c/ W.-Mr^"^ /y /z.e-^i>^ c./^ <«^< ^^IyC^i^^ ' «>^ .t**Jt>H a^^ |TII£OLGGI(MLSEMIW''RYi Sec i < r < AN ESSAY ON MORAL AGENCY. A N ESSAY O N MORAL AGENCY CONTAINING Remarks on a late anonj'mous Publication, ENTITLED! An EXAMINATION of the late President EDWARDS'S INQUIRY on FREEDOM of WILL. BY STEPHEN WEST, d. d. PASTOK, OF THE CHURCH IN STOCKBRIDGE. Thy peopU jiiall be willing in the day of thy power. Psalm ex. 5. I ^HE SECOND EDITION. TO WHICH IS ADDED, AN APPENDIX, BY THE AUTHOR. SALEM: J'RINTED BY THOMAS C. GUSHING. 1794. PREFACE. THE dotTtrincs of divine prefciencc, and of the: liberty and freedom of the creature, have been thought, by many, to be involved in lb much darknefs and uncertainty, efpecially when confidered in their mutual relation to each other, and the afpeft which the one necelTarily hath upon the other ; that it hath been efteemed a mark of modefly, good fenle, and in- genuity, frankly to confefs our ip;i!orance in points of ilich depth and myilery, and yield them up as perfectly incapable of being reconciled, even in idea, the one with the other. With this view and apprchenfion of tilings are the minds of iome fo entirely and perfectly ^ pofTeired, that the very thought of its being in the power of man to reconcile t\\c foreknowledge of God, with the liberty Gfxvill in creatures, is iirongly repel- led ; and the knowledge of any attempt to fliev/ the confiflency of the one witii the other, received witii lenfible uneahnefs and difpleaiure. And yet thefe are, both, points of undoubted certainty and truth ; and that, by the acknowledgment of mod of thofe in whole apprehenlions they are fo exceedingly myflerious, ir- reconcilable and incomprehenfible. This (if I may be permitted to fay it) to me appeareth remarkable. That we (liould firmly believe dodlrines which in our own view are perfeftly incapable, by any human un- derftanding, of being reconciled together, is like yielding our aiTent to both parts of a contradiction . And, not only fo, but that we fliould eifeem them both of fuch importance as to make them articles of our rcli^iGus vi PREFACE. religions f.uth and beliefs and yet be fo efFe (finally per- fuaded of their inconfillency with each other, as to look upon every attempt to reconcile the liberty and freedom of men in their anions, with that indiflblu- ble, infallible connexion of all events with fome ante- cedent cauie, reafon or ground of their exiftence, which is necelTarily implied in the dodtrine of the full and perfe£t prefcience of God ; to me, I confefs, ap- peareth rather an argument of the pov.'er of prejudice, and of an unreafonable attachment to fome pre-con- ceived opinion, than of real modefty and true great- iiefs of mind. However, the bed of men are, doubt- lefs, liable to prejudice and miftake, and incident to error : and very far would I be from cenfuring thofe who differ from me in opinion, refpefting the points principally treated on, in the following EfFay, as ei- ther diftionefl or weak. What I would by thefe ob- fervations, is to make it appear that the confiftency of human liberty with the prejcie7'/ce of God, is a fubjeft fit a-nd proper to engage the attention of men; and that to evince this confiftency cannot be unworthy of the f.iiempt of fuch as profefs themfelves advocates for both, and to have a firm perfuafion of the truth and importance of them, whatever appearance there may be of inconfiftency between them. By this means and in this way would I befpeak tlie candour and engage the patience of the reader ; hoping that thefe obfer- vations may raife and awaken his attention, to what \ have written on the fubjed:. From fuch whofc minds are foured and prejudiced againft every thing that is ?ieiv^ and who, even them- felves, will be bitter againft the bitternefs of difpute, I have little favour to expeft : with them I look for little fuccels. No arguments w^ill adminifter convic- tion to them. Nothing can be clear — nothing perlpi- cuous enough to enlighten, convince and perfuadc them. Such as are refolved to embrace the reigning fentiments and the fafhionable opinions j or who take their PREFACE. vii their principles upon truft^ without examining for thenirelves and feeing with their own eyes j will prob- ably receive little or no improvement from the fol- lov/ing EfTay, even though tiie defign of it Ihould be judiciouily executed. 'Theje (if any fuch there are) are the adverfaries from whom I am mod apprehen- five of danger. I'hefe cor^nxoxxXy make ufe of weap- ons, againft which there is no defence. But if tliere are any who are impartial lovers of trath ; who are difpofed to careful and critical exam- ination ; who are ready to admit aiiy point upon proper evidence, even though it be neiu^ and oppofed by the flrong current of prevailing opinion ; to them I beg leave humbly to commend theperufal of the fol- lowing Eifay : to their judgment and corre^Sion I cheerfully fubmit it : from them I hope for inftruiftion and improvement, and by them I hope to be fet right in points wherein it Ihall appear that I am wrong. Nor am I without hopes of affording fome pleafure, entertainment and improvement to them. To what I have written upon that mofl important fubje£t of the divine agency rejpeding the event of inoral evil^ I earneftly and particularly requell: the careful, critical and candid attention of the reader. Here I have purfaed fomewliat of an unbeaten path ; and not without great fears and apprehenfions left 1 Ihould fay lomething diflionourable and reproachful to Hii\r, the honour of whofe glorious government and name I have humbly endeavoured to vindicate and defend. Here, in many things I have faid, I pretend not to be pofitive — to be certain : and any air of peremptorinefs which my arguments may be thought to carry in them, 1 humbly requefl may be confidered as intended and meant to give the argument its greateft advan- tage, and not to exprefs the confidence I have in my own fentiments and opinion. I have written notliing, however, but what appeared to m.e to be the truth. Objeclions Viii PREFACE. Obje£lions I have endeavoured (hoiild appear to ad- vantage, and in their full ftrength : and whether I am to be accufed of giving lueak anflvers to Jlrong objec- tions, the intelligent reader muft judge. After all, if the fcheme of doftrine and fentiments here advanced, fhall be found, upon careful, flrift examination, to imply any thing inconfiitent with the mofl: perfccTt pu- rity and holinefs of God, and his utter and infinite hatred of all moral evil ; or any thing inconfiflent with the ideas of defert of punifliment in the fmner ; I will cheerfully give it up, and heartily condemn and abjure it : and fliall think myfelf obliged to make my moit grateful acknowledgments to any one, who fhall be at the pains of detecting the weaknefs and fophiflry of thofe arguments by which I have urged a fpecial divine agency and difpofal, giving certainty to the ex- iftence of moral evil in the iyflem. Yet I cannot but exprefs my hopes that the reafons and arguments which I herewith humbly offer to the public, in fup- port of the doftrine I have prefumed to advance, will be a means of diffuhng fome new light on this impor- tant fiibjecft ; and Vv^ill invite fbme one of a more nice difcernment and jufl and comprehenfive view of things, more carefully to examine and thoroughly to fcan and canvais the fubjeft. A vindication of Mr. Edwards, the reader wall ea- fily difcern, hath Kot been an object fo particularly in view in the following EfTay. His character is but of fmall importance, compared to that of the caufe of truth: but if it was, it appearcth not to need any fupport which the author of the following fheets is ca- pable of giving it. For although it may be true that the author of the Exami?intion of his Inquiry^ Sec. hath detected fome lefTer errors in that very maflerly tra(ft ; yet the grand pillars of his doftrine, I am humbly of opinion, flill ftand firm and unfkaken ; and that juflly celebrated performance remaineth as a brazen wall againfl the prevailing errors of the day. This great man's P R E i!" A C E. ix man's writings, though doubtlefs in many refpc^s im- perfed^ have yet left a favour in his name, vvhicii will make it remembered with g;ratitude and pleafure by the lovers of truth, and friends of free inquiry. ^ That fo important a fubjeft as that of Liberty and urgency (a fubject which hath engaged the attention and employed the pens of the greatelt Geniiifes in the feveral learned nations, in almoil: ail ages of the world) ftiould be undertaken by fo young and inexperienced a writer, may be thought by many, perhaps, arrogant and prefumptuous. This, however, it is hoped, will not prejudice the reader againft the arguments — the reajons which are exhibited in fupport of the leading fentiments of the following Ejfay^ and the fcheme of dod:rine contained in it. Th.^ fry le and manner are, doubtlefs, in many refpedls very defetStive, and need the candour and patience of the reader ; which, ac- cordingly, are humbly requefted. But to ail^ any fa- vour to the argument^ would be doing injuflice to the caufe of truths Many things in the Examiner^ which appeared to me to be exceptionable, have been paficd unnoticed ; they not falling fo diredly within the defign of the follow- ing E[]ay. But the arguments which appeared, to me, to be of principal weight in fupport oi \.\\-3it frcedo7/i of will for which he profeiTeth himfelf an advocate, I have, according to my ability, examined and coniider- ed. I have not defigned'y mifunderflood or pervert- ed his meaning, nor knowingly wreftcd his words from their mofl plain and obvious import, by f^srced and unnatural conftru6lion. But whether I have, ill any thing, corrected him, and ihown his rcafonings to be inconclufive and unjuil, 1 mull leave to the judg- ment of the candid and intelligent reader. I have only to requeft a patient, fair and impartial hearing ; and humbly to afl-;: the imited prayers of all \ B the zi PREFACE. the lovers and friends of truth, to the great foUntam and Father of lights ^ for larger and more abundant meafures to be given of that bleffed 5/77r/7 which lead- eth and guideth into all truth ; that all error, igno- rance and darknefs may be done away, and light and truth prevail and fhine more abundantly, to the Glory ofGod^ here in our dark world. .^tockbridgc, 27th March, 1772* INTRODUCTION. INTRODUCTION. ■•t\>o!urtary I lierc ufe. rot as denoting any opprjition made to the •will, as the term moil generaliy implicth ■, but merely as being •uithcut -wilU anj Sect. I. MORAL AGENCY. 19 to look for fome real conformity, in a moral agcnl, to Ibme rule or law which is obligatory on him, or fome poritive oppofition to It as a proper ground of praife or blame, cenfure or commendation.- Where there is no exercife of v/ill — no aifecftion of mind, there is no- thing;, in a moral fenfe, cither beautiful or deformed. Whatever, therefore, maybe the powers of man- kind in refpeft to the froduCiion of volition ; what-sver be the caiifs out of which voluntary exertion arifeth ; whether it be internal or external ; whether fuch ex- ertion is fclf-ori0nated^ or arifeth as an effeft out of fome foreign caufe ; ftill where fuch an effeft is formed, there is moral agency ; and where it is not, there it is in vain to look for moral quality — either virtue or vice. Ynjpontaneous^ voluntary exertion is all the freedom which it is poffible for any one to enjoy. Here is" all C 2 the * Againft this propofitio.n it may poUlbly be obje£led, that «' W.mt of con- formity" to the divine law, is finfiil — IVmU of love, or not lo-ving Godi is c.rimi- ral ; and therefore, (it may be urged) it is unreafonable to place that moral agency which rendereth vis capable of virtue and vice, and makes us the fit fvib- jects of leward or piinilhment, altofjcther \n fpoiitaficor/s., ■voluntary exertion. Sucli an objector I would aik. In whom is >' a -want nf conformity," or v-iant f love, iinfiil ? — !n trees, or in br\iles ? Tliis will not be pretended. That want of love to God v/hich is to be found in the brutal creation, or in the vegetable worlds cannot be criminal. Wliy then {hould want of love to God be criminal in ma;i — ualefs it be, ihat in all that luant of lo-,i^ toward God or our fcilovz-Lreatiives, i;u which we are chargeable with wickedneis in the eye of the divine law, there is ioxne p'fiive oppofition to Itive — fome aJfeSllon of mind inconfillent v»'itlt love r Jt is true, that when we exercife our allcdion, it ought to be, not in oppofition, but in pofitive love, to God. To exercife any allcdion refpecting tlie Deity whicli is. vvlioUy without love, is infinitely wrong and criminal, in fuch a fcnfe as t'lis, it is morally evil not to love God. But that which is me.-el-/ reg^tivi;, hath no quality in it — nothing predicable of it- Where there is no uiiection inconfillent with love — no exercife of heart carrying in it any oppofition to God, or refiedion upon liim unworthy of his own infinitely excellent and glorious charader, tjiere is no- thing criminal or ofTenfive to Cod. That ivant of love which i.-; criminal, is fomething which liatli undutifulncf in it towards God : it .invariably implieth fome mental exercife or aitedion which is inconfilient with love, and which con- tain:th in it difrrfpcEl to God, and pouvelh contempt upon him. It is not a- fjrceable to the piadice and conniion fenfe of men, to cenfure and condemn any thing which is negative, in any other fenfe than this. If we ftel ourfelves iit great diftrefs, or in imminent danger, and one of our fellowuien fnould ftand by and refufeto lend us his aifdlance, we (hould have iull rcalbn to caft blame and cenfure upon him : but if he was fallen into a fwoon, or burled in a deep I'eep, we Ihouid entertain no hard thoughts of him. Tiie rcafon ii plain : hi^ Ttot ajjijling us, in the former cafe, containeth in it a criminal indijf<.rei!ce to our iafety — fme exercife of heart inconfillent with a proper concern for it ; in tb.c latter, it doth not. For this reafon we jufUy blame in the one cafe, and not in the other. So that "want of love to God which only is criminal, is a want of love which containeth in it fome pofitive oppofition or difaitrdion to God, or fuch in» diilerency of mind toward hiiu, aa is inconfillent with lo>c- 20 An E S S A Y ON Parti, the moral liberty which is any wsys efTentlal to rcr ward or piinifhment, virtue or vice. Whoever act- eth voluntarily, acteth in the view of motives : and in the volitions of agents which take place and are ex-r crted i:i the veiw of motives, is all the influence vrhich motives have, on intelligent minds. lie v/ho exerteth volitions, and ci-icrcifeth affections, in the view of mo-^ tives, a<[l:eth like a rational, intelligent, moral agent. He inherits all tliat moral liberty which it is poilible for a creature to enjoy • and all, which any creature doth or can improve. Liberty and agency^ as it appears to m,e they have often been made ufe of in difputes, are terms of fuch refinement and abf traction as to be incapable of any very clear explanation. While thefe terms lead us to an inquiry after any thing different from what we all have conlcioufnefs of, whenever wc exerciie our wills and affeftions, we are purfuing a fliadow jnflcad of a fubftance ; there being no liberty^ freedojn^ agency^ or power ofwill^ befide what is exercifed in voluntary, fpontaneous exertion, which any one can fenfibly feel and enjoy — M'hich can be of any benefit to any one, or capable of improvement. W'hen we look for that liberty or freedom which dignifieth human nature above the lower creation, we are to fearch for it only in what every man feels when he exercifcth will and affecStion," or, in the view of m^otives, puts forth or ex- erteth an aft of choice. This is v/hat makes a free agent : thefe are the exercifes and powers which con- ilitute human liberty — m.oral freedom. Moral liberty effentially confifleth in voluntary ex- erciie. And yet when I fay that liberty confifleth in voluntary exercife, I v/ould not be underflood, that liberty and volition are convertible terms, importing precifely one and the fame thing. But my meaning is, that in every volition we find liberty, true moral liber- ty, and the higheil kind of it that ever can be found in a moral agent. IMotion, and a body moving, are not precifely one and the fame thing : yet we can have no idea Scil.l. MORAL AGENCY. 2| idea of the former, v/itliout the latter. So although liberty and volition may not be precilely the fame, yet all the idea we have of liberty is to be found in volun- tary exertion. Volition may more properly be termed.^- c\. J're.? aclioji^ tlvin. freedom : yet to obtain an idea of liberty, our bed way, as in many other cafes, is not to confider tilings abftraifl-ly, but to turn our thoughts to the concrete (volition) ; wherein we lliall certainly (iifcover the thing fought for. though it is fo difficult, if not impoffible, to feparate the abilra<£l from the con- crete. 'To he free, therefore, 2.ud to he voluntary in any adlion whatfoever, either internal or external, I fuppofe are one and the fame thing. It therefore appears that the queftion fo often agita- ted, viz. Whether the ff^ill is free ? is utterly unmean- ning and impertinent. Whatever is inconfiftent with the freedom of the human v/ill, is equally inconfiftent with the very being of it : for taking away its freedom, is defcroying its very effence. There is no more pro- priety in afiiing whether the /^ill is freef than whe- ther the effential properties of a fubjeft belong to it ? or whether any thing is made up of its conftituent parts ? It may as well be allied, \vh.e^\\eY fire is hot, or water fluid f as whether the Pi^'ill i3>freef and yet every one knows that heat and fluidity are effential properties of fire and water ; the ideas of thefe qualities being ne- ceflarily contained in the explanation of the terms. In like manner is freedom eflential to the humaji M'ill ; and liberty as effential a property of our voluntary ex- ertions, as heat is of fire, or fluidity of water. Here is the only liberty, agency or freedom, of which it is poffible that mankind fhould be confcious and percipient. We may with as much reafon fup- pofe that mankind are corifcious and percipient of that; which is the ground of their fir ft perception and confci- oufnefs ; as to fuppofe that they are confcious of any moral liberty, or power of will, antecedent to, and the ground of, voluntary exertion. The mind is confci- pus of nothing otherwife than in and by its own ex- tions. 22 An E S S A Y on Parti. ertions. As It is confcious of a povv-er of thought ard idea, only in thinking and perceiving ; fo it is confci- ^ ous of a power ofwill^ only in the exercijss of volition. That the mind (hould be confcious of a povjer of clioice which is diftingui (liable from 'adual choojing^ is no more conceivable, than that v/e fnould be confcious of a power of thinking and perceiving, without, at the fame time, feelinp; or exercifuig any perception or thought. Minds are converfant only with their own ideas : they perceive and are immediately'^ confcious of nothing befide their o\vn exercifes and ideas. However the mind may reajbn and infer concerning other things, and form premifes, and make concluiions, with a great degree of juftice and precifion ; flill thofe things of which we attain the knowledge in fuch a way as this, are not the objediis of dire tt, immediate perception. If liberty is what vv-e perceive actually to exift in the mind, it can certainly be perceived no otherwife than in its exercife : jufl as a power of choice can be per- ceived only in actual choofing. But liberty exercifid mud certainly be a voluntary exercife — an exercife of will. And what liberty or freedom any one can per- ceive to be in volimtary exercife^ befide what is itielf an exertion of will, and is ncceffarily included in all our voluntary exertions-^ is to me quite inconceivable. It therefore foiloweth, that there is in mankind no confcioufnefs of liberty or freedom, befide the confci- oufnefs neceiTarily contained in our voluntary exer- tions. Confequently it is prepofterous and unintelli- gible, to talk of being conjcious of any power of will, diftinft from the exercife q1\n\\\.\ or, of a power of choofing, diftind: from actual choice. Exercifes of vo- lition, and making aClual choice^ are fomething of which we all have a confcioufnefs in innumerable inftances ; and herein is all the power ofipill^ the power of choice^ of which we have any direcfl and immediate percep- tion. If mankind have any confcioufnefs or immediate perception of any power of will, diflindt from what they Sea. I. MORAL AGENCY. 23 they feel in the a6lual exercifes of volition — if they are confclous of any power of a6lion, diflinft from the confcioufnels they have in aftual voluntary exertion, and previous to it 3 they muft nevertheleis be conlci- ous of this power as being in exercije. If they are con- fclous of this power of will and aftion as i?! adual exer- cije y this is in no meafure different from bein,g confcl- ous of adual choice — volimtary exertion. To be con- fcious of a jwvoer of will in adual exercije^ is juft the fame as to be conicious of an exercife of will — adiual volition. This I think is obvious. If they are confcious of a power of will w^hich is antecedent to exercife, and the ground of it, it mufl be a power wherein men are involuntary and paffive ; it be- ing a power refulting from the immediate efficiency of God as its caufe ; and therefore can, with no propriety, on any principles, be X.QYx^^Afree. It is objefted againfl the doftrine of an infallible connexion in things, that it is inconfiflent with the freedom and liberty of the will, to admit, that the exercifes of it arife from any extrinfic influence and caufe. But no one, I apprehend, will think of afTertIng, that this poicer of will in men, which is infilted on by fome as the next and immediate caule of voluntary exercife, doth not nrife wholly and entirely from fome ^.v/ri;^//6" influence and caufe. A- greeable to the opinions of thofe, therefore, who m.ake this.objet^fion, it is impoflible that liberty or freedom fhould confiH in f.icii a power. For in this povver, by the fuppofition, mankind are /;/ every fen] e paftive. It wa? made — created by the Deity, without any agcn- c)'-, inliucnce or choice of thcir's : and now it is made, it is perfecftly involuntary and paffive. It is therefore impoilible, that liberty or freedom fnould confifl in any fuch power as is previous to voluntary exercife — menial exertion. I the rather mention thefe things to take off the force of the arguments in favor of fome power ofa«f}:iori in men, diftincT: from voluntary exertion, which can with any fliew of reafon be confulcred as our dignity or pri- vilege. 44 An essay on Parti. Vilege, pretended to be drawn from the feelings of hu- man nature, and the univerfal fenfe and experience of mankind. And if the obfervations which have been mentioned are juft, thiere are, in faft, no fiich feelinjrS as are urged, in human p.ature j nor is it the univerfal fenfe of mankind, that human nature is dignified with any fuch powers ; or that it doth inherit or polfefs them . Spontaneous, voluntary exertion is fomething of which all mankind have immediate confcioufnefs and perception* Here is an agency, the exiflence and re- ality of which may be fupported and proved by all the feelings of human nature, and the univerfally concur- ring teftimony of all mankind. Here is all the power which is neceffary to render any one a moral agent, an accountable creature, and the proper fubjeft of re- ward or punifhment, praife or blame. But it will probably be expe£ted, that fome reafons £[iouldbe offered in juftification of the definition which hath been given o^ moral agency ; and, to fhew that no power in ;;ze;z, previous to voluntary exertion, and the ground thereof, is any ways eiTential to the morality of actions ; or to that agency which is necelTary to re- ward or punifhment, virtue or vice. The following reafons appear to me fufficient to juflify the definition. I. That men are the proper fubjefts of reward and punifhment, for all their voluntary, fpontaneous exer- tions. Whatever of defert there may be in other tilings, it is yet conceded on all hands, that our voliai- tary exertions have moral defert in them.. This is a fort of agency which is the objed: of command and prohibi- tion in the word of God. Accordingly we find that the exercifes of affedlion, voluntary exertions, are fubjefted to law, and are the direft object of divine precept. " Thou fhalt love the Lord thy God," &c. is the firfl and great commandmxCnt. Nor can any thing juftjy be confidered as having the nature of obedience or dif- obedience, any farther than it partaketh of voluntary excrcije and affeCIion, Merc voluntary exercifes, of a certain Sect. I. MOP. AL AGENCY. is certain kind, are accepted as obedience. Thefe, and tliefe only, are our conformity to the divine law. And fo much do all obedience and difobedience confifl in the exerciles of the will, fo much do our voluntary exertions conftithte the very effence and formal nature of virtue and vice, that no man will ever be, either rewarded or punifhed, for any thing befide his exerciics of affection — fpontaneous, voluntary exertions. What- ever adlion or event taketh plate without any concur- rence of our wills, or othcrwife than as the fruit of our voluntary exertion, and v/hich hath nothing of our will or choice in it, will never be fet to our ac- count for adjufting our reward or punifhment. It is agreeable to the cbmmon ienfe and opinions of men, that all fpontaneous^ voluntary exertions carry in them defert of either punifhment or reward. It is a maxim elfablifhed by the univerfal fenfe of mankind, that the excrcifes of our affeftions are, in their very na- ture, either virtuous or vicious.* And fo univerfally doth a fenfe of defert on this account prevail among mankind, that in order to determine any man's char- after and defert, we always accuilom ourfelves to in- quire into his motives^ and pae temper^ dij'poritio'ri or (iate of mind from whence his outward aftions and conducSfc proceed. Here, all acknowledge, are to be found moral quality and defert. In t\\Q exsrcifes of af- fe^iun do men place virtue, or vice. Tliefe obfervations are abundantly cqnfirmed by the Author of the Examination of the late Prefidsnt Edrvards's Inquiry on Freedom of fi^Hl. He confider- eth all 'moral good and evil as confi fling in the dijpofition or eflate of the inind or will. (p. 31.) He fays (p^ 96) that vje apprdve good i?iteniions\ and condemn evil ones., in oiirjelvss 'and in others.^ fo far asfiich affeCiions can he knoivn.) And in the fame place he reprefents it, D that * Dr. Taylor, in his Scripture noclrine of Original Sin, j;reatly iiififictii that all fin iieth in the ch-iice of the mind. Thus he tells lis (p. 127. edit, i.} that the original caufe '» of lin is a maa's chor^Jing to follow the appetites of The flelh ;" that " fin proceedeth from our own cko'ce, as it neajfurlly mult ;" (p. 13c) that " vice is alzvays ttje fali'ty chr.ice of a fe--fo>t's otxin luill, other-u<'-ff it is net chi/te." (p. 190.) And he tepit[Qinelh ^»Ji, or ill e^u/ur Jfjirf, ?Lshcing i'/rtjimhi\. fp. ;ij ) ■ V? 26 An E S S A V ON Partis that whatever the outward anions of men in fad are,- they are judged according to what they would have done. He faith, further, that though natural necejfity exercifeth the outward aCl^ it hinders not but the ejiaie of the will J72ay be ri^ht or wrong. The juftfiefs of thefe obfervations depends entirely upon the fuppofi- tion that virtue and vice are properly and direftly pre- dicablje of the exercifes of affeftion — free, fpontane- ous, voluntary exertions. If, in the exercifes of fuch afteftions limply, there is nothing virtuous or vicious, commendable or criminal ; then furely weare to look farther back than to the intentions of men, or the fate of their wills ^ for virtue and vice. II. There is nothing morally beautiful or deformed in any thing befide the exercifes of afFeftion — fponta- neous, voluntary exertion. Where there is no affec- tion of any kind,- there is nothing which hearcth any refemblance of the moral character of the Deity ; nor^ any thing oppofite to it. Where there are no excer- cifes of affeftion, it is impoffible that there fhould he any degree of obedience to that great command of Love, wherein is the fulfilling of the law: and, I may add, where there is no affection, as little is there: of oppofition to it. If the great and only moral beauty in the univerfe confifteth in love^ in its feveral and dif- ferent exercifes and modifications (all which confift in certain poiitive exercifes of affection) it is in vain to look for moral beauty^ where there is an entire want and negation of all mental, voluntary affeftion : and our expecHiations of finding any moral turpitude or de- formity, will be as utterly fruitlefs, if we fearch for it in fomething which is wholly deftitute of all mental exercife and affection. We may as well look for mo- ral beauty in the order, proportion and harmony of the natural fyilem,' or in the colours of the rainbow, as in any thing v^hatfoever, which is wholly void of mental exercife and affeftion. And we may as ration- ally predicate moral turpitude and deformity of bar- ren deferts and ragged mountains, as of any thing which Sea. I MORAL AGENCY, 27 \vhich is utterly deftitute of all voluntary rxIFe^lion and exertion. There is nothin^e, either in any beauty, or deformity, v/hich can be found in ajiy thing that is wholly without mental exercife and afledion, that is any way dillinguilhable from the beauty and deformity of natural things ; which none pretend to be either virtuous or vicious. And if it is indeed fo that there is no moral beauty or deformity in any thing befide the exercifes of aifefl:ion-r-free, voluntary exertion ; in fuch exertion, doubtlefs, is to be found that agency which diftinguifheth moral beings, and is tlie proper ground of our accountablenefs to God. III. The remorfe of confcience which wicked men feel, is upon no other ground than that of tlie fuppofed evil and turpitude of exercifes of affection — voluntary, ipontaneous exertion : This, therefore, is an argument that moral agency confifletli in lucli aiFeclions and exer- tions. Wiien wc do any outward a^lion for which we condemn ourfelves, our remorfe always terminates up- on the aife<^ion from whence it proceeded, and which was the caufe of it : — All the ground of forrow is, that we exercifed and indulged fuch affedions and incli- nations. We feel ourfelves jnftly condemned for any v/icked aftion, upon the confideration that our hearts ivcre in the things and Ave did it voluntaril)/ and freely. No one pretends to look any farther back than to the voluntary defign and. intention^ for a ground of praife or blame. An awakened confcience never referreth us farther back than to the ajfe6ion — the intention of the mind. And \^ had defign and intention can be faftened upon us, all our pleas fail, and our excufcs vanilh, and our own confciences condemn us. In thefe obfervations I have the Ex-^— r's concur- rence, in the following words. He faith, (p. 97) IV e are condemned or approved of ourj elves for a 'willing or unwilling mind ; and have a natural apprehenfion that the judgment of God will feco72d our own — A natural ap- prehenfion, however, wliich, I muft obferve, is very ill founded, unlefs there is fomelhing worthy of being D z approved 28 An E S S A Y on Parti, approved cr condemned in the exercifes of the will^ or in voluntary exertions. Our Author, I am fenfible, prefently adds, that '*• the inward perturbation vicious '^ men feel, proceeds from a conviction that they might '' have cultivated another frame of heart J^ But if by ^ - cultivating another fraiyie of heart ^^^ he intends any thing diftincl from voluntary exertion — any thing. ii:ithoui volition and v^ithout defign ; the afTertion is as irreconcilable v,'ith his own previous obfervation, as with the argument nov/ under confidcration. If by cultivating another frame of heart our Author intends to denote any exercije of mind or hearty it muft unquef- t\on2.h\Y ht voluntary : for no other exercife, particu- larly on his principles., can be a reafonabie ground of any inward perturbation at all. And if this exprefiion is defigned to. convey the idea, of any exercije of will., or voluntary exertion., inilead of weakening, it ftrengtheneth and confirmeth the argument under con- ilderation. But if the Ex — r, by this expreffion, in- tends any thing which is wholly involuntary and un- clefigning ; it is quite unjuft to fpeak of intentions as being either good, or evil ; or, to lead his readers to apprehend that there is any thing which ought to be, cither approved or condemned^ in willingnejs or unwil- lingne/s of m'lud. IV. Another argument in favor of the definition which hath already been given of moral agency, is, that mankind are agents in nothing but Jpontaneous^ voluntary exertions. Wliatever event comes into ex- iflence, in which we have no voluntary intention and dehgn ; whatever effeS: is brought to pafs, without any concurrence of our wills ; is never deemed our cMion : vv^e are not anfwerable for it. If we can plead that we were not agents in any affair ; that any event, however difagreeable, hath taken place and exifted otherwife than as the fruit of our voluntary exertion., and without the concurrence of our wills ; this will ever be confidered as fufficient to excufe and acquit us from, any blame in the cafe ; and for this very obvi- ous 6*ea.l. MORAL AGENCY. 2^. ous reafon, viz. that nothing but our own adions — Ibmething wherein we exerted ourjelves^ and were agents— C2in^ with any appearance of equity and jullice, be charo;ed to our account. Let the queftion be as it will refpefting the powers of human nature ; whether the volitions of agents are J elf-originated ; or, whether they derive from fome foreign, extrinfic caufe ; flill nothing but the excrcij'e of thefe powers in voluntary exertions can, with any propriety, be thought to incur ccnfure, or merit com- mendation. Whatever are the powers of mankind, there is nothing more to be found in the exercife of thcfe powers, than voluntary^ Jpontaneoiis exertion. — Where we behold voluntary exertion, we behold every thing that can be found in the exercife of all thofe faculties and powers, for which the moft ftrenu- ous advocate for the powers and dignity of human na- ture ever pleadeth. All the real benefit and privilege of any liberty that is ever infifted on as being effential to moral agency, is to be found in voluntary exertion. No notion o.f freedom, that has ever been efpoufed and advanced, dignifieth mankind above this. If it is true, as our Author urgeth, (p. 109) and as is univerfaily infifted on by the advocates for a power of felf-determination in men, that a freedojii to either fide is eifential to moral liberty, and confiftent with all principles of moral aftion, and all doftrine of any influence of motives upon the minds of men, which is capable of being vindicated and explained; yet this freedom to either fide is exercifed only in the mind's freely determining itfelf to one fide^ rather than the other. But fuch a free determination of mind to one fide, rather than the other, is nothing m^ore than the mind's preferring the one to the other, by a free, 'Voluntary determination. So that, upon the whole, nothing is found in the mind more than voluntary ^Jpon- taneous exertion. The higheft powers of human na- ture, threrefore, that are ever boafted of, when they come to be applied to ufe, and put forth into exercife, amount 3© AnESSAYon ' . Part I, amount to nothing more than an ad of choice or pre-r feretice — -free^ voluntary^ Jpontaneoiu exertion. Even the doftrine of internal liberty^ which the Ex — r fo llrenuoufly urgeth in oppofition (as he imagines) to Mr. Edwards^ extendeth to nothing farther than a choice, preference, or prepcnderation of mind to- wards fome certain objefts rather than others ; the whole of its benefit and exercife being comprehended in voluntary, fpontaneous exertion. V. In judging of human actions, and determining the nature and quality of them, mankind never carry their inquiries farther back than to the flate, temper or difpofition of the mind from whence the aiStions of men arife. When we have obtained a view of the diipofition, and are fatisfied what was the internal ilate of the mind — the voluntary exercife, in any out- ward a:t fedlion. X Sect. IL Of P IV E R. NQUIRIES into the nature of liberty and agency, __ it appears to me, have been greatly embarrafTed and perplexed by the vague and indeterminate fenfe in which the word Power hath been ufed in fuch like difputes. It feems to be often ufed to denote fome privilege — fome fufficiency there is in men for fome e- vent, over and above any thing of v/hich we are con- fcious in mere voluntary exertion. Thus a power of thinking — of underftauding — of will — feemeth, many times, to be confidered as fome power ^ opportunity^ or fu^ciency^ there is in men, to begin or produce tiiought, underftauding or volition ,• — a power^ confcquently, which is without thought, without underftanding, and without will — a power ftripped naked, and diverted of every thing whereby it can ever pofTibly be known, diftinguifhed, or enjoyed. Even the accurate Pvlr. Locke fpeaketh of a power to begin aaions of the inindy by a preference of the mind. (^See Hum. Und. Vol. I. Chap. 21. Sec. 5.] As if the atlion and preference of the mind were fo different from each other, as that they might properly be treated of, as cau(e and effeCi ! Or. 38 An- E S S A Y ON Part L Or, as if the mind was not always in adion^ when it prefers any thing ! The meaning of the word Power, as a}5plied both to natural and moral things, reqiiireth careful explana- tion. I fliall examine the term, in the preient fedtion, with care and flriftnefs ; endeavoring, as far as I am able, to clear the fubjeft of the difficulties with which it hath ufually been perplexed. I beg the Reader's careful and candid attention to the following obferva' tions on the fubjeft. I. The word Power, as applied to natural, inani- mate things, I believe, in common ufe, intcndeth and implieth nothing more than a fitnefs or capacity for be- ing the fuhjed offome certain effeds^ from external in- jiuence. Thus there is a power of fertility^ or of beijig rendered fruitful^ in the earth ; of vegetation^ in plants and herbs ; and, of refifiance^ elajlicity and motion^ in bodies. And all that we can confiftently mean, by fuch like expreffions, is, that the earth, and different bodies upon it, are fubjed: to certain particular altera- tions and changes, from fome certain kinds of influence and operation upon them. Where we behold, in na- tural bodies, certain vifible, difcernible effefts arife from the application or influence of fome external caufe ; there we accuftom ourfelves to fpeak of bodies as having, or being endued with, certain poTuers. This fufceptiblenefs in bodies, of certain, particular kinds of influence ; or, a fitnefs and adaptednefs in them, to be the fabjefts of certain efFe(Si:s ; wc ufually exprefs by the term Power. Thus we find, by expe- rience, that the air, under certain given circumflances, is expanded ; under others, cojnprejj'ed : hence we fay, that the air hath a power of expanfion and compreffion. But if wc ufe tlie expreffion with propriety, we can mean nothing more by it, than the foundation there is, in the nature of things, for certain difcernible altera- tions and effed;s, in fcnfible things, from feme parti- cular kind of external influence and caufe. But not having ever obferved any fuch effeft in ivater.^ from any Se£t.h MO Rx\L AGENCY. ^ any caufe we have known to operate upon it ; we fay, water hath neither a power of being expanded^ nor compre(Jcd : and yet, all that we can confiftently mean by fuch an expreffion, is, to deny any foundation, m the nature of things, for any fuch cfFed in water^ from the operation of any caufe, or external influence, , which liath ever fallen under our obfervation. In a lenfe fmiilar to this do we ufe the phrafes, Power of Motion — of Elalticity — of Gravitation. We mean, by fuch like terms and phrafes, to defcribe fomething which we call capacity in bodies of becom- ing the fubjefts of certain difcernible alterations, and perceptible efrefts, from the operation and influence of fome external caufe : or (to fpeak more philofophi- cally) we mean to exprefs the foundation there isy in the nature of things^ under certain given circumftances^ for fuch perceptible^ fenfible effeds. Thcfc obfcrvations are fufficient to determine the meaning of the v/ord Power, Vv-hen applied to mere fenfelefs, inanimate things ; and Ihew, that we intend nothing more by it, than the capacity there is in mate- rial things, of being the fubjecSts of certain difcernible alterations and changes, upon the application of fome external influence and operation : and this is, really, nothing more than the foundation there is in nature, for the taking place of eflecHis, in a certain particular feries, connexion and order. Thefe remarks, it is hoped, may furnifh us with fome materials for a proper explanation of the powers of human nature ; and for afcei taining the meaning of the exprefiion. The expreffion, the powers of human nature^ when it is ufe d 171 its real analogy to the word Power, as ap- plied to inanimate^ material things^ can import nothing more than a capacity there is, in human nature, of be- coming the fiibjeft of certain particular fenfations, apprehenfions, and voluntary exei^tions. We have obferved it to be a general law of nature, or rather of divine operation, that, under certain circumllances, me!i ^'0 An£SSAYon Part ti men fliould be the fubjecls of certain feelhjof, exercife-s Viiid. fe^ijntions . Accordingly we fay, that man hath a power of thought — of miderftanding — and of will — to exprefs the different kinds of eifed; of wliich he may be the fubjeft, under certain circumftances, and from iome particular influence and application* But when wc fpeak of men as having a power of thinking and 'willing^ it is as diftant from all reafon and common fenfe to conceive an idea, from this expreflion, that men are the juhjeCls of their own influence^ in thinking and willing, as it is, from the fimilar expreffion, in re- ference to natural things, to conceive the earth itfelf, and natural bodies upon it, to be the fubjeds of their own influence^ in attradlion, vegetation, and the other fenfible effects which v/e obferve are conftantly taking place in the material world. If the human mind is the Jubjedi of its own influence, in thinking and willing ; it mufl be an influence that is exerted luithout thought^ and without defign: a confideration, which at once takes away its fufhciency for being the canje of thought, and of will. But it is no more agreeable to common fenfe, to imagine that men are the JuhjeCis of their oiun influence^ in thinking and willing, than, that matter is theJubjeCi of its own influence on itfelf in that tendency we obferve in the various parts of material things to each other, and to one common centre, which we mean to exprefs by the terms Gravitation and x\ttra<5lion. It is quite as agreeable to common fenfe, to fuppofe, that the tendency which we obfervC in natural bodies, upon the furface of our earth, to its centre, is the effed: of fome fecret and very myfterious influence exerted by the bodies themfelves upon theju- felves^ caufing them to gravitate toward the centre ; I fay, this is a fuppolition quite as agreeable to common fenfe, as the opinion which fijppofeth that mankind exert an influence on themfelves, caufing them to put forth thought^ and exert aCIs of will. And one would render himfelf ridiculous to ufe the v/ord Power, in reference to inanimate things, in fuch a fenfe as this ; and Sea. t. MORALAGSNCY. 4t and to exprefs fuch a mixed and inconceivable kind of influence ; and would plainly (hew himrelf to be an utter ftranger to nature, pnd to its laws. And yet tb conceive that the expreffions, The powers of human nature^ The. powers of maiikind^ import that thofe men- tal and moral exercifes, which take place in rational, intelligent agents, are fruits and eifefts of fome certain influence exerted by thefe fame agents upon thera- felves in order to be^et and produce mental a determining the feveral natures of things, and their Ipecific differ- ences from each other, is, their fitnefs and adaptednefs to be the fubjefts of fome certain kinds of influence ; and to have certain effe£ls appear in them, upon the application of fuch influence to them, and its exertion upon them. Thus we find the air to be expanded by heat ; and that bodies are moved by the influence of certain degrees of external force upon them. Upon this ground it is that we fay the air has a power of expanfion ; and bodies, the power of motion. So, from the influence of fome caufe or other, we find men to be the fubje£ls of underftanding and volition. Hence we fay, they have a power of intelleft, and a power of will. This, it appears to me, is all that we can eonfiflently mean by the expreflions, u4 Power of Underfiandingy and Power of IV ill ^ if we ufe them to denote any thing previous to all perception and voluntary exertion. When we behold thefe effeds-^ as in other cafes, fo in this, our minds frequently recur to a caufe : and from an uniformity of etfeft, we infer uniformity of caufe, and of its 'influence and operation. From a general uniformity, alfo, of divine operation (things continu- ing as they are) we conclude and infer a fimilarity of eifecfts, and look forward to it : wc expeft events to take place in the fame feries and order, in which we have obferved them already to come uniformly into exiitence. That confl:itution and eftablifliment of things, which is the ground of fuch like reafonings, and the uniformity of their operation and iflue, is what we Sea.I. MORAL AGENCY. 45 WC mean to exprefs by the word Power, as applied to natural things ; and, frequently, as applied to intelli- gent beings, or moral agents. Not that I apprehend this to be the only fenfe in which the word Power may be ufed with propriety, as applied to moral agents — to men. Far otherwife : for it may doubtlefs be ufed with proprieiy to indicate and point out fonie abilities properly in men — fome- thing wherein man is a moral agent, and on account of which he is a fit fubje^ft of praife or blame, com- mendation or ceniiire. The definition of Power, in this ufe and application of the term, as far as I am able, I (hall prelcntly give. But it may be worth our while firfl to fpend a little time in comparing the ideas of Power, entertained by thofe Gentlemen who.ef- poufe the doftrine of a contingency of events, with the definition which hath been already given ; and fee if thefe ideas are any where to be found in it. If, by a power of felf-determination ^ as the phrafe is frequently ufed by Gentlemen on that fide of the qaef- tion, and by the Author of the Examination of Mr. E D w A R D s^s Inquiry — a power ofivill^ a power of choice^ ^•c. — be meant nothing more than fome foundation there is, in the nature of things, for our beiLg the fubjedls of certain exercifes of choice ; Calviniftic divines have no contention with.them. If by capacity of choofing^ faculty ofwill^ &:c. be underftood the foun- dation there is, in the nature of things, or the particu- lar conftitution of any being, for becoming the fubjeft of fuch kind of cffedls ; tlie exprelfion will not lead to that confufion which hath very generally attended the ufe of it. Ufed in this fenfe, it will not carry away the mind into a dark apprehenfion of fome fecret and myfterious power, which exerteth influence upon itfelf, to roufe up and firft awaken itfelf into a6lion : — a no- tion, than which nothing can poHfibly be more repug- nant to itfelf, and to common fenfe ; or more diredily and infallibly deflroy and take away all ground and poflibility of its own exiftence. If there is any Inch F 3 power 44 An ,E S S A Y on Parti, power as this in human nature, it is by no means con* tained within the definition of power which hath been but now given. This definition is far from compre-= hending it : yea, I may fay there mufl be a definition coined for it, and terms of greater energy, and more cxpreflive, than our dry^ barren langurtge will afford, be invelied to defcribe, and in its full fhength expreis, the idea, to the weak minds and feeble apprehenfions of men. If men may be the fabje£ls of volition and choice, it in no meafure from thence followeth that they, by fome mental exertion of their own, originate their own volitions. A fitnefs, or adaptednefs, in any thing, to be the fubjeci^ of ^ certain kind of influence^ and, in confequence of that influence, to have certain effects appear in it, doth, in no degree, of itjelf determine whence this influence arifcth — whether it is from within, or from without*. For a perfon to be a fubjej- of holy exercifes-, before that fixt and certain connexion between prefent and future exercifes of the fame general nature and denoinination^ which we mean to exprefs by the terms Habit and Temper, might take place. But it is now become a gracious conftitution of God, and the fubjedt of a promife to men, that Habit fliall be formed by one fuch exercife as we are called to in the gofpel : perfeverance in holinefs, and eternal life, being certainly and infallibly conneded with the firft and lowefl Sear. II. MORAL AGENCY. 57 lowed degree of hearty compliance with the propofals of the goipel. 2. It hence appeareth, that the firft fin and fall of Adam were not in oppoiition to the habit and temper of his mind ; tliough this ad: was in direft oppofition to all Xh^ former moral exercijes of it. All that makes it fo inconceivable to us, that any one fliould aft and conduct in oppofition to the temper and habit of his mind, is, the connexion we have obferved invariably to take place (unlefs there is fome manifeft and fpecial divine interpohtion to the contrary) between prefent exercifes of will, and future voluntary exertions of the fame general nature and denomination. If we had not been wont to find fuch a connexion in things, and fo accuftomed to look for and expect it ; it would ap- pear nothing ftrange or furprifing to us, to find in men a direct oppofition between X\\qXv prefent and paft incli- nation and will ; or, to expert a like oppofition in ex- ercifes to come. Were it not that our ideas and con- ceptions of things were turned into a particular chan- nel, and formed, as it were, in a certain mould, by our obferving fuch a connexion in human volitions^ and fach an invariable law of operation refpefting their coming into exiftence ; there would appear no- thing flrange, nothing embarraffing, in the opinion, that men might tnrn alternately from fm to holinefs, and from holinefs to fm ; as we fee the matter in fadt exemplified, in the cale of our firft parents, and thofe of their pofterity v/ho become true converts to the religion of Chrift. The fall of our firft parents was an event inconfift- ent with fuch a connexion in thin2:s as hath been A^'i- crjbed ; and utterly irreconcilable with habit and iem- ,pcr^ in' this conftruftion of the terms. But this dilii- cult'y will at once fabiide, if v/e rccolleft, that, in rei- pccTt to Adam in innocency, there was no fuch connex- ion took place: lie had no holy y^'?/'/Y of mind, ard temper of foul, to (111 againlt and refill. And as to any difficiiltv arifini^f fro??z temper^ it is no more inconcciva- ■ ^ ^ • ' II blc ^ Ai^ E S S A Y o >T Part t ble how Adam fliouldyFw, than how he ilionld contimis to be holy. There is, I would beg leave to obferve, no difficulty at all, refpefting the fall of Adam from his original ftate of perfeftion and purity, into a ftate of fin and guilt, which is any W2.ys peculiar^ and doth not equally prefs the argument in general refpefting the taking place o? any fm, and the admijfion of it into God's world. If, indeed, we would maintain a proper idea and fuitable fenfe of the conftant, immediate dependence of all creatures and things on God ; and would duly confider how utterly unconnefted human volitions in themfelves are, and in their own nature, abflraftly confidered, and afide from any particular divine ejlab- liflmient and law of operatioii refpeiVing their taking place ; if thefe things, I fay, were duly confidered and kept in view, I muft take liberty humbly to exprefs it as my opinion, tljat we ihould not find ourfelves fo embarrafled and perplexed in the argument refpecSting Adam's original fin and fall. But it is time to conclude the feftion on Power, and proceed to confider the doftrine of Motives ; which is a fubjeft of importance in the prefent inquiry. This ftiall be the bufinefs of the next fedlion. S E C T. Ill, IVherein the Nature and Influence o/" M o t i v e s are carefully examined and explained. ''T'^HE ufe and application of the term Motive, in JL moral efiays and metaphyfical difquifitions, is frequently fuch as tendeth to beget an apprehenfion in the Reader, that the mind is the pajjlve Jubjed of the influence of miOtives ; that there is fomething very nearly refembling an active power and agency in them, to produce ciTects on the mind ; or, at leafi:, that they are the ?neajiSj or infiiruments, whereby God avjakeneth the Sea . in. MO R A L A G E N C Y. 59 the mind Into fenfation, perception and choice. The human mind leems, many times, to be confidered as being 7720ved and determined by motives ; in the fame manner as clocks and watches are moved and deter- mined by weights and fprings. It is apparent, that in theie machines every degree of motion in the wheels is the e^'eci of antecedent influence upon them, from the weights and fprings. The fpring of a watch puts forth and exerteth its influence, previous to the motion of any of its wheels ; and the motion of the wheels is wholly the fruit and ut by the icill and operation of <' God — rfio more than the acorn deriveth from the oak. It is, I judge, a great «♦ ihoui^h common fallacy, to fuppoi'e that fomething is infufed into the huinan "nature, ablolutely independent of ouvfelves, and not from the luill of God." (See Scrip. Doc. i:c. p. 187.) And aj=;aiii, "No chan>;es can happen in our " conftitution, withaut cither the a t>l> ointment, cr hnin.di.ite operation, of God-'' p. 191. 68 AnESSAYon Parti. efficiency ; but only fomething effentialto the whitenefs of fnow, and the fluidity of water. In a fenfe analogous to this, the agreeable appeara72ce of any thing may be faid to be the cauje of our choof- ing it ; and the perception of fometliing difarrreeable, the caufe of our diflike and averfion. And thus the •will may be faid to be as the grente/i apparent good is ; jufl as the fluidity of water may be faid to be as the Jmoothnefs and roundnejs of its particles are ; or, the folidity and hardnefs of any thing, as the clofenejs^ co- he fion or fixednefs of its parts. But to fay, that agree- able and difagreeablc appearances are the efficient rea- fon and caufe of volition, would be as far from being true, as that the fmoothnefs and rotundity of the par- ticles of water have efficiency in them to produce flui- dity and fluctuation ; or, that nearnefs and fixednefs of parts have efficiency to produce folidity and hard- nefs as their effeCl. An agreeable appearance to the mind, is no more diftin/hich is previous to the event and extrifific of it, and with which the event is certainly conne<^ed. Now if moral events fcand in fuch a relation to their caufes, Sed. V. MORAL AGENCY. 93 caufes, and are fo connefted with them, it cannot be that the voluntary exercifes of mankind are yd'//-or/o-m- ated : this connexion being as inconiiilent with a power of felf-determination in men, as any dodlrine of necef- lity that was ever elpoufed by Hobbs, Spinoza or Mr. Edwards. Let the cauj'e of moral events be intelligent mind^ or what elfe it will, that doth not hinder or break that certain connexion in things — between hu- man volitions and/c;;;2^ antecedent cauie, which entire- ly fubvcrteth that liberty — that freedom to either Jide^ which, in our x^uthor's view, is eflential to virtue and vice. If our Author meaneth to account for that moral event called volition^ by intelligent mind^ as its caufe, in order to evade the evidence of a fixt connexion and antecedent certainty of things ; his confequence is certainly exceedingly lame : it hath no connexio7i with his premifes. To argue againft an eftabliflied connex- ion in things, and between caufes and effects, only by refolving/o^^^d' events into fomc certai?!^ particular cauje^ is not to bring a reafon to which any one can Jniily" expeft a reply.* 2. .Our Author urgeth, that the intelligent mind, which is the caufe of moral events — volitions — niulh be the human mind, not the divine. But yet i?itelligent mindy * The connexion of the ai£ts of tlie will, with fome antecedent, extrinfic caufci is very fully and exprefsly aflertcd by Dr. Whitby, i/i hh dlfconrfe o;z the f.vc foitits, rotwithftanding his fhowing himlelf fo flrenuous an advocate for a power of I'elf-, determination in men. In treating on the influences of the divir.e ipirit, in his difcourfe oi f"fficie7it and efftEluaU cjinmori avdffccial grace-, he faith (p. 221, 222. edit. 2.) «' That it muft be granted that in raifin;; an idea in my brain by the " Holy Spirit, and the imprelfion made upon it there, the action is truly phyjical .- ♦' That in thofc adiions I am nvholly fajfi-ve — That thefe operations are iireJifiibU «' in their produftion" And (p.. 303.) that " when evidence is propounded and «' difcernedi the mind doth -necejfarily afl'cnt unto it." Here the reader will ob- ferve, that, according to the Dodtor, we are •wholly fajjlve and TiecrJJaryiw our aflent to propofitions— fpeculative truth ; and that luch alVent arifeth aiiogether from extrinjic, phy s 1 c a l influence and operation. And this fame Author aflertcth (p. 21 2.) that «' what makes the ixiiLl chocft, is fomething approved by the undtr-- *>■ Jl^nding, and cottfequently appearing to the foul as good." And faith, that *' to fay that evidence propofed, apprehended and coni'.dered, is not fufficient to *• make the underjiavding to appro-ve ; or that the greateft good propofed, or the •» greateft evil threatened, when equally believed and rettcded on, is not fiffficicnt *♦ to engage the ivill to choofe the good and refufc the evil, is, in elted, to fay» «« that lubicb alone doth mei'e the iviii to choofe or to rtfufe, is not fufficient to en- •' gage it fo to do." And all the arguments on that and one or two of the next fuccceding pages, afe calculated and urged to prove a connexion of ads of the will, with fome antecedent views of the mind. 94 An E S S A Y ON Part I, 77tind^ in liis fenfe of the expreffion, is itfelf as much an effhd as any thing elie ; and ftandeth in as much need of a caufe for its fupport, as that moral event itfelf, of Avhich intelligent mind is the caufe. His device, therefore, is quite infufficient to account for human volitions, in confiflency with their being unconnedled, in their exiflence, with any antecedent caufe. To pretend to account for one moral event by another^ and that an event the exiftence of which is as unaccounta- ble as the other, for the exiflence of which this is brought into view as a reafon oi^ caufe ; and this^ too, in order to evince the poflibility of the exiftence of fome events^ without connexion with a?:y antecedent caufe ; every critical reader will at once fee is perfect- ly inconfiflent and abfurd. It is conceded that every moral event muft have a caufe. The exercifes of the human will are the events in queftion. Our Author appeals to " thofe who have common underftanding to judge,'' whether intelligent mind (not the Deity, but the mind itfelf, for the exer- cife of which a caufe is fought) is not the caufe. I be- lieve we may fafely venture to put the decifion of the queftion upon the propofed iflue. II. A fixed, unalterable, eftablifhed connexion in things ; or a previous infallible certainty of all events which ever did, or will, take place within the whole compafs of creation 3 may be moft clearly and certain- ly inferred' from the conftant, abfolute dependence which all things have upon God. Every cauje which exerteth any influence in the whole univerfe, deriveth all its operative power' and ftrength ultimately from God ; and, therefore, in all its exertions, muft be, in fome way or other, connected either mediately or im- mediately with the divine will, and the conftant exer- tions of the divine mind. Even admitting that there are fach powers of human nature as our Author urgeth (were it, indeed, poflible to form any manner of idea or conception of them) ftill for their being — their ex- iflence — they muft, of neceflity, be conflantly depend- f ent Setl,V. MORAL AGENCY. 95^ ent on God. It cannot be fuppofed, with the lead appearance of reafon, that men, or any other creatures^ are fo formed, dignified and endowed, as to be capable of exifting, and remaining any thing, even the ipace of a fmgle moment, without divine aids, and fupports from witliout, fo as to render a pofitive a6i of power neceffary to annihilate and reduce them to their ori- ginal nothing. And whatever is altogether and entire- ly dependent on God for its exiftence^ in the whole and every part of it ; muft, of confequence, be dependent on God for its exertion^ in the whole and every degree of it : — ^the exertion being one thing which necefiarily comes into confideration in determining the ;2fi2'z^rd' and quality of the exiftence which is fupported and upheld.* And if the power infifted on, in every degree of its exertion, is dependent on God, the confequence unde- niably is, that its exertions are, in fome way or another, clofely and infeparably connecfted with fome anteced- ent cauie. And if they are conucded with fome ante- cedent caufe, nothing is more manifeft than that there is an antecedent certainty of their exiflence. Thefe confequences, to me, it appearetli, cannot be evaded, without denying, not only an immediate^ but even au ultnnate, dependence on God. \ mediate and ultimciie dependence as truly giveth a previous, abfolute and infallible certainty to any thing, as an immediate de- pendence. The whole and only diiTerence is, that, in the one cafe^ the caufe vrhich determines and giveth certainty to the event, operates through one or a num- ber of means ^ before its genuine tendency and ultimate influence becometh vifible in event : in the other ^ its tendency and influence are immediately feen ; and it doth not operate and extend through any ?2:edium^ to its effeft. It is quite unphilofophical (not to fay athe- iflical) to fuffer any number of inters cning media to obfcure * This obfervation is nndoiibiedly jiift, if men liave not a po^ver of Iclt'-Uetcr- mination or of originating voluntary motion in themfelves. For if men liavc not this power, ihey are equally dependent on God for their exerc.'/cs as lor tiicir ^^- irrg — their exiftence. And for a proof thnt there are no fuch powers in nicn, I bfg leave to refer the reader to the next lection, where tliii fu'ojcd is particularly coniidered. 96 An E S S A Y on Part L obfcure the agency of that divine hand which God is lifting up and making vifible in all his works. And it is very ungrateful and difrefpeftful to the Deity, for us to fuffer an eftahliJJied courfe of things, or an operation by weans ^ to lelTen our fenfe of dependence on liim. But that a power of felf-determination in men, and of beginning motion in themfelves, fliould be fpoken of as inconfiftent with that dependence which creatures neceffarily have on God, Dr. Clarke, in his demonflra- tion of the being and attributes of God, and our Author after him (as he quotes him v/ith approbation, p- 93, 94. marg.) thinketh to be only " a childifli trifling with words.'' Let us hear the DocT:or's more manly reafoning upon the fubjeft. In the firft place he tells us that " a power oti beginning motion is not in iff elf an impoflible thing," (a power in a being to begin his mun internal motion he doubtlefs meaneth, or his ob- fervation is perfectly impertinent,) '' becaufe it muft of necefTity be in the fupreme caufe." (edit. 8. p. 83.) Hence he concludes, that it may be cojnmunicated to creatures. The Doftor goes on to obferve farther, that fuch a power no more implieth independency, than our powers of perception and confcioufiiefs imply independence on God. He fays, *' In reality it is al- '' together as hard to conceive how confcioufnefs or " the power of perception fhould be communicated to " a created being, as how a power of fclf-motion fliould " be fo." (p. 84.) A fmall degree of refledlion, I think, will convince any one that the Doftor's obferva- tions are neither juft nor pertinent. For, I . By what authority doth he fo peremptorily con- clude that this power of beginning motion muft necef- /drily be in the fupreme caufe ? There is, in truth, no more reafon to fuppofe that fuch a power exifteth in the fapreme, than in fubordinate, beings. It is, if poffible, a greater inconfiftency to fuppofe it to be in God, than in men. However, that v/hieh is perfecftly inconfiftent and abfurd in itfelf, and is a notion v/hich is, in various ways, fubverfive of itfelf, can, with no propriety, -«ea:. V. MORAL AGENCY. ^f propriety, be applied either to the Creator, or to his creature. That which is abfurd and inconfiftent with itfelf, is fo, be it where it will ; cither in the Su- preme, or in Tome fubordinate caufe. But if this povver is indeed of God, there inufl: haver been a time, according to the Dotitor^s own ftating of the matter, when motion did begm in God. To talk of there being a power of begiftning (internal) motioyi In God, without fuppofing that the motion and exercife of tlie divine mind ever did, or in the nature of things might be conceived to, begin^ I think we may be al- lowed to fay, is " a childifh trifling with words.'' And to fpeak of the motion and exercife of the divine mind z^ in fad tvtr beginning to exift, is rnore than " a childifh trifling with words ;'' even an ciFen thejice argue the inconfidency of his communicating to 115 the powers in queftion. The 7?wdiis of divine operation, in pro- ducing moral being, perception and confcioufners, is what no one, that 1 know of, pretends to comprehend. But if confcioufnefs and perception are the fruit of di- vine efficiency and operation, then for theje powers creatures ^re dependent on God. The Dodor fpeaks of a power of exifting^ of being confcious., &c. in a man- ner wliich as truly implieth ifidcprndency^ as that power o? felf-motion^ for which he is fo llrenuous an advocate. If by thefe expreflions he means a power in men, tlie fruit of the exertion and influence of which is their exigence or confcioufnefs, he is very fafe in concluding that fiich powers as truly imply independence on God, as it can be fuppofed to be implied in a power of felf- motion, felf-determination. And whenever v/e con- cede, that human nature is endowed with fuch powers, we will then readily admit that the Doftor's " clear and conclulive reafonings" are quite fufficient to filence all our objeftions againft that opinion of a power of fclf-motion in men, which arije fro?n an apprehenfion of its inconfiflency with that dependence which all creatures have upon God^ 3. Inilead of fairly anfwering the objection, there- fore, the Doftor only lets us know, that the very fame objeAion lieth with equal weight againft fome things which he fuppofeth we receive for truth ; and, there- fore, that it is unreafbnable/or us to mention it. ""l he obje«llion againft his opinion, as he himfelf itatcs it, let it be remembered, is, that it implieth ability in men to a6{ independently fro7n any fuperior caufe. And is not the very thing which he is pleading for, a power in men to originate their own internal cxercifes and mo- tions ? — even fo that the nature of thefe exercifes, and ^he direction of thefe motions, fhall be determined, not N 2 bv joo An essay on t'art h ^y any extrin/ic, but wholly by an iritrinfic caufe ? And doth not this imply, that thefe motions and exer- cises are independent of every thing extrinfic of the man whofe exercifes they are \ Doth not the Doctor's opinion, even by the very terms, imply that there are grounds for the objedlion which the maintainers of fate (as he is pleafed to term them) make againit it, viz. that it implieth an ability in the creature to ad independently from any fuperior caufe ? Is it not a j)ower of s&;.F-MOTioN that the Do<^or foflrenuoufly iirgeth ? And what can this povjer mean, unlefs it be, tliat for certain exercijes ayid motions we are dependent only on ourfeives— not on 2iUy foreign ^ extrinfic caufe ? For us to be independent on any fuperior caufe /o a* our adions^ is to have our aClions arife from no external, fuperior efficiency, or caufe. And when our aCiions^ arife from no fuch efficiency, then we aCi indepaidtntlyt pf any fuch efficiency. When our aCfions do arife from any external efficiency and influence, then they are not Jelf-origiiiated — we are not Jelf-moved, For Jelf-origitiated motion to be dependent on extrinfic caiije nnd inftuence^ for its exiflencc, is a contradiftion in terms. When the adion of the mind doth not arife from the influence of any external, fuperior caufe ; then it certainly nCteth independently of fuch caufe. Thcfdfalifis^ therefore, will doubtlefs think that there is weight in their objeftion, until a better and more; pertinent anfwer is provided, than th^ Do£tor hath given it. As to the Doc^tor^s argument from the feelings^ the experience of mankind, there certainly cannot be much weight in it. He fays, " We have all the fame expe* ^' rience, the fame marks and evidence, exactly, of our '^ having really a power of felf-motion, as the moft " rigid fatalifl could poffible contrive to require, if he " was to make the Jiippofition of a nian*s being endued " with that power." (p. 85.) This is a bare aflertion as to matter of faft. And the advocates for certain ^omiexion^ to be liire Mr. Edwards and his followers, as Sea. V. MORAL AGENCY. loi as confidently afTert, that *' all their feelings ^ their experience^ their perception and confcioulnels, are but precifely fuch as are perfectly confiflent witlr that eftabliflied connexion and previous certainty of things, for the belief of which they have had the opprobrious name of fatalifls fo liberally beftowed upon them.'' Jail as much weiglit as is laid upon the one of thcfe arguments or alTertions, muft alfo be allowed the other 5 by which means tliey will exaftly counterbal- ance and deftroy each other. III. That there is a previous certainty of all events »— a certain, infallible connexion in things — is abun- dantly manifell from the doftrine of the fore-know- ledge of God. That there is fuch a fore-knowledge of God, even of the volitions of men, the nioft hidden, fecret volitions and exercifes of their thoughts and hearts, is very clearly evident from the word of God, as well as from the conftant conformity of Divine Providence, in all ages, to the view and reprefentation of things given in his holy w^ord. And fmce God's certain fore-knowledge of all things is a doftrine con- ceded by the advocates for a power of felf-determina- tion in men, I (hall not think it neceflary to enter upon the proof of it ; but fliew the certainty with which this doctrine inferreth an eftablidied connexion in things, and a previous infallible certainty of all events which ever take place in the ?7wral^ as well as in the natural world. It is impoflible any event fliould be fore-known,, the futur^ exillence of which is uncertain. An)'- event, the future exiftence of which is in the nature of things uncertain, way fail of taking place. And to fuppofe that any fuch event fhould he fore-knowji,, very ill ton- fifteth with the pofTibility of its failing of ever gaining exiftence. This is juft the fame as to fuppofe that the exiftence of an event may be fore-knomn^ which yet '}}iay never take place. Fore^knoinled^e of an event is a knowledge of the certainty of the future exiftence of that event. But if there is not, in the nature of things, an 102 Aw E S S A Y on Part I, an abfolute certainty of the futare exigence .of an event ; nothing can be more inanifeflly abfurd, than to fuppofe that its future exiftence fbould be fore-, known. Knowledge of any thing, as it relateth to the prefent argument, is no other than tshe mind'syc'^Ko-, or- percezving^ its certainty. But to fuppofe that certainty ifhould h^feen and perceived where it is not^ and where it doth not exift^ is irrational and abfurd. Where there is fufficient ftrength of faculties, it is polfible that whatever doth exifl^ may be perceived and feen. But to lee things •which are not — which do not exi/I — t requires very peculiar i^cuKics, and a ftretch of powers, quite beyond all degree of human conception and com- prehenfion, and even dire^Uy co-ntradiftory thereto. An event which is contingent, and the exiflence of which is not now certainly fuiurey c2innot be feen to be future, by inunediate intuition ; for, by the fuppofition^^ there is no fuch event cxi/ling. Strength of faculties, and quicknefs and accuteuefs of difcernment, better enable beings to fee and difcover whatever is — what-^ ever doth exijl. But no conceivable frrength of facul- ties, and enlargement of powers,, make any advances toward a difcovery and fight of what is not. Such an. event, could it be conceived of, could not be feen by means of any thing elfe ; for, by fuppofition, it is wholly unconneded with any thing elfe. Until, there- fore, they who oppofe the dodrine of an abfolute con-r. nexion in things, and an infallible antecedent certainty of all events, fhew us fome way in which events, fo contingent as they imagine humjin volitions are, may be certainly fore-known, we fliali.think the doctrine of the divine prefcience an infupejj'able difficulty in the way of their fcheme. As all events, the exillence of" •which is certain^ are capable of being fore-known / fo, on the other hand, all events which are capable of being /or Sea. VI. MORAL AGfiNCY, lo^ to take off the edge or abate the force of them. The principal argument which our Author ofFereth in con- futation of Mr. Edwards's reafonings, particularly on this fubjed^ is, that the doctrine of fuch an infallible connexion in things, as is inconfiftent with the power in queftion, makes God the Author of fin, and implieth the concurrence of poiitive divine efficiency to the taking place of fuch an event. Whether this is aii objeftion of any weight, and by any means fuflicient to overthrow the doctrine againft which it is brought, I fliall, by and by, confider as carefully as I can. Our Autiior, indeed, informs the public, in his pre- face, that *' the inquifitivc may find a full anfwer to " the principal arguments of Mr. Edwards's book, fpe- " culatively confidered, in Dr. Clarke's demonftration *' of the being and attributes of God." If the Doctor's anfwer is fo full and complete, our Author might tioubtlefs have given a fummary of it, in fo clear and ftriking a manner, and fet it in fo flrong and convin- cing a light, as would have put a final period to the debate on this intricate fubjeft. He hath not, howe- ver, feen fit to talce this method to elucidate his fub- jeft. The public, therefore, may perhaps diffent from the Ex — r in opinion, concerning the fulnefs and per- fpicnity of the Doctor's anfwer to the principal argu- ments of Mr. Edwards's book. I would, therefore, in this fee^ion, propofe the doc- trine of a power of felf-determination in the will, or of originating motioii in ourfelves, to free and careful examination. I confefs myfelf difficulted, however, to form any clear, determinate idea of the power in queftion. A power of felf-determination appears to me incapable of definition or conception. If I mifieprefent tlie opinion of our Author, and of Gentlemen on that fide of the queftion with him refpecfting liberty ; it is not with defign, but wholly for want of undcrftanding what the opinion and fentimcnt really is. In Ipeaking of the power which, in Lis view, is no- O cefiai y lo^ AnESSAYon ^ Partf. .cefTarjr to moral liberty and agency, our Author term- eth it '' a power of felf-determination," (p. 34. 88.) and, after Dr. Clarke,* *' a power of beginning mo- tion — a power of felf-motion,'* &c. (p. 93, 94, 95. marg.) It is fpoken of as a felf-jnoving j acuity — a principle or power o^ beginning motion, (p. 91. marg.) The Ex — r confiders it as a power whereby 77ien are the voliinta^ry.^ defigning caufes of their own volitions. (p. 81, 82.) It hence appears that the power which our Author infifts on as eflential to moral liberty, is a capacity, or faculty, with which moral agents are endowed, of beginning and originating their own internal motions and voluntary exertions : even fo that nothing but what is in the ■)nan^ and what properly belon^eth to him^ canjuftly be confidered as the Ci^/^/i? of his mental ex- ercifes and volitions. Accordingly he urgeth that we muft be the caufes of our own volitions . (p . 8 2 . ) And rep- refents the application of commands, invitations, moni- tions. Sec. as being coniiftent with 2. freedom to either fide. (p. 109.) This is the power — thefe are the fa- culties, which, in our Author's view, are eflential to moral aftion, virtue or vice, praife or blame. Moral action, therefore, upon thefe principles, is fomething of which there is no caufe, reafon, or ground whatfoever of its exiftence. *' For whatever '' exifts, muft either have come into being out of no- " thing * The Do£>or's pretended demonftration of the realSty of the exiftence of that kind of liberty and freedom of will which heconfidereth aseflential to the molality of aftions, drawn from the power there is efientially in Cod to begin motion ; •which power it is fuppofed he hath communicated to his creatures ; I muft beg Jeave to confider as a mere quibble upon the term motion. When he firft ad- vanceth his argument for freedom of luilh from a power in the Deity to begin mation ; his readers would naturally be led, from his manner of ufing the term, to underftand him to fpeak of external, material moticn, though, afterwards, the term is fo ufed as Xo coniey xhc xAsa. oi -voluntary exerelfi — internal motion. If the Dodor's argument for liberty is that there is a power in God. which, in kind and in a degree, he hath communicated to men, to begin external, material motion ; with whom doth he imagine that he is contending ? But becaufe there is a power in the Deity to begin external, material motion, doth it from thence follow that he hath a power to begin his own internal, -voluntary exercifes and motions ? Or from a power in men to begin fuch kind of motion, doth it at all follow, that they are poii'efled of that powtr of ivill and felf-determination which the Doctor urgeth ? His premifes and cdnfeqtience are certainly utter flrangers to each other. So w/ak an argument, from fo ftrong and mallerly areafoner, rendercth the caufe itleif, in whicli it is urged, juftly fufpicious. Sea. VI. MORAL AGENCY. '407 *' thing, abfolutely without a caufe ; or it muft have *' bfeen produced by fome external caufe ; or it muft *' be felf-exiftent ;" the two laft of which will not ei- ther of them be pretended of creatures. (See Dr. Clarke's Demonftrat. &c. p. 15. edit. 8.) This alfo is very manifeftly implied by the terms self-motion, SELF-MOTIVE, POWER, SELF-MOVING FACULTY, &c. It is, by the very terms, a motion or exercife,. for which there is no ground, reafon or caufe, out of it/elf and of what properly helongeth to its very nature. Nothing, therefore, can be more prepoflierous, than to attempt to give a reafon for the exiftence, or taking place, of that kind of adion^ of which our Author would predicate either virtue or vice, according to his own definition of it. The very attempt denieth the thing defigned to be illuftrated and proved. And yet our Author blames Mr. Edwards for not having fhown the caufe of volition. On the other hand, our Author blames Dr. Clarke for fpeaking of a groundy foundation^ caufe^ or reafon^ of God's being ; becaufe, as he fuppofeth, there is an utter impropriety in fup- pofmg any thing, in any fenfe, the prior ground of the jirft exiftence. (See p. 37, 38. marg.) And yet there is as manifeft an impropriety in attempting to give a resfon or caufe for the exiftence of that which is felf- originated ; as, to affign a prior ground of the firft exiftence. According to our Author's definition of the power in queftion, the following things, it may be obferved, are effential to moral adlion. I . That, immediately antecedent to choice, or vo- luntary exertion, man muft be perfeftly indifferent in the ftate of his mind ; without the leaft degree of in- clination, bias, or preponderation, one way or the other ; or, to one thing more than to another. Ac- cordingly we find that the advocates for the power under conftderation, exprefsly and avowedly plead for a liberty of indifference^ as being ellential to virtue or vice, praiie or blame. O 2 2. Anotlier 1o8 An essay oi^ Parti. 2. Another thing efTential to the power under codC- deration, is, that there fhould be no prevailing ten-« dency or preponderatioa, in the Hate of things, from outward objeds^ to any one particular choice or volun* tary exercife, rather than another ; from which ten- dency, or preponderation, there fhould arife a greater probability that one particular volition fliould take f lace, than another. All fuch prevailing tendency in outward objects muJH: infallibly be of the nature of that necellity, which, in our Author's view, is incon* fiftcnt with all ideas of moral defert in actions. For as far as there is a preponderancy and prevailing ten«» dency in things to one certain^ particular volition, rather than another ; fo far a connexion taketh place between volition, and fome antecedent, external caufe. But fuch a connexion as this, in every degree of it, the Kx — r infifts, h inconfiftent with that fovereignty over our own anions, which, in his view, is efTential to all ideas of moral defert. 5. In that indifference which is infifled on as effen-^ tlai to free and moral aftion, it is evident, man muft be either perceptive and confcions, or utterly uncon- Icious and impercipient. If, in that indifference, which, in cur Author's view, is efTential to the moral- ity of action, the mind is perfedlly u7iconJcious and ;:72- percipient ; it mufl be fuppofed, that, by an exertion of its own, for which (it is to be remembered) there was no antecedent caufe, reafon or ground^ and in v/hich it is, itfelf, utterly without any degree of con* fcioufnefs or perception, it awakened and rouled up itfelf into confcioufnels, a«5tivity and life. If, on the other hand, in that indifference which is immediately to precede the eleftion of the mind, in order that its choice may be free, it is percipient and con/cious ; it mufl be fuppofed that the mind takes into its view the ideas of things propofed to \X.s> free choice, and fur- ve^reth them in their leveral properties, relations and connexions, with a perfe(^ mdifference of mind, with- out the leafl bias or inclination one way or thc.othcr ; until Sea. VI. MORAL AGENCY. 1G9 until the noble, unfettered foul, by its non-fovcreign and arbitrary aft, (which, by the way, is antecedent to any degree of mentnl adioii and exertion) command* eth itfelf into a bias and preponderation of difpofition towards jome one of that variety of objefts which are ii;i view, rather than all others. All thefe things appear to me necefTary to that pow- er oi fclf-motion^ JeLf-cieter?mnation^ which, in our Au- thor's view, is eifential to moral agency, virtue and vice. For if there is any internal bias upon the mind, inclining and prevailingly difpofmg it to any particular aftion or choice, rather than its oppofite ; or, if there is any thing m the Itate, circumftances, lituation or connexion of o«z'Zi;d!/Y/ objetls^ ^vom. whence arifeth a prevailing tendency or preponderation, in any way, or on any account, to one certain, particular choice of the mind, rather than another ; in that cafe it is ma- nifeft that either this internal bias^ or the external cir^ cumflances of things, concur as cauje to the taking place of an af Part Iv and allprcponderation or tendency arifmg from out- ward circumflances, lituatioii or objects, to any par- ticular, definite choice ; is altogether inconiiftcnt witlv the idea of a finner's being ever nbandojied of God, and jjivefJ over to the cnnmiijjlun of fin. It hath been the general opimon of ProteRant Divines, that fmners arc^ fometimes, in fuc-h a ienfe abandoned of God, and given over to finning, as implieth a flrong, prevailing tendency in the ftate and circumflances of things, either internal or external, or both, to that moral evil- and wickednefs •which is exceedingly provoking to him, and which draweth down his difpleafure upon them. And this opinion is fufiiciently authorized by the Apoitle Paul, in his-Epiflle to the Romans. When he had been giving the character of the heathen world^ and mentioning their proncneis to idolatry, whereby they ""'changed tlic glory of the uncorruptible God,, into an image made like to corruptible mail, he fays, (ver. 24;) fVherefore^ aljo^ God gave them up to un- cle annejs throupji the lujis of their own hearts. And (ver. 26.) FoF this cauje God gave them up to vile cf-' fcCiioris . And even the Ex— ^r himfelf, though, as it :>ppears to me, in dire ft oppofition to the leading len- timents of his whole book, yet apjrears, by Ibme thingi; laid in it, to be of the fame opinion. In p. 107, he fi:)eak3 oi finners being abandoned and given vp of God y and formcth an argument' upon it, and draws a conclu- lion from it, as he imagincth.- in favour of a power of felf-determ-ination in m.en. It is difficult to conceive v/hat our Author can intend by the exprellion oifinners being abandoned and givenup of God^ fhort of a prevail- ing tendency in the ftate of things^ either internal or external, to that fin which is their ruin-^fome fuch tendency as is utterly inconfiflent with a freedom to either Jide, And it is- very raanifefl that this is the lenfe in which he ufeth tlie phrafe, by the argument which he foundeth upon it,- in order to eflablifli his own fentiment — ^a fentiment direftly repugnant to itj. and mofl perfcftly inconliflent with it.^ For as far as any ■f^ea.ri. MORAL AGENCY. viy nny of the determinations of the mind take place under fach an InHucnce as miiib certainly be implied in the oxpreHions of hc^iftg abandoned and given up ofGod^ (if •they have any meaning) they cannot he fclf-oriiyinated and fcdf-movcd ; and, therefore, in our Author's fenfe of freedoii;!, cannot be free. If perfons being aban- cioned and given up of God doth not import any pre- vailing tendency and preponderation, in the (late and circumftances of things, to vice and wickednefs, rather -than to virtne and holinefs ; certainly no weight can be laid upon the fnppofition that fmners are fom,etimcs abandoned and given np of God, as an argmiient to prove that a ^owcy o? /rl.f-determi?2aiion^ and a freedon: to either ftde^ is a privilege of v^'hich they had been hi^retofore poiiefTed : if it dnth import fnch a prevail- ing tcndesicy an-d preponderation, t&c. then fiirely that liberty, which is efTential to the fnoralitv of a(?}:ions, is coniillcnt v/ith a prevailing tendency 'in the ftate and circumftances of things, either external or internal, or botli, to thofe aftions and determinations which arc denominated morally evil. To fpeak of fmners being abandoned and given np of God,'^ withont importing a prevailing tendency to ilich choice and aiftions as are morally evil, in diftinc- \ion from thofe which are nioraily virtuous and good ; is to talk unintelligibly and witliout meaning. To I'pcak of a power of felf-motion, felf-determ'ination, as ibmething v/liich is confiftent with a prevailing ten- dency in things to one prrticular event ip diltinclion from all others, and in oppofition to them, is to uie terms in a manner equally unmeaning and unintelligi- ble. Either, therefore, there can no fuch thing in nature take place, refpei^ling any man, as may, with the lead appearance of propriety, be termed his being; abandoned and criven up of Cod ; or, on the other hand, that liberty which confifteth in a freedom to either fide — a freedom from all preponderating tendency and bias, in the ftate and circumftances of things," to one particular choice and a: Parti. And certainly a propriety and fitnefs in things, which is not the leaft regardeJ in the determination of the will, can no more be a ground and reafon of thofe de- terminations, than if the idea of propriety did not cy.\il in the mind, and the mind was wholly unconfcious both of obje<5b and iitnefs. it is, therefore, as fuppoi- abie (and, upon our Author's principles, mafl he ac- knowledged to be fo) that voluntary motion and ex^- ertion fliould arife inftantaneoufly and immediately out of non-entity, without the operation and influence of any extrinfic caufe, as that it Ihouid take place in a mind which hath idea and xjbjetft in vie-w, without the concurrence and influence of any inch caufe.- If it fliould be faid, that it is not pretended that hu- man volitions take j)lace in the fame manner as any event muit be conceived to do (were any fuch thing pofiible) which fliould ftart into life and being imme- diately out of non-exiftence, without the concurrei;c€ of any extrinfic caule ; but that Man, who is created and upheld every moment by the mighty power of God, is the proper author and caufe of his own \ oli- libus ; I'uch a fnppofition would not at all relieve the opinion of a povycr of felf-motion, fclf-detcrmination, from the difliculties which embarrafs it i; nor would it in " ahfohitcly i"diff:rcnt. In which l.i't'V r.->fc there may !jc iin-y ^icd yaf-jo tQ " fcrs ihat which is indiffirent before moiives ; •' this, I fay, is to ciiwde the mird fiom tiio m'^tlvei, as if tliey were ivithoui the «« mind, as the weight is diflinct from the balance ; and as if the mbid liad, bc- " iides moiives, other difp-Jitioiis to act, by virtue of wliich it eould rye:/ or accept *<■ tiie ifi(,ii-i'es. Whereas, in truth, the motives comprel'.cnd all the d[fi>'Jlti:,ns <' which the mind can have to act voluntarily ; for they include not only tiie rear <<■ fana-, but alfo the inclina>iovti arifing fro'u paiTions, or otlier precedinji; iinpref- " fions. Wherefore if the mirjd (hould prefer a weak itfliittUinn to a Ihonc one> «■ it would ad againft itl'clf, and othcrvvife than it h difpc/ed to ad. Wliicli • ' n-'ows that the Auilior's notions, contrary to mine, are luperlicial, and appear •' to have no folidity in them, when they are well contidered. To alibrt, alfn> f* that the mind may hai-e good reaf'jns to nSt, when it has no motives, and iL-hen «' thi»pr^ r.fc a/>/olutei-y indifferent, as the Author explains himfelf licre ; this,'. I •« lay, is a manitelt contradiction : for if the mind ha.s good reafon s for takinq; the " /"^r/ it takes, then the thlntcs are not /^ to tjie inind." (Fjperb be- tween Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Claike. p.- 121. and 16:-. i6y.) fica.VI. MORAL AGENCY. 119 in the leaft ^iTiH us in forming any ideas and concep- tions of the power in queftion, its properties, or the law and manner of its operation. If man is the aiitJior and caula of his own volitions, it is unc]ueilionable that ht mud, in fome way, exert XuniiiiM i?i order to produce them. C^/z^/c- always takes place and is exerted previous to the exillence of its eiieiTt. if man is the caujc of his own acfts of will, he mull excFcile forae pov/er in order to produce thejc ;-v(:ls. 'I'hat which doth noth'uiir — cxcrtcth nothing in order to an ejJ\'Ci^ and fo, of courfc, antecedent \q^ 1\\q, cffetT; — hath nothing in it of that relation which M'p mean to expreis by tlie' word cauje ; and is llript of every thing whereby it is fitted for being the reajon of an event. If man, therefore, is the ccade of his own volitions, ho muft be fo by Jome exertion. To repre- fent him to be tlie cauJe of his own afts of v/ill, other- wife tlian by any exertion, is to bring into view a caiife of fuch a fmgular and peculiar nature, as containeth in it no manner of realirn for the exiilence of its cffeiTi:. If man is the canje of iiis own volitions, by Jome exer- tion of his own ; it niiul be an exertion which is either voluntary^ or involuntary . If the exertion, by which man is the caufe of his own afts of will, is voluntary ; then this exertion itfclf is an aCl of the will ; — there being no juft ground of any diilinction between an nit cf the luill^ and voluntary exertion. And, confequently, this exertion of man, whereby he is the caufe of his own acTis of will, is itfelf the very elfeci, of which wc are endeavouring to explore the caufe, in man. To fay that man, by his own free, voluntary exertions, produceth and is the caufe of his own acls of will — free, voluntary exertions — makes not the lead advances toward a folution of the queftion, " What is the r^'r^t'- of an a<5b or exertion of the will V nor at all alliftetk us in exploring it. To fuppofe this exertion of men, whereby they beget and produce their own v^olitions, to be involuntary^ and to have no exerciie of will in it, v/ould be attended with feveral difficulties. For, I. Such T2d Air E S $ A Y o>? t^art L 1. Such nn exertion as this muft imply fbme faculty or power in human nature, which hath never yet been difcoverecl ; but hath hitherto efcaped the notice and obiervation of the mofh fubtile and critical inquirer. It is not the faculty of uncle rfl an dinsi • foi"i with the diftates of this facult)', it is acknowledged, the choice of the mind is, in no degree, connefted ; being often in oppofitionto them< And that^ furely, cannot be the cmije of an event, the whole influence of which (all the influence which it is, by the nature of it, fitted to have) is utterly refifted by the event. And what powers there are, in human nature, for any to exert, befide thofe of underflanding and will, we muft wait to be informed by fuch as urge, that all the a^ls of ouf wills are the effects of our own exertions. 2. To fuppofe that fome human exertion, which is withoilt volition and properly diftinft from it, is yeS the cmife of acls of will in us ; is to fuppofe volition to be not only connedled with foiiie antecedent caufe, but that fuch an one as is entirely involuntary^ and therefore neceff'ary^ with all that necellity which carl be predicated of any mere natural efi'edt. This is at once inconliftent with all the ideas of liberty given by" our Author, and utterly fubverfive of a power of lelf- motioji, felf-determination. 3. If volition is an eifed: of fuch hiiman exertion a^ is withoilt volition^ it muft, of confequence, be an ex- ertion in which 77ian is not an agent. How any man fliould exert himfelf and be an agent in any thing wherein he hath no exercife of will and voluntary choice, is quite inconceivable. Nor is it lefs difficult to give a reafon wliy fiich an exertion fliould be attri- buted unto him as his own ad. If the exertion, which is the caiije of an aft of will in man, is without any adl or agency of man's will in it ; it muft, of confequence, be an exertion in which man is entirely and perfectly pafllve ; and, therefore, an exertion which can, M'-ith no propriety, be termed our adioii. And if it is a caufsy in the exercilc and operation of which man is paflive Scft.Vi. MORAL AGENCV. li! jDaiUve and involuntary ; it may as well be external as internal^ as to any advantage mankind can ever reap from it, or any improvement it makes in liberty, by removing it farther from neceffity. If the power, which mankind are fnppofed to hav6 over their own wills, and to produce adcs arid exertions of will in themfelves, hath no degree of choice, pre- ference; or volition in it ; it 77jay be that it never will beget, or produce, choice. And a man may exercife his fovereignty over his own will, to as little purpofe as a poor bCggar, covered with rags, exerts his fove- reign authority over kingdoms and realms, v/hich his fick, difordered brain hath made him imagine are fub- jed: to his fole cdmmand and arbitrary will. That muft furely be a very miferable and impotent fort of a power over the will, which, in its ntmoft ftrength of exertion, will never produce the leaft degree of voli- tion, or choice — v^olition and choice being, neverthe- lefs, under fome other and more efFeclual law of operation. And yet it is not at all furpriling, that this fovereign power over the will fliOuld never bring the leafl: degree of volition or choice into exiflence ; be- caufe, by the fuppolition, it is never exerted luith any Juch defign and choice^ or put fortli/^;r any fiich purpofe. It is altogether inconceivable how that power of will ihould, in any wife, account for the taking place of choice^ and volition, which hath no greater tendency to fuch an event than to its contrary, even in the ut- moft ftrength of its exertion ; and wliich, indeed, doth not prefer choice, or tend to it more tha:n to its oppo- fitc. "VVhoever fpeaketh of a felf-originating motion in the mind of man, or of an exercife of will begun by itfclf, conveys no manner of idea beyond that of the bare exercife of volition and motion. There i^ fome- thing, in the very nature of things, repelling every idea of any thing f;irther in men, and refifting every conception of it : the very idea (if I may lb call it) of a power of felf-motion, felf-determination, in vari- Q. ous I2'2 An ess ay on Part ^, ous ways deftroying itfclf, every way militating againft it le If and its own exiftence, and entirely fliutting itfelf out of the world. Nothing farther, it appears to me, can be faid, to' define this felf-detcrminating power of the will, than, that the nature and quality of volition is to be dtter- rnimd by fomething which is to be found in volition itfelf, and belonging to it : jull as we fay, that a cer- tain difpofition of equal lines detertnines or conJUtiites a fquare ;■ and' equal diflance from a centre, a circle. In fuch a fenfe as thig^, both a fquare and a circle are determined by tliemfelves ; \,t. J elf- determined. If this is what Gentlemen' mean by a felf-determining power, they will, probably, have no one to contend with them. If they intend any thing farther, it mufl' be fomething, of whicli no difl:in<5l, determinate idea can be formed-; and which, indeed, the very iuppofi- tion of its being would fhut out of exiflence. That aft's of will fhould be connedled, in their exifl- ence, with Ibme antecedent and extrinfic caule, and the agent be efleemdd virtuous, or vicious, for exer- cifes of will which take place in fucli a connexion ; is a fentiment, which, in our Author's opinion, is embar- raffed with infuperable difficulties. The Ex — r fup- pofeth, that if it might be admitted that men are tlie voluntary:^ defigning cauj'e of thofe imvard ads wherein the nature of virtue and vice confifs^ this would unravel the myflery, and folve the whole difficulty, if^tt^^. 67.) This, however, would be^ at befl, but running into One difficulty, in order to avoid another. It is here conceded, that th are confequently deilitute of all degrees of virtue and vice'. Nor are th.efe the only ways in which our Author's fentiments are incQnfillent with the very being either of virtue or vice. For it is a favourite i£ntiment of his, that there is no more in the cffeft, than in its caufe. He fays (p. 58^) " There is no evading the " confequence, indeed, that the whole guilt of men's '* evil difpofitions is chargeable on God, not them- *' felves, or on blind neceflity and fiitality, if the " things Mr. Ed\vards advanceth be true." — Meaning, doubtlefs, what he advanceth in proof of an ellabiiih- ed, unfailing connexion between all events or effefts, and fome antecedent caufe. Thofe volitions, tlierc- fore, which arc the cffeCls of our ov/n voluntar)' de- % 2 ii^n, 324 An E S S A Y ON Part L fign, cannot, for this very reajon^ have either virtue o;- predicated of them. Further, '' There being no more in the effect, than in its *' caufe,-' it is, upon the principle I am confidering, ridiculous to fpeak of thofe volitious which are the effects of fuch an aft of the will as doth not arife out of a former voluntary defign (it being itfelf //Vy? and original in the ferics) as having moral quality in it, or being capable of virtue or vice. The Jelf-moved^ J^lf- determincd aft pf will, is neither virtuous nor yiciouSj becaule it is not the fruit or eJfeCt of our own volun- tary defign. That which is the effeil of our originaL ^r/? voluntary defign, cannot be virtuous, or vicious, for this reafon, viz. That there was no virtue nor vice in its caufe. So that, upon the whole, nothing can be more irrational, inconfillent and abfurd, than to fuppofe that there can be any fuch thing, in the Vniverfe, as we mean to expreis by the terms virtue and vice. That original voluntary defign, which is the caiife of our own inward afts, cannot be, itfclf, vicious, for this obvious reafon, viz. That it doth not arif^ out of a vicious cauje, Thofe inward afts, which are the effcds of pur o"vvn voluntary defign, cannot be vicious, for two reafons ; The firll is, that; they are ejfeds-^not fqlf-originated, felf-moved ; the fecond is, that (there being no more in the effeft thau in its caufe) they did -not arife out of a vicious cauJe, Thus doth it appear, that the idea of felf-motion, felf-determjnatioa, that is, a motion originated by itfelf, and by its own caufai influence brought into exiflence, is " in itfelf as evidently and clearly a *' contradiftion, as that two and two fliould make five,"! or any other the moil abfurd and contradiftory fuppo- fition that can be named. And therefore, though challenged in fo high a tone, by fo great a man as Dr. Clarke, we fiiall not be " afliamed" utterly to deny that tlierc is, or ever was, or can be, any fuch thing ; or, that any man ever had an idea of it. And here, if I might be allowed j 1 would tranfcribe a fentence froR^ vSea. VI. MORAL AGENCY. i-j" from the Doftor, and apply it to the prefent cafe. His words are thefe, "" A man of any confiderahle *' modefly Vv^ould be ahnoft tempted rather to doubt *' the truth of his faculties, than to take upon him to *' aiTert one fuch intolerable abfurdity, merely for ." avoiding another.'' (ed. 8. p. 85.) From fach a delcription and repreientation of thofe internal exercifes and motions which are, alone, in the fenfe of thefe Gentlemen, the fubjefts of moral defert : -s—That they mufl be the fruit and effed of onr own voluntary defign ; yet J elf-originated^ felf-moved : — That, in order to their being denominated morally evil, they mufl arife out of an evil cauje^ and be the eff'eds of it ; and yet, in order to their being denom-i- nated morally evil, it is abfolutely neccflary that they fliould be utterly unco?ineded with any extrinfic^ (f.nte' cedent caufe /—rThat their moral evil doth not confift in the nature of them, but their caufe ; and yet that they have nothing belide their nature predicable of them ; out of themfelves, and diftinguifliable from their peculiar nature^ they having no caufe : — And, finally, that if they are not caujed by our own volun- tary defign, they cannot be juftly chargeable with mo- ral evil ; and yet if they are caujed by any thing out of themfelves, they can, for that very reajon^ have no moral evil predicated of them :— rl lay, from fuch di^^- criptions and definitions, as thefe, of thofe kinds of exercifes and motions which alone are capable of mo- ral defert, what can any one think — what can the world of mankind conclude— but that all our ideas of jnorality are imaginary and vain, and the very terms virtue and vice^ empty and infignif^cant ? — That the very ideas of moral evil and fm are the offspring of the frighted imaginations and difordered brain of ig- norant, pedantic reclufes, educated in the gloomy vale of fuperftitioii and ignorance — prejudices from which the mind can be unfettered only by breathing the freer air of focial pleafiire, and thus opening and expanding,, to receive n^ore noble und liberal ideas and fcntiments of j;jS An E S S A Y on Part T, of things ? What lefs, than to eradicate from the mind^ ofnjenthofe uneafy apprehenfions, wliich, notwithT ftanding all the arts oi philojophy^ will many times get poiTellion of them, can people in general apprehend to be the delign of Gentlemen, who, in their definitions of moral evil, make ufe of fuchnice, fubtilc and pecu- liar diflindtions — fliifting and changing, and affirming and denying, in the very fame breath, one and the fame thing ? According to fuch like reafonings as- thcfe, who but muft apprehend that the natural notion? of men, conterning moral good and evil, are an elfcrt of that extraordinary machinery which is fuppofed by a late w*riter * to have been introduced by the wile Author of Nature, that we might receive a nice and ariificial £tt of feelings, merely for the fake of giving confcience a commanding power and influence. But it feemeth unnecelfary any farther to purfue the argument \ efpecially fmce the objeftions made by Mr. Edwards againft a power of felf-determination in men, and his clear, nervous and conclufive reafoning and argumentation againft the poflibility of any fuch power, are by our Author pafled over in filence, and left in their full ftrength. But before I finifli the feftion, I beg to be indulged in a conje6ture concerning the rife and origin of the notion of this myfterious, incomprehenfible power in men. I cannot but apprehend, that the opinion arofe from a degree of abflraftion, in the ideas of men, or exercifes from agents ; which is a refinement far above vulgar underftandings, if not above truth itfelf. From this abll:ra &c. See p- an* .Sea. VL MOllAL AGENCY. 127 tal, voluntary exercife) and agent m'a.y jujily be confid- ered under thefe different predicaments, and as ful- taining the different relations to each other which \vt mean to exprefs by the terms caufe and effcd. The action of a man noteth only a certain mode of his ex- iftcnce ; it being merely an accidc'ut^ of which man is t\\QJubjtCi, There is as little reafon in confidering ?nn.n and his exercife as diflinft things, fuflaining the different relations to each other of caufe and effeCl^ as there is for making a like diftin <« to aflc this here ? You have no need to alk it for the underftanding of what '« I have fpoken. It can ftand on its own legSi wltiiout flying to that foreignt "f or remote help.-— — Let it come which way it will, you fee it doth not excufe ; «' and fo do all men, whatfoever they may lay to the contrary." Trueman'S Difcourfe of Natural and Moral rmpotcncy. page 14a. 5fca. til. MORAL AGENCY.' ti9 S E C t. vir. U'^ here in ii is JJiown^ that ihe dodf-ine cfnh infallible previous certainty of all hiunan volitiotis doth not im- ply that mankind are biit mere rnachines, THE advdcatfes for a po-^er of felf-deteffhinatiori in men loudly exclaim againlT; the doiHirine of an sntecedent infallible! certainty of the vohmtary exer- difes of m€^n, as being utterly inconfiftentwith all ideas <5f moral liberty ; fubjeding all the actions of mankind oral per- feftions of God, and making him '' the almighty mi- iJifter of/rt/d'.'" (S'eep. 81 — 2—3.) Here he difTents from Dr. Clarke. The Doctor diftrnguifheth between natural and moral neceffity : this d^iftincftioa our Au- thor cxprefsiy denieth (p. 81.) And his argument (p. 61 .) is founded on the fame fuppofition. But upon the very fuppofition of an abfolute moral neteffity, fuch an one as inferreth aS infallible a certainty as ?iny natural neceffity which can he conceived of, it is, that the Dodor founds his demonftrative arguments of the moral attributes and perfetflions of G6d. He faith Cp. 116. edit. &.) that '' 'tis evident He (God) rouft R '^ c.f 130 ■ An E S S A Y ON Parti. " oi neceffity do always what he knows to be fitteft to " be do7ie.*'- And in p. 118. he faith exprefsly, thaf the " moral attributes^' (of the Deity) " are really " " and truly neceffary^- by fuch a neceftity, as, though it " be not at alt inconfifLeut' with liberty, yet is equally *' certain^ infallible ^ and to be depended upon^ as eveif " the exiflence itfelf, or the eternity of God/' So the Docftor alloweth, that moral necejjity is evi- dently conliflent with natural liberty ; and, that it i^^ morally impoffible for a perfoii, free from alt pain and difordcr of body and mind, to endeavour to hurt him- felf; and faith exprefsly, that it is morally impoffible for him to choofe to do it. " Which alfo," continues- he, '' is the very fame reafon why the moft perfeft " rational creatures fuperior to men cannot do evil :' '' not becaufe they want a natural poiver to perform " the material a^ion ; but becaufe it is inorally impof- ^^ fible^ that, with' a ptrfecl knowledge of what is befty ^' and without any temptation to evil, their will fl)ould determine itfelf to choofe or a^ By moral exercife we mean that nffeOJ.on of ?nind^ of • which we are con/aous in our views of moral things : Or, whenever we feel either love or hatred. Sec. m tlie view of any charafter, or moral truth ; then we put fortli a moral exercife., and perform a moral aCiion. 'iliis is the iilea, which, I believe, is generally enter- tained of moral exercife and a€iion ; and which needeth no farther explanation, as it is fomething of which every one hath a confciQufnefs within himfelf, and daily experienceth in his own bread. On the other hand : Mechanical motion is that which, in the fubjeft, is without either will., conjcioujnefs., per- ception or defign. Whatever motion we behold, which appea,reth to be utterly involuntary and undefigning., li 2 we X32 An E S S A Y ON Part L %ve confider as altogether mechnnknl- — a motion arifing wholly from Ibme external iuiluence and operation ; being witlwut the leaji degree of voluntary inclination and defign. Thus we ternrx the motions of the earth, and other bodies which corapofe the material fyftem, inechanical. And after the fame manner do we fpeak of the afcending of vapours, the blowing of the winds, Jhe motions of clocks, watches, &c. The efFefts which we behold in thefe natural bodies, we never jconfider as the fruit of any voluntary intention, medi- tation or defign, in the bodies themfclves which are |the fubjefts of thsfe vifiblc effects : but the changes jind alteratJions which we obfcrve in them, we confider as the mere pfteds of fomc external influence and foYce. Thefe, it .appears to me, are the ideas which men generall}'' have of ?rioral exercijes^ and of mechanical motions ; ideas as diftinft frqm each other, as voluntary and involuntary^ deftgning and iindefigned. If thefe definitions ar.e juft, can any thing be more imreafonable than to coniider voluntary, d,efigning a- gents, as but mere machines, becaufe there*is an ante- cedent ground or reafon of their mental exercifeS and volitions ? VVhen men are agents in any thing, is not this a fufficient reafon why they fhould be praifed or blamed, according as the action is either morally good or evil .''—And that, even though there was an ante- cedent caufe or reafon of the aftion, in the operation and influence of which they themfelvcs, were not agents or aciive ? Are men in any mcaiure the lefs vo- lufitary, aftivc and defigning, in their mental and mo- ral exercifes, bccaufe of any antecedent ground or reafon there may be of thefe their mental excrciles, in tlie influence and operation of whicli reafon, caufe or j^round, they themlelvcG are net defigning and volun- tary ? As v.^cll might we fay that the moral being man^ bccaufe for his exiflence he is wholly dependent on O.od, and is entirely the woikmanfhip pf God, is but a ijir.re machine. And if men are not the lefs voluntary by rpj^ioji of an^^ previous caufe there is of their men- Sea. Vlf. MORAL AGENCY. 133 lal inclinations and exertions ; why is the opinion that there is, in fa reader to iudt?^-- 134 An E S S A Y ON Part {, wickednefs I And whether, after it is conceded that, even upon fuppofition of a previous, infaUiblc certainty of the volitions of men, they are the doers and ac'rors of wickednefs, there can be any reafon or room for the objeftion, that the do£lrine of fuch an infallible previous certainty of all events, makes men but mer9 machines, and borders too much upon the atheiilicaJ. notion of fate, to be entertained by Chriftian divines I If it is once granted that it is criminal to be the doers^ the adors of v/ickednefs ; the grand obje«^ion againftthe Calviniftic cjo^trin^ refpevn ad:s of willy then, certainly, upon the ohjtdor's plan, afts of will are bat mere eiVeds ; — and fiich, too, as are abfolutely and infcillibly conne«5led with their pofif.ive (and I Blight juftly add) involiiiitary cauft .•—-which certainly vcr^eth upon the obnoxious doctrine of fate. Befides, if man is the dc/igning caufe of his own vo- litions, it muft doubtleis be that he is fo by zvohuitary defign ;' and this^ affo, the effect of a /or ;?jfr voluntary defign, and fo on, until we come to the 'volition which is origina'l and firft, witho-ut any going before it. And this firft, original volition mu(^ be either an event Vithout a7iy caufe ; 6r arife from fome foreign, ex- trinfic caufe ; which again, upon the objector's prin- ciples, introduceth the gloomy^ iyrannical doctrine of fate. For volition to arife out of no caufe whatfoever, and be an event for which there is abfolutely no rea- fon and gro^irnd, is' as inconfiftent v/ith liberty and freedom, as- the opinion of an antecedent certainty of all events. For upon the objesftor's principles, it is necefiary that volition ftiouM arife out of a free caufe. For volition to arife out of no cailfe, and thus be an eveat abfokitcly un-accountable and for which ho pof- fible reafon- can be given, makes it as undefigning and ntceflary, as the fuppofition of its abfolute, infaHible' connexion v/ith fome extrinfic caufe. For it to arife dut of any cauje^ as its eifett, fuppofeth it, upon our Author's principles, to be a motion which, is merely iliechanical. But it being t. maxim w^th the Ex — r, that there is no more in the effect than in its caufe, to fuppofe* that volition arifeth out of man's voluntary defign, as its caufe, will make man himfelf but a mere machine. So that, even upon- the objector's own prin- ciples, as truly as on our?,, man, however curious, is yet but a mere machine. There is no way, upon tlie i:)rincipres of Gentlemen who 1^6 An E S S A Y on Parti. "Vvho lir^e fuch objeftions as thefe, for any one to be- come really blame-worthy and criminal, unlefs he is the caulb — the pofrtive Iburce and efficient author — of liis own whole exillence : all dependency for life, be-" ing or exercife, invelving in it the nbjurd., inconftfient dodrine of fate And it is indeed quite as conceivable, that a creature fhould be the politive, voluntary, de^' figning caufcof his whole exillence, as of any part of it ; or, that a fubjedl lliouid be the r^7///c of its omi? accidents.' I think, therefore, while it is allowed, as it ccvtainly mud be, that, even upon the do<^rine of a certain^ eflablilhed' connexion in things, men art doers — adors of wickedncfs ; and that they exert adls of will— ^a-- ercife voluntary defign ; there can be no weight in the objeclion, that, upon this hypothefis, they are but mere machines. It rnufl be manifeft to every one, who will attentively ccnfider the matter, tha:t we ufe the word^ mechajiical^ not to exprefs the connexion of any thing with fome antecedent caufe, ground or reafon of its exigence ; but merely to note the quality of an efl'cfty as being without voluntary intention and defign. Ilie word Vriechankal is not ufed to denote the relation of effe<^, but the nature and quality of it, as being without will and without defign. So that although all events' may equallV faftain the relation of effefts, yet they are not all mechanical ; fome being voluntary and defign-> i'ng ; others, without intention, or defign. IfbyFATEis meant a blind, undefigning neceility of events ; every impartial, candid mind, will eafily difcover the unreafonablenefs of charging the doftrine of an antecedent, infallible certainty of all events, as favouring of the antient, hcatheniih opinion of fate. But if by the term,^ as ufed by modern divines, be meant nothing more than an infallible^ previous cer- tainty of every, even the mofl minute, event which ever taketh place in any part of the moral or natural fyftem,' 1 am willing, for my own part, to allow myfclf a Sfidl. VIII. MORAL AGENCY. 137 a maintainer of the dodrine of fate* (though I greatly diflike the term. ;) and fhall thhik mylelf fufficiently kept in countenance by the greuteft philofophers in all ages, as well heathen as chriftian — by the moll eminent divines in the early ages of the church — by the Aflcm- bly of Divines at Weflminfler — and, finally, by the holy fcriptures themielves, which mod fully and ftrongly afTert the unpopular doctrines of prcdeftina- tion, and the abfolutenefs and uuiverfality of the di- vine decrees. Thefe are the doftrincs which, there is abundant reafon to think, are, at bottom, fo difguftful and unpleafing to men ; and which are meant to be Secretly wounded by the hard names of necejjity and fate. Sect. VIIL H'^herein the Ex — r's rerifo72ings^ in fever al parts of kit performance -which have not yet been taken notice of are particularly confidcrcd. THOUGH I am humbly of opinion that what Mr. Edwards hath faid directly upon the fubjeft of the government and detemiinntion of the will by motives^ is not altogether ccrrecl:, but liable to Jbme of the ex- ceptions which the Mr. — r hath taken againft it ; flill, S it * Mr. Leibnitz, in his fifth paper to Dr. Clarke? in anfwer to the Doflor's charge againft him of maintaining the doftrine oifatt, faith? '• As to the notion <• of fatality, which the Author lays alfo to my charge, this is anotlit;r sinbi- •' guity. Tliere is a.fatum mahometanntn-, a fatutr. Jlolcum-, lu'.d a fw.um cLriJilj- *•■ num. The Turkijh fare will have an c_^' J? to happet», even though its r.-j;//? •' fhould be avoided ; as if there was an abfclute necrjfity. The SvAcal fate will •♦ liave a mart to be quiet> lecaif he >nufi ha-vi: fatieiae, ii.be:Lrr he iviU or rt'itt " fince it is impoflible to reliU the courfe ot things. But Mis agreed that there • » is K fiitum chr'iJl'ianutH^ a certain dejtiny oi evcxy i\\\n^, .refulated by the fore^ •« knuivlcd^i- akdfrovider.ee of Gsd. Fatum ij derived fiomf.tii ; that i£, to pro- «' nou'tre, to decree ; andi in its right fcnlCi it fi^'tiities the decree of providence. •» And thofe who fuhmit to it through a knoiviiJge of the divine perfeifianst «» whereoi' the love of God is a conlequencci have not only patiunce, uke the "heathen phuolophcrs, but arc alio au'entcd with wh.^.t is ordained b} God» »» knowing that he docs every thing yi>- the hejl ; and not only for the greatejf »' gycd i.t gt/iaal, but alfo for the greateft particular good of thof.; th-it iove liini- " See a CoUeSIijtt cf papen uhich pajftd teiMeir. Mr. l.eii/:::x, iirtd Dr. Ciarkci p. »63, 165. 138: AnESSAYom Part I. it appears to me, he hath not treated that eminent Au- thor, in many refpciHis, with that jufLice and candour which diftinguilh the lovers of truth, and the upright and honeft inquirers after it. I fcall-inflance in a few particulars : 1. The Ex — r hath very particularly and exprefsly condemned him, as being in alliance, in fentinient, with fata/ij?j^ epiciirians and atheijts^ becaufe lie main- tains the opinion ofr,n abfolute previous certainty and infallible connexion in things, and exprefsly denieth a power of feif-determination in men ; and yet has taken no notice of the arguments by which Mr. Edwards fupporteth his own opinion, and refutes thofs of his adverfary. It is remarkable, that, through our Author'3 whole performance, there is nothing faid to expofe the ibphiftry of the arguments which Mr. Edwards hath made ule of in proof of an infallible antecedent cer* tainty of all events, aird Ihew the wcaknefs and futil- ity of them ; and that his clear and very ftriking reafonings, againfl a power of felf-determination in men, are wholly palTed over in fdence. Herein, it appears to me, our Author hath done juftice, neither to Mr. Edwards, nor to himfelf. Not to Mr. Ed- wards ; in fuppofrng that fome incorreftnefs of ex- preilion, or even fentiment, rcfpeding the influence of motives upon the human luill^ fo to weaken the force ot liis arguments for the grand point in debate between the Calvinifts and Arminians, as to render them un-^ worthy of any farther notice, or i^egly : Nor to hivi- Jelj\ in not giving arguments, of fucli peculiar perfpi- cuity and ftrength, any greater weight in his own mind, 2. Our Author frequently afTerts, that Mr. Edwards denieth interiial liberty^ or that the ivill is free. (Sec part i'. £cCt. 3.) And faith, that it is' contrary to the general docTirine of his book, that " the adts of the will are free.'' (See p. 67 .^ All that our Author can with juflice found this charge againfl Mr. Edv/ards upon, is, liis conftantly denying, that ads of the will arc Sea.;VlIL MORAL AGENCY, 159 .are to be ccnfidered as the fniit of our oiun pleafure ; and, that this is a conlideration neceflary to either the virtuoiifnefs or vicioufuers of volitions. If by free is meant fomething which is the fruit and conjeqvence of the pleafure of the mind^ and that no a ^jt^jft' ««'«/« ; that a man can neither be counted good and lionelt, or bad and dilhonclt, for his agility or comelinefs, duljiffsi hlcckilhnefs, or acutenefs ; but may be (having fuch power and doing accordingly) admired, though not praifed ; and for the defect of fucli power may be pitied, but not blamed orpuniiiicd. And this impotency may be a puniihment, but not a fin. The moral and ethical aci or habit is jud contrary. It is that which \\ laudable or vitu|)crablc, and that which a man may be looked on as honeft or dilhoneft for. Now natural impotency ii always, in this fenfe, of fomfthing that a man cannot d^, if he would never fo much , or hath not ths very faculty of willing >t- Tl«e Seft.VIII. MORAL AGENCY. 141 4. Mr. Edwards hath infifted, that the virtuoiifnefs and vicioufncfs of difpoiitions, habits of mind and in- clinations, are to be fought wholly in thefe difpofitions and inclinations themfclves ; and not, in any meafure, in their caufe. This do6lrine of Mr. Edwards, the Ex— *r reprefentcth in fuch a manner and in fuch terms as greatly tend to betray unwary readers into very wrong and falfe apprehenlions of the real opinion and fcntiments of that eminent author. He fays (p. 57.) '^ What doth it amount to ? The plain " truth is" (oa Mr. Edwards's principles) " that *' when we fet ourfeives to judge of human aftions, ''• we muft have no confideration of the fource of " them, but entirely detach them from their caufes.' *' Be the efficient caufe who or what it will, all we *' have to attend to, is the ellcft produced — by this " we muif eltimate the goodnefs or wickednefs of *' men — I" The term action^ is mod: commonly ap- plied to external^ bodily exertions. It is a didlate of common fenfe, that, in judging o^ aLlions^ in this feufe of the term, we muft look wholly to x\\c\v fource^ and by this' only eftimatc the goodnefs or wickednefs of men. Mr. Edwards is fo far from having faid any thing inconliftent with this opinion, that he hath offer- ed unanfwerable arguments in fupport of it. And yet our Author hath expreflcd himielf, on this head, in terms naturally adapted to perfuadc his lefs accurate and judicious readers, that Mr. Edwards was fo weak as to imagine that the commendablenefs or criminality of the outward actions of men do not at all depend upon The mir^il impotericy is of fomethin^, that a man bath the natural faculty to will, or can do it if he would ; but is hindered only by moral vicious habits Irorn willing or doing it. (page 4.) Thi« moral impotericy doth not excufe from fault, 9r make the threat^nin^s unjuft. Nay, it is alio in thi? contrary to natural (which I would have you ob- ferve and confider well. To convince you of the great dilVerence) ; that the natural impoteiicy, the greater it is, by lb much the more it doth letien the fault in not .obeying the command ; and the leis it is, by fo much the more it doth >;icaten the fault. But the greater it [moral impotency] is, the greater is the fault, and more blame-worthy, and farther from excufe j and the lefs it is, the lefs faulty, (page 31.) If any one defires to know whether Mr. Edwards's language is new, and be- fore unknown to i!ie church, let hiji> read this whole difcoarfe of Truman. 142 An essay on Part L ■upon the internal purpofes and defigns from -which the actions proceed. In this inftance our Author, I ap- prehend, evadeth the force of Mr. Edwards's argij- Kient ; and hardly fhews himfelf the candid, fair in- tjuirer. But will the Ex-^r infill: on the confeqiience which he fuppofeth to follov/ from thefc principles of Mr. .Edwards ? He lays, " He, therefore, that with one " original talent makes as great improvement as an- ** other with live, is no more praifeworthy — that is, *' is not accepted according to that he hath. He that " offends againll five degrees of light, originally giv*- *' en, is guilty in no higher degree than he who oflbnds *' againft but one degree of light." I know not by what rule of reafon our Author makes this inference. If the vicioufnefs of any thing lieth in the nature of it, not in its caufe ; is this a confideration, that at all di- minifheth the difference between rebellion againll different degrees of light ? Will our Author infift, alio, that the difference between things adlualiy ex- ifting, confiileth not in the nature of the things them- felvcs, but in their caufe f There is nothing whereby we can determhie the ftrength of any internal difpo- iition, but by the degrees of difhculty it will over- come, or light againll which it will rebel. If it re- quires greater flrengtli of inclination and difpofition to refiif five degrees of ligiit, than to refill one, there is certainly a higher degree of wickednefs in relilling five, than in refifting one ; efpecially if the wickednefs lieth in the nature of the difpoiition exerclfed, and not in its caufe, 5". Our Author pretendeth to quote Mr. Edwards, as alferting that " moral evil is not of « bad, but good *' tendency.'* (p. 72.) For this he referreth his rea- ders to part 4. feft. 9. of that Author's Inquiry. I have carefully examined that feclion, and can find no Aich affertion in- it, or any thing akin to it. Mr. Ed- "w^ards acknowledgeth, that, upon his principles, it mufl be granted, that the taking place of fin is a fruit and effea Scc^. VIIL MORAL AGENCY. 14J elTeft of the divine permifTion and difpofal. And to fliew that tliis permiifion and difpolal of divine provi- dence are not inconfiflent with the divine purity and holinefs, and do not rcfieft upon the moral character of God, he afTcrls that there is 710 had tendency in fuch perniiiTinn and difpofal. ^He faith (p. 11$-) '^ 'Tis '* not oF a bad tendency^ for the Ibpreme Being thus *' to order and permit that moral evil to be, which it *' is- beft ihould come to pafs.'' This, any one may fee, is a very different thing from faying that " moral *' evil is not of a bad, bat good tendency." In this pretended quotation there is at leaft the appearance of difingeiiuity and unfairnefs. If our Author had care- fully attended to the evident defign and fcope of the fe tious ; endeavoureth to make it manifeft that Mr. Edwards's definition of a moral aCi'ton.^ viz. that it is voluntary^ includes, not only the actions of men, but alfo, thofe of the brute creation. And hovi^ever diifo- ftant it may be from the dictates of the common fenf^ of men, to imagine that the actions of brutes fall un- der any moral denomination ; yet, that by the help of metaphylicks, we may, in time, bring our minds to comport with fuch an w^q of language and terms, fee p. 89, 90. If the Ex — r had reflected, that there is, ever)' wa3/, as much evidence that the brute creation correlpond with mankind in that quality of their nar ture, Xh^t their aCli 071 s are Jelf-deter?nined^ as in this, that they are voluntary ; I cannot but think he would have omitted this obfervation. For him to fay, that a power of felf-'detertnination is what digniiieth m.an above the brutes, and is that which forms the grand diftin^lion between 772oral ^nA g7ii-mal nature, is altoge- ther without authority and proof. For when he has proved that mankind ure invefled with fuch uncommon powers, and that fuch a power is neceffary to the morality of their aciions, we fliall be equally author- ized to fay, that his definition includeth the adlons of the brutal part of the creation, as he now is, to raife fucli an objection againfl the definition adopted by us. For he {liould remember, that, ripnit his principles^ there is no more evidence that the a:— r often concedes that mankind are in a fallen and depraved ftate. He fays, (p. 61, 62.) Admitting that fuch a ftate of the will may be re^ quired as is forever i)npoffible ; this can be only on a fuppofition of a power once given and pofTefied, but loft.*' And (p. 105.) " However great that cc «( *' impotency is v/hich is derived from Adam, there is a " manifeft difference bstwxcn a moral inability^ or ne- >0-<>'"-<>'"'0""©""<»-"©""*>"-<>"-0.'"«m.«-»-.^...i<>M..«|>....»-..t>...0""«>i."<>..^>.-.0....<>,^ f ^KT f64 An essay oh Part II, PART II. TVherein the divine agency and dijpofal^ refpeding the taking place of moral evil in the Jyjlem^ are humbly and carefully inquired into ^ and particularly confidered, THAT the Divine Being {liould exert any pofi- tive agency and influence in fuch a difpoial of things in his iyftem, as he certainly knew would be in- fallibly attended with the confequence of the taking place Q^ moral evil^ hath been thought, by many, an opinion too bold and daring to be admitted ; involving in if the moft bafe and unworthy apprehenfions of God, and being moft reproachful to the v/ifdom and purity of his laws and government. Accordingly we find, that the great objection which is frequently made a- gainft the calviniflic fcheme of doctrine, viz. that it fuppofeth God to be the author of fin, hath appeared fo formidable, that writers, in general, have evaded a direft anfwer to it 5 and endeavoured to faften the fame upon their adverfaries. And, indeed, that God fliould be, in any degree, the Author of fin, in that fenfe in which the term author is very frequently ufed, is a fuppoiition full of abfur- dity and bhifphemy ; and incapable of being, one mo- ment, admitted. The term author very frequently conveys the idea o{ doings performing-^ or atting. When %ve fpeak of a man as the author of any adlion, or faft, we ufually mean the fame, as ador or doer of it. When we {peak of any perfon as being the author of a piece of wickednefs, we mean the fame as aCior or perpetrar tor of it. . When fuch an idea as this is comprehended under the term author^ there is fomething fo harlh and grating — fomething fo abhorrent from all our natural notions Partil. MORAL AGENCY. 267 notions of God, and of the equity and excellency of his moral government, in the opinion that he is the author of fin — that it may reafonably be expefted it will immediately difguft, and appear fliocking to the natnr'il realon and common underllandings of men. If the doctrine of an antecedent certainty of all events, and a fixed^ efiabli(hed connexion of caufe and efFeici/ous. 'Tis an impions folly to imagine tliat God was either de- «' fedive in tcifdom, not to know wlut was the beft ftate for man in his creation ; »• or dcfedtive in goodncfsy that, knowing it, he would not confer it upon him ; " or defective in po-wir, that, willing, he was nnable to make him better." (See Dr. Buut on He batmnny of the di-jim iitilb.::t::> third edition, p- 47-) 274 ' An E S S A Y on Part IL ing, '* in -wifdom haft thou made them all/' or ever apprehending it ; but he afcribed that to God, which doth not, in faft, appear in his works. Befides : — To fuppoie that the good to arife from this diverfity of effect and operation in tlie moral world, was fo exaftly and equally balanced and pro- portioned, in thefe fevcrally different plans of admin- iftration, as to exclude all room for a preference of the one before the other, implreth that it was not an unde- firahle thing, up5n the whole, that moral evil fliould take place and come into exiftence. It implieth, like- wife, that the infinitely wife and good Being did not, himfelf, prefer a method and fcene of operation and government, which fhould entirely exclude any fuch event. \Vhen the univerfal and uninterrupted reign of holi- nefs, in all ages, and all orders and ranks of beings, on the one hand ; and the exiftence of moral evil, and its amazingly extcnfive reign, on the other ; were events (to fpeak after the manner of men) in contem- plation in the divine mind (as it muftbe, on all hands, admitted that God had a perfecV knowledge, forefight and view of all poffible exiftences and events) — if that fyltem and fcene of operation, in which moral evil Ihould never have exiftence, was actually chojen and preferred in the divine mind ; certainly the Deity is infinitely difappointed in the ilTue of his own opera- tions — if,, indeed, they may be called his oiun : and it mufl needs be that his will is infinitelv more crofTcd and thwarted by that fcene and courfe of events which are aftually exhibited to view, than that of <^;zy, or all ^ other beings together, in this extended, complicated fyftem . II. From the preceding obfervations it is abundant- ly manifeft, that the plan of government, and fcene of operation and events, which is actually furnifned out to view in the prefent fyftem, was the fruit of choice — of PRU DENT, WISE DP: SIGN. Nothing can be more difhonorable and reproachful to God, than to imagine that Sea.t. MORAL AGEKCY. 175' that the fyftem which is aftually formed by the divine hand, and which was made for his pleafiire and glory, is, yet, not the fruit of wife contrivance and defign. And it muft be equally inconfiftent with all our ideas of the natural as well as moral perfedlions of God, to apprehend that he had not in his view, antecedent to creation, the pofjibility of a fyflem of intelligences, among whom there fliould be no defection from God. Our Author himfelf fpeaketh in terms naturally tend- ing to excite, in his readers, an apprehenfion that he imagined fuch a fyftem a conceivable thing. He fays (p. 75.) " To fay it (/?«) could not have been pre- " ven-ted, is faying more than any one knows.** And yet he faith, " How fm came to be permitted, is more *' than any one can comprehend." The very fuppofi- tion, however, of a poliibility of a fyftem of intelli- gences perfeftly holy, and free from all degrees 6f fm 5 doth very naturally fuggeft to us one general reafon for the exifterice of inch a fyftem as that in which we now are, viz. that fome more wife and excellent ends are to be accompiiihcd under the prefent fyftem of government and adminiftration, than could have been brought about in a fyftem and under a government wherein no inch thing as moral evil took place. If we admit the poilibility that fin could have been pre- vented in the moral world ; how can we otherv/ife reconcile it to the divine character and government, that fuch an event hath been, in faft, permitted to take place — yea, and that moral evil hath been fuffered to fpread over fo great a part of the fyftem — otherwife than by fuppofmg that it will be the occafion q? great- er good in the univerfe, than could otherwife have been accompliftied ? When we confider the infinite extent of the wif- dom, goodnefs and power of God, and take into view his abfolute fupremacy, government and authority ; it muft be a very peculiar Jlretch of imagination and thought, that can fuppofe tiie prefent fyftem of events and adminiftration is not, in all its parts, the fruit of choice^ 176 An essay on - Part IL choice^ and wife defi^n ; and Ihat, in preference to all other fyftems poflible or conceivable ;— And this it certainly could not be, unlefs Ibme more wife and valuable ends were to be accomplifhed, than could have been brought to pais in a fyltem wherein there was no moral evil. However great and infinite may be the conceivable variety of lyftems, which the di-* vine, omnipotent mind may be fuppofed to have in view ; yet they may be all comprehended under this one general diftinftion, of being luith^ or without fin. And between fyftems, in this general view only^ is the comparative judgment to be formed, and the prefer-* ence to be given of the one, before the other. What the judgment and preference of the divine mind in fad were, is fufficiently evident in event : — an authority upon which we' may fafely conclude the preferablenefs o^ fuch a Jyjlem before any other \ and, that fome 7;/orr E S S A Y ON Part IL is thus exprefTed by the wife man, Prov. xvii. 17. " A friend loveth at all times^ and a brotlier is born for adverfity '^ Nothing fo endeareth any one lo us, as his cordial friendfbip, and the tokens of a ftedfaft, unalterable aifeftion and love, when we are forfaken, deftitute, and in diftrefs : nothing difcovcreth inch ftrength and fervor of affeftion, fuch clofe and inti- mate union of heart to us. Thus the tender and footh- ing friendfhip, the kind affiftance and generous confi- dence, of an affectionate hufband, for a poor, weak, helplefs woman, who is forfaken and abandoned of every other helper and friend, will be the moft com- forting cordial, and the flrongeft teflimony of connu- bial love ; deferving the moft generous and grateful returns. And for a hufband, beholding a helplefs yet ungrateful wife in fome imminent danger, and incapa- ble of being aflifted and relieved otherwife than at the hazard of his own fafety and life ; yet in thefe circum- flances to forget all her ingratitude and infidelity, and boldly, though calmly, plunge himfelf into the moft imminent danger for her fafety and relief, and aftually refcue and fave her — how peculiarly tender and affeft- ing would be her feelings — how foft and pleafmg her fenfations, if fhe had any gratitude, ingenuity and love 1 To find in a hufband to whom fhe had been unfaithful, yet fo tender, fo endearing and faithful a friend ; in whofe love flie may confide, and to whofs bofom fli© is invited to return : to find, I fay, in fuch an one, an unalterable afiPedion, and fuch flrength of love as will brave and defpife dangers for her fafety ; muft certainly give fo convincing a proof, lo ftrong a teflimony, of unconquerable, invincible love, as can- not fail exceedingly to delight and ravifh the heart, •where there are the leafl remains of gratitude and love. Under what figure or emblem is the divine love, tovv^ards his chofen ones, fo often reprefented in the word of God, as this ? The holy Spirit himfelf could find no other fimiiitude fo aptly to exprefs to our un- derji abiding Sea. I. MORAL AGENCY. 187 derjianding and co7nprehenfion the wonderful ftrength, extent and freedom of the divine love. Chrift Jeius iiimrelf is frequently reprelented as a bridegroom ; and the church, his fpoufe. When He beheld us in our infinitely ruined and guilty ftate, purfued by the wrath and vengeance of Almighty God ; notwithftand- ing our bafe ingratitude, abominable proftitution and infidelity, he not only calmly ventures into the midft of danger, but even fubmits to death itfelf, and fuf- taineth the infinite weight of the divine wrath, for us , bimfelf becoming a curfe, and bearing our fins in his own body upon the tree, for us.- And now, having purchafed redemption for his people, he, with infinite r-ondefcenfion and indulgence, inviteth us to put our trufl in him, and freely to caft all our cares and bur- dens upon him — pouring our complaints into his bo- fom, with the fuUeft affurance of finding in him an in- finitely powerful protector, and cordial, faithful and indulgent friend. Nor is it the church, which is redeemed from among men^ that alone receiveth the benefit of the great things done for linncrs r but the whole family in hea- ven Viave herein ftronger teflimonies, and more lively, affecting and engaging difcoveries, of the infinite depth, perfedtion and purit}'- of the divine love, than they woultl otherwife have been capable of re- ceiving : wliich difcoveries, doubtlefs, wonderfuilv open and enlarge their friendly and benevolent hearts, and exceedingly increafe their felicity and joy in God. That this is verily the cafe, is evidently held forth in the parable of our bleifed Lord concerning the loll fheep. Matt, xviii. 12. where it is reprefented as a peculiar ornament and teftimony of the divine love, Y 2 that * V/e are not to fiippofe that the fuffcring^ of Chrift were, ftriclly fpeiiking, i'ljiniu : though very extreme, they were neverthelcl's fmite. I'he wraih whicli ex.lti in the divine mind againft finners, is really without bounds, and truly in- tiiiite. Tills dii'plcal"i*re of Cod with linneri, ChiiA endured in its natural and genuine.etiods : and that to inch a degree, and in luch incaAire, as, coii(iderii\^ the infinite dignity of his pcifon, were as really lulKcicnt lo cftablilh the divine auihority, and manifeft God's infinite haired of iniquity, as tliough this difplea- J'ure had fallen ca the finjier, and funk hiui into tndlefs perdition. An ess a Y on Pan II, that -' the Son of man came to fave that which was loft." The concern of the good {hepherd for one loft fhetpy is a teftimony of his aftetTiion and regard for the flock ; as it (heweth what pains lie will take to recover ^vcn one. So the divine Being, agreeable to this iimil- itude, manit'efleth, in the falvation of finners, not merely his love to us ; but the infinite benevolence and goodnefs of his holy and pure nature in general, to the abundant joy and greater felicity of every vir- tuous being in the v/hole intelligent fyflem. IV. Another valuable end, occafioned by the exifl- ence of moral evil, is the peculiar preparation to which it formeth fuch imperfe(ft creatures as men, for re- joicing in God, and beholding and enjoying the infi- nite beauty, riches and glory of his free and abundant grace. Nothing, like diilrefs and a fenfe of danger, prepareth the heart for relifhing affiftance and relief. Nothing, like a fepfe of guilt, ingratitude and unwor- thinefs, formeth and fitteth the heart for rejoicing in grace. Such is the imperfe(rtio,n of human, and indeed of all created, nature, that things, to our view, are greatly illuilrated by their oppolites ; and every char- after and quality appear heightened by contrail. Thus hunger preparetl; for relifliing food ; and ficknefs, for enjoying health. So -wearinels prepares for reft, and fweetens it to us ; and darknefs, for making the light welcome and acceptable to us. Hence the morning, light is a known emblem of joy ; and the period of our Ibrrows is often compared to the fteeing of the fJiadoius of the flight. Relief 5s never fo acceptable and grateful, as when our diflreifes are at their height : itnd never is any fo ready to aci^nowledge, and fo pre- pared to behoid, the glory of free, fovereign grace, as when he hath the deepcft fenfe of his own infinite vilencfs autl unworthinels, and moil; feniibly feeleth his helplefinefs and dependence. Hence it is one of the charaftcrs of divine grace^ which J)nrticiil(frly tq- commendetli it, that ils ailiflance and relief are fo opportune— fo peculiarly feafpiiable apd timely. Ac- cordingly .Scd^.I. MORAL AGENCY. i8$ cordingly \vc find it faid, liai. xlix. 8. " Thus faith " the Lord, in an acceptable time have I heard thee, " and in the day of faivation have I helped thee :" that is, when relief and alliilance were moil needful. Agreeably Chrift is reprefented as being anointed *' to preach good tidings — to proclaim the acceptable *' year of the Lord-— 2Lud co?;.'fort ail t/iat mourn. ^' Ifai. Ixi. I, 2. Therefore it is that the evangelical Pro- phet, forefeeing by faith the coming of " that juft one," exclaimeth in thole tender and animating ftrains-, liai. lii. 7. " How beautifnl upon the mountains are the " feet of him that bringeth glad tidings, that publiiheth *' peace, that bringeth good tidings of good, that faith '^ unto Zion, T h y G o d r e i gn et h." Here are fome few of thofe valuable ends which ap- pear to have been occafioned by the exiflence of moral evil, in the fyftcm. Now, that the taking place of iin hath opened a wider and more exteniive field of operation, and iprcad a icene for a more full diiplay and manifcilation, and Itrong and clear dilcovery, of the divine perfections, js a faft, of which, I think, there cannot poilibly be any dtniht. The eternal deilruc^tion of ilnners, it can- not pofiibly be conceived, will be any Jiinclrance or obfiritdion to thoie manifeltations of the divine fulneis, fufiicicncy and goodnefs, v/hich he will make towards the choien veiiels of his mercy and grace. There is jiot the leait realon to imagine that the exiflence of moral evil will be the occaiion of preventiri'^ the dii- coycry of any thing which is really //.' the Deity ^ to his cledt — the virtuous part of the fyflem of created intel- ligences. Nor can it be fuppoied that there will be any thing, occafioned by the taking place of fin^ in any degree to obftrncl the faints* vifion of the divine per- fe<^tion, and tiicir apprehcniion and underflanding of his character in its true bcautv and excellencies, in the outward exhibitions which are made of it : unlefs, indeed, the eternal deflruclion of ilnners is a (lain in i;he divine tharaiTtcr, and \\\^( 1 intend to draw *' a comparifon betwixt them, yet you ought to know, that xhc\gT-uce and baieft: «' in the Redeemer ov E u r L ow and abound y^zr 3f>'o;7; this luay, than could be in any other. It is infinitely unlikely that the wife and good God fhould make choice of fo expensive away for accompli{hing an end, no better, and no more valuable, than might have been accomplifhed without this expence. 4. Chrift Jefus is faid to be the brightnefs of the Father's glory, and the exprefs image of his perfon. Heb. i. q. Which words manifeftly intimate z/pecial dijplay of the divine excellencies and perfe:cellency and glory of the divine Being doth not confift in an ability and difpolition to do the moft: excellent things. 5. Another argument in favour of the opinion under confideration may be drawn from the exprefs, manifeft defign of the Deity, in raifing up Pharaoh, and fufter- ing ib long his moft bold, arrogant and daring oppofi- tion to him ; and tlic very great good which was, through this means, accompliflicd. It is very manifeft that ihe oppofition of Pharaoh and his people, to the God of Ifrael, turned out, in event, greatly to the honour of God. It was the oc- cafion of his being fignally honoured, and wonderfully glorified. A peculiar good hy this means was effected — a great and wonderful eftablifliment of liis authority and fupremacy — a fear of his great and glorious name — an extenfiye fpread of the knowledge of it — and a great awe and reverence of Jehovah begotten in tlie hearts of men. Tbefe are ends peculiarly valuable and excellent, and -.vorthy to be accomplift:ed at great expence. I9& An ess a Y on Part II. cxpencc. Therefore God faith, Excel, ix. i6. " And *' in very deed for this caujfe have I raifcd thee up, *' for to ihew in thee my power ; and that my name ** may be declared throughout all the earth.*' Pharaoh and his people, who fo oppreffed Ifrael, very manifeftly in figure reprefented fatan and his chil- dren. They were defigncd as a figurative reprefenta-» tion of the powers of darknefs, engaged againfl Chrift and his glorious caufe. The people of Ifrael, in a figure, reprefented the whole Church of Chrift. There- fore it is that the faints in heaven, who have gotten the vidlory over fatan, are reprefented, Rev. xv. 3. as finging the fong of Moses and the fong of the Lamb. And if the oppofitipn of Pharaoh and his peo- ple, to the God of Ifrael, was the occafion o^ greater pood ; doubtlefs the oppofition of fatan and his fol- lowers, to Chrift, will likewife be the occafion of greater good. If the fm of one is over-ruled to greater good, the fm of another, alfo, is ; and, without quel- tion, the fm of all. So that, upon the w^hole, it is abundantly evident, there will be more glory to God, and more good in the fyftem, than if fm had never taken place. Other arguments to the point in hand might be col- Jefted out of the holy fcriptures ; but 1 ftudy brevity : and the obfervations which have been already made upon the exprefs declarations of the v/ord of God, are fuificient to fliew, that the opinion of greater good being occafioned by the exiftence of moral evil, was not unknovi^n to the facred writers ; nor is this a doc- trine of human invention, upon which the Jcriptures are fllent, and into which they give us r.o light and information. S LC't. Sea.n. MORALAGENCy, 199 Sect. II. Shewing that it luns^ upon the ivhole^ a dcfirahle things that MORAL i^witfliould take place in the fy/iem* IF it is once admitted, that the exigence of moral evil is the occafion of greater good ; and that it was a neceffary means of h.3.vlng th€ greate/^ good ef- fecT:ed and produced ; it will follow, of courfe, that it was, upon the whole, a defirable thing that fuch aa event fliould take place in the intelligent lyflem. If a greater good is, upon the whole, defirable, in prefer- ence to a lefs ; then, doubtlefs, every thing which is neceirary to the accomplifhment of the greater good, is alfo clefirable. To fay that any end is, upon the whole, defirable, is to fay that all the necelTary means 6f tlie accomplifliment of this end are alfo defirable. To fay that any end is, upon the whole, defirable ; and yet that the means through which alone this end is capable of being effccfted and accompliflicd, are, upon the whole, undeiirable ; is perfeftly contradifto- ry and abfurd. For however undefirable the means may be, in themfelvcs confidered, and for their own iake ; yet if the expence of the means is not equal to the gain attending the end ; the means, however dif- agreeable in themfelves, yet, upon the whole, and in a relative view of them, are defirable. If the Good^ contained and comprehended in the final iflue and event, outweighs and overbalanceth the evil attending the means which are necejj'ary in order to the accom.- plifliment of it ; in that cafe the end, confidered in its whole connexion, and in its neceffary relation to the means whereby it is effected, may with truth and propriety be faid to be defirable and good. And if the exiftence of moral evil is a necelTary means of the greater Good ; there can be no reafonable obje2 An Ifc S S a Y 01* Part If, •yet, ill its real relation to that great ai^d infinite good efFe6led by the death of Chrifl, and its connexion with it, it was really preferred and chojen by our bleffed Lord. Thefe things being preniifed, I proceed to offer x\\t following arguments to confideration, in proof of its being upon the luholez. defirable thing that moral evil fhould come into exiflence. It is abiblately defirable, in the nature of things, that the greattji good fliouid be actually effecled and- produced. The idea of good ahv^ays implieth defira- blenefs. Every thing which is good^ is, in that view, and fo far, deiirable : to fuppofe the contrary is con- tradiftory and abfurd. The greater any conceivable good is, the more defirable is it that it fliOuld come into exiflence. The great eft good^ therefore, is mo ft defirable ; a heaft perfeftly benevolent and virtuous will mofl ardently delire it, and be perfectly let upofi it. 2 . That wliich is defirable, upon the iuhole^ is deiira- ble confidered in all its relations^ confequences and con- nexions. When an event may be faid, upon the .whole, to be truly defirable ; all the means which are neceffary to the exiftence of that event, are alfo de- iirable. To fuppofe any thing, though defirable in atfelf and for its own fake, yet, in a relative view and in connexion with the neceffary means of its accom- piifliment, undefirable ; ij to fuppof(* that // is not^ upon the whole^ all things being confidered, a defirable thing that the event Ihould come into exiftence. But when an event, confidered in all its relations and con- nexions, is really deiirable ; that is a confideration which rendereth it a defirable thing that thofe fubor- dinate events, which are neceffary means of its accom- plifhment, fhould alfo come into exiflence. When wc wifli for an event, we wifli for every thing which is neceffary to that event, and neceflarily connefted with : it. And though the means may be, in their nature and on their own account, undefirable 5 yet, in a relative vievvy Sjeft. II. MORAL AGENCY. 20? o view, and confidered as in connexion with the event, they are delirable. Nor doth it argue any love to the means for t/ieir own fnke^ for any one really to defire and vvi/li for them. This, alio, may be illuftrated by that very marvellous event, the death of Chriit. The crucifixion of the Lord of glory ; confidered as tranf^ aded by finners^ and being the ftrongeft oppofition to infinite excellency and goodnefs, and a mofl furprifing cfFedt of the enmity of the hearts of men againfl God ; was the' moll abominable and hateful event that was ever tranfacfled here in our world : And yet this fame event, confidered in its relation to the glory of God and the falvation of fmners, was the moftdefirable and happy event that ever took place in any part of the iyftem. This being an event which hath lb favour a-' hie an afped upon the felicity of lofl men ; we do not hear mankind complain of it 2.^ firajige doCirine^ utterly incoif/ijrent with the idea of the great and infinite evil of fin^ to reprefent the death of Chrift as being, upon the whole, a defirable event. And if the crucifixion of our Lord was, upon the whole, a dehrable event ; then that conducft of the Jews, which was neceflary to the taking place of this event, was alio defirable. But ttiis conduct of the Jews was, in itfelf, infinitely evil a,nd finful ; and, therefore, -in itfelf, molt abominable and hateful. Yet even this conduct, wicked and finful as it was, in the ftate wherein things then aftuaily were, and in its relation to that which was the great and principal end of the death of Chrift, was unquef- tionably defirable. Nor are men wont to exclaim againfl it as a dodlrine tending; to licentioufncfs, when the crucifixion of our Lord is reprefcnted as upon the whole a defirable event. It therefore followeth, 3. That whatever llandeth in fuch a relation to an event which is defirable upon the whole^ as to be effen- tial to the exiftence of that event, and a necelTaiy means of its taking place, is, alfo, itfelf defirable. It is defi- rable that that event, whatever it is, fhould take place, without which the greatefl good cannot be accomplilh- A a^ ^ ed^ ^94 An E S S A Y on Part IL cd, and fomething, which is upon the whole defirable, cannot come into exiftence. Whatever fin, therefore, is a necejj'ary means of the prertefl good, it is a defirable thing that it fhould exilt and take place in event. But it hath been before fhown, that fm is the occafion of greater good : yea, and that the imperfe£tion of created nature is fuch, that this greater good could not 'p^{[ib\y be effefted without the intervention of fm, or the tak- ing place of moral evil in the fyflem. 4. It is defirable, in the nature of things, that the difpofition of the divine mind tov/ards fm, fiiould moft clearly and fully appear to the views and apprehenfions of rational, intelligent creatures. 7'hat which is lovely and beautiful m iifcif^ mufl alfo be lovely and beautiful in its appearance. That which is excellent in its exift- ence, mufh likewife be excellent m its exercije. That which it is a defirable thing that it fhould ("x//?, is alfo a defirable thing Ihould be exercifed : for if the exercije is not defirable, the exigence alfo is not defirable. \i \t is, therefore, a defirable thing that the real hatred of the divine mind to Jin fliould exifi^ it is a defirable thing that it Ihouid be exercifed. And if it is a defirable thing that hatred of the divine mind to lin fhould be mamfcfled and appear^ it was a defirable thing that there ihould h^. fiiitabU? objeds toward whom this difpofition of the divine mind might be manifcfled and appear. If it is a defirable thing that the hatred of the divine mind to fin fhould be exercifed^ it is of courfe a defira- ble thing that there fnould be fome proper objcifls to- Tvard wliom to exercife it. And on whom is it poUible that God fhould exercife and raanifeft his hatred of fin, but the finner f It is, therefore, in the nature of things, defirable that fuch beings as finners fhould exift in the intelligent fyflem : conlequently, a defirable thing that moral evil fnould come into exiftence, 5. That exercife of the divine gocdnefs, which is, in fcriptare, by way cf eminence, called grace, is reprefcnted as the very glory of the divine nature ; and the difplay and difcovery of it, the great and prin- cipal Sci^. II. MORAL AGENCYo 205- cipal end of creation. And as it was, in the nature of things, defirable that the riches of divine jnercy and grace ftiouid be manifefted and difplayed, and appear and be exhibited in their natural and genuine fruits ; fo it was delirable, in the nature of things, that there fhould c:<:ift, foraewhere in the intelligent fyflem, objccls of mercy or of grace. It is eafy to fee that tiiere could have been no room for jjiercy and grace to be exercifed, had moral evil never taken pjace. The holy and vir- tuous, who never rebelled againft God, though tliey have not in them any proper dejert of that favour and goodnefs which is conilantly exercifed towards them ; yet, it is very evident, are not properly objeds of viercy and grace. The mercy and grace of God are exercifed only toward finners — the ill-deferving. The divine goodnefs never could have appeared in that peculiar glory and brightnefs, which, in fcripture, are called GRACE, if there had been no Tinners to become the fubje<^s of it. And as mercy ij\A grace are repre- fented as being the peculiar glory a-nd perfeLiion of God ; fo was it peculiarly deferable that they fliould appear, and be exhibited in thjeir fruits, to the views of intelli- gent creatures. And, therefore, it was a defirable thing, and what would be the objed of the real wifli of an infinitely benevolent heart, that there might be and exift a proper andjiiitahle occafion for the exercife and dlfcovery of that peculiarly beautiful and glorious attribute of God called grace : confequently it was really, in the nature of things, defirable that moral evil Hiould take place. As it was, in the nature of things, defirable that the peculiar brightnefs and glory of the divine charafter Ihould appear ; fo was it defi- rable that there fiiouid be fome ?nedium through which creatures might be ehablcd to behold it. Without Jo^ue niedimn^ it folioweth from what hath been before faid refpecling the natural ijn^erfcCUon infeparable f-om the very idea ofc R f. AT u R E, and the inability of crea- tares to behold and perceive the divine perfections any otherwifc than as appearing ia fruits and cffeds, that they 2o6 Aw ESSAY on Fart II. they nCvcr could behold and apprehend that in God, which is called his grace. There cun be no nicdhim through which creatures are capable of beholding dijr vine mercy and grace^ but that nirworthinejs and ill-de- fert there is in a Unner. And that unworthinefs and ill^ defert^ every one may fee, cannot exilt, unlefs there is a finner — unlefs moral evil taketh place. If It is only acknowledged, that the mercy and grace of God are his peculiar glory ^ or a peculiar brightnefs and full exercife of his inherent excellency ; it v/il| manifeflly follow, that the exercises of divine mercy and grace do peculiar good in the fyftem, and efFexft purpofes and deligns which are peculiarly excellent ; being produdlive of a more valuable endthdin could have been elTefted without the difcovery and ^xercife of them. If the fyftem would have been a^ perfed and complete without moral evil ; the divine character, of courfe, would have been as excellent and beautiful -withcmt that in it, which peculiarly and ejpec.ially appeareth and is manifefted both in tlie exerciies of his 7^2(f;Yj and^r<7<:art It. carrying more full convi(5lion, to mention one or two of the evil and bad confequences which will certainly follow from the fuppofition that the exiftence of moral evil — the taking place of fm — in the fyflem, is, upon the whole, an undefirable event. 1. If it would really have been better, upon the whole,, in the nature of things, that moral evil fhould never have come into exiftence ; then God hath not ordered and difpofed things in fo excellent a manner, and to fo good advantage, as they might, in the nature -of things, have been ordered and difpofed. To fay that there could not have been a fyftem v/ithout fm, and yet that fuch a fyftem would have been moft perfei the aniverfc j and his glorious mind is overwhelmedwitii infinite Seer HIo MORAL AGENCY. sit infinite forfow, grief and diflrefs. Thefe coiifidcra- tions, I am humbly of opinion, do clearly fiiew-^yc^i^ perfe^fy demonfira'te^ that in the viev^^ of the Deity, that is, in the view of impartial^ perfeCl reaJon—JlriCl^ exnd truths it was- not, on the whole, all things being confidered, an mdefirable thing that moral evil fhould come into exigence. And when it is proved, to the oonvi(fbion of the underllandings of men, that the ex* iftence of fuch an event, in the intelicifilual fyftem, was not, upon the whole, undcfirable ; people will meet with no diJfficnUy, 1 apprehend, in admitting the rcafonablenefs of the fuppofition, o? the pofitive defira-' biennis of the exiftence and taking place of fuch aa event. S E O T. III. IVhcrein it is pie^n that fuch a pofitive divine agency a?id difpofal^ as ivouldgive INFALLIBLE CERTAINTY to the exiflence o/* ^roE.AL EVIL z« the Jyftem^ are not incoJtJIJient with the purity and holinejs of Cod, IF fuch a difpofal of tilings as fhall give infallible cer- tainty of the exifrence of moral evil in the lyflem, ind aftually iffue in that event ; and if God's adjufling and arranging thingli in a manner and order tending to fuch an ilfue ; is wife and proper — agreeable to the di<9:atc5 of the moft perfe£l and confammate wifdom— it will be abundantly manifeft that fuch a pofttive dif- p'tfai and agency as would infallibly inf/e the future ex- iftence and taking place of moral evil in the fyftevi^ is not incojififtent with the purity and ho^nefs of God. For, I. That which is not inconfiftent with perfe(n: and confammate wifdom, is not inconfiftent with the moft perfect: purity and holinefs. Whatever is not incon-* fiftent with perfeft wifdom to defign^ diilate and dired ; is not inconfiftent with the pm*ity and holinefs of the moft wife Being, to effed and acconipUPt. Wifdom licver diifiatcth any thing, inconfiftent with purity and B b 2 holinefs. 212 An E S S a Y on Part II. holinefs. Where wifdom app^oveth, pnri^y and holi- Ziefs equally approve. Whatever oftendethi purity, is forbidden by wifdom : for thefe two attributes per- fectly harmonize w^ith each other. It is the part o^ ivifdom to form noble and excellent defigns ; and to devile the beft means and methods for accomplifhing them. This fcems to be the peculiar end and principal province of wifdom. Noble and excellent ends^ together with a prudent adjuftment and adaptednefs oi means to the accomplifbment of them, are the ftrongeft teiiimonies and indications ofM^fdom. In botli thefe ways is the wifdom of God indubitable, and unqueftionab'ly clear, in fuch an adjufbment and difpofition of things as would give certain futurity to the event in queflion. For it hath been fhown that the taking place <3f fin hath" been the occallon of an abundantly more perfed: and complete exhibition of the divine perfeftions, to the views of creatures ; and a more fall and perfe*^ manifeftation of them in their proper and genuine fruits, than could poffibly have, been made, if moral evil had never cxifted. And, confequently, that there is a more dear underftanding, and perfec'l and fenfible perception of the divine excel- lencies, in the f^^llem of created intelligences, than there would have been, if fm had never taken place ; and, ofcourfe, ?7iore good dojze in the. ^y9icm.. It hath been fhown that the exiftcnce of moral evil hath k>een the occafion of Jar more arid greater good in the iyfteni ; yea, of greater good than could poffibly have been ef- fected otherwife tiian by the intervention of moral evil. And if this is in fl^dt the cafe, (which I beg leave, after what hath been faid upon it, to confider as being certainly proved,) there is na room left to queftion tiie Vr-ifdom of the projedion of Inch a fyflem as this, in all the variety of its parts : or, to imagine that the moral evil which taketh place in it, indicateth any want of prudent for^fi^ht and wile defigUc But rather, if what hath been faid is jufl, the exigence pf moral evil in Sea. III. MORAL AGENCY. 213 in the fyftcm, when the fcene is fo far opened to view as to enable us to judge of the ifFue of things, is a cer- tain proof and pregnant inflance of the confummate wifdom of the Grand Prpjeftor of this extended, com- plicated fyftem. And when we confider, farther, howa-fcene of guilt, mifery and wickednefs prepares fuch imperfeft crea- tures as we are, for 3 proper and entire fubmiffion to God, and for apprehendin^g the mercy and grace of God in their abundant riches and freedom ; and moit fenfibly rclifliing and apprehending that ialvation and relief which is provided for finful men, in the gofpel of Chrift : I fay, when we duly attend to thefe.co^fidera- tions, and give them their proper and j nil weight ; we fliall not have any occafion to apprehend any defeCi of wifdom, in the means and methods of God's own de- viling for cifecling the greateft good, and accomplifhing the mod valuable ends of creation. But, on the con- trary, if we examine with honed- Tind upright hearts, we cannot but difcern in the prejer,'t Jyftem of divine adminiftration and governments Uotwithflanding the moral evil which cometh into exiilcnee under it, the ftrongeft marks and mort evident traces of pcrfeci, confummate wifdom and fkill. It is abundantly manifcft, that God's adopting the prefent plan of operation, and fyftem of adminiftration and government, hath in faCl been the occafion of the exillence of moral evil. And that God forefaw this event, and forefaw it to be infallibly connedled with that particular exertion of his own power, which fhould be productive oijiich a Jyftem as he hath created^ is what cannot be denied, without avowed oppofition to the word of God. Was this exertion of the divine power under the direftion of wijdoui f Is it w^orthy the charafter ziiA wifdom of God, to form fuch a fjf teni^ and in fuch a manner to ad'i^ft and balance the various parts and pioportions of it ? But if a fyflemj fo formed, balanced and adjufted \\\ its feveral pro- portions and parts as is in fad attended and follQwed by 214 A^ E S"S A V 6 if fdrtlt by the t aid n'g" place o'f flw, is no" rej^roaclt to the wif* dom. of God U'/ie7i at^ually appearing' in event ; it is BO ref^rrtach to the wifdoiil of God, to Aippofe fuch a iyflem to ejcift-in div-ine' defipi^ eveii in a full, particu- lar and perfect view of its being attended and follow^ cd by fdch an event. If moral evil is not a real blemifh in the go"vemme)it of God ; it is as little io, confidered as* exifling; in divine dafign. Nothing can be vrife, as- appearing in event^ which is unwife, as entertained in defign. That which is no argument of at defefi inwifaortl, when exifling' /« rr^^w/', will never argue any defccH: of wifdom, as entertained in purpofe (iffd defign. If it Was wife in the Deity to enter upon a fyfte'irt <5f operation, V^'hich fhbuld in fail be accom- panied and follovv'ed by flich an event ; it was equally wife iri him, a£^ually td fore-ordai?i fach an event, and to difpole and order things' ivith an exprcfs purpofe and deftgjt to give infallible futurity to the exigence of moral evil'-^the tailing place of fin. And I fee not how any one can -fuppofe- that fuch a divine agency and foritive difpof'al of things as (liall give infallible certainty to the exifience of fuch aPx event, is any blemifii in the charafterof tlie fupreme Govei^nor of tlie univerfe, or indicatcth any defcvll of wifdom in him, or is any way unworthy of him ; without imaginhig that the mora! evil now in tlie lyflcm, is an aCiual reproach to God ; rendering it impolfible that intelligent creatures ihftuld perfe£lly and entirely acquiefce in'iiim. To fay that God did not forefee any fuch event as being certainly and infallibly conne(^ed^ by way of confe- quence, with his own pofitive agency and dijpojal^ vs, to relieve one attribute at the e5:pcnce of another : which doth no honor to the name of God. But it is, on the other hand, moft reproachful to him, to fup- pofe that any thing which God hath ordered and done, renderetll/«f-^ ajalva needful for his chara£iter. On the other hand, it is exceedingly manifefl, that what- ever in event is no ar-rument of defeft of wifdom in the fyilem arid- government of God,- would be no ar- gument Sccl. m. MORAJL AGENCY. a^ gument of any dcfcffl in wlfdom, confidered as enters* tained in po/Jtiv.e purpoje and dejign* If the event of moral evil, 'when in a6iual exiftence^ doth in ifuCt not render the divine wifdoni quellionable and rufpicious ; furely it can afford no pretext for calling the fame vvifdom in queition, when coniidered as ejiifling ia divine purpoj J anddi'fipn. To fay otherwife, would be the fame as to urge that the lejs is an argument of im» perfeiTlion, where the greater is not :-^<~-a method of argumentation very ill adapted to adminifter convic*- tion. He, tlierefore, who will be bold enough to venture on a.fuil and confident belief that the prefent fyftem, in ull and every of its parts and events^ is wifely ordered and difpofed ; need apprehend no danger in ^(Taredly Kelieving that yi^*:/? a fyftem^ in all its parts ^ did a Nov/, as was obferved before, whatever is the aftual ilTae and event of the, divine operations, that^ we may conchide, was the finaicaufe and reafon of them, and the objeft really in view in t^iofe operations. The end which appearetli to be eventually anfwered, by the cxifVencc and taking place of moral evil, was, doubt- lefs, the end in vieiu in thole operations and difpofals which were the caufe and ground of the exidence of fuch an event. But that the exiflence of moral evil hath been the occafion and reafon of afuller manifefla- tiori and clearer difcovery of the fpotlefs purity and holinefs of God, and the infinite oppofition of the di- vine mind to fin, than otherwife would have been ever made ; is what cannot, 1 think, with the leaft reafon, be denied. We may, therefore, fafely conclude, that ///// was an objed in viezu, in that agency and thofe di- vine operations which gave certainty to the future ex- iflence of moral evil, and w'ere the caufe of it. Whe- ther a manifeftation of the hatred of God to fin, and the infinite averfion of his holy and pure nature to moral evil, were, the 07//y, or cliirf and principnl^ end of this agency and operation, is not neeeHary to be determ.ined : it is fufiicicnt, in the prefent cafe, if it appeareth that it was a?i end leally and ultimately in view. For if it is manifefi: that any particular divijic agency and difpofal had, for their objeft, a more per- feft difcovery of the infinite hatred and oppofition of the divine mind to fin ; it will be abundantly evident, that fuch an agency and difpofal are not repugnant to the divine purity ; and, in their nature and operation, inconfiilent with the divine hatred to fin ; — Unlefs, indeed, the infinitely wife and all-knowing God hath been guilty of fo grofs an overfight and millakc, as totally to fubvert, by his ovvm agency and operation, the very end, defign and obje07/^fr of Coo, than that of the connexion of events with his will. His jmivtr iiuendeth nothing more than that tcill of his which hath events wiiich arc its objects connected witii it. But ihe />c«/c-r of God i" generally leckoned not among his moral attributes. The tyercife of this jicwer is unqueftionably under the direction of wifdom, and therefore fcrveth to difplay moral chaiaclcr : but, confidered merely as that •with •which J'-ick events ci are its ohjfFts are cornifSfcn, it is no part of tiie moral chur~ aEi:r ot God- The wt l l of God, wiiich is the rule of tiuty to creatures, is iiis bene-i>nlevce and love — that difpolition whereby he h necelliuily pleafed with love and benevolence iu his creatures. And as this benevolence and love are th« only m.,ral, ffiritual beauty of the divine nature ; by fuch a d'fpofiicn only is it poflTible for creatures to be ipirituaUy united to him, and pieaie and obey him. This lets us fee that that iviH of the Deity wjnch givcth exiftence and being to events, and that -rviil of his which is expreiiod in (he precepts of his vfy,al laiv, are no more the fame, than the ft-uer and the holy nature oJ God are one and the fame. Seft. IV. MORAL AGENCY, 221 Sect. IV. Objedions confiderzd and rsfutsi. ALTHOUGH an anfwer to the principal objedlions which can be made againfl; the dodtrine of a fpe- cial divine agency and diipofal, giving infallible cer- tainty to the future exiftence of moral evil, hath been, as I apprehend, in a confiderable mcafure anticipated, in the preceding fe^lions ; a more particular and crit- ical examination of them, however, may ferve more fully to illultrate the fubjeft under confideration ; and, probably, will not be unfatisfadtory to the reader. 'J his, therefore, fliall be the fubject of the prefent fection. Ob J. \. For God to put forth any pofitive exertions of his own divine and almighty power, which Ihould, either mediately or immediately, be prodiKflive of fuch an effeCt ; and, whereby he a(fiually purpofed and de- figncd to bring moral evil m^o exiftence, in the fyftem ; neceiTarily importeth fome degree of approbation of ryioral evil itfc[f\ in the divine mind. For if God doth not, in fome degree, approve of fm ; why doth he put fortli any act of his own divine, refiftlels pow-er, luith an exprefs purpofe anddcfign to the exiitence and taking- place of fuch an effeft ? Ans. In order to invalidate effeftually the objecTiion before us, feveral things mufl be particularly confider- ed. And I would bbferve, I . That for God to put forth fome pofitive exertion of his own divine power, which he deigned fhould be produftive of the exiftence of moral evil, by no means neceifarily implieth any degree of approbation of fm, or the lead reconcilablen^fs of mind to the evil nature of it. There is nothing abfard and inconfiftent, as hath been before obierved, in fuppofing that the fame objc«.T:, or event, (liould be approved of and confidered S22 An essay on Part II. as being defirable in one vieiv of it ; and, at the fame time, confidered as being undefirable, and be greatly difapproved of, in another. Inftances of this kind are not uncommon, among men. How often do we, witli pleafure and cheerfulneis, fubmit to pain and fufterings witli a view to the attainment of fome greater good, and tlie pofTeffion of higher degrees of felicity ? And yet any one would be thought to reafon in a manner very inconclufive and precipitant, who (liould go gbont to prove, by inflances of this kind, that human natm'e is enamoured of mifery, and that mankind arc lovers of pain and fuffering. And yet this condn(n: of iTiankind affordeth as much reafon for concluding that huynan natiirs is reconciled to mifery, as a pofitive di- vine difpofal in favour of the exiflence of moral evil^ doth, for concluding that the divine nature is recon- ciled to fm. If it is conceivable that human nature ftiould choofe fuffering and pain^ confiftently with a perfect; averfion and abhorrence of all fnffering ; it is equally conceivable that the divine Being may cjioofe and prefer the exiflence Q>i moral evil ^ confillcntly with his utter averfion and perfeft abhorrence of all fm. Ob J. The cafes are far from being fnnilar and pa- rallel ; and there is no pretext for reafoning from the one to the other. For 7nan is but a weak, helplefs and dependent creature, having a great degree of imper- fc<£tion neccflariiy cleaving to him ; and, therefore, may be necejjitated to feek the highcfl felicity of his nature, through perils, fuffering and danger. But this is infinitely far from beijig the cafe with the fu- preme Being ; who is poflelTed of infinite Jufjicier.cy and f'ulnefs., and needcth no fuch difagreeable 7?ieans of at- taining his own higheft felicity and enjoyment. Ans. Whatever fulnefs and fufficiency there m.ay be in God — as, doubtlefs, they are abfolutely infinite and boundlefs ; his dealings are, yet, with creatures who are imperfeCI ; and the manifeftations and com- munications which he is making of himfelf, are to ci-'catures who are extremely dull of receiving ajid // ^v??^/*?, the felf-exiflL^nt and omnipotent Beings is not I'ubjedt ; but by a neceinty of fitnefs — of reafon and fuitabienefs) to accommodate htmfelf to their weaknefs and im^ ■pcrf'eCIinn ; ard make w^q of fach means of inftruiftion and communication, as are bed adapted to convey the knowleq^ge of himfelf to creatures of tlieir imperfect vievvs ar.'i dull appreheniion. This confideration may make it equally necefj'ary (though not with the very Ja',ne kind of neceinty) for tiie Deity to make ufe of certain means and iiijiruments for the accompliflmient of his ends, which are in their nature and for their oiun Jakes difagreeable to him ; as for men to fubmit to things which are difagreeable and painful to them, in order to their highell felicity : — it being carefully kept in memory, however, that the uje of thefe means is far from being, in the jdme fenfe^ painful and difagreeable to the Deity, as aftual pain and fufterings are difagree- able to creatures . It is, therefore, as fuppofable that the Deity fhould, by fome pofitive exertions of his own, either mediately or immediately, bring moral evil into exiftence, confiftently v/ith his infinite hatred of moral evil, and the averfion of his own holy and pure nature, to the nature of all fin ; as it is fuppofa- ble that mankind, who love happinefs and hate mifery, fliould yet, with pleajure- and cheer fulnejs^ fubmit to pain and fuffe rings — it being effential to their very na- tures perfeftly to hate and abhor mifery and pain. 2. God alRireth us, by the prophet Ezekiel, that he hath no pleajure in tiie death of the wicked — the death "^ of him that dieth 5 but that the wicked turn and live, Andn . * Clnp. xviii. 23» 32. anixxslii. !i. i24 An E S S A Y ON Part 11 . And, by his Apoftle, that he would have all nien to be laved, and come to the knowledge of the truth.*' And yet nothing is more evident than that there is a pofitive agency of God — pofitive exertions of divine power — in and for the eternal death and utter delrruc- tion of finners : therefore pofitive exertions of his oivn divine and almighty power ^ for the produCiion of an event in which //eing to any event, to be the fame as his frec^ptlfe wili to his creatures ; it is as really dllhonourable and reproachful to Cod> to fay that he <>ermhteth fin, as to fay that, by iomz pr.Jiii-ve agency and difpofal. He, either mediately or immediately, caufeth the exiftence of it. For it is as truly and infinitely contrary to the p-t- efptive 'wii! of God, \rt permit fin, as adhialiy lo cctnmand ■an^ cnjnin it. But if the creative and f receptive will of God are not the fame, we have no occaliou iox the ^eritle (and, I may fay, in this place infigniticant) tenn permit, in order to relieve our imaginations ; it implying no ir.confifteucy to fuppofe tliat God» eitlier mediately or immediately, by fome exertions of his own almighty p'^;wer, gave certainty to the exiftence of moral evil. But be this as it will, the term permit, in this ufe and application ot it, carrieth, every v.'ay, as real a rcficiliini upon the moral charadier of God, as the terms pofitr-je agency and difp(ful .■ "the former implying Ibme degree of that f.imc reconcilablenefs of the divine mind to moral evil, which is apprehended to be implied in the latter. It is a tcirn. therefore, in my humble opinion, which hath been improperly ufed ; tending to relieve only the imaginations of men ; and that by begetting in the mini! an ap. prehenfion of certain powers, in creatures, wliich do not belong to them ; and, of a certain negleSi in pro-vidcnc:, and carileffn(fi in the divine mindi which are inriniteJj' reproachful to him. »^o An essay on Part II. wickednefs and obftinacy of Pharaoh aS the eff'eCl^ of which a pofitive divine agency and dilpofal were, ei- ther mediately or immediately) the cmj'e ; furely he would have exprefTed himielf in a manner more cau- tious and guarded, on fo delicate a fubjecl ; and not iuffered his relation, as it unqneftionably doth, to carry in it fuch vifible marks of a pofitive divine pur- pole and defign giving birth to a feries of the mofl bold and daring wickednefs. Mofes could not have made ufe of terms more flrong and exprellivc, if he had actually defigned to reprefent a politive divine a- gency and difpofal as giving previous infallible cer- tainty to any fcene or feries of events. And if all thefe expreffions are to be fo analyzed and fubtilized, and perfectly interpreted away, as to convey no idea of its being more agreeable to the divine purpofe and intention that this fcene of wickednefs fliould tak« place, t\i^nt\\Q fiatnre and evil o? {\n are to the holy and pure nature of God ; we mufl forever defpair of determining any dofrjfeth a moral charader, and not before, he is fufceptible of injujiice on account of it. But that excrcife of the will, or power, of God, which hath for its objed the exiilcnce of a moral being, either finful, or holy, contains in it no ejiimation whatever oi his charader ; andj in tlie nature of things, can do him? neither y«/?/ff nor the contrary. Se6l. V. MORAL AGENCY. 245 However difguftful and unpopular this reafoning of the Apoftle may be in our day, the iiappy tim^, we hope, will come, when thefe Icriptures, as w^ell as others, iliall be underftood in their true fimplicity, perfpicuity and beauty ; and the Spirit of God be lb plentifully poured out, that the palfions and corrup- tions of men fliall not be irritated by plain, evangelical truth ! There are various reprefentations in fcripture, the plain and moft natural conftru(^ion of v/hich clearly convey the idea of fome Ipecial divine efficiency and diipofal, as caufe^ of the exiftence and taking place of moral evil, as its effecL We have an inflance of this kuid, whicli i 5 very clear and illuflrating, in the cafe of the king of Affyria. God calleth him the rod of his anocr ; and faith, that the fiaff in His handy i. e. the power by which this proud monarch fmotc and de- (Troyed the nations, was God's own indigiuition. And God faitli, that he will fend him a^ainft an hypocritical nation ; meaning the Jews ; and that he lu ill give him a charge to take the J.poil^ and to take the prey^ and to tread doiun like the ?nire of the ft reels. Then God mentioneth, by the Prophet, the great and exceedingly wide difference there was in the views of this haughty and afpiring prince, from his own wife and righteous purpofes in the fame event and work. The Affyrian monarcli would arrogate all the glorj'- of liis conquefl to himlblf, and attribute it to the power of his ov*'n arm : wliereas. he was no more than a rod, in the hand of the wife and righteous Governor of the world, for correcting and chaftifing the people of Ifrael, There- fore God faith, that, luken the Lord hath performed his whole work upon 7?wnnt Zion^ and on JeruJale7H^ I will piiniOi the fruit of the ft out heart of the king of .-Iffyri:!^ and the glory of his high looks. But however eiic6:ual the appointment and difpofil of God might be, in the' cafe ; this, by no means, excufed tlie proud A[Jyrian from the wickednefs of which he was guilty in accom- plifliing the purpofes and decrees of God. Accord- F f 2 inglv $44 An E S S A Y on Part II. ingly we find that the Lord expoftulates with him upon the exceeding unrealonableneis of his proud and aj-ro- gant boafting, in the following manner. Shall the nx boaft itj elf again Jl him that heweth therewith f Or fliall the fail) magnify itfelf again f him that fiaketh it f As if the rod pioidd flake itfelf a gain fl them that lift it up ; or as if the faff f ion Id lift up itfelf as if it were no wood. Seethe whole account in Ifai. Chap. x. From this reprefentation of the matter it is abun- dantly evident, that the very aftions and conduft of this afpiring prince, which were fo exceedingly pro- voking to God, and for which he %vas refolved to punifh him, were, neverthelefs, moft abfolutely and infallibly predetermined by the all-wife God. The defigns of the Deity, in raifing up one of fuch a char- a^iit'''l![:'-'''!£^'^ CONCLUSION. MORAL AGENCY. S49 CONCLUSION. PON the whole, I am humbly of opinion^ that the fcheme of doftrine which implieth an infal- lible connexion in things, and an abfolutc previous certainty of all events, as well in the moral as in the natural world, ftandeth upon a firm and fure bafis ; and that, notwithftanding the many hard and reproach- ful names with which it is loaded, and which at the prefent day are fo liberally thrown out againfl it, it is capable of a jull, folid and rational defence. There is nothing in thefe doftrines, as hath been fliown in the preceding fe(Si:ions, tending in any degree to lelTen our apprehenlions of the exceeding evil, turpi- tude and hatefulnefs of fm ; or, furnifhing the fmncr with any juft; pretext and excufe for his fin. There is nothing in thefe fentiments inconfiflent with the ideas of defert either of praife or blame ; or that precludeth the ufe of means and tlie endeavours of men, and rendereth ufclefs that wifdom, prudence, fagacity and forelight, with which the Author of our beings hathe^idowed us. And there is nothing in this fcheme of dod:rinc, 1 may farther add, that appeareth to reflecl any reproach upon the moft high God, or that implieth in it any thing inconfiitent with his fpotlefs purity and holinefs, rendering any of his difpenfations dark, myflerious and unintelligible. On tiic other hand, I think it a- bundantly evident that the fcheme of fentimer^ts, con* tained in the preceding pages, hath a very manifefl and apparent tendency to raiils and exalt our ideas of G o- the i^o An E S S A Y oiT Con- the wifdom, goodnefs, fovereignty and fnpremacy of^ God ; to convince us of the infinite extent, wifdom and excellency of his government ; and are excel- lently fitted, in their nature, to form our minds to an entire confidence in God, the great Governor of the world, a quiet fubniilfion to his will, and cheerful acquiefcence in his difpofals, however otherwile dark and myfterious they may appear to the narrow and extremely imperfect views of men. No other fcheme of doftrine, as to me it appeareth, can ever reconcile the prefent fyftem as it is in all its parts, together with that fcene of events which is aftually furniihed out to view, with perfe produce an aft of will \ If he doth any thing, he ex- ercifeth an aft of will : and, therefore, exercifetli an aft of will, in order to produce an aft of will. This m^iil be the way in which moral agents efffcd their own afts of wilL And yet, by the fuppofition, this aft of will is excrcifed in order to produce the fir ft aft of will ; and vnuft, therefore, be antecedent to it. It is the caufe of an aft of will that we are feeking after, Caufe is always prior to its effed. Whatever is the cauJe of an aft of will, muft be prior to that aft of will Svhich is its effcd, - The caife of an aft of will in a moral agent, muft precede that ad of will in the agent which is effcded by it. But, afts of will in moral agents have not been eternally fucceiiive — the fucceed- 6 APPENDIX. ing cauled by the preceding one. "We want the caiife of Xhc firji in t\\Qjeries. To fay that the firji was caiijed or effeCied by an antecedent one^ is a. contradic- tion in terms. We might, with as much propriety, fay that this fir ft caujed itfelf : and, therefore, that " volition jQ^rings from itfelf ;" which the Uoftor lays " is a very different thing from faying that the Jubjecl " is the caufe of it.''* Let the reader judge whether it be different. If there be a dilference, let it be point- ed out. To fay tliat the firfl aft of will in a moral agent was caufed by an aft of will of this fame moral agent, cannot be materially different from faying that the firft aft of will fprang from itfelf. And, if the/z>y? fprings from itfelf, all the refl may as well. We are fenfible that it is a contradiftion in terms, to lay that volition fprings from itfelf — and, not lefs con- t'radiftory and abfurd, to fay that the volitions of moral agents fpring from a voluntary caufe in the agents themfelves. But, this lies, and lies as a dead weight, upon the advocates for a power of felf-deter- mination : we are not anfwerable for it. Would thefe gentlemen gain any advantage to theit caufe, by urging that it is not by afts of will, but in fome other way, that moral agents ejfeCi their own vo- litions ? If they would, let them take it, and wel- come. If it be not by their own exertions that moral agents effeft their afts of will, Hov/ is it ? Do moral agents do any thing without exertion f And, have they any exertions befides voluntary ones ? Can any thing they do without an aft of will (could there bs any fuch thing) be called their a6l f And, could this autliorize us to confider them as the caujes of their own afts of will ? To fay that men are the involun- tary cauies of their own afts of will, is the fame as to fay that they are 720 caiifes at all of them ; and, this is to fay that they are not the caujes of their own afts of will. The doftrine of a power of felf-determination, or of APPENDIX. 7 oC a power in men to produce and effect their own ai ; and, at the fame tune, that the Deity knows that certain events (hall take place becauje he has determined that they fhcill. Should it be con- lldered by the public that the Doftor maintains the divine fo}-elmoivlcrhe -oi the exiftence of events to be antecedent to Gpd's decrees that they (hall exifl ; man- kind will be liable to fnppoie that his dodrine^ not Mr. Edv/ards's, fubjefts the Deity to "■ an Hohhiftical fatality." For, if events have fixed certain futurity antecedent to the determinations of the divine mind concerning them, it is ealy to fee there is a caufe fomewhere operating fuperior to the divine v/ill. '\. To admit a povv^er of felf-determination.in men, is inconfiltent with the fuppofition that hnly ajfetiions are the efi'eft of the imrne:liate influence of the Spirit of God on the heart. It is as inconllflent with the exjfl-- cnce of this fuppofed power, to admit the Deity to be the caufe of holy ^ as of unholy affeftions. If the moral capacity v/ith whicli God' hath endowed us be the proper caiije of volition^ it is as much the proper caufe of thofe which are holy^ as of thofe which are unholy ; and, men deterniirie thenij elves as much to holinejs as to (in. This the Doc^lor's argument really admits. For, he faitli, " Were there not a proper taufc i/i the ^' niind^ the cxcrciies and a(fl:ior!S of mankind would ^' uniformly be luch as the order of our nature poini:s *' out. And, the fuppofition of the fall of ano;els or *' men would be as wild, as the fuppofition of the *' everlalliiig mountadns moving out of their place, or ^' the '"nterruption of the harmony or the fpheres. At: lead it would be viewed in no other light than n-ny alter ution in the natural worlds or fufpenfioji of the Urns of nature. The latter might as well be judged criminal and morally evil, as the form.er. If the caufe of \.\\Q acflions and exercifes of moral agents be not in thonjelves^ then the Deity is the proper, effi- cient caufe of them."* This implies the motions of the • p 11, aa. 96 APPENDIX. the human will, if eaufed by divine efficiency, td be a? perfe«511y mechankol as tiiole of the heavenly bodies ; and, that neither virtue nor vice are any more proper- ly pred^cable of them — tliat exercil'es of love are no more of the nature of virtue, than the harmony of the fpheres ; nor, of hatred of the nature of vice, than tempells and ftorms. And, this mull evidently be the truth, if it be efiential to moral aftion that the " mind *' of the agent be the true caule of his own eleftion *' and actions." If no adlions, or ele(f/, however it doth, viewed in relation to the r^.'//^ *' and producer of it. "§ That moral evil hath a caufe, yea, an efficient one, is allowed by the Doftor. He fays, " No-w if they" (moral agents) " are not the efficients of their own '^ fins, the Deity mufl be ; elie fin would have no *' eificient caufe at all — every fm would be an cffec^t '• without a caufe — to fay which, we agree with Mr. " Edwards, would be abfurd."{j On this we remark, that the exigence of fin muft be n€ce[fary^ with all tkat necsfjity which Mr. Edwards urgeth, an-d to which the Doftor objeifreth. To fay that fin is the cffenoral agents mufi: be linful antecedently to thofe vicious volitions of which they are, themfelves^ the efficient caufe. And, if raorai agents are finfui antecedently to their efFe?> mediate conlcioulfiejs oi' liberty ^^ meaning undoubtedly a power of felf- determination. And, coufidering it as dangerous to bring thefe fentiments to the tefl: of meti- aphyfical difcuffion, he takes the fliorter way of confli- tuting X.\xem. fir/l principles ; and, then no one ought to difpute them. But, poliibiy it may be thought injurious to the Doftor to reprefent him as taking/o /?/w?;/v/ry a luny to anfwer the argument from thofe palTages of fcripture which relate to the cruciiixion of Chrifi 5 fmce he has endeavoured to (liow that they may be taken in a dif- ferent fenfc from that in which they are underftood by his oppofers. The DoiTtor fays there is a twofold fenfe in which events may be faid to come to pafs by the determinate counfel and foreknowledge of God, without implying any aftive concurrence or efticiency of his power. § The firft is, when events come to pafs agreeably to the prediciions of his word. But, was it not incumbent on the Doctor, in order to fup- port his own conftruftion of thefe palTages, to fliow that God predicls certain events, and 3^et exerts no power, in order to bring them into exiftence ? Are ^divine predidions of events to be confidered as mere fortune-telling \ Can they juftly be confidered in any other light tlian declarations of what God defi^ns and wills /hall come to pafs f It is unfuppofable that the will of the Deity f^iould be indifferent with refpeft to the exiftence of thofe events which he lets hi.s crea- tures know fliall certainly come to pafs : and, abfurd tc * p. l^•J. k p. IC7. ' APPENDIX. 41 to imagine tlint his will oppofeth their coming into ex- iitence. Divine prediftions of future events muft, therefore, be viewed as declarations that God wil/s and defigns that thofe events fhall come to pals. And, it is God's will aiid de/ign thus revealed, that gives cer- t:iinty to the future exiltence of the events which they reipeft. And, in connexion with this divine will thus revealed it is that the events do, in facl, take place. And, if this be fo, let the candid reader judge whether UTiy event which GOD predldls, can be fuppofed to take place " without implying any acl:ive concurrence of divine power.'' But, further, the Dodlor urgeth that " fuch events as God determines not to prevent " by the interpoial of his power, may alfo t)e faid to '^ come to pafs in the fame way." But, is God's not preventing^ and in this fenfe permitting^ any caufe at all of the events thus permitted ^ Let it be remem- bered that the Doctor himfelf llippofeth it to be ab- iurd, as has been before obfcrved, to imagine that /in has no efficient caufe. According to him, therefore, t/Lnt luickednefs voJiicfi God dnifi not ^ by his power^ pre-^ vent ynen from being the efficient caufe of] theinfelves ^ 'may be jaid to come to pafs by tfie determinate counfcl^ foreknowledge and ordination of God. But, will not every reader, at once, fee that this conftrudtlon holds for granted a power of felf-determination in mxn ; and, that men are the efficients of their own acfrs of will ? When it is proved that men poffeis fuch a power, we may allow that thofe pailliges of fcripture which foretel the crucifixion of Chrift, and reprefent this event as a fruit of the determinate counfel of God, may intend no more than that God determined not to interpofe, by his power, to fave his Son from crucifixion. But, until this is proved^ we fliali not hefitate to conclude that the Dod;or has faid nothing to take oil the force of the argument of his oppofers drawn from the pafl'ages under confideration. Mo, that all he has faid really amounts to no more than thisj viz. that they do not^ cannot^ imply any efficient div'ne 42 APPENDIX. » ^ divine determination with refpe^H: to the taking place ©f this event. As . to thole palTages of fcripture where God is fpoken of as hardening Pharaoh's heart, the Doftor gets over them in a manner equally concife and eafy. He fays, *-' Now that God did not, could not, thus harden Pharaoh," (that is, in the manner urged by his oppofers) " is manifeft from the cleareft notices wc ** have of the divine moral perfections."* T/ie clear notices the Dodlor hath of the divine moral pcrfe<^ions are the proof that God did not harden Pharaoh's heart, in fuch a manner as the oppofers of his ideas of liber- ty urge thefe pafTages as a proof that he did. The clear notices, however, which the Apoflle Paul had of the divine moral perfeftions, feemed to be fomewhat different. For, alluding to the JVIofaic hiflory of God's treatment of Pharaoh, in hardening his heart, he makes this conclafion, '* Therefore hath he mercy *' on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will " he hardeneth."§ The Apo/lle here makes ufc of an aclive verh^ he hardeneth ; and, an aftive verb ufcd in a manner as truly implying agency and efficiency as words can well exprefs. When fuch pafTages as thefe, with a great variety of others of tlie fame tenoitr which might be mentioned, were it neceflary, are urged as a proof that the will, or decree, of God re- ally originated the exiftence of moral evil, Is it a fuf- ticient anfwer to fay, that God did not^ could not^ thus do it^ is evident from the clear eji notices ive have of the divine moral pcrfedions f Is this a fufHcient authority for determining that thefe texts are mifconftrued and mifapplied by thofe who urge them as a proof that th6 Deity, for wife reafons, really zuilled that moral evil fliould exiit ? The public, certainly, have reafon to expe£t fome better proof that the fentiments of Mr, Edwards have not the authority of the word of God for their fnpport. Bat. why fliould it be thought nn reafon able to fup* pofe *p. 112. S Rom. ix. iS. APPENDIX. 43 pofe that die Deity fliould fo ordain that, for wife realbns, moral evil fhould exift in his fyflem ? Can any one believe that there is the fame oppofition of will, in the divine mind, to the taking place of fuch an event, as there is to the real nature of moral evil ? No man, in his fenfes, will admit this : the confe- quences would be too repugnant to every idea of the Juprematy and almighty power of God to be allowed. And, if the oppofition of the divine will to the nature of moral evil^ and to its taking place in the jyjlein^ are not one and the jame ; How can it be made to appear that his ijoillin^ or ordaining that it fhould take place, is inconfiflent with his hating it with an infinite hatred ? And, if it be confiflent with the infinite purity and ho- linefs of God, and his mofc perfect difapprobation of moral evil, that He fhould, neverthelefs, for reaions in his own eternal mind, lee fit to decree and ordain that it fliould exift ; there will appear to be no incon- flftency betwixt the decrees of God, and the commands and prohibit iuiis of his word. The moral law is the rule and meafure of our conduCi — it points out what is fit for us to do, and what in our charaCiers the Deity will viev/ witii approbation, or the reverfe. The de^ trees of God TcXaXQ to his oiun condud ; and, are the rule and meafure of it in his ordination and dijpojal of events. It belongs to Co^, and to him alone., to fay what events fliall take place, and what, not. Nothing but obedience, and fubmiffion to his authority, belong to us. Nor, is it any more inconfiflent with the di- vine purity and hatred of iniquity for him to ordain, than for him to permit.^ that it fliould take place. He could have prevented its exiilencc, all agree : and, had he the fame infinite avcrfion of will from its taking fl'ice^ as he hath from the nature of it^ he certainly would have done it. Moral evil mull:, of neceflity, have a caufe of its exigence. This is admitted by the Dodor. And, as moral evil had beginning of exiftcnce, it mufl of ne- ccility have been originated by a caufe which is Jiot morally 44 APPENDIX. morally evil^ but the rcverfe. To admit that moral evil had beginning of exiftence in the fyflem— tliat it hath a caiije — that it was originated by any thing be fides itjelf ; and yet, to fay that its caiife was morally, evil^ is a perfect abfurdity. To fay that it hath no canje of its exigence, is the fame as to fay tiiat it had no hegiii^ ning — therefore is etertinl. Whether moral evil be, itfelf, beft for the world, is not afubject of debate amongft divines of any deno- mination. The affirmative of this no one has ever at- tempted to defend. The Doftor might have omitted the feclion in which he endeavours to prove that moral evil is not bejl for the world. He would not, then, have had occafion to affert that Mr. Edwards" declares that it is. He faith, " Now were it admitted, that moral ^' evil is for the be fr^ as Pvlr. Edwards declares he is certain it is .'"^ Mr. Edwards's words are, as quoted by the Doflor, " I believe there is no perfon of good " underflanding who will venture to fay, he is certain *' that it is impbffible it fhould be bell, that *' there fliould be fuch a thing as moral evil in the *' world. "§ The intervening part of the fentence, omit- ted by the Doctor, is, " taking in the whole compafs *•' and extent of exiftence, and all confequences in the. " endlefs ferics of events.'' Had the Doctor any au- thority from this paiTage, or from the next immediate- ly following, to alFert that Mr. Edwards declares that he is ce\'td.\n ?noral evil is for the befi: ? • Would the Dodtor think himfelf candidly treated, flioukl it be af- ferted that he had written a feftion to prove that //.// not beft there fliould be any fuch thing as moral evil in the fyflem ? Yet this might be afferted with as much propriety as he tells his readers that Mr. Edwards dc" dares he is certain that moral evil is for the beft. If the Doctor would oppofe the real fentiments of Mr. Edwards, as he prcfeffeth to do, it will lie upon him to prove til at, all things confidcred^ it is not^ on the whole ^ b'jl that moral evil hath taken place. Andy p. oj. , p. ISj. APPENDIX. 4; > when he has done this, he will not only have fubvert- ed Mr. Edwards's argument, but, alio, difcovered great imperfeftion in the fyflem and government of God. I'he queftlon is not, whether moral evil be for tfiif beffy but whether that divine dijpojnl and ordination^ under which ^ and as a fruit ofwhich^ moral evil doth in jaCt take place ^ be for thebef}. When it {hall be not only aflcrted, but proved, by the Dodlor, either, that moral evil doth not take place as a certain fruit and confeqiience of a divine ordination and difpofal of things ; or, that this divine ordination and dilpofal of things was not moil psrfedily wife and befl ; then, and not till then, it will be neceiTary to attempt a farther vindication of Mr. Edwards againft the reafonings and objeJt and temper are denned to mean a filled" connexion betwixt our ^^7/^"- Jent exerciles of uc'ill and future evercifes of \\\\^ jfvmff gcn&ral nature. Adam not being confirmed in inno- cency, there was no fach eiiablifhed connexion be- twixt his /?^/? and future holy exercifes of mind. In this feniis it was laid that he had not a holy temper, or the habit of holinefs. But, lell our ideas fhonld be miftaken, it was immediat.fly added, that the J ir/I and original exercifes of our firft parents were holy — pofitivc' ly virtuous and good. How far the Do(flor's remarks on the fejflion on povjer^ in the EfTay, are juit, we are content to leave to the decifion of others. He conjeilures that our ufe of the term power ^ and the application we make of it^ are improper and without authority. Be this as it may, the principal quellion onght to be, whether our rea-s Ibnings upon the fubjecl are jufl. However, we imagined that the authority of Mr. Locke, and of Chamber's D'cti9nary, v;ere fufiicient to juftify our application of the term : and, thefe authorities we had. The Doftor luppofeth that, in the Eifay pro- felTedly written on Moral Agency, " the fubjeft itjelf has been kept wholly out of figlit.''* The reader will judge whether the ground of this fuppofitioD be not, that a pozuer ofJelf~deter?jtination is excluded. If this power be efiential to moral agency, we iYCclf al- low that v;e have, in our definition, left men no power that is effential to it. Whether any thing we had (aid in the fc^tion on power be inconfillent with the praiie- worthinefs, or blame-worthinefs, of human alliens, we leave to others to determine. Upon a review of the fccftion on motives^ we do not find it liable to the objetftions the DoAor hath made againft it. Motives^ coniidered as external objefts or things, may be perceived by the intelkdual faculty, without * p. 144. ^9 , APPENDIX. tvithont any tendency to engage the choke. But tbnt which the muid relifheth in an objeii, or apprehends a5 agreeable and lovely^ cannot be perceived and rejeded — the relilh, or perception of agreeablenefs, being in fa(ft all the choice v/hich is made of it. The reasons ex- hibited in the gofpei why men ought to foriake their fi0S, may be clearly dlfcerned by the intt-llecflnal powers ; and, the will at the fame time be entirely oppofed to them. What the Doctor's idea is of the tendency the gofpei hath to produce a change in men, we do not pretend to determine. But, that the clear- eO: exhibition of golpel truth to the intelleftual viev/s of men, is, always, attended with a ftrong and violent opposition of the will to it until the heart be chonrted by the immediate power of God^ we fiippofe capable of proof, both from the holy fcriptures, and from e>:pe« rience. If the Do *' notwithftandino; the e>;planation given in the " Ex- " amination continued ?" He had laid, " fuch facul- ^^ ties, principles, powers and affedions as they are *' poirelTed of — are the only principles they can be re- " quired to a6i from and improve/' Thefe powders iind principles he now explains to mean fiatural ones — ■ thofe which t\\G imregetiernte t^o^^cCs, ; therefore, not fpiritual. If men can be " commanded, invited, ex- horted" to aft from no oilier principles than thefe, even according to tlie Dodor's own explanation of the term principles'^ Will he at the fame time deny that the unrcgenerate are deftitnte of any power to ad: from thefe principles, which the regenerate are en- dowed with for ading from the principles which they poiTefs ? The Dodor fays, " If it was not with dedgn, but *' wholly for want of underftanding v/hat the opinion " and real fentiment of the Examiner is, that Mr. ** Weft hath fo ^^rqffly mifreprefented him, he can eafily " forgive this wrong."* Whether we have rnilreprt- fented the opinion and real fentiment of the Examiner, is left to the candid public to jndge. But, for further light refpeding lii^ fentiments on the fiibjecl o'i means, the Doctor turns us to the firlt iecT-ion of the " Examination continued." Here he tells us, that *' By the gofpel God calleth upon all *' men every where to repent, and believe in his -Sou *' for reconciliation and falvation" — that H'e (God)' *' alfo gives his fpirit witti his gofpel, of wdiich unre-' '* generate rne^i receive a meafure' :" and immediately adds, that " to him that hath fliall be given, and he fliall have abundance. "§ If unrcgenerate men receive a meafure of the fpirit, and have promifes made to them of receiving abundance tipon their alking in the Cxercife of that fpirit a meafure of which they now have, What power can they nov»^ w^ant in order to do O o every* 54 A P P^ E N D I X. ever}'' thlnp; th?it is required of them, luhkh the regen- erate poircls ? I'he Dodlor proceeds immediately to obferve, " We do not afcribe any ielf-derived, inde- " pendent power, either to luirepenerate or regenerate " men, but fuch only as they have received from God, " of which they are not, ftricHily ipeaking, the propri- " etors, but ftewards." But, do you not. Sir, really afcribe the fame powers to both ? Do you afcribe any higher power to the regenerate than one whereby they may afk, with a pramije of receiving ? And, do you not afcribe the fame to the unregenerate f After this no one will be furprifed to hear the Doftor repre- lent common and fpecial grace as fcarcely diflinguifh* able. He tells us that *•' preparatory and regenerat- *' ing grace are the operation of the fame fpirit. 1 he *' tranlition from one to the other is not eafily dif- " cerned. *Tis a nice thing to draw the line exacflly "' betv/een common and fpecial grace, * admitting a " fpeciiic difference."* Muft it not, then, be a tiling equally nice to diftinguifh between the powers of the regenerate and the unregenerate ? In a cafe of fuch ?iicety as this, if we had mifapprehended the Examiner in what he«faid refped:ing the irfe of means, and the powers of men, we think we may ftand excufed. But, the Dodlor has not told us upon what authori- ty he aiferts the tranfition from preparatory to regene- ratinii grace to be not eafily difcerned. Dotli he fup- pofe the tranfition from rebellion to Juhnijfion to be fo fmall ? Is the change in regeneration fuch as to be fcarcely difcerniblie ? Is it fo nice a thing to draw the line of dif}:ind;ion between enmity and frienoJ}iip f And,-«i:^ not the flnregenerate univerJaUy reprefentcd, in the holy fcriptures, as enemies to God \ It is true, indeed, that'we have no other way to diftinguifh any divine operations, one from another, than by the effeils produced by them. But, we attribute the fame kind of- diilini^tion, in this regard, to the operations, as are found in the effefts. Viev/ed in this light, the trauiition ♦p. ii. APPENDIX. 5^ tranfition from every thiii^ that -takes place in the iinre- gcnerate iinner, or with relpect to him, to a ftate of regencracy, is great — yea, exceedingly great ; he being brought oat of darkncfs into 7narvcllous dipjit — olcj things being clone away in him, and all things become new. In the clofc of his remarks upon onr mifreprefcnta- tion of what he had faid upon the fLibjecTt of m/^ans^ and the poivers of the uuregeiiernte^ the Docftor ob- ferves, '' The Examiner is willing, upon the whole, " that what is oifered on the fubjeft of means^ *' p. Ill — ii6. of the Examination, fliould ftand as it *' doth." We only add, that we do not find that, in the ^' Examination continued," he has thrown any new light upon the fabjeft, or repreiented it to any greater advantage. Speaking, in the '" Examination," of the powers of the unre generate^ and their capacity of l)eing benefited through their oiun endeavours in the life of the means of grace, the author reprobates the diillnftion which has often been made of 7r-oral from natural powers. 'He oblerves that " to fay that their incapacity" (the incapacity of the unregenerate to ufe the means of grace futccfsfully) '' is not natural^ but i-iioral^ is fay- ^' ing nothing to the purpofe, as we triill hath be^n " {hewn. If the incapacicy be rnal^ it is no matter *' under what name it goes."* By the capacity of unregenerate men, of good" effect from the means of grace, through their oiun endeavours in the ujc of the/}? ^ and the common Jlrivings of God's Spirit^ whicli he ipeaks of, on the page juft mentioned ; we fuppofe he means the iame as a power to ufe thefe means to good effedt : and, the rather, as he had, jud; before, been fpeaking of the '' poiucr" of the unregenerate " to life the means of grace." But if unregeiiernte fmners poifels botli natural and moral capacity, or power, through the drivings of God's Spirit, to ufe the mcars of grace to good eifc6l, By the want of lohat power O o 2 are S6 APPENDIX. are or can they be diftinguifned from tlie regenerate f And, from what principles, of wihich they are not now poffeiFed, can they be obliged to a<5i: ? After rejeftin^-, on the lall: mentioned psge, the diftinftion between natural and moral incapacity, the Examiner proceeds, '' Is it determined htforeJiand^ that any of the unregen- ^^ crate fhall not ufe the means of grace, or fl:ail not ^' fucceed ? Jf it is, let any man ftow iiow the gofpel *' can be a privilege to them, or they liable to a great- *' er damnation for abiifing it." Can the idea here exprelTcd be any other, than, that if a fuccefsfui and beneficial ufe of the means of grace, amongft men, depends on the decree and iviil of God, the goipel can be no privilege ? And, if not, What is the diflinclion betwixt the po-wers^ or capacities^ of the regenerate ^nd the unregenerate ? We will not a^ain prefume to luggeft what the >'Do£lor's real Jeniimeuts are of the powers of the un- regenerate, left we fhould be guilty of mifreprefenta- j tion. If the reader can colled them from the '^ Ex- ^ amination," with the alliftancc offered him in the " Examination continued," lie has our fall liberty, and our wifhes for his fiiccefs. We would remark, however, the confidence with which the Examiner re-- je(rts the generally received doclrine of the divine de- crees 2.x\ili particular eleCiion, Yea, fo very confident is he that ^here is no truth in this dodtrine, that he challengeth any man, on this principle, to ihow that the gofpel is a privilege to the unregenerate. With thefe few ftrokes of his pen has he thus annihilated this doftrine 1 But, we proceed to fome further remarks. The Doftor tells his readers, in hij; Striftures,* that he is charged, by the author of the EiTay, with \^ difingenuity and unfairnefs, injuftice and want of candour ;" with being '* no lover of truth, nor an ^' honeft inquirer after it — with writing from envy, '' to caft an p/J-ium, and raife a popular cry j" — and, •• that AT P E N D I X. <;7 " that he is condemned as a libertine^ heretic/' &c. Alio, that we have repreferited thole " who cannot " believe that God is tiie efficient caule of all the " wickednefs of men and devils, as men of corrupt "• minds — dr-fliiute of the Jpirit of God^ irritated with " plain evangelical truth ^ of a proud and haughty *''• jpirit ^'^ &c.'* On which we only obferve, that the "Potior had no need to apply to himfelf, or to any particular cials of men, tilings which we have faid ot hmiian nature in general in its prefent fallen flate. Nor, had he any authority to fay that we reprelented \\\ra-A.% defigning to propagate and eftabi i in y/V/i /r;?//'- ments as thofe to which xve believe the general fcheme which he has advanced naturally tends, and in which it ultimately terminates. If he can find any palTage in the Eifay in which all, who do not believe the Deity to be the efficient caule of all wickednefs, arc repre- lented as men of corrupt mind — deftitute of the Spirit of God^ Sec. the author will hold himfelf under obliga- tion to make the fullell retraction. Perhaps the reader may judge th^t the author of the Efiay h:is mifrcprefented the Examiner in vAM\t is faid, p. lo/j. of faid Elfay. '1 here we obferved that " to " deny t!^e prefcience of God, or adopt a fcheme of doc- *' trine which cannot l^e reconciled with his certain '^ foreknowledge of all events, carries an imputation o\\ '^ God as really diihonourable to him, as any of the ob- " noxious fentiments fnppofed by our a^ithor to ha *' contained in that trad of Mr. Edwards upon which *^' he is animadverting. And, yet this is a difHculty *' with which our author's fcheme is confljedly em- " barraffed." It is admitted that tlie paffage vvnll bear this conftrudion, viz. "• that the Docftor's fcheme is '■' corifefedlv embarrafled with the difficulty of being ir- '•' reconcilable with the divine foreknowledge of all e- " yents /' yea, that this is the moft natural conllruc- tion.. In this reprefentation we frankly acknowledge that the Doctor is injured ; and, condemn our own inad- vertence »p. 159, 160- 58 APPENDIX. vertence in making it. The " intimation'* which thfr Doctor has given ns, in his Striftures, of the miftake, has indeed made quite a dift'erent impreihon on our mind, from what the mifreprefentation itfelf ap- pears to have made on his ; as, we can receive it without thofe flronp; fenfations of difgud and con- tempt with which he Teemed pofTefled when he gave it. But, that the Do(n:or's Icheme is embarralTed with difficulties arifing from the do(Slrine of the foreknow- ledge of God, he doth not pretend to deny. Yea, he expreilcs it as his opinion that the ivijeft of jntn con- fider the divine prefcience as incapable of being re- conciled with (what he ftyles) liberty in the creature, by any hni7ian under fiandin^,''^' The Do (^ or ought to have due credit for fo frank a confeflion : and, we may hence conclude that this is a difficulty which he will never furmount — a difficulty, under the heavy Tveight of which the Icheme of doftrine he has advan- ced mnfl lie till a greater light fliines than is ever e:;';- pecled to appear in our world. T\\Q. repreientation which the Do£ior gives, § of the hypothecs advanced in the fecond part of the '•■ KfTay,'' we think is unjuft. However, the reader will judge for himfelf. What authority he he'd to re- prefent it as our opinion that rnnltitiides will perifii, while fczv only will be faved ; and, tl.at thcl'e multi- tudes \vere m.ade finners in order to fccure the future obedience and promote the happinefs oi' tJiiJe ftiu j we know not. When the reader turns to th.c feveral places to which the Dodlor refers him for liis authori- ties, we feel confident, he will find that no fuch fenti- ments are there expreffed. That the awful manifefla- tions of the divine difpleafare againlf fm in the eter- nal torments of the damned, will greatly enhance the ideas of the divine glory, and in that way be a mean of cftabiiffiing the authority of the Deity, and Iccur- ingthe future obedience, both of faints and angels ; is v«^hat * P* 9^- S P- *^4- APPENDIX. S9 ivhat we fully believe : nor, do we find that the Doc- tor hath offered any reafonable objedion againll the truth and juflneis of the fentiment. Whether any thing further than this is advanced by the Ejdayift, on this head, the candid reader is to determine for him- fclf. When cur author aflis, '' What warrant Mr. *' Weft, or any man, hath to fay that, had not *' moral evil exifted, the Governor of the world could *' not have exhibited his hatred of fin, his love of ho- *' linefs, his goodnels and authority, illuflrioup.y in *' other ways ?"*. He, prudently enough for himfelf, changeth the ground of the debate. Did Mr. Wcfl^ or any other man, ever afTert that the Deity could not have manifefted his perfeclions illuftrionfiy^ had moral evil never taken place ? The Dodtor muft be fenfible that this is a point which was never contefled by the author of the Effay. Why then doth he endeavour to reprcfent him to the public as guilty of fuch prefump- tion \ That the taking place of fin will be the occa- /ton oi bri^Jiter manifellations of the divine glory, and more illuftrious dilplays of the perfections of God, is what we fully believe : any thing further than this, we dM not prefume to urge. The Doftor further, on the laft quoted page, infin- uates to his readers that we had reprelented all thofe who do not agree with us in what we had faid on. the prefer ahlanefs and dcfirahlcnejs of jnoral ev.il^ as he fhrajeth it^ as being " prejudiced^ Joiir^ bitter^*' Sec. In reply to this charge we have only to afk the reader to turn to the paifage to which the Doftor refers him for its fupport. 'I'his is all we need fay for refut- ing it. The Dodlor's abhorreoce of the fentiments advan- ced in the '' Effay," exprelTeth itfelf much more in flrong exclamation, than in Iblid and rational argu- ment. He tells his renders, at the cloie of his *' Strictures," that the author ought to be '*• withftood to the face as one who hatli fpuken wickedly for God." We •p. 164 6o APPENDIX. "We are willing to be refilled, in any thing we have advanced, with the weapons of reajun. and the oracUs of Cod. To the force of thefe, we hope, we fhall cheerfully yield. The word of God is the fole rule by v/hich controverfies of this kind are ultimately to be decided. We fliall be under obligation thankfully to acknowledge the kindnefs of any man who will point out to us in what refpeds we have perverted it. The feftion " on texts of fcripture mifconftrued," has not furniflied the opportunity for our acknowledg- ing our obligations, in this refpeft, to the author. The Doftor thus concludes his .Striftures, " When *' impious tenets are publicly advanced, a vindication " of the divine character forbids us to be unconcern- ed. If any thing we have faid towards the clofe of thefe Striftures, fnould have the appearance of /(?•• verity.^ Hint fc verity hath not the pe^-fon^ but the opinions of our author for its objeft — opinic#is to which too ilrong a difiike cannot be exprefied — We have, at the fame time, aimed to keep in mind the Apoilolic advice, in vieeknejs inftrudiug tJioJ'e that oppnfe thejnjdves." The finccrity and warmth of the Doctor's oppofition to the fentiments contai-wed in the " EiTay," there is not the lead: room to queftiou. But, he feems to feel the need of fome apology for the appearance it may, poffibly, be imagined there is of Jeverity^ towards the clofe of his Strictures. TV^/j, he tells us however, hath not the per/on., but the opitiions of the author of the EfFay, for its object. This apol- ogy may readily be admitted ; for, opiniojis dread no feverity but that vti fair ^ found argumentation. Here the Doftor (lands jnflly excufed. As to the meafurc of his mceknefs in the infruCiions he has given us, we fliall not take upon us to decide. Had there been a greater mixture of argument., they would not have been lefs convincing. Whether his inflrut^ioYis exceed in the Jircngth of the rea/onings tliey exhibit, or r)ie ineeknefs of the manner in which they are given, \vt profefs ourfelvts to be unable to determine. All we can APPENDIX. 6i can fay, is, we prefume there is room left for im- provement in both. Unhappy it is, that controverfies on the mod folemn and important fubje£ts are too frequently managed with a fpirit, an acrimony, which tend rather to dif- grace the authors, tlian to recommend the fentiments they advance. The public will not expe«ft contro- verfial writings to be free from thefe imperfections, fo long as the hearts of men remain fo m.ucli under the pov/er of prejudice as to lead to fo great a differ- ence of fentiment as evidently runs through the writ- ings of the Doctor, now before us, and the preceding EfTay. If, amidil the perjonalities which may be found in each, the candid mind of the reader can find any thing that is inllruftivc ; while he pities the failings of the authors, he will embrace the light which he difcovers amidll fo many imperfedions. And, every cordial friend to the caufe of Chrift will be excited fervently, to wifh and pray for the commancement of that Iiappy period, wdien the watchmen fijcill fee eye to eye — vrhen all the profeiTed miniilers of Chrift fhall have the love of the truth in their hearts ; and, fliall unite, with one heart, and with one voice, to proclaim that glorious fyftem of truth which is really contained in the gofpel of Chriji. A M E N, ll'iftliiTili Mliiil i ' .v.nxJUVWi '»c7:\%'-'r ^J» - 'wac^VJ S ERRATA. Page. Line. 12. for formed, read /5Kff^. for exercifetb, read excvjeth. for and, read or. for thought, read that. from bottom, for And, read Any, for inverted, read innjented. for denominations, read denomination. for formed, tczi found. for every, read 'very. from bottom, after i. e. infert are. far o{, read in. from bottom, for meaning, read reafoning, for non-fovc reign, read onjun fovereign. after it, infert is. from bottom, for confiftent,»read /«fo«,/^f«/. for iindefigned, read undefigning. for expofed, read exprejftd. for even, read e-uer. from bottom, for power, xtzi. po'Vjers, for fentimentSj Xfidi/entimejjt. for ? put ; from bottom, for ccnfideratlon, xz.z.^co7iJideratisns, for is alfo, read // is alfo; 6. for fcene, read/f///?. 19- 12. 26. 4- 3i» 24. 36. 18. 40. 3- 44. 7- 56. 19. 74- 14. «9. 4- 92. 12. 97. T- ibid. 3- 109. I. I II. 8, J16. 13. 132. 18. 146. 7- ibid. ih. 153- 3- 162. M- ibid. 19. 172. 10. 204. 17- 213- 6. 5e# feuje fo^e: ttf^ r