^^-^^ 
 
 '^^y 
 
 .-^^^i 
 
^  .,5^/>^< 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY 
 
 RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL     AND     REVEALED, 
 
 TO       THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE   OF  NA 
 
 SEP  20  19 
 
 TO      WHICH     ARE      ADDED, 
 
 TWO    BRIEF    DISSERTATIO^NS 
 I,  On  Perfonal  Identity,     11,  On  the  Nature  ^^  ^^^^'^^^iQflfi^i  RP! 
 
 TOGETHER       WITH 
 
 A  CHARGE  delivered  to  the  Clergy  of  the  DIocefc  of 
 Durham,  at  the  Primary  Viiitation,  in  the  Year  mdccli. 
 
 By    JOSEPH    BUTLER,    ll.d. 
 
 LATE     LORD     BISHOP     OF     DURHAM. 
 
 Ejus  (Analogiae)  ha:c 'vis  ef},  ut  id  quod  dubium   eft,  ad  all  quid 
 fimiU  de  quo  non  quceritur,  referat  ;  ut  incerta  certis  probet. 
 
 QUINT.    IN3T.    ORAT.     L.   1.    C.  6. 
 
 A    NEW    EDITION,     CORRECTED. 
 
 WITH      A 
 
 PREFACE, 
 
 CIVIN'C     SOME      ACCOU.KT      OF      THE       CHARACTER      AND    WRITINGS 
 ^  «         OF     THE    AUTHOR,/ 
 
 By  SAMUEL,  Lord  Bishop  of'GLOUCESTER. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed  for  J.  F.  and  C.  Rivincton,N°62,^^  ?auVs Church  Yardy 
 G.  and  F.  Wilkie,  N°  57,  Paternojier-Roiv-^  and  S.  HAYiiS, 
 O  ?(f or d- Street, 
 
 M  DCC  XCI. 
 
T  O 
 
 THE      REVEREND 
 
 Dr.  THOMAS  B  A  L  G  U  Y, 
 
 ARCHDEACON  AND  PREBENDARY  OF  WINCHESTER,  &:c. 
 DEAR    SIR, 
 
 ITruft  you  will  excufe  the  liberty 
 I  have  taken  of  prefixing  your 
 Name  to  the  following  (heets ;  the 
 latter  part  of  which,  I  am  confident, 
 will  not  be  thought  undeferving  of 
 your  approbation  ;  and  of  the  for- 
 mer part  you  will  commend  the  in- 
 tention at  leaft,  if  not  the  execu- 
 tion. In  vindicating  the  character  of 
 Bifhop  Butler  from  the  afperfions 
 thrown  upon  it  fince  his  death,  I 
 have  but  difcharged  a  common  duty 
 ol  humanity,  which  furvivors  owe  to 
 thofe  who  have  deferved  well  of 
 mankind  by  their  lives   or  writings, 
 
 A   2  when 
 
(     iv     ) 
 
 when  they  are  paft  the  power  of  ap^ 
 pearing  in  their  own  defence.  And 
 if  what  I  have  added,  by  way  of 
 opening  the  general  defign  of  the 
 works  of  this  great  Prelate,  be 
 of  ufc  in  exciting  the  younger 
 clafs  of  Students  in  our  Univer- 
 fities  to  read,  and  fo  to  re^d  as  to 
 underftand,  the  Two  Volumes  pre- 
 pared and  publifhed  by  the  Au- 
 thor himfelf;  I  flatter  myfelf  I  fliall 
 have  done  no  inconflderable  fervice 
 to  Morality  and  Religion.  Your 
 time  and  ftudies  have  been  long 
 fuccefsfully  devoted  to  the  fupport 
 of  the  fame  great  caufe :  and  in 
 what  you  have  lately  given  to  the 
 world,  both  as  an  Author  and  an 
 Editor,  you  have  largely  contributed 
 to  the  defence  of  our  common  Chrif- 
 tianity,  and  of  what  was  efteemed 
 by  One,  who  was  perfecftly  compe- 
 tent 
 
(      V      ) 
 
 tent  to  judge,  its  beft  Eftablifhment, 
 the  Church  of  England.  In  the 
 prefent  publication  I  confider  my- 
 felf  as  a  fellow-labourer  with  You 
 in  the  fame  defign,  and  tracing  the 
 path  You  have  trod  before,  but  at 
 great  diftance,  arid  w^ith  unequal 
 paces.  When,  by  His  Majesty's 
 goodnefs,  I  was  raifed  to  that  ftation 
 of  eminence  in  the  Church,  to  which 
 You  had  been  lirfl:  named,  and 
 which,  on  account  of  the  infirmity 
 of  your  health.  You  had  defired  to 
 decline;  it  was  honour  enough  for 
 Me  on  fuch  an  occafion  to  have 
 been  thought  of  next  to  You  :  And 
 I  know  of  no  better  rule  by  which 
 to  govern  rriy  condu6l,  fo  as  not  to 
 difcredit  the  Royal  Hand  which  con- 
 ferred on  me  fo  fignal  and  unme- 
 rited a  favour,  than  in  cafes  of  diffi- 
 culty to  put  the  queftion  to  myfelf, 
 
 A   ';  How 
 
(     vi      ) 
 
 How  You  would  probably  have 
 afted  in  the  flime  iituation.  You 
 fee,  Sir,  1  ftiil  look  up  to  You,  as 
 I  have  been  wont,  both  as  my  Su- 
 perior and  my  Exam^ple.  That  I 
 may  long  reap  the  benefit  of  your 
 advice  and  friendiliip ;  and  that  fuch 
 a  meafure  of  health  and  ftrength 
 may  be  continued  to  You,  as  may 
 enable  you  to  pafs  the  evening  of 
 your  days  with  comfort,  and  enjoy 
 the  blcfllngs  of  the  life  you  love  ; 
 is  the  cordial  v/ifh  of, 
 
 DEAR     SIR, 
 
 Your  very  affedionate 
 and  faithful  Servant, 
 S.  GLOUCESTER. 
 
 j^-.t.ii.uuh  Street,  Weftminilcr, 
 1 2th  May,  1786. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 BY      THE 
 
 D      I      T      O      R. 
 
 **  When  I  confider  how  light  a  matter  very  often  fubje^ls 
 "  the  beft  eftabliftied  charac1:ers  to  the  fufpicions  of 
 "  pofterity,  pofterity  often  as  malignant  to  virtue  as 
 "  the  age  that  faw  it  was  envious  of  its  glory ,  and 
 *'  how  ready  a  remote  age  is  to  catch  at  a  'ow  revived 
 "  flander,  which  the  times  that  brou'-ht  it  forth  faw 
 ''  defpifed  and  forgotten  almoil  in  its  birth;  I  cannot 
 *'  but  think  it  a  matter  that  deferves  attention."— L^if- 
 ter  to  the  Editor  of  ihe  Letters  on  the  spirit  of  Patri^ 
 ttiyn^  kc.  by  Bp.  Warburton.  See  his  Works, 
 Vol.  VII.  p.  547. 
 
 TH  E  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  the 
 Diocefe  of  Dur/jam,  which  is  fub- 
 joined  to  the  pref>^nt  Volume,  WaS  printed 
 and  pubiifhed  in  the  year  1 75 1  by  the  learned 
 Prelate,  whofe  name  it  bears;  and,  together 
 with  the  Sermons  and  x4ln  a.logy  of  the  11.  ns 
 Writer,  both  too  well  known  to  need  a  ..iore 
 particular  defcription,  completes  the  cc'i«-;c- 
 tion  of  his  Works.  It  has  lon^-  been  conjider- 
 cd  as  a  matter  of  Curioiity,  on  account  of  its 
 
 A  4  Scarcenefs; 
 
Vlll 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 Scarcencfs ;  and  it  is  equally  curious  on  other 
 accounts,  its  Subjedl,  and  the  Calumny  to 
 whicli  it  gave  occafion,  of  reprefenting  the 
 Author  as  addichd  to  Supcrjlition,  as  inclined 
 to  Popcryy  and  as  dyijig  in  the  co7n7nunion  of 
 the  Church  of  Rome,  The  improved  Edi- 
 tion of  tlie  Biographia  Brita?inica,  now  pub- 
 lilhing  under  the  care  of  Dr.  Kippis,  having 
 unavoidably  brought  this  Calumny  again 
 into  noticv?;  it  may  not  be  unfeafonable  to 
 offer  a  few  re  fled  ions  in  this  place,  by  way. 
 of  obviating  any  impreflions-  that  may  hence 
 arife,  to  the  difadvantage  of  fo  great  a  cha- 
 radler  as  that  of  the  late  Bifhop  Butler^ 
 referring  thofe,  who  defire  a  more  particular 
 account  of  his  Life,  to  the  third  Volume  of 
 the  fame  entertaining  work,  printed  in  1784, 
 Art.  Butler  fjoj'ephj 
 
 I.  The  principal  defign  of  the  Bifhop, 
 in  his  Charge,  is  to  exhort  his  Clergy  to 
 *'  do  their  part  towards  reviving  a  Pradti- 
 **  cal  Senfe  of  Religion  amongft  the  People 
 "  committed  to  their  care;"  and,  as  one 
 way  of  cffcding  this,  to  **  inflru6t  them  in 
 "  the  Importance  of  External  Religion y'  or 
 the  ufefulnefs  of  Outward  Obfervances  in 
 promoting  Inward  Piety.  Now  from  the 
 compound  nature  of  Man,  confifting  of  two 
 parts,  the  Body  and  the  Mind,  together  with 
 the  influence  which  thefe  are  found  to  have 
 on  one  another,  it  follows,  that  the  Re- 
 ligious Regards  of  fuch  a  creature  ought  to 
 
B  Y  T  H  E    E  D  I T  O  R.  ix 
 
 be  fo  framed,  as  to  be  in  fome  way  properly 
 accommodated  to  both.     A  Religion  which 
 is   purely  fpiritual,   flrippcd  of  every  thing 
 that   may    aftedl  the  fenfes,   and    confidered 
 only  as  a  divine  philofophy  of  the  mind,  if 
 it  do  not  mount  up  into  Enthufiafm,  as  has 
 frequently  been  the   cafe,  often  finks,  after 
 a  few  fliort  fervours,  into  Indifference :  an 
 abftradled  invifible  objedt,   like  that  which 
 Natural  Religion  offers,  ceafes   to  move  or 
 intereft  the  heart ;  and  fomething  further  is 
 wanting  to  bring   it  nearer,    and   render   it 
 more  prefent   to  our  view,   than  merely  an 
 intelledlual  contemplation.      On    the    other 
 hand,  when,  in  order  to  remedy  this  incon- 
 venience, recor.rfe  is  had  to  Inftituted  Forms 
 and  Ritual  Injunctions ;  there  is  always  dan- 
 ger left  men  be  tempted  to  reft  entirely  on 
 thefe,  and  perfaade   themfelves   that  a  p^iin- 
 ful  attention  to  fach  obfervances  v/ill  atong 
 for  the  want  of  genuii^<e  Piety  and  Vn'tue. 
 Yet  furely  there  is  a  way  of  fteering  fafely 
 between    thefe   two   Extremes;  of  fo   con- 
 fulting  both  the  pacts  of  our  Conftitution, 
 that  the  Body  and  the  Mind  may  concur  in 
 rendering  our  religious    fervices    acceptable 
 to  God,  and  at  the  fame  time  ufefui  to  our- 
 felves.     And   what   way    can    this    be,    but 
 precifely  that  which  is  recommended  in  the 
 Charge  ;  fuch  a  cultivation  of  Outward  as 
 well   a?    Inward   Religion,   that    from    both 
 may  refult,  what  is  the  point  chiefly  to  be 
 
 laboured 
 
X  PREFACE 
 
 laboured  and  at  all  events  to  be  fecured,  a 
 OTfclpond  nt  l^emper  and  Behaviour  j  or, 
 in  other  woids,  luch  an  application  of  the 
 f^ornis  of  Godllnefs  as  n^ay  be  fubfervient 
 in  promoting  the  Power  and  Spirit  of  it? 
 No  man  \n  ho  believes  the  Scriptures  of  the 
 Old  and  New  Teftament,  and  underftands 
 what  he  believes,  but  iiiuft  know,  that  Ex- 
 ternal Religion  is  as  much  enjoined,  and 
 conftitutes  as  real  a  part  of  Revelation,  as 
 that  which  is  Internal.  The  many  Cere- 
 monies in  iif-^.  among  the  Jews,  in  confe- 
 quence  of  a  divine  command  ^  the  Baptifm 
 of  Water,  as  an  emblem  of  moral  purity ; 
 the  eating  and  drinking  of  Bread  and  Wine, 
 as  fymbols  and  reprefentations  of  the  Body 
 and  Blood  of  Chriil,  required  of  Chriftians, 
 are  proofs  of  this.  On  comparing  thefe 
 two  parts  of  Religion  together,  one,  it  is 
 immediately  feen,  is  of  much  greater  im- 
 portance than  the  other;  and,  whenever 
 they  happen  to  interfere,  is  always  to  be 
 preferred:  But  does  it  follow  from  hence, 
 that  therefore  that  other  is  of  little  or  no 
 importance,  and,  in  cafes  where  there  is  no 
 competition,  may  entirely  be  negled:ed?  Or 
 rather   is  not   the  lecritimate   concluiion  di- 
 
 o 
 
 reclly  the  reverfe,  that  nothing  is  to  be  look- 
 ed upon  as  of  little  importance,  which  is  of 
 any  uic  at  all  in  preferving  upon  our  minds 
 a  fenfe  of  the  Divine  Authority,  which  re- 
 cals   to  our  remembrance  the  obli^^atiuns  we 
 
 are 
 
BY  THE   EDITOR.  xi 
 
 are  under,  and  helps  to  keep  us,  as  the 
 Scripture  expreffes  it,  in  the  fear  of  the  Lord 
 all  the  daylong^?  If,  to  adopt  the  inftance 
 mentioned  in  the  Charge,  the  fight  of  a 
 Church  (hould  remind  a  man  of  fome  fen- 
 timent  of  Piety  ;  if,  from  the  view  of  a  ma- 
 terial building  dedicated  to  the  fcrvice  of 
 God,  he  fhould  be  led  to  regard  himfelf, 
 his  own  Body,  as  a  living  Tejnple  of  the 
 Holy  Ghoji^,  and  therefore  no  more  than 
 the  other,  to  be  prophancd  or  defecrated  by 
 any  thing  that  defileth  or  is  impure;  could 
 it  be  truly  faid  of  fuch  a  one  that  he  was 
 Superftitious,  or  miftook  the  means  of  Re- 
 ligion for  the  end  ?  If,  to  ufe  another,  and 
 what  has  been  thought  a  more  obnoxious 
 inftance,  taken  from  the  Bifhop's  practice, 
 a  Cross,  erected  in  a  place  of  Public  Wor- 
 fhipj,  fhould  caufe  us  to  reflect  on  him 
 who  died  on  a  crofs  for  cur  jflilvation,  and 
 on  the  necei?ity  of  our  own  dying  to  fin  |[, 
 and  of  criicfying  the  flejh  ^dth  its  affettions 
 and  lifts  §  ;  would  any  worfe  confequences 
 follow  from  fuch  fentiments  fo  excited,  than 
 if  the  fame  fentiments  had  been  excited  by 
 the  view  of  a  Pidlure,  of  the  Crucifixion 
 fuppofe,  fuch  as  is  commonly  placed,  and 
 with  this   very  defign,  in  foreign  Churches, 
 
 *  Prov.  xxiii.  17.  ft  Cor.  vi.   ig, 
 
 J  See  note  [A],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface, 
 II  Rom.  vi,  lie  §  Gal.  v.  24. 
 
 and 
 
xii  PREFACE 
 
 and  indeed  in  many  of  our  own  ?  Both  tkd 
 inftances  here  adduced,  it  is  very  poffible, 
 may  be  far  from  being  approved,  even  by 
 thofe  who  are  under  the  moft  fmcere  con- 
 vidlions  of  the  importance  of  true  Religion  : 
 and  it  is  eafy  to  conceive  how  open  to  fcorn 
 and  cenfure  they  muft  be  from  others,  who 
 think  they  have  a  talent  for  ridicule,  and 
 have  accuftomed  themfelves  to  regard  all 
 pretenfions  to  Piety  as  hypocritical  or  fuper- 
 ftitious.  But  JVijUo?7i  is  jiiftificd  of  her 
 children  *.  Religion  is  what  it  is,  whether 
 men  will  hear^  or  whether  they  will  for  bear  ^  -, 
 and  whatever  in  the  fmalleft  degree  promotes 
 its  interefts,  and  affifts  us  in  performing  itsT 
 commands,  whether  that  affiftance  be  de- 
 rived from  the  medium  of  the  Body  or  the 
 Mind,  ought  to  be  efteemed  of  great  weight, 
 and  defervine   of  our   moft    ferious    atten- 
 
 tion. 
 
 However,  be  the  danger  of  Superftition 
 what  it  may,  no  one  was  more  fenfible  of 
 that  danger,  or  more  in  earneft  in  maintain- 
 ing that  External  A6ts  of  themfelves  are  no- 
 thing, and  that  Moral  Holinefs,  as  diftin- 
 guiflied  from  bodily  obfervances  of  every 
 kind,  is  that  which  conftitutes  the  Eflence 
 of  Rehgion,  than  Bifhop  Butler.  Not 
 only  the  Charge  itfelf,  the  whole  intention 
 
 *  A4atth.  xi.  19.  f  Ezek.  ii.  5. 
 
 of 
 
BY  THE    EDITOR. 
 
 xia 
 
 of  which  is  plainly  nothing  more  than  to 
 inforce  the  neceffity  of  P radical  Religion^ 
 the  reality  as  well  as  form,  is  a  demonftra- 
 tion  of  this,  but  many  paffages  loefides  to 
 the  fame  purpofe,  felefted  from  his  other 
 writings.  Take  the  two  following  as  fpe- 
 cimens.  In  his  Analogy  he  obferves  thus : 
 *'  Though  mankind  have,  in  all  ages,  been 
 ^^  greatly  prone  to  place  their  Religion  in 
 ^^  peculiar  pofitive  Rites,  by  way  of  equi- 
 *'  valent  for  obedience  to  Moral  Precepts  ^ 
 "  yet,  ^  without  making  any  comparifon  at 
 '*  all  between  them,  the  Nature  of  the 
 **  Thing  abundantly  fliews  all  notions  of 
 **  that  kind  to  be  utterly  fubverfive  of  true 
 -  Religion :  as  they  are,  moreover,  con- 
 **  trary  to  the  whole  general  tenor  of  Scrip- 
 **  ture;  and  likewife  to  the  moft  exprefs 
 *'  particular  declarations  of  it,  that  nothing 
 *'  can  render  us  accepted  of  God,  without 
 "  Moral  Virtue  *."  And  to  the  fame  pur- 
 pofe in  his  Sermon^  preached  before  the  So- 
 ciety for  the  Propagation  of  the  Gofpel,  in 
 February  1738-9.  **  Indeed  amongft  crea- 
 *^  tures  naturally  formed  for  Religion,  yet 
 ^*  fo  much  under  the  power  of  Imagination 
 ^'  as  men  are,  Superftition  is  an  evil,  which 
 **  can  never  be  out  of  fight.  But  even 
 f^  againft    This,    true    Religion    is   a   great 
 
 *  Analogy,  Part  II.  Chap»  r. 
 
 ^^  Security, 
 
XIV 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 *'  Security,  and  the  only  one.  True  Rell- 
 <*  gion  takes  up  that  place  in  the  mind, 
 *'  which  Superftition  would  ufurp,  and  fo 
 "  leaves  little  room  for  it;  and  likewife  lays  us 
 "  under  tlie  llrongeft  ob.i  ations  to  oppofc 
 "  it.  On  the  contrary,  the  danger  of  Su- 
 *'  pcrilition  cannot  but  be  increaft^d  by  the 
 "  prevalence  of  Irreligion :  and  by  its  ge- 
 •*  neral  prevalence,  the  evil  will  be  una- 
 •*  voidabk^  For  the  comm.on  People, 
 "  v/anting  a  Religion,  will  of  courfe  take 
 <*  up  with  almoft  any  Super ftition,  which  is 
 *'  thrown  in  their  way :  and,  in  procefs  of 
 *'  time,  amidft  the  infinite  viciffitudes  of 
 **  the  political  world,  the  leaders  of  Parties 
 **  will  certainly  be  able  to  ferve  themfelves 
 "  of  that  Superftition,  whatever  it  be,  which 
 **  is  getting  ground;  and  will  not  fail  to 
 "  carry  it  to  the  utmoft  length  their  occa- 
 **  fions  require.  The  general  Nature  of  the 
 "  Thing  (hews  this;  and  Hiftory  and  Fa6t 
 "  confirm  it.  It  is  therefore  wonderful, 
 "  thofe  people  who  feem  to  think  there  is 
 "  but  one  evil  in  life,  that  of  Superftition, 
 '*  {hould  not  fje  that  Atheifm  and  Pro- 
 *'  fanenefs    m.uft    be    the    Introdudion    of 
 
 'He  who  can  think  and  write  in  fuch  a 
 manner,  can  never   be  faid   to  miftake  the 
 
 *  ^e^"^-  XVI.  p.  339,  340.    Ed.  4th,  1749. 
 
 nature 
 
BYTHE   EDITOR.  xv 
 
 nature  of  real  Religion :  And  he,  who,  af- 
 ter fuch  proofs  to  the  contrary,  can  perlift  in 
 afferting  of  fo  difcreet  and  IcArned  a  perfon, 
 that  he  was  addicted  to  Superjtitmi,  muft 
 himfelf  be  much  a  ftranger  both  to  Truth 
 and  Charity. 
 
 And  here  it  may  be  worth  our  wliile  to 
 obferve  that  the  fame  excellent  Prelate,  who 
 by  one  fet  of  men  was  iufpcdted  of  Superjii- 
 tiony  on  account  of  his  Charge,  has  by  an- 
 other been  reprefented  as  leaning  to  the  op- 
 pofite  extreme  of  Enthujiajmy  on  account  of 
 his  Two  Difcourfes  Oit  the  Love  of  God. 
 But  both  opinions  are  equally  without 
 foundation.  He  was  neither  Superftitious 
 nor  an  Enthufiaft :  His  mind  was  much 
 too  ftrong,  and  his  habits  of  thinking  and 
 reafoning  much  too  ftrid  and  fcvere,  to  fufFer 
 him  to  defcend  to  the  weakneffes  of  either 
 charader.  His  Piety  was  at  once  fervent 
 and  rational.  When  impreiLd  with  a  ge- 
 nerous concern  for  the  declining  caufe  of 
 Religion,  he  laboured  to  revive  its  dying  in- 
 ter efts ;  nothing  he  judged  would  be  more 
 eftedtual  to  that  end,  among  creatures  fo 
 much  engaged  with  bodily  things,  and  fo 
 apt  to  be  afFcded  with  whatever  ftrongly 
 folicits  the  fenfes  as  men  are,  than  a  Religion 
 of  fuch  a"  frame  as  (hould  in  its  exercife  re- 
 quire the  joint  exertions  of  the  Body  and  the 
 Mind.  On  the  other  hand,  when  pene- 
 trated with  the  dignity  and   importance  of 
 
 the 
 9 
 
xvi  PREFACE 
 
 the  firji  and  great  commandment  *,   Love  to 
 God,  he  fet  himfelf  to  enquire,  what  thofc 
 movements  of  the  heart  are,  which  are  due 
 to  Him,  the  Author  and  Caufe  of  all  things ; 
 he  found,  in  the  cooleft  way  of  confideration, 
 tliat  God  is  the  natural  Obje(ft  of  the  fame 
 affections    of   Gratitude,    Reverence,    Fear, 
 Defire  of  Approbation,  Truft,  and  Depend- 
 ence,   the  fame  affections    in    kind^    though 
 doubtlefs   in  a  very  difproportionate   degree^ 
 which  any  one  would  feel  from  contemplat- 
 ing a  Perfed:    Characfler   in  a  Creature,    in 
 which    Goodnefs    with  Wifdom  and  Power 
 are  fuppofed   to  be  the  predominant  quali- 
 liss,  with  the  further  circumftance  that  this 
 Creature  was  alfo  his  Governor  and  Friend. 
 This  fubjed:  is  manifeftly  a  real  one;  there 
 is  nothing   in    it  fanciful    or  unreafonable  : 
 This  way  of  being  afFe(5led  towards  God  is 
 Piety,  in  the  ftriCteft  kxiio, :  This  is  Religion, 
 considered  as  a  habit  of  mind ;  a  Religion, 
 fuited    to    the    Nature    and    condition    of 
 Manf. 
 
 II.  From  Superflition  to  Popery  the  tran- 
 fitlon  is  eafy  :  No  wonder  then,  that,  in  the 
 progrefs  of  detraction,  the  fimple  imputation 
 of  the  former  of  thefe,  with  which  the  at- 
 tack on  the  character  of  our   Author   was 
 
 *  Alatth.  xxli.   38. 
 
 I  See  note  [B],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 
 
 opened. 
 
BY    THE    EDITOR.       xvll 
 
 opened,   fhould    be    followed   by  the    more 
 aggravated   imputation  of  the  latter.     No- 
 thing,   I  think,  can    fairly  be    gathered   in 
 fupport  of  fuch  a  fuggeftion  from  the  Charge^ 
 in   which  Popery  is  barely  mentioned,  and 
 occafionally  only,  and  in  a  fentence  or  two; 
 yet  even  there,  it  fhould  be  remarked,  the 
 Billiop  takes  care    to  defcribe   the   peculiar 
 obfervances    required    by  it,    *'  fome    as    in 
 "  themfelves  wrong   and    fuperftitious,  and 
 *^  others  of  them  as  being  made  fubfervient 
 *^  to  the  purpofes   of  fuperftition."     With 
 refped  to  his  other  writings,  any  one  at  all 
 converfant  with  them  needs  not  to  be  told, 
 that  the  matters  treated  of  both  in  his  Ser^ 
 mons  and  his  Analogy  did,    none   of  them, 
 diredly  lead  him  to  confider,  and  much  lefs 
 to  combat,    the   opinions,  whether  relating 
 to  Faith  or  Worlhip,  which  are  peculiar  to 
 the  Church  of  Rome:  It   might   therefore 
 have  happened,  yet  without  any  juft   con- 
 clulion  arifing  from  thence,  of  being  himfelf 
 inclined  to  favour  thofe  opinions,  that  he  had 
 never   mentioned,   fo   mAich  as  incidentall)^ 
 the  fubjed;  of  Popery  at  all.    But  fortunately 
 for  the  reputation  of  the  Bifhop,  and  to  the 
 eternal    difgrace    of  his  calumniators,    even 
 this  poor  refource  is  wanting  to  fupport  their 
 malevolence.     In  his  Sermon  at  St.  Bride's 
 before  the  Lord  Mayor  in  1740,  after  having 
 fiid  that  *'  Our  Laws  and  whole  Conftitu- 
 **  tion    go   more     upon    fuppofition    of  an 
 
 b  *^  Equality 
 
xviii  PREFACE 
 
 **  Equality  amongft  mankind,  than  the  Con- 
 <*  ftitution  and  Laws  of  other  Countries ;" 
 he   goes  on  to  obferve,  that  '^  this  plainly 
 **  requires,    that     more    particular     regard 
 ''  lliould  be  had  to   the  Education   of  the 
 "  lower  people  Here,  than  in  places  where 
 "  they  are  born  Slaves  of  Power,  and  to  be 
 ''  made  Slaves  of  SuperJUtmi  *;''    meaning 
 evidently  in  this  place  by  the  general  term 
 Superftition,    the    particular   errors   of  the 
 Romanifts.     This    is    fomething ;    but    we 
 have  a  ftill  plainer  indication  what  his  fenti- 
 ments  concerning  Popery  really  were,  from 
 another  of  his  Additional  Sermons,  I  mean 
 that  before  the  Houfe  of  Lords  on  June  the 
 1 1  th,    1 747,    the  Anniverfary   of   his    late 
 Maiefty's   Acceffion.     The   paiTage   alluded 
 to  is  as  follows,  and  my  readers  will  not  be 
 difpleafed  that  I  give   it    them  at    length. 
 "  The  value  of  our  Religious  Eftabhfhment 
 '*  ought  to  be  very  much  heightened  in  our 
 "  elleem,  by  conlidering  wdiat  it  is  a  fecu- 
 "  rity  from ;  I  mean  that  great  Corruption 
 "  of  Chriflianity,    Popery,    which    is    ever 
 *'  hard  at  work  to  bring  us  again  under  its 
 "  yoke.     Whoever  will  confider  the  Popilli 
 "  Claims,    to    the    difpofal    of    the  whole 
 *'  Earth,  as  of  divine  right,  to  difpenfe  with 
 •*  the  moll  facred  engagements,  the  claims 
 
 *  Serm.  XVII.  p.  367. 
 
 <'  to 
 
BYTHE   EDITOR.        xlx 
 
 *'  to  fupreme  abfolute  Authority  in  Religion  i 
 «  in   Ihort,   the   general   Claims  which  the 
 «'  Canonifts  exprefs  by  the  words,  Flenkiide 
 "  of  Power — whoever,  I  fay,  will  confider 
 ''  Popery  as  it  is  profelTed  at  Rome,  may  fee, 
 «  that  it  is  manlfeft,  open  Ufurpation  of  all 
 "  human  and  divine  Authority.     But  even 
 ''  in  thofe  Roman-catholic  Countries  where 
 "  thefe  monftrous  claims  are  not  admittedj 
 "  and   the  Civil  Power  does,  in  many  re- 
 "  fpeds,  reft  rain  the  Papal;  yet  Perfecution 
 "  is  profeiTed,  as  it  is  abfolutely  injoined  by 
 <«  what  is  acknowledged  to  be  their  higheft 
 *'  Authority,  a  General  Council,   fo  called, 
 "  with  the  Pope  at  the  head  of  it;  and  is 
 "  pradlifed  in  all  of  them,   I   think  without 
 *'  exception,  where  it   can  be   done   fafely. 
 *'  Thus  they  go  on  to  fubftitute  Force  in- 
 "  ftead  of  Argument;  and  external  Profef- 
 *«  fion  made  by  Force  inftead  of  reafonable 
 "  Convidion.     And    thus    Corruptions    of 
 *'  the  groffeft  fort  have  been  in  vogue,  for 
 "  many    generations,    in    many    parts     of 
 «  Chriftendom;  and  are  fo  ftill,  even  where 
 *'  Popery  obtains  in  its  kad  abfurd   Form: 
 "  and  their  Antiquity  end  wide  Extent  are 
 '*  infifted  upon  as  Proofs  of  their  Truth;  a 
 «'  kind  of  Proof,  which  at  beft  can  only  be 
 "  prefjmptive,  but  which  lofes  all  its  httle 
 *'  weight,    in    proportion  as    the    long  and 
 «^  large  prevalence  of  fuch  Corruptions  have 
 b  2  *'  been 
 
XX  PREFACE 
 
 ''  been  obtained  by  Force  *."  In  another 
 part  of  the  llime  Sermon,  where  he  is  again 
 fpeaking  of  our  Ecclefiaftical  Conftitution, 
 he  reminds  his  Audience  that  it  is  to  be  va- 
 lued, '*  not  becaufe  it  leaves  us  at  liberty  to 
 **  have  as  little  Religion  as  wc  pleafe,  with- 
 "  out  being  accountable  to  Human  Judica- 
 "  tories;  but  becauft — it  exhibits  to  our 
 **  view,  and  inforces  upon  our  Confciences, 
 *'  genuine  Chriftianity,  free  from  the  Su- 
 **  perflitions  with  which  it  is  defiled  in  other 
 **  Countries ;"  which  Superftitions,  he  ob- 
 ferves,-  "  naturally  tend  to  abate  its  Force  -fJ' 
 The  date  of  this  Sermon  iliould  here  be  at- 
 tended to.  It  was  preached  in  June,  1747; 
 that  is,  four  years  before  the  delivery  and 
 publication  of  the  Charge,  which  was  in 
 the  year  1751  ;  and  exadtly  five  years  before 
 the  Author  died,  v/hich  was  in  June,  1752, 
 We  have  then,  in  the  paiTages  now  laid 
 before  the  reader,  a  clear  and  unequivocal 
 proof,  brought  down  to  within  a  few  years 
 of  Biihop  Butler's  death,  that  Popery  was 
 held  by  him  in  the  utmoft  abhorrence,  and 
 that  he  regarded  it  in  no  other  light  than 
 as  t/je  great  Corruption  of  Chrijlicuiity,  and  a 
 manifejt^  open  IJjurpation  of  all  bimian  and 
 divine  Authority.      The  argument  is  decifive  ; 
 
 •»  Serm.  XX.  p.  44c—- 442.  f  P.  449. 
 
 nor 
 
BY  THE  EDITOR.         xxi 
 
 nor  will  any  thing  be  of  force  to  invalidate 
 it,  unlefs  from  fome  after -aB  during  the 
 fhort  remainder  of  the  Bifliop's  life,  bejides 
 that  of  delivering  and  printing  his  Charge, 
 (which,  after  what  I  have  faid  here,  and  in 
 the  Notes  added  to  this  Preface  and  to  the 
 Charge,  I  mnft  have  leave  to  confider  as  af- 
 fording no  Evidence  at  all  of  his  inclination 
 to  Papiflical  Dodirines  or  Ceremonies)  the 
 contrary  fhall  incontrovertibly  appear. 
 
 III.  One  fuch  after-a6l  however  has  been 
 alleged,  which  would  efFedlually  demolilli 
 all  that  we  have  urged  in  behalf  of  our  Pre- 
 late, were  it  true,  as  is  pretended,  that  he 
 died  in  the  Communion  of  the  Church  of  Rome, 
 Had  a  ftory  of  this  fort  been  invented  and 
 propagated  by  Papifts,  the  wonder  might  have 
 been  lefs  : 
 
 Hoc  Ithaciis  vel'it^  ^  magno  ??ierccntur  Airtd(S, 
 
 But  to  the  reproach  of  Proteflantifm,  the 
 fabrication  of  this  Calumny,  for  fuch  we 
 fhall  find  it,  originated  from  among  our- 
 felves.  It  is  pretty  remarkable  that  a  cir- 
 cumftance  fo  extrardinary  fhould  never  have 
 been  divulged  till  the  year  1767,  fifteen  years 
 after  the  Bifhop's  deceafe.  At  that  time 
 Dr.  Thomas  Secker  was  Archbifhop  of 
 Canterbury;  who  of  all  others  was  the 
 moft  likely  to  know  the  truth  or  falfehood 
 
 b   3  of 
 
xxii  PREFACE 
 
 of  the  fad  afferted,  having  been  educate4 
 with  our  Author  in  his  early  youth,  and 
 having  Hved  in  a  conft.int  habit  of  intimacy 
 with  him  to  the  very  time  of  his  death.  The 
 good  Archbilhop  Wc.s  not  filent  on  this  oc- 
 cafion  :  with  a  virtuous  indignation  he  flood 
 forth  to  protcd:  the  poflhumeus  character 
 of  his  Friend  -,  and  in  a  pubHc  Newfpaper, 
 under  the  fignature  oiMiJopJeudeSy  called  upon 
 his.accLifer  to  fupport  what  he  had  advanced 
 by  whatever  proofs  he  could.  ,  No  proof, 
 however,  nor  any  thing  like  a  proof,  ap- 
 peared in  reply ;  and  every  man  of  fenfe  and 
 candour  at  that  time  was  perfectly  convinced 
 the  alTertion  was  entirely  groundlefs  *.  As 
 a  further  confirmation  of  the  rectitude  of  this 
 judgment,  it  may  not  be  amifs  to  mention, 
 there  is  yet  in  exiilence  a  flrong  prefumptive 
 argument  at  leaft  in  its  favour,  drawn  from 
 the  teftimony  of  thofe  who  attended  our 
 Author  in  the  ficknefs  of  which  he  died. 
 The  laft  days  of  this  excellent  Prelate  were 
 paflcd  at  Bath',  Dr.  Nathanael  For- 
 STER,  his  Chaplain,  being  continually  with 
 him ;  and  for  one  day,  and  at  the  very  end 
 of  his  illnefs.  Dr.  Martin  Benson  alfo, 
 the  then  Bidjc^o  of  Gloucester,  who 
 fhortened  his  own  life  in  his  pious  hafte  to 
 yifithis  dying  Friend.  Both  thefe  perfons  con- 
 
 *  See  note  [CI,  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 
 
 ftantlv 
 
BY   THE   EDITOR.       xxiii 
 
 ftantly  wrote  Letters  to  Dr.  Secker,  then 
 Bifliop  of  Oxford,  containing  accounts  of 
 Bifliop  Butler's  declining  health,  and  of 
 the  fymptoms  and  progrefs  of  his  diforder, 
 which,  as  was  conjedured,  foon  terminated 
 in  his  death.  Thefe  Letters,  which  are  ftill 
 preferved  in  the  Lambeth  Library  *",  I  have 
 read;  and  not  the  flendereft  argument  can 
 be  colled:ed  from  them,  in  juftification  of 
 the  ridiculous  flander  v/e  are  here  coniider- 
 ing.  If  at  that  awful  feafon  the  Biiliop  was 
 not  known  to  have  exprefled  any  opinion, 
 tending  to  fhew  his  di/like  to  Popery;  nei- 
 ther was  he  known  to  have  faid  any  thing, 
 that  could  at  all  be  conftrued  in  approbation 
 of  it :  and  the  natural  prefumption  is,  that 
 whatever  fentiments  he  had  formerly  enter- 
 tained concerning  that  corrupt  fyilem  of  Re- 
 ligion, he  continued  to  entertain  them  to 
 the  laft.  The  truth  is,  neither  the  word 
 nor  the  idea  of  Popery  feems  once  to  have 
 occurred  either  to  the  Bifliop  himfelf,  or  to 
 thofe  who  watched  his  parting  moments  : 
 Their  thoughts  were  otherwife  engaged. 
 His  diforder  had  reduced  him  to  fuch  debi^ 
 lity,  as  to  render  him  incapable  of  fpcaking 
 jnuch  or  long  on  any  fubjed: :  the  few  bright 
 intervals  that  occun*ed  were  paffed  in  a  ftate 
 pf  the  utmoft  tranquillity  and  compofure : 
 and  in  that  compofure    he  expired.     Mark 
 
 f  See  note  [DJ   at  the  end  of  this  Preface^ 
 
 h  4  t^e 
 
XXIV 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 the  pcrfcB  man,  and  behold  the  upright ;  for 
 the  end  of  that  man  is  peace  *. — Let  me  die 
 the  death  of  the  Righteous,  and  let  my  lajl  end 
 be  like  His  f  / 
 
 Out  of  pure  refpedl  for  the  virtues  of  a 
 man,  whom  I  had  never  the  happinefs  of 
 knowing,  or  even  of  feeing,  but  from  whofe 
 writings  I  have  received  the  greateft  bene- 
 fit and  illumination,  and  which  I  have  rea- 
 fon  to  be  thankful  to  Providence  for  hav- 
 ing early  thrown  in  my  way ;  I  have  ad- 
 ventured, in  what  I  have  now  offered  to 
 the  public,  to  ftep  forth  in  his  defence,  and 
 to  vindicate  his  honeft  fame  from  the  at- 
 tacks of  thofe,  who,  wdth  the  vain  hope  of 
 bringing  down  fuperior  characters  to  their 
 own  level,  are  for  ever  at  work  in  detract- 
 ing from  their  juft  praife.  For  the  literary 
 reputation  of  Bifhop  Butler,  it  ftands  too 
 high  in  the  opinion  of  the  v/orld,  to  incur 
 the  danger  of  any  diminution  :  but  this  in 
 truth  is  the  leaft  of  his  excellencies.  He 
 was  more  than  a  good  Writer,  he  was  a 
 good  Man  ;  and,  what  is  an  addition  even 
 to  this  eulogy,  he  was  a  fincere  Chriftian. 
 His  whole  ftudy  was  direded  to  the  Know- 
 ledge and  Pradtice  of  found  Morality  and 
 true  Religion:  thefe  he  adorned  by  his  Life, 
 and  has  recommended  to  future  ages  in  his 
 Writings  ;    in  which,  if  my  judgment  be  of 
 
 ♦  Ff,  xxxvll.  37.  -J-  Numb,  xxlii.  10. 
 
 asy 
 
BY  THE  EDITOR.        xxv 
 
 any  avail,  he  has  done  effential  fervice  to 
 both,  as  much,  perhaps,  as  any  fingle  per- 
 fon,  fincc  the  extraordinary  gifts  o{  the  word 
 of  Wijdom  and  the  word  of  Knowledge"^  have 
 been  withdrawn. 
 
 In  what  follows  I  propofe  to  give  a  fhort 
 account  of  the  Bifhop's  Moral  and  Reli- 
 gious Systems,  as  thefe  are  coUedted  from 
 his  Works. 
 
 I.  His  way  of  treating  the  fubjedl  of 
 Morals  is  to  be  gathered  from  the  Vo- 
 lume oi  his  Sermons,  and  particularly  from 
 the  three  iirfl,  and  from  the  Preface  to  that 
 Volume. 
 
 "  There  is,"  as  our  Author  with  lingu- 
 lar fagacity  has  obferved,  "  a  much  more 
 "  exad:  correfpondence  between  the  Natural 
 '*  and  Moral  World,  than  we  are  apt  to 
 **  take  notice  of-f-."  The  inward  Frame 
 of  Man  anfwers  to  his  outward  Condition: 
 the  feveral  propenfities,  pafTions,  and  affec- 
 tions, implanted  in  our  hearts  by  the  Author 
 of  Nature,  are  in  a  peculiar  manner  adapted 
 to  the  circumftances  of  life  in  which  He 
 hath  placed  us.  This  general  obfervation, 
 properly  purfued,  leads  to  feveral  important 
 conclufions.  The  original  internal  Confti- 
 tution  of  Man,  compared  with  his  external 
 Condition,  enables  us  to  difcern  what  Courfe 
 
 *  I  Cor.  xii.  8,  t  Serm.  VI. 
 
 of 
 
XXVI  PREFACE 
 
 of  A6lion  and  Behaviour  that  Conftitutioii 
 leads  to,  what  is  our  Duty  refpeding  that 
 Condition,  and  furnilTies  us  befides  w^ith  the 
 mofl  powerful  Arguments  to  the  Practice 
 of  it. 
 
 What  the  Inward  Frame  and  Conftitution 
 of  Man  is,  is  a  queilion  of  Fad:^  to  be  de- 
 termined, as  other  Fads  are,  from  Expe- 
 rience, from  our  internal  Feelings  and  exter- 
 nal Senfes,  and  from  the  Teftimony  of  others. 
 Whether  Human  Nature  and  the  Circum- 
 ftances  in  which  it  is  placed  might  not  have 
 been  ordered  other  wife,  is  foreign  to  our 
 enduiry,  and  none  of  cur  concern;  Our 
 Province  is,  taking  both  of  thefe  as  they 
 are,  and  viewing  the  connexion  between 
 them,  from  that  connexion  to  difcover,  if  we 
 can,  what  Courfe  of  Adiion  is  fitted  to  that 
 Nature  and  thofe  Circumftances.  Froni 
 contemplating  the  Bodily  Senfes,  and  the 
 organs  or  inllruments  adapted  to  them,  we 
 learn  that  the  Eye  was  given  to  fee  with,  the 
 Ear  to  hear  with.  In  like  manner,  from 
 confidering  our  Inward  Perceptions  and  the 
 final  caufes  of  them,  we  colled  that  the 
 feeling  of  Shame,  for  inftance,  was  given  to 
 prevent  the  doing  of  things  fhameful^  Com- 
 paflion,  to  carry  us  tu  relieve  others  in  dif- 
 trefs;  Anger,  to  refift  Hidden  violence  of- 
 fered to  ourfelves.  If,  continuing  our  en- 
 quiries in  this  way,  it  fhould  at  length  ap- 
 pear,  that  the   Nature,  the  v/hole  Nature, 
 
BYTHE  EDITOR.        xxvli 
 
 of  man  leads  him  to  and  is  fitted  for  that 
 particular  courfe  of  behaviour,  which  we 
 Tufually  diftinguifli  by  the  name  of  Virtue; 
 we  are  authorized  to  conclude,  that  Virtue 
 is  the  Law  we  are  born  under,  that  it  was 
 fo  intended  by  the  Author  of  our  Being; 
 and  we  are  bound  by  the  moft  intimate  of 
 all  obligations,  a  regard  to  cur  own  highefl 
 Intereft  and  Happinefs,  to  conform  to  it  in 
 all  fituations  and  events- 
 Human  Nature  is  not  fimple  and  uni- 
 form, but  made  up  of  feveral  parts;  and 
 we  can  have  no  juft  idea  of  it  as  a  Syftem 
 or  Gonflitution,  unlefs  we  take  into  our 
 view  the  refpedts  and  relations  which  thefe 
 parts  have  to  each  other.  As  the  Body  is 
 not  one  member,  but  many;  fo  our  Inward 
 Strudure  con fifls  of  various  inftind:s,  appe- 
 tites, and  propenfions.  Thus  far  there  is  no 
 difference  between  Human  Creatures  and 
 Brutes.  But  befides  thefe  common  paiTions 
 and  affed:ions,  there  is  another  principle, 
 peculiar  to  Mankind,  that  of  Confcience, 
 Moral  Senfe,  Reflection,  call  it  v/hat  yoii 
 pleafe,  by  which  they  are  enabled  to  review 
 their  whole  condud:,  to  approve  of  fome 
 adions  in  themfelves,  and  to  difapprove  of 
 others.  That  this  principle  will  of  courfe 
 have  fome  influence  on  cur  behaviour,  at 
 leafl:  at  times,  will  hardly  be  difputed:  but 
 |he  particular  influence  which  it   ought  to 
 
 have. 
 
xxvm 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 have,  the  precife  degree  of  power  in  the 
 regulating  of  our  internal  frame  that  is 
 aliigncd  it  by  Him  who  placed  it  there,  is  a 
 point  of  the  utmoft  confequence  in  itfelf, 
 and  on  the  determination  of  which  the  very 
 hinge  of  our  Author's  Moral  Syftem  turns. 
 If  the  faculty  here  ipcken  of  be,  indeed, 
 what  it  is  allcrtcd  to  be,  in  nature  and  kind 
 fupcrior  to  every  other  paflion  and  affed:ion; 
 if  it  be  given,  not  merely  that  it  may  exert 
 its  force  occaiionally,  or  as  our  prefent  hu- 
 mour or  fancy  may  difpofe  us,  but  that  it 
 may  at  all  times  exercife  an  uncontroul- 
 able  Authority  and  Government  over  all 
 the  refi:^  it  will  then  follow  that  in  order 
 to  complete  the  idea  of  Human  Nature, 
 as  a  Syftem,  we  muft  not  only  take  in  each 
 particular  bias,  propenfion,  inftinct,  which 
 are  ittn  to  belong  to  it,  but  we  muft  add 
 bolides  the  principle  of  Confcience,  toge- 
 ther with  the  fubjecition  that  is  due  to  it 
 from  all  the  other  appetites  and  paftions: 
 juft  as  the  idea  of  a  Civil  Conftitution  is 
 formed,  not  barely  from  enumerating  the 
 fcveral  members  and  ranks  of  which  it  is 
 compofed,  but  from  thefe  confidered  as  add- 
 ing in  various  degrees  of  fubordination  to 
 each  other,  and  all  under  the  diredion  of 
 the  iame  Supreme  Authority,  whether  that 
 Authority  be  veftcd  in  one  perfon  or  more. 
 The  view  here  given  of  the  Internal  Con- 
 ftitution 
 
BY  THE  EDITOR.         xxlx 
 
 ftitutlon  of  Man,  and  of  the  Sprcmacy 
 of  Confcience,  agreeably  to  the  conceptions 
 of  Bifliop  Butler,  enables  us  to  compre- 
 hend the  force  of  that  expreffion,  common 
 to  him  and  the  antient  Moralifts,  that  Vir- 
 tue confifts  in  yi//<5W;?^  Nature,  The  mean- 
 ing cannot  be,  that  it  confifls  in  acting 
 agreeably  to  that  propenfity  of  our  Nature 
 which  happens  to  be  the  flrongeft ;  or  which 
 propels  us  towards  certain  objed:s,  without 
 any  regard  to  the  methods  by  which  they 
 are  to  be  obtained :  But  the  meaning  mufl 
 be,  that  Virtue  coniifts  in  the  due  regula- 
 tion and  fubjeftioh  of  all  the  other  appetites 
 and  aifedions  to  the  Superior  Faculty  of 
 Confcience;  from  a  conformity  to  which 
 alone  our  aftions  are  properly  natural^  or 
 correfpondent  to  the  nature,  to  the  whole 
 nature,  of  fuch  an  agent  as  Man.  From 
 hence  too  it  appears,  that  the  Author  of  our 
 Frame  is  by  no  means  indifferent  to  Virtue 
 and  Vice,  or  has  left  us  at  liberty  to  ad:  at 
 random,  as  humour  or  appetite  may  prompt 
 US;  but  that  every  man  has  the  Rule  of 
 Right  within  him ;  a  Rule  attended  in  the 
 very  notion  of  it  with  Authority,  and  fuch 
 as  has  the  force  of  a  Direcftion  and  a  Com- 
 mand from  Him,  who  made  us  what  we 
 are,  what  Courfe  of  Behaviour  is  fuited  to 
 our  Nature,  and  which  He  expefts  that  we 
 fliould  follow.  This  Moral  Faculty  implies 
 alfo  a  pre-fentiment  and  apprehenfion,  that 
 9         .  tlic 
 
XXX 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 the  Judgment  which  it  paffes  an  our  adioASy 
 eonlidered  as  of  good  or  ill  defert,  will  here- 
 after be  confirmed  by  the  unerring  Judgment 
 of  God ;  when  Virtue  and  Happinefs,  Vice 
 and  Mifery,  whofe  ideas  are  now  fo  clofely 
 connected,  fhall  be  indiffolubly  united,-  and 
 the  Divine  Government  be  found  to  cor- 
 relpond  in  the  moft  exadt  proportion  to  the 
 Nature  He  has  given  us.  Laftly,  this  jufl: 
 Prerogative  or  Supremacy  of  Confcience  it 
 is,  which  Mr.  Pope  has  defcribed  in  his 
 Univcrjal  Prayer,  though  perhaps  he  may 
 have  expreffed  it  rather  too  ftrongly,  where 
 he  fays, 
 
 «  What  Confcience  di(3:ates  to  be  done, 
 
 "  Or  warns  me  not  to  do, 
 '^  This  teach  me  ?nore  thmi  Hell  to  ftiun, 
 
 *'  That  more  than  Heaven  purfue." 
 
 The  reader  will  obferve,  that  this  way  of 
 treating  the  fubjed  of  Morals  by  an  appeal 
 to  FaBs  does  not  at  all  interfere  with  that 
 other  way,  adopted  by  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke 
 and  others,  which  begins  with  enquiring 
 into  the  Relations  and  Fitne[]es  of  "Thhigs^ 
 but  rather  illuilrates  and  confirms  it.  That 
 there  are  effential  difterences  in  the  qualities 
 of  human  ad:ions,  eflabliilied  by  nature,  and 
 that  this  natural  difl:erence  of  things,  prior 
 to  and  independent  of  all  Will,  creates  a  na- 
 tural Jitnejs  in  the  agent  to  adt  agreeably  to 
 it,  feems  as  little  to  be  denied,  as  that  there 
 X  is 
 
BY  THE  EDITOR.        xxxi 
 
 IS  the  moral  difference  before  explained,  from 
 which  we  approve  and  feel  a  pleafure  in 
 what  is  right  and  conceive  a  diftafte  to 
 w^hat  is  wrong.  Still  however,  when  we  are 
 endeavouring  to  eftabliih  either  this  moral 
 or  that  natural  difference,  it  ought  never  to 
 be  forgotten,  or  rather  it  will  require  to  be 
 diftindly  iliewn,  that  both  of  thefe,  when 
 traced  up  to  their  fource,  fuppofe  an  in- 
 telligent Author  of  Nature  and  moral  Ruler 
 of  the  World;  v/ho  originally  appointed 
 thefe  differences,  and  by  fuch  an  appoint- 
 ment has  fignified  his  Will  that  we  fliould 
 conform  to  them,  as  the  only  effectual  me- 
 thod of  fecuring  our  Happiness  on  the 
 whole  under  his  government  ^.  And  of 
 this  confideration  our  Prelate  himfelf  was 
 not  unmindful;  as  may  be  collefted  from 
 many  expreffions  in  different  parts  of  his 
 writings,  and  particularly  from  the  follow- 
 ing paffages  in  his  Xlth  Sermon.  **  It  may 
 *^  be  allov/ed,  without  any  prejudice  to  the 
 "  caufe  of  Virtue  and  Religion,  that  our 
 *'  ideas  of  Happinefs  and  Mifcry  are  of  all 
 "  our  ideas  the  neareil  and  moft  important 
 *^  to  us ;  that  they  will,  nay,  if  you  pleafe, 
 *'  that  they  ought  to  prevail  over  thofe  of 
 "  Order,  and  Beauty,  and  Harmony,  and 
 "  Proportion,  if  there  fliould  ever  be,  as  it 
 **  is  impoffible  there    ever   fiiould  be,   any 
 
 »  See  note  [EJ,  at;  the  end  of  this  Prefacct 
 
 "  Inconfiflence 
 
xxxii  PREFACE 
 
 **  Inconfiftence  between  them/'  And  again, 
 "  Though  Virtue  or  moral  Recftitude  does 
 **  indeed  conlill  in  afFcdion  to  and  purfuit 
 ''  of  what  is  right  and  good^  as  fuch ;  yet, 
 <'  when  wc  lit  down  in  a  cool  hour,  we  can 
 "  neither  juftify  to  ourfclves  this  or  any 
 "  .other  purfuit,  till  we  are  convinced  that 
 **  it  will  be  for  our  Hapdinefs,  or  at  leaft 
 **  not  contrary  to  it  */' 
 
 Bcfides  the  general  Syftem  of  Morality 
 opened  above,  our  Author  in  his  Volunric  of 
 Sermons  has  ftated  with  accuracy  the  dif- 
 ference between  Self-Love  and  Benevolence; 
 in  oppofition  to  thofe  who  on  the  one  hand 
 make  the  whole  of  Virtue  to  confift  in  Be- 
 nevolence -f,  and  to  thofe,  who  on  the  other 
 ailert  that  every  particular  affedion  and  adlion 
 is  refolvable  into  Self-Love.  In  combating 
 thefe  opinions,  he  has  iliewn,  I  think  un^ 
 anfwerably,  that  there  are  the  fame  kind  of 
 indications  in  Human  Nature,  that  we  wero 
 made  to  promote  the  happinefs  of  others,  as 
 that  we  were  made  to  promote  our  own  : 
 that  it  is  no  jufl  objedion  to  this,  that  we 
 have  difpofitions  to  do  evt7  to  others  as  well 
 as  good;  for  we  have  alfo  difpofitions  to  do 
 evi/  as  well  as  good  to  oiirjelvesy  to  our  own 
 mofh  important  intererts   even  in   this    life, 
 
 *  Scrm.  Xr.  p.  229. 
 
 t  5^ee  the  2d  Diflertation  On  the  Nature  of  Virtue-^  at 
 the  end  of  the  Analogy, 
 
 for 
 
feY    THE    EDITOR. 
 
 xxxin 
 
 for  the  fake  of  gratifying  a  prefcnt  paffion  : 
 that  the  thing  to  be  lamented  is,  not  that 
 men  have  too  great  a  regard  to  their  own 
 real  good,  but  that  they  have  not  enough  : 
 that  Benevolence  is  not  more  at  variance 
 with  or  unfriendly  to  Self- Love,  than  any 
 other  particular  afteftion  is :  and  that  by 
 confulting  the  happinefs  of  others  a  man  is 
 fo  far  from  Icffen'mg  his  own,  that  the  very 
 endeavour  to  do  fo,  though  he  lliould  fail  in 
 the  accomplifhment,  is  a  fource  of  the 
 higheft  fatisfa(^ion  and  peace  of  mind*. 
 He  has  alfo,  in  paffing,  animadverted  on  the 
 Philofopher  of  Malmjbiiry,  who  in  his  book 
 Of  Human  Nature  has  advanced,  as  difco- 
 veries  in  Moral  Science,  that  Benevolence  is 
 only  the  Love  of  Power,  and  Compaffion 
 the  Fear  of  future  Calamity  to  Ourfelves. 
 And  this  our  Author  has  done,  not  fo  much 
 with  the  defign  of  expofing  the  falfe  reafon- 
 ing  of  Mr.  HobbeSy  but  becaufe  on  fo  per- 
 verfe  an  account  of  Human  Nature  he  has 
 raifed  a  Syflem,  fubverfive  of  all  Juftice  and 
 Honefty  "f*. 
 
 IL  The  Religious  Syflem  of  Bifhop 
 Butler  is  chiefly  to  be  collefted  from  the 
 Treatife,  entitled    T^he  Analogy   of  Religion ^ 
 
 *  See   Sermons   I.  and  XI.    and   the  Preface   to   th? 
 Volume  of  Sermons. 
 
 t  See  the  Notes  to  Sermon  I.  and  V, 
 
 G  iSiaturv-i 
 
XXXIV 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 Natural  and  Revealed y  to  the  CoJiJlitution  and 
 Courje  oj  Nature. 
 
 yill  t/jiugs  are  double  one  againji  another ^ 
 and  God  hath  made  Jiothing  hnperfeB  *.  On 
 this  finglc  obicrvation  of  the  Son  of  Sirach^ 
 the  whole  Fabrick  of  our  Prelate's  defence 
 of  Religion,  in  Ins  Analogy,  is  raifed.  In- 
 itead  of  indulging  to  idle  Speculations,  how 
 the  World  might  poilibly  have  been  better 
 than  it  is  -,  or,  forgetful  oi  the  difference  be- 
 tween Hypothefis  and  Fad:,  attempting  to 
 explain  the  Divine  Oeconomy  with  refpedt 
 to  intelligent  creatures  from  pre-conceived 
 notions  of  his  own  ;  he  firft  inquires  what 
 the  Conflitution  of  Nature,  as  made  known 
 to  us  in  the  way  of  Experiment,  acflually 
 is ;  and  from  this,  now  feen  and  acknow- 
 ledged, he  endeavours  to  form  a  judgment 
 of  that  larger  Conftitution,  which  Religion 
 difcovers  to  us.  If  the  Difpenfatlon  of  Pro- 
 vidence we  are  now  under,  conlidered  as 
 inhabitants  of  This  World,  and  having  a 
 Temporal  intereft  to  fecure  in  it,  be  found., 
 on  examination,  to  be  analogous  to,  and  of 
 a  piece  with,  that  further  Difpenfation, 
 which  relates  to  us  as  defigned  for  another 
 World,  in  which  we  have  an  Eternal  in- 
 tereft, depending  on  our  behaviour  here  ^ 
 if  both  may  be  traced  up  to  the  fame  Ge- 
 neral Laws,  and  appear  to  be  carried  on  aC' 
 
 *■  Ecclus.  xlii.  24.. 
 
 cording 
 
SY    the    editor,         XXXV 
 
 cording  to  the  fame  Plaii  of  Adminiflra- 
 tion;  the  fair  Prefumption  is,  that  both 
 proceed  from  one  and  the  fame  Author^ 
 And  if  the  principal  parts  Objected  to  in 
 this  latter  Difpenfation  be  fimilar  to  and  of 
 the  fame  kind  with  what  we  certainly  Ex- 
 perience under  the  former;  the  Objedions^ 
 being  clearly  inconclufive  in  one  cafe,  be- 
 caufe  con  trad icfted  by  plain  Fa6l,  muft,  in 
 all  reafon,  be  allowed  to  be  inconclufive  alfo 
 in  the  other. 
 
 This  way  of  arguing  from,  what  is  acknow- 
 ledged to  what  is  difputed,  from  things 
 known  to  other  things  that  refemble  them, 
 from  that  part  of  the  divine  eftablifliment 
 w^hich  is  expofed  to  our  view  to  that  more 
 important  one  which  lies  beyond  it,  is  on 
 all  hands  confefTed  to  be  jufl.  By  this  me- 
 thod Sir  Ifaac  Newton  has  unfolded  the  Syf- 
 tem  of  Nature;  by  the  fame  method  Bifnop 
 Butler  has  explained  the  Syftem  of  Grace, 
 and  thus,  to  ufe  the  words  of  a  writer, 
 whom  I  quote  with  pleafure,  "  has  formed 
 "  and  concluded  a  happy  alliance  between 
 ''  Faith  and  Philofophy*." 
 
 And  although  the  argument  from  Analogy 
 be  allowed  to  be  impcrfecS,  and  by  no  means 
 fufficient  to  folve  all  difliculties  refpeding 
 the  Government  of  God,  and  the  deligns  of 
 
 *  Mr.  Maimvarlng's  DifTertatlon,  prefixed  to  his  Vo- 
 lume of  Sermons. 
 
 c   2  his 
 
XXXVl 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 his  Providence  vvith  regard  to  mankind;  (a 
 degree  of  knowledge,  which  we  are  not  fur- 
 nilhed  with  faculties  for  attaining,  at  leaft 
 in  the  prcfcnt  llate)  yet  furely  it  is  of  im- 
 portance to  learn  from  it,  that  the  Natural 
 and  Moral  World  are  intimately  connected, 
 and  Parts  of  one  ftupendous  Whole  or  Syf- 
 tem;  and  that  the  chief  Objedions,  which 
 are  brought  againft  Religion,  may  be  urged 
 \vith  equal  force  againft  the  conftitution  and 
 courfe  of  Nature,  where  they  are  certainly 
 falfe  in  fad.  And  this  information  we  may 
 derive  from  the  work  before  us;  the  proper 
 defign  of  which,  it  may  be  of  ufe  to  ob- 
 lerve,  is  not  to  prove  the  Truth  of  Religion 
 either  natural  or  revealed,  but  to  confirm 
 that  proof,  already  kno\vn,  by  confiderati- 
 ons  from  Analogy. 
 
 After  this  account  of  the  method  of  rea- 
 foning  employed  by  our  Author,  let  us  now 
 advert  to  his  manner  of  applying  it,  Firft 
 to  the  fubjedl  of  Natural  Religion,  and  Se- 
 condly to  that  of  Revealed. 
 
 I.  The  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and 
 fears  is  a  Future  Life;  and  with  this  the 
 Treatife  bej^ins.  Neither  the  Reafon  of  the 
 Thing,  nor  the  Analogy  of  Nature,  ac- 
 cording to  Bifliop  Butler,  give  ground 
 for  imagining,  that  the  unknown  event. 
 Death,  will  be  our  dcftrudion.  The  ftates 
 in  which  we  have  formerly  exifted,  in  the 
 Womb  and  in  Infancy,  are  not  more  dif- 
 ferent 
 
BY    THE    EDITOR,     xxxvii 
 
 ferent  from  each  other  than  from  that  of 
 Mature  Age  in  which  we  now  exift :  there- 
 fore that  we  fhall  continue  to  exift  here- 
 after, in  a  ftate  as  different  from  the  prefent 
 as  the  prefent  is  from  thofe  through  which 
 we  have  paffed  ahxady,  is  a  Prefumption 
 favoured  by  the  Analogy  of  Nature.  All 
 that  we  know  from  Reafon  concerning 
 Death,  is  the  effcds  it  has  upon  Aninlal 
 Bodies :  and  the  frequent  inftances  among 
 Men  of  the  Intelledual  Powers  continuing 
 in  high  health  and  vigour,  at  the  very  time 
 when  a  mortal  dife:<{e  is  on  the  point  of 
 putting, an  end  to  all  the  Powers  of  Senfa- 
 tion,  induce  us  to  hope  that  it  may  have  no 
 effect  at  all  on  the  Human  Soul,  not  even 
 fo  much  as  to  fufpend  the  exercife  of  its 
 faculties  :  though  if  it  have,  the  Sufpenfioa 
 of  a  Power  by  no  m.eans  implies  its  Ex- 
 tindion,  as  Sleep  or  a  Swoon  may  convince 
 us*. 
 
 The  Probability  of  a  Future  State  once 
 granted,  an  important  queftion  arifes.  How 
 beft  to  fecure  our  Intereft  in  that  State. 
 We  find  from  what  paffes  daily  before  us, 
 that  the  Conftitution  of  Nature  admits  of 
 Mifery  as  well  as  Haopinefs ;  that  both  of 
 thefe  are  the  Confequences  of  our  own  Ac^ 
 tions;  and  thefe  Confequences  we  are  ena- 
 bled to  forefee.     Therefore  that  our  Hap- 
 
 *  Part  I.  Chapter  i. 
 
 c   3  pinefs 
 
xxxvlii        PREFACE 
 
 pinefs  or  Mifery  in  a  future  world  may  de- 
 pend on  our  own  Adions  alfo,  and  that 
 Rewards  or  Punifhments  hereafter  may  fol- 
 low our  good  or  ill  behaviour  here  ;  is  but 
 an  appointment  of  the  fame  fort  with  what 
 Xve  experience  under  the  divine  Government, 
 according  to  the  regular  courfe  of  Nature  *♦ 
 
 This  fuppofition  is  confirmed  from  ano- 
 ther circumftance,  that  the  Natural  Govern- 
 ment of  God,  under  which  we  now  live,  is 
 alfo  Moral;  in  which  Rewards  and  Punifli- 
 ments  are  the  confequences  of  Adions,  con- 
 fidered  as  virtuous  and  vitious.  Not  that 
 every  man  is  rewarded  or  puniihed  here  in 
 exaft  proportion  to  his  defert ;  for  the  eifen- 
 tial  Tendencies  of  Virtue  and  Vice  to  pro- 
 duce happinefs  and  the  contrary  are  ofter^ 
 hindered  from  taking  efFed:  from  accidental 
 caufes.  However  there  are  plainly  the  ru- 
 diments and  beginnings  of  a  righteous  ad- 
 miniftration  to  be  difcerned  in  the  Conftitu- 
 tion  of  Nature  :  from  whence  we  are  led  tq 
 expedl,  that  thefe  accidental  hindrances  will 
 one  day  be  removed,  and  the  rule  of  diftri- 
 butive  Juftice  obtain  completely  in  a  more 
 perfedl  ftate  -f-. 
 
 The  Moral  Government  of  God,  thus 
 eftabliihed,  implies  in  the  notion  of  it  fome 
 fort  of  Trial,  or  a  moral  poffibility  of  aft- 
 jmg  wrong  as  wxll  as  right,  in  thofe  whq 
 
 *  Cb,.  2.  t  Ch.  3. 
 
 are 
 
BY    THE    EDITOR,     xxxix 
 
 are  the  fubjedls  of  it.  And  the  dodlrine 
 of  Religion,  that  the  prefent  life  is  in  fad; 
 a  ftate  of  Probation  foi*  a  future  one,  is 
 rendered  credible,  from  its  being  analogous 
 throughout  to  the  general  condud:  of  Pro- 
 vidence towards  us  with  refped  to  this 
 world;  in  which  Prudence  is  necellary  to 
 fecure  our  temporal  intereft,  juft  as  we  are 
 taught  that  Virtue  is  neceiTary  to  fecure  our 
 eternal  intereft;  and  both  are  trufted  to  our- 
 felves  *. 
 
 But  the  prefent  life  is  not  merely  a  ftate 
 of  Probation,  implying  in  it  difficulties  and 
 danger;  it  is  alfo  a  ftate  of  Difcipline  and 
 Improvement;  and  that  both  in  our  tem- 
 poral and  religious  capacity.  Thus  Child-i 
 hood  is  a  ftate  of  Difcipline  for  Youth; 
 Youth  for  Manhood,  and  that  for  old  Age. 
 Strength  of  body,  and  maturity  of  under- 
 ftanding,  are  acquired  by  degrees;  and  nei- 
 ther of  them  without  continual  exercife  and 
 attention  on  our  part,  not  only  in  the  be- 
 ginning of  life,  but  through  the  whole 
 courfe  of  it.  So  again  with  refpe<ft  to  our 
 religious  concerns,  the  prefent  world  is  fitted 
 to  be,  and  to  good  men  is  in  event,  a  ftate 
 of  Difcipline  and  Improvement  for  a  future 
 one.  The  feveral  pafiions  and  propenfions, 
 implanted  in  our  hearts,  incline  us,  in  a 
 multitude  of  inftances,   to    forbidden   plca- 
 
 *  Ch.  4. 
 
 c  4  fares: 
 
xi  PREFACE 
 
 fares :  this  inward  infirmity  is  cncreafed  by 
 various  Ihares  and  temptations,  perpetually 
 occurring  from  without:  hence  arifes  the 
 necelTity  of  recoUedlion  and  felf-government, 
 of  withftanding  the  calls  of  appetite,  and 
 forming  our  minds  to  Habits  of  Piety  and 
 Virtue:  Habits,  of  which  we  are  capable, 
 and  which  to  creatures  in  a  ftate  of  moral 
 imperfedion,  and  fallen  from  their  original 
 integrity,  muft  be  of  the  greateft  ufe,  as  an 
 additional  fecurity,  over  and  above  the  prin- 
 ciple of  Confcience,  from  the  dangers  to 
 which  we  are  cxpofed*. 
 
 Nor  is  the  Credibility  here  given,  by  the 
 Analogy  of  Nature,  to  the  general  docftrine 
 of  Religion,  deftroyed  or  weakened  by  any 
 notions  concerning  Neceffity.  Of  itfelf  it 
 is  a  niere  word,  the  fign  of  an  abftradt  idea ; 
 and  as  much  requires  an  Agent,  that  is,  a 
 neceflary  Agent,  in  order  to  effed:  any  thing, 
 as  Freedom  requires  a  free  Agent.  Ad- 
 mitting it  to  be  fpeculatlvely  true,  if  confi- 
 dered  as  influencing  pradice,  it  is  the  fame 
 as  falfe:  for  it  is  matter  of  experience, 
 that,  with  regard  to  our  prefent  intereft,  and 
 as  inhabitants  of  this  world,  we  are  treated 
 as  if  we  were  free ;  and  therefore  the  Ana- 
 logy of  Nature  leadb  us  to  conclude,  that, 
 with  regard  to  our  future  intereft,  and  as 
 defigned    for   another   world,    we    fhall   be 
 
 *  Ch.  5. 
 
 treated 
 
BY    THE    EDITOR.        xli 
 
 treated  as  free  alfo.  Nor  does  the  opinion 
 of Neceffity,  fuppofing  it  poffible,  at  all  afFedt 
 either  the  general  proof  of  Religion,  or  its 
 external  evidence  *. 
 
 Still  objections  may  be  made  againft  the 
 Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  of  the  Divine  Go- 
 vernment, to  which  Analogy,  which  can 
 only  fhew  the  truth  or  credibility  of  Fadl:s, 
 affords  no  Anfwer.  Yet  even  here  Analogy 
 is  of  ufe,  if  it  fuggeft  that  the  Divine  Go- 
 vernment is  a  Scheme  or  Syftem,  and  not  a 
 number  of  unconnedled  adVs,  and  that  this 
 Syftem  is  alfo  above  our  comprehenfion. 
 Now  the  Government  of  the  Natural  World 
 appears  to  be  a  fyftem  of  this  kind ;  with 
 Parts,  related  to  each  other,  and  together 
 compofing  a  Whole  ;  in  which  Syftem  Ends 
 are  brought  about  by  the  ufe  of  Means, 
 many  of  which  Means,  before  experience, 
 would  have  been  fufpeded  to  have  had  a 
 quite  contrary  tendency;  v/hich  is  carried 
 on  by  General  Laws,  fimilar  caufes  uni- 
 formly producing  fimilar  eifedis  ;  the  utility 
 of  which  General  Laws,  and  the  incon- 
 veniences which  would  probably  arife  from 
 the  occafional  or  even  lecret  fufpenfion  of 
 them,  we  are  in  fome  fort  enabled  to  dif- 
 cern-f;  but  of  the  Whole  we  are  incom- 
 petent judges,   becaufe   of  the   fmall   Part 
 
 *  Ch.  6. 
 
 t  See    a    Treatife    on    Divine    Benevolence^     by   Dr. 
 Thomas  Balguy  j  Fart  II. 
 
 which 
 
xlii  PREFACE 
 
 which  comes  within  our  view.  Reafoning 
 then  from  what  we  know,  it  is  highly  cre-^ 
 dible,  that  the  Government  of  the  Moral 
 World  is  a  Syftem  alfo,  carried  on  by  Ge- 
 neral Laws,  and  in  which  Ends  are  accom- 
 plifhcd  by  the  intervention  of  Means ;  and 
 that  both  Conftitutions,  the  Natural  and 
 the  Moral,  are  fo  conned:ed,  as  to  form  to- 
 gether but  One  Scheme.  But  of  this  Scheme, 
 as  of  that  of  the  Natural  World  taken  alone, 
 we  are  not  qualified  to  judge,  on  account  of 
 the  mutual  refped:  of  the  feveral  Parts,  to 
 each  ether  and  to  the  Whole,  and  our  own 
 incapacity  to  furvey  the  Whole,  or,  with 
 accuracy,  any  fingle  Part.  All  objedliohs 
 therefore  to  the  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  of 
 the  Divine  Government  may  be  founded 
 merely  on  our  Ignorance*;  and  to  fuch  ob- 
 jedlions  our  Ignorance  is  the  proper,  and  a 
 fatisfaftory,  Anfwer  -f*. 
 
 2.  The  chief  difficulties  concerning  Na- 
 tural Religion  being  now  removed,  our  Au- 
 thor proceeds,  in  the  next  place,  to  that 
 which  is  Revealed;  and  as  an  introdud:ion 
 to  an  enquiry  into  the  CredibiHty  of  Chrif- 
 tianity,  begins  with  the  confideration  of  its 
 Importance. 
 
 The  Importance  of  Chriflianity  appears 
 in  two  refpedls.     Firft,  in  its  being  a  Re- 
 
 *  See  note  [F],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 
 1  Ch.  7. 
 
 publication 
 
BY    THE    EDITOR.      xliii 
 
 publication  of  Natural  Religion,  in  its  na- 
 tive fimplicity,  with  authority,  and  with 
 circumftances  of  advantage ;  afcertaining,  in 
 many  inftances  of  moment,  what  before  was 
 only  probable,  and  particularly  confirming 
 the  dodlrine  of  a  Future  State  of  Rewards 
 and  Punifhments  *.  Secondly,  as  revealing 
 a  new  Difpenfation  of  Providence,  originat- 
 ing from  the  pure  Love  and  Mercy  of 
 God,  and  conduced  by  the  Mediation  of 
 his  Son,  and  the  Guidance  of  his  Spirit, 
 for  the  Recovery  and  Salvation  of  Mankind, 
 reprefented  in  a  ftate  of  Apojftacy  and  Ruin. 
 This  account  of  Chriftianity  being  admitted 
 to  be  juft,  and  the  diftind:  Offices  of  thefe 
 three  Divine  Perfons  being  once  difcovered 
 to  us,  we  are  as  much  obliged  in  point  of 
 duty  to  acknowledge  the  relations  we  ftand 
 in  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghoft,  as  our  Me- 
 diator and  Sand:ifier,  as  we  are  obliged  in 
 point  of  duty  to  acknowledge  the  relation 
 we  ftand  in  to  God  the  Father ;  although 
 the  two  former  of  thefe  relations  be  learnt 
 from  Revelation  only,  and  in  the  laft  we 
 are  inftrudled  by  the  light  of  Nature;  the 
 obligation  in  either  cafe  arifmg  from  the 
 Offices  themfelves,  and  not  at  all  depending 
 on  the  manner  in  which  they  are  made 
 known  to  us  -j-, 
 
 *  See  note  [G],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 
 t  Part  II.  Chapter  i. 
 
 The 
 
xliv  PREFACE 
 
 The  Prefumptions  againft  Revelation  in 
 general  are,  that  it  is  not  difcoverabie  by 
 rcafon,  that  it  is  unhke  to  what  is  fo  dif- 
 covered,  and  that  it  was  introduced  and 
 fupported  by  Miracles.  But  in  a  Scheme 
 fo  large  as  that  of  the  Univerfe,  unbounded 
 in  extent  and  everjafting  in  duration,  there 
 muft  of  neceffity  be  numberlefs  circnmftances 
 which  are  beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties 
 to  difcern,  and  which  can  only  be  known 
 by  divine  illumination.  And  both  in  the 
 Natural  and  Moral  Government  of  the 
 World,  under  which  we  live,  we  find  many 
 things  unlike  one  to  another,  and  therefore 
 oug:ht  not  to  wonder  if  the  fame  unlikenefs 
 obtain  between  tilings  vifible  and  invifible  : 
 although  it  be  far  from  true,  that  Revealed 
 Religion  is  entirely  unlike  the  Conftitution 
 of  Nature,  as  Analogy  may  teach  us.  Nor 
 is  there  any  thing  increaible  in  Revelation, 
 confidered  as  Miraculous ;  whether  Miracles 
 be  fuppofed  to  have  been  performed  at  the 
 beginning  of  the  world,  or  after  a  courfe  of 
 Nature  has  been  eftablifhed.  Not  at  the 
 beginning  of  the  world-,  for  then  there  was 
 either  no  courfe  of  Nature  at  all,  or  a  power 
 muft  have  been  exerted  totally  different  from 
 what  that  courfe  is  at  prefent:  All  men  and 
 animals  cannot  have  been  born,  as  they  are 
 now;  but  a  pair  of  each  fort  muft  have  been 
 produced  at  firft,  in  a  way  altogether  unlike 
 to  that  in  which  they  have  been  fmce  pro- 
 duced i 
 
BY    THE    EDITOR.        xlv 
 
 duced;  unlefs  we  affirm,  that  men  and 
 anim.als  have  exifled  from  eternity  in  an 
 endiefs  focceffion:  One  Miracle  tiiercfore  at 
 lead  there  muft  have  been,  at  the  beginning 
 of  the  world,  or  at  the  time  of  Min's  Crea- 
 tion. Not  after  the  fettlcmmt  of  a  coiirfe  of 
 ISatiirey  on  account  of  Miracles  being  con- 
 trary to  that  courfe,  or,  in  other  words, 
 contrary  to  Experience:  for  in  order  to  know 
 whether  Miracles,  worked  in  atteftation  of 
 a  Divine  Religion,  be  contrary  to  Experi- 
 ence or  not,  we  ought  to  be  acquainted  with 
 other  cafes,  fimilar  or  parallel  to  thofe,  in 
 which  Miracles  are  alledgcd  to  have  been 
 wroug-ht.  But  v^here  fhall  we  find  fuch 
 fimilar  or  parallel  cafes  ?  The  World  which 
 w^e  inhabit  affords  none:  We  know  of  no 
 extraordinary  Revelations  from  God  to  Man, 
 but  thofe  recorded  in  the  old  and  new  Tefta- 
 ment;  all  of  which  were  eflablifhed  by 
 Miracles:  It  cannot  therefore  be  faid  that 
 Miracles  are  incredible,  becaufe  contrary  ta 
 Experience,  when  all  the  Experience  we 
 have  is  in  favour  of  Miracles,  and  on  the* 
 fide  of  Religion  * .  Befides,  in  reafoning 
 concerning  Miracles,  they  ought  not  to  be 
 compared  v/ith  common  natural  events,  but 
 with  uncommon  appearances,  fuch  as 
 Comets,   Magnetifm,  Elecftricity;   which   to 
 
 *  See  note  [H],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 
 
 one 
 
xlvi  PREFACE 
 
 one  acquainted  only  with  the  ufual  Phas- 
 nomena  of  Nature,  and  the  common  powers 
 of  Matter,  muft,  before  proof  of  their  aftual 
 exigence,  be  thought  incredible  *. 
 
 The  Prefumptions  againft  Revelation  in 
 general  being  difpatched,  Objeftions  againft 
 the  Chriftian  Revelation  in  particular, 
 againft  the  Scheme  of  it,  as  diftinguiftied 
 from  objeftions  againft  its  Evidence,  are 
 confidered  next.  Now,  fuppofing  a  Reve- 
 lation to  be  really  given,  it  is  highly  proba- 
 ble beforehand,  that  it  muft  contain  many 
 things,  appearing  to  us  liable  to  objections. 
 The  acknowledged  Difpenfation  of  Nature 
 is  very  different  from  what  we  ftiould  have 
 expeded;  reafoning  then  from  Analogy, 
 the  Revealed  Difpenfation,  it  is  credible, 
 would  be  alfo  different.  Nor  are  we  in  any 
 fort  judges  at  what  time,  or  in  what  degree, 
 or  manner,  it  is  fit  or  expedient  for  God  to 
 inftruft  us,  in  things  confeffedly  of  the 
 greateft  ufe,  either  by  natural  reafon,  or  by 
 fupernatural  information.  Thus  arguing  on 
 fpeculation  only,  and  without  experience,  it 
 would  feem  very  unlikely  that  fo  important 
 a  Remedy  as  that  provided  by  Chriftianity 
 for  the  recovery  of  mankind  from  a  ftate  of 
 ruin,  fliould   have  been   for   fo   many   ages 
 
 *    Ch.  2. 
 
 withheld  ; 
 
BY   THE    EDITOR.       xlvii 
 
 withheld ;  and,  when  at  laft  vouchfafed, 
 fhould  be  imparted  to  fo  few ;  and,  after  it 
 has  been  imparted,  fhould  be  attended  with 
 obfcurity  and  doubt.  And  juft  fo  we  might 
 have  argued,  before  experience,  concerning 
 the  Remedies  provided  in  nature  for  Bodily 
 Difeafes,  to  which  by  nature  we  are  ex- 
 pofed :  for  many  of  thefe  v/ere  unknown  to 
 mankind  for  a  number  of  ages ;  are  known 
 but  to  few  now ;  feme  important  ones  pro- 
 bably not  difcovered  yet ;  and  thofe  which 
 are,  neither  certain  in  their  application,  nor 
 univerfal  in  their  ufe :  And  the  fame  mode 
 of  reafoning  that  would  lead  us  to  exped: 
 they  fliould  have  been  fo,  would  lead  us 
 to  exped:  that  the  neceffity  of  them  iliould 
 have  been  fuperfeded,  by  there  being  no 
 Difeafes  ^  as  the  neceffity  of  the  Chriftian 
 Scheme,  it  may  be  thought,  might  alfo  have 
 been  fuperfeded,  by  preventing  the  fall  of 
 man,  fo  that  he  fliould  not  have  flood  in 
 need  of  a  Redeemer  at  all*. 
 
 As  to  Objections  againft  the  Wifdom  and 
 Goodnefs  of  Chrillianity,  the  fame  Anfwer 
 may  be  applied  to  them  as  was  to  the  like 
 objed;ions  againft  the  Conftitution  of  Nature. 
 For  here  alfo,  Chriftianity  is  a  Scheme  or 
 Oeconomy,  compofed  of  various  Parts, 
 forming  a  Whole ;  in  which  Scheme  Means 
 are  ufed  for  the  accomplifliing  of  Ends ;  and 
 
 *  Ch.  3. 
 
 which 
 
xlviii  PREFACE 
 
 which  is  condLn5led  by  General  Laws  :  of 
 all  of  which  we  know  as  little  as  we  do  of 
 the  Conftitution  of  Nature.  And  the  feem- 
 ing  want  of  Wifdom  or  Goodnefs  in  this 
 Syftem  is  to  be  afcribed  to  the  fame  caufe,  as 
 the  like  appearances  of  defecfls  in  the  Natural 
 Syftem;  our  inabihty  to  difcern  the  whole 
 Scheme,  and  our  ignorance  of  the  relation  of 
 th.ofe  parts  which  are  difcernible  to  others 
 beyond  our  view. 
 
 The  Objections  againft  Chriftianity  as  a 
 matter  of  Fad:,  and  againft  the  Wifdom  and 
 Goodnefs  of  it,  having  been  obviated  toge- 
 ther, the  chief  of  them  are  now  to  be  con- 
 fidered  diflindly.  One  of  thefe,  which  is 
 levelled  againft  the  entire  Syilem  itfelf,  is  of 
 this  fort :  The  Reftoration  of  Mankind,  re- 
 prefented  in  Scripture  as  the  great  defign  of 
 the  Gofpel,  is  defcribed  as  requiring  a  long 
 feries  of  means,  and  perfons,  and  difpenfa- 
 tions,  before  it  can  be  brought  to  its  com- 
 pletion ;  whereas  the  whole  ought  to  have 
 been  effeded  at  once.  Now  every  thing  we 
 fee  in  the  courfe  of  Nature  fliews  the  folly 
 of  this  objedlion.  For  in  the  natural  courfe 
 of  Providence,  Ends  are  brought  about  by 
 Means,  not  operating  immediately  and  at 
 onc-e,  but  deliberately  and  in  a  way  of  pro- 
 greffion  -,  one  thing  being  fubfervient  to 
 another,  this  to  fomewhat  further.  The 
 change  of  feafons,  the  ripening  of  fruits,  the 
 growth  of  vegetable  and  animal  bodies,  are 
 
 inftances 
 
BY  THE    EDITOR,      xllx 
 
 inftances  of  this.  And  therefore  that  the 
 fame  progreffive  method  fliould  be  followed 
 in  the  difpenfation  of  Chriftianity,  as  is  ob- 
 ferved  in  the  common  difpenfation  of  Pro- 
 vidence, is  a  reafonable  expe<5tation,  juftified 
 by  the  Analogy  of  Nature*. 
 
 Another  circumftance  objedied  to  in   the 
 Chriftian  Scheme  is  the  appointment  of  a 
 Mediator,    and    the    faving    of   the    world 
 throuo^h  him.     But  the  vilible  Government 
 of  God  being  actually  adminiftered  in  this 
 way,  or  by  the  Mediation  and  Inftrumenta- 
 lity  of  others;  there  can  be  no  General  Pre- 
 fumption   againft    an   appointment   of  this 
 kind,  againft  his  invifible  Government  being 
 exercifed    in    the    fame   manner.   We   have 
 fetn  already  that,  with  regard  to  ourfelves, 
 this  vifible  Government  is  carried  on  by  Re- 
 wards and  Punifhments;  for  Happinefs  and 
 Mifery   are    the   confequences  of  our  own 
 adlions,  coniidered  as  virtuous  and  vicious, 
 and   thefe   confequences  we  are  enabled  to 
 forefee.     It  might  have  been  imagined,  be- 
 fore   confulting    Experience,  that  after   we 
 had  rendered  ourfelves  liable  to   mifery  by 
 our  own  ill  conduft,  forrow  for  what  was 
 paft,    and    behaving   well    for    the    future, 
 would,     alone    and     of    themfelves,    have 
 exempted    us    from    deferved    Punifliment, 
 
 *  Ch.  4. 
 
 d  and 
 
1  PREFACE 
 
 and  reftored  us  to  the  Divine  Favour.  But 
 the  Fad  is  otherwile;  and  real  reformation 
 is  often  found  to  be  of  no  avail,  fo  as  to 
 fecure  the  criminal  from  poverty,  ficknefs, 
 infamy,  and  death,  the  never-fdiang  attend- 
 ants on  vice  and  extravagance,  exceeding  a 
 certain  degree.  By  the  courie  of  Nature 
 then  it  appears,  God  does  not  always  pardon 
 a  finner  on  his  Repentance.  Yet  there  is 
 Provifion  made,  even  in  Nature,  that  the 
 miferies,  which  men  bring  on  themfelves 
 by  unlawful  indulgencies,  may  in  many 
 cafes  be  mitigated,  and  in  fome  removed; 
 partly  by  extraordinary  exertions  of  the  Of- 
 fender himfelf,  but  more  efpecially  and  fre- 
 quently by  the  Intervention  of  Others,  who 
 voluntarily,  and  from  naotives  of  compaf- 
 fion,  fubmit  to  labour  and  forrow,  fuch  as 
 produce  long  and  lafling  inconveniences  to 
 themfelves,  as  the  means  of  refcuing  another 
 from  the  wretched  effects  of  former  impru- 
 dences. Vicarious  Puni(hment,  therefore, 
 or  one  perfon's  fufferings  contributing  to  the 
 relief  of  another,  is  a  providential  difpoli- 
 tion,  in  the  Oeconomy  of  Nature  *  :  And  it 
 ought  not  to  be  matter  of  furprife,  if  by 
 a  method  analogous  to  this  we  be  redeemed 
 from  iin  and  mifery,  in  the  Oeconomy  of 
 Grace.     That  mankind  at  prefent  are  in  a 
 
 ♦  See  note  [I],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface, 
 
 ftate 
 
BYTHE    EDITOR,  II 
 
 ftate  of  degradation,  different  from  that  in 
 which  they  v/ere  originally  created,  is  the 
 very  ground  of  the  Chriftian  Revelation,  as 
 contained  in  the  Scriptures.  Whether  we 
 acquiefce  in  the  account,  that  our  being 
 placed  in  fuch  a  ftate  is  owing  to  the  crime 
 of  our  iirft  parents,  or  chufe  to  afcribe  it 
 to  any  other  caufe,  it  makes  no  difference  as 
 to  our  Condition :  the  vice  and  unhappinefs 
 of  the  world  are  ftill  there,  notwithftanding 
 all  our  fuppoiitions;  nor  is  it  Chriltianity 
 that  hath  put  us  into  this  ftate.  We  learn 
 alfo  from  the  fame  Scriptures,  what  Expe-* 
 rience  and  the  ufe  of  Expiatory  Sacrifices 
 from  the  moft  early  times  might  have 
 taught  us,  that  Repentance  alone  is  not 
 fufficient  to  prevent  the  fatal  confequences 
 of  paft  tranfgreffions :  But  that  ftill  there 
 is  room  for  Mercy,  and  that  Repentance 
 fhall  be  available,  though  not  of  itfelf,  yet 
 through  the  Mediation  of  a  Divine  Perfon, 
 the  Meffiah;  who,  from  the  fublimeft  prin- 
 ciples of  compaflion,  when  we  were  dead  in 
 trefpaffes  and  Jins*,  fuffered  and  died,  the 
 innocent  for  the  guilty,  the  juji  for  the  im- 
 juji-^,  that  we  might  have  redemption  through 
 his  bloody  even  the  forgivencfs  of  Ji7is\.  In 
 vAi2X  way  the  Death  of  Chrift  was  of  that 
 efficacy  it  is  faid  to  be,  in   procuring  the 
 
 *  Ephef.  ii.  i.         f  Pet.  ili.  i8.        %  Colofl.  i.  14. 
 d  2  reconciliation 
 
lii  PREFACE 
 
 reconciliation  of  finners,  the  Scriptures  have 
 not  explained:  It  is  enough  that  the  doc- 
 trine is  revealed ;  that  it  is  not  contrary  to 
 any  truths  which  Reafon  and  Experience 
 teach  US;  and  that  it  accords  in  perfed 
 harmony  with  the  ufual  method  of  the  Di- 
 vine Condud  in  the  Government  of  the 
 World*. 
 
 Again  it  hath  been  faid,  that  if  the  Chrif- 
 tian  Revelation  were  true,  it  muft  have  been 
 Univerfal,  and  could  not  have  been  left  upoa 
 Doubtful  Evidence.  But  God,  in  his  Na- 
 tural Providence,  difpenfes  his  gifts  in  great 
 variety,  not  only  among  creatures  of  the 
 fame  fpecies,  but  to  the  fame  individuals 
 alfo  at  different  times.  Had  the  Chriftiau 
 Revc-lation  been  Univerfal  at  firft,  yet  from 
 the  divprfity  of  men's  abilities  both  of  mind 
 and  body,  their  various  m.eans  of  improve- 
 ment, and  other  external  advantages,  fome 
 perfons  muft  foon  have  been  in  a  fituation, 
 with  refpedt  to  religious  knowledge,  much 
 fuperior  to  that  of  others,  as  much  perhaps 
 as  they  are  at  prfent ;  And  all  men  will  be 
 equitably  dealt  with  at  laft;  and  to  whom 
 little  is  given,  of  him  little  will  be  required. 
 Then  as  to  the  Evidence  for  Religion  being, 
 left  Doubtful,  difficulties  of  this  fort,  like 
 difficulties  in  Pradice^  afford  fcope  and  op- 
 portunity for  a  virtuous  exercife  of  the  un- 
 
 *  Ch.  5. 
 
 derftanding, 
 
BYTHE   EDITOR.         llli 
 
 derflandlng,  and  difpofe  the  mind  to  ac- 
 quiefce  and  reft  fatisfied  with  any  evidence 
 that  is  real.  In  the  daily  commerce  of  life, 
 men  are  obliged  to  ad  upon  great  uncer- 
 tainties, with  regard  to  fuccefs  in  their  Tem- 
 poral Purfuits :  and  the  cafe  with  regard  to 
 Religion  is  parallel.  However,  though  Re- 
 ligion be  not  intuitively  true,  the  proofs  of  it 
 which  we  have  are  amply  fufficient  in  reafon 
 to  induce  us  to  embrace  it ;  and  diffatisfadiion 
 Avith  thofe  proofs  may  poffibly  be  men's  own 
 fault  ^. 
 
 Nothing  remains  but  to  attend  to  the 
 Pofitive  Evidence  there  is  for  the  truth  of 
 Chriflianity.  Now  befides  its  diredt  and 
 fundamental  proofs,  which  are  Miracles  and 
 Prophecies ;  there  are  many  Collateral  Cir- 
 cumftances,  which  may  be  united  into  one 
 view,  and  all  together  may  be  confidered  as 
 making  up  One  Argument.  In  this  way  of 
 treating  the  fubjedt,  the  Revelation,  whe- 
 ther real  or  otherwife,  may  be  fuppofed  to 
 be  wholly  Hiftorical :  The  general  defign  of 
 which  appears  to  be,  to  give  an  account  of 
 the  Condition  of  Religion,  and  its  profef- 
 fors,  with  a  concife  narration  of  the  Politi- 
 cal State  of  things,  as  far  as  Religion  is 
 aftedted  by  it,  during  a  great  length  of  time, 
 near  fix  thoufand  years  of  which  are  already 
 paft.     More  particularly  it  comprehends  an 
 
 *  Ch.  6. 
 
 d  3  account 
 
llr  PREFACE 
 
 account    of  God's   entering    into   Covenant 
 with  one  nation,  the  Jews,   that  He  would 
 be  their  God,  and  that  they  fhould  be  His 
 People  j  of  his  often  interpofing  in  their  af- 
 fairs ',  giving  them  the  promife,  and  after- 
 wards the  pofTeflion,   of  a  flourifliing  coun- 
 try; afluring  them  of  the  greateft  national 
 profperity,  in  cafe  of  their   obedience,   and 
 threatening  the  fevereft  national  punifhment, 
 in  cafe  they  forfook  Him,  and  joined  in  the 
 Idolatry    of  their     Pagan   neighbours.      It 
 contains    alfo  a    predid;ion    of  a    Particular 
 Perfon,   to   appear  in  the   fulnefs  of    time, 
 in  whom  all  the   promifes  of  God    to    the 
 Jews  were   to    be   fulfilled :  And    it  relates 
 tha-t,    at   the  time   expected,    a   Perfon   did 
 adlually  appear,  affuming  to  be  the  Saviour 
 foretold;    that  he  worked  various    miracles 
 among  them,  in  confirmation  of  his  divine 
 authority;    and,  as  was  foretold    alfo,    was 
 rejefted  and  put  to  death   by  the  very  peo- 
 ple who  had  long  defired  and  waited  for  his 
 coming  :  but  that  his  Rehgion,   in  fpite  of 
 all  oppofition,  was  eftablifhed  in    the  world 
 by  his   difciples,  invefted  with  fupernatural 
 powers  for  that  purpofe  :    of  the   fate  and 
 fortunes  of  which  Religion  there  is  a  pro- 
 phetical defcription,  carried  down  to  the  end 
 of  time.     Let  any  one  now,  after   reading 
 the  above   Hiftory,  and  not  knowing  whe- 
 ther the  whole  were  not  a    fidion,  be  fup- 
 pofed  to  afli.  Whether  all  that  is  here  re- 
 Q  lated 
 
B  Y    T  H  E    EDITOR.         Iv 
 
 lated  be  true?  and  inftead  of  a  difed:  an- 
 fwer,  let  him  be  informed  of  the  feveral 
 acknowledged  Fads,  Vv^hich  are  found  to 
 correfpond  to  it  in  real  life 5  and  then  let 
 him  compare  the  Hillory  and  Fads  toge- 
 ther, and  obferve  the  aftonlfhing  coincidence 
 of  both:  fuch  a  joint  review  muft  appear 
 to  him  of  very  great  weight,  and  to  amount' 
 to  evidence  fomewhat  more  than  human. 
 And  unlefs  the  whole  feries,  and  every  par- 
 ticular circumftance  contained  in  it,  can  be 
 thought  to  have  arifv^n  from  accident,  the 
 Truth  of  Chriftianity  is  proved"*. 
 
 *  Ch.  7.  To  the  Analogy  are  fubjoined  Two  Dif- 
 fertations,  both  originally  inferted  in  the  body  of  the 
 work.  One  on  Perjonal  Identity^  m  which  are  contained 
 fame  ftridures  on  Mr.  Locke^  who  allerts  that  Confci- 
 oufnefs  makes  or  conftitutes  Perfonal  Identity  j  whereas, 
 as  our  Author  obferves,  Confcioufnefs  makes  only  Per- 
 fonality,  or  is  neceflary  to  the  idea  of  a  Perfon,  i.  e.  a 
 thinking  intelligent  Being,  but  pre-fjppofes,  and  there- 
 fore cannot  conlliitute,  i'erfonal  Identity;  juft  as  Know- 
 ledge pre-fuppofes  Truth,  but  does  not  confliitute  it. 
 Confcioufnefs  of  paft  ailions  does  indeed  ^hqw  us  the 
 Identity  of  ourfelves,  or  gives  us  a  certain  aflurance 
 that  we  are  the  fame  Peribns  or  living  Agents  now, 
 which  we  were  at  the  time  to  which  our  remembrance 
 can  look  back:  but  ftill  we  fhould  be  the  fame  Perfons 
 as  we  were,  though  this  Confcioufnefs  of  what  is  pait 
 were  wantmg,  though  all  that  had  been  done  by  us  for- 
 merly were  forgotten  ;  unlefs  it  be  true  that  no  perfon 
 has  exifted  a  fmgle  moment  beyond  what  he  can  re- 
 member. The  other  DilTertation  is  On  the  Nature  of 
 Virtue^  which  properly  belongs  to  the  Moral  Syflem  of 
 our  Author,  already  explained. 
 
 d  A  The 
 
Ivi  PREFACE 
 
 The  view  here  given  of  the  Moral  and 
 Religious  Syftems  of  Bifhop  Butler,  it 
 will  immediately  be  perceived,  is  chiefly  in- 
 tended for  Younger  Students,  efpecially  for 
 Students  in  Divinity;  to  whom  it  is  hoped 
 it  may  be  of  ufe,  fo  as  to  encourage  them 
 to  per  ufe,  with  proper  diligence,  the  original 
 works  of  the  Author-  himfelf.  For  it  may 
 be  neceff-iry  to  obferve,  that  neither  of  the 
 Volumes  of  this  excellent  Prelate  are  ad- 
 drelied  to  thofe,  who  read  for  amufcment, 
 or  curiolity,  or  to  get  rid  of  time.  All 
 SubjcLts  are  not  to  be  com.prehended  with 
 the  fame  eafe;  and  Morality  and  Religion, 
 when  treated  as  Sciences,  each  accompanied 
 with  difficulties  of  its  own,  can  neither  of 
 tl:em  be  underftood  as  they  ought,  without 
 a  very  peculiar  attention.  But  Morality  and 
 Religion  are  not  merely  to  be  ftudied  as 
 Sciences,  or  as  being  fpeculatively  true;  they 
 are  to  be  regarded  in  another  and  higher 
 light,  as  the  Rule  of  Life  and  Manners,  as 
 containing  authoritative  dired:ions  by  which 
 to  regulate  our  Faith  and  Pradice.  And  in 
 this  view,  the  infinite  importance  of  them 
 confidered,  it  can  never  be  an  indiiferent 
 matter  v/hether  they  be  received  or  rejected. 
 For  both  claim  to  be  the  voice  of  God;  and 
 whether  they  be  fo  or  not,  cannot  be  known, 
 till  their  claims  be  impartially  examined.  If 
 they  indeed  come  from  Him,  we  are  bound 
 to  conform  to  them  at  our  peril :  nor  is  it 
 
 left 
 
BY  THE    EDITOR.        Ivu 
 
 left  to  our  choice,  whether  we  will  fubmit 
 to  the  obligations  they  impole  upon  us  or 
 not ',  for  fubmit  to  them  we  muft  in  fach 
 a  fenfe,  as  to  incur  the  punifhments  de- 
 nounced by  both  againft  wilful  difobedience 
 to  their  injunftions. 
 
 The 
 
[     h'm    3 
 
 Tlie  following  EPITAPH,  faid  to  be  written  by 
 Dr.  N.ithanad  Forp)\  is  infcribed  on  a  flat  marble 
 ilonc,  ill  the  cathedral  church  of  Brijloh  placed  over  the 
 fpot  where  the  remains  of  Blftiop  Butler  are  depofit- 
 cd  ;  and  which,  as  \t  is  now  almoft  obliterated,  it  may 
 be  worth  while  here  to  preferve. 
 
 H.  S. 
 Reverendus  admodum  in  Chrifto  Pater 
 
 J  O  S  E  P  H  U  S    BUTLER,    LL.  D, 
 
 Hujufce  primo  Dioecefeos 
 
 Deinde  Dunelmenfis  Epifcopus. 
 
 Qiialis  quantufq;  Vir  erat 
 
 Sua  libentiffime  agnovit  aetas  : 
 
 Et  fi  quid  Praefuli  aut  Scriptori  ad  famam  valent 
 
 Mens  altiflima, 
 
 Ingenii  perfpicacis  et  fuba6ti  Vis, 
 
 Antmufq;  plus,  fimplex.  candidus,  liberalisj 
 
 Mortui  baud  facile  evanefcet  memoria. 
 
 Obiit  Bathonias  i6  Kalend.  Julii, 
 
 A.  D.  1752. 
 
 Annos  natus  60. 
 
 NOTES 
 
[  1«  ] 
 
 NOTES    TO    THE    PREFACE 
 
 BY      THE 
 
 EDITOR. 
 
 D 
 
 Page  xl.     [A.] 
 
 |R.  Butler,  when  Bifliop  of  Brijlol^  put  up  a  Crof?, 
 a  plain  piece  of  marble  inlaid,  in  the  chapel  of  his 
 Epifcopal  houfe.  This,  which  was  intended  by  the  blame- 
 lefs  Prelate  merely  as  a  fign  or  memorial,  that  true  Chrif- 
 tians  are  to  bear  their  Crofs,  and  not  to  be  afhamcd  of 
 following  a  Crucified  Mafter,  was  confidered  as  afford- 
 ing a  prefumption  that  he  was  fecretly  inclined  to  Popifh 
 forms  and  ceremonies,  and  had  no  great  diflike  to  Popery 
 itfelf.  And,  on  account  of  the  offence  it  occafioned,  both 
 at  the  time  and  fmce,  it  were  to  be  wifhed,  in  prudence,  it 
 had  not  been  done. 
 
 Page  xvi.     [B], 
 
 Many  of  the  fentiments,  in  thefe  Two  Difcodrfes  of 
 Bifhop  Butler,  concerning  the  Sovereign  Good  of 
 man ;  the  irapofTibility  of  procuring  it  in  the  prefent 
 life ;  the  unfatisfa6lorinefs  of  earthly  enjoyments ;  to'j-e- 
 ther  with  the  Somewhat  beyond  and  above  tiiem  all, 
 which  once  attained,  there  will  reft  nothing  further  to 
 be  wifhed  or  hoped  ;  and  which  is  then  only  to  be  ex- 
 pected, when  we  fhall  have  put  off  this  mortal  body,  and  our 
 
 union 
 
Ix  NOTES  TO  THiE  PREFACE 
 
 Uhion  with  God   fhall  be   complete;    occur  in  Hooker  i 
 EccUf..iJlkal  Polity,  Book  I.  §  xi. 
 
 Page  xxii.     [C]. 
 
 When  the  firfl  edition  of  this  Preface  was  publifhed^ 
 1  had  in  vain  endeavoured  to  procure  a  fight  of  the  pa- 
 pers, in  which  Bifhop  Butler  was  accufed  of  having 
 died  a  Papifl-,  and  Archbifhop  Secker's  replies  to'  them  ; 
 though  1  well  remembered  to  have  read  both,  when  they 
 firft  appeared  in  the  public  prir.ts.  But  a  learned  Pro-, 
 fefl()r  in  the  univerfity  of  Oxford  has  furnifhed  me  with  the 
 v/hole  controverfy  in  its  original  form ;  a  brief  hiftory  of 
 which  it  may  not  be  unacceptable  to  offer  here  to  the 
 Curious  reader. 
 
 The  attack  was  opened  in  the  vear  1767,  in  an  anony- 
 rtious  pamphlet,  intitled  T^he  Root  of  Protrjiant  Errors 
 ixainined:  in  which  the  author  aflerted,  that  "  by  an 
 Anecdote  lately  given  him,  that  "  fame  Prelate,"  (who 
 at  the  bottom  of  the  page  is  called  B — p  of  D — m) 
 ''  is  faid  to  have  died  in  the  communion  of  a  church, 
 "  that  makes  much  ufe  of  Saints,  Saints  Days,  and  al! 
 "  the  trumpery  of  Saint  Worfhip."  When  this  re- 
 markable facl,  now  firft  divulged,  came  to  be  generally 
 known,  it  occafioned,  as  might  be  expected,  no  little 
 alarm  :  and  intelligence  of  it  was  no  fooner  conveyed 
 to  Archbifhop  Secker,  than  in  a  fhort  letter,  ligned 
 Mijotftudes^  and  printed  in  the  St.  yames's  Chro7iicU 
 of  May  9,  he  called  upon  the  writer  to  produce  his 
 authority  for  publifhing  "  fo  grofs  and  fcandalous  a 
 "  falfhood."  To  this  challenge  an  immediate  anfwer 
 was  returned  by  the  author  of  the  pamphlet,  who,  now 
 aiTuming  the  name  of  Philchuihercs,  informed  Mfoffcudcs, 
 through  the  channel  of  the  fame  paper,  that  "  fuch  Anec- 
 ''  dote  had  been  given  him  ;  and  that  he  was  yet  of 
 "  opinion  there  is  not  any  thing  improbable  in  it,  when 
 "  it  is  confidered  that  the  fame  Prelate  put  up  the  Popifli 
 "  infgnia  cf  the  Crcfs  in  his  chapel,  when  at  BrijJol ; 
 "  and  in  his  laft  Epifcopal  Charge  has  fquinted  very  much 
 "  towards  that  Supcrftition."  Here  we  find  the  accufation 
 not  only  repeated^  but  fupported  by  reafons,  fuch  as  they 
 
 arc  i 
 
B  Y    T  H  E    E  D  I  T  O  R.  Ixi 
 
 ju-e ;  of  which  It  feemed  necefliiry,  that  fome  notice 
 fhould  be  taken :  nor  did  the  ArchbHhop  conceive  it 
 unbecoming  his  own  dignity  to  fland  up  on  this  occa- 
 Hon,  as  the  vindicator  of  Innocence  agninft  the  calum^ 
 niator  of  the  helplefs  dead.  Accordingly,  in  a  fecond 
 letter  In  the  fame  news- paper  of  May  23,  and  fubfcribed 
 Mifopfeudcs^  as  before ;  after  reciting  from  Bi{hop  BuTr- 
 i.er's  Sermon  before  the  Lords  the  very  paflage,  here 
 printed  in  the  Preface,  and  obferving  that  "  there  are, 
 '*■  in  the  fame  Sermon,  declarations,  as  ftrong  as  can 
 "  be  made,  againll  temporal  pwnifl:iments  for  Herefy, 
 "  Schifm,  or  even  for  Idolatry  j"  his  Grace  cxprefles 
 himfelf  thus  :  "  Now  he  (Bilhop  Butler)  was  uni- 
 "  verfally  efteemcd,  throughout  his  life,  a  man  of  ftri^l. 
 "  piety  and  honefiy,  as  well  as  uncommon  abilities.  Me 
 *'  gave  all  the  proofs,  public  and  private,  which  his  fta- 
 "  tion  led  him  to  give,  and  they  were  decifive  and 
 *'  daily,  of  his  continuing  to  the  laft  a  fincere  member  of 
 "  the  church  of  England.  Nor  had  ever  any  of  his  ac-r 
 "  quaintance,  or  molt  intimate  friends,  nor  have  they  to 
 "  this  day,  the  leaft  doubt  of  it."  As  to  putting  up  a  Crof^ 
 in  his  chapel,  the  Archbifliop  frankly  ov/ns,  that  for  him- 
 felf he  wifhes  he  had  not  j  and  thinks  that  in  io  doing  the 
 Bifhop  did  amifs.  But  then  he  ailsis,  "  Can  that  be  op- 
 "  pofed,  as  any  proof  of  Popery,  to  all  the  evidence  011 
 "  the  other  fide ;  or  even  to  the  Tingle  evidence  of  the 
 "  above-mentioned  Sermon  ?  Mcft  of  our  churches  have 
 "  Croffes  upon  them  :  Are  they  therefore  Popifh  churches  ? 
 "  The  Lutherans  have  more  than  CrofTes  in  theirs  :  Are 
 «  the  Lutherans  therefore  Paplfts  ?"  And  as  to  the  Charge^ 
 no  Papift,  his  Grace  remarks,  would  have  fpokcn  as 
 Bifnop  Butler  there  does,  of  the  obfervances  peculiar 
 to  Roman  Catholics,  fome  of  which  he  exprefly  cenfures 
 as  wrong  and  fuperftitious,  and  others,  as  made  fub- 
 fervient  to  the  purpofes  of  fuperftltion,  and,  on  thefe  ac-^ 
 .counts,  abolifhed  at  the  Reformation,  After  the  publi- 
 cation of  this  letter,  Philelcuiheros  replied  in  a  fhort  de- 
 fence of  his  own  conduct,  but  without  producino-  any 
 thing  new  In  confirmation  of  what  he  had  advanced. 
 And  here  the  controverfy,  fo  far  as  tiic  two  principals 
 were  concerned,  fecms  to  have  ended. 
 
Ixli         NOTES  TO  THE  PREFACE 
 
 But  the  difpute  was  not  fufFcred  to  die  away  quite  fo 
 foon.  For  in  the  ilime  year,  and  in  the  fame  news- 
 paper o^  July  21,  another  letter  appeared;  In  which  the 
 author  not  only  contended  that  the  Crofs  in  the  Epifco- 
 pal  chapel  at  Brijioly  and  the  Charge  to  the  clergy  of 
 Durham  in  1751,  amount  to  full  proof  of  a  ftrong  at- 
 tachment to  the  idolatrous  communion  of  the  church  of 
 Rome,  but,  with  the  reader's  leave,  he  would  fain  ac- 
 count for  the  Bifbop's  "  tendency  this  way."  And  this 
 he  attempted  to  do,  "  from  the  natural  melancholy  and 
 gloominefs  of  Dr.  Butler's  difpofition  ;  from  his  great 
 fondnefs  for  the  lives  of  Romifh  Saints,  and  their  books 
 of  myftic  piety ;  from  his  drawing  his  notions  of  teach- 
 \n<y  men  religion,  not  from  the  New  Teftament,  but 
 from  philofophical  and  political  opinions  of  his  own ; 
 and  above  all,  from  his  tranfition  from  a  fl:ri(5t  Difienter 
 amongft  the  Prefbytcrians  to  a  rigid  Churchman,  and 
 his  fudden  and  unexpe6led  elevation  to  great  wealth 
 and  dignity  in  the  church."  The  attack  thus  renewed 
 excited  the  Archbifhop's  attention  a  fecond  time,  and  drew 
 from  him  a  frefli  anfwer,  fubfcribed  alfo  A^ifopfeudeSj  in 
 the  St,  James's  Chronicle  of  Auguft  4.  In  this  letter 
 our  excellent  Metropolitan,  firft  of  all  obliquely  hinting 
 at  the  unfalrnefs  of  fitting  in  judgment  on  the  charac- 
 ter of  a  man  v/ho  had  been  dead  1 5  years  ;  and  then  re- 
 minding his  correfpondent,  that  "  full  proof  had  been 
 already  publifhed  that  Bifliop  Butler  abhorred  Popery 
 as  a  vile  corruption  of  Chriliianlty,  and  that  it  might  be 
 proved,  if  needful,  that  he  held  the  Pope  to  be  Anti- 
 chriili"  (to  which  deciiive  tellimonies  of  undoubted 
 avcrfion  from  the  Romifh  church  another  is  alfo  added 
 in  the  Poftfcript,  his  taking,  when  promoted  to  the  See 
 of  Durham^  for  his  domeftic  chaplain,  Dr.  Nath. 
 Forfter,  who  had  publiflied,  not  four  years  before,  a 
 Sermon,  intitlcd.  Popery  deftrudive  of  the  Evidence  of 
 Chriftianity ;)  proceeds  to  obferve,  "  That  the  natupal 
 melancholy  of  the  Biihop's  temper  would  rather  have 
 fixed  him  amongft  his  firil  friends,  than  prompted  him 
 to  the  change  he  made :  That  he  read  books  of  all  forts, 
 as  well  as  books  of  myftic  piety,  and  knew  how  to 
 pick  the  good  that  was  in  them  out  of  the  bad  :  That 
 
 his 
 
BY    THE    EDITOR.  Ixiii 
 
 his  opinions  were  expofed  without  referve  in  his  Ana- 
 logy and  his  Sermons,  and  if  the  doctrine  of  cither  be 
 Popifh  or  Unfcriptural,  the  learned  world  hath  mlflakeii 
 ilrangely  in  admiring  both  :  That  inftead  of  being  a  ftri(5l 
 Diffenter,  he  never  was  a  communicant  in  any  Diilent- 
 ing  Aflembly  ;  on  the  contrary,  that  he  went  occafionally, 
 from  his  early  years,  to  the  eftablifhed  worfhip,  and  be- 
 came a  conftant  conform ift  to  it,  when  he  was  barely 
 of  age,  and  entered  himfelf,  in  1714,  of  Oriel  College: 
 That  his  elevation  to  great  dignity  in  the  church,  far  from 
 being  fudden  and  unexpected,  was  a  gradual  and  natural 
 rife,  through  a  variety  of  preferments,  and  a  period  of 
 32  years  :  That  as  Bifliop  of  Durham  he  had  very  little 
 authority  beyond  his  brethren,  and  in  ecclefiaftical  mat- 
 ters had  none  beyond  them ;  a  larger  income  than  moft  of 
 them  he  had  ;  but  this  he  employed,  not,  as  was  infi- 
 nuated,  in  augmenting  the  pomp  of  worfhip  in  his  Ca- 
 thedral, where  indeed  it  is  no  greater  than  in  otliers, 
 but  for  the  purpofes  of  charity,  and  in  the  repairing  of 
 his  houfes.'*  After  thefe  remarks,  the  letter  clofes  with 
 the  following  words  •  ••'  upon  the  whole,  few  acculii- 
 "  tions,  fo  entirely  groundlefs,  have  been  fo  pertinaci- 
 "  oufly,  I  am  unwilling  to  fay  maliciouily,  carried  on,  as 
 ''  the  prefent :  and  furely  it  is  high  time  for  the  au- 
 "  thors  and  abettors  of  it,  in  mere  common  prudence, 
 *'  to  fhew  fome  regard,  if  not  to  truth,  at  leaft  to 
 «  fhame." 
 
 It  only  remains  to  be  mentioned,  that  the  above  let- 
 ters of  Archbiihop  Seeker  had  fuch  an  efFetSl  on  a  writer, 
 who  figned  himfelf  in  the  St,  yatnes^s  Chronicle  of 
 Auguji  1^^  A  Dijfenting  Mlnijler^  that  he  declared  it  as 
 his  opinion,  that  "  the  author  of  the  pamphlet,  called 
 "  The  Root  of  Proteftant  Errors  examined^  and  his  friends, 
 ''  were  obliged  in  candour,  in  juftice,  and  in  honour,  to 
 "  retraft  their  charge,  unlefs  they  could  eftablifh  it  011 
 *'  much  better  grounds  than  had  hitherto  appeared  :" 
 and  he  expreffed  his  "  hopes  that  it  would  be  underftood 
 "  that  the  Diflenters  in  general  had  no  hand  in  the  ac- 
 "  culation,  and  that  it  had  only  been  the  a£l  of  two  or 
 "  three  mifl-aken  men."  Another  perfon,  alfo,  "  a  fo- 
 "  reigner  by  birth,"  as  he  fays  of  himfelf,  who  had  been 
 
 long 
 
Ixlv        NOTES  TO  THE  PREFACE 
 
 lon^  an  admirer  of  Bifliop  Butler,  and  had  perufed 
 with  o-rcat  attention  all  that  had  been  written  on  both 
 fides  in  the  prelent  controverfy,  confefles  he  had  been 
 '•'  wonderfully  pleafed  with  obferving,  with  what  can- 
 "  dour  and  temper,  as  well  as  clearnefs  and  fulidity  he 
 «  was  vindicated  from  the  aiperfions  laid  againft  him.'* 
 All  the  adverfaries  of  our  Prelate  however  had  not  the 
 virtue  or  fenfe  to  be  thus  convinced  ;  fome  of  whom 
 ftill  continued,  under  the  fignatures  o/i  Old  Martin^  La^ 
 i'lmcr^  An  hnfartial  Protejiant^  Paulhzui.  Mijonothos^  to 
 repeat  their  confuted  falflioods  in  the  public  prints  j  as 
 if  the  curfe  of  calumniators  had  fallen  upon  them,  and 
 their  memory,  by  being  long  a  traitor  to  truth,  had 
 taken  at  laft  a  fevere  revenge,  and  compelled  them  to 
 credit  their  own  lie.  The  firft  of  thefe  gentlemen,  Old 
 Martin^  who  dates  from  N-c-Jl-e^  May  29,  from  the 
 rancour  and  malignity  with  which  his  letter  abounds, 
 and  from  the  particular  virulence  he  difcovers  towards 
 the  chara6lers  of  Bifhop  Butler  and  his  Defender,  I 
 conje6lure  to  be  no  other  than  the  very  perfon  who  had 
 already  figured  in  this  difpute,  fo  early  as  the  year  1752  ; 
 of  whofe  work,  intitled  A  ferious  Enquiry  into  the  Ufe 
 and  Importance  of  External  Religion^  the  reader  will  find 
 fome  account  in  the  notes  fubjoined  to  the  Biihop's 
 charge,  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 
 
 Page  xxiii.     [D.] 
 
 The  letters,  with  a  fight  of  which  I  was  indulged  by 
 the  favour  of  our  prefent  mod:  worthy  Metropolitan,  are 
 all,  as  I  remember,  wrapped  together  under  one  cover  ; 
 on  the  back  of  which  is  v^'ritten,  in  Archbifhop  Secker's 
 own  hand,  the  following  words,  or  words  to  this  efFeft, 
 Prefiimptive  Arguments  that  B'ljhop  Butler  did  not  die  a 
 Papiji, 
 
 Page  xxxL  [E]. 
 *'  Far  be  It  from  me,"  fays  the  excellent  Dr.  71  BaU 
 guy  *,  "  to  difpute  the  reality  of  a  moral  principle  in  the 
 "  human  heart.  1  fed  its  exiftence  :  I  clearly  difcern  it^ 
 *'  ufe  and  importance.  But  in  no  refpeft  is  it  more  im- 
 ''  portant,  that  as  it  fuggells  the  idea  of  a  moral  governor, 
 '^  Difcourfe  IX. 
 
 «  Let 
 
BY    THE    EDITOR.  Ixr 
 
 ^  Let  this  idea  be  once  eftaced,  ar.d  the  principle  of  con- 
 «  rdence  will  foon  be  found  weak  and  ineffedhial.  Its 
 *'  influence  on  men's  condutSl  has,  indeed,  been  too 
 *'  much  undervalued  by  fome  philofophical  inquirers. 
 •'  But  be  that  influence,  while  it  lafts,  more  or  lefs  ; 
 *'  it  is  not  a  Jieady  and  permanent  principle  of  a6^ion. 
 *'  Unhappily  we  always  have  it  in  our  power  to  lay  it 
 "  ajleep. — Ns^leSi  alone  will  fupprefs  and  ftifle  it ;  and 
 *'  bring  it  almoft  into  a  ftate  of  ftupefadion.  Nor  can. 
 *'  any  thing,  lefs  than  the  terrors  of  Religion,  awaken  our 
 "  minds  from  this  dangerous  and  deadly  fleep. — It  can 
 ^'  never  be  matter  of  indifference  to  a  thinking  man; 
 *«  whether  he  is  to  be  happy  or  miferable  beyond  the 
 *'  erave." 
 
 grave 
 
 Page  xlii;     [F]. 
 
 77;^  Ignorance  of  Man  is  a  favourite  do^lrine  with 
 Bifhop  Butler,  It  occurs  in  the  fecond  Part  of  the 
 Analogy  ;  it  makes  the  fubje6l  of  his  fifteenth  Sermon  ; 
 and  we  meet  with  it  again  in  his  Charge.  Whether 
 fometimes  it  be  not  carried  to  a  length,  which  is  excef- 
 live,  may  admit  of  doubt. 
 
 Page  xliii.     [G]o 
 
 Admirable  to  this  purpofe  are  the  words  of  Dr.  T,  ^al-^ 
 guy,  in  the  9th  of  his  Difcourfes,  already  referred  to, 
 p.  xxxi.  "  The  doctrine  of  a  life  to  come,  fome  perfons 
 "  will  fay,  is  a  doctrine  of  Natural  Religion  j  and  can 
 ^'  never  therefore  be  properly  alleged  to  fhew  the  Im- 
 *'  portance  of  Rjv'elation.  They  judge  perhaps  from 
 **  the  frame  of  the  world,  that  the  prefent  fyllem  is  im-^ 
 *'  perfect :  they  fee  defigns  in  it,  not  yet  compleated-,  and 
 *'  they  think  they  have  grounds  for  expedling  another 
 *'  flate,  In  which  thefe  deiigns  fliall  be  farther  carried 
 •*  on,  and  brought  to  a  conclufion,  worthy  of  infinite 
 "  Wu'dom.  I  am  not  concerned  to  difpute  th^  jufmfs  of 
 *'  this  reafoning  ;  nor  do  I  wifti  to  difpute  it.  But  how 
 *'  far  will  it  reach  ?  Will  it  lead  us  to  the  Chriftian 
 *'  dodrine  of  a  judgment  to  come  ?  Will  it  give  us  the 
 *'  profpect  of  an  eternity  of  happiaefs  ?    Nothing   of  all 
 
 c  «  this* 
 
Ixvl  NOTES  TO  THE  PREFACE 
 
 *'  this.  It  (hews  us  only,  that  death  is  not  the  end  of  our 
 "  beinn-s ;  that  wc  are  likely  to  pafs  hereafter  into  other 
 *■'-  fylk-ms,  more  fiivourable  than  the  prefent  to  the  great 
 "  ends  of  God's  providence,  the  virtue  and  the  hnpplnefs 
 ''  of  his  intelligent  creatures.  But  into  what  fyftems  wc 
 *'  are  to  be  removed ;  what  new  fcenes  are  to  be  pre- 
 "  fented  to  us,  either  of  pleafure  or  paiji  \  what  new  parts 
 "  we  fhall  have  to  a<5l,  and  to  what  trials  and  temptations 
 "  we  may  yet  be  expofed  \  on  all  thefe  fubje6ls  we  know 
 "  juft  nothing,  lliat-  our  happinefs  for  ever  depends  on 
 '^  our  conduS:  here^  is  a  moft  important  propofitioHj 
 '^  which  we  learn  cnly  from  Revelation" 
 
 Page  xlv.     [HJ. 
 
 '*  In  the  common  affairs  of  life,  common  Experience 
 "  is  fufficient  to  direct  us.  But  will  common  Experience 
 *'  ferve  to  guide  our  judgment  concerning  the  fall  arid 
 "  rcde?nption  of  mankind  ?  From  what  we  fee  every  day, 
 *'  can  we  explain  the  commejicement^  or  foretel  the  difj'o- 
 "  lution^  of  the  world  \  To  judge  of  events  like  thefe,  we 
 "  fhould  be  converfant  in  the  hiftory  of  other  planets  ; 
 "  (hould  be  diftin6i:ly  Informed  of  God's  various  difpen- 
 '•  fations  to  all  the  different  'orders  of  rational  beings. 
 "  Inftead  then  of  grounding  our  religious  opinions  on 
 "  what  %ve  call  Experience^  let  us  apply  to  a  more  cer- 
 "  tain  guide,  \^X.  us  hearken  to  the  Teftimony  of  God 
 "  himfelf.  The  credibility  of  human  tcjTvuo7iy^  and  the 
 *'  conduct  of  human  agents^  are  fubje£ts  perfe(9.1y  within 
 *'  the  reach  of  our  natural  faculties  ;  and  we  ought  to 
 ''  defire  no  firmer  foundation  for  our  belief  of  ReHglon, 
 *'  than  for  the  judgments  we  form  in  the  common  af- 
 "  fairs  of  life:  where  we  fee  a  little  plain  tefflmony 
 "  eafily  outweighs  the  moft  fpecious  conjectures,  and 
 "  not  feldom  even  flrong  probabilities."  Dr.  Balguy's 
 4th  Charge.  See  alfo  an  excellent  pamphlet,  en- 
 titled. Remarks  on  Mr,  Hume's  Efjay  on  the  Natural 
 ELjl'.ry  of  Rdigioiiy  §  5,  And  the  6th  of  Dr.  Powdl*i 
 Difcourfes. 
 
 Page 
 
feY    THE    EDITOR.  Ixvii 
 
 > 
 
 Page  I.  [I]. 
 Dr.  Arthur  Ashley  Sykes,  from  whofe  writings 
 feme  good  may  be  collefted  out  of  a  multltaJe  of  things 
 of  a  contrary  tendency,  in  what  he  is  pleafed  to  call  The 
 Scripture-D-^Sirine  of  Redetription  *,  oppofes  what  is  here 
 advanced  by  Bifliop  Butler j  quoting  his  words,  but 
 without  mentioning  his  name.  If  what  is  faid  above  be 
 not  thought  a  fufficicnt  ahfwer  to  the  objedions  of  this 
 author,  the  reader  may  do  well  to  cohfult  a  Charge  On 
 the  life  and  Ahuf^  of  Philofophy  in  the  Jludy  of  Relh^ioriy 
 by  the  late  Dr.  Powell ;  who  feems  to  me  to  have  had 
 the  obfervations  of  Dr.  Sykes  in  his  view,  where  he  is 
 confuting  the  reafonings  of  certain  philofophizing  Di- 
 vines againft  the  doctrine  of  the  Atonement,  PowelFs 
 Difcourfes,    Charge  111,  p.  342 — 348. 
 
 **  See  the  Obfervations  on  the  Texts  cited  in  his  firfl  Clnpter,  and 
 Alfo  in  Cliapters  the  fifth  and  fixth. 
 
 e  2 
 
THE 
 ANALOGY 
 
 O    F 
 
 RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL    AND    REVEALED, 
 
 TO   THE   CONSTITUTION  AND   COURSE   OF   NATURE. 
 
 <^  3 
 
TO      1^  H  E 
 RIGHT      HONOURABLE 
 
 CHARLES  Lord  TALBOT, 
 
 BARON    OF     HENSOL, 
 
 LORD   HIGH   CHANCELLOR  OF    GREAT 
 BRITAIN, 
 
 THE       FOLLOWING 
 
 TREATISE 
 
 IS,  WITH   ALL    RESPECT,   INSCRIBED, 
 
 IN   ACKNOWLEDGMENT  OF    THE  HIGHEST 
 OBLIGATIONS   TO   THE   LATE 
 
 J.ORD    BISHOP  OF    DURHAM   AND 
 TO   HIMSELF, 
 
 BY    HIS    lordship's 
 MOST    DUTIFUL, 
 MOST    DEVOTED, 
 ANp    r^OST    HUMBLE    SERVANT, 
 
 JOSEPH     BUTLE  R , 
 e  4 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 IF  the  reader  fhould  meet  here  with  any 
 thing,  which  he  had  not  before  attended 
 to,  it  will  not  be  in  the  obfervations  upon 
 the  conftitution  and  courfe  of  nature,  thefe 
 being  all  obvious ;  but  in  the  application  of 
 them:  in  which,  though  there  i^  nothing 
 but  what  appears  to  me  of  fome  real  weighty, 
 and  therefore  of  great  importance ;  yet  he 
 will  obferve  feveral  things,  which  will  ap-? 
 pear  to  him  of  very  little,  if  he  can  think 
 things  to  be  of  little  importance,  which  are 
 of  any  real  weight  at  all,  upon  fuch  a  fubjefl: 
 as  religion.  However,  the  proper  force  of 
 the  following  treatife,  lies  in  the  whole  gene- 
 ral analogy  confidered  together* 
 
 It  is  come,  I  know  not  how,  to  be  taken 
 for  granted,  by  many  perfons,  that  Chriftia- 
 nity  is  not  fo  much  as  a  fubjeft  of  inquiry ; 
 but  that  it  is,  now  at  length,  difcovered  to  be 
 fidtitious.  And  accordingly  they  treat  it,  as 
 if,  in  the  prefent  age,  this  were  an  agreed 
 point,  among  all  people  of  difcernment;  and 
 nothing  remained,  but  to  fet  it  up  as  a  prin- 
 cipal fubjed  of  mirth  and  ridicule,  as  it  were 
 by  way  of  reprifals,  for  its  having  fo  long  in- 
 terrupted the  pleafures   of  the  world.     On 
 
 the 
 
AD  FERTI  S  E  ME  NT. 
 
 the  contrary,  thus  much,  at  leait,  will  be 
 here  found,  not  taken  for  granted,  but  pro- 
 ved, that  any  reafonable  man,  who  will  tho- 
 rouo-hlv  conlider  the  matter,  may  be  as  much 
 alfured',  as  he  is  of  his  own  being,  that  it  is 
 ):iot,  however,  fo  clear  a  cafe,  that  there  is  no- 
 thing in  it.  There  is,  I  think,  ftrong  evi- 
 dence of  its  truth;  but  it  is  certain  no  one  can, 
 upon  principles  of  reafon,  be  fatisfied  of  the 
 contrary.  And  the  pradical  confequence  to 
 be  drawn  fi-om  this,  is  not  attended  to,  by 
 every  one  who  is  concerned  in  it. 
 
 May  1736, 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 JnTRODUCTION   -    r      Pages 
 PART     I. 
 
 pF      NATURAL      RELIGION, 
 
 CHAP.    I. 
 iyF  a  Future  Life     -     ~     -     -     -     17 
 
 CHAP.     II, 
 
 Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and 
 Funifoments ;  and  particularly  of  the  lat- 
 
 ter     ~     y     ^ 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP.  III. 
 
 Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God    Page  62 
 
 CHAP.     IV, 
 
 Of  a  State  of  Probation  as  i??2p  lying  Trial, 
 Difficulties  and  Danger       -     ^     »»      97 
 
 CHAP,     V, 
 
 Of  a  State  of  Frobation,  as  intended  for  7no^ 
 ral  Difcip line  and  Improvement   -     -    109 
 
 CHAP.     VI. 
 
 Of  the  Opinion  ofNeceffity,  confidered  as  in" 
 fuencing  PraBice     -----     i^^ 
 
 CHAP.    VII. 
 
 Of  the  Governme?2t  of  God,  confidered  as  a 
 Scheme  or  Conjiitution,  imperfeBly  compre- 
 hended    -------.     I  6q 
 
 CONCLUSION     .     -     -     -      186 
 
 PART 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 P  A  R  T     II. 
 
 OF      REVEALED      RELIGIOI^. 
 
 CHAP.      I. 
 
 Of  the  Impoi^tance  of  ChriJiiaTiity      Page  195 
 
 CHAP.     II. 
 
 -Of  the  fuppofed  Prefiimptmi  agamji  a  Reve- 
 Iatio?2y  confidered  as  miraculous    -     -     222 
 
 CHAP.     III. 
 
 Of  ou?'  Incapacity  ofjudging^  what  were  to  he 
 expeuled  in  a  Revelation -y  and  the  Credit- 
 hilityy  from  Analogy^  that  it  77111JI  contain 
 Things  appearing  liable  to  Obje^ioJis      233 
 
 C  II  A   P. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP.     IV. 
 
 OfChrijlianityy  co?ifide7'ed  as  a  Scheme  or  Con-- 
 jiitiitmy  imperfectly  comprehended  Page  256" 
 
 CHAP.     V- 
 
 Of  the  particular  Syjlem  of  Chrijlianity )  the 
 Appointment  of  a  Mediator^  and  the  Re^ 
 dcmption  of  the  World  by  him    ~       «  26S 
 
 CHAP.     VL 
 
 Of  the  Want  of  JJniverfality  in  Revelation  t 
 ajid  of  the  fiippofed  'Deficiency  in  the  Proof 
 of  it      ^•.-.*--.-.«.       297 
 
 CHAP.    VIL 
 
 Of  the  particular  Evide?ice  for  Chrifiianity 
 
 326 
 
 CHAP, 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 C  H  A  P.     VIIL 
 
 Of  the  ObjeBions  which  may  be  inade  againjl 
 arguing  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to 
 Religion     ------     Page   380 
 
 CONCLUSION       -     -     -     -    400 
 
 DISSERTATION  I. 
 
 Of   Perfonal  Identity     -      -      -  -     41^ 
 
 DISSERTATION  II. 
 
 Of  th.   Nature  of  Virtue      -      -  -      427 
 
 A  Charge  to   the   Clergy  of  the   Diocefe   of 
 Durham^  1751      •      -     -     -      -      443 
 
 I  N  T  R  O^ 
 
C    I    ] 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 PRobable  evidence  is  eflentlally  diftin- 
 guilhed  from  demonftrative  by  this,  that 
 it  admits  of  degrees ;  and  of  all  variety  of 
 them,  from  the  higheft  moral  certainty,  to 
 the  very  loweft  prefumption.  We  cannot 
 indeed  fay  a  thing  is  probably  true  upon  one 
 very  flight  prefumption  for  it  5  becaufe,  as 
 there  may  be  probabilities  on  both  fides  of  a 
 queftion,  there  may  be  fome  againft  it :  and 
 though  there  be  not,  yet  a  flight  prefumption 
 does  not  beget  that  degree  of  conviction, 
 which  is  implied  in  faying  a  thing  is  probably 
 true.  But  that  the  flighteft  poffible  prefump- 
 tion is  of  the  nature  of  a  probability,  ap- 
 pears from  hence ;  that  fuch  low  prefumption 
 often  repeated,  will  amount  even  to  moral 
 certainty.  Thus  a  man's  having  obferved 
 the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide  to-day,  affords 
 fome  fort  of  prefumption,  though  the  lov/eft 
 imaginable,  that  it  may  happen  again  to- 
 morrow ;  but  the  obfervation  of  this  event 
 for  fo  many  days,  and  months,  and  ages  to- 
 gether, as  it  has  been  obferved  by  mankind, 
 gives  us  a  full  affurance  that  it  will. 
 
 B  That 
 
2         INTR  0  DUCriO  N. 
 
 That  which  chiefly  conflitutes  Probability 
 is  exprefled  in    the  word   Likely,  /.  e,  like 
 feme  truth  %  or  true  event;  like  it,  in  itfelf, 
 in  its  evidence,  in  fome  more  or  fewer  of  its 
 circumftances.     For  when  we  determine  a 
 thing  to  be  probably  true,  fuppofe  that  an 
 event  has  or  will  come  to  pafs,  'tis  from  the 
 mind's  remarking  in  it  a  likenefs  to  fome 
 other  event,  which  we  have  obferved    has 
 come  to  pafs.    And  this  obfervation  forms, 
 in  numberlefs  daily  inftances,  a  prefumption, 
 opinion,  or  full  conviftion,  that  fuch  event 
 has  or  will  come  to  pafs ;  according  as  the 
 obfervation  is,  that  the  like  event  has  fome- 
 times,  moft  commonly,  or  always  fo  far  as 
 our  obfervation  reaches,  come  to  pafs  at  like 
 diftances  of  time,  or  place,  or  upon  like  oc- 
 cafions.    Hence  arifes  the  belief,  that  a  child, 
 if  it  lives  twenty  years,  will  grow  up  to  the 
 ftature  and   ftrength   of  a  man ;  that    food 
 will  contribute  to  the  prefervation  of  its  life, 
 and   the  want  of  it   for  fuch  a  number  of 
 days,  be  its  certain  defl:rud:ion.     So  likewife 
 the  rule  and  meafurc  of  our  hopes  and  fears 
 concerning  the  fuccefs  of  our  purfuits ;  our 
 expedations  that  others  will  2.3:  fo  and  fo  in 
 fuch  circumilances ;  and  our  judgment  that 
 fuch  actions  proceed  from  fuch  principles ; 
 all  thefe  rely  upon  our  having  obferved  the 
 like  to  what  we  hope,  fear,  expeft,  judge  5  I 
 
 *  Veririmilc. 
 
 fay 
 
INTRO  DUCTION.         3 
 
 fay  upon  our  having  obferved  the  Hke,  either 
 with  refpecft  to  others  or  ourfelves.  And 
 thus,  whereas  the  prince  ^  who  had  always 
 hved  in  a  warm  cKmate,  naturally  concluded 
 in  the  way  of  analogy,  that  there  was  no  fuch 
 thing  as  water's  becoming  hard ;  becaufe  he 
 had  always  obferved  it  to  be  fl^id  and  yield- 
 ing :  we  on  the  contrary,  from  analogy  con- 
 clude, that  there  is  no  prefumption  at  all 
 againft  this :  that  'tis  fuppofcable,  there  may 
 be  froft  in  Eiigla?id  any  given  day  in  January 
 next ;  probable  that  there  will  on  fome  day 
 of  the  month  ;  and  that  there  is  a  moral  cer- 
 tainty, /.  e,  ground  for  an  expeftation  with-' 
 out  any  doubt  of  it,  in  fome  part  or  other  of 
 the  winter. 
 
 Probable  evidence.  In  its  very  nature,  af- 
 fords but  an  imperfed  kind  of  information ; 
 and  is  to  be  confidered  as  relative  only  to 
 beings  of  limited  capacities.  For  nothing 
 which  is  the  poifible  objed;  of  knowledge, 
 whether  pafl,  prefent,  or  future,  can  be  pro- 
 bable to  an  infinite  Intelligence  ;  lince  it  can- 
 not but  be  difcerned  abfolutely  as  it  is  in  it- 
 felf,  certainly  true,  or  certainly  falfe.  But  to 
 Us,  probability  is  the  very  guide  of  life. 
 
 From  thefe  things  it  follows,  that  in  quef- 
 tions  of  difficulty,  or  fuch  as  are  thought  fo, 
 
 ^  The  flory  is  told  by  Mr.  Locke  in  the  Chapter  of  Pro- 
 bability, 
 
 B  2  where 
 
4         INTRO  D  UCriON. 
 
 where  more  fatisfadlory  evidence  cannot  be 
 had,  or  is  not  feen ;  if  the  refult  of  examina- 
 tion be,  that  there  appears  upon  the  whole, 
 any  the  loweft  prefumption  on  one  fide,  and 
 none  on  the  other,  or  a  greater  prefumption 
 on  one  fide,  though  in  the  loweft  degree 
 greater;  this  determines  the  queftion,  even 
 in  matters  of  fpeculation;  and  in  matters  of 
 pradice,  will  lay  us  uiider  an  abfolute  and 
 formal  obligation,  in  point  of  prudence  and 
 of  intereft,  to  ad  upon  that  prefumption  or 
 low  probability,  though  it  be  fo  low  as  to 
 leave  the  mind  in  very  great  doubt  which  is 
 the  truth.  For  furely  a  man  is  as  really  bound 
 in  prudence,  to  do  what  upon  the  whole  ap- 
 pears, according  to  the  beil  of  his  judgment, 
 to  be  for  his  happinefs,  as  what  he  certainly 
 knows  to  be  fo.  Nay  further,  in  queftions 
 of  great  confequence,  a  reafonable  man  will 
 think  it  concerns  him  to  remark  lower  pro- 
 babilities and  prefumptions  than  thefe;  fuch 
 as  amount  to  no  more  than  ihowing  one  lide 
 of  a  queftion  to  be  as  fuppofeable  and  credible 
 as  the  other:  nay,  fuch  as  but  amount  to 
 much  lefs  even  than  this.  For  numberlefs 
 inftances  might  be  mentioned  refpeding  the 
 common  purfuits  of  life,  where  a  man  would 
 be  thought,  in  a  literal  fenfe,  diftraded,  who 
 would  not  ad,  and  with  great  application  too, 
 not  only  upon  an  even  chance,  but  upon  much 
 lefs,  and  where  the  probability  or  chance  was 
 greatly  againft  his  fucceeding  \ 
 
 «  See  Chap,  vl.  Part  II. 
 
 It 
 
INTRO  D  UCriO  N.  5 
 
 It  is  not  my  defign  to  inquire  further  into 
 the  nature,  the  foundation,  and  meafure  of 
 probability  ;  or  whence  it  proceeds  that  /ike- 
 nefs  iliouid  beget  that  prefumption,  opinion, 
 and  full  con.^  idtion,  which  the  human  mind 
 is  formed  to  receive  from  it,  and  which  it  does 
 neceffarily  produce  in  every  one  ;  or  to  guard 
 againft  the  errors,  to  which  reafoning  from 
 analogy  is  liable.  This  belongs  to  the  fubjecfl 
 of  logic  'y  and  is  a  part  of  that  fubjed:  which 
 has  not  yet  been  thoroughly  coniidered.  Indeed 
 I  ihall  not  take  upon  me  to  fay,  how  far  the 
 extent,  compafs,  and  force,  of  analogical  rea- 
 foning, can  be  reduced  to  general  heads  arid 
 rules ;  and  the  whole  be  formed  into  a  fyftem. 
 But  though  fo  little  in  this  way  has  been  at- 
 tempted by  thofe  who  have  treated  of  our 
 intelledlual  powers,  and  the  exercife  of  them; 
 this  does  not  hinder  but  that  we  may  be,  as 
 we  unqueftionably  are,  affured,  that  analogy 
 is  of  weight,  in  various  degrees,  towards  de- 
 termining our  judgment,  and  our  pracftice. 
 Nor  does  it  in  any  wife  ceafe  to  be  of  weight 
 in  thofe  cafes,  becaufe  perfons,  either  given  to 
 difpute,  or  who  require  things  to  be  ftated 
 with  greater  exadlnefs  than  our  faculties  ap- 
 pear to  admit  of  in  pradlical  matters,  may  find 
 other  cafes  in  which  'tis  not  eafy  to  fay, 
 whether  it  be,  or  be  not,  of  any  weight  3  or  in- 
 ftances  of  feeming  analogies,  which  are  really 
 of  none.  It  is  enough  to  the  prefent  purpofe 
 to  obferve,  that  this  general  way  of  arguing 
 
 B  3  is 
 
6  INrRODUCriON. 
 
 is  evidently  natural,  juft,  and  conclufive.  For 
 there  is  no  man  can  make  a  queftion  but  that 
 the  fun  will  rife  to-morrow ;  and  be  ktn^ 
 where  it  is  f:en  at  all,  in  the  figure  of  a  circle, 
 and  not  in  that  of  a  fquare. 
 
 \  Hence,  namely  from  analogical  reafoning, 
 O'rigen  ^  has  with  Angular  fagacity  obferved, 
 that  he  who  believes  the  Scripture  to  have  pro^ 
 ceeded  from  him  who  is  the  Author  of  Nature^ 
 may  well  expedi  to  find  the  fame  fort  of  difiicul- 
 ties  in  ity  as  are  found  in  the  confiitution  ofNa^ 
 tare.  And  in  a  like  way  of  reflexion  it  may 
 be  added,  that  he  who  denies  the  Scripture 
 to  have  been  from  God  upon  account  of  thefe 
 difficulties,  may,  for  the  very  fame  reafon,  de- 
 ny the  world  to  have  been  formed  by  him. 
 On  the  other  hand,  if  there  be  an  analogy  or 
 likenefs  between  that  fyftem  of  things  and 
 difpenfation  of  Providence,  which  revelation 
 informs  us  of,  and  that  fyftem  of  things  and 
 difpenfation  of  Providence,  which  experience 
 together  with  reafon  informs  us  of,  /.  e,  the 
 knovv'n  courf ;  of  Nature  ;  this  is  a  prefump- 
 tion,  that  they  have  both  the  fame  author  and 
 caufe ;  at  leaft  fo  far  as  to  anfwer  objed:ions 
 againil  the  former's  being  from  God,  drawn 
 from  any  thing  which  is  analogical  or  fimilar 
 to  what  is  in  the  latter,  which  is  acknow- 
 
 ^  Xpy\  fxsv  roi  ys  rov  octtx^  Trapa^e^.ausvov  ra  Trrla'avTog  tov 
 Hoa-fMOV  Eivai  rcxvTcx^  rag  y^cKpag  TTETrda-^ai^  oti  ocra  Trspl  rrig  hticteco; 
 cuTTavTa  To7g  ^m^o-i  tov  7rEf\  aurrii  Xoyot/,  TWja  km  Trspi  T«y 
 7poi!p'2v,     Philocal.  p.  23.  Ed.  Cant. 
 
 I  ledged 
 
INTR  0  D  UCriO  N.  7 
 
 ledged   to  be  from  him :  for  an  Author  of 
 Nature  is  here  fuppofcd. 
 
 Forming  our  notions  of  the  conftitution 
 and  government  of  the  world  upon  reafoning> 
 without  foundation  for  the  principles  which 
 we  alTume,  whether  from  the  attributes  of 
 God  or  any  thing  elfcj  is  building  a  world  up- 
 on hypothefis,  like  Des  Cartes,  Forming  our 
 notions  upon  reafoning  from  principles  which 
 are  certain,  but  applied  to  cafes  to  which  we 
 have  no  ground  to  apply  them,  (like  thofe 
 who  explain  the  ftrudlure  of  the  human  body, 
 and  the  nature  of  difeafes  and  medicines  from 
 mere  matliematics  without  fufficient  dataj 
 is  an  error  much  a- kin  to  the  former :  fmce 
 what  is  alTumed  in  order  to  make  the  reafon- 
 ing applicable,  is  Hypothefis.  But  it  muft  be 
 allowed  juft,  to  join  abftradl  reafonings  with 
 the  obfcrvation  of  fadis,  and  argue  from  fuch 
 fad:s  as  are  known,  to  others  that  are  like 
 them ;  from  that  part  of  the  Divine  govern- 
 ment over  intelligent  creatures  which  comes 
 under  our  view,  to  that  larger  and  more  ge- 
 neral government  over  them,  which  is  beyond 
 it  j  and  from  what  is  prefent,  to  colled:,  what 
 is  likely,  credible,  or  not  incredible,  will  be 
 hereafter. 
 
 This  method  then  of  concluding  and  de- 
 termining being  pracflical,  and  what,  if  we 
 will  aft  at  all,  we  cannot  but  ad:  upon  in  the 
 
 B  4  common 
 
8  INTRODUCTION. 
 
 common  purfiiits  of  life;  being  evidently 
 conclufive,  in  various  degrees,  proportionable 
 to  tlie  deizree  and  exadlnefs  of  the  w^hole 
 analogy  or  likenefs ;  and  having  fo  great  au- 
 thority for  its  introdudion  into  the  fubjed  of 
 religion,  even  revealed  religion ;  my  delign 
 is  to  apply  it  to  that  fubjeft  in  general,  both 
 natural  and  revealed  :  taking  for  proved,  that 
 there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  Nature,  and 
 natural  governor  of  the  world.  For  as  there 
 is  no  prefumption  againft  this  prior  to  the 
 proof  of  it :  fo  it  has  been  often  proved  w^ith 
 accumulated  evidence ;  from  this  argument 
 of  analogy  and  final  caufes  ;  from  abftrad: 
 reafonings ;  from  the  mofl  antient  tradition 
 and  teftimony ;  and  from  the  general  confent 
 of  mankind.  Nor  does  it  appear,  fo  far  as  I 
 can  find,  to  be  denied,  by  the  generality  of 
 thofe  who  profefs  themfelves  diffatisfied  with 
 the  evidence  of  religion. 
 
 As  there  are  fome,  who,  inftead  of  thus 
 attending  to  what  is  in  fad:  the  conftitution 
 of  Nature,  form  their  notions  of  God's  go- 
 vernment uponhypothefis:  fo  there  are  others, 
 who  indulge  themfelves  in  vain  and  idle  fpe- 
 culations,  how  the  world  might  poflibly  have 
 been  framed  otherwife  than  it  is ;  and  upon 
 luppotition  that  things  might,  in  imagining 
 that  they  fhould,  have  been  difpofed  and  car- 
 ried on  after  a  better  model,  than  what  appears 
 in  the  prefent  diljpofition  and  condud  of  them. 
 9  Suppofe 
 
INTRO  DUCriO  K  9 
 
 Suppofe  now  a  perfon  of  fuch  a  turn  of  mind, 
 logo  on  with  his  reveries,  till  he  had  at  length 
 fixt  upon  fome  particular  plan  of  Nature,  as 
 
 appearing   to    him    the   beft. One   jfhall 
 
 fcarce  be  thought  guilty  of  detraftion  againft 
 human  underftanding,  if  one  fhould  lay,  even 
 beforehand,  that  the  plan  which  this  fpecula- 
 tive  perfon  would  fix  upon,  though  he  were 
 the  wifeft  of  the  fons  of  men,  probably  would 
 not  be  the  very  beft,  even  according  to  his  own 
 notions  of  6eji ;  whether  he  thought  that  to 
 be  fo,  which  afforded  occafions  and  motives 
 for  the  exercife  of  the  greateft  virtue,  or  which 
 was  produftive  of  the  greateft  happinefs,  or 
 that  thefe  two  were  neceflarily  connected,  and 
 run  up  into  one  and  the  fame  plan.  However, 
 it  may  not  be  amifs  once  for  all  to  fee,  what 
 would  be  the  amount  of  thefe  emendations 
 and  imaginary  improvements  upon  the  fyftem 
 of  nature,  or  how  far  they  would  miflead  us. 
 And  it  feems  there  could  be  no  flopping,  till 
 we  came  to  fome  fuch  conclufions  as  thefe : 
 That  all  creatures  fhould  at  fix^ft  be  made  as 
 perfed  and  as  happy,  as  they  were  capable  of 
 ever  being:  That  nothing,  to  be  fure,  of  ha- 
 zard or  danger  fhould  be  put  upon  them  to 
 do;  fome  indolent  perfons  would  perhaps 
 think  nothing  at  all :  or  certainly,  that  cf- 
 fed:ual  care  fliould  be  taken,  that  they  fliould, 
 whether  neceflarily  or  not,  yet  eventually  and 
 in  facl;,  always  do  what  was  right  and  moft 
 conducive    to    happinefs,   which  would   be 
 
 thought 
 
lo        INTRODUCTION. 
 
 thought  eafyfor  infinite  power  to  effedl;  ei- 
 ther by  not  giving  them  any  principles  which 
 would  endanger  their  going  wrong ;  or  by 
 laying  the  right  motive  of  adion  in  every 
 inftance  before  their  nminds  continually  in  fo 
 ftrong  a  manner,  as  would  never  fail  of  in- 
 ducing them  to  ad:  conformably  to  it :  and 
 that  the  whole  method  of  government  by 
 punifliments  fhould  be  rejected,  as  abfurd; 
 as  an  awkward  round-about  method  of  car- 
 rying things  on ;  nay  as  contrary  to  a  princi- 
 pal purpofe,  for  which  it  would  be  fuppofed 
 creatures  were  made,  namely  happinefs. 
 
 Now,  without  confidering  what  is  to  be  faid 
 in  particular  to  the  feveral  parts  of  this  train 
 of  folly  and  extravagance ;  what  has  been 
 above  intimxated,  is  a  full  dired  general  an-r 
 fwer  to  it,  namely,  that  we  may  fee  before- 
 hand that  we  have  not  faculties  for  this  kind  of 
 fpeculation.  For  though  it  be  admitted,  that 
 from  the  firft  principles  of  our  nature,  we 
 unavoidably  judge  or  determine  fome  ends 
 to  be  abfolutely  in  themfelves  preferable  to 
 others,  and  that  the  ends  now  mentioned,  or 
 if  they  run  up  into  one,  that  this  one  is  ab- 
 folutely the  beft ;  and  confequently  that  we 
 muft  conclude  the  ultimate  end  defigned,  in 
 the  conftitution  of  Nature  and  condud  of 
 Providence,  is  the  moft  virtue  and  happinefs 
 pofTible :  yet  we  are  far  from  being  able  to 
 judge,  what  particular  difpofition  of  things 
 
 would 
 
INTRODUCTION.       ii 
 
 would  be  moft  friendly  and  affiflant  to  vir- 
 tue ;  or  what  means  might  be  abfolutely  ne- 
 cefTary  to  produce  the  moft  happinefs  in  a 
 fyftem  of  fuch  extent  as  our  own  world  may 
 be,  taking  in  all  that  is  paft  and  to  come, 
 though  we  ihould  fuppofc  it  detached  from  the 
 whole  of  things.  Indeed  we  are  fo  far  from 
 being  able  to  judge  of  this;  that  we  are  not 
 judges  what  may  be  the  neceffary  means  of 
 raifmg  and  conducting  one  perfon  to  the  high- 
 eft  perfe6tion  and  happinefs  of  his  nature. 
 Nay  even  in  the  httle  affairs  of  the  prefent 
 life,  we  find  men  of  different  educations  and 
 ranks  are  not  competent  judges  oi  the  con- 
 dud  of  each  other.  Our  whole  nature  leads 
 us  to  afcribe  all  moral  perfection  to  God,  and 
 to  deny  all  imperfedion  of  him.  ~^And  this 
 will  for  ever  be  a  pradical  proof  of  his  moral 
 charader,  to  fuch  as  will  confider  what  a  prac- 
 tical proof  is  ;  becaufe  it  is  the  voice  of  God 
 fpeaking  in  us.  And  from  hence  we  con- 
 clude, that  virtue  muft  be  the  happinefs,  and 
 vice  the  mifery,  of  every  creature;  and  that 
 regularity  and  order  and  right  cannot  but 
 prevail  finally  in  a  univerfe  under  his  govern- 
 ment. But  we  are  in  no  fort  judges,  what 
 are  the  neceffary  means  of  accomplilliing  this 
 end. 
 
 Let  us  then,  inftead  of  that  idle  and  not 
 very  innocent  employment  of  forming  ima- 
 ginary models  of  a  world,  and  fchemes  of 
 
 governing 
 
j2        INTR  ODUCTION. 
 
 governing  it,  turn  our  thoughts  to  what  wc 
 experience  to  be  the  condud:  of  Nature  with 
 relpetfl  to  .intelligent  creatures  ;  which  may 
 be  refoived  into  general  laws  or  rules  of  ad- 
 miniftration,  in  the  fame  way  as  many  of  the 
 laws  of  nature  refpedting  inanimate  matter 
 may  be  colleded  from  experiments.  And  let 
 us  compare  the  known  conftitution  and  courfe 
 of  things,  with  what  is  faid  to  be  the  moral 
 fyftem  of  nature ;  the  acknowledged  difpen- 
 fations  of  Providence,  or  that  government 
 which  we  find  ourfelves  under,  with  what 
 religion  teaches  us  to  believe  and  expecft^  and 
 fee  whether  they  are  not  analogous  and  of  a 
 piece.  And  upon  fuch  a  comparifon^  it  will 
 I  think  be  found,  that  they  are  very  much 
 fo :  that  both  may  be  traced  up  to  the  fame 
 general  laws,  and  refoived  into  the  fame  prin- 
 ciples of  divine  condu(fl. 
 
 The  analogy  here  propofed  to  be  confide- 
 red,  is  of  pretty  large  extent,  and  confifts  of 
 feveral  parts  -,  in  fome,  more,  in  others,  lefs, 
 exadl.  In  fom.e  few  inftances  perhaps  it  may 
 amount  to  a  real  pradlical  proof;  in  others 
 jiot  fo.  Yet  in  thefe  it  is  a  confirmation  of 
 what  is  proved  othex"-  ways.  It  will  unde- 
 niably Ihow,  what  too  many  want  to  have 
 fliown  them,  that  the  fyfliem  of  religion  both 
 natural  and  revealed,  confidered  only  as  a 
 fyftcm,  and  prior  to  the  proof  of  it,  is  not  a 
 fubjed  of  ridicule,  unlefs  that  of  Nature  be 
 
 fo 
 
INTRODUCTION.         13 
 
 fo  too.  And  it  will  afford  an  anfwer  to  al- 
 moft  all  objedtions  againft  the  fyftem  both  of 
 natural  and  revealed  religion;  though  not 
 perhaps  an  anfwer  in  fo  great  a  degree,  yet  in 
 a  very  confiderable  degree  an  anfwer,  to  the 
 objeftions  againft  the  evidence  of  it :  for 
 objedions  againft  a  proof,  and  objcftions 
 againft  what  is  faid  to  be  proved,  the  reader 
 will  obferve  are  different  things. 
 
 t>' 
 
 Now  the  divine  government  of  the  world, 
 implied  in  the  notion  of  religion  In  general 
 and  of  Chriftianity, contains  in  it;  That  man- 
 kind is  appointed  to  live  in  a  future  ftate%*, 
 That  there,  every  one  fliall  be  rewarded  or 
 punifhed  ^ ;  rewarded  or  punifhed  refpedtively 
 for  all  that  behaviour  here,  whigh  we  com- 
 prehend under  the  words,  virtuous  or  vitious, 
 morally  good  or  evil  ^ :  That  our  prefent  life 
 is  a  probation,  a  ftate  of  trial  \  and  of  difci- 
 pline  ',  for  that  future  one ;  notwithftand- 
 ing  the  objedions,  which  men  may  fancy 
 they  have,  from  notions  of  Neceffity,  againft 
 there  being  any  fuch  moral  plan  as  this  at 
 all  ^ ;  and  whatever  objedlons  may  appear  to 
 li'3  againft  the  wifdom  and  goodnefs  of  it,  as 
 it  ftands  fo  imperfeftly  made  known  to  us  at 
 prefent  * :  That  this  world  being  in  a  ftate  of 
 apoftacy  and  wickednefs,  and  confequently 
 
 ^  Cb.  I        f  Ch.  ii.        I  Ch.  iii, 
 ^-  Ch.  V,  k  Ch.  vi.  ^  Ch. 
 
 Vil. 
 
 of 
 
14        INTRO  DUCTION. 
 
 of  ruin,  and  the  fenfe  both  of  their  condi- 
 tion and  duty  being  greatly  corrupted  amongft 
 men,  this  gave  occafion  for  an  additional  dif- 
 penfation  of  Providence ;  of  the  utmofl  im- 
 portance "" ;  proved  by  miracles ";  but  con- 
 taining in  it  many  things  appearing  to  us 
 Urange  and  not  to  have  been  expefted  ° ;  a 
 difpenfation  of  Providence,  which  is  a  fcheme 
 or  fyftem  of  things  ^  -,  carried  on  by  the  me- 
 diation of  a  divine  perfon,  the  Meffiah,  in 
 order  to  the  recovery  of  the  v^orld  ^;  yet  not 
 revealed  to  all  men,  nor  proved  v^ith  the 
 ftrongeft  poflible  evidence  to  all  thofe  to 
 whom  it  is  revealed ;  but  only  to  fuch  a  part 
 of  mankind,  and  with  fuch  particular  evi- 
 dence as  the  wifdom  of  God  thought  fit '. 
 The  defign  then  of  the  following  Treatife 
 will  be  to  iliew  that  the  feveral  parts  princi- 
 pally objected  againll  in  this  moral  and  Chrif- 
 tain  difpenfation,  including  its  fcheme,  its 
 publication,  and  the  proof  which  God  has 
 afforded  us  of  its  truth ;  that  the  particular 
 parts  principally  objedcd  againft  in  this 
 whole  difpenfation,  are  analogous  to  what  is 
 experienced  in  the  conftitution  and  courfe  of 
 Nature,  or  Providence ;  that  the  chief  ob- 
 jedions  themfelves  which  are  alledged  againft 
 the  former,  are  no  other,  than  what  may  be 
 alledged  with  like  juftnefs  againft  the  latter^ 
 
 "^  Part  n.  Ch.  i.  «  Ch.  ii.  «  Ch.  iii. 
 
 f  Ch,  iv,  ^  Ch,  V.  '  Ch,  vi,  vii. 
 
 where 
 
INTRODUCTION.       15 
 
 where  they  are  found  in  fad:  to  be  inconclu- 
 five;  and  that  this  argument  from  analogy 
 is  in  general  unanfvverable,  and  undoubtedly 
 of  weight  on  the  fide  of  religion  %  not  with- 
 Handing  the  objedlions  which  may  feem  to 
 lie  againft  it,  and  the  real  ground  which  there 
 may  be  for  difference  of  opinion,  as  to  the 
 particular  degree  of  \veight  which  is  to  be 
 laid  upon  it.  This  is  a  general  account  of 
 what  may  be  looked  for  in  the  following 
 Treatife.  And  I  iliall  begin  it  with  that 
 which  is  the  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and 
 of  all  our  feajs ;  all  our  hopes  and  fears, 
 which  are  of  any  confideration  5  I  mean  a 
 future  life. 
 
 •  Chap.  vlil. 
 
 THE 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY 
 
 O  F 
 
 RELIGION 
 
 T  O       T  H  E 
 
 Conftitution  and  Courfe  of  Nature. 
 
 PARTI. 
 
 Of  Natural    Religion. 
 
 CHAP.     I. 
 
 Of  a  Future  Life. 
 
 STRANGE  difficulties  have  been  raifed 
 by  Ibme  concerning  perfonal  identity,  or 
 the  famenefs  of  hving  agents,  impHed  in  the 
 notion  of  our  exifiing  now  and  hereafter,  or 
 in  any  two  fucceffive  moments  ;  which  who- 
 ever thinks  it  worth  while,  may  fee  conli- 
 dered  in  the  firft  Differ tation  at  the  end  of 
 
 C  this 
 
1 8  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 
 
 this  Trcatlfe.  But  without  regard  to  any  of 
 them  here,  let  us  conlider  what  the  analogy 
 of  nature,  and  the  feveral  changes  which  we 
 have  undergone,  and  thofe  which  we  know 
 we  may  undergo  without  being  deftroyed, 
 fuggeft,  as  to  the  effed:  which  death  may,  or 
 may  not  have  upon  us ;  and  whether  it  be 
 not  from  thence  probable,  that  we  may  fur- 
 vive  this  change,  and  exift  in  a  future  ftate  of 
 life  and  perception. 
 
 I.  From  our  being  born  into  the  prefent 
 world  in  the  helplefs  imperfed:  flate  of  in- 
 fancy, and  having  arrived  from  thence  to 
 mature  age,  we  find  it  to  be  a  general  law 
 of  nature  in  our  own  fpecies,  that  the  fame 
 creatures,  the  fame  individuals,  fhould  exift 
 in  degrees  of  life  and  perception,  with  capa- 
 cities of  aftion,  of  enjoyment  and  fufFer- 
 ing,  in  one  period  of  their  being,  greatly  dif- 
 ferent from  thofe  appointed  them  in  another 
 period  of  it.  And  in  other  creatures  the 
 fame  law  holds.  For  the  difference  of  their 
 capacities  and  ftates  of  life  at  their  birth  (to 
 go  no  higher)  and  in  maturity ;  the  change 
 of  worms  into  flies,  and  the  vaft  enlargement 
 of  their  locomotive  powers  by  fuch  change  : 
 and  birds  and  infedts  burfting  the  fliell  their 
 habitation,  and  by  this  means  entering  into  a 
 new  world,  furnilhed  with  new  accommo- 
 dations for  them,  and  finding  a  new  fphere 
 
 of 
 
Chap.  I.        Of  a  Future  Ltfe^  19 
 
 of  aftion  afligned  them ;  thefe  are  inftances 
 of  this  general  law  of  nature.  Thus  all  the 
 various  and  wonderful  transformations  of  ani- 
 mals are  to  be  taken  into  confideration  here. 
 But  the  ftates  of  life  in  which  we  ourfelves 
 exifted  formerly  in  the  womb  and  in  our  in- 
 fancy, are  almoft  as  different  from  our  pre- 
 fent  in  mature  age,  as  it  is  poflible  to  con- 
 ceive any  two  ftates  or  degrees  of  life  can  be. 
 Therefore,  that  we  are  to  exift  hereafter  in  a 
 ftate  as  different  (fuppofe)  from  our  prefent, 
 as  this  is  from  our  former,  is  but  according 
 to  the  analogy  of  nature  ;  according  to  a  na- 
 tural order  or  appointment  of  the  very  fame 
 kind,  with  what  we  have  already  experi- 
 enced. 
 
 II.  We  know  we  are  endued  with  capaci- 
 ties of  a(flion,  of  happinefs  and  mifery :  for 
 we  are  confcious  of  adiing,  of  enjoying  plea- 
 fure  and  fuffering  pain.  Now  that  we  have 
 thefe  powers  and  capacities  before  death,  is 
 a  prefumption  that  we  fhall  retain  them 
 through  and  after  death  ;  indeed  a  probabi- 
 lity of  it  abundantly  fufficient  to  ad:  upon,  un- 
 lefs  there  be  fome  pofitive  reafon  to  think 
 that  death  is  the  deftrudion  of  thofe  living 
 powers  :  becaufe  there  is  in  every  cafe  a  pro- 
 bability, that  all  things  will  contijiue  as  we 
 experience  they  are,  in  all  refpeds,  except 
 thofe  in  which  we  have  fome  reafon  to  think 
 C  2  thev 
 
20  ^f  ^  Future  Life.  Part  L 
 
 they  will  be  altered.  This  is  that  kind""  of 
 prelumption  or  probability  from  analogy,  ex- 
 prefs'd  in  the  very  word  continuance^  which 
 I'eems  our  only  natural  reafon  for  believing 
 the  courfe  of  the  world  will  continue  to- 
 inorrow,  as  it  has  done  fo  far  as  our  experi- 
 ence or  knowledge  of  hiftory  can  carry  us 
 back.  Nay  it  feems  our  only  reafon  for  be- 
 lieving, that  any  one  fubftance  now  exifting, 
 will  continue  to  exift  a  moment  longer;  the 
 felf-exiftent  fubftance  only  excepted.  Thus 
 if  men  were  alTured  that  the  unknown  event, 
 death,  was  not  the  deftruclion  of  our  faculties 
 of  perception  and  of  aftion,  there  would  be 
 no  apprehenfion,  that  any  other  power  or 
 event  unconnected  with  this  of  death,  would 
 deftroy  thefe  faculties  juft  at  the  inftant  of 
 each  creature's  death  -,  and  therefore  no  doubt 
 but  that  they  would  remain  after  it :  which 
 fliovvs  the  high  probabihty  that  our  living 
 powers  will  continue  after  death,  unlefs  there 
 be  fome  ground  to  think  that  death  is  their 
 deftrudtion  ^  For,  if  it  would  be  in  a  manner 
 
 certain 
 
 I  fay  kind  of  prefumption  or  probability ;  for  I  do  not 
 mean  to  affirm  that  there  is  the  fame  degree  of  convi(5lion, 
 that  our  living  powers  will  continue  after  death,  as  there  is, 
 that  our  fubftances  will. 
 
 **  DeJiru5lion  of  living  puwers^  is  a  manner  of  expreilion 
 unavoidably^  ambiguous  J  and  may  fignify  eitlier  the  dejlruc- 
 tion  of  a  livmg  beings  fo  as  that  the  fame  living  being /hall  he 
 uncapable  of  ever  perceiving  or  a6ling  again  at  all :  Or  th^ 
 deJiruSlion  of  thofe  means  and  inflruments  by  which  it  is  capa-^ 
 4  bU 
 
Chap.  I.        Of  a  Future  Life.  2 1 
 
 certain  that  we  fhould  furvive  death,  provided 
 it  were  certain  that  death  would  not  be  our 
 deftrudlion,  it  muft  be  highly  probable  we 
 fhall  furvive  it,  if  there  be  no  ground  to  think 
 death  will  be  our  deflrudion. 
 
 Now  though  I  think  it  muft  be  acknow- 
 ledged, that  prior  to  the  natural  and  moral 
 proofs  of  a  future  life  commonly  infifted 
 upon,  there  would  arife  a  general  confufed 
 fufpicion,  that  in  the  great  fliock  and  altera- 
 tion which  we  fliall  undergo  by  death,  we, 
 /.  e.  our  living  powers,  might  be  wholly  de- 
 ftroyed  ;  yet  even  prior  to  thofe  proofs,  there 
 is  really  no  particular  diflind:  ground  or  rea- 
 fon  for  this  apprehenlion  at  all,  fo  far  as  I  can 
 find.  If  there  be,  it  muft  arife  either  from 
 the  reafon  of  the  thi?2gy  or  from  the  analogy 
 of  nature. 
 
 But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reafon  of 
 the  thing,  that  death  is  the  deftrudlion  of 
 living  agents,  becaufe  we  know  not  at  all 
 what  death  is  in  itfelf  3  but  only  fome  of  its 
 
 hie  of  its  prefent  Ivfe^  of  its  prefentjlate  of  perception  and  of 
 aSiion,  It  is  here  ufed  in  the  former  fenfe.  When  it  is 
 ufed  in  the  latter,  the  epithet  prefent  is  added.  The  lofs  of 
 a  man's  eye,  is  a  deftru6lion  of  living  powers  in  the  latter 
 fenfe.  But  we  have  no  reafon  to  thirlc  the  de{lru(Elion  of 
 living  powers,  in  the  former  fenfe,  to  be  pofHble  We 
 have  no  more  reafon  to  think  a  being  endued  with  living 
 powers,  ever  lofes  them  during  its  whole  exiftence,  than  to 
 believe  that  a  ftone  ever  acquires  them. 
 
 C  3  effeds. 
 
12  Of  ^  Future  Life.         Part  I. 
 
 efFefts,  fuch  as  the  diflblution  of  flefh,  ikin, 
 and  bones.  And  thefe  effeds  do  in  no  wife 
 appear  to  imply  the  deftrucflion  of  a  Uving 
 agent.  And  befides,  as  we  are  greatly  in  the 
 dark,  upon  what  the  exercife  of  our  living 
 powers  depends,  fo  we  are  wholly  ignorant 
 what  the  powers  themfelves  depend  upon; 
 the  powers  themfelves  as  diftinguifhed,  not 
 only  from  their  adual  exercife,  but  alfo  from 
 the  prefent  capacity  of  exerciiing  them;  and 
 as  oppofed  to  their  deftrudlion  :  for  fleep,  or 
 however  a  fwoon,  fhews  us,  not  only  that 
 thefe  powers  exift  when  they  are  not  exer- 
 cifed,  as  the  paffive  power  of  motion  does  in 
 inanimate  matter ;  but  ihews  alfo  that  they 
 exift,  v/hen  there  is  no  prefent  capacity 
 of  exercifing  them  :  or  that  the  capacities  of 
 exercifing  them  for  the  prefent,  as  \^ell  as  the 
 acftual  exercife  of  them,  may  be  fufpended, 
 and  yet  the  powers  themfelves  remain  ufide- 
 ftroyed.  Since  then  we  know  not  at  all  upon 
 what  the  exiftence  of  our  living  powers  de- 
 pends, this  Ihews  further,  there  can  no  pro- 
 bability be  collected  from  the  reafon  of  the 
 thing,  that  death  will  be  their  deftruftion : 
 becaufe  their  exiftence  may  depend,  upon 
 fomewhat  in  no  degree  affeded  by  death; 
 upon  fomewhat  quite  out  of  the  feach  of 
 this  king  of  terrors.  So  that  there  is  nothing 
 more  certain,  than  that  the  reafon  of  the  thing 
 fhews  us  no  connection  between  death,  and 
 the  deftrudion  of  living  agents.     Nor  can 
 
 we 
 
chap.  I.         Of  a  Future  Life.  23 
 
 we  find  any  thing  throughout  the  whole  ajia- 
 logy  ofNaturCy  to  afford  us  even  the  flighteft 
 prefumptlon,  that  animals  ever  lofe  their  li- 
 ving powers  ;  much  lefs,  if  it  were  poilible, 
 that  they  lofe  them  by  death  -,  for  we  have 
 no  faculties  wherewith  to  trace  any  beyond 
 or  through  it,  fo  as  to  fee  what  becomes  of 
 them.  This  event  removes  them  from  our 
 view.  It  deflroys  the  fenfble  proof,  which 
 we  had  before  their  death,  of  their  being 
 poffeffed  of  living  powers,  but  does  not  ap- 
 pear to  afford  the  leaft  reafon  to  believe  that 
 they  are,  then,  or  by  that  event,  deprived  of 
 them. 
 
 And  our  knowing,  that  they  were  poffeffed 
 of  thefe  powers,  up  to  the  very  period  to 
 which  we  have  faculties  capable  of  tracing 
 them,  is  Itfelf  a  probability  of  their  retaining 
 them,  beyond  it.  And  this  is  confirmed,  and 
 a  fenfible  credibility  is  given  to  it,  by  obferv- 
 ing  the  very  great  and  aflonifhing  changes 
 which  we  have  experienced ;  fo  great,  that 
 our  exiftence  in  another  ftate  of  life,  of  per- 
 ception and  of  action,  will  be  but  according 
 to  a  method  of  providential  condudl,  the  like 
 to  which  has  been  already  exercifed  even 
 with  regard  to  ourfelves;  according  to  a 
 courfe  of  nature,  the  like  to  which  we  have 
 already  gone  through. 
 
 C  4.  However, 
 
2 4.  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 
 
 However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly 
 ienfible,  how  difficult  it  is  to  filence  imagi- 
 nation enough  to  make  the  voice  of  reafon 
 even  diftindtly  heard  in  this  cafe ;  as  we  are 
 accuflomed,  from  our  youth  up,  to  indulge 
 that  forward  delufive  faculty,  ever  obtruding 
 beyond  its  fphere ;  of  fome  affiftance  indeed 
 to  apprehenfion,  but  the  author  of  all  error  : 
 as  we  plainly  lofe  ourfelves  in  grofs  and  crude 
 conceptions  of  things,  taking  for  granted  that 
 we  are  acquainted  with,  what  indeed  we  are 
 wholly  ignorant  of  ^  it  may  be  proper  to  con- 
 fider  the  imaginary  prefumptions,  that  death 
 will  be  our  deftrud:ion,  arifmg  from  thefe 
 kinds  of  early  and  lafting  prejudices;  and  to 
 fhew  how  little  they  can  really  amount  to, 
 even  though  we  cannot  wholly  diveft  our- 
 felves of  them.     And, 
 
 I.  All  prefumption  of  death's  being  the 
 deftmdion  of  living  beings,  muft  go  upon 
 fuppofition  that  they  are  compounded  j  and 
 fo,  difcerptible.  But  fmce  confcioufnefs  is  a 
 fingle  and  indivifible  power,  it  fhould  feem 
 that  the  fubjed:  in  which  it  refides,  muft  be 
 fo  too.  For  were  the  motion  of  any  parti- 
 cle of  matter  abfolutely  one  and  indivifible, 
 fo  as  that  it  fhould  imply  a  contradiction  to 
 fuppofe  part  of  this  motion  to  exift,  and  part 
 not  to  exift,  /.  e,  part  of  this  matter  to  move, 
 and  part  to  be  at  reft  3  then  its  power  of  mo- 
 tion 
 
Chap.  I.        Of  a  Future  Life.  25 
 
 tion  would  be  indivifible ;  and  fo  alfo  would 
 the  fubjed:  in  which  the  power  inheres, 
 namely  the  particle  of  matter  :  for  if  this 
 could  be  divided  into  two,  one  part  might  be 
 moved  and  the  other  at  reft,  which  is  con- 
 trary to  the  fuppofition.  In  like  manner  it 
 has  been  argued  %  and,  for  any  thing  appear- 
 ing to  the  contrary,  juftly,  that  fince  the  per- 
 ception or  confcioufnefs,  which  we  have  of 
 our  own  exiftence,  is  indivifible,  fo  as  that  it 
 is  a  contradicflion  to  fuppofe  one  part  of  it 
 fhould  be  here  and  the  other  there  ;  the  per- 
 ceptive power,  or  the  power  of  confcioufnefs, 
 is  indivifible  too :  and  confequently  the  fub- 
 je-vffc  in  which  it  refides ;  /.  e.  the  confcious 
 Being.  Now  upon  fuppofition  that  living 
 agent  each  man  calls  himfelf,  is  thus  a  fingle 
 being,  which  there  is  at  leaft  no  more  difii- 
 culty  in  conceiving  than  in  conceiving  it  to 
 be  a  compound,  and  of  which  there  is  the 
 proof  now  mentioned ;  it  follows,  that  our 
 organized  bodies  are  no  more  ourfelves  or  part 
 of  ourfelves,  than  any  other  matter  around  us. 
 And  it  is  as  eafy  to  conceive,  how  matter, 
 which  is  no  part  of  ourfelves,  may  be  appro- 
 priated to  us  in  the  manner  which  our  pre- 
 fent  bodies  are  ^  as  how  we  can  receive  im- 
 preffions  from,  and  have  povi'-er  over  any 
 matter.  It  is  as  eafy  to  conceive,  that  we 
 may  exift  out  of  bodies,  as  in  them  :  that 
 
 «  See  Dr.  Clarke's  Letter  to  Mr.  Dodwell^  and  the  de- 
 fences of  it. 
 
 we 
 
26  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 
 
 we  might  have  animated  bodies  of  any  other 
 organs  and  fcnfes  wholly  different  from  thefe 
 now  given  us,  and  that  we  may  hereafter 
 animate  thefe  fame  or  new  bodies  varioufly 
 modified  and  organized  ^  as  to  conceive  how; 
 we  can  animate  fuch  bodies  as  our  prefent. 
 And  laflly,  the  diifolution  of  all  thefe  feveral 
 organized  bodies,  fuppofmg  ourfelves  to  have 
 fucceffively  animated  them,  would  have  no 
 more  conceivable  tendency  to  deftroy  the  liv- 
 ing beings  ourfelves,  or  deprive  us  of  living 
 faculties,  the  faculties  of  perception  and  of 
 aftion,  than  the  diifolution  of  any  foreign 
 matter,  which  we  are  capable  of  receiving 
 imprefTions  from,  and  making  ufe  of  for  the 
 common  occafions  of  life. 
 
 II.  The  fimpliCity  and  abfolute  onenefs  of 
 a  living  agent  cannot  indeed,  from  the  nature 
 of  the  thing,  be  properly  proved  by  experi- 
 mental obfervations.  But  as  theie  fall  in 
 with  the  fuppofition  of  its  unity,  fo  they 
 plainly  lead  us  to  conclude  certainly,  that  our 
 grofs  organized  bodies,  with  which  we  per- 
 ceive the  objects  of  fenfe,  and  with  which 
 we  a<fl:,  are  no  part  of  ourfelves  ;  and  there- 
 fore fhow  us,  that  we  have  no  reafon  to  be- 
 lieve their  deftrudlion  to  be  ours :  even  with- 
 out determining  whether  our  living  fub- 
 ftances  be  material  or  immaterial.  For  we 
 fee  by  experience,  that  men  may  lofe  their 
 limbs,  their  organs   of  fenfe,  and  even  the 
 
 greateft 
 
chap.  I.         Of  a  Future  Life.  27 
 
 greateft  part  of  thele  bodies,  and  yet  remain 
 the  fame  Hving  agents.  And  perfons  can 
 trace  up  the  exillence  of  themfelves  to  a 
 time,  when  the  bulk  of  their  bodies  was  ex- 
 tremely fmall,  in  comparifon  of  what  it  is  in 
 mature  age :  and  we  cannot  but  think,  that 
 they  might  then  have  loft  a  confiderable  part 
 of  that  fmall  body,  and  yet  have  remained 
 the  fame  living  agents ;  as  they  may  now  lofe 
 great  part  of  their  prefent  body,  and  remain 
 fo.  And  it  is  certain,  that  the  bodies  of  all 
 animals  are  in  a  conftant  flux,  from  that 
 never-ceaiing  attrition,  which  there  is  in  every 
 part  of  them.  Now  things  of  this  kind 
 unavoidably  teach  us  to  diftinguifh,  between 
 thefe  living  agents  ourfelves,  and  large  quan- 
 tities of  matter,  in  which  we  are  very  nearly 
 interefted  :  fmce  thefe  may  be  alienated,  and 
 actually  are  in  a  daily  courfe  of  fucceilion, 
 and  changing  their  owners ;  whilft  we  are 
 afTured,  that  each  living  agent  remains  one 
 and  the  fame  permanent  being  ^  And  this 
 general  obfervation  leads  us  on  to  the  follow- 
 ing ones. 
 
 Firft^  That  we  have  no  way  of  determin- 
 ing by  experience,  what  is  the  certain  bulk 
 of  the  living  being  each  man  calls  himfelf: 
 and  yet,  till  it  be  determined  that  it  is  larger 
 in  bulk  than  the  folid  elementary  particles  of 
 
 *  See  Dijprtat'ion  i. 
 
 matter. 
 
28  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 
 
 matter,  which  there  is  no  ground  to  think 
 any  natural  power  can  dillolve,  there  is  no 
 fort  of  reafon  to  think  death  to  be  the  diffo- 
 lution  of  it,  of  the  living  being,  even  though 
 it  fliould  not  be  abfolutely  indifcerptible. 
 
 Seco^idfyy  From  our  being  fo  nearly  related 
 to  and  interefted  in  certain  fyftems  of  matter, 
 fuppofe  our  flelh  and  bones,  and  afterwards 
 ceafing  to  be  at  all  related  to  them,  the  living 
 agents  ourfelves  remaining  all  this  while  un- 
 deftroyed  notwithftanding  fuch  alienation ; 
 and  confequently  thefe  fyftems  of  matter  not 
 being  ourfelves  :  it  follows  further,  that  we 
 have  no  ground  to  conclude  any  other,  fup- 
 pofe internal  fyftems  of  matter,  to  be  the  liv- 
 ing agents  ourfelves  ^  becaufe  we  can  have  no 
 ground  to  conclude  this,  but  from  our  rela- 
 tion to  and  intereft  in  fuch  other  fyftems  of 
 matter :  and  therefore  we  can  have  no  reafon 
 to  conclude,  what  befalls  thofe  fyftems  of 
 matter  at  death,  to  be  the  deftrudlion  of  the 
 living  agents.  We  have  already  feveral  times 
 over  loft  a  great  part  or  perhaps  the  whole  of 
 our  body,  according  to  certain  common  efta- 
 blifhed  laws  of  nature^  yet  we  remain  the 
 fame  living  agents  :  when  we  ftiall  lofe  as 
 great  a  part,  or  the  whole,  by  another  com- 
 mon eftabliftied  law  of  nature,  death;  why 
 may  we  not  alfo  remain  the  fame  ?  That  the 
 alienation  has  been  gradual  in  one  cafe,  and 
 in  the  other  will  be  more  at  once,  does  not 
 
 prove 
 
chap.  I.         Of  a  Future  Life,  29 
 
 prove  any  thing  to  the  contrary.  We  have 
 pafTed  undeftroyed  through  thofe  many  and 
 great  revolutions  of  matter,  fo  peculiarly  ap- 
 propriated to  us  ourfelves ;  why  Ihould  we 
 imagine  death  will  be  fo  fatal  to  us  ?  Nor 
 can  it  be  objedied,  that  what  is  thus  alienated 
 or  loft,  is  no  part  of  our  original  folid  body, 
 but  only  adventitious  matter;  becaufe  we 
 may  lofe  in  tire  limbs,  which  muft  have  con- 
 tained many  folid  parts  and  veffels  of  the 
 original  body:  or  if  this  be  not  admitted, 
 wx  have  no  proof,  that  any  of  thefe  folid 
 parts  are  dilfolved  or  alienated  by  death. 
 Though,  by  the  way,  wx  are  very  nearly  re- 
 lated to  that  extraneous  or  adventitious  mat- 
 ter, whilft  it  continues  united  to  and  diftend- 
 ing  the  feveral  parts  of  our  folid  body.  But 
 after  all;  the  relation  a  perfon  bears  to  thofe 
 parts  of  his  body,  to  which  he  is  the  moll 
 nearly  related  ;  what  does  it  appear  to  amount 
 to  but  this,  that  the  living  agent,  and  thofe 
 parts  of  the  body,  mutually  affed  each  other  ? 
 And  the  fame  thing,  the  fame  thing  in  kind 
 though  not  in  degree,  may  be  faid  of  all  fo^ 
 reign  matter,  which  gives  us  ideas,  and  which 
 we  have  any  power  over.  From  thefe  ob- 
 fervations  the  whole  ground  of  the  imagi- 
 nation is  removed,  that  the  diffolutlon  of 
 any  matter,  is  the  deflrudion  of  a  living 
 agent,  from  the  intereft  he  once  had  in  fuch 
 matter, 
 
 "thirdly^ 
 
JO  0/  ^  Future  Life.  Part  I. 
 
 *Thirdlyy  If  we  confider  our  body  fome- 
 what  more  diftincftly,  as  made  up  of  organs 
 and  inftruments  of  perception  and  of  motion, 
 it  will  bring  us  to  the  fame  conclufion.  Thus 
 the  common  optical  experiments  fhow,  and 
 even  the  obfervation  how  fight  is  affifted  by 
 glaffes  fliows,  that  we  fee  with  our  eyes  in 
 the  fame  fenfe  as  we  fee  with  glaffes.     Nor 
 is  there  any  reafon  to  believe,  that  we  fee 
 with  them  in  any  other  fenfe ;  any  other,  I 
 mean,  which  would  lead  us  to  think  the  eye 
 itfelf  a  percipient.     The  like  is  to  be  faid  of 
 hearing  :  and  our  feeling  diflant  folid  matter 
 by  means   of  fomewhat  in  our  handj  feems 
 an  inftance  of  the  like  kind,  as  to  the  fubjedt 
 we  are  confide  ring.     All  thefe  are  in  fiances 
 of  foreign  matter,  or  fuch  as  is  no  part  of 
 our  body,  being   inftrumental  in  preparing 
 objed:s  for,  and  conveying  them  to,  the  per- 
 ceiving power,  in  a  manner  fimilar  or  like  to 
 the   manner  in  which   our  organs  of  itniQ 
 prepare  and  convey  them.     Both  are  in  a 
 like  way  inftruments  of  our  receiving  fuch 
 ideas  from  external  objeds,  as  the  Author  of 
 nature  appointed  thofe  external  objed:s  to  be 
 the  occafions  of  exciting  in  us.     However, 
 glaffes  are  evidently  inftances  of  this ;  namely 
 of  matter  which  is   no   part  of  our  body, 
 preparing  objeds  for  and  conveying    them 
 towards   the  perceiving  power,  in  like  man- 
 ner as  our  bodily  organs  do.     And  if  we  fee 
 with  our  eyes  only  in  the  fame  manner  as  we 
 
 3  ^^ 
 
Chap.  I.        Of  a  Future  Life.  31 
 
 do  with  glaffes,  the  like  may  juftly  be  con- 
 cluded, from  analogy,  of  all  our  other  fenfes. 
 It  is  not  intended,  by  any  thing  here  faid,  to 
 affirm,  that  the  whole  apparatus  of  vifion, 
 or  of  perception  by  any  other  of  our  fenfes, 
 can  be  traced,  through  all  its  fteps,  quite  up 
 to  the  living  power  of  feeing,  or  perceiving: 
 but  that  fo  far  as  it  can  be  traced  by  experi- 
 mental obfervations,  fo  far  it  appears,  that 
 our  organs  of  fenfe  prepare  and  convey  on 
 objed:s,  in  order  to  their  being  perceived,  in 
 like  manner  as  foreign  matter  does,  without 
 affording  any  fliadow  of  appearance,  that 
 they  themfelves  perceive.  And  that  we  have 
 no  reafon  to  think  our  organs  of  fenfe  per- 
 cipients, is  confirmed  by  inftances  of  perfons 
 lofmg  fome  of  them,  the  living  beings  them- 
 felves, their  former  occupiers,  remaining  un- 
 impaired. It  is  confirmed  alfo  by  the  expe- 
 rience of  dreams ;  by  which  we  find  we  are 
 at  prefent  pofl^elTed  of  a  latent,  and,  what 
 would  otherwife  be,  an  unimagined  unknown 
 power  of  perceiving  fenfible  objedts,  in  as 
 ftrong  and  lively  a  manner  without  our  ex- 
 ternal organs  of  fenfe  as  with  them. 
 
 So  alfo  with  regard  to  our  power  of  moving, 
 or  directing  motion  by  will  and  choice :  upon 
 the  deftrudtion  of  a  limb,  this  adtive  power 
 remains,  as  it  evidently  feems,  unlefl!ened ;  fo 
 as  that  the  living  being,  who  has  fuffered 
 this  lofs,  would  be  capable  of  moving  as 
 
 before. 
 
32  QT  ^  Future  Life.  Part  I. 
 
 before,  if  It  had  another  limb  to  move  with. 
 It  can  walk  by  the  help  of  an  artificial  leg; 
 juft  as  it  can  make  ufe  of  a  pole  or  a  leaver, 
 to  reach  towards  itfclf  and  to  move  things, 
 beyond  the  length  and  the  power  of  its  na- 
 tural arm  :  and  this  lafl  it  does  in  the  fame 
 manner  as  it  reaches  and  moves,  with  its 
 natural  arm,  things  nearer  and  of  lefs  weight. 
 Nor  is  there  fo  much  as  any  appearance  of 
 our  limbs  being  endued  with  a  power  of 
 moving  or  direcfling  themfelves;  though  they 
 are  adapted,  like  the  feveral  parts  ofa  machine, 
 to  be  the  inftruments  of  motion  to  each 
 other ;  and  fome  parts  of  the  fame  limb,  to 
 be  inftruments  of  motion  to  other  parts  of 
 it. 
 
 Thus  a  man  determines,  that  he  will  look 
 at  fuch  an  objed:  through  a  microfcope ;  or 
 being  lame  fuppofe,  that  he  will  walk  to  fuch 
 a  place  with  a  ftaff  a  week  hence.  His  eyes 
 and  his  feet  no  more  determine  in  thefe  cafes, 
 than  the  microfcope  and  the  ftaff.  Nor  is 
 there  any  ground  to  think  they  any  more  put 
 the  determination  in  pradice;  or  that  his 
 eyes  are  the  feers  or  his  feet  the  movers, 
 in  any  other  fenfe  than  as  the  microfcope 
 and  the  ftaff  are.  Upon  the  whole  then, 
 our  organs  of  fenfe  and  our  limbs  are  cer- 
 tainly inftruments,  which  the  living  perfons 
 ourfelves  make  ufe  of  to  perceive  and  move 
 with :  there  is  not  any  probability,  that  they 
 
 are 
 
chap.  I.       0/^^  Future  Life.  33 
 
 are  any  more  ;  nor  confequently,  that  we  have 
 any  other  kind  of  relation  to  thcni,  than 
 what  we  may  have  to  any  other  foreign  mat- 
 ter formed  into  inflruments  of  perception 
 and  motion,  fuppofe  into  a  microfcopc  or 
 a  ftafF;  (I  fay  any  other  kind  of  relation,  for 
 I  am  not  fpeaking  of  the  degree  of  it)  nor 
 confequently  is  there  any  probability,  that 
 the  alienation  or  dilTolution  of  thefe  inflru- 
 ments is  the  deftrudtion  of  the  perceiving 
 and  moving  agent. 
 
 And  thus  our  finding,  that  the  dilTolution 
 of  matter,  in  which  living  beings  were  moft 
 nearly  interefted,  is  not  their  dilTolution  ;  and 
 that  the  deflru6tion  of  feveral  of  the  organs 
 and  inflruments  of  perception  and  of  motion 
 belonging  to  them,  is  not  their  deflruftion  ^ 
 fhows  demonftratively,  that  there  is  no  ground 
 to  think  that  the  diffolution  of  any  other 
 matter,  or  deflrudtion  of  any  other  organs  and 
 inflruments,  will  be  the  dilTolution  or  de- 
 flrudion  of  living  agents,  from  the  like  kind 
 of  relation.  And  we  have  no  reafon  to  think 
 we  fland  in  any  other  kind  of  relation  to  any 
 thing  which  we  find  diflblved  by  death. 
 
 But  it  is  laid  thefe  obfervations  are  equally 
 applicable  to  brutes  :  and  'tis  thought  an  in- 
 fupcrable  difficulty,  that  they  fliould  be  im- 
 mortal, and  by  confequence  capable  of  ever- 
 lafling  happinefs.     Now  this  manner  of  ex- 
 
 D  prcfiion 
 
34  ^f^  Future  Life.  Part  I. 
 
 preffion  Is  both  invidious  and  weak :  but  the 
 thing  intended  by  it,  is  really  no  difficulty  at 
 all,  either  in  the  way  of  natural  or  moral  con- 
 fideration.     For  \JL    Suppofe  the  invidious 
 thing,  defigned  in  ifuch  a  manner  of  expreffion, 
 were  really  implied,  as  it  is  not  in  the  leail:  in 
 the  natural  immortality  of  brutes ;  namely, 
 that  they  muft  arrive  at  great  attainments, 
 and  become  rational  and  moral  agents ;  even 
 this  would  be  no  difficulty :   fince  we  know 
 not  what  latent  powers  and  capacities  they 
 may  be  endued  with.   There  was  once,  prior 
 to  experience,  as  great  prefumption  againfl 
 human  creatures,  as  there  is  againft  the  brute 
 creatures,  arriving  at  that  degree  of  under- 
 ftanding,  which  we  have  in  mature  age.   For 
 we  can  trace  up  our  own  exiftence  to  the  fame 
 original  with  theirs.    And  we  find  it  to  be  a 
 general  law  of  nature,  that  creatures  endued 
 with  capacities  of  virtue  and  religion,  fhould 
 be  placed  in  a  condition  of  being,  in  which 
 they  are  altogether  without  the  ufe  of  them, 
 for  a  confiderable  length  of  their  duration ; 
 as  in  infancy  and  childhood.     And  great  part 
 of  the  human  fpecies  go  out  of  the  prefent 
 world,  before  they  come  to  the  exercii'e  of 
 thefe  capacities  in  any  degree  at  all.     But 
 then,  ^dljy  the  natural  immortality  of  brutes, 
 does  not  in  the  leaft  imply,  that  they  are 
 endued  with  any  latent  capacities  of  a   ra- 
 tional or  moral  nature,     And  the  oeconomy 
 of  the  univerfe  might  require,   that   there 
 6  fiiould 
 
Chap.  I.        Of  a  Future  Lift.  35 
 
 fliould  be  living  creatures  without  any  Ca- 
 pacities of  this  kind.  And  all  difficulties  as 
 to  the  manner  how  they  are  to  be  difpofed 
 of,  are  fo  apparently  and  wholly  founded  in 
 our  igni)rance,  that  'tis  wonderful  they  fhould 
 be  infifted  upon  by  any,  but  fuch  as  are  weak 
 enough  to  think  they  are  acquainted  with  the 
 whole  fyftem  of  things.  There  is  then  ab- 
 folutely  nothing  at  all  in  this  objedlion,  which 
 is  fo  rhetorically  urged  againfl  the  greateft 
 part  of  the  natural  proofs  or  prefumptions  of 
 the  immortality  of  human  minds :  I  fay  the 
 greateft  part ;  for  'tis  lefs  applicable  to  the 
 following  obfervation,  which  is  more  peculiar 
 to  mankind : 
 
 III.  That  as  'tis  evident  onx  prefent  powers 
 and  capacities  of  reafon,  memory,  and  affec- 
 tion, do  not  depend  upon  our  grofs  body  in 
 the  manner  in  which  perception  by  our  or- 
 gans of  fenfe  does ;  fo  they  do  not  appear  to 
 depend  upon  it  at  all  in  any  fuch  manner,  as 
 to  give  ground  to  think,  that  the  diiTolution  of 
 this  body,  will  be  the  deftrudlion  of  thefe  our 
 prefent  powers  of  refledtion,  as  it  will  of  ouf 
 powers  of  fenfation;  or  to  give  ground  to 
 conclude,  even  that  it  will  be  fo  much  as 
 a  fufpenfion  of  the  former. 
 
 Human  creatures  exift  at  prefent  In  two 
 
 ftates  of  life  and  perception,  greatly  different 
 
 from  each  other ;  each  of  which  has  its  own 
 
 D  2  peculiar 
 
36  ^f  ^  Future  Life.  Part  L 
 
 peculiar  laws,  and  its  own  peculiar  enjoyments 
 and  fufFcrings.      When  any  of  our  lenfes  are 
 affe6Ved  or  appetites  gratified  with  the  objedts 
 of  thcni,  we  may  be  fold  to  exifl  or  live  in  a 
 ftatc  of  fenfation.     When  none  of  our  fenfes 
 are  affefted  or  appetites  gratified,  and  yet  we 
 perceive  and  reafon  and  a6t ;  we  may  be  faid 
 to  exift  or  live  in  a  ftate  of  reflection.     Now 
 it   is   by  TjO  means   certain,  that   any  thing 
 which  is  diffolved  by  death,   is  any  w^ay  ne- 
 celfary  to  the  living  being  in  this  its  flate  of 
 reflection,  after  ideas  are  gained.  For,  though 
 from  our  prefent  conftitution  and  condition 
 of  being,  our  external  organs  of  fenfe   are 
 neceflary  for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  re- 
 flecting powers,  as  carriages  and  leavers  and 
 fcaffolds  are  in  architecture  :  yet  when  thefe 
 ideas  are  brought  in,  we  are  capable  of  re- 
 flecting in  the   mofl:  intenfe  degree,  and  of 
 enjoying  the  greateft  pleafure  and  feeling  the 
 greateft  pain  by  means    of  that    reflection, 
 without  anv  aflifl:ance  from  our  fenfes :  and 
 without  any  at  all,  which  we  know  of,  from 
 that  body  which  will  be  dillblved  by  death. 
 It  does  not  appear  then,  that  the  relation  of 
 this  grofs  body  to  the  reflecting  being,  is, 
 in  any  degree,  neceflary  to  thinkuig;  to  our 
 intellectual    enjoyments    or   fufferings  :    noF 
 confequently,    that  the  diilblution    or   alie- 
 nation" of  the  former  by  death,  will  be  the 
 ileltruClion   of  thofe   prefent  powers,  which 
 render  us  capable  of  this  ftate  of  reflection. 
 
 Further, 
 
Chap.  I.        Of  a  Future  Life,  37 
 
 Further,  there  are  inftances  of  mortal  dif- 
 eales,  which  do  not  at  all  afFed:  our  prefent 
 intelledlual  powers ;  and  this  affords  a  pre- 
 fumption,  that  thofe  difealcs  will  not  deltroy  , 
 thefe  prefjnt  powers.  Indeed,  from  theob- 
 fervations  made  above  %  it  appears,  that  there 
 is  no  prefumption,  from  their  mutually  af- 
 fedling  each  other,  that  the  diffolution  of  the 
 body  is  the  deftrudtion  of  the  living  agent. 
 And  by  the  fame  reafoning,  it  mull  appear 
 too,  that  there  is  no  prefumption,  from  their 
 mutually  afFed:ing  each  other,  that  the  dillb- 
 lution  of  the  body  is  the  deftrudtion  of  our 
 prefent  refle6ling  powers  :  but  inftances  of 
 their  not  affedling  each  other,  afford  a  pre- 
 fumption of  the  contrary.  Inftances  of  mor- 
 tal diilafes  not  impairing  our  prefent  refted:- 
 ing  powers,  evidently  turn  our  thoughts  even 
 from  imagining  fuch  difeafes  to  be  the  de^^ 
 ftruiftion  of  them.  Several  things  indeed 
 greatly  affedl  all  our  living  powers,  and  at 
 length  fufpend  the  exercife  of  them;  as  for 
 inftance  drowlinefs,  increaftng  till  it  ends  in 
 found  fleep :  and  from  hence  we  might  have 
 imagined  it  would  deftroy  them,  till  we  found 
 by  experience  the  weaknefs  of  this  way  of 
 judging.  But  in  the  difeafes  now  ^lentioned, 
 there  is  not  fo  much  as  this  fliadow  of  pro- 
 babihty,  to  lead  us  to  any  fuch  conclufion,  ^s 
 to  the  refledting  powers  which  we  have  at 
 
 *  p.  27,  28,  29,  3c 
 
 D   3  prefent. 
 
^8  0/  ^  Future  Life.  Part  I. 
 
 prefent.  For  in  thofe  difeafes,  perfons  the 
 moment  before  death  appear  to  be  in  the 
 higheft  vigour  of  life.  They  difcover  appre- 
 henfion,  memory,  reafon,  all  entire^  with  the 
 utmoft  force  of  affecftion  ^  fenfe  of  a  charadier, 
 of  fhame  and  honour ;  and  the  higheft  mental 
 enjoyments  and  fuiferings,  even  to  the  laft 
 gafp  :  and  thefe  furely  prove  even  greater  vi- 
 gour of  life  than  bodily  ftrength  does.  Now 
 what  pretence  is  there  for  thinking,  that  a 
 progreffive  difeafe  when  arrived  to  fuch  a  de- 
 gree, I  mean  that  degree  which  is  mortal,  will 
 deftroy  thofe  powers,  which  were  not  im- 
 paired, which  were  not  affed:ed  by  it,  during 
 its  whole  progrefs  quite  up  to  that  degree  ? 
 And  if  death  by  difeafes  of  this  kind,  is  not 
 the  deflruftion  of  our  prefent  refledting  pow- 
 ers, 'twill  fcarce  be  thought  that  death  by 
 any  other  means  is. 
 
 It  is  obvious  that  this  general  obfervation 
 may  be  carried  on  further  :  and  there  appears 
 fo  little  conned:ion  between  our  bodily  pow- 
 ers of  fenfation,  and  our  prefent  powers  of 
 refledlion,  that  there  is  no  reafon  to  conclude, 
 that  death,  which  dcftroys  the  former,  does 
 fo  much  as  fufpend  the  exercife  of  the  latter, 
 or  interrupt  our  continuing  to  exift  in  the  like 
 ftate  of  reflection  which  we  do  now.  For 
 fufpenfion  of  reafon,  memory,  and  the  affec- 
 tions which  they  excite,  is  no  part  of  the 
 idea  of  death,  nor  is  implied  in  our  notion  of 
 
 it. 
 
chap,  I.       Of  a  Future  Life.  39 
 
 it.  And  our  daily  experiencing  thefe  power* 
 to  be  exercifed,  without  any  affiftance,  that 
 we  know  of,  from  thofe  bodies,  which  will 
 be  diffolved  by  death ;  and  our  finding  often, 
 that  the  exercife  of  them  is  fo  lively  to  the 
 laft;  thefe  things  afford  a  fenfible  apprehen- 
 fion,  that  death  may  not  perhaps  be  fo  much 
 as  a  difcontinuance  of  the  exercife  of  thefe 
 powers,  nor  of  the  enjoyments  and  fufFeriHgs 
 which  it  implies  ^  So  that  our  pofthumous 
 life,  whatever  there  may  be  in  it  additional  to 
 our  prefent,  yet  may  not  be  intirely  begin- 
 ning anew ;  but  going  on.  Death  may,  in 
 fome  fort,  and  in  fome  refpecfts,  anfwer  to 
 our  birth ;  which  is  not  a  fufpenfion  of  the 
 faculties  which  we  had  before  it,  or  a  total 
 change  of  the  ftate  of  life  in  which  we  exifted 
 when  in  the  womb ;  but  a  continuation  of 
 both,  with  fuch  and  fuch  great  alterations. 
 
 Nay,  for  what  we  know  of  ourfelves,  of 
 our  prefent  life  and  of  death  ;  death  may  im- 
 mediately, in  the  natural  courfe  of  things, 
 put  us  into  a  higher  and  more  enlarged  ftate 
 
 ^  There  are  three  dlll:in(3:  oueftlons,  relating  to  a  future 
 life,  here  confidered :  Whether  death  be  the  deftruvflion  of 
 living  agents  3  if  not,  Whether  it  be  the  deftrucHon  of 
 their  prefent  powers  of  reflecl:ion,  as  it  certainly  is  the  de- 
 ftru(Stion  of  their  prefent  powers  of  feiificion  ;  and  if  not, 
 Whether  it  be  the  fufpenfion,  or  difcontinuance  of  the  ex- 
 ercife, of  thefe  prefent  refled^ting  powers.  Now,  if  there 
 be  no  reafon  to  believe  the  lall,  there  will  be,  if  that  were 
 poiTiWe,  lefs  for  the  next,  aniJefs  ftill  for  the  ftrft. 
 
 D  4  of 
 
40  ^f  ^  Future  Life.         Part  L 
 
 of  life,  as  our  birth  does  ^ ;  a  ftate  in  which 
 our  capacities,  and  fphere  of  perception  and 
 of  adlion,  may  be  much  greater  than  at  pre- 
 fent.  For  as  our  relation  to  our  external 
 organs  of  fenfe,  renders  us  capable  of  exift- 
 ing  in  our  prefent  ftate  of  fenfation;  fo  it 
 may  be  the  only  natural  hindrance  to  our 
 exifting,  immediately  and  of  courfe,  in  a 
 higher  ftate  of  reflection.  The  truth  is,  rea- 
 fon  does  not  at  all  fhew  us,  in  what  ftate 
 death  naturally  leaves  us.  But  were  we  fure, 
 that  it  would  fufpend  all  our  perceptive  and 
 affive  powers;  yet  the  fufpenfion  of  a  power 
 and  the  deftrudlion  of  it,  are  effects  fo  totally 
 different  in  kind,  as  we  experience  from  fleep 
 and  a  fwoon,  that  we  cannot  in  any  wife  argue 
 from  one  to  the  other;  or  conclude  even  to 
 the  loweft  degree  of  probability,  that  the 
 fame  kind  of  force  which  is  fuflicient  to 
 fufpend  our  faculties,  though  it  be  increafed 
 ever  fo  much,  will  be  fuflicient  to  deftroy 
 them. 
 
 Thefe  obfjrvations  together  may  be  fufli- 
 cient to  fhev/,  how  little  prefumption  there 
 is,   that  death  is   the  deftru6lion  of  human 
 
 s  This,  according  to  Straho^  was  the  opinion  of  the 
 Brjch7nans^  vo/xic^eiv  /xev  yap  d'h  tov  /xev  iv5<z Jc  /S/ov,  a>5  av  aHfj-nv 
 zvoixhm  ?lvai'  tov  ds  ^Jlvo-tov^  ysv^Tiv  d^  rov  ovrag  ^<ov,  koci 
 ■TOV  ib^alf^ovx  TOi;  (pi?\Gcrc(py)craa-i'  Lib.  XV^.  p.  IO39,  Ed. 
 Amil.  1707.  To  which  opinion  perhaps  Jntoninus  may 
 9.11ude  in  thefe  words,  w^  v'uv  TSE^ifxmig^  ttote  euQ^vqv  ek  rti; 
 yxfcbg  Tr.v  yvvxiiiog  an  cifXSv?,  arwj  ek^ex^ct^^i  rr)V  co^av  ev  ri  to 
 '^v/_^%piov  c'd  Ta  hhvT^a  Tina  ihTiEjinai,      Lib.  IX.  C.  3* 
 
 creatures. 
 
Chap.  I.        Of  a  Future  Life,  41 
 
 creatures.  However  there  is  the  fl^adow  of 
 an  analogy,  which  may  lead  us  to  imagine  it 
 is  ;  the  llippofed  likencfs  which  is  obferved 
 between  the  decay  of  vegct..bles,  and  of  liv- 
 ing creatures.  And  this  iikenels  is  indeed 
 fufficient  to  afibrd  the  pocts  Vcry  apt  allufions 
 to  the  flowers  of  the  field,  in  their  piOlures 
 of  the  frailty  of  our  prefent  life.  But  in 
 reafon,  the  analogy  is  fo  far  from  holding, 
 that  there  appears  no  ground  even  for  the 
 comparifon,  as  to  the  prefent  queftion  :  be- 
 caufe  one  of  the  two  fubjedts  compared,  is 
 wholly  void  of  That,  which  is  the  principal 
 and  chief  thing  in  the  other,  the  power  of 
 perception  and  of  acTiion  ;  and  which  is  the 
 only  thing  we  are  inquiring  about  th^  conti- 
 nuance of.  So  that  the  deilrudlion  of  a  ve- 
 getable, is  an  event  not  fimilar  or  analogous 
 to  the  deftrudiion  of  a  living  agent. 
 
 But  if,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  off 
 the  delufive  cuflom  of  fubftitutiing  imagina- 
 tion in  the  room  of  experience,  wx  would 
 confine  ourfelves  to  what  we  do  know  and 
 underftand ;  if  we  would  argue  only  from 
 That,  and  from  That  form  our  expec^tations  ; 
 it  would  appear  at  fi.rfi:  fight,  that  as  no  pro- 
 bability of  living  beings  ever  ceafing  to  be  fo, 
 can  be  concluded  from  the  reafon  of  the 
 thing ;  fo  none  can  be  collected  from  the 
 analogy  of  Nature  ^  becaufe  we  cannot  tr.tce 
 any  living  beings  beyond  death.  Eat  as  wc  are 
 8  confcious 
 
42  Of  a  Future  Life,  Part  I. 
 
 confclous  that  we  are  endued  with  capacities 
 of  perception  and  of  adtion,  and  are  living 
 perfons ;  what  we  are  to  go  upon  is,  that  we 
 ihall  continue  fo,  till  we  forefee  fome  accident 
 or  event,  which  will  endanger  thofe  capa- 
 cities, or  be  likely  to  deftroy  us  :  which  death 
 does  in  no  wife  appear  to  be. 
 
 And  thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world, 
 we  may  pafs  into  nev/  fcenes,  and  a  new  flate 
 of  life  and  adtion,  juft  as  naturally  as  we 
 came  into  the  prefent.  And  this  new  ftate 
 may  naturally  be  a  focial  one.  And  the  ad- 
 vantages of  it,  advantages  of  every  kind,  may 
 naturally  be  beftowed,  according  to  fome  fixt 
 general  laws  of  wifdom,  upon  every  one  in 
 proportion  to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue.  And 
 though  the  advantages  of  that  future  natural 
 ftate,  fhould  not  be  beftowed,  as  thefe  of  the 
 prefent  in  fome  meafure  are,  by  the  will  of 
 the  fociety ;  but  entirely  by  his  more  imme- 
 diate adion,  upon  whom  the  whole  frame  of 
 nature  depends  :  yet  this  diftribution  may  be 
 juft  as  natural,  as  their  being  diftributed  here 
 by  the  inftrumentality  of  men.  And  indeed, 
 though  one  were  to  allow  any  confufed  unde- 
 termined fenfe,  which  people  pleafe  to  put 
 upon  the  word  naturaly  it  would  be  a  fhort- 
 nefs  of  thought  fcarce  credible,  to  imagine, 
 that  no  fyftem  or  courfe  of  things  can  be  fo, 
 but  only  what  we  fee  at  prefent  ^ :  efpecially 
 
 ^  See  Part  II.  Ch.  ii.  p.  224,  &c.  and  Part  II.  Ch.  iii. 
 p.  261. 
 
 whilft 
 
Chap.  I.        Of  a  Future  Life.  43 
 
 whilft  the  probability  of  a  future  life,  or  the 
 natural  immortality  of  the  foul,  is  admitted 
 upon  the  evidence  of  reafon ;  becaufe  this 
 is  really  both  admitting  and  denying  at  once, 
 a  ftate  of  being  different  from  the  prefent  to 
 be  natural.  But  the  only  diftind:  meaning 
 of  that  word  isy  Jlated,fixedy  ov  fettled :  fince 
 what  is  natural,  as  much  requires  and  prefup- 
 pofes  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  fo,  /.  e. 
 to  efFedl  it  continually  or  at  ftated  times ;  as 
 what  is  fupernatural  or  miraculous  does  to 
 efFed:  it  for  once.  And  from  hence  it  muft 
 follow,  that  perfons  notion  of  what  is  na- 
 tural, will  be  enlarged  in  proportion  to  their 
 greater  knowledge  of  the  works  of  God, 
 and  the  difpenfations  of  his  providence.  Nor 
 is  there  any  abfurdity  in  fiippoling,  that  there 
 may  be  beings  in  the  univerfe,  whofe  capa- 
 cities, and  knowledge,  and  views,  may  be  fo 
 extenfive,  as  that  the  whole  Chriftian  diipen- 
 fation  may  to  them  appear  natural,  /.  e.  ana- 
 logous or  coniormable  to  God's  dealings  with 
 other  parts  of  his  creation;  as  natural  as  the 
 vifible  known  courfe  of  things  appears  to  us. 
 For  there  feems  fcarce  any  other  poffible  knk 
 to  be  put  upon  the  word,  but  that  only  in 
 which  it  is  here  ufed;  fimilar,  flated,  or 
 uniform. 
 
 This  credibility  of  a  future  life,  which  has 
 been  here  infifted  upon,  how  little  foever  it 
 may  fatisfy  our  curiofity,  feems  to  anfwer  all 
 
 the 
 
44  Of  a  Future  Life.  .  Part  I. 
 
 the  purpofes  of  religion.  In  like  manner  as  a 
 demonilrative  proof  would.  Indeed  a  proof, 
 even  a  demonftrative  one,  of  a  future  life, 
 would  not  be  a  proof  of  religion.  For  that 
 we  are  to  live  hereafter,  is  juft  as  reconcileable 
 v/ith  the  fcheme  of  atheifm,  and  as  well  to 
 be  accounted  ior  by  it,  as  that  we  are  now 
 alive,  is :  c.nd  therefore  nothing  can  be  more 
 abiuru  than  to  argue  from  that  fcheme,  that 
 ther-  can  be  no  future  ftate.  But  as  religion 
 implies  a  future  ftate,  anyprefumption  againft. 
 fuch  a  ftate,  is  a  prefumption  againft  religion. 
 And  the  foregoing  obfervations  remove  all 
 prefumptions  of  that  fort,  and  prove,  to  a 
 very  conliderable  degree  of  probability,  one 
 fundamental  doctrine  of  religion  j  which,  if 
 believed,  would  greatly  open  and  difpofe  the 
 mind  ferioufly  to  attend  to  the  general  evi-^ 
 dence  of  the  whole. 
 
 C  H  A  P. 
 
[    45     ] 
 
 CHAP.     11. 
 
 Of  the  Goveriiment  of  God  by  Reivards  and 
 Fiimjhrnents  \  a?id  particularly  of  the  latter. 
 
 THAT  which  makes  the  queftion  con- 
 cerning a  future  Hfe  to  be  of  fo  great 
 importance  to  us,  is  our  capacity  of  happinefs 
 and  mifery.  And  that  which  makes  the  con- 
 lideration  of  it  to  be  of  fo  great  importance 
 to  us,  is  the  fuppofition  of  our  happinefs  and 
 mifery  Hereafter,  depending  upon  our  adtions 
 Here.  Without  this  indeed,  curiofity  could 
 not  but  fometimes  bring  a  fubjeft,  in  which  we 
 may  be  fo  highly  interefted,  to  our  thoughts,; 
 efpecially  upon  the  mortality  of  others,  or 
 the  near  profpedl  of  our  own.  But  reafon- 
 able  men  w^ould  not  take  any  farther  t'lought 
 about  Hereafter,  than  what  fhould  happen 
 thus  occalionally  to  rife  in  their  minds,  if  it 
 were  certain  that  our  future  intereft  no  way 
 depended  upon  our  pr elent  behaviour :  where- 
 as on  the  contrary,  if  there  be  ground,  either 
 from  analogy  or  any  thing  elfe,  to  think  it 
 does :  then  there  is  reafon  alfo  for  the  moft 
 adlive  thought  and  folicitude,  to  fecure  that 
 intereft  ;  to  behave  fo  as  that  we  may  efcape 
 that  mifery,  and  obtain  that  happineis  in  an- 
 other life,  which  we  not  only  fuppofe  our- 
 felves  capable  of,  but  which  we  apprehend 
 
 alfo 
 
46  Of  the  Government  of  God    Part  L 
 
 alfo  is  put  in  our  own  power.  And  whether 
 there  be  ground  for  this  lafl  apprehenfion, 
 certainly  would  deferve  to  be  moft  ferioufly 
 confidered,  were  there  no  other  proof  of  a 
 future  life  and  intereft,  than  that  prefumptive 
 one,  which  the  foregoing  obfervations  amount 
 to. 
 
 Now  In  the  prefent  ftate,  all  which  we 
 enjoy,  and  a  great  part  of  what  we  fuffer,  is 
 put  in  our  own  power.  For  pleafurc  and 
 pain  are  the  confequences  of  our  ad:ions : 
 and  we  are  endued  by  the  Author  of  our 
 Nature  with  capacities  of  forefeeing  thefe 
 confequences.  We  find  by  experience  He 
 does  not  fo  much  as  preferve  our  lives,  ex- 
 clufively  of  our  own  care  and  attention,  to 
 provide  ourfelves  with,  and  to  make  ufe  of, 
 that  fuftenance,  by  which  he  has  appointed 
 our  lives  ihall  be  preferved;  and  without 
 which,  he  has  appointed,  they  fhall  not  be 
 preferved  at  all.  And  in  general  we  forefee, 
 that  the  external  things,  which  are  the  ob- 
 jedls  of  our  various  paffions,  can  neither  be 
 obtained  nor  enjoyed,  without  exerting  our- 
 felves in  fuch  and  fuch  manners  :  but  by  thus 
 exerting  ourfelves,  we  obtain  and  enjoy  thefe 
 cbjecSls,  in  which  our  natural  good  confifts ; 
 or  by  this  means  God  gives  us  the  pofTeffion 
 and  enjoyment  of  them.  I  know  not,  that 
 we  have  any  one  kind  or  degree  of  enjoy- 
 ment, but  by  the  means  of  our  own  aftions. 
 
 And 
 
Chap.  II.  by  Rewards  and  PuniJJjtnents,     47 
 
 And  by  prudence  and  care,  we  may,  for  the 
 moft  part,  pals  our  days  in  tolerable  eafe  and 
 quiet :  or  on  the  contrary,  we  may  by  rafh- 
 nefs,  ungoverned  paffion,  wilfulnefs,  or  even, 
 by  negligence,  make  ourfelves  as  miferable  as 
 ever  we  pleafe.  And  many  do  pleafe  to 
 make  themfelves  extremely  miferable,  /.  e,  to 
 do  what  they  know  beforehand  will  render 
 them  fo.  They  follow  thofe  ways,  the  fruit 
 of  which  they  know  by  inftruftion,  ex- 
 ample, experience,  will  be  difgrace  and  po- 
 verty and  ficknefs  and  untimely  death.  This 
 every  one  obferves  to  be  the  general  courfe  of 
 things ;  though  it  is  to  be  allowed,  we  can- 
 not find  by  experience,  that  all  our  fufferings 
 are  owing  to  our  own  follies. 
 
 Why  the  Author  of  Nature  does  not  give 
 his  creatures  promifcuoufly  fuch  and  fucli 
 perceptions,  without  regard  to  their  beha- 
 viour; why  he  does  not  make  them  happy 
 without  the  inftrumentality  of  their  own  ac- 
 tions, and  prevent  their  bringing  any  fufFer- 
 ings  upon  themfelves;  is  another  matter. 
 Perhaps  there  may  be  fome  impoffibilities  in 
 the  nature  of  things,  which  we  are  unac- 
 quainted with  '.  Or  lefs  happinefs,  it  may 
 be,  would  upon  the  whole  be  produced  by 
 fuch  a  method  of  condud:,  than  is  by  the 
 prefent.     Or  perhaps  divine  goodnefs,  with 
 
 *  Ch,  vii.  p.  175,  &c. 
 
 which. 
 
48  Of  the  Gove?'nment  of  God     Part  I. 
 
 which,  if  I  miftake  not,  we  make  very  free 
 in  our  fpeculations,  may  not  be  a  bare  lingle 
 difpoiltion  to  produce  happinefs  ;  but  a  dif- 
 poiition  to  make  the  good,  the  faithful,  the 
 honeil  man  happy.  Perhaps  an  infinitely 
 perfedl  Mind  may  be  pleafed,  with  feeing  his 
 creatures  behave  fuitably  to  the  nature  which 
 he  has  given  them  5  to  the  relations  which  he 
 has  placed  them  in  to  each  other;  and  to  that, 
 which  they  ftand  in  to  himfelf :  that  relation 
 to  himfelf,  which,  during  their  exiftence,  is 
 even  neceffary,  and  which  is  the  moft  im- 
 portant one  of  all.  Perhaps,  I  fay,  an  in- 
 finitely perfed:  Mind  may  be  pleafed  with 
 this  moral  piety  of  moral  agents,  in  and  for 
 itfelf;  as  well  as  upon  account  of  its  being 
 effentially  conducive  to  the  happinefs  of  his 
 creation.  Or  the  whole  end,  for  which  God 
 made,  and  thus  governs  the  world,  may  be 
 utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties : 
 there  may  be  fomewhat  in  it  as  impoffible 
 for  us  to  have  any  conception  of,  as  for  a 
 blind  man  to  have  a  conception  of  colours. 
 But  however  this  be,  it  is  certain  matter  of 
 univerfal  experience,  that  the  general  method 
 of  divine  adminiftration,  is,  forewarning  us, 
 or  giving  us  capacities  to  forefee,  with  more 
 or  lefs  clearnefs,  that  if  we  ad:  fo  and  fo,  we 
 fliall  have  fuch  enjoyments,  if  fo  and  fo,  fuch 
 fufiferingSj  and  giving  us  thofe  enjoyments, 
 and  making  us  feel  thofe  fufferings,  in  con- 
 fe que  nee  of  our  adtions. 
 
 "  But 
 
Chap.  II.    hy  Rewards  and  PuJiijJotnents,     49 
 
 "  But  all  this  is  to  be  afcribed  to  the  gene- 
 *'  ral  courfe  of  nature/'  True.  This  is  the 
 very  thing  which  I  am  obferving.  It  is  to 
 be  afcribed  to  the  general  courfe  of  nature: 
 /.  e,  not  furely  to  the  words  or  ideas,  courfe 
 of  nature  y  but  to  him  who  appointed  it,  and 
 put  things  into  it:  or  to  a  courfe  of  operation^ 
 from  its  uniformity  or  conftancy,  called  na- 
 tural''^  and  which  neceffarily  implies  an  ope- 
 rating agent.  For  when  men  find  them- 
 felves  neceffitated  to  confefs  an  Author  of  Na- 
 ture, or  that  God  is  the  natural  governor  of 
 the  world ;  they  muft  not  deny  this  again,  be- 
 caufe  his  government  is  uniform;  they  muft 
 not  deny  that  he  does  things  at  all,  becaufe 
 he  does  them  conftandy ;  becaufe  the  effects 
 of  his  acfbing  are  permanent,  whether  his 
 adting  be  fo  or  not ;  though  there  is  no  reafon 
 to  think  it  is  not.  In  fhort,  every  man,  in 
 every  thing  he  does,  naturally  ad:s  upon  the 
 forethought  and  apprehenfion  of  avoiding 
 evil  or  obtaining  good  :  and  if  the  natural 
 courfe  of  things  be  the  appointment  of  God> 
 and  our  natural  faculties  of  knowledge  and 
 experience,  are  given  us  by  him ;  then  the 
 good  and  bad  confequences  which  follow  our 
 a<ftions,  are  his  appointment, and  our  forefight 
 of  thofe  confequences,  is  a  warning  given  us 
 by  him,  how  we  are  to  ad:. 
 
 **  Is  the  pleafurc  then,  naturally  accom- 
 
 *  p.  4a,  43- 
 
 E  **  panying 
 
50  Of  the  Government  of  God     Part  L 
 
 **  panying  every  particular  gratification  of 
 "  paffion,  intended,  to  put  us  upon  gratifying 
 "  ourfelves  in  every  fuch  particular  inftance, 
 **  and  as  a  reward  to  us  for  fo  doing?"  No 
 certainly.  Nor  is  it  to  be  faid,  that  our  eyes 
 w^ere  naturally  intended  to  give  us  the  fight 
 of  each  particular  objed:,  to  v^hich  they  do 
 or  can  extend ;  objects  which  are  deftrudlive 
 of  them,  or  which,  for  any  other  reafon,  it 
 may  become  us  to  turn  our  eyes  from.  Yet 
 there  is  no  doubt,  but  that  our  eyes  were  in- 
 tended for  us  to  fee  with.  So  neither  is 
 there  any  doubt,  but  that  the  forefeen  plea- 
 fures  and  pains  belonging  to  the  paffions, 
 were  intended,  in  general,  to  induce  mankind 
 to  ad:  in  fuch  and  fuch  manners. 
 
 Now  from  this  general  obfervation,  ob  - 
 vious  to  every  one,  that  God  has  given  us  to 
 underfland,  he  has  appointed  fatisfadlion  and 
 delight  to  be  the  confequence  of  our  afting 
 in  one  manner,  and  pain  and  uneafinefs  of 
 our  ading  in  another,  and  of  our  not  adling 
 at  all ;  and  that  we  find  the  confequences, 
 which  we  were  beforehand  informed  of,  uni- 
 formly to  follow ;  we  may  learn,  that  we  are 
 at  prefent  adually  under  his  government  in 
 the  fiiridlefl:  and  moft  proper  fenfe ;  in  fuch  a 
 fenfe,  as  that  he  rewards  and  punifhes  us  for 
 our  adlions.  An  Author  of  Nature  being 
 fuppofed,  it  is  not  fo  much  a  dedudlion  of 
 reafon,  as  a  m.atter  of  experience,  that  we 
 are  thus  under  his  government :  under  his 
 
 government. 
 
chap.  II.    by  Rewards  and Pufitfimefits.     51 
 
 government,  in  the  fame  fenfe,  as  we  are  un- 
 der the  government  of  civil  magiftrates.  Be- 
 caufe  the  annexing  pleafure  to  fome  acflions, 
 and  pain  to  others,  in  our  power  to  do  or 
 forbear,  and  giving  notice  of  this  appoint- 
 ment beforehand  to  thofe  whom  it  concerns; 
 is  the  proper  formal  notion  of  government. 
 Whether  the  pleafure  or  pain  which  thus 
 follows  upon  our  behaviour,  be  owing,  to  the 
 Author  of  Nature's  affing  upon  us  every 
 moment  which  we  feel  it^  or  to  his  having 
 at  once  contrived  and  executed  his  own  part 
 in  the  plan  of  the  world;  makes  no  altera- 
 tion as  to  the  matter  before  us.  For  if  civil 
 magiftrates  could  make  the  fand:ions  of  their 
 laws  take  place,  v/ithout  interpofmg  at  all, 
 after  they  had  pafTed  them ;  without  a  trial, 
 and  the  formalities  of  an  execution  :  if  they 
 were  able  to  make  their  laws  execute  them- 
 felves,  or  every  offender  to  execute  them  up- 
 on himfelf ;  we  iliould  be  juft  in  the  fame 
 fenfe  under  their  government  then,  as  we  are 
 now:  but  in  a  much  higher  degree,  and  more 
 perfeft  manner.  Vain  is  the  ridicule,  with 
 which,  one  forefees,  fome  perfons  will  divert 
 themfelves,  upon  finding  leffer  pains  con- 
 fidered  as  inftances  of  divine  punilhment. 
 There  is  no  poffibiUty  of  anfwering  or  evad- 
 ing the  general  thing  here  intended,  without 
 denying  all  final  caufes.  For  final  caufes 
 being  admitted,  the  pleafures  and  pains  now 
 mentioned  muft  be  admitted  too  as  inftances 
 
 E  2  of 
 
52  Of  the  Government  of  God     Parti. 
 
 of  them.  And  if  they  are}  if  God  annexes 
 dehght  to  fome  adtions,  and  uneafmefs  to 
 others,  with  an  apparent  defign  to  induce  us 
 to  ad  fo  and  fo ;  then  he  not  only  difpenfes 
 happinefs  and  mifery,  but  alfo  rewards  and 
 puniflies  actions.  If,  for  example,  the  pain 
 which  we  feel,  upon  doing  what  tends  to  the 
 deftruftion  of  our  bodies,  fuppofe  upon  too 
 near  approaches  to  fire,  or  upon  wounding 
 ourfelves,  be  appointed  by  the  Author  of  Na- 
 ture to  prevent  our  doing  what  thus  tends  to 
 our  deftrudion  ;  this  is  altogether  as  much 
 an  inftance  of  his  puniihing  our  adlions,  and 
 confequently  of  our  being  under  his  govern- 
 ment, as  declaring  by  a  voice  from  heaven, 
 that  if  we  adled  fo,  he  would  inflidt  fuch  pain 
 upon  us,  and  inflifting  it,  whether  it  be  greater 
 or  lefs. 
 
 Thus  we  find,  that  the  true  notion,  or  con- 
 ception of  the  Author  of  Nature,  is  that  of 
 a  mafter  or  governor,  prior  to  the  confide- 
 ration  of  his  moral  attributes.  The  fadt  of 
 our  cafe,  which  we  find  by  experience,  is, 
 that  he  actually  exercifes  dominion  or  go- 
 vernment over  us  at  prefent,  by  rewarding 
 and  punifhing  us  for  our  adlions,  in  as  ftridt 
 and  proper  a  fenfe  of  thefe  words,  and  even 
 in  the  fame  fenfe,  as  children,  fervants,  fub- 
 jedls,  are  rewarded  and  punifhed  by  thofe 
 who  govern  them. 
 
 And 
 
chap.  11.  by  PuniJJ:?nc?2fs.  53 
 
 And  thus  the  whole  analogy  of  Nature, 
 the  whole  prefent  courfe  of  things,  moll  fully 
 fhows,  that  there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the 
 general  doctrine  of  religion ;  that  God  will 
 reward  and  punifh  men  for  their  adtions  here- 
 after :  nothing  incredible,  I  mean,  arifing  out 
 of  the  notion  of  rewarding  and  punifhing. 
 For  the  whole  courfe  of  nature  is  a  prefent 
 inftance  of  his  exerciling  that  governrnent 
 over  us,  which  implies  in  it  rewarding  ancj 
 punifhing. 
 
 BU  T  as  divine  punifliment  Is  what  men 
 chiefly  objedl  againft,  and  are  moft  un- 
 willing to  allow  'y  it  may  be  proper  to  men- 
 tion fome  circumflances  in  the  natural  courfe 
 of  punifhments  at  prefent,  which  are  analo- 
 gous to  what  religion  teaches  us  concerning 
 a  future  flate  of  punifhment :  indeed  fo  ana- 
 logous, that  as  they  add  a  farther  credibility 
 to  it,  fo  they  cannot  but  raife  a  moft  ferious 
 apprehenfion  of  it  in  thof(?  who  will  attend 
 to  them. 
 
 It  has  been  now  obferved,  that  fuch  and 
 fuch  miferies  naturally  follow  fuch  and  fuch 
 adtions  of  imprudence  and  wilfulnefs,  as  well 
 as  adions  more  commonly  and  more  diftin<ft- 
 ly  conlidered  as  vitious ,  and  that  thefe  con- 
 fequences,  when  they  may  be  forefeen,  are 
 properly  natural  punilhments  annexed  to  fuch 
 
 E  3  actions. 
 
54  Of  the  Government  of  God    Part  I. 
 
 ad:ions.     For  the  general  thing  here  infiited 
 upon,  iv^,  not  that  we  fee  a  great  deal  of  mi- 
 fery  in  the  world,  but  a  great  deal  which  men 
 bring  upon  themfelves  by  their  own  behaviour, 
 which  they  might   have  forefeen  and  avoid- 
 ed.   Now  the  circumftances  of  thefe  natural 
 punifhments,  particularly  deferving  our  atten- 
 tion, are  fuch  as  thefe;  That  oftentimes  they 
 follow,  or  are  inflidled  in  confequcnce  of,  ac- 
 tions, which  procure  many  prefent  advanta- 
 ges, and  are  accompanied  with  much  prefent 
 pleafure ;  for  inftance,  ficknefs  and  untimely 
 death  is  the  confequence  of  intemperance, 
 though  accompanied  v/ith  the  higheft  mirth 
 and  jollity  :  That  thefe  punifhments  are  often 
 much  greater,  than  the  advantages  or  plea- 
 fures  obtained  by  the  adions,  of  which  they 
 are  the  punilliments  or  confequences  :  That 
 though  we  may  imagine  a  conftitution   of 
 nature,  in  which  thefe  natural  puniiliments, 
 v/hich  are  in  fadl  to  follow,  would  follow^ 
 immediately  upon  fuch   adlions   being  done, 
 or  very  foon  after  j  we  find  on  the  contrary 
 in  our  world,   that  they  are  often  delayed  a 
 great  while,  fometimes  even  till  long  after  the 
 adtions  occafioning  them  are  forgot;  fo  that 
 the  conftitution  of  nature  is  fuch,  that  delay 
 of  punifliment  is  no   foi  t  nor  degree  of  pre- 
 fumption  of  final  impunity  :  That  after  fuch 
 delay,  thefe  natural  punifhments  or  miferies 
 often  come,  not   by  degrees,  but  fuddenly, 
 with   violence,  and  at  once ;  however,  the 
 ^  A.  chief 
 
chap.  II.  by  Pu77tJJ:menfs.  55 
 
 chief  mifery  often  does :  That  as  certainty 
 of  fuch  diftant  mifery  following  fuch  actions, 
 is  never  afforded  perfons ;  fo  perhaps  during 
 the  actions,  they  have  feldom  a  diftind;  full 
 expecflation  of  its  following ' :  and  many  times 
 the  cafe  is  only  thus,  that  they  fee  in  general, 
 or  may  fee,  the  credibility,  that  intempe- 
 rance, fuppofe,  will  bring  after  it  difeafes; 
 civil  crimes,  civil  punifliments;  Vv^hen  yet 
 the  real  probability  often  is,  that  they  iliall 
 efcape  :  but  things  notwithftanding  take  their 
 deflined  courfe,  and  the  mifery  inevitably  fol- 
 lows at  its  appointed  time,  in  very  many  of 
 thefe  cafes.  Thus  alfo  though  youth  may- 
 be alledged  as  an  excufe  for  raflmefs  and  folly, 
 as  being  naturally  thoughtlefs,  and  not  clear- 
 ly forefeeing  all  the  confequences  of  being 
 untraceable  and  profligate ;  this  does  not  hin- 
 der, but  that  thefe  confequences  follow,  and 
 are  grievoufly  felt,  throughout  the  whole 
 courfe  of  mature  life.  Habits  contrad:ed  even 
 in  that  age,  are  often  utter  ruin  :  and  men's 
 fuccefs  in  the  world,  not  only  in  the  common 
 fenfe  of  worldly  fuccefs,  but  their  real  hap- 
 pinefs  and  mifery  depends,  in  a  great  degree, 
 and  in  various  v/ays,  upon  the  manner  in 
 which  they  pafs  their  youth ;  which  confe- 
 quences they  for  the  moft  part  negled:  to 
 conlider,  and  perhaps  feldom  can  properly  be 
 faid  to  believe,  beforehand.     It  requires  alfo 
 
 »  See  Part  II.  Chap,  vi. 
 
 E  4  to 
 
^6  Of  the  Government  of  God    Part  I, 
 
 to  be  mentioned,  that  in  numberlefs  cafes, 
 the  natural  courfe  of  things  affords  us  op- 
 portunities, for  procuring  advantages  to  our- 
 felves  at  certain  times,  which  we  cannot  pro- 
 cure when  we  will  3  nor  ever  recall  the  op- 
 portunities, if  we  have  neglected  them.     In- 
 deed the  general  courfe  of  nature  is  an  ex- 
 ample of  this.     If,  during  the  opportunity 
 of  youth,  perfons  are  indocile  and  felf-wiird  ; 
 they  inevitably  fuffer  in  their  future  life,  for 
 want  of  thofe  acquirements,  which  they  ne- 
 glected the  natural  feafon  of  attaining.     If 
 the  hufbandman  lets  his  feed- time  pafs  with- 
 out fowing,  the  whole  year  is  loft  to  him 
 beyond  recovery.     In  like  manner,  though 
 after  men  have  been  guilty  of  folly  and  ex- 
 travagance up  to  a  certain  degree^  it  is  often 
 in  their  power,  for  inftance,  to  retrieve  their 
 affairs,  to  recover  their  health  and  charafter  j 
 at  leaft  in  good  meafure  :  yet  real  reformation 
 is,  in  many  cafes,  of  no  avail  at  all  towards 
 preventing  the  miferies,  poverty,  ficknefs,  in- 
 famy, naturally  annexed  to  folly  and  extra «• 
 vagance  exceeding  that  degree^     There  is  a 
 certain  bound  to  imprudence  and  mifbeha- 
 viour,  which  being  tranfgreffed,  there  remains 
 no  place  for  repentance  in  the  natural  courfe 
 pf  things.     It  is  further  very  much   to  be 
 remarked,  that  negleds  from  inconfiderate- 
 nefs,  want  of  attention "",  not  looking  about 
 
 ^  Part  11.  Chap.  vi. 
 
 W5 
 
Chap.  II.         hy  Piailpments.  57 
 
 us  to  fee  what  we  have  to  do,  are  often  at- 
 tended with  confeqiiences  ahogether  as  dread- 
 ful, as  any  adive  miibehaviour,  from  the  moft 
 extravagant  pafiion.  And  la  Illy,  civil  go- 
 vernment being  natural,  the  punifhments  of 
 it  are  fo  too  :  and  fome  of  thefe  punifhments 
 are  capital ;  as  the  efFedls  of  a  diffolute  courfe 
 of  pleafure  are  often  mortal.  So  that  many 
 natural  punifhments  are  final "  to  him,  who 
 incurs  them,  if  confidered  only  in  his  tem- 
 poral capacity  :  and  feem  inflided  by  natural 
 
 »  The  general  confideration  of  a  future  ftate  of  punifli- 
 ment,  moft  evidently  belongs  to  the  fubje6l  of  natural  reli- 
 gion.    But  if  any  of  thefe  reflecSlions  fliould  be  thought  te 
 relate  more  particularly  to  this  do6trine,  as  taught  in  fcrip- 
 ture ;  the  reader  is  defired  to  obferve,  that  gentile  writers, 
 both  moralifts,  and  poets,  fpeak  of  tke  future  punifhment 
 of  the  wicked,  both  as  to  the  duration  and  degree  of  it,  in 
 a  like  manner  of  expreliion  and  of  defcription,  as  the  fcrip- 
 ture  does.     So  that  all  which  can  pofitively  be  afTerted  to 
 be  matter  of  mere  revelation,  with  regard  to  this  doftrine, 
 feems  to  be,  that  the  great  difti nation  between  the  righ- 
 teous and  the  wicked,  (hall  be  made  at  the  end  of  this 
 world ;  that  each  fhall  then  receive  according  to  his  deferts. 
 Reafon  did,  as  it  well  might,  conclude  that  it  fhould,  fi- 
 nally and  upon  the  whole,  be  well  with  the  righteous,  and 
 ill  with  the  wicked  :  but  it  could  not  be  determined  upon 
 any  principles  of  rqafon,  whether  human  creatures  might 
 not  have  been  appointed  to  pafs  through  other  ftates  of  life 
 and  being,  before  that  diftributive  juftice  fhould  finally  and 
 effectually  take    place.     Revelation   teaches  us,  that  the 
 next  ftate  of  things  after  the  prefent,  is  appointed  for  the 
 execution  of  this  juftice ;  that  it  fhall  be  no  longer  delayed: 
 but  the  myjlery  of  God^  the  great  myftery  of  his  fufFering 
 vice  and  confufion  to  prevail,  Jhall  then  be  finijhed  \  and  he 
 will  take  to  him  his  great  pswer  and  will  reign^  by  rendering 
 to  every  one  according  to  bis  works.     - 
 
 appointment, 
 
r8  Of  the  Government  of  God      Part  L 
 
 appointment,  either  to  remove  the  offender 
 out  of  the  way  of  being  further  mifchievous ; 
 or  as  an  example,  though  frequently  a  difre- 
 garded  one,  to  thofe  who  are  left  behind. 
 
 Thefe  things  are  not,  what  we  call  acci- 
 dental, or  to  be  met  with  only  now  and  then  ; 
 but  they  are  things  of  every  day's  experience : 
 they  proceed  from  general  laws,  very  gene- 
 ral ones,  by  which  God  governs  the  world, 
 in  the  natural  courfe  of  his  Providence.  And 
 they  are  fo  analogous,  to  what  religion  reaches 
 us  concerning  the  future  punilliment  of  the 
 wicked,  fo  much  of  apiece  with  it,  that  both 
 would  naturally  be  expreffed  in  the  very  fame 
 words,  and  manner  of  defcription.  In  the 
 Book  of  Proverbs  %  for  inftance,  Wifdom  is 
 introduced,  as  frequenting  the  moft  public 
 places  of  refort,  and  as  rejected  when  ihe  of- 
 fers herfelf  as  the  natural  appointed  guide  of 
 human  life.  How  longy  fpeaking  to  thofe 
 who  are  paffing  through  it,  how  longy  ye 
 Ji?7iple  onesy  will  ye  love  folly ,  and  the  f corn- 
 ers delight  in  their  fcorningy  ajid  fools  hate 
 knowledge  ?  luurn  ye  at  my  reproof  Behold^ 
 I  will  pour  out  my  fpirit  upon  you^  I  will  make 
 known  my  words  unto  you.  But  upon  being 
 negledled,  Becaufe  I  have  c ailed j  and  ye  re-> 
 fufedy  I  have  Jlretched  out  my  hand,  and  no 
 man  regarded ;  but  ye  have  fet  at  nought  all 
 
 *"  Chap,  u 
 
 my 
 
Cfeap.  II.  hy  Ptoiijhmenfs.  59 
 
 my  counfely  and  i^ould  none  of  my  reproof :  I 
 alfo  will  laugh  at  your  calaynity^  I  will  ?nock 
 when  your  fear  cometh ;  when  your  fear  co?netb 
 as  deflation,  and  your  dcflru5lion  cometh  as  a 
 whirlwind ',  when  diftrefs  and  anguijh  coineth 
 upon  you.  The?!  fall  they  call  upon  me,  but  I 
 will  not  anfwer  ;  they  fallfeek  me  early,  hut 
 they  fall  not  find  me.  This  paflage,  every- 
 one fees,  is  poetical,  and  fome  parts  of  it  are 
 highly  figurative ;  but  their  meaning  is  ob- 
 vious. And  the  thing  intended  is  exprefled 
 nnore  literally  in  the  following  w^ords ;  For 
 that  they  hated  knowledge,  and  did  not  chufe 
 
 the  fear  of  the  Lord therefore  fall  they 
 
 eat  of  the  fruit  of  their  own  way,  and  he  filed 
 with  their  own  devices »  For  the  fecurity  of 
 the  fmple  fball  fay  them,  and  the  profperity 
 of  fools  Jlmll  defroy  them.  And  the  whole 
 paiTage  is  fo  equally  applicable,  to  what  we 
 experience  in  the  prefent  world,  concerning 
 the  confequences  of  men's  aftions,  and  to 
 what  religion  teaches  us  is  to  be  expedled  in 
 another,  that  it  may  be  queftioned  which  of 
 the  two  was  principally  intended. 
 
 Indeed  when  one  has  been  recollefting  the 
 proper  proofs  of  a  future  ftate  of  rewards  and 
 punifliments,  nothing  methinks  can  give  one 
 fo  fenfible  an  apprehenfion  of  the  latter,  or 
 reprefentation  of  it  to  the  mind  j  as  obferving, 
 that  after  the  many  difregarded  checks,  ad- 
 monitions and  warnings,  which  people  meet 
 
 with 
 
6o  Of  the  Government  of  God     Part  L 
 
 with  In  the  ways  of  vice  and  folly  and  extra- 
 vagance 'y  warnings  from  their  very  nature  j 
 from  the  examples  of  others  5  from  the  kffer 
 inconveniences  which  they  bring  upon  them- 
 felves ;  from  the  inftrudtions  of  wife  and  vir- 
 tuous men  :  after  thefe  have  been  long  de- 
 fpifed,  fcorned,  ridiculed ;  after  the  chief  bad 
 confequences,  temporal  confequences,  of  their 
 follies,  have  been  delayed  for  a  great  while ; 
 at  length  they  break  in  irrefiftibly,  like  an 
 armed  force :  repentance  is  too  late  to  relieve, 
 and  can  ferve  only  to  aggravate,  their  diftrefs  : 
 the  cafe  is  become  defperate :  and  poverty 
 and  ficknefs,  remorfe  and  anguifh,  infamy  and 
 death,  the  eiFe6ls  of  their  own  doings,  over- 
 whelm them,  beyond  poffibility  of  remedy  or 
 efcape.  This  is  an  account  of  what  is  in  izSi 
 the  general  conftitution  of  nature. 
 
 It  is  not  in  any  fort  meant,  that  according 
 to  what  appears  at  prefent  of  the  natural 
 courfe  of  things,  men  are  always  uniformly 
 punifhed  in  proportion  to  their  mifbehaviour : 
 but  that  there  are  very  many  inftances  of  mif- 
 behaviour  punifhed  in  the  feveral  ways  now 
 mentioned,  and  very  dreadful  inftances  too ; 
 fufficient  to  fliow  what  the  laws  of  the  univerfe 
 may  admit;  and,  if  thoroughly  confidered, 
 fufficient  fully  toanfwer  all  objed:ions  againft 
 the  credibility  of  a  future  ftate  of  punifhments, 
 from  any  imaginations,  that  the  frailty  of  our 
 nature  and  external  temptations,  almoft  anni- 
 hilate 
 
Chap.  II.  by  Pu7iiJJ: merits.  6l 
 
 hilate  the  guilt  of  human  vices :  as  well  as 
 objedions  of  another  fort;  from  neceffity; 
 from  fuppofitions,  that  the  will  of  an  infinite 
 being  cannot  be  contradicted ;  or  that  he  mufl 
 be  incapable  of  offence  and  provocation  ^ 
 
 Refleftions  of  this  kind  are  not  without 
 their  terrors  to  ferious  perfons,  the  moft  free 
 from  enthufiafm,  and  of  the  greateft  ftrength 
 of  mind  :  but  it  is  fit  things  be  ftated  and 
 confidered  as  they  really  are.  And  there  is, 
 in  the  prefent  age,  a  certain  fearlefsnefs,  with 
 regard  to  what  may  be  hereafter  under  the 
 government  of  God,  which,  nothing  but  an 
 univerfally  acknowledged  demonftration  on 
 the  fide  of  atheifm  can  juftify;  and  which 
 makes  it  quite  necefiary,  that  men  be  re- 
 minded, and  if  poflible  made  to  feel,  that  there 
 is  no  fort  of  ground  for  being  thus  prefump- 
 tuous,  even  upon  the  moft  fceptical  principles. 
 For,  may  it  not  be  faid  of  any  perfon  upon 
 his  being  born  into  the  world,  he  may  behave 
 fo,  as  to  be  of  no  fervice  to  it,  but  by  being 
 made  an  example  of  the  woful  effedis  of  vice 
 and  folly  ?  That  he  may,  as  any  one  may,  if 
 he  will,  incur  an  infamous  execution,  from 
 the  hands  of  civil  juftice;  or  in  fome  other 
 courfe  of  extravagance  fliorten  his  days :  or 
 bring  upon  himfelf  infamy  and  difeafes  worfe 
 than  death  ?  So  that  it  had  been  better  for 
 
 p  See  Chap.  iv.  $c  vi. 
 
 him. 
 
62  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 
 
 him,  even  with  regard  to  the  prefent  world, 
 that  he  had  never  been  born.  And  is  there 
 any  pretence  of  reafon,  for  people  to  think 
 themfelves  fecure,  and  talk  as  if  they  had 
 certain  proof,  that  let  them  ad:  as  licentioufly 
 as  they  w^ill,  there  can  be  nothing  analogous 
 to  this,  with  regard  to  a  future  and  more  ge- 
 neral intereft,  under  the  providence  and  go- 
 vernment of  the  fame  God  ? 
 
 CHAP.     III. 
 
 Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God. 
 
 AS  the  manifold  appearances  of  defign 
 and  of  final  caufes,  in  the  conftitution 
 of  the  world,  prove  it  to  be  the  work  of  an 
 intelligent  Mind;  fo  the  particular  final  caufes 
 of  pleafure  and  pain  diilributed  amongft  his 
 creatures,  prove  that  they  are  under  his  go- 
 vernment: what  may  be  called  his  natural 
 o:overnment  of  creatures  endued  with  fenfe 
 and  reafon.  This,  however,  implies  fome- 
 what  more  than  feems  ufually  attended  to, 
 when  we  fpeak  of  God's  natural  government 
 of  the  world.  It  implies  government  of  the 
 very  fame  kind  with  that,  which  a  mafter 
 ^  exercifes 
 
Chap.  III.     Governmejit  of  God.  63 
 
 exercifes  over  his  fervants,  or  a  civil  magif- 
 trate  over  his  fubjecfls.  Thefe  latter  inflances 
 of  final  caufcs,  as  really  prove  an  intelligent 
 Governor  of  the  world,  in  the  fenfe  now 
 mentioned,  and  before  ^  diftinftly  treated  of; 
 as  any  other  inftances  of  final  caufes  prove 
 an  intellieent  Maker  of  it. 
 
 't>' 
 
 But  this  alone  does  not  appear  at  firft  fight 
 to  determine  any  thing  certainly,  concerning 
 the  moral  character  of  the  Author  of  Nature, 
 confidered  in  this  relation  of  governor ;  does 
 not  afcertain  his  government  to  be  moral,  or 
 prove  that  he  is  the  righteous  judge  of  the 
 world.  Moral  government  confills,  not  bare- 
 ly  in  rewarding  and  puniiliing  men  for  their 
 adtions,  which  the  mofl  tyrannical  perfon  may- 
 do  :  but  in  rewarding  the  righteous  and  pu- 
 nifhing  the  wicked  ;  in  rendering  to  m.en  ac- 
 cording to  their  actions,  confidered  as  good 
 or  evil.  And  the  perfedion  of  moral  go- 
 vernment confiflis  in  doing  this,  with  regard 
 to  all  intelligent  creatures,  in  an  exad:  propor- 
 tion to  their  perfonal  merits  or  demerits. 
 
 Some  men  feem  to  think  the  only  charac- 
 ter of  the  Author  of  Nature  to  be  that  of 
 fimple  abfolute  benevolence.  This,  confider- 
 ed as  a  principle  of  adion  and  infinite  in  de- 
 gree, is  a  difpofition  to  produce  the  greatefl 
 
 *  Ch,  ii. 
 
 t)oflible 
 
6-^  Of  the  Moral  Paf  t  L 
 
 poflible  happinefs,  without  regard  to  perfons 
 behaviour,  otherwife  than  as  fuch  regard 
 would  produce  higher  degrees  of  it.  And 
 fuppofing  this  to  be  the  only  charader  of 
 God,  veracity  and  juftice  in  him  would  be 
 nothing  but  benevolence  conduced  by  wif-* 
 dom.  Now  furely  this  ought  not  be  af* 
 f;:rted,  unlefs  it  can  be  proved  ;  for  we  fliould 
 fpeak  with  cautious  reverence  upon  fuch  a 
 fubjedt.  And  whether  it  can  be  proved  or  no, 
 is  not  the  thing  here  to  be  inquired  into;  but 
 whether  in  the  conflitution  and  condud:  of  the 
 world,  a  righteous  government  be  not  difcer- 
 nibly  planned  out :  which  neceffarily  implies 
 a  righteous  governor.  There  may  poffibly 
 be  in  the  creation  beings,  to  whom  the 
 Author  of  Nature  manifefts  himfelf  under 
 this  moft  amiable  of  all  characters,  this  of 
 infinite  abfolute  benevolence ;  for  it  is  the 
 molT:  amiable,  fuppofing  it  not,  as  perhaps  it 
 is  not,  incompatible  with  juftice  :  but  he  ma- 
 nifefts himfelf  to  us  under  the  character  of  a 
 righteous  governor.  He  may,  confiftently 
 with  this,  be  fimply  and  abfolutely  benevolent, 
 in  the  fenfe  now  explained :  but  he  is,  for  he 
 has  given  us  a  proof  in  the  conftitution  and 
 conduct  of  the  world  that  he  is,  a  governor 
 over  fervants,  as  he  rewards  and  punilhes  us 
 for  our  adlions.  And  in  the  conftitution  and 
 condud:  of  it,  he  may  alfo  have  given,  befides 
 the  reafon  of  the  thing,  and  the  natural  pre- 
 fages  of  confcience,  clear  and  diftind  inti- 
 mations 
 
Chap.  III.       Govcr?2mc7JtofGod.  65 
 
 mations,  that  his  government  is  righteous  or 
 moral :  clear  to  fuch  as  think  the  nature  of 
 it  deferving  their  attention  :  and  yet  not  to 
 every  carelefs  perfon,  who  cafts  a  tranfient 
 refleftion  upon  the  fubjed:  *". 
 
 ^       But  it  is  particularly  to  be  obferved,  that 
 
 the  divine  government,  which  we  experience 
 
 ourlelves   under  in  the  prefent  ftate,  taken 
 
 alone,  is  allowed  not  to  be  the  perfection  of 
 
 moral  government.  And  yet  this  by  no  means 
 
 hinders,  but  that  there  may  be  fomewhat,  be 
 
 it  more  or  lefs,  truly  moral  in  it.  A  righteous 
 
 government  may  plainly  appear  to  be  carried 
 
 j     on  to  fome  degree :  enough  to  give  us  the 
 
 I     apprehenfion  that  it  fhall  be  compleated,  or 
 
 I      carried  on  to  that  degree  of  perfection  which 
 
 ■      religion  teaches  us  it  fliall ;  but  which  cannot 
 
 I     appear,  till  much  more  of  the  divine  admi- 
 
 i     niftration  be  feen,  than  can  in  the  prefent  life. 
 
 '     And  the  defign  of  this  Chapter  is  to  inquire, 
 
 how  far  this  is  the  cafe :  how  far,  over  and 
 
 ^  The  obje6lions  againft  religion,  from  the  evidence  of 
 
 it    not  being  univerfal,  nor    fo   ftrong  as  might  pollibly 
 
 j       have  been,  may  be  urged  againft  natural  religion,  as  wqIX 
 
 1      as  againft  revealed.     And  therefore  the  confideration  of 
 
 i       them  belongs  to  the  firft  part  of  this  Treatlfe,  as  v^^ell  as 
 
 the    fecond.     But    as    thefe  objections  arc  chiefly  urged 
 
 againft  revealed  religion,  I  chofe  to  confider  them  in  the 
 
 fecond  Part.     And  the  anfwer  to  them  there,  Ch.  vi.  as 
 
 urged  againft  Chriftianity,  being  almoft  equally  applicable 
 
 to  them  as  urged  againft  the  Religion  of  Nature;  to  avoid 
 
 repetition,  the  reader  is  referred  to  that  chapter, 
 
 F  above 
 
66  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 
 
 above  the  moral  nature  *"  which  God  has  given 
 us,  and  our  natural  notion  of  him  as  righteous 
 governor  of  thofe  his  creatures,  to  whom  he 
 has  given  this  nature  ^  \  I  fay  how  far  befides 
 this,  the  principles  and  beginnings  of  a  moral 
 government  over  the  world  may  be  difcerned, 
 notvvithftanding  and  amidft  all  the  confufion 
 and  diforder  of  it. 
 
 Now  one  might  mention  here,  what  has 
 been  often  urged  with  great  force,  that  in  ge- 
 neral, lefs  uneafinefs  and  more  fatisfacSlion,  are 
 the  natural  confequences'  of  a  virtuous  than 
 of  a  vicious  courfe  of  life,  in  the  prefent  ftate, 
 as  an  inftance  of  a  moral  government  efta- 
 bliflied  in  nature;  an  inftance  of  it,  colled:ed 
 from  experience  and  prefent  matter  of  fad:. 
 But  it  muft  be  owned  a  thing  of  difficulty  to 
 w^eigh  and  balance  pleafiires  and  uneaiinelTes, 
 each  amongft  themfelves,  and  alfo  againft 
 each  other,  fo  as  to  make  an  eftimate  with 
 any  exadnefs,  of  the  overplus  of  happinefs 
 on  the  fide  of  virtue.  And  it  is  not  impof- 
 fible,  that,  amidft  the  infinite  diforders  of  the 
 world,  there  may  be  exceptions  to  the  happi- 
 nefs of  virtue;  even  with  regard  to  thofe 
 perfons,  whofe  courfe  of  life  from  their  youth 
 up,  has  been  blamelefs ;  and  more  with  regard 
 to  thofe,  who  have  gone  on  for  fome  time  in 
 
 *=  Differtatlon  II,  "^  Chap.  vi.    p.  158,&c. 
 
 <^  See   Lord  Shaftjbuns  Inquiry    concerning   Virtue, 
 Part  II. 
 
 the 
 
Chap.  III.      Govermnent  of  God,  67 
 
 the  ways  of  vice,  and  have  afterwards  re- 
 formed. For  fuppofe  an  inftance  of  the  latter 
 cafe ;  a  perfon  with  his  paffions  inflamed,  his 
 natural  faculty  of  felf- government  impaired 
 by  habits  of  indulgence,  and  with  all  his  vices 
 about  him,  like  fo  many  harpies,  craving  for 
 their  accuftomed  gratifications  :  who  can  fay 
 how  long  it  might  be,  before  fuch  a  perfon 
 would  find  more  fatisfad:ion  in  the  reafon- 
 ablenefs  and  prefent  good  confequences  of 
 virtue,  than  difficulties  and  felf-denial  in  the 
 reftraints  of  it  ?  Experience  alfo  fhows,  that 
 men  can,  to  a  great  degree,  get  over  their  fenfe 
 of  fliame,  fo  as  that  by  profefling  themfelves 
 to  be  without  principle,  and  avowing  even 
 dired:  villainy,  they  can  fupport  themfelves 
 againft  the  infamy  of  it.  But  as  the  ill  ac- 
 tions of  any  one  will  probably  be  more  talked 
 of,  and  oftener  thrown  in  his  way,  upon  his 
 reformation  ;  fo  the  infamy  of  them  will  be 
 much  more  felt,  after  the  natural  fenfe  of  vir- 
 tue and  honour  is  recovered.  Uneafinefles 
 of  this  kind  ought  indeed  to  be  put  to  the 
 account  of  former  vices  :  yet  it  will  be  faid, 
 they  are  in  part  the  confequences  of  reforma- 
 tion. Still  I  am  far  from  allowing  it  doubt- 
 ful, whether  virtue,  upon  the  vv^hols,  be  hap- 
 pier than  vice  in  the  prefent  world.  But  if 
 it  were,  yet  the  beginnings  of  a  righteous 
 adminifl:ratlon  may  beyond  all  queftion  be 
 found  in  nature,  if  we  will  attentively  in- 
 quire after  them.     And, 
 
 F  2  I.  In 
 
68  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 
 
 I.  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God's 
 moral  Government  over  the  world  might  be 
 treated,  if  it  did  not  appear,  whether  he  were 
 in  a  proper  fcnfe  our  governor  at  all :  yet 
 when  it  is  certain  matter  of  experience,  that 
 he  does  manifeft  himfelf  to  us  under  the  cha- 
 radter  of  a  governor,  in  the  itni^  explained  ^ ; 
 it  mufl:  deferve  to  be  confidered,  whether 
 there  be  not  reafon  to  apprehend,  that  he 
 may  be  a  righteous  or  moral  governor.  Since 
 it  appears  to  be  fad,  that  God  does  govern 
 mankind  by  the  method  of  rewards  and  pu- 
 nifhments,  according  to  fome  fettled  rules  of 
 diftribution;  it  is  furely  a  queilion  to  be  afked. 
 What  prefumption  is  there  againft  his  finally 
 rewarding  and  punifliing  them,  according  to 
 this  particular  rule,  namely,  as  they  ad;  rea- 
 fonably  or  unreafonably,  virtuoufly  or  viciouf- 
 ly  ?  fince  rendering  men  happy  or  miferable 
 by  this  rule,  certainly  falls  in,  much  more  falls 
 in,  with  our  natural  apprehenfions  and  fenfe 
 of  things,  than  doing  fo  by  any  other  rule 
 whatever  :  fince  rewarding  and  punidiing  ac- 
 tions by  any  other  rule,  would  appear  much 
 harder  to  be  accounted  for,  by  minds  formed 
 as  he  has  formed  ours.  Be  the  evidence  of 
 religion  th.-^n  more  or  lefs  clear,  the  expec- 
 tation which  it  ralfes  in  us,  that  the  righte- 
 ous fhall,  upon  the  whole,  be  happy,  and  the 
 wicked  miferable,  cannot  however  poflibly  be 
 
 '  Chap,  ii, 
 
 confidered 
 
chap.  III.       Govern??icnt  of  God*  69 
 
 conlidered  as  abfurd  or  chimerical ;  becaufe  it 
 is  no  more  than  an  expedlation,  that  a  method 
 of  government  already  begun,  fliall  be  carried 
 on,  the  method  of  rewarding  and  punidiing 
 ad:ions ;  and  fhall  be  carried  on  by  a  particu- 
 lar rule,  which  unavoidably  appears  to  us  at 
 firft  fight  more  natural  than  any  other,  the 
 rule  which  we  call  diftributive  juftice.    Nor, 
 
 II.  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  pafled  over,  that 
 tranquillity,  fatisfacftion,  and  external  advan- 
 tages, being  the  natural  confequences  of  pru- 
 dent management  of  ourfelves,and  our  affairs; 
 and  rafhnefs,  profligate  negligence,  and  wilful 
 folly,  bringing  after  them  many  inconveni- 
 ences and  fufferings;  thefe  afford  inilances 
 of  a  right  conftitution  of  nature:  as  the  cor- 
 redlion  of  children,  for  their  own  fakes,  and 
 by  way  of  example,  when  they  run  into  dan- 
 ger or  hurt  themfelves,  is  a  part  of  right  edu- 
 cation. And  thus,  that  God  governs  the 
 world  by  general  fixt  laws,  that  he  has  endu- 
 ed us  with  capacities  of  refledting  upon  this 
 conftitution  of  things,  and  forefeeing  the  good 
 and  bad  confequences  of  our  behaviour;  plain- 
 ly implies  fome  fort  of  moral  government : 
 fmce  from  fuch  a  conftitution  of  things  it 
 cannot  but  follow,  that  prudence  and  impru- 
 dence, which  are  of  the  nature  of  virtue  and 
 vice,  ^  muft  be,  as  they  are,  refpedively  re- 
 warded and  punifhed. 
 
 s  See  DifTert.  II. 
 
 F  3  III.  From. 
 
JO  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 
 
 III.  From  the  natural  courfe  of  things,  vi- 
 cious ad:ions  are,   to  a  great  degree,  ad:ually 
 puniflied  as  mifchievous  to  fociety ;  and  be- 
 lides  punifliment  adually  inflided  upon  this 
 account,  there  is  alfo  the  fear  and  apprehen- 
 fion  of  it  in  thofe  perfons,  whofe  crimes  have 
 rendered  them  obnoxious  to  it,  in  cafe  of  a 
 difcovery  ;  this  ftate  of  fear  being  itfelf  often 
 a  very  confiderable  punifhment.     The  natu- 
 ral fear  and  apprehenfion  of  it  too,  which  re- 
 ftrains  from  fuch  crimes,  is  a  declaration  of 
 nature  againft  them.     It  is  ncceffary  to  the 
 very  being  of  fociety,  that  vices  deftrucflive  of 
 it,  fliould  be  punifhed  as  beiiigjo ;  the  vices 
 of  fallliood,  injuftice,  cruelty:  which  punifh- 
 ment therefore  is  as  natural  as  fociety  ^  and  fo 
 is  an  inftance  of  a  kind  of  moral  government, 
 naturally  eilablilhed  and  a(flually  taking  place. 
 And,  fince  the  certain  natural  courfe  of  things, 
 is  the  condud:  of  Providence  or  the  government 
 of  God,  though  carried  on  by  the  inftrumen- 
 tality  of  men  ;  the  obfervation  here  made  a- 
 mounts  to  this,  that  mankind  find  themfelves 
 placed  by  him  in  fuch  circumftances,  as  that 
 they  are  unavoidably  accountable  for  their  be- 
 haviour, and  are  often  puniflied,  and  fome- 
 times  rewarded  under  his  government,  in  the 
 view  of  their  being  mifchievous,  or  eminently 
 beneficial  to  fociety. 
 
 If  it  be  objedled  that  good  aftions,  and  fuch 
 as  are  beneficial  to  fociety,  are  often  punifhed, 
 
 as 
 
chap.  III.       Government  of  God.  71 
 
 as  in  the  cafe  of  perfecution  and  in  other  cafes ; 
 and  that  ill  and  niiichievous  adtions  are  often 
 rewarded :  it  may  be  anfwered  diftindly ;  firft, 
 that  this  is  in  no  fort  neceffary,  and  confe- 
 quently  not  natural,  in  the  fenfe  in  which  it 
 is  neceffary,  and  therefore  natural,  that  ill  or 
 mifchievous  actions  fliould  be  punilhed:  and 
 in  the  next  place,  that  good  actions  are  ne- 
 v^er  puniflied,  confidered  as  beneficial  to  fb- 
 ciety,  nor  ill  adions  rewarded,  under  the  view 
 of  their  being  hurtful  to  it.  So  that  it  ftands 
 good,  without  any  thing  on  the  fide  of  vice 
 to  be  fet  over  ao^ainft  it,  that  the  Author 
 of  Nature  has  as  truly  direfted,  that  vicious 
 acftions  confidered  as  mifchievous  to  fociety, 
 fhould  be  puniflied,  and  put  mankind  under 
 a  neceflity  of  thus  punifhing  them  ;  as  he 
 has  directed  and  neceflitated  us  to  prefer ve 
 our  lives  by  food. 
 
 IV.  In  the  natural  courfe  of  things,  virtue 
 as  fuch  is  adually  rewarded,  and  vice  as  fuch 
 punifhed  :  which  feems  to  afford  an  inftance 
 or  example,  not  only  of  government,  but  of 
 moral  government,  begun  and  eflabliilied ; 
 moral  in  the  ftrid:eft  fenfe;  though  not  in  that 
 perfedlion  of  degree,  which  religion  teaches 
 us  to  expedt.  In  order  to  fee  this  more  clearly, 
 we  muft  diftinguifh  between  actions  them- 
 felves,  and  that  quality  afcribed  to  them, 
 which  we  call  virtuous  or  vicious.  The  gra- 
 tification itfelf  of  every  natural  pafTion,  mufl 
 
 F  4  be 
 
72  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 
 
 be  attended  with  delight :  and  acquifitions  of 
 fortune,  however  made,  are  acquifitions  of  the 
 means  or  materials  of  enjoyment.  An  adion 
 then,  by  which  any  natural  paffion  is  gratified 
 or  fortune  acquired,  procures  delight  or  ad- 
 vantage ;  abft  faded  fi-om  all  confide  ration  of 
 the  morality  of  fuch  acSion.  Confequently, 
 the  pleafure  or  advantage  in  this  cafe,  is  gain- 
 ed by  the  adion  itfelf,  not  by  the  moraUty, 
 the  virtuoufnefs  or  vicioufnefs  of  it  ^  though 
 it  be,  perhaps,  virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus,  to 
 fay  fuch  an  adion  or  courfe  of  behaviour,  pro- 
 cured fuch  pleafure  or  advantage,  or  brought 
 on  fuch  inconvenience  and  pain,  is  quite  a 
 different  thing  from  faying,  that  fuch  good 
 or  bad  effed  w^as  owing  to  the  virtue  or  vice 
 if  fuch  adion  or  behaviour.  In  one  cafe,  an 
 adion  abftraded  from  all  moral  confideration, 
 produced  its  effed  :  in  the  other  cafe,  for  it 
 will  appear  that  there  are  fuch  cafes,  the  mo- 
 rality of  the  adion,  the  adion  under  a  moral 
 confideration,  /.  e.  the  virtuoufnefs  or  viciouf- 
 nefs of  it,  produced  the  effed.  Now  I  fay  virtue 
 as  fuch  naturally  procures  confiderable  advan- 
 tages to  the  virtuous,  and  vice  as  fuch,  naturally 
 occaficns  great  inconvenience  and  even  mifery 
 to  the  vicious,  in  very  many  inftances.  The 
 immediate  effeds  of  virtue  and  vice  upon  the 
 mind  and  temper,  are  to  be  mentioned  as  in- 
 ftances of  it.  Vice  as  fuch  is  naturally  attend- 
 ed with  fome  fort  of  uneafinefs,  and,  not  un- 
 commonly, with  great  difturbance  ^nd  appre- 
 
 henfion. 
 
Chap.  III.       Governynent  of  God,  73 
 
 heniion.  That  inward  feeling,  which,  refpedt- 
 ing  lefTer  matters,  and  in  familiar  fpeech,  we 
 call  being  vexed  with  onefelf,  and  in  matters 
 of  importance  and  in  more  ferious  language, 
 remorfe ;  is  an  uneafinefs  naturally  arifing 
 from  an  adion  of  a  man's  own,  refle<fted  upon 
 by  himfelf  as  wrong,  unreafonable,  faulty,  /.  e. 
 vicious  in  greater  or  lefs  degrees:  and  this 
 manifeftly  is  a  diiferent  feeling  from  that  un- 
 eafinefs, which  arifes  from  a  fenfe  of  mere 
 lofs  or  harm.  What  is  more  common,  than 
 to  hear  a  man  lamenting  an  accident  or  event, 
 
 and  adding but  however  he  has  the  fatif- 
 
 fadlion  that  he  cannot  blame  himfelf  for  it ; 
 or  on  the  contrary,  that  he  has  the  uneafinefs 
 of  being  fenfible  it  was  his  own  doing  ?  Thus 
 alfo  the  diflurbance  and  fear,  which  often  fol- 
 low upon  a  man's  having  done  an  injury,  arife 
 from  a  fenfe  of  his  being  blame-worthy; 
 otherwife  there  would,  in  many  cafes,  be  no 
 ground  of  diflurbance,  nor  any  reafon  to  fear 
 refentment  or  fhame.  On  the  other  hand, 
 inward  fecurity  and  peace,  and  a  mind  open 
 to  the  fcveral  gratifications  of  life,  are  the  na- 
 tural attendants  of  innocence  and  virtue.  To 
 which  muft  be  added  the  complacency,  fatif- 
 fadlon,  and  even  joy  of  heart,  which  accom- 
 pany the  exercife,  the  real  cxercife,  of  grati- 
 tude, friendfhip,  benevolence. 
 
 And  here,  I  think,  ought  to  be  mentioned, 
 the  fears  of  future  punifhment,  and  peaceful 
 
 hopes 
 
74  Of  t^^  Moral  Part  I. 
 
 hopes  of  a  better  life,  in  thofe  who  fully  be- 
 lieve, or  have  any  ferious  apprehenfion  of  re- 
 ligion :  becaufe  thefe  hopes  and  fears  are  pre- 
 fent  uneafinefs  and  fatisfadlion  to  the  mind; 
 and  cannot  be  got  rid  of  by  great  part  of  the 
 world,  even  by  men  who  have  thought  moft 
 thoroughly  upon  the  fubje6t  of  religion.  And 
 no  one  can  fay,  how  confiderable  this  unea- 
 iinefs  and  fatisfadtion  may  be,  or  what  upon 
 the  whole  it  may  amount  to. 
 
 In  the  next  place  comes  in  the  confidera- 
 tion,  that  all  honeft  and  good  men  are  difpo- 
 fed  to  befriend  honeft  good  men  as  fuch,  and 
 to  difcountenance  the  vicious  as  fuch,  and  do 
 fo  in  fome  degree;  indeed  in  a  confiderable 
 degree :  from  which  favour  and  difcourage- 
 ment  cannot  but  arife  confiderable  advantage 
 and  inconvenience.  And  though  the  genera- 
 lity of  the  world  have  little  regard  to  the  mo- 
 lity  of  their  own  adlions,  and  may  be  fup- 
 pofed  to  have  lefs  to  that  of  others,  when  they 
 themfelves  are  not  concerned  ;  yet  let  any  one 
 be  known  to  be  a'  man  of  virtue,  fome  how 
 or  other,  he  will  be  favoured,  and  good  offices 
 will  be  done  him,  from  regard  to  his  charac- 
 ter without  remote  views,  occafionally,  and  in 
 fome  low  degree,  I  think,  by  the  generality  of 
 the  world,  as  it  happens  to  come  in  their  way. 
 Publick  honours  too  and  advantages  are  the 
 natural  confequences,  are  fometimes  at  leaft 
 the  confequences  in  fad:,  of  virtuous  adions; 
 
 of 
 
Chap.  III.       Cover ?imcnt  of  God.  75 
 
 of  eminent  juftice,  fidelity,  charity,  love  to 
 our  country,  confidercd  in  the  view  of  being 
 virtuous.  And  fometimes  even  death  itfelf, 
 often  infamy  and  external  inconveniences, 
 are  the  publick  confequences  of  vice  as  vice. 
 For  inftance,  the  fenfe  which  mankind  have 
 of  tyranny,  injuftice,  oppreffion,  additional  to 
 the  mere  feeling  or  fear  of  mifery,  has  doubt- 
 lefs  been  inftrumental  in  bi-inging  about  revo- 
 lutions, which  make  a  figure  even  in  the  hif- 
 tory  of  the  world.  For  it  is  plain,  men  refent 
 injuries  as  implying  faultinefs,  and  retaliate, 
 not  merely  under  the  notion  of  having  receiv- 
 ed harm,  but  of  having  received  wrong;  and 
 they  have  this  refentment  in  behalf  of  others, 
 as  well  as  of  themfelves.  So  likewife  even  the 
 generality  are,  in  fome  degree,  grateful  and 
 difpofed  to  return  good  offices,  not  merely  be- 
 caufe  fuch  an  one  has  been  the  occafion  of 
 good  to  them,  but  under  the  view,  that  fuch 
 good  offices  implied  kind  intention  and  good 
 defert  in  the  doer.  To  all  this  may  be  added 
 two  or  three  particular  things,  which,  many 
 perfons  will  think  frivolous ;  but  to  me  no- 
 thing appears  fo,  which  at  all  comes  in  to- 
 wards determining  a  queftion  of  fuch  import- 
 ance, as,  whether  there  be,  or  be  not,  a  mo- 
 ral  inftitution  of  government,  in  the  ftrideft 
 fenfe  moral,  vijibly  eftablifhed  and  begun  in 
 nature.  The  particular  things  are  thefe  :  That 
 in  domeftic  government,  which  is  doubtlefs 
 natural,  children  and  others  alfo  are  very  ge- 
 nerally 
 
76  Of  the  Moral  Part  I, 
 
 nerally  punifhed  for  falfhood  and  injuftice  and 
 ill-behaviour,  as  fuch,  and  rewarded  for  the 
 contrar}^;  which  are  inftances  where  veracity 
 and  juftice,  and  right  behaviour  as  fuch,  are 
 naturally  inforced  by  rev/ards  and  punifli- 
 ments,  whether  more  or  lefs  confiderable  in 
 degree :  That,  though  civil  government  be 
 fuppofed  to  take  cognizance  of  actions  in  no 
 other  view  than  as  prejudicial  to  fociety,  with- 
 out refpedl  to  the  immorality  of  them ;  yet 
 as  fuch  actions  are  immoral,  fo  the  fenfe  which 
 men  have  of  the  immorality  of  them,  very 
 greatly  contributes,  in  different  ways,  to  bring 
 offenders  to  juftice  :  and,  that  intire  abfence  of 
 all  crime  and  guilt  in  the  moral  fenfe,  when 
 plainly  appearing,  will  almoft  of  courfe  pro- 
 cure, and  circumllances  of  aggravated  guilt 
 prevent,  a  remiffion  of  the  penalties  annexed 
 to  civil  crimes,  in  many  cafes,  though  by  no 
 means  in  all. 
 
 Upon  the  whole  then,  befides  the  good  and 
 bad  efl'edis  of  virtue  and  vice  upon  men's 
 own  minds,  the  courfe  of  the  world  does,  in 
 fome  meafure,  turn  upon  the  approbation  and 
 difapprobation  of  them  as  fuch,  in  others. 
 The  fenfe  of  well  and  ill-doing,  the  prefages 
 of  confcience,  the  love  of  good  charadiers  and 
 dilhke  of  bad  ones,  honour,  {liame,refentment, 
 gratitude  -,  all  thefe,  confidered  in  themfelves, 
 and  in  their  effecSs,  do  afford  manifefl  real  in- 
 ftances of  virtue  as  fuch  naturally  favoured, 
 
 and 
 
chap.  III.       Government  of  God.  77 
 
 and  of  vice  as  fuch  difcountenanced,  more  or 
 lefs,  in  the  daily  courfe  of  human  life;  in 
 every  age,  in  every  relation,  in  every  general 
 circumftance  of  it.  That  God  has  given  us 
 a  moral  nature  \  may  moll  juilly  be  urged  as 
 a  proof  of  our  being  under  his  moral  govern- 
 ment :  but  that  he  has  placed  us  in  a  condi- 
 tion, which  gives  this  nature,  as  one  may 
 fpeak,  fcope  to  operate,  and  in  which  it  does 
 unavoidably  operate ;  /.  e.  influence  mankind 
 to  ad,  fo  as  thus  to  favour  and  reward  virtue, 
 and  difcountenance  and  punifli  vice ;  this  is 
 not  the  fame,  but  a  further,  additional  proof 
 of  his  moral  government :  for  it  is  an  inftance 
 of  it.  The  firft  is  a  proof,  that  he  will  finally 
 favour  and  fupport  virtue  efFedually :  the  fe- 
 cond  is  an  example  of  his  favouring  and  fup- 
 porting  it  at  prefent,  in  fome  degree. 
 
 If  a  more  diftindl  inquiry  be  made,  whence 
 it  arifes,  that  virtue  as  fuch  is  often  rewarded, 
 and  vice  as  fuch  is  puniihed,  and  this  rule 
 never  inverted :  it  will  be  found  to  proceed, 
 in  part,  immediately  from  the  moral  nature 
 itfelf,  which  God  has  given  us ;  and  alfo  in 
 part,  from  his  having  given  us,  together  with 
 this  nature,  fo  great  a  power  over  each  other's 
 happinefs  and  mifery.  Yoxjirji,  it  is  certain, 
 that  peace  and  delight,  in  fome  degree  and 
 upon  fome  occafions,  is  the  neceflary  and 
 prefent  efFed;  of  virtuous  pradice  ;  an  effect 
 "^  See  DilTert.  IL 
 
 arifing 
 
78  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 
 
 arifing  immediately  from  that  conftitution  of 
 our  nature.  We  are  fo  m.ade,  that  well-doing 
 as  fuch  gives  us  fatisfadion,  at  leaft,  in  fome 
 inftances ;  ill-doing  as  fuch,  in  none.  And 
 fecondly,  from  our  moral  nature,  joined  with 
 God's  having  put  our  happinefs  and  mifery 
 in  many  refpedis  in  each  other's  power,  it 
 cannot  but  be,  that  vice  as  fuch,  fome  kinds 
 and  inftances  of  it  at  leaft,  will  be  infamous, 
 and  men-will  be  difpofed  to  punifli  it  as  in  itfelf 
 deteftable ;  and  the  villain  will  by  no  means 
 be  able  always  to  avoid  feeling  that  infamy, 
 any  more  than  he  will  be  able  to  efcape  this 
 further  punifhment,  which  mankind  will  be 
 difpofed  to  inflid;  upon  him,  under  the  notion 
 of  his  deferving  it.  But  there  can  be  nothing 
 on  the  fide  of  vice,  to  anfwer  this ;  becaufe 
 there  is  nothing  in  the  human  mind,  contra- 
 didlory,  as  the  logicians  fpeak,  to  virtue.  For 
 virtue  confifts  in  a  regard  to  what  is  right 
 and  reafonable,  as  being  foj  in  a  regard  to 
 veracity,  juftice,  charity,  in  themfelves:  and 
 there  is  furely  no  fuch  thing,  as  a  like  natu- 
 ral regard  to  falfehood,  injuftice,  cruelty.  If 
 it  be  thought,  that  there  are  inftances  of  an 
 approbation  of  vice,  as  fuch,  in  itfelf,  and  for 
 its  own  fake,  (though  it  does  not  appear  to 
 me,  that  there  is  any  fuch  thing  at  all  j  but 
 fuppofing  there  be,)  it  is  evidently  monftrous : 
 as  much  fo,  as  the  moft  acknowledged  per- 
 veriion  of  any  paffion  whatever.  Such  in- 
 ftances of  perverfion  then  being  left  out,  as 
 
 merely 
 
chap.  III.      Government  of  God.  79 
 
 merely  imaginary,  or,  however,  unnatural; 
 it  mull  follow,  from  the  frame  of  our  nature, 
 and  from  our  condition,  in  the  refpedls  now 
 defcribcd,  that  vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  vir- 
 tue cannot  but  be,  favoured  as  fuch  by  others, 
 upon  fome  occafions ;  and  happy  in  itfelf,  in 
 fome  degree.  For  what  is  here  infifted  upon, 
 is  not  the  degree  in  which  virtue  and  vice  are 
 thus  diftinguifhed,  but  only  the  thing  itfelf, 
 that  they  are  fo  in  fome  degree ;  though  the 
 whole  good  and  bad  effed:  of  virtue  and  vice 
 as  fuch,  is  not  inconfiderable  in  degree.  But 
 that  they  muft  be  thus  diftinguifhed  in  fome 
 degree,  is  in  a  manner  neceffary :  it  is  matter 
 of  fad:  of  daily  experience,  even  in  the  great- 
 eft  confufion  of  human  affairs. 
 
 It  is  not  pretended  but  that  in  the  natural 
 courfe  of  things,  happinefs  and  mifery  appear 
 to  be  diftributed  by  other  rules,  than  only 
 the  perfonal  merit  and  demerit  of  charaders. 
 They  may  fometimes  be  diftributed  by  way  of 
 mere  difcipline.  There  may  be  the  wifeft  and 
 beft  reafons,  why  the  world  ftiould  be  govern- 
 ed by  general  lavi^s,  from  whence  fuch  pro- 
 mifcuous  diftribution  perhaps  muft  follow; 
 and  alfo  why  our  happinefs  and  mifery  fliould 
 be  put  in  each  other's  power,  in  the  degree 
 which  they  are.  And  thefe  things,  as  in  ge- 
 neral they  contribute  to  the  rewarding  virtue 
 and  puniftiing  vice,  as  fuch :  fo  they  often 
 contribute  alfo,  not  to  the  inverfion  of  this, 
 3  which 
 
8o  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 
 
 which  is  impoflible;  but  to  the  rendering 
 perfons  profperous,  though  wicked  5  afiiided, 
 though  righteous ;  and,  which  is  worfe,  to 
 the  rewarding  fome  anions ,  though  vicious  ; 
 2inA  punijhing  other  anions ^  though  virtuous. 
 But  all  this  cannot  drown  the  voice  of  nature 
 in  the  condud  of  Providence,  plainly  declar- 
 ing itfelf  for  virtue^  by  wayof  diftindiion  from 
 vice,  and  preference  to  it.  For,  our  being  fo 
 conftituted,  as  that  virtue  and  vice  are  thus 
 naturally  favoured  and  difcountenanced,  re- 
 warded and  punifhed  refpeftively  as  fuch,  is 
 an  intuitive  proof  of  the  intent  of  nature,  that 
 it  ihould  be  fo :  otherwife  the  conftitution  of 
 our  mind,  from  which  it  thus  immediately 
 and  direftly  proceeds,  would  be  abfurd.  But 
 it  cannot  be  faid,  becaufe  virtuous  adlions  are 
 fometlmes  punifhed,  and  vicious  adions  re- 
 warded, that  nature  intended  it.  For,  though 
 this  great  diforder  is  brought  about,  as  all  ac- 
 tions are  done,  by  means  of  fome  natural  paf- 
 fion ;  yet  this  may  be^  as  it  undoubtedly  is, 
 brought  about  by  the  perverfion  of  fuch  paf- 
 fion,  implanted  in  us  for  other,  and  thofe  very 
 good  purpofes.  And  indeed  thefe  other  and 
 good  •  purpofes,  even  of  every  paffion,  may 
 be  clearly  feen. 
 
 We  have  then  a  declaration,  in  fome  degree 
 of  prefent  effeft,  from  Him  who  is  fupreme 
 in  Nature,  which  fide  He  is  of,  or  what  part 
 He  takes :  a  declaration  for  virtue,  and  againft 
 
 vice. 
 
Ciiap.  III.     Gdverfiment  of  Go^.  8i 
 
 rice.  So  far  therefore  as  a  man  is  true  to 
 virtue j  to  veracity  and  juftice,  to  equity  and 
 charity,  and  the  right  of  the  cafe,  in  v^hatever 
 he  is  concerned;  fo  far  he  is  on  the  fide  of 
 the  divine  adminiftration,  and  co-operates 
 with  it :  and  from  hence,  to  fuch  a  man, 
 arifes  naturally  a  fecret  fatisfadion  and  fenfe 
 of  fecurity,  and  implicit  hope  of  fomewhat 
 further.     And, 
 
 V.  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  necef- 
 fary  tendencies  of  virtue,  v^hich,  though  not 
 of  prefent  effedt,  yet  are  at  prefeht  difcernible 
 in  nature ;  and  fo  afford  an  infl:ance  of  fome- 
 what moral  in  the  elTential  confl:itution  of  it. 
 There  is,  in  the  nature  of  things^  a  tendency 
 in  virtue  and  vice  to  produce  the  good  and 
 bad  eifed:s  now  mentioned,  in  a  greater  degree 
 than  they  do  in  fadl  produce  them.  For  in-^ 
 ilance ;  good  and  bad  men  would  be  much 
 more  rewarded  and  punifiied  as  fuch,  were  it 
 not,  that  juftice  is  often  artificially  eluded, 
 that  characfters  are  not  known,  and  many,.' 
 who  would  thus  favour  virtue  and  difcourage 
 vice,  are  hindered  from  doing  fo  by  accidental 
 caufes.  Thefe  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice 
 are  obvious  with  regard  to  individuals.  But  it 
 may  require  more  particularly  to  be  confi- 
 dered,  that  power  in  ^.fociety^  by  being  under 
 the  direction  of  virtue,  naturally  increafes, 
 and  has  a  neceflary  tendency  to  prevail  over* 
 oppofite  power,  not  under  the  direftiou  of  it  j 
 
 G  in 
 
82  Of  the  Moral  Part  L 
 
 in  like  manner  as  power,  by  being  under  the 
 diredtion  of  reafon,  increafes,  and  has  a  ten- 
 dency to  prevail  over  brute  force.  There  are 
 feveral  brute  creatures  of  equal,  and  feveral 
 of  fuperior  ftrength,  to  that  of  men;  and 
 poffibly  the  fum  of  the  w^hole  ftrength  of 
 brutes,  may  be  greater  than  that  of  mankind  : 
 but  reafon  gives  us  the  advantage  and  fuperi- 
 ority  over  them  -,  and  thus  man  is  the  ac- 
 knowledged governing  animal  upon  the  earth. 
 Nor  is  this  Superiority  confidered  by  any  as 
 accidental;  but  as  what  reafon  has  a  tendency, 
 in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  to  obtain.  And  yet 
 perhaps  ditiiculties  may  be  raifed  about  the 
 meaning,  as  well  as  the  truth,  of  the  affertion, 
 that  virtue  has  the  like  tendency. 
 
 To  obviate  thefe  difficulties,  let  us  fee 
 more  diftindtly,  how  the  cafe  ftands  with  re- 
 gard to  reafon ;  which  is  fo  readily  acknow- 
 ledged to  have  this  advantageous  tendency, 
 Suppofe  then  two  or  three  men,  of  the  beft 
 and  moft  improved  underftanding,  in  a  defo- 
 late  open  plain,  attacked  by  ten  times  the 
 number  of  beafts  of  prey :  would  their  rea- 
 fon fecure  them  the  victory  in  this  unequal 
 combat  ?  Power  then,  though  joined  with 
 reafon,  and  under  its  direcStion,  cannot  be  ex- 
 pected to  prevail  over  oppofrte  power,  though 
 merely  brutal,  unlefs  the  one  bears  fome  pro- 
 portion to  the  other.  Again  :  put  the  ima- 
 ginary cafe,  that  rational  and  irrational  crea- 
 ture s 
 
Chap.  III.       Government  of  God.  S3 
 
 tures  were  of  like  external  fhape  and  man- 
 ner :  it  is  certain,  before  there  were  opportu- 
 nities for  the  liril:  to  diftinguilh  each  other,  to 
 feparate  from  their  adverfaries,  and  to  form  an 
 union  among  themfelves,  they  might  be  upon 
 a  level,  or  in  feveral  refpedls  upon  great  dif- 
 advantage;  though  united  they  might  be  vaft- 
 ly  fuperior :  fince  union  is  of  fuch  efficacy, 
 that  ten  men  united,  might  be  able  to  accom- 
 plifh,  what  ten  thoufand  of  the  fame  natural 
 ftrength  and  linderflanding  wholly  ununited^ 
 could  not.     In  this  cafe  tlien,  brute  force 
 might  more  than  maintain  its  ground  againfc 
 reafon,  for  want  of  union  among  the  rational 
 creatures.     Or  fuppofe  a  number  of  men  to 
 land  upon  an  ifland   inhabited  only  by  wild 
 beafto ;  a  number  of  men,  who,  by  the  regu- 
 lations of  civil  government,  the  inventions 
 of  art,  and    the  experience  of  feme   years, 
 could  they  be  preferved  fo  long,  would  be 
 really   fufficient  to  fubdue  the  wild  beafts, 
 and  to  preferve  themfelves  in  fecurity  from 
 them  :  yet  a  conjuncture  of  accidents  might 
 give  fuch  advantage  to  the  irrational  animals,  as 
 that  they  might  at  once  overpower,  and  even, 
 extirpate,  the  whole  fpecies  of  rational  ones. 
 Length  of  time   then,  proper  fcope  and  op- 
 portunities, for  reafon  to  exert  itfclf,  may  be 
 abfolutely  neceilary  to    its    prevailing  over 
 brute  force.   Further  ftill :  there  are  many  in- 
 flancesofbrutesfucceeding  in  attempts,  which 
 they  could  not  have  undertaken,  had  not  their 
 irrational  nature  rendered  them  incapable  of 
 G  2  forefeeing 
 
§4  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 
 
 forefeeing  the  danger  of  fach  attempts,  or  the 
 fury  of  paffion  hindered  their  attending  to  it ; 
 and  there  are  inftances  of  reafon  and  real  pru- 
 dence preventing  men*s  undertaking  what,  it 
 hath  appeared  afterwards,  they  might  have 
 fucceeded  in  by  a  lucky  rafhnels.     And  in 
 certain  conjun6tures,    ignorance   and   folly, 
 weaknefs  and  difcord,  may  have  their  advan- 
 tages.    So  that  rational  animals  have  not  ne- 
 ceflarily  the  fuperiority  over  irrational  ones  : 
 but,  how  improbable  foever  it  may  be,  it  is 
 evidently  poffible,  that,  in  fome  globes,  the 
 latter  may  be  fuperior.  And  were  the  former 
 wholly  at  variance  and  difunited,  by  falfe  felf- 
 intereft  and  envy,  by  treachery  and  injuftice, 
 and  confequent  rage  and  malice  againft  each 
 other,  whilft  the  latter  were  firmly  united  a- 
 mongthemfelvesby  inftindl;  this  might  great- 
 ly contribute  to  the  introducing  fuch  an  in- 
 verted order  of  things.    For  every  one  would 
 conlider  it  as  inverted  :  fince  reafon  has,  in 
 the  nature  of  it,  a  tendency  to  prevail  over 
 brute  force;  notwithftanding  the  poffibility 
 it  may  not  prevail,  and  the  neceffity,  which 
 there  is,  of  many  concurring  circumftances  to 
 render  it  prevalent. 
 
 Now  I  fay,  virtue  in  a  fociety  has  a  like 
 tendency  to  procure  luperiority  and  additional 
 power :  whether  this  power  be  confidered  as 
 the  means  of  fecurity  from  oppofite  power,  or 
 of  obtaining  other  advantages.  And  it  has 
 this  tendency,  by  rendering  publick  good,  an 
 
 objedl 
 
Chap.  III.      Government  of  God.  85 
 
 objeft  and  end,  to  every  member  of  the  foci- 
 ety ;  by  putting  every  one  upon  confideratiou 
 and  diligence,  recollection  and  feif-govern- 
 ment,  both  in  order  to  fee  what  is  the  moft 
 effecflual  method,  and  alfo  in  order  to  perform 
 their  proper  part,  for  obtaining  and  preferving 
 it ;  by  uniting  a  fociety  within  itfelf,  and  fo 
 increafing  its  ftrength ;  and,  which  is  parti- 
 cularly to  be  mentioned,  uniting  it  by  means 
 of  veracity  and  jullice.  For  as  thefe  lafi:  are 
 principal  bonds  of  union,  lb  benevolence  or 
 public  fpirit,  undirected,  unreftrained  by 
 them,  is,  no  body  knows  what. 
 
 And  fuppofe  the  in viiible  world,  and  thein- 
 vifible  difpenfations  of  Providence,  to  be,  in 
 any  fort,  analogous  to  what  appears  :  or  that 
 both  together  make  up  one  uniform  fcheme, 
 the  two  parts  of  which,  the  part  which  we 
 fee,  and  that  which  is  beyond  our  obfervation, 
 are  analogous  to  each  .tSier :  then,  there  muft 
 be  a  like  natural  tendency  in  the  derived 
 power,  throughout  the  univerfe,  under  the 
 direction  of  virtue,  to  prevail  in  general  over 
 that,  which  is  not  under  its  protedion ;  as 
 there  is  in  reafon,  derived  reafon  in  the  uni- 
 verfe, to  prevail  over  brute  force..  But  then, 
 in  order  to  the  prevalence  of  virtue,  or  that  it 
 may  a(ftually  produce,  what  it  has  a  tendency 
 to  produce ;  the  like  concurrences  are  necef- 
 fary,asare,  to  the  prevalence  of  reafon.  There 
 muft  be  ibme  proportion,  between  the  natu- 
 
 G  3  x%\ 
 
86  Of  the  Moral  Part  I, 
 
 ral  power  or  force  which  is,  and  that  which 
 is  not,  under  the  direction  of  virtue  :   there 
 mufl  be  fufficient  length  of  time;   for  the 
 compleat  fuccefs  of  virtue,  as  of  reafon,  can- 
 not, from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  other- 
 wife  than  gradual :  there  muft  be,  as  one  may 
 fpeak,  a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  flage  large  and  ex~ 
 tenfive  enough,  proper  occafions  and  oppor- 
 tunities, for  the  virtuous  to  join  together,  to 
 exert  themfelves  againft  lawlefs  force,  and  to 
 reap  the  fruit  of  their  united  labours.    Now 
 indeed  it  is  to  be  hoped,  that  the  dif]3ropQr- 
 tion  between  the  good  and  bad,  even  here  on 
 earth,  is  not  fo  great,  but  that  the  former 
 have  natural  power  fufficient  to  their  prevail- 
 ing to  a  confiderable  degree,  if  circumfrances 
 would  permit  this  power  to  be  united.  For, 
 much  lefs,  very  much  lefs,  power  under  the 
 direction  of  virtue,  would  prevail  over  much 
 greater  not  under  the  direction  of  it.    How- 
 ever, good  men  over  the  face  of  the  earth  can- 
 not unite;  as  for  other  reafons,  fo  becaufe  they 
 cannot,    be   fufnclently  afcertained   of   each 
 other's  characters.  And  the  knov/n  courfe  of 
 human  things,  the  fcene  we  are  now  paffing 
 through,  particularly  the  fhortnefs  of  life,  de- 
 nies to  virtue  its  full  fcope  in  feveral  other  re- 
 fpeCls.  The  naturai  tendency,  which  we  have 
 been  confidering,  though  real,  is  hindered ixom. 
 being  carried  into  effed:  in  the  prefent  ftate : 
 but  thefe  hindrances  may  be  removed  in  a 
 future  one.     Virtue,  to  borrow  the  Chriilian 
 6  allufion. 
 
Chap.  III.     Government  of  God.  87 
 
 allufion,  is  militant  here ;  and  various  unto- 
 ward accidents  contribute  to  its  being  often 
 overborn :  but  it  may  combat  with  greater 
 advantage  hereafter,  and  prevail  compleatly, 
 and  enjoy  its  coniequent  rewards,  in  fome  fu- 
 ture jflates.     Neglected  as  it  is,  perhaps  un- 
 known, perhaps  defpifcd  and  opprefled,  here ; 
 there  maybe  fcenes  in  eternity,  lafting  enough, 
 and  in  every  other  way  adapted,  to  afford  it  a 
 fufficient  fphere  of  adion;  and  a  fufficient 
 fphere  for  the  natural  confequences  of  it  to 
 follow  in  fad.     If  the  foul  be  naturally  im- 
 mortal, and  this  ftate  be  a  progrefs  towards  a 
 future  one,  as  childhood  is  towards  mature 
 age;  good  men  may  naturally  unite,  not  only 
 amongft  themfelves,  but  alfo  with  other  or- 
 ders of  virtuous  creatures,  in  that  future  ftate. 
 For  virtue,  from  the  very  nature  of  it,  is  a 
 principle  and  bond  of  union,  in  fome  degree, 
 amongft  all   who  are  endued    with  it,    and 
 known  to  each  other;  fo  as  that  by  it,  a  good 
 man  cannot  but  recommend  himfelf  to  the 
 favour  and  protection  of  all  virtuous  beings, 
 throughout  the  whole  univerfe,  v/ho  can  be 
 acquainted  with  his  character,  and  can  any  v/ay 
 interpofe  in  his  behalf  in  any  part  of  his  dura- 
 tion.    And  one  might  add,  that  fuppofe  all 
 this  advantageous  tendency  of  virtue  to  be- 
 come effedl,  amongft  one  or  more  orders  of 
 creatures,  in  any  diftant  fcenes  and  periods, 
 and  to  be  feen  by  any  orders  of  vicious  crea- 
 tures, throughout  the  univerfal  kinedom  of 
 
 G  4  "   God  5 
 
88      •  Of  the  Moral  Part  I, 
 
 God  i  this  happy  effedl  of  virtue,  would  have 
 a  tendency,  by  way  of  example,  and  poffibly 
 an  other  v/:ys,  to  amend  thofe  of  them,  who 
 are  capable  of  amendment,  and  being  reco- 
 vered to  a  jufl  fenfe  of  virtue.  If  our  notions 
 of  the  plan  of  Providence  were  enlarged,  in 
 any  fort  proportionably  towhat  latedifcoveries 
 have  enlarged  our  views  with  refped:  to  the 
 material  world ;  reprefentations  of  this  kind 
 would  not  appear  abfurd  or  extravagant. 
 However  they  are  not  to  be  taken,  as  intended 
 for  a  literal  delineation  of  what  is  in  fa 61  the 
 particular  fcheme  of  the  univerfe,  which  can- 
 not be  known  without  revelation  :  for  fuppo-^ 
 fitions  are  not  to  be  looked  on  as  true,  becaufe 
 not  incredible:  but  they  are  mentioned  to 
 fhew,  that  our  finding  virtue  to  be  hindered 
 from  procuring  to  itfelf  fuch  fuperiorityandad-. 
 vantages,  is  no  objecflion  againfl  its  having,  in 
 the  effential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to 
 procure  them.  And  the  fuppofitions  now 
 mentioned  do  plainly  jfhew  this :  for  they 
 fhew,  that  thefe  hindrances  are  fo  far  from 
 being  neceffary,  that  we  ourfelves  can  eafily 
 conceive,  how  they  may  be  removed  in  future 
 ftatcs,  and  full  fcope  be  granted  to  virtue.  And 
 all  thefe  advantageous  tendencies  of  it,  are  to 
 be  confidered  as  declarations  of  God  in  its  fa- 
 vour. This  however  is  taking  a  pretty  large 
 compafs  ;  though  it  is  certain,  that,  as  the 
 material  world  appears  to  be,  in  a  manner, 
 boundlefs  and  immenfe  5  there  mull  be  Jome 
 
 fcheme 
 
Chap.  III.     Government  of  God.  8} 
 
 fcheme  of  Providence  vaft  in  proportion  to 
 it. 
 
 But  let  us  return  to  the  earth  our  habita- 
 tion 'y  and  we  ihA\  fee  this  happy  tendency  of 
 virtue,  by  imagining  an  inftance  not  fo  vaft 
 and  remote  :  by  fuppoling  a  kingdom  or  foci- 
 ety  of  men  upon  it,  perfedly  virtuous,  for  a 
 fucceffion  of  many  ag.^s;  to  which,  if  you 
 pleafe,  may  be  given  a  fituation  advantageous 
 for  univerfal  monarchy.  In  fuch  a  ftate,  there 
 would  be  no  fuch  thing  as  faction  :  but  meri 
 of  the  greateft  capacity  would  of  courfe,  all 
 along,  have  the  chief  direction  of  affairs  wil- 
 lingly yielded  to  them ;  and  they  would  fhare 
 it  among  themfelves  without  envy.  Each  of 
 thefe  would  have  the  part  affigned  him,  to 
 which  his  genius  was  peculiarly  adapted :  and 
 others,  who  had  not  any  diftinguiflied  genius, 
 would  be  fafe,and  think  themfelves  very  hap- 
 py, by  being  under  the  protection  and  guidance 
 of  thofe  who  had.  Publick  determinations 
 would  really  be  the  refult  of  the  united  wif- 
 dom  of  the  community :  and  they  would  faith- 
 fully be  executed,  by  the  united  ftrength  of  it. 
 Some  would  in  a  higher  way  con  tribute,  but  all 
 would  in  fome  way  contribute,  to  the  pubHck 
 profperity :  and  in  it,  each  would  en  j  oy  the  fruits 
 of  his  own  virtue,  And  as  injuftice,  whether 
 by  fraud  or  force,  would  be  unknown  among 
 themfelves ;  fo  they  would  be  fufficiently  fe- 
 cured  from  it  in  their  neighbours.  For  cun- 
 ning 
 
901  Of  the  Moral  Part  !• 
 
 jiing  and  falfe  felf-intereft,  confederacies  in 
 injuflice,  ever  flighty  and  accompanied  with 
 fadlion  and  inteftine  treachery;   thefe  on  one 
 hand,  would  be  found  mere  childilh  folly  and 
 weaknefs,  when  fet  in  oppofition  againft  wif- 
 dom,  publick  fpirit,  union  inviolable,  and  fide- 
 lity on  the  other :  allowing  both  a  fufficient 
 length  of  years  to  try  their  force.    Add  the 
 general    influence,    which  fuch    a  kingdom 
 would  have  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  byway 
 of  example  particularly,   and  the  reverence 
 which  would  be  paid  it.    It  would  plainly  be 
 fuperior  to  all  others,  and  the   world  mull 
 gradually  come  under  its  empire:  not  by  means 
 of  lawlefs  violence;  but  partly  by  what  mufi: 
 be  allowed  to  be  juft  conqueft;  and  partly  by 
 other  kingdoms  fubmitting  themfelves  volun- 
 tarily to  it,  throughout  a  courfe  of  ages,  and 
 claiming  its  protection,  one  after  another,  in 
 fucceffive  exigencies.     The  head  of  it  would 
 be  an  univerfal  monarch,  in  another  fenfe  than 
 any  mortal  has  yet  been;  and  the  eaftern  ftile 
 would  be  literally  applicable  to  him,  that  all 
 peopky  7iatio7iSy  and  languages  Jhouldferve  him. 
 And  though  indeed  our  knowledge  of  human 
 nature,  and  the  whole  hiflory  of  mankind, 
 fhew  the  impoflibility,  without  fome  miracu- 
 lous interpolation,  tlaat  a  number  of  men,  here 
 on  earth,  fliould  unite  in  one  fociety  or  go- 
 vernment, in  the  fear  of  God  and  univerfal 
 practice  of  virtue;  and   that  iuch  a  govern- 
 ment fhould  continue  fo  united  for  a  fuc- 
 
 cefiion 
 
chap.  III.     Government  of  God.  xj\ 
 
 ceffion  of  ages :  yet  admitting  or  fuppofing 
 this,  the  cffed  would  be  as  now  drawn  out.  AncJ 
 thus,  for  in  fiance,  the  wonderful  power  and 
 profperity  promifcdto  thejewifli  nation  in  the 
 fcripture,  would  be,  in  a  great  meafure,  the 
 confequence  of  what  is  predidted  of  them ; 
 that  xho,  people  Jhould  be  all  righteous  and  inhe* 
 rit  the  land  for  ever  ^;  were  we  to  underftand  the 
 latter  phrafe  of  a  long  continuance  only,  fuffi- 
 cient  to  give  things  time  to  work.  The  pre- 
 di(5lions  of  this  kind,  for  there  are  many  of 
 them,  cannot  come  to  pafs,  in  the  prefent 
 known  courfe  of  nature  -,  but  fuppofe  them 
 come  to  pafs,  and  then,  the  dominion  and  pre- 
 eminence promifed  muft  naturally  follow,  to 
 a  very  confiderable  degree. 
 
 Confider  now,  the  general  fyftem  of  religi- 
 on :  that  the  government  of  the  world  is  uni- 
 form, and  one,  and  moral;  that  virtue  and 
 right  fliall  finally  have  the  advantage,  and 
 prevail  over  fraud  and  lawlefs  force,  over  the 
 deceits  as  v/ell  as  the  violence  of  wickednefs, 
 under  the  condud;  of  one  fupreme  governor : 
 and  from  the  obfervations  above  made,  it  Vvill 
 appear,  that  God  has,  by  our  reafon,  given  us 
 to  fee  a  peculiar  connexion  in  the  feveral  parts 
 of  this  fcheme,  and  a  tendency  towards  the 
 completion  of  it,  arifing  out  of  the  very  na- 
 ture of  virtue :  which  tendency  is  to  be  con- 
 fidered  as  fomewhat  moral  in  theefTential  con- 
 flitution  of  things.    If  any  one  fhould  think 
 
 ^  Ifa.  Ix.  21, 
 
 all 
 
92  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 
 
 all  this  to  be  of  little  importance  j  I  defire  him 
 to  confider,  what  he  would  think,  if  vice  had, 
 eflenti ally  and  in  its  nature,  thefe  advantage- 
 ous tendencies;  or  if  virtue  had  efTentially  the 
 direft  contrary  ones. 
 
 But  it  may  be  objecfted,  that,  notwithftand-. 
 ing  all  thefe  natural  effeds  and  thefe  natural 
 tendencies  of  virtue  ;  yet  things  may  be  now 
 going  on  throughout  the  univerfe,  and  may 
 go  on  hereafter,  in  the  fame  mixt  way  as  here 
 at  prefent  upon  earth:  virtue  fometimes  prof- 
 perous,  fometimes  depreffed  ;  vice  fometimes 
 punifhed,  fometimes  fuccefsful.   The  anfvver 
 to  which  is,  that  it  is  not  the  purpofe  of  this 
 chapter,  nor  of  this  treatife,  properly  to  prove 
 God's  perfed;  moral  government   over   the 
 world,  or  the  truth  of  religion  ;  but  to  obferve 
 what  there  is  in  the  conftitution  and  courfe  of 
 nature,  to  confirm  the  proper  proof  of  it,  fup- 
 pofed  to  be  known :  and  that  the  weight  of 
 the  foregoing  obfervations  to  this  purpofe, 
 may  be  thus  diftindlly  proved.    Pleafure  and 
 pain  are  indeed  to  a  certain  degree,  fiy  to  a  very 
 high  degree,  diftributed  amongft  us  without 
 any  apparent  regard  to  the  merit  or  demerit 
 of  charaders.     And  were  there  nothing  elfe, 
 concerning  this  matter,  difcernible  in  the  con- 
 ftitution and  courfe  of  nature;  there  would  be 
 no  ground  from  the  conftitution  and  courfe  of 
 nature,  to  hope  or  to  fear,  that  men  would  be 
 rewarded  or  puniflied  hereafter  according  to 
 their  deferts :  which  however,  it  is  to  be  re- 
 marked^ 
 
Chap.  III.     Government  of  God.  9j 
 
 marked.  Implies,  that  even  then  there  would 
 be  no  ground  from  appearances  to  think,  that 
 vice  upon  the  whole  would  have  the  advan- 
 tage, rather  than  that  virtue  would.  And  thus 
 the  proof  of  a  future  flate  of  retribution, 
 would  reft  upon  the  ufual  known  arguments 
 for  it :  which  are  I  think  plainly  unanfwer- 
 able ;  and  would  be  fo,  though  there  were  no 
 additional  confirmation  of  them  from  the 
 things  above  infifted  on.  But  thefe  things  are 
 a  very  ftrong  confirmation  of  them.     For, 
 
 F/r/?,Theyfhew,  that  the  Author  of  Nature 
 is  not  indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice.  They 
 amount  to  a  declaration  from  him,  determi- 
 nate and  not  to  be  evaded,  in  favour  of  one, 
 and  againft  the  other :  fuch  a  declaration,  as 
 there  is  nothing  to  be  fet  over  againft  or  an- 
 fwer,  on  the  part  of  vice.  So  that  were  a  man, 
 laying  afide  the  proper  proof  of  religion,  to 
 determine  from  the  courfe  of  nature  only, 
 whether  it  were  moft  probable,  that  the  righ- 
 teous or  the  wicked,  would  have  the  advan- 
 tage in  a  future  life ;  there  can  be  no  doubt, 
 but  that  he  would  determine  the  probability 
 to  be,  that  the  former  would.  The  courie 
 of  nature  then,  in  the  view  of  it  now  given, 
 furnifhes  us  with  a  real  practical  proof  of  the 
 obligations  of  religion. 
 
 Secondly y  When,  conformably  to  what  reli- 
 gion teaches  us,  God  fhall  reward  and  punilh 
 virtue  and,  vice  as  fuch,  fo  as  that  every  one 
 
 fhall. 
 
9'4  Of  the  Moral  Part  t 
 
 fhall,  upon  the  whole,  have  his  deferts ;  this 
 diftributive  juftice  will  not  be  a  thing  differ- 
 ent in  ktJid,  bat  only  in  degree,  from  what 
 we  experience  in  his  pref^nt  government.  It 
 will  be  that  in  ejj'cdl,  toward  which  we  now 
 fee  a  tendency.  It  will  be  no  more  than  the 
 completion  of  that  moral  government,  aho  prin- 
 ciples and  hegiraiing  of  whicli,  have  been 
 fhewn,  beyond  all  dlfpute,  difcernible  in  the 
 prefent  conftitution  and  courfe  of  nature. 
 And  from  hence  it  follows. 
 
 Thirdly,  That, as  under  the  natural  govern- 
 ment of  God,  our  experience  of  thofe  kinds 
 and  degrees  of  happinefs  and  mJfery,  which 
 we  do  experience  at  prefent,  gives  juiT:  ground 
 to  hope  for  and  to  fear,  higher  degrees  and 
 other  kinds  of  both  in  a  future  ftate,  fuppofing 
 a  future  ftate  admitted :  fo  under  his  moral 
 government,  our  experience,  that  virtue  and 
 vice  are,  in  the  manners  above-mentioned, 
 adually  rewarded  and  puni{hed  at  prefent,  in 
 a  certain  degree,  gives  juft  ground  to  hope  and 
 to  fear,  that  they  7naybe  rew^arded  and  puniih- 
 ed  in  an  higher  degree  hereafter.  It  is  ac- 
 knowledged indeed  that  this  alone  is  not  fuf- 
 ficient  ground  to  think,  that  they  aciiially  wilt 
 be  rewarded  and  punifhed  in  a  higher  degree, 
 rather  than  in  a  lower  :  but  then, 
 
 La/ily,  There  is  fufficient  ground  to  think 
 fo,  from  the  good  and  bad  tendencies  of  virtue 
 and  vice.    For  thefe  tendencies  are  elTcntial, 
 
 and 
 
chap.  III.     Government  of  God.  9^ 
 
 and  founded  in  the  nature  of  things :  whereas 
 the  hindrances  to  their  becoming  effedt,  are, 
 in  numberlefs  cafes,  not  neceffary,  but  artifi- 
 cial only.  Now  it  may  be  much  more  ftrong- 
 ly  argued,  that  thefe  tendencies,  as  well  as  the 
 adlual  rewards  and  punifliments,  of  virtue  and 
 vice,  which  arife  direffly  out  of  the  nature  of 
 things,  will  remain  hereafter,  than  that  the 
 accidental  hindrances  of  them  will.  And  if 
 thefe  hindrances  do  not  remain;  thofe  rewards 
 and  punifliments  cannot  but  be  carried  on 
 much  further  towards  the  perfecftion  of  moral 
 government :  /.  e,  the  tendenciels  of  virtue  and 
 vice  will  become  effedt :  but  when,  or  where, 
 or  in  what  particular  way,  cannot  be  knowa 
 at  all,  but  by  revelation. 
 
 Upon  the  whole:  there  is  a  kind  of  moral 
 government  implied  in  God^s  natural  govern- 
 ment ' :  virtue  and  vice  are  naturally  reward- 
 ed and  puniflied  as  beneficial  and  mifchiev- 
 ous  to  fociety "  -,  and  rewarded  and  punifhed 
 diredlly  as  virtue  and  vice  \  The  notion  then 
 of  a  moral  fcheme  of  government,  is  not  fic- 
 titious but  natural ;  for  it  is  fuggefted  to  our 
 thoughts  by  the  conftitution  and  courfe  of  na- 
 ture :  and  the  execution  of  this  fcheme  is  ac- 
 tually begun,  in  the  inftances  here  mentioned. 
 And  thefe  things  are  to  be  confidered,  as  a  de- 
 claration of  the  Author  of  Nature,  for  virtue, 
 
 'p.  69.  ^' P«  7<^»  ^p.  715&C. 
 
 and 
 
g6  Of  the  Mora!  Part  L 
 
 and  againft  vice :  they  give  a  credibility  to  the 
 fuppofition  of  their  being  rewarded  and  pu- 
 nifhed  hereafter ;  and  alfo  ground  to  hope  and 
 to  fear,  that  they  may  be  rewarded  and  pu- 
 nifhed  in  higher  degrees  than  they  are  here. 
 And  as  all  this  is  confirmed,  fo  the  argument 
 for  religion,  from  the  conftitution  and  courfe 
 of  nature,  is  carried  on  farther,  by  obferving; 
 that  there  are  natural  tendencies,  and,  in  in- 
 numerable cafes,  only  artificial  hindrances,  to 
 this  moral  fcheme^s  being  carried  on  much 
 farther  towards  perfection,  than  it  is  at  pre- 
 fent  *".  The  notion  then  of  a  moral  fcheme  of 
 government,  much  more  perfed:  than  what  is 
 feen,  is  not  a  fiditious,  but  a  natural  notion  ^ 
 for  it  is  fuggefted  to  our  thoughts,  by  the 
 efTential  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  And 
 thefe  tendencies  are  to  be  confidered  as  inti- 
 mations, as  implicit  prom  ifcs  and  threatenings, 
 from  the  Author  of  Nature,  of  much  greater 
 rewards  and  punifhments  to  follow  virtue  and 
 vice,  than  do  at  prefent.  And  indeed,  every 
 natural  tendency,  which  is  to  continue,  but 
 which  is  hindered  from  becoming  efFefl:  by 
 only  accidental  caufes,  afibrds  a  prefumption, 
 that  fuch  tendency  will,  fome  time  or  other, 
 become  effeft :  a  prefumption  in  degree  pro- 
 portionable to  the  length  of  the  duration,  thro' 
 which  fuch  tendency  will  continue.  And 
 from  thefe  things  together,  arifes  a  real  pre- 
 
 «  p.  8i,  &c, 
 \_ :  fumptlon. 
 
Chap.  III.       Gov£r?2ment  of  God*  gy 
 
 lumption,  that  the  moral  fcheme  of  govern- 
 ment eftabliihed  in  nature,  fhall  be  carried  on 
 much  farther  towards  perfec^tion  hereafter; 
 and,  I  think,  a  prefumption  that  it  will  be 
 abfolutely  compleated.  But  from  thefe  things, 
 joined  with  the  moral  nature  which  God  has 
 given  us,  confidered  as  given  us  by  him,  arifes 
 a  practical  proof"  that  it  will  be  compleated : 
 a  proof  from  fad:  y  and  therefore  a  diftind:  one 
 from  that,  which  is  deduced  from  the  eternal 
 and  unalterable  relations,  the  fitnefs  and  un* 
 iitnefs  of  adions. 
 
 CHAP.  IV. 
 
 Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as   implying  Trial, 
 
 Difficulties  and  Danger. 
 
 TH  E  general  dodrlne  of  religion,  that 
 our  prefent  life  is  a  ftate  of  probation 
 for  a  future  one,  comprehends  under  it  feveral 
 particular  things,  diftind  from  each  other. 
 But  the  firft,  and  moft  common  meaning  of 
 it,  feems  to  be,  that  our  future  intereft  is  now 
 depending,  and  depending  upon  ourfelves  ; 
 that  we  have  fcope  and  opportunities  here,  for 
 
 •  See  this  proof  drawn  out  briefly,  Ch.  vi.  p.  158,  &c. 
 
 H  that 
 
^8  Of  a  State  of  "Trial        Part  I. 
 
 that  good  and  bad  behaviour,  which  God  will 
 reward  and  punifh  hereafter  y  together  with 
 temptations  to  one,  as  well  as  inducements  of 
 reafon  to  the  other.  And  this  is,  in  great 
 meafure,  the  fame  with  faying,  that  we  are  un- 
 der the  moral  government  of  God,  and  to  give 
 an  account  of  our  acflions  to  him.  For  the 
 notion  of  a  future  account  and  general  righte- 
 ous judgment,  implies  fome  fort  of  tempta- 
 tions to  what  is  wrons: :  otherwife  there  would 
 
 o 
 
 be  no  moral  poffibility  of  doing  wrong,  nor 
 ground  for  judgment,  or  difcrimination.  But 
 there  is  this  difference,  that  the  word  proba- 
 tion  is  more  diftindily  and  particularly  expref- 
 five  of  allurements  to  wrone,  or  difficulties  in 
 adhering  uniformly  to  vvhat  is  rjght,  and  of 
 the  danger  of  mifcarrying  by  fuch  tempta- 
 tions, than  the  words  moral  governmeitt,  A 
 ftate  of  probation  then,  as  thus  particularly 
 implying  in  it  trial,  difficulties  and  danger,  mxay 
 require  to  be  confidered  diftinctly  by  itfelf. 
 
 And  as  the  moral  government  of  God, 
 which  religion  teaches  us,  implies,  that  we  are 
 in  a  ftate  of  trialv/ith  regard  to  a  future  world : 
 fo  alio  his  natural  governm.ent  over  u^,  im- 
 plies, that  we  are  in  a  ftate  of  trial,  in  the  like 
 lenfe,  with  regard  to  the  prcfent  world.  Natu- 
 ral government  by  rewards  and  puhiiliments, 
 as  much  implies  natural  trial,  as  moral  go- 
 vernment docs  moral  trial.  The  natural  go- 
 vernment of  God  here  meant",  conlifts,  in  his 
 »  Ch.  ii. 
 
 annexing 
 
Chap.  IV.       Of  a  S:ate  ofTriaL  pp 
 
 annexing  pleafure  to  fome  adions,  and  pain 
 to  others,  which  are  in  our  power  to  do  or 
 forbear,  and  in  giving  us  notice  of  fuch  ap- 
 pointment beforehand.  This  neceffarily  im- 
 phes,  that  he  has  made  our  happineis  and  mi- 
 fery,  or  our  interelt,  to  depend  in  part  upon 
 ourfelves.  x'^nd  fo  far  as  men  have  temptations 
 to  any  courfc  of  aiftion,  which  will  probably 
 occalion  them  greater  temporal  inconvenience 
 and  uneafinefs,  than  fitisfadiion ;  fo  far  their 
 temporal  intereif  is  in  danger  from  themfelves, 
 or  they  are  in  a  ftate  of  trial  with  refpedl  to 
 it.  Now  people  often  blame  others,  and  even 
 themfelves,  for  their  mifcondudt  in  their  tern-  \ 
 poral  concerns.  And  we  find  many  are  great- 
 ly wanting  to  themfelves,  and  mifs  of  that  na- 
 tural happincfs,  which  they  might  have  ob- 
 tained in  the  prefent  life  :  perhaps  every  one 
 does  in  fome  degree.  But  many  run  them- 
 felves into  great  inconvenience,  and  into  ex- 
 treme diftrefs  and  mifery  :  not  through  inca- 
 pacity of  knowing  better,  and  doing  better 
 for  themfelves,  which  would  be  nothing  to 
 the  prefent  purpofe  ;  but  through  their  own 
 fault.  And  thefe  things  neceflarily  imply 
 temptation,  and  danger  of  mifcarrying,  in  a 
 greater  or  iefs  degree,  with  refped;  to  our 
 worldly  intereft  or  happlnefs.  Every  one  too, 
 withouthaving  religion  in  his  thoughts,  fpeaks 
 of  the  hazards  which  young  people  run,  upon 
 their  fetting  out  in  the  world  :  hazards  from 
 other  caufes,  than  merely  their  ignorance,  and 
 H  2  una^voidabh 
 
TOO  Of  a  State  of  Trial  Part  I. 
 
 unavoidable  accidents.  And  fome  courfes  of 
 vice,  at  leaft,  being  contrary  to  men's  worldly 
 interefl:  or  good  ;  temptations  to  thefe,  muft 
 at  the  fame  time  be  temptations  to  forego 
 our  prefent  and  our  future  intereft.  Thus  in 
 our  natural  or  temporal  capacity,  we  are  in  a 
 ftate  of  trial,  /.  e,  of  difficulty  and  danger, 
 analogous,  or  like  to  our  moral  and  religious 
 trial. 
 
 This  will  more  diflinftly  appear  to  any  one, 
 who  thinks  it  worthwhile,  more  diftindtly,  to 
 confider,  what  it  is  which  conftitutes  our 
 trial  in  both  capacities,  and  to  obferve,  how 
 mankind  behave  under  it. 
 
 And  that  which  conftitutes  this  our  trial. 
 In  both  thefe  capacities,  muft  be  fomewhat 
 either  in  our  external  circumftances,  or  in  our 
 nature.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  perfons  may 
 be  betrayed  into  wrong  behaviour  upon  fur- 
 prife,  or  overcome  upon  any  other  very  Angu- 
 lar and  extraordinary  external  occalions  ^  who 
 would,  otherwife,  have  preferved  their  cha- 
 rad:er  of  prudence  and  of  virtue  :  in  which 
 cafes,  every  one,  in  fpeaking  of  the  wrong  be- 
 haviour Oi  thefe  perfons,  would  impute  it  to 
 fuch  particular  external  circumftances.  And 
 on  the  other  hand,  men  who  have  contradled 
 habits  of  vice  and  folly  of  any  kind,  or  have 
 fome  particular  paffions  in  excefs,  will  feek 
 opportunities,  and,  as  it  were,  go  out  of  their 
 
 way. 
 
Chap.  IV.     OJ  a  State  of  trial  loi 
 
 way,  to  gratify  themfelves  in  thefe  refpefts, 
 at  the  expence  of  their  wifdom  and  their  vir- 
 tue ;  led  to  it,  as  every  one  would  fay,  not  by 
 external  temptations,  but  by  fuch  habits  and 
 paffions.     And  the  account -of  this  laft  cafe 
 is,  that  particular  paflions  are  no  more  coin- 
 cident w^ith  prudence,  or  that  reafonable  felf- 
 love,  the  end  of  which  is  our  worldly  intereft, 
 than  they  are  with  the  principle  of  virtue  and 
 religion  -,  but  often  draw  contrary  ways  to 
 one,  as  well  as  to   the  other  :  and  fo  fuch 
 particular  paffions  are  as  much  temptations, 
 to  acft  imprudently  with  regard  to  our  worldly 
 intereft,  as  to  act  vitioully  \     However,  as 
 when  we  fay,  men  are  milled  by  external  cir- 
 cumftances  of  temptation  ;  it  cannot  but  be 
 underftood,  that  there  is  fomewhat  within 
 themfelves,   to   render  thofe    circumftances 
 temptations,  or  to  render  them  fufceptible 
 of  impreffions    from    them :    fo   when    we 
 fay,  they  are  mifled  by  paffions  ;  it  is  always 
 fuppofed,  that  there  are  occalions,  circum- 
 ftances, and  objects,  exciting  thefe  paffions, 
 and  affording    means   for  gratifying    them. 
 And  therefore,  temptations  from  within,  and  • 
 from  without,  coincide,  and  mutually  imply 
 each  other.  Now  the  feveral  externa)  objedls 
 of  the  appetites,  paffions,  and  affed:ions,  be- 
 ing prefent  to  the  fcnfes,  or  offering  them- 
 
 ^  See  Sermons  preached  at   the  Rolh^  1726.  id.  Ed. 
 p.  205,  ^c,     Pref.  p.  25j  l^ju     Serm.  p.  21.  i^rV. 
 
 H  3  fclves 
 
IC2  ^f^  ^i^^^  of 'TriaL         Parti. 
 
 felves  to  the  mind,  and  fo  exciting  emotions 
 fuitable  to  their  nature;  not  only  in  cafes 
 where  they  can  be  gratified  confiftently  with 
 innocence  and  prudence,  but  alfo  in  cafes 
 where  they  cannot,  and  yet  can  be  gratified 
 imprudently  and  vitioufly:  this  as  really  puts 
 them  in  danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing  their 
 prefent  intereft  or  good, as  their  future;  and  as 
 really  renders  feif-denial  as  necefTary  to  fecure 
 one,  as  the  other:   /.  e,  we  are  in  a  like  ftate 
 of  trial  with  refped".  to  both,  by  the  very  fame 
 paflions,  excited  by  the  very  fame   means. 
 Thus  mankind  having  a  temporal  intereft 
 depending  upon  themfelves,  and  a  prudent 
 courfe  of  behaviour  being  necefiary  to  fecure 
 it ;  pafiions  inordinately  excited,  whether  by 
 means  of  example,  or  by  any  other  external 
 circumftance,  towards  fuch  objedls,  at  fuch 
 times,  or  in  fuch  degrees,  as  that  they  cannot 
 be  gratified  confiftently  v^ith  worldly  pru- 
 dence ;  are  temptations,  dangerous,  and  too 
 often   fuccefsful    temptations,    to   forego   a 
 greater  temporal  good  for  a   lefs  ;  /.  e,   to 
 forego  what  is,  upon  the  whole,  our  tempo- 
 ral intereft,  for  the  fake  of  a  prefent  gratifi- 
 cation.    This  is  a  defcription  of  our  ftate  of 
 trial   in  our  temporal  capacity.      Subftitute 
 now  the  word  future  for  temporal,  and  'u/r- 
 tue  for  prudence;  and   it  will    be    juft    as 
 proper  a  defcription  of  our  ftate  of  trial  in 
 our  religious  capacity  :  fo  analogous  are  they 
 to  each  other. 
 
 If; 
 
Chap.  IV.       Of  a  State  of  Trial.  103 
 
 If,  from  confidcratlon  of  this  our  Uke  ftate 
 of  trial  in  both  capacities,  we  go  on  to  ob- 
 ferve  farther,  how  mankind  behave  .under  it ; 
 we  fliall  find  there  are  feme,  who  have  fo 
 little  fenfe  of  it,  that  they  fcarce  look  beyond 
 the  pafllng  day  :  they  are  fo  taken  up  with 
 prefent  gratifications,  as  to  have,  in  a  manner, 
 no  feeling  of  confequences,  no  regard  to  their 
 future  eafe  or  fortune  in  this  life  -,  any  more 
 than  to  their  happinefs  in  another.  Some 
 appear  to  be  blinded  and  deceived  by  inordi- 
 nate pafiion,  in  their  worldly  concerns,  as 
 much  as  in  religion.  Others  are,  not  deceiv- 
 ed, but,  as  itwere,  forcibly  carried  away  by  the 
 like  paflions,  againft  their  better  judgment, 
 and  feeble  refoluticns  too  of  acfting  better. 
 And  there  are  men,  and  truely  they  are  not  a 
 few,  who  fliamelefslyavow,  not  their  intereft, 
 but  their  mere  will  and  pleafure,  to  be  their 
 law  of  life :  and  who,  in  open  defiance  of 
 every  thing  that  is  reafonable,  will  go  on  in 
 a  courfe  of  vitious  extravagance,  forefeeing, 
 with  no  remorfe  and  little  fear,  that  it  will 
 be  tlieir  temporal  ruin  ;  and  fome  of  them, 
 under  the  apprehenfion  of  the  confequences 
 of  wickednefs  in  another  ftate.  And  to  fpeak 
 in  the  m^oft  moderate  Vv^ay,  human  creatures 
 are  not  only  continually  liable  to  go  wrong 
 voluntarily,  but  we  fee  likewife  that  they 
 often  actually  do  fo,  with  refped:  to  their 
 temporal  interefts,  as  v/ell  as  v/ith  refpedt  to 
 religion. 
 
 H  4  Thus 
 
104  ^f  ^  ^^^^^  tf  2V/^/.         Part  I. 
 
 Thus  our  difficulties  and  dangers,  or  our 
 trials,  in  our  temporal  and  our  religious  ca- 
 pacity, as  they  proceed  from  the  fame  caufes, 
 and  have  the  fame  effeft  upon  men's  beha- 
 viour, are  evidently  analogous,  and  of  the 
 fame  kind. 
 
 It  may  be  added,  that  as  the  difficulties  and 
 dangers  of  mifcarrying  in  our  religious  ftate 
 of  trial,  are  greatly  increafed,  and  one  is  ready 
 to  think,  in  a  manner  wholly  7nade,  by  the  ill 
 behaviour  of  others  ^  by  a  wrong  education, 
 wrong  in  a  moral  fenfe,  fometimes  pofitively 
 vitious  ;  by  general  bad  example  ;  by  the  dif- 
 honeft  artifices  which  are  got  into  bufmefs 
 of  all  kinds ;  and,  in  very  many  parts  of  the 
 world,  by  religion's  being  corrupted  into  fu- 
 perftitions,  which  indulge  men  in  their  vices ; 
 fo  in  like  manner,  the  difficulties  of  condu(fl- 
 ing  ourfelves  prudently  in  refped;  to  our  pre- 
 fent  intereft,  and  our  danger  of  being  led  aiide 
 from  purfuing  it,  are  greatly  increafed,  by  a 
 foolifh  education  ;  and,  after  we  come  to  ma- 
 ture age,  by  the  extravagance  and  carelefsnefs 
 of  others,  whom  we  have  intercourfe  with ; 
 and  by  miftaken  notions,  very  generally  pre- 
 valent, and  taken  up  from  common  opinion, 
 concerning  temporal  h'^ppinefs,  and  wherein 
 it  confifts.  And  perfons,  by  their  own  neg- 
 ligence and  folly  in  their  temporal  affairs, 
 no  Itfs  than  by  a  courfe  of  vice,  bring  them- 
 felves  into  new  difficulties  3  and,  by  habits 
 
 of 
 
Chap.  IV.       Of  a  State  of  Trial  105 
 
 of  indulgence,  become  lefs  qualified  to  go 
 through  them:  and  one  irregularity  after 
 another,  embarrafles  things  to  fuch  a  degree, 
 that  they  know  not  whereabout  they  are; 
 and  often  makes  the  path  of  condudl  fo  in- 
 tricate and  perplexed,  that  it  is  difficult  to 
 trace  it  out ;  difficult  even  to  determine  what 
 is  the  prudent  or  the  moral  part.  Thus,  for 
 inftance,  wrong  behaviour  in  one  ftage  of 
 life,  youth ;  wrong,  I  mean,  confidering  our- 
 felves  only  in  our  temporal  capacity,  without 
 taking  in  religion  -,  this,  in  feveral  ways,  in- 
 creafes  the  difficulties  of  right  behaviour  in 
 mature  age  -,  i,  e,  puts  us  into  a  more  difad- 
 vantageous  ftate  of  trial  in  our  temporal  ca- 
 pacity. 
 
 We  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of 
 God.  There  are  natural  appearances  of  our 
 being  in  a  ftate  of  degradation  ^  And  we 
 certainly  are  in  a  condition,  which  does  not 
 feeWy  by  any  means,  the  moft  advantageous 
 we  could  imagine  or  defire,  either  in  our  na- 
 tural or  moral  capacity,  for  fecuring  either 
 our  prefent  or  future  intereft.  However, 
 this  condition,  low  and  careful  and  uncertain 
 as  it  is,  does  not  afford  any  juft  ground  of 
 complaint.  For,  as  men  may  manage  their 
 temporal  affairs  with  prudence,  and  fo  pafs 
 their  days  here  on  earth  in  tolerable  eafe  and 
 
 «  Part  II.  Chap.  v.  p.  281. 
 
 fatisfadion. 
 
io6  Of  a  State  of  Trial.         Part  I. 
 
 fatisfaftion,  by  a  moderate  degree  of  ca^-e :  fo 
 like  wife  with  regard  to  religion,  there  lo  no 
 more  required  than  what  they  are  well  able 
 to  dc,  and  what  they  muft  be  greatly  wanting 
 to  themfelves,  if  they  neglecS.  And  for  per- 
 fons  to  have  that  put  upon  them,  v/hich 
 they  are  well  able  to  go  through,  and  no 
 more,  we  naturally  coniider  as  an  equitable 
 thing;  fuppofmg  it  done  by  proper  authority. 
 Nor  have  we  any  more  reafon  to  complain 
 of  it,  with  regard  to  the  Author  of  Nature, 
 than  of  his  not  having  given  us  other  advan- 
 tages, belonging  to  other  orders  of  creatures. 
 
 But  the  thing  here  infifted  upon  is,  that 
 the  ftate  of  trial,  which  religion  teaches  us 
 we  are  in,  is  rendered  credible,  by  its  being 
 throughout  uniform  and  of  a  piece  with  the 
 general  condud:  of  Providence  tovv^ards  us,  in 
 all  other  refpefts  within  the  compafs  of  our 
 knowledge.  Indeed  if  mankind,  confidered 
 in  their  natural  capacity,  as  inhabitants  of 
 this  world  only,  found  themfelves,  from  their 
 birth  to  their  death,  in  a  fettled  ftate  of  fe- 
 curity  and  happinefs,  without  any  folicitude 
 or  thought  of  their  own  :  or  if  they  were  in 
 no  danger  of  being  brought  into  inconveni- 
 ences and  diftrefs,  by  carelefsnefs,  or  the  folly 
 of  paffion,  through  bad  example,  the  treach- 
 ery of  others,  or  the  deceitful  appearances 
 of  things :  were  this  our  natural  condition, 
 then  it  might  feem  ftrange,  and  be  fome  pre- 
 emption 
 
chap.  IV,     Gf  a  State  of  Trial.  107 
 
 fumption  againfl:  the  truth  of  religion,  that 
 it  reprefents  our  future  and  more  general  in- 
 tereft,  as  not  fecure  of  courfe,  but  as  depend- 
 ing upon  our  behaviour,  and  requiring  re- 
 collctftion  and  felf-government  to  obtain  it. 
 For  it  might  be  alledged,  "  What  you  fay  is 
 **  our  condition  is  one  refpe6l,  in  not  in  any 
 *'  wife  of  a  fort  with  what  we  find,  by  expe- 
 "  rience,  our  condition  is  in  another.  Our 
 "  whole  prefent  intereft  is  fecured  to  our 
 "  hands,  without  any  folicitude  of  ours ;  and 
 *^  why  fhould  not  our  future  intereft,  if  we 
 '^  have  any  fuch,  be  fo  too  ?"  But  fmce,  on 
 the  contrary,  thought  and  confideration,  the 
 voluntary  denying  ourfelves  many  things 
 which  we  defire,  and  a  courfe  of  behaviour, 
 far  from  being  always  agreeable  to  us ;  are 
 abfolutely  neceflary  to  our  afting  even  a  com- 
 mon decent,  and  common  prudent  part,  fo 
 as  to  pals  with  any  fatisfaftion  through  the 
 prefent  world,  and  be  received  upon  any  to- 
 lerable good  terms  in  it :  fmce  this  is  the  cafe, 
 all  prefumption  againft  felf-denial  and  atten- 
 tion being  neceffary  to  fecure  our  higher  in- 
 tereft-, is  removed.  Had  we  not  experience, 
 it  might,  perhaps  fpecioufly,  be  urged,  that 
 it  is  improbable  any  kind  of  hazard  and  dan- 
 ger fliould  be  put  upon  us  by  an  infinite  Be- 
 ing ;  when  every  thing  which  is  hazard  and 
 danger  in  our  manner  of  conception,  and  will 
 end  in  error,  confuiion,  and  mifery,  is  now 
 already  certain  in  his  fore-knowledge.     And 
 
 indeed. 
 
io8  Of  a  State  of  Trial.         Parti. 
 
 indeed,  why  any  thing  of  hazard  and  danger 
 fhould  be  put  upon  fuch  frail  creatures  as  we 
 are,  may  well  be  thought  a  difficulty  in  fpe- 
 culation  ;  and  cannot  but  be  fo,  till  we  know 
 the  whole,  or,  however,  much  more  of  the 
 caie.  But  ftill  the  conftitution  of  nature 
 is  as  it  is.  Our  happinefs  and  mifery  are 
 trufted  to  our  condud:,  and  made  to  depend 
 upon  it.  Somewhat,  and,  in  many  circum- 
 ftances,  a  great  deal  too,  is  put  upon  us,  either 
 to  do,  or  to  fufFer,  as  we  chufe.  And  all  the 
 various  miferies  of  life,  which  people  bring 
 upon  themfelves  by  negligence  and  folly,  and 
 might  have  avoided  by  proper  care,  are  in- 
 ftances  of  this :  which  miferies  are  before- 
 hand, juft  as  contingent  and  undetermined  as 
 their  condudl,  and  left  to  be  determined  by 
 
 Thefe  obfervatlons  are  an  anfwer  to  the 
 objedions  againft  the  credibility  of  a  ftate  of 
 trial,  as  implying  temptations,  and  real  dan- 
 ger of  mifcarrying  with  regard  to  our  general 
 intereft,  under  the  moral  government  of  God: 
 and  they  fhew,  that,  if  we  are  at  all  to  be  con- 
 fidered  in  fuch  a  capacity,  and  as  having  fuch 
 an  intereft  j  the  general  analogy  of  Providence 
 muft  lead  us  to  apprehend  ourfelves  in  danger 
 of  mifcarrying,  in  different  degrees,  as  to  this 
 intereft,  by  our  neglecfting  to  ad  the  proper 
 part  belonging  to  us  in  that  capacity.  For 
 we  have  a  prefent  intereft,  under  the  govern- 
 ment 
 
Chap.  IV.     Of  a  State  of  Trial.  109 
 
 ment  of  God  which  we  experience  here  upon 
 earth.  And  this  intereft,  as  it  is  not  forced 
 upon  us,  fo  neither  is  it  offered  to  our  accept- 
 ance, but  to  our  acquifition  ;  in  fuch  fort, 
 as  that  we  are  in  danger  of  miiTing  it,  by- 
 means  of  temptations  to  negled:,  or  ad:  con- 
 trary to  it ;  and  without  attention  and  felf- 
 denial,  muft  and  do  mifs  of  it.  It  is  then 
 perfectly  credible,  that  this  may  be  our  cafe, 
 with  refpedt  to  that  chief  and  final  good, 
 which  religion  propofes  to  us. 
 
 CHAP.    V, 
 
 Of  a  State  of  Probation  y  as  intended  for  moral 
 Difcipline  and  Improvement. 
 
 FROM  the  conlideration  of  our  being 
 in  a  probation-ilate,  of  fo  much  diffi- 
 culty and  hazard,  naturally  arifes  the  queftion, 
 how  we  came  to  be  placed  in  it.  But  fuch 
 a  general  inquiry  as  this,  would  be  found 
 involved  in  infuperable  difficulties.  For, 
 though  fome  of  thefe  difficulties  would  be 
 leiTened  by  obferving,  that  all  wickednefs  is 
 voluntary,  as  is  implied  in  its  very  notion ; 
 and  that  many  of  the  miferies  of  life  have  ap- 
 parent 
 
no  ^f  ^  State  of  Parti. 
 
 parent  good  effedls  :  yet,  when  v/e  confider 
 other  circum fiances  belonging  to  both,  and 
 what  muft  be  the  confequence  of  the  former 
 in  a  life  to  come^  it  cannot  but  be  acknov/- 
 ledged  plain  foliy  and  prefumption,  to  pretend 
 to  give  an  account  of  the  whole  reafons  of 
 this  matter  :  the  whole  reafons  of  our  being 
 allotted  a  condition,  out  of  which  fo  much 
 wickednefs  and  mifery,  fo  circumftanced, 
 would  in  fad  arife.  Whether  it  be  not  be- 
 yond our  faculties,  not  only  to  find  out,  but 
 even  to  underftand,  the  whole  account  of 
 this ;  or,  though  we  fliould  be  fuppofed  ca- 
 pable of  underftanding  it,  yet,  whether  it 
 w^ould  be  of  fervice  or  prejudice  to  us  to  be 
 ir.formed  of  it,  is  impoffible  to  fay.  But 
 as  our  prefent  condition  can  in  no  wife  be 
 fhewn  inconfiftent  with  the  perfed:  moral 
 government  of  God  :  fo  religion  teaches  us 
 we  were  placed  in  it,  that  we  might  qualify 
 ourfelves,  by  the  praftice  of  virtue,  for  ano- 
 ther ftate  which  is  to  follow  it.  And  this, 
 though  but  a  partial  anfwer,  a  very  partial 
 one  indeed,  to  the  inquiry  now  mentioned  -, 
 yet,  is  a  more  fatisfadtory  anfwer  to  another, 
 which  is  of  real,  and  of  the  utmoft  import- 
 ance to  us  to  have  anfwered :  the  inquiry. 
 What  is  our  bufmefs  here  ?  The  known  end 
 then,  why  we  are  placed  in  a  ftate  of  fo  much 
 afflidion,  hazard,  and  difficulty,  is,  our  im- 
 provement in  virtue  and  piety,  as  the  requifite 
 §  qualification 
 
chap.  V.         Moral  Difcipline,  1 1 1 
 
 qualification  for  a  future  ftate  of  fecurity  and 
 happinefs. 
 
 Now  the  beginning  of  life,  confidered  as 
 an  education  for  mature  age  in  the  prefent 
 world,  appears  plainly,  at  firft  fight  analo- 
 gous to  this  our  trial  for  a  future  one :  the  for- 
 mer being  in  our  temporal  capacity,  what  the 
 latter  is  in  our  religious  capacity.  But  fome 
 obfervations  common  to  both  of  them,  and 
 a  more  difliinfl;  confideration  of  each,  will 
 more  diftindlly  (hew  the  extent  and  force  of 
 the  analogy  between  them ;  and  the  credibi- 
 lity, which  arifes  from  hence,  as  well  as  from 
 the  nature  of  the  thing,  that  the  prefent  life 
 was  intended  to  be  a  Hate  of  difcipline  for  a 
 future  one. 
 
 I.  Every  fpecies  of  creatures  is,  we  fee,  de- 
 figned  for  a  particular  v/ay  of  life ;  to  which, 
 the  nature,  the  capacities,  temper,  and  quali- 
 fications, of  each  fpecies,  are  as  necefiary, 
 as  their  external  circumftances.  Eoth  come 
 into  the  notion  of  fuch  ftate,  or  particular 
 way  of  life,  and  are  confl:ituent  parts  of  it. 
 Change  a  man's  capacities  or  character  to  the 
 degree,  in  which  it  is  conceivable  they  may 
 be  changed  -,  and  he  would  be  altogether  in* 
 capable  of  a  human  courfe  of  life,  and  human 
 happinefs  3  as  incapable,  as  if,  his  nature 
 continuing  unchanged,  he  were  placed  in  a 
 world,  where  he  had  no  fphcre  of  aftion,  nor 
 
 any 
 
112  Of  a  State  of  Parti. 
 
 any  objeds  to  anfwer  his  appetites,  paffions, 
 and  affe(fl:ions  of  any  fort.  One  thing  is  {^t 
 over  againft  another,  as  an  antient  writer  ex- 
 prefTes  it.  Our  nature  correfponds  to  our  ex- 
 ♦  ternal  condition.  Without  this  correfpond- 
 ence,  there  would  be  no  poflibihty  of  any 
 fuch  thing  as  human  Ufe  and  human  happi- 
 nefs  :  which  life  and  happinefs  are,  therefore, 
 a  refult  from  our  nature  and  condition  jointly : 
 meaning  by  human  life,  not  living  in  the  lite- 
 ral fenfe,  but  the  whole  complex  notion  com- 
 monly underftood  by  thofe  words.  So  that 
 "without  determining  what  will  be  the  em- 
 ployment and  happinefs,  the  particular  life,  of 
 good  men  hereafter ;  there  muft  be  fome  de- 
 terminate capacities,  fome  neceilary  chara(5ler 
 and  qualifications,  without  which  perfons 
 cannot  but  be  utterly  incapable  of  it :  in  like 
 manner,  as  there  muft  be  fome,  without  which 
 men  would  be  incapable  of  their  prefent  ftate 
 of  life.     Now, 
 
 II.  The  conftitution  of  human  creatures, 
 and  indeed  of  all  creatures  which  come  under 
 our  notice,  is  fuch,  as  that  they  are  capable  of 
 naturally  becoming  qualified  for  ftates  of  life, 
 for  which  they  were  once  wholly  unqualified. 
 In  imagination  we  may  indeed  conceive  of 
 creatures,  as  incapable  of  having  any  of  their 
 faculties  naturally  enlarged,  or  as  being  unable 
 naturally  to  acquire  any  new  qualifications : 
 but  the  faculties  of  every  fpecies  known  to  us, 
 
 are 
 
Chap.  V.         Moral  D  if  dp  line.  1 1 3 
 
 are  made  for  enlargement^  for  acquirements 
 of  experience  and  habits.  We  find  ourl^ives 
 in  particular  indued  with  capacities,  not  only 
 of  perceiving  ideas,  and  of  knowledge  or  per- 
 ceiving truth,  but  alfo  of  floring  up  our  ideas 
 and  knowledge  by  memory.  We  ire  capable, 
 not  only  of  a6ling,  and  of  having  different 
 momentary  imprellions  made  upon  us;  but  of 
 getting  a  new  facility  in  any  kind  of  ad:ion> 
 and  of  fettled  alterations  in  our  temper  or 
 character.  The  power  of  the  two  laft  is  the 
 power  of  habits.  But  neither  the  perception 
 of  ideas,  nor  knowledge  of  any  fort,  are  ha- 
 bits; though  abfolutely  necefiary  to  the  form- 
 ing of  them.  However,  apprehenfion,  rea- 
 fon,  memory,  which  are  the  capacities  of  ac- 
 quiring knowledge,  are  greatly  improved  by 
 exercife.  Whether  the  word  habit  is  appli- 
 cable to  all  thefe  improvements,  and  in  par- 
 ticular how  far  the  powers  of  memory  and  of 
 habits  may  be  powers  of  the  fame  nature,  I 
 fhall  not  inquire.  But  that  perceptions  come 
 into  our  minds  readily  and  of  courfe,  bymeans 
 of  their  having  been  there  before,  feems  a 
 thing  of  the  fame  fort,  as  readinefs  in  any  par- 
 ticular kind  of  action,  proceeding  from  being 
 accuftomed  to  it.  And  aptnefs  to  recolle(ft 
 pradical  obfervations  of  fervice  in  our  con- 
 duct, is  plainly  habit  in  many  cafes.  There 
 are  habits  of  perception,  and  habits  of  ad:ion. 
 An  inftance  of  the  former,  is  our  conilant  and 
 even  involuntary  readinefs,  in  correding  the 
 
 I  imprcffions 
 
114  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 
 
 impreffions  of  our  iight  concerning  magni- 
 tudes aiid  dift.  ftces,  {o  as  to  fubftitute  judg- 
 ment in  the  re  om  of  fcnlution  imperceptibly 
 to  ourielves.  And  it  fecms  as  if  all  other 
 alTociaiions  of  ideas  not  naturally  connecfled, 
 might  be  called  paflive  habits;  as  properly  as 
 our  readincfs  in  underftanding  languages  up- 
 on fight,  or  hcarin.;  of  word?.  And  our  rea- 
 dinefs  in  fpeaking  and  writing  them  is  an  in- 
 ftance  of  the  latter,  of  adlive  habits.  For  dif- 
 tindlnefs,  we  may  confider  habits,  as  belong- 
 ing t^^th^-bnriy,  ^LJlbiUI^ii  *  ^^^  ^^^  latter 
 will  be  explained  by  the  former.  Under  the 
 formier  are  comprehended  all  bodily  activities 
 or  m.otions,  whether  graceful  or  unbecoming, 
 which  are  owing  to  ufe :  under  the  latter,  ge- 
 neral" h.:bits  oi  life  and  conduct;  fuch  as  thofe 
 of  obedience  and  fubmifiion  to  authority,  or 
 to  any  particular  perfon  ;  thofc  of  veracity, 
 juflice,  and  charity ;  thofe  of  attention,  in- 
 duflry,  felf- government,  envy,  revenge.  And 
 habits  of  this  latter  kind  feem  produced  by 
 repeated  aCts,  as  well  as  the  formxr.  And  in 
 like  manner  as  habits  belonging  to  the  body, 
 are  produced  by  external  ads  :  fo  habits  of 
 the  nnnd  are  produced  by  the  exertion  of  in- 
 ward pra'itical  principles,  /.  6'.  by  carrying  them 
 into  ad,  Grading  upon  them;  the  principles 
 of  obedience,  of  veracity,  juflice,  and  charity. 
 Nor  can  thofe  habits  be  formed  by  any  exter-  . 
 nal  coui  fe  of  adion,  othcrvvife  than  as  it  pro- 
 ceeds from  thcfe  principles  :  becaufe  it  is  only 
 
 thefe 
 
Chap.  V.         Moral  Difciplme.  1 1  ^ 
 
 thefe  inward  principles  exerted,  which  are 
 flri(flly  adls  of  obedience,  of  veracity,  of  juf- 
 tice,  and  of  charity.  So  likewife  habits  of  at- 
 tention, induftry,  felf- government^  are  in  the 
 fame  manner  acquired  by  exerciic ;  and  habits 
 of  envy  and  revenge  by  indulgence,  whether 
 in  outward  adl,  or  in  thought  and  intention, 
 /.  e,  inward  ad: :  for  fuch  intention  is  an  ad:. 
 Refolutions  alfo  to  do  well,  are  properly  ads. 
 And  endeavouring  to  enforce  upon  our  own 
 minds,a  prad:ical  fenfe  of  virtue,  or  to  beget  in 
 others  that  pradical  fenfe  of  it,  which  a  man 
 really  has  himfclf,  is  a  virtuous  ad:.  All  thefe, 
 therefore,  may  and  will  contribute  towards 
 forming  good  habits.  But  going  over  the  the- 
 ory of  virtue  in  one's  thoughts,  talking  well, 
 and  drawing  fine  pidures,  of  it ;  this  is  fo  far 
 from  neceflarily  or  certainly  conducing  to 
 form  an  habit  of  it,  in  him  who  thus  employs 
 himfelf ;  that  it  may  harden  the  mind  in  a 
 contrary  courfe,  and  render  it  gradually  more 
 infenfible,  /.  e,  form  an  habit  of  infenfibility, 
 to  all  moral  confiderations.  For,  from  our 
 very  faculty  of  habits,  paffive  imprefiions,  by 
 being  repeated,  grow  weaker.  Thoughts,  by 
 often  paffing  through  the  mind,  are  felt  lefs 
 fenfibly :  being  accuftomed  to  danger,  begets 
 intrepidity,  /.  e,  leffens  fear  j  to  diftrefs,  leflens 
 the  pafTion  of  pity;  to  inftances  of  others 
 mortaUty,  leffens  the  fenfible  apprehenfion  of 
 our  own.  And  from  thefe  two  obfervations 
 together;  that  pradical  habits  are  formed  and 
 itrengthened  by  repeated  ads,  and  that  paffive 
 
 I  2  impreffions 
 
ii6  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 
 
 impreffions  grow  weaker  by  being  repeated 
 upon  us  y  it  muft  follow,  that  adive  habits 
 may  be  gradually  forming  and  ftrengthening, 
 by  a  courfe  of  afting  upon  fuch  and  fuch  mo- 
 tives and  excitements,  whilft  thefe  motives  and 
 excitements  themfelves  arc,  by  proportionable 
 degrees,  gro wing lefsfenfible,  /.  e.  arc  continu- 
 ally lefs  and  lefs  fenfibly  felt,  even  as  the  ac- 
 tive habits  ftrengthen.  And  experience  con- 
 firms this :  for  active  principles,  at  the  very 
 time  that  they  are  lefs  lively  in  perception 
 than  they  were,  are  found  to  be,  fome  how, 
 wrought  more  thoroughly  into  the  temper  and 
 charader,  and  become  more  efFed:ual  in  in- 
 fluencing ourpradtice.  The  three  things  juft 
 mentioned,  may  afford  inftances  of  it.     Per- 
 ception of  danger,  is  a  natural  excitemxcnt  of 
 paffive  fear,  and  adlive  caution  :  and  by  being 
 inured  to  danger,  habits  of  the  latter  are  gra- 
 dually wrought,  at  the  fame  time  that  the 
 former  gradually  leffens.  Perception  of  diftrefs 
 in  others,  is  a  natural  excitement,  paffively  to 
 pity,  and  acflively  to  relieve  it :  but  let  a  man 
 let  himfelf  to  attend  to,  inquire  out,  and  relieve 
 diftreffed  perfons,  and  he  cannot  but  grow  lefs 
 and  lefs  fenfibly  affected  with  the  various  mife« 
 ries  of  life,  with  which  he  muft  become  ac- 
 quainted 5  when  yet,  at  the  fame  time,  bene- 
 volence, confidered  not  as  a  paffion,  but  as  a 
 pracflical  principle  of  adion,  will  ftrengthen: 
 and  whilft  he  paffively  compaffionates  the  dif- 
 treffed lefs,  he  will  acquire  a  greater  aptitude 
 adively  to  affift  and  befriend  them.     So  alfo 
 
 at 
 
chap.  V.  Moral  'DifcipUne^  iij 
 
 at  the  fame  time  that  the  daily  inftances  of 
 mens  dying  around  us,  give  us  daily  a  lefs 
 fenfible  paffive  feeling  or  apprchenfion  of  our 
 own  mortality,  fuch  inflances  greatly  contri- 
 bute to  the  ftrengthening  a  practical  regard  to 
 it  in  ferious  men  ;  /.  e.  to  forming  an  habit  of 
 adling  with  a  conllant  view  to  it.  And  this 
 feems  again  further  to  fhew,  that  paffive  im- 
 preffions  inade  upon  our  minds  by  admoni- 
 tion, experience,  example,  though  they  may 
 have  a  remote  efficacy,  and  a  very  great  one, 
 towards  forming  a(!:tive  habits,  yet,  can  have 
 this  efficacy  no  otherwife  than  by  inducing  us 
 to  fuch  a  courfe  of  adtion :  and  that  it  is,  not 
 being  affedled  fo  and  fo,  but  acting,  which 
 forms  thofe  habits  :  only  it  muft  be  always 
 remembered,  that  real  endeavours  to  enforce 
 good  impreffions  upon  ourfelves,  are  a  fpecies 
 of  virtuous  adlion.  Nor  do  we  know  how 
 far  it  is  poffible,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that 
 effed:s  iliould  be  wrought  in  us  at  once,  equi* 
 valent  to  habits,  /.  e,  what  is  wrought  by  ufe 
 and  exercife.  However,  the  thing  infifted 
 upon  is,  not  what  may  be  poffible,  but  what 
 is  in  fadt  the  appointment  of  nature  :  which 
 is,  that  active  habits  are  to  be  formed  by  ex- 
 ercife. Their  progrefs  may  be  fo  gradual,  as 
 to  be  imperceptible  in  its  fteps  :  it  may  be 
 hard  to  explain  the  faculty,  by  which  we  are 
 capable  of  habits,  throughout  its  fcven  1  parts; 
 and  to  trace  it  up  to  its  original,  fo  as  to  diftin- 
 guifh  it  from  all  others  in  our  mmd:  ana  it 
 
 I  3  ieems 
 
ji8  Of  a  State  of  Parti, 
 
 feems  as  if  contrary  effedls  were  to  be  afcribed 
 to  it.  But  the  thing  in  general,  that  our  na- 
 ture is  formed  to  yield,  in  fome  fuch  manner 
 as  this,  to  ufe  and  excrcife,  is  matter  of  cer- 
 tain experience. 
 
 Thus,  by  accuftoming  ourfelves  to  any 
 courfe  of  action,  we  get  an  aptnefs  to  go  on, 
 a  facility,  readinefs,  and  often  pleafure,  in  it. 
 The  inclinations  which  rendered  us  averfe  to 
 it,  grow  weaker :  the  difficulties  in  it,  not 
 only  the  imaginary  but  the  real  ones,  leffen : 
 the  reafons  for  it,  offer  themfelves  of  courfe 
 to  our  thoughts  upon  all  occafions  :  and  the 
 leaft  glimpfe  of  them  is  fufficient  to  make  us 
 go  on,  in  a  courfe  of  adlion,  to  which  we 
 have  been  accuftomed.  And  practical  prin- 
 ciples appear  to  grow  ftronger,  abfolutely  in 
 themfelves,  by  exercife;  as  well  as  relatively, 
 with  regard  to  contrary  principles;  which,  by 
 being  accuftomed  to  fubmit,  do  fo  habitually, 
 and  of  courfe.  And  thus  a  new  character,  in 
 fcveral  refpecfts,  may  be  formed ;  and  many 
 habitudes  of  life,  not  given  by  nature,  but 
 which  nature  diredis  us  to  acquire. 
 
 III.  Indeed  we  may  be  affured,  that  we 
 fliould  never  have  had  thefe  capacities  of  im- 
 proving by  experience,  acquired  knowledge, 
 and  habits,  had  they  not  been  neceffary,  and 
 intended  to  be  made  ufe  of.  And  accordingly 
 we  find  them  fo  neceffary,  and  fo  much  in- 
 *  tended^ 
 
chap.  V.  Moral  Dlfciplme,  i  r  9 
 
 tended,  that  without  them  we  ihould  be  ut- 
 terly incapable  of  that,  which  was  tlie  end 
 for  which  we  wwc  made,  confidered  in  our 
 temporal  capacity  only  :  the  employments  and 
 fatisfadiions  of  our  mature  ftatc  of  life. 
 
 Nature  does  in  no  wife  qualify  us  wholly, 
 much  lefs  at  once,  for  this  m^ature  ftate  of 
 life.  Even  maturity  of  undcrflanding  and 
 bodily  ftrength,  arc  not  only  arrived  to  gra- 
 dually, but  are  aJfo  very  much  owing  to  the 
 continued  exercifc  of  our  powers  of  body  and 
 mind,  from  in-'ancy.  But  if  w^e  fuppofe  a 
 perfon  brought  into  the  w^orld  with  both 
 thefe  in  maturity,  as  far  as  this  is  conceivable^ 
 he  would  plainly  at  firft  be  as  unqualified  for 
 the  human  life  of  mature  age,  as  an  idiot. 
 He  w^ould  be  in  a  manner  difcradled,  with 
 aftoniihment,  and  apprehenfion,  and  cur iofity, 
 and  fufpenfe:  nor  can  one  guefs,  how  long  it 
 would  be,  before  he  would  be  familiarized  to 
 himfelfand  the  objedls  about  him  enough, 
 even  to  fet  himfelf  to  any  thing.  It  m^ay  be 
 qucftioned  too,  wdiether  the  natural  infonra- 
 tion  of  his  fight  and  hearing,  would  be  of  any 
 manner  of  ufe  at  all  to  him  in  adting,  before 
 experience.  And  it  feems,  that  men  would 
 be  fi:rangcly  headfirong  and  felf- willed,  ?nd 
 difpofed  to  exert  themfeives  with  an  impetu- 
 ofity,  which  would  render  fociety  infupport- 
 able,  and  the  living  in  it  impracticable ;  wxrc 
 it  not  for  fome  acquired  moderation  and  felf- 
 I  4  government, 
 
120  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 
 
 government,  fomc  aptitude  and  readinefs  in 
 reftraining  themfelves,  and  concealing  their 
 fenfe  of  things.  Want  of  every  thing  of  this 
 kind  which  is  learnt,  would  render  a  man 
 as  uncapable  of  fociety,  as  want  of  language 
 would:  or  as  his  natural  ignorance  of  any  of 
 the  particular  employments  of  life,  would 
 render  him  uncapable  of  providing  himfelf 
 with  the  common  conveniences,  or  fupply- 
 inof  the  neceffarv  v/ants  of  it.  In  thefe  re- 
 fpefts,  and  probably  in  many  more,  of  which 
 we  hr.vc  no  particular  notion,  mankind  is 
 left,  by  nature,  an  imformed,  unfinifhed  crea- 
 ture 'y  Utterly  deficient  and  unqualified,  before 
 the  acquirement  of  knowledge,  experience, 
 and  habits,  for  that  mature  ftate  of  life,  which 
 was  the  end  of  his  creation,  conlidering  him, 
 as  related  only  to  this  world. 
 
 But  then,  as  nature  has  endued  us  with  a 
 power  of  fupplying  thofe  deficiencies,  by  ac- 
 quired knowledge,  experience,  and  habits: 
 fo  likevv'ife'we  are  placed  in  a  condition,  in 
 infancy,  childhood,  and  youth,  fitted  for  it^ 
 fitted  for  our  acquiring  thofe  quahfications 
 of  all  forts,  which  we  fland  in  need  of  in  ma- 
 ture age.  Hence  children,  from  their  very 
 birth,  are  daily  growing  acquainted,  with  the 
 objects  about  them,  with  the  fcene  in  which 
 they  are  placed,  and  to  have  a  future  part ; 
 and  learning  fomewhat  or  other,  neceflary  to 
 ihe  performance  of  it.     The  fubordinations, 
 
 to 
 
Chap.  V.        Moral  Difcipline.  121 
 
 to  which  they  are  accuftomed  In  domeftic 
 life,  teach  tliem  felf-government  in  common 
 behaviour  abroad,  and  prepare  them  for  fiib- 
 jefdon  and  obedience  to  civil  authority. 
 What  pafles  before  their  eyes,  and  daily  hap- 
 pens to  them,  gives  them  experience,  caution 
 againft  treachery  and  deceit,  together  with 
 numberlefs  little  rules  of  action  and  condudt, 
 which  we  could  not  live  without ;  and  which 
 are  learnt  fo  infenfibly  and  fo  perfectly,  as  to 
 be  miftaken  perhaps  for  inftincl :  though 
 they  are  the  eifed:  of  long  experience  and  ex- 
 ercife;  as  much  fo  as  language,  or  know- 
 ledge in  particular  bufinefs,  or  the  quaUfica- 
 tions  and  behaviour  belonging  to  the  feveral 
 ranks  and  profeffions.  Thus  the  beginning 
 of  our  days  is  adapted  to  be,  and  is,  a  ftate  of 
 education  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  ma- 
 ture life.  We  are  much  affiiled  in  it  by  ex- 
 ample, inftrucSion,  and*  the  care  of  others  : 
 but  a  great  deal  is  left  to  ourfelves  to  do. 
 And  pt  this,  as  part  is  done  eafily  and  of 
 courfe ',  fo  part  requires  diligence  and  care, 
 the  voluntary  foregoing  many  things  which 
 we  defire,  and  fetting  ourfelves  to  what  we 
 fhould  have  no  inclination  to,  but  for  the 
 neceffity  or  expedience  of  it.  For,  that  la- 
 bour and  induftrv,  which  the  ftation  of  fo 
 many  abfolutely  requires,  they  would  be 
 greatly  unqualified  for,  in  maturity ;  as  thofe 
 in  other  ftations  would  be,  for  any  other  forts 
 of  application  ;  if  both  were  not  accuftomed 
 
 to 
 
122  Cy^  ^tate  of  Part  I. 
 
 to  them  in  their  youth.  And  according  as 
 perfons  behave  themfelvcs,  in  the  general 
 education  which  all  go  through,  and  in  the 
 particular  ones  adapted  to  particular  employ- 
 ments ;  their  character  is  formed,  and  made 
 appear ;  they  recommend  themfelves  more 
 or  lefs  ;  and  are  capable  of,  and  placed  in, 
 different  ftations  in  the  fociety  of  mankind. 
 
 The  former  part  of  life  then.  Is  to  be  con- 
 fidered  as  an  important  opportunity,  which 
 nature  puts  into  our  hands ;  and  which, 
 when  loft,  is  not  to  be  recovered.  And  our 
 being  placed  in  a  ftate  of  difcipline  through- 
 out this  life,  for  another  worlds  is  a  provi- 
 dential difpofitlon  of  things,  exadily  of  the 
 fame  kind,  as  our  being  placed  in  a  ftate  of 
 difcipline  during  childhood,  for  mature  age. 
 Our  condition  in  both  refpecls  is  uniform 
 and  of  a  piece,  and  comprehended  under  one 
 and  the  fame  general  law  of  nature. 
 
 And  if  we  were  not  able  at  all  to  difcern, 
 how  or  in  what  way  the  prefent  life  could 
 be  our  preparation  for  another ;  this  would 
 be  no  objedtion  againft  the  credibility  of  its 
 being  fo.  For  we  do  not  difcern,  how  food 
 and  llc'ep  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the 
 body  :  nor  could  have  any  thought  that  they 
 would,  before  we  had  experience.  Nor  do 
 children  at  all  think,  on  the  one  hand,  that 
 the  fports  and  exercifes,  to  which  they  are  fo 
 
 much 
 
Chap.  V.  Moral  DifcipHne.  IZ3 
 
 much  addi(fted,  contribute  to  their  health  and 
 growth ;  nor  on  the  other,  of  the  neceffity 
 which  there  is  for  their  being  reflniined  ia 
 them :  nor  are  they  capable  of  underftanding 
 the  ufe  of  many  pirts  of  difcipiine,  which 
 neverthelefs  they  muft  be  made  to  go  through, 
 in  order  to  qualify  them  lor  the  buiinefs  of 
 mature  age.  Were  we  not  able  then  to  dif- 
 cover,  in  what  refpedls  the  prefcnt  life  could 
 form  us  for  a  future  one  :  yet  nothing  would 
 be  more  fuppofdble  than  that  it  might,  in 
 fome  refped:s  or  other,  from  the  general  ana- 
 logy of  providence.  And  this,  for  ought  I 
 fee,  might  reafonably  be  faid,  even  though 
 we  fhould  not  take  in  the  confideration  of 
 God's  moral  government  over  the  world. 
 But, 
 
 IV.  Take  In  this  confideration,  and  con- 
 fequently,  that  the  chara(f];er  of  virtue  and  pie- 
 ty is  a  neceffary  qualification  for  the  future 
 ftate ;  and  then  we  may  difi:in<fLly  fee,  how, 
 and  in  what  refpedts,  the  prefent  life  may  be 
 a  preparation  for  it :  fince  we  want,  and  are 
 capable  of,  improvement  in  that  charautcr,  by 
 moral  arid  religious  habits  \  and  the  prefent 
 life  is  fit  to  be  a  fate  of  difcipiine  for  fuch  i?n^ 
 provement :  in  like  manner  as  we  have  already 
 pbfervedj  hov/,  and  in  what  refpecfts,  infancy, 
 childhood,  and  youth,  are  a  necefl^ary  prepa- 
 ration, and  a  natural  ftate  of  difcipiine,  iox 
 mature  age. 
 
 Nothing 
 
124  ^f  ^  ^^^'^  ^f  P^rt  I. 
 
 Nothing  which  we  at  prefent  fee,  would 
 lead  us  to  the  thought  of  a  foUtary  unac^tive 
 ftate  hereafter  :  but,  if  we  judge  at  all  from 
 the  analogy  of  nature,  we  mud  fuj3pofe,  ac- 
 cording to  the  Scripture  account  of  it,  that  it 
 will  be  a  community.  And  there  is  no  ilia- 
 dow  of  any  thing  unreafonable  in  conceiving, 
 though  there  be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  this 
 community  will  be,  as  the  Scripture  reprefents 
 it,  under  the  more  immediate,  or,  if  fuch  an 
 expreffion  may  be  ufed,  the  more  fenfible  go- 
 vernm.ent  of  God.  Nor  is  our  ignorance, 
 what  will  be  the  employments  of  this  happy 
 community,  nor  our  confequent  ignorance, 
 what  particular  fcope  or  occafion  there  will 
 be  for  the  exerclfe  of  veracity,  juftice,  and 
 charity,  amongft  the  members  of  it  with  re- 
 gard to  each  other;  any  proof,  that  there  will 
 be  no  fphere  of  exercife  for  thofe  virtues. 
 Much  lefs,  if  that  were  pollible,  is  our  ig- 
 norance any  proof,  that  there  v/ill  be  no 
 occafion  for  that  frame  of  mind,  or  cha- 
 rader,  w^hich  is  formed  by  the  daily  prac- 
 tice of  thofe  particular  virtues  here,  and  which 
 is  a  remit  from  it.  This  at  leafi:  muft  be 
 owned  in  general,  that,  as  the  government 
 eftablifhed  in  the  univerfe  is  moral,  the  cha- 
 rad:er  of  virtue  and  piety  muft,  in  fome  way 
 or  other,  be  the  condition  of  our  happinefs, 
 or  the  qualification  for  it. 
 
 Now  fi'om  what  is  above  obferved,  coh- 
 2  cerning 
 
Chap.  V.        Moral  DJfcipline.  125 
 
 cerning  our  natural  power  of  habits,  it  is  eafy 
 to  fee,  that  we  are  capable  of  moral  improve- 
 ment by  difcipline.      And  how  greatly  we 
 "wajit  it,  need  not  be  proved  to  any  one  who 
 is  acquainted  with  the  great  wickednefs  of 
 mankind  y  or  even  with  thofe  imperfed:ions, 
 which  the  beft  are  confcious  of.    But  it  is  not 
 perhaps  diftincflly  attended  to  by  every  one, 
 that    the  occafion  v/hich    human   creatures 
 have  for  difcipline,  to  improve  in  them  this 
 character  of  virtue  and  piety,  is  to  be  traced 
 up  higher  than  to  excels  in  the  paffions,  by 
 indulgence    and   habits   of  vice.     Mankind, 
 and  perhaps  all  finite  creatures,  from  the  very 
 conftitution  of  their  nature,  before  habits  of 
 virtue,  are  deficient,  and  in  danger  of  devi- 
 ating from  what  is  right :  and  therefore  ftand 
 in  need  of  virtuous    habits,    for  a   fecurity 
 againft  this  danger.     For,  together  with  the 
 general  principle  of  moral  underftanding,  we 
 have  in  our  inward  frame  various  affections 
 towards  particular  external  objects.     Thefe 
 afteftions  are  naturally,  and  of  right,  fubjedl  to 
 the  government  of  the  moral  principle,  as  to 
 the  occafion s  upon  which  they  may  be  grati- 
 fied ',  as  to  the  times,  degrees,  and  manner,  in 
 which  the  obj  edls  of  them  may  be  purfued :  but 
 then  the  principle  of  virtue  can  neither  excite 
 them,  nor  prevent  their  being  excited.     On 
 the  contrary,  they  are  naturally  felt,  when 
 the  objedls  of  them  are  prefent  to  the  mind, 
 not  only  before  all   confideration,   whether 
 
 they 
 
1 26  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 
 
 they  can  be  obtained  by  lawful  means,  but 
 after  it  is  found  they  cannot.  For  the  natu- 
 ral obje6ls  of  affection  continue  fo ;  the  ne- 
 ceflaries,  conveniences,  and  pleafures  of  life, 
 remain  naturally  defirable  3  though  they  can- 
 not be  obtained  innocently  :  nay,  though  they 
 cannot  pofiibly  be  obtained  at  all.  And  when 
 the  objects  of  any  aifedtion  whatever  cannot 
 be  obtained  without  unlawful  m.eans;  but  may 
 be  obtained  by  them  :  fuch  afFudion,  though 
 its  being  excited,  and  its  continuing  fome 
 time  in  the  mind,  be  it  as  innocent  as  it  is 
 natural  and  neceffary  ;  yet  cannot  but  be  con- 
 ceived to  have  a  tendency  to  incline  perfons 
 to  venture  upon  fuch  unlawful  means  :  and 
 therefore  muft  be  conceived  as  putting  theni 
 in  fome  danger  of  it.  Now  what  is  the  ge- 
 neral fecurity  againft  this  danger,  againft  their- 
 adliually  deviating  from  right  ?  As  the  danger 
 is,  fo  alfo  muft  the  fecurity  be,  from  within : 
 from  the  practical  principle  of  virtue  \    And 
 
 the 
 
 *  It  may  be  thought,  that  a  fenfe  of  intereil  would  as  ef- 
 fe£lually  reflrain  creatures  from  doing  wrong.  But  if  b}' 
 :2.fer.f:  of  inter  ejl.  is  meant  a  fpeculative  conviction  or  behet-, 
 that  fuch  and  fuch  indulgence  would  occafion  them  great- 
 er uneafmefs,  upon  the  whole,  than  fatisfaclion :  it  is  con- 
 trary toprefent  experience  to  fay,  that  this  fenfe  of  intereft 
 is  fufficient  to  reftrain  them  from  thus  indulging  themfelves. 
 And  \^hy  2ifcnfe  of  intercji  \z  meant  a  pradical  regard  to 
 what  is  upon  the  whole  our  happincfs :  this  is  not  only  co-^ 
 incident  with  the  principle  of  virtue  or  moral  rectitude, 
 but  is  a  part  of  the  idea  itfelf.  And  it  is  evident  this  rea- 
 fonable  lelf-Iove  wants  to  be  improved,  as  really  as  any 
 principle  In  our  nature.     For  we  dailv  fee  it  overmatched, 
 
 not 
 
Chap.  V.         Moral  Dijcipline.  127 
 
 the  flrengthening  or  improving  tliis  prin- 
 ciple, conlidered  as  pra(^l;ical,  or  as  a  prin- 
 ciple of  adion,  will  Icllcn  the  danger,  or  in- 
 crease the  fecurity  again  ft  it.  And  this  moral 
 principle  is  capable  of  improvement,  by  pro- 
 per difcipline  and  exercife  :  by  recolleffing 
 the  pradical  impreffions  which  example  and 
 experience  have  made  upon  us  :  and,  inftead 
 of  following  humour  and  mere  inclination, 
 by  continually  attending  to  the  equity  and 
 right  of  the  cafe,  in  whatever  we  are  engaged, 
 be  it  in  greater  or  lefs  matters ;  and  accuf- 
 toming  ourfelves  always  to  adt  upon  it;  as 
 being  itfelf  the  juft  and  natural  motive  of  ac- 
 tion :  and  as  this  moral  courfe  of  behaviour, 
 muft  neceffarily,  under  divine  government, 
 be  our  final  intereft.  T^hiis  the  principle  of 
 virtue,  improved  into  an  habit,  of  which  im-- 
 provernent  we  are  thus  capable,  will  plainly  be, 
 in  proportion  to  the  Jlrerigth  of  it,  a  fecurity 
 againji  the  danger  which  finite  creatures  are  in, 
 from  the  very  nature  of  propenfiojz,  or  parti-^ 
 ciilar  af^ofions.  This  way  of  putting  the 
 matter,  fuppofes  particular  aftedlions  to  re- 
 main in    a  future  ftate;  which  it  is  fcarce 
 
 not  only  by  the  more  boifterous  pafnons,  but  by  curlofity, 
 fhame,  love  of  imitation,  by  any  thing,  even  indolence : 
 efpecially  if  the  intcrefl,  the  temporal  Intereft,  fuppofe, 
 which  is  the  end  of  fuch  fclf-love,  be  at  a  diftance.  So 
 greatly  are  profligate  men  miftaken,  when  they  afRrm  thcv 
 are  wholly  governed  by  intercftedncfs  and  felt-love.  And 
 fo  little  caufe  is  there  for  moralifts  to  difclaim  this  prin- 
 ciple.    Sec  p.  LOO,  1 01. 
 
 poflibic 
 
128  <y^  State  of  PartL 
 
 poffible  to  avoid  fuppofing.  And  if  they  do ; 
 we  clearly  fee,  that  acquired  habits  of  virtue 
 and  felf-government  may  be  neceffary  for  the 
 regulation  of  them.  However,  though  wc 
 were  not  diftindly  to  take  in  this  fuppofition, 
 but  to  fpeak  only  in  general  y  the  thing  really 
 comes  to  the  fame.  For  habits  of  virtue, 
 thus  acquired  by  difcipline,  are  improvement 
 in  virtue :  and  improvement  in  virtue,  mufl 
 be  advancement  in  happinefs,  if  the  govern- 
 ment of  the  univerfe  be  moral. 
 
 [/   From  thefe  things  we  may  obferve,  and  it 
 will  farther  (htw  this  our  natural  and  original 
 need  of  being  improved  by  difcipline,  how  it 
 comes  to  pafs,  that  creatures  made  upright 
 fall ;  and  that  thofe  who  preferve  their  up- 
 rightnefs,  by  fo  doing,  raife  themfelves  to  a 
 more  fecure  ftate  of  virtue.    To  fay  that  the 
 former  is  accounted  for  by  the  nature  of  li- 
 berty, is  to  fay  no  more,  than  that  an  event's 
 adlually  happening  is  accounted  for  by  a  mere 
 poffibility  of  its  happening.      But  it  feems 
 diftindly  conceivable  from  the  very  nature 
 of  particular  affedions  or  propenfions.    For, 
 fuppofe  creatures  intended  for  fjch  a  particu- 
 lar ftate  of  life,  for  which  fuch  propenfions 
 were  necefli3.ry:  fuppole  them  endued  with 
 fuch  propenfions,  together  with  moral  under- 
 ftanding,  as  well  including  a  pradical  fenfe  of 
 virtue,  as  a  fpeculative  perception  of  it ;  and 
 that  all  thefe  feveral  principles,  both  natural 
 and  moral,  forming  an  inward  conftitution  of 
 
 mind. 
 
Chap.  V.        Moral  Difciphne.  129 
 
 mind,  were  in  the  moft  exadl  proportion  poffi- 
 ble;  /.  e,  in  a  proportion  the  moft  exactly 
 adapted  to  their  intended  ftate  of  hfe:  fuch 
 creatures  would  be  made  upright,  or  finitely 
 perfedt.  Now  particular  propenfions,  from 
 their  very  nature,  muft  be  felt,  the  objedts  of 
 them  being  prefent;  though  they  cannot  be 
 gratified  at  all,  or  not  with  the  allowance  of 
 the  moral  principle.  But  if  they  can  be  gra- 
 tified without  its  allowance,  or  by  contradid- 
 ing  it ;  then  they  muft  be  conceived  to  have 
 fome  tendency,  in  how  low  a,  degree  foever, 
 yet  fome  tendency,  to  induce  perfons  to  fuch 
 forbidden  gratification.  This  tendency,  in 
 fome  one  particular  propenfion,  may  be  in- 
 creafed,  by  the  greater  frequency  of  occafions 
 naturally  exciting  it,  than  of  occafions  exciting 
 others.  The  leaft  voluntary  indulgence  in  for- 
 bidden circumftances,  though  but  in  thought, 
 will  increafe  this  wrong  tendency ;  and  may 
 increafe  it  further,  till,  peculiar  conjundtures 
 perhaps  confpiring,  it  becomes  effcdt;  and 
 danger  of  deviating  from  right,  ends  in  adtual 
 deviation  from  it :  a  danger  necefiarily  arifing 
 from  the  very  nature  of  propenfion;  and  which 
 therefore  could  not  have  been  prevented, 
 though  it  might  have  been  efcaped,  or  got 
 innocently  through.  The  cafe  would  be,  as  if 
 we  were  to  fuppofe  a  ftrait  path  marked  out 
 for  a  perfon,  in  which  fuch  a  degree  of  at^ 
 tention  would  keep  him  fteady  :  but  if  he 
 would  not  attend  in  this  degree,  any  one  of  a 
 
 K  thoufand 
 
1 30  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 
 
 thoufand  objedls,  catching  his  eye,  might  lead 
 him  out  of  it.  Now  it  is  impoffible  to  fay, 
 howmuch,even  the  firft  full  overt  a6l  of  irre- 
 gularity, might  diforder  the  inward  conftitu- 
 tion  'y  unfettle  the  adjuftments,  and  alter  the 
 proportions,  which  formed  it,  and  in  which 
 the  uprightnefs  of  its  make  confiflcd  :  but  re- 
 petition of  irregularities  would  produce  habits. 
 And  thus  the  conftitution  would  be  fpoil- 
 ed ;  and  creatures  made  upright,  become  cor- 
 rupt and  depraved  in  their  fettled  charader, 
 proportionably  to  their  repeated  irregularities 
 in  occafional  ads.  But  on  the  contrary,  thefe 
 creatures  might  have  improved  and  raifed 
 themfelves,  to  an  higher  and  more  fecure  ftate 
 of  virtue,  by  the  contrary  behaviour  :  by  ftea- 
 dily  following  the  moral  principle,  fuppofed 
 to  be  one  part  of  their  nature  j  and  thus  with- 
 llanding  that  unavoidable  danger  of  defection, 
 which  ncceffarily  arofe  from  propenfion,  the 
 other  part  of  it.  For,  by  thus  preserving  their 
 integrity  for  fome  time,  their  danger  would 
 Icfien;  fmce  propenfions  by  being  inured  to 
 fubmit,  would  do  it  more  eafily  and  of  courfe: 
 and  their  fecurityagainft  this  lefTening  danger 
 would  increafe ;  fince  the  moral  principle 
 would  gain  additional  ftrength  by  exercife : 
 both  which  things  are  implied  in  the  notion 
 of  virtuous  habits.  Thus  then  vicious  indul- 
 gence, is  not  only  criminal  in  itfelf,  but  alfo 
 depraves  the  inward  conftitution  and  character. 
 And  virtuous  i*lf-government,  is  not  only 
 2  right 
 
chap.  V.        Moral  Difcipline.  131 
 
 right  in  itfelf,  but  alfo  improves  the  inward 
 conflitution  or  charader :  and  may  improve 
 it  to  fuch  a  degree,  that  though  v^^e  fhould 
 fuppofe  it  impoffible,  for  particular  afFecftions 
 to  be  abfolutely  coincident  with  the  moral 
 principle ;  and  confequently  fhould  allow, 
 that  fuch  creatures  as  have  been  above  fup- 
 pofed,  would  for  ever  remain  defedlble ;  yet 
 their  danger  of  aftually  deviating  from  right, 
 may  be  almoft  infinitely  lefTened,  and  they 
 fully  fortified  againft  what  remains  of  it :  if 
 that  may  be  called  danger,  againft  which, 
 there  is  an  adequate  effedtual  fecurity.  But 
 flill,  this  their  higher  perfection  may  conti- 
 nue to  confift  in  habits  of  virtue  formed  in  a 
 ftate  of  difcipline,  and  this  their  m.ore  com- 
 pleat  fecurity  remain  to  proceed  from  them. 
 And  thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable,  that  crea- 
 tures without  blemifh,  as  they  came  out  of 
 the  hands  of  God,  may  be  in  danger  of  going 
 wrong;  and  fo  may  ftand  in  need  of  the  fecu- 
 rity of  virtuous  habits,  additional  to  the  moral 
 principle  wrought  into  their  natures  by  him. 
 That  which  is  the  ground  of  their  danger,  or 
 their  want  of  fecurity,  may  be  con  fide  red  as 
 a  deficiency  in  them,  to  which  virtuous  habits 
 are  the  natural  fupply.  And  as  they  are  na- 
 turally capable  of  being  raifed  and  improv- 
 ed by  difcipline,  it  may  be  a  thing  fit  and 
 requifite,  that  they  fliould  be  placed  in  cir- 
 cumftances  wtth  an  eye  to  it :  in  circum- 
 ftances  peculiarly  fitted  to  be,   to   them,  a 
 
 K  2  ftate 
 
132  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 
 
 ftatc  of  difcipllne  for  their  improvement  in 
 virtue. 
 
 But  how  much  more  ftrongly  muft  this 
 hold  with  rcfped;  to  thofe,  who  have  corrupt- 
 ed their  natures,  are  fallen  from  their  original 
 reftitude,  and  whofe  paffions  are  become  ex- 
 ceffive  by  repeated  violations  of  their  inward 
 conftitution  ?  Upright  creatures  may  v/ant  to 
 be  improved:  depraved  creatures  want  to  be 
 renewed.  Education  and  difcipline,  which 
 may  be  in  all  degrees  and  forts  of  gentlenefs 
 and  of  feverity,  is  expedient  for  thofe :  but 
 muft  be  abfolutely  neceffary  for  thefe.  For 
 thefe,  difcipline  of  the  feverer  fort  too,  and  in 
 the  higher  degrees  of  it,  muft  be  neceffary,  in 
 order  to  wear  out  vicious  habits  -,  to  recover 
 their  primitive  ftrength  of  felf-government, 
 which  indulgence  muft  have  vv^eakened ;  to 
 repair,  as  well  as  raife  into  an  habit,  the  moral 
 principle,  in  order  to  their  arriving  at  a  fecure*, 
 ftate  of  virtuous  happinefs. 
 
 Now  whoever  will  confider  the  thing,  may 
 clearly  fee,  that  the  prefent  world  is  peculiarly 
 fit  to  be  a  ftate  of  difcipline  for  this  purpofe, 
 to  fuch  as  will  fet  themfelves  to  mend  and 
 improve.  For,  the  various  temptations  with 
 which  we  are  furrounded ;  our  experience  of 
 the  deceits  of  wickednefs ;  having  been  in 
 many  inftances  led  wrong  ourfelves  ^  the  great 
 vicioufnefs  of  the  world;  the  infinite  diforders 
 
 confequent 
 
chap.  V,         Moral  Difcipliiie.  133 
 
 confequent  upon  it ;  our  being  made  acquaint- 
 ed with  pain  and  forrow,  either  from  our  own 
 feeling  of  it,  or  from  the  fight  of  it  in  others ; 
 thefe  things,  though  fome  of  them  may  indeed 
 produce  wrong  eifeds  upon  our  minds,  yet 
 when  duly  reflected  upon,  have,  all  of  them,  a 
 dired:  tendency  to  bring  us  to  a  fettled  modera- 
 tion and  reafonablenefs  of  temper  :  the  con- 
 trary both  to  thoughtlefs  levity,  and  alfo  to 
 that  unreftrained  felf-will,  and  violent  bent  to 
 follow  prefent  inclination,  which  may  be  ob- 
 ferved  in  undifciplined  minds.  Such  experi- 
 ence, as  the  prefent  ftate  affords,  of  the  frailty 
 of  our  nature ;  of  the  boundlefs  extravagance 
 of  ungoverned  paffion ;  of  the  power  which 
 an  infinite  Being  has  over  us,  by  the  various 
 capacities  of  mifery  which  he  has  given  us; 
 in  fliort,  that  kind  and  degree  of  experience, 
 which  the  prefent  ftate  affords  us,  that  the 
 conftitution  of  nature  is  fuch  as  to  admit  the 
 poffibility,  the  danger,  and  the  adtual  event, 
 of  creatures  lofing  their  innocence  and  happi- 
 nefs,  and  becoming  vicious  and  wretched ; 
 hath  a  tendency  to  give  us  a  practical  fenfe 
 of  things  very  different  from  a  mere  fpecu- 
 lative  knowledge,  that  we  are  liable  to  vice, 
 and  capable  of  mifery.  And  who  knows, 
 whether  the  fecurity  of  creatures  in  the 
 higheft  and  moft  fettled  ftate  of  perfedlion, 
 may  not  in  part  arife,  from  their  having  had 
 fuch  a  fenlc  of  things  as  this,  formed,  and 
 habitually  fixed  within  them,  in  fome  ftate  of 
 K  3  probation. 
 
134  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 
 
 probation.  And  paffing  through  the  prefent 
 world  with  that  moral  attention,  which 
 is  neceilary  to  the  adting  a  right  part  in  it, 
 may  leave  everlafting  impreffions  of  this  fort 
 upon  our  minds.  But  to  be  a  little  more 
 diftinft  :  allurements  to  what  is  wrong  ;  diffi- 
 culties in  the  difcharge  of  our  duty  -,  our  not 
 being  able  to  ad:  an  uniform  right  part  with- 
 out fome  thought  and  care  -,  and  the  oppor- 
 tunities wnich  we  have,  or  imagine  we  have, 
 of  avoiding  what  we  diflike,  or  obtaining 
 what  we  deiire,  by  unlawful  means,  when  we 
 either  cannot  do  it  at  all,  or  at  leaft  not  fo 
 eafily,  by  lawful  ones;  thefe  things,  /.  e,  the 
 J  fnares  and  temptations  of  vice,  are  what  ren- 
 1  der  the  prefent  world  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a 
 \fl:ate  of  difcipline,  to  thofe  who  will  preferve 
 itheir  integrity  :  becaufe  they  render  being 
 fiipon  our  guard,  refolution,  and  the  denial  of 
 iDur  paffions,  neceilary  in  order  to  that  end. 
 /And  the  exercife  of  fuch  particular  recollec- 
 [  lion,  intention  of  mind,  and  felf-government, 
 in  the  practice  of  virtue,  has,  from  the  make 
 of  our  nature,  a  peculiar  tendency  to  form 
 habits  of  virtue ;  as  implying,  not  only  a  real, 
 but  alfo  a  more  continued,  and  a  more  intenfe 
 exercife  of  the  virtuous  principle ;  or  a  more 
 coi.ftant  and  a  ftrongcr  effort  of  virtue  exerted 
 into  a6t.  Thus  fuppofe  a  perfon  to  know 
 himfelf  to  be  in  particular  danger,  for  fome 
 time,  of  doing  any  thing  wrong,  which  yet 
 he  fully  refoives  not  to  do :  continued  recol- 
 
 ledion, 
 
chap.  V.  Moral  DifcipUne.  135 
 
 lecflion,  and  keeping  upon  his  guard,  in  order 
 to  make  good  his  relbhition,  is  a  continued 
 exerting  of  that  adl  of  virtue  in  a  high  degreCy 
 which  need  have  been,  and  perhaps  would 
 have  been,  only  injlantancous  and  ^eak^  had 
 the  temptation  been  fo.     It  is  indeed  ridicu- 
 lous to  affert,  that  felf-denial  is  effential  to 
 virtue  and  piety :   but  it   would  have  been 
 nearer  the  truth,  though  not  ftridly  the  truth 
 itfelf,  to  have  laid,  that  it  is  effential  to  dif- 
 cipline  and  improvement.     For  though  ac- 
 tions materially  virtuous,  which  have  no  fort 
 of  difficulty,  but  are  perfedlly  agreeable  to  our 
 particular  inclinations,  may  poilibly  be  done 
 only  from  thefe  particular  inclinations,  and  fo 
 may  not  be  any  exercife  of  the  principle  of 
 virtue,  /.  e,  not  be  virtuous  aftions  at  all ; 
 yet  on  the  contrary,  they  may  be  an  exercife 
 of  that  principle :  and  when  they  are,  they 
 have  a  tendency  to  form  and  fix  the  habit  of 
 virtue.     But  when  the  exercife  of  the  virtu- 
 ous principle  is  more  continued,  oftener  re- 
 peated, and  more  intenfe ;  as  it  muft  be  in  cir-' 
 cumftances  of  danger,  temptation,  and  diffi- 
 culty, of  any  kind  and  in  any  degree ;  this 
 tendency  is  increafed  proportionably,  and   ar 
 more  confirmed  habit  is  the  confequence. 
 
 This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length  : 
 but  how  fir  it  may  hold,  I  know  not.  Nei- 
 ther our  intellectual  powers,  nor  our  bodily 
 
 K  4  ftrength, 
 
136  Of  a  State  of  Parti. 
 
 ftrength,  can  be  improved  beyond  fuch  a  de- 
 gree :  and  both  may  be  over- wrought.   Pof- 
 libly  there  may  be  fomewhat  analogous  to 
 this,  with  refpedl  to  the  moral   charader; 
 which  is  fcarce  worth  confidering.     And  I 
 mention  it  onlv,  left  it  fliould  come  into  fome 
 perfons  thoughts,  not  as  an  exception  to  the 
 foregoing  obfervations,  which  perhaps  it  is; 
 but  as  a  confutation  of  them,  v/hich  it  is  not> 
 And  there  may  be  feveral  other  exceptions. 
 Obfervations  of  this  kind  cannot  be  fuppofed 
 to  hold  minutely,  and  in  every  cafe.     It  is 
 enough  that  they  hold  in  general.  And  thefe 
 plainly  hold  fo  far,  as  that  from  them  may  be 
 feen  diftindly,  which  is  all  that  is  intended 
 by  them,  that  the  prefent  world  is  peculiarly  fit 
 to  be  aflate  of  difcipline^for  our  improvement  in 
 *uirtue  and  piety  :  in  the  fame  fenfe  as  fome  fci- 
 ences,  by  requiring  and  engaging  the  atten- 
 tion, not  to  be  fure  of  fuch  perfons  as  will 
 not,  but  of  fuch  as  will,  fet  themfelves  to 
 them ;  are  fit  to  forni  the  mind  to  habits  of 
 attention. 
 
 Indeed  the  prefent  ftate  is  fo  far  from  prov- 
 ing, in  event,  a  difciplinc  of  virtue  to  the  ge- 
 nerality of  men,  that,  on  the  contrary,  they 
 feem  to  make  it  a  difcipline  of  vice.  And 
 the  vicioufnefs  of  the  world  is,  in  different 
 ways,  the  great  temptation,  which  renders  it 
 ^  ftate  of  virtuous  difcipline,  in  the  degree  it 
 
 is, 
 
chap*  V.        Moral  Difcipline.  137 
 
 is,  to  good  men.  The  whole  end,  and  the 
 whole  occafion,  of  mankind's  being  placed  ia 
 fuch  a  ftate  as  the  prefent,  is  not  pretended  to 
 be  accounted  for.  That  which  appears  amidll 
 the  general  corruption,  is,  that  there  are  fome 
 perfons,  who,  having  within  them  the  prin- 
 ciple of  amendment  and  recovery,  attend  to 
 and  foljow  the  notices  of  virtue  and  religion, 
 be  they  more  clear  or  more  obfcure,  which 
 are  afforded  them ;  and  that  the  prefent  world 
 is,  not  only  an  axercife  of  virtue  in  thefe 
 perfons,  but  an  exercife  of  it  in  ways  and  de- 
 grees, peculiarly  apt  to  improve  it:  apt  to 
 improve  it,  in  fome  refpefts,  even  beyond  what 
 would  be,  by  the  exercife  of  it  required  in  a 
 perfedlly  virtuous  fociety,  or  in  a  fociety  of 
 equally  imperfedt  virtue  with  themfelves.  But 
 that  the  prefent  world  does  not  aftually  be- 
 come a  ftate  of  moral  difcipline  to  many,  even 
 to  the  generality,  /.  e,  that  they  do  not  im- 
 prove or  grow  better  in  it,  cannot  be  urged 
 as  a  proof,  that  it  was  not  intended  for  moral 
 difcipline,  by  any  v/ho  at  all  obfcrve  the  ana- 
 logy of  nature.  For,  of  the  numerous  feeds 
 of  vegetables  and  bodies  of  animals,  which  are 
 adapted  and  put  in  the  way,  to  improve  to  fuch 
 a  point  or  ftate  of  natural  maturity  and  perfec- 
 tion, we  do  not  fee  perhaps  that  one  in  a  mil- 
 lion adtually  does.  Far  the  greateft  part  of 
 them  decay  before  they  are  improved  to  it ; 
 and  appear  to  be  abfolutely  deftroyed.     Yet 
 
 no 
 
138  Of  a  State  Gf  Parti. 
 
 no  one,  who  does  not  deny  all  final  caufes, 
 will  deny,  that  thofe  feeds  and  bodies,  which 
 do  attain  to  that  point  of  maturity  and  per- 
 fe(ftion,  anfwer  the  end  for  which  they  were 
 really  defigned  by  nature  -,  and  therefore  that 
 nature  defigned  them  for  fuch  perfection. 
 And  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  though  it  is 
 not  to  the  prefent  purpofe,  tiiat  the  appear-- 
 anceo{i\xQ\\  an  amazing  ^wajicm  nature,  with 
 refped:  to  thefe  feeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign 
 caufes,  is  to  us  as  unaccountable,  as,  what  is 
 much  more  terrible,  the  prefent  and  future 
 ruin  of  fo  many  moral  agents  by  themfelves, 
 /.  e,  by  vice, 
 
 Agalnft  this  whole  notion  of  moral  difci- 
 pline,  it  may  be  objecfled,  in  another  way ; 
 that  fo  far  as  a  courfe  of  behaviour,  materially 
 virtuous,  proceeds  from  hope  and  fear,  fo  far 
 it  is  only  a  dilcipline  and  fi:rengthening  of 
 felf-love.  But  doing  what  God  com.mands, 
 becaufe  he  comm^ands  it,  is  obedience,  though 
 it  proceeds  from  hope  or  fear.  And  a  courfe 
 of  fuch  obedience  will  form  habits  of  it.  And 
 a  conftant  regard  to  veracity,  jufi:ice,  and  cha- 
 rity, may  form  difl:ind  habits  of  thefe  parti- 
 cular virtues;  and  will  certainly  form  habits 
 of  felf-government,  and  of  denying  our  incH- 
 nations,  whenever  veracity,  juftice,  or  charity 
 requires  it.  Nor  is  there  any  foundation  for 
 this  great  nicety,  with  which  feme  affed  to 
 
 diftinguifh 
 
chap.  V.        Moral  Difctpline.  139 
 
 diftinguifli  In  this  cafe,  in  order  to  depreciate 
 all  religion  proceeding  from  hope  or  fear. 
 For,  veracity,  juftice,  and  charity,  regard  to 
 God's  authority, and  to  our  own  chief  intereft, 
 are  not  only  all  three  coincident ;  but  each  of 
 them  is,  in  itfelf,  a  juft  and  natural  motive  or 
 principle  of  a(!Aion.  And  he  v/ho  begins  a 
 good  life  from  any  one  of  them,  and  perfe- 
 veres  in  it,  as  he  is  already  in  fome  degree,  fo 
 he  cannot  fail  of  becoming  more  and  more,  of 
 that  charafter,  which  is  correfpondent  to  the 
 conftitution  of  nature  as  moral;  and  to  the 
 relation,  which  God  ftands  in  to  us  as  moral 
 governor  of  it :  nor  confequently  can  he  fail  of 
 obtaining  that  happinefs,  which  this  confti- 
 tution and  relation  neceffarily  fuppofe  con- 
 nedled  with  that  charafter, 
 
 Thefe  feveral  obfervatlons,  concerning  the 
 aftive  principle  of  virtue  and  obedience  to 
 God's  commands,  are  applicable  to  paffive 
 fubmiffion  or  refignation  to  his  will :  which 
 is  another  effential  part  of  a  right  charafter, 
 connected  with  the  former,  and  very  much  in 
 our  power  to  form  ourfelves  to.  It  may  be 
 imagined,  that  nothing  but  afflictions  can  give 
 occafion  for  or  require  this  virtue;  that  it 
 can  have  no  refped;  to,  nor  be  any  way  necef- 
 fary  to  qualify  for,  a  ftate  of  perfeft  happi- 
 nefs ;  but  it  is  not  experience  which  can  make 
 US  think  thus.     Profperity  itfelf,  whilft  any 
 
 thing 
 
140  Q/*^  State  of  Part  L 
 
 thing  fuppofed  defirable  is  not  ours,  begets 
 extravagant  and  unbounded  thoughts.  Ima- 
 gination is  altogether  as  much  a  fource  of  dif- 
 content,  as  any  thing  in  our  external  condi- 
 tion. It  is  indeed  true,  that  there  can  be  no 
 fcope  for  patience,  when  forrow  fhall  be  no 
 more :  but  there  may  be  need  of  a  temper  of 
 mind,  which  fhall  have  been  formed  by  pati- 
 ence. For,  though  felf-love,  confidered  merely 
 as  an  active  principle  leading  us  to  purfue 
 our  chief  intereft,  cannot  but  be  uniformly 
 coincident  with  the  principle  of  obedience  to 
 God's  commands,  our  intereft  being  rightly 
 underftood ;  becaufe  this  obedience,  and  the 
 purfuit  of  our  own  chief  intereft,  muft  be  in 
 every  cafe  one  and  the  fame  thing :  yet  it  may 
 be  queftioned,  whether  felf-love,  confidered 
 merely  as  the  defire  of  our  own  intereft  or 
 happinefs,  can,  from  its  nature,  be  thus  abfo- 
 lutely  and  uniformly  coincident  with  the  will 
 of  God  y  any  more  than  particular  affections 
 can  ^ :  coincident  in  fuch  fort,  as  not  to  be  li- 
 able to  be  excited  upon  occafions  and  in  de- 
 grees, impofUble  to  be  gratified  confiftently 
 with  the  conftitution  of  things,  or  the  divine 
 appointments.  So  that  habits  of  refignation 
 may,  upon  this  account,  be  requifite  for  all 
 creatures :  habits,  I  fay ;  which  fignify  what 
 is  formed  by  ufe.  However,  in  general  it  is 
 obvious,  that  both  felf-love  and  particular  af- 
 
 ^  p.  107. 
 
 fedtions 
 
chap.  V*         Moral  DifcipUne.  141 
 
 feftions  in  human  creatures,  confidered  only  as 
 paffive  feelings, diftort  and  rend  the  mind;  and 
 therefore  Hand  in  need  of  difcipline.  Now 
 denial  of  thofe  particular  affecftions,  in  a  courfe 
 of  adtive  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  will, 
 has  a  tendency  to  moderate  them  -,  and  feems 
 alfo  to  have  a  tendency  to  habituate  the  mind, 
 to  be  eafy  and  fatisfied  with  that  degree  of 
 happinefs  which  is  allotted  uc,  /.  e.  to  mode- 
 rate felf-love.  But  the  proper  difcipline  for 
 refignation,  is  afflidlion.  For  a  right  beha- 
 viour under  that  trial ;  recollecting  ourfelves 
 fo  as  to  confider  it  in  the  view,  in  v/hich  re- 
 ligion teaches  us  to  confider  it,  as  from  the 
 hand  of  God ;  receiving  it  as  what  he  ap- 
 points, or  thinks  proper  to  permit,  in  his 
 world  and  under  his  government;  this  will 
 habituate  the  mind  to  a  dutiful  fubmiffion. 
 And  fuch  fubmiffion,  together  with  the  adtive 
 principle  of  obedience,  make  up  the  temper 
 and  charader  in  us,  which  anfwers  to  his  fo- 
 vereignty;  and  which  abfolutely  belongs  to 
 the  condition  of  our  being,  as  dependent 
 creatures.  Nor  can  it  be  faid,  that  this  is 
 only  breaking  the  mind  to  a  fubmiflion  to 
 mere  power;  for  mere  power  may  be  acci- 
 dental, and  precarious,  and  ufurped :  but  it  is 
 forming  within  ourfelves  the  temper  of  refig- 
 nation to  his  rightful  authority,  who  is,  by 
 nature,  fupreme  over  all. 
 
 Upon 
 
142  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 
 
 Upon  the  whole  :  fuch  a  charafter,  and 
 fuch  qualifications,  are  neceffary  for  a  mature 
 ftate  of  life  in  the  prefent  world,  as  nature 
 alone  does  in  no  wife  beflow;  but  has  put  it 
 upon  us,  in  great  part,  to  acquire,  in  our  pro- 
 grefs  from  one  llage  of  life  to  another,  from 
 childhood  to  mature  age :  put  it  upon  us  to 
 acquire  them,  by  giving  us  capacities  of  do- 
 ing it,  and  by  placing  us,  in  the  beginning 
 of  life,  in  a  condition  fit  for  it.  And  this  is 
 a  general  analogy  to  our  condition  in  the  pre- 
 fent world,  as  in  a  ftate  of  moral  difcipline  for 
 another.  It  is  in  vain  then  to  objed:  againft 
 the  credibility  of  the  prefent  life's  being  in- 
 tended for  this  purpofe,  that  all  the  trouble 
 and  the  danger,  unavoidably  accompanying 
 fuch  difcipline,  might  have  been  faved  us,  by 
 our  being  made  at  once  the  creatures  and  the 
 characters,  which  we  were  to  he.  For  we  ex- 
 perience, that  what  we  were  to  be^  was  to  be 
 the  effed:  of  what  we  would  do :  and  that  the 
 general  condudl  of  nature  is,  not  to  fave  us 
 trouble  or  danger,  but  to  make  us  capable  of 
 going  through  them,  and  to  put  it  upon  us 
 to  do  fo.  Acquirements  of  our  own,  expe- 
 rience and  habits,  are  the  natural  fupply  to 
 our  deficiencies,  and  fecurity  againft  our  dan- 
 gers :  fince  it  is  as  plainly  natural  to  fet  our- 
 felves  to  acquire  the  qualifications,  as  the  ex- 
 ternal things,  which  we  ftand  in  need  of.  In 
 particular,  it  is  as  plainly  a  general  law  of 
 
 nature. 
 
Chap.  V.        Moral  Bifc'pJlne.  \\i 
 
 nature,  that  we  iliould,  with  regard  to  our 
 temporal  intereft,  form  and  cultivate  pradical 
 principles  within  us,  by  attention,  ufe,  and 
 difcipline,  as  any  thing  whatever  is  a  natural 
 law ;  chiefly  in  the  beginning  of  life^  but  alfo 
 throughout  the  whole  courfe  of  it.  And  the 
 alternative  is  left  to  our  choice  :  either  to 
 improve  ourfelves,  and  better  our  condition; 
 or,  in  default  of  fuch  improvement,  to  re- 
 main deficient  and  wretched.  It  is  therefore 
 perfectly  credible,  from  the  analogy  of  nature, 
 that  the  fame  may  be  our  cafe,  with  refped: 
 to  the  happinefs  of  a  future  ftate,  and  the 
 qualifications  nccefiary  for  it. 
 
 There  is  a  third  thing,  v/nlch  may  feem 
 implied  in  the  prefent  world's  being  a  ftate 
 of  probation ;  that  it  is  a  theatre  of  ad:ion,; 
 for  the  manifeftation  of  perfons  charaders,^ 
 with  refped  to  a  future  one ;  not  to  be  fure^ 
 to  an  all-knowing  Being,  but  to  his  creation 
 or  part  of  it.  This  m/ay,  perhaps,  be  only  a 
 confequence  of  our  being  in  a  ftate  of  proba- 
 tion in  the  other  fenfes.  However,  it  is  not 
 impoffible,  that  mens  (hewing  and  making 
 manifeft,  what  is  in  their  heart,  what  their 
 real  charadler  is,  may  have  refpecft  to  a  future 
 life,  in  ways  and  manners  which  we  are  not 
 acquainted  with :  particularly  it  may  be  a 
 means,  for  the  Author  of  Nature  does  not  ap- 
 pear to  do  any  thing  without  means,  of  their 
 being  difpofed  of  fuitably  to  their  characters ; 
 
 and 
 
14^  Of  a  State  of.  Sec.  Parti. 
 
 and  of  its  being  known  to  the  creation,  by 
 way  of  example,  that  they  are  thus  difpofed 
 of.  But  not  to  enter  upon  any  conjedlural 
 account  of  this ;  one  may  juft  mention,  that 
 the  manifeftation  of  perfons  charadlers,  con- 
 tributes very  much,  in  various  ways,  to  the 
 carrying  on  a  great  part  of  that  general  courfe 
 of  nature,  refpedling  mankind,  which  comes 
 under  our  obfervation  at  prefent.  I  ihall  only 
 add,  that  probation,  in  both  thefe  fenfes,  as 
 well  as  in  that  treated  of  in  the  foregoing 
 Chapter,  is  implied  in  moral  government ; 
 fince  by  perfons  behaviour  under  it,  their 
 characters  cannot  but  be  manifeiled,  and;j  if 
 they  behave  well,  improved. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[     H5     ] 
 
 C  H  A  P.     VI. 
 
 Of  the  Opinion  of  Nece£ity,  coJifidercd  as  in^ 
 jluencing  Pradike, 
 
 THROUGHOUT  the  foregoing  Trea- 
 dle it  appears,  that  the  condition  of 
 mankind,  confidered  as  inhabitants  of  this 
 world  only,  and  under  the  government  of  God 
 which  we  experience  ;  is  greatly  analogous  to 
 our  condition,  as  defigned  for  another  world, 
 or  under  that  farther  government,  which  re- 
 ligion teaches  us.  If  therefore  any  affert,  as 
 a  Fatalift  muft,  that  the  opinion  of  univerfal 
 Neceffity  is  reconcileable  with  the  former ; 
 there  immediately  arifes  a  queftion  in  the  way 
 of  analogy,  whether  he  muft  not  alfo  own  it 
 to  be  reconcileable  with  the  latter,  /.  e,  with 
 the  fyftem  of  religion  itfeif,  and  the  proof  of 
 it.  The  reader  then  will  obferve,  that  the 
 queftion  now  before  us  is  notabfolute.  Whe- 
 ther the  opinion  of  Fate  be  reconcileable  with 
 religion  \  but  hypothetical,  Whether,  upon 
 fuppofition  of  its  being  reconcileable  with 
 the  conftitution  of  nature,  it  be  not  recon- 
 cileable with  religion  alfo  :  or,  what  pretence 
 a  Fatalift,  not  other  perfons,  but  a  Fatalift, 
 has  to  conclude  from  his  opinion,  that  there 
 can  be  no  fuch  thing  as  religion.  And  as  the 
 puzzle  and  obfcurity,  which  muft  unavoid- 
 
 L  ably 
 
146       Of  the  opinion  of  NeceJJkyy       Parti. 
 
 ably  arife  from  arguing  upon  fo  abfurd  a  fup- 
 pofition  as  that  of  univerfal  Neceffity,  will, 
 I  fear,  eafily  be  feen ;  it  will,  I  hope,  as  eafily 
 be  excufcd. 
 
 But  fince  it  has  been  all  along  taken  for 
 granted,  as  a  thing  proved,  that  there  is  an 
 intelligent  Author  of  Nature,  or  natural  Go- 
 vernor of  the  worlds  and  fince  an  objedion 
 may  be  made  againft  the  proof  of  this,  from 
 the  opinion  of  univerfal  Neceffity,  as  it  may 
 be  fuppofed,  that  fiich  Neceffity  will  itfeif 
 account  for  the  origin  and  prefervation  of  all 
 things :  it  is  requifite,  that  this  objedion  be 
 diftinftly  anfwered ;  or  that  it  be  fhewn,  that 
 a  Fatality,  fuppofed  confiftent  with  what  we 
 certainly  experience,  does  not  deftroy  the  proof 
 of  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  Na- 
 ture; before  we  proceed  to  confider,  whether 
 it  deftroys  the  proof  of  a  moral  Governor  of 
 it,  or  of  our  being  in  a  ftate  of  religion. 
 
 Now,  when  it  is  faid  by  a  Fatalift,  that  the 
 whole  conftitution  of  nature,  and  the  ad  ions 
 of  men,  that  every  thing,  and  every  mode  and 
 circumftance  of  every  thing,  is  neceffary  and 
 could  not  pollibly  have  been  otherwife  ^  it  is 
 to  be  obferved,  that  this  Neceffity  does  not 
 exclude  deliberation,  choice,  preference,  and 
 ading  from  certain  principles,  and  to  certain 
 ends  :  becaufe  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted 
 experience,  acknowledged  by  all,  and  what 
 
 every 
 
 4 
 
chap.  VI.     as  mjiuenc'mg  PraBice.  147 
 
 every  man  may,  every  moment,  be  confcious 
 of.  And  from  hence  it  follows,  that  Neceffity, 
 alone  and  of  itfelf,  is  in  no  fort  an  account 
 of  the  conftitution  of  nature,  and  how  things 
 came  to  be  and  to  CGntinue  as  they  are ;  but 
 only  an  account  of  this  circumjlance  relating 
 to  their  origin  and  countenance,  that  they 
 could  not  have  been  otherwife,  than  they  are 
 and  have  been.  The  affertion  that  every 
 thing  is  by  Neceffity  of  Nature,  is  not  an  an- 
 fwer  to  the  queftion ;  Whether  the  world 
 came  into  being  as  it  is,  by  an  intelligent 
 Agent  forming  it  thus,  or  not :  but  to  quite 
 another  queftion ;  Whether  it  came  into  be- 
 ing as  it  is,  in  that  way  and  manner  which 
 we  call  neceffarily^  or  in  that  way  and  manner 
 which  we  call  freely.  For  fuppofe  farther, 
 that  one  who  was  a  Fatalift,  and  one  who 
 kept  to  his  natural  fenfe  of  things,  and  be- 
 lieved himfelf  a  Free  Agent,  were  difputing 
 together,  and  vindicating  their  refpedive  opi- 
 nions ;  and  they  ihould  happen  to  inftance 
 in  a  houfe  :  they  would  agree  that  it  was 
 built  by  an  archited:.  Their  difference  con- 
 cerning Neceffity  and  Freedom,  would  occa- 
 fion  no  difference  of  judgment  concerning 
 this;  but  only  concerning  another  matter; 
 whether  the  archited  built  it  neceffarily  or 
 freely.  Suppofe  then  they  fhould  proceed  to 
 enquire  concerning  the  conftitution  of  na- 
 ture :  in  a  lax  way  of  fpeaking,  one  of  them 
 might  fay,  it  was  by  Neceffity;  and  the  other, 
 
 L  2  by 
 
1 48  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necejfity,     Part  I. 
 
 by  Freedom  :  but  if  they  had  any  meaning  to 
 their  words,  as  the  latter  muft  mean  a  Free 
 Agent,  fo  the  former  muft  at  length  be  redu- 
 ced to  mean  an  Agent,  whether  he  would  fay 
 one  or  more,  acting  by  Neceffity  :  for  abftradt 
 notions  can  do  nothing.  Indeed  we  afcribe 
 to  God  a  necelTary  exiftence,  uncaufcd  by 
 any  agent.  For  we  find  within  ourfelves 
 the  idea  of  infinity,  /.  e.  immenfity  and  eter- 
 nity, impofiible,  even  in  imagination,  to  be 
 removed  out  of  being.  We  feem  to  difcern 
 intuitively,  that  there  muft,  and  cannot  but 
 be,  fomewhat,  external  to  ourfelves,  anfwer- 
 ing  this  idea,  or  the  archetype  of  it.  And 
 from  hence  (for  this  abjlradl^  as  much  as  any 
 other,  implies  a  concrete)  we  conclude,  that 
 there  is,  and  cannot  but  be,  an  infinite,  and 
 immenfe  eternal  Being  exifting,  prior  to  all 
 defign  contributing  to  his  exiftence,  and  ex- 
 clufive  of  it.  And  from  the  fcantinefs  of 
 language,  a  manner  of  fpeaking  has  been  in- 
 troduced; that  Neccfiity  is  the  foundation, 
 the  reafon,  the  account  of  the  exiftence  of 
 God.  But  it  is  not  alledged,  nor  can  it  be 
 at  all  intended,  that  every  thing  exifts  as  it 
 does,  by  this  kind  of  Neceffity;  a  Neceffity 
 antecedent  in  nature  to  defign  :  it  cannot,  I 
 lay,  be  meant  that  every  thing  exifts  as  it 
 does,  by  this  kind  of  Neceffity,  upon  feveral 
 accounts;  and  particularly  becaufe  it  is  admit- 
 ted, that  defign,  in  the  actions  of  men,  contri- 
 butes to  many  alterations  in  nature.  For  if  any 
 §  deny 
 
Chap.  VI.       as  mfluencing  PraSfice.         149 
 
 deny  this,  I  iliall  not  pretend  to  reafon  with 
 them. 
 
 From  thefe  things  it  follows  ;  Firji,  That 
 when  a  Fatalift  alTerts,  that  every  thing  is  hy 
 NeceJJityy  he  rnuil:  mean,  by  an  Agent  acting 
 necejjarily  ;  he  muft  I  fay  mean  this,  for  I  am 
 very  fenfible  he  would  not  chufe  to  mean  it : 
 And  Secondly,  That  the  Neceffity,  by  which 
 fuch  an  Agent  is  fuppofed  to  adt,  does  not 
 exclude  intelligence  and  defign.  So  that, 
 were  the  fyflem  of  Fatality  admitted;  it  would 
 juft  as  much  account  for  the  formation  oi  the 
 world,  as  for  the  ftrudure  of  an  houfe,  and 
 no  more,  Neceffity  as  much  requires  and 
 fuppofes  a  Neceffary  Agent,  as  Freedom  re- 
 quires and  fuppofes  a  Free  Agent,  to  be  the 
 former  of  the  world.  And  the  appearances 
 of  t/^^«  and  oi  Jinal  caufes  in  the  conftitu- 
 tion  of  nature,  as  really  prove  this  adting 
 Agent,  to  be  an  intelligent  dejigner^  or  to  acS 
 from  choice  ;  upon  the  fcheme  qf  Neceffity, 
 fuppofed  poffible,  as  upon  that  of  Freedom. 
 
 It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  Ne~ 
 ceffity  does  not  deftroy  the  proof,  that  there 
 is  an  intelligent  Author  of  Nature  and  natu^ 
 ral  Governor  of  the  world;  the  prefent  quef- 
 tion,  which  the  analogy  before  mentioned  ^ 
 faggefts,  and  which,  I  think,  it  will  aufwer, 
 
 -  p.  145. 
 
 L  3  is 
 
150  Of  the  Opinion  ofNeceJJit)\     Part  L 
 
 is  this :  Whether  the  opinion  of  Neceffity, 
 fuppofcd  confiftent  with  pofabllity,  with  the 
 conftitution  of  the  world,  and  the  natural 
 government  which  we  experience  exercifcd 
 over  it ;  deftroys  all  reafonable  ground  of  be- 
 lief, that  we  are  in  a  ftate  of  religion  :  or 
 whether  that  opinion  be  reconcileable  with 
 religion ;  v/ith  the  fyftem,  and  the  proof  of 
 it. 
 
 Suppofe  then  a  Fatalifl  to  educate  any  one, 
 from  his  youth  up,  in  his  own  principles  i 
 that  the  child  iliouid  realbn  upon  them,  and 
 conclude,  that  iince  he  cannot  poflibly  be- 
 have otherwife  than  he  does,  he  is  not  a  fub- 
 jecl  of  blame  or  commendation,  nor  can  de- 
 ferve  to  be  rewarded  or  punifhed :  imagine 
 him  to  eradicate  the  very  perceptions  of  blame 
 and  commendation  out  of  his  mind,  by  means 
 of  this  fyiiem ;  to  form  his  temper,  and  cha- 
 radter,  and  behaviour  to  it;  and  from  it  to 
 judge  of  the  treatment    he  w^as   to  exped:, 
 fay,  from  reafonable  men,  upon  his  coming 
 abroad  into  the  v/orld :  as  the  Fatalifl:  judges 
 from  this  fyftem.  what  he  is  to  exped:  from 
 the  Author  of  Nature,  and  with  regard  to  a 
 future  ftate.     I  cannot  forbear  flopping  here 
 to  afk,  whether  any  one  of  common  fenfe 
 would  think  fit,  that  a  child  ihould  be  put 
 upon  thefe  fpeculations,  and  be  left  to  apply 
 them  to  pradice.     And  a  man  has  little  pre« 
 tence  to  reafon,  who  is  not  fenfible,  that  we 
 
 are 
 
Chap.  VI.     as  viflucncing  PraBice.  151 
 
 are  all  children  in  fpeculations  of  this  kind. 
 However,  the  child  would  doabtlefs  be  high- 
 ly deUghted  to  find  himfelf  freed  from  the 
 reftraints  of  fear  and  fhame,  with  which  his 
 play-fellows  were  fettered  and  embarrafledi 
 and  highly  conceited  in  his  fuperior  know- 
 ledge, fo  far  beyond  his  years.  But  conceit 
 and  vanity  would  be  the  leaft  bad  part  of 
 the  influence,  which  thefe  principles  rnuft 
 have,  when  thus  reafoned  and  adled  upon, 
 during  the  courfe  of  his  education.  He  niuft 
 either  be  allowed  to  go  on  and  be  the  plague 
 of  all  about  him,  and  himfelf  too,  even  to 
 his  own  deftrudtion :  or  elfc  correction  mail 
 be  continualy  made  ufe  of,  to  fupply  the 
 want  of  thofe  natural  perceptions  of  blame 
 and  commendation,  which  we  have  fuppofed 
 to  be  removed  -,  and  to  give  him  a  pradical 
 impreflion,  of  what  he  had  reafoned  himfelf 
 out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he  was  in  fad'  an 
 accountable  child,  and  to  be  punifhed  for 
 doing  what  he  was  forbid.  It  is  therefore 
 in  reality  impoffible,  but  that  the  correction 
 which  he  muft  meet  with,  in  the  courfe  of 
 his  education,  muft  convince  him,  that  if  the 
 fcheme  he  was  inftrudcd  in  were  not  falfe ; 
 yet  that  he  reafoned  inconclufively  upon  it, 
 and  fomehow  or  other  mifapplied  it  to  prac- 
 tice and  common  life  :  as  what  the  Fatalifl 
 experiences  of  the  conduct  of  Providence  at 
 prefent,  ought  in  all  reafon  to  convince  him, 
 that  this  fcheme  is  mifapplied,  when  applied 
 
 L  4  to 
 
1^2  Of  the  Opinion  ofNeceJJity,     Part  I. 
 
 to  the  fubjed  of  religion  ^.  But  fuppofmg 
 the  child's  temper  could  remain  ftill  formed 
 to  the  fyftem,  and  his  expec^lation  of  the 
 treatment  he  was  to  have  in  the  world  be  re- 
 gulated by  it ;  fo  as  to  exped  that  no  rea- 
 fonable  man  would  blame  or  punifh  him, 
 for  any  thing  which  he  fhould  do,  becaufe 
 he  could  not  help  doing  it  :  upon  this  fup- 
 pofition  it  is  manifeft  he  would,  upon  his 
 coming  abroad  into  the  world,  be  insupport- 
 able to  fociety,  and  the  treatment  which  he 
 would  receive  from  it,  would  render  it  fo 
 to  him ;  and  he  could  not  fail  of  doing  fome- 
 what,  very  foon,  for  which  he  would  be  de- 
 livered over  into  the  hands  of  civil  juftice. 
 And  thus,  in  the  end,  he  would  be  convinced 
 of  the  obligations  he  was  under  to  his 
 wife  inftrudor.  Or  fuppofe  this  fcheme  of 
 Fatality,  in  any  other  way,  applied  to  prac- 
 tice, fuch  practical  application  of  it,  will  be 
 found  equally  abfurd ;  equally  fallacious  in 
 a  pra(flical  fenfe :  for  inftance,  that  if  a 
 man  be  deftined  to  live  fuch  a  time,  he 
 fhall  live  to  it,  though  he  take  no  care  of 
 his  own  prefervation ;  or  if  he  be  deftined 
 to  die  before  that  time,  no  care  can  prevent 
 it :  therefore  all  care  about  preferving  one's 
 life  is  to  be  negleded :  which  is  the  fallacy 
 inftanced  in  by  the  ancients.  But  now  on 
 the  contrary,  none  of  thefe  practical  abfur- 
 dities  can  be  drawn,  from    rcafoning  upon 
 
 ^p.  i66. 
 
 the 
 
chap.  VI.     as  infuencing  PraBice.  i -^ 
 
 the  fuppofition,  that  we  are  free;  but  all 
 fuch  reafoning  with  regard  to  the  common 
 affiiirs  of  life,  is  juftlfied  by  experience.  And 
 therefore,  though  it  were  admitted  that  this 
 opinion  of  Neceflity  were  fpeculatively  true  ; 
 yet,  with  regard  to  pradllce,  it  is  as  if  it  were 
 falfe,  fo  far  as  our  experience  reaches  ;  that 
 is,  to  the  whole  of  our  prefent  life.  For, 
 the  conftitution  of  the  prefent  world,  and 
 the  condition  in  which  we  are  acflually  placed, 
 is,  as  if  we  were  free.  And  it  may  perhaps 
 julfly  be  concluded,  that  fince  the  whole 
 procefs  of  adlion,  through  every  ftep  of  it, 
 fufpenfe,  deliberation,  inclining  one  way,  de- 
 termining, and  at  lafl  doing  as  we  determine, 
 is  as  if  we  were  free,  therefore  we  are  fo.  But 
 the  thing  here  infilled  upon  is,  that  under 
 the  prefent  natural  government  of  the  world, 
 we  find  we  are  treated  and  dealt  with,  as 
 if  we  were  free,  prior  to  all  confideration 
 whether  we  are  or  not.  Were  this  opinion 
 therefore  of  Neceffity  admitted  to  be  ever  fo 
 true;  yet  fuch  is  in  fad:  our  condition  and 
 the  natural  courfe  of  things,  that  whenever 
 we  apply  it  to  life  and  praffice,  this  appli- 
 cation of  it,  always  mifleads  us,  and  cannot 
 but  miilead  us,  in  a  moft  dreadful  manner, 
 with  regard  to  our  prefent  interejft.  And 
 how  can  people  think  themfelves  fo  very 
 fecure  then,  that  the  fame  application  of  the 
 fame  opinion  may  not  miilead  them  alfo,  in 
 fome  analogous  manner,  with  refpedl  to  a 
 future,  o:  more  general,  and  more  important 
 
 interefl  ? 
 
154         Of  the  Opinion  ofNeceJJtfy,      Part  L 
 
 interefti  For,  religion  being  a  pradical  fub- 
 jedtj  and  the  analogy  of  nature  fliewing  us, 
 that  we  have  not  faculties  to  apply  this  opi- 
 nion, were  it  a  true  one,  to  practical  fubjedts ; 
 whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the  fubjecl  of 
 religion,  and  thence  conclude,  that  we  are 
 free  from  its  obligations,  it  is  plain  this  con- 
 clufion  cannot  be  depended  upon.  There 
 will  ftill  remain  juft  reafon  to  think,  what- 
 ever appearances  are,  that  we  deceive  our- 
 felves ;  in  fomewhat  of  a  like  manner,  as 
 when  people  fancy  they  can  draw  contradic- 
 tory conclufions  from  the  idea  of  infinity. 
 
 From  tliefe  things  together,  the  attentive 
 reader  will  fee  it  follows,  that  if  upon  fup- 
 pofition  of  Freedom  the  evidence  o\  religion 
 be  conclufive,  it  remains  fo,  upon  fuppofition 
 of  Neceffity;  becaufe  the  notion  of  Neceffity 
 is  not  applicable  to  pradlical  fabjeds :  /.  e. 
 with  refpecl  to  them,  is  as  if  it  were  not 
 true.  Nor  does  this  contain  any  refledion 
 upon  reafon ;  but  only  upon  what  is  unrea- 
 fonable.  For  to  pretend  to  ad:  upon  reafon, 
 in  oppofition  to  pradical  principles,  which 
 the  Author  of  our  Nature  gave  us  to  ad 
 upon;  and  to  pretend  to  apply  our  reafon 
 to  fubjeds,  v/ith  regard  to  which,  our  own 
 fhort  views,  and  even  our  experience,  will 
 fhew  us,  it  cannot  be  depended  upon  j  and 
 iiich,  at  bed,  the  fubjed  of  Neceffity  muft 
 be;  this  is  vanity,  conceit,  and  unreafon- 
 ablenefs. 
 
 But 
 
Chap.  VI.      as  hifiuencing  FraBice,  155 
 
 But  this  is  not  all.  For  we  find  within 
 ourfelves  a  will,  and  are  confcious  of  a  cha- 
 rad:er.  Now  if  this,  in  us,  be  reconcileable 
 with  Fate,  it  is  reconcileable  with  it,  in  the 
 Author  of  Nature.  And  befides,  natural  go- 
 vernment and  final  caufes,  imply  a  chara&er 
 and  a  will  in  the  Governor  and  Defigner ' ;  a 
 will  concerning  the  creatures  whom  he  go- 
 verns. The  Author  of  Nature  then  being 
 certainly  of  fome  character  or  other,  not- 
 withftanding  Neceffitv;  it  is  evident  this  Ne- 
 cefiity  is  as  reconcileable  with  the  particular 
 character  of  benevolence,  veracity,  andjuftice 
 in  him,  which  attributes  are  the  foundation 
 of  religion,  as  with  any  other  chara<fter : 
 fince  we  find  this  Necefilty  no  more  hinders 
 men  from  being  benevolent,  than  cruel;  true, 
 than  faithlefs;  juft,  than  unjuli;  or  if  the 
 Fatalift  pleafes,  what  we  call  unjuil.  For  it 
 is  faid  indeed,  that  what,  upon  fuppofition  of 
 Freedom,  would  be  juft  punifhment;  upon 
 fuppofition  of  Neccffity,  becomes  manifcftly 
 unjuft:  becaufe  it  is  punifliment  inflicted  for 
 doing  that,  which  pcrfons  could  not  avoid 
 doing.  As  if  the  Necefiity,  which  is  fuppofcd 
 to  deftroy  the  injuftice  of  murder,  for  in- 
 ftance,  would  not  alfo  deftroy  the  injuftice  of 
 
 '^  By  will znd  charaHer  is  meant  that,  which,  in  fpeaking 
 of  men,  we  fhould  exprefs,  not  only  by  thefe  words,  but  alfo 
 by  the  words,  temper^  tajie^  dlfpofiticns^  praSiical  prh:ciplts  : 
 that  whole  fra7ne  of  77i}nd^frcm  whence  we  aCl  in  07ie  7nanncr 
 fiither  than  another. 
 
 punifliing 
 
156         Of  the  Opinion  ofNecefity,     Part  L 
 
 puniflilng  it.  However,  as  little  to  the  pur- 
 pole  as  this  objection  is  in  itfelf,  it  is  very 
 much  to  the  purpofe  to  obferve  from  it,  how 
 the  notions  of  juftice  and  injuftice  remain, 
 even  vvhilft  we  endeavour  to  fuppofe  them 
 removed;  how  they  force  themfelves  upon 
 the  mind,  even  whilft  we  are  making  fuppo- 
 fitions  deftrudlive  of  them  :  for  there  is  not, 
 perhaps,  a  man  in  the  world,  but  would  be 
 ready  to  make  this  objedlion  at  firfi:  thought. 
 
 But  though  it  is  moft  evident,  that  univer- 
 fal  Neceffity,  if  it  be  reconcileable  with  any 
 thing,  is  reconcileable  with  that  charadter  in 
 the  Author  of  Nature,  which  is  the  founda- 
 tion of  religion ;  "  Yet,  does  it  not  plainly 
 "  deftroy  the  proof,  that  he  is  of  that  cha- 
 **  radler,  and  confequently  the  proof  of  reli- 
 *^  gion  ?"  By  no  means.  For  we  find,  that 
 happinefs  and  mifcry  are  not  our  fate,  in  any 
 fuch  fenfe  as  not  to  be  the  confequences  of 
 our  behaviour;  but  that  they  are  the  confe- 
 quences of  it  ^  We  find  God  exercifes  the 
 fame  kind  of  government  over  us,  with  that, 
 which  a  father  exercifes  over  his  children,  and 
 a  civil  magiftrate  over  his  fubjedis.  Now, 
 whatever  becomes  of  abflrad:  queftions  con- 
 cerning Liberty  and  Neceffity,  it  evidently 
 appears  to  us,  that  veracity  and  juftice  muft 
 be  the  natural  rule  and  meafure  of  cxercifing 
 
 ^  Chap.  ii. 
 
 this 
 
Chap.  VI.      as  infiumcing  FraBicc.  157 
 
 this  authority  or  government,  to  a  Being, 
 who  can  have  no  competitions,  or  interfering 
 of  interefts,  with  his  creatures  and  his  fub- 
 jeds. 
 
 But  as  the  do6lrine  of  Liberty,  though  we 
 experience  its  truth,  may  be  perplexed  with 
 difficulties,  which  run  up  into  the  moft  ab- 
 ftrufe  of  all  fpeculations ;  and  as  the  opinion 
 of  Neceffity  feems  to  be  the  very  balls,  upon 
 which  infidelity  grounds  itfelf ;  it  may  be  of 
 fome  ufe  to  offer  a  more  particular  proof  of 
 the  obligations  of  religion,  which  may  dif- 
 tindily  be  fhewn  not  to  be  deftroyed  by  this 
 opinion. 
 
 The  proof  from  final  caufes  of  an  intelli- 
 gent Author  of  Nature,  is  not  affefted  by  the 
 opinion  of  Necefllty ;  fupponng  Neceffity  a 
 thing  poffible  in  itfelf,  and  reconcileable  with 
 the  conftitution  of  things  ^  And  it  is  a  mat- 
 ter of  fa6l,  independent  on  this  or  any  other 
 fpeculation,  that  he  governs  the  world  by  the 
 method  of  rewards  and  puniffiments  ^ :  and 
 alfo  that  he  hath  given  us  a  moral  faculty,  by 
 which  we  diftinguiffi  between  actions,  and 
 approve  fome  as  virtuous  and  of  good-defert, 
 and  difapprove  others  as  vicious  and  of  iil- 
 defert  \  Now  this  moral  difcernment  im- 
 plies in  the  notion  of  it,  a  rule  of  adlion,  and 
 
 ''p.  146,  &c.  «Ch.ii.  ^DifTert.  II. 
 
 a  rule 
 
158  Of  the  Opinion  of  NeceJJify,     Part  I. 
 
 a  rule  of  a  very  peculiar  kind  :  for  it  carries 
 in  it  authority  and  a  right  of  diredion;  au- 
 thority in  fuch  a  (tnky  as  that  we  cannot  de- 
 p.irt  from  it  without  being  ft-If-condemned  ^. 
 And  that  the  di6tates  of  this  moral  faculty, 
 which  are  by  nature  a  rule  to  us,  are  more- 
 over the  laws  of  God,  laws  in  a  fenfe  including 
 fandiions ;  may  be  thus  proved.  Confciouf- 
 nefs  of  a  rule  or  guide  of  aftion,  in  creatures 
 who  are  capable  of  confidering  it  as  given 
 them  by  their  Maker,  not  only  raifes  imme- 
 diately a  (cn(t  of  duty,  but  alfo  a  {cn(Q  of  fe- 
 curity  in  following  it,  and  of  danger  in  de- 
 viating from  it.  A  direftion  of  the  Author 
 of  Nature,  given  to  creatures  capable  of  look- 
 ing upon  it  as  fuch,  is  plainly  a  command 
 from  him :  and  a  command  from  him,  ne- 
 ceffarily  includes  in  it,  at  leaft,  an  implicit 
 promife  in  cafe  of  obedience,  or  threatening 
 in  cafe  of  difobedience.  But  then  the  fenfe 
 or  perception  of  good  and  ill  defert  \  which 
 is  contained  in  the  moral  difcernment,  ren- 
 ders the  fancflion  explicit,  and  makes  it  ap- 
 pear, as  one  may  fay,  expreffed.  For  iince 
 his  method  of  government  is  to  reward  and 
 punifh  adtions,  his  having  annexed  to  feme 
 adions  an  infeparable  fenfe  of  good  defert,  and 
 to  others  of  ill,  this  furely  amounts  to  decla- 
 ring, upon  w^hom  his  punilhments  ihall  be 
 inflided,  and  his  rewards  be  beftowed.  For 
 he  muft  have  niven  us  this  difcernment  and 
 
 «  Serm.  2.  at  the  Rolls.  ^  Di/Tert.  II. 
 
 fenfe 
 
Chap.  VI.     as  injinencmg  Practice.  i  5^ 
 
 lenfe  of  things,  as  a  pre-fentiment  of  what  is 
 to  be  hereafter  :  th.it  is,  by  way  of  information 
 before- hand,  what  we  are  finally  to  expert  in 
 his  world.  There  is  then  moil  evident  ground 
 to  think,  that  the  government  of  God,  upon 
 the  whole,  will  be  found  to  correfpond  to  the 
 nature  which  he  lias  given  us  :  and  that  in  the 
 upfliot  and  iffue  of  things,  happinefs  and 
 mifery  fhall,  in  fad:  and  event,  be  made  to 
 follow  virtue  and  vice  refpedlively ;  as  he  has 
 already,  in  fo  peculiar  a  manner,  alibciated  the 
 ideas  of  them  in  our  minds.  And  from  hence 
 might  eafily  be  deduced  the  obligations  of  re- 
 ligious worihip,  were  it  only  to  be  confidered 
 as  a  means  of  prefer ving  upon  our  minds  a 
 fenfe  of  this  m.oral  government  of  God,  and 
 fecuring  our  obedience  to  it :  v/hich  yet  is  an 
 extremely  imperfedl  view  of  that  moft  impor- 
 tant duty. 
 
 Now  I  fay,  no  objeftion  from  Neceffity 
 can  lie  again  ft  this  general  proof  of  religion. 
 None  againft  the  proportion  reafoned  upon, 
 that  we  have  fuch  a  moral  faculty  and  dif- 
 cernrnent ;  becaufe  this  is  a  mere  matter  of 
 fa6t,  a  thing  of  experience,  that  human  kind 
 is  thus  conftituted  :  none  againft  the  con- 
 clufion  y  becaufe  it  is  immediate  and  wholly 
 from  this  fadt.  For  the  conclufion,  that  God 
 will  finally  reward  the  righteous  and  punifh 
 the  wicked,  is  not  here  drawn,  from  its  ap- 
 pearing 
 
i6o  Of  the  Ophimi  of  Neccjfity,     Part  I. 
 
 pearing  to  us  fit ',  that  he  Jfdould-,  but  from  its 
 appearing,  that  he  has  told  us,  he  ivill.  And 
 this  he  hath  certainly  told  us,  in  the  promife 
 and  threatening,  which  it  hath  been  obferved 
 the  notion  of  a  command  implies,  and  the 
 fenfe  of  good  and  ill  defert  which  he  has  given 
 us,  more  diftind:ly  exprefTes.  And  this  rea- 
 foning  from  fad;  is  confirmed,  and  in  fome 
 degree  even  verified,  by  other  fa6ls  j  by  the 
 natural  tendencies  of  virtue  and  of  vice  *";  and 
 by  this,  that  God,  in  the  natural  courfe  of  his 
 providence,  puniilies  vicious  actions  as  mif- 
 chievous  to  fociety;  and  alfo  vicious  adions  as 
 fuch  in  the  ftrideft  fenfe  ^  So  that  the  general 
 proof  of  religion  is  unanfwerably  real,  even 
 
 ^  However,  I  am  far  from  intending  to  deny,  that  the 
 will  of  God  is  determinedj  by  what  is  fit,  by  the  right  and 
 rcafon  of  the  cafe  ;  though  one  chufes  to  decline  matters  of 
 fuch  abftra6t  fpeculation,  and  to  fpeak  with  caution  when 
 one  does  fpeak  of  them.  But  if  it  be  intelligible  to  fay,  that 
 //  is  fit  and  reajonable  for  every  one  to  confult  his  own  happinefs^ 
 then  ftnefs  of  a"ion^  or  the  right  and  rcafon  of  the  cafe^  is  an 
 intelligible  manner  of  fpeaking.  And  it  icems  as  incon- 
 ceivable, to  fuppofe  God  to  approve  one  courfe  of  adlion, 
 or  one  end,  preferably  to  another,  which  yet  his  a6ling  at  all 
 from  defign  implies  that  he  does,  without  fuppofmg  fome- 
 what  prior  in  that  end,  to  be  the  ground  of  the  preference  ; 
 as  to  fuppofe  him  to  difcern  an  abftracl  propofition  to  be 
 true,  without  fuppofmg  fomewhat  prior  in  it,  to  be  the 
 ground  of  the  dilcernmennt.  It  doth  not  therefore  appear, 
 that  moral  right  is  any  more  relative  to  perception,  than 
 abftra6l  truth  is :  or  that  it  is  any  more  improper,  to  fpeak 
 of  the  fitncfs  and  rightnefs  of  actions  and  ends,  as  founded 
 iR  the  nature  of  things,  than  to  fpeak  of  abllradl  truth,  as 
 thus  founded. 
 
 J^  p.  8i.  ^  p.  70,  c\-c. 
 
 upon 
 
Chap.  VI.     as  injluencmg  VraBice.         l6l 
 
 upon  the  wild  fuppofition  which  we  are  argu- 
 ing upon. 
 
 It  muft  likewife  be  obferved  farther,  that 
 natural  religion  hath,  befides  this,  an  external 
 evidence  5  which  the  dod:rine  of  Neceflity,if  it 
 could  be  true,  would  not  affedl.  For  fuppofe 
 a  perfon,  by  the  obfervations  and  reafoning 
 above,  or  by  any  other,  convinced  of  the  truth 
 of  religion  \  that  there  is  a  God,  who  made 
 the  world,  who  is  the  moral  governor  and 
 judge  of  mankind,  and  will  upon  the  whole 
 deal  with  every  one  according  to  his  works : 
 I  fay,  fuppofe  a  perfon  convinced  of  this  by 
 reafon ;  but  to  know  nothing  at  all  of  anti- 
 quity, or  the  prefent  ftate  of  mankind:  it 
 would  be  natural  for  fuch  an  one  to  be  inqui- 
 fitive,  what  was  the  hiftory  of  this  fyjftem  of 
 dod:rine ;  at  what  time,  and  in  what  manner, 
 it  came  firfl  into  the  world ;  and  whether  it 
 were  believed  by  any  confiderable  part  of  it. 
 And  were  he  upon  inquiry  to  find,  that  a 
 particular  perfon,  in  a  late  age,  firft  of  all  pro- 
 pofed  it,  as  a  deduction  of  reafon,  and  that 
 mankind  were  before  wholly  ignorant  of  it : 
 then,  though  its  evidence  from  reafon  would 
 remain,  there  would  be  no  additional  proba- 
 bility of  its  truth,  from  the  account  of  its  dif- 
 covery.  But  inflead  of  this  being  the  fad:  of 
 the  cafe,  on  the  contrary,  he  would  find,  what 
 could  not  but  afford  him  a  very  flrong  con- 
 firmation of  its  truth ;  Firjl^  That  fome  what  of 
 
 M  this 
 
1 62         Of  the  Opinion  of  NeceJ/ity,      Part  I. 
 
 this  fyftem,  with  more  or  fewer  additions  and 
 alterations,  hath  been  profeffed  in  all  ages  and 
 countries,  of  which  we  have  any  certain  in- 
 formation relating  to  this  matter.  Secondly ^ 
 That  it  is  certain  hiftorical  fa6t.  fo  far  as  we 
 can  trace  things  up,  that  this  whole  fyftem  of 
 belief,  that  there  is  one  God,  the  creator  and 
 moral  governor  of  the  world,  and  that  man- 
 kind is  in  a  ftate  of  religion,  was  received  in 
 the  firft  ages.  And  Thirdly,  That  as  there 
 is  no  hint  or  intimation  in  hiftory,  that  this 
 fyftem  was  firft  reafoned  out  -,  fo  there  is  ex- 
 prefs  hiftorical  or  traditional  evidence,  as  an- 
 cient as  hiftory,  that  it  was  taught  firft  by  re- 
 velation. Now  thefe  things  muft  be  allowed 
 to  be  of  great  weight.  The  firft  of  them, 
 general  confent,  fliews  this  fyftem  to  be  con- 
 formable to  the  common  fenle  of  mankind. 
 The  fecond,  namely,  that  religion  w^as  be- 
 lieved in  the  firft  ages  of  the  world,  efpecially 
 as  it  does  not  appear  that  there  were  then  any 
 fuperftitious  or  faife  additions  to  it,  cannot 
 but  be  a  farther  confirmation  of  its  truth. 
 For  it  is  a  proof  of  this  alternative :  either 
 that  it  came  into  the  world  by  revelation  j  or 
 that  it  is  natural,  obvious,  and  forces  itfelf 
 upon  the  mind.  The  former  of  thefe  is  the 
 conclufion  of  learned  men.  And  whoever 
 will  confider,  how  unapt  for  fpeculation  rude 
 and  uncultivated  minds  are,  will,  perhaps 
 from  heace  alone,  be  ftrongly  inclined  to  be- 
 lieve it  the  truth.    And  as  it  is  fliewn  in  the 
 
 §  Second 
 
Chap.  VI.     as  infiuencing  PraBice.  163 
 
 Second  Part""  of  thisTreatife,  that  there  is  no- 
 thing of  fuch  peculiar  prefumption  again  ft  a 
 revelation  in  the  beginning  of  the  world,  as 
 there  is  fuppofed  to   be  againft  fubfequent 
 ones  :  a  fceptick  could  not,  I  think,  give  any 
 account,  which  would  appear  more  probable 
 even  to  himfclf,  of  the  early  pretences  to  reve- 
 lation 3  than  by  fuppofing  Ibme  real  original 
 one,  from  whence  they  were  copied.  And  the 
 third  thing  abovementioned,  that  there  is  ex- 
 prefs  hiftorical  or  traditional  evidence  as  an- 
 cient as  hiftory,  of  the  fyftem  of  religion  being 
 taught  mankind  by  revelation;  this  muft  be 
 adniitted  as  fome  degree  of  real  proof,  that  it 
 was  fo  taught.  For  v/hy  fhould  not  the  molt 
 ancient  tradition  be  admitted,  as  fome  addi- 
 tional proof  of  a  fadt,  againft  which  there  is 
 no  prefumption  ?    And  this  proof  is  men-* 
 tioned  here,  becaufe  it  has  its  weight  to  fliew, 
 that  religion  came  into  the  world  by  revela- 
 tion, prior  to  all  coniideration  of  the  proper 
 authority  of  any  book  fuppofed  to  contain  it: 
 and  even  prior  to  all  coniideration,  whether 
 the  revelation  itfelf  be  uncorruptly  handed 
 down  and  related,  or  mixed  and  darkened  with 
 fables.     Thus  the  hiftorical  account,  which 
 we  have,  of  the  origin  of  religion,  taking  in 
 all  circumftances,  is  a  real  contirmation  of  its 
 truth,  no  way  affedled  by  the  opinion  of  Ne- 
 ceffity.     And  the  external  evidence,  even  of 
 
 «"  Chap.  ii. 
 
 M  a  natural 
 
164         Of  the  Opinion  ofNeceJtty^     Part  L 
 
 natural  religion,    is    by  no  means  inconii- 
 derable. 
 
 But  it  is  carefully  to  be  obferved,  and 
 ought  to  be  recoUefted  after  all  proofs  of  vir- 
 tue and  religion,  which  are  only  general;  that 
 as  fpeculative  reafon  may  be  negledled,  preju- 
 diced, and  deceived :  fo  alfo  may  our  moral 
 under/landing  be  impaired  and  perverted,  and 
 the  dictates  of  it  not  impartially  attended  to. 
 This  indeed  proves  nothing  againft  the  reality 
 of  our  fpeculative  or  practical  faculties  of  per- 
 ception ;  againft  their  being  intended  by  na- 
 ture, to  inform  us  in  the  theory  of  things, 
 and  inftrud:  us  how  we  are  to  behave,  and 
 what  we  are  to  exped:  in  confequence  of  our 
 behaviour.  Yet  our  liablenefs,  in  the  degree 
 we  are  liable,  to  prejudice  and  perverlion,  is  a 
 moft  ferious  admonition  to  us  to  be  upon  our 
 guard,  with  refpefl:  to  what  is  of  fuch  con- 
 fequence, as  our  determinations  concerning 
 virtue  and  religion :  and  particularly  not  to 
 take  cuftom,  and  fafhion,  and  flight  notions  of 
 honour,  or  imaginations  of  prefent  eafe,  ufe 
 and  convenience  to  mankind,  for  the  only 
 moral  rule ". 
 
 The  foregoing  obfervations,  drawn  from 
 the  nature  of  the  thing,  and  the  hiftory  of 
 religion,  amount,  when  taken  together,  to  a 
 
 «  DiiTert.  IL 
 
 real 
 
chap.  VI.     as  injlmncing  Pra5tke,  165 
 
 real  practical  proof  of  it,  not  to  be  confuted: 
 fuch  a  proof  as,  confidering  the  infinite  im- 
 portance of  the  thing,  I  apprehend,  would 
 be  admitted  fully  fufficient,  in  reafon,  to  in- 
 fluence the  adions  of  men,  who  a6t  upon 
 thought  and  refledion ;  if  it  were  admitted 
 that  there  is  no  proof  of  the  contrary.  But 
 it  may  be  faid :  '^  There  are  many  probabili- 
 *^  ties,  which  cannot  indeed  be  confuted,  /.  e. 
 "  fhewn  to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet  may 
 *'  be  overbalanced,  by  greater  probabilities  on 
 "  the  other  fide ;  much  more  by  demonflra- 
 "  tion.  And  there  is  no  occafion  to  objed: 
 "  againft  particular  arguments  alledged  for  an 
 *^  opinion,  when  the  opinion  itfelf  may  be 
 "  clearly  fhewn  to  be  falfe,  without  meddling 
 *'  withfucharguments  at  all,  but  leaving  them 
 "  juft  as  they  are  °.  Now  the  method  of  go- 
 **  vernment  by  rewards  and  puniihments,  and 
 "  efpecially  rewarding  and  punifliing  good 
 *^  and  ill  defert  as  fuch  refpedively,  mull  go 
 *'  upon  fuppofition,  that  we  are  Free  and  not 
 "  Neceflary  Agents.  And  it  is  incredible,  that 
 **  the  Author  of  Nature  fhould  govern  us 
 *^  upon  a  fuppofition  as  true,  which  he 
 "  knows  to  be  falfe  :  and  therefore  abfurd  to 
 "  think,  he  will  reward  or  punifh  us  for  our 
 *^  adions  hereafter ;  efpecially  that  he  will  do 
 ^'  it  under  the  notion,  that  they  are  of  good  or 
 
 •  p.  I,  12. 
 
 M  3  «  ill 
 
1 66       Of  the  Opinion  of  Necejtty^       Part  L 
 
 "  ill  defert/'  Here  then  the  matter  is  brought 
 to  a  point.    And  the  anfwer  to  all  this  is  full, 
 and  not  to  be  evaded  :  that  the  whole  confti- 
 tution  and  courle  of  things,  the  whole  analo- 
 gy of  providence,  fhews  beyond  poflibility  of 
 doubt,  that  the  conclufion  from  this  reafoning 
 is  falfe  3  wherever  the  fallacy  lies.  The  doc- 
 trine of  Freedom  indeed  clearly  iliows  where  : 
 in  fuppofingourfelves  Neceirary,when  in  truth 
 we  are  Free  Agents.  But  upon  the  fuppofition 
 of  Neceffity,  the  fallacy  lies  in  taking  for  grant- 
 ed, that  it  is  incredible  Neceffary  Agents  (liould 
 be  rewarded  and  punifhed.     But  that,  fome 
 how  or  other,  the  conclulion  now  mentioned 
 is  falfe,  is  moft  certain.      For  it  is  fadl,  that 
 God  does  govern  even  brute  creatures  by  the 
 method  of  rewards  and  punilliments,  in  the 
 natural  courfe  of  things.     And  men  are  re- 
 warded and  punifhed  for  their  anions,  pu- 
 nifhed for  actions  mifchievous  to  focietyas  be- 
 ing fo,  punifhed  for  vicious  aftions  as  fuch; 
 by  the  natural  inflrumentality  of  each  other, 
 under    the    prefent    condud:    of  providence. 
 Nay  even  the  affed:ion  of  gratitude,  and  the 
 paiiion?)f  rcfentment,and  the  rewards  and  pu- 
 nilliments following  from  them,  v/hich  in  ge- 
 neral are  to  be  confidered  as  natural,  /.  e,  from 
 the  Author  of  Nature;  thefe  rewards  and 
 punifhments,  being  naturally '  annexed  to  ac- 
 tions confidered  as  implying  good  intention 
 
 »  Serip,  8th,  at  the  RoUu 
 
 and 
 
chap.  VI.     as  hijiuencing  PraBice.  167 
 
 and  good  defert,  ill  intention  and  ill  defert; 
 thefe  natural  rewards  and  punifliments,  I  fay, 
 are  as  much  a  contradiction  to  the  conclulion 
 above,  and  fliew  its  fldfhood,  as  a  more  exad: 
 and  compleat  rewarding  and  puniihing  of 
 good  and  ill  defert  as  fuch.  So  that  if  it  be 
 incredible,  that  NecefTary  Agents  fhould  be 
 thus  rewarded  and  puniflied  ;  then,  men  are 
 not  neceilary  but  free :  fmce  it  is  matter  of 
 fadl,  that  they  are  thus  rewarded  and  punifh- 
 ed.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  which  is  the 
 fuppofition  w^e  have  been  arguing  upon,  it  be 
 infifted,  that  men  are  Neceilary  Agents;  then, 
 there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the  farther  fup<*- 
 pofition  of  Neceilary  Agents  being  thus  re- 
 warded and  puniilied  :  fmce  we  ourfelves  are 
 thus  dealt  with. 
 
 From  the  w^hole  therefore  It  muft  follow, 
 that  a  Neceffity  fuppofed  poiTible,  and  recon- 
 cileable  with  the  conftitution  of  things,  does 
 in  no  fort  prove  that  the  Author  of  Nature 
 will  not,  nor  deftroy  the  proof  that  he  will, 
 finally  and  upon  the  whole,  in  his  eternal 
 government,  render  his  creatures  happy  or 
 miferable,  by  fome  means  or  other,  as  they 
 behave  well  or  ill.  Or,  to  exprefs  this  con- 
 clufion  in  words  conformable  to  the  title  of 
 the  Chapter,  the  analogy  of  nature  fhews  us, 
 that  the  opinion  of  Neceffity,  confidered  as 
 practical,  is  falfe.  And  if  NeceiTity,  upon 
 the    fuppoiition   abovementioned,  doth   not 
 
 M  ^  deflroy 
 
1 68     Of  the  Opinion  ofNeceJJityy  &c.  Part  I. 
 
 deftroy  the  proof  of  natural  religion,  it  evi- 
 dently makes  no  alteration  in  the  proof  of  re- 
 vealed. 
 
 From  thefe  things  likewife  v^e  may  learn, 
 in  what  fenfe  to  underftand  that  general  af- 
 fertion,  that  the  opinion  of  Neceffity  is  effen- 
 tially  deftrudive  of  all  religion.  Firft  in  a 
 practical  fenfe  -,  that  by  this  notion,  atheif- 
 tical  men  pretend  to  fatisfy  and  encourage 
 themfelves  in  vice,  and  juftify  to  others  their 
 difregard  to  all  religion.  And  fecondly,  in 
 the  Ilridleft  fenfe ;  that  it  is  a  contradiction 
 to  the  v^hole  conftitution  of  nature,  and  to 
 what  we  may  every  moment  experience  in 
 ourfelves,  and  fo  overturns  every  thing.  But 
 by  no  means  is  this  affertion  to  be  under- 
 ilood,  as  if  Neceffity,  fuppofing  it  could  pof- 
 libly  be  reconciled  with  the  conftitution  of 
 things  and  with  what  we  experience,  were 
 not  alfo  reconcileable  with  religion  :  for  up- 
 on this  fuppofition,  it  demonftrably  is  fo. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
[     i69    ] 
 
 CHAP.     VIL 
 
 Of  the  Govermnent  of  God^  cojifdered  as  a 
 Scheme  or  Conjlitutioriy  hn^erjecUy  compre-- 
 bended. 
 
 THOUGH  it  be,  as  It  cannot  but  be, 
 acknowledged,  that  the  analogy  of  na- 
 ture gives  a  llrong  credibility,  to  the  general 
 dodtrine  of  religion,  and  to  the  feveral  parti- 
 cular things  contained  in  it,  confidcred  as  fo 
 many  matters  of  fad: ;  and  likewife  that  it 
 fliews  this  credibility  not  to  be  deftroyed  by 
 any  notions  of  Neceffity :  yet  ftill,  objedtions 
 may  be  infifted  upon,  againll  the  wifdom, 
 equity,  and  goodnefs  of  the  divine  govern- 
 ment implied  in  the  notion  of  religion,  and 
 againft  the  method  by  which  this  govera- 
 ment  is  conduced;  to  which  objcdions  ana- 
 logy can  be  no  dired;  anfwer.  For  the  cre- 
 dibility, or  the  certain  truth,  of  a  matter  of 
 fad,  does  not  immediately  prove  any  thing 
 concerning  the  wifdom  or  goodnefs  of  it : 
 and  analogy  can  do  no  more,  immediately  or 
 diredly,  than  fhew  fuuh  and  fuch  things  to 
 be  true  or  credible,  conlidered  only  as  matters 
 of  fad.  But  ftill,  if,  upon  mppofition  of  a 
 moral  conftitution  of  nature  and  a  moral  go- 
 vernment over  it,  analogy  fuggefts  and  makes 
 it  credible,  that  this  government  muft  be  a 
 
 fcheme. 
 
lyo  T^he  Government  ofGody        Part  I. 
 
 fcheme,  fyftem,  or  conftitution  of  government, 
 as  diftinguifhed  from  a  number  of  fmgle  un- 
 conneded  ads  of  diftributlve  juftice  and  good- 
 nefs ;  and  likewife,  that  it  muft  be  a  fcheme, 
 fo  imperfeftly  comprehended,  and  of  fuch  a 
 fort  in  other  refpeds,  as  to  afford  a  dired  ge- 
 neral anfwer  to  all  objedions  againfl  the  juf- 
 tice  and  goodnefs  of  it :  then  analogy  is,  re- 
 motely, of  great  fervice  in  anfwering  thofe 
 objedions;  both  by  fuggefting  the  anfwer, 
 and  fhewing  it  to  be  a  credible  one. 
 
 Now  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to 
 be  the  cafe.  For,  Firft,  Upon  fappofition 
 that  God  exercifes  a  moral  government  over 
 the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural  govern- 
 ment fuggefts  and  makes  it  credible,  that  his 
 moral  government  muft  be  a  fcheme,  quite 
 beyond  our  comprehenfion :  and  this  affords 
 a  general  anfwer  to  all  objedions  againft  the 
 juftice  and  goodnefs  of  it.  And,  Secondly,  A 
 more  diftind  obfervation  of  fome  particular 
 things  contained  in  God's  fcheme  of  natural 
 government,  the  like  things  being  fuppofed, 
 by  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his  moral  go- 
 vernment, will  farther  fliew,  how  little  weight 
 is  to  be  laid  upon  thefe  objedions. 
 
 I.  Upon  fuppofition  that  God  exercifes  a 
 moral  government  over  the  world,  the  ana- 
 logy of  his  natural  government  fuggefts  and 
 pukes  it  credible,  that  his  moral  government 
 
 muft 
 
chap.  VII.  a  Scheme  incomprehenjible.       171 
 
 muft  be  a  fcheme,  quite  beyond  our  compre- 
 heniion :  and  this  affords  a  general  anfwer  to 
 all  objections  againft  the  jurtice  and  goodnefs 
 of  it.     It  is  moft  obvious,  analogy  renders  it 
 highly  credible,  that  upon  iuppofition  of  a 
 moral  government,  it  mud  be  a  fcheme :  for 
 the  world,  and  the  whole  natural  government 
 of  it,  appears  to  be  fo  ;  to  be  a  fcheme,  fyftem, 
 or    conllitution,  whofe  parts    correfpond   to 
 each  other,  and  to  a  whole  -,  as  really  as  any 
 work  of  art,  or  as  any  particular  model  of  a 
 civil  conftitution  and  government.     In  this 
 great  fcheme  of  the  natural  world,  individuals 
 have  various  peculiar  relations  to  other  indi- 
 viduals of  their  ov/n   fpecies.     And  whole 
 fpecies  are,  we  find,  varioufly  related  to  other 
 fpecies,  upon  this  earth.     Nor  do  we  know, 
 how  much  farther  thefe   kinds  of  relations 
 may  extend.     And,  as  there  is  not  any  action 
 or  natural  event,  which  we  are  acquainted 
 with,  fo  fmgle  and  unconnected,  as  not  to 
 have  a  refpeCt    to    fome  other  adtions  and 
 events  :  fo  poffibly  each  of  them,  when  it  has 
 not  an  immediate,  may  yet  have  a  remote, 
 natural  relation  to  other  adions  and  events, 
 much   beyond  the  compafs  of  this   prefent 
 world.     There  feems  indeed  nothing,  from 
 whence  we  can  fo  much  as  make  a  conjec- 
 ture, whether  all  creatures,  a(5tions,  and  events, 
 throughout  the  whole  of  nature,   have  rela- 
 tione to  each  other.     But,  as  it  is  obvious, 
 that  all  events  have  future  unknown  confe- 
 
 quences : 
 
172  "^^'^^  Government  of  God ^       Part  I. 
 
 quences  :  fo,  if  we  trace  any,  as  far  as  we  can 
 go,  into  what  is  conneded  with  it ;  we  fhall 
 find,  that  if  fuch  event  were  not  connected 
 with  fomevvhat  farther  in  nature  unknown 
 to  us,  foQiewhat  both  paft  and  prefent,  fuch 
 event  could  not  poffibly  have  been  at  all. 
 Nor  can  we  give  the  whole  account  of  any 
 one  thing  whatever  :  of  all  its  caufes,  ends, 
 and  neceffaryadjunfts;  thofe  adjuncts,  I  mean, 
 without  which  it  could  not  have  been.  By 
 this  moll  aflonifl^iing  connexion,  thefe  reci- 
 procal correfpondencies  and  mutual  relations, 
 every  thing  which  we  fee  in  the  courfe  of  na- 
 ture, is  aftually  brought  about.  And  things 
 feemingly  the  mjft  infigniiicant  imaginable, 
 are  perpetually  obferved  to  be  neceffary  con- 
 ditions to  other  things  of  the  greateft  im- 
 portance :  fo  that  any  one  thing  whatever, 
 may,  for  ought  we  know  to  the  contrary,  be 
 a  neceffary  condition  to  any  other.  The  na- 
 tural world  then,  and  natural  government  of 
 it,  being  fuch  an  incomprehenfible  fcheme; 
 fo  incomprehenfible,  that  a  man  muft,  really 
 in  the  literal  fenfe,  know  nothing  at  all,  who 
 is  not  fenfible  of  his  ignorance  in  it :  this 
 immediately  fuggefts,  and  ftrongly  ihews  the 
 credibility,  that  the  moral  world  and  govern- 
 mei  t  o^  it  may  be  fo  too.  Indeed  the  natural 
 and  moral  conftitution  and  government  of  the 
 world  are  fo  conne6led,  as  to  make  up  toge- 
 ther but  one  fcheme  :  and  it  is  highly  pro- 
 bable, that  the  iirfl  is  formed  and  carried  on 
 X  merely 
 
Chap.  VII.  a  Scheme  incomprehenfilk.       173 
 
 merely  in  fubferviency  to  the  latter ;  as  the 
 vegetable  world  is  for  the  animal,  and  orga- 
 nized bodies  for  minds.  But  the  thing  in- 
 tended here,  is,  without  inquiring  how  far 
 the  adminiftration  of  the  natural  world  is 
 fubordinate  to  that  of  the  moral,  only  to  ob- 
 ferve  the  credibility,  that  one  fliould  be  ana- 
 logous or  fimilar  to  the  other :  that  therefore 
 every  ad:  of  divine  juftice  and  goodnefs,  may 
 be  fuppofed  to  look  much  beyond  itfelf,  and 
 its  immediate  objedt ;  may  have  fome  refe- 
 rence to  other  parts  of  God's  moral  admi- 
 niftration, and  to  a  general  moral  plan  :  and 
 that  every  circumftance  of  this  his  moral  go- 
 vernm.ent,  may  be  adjufted  beforehand  with 
 a  view  to  the  whole  of  it.  Thus  for  ex- 
 ample :  the  determined  length  of  time,  and 
 the  degrees  and  ways,  in  which  virtue  is  to 
 remain  in  a  ftate  of  warfare  and  difcipline, 
 and  in  which  wickednefs  is  permitted  to  have 
 its  progrefs ;  the  times  appointed  for  the 
 execution  of  juflice;  the  appointed  inftru- 
 ments  of  it;  the  kinds  of  rewards  and  pu- 
 niihments,  and  the  manners  of  their  diftri- 
 bution;  all  particular  inftances  of  divine  juf- 
 tice and  goodnefs,  and  every  circumftance  of 
 them,  may  have  fuch  refpedis  to  each  other, 
 as  to  make  up  all  together  a  whole,  connected 
 and  related  in  all  its  parts :  a  fcheme  or 
 iyftem,  which  is  as  properly  one  as  the  na- 
 tural world  is,  and  of  the  like  kind.  And 
 liippofing  this  to  be  the  cafe ;  it  is  moft  evi- 
 dent. 
 
174.  7^^'^'  Government  of  God,       Part  L 
 
 dent,  that  we  are  not  competent  judges  of 
 this  fcheme,  from  the  fmall  parts  of  it,  which 
 come  within  our  view  in  the  prcfent  hfe : 
 and  therefore  no  objections  againfl  any  of 
 thefe  parts,  can  be  infifted  upon  by  reafonable 
 men. 
 
 This  our  ignorance,  and  the  confequence 
 here  drawn  from  it,  are  univerfally  acknow- 
 ledged, upon  other  occafions;  and,  though 
 fcarce  denied,  yet  are  univerfally  forgot,  when 
 perfons  come  to  argue  again  ft  religion.    And 
 it  is  not  perhaps  eafy,  even  for  the  moft  rea- 
 fonable men,  ahvays  to  bear  in  mind  the  de- 
 gree of  our  ignorance,  and  make  due  allow- 
 ances for  it.     Upon  thefe  accounts,  it  may 
 not  be  ufelefs  to  go  on  a  little  farther,  in  order 
 to  fhew  more  diftindly,  how  juft  an  anfwer 
 our  ignorance  is,  to  objections    againft  the 
 fcheme  of  providence.  Suppofe  then  a  perfon 
 boldly  to  affert,  that  the  things  complained 
 of,  the  origin  and  continuance  of  evil,  might 
 eafily  have  been  prevented  by  repeated  inter- 
 pofitions%  interpofitions  fo  guarded  and  cir- 
 cumftanced,  as  would  preclude  all  mifchief 
 arifing  from  them  :  or,  if  this  were  imprac- 
 ticable, that  a  fcheme  of  government  is  itfelf 
 an  imperfection;  fince  more  good  might  have 
 been  produced,  without  any  fcheme,  fyftem, 
 or  conftitutJon  at  all,   by  continued  fmgle 
 
 »p.  179, 180, 181. 
 
 unrelated 
 
Chap.  VII.  a  Scheme  incomprehenfibk,      175 
 
 unrelated  a6ls  of  diftributive  juftice  and  good- 
 nefs ;  becaufe  thefe  would  have  occalioned 
 no  irregularities.  And  farther  than  this,  it  is 
 prefumed,  the  objcdions  will  not  be  carried. 
 Yet  the  anfwer  is  obvious :  that  were  thefe 
 affertions  true,  fcill  the  obfervations  above, 
 concerning  our  ignorance  in  the  fcheme 
 of  divine  government,  and  the  confequence 
 drawn  from  it,  would  hold,  in  great  meafure; 
 enough  to  vindicate  religion,  againft  ail  ob- 
 jections from  the  difordcrs  of  the  prefent 
 ftate.  Were  thefe  afiertions  true,  yet  the 
 government  of  the  world  might  be  jufl  and 
 good  notwithftanding ;  for,  at  the  moft,  they 
 would  infer  nothing  more  than  that  it  might 
 have  been  better.  But  indeed  they  are  mere 
 arbitrary  affertions :  no  man  being  fufficiently 
 acquainted  with  the  poffibilities  of  things, 
 to  bring  any  proof  of  them,  to  the  lowed 
 degree  of  probability.  For  however  poffible 
 what  is  aflerted  may  feem ;  yet  many  inftan- 
 ces  may  be  allcdgcd,  in  things  much  lefs  out 
 of  our  reach,  of  fuppofitions  abfolutely  im- 
 poffible,  and  reducible  to  the  moft  palpable 
 felf-contradi(5tions,  which,  not  every  one  by 
 any  means  would  perceive  to  be  fuch,  nor 
 perhaps  any  one  at  iirft  fight  fufpecl.  From 
 thefe  things,  it  is  eafy  to  fee  diftindlly,  how 
 our  ignorance,  as  it  is  the  common,  is  really  a 
 fatisfaftory  anfwer  to  all  objedlions  againft  the 
 juftice  and  goodnefs  of  Providence.  If  a  man 
 contemplating  any  one  providential  difpen- 
 
 fation^ 
 
tjS  7he  Government  of  God ^      Part  I. 
 
 fation,  which  had  no  relation  to  any  others, 
 fhould  objedt,  that  he  difcerned  in  it  a  dis- 
 regard to  j  uftice,  or  a  deficiency  of  goodnefs  ; 
 nothing  would  be  lefs  an  anfwer  to  fuch  ob- 
 jedtion,  than  our  ignorance  in  other  parts  of 
 providence,  or  in  the  poffibilities  of  things, 
 no  way  related  to  what  he  was  contemplating. 
 But  when  we  know  not,  but  the  parts  ob- 
 jedled  againft  may  be  relative  to  other  parts 
 unknown  to  us;  and  when  we  are  unac- 
 quainted with  what  is,  in  the  nature  of  the 
 thing,  practicable  in  the  cafe  before  us;  then 
 cur  ignorance  is  a  fatisfacftory  anfwer:  becaufe, 
 fome  unknown  relation,  or  fome  unknown 
 impoffibility,  may  render  what  is  objeded 
 againfl:,  juft  and  good ;  nay  good  in  the  high- 
 eft  practicable  degree. 
 
 11.  And  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid 
 upon  fuch  objedions,  will  farther  appear,  by 
 a  more  diftind:  obfervation  of  fome  particular 
 things  contained  in  the  natural  government 
 of  God,  the  like  to  which  may  be  fuppofed, 
 from  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his  moral 
 government. 
 
 Firjiy  As  in  the  fcheme  of  the  natural 
 world,  no  ends  appear  to  be  accomplifhed 
 without  means :  fo  we  find  that  means  very 
 undefirable,  often  conduce  to  bring  about 
 ends  in  fuch  a  meafure  defirable,  as  greatly  to 
 overbalance  the  difagreeablenefs  of  the  means. 
 
 And 
 
Chap.  VII.     a  Scheme  incomprehenjible,      177 
 
 And  in  cafes  where  fach  means  are  conducive 
 to  fuch  ends,  it  is  not  reafon,  bat  experience, 
 which  fhews  us,  that  they  are  thus  conducive. 
 Experience  ailb  (hews  many  means  to  be 
 conducive  and  necelTary  to  accompliili  ends, 
 which  means,  before  experience,  we  fnould 
 have  thought,  would  have  had  even  a  con- 
 trary tendency^  Now  from  thefe  obferva- 
 tions  relating  to  the  natural  fcheme  of  the 
 world,  the  moral  being  fuppofed  analogous 
 to  it,  arifes  a  great  credibility,  that  the  put- 
 ting our  mifery  in  each  other's  power  to  the 
 degree  it  is,  and  making  men  liable  to  vice 
 to  the  degree  we  are;  and  in  general,  that 
 thofe  thingSj  which  are  objed:ed  againft  the 
 moral  fcheme  of  Providence,  may  be,  upon 
 the  whole,  friendly  and  affiftant  to  virtue, 
 and  produd:ive  of  an  over-balance  of  hap- 
 pinefs :  /.  e.  the  things  objedied  againft,  may 
 be  means,  by  which  an  over-balance  of  good 
 will,  in  the  end,  be  found  produced.  And 
 from  the  fame  obfervations,  it  appears  to  be 
 no  prefumption  againft  this,  that  we  do  not, 
 if  indeed  we  do  not,  fee  thofe  means  to  have 
 any  fuch  tendency;  or  that  they  feem  to  us 
 to  have  a  contrary  one.  Thus  thofe  things, 
 which  we  call  irregularities,  may  not  be  fo 
 at  all :  becaufe  they  may  be  means  of  ac- 
 compliihing  wife  and  good  ends  more  con- 
 fiderable.     And  it  may  be  added,  as  above  % 
 
 N  that 
 
178  The  Gover?2meJ7f  of  Gody       Part  I. 
 
 that  they  may  alio  be  the  only  means  by 
 which  thefc  wife  and  good  ends  are  capable 
 of  being  accomplifhed. 
 
 After  thefc  obfervations  it  may  be  proper 
 to  add,  in  order  to  obviate  aa  abfurd  and 
 wicked  conclufion  from  any  of  them,  that 
 though  the  conftitution  of  our  nature  from 
 whence  we  are  capable  of  vice  and  mifery^, 
 may,  as  it  undoubtedly  does,  contribute  to 
 the  perfection  and  happinefs  of  the  world ; 
 and  though  the  aftual  permiffion  of  evil  may 
 be  beneficial  to  it :  fi.  e.  it  would  have  been 
 more  mlfchievous,  not  that  a  wicked  perfon 
 had  himfelf  abflained  from  his  own  wicked- 
 nefs,  but  that  any  one  had  forcibly  prevented 
 it,  than  that  it  was  perm.itted  :)  yet  notwith- 
 ftanding,  it  might  have  been  much  better  for 
 the  world,  if  this  very  evil  had  never  been 
 done.  Nay  it  is  moil  clearly  conceivable, 
 that  the  very  commlfTion  of  wickednefs  may 
 be  beneficial  to  the  world,  and  yet,  that  it 
 would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial  for  men 
 to  refrain  from  it.  For  thus,  in  the  wife  and 
 gc'>d  conftitution  of  the  natural  world,  there 
 are  diforders  which  bring  their  own  cures ; 
 difeafes,  v/hich  are  themfelves  remedies.  Ma- 
 ny a  man  would  have  died,  had  it  not  been 
 for  the  gout  or  a  fever;  yet  it  would  be 
 thought  madnefs  to  allert,  that  ficknefs  is 
 abetter  or  more  perfedl  ftate  than  health; 
 I  though 
 
chap.  ^'"11.     a  Scbc;nc  hiComprehe7ifibk.     1 79 
 
 though  the  like,  with  regard  to  the  moral 
 world,  has  been  ailertcd.     But, 
 
 Secondly^  The  natural  government  of  the 
 world  is  carried  on  by  general  laws.  For 
 this  there  may  be  wile  and  good  reafons :  the 
 wilefl  and  beft,  for  ought  we  know  to  the 
 contrary.  And  that  there  are  fuch  reafons, 
 is  fuggefted  to  cur  thoughts,  by  the  analogy 
 of  nature  :  by  our  being  made  to  experience 
 good  ends  to  be  accompli/lied,  as  indeed  all 
 the  good  v/hich  we  enjoy  is  accompliflied, 
 by  this  means,  that  the  laws,  by  which  the 
 world  is  governed,  are  general.  For  we  have 
 fcarce  any  kind  of  enjoyments,  but  what  we 
 are,  in  fome  way  or  other,  inftrumental  in 
 procuring  ourfslves,  by  adring  in  a  manner 
 which  we  forefee  likely  to  procure  them:  now 
 this  forefight  could  not  be  at  all,  were  not 
 the  government  of  the  Vv'orld  carried  on  by 
 general  laws.  And  though,  for  ought  we 
 know  to  the  contrary,  every  fmgle  cafe  may 
 be,  at  length,  fou*nd  to  have  been  provided 
 for  even  by  thefe:  yet  to  prevent  all  irregu- 
 larities, or  remedy  them  as  they  arife,  by  the 
 wifeft  and  bell  general  laws,  may  be  impoffi- 
 ble  in  the  nature  of  things ;  as  we  fee  it  is 
 abfolutely  impofnble  in  civil  governm-ent. 
 But  then  we  are  ready  to  think,  that,  the 
 conftitution  of  nature  remaining  as  it  is, 
 and  the  couffc  of  things  being  permitted  to 
 go  on,  in  other  refpecfls,   as  it  does,  there 
 
 N  2  might 
 
iSo  The  Go'-ccrnnient  of  God,       Part  I. 
 
 might  be  interpolitions  to  prevent  ij-rcirulari- 
 ties  y  though  they  could  not  have  been  pre- 
 vented   or  remedied    by   any   general   laws. 
 And  there  would  indeed  be  realbn  to  wifli, 
 which,  by  the  way,  is  very  different  from  a 
 right  to  claim,  that  all  irregularities  were  pre- 
 vented or  remedied  by  prefent  interpofitions, 
 if  thefe  interpolitions  would   have  no  other 
 effed  than  this.     But  it  is  plain  they  would 
 have  fome  vilible  and  immediate  bad  eftedls : 
 for  inftance,  they  would  encourage  idlenefs 
 and  negligence;  and  they  would  render  doubt- 
 ful the  natural  rule  of  life,  which  is  afcer- 
 tained  by  this   very  thing,  that  the  courfe 
 of  the  world  is   carried  on  by  general  laws. 
 And  farther,  it  is  certain  they  would  have 
 diftant  effects,  and  very  great  ones  too;  by 
 means  of  the  wonderful  connexions  before 
 mentioned '.     So  that  we  cannot  io  much  as 
 guefs,  what  would  be  the  whole  refult  of  the 
 interpofitions  defired.     It  may  be  faid,  any 
 bad  refult  might  be  prevented  by  farther  in- 
 terpolations, whenever  there  w^as  cccafidn  for 
 them  :  but  this  again  is  talking  quite  at  ran- 
 dom, and  in  the  dark  ''•     Upon  the  whole 
 then,  w^e  fee  wife  reafons,  why  the  courfe  of 
 the  world  fliould  be  carried  on   by  general 
 laws,  and  good   ends  accompliflied  by  this 
 means:  and,  for  ought  we  know,  there  may 
 be  the  wifefi;  reafons  for  it,  and  the  beft  ends 
 
 c 
 
 accompliflied 
 
Chap.  VII.  a  Scheme  hicojnprehenfiblc.       iSi 
 
 accompliflied  by  it.  We  have  no  ground  to 
 bdievc,  that  all  irregularities  could  be  rc~ 
 medied  as  they  arife,  or  could  have  been 
 precluded,  by  general  laws.  We  find  that 
 interpofitions  v/ould  produce  evil,  and  pre- 
 vent good :  and,  for  ought  we  know,  they 
 would  produce  greater  evil  than  they  would 
 prevent ;  and  prevent  greater  good  than  they 
 would  produce.  And  if  this  be  the  cafe, 
 then  the  not  interpofing  is  fo  far  from  being 
 a  ground  of  complaint,  that  it  is  an  inflance 
 of  goodnefs.  This  is  intelligible  and  fuffi- 
 cient :  and  going  farther,  feems  beyond  the 
 utmoft  reach  of  our  faculties. 
 
 But  it  may  be  faid,  that  "  after  all,  thefe 
 *^  fjppofed  impoffibilities  and  relations  are 
 "  v/hat  we  are  unacquainted  with ;  and  wc 
 *^  muft  judge  of  religion,  as  of  other  things, 
 *^  by  v/hat  we  do  knov/,  and  look  upon  the 
 "  reft  as  nothing  :  or  however,  that  the  an- 
 **  fwers  here  given  to  what  is  objected  againft 
 *^  religion,  may  equally  be  made  ufe  of  to 
 "  invalidate  the  proof  of  it ;  fmce  their  ftrefs 
 ^*  lies  fo  very  much  upon  our  ignorance." 
 But, 
 
 Firjl^  Though  total  ignorance  in  any  mat- 
 ter, does  indeed  equally  deftroy,  or  rather 
 preclude,  all  proof  concerning  it,  and  objec- 
 tions againft  it :  yet  partial  ignorance  does 
 not.     For  we  may  ip  any  degree   be  con- 
 
 N  3  vinced. 
 
I S 2  The  Government  cf  God,       Part  I. 
 
 vinced,  that  a  perfon  is  of  fuch  a  charadler, 
 and    coxifcqiieiitiy    v/ill    purfue    fuch   ends ; 
 though  we  are  greatly  ignorant,  what  is  the 
 proper  way  of  adling,  in  order,  the  moll  ef- 
 fectually, to  obtain  thofe  ends :  and  in  this 
 cafe,  objediona  againfc  his  manner  of  adfng, 
 as  fcemingly  not  conducive  to  obtain  them, 
 might  be  anfvvered  by  our  ignorance ;  though 
 the  proof  that  fuch  ends  were  intended,  might 
 not  at  all  be  invalidated  by  it.     Thus,  the 
 proof  of  religion  is  a  proof  of  the  moral  cha- 
 racter of  Godj  and  ccnfequently  that  his  go- 
 vernment is  moral,  and  that  every  one  upon 
 the  wdiole  fliall  receive  according  to  his  de- 
 ferts  'y  a  proof  that  this  is  the  defigned  end  of 
 his  government.   But  we  are  not  competent 
 judges,  v/hat  is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in 
 order  the  mofl  effectually  to  accomplifli  this 
 end  %     Therefore  our  ignorance  is  an  anfwer 
 to  objedions  againft  the  condudt  of  Provi- 
 dence, in  permitting  irregularities,  as  feeming 
 contradidtory  to  this  er:d.     Now,  fmce  it  is 
 fo  obvious,  that  our  ignorance  may  be  a  fatif- 
 faCtory  anfwer  to  objedtlons  againft  a  thing, 
 and  yet  not  alfcfl:  the  proof  of  it  ^  till  it  can 
 be  Ihewn,  it  is  frivolous  to  afiert,  that  our 
 ignorance  invalidates  the  proof  of  religion,  as 
 it  does  the  objections  againft  it. 
 
 Secondly.  Suppcfe  unknown  Impoffibilities, 
 
 <^p.    10,  II.. 
 
 and 
 
Chnp.  VI I.  a  Scheme  hicompreheJifihk,       183 
 
 and  unknown  relations,  might  juftly  be  urged 
 to  invalidate  the  proof  of  religion,  as  well  as 
 to  anfwer  ohjedions  againft  it :  and  that  in 
 confequence  of  this,   the   proof  of  it   were 
 doubtiuL     Yet  ftill,  let  tlie  aflertion  be  de- 
 fpifed,  or  let  it  be  ridiculed,  it  is  undeniably 
 true,   that   moral  obligations   would   remain 
 certain,   though   it    were  not    certain    what 
 would,  upon  the  whole,  be  the  confequences 
 of  obferving  or  violating  them.     For,   thefe 
 obligations  arife  immediately  and  neceffarily 
 from  the  judgment  of  our  own  mind,  unlefs 
 perverted,  which  we  cannot  violate  without 
 being  felf-condemned.     And  they  v/ould  be 
 certain  too,  from  confiderations  of  intereft. 
 For  though  it  were  doubtful,  what  will  be 
 the  future  confequences  of  virtue  and  vice ; 
 yet  it  is,  however,  credible,  that  they  may 
 have    thofe    confequences,    which    religion 
 teaches  us  they  will :  and  this  credibility  is 
 a  certain  ^  obligation  in  point  of  prudence,  to 
 -abftain  from  all  wickednefs,  and  to  live   in 
 the  confcientious  pradlice  of  all  that  is  good. 
 But, 
 
 'Thirdly i  The  anfwers  above  given  to  the 
 objeffions  againft  religion,  cannot  equally  be 
 made  ufe  of  to  invalidate  the  proof  of  it.  For, 
 upon  fuppofition  that  God  cxcrcifes  a  moral 
 government  over  the  world,  analogy  does  moft 
 
 f  p.  4.     And  Part  II.  Chap,  vi, 
 
 N  4  flrongly  ' 
 
1 84  ^'he  Goveniment  of  GdJ,       Part  I. 
 
 ftrongly  lead  us  to  conclude,  that  this  moral 
 government  muil  be  a  fchcme,  or  conftitu- 
 tion,  beyond  our  comprehenlion.  And  a 
 thoiifand  particular  analogies  fliew  us,  that 
 parts  of  fuch  a  fcheme,  from  their  relation  to 
 other  parts,  may  conduce  to  accomplifh  ends, 
 which  v/e  iliould  have  thought,  they  had  no 
 tendency  at  all  to  accomplifli :  nay  ends, 
 which  before  experience,  we  fhould  have 
 thought  fuch  parts  v/ere  contradidlory  to,  and 
 had  a  tendency  to  prevent.  And  therefore 
 all  thefe  analogies  fbew,  that  the  way  of 
 arguing  made  ufe  of  in  objedting  againft  re- 
 ligion, is  delufive :  becauie  they  fl^ew  it  is 
 not  at  all  incredible,  that,  could  we  compre- 
 hend the  v/hole,  v/e  iliould  find  the  permiifion 
 of  the  diforders  objected  againft,  to  be  con- 
 fiftent  vWth  juftice  and  goodnefs;  and  even 
 to  be  inftances  of  them.  Now  this  is  not 
 applicable  to  the  proof  of  religion,  as  it  is  to 
 the  objections  againft  it  ^;  and  therefore  can- 
 not invalidate  that  proof,  as  it  does  thefe  ob- 
 jections. 
 
 Lajily,  From  the  obfervatlon  now  made, 
 it  is  eafy  to  fee,  that  the  anfwers  above  given 
 to  the  objedtiohs  againft  providence,  though 
 in  a  general  way  of  fpeaking,  they  may  be 
 faid  to  be  taken  from  our  ignorance;  yet  are 
 by  no  means   taken  merely  from  that,    but 
 
 2  Serm.  at  the  Rclb^  p.  312.  2d  Ed, 
 
 from 
 
Chap.  VII.    a  Scheme  h:co?7iprehcnfihle.      185 
 
 from  fomewhat  which  analogy  fhews  us  con- 
 cerning it.  For  analogy  flicws  us  politively, 
 that  our  ignorance  in  the  poffibilitics  qf  things, 
 and  the  various  relations  in  nature,  renders  us 
 incompetent  judges,  and  leads  us  to  falfe  con- 
 clu lions,  in  cafes  fimilar  to  this,  in  which  we 
 pretend  to  judge  and  to  objedl.  So  that  the 
 things  above  infilled  upon,  are  not  mere 
 fuppofitions  of  unkjiown  impoffibilities  and 
 relations :  but  they  are  fuggefted  to  our 
 thoughts  and  even  forced  upon  tlie  obferva- 
 tion  of  ferious  men,  and  rendered  credible 
 too,  by  the  analogy  of  nature.  And  there- 
 fore, to  take  thefe  things  into  the  account,  is 
 to  judge  by  experience  and  what  we  do  know : 
 and  it  is  not  judging  fo,  to  take  no  notice  of 
 them. 
 
 CO  N- 
 
[     i86     ] 
 C  O   N   C   L    U   S   I   O   N 
 
 *"  I  ^HE  obferviitions  of  the  laft  Chapter, 
 J^  lead  us  to  confider  this  little  fcene  of 
 human  life,  in  which  we  are  fo  bufily  en- 
 gaged, as  having  a  reference,  of  fome  fort 
 or  other,  to  a  much  larger  plan  of  things. 
 V/hether  we  are,  any  way,  related  to  the  more 
 diftant  parts  of  the  boundlefs  univerfe,  into 
 which  we  are  brought,  is  altogether  uncer- 
 tain. But  it  is  evident,  that  the  courfe  of 
 things,  which  comes  within  our  view,  is 
 conneded  with  fomewhat,  paft,  prefent,  and 
 future,  beyond  it  \  So  that  we  are  placed, 
 as  one  may  fpeak,  in  the  middle  of  a  fcheme, 
 not  as  a  fixt  but  a  progreffive  one,  every  way  in- 
 comprehenfible:  incomprehenfible,  in  a  man- 
 ner equally,  with  refpedl  to  what  has  been, 
 what  now  is,  and  what  fl:iall  be  hereafter. 
 And  this  fcheme  cannot  but  contain  in  it 
 fomewhat,  as  wonderful,  and  as  much  be- 
 yond our  thought  and  conception  '',  as  any 
 thing  in  that  of  religion.  For,  will  any  man 
 in  his  fenfes  fiy,  that  it  is  lefs  difficult  to 
 conceive,  how  the  wcild  came  to  be  and  to 
 continue  as  it  is,  without,  than  with,  an  in- 
 telligent Author  and  Governor  of  it  ?  or,  ad- 
 
 *p.  171,  kc.  ^  See  Part  XL  Ch.  il. 
 
 mittmg 
 
Part  I.       C  G  N  C  LUS  10  N,  187 
 
 mitting  on  intelligent   Governor  of  it,  that 
 there  is  fome  other  rule  of  government  more 
 natural,  and  of  eafjer  conception,  than  that, 
 which   vve   call  moral  ?    Indeed,  v»^itnout  an 
 intellip-ent  Author  and  Governor  of  Nature, 
 no  account  at  all  can  be  given,  how  this  uni- 
 verfe,  or  the  part  of  it  particularly  in  which 
 we  are  concerned,  came  to  be,  and  the  courfe 
 of  it   to  be  carried  on,   as  it  is :   nor  any,  of 
 its  general  end  and  delign,  without  a  moral 
 Governor  of  it.     That  there  is  an  intellip^ent 
 Author  of  Nature  and  natural  Governor  of 
 the  world,   is  a  principle  gone  upon  in   the 
 foregoing  treatife;  as   proved,  and  generally 
 known    and   confefied  to  be   proved.     And 
 the  very  notion  of  an  intelligent  Author  of 
 Nature,    proved  by   particular   final  caufes 
 implies  a  will  and  a  characl:er '.     Now,  as 
 our  whole  nature,   the  nature  which  he  has 
 given  us,  leads  us  to  conclude  his  will  and 
 charafcer  to   be   moral,  juft,   and  good  :   fo 
 w^e  can  fcarce  in  im.agination  conceive,  what 
 it    can   be    otherwife.      However,    in    con- 
 fequence   of    this    his    will    and   charadler, 
 whatever  it  be,  he  formed  the  univerfe  as  it 
 is,  and  carries  on  the  courfe  of  it  as  he  does, 
 rather   than  in   any  other  manner ,  and  has 
 affigned  to  us,  and  to  all  living  creatures,  a 
 part  and  a  lot  in  it.     Irrational  creatures  ac5t 
 this  their  part,  and  enjoy  and  undergo  the 
 
 plcafurcs 
 
i88       CONCLUSION.  Parti. 
 
 pleafures  and  the  pains  allotted  them,  with^ 
 out  any  reflediion.  But  one  would  think  it 
 impoffible,  that  creatures  endued  with  reafon 
 could  avoid  reflccSting  fometimes  upon  all 
 this  y  refledling,  if  not  from  v»dience  we  came, 
 yet,  at  leafh,  whither  we  are  going;  and  what 
 the  myflerious  fcheme,  in  the  midli  of  which 
 we  find  ourfelves,  will,  at  length,  come  out, 
 and  produce  :  a  fcheme  in  v/hich  it  is  certain 
 we  are  highly  interefted,  and  in  which  we 
 may  be  interefted  even  beyond  conception. 
 For  many  things  prove  it  palpably  abfurd  to 
 conclude,  that  we  fhall  ceafe  to  be,  at  death. 
 Particular  analogies  do  mcft  fenfibly  fhev/  us, 
 that  there  is  nothing  to  be  thought  ftrange, 
 in  our  beins:  to  exifl  in  another  fcate  of  life. 
 And  that  we  are  now  living  beings,  affords  a 
 ftrong  probability,  that  we  lliall  coJitifiue  fo ; 
 unlefs  there  be  fome  poiitive  ground,  and 
 there  is  none  from  reafon  or  analogy,  to  think 
 death  will  deftroy  us.  Were  a  perfuafion  of 
 this  kind  ever  fo  well  grounded,  there  would, 
 furely,  be  little  reafon  to  take  pleafure  in  it. 
 But  indeed  it  can  have  no  other  ground, 
 than  fome  fuch  imagination,  as  that  of  our 
 grofs  bodies  being  ourfelves :  which  is  con- 
 trary to  experience.  Experience  too  moft 
 clearly  fliews  us  the  folly  of  concluding,  from 
 the  body  and  the  living  agent  afte(^ling  each 
 other  mutually,  that  the  diflblution  of  the 
 former  is  the  deftrudlion  of  the  latter.  And 
 there  are  remarkable  inilances  of  their  not 
 
 affecting 
 
PartL       CONCLUSION,  189 
 
 affcdcing  each  other,  which  lead  us  to  a 
 contrary  conchifion.  The  llippofition  then, 
 which  in  all  realbn  we  arc  to  go  upon,  is, 
 that  our  living  nature  \^dll  continue  after 
 death.  And  it  is  infinitely  unreafonable  to 
 form  an  inftitution  of  life,  or  to  a6t,  upon 
 any  other  fuppofition.  Now  all  expedtation 
 of  immortality,  whether  more  or  lefs  certain, 
 opens  an  unbounded  profped;  to  our  hopes  and 
 our  fears :  fmce  we  fee  the  conftitution  of  na- 
 ture is  fuch,  as  to  admit  of  mifery,  as  well  as 
 to  be  productive  of  happinefs,  and  experience 
 ourfelves  to  partake  of  both  in  fome  degree; 
 and  fmce  we  cannot  but  know,  what  higher 
 degrees  of  both  we  are  capable  of.  And 
 there  is  no  prefumption  againft  believing  far- 
 ther, that  our  future  intereft  depends  upon 
 our  prefent  behaviour :  for  we  fee  our  prefent 
 intcreft  doth;  and  that  the  happinefs  and 
 mifery,  which  are  naturally  annexed  to  our 
 adions,  very  frequently  do  not  follow,  till 
 long  after  the  acTtions  are  done,  to  which  they 
 are  refpedively  annexed.  So  that  were  fpe- 
 culation  to  leave  us  uncertain,  whether  it 
 were  likely,  that  the  Author  of  Nature,  in 
 giving  happinefs  and  mifery  to  his  creatures, 
 hath  regard  to  their  adions  or  not :  yet,  iince 
 we  find  by  experience  that  he  hath  fuch  re- 
 gard, the  whole  fenfe  of  things  which  he  has 
 given  us,  plainly  leads  us,  at  once  and  without 
 any  elaborate  inquiries,  to  think,  that  it  may, 
 indeed  muft,  be  to  good  adions  chiefly  that 
 
 he 
 
190         CONCLUSION.       Parti. 
 
 he  hath  annexed  happinefs,  and  to  bad  adions 
 mifery ;  or  that  he  will,  upon  the  whole,  re- 
 ward thofe  who  do  well,  and  puni/h  thofe 
 who  do  evil.  To  confirm  this  from  the  con- 
 ftitution  of  the  world,  it  has  been  obferved ; 
 that  fome  fort  of  moral  government  is  necef- 
 farily  implied  in  that  natural  government  of 
 God,  which  we  experience  ourfelves  under : 
 that  good  and  bad  adions,  at  prefent,  arc  na- 
 turally rewarded  and  puniflied,  not  only  as 
 beneficial  and  mifchievous  to  fociety  :  but  alfo 
 as  virtuous  and  vicious  :  and  that  there  is,  in 
 the  very  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to 
 their  being  rewarded  and  punifhed  in  a  much 
 higher  degree,  than  they  are  at  prefent.  And 
 though  this  higher  degree  of  diftributive  juf- 
 tice,  which  nature  thus  points  out  and  leads 
 towards,  is  prevented  for  a  time  from  taking 
 place :  it  is  by  obfcacles,  which  the  ftate  of 
 this  world  unhappily  throws  in  its  way,  and 
 which  thereidre  are  in  their  nature  tempo- 
 rary. Now,  as  thefe  things  in  the  natural 
 condu(5l  of  Providence,  are  obfervable  on  the 
 fide  of  virtue ;  fo  there  is  nothing  to  be  fet 
 againfl:  them,  on  the  fide  of  vice,  A  moral 
 fcheme  of  government  then,  is  vifibly  efla- 
 blifhed,  and,  in  fome  degree,  carried  into  exe- 
 cution :  and  this,  together  with  the  efl^ential 
 tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  duly  confidered, 
 naturally  raife  in  us  an  apprehenfion,  that 
 it  will  be  carried  on  farther  towards  perfec- 
 tion, in  a  future  ftate,  and  that  every  one 
 
 ihall 
 
Part  L        C  O  NC  L  US  10  N.         191 
 
 {IvciW  there  receive  according  to  his  dcferts. 
 And  if  this  be  io,  then  bur  future  and  gene- 
 ral intered,  under  the  moral  government  of 
 God  is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our  beha- 
 viour ;  notwithllanding  the  difliculty,  which 
 this  may  occafion,  of  fecuring  it,  and  the 
 danger  of  lofing  it:  jufl:  in  the  fame  manner 
 as  our  temporal  interefl,  under  his  natural 
 government,  is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our 
 behaviour;  notwithftanding  the  like  dili}- 
 culty  and  danger.  For,  from  our  original 
 conllitution,  and  that  of  the  world  which  we 
 inhabit,  we  are  naturally  trufted  with  our- 
 felves ;  w^ith  our  own  condudl  and  our  ow^n 
 intereft.  And  from  the  fame  conftitution  of 
 nature,  efpecially  joined  with  that  courfe  of 
 things  which  is  owing  to  men,  we  have 
 temptations  to  be  unfaithful  in  this  trull ;  to 
 forfeit  this  intereft,  to  negled:  it,  and  run 
 ourfelves  into  mifery  and  ruin.  From  thefe 
 temptations  arife,  the  difficulties  of  behavino; 
 fo  as  to  fecure  oar  temporal  intereft,  and  the 
 hazard  of  behaving  fo  as  to  mifcarry  in  it. 
 There  is  therefore  nothing  incredible  in  fup- 
 pofing,  there  may  be  the  like  difficulty  and 
 hazard  with  regard  to  that  chief  and  final 
 good,  which  religion  lays  before  us.  Indeed 
 the  whole  account,  how  it  came  to  pafs,  that 
 we  were  placed  in  fuch  a  condition  as  this ; 
 muft  be  beyond  our  comprehenfion.  But  it 
 is  in  part  accounted  for  by  what  religion 
 teaches  us,  that  the  character  of  virtue  and 
 
 piety 
 
igt  CONCLUSION.      Part  L 
 
 piety  muft  be  a  neccflary  qualification  for  a 
 future  ftate  of  fecurity  and  happinefs,  under 
 the  moral  government  of  God ;  in  like  man- 
 ner, as  fome  certain  qualifications  or  other 
 are  necefiary  for  every  particular  condition  of 
 life,  under  his  natural  government :  and  that 
 the  prefent  ftate  was  intended  to  be  a  fchool 
 of  difcipline,  for  improving  in  ourfelves  that 
 charader.  Now  this  intention  of  nature  is 
 rendered  highly  credible  by  obfcrving  ;  that 
 we  are  plainly  made  for  improvement  of  all 
 kinds ;  that  it  is  a  general  appointment  of 
 Providence,  that  we  cultivate  practical  prin- 
 ciples, and  form  within  ourfelves  habits  of 
 adion,  in  order  to  become  fit  for,  what  we 
 were  wholly  unfit  for  before  :  that  in  parti- 
 cular, childhood  and  youth  is  naturally  ap- 
 pointed to  be  a  ftate  of  difcipline  for  mature 
 age :  and  that  the  prefent  world  is  peculiarly 
 fitted  for  a  ftate  of  moral  difcipline.  And, 
 whereas  objections  are  urged  againft  the  whole 
 notion  of  moral  government  and  a  probation- 
 ftate,  from  the  opinion  of  Necefiityj  it  has 
 been  ftiewn,  that  God  has  given  us  the  evi- 
 dence, as  it  were,  of  experience,  that  all  ob- 
 jections againft  religion,  on  this  head,  are  vain 
 and  delufive.  He  has  alfo,  in  his  natural 
 government,  fuggefted  an  anfwer  to  all  our 
 ihort-fighted  objections,  againft  the  equity 
 and  goodnefs  of  his  moral  government:  and 
 in  general  he  has  exemplified  to  us  the  latter 
 by  the  former, 
 
 Thefe 
 
Parti.      CONCLUSION.  193 
 
 Thefe  things,  which,  it  is  to  be  remem- 
 faered,  are  matters  of  fad:,  ought,  in  all  com- 
 mon fenfe,  to  awaken  mankind;  to  induce 
 them  to  confider  in  earneft  their  condition, 
 and  what  they  have  to  do.  It  is  abfurd,  ab- 
 furd  to  the  degree  of  being  ridiculous,  if  the 
 fubjedl  were  not  of  fo  ferious  a  kind,  for  men 
 to  think  themlelves  fecure,  in  a  vicious  life ; 
 or  even  in  that  immoral  thoughtlelTnefs, 
 which  far  the  greateft  part  of  them  are  fallen 
 into.  And  the  credibility  of  religion,  arifmg 
 from  experience  and  fads  here  confidered,  is 
 fully  fufficient,  in  reafon,  to  engage  them  to 
 live  in  the  general  pradice  of  all  virtue  and 
 piety;  under  the  ferious  apprehenfion,  though 
 k  fhould  be  mixed  with  fome  doubt "^j  of  a 
 righteous  adminiftration  eftablillied  in  nature, 
 and  a  future  judgment  in  confequence  of  it: 
 efpecially  when  we  confider,  how  very  quef- 
 tionable  it  is,  whether  any  thing  at  all  can 
 be  gained  by  vice '  -,  how  unqueftionably  little, 
 as  well  as  precarious,  the  pleafures  and  profits 
 of  it  are  at  the  beft;  and  how  foon  they  muft 
 be  parted  with  at  the  longeft.  For,  in  the 
 deliberations  of  reafon,  concerning  what  we 
 are  to  purine,  and  what  to  avoid,  as  tempta- 
 tions to  any  thing  from  mere  pafiion,  are  fup- 
 pofed  out  of  the  cafe :  fo  inducements  to  vice, 
 from  cool  expedations  of  pleafure  and  intereft 
 fo  fmall  and  uncer}:ain  and  (hoi*!:,  ^re  r^all}^  fo 
 
 ^  Part  II.  Ch.  6.         *=  p.  66, 
 
 O  infig- 
 
194         CONCLUSION.       Part  L 
 
 infignificant,  as,  in  the  view  of  reafon,  to  be 
 almoft  nothing  in  themfelves :  and  in  com- 
 parifon  with  the  importance  of  religion,  they 
 quite  difappear  and  are  loft.   Mere  paffion  in- 
 deed may  be  alledged,  though  not  as  a  reafon, 
 yet  as  an  excufe,  for  a  vicious  courfe  of  life. 
 And  how  forry  an  excufe  it  is,  v/ill  be  ma- 
 nifeft  by  cbferving,  that  we  are  placed  in  a 
 condition,  in  which  we  are  unavoidably  in- 
 ured to  govern  our  pafTions,  by  being  neceffi- 
 tated  to  govern  them :  and  to  lay  ourfelves 
 under  the  fame  kind  of  reftraints,  and  as  great 
 ones  too,  from  temporal  regai:ds,  as  virtue  and 
 piety,  in  the  ordinary  courfe  of  things,  re- 
 quire.    The    plea   of  ungovernable  paffion 
 then,  on  the  fide  of  vice,  is  the  poorefl  of  all 
 things :  for  it  is  no  reafon,  and  but  a  poor 
 excufe.     But  the  proper  motives  to  religion, 
 are  the  proper  proofs  of  it,  from  our  moral 
 nature,  from  the  prefages  of  confcience,  and 
 our  natural  apprehenfion  of  God  under  the 
 character  of  a  righteous  governor  and  judge; 
 a  nature  and  confcience  and  apprehenfion  gi- 
 ven us  by  him :  and  from  the  confirmation  of 
 the  dictates  of  reafon,  by  /tfe  and  immortality 
 brought  to  light  by  the  Gofpel  •:,  and  the  wrath  of 
 God  revealed  from  heaven^  againjl  all  ujigod-* 
 linefsy  and  iinrighteoifnefs  of  men, 
 
 * 
 
 THE    END    OF    THE    FIRST    PART, 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY 
 
 o  F 
 
 RELIGION 
 
 TO       THE 
 
 Conflitution  and  Courfe  of  Nature. 
 
 P  A  R  T     IL 
 
 Of   Revealed    Religion. 
 
 CHAP.     I. 
 
 Of  the  Importance  of  Chrijlianity^ 
 
 SOME  perfons,  upon  pretence  of  the 
 fufficiency  of  the  light  of  nature,  avow- 
 edly rejed:  all  revelation,  as,  in  its  very  notion, 
 incredible,  and  what  muft  be  fictitious.  And 
 indeed  it  is  certain,  no  revelation  would  have 
 been   given,  had  the   light  of   nature    been 
 
 O  2  furiicient 
 
196  Of  the  Importance  Part  II. 
 
 fufficient  in  fuch  a  fenfe,  as  to  render  one, 
 not  wanting  and  ufelefs.  But  no  man,  in 
 ferioufneis  and  fimplicity  of  mind,  can  pof- 
 fibly  think  it  fo,  who  confiders  the  ftiite  of 
 rehgion  in  the  heathen  world,  bc^fore  revcr- 
 lation,  and  its  prefent  ftate  in  thole  places 
 which  have  borrowed  no  Hght  from  it :  par- 
 ticularly, the  doubtfulnefs  of  fome  of  the 
 great€ft  men,  concerning  things  of  the  ut- 
 moft  importance,  as  well  as  the  natural  inat- 
 tention and  ignorance  of  mankind  in  general. 
 It  is  impoffible  to  fay,  who  would  have  been 
 able  to  have  reafoned  out  that  whole  fyftem^ 
 which  we  call  natural  rehgion,  in  its  genuine 
 limplicity,  clear  of  fuperflition  :  but  there  is 
 certainly  no  ground  to  affirm,  ihat  the  gene- 
 rality could.  If  they  could,  there  is  no  fort 
 of  probability  that  they  would.  Admitting 
 there  were,  they  would  highly  want  a  ftand- 
 ing  admonition,  to  remind  them  of  it,  and 
 inculcate  it  upon  them.  And  farther  ftill, 
 were  they  as  much  difpofed  to  attend  to  re- 
 ligion, as  the  better  fort  of  men  are:  yet  even 
 upon  this  fuppofition,  there  would  be  various 
 occafions  for  fupernatural  inftrudtion  and  af- 
 fillance,  and  the  greateft  advantages  might  be 
 afforded  by  them.  So  that  to  fay,  revelation 
 is  a  thing  fuperfluous.  what  there  was  no 
 need  of,  and  what  can  be  of  no  fervice ;  is« 
 I  think,  to  talk  quite  wildly  and  at  random. 
 Nor  would  it  be  more  extravagant  to  aflirm;, 
 that  mankind  is  fo  entirely  at  eafe  in  the 
 
 orefent 
 
Chap.  I.  of  ChrtjUanlty.  197 
 
 prefent  ftate,  and  life  fo  compleatly  happy; 
 that  it  is  a  contmdidlion  to  fuppofe  our 
 condition  capable  of  being,  in  any  refpe(fl, 
 better. 
 
 There  are  other  perfons,  not  to  be  ranked 
 with  thefe,  who  feem  to  be  getting  into  a 
 way  of  neglecting,  and,  as  it  were,  over- 
 looking revelation,  as  of  fmall  importance, 
 provided  natural  religion  be  kept  to.  With 
 little  regard,  either  to  the  evidence  of  the 
 former,  or  to  the  objections  againft  it,  and 
 even  upon  fuppofition  of  its  truth;  **  the 
 *'  only  defign  of  it,'*  fay  they,  "  muft  be, 
 ^*  to  eftablifh  a  belief  of  the  moral  fyftem 
 *'  of  nature,  and  to  enforce  the  prad:ice  of 
 *'  natural  piety  and  virtue.  The  belief  and 
 **  pradice  of  thefe  things  were,  perhaps, 
 **  much  promoted  by  the  firft  publication  of 
 **  Chriftianity  :  but  whether  they  are  be- 
 **  lieved  and  pradtifed,  upon  the  evidence 
 *'  and  motives  of  nature  or  of  revelation, 
 *^  is  no  great  matter""'.  This  way  of  con-" 
 fidering  revelation,  though  it  is  not  the  fame 
 
 *  Invenis  multos propterea  nolle  fieri  Chriftlanos, 
 
 quiaquafi  fufficiunt  fibi  de  bona  vita  Tua.  Bene  vivere  opus 
 elt,  ait.  Quid  mihi  praecepturus  eft  Chriftus  ?  Ut  bene 
 vivam  ?  Jam  bene  vivo.  Qu'*^  ^"^'^^^  nece/Tarius  eft  Chrif- 
 tus? Nullum  homicidium,  nullum  furtum,  nullam  rapinam 
 facio,  res  alienas  non  concupifco,  nullo  adulterio  contami- 
 nor.  Nam  inveniaiur  in  vita  mea  aliquid  quod  reprehen- 
 datur,  et  qui  rcprehenderit  facial  Chriftianum. 
 
 Aug^  in  Pjd<^  xxxi. 
 
 O  3  with 
 
igi  Of  the  Importance  Part  II* 
 
 with  the  former,  yet  borders  nearly  upon  it, 
 and  very  much,   at  length,  runs  up  into  it : 
 and  requires  to   be    particularly   confidered, 
 with  regard  to  the  perfons,  who  feem  to  be 
 getting  into  this  way.     The  confideration  of 
 it  will  likewife  farther  Ihew  the  extravagance 
 of  the  former  opinion,  and  the  truth  of  the 
 obfervations  in  anfwer  to  it,  juft  mention- 
 ed.    And  an  inquiry  into  the  Importance  of 
 Chriftianity,  cannot  be  an  irr:proper  intro- 
 dudion  to  a  treatife  concerning  the  Credi- 
 bility of  it. 
 
 Now   if  God  has    given  a  revelation  to 
 mankind,    and    commanded    thofe     things, 
 which  are  commanded  in  Chriftianity ;  it  is 
 evident,  at  firll  fight,  that  it  cannot  in  any 
 wife  be  an  indifferent  matter,    whether  we 
 obey  or  difobey  thofe  comm.ands :  unlefs  we 
 are  certainly  allured,  that  we  know  all  the 
 reafons  for  them,  and  that  all  thofe  reafons 
 are  now  ceaftd,  with  regard  to  mankind  in 
 general,  or  to  ourfelves  in  particular.     And 
 it  is  abfolutely  impoffible,  we  can  be  affured 
 of  this.     For  our  ignorance  of  thefe  reafons 
 proves  nothing  in  the  cafe :   fince  the  whole 
 analogy  of  nature  ihews,  what  is  indeed  in 
 itfelf  evident,    that   there    may    be    infinite 
 reafons  for  things,  with  which  we  are  not 
 acquainted. 
 
 But  the  importance  of  Chrlftianity  will 
 
 more 
 
chap.  I.  of  Chrijlmiity.  199 
 
 more  diftindlly  appear,  by  confidering  It  more 
 diftindHy :  Firjl^  as  a  republication,  and  ex- 
 ternal inilitution,  of  natural  or  eflential  reli- 
 .gion,  adapted  to  the  pre  fen  t  circumftances 
 of  mankind,  and  intended  to  promote  na- 
 tural piety  and  virtue  :  And  Secondly ^  as  con- 
 taining an  account  of  a  difpenfation  of  things, 
 not  difcoverable  by  reafon,  in  confequence 
 of  which,  feveral  diftindt  precepts  are  en- 
 joined us.  For  though  natural  religion  is 
 the  foundation  and  principal  part  of  Chrifti- 
 anity,  it  is  not  in  any  fenfe  the  whole  of  it. 
 
 I.  Chriftianity  is  a  republication  of  na- 
 tural religion.  It  inflruifts  mankind  in  the 
 moral  fyftem  of  the  world:  that  it  is  the 
 work  of  an  infinitely  perfed;  Being,  and  under 
 his  government;  that  virtue  is  his  law;  and 
 that  he  will  finally  judge  mankind  in  righ- 
 teoufnefs,  and  render  to  all  according  to 
 their  works,  in  a  future  ftate.  And,  which 
 is  very  material,  it  teaches  natural  religion,  in 
 its  genuine  fimplicity;  free  from  thofe  fuper- 
 ftitions,  with  which  it  was  totally  corrupted, 
 and  under  which  it  was  in  a  manner  loll. 
 
 Revelation  is  farther,  an  authoritative  pub- 
 iication  of  natural  religion,  and  fo  affords  the 
 evidence  of  teflimony  for  the  truth  of  it.  In^ 
 deed  the  miracles  and  prophecies  recorded  in 
 Scripture,  were  intended  to  prove  a  parti- 
 cular  difpenfation   of  Providence,   the   re- 
 
 O  4  demption 
 
200  Of  the  Importajice         Part  11. 
 
 demption  of  the  world  by  the  Meffiah  :  but 
 this  does  not  hmder,  but  that  they  may  ahb 
 prove  God's  general  providence  over  the 
 world,  as  our  moral  governor  and  judge. 
 And  they  evidently  do  prove  it ;  becaule  this 
 charafter  of  the  Author  of  Nature,  is  necef- 
 farily  connected  with  and  implied  in  that  par- 
 ticular revealed  difpenfation  of  things  :  it  is 
 likewife  continually  taught  exprefsly,  and  in- 
 fifted  upon,  by  thofe  perfons,  who  wrought 
 the  miracles  and  delivered  the  prophecies.  So 
 that  indeed  natural  religion  feems  as  much 
 proved  by  the  Scripture  revelation,  as  it  would 
 have  been,  had  the  defign  of  revelation  been 
 nothing  elfe  than  to  prove  it. 
 
 But  it  may  poilibly  be  difputed,  how  far 
 mu'acles  can  prove  natural  religion ;  and  no- 
 table objedions  may  be  urged  againft  this 
 proof  of  it,  confidercd  as  a  matter  of  fpecu- 
 lation :  but  coniidered  as  a  pradical  thing, 
 there  can  be  none.  For  fuppofe  a  perfon  to 
 teach  natural  religion  to  a  nation,  who  had 
 lived  in  total  ignorance  or  forgetfulnefs  of  it; 
 and  to  declare  he  was  ccmmiffioned  by  God 
 fo  to  do  :  fuppofe  him,  in  proof  of  his  com- 
 mifilon,  to  foretel  things  future,  which  no 
 human  forefight  could  have  gueffed  at;  to 
 divide  the  fea  with  a  word ;  feed  great  mul- 
 titudes with  bread  from  heaven ;  cure  all 
 manner  of  difeafes  ;  and  raife  the  dead,  even 
 himfelf,  to  life :  w^ould  not  this  give  addi- 
 tional 
 
Chap.  I.  cf  Chriflianity*  ao  I 
 
 tional  credibility  to  his  teaching,  a  credibi- 
 lity beyond  what  that  of  a  common  man 
 would  have  ;  and  be  an  authoritative  publica- 
 tion of  the  law  of  nature,  /.  e.  a  new  proof 
 of  it  ?  It  would  be  a  pratflical  one,  of  the 
 ftrongeft  kind,  perhaps,  which  human  crea- 
 tures are  capable  of  having  given  them.  The 
 Law  of  MofeG  then,  and  the  Gofpel  of  Chrift, 
 are  authoritative  publications  of  the  religion 
 of  nature :  they  afford  a  proof  of  God's  ge- 
 neral providence,  as  moral  governor  of  the 
 world ;  as  well  as  of  his  particular  difpenfa- 
 tions  of  providence  towards  finful  creatures, 
 revealed  in  the  Law  and  the  Gofpel.  As 
 they  are  the  only  evidence  of  the  latter; 
 fo  they  are  an  additional  evidence  of  the 
 former. 
 
 To  fhew  this  further,  let  us  fuppofe  a  man 
 of  the  greateft  and  moft  improved  capacity, 
 who  had  never  heard  of  revelation,  convinced 
 upon  the  whole,  notwithllanding  the  dif- 
 orders  of  the  world,  that  it  was  under  the 
 diredion  and  moral  government  of  an  infi- 
 nitely perfed:  Being ;  but  ready  to  queftion, 
 whether  he  v/ere  not  got  beyond  the  reach 
 of  his  faculties  :  fuppofe  him  brought,  by 
 this  fufpicion,  into  great  danger  of  being 
 carried  away  by  the  univerfal  bad  example  of 
 almoft  every  one  around  him,  who  appeared 
 to  have  no  fenfe,  no  pradlical  {ti\{^  at  ieaft,  of 
 thefe  things :  and  this,  perhaps,  would  be  as 
 
 advantageous 
 
202  Of  the  Importance  Part  II. 
 
 advantageous  a  fituation  with  regard  to  reli- 
 gion, as  nature  alone  ever  placed  any  man  in. 
 What  a  confirmation  now  muft  it  he  to  fuch 
 a  perlbn,  all  at  once,  to  find,  that  this  moral 
 fyftem  of  things  was  revealed  to  mankind,  in 
 the  name  of  that  infinite  Being,  whom  he  had 
 from  principles  of  reafon  believed  in  j  and 
 that  the  publiihers  of  the  revelation  proved 
 their  commiffion  from  him,  by  making  it 
 appear,  that  he  had  intrulled  them  with  a 
 power  of  fufpending  and  changing  the  gene- 
 ral laws  of  nature. 
 
 Nor  muft  it  by  any  means  be  omitted,  for 
 It  is  a  thing  of  the  utmoft  importance,  that 
 life  and  immortality  are  eminently  brought 
 to  light  by  the  Gofpel.  The  great  docftrines 
 of  a  future  ftate,  the  danger  of  a  courfe  of 
 wdckednefs,  and  the  efficacy  of  repentance, 
 are  not  only  confirmed  in  the  Gofpel,  but 
 are  taught,  efpecially  the  laft  is,  with  a  de- 
 gree of  light,  to  which  that  of  nature  is  but 
 darknefs. 
 
 Farther  :  As  Chriftianity  ferved  thefe  ends 
 and  purpofes,  when  it  v/as  firft  publiibed,  by 
 the  miraculous  publication  itfelf ;  fo  it  was 
 intended  to  ferve  the  fame  purpofes,  in  future 
 ages,  by  means  of  the  fettlement  of  a  vifi- 
 bie  church  :  of  a  fociety,  diftinguiflied  from 
 common  ones,  and  from  the  reft  of  the 
 world,  by  pecuhar  religious  inftitutions ;  by 
 
 an 
 
chap.  I.  of  Chrijiianlty .  203 
 
 an  inftituted  method  of  inftrudlion,  and  an 
 inftituted  form  of  external  religion.     Mira- 
 culous powers  were  given  to  the  firft  preach- 
 ers of  Chriftianity,  in   order   to  their  intro- 
 ducing it  into  the  world  :  a  vifible  church 
 was  eftabli(hed,   in  order  to  continue  it,  and 
 carry  it  on  fucceffively  throughout  all  ages. 
 Had  Mofes  and  the  Prophets,  Chrift  and  his 
 Apoftles,  only  taught,  and  by  miracles  prov- 
 ed, religion  to  their  cotemporaries ;  the  be- 
 nefits of  their  inftrudlions  would  have  reached 
 but  to  a  fmall  part  of  mankind.    Chriftianity 
 muft  have  been,  in  a  great  degree,  funk  and 
 forgot  in  a  very  few  ages.     To  prevent  this, 
 appears  to  have  been  one  reafon,  why  a  vifible 
 church  was   inftituted :    to  be,  like    a  city 
 upon  a  hill,  a  ftanding  memorial  to  the  world 
 of  the  duty  which  we  owe  our  Maker :  to 
 call  men  continually,  both  by  example   and 
 inftrudion,  to  attend  to  it,  and,  by  the  form 
 of  religion  ever  before    their  eyes,   remind 
 them  of  the  reality :  to  be  the  repofitory  of 
 the  oracles  of  God:  to  hold  up  the  light 
 of  revelation  in  ^id  to  that  of  nature,  and 
 propagate  it  throughout  all  generations  to  the 
 
 end  of  the  v/orld the  light  of  revelation, 
 
 confidered  here  in  no  other  view,  than  as 
 defiened  to  enforce  natural  relii^ion.  And 
 in  proportion  as  Chriftianity  is  profefled  and 
 taught  in  the  v/orld,  religion,  natural  or  eflen- 
 t:al  religion,  is  thus  diftindtly  and  advanta- 
 gcoufly  laid   before  mankind;  and    brought 
 
 agaia 
 
204  Of  the  Importance  Part  IT. 
 
 •again  and  again  to  their  thoughts,  as  a  mat- 
 ter of  infinite  importance.     A  vifible  church 
 has  alfo  a  farther  tendency  to  promote  na- 
 tural reh*;aon,  as  being  an  inftituted  method 
 of  education,    originally   intended    to    be  of 
 more  peculiar  advantage  to  thofe  who  would 
 conform  to  it.     For  one  end  of  the  inftitu- 
 tion  was,  that  by  admonition  and  reproof,  as 
 well  as  inftrudion ;  by  a  general  regular  dif- 
 cipline,  and  publick  exercifes  of  religion;  the 
 body  of  Chrijiy  as  the  Scripture  fpeaics,  Ihould 
 be  edified ^y  i.  e,  trained  up  in  piety  and  virtue-, 
 for  a  higher  and  better  ftate.     This  fettle- 
 ment  then  appearing  thus  beneficial ;  tending 
 in  the  nature  of  the  thing  to  anfwer,  and  in 
 fome  degree  acTtually  anfwering,  thofe  ends ; 
 it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  the  very  notion 
 of  it  implies  pofitive  inftitutions :  for  the  vifi- 
 bility  of  the  church  confifts  in  them.    Take 
 away  every  thing  of  this  kind,  and  you  lofe 
 the  very  notion  itfelf.     So  that  if  the  things 
 now  mentioned  are  advantages,  the  reafon  and 
 importance  of  pofitive  infliitutions  in  general, 
 is  moft  obvious ;  fince  without  them,  thefe 
 advantages  could  not  be  fecured  to  the  world. 
 And  it  is  mere  idle  wantonnefs,  to  infift  upon 
 knowing   the  reafon s,  why  fuch    particular 
 ones  were  fixed  upon,  rather  than  others. 
 
 The  benefit  arifing  from  this  fupernatural 
 afliftance,  which  Chriftianity  affords  to  na- 
 tural religion,  is  what  fome  perfons  are  very 
 
 :        §  flow 
 
Chap.  I.  of  Chrljllantty.  205 
 
 flow  in  apprehending.  And  yet  it  is  a  thing 
 diftind:  in  itfelf,  and  a  very  plain  obvious  one. 
 For  will  any  in  good  earnell  really  fay,  that 
 the  bulk  of  mankind  in  the  heathen  world, 
 ivere  in  as  advantageous  a  fit  lation  with  re- 
 gard to  natural  religion,  as  they  are  now 
 ^mongft  us  :  that  it  vvas  laid  bci^ore  them, 
 a*nd  enforced  upon  them,  in  a  manner  as 
 dillind,  and  as  much  tending  to  inducncc 
 their  pradice  ? 
 
 The  objedions  againft  all  this,  from  the 
 perv£rfi<jn  of  Chriftianity,  and  from  the  fup- 
 pofition  of  its  having  had  but  little  good  in- 
 fluence, however  innocently  they  may  be  pro- 
 pofed,  yet  cannot  be  infifted  upon  as  con- 
 clufn/e,  upon  any  principles,  bat  fuch  as  lead 
 to  downright  Atheifm :  becaufe  the  mani- 
 feftation  of  the  law  of  nature  by  reafon, 
 which,  upon  all  principles  of  Theifm,  muil 
 have  been  from  God,  has  been  perverted  and 
 rendered  inelfcdual  in  the  fame  manner.  It 
 rnay  indeed,  I  think,  truly  be  faid,  that  the 
 good  effects  of  Chriftianity  have  not  been 
 fraall  \  nor  its  fuppofed  ill  effeds,  any  effcds 
 '^i  all  of  it,  properly  fpeaking.  Perhaps  too^ 
 4he  things  themfelves  done,  have  been  ag> 
 gradated :  and  if  not,  Chriftianity  hath  been 
 often  only  a  pretence :  and  the  fame  evils  in 
 ^he  main  would. have  been  done,  upon  fdme 
 other  pretence.  However,  great  and  fhock-^ 
 ing  as  the  corruptions  and  abufes  of  it  have 
 
 really 
 
2o6  Of  the  Importance  Part  II. 
 
 really  been,  they  cannot  be  infilled  upon 
 as  arguments  againft  it,  upon  principles  of 
 Theifm.  For  one  cannot  proceed  one  ftep  in 
 reafoning  upon  natural  rehgion,  any  more 
 than  upon  Chriftianity,  without  laying  it 
 down  as  a  firft  principle,  that  the  difpenfa- 
 tions  of  Providence  are  not  to  be  judged  of, 
 by  their  perverfions,  but  by  their  genuinfe 
 tendencies  :  not  by  what  they  do  actually  feem 
 to  effed:,  but  by  what  they  would  erfed:  if 
 mankind  did  their  part;  that  part  which  is 
 juftly  put  and  left  upon  them.  It  is  altoge- 
 ther as  much  the  language  of  one,  as  of  the 
 other;  He  that  is  unjufi^  let  him  he  unjujijlill: 
 mid  he  that  is  holy,  let  him  be  holy Jiill^.  The 
 light  of  reafon  does  not,  any  more  than  that 
 of  revelation,  force  men  to  fubmit  to  its  au- 
 thority :  both  admonifh  them  of  what  they 
 ought  to  do  and  avoid,  together  with  the  con- 
 fequences  of  each;  and  after  this,  leave  them 
 at  full  liberty  to  adl  juft  as  they  pleafe,  till 
 the  appointed  time  of  judgment.  Every  mo- 
 ment's experience  fhews,  that  this  is  God's 
 general  rule  of  government. 
 
 To  return  then  :  Chriftianity  being  a  pro- 
 mulgation of  the  law  of  nature;  being  more- 
 over an  authoritative  promulgation  of  it;  with 
 new  light,  and  other  circumftances  of  pecu- 
 Jiar  advantage,  adapted  to  the  wants  of  man- 
 
 *  Rev.  xxii.  ii, 
 
 kind; 
 
chap.  I.  of  Chrijlianity,  207 
 
 kind ;  thefe  things  fully  fhew  its  importance. 
 And  it  is  to  be  oblerved  farther,  that  as  the 
 nature  of  the  cafe  requires,  fo  all  Chriftians 
 are  commanded  to  contribute,  by  their  pro- 
 feffion  of  Chriftianity,  to  preferve  it  in  the 
 world,  and  render  it  fuch  a  promulgation  andl 
 enforcement  of  religion.  For  it  is  the  very 
 fchcme  of  the  Golpel,  that  each  Chriftian 
 fliould,  in  his  degree,  contribute  towards  con- 
 tinuing and  carrying  it  on :  all  by  uniting  in 
 the  publick  profeihon  and  external  practice  of 
 Chriftianity ;  fome  by  inftruding,  by  having; 
 the  overfight  and  taking  care  of  this  religious 
 community,  the  church  of  God.  Now  this 
 farther  fhews  the  importance  of  Chriftianity  ; 
 and,  which  is  what  1  chiefly  intend,  its  im- 
 portance in  a  pracftical  fenfe  :  or  the  high 
 obligations  we  are  under,  to  take  it  into  our 
 moft  ferious  conllderation ;  and  the  danger 
 there  muft  neceffarily  be,  not  only  in  treating 
 it  defpitefuUy,  which  I  am  not  now  fpeaking 
 of,  but  in  difregarding  and  negledling  it.  For 
 this  is  negleding  to  do  what  is  exprefsly  en- 
 joined us,  for  continuing  thofe  benefits  to  the 
 world,  and  tranfmitting  them  down  to  future 
 times.  And  all  this  holds,  even  though  the  only 
 thing  to  be  confidered  in  Chriftianity,  v/ere 
 its  fubferviency  to  natural  religion.     But, 
 
 II.  Chriftianity  is  to  be  confidered  in  a 
 further  view :  as  containing  an  account  of  a 
 difpenfation  of  things,  not  at  all  difccverable 
 
 by 
 
2o8  Of  .the  Importance  Part  II. 
 
 by  reafon,  in  confequence  of  which  feveral 
 diftind;  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  Chriftianity 
 is  not  only  an  external  inftitution  of  natural 
 religion,  and  a  new  promulgation  of  God's 
 general  providence,  as  righteous  governor 
 and  judge  of  the  world  ;  but  it  contains  alfo 
 a  revelation  of  a  particular  difpenfation  of 
 providence,  carrying  on  by  his  Son  and  Spirit 
 for  the  recovery  and  falvation  of  mankind, 
 who  are  reprefented,  in  Scripture,  to  be  in  a 
 ftate  of  ruin.  And  in  confequence  of  this 
 revelation  being  made,  we  are  commanded  to 
 be  baptizedy  not  only  in  the  name  of  the  Father' ^ 
 but  alfo,  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghoji :  and 
 •other  obligations  of  duty,  unknown  before, 
 to  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghoft,  are  revealed. 
 Now  the  importance  of  thefe  duties  may  be 
 judged  of,  by  obferving  that  they  arife,  not 
 from  poiitive  command  .  merely ;  but  alfo 
 from  the  offices,  which  appear,  from  Scrip- 
 ture, to  belong  to  thofe  divine  perfons  in  the 
 Gofpel  difpenfation ;  or  from  the  relations, 
 which,  we  are  there  informed,  theyftand  in  to 
 us.  By  reafon  is  revealed  the  relation,  which 
 God  the  Father  ftands  in  to  us.  Hence  arifes 
 the  obligation  of  duty,  which  we  are  under  to 
 him.  In  Scripture  are  revealed  the  relations, 
 which  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  fland  in  to  us^^ 
 Hence  arife  the  obligations  of  duty,  which 
 V7t  are  under  to  them.  The  truth  of  the 
 cafe,  as  one  may  fpeak,  in  each  of  thefe  three 
 refped.?  being  admitted ;  that  God  is  the  go- 
 vernor 
 
Cfeap.  I.  of  Chrifttanity.  209 
 
 vernor  of  the  world,  upon  the  evidence  of 
 reafon ;  that  Chrift  is  the  mediator  between 
 God  and  man,  and  the  Holy  Ghoft  our  guide 
 and  fandifier,  upon  the  evidence  of  revelation  : 
 the  truth  of  the  cafe,  I  fay,  in  each  of  thefe 
 refpefts  being  admitted ;  it  is  no  more  a  quef- 
 tion,  why  it  ihould  be  commanded,  that  we 
 be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son  and  of 
 the  Holy  Ghoft,  than  that  we  be  baptized  in 
 the  name  of  the  Father.  This  matter  feems 
 to  require  to  be  more  fully  ftated  \ 
 
 Let  it  be  remembered  then,  that  religion 
 comes  under  the  twofold  confideration  of  in- 
 ternal and  external :  for  the  latter  is  aS  real  a 
 part  of  religion,  of  true  religion,  as  the  for- 
 mer. Now  when  religion  is  confidered  tin- 
 der the  firft  notion,  as  an  inward  principle, 
 to  be  exerted  in  fuch  and  fuch  inv^afd  adls  of 
 the  mind  and  heart ;  the  eiTence  of  natural 
 religion  may  be  faid  to  confift  in  religious  re- 
 gards to  God  the  Father  Almighty :  and  the 
 ciTence  of  revealed  religion,  as  diftinguifhed 
 from  natural,  to  confift  in  religious  regards  to 
 the  Son,  and  to  the  Holy  Ghoji.  And  the  obli- 
 gation we  are  underj  of  paying  thefe  religious 
 regards  to  each  of  thefe  divine  perfons  refpec- 
 tively,  arifes   from  the   refpedive  relations. 
 
 ^  See,  The  Nature,  Obligation,  and  EfHcacy,  of  the 
 Chriftian  Sacraments,  l^V.  and  C(?//;/'^r  of  revealed  Religion, 
 as  there  quoted* 
 
 P  which 
 
210  Of  the  Importance  Part  11. 
 
 which  they  each  ftand  in  to  us.  How  thefe 
 relations  are  made  known,  whether  by  reafon 
 or  revelation,  makes  no  alteration  in  the  cafe: 
 becaufe  the  duties  arife  out  of  the  relations 
 themfelves,  not  out  of  the  manner  in  which 
 we  are  informed  of  them.  The  Son  and  Spi- 
 rit have  each  his  proper  office,  in  that  great 
 difpenfation  of  providence,  the  redemption  of 
 the  world :  the  one  our  mediator,  the  other 
 our  fanftifier.  Docs  not  then  the  duty  of 
 religious  regards  to  both  thefe  divine  perfons, 
 as  immediately  arife,  to  the  view  of  reafon, 
 out  of  the  very  nature  of  thefe  offices  and  re- 
 lations^ as  the  inward  good- will  and  kind 
 intention,  which  we  owe  to  our  fellow-crea- 
 tures, arifes  out  of  the  common  relations  be- 
 tween us  and  them  ?  But  it  will  be  aiked, 
 *^  What  are  the  inward  religious  regards,  ap- 
 **  pearing  thus  cbvioufly  due  to  the  Son  and 
 *'  Holy  Spirit;  as  arifing,  not  merely  from 
 *^  command  in  Scripture,  but  from  the  very 
 **  nature  of  the  revealed  relations,  which  they 
 *'  ftand  in  to  us  ?''  I  anfwer,  the  religious  re- 
 gards of  reverence,  honour,  love,  truft,  grati- 
 tude, fear,  hope.  In  what  external  manner, 
 this  inward  worship  is  to  be  exprefled,  is  a 
 matter  of  pure  revealed  command ;  as  perhaps 
 the  external  manner,  in  which  God  the  Fa- 
 ther is  to  be  worflnpped,  maybe  more  fo, than 
 we  are  ready  to  think :  but  the  w  orfhip,  the 
 internal  w^orfliip  itfelf,  to  the  Son  and  Holy 
 Ghoft,  is  no  farther  matter  of  pure  revealed 
 §  command^ 
 
chap.  r.  of'  Chrijiiamty.  211 
 
 command,  than  as  the  relations  they  ftand  in 
 to  us,  are  matter  of  pure  revelation :  for  the 
 relations  being  known,  the  obligations  to 
 fuch  internal  worlhip  are  obligations  of  rej.- 
 fon,  arifing  out  of  thofe  relations  themfelveSo 
 In  Ihort,  the  hiftory  of  the  Gofpel  as  immedi- 
 ately fhews  us  the  reafon  of  thefe  obligations, 
 as  it  fliews  us  the  meaning  of  the  words.  Son 
 and  Holy  Ghoft. 
 
 If  this  account  of  the  Chriftian  religion  be 
 juft ;  thofe  perfons  who  can  fpeak  lightly  of 
 it,  as  of  little  confequence,  provided  natural 
 religion  be  kept  to,  plainly  forget,  that  Chrif- 
 tianity,  even  what  is  peculiarly  fo  called,  as 
 diftinguifhed  from  natural  religion,  has  yet 
 fomewhat  very  important,  even  of  a  moral 
 nature.     For  the  office  of  our  Lord  being 
 made  known,  and  the  relation  he  ftands  in  to 
 us,  the  obligation  of  religious  regards  to  him,  is 
 plainly  moral;  as  much  as  charity  to  mankind 
 is :  fmce  this  obligation  arifes,  before  external 
 command,  immediately  out  of  that  his  office 
 and  relation  itfelf.      Thofe  perfons  appear  to 
 forget,  that  revelation  is  to  be  confidered,  as 
 informing  us  of  fomewhat  new,  in  the  ftate 
 of  mankind,  and  in  the  government  of  the 
 world:  as  acquainting  us  with  fome  relations 
 we  ftand  in,  which  could  not  otherwife  have 
 been  known.    And  thefe  relations  being  real, 
 (though  before  revelation  we  could  be  under 
 no  obligations  from    them,   yet  upon   their 
 
 P  2  being 
 
ili  Of  the  Importance         Part  IL 
 
 being  revealed,)  there  is  no  reafon  to.  think. 
 But  that  negled:  of  behaving  fiiitably  to  them;, 
 will  be  attended  with  the  fame  kind  of  con- 
 sequences under  God's  government;  as  ne- 
 gledling  to  behave  fuitably  to  any  other  rela- 
 tions made  known  to  us  by  reafon.  And  ig- 
 norance, whether  unavoidable  or  voluntary,, 
 {o  far  as  we  can  pofTibly  f^e,  will,  juft  as 
 much,  and  jufl  as  little,  excufe  in  one  cafe  as. 
 in  the  other:  the  ignorance  being  fuppofcd 
 equally  unavoidable^  or  equally  voluntary,  in 
 both  cafes • 
 
 If  therefore  Chrift  be  indeed  the  mediator 
 between  God  and  man,  /.  e,  if  Chriflianity  be 
 true;  if  he  be  indeed  our  Lord,  our  Saviour, 
 and  our  God  ;  no  one  can  fay,  what  may  fol- 
 low, not  only  the  obftinate,  but  the  carelefs 
 difregard  to  him,  in  thofe  high  relations.  Nay 
 ijo  one  can  fay,  what  may  follow  fuch  difre- 
 gard,  even  in  the  way  af  natural  confequence  ^ 
 For,  as  the  natural  confequences  of  vice  in 
 ihis  life,  are  doubtlefs  to  be  confidered,  as  ju- 
 dicial puni(hments  inflided  by  God;  {o  like- 
 wife,  far  ought  we  know^  the  judicial  puniili- 
 ments  of  the  future  life  may  be,  in  a  like  way 
 or  a  like  fenfe,  the  natural  confequence  of 
 vice^ :  of  men's  violatin;!:  or  difre2:ardinQ:  the 
 relations,  which  God  has  placed  them  in 
 here,  and  made  known  to  them. 
 
 p.  42,  43.  ^  Ch.  V. 
 
 Again: 
 
chap.  I.  cf  Chrijlianity.  21 3 
 
 Again  :  If  mankind  are  corrupted  and  de- 
 praved in  their  moral  charadler,  and  fo  are 
 xiniit  for  that  il:ate,  which  Chrift  is  gone  to 
 prepare  for  his  difciples ;  and  if  the  affiftancc 
 of  God's  Spirit  be  neceffary  to  renew  their 
 nature,  in  the  degree  requifite  to  their  being 
 quaUfied  for  that  ftate ;  all  which  is  implied 
 in  the  expi efs,  though  figurative  declaration. 
 Except  a  man  he  borji  of  the  Spirit^  be  cannot 
 enter  into  the  kingdom  ofGod^:  fuppofing  this, 
 is  it  poffible  any  ferious  perfon  can  think  it  a 
 flight  matter,  whether  or  no  he  makes  ufe  of 
 the  means,  exprefsly  commanded  by  God,  for 
 obtaining  this  divine  affi fiance  ?  efpecially 
 fince  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  Thews,  that 
 we  are  not  to  expect  any  benefits  without 
 making  ufe  of  the  appoinred  means  for  ob- 
 taining or  enjoying  them.  Now  reafon  fhews 
 us  nothings  of  the  particular  immediate  means 
 of  obtaining,  either  temporal  or  fpiritual  be-^ 
 nefits.  This  therefore  v/e  muft  learn,  either 
 from  experience  or  revelation.  And  experi-r 
 cnce,  the  prefent  cafe  does  not  admit  of. 
 
 The  conclufion  from  all  this  evidently  is  i 
 that,  Chriilianity  being  fuppofed  either  true 
 or  credible,  it  is  unfpeakable  irreverence,  and 
 really  the  moft  prefiimptuous  i-a(hnefs,  to 
 treat  it  as  a  light  matter.  It  can  never  juflly 
 be  efteemed  of  little  confequence,  till  it  be 
 
 ^  John  iii.  5. 
 
 P  3  pofitlvely 
 
214  Of  the  liHporfance  f^art  II . 
 
 pofitively  fuppofed  falfe.  Nor  do  I  know  a 
 higher  and  more  important  obhgation  which 
 we  are  under,  than  that,  of  examining  mofl 
 ferioufly  into  the  evidence  of  it,  fuppofmg  its 
 credibihty ,  and  of  embracing  it,  upon  fup- 
 polition  of  its  truth. 
 
 The  two  following  deducflions  may  be  pro-- 
 per  to  be  added,  in  order  to  illuftrate  the 
 foregoing  obfervations,  and  to  prevent  their 
 being  miftaken. 
 
 Firjiy  Hence  we  may  clearly  fee,  where 
 Jies  the  diftind:ion  between  what  is  pofitive 
 and  what  is  moral  in  religion.  Moral  pre^ 
 cepts  are  precepts,  the  reafons  of  which  we 
 fee :  pofitive  precepts  are  precepts,  the  reafons 
 of  which  we  do  not  fee  ^.  Moral  duties  arife 
 out  of  the  nature  of  the  cafe  itfelf,  prior  to 
 external  command*  Poiitive  duties  do  not 
 arife  out  of  the  nature  of  the  cafe  3  but  from 
 external  command  :  nor  would  they  be  duties 
 at  all,  were  it  not  for  fuch  command,  received 
 from  him  whofe  creatures  and  fubjeds  we 
 
 2  This  is  the  cliftin£llon  between  moral  and  pofitive  pre- 
 cepts, confidered  refpedlively  as  fuch.  But  yet,  firtce  the 
 latter  have  fomevvhat  of  a  moral  nature,  v^^e  may  fee  the 
 reafon  of  them,  confidered  in  this  Vievi^.  Moral  and  pofi- 
 tive precepts  are,  in  fome  refpe61s  alike,  in  other  refpecfcs 
 different.  So  far  as  they  are  alike,  v/e  difcern  the  reafons 
 of  both  :  fo  far  as  they  are  different,  we  difcern  the  reafons 
 of  the  former,  but  not  of  the  latter.  See  p.  202,  &c.  and 
 p.  ii6. 
 
 ^  are. 
 
chap.  I.  of  Ch^ijJianity.  215 
 
 are.  But  the  manner  in  which  the  nature 
 of  the  cafe,  or  the  fadt  of  the  relation,  is  made 
 known,  this  doth  not  denominate  any  duty 
 either  pofitive  or  moral.  That  we  be  bap- 
 tized in  the  name  of  the  Father,  is  as  much 
 a  pofitive  duty,  as  that  we  be  baptized  in  the 
 name  of  the  Son  ;  becaufe  both  arife  equally 
 from  revealed  command :  though  the  rela- 
 tion which  we  ftand  in  to  God  the  Father, 
 is  made  known  to  us  by  reafon ;  the  relation 
 we-ftand  in  to  Chriift,  by  revelation  only.  On 
 the  other  hand,  the  difpenfation  of  the  Gofpel 
 admitted,  gratitude  as  immediately  becomes 
 due  to  Chrift,  from  his  being  the  voluntary 
 minifler  of  this  difpenfation  ;  as  it  is  due  to 
 God  the  Father,  from  his  being  the  fountain 
 of  all  good  :  though  the  firft  is  made  known 
 to  us,  by  revelation  only;  the  fecond,  by  rea- 
 fon. Hence  alfo  we  may  fee,  and,  for  dif- 
 tinftnefs  fake,  it  may  be  worth  mentioning^ 
 that  pofitive  inftitutions  come  under  a  two- 
 fold confideration.  They  are  either  inftitu- 
 tions founded  on  natural  religion,  as  baptifm 
 in  the  name  of  the  Father ;  though  this  has 
 alfo  ^  particular  reference  to  the  Gofpel  dif- 
 penfation, for  it  is  in  the  name  of  God,  as  the 
 Father  of  our  Lord  Jefus  Chrift  :  or  they 
 are  external  inftitutions  founded  on  revealed 
 religion  j  as  baptifm  in  the  name  of  the  Son, 
 and  of  the  Holy  Ghoft. 
 
 P  4  *  Seco7idlyy 
 
21 6  Of  the  Importance        Part  11. 
 
 Secondly y  From  the  diftindion  between 
 what  is  moral  and  what  is  politive  in  religion, 
 appears  the  ground  of  that  peculiar  prefe- 
 rence, which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  to  be 
 due  to  the  former. 
 
 The  reafon  of  pofitive  inftitutions  in  ge- 
 neral, is  very  obvious :  though  we  ihould  not 
 fee  the  reafon,  why  fuch  particular  ones  are 
 pitched  upon,  rather  than  others.  Whoever 
 therefore,  inftead  of  cavilling  at  words,  will 
 attend  to  the  thing  itfelf,  may  clearly  fee, 
 that  pofitive  inftitutions  in  general,  as  diftin- 
 guifhed  from  this  or  that  particular  one,  have 
 the  nature  of  moral  commands :  iince  the 
 reafons  of  them  appear.  Thus,  for  inftance, 
 the  external  wprfliip  of  God  is  a  moral  duty, 
 though  no  particular  mode  of  it  be  fo.  Care 
 then  is  to  be  taken,  when  a  comparifon  is 
 made  between  pofitive  and  moral  duties,  that 
 they  be  compared,  no  farther  than  as  they  are 
 different :  no  farther  than  as  the  former  are 
 politive,  or  arife  out  of  mere  external  com- 
 mand, the  reafons  of  which  we  are  not  ac- 
 quainted with  'y  and  as  the  latter  are  moral. 
 Of  arife  out  of  the  apparent  reafon  of  the 
 cafe,  without  fuch  external  command.  Unlefs 
 this  caution  be  obferved,  we  fhall  run  into 
 cndlefs  confufion. 
 
 Now  this   being  premifed,  fuppofe  two 
 "*         .    ^  ftanding 
 
Chap.  I.  of  Chrijiiantfy.  2ij 
 
 ftanding  precepts  enjoined  by  the  fame  au- 
 thority; that,  in  certain  conjunctures,  it  is 
 impoffible  to  obey  both;  that  the  former  is 
 moral,  /.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we  fee  the 
 reafons,  and  that  they  hold  in  the  particular 
 c;afe  before  us  ;  but  that  the  latter  is  pofitive, 
 i.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we  do  not  fee  the 
 reafons  :  it  is  indupu table  that  our  obliga- 
 tions are  to  obey  the  former ;  becaufe  there  is 
 an  apparent  reafon  for  this  preference,  and 
 none  againft  it.  Farther,  poiitive  inftitutions, 
 I  fappcfe  all  thole  which  Chriftianity  enjoins, 
 are  means  to  a  moral  end:  and  the  end  mull 
 be  acknowledged  more  excellent,  than  the 
 means.  Nor  is  obfervance  of  thefe  inftitu- 
 tions  any  religious  obedience  at  all,  or  of  any 
 value,  ctherwife  than  as  it  proceds  from  a 
 moral  principle.  This  feems  to  be  the  ftriCt, 
 logical  way  of  ftating  and  determining  this 
 matter  :  but  will,  perhaps,  be  fouild  lefs  ap- 
 plicable to  practice,  than  may  be  thought  at 
 firft  fight. 
 
 And  therefore,  in  a  more  pradical,  though 
 more  lax  way  ot  confideration,  and  taking 
 the  words,  moral  law  and  pofitive  inflitutions^ 
 in  the  popular  fenfe ;  I  add,  that  the  whole 
 moral  law  is  as  much  matter  of  revealed 
 command,  as  pofitive  inftitutions  are  :  for  the 
 Scripture  enjoins  every  moral  virtue.  In  this 
 refpedt  then  they  are  both  upon  a  level.  But 
 the  moral  law  is,  moreover,  written  upon  cur 
 
 hearts  j 
 
21 8  Of  the  Importance         Part  11. 
 
 hearts;  interwoven  into  our  very  nature. 
 And  this  is  a  plain  intimation  of  the  Author 
 of  it,  v/hich  is  to  be  preferred,  when  they  in- 
 terfere. 
 
 But  there  is  x^ot  altogether  fo  much  ne- 
 ceffity  for  the  determination  of  this  queftion, 
 as  fome  perfons  feem  to  think.     Nor  are  we 
 left  to  reafon  alone  to  determine  it.     For, 
 Firji^  Though   mankind  have,  in   all  ages, 
 been  greatly  prone  to  place  their  religion  in 
 peculiar  pofitive  rites,  by  way  of  equivalent 
 for  obedience  to  moral  precepts ;  yet,  with- 
 out making  any  comparifon  at  all  between 
 them,  and  confequently  without  determining 
 which  is  to  have  the  preference,  the  nature 
 of  the  thing  abundantly  fhews  all  notions  of 
 that  kind  to  be  utterly   fubverfive  of  true 
 religion  :  as  they  are,  moreover,   contrary  to 
 the  whole  general  tenor  of  Scripture ;  and 
 likewife  to  the  moft  exprefs  particular  de- 
 clarations of  it,  that  nothing  can  render  us 
 accepted  of  God,  without  moral  virtue.    Se- 
 condly ^  Upon  the  occafion  of  mentioning  to- 
 gether pofitive  and  moral  duties,  the  Scrip- 
 ture always  puts  the  ftrefs  of  religion  upon 
 the  latter,  and  never  upon  the  former:  which, 
 though  no  fort  of  allowance  to  negled:  the 
 former,  when  they  do  not  interfere  with  the 
 latter ;  yet  is  a  plain  intimation,  that  when 
 they  do,  the  latter  are  to  be  preferred.    And 
 farther,  as  mankind  are  for  placing  the  ftrefs 
 
 of 
 
Chap.  I.  of  Chrijiianity.  ±ig 
 
 of  their  religion  any  where,  rather  than  upon 
 virtue;  left  both  the  reafon  of  the  thing,  and 
 the  general  fpirit  of  Chriftianity,  appearing 
 in  the  intimation  now  mentioned,  fliould  be 
 inefFeclual  againft  this  prevalent  folly :  our 
 Lord  himfelf,  from  v/hofe  command  alone 
 the  obligation  of  pofitive  inftitutions  arifes^ 
 has  taken  occafion  to  maxke  the  comparifon 
 between  them  and  moral  precepts;  when 
 the  Pharifees  cenfured  him,  for  eating  with 
 publicans  and  Jinners  -,  and  alio  when  they 
 cenfured  his  difciples,  for  plucking  the  ears  of 
 corn  on  the  Sabbath-day.  Upon  this  compa- 
 rifon, he  has  determined  exprefsly,  and  in 
 form,  which  ihall  have  the  preference  when 
 they  interfere.  And  by  delivering  his  autho* 
 ritative  determination  in  a  proverbial  manner 
 of  expreffion,  he  has  made  it  general :  /  will 
 have  mercy ^  and  not  facrifice  *".  The  propriety 
 of  the  word  proverbial y  is  not  the  thing  in- 
 fifted  upon  :  though  I  think  the  manner  of 
 fpeaking  is  to  be  called  fo.  But  that  the 
 manner  of  fpeaking  very  remarkably  renders 
 the  determination  general,  is  farely  indifpu- 
 table.  For,  had  it,  in  the  latter  cafe,  been 
 faid  only,  that  God  preferred  mercy  to  the 
 rigid  obfervance  of  the  Sabbath  ;  even  then, 
 by  parity  of  reafon,  moft  juftly  might  we 
 have  argued,  that  he  preferred  mercy  like  wife, 
 to  the  obfervance  of  other  ritual  inftitutions; 
 
 ^  Matth.  ix.  130  and  xii.  7. 
 
 and 
 
220  Of  the  Importance  Part  IL 
 
 and  in  general,  moral  duties,  to  pofitive  ones. 
 And  thus  the  determination  would  have  been 
 general;  though  its  b 'ing  fo,  were  inferred 
 and  not  expreffed.  But  as  the  pallage  really 
 ftands  in  the  Gofpel,  it  is  much  itronger. 
 For  the  fenfe  and  the  very  literal  words  of 
 our  Lord's  i^nfwer,  are  as  applicable  to  any 
 other  infl-ance  of  a  comparifon,  between  po- 
 fitive and  moral  duties,  as  to  this  upon  which 
 they  were  fpoken.  And  if,  in  cafe  of  com- 
 petition, mercy  is  to  be  preferred  to  pofitive 
 inftitutions,  it  will  fcarce  be  thought,  that 
 juftice  is  to  give  place  to  them.  It  is  remark- 
 able too,  that,  as  the  words  are  a  quotation 
 "from  the  Old  Teftament,  they  are  introduced, 
 on  both  the  forementioned  occafions,  with  a 
 declaration,  that  the  Pharifees  did  not  under- 
 fland  the  meaning  of  them.  This,  I  fay, 
 is  very  remarkable.  For,  fmce  it  is  fcarce 
 poliible,  for  the  moft  ignorant  perfon,  not  to 
 underftand  the  literal  fenfe  of  the  paffage,  in 
 the  Prophet ' ;  and  iince  underftanding  the 
 literal  fenfe  would  not.  have  prevented  their 
 CGiidemning  the  guiltlejs^ \  it  can  hardly  be 
 doubted,  that  the  thing  which  our  Lord  really 
 intended  in  that  declaration,  was,  that  the 
 Pharifees  had  not  learnt  from  it,  as  they 
 might,  wherein  the  general  fpirit  of  religion 
 conlifts :  that  it  confifts  in  moral  piety  and 
 virtue,  as  diftinguiilied  from  forms,  and  ritual 
 
 »  Hof.  vi,  *  See  Matth.  xii.  7. 
 
 obfervanceSft 
 
Chap.  I.  Of  Chriftianity.  22  r 
 
 obfervances.  However,  it  is  certain  we  may 
 learn  this  from  his  divine  appUcation  of  the 
 p^iffage,  in  the  Gofpel. 
 
 But,  as  it  is  one  of  the  pecuhar  weaknefles 
 of  human  nature,  when,  upon  a  comparifoa 
 of  two  things,  one  is  found  to  be  of  greater 
 importance  than  the  other,  to  confidcr  this 
 other  as  of  fcarce  any  importance  at  all :  it 
 is  highly  neceflary  that  we  remind  ourfelves, 
 how  great  prefumption  it  is,  to  make  light  of 
 any  inftitutions  of  divine  appointment ;  that 
 our  obligations  to  obey  all  God's  commands 
 whatever,  are  abfolute  and  indifpen fable;  and 
 that  commands  merely  pofitive,  admitted  to 
 be  from  him,  lay  us  under  a  moral  obligation 
 to  obey  them :  an  obligation  moral  in  the 
 flrideft  and  moft  proper  fenfe. 
 
 To  thefe  things  I  cannot  forbear  adding, 
 that  the  account  now  given  of  Chriftianity, 
 moft  ftrongly  fliews  and  enforces  upon  us 
 the  obligation  of  fearching  the  Scriptures,  in 
 order  to  fee,  what  the  fcheme  of  revelation 
 really  is ;  inflead  of  determining  beforehand,, 
 from  reafon,  what  the  fcheme  of  it  muft 
 be  *.  Indeed  if  in  revelation  there  be  found 
 any  paffages,  the  feeming  meaning  of  which 
 is  contrary  to  natural  religion  ;  we  may  moft 
 certainly  conclude,  fuch  feeming  meaning  not 
 
 ^  Sec  Chap,  ill. 
 
 to 
 
222       Of  the  fuppofed  Prefumptlon    Part  IL 
 
 to  be  the  real  one.  But  it  is  not  any  degree 
 of  a  prefumption  againft  an  interpretation  of 
 Scripture,  that  fuch  interpretation  contains  a 
 doctrine,  which  the  light  of  nature  cannot 
 difcover"';  or  a  precept,  which  the  law  of 
 nature  does  not  oblige  to. 
 
 C  H  A  P.    II. 
 
 Of  the  fuppofed  Prefumption  againjl  a  Rcvela^ 
 tion,  confidered  as  miraculous. 
 
 HAVING  fhewn  the  importance  of 
 the  Chriftian  revelation,  and  the  obli- 
 gations which  we  are  under  ferioufly  to  attend 
 to  it,  upon  fuppofition  of  its  truth,  or  its  cre- 
 dibility :  the  next  thing  in  order,  is  to  con- 
 fider,  the  fuppofed  prcfuinptions  againft  re- 
 velation in  general ;  which  iliall  be  the  fub- 
 jeft  of  this  Chapter :  and  the  objeftions  a- 
 gainft  the  Chriftian  in  particular  \  which  fhall 
 be  the  fubjed;  of  fome  following  ones  \  For 
 it  feems  the  moft  natural  method,  to  remove 
 the  prejudices  againft  Chriftianityi  before  we 
 
 *  p.  224,  225.  3  Ch.  iii,  iv,  v,  vi. 
 
 proceed 
 
Chap.  II.         againj}  Miracles.  223 
 
 proceed  to  the  confidcration  of  the  pofitive 
 evidence  for  it,  and  the  objcdions  againft  that 
 evidence  ^ 
 
 It  is,  I  think,  commonly  fuppofed,  that 
 there  is  fome  pccuhar  prefumption,  from  the 
 analogy  of  nature,  againft  the  Chriflian  fcheme 
 of  things,  at  leaft  againft  miracles  :  fo  as  that 
 ftronger  evidence  is  neceflary  to  prove  the 
 truth  and  reality  of  them,  than  would  be  fuf- 
 ficient  to  convince  us  of  other  events,  or  mat- 
 ters of  fadl.  Indeed  the  confideration  of  this 
 fuppofed  prefumption,  cannot  but  be  thought 
 very  infignificant,  by  many  perfons.  Yet,  as 
 it  belongs  to  the  fubjedl  of  this  Treatife ;  fo 
 it  may  tend  to  open  the  mind,  and  remove 
 fome  prejudices  :  however  needlefs  the  confi- 
 deration  of  it  be,  upon  its  own  account. 
 
 I.  I  find  no  apppcarance  of  a  prefumption, 
 from  the  analogy  of  nature,  againft  the  ge- 
 neral fcheme  of  Chriftianity,  that  God  crea- 
 ted and  invifibly  governs  the  world  by  Jefus 
 Chrift;  and  by  him  alfo  will  hereafter  j  udge 
 it  in  righteoufnefs,  /.  e,  render  to  every  one 
 according  to  his  works :  and  that  good  men. 
 are  under  the  fecret  influence  of  his  Spirit. 
 Whether  thefe  things  are,  or  are  not,  to  .be 
 called  miraculous,  is,  perhaps,  only  a  quef- 
 jtion  about  words ;   or  however,  is  of  no  mo- 
 
 ^  Chap.  vii. 
 
 ment 
 
224       Of  the  fiippofed  Prefumptton     Part  II„ 
 
 ment  in  the  cafe.  If  the  analogy  of  nature 
 raifes  any  prefumption  again  ft  this  general 
 fcheme  of  Chriftianity,  it  muft  be,  either  be- 
 caufe  it  is  not  difcoverable  by  reafon  or  ex- 
 perience; or  elfe,  becaufe  it  is  unlike  that 
 courfe  of  nature,  which  is.  But  analogy 
 railes  no  prefumption  againft  the  truth  of  this 
 fcheme,  upon  either  of  thefe  accounts. 
 
 Firjiy  There  is  no  prefumption,  from  ana- 
 logy, againft  the  truth  of  it,  upon  account 
 of  its  not  being  difcoverable  by  reafon  or  ex- 
 perience. For  fuppofe  one  who  never  heard 
 of  revelation,  of  the  moft  improved  under- 
 ftanding,  and  acquainted  with  our  whole 
 fyftem  of  natural  philofophy  and  natural  re- 
 ligion :  fuch  an  one  could  not  but  be  fenfible, 
 that  it  was  but  a  very  fmall  part  cf  the  na- 
 tural and  moral  fyftem  of  the  univerfe,  which 
 he  was  acquainted  with.  He  could  not  but 
 be  fenfible,  that  there  muft  be  innumerable 
 things,  in  the  difpenlations  of  Providence 
 paft,  in  the  invifible  government  over  the 
 world  at  prefent  carrying  on,  and  in  what  is 
 to  come  j  of  which  he  was  wholly  ignorant  % 
 and  which  could  not  be  difcovered  without 
 revelation.  Whether  the  fcheme  of  nature 
 be,  in  the  ftrid;eft  fenfe,  injfinite  or  not ;  it  is 
 evidently  vaft,  even  beyond  all  poftible  ima- 
 gination.     And  doubtlefs  that   part    of  it. 
 
 *  p.  172* 
 
 which- 
 
 / 
 
chap.  II.  cgainfi  Miracles.  225 
 
 which  is  opened  to  our  view,  is  b'lt  as  a 
 point,  in  comparifon  of  the  whole  plan  of 
 Providence,  reaching  throughout  eternity  pa^ 
 and  future  -,  in  comparifon  of  what  is  even 
 now  going  on,  in  the  remote  parts  of  the 
 boundlefs  univerfe ;  nay  in  comparifon  of  the 
 whole  fcheme  of  this  world.  And  therefore, 
 that  things  lie  beyond  the  natural  reach  of 
 our  faculties,  is  no  fort  of  prefumption  again  ft 
 the  truth  and  reality  of  them  :  becaufe  it  is 
 certain,  there  are  innu;r.er^bie  thing>,  in  the 
 conftitution  and  government  of  the  univerfe, 
 which  are  thus  beyond  the  natural  reach  of 
 our  faculties.  Secondly^  Analogy  raifes  no 
 prefumption,  againft  any  of  the  things  con- 
 tained in  this  general  dodtrine  of  Scripture  now 
 mentioned,  upon  account  of  their  being  un- 
 like the  known  courfe  of  nature.  For  there 
 is  no  prefumption  at  all  from  analogy,  that 
 the  whole  courfe  of  things,  or  divine  govern- 
 ment, naturally  unknown  to  us,  and  e^very  thing 
 in  it,  is  like  to  any  thing  in  that  which  is 
 known ;  and  therefore  no  peculiar  prefump- 
 tion againft  any  thing  in  the  former,  upon 
 account  of  its  being  unlike  to  any  thing  in 
 the  latter.  And  in  the  conftitution  and  na- 
 tural government  of  the  world,  as  well  as  in 
 the  moral  government  of  it,  we  fee  things,  in 
 a  great  degree,  unlike  one  another:  and  there- 
 fore ought  not  to  wonder  at  fuch  unlikenefs 
 between  thinj^s  vifible  and  invifible.  How- 
 ever,  the  fcheme   of  Chriftianity  is  by  no 
 
 Q^  means . 
 
226         OfthefuppofedPrefumptton    PartIL 
 
 means  entirely  unlike  jhe  fcheme  of  nature  ; 
 as  will  appear  in  the  following  part  of  this 
 Treatife. 
 
 ♦,;The  notion  of  a  miracle,  confidered  as  a 
 proof  of  a  divine  miffion,  has  been  ftated 
 with  great  exadlnefs  by  divines ;  and  is,  I 
 think,  fuffiqently  underftood  by  every  one, 
 If^here  are^  alfo  invifible  miracles,  the  Incar- 
 nation of  Chrift,  for  inftance,  which,  being 
 fecret,  cannot  be  ailedged  as  a  proof  of  fuch 
 a  miffion,;  but  require  themfelves  to  be  proved^ 
 l|j5  vifible  miracles.  Revelation  itfeif  too  is 
 miraculous;  and  miracles  are  the  proof  of  it: 
 and  the  fuppofed  prefamption  agalnft  thefe,_ 
 Ihall  preijently  be  conlidered.  All  which  1 
 I^ave  been  obferving  here  is,  that,  whether  we 
 chufe  to  call  every  thing  in  the  difpenfations 
 of  Providence,  not  difcoverable  without  reve- 
 lation, nor  like.the  known  courfe  of  things,^ 
 miraculous ;  and  v/hether  the  general  Chiif- . 
 tian  difpenfation  now  mentioned,  is  to  be  cal- 
 led fo,  or  not;  the  foregoing  obfervations  feem 
 certainly  to  iliew,  that  there  is  no  prefump- 
 tjon.againfi;  it,/rom  the  analogy  of  nature. 
 
 j^II.  There. IS  no  prefumption,  from  analo- 
 gr^  agalnft  fome  operations,,  which,  we  ihould 
 now  call  miraculous;  particularly  none  againft 
 a.  revelation  at  the  beginning  pf  the  world : 
 nothing  of  fuch  pn^fuinption  againft  it,  as 
 i^  fuppofed  to  be  implied  or  exprefled  in  thc^ 
 
Chap.  11.  again/}  Miracles.  227 
 
 word,  miraculous.  For  a  miracle,  in  its  very- 
 notion,  is  relative  to  a  courfe  of  natuu ;  and 
 impli::S  fomevvhat  different  trom  it,  conlidered 
 as  being  fo«  Now,  either  there  was  no  courfe 
 of  nature  at  the  time  w^hich  wc  are  fpeaking 
 of:  or  if  there  were,  we  are  noc  acquiiinted, 
 what  the  courfe  of  nature  is,  upon  the  fir  ft 
 peopling  of  worlds.  And  therefore  the  quef- 
 tion,  whether  mankind  had  a  revelation  made 
 to  them  at  that  time,  is  to  be  confidered,  not 
 as  a  qurftion  concerning  a  miracle;  b  it  as  a 
 common  qucftion  of  fad:.  And  we  have  the 
 like  reafon,  be  it  more  or  lefs,  to  admit  the 
 report  of  tradition,  concerning  this  qucftion, 
 and  coiicerning  common  matters  of  fadt  of 
 the  fame  antiquity;  for  inftance,  what  part 
 of  the  earth  was  hrft  peopled. 
 
 Or  thus:  When  mankind  was  firft  placed 
 In  this  ftate,  there  was  a  power  exerted, 
 totally  different  from  the  prefent  courfe  of 
 nature.  Now,'  whether  this  power,  thus 
 wholly  different  fro.n  the  prefent  courfe  of 
 nature,  for  we  cannot  properly  apply  to  it  the 
 word  miraculous-,  whether  this  power  Hop- 
 ped immediately  after  it  had  made  man,  or 
 went  on,  arid  exerted  itfelf  iartner  in  giving 
 him  a  revelation,  is  a  queftion  of  the  fame 
 kind,  as  whether  an  ordinary  power  exerted 
 itfelf  in  fuch  a  particular  degree  and  manner, 
 cr  not. 
 
 Or  fuppofe  the  power  exerted  in  the  for- 
 0^2  matioa 
 
223       Of  thefuppofed  Treftmpthn     Part  I L 
 
 matlon  of  the  world,  be  confidered  as  mira- 
 culous, or  rather,  be  called  by  that  name; 
 the  cafe  will  not  be  different :  fince  it  muft  be 
 acknowledged,  that  fuch  a  power  was  exert- 
 ed. For  luppofing  it  acknowledged,  that 
 our  Saviour  fpent  fome  years  in  a  courfe  of 
 working  miracles :  there  is  no  more  prefump- 
 tion^  worth  mentioning,  againft  his  having 
 exerted  this  miraculous  power,  in  a  certain 
 degree  greater,  than  in  a  certain  degree  lefs ; 
 in  one  or  two  more  inftances,  than  in  one 
 or  two  fewer;  in  this,  than  in  another 
 manner. 
 
 It  is  evident  then,  that  there  can  be  no 
 peculiar  prefumption,  from  the  analogy  of 
 nature,  againft  fuppofing  a  revelation,  when 
 man  was  firft  placed  upon  the  earth. 
 
 Add,  that  there  does  not  appear  the  leaft 
 intimation  in  hiftory  or  tradition,  that  re- 
 ligion was  firft  reafoned  out :  but  the  whole 
 of  hiftory  and  tradition  makes  for  the  other 
 fide,  that  it  came  into  the  world  by  reve- 
 lation. Indeed  the  ftate  of  religion  in  the 
 firft  ages,  of  which  we  have  any  account, 
 feems  to  fuppofe  and  imply,  that  this  was  the 
 original  of  it  amongft  mankind.  And  thefe 
 reflections  together,  without  taking  in  the 
 peculiar  authority  of  Scripture,  amount  to 
 real  and  a  very  material  degree  of  evidence, 
 that  there  was  a  revelation  at  the  beginning 
 of  the  world.  Now  this,  as  it  is  a  con- 
 8  firmation 
 
chap.  II.  ^g^^^ft  Miracles.  229 
 
 firmation  of  natural  religion,  and  therefore 
 mentioned  in  the  former  part  of  this  Trea- 
 tife  '^ ;  io  hkewife  it  has  a  tendency  to  re- 
 move any  prejudices  againft  a  fubf.quent  re- 
 velation. 
 
 III.  But  flill  it  may  be  objefted,  that  there 
 is  fome  peculiar  prefumption,  from  analogy, 
 againft  miracle§  ;  particularly  againft  revela- 
 tion, after  the  fettlement  and  during  the  con- 
 tinuance of  a  courfe  of  nature. 
 
 Now  with  regard  to  this  fuppofed  pre- 
 fumption,  it  is  to  be  obferved  in  general; 
 that  before  we  can  have  ground  for  raifing 
 what  can,  with  any  propriety,  be  called  an 
 argument  from  analogy,  for  or  againft  revela- 
 tion coniidered  as  fomewhat  miracuJous,  we 
 muft  be  acquainted  with  a  fimilar  or  parallel 
 cafe.     But  the  hiftory  of  fome  other  world, 
 feeminglyin  like  circumftances  with  our  own, 
 is  no  more  than  a  parallel  cafe :  and  therefore 
 nothing  (hort  of  this,  can  be  fo.     Yet,  could 
 we  come  at  a  prefumptive  proof,  for  or  againft 
 a  revelation,  from  being  informed,  whether 
 fuch  world  had  one,  or  not;  fuch  a  proof, 
 being  drawn  from  one  fingle  Inftance  only, 
 muft   be   infinitely  precarious.     More   par- 
 ticularly :    Firjl  of   all ;    There    is    a    very 
 ftrong  prefumption  againft  common  fpecu- 
 
 **  p.   161,  &c. 
 
 0^3  latlvc 
 
230        Of  thefuppofed  Prefumption    Part  II. 
 
 lative  truths,  and  againft  the  moft  ordinary 
 fads,  before  the  proof  of  them ;    which  yet 
 is  overcome  by  almoft  an)  proof.     There  is 
 a  prefumption  of  millions  to  one,  againft  the 
 ftory  of  Ciefar,  or  of  any  other  man.     For 
 fuppofe  a  number  of  common  fad:s  fo  and  fo 
 circuniftancL:d,  cf  which  one  had  no  kind  of 
 proof,   fliould  happen    to    come   into  one's 
 thoughts;    evviy    one    would,    without  any 
 pofiibie  do  ibt,  conclude  them  to    be  falfe. 
 Ki\\  the  like  may  be  faid  of  a  fingle  common 
 fad:.     And  from  hence  it  appears,  that  the 
 queftion  of  importance,  as  to  the  matter  be- 
 fore us,  is,  concerning  the  degree  of  the  pe- 
 culiar prefumption fuppofed  againft  miracles; 
 not  whether  there  be  any  peculiar  prefump- 
 tion at  all  againft  them.     For,  if  there  be 
 the  prefumption  of  millions  to  one,  againft 
 the  moft  common  fads ;  what  can  a  fmall 
 prefumption,  additional  to  this,  amount  to, 
 though  it  be  peculiar?  It  cannot  be  eftimated, 
 and  is  as  nothing.     The  only  material  quef- 
 tion is,  whether  there  be  any  fuch,  prefum.p- 
 tion   againft  miracles,  as  to  render  them  in 
 any  fort  incredible.     Secondly^    If  we  leave 
 out  tl:c  confideration  of  religion,  we  are  in 
 fuch  total  darknefs,  upon  what  caufes,  occa- 
 fions,  reafons,  or  circumftances,  the  prefent 
 courfe  of  nature  depends ;  that  there  does  not 
 appear  any  improbability  for  or  againft  fup- 
 pofing,  that  five  or  fix  thoufand  years  may 
 have  given  fcope  for  caufes,  occafions,  rea- 
 fons. 
 
chap.' II.  againjl  Miracles.  231 
 
 fons,  or  circiim fiances,  from  whence  mira- 
 culous interpofitions  may  have  arifen.  And 
 from  this,  joined  with  the  foregoing  obfer- 
 vation,  it  will  follow,  that  there  muft  be  a 
 prefumption,  beyond  all  comparifon,  greater, 
 againft  the  particular  common  faCls  juft  now 
 inftanced  in,  than  againft  miracles  in  general)^ 
 before  any  evidence  of  either.  But,  "Thirdly^ 
 Take  in  the  confideration  of  religion,  or  the 
 moral  fyftem  of  the  world,  and  then  we  fee 
 diftind:  particular  reafons  for  miracles :  to 
 afford  mankind  inftrudion  additional  to  that 
 of  nature,  and  to  atteft  the  truth  of  it. '  And 
 this  gives  a  real  credibility  to  the  fuppofition, 
 that  it  might  be  part  of  the  original  plan  of 
 things,  that  there  iliou Id  be  miraculous  in- 
 terpofitions. Then,  Lajlly^  Miracles  muft 
 not  be  compared  to  common  natural  events; 
 or  to  events  which,  though  uncommon,  are 
 fimilar  to  what  we  daily  experience :  but  to 
 the  extraordinary  phenomena  of  nature.  And 
 then  the  comparifon  will  be  between,  the 
 prefumption  againft  miracles ;  and  the  pre- 
 fumption againft  fuch  uncommon  appear- 
 ances, fuppofe,  as  comets,  and  againft  there 
 being  any  fuch  powers  in  nature  as  magnet- 
 ifm  and  electricity,  fo  contrary  to  the  pro- 
 perties of  other  bodies  not  endued  with  thefe 
 powers.  And  before  any  one  can  determine, 
 whether  there  be  any  peculiar  prefumption 
 againft  miracles,  more  than  againft  other  ex- 
 traordinary things  ',  he  muft  confider,  what, 
 
 0^4  upon 
 
232  OfthefuppofedPrefumption^  &c.  Partial. 
 
 upon  firft  hearing,  would  be  the  prefumption 
 againft  t  <i  laft- mentioned  appearances  and 
 pc  veis,  to  a  perfon  acquainted  only  with  the 
 daily,  monthly,  and  annual,  courfs  of  nature 
 reipedling  this  earth,  and  with  thofj  com- 
 mon powers  of  matter  which  we  every  day 
 fee. 
 
 Upon  all  this  I  conclude ;  that  there  cer- 
 tainly is  no  iach  prefumption  againft  miracles, 
 as  to  render  them  in  ary  wife  incredible: 
 that  on  the  contrary,  our  b^ing  able  to  dif- 
 cern  reafons  for  them,  gives  a  pofitive  credi- 
 bility to  the  hiftory  of  them,  in  cafes  where 
 thofe  reafons  hold :  and  that  it  is  by  no  means 
 certain,  that  there  is  any  particular  prefump- 
 tion at  all,  from  analogy,  even  in  the  loweft 
 degree,  againft  miracles,  as  diftinguiflied  from 
 other  extraordinary  phenomena :  though  it  is 
 not  worth  while  to  perplex  the  Reader  with 
 inquiries  into  the  abftradl  nature  of  evidence, 
 in  order  to  determine  a  queftion,  wnich, 
 without  fuch  inquiries,  we  fee  *  is  of  no  im* 
 portance. 
 
 "  p.  230. 
 
 C  H  A  K 
 
C  233  ) 
 
 CHAP.    III. 
 
 Of  our  Incapacity  ofjudgingy  what  ^ere  to  ht 
 expcdleu  in  a  Acvelation  ;  and  the  Credit 
 btl'tty^  from  A  alogyy  that  it  muji  contain 
 Things  appearing  liable  to  ObjeStions^ 
 
 PI  E SIDES  the  objeaions  againft  the 
 \  evidence  for  Chriftianity,  many  are  al- 
 ledged  againft  the  fcheme  of  it;  ae  inft  the 
 whole  manner  in  which  it  is  put  and  left 
 With  the  world;  as  well  as  againft  i^sftx^ 
 particular  relatiohs  in  Scripture:  obie  lions 
 dfawn,  from  the  deficiencies  of  revelation; 
 from  things;  in  it  appearing  to  men  foolijl:- 
 nefs"" ;  from  i^s  ontaining  matters  of  offence^ 
 which  have  led,  and  it  muft  have  been  fore- 
 feen  would  lead,  into  ftrange  enthufiafm  and 
 fuperftition,  and  be  made  to  ferve  the  pur- 
 pofes  of  tyranny  and  wickednels;  from  its 
 not  being  univerfal ;  and,  which  is  a  thing  of 
 the  fame  kind,  from  its  evidence  not  being 
 fo  convincing  and  fatisfadtory  as  it  might  have 
 been :  for  this  laft  is  fometimes  turned  into 
 a  pofitive  argument  againft  its  truth  \  It 
 would  be  tedious,  indeed  impofiible,  to  enu- 
 merate tl>e  feveral  particulars  comprehended 
 
 »  I  Cor.  i.  28.  *  See  Ch.  vi. 
 
 under 
 
234       ^^^  CredibUhy  of  Revelation    Part  II. 
 
 under  the  objed:ions  here  referred  to ;  they 
 being  fo  various,  according  to  the  different 
 fancies  of  men.  There  are  perfons,  who 
 think  it  a  ftrong  objedion  againft  the  autho- 
 rity of  Scripture,  that  it  is  not  compofed  by 
 rules  of  art,  agreed  upon  by  criticks,  for  po- 
 lite and  corred:  writing.  And  the  fcorn  is 
 inexpreffible,  with  which  fome  of  the  pro- 
 phetick  parts  of  Scripture  are  treated  :  partly 
 through  the  rafhnefs  of  interpreters  -,  but  very 
 'rnuch  alfo,  on  account  of  the  hieroglyphical 
 and  figurative  language,  in  which  they  are 
 left  us.  Some  of  the  principal  things  of  this 
 fort  (liall  be  particularly  confidered  in  the  fol- 
 lowing Chapters,  But  my  defign  at  prcfent> 
 is  to  obferve  in  general,  with  refped:  to  this 
 whole  way  of  arguing,  that,  upon  fuppofition 
 of  a  revelation,  it  is  highly  credible  before- 
 hand, we  fhould  be  incompetent  judges  of  it, 
 to  a  great  degree :  and  that  it  VN^ould  contain 
 many  things  appearing  to  us  liable  to  great 
 objedtions;  in  cafe  we  judge  of  it  othervvifej 
 than  by  the  analogy  of  nature.  And  there- 
 fore, though  objedions  againft  the  evidence 
 of  Chriflianity  are  moll  ferioufly  to  be  con- 
 fidered; yet  objedions  againft  Chriflianity 
 itfelf  are,  in  a  great  meafure,  frivolous :  almoll 
 all  objedions  againft  it,  excepting  thofe  which 
 are  alledged  againft  the  particular  proofs  of 
 its  coming  from  God .  I  exprefs  myfelf  with 
 caution,  left  I  ihould  be  miftaken  to  vilify  rea- 
 fouj   which   is  indeed  the  only  faculty  we 
 
 have 
 
chap.  III.       liable  to  ObjeBions.  235 
 
 have  wherewith  to  judge  concerning  any 
 thing,  even  revelation  itfeif :  or  be  mifunder- 
 flood  to  alTert,  that  a  fuppofcd  revelation  can- 
 not be  proved  falfe,  from  internal  characters. 
 For,  it  may  contain  clear  immoralitiesbr  con- 
 tradiflions :  and  either  of  thefc  would  prove 
 it  falfe.  Nor  will  I  taix  upon  me  to  affinn, 
 that  nothing  elle  can  poffibly  render  any  fup- 
 pofcd revelation  incredible.  Yet  ftill  the  ob- 
 fervation  above  is,  I  think,  true  beyond  doubt, 
 that  objections  againft  Chriftianity,  as  didin- 
 guiihed  from  objedlions  againft  its  evidence, 
 are  frivolous.  To  make  out  this,  is  the  ge- 
 neral delign  of  the  prefent  Chapter.  And 
 with  regard  to  the  whole  of  it,  I  cannot  but 
 particulcirly  wifli,  that  the  proofs  might  be 
 attended  to;  rather  than  the  aflertions  cavil- 
 Jed  at,  upon  account  of  any  unacceptable  con- 
 fequences,  whether  real  or  fuppofed,  which 
 may  be  drawn  from  them.  For,  after  all, 
 that  which  is  true,  muft  be  admitted,  though 
 it  ihould  fhew  us  the  ihortnefs  of  our  facul- 
 ties;  and  that  we  are  in  no  wife  judges  of 
 many  things,  of  which  we  are  apt  to  think 
 ourfelves  very  competent  ones.  Nor  will 
 this  be  any  objed:ion  with  reafonable  men, 
 at  leaft  upon  fecond  thought  it  will  not  be 
 any  objection  with  fuch,  againft:  the  juftnefs 
 of  the  following  obfervations. 
 
 As  God  governs  the  world,  and  inftrufts 
 his  creatures,  according   to  certain  laws  or 
 
 rules. 
 
2^6       Tie  Credibility  of  Revelation    PartJL 
 
 rules,  in  the  known  courfe  of  nature  ;  known 
 by  reafon  together  with  experience :  fo  the 
 Scripture  informs  us  of  a  fcheme  of  divine 
 Providence,  additional  to  this.   It  relates,  tlmt 
 God  Ifas,  by  revelation,  inftrudted  men   in 
 things   concerning  his  government,   which 
 they  could  not  otherwife  have  known :  and 
 reminded  them  of  things,  which  they  might 
 otherwife  know:  and  attefted  the  truth  of 
 the  whole  by  miracles.     Now  if  the  natural 
 and   the  revealed  difpenfation  of  things  arc 
 both  from  God,  if  they  coincide  with  each 
 other,  and  together  make  up  one  fcheme  of 
 Providence :  our  being  incompetent  judges  of 
 one*  muft  render  it  credible,  that  we  may  be 
 incompetent  judges  alfo  of  the  other*     Since, 
 upon  experience,  the  acknowledged  conftitu-* 
 tion  and  courfe  of  nature  is  found  to  be  great- 
 ly different   from  what,  before  experience, 
 would  have  been  expelled ;  and  fucn  as,  men 
 faticy,  there  He  great  objections  again  ft :  this 
 renders   it  beforehand  highly  credible,   that 
 they  may  find  the  revealed  difpenfation  like- 
 wife,  if  they  judge  of  it  as  they  do  of  the  con- 
 ftitution  of  nature,  very  different  from  expec- 
 tations formed  beforehand ;  and  liable,  in  ap- 
 pearance, to  great  objeftion  s :  objedlionsagainft 
 the  fcheme  itfelf^  and  againft  the  degrees  and 
 manners  of  the  miraculous  interpofitions,  by 
 which  it  was  attefled  and  carried  on.     Thus 
 fuppofe  a  prince    to  govern   his   dominions 
 in  the  wifeft  manner  pcffible,   by  common 
 
 known 
 
Chap.  111.        iifibk  to  ObjeSitom.  ^37 
 
 known  laws ;  and  that  upon  fome  exigencies 
 he  fhould  fufpend  thefe  laws ;  and  govern,  in 
 feveral  inflances,  in  a  different  manner:  if 
 one  of  his  fubjecflswere  not  a  competent  judg*i 
 beforehand,  by  what  common  rules  the  go- 
 vernment fliould  or  would  be  carried  on ;  it 
 could  not  be  expefted,  that  the  fame  perfon 
 would  be  a  competent  judge>  in  what  exigen* 
 cics,  or  in  what  manner,  or  to  what  degree^ 
 thofe  laws  commonly  obferved  would  be  fuf- 
 pended  or  deviated  from.     If  he  were  not  a 
 judge  of  the  wifdom  of  the  ordinary  adminif- 
 tration;  there  is  no  reafon  to  think,  he  would 
 be  a  judge  of  the  wifdom  of  the  extraordinary* 
 If  he  thought  he  had  objedlions  againft  the 
 former;   doubtlefs,  it   is  highly  fuppofabl^ 
 he  might  think  alfo,  that  he  had  objections 
 againft  the  latter*     And  thus,  as  we  fall  into 
 infinite  follies  and  miftakes,  whenever  we  pre- 
 tend, othcrwife  than  from  experience  and  ana- 
 logy, to  judge  of  the  conftitution  and  courfe 
 of  nature  ;  it  is  evidently  fuppofable  before- 
 hand, that  we  fhouid  fall  into  as  great,  in  pre- 
 tending to  judge,  in  tae  like  manner,  con-* 
 cerning  revelation.     Nor  is   there  any  more 
 ground  to  exped:  that  this  latter  fhould  ap- 
 pear to  us  clear  of  objections,  than  that  the 
 former  fhould. 
 
 Thefe  obfei  vat  Ions,  relating  to  the  whole 
 of  Chriftijnity,  are  applicable  to  infpiratioa 
 in  particular.   As  we  are  in  no  fort  judges  be- 
 forehand. 
 
238       ne  Credibility  of  Revelation    Part  I L 
 
 forehand,  by  what  laws  or  rules,  in  what  de- 
 gree, or  by  what  means,  it  were  to  have  been 
 expefted,  that  God  would  naturally  in(hu6t 
 us :  fo  upon  fuppofition  of  his  affording  us 
 light  and  inftru(!:lion  by  revelation,  additional 
 to  what  he  has  afforded  us  by  reafon  and  ex- 
 perience, we  are  in  no  fort  judges,  by  what 
 methods,  and  in  what  proportion,  it  were  to 
 be  expeded,  that  this  fupernatural  light  and 
 inftruftion  would  be  afforded  us.    We  know 
 not  beforehand,  what  degree  or  kind  of  natu- 
 ral information,  it  were  to  be  expedted  God 
 would  afford  men,  each  by  his  own  reafon  and 
 experience :  nor  how  far  he  would  enable,  and 
 effedually  difpofe  them  to  communicate  it, 
 whatever  it  fliould  be,  to  each  other  :  nor 
 whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be,  certain, 
 highly  probable,  or  doubtful :  nor  whether  it 
 would  be  given  with  equal  clearnefs  and  con- 
 viction to  all.     Nor  could  we  guefs,  upon 
 any  good  ground  I  mean,  whether  natural 
 knowledge,  or    even  the    faculty  itfelf,  by 
 which  we  are  capable  of  attaining  it,  reafon, 
 would  be  given  us  at  once,  or  gradually.     In 
 like  manner,  we  are  v/holly  ignorant,  what 
 degree  of  new  knowledge,  it  were  to  be  ex- 
 pefted,  God  would  give  mankind  by  revela- 
 tion, upon  fuppofition  of  his  affording  one: 
 or  how  far,  or  in  what  way,  he  would  inter- 
 pofe  miraculoufly,  to  qualify  them,  to  whom 
 he  fhould  originally  make  the  revelation,  for 
 communicating  the  knowledge  given  by  it; 
 
 and 
 
Chap.  11  r.   "    liable  to  ObjeBions.  239 
 
 and  to  fecure  their  doing  it  to  the  age  in 
 which  tiiey  ihouid  live ;  and  to  fecure  its  be- 
 ing tranimittcd  to  pofterity.  We  are  equally 
 ignorant,  whether  the  evidence  of  it  would 
 be,  certain,  or  highly  probable,  or  doubtful' : 
 or  whether  all  who  fhould  have  any  degree  of 
 inftrudlion  from  it,  and  any  degree  of  evidence 
 of  its  truth,  would  have  the  lame :  or  whe- 
 ther the  fchemc  would  be  revealed  at  once, 
 or  unfolded  gradually.  Nay  we  are  not  ia 
 any  fort  able  to  judge,  whether  it  were  to  have 
 been  expedled,  that  the  revelation  Ihould  have 
 been  committed  to  writings  or  left  to  be 
 handed  down,  and  confequently  corrupted,  by 
 verbal  tradition,  and  at  length  funk  under  it, 
 if  mankind  fo  pleafed,  and  during  fuch  time 
 as  they  are  permitted,  in  the  degree  they  evi- 
 dently are,  to  ad:  as  they  will.  ;•;- 
 
 But  it  may  be  faid,  "  that  a  revelation  ia 
 "  fome  of  theabovementionedcircumftanccsj 
 "  one,  for  inftance,  which  was  not  committed 
 "  to  writing,  and  thus  iecured  againft  danger 
 "  of  corruption,  would  not  have  anfv/ered  its 
 "  purpofe."  I  afk,  what  purpofe  ?  It  would 
 not  have  anfvvered  all  the  purpofes,  which  it 
 has  now  anfwered,  and  in  the  fame  degree : 
 l;)ut  it  would  have  anfwered  others,  or  the 
 fame  in  diifercnt  degrees.  And  which  of 
 thefe  were  the  purpoles  of  God,  and  heil:  fell 
 
 rv^  *  See  Ch.  vl. 
 
 .i.'.z  in 
 
240       The  Credibility  of  Revelation     Part  II. 
 
 in  with  his  general  government,  we  could 
 not  at  all  have  ddwrmined  beforehand. 
 
 Now  (ince  it  has  been  fliewn,  that  we  have 
 no  principltrs  of  reafon,  upon  which  to  judge 
 beforehand,  how  it  were  to  be  expedted  reve- 
 lation ihould  have  been  left,  or  what  was 
 moft  fuitable  to  the  divine  plan  of  govern- 
 ment, in  an3rof  the  forementioned  refpecSts ;  it 
 jnuft  be  quite  frivolous  to  objedl  afterwards 
 as  to  any  of  them,  againft  its  being  left  in  one 
 way,  rather  than  another :  for  this  would  be 
 to  objeft  againft  things,  upon  account  oi  their 
 being  diiFerent  from  expcd:ations,^'hich  have 
 been  ihewn  to  be  without  reafoa  And  thus 
 we  fee,  that  tne  only  qu:fti>  concerning  the 
 truth  of  Chriftianitv  i-  xther  it  be  a  real 
 revelation ;  not  whether  it  be  attended  with 
 every  circumftance  which  we  fhoiild  have 
 looked  for :  and  concerning  the  authority  of 
 Scripture,  whether  it  be  what  it  claims  to  be; 
 not  whether  it  be  a  book  of  fuch  fort,  and  fo 
 promulged,  as  weak  men  are  apt  to  fancy,  a 
 book  containing  a  divine  revelation  (hould. 
 And  therefore,  neither  obfcurity,  nor  feeming 
 inaccuracy  of  ftile,  nor  various  readings,  nor 
 early  difputes  about  the  authors  of  particular 
 parts  ',  nor  any  other  things  of  the  like  kind, 
 though  they  had  been  much  more  confidcra- 
 ble  in  degree  than  they  are,  could  overthrow 
 the  authority  of  the  Scripture :  unlefs  the 
 Prophets,  Apoftles,  or  our  Lord,  had  promi- 
 
 fed. 
 
Chap.  III.       liable  to  ObjcB'io7is.  241 
 
 fed,  that  the  book  containing  the  divine  re- 
 velation, (hould  be  lecure  from  thofe  things^ 
 Nor  in  leed  can  any  objections  overthrow  fiich 
 a  kind  v>*  revelation  as  the  Chriftian  claims 
 to  be,  lince  there  are  no  objections  againit 
 the  morality  of  it  ^y  but  fuch  as  can  Ihew^ 
 that  there  is  no  proof  of  miracles  wrought 
 originally  in  atteftation  of  it ;  no  appearance 
 of  any  thing  miraculous  in  its  obtaining  in 
 the  world;  nor  any  of  prophecy,  that  is,  of 
 events  foretold,  which  human  fagacity  could 
 not  forefee.  If  it  can  be  rtiewn,  that  the 
 proof  alledged  for  all  thefe,  is  abfolutely  none 
 at  all,  then  is  revelation  overturned.  But 
 were  it  allowed,  that  the  proof  of  any  one  or 
 all  of  them,  is  lower  than  is  allowed  -,  yet, 
 whiift  any  proof  of  them  remains,  revelatioa 
 will  ftand  upon  much  the  fame  foot  it  does 
 at  prefent,  as  to  all  the  purpofes  of  life  and 
 pradice,  and  ought  to  have  the  like  influence 
 upon  our  behaviour* 
 
 From  the  foregoing  obfervatlons  too,  it 
 will  follow,  and  thofe  who  will  thoroughly 
 examine  into  revelation,  will  find  it  worth 
 remarking  ;  that  there  are  feveral  ways  of 
 arguing,  which,  though  juft  with  regard  to 
 other  writings,  are  not  applicable  to  Scrip- 
 ture :  at  leaft  not  to  the  prophetick  parts  of  it^ 
 We  cannot  argue,  for  inftance,  that  this  can*' 
 
 ^  p.  251. 
 
 R  not 
 
242       "The  Credibility  of  Revelation     Part  IL 
 
 not  be  the  fenfe  or  intent  of  fuch  a  paffage 
 of  Scripture;  for  if  it  had,  it  would  have 
 been  expreft  more  plainly,  or  have  been  re- 
 prefented  under  a  more  apt  figure  or  hicro- 
 glyphick  :  yet  Vv^e  may  juflly  argue  thus,  with 
 refped:  to  common  books.  And  the  reafon 
 of  this  difference  is  very  evident;  that  in 
 Scripture,  we  are  not  competent  judges,  as  we 
 are  in  common  books,  how  plainly  it  were  to 
 have  been  expedted,  what  is  the  true  fenfe 
 lliould  have  been  expreft,  or  under  how  apt  an 
 image,  figured.  The  only  queftion  is,  what 
 appearance  there  is,  that  this  is  the  fenfe^ 
 and  fcarce  at  all,  how  much  more  determi- 
 nately  or  accurately  it  might  have  been  ex- 
 preft or  figured. 
 
 "  But  is  it  not  felf-evident,  that  internal 
 *'  improbabilities  of  all  kinds,  weaken  exter- 
 **  nal  probable  proof?''  Doubtlefs.  But  to 
 what  practical  purpofe  can  this  be  alledged 
 here,  when  it  has  been  proved  before  %  that 
 real  internal  improbabilities  which  rife  even 
 to  moral  certainty,  are  overcome  by  the  moft 
 ordinary  teftimony ;  and  when  it  now  has 
 been  made  appear,  that  w^e  fcarce  know  what 
 are  improbabilities,  as  to  the  matter  we  are 
 here  confidering:  as  it  will  farther  appear 
 from  what  follows. 
 
 *  p.  230. 
 
 For 
 
Chap.  III.        Uahle  to  ObjeSlions.  243 
 
 For  though  from  \\\t  obferv;Lticns  above 
 made,  it  is  manifeil:,  that  we  are  not  in  any 
 fort  competent  judges,  what  fupernatural  in- 
 ftrudion  were  to  have  been  .  \pedt.  a ;  and 
 though  it  is  felf-evident,  th.  t  th^  ohjccl-.tions 
 of  an  incompetent  judgment  p^ull  be  frivo- 
 lous :  yet  it  may  be  proper  to  ^o  one  Rep 
 farther,  and  obferve  :  that  if  men  will  be  re- 
 gardkfs  of  thefc  things,  and  pretend  to  judge 
 of  the   Scripture   by  preconceived  expecta- 
 tions 5   the  analogy  of  nature  ihews  before- 
 hand, not  only  that  it  is  highly  credible  they 
 may,  but  alio  probable  that  they  will,  ima- 
 gine they  have  ftrong  objedions  againft  it, 
 however  really  unexceptionable  :  for  fo,  prior 
 to  experience,  they  would  think   they  had, 
 againft  the  circumftances   and  degrees,  and 
 the  whole  manner  of  that  inftrudion,  which 
 is  afforded  by  the  ordinary  courfe  of  nature. 
 Were  the  inftrudion  which  God  affords  to 
 brute  creatures  by  inftiiids  and  mere  pro- 
 penfions,  and  to  mankind  by  th  fe  together 
 with  reafon,  matter  of  probable  prcof,  and 
 not  of  certain  obfervation  3  it  would  be  re- 
 jeded  as  incredible,  in  many  inftances  of  it, 
 only  upon  account  of  the  means  by  which 
 this  inftrudion  is  given,  the  feeming  diipro- 
 portions,    the    limitations,    necelTary   condi- 
 tions, and  circumftaivces  of  it.   For  inftance  : 
 Would  it  not  have  been  thought  highly  im- 
 probable, that  men  Ihould  have  been  fo  much 
 more  capable   of  difcovering,  even  to  cer- 
 
 R  2  tainty, 
 
244       ^'^^  Credibility  of  Revelation    Part  Il» 
 
 tainty,  the  general  laws  of  matter,  and  the 
 magnitudes,  paths,  and  revolutions  of  the 
 heavenly  bodies ;  than  the  occafions  and 
 cures  of  diftempers,  and  many  other  things, 
 in  which  human  life  feems  fo  much  more 
 nearly  concerned,  than  in  aftronomy  ?  How 
 capricious  and  irregular  a  way  of  information, 
 would  it  be  faid,  is  that  oi  invention,  by  means 
 of  which,  nature  inflru6ts  us  in  matters  of 
 fcience,  and  in  many  things,  upon  which 
 the  affairs  of  the  world  greatly  depend : 
 that  a  man  fhould,  by  this  faculty,  be  made 
 acquainted  with  a  thing  in  an  inftant,  when 
 perhaps  he  is  thinking  of  fomewhat  elfe, 
 which  he  has  in  vain  been  fearching  after,  it 
 miiy  be,  for  years.  So  like  wife  the  imper- 
 fections attending  the  only  method,  by  which 
 nature  enables  and  directs  us  to  communicate 
 our  thoughts  to  each  other,  are  innumerable. 
 Language  is,  in  its  very  nature,  inadequate, 
 ambiguous,  liable  to  infinite  abufe,  even  from 
 negligence ;  and  fo  liable  to  it  from  defign, 
 that  every  man  can  deceive  and  betray  by  it. 
 And,  to  mention  but  one  inftance  more;  that 
 brutes,  without  reafon,  fhould  ad:,  in  many 
 refpeds,  with  a  iagacity  and  forefight  vaflly 
 greater  than  what  men  have  in  thofe  refpefts, 
 would  be  thought  impoiTible.  Yet  it  is  cer- 
 tain they  do  aCt  with  fuch  fuperior  forefight : 
 whether  it  be  their  own  indeed,  is  another 
 queftion.  From  thefe  things,  it  is  highly 
 credible  beforehand,  that  upon  fuppofition 
 2  God 
 
chap.  III.       liable  to  Obje^ions.  245 
 
 God  fliould  afford  men  fome  additional  in- 
 ftrucftion  by  revelation,  it  would  be  with  cir- 
 cumftances,  in  manners,  degrees,  and  refpedts, 
 which  we  fliould  be  apt  to  fancy  we  had 
 great  objeftions  againft  the  credibility  of. 
 Nor  are  the  objecftions  againft  the  Scripture, 
 nor  againft  Chriftianity  in  general,  at  all  more 
 or  greater,  than  the  analogy  of  nature  would 
 
 beforehand not  perhaps  give  ground  to 
 
 exped:;  for  this  analogy  may  not  be  fufticient, 
 in  fome  cafe,  to  ground  an  expeftation  upon ; 
 but  no  more  nor  greater,  than  analogy  would 
 fhew  it,  beforehand,  to  be  fuppofable  and 
 credible,  that  there  might  feem  to  lie  againft 
 revelation. 
 
 By  applying  thefe  general  obfervations  to 
 a  particular  objedlion,  it  will  be  more  dif- 
 tindly  feen,  how  they  are  applicable  to  others 
 of  the  like  kind :  and  indeed  to  almoft  all 
 objections  againft  Chriftianity,  as  diftinguifh- 
 ed  from  objections  againft  its  evidence.  It 
 appears  from  Scripture,  that,  as  it  was  nqt 
 unufual  in  the  apoftolick  age,  for  perfons, 
 upon  their  converfion  to  Chriftianity,  to  be 
 endued  with  miraculous  gifts;  fo,  fome  of 
 thofe  perfons  exercifed  thefe  gifts  in  aftrange- 
 ly  irregular  and  diforderly  manner:  and  this 
 is  made  an  objection  againft  their  being  really 
 miraculous.  Now  the  foregoing  obfervations. 
 quite  remove  this  objeClion,  how  confiderable 
 foever  it  may  appear  at  firft  fight.   For  con.- 
 
 R  3  fidQf 
 
246       The  Credibility  of  Revelation    Part  II. 
 
 fider  a  perfon  endued  with  any  of  thefe  gifts ; 
 for  inftance,  that  of  tongues :  it  is  to  be  fup- 
 pofed,  that  he  had  the  fame  power  over  this 
 miraculous  gift,  as  he  would  have  had  over 
 it,  had  it  been  the  t^ffedl  of  habit,  of  ftudy 
 and  ufe,  as  it  ordinarily  is;  or  the  fame  power 
 over  it,  as  he  had  over  any  other  natural  en- 
 dowment. Confequently,  he  would  ufe  it  in 
 the  fame  manner  he  did  any  other  j  either 
 regularly  and  upon  proper  occafions  only,  or 
 irregularly  and  upon  improper  ones  :  accord- 
 ing to  his  kiiic  of  u  C'-^ncy,  and  his  charafter 
 of  prudcnc'%  Vv'^here  .hen  is  the  objedion  ? 
 Why,  if  'his  miraculous  power  was  indeed 
 giv«.  n  to  th:  world,  to  propagate  Chi iftianity 
 and  atteft  t  le  truth  of  it,  we  might,  it  feems, 
 h^  ve  exp.  died,  that  other  fort  of  p.rfonsfhould 
 huve  bwcn  chofen  to  be  in  veiled  with  it ;  or 
 that  thefe  Trould,  at  the  fane  time,  have  been 
 endued  with  pruaence ;  or  that  they  (Lould 
 hav^  been,  conanuall)/,  rcftrained  and  directed 
 in  the  txcrcife  of  ii :  /.  e.  that  God  fhould 
 huve  miraculoufly  interpofed,  if  at  all,  in  a 
 different  rr^anner  or  higher  degreee.  But  from 
 the  obfervations  priade  above,  it  is  undeni  bly 
 evident,  that  ve  are  not  judges,  in  what  de- 
 grees and  manners,  it  were  to  have  been  ex- 
 pected, he  (hould  miraculoufly  interpofe  ;  up- 
 on fnppofiticn  of  his  doing  it  in  fome  degree 
 and  manner.  Nor,  in  the  nature  1  courfe  of 
 Providence,  are  fuperior  gifts  of  memory, 
 eloquence,  knowledge,  and  other  talents  of 
 I  great 
 
Chap.  III.       liable  to  ObjeBions.  2j\rj 
 
 great  influence,  conferred  only  on  perfons  of 
 prudence  and  decency,  or  fuch  as  are  difpofcd 
 to  make  tiie  propereft  ufe  of  them.  Nor  is 
 the  infi;rud:ion  and  admonition  naturally  af- 
 forded us  for  the  condud;  of  life,  particularly 
 in  our  education,  commonly  given  in  a  man- 
 ner the  moft  fuited  to  recommend  it ;  but 
 often  with  circumftances  apt  to  prejudice  us 
 again  ft  fuch  inft  ruction. 
 
 One  m.ight  go  on  to  add,  that  there  is  a 
 great  refemblance  between  the  light  of  nature 
 and  of  revelation,  in  feveral  other  refped:s. 
 Practical  Chriftianity,  or  that  faith  and  beha- 
 viour which  renders  a  man  a  Chriftian,  is  a 
 plain  and  obvious  thing:  like  the  common 
 rules  of  condu(5t,  with  refpe<fl  to  our  ordinary 
 temporal  affairs.    The  more  diftind  and  par- 
 ticular knowledge  of  thofe  things,  the  ftudy 
 of  which  the  Apoftle  calls  going  on  unto  per- 
 feBion  \  and  of  the  prophetic  parts  of  reve- 
 lation, like  many  parts  of  natural  and  even 
 civil    knowledge,    may    require    very    exadt 
 thought,  and  careful  conlideration.  The  hin- 
 drances too,  of  natural,  and  of  fupernatural 
 light  and  knowledge,  have  been  of  the  fame 
 kind.  And  as,  it  is  owned,  the  whole  fcheme 
 of  Scripture  is  not  yet  underftood;  fo,  if  it 
 ever  comes  to  be  underftood,  before  the  rejii^ 
 tiition  of  all  things^  y  and  without  miraculous 
 
 ^  Heb.  VI,  I.  «  Adsiii.  21. 
 
 R  4  inter- 
 
248       T^l^e  Credibility  of  Revelation    Part  II, 
 
 interpofitions;  it  muft  be  in  the  fame  way  as 
 natural  knowledge  is  come  at :  by  the  conti- 
 nuance and  progrefs  of  learning  and  of  li- 
 berty ;  and  by  particular  perfons  attending  to, 
 comparing  and  purfuing,  intimations  fcattered 
 up  and  down  it,  which  are  overlooked  and 
 difregarded  by  the  generality  of  the  world. 
 For  this  is  the  way,  in  which  all  improve- 
 ments are  made;  by  thoughtful  men's  tracing 
 on  obfcure  hints,  as  it  were,  dropped  us  by 
 nature  accidentally,  or  which  feem  to  come 
 into  our  minds  by  chance.  Nor  is  it  at  all 
 incredible,  that  a  book,  which  has  been  fo 
 long  in  the  poffeffion  of  mankind,  fhould 
 contain  many  truths  as  yet  undifcovered. 
 For,  all  the  fame  phenomena,  and  the  fame 
 faculties  of  inveftigation,  from  which  fuch 
 great  difcoveries  in  natural  knowledge  have 
 been  made  in  the  prefent  and  laft  age,  were 
 equally  in  the  pofTefiion  of  mankind,  feveral 
 thoufand  years  before.  And  poffibly  it  might 
 be  intended,  that  events,  as  they  come  to 
 pafs,  fhould  open  and  afcertain  the  meaning 
 of  feveral  parts  of  Scripture. 
 
 It  may  be  objefted,  that  this  analogy  fails 
 in  a  material  refpeft :  for  that  natural  know- 
 ledge is  of  little  or  no  confequence.  But  I 
 have  been  fpeaking  of  the  general  inftrudtion, 
 which  nature  does  or  does  not  afford  us.  And 
 befides,  fome  parts  of  natural  knowledge,  in 
 the  more  common  rellrained   itnk   of  the 
 
 words^i 
 
Chap.  III.       Uahle  to  ObjeBions.  249 
 
 words,  are  of  the  greateil:  confequence  to 
 the  eafe  and  convenience  of  hfe.  But  fup-. 
 pofe  the  analogy  did,  as  it  does  not,  fail  in 
 this  refpc(fl  -,  yet  it  might  be  abundantly  fup- 
 plied,  from  the  whole  conftitution  and  courfe 
 of  nature :  which  fliews,  that  God  does  not 
 difpenfe  his  gifts,  according  to  our  notions 
 of  the  advantage  and  confequence  they  would 
 be  of  to  us.  And  this  in  general,  with  his 
 method  of  difpenfing  knowledge  in  particu- 
 lar, would  together  make  out  an  analogy  full 
 to  the  point  before  us. 
 
 But  it  may  be  objedled  ftill  farther  and 
 more  generally;  "The  Scripture  reprefents 
 ^^  the  world  as  in  a  ftate  of  ruin,  and  Chrif- 
 **  tianity  as  an  expedient  to  recover  it,  to 
 "  help  in  thefe  refpeds  where  nature  fails : 
 !**  in  particular,  to  fupply  the  deficiencies  of 
 ^^  natural  light.  Is  it  credible  then,  that  fo 
 "  many  ages  fhould  have  been  let  pafs,  be- 
 ^*  fore  a  matter  of  fuch  a  fort,  of  fo  great  and 
 '*  fo  general  importance,  was  made  known  to 
 ^*  mankind ;  and  then  that  it  fhould  be  made 
 ^'  known  to  fo  fmall  a  part  of  them  ?  Is  it 
 **  conceivable,  that  this  fupply  fhould  be 
 "  io  very  deficient,  fhould  have  the  like 
 ^*  obfcurity  and  doubtfulnefs,  be  liable  to 
 ^^  the  like  perverfions,  in  Ihort,  lie  open  to 
 ■**  all  the  like  cbjed:ions,  as  the  light  of  na- 
 ^'  ture  itfelfV?''  Without  determining  how 
 
 *  Ch.  vi. 
 
 far 
 
250       The  Credibility  of  Revelation    Part  II. 
 
 far  this  in  fadt  is  fo,  I  anfwer ;  it  is  by  no 
 means  incredible,  that  it  might  be  fo,  if  the 
 light  of  nature  and  of  revelation  be  from  the 
 fame  hand.    Men  are  naturally  liable  to  dif- 
 eafes :  for  which  God,  in  his  good   provi- 
 dence, has  provided  natural  remedies'.    But 
 remedies  exifting  in  nature,  have  been  un- 
 known   to    marikiild    for    many   ages  :   are 
 known  but  to    few   now  :    probably  many 
 valuable  ones  are  not  known  yet.     Great  has 
 been  and  is  the  obfcurity  and  difiiculty,  in 
 the  nature  and  application  of  them.     Cir- 
 cumftances  feem  often  to  m.ake  them  very 
 improper,  where  they  are  abfolutely  neceflary. 
 It  is  after  long  labour  and  ftudy,  and  many 
 unfuccefsful  endeavours,  that  they  are  brought 
 to  be  as  ufeful  as  they  are ;  after  high  con- 
 tempt and  abfolute    rejedlion   of  the  moft 
 ufeful    we    have;    and    after    difputes    and 
 doubts,  which  have   feemed  to   be   endlefs. 
 The  beft   remedies   too,    when   unlkilfully, 
 much  more  if  difhoneftly,  applied,  may  pro- 
 duce new  difeafes :    and   with    the    righteft 
 application,   the    fuccefs  of   them    is    often 
 doubtful.     In  many  cafes,   they   are  not  at 
 all  effectual :  where  they  are,  it  is  often  very 
 flowly :  and  the  application  of  them,  and  the 
 neceilary   regimen  accompanying  it,  is,  not 
 uncommonly,  fo  difagreeable,  that  fome  will 
 not  fubmit  to  them  y  and  fitisfy  themfelves 
 
 *  See  Ch.  V. 
 
 with 
 
Chap.  III.       liMe  to  Obje5iioj2S.  251 
 
 with  the  excufe,  that  if  they  would,  it  is 
 not  certain,  whether  it  would  be  fuccefsful. 
 And  many  perfons,  who  labour  under  difeafes, 
 for  which  there  are  known  natural  remedies, 
 are  not  fo  happy  as  to  be  always,  if  ever,  in 
 the  way  of  them.  In  a  word,  the  remedies 
 which  nature  has  provided  for  difeafes,  are 
 neither  certain,  perfedt,  nor  univerfal.  And 
 indeed  the  fame  principles  of  arguing  which 
 would  lead  us  to  conclude,  that  they  muft 
 be  fo,  would  lead  us  like  wife  to  conclude, 
 that  there  could  be  no  occc^^iion  for  them;  /.  e, 
 that  there  could  be  no  difeafes  at  all.  And 
 therefore,  our  experience  that  there  are  dif- 
 eafes, fhews,  that  it  is  credible  beforehand, 
 upon  fuppofition  nature  has  provided  reme- 
 dies for  them,  that  thefe  remedies  may  be,  as 
 by  experience  we  find  they  are,  not  certain, 
 nor  perfect,  nor  univerfal;  becaufe  it  fhews, 
 that  the  principles  upon  which  we  fliould 
 exped:  the  contrary,  are  fallacious. 
 
 And  now,  what  is  the  juft  confequence 
 from  all  thefe  thinQ;s  ?  Not  that  rcafon  is  no 
 judge  of  what  is  offered  to  us  as  being  of 
 divine  revelation.  For,  this  would  be  to  in- 
 f^r,  that  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  any  thing, 
 becauie  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  all  things. 
 Reafon  can,  and  it  ought  to  judge,  not  only 
 of  the  meaning,  but  alfo  of  the  morality  and 
 the  evidence,  of  revelation.  Fir/iy  It  is  the 
 province  of  reafon  to  judge  of  the  morality 
 
 of 
 
252       "The  Credibility  of  Revelatioji     Part  II. 
 
 of  the  Scripture;  /.  e,  not  whether  it  contains 
 things  different  from  what  we  fhould  have 
 expedied  from  a  wife,  juft,  and  good  Being; 
 for  objedlions  from   hence  have  been  now 
 obviated :    but   whether    it   contains    things 
 plainly  contradictory  to  wifdom,  juftice,  or 
 goodnefs ;  to  what  the  light  of  nature  teaches 
 us  of  God.     And  I  know   nothing  of  this 
 fort  objedled  againft  Scripture,  excepting  fuch- 
 objedlions  as  are  formed  upon  fuppofitions, 
 which  would  equally  conclude  that  the  con- 
 ftitution  of  nature  is  contradicftory  to  wifdom, 
 juftice,  or  goodnefs ;  which  moft  certainly  it 
 is   not.     Indeed   there   are   fome    particular 
 precepts  in  Scripture,  given  to  particular  per- 
 fons,  requiring  adlions,  which  would  be  im- 
 moral and  vicious,  were  it  not  for  fuch  pre- 
 cepts.    But  it  is  eafy  to  fee,  that  all  thefe  are 
 of  fuch  a  kind,  as  that  the  precept  changes 
 the  whole  nature  of  the  cafe  and  of  the  ac- 
 tion ;  and  both  conftitutes,  and  Ihews  that 
 not  to  be  unjuft  or  immoral,  which,  prior  to 
 the  precept,  muft  have  appeared  and  really 
 have  been  fo :  which  may  well  be,  fmce  none 
 of  thefe  precepts  are  contrary  to  immutable 
 morality.     If  itwxre  commanded,  to  culti- 
 vate the  principles,  and  ad:  from  the  fpirit, 
 of  treachery,  ingratitude,  cruelty;  the  com- 
 mand w^ould  not  alter  the  nature  of  the  cafe 
 or  of  the  adion,  in  any  of  thefe  inllances. 
 But  it  is  quite  otherwile  in  precepts,  which 
 require  only  the  doing  an  external  a^^ion  :  for 
 
 inftance. 
 
Chap.  III.         liable  to  ObjeSllons.  £53 
 
 inftance,  taking  away  the  property  or  Hfe  of 
 any.  For  men  have  no  right  to  either  Hfe 
 or  property,  but  what  arifes  folely  from  the 
 grant  of  God :  v/hen  this  grant  is  revoked, 
 they  ceafe  to  have  any  right  at  all,  in  either  : 
 and  when  this  revocation  is  made  known,  as 
 furely  it  is  poffible  it  may  be,  it  muft  ceafe  to 
 be  unjuft  to  deprive  them  of  either.  And 
 though  a  courfe  of  external  a6ls,  which  with- 
 out command  would  be  immoral,  muft  make 
 an  immoral  habit;  yet  a  few  detached  com- 
 mands have  no  fuch  natural  tendency.  I 
 thought  proper  to  fay  thus  much  of  the  few 
 Scripture  precepts,  which  require,  not  vicious 
 adlions,  but  ad:ions  which  would  have  been, 
 vicious  had  it  not  been  for  fuch  precepts ; 
 becaufe  they  are  fometimes  weakly  urged  as 
 immoral,  and  great  weight  is  laid  upon  ob- 
 jections drawn  from  them.  But  to  me  there 
 feems  no  difficulty  at  all  in  thefe  precepts, 
 but  what  arifes  from  their  being  offences : 
 /.  e,  from  their  being  liable  to  be  perverted, 
 as  indeed  they  are,  by  wicked  defigning  men, 
 to  ferve  the  moft  horrid  purpofes ;  and,  per- 
 haps, to  miflead  the  weak  and  enthufiaftick. 
 And  objedlions  from  this  head,  are  not  ob- 
 jedlions  againft  revelation  ;  but  againft  the 
 whole  notion  of  religion,  as  a  trial ;  and  a- 
 gainft  the  general  conftitution  of  nature. 
 Secondly,  Reafon  is  able  to  judge,  and  muft, 
 of  the  evidence  of  revelation,  and  of  the  ob- 
 
 jedlicns 
 
254       ^^^  Credibility  of  Revelation     Part  IT^ 
 
 jedlions  urged  againft  that  evidence:  which 
 fliall  be  the  fubjedt  of  a  following  Chapter  ^. 
 
 But  the  confequence  of  the  foregoing  ob- 
 fervation  is,  that  the  queftion,  upon  which 
 the  truth  of  Chriftianity  depends,  is  fcarce 
 at  all,  \vhat  objections  there  are  againft  its 
 fcheme,  fince  there  are  none  againft  the  mo- 
 rality of  it;  but  ivhat   objeBions   there   are 
 againft    its   evidence:     or,    ivhaf  proof  there 
 remains  of  it,  after  due  allowa?ices  rnade  for 
 the  objeBions  agaifift   that  proof:   becaufe    it 
 has   been  fliewn,   that  the  objeBions  againjl 
 Chrijlianityy    as   diftinguifbed  from    objections 
 agai7ift  its  evidence,  are  frivolous.     For  furely 
 very  little  weight,  if  any  at  all,  is  to  be  laid 
 upon  a  way  of  arguing  and  obje(fting,  which, 
 when  applied  to  the  general  conftitution  of 
 nature,  experience  fliews  not  to  be  conclu- 
 five :  and  fuch,  I  think,  is  the  whole  w^ay 
 of  objedling  treated  of  throughout  this  Chap- 
 ter.   It  is  refolvable  into  principles,  and  goes 
 upon  fuppofitions,  which  miflead  us  to  think, 
 that  the  Author  of  Nature  would  not  ad;,  as 
 we  experience  he  does ;  or  would  ad,  in  fuch 
 and  fuch  cafes,  as  we  experience  he  does  not, 
 in  like  cafes.     But   the   unreafonablenefs  of 
 this  way  of  objecting,  will  appear  yet  more 
 evidently  from  hence,  that  the  chief  things 
 
 *  Chap,  vii, 
 
 thus 
 
Chap.  III.         liable  to  ObjeBions.  255 
 
 thus  objedted  agalnft,  are  juftified,  as  fhall  be 
 farther  fhown',  by  diftind:,  particular,  and  full 
 analogies,  in  the  conflitution  and  courfe  of 
 nature. 
 
 But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that,  as  fri- 
 volous as  objeftions  of  the  foregoing  fort 
 againfl  revelation  are,  yet,  when  a  fuppofed 
 revelation  is  more  confiftent  with  itfelf,  and 
 has  a  more  general  and  uniform  tendency  to 
 promote  virtue,  than,  all  circumftances  con- 
 fidered,  could  have  been  expedied  from  en- 
 thufiafm  and  political  views;  this  is  a  pre- 
 fumptive  proof  of  its  not  proceeding  from 
 them,  and  fo  of  its  truth :  becaufe  we  are 
 competent  judges,  whatmnght  have  been  ex- 
 pected from  enthufiafm  and  political  views, 
 
 •  Ch.  iv.  latter  part.     And  v,  vl. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[    ^56    ] 
 
 CHAP.     IV. 
 
 Of  Chrijllanity^  conjidered  as  a  Schefne  or  Con^ 
 Jlitutioriy  imperfe^ly  comprehended. 
 
 IT  hath  been  now  {hewn ^  that  the  ana- 
 logy of  nature,  renders  it  highly  credi- 
 ble beforehand,  that  fuppofing  a  revelation 
 to  be  made,  it  muft  contain  many  things 
 very  different  from  what  we  fliould  have  ex- 
 pelled, and  fuch  as  appear  open  to  great  ob- 
 jections :  and  that  this  obfervation,  in  good 
 meafure,  takes  off  the  force  of  thofe  objec- 
 tions, or  rather  precludes  them.  But  it  may 
 bealledged,  that  this  is  a  very  partial  anfwer 
 to  fuch  objecftions,  or  a  very  unfatisfadlory 
 way  of  obviating  them,  becaufe  it  doth  not 
 fhew  at  all,  that  the  things  objedled  againft 
 can  be  wife,  juft,  and  good;  much  lefs,  that 
 it  is  credible  they  are  fo.  It  will  therefore 
 be  proper  to  (hew  this  diftinftly ;  by  applying 
 to  thefe  objecftions  againft  the  wifdom,  juf- 
 tice,  and  goodnefs  of  Chriftianity,  the  anfwer 
 above''  given  to  the  like  objedions  againft  the 
 conftitution  of  nature :  before  we  confide r 
 the  particular  analogies  in  the  latter,  to  the 
 
 *  In  the  foregoing  Chapter. 
 
 ^  Part  I,  Ch.  vii.  to  which  this  all  along  refers; 
 
 parti- 
 
Chap.  IV.     imperfeBly  cofnprehendcd,       257 
 
 particular  things  objed:ed  againft  in  the  for- 
 mer. Now  that  which  affords  a  fufficient 
 anfwer  to  objections  againft  the  wifdom,  juf- 
 tice  andgoodnefsof  the  conftitution  of  Nature, 
 is  its  being  a  conftitution,  a  fyftem  or  fcheme, 
 imperfed:ly  comprehended;  a  fcheme  in 
 which  means  are  made  ufe  of  to  accomplifh 
 ends;  and  which  is  carried  on  by  general  laws. 
 For  from  thefe  things  it  has  been  proved,  not 
 only  to  be  poffible,  but  alfo  to  be  credible, 
 that  thofe  things  which  are  objected  againft, 
 may  be  conliftent  with  wifdom,  juftice  and 
 goodnefs ;  nay,  may  be  inftances  of  them  : 
 and  even  that  the  conftitution  and  govern- 
 ment of  Nature  may  be  perfed  in  the  higheft 
 poflible  degree.  If  Chriftianity  then  be  a 
 fcheme,  and  of  the  like  kind;  it  is  evident, 
 the  like  objedions  againft  it,  muft  admit  of 
 the  like  anfwer.     And, 
 
 I.  Chriftianity  Is  a  fcheme,  quite  beyond 
 our  comprelienfion.  The  moral  government 
 of  God  is  exercifed,  by  gradually  condudling 
 things  fo  in  the  courfe  of  his  providence,  that 
 every  one,  at  length  and  upon  the  whole, 
 ihall  receive  according  to  his  deferts;  and 
 neither  fraud  nor  violence,  but  truth  and 
 right,  iliall  finally  prevail.  Chriftianity  is  a 
 particular  fcheme  under  this  general  plan  of 
 Providence,  and  a  part  of  it,  conducive  to  its 
 completion,  v^ith  regard  to  mankind  :  con- 
 
 S  fifting 
 
258  ChrijUanity  a  Schemey         Part  II. 
 
 liftingltfelfalfo  of  various  parts,  and  amyfte- 
 rious  oeconomy,   which    has  been  carrying^ 
 on  from  the  time  the  world  came  into  its 
 prefent  wretched  flate,  and  is  ilill  carrying 
 on,  for  its  recovery,  by  a  divine  perlon,  the 
 Mefliuh ;  who  is  to  gather  together  in  oney  the 
 children  ofGody  that  are Jc uttered  abroad^ y  and 
 efcablifli  an  everlafting  kingdom y  wherein  dwel^ 
 leth  7^ighteoiiJheJs  ^    And  in  order  to  it ;  after 
 various  manifeftations  of  things,  relating  to 
 this   great    and  general    fcheme  of  Provi- 
 dence, through  a  fucceffion  of  matiy  ages : 
 (For  the  Spirit  of  Chriji  which  was  in  the 
 prophet Sy  tejiijied  beforehand  his  fuffe rings y  and 
 the  glory  that  JJjould follow  :  unto  whom  it  was 
 revealedy  that  not  unto  themfelvesy  but  unto  us 
 they  did  ?mnijier  the  things  which  are  now  re- 
 ported  unto  us  by  them  that  have  preached  the 
 Gofpel'y  which  things  the  Angels  dejire  to  look 
 into'' :) after  various  difpenfations,  look- 
 ing forward,  and  preparatory,  to  this  final  Sal- 
 vation :  in  the  fullnefs  of  timcy  when  infinite 
 wifdom  thought  fit;  He,  beijig  in  the  for?n 
 
 of  Gody made  himfelf  of  no  reputation y  ajid 
 
 took  upon  him  the  fo?^m  of  a  Servanty  a7id  was 
 made  in  the  likenefs  of  men  :  and  being  fowid  in 
 fajhion  as  a  many  he  humbled  himfelf  and  be^ 
 cajne  obedient  to  deaihy  e-ven  the  death  of  the 
 crofs :  wherefore  God  alfo  hath  highly  exalted 
 
 «  Joh.  xi.  52,      *  2  Pet.  iil.  13.     *  I  Pet.  i.  11.  12. 
 
 him. 
 
chap.  IV.     imperfectly  comprehejided.       259 
 
 hirriy  and  given  him  a  ?2ame  which  is  above 
 every  name  :  that  at  the  name  of  J  ejus  every 
 hiee  Jljould  l?ow^  of  things  in  heaven^  and  things 
 in  the  earthy  and  things  under  the  earth  :  And 
 that  every  tongue  Jljould  confefs^  that  Jefus 
 Chriji  is  Lord^  to  the  glory  of  God  the  Father\ 
 Parts  likewife  of  this  oeconomy,  are  the  ml~ 
 raculous  miffion  of  the  Holy  Ghoft,  and  his 
 ordinary  affi (lance  given  to  good  men :  tlie 
 invifible  government,  which  Chrift  at  prefent 
 exercifes  over  his  church :  that  w^hich  he 
 himfelf  refers  to  in  thefe  words,  ^In  my  Fa^ 
 thers  houfe  are  ma?iy  jnanjions 1  go  to  pre- 
 pare a  place  for  you  :  and  his  future  return  to 
 judge  the  world  in  right eoufnefs,  and  compleat- 
 ly  re-eftabU/h  the  kingdom  of  God.  For 
 the  Father  judgeth  no  man  :  hut  hath  commit- 
 ted all  judgme?2t  wito  the  Son  :  that  all  men 
 ftoould  honour  the  Son^  even  as  they  honour  the 
 Father^.  All  power  is  given  unto  him  in  Hea- 
 ven and  in  earth  \  And  he  muft  reign^  till  he 
 hath  put  all  enemies  under  his  feet,  'Then  Com- 
 eth the  endy  when  he  fid  all  have  delivered  up 
 the  kingdom  to  Gody  even  the  Father-,  when  he 
 foall  have  put  down  all  ruky  and  all  authority 
 and  power.  And  when  all  things  fall  bejub- 
 dued  unto  him^  then  fall  the  Son  alfo  himfelf  be 
 fubjecl  unto  him  that  put  all  things  under  hiniy 
 that   God  may  be  all  in  air.      Now  Uttle, 
 
 ^  Phil.  ii.  ^  Joh.  xlv.  2.  ^  Joh.  v.  22,  23. 
 
 •  Mattn.  xxviii.  |8.  ^  i  Cor.  xv, 
 
 S  z  furely. 
 
26o  Chrijlianity  a  SchemCy        Part  II. 
 
 furely,  need  be  faid  to  ihevv,  that  this  fyftem, 
 or  fcheme  of  things,  is  but  imperfectly  com- 
 prehended by  us.  The  bcripture  exprefsly  af- 
 ferts  it  to  be  fo.  And  indeed  one  cannot  read 
 a  paffage  relating  to  this  great  fnyjtery  of  God- 
 li?iejs\  but  what  inmiediately  runs  up  into 
 fomething  which  fhews  us  our  ignorance  in 
 it ;  as  every  thing  in  nature  ihews  us  our  ig- 
 norance in  the  conftitution  of  nature.  And 
 whoever  v/ill  ferioufly  confider  that  part  of 
 the  Chriftian  fcheme,  which  is  revealed  in 
 Scripture,  will  find  fo  much  more  unrevealed, 
 as  will  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the  purpofes 
 of  judging  and  objedfing,  we  know  as  little  of 
 it,  as  of  the  conftitution  of  nature.  Our  ig- 
 norance, therefore,  is  as  much  an  anfvver  to 
 our  objections  againft  the  perfection  of  one,  as 
 againft  the  perfection  of  the  other "'. 
 
 II.  It  is  obvious  too,  that  in  the  Chriftian 
 difpenfation,  as  much  as  in  the  natural  fcheme 
 of  things,  means  are  made  ufe  of  to  accom- 
 plifli  ends.  And  the  obfervation  of  this  fur- 
 nifhes  us  with  the  fame  anfwer,  to  objections 
 againft  the  perfection  of  Chriftianity,  as  to 
 objections  of  the  like  kind,  againft  the  confti- 
 tution of  nature.  It  Ihews  the  credibility, 
 that  the  things  objeCted  againft,  how foolijh'' 
 foever  they  appear  to  men,  may  be  the  very 
 beft   means  of  accomplifliing  the  very  beft 
 
 '  I  Tim.  iii.  i6.         "'  p.  171,  &c.         ^  I  Cor.  i. 
 
 ends. 
 
Chap.  IV.     imperfe5lly  comprehended.       261 
 
 ends.  And  their  2i\'>^Qd.nng  fooli/Jmefs  is  no 
 prefumption  againfl:  this,  in  a  fcheme  fo 
 greatly  beyond  our  comprehcnlion ". 
 
 III.  The  credibility,  that  the  Chriftian  dif- 
 penfation  may  have  b.en,  all  along,  carried 
 on  by  general  laws  %  no  lefs  than  the  courfe 
 of  nature,   may  r^q-iire  to  be  more  diilindtly 
 made  out.  Conlid.r  then,  upon  what  ground 
 it  is  we  fav,   that  the  wholj  coir.mon  courfe 
 of  nature  is  carried  on  according  to  general 
 foreordjined  laws.     We  know  indeed  feve- 
 ral  of  the  general  laws  of  matter  :  and  a  great 
 part  of  the  natural  behaviour  of  living  agents, 
 is  reducible  to  general  laws.     But  we  know 
 in  a  manner  nothing,   by  what  laws,  ftorms 
 and  tempefts,  earthquakes,  famine,  peflilence 
 become    the  inftruments  of   deftruclion    to 
 mankind.     And  the  laws,  by  which  perfons 
 born  into  the  world  at  fuch  a  time  and  place, 
 are  of  fuch  capacities,  genius's,  tempers;  the 
 laws,  by  which  thoughts  come  into  our  mind, 
 in  a  multitude  of  cafesj  and  by  which  innu- 
 merable things  happen,  of  the  greateft  influ- 
 ence upon  the  affairs  and  ftatc  of  the  world ; 
 thefe  laws  are  fo  wholly  unknown  to  us,  that 
 we  call  the  events  which  come  to  pafs  by 
 them,  accidental :  though  all  reafonablc  men 
 know  certainly,  that  there  cannot,  in  reality, 
 be  any  fuch  thing  as  chance :   and  conclude, 
 
 «'p.  176,  177.  Pp.  178,  179. 
 
 S   3  that 
 
262  Chrijlianity  a  Scheme^        Part  IL 
 
 that  the  things  which  have  this  appea,rance 
 are  the  refult  of  general  laws,  an4  may  be 
 reduced  into  them.  It  is  then  but  an  exceed- 
 ing little  way,  and   in  but  a   Very  few  re- 
 fpeds,   that  we  can    trace    up   the    natural 
 courfe  of  things  before  us,  to  general  laws. 
 And  it  is  only  from  analogy,  that  we  con- 
 clude the  whole  of  it  to  be  capable  of  being 
 reduced  into  them:  only  from   our   feeing, 
 that  part  is  fo.     It  is  from  our  finding,  that 
 the  courfe  of  nature,  in  fome  refpeds  and  fo 
 far,  goes  on  by  general  laws,  that  we  conclude 
 this  of  the  reft.  And  if  that  be  a  juft  ground 
 for  fuch  a  conclulion,  it  is  a  juft  ground  alfo, 
 if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  apprehend,  to  ren- 
 der it    fuppofeable    and    credible,  which    is 
 fufficient  for  anfvvering  objections,  that  God's 
 miraculous  interpofitions  may  have  been,  all 
 along  in  like  manner,  by  ^^;^^r^/ laws  ofwif- 
 dom.     Thus,  that  miraculous  powers  (hould 
 be  exerted,   at  fuch   times,   upon   fuch  oc- 
 cafions,  in  fuch  degrees  and  manners,  and 
 v/ith  regard   to   fuch    perfons,   rather    thari 
 others  ;  that  the  affairs  of  the  world,  being 
 permitted  to  go  on  in  their  natural  courfe  io, 
 far,  fhpuld,  juft  at  fuch  a  point,  have  a  new 
 diredion  given  them  by  miraculous  interpo- 
 fitions; that  thefe  interpofitions  fhould  be 
 exadtly  in  fuch  degrees  and  refpeds  only;  all 
 this  moy  have  been  by  general  laws.     Thefe 
 laws   are    unknown  indeed  to  us  :     but  no 
 more  unknown,  than  the  laws  from  whence 
 
 it 
 
Chap.  IV.    hnpcrfcLlly  comprehended.         263 
 
 it  is,  that  feme  die  as  foon  as  they  arc  born, 
 and  others  live  to  extreme  old  age ;  that  one 
 man  is  iafuperior  to  another  in  underftinding; 
 with  innumerable  more  things,  which,  as 
 was  before  obllrved,  we  cannot  reduce  to  any 
 laws  or  rules  at  all,  though  it  is  taken  for 
 granted,  they  are  as  much  reducible  to  general 
 ones,  as  gravitation.  Now,  if  the  revealed 
 difpenfations  of  Providence,  and  miraculous 
 interpoiitions,  be  by  general  laws,  as  well  as 
 God's  ordinary  government  in  the  courfe  of 
 nature,  made  known  by  reafon  and  experi- 
 ence ;  there  is  no  more  reafon  to  expe(ft,  that 
 every  exigence,  as  it  arifes,  fliould  be  provi- 
 ded for  by  thefe  general  laws  or  miraculous 
 interpoiitions,  than  that  every  exigence  in 
 nature  fhould,  by  the  general  laws  of  nature  : 
 yet  there  might  be  wife  and  good  reafons, 
 that  miraculous  interpofitions  fhould  be  by 
 general  laws ;  and  that  thefe  laws  fhould  not 
 be  broken  in  upon,  or  deviated  from,  by 
 Other  miracles. 
 
 Upon  the  whole  then  :  the  appearance  of 
 deficiencies  and  irregularities  in  nature,  is 
 owing  to  its  being  a  fcheme  but  in  part  made 
 known,  and  of  fuch  a  certain  particular  kind 
 in  other  refpedls.  Now  we  fee  no  more  rea- 
 fon, why  the  frame  and  courfe  of  nature  fhould 
 be  fuch  a  fcheme,  than  why  Chriflianity 
 fhould.  And  that  the  former  is  fuch  a  fcheme, 
 renders  it  credible,  that  the  latter,  upon  fup- 
 S  4  pofition 
 
264  Chrijiianity  a  Schemey  Part  IL 
 
 pofition  of  its  truth,  may  be  fo  too.  And 
 as  it  is  manifeft,  that  Chrifliianity  is  a  fcheme 
 revealed  but  in  part,  and  a  fcheme  in  which 
 means  are  made  ufe  of  to  accomplifh  ends ; 
 like  to  that  of  nature :  fo  the  credibiHty,  that 
 it  may  have  been  all  along  carried  on  by  ge- 
 neral laws,  no  lefs  than  the  courfe  of  nature, 
 has  been  diflindly  proved.  And  from  all  this 
 it  is  beforehand  credible  that  there  might,  I 
 think  probable  that  there  would,  be  the  like 
 appearance  of  deficiencies  and  irregularities 
 in  Chriftianity,  as  in  nature :  /.  e,  that  Chrif- 
 tianity  would  be  liable  to  the  like  objedlions, 
 as  the  frame  of  nature.  And  thefe  objedions 
 are  anfwered  by  thefe  obfervations  concerning 
 Chriftianity;  as  the  like  objedlions  againft  the 
 frame  of  nature,  are  anfwered  by  the  likq 
 obfervations  concerning  the  frame  of  na^ 
 ture. 
 
 THE  objections  againft  Chriftianity, 
 confidered  as  a  matter  of  fad:  ^,  having, 
 in  general,  been  obviated  in  the  preceding. 
 Chapter ;  and  the  fame,  confidered  as  made 
 againft  the  wifdom  and  goodnefs  of  it,  having 
 been  obviated  in  this:  the  next  thing,  ac- 
 cording to  the  method  propofed,  is  to  fliew, 
 that  the  principal  objcvflions,  in  particular, 
 againft   Chriftianity,    may    be  anfwered,  by 
 
 *J  p.  169. 
 
 particular 
 
chap.  IV.    imperfcBly  comprehended.        265 
 
 particular  and  full  analogies  in  nature.     And 
 as   one  of  them  is  made  againft   the  whole 
 fcheme  of  it  together,  as  jufl:  now  defcribed, 
 I  chufe  to  confider  it  here,  rather  than  in  a 
 diftind  Chapter  by  itfelf.     The  thing  objedied 
 againft  this  fcheme  of  the  Gofpel,  is,  ''  that 
 ^*  it  feems  to  fuppofe,  God  was  reduced   to 
 *^  the  necelTity  of  a   long  feries  of  intricate 
 "  means,  in  order  to  accomplifli  his  ends,  the 
 '^  recovery  and  falyation  of  the  world  :    in 
 "  like  fort  as  men,  for  want  of  underllanding 
 **  or  power,  not  being  able  to  come  at  their 
 ^*  ends  diredlly,  are  forced  to  go  round-about 
 "  ways,  and  make  ufe  of  many  perplexed  con- 
 "  trivances  to  arrive  at  them.''     Now  every 
 thing  which  we  fee,  fhews  the  folly  of  this, 
 confidered  as  an  objedtion  againft  the  truth  of 
 Chriftianity.     For,  according  to  our  manner 
 of  conception,  God  n^akes  ufe  of  variety  of 
 means,  what    we  often   think  tedious  ones, 
 in  the  natural  courfe  of  providence,  for  the 
 accomplifhment  of  all  his  ends.     Indeed  it 
 is  certain,  there  is  fomewhat  in  this  matter 
 quite    beyond    our  comprehenfion :  but   the 
 myftery  is  as  great  in  nature  as  in  Chriftianity. 
 We  know  what  we  ourfelves  aim  at,  as  final 
 ends :  and  what  ccurfes  we  take,  merely  as 
 means  conducing  to  thofe  ends.     But  we  are 
 greatly  ignorant,  how  far  things  are  confi- 
 dered by  the  Author  of  Nature,  under  the 
 fingle  notion  of  means  and  ends ;  fo  as  that  it 
 may  be  faid,  this  is  merely  an  end,  and  that 
 
 merely 
 
266  Chrijlianity  a  Scheme^        Part  IL 
 
 merely  means,  in  his  regard.  And  whether 
 there  be  not  fome  peculiar  abfurdity  in  our 
 very  manner  of  conception,  concerning  this 
 matter,  Ibmewhat  contradidory  ariling  from 
 our  extremely  imperfe6t  vdews  of  things,  it 
 is  impolTible  to  fay.  However,  thus  much  is 
 manifefl,  that  the  whole  natural  v/orld  and 
 government  of  it  is  a  fcheme  or  fyftem  ;  not 
 a  fixed,  but  a  progreffive  one :  a  fcheme,  in 
 which  the  operation  of  various  means  takes 
 up  a  great  length  of  time,  before  the  ends 
 they  tend  to  can  be  attained.  The  change 
 of  feafons,  the  ripening  of  the  fruits  of 
 the  earth,  the  very  hiftory  of  a  flower,  is 
 an  injftance  of  this :  and  fo  is  human  life. 
 Thus  vegetable  bodies,  and  thofe  of  ani- 
 mals, though  poffibly  formed  at  once,  yet 
 grow  up  by  degrees  to  a  mature  ftate.  And 
 thus  rational  agents,  whp  animate  thefe  latter 
 bodies,  are  naturally  dirc6ted  to  form,  each 
 his  own  manners  and  charadler,  by  the  gra- 
 dual gaining  of  knowledge  and  experience, 
 and  by  a  long  courfe  of  adion.  Our  exiftence 
 is  not  only  fucceflive,  as  it  muft  be  of  necef- 
 iity ;  but  one  ftate  of  our  life  and  being,  is; 
 appointed  by  God,  to  be  a  preparation  for 
 another ;  and  that,  to  be  the  means  of  at^ 
 taining  to  another  fucceeding  one  :  infancy 
 to  childhood;  childhood  to  youth;  youth 
 to  mature  age.  Men  arc  impatient,  and 
 for  precipitating  things  :  but  the  Author  of 
 Nature   appears    deliberate    throughout   his 
 
 operations  y 
 
Chap.  IV.     imperfeBly  comprehended.       267 
 
 operations ;  accomplifhing  his  natural  ends, 
 by  flow  fucceffive  fteps.     And    there    is  a 
 plan  of  things   beforehand  laid  out,  which, 
 from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  various  fyftems 
 of  means,  as  well  as  length  of  time,  in  order 
 to  the  carrying  on  its  feveral  parts  into  exe- 
 cution.    Thus,  in  the  daily  courfe  of  natural 
 providence,  God  operates  in  the  very  fame 
 manner,  as  in  the  difpenfation  of  Chriftianity : 
 making   one  thing   fubfervient  to  another; 
 this,  to  fomewhat  farther;  and  fo  on,  through 
 a  progreflive  fcries  of  means,  which  extend, 
 both  backward  and  forward,  beyond  our  ut- 
 moft  view.     Of  this  manner  of  operation, 
 every  thing  we  fee  in  the  courfe  of  nature, 
 is  as  much  an  in  fiance,  as  any  part  of  the 
 Chriftian  difpenfation. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[     268     ] 
 
 CHAP.     V. 
 
 Of  the  particular  S-Jlem  of  Chriftianity  -,  the 
 Appoint7nent  of  a  Mediator,  and  the  Re- 
 demption  of  the  World  by  him, 
 
 THERE  IS  not,  I  think,  any  thing  re- 
 lating to  erriftianity,  which  has  been 
 moi"e  objected  againft,  than  the  mediation  of 
 Chriftj  in  fome  or  other  of  its  parts.  Yet, 
 upon  thorough  confideration,  there  feems  no- 
 thing lefs  juftly  liable  to  it.     For, 
 
 I.  The  whole  analo:^y  of  nature  removes 
 all  imagined  prefumption  againfl:  the  general 
 notion  of  a  Mediator  hetweeji  God  afid  man  \ 
 For  we  find  all  living  creatures  are  brought 
 into  the  world,  and  their  life  in  infancy  is 
 preferved,  by  the  inftrumentaUty  of  others  : 
 and  every  fatisfadlion  of  it,  fome  way  or 
 other,  is  beftowed  by  the  like  means.  So 
 that  the  vifible  government,  which  God  ex- 
 ercifes  over  the  world,  is  by  the  inflrumen- 
 tahty  and  mediation  of  others.  And  how 
 far  his  in  vifible  government  be  or  be  not  fo, 
 it  is  imipoffible  to  determine  at  all  by  reafon. 
 And  the  fuppoiition,  that  part  of  it  is  fo,  ap- 
 
 *  I  Tim.  ii.  5. 
 
 pear 
 
Chap,  V.      T^hc  Appoi?itment  of.  See.         269 
 
 pears,  to  fay  the  leaft,  altogether  as  credible, 
 as  the  contrary.     There  is  then  no  fort  of 
 objection,  from  the  light  of  nature,  againfl 
 the  general    notion  of   a  mediator  between 
 God  and  man,   coniidered  as  a  do(fl;rine  of 
 Chriftianity,  or  as  an    appointment    in    this 
 difpenfation :  fince  we    find  by    experience, 
 that  God  does  appoint  mediators,   to  be  the 
 inftruments  of  good  and  evil  to  us ;  tlie  in- 
 ftruments  of  his  juftice  and  his  mercy.    And 
 the  objedion  here  referred  to  is  urged,  not 
 againft  mediation  in  that  high,  eminent  and 
 peculiar  icni^,  in  which  Chrift  is  our  media- 
 tor; but  abfolutely  againft  the  whole  notion 
 itfelf  of  a  mediator  at  alL 
 
 II.  As  we  muft  fjppofc,  that  the  world  is 
 under  the  proper  moral  government  of  God, 
 or  in  a  ftate  of  religion,  before  we  can  enter 
 into  confideration  of  the  revealed  dodlrine, 
 concerning  the  redemption  of  it  by  Chrift  | 
 fo  that  fuppofition  is  here  to  be  diftinvMy 
 taken  notice  of.  Now  the  divine  moral  go- 
 vernment which  religion  teaches  us,  implies, 
 that  the  confequence  of  vice  fliall  be  mifery, 
 infome  future  ftate,  by  the  righteous  judg- 
 ment of  God.  That  fuch  confequent  pu~ 
 nifhment  iliall  take  effed  by  his  appoint- 
 ment, is  neceffarily  im.plied.  But,  as  it  is  not 
 in  any  fort  to  be  fuppofed,  that  we  are  made 
 acquainted  with  all  the  ends  or  reaibns,  for 
 which  it  is  fit  future  puniiliments  fhould  be 
 
 infilled. 
 
270  'l^he  Appointment  of         Part  IL 
 
 inflided,  or  why  God  has  appointed,  fuch 
 and  fuch  confequent  mifcry  fhould  follow 
 vice ;  and  as  we  are  altogether  in  the  dark, 
 how  or  in  what  manner  it  fliould  follow,  by 
 what  immediate  occaiions,  or  by  the  inftru- 
 mentality  of  what  means ;  there  is  no  abfur- 
 dity  in  fuppofing,  it  may  follow  in  a  way  ana- 
 logous to  that,  in  which  many  miferies  fol- 
 low fuch  ani'  fuch  courfes  of  action  at  pre- 
 fent;  poverty,  ficknefs,  infamy,  untimely 
 death  by  difeafes,  death  from  the  hands  of 
 civil  juftice.  There  is  no  abfurdity  in  fup- 
 pofing future  punifliment  may  follow  wick- 
 ednefs  of  courfe,  as  we  fpeak,  or  in  the  way 
 of  natural  confequence  from  God's  original 
 coaftitution  of  the  world ;  from  the  nature 
 he  has  given  us,  and  from  the  condition  in 
 which  he  places  us !  or  in  a  like  manner,  as 
 a  perfon  rafhly  trifling  upon  a  precipice,  in 
 the  way  cf  natural  confequence,  falls  down  % 
 in  the  way  of  natural  confequence,  breaks  his 
 limbs,  fuppofe  j  in  the  way  of  natural  con- 
 fequence of  this,  without  help,  perilhes. 
 
 Some  good  men  may  perhaps  be  offended, 
 with  hearing  it  fpoken  of  as  a  fuppofeable 
 thing,  that  the  future  punifliments  of  wick- 
 ednefs  may  be  in  tiie  way  of  natural  confe- 
 quence :  as  if  this  were  taking  the  execution 
 of  juftice  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  and  giving 
 it  to  nature.  But  they  fhould  remember, 
 that  when  things  come  to  pafs  according  to 
 9  the 
 
Chap.  V.     a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.        Tji 
 
 the  courfe  of  nature,  this  does  not  hinder 
 them  from  being  his  doing,  who  is  the  God 
 of  nature  :  and  that  the  Scripture  afcribes 
 thofe  punifhments  to  divine  juftice,  which 
 are  known  to  be  natural;  and  which  muil 
 be  called  fo,  when  diftinguilhed  from  fuch  as 
 are  miraculous.  But  after  all,  this  fuppofi- 
 tion,  or  rather  this  way  of  fpeaking,  is  here 
 made  ufe  of  only  by  way  of  illuftration  of  the 
 fubjed:  before  us.  For  fince  it  mufl  be  ad- 
 mitted, that  the  future  puniihment  of  wick- 
 ednefs  is  not  a  matter  of  arbitrary  appoint- 
 ment, but  of  realon,  equity  and  juftice ;  it 
 comes,  for  ought  I  fee,  to  the  fame  thing, 
 whether  it  is  fuppofed  to  be  in  Aided  in  a  wa}?- 
 analogous  to  that  in  which  the  temporal  pu- 
 nifhments of  vice  and  folly  are  inflided,  or  in 
 any  other  way.  And  though  there  were  a 
 difference,  it  is  allowable,  in  the  prefent  cafe, 
 to  make  this  fuppofition,  plainly  not  an  in- 
 credible one;  that  future  punifhment  may 
 follow  wickednefs  in  the  way  of  natural  con- 
 fequence,  or  according  to  fome  general  laws 
 of  government  already  eftabliihed  in  the  uni- 
 verfe, 
 
 III.  Upon  this  f^appofition,  or  even  with- 
 out it,  we  may  obferve  fomewhat,  much  to 
 the  prefent  purpofe,  in  the  conftitution  of 
 nature  or  appointments  of  Providence :  the 
 provifion  which  is  made,  that  all  the  bad 
 natural  confequences  of  men's  adions,  fhould 
 
 not 
 
272  The  Appointment  of         Part  IL 
 
 not  always  adlually  follow;  or  that  fuch  bad 
 conlequences,  as,  according  to  the  fettled 
 courfe  of  things,  would  inevitably  have  fol- 
 lowed if  not  prevented,  fliould,  in  certain 
 degrees,  be  prevented.  We  are  apt  prefump- 
 tuoufly  to  imagine,  that  the  world  might 
 have  been  fo  constituted,  as  that  there  would 
 not  have  been  any  fuch  thing  as  mifery  or 
 evil.  On  the  contrary  we  find  the  Author  of 
 Nature  permits  it :  but  then  he  has  provided 
 reliefs,  and,  in  many  cafes,  perfed:  remedies 
 for  it,  after  fome  pains  and  difficulties ;  reliefs 
 and  remedies  even  for  that  evil,  which  is  the 
 fruit  of  our  own  mifconducfl ;  and  which,  in 
 the  courfe  of  nature,  would  have  continued, 
 and  ended  in  our  dcftrucftion,  but  for  fuch 
 remedies.  And  this  is  an  inftance  both  of 
 feverity  and  of  indulgence,  in  the  conftitution 
 of  nature.  Thus  all  the  bad  confequences, 
 now  mentioned,  of  a  man's  trifling  upon  a 
 precipice,  might  be  prevented.  And  though 
 all  were  not,  yet  fome  of  them  might,  by 
 proper  interpolition,  if  not  rejected :  by  an- 
 other's coming  to  the  rafh  man's  relief,  with 
 his  own  laying  hold  on  that  relief,  in  fuch 
 fort  as  the  cafe  required.  Perfons  may  do  a 
 great  deal  themfelves  towards  preventing  the 
 bad  confequences  of  their  follies  :  and  more 
 may  be  done  by  themfelves,  together  with 
 the  affiflance  of  others  their  fellow  creatures ; 
 which  affiftance  Nature  requires  and  prompts 
 us  to.     This  is  the  general  conftitution  of 
 
 the 
 
Chap.  V.     4  Mediator  and  Redeemer.        273 
 
 the  world.  Now  fuppofe  it  had  been  fo  con- 
 ftituted,  that  after  fuch  a(fl:ions  were  done,  as 
 were  forefeen  naturally  to  draw  after  them 
 mifery  to  the  doer,  it  fliould  have  been  no 
 mere  in  human  power  to  have  prevented  that 
 naturally  confequent  mifery,  in  any  inftance, 
 than  it  is,  in  all;  no  one  can  fay,  whether 
 fuch  a  more  fevere  conftitution  of  things 
 might  not  yet  have  been  really  good.  Butj 
 that  on  the  contrary,  provifion  is  made  by 
 nature,  that  we  may  and  do,  to  fo  great  degree, 
 prevent  the  bad  natural  effedts  of  our  follies ; 
 this  may  be  called  mercy  or  compLiflion  in 
 the  original  conftitution  of  the  world  :  com- 
 pafiion,  as  diftinguiflied  from  goodnefs  in  ge-» 
 neral.  And,  the  whole  known  conftitution 
 and  courfe  of  things  affording  us  inftances  of 
 fuch  compaffion,  it  would  be  according  to  the 
 analogy  of  nature,  to  hope,  that,  however  rui- 
 nous the  natural  confequences  of  vice  might 
 be,  from  the  general  laws  of  God's  govern- 
 ment over  the  univerfe ;  yet  provifion  might 
 be  made,  poffibly  might  have  been  originally 
 made,  for  preventing  thofe  ruinous  confe- 
 quences from  inevitably  following :  at  Icaft 
 from  following  univerfally,  and  in  all  cafes. 
 
 Many,  I  am  fenfible,  will  wonder  at  find- 
 ing this  made  a  queftion,  or  fpoken  of  as  in 
 any  degree  doubtful.  The  generality  of  man- 
 kind are  fo  far  from  having  that  awful  fenfe 
 of  things,   which   the  prefent  ftate  of  vice 
 
 T  and 
 
274  ^'^^  Appointment  of        Part  IL 
 
 and  mifery  and  darknefs  feems  to  make  but 
 reafonable,  that  they  have  fcarce  any  appre- 
 henfion  or  thought  at  all  about  this  matter, 
 any  way :  and  fome  ferious  perfons  may  have 
 Ipoken  unadviiediy  concerning  it.  But  let 
 us  obferve,  v/hat  v^e  experience  to  be,  and 
 what,  from  the  very  conftitution  of  nature, 
 cannot  but  be,  the  confequences  of  irregular 
 and  diforderly  behaviour ;  even  of  fuch  rafh- 
 nefs,  wilfulnefs,  negleds,  as  we  fcarce  call 
 vicious.  Now  is  it  natural  to  apprehend,  that 
 the  bad  confequences  of  irregularity  will  be 
 greater,  in  proportion  as  the  irregularity  is  fo. 
 And  there  is  no  comparifon  between  thefe 
 irregularities,  and  the  greater  inftances  of  vice, 
 or  a  diifolute  profligate  difregard  to  all  reli- 
 gion; if  there  be  any  thing  at  all  in  religion. 
 For  confider  what  it  is  for  creatures,  moral 
 agents,  prefumptuoully  to  introduce  that  con- 
 fufion  and  mifery  into  the  kingdom  of  God, 
 which  mankind  have  in  fad;  introduced;  to 
 blafpheme  the  Sovereign  Lord  of  all ;  to 
 contemn  his  authority  ;  to  be  injurious  to 
 the  degree  they  are,  to  their  fellow  creatures, 
 the  creatures  of  God.  Add  that  the  effecfts 
 of  vice  in  the  prefent  world,  are  often  extreme 
 mifery,  irretrievable  ruin,  and  even  death : 
 and  upon  putting  all  this  together,  it  will 
 appear,  that  as  no  one  can  fay,  in  what  degree 
 fatal,  the  unprevented  confequences  of  vice 
 may  be,  according  to  the  general  rule  of 
 divine  government ;    fo   it  is  by  no  means 
 
 intuitively 
 
Chapi  V.     a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.        275 
 
 intuitively  certain,  how  far  thefe  confequen- 
 ces  could  poffibly,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing, 
 be  prevented,  confiftently  with  the  eternal  rule 
 of  right,  or  with  what  is,  in  fad,  the  mo- 
 ral conftitution  of  nature^  However,  there 
 would  be  large  ground  to  hope,  that  the  uni- 
 verfal  government  Was  not  fo  feverely  ftrid:, 
 but  that  there  was  room  for  pardon,  or  for 
 having  thofe  penal  confequences  prevented. 
 Yet, 
 
 IV.  There  feems  no  probability,  that  any 
 thing  we  could  do,  would  alone  and  of  itfelf 
 prevent  them :  prevent  their  following,  of 
 being  inflicfted.  But  one  would  think,  at  leaft, 
 it  were  impoffible,  that  the  contrary  ihould 
 be  thought  certain.  For  we  are  not  acquaint- 
 ed with  the  whole  of  the  cafe.  We  are  not 
 informed  of  all  the  reafons,  which  render  it 
 fit  that  future  punifliments  fliould  be  in- 
 flidled  :  and  therefore  cannot  know,  whether 
 any  thing  we  could  do  would  make  fuch  an 
 alteration,  as  to  render  it  fit  that  they  fhould 
 be  remitted.  We  do  not  knov/,  what  the 
 whole  natural  or  appointed  confequences  of 
 vice  are  ^  nor  in  what  way  they  would  fol- 
 low, if  not  prevented :  and  therefore  can  in 
 no  fort  fay,  whether  we  could  do  any  thing, 
 which  would  be  fufficient  to  prevent  them. 
 Our  ignorance  being  thus  manifeft,  let  us  re- 
 collect the  analogy  of  Nature  or  Providence* 
 For,  though  this  may  be  but  a  flight  ground 
 
 T  2  to 
 
276  T^he  Appoint77ient  of        Part  IL 
 
 to  raife  a  pofitive  opinion  upon,  in  this  mat- 
 ter ;  yet  it  is  fufficient  to  anfwer  a  mere  arbi- 
 trary alTertion,  without  any  kind  of  evidence, 
 urged  by  way  of  objection  againft  a  dodlrine, 
 the  proof  of  which  is  not  reafon,  but  reve- 
 lation. Confider  then :  people  ruin  their 
 fortunes  by  extravagance ;  they  bring  difeafes 
 upon  themfelves  by  excefsj  they  incur  the 
 penalties  of  civil  laws,  and  furely  civil  go- 
 vernment is  natural :  will  forrow  for  thefe 
 follies  paft,  and  behaving  well  for  the  future, 
 alone  and  of  itfelf,  prevent  the  natural  confe- 
 quences  of  them  ?  On  the  contrary,  men's 
 natural  abilities  of  helping  themfelves  are 
 often  impaired  :  or  if  not,  yet  they  are  forced 
 to  be  beholden  to  the  afiiftance  of  others, 
 upon  feveral  accounts,  and  in  different  ways : 
 afliftance  which  they  would  have  had  no  occa- 
 fion  for,  had  it  not  been  for  their  mifconduft ; 
 but  which,  in  the  difadvantageous  condition 
 they  have  reduced  themfelves  to,  is  abfolutely 
 neceffary  to  their  recovery,  and  retrieving 
 their  affairs.  Now  fince  this  is  our  cafe, 
 confidering  ourfclves  merely  as  inhabitants  of 
 this  world,  and  as  having  a  temporal  intereft 
 here,  under  the  natural  government  of  God, 
 which  however  has  a  great  deal  moral  in  it : 
 why  is  it  not  fuppofeable  that  this  may  be 
 our  cafe  alfo,  in  our  more  important  capacity, 
 a^  under  his  perfed:  moral  government,  and 
 having  a  more  general  and  future  intereft  de- 
 pending ?  If  we  have  milbehaved  in  this 
 Z  higher 
 
Chap.  V.     a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.        2jy 
 
 higher  capacity,  and  rendered  ourfelves  ob- 
 noxious to  the  future  punifliment,  which  God 
 has  annexed  to  vice  :  it  is  plainly  credible, 
 that  behaving  well  for  the  time  to  come,  may 
 be not  ufelefs,  God  forbid but  whol- 
 ly infufficient,  alone  and  of  itfelf,  to  prevent 
 that  punifliment ;  or  to  put  us  in  the  condi- 
 tion, which  we  fhould  have  been  in,  had  we 
 preferved  our  innocence. 
 
 And  though  we  ought  to  reafon  with  all 
 reverence,  whenever  we  reafon  concerning 
 the  divine  condud :  yet  it  may  be  added,  that 
 it  is  clearly  contrary  to  all  our  notions  of  go- 
 vernment, as  well  as  to  what  is,  in  fa6l,  the 
 general  conftitutlon  of  nature,  to  fuppofe  that 
 doing  well  for  the  future,  fhould,  in  all  cafes, 
 prevent  all  the  judicial  bad  confequences  of 
 having  done  evil,  or  all  the  punifliment  an- 
 nexed to  difobedience.  And  we  have  mani- 
 feftly  nothing  from  whence  to  determine,  in 
 what  degree  and  in  what  cafes,  reformation 
 would  prevent  this  punifhment,  even  fuppof- 
 ing  that  it  would  in  fome.  And  though  the 
 efhcacy  of  repentance  itfelf  alone,  to  prevent 
 what  mankind  had  rendered  themfelves  ob- 
 noxious to,  and  recover  what  they  had  for- 
 feited, is  now  infifled  upon,  in  oppofition  to 
 Chriflianity  :  yet,  by  the  general  prevalence 
 of  propitiatory  facriiices  over  the  heathen 
 world,  this  notion,  of  repentance  alone  being 
 T  3  fufficient 
 
2/8  The  Appointment  of        Part  II. 
 
 fufficient  to  expiate  guilt,  appears  to  be  con- 
 trary to  the  general  fenfe  of  mankind. 
 
 Upon  the  whole  then :  had  the  laws,  the 
 general  laws  of  God's  government  been  per- 
 mitted to  operate,  without  any  interpofition 
 in  our  behalf,  the  future  punifliment,  for 
 ought  we  know  to  the  contrary,  or  have  any 
 reafon  to  think,  muft  inevitably  have  follow^ 
 ed,  notwithftanding  any  thing  we  could  have 
 done  to  prevent  it.     Now, 
 
 V.  In  this  darknefs,  or  this  light  of  na- 
 ture, call  it  which  you  pleafe,  revelation 
 comes  in ;  confirms  every  doubting  fear, 
 which  could  enter  into  the  heart  of  man, 
 concerning  the  future  unprevented  confe- 
 quenee  of  wickednefs  -,  fuppofes  the  world  to 
 be  in  a  ftate  of  ruin;  (a  fuppofition  which 
 feems  the  very  ground  of  the  Chriftian  dif- 
 penfation,  and  which,  if  not  proveable  by 
 reafon,  yet  it  is  in  no  wife  contrary  to  it  \) 
 teaches  us  too,  that  the  rules  of  divine  go- 
 vernment are  fuch,  as  not  to  admit  of  pardon 
 immediately  and  diredly  upon  repentance,  or 
 by  the  fole  efficacy  of  it :  but  then  teaches 
 at  the  fame  time,  what  nature  might  juftly 
 have  hoped,  that  the  moral  government  of 
 the  univerfe  was  not  fo  rigid,  but  that  there 
 was  room  for  an  interpolition,  to  avert  the 
 fatal  confequences  of  vice  ^  which  therefore, 
 
 by 
 
Chap.  V.     a  Mediator  and  Redeemer .         279 
 
 by  this  means,  does  admit  of  pardon.     Reve- 
 lation teaches  us,  that  the  unknown  laws  of 
 God's  more  general  government,  no  lefs  than 
 the  particular  laws  by  w^hich  we  experience 
 he  governs  us  at  prefent,  are  compaffionate  ^ 
 as  well  as  good  in  the  more  general  notion  of 
 goodnefs :  and  that  he  hath  mercifully  pro- 
 vided, that  there  fliould  be  an  interpofition 
 to  prevent  the  deftrucSion  of  human  kind; 
 whatever  that  deftrudlion  unpre vented  w^ould 
 have  been.     God  Jo  loved  the  world,  thizt  he 
 gave  his  only  begotte?2  Son,  that  whojoever  be-- 
 lieveth,  not,  to  be  fure,  in  a  fpeculative,  but 
 in  a  practical  fenfe,  that  whofoever  believeth  in 
 him,  Jhould  not  perifb  ^ :  gave  his  Son  in   the 
 fame  way  of  goodnefs  to  the  world,  as  he  af- 
 fords particular  perfons  the  friendly  affiftance 
 of  their  fellow -creatures  ;  when,  without  it, 
 their  temporal  ruin  would  be  the  certain  con- 
 fequence  of  their  follies  :  in  the  fame  way  of 
 goodnefs,  I   fay ;  though  in  a   tranfcendent 
 and  infinitely  higher  degree.     And   the  Son 
 of  God  loved  us  and  gave  himfelffor  us,  with 
 a  love,  which  he  himfelf  compares  to  that  of 
 human  friendihip :  though,   in  this  cafe,  all 
 comparifons  muft  fall  infinitely  fhort  of  the 
 thing  intended  to    be    illuftrated    by   them. 
 He  interpofed  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  was  ne- 
 ceflary  and  effedual  to  prevent  that  execution 
 of  juftice  upon  finners,  which  God  had  ap- 
 
 ^  p.  271.  5;c.  '  Joh.  iii,  16. 
 
 T  4  pointed 
 
28 o  ^he  Apf  ointment  of        Part  IL 
 
 pointed  fhould  otherwife  have  been  executed 
 upon  them :  or  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  to  pre- 
 vent that  punifliment  from  adually  folio w^ing, 
 which,  according  to  the  general  laws  of  divine 
 government,  muft  have  followed  the  fins  of 
 the  world,  had  it  not  beer^  for  fuch  interpo- 
 fition  \ 
 
 If  any  thing  here  faid,  fhould  appear,  up- 
 on firft  thought,  inconfiftent  with  divine 
 goodnefs  5  a  fecond,  I  am  perfuaded,  will  en- 
 
 **  It  cannot,  T  fuppofe,  be  imagined,  even  by  the  moll 
 curfory  reader,  that  it  is,  in  any  fort,  affirmed  or  implied 
 in  any  thing  faid  in  this  chapter,  that  none  can  have  the 
 benefit  of  the  general  Redemption,  but  fuch  as  have  the 
 advantage  of  being  made  acquainted  with  it  in  the  prefent 
 life.  But  it  may  be  needful  to  mention,  that  feveral  quef- 
 tions,  vi'hich  have  been  brought  into  the  fubje(St  before  us, 
 and  determi;  cd,  are  not  in  the  leaft  entered  into  here : 
 queftions  which  have  been,  I  fear,  rafhly  determined,  ancj 
 perhaps  with  equal  raftinefs  contrary  ways.  For  inftance, 
 whether  God  could  have  faved  the  world  by  other  means 
 than  the  death  ol  Chrilt,  confidently  with  the  general  laws 
 of  his  government.  And  had  not  Chrift  conie  into  the 
 world,  what  would  have  been  the  future  condition  of  the 
 better  fort  of  men  \  thole  juft  perfons  over  the  face  of  the 
 earth,  for  whom,  Mam.JJes  m  his  prayer  aflerts,  repentance 
 •was  not  appointed.  J  he  meaning  of  the  firft  of  thefe 
 queftions  is  greatly  ambiguous :  and  neither  of  them  can 
 properly  be  anfwered,  without  going  upon  that  infinitely 
 abiurd  luppolition,  that  we  know  the  whole  of  the  cafe. 
 And  pertiaps  the  very  inquiry,  what  wouli  have  followed  if 
 Gcd  ban  7,ut  aone  as  he  has^  may  have  in  it  fome  very  great 
 impropriety ;  and  ought  not  to  be  carried  on  any  farther, 
 ^han  is  neceffary  to  help  our  partial  and  inadequate  concep- 
 tions of  things. 
 
 tirely 
 
Chap.  V.    a  Mediator  ajii  Redeemer,       281 
 
 tirely  remove  that  appearance.  For  were  we 
 to  fuppofe  the  conftitution  of  things  to  be 
 fuch,  as  that  the  whole  creation  muft  have 
 perilhed,  had  it  not  been  for  fomewhat,  which 
 God  had  appointed  fliould  be,  in  order  to 
 prevent  that  rum :  even  this  fuppofition  would 
 not  be  incoiiixftent,  in  any  degree,  with  the 
 moft  ablolutely  perfed:  goodnefs.  But  ftill 
 it  may  be  thought,  that  this  whole  manner 
 of  treating  the  fubjedl  before  us,  fuppofes 
 mankind  to  be  naturally  in  a  very  ilrange 
 ftatc.  And  truly  fo  it  does.  But  it  is  not 
 Chriftianity,  which  has  put  us  into  this  ftate. 
 Whoever  will  conlider  the  manifold  mifc- 
 ries,  and  the  extreme  wickednefs  of  the  world; 
 that  the  beft  have  great  wrongneffes  within 
 themfelves,  which  they  complain  of,  and  en- 
 deavour to  amende  but  that  the  generality 
 grow  more  profligate  and  corrupt  with  age : 
 that  heathen  moralifts  thought  the  prefent 
 ftate  to  be  a  ftate  of  punifliment:  and,  v/hat 
 might  be  added,  that  the  earth  our  habitation 
 has  the  appearances  of  being  a  ruin :  who- 
 ever, I  fay,  will  confider  all  thefe,  and  fome 
 other  obvious  things,  will  think  he  has  little 
 reafon  to  objedl  againfl:  the  Scripture  account, 
 that  mankind  is  in  a  ftate  of  degradation; 
 againft  this  being  the  fa6t :  how  difficult 
 foever  he  may  think  it  to  account  for,  or 
 even  to  form  a  diftindt  conception  of  the  oc- 
 cafions  and  circumftances  of  it.  But  that 
 the  crime  of  our  firft  parents  was  the  occa- 
 
 fion 
 
282  'The  Appoiittment  of         Part  11. 
 
 lion  of  our  being  placed  in  a  more  difadvan- 
 tageous  condition,  is  a  thing  throughout  and 
 particularly  analogous  to  what  we  fee,  in  the 
 daily  courfe  of  natural  Providence ;  as  the 
 recovery  of  the  world  by  the  interpofition  of 
 Chrift,  has  been  iliewn  to  be  fo  in  general. 
 
 VI.  The  particular  manner  in  which 
 Chrift  interpofed  in  the  redemption  of  the 
 world,  or  his  office  as  mediator ^  in  the  largeft 
 fenfe,  between  God  and  man,  is  thus  repre- 
 fented  to  us  in  the  Scripture.  He  is  the  light 
 of  the  world^  ^  the  revealer  of  the  will  of  God 
 in  the  moft  eminent  icnit.  He  is  a  propiti- 
 atory facrifice  ^  -,  the  lamb  of  God  ^ :  and,  as  he 
 voluntarily  offered  himfelf  up,  he  is  ftiled  our 
 high-prieft  ^.  And,  which  feems  of  peculiar 
 weight,  he  is  defcribed  beforehand  in  the  Old 
 Teftament,  under  the  fame  charad:ers  of  a 
 prieft,  and  an  expiatory  vidlim  '.  And  where- 
 as it  is  objecled,  that  all  this  is  merely 
 by  way  of  allufion  to  the  facrifices  of  the 
 Mofaick  Law,  the  apoftle  on  the  contrary 
 affirms,  that  the  Law  was  a  fiadow  of  good 
 things  to  come,  and  not  the  vejy  image  of  the 
 things  ^  :  and  that  the  priejls  that  offer  gifts 
 according  to  the  law—ferve  unto  the  example 
 
 *=  Joh.  i.  and  vlli.  I3.  ^  Rom.  iii.  25.  and  v.  ii. 
 I  Cor.  V.  7.  Eph.  V.  2.  I  Joh.  ii.  2.  Matth.  xxvi.  28. 
 s  Joh.  i.  29,  36.  and  throughout  the  Book  of  Revelation. 
 ^  Throughout  the  Epiitle  to  the  Plebrews.  ^  Ifai.  liii. 
 
 Dan.  ix.  24.     Pf.  ex.  4.  ^  Heb.  x.  i. 
 
 7  a7id 
 
chap.  V.     a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.       283 
 
 and  Jhadow  of  heavenly  things^  as  Mofes  'was 
 admonijhed  of  Gody  when  he  was  about  to  make 
 the  tabernacle.  For  fee,  faith  he,  that  thou 
 make  all  things  according  to  the  pattern  Jhewed 
 to  thee  in  the  ?nou?it\  /.  e,  the  Levitical 
 priefthood  was  a  fliadow  of  the  priefthood  of 
 Chrift;  In  hue  manner  as  the  tabernacle 
 made  by  Mofes ^  was  according  to  that  (hewed 
 him  in  the  mount.  The  priefthood  of  Chrlft, 
 and  the  tabernacle  in  the  mount,  were  the 
 originals :  of  the  former  of  which,  the  Le- 
 vitical priefthood  was  a  type;  and  of  the 
 latter,  the  tabernacle  made  by  Mofes  was  a 
 copy.  The  dod:rine  of  this  epiftle  then 
 plainly  is,  that  the  legal  facriiices  were  allu- 
 fions  to  the  great  and  final  atonement,  to  be 
 made  by  the  blood  of  Chrift  ^  and  not  that 
 this  was  an  allufion  to  thofe.  Nor  can  any 
 thing  be  more  exprefs  or  determinate,  than 
 the  following  palTage.  It  is  not  pofjible  that 
 the  blood  of  bulls  and  of  goats  JJjould  take  away 
 Jin,  Wherefore  when  he  comet h  into  the  worlds 
 he  faithf  facrifice  and  offering,  i.  e.  of  bulls 
 and  of  goats,  thou  wouldeft  not,  but  a  body 
 
 haft  thou  prepared  ?ne Lo  I  come  to  do  thy 
 
 will  O  God By  which  will  we  are  fancli-. 
 
 fed,  through  the  offering  of  the  body  of  Jefus 
 Chrift  once  for  all"^.  And  to  add  one  paffage 
 more  of  the  like  kind :  Chrijl  was  once  offered 
 to  bear  the  fns  of  many  -,  and  unto  them  that 
 
 *  Heb.  vlii.  4,  5.  ^  Hcb.  x.  4,  5,  7,  9,  10. 
 
 look 
 
284  5"^^  Appointment  of        Part  IL 
 
 look  fo?^  him  JJjall  he  appear  the  fecond  time, 
 without  Jin ',  i.  e.  without  bearing  fin,  as  he 
 did  at  his  firft  coming,  by  being  an  offering 
 for  it ;  without  having  our  iniquities  again 
 laid  upon  himy  without  being  any  more  a  fin- 
 offering: unto  the?n  that  look  for  himjhall 
 
 he  appear  the  fecond  time^  without  fny  unto 
 falvation ".  Nor  do  the  infpired  writers  at  all 
 confine  themfelves  to  this  manner  of  fpeaking 
 concerning  the  fatisfadion  of  Chrift;  but 
 declare  an  efficacy  in  what  he  did  and  fuffered 
 for  us,  additional  to  and  beyond  mere  in- 
 ftru6lion,  example  and  government,  in  great 
 variety  of  expreffion  :  'That  Jefus  Jhould  die 
 for  that  nation  the  Jews :  a72d  not  for  that 
 nation  only^  hut  that  alfoy  plainly  by  the  effi- 
 cacy of  his  death,  he  Jhould  gather  together 
 in  oncy  the  children  of  God y  that  were  fcattered 
 abroad'' :  that  he  filffered for  fnsy  the  juji  for 
 the  unjujl  ^ :  that  he  gave  his  lify  himfelf  a 
 ranjom'^ :  that  we  are  bought y  bought  with 
 a price^ :  that  he  redeemed  us  with  his  blood ; 
 redeemed  us  from  the  curfe  of  the  law  being 
 made  a  curfe  for  us ' ;  that  he  is  our  advocate^ 
 inter cejjor  2ind propitiation^ :  that  he  was  made 
 perfetty  or  confuriimate,  through  fufferings : 
 and  being  thus  made  perfeEiy  he  became  the 
 author  of  falvation  " ;   that  God  was  in  Chriji 
 
 "  Hcb.  Ix.  28.  °  Joh.  xi.  51,  52.  P  I  Pet.  iii.  18. 
 ^Matth.  XX.  28.  Mark  x.45,  i  Tim.  il.  6.  '  2  Pet.  ii.  r. 
 Rev.  xiv.  4.  I  Cor.  vi.  20.  "  i  Pet.  i.  19.  Rev.  v.  9. 
 Gall.  iii.  13,  *  Heb.  vii.  25.  i  Joh.  ii.  i,  2.  "  Heb.  ii, 
 10.  and  V.  9. 
 
 reconciling 
 
] 
 
 Chap.  V.      a  Mediator  and  Redee?7ier.      285 
 
 reconciling  the  loorld  to  himfelf-y  by  the  death 
 of  his  Sony  by  the  crofs ;  not  imputing  their 
 trefpajfes  unto  them  ^  :  and  laftly,  that  through 
 death  he  dejlroyed  him  that  had  the  power 
 cf  death  "".  Chrift  then  having  thus  humbled 
 himfelf,  and  become  obedient  to  deaths  even  the 
 death  of  the  crofs ;  God  alfo  hath  highly  exalted 
 himy  and  given  him  a  name  which  is  above 
 every  nayne :  hath  given  all  things  into  his 
 hands :  hath  committed  all  judgnient  unto  him  y 
 that  all  men  fiould  honour  the  Son  even  as  they 
 honour  the  Father  ^.  For,  worthy  is  the  lamb 
 that  was  fain  y  to  receive  power  y  and  riches^ 
 and  wifdomy  and  freiigthy  and  honour y  and 
 glory y  and  blefing.  And  every  creature  which 
 is  in  heaven y  ayid  on  the  earthy  heard  lyfayingy 
 Blefingy  and  honour y  and  glory y  and  power y  be 
 unto  him  that  fitteth  upon  the  throncy  and  unto 
 the  La?nb  for  ever  and  ever "". 
 
 Thefe  paffages  of  Scripture  feem  to  com- 
 prehend and  exprefs  the  chief  parts  of  Chrift's 
 office,  as  mediator  between  God  and  man,  (o 
 far,  I  mean,  as  the  nature  of  this  his  office  is 
 revealed;  and  it  is  ufually  treated  of  by  di- 
 vines under  three  heads, 
 
 Firji,  He  was,  by  way  of  eminence  the 
 Prophet :  that  Prophet  that  Jhould  come  into 
 
 ^  2  Cor.  V.  19.  Rom.  v.  10  Eph.  ii.  16.  *  Heb.  ii. 
 14.  See  alfo  a  remarkable  pafTage  in  the  Book  of  Job, 
 xxxiii.  24.  y  Phil,  ii,  8,  9.  Job,  iii.  35,  and  v,  22,  23. 
 »  Rer.  V.  12,  13. 
 
 the 
 
286  The  Appointment  of        Part  IL 
 
 the  world  ^i  to  declare  the  divine  will.  He 
 publiflicd  anew  the  law  of  nature,  which  men 
 had  corrupted ;  and  the  very  knowledge  of 
 which,  to  fome  degree,  was  loft  among  them. 
 He  taught  mankind,  taught  us  authoritatively, 
 to  live  foberlyy  righteoujly,  and  godly  in  this 
 prefent  worlds  in  expectation  of  the  future 
 judgment  of  God.  He  confirmed  the  truth 
 of  this  moral  fyftem  of  nature,  and  gave  us 
 additional  evidence  of  it  j  the  evidence  of  tef- 
 timony  \  He  diftinftlv  revealed,  the  man- 
 ner in  which  God  v/ould  be  worfhipped,  the 
 efficacy  of  repentance,  and  the  rewards  and 
 punifhments  of  a  future  life.  Thus  he  was 
 a  prophet  in  a  fenfe,  in  which  no  other  ever 
 was.  To  which  is  to  be  added,  that  he  fet 
 us  a  perfed:  example^  that  we  p^ould follow  his 
 Jleps. 
 
 Secojzdfyy  He  has  a  kingdom^  which  is  not  of 
 this  wofdd.  He  founded  a  Church,  to  be  to 
 mankind  a  ftanding  memorial  of  religion, 
 and  invitation  to  it ;  which  he  promifed  to 
 be  with  always  even  to  the  end.  He  exer- 
 cifes  an  invifible  government  over  it,  himfelf, 
 and  by  his  Spirit :  over  that  part  of  it,  which 
 is  militaiit  here  on  earth,  a  government  of 
 difcipline,yir  the  pcrfediing  of  the  faints y  for 
 the  edifying  his  body :  till  we  all  come  in  the 
 unity  of  the  faith y  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
 
 » Joh.  vi.  14.  ^  p.  199,  &c. 
 
 Son 
 
Chap,  V.      a  Mediator  a?id  Redeemer.      287 
 
 Son  of  God 9  unto  a  perfect  man,  unto  the  mea^ 
 Jure  of  the  Jlature  of  the  fullnefs  ofChriJl^. 
 Of  this  Church,  all  perfons  fcattered  over 
 the  world,  who  live  in  obedience  to  his  laws, 
 are  members.  For  thefe  he  is  gone  to  pre^ 
 fare  a  place,  and  will  come  again  to  receive 
 them  unto  himfelf  that  where  he  is,  there  they 
 may  be  alfo ;  and  reign  with  him  for  ever  and 
 ever  ^ :  and  likewife  to  take  veyigeance  on  them 
 that  know  not  God^  and  obey  not  hi^  gfp^l  "• 
 
 Againft  thefe  parts  of  Chrift's  office,  I 
 find  no  objedlions,  but  what  are  fully  obvia- 
 ted in  the  beginning  of  this  Chapter. 
 
 Lajlly,  Chrift  offered  himfelf  a  propitia- 
 tory facrifice,  and  made  atonement  for  the 
 fms  of  the  world  :  which  is  mentioned  laft, 
 in  regard  to  what  is  objecfred  againft  it.  Sa- 
 crifices of  expiation  were  commanded  the 
 Jews,  and  obtained  amongft  moft  other  na- 
 tions, from  tradition,  whofe  original  probably 
 was  revelation.  And  they  were  continually 
 repeated,  both  occafionally,  and  at  the  returns 
 of  ftated  times :  and  made  up  great  part  of 
 the  external  religion  of  mankind.  But  now 
 once  in  the  end  of  the  world  Chriji  appeared  to 
 put  away  fm  by  the  facrifice  of  himfelf  \  And 
 this  facrifice  was,  in  the  higheft  degree  and 
 
 *  Eph.  iv.  12,  13.  *■  Joh.  xiv.  2,  3.    Rev.  iii.  2i, 
 
 and  xi,  15        « 2  IhefT,  i.  8.        ^  Heb.  ix.  26. 
 
 with 
 
288  "The  Appointment  of       Part  II. 
 
 with  the  moft  extenfive  influence^  of  that 
 efficacy  for  obtaining  pardon  of  fin,  which 
 the  heathens  may  be  fuppofcd  to  have 
 thought  their  facrifices  to  have  been,  and 
 which  the  Jewiih  facrifices  really  were  in 
 fome  degree,  and  with  regard  to  fome 
 perfons. 
 
 How  and  in  what  particular  way  it  had 
 this  efficacy,  there  are  not  wanting  perfons 
 who  have  endeavoured  to  explain :  but  I  do 
 not  find  that  the  Scripture  has  explained  it. 
 We  feem  to  be  very  much  in  the  dark,  con-^ 
 cerning  the  manner  in  which  the  ancients 
 underftood  atonement  to  be  made,  /.  e. 
 pardon  to  be  obtained  by  facrifices.  i\nd  if 
 the  Scripture  has,  as  furely  it  has,  left  this 
 matter  of  the  fatisfadtion  of  Chrifl  myfl:eri- 
 ous,  left  fomewhat  in  it  unrevealed,  all  con* 
 jed;ures  about  it  mud  be,  if  not  evidently  ab- 
 furd,  yet  at  leaft  uncertain.  Nor  has  any  one 
 reafon  to  complain  for  want  of  farther  infor- 
 mation, unlefs  he  can  fhew  his  claim  to  it. 
 
 Some  having  endeavoured  to  explain  the 
 efficacy  of  v/hat  Chrifl:  has  done  and  fuff^er^d 
 for  us,  beyond  what  the  Scripture  has  autho- 
 rized: others,  probably  becaufe  they  could  not 
 explain  it,  have  been  for  taking  it  away,  and 
 confining  his  office  as  redeemer  of  the  world 
 to  his  infl:rudtion,  example  and  govern- 
 ment of  the  church.     Whereas  the  doftrine 
 
 of 
 
Chap.  V.     a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.       289 
 
 of  the  gofpel  appears  to  be  ;  not  only  that  he 
 taught  the  eriicacy  of  repentance,  but  rendered 
 it  of  the  efficacy  which  it  is,  by  what  he  did 
 and  fuftcrcd  for  us  :  that  he  obtained  for  us 
 the  b^:nefit  of  having  our  repentance  accepted 
 unto  eternal  life:  not  only  that  he  revealed  to 
 finners,  that  they  were  in  a  capacity  of  falva- 
 tion,   and  how   they   might    obtain   it;    but 
 moreover  that  he  put  them  into  this  capacity 
 of  falvation,  by  what  he  did  and  fuffered  for 
 them;  put  us  intoacapacity  of  efcaping future 
 puniihment,  and  obtaining  future  happinefs. 
 !And  it  is  our  wifdom  thankfully  to  accept 
 the   benefit,  by  performing    the    conditions, 
 upon  which  it  is  offered,  on  our  part,  with- 
 out difputing  how  it  was  procured,  on  his. 
 For 
 
 VII.  Since  we  neither  know,  by  what  means 
 punifliment  in  a  future  ftate  would  have  fol- 
 lowed wickednefs  in  this;  nor  in  what  man- 
 ner it  would  have  been  inflidled,  had  it  not 
 been  prevented;  nor  all  the  reafons  why  its 
 inflidion  would  have  been  needful ;  nor  the 
 particular  nature  of  that  ftate  of  happinefs, 
 which  Chrift  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  difci- 
 ples  :  and  fince  we  are  ignorant  how  far  any 
 thing  w^hich  we  could  do,  would,  alone  and 
 of  itlelf,  have  been  eff^-T:ual  to  prevenr  that 
 punilTiment,  to  which  we  were  obnoxious, 
 and  recover  that  happinefs,  which  we  had 
 forfeited  ;  it  is  moil  eviaeni.  we  are  not  judges, 
 
 U  ante- 
 
290  Tihe  Appointment  of         Part  II. 
 
 antecedently  to  revelation,  whether  a  media- 
 tor was  or  was  not  neceflary,  to  obtain  thofe 
 ends :   to  prevent   That  future  punifiiment, 
 and  bring  mankind  to  the  final  happinefs  of 
 their  nature.    And  for  the  very  fame  reafons, 
 upon  fuppofition  of  the  neceflity  of  a  media^ 
 tor,  we  are  no  more  judges,  antecedently  to 
 revelation,  of  the  whole  nature  of  his  office, 
 or  the  feveral  parts  of  which  it  confifts ;  of 
 what  was  fit  and  requifite  to  be  affigned  him, 
 in  order  to  accomplifli  the  ends  of  divine  pro- 
 vidence in  the  appointment.  And  from  hence 
 it  follows,  that  to  objedt  againft  the  expedi- 
 ency or  ufefulnefs  of  particular  things,  re- 
 vealed to  have  been  done  or  fuiFered  by  him, 
 becaufe  we  do  not  fee  how  they  were  condu- 
 cive to  thofe  ends ;  is  highly  abfurd.     Yet 
 nothing  is  more  common  to  be  met  with, 
 than  this  abfurdity.     But  if  it  be  acknow- 
 ledged beforehand,  that  we  are  not  judges  in 
 the  cafe,  it  is  evident  that  no  objedtion  can, 
 with  any  fhadow  of  reafon,  be  urged  againft 
 any  particular    part    of  Chrift's   mediatorial 
 oflSce  revealed  in   Scripture,    till  it    can   be 
 fhewn  pofitivcly,  not  to  be  requifite  or  con- 
 ducive to  the  ends  propofed  to  be  accom- 
 pliflied ;  or  that  it  is  in  itfelf  unreafonable. 
 
 And  there  is  one  objedtion  made  againft 
 the  fatisfadlion  of  Chrift,  which  looks  to  be 
 of  this  pofitive  kind :  that  the  dodrine  of 
 his  being  appointed  to  fuifer  for  the  fins  of 
 
 the 
 
Chap.  V.     a  Mediator  and  Redeemer,        291 
 
 the  world,  reprefents  God  as  being  indifferent 
 whether    he    punifhed    the    innocent  or  the 
 guilty.     Now  from  the   foregoing   obferva- 
 tions  we  may  fee  the  extreme  llightnefs  of  all 
 fuch  objed:ions  y  and  (though  it  is  moft  cer- 
 tain all  who  make  them  do  not  fee  the  confe- 
 quence)   that    they  conclude    altogether    as 
 much,  againft  God's  whole  original  conftitu- 
 tion   of  nature,  and  the  whole  daily  courfe 
 of  divine  Providence  in  the  government  of 
 the  world,  /.  e.  again  (l  the  whole  fcheme  of 
 Theifm  and  the  whole  notion  of  religion ;   as 
 againft  Chriftianity.    For  the  world  is  a  con- 
 ftitution    or    fyftem,    whole    parts    have    a 
 mutual  reference  to  each  other  :  and  there  is 
 a  fcheme  of  things  gradually  carrying  on, 
 called  the  courfe  of  nature,  to  the  carrying  on 
 of  which,  God  has  appointed  us,  in  various 
 ways,  to  contribute.    And  when,  in  the  daily 
 courfe  of  natural  providence,  it  is  appointed 
 that  innocent    people    fhould  fuifer  lor  the 
 faults  of  the  guilty,  this  is  liable  to  the  very 
 fame  objection,  as  the  inftance  we  are  now 
 confidering.     The  infinitely  greater  import- 
 ance   of  that    appointment    of  Chriftianity 
 which  is   objed:ed  againft,  does  not  hinder 
 but  it  may  be,  as  it  plainly  is,  an  appoint- 
 ment of  the  very  fame  kind,  with  what  the 
 world  affords  us  daily  examples  of.     Nay  if 
 there  were  any  force  at  all  in  the  objection, 
 it  would  be  ftronger,  in  one  refpedt,  againft 
 natural  Providence,  than  againft  Chriftianity : 
 
 U  2  becaufe 
 
292  ^he  Appointment  of        Part  II, 
 
 becaufe  under  the  former,  we  are  in  many 
 cafes  commanded,  and  even  neceffitated  whe- 
 ther we  will  or  no,  to  faffer  for  the  faults  of 
 others;  whereas  the  fufferings  of  Chrift  were 
 voluntary.  The  world's  being  under  the 
 righteous  government  of  God,  does  indeed 
 imply,  that  finally  and  upon  the  whole  every 
 one  Ihall  receive  according  to  his  perfonal  de- 
 ferts :  and  the  general  docftrine  of  the  whole 
 Scripture  is,  that  this  ihall  be  the  completion 
 of  the  divine  government.  But  during  the 
 progrefs,  and,  for  ought  we  know,  even  in 
 order  to  the  completion  of  this  moral  fcheme, 
 vicarious  punifhments  may  be  fit,  and  abfo- 
 lutely  neceffiry.  Men  by  their  follies  run 
 themfelves  into  extreme  diftrefs ;  into  diffi- 
 culties v/hich  would  be  abfolutely  fatal  to 
 them,  were  it  not  for  the  interpofition  and 
 aflillance  of  others.  God  commands  by  the 
 law  of  nature,  that  we  afford  them  this  aififl- 
 ance,  in  many  cafes  where  we  cannot  do  it 
 without  very  great  pains,  and  labour,  and 
 fufi^Tings  to  ourfelves.  And  we  fee  in  what 
 variety  of  v/ays,  one  perfon's  fufferings  con- 
 tribute to  the  relief  of  another :  and  how,  or 
 by  what  particular  means,  this  comes  to  pafs 
 or  follows,  from  the  conftitution  and  laws  of 
 nature,  which  come  under  our  notice :  and, 
 being  familiarized  to  it,  men  are  not  ihocked 
 with  it.  So  that  the  reafon  of  their  infifting 
 upon  objedions  of  the  foregoing  kind  againft 
 the  fatisfadion  of  Chrift,  is^  either  that  they 
 
 do 
 
chap.  V.     a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.       293 
 
 do  not  confider  God's  fettled    and  uniform 
 appointments  as  his  appointments  at  all  j  or 
 elfe,  they  forget  that  vicarious  punifhment  is 
 a  providential  appointment  of  every  day's  ex- 
 perience :  and  then,   from  their  being  unac- 
 quainted w^ith  the  more  general  laws  of  na- 
 ture or  divine  government  over  the  world, 
 and  not  feeing  how  the  fufferings  of  Chrift 
 could  contribute    to    the  redemption   of  it, 
 unlefs  by  arbitrary  and  tyrannical  will ;   they 
 conclude  his  fufferings  could  not  contribute 
 to  it  any  other  way.   And  yet,  what  has  been 
 often  alledged  in  juftification  of  this  dodtrine, 
 even  from  the  apparent  natural  tendency  of 
 this  method  of  our  redemption ;  its  tendency 
 to  vindicate  the  authority  of  God's  laws,  and 
 deter  his  creatures  from  fin  ;   this  has  never 
 yet  been  anfwered,  and  is  I  think  plainly  un- 
 anfwerable :  though  I  am  far  from  thinking 
 it  an  account  of  the  whole  of  the  cafe.     But 
 without    taking    this    into    confideration,  it 
 abundantly  appears,    from  the   obfervations 
 above  made,  that  this  objedlion  is,  not  an 
 objed;ion  againft  Chriflianity,  but  againft  the 
 whole  general  conftitution  of  nature.     And 
 if  it  were  to  be  confidered  as  an  objection 
 againft  Chriflianity,  or  confidering  it  as  it  is, 
 an  objection  againft  the  conftitution  of  na- 
 ture; it  amounts  to  no  more  in  conclufion 
 than  this,  that  a  divine  appointment  cannot 
 be  neceflary  or  expedient,  becaufe  the  objec- 
 tor does  not  difcern  it  to  be  fo ;  though  he 
 
 U  3  muft 
 
294  ^'^^  Appointment  of        Part  II. 
 
 muft  own  that  the  nature  of  the  cafe  is  fuch, 
 as  renders  him  uncapable  of  judging,  whether 
 it  be  fo  or  not ;  or  of  feeing  it  to  be  neceflary, 
 though  it  were  fo. 
 
 It  is  indeed  a  matter  of  great  patience  to 
 reafonable  men,  to  find  people  arguing  in  this 
 manner  :  obje(fling  againft  the  credibility  of 
 fuch  particular  things  revealed  in  Scripture, 
 that  they  do  not  fee  the  neceffity  or  expediency 
 of  them.     For  though  it  is  highly  right,  and 
 the  moft  pious  exercife  of  our  underftanding, 
 to  enquire  with  due  reverence  into  the  ends 
 and  reafons  of  God's  difpenfations :  yet  when 
 thofe  reafons  are  concealed,  to  argue  from  our 
 ignorance,  that  fuch  difpenfations  cannot  be 
 from  God,  is  infinitely  abfuid.     The  pre- 
 fumption  of  this  kind  of  objed:ions,  feems 
 almoft  loft  in  the  folly  of  them.     And  the 
 folly  of  them  is  yet  greater,  when   they  are 
 urged,  as  ufually  they  are,  againft  things  in 
 Chriftianity  analogous  or  like  to  thofe  natural 
 difpenfations  of  Providence,  which  are  matter 
 of  experience.     Let  reafon  be  kept  to  :   and 
 if  any  part  of  the  Scripture  account  of  the 
 redemption  of  the  world  by  Chrift,  can  be 
 fhewn  to  be  really  contrary  to  it,  let  the 
 Scripture,  in  the  name  of  God,  be  given  up  : 
 but  let  not  fuch  poor  creatures  as  we,  go  on 
 objedting  againft  an  infinite  fcheme,  that  we 
 do  not  fee  the  neceffity  or  ufefulnefs  of  all 
 its  parts,  and  cajl  this  reafoning  3  and,  which 
 
 ftiU 
 
Chap.  V.     a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.       295 
 
 ftill  farther  heightens  the  abfurdity  in  the 
 prefent  cafe,  parts  which  we  are  not  ac- 
 tively concerned  in.  For  it  may  be  worth 
 mentioning, 
 
 Lajily,  That  not  only  the  reafon  of  the 
 thing,  but  the  whole  analogy  of  nature, 
 iliould  teach  us,  not  to  expecS  to  have  the 
 like  information  concerning  the  divine  con- 
 dufl:,  as  concerning  our  own  duty.  God 
 inftrudls  us  by  experience,  (for  it  is  not  reafon, 
 but  experience  which  inftrud:s  us)  what  good 
 or  bad  confequences  will  follow  from  our 
 acting  in  fuch  and  fuch  manners  :  and  by 
 this  he  directs  us,  how  we  are  to  behave 
 ourfelves.  But,  though  we  are  fufficiently 
 inftrudled  for  the  common  purpofes  of  life : 
 yet  it  is  but  an  almoft  infinitely  fmall  part  of 
 natural  Providence,  which  we  are  at  all  let 
 into.  The  cafe  is  the  fame  with  regard  to 
 revelation.  The  do6lrine  of  a  mediator  be- 
 tween God  and  man,  againft  which  it  is 
 objed:ed,  that  the  expediency  of  fome  things 
 in  it  is  not  underftood,  relates  only  to  v/hat 
 was  done  on  God's  part  in  the  appointment, 
 and  on  the  Mediator's  in  the  execution  of  it. 
 For  what  is  required  of  us,  in  confequence 
 of  this  gracious  difpenfation,  is  another  fub- 
 jedl,  in  which  none  can  complain  for  want 
 of  information.  The  conftitution  of  the 
 world,  and  God's  natural  government  over 
 it,  is  all  myftery,  as  much  as  the  Chriftiaa 
 
 U  4  difpenfation. 
 
296  7he  AppQintment  of,  ccc.     Part  II. 
 
 dlfpenfation.  Yet  under  the  firft,  he  has 
 given  men  all  things  pertaining  to  Ufe ;  and 
 under  the  other,  all  things  pertaining  unto 
 godlinefs.  And  it  may  be  added,  that  there 
 is  nothing  hard  to  be  accounted  for  in  any  of 
 the  common  pr';cepts  of  Chriili mity  :  though 
 if  there  were,  furely,  a  divine  command  is 
 abundantly  fufficient  to  lay  us  under  the 
 ftrongeft  obligations  to  obedience.  But  the 
 fid:  is,  that  the  reafons  of  all  the  Chriftian 
 precepts  are  evident.  Pofitive  inftitutions  are 
 manifeftly  necefl-iry  to  keep  up  and  propagate 
 religion  amongft  mankind.  And  our  duty 
 to  Chnft,  the  internal  and  external  worfhip 
 of  him.  j  this  part  of  the  religion  of  the 
 Gofpel,  manifeftly  arifes  out  of  what  he  has 
 done  and  fuffered,  his  authority  and  domi- 
 nion, and  the  relation,  which  he  is  revealed 
 to  ftand  in  to  us  % 
 
 ?  p.  20S,  kc. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[     297    ] 
 
 CHAP.     VI. 
 
 Of  the  Want  of  Umverfalky  in   Revelation : 
 and  of  the  fuppofed  Defciency  in  the  Proof 
 of  it. 
 
 IT  has  been  thought  by  fome  perfons,  that 
 if  the  evidence  of  revelation  appears 
 doubtful,  this  itfelf  turns  into  a  pofitive  ar- 
 gument againft  it :  becaufe  it  cannot  be  fup- 
 pofed, that,  if  it  vi^ere  true,  it  would  be  left 
 to  fubfift  upon  doubtful  evidence.  And  the 
 objedtion  againft  revelation  from  its  not  be- 
 ing univerfal,  is  often  infifted  upon  as  of  great 
 weight. 
 
 Now  the  weaknefs  of  thefe  opinions  may 
 be  lliewn,  by  obferving  the  fuppofitions  on 
 which  they  are  founded :  which  are  really 
 fuch  as  thefe  ^  that  it  cannot  be  thought  God 
 would  have  beftowed  any  favour  at  all  upon 
 us,  unlefs  in  the  degree,  which,  we  think, 
 he  might,  and  vv^hich,  we  imagine,  would  be 
 moft  to  our  particular  advantage;  and  alfo 
 that  it  cannot  be  thought  he  would  beftowa 
 favour  upon  any,  unlefs  he  beftowed  the  fame 
 upon  all :  fuppoiitions  which  we  find  contra- 
 gifted,  not  by  a  few  inftances  in  God's  na- 
 tural 
 
298  Revelation  not  iiniverfal :       Part  II. 
 
 tural  government  of  the  world,  but  by  the 
 general  analogy  of  nature  together. 
 
 Perfons  who  fpeak  of  the  evidence  of 
 religion  as  doubtful,  and  of  this  fuppofed 
 doubtfulnefs  as  a  pofitive  argument  againft  it, 
 {liould  be  put  upon  confidering,  what  that 
 evidence  indeed  is,  which  they  ad:  upon  with 
 regard  to  their  temporal  interefts.  For,  it 
 is  not  only  extremely  difficult,  but,  in  many 
 cafes,  abfolutely  impoffible,  to  balance  plea- 
 fure  and  pain,  fatisfaftion  and  uneafinefs,  fo 
 as  to  be  able  to  fay,  on  which  fide  the  over- 
 plus is.  There  are  the  like  difficulties  and 
 impoffibilities  in  making  the  due  allowances, 
 for  a  change  of  temper  and  tafte,  for  fatlety, 
 difgufts,  ill  health :  any  of  which  render 
 men  incapable  of  enjoying,  after  they  have 
 obtained,  what  they  moil  eagerly  deiired. 
 Numberlefs  too  are  the  accidents,  belides  that 
 one  of  untimely  death,  which  may  even  pro- 
 bably difappoint  the  beft  concerted  fchemes : 
 and  ftrong  objedlions  are  often  feen  to  lie 
 againft  them,  not  to  be  removed  or  anfwered, 
 but  which  feem  overbalanced  by  reafons  on 
 the  other  fide ;  fo  as  that  the  certain  diffi- 
 culties and  dangers  of  the  purfuit  are,  by 
 every  one,  thought  juftly  difregarded,  upon 
 account  of  the  appearing  greater  advantages 
 in  cafe  of  fuccefs,  though  there  be  but  little 
 probability  of  it.  Laftly,  every  one  obferves 
 our  liablenefs,  if  we  be  not  upon  our  guard, 
 to  be  deceived  by  the  fallhood  of  men,  and 
 
 the 
 
Chap .V I .  fuppofed  deficiency  in  its  Proof,    299 
 
 the  falfe  appearances    of   things :  and    this 
 danger  muft  be  greatly  increafcd,  if  there  be 
 a  flrong  bias   within,  fuppofe  from  indulged 
 paffion,  to  favour  the  deceit.     Hence  arifcs 
 that  great  uncertainty  and   doubtfuhiefs   of 
 proof,  wherein  our  temporal  intereft  really 
 confifts ;  what  are  the  mofl  probable  means 
 of  attaining  it ;  and  whether  thofe  means  will 
 eventually  be  fuccefsful.     And    numberlefs 
 inftances  there  are,  in  the  daily  courfe  of  hfe, 
 in  which  all  men  think  it  reafonable  to  engage 
 in  purfuits,  though  the  probability  is  greatly 
 againft  fucceeding ;  and  to  make  fuch  pro- 
 vifion    for  themfelves,  as  it    is  fuppofeable 
 they  may  have  occafion  for,  though  the  plain 
 acknowledged  probability  is,  that  they  never 
 fhall.     Then  thofe  who  think  the  objection 
 againft  revelation,  from  its  light  not  being 
 univerfal,  to  be  of  weight,  fhould  obferve, 
 that  the  Author  of  nature,  in    numberlefs 
 inftances,  beftows  That  upon  fome,  which  he 
 does  not  upon  others,  who  feem  equally  to 
 ftand  in  need  of  it.     Indeed  he  appears  to 
 beftow  all  his  gifts  with  the  moft  promif- 
 cuous  variety  among  creatures  of  the  fame 
 fpecies :  health  and   ftrength,    capacities  of 
 prudence  and  of  knowledge,  means  of  im- 
 provement, riches,  and  all  external  advantages. 
 And  as  there  are  not  any  two  men  found,  of 
 exadlylike  ftiapeand  features:  fo  it  is  probable 
 there  are  not  any  two,  of  an  exadlly  like  con- 
 ftitution,  temper  and  fituation,  with  regard 
 4  to 
 
300         Revelation  not  umverfal:        Part  !!• 
 
 to  the  goods  and  evils  of  life.  Yet,  notwith- 
 ftanding  thefe  uncertainties  and  varieties,  God 
 does  exercife  a  natural  government  over  the 
 world  :  and  there  is  fuch  a  thing  as  a  prudent 
 and  imprudent  inftitution  of  life,  with  regard 
 to  our  health  and  our  affairs,  under  that  his 
 natural  government. 
 
 As  neither  the  Jewifli  nor  Chriftian  revela- 
 tion have  been  univerfal ;  and  as  they  have 
 been  afforded  to  a  greater  or  lefs  part  of  the 
 world,  at  different  times :  fo  likewife  at  diffe- 
 rent times,  both  revelations  have  had  diffe- 
 rent degrees  of  evidence.  The  Jews  who 
 lived  during  the  fucceflion  of  prophets,  that 
 is,  from  Mofes  till  after  the  Captivity,  had 
 higher  evidence  of  the  truth  of  their  religion, 
 than  thofe  had,  who  lived  in  the  interval  be- 
 tween the  lafl  mentioned  period,  and  the 
 coming  of  Chrifl.  And  the  firfl  Chriflians 
 had  higher  evidence  of  the  miracles  wrought 
 in  attefiation  of  Chriflianity,  than  what  we 
 have  now.  They  had  alfo  a  flrong  prefump- 
 tive  proof  of  the  truth  of  it,  perhaps  of  much 
 greater  force,  in  way  of  argument,  than  many 
 think,  of  which  v/e  have  very  little  remain- 
 ing; I  mean  the  prefumptive  proof  of  its 
 truth,  from  the  influence  v/hich  it  had  upon 
 the  hves  of  the  generality  of  its  profeffors. 
 And  we,  or  future  ages,  may  poffibly  have  a 
 proof  of  it,  which  they  could  not  have,  from 
 the  conformity  between  the  prophetick  hif- 
 
 tory3 
 
Chap .VI.  Juppofed  deficiency  in  its  Proof,    301 
 
 tory,  and  the  ft  ate  of  the  world  and  of  Chrif- 
 tianity.  And  farther  :  if  we  were  to  fuppofe 
 the  evidence,  which  fome  have  of  religion,  to 
 amount  to  little  more,  than  feeing  that  it  may 
 be  true  ^  but  that  they  remain  in  great  doubts 
 and  uncertainties  about  both  its  evidence  and 
 its  nature,  and  great  perplexities  concerning 
 the  rule  of  life  :  others  to  have  a  full  convic- 
 tion of  the  truth  of  religion,  with  a  diftindl 
 knowledge  of  their  duty  :  and  others  feverally 
 to  have  all  the  intermediate  degrees  of  reli- 
 gious light  and  evidence,  which  lie  between 
 
 thefe  two if  we   put    the  cafe,  that  for 
 
 the  prefent,  it  was  intended,  revelation  fhould 
 be  no  more  than  a  fmall  light,  in  the  midfl 
 of  a  world  greatly  overfpread,  notwithiland- 
 ing  it,  with  ignorance  and  darknefs :  that  cer- 
 tain glimmerings  of  this  light  fhould  extend, 
 and  be  directed,  to  remote  diftances,  in  fuch 
 a  manner  as  that  thofe  who  really  partook  of 
 it,  (hould  net  difcern  from  whence  it  origi- 
 nally came :  that  fome  in  a  nearer  iituation 
 to  it,  fliould  have  its  light  obfcured,  and,  in 
 different  ways  and  degrees,  intercepted  :  and 
 that  others  Ihould  be  placed  within  its  clearer 
 influence,  and  be  much  more  enlivened, 
 cheared  and  directed  by  it  y  but  yet  that  even 
 to  thefe,  it  fliould  be  no  more  than  a  light 
 finning  in  a  dark  place:  all  this  would  be 
 perfectly  uniform  and  of  a  piece  with  the 
 condudt  of  Providence,  in  the  diftribution  of 
 its  other  bleffings.     If  the  faft  of  the  cafe 
 
 really 
 
jo2  Revelation  not  univerfal:      Part  11. 
 
 really  were,  that  fome  have  received  no  light 
 at  all  from  the  Scripture ;  as  many  ages  and 
 countries  in  the  heathen  world :  that  others, 
 though  they  have,  by  means  of  it,  had  effen- 
 tial  or  natural  religion  enforced  upon  their  con- 
 fciences,yet  have  never  had  the  genuine  Scrip- 
 ture-revelation, with  its  real  evidence,  pro- 
 pofed  to  their  confideration ;  and  the  ancient 
 Perjians,  and  modern  Mahometans^  may  poffi- 
 bly  be  inftances  of  people  in  a  fituation  fome- 
 what  like  to  this :  that  others,  though  they 
 have  had  the  Scripture  laid  before  them  as  of 
 divine  revelation,  yet  have  had  it  with  the 
 fyftem  and  evidence  of  Chriftianity  fo  inter- 
 polated, the  fyftem  fo  corrupted,  the  evidence 
 fo  blended  with  falfe  miracles,  as  to  leave  the 
 mind  in  the  utmoft  doubtfulnefs  and  uncer- 
 tainty about  the  whole ;  which  may  be  the 
 ftate  of  fome  thoughtful  men,  in  moft  of 
 thofe  nations  who  call  themfelves  Chriftian : 
 and  laftly,  that  others  have  had  Chriftianity 
 oftered  to  them  in  its  genune  fimplicity,  and 
 with  its  proper  evidence,  as  perfons  in  coun- 
 tries and  churches  of  civil  and  of  chriftian 
 liberty ;  but  however  that  even  thefe  perfons 
 are  left  in  great  ignorance  in  many  refpecfts, 
 and  have  by  no  means  light  afforded  them 
 enough  to  fatisfy  their  curiofity,  but  only  to 
 regulate  their  life,  to  teach  them  their  duty 
 and  encourage  them  in  the  careful  difcharge 
 of  it :  1  fay,  if  we  were  to  f  jppofe  this  fome- 
 what  of  a  eeneral  true  account  of  the  degrees 
 
 of 
 
Chap.  VI.  fuppofcd deficiency  in  its  Proof,  303 
 
 of  moral  and  religious  light  and  evidence, 
 which  were  intended  to  be  afforded  mankind, 
 and  of  what  has  adlually  been  and  is  their 
 fituation,  in  their  moral  and  religious  capa- 
 city; there  would  be  nothing  in  all  this  igno- 
 rance, doubtfulnefs  and  uncertainty,  in  all 
 thefe  varieties,  and  fuppofed  diladvantages  of 
 fome  in  comparifon  of  others,  refpedting  reli- 
 gion, but  may  be  paralleled  by  manifeft  ana- 
 logies in  the  natural  difpenfations  of  Provi- 
 dence at  prefent,  and  confidering  ourfelves 
 merely  in  our  temporal  capcity. 
 
 Nor  is  there  any  thing  fliocking  in  all  this, 
 or  which  would  feem  to  bear  hard  upon  the 
 moral  adminiftration  in  nature,  if  we  would 
 really  keep  in  mind,  that  every  one  jfhall  be 
 dealt  equitably  with:  inftead  of  forgetting 
 this,  or  explaining  it  away,  after  it  is  ac- 
 knowledged in  words.  All  fhadow  of  in- 
 juftice,  and  indeed  all  harfh  appearances,  in 
 this  various  ceconomy  of  Providence,  would 
 be  loft  'y  if  we  would  keep  in  mind,  that  every 
 merciful  allowance  fhall  be  made,  and  no 
 more  be  required  of  any  one,  than  v/hat  might 
 have  been  equitably  expedled  of  him,  from 
 the  circumftances  in  which  he  was  placed; 
 and  not  what  might  have  been  exped:ed,  had 
 he  been  placed  in  other  circumftances  :  /.  e. 
 in  Scripture  language,  that  every  man  fhall 
 be  accepted  according  to  what  he  had,  not  ac- 
 cording 
 
304         Revelation  not  univerfal :       Part  IL 
 
 cording  to  what  he  had  not"".  This  however 
 doth  not  by  any  means  imply,  that  all  perfons 
 condition  here,  is  equally  advantageous  v^ith 
 refpecl  to  futurity.  And  Providence's  defign- 
 ing  to  place  fome  in  greater  darknefs  with  re- 
 fped:  to  religious  knowledge,  is  no  more  a 
 reafon  why  they  fliould  not  endeavour  to 
 get  out  of  that  darknefs,  and  others  to  bring 
 them  out  of  it;  than  why  ignorant  and  flow 
 people  in  matters  of  other  knowledge,  fhould 
 not  endeavour  to  learn,  or  fhould  not  be 
 inftrufted. 
 
 It  is  not  unreafonable  to  fuppofe,  that  the 
 fame  wife  and  good   principle,  whatever  it 
 was,  which  difpofed  the  Author  of  nature  to 
 make  different  kinds  and  orders  of  creatures, 
 difpofed  him  alfo  to  place  creatures  of  like 
 kinds  in  different   fituations  :   and  that  the 
 fame  principle  v^hich  difpofed  him  to  make 
 creatures  of  different   moral  capacities,  dif- 
 pofed him  alfo  to  place  creatures  of  like  mo- 
 ral capacities,  in  different  religious  fituations; 
 and  even  the  fame  creatures,  in  different  pe- 
 riods of  their  being.     And  the  account  or 
 reafon  of  this,  is  alfo  moft  probably  the  ac- 
 count, why  the  conftitution  of  things  is  fuch, 
 as  that  creatures  of  moral  natures  or  capaci- 
 ties, for  a  confiderable  part  of  that  duration 
 in  which  they  are  living  agents,  are  not  at  all 
 fubjefts  of  morality  and  religion;  but  grow 
 
 *  2  Cor.  viii.  12. 
 
 up 
 
(Z\i2i^N\,fiippofed  deficiency  in  its  Proof.   305 
 
 tip  to  be  fo,  and  grow  up  to  be  fo  more  and 
 more,  gradually  from  childhood  to  mature 
 age. 
 
 What,  in  particular,  is  the  account  or  rea- 
 fon  of  thefe  things,  we  muft  be  greatly  in 
 the  dark,  were  it  only  that  we  know  fo  very 
 little  even  of  our  own  cafe.  Our  prefent 
 ftate  may  poffibly  be  the  confequence  of 
 fomewhat  pail,  which  we  are  wholly  ignorant 
 of:  as  it  has  a  reference  to  fomewhat  to 
 come,  of  which  we  know  fcarce  any  more 
 than  is  necelTary  for  practice.  A  fyflem  or 
 conftitution,  in  its  notion,  implies  variety; 
 and  fo  complicated  an  one  as  this  world,  ve- 
 ry great  variety.  So  that  were  revelation  uni- 
 verfal,  yet  from  men*s  diiferent  capacities  of 
 underftanding,  from  the  different  lengths  of 
 their  lives,  their  different  educations  and 
 other  external  circumflances,  and  from  their 
 difference  of  temper  and  bodily  conftitution  ; 
 their  religious  fituations  would  be  widely  dif- 
 ferent, and  the  difadvantage  of  fome  in  com- 
 parifon  of  others,  perhaps,  altogether  as  much 
 as  at  prefent.  And  the  true  account,  what- 
 ever it  be,  why  mankind,  or  fuch  a  part  of 
 mankind,  are  placed  in  this  condition  of  ig- 
 norance, mufl  be  fuppofed  alfo  the  true  ac- 
 count of  our  farther  ignorance,  in  not  know- 
 ing the  reafons,  v/hy,  or  whence  it  is,  that 
 they  are  placed  in  this  condition.  But  the 
 following  practical  reflexions  may  deferve  the 
 ferious  conlideration  of  thofe  perfons,  who 
 
 X  think 
 
^06  Revelation  not  t^niverfal :     Part  11. 
 
 think  the  circumftances  of  mankind  or  their 
 own,  in  the  foremen tioncd  refpeds,  a  ground 
 of  complaint. 
 
 FirJ},  The  evidence  of  religion  not  appear- 
 ing obvious,  may  conftitute  one  particular 
 part  of  feme  men's  trial  in  the  religious  fenfe  : 
 2^3  it  gives  fcope,  for  a  virtuous  exercife,  or 
 vicious  negleii  of  their  underftanding,  in  ex~ 
 amining  or  not  examining  into  that  evidence. 
 There  feems  no  poffible  reafon  to  be  given, 
 why  v/e  may  not  be  in  a  ftate  of  moral  proba- 
 tion, v/ith  regard  to  the  exercife  of  our  un- 
 derftanding upon  the  fjbjedl  of  religion,  as 
 we  are  with  regard  to  our  behaviour  in  com- 
 mon affairs.  The  former  is  as  much  a  thing 
 within  our  power  and  choice,  as  the  latter. 
 And  I  fuppofe  it  is  to  be  laid  down  for 
 certain,  that  the  fame  character,  the  fame 
 inward  principle,  which,  after  a  man  is  con- 
 vinced of  the  truth  of  religion,  renders  him 
 obedient  to  the  precepts  of  it,  would,  were 
 he  not  thus  convinced,  fct  him  about  an  ex- 
 amination of  it,  upon  its  fyftem  and  evidence 
 being  offered  to  his  thoughts  :  and  that  in  the 
 latter  itate,  his  examination  would  be  with 
 an  '  impartiality,  ferioufnefs,  and  folicitude, 
 proportionable  to  what  his  obedience  is  in 
 the  former.  And  as  inattention,  negligence, 
 want  of  all  ferious  concern,  about  a  matter 
 of  fuch  a  nature  and  fuch  importance,  when 
 offered  to  men's  confideration,  is,  before  a  dif- 
 
 tindt 
 
Chap.  VI.  ftippofed  deficiejicy  in  its  Proof,  307 
 
 tindl  conviction  of  its  truth,  as  real  immoral 
 depravity  and  diflblutenefs  ,•  as  neglecft  of  re* 
 ligious  pracftice  after  fuch  conviffion :  fo  ac- 
 tive folicitude  about  it,  and  fair  impartial 
 confideration  of  its  evidence  before  fuch  con- 
 vidlion,  is  as  really  an  exercife  of  a  morally 
 right  temper;  as  is  religious  pra^flice  after. 
 Thus,  that  religion  is  not  intuitively  true, 
 but  a  matter  of  deduftion  and  inference ;  that 
 a  conviftion  of  its  truth  is  not  forced  upon 
 every  one,  but  left  to  be,  by  fome,  collected 
 with  heedful  attention  to  premifes;  this  as 
 much  conftitutes  religious  probation,  as  much 
 affords  fphere,  fcope,  opportunity,  for  right 
 and  wrong  behaviour,  as  any  thing  whatever 
 does.  And  their  m^anner  of  treating  this 
 fubjedl  when  laid  before  them,  ihcws  what 
 is  in  their  heart,  and  is  an  exertion  of  it. 
 
 Secondly,  It  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evi- 
 dent, though  it  is  not  fo  much  attended  to, 
 that  if  upon  confideration  of  religion,  the 
 evidence  of  it  fhould  feem  to  any  perfons 
 doubtful,  in  the  higheil:  fuppofable  degree; 
 even  this  doubtful  evidence  will,  however, 
 put  them  into  a  general  fiat  c  of  probation  in 
 the  moral  and  religious  fenfe.  For,  fuppofe 
 a  man  to  be  really  in  doubt,  v/hether  fuch  a 
 perfon  had  not  done  him  the  greateft  favour; 
 or,  whether  his  whole  temporal  intereft  did 
 not  depend  upon  that  perfon  :  no  one,  who 
 hid  any  fenfe  of  gratitude  and  of  prudence, 
 
 X  2  could 
 
308  Revelation  not  univerfal :     Part  II. 
 
 could  poffibly  confider  himfelf  in  the  fame 
 fituation  with  regard  to  fuch  perfon,  as  if  he 
 had  no  fuch  doubt.  In  truth,  it  is  as  juft  to 
 fay,  that  certainty  and  doubt  are  the  fame;  as 
 to  fay,  the  fituations  now  mentioned,  would 
 leave  a  man  as  entirely  at  liberty  in  point  of 
 gratitude  or  prudence,  as  he  would  be,  were 
 he  certain  he  had  received  no  favour  from 
 fuch  perfon,  or  that  he  no  way  depended 
 upon  him.  And  thus,  though  the  evidence 
 of  religion  which  is  afforded  to  fome  men, 
 fliould  be  little  more  than  that  they  are  given 
 to  fee,  the  fyftem  of  Chriflianity,  or  religion 
 in  general,  to  be  fuppofable  and  credible  ; 
 this  ought  in  all  reafon  to  beget  a  ferious 
 practical  apprehenfion,  that  it  may  be  true. 
 And  even  this  will  afford  matter  of  exercife, 
 for  religious  fufpenfe  and  deliberation,  for 
 moral  refolution  and  felf-government  -,  be- 
 caufe  the  apprehenfion  that  religion  may  be 
 true,  does  as  really  lay  men  under  obligations, 
 as  a  full  conviftion  that  it  is  true.  It  gives 
 occafion  and  motives  to  confider  farther  the 
 important  fubjedl ;  to  preferve  attentively 
 upon  their  minds,  a  general  implicit  fenfe 
 that  they  may  be  under  divine  moral  govern- 
 ment, an  awful  folicitude  about  religion  whe- 
 ther natural  or  revealed.  Such  apprehenfion 
 ought  to  turn  men's  eyes  to  every  degree  of 
 new  light  which  may  be  had,  from  whatever 
 fide  it  comes ;  and  induce  them  to  refrain,  in 
 the  mean  time,  from  all  immoralities,  and  live 
 
 in 
 
Chap.  VI.  fu pp of ed  deficiency  in  its  Proof,  309 
 
 in  the  confcientious  pra'fbice  of  every  com- 
 mon virtue.  Efpecially  are  they  hound  to 
 keep  at  the  greateft  diftance  from  all  dilTokitc 
 profanenefs  ;  for  this  the  very  nature  of  the 
 cafe  forbids ;  and  to  treat  with  highelt  reve- 
 rence a  matter,  upon  which  their  own  whole 
 intereft  and  being,  and  the  fate  of  nature  de- 
 pends. This  behaviour,  and  an  aftive  endea- 
 vour to  maintain  within  themfelves  this  tem- 
 per, is  the  bulineis,  the  duty,  and  the  wifdom 
 of  thofe  perfons,  who  complain  of  the  doubt- 
 fulnefs  of  religion  :  is  what  they  are  under 
 the  moft  proper  obllgationG  to.  And  fuch 
 behaviour  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tenden- 
 cy to  improve  in  them,  that  character,  which 
 the  practice  of  all  the  feveral  duties  of  reli- 
 gion, from  a  full  convid:ion  of  its  truth,  is  an 
 exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve 
 in  others  :  others,  I  fay,  to  whom  God  has 
 afforded  fuch  convidlion.  Nay,  confidering 
 the  infinite  importance  of  religion,  revealed 
 as  well  as  natural,  I  think  it  may  be  faid  in 
 general,  that  whoever  will  weigh  the  matter 
 thoroughly  may  fee,  there  is  not  nearfo  much 
 difference,  as  is  commonly  imagined,  between 
 what  ought  in  reafon  to  be  the  rule  of  life, 
 to  thofe  perfons  who  are  fully  convinced  of 
 its  truth,  and  to  thofe  who  have  only  a  feri- 
 ous  doubting  apprehenfion,  that  it  may  be 
 true.  Their  hopes,  and  fears,  and  obligations, 
 will  be  in  various  degrees:  but,  as  the  fub- 
 je(fl-matter  of  their  hopes  and  fears  is  the 
 feme;  fo  the  ("ubjedl- matter  of  their  obliga- 
 
 X  3  tions. 
 
310  Revelation  not  univerfal :     Part  IL 
 
 tions,  what  they  are  bound  to  do  and  to  re- 
 frain from,  is  not  fo  very  unlike. 
 
 It  is  to  be  obferved  farther,  that,  from  a 
 character  of  underftanding,  or  a  fituation  of 
 influence  in  the  world,  fome  perfons  have  it 
 in  their  power  to  do  infinitely  more  harm  or 
 good,  by  fetting  an  example  of  profanenefs 
 and  avowed  difregard  to  all  religion,  or,  on 
 the  contrary,  of  a  ferious,  though  perhaps 
 doubting,  apprehenfion  of  its  truth,  and  of  a 
 reverend  regard  to  it  under  this  doubtfulnefs ; 
 than  they  can  do,  by  ading  well  or  ill  in  all 
 the  common  intercourfes-  amongfl  mankind. 
 And  confequently  they  are  moft  highly  ac- 
 countable for  a  behaviour,  which,  they  may 
 eafdy  forefee,  is  of  fuch  importance,  and  in 
 which  there  is  moft  plainly  a  right  and  a 
 wrong;  even  admitting  the  evidence  of  reli- 
 gion to  be  as  doubtful,  as  is  pretended. 
 
 The  ground  of  thefe  obfervations,  and 
 that  which  renders  them  juft  and  true,  is, 
 that  doubting  neceffarily  implies  fome  degree 
 of  evidence  for  that,  of  which  we  doubt. 
 For  no  perfon  would  be  in  doubt  concerning 
 the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts  fo  and  fo  cir- 
 cumftanced,  v.'hich  lliould  accidentally  come 
 into  his  thoughts,  and  of  which  he  had  no 
 evidence  at  all.  And  though  in  the  cafe  of 
 an  even  chance,  and  where  confequently  we 
 were  in  doubt,  we  fhould  in  common  lan- 
 guage 
 
Chap.  W,  fuppofcd dcfcicncy  in  its  Proof,   511 
 
 guage  fay,  that  we  had  no  evidence  at  all  for 
 either  fide;  yet  that  fituation  of  things, 
 which  renders  it  an  even  chance  and  no  more, 
 that  fuch  an  event  will  happen,  renders  this 
 cafe  equivalent  to  all  others,  where  there  is 
 fuch  evidence  on  both  fides  of  a  qncftion  ^ 
 as  leaves  the  mind  in  doubt  concerning  the 
 truth.  Indeed  in  all  thefe  cafes,  there  is  no 
 more  evidence  on  one  fide,  than  on  the  other ; 
 but  there  is  (what  is  equivalent  to)  much 
 more  for  either,  than  for  the  truth  of  a  num- 
 ber of  fadls  which  come  into  one's  thoughts 
 at  random.  And  thus  in  all  thefe  cafes,  doubt 
 as  much  prefuppofes  evidence,  lower  degrees 
 of  evidence ;  as  belief  prefuppofes  higher, 
 and  certainty  higher  ftill.  Any  one,  who  will 
 a  little  attend  to  the  nature  of  evidence,  will 
 eafily  carry  this  obfervation  on,  and  fee,  that 
 between  no  evidence  at  all,  and  that  degree 
 of  it  which  affords  ground  of  doubt,  there 
 are  as  many  intermediate  degrees  ;  as  there 
 are,  between  that  degree  vv'hich  is  the  ground 
 of  doubt,  and  demonftration.  And  though 
 we  have  not  faculties  to  diftinguifh  thefe 
 degrees  of  evidence,  with  any  fort  of  exa(ft- 
 nefs  I  yet,  in  proportion  as  they  are  difcerned, 
 they  ought  to  influence  our  pracftice.  For 
 it  is  as  real  an  imperfedion  in  the  moral 
 character,  not  to  be  influenced  in  pracftice  by 
 a  lower  degree  of  evidence  when  difceri^d, 
 
 ^  Introdu(5^ion. 
 
 X  4  as 
 
312  Revelation  not  univerfal :     Part  11^ 
 
 as  It  is,  in  the  underftanding,  not  to  difcern  it. 
 And  as,  in  all  fubjeds  which  men  confider, 
 they  difcern  the  lower  as  well  as  higher  de- 
 grees of  evidence,    proportionably  to    their 
 capacity  of  underftanding :   fo,  in    practical 
 fubjedls,  they  are  influenced  in  practice,  by 
 the  lower  as  well  as  higher   degrees  of  it, 
 proportionably  to  their  fairnefs  and  honefty. 
 And  as,  in  proportion  to  defects  in  the  un- 
 derftanding, men  are  unapt  to  fee  lower  de- 
 grees of  evidence,  are  in  danger  of  overlook- 
 ing evidence  when  it  is  not  glaring,  and  are 
 eafily  impofed  upon  in    fuch  cafes ;    fo,  in 
 proportion  to  the  corruption  of  the  heart, 
 they  feem  capable   of  fatisfying    themfelves 
 with  having  no  regard  in  practice  to  evidence 
 acknowledged  real,  if  it  be  not  overbearing. 
 From     thefe    things    it   muft    follow,    that 
 doubting  concerning  religion  implies  fuch  a 
 degree  of  evidence  for  it,  as  joined  with  the 
 confideration  of  its  importance,  unqueftion- 
 ably  lays  men   under  the  obligations  before 
 mentioned,   to  have  a  dutiful  regard  to  it  ir^ 
 all  their  behaviour. 
 
 Thirdly^  The  difficulties  in  which  the  evi- 
 dence of  religion  is  involved,  which  fome 
 complain  of,  is  no  more  a  juft  ground  of 
 complaint,  than  the  external  circumftances 
 of  temptation,  which  others  are  placed  in ; 
 or  than  difficulties  in  the  practice  of  it,  after 
 a  full  conviction  of  its  truth.     Temptations 
 
 render 
 
Chap.  VI.  fuppofcd  deficmicy  In  Its  Proof,  313 
 
 render  our  ftate  a  more  improving  ftate  of 
 difcipline  %  than  it  would  be  otherwife :  as 
 they  give  occalion  for  a  more  attentive  ex- 
 ercife  of  the  virtuous  principle,  which  con- 
 firms and  llrengthens  it  more,  than  an  eafier 
 or  lefs  attentive  excrcifc  of  it  could.  Now 
 fpeculative  difficulties  are,  in  this  refpecft, 
 of  the  very  lame  nature  with  thefe  external 
 temptations.  For  the  evidence  of  religioi^ 
 not  appearing  obvious,  is,  to  fome  pcrfons,  a, 
 temptation  to  rejed;  it,  without  any  confide-r 
 ration  at  all;  and  therefore  requires  fuch  an 
 attentive  exercife  of  the  virtuous  principle, 
 ferioufly  to  confider  that  evidence,  as  there 
 would  be  no  occafion  for,  but  fpr  fuch  temp- 
 tation. And  the  fuppofed  doubtfulnefs  of 
 its  evidence,  after  it  has  been  in  fome  fort 
 confidered,  affords  opportunity  to  an  unfair 
 mind  of  explaining  away,  and  deceitfully 
 hiding  from  itfelf,  that  evidence  which  it 
 might  fee;  and  alfo  for  men's  encouraging 
 themfelves  in  vice  from  hopes  of  impunity, 
 though  they  do  clearly  fee  thus  much  at  leaft, 
 that  thefe  hopes  are  uncertain  :  in  like  man- 
 ner as  the  common  temptation  to  many  in- 
 ftances  of  folly,  which  end  in  temporal  infamy 
 and  ruin,  is,  the  ground  for  hope  of  not  being 
 detedled,  and  of  efcaping  with  impunity; 
 /.  e.  the  doubtfulnefs  of  the  proof  beforehand, 
 that  fuch  foolifli  behaviour  will  thus  end  in 
 
 «  Part  I.  Chap.  v. 
 
 .^  infamy 
 
314  Revelatio?!  not  iiniverfal :     Part  II. 
 
 infamy  and  ruin.  On  the  contrary,  fuppofed 
 doubtfulnefs  in  the  evidence  of  religion  calls 
 for  a  more  careful  and  attentive  exercife  of  the 
 virtuous  principle,  in  fairly  yielding  them- 
 felves  up  to  the  proper  influence  of  any  real 
 evidence,  though  doubtful ;  and  in  praffifmg 
 confcientioufly  all  virtue,  though  under  fome 
 uncertainty,  whether  the  government  in  the 
 univerfe  may  not  poiTibly  be  fuch,  as  that 
 vice  may  efcape  v^ith  impunity.  And  in 
 general,  temptation,  meaning  by  this  word, 
 the  leffer  allurements  to  wrong  and  difficulties 
 in  the  difcharge  of  our  duty,  as  v/ell  as  the 
 greater  ones,  temptation,  I  fay,  as  fuch  and 
 of  every  kind  and  degree,  as  it  calls  forth  fome 
 virtuous  efforts,  additional  to  what  would 
 otherwife  have  been  wanting,  cannot  but  be 
 an  additional  difcipline  and  improvement  of 
 virtue,  as  well  as  probation  of  it  in  the  other 
 fenfes  of  that  word  ^  So  that  the  very  fame 
 account  is  to  be  given,  why  the  evidence  of 
 religion  fliould  be  left  in  fuch  a  manner,  as 
 to  require,  in  fome,  an  attentive,  folicitous, 
 perhaps  painful  exercife  of  their  underftand- 
 ing  about  it ;  as  why  others  fhould  be  placed 
 in  fuch  circumftanccs,  as  that  the  pradice  of 
 its  common  duties,  after  a  full  convidtion  of 
 the  truth  of  it,  fhould  require  attention,  io^ 
 licitude,  and  pains  :  or,  why  appearing  doubt- 
 fulnefs fhould  be  permitted  to  afford  matter 
 
 ^  Part  I.  Chap,  iv,  and  p.  143. 
 
 of 
 
chap.  VI.  fuppofed  dcficte?icy  in  its  Proof.  3 1 5 
 
 of  temptation  to  Ibme^  as  why  external  dif- 
 ficulties and  allurements  fhould  be  permitted 
 to  afford  niatter  of  temptation  to  others. 
 The  lame  account  allb  is  to  be  given,  why 
 fome  Ihould  be  exerciied  with  tem[)tations  of 
 both  thcle  kinds  ;  as  why  others  ihould  be 
 exercifed  with  the  latter  in  fuch  very  high 
 degrees,  as  fome  have  been,  particularly  as 
 the  primitive  Chriftians  were. 
 
 Nor  does  there  appear  any  abfardity  in 
 fuppofmg,  that  the  fpeculative  difficulties  in 
 which  the  evidence  of  relinon  is  involved, 
 may  make  even  the  principal  part  of  fome 
 perfons  trial.  For,  as  the  chief  temptations 
 of  the  generality  of  the  world,  arc,  the  ordi- 
 nary motives  to  injuftice  or  unreftrained  plea- 
 fure  ;  or  to  live  in  the  negled  of  religion  from 
 that  frame  of  mind,  which  renders  many 
 perfons  almoft  without  feeling  as  to  any  thing 
 diftant,  or  which  is  not  the  objedl  of  their 
 fenfes :  fo  there  are  other  perfons  without  this 
 fhallownefs  of  temper,  perfons  of  a  deeper 
 fenfe  as  to  what  is  invifible  and  future;  who 
 not  only  fee,  but  have  a  general  pradical 
 feeling,  that  what  is  to  come  will  be  prefent, 
 and  that  things  are  not  lefs  real  for  their  not 
 being  the  objects  of  fenfe;  and  who,  from 
 their  natural  conftitution  of  body  and  of 
 temper,  and  from  their  external  condition, 
 may  have  fmall  temptations  to  behave  ill, 
 fmall   difficulty    in    behaving    well,    in  the 
 
 common 
 
3 1  6  Revelation  not  univerfal:       Part  IL 
 
 common  courfe  of  life.  Now  when  thefe 
 latter  perfons  have  a  diftincfl  full  convldlion  of 
 the  truth  of  religion,  without  any  poffible 
 doubts  or  difficulties,  the  practice  of  it  is  to 
 them  unavoidable,  unlefs  they  will  do  a  con- 
 ftant  violence  to  their  own  minds ;  and  reli- 
 gion is  fcarce  any  more  a  difcipline  to  them, 
 than  it  is  to  creatures  in  a  flate  of  perfection. 
 Yet  thefe  perfons  may  poffibly  ftand  in  need 
 of  moral  difcipline  and  exercife  in  a  higher 
 degree,  than  they  would  have  by  fuch  an  eafy 
 practice  of  religion.  Or  it  may  be  requifite, 
 for  reafons  unknown  to  us,  that  they  Ihould 
 give  fome  farther  manifeftation^  what  is  their 
 moral  character,  to  the  creation  of  God,  than 
 fuch  a  practice  of  it  would  be.  Thus  in 
 the  great  variety  of  religious  fituations  in 
 which  men  are  placed,  what  conftitutes,  what 
 chiefly  and  peculiarly  conftitutes  the  proba- 
 tion, in  all  fenfes,  of  fome  perfons,  may  be 
 the  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of  reli- 
 gion is  involved :  and  their  principal  and  dif- 
 tinguiflied  trial  may  be,  how  they  w^ill  be- 
 have under  and  with  refpe(ft  to  thefe  difficul- 
 ties. Circumftances  in  men's  lituation  in 
 their  temporal  capacity,  analogous  in  good 
 meafure  to  this  refpedting  religion,  are  to 
 be  obferved.  We  find  fome  perfons  are  placed 
 in  fuch  a  fituation  in  the  world,  as  that  their 
 chief  difficulty  with  regard  to  conduct,  is  not 
 
 '  P-  i43« 
 
 the 
 
Chap.  VI.  fuppofed  deficiency  in  its  Proof.  3 1 7 
 
 the  doing  what  is  prudent  when  it  is  known  ; 
 for  this,  in  numberlefs  cafes,  is  as  eafy  as  the 
 contrary:  but  to  fome  the  principal  exer- 
 cife  is,  recoUedlion  and  being  upon  their 
 guard  againft:  deceits,  the  deceits  fuppofe  of 
 thofe  about  them ;  againft  falfe  appearances 
 of  reafon  and  prudence.  To  perfons  in 
 fome  fituations  the  principal  exercife  with 
 refpedt  to  conduft,  is,  attention  in  order 
 to  inform  themfelves  what  is  proper,  what 
 is  really  the  reafonable  and  prudent  part  to 
 ad:. 
 
 But  as  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  fuppofi- 
 tion,  that  men's  diifatisfadlion  with  the  evi- 
 dence of  religion  is  not  owing  to  their  neg- 
 led:s  or  prejudices ;  it  muft  be  added,  on  the 
 other  hand,  in  all  common  reafon,  and  as 
 what  the  truth  of  the  cafe  plainly  requires 
 ihould  be  added,  that  fuch  diffatisfadion  pof- 
 fibly  may  be  owing  to  thofe,  poffibly  may  be 
 men's  own  fault  .     For, 
 
 If  there  are  any  perfons,  who  never  fet 
 themfelves  heartily  and  in  earneft  to  be  in- 
 formed in  religion  :  if  there  are  any,  who  fe- 
 cretly  wifh  it  may  not  prove  true ;  and  are 
 lefs  attentive  to  evidence  than  to  difficulties, 
 and  more  to  objections  than  to  what  is  faid 
 in  anfwer  to  them  :  thefe  perfons  will  fcarce 
 be  thought  in  a  likely  way  of  feeing  the  evi- 
 dence oi  religion,  though  it  were  moft  cer- 
 tainly 
 
3i8  Revelation  not  U7iiverfal :       Part  II. 
 
 tainly  true,  and  capable  of  being  ever  fo  fully- 
 proved.  If  any  accuftom  themfelves  to  con- 
 fider  this  fubjed:  ufually  in  the  way  of  mirth 
 and  fport  :  if  they  attend  to  forms  and  repre- 
 fentations,  and  inadequate  manners  of  expref- 
 fion,  inftead  of  the  real  things  intended  by 
 them :  (for  figns  often  can  be  no  more  than 
 inadequately  expreffive  of  the  things  figni- 
 fied :)  or  if  they  fubftitute  human  errors,  in 
 the  room  of  divine  truth  :  why  may  not  all,  or 
 any  of  thefe  things,  hinder  fome  men  from 
 feeing  that  evidence,  which  really  is  feen  by 
 others;  as  a  like  turn  of  mind,  with  refpcdl:  to 
 matters  of  common  fpeculation  and  pradlice^ 
 does,  we  find  by  experience,  hinder  them  from 
 attaining  that  knowledge  and  right  under- 
 Handing,  in  matters  of  common  fpeculation  and 
 pracflice,  which  more  fair  and  attentive  minds 
 attain  to  ?  And  the  effed:  will  be  the  fame, 
 whether  their  negled;  of  ferioufly  confidering 
 the  evidence  of  religion,  and  their  indired:  be- 
 haviour with  regard  to  Ix^  proceed  from  mere 
 careleffnefs,  or  from  the  groiTer  vices ;  or  whe- 
 ther it  be  owing  to  this,  that  forms  and  figu- 
 rative manners  of  expreflion,  as  well  as  errors, 
 adminifler  occafions  of  ridicule,  when  the 
 things  intended,  and  the  truth  itfelf,  would 
 not.  Men  may  indulge  a  ludicrous  turn  fo 
 far  as  to  lofe  all  fenfe  of  condud  and  pru- 
 dence in  worldly  affairs,  and  even,  as  it  feems, 
 to  impair  their  faculty  of  reafon.  And  in 
 general,  levity,  careleffnefs,  paffion,  and  pre- 
 
 9  judice. 
 
Chap.  VI.  fuppofed  deficiency  in  its  Proof,    3 1 9 
 
 judice,  do  hinder  us  from  being  rightly  in- 
 formed, with  refpedt  to  common  things :  and 
 they  may^  in  hke  manner,  and  perhaps  in 
 fome  farther  providential  manner,  with  re- 
 fped;  to  moral  and  religious  fubjedls  :  may 
 hinder  evidence  from  being  laid  before  us, 
 and  from  being  feen  when  it  is.  The  Scrip- 
 ture ^  does  declare,  that  every  ont  Jhall  not  im- 
 derjland.  And  it  makes  no  difference,  by 
 what  providential  conduct  this  comes  to 
 pafs :  whether  the  evidence  of  Chriftianity 
 was,  oi-iginally  and  with  defign,  put  and  left 
 fo,  as  that  thofe  who  are  defirous  of  evading 
 moral  obligations,  fhould  not  fee  it ;  and  that 
 honeft-minded  perfons  fhould  :  or,  whether  it 
 comes  to  pafs  by  any  other  means. 
 
 Farther :  The  general  proof  of  natural  reli- 
 gion and  of  Chriftianity,  does,  I  think,  lie 
 level  to  common  men ;  even  thofe,  the  great- 
 eft  part  of  whofe  time,  from  childhood  to 
 old-age,  is  taken  up  with  providing,  for  them- 
 felves  and  their  families,  the  common  con- 
 
 ^Dan.  xii.  10.  See  alfo  If.  xxix.  13,  14.  Matth.  vi. 
 23.  and  xi.  25.  and  xiii.  1 1,  i2.  Joh.  iii.  ig.  Joh. 
 V.  44.  I  Cor.  ii.  14.  and  2  Cor.  Iv.  4.  2  Tim.  iii.  13. 
 and  that  afFedionate,  as  well  as  authoritative  admonition, 
 ^  very  many  times  inculcated,  He  that  hath  ears  to  hear^ 
 let  him  hear.  Grot'ius  faw  fo  ftrongly  the  thing  intended 
 in  thefe  and  other  pailages  of  Scripture  of  the  like  fenfe,  as 
 to  fay,  that  the  proof  given  us  of  Chriftianity  was  lefs 
 than  it  might  have  been,  for  this  very  purpofe  ;  IJt  ita  Jermo 
 JEvangelii  tanquam  lapis  ejpt  Lydius  ad  quern  ingeniafanalilia 
 fxplorarentar.     De  Ver.  R.  C.   L.  2.  towards  the  end. 
 
 veniencies. 
 
^20  Revelation  not  univerfat:      Part  II» 
 
 venlencies,  perhaps  neceffaries  of  life :  thofe, 
 I  mean,  of  this  rank,  who  ever  think  at  all  of 
 aiking  after  proof  or  attending  to  it.  Com- 
 mon men,  were  they  as  much  in  earneft 
 about  religion,  as  about  their  temporal  affairs, 
 are  capable  of  being  convinced  upon  real 
 evidence,  that  there  is  a  God  who  governs 
 the  world :  and  they  feel  themfelves  to  be  of 
 a  moral  nature,  and  accountable  creatures. 
 And  as  Chriftianity  entirely  falls  in  with  this 
 their  natural  fenfe  of  things  ;  fo  they  are  ca- 
 pable, not  only  of  being  perfuaded,  but  of 
 being  made  to  fee,  that  there  is  evidence  of 
 miracles  wrought  in  atteftation  of  it,  and 
 many  appearing  completions  of  prophecy. 
 But  though  this  proof  is  real  and  conclulive, 
 yet  it  is  liable  to  objedlions,  and  may  be  run 
 up  into  difficulties  %  which,  however,  perfons 
 who  are  capable,  not  only  of  talking  of,  but 
 of  really  feeing,  are  capable  alfo  of  feeing 
 through  :  /.  e.  not  of  clearing  up  and  anfwer- 
 ing  them,  fo  as  to  fatisfy  their  curioiity,  for 
 of  fuch  knowledge  we  are  not  capable  with 
 refpedl  to  any  one  thing  in  nature ;  but  capa- 
 ble of  feeing  that  the  proof  is  not  loft  in  thefe 
 difficulties,  or  deftroyed  by  thefe  objecflions. 
 But  then  a  thorough  examination  into  religion, 
 with  regard  to  thefe  objections,  which  can- 
 not be  the  bunnefs  of  every  man,  is  a  matter 
 of  pretty  large  compafs,  and,  from  the  nature 
 of  it,  requires  fome  knowledge,  as  well  as 
 time  and  attention  5  to  fee,  how  the  evidence 
 
 comes 
 
chap.  VI.  fuppofed  deficiency  hi  its  Proof.    321 
 
 comes  out,  upon  balancing  one  thing  with 
 another,  and  what,  upon  the  whole,  is  the 
 amount  of  it.  Now  if  perfons  who  have 
 picked  up  thefe  objecftions  from  others,  and 
 take  for  granted  they  are  of  weight,  upon  the 
 word  of  thofe  from  whom  they  received 
 them,  or,  by  often  retailing  of  them,  come 
 to  fee  or  fancy  they  fee  them  to  be  of  weight ; 
 will  not  prepare  themfelves  for  fuch  an  exami- 
 nation, with  a  competent  degree  of  know- 
 ledge ;  or  will  not  give  that  time  and  atten- 
 tion to  the  fubjed,  which,  from  the  nature 
 of  it,  is  neceffary  for  attaining  fuch  informa- 
 tion :  in  this  cafe,  they  muft  remain  in  doubt- 
 fulnefs,  ignorance  or  error ;  in  the  fame  way 
 as  they  muft,  with  regard  to  common  fcien- 
 ces,  and  matters  of  common  life,  if  they  neg- 
 lect the  neceflary  means  of  being  informed 
 in  them. 
 
 But  ftill  perhaps  it  will  be  objeded,  that 
 if  a  prince  or  common  mafter  were  to  fend 
 directions  to  a  fervant,  he  w^ould  take  care, 
 that  they  fhould  always  bear  the  certain 
 marks,  who  they  came  from,  and  that  their 
 fenfe  fhould  be  always  plain  :  fo  as  that  there 
 fhould  be  no  poffible  doubt,  if  he  could  help 
 it,  concerning  the  authority  or  meaning  of 
 them.  Now  the  proper  anfwer  to  all  this 
 kind  of  objedions  is,  that,  wherever  the  fal- 
 lacy lies,  it  is  even  certain  we  cannot  argue 
 
 Y  thus 
 
322  Re'ielation  not  univerfal :      Part  II. 
 
 thus  with  refped:  to  Him,  who  is  the  gover- 
 nor of  the  world :  and  particularly  that  he 
 does  not  afford  us  fuch  information,  wdth  re- 
 fpedl  to  our  temporal    affairs  and  intereils, 
 as  experience  abundantly  fhews.     However, 
 there  is  a  full  anfwer  to   this  objedion,  from 
 the  very  nature  of  religion.     For,  the  reafon 
 why  a  prince  would    give  his  diredlions  in 
 this  plain  manner,  is,  that  he    abfolutely  de- 
 iires  fuch  an  external  adiion  fhould  be  done, 
 without  concerning  himfelf  with  the  motive 
 or  principal  upon  which  it  is  done :  /.  e.  he 
 regards  only  the  external  event,  or  the  thing's 
 being  done  -,  and  not  at  all,  properly  fpeaking, 
 the  doing  of  it,  or  the  action.     Whereas  the 
 whole  of  morality  and    religion    confifting 
 merely  in  acflion  itfelf,  there  is  no  fort  of  pa- 
 rallel between  the  cafes.  But  if  the  prince  be 
 fuppofed  to  regard  only  the  ad:ion  ;  /.  e.  only 
 to  defire  to  exercife,  or  in  any  icnic  prove,  the 
 underftanding  or  loyalty  of  a  fervant ;    he 
 would  not  always  give  his  orders  in  fuch  a 
 plain  manner.  It  may  be  proper  to  add,  that 
 the  will  of  God,  refpe<fting  morality  and  reli- 
 gion, may  be  confidered,  either  as   abfolute, 
 or  as  only  conditional.     If  it  be  abfolute,  it 
 can  only  be  thus,  that  we  fiiould  ad:  virtu- 
 oufly  in  fuch  given  ci^cumftances;  not  that 
 w^e  Ihould  be  brought  to  ad  fo,  by  his  chang- 
 ing  of   our    circumftances.     And  if  God's 
 will  be  thus  abfolute,  then  it  is  in  our  pow- 
 er, in  the  highefl  and  ftrideft  fenfe,  to  do  or 
 §  to 
 
Ghap.  VI.  fuppofed dejiciency  in  Its  Proof.    323 
 
 to  contradi'il  his  will;  which  is  a  mou;  weigh- 
 ty confideration.  Or  his  will  may  be  con- 
 lidered  only  as  conditional,  that  it  wc  aCc  fp 
 and  lb,  we  ihall  be  rewarded  ;  if  otiierwife, 
 puniihed  :  -of  which  conditional  will  of  the 
 Author  of  Nature,  the  whole  conjftitution  of 
 it  affords  moft  certain  inilances. 
 
 Upon  the  whole :  that  w^e  are  in  a  flate  of 
 religion  neceilanly  implies,  that  we  are  in  a 
 ftate  of  probation  :  and  the  credibility  O;- our 
 being  at  all  in  fuch  a  ftate  being  admitted, 
 there  feems  no  peculiar  difficulty  in  fuppo- 
 ling  our  probation  to  be,  juft  as  it  is,  in  thofe 
 refpedts  which  are  above  objedted  againft. 
 There  feems  no  pretence,  from  the  reafon  of 
 the  things  to  fay,  that  the  trial  cannot  equi- 
 tably be  any  thing,  but  whether  perfons  will 
 acft  fuitably  to  certain  information,  or  fuch  as 
 admits  no  room  for  doubt;  fo  as  that  there 
 can  be  no  danger  of  mifcarriage,  but  either 
 from  their  not  attending  to  what  they  cer- 
 tainly know,  or  from  overbearing  paffioa 
 hurrying  them  on  to  ad  contrary  to  it.  For, 
 fince  ignorance  and  doubt  afford  fcope  for 
 probation  in  all  fenfes,  as  really  as  intuitive 
 convidtion  or  certainty ;  and  fince  the  two 
 former  are  to  be  put  to  the  fame  account,  as 
 difficulties  in  praftice  ;  men's  moral  proba- 
 tion may  alfo  be,  whether  they  will  take  due 
 care  to  inform  themfelves  by  impartial  con  li- 
 beration, and  afterwards  whether  they  will 
 Y  2  aa 
 
324  Revelation  not  univerfal:     Part  II, 
 
 adt  as  the  cafe  requires,  upon  the  evidence 
 which  they  h^.ve,  however  •  doubtful.  And 
 this,  we  find  by  xperietzccy  is  frequently  our 
 probation  ^,  in  our  temporal  capacity  .  For, 
 the  information  which  we  want  with  regard 
 to  our  worldly  interefts,  is  by  no  means  al- 
 ways given  us  of  courfe,  without  any  care  of 
 our  own.  And  we  are  greatly  liable  to  felf- 
 deceit  from  inward  fecret  prejudices,  and  alfo 
 to  the  deceits  of  others.  So  that  to  be  able 
 to  judge  what  is  the  prudent  part,  often 
 requires  much  and  difficult  confideration. 
 Then  after  we  have  judged  the  very  beft  we 
 can,  the  evidence  upon  which  we  muft  aft,  if 
 we  will  live  and  adl  at  all,  is  perpetually  doubt- 
 ful to  a  very  high  degree.  And  the  conftitu- 
 tlon  and  courfe  of  the  world  in  fad:  is  fuch, 
 as  that  v/ant  of  impartial  confideration  what 
 we  have  to  do,  and  venturing  upon  extra- 
 vagant courfes  becaufe  it  is  doubtful  what 
 will  be  the  confequence,  are  often  naturally, 
 /.  e,  providentially,  altogether  as  fatal,  as  mif- 
 conducfl  occafioned  by  heedlefs  inattention  to 
 what  we  certainly  know,  or  difregarding  it 
 from  overbearing  paffion. 
 
 Several  of  the  obfervations  here  made,  may 
 well  feem  ftrange,  perhaps  unintelligible,  to 
 many  good  men.  But  if  the  perfons  for 
 whofe  fake  they  are  made,  think  fo  ;  perfons 
 
 ^P-  55>  3135  316,  317. 
 
 who 
 
Chap.  VI.  fuppofed dejicle7icy  in  its  Proof,   32^ 
 
 who  objed:  as  above,  and  throw  off  all  regard 
 to  religion  under  pretence  of  want  of  evi- 
 dence y  I  dcfire  them  to  confider  again,  whe- 
 ther their  thinking  fp,  be  owing  to  any  thing 
 unintelligible  in  thefe  obftrvations,  or  to  their 
 own  not  having  fuch  a  i^wiz  of  religion  and 
 ferious  folicitude  about  it,  as  even  their  ftate 
 of  fcepticifm  does  in  all  reafon  require  ?  It 
 ought  to  be  forced    upon  the    refledion  of 
 thefe  perfons,  that  our  nature  and  condition 
 neceflarily  require  us,   in  the  daily  courfe  of 
 life,  to  ad:  upon  evidence  much  lower  than 
 what  is  commonly  called  probable  ;  to  guard, 
 not  only  againft  what  we   fully  believe  will, 
 but  alfo  againft  what  we  think  it  fuppofeable 
 may,  happen  ;  and  to  engage  in  purfuits  when 
 the  probability  is  greatly  againft  fuccefs,  if  it 
 be  credible,  that  poffibly  we  may  fucceed  in 
 them. 
 
 Y  3  CHAP, 
 
[     3^6    3 
 
 CHAP.     VIL 
 
 Of  the  particular  'Evidence  for  Chrijiianity . 
 
 ^■^HE  prefumptions  againft  revelation, 
 and  objedions  againft  the  general 
 fcheme  of  Chriitianity,  and  particular  things 
 relating  to  it,  being  removed  ^  there  remains 
 to  be  confidered,  what  pofitive  evidence  vv^e 
 have  for  tiie  truth  of  it :  chiefly  in  order  to 
 fee,  whav  Jie  analogy  of  nature  iuggefts  with 
 reg-ird  to  tiiat  evidence,  and  the  objedlions 
 againft  n  :  or  to  fee  vv^hat  is,  and  is  allowed 
 to  be,  the  plain  natural  rule  of  judgment 
 and  of  action,  in  our  temporal  concerns,  in 
 Cafes  where  we  have  the  fime  kind  of  evidence, 
 and  the  fame  kind  of  objed:ions  againft  itj 
 that  we  have  in  the  cafe  before  us. 
 
 Now  in  the  evidence  of  Chriftianity,  there 
 feem  to  be  feveral  things  of  great  weight,  not 
 reducible  to  the  head,  either  of  miracles,  or 
 the  completion  of  prophecy,  in  the  common 
 acctDtati  n  of  the  words.  But  thefe  two  are 
 its  direct  and  fundamental  proofs  :  and  thofe 
 other  ihings,  however  coniiderabie  they  are, 
 yet  ought  never  to  be  urged  apart  from  its 
 dirtdi  proofs,  but  always  to  be  joined  with 
 them.  Thus  the  evidence  of  Chriftianity 
 will  be  a  long  feries  of  things,  reachirg,  as  it 
 
 feems. 
 
Chap.  VII.  Of  the  particular  KvidencCy  &c.  327 
 
 feems,  from  the  beginning  of  the  world  to 
 the  prefent  time,  of  great  variety  and  compafs, 
 taking  in  both  the  dired;,  and  aUb  the  colla- 
 teral, proofs;  and  making  up,  all  of  them 
 together,  one  argument :  the  convidtion  ari- 
 fing  from  which  kind  of  proof,  may  be  com- 
 pared to  what  we  call  the  effedi  in  architec- 
 ture or  other  works  of  art;  a  refiilt  from  a 
 great  number  of  things  fo  and  fo  difpofed, 
 and  taken  into  one  view.  I  (hall  therefore, 
 FIRST y  make  fome  obfervations  relating  to 
 miracles,  and  the  appearing  completions  of 
 prophecy;  and  confider  what  analogy  fuggefts, 
 in  anfwer  to  the  objections  brought  againft 
 this  evidence.  And,  SECONDLTy  I  fhall 
 endeavour  to  give  fome  account  of  the  gene- 
 ral argum^ent  now  mentioned,  confifting  both 
 of  the  direct  and  collateral  evidence,  con- 
 fidered  as  making  up  one  argument :  this 
 being  the  kind  of  proof,  upon  which  we  de- 
 termine mofl  queftions  of  difficulty,  concern- 
 ing common  facts,  alledged  to  have  happened 
 or  feeming  likely  to  happen ;  efpecially  quef- 
 tions  relating  to  condudt, 
 
 FIRST'  I  fhall  make  fome  obfervations 
 upon  the  dired;  proof  of  Chriftianity  from 
 miracles  and  prophecy,  and  upon  the  objec- 
 tions ailedged  againft  it. 
 
 I.  Now  the  following  obfervations  relating 
 to  the  hiftorical  evidence  of  miracles  wrought 
 
 Y4  in 
 
328         Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  IL 
 
 in  atteftation  of  Chriftianity,  appear  to  be  of 
 great  weight. 
 
 I.  The  Old  Teftament  affords  us  the  fame 
 hiftorical  evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Mofcs 
 and  of  the  prophets,  as  of  the  common  civil 
 hiftory  oi  Mofes  and  the  kings  oi  Ifrael-,  or, 
 as  of  the  affairs  of  the  Jewidi  nation.  And 
 the  Go/pels  and  the  ABs  afford  us  jhe  fame 
 hiftorical  evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Chrift 
 and  the  Apoftles,  as  of  the  common  matters 
 related  in  them.  This  indeed  could  not  have 
 been  affirmed  by  any  reafonable  man,  if  the 
 authors  of  thefe  Books,  like  many  other  hif- 
 torians,  had  appeared  to  make  an  entertaining 
 manner  of  writing  their  aim  ;  though  they 
 held  interfperfed  miracles  in  their  works,  at 
 proper  diftances  and  upon  proper  occafions. 
 Thefe  mipht  have  animated  a  dull  relation, 
 amufed  the  reader  and  engaged  his  attention. 
 And  the  fame  account  would  naturally  have 
 been  given  of  them,  as  of  the  fpeeches  and 
 defcriptions  of  fuch  authors :  the  fame  ac- 
 count, in  a  manner,  as  is  to  be  given,  why^ 
 the  poets  make  ufe  of  wonders  and  prodigies. 
 But  the  fad:s,  both  miraculous  and  natural, 
 in  Scripture,  are  related  in  plain  unadorned 
 narratives  :  and  both  of  them  appear,  in  all 
 refpe^ls,  to  ftand  upon  the  fame  foot  of  hif- 
 torical evidence.  Farther :  fome  parts  of 
 Scripture,  containing  an  account  of  miracles 
 fully  furHcicnt  to  prove  the  truth  of  Chrifti- 
 anity, 
 
 I 
 
Chap.  VII.      for  Chrijlianity,  329 
 
 anity,  are  quoted  as  genuine,  from  the  age  ia 
 which  they  are  laid  to  be  written,   down  to 
 the  prefent :    and  no  other  parts  of   them, 
 material  in  the  prefent  queftion,  are  omitted 
 to  be  quoted  in  fuch  manner,  as  to  alford  any 
 fort  of  proof  of  their    not    being    genuine. 
 And,  as  common   hiilory,    when    called   in 
 queftion  in  any  inftance,  may  often  be  great- 
 ly confirmed   by  cotemporary  or  fubfequent 
 events  more  known  and  acknowledged;  and 
 as  the  common  Scripture-hiftory,  like  many 
 others,  is  thus  confirmed :  io  likewife  is  the 
 miraculous  hiftory  of  it,  not  only  in  parti- 
 cular inllances,  but  in    general.      For,  the 
 eftabliihment  of  the  Jewifli    and  Chriftian 
 religions,  which  were    events    cotemporary 
 with  the  miracles  related  to  be  wrought  in 
 atteftation  of  both,  or  fubfequent  to  them, 
 thefe  events  are  juft  what  we  ihould  have  ex- 
 pected, upon  fuppofition  fuch  miracles  were 
 really  wrought  to  attell;  the  truth  of  thofe 
 religions.     Thefe  miracles  are  a  fatis factory 
 account  of  thofe  events :  of  which  no  other 
 fatisfa(flory  account  can   be  given ;  nor  any 
 account  at  all,  but  what  is  imaginary  merely 
 and  invented.   It  is  to  be  added,  that  the  moft 
 obvious,  the  moil  eafy  and  direct  account  of 
 this  hiftory,  how  it  came  to  be  written  and 
 to  be  received  in  the  world,  as  a  true  hiftory, 
 is,  that  it  really  is  lb  :  nor  can  any  other  ac- 
 count of  it  be  eafy  and  diredl.      Now,  though 
 an  account,  not  at  ail  obvious,  but  very  far- 
 fetched 
 
33^         0/  the  particular  Evidence      Part  II. 
 
 fetched  and  indired:,  may  indeed  be,  and  often 
 is,  the  true  account  of  a  matter;  yet  it  can- 
 not be  admitted  on  the  authority  of  its  being 
 aflerted.  Mere  guefs,  fuppofition,  and  pof- 
 iibihty,  when  oppofed  to  hiilorical  evidence, 
 prove  nothings  but  that  hiilorical  evidence  is 
 not  demonlirative. 
 
 Now  the  juft  confequence  from  all  this,  I 
 think,  is,  that  the  Script ure-hiftory  in  general 
 is  to  be  admitted  as  an  authentick  genuine 
 hiftory,  till  fomevvhat  poiitive  be  alledged 
 fufficient  to  invalidate  it.  But  no  man  will 
 deny  the  confequence  to  be,  that  it  cannot 
 be  rejected,  or  thrown  by  as  of  no  authority, 
 till  it  can  be  proved  to  be  of  none ;  even 
 though  the  evidence  now  mentioned  for  its 
 authority  were  doubtful.  This  evidence  may 
 be  confronted  by  hiftorical  evidence  on  the 
 other  fide  if  there  be  any:  or  general  incre- 
 dibility in  the  things  related,  or  inconfiftence 
 in  the  general  turn  of  the  hiftory,  would 
 prove  it  to  be  of  no  authority.  But  fince, 
 upon  the  face  of  the  matter,  upon  a  lirft  and 
 general  view,  the  appearance  is,  that  it  is  an 
 authentick  hiftory ;  it  cannot  be  determined 
 to  be  ficlitious  without  fome  proof,  that  it  is 
 fo.  And  the  follovvine  obfervations,  in  fup- 
 port  of  thefe  and  coincident  with  them,  will 
 greatly  confirm  the  hiftorical  evidence  for  the 
 truth  of  Chriftianity. 
 
 2.  The 
 
chap.  VII.         for  Chrijlianify,  331 
 
 2.  The  epiftles  of  St.  Paul,  from  the 
 nature  of  epillolary  writing,  and  moreover 
 from  feveral  of  them  being  written,  not  to 
 particular  perfons,  but  to  churches  ;  carry  in 
 them  evidences  of  their  being  genuine,  be- 
 yond what  can  be  in  a  mere  hiflorical  narra- 
 tive, left  to  the  world  at  large.  This  evi- 
 dence, joined  with  that  which  they  have  in 
 common  with  the  reft  of  the  New  Teftament, 
 feems  not  to  leave  fo  much  as  any  particular 
 pretence  for  denying  their  genuinenefs,  con- 
 iidered  as  an  ordinary  matter  of  fad:,  or  of 
 criticifm :  I  fay  particular  pretence,  for  de- 
 nying it;  becaufe  any  fmgle  fad,  of  fuch  a 
 kind  and  fuch  antiquity,  may  have  general 
 doubts  raifed  concerning  it,  from  the  very  na- 
 ture of  human  affairs  and  human  teftimony. 
 There  is  alfo  to  be  mentioned,  a  diftind  and 
 particular  evidence  of  the  genuinenefs  of  the 
 epiftle  chiefly  referred  to  here,  the  firft  to  the 
 Corinthians ;  from  the  manner  in  which  it 
 is  quoted  by  Clemens  Romanusy  in  an  epiftle 
 of  his  own  to  that  church  \  Now  thefe 
 epiftles  afford  a  proof  of  Chriftianity,  detach- 
 ed from  all  others,  which  is,  I  think,  a  thing 
 of  weight;  and  alfo  a  proof  of  a  nature  and 
 kind  peculiar  to  itfelf.     For, 
 
 In  them  the  author  declares,  that  he  receiv- 
 ed the  Gofpel  in  general,  and  the  inftitutioa 
 
 •  Clem.  Rom,  Ep.  I.  c.  47. 
 
 of 
 
3  3  2         O/'  the  particular  Evidence     Part  IL 
 
 of  the  Communion  in  particular,  not  froni 
 the  reft  of  the  Apoftles,  or  jointly  together 
 with  them,  but  alone,  from  Chrift  himfelf : 
 whom  he  declares  likewife,  conformably  to 
 the  hillory  in  the  Acts,  that  he  fiw  after  his 
 afcenfion\  So  that  the  tefiimony  of  St. 
 Paul  is  to  be  confidered,  as  detached  from 
 that  of  the  reft  of  the  Apoftles. 
 
 And  he  declares  farther,  that  he  was  en- 
 dued witTi  a  power  of  working  miracles,  as 
 what  was  publicly  known  to  thofe  very  peo- 
 ple, fpeaks  of  frequent  and  great  variety  of 
 miraculous  shifts  as  then  fubfiftin^  in  thofe 
 very  churches,  to  which  he  was  writing; 
 which  he  was  reproving  for  feveral  irregula- 
 rities ;  and  where  he  had  perfonal  oppofers : 
 he  mentions  thefe  gifts  incidentally,  in  the 
 moft  eafy  manner  and  without  effort ;  by  way 
 of  reproof  to  thofe  who  had  them,  for  their 
 indecent  ufe  of  them  -,  and  by  way  of  depre- 
 ciating them,  in  comparifon  of  moral  virtues  : 
 in  fliort  he  fpeaks  to  thefe  churches,  of  thefe 
 miraculous  powers,  in  the  manner,  any  one 
 -would  fpeak  to  another  of  a  thing,  which  was 
 as  fam.iliar  and  as  much  known  in  common  to 
 them  both,  as  any  thing  in  the  worlds  And 
 this,  as  hath  been  obferved  by  feveral  perfons, 
 is  furely  a  very  confiderable  thing. 
 
 ^  Gal,  i.        I  Cor.  xi.  23,  he,        1  Cor.  xv.  8. 
 
 •=  Rom.  XV.  19.  I  Cor.  xii.  8,  9,  lO — -28,  &c.  and 
 c.  xiii.  T,  2,  8,  and  the  whole  xiv-'»  ch,  2  Cor.  xii.  12, 
 ij.     Ga!.  ii;.  2,  5. 
 
 3- It 
 
Chap.  VII.        for  Chrijltantty .  333 
 
 3.  It  Is  an  acknowledged  hiftorical  fa 61, 
 that  Chriflianity  offered  itfclf  to  the  world, 
 and  demanded  to  be  received,  upon  the  alle- 
 gation, /.  f.  as  unbelievers  would  fpcak,  upon 
 the  pretence,  of  miracles,  publicly  wrought 
 to  atteft  the  truth  of  it,   in  fuch  an  age  ;  and 
 that  it  was  adtually  received  by  great  numbers 
 in  that  very  age,  and  upon  the  profeffed  belief 
 of  the  reality  of  thefe  miracles.     And.  Chrif- 
 tianity,  including  the  difpenfation  of  the  Old 
 Teftament,  feems  diftinguifhed  by  this  from 
 all  other  religions.     I  mean,  that  this  does 
 not  appear  to  be  the  cafe  with  regard  to  any 
 other:  for  furely  it  will  not  be  fuppofr  i  to 
 lie  upon  any  perfon,  to    prove   by  poiitive 
 hiftorical  evidence,  that  it  was  not.     It  does 
 in  no  fort  appear  that  Mahometaxiifm  was 
 flrft  received  in  the  world  upon  the  foot  of 
 fuppofed  miracles  "*,  /.  e.  public  ones :  for,  as 
 revelation  is  itfelf  miraculous,  all  pretence  to 
 it  muft  neceffarily  imply  fome  pretence  of 
 miracles.     And  it  is  a  known  fa^,   that  it 
 was  immediately,  at  the  very  firft,  propagated 
 by  other  means.     And  as  particular  infiltu- 
 tions,  whether  in  Paganifm  or  Popery,  faid 
 to  be  confirmed  by  miracles  after  thofe  infli- 
 tutions  had  obtained,  are  not  to  the  purpofe : 
 fo,  were  there  what  might  be  called  hiftorical 
 proof,  that  any  of  them  were  introduced  by 
 a  fuppofed  divine  command,  believed  to  be 
 
 ^  See  the  Koran,  c.  xiii,  and  c.  xvil. 
 
 attefted 
 
3  34        Of  the  particular  Evidence      Part  II, 
 
 attefted  by  miracles ;  thefe  would  not  be  in 
 any  wife  parallel.  For  fingle  things  of  this 
 fort  are  eafy  to  be  accounted  for,  after  parties 
 are  formed  and  have  power  in  their  hands ; 
 and  the  leaders  of  them  are  in  veneration 
 with  the  multitude;  and  political  interefts 
 are  blended  with  religious  claims,  and  reli- 
 gious diftinctions.  But  before  any  thing  of 
 this  kind,  for  a  few  perfons,  and  thofe  of  the 
 lov/eft  rank,  all  at  once,  to  bring  over  fuch 
 great  numbers  to  a  new  religion,  and  get  it 
 to  be  received  upon  the  particular  evidence  of 
 miracles ;  this  is  quite  another  thing.  And 
 I  think  it  will  be  allowed  by  any  fair  adver- 
 fary,  that  the  fad  now  mentioned,  taking  in 
 all  the  circumflances  of  it,  is  peculiar  to  the 
 Chriftian  religion.  However,  the  fad  itfelf 
 is  allowed,  that  Chriftianity  obtained,  /.  e. 
 was  profeffed  to  be  received  in  the  world, 
 upon  the  belief  of  miracles,  immediately  in 
 the  ap-e  in  which  it  is  faid  thofe  miracles 
 were  wrou2:ht :  or  that  this  is  what  its  iirft 
 converts  would  have  alledged,  as  the  reafon 
 for  their  embracing  it.  Now  certainly  it  is 
 not  to  be  fuppofed,  that  fuch  numbers  of 
 men,  in  the  moft  diftant  parts  of  the  world, 
 fhould  forfake  the  religion  of  their  country, 
 in  which  they  had  been  educated ;  feparate 
 themfelves  from  their  friends,  particularly  in 
 their  feftival  ifliows  and  folemnities,  to  which 
 th&  common  people  are  fo  greatly  addided, 
 and  which  were  of  a  nature  to  engage  them 
 
 much 
 
chap.  VII.       for  ChriJlianUy.  33^ 
 
 much   more,    than    any  thing    of  that   fox^t 
 amongft  us ;  and  Embrace  a  religion,  which 
 could  not  but  expofe  them  to  many  inconve- 
 niences, and  indeed  muft  have  been  a  giving 
 up  the  world  in  a  great  degree,  even  from  the 
 very  firft,  and  before  the  empire  engaged  in 
 form  againft  them:  it  cannot   be  fuppofcd, 
 that  fuch  numbers  fhould  make  fo  great,  and, 
 to  fay  the  lead,  fo  inconvenient  a  change  in 
 their  whole  inftitution  of  life,   unlcfs    they 
 wxre  really  convinced  of  the  truth  of  thofe 
 miracles,  upon  the  knowledge  or  belief  of 
 which,  they  profefled  to  make  it.     And  it 
 will,   I    fuppofe,    readily    be    acknowledged, 
 that  the  generality  of  the  iirft  converts  to 
 Chriftianity,  muft  have  believed  them :   that 
 as  by  becoming  Chriftians   they  declared  to 
 the  world,  they  were  fatisfied  of  the  truth 
 of  thofe  miracles ;  fo  this  declaration  was  to 
 be  credited.     And  this  their  teftimony  is  the 
 fame  kind  of  evidence    for   thofe  miracles, 
 as  if  they  had  put  it   in  writing,  and  thefe 
 writings  had  come  down  to  us.     And  it  is 
 real  evidence,  becaufe  it  is  of  fa<fts,  which 
 they  had    capacity  and  full  opportunity  to 
 inform    themfelves    of.     It    is    alfo  diftindl 
 from'the  dired:  or  exprefs  hiftorical  evidence, 
 though  it  is  of  the  fame  kind :  and  it  would 
 be  allov/ed  to  be  diftind:  in  all  cafes.     For 
 were  a  fad:  exprefsly  related  by  one  or  more 
 ancient  hiftorians,  and  difputed  in  after  ages  ; 
 that  this  fad  is  acknowledged  to  have  been 
 
 believed. 
 
336        Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  11. 
 
 believed,  by  great  numbers  of  the  age  in 
 which  the  hiftorian  fays  it  was  done,  would 
 be  allowed  an  additional  proof  of  fuch  fad:, 
 quite  diftind  fioni  the  cxprefs  teftimony  of 
 the  hiftorian.  Thr  credulity  of  mankind  is 
 acknowledged  :  and  the  fulpicions  of  man- 
 kind ought  to  be  aL-knowiedged  too ;  and 
 their  backwardnefs  even  to  bc:lieve,  and  great- 
 er ftill  to  pradife,  wh.  t  makes  againft  their 
 intereft.  And  it  niuft  particularly  be  re- 
 membered, that  education,  and  prejudice,  and 
 authority,  were  againft  Chriiiianity,  in  the 
 age  I  am  fpeaking  of.  So  that  the  immediate 
 converfion  of  fuch  numbers,  is  a  real  pre- 
 fumption  of  fomewhat  more  than  human  in 
 this  matter  :  1  fay  prefumption,  for  it  is  not 
 alledged  as  a  proof  alone  and  by  itfelf.  Nor 
 need  anyone  of  the  things  mentioned  in  this 
 chapter  be  confidered  as  a  proof  by  itfelf: 
 and  yet  all  of  them  together  m.ay  be  one  of 
 the  ftrongeft". 
 
 Upon  the  whole  :  as  there  is  large  hifto- 
 rlcal  evidence,  both  dired  and  circumftantial^ 
 of  miracles  wrought  in  atteftation  of  Chrifti- 
 anity,  colledled  by  thofe  who  have  writ  upon 
 the  fubiect;  it  lies  upon  unbelievers  to  fhew, 
 why  this  evidence  is  not  to  be  credited.  This 
 way  of  fpeaking,  is,  I  think,  juft  ;  and  what 
 perfons  who  write    in  defence  of  religion, 
 
 '  P- 177^  &c- 
 
 naturally 
 
Chap.  VIL       for  Chrljlianity .  237 
 
 naturally  fall  into.  Yet,  in  a  matter  of  fuch 
 unfpeakable  importance,  the  proper  queftion 
 is,  not  whom  it  lies  upon,  accordin:^  to  the 
 rules  of  argument,  to  maintain  or  confute 
 objections  :  but,  whether  there  really  are  any, 
 againft  this  evidence,  fufRcient,  in  reafon,  to 
 deftroy  the  credit  of  it.  However,  unbelievers 
 feem  to  take  upon  them  the  part  of  fhevvdng 
 that  there  are. 
 
 They  alledge,  that  numberlefs  enthufi- 
 aftick  people,  in  different  ages  and  countries, 
 expofe  themfelves  to  the  fame  difficulties 
 which  the  primitive  Chriftians  did  r,  and  are 
 ready  to  give  up  their  lives,  for  the  mofl  idle 
 follies  imaginable.  But  it  is  not  very  clear, 
 to  w^hat  purpofe  this  objection  is  brought. 
 For  every  one,  furely,  in  every  cafe,  mufl 
 diftinguifh  between  opinions  and  £icls.  And 
 though  te film ony  is  no  proof  of  enthuiiaftick 
 opinions,  or  of  any  opinions  :.t  all  \  yet  it  is 
 allov/ed,  in  all  other  cafes,  to  be  a  proof  of 
 fads.  And  a  perfon's  laying  down  his  life  in 
 atteftation  of  fadisor  of  opinions,is  the  ftrong- 
 eft  proof  of  his  believing  them.  And  if  the 
 Apoftles  and  their  cotemporaries  did  believe 
 the  fad:s,  in  atteftation  of  which  they  expofed 
 themfelves  to  futterings  and  death  ;  this  their 
 belief,  or  rather  knowledge,  muft  be  a  proof 
 of  thofe  fa<fls  :  for  they  were  fuch  as  came 
 under  the  obfervation  of  their  fenfes.  And 
 rhough  it  is  not  of  equal  weight,  yet  it  is  of 
 
 Z  weight. 
 
338         Of  the  particular  Evidence    Part  IL 
 
 weight,  that  the  martyrs  of  the  next  age,  not- 
 withilanding  they  were  not  eye-witnefles  of 
 thofe  fads,  as  were  the  Apofties  and  their 
 cotcmporaries,  had,  however,  lull  opportu- 
 nity to  inform  themfelves,  v,  hethcr  they  were 
 true  or  not,  and  gave  equul  proof  of  their  be- 
 lieving them  to  be  true 
 
 But  enthufiafm,  it  is  faid,  greatly  weakens 
 the  evidence  of  teftimony  even  for  fa6ls,  in 
 matters  relating  to  religion  :  fome  feem  to 
 think,  it  totally  and  abfoluteiy  deftroys  the 
 evidence  of  teftimony  upon  this  fubjed:. 
 And  indeed  tlie  powers  of  enthufiafm,  and 
 of  difeafes  too  which  operate  in  a  like  man- 
 ner^ are  very  wonderful,  in  particular  inftan- 
 ces.  But  if  great  numbers  of  men,  not  ap- 
 pearing in  any  peculiar  degree  weak,  nor  un- 
 der any  peculiar  fufpicion  of  negligence,  af- 
 firm that  they  law  and  heard  fuch  things 
 plainly  with  their  eyes  and  their  ears,  and 
 are  admitted  to  be  in  earneft ;  fuch  tefti- 
 mony is  evidence  of  the  ftrongeft  kind  we 
 can  have,  for  any  matter  of  fadt.  Yet  pof- 
 fibly  it  may  be  overcome,  ftrong  as  it  is,  by 
 incredibility  in  the  things  thus  attefted,  or  by 
 contrary  teftimony.  And  in  an  inftance  where 
 one  thought  it  was  fo  overcome,  it  might  be 
 juft  to  confider,  how  far  fuch  evidence  could 
 be  accounted  for,  by  enthufiafm  :  for  it  feems 
 as  if  no  other  imaginable  account  were  to  be 
 given  of  it.  But  till  fuch  incredibility  be 
 9  fliewn. 
 
Chap.  VII.      for  Chrijlianity,  339 
 
 fhewn,  or  contrary  telamony  produced,  it 
 cannot  furely  be  expelled,  that  io  far-fetched> 
 fo  indire^fV  and  wonderful  an  account  of  fuch 
 teftimony,  as  that  of  cnthufiafm  muft  be;  an 
 account  fo  ftrange,  that  the  generality  of  man- 
 kind can  fcarce  be  made  to  underfland  what 
 is  meant  by  it :  it  cannot,  I  fay,  be  expedled  1 
 that  Ibch  account  will  be  admitted  of  fuch 
 evidence ;  when  there  is  this  diredl,  eafy  and 
 obvious  account  of  it,  that  people  really  faw 
 and  heard  a  thing  not  incredible,  which  they 
 affirm  fincerely  and  with  full  aflurance,  they 
 did  fee  and  hear.  Grantinp;  then  that  enthu- 
 fiafm  is  not  (ftridly  fpeaking)  an  abfurd,  but 
 a  poffible  account  of  fuch  teftimony;  it  is 
 manifeft  that  the  very  mention  of  it  goes 
 upon  the  previous  fuppofition,  that  the  things 
 fo  attefted  are  incredible  :  and  therefore  need 
 not  be  confidcred,  till  they  are  fhewn  to  be 
 fo.  Much  lefs  need  it  be  confidered,  after 
 the  contrary  has  been  proved.  And  1  think 
 it  has  been  proved,  to  full  fatisfadlion,  that 
 there  is  no  incredibility  in  a  revelation,  in  ge- 
 neral ;  or  in  fuch  an  one  as  the  Chriftian,  in 
 particular.  Hov/evev;  as  religion  is  fuppofed 
 peculiarly  liable  to  enthufiafm,  it  may  juft 
 be  obferved,  that  prejudices  almoft  w^ithout 
 number  and  v/ithout  name,  romance,  affec- 
 tation, humour,  a  defire  to  engage  attention 
 or  to  furprizc,  the  party-fpirit,  cuftom,  little 
 competitions,  unaccountable  likings  and  dif- 
 likings;  thefe  influence  men  flrongly  incom- 
 
 Z  2  mou 
 
3  4o       ^f  i^^  particular  Evidence      Part  11. 
 
 mon  matters.  And  as  thefe  prejudices  are 
 often  fcarce  known  or  refledied  upon  by  the 
 perfons  themfelves  who  are  influenced  by 
 them,  they  are  to  be  confidered  as  influences 
 of  a  hke  kind  to  enthuliafm.  Yet  hum.an 
 teflimony  in  common  matters  is  naturally 
 and  juftly  beheved  notwithftanding. 
 
 It  is  intimated  farther,  in  a  more  refined 
 way  of  obfervation,  that  though  it  fhould  be 
 proved,  that  the  apoftles  and  firfl:  Chrifliians 
 could  not,  in  fome  refpecfls,  he  deceived 
 themfelves,  and,  in  other  refpfts,  cannot  be 
 thought  to  have  intended  to  impofe  upon  the 
 world;  yet  it  will  not  follov/,  that  their  ge- 
 neral teftimony  is  to  be  believed,  though  truly 
 handed  down  to  us :  becaufe  they  might  ftill 
 in  part,  /.  e.  in  other  refpedls,  be  deceived 
 themfdves,  and  in  part  alfo  defignedly  impofe 
 upon  others ;  which,  it  is  added,  is  a  thing 
 very  credible,  from  that  mixture  of  real  en- 
 thufiafm,  and  real  knavery,  to  be  met  with 
 in  the  fame  charafcers.  And,  I  muft  confefs, 
 I  think  the  matter  of  flict  contained  in  this 
 obfervation  upon  mankind,  is  not  to  be  de- 
 nied ;  a!;d  that  fomewhat  very  much  a-kin  to 
 it,  is  often  fuppofcd  in  Scripture  as  a  very 
 common  cafe,  and  rnoft  fcverely  reproved. 
 But  it  were  to  have  I5een  expefied,  that  per- 
 fons  capable  of  applying  this  obfervation  as 
 applied  in  the  objection,  might  alfo  frequently 
 have  met  with  the  like  mixt  charac^ter,  in 
 
 inftanccs 
 
Chap.  VIL       for  Chrijiianity.  341 
 
 inftances  where  religion  was  quite  out  of  th^ 
 cafe.  The  thing  plainly  is,  that  mc^kin^ 
 are  naturally  endued  with  reafon,  or  a  capa' 
 city  ofdiftinguifhing  between  truth  and  falfe" 
 hood.;  and  as  naturally  they  are  endued  with 
 veracity,  or  a  regard  to  truth  in  wh;it  they 
 fay  :  but  from  many  occafions,  they  are  lia- 
 able  to  be  prejudiced  and  biaffed  and  deceived 
 themfelves,  and  capable  of  intending  to  de- 
 ceive others,  in  every  different  degree  :  in- 
 fomuch  that,  as  we  are  all  liable  to  be  de- 
 ceived by  prejudice,  fo  likev/iie  it  feems  to 
 be  not  an  uncommon  thing,  for  perfuns, 
 who,  from  their  regard  to  truth,  would  not 
 invent  a  lie  entirely  without  any  foundation 
 at  all,  to  propagate  it  with  heightening  cir- 
 cumftances,  after  it  is  once  invented  and  fet 
 agoing.  And  others,  though  they  would 
 not  propagate  a  lie,  yet,  which  is  a  lower 
 degree  of  falfliood,  will  let  it  pafs  without 
 contradidlion.  But  notwithflanding  all  this, 
 human  teftimony  remains  fall  a  natural 
 ground  of  aflent;  and  this  afient  a  natural 
 principle  of  adlion. 
 
 It  is  objedled  farther,  that  however  it  has 
 happened,  \S\^faB  is,  that  mankind  have,  in 
 different  ages,  been  ftrangely  deluded  with 
 pretences  to  miracles  and  wonders.  But  it 
 is  by  no  means  to  be  admitted,  that  they 
 have  been  oftener,  or  are  at  all  m.ore  liable 
 to  be  deceived  by  thefe  pretences,  than  by 
 others. 
 
 Z   -  It 
 
342        Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  IL 
 
 It  is  added,  that  there  is  a  very  conliderable 
 degree  of  hiftorical  evidence  for  miracles, 
 which  are,  on  all  hands,  acknowledgea  to  bo 
 fabulous.  But  fuppofe  there  were  even  the 
 like  hiftorical  evidence  for  thefe,  to  what  there 
 is  for  thofe  alledged  in  proof  of  Chnftianity, 
 which  yet  is  in  no  wife  allowed,  but  fuppofe 
 this;  the  confequence  would  not  be,  that 
 the  evidence  of  the  latter  is  not  tp  be  admit- 
 ted. Nor  is  there  a  man  in  the  world  who,, 
 in  common  cafes,  would  conclude  thus.  For 
 what  would  fuch  a  conclufion  really  amount 
 to  but  this,  that  evidence  confuted  bv  con- 
 trary  evidence,  or  any  way  overbalanced,  de- 
 ftroys  the  credibility  of  other  evidence,  nei- 
 ther confuted,  nor  overbalanced  ?  To  argue, 
 that  becaufe  there  is,  if  there  were,  like  evi- 
 dence from  teftimony,  for  miracles  acknow- 
 ledged falfe,  as  for  thofe  in  atteftation  of 
 Chriftianity,  therefore  the  evidence  in  the 
 latter  cafe  is  not  to.  be  credited ;  this  is  the 
 fam.c  as  to  argue,  that  if  two  men  of  equally 
 good  reputation,  had  given  evidence  in  diife- 
 rent  cafes  no  way  connedled,  and  one  of  them 
 had  been  convidled  of  perjury,  this  confuted 
 the  teftimonv  of  the  otherc 
 
 Upon  the  whole  then,  the  general  obfer- 
 yation  that  human  creatures  are  fo  liable  to 
 be  deceived,  from  enthufiafm  in  religion, 
 and  principles  equivalent  to  enthufiafm  in 
 common  matters,  and  in  both  from  negli- 
 gence ; 
 
chap.  VII.      for  Chnjiiafiity.  343 
 
 gence;  and  that  they  are  fo  capable  of  dif- 
 honeftly  endeavouriiiL^  to  deceive  others  j  this 
 does  indeed  weaken  the  evidence  of  teftimony 
 in  all  cafes,  but  does  not  deilroy  it  in  any. 
 And  thefc  things  will  appear,  to  different 
 men,  to  weaken  the  evidence  of  teilimony,  in 
 different  degrees  :  in  degrees  proportionable 
 to  the  obiervations  they  have  made,  or  the 
 notions  they  have  any  way  taken  up,  con- 
 cerning the  weaknefs  and  negligence  and 
 difhoncfty  of  mankind  ;  or  corxerning  the 
 powers  of  enthufiafm,  and  prejudices  equi- 
 valent to  it.  But  it  feems  to  mc,  that  people 
 do  not  know  what  they  fay,  who  affirm  thefe 
 things  todeftroy  the  evidence  from  teilimony, 
 which  we  have  of  the  truth  of  Chriftianity. 
 Nothing  can  deilroy  the  evidence  of  teftimony 
 in  any  cafe,  but  a  proof  or  probability,  that 
 perfons  are  not  competent  judges  of  the  fads 
 to  which  they  give  teftimony ;  or  that  they 
 are  adually  under  fome  indiredl  influence  in 
 giving  it,  in  fuch  particular  cafe.  Till  this 
 be  made  out,  the  natural  laws  of  human  ac- 
 tions require,  that  teftimony  be  admitted.  It 
 can  never  be  fufiicient  to  overthrow  direct 
 hiftorical  evidence,  indolently  to  lay,  that 
 there  are  fo  many  principles,  from  whence 
 men  are  liable  to  be  deceived  themfelves  and 
 difpofed  to  deceive  others,  efpecially  in  mat- 
 ters of  rehgion,  that  one  knows  not  what  to 
 believe.  And  it  is  furprizing  perfons  can  help 
 reflecfting,  that  this  very  manner  of  fpeaking, 
 fuppofes  they  are  not  fitislied  that  there  is 
 
 Z  4  nothing 
 
344        Of  the  particular  Evidence      Part  IL 
 
 nothing  in  the  evidence,  of  which  they  fpeak 
 thus  ',  or  that  they  can  avoid  obferving,  if 
 they  do  make  this  refledion,  that  it  is,  on 
 fuch  a  fubjed,  a  very  material  one  \ 
 
 And  over  againfl  all  thefe  objedions,  is  to 
 be  fct,  the  importance  of  Chriftianity,  as  what 
 muft  have  engaged  the  attention  of  its  firfl 
 converts,  fo  as  to  have  rendered  them  lefs  liable 
 to  be  deceived  from  carcleffnefs,  than  they 
 would  in  common  matters ;  and  likewife  the 
 ftrong  obligations  to  veracity,  which  their 
 religion  laid  them  under  :  fo  that  the  firft  and 
 moft  obvious  prefumption  is,  that  they  could 
 not  be  deceived  themfelves,  nor  would  deceive 
 others.  And  this  pi-efumption  in  this  de- 
 gree, is  peculiar  to  the  teftimony  wx  have  been 
 confidering. 
 
 In  argument,  affertions  are  nothing  in 
 themfelves,  and  have  an  air  of  politivenefs, 
 which  fometimes  is  not  very  eafy  :  yet  they 
 are  necellary,  and  necefTary  to  be  repeated;  in 
 order  to  conned  a  difcourfe,  and  dirtindly  to 
 lay  before  the  view  of  the  reader,  what  is  pro- 
 pofed  to  be  proved,  and  v/hat  is  left  as  proved. 
 Now  the  conclufion  from  the  foregoing  ob- 
 fervations  is,  I  think,  beyond  all  doubt,  this : 
 that  unbelievers  muft  be  forced  to  admit  the 
 external  evidence  for  Chriftianity,   /.  e.    the 
 
 ^  See  the  foregoing  Chapter. 
 
 proof 
 
Chap.  VII.        for  Chri[liamty.  34^ 
 
 proof  of  miracles  wroujit  to  atteft  it,  to  be 
 of  real  weight  and  very  conlidcj  able ;  though 
 they  cannot  allow  it  to  be  fufficient,  to  con- 
 vince them  of  the  reality  of  thofe  miracles. 
 And  as  they  muft,  in  all  reafon,  admit  this  ; 
 fo  it  feems  to  me,  that  upon  conlideration 
 they  would,  in  facl:,  admit  it  \  thofe  of  them, 
 I  mean,  who  know  any  thing  at  all  of  the 
 matter  :  in  like  manner  as  perfons,  in  many 
 cafes,  own,  they  fee  ftrong  evidence  from 
 teftimony,  for  the  truth  of  things,  which  yet 
 they  cannot  be  convinced  are  true  :  cafes,  fup- 
 pofe,  where  there  is  contrary  teftimony ;  or 
 things  which  they  th'nk,  whether  with  or 
 without  reafon,  to  be  incredible.  But  there 
 is  no  teftimony  contrary  to  that  which  we 
 have  been  confidering  :  and  it  has  been  fully 
 proved,  that  there  is  no  incredibility,  in 
 Chriftianity  in  general,  or  in  any  part  of  it. 
 
 II.  As  to  the  evidence  for  Chriftianity 
 from  prophecy,  I  ihall  only  make  fome  few 
 general  obfervations,  which  are  fuggefted  by 
 the  Analogy  of  Nature  ;  /.  e,  by  the  acknow- 
 ledged natural  rules  of  judging  in  common 
 matters,  concerning  evidence  of  a  like  kind 
 to  this  from  prophecy. 
 
 I.  The  obfcurity  or  unintelligiblenefs  of 
 one  part  of  a  prophecy,  does  not,  in  any  de- 
 gree, invalidate  the  proof  of  fore  fight,  arifing 
 from  the  appearing  completion  oi  thofe  oth^r 
 
 parts 
 
•46         Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  IL 
 
 parts  which  are  under  flood.  For  the  cafe  Is 
 evidently  the  fame,  as  if  thofe  parts,  which 
 are  not  underftood,  were  loft,  or  not  written 
 at  all,  or  written  in  an  unknown  tongue. 
 Whether  this  obfervation  be  commonly  at- 
 tended to  or  not,  it  is  fo  evident,  that  one 
 can  fcarce  bring  onefelf  to  fet  dow^n  an  in- 
 ftance  in  common  matters,  to  exemplify  it. 
 However,  fuppofe  a  writing,  partly  in  cypher, 
 and  partly  in  plain  words  at  length  ^  and  that 
 in  the  part  one  underftood,  there  appeared 
 mention  of  feveral  known  fad:s :  it  would  ne- 
 ver come  into  any  man's  thoughts  to  ima- 
 gine, that  if  he  underftood  the  whole,  per- 
 haps he  might  find,  that  thofe  fads  were  not 
 in  reality  known  by  the  writer.  Indeed, 
 both  in  this  example  and  the  thing  intended 
 to  be  exemplified  by  it,  our  not  underftanding 
 the  whole  (the  whole  fuppofe  of  a  fen te nee 
 or  a  paragraph)  might  fometimes  occafion  a 
 doubt,  whether  one  underftood  the  literal 
 meaning  of  fuch  a  part :  but  this  comes  under 
 another  confideration. 
 
 For  the  fame  reafon,  though  a  man  fliould 
 be  incapable,  for  want  of  learning,  or  oppor- 
 tunities of  inquiry,  or  from  not  having  turned 
 his  ftudies  this  way,  even  fo  much  as  to  judge, 
 whether  particular  prophecies  have  been 
 throughout  compleatly  fulfilled ;  yet  he  may 
 fee,  in  general,  that  they  have  been  fulfilled 
 to  fuch  a  degree,  as,  upon  very  good  ground, 
 
 to 
 
Chap.  VII.        for  Chrljlianity,  347 
 
 to  be  convinced  of  foreiight  more  than  hu- 
 man in  lach  prophecies,  and  of  fuch  events 
 being  intended  by  them.  For  the  fame  rea- 
 fon  aUb,  though  by  means  of  the  deficiencies 
 in  civil  hifliory,  and  the  different  accounts  of 
 hiftorians,  the  mofh  learned  fliould  not  be  able 
 to  make  out  to  fatisfaclion,  that  fuch  parts  of 
 the  prophetic  hiftory  have  been  minutely 
 and  throughout  fulfilled  -,  yet  a  very  ftrong 
 proof  of  forefight  may  arife,  from  that  ge- 
 neral completion  of  them,  which  is  made 
 out :  as  much  proof  of  forefight,  perhaps,  as 
 the  giver  of  prophecy  intended  fliould  ever  be 
 afforded  by  fuch  parts  of  prophecy. 
 
 2.  A  long  feries  of  prophecy  being  appli- 
 cable to  fuch  and  fuch  events,  is  itfelf  a  proof, 
 that  it  was  intended  of  them :  as  the  rules, 
 by  which  we  naturally  judge  and  determine, 
 in  common  cafes  parallel  to  this,  will  fhew. 
 This  obfervation  I  make  in  anfwer  to  the 
 common  objedion  againft  the  application 
 of  the  prophecies,  that  confidering  each  of 
 them  diftinctly  by  Itfelf,  it  does  not  at  all  ap- 
 pear, that  they  were  intended  of  thofe  parti- 
 cular events,  to  which  they  are  applied  by 
 Chrlftlans  ;  and  therefore  it  is  to  be  fuppofed, 
 that,  if  they  meant  any  thing,  they  were  in- 
 tended of  other  events  unknown  to  us,  and 
 not  of  thefe  at  all. 
 
 Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing,  which 
 
 bear 
 
348  Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  II. 
 
 bear  a  great  refemblance  to  prophecy,  with 
 refpe(!^-  to  the  matter  before  us :  the  mytho- 
 logical, and  the  fatirical  where  the  fatire  is, 
 to  a  certain  degree,  concealed.  And  a  man 
 might  be  allured,  that  he  underftood  what  an 
 author  intended  by  a  fable  or  parable,  related 
 without  any  application  or  moral,  merely 
 from  feeing  it  to  be  eafily  capable  of  fuch 
 application,  and  that  fuch  a  moral  might 
 naturally  be  deduced  from  it.  And  he  might 
 be  fully  alTured,  that  fuch  perfons  and  events 
 were  intended  in  a  fatirical  v/riting,  merely 
 from  its  being  applicable  to  them.  And, 
 agreeably  to  the  la  ft  obfervation,  he  might  be 
 in  a  good  meafure  fatisfied  of  it,  though  he 
 were  not  enough  informed  in  affairs,  or  in 
 the  ftory  of  fuch  perfons,  to  underftand  half 
 the  fatire.  For,  his  fatisfa6lion,  that  he  un- 
 derftood the  m.eaning,  the  intended  meaning, 
 of  thefe  writings,  would  be  greater  or  leis, 
 in  proportion  as  he  faw  the  general  turn  of 
 them  to  be  capable  of  fuch  application ;  and 
 in  proportion  to  the  number  of  particular 
 things  capable,  of  it.  And  thus,  if  a  long 
 ferics  of  prophecy  is  applicable  to  the  prefent 
 ftate  of  the  church,  and  to  the  political  fitu- 
 ations  of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world,  fome 
 thoufind  years  after  thefe  prophecies  wxre 
 delivered,  and  a  long  ferles  of  prophecy  de- 
 livered before  the  coming  of  Chrift  is  appli- 
 cable to  him  ;  thefe  thin^-rs  are  in  thcmfelves 
 a  proof,  that  the  prophetic  hiftory  was  in- 
 tended of  him,  and  of  thofe  events  :  in  pro- 
 portion 
 
Chap.  VII.        for  Chrtfiianity .  349 
 
 portion  as  the  general  turn  of  it,  is  capable 
 of  fuch  application,  and  to  the  number  and 
 variety  of  particular  prophecies  capable  of  it. 
 And,  though  in  all  juft  way  of  confideration, 
 the  appearing  completion  of  prophecies,  is 
 to  be  allowed  to  be  thus  explanatory  of,  and 
 to  determine  their  meaning ;  yet  it  is  to  be 
 remembered  farther,  that  the  ancient  Jews 
 applied  the  prophecies  to  a  Meiliah  before 
 his  coming,  in  much  the  fame^manner  as 
 Chrillians  do  now:  and  that  the  primitive 
 Chriftians  interpreted  the  prophecies  refpedt- 
 ing  the  ftate  of  the  church  and  of  the  world 
 in  the  laft  ages,  in  the  fenfe,  which  the  event 
 feems  to  confirm  and  verify.  And  from 
 thefe  things  it  may  be  made  appear : 
 
 3.  That  the  fliewing  even  to  a  high  pro- 
 bability, if  that  could  be,  that  the  prophets 
 thought  of  fome  other  events,  in  fuch  and 
 fuch  prediftions,  and  not  thofe  at  all  which 
 Chrillians  alledge  to  be  completions  of  thofe 
 predidiions  ;  or  that  fuch  and  fuch  prophecies 
 are  capable  of  being  applied  to  other  events 
 than  thofe,  to  which  Chriftians  apply  them 
 
 that  this  would    not  confute  or  deftroy 
 
 the  force  of  the  argument  from  prophecy, 
 even  with  regard  to  thofe  very  inftances. 
 For,  obferve  how  this  matter  really  is.  If 
 one  knew  luch  a  perfon  to  be  the  fole  author 
 of  fuch  a  book,  and  was  certainly  aiTured,  or 
 fatisfied  to  any  degree,  that  one  knew  the 
 
 whole 
 
350  Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  IL        .| 
 
 whole  of  what  he  intended  in  it ;  one  fliould  ; 
 
 be  affured  or  fatisfied  to  fuch  degree,  that 
 one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of  that  book  : 
 for  the  meaning  of  a  book,  is  nothing  but  ' 
 
 the  meaning  of  the  author.  But  if  one  knew 
 a  perfon  to  have  compiled  a  book  out  of 
 memoirs,  which  he  received  from  another, 
 of  vaftly  fuperior  knowledge  in  the  fubjecft 
 of  it,  efpecially  if  it  were  a  book  full  of  great 
 intricacies  and  difficulties  ;  it  would  in  no  wife 
 follow,  that  one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of 
 the  bookj  from  knowing  the  whole  meaning 
 of  the  compiler :  for  the  original  memoirs, 
 /.  e.  the  author  of  them,  might  have,  and 
 there  would  be  no  degree  of  prefumption,  in 
 many  cafes,  againft  fuppoiing  him  to  have, 
 fome  farther  meaning  than  the  compiler  faw. 
 To  fay  then,  that  the  Scriptures  and  the  things 
 contained  in  them  can  have  no  other  or  far- 
 ther meaning,  than  thofe  perfons  thought  or 
 had,  who  firll  recited  or  wrote  them ;  is  evi- 
 dently faying,  that  thofe  perfons  were  the 
 original,  proper,  and  fole  authors  of  thofe 
 books,  /.  e.  that  they  are  not  infpired  :  which 
 is  abfurd,  whilft  the  authority  of  thefe  books 
 is  under  examination  ;  /.  e.  till  you  have  de- 
 termined they  are  of  no  divine  authority  at  all. 
 Till  this  be  determined,  it  muft  in  all  rcafon 
 be  fuppofed,  not  indeed  that  they  have,  for 
 this  is  taking  for  granted  that  they  are  in- 
 fpired, but  that  they  may  have,  fome  farther 
 meaning  than  what    the   compilers    faw  or 
 
 underflood. 
 
Chap.  VII.      for  Chrijlianity.  351 
 
 underftood.  And  upon  this  fuppofition,  it 
 is  fuppofeable  alfo,  that  this  farther  meaning 
 may  be  fulfilled.  Now  events  correfponding 
 to  prophecies,  interpreted  in  a  ditfercnt  mean- 
 ing from  that,  in  which  the  prophets  are 
 fuppofed  to  have  underftood  them  ;  this  af- 
 fords, in  a  manner,  the  fame  proof,  that  this 
 different  fenfe  was  originally  intended,  as  it 
 would  have  afforded,  if  the  prophets  had  not 
 und'  rftood  their  predidlions  in  the  fenfe  it  is 
 fuppofed  they  did :  becaufe  there  is  no  pre- 
 fumption  of  their  fenfe  of  them,  being  the 
 whole  fenfe  of  them.  And  it  has  been  al- 
 ready fhewn,  that  the  apparent  completions 
 of  prophecy,  muft  be  allowed  to  be  explana- 
 tory of  ils  meaning.  So  that  the  queftion 
 is,  whether  a  feries  of  prophecy  has  been 
 fulfilled,  in  a  natural  pr  proper,  /.  e.  in  any 
 real,  fenfe  of  the  v/ords  of  it.  For  fuch 
 completion  is  equally  a  proof  of  forefight 
 more  than  human,  whether  the  prophets  are, 
 or  are  not,  fuppofed  to  have  underftood  it  in 
 a  different  fenfe.  I  fay,  fuppofed :  for,  though 
 I  think  it  clear,  that  the  prophets  did  not  un- 
 derftand  the  full  meaning  of  their  predictions; 
 it  is  another  queftion,  how  far  they  thought 
 they  did,  and  in  what  itnit  they  underftood 
 them. 
 
 Hence  may  be  feen,  to  how  little  purpofe 
 thofe  perfons  bufy  themfelves,  who  endeavour 
 to  prove  that  the  prophetick  hiftory  is  appH- 
 
 cablc 
 
352         Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  11. 
 
 cable  to  events,  of  the  age  in  which  it  was 
 written,  or  of  ages  before  it.  Indeed  to  have 
 proved  this  before  there  was  any  appearance 
 of  a  farther  completion  of  it,  migiit  have 
 anfvvered  fome  purpofe ;  for  it  might  have 
 prevented  the  expecflation  of  any  fu.  h  farther 
 completion.  Thus  could  Porphyry  have 
 fhcwn,  that  fome  principal  parts  of  the  book 
 of  Daniely  for  inflance,  the  feventh  verfe  of 
 the  feventh  chapter,  which  the  Chriflians 
 interpreted  of  the  latter  ages,  was  applicable 
 to  events,  which  happened  before  or  about 
 the  age  oi  Antiochus  Epiphanes-y  this  might 
 have  prevented  them  from  expecting  any  far- 
 ther completion  of  it.  And,  unlefs  there 
 vv^as  then,  as  I  think  there  muft  have  been, 
 external  evidence  concerning  that  book,  more 
 than  is  come  down  to  us ;  fuch  a  difcovery 
 might  have  been  a  ftumbling-block  in  the 
 way  of  Chriftianity  itfelf :  confidering  the 
 authority  wdiich  our  Saviour  has  given  to  the 
 book  of  Daniely  and  how  much  the  general 
 fcheme  of  Chriftianity  prefuppofes  the  truth 
 of  it.  But  even  tms  c^iicovery,  had  there 
 been  any  fuch  ^  would  be  of  very  little  weight 
 with  reafonable  men.    Now ;  if  this  paffage, 
 
 s  It  appears,  that  Porphyry  did  nothing  worth  mention- 
 ing in  this  way.  For  jerorn  oh  the  place  fays :  Duas  pof- 
 teriores  hejiias — in  uno  Macedonum  regno  ponit.  And  as  to 
 the  ten  kings ;  Decern  reges  enumerate  qui  fuerunt  favijfimi : 
 ipfjfque  reges  noti  imitis  ponit  rcgni^  vcrbi  gratia^  Alacedonii^ey 
 6yri^,  Jfta:^  et  /Egypti ;  fed  de  diverfis  r::gms  uunm  efficit 
 regnm  ordinem.  And  in  this  way  of  interpretation,  any 
 tiling  may  be  made  of  any  thing. 
 
 thus 
 
Chap.  VII.        for  Chnjllamty.  353 
 
 thus  applicable  to  events  before  the  age  of 
 Porphyry^  appears  to  be  applicable  alio  to 
 events,  which  fucceeded  the  diilbkition  of 
 the  Roman  empire.  I  mention  tliis,  not  at 
 all  as  inttMiding  to  mfinuate,  that  the  divifion 
 of  this  empire  into  ten  parts,  for  it  plainly 
 was  divided  into  about  that  number,  were, 
 alone  and  by  itfelf,  of  any  moment  in  veri- 
 fying the  prophetick  hiftory  :  but  only  as  an 
 example  of  the  thing  I  am  fpeaking  of.  And 
 thus  upon  the  whole,  the  matter  of  enquiry 
 evidently  mull  be,  as  above  put.  Whether  the 
 prophecies  are  applicable,  to  Chrift,  and  to 
 the  prefent  ftate  of  the  world  and  of  the 
 church;  applicable  in  fuch  a  degree,  as  to  im- 
 ply foreiight :  not  whether  they  are  capable 
 of  any  other  application  ;  though  I  know  no 
 pretence  for  fiying,  the  general  turn  of  them 
 is  capable  of  any  other. 
 
 Thefe  obfervations  are,  I  think,  juft;  and 
 the  evidence  referred  to  in  them,  real:  though 
 there  may  be  people  who  will  not  accept  of 
 fuch  imperfed:  information  from  Scripture. 
 Some  too  have  not  integrity  and  regard 
 enough  to  truth,  to  attend  to  evidence,  which 
 keeps  the  mind  in  doubt,  perhaps  perplexity, 
 and  which  is  much  of  a  different  fort  ff'-ni 
 what  they  expedcd.  And  it  plainly  requires 
 a  degree  of  m.odefty  and  fairnels,  beyond 
 what  every  one  hai>,  for  a  man  to  fay,  not  to 
 the  world,  but  to  himf.-l ,  that  thev-  is  a  real 
 
 A  a  appearance 
 
354         Of  the  particular  Evidence    Part  IL 
 
 appearance  of  fomewhat  of  great  weight  in 
 this  matter,  though  he  is  not  able  thoroughly 
 to  fatisfy  himfelf  about  it ;  but  it  fhall  have 
 its  influence  upon  him,  in  proportion  to  its 
 appearing  reality  and  weight.  It  is  much 
 more  eafy,  and  more  falls  in  with  the  negli- 
 gence, prefumption,  and  wilfulnefs  of  the 
 generality,  to  determine  at  once,  with  a  deci- 
 five  air.  There  is  nothing  in  it.  The  prejudices 
 ariiingfrom  that  abfolute  contempt  and  fcorn, 
 with  which  this  evidence  is  treated  in  the 
 world,  I  do  not  mention.  For  what  indeed 
 can  be  jfaid  to  perfons,  who  are  weak  enough 
 in  their  underftandings,  to  think  this  any 
 prefumption  againft  it ;  or,  if  they  do  not, 
 are  yet  weak  enough  in  their  temper  to  be 
 influenced  by  fuch  prejudices,  upon  fuch  a 
 fubjedt  ? 
 
 I  fhall  now,  SECONDLT,  endeavour  to 
 give  fome  account  of  the  general  argument 
 for  the  truth  of  Chriftianity,  confifting  both 
 of  the  direct  and  circumfcantial  evidence, 
 confidered  as  making  up  one  argument.  In- 
 deed to  Hate  and  examine  this  argument  fully, 
 would  be  a  work  m.uch  beyond  the  compafs 
 of  this  whole  treatife :  nor  is  fo  much  as  a 
 p'-oper  abridgment  of  it  to  be  expe6ted  here. 
 Yet  the  prefent  fubjedt  requires  to  have  fome 
 brief  account  of  it  given.  For  it  is  the  kind 
 of  evidence,  upon  which  moft  queftions  of 
 difficulty,  in  common  pradice,  are  determin- 
 I  ed: 
 
Chap*  VIL        for  Chrijiiantty .  3^^ 
 
 ed :  evidence  ariling  from  various  coinciden- 
 ces, which  fupport  and  coniirm  each  other, 
 and  in  this  manner  prove,  with  more  or  lefs 
 certainty,  the  point  under  conlideration.  And 
 I  chufe  to  do  it  ahb  :  Firft,  becaule  it  fcems 
 to  be  of  the  greateft  importance,  and  not  duly- 
 attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the  proof  of 
 revelation  is,  not  fome  dirc6l  and  exprefs 
 things  only,  but  a  great  variety  of  circum- 
 ftantial  things  alfo;  and  that  though  each  of 
 thefe  dired;  and  circumftantial  things,  is  in- 
 deed to  be  confidered  feparately,  yet  they  are 
 afterwards  to  be  joined  together ;  for  that 
 the  proper  force  of  the  evidence  confifts  in 
 the  refult  of  thofe  feveral  things,  confidered 
 in  their  refpe(fts  to  each  other,  and  united  into 
 one  view :  and  in  the  next  place,  becaufe  it 
 feems  to  me,  that  the  matters  of  fadt  here  fet 
 down,  which  are  acknowledged  by  unbeliev- 
 ers, muft  be  acknowledged  by  t^em  alfo  to 
 contain  together  a  degree  of  evidence  of  great 
 weight,  if  they  could  be  brought  to  lay  thefe 
 feveral  things  before  themfelves  diftindly,  and 
 then  with  attention  confider  them  together^ 
 inftead  of  that  curfory  thought  of  them,  to 
 which  we  are  familiarifed.  For  being  fami- 
 liarifed  to  the  curfory  thought  of  things,  as 
 really  hinders  the  weight  of  them  from  being 
 feen,  as  from  having  its  due  influence  upon 
 pradice. 
 
 The  thing  affcrted,  and  the  truth  of  which 
 A  a  2  is 
 
356         Of  the  particular  'Evidence     Part  11. 
 
 is  to  be  enquired  into,  is  this  :  That  over  and 
 above  our  reafon  and  affections,  which  God 
 has  given  us  for  the  information  of  our  judg- 
 ment and  the  condudl  of  our  Hves,  he  has 
 alfo,  by  external  revelation,  given  us  an  ac- 
 count of  himfelf  and  his  moral  government 
 over  the  world,  implying  a  future  ftate  of 
 rewards  and  punifhments ;  /.  e,  hath  revealed 
 the  fyftem  of  natural  religion:  for  natural 
 religion  may  be  externally  ^'  revealed  by  God, 
 as  the  ignorant  may  be  taught  it  by  mankind 
 
 their  fellow-creatures that   God,    I  fay, 
 
 has  given  us  the  evidence  of  revelation,  as 
 well  as  the  evidence  of  reafon,  to  afcertain 
 this  moral  fyftem ;  together  with  an  account 
 of  a  particular  difpenfation  of  Providence, 
 which  reafon  could  no  way  have  difcovered, 
 and  a  particular  inftitution  of  religion  found- 
 ed on  it,  for  the  recovery  of  mankind  out  of 
 their  prefei  !  wretched  condition,  and  raifmg 
 them  to  the  perfedion  and  final  happinefs  of 
 their  nature. 
 
 This  revelation,  whether  real  or  fuppofed, 
 may  be  confidered  as  wholly  hiftorical.  For 
 prophecy  is  nothing  but  the  hiftory  of  events 
 before  they  come  to  pafs :  do6trines  alio  are 
 matters  of  fad: :  and  precepts  come  under  the 
 fame  notion.  And  the  general  defign  of 
 Scripture,  which  contains  in  it  this  revelation, 
 
 ^  p.  199,  &c. 
 
 thus 
 
Chap.  VII.        for  Cbrijiianity.  357 
 
 thus  confidered  as  hiftorical,  may  be  faid  to 
 be,  to  give  us  an  account  of  the  world,  in  this 
 one  fingle  view,  as  God's  v/orld  :  by  which  it 
 appears  ellentially  diftinguiflied  from  all 
 other  books,  fo  far  as  I  have  found,  except 
 fuch  as  are  copied  from  it.  It  begins  with 
 an  account  of  God's  creation  of  the  world,  in 
 order  to  afcertain,  and  diftinguilh  from  all 
 others,  w^ho  is  the  objed:  of  our  worfliip,  by 
 what  he  has  done  :  in  order  to  afcertain,  who 
 he  is,  concerning  whofe  providence,  com- 
 mands, promifes  and  threatenings,  this  facred 
 book,  all  along, 'treats  ;  the  Maker  and  Pro- 
 prietor of  the  world,  he  whofe  creatures  we 
 are,  the  God  of  nature  :  in  order  like  wife  to 
 diftinguilh  him  from  the  idols  of  the  nations, 
 which  are  either  imaginary  beings,  /.  e.  no 
 beings  at  all ;  or  elfe  part  of  that  creation, 
 the  hiftorical  relation  of  which  is  here  eiven. 
 And  St.  John,  not  improbably,  with  an  eye 
 to  this  Mofaic  account  of  the  creation,  be- 
 gins his  Gofpel  with  an  account,  of  our 
 Saviour's  pra^exiftence,  and  that  all  things 
 were  made  by  him ;  and  without  hi/n  was  not 
 any  thing  iriade  that  was  made ' :  agreeably  to 
 the  dodrine  of  St.  Paul,  that  God  created  all 
 things  by  Jefiis  Chriji  \  This  being  premi- 
 fed,  the  Scripture,  taken  together,  feems  to 
 profefs  to  contain  a  kind  of  an  abridgment 
 of  the  hiftory  of  the  world,  in  the  view  juft 
 now  mentioned  :  that  is,  a  general  account  of 
 
 ^  Joh.  i,  3.  ^  Eph.  iii.  9. 
 
 Aa  3  the 
 
358         Of  the  particular  'Evidence    Part  II. 
 
 the  condition  of  religion  and  its  profeflbrs, 
 during  the  continuance  of  that  anolVacy  from 
 God,  and  ftate  of  wickcdnefs,  which  it  every 
 where  fuppofes  the  world  to  lie  in.  And  this 
 account  of  the  ftate  of  leligion,  carries  with 
 it  fome  brief  account  of  the  political  ft.ite  of 
 things,  as  religion  is  affeded  by  it.  Revela- 
 tion indeed  con  fide  rs  the  common  affairs  of 
 this  world,  and  vvhat  is  going  on  in  it,  as  a 
 mere  fcene  of  diftracflion  ;  i^nd  cannot  be  fup- 
 pofed  to  concern  itfelf  with  foretelling,  at 
 what  time,  Rome  or  Babylon  or  Greece^  or  any 
 particular  place,  flaould  be  the  mod  confpi- 
 cuou'=:  feat  of  that  tyranny  and  diffolutenefs, 
 which  all  places  equally  afpire  to  be  3  cannot, 
 I  fay,  be  fuppckd  to  give  any  account  of  this 
 wild  fcene  for  its  own  fake.  But  it  feems 
 to  contain  fome  very  general  account  of  the 
 chief  governments  of  the  world,  as  the  gene- 
 ral ftate  of  religion,  has  been,  is,  or  fhall  be, 
 affedled  by  them,  from  the  firft  tranfgrelTion, 
 and  during  the  whole  interval  of  the  world's 
 continuing  in  its  prefent  ftate,  to  a  certain 
 future  period,  fpoken  of  both  in  the  Old  and 
 New  Teftament,  very  diftindly,  and  in  great 
 variety  of  expreffion  :  'The  times  of  the  rejlitu^ 
 tion  of  all  things^:  when  the  myjiery  of  God 
 Jlall  be  finifljedy  as  he  hath  declarsd  to  his  fer- 
 vants  the  prophets  "  .*  when  the  God  of  heaven 
 Jhallfct  up  a  kingdom ^  which  Jhall  never  be  de- 
 Jiroyed :  and  the  kingdom  JJjall  not  be  left  to 
 
 *  A6ls  iii»  21.  ^  Rev.  x.  7* 
 
 Other 
 
Chap.  VII.        for  Chrijllmiity.  359 
 
 other  people  ""^"^xs,  it  is  reprcfcntcd  to  be  during 
 this  apoftacy,  hut  judgment  Jhcill  be  given  to 
 the  faints  %  and  they  jhall  reign  ^ ;  and  the 
 kingdom  and  do^ninion,  and  the  greatnefs  of  the 
 kingdom  under  the  whole  heaven,  fall  be  given 
 to  the  people  of  the  faints  of  the  mojl  liigh'^. 
 
 Upon  this  general  view  of  the  Scripture, 
 I  would  remark,  how  great  a  length  of  time, 
 the  whole  relation  takes  up,  near  fix  tlioufand 
 years  of  which  are  paft :  and  how  great  a 
 variety  of  things  it  treats  of  5  the  natural  and 
 moral  fyflem  or  hiftory  of  the  world,  includ- 
 ing the  time  when  it  was  formed,  all  con- 
 tained in  the  very  firft  book,  and  evidently 
 written  in  a  rude  and  unlearned  age ;  and  in 
 fubfequent  books,  the  various  common  and 
 prophetick  hiftory,  and  the  particular  difpen- 
 iiuion  of  Chriftianity.  Now  all  this  toge- 
 ther gives  the  largeft  fcope  for  criticifm  ;  and 
 for  confutation  of  what  is  capable  of  being 
 confuted,  either  from  reafon,  or  from  com- 
 mon hiftory,  or  from  any  inconfiftence  in  its 
 feveral  parts.  And  it  is  a  thing  which  de- 
 ferves,  I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that  whereas 
 fome  imagine,  the  fuppofed  doubtfulnefs  of 
 the  evidence  for  revelation  implies  a  pofitive 
 argument  that  it  is  not  true ;  it  appears,  on 
 the  contrary,  to  imply  a  pofitive  argument 
 that  it  is  true.     For,  could  any  common  re- 
 
 ■  Dan.  il,  •  Dan.  vii.  22.  '  Rev.  *»  Dan.  vil. 
 
 A  a  4  lation. 
 
360'         Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  IL 
 
 lation,  of  fuch  antiquity,  extent,  and  variety 
 (for  in  thefe  things  the  flrels  of  what  I  am 
 now  obferving  hes)  be  propofed  to  the  exa- 
 mination of  the  world :  ihat  it  could  not,  in 
 an  age  of  knowledge  and  Lberty,  be  confuted, 
 or  (hewn  to  have  nothing  in  it,  to  the  fatif- 
 faclion  of  reafonable  men ;  this  would  be 
 thought  a  ftrong  prefumptive  proof  of  its 
 truth.  And  indeed  it  muft  be  a  proof  of  it, 
 juft  in  proportion  to  the  probability,  that  if 
 it  were  falfe,  it  might  be  fhewn  to  be  fo  :  and 
 this,  1  think,  is  fcarce  pretended  to  be  ihewn 
 but  upon  principles  and  in  ways  of  arguing, 
 which  have  been  clearly  obviated'.  Nor 
 does  it  at  all  appear,  that  any  fet  of  men  who. 
 believe  natural  religion,  are  of  the  opinion, 
 that  Chriftianity  has  been  thus  confuted.  But 
 to  proceed : 
 
 Together  with  the  rporal  fyilem  of  the 
 world,  the  Old  Teftament  contains  a  chrono- 
 logical account  of  the  beguining  of  it,  and 
 from  thence,  an  unbroken  genealogy  of  m.an- 
 kind  for  many  ages  before  common  hiftory 
 begins  ;  and  carried  on  as  much  farther,  as  to 
 make  up  a  continued  thread  of  hiftory  of 
 the  length  of  between  three  and  four  thou- 
 fand  years.  It  contains  an  account  of  God's 
 making  a  covenant  with  a  particular  nation, 
 that  they  fhould  be  his  people,  and  he  would 
 
 ^  Ch.  ii,  ilij  &c. 
 
 bq 
 
Ciiap.  VIL        for  Chrijliantty.  361 
 
 he  their  God,  in  a  peculiar  fenfe^  of  his  often 
 interpofingmiraculoufly  in  their  affliirs  ;  giv- 
 ing them  the  promife,  and,  long  after,  the 
 pofkiTion,  of  a  particular  country;  alluring 
 them  of  the  greateft  national  profperity  in  it, 
 if  they  would  worlhip  him,  in  oppofition  to 
 the  idols  which  the  reft  of  the  world  wor- 
 lliipped,  and  obey  his  commands  -,  and  threat- 
 ening them  with  unexampled  punifhments,  if 
 they  difobeyed  him,  and  fell  into  the  general 
 idolatry :  infomuch  that  this  one  nation 
 fliould  continue  to  be  the  obfervation  and  the 
 wonder  of  all  the  world.  It  declares  parti- 
 cularly, that  God  would  fcatter  than  among  all 
 people,  from  o?2e  end  of  the  earth  unto  the  other  : 
 but  that  when  they  Jhould  return  unto  the  Lord 
 their  God,  he  would  have  compafmi  upon  them, 
 and  gather  them  from  all  the  nations,  whither 
 he  had fcattered  them :  that  Ifrael  jhould  be  fa^ 
 *ved  in  the  Lord,  with  an  everlajii?2g  fahation  ; 
 and  not  be  ajlo anted  or  confounded  world  with- 
 out  end.  And  as  fome  of  thefe  promifes  are 
 conditional,  others  are  as  abfolute,  as  any 
 thing  can  be  expreffcd :  that  the  time  fliould 
 come,  when  the  people  fuould  be  all  righteous, 
 and  inherit  the  land  for  ever :  that  though  God 
 would  make  a  full  end  of  all  nations  whither  he 
 had  fcattered  tbe^n,  yet  would  he  not  make  a 
 full  end  of  them :  that  he  would  bring  again  the 
 captivity  of  his  people  Ifrael,  a?2d  plant  them 
 upon  their  land,  and  they  jhould  be  no  jnore  pul- 
 led up  out  of  their  land:  that  the  feed  of  Jjrael 
 5  Jhould 
 
362  Of  the  particular  Kvidencc     Part  II. 
 
 fooiild  not  ceafe  from  being  a  nation  for  ever  \ 
 It  foretells,  that  God  would  raife  them  up  a 
 particular  perfon,  in  whom  all  his  promifes 
 ifhoidd  finally  be  fulfilled ;  the  Meffiab,  who 
 fhould  be,  in  an  high  and  eminent  fenfe,  their 
 anointed  Prince  and  Saviour.  This  was 
 foretold  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  raifed  a  general 
 expecftation  of  fuch  a  perfon  in  the  nation,  as 
 appears  from  the  New  Telliunent,  and  is  an 
 acknowledged  fad; 5  an  cxpeftalion  of  his 
 coming  at  fuch  a  particular  time,  before  any 
 one  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  perfon,  and 
 when  there  was  no  ground  for  fuch  an  expec- 
 tation, but  from  the  prophecies  :  which  ex- 
 pectation therefore,  mufl  in  all  reafon  be  pre- 
 fum.cd  (0  be  explanatory  of  thofe  prophecies, 
 if  there  were  any  doubt  about  their  meaning. 
 It  Teems  mioreover  to  foretell,  that  this  perfon 
 fh  uld  be  rej idled  by  that  nation,  to  whom 
 he  had  been  fo  long  promifed,  and  thcugh 
 he  was  fo  much  defired  by  them  ^  And  it 
 exprefsly  foretells,  that  he  fliould  be  the  Sa- 
 viour of  the  Gentiles ;  and  even  that  the  com- 
 pletion of  the  fcheme,  contained  in  this  book, 
 and  then  begun,  and  in  its  progrefs,  fliould 
 be  fomewhat  fo  great,  that,  in  comparifon 
 with  it,  the  reftoration  of  the   Jews  alone 
 
 •  Deut.  xxvili.  64.      Ch.  xxx.  2,  3.     K  xlv.  17.    Ch.  Ix. 
 21.       jer.  xxx.    li.  Ch.  xlvi.   28.  Amos  ix.  15. 
 
 Jer.  xxxi.  36. 
 
 ^  IL  viii.  14,  15.  Ch.  xlix.  5.     Ch.  liii.     Mai.  i.  lO,  11. 
 and  Ch.  iii. 
 
 would 
 
Chap.  VII.      for  Chrijltanity,  363 
 
 would  he  but  of  fmall  account.  It  is  a  light 
 thiizg  that  thou  jhoiihicjl  be  7ny  feroant  to  raife 
 up  the  tribes  of  facob,  and  to  rejlore  the  pre^ 
 
 ferved  oj  Ifrael :  I  will  alfo  give  thee  for  a  light 
 to  the  Uentiles,  that  thou  jnayjl  be  for  filvation 
 unto  the  end  of  the  earth.  And,  /;/  the  laji 
 daysy  the  mountain  of  the  Lord's  houfe  fiall  be 
 ejlablijhed  in  the  top  of  the  mount  ains,  and  fall 
 be  exalted  above  the  hills  ;  and  all  nations  Ihall 
 
 fow  into  it for  out  of  Zion  fiall  go  forth 
 
 the  law,  and  the  word  oJ  the  Lord  from  ^eru-^ 
 
 falem.  And  he  Jhall  judge  among  the  riations 
 and  the  Lord  alone  fl: all  be  exalted  in  that 
 day,  and  the  idols  he  fall  utterly  ahoUjh'\  The 
 Scripture  farther  contains  an  account,  that 
 at  the  time  the  Meffiah  was  expedled,  apcrfon 
 role  up,  in  this  nation,  claiming  to  be  that 
 Meffiah,  to  be  the  perfon,  whom  all  the  pro- 
 phecies referred  to,  and  in  whom  they  fhould 
 center  :  that  he  fpent  fome  years  in  a  con- 
 tinued courfe  of  miraculous  works :  and  en- 
 dued his  immediate  difciples  and  followers 
 with  a  power  of  doing  the  fame,  as  a  proof 
 of  the  truth  of  that  religion,  which  he  com- 
 miffioned  them  to  publifh :  that,  inverted 
 with  this  authority  and  power,  they  made 
 numerous  converts  in  the  remoteft  countries, 
 
 «  If.  xlix.  6.  Ch.  ii.  Ch.  xi.  Ch.  Ivi.  7.  Mai.  i.  ir. 
 To  which  mud  be  adJed,  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like 
 kind^  ievc-al  in  the  \ew  Teftainent,  and  very  many  in 
 the  <'  jld  ;  which  defcribe  what  fhall  be  the  completion  of 
 the  revealed  plan  of  Providence. 
 
 and 
 
364        Of  the  particular  Evideiice      Piirt  IT, 
 
 and  fettled  and  eilablifhed  his  religion  in  the 
 world  ;  to  the  end  of  which,  the  Scripture 
 profelles  to  give  a  prophetick  account  of  the 
 jftate  of  this  religion  amongft  mankind. 
 
 Let  us  now  fuppofe  a  perfon  utterly  igno- 
 rant of  hiftory,  to  have  all  this  related  to  him, 
 out  of  the  Scripture.  Or  fuppofe  fuch  an 
 one,  having  the  Scripture  put  into  his  hands, 
 to  remark  thefe  things  in  it,  not  knowing  but 
 that  the  whole,  even  its  civil  hiftory,  as  well 
 as  the  other  parts  of  it,  might  be,  from  be- 
 ginning to  end,  an  intire  invention;  and  to 
 af]^.  What  truth  was  in  it,  and  whether  the 
 revelation  here  related,  w^as  real  or  a  ficftion  ? 
 And  inftead  of  a  dired;  anfwer,  fuppofe  him, 
 all  at  once,  to  be  told  the  following  confeft 
 fads ;  and  then  to  unite  them  into  one 
 view* 
 
 Let  him  iirft  be  told,  in  how  great  a  de- 
 gree the  profeflion  and  eftablifliment  of  natu- 
 ral religion,  the  belief  that  there  is  one  God 
 to  be  worshipped,  that  virtue  is  his  law,  and 
 that  mankind  fhall  be  rewarded  and  puniflied 
 hereafter,  as  they  obey  and  difobey  it  here ; 
 in  how  very  great  a  degree,  I  fay,  the  pro- 
 feffion  and  eftablidiment  of  this  moral  fyflem 
 in  the  world,  is  owing  to  the  revelation, 
 whether  real  or  fuppofed,  contained  in  this 
 book  :  the  eftablilhment  of  this  moral  fyftem, 
 even  in  thofe  countries  which  do  not  ac- 
 knowledge 
 
Chap.  VII.        for  ChrljVianity,  365 
 
 knowledge  the  proper  authority  of  the  Scrip- 
 ture''. Let  him  be  told  alio,  what  number 
 of  nations  do  acknowledge  its  proper  autho- 
 rity. Let  him  then  take  in  the  confideration 
 of  what  importance  religion  is  to  mankind. 
 And  upon  thefe  things,  he  might,  I  think, 
 truly  obferve,  that  this  fuppofed  revelation's 
 obtaining  and  bein^^  received  in  the  world, 
 with  all  the  circumilances  and  effects  of  it, 
 confidered  together  as  one  event,  is  the  moffc 
 confpicuous  and  important  event  in  the  ftory 
 of  mankind  :  that  a  book  of  this  nature,  and 
 thus  promulged  and  recommended  to  our 
 confideration,  demands,  as  if  by  a  voice  from 
 heaven,  to  have  its  claims  moft  ferioufly  ex- 
 amined into  :  and  that,  before  fach  examina- 
 tion, to  treat  it  with  any  kind  of  fcoffing  and 
 ridicule,  is  an  offence  againft  natural  piety. 
 But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  how  much 
 foever  the  eftabhfhment  of  natural  religion 
 in  the  world  is  owing  to  the  Scripture-reve- 
 lation, this  does  not  dcftroy  the  proof  of  re- 
 ligion from  reafon ;  any  more  than  the  proof 
 of  Eticlicfs  Eleme?its  is  deftroyed,  by  a  man's 
 knowing  or  thinking,  that  he  fhould  never 
 have  feen  the  truth  of  the  feveral  propofitions 
 contained  in  it,  nor  had  thofe  propofitions 
 come  into  his  thoughts,  but  for  that  matl^e- 
 matician-. 
 
 *  p.  302. 
 
 Let 
 
366  Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  ll. 
 
 Let  fuch  a  perfon  as  we  are  fpeaking  of, 
 be,  in  the  next  place,  informed,  of  the  ac- 
 knowledged antiquity  of  the  firft  parts  of 
 this  book :  !ind  that  its  chronology,  its  ac- 
 count of  the  time  when  the  earth,  and  the 
 feveral  parts  of  it,  were  firft  peopled  with 
 human  creatures,  is'no  w^ay  contradicted,  but 
 is  really  confirm.ed,  by  the  natural  and  civil 
 hiftory  of  the  world,  collected  from  common 
 hiftorians,  from  the  ftate  of  the  earth,  and 
 from  the  late  invention  of  arts  and  fciences. 
 And  as  the  Scripture  contains  an  unbroken 
 thread  of  common  and  civil  hiftory,  from 
 the  creation  to  the  captivity,  for  between 
 three  and  four  thoufand  years :  let  the  perfon 
 we  are  fpeaking  of  be  told  in  the  next  place, 
 that  this  general  hiftory,  as  it  is  not  contra- 
 difted,  but  is  confirmed  by  prophane  hiftory 
 as  mATch  as  there  would  be  reafon  to  expeft, 
 upon  fuppofition  of  its  truth  ;  fo  there  is  no- 
 thing in  the  whole  hiftory  itfelf  to  give  any 
 reafonable  ground  of  fufpicion,  of  its  not  being, 
 in  the  general,  a  faithful  and  literally  true 
 genealogy  of  men,  and  feries  of  things.  I 
 fpeak  here  only  of  the  common  Scripture- 
 hiftory,  or  of  the  courfe  of  ordinary  events 
 related  in  it^  as  diftinguiflicd  from  miracles, 
 and  from  the  prophetick  hiftory.  In  all  the 
 Scripture-narrations  of  this  kind,  following 
 events  arife  out  of  foregoing  ones,  as  in  all 
 other  hiftories.  There  appears  nothing  re- 
 lated as  done  in  any  age,  not  conformable  to 
 
 the 
 
chap.  VII.        for  Chrijilanity^  367 
 
 the  manners  of  that  age  :  nothing  in  the  ac- 
 count of  a  fucceeding  age,  which,  one  would 
 iiiy,  could  not  be  true,  or  was  improbable, 
 from  the  account  of  things  in  the  preceding 
 one.      There  is  nothing    in    the  charad:ers, 
 which  would  raife  a  thought  of  their  being 
 feigned ;  but  all  the  internal  marks  imaginable 
 of  their  being  real.     It  is  to  be  added  alfo, 
 that  mere  genealogies,  bare  narratives  of  the 
 number  of  years,  which   pcrfons  called  by 
 fuch  and  fuch  names  lived,  do  not  carry  the 
 face  of  iidion;  perhaps  do  carry  fome  pre- 
 fumption  of  veracity  ;  and  all  unadorned  nar-. 
 ratives,  which  have  nothing  to  furprize,  may 
 be  thought  to  carry  fomewhat  of  the  like 
 prefumptlon    too.     And  the  domeftick  and 
 the  political  hiftory  is  plainly  credible.  There 
 may  be  incidents  in  Scripture,  which  taken 
 alone  in  the  naked  way  they  are   told,  may 
 appear  ftrange;  efpecially  to  perfons  of  other 
 manners,  temper,  education  :  but  there  are 
 alfo  incidents  of  undoubted   truth,  in  many 
 or  moft  perfons  lives,    which,  in  the  fame 
 circumftances,  would  appear  to  the  full  as 
 ftrange.     There  may  be  miftakes  of  tranf- 
 cribers,  there  may  be  other  real  or  feeming 
 miftakes,  not  eafy  to  be  particularly  accounted 
 for :   but  there  are  certainly  no  more  things 
 of  this  kind  in  the  Scripture,  than  what  were 
 to  have  been  expedled  in  books  of  fuch  anti- 
 quity ;  and  nothing,  in  any  wife,  fufficient 
 to  difcredit  the  general  narrative.  Now,  that 
 
 a  hif- 
 
3  6  S  Of  the  particular  'Evidence     Part  ll. 
 
 a  hiftory  claiming  to  commence  from  the 
 creation,  and  extending  in  one  continued 
 feries,  through  fo  great  a  length  of  time,  and 
 variety  of  events,  fhould  have  fuch  appear- 
 ances of  reahty  and  truth  in  its  whole  con- 
 texture, is  furely  a  very  remarkable  circum- 
 ftance  in  its  favour.  And  as  all  this  is  ap- 
 plicable to  the  common  hiftory  of  the  New 
 Teftament;  fo  there  is  a  farther  credibility, 
 and  a  very  high  one,  given  to  it,  by  profane 
 authors :  many  of  thefe  writing  of  the  fame 
 times,  and  confirming  the  truth  of  cuftoms 
 and  events,  which  are  incidentally  as  well  as 
 more  purpofely  mentioned  in  it.  And  this 
 credibility  of  the  common  Scripture-hiftory, 
 gives  fome  credibility  to  its  miraculous  hif- 
 tory :  efpecially  as  this  is  interwoven  with 
 the  common,  fo  as  that  they  imply  each 
 other,  and  both  together  make  up  one  re- 
 lation. 
 
 Let  it  then  be  more  particularly  obferved 
 to  this  perfon,  that  it  is  an  acknowledged 
 matter  of  fad:,  which  is  indeed  implied  in 
 the  foregoing  obfervation,  that  there  was 
 fuch  a  nation  as  the  Jews,  of  the  greateft 
 'antiquity,  whofe  government  and  general 
 poUty  was  founded  on  the  law,  here  related 
 to  be  given  them  by  Mofes  as  from  heaven  : 
 that  natural  religion,  though  with  rites  ad- 
 ditional yet  no  way  contrary  to  it,  was  their 
 eftabliQied  religion,  which  cannot  be  faid  of 
 
 the 
 
Chap.  VII.      for  Chrijlianity.  369 
 
 the  Gentile  world  :  and  that  their  very  being 
 as  a  nation,  depended  upon  their  acknow- 
 ledgment of  one  God,  the  God  of  the  uni- 
 verfe.  For,  fuppoie  in  their  captivity  in 
 Babyloiiy  they  had  gone  over  to  the  religion 
 of  their  conquerors,  there  would  have  re- 
 mained no  bond  of  union,  to  keep  them  a 
 diftindt  people.  And  whillT:  they  were  under 
 their  own  kings,  in  their  own  country,  a  total 
 apoftacy  from  God  would  have  been  the  dif- 
 folution  of  their  whole  government.  They, 
 in  fuch  a  fenfe,  nationally  acknowledged  and 
 worihippcd  the  Maker  of  heaven  and  earth, 
 when  the  refl  of  the  world  wxre  funk  in 
 idolatry,  as  rendered  thei-n,  in  fad:,  the  pecu- 
 liar people  of  God.  And  th-:5  fo  remarkable 
 an  eftablifhment  and  prcfervaLc":  of  natural 
 religion  amongit  them,  Terns  tc  - dd  fome 
 peculiar  credibility  to  the  hiilorical  c  idencc 
 for  the  miracles  oi  Mofes  and  the  Prop.  .  ts  : 
 becaufe  thefe  miracles  are  a  full  fatlsfadtory 
 account  of  this  event,  which  plainly  wants  to 
 be  accounted  for,  and  cannot  otherwife. 
 
 Let  this  perfon,  fuppofed  wholly  ignorant 
 of  hiftory,  be  acquainted  farther,  that  one 
 claiming  to  be  the  Meffiah,  of  Jewifh  ex- 
 traction, rofe  up  at  the  time  when  this  nation, 
 from  the  prophecies  abovementioned,  expect- 
 ed the  Mefliah  :  that  he  was  rejected,  as  it 
 feemed  to  have  been  foretold  he  (hould,  by 
 the  body  of  the  people,  under  the  diredlion 
 
 Bb  of 
 
370        Of  the  particular  'Evidence      Part  IL 
 
 of  their  rulers :  that  in  the  courfe  of  a  very 
 few  years,  he  was  believed  on  and  acknow- 
 ledged as  the  promlfed  MelTiah,  by  great 
 numbers  among  the  Gentiles,  agreeably  to 
 the  prophecies  of  Scripture,  yet  not  upon  the 
 evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles  ^,  of 
 which  miracles  we  have  alfo  ftrono^  hiflorical 
 evidence ;  (by  which  I  mean  here  no  more 
 than  muft  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers, 
 for  let  pious  frauds  and  follies  be  admitted  to 
 weaken,  it  is  abfurd  to  hy  they  deftroy,  our 
 evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  proof  of 
 Chriftianity'' :)  that  this  religion  approving 
 itfclf  to  the  reafon  of  mankind,  and  carrying 
 its  own  evidence  with  it,  fo  far  as  reafon  is  a 
 judge  of  its  fyftem,  and  being  no  way  con- 
 trary to  reafon  in  thofe  parts  of  it  which  re- 
 quire to  be  believed  upon  the  mere  authority 
 of  its  Author;  that  this  religion,  I  fay,  gra- 
 dually fpread  and  iupported  itfelf,  for  fome 
 hundred  years,  not  only  v/ithout  any  affiftance 
 from  temporal  power,  but  under  conftant 
 difcouragernents,  and  often  the  bittereft  per- 
 fecutions  from  it ;  and  then  became  the  re- 
 ligion of  the  world  :  that  in  the  mean  time, 
 the  Jewifh  nation  and  government  were  de- 
 ilroyed,  in  a  very  remarkable  manner,  and 
 the  people  carried  away  captive  and  difperfed 
 through  the  moil  diflant  countries  ;  in  which 
 rtate  of  difperfion  they  have  remained  fifteen 
 
 '  P-  IIZ^  ^^c.  ^'  p.  343,  &c. 
 
 hundred 
 
Chap.  VII.      fo7'  Chrljlianity,  371 
 
 hundred  years :  and  that  they  remain  a  nu- 
 merous people,  united  amongft  themlelves, 
 and  diftinguiflied  from  the  reft  of  the  world, 
 as  they  were  in  the  days  of  Mojis,  by  the  pro- 
 feffion  of  his  law ;  and  every  where  looked  up- 
 on in  a  manner,  which  one  fcarce  knows  how 
 diftin^^tly  to  exprcfs,  but  in  the  words  of  the 
 prophetick  account  of  it,  given  fo  many  ages 
 before  it  came  to  pafs  ;  Tboufialt  hccome  an 
 ajlonifumcnt y  a  proverb y  and  a  by-'ivord,  ajjiong 
 all  ?2atio?2S  whither  the  Lord  flmll  lead  thee  \ 
 
 The  appearance  of  a  (landing  miracle,  in 
 the  yews  remaining  a  diftin(fl  people  in  their 
 difperfion,  and  the  confirmation  v/hich  this 
 event  appears  to  give  to  the  truth  of  revela- 
 tion ;  may  be  thought  to  be  anfwered,  by  their 
 religion's  forbiddinj?  them  inter-mai  ria2"es 
 with  thofe  of  any  other,  and  prefcribing  them 
 a  great  many  peculiarities  in  their  food,  by 
 which  they  are  debarred  frcm  the  means  of 
 incorporating  with  the  people  in  vv^hc  fe.  coun- 
 tries they  live.  This  is  not,  I  think,  z  fatif- 
 fadory  account  of  that  which  it  pretends  to 
 account  for.  But  what  does  it  pretend  to 
 account  for  ?  The  correfpondcnce  between 
 this  event  and  the  prophecies  ;  or  the  coin- 
 cidence of  both,  with  a  long  difpcnfation  of 
 Providence  of  a  peculiar  nature,  towards  that 
 people  formerly  ?    No.     It  is  only  the  event 
 
 *  Deut.  xxviii.   37, 
 
 B  b  2  itfelf, 
 
372         Of  the  particular  Evidence    Part  IL 
 
 itfelf,  which  is  offered  to  be  thus  accounted 
 for ;  which  fingle  event  taken  alone,  ab- 
 ftraded  from  all  fuch  correfpondence  and 
 coincidence,  perhaps  would  not  have  appear- 
 ed miraculous :  but  that  correfpondence  and 
 coincidence  may  be  fo,  though  the  event  itfelf 
 be  fuppofed  not.  Thus  the  concurrence  of 
 our  Saviour's  being  born  at  Bethlehcmy  with 
 a  long  foregoing  feries  of  prophecy  and  other 
 coincidences,  is  doubtlefs  miraculous,  the  fe- 
 ries of  prophecy,  and  other  coincidences,  and 
 the  event,  being  admitted  :  though  the  event 
 itfelf,  his  birth  at  that  place,  appears  to  have 
 been  brought  about  in  a  natural  way;  of 
 which,  however,  no  one  can  be  certain. 
 
 And  as  feveral  of  thefe  events  feem,  in 
 fome  degree  exprefsly,  to  have  verified  the 
 prophetick  hiftory  already :  fo  likewife  they 
 m^ay  be  confidered  farther,  as  having  a  pecu- 
 liar afped:  towards  the  full  completion  of  it ; 
 as  affording  fome  prefumption  that  the  whole 
 of  it  fhall,  one  time  or  other,  be  fulfilled. 
 Thus,  chat  the yfic^j- have  been  fo  wonderfully 
 preferved  in  their  long  and  wide  difperfion  ; 
 which  is  indeed  the  direft  fulfilling  of  fome 
 prophecies,  but  is  now  mentioned  only  as 
 looking  forward  to  fomewhat  yet  to  come  : 
 that  natural  religion  canje  forth  from  Judea^ 
 and  fprcad,  in  the  degree  it  has  done  over  the 
 worla,  before  loft  m  i«  kjlatiy ;  which,  toge- 
 ther with  fome  other  things,  have  diftinguiih- 
 
 ed 
 
V 
 
 Chap.  VII.      for  Chnjiariky.  373 
 
 ed  that  very  place,  in  Uke  manner,  as  the 
 people  of  it  are  diflinguiflied :  that  this  great 
 change  of  religion  over  the  enrtli,  was  brought 
 about  under  the  profeflion  and  acknowledg- 
 ment, that  Jefus  was  the  promifed  MeiTiah: 
 things  of  this  kind  naturally  turn  the  thoughts 
 of  ferious  men  towards  the  full  completion 
 of  the  prophetick  hiftory,  concerning  the 
 final  reftoration  of  that  people  ;  coiiccrning 
 ihe  eftablifliment  of  the  everlafting  kingdom 
 among  them,  the  kingdom  of  the  Mefiiah ; 
 and  the  future  ftate  of  the  world,  under  this 
 facred  government.  Such  circumftances  and 
 events  compared  with  thefe  prophecies, 
 though  no  completions  of  them,  yet  would 
 not,  I  think,  be  fpoken  of  as  nothing  in  the 
 argument,  by  a  perfon  upon  his  firil  being 
 informed  of  them.  They  fall  in  with  the 
 prophetick  hiftory  of  things  ftill  future,  give 
 it  fome  additional  credibility,  have  the  ap- 
 pearance of  being  fomewhat  in  order  to  the 
 full  completion  of  it. 
 
 Indeed  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  know- 
 ledge, and  great  calmnefs  and  confidcration, 
 to  be  able  to  judge,  thoroughly,  of  the  evi- 
 dence for  the  truth  of  Chriftianity,  from  that 
 part  of  the  prophetick  hiftory,  which  relates 
 to  the  fituation  of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world, 
 and  to  the  ftate  of  the  Church,  from  the 
 eftablifhment  of  Chriftianity  to  the  prefent 
 time.     But  it  appears,  from  a  general  view 
 
 B  b  3  of 
 
374         Of  the  particular  Evidence     P.irt  11. 
 
 of  it,  to  be  very  material.  And  thofe  pcrlbns 
 who  have  thoroughly  examined  it,  and  fome 
 of  them  were  men  of  the  cooloft  tempers, 
 greateil  capacities,  and  leaft  liable  to  imputa- 
 tions of  prejudice,  infift  upon  it  as  detcnnln- 
 ately  conclufive. 
 
 Suppofe  now  a  perfon  quite  ignorant  of 
 hiftory,  firft  to  recoiled:  the  paffages  above- 
 mentioned  out  of  Scripture,  without  know- 
 ing but  that  the  whole  was  a  late  £ction, 
 then  to  be  informed  of  the    correfpondent 
 fads  now  mentioned,  and  to  unite  them  all 
 into  one  view :  that  the  profelTion  and  cfta- 
 bliihment  of  natural  religion  in  the  world,  is 
 greatly  owing,  in  different  ways,  to  this  book, 
 and  the  fuppofed  revelation  which  it  contains ; 
 that  it  is  acknowledged  to  be   of  the  earlieft 
 antiquity ;  that  its  chronology  and  comm.on 
 hiftory  are  intirely  credible  ;  that  this  antient 
 nation,  the  Jews,  of  v/hom  it  chiefly  treats, 
 appear  to  have  been,  in  fad,  the  people  of  God, 
 in  a  diftinguifhed  fenfe ;   that,  as   there  was 
 a  national  expedation  amongft  them,  raifed 
 from  the  prophecies,  of  a  Meffiah  to  appear 
 at  fuch  a  time,  fo  one  at  this  time  appeared 
 claiming  to  be  that  Meffiah;  that  he  was 
 rejeded  by  this  nation ;  but  received  by  the 
 Gentiles,  not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy, 
 but  of  miracles ;  that  the  religion  he  taught 
 fupported  itfelf  under  the  greateft  difficulties, 
 gained  ground,    and   at  length  became  the 
 
 religion 
 
Chap.  VIL       for  Chrifiianity.  375 
 
 religion  of  the  world  ;  thiit  in  the  mean  time 
 the  Jcwiih  polity  was  utterly  deflroyed,  and 
 the  nation  difperlcd  over  the  lace  of  the  eart'i, 
 that  notwithllanding  this,  thiy  have  remained 
 a  diflind:  numerous  people  for  fo  many  cen- 
 turies, even  to  this  day;  which  not  only  ap- 
 pears to  be  the  exprcfs  completion  of  fjveral 
 prophecies  concerning  them  ;  but  alio  renders 
 it,  as  one  may  fpeak,  a  vifible  and  cafy  poffi- 
 bility,  that  the  promifes  made  to  them  as  a 
 nation,  may  yet  be    fulfilled.     And  to  thefe 
 acknowledged  trutlis,  let  the  perion  we  have 
 been  fuppofmg,   add,  as  I  think  he  ought, 
 whether  every  one  will  allow  it  or  no,  the 
 obvious  appearances  v/hich  there  are,  of  the 
 ftate  of  the  world,  in  other  refpedls  befides 
 what  relates  to  the  JewSy  and  of  the  Chriftian 
 Church,  having  fo  long  anfwered,  and  ftill 
 anfwering  to  the  prophetick  hiftory.  Suppofe, 
 I  fay,  thefe  fads  fet  over  againft  the  things 
 before  mentioned  cut  of  the  Scripture,  and 
 ferioully  compared  with  them  ;  the  joint  viev/ 
 of  both  together,  muft,  I  think,  appear   of 
 very  great  v/eight  to  a  confiderate  reafonable 
 perfon  :  of  much  greater  indeed,  upon  having 
 them  firfl:  laid  before  him,  than  is  cafy  for  us, 
 who  are  fo  familiarifed  to  them, ^ to  conceive, 
 without  fome   particular  attention  for  that 
 purpofe. 
 
 All  thefe  things,  and  the  feveral  particulars 
 contained  under  them,  require  to  be  diflindly 
 
 B  b  4  and 
 
376        Of  the  particular  'Evidence     Part  II. 
 
 and  mofi:  thoroughly  examined  into;  that  the 
 weight  of  each  may  be  judged  of,  upon  fuch 
 examination,  and  fuch  conclufion  drawn  as 
 refalts  from  their  united  force.      But   this 
 has  not  been  attempted  here.     I  have  gone 
 no  farther  than  to  Ihow,  that  the  general  im- 
 perfe6t  view  of  them  now  given,  the  confeft 
 hiftorical  evidence  for  miracles,  and  the  many 
 obvious  appearing  completions  of  prophecy, 
 together  with  the  collateral  things  ^  here  men- 
 tioned, and  there  are  feveral  others  of  the 
 like  fort;  that  all  this  together,  which,  being 
 fid:,  m.uft  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers, 
 amounts  to  real  evidence  of  fomewhat  more 
 than  human  in  this  matter  :  evidence  much 
 more  important,  than  carelefs  men,  who  have 
 been  accuftomed  only  to  tranfient  and  partial 
 views  of  it,  can  imagine ;  and  indeed  abund- 
 antly fuiTicient  to  a-^  upon.  And  thefe  things, 
 I  apprehend,  muft  be  acknowledged  by  un- 
 beliLwers.     For  though  they  may  fay,  that 
 the  hiftoiical  evidence  of  miracles  wrought 
 in  atteftation    of  Chriftianity,    is  not   futfi- 
 cient  to  convince  them,  that  fuch  miracles 
 were  r  rally  wrought :  they  cannot  deny  that 
 there  is  fuch  hiftorical  evidence,  it  being  a 
 known  matter  of  ij^di  that  there  is.     They 
 may  fay,  the  conformity  between  the   pro- 
 phecies and  events,  is  by  accident :  but  there 
 
 ^  All  the  particular  things  mentioned  in  this  chapter, 
 not  reduceablc  to  the  head,  of  certain  miracles,  or  deter- 
 minate completions  of  prophecy.     See  p.  326,  327, 
 
 are 
 
Chap.  VIL        for  Chrijliamty.  377 
 
 are  many  inftances  in  which  fuch  conformity 
 itfelf  cannot  be  denied.  They  may  fay,  with 
 regard  to  luch  kind  of  collateral  things  as 
 thofe  abovementioned,that  any  odd  accidental 
 events,  without  meaning,  will  have  a  meaning 
 found  in  them  by  fanciful  people :  and  that 
 fuch  as  are  fanciful  in  any  one  certain  way^ 
 will  make  out  a  thoufand  coincidences,  which 
 feem  to  favour  their  peculiar  follies.  Men,  I 
 fay,  may  talk  thus :  but  no  one  who  is  fe- 
 rious,  can  poflibly  think  thefe  things  to  be 
 nothing,  if  he  conliders  the  importance  of 
 collateral  things,  and  even  of  leffer  circum- 
 ftances,  in  the  evidence  of  probability,  as  dif- 
 tinguiflied,  in  nature,  from  the  evidence  of 
 demonftration.  In  many  cafes  indeed  it  fe^his 
 to  require  the  trueft  judgment,  to  determine 
 with  exadtnefs  the  v/eight  of  circumftantial 
 evidence  :  but  it  is  very  often  altogether  as 
 convincing,  as  that,  which  is  the  moft  exprefs 
 and  direft. 
 
 This  general  view  of  the  evidence  for 
 Ghriftianity,  confidered  as  making  one  argu- 
 ment, m^ay  alfo  ferve  to  recommend  to  ferious 
 perfons,  to  fet  down  every  thing,  which  they 
 think  may  be  of  any  real  weight  at  all  in 
 proof  of  it,  and  particularly  the  many  fceming 
 completions  of  prophecy  :  and  they  will  find, 
 that,  judging  by  the  natural  rules,  by  which 
 we  judge  of  probable  evidence  in  common 
 matters,  they  amount  to  a  much  higher  de- 
 gree 
 
378        Of  the  particular  Evidence      Part  II. 
 
 gree  of  proof,  upon  fuch  a  joint  review,  than 
 could  be  fuppofed  upon  confidering  them 
 feparately,  at  different  times;  how  ftrong  fo- 
 ever  the  proof  might  before  appear  to"  them, 
 upon  fuch  feparate  views  of  it.  For  pro- 
 bable proofs,  by  being  added,  not  only  increafe 
 tlie  evidence,  but  multiply  it.  Nor  iliould  I 
 diffuade  any  one  from  fetting  down,  what  he 
 thought  made  for  the  contrary  fide.  But 
 then  it  is  to  be  remembered,  not  in  order  to 
 influence  his  judgment,  but  his  practice,  that 
 a  miilake  on  one  fide,  may  be,  in  its  confe- 
 quences,  much  m.ore  dangerous,  than  a  mif- 
 take  on  the  other.  And  what  courfe  is  moil 
 •fafe,  and  v/hat  moft  dangerous,  is  a  confider- 
 ation  thought  very  material,  when  we  deli- 
 berate, not  concerning  events,  but  concerning 
 condud:  in  our  temporal  affairs.  To  be  in- 
 fluenced by  this  confideration  in  our  judg- 
 ment, to  believe  or  difbelieve  upon  it,  is 
 indeed  as  much  prejudice,  as  any  thing  what- 
 ever. And,  like  other  prejudices,  it  operates 
 contrary  ways,  in  different  men.  For  fome 
 are  inclined  to  believe,  what  they  hope;  and 
 others,  v/hat  they  fear.  And  it  is  manifeft 
 unreafonablenefs,  to  apply  to  men's  paffions 
 in  order  to  gain  their  affent.  But  in  delibe- 
 rations concerning  condudl,  there  is  nothing 
 Vv^hich  reafon  more  requires  to  be  taken  into 
 the  account,  than  the  importance  of  it.  For, 
 fiappofe  it  doubtful,  v/liat  would  be  the  cou- 
 fequence  of  acting  in  this,  or  in  a  contrary 
 
 manner : 
 
Chap.  VII.        for  ChnjVtanity,    .  379 
 
 manner :  ftill,  that  taking  one  fide  could  be 
 attended  with  Httle  or  no  bad  confequcnce, 
 and  taking  the  other  might  be  attended  with 
 the  greateil,  muft  appear,  to  unprejudiced 
 reafon,  of  the  higheft  moment  towards  de- 
 termining, how  we  are  to  ad:.  But  the  truth 
 of  our  religion,  hke  the  truth  of  common 
 matters,  is  to  be  judged  of  by  all  the  evidence 
 taken  together.  And  unlefs  the  whole  feries 
 of  things  which  may  be  alledged  in  this 
 argument,  and  every  particular  thing  in  it, 
 can  reafonably  be  fuppofed  to  have  been  by 
 accident  -,  (for  here  the  flrefs  of  the  argument 
 for  Chriftianity  lies ;)  then  is  the  truth  of  it 
 proved  :  in  like  manner,  as  if  in  any  common 
 cafe,  numerous  events  acknovvledoed,  vv-ere 
 to  be  alledged  in  proof  of  any  other  event 
 difputed  J  the  truth  of  the  dif:>uted  event 
 would  be  proved,  not  only  if  any  one  cf  the 
 acknowledged  ones  did  of  itfelf  clearly  imply 
 it,  but,  though  no  one  of  them  fingly  did  fo, 
 if  the  whole  of  the  acknowledi^ed  events 
 taken  together,  could  not  in  reafon  be  fup- 
 pofed to  have  happened,  unlefs  the  difputed 
 one  were  true. 
 
 It  is  obvious,  how  much  advantage,  the 
 nature  of  this  evidence  gives  to  thofe  perfons, 
 whp  attack  Chriftianity,  elpeciaby  in  con- 
 verfation.  For  it  is  ealy  to  fhew,  in  a  fnort 
 and  lively  m.anner,  that  fuch  and  fuch  things 
 are  liable  to  objedion,   that  this  and  another 
 
 thing, 
 
380      Ohjecitons  againjl  the  Analogy    Part  II. 
 
 thing,  Is  of  little  weight  in  itfelf;  but  im- 
 poflible  to  fhew,  in  like  manner,  the  united 
 force  of  the  whole  argument  in  one  view. 
 
 However,  laftly,  as  it  has  been  made  ap- 
 pear, that  there  is  no  prefumption  again  ft  a 
 revelation  as  miraculous  -,  that  the  general 
 icheme  of  Chriftianity,  and  the  principal  parts 
 of  it,  are  conformable  to  the  experienced 
 conftitution  of  things,  and  the  whole  per- 
 fectly credible  :  fo  the  account  now  given  of 
 the  pofitive  evidence  for  it,  fliews,  that  this 
 evidence  is  fuch,  as,  from  the  nature  of  it, 
 cannot  be  deftroyed^  though  it  ihould  be 
 leflened. 
 
 CHAP.     VIII. 
 
 Of  the  ObjeBions  which  may  he  made  againjl 
 arguing  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature^  to 
 Religion. 
 
 IF  every  one  would  confider,  with  fuch 
 attention  as  they  are  bound,  even  in  point 
 of  morality,  to  confider,  what  they  judge 
 and  give  characters  of;  the  occaiion  of  this 
 chapter  would  be,  in  fome  good  meafure  at 
 
 leaft. 
 
Chap.  VIII.    of  Nature  to  Religion.  3S1 
 
 leaft,  fuperfcded.  But  fince  this  is  not  to  be 
 exped:ed ;  for  Ibme  we  find  do  not  concern 
 thcmfclves  to  underftand  even  what  they 
 write  againft  :  fince  this  treatife,  in  common 
 with  moft  others,  lies  open  to  objections, 
 which  may  appear  very  material  to  thoughtful 
 men  at  firft  fight ;  and,  befides  that,  feems 
 peculiarly  liable  to  the  objections,  of  fuch 
 as  can  judge  without  thinking,  and  of  fuch 
 as  can  cenfure  without  judging;  it  may  not 
 be  amifs  to  fet  down  the  chief  of  thefe  ob- 
 jedions  which  occur  to  me,  and  confider 
 them  to  their  hdnds.  And  they  are  fuch  as 
 thefe ; 
 
 *'  That  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  folve  difficul- 
 **  ties  in  revelation,  by  faying,  that  there  are 
 "  the  fame  in  natural  religion ;  when  what 
 *'  is  wanting  is  to  clear  both  of  them,  of 
 "  thefe  their  common,  as  well  as  other  their 
 "  refpeCtive,  difficulties  :  but  that  it  is  a 
 "  fiirange  way  indeed  of  convincing  men  of 
 "  the  obligations  of  religion,  to  ihew  them, 
 ^*  that  they  have  as  little  reafon  for  their 
 *'  worldly  purfuits :  and  a  ftrange  way  of 
 *'  vindicating  the  juftice  and  goodnefs  of  the 
 *^  Author  of  nature,  and  of  removing  the 
 "  objections  againft  both,  to  which  the  fyf- 
 **  tem  of  religion  lies  open,  to  (hew,  that  the 
 "  like  objections  lie  againft  natural  provi- 
 "  dence ;  a  way  of  anfwering  objections 
 **  againft  religion,  without  fo  much  as  pte- 
 
 *'  tending 
 
382       OhjeBions  agatnjl  the  Analogy  Part  11. 
 
 **  tending  to  make  out,  that  the  fyftem  of 
 "  it,  or  the  particular  things  in  it  objedled 
 
 **  againft,  are  reafonable efpecially,  per- 
 
 **  haps  fome  may  be  inattentive  enough  to 
 *^  add,  Muft  this  be  thought  ftrange,  when 
 "  it  is  confeffed  that  analogy  is  no  anfwer  to 
 "  fuch  objedions  :  that  when  this  fort  of 
 **  reafoning  is  carried  to  the  utmoft  length 
 **  it  can  be  imagined  capable  of,  it  will  yet 
 "  leave  the  mind  in  a  very  unfatisfied  ftate  : 
 **  and  that  it  muft  be  unaccountable  igno- 
 **  ranee  of  mankind,  to  imagine  they  will 
 **  be  prevailed  with  to  forego  their  prefent 
 "  interefts  and  pleafures,  from  regard  to  re- 
 "  ligion,  upon  doubtful  evidence." 
 
 Now,  as  plaufible  as  this  way  of  talking 
 may  appear,  that  appearance  will  be  found  in 
 a  great  meafure  owing  to  half- views,  which 
 fhew  but  part  of  an  objed:,  yet  fhew  that 
 indiftindly  ;  and  to  undeterminate  language. 
 By  thefe  means  weak  men  are  often  deceived 
 by  others,  and  ludicrous  men,  by  themfelves. 
 And  even  thofe,  who  are  ferious  and  confide- 
 rate,  cannot  always  readily  difintangle,  and 
 at  once  clearly  fee  through  the  perplexities, 
 in  which  fubjedis  themfelves  are  involved; 
 and  which  are  heightened  by  the  deficiencies 
 and  the  abufe  of  words.  To  this  latter  fort 
 of  perfons,  the  following  reply  to  each  part 
 of  this  obje£i:ion  feverally,  may  be  of  fome 
 
 afliftance; 
 
Chap.  Vlil.     of  Nature  to  Religion.  383 
 
 affiftance ;  as  it  may  alfo  tend  a  little  to  flop 
 and  filencc  others. 
 
 Firfiy  The  thing  wanted,  /.  e.  what  men 
 require,  is  to  have  all  difficulties  cleared. 
 And  this  is,  or,  at  leaft  for  any  thing  we  know 
 to  the  contrary,  it  may  be,  the  fame,  as  requir- 
 ing to  comprehend  the  divine  nature,  and 
 the  whole  plan  of  Providence  from  everlaft- 
 ing  to  everlafting.  But  it  hath  always  been 
 allowed  to  argue,  from  what  is  acknowledged, 
 to  what  is  difputed.  And  it  is  in  no  other  fenfc 
 a  poor  thing,  to  argue  from  natural  religion 
 to  revealed,  in  the  manner  found  fault  with, 
 than  it  is  to  argue  in  numberlefs  other  ways 
 of  probable  dedu6lion  and  inference,  in  mat- 
 ters of  condudl,  which  we  are  continually  re- 
 duced to  the  neceffity  of  doing.  Indeed  the 
 epithet  poory  may  be  applied,  I  fear  as  pro- 
 perly, to  great  part  or  the  whole  of  human 
 life,  as  it  is  to  the  thino^s  mentioned  in  the 
 objection.  Is  it  not  a  poor  thing,  for  a  phy- 
 lician  to  have  fo  little  knowledge  in  the  cure 
 of  difeafes,  as  even  the  moil  eminent  have  ? 
 To  ad:  upon  conjevflure  and  guefs,  where  the 
 life  of  man  is  concerned  ?  Undoubtedly  it 
 is  :  but  not  in  comparifon  of  having  no  Ikill 
 at  all  in  that  ufeful  art,  and  being  obliged  to 
 ad:  v/holly  in  the  dark. 
 
 Further :  fmce  it  is  as  unreafonable,  as  it 
 
 Is  common,  to  urge  objedions  againft  reve- 
 
 I  lation. 
 
384      Ohjc^ions  againjl  the  Analogy    Part  IL 
 
 lation,  which  are  of  equal  weight  againft  na- 
 tural religion  ;  and  thofe  who  do  this,  if  they 
 are  not  confufed  themfelves,  deal  unfairly 
 with  others,  in  making  it  feem,  that  they 
 are  arguing  only  againft  revelation,  or  parti- 
 cular doctrines  of  it,  when  in  reality  they  are 
 arguing  againft  moral  providence ;  it  is  a  thing 
 of  confequence  to  ihow,  that  fuch  objedions 
 are  as  much  levelled  againft  natural  religion, 
 as  againft  revealed.  And  objed:ions,  which 
 are  equally  applicable  to  both,  are  properly 
 fpeaking  anfwered,  by  its  being  fliown  that 
 they  are  fo,  provided  the  former  be  admitted 
 to  be  true.  And  without  taking  in  the  con- 
 fideration  how  diftindly  this  is  admitted,  it 
 is  plainly  very  material  to  obferve,  that  as  the 
 things  objected  againft  in  natural  religion, 
 are  of  the  fame  kind  with  what  is  c^rtaiii 
 matter  of  experience  in  the  courfe  of  provi- 
 dence, and  in  the  information  which  God  af- 
 fords us  concerning  our  temporal  intereft  un- 
 der his  government ;  fo  the  ohjed:ions  againft 
 the  fyftem  of  Chriftianity  and  the  evidence  of 
 it,  are  of  the  very  f\me  kind  with  thole  which 
 are  made  againft  the  fyftem  ana  evidence  of 
 natural  religion.  However,  the  reader  upon 
 review  may  fee,  that  moft  of  the  analogies 
 infifted  upon,  even  in  the  latter  part  of  this 
 treatife,  do  not  necefKtrily  require  to  have 
 more  taken  for  grantt^d  th  n  is  m  the  former ; 
 that  there  is  an  Author  of  nature,  or  natural 
 Governor  of  the  world :  and  Chriftianity  is 
 
 vindicated. 
 
chap.  VIII.     of  Nature  to  Religion,         385 
 
 vindicated,  not  from  its  analogy  to  natural 
 religion,  but  chiefly,  from  its  analogy  to  the 
 experienced  conftitution  of  nature. 
 
 Secondly,  Religion  is  a  pra(fl:ical  thing,  and 
 conflfts  in  fuch  a  determinate  courfe  of  life ; 
 as  being  what  there  is  reafon  to  think,  is 
 commanded  by  the  Author  of  nr^ture,  and 
 will,  upon  the  whole,  be  our  happinefs  un- 
 der his  government.  Now  if  men  can  be 
 convinced,  that  they  have  the  like  reafon  to 
 believe  this,  as  to  believe,  that  taking  care  of* 
 their  temporal  affairs  will  be  to  their  advan- 
 tage ;  fuch  convidtion  cannot  but  be  an  ar- 
 gument to  them  for  the  pradice  of  religion. 
 And  if  there  be  really  any  reafon  for  believing 
 one  of  thefe,  and  endeavouring  to  preferve 
 life,  and  fecure  ourfelves  the  neceflaries  and 
 conveniences  of  it :  then  there  is  reafon  alfo 
 for  believing  the  other,  and  endeavouring  to 
 fecure  the  intereft  it  propofes  to  us.  And  if 
 the  intereft,  which  religion  propofes  to  us, 
 be  infinitely  greater  than  our  whole  temporal 
 intereft;  then  there  muft  be  proportionably 
 greater  reafon,  for  endeavouring  to  fecure  one, 
 than  the  other :  fince,  by  the  fuppofition,  the 
 probability  of  our  fecuring  one,  is  equal  to 
 the  probability  of  our  fecuring  the  other. 
 This  feem^s  plainly  unanfv/erable  ;  and  has  a 
 tendency  to  influence  fair  minds,  who  con- 
 fider  what  our  condition  really  is,  or  upon 
 what  evidence  we  are  naturally  appointed  to 
 
 C  c  ad; 
 
386     Chjedlions  agahijl  the  Analog   Part  IL 
 
 a6l ;  and  v/ho  are  difpofed  to  acqulefce  in  the 
 terms  upon  \yhich  we  live,  and  attend  to  and 
 follow  that  practical  inftrudtion,  whatever  it 
 be,  which  is  afforded  us.  • 
 
 But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  ar- 
 gument referred  to  in  the  objedion,  lies  in 
 another  place.     For,  it  is  faid  that  the  proof 
 of  religion  is  involved  in  fuch   inextricable 
 difficulties,  as  to  render  it  doubtful;  and  that 
 it  cannot  be  fuppofed,  that  if  it  were  true,  it 
 would  be  left  upon  doubtful  evidence.    Here 
 then,  over  and  above  the  force  of  each  par- 
 ticular difficulty  or  objedion,  thefe  difficul- 
 ties and  objections  taken  togetherj  are  turned 
 into  a  politive  argument  againft  the  truth  of 
 religion :  which  argument  would  ftand  thus. 
 If  religion  were  true,  it  would  not  be  left 
 doubtful,  and  open  to  objed:ions  to  the  de- 
 gree in  which  it  is:   therefore  that  it  is  thus 
 left,   not   only    renders    the    evidence    of  it 
 weak,  and  leffens  its  force,  in  proportion  to 
 the    weight    of  fach   objeftions ;    but    alfo 
 fliews  it  to  be  falfe,  or  is  a  general  prefump- 
 tion  of  its  being  fo.     Now  the  obfervation, 
 that  from  the  natural  conflitution  and  courfe 
 of  things,  v/e  muft  in  our  temporal  concerns, 
 almoft  continually,  and  in  matters  of  great 
 confequence,  a6t  upon  evidence  of  a  like  kind 
 ^nd  degree  to  the  evidence  of  religion  ;  is  an 
 anfvver  tothis  argument;    becaufe  it  fliews, 
 that  it,  is  according  to  the  condud:  and  cha- 
 8  radter 
 
 I 
 
Chap.  VIII.     of  Nature  to  Religion,         387 
 
 rafter  of  the  Autlior  of  nature  to  appoint 
 we  fliould  adl  upon  evidence  like  to  that 
 which  this  argument  pre  fumes  he  cannot  be 
 fuppofed  to  appoint  we  fhould  adl  upon:  it 
 is  an  inftance,  a  general  one  made  up  of  nu- 
 merous particular  ones,  of  fomewhat  in  his 
 dealing  with  us,  fimilar  to  what  is  faid  to  be 
 incredible.  And  as  the  force  of  this  anfwer 
 lies  merely  in  the  parallel,  which  there  is  be- 
 tween the  evidence  for  religion  and  for  our 
 temporal  conduct;  the  anfwer  is  equally  juft 
 and  conclufive,  whether  the  parallel  be  made 
 out,  by  (hewing  the  evidence  of  the  former 
 to  be  higher,  or  the  evidence  of  the  latter  to 
 be  lower. 
 
 l^hirdly.  The  defign  of  this  treatife  is  not 
 to  vindicate  the  charader  of  God,  but  to 
 ihew  the  obligations  of  men :  it  is  not  to 
 juftify  his  providence,  but  to  fliew  what  be- 
 longs to  us  to  do.  Thefe  are  two  fubjecSs, 
 ^nd  ought  not  to  be  confounded.  And 
 though  they  may  at  length  run  up  into  each 
 other,  yet  obfervations  may  immediately  tend 
 to  make  out  the  latter,  which  do  not  appear, 
 by  any  immediate  connection,  to  the  pur- 
 pofe  of  the  former;  which  is  lefs  our  con- 
 cern than  many  feem  to  think.  For,  ift.  It 
 is  not  neceffary  v/e  fhould  juftify  the  difpen- 
 fations  of  Providence  againft  objiflions,  any 
 farther  than  to  fhew,  that  the  things  objedled 
 againft  may,  for  ought  we  know,  be  conlift- 
 
 C  c  2  ent 
 
388     ObjeSiions  againfz  the  Analogy    Part  IL 
 
 ^wX.  with  juflice  and  goodnefs.  Suppofe  then, 
 that  there  are  things  in  the  fyftem  of  this 
 world,  and  plan  of  Providence  relating 
 to  it,  which  taken  alone  would  be  unjuft:  yet 
 it  has  been  fhewn  unanfwerably,  that  if  we 
 could  take  in  the  reference,  which  thefe 
 things  may  have,  to  other  things  prefent, 
 pad  and  to  come ;  to  the  whole  fcheme, 
 which  the  things  objected  againfl:  are  parts 
 of;  thefe  very  things  might,  for  ought  we 
 know,  be  found  to  be,  not  only  confident 
 with  juftice,  but  injftances  of  it.  Indeed  it 
 has  been  fhewn,  by  the  analogy  of  what  we 
 fee,  not  only  poffible  that  this  may  be  the 
 cafe,  but  credible  that  it  is.  And  thus  ob- 
 jecflions,  drawn  from  fuch  things,  are  an- 
 fwered,  and  Providence  is  vindicated,  as  far 
 as  religion  makes  its  vindication  neceflary. 
 Hence  it  appears,  2dly,  that  objections  againft 
 the  Divine  juftice  and  goodnefs  are  not  en- 
 deavoured to  be  removed,  by  fliewing  that 
 the  like  objections,  allowed  to  be  really  con- 
 clufive,  lie  againft  natural  providence  :  but 
 thofe  objedions  being  fuppofed  and  (hewn 
 not  to  be  conclufive,  the  things  objected 
 againft,  confidered  as  matters  of  fa<fl,  are  far-- 
 ther  fliewn  to  be  credible,  from  their  con- 
 formity to  the  conftitution  of  nature;  for  in- 
 ftance,  that  God  will  reward- and  puniih  men 
 for  their  adtions  hereafter,  from  the  obferva- 
 tion,  that  he  does  reward  and  punidi  them 
 for  their  a(ftions  here.  And  this,  I  appre- 
 hend   is    of  weight.      And    I  add,    3dly,  it 
 
 would 
 
Chap.  VIII.      of  Nature  to  Religion.        389 
 
 would  be  of  weight,  even  though  thofe  ob- 
 jedlions  were  not  aniwercd.  For,  there  being 
 the  proof  of  religion  above  fet  down  \  and  re- 
 ligion implying  feveral  fads ;  for  inflance 
 again,  the  lad  laft  mentioned,  that  God  will 
 reward  and  punilh  men  for  their  adlions 
 hereafter;  the  obfervation  that  his  prefent 
 method  of  government  is  by  rewards  and 
 punilhments,  fliews  that  future  fad  not  to 
 be  incredible  :  whatever  objedions  men  may 
 think  they  have  againft  it,  as  unjuft  or  un- 
 merciful, according  to  their  notions  of  juf- 
 tice  and  mercy ;  or  as  improbable  from  their 
 belief  of  neceliity.  I  fay,  as  iynpro table  :  for 
 it  is  evident  no  objedion  againft  it,  as  unjujiy 
 can  be  urged  from  neceffity  ;  iince  this  notion 
 as  much  deftroys  injuftice,  as  it  does  juftice,. 
 Then  4thly,  Though  objedions  againft  the 
 reafonablenefs  of  the  fyftemof  relij^ion,  cannot 
 indeed  be  anfwered  without  entering  into  con- 
 iideration  of  its  reafonablenefs;  yet  objcdbons 
 againft  the  credibility  or  trutn  of  it,  may. 
 Becaufe  the  fyftem  of  it  is  reducible  into  what 
 is  properly  matter  of  fad:  and  the  truth,  the 
 probable  truth, of  fads, may  be  ihewn  without 
 confideration  of  their  reafonablenefs.  Nor 
 is  it  neceffary,  though,  in  fome  cafes  and  re- 
 fpeds,  it  is  highly  uleful  and  proper,  yet  it 
 is  not  neceffary,  to  give  a  proof  of  the  reafon- 
 ablenefs of  every  precept  injoined  us,  and  of 
 every  particular  difpenfation  of  Providence, 
 which  comes  into  the  fyftem  of  religion.  Indeed 
 ):he  more  thoroughly  a   perfon  of  a  riglit  dif- 
 
 C  c   3  pofition 
 
390     OhjcBions  agalnjl  the  Analogy     Piirt  IL 
 
 pofition  is  convinced  of  the  perfe^lion  of  the 
 Divine  nature  and  condud:,  the  farther  he  will 
 advance  towards  that  perfedlion  of  rehgion, 
 which  St.  ^ohn  ^  fpeaks  of.     But  the  gene- 
 ral obligations  of  religion  are  fully  made  out, 
 by  proving  the  reafonablenefs  of  the  pradice 
 of  it.    And  that  the  pradlice  of  religion  is 
 reafonable,  may  be  fhewn,  though  no  m.ore 
 could  be  proved,  than  that  the  fyftem  of  it 
 may  befoy  for  ought  we  know  to  the  contrary  : 
 and  even  without  entering  into  the  diftind: 
 confideration  of  this.  And  from  hence,  5thly, 
 it  is  eafy  to  fee,  that  though  the  analogy  of 
 nature  is  not  an  immediate  anfwer  to  objec- 
 tions againft  the  wifdom,  the  juflice  or  good- 
 nefs,  of  any  dodlrine  or  precept  of  religion  : 
 yet  it  may  be,  as  it  is,  an  immediate  and  dired 
 anfwer  to  what  is  really  intended  by  fuch  ob- 
 jedtions ;  which  is,  to  fhew  that  the  things 
 objefted  againft  are  incredible. 
 
 Fourthly y  It  is  moil  readily  acknowledged, 
 that  the  foregoing  treatife  is  by  no  means  ia- 
 tisfaftory  ;  very  far  indeed  from  it :  but  fo 
 would  any  natural  inftitution  of  life  appear, 
 if  reduced  into  a  fyftem,  together  with  its 
 evidence.  Leaving  religion  out  of  the  cafe, 
 men  are  divided  in  their  opinions,  whether 
 our  pleafures  overbalance  our  pains :  and 
 v/hether  it  be,  or  be  not,  eligible  to  live  in 
 
 a  I  Joh.  iv.  1 8. 
 
 this 
 
Chap.  VIII.      of  Natiwe  to  ReligioJi.        391 
 
 this  world.  And  were  all  fuch  controverfics 
 fettled,  which  perhaps,  in  fpeciilation,  would 
 be  found  involved  in  great  difficulties ;  and 
 were  it  determined  upon  the  evidence  of  rea- 
 fon,  as  nature  has  determined  it  to  our  hands, 
 that  life  is  to  be  preferved :  yet  ftill,  tlie  rules 
 which  God  has  been  pleafed  to  aftbrd  us, 
 for  efcaping  the  miferies  of  it  and  obtaining 
 its  fatisfa(!:lions,  the  rules,  for  inftance,  of 
 preferving  health  and  recovering  it  when  loft, 
 are  not  only  fallible  and  precarious,  but  very 
 far  from  being  exa6l.  Nor  are  we  informed 
 by  nature,  in  future  contingencies  and  acci- 
 dents, fo  as  to  render  it  at  all  certain,  what 
 is  the  beft  method  of  managing  our  affairs. 
 What  will  be  the  fuccefs  of  our  temporal 
 purfuits,  in  the  common  fenfc  of  the  word 
 Succefs,  is  highly  doubtful.  And  what  will 
 be  the  fuccefs  of  them  in  the  proper  fenfe  of 
 the  word ;  /.  e.  what  happinefs  or  enjoyment 
 we  fhall  obtain  by  them,  is  doubtful  m  a 
 much  higher  degree.  Indeed  the  unfatisfac- 
 tory  nature  of  the  evidence,  with  which  we 
 are  obliged  to  take  up,  in  the  daily  courfe  of 
 life,  is  fcarce  to  be  exprefl'ed.  Yet  men  do 
 not  throw  away  life,  or  difrcgard  the  intercfts 
 of  it,  upon  account  of  this  doubtfulnefs.  The 
 evidence  of  religion  then  being  admitted  real, 
 thofe  who  object  again  ft  it,  as  not  fatisfac- 
 tory,  /.  e.  as  not  being  what  they  wifli  it, 
 plainly  forget  the  very  condition  of  our 
 being:  for  fatisfacflion,  in  this  fenfe,  does  not 
 bdoiig  to  fuch  a  creature  as  man.  And,  v/hich 
 
 C  c  4  is 
 
392     Ohjeciions  againjl  the  Analogy    Part  II. 
 
 is  more  materia],  they  forget  alfo  the  very 
 nature  of  religion.  For,  religion  prefup- 
 pofes,  in  all  thofe  who  will  embrace  it,  a 
 certain  degree  of  integrity  and  honefty ;  which 
 it  was  intended  to  try  whether  men  have  or 
 not,  and  to  exercife  in  fuch  as  have  it,  in  or- 
 der to  its  improvement.  Religion  prefup- 
 pofes  this  as  much,  and  in  the  fame  fenfe,  as 
 fpeaking  to  a  man,  prefuppofes  he  under- 
 flands  the  language  in  which  you  fpeak;  or 
 as  warning  a  man  of  any  danger,  prefuppofes 
 that  he  hath  fuch  a  regard  to  himfelf,  as  that 
 he  will  endeavour  to  avoid  it.  And  therefore 
 the  queftion  is  not  at  all.  Whether  the  evi- 
 dence of  religion  be  fatisfadtory ;  but  Whe- 
 ther it  be,  in  reafon,  fufficient  to  prove  and 
 difcipline  that  virtue,  which  it  prefuppofes. 
 Now  the  evidence  of  it  is  fully  fufficient  for 
 all  thofe  purpofes  of  probation;  how  far 
 foever  it  is  from  being  fatisfadtory,  as  to  the 
 purpofes  of  curiofity,  or  any  other :  and  in- 
 deed it  anfwers  the  purpofes  of  the  former  in 
 feveral  refpedls,  which  it  would  not  do,  if 
 it  were  as  overbearing  as  is  required.  One 
 might  add  farther;  that  whether  the  motives 
 or  the  evidence  for  any  courfe  of  action  be 
 fatisfadtory,  meaning  here  by  that  word,  what 
 fatisiies  a  man,  that  fuch  a  courfe  of  adion  will 
 in  event  be  for  his  good;  this  need  never  be, 
 and  I  think,  ftridily  fpeaking,  never  is,  the 
 practical  queftion  in  common  matters.  But 
 the  praftical  queftion  in  all  cafes,  is.  Whether 
 the  evidence  for  a  courfe  of  adion  be  fuch 
 §  as. 
 
Chap.  VIII.       of  Nature  to  Religion,         393 
 
 as,  taking  In  all  circumftances,  makes  the 
 faculty  within  us,  which  is  the  guide  and 
 judge  of  conduct  ^  determine  that  courfe  of 
 acflion  to  be  prudent.  Indeed  fitisfad:ion 
 that  it  will  be  for  our  intereft  or  happinefs, 
 abundantly  determines  an  acflion  to  be  pru- 
 dent :  but  evidence  almoll  infinitely  lower 
 than  this,  determines  actions  to  be  fo  too ; 
 even  in  the  conduct  of  every  day. 
 
 Fifthly,  As  to  the  objedion  concerning 
 the  influence  which  this  argument,  or  any 
 part  of  it,  may,  or  may  not,  be  expeded  to 
 have  upon  men  :  I  obferve,  as  above,  that 
 religion  being  intended  for  a  trial  and  exercife 
 of  the  morality  of  every  perfon's  character, 
 who  is  a  fubjed:  of  it  -,  and  there  being,  as  I 
 have  fhewn,  fuch  evidence  for  it,  as  is  fuffi- 
 cient,  in  reafon,  to  influence  men  to  embrace 
 it :  to  cbjed:,  that  it  is  not  to  be  imagined 
 mankind  will  be  influenced  by  fuch  evidence, 
 is  nothing  to  the  purpofe  of  the  foregoing 
 treatife.  For  the  purpofe  of  it  is  not  to 
 inquire,  what  fort  of  creatures  mankind  are  ; 
 but  what,  the  light  and  knowledge  which  is 
 afforded  them,  requires  they  Ihould  be  :  to 
 fliew  how,  in  reafon,  they  ought  to  behave  ^ 
 not  how,  in  fad,  they  will  behave.  This 
 depends  upon  themfelves,  and  is  their  own 
 concern ;  tlie  pcrfonal  concern  of  each  man 
 in  particular.  And  liow  little  regard  the 
 *  SceDiflcrt.  II. 
 
 generality 
 
394     Ohjedlions  againjl  the  Analogy    Part  II. 
 
 generality  have  to  it,  experience  indeed  does 
 too  fully  fliew.  But  religion,  confidered  as  a 
 probation,  has  had  its  end  upon  all  perfons, 
 to  whom  it  has  been  propoied  with  evidence 
 fufficient  in  reafon  to  influence  their  prad:ice: 
 for  by  this  means  they  have  been  put  into  a 
 flate  of  probation ;  let  them  behave  as  they 
 will  in  it.  And  thus,  not  only  revelation,  but 
 reafon  alfo,  teaches  us,  that  by  the  evidence 
 of  religion  being  laid  before  men,  the  deiigns 
 of  Providence  are  carrying  on,  not  only  with 
 regard  to  thofe  w^ho  will,  but  like  wife  with 
 regard  to  thofe  who  will  not,  be  influenced 
 by  it.  However,  laflly,  the  objection  here 
 referred  to,  allows  the  things  infifted  upon 
 in  this  treatife  to  be  of  fome  weight :  and  if 
 fo,  it  may  be  hoped  it  will  have  fome  influ- 
 ence. And  if  there  be  a  probability  that  it 
 v/ill  have  any  at  all,  there  is  the  fame  reafon 
 in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  to  lay  it  before 
 men,  as  there  would  be,  if  it  were  likely  to 
 have  a  greater  influence. 
 
 And  farther,  I  defire  it  may  be  confidered, 
 with  refpe6t  to  the  whole  of  the  foregoing 
 objecflions,  that  in  this  treatife  I  have  argued 
 upon  the  principles  of  others  %  not  my  own : 
 
 c  n, 
 
 By  arguing  upon  the  principles  of  others y  the  reader  will 
 obferve  is  meant ;  not  proving  any  thing/w//2  thofe  prin- 
 ciples, but  notivithjlayiding  them.  Thus  rehgion  is  proved, 
 not  from  the  opinion  of  neceflity ;  which  is  abfurd  :  but,' 
 notwithjianding  or  even  though  that  opinion  were  admitted  to 
 be  true. 
 
 and 
 
Chap.  VIII.     of  Nature  to  Religion.         39^ 
 
 and  have  omitted  what  I  think  true,  and  of 
 the   utmoft   importance,    becaufe  by  others 
 thought  unintelUgible,  or  not  true.     Thus  I 
 have  argued  upon  the  principles  of  the  Fata- 
 lifts,  v^'hich  I  do  not  beheve :  and  have  omit^. 
 ted  a  thing  of  the  utmoft  importance  which' 
 I  do  beheve,  the  moral  fitnefs  and  unfitnefs 
 of  adions,  prior  to  all  will  whatever  3  which 
 I   apprehend   as  certainly   to   deternnne  the 
 Divine  condudl,  as  fpeculative  truth  and  falfe-. 
 hood  neceffarily  determine  the  Divine  judr^- 
 ment.      Indeed  the   principle  of  liberty  and 
 that  of  moral  fitnefs  fo  force  themfelves  upon 
 the  mind,  that  moralifts,  the  ancients  as  well 
 as  moderns,  have  formed  their  language  upon 
 it.     And   probably  it  may  appear  in  mine  : 
 though  I  have  endeavoured  to  avoid  it ;  and 
 in  order   to   avoid   it,  have  fometimcs  been 
 obliged  to  exprefs  myfelf  in  a  manner,  which 
 will  appear  ftrange  to  fuch  as  do  not  obferve 
 the  reafon  for  it :   but  the  general  argument 
 here  purfued,  does  not  at  all  fuppofe,  or  pro- 
 ceed upon,  thefe  principles.     Now,  thefe  two 
 abftrad:  principles  of  liberty  and  moral  fitnefs 
 being  omitted,   religion  can  be  confidercd  in 
 no  other  viev/  than  merely  as  a  queftion  of 
 fadl :  and  in   this  view  it  is  here  coniidered. 
 It  is  obvious,  that  Chriftianity,  and  the  proof 
 of  it,  are  both  hiftorical.     And  even  natural 
 religion  is,   properly,  a  matter  of  flid:.      For, 
 that  there   is  a   righteous    Governor   of  the 
 world,  is  fo :    and   this   propofition  contains 
 
 the 
 
396     Objeclions  againji  the  Analogy    Part  IL 
 
 the  general  fyftem  of  natural  religion.  But 
 then,  feveral  abftrad:  truths,  and  in  particular 
 thofe  two  principles,  are  ufually  taken  into 
 confideration  in  the  proof  of  it :  whereas  it 
 is  here  treated  of  only  as  a  matter  of  fad:.  To 
 explain  this :  that  the  three  angles  of  a  tri- 
 angle are  equal  to  two  right  ones,  is  an  ab- 
 ftradl  truth  :  but  that  they  appear  fo  to  our 
 mind,  is  only  a  matter  of  fact.  And  this 
 laft  muft  have  been  admitted,  if  any  thing 
 was,  by  thofe  ancient  fcepticks,  who  would 
 not  have  admitted  the  former  :  but  pretended 
 to  doubt.  Whether  there^were  any  fuch  thing 
 as  truth,  or  Whether  we  could  certainly  de- 
 pend upon  our  faculties  of  underllanding  for 
 the  knowledge  of  it  in  any  cafe.  So  like- 
 wife,  that  there  is,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
 an  original  ftandard  of  right  and  wrong  in 
 adlions,  independent  upon  all  will,  but  which 
 unalterably  determines  the  will  of  God,  to  ex- 
 ercife  that  moral  government  over  the  world 
 which  religion  teaches,  /.  e.  finally  and  upon 
 the  whole  to  reward  and  punifli  men  refped- 
 ively  as  they  adt  right  or  wrong ;  this  affer- 
 tion  contains  an  abftracft  truth,  as  well  as 
 matter  of  fa(fl.  But  fuppofe  in  the  prefent 
 ftate,  every  man,  without  exception,  was 
 rewarded  and  punifhed,  in  exad:  proportion, 
 as  he  followed  or  tranfgrefled  that  fenfe  of 
 right  and  wrong,  which  God  has  implanted 
 in  the  nature  of  every  man :  this  would  not 
 be  at  all  an  abflraft  truth,  but  only  a  matter 
 
 of 
 
Chap.  VIIL     of  Nature  to  Religion.         397 
 
 of  fadt.  And  though  this  fadt  were  ac- 
 knowledged by  every  one ;  yet  the  very  fame 
 difficulties  might  be  raifed,  as  are  now,  con- 
 cerning the  abftrad  queftions  of  Hhcrty  and 
 moral  iitnefs  :  and  we  fliould  have  a  proof, 
 even  the  certain  one  of  experience,  that  the 
 government  of  the  world  was  perfectly  moral, 
 without  taking  in  the  confideration  of  thofe 
 queftions :  and  this  proof  would  remain, 
 in  what  way  foever  they  were  determined. 
 And  thus,  God  having  given  mankind  a 
 moral  faculty,  the  objedl  of  which  is  adions, 
 and  which  naturally  approves  fome  actions 
 as  right  and  of  good-defert,  and  condemns 
 others  as  wrong,  and  of  ill-defert ;  that  he 
 will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  reward  the 
 former  and  punifh  the  latter,  is  not  an  aflertion 
 of  an  abftradl  truth,  but  of  what  is  as  mere 
 a  facft,  as  his  doing  fo  at  prefent  would  be. 
 This  future  fad  I  have,  not  indeed  proved 
 with  the  force  with  which  it  might  be  prov- 
 ed, from  the  principles  of  liberty  and  moral 
 fitnefs;  but  without  them  have  given  a  really 
 conclulive  pradlical  proof  of  it,  which  is 
 greatly  ftrengthened  by  the  general  analogy 
 of  nature  :  a  proof,  eafily  cavilled  at,  eafily 
 ihewn  not  to  be  demonflrative,  for  it  is  not 
 offered  as  fuch  ;  but  impoffible,  I  think,  to 
 be  evaded  or  anfwered.  And  thus  the  obli- 
 gations of  rehgion  are  made  out,  exclufively 
 of  the  queftions  concerning  liberty  and  mo- 
 ral fitnefs  j  which  have  been  perplexed  with 
 
 difficulties 
 
398       OhjeEllons  againfi  the  Analogy    Part  IL 
 
 difficulties  and  abftrufe  reafonings,  as  every 
 thing  may. 
 
 Hence  therefore  may  be  obferved  diftindly, 
 what  is  the  force  of  this  treatife.  It  will  be, 
 to  fuch  as  are  convinced  of  religion  upon  the 
 proof  arifmg  out  of  the  two  lafl  mentioned 
 principles,  an  additional  proof  and  a  confir- 
 mation of  it  :  to  fuch  as  do  not  admit  thofe 
 principles,  an  original  proof  of  it  ^^  and  a 
 confirmation  of  that  proof.  Thofe  who 
 believe,  will  here  find  the  fcheme  of  Chrifli- 
 anity  cleared  ofobjedions,  and  the  evidence 
 of  it  in  a  peculiar  manner  ftrengthened :  thofe 
 w^ho  do  not  believe,  will  at  ieaft  be  fliewn 
 the  abfurdity  of  all  attempts  to  prove  Chrif- 
 tianity  falfe,  the  plain  undoubted  credibility 
 of  it ;  and,  I  hope,  a  good  deal  more. 
 
 And  thus,  though  fome  perhaps  may  feri- 
 oufly  think,  that  analogy  as  here  urged,  has 
 too  great  ftrefs  laid  upon  it  ;  and  ridicule, 
 unanfv/erable  ridicule,  may  be  applied,  to 
 fhev/  the  argument  from  it  in  a  difadvanta- 
 geous  hght:  yet  there  can  be  no  queftion, 
 but  that  it  is  a  real  one.  For  religion,  both 
 natural  and  revealed,  implying  in  it  numerous 
 fiid:s  y  analogy,  being  a  confirmation  of  all 
 facfhs  to  which  it  can  be  applied,  as  it  is  the 
 only  proof  of  moft,  cannot  but  be  admitted 
 
 ''P-  ^57?  158,  &c. 
 
 by 
 
Chap.  VIII.     of  Nature  to  Religion.         399 
 
 by  every  one  to  be  a  material  thing,  and  truly 
 of  weight  on  the  fide  of  religion,  both  na- 
 tural and  revealed  :  and  it  ought  to  be  parti- 
 cularly regarded  by  fuch  as  profefs  to  follow 
 nature,  and  to  be  lefs  fatisfied  with  abflradl 
 reafonings. 
 
 C  O  N- 
 
[     400     ] 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 WHATEVER  account  may  be  given, 
 of  the  ftrange  inattention  and  difre- 
 gard,  in  fome  ages  and  countries,  to  a  matter 
 of  fuch  importance  as  religion ;  it  would, 
 before  experience,  be  incredible,  that  there 
 fhould  be  the  like  difregard  in  thofe,  who 
 have  had  the  moral  fyftem  of  the  world  laid 
 before  them,  as  it  is  by  Chriftianity,  and  often 
 inculcated  upon  them  :  becaufe  this  moral 
 fyftem  carries  in  it  a  good  degree  of  evidence 
 for  its  truth,  upon  its  being  barely  propofed 
 to  our  thoughts.  There  is  no  need  of  ab- 
 flrufe  reafonings  and  diftindions,  to  convince 
 an  unprejudiced  underftanding,  that  there  is 
 a  God  who  made  and  governs  the  world,  and 
 w^ill  judge  it  in  righteoufnefs ;  though  they 
 may  be  neceiTary  to  anfvver  abflrufe  difficul- 
 ties, when  once  fuch  are  raifed:  when  the 
 very  meaning  of  thofe  words,  which  exprefs 
 moft  intelligibly  the  general  doftrine  of  re- 
 ligion, is  pretended  to  be  uncertain ;  and  the 
 clear  truth  of  the  thing  itfelf  is  obfcured 
 by  the  intricacies  of  fpeculation.  But  to  an 
 unprejudiced  mind,  ten  thoufand  thoufand 
 inftances  of  defign,  cannot  but  prove  a  de- 
 figner.     And  it  is  intuitively  manifeft,  that 
 
 creatures 
 
Part  II.      CONCLUSION.        401 
 
 creatures  ought  to  live  under  a  dutiful  fcnfc 
 of  their  Maker;  and  that  juftice  and  charity 
 muft  be  his  laws,  to  creatures  whom  he  has 
 made  focial,  and  placed  in  focicty.  Indeed 
 the  truth  of  revealed  religion,  peculiarly  fo 
 called,  is  not  feif-evident ;  but  requires  ex- 
 ternal proof,  in  order  to  its  being  received* 
 Yet  inattention,  among  us,  to  revealed  reli- 
 gion, wall  be  found  to  imply  the  fame  dilfo- 
 lute  immoral  temper  of  mind,  as  inattention 
 to  natural  religion :  becaufe,  when  both  are 
 laid  before  us,  in  the  manner  they  are  in 
 Chriftian  countries  of  liberty;  our  obliga- 
 tions to  inquire  into  both,  and  to  embrace 
 both  upon  fuppofition  of  their  truth,  are 
 obligations  of  the  fame  nature.  For,  reve- 
 lation claims  to  be  the  voice  of  God :  and 
 our  obligation  to  attend  to  his  voice,  is, 
 furely,  moral  in  all  cafes.  And  as  it  is  in- 
 lifted,  that  its  evidence  is  conclufive,  upon 
 thorough  confideration  of  it ;  fo,  it  offers 
 itfelf  to  us  with  manifeft  obvious  appearan- 
 ces of  having  fomething  more  than  human 
 in  it,  and  therefore  in  all  reafon  requires,  to 
 have  its  claims  moft  ferioully  examined  into. 
 It  is  to  be  added,  that  though  light  and 
 knowledge,  in  what  manner  foever  afforded 
 us,  is  equally  from  God;  yet  a  miraculous 
 revelation  has  a  peculiar  tendency,  from  the 
 iirft  principles  of  our  nature,  to  awaken  man- 
 kind, and  infpire  them  with  reverence  and 
 awe  :  and  this  is  a  peculiar  obiigation,  to  at- 
 
 D  d  tend 
 
402        CONCLUSION.       PartiL 
 
 tend  to  what  claims  to  be  {o  with  fuch appear- 
 ances of  truth.  It  is  therefore  moft  certain, 
 that  our  obhgations  to  enquire  ferioufly  into 
 the  evidence  of  Chiiitianity,  and,  upon  fup- 
 pofition  of  its  truth,  to  embrace  it;  are  of 
 the  utmoft  importance,  and  moral  in  the 
 higheft  and  moft  proper  fenfe.  Let  us  then 
 fuppofe,  that  the  evidence  of  rehgion  in  ge- 
 neral, and  of  Chriftivmity,  has  been  ferioufly 
 enquired  into,  by  all  reafonable  men  among 
 us.  Yet  we  find  many  profefledly  to  reject 
 both,  upon  fpeculative  principles  of  infidelity. 
 And  all  of  them  do  not  content  themfelves 
 with  a  bare  negledl  of  religion,  and  enjoying 
 their  imaginary  freedom  from  its  reftraints. 
 Some  go  much  beyond  this.  They  deride 
 God's  moral  government  over  the  world. 
 They  renounce  his  protecflion,  and  defy  his 
 juftice.  They  ridicule  and  vilify  Chrifti- 
 anity,  and  blafpheme  the  Author  of  it :  and 
 take  all  occafions  to  manifeft  a  fcorn  and 
 contempt  of  revelation.  This  amounts  to 
 an  aftive  fetting  themfelves  againft  religion  ; 
 to  v/hat  may  be  confidered  as  a  pofitive  prin- 
 ciple of  irreligion  :  which  they  cultivate  with- 
 in themfelves,  and,  whether  they  intend  this 
 effed:  or  not,  render  habitual,  as  a  good  man 
 does  the  contrary  principle.  And  others, 
 w^ho  are  not  chargeable  with  -  all  this  profli- 
 gatenefs,  yet,  are  in  avowed  oppofition  to 
 religion,  as  if  difcovered .  to  be  groundlefs. 
 Now  admitting,  Vv'hicli  is  the  fuppofition  we 
 ""  go 
 
Partll.     CONCLUSION.  403 
 
 go  upon,  that  thcfe  perfons  adl  upon  what  they 
 think  principles  of  reafon,  and  otherwifc  they 
 are  not  to  be  argued  with  ;  it  is  really  incon- 
 ceivable, that  they  fliould  imagine  they  clearly 
 fee  the  whole  evidence  of  it,  confidercd  in 
 itfelf,  to  be  nothing  at  all :  nor  do  they  pre- 
 tend this.  They  are  far  indeed  from  having 
 a  juft  notion  of  its  evidence  :  but  they  v/ould 
 not  fay  its  evidence  was  nothing,  if  they 
 thought  the  fyftem  of  it,  with  all  its  circum- 
 ftances,  were  credible,  like  other  matters  of 
 fcience  or  hiflory.  So  that  their  manner  of 
 treating  it  muft  proceed,  either  fromfuch  kind 
 of  objed:ions  againft  all  religion,  as  have  been 
 anfwered  or  obviated  in  the  former  part  of 
 this  Treatife  ;  or  elfe  from  objedlions  and  dif- 
 ficulties, fuppofed  more  peculiar  to  Chrifli- 
 anity.  Thus,  they  entertain  prejudices  againfl 
 the  whole  notion  of  a  revelation,  and  mira- 
 culous interpofitions.  They  find  things  in 
 Scripture,  whether  in  incidental  pafiages,  or 
 in  the  general  fcheme  of  it,  which  appear  to 
 them  unreafonable.  They  take  for  granted, 
 that  if  Chriftianity  were  true,  the  light  of  it 
 muft  have  been  morfe  general,  and  the  evi- 
 dence of  it  more  fatisfaclory,  or  rather  over- 
 bearing :  that  it  muft  and  would  have  been, 
 in  fome  way,  otherwife  put  and  left,  than  it 
 is.  Now  this  is  not  imagining  they  fee  the 
 evidence  itfelf  to  be  nothing,  or  inconfidc- 
 jable  j  but  quite  another  thing.  It  is  being 
 fortified  againft  the  evidence,  in  fome  degree 
 D  d   2  acknowled^^cd, 
 
404         CONCLUSION.      Part  IL 
 
 acknowledged,  by  thinking  they  fee  the  fyftem 
 of  Chriftianity,  or  fomewhat  which  appears 
 to  them  neceilarily  connedled  with  it,  to  be 
 incredible  or  falfe :  fortified  againft  that  evi- 
 dence, which  might,  otherwife,  make  great 
 impreffion  upon  them.  Or,  laftly,  if  any  of 
 thefe  perfons  are,  upon  the  whole,  in  doubt 
 concerning  the  truth  of  Chriftianity ;  their 
 behaviour  feems  owing  to  their  taking  for 
 granted,  through  ftrange  inattention,  that 
 fuch  doubting  is,  in  a  manner,  the  fame 
 thing,  as  being  certain  againft  it. 
 
 To  thefe  perfons,  and  to  this  ftate  of  opi- 
 nion concerning  religion,  the  foregoing  Trea- 
 tife  is  adapted.  For,  all  the  general  objecftions 
 againft  the  moral  fyftem  of  nature  having 
 been  obviated,  it  is  ftiewn,  that  there  is  not 
 any  peculiar  prefumption  at  all  againft  Chrif- 
 tianity, either  confidered  as  not  difcoverable 
 by  reafon,  or  as  unlike  to  what  is  fodifcovered; 
 nor  any  worth  mentioning,  againft  it  as  mira- 
 culous, if  any  at  all;  none  certainly,  which  can 
 render  it  in  the  leaft  incredible.  It  is  fliev/n, 
 that  upon  fuppofition  of  a  divine  revelation, 
 the  analogy  of  nature  renders  it  beforehand 
 highly  credible,  I  think  probable,  that  many 
 things  in  it  muft  appear  liable  to  great  ob- 
 jed:ions ;  and  that  we  muft  be  incompetent 
 judges  of  it,  to  a  great  degree.  This  obfer- 
 vation  is,  I  think,  unqueftionably  true,  and 
 of  thQ  very  utmoft  importance ;  but  it  is 
 z  yrged. 
 
Part  II.     CONCLUSION.  405 
 
 urged,  as  I  hope  it  will  be  underllood,  with 
 great  caution  of  not  viHfying  the  faculty  of 
 reafon,  which  is  the  candle  of  the  Lord  ^nt bin 
 lis ' ;  though  it  can  afford  no  light,  wlicre  it 
 does  not  Ihinc ;  nor  judge,  where  it  has  no 
 principles  to  judge  upon.  The  objedions 
 here  fpokcn  of,  being  firft  anfwered  in  the 
 view  of  objedions  againft  Chriftianity  as  a 
 matter  of  fad,  are  in  the  next  place  confi- 
 dered  as  urged,  more  immediately,  againft  the 
 wifdom,  juftice,  and  goodnefs  of  the  Chriftian 
 difpenfation.  And  it  is  fully  made  out,  that 
 they  admit  of  exadly  the  like  anfwer,  in 
 every  refped,  to  what  the  like  objedions 
 againft  the  conftitution  of  nature  admit  of: 
 that,  as  partial  views  give  the  appearance  of 
 wrong  to  things,  which,  upon  farther  con- 
 fideration  and  knowledge  of  their  relations 
 to  other  things,  are  found  juft  and  good  ;  fo 
 it  is  perfedly  credible,  that  the  things  ob- 
 jeded,  againft  the  wifdom  and  goodnefs  of 
 the  Chriftian  difpenfation,  may  be  rendered 
 inftances  of  wifdom  and  goodnefs,  by  their 
 reference  to  other  things  beyond  our  view : 
 becaufe  Chriftianity  is  a  fcheme  as  much 
 above  our  comprehenfion,  as  that  of  nature  ; 
 and  like  that,  a  fcheme  in  which  means  are 
 made  ufe  of  to  accomplifli  ends,  and  which, 
 as  is  moft  credible,  may  be  carried  on  by  ge- 
 neral laws.    And  it  ought  to  be  attended  to, 
 
 •  Prov.  XX.  27. 
 
 D  d  ^  that 
 
4o6  CONCLUSION.     Part  II, 
 
 that  this  is  not  an  anfvver  taken,  merely  or 
 chiefly  from  our  ignorance  ;  but  from  fome- 
 what  poiitive,  which  our  obfervation  fliews 
 us.     For,  to  hke  objedlions,  the  Hke  anfwer 
 is  experienced  to  be  juft,  in  numberlefs  paral- 
 lel cafes.     The  objecftions  againft  the  Chrifr 
 tian  difpeniation,  and  the  method  by  which 
 it  is  carried  on,  having  been  thus  obviated, 
 in  jT^eneral  and  t0P:ether;   the  chief  of  them 
 are  confidered  difhindly,  and  the  particular 
 things    objected  to   are    fhevv^n  credible,  by 
 their  perfed:  analogy,  each  apart,  to  the  con- 
 iLitution  of  nature.    Thus;  if  man  be  fallen 
 from  his  primitive  ftate,  and  to  be  reftoredj, 
 and  infinite  wdfdom  and  power  engages  in 
 accomplif]]ing  our  recovery  :  it  v/ere  to  have 
 been  expected,  it   is  faid,   that    this    fhould 
 have  been  eifedled  at  once ;   and  not  by  fuch 
 a  long  ferics  of  means,  and    fuch  a  various 
 Gjconomy  of  perfons  and  things;  one  difpen- 
 fation  preparatory  to  another,  this  to  a  farther 
 one,  and  fo  on  through  an  indefinite  number 
 of  ages,   before  the  end  of  the  fcheme  pro- 
 pofed    can    be    compleatly  accompliflied ;  a 
 fcheme  conducted    by  infinite    wifdom,  and 
 executed  by  ahnighty  pov/er.     But  now  on 
 the  contrary,  our  finding  that  every  thing  in 
 the  conflitution  and  courfe  of  nature  is  thus 
 carried  on,  fl>ews  fuch  exnedations  concern- 
 ing  revelation  to  be  highly  unreafonable ;  and 
 is  a  fatisfaclory  anfvver  to  them,  when  urged 
 as  objedions  againfc  the  credibility,  that  the 
 
 great 
 
Part  II.     CONCLUSION.  407 
 
 great  fchcme  of  providence  in  the  redemption 
 of  the  world  may  be  of  this  kind,  and  to  be 
 accompUfhed  in  this  manner.  As  to  the 
 particular  method  of  our  redemption,  the 
 appointment  of  a  Mediator  between  CJod  and 
 man  :  this  has  been  Ihevvn  to  be  moll:  obvi- 
 oufly  analogous  to  the  general  condud:  of 
 nature,  /.  e.  the  God  of  nature,  in  appoint- 
 ing others  to  be  the  inlfruments  of  his  mer- 
 cy, as  we  experience  in  the  daily  courfe  of 
 providence.  The  condition  of  this  world, 
 which  the  dodrine  of  our  redemption  by 
 Chrift  prefuppofes,  fo  much  flUls  in  with 
 natural  appearances,  that  heathen  moralifts 
 inferred  it  from  thofe  appearances  :  inferred 
 that  human  nature  was  fallen  from  its  ori- 
 ginal reditude,  and,  in  conlequence  of  this, 
 degraded  from  its  primitive  happinefs.  Or, 
 however  this  opinion  came  into  the  world, 
 thefe  appearances  muft  have  kept  up  the  tra- 
 dition, and  confirmed  the  belief  of  it.  And 
 as  it  v/as  the  general  opinion  under  the  light 
 of  nature,  that  repentance  and  reformation, 
 alone  and  by  itfelf,  wms  not  furHcicnt  to  do 
 away  fin,  and  procure  a  full  remiilion  of  the 
 penalties  annexed  to  it ;  and  as  the  reafon  of 
 the  thing  does  not  at  all  lead  to  any  fuch 
 conclufion  :  fo  every  day's  experience  fliews 
 us,  that  reformation  is  not,  in  any  fort,  fulii- 
 cient  to  prevent  the  prcknt  difad vantages 
 and  miferies,  which,  in  the  natural  courfe  of 
 things,  God  has  annexed  to  folly  and  extra- 
 D  d  4  vagancc. 
 
4o8  CONCLUSION.     Part  IL 
 
 vagance.  Yet  there  may  be  ground  to  think, 
 that  the  punifhments.  which,  by  the  general 
 laws  of  divine  government,  are  annexed  to 
 vice,  may  be  prevented :  that  provifion  may 
 have  been,  even  originally,  made,  that  they 
 ihould  be  prevented  by  fome  means  or  other, 
 though  they  could  not  by  reformation  alone, 
 For  we  have  daily  inftances  oi  Jiich  7nercy^  in 
 the  general  condudl  of  nature :  compaffion 
 provided  for  mifery  ^  medicines  for  difeafes, 
 friends  againft  enemies.  There  is  provifion 
 made,  in  the  original  conftitution  of  the 
 world,  that  much  of  the  natural  bad  confe- 
 quences  of  our  follies,  which  perfons  them- 
 felves  alone  cannot  prevent,  may  be  prevented 
 by  the  afliftance  of  others ;  alliftance,  which 
 nature  enables,  and  difpofes,  and  appoints 
 them  to  afford.  By  a  method  of  goodnefs 
 analogous  to  this,  when  the  world  lay  in 
 wickednefs  and  confequently  in  ruin,  God  fo 
 loved  the  worlds  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten 
 Son  to  fave  it:  and  he  being  .made  perfeB  by 
 Sufferings  becaine  the  author  of  eternal  f ah  at  ion 
 to  ail  them  that  obey  him  \  Indeed  neither 
 reafon  nor  analogy  would  lead  us  to  think,  in 
 particular,  that  the  interpolition  of  Chrift, 
 in  the  manner  in  which  he  did  interpofe, 
 would  be  of  that  efiicacy  for  recovery  of  the 
 world,  which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  it  was : 
 but  neither  would  reafon  nor  analogy  lead  us 
 
 *  Serm.  at  the  Rolls,  p.  io6. 
 "  Joh.  iii.  1 6.     Heb.  v.  9. 
 
 to 
 
Part  IL     C  0  NC  LUS  I  0  N. 
 
 409 
 
 to  think,  that  other  particular  means  would 
 be  of  the  efficacy,  which  experience  fliews 
 they  are,  in  nutnbcrlefs  inftances.  And  there- 
 fore, as  the  cafe  before  us  does  not  admit  of 
 experience ;  fo,  that  neither  reafon  nor  ana- 
 logy can  fliew,  how  or  in  what  particular 
 way,  the  interpofition  of  Chrift,  as  revealed 
 in  Scripture,  is  of  that  efficacy,  which  it  is 
 there  reprefented  to  be ;  this  is  no  kind  nor 
 degree  of  prefumption  againft  its  being  really 
 of  that  efficacy.  Farther:  the  objedions 
 againft  Chriftianity,  from  the  light  of  it  not 
 being  univerfal,  nor  its  evidence  fo  ftrong 
 as  might  poffibly  be  given  us,  have  been  an- 
 fwered  by  the  general  analogy  of  nature.  That 
 God  has  made  fuch  variety  of  creatures,  is 
 indeed  an  anfwer  to  the  former :  but  that  he 
 difpenfes  his  gifts  in  fuch  variety,  both  of 
 degrees  and  kinds,  amongft  creatures  of  the 
 fame  fpccies,  and  even  to  the  fame  individuals 
 at  different  times ;  is  a  more  obvious  and  full 
 anfwer  to  it.  And  it  is  fo  far  from  being 
 the  method  of  providence  in  other  cafes,  to 
 afford  us  fuch  overbearing  evidence,  as  fome 
 require  in  proof  of  Chriftianity ;  that  on  the 
 contrary,  the  evidence  upon  which  we  are 
 naturally  appointed  to  ad:  in  comon  mat- 
 ters, throughout  a  very  great  part  of  life,  is 
 doubtful  in  a  hiGrh  de2:ree.  And  admitting; 
 the  fadt,  that  God  has  afforded  to  fome,  no 
 more  than  doubtful  evidence  of  rcliirion : 
 the  fame  account  may  be  given  of  it,  as  of 
 
 difficulties 
 
4IO        CONCLUSION.       Part  II. 
 
 difficulties  and  temptations  with  regard  to 
 practice.  But  as  it  is  not  impofiible  \  furely, 
 that  this  alledged  doubtfulnefs  may  be  men's 
 own  fault :  it  deferves  their  moft  ferious  con- 
 lideration,  whether  it  be  not  fo.  However, 
 it  is  certain,  that  doubting  implies  a  degree 
 of  evidence  for  that,  of  which  we  doubt  :  and 
 that  this  degree  of  evidence,  as  really  lays 
 us  under  obligations,  as  demonflrative  evi- 
 dence. 
 
 The  w^hole  then  of  religion  is  throughout 
 credible ;  nor  is  there,  I  think,  any  thing 
 relating  to  the  revealed  difpenfation  of  things, 
 more  different  from  the  experienced  conftitu- 
 tion  and  courfe  of  nature,  than  fome  parts 
 of  the  conftitution  of  nature,  are  from  other 
 parts  of  it.  And  if  fo,  the  only  queflion 
 which  remains,  is,  what  pofitive  evidence 
 can  be  alledged  for  the  truth  of  Chriftianity. 
 This  too  in  general  has  been  confidered,  and 
 the  objedions  againft  it  eftimated.  Dedudt 
 therefore  what  is  to  be  deducted  from  that 
 evidence,  upon  account  of  any  weight  which 
 may  be  thought  to  remain  in  thefe  objedlions, 
 after  what  the  analogy  of  nature  has  fug- 
 gefted  in  anfwer  to  them  :  and  then  confider, 
 what  are  the  practical  confequences  from  all 
 this,  upon  the  moft  fceptical  principles,  one 
 can  argue  upon  :  (for  I  am  wTiting  to  perfons 
 
 ^p.  317,  &c. 
 
 who 
 
Part  II.      CONCLUSION.         4x1 
 
 who  entertain  thcfc  principles  :)  and  upon 
 fuch  confideration,  it  will  be  obvious,  that 
 immorality,  as  little  exculc  as  it  admits  of  in 
 itfelf,  is  greatly  aggravated,  in  pcrfons  who 
 have  been  made  acquainted  with  Chrillianity, 
 whether  they  believe  it,  or  not:  becaufe  the 
 moral  fyftem  of  nature,  or  natural  religion, 
 which  Chriftianity  lays  before  us,  approves 
 itfelf,  almoft  intuitively,  to  a  realonable  mind 
 upon  feeing  it  propofed.  In  the  next  place, 
 with  regard  to  Chriftianity,  it  will  be  ob- 
 ferved;  that  there  is  a  middle,  between  a 
 full  fitisfidion  of  the  truth  of  it,  and  a  fatif- 
 facflion  of  the  contrary.  The  middle  Hate 
 of  mind  between  thefe  two,  confifts  in  a  fe- 
 rious  apprehenfion,  that  it  may  be  true;  joined 
 with  doubt,  whether  it  be  fo.  And  this, 
 upon  the  beft  judgment  I  am  able  to  make, 
 is  as  far  towards  fpeculative  infidelity,  as  any 
 fceptick  can  at  all  be  fuppofed  to  go,  who 
 has  had  true  Chriftianity,  with  the  proper 
 evidence  of  it,  laid  before  him,  and  has  in 
 any  tolerable  meafure  confidered  them.  For 
 I  would  not  be  miftaken  to  comprehend  all, 
 who  have  ever  heard  of  it:  becaufe  it  feems 
 evident  that  in  many  countries,  called  Chrif- 
 tian,  neither  Chriftianity,  nor  its  evidence, 
 are  fairly  laid  before  men.  And  in  places 
 where  both  are,  there  appear  to  be  fome, 
 who  have  very  little  attended  to  either,  and 
 who  rejedl  Chriftianity  with  a  fcorn  propor- 
 tionate to  their  inattention;  and  yet  are  by 
 
 no 
 
412'    CONCLUSION.       Part  IL 
 
 no  means  without  underftanding  In  other 
 matters.  Now  it  has  been  fhewn,  that  a  fe- 
 rious  apprehenfion  that  Chriftianity  may  be 
 true,  lays  perfons  under  the  ftrideft  obhga- 
 tions  of  a  ferious  regard  to  it,  throughout 
 the  whole  of  their  life:  a  regard  not  the 
 fame  exactly,  but  in  many  refpedls  nearly 
 the  fame,  with  what  a  full  conviftion  of  its 
 truth  would  lay  them  under.  Laftly,  it 
 will  appear,  that  blafphemy  and  prophane- 
 nefs,  I  mean  with  regard  to  Chriftianity,  are 
 abfolutely  without  excufe.  For  there  is  no 
 temptation  to  it,  but  from  the  wantonnefs 
 of  vanity  or  mirth:  and  thefe,  confidering 
 the  infinite  importance  of  the  fubjed:,  are  no 
 fuch  temptations  as  to  afford  any  excufe  for 
 it.  If  this  be  a  juft  account  of  things,  and 
 yet  men  can  go  on  to  vilify  or  difregard 
 Chriftianity,  which  is  to  talk  and  adl,  as 
 if  they  had  a  demonftration  of  its  falihood; 
 there  is  no  reafon  to  think  they  would  alter 
 their  behaviour  to  any  purpofe,  though  there 
 were  a  demonftration  of  its  truth. 
 
 THE    END    OF    THE    SECOND    PART, 
 
Two  brief  DISSERTATIONS, 
 
 I.  Of  Personal  Identity, 
 IL  Of  the  Nature  g/' Virtue^ 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 JNthejirJl  copy  of  thcfe  papers  y  I  had  infer  ted 
 the  two  following  differtatiojis  into  the  chap-^ 
 tersy  Of  a  future  Life,  and^  Of  the  moral  Go- 
 vernment of  God,  with  which  they  are  clofely 
 connected.  But  as  they  do  not  direclly  fall  un- 
 der the  titlt  of  the  foregoing  Treatifcy  and  would 
 have  kept  the  fubjeSi  of  it  too  long  out  offght; 
 it  feemed  more  proper  to  place  them  by  them- 
 fehes^ 
 
[    415     ] 
 DISSERT.       I. 
 
 OfPerfonal  Identity. 
 
 TT7HETHER  we  are  to  live  in  a  iw-- 
 VV  ture  ftate,  as  it  is  the  moft  important 
 queftion  which  can  poffibly  be  afked,  fo  it 
 is  the  moft  intelligible  one  which  can  be  ex- 
 prclTed  in  language.  Yet  ftrange  perplexi- 
 ties have  been  raifed  about  the  meaning  of 
 that  identity  or  famenefs  of  perfon,  which 
 is  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  living  now 
 and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  fucceffive  mo- 
 ments. And  the  folution  of  thefe  difficulties 
 hath  been  ilronger,  than  the  difficulties  them- 
 felves.  For,  perfonal  identity  has  been  ex- 
 plained fo  by  feme,  as  to  render  the  enquiry 
 concerning  a  future  life,  of  no  confequence 
 at  all  to  us  the  perfons  who  are  making  it. 
 And  though  few  men  can  be  milled  by  fucii 
 fubtleties  -,  yet  it  may  be  proper  a  little  to 
 confider  them. 
 
 Nov/  when  it  is  afkcd,  wherein  perfonal 
 identity  confifts,  the  anfwer  ffiould  be  the 
 fame  as  if  it  wei-e  alked,  wherein  confifls 
 fimilitude  or  equality  -,  that  all  attempts  to 
 define,  would  but  perplex  it.  Yet  there  is 
 no  difficulty  at  all  in  afccrtaining  the  idea. 
 
 For 
 
41 6  Of  P erf  Olid  Identity.  Dlff.  I. 
 
 For  as,  upon  two  triangles  being  compared 
 or  viewed  together,  there  arifes  to  the  mind 
 the  idea  of  iimilitude;  or  upon  twice  two 
 and  four,  the  idea  of  equaHty:  fo  likewife, 
 upon  comparing  the  confcioufneffes  of  ones 
 felf  or  ones  own  exiftence  in  any  two  mo- 
 ments, there  as  immediately  arifes  to  the 
 mind  the  idea  of  perfonal  identity.  And  as 
 the  two  former  comparifons  not  only  give 
 us  the  ideas  of  fimihtude  and  equality j  but 
 alfo  iliew  us,  that  two  triangles  are  alike, 
 and  twice  two  and  four  are  equal :  fo  the  lat- 
 ter comparifon  not  only  gives  us  the  idea  of 
 perfonal  identity,  but  alfo  fliews  us  the  iden- 
 tity of  ourfelves  in  thofe  two  moments ;  the 
 prefent,  fuppofe,  and  that  immediately  paft ; 
 or  the  prefent,  and  that,  a  month,  a  year, 
 of  X.\NZTLty  years  paft.  Or  in  other  words,  by 
 reiledling  upon  that,  which  is  my  felf  now, 
 and  that,  which  was  my  felf  twenty  years 
 ago,  I  difcern  they  are  not  two,  but  one  and 
 the  fame  felf, 
 
 But  though  confcioufnefs  of  what  is  paft 
 does  thus  afcertain  our  perfonal  identity  to 
 ourfelves,  yet  to  fay,  that  it  makes  perfonal 
 identity,  or  is  neceffary  to  our  being  the  fame 
 perfons,  is  to  fay,  that  a  perfon  has  not  ex- 
 ift-ed  a  fingle  moment,  nor  done  one  adion, 
 bat  what  he  can  remember ;  indeed  none  but 
 what  he  reflefts  upon.  And  one  fliould  really 
 think  it  feif-evident,  that   confcioufnefs   of 
 
 perfonal 
 
our  I.  OfPerfo7ial  Identity.  417 
 
 perfonal  identity  prefuppofes,  and  therefore 
 cannot  conftitute,  perfonal  Identity;  any 
 more  than  knowledge,  in  any  other  cafe, 
 can  conftitute  truth,  which  it  prefuppofes. 
 
 This  wonderful  miftake  may  pofiibly  have 
 arifen  from  hence,  that  to  be  endued  with 
 confcioufnefs,  is  infeparable  from  the  idea  of 
 a  perfon,  or  intelligent  being.  For,  this 
 might  be  expreffed  inaccurately  thus,  that 
 confcioufnefs  makes  perfonality:  and  from 
 hence  it  might  be  concluded  to  make  perfo- 
 nal identity.  But  though  prefent  confciouf- 
 nefs of  what  we  at  prefent  do  and  feel,  is  ne- 
 ceifary  to  cur  being  the  perfon s  we  now  are; 
 yet  prefent  confcioufnefs  of  paft  actions  or 
 feelings,  is  not  neceifary  to  our  being  the  fame 
 perfon s,  who  performed  thofe  adrions  or  had 
 thofe  feelings. 
 
 The  inquiry,  what  "makes  vegetables  the 
 fame  in  the  common  acceptation  of  the 
 word,  does  not  appear  to  have  any  relation 
 to  this  of  perfonal  identity :  becaufe  the 
 word,  fayne,  when  applied  to  them  and  to 
 perfon,  is  not  only  applied  to  different  fub- 
 jedls,  but  it  is  alfo  ufed  in  different  fenfes. 
 For  when  a  man  fwcars  to  the  fame  tree,  as 
 having  ftood  fifty  years  in  the  fame  place,  he 
 means  only  the  fame  as  to  all  the  purpoies  of 
 property  and  ufes  of  common  life,  and  not 
 that   the  tree  has    been    all    that    time  the 
 
 E  e  fame 
 
41 8  Of  Terfonal  Identity.  Difl;  I. 
 
 fame  in  the  ftridl  philolbphical  fenfe  of  the 
 word.     For  he  does  not  know,  whether  any 
 one    particle   of   the    prefent   tree,    be    the 
 fame  with  any  one  particle  of  the  tree  which 
 flood  in  the  fame  place  fifty  years  ago.  And 
 if  they  have  not  one  common  particle  of  mat- 
 ter, they  cannot  be  the  fame  tree  in  the  pro- 
 per philofophick  fenfe  of  the  Vfoxdi  fame:  it 
 being  evidently  a  contradidlion  in  terms,  to 
 fay  they  are,  when  no  part  of  their  fubflance, 
 and  no  one  of  their  properties  is  the  fime:  no 
 part  of  their  fubftance,  by  the  fuppofition^ 
 no  one  of  their  properties,  becaufe  it  is  allow- 
 ed, that  the  fmie  property  cannot  be  tranf- 
 ferred  from  one  '  fubftance  to  another.     And 
 therefore  when  we  fay  the  identity  or  fame- 
 nefs  of  a  plant   confifts  in  a  continuation  of 
 the  fame  life,  communicated  under  the  fame 
 organization,  to  a   number   of  particles    of 
 matter,  whether  the  fame  or  not;  the  word 
 famey  when  applied   to  life  and  to  organiza- 
 tion, cannot  poflibly  be  underftood  to  fignify, 
 what  it  fignifies  in  this  very  fentence,  when 
 applied  to  matter.     In    a    loofe  and  popular 
 fenfe    then,   the    life    and    the    organization 
 and  the  plant  are  juftly  faid  to  be  the  fame, 
 notwithftanding  the  perpetual  change  of  the 
 parts.     But  in  a  ftri(ft  and  philofophical  man- 
 ner of  fpeech,  no  man,  no  being,  no  mode 
 of  being,    no    any- thing,  can  be    the   fame 
 with    that,  with  which  it  hath  indeed  no- 
 thing the  fame.     Now  famenefs  is  ufed  in 
 
 this 
 
Di'iT.  I.  Of  Perfo?ial  Identity.  419 
 
 this  Litter  fenfc  when  applied  to  perfons.  The 
 Identity  of  thefe,  therefore,  cannot  fubfift 
 with  diverfity  of  fubftance. 
 
 The  thing  here  confidered,  and,  dcmon- 
 ftratively,  as  I  think,  determined,  is  piopofed 
 by  Mr.  Locke  in  thefe  words.  Whether  it,  i.  e. 
 the  fame  felf  or  perfon,  be  the  fame  identical 
 fulfance?  And  he  has  fuggefted  what  is  a 
 much  better  anfwer  to  the  qaeftion,  than 
 that  which  he  gives  it  in  form.  For  he 
 defines  Perfon,  a  thinking  intelligent  beijigy 
 &c.  and  perfonal  identity,  the  famejicfs  of  a 
 rational  Being  \  The  queftion  then  is,  whe- 
 ther the  fame  rational  being  is  the  fame 
 fubftance  :  which  needs  no  anfwer,  becaufe 
 Being  and  Subftance,  in  this  place,  ftand  for 
 the  fame  idea.  The  ground  of  the  doubt, 
 whether  the  fame  perfon  be  the  fame  fub- 
 ftance, is  fiid  to  be  this;  that  the  confciouf- 
 nefs  of  our  own  exiftence,  in  youth  and 
 in  old-age,  or  in  any  two  joint  fucceffive  mo- 
 ments, is  not  the  fame  individual  a5lion '',  i.  e. 
 not  the  fame  confcioufnefs,  but  different  fuc- 
 ceffive confcioufneffes.  Now  it  is  ftrange  that 
 this  ihould  have  occafioned  fuch  perplexities. 
 For  it  is  furely  conceivable,  that  a  perfon  may 
 have  a  capacity  of  knowing  fome  objed:  or 
 other  to  be  the  fame  now,  which  it  was  when 
 
 *  Lockers  Works,  vol.  L  p.  146, 
 ^  Locke^  p.  1465  147. 
 
 E  e  «  iie 
 
420  Of  PerfonaJ  Identity.  Diff.  L 
 
 he  contemplated  it  formerly :  yet  in  this 
 cafe,  where,  by  the  fuppofition,  the  objedl 
 is  perceived  to  be  the  fame,  the  perception  of 
 it  in  any  two  moments  cannot  be  one  and  the 
 fame  perception.  And  thus,  though  the  fuc- 
 ceffive  confcioufnefles  which  we  have  of  our 
 owm  exiftence  are  not  the  fame,  yet  are  they 
 confcioufnefles  of  one  and  the  fame  thing 
 or  objed;  of  the  fame  perfon,  felf,  or  living 
 agent.  The  perfon,  of  whofe  exiftence  the 
 confcioufnefs  is  felt  now,  and  was  felt  an 
 hour  or  a  year  ago,  is  difcerned  to  be,  not 
 two  perfons,  but  one  and  the  fame  perfon  ; 
 and  therefore  is  one  and  the  fame. 
 
 Mr.  Locke's  obfervations  upon  this  fubjeft 
 appear  hafty  :  and  he  feems  to  profefs  himfelf 
 diffatisfied  with  fuppofitions,  which  he  has 
 made  relating  to  it '.  But  fome  of  thofe 
 hafty  obfervations  have  been  carried  to  a 
 ftrange  length  by  others  -,  whofe  notion, 
 when  traced  and  examined  to  the  bottom, 
 amounts,  I  thhik,  to  this  '^  :  "  that  Perfona- 
 **  lity  is  not  a  permanent,  but  a  tranfient 
 "  thing:  that  it  lives  and  dies,  begins  and 
 '*  ends  continually :  that  no  one  can  any 
 '*  more  remain  one  and  the  fame  perfon  two 
 *'  moments    together,   than    two    fucceflive 
 
 *  Locke,  p.  152. 
 
 ••  See  an  anfwer  toDr,  Clarke's  third  defence  of  his  letter 
 to  Mr.  Dodwdfy  2d  edit.  p.  44,  56,  &c. 
 
 *^  moments 
 
DiiT.  I.  Of  Perfonal  Identity.  42 1 
 
 "  moments  can  be  one  and  the  fame  mo- 
 **  ment :  that  our  llibftance  is  indeed  conti- 
 **  nually  changing;  but  whether  this  be  fo 
 "  or  not,  is,  it  feems,  nothing  to  the  purpofe  : 
 ^*  fince  it  is  not  fubftance,  but  confciouf- 
 **  nefs  alone,  which  conilitutes  perlbnaHty ; 
 "  which  confcioufnefs,  being  lucceffive,  can- 
 *'  not  be  the  lame  in  any  two  moments,  nor 
 "  confequently  the  perlbnaHty  conftituted  by 
 **  it."  And  from  hence  it  muft  follow,  that 
 it  is  a  fallacy  upon  ourfelves,  to  charge  our 
 prefent  felves  with  any  thing  we  did,  or  to 
 imagine  our  prefent  felves  interefted  in  any 
 thing  which  befel  us,  yefterday,  or  that 
 our  prefent  felf  will  be  interefted  in  what 
 will  befall  us  to-morrow:  iince  our  prefent 
 felf  is  not,  in  reality,  the  fame  with  the 
 felf  of  yefterday,  but  another  like  felf  or 
 perfon  coming  in  its  room,  and  miftaken 
 for  it  y  to  which  another  felf  will  fucceed  to- 
 morrrow.  This,  I  fay,  m.uft  follow  :  for  if 
 the  felf  or  perfon  of  to-day,  and  that  of 
 to-morrow,  are  not  the  fame,  but  only  like 
 perfons  \  the  perfon  of  to-day,  is  really  no 
 more  interefted  in  what  will  befall  the  per- 
 fon of  to-morrow,  than  in  what  will  betall 
 any  other  perfon.  It  may  be  thought  perhaps, 
 that  this  is  not  a  juft  reprefentation  ot  the 
 opinion  we  are  fpeaking  of:  becaufe  thofe 
 who  maintain  it  allow,  that  a  perfon  is  the 
 fame  as  far  back  as  his  remembrance  reaches. 
 And  indeed  they  do  ufe  the  words^  identity 
 
 E  e  3  and 
 
422  Of  Perjonal  Identity.         Diff.  I, 
 
 ^Ltidfame  perfon.  Nor  will  language  permit 
 thefe  words  to  be  laid  alide  :  fince  if  they 
 were,  there  muft  be,  I  know  not  what  ridi- 
 culous periphrafis,  fubilituted  in  the  room 
 of  them.  But  they  cannot,  confiftently  with 
 themfelves,  mean,  that  the  perfon  is  really 
 the  fame.  For,  it  is  felf- evident,  that  the 
 perfonality  cannot  be  really  the  fame,  if,  as 
 they  exprefsly  affert,  that  in  which  it  con- 
 fifts,  is  not  the  fame.  And  as,  confiftently 
 with  themfelves,  they  cannot,  io^  I  think  \% 
 appears,  they  do  not,  mean,  that  the  perfon 
 is  really  the  fame,  but  only  that  he  is  fo  in  a 
 fidlitious  fenfe  :  in  fuch  a  fenfe  only  as  they 
 aflert,  for  this  they  do  affert,  that  any  num- 
 ber of  perfons  whatever  may  be  ttje  fame 
 perfon.  The  bare  unfolding  this  notion,  and 
 laying  it  thus  naked  and  open,  feems  the 
 beft  confutation  of  it.  However,  fmce  great 
 ftrefs  is  feid  to  be  put  upon  it,  I  add  the  fol- 
 lowing things. 
 
 Firjl^  This  notion  is  abfolutely  contradic- 
 tory to  that  certain  conviction,  which  necef- 
 farily  and  every  moment  rifes  within  us,  when 
 we  turn  our  thoughts  upon  ourfelves,  when 
 we  reflecfl  upon  what  is  paft,  and  look  for- 
 ward upon  what  is  to  come.  All  imagina- 
 tion of  a  daily  change  of  that  living  agent 
 which  each  man  calls  himfelf,  for  another, 
 or  of  any  fuch  change  throughout  our  whole 
 2  prefent 
 
DiiT.  I.  Of  Perfonal  Identity.  423 
 
 prefent  life,  is  entirely  borne  down  bv  our  na- 
 tural fenfe  of  things.  Nor  is  it  polTible  for 
 a  perfon  in  his  wits,  to  alter  his  conduct, 
 with  regard  to  his  health  or  afl'airs,  from  a 
 fufpicion,  that  though  he  fliould  Hve  to-mor- 
 row, he  fliould  not,  however,  be  tlie  fame 
 perfon  he  is  to-day.  And  yet,  if  it  be  rea- 
 fonable  to  a(fl,  with  relped:  to  a  future  life, 
 upon  this  notion  that  perfonality  is  tranfient; 
 it  is  reafonable  to  acl  upon  it,  with  refpect  to 
 the  prefent.  Here  then  is  a  notion  equally 
 applicable  to  religion  and  to  our  temporal 
 concerns;  and  every  one  fees  and  feels  the 
 inexpreffible  abfurdity  of  it  in  the  latter  cafe: 
 if  therefore  any  can  take  up  with  it  in  the 
 former,  this  cannot  proceed  from  the  reafon 
 of  the  thing,  but  muft  be  owing  to  an  in- 
 ward unfairnefs,  and  fecret  corruption  of 
 heart. 
 
 Secondly,  It  is  not  an  idea,  or  abfl:ra(fl:  no- 
 tion, or  quality,  but  a  being  only,  which  is 
 capable  of  life  and  action,  of  happinefs 
 and  miiery.  Now  all  beings  confelfedly 
 continue  the  fime,  during  the  whole  time 
 of  their  exiftence.  Confider  then  a  living 
 being  now  exifling,  and  which  has  exifted 
 for  any  time  ahve:  this  living  being  muft 
 have  done  and  fuffered  and  enjoyed,  what  it 
 has  done  and  fuffered  and  enjoyed  formerly, 
 (this  living  being,  I  fay,  and  not  another,) 
 as  really  as  it  docs  and  fuffers   and  enjoys, 
 
 E  e  4  wliat 
 
424.  Of  PerfonaJ  Identify .  DiiT:  I, . 
 
 what  it  does  and  fuffers  and  enjoys  this  in- 
 ftant.  All  thefe  fucceflive  a(!?t;ions,  enjoy- 
 ments, and  fufferings,  are  adtions,  enjoy- 
 ments, and  fufferings,  of  the  fame  hving 
 being.  And  they  are  fo,  prior  to  all  confi- 
 deration  of  its  remembering  ox  forgetting} 
 fince  remembering  or  forgetting  can  make  no 
 alteration  in  the  truth  of  paft  matter  of 
 faft.  And  fuppofe  this  being  endued  with 
 limited  powers  of  knowledge  and  memory, 
 there  is  no  more  diiliculty  in  conceiving 
 it  to  have  a  power,  of  knowing  itfelf  to 
 be  the  fame  living  being  which  it  was  fome 
 time  ago,  of  remembering  fome  of  its  ac- 
 tions, fufferings,  and  enjoyments,  and  for- 
 getting others,  than  in  conceiving  it  to 
 know  or  remember  or  forget  any  thing 
 elfe. 
 
 Thirdly^  Every  perfon  is  confcious,  that 
 he  is  now  the  fame  perfon  or  fclf  he  was,  as 
 far  back  as  his  remembrance  reaches :  fmce 
 when  any  one  refleds  upon  a  paft  adiion  of 
 his  own,  he  is  juft  as  certain  of  the  perfon 
 who  did  that  aftion,  narnely,  himfelf,  the 
 perfon  who  now  reflects  upon  it,  as  he  is 
 certain  that  the  adion  was  at  all  done.  Nay 
 very  often  a  perfon 's  affurance  of  an  adion 
 having  been  done,  of  which  he  is  abfolutely 
 affurcd,  arifes  wholly  from  the  confcioufnefs 
 that  he  himfplf  did  it.     And  this  he,  perfon, 
 
 ox 
 
Difl'  I.  Of  Perfo7ial  IJenttfy.  425 
 
 or  felf,  muft  either  be  a  fubftance,  or  the 
 property  of  ibine  fubftance.  If  he,  if  per- 
 fon,  be  a  fubftance  -,  then  confcioufnefs  that 
 he  is  the  fame  pcrfon,  is  confcioufnefs  that 
 he  is  the  liime  fubftance.  If  the  perfon,  or 
 he,  be  the  property  of  a  fubftance;  ftill 
 confcioufnefs  that  he  is  the  fame  property  is 
 as  certain  a  proof  that  his  fubftance  remains 
 the  fame,  as  confcioufnefs  that  he  remains  the 
 fame  fubftance  would  be :  fince  the  fame 
 property  cannot  be  transferred  from  one  fub- 
 ftance to  another. 
 
 But  though  we  are  thus  certain,  that  we 
 are  the  fame  agents,  hving  beings,  or  fub- 
 ftances,  now,  which  we  were  as  far  back  as 
 our  remembrance  reaches;  yet  it  is  aiked, 
 whether  we  may  not  poflibly  be  deceived  in 
 it  ?  And  this  queftion  may  be  afked  at  the 
 end  of  any  demonftration  whatever :  be- 
 caufe  it  is  a  queftion  concerning  the  truth 
 of  perception  by  memory.  And  he  who 
 can  doubt,  whether  perception  by  memory 
 can  in  this  cafe  be  depended  upon,  may  doubt 
 ahb,  whether  perception  by  dedudion  and 
 reafoning,  which  alfo  include  memory,  or 
 indeed  whether  intuitive  perception  can. 
 Here  then  we  can  go  no  farther.  For  it  is 
 ridiculous  to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of 
 thofe  perceptions,  whofe  truth  we  can  no 
 otherwife  prove,  than  by  other  perceptions 
 
 of 
 
426  Of  P erf onal  Identity.         DifT.  !• 
 
 of  exacftly  the  fame  kind  with  them,  and 
 which  there  is  juft  the  fame  ground  to  fuf- 
 peft;  or  to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of 
 our  faculties,  which  can  no  otherwife  be 
 proved,  than  by  the  ufe  or  means  of  thofc 
 very  fufpedted  faculties  themfelves. 
 
 D  I  S- 
 
[     4^7     ] 
 DISSERT.     IL 
 
 Of  the  Nalure  of  Virtue. 
 
 THAT  which  renders  beings  capable  of 
 moral  government,  is  their  having  a 
 moral  nature,  and  moral  faculties  of  per- 
 ception and  of  aftion.  Brute  creatures  are 
 impreffed  and  adiuated  by  various  inftin(5ls 
 and  propenfions  :  fo  alfo  are  we.  But  addi- 
 tional to  this,  we  have  a  capacity  of  reflecting 
 upon  adlions  and  chara6lers,  and  making  them 
 an  object  to  our  thought :  and  on  doing  this, 
 we  '  naturally  and  unavoidably  approve  fome 
 adiions,  under  the  peculiar  view  of  their  being 
 virtuous  and  of  good-defert;  and  difipprove 
 others,  as  vicious  and  of  ill-defert.  That  we 
 have  this  moral  approving  and  difapproving 
 '  faculty,  is  certain  from  our  experiencing  it 
 
 *  This  way  of  fpeaking  is  taken  from  EpiSletiis  *,  and 
 js  made^ife  of  as  fecming  the  moft  full,  and  leaft  liable  to 
 cavil.  And  the  moral  faculty  may  be  underllood  to  have 
 thefe  two  epithets,  ocxi/xairTi>i«  and  a^&ob«i,owj<rTiHr;,  upon  a 
 double  account :  bec;:ufe,  upon  a  furvey  of  acSlions,  whe- 
 ther before  or  after  they  are  done,  it  determines  them  to 
 be  good  or  evil;  and  alio  becaufe  it  determines  itfclf  to  be 
 the  guide  of  action  and  of  life,  in  contradiftinction  from  all 
 other  fliculties,  or  natural  principles  of  action  :  in  the  very 
 fame  manner,  as  Ipeculative  re^fon  dintlly  and  naturally 
 judges  of  fpeculatjve  truth  and  falfhood;  and,  at  the  fame 
 time  is  attended  with  a  confcioufnefs  upon  rcfucU:v^  that 
 the  natural  right  to  judge  of  them  belongs  to  it. 
 
 f  An,  Epicl,  L.  I.  c.  I. 
 
 in 
 
428  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.      D iff.  II. 
 
 in  ourfelves,  and  recognizing  it  in  each  other. 
 It  appears  from  our  exercifing  it  unavoidably, 
 in   the  approbation  and  difapprobation  even 
 of  feigned  characters  :  from  the  words,  right 
 and  wrong,  odious  and    amiable,    bafe   and 
 worthy,  with  many  others  of  like  fignifica- 
 tion  in  all  languages,  applied  to  actions  and 
 charadlers :  from  the  many  written  fyftems  of 
 morals  which  fappofe  it ;  fmce  it  cannot  be 
 imagined,  that  all  thefe  authors,  throughout 
 all  thefe  treatifes,  had  abfolutely  no  meaning 
 at  all  to  their  words,  or  a  meaning  merely 
 chimerical :  from  our  natural  fcnfe  of  grati- 
 tude, which    implies  a  diftincftion    between 
 merely  being  the  inftrument  of  ,good,  and 
 intending  it:  from  the  like  diflinfrion,  every 
 one  makes,  between  injury  and  mere   harm, 
 which,  Hobbs  fiys,  is  peculiar  to  mankind ; 
 and   between    injury  and   juft    punifhment, 
 a  diftindtion  plainly  natural,  prior  to  the  con- 
 lideration  of  human  laws.     It    is    manifeft 
 great  part  of  common  language,  and  of  com- 
 mion  behaviour  over    the   world,  is    formed 
 upon    fuppo(ition  of  fuch  a  moral    faculty  ^ 
 whether  called  confcience,  moral  reafon,  mo- 
 ral fenfe,  or  divine  reafon  ;  whether  confider- 
 ed  as  a  fentiment  of  the  underftanding,  or  as  a 
 perception  of  the  heart,  or,  which  feems  the 
 truth,   as  including  both.      Nor  is  it  at   all 
 doubtful  in  the  general,  what  courfe  of  adtion 
 this    faculty,   or  prad^ical    difcerning  power 
 within  us,  approves,  and  what  it  disapproves. 
 
 For, 
 
Diff.  II.     Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  429 
 
 For,  as  much  as  it  has  been  difputed  wherein 
 virtue  confifts,  or  whatever  ground  for  doubt 
 there  may  be  about  particulars;  yet,  in  ge- 
 neral, there  is  in  reality  an  univerlliUy  ac- 
 knowledged ftandard  of  it.  It  is  that,  which 
 all  ages  and  all  countries  have  made  profefhon 
 of  in  publick :  it  is  that,  which  every  man 
 you  meet,  puts  on  the  Ihew  of:  it  is  that, 
 which  the  primary  and  fundamental  laws  of 
 all  civil  conflitutions,  over  the  face  of  the 
 earth,  make  it  their  bufmefs  and  endeavour 
 to  enforce  the  pradice  of  upon  mankind  : 
 namely,  juftice,  veracity,  and  regard  to  com- 
 mon good.  It  being  manifeft  then,  in  gene- 
 ral, that  we  have  fuch  a  faculty  or  difcern- 
 ment  as  this  :  it  may  be  of  ufe  to  remark 
 fome  things,  more  diftindlly,  concerning  it. 
 
 Firjly  It  ought  to  be  obferved,  that  the 
 objed;  of  this  faculty  is  a(fbions  ^  compre- 
 hending under  that  name  adlive  or  practical 
 principles  :  thofe  principles  from  which  men 
 would  adt,  if  occafions  and  circumflances 
 gave  them  power  ;  and  which,  when  fixed 
 and  habitual  in  any  perfon,  we  call,  his  cha- 
 rad:er.  It  does  not  appear,  that  brutes  have 
 the  leaft  reflex  fenfe  of  acflions,  as  diftinguiih- 
 ed  from  events  :  or  that  will  and  dcfign, 
 which  conflitute  the  very  nature  of  adlions  as 
 
 **  ivo\  Y)  apiTY]  Kixi  Kakia — iv  Triia-ei  a?^.a  ivepyHo..  M.  Au- 
 ton.  L.  g.  16.  Virtutis  laus  oinnis  in  adionc  confiftit. 
 Cic.  Off.  K  I.  c.  6. 
 
 fuch. 
 
430         Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.       DifT.  IT. 
 
 fuch,  are  at  all  an  object  to  their  perception. 
 But  to  ours  they  are :  and  they  are  the  ob- 
 jed:,  and  the  only  one,  of  the  approving  and 
 difapproving  faculty.  A6ling,  condudl,  be- 
 haviour, abftradled  from  all  regard  to  what 
 is,  in  fad:  and  event,  the  confequence  of  it,  is 
 itfelf  the  natural  objedl  of  the  moral  difcern- 
 ment ;  as  fpeculative  truth  and  falfliood  is, 
 of  fpeculative  reafon.  Intention  of  fuch  and 
 fuch  confequences,  indeed,  is  alw^ays  included; 
 for  it  is  part  of  the  aftion  itfelf:  but  though 
 the  intended  good  or  bad  confequences  do 
 not  follow,  we  have  exadly  the  fame  fenfe  of 
 the  a6lion  as  if  they  did.  In  like  manner 
 we  think  well  or  ill  of  characflers,  abftradled 
 from  all  confideration  of  the  good  or  the 
 evil,  which  perfons  of  fuch  characters  have 
 it  adually  in  their  power  to  do.  We  never, 
 in  the  moral  way,  applaud  or  blame  either 
 ourfelves  or  others,  for  what  we  enjoy  or 
 what  we  fufFer,  or  for  having  impreiiions 
 made  upon  us  which  we  confider  as  altoge- 
 ther out  of  our  power;  but  only  for  what 
 we  do,  or  would  have  done,  had  it  been  in 
 our  power;  or  for  what  we  leave  undone 
 which  we  m.ight  have  done,  or  would  have 
 left  undone  though  we  could  have  done  it. 
 
 Secondly,  Our  fenfe  or  dilcernment  of  ac- 
 tions as  morally  good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a 
 fenfe  or  difcernment  of  them  as  of  good  or 
 ill  defert.     It  may  be  difficult  to  explain  this 
 
 perception^. 
 
Diir.  II.         Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue:         43 1 
 
 perception,  lb  as  to  anfwer  all  the  queftions 
 which  may  be  afked  concerning  it:  but  every 
 one  ipeaks  of  fuch  and  luch  adions  as  de- 
 ferving  punilliment;  and  it  is  not,  I  liippofe, 
 pretended  that  they  have  abfolutcly  no  mean- 
 ing at  all  to  the  expreffion.  Now  the  mean- 
 ing plainly  is  not,  that  we  conceive  it  for  the 
 good  of  fociety,  that  the  doer  of  fuch  adlions 
 ihould  be  made  to  fuffer.  For  if  unhappily 
 it  were  refolved,  that  a  man  who,  by  fome 
 innocent  adion,  was  infected  with  the  plague, 
 lliould  be  left  to  perifh,  left,  by  other  peoples 
 coming  near  him,  the  infedlion  fliould  fpread: 
 no  one  would  fay,  he  deferved  this  treatment. 
 Innocence  and  ill-defert  are  inconfiftent  ideas. 
 Ill-defert  always  fuppofes  guilt:  and  if  one 
 be  not  part  of  the  other,  yet  they  are  evi- 
 dently and  naturally  conneded  in  our  mind. 
 The  fight  of  a  man  in  mifery  raifes  our 
 compaffion  towards  him;  and,  if  this  mifery 
 be  inflided  on  him  by  another,  our  indig- 
 nation againft  the  author  of  it.  But  when 
 we  are  informed,  that  the  fufferer  is  a  villain, 
 and  is  punilhed  only  for  his  treachery  or 
 cruelty;  our  compaffion  exceedingly  leffens, 
 and,  in  many  inftances,  our  indignation  wholly 
 fubfides.  Now  what  produces  this  effed,  is 
 the  conception  of  that  in  the  fufferer,  which 
 we  call  ill-defert.  Upon  confidering  then, 
 or  viewing  together,  our  notion  of  vice  and 
 that  of  mifery,  there  refults  a  third,  that  of 
 ill-defert.  And  thus  there  is  in  human  crea- 
 tures 
 
432       Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.       DilT.  IL 
 
 tures  an  aflbciation  of  the  two  ideas,  natural 
 and  moral  evil,  wickednefs  and  punifhment. 
 If  this  aflbciation  were  merely  artificial  or 
 accidental,  it  were  nothing:  but  being  moft 
 unqueftionably  natural,  it  greatly  concerns 
 us  to  attend  to  it,  inftead  of  endeavouring  to 
 explain  it  away* 
 
 It  may  be  obferved  farther,  concerning  our 
 perception  of  good  and  of  ill  deiert,  that  the 
 former  is  very  weak  with  refped:  to  common 
 inftances  of  virtue.  One  reafon  of  which 
 may  be,  that  it  does  not  appear  to  a  fpedlator, 
 how  far  fuch  inftances  of  virtue  proceed  from 
 a  virtuous  principle,  or  in  what  degree  this 
 principle  is  prevalent:  fi nee  a  very  weak  re- 
 gard to  virtue  may  be  fufficicnt  to  make  men 
 aft  well  in  many  common  inftances.  And 
 on  the  other  hand,  our  perception  of  ill-defert 
 in  vicious  adions  leflens,  in  proportion  to 
 the  temjptations  men  are  thought  to  have 
 had  to  fuch  vices.  For,  vice  in  human  crea- 
 tures confifting  chiefly  in  the  abfence  or  want 
 of  the  virtuous  principle;  though  a  man  be 
 overcome,  fuppofe,  by  tortures^  it  does  not 
 from  thence  appear,  to  what  degree  the  virtu- 
 ous principle  was  v/anting.  All  that  appears 
 is,  that  he  had  it  not  in  fuch  a  degree,  as 
 to  prevail  over  the  temptation :  but  poflibly 
 he  had  it  in  a  degree,  which  would  have 
 rendered  him  proof  againft  common  temp- 
 tations, 
 
 7  ^birdlyy 
 
Diff.  II.       Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.         433 
 
 Thirdly y  Our  perception  of  vice  and  ill- 
 defert  arifes  from,  and  is  the  refill t  of,  a 
 comparifon  of  actions  with  the  nature  and 
 capacities  of  the  agent.  For,  the  mere  neg- 
 lect of  doing  what  we  ought  to  do,  would, 
 in  many  cafes,  be  determined  by  all  men  to 
 be  in  the  higheft  degree  vicious.  And  this 
 determination  muft  arife  from  fuch  compa- 
 rifon and  be  the  refult  of  it ;  becaufe  fuch 
 negled  would  not  be  vicious  in  creatures  of 
 other  natures  and  capacities,  as  brutes.  And 
 it  is  the  fame  alfo  with  refpedl  to  pofitive 
 vices,  or  fuch  as  confift  in  doing  what  we 
 ought  not.  For,  every  one  has  a  different 
 feafe  of  harm  done  by  an  idiot,  madman  or 
 child,  and  by  one  of  mature  and  common 
 underftanding ;  though  the  adlion  of  both, 
 including  the  intention  which  is  part  of  the 
 adlion,  be  the  fame  :  as  it  may  be,  fince  idiots 
 aod  madmen,  as  well  as  children,  are  capable 
 not  only  of  doing  mifchief,  but  alfo  of  in- 
 tending it.  Now  this  difference  muft  arife 
 from  fomewh^t  difcerned  in  the  nature  or 
 capacities  of  one,  which  renders  the  adion 
 vicious;  and  the  want  of  which  in  the  other, 
 renders  the  fame  ad:ion  innocent  or  It-fs  vi* 
 cious  :  and  this  plainly  fuppofes  a  comparifon, 
 whether  rcfleded  upon  or  not,  between  the 
 acftion  and  capacities  of  the  agent,  previous 
 to  our  determining  an  adlion  to  be  vicious. 
 And  hence  arifes  a  proper  application  of  the 
 epithets,  incongruous,  unfuitable,  difpropor- 
 
 F   f  ticnate,^ 
 
434  0/  ^^^  Nature  of  Virtue.     Diff,  II. 
 
 tionate,  unfit,  to  actions  which  our  moral  fa- 
 culty determines  to  be  vicious. 
 
 Fourthly^  It  deferves  to  be  confidered, 
 whether  men  are  more  at  liberty,  in  point  of 
 morals,  to  make  themfelves  miferable  without 
 rcafon,  than  to  make  other  people  fo  :  or 
 diffolutely  to  negleft  their  own  greater  good, 
 for  the  fake  of  a  prefent  lefier  gratification, 
 than  they  are  to  negled:  the  good  of  others, 
 whom  nature  has  committed  to  their  care. 
 It  fhould  feem,  that  a  due  concern  about  our 
 own  interert  or  happinefs,  and  a  reafonable 
 endeavour  to  fccure  and  promote  it,  which 
 is,  I  think,  very  much  the  meaning  of  the 
 word,  prudence,  in  our  language;  it  fhould 
 feem,  that  this  is  virtue,  and  the  contrary  be- 
 haviour faulty  and  blameable  :  iince,  in  the 
 calmeft  way  of  refled:ion,  we  approve  of  the 
 firft,  and  condemn  the  other  condudt,  both 
 in  ourfelves  and  others*  This  approbation 
 and  difapprobation  are  altogether  different 
 from  mere  defire  of  our  own,  or  of  their 
 happinefs,  and  from  forrow  upon  miffing  it. 
 For  the  objeft  or  occafion  of  this  laft  kind 
 of  perception,  is  fatisfaclion  or  uneafmefs : 
 whereas  the  objed:  of  the  firft  is  adive  be- 
 haviour. In  one  cafe,  what  our  thoughts  fix 
 upon,  is  our  condition  :  in  the  other,  our 
 condud.  It  is  true  indeed,  that  nature  has 
 not  given  us  fo  fcnfible  a  difapprobation  of 
 imprudence  and  folly,  either  in  ourfelves  or 
 
 others. 
 
DifT.  II.     Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  43  5 
 
 others,  as  of  falfhood,  injuflice  and  cruelty: 
 J  fuppofe,  bccaufe  that  conilant  habitual  i^nio:. 
 of  private  intereft  and  good,  which  we  always 
 carry  about  with  us,    renders  fuch   fcnlible 
 difapprobation  lefs  ncccffary,  lefs  wanting,  to 
 keep  us  from  imprudcnty  negleding  our  own 
 happinefs,    and   foolifhiy   injuring  ourfclves, 
 than  it  is  neceifary  and  wanting  to  keep  us 
 from  injuring  others,  to  whofe  ^ood  we  can- 
 not have  fo  ftrong  and  conftant  a  regard  :  and 
 alfo  becaufe  imprudence  and  folly,  appearing  to 
 bring  its  own  punilhment  more  in.mediacely 
 and  conftantly  than  injurious  behaviour,   it 
 lefs  needs  the  additional  punifhment,  which 
 would  be  inflidied  upon  it  by  others,  had  they 
 the  fame  fenfible  indignation  againfl:   it,  as 
 againii  injuflice  and  fraud  and  cruelty.     Be- 
 fides,  unhappinefs  being  in  itfeif  the  natural 
 objedl  of  coinpatlion  ;  the  unhappinefs  which 
 people   bring  upon  themfelves,  though  it  be 
 wilfully,  excites  in  us  fome  pity  for  them ; 
 and    this    of  courfe    lellens    our   dilpleafure 
 againfl  th^m.     But  ilill  it   is  matter  of  ex- 
 perience, that  we  are  formed  fo,  as  to  refled: 
 very  feverely  upon  the  greater  inflances   of 
 imprudent  negleds  and  foolifh  rafhnefs,  both 
 in  oarfelves  and  others.     In  inflances  of  this 
 kind,  men  often  fay  of  themfelves  with  re- 
 morfe,  and  of  others  with  fome  indignation, 
 that  they  deferved  to  fuffer  fuch  calamities, 
 becaufe  they  brought  them  upon  themfelves, 
 and  would  not   take  warning.     ParticuLirly 
 
 F  f  2  when 
 
43  6  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.     DifT.  II. 
 
 when  perfons  come  to  poverty  and  diftrefs  by 
 a  long  courfe  of  extravagance,  and  after  fre- 
 quent admonitions,  though  w^ithout  falfhood 
 or  injuftice;  we  plainly  do  not  regard  fuch 
 people,  as  alike  objects  of  compaffion  with 
 thofe,  who  arc  brought  into  the  fame  con- 
 dition by  unavoidable  accidents.  From  thefe 
 things  it  appears,  that  prudence  is  a  fpecies 
 of  virtue,  and  folly  of  vice  :  meaning  hyfolly^ 
 fomewhat  quite  different  from  mere  incapa- 
 city ;  a  thoughtlefs  want  of  that  regard  and 
 attention  to  our  own  happinefs,  which  we 
 had  capacity  for.  And  this  the  word  pro- 
 perly includes ;  and,  as  it  feems,  in  its  ufual 
 acceptation  :  for  we  fcarce  apply  it  to  brute 
 creatures. 
 
 However,  if  any  perfon  be  difpofed  to  dif- 
 pute  the  matter,  I  fliall  very  willingly  give 
 him  up  the  words  Virtue  and  Vice,  as  not 
 applicable  to  prudence  and  folly :  but  mufl 
 beg  leave  to  infift,  that  the  faculty  within  us^ 
 which  is  the  judge  of  aftions,  approves  of 
 prudent  aftions,  and  difapproves  imprudent 
 ones  j  I  fay  prudent  and  imprudent  anions 
 as  fuch,  and  confidered  di(lin6tly  from  the 
 happinefs  or  mifry  which  they  occafion* 
 And  by  the  way,  this  obfervation  may  help 
 to  determine,  what  iuftnefs  there  is  in  that 
 objedion  againft  religion,  that  it  teaches  us 
 to  be  interelled  and  felfifh. 
 
 Fifthly, 
 
DifT.  II.     Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  437 
 
 Fifthly,  Without  inquiring  how  flu*,  and 
 in  what  fenfe,  virtue  is  refolvahle  into  be- 
 nevolence, and  vice  into  the  want  of  it;  it 
 may  be  proper  to  obferve,  that  benevolence 
 and  the  want  of  it,  fingly  confidered,  are  in 
 no  fort  the  whole  of  virtue  and  vice.    For 
 if  this  were  the  cafe,  in  the  review  of  one's 
 own  character  or    that  of  others,  our  mo- 
 ral underftanding  and  moral  fenfe  would  be 
 indifferent  to  every  thing,  but  the  degrees 
 in  which  benevolence  prevailed,  and  the  de- 
 grees in  which  it  was  wanting*    That  is,  we 
 fliould    neither    approve  of  benevolence    to 
 fome  perfons  rather  than  to  others,  nor  dif- 
 approve  injuftice  and  fahliood  upon  any  other 
 account,  than   merely  as  an  overbalance  of 
 happinefs  was  forefeen  likely  to  be  produced 
 by  the  firft,  and  of  mifery   by  the  fccond. 
 But  now  on  the  contrary,  fuppofe  two  men 
 competitors  for  any  thing  whatever,  which 
 would  be  of  equal  advantage  to  each  of  them: 
 though  nothing  indeed  would  be  more  im- 
 pertinent, than  for  a  ftranger  to  bufy  him- 
 felf  to  get  one  of  them  preferred  to  the  other; 
 yet  fuch  endeavour  would  be  virtue,  in  behalf 
 of  a  friend  or  benefador,  abflraded  from  all 
 conlideration    of  diflant    confequences :    as 
 that  examples   of  gratitude,  and  the  culti- 
 vation of  friendfliip,    would    be  of   general 
 good   to    the    world.     Again,    fuppofe    one 
 man  fhould,  by   fraud  or  violence,  take  from 
 another  the  fruit  of  his  labour,  with  intent 
 Ff  3  to 
 
438  0/  the  Nature  of  Virtue.     Diff.  11. 
 
 to  give  It  to  a  third,  who,  he  thought,  would 
 have  as  much  pleafure  from  it,  as  would  ba- 
 lance the  pleafure  which  the  firft  pofleiTor 
 would  have  had  in  the  enjoyment,  and  his 
 vexation  in  the  lofs  of  it;  fuppofe  alfo  that 
 no  bad  confequences  would  follow:  yet  fuch 
 an  a6lion  would  furely  be  vicious.  Nay  far- 
 ther, were  treachery,  violence  and  injuftice, 
 no  otherwife  vicious,  than  as  forefeen  likely 
 to  produce  an  overbalance  of  mifery  to  fo- 
 ciety;  then,  if  in  any  cafe  a  man  could  pro- 
 cure to  himfelf  as  great  advantage  by  an  ad: 
 of  injuftice,  as  the  v/hole  forefeen  inconve- 
 nience, likely  to  be  brought  upon  others  by  it, 
 would  amount  to;  fuch  a  piece  of  injuftice 
 would  not  be  faulty  or  vicious  at  all:  becaufe 
 it  would  be  no  more  than,  in  any  other  cafe, 
 for  a  man  to  prefer  his  own  fatisfaction  to 
 another's  in  equal  degrees.  The  fad;  then 
 appears  \.o  be,  that  we  are  conftituted  fo,  as 
 to  condemn  falihood,  unprovoked  violence, 
 injuftice,  and  to  approve  of  benevolence  >to 
 fome  preferably  to  others,  abftraded  from  all 
 confideration,  which  condud:  is  likelieft  to 
 produce  an  overbalance  of  happinefs  or  mi- 
 fery. And  therefore,  were  the  Author  of  na- 
 ture to  propofe  nothing  to  himfelf  as  an  end 
 but  the  produdion  of  happinefs,  were  his 
 moral  charader  merely  thai  of  benevolence ; 
 yet  ours  is  not  fo.  Upon  that  fuppofition 
 indeed,  the  only  reafon  of  his  giving  us  the 
 abovementioned  approbation  of  benevolence 
 8  to 
 
DlfT.  II.     Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  439 
 
 to  fome  perfons  rather  than  others,  and  difap- 
 probation  of  falfliood,  unprovoked  violence, 
 and  injuftice,  muft  be,  that  he  forefaw,  this 
 conftitution  of  our  nature  would  produce 
 more  happinefs,  than  forming  us  with  a  tem- 
 per of  more  general  benevolence.  But  ftill 
 fince  this  is  our  conflitution ;  falfhood,  vio- 
 lence, injuftice,  muft  be  vice  in  us,  and  be- 
 nevolence to  fome  preferably  to  others,  vir- 
 tue; abftrafted  from  all  confidcration  of  the 
 overbalance  of  evil  or  good,  which  they  may 
 appear  likely  to  produce. 
 
 Now  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with 
 fuch  a  moral  nature  as  we  have  been  explain- 
 ing, or  with  a  moral  faculty,  the  natural  ob- 
 jed:  of  which  is  aftions:  moral  government 
 muft  confift,  in  rendering  them  happy  and 
 unhappy,  in  rewarding  and  punifliing  them, 
 as  they  follow,  negled,  or  depart  from,  the 
 moral  rule  of  adion  interwoven  in  their  na- 
 ture, or  fuggefted  and  enforced  by  this  moral 
 faculty';  in  rewarding  and  puniflnng  them 
 upon  account  of  their  fo  doing. 
 
 I  am  not  fenfible,  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth 
 obfervation,  contradicted  vi^hat  any  author 
 defigned  to  alTert.  But  fome  of  great  and 
 diftinguiflied  merit,  have,  I  think,  expreffcd 
 themfelves  in  a  manner;  which  may  occafion 
 
 p,  164. 
 F  f  4  fome 
 
440  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.      DilT.  II. 
 
 fome  danger,  to  carelefs  readers,  of  imagin- 
 ing the  whole  of  virtue  to  confift  in  fingly 
 aiming,  according  to  the  beft  of  their  judg- 
 ment, at  promoting  the  happinefs  of  man- 
 kind in  the  prefent  ftate^  and  the  whole  of 
 vice,  in  doing  what  they  forefee,  or  might 
 forefee,  is  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of 
 unhappinefs  in  it:  than  which  miftakes, 
 none  can  be  conceived  more  terrible.  For  it 
 is  certain  that  fome  of  the  moft  fhocking 
 inftances  of  injuftice,  adultery,  murder,  per- 
 jury, and  even  of  perfecution,  may,  in  many 
 fuppofable  cafes,  not  have  the  appearance 
 of  being  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance 
 of  mifery  in  the  prefent  ftate ;  perhaps  fome- 
 times  may  have  the  contrary  appearance. 
 For  this  reflection  might  eafily  be  carried  on, 
 
 but  I  forbear The  happinefs  of  the  world 
 
 is  the  concern  of  him,  who  is  the  lord  and 
 the  proprietor  of  it :  nor  do  we  know  what 
 we  are  about,  when  we  endeavour  to  pro- 
 mote the  good  of  mankind  in  any  ways,  but 
 thofe  which  he  has  direfted;  that  is  indeed 
 in  all  ways,  not  contrary  to  veracity  and  juf- 
 tice.  I  fpeak  thus  upon  fuppofition  of  per- 
 fons  really  endeavouring,  in  fome  fort,  to  do 
 good  without  regard  to  thefe.  But  the  truth 
 feems  to  be,  that  fuch  fuppofed  endeavours 
 proceed,  almoft  always,  from  ambition,  the 
 Ipirit  of  party,  or  fome  indiredl  principle, 
 concealed  perhaps  in  great  meafure  from  per- 
 fons  themfelves.     And  though  it  is  our  bu- 
 
 fine(s 
 
DilT.  II.     Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  441 
 
 finefs  and  our  duty  to  endeavour,  witliln  the 
 bounds  of  veracity  and  julHce,  to  contribute 
 to  the  eafe,  convenience,  and  even  chearful- 
 nefs  and  diverfion  of  our  fellow-creatures  : 
 yet  from  our  fliort  views,  it  is  greatly  uncer- 
 tain, whether  this  endeavour  will,  in  particu- 
 lar inftances,  produce  an  overbalance  of  hap- 
 pinefs  upon  the  whole ;  fince  fo  many  and 
 diftant  things  mufl  come  into  the  account. 
 And  that  which  makes  it  our  duty,  is,  that 
 there  is  fome  appearance  that  it  will,  and  no 
 pofitive  appearance  fufficient  to  balance  this, 
 on  the  contrary  fide;  and  alfo,  that  fuch 
 benevolent  endeavour  is  a  cultivation  of  that 
 moft  excellent  of  all  virtuous  principles,  the 
 adive  principle  of  benevolence. 
 
 However,  though  veracity,  as  well  as  juf- 
 tice,  is  to  be  our  rule  of  life ;  it  mud  be 
 added,  otherwife  a  fnare  will  be  laid  in  the 
 way  of  fome  plain  men,  that  the  ufe  of  com- 
 mon forms  of  fpeech  generally  underftood, 
 cannot  be  faUhood ;  and,  in  general,  that  there 
 can  be  no  defio:ned  falfhood  without  defiorn- 
 ing  to  deceive.  It  mufl  likewife  be  obfer- 
 ved,  that  in  numberlefs  cafes,  a  man  may  be 
 under  the  ftricfleft  obligations  to  what  he 
 forefees  will  deceive,  without  his  intending 
 it.  For  it  is  impoflible  not  to  forefce,  that 
 the  words  and  actions  of  men  in  different 
 ranks  and  employm^ents,  and  of  different  edu- 
 cations. 
 
44^  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.     DiC  IL 
 
 cations,  will  perpetually  be  miftaken  by  each 
 other :  and  it  cannot  but  be  fo,  whilft  they 
 will  judge  with  the  utmoft  careleffnefs,  as 
 they  daily  do,  of  what  they  are  not,  perhaps, 
 eiiough  informed  to  be  competent  judges  of, 
 even  though  they  confidered  it  with  great 
 attention. 
 
 Publijhed^  by  the  fame  Author^ 
 
 In  One  Volume,  06lavo,  Price  Six  Shillings,  bound, 
 
 FIFTEEN       SERMONS, 
 
 Preached  at  the  E.olls  Chapel: 
 To  which  are  added, 
 
 SIX     SERMONS,    on  Public  Occafions. 
 
A 
 
 CHARGE 
 
 DELIVERED    TO    THE 
 
 CLERGY 
 
 AT    THE 
 
 PRIMARY    VISITATION   OF  THE  DIOCESE   OF    DURHAM, 
 IN    THE    YEAR    M,DCC.LI> 
 
 BY     THE    RIGHT    REVEREND    FATHER    IN    COD 
 
 yOJSEPH     BUTLER,    LL.p. 
 
 THEN  LORD  BISHOP  OF  T  H^T  DIOCESE. 
 
 WITH      NOTES, 
 
 Containing  a  Defence  of  the  Charge  againll  the  Obie6\ions  of  a» 
 Anonymous  Writer, 
 
 By       THE       EDITOR. 
 
:li 
 
CHARGE 
 
 DELIVERED    TO   THE 
 
 CLERGY,       G?r.  ^ 
 
 IT  is  impoffible  for  me,  my  brethren, 
 upon  our  firft  meeting  of  this  kind,  to 
 forbear  lamenting  with  you  the  general  de- 
 cay of  religion  in  this  nation ;  which  is  now 
 obferved  by  everyone,  and  has  been  for  fomc 
 time  the  complaint  of  all  ferious  perlbns. 
 The  influence  of  it  is  more  and  more  wear- 
 ing out  of  the  minds  of  men,  even  of  thofe 
 who  do  not  pretend  to  enter  into  fpecula- 
 
 *  The  publication  of  Bifhop  Butler's  Charge,  in  the 
 year  1751,  was  followed  by  a  Pamphlet,  printed  in  1752, 
 entitled  A  Serious  Enquiry  vito  the  Ufe  and  Importance  of 
 External  Religion^  occajloned  by  fome  Pajfages  in  the  Right 
 Reverend  the  Lord  Bijhop  of  Durham's  Charge  to  the  Clergy 
 of  that  Diocefe^  Sic,  humbly  addrejpd  to  his  Lordjhip,  This 
 ramphlct  has  been  reprinted  in  a  mifcellaneous  work: 
 fuch  parts  of  it,  as  feemed  moft  worthy  of  obfervation,  the 
 reader  will  find  in  the  Notes  fubjoined  to  thofe  pailages  of 
 tlje  Charge,  to  which  the  i^amphlet  refers, 
 
 tion<; 
 
44^  Charge  to  the 
 
 tions  upon  the  fabjeft:  but  the  number  of. 
 thofe  who  do,  and  who  profefs  thcmfelves 
 unbelievers,  increafes,  and  with  their  num- 
 bers their  zeal*  Zeal,  'tis  natural  to  afk — » 
 for"  what  ?  Why  truly yjr  nothing,  but  againjl 
 every  thing  that  is  good  and  facred  amongft 
 us. 
 
 Indeed,  whatever  efforts  are  made  againft 
 our  /eljgion,  no  Chriftian  can  poffibly  de- 
 fpair  of  it.  For  He,  who  has  all  power  in 
 heaven  and  earth,  has  promifed,  that  he  will 
 be  with  lis  to  the  end  of  the  world.  Nor  can 
 the  prefent  decline  of  it  be  any  ftumbling- 
 block  to  fuch  as  are  confiderate;  fince  he 
 himfelf  has  fo  ftrongly  exprefied  what  is  as 
 remarkably  predi(5ted  in  other  paiTages  of 
 Scripture,  the  great  defedrion  from  his  re- 
 ligion which  fhould  be  in  the  latter  davs,  by 
 that  prophetic  queftion.  When  the  Son  of 
 Man  comet  h,  Jhall  he  find  faith  upon  the  earth? 
 How  near  this  time  is,  God  only  knows; 
 but  this  kind  of  fcripture  figns  of  it  is  too 
 apparent.  For  as  different  ages  have  been 
 diftinguifhed  by  different  forts  of  particular 
 errors  and  vices,  the  deplorable  diftindlion 
 of  ours  is  an  avowed  fcorn  of  religion  in 
 fome,  and  a  growing  difregard  to  it  in  the 
 generality. 
 
 As  to  the  profeffed  enemies  of  religion, 
 I    know  not  how  often  they  may  come  in 
 your  way;  but  often  enough,  I  fear,  in  the 
 way  of  fome  at  leaft  amongft  you,  to  re- 
 quire 
 
Clergy  of  Dtirhaniy  175 1.  447 
 
 quire  confideration,  what  is  the  proper  be- 
 haviour towards  them.  One  would  to  be 
 fure  avoid  great  famiharities  with  thefe  per- 
 fons;  efpecially  if  they  affcd:  to  be  hcen- 
 tious  and  profane  in  their  common  talk. 
 Yet  if  you  fall  into  their  company,  treat 
 them  with  the  regards  which  belong  to  their 
 rank;  for  fo  we  muft  people  who  are  vicious 
 in  any  other  refpedl.  We  iliould  itudy  what 
 St.  JameSy  with  wonderful  elegance  and  ex- 
 preffivenefs,  calls  meeknefs  of  wfJofn,  in  our 
 behaviour  towards  all  men;  but  more  efpe- 
 cially towards  thefe  men:  not  fo  much  as 
 being  what  we  owe  to  them,  but  to  our- 
 felves  and  our  religion;  that  we  may  adorn 
 the  doBrine  of  God  our  Saviour,  in  our  car- 
 riage towards  thofe  who  labour  to  viHfy 
 it. 
 
 For  difcourfe  with  them;  tlie  caution 
 commonly  given,  not  to  attempt  anfwering 
 objecftions  which  v/e  have  not  confidered,  is 
 certainly  juft.  Nor  need  any  one  in  a  par- 
 ticular cafe  be  afhamed  frankly  to  acknow- 
 ledge his  ignorance,  provided  it  be  not  ge- 
 neral. And  though  il  w^ere,  to  talk  of  what 
 he  is  not  acquainted  with,  is  a  dangerous 
 method  of  endeavouring  to  conceal  it.  But 
 a  confiderate  perfon,  however  qualified  he  be 
 to  defend  his  religion,  and  anfvvcr  the  ob- 
 jeffions  he  hears  made  againft  it,  may  fome- 
 times  fee  cauf:  to  decline  that  office.  Scep- 
 tical and  protane  men  are  ex^trcmely  apt  to 
 
 brin;^ 
 
448  Charge  to  the 
 
 bring  up  this  fubjedl  at  meetings  ojf  entef-^ 
 tainment,  and  fuch  as  are  of  the  freer  fort- 
 innocent  ones,  I  mean,  othervvife  I  fliould 
 not  fuppofe  you  would  be  prefent  at  them. 
 Now  religion  is  by  far  too  ferious  a  matter 
 to  be  the  hackney  fubjeft  upon  thefe  occa- 
 fions.  And  by  preventing  its  being  made 
 fo,  you  will  better  fecure  the  reverence  which 
 is  due  to  it,  than  by  entering  into  its  de- 
 fence. Every  one  obferves,  that  men's  hav- 
 ing examples  of  vice  often  before  their  eyes, 
 familiarifes  it  to  the  mind,  and  has  a  ten- 
 dency to  take  off  that  juft  abhorrence  of  it 
 which  the  innocent  at  firft  felt,  even  though 
 it  fliould  not  alter  their  judgment  of  vice,  or 
 make  them  really  believe  it  to  be  lefs  evil  or 
 dangerous.  In  like  manner,  the  hearing  re- 
 ligion often  difputed  about  in  light  familiar 
 converfatibn,  has  a  tendency  to  leffen  that 
 facred  regard  to  it,  which  a  good  man  would 
 endeavour  always  to  keep  up,  both  in  him- 
 felf  and  others.  But  this  is  not  all:  people 
 are  too  apt  jnconfiderately  to  take  for  grant- 
 ed, that  things  are  really  queftionable,  be- 
 caufe  they  hear  them  often  difputed.  This 
 indeed  is  fo  far  from  being  a  confequence, 
 that  we  know  dem.onfl;rated  truths  have  been 
 difputed,  and  even  matters  of  fad,  the  ob- 
 je<5ts  of  our  fcnfes.  But  were  it  a  confe- 
 quence, were  the  evidence  of  religion  no 
 more  than  doubtful,  then  it  ought  not  to  be 
 concluded  falfe  any  more  than  true,  nor  de- 
 nied 
 
Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.         449 
 
 nied  any  more  than  affirmed^  for  llifpcnce 
 would  be  the  reafonable  ftate  of  mind  with 
 regard  to  it.  And  tlicn  it  ought  in  all  rea-» 
 fon,  confidering  its  infinite  importance,  to 
 have  nearly  the  fame  intlucnce  upon  pra6lice, 
 as  if  it  were  thoroughly  believed.  For  would 
 It  not  be  madnefs  for  a  man  to  forfake  a  lafe 
 road,  and  prefer  to  it  one  in  which  he  ac- 
 knowledges there  is  an  even  chance  he  fhould 
 lofe  his  life,  though  there  were  an  even 
 chance  likewife  of  his  getting  fafe  through 
 It  ?  Yet  there  are  people  abfurd  enough,  to 
 take  the  fuppofed  doubtfuln^fs  of  religion 
 for  the  fame  thing  as  a  proof  of  its  falfe- 
 hood,  after  they  have  concluded  it  doubtful 
 from  hearing  it  often  ca-lcd  in  queftion. 
 This  flicws  how  infinitely  unreafonable  fccp- 
 tical  men  are,  with  regard  to  religion,  and 
 that  they  really  lay  aiide  their  reafon  upon 
 this  luhje6l  as  much  as  the  moft  extravagant 
 enthufiafts.  But  further,  cavilling  and  ob- 
 jecting upon  any  fabjed  is  mu^h  aficr  than 
 clearing  up^  ditticuities:  and  this  Lft  part 
 will  always  be  put  upon  the  defenders  of  re^ 
 ligion.  Now  a  muii  may  b^  fuJiv  convinced 
 of  the  truth  of  a  matter,  and  upon  the 
 flrongcfl  rcafons,  and  yet  not  be  able  to 
 anfwer  all  the  diiiiculties  which  may  be  raifcd 
 upon  it. 
 
 Then  again,  the  general  evidence  of  reli- 
 gion is  complex  and  various.     It  confifts  of 
 a  long  feries  of  things,  one  preparatory  to 
 G  2  and 
 
4.50  Charge  to  the 
 
 and  confirming  another,  from  the  very  be- 
 ginning of  the  world  to  the  prefent  time. 
 And  'tis  eafy  to  fee  how  impoffible  it  muft 
 be,  in  a  curfory  converfition,  to  unite  all 
 this  into  one  argument,  and  reprefent  it  as 
 it  ought;  and,  could  it  be  done,  how  ut- 
 terly indifpofed  people  would  be  to  attend  to 
 it— I  fay  in  a  curfory  converfation:  where- 
 as unronnedled  objections  are  thrown  out  in 
 a  few  words,  and  are  eafily  apprehended, 
 without  more  attention  than  is  ufual  in 
 common  talk.  So  that,  not  with  (landing  we 
 have  the  beft  caufe  in  the  world,  and  though 
 a  man  were  very  capable  of  defending  it, 
 yet  I  know  not  why  he  fhould  be  forward 
 to  undertake  it  upon  fo  great  a  difadvantage, 
 and  to  fo  little  good  effed:,  as  it  muft  be 
 done  amidft  the  gaiety  and  careleflhefs  of 
 common  converfation. 
 
 But  then  it  will  be  neceifary  to  be  very 
 particularly  upon  your  guard,  that  you  may 
 noifeemy  by  way  of  compliance,  to  join  in 
 with  any  levity  of  difcourfe  refpefting  re- 
 ligion. Nor  would  one  let  any  pretended 
 argument  againft  it  pafs  entirely  without  no- 
 tice; nor  any  grofs  ribaldry  upon  it,  with- 
 out exprefiing  our  thorough  difapprobation. 
 This  laft  may  fome times  be  done  by  filence; 
 for  filence  fometimes  is  very  expreffive;  as 
 was  tliat  of  ourbleiTed  Saviour  before  the 
 Sa?2hedrhny  and  before  Pilate.  Or  it  may  be 
 done  by  obferving  mildly,  that  religion  deferves 
 
 another 
 
Clergy  of  Durham ^   1751.  451 
 
 another  fort  of  treatment,  or  a  more  thorough 
 confideration  than  fuch  a  time,  or  fuch  cir- 
 cumftances  admit.     However,  as   it  is  ab- 
 folutely  neccflliry,  that  we  take  care,  by  di- 
 ligent reading  and  ftudy,  to  be  always  pre- 
 pared, to  be  ready  always  to  give  an  ajijhver 
 to  every  man  that  ajketh  a  reajon  of  the  hope 
 that  is  in  us-,  fo  there  may  be  occafioiiS  when 
 it  will  highly  become    us    to  do    it.     And 
 then  we  muft  take  care  to  do  it  in  the  fpi- 
 rit  which  the    apoftle  requires,  with  meek- 
 ?iefs  and  fear  * ;    meeknefs  towards  thofe  who 
 give  occafions  for  entering  into  the  defence 
 of  our  religion  ;  and  withy^^r,  not  of  them, 
 but  of  God ;  with  that  reverential  fear,  which 
 the  nature  of  religion  requires,  and  which  is 
 fo  far  from  being  inconliftent  with,  that  it 
 will    infpire    proper  courage   towards   men. 
 Now  this  reverential  fear  will  lead  us  to  in- 
 fill ftrongly  upon  the  infiinte    greatnefs  of 
 God's  fcheme  of  government,  both  in  extent 
 and  duration,  together  with  the   wife  con- 
 nexion of  its  parts,  and  the  impoffibility  of 
 accounting  fully  for  the  feveral  parts,  with- 
 out feeing  the  whole  plan  of  Providence  to 
 which  they  relate;  which  is  beyond  the  ut- 
 moft  ftretch  of  our  underftanding.     And  to 
 all  this  muft  be  added  the  ncceffary  dcficii:ncy 
 of  human  language,  when  things  divine  are 
 the  fubjedt  of  it.     Thefe  obfervations  are  a 
 
 •  1  Pet.  iii.  15. 
 
 G  g  2  proper 
 
45  2  Charge  to  the 
 
 proper  full  anfwer  to  many  objedlons,  aad 
 very  material  with  regard  to  all. 
 
 But  your  {landing  buiinefs,  and  which  re- 
 quires conftant  attention,  is  with  the  body 
 of  the  people ;  to  revive  in  them  the  fpirit 
 of  reli2;ion    which    is    fo    much    declining. 
 And  it  may  feem,  that  whatever  reafon  there 
 be  for  caution  as  to  entering  into  any  argu- 
 mentative defence  of  religion  in  conunon  con- 
 'verfatio?2y  yet  that  'tis  neceffary  to  do  this 
 from  the  pulpit,  in  order  to  guard  the  people 
 againft  being   corrupted,  however   in    fome 
 places.     But  then  furely  it  (liould  be  done 
 in  a  manner  as  little  controverfial  as  poffible. 
 For  though  fuch  as  are  capable  of  feeing  the 
 force  of  objed;ions  are  capable  alfo  of  feeing 
 the  force  of  the  anfwers  which  are  given  to 
 them  'y  yet  the  truth  is,  the  people  will  not 
 competently  attend  to  either.     But  'tis  eafy 
 to  fee  which  they  will  attend  to  mod.    And 
 to  hear  religion  treated   of,  as  what  many 
 deny,  and  which  has  much  faid  againft  it  as 
 well  as  for  it ;  this  cannot  but  have  a  ten- 
 dency to  give  them  ill  impreiTions  at   any 
 time  :    and  feems    particularly  improper  for 
 all  perfons  at  a  time  of  devotion  -,  even  for 
 fuch  as  are  arrived  at  the  molt  fettled  ftate 
 of  piety : — I  fay  at  a  time  of  devotion  ;  when 
 vre  are  affembkd  to  yield  ourf  Ives  up  to  the 
 full  influence   of  the   Divine   Presence, 
 and  to  call  forth  into  adiual   exercife  every 
 pious  aifedtion  of  heart.     For  it  is  to  be  re- 
 peated. 
 
Clergy  of  Durham y  1751.  453 
 
 pcated,  that  the  heart  and  courfe  of  affedions 
 ii^ay  be  diilurbed  when  there  is  no  alteration 
 of  judgment.  Now  the  evidence  of  rehgion 
 may  be  laid  before  men  without  any  air  of 
 controverfy.  Tlie  proof  of  the  being  of 
 God,  from  final  caufes,  or  the  defign  and 
 wifdom  which  appears  in  every  part  of  na- 
 ture ;  together  with  the  law  of  virtue  writ- 
 ten upon  our  hearts"*  :  the  proof  of  Ch  rift  i- 
 
 anity 
 
 .  *  The  law  of  virtue  written  upon  our  hearts.]  The 
 author  of  the  Enquiry^  mentioned  above,  informs  us  in  his 
 Poflfcript,  that  "  the  certain  confequence  of  referring 
 "  mankind  to  a  laiv  of  nature  or  virtue  ijurittcn  upon  their 
 *'  hearts  is  their  having  recourfe  to  their  own  fcuje  of  things 
 "  on  all  occafions ;  which  being,  in  a  great  majority,  no 
 "  better  than  family  fuperftition,  party  prejudice,  or  fch^- 
 "  interefted  artifice,  (perhaps  a  compound  of  all)  will  be 
 "  too  apt  to  over-rule  the  plain  precepts  of  the  Gofpel." 
 And  he  declares,  he  has  "  no  better  opinion  of  the  clear - 
 "  nefs^  certainty^  uniformity ^  univerfalHy^  Sec,  of  this  law, 
 **  than"  he  has  "  of  the  importance  of  exter?ial  religion.''' 
 What  then  muft  we  fay  to  St.  Paiil^  who  not  only  allerts, 
 in  the  ftrongeft  term.s,  the  reality  of  fuch  a  law,  but  fpeaks 
 of  its  obHgation  as  extending  to  all  mankind  ?  bhiming 
 fome  among  the  Gentiles  as  without  cxcufe^  for  not  advert- 
 ing to  and  obeying  it;  and  commending  others  for  doing 
 hy  Nature  (in  contradiftindion  to  Revelation)  the  things 
 contained  in  the  laWy  thus  Jhewing  the  work  of  the  law  writ^ 
 ten  in  their  hearts.  If,  becaufe  "  natural  religion  is  liable 
 "  to  be  miftaken,  it  is  high  time  to  have  done  with  it  in 
 "  the  pulpit;'*  how  comes  it  that  the  fame  apoftle  refers 
 the  Philippians  to  the  ftudy  of  this  religion,  to  whatfoever 
 things  are  true^  honrjl^  jujl^  hvdy  and  of  good  report  ^^  And 
 yet  without  fuch  a  ftudy  our  knowledge  of  the  moral  law 
 muft  always  remain  imperfect :  for  a  complecc  fyftem  of 
 morality  is  certainly  no  where  to  be  found  either  in  tiie 
 
 G  g  3  Old 
 
454  Charge  to  the 
 
 anity  from  miracles,  and  the  accomplifli- 
 ment  of  prophecies  y  and  the  confirmation 
 which  the  natural  and  civil  hiftory  of  the 
 world  give  to  the  Scripture  account  of 
 things  :  thcfe  evidences  of  religion  mjght 
 properly  be  infifted  on,  in  a  way  to  affedt 
 and  influence  the  heart,  though  there  were 
 no  profeffed  unbeli.vers  in  the  world;  and 
 therefore  may  be  infilled  on,  without  taking 
 much  notice  that  there  are  fuch.  And  even 
 their  particular  objections  may  be  obviated 
 
 without 
 
 Old  or  New  Teftament  *.  When  a  Chriftian  minlfler  Is 
 enforcing  the  duties  or  doctrines  of  revealed  religi-.n,  he 
 may  perhaps  do  well  to  *•'  tell  his  people  he  has  no  other 
 *'  proof  of  the  original,  truth,  obligations,  prefent  benefits 
 *'  and  future  rewards  of  religion  to  lay  before  them,  than 
 "  what  is  contained  in  the  Scriptures."  But  what  if  his 
 purpofe  be  to  inculcate  fome  moral  virtue  ?  Will  it  not 
 be  ufeful  here,  befides  obferving  that  the  pra6lice  of  that 
 virtue  is  enjoined  by  a  divine  command,  to  recommend  it 
 ftill  further  to  his  hearers,  by  fliewing  that  it  approves  it- 
 felf  to  our  inward  fenfe  and  perception,  and  accords  with 
 the  native  fentiment?  and  fuggeftions  of  our  minds  ?  Me- 
 taphvficians  may  f^y  what  they  will  of  our  feelings  of  this 
 fort  being  all  illufive,  liable  to  be  perverted  by  education 
 and  nabit,  and  julged  of  hy  men's  own  le'ife  of  things  : 
 they,  whole  under  iaadings  are  yet  wifpoUed  by  philcf->phy 
 end  vain  deceit^  will  be  little  d  fpofed  to  liden  to  fuch  afT^r- 
 tions.  ^s'or  are  there  wanting  arguments  which  prove, 
 and,  as  fliould  feem,  to  the  fatisfa<5lion  of  every  reafonable 
 enquirer,  that  the  greac  and  leading  principles  of  moral 
 duties  have  in  all  ages  been  the  fame ;  that  fucii  virtues  as 
 benevolence,  j\'ftice,  compaffion,  gratitude,  accidental  ob- 
 ftacles  removed,  and  when  the    precife  meaning  of  the 
 
 •  See  the  fecond  of  Dr.  Balguy's  Charges. 
 
 words 
 
Clergy  of  "Durham,  1751.  455 
 
 without  a  formal  mention  of  them.  Bc- 
 fides,  as  to  reHgion  in  general,  it  is  a  pra6tl- 
 cal  thing,  and  no  otherwife  a  matter  of  fpe- 
 culation,  than  comnion  prudence  in  the  ma- 
 nagement of  our  worldly  affairs  is  fo.  And 
 if  one  were  endeavouring  to  brin^^;  a  plain 
 man  to  be  more  careful,  with  regard  to  this 
 lafl,  it  would  be  thought  a  ftrange  metliod 
 of  doing  it,  to  perplex  him  with  itating  for- 
 mally the  feveral  objedtions  which  men  of 
 gaiety  or  fpeculation  have  made  againft  pru- 
 dence, and  the  advantages  which  they  plea- 
 fantly  tell  us  folly  has  over  it;  though  one 
 could  anfwer  thole  objedlions  ever  fo  fully. 
 
 Nor  does  the  want  of  religion  in  the 
 generality  of  the  common  people,  appear 
 owing    to    a  fpeculative  dilbelicf,  or  denial 
 
 words  has  been  once  explained,  arc  inftinctlvely  known 
 and  approved  by  all  men;  and  that  our  approbation  of 
 thefe  is  as  much  a  part  of  our  nature  implanted  in  us  by 
 God,  and  as  little  liable  to  caprice  and  fafiiion,  as  the  fenfe 
 of  feeing,  given  us  alfo  by  Him,  by  which  all  bodies  appear 
 to  us  in  an  ere£t,  and  not  an  inverted  pofition  *  —  Mr. 
 Locke's  authority  has  been  generally  looked  up  to  as  deci- 
 five  on  fuch  queftions,  and  his  fentiments  have  been  em- 
 braced implicitly  and  without  examination.  That  great 
 and  good  man  however  is  not  to  be  charged  with  the  per- 
 nicious confequences,  which  others  have  drawn  fiom  his 
 opinions :  confequences  which  have  been  carried  to  fuch 
 a  length,  as  to  deftroy  all  moral  difference  of  human  ac- 
 tions ;  making  virtue  and  vice  altogether  arbitrary  ;  calling 
 evil  good^  and  good  hdH  ;  putting  darkmfs  for  light-,  and  light 
 for  darknefs;  putting  bitter  for  fwect-i  and  five  ct  for  bitta\ 
 
 ♦  See  the  third  of  Bifhop  Hurd's  Seimoiu,  Vol.  I. 
 
 Gg  4  of 
 
45^  Charge  to  the 
 
 of  it,  but  chiefly  to  though  tie  ffnefs  and 
 the  common  temptations  of  life.  Your 
 chief  bufmefs  therefore  is  to  endeavour  to 
 beget  a  pradical  fenfe  of  it  upon  their  hearts, 
 as  what  they  acknowledge  their  belief  of, 
 and  profefs  they  ought  to  conform  them- 
 fclves  to.  And  this  is  to  be  done,  by 
 keeping  up,  as  well  as  Vv^e  are  able,  the  form 
 and  face  of  religion  with  decency  and  re- 
 verence, and  in  fuch  a  degree  as  to  bring 
 the  thoughts  of  religion  often  to  their 
 minds*;   and  then   endeavouring   to   make 
 
 this 
 
 *  By  keeping  up  the  form  and  face  of  religion —  in 
 fuch  a  degree^  as  to  bring  the  thoughts  of  religion  ofte7i 
 to  their  minds.]  I'o  this  it  is  faid  by  our  Enquirer^ 
 that  "  the  Clergy  of  the  Church  of  England  have  noway 
 *'  of  keeping  up  the  form  and  face  of  religion  any  oft^ 
 ^  ener^  or  in  any  other  degree^  than  is  direiled  by  the 
 ''  pr-^fcribed  order  of  the  Church."  As  if  the  whole 
 duty  of  a  parifh  prieft  confifted  in  reading  prayers  and 
 a  fermon  on  Sundaj^s,  and  performing  the  occafional 
 offices  appointed  in  the  Liturgy !  One  would  think  the 
 writer  who  made  this  objection  had  never  read  more  of 
 the  Charge  than  the  four  pages  he  has  particularly  fe- 
 lecled  for  the  fubjecSl  of  his  animadverfions.  Had  he 
 looked  farther,  he  would  have  found  other  methods  re- 
 commended to,  the  Clergy  of  introducing  a  {z\~\{q  of  r'e- 
 ligion  into  the  minds  of  their  pariftiioners,  which  occur 
 much  opener  than  the  times  allotted  for  the  public  fer vices 
 of  the  Church  :  fuch  as  family  prayers  ;  acknowledging 
 the  divine  bounty  at  our  meals ;  perfonal  applications  from 
 minifters  of  parifhes  to  individuals  under  their  care,  on 
 particular  occafions  and  circumftances  :  as  at  the  time 
 of  Confirmation,  at  firll;  receiving  the  holy  communion, 
 on  recovery  from  ficknefs,  and  the  lilce  ;  none  of  which 
 are  preicnbed   in  our  eftablifhed  ritual,   any  more  than 
 
 thofQ 
 
Clergy  of  Durhain,  1751.         457 
 
 this  form  more  and  more  fubfervient  to  pro- 
 niote  the  reaUty  and  power  of  it.  The  form 
 of  rchgion  may  indeed  be  where  there  is 
 little  of  the  thing  itfelf^  but  the  thing  itfelf 
 cannot  be  prefv::rved  amongll  mankind  with- 
 out the  form*.  And  this  form  frequently 
 occurring  in  fome  inftance  or  other  of  it, 
 will    be    a    frequent    admonition  -f-  to    bad 
 
 men 
 
 thofe  others  {o  ludicroufly  mentioned  by  this  writer, 
 *'  bowing  to  the  caft,  turning  the  face  to  that  quaitcr  in 
 "  repeating  the  creeds,  dipping  the  finger  in  water,  and 
 "  therewith  croffing   the  child's  torehead  in  baptifm." 
 
 *  The  thing  itfelf  cannot  be  preferved  amongft 
 mankind  without  the  form.]  The  Quakers  rcjed  all 
 forms,  even  the  two  of  Chrift's  own  iniUtution  :  will 
 it  be  faid  that  "  thefe  men  have  no  religion  preferved 
 *'  among  them  ?'*  It  will  neither  be  faid  nor  infinuated. 
 The  Quakers,  though  they  have  not  the  form^  are  careful 
 to  keep  up  the  face  of  religion  3  as  appears  not  only 
 from  the  cuftom  of  aflembhng  themfelves  for  the  par- 
 pofes  of  public  worfhip  on  the  Lord's  day,  but  f'om 
 their  filent  meetings  on  other  days  of  the  week.  And 
 that  they  are  equally  fenfible  of  the  importance  of 
 maintaining  the  influence  of  religion  on  their  minds 
 is  manifeft  from  the  pradicc  of  what  they  call  7>j- 
 VJard  praywr^  in  conformity  to  the  diredion  of  Scrip- 
 ture to  pray  coiitinuolly  :  "  Which,"  faith  Robert  Bar- 
 clay, "  cannot  be  underftood  of  cutward  prayer,  be- 
 "  caufe  it  were  impofTible  that  men  fhould  be  always 
 "  upon  their  knees,  cxprcfTmg  the  tuords  of  prayer;  which 
 ''  would  hinder  them  from  the  exercife  of  thofe  duties  no 
 *'  lefs  pofitivcly  commanded."  Apology  for  the  fakers. 
 Prop.  xi.      Of  JVorJhip, 
 
 f  This  form  frequently  occurring  in  fome  inftance  or 
 other  of  it,  will  be  a  frequeyit  admonition,  5cc.]  Here 
 it  has  been  objedled,  that  "  the  number^  variety^  and  frc" 
 *'  qumt  occurrence  of  forms  in  religion  are   too  apt  to 
 
 ''  be 
 
458  Charge  to  the 
 
 men  to  repent,  and  to  good  men  to  grow 
 better;  and  alfo  be  the  means  of  their 
 doing  fo. 
 
 That  which  men  have  accounted  religion 
 in  the  fevernl  countries  of  the  world,  gene- 
 rally fpeaking,  has  had  a  great  and  confpicu- 
 ous  pa  £  in  ail  public  appearances,  and  the 
 face  of  It  been  kept  up  with  great  reve- 
 rence throughout  all  ranks  from  the  higheft 
 to  the  lowed;  not  only  upon  occafional 
 folemnities,  but  alfo  in  the  daily  courfe  of 
 behaviour.     In    the    heathen   world,    their 
 
 *'  be  confidered  by  the  generality  as  commutations  for  their 
 "  vices,  as  fomething  fuhftituted  in  lieu  of  repentance, 
 *^  and  as  loads  and  incumbrances  upon  true  Chriftian 
 "  edification."  This  way  of  arguing  againft  the  ufe  of 
 a  thing  from  the  abufe  of  it,  inftead  of  arguing  from  the 
 nature  of  the  thing  itfelf,  is  the  mafter  fophifm  that  per- 
 vi,des  the  whole  performance  we  are  here  examining. 
 What  reafonable  man  ever  denied  that  the  pomp  of  out- 
 ward worihip  has  been  fometimes  miftaken  for  inward 
 piety?  that  pofitive  inftitutions,  when  refted  in  as  ends, 
 inftead  of  being  applied  as  means,  are  hurtful  to  the  in- 
 terefts  of  true  religion ?  Not  Bifhop  Butler  certainly; 
 who  blames  the  obfervances  of  the  Papifts  on  this  ac- 
 count ;  feme  of  them  as  being  "  in  themfelves  wrong 
 *'  and  fuperltitious;"  and  others,  as  being  ''  made  fub- 
 ''  fervient  to  the  purpofes  of  fuperftition,"  and  for  this 
 reafon  "  abolifhed  by  our  Reformers.'*  In  the  mean 
 while  it  will  fl:ill  be  true,  that  bodily  worfhip  is  by  no 
 means  to  be  difcarded,  as  unufeful  in  exciting  fpiritu^l 
 devotion  ;  on  the  contrary,  that  thev  mutually  aililt  and 
 ilrengthen  each  other  ;  and  that  a  mere  mental  intercourfe 
 with  God,  and  a  religious  fervice  purely  intelle<Si:ual,  is 
 altogether  unfuitable  to  fuch  a  creature  as  man,  during  his 
 prefent  flate  on  earth. 
 
 fuperflition 
 
Clergy  of  Durham,  1 7  5 1 .  459 
 
 fuperftition  was  the  chief  fubjedt  of  ftatuary, 
 fculpture,  painting,  and  poetry.  It  mixt  it- 
 felf  with  bufinefs,  civil  forms,  diverlions, 
 domeftick  entertainments,  and  every  part  of 
 common  life.  The  Mahometans  arc  obliged 
 to  fhort  devotions  five  tmies  between  morn- 
 ing and  evening.  In  Roman  Catho'ic 
 countries,  people  cannot  pufs  a  day  with- 
 out having  religion  recalled  to  their  thou^Hus,, 
 by  fome  or  other  memorial  of  it;  by  fome 
 ceremony  or  public  religious  form  occurring 
 in  their  way  * :  belides  th^ir  frequent 
 holidays,    the  fliort   prayers  they  are  daily 
 
 called 
 
 *  In  Roman  Catholic  countries,  people  cannot  pafs  a 
 day  without  having  religion  recalled  to  their  thoughts — by 
 fome  ceremony  or  public  religious  form  occurring  in  their 
 way.]  "  What  in  the  former  period"  fwhen  fpeakiig 
 of  the  Heathen  world)  was  '  called  Su-  r^Jiition^  be- 
 *'  comes  in  this'*  (when  fpeaking  of  Roman  Catholics) 
 *'  Religion  and  Religious  For?ns ,  which  the  "apifts  pretend- 
 *'  ing  to  connect  with  C  hriftiamty,  and  the  Charge  giv- 
 **  ing  no  hint  that  this  is  no  more  than  a  pietcnce,  a 
 *'  plain  reader  muft  needs  ta/ie  thi*^  as  fpoken  of  the 
 •'  means  and  memorials  of  J'rue  Kelig.on,  and  will 
 **  accordingly  confider  thefe  as  recommended  to  his  prac- 
 '*  tice  and  imitation."  if  a  pi. an  reader,  at  flrft  view  of  the 
 paflasje  alluded  to,  (hould  inadvertency  tall  into  fuch  a 
 miltake,  he  would  find  that  miftake  iir.mediately  corre<5led 
 by  the  very  next  fentence  that  follows,  where  the  religion 
 of  the  Roman  Catholics  and  tneir  ^wperltition  are  dulin- 
 guiftied  from  each  other  in  exprefs  words,  i-ut  the  terms 
 in  queftion  are  ufed  with  the  ftridtell-  propriety.  The 
 defign  of  the  Biihop,  in  this  part  of  his  v.hirge,  is 
 to  confider  religion,  not  under  the  notion  ot  its  being 
 true,  but  as  it  affedts  the  fenfes  and  imagination'  of  the 
 multitude.     For  lo  the  paragraph  begins.    *'  1  hat  which 
 
 "  men 
 
460  Charge  to  the 
 
 called  to,  and  the  occafional  devotions  en* 
 joined  by  confefTors.  By  thefe  means  their 
 fuperflition  finks  deep  into  the  minds  of  the 
 people,  and  their  reHgion  alfo  into  the  minds 
 of  fuch  among  them  as  are  ferious  and  well- 
 difpofed.  Our  reformers,  confidering  that 
 fome  of  thefe  obfervances  were  in  themfelves- 
 wrong  and  fuperftitious,  and  others  of 
 them  made  fubfervient  to  the  purpofes  of 
 fuperflition,  abolifhed  them,  reduced  the 
 form  of  religion  to  great  fimplicity,  and  en- 
 joined no  more  particular  rulcs^  nor  left  anjr 
 
 "  men  have  accounted  religion  In  the  feveral  countries  of 
 "  the  world,"  (whether  the  religion  be  true  or  falfe  is  be- 
 £cle  his  prefent  argument)  "  generally  fpeaking,  has  had 
 *'  a  great  and  confpicuous  part  in  all  public  appear- 
 *^  ances."  This  pofition  he  iliullrates  by  three  examples, 
 the  Heathen,  the  Mahometan,  and  the  Roman  Catholic 
 religions.  The  two  flrft  of  thefe,  having  little  or  nothing 
 of  true  religion  belonging  to  them,  may  well  enough  be 
 chara(?terized  under  the  common  name  of  Superitition  : 
 the  lafl  contains  a  mixture  of  both  ;  which  therefore  the 
 Bifhop,  like  a  good  writer  as  well  as  a  juft  reafoner,  is 
 careful  to  diuingulfii.  In  Roman  Catholic  countries  a 
 man  can  hardly  travel  a  mile  without  paffing  a  cruel-.. 
 fix  ere£ted  on  the  road -fide:  he  may  either  flop  to  wor- 
 fhip  the  image  reprefented  on  the  crofs  ;  or  he  may  fimply 
 be  reminded  by  it  of  his  own  relation  to  Chrift  crucified  ; 
 thus  by  one  and  the  fame  outward ,  fign  "  religion 
 "  mav  be  recalled  to  his  thoughts,"  or  fuperflition  may 
 take  poifellion  of  his  mind.  In  the  celebration  of  the 
 Eucharift,  the  elements  of  bread  and  wine  are  regarded  by 
 a  Papift  as  the  very  body  and  blood  of  Chrift  ;  to  a  Proj- 
 teftant  they  appear  only  as  fymbols  and  memorials  of  that 
 body  and  blood  :  what  in  one  is  an  adl  of  rational  devo- 
 tion, becomes  in  the  other  an  inftance  of  the  grollcfl  fu- 
 perftition,  if  not  idolatry. 
 
 thing 
 
Clergy  of  Durham^  '^7S^'         46 1 
 
 thing  more  of  what  was  external  In  rehgion 
 than  was,  In  a  manner,  neceffary  to  preferve  a 
 fenfe  of  rcHgion  Itfelf  upon  the  minds  of 
 the  people.  But  a  great  part  of  this  is  ne- 
 gledled  by  the  generality  amongfl  us;  for 
 inftance,  the  fervice  of  the  Church,  not  only 
 upon  common  days,  but  alfo  upon  faints 
 days;  and  feveral  other  things  might  be 
 mentioned.  Thus  they  have  no  cultomary 
 admonition,  no  public  call  to  recoiled!:  the 
 thoughts  of  God  and  Religion  from  one 
 Sunday  to  another. 
 
 It  was  far  otherwife  under  the  Law. 
 Thefe  -doordsy  fays  Mofes  to  the  children  of 
 Israel,  which  I  co?nmand  thee,  JJjall  be  hi 
 thine  heart:  a?2d  thou  JI?alt  teach  them  dili^ 
 gently  unto  thy  children ^  and  fh alt  talk  of  them 
 when  thoufittefi  in  thine  houJt\  and  when  thou 
 walkejl  by  the  way,  and  when  thou  lieji  down^ 
 and  when  thou  rifejl  up  * .     And  as  they  were 
 
 com- 
 
 *  And  when  thou  r'lfeft  up,"]  Allowing  that  "  what 
 *'  Mofes  in  this  pafTage  wanted  to  have  efFecied  was  obedi- 
 "  ence  to  the  moral  law,"  nothing  fure  could  be  of  greater 
 ufe  in  fecuring  that  obedience  than  the  pra6licc  here  en- 
 j/^ined.  Our  Enquirer  however  is  of  a  different  opinion; 
 and  "  very  much  queftions  whether  his  Lordfhip  could 
 "  have  fallen  upon  any  palTige  in  the  Old  Teilament, 
 "  which  relates  at  all  to  his  fubj-jd,  t'lat  would  have  been 
 "  lefs  favourable  to  his  argument."     IVho  J})all  decide^  &c? 
 
 . I  he  Bifhop  goes  on,    "  As  they  (the  Jews)  were 
 
 *'  commanded  this,  (o  'tis  obvious  how  much  the  confti- 
 **  tution  oF  their  law  was  adapted  to  effcc'l  it,  and  keep 
 ''  religion  ever  in  view."  Upon  which  t\\Q  Enquirer  re- 
 marks, "  It  was  then  very  ill,  or  at  leaft  very  unwifely 
 •'  done,    to    abrogate    that  law,  whofe  conllitution  was 
 
 "  adapted 
 
462  Charge  to  the 
 
 commanded  this,  fo  'tis  obvious  how  much 
 the  conftitution  of  that  law  was  adapted 
 to  efFed:  it,  and  keep  rehgion  ever  in  view. 
 And  without  fomewhat  of  this  nature,  piety 
 will  grow  languid  even  among  the  better  fort 
 
 of 
 
 "  adapted  to  (o  excellent  a  purpofe."  Let  us  firfl  fee 
 what  may  be  oiFered  in  defence  of  the  Bifhop.,  and  then 
 confider  what  is  to  be  faid  in  anfwer  to  his  opponent. 
 The  purpofe  for  which  the  Mofaic  conftitution  was 
 eftabliftied  was  this,  To  preferve,  amidft  a  world  univer- 
 fally  addidted  to  polytheifm  and  idolatry,  the  great  doftrine 
 of  the  Unity  of  the  Divine  Nature,  ////  the  fcedjhonld  corne 
 to  whom  the  promije  was  made.  As  a  means  to  this  end, 
 the  Ifraelites  were  not  only  to  be  kept  feparate  from  every 
 other  nation;  but,  the  better  to  enfure  fuch  feparation, 
 they  were  to  be  conftantly  employed  in  a  multifarious 
 ritual,  which  left  them  neither  time  nor  opportunity  for 
 deviating  into  the  fuperfl:itious  obfervances  of  their  Pagan 
 neighbours.  And  this,  I  fuppofe,  may  fuffice  for  vindi- 
 cating the  Biihop's  aflertion,  that  "  the  conftitution  of 
 *'  the  Jewifti  law  was  adapted  to  keep  religion  ever  in 
 **  view."  But  the  Jewiih  law  was  not  only  adapted  to 
 this  end ;  we  are  next  to  obferve,  that  the  end  itfelf  was 
 a£lually  gained.  For  though  it  be  too  notorious  to  be  de- 
 nied, that  the  Jews  did  not  always  confine  their  religious 
 homage  to  the  God  of  Ifracl,  but  polluted  the  fervice,  due 
 to  Him  alone,  with  foreign  worfhip  ;  yet,  even  in  their 
 worft  defedtions,  it  (hould  be  remembered,  they  never  to- 
 tally lejedled  the  true  Jehovah  ;  and  after  their  return 
 from  captivity,  they  were  fo  thoroughly  cured  of  all  re- 
 maining propenfity  to  the  idolatrous  rights  of  heathenifm, 
 as  never  again  to  violate  their  allegiance  to  the  God  of 
 their  fathers.  It  appears  then  that,  iri  confequence  of  the 
 Jewifli  feparation,  the  principle  of  the  Unity  was  in  fadl 
 preferved  inviolate  among  that  people  till  the  coming  of 
 Chrift.  When  the  iVIofaic  conftitution  had  thus  attained 
 its  end,  and  mankind  were  now  prepared  for  the  reception 
 I  of 
 
Clergy  of  Durham ^  ^75^*  463 
 
 of  men;  and  the  worft  will  go  on  quietly  in 
 an  abandoned  courfe,  with  fewer  interrup- 
 tions from  within  than  they  would  have, 
 were  religious  reflexions  forced  oftener  upon 
 their  minds*,  and  confequently  with  Icfs 
 probability  of  their  amendment.  Indeed 
 in  moft  ages  of  the  Church,  the  care  of 
 reafonable  men  has  been,  as  there  has  been 
 for  the  moft  part  occafion,  to  draw  the  peo- 
 ple off  from  laying  too  great  weight  upon 
 external  things;  upon  formal  a6ls  of  piety. 
 But  the  ftate  of  matters  is  quite  changed  now 
 
 of  a  hetier  co'venaiit^  the  law  expired  of  courfe ;  the  par- 
 tition wall  that  had  divided  the  Jew  from  the  Gentile  was 
 taken  dov/n,  and  all  diftin(5\ion  between  them  loft  under 
 the  common  name  of  Chriftians.  And  this  may  fuffice  to 
 fhew,  in  oppofition  to  our  Enquirer^  that  it  was  both  very 
 well  and  very  wifely  done  to  abrogate  a  law,  when  the 
 purpofe  for  which  the  law  had  been  enacled  was  accom- 
 plifhed. 
 
 ♦  Were  relio^Ious  refle6^ions  forced  oftener  upon  their 
 minds.]  '*"  According  to  the  Bifhop's  dod'trine"  then, 
 fays  the  Enquirer^  "  it  fnould  be  not  only  good  policy, 
 "  but  wholefome  difcipline  to  force  men  in  England  to 
 ''  come  to  church,  and  in  France  to  go  to  mafs."  And 
 again,  "  Jf  externals  have  this  virtue  to  enforce  religious 
 "  refleflions,  it  muft  be  right  to  compel  thofe  who  are  in- 
 *•  difpofed  to  fuch  reflections  to  attend  thefe  memorials." 
 Yes  i  granting  that  the  kn^Q  of  the  paflage  in  the  Charge 
 is  not  (hamehilly  perverted,  and  that  we  are  to  underftand 
 the  Hilnop  here  to  ibealc  of  cxternaL  force  and  compullion. 
 Whereas  by  "  religious  refle^5lionsyo;•6W*  is  plainly  meant 
 no  more  than  religious  reflecVions  oftener  thrown  in  jnen's 
 way\  brought  more  frequently  into  their  thoughts^  fo  as  to 
 produce  an  habitual  recollediiou  that  they  are  always  in 
 the  Divine  prefence. 
 
 with 
 
464.  Charge  to  the 
 
 with  us.  Thefe  things  are  negledled  to  t 
 degree,  which  is,  and  cannot  but  be  attended 
 with  a  decay  of  all  that  is  good.  'Tis  highly 
 feafonable  now  to  inftrudl  the  people  in  the 
 importance  of  external  religion^'. 
 
 And  doubtlefs  under  this  head  muft  come 
 into  confideration  a  proper  regard  to  the 
 ftrud:ures  which  are  confecrated  to  the  fer-* 
 vice  of  God.  In  the  prefent  turn  of  the 
 age,  one  may  obf^^rve  a  wonderful  frugality 
 in  every  thing  which  has  refped:  to  religion, 
 and  extravagance  in   every  thing  elfe.     But 
 
 *  To  in{lru6l  the  people  in  the  Importance  of  external 
 religion  ]  "  1  he  importance  of  external  religion."  the 
 Enquirer  remarks,  "  is  the  grand  engine  of  the  Papifls. 
 ''  which  they  play  with  the  greatefl:  efFe£l-  upon  our  com- 
 "  mon  people,  who  are  always  foonefl:  taken  and  infnared 
 "  by  form  and  /hew  ;  and,  fo  far  as  we  concur  with  them 
 "  in  the  principle,  we  are  doing  their  work;  fmce,  if  ex- 
 "  ternals,  as  fuch,  are  important,  the  plain  natural  confe- 
 "  quence  is,  the  more  of  them  the  better,''  He  had  the 
 fame  refledion  once  before :  "  If  true  religion  cannot  be 
 "  preferved  amcng  men   without  formsy   the  Cv.nfcquence 
 
 "  muft  be,  that  the  Romifl)  religion,   having more  fre^ 
 
 "  qiicnt  occurrences  of  form.s,  is  better  than  other  reli- 
 
 "  gions,    which    have  fewer    of   thefe occurrences." 
 
 To  this  argument  I  reply,  Nego  conJequentia?n,  There 
 may  be  too  much  of  form  in  religion,  as  well  as  too  little  : 
 the  one  leads  to  enthufiafm,  the  other  degenerates  into 
 fuperftition  ;  one  is  puritanifm,  the  other  popery  ;  whereas 
 the  rational  worfhip  of  God  is  equally  removed  from  ei- 
 ther extreme.  Did  the  Enquirer  never  hear  of  the  pofli- 
 bility  of  having  too  much  of  a  gord  thing  ?  Or  does  he 
 fuppofe,  with  the  late  hiftorian  of  Great  iiritain,  that  all 
 religion  is  divided  into  two  fpecies,  thefuperftitious  and  the 
 fanatical ;  and  that  whatever  is  not  one  of  thefe,  muft  of 
 ^ecelTity  be  the  other  I 
 
 amidft 
 
Clergy  of  TDurhamy   1 75 1 .  465 
 
 amidft  the  appearances  of  opulence  and  im- 
 provement in  all  common  things,  which  arc 
 now  feen  in  moft  places,  it  would  be  hard 
 to  find  a  reafon,  why  thcfe  monuments  of 
 ancient  piety  fliould  not  be  preferved  in  their 
 original  beauty  and  magnificence.  But  in 
 the  leaft  opulent  places  they  muft  be  pre- 
 ferved  in  becoming  repair^  and  every  thing 
 relating  to  the  divine  fervice  be,  however, 
 decent  and  clean;  otherwife  wx  fhall  vilify 
 the  face  of  religion  whilft  we  keep  it  up* 
 All  this  is  indeed  principally  the  duty  of 
 others.  Yours  is  to  prefs  ftrongly  upon 
 them  what  is  their  duty  in  this  refpecfl^ 
 and  admionilh  them  of  it  often,  if  they  are 
 negligent. 
 
 But  then  you  muft  be  fure  to  take  care 
 and  not  negledl  that  part  of  the  facred  fabric 
 which  belongs  to  you  to  maintain  in  repair 
 and  decency.  Such  negledl  would  be  great 
 impiety  in  you,  and  of  rnoft  pernicious  ex- 
 ample to  others.  Nor  could  you,  tvith  any 
 fuccefs,  or  any  propriety,  urge  upon  them 
 their  duty  in  a  regard  in  which  you  your- 
 felves  fliould  be  openly  negle6lful  of  it, 
 
 Bifhop  Fleetwood  has  obferved^-,  that 
 tinlefs  the  good  public  fpir it  of  hiiildiiigy  r cp air- 
 ing y  and  adorni?2g  churches  prevails  a  great 
 deal  more  among  us,  and  be  more  encouraged , 
 an  hundred  years  will  bring  to  the  ground  an 
 
 *  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  St.  Afaph,  17 10. 
 
 H  h  huge 
 
466  Charge  to  the 
 
 huge  number  of  our  churches.  This  excellent 
 prelate  made  this  obfervation  forty  years 
 ago:  and  no  one  I  believe  will  imagine,  that 
 the  good  fpirit  he  has  recommended  prevails 
 more  at  prefent  than  it  did  then. 
 
 But  if  thefe  appendages  of  the  divine  fer- 
 vice  are  to  be  regarded,  doubtlefs  the  divine 
 fervice  itfelf  is  more  to  be  regarded;  and  the 
 confcientious  attendance  upon  it  ought  often 
 to  be  inculcated  upon  the  people,  as  a  plain 
 precept  of  the  gofpel,  as  the  means  of  grace, 
 and  wrhat  has  peculiar  promifes  annexed  tb 
 it.  But  external  ads  of  piety  and  devotion, 
 and  the  frequent  returns  of  them  are,  more- 
 over, necelTary  to  keep  up  a  i^wic  of  religion, 
 which  the  affairs  of  the  world  will  otherwife 
 wear  out  of  men's  hearts.  And  the  frequent 
 returns,  whether  of  public  devotions,  or  of 
 any  thing  elfe,  to  introduce  religion  into 
 men's  ferious  thoughts,  will  have  an  influ- 
 ence upon  them,  in  proportion  as  they  are 
 fufceptible  of  religion,  and  not  given  over  to 
 a  reprobate  mind.  For  this  reafon,  befides 
 others,  the  fervice  of  the  Church  ought  to 
 be  celebrated  as  often  as  you  can  have  a  con- 
 gregation to  attend  it. 
 
 But  lince  the  body  of  the  people,  efpe- 
 cially  in  country  places,  cannot  be  brought 
 to  attend  it  oftener  than  one  day  in  a  week; 
 and  fmce  this  is  in  no  fort  enough  to  keep 
 up  in  them  a  due  fenfe  of  religion;  it  were 
 greatly  to  be  wifhed  they  could  hz  perfuaded 
 9  ^^ 
 
Clergy  of  Durham^  1751.  467 
 
 to  any  thing  which  might,  in  fome  meafure, 
 fupply  the  want  of  more  frequent  pubhc  de- 
 votions, or  ferve  the  Hke  purpofes.  Family 
 prayers,  regularly  kept  up  in  every  houfe, 
 would  have  a  great  good  effedt. 
 
 Secret  prayer,  as  exprefsly  as  it  is  com- 
 manded by  our  Saviour,  and  as  evidently 
 as  it  is  implied  in  the  notion  of  piety,  will 
 yet,  I  fear,  be  grievoufly  forgotten  by  the  ge- 
 nerality, *till  they  can  be  brought  to  fix  for 
 themfelves  certain  times  of  the  day  for  it; 
 lince  this  is  not  done  to  their  hands,  as  it 
 was  in  the  Jewifli  Church  by  cuftom  or  au- 
 thority. Indeed,  cuflom,  as  well  as  the  ma- 
 nifefl  propriety  of  the  thing,  and  examples 
 of  good  men  in  Scripture,  juftify  us  in  inlift- 
 ing,  that  none  omit  their  prayers  morning 
 or  evening,  who  have  not  thrown  off  all  re- 
 gards to  piety.  But  fecret  prayer  compre- 
 hends not  only  devotions  before  men  begin 
 and  after  they  have  ended  the  bufmefs  of  the 
 day,  but  fuch  alfo  as  may  be  performed 
 while  they  are  employed  in  it,  or  even  in 
 company.  And  truly^  if  befides  our  more 
 fet  devotions,  morning  and  evening,  all  of 
 us  would  fix  upon  certain  times  of  the  day, 
 fo  that  the  return  of  the  hour  fliould  re- 
 mind us,  to  fay  fhort  prayers,  or  exercife  our 
 thoughts  in  a  way  equivalent  to  this^  per- 
 haps there  are  fev/  perfons  in  fo  high  and 
 habitual  a  ftate  of  piety,  as  not  to  find  the 
 benefit  of  it.     If  it  took  up  no  more  than  a 
 
 II  h  2  minute 
 
468  Charge  to  the 
 
 minute  or  two,  or  even  lefs  time  than  that, 
 it  would  ferve  the  end  I  am  propofing;  it 
 would  be  a  recollecftion,  that  we  are  in  the 
 Divine  prefence,  and  contribute  to  our  being 
 in  the  fear  of  the  Lord  all  the  day  long, 
 
 A  duty  of  the  like  kind,  and  ferving  to 
 the  fame  purpofe,  is  the  particular  acknow- 
 ledgment of  God  when  we  are  partaking  of 
 his  bounty  at  our  meals.  The  negledl  of 
 this  is  faid  to  have  been  fcandalous  to  a  pro- 
 verb, in  the  heathen  world"*;  but  it  is 
 without  Ihame  laid  aiide  at  the  tables  of  the 
 higheft  and  the  loweft  rank  among  us. 
 
 And  as  parents  fliould  be  admoniflied,  and 
 it  fliould  be  prefled  upon  their  confciences, 
 to  teach  their  children  their  prayers  and  ca- 
 techifm,  it  being  what  they  are  obliged  to 
 upon  all  accounts ;  fo  it  is  proper  to  be 
 mentioned  here,  as  a  means  by  which  they 
 will  bring  the  principles  of  Chriftianity  often 
 to  their  ov/n  minds,  inftead  of  laying  afide 
 all  thoughts  of  it  from  week's-end  to  week's- 
 end. 
 
 General  exhortations  to  piety,  abPtrafted 
 from  the  particular  circumftances  of  it,  are 
 of  great  ufe  to  fuch  as  are  already  got  into  a 
 rehgious  courfe  of  life:  but,  fuch  as  are 
 not,  though  they  be  touched  v/ith  them, 
 yet  when  they  go  away  from   church  they 
 
 *  Cudworth  en  the  Lord's  Supper,  p.  8.  Cafaub*  in 
 Athenxum,  L.  i.  c.  xi.  p.  22.  Duport.  YxiA.  in  Theo- 
 phraflum  Ed.  Needham.  C.  ix,  p.  3  j5>  «5cc, 
 
 fcarc* 
 
Clergy  of  Bur  ham,  1751.         469 
 
 fcarce  know  where  Co  begin,  or  how  to 
 fet  about  what  they  are  exhorted  to.  And 
 'tis  with  relped  to  reh'gion,  as  in  the 
 common  affairs  of  hfe,  in  which  many- 
 things  of  great  confequence  intended,  are 
 yet  never  done  at  all,  becaufe  they  may  be 
 done  at  any  time,  and  in  any  manner; 
 which  would  not  be,  were  fome  determi- 
 nate time  and  manner  voluntarily  fixed 
 upon  for  the  doing  of  them.  Particular 
 rules  and  directions  then  concerning  the 
 times  and  circumftances  of  performing  ac- 
 knowledged duties,  bring  religion  nearer  to 
 pra<5lice;  and  fuch  as  are  really  proper,  and 
 cannot  well  be  miftaken,  and  are  eafily  ob- 
 
 ferved. Such  particular  rules  in  religion, 
 
 prudently  recommended,  would  have  an  in- 
 fluence upon  the  people. 
 
 All  this  indeed  may  be  called  form;  as 
 every  thing  external  in  religion  may  be 
 merely  fo.  And  therefore  whilfh  we  endea- 
 vour in  thefe,  and  other  like  inftances,  to  keep 
 up  \S\^form  of  godlinejs  '^'  amongft  thofe  who 
 are  our  care,  and  over  whom  we  have  any 
 influence,  we  mufl:  endeavour  alfo  that  this 
 form  be  made  more  and  more  fubfervient  to 
 promote  the  power  of  it  ^".  Admonifli  thcin 
 to  take  heed,  that  they  mean  what  they 
 fay  in  their  prayers,  that  their  thoughts 
 ^nd  intentions   go   along  with  their  words, 
 
 *  *    2  Tim.  iii.  5. 
 
 H  h  7  that 
 
470  Charge  to  the 
 
 that  they  really  in  their  hearts  exert  and  ex- 
 ercife  before  God  the  affections  they  exprefs 
 with  their  mouth.     Teach  them,  not  that 
 external  religion  is  nothing,  for  this  is  not 
 true  in  any  fenfe;  it  being  fcarce  poiTible, 
 but  that  it  will  lay  fome  fort  of  reftraint  upon 
 a  man's  morals ;  and  'tis  moreover  of  good 
 cfFed  with  refpedl  to  the  world  about  him. 
 But  teach  them  that  regard  to  one  duty  will 
 in  no  fort  atone  for  the  negledl  of  any  other. 
 Endeavour   to   raife    in  their  hearts  fuch  a 
 fenfe  of  God  as  fhall  be  an  habitual,  ready 
 principle  of  reverence,  love,  gratitude,  hope, 
 truft,  refignation,    and    obedience.     Exhort 
 them  to  make  ufe    of  every   circumftance, 
 which  brings  the  fubjedt  of  religion  at  all 
 before  them ;   to  turn  their  hearts  habitually 
 to  him;  to  recoiled;  feriouily  the  thoughts  of 
 his  prefence  in  whom  they  live  and  move  and 
 have  their  beings  and  by  a  fhort  a6t  of  their 
 mind  devote  themfelves  to  his  fervice. — If, 
 for  inftance,  perfons  would  accuftom  them- 
 felves to  be  thus  admonifhed    by  the   very 
 fight  of  a  Church,  could  it  be  called  fuper- 
 ftition  ?  Enforce  upon    them   the    neceffity 
 of  making  religion    their  principal  concern, 
 as    what    is    the   exprefs    condition  of  the 
 Gofpel  covenant,  and  what  the  very  nature 
 of  the  thing    requires.      Explain    to   them 
 the  terms  of  that  covenant  of  mercy,  founded 
 in  the  incarnation,  facrifice,  and  interceflion 
 of   Christ,    together  with    the    promifed 
 
 afliflance 
 
Clergy  of  Durham,  1 7  5 1 .         471 
 
 affiftance  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  not  to  fu- 
 perfede  our  own  endeavours,  but  to  render 
 them  efFecluul.  The  greater  feftivals  of  the 
 Church  being  inftituted  for  commemorating 
 the  feveral  parts  of  the  Gofpel  hiflory,  of 
 courfe  lead  you  to  explain  thefe  its  feveral 
 dodlrines,  and  fhew  the  Chriftian  pracl^ice 
 which  arifes  out  of  them.  And  the  more 
 occalional  folemnities  of  religion,  as  well  as 
 thefe  feftivals,  will  often  afford  you  the 
 faireft  opportunities  of  enforcing  all  thefe 
 things  in  familiar  converfation.  Indeed  all 
 affetlation  of  talking  pioufly  is  quite  nau- 
 feous :  and  though  there  be  nothing  of 
 this,  yet  men  will  eafily  be  difgufled  at 
 the  too  great  frequency  or  length  of  thufe 
 occafional  admonitions.  But  a  word  of  • 
 God  and  Religion  dropped  fometimes  in 
 converfation,  gently,  and  without  any  thing 
 fevere  or  forbidding,  in  the  manner  of  it ; 
 this  is  not  unacceptable.  It  leaves  an 
 impreflion,  is  repeated  again  by  the  hear- 
 ers, and  often  remembered  by  plain  v/eii- 
 difpofed  perfons  longer  tlaan  one  would 
 think.  Particular  circumftances  too  which 
 render  men  more  apt  to  receive  inftruc- 
 tion,  fliould  be  laid  hold  of  to  talk  fc- 
 rioufly  to  their  confciences.  For  inlfance, 
 after  a  man's  recovery  from  a  dangerous 
 (icknefs,  how  proper  is  it  to  advife  him 
 to  recolle(ft  and  ever  bear  in  mind,  what 
 were  h*^  hopes  or  fears,  his  wiihes  and 
 H  h  4  refolutioiis. 
 
47  2  Charge  to  the 
 
 refolutions,  when  under  the  apprehenfion 
 of  death;  in  order  to  bring  him  to  repent- 
 ance, or  confirm  him  in  a  courfe  of  piety, 
 according  as  his  Hfe  and  character  has  been. 
 So  likewife  the  terrible  accidents  which  often 
 happen  from  riot  and  debauchery,  and  indeed[ 
 almoft  every  vice,  are  occafions  providen- 
 tially thrown  in  your  way,  to  difcourfe 
 againft  thefe  vices  in  comm.on  converfation, 
 as  well  as  from  the  pulpit,  upon  any  fuch 
 accidents  happening  in  your  parirfi,  or  in  a 
 neighbouring  one.  Occafions  and  circum- 
 ftances  of  a  like  kind  to  fome  or  other  of 
 thefe  occur  often,  and  ought,  if  I  may  fo 
 fpeak,  to  be  catched  at,  as  opportunities  of 
 conveying  inftruffion,  both  public  and  pri- 
 vate, v/ith  great  force  and  advantage. 
 
 Public  inftrucftion  is  alfo  abfolutely  necef- 
 fary,  and  can  in  no  fort  be  difpenfed  with. 
 But  as  it  is  common  to  all  who  are  prefent, 
 many  perfons  ftrangely  negledt  to  appropriate 
 what  they  hear  to  themfelves,  to  their  own 
 heart  and  life.  Now  the  only  remedy  for 
 this  in  our  power  is  a  particular  perfonal 
 application.  And  a  perfonal  application 
 makes  a  very  different  imprefiion  from  a 
 common,  general  one.  It  were  therefore 
 greatly  to  be  Vv^iilied,  that  every  man  fliould 
 have  the  principles  of  Chriflianity,  and  his 
 own  particular  duty  enforced  upon  his  con- 
 fcience,  in  a  manner  fuited  to  his  capacity, 
 in  private.  And  befides  the  occafional  op- 
 portunities 
 
Clergy  of  Durham y  1751.         473 
 
 portunities  of  doing  this,  fome  of  which 
 have  been  iniimated,  there  are  ftated  oppor- 
 tunities of  doing  it.  Such,  for  inftance,  is 
 Confirmation:  and  the  ufual  age  for  Con- 
 firmation, is  that  time  of  Hie,  from  which 
 youth  muft  become  more  and  more  their 
 own  mafters,  when  they  are  often  leaving 
 their  father's  houfe,  going  out  into  the  wide 
 wo:ld  and  all  i  numerous  temptations; 
 agai  ift  which  they  particularly  want  to  be 
 fortifijd,  by  having  ftrong  and  lively  impref- 
 fions  of  relibnon  made  upon  their  minds. 
 Now  th^  61  ft  Canon  exprefsly  requires,  that 
 every  minifter  that  hath  care  of  fouls  fliall 
 ufe  his  beft  endeavour  to  prepare  and  make 
 able — as  many  as  he  can  to  be  confirmed; 
 which  cannot  be  done  as  it  ought  without 
 fuch  perfonal  application  to  each  candidate 
 in  particular  a§  I  am  recommending.  An- 
 other opportunity  for  doing  this  is,  w^hen 
 any  one  of  your  panihioners  fignifies  his 
 name,  as  intending  for  the  firft  time  to  be 
 partaker  of  the  Communion.  The  Rubrick 
 requires,  that  all  perfons,  whenever  they  in- 
 tend to  receive,  fhall  fignify  their  names  be- 
 forehand to  the  minifter;  which,  if  it  be  not 
 infifted  upon  in  all  cafes,  ought  abfolutely 
 to  be  irjfifted  upon  for  the  firft  time.  Now 
 this  even  lays  it  in  your  way  to  difcourfe 
 with  them  in  private  upon  the  nature  and 
 benefits  of  this  facrament,  and  enforce  upon 
 them  the  importance  and  necefiity  of  reli- 
 
 gion. 
 
474  Charge  to  the 
 
 gion.  However  I  do  not  mean  to  put  this 
 upon  the  fame  foot  with  catechifing  youth 
 and  preparing  them  for  confirmation;  thefe 
 being  indifpenfable  obligations  and  exprefsly 
 commanded  by  our  canons.  This  private 
 intercourfe  with  your  parifliioners  prepara- 
 tory to  their  firft  communion,  let  it,  if  you 
 pleafe,  be  confidered  as  a  voluntary  fervice 
 to  religion  on  your  part,  and  a  voluntar}?-  in- 
 ftance  of  docility  on  theirs.  I  will  only  add, 
 as  to  this  pradlice,  that  it  is  regularly  kept 
 up  by  fome  perfons,  and  particularly  by  one, 
 whofe  exemplary  behaviour  in  every  part  of 
 the  paftoral  office  is  enforced  upon  you  by 
 his  ftation  of  authority  and  influence  in  (this 
 part  *  efpecially  of)  the  diocefe. 
 
 I  am  very  fenlible,  my  brethren,  that  fome 
 of  thefe  things,  in  places  where  they  are 
 greatly  wanted,  are  impradticable,  from  the 
 largenefs  of  pariflies,  fuppofe.  And  where 
 there  is  no  impediment  of  this  fort,  yet  the 
 performance  of  them  will  depend  upon 
 others,  as  well  as  upon  you.  People  can- 
 not be  admoniihed  or  inflrudied  in  private, 
 unlefs  they  will  permit  it.  And  little  will 
 you  be  able  to  do  in  forming  the  minds  of 
 children  to  a  knic  of  religion,  if  their  pa- 
 rents will  not  affifl  you  in  it:  and  yet  much 
 lefs,  if  they  will  fruftrate  your  endeavours, 
 by  their  bad  example,  and  giving  encourage- 
 
 *  The  Archdeaconry  of  Northumberland, 
 
 Hient 
 
Clergy  of  Durham,  175 1.  475 
 
 ment  to  their  children  to  be  cUlTolute.  TIic 
 like  is  to  be  faid  alfo  of  your  influence  in  re- 
 forming the  common  people  in  general,  ia 
 proportion  as  their  fuperiors  adt  in  like 
 manner  to  fuch  parents;  and  wliilft  they, 
 the  lower  people  1  mean,  muft  have  fuch 
 numerous  temptations  to  drunkcnnefs  and 
 riot  every  where  placed  in  their  way.  And 
 'tis  cruel  ufage  we  often  meet  with,  in  being 
 ceniured  for  not  doing  what  we  cannot  do, 
 wdthout,  what  we  cannot  have,  the  concur- 
 rence of  our  cenfurers.  Doubtlefs  very  much 
 reproach  which  now  lights  upon  the  clergy 
 would  be  found  to  fall  elfewhere,  if  due  al- 
 lowances were  made  for  things  of  this  kind. 
 But  then  we,  my  brethren,  muft  take  care 
 and  not  make  more  than  due  allowances  for 
 them.  If  others  deal  unchwritably  with  us, 
 we  muft  deal  impartially  witii  ourfelves,  as 
 in  a  matter  of  confcience,  in  determining 
 what  good  is  in  our  power  to  do:  and  not 
 let  indolence  keep  us  from  fetting  about 
 what  really  is  in  our  power;  nor  any  heat  of 
 temper  create  obftacles  in  the  profecution  of 
 it,  or  render  infuperable  fuch  as  we  find, 
 when  perhaps  gentlenefs  and  patience  would 
 prevent,  or  overcome  them. 
 
 Indeed  all  this  diligence  to  which  I  have 
 been  exhorting  you  and  myfelf,  for  God 
 forbid  I  fhould  not  consider  myfelf  as  includ- 
 ed in  all  the  general  admonitions  you  receive 
 
 from 
 
476  Charge  to  the 
 
 from  me ;  all  this  diligence  in  thefe  things 
 does  indeed  fuppofe,  that  we  give  ourfelves 
 wholly  to  them.  It  fuppofes,  not  only  that 
 we  have  a  real  kwic  of  religion  upon  our 
 own  minds,  but  alfo,  that  to  promote  the 
 praftice  of  it  in  others  is  habitually  up- 
 permoft  in  our  thought  and  intention, 
 as  the  bulinefs  of  our  lives.  And  this,  my 
 brethren,  is  the  bufinefs  of  our  lives,  in  every 
 fenfe,  and  upon  every  account,  'Tis  the 
 general  bufinefs  of  all  Chriftians  as  they 
 have  opportunity :  'tis  our  particular  bufinefs. 
 "Tis  fo  as  we  have  devoted  ourfelves  to  it  by 
 the  moft  folemn  engagements;  as  according 
 to  our  Lord's  appoiJitment  we  live  of  the 
 Gofpel'^'y  and  as  the  prefervation  and  ad- 
 vancement of  religion,  in  fuch  and  fuch  dif- 
 tri(fls,  are,  in  fome  refpedts,  our  appropriated 
 truft. 
 
 By  being  faithful  in  the  difcharge  of  this 
 our  truft,  by  thus  taking  heed  to  the  minijlry 
 *we  have  received  in  the  Lord  that  we  fulfil. 
 //•f-,  we  fhall  do  our  part  tov/ards  reviving, 
 a  prad:ical  kxii^  of  religion  amongft  the  peo- 
 ple committed  to  our  care.  And  this  will 
 be  the  fecureft  barrier  againft  the  efforts  of 
 infidelity;  a  great  fourfe  of  which  plainly  is, 
 the  endeavour  to  get  rid  of  religious  re- 
 ftraints.     But  whatever  be  our  fuccefs  with 
 
 *  I  Cor.  ix.  I4»,  t  Col.  iv,  17. 
 
 regard 
 
Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  477 
 
 regard  to  others,  we  fhall  have  the  approba- 
 tion of  our  confciences,  and  may  reft  allured, 
 that  as  to  ourfelves  at  leaft,  our  labour  is  not 
 in  vain  in  the  Lord*. 
 
 *  I  Cor.  X7.  52. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
Publijljed  by  the  Editor. 
 
 i.  Twelve  Sermons  on  the  Prophe- 
 cies concerning  the  Chriftian  Church;  and, 
 in  particular,  concerning  the  Church  of 
 Papal  Rome:  being  the  Second  Course 
 preached  in  Lincoln's-Inn  Chapel,  at  the 
 Ledlure  of  the  Right  Reverend  William 
 Warburton,  late  Lord  Bifhop  of  Gloucefter, 
 1776. 
 
 2.  An  Analysis  of  the  Roman  Civil 
 Law  ;  in  which  a  Comparifon  is,  occa- 
 fionally,  made  between  the  Roman  Laws, 
 and  thofe  of  England;  being  the  Heads 
 of  a  Courfe  of  Ledures,  publickly  read 
 in  the  Univerfity  of  Cambridge.  The 
 Third  Edition,  1779. 
 
 3.  A  Sermon  preached  before  the  Lords 
 Spiritual  and  Temporal,  in  the  Abbey 
 Church  of  Weftminfter,  on  Friday,  Fe- 
 bruary 8,  1782;  being  the  Day  appointed 
 by  His  Majefty's  Proclamation  for  a  Ge- 
 neral Fall. 
 
 A 
 
Fiiblijhed  by  the  Editor. 
 
 4.  A  Sermon  preached  before  the  Lords 
 Spiritual  and  Temporal,  in  the  Abbey 
 Church  of  Weflminfter,  on  Vv'ednefday, 
 January  30,  1788;  being  the  Anniverfary 
 of  King  Charles's  Martyrdom. 
 
^f* 
 
 -•V 
 
 ^^y>s 
 
 #*H- 
 
 K'^mf^^^. 
 
 ^^'i^^:^: 
 
 V  >.