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ΝΥ A j Bly 4 7 ἐτ ΚΕΝ ΩΝ IE, ἵ ἜΣ AN ΜΙ ἊΝ Baie vor i ye a yr Hie Ry [Ἢ THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT EXAMINED IN KIGHT LECTURES, PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, IN THE YEAR M.DCCC.LVIII. ΟΝ THE FOUNDATION OF THE LATE REV. JOHN BAMPTON, M.A. CANON OF SALISBURY. BY HENRY LONGUEVILLE MAN SEL, B.D. Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College ; Tutor and late Fellow of St. John’s College. OXFORD: PRINTED BY J. WRIGHT, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY, FOR JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, LONDON; SOLD BY J. H. ἃ JAS. PARKER, OXFORD, AND 377 STRAND, LONDON. M.DCCC.LVIII. THE OBJECTIONS MADE TO FAITH ARE BY NO MEANS AN EFFECT OF KNOWLEDGE, BUT PROCEED RATHER FROM AN IGNORANCE OF WHAT KNOWLEDGE IS. BISHOP BERKELEY. No DIFFICULTY EMERGES IN THEOLOGY, WHICH HAD NOT PRE- VIOUSLY EMERGED IN PHILOSOPHY, SIR W, HAMILTON. EXTRACT FROM THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE REV. JOHN BAMPTON, CANON OF SALISBURY. ea “1 give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to ἐς the Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University “of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and sin- ἐς oular the said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the ‘¢ intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned; that is to ‘“¢ say, I will and appoint that the Vice-Chancellor of the «ς University of Oxford for the time being shall take and «ἐ receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and ‘* (after all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions “ made) that he pay all the remainder to the endowment * of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be established for ‘‘ ever in the said University, and to be performed in the ‘** manner following : “41 direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in «< Kaster Term, a Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads “ οὗ Colleges only, and by no others, in the room ad- “joining to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten ‘‘in the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach ‘eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, the year following, at “51. Mary's in Oxford, between the commencement of the a 2 iv EXTRACT FROM CANON BAMPTON’S WILL. “ last month in Lent Term, and the end of the third week “in Act Term. « Also I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity «© Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the ἐς following Subjects—to confirm and establish the Christ- “ian Faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics ‘© upon the divine authority of the holy Scriptures— ‘‘ upon the authority of the writings of the primitive Fa- ‘« thers, as to the faith and practice of the primitive Church ‘upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus ςς Christ—upon the Divinity of the Holy Ghost—upon the « Articles of the Christian Faith, as comprehended in the «« Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds. ‘** Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity ςς Lecture Sermons shall be always printed, within two “6 months after they are preached, and one copy shall be ἐς oiven to the Chancellor of the University, and one copy “τὸ the Head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor ςς οὗ the city of Oxford, and one copy to be put into the «ς Bodleian Library; and the expense of printing them shall ** be paid out of the revenue of the Land or Estates given ** for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the ** Preacher shall not be paid, nor be entitled to the revenue, ** before they are printed. ** Also I direct and appoimt, that no person shall be ** qualified to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, un- ** less he hath taken the degree of Master of Arts at least, ἐς in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge ; ‘and that the same person shall never preach the Divinity ** Lecture Sermons twice.” ΡΉΓΑΝ, Iv has been observed by a thoughtful writer of the present day, that “the theological struggle of this age, in all its more important phases, turns upon the philosophical problem of the limits of knowledge and the true theory of human ignor- ance*.” The present Lectures may be regarded as an attempt to obtain an answer to this pro- blem, in one at least of its aspects, by shewing what limitations to the construction of a philo- sophical Theology necessarily exist in the con- stitution and laws of the human mind. The title selected may perhaps require a few words of explanation. In the expression, religious thought, the term thought is not intended to desig- nate any special mode of acquiring or communi- cating knowledge; as if truths beyond the reach of thought could be attained by intuition or some other mental process. It is used as a general term, to include all that can be distinctly appre- hended as existing in any man’s own conscious- ness, or can be communicated to others by means of language. Those states of mind which do not fulfil these conditions are only indirectly exa- mined in the following pages ; but the very cir- ἃ Professor Fraser, Hssays in Philosophy, p. 281. vi PREFACE. cumstance, that such states, even granting them to exist, can neither be distinctly apprehended nor intelligibly communicated, renders them, whatever may be their supposed effects on indi- vidual minds, unavailable as instruments for the construction or criticism of any religious doc- trine. Though the need of such an inquiry as 1s now attempted was suggested to the Author chiefly by the perusal of theological writings of the present generation, he has not, in the prosecution of it, thought it necessary to confine his remarks ex- clusively to living writers, or to those whose influence is extensively felt in this country. Enough reference will be found to recent pub- lications, to shew, it is believed, that the work is not uncalled for at this time; but the causes of the evil chiefly assailed lie deep in the tenden- cies of human nature, and are operative, with identity of principle and but little variety of de- tail, at different times and in different places. In Germany, indeed, it may be said that Ra-— tionalism, properly so called, is not at present the predominant phase of theological speculation. Still it is found, in no sparing measure, in its own name and character; and still more, it un- derlies and leavens the speculations of many writers who are apparently pursuing a different method. Publications whose professed object is historical or critical, are often undertaken in the interest of a foregone philosophical conclusion. If a writer commences his inquiry by —laying PREFACE. Vil down, with Strauss, as a canon of criticism, that whatever is supernatural is necessarily unhis- torical; or if, with Vatke or Baur, he assumes the Hegelian theory of development as the “stand- point” from which to contemplate the history of nations or of doctrines, his researches will be indirectly amenable to any criticism which may affect the philosophical principles on which they are conducted. But, directly, the historical and critical researches of modern theology do not come within the class of inquiries examined in the present work. For, whatever may be their merits or defects in the hands of individual writ- ers, they cannot in themselves be regarded as transcending the legitimate boundaries of human thought; but on the contrary, they are rather legitimate, though often over-estimated, contri- butions to the general sum of Christian Evi- dences. With regard to the philosophical speculations in Theology which are the direct objects of ex- amination in the following pages, the present work may be regarded as an attempt to pursue, in relation to Theology, the inquiry instituted by Kant in relation to Metaphysics; namely, How are synthetical judgments a priort possible? In other words; Does there exist in the human mind any direct faculty of religious knowledge, by which, in its speculative exercise, we are enabled to decide, independently of all external Revela- tion, what is the true nature of God, and the manner in which He must manifest Himself to vill PREFACE. the world; and by which, in its critical exercise, we are entitled authoritatively to decide for or against the claims of any professed Revelation, as containing a true or a false representation of the Divine Nature and Attributes? And if it can be shewn that no such faculty exists, but that the conclusions arrived at in this respect are gained indirectly, by transferring to the region of Theology judgments which properly belong to another province of human thought; there then arises a second inquiry; namely, What cautions are necessary to be observed m the process of transferring, and what is the value of the judg- ments when transferred? The moral and theo- logical writings of Kant and his followers are so far from furnishing a satisfactory answer to these questions, that they rather seem as if they had been written expressly for the purpose of re- versing the method carried out with such good effect in relation to Metaphysics. [Ὁ is rather to a philosopher of our own age and country that we must look for the true theory of the limits of human thought, as ap- plicable to theological, no less than to meta- physical researches,—a theory exhibited indeed in a fragmentary and incomplete form, but con- taining the germ of nearly all that is requisite for a full exposition of the system. The cele- brated article of Sir William Hamilton, on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, contains the key to the understanding and appreciation of nearly the whole body of modern German specu- PREFACE. 1x lation. His great principle, that “the Uncon- ditioned is incognisable and inconceivable; its notion being only negative of the Conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived,’ has suggested the principal part of the inquiries pursued in the present work; and his practical conclusion, “ We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of exist- ence; and are warned from recognising the do- main of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive with the horizon of our faith,” is identical with that which is constantly enforced throughout these Lectures. But if the best theoretical exposition of the limits of human thought is to be found in the writings of a philosopher but recently removed from among us; it is in a work of more than a century old that we find the best instance of the acknowledgement of those limits in practice. The Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed, to the con- stitution and course of Nature furnishes an exam- ple of a profound and searching philosophical spirit, combined with a just perception of the bounds within which all human philosophy must be confined, to which, in the whole range of simi- lar investigations, it would be difficult, if not im- possible, to find a parallel. The author of that work has been justly described as “one to whose deep sayings no thoughtful mind was ever yet introduced for the first time, without acknow- ledging the period an epoch in its intellectual Χ PREFACE. history”;” and it may be added that the feeling of admiration thus excited will only be increased by a comparison of his writings with the preten- tious failures of more ambitious thinkers. Con- nected as the present Author has been for many years with the studies of Oxford, of which those writings have long formed an important part, he feels that he would be wanting in his duty to the University to which he owes so much, were he to hesitate to declare, at this time, his deep-rooted and increasing conviction, that sound religious philosophy will flourish or fade within her walls, according as she perseveres or neglects to study the works and cultivate the spirit of her great son and teacher, Bishop Butler. b W. A. Butler, Letiers on the Development of Christian Doc- irine, p. 75. » Ἢ am AAA A w αι δαὶ NG Are INOLOGICKLE VV¥vVVVW*¥ CONTENTS. LECTURE I. Dogmatism and Rationalism as methods of religious phi- losophy—meaning of these terms—errors of the respective systems denoted by each; the one forcing reason into agreement with revelation, the other forcing revelation into agreement with reason.—Both methods may be regarded as attempts, from opposite sides, to produce exact coinci- dence between belief and thought.—Instances of each ex- hibited and examined.—Human conceptions are unavoid- able in Theology; but there is need of some principle to determine their proper place in it.—Such a principle can only be gained by an investigation of the Limits of Human Thought.—The proper object of criticism is not religion, but the human mind in its relation to religion—A direct criticism of religion as a representation of God can only be accomplished by the construction of a Philosophy of the Infinite.—It is therefore necessary to inquire whether such a philosophy is possible; and this can only be ascertained by an examination of the laws of human thought in general, which will determine those of religious thought in particu- lar.—Analogous difficulties may be expected in philosophy and in religion, arising from the limitations of thought common to both.—Contrast between two opposite state- ments of the extent of human knowledge, in the words of St. Paul and of Hegel.—Purpose of the following Lectures, as an examination of the Limits of Religious Thought. LECTURE ILI. Statement of the two opposite methods by which a Philo- sophy of Religion may be attempted; the Objective or Xi CONTENTS. Metaphysical, based upon a supposed knowledge of the na- ture of God, and the Subjective or Psychological, based on a knowledge of the mental faculties of man.—Relation of these methods respectively to the Criticism of Revelation — dependence of the former method upon the latter —Fur- ther examination of the Objective or Metaphysical method. Two different modes in which man may be supposed to be capable of attaining to a knowledge of God—specimen of each—insufficiency of both to found a Rational Theology. Examination of the fundamental ideas of Rational Theo- logy,—the Absolute—the Infinite—the First Cause—mu- tual contradictions involved in these three ideas—concep- tion of an eternal Causation incompatible with the Abso- lute—coneeption of a temporal Causation meompatible with the Infinite—The Absolute cannot be conceived as a necessary and unconscious cause,—nor as a voluntary and conscious cause,—nor as possessing consciousness at all,—nor as containing within itself any kind of relation, —nor as one and simple, out of all relation. Effect of these counter impossibilities on the conceptions of Theology—apparent contradictions in the conception of the Divine Attributes as absolute and infinite—Further contradictions involved in the coexistence of the Relative with the Absolute, and of the Finite with the Infinite. Pantheism avoids these contradictions by denying the ex- istence of the Finite and Relative—this solution untenable —self-contradictions of the Pantheistic hypothesis —AIL ternative of Atheism, which denies the existence of the Infinite and Absolute—contradictions involved in this hy- pothesis—Summary of conclusions.—Necessary failure of all attempts to construct a Metaphysical Theology —al- ternative necessitated by this failure——Practical result of the above inquiry. LECTURE III. Reeapitulation of the results of the last Lecture.—Ne- cessity of examining the Philosophy of Religion from the Subjective or Psychological side, as dependent upon a CONTENTS. ΧΙ knowledge of the laws of the human mind.—General con- ditions of all human Consciousness.— First condition of Consciousness, Distinction between one Object and another— such a distinction necessarily implies Limitation—conse- quent impossibility of conceiving the Infinite —Explanation of the contradictions involved in the idea of the Infinite— this idea inadmissible as the basis of a scientific Theology. —Second condition of Consciousness, Relation between Sub- ject and Olyect—consequent impossibility of conceiving the Absolute.—Explanation of the contradictions involved in the idea of the Absolute.—Impossibility of a partial know- ledge of the Infinite and Absolute.— Third condition of Con- sciousness, Succession and Duration in Time—hence all ob- jects are conceived as finite—consequent impossibility of conceiving Creation, and counter impossibility of conceiving finite existence as uncreated.—Attempt to evade this limit- ation in Theology by the hypothesis of the existence of God out of Time—this hypothesis untenable in philosophy and unavailable in theology.—Fourth condition of Consciousness, Personality—Personality a limitation and a relation, and hence inadequate to represent the Infinite.—Theological consequences of this condition.—Personality the source and type of our conception of Reality, and therefore the only fitting representation of God.—Necessity of thinking of God as personal and yet of believing in Him as infinite —apparent contradiction between these representations— hence Thought cannot be the measure of Belief.—Conse- quent impossibility of constructing a Rational Theology.— Attempt to avoid the above conclusions by placing the Philosophy of the Infinite in a point beyond Consciousness —necessary failure of this attempt—Summary of conclu- sions.—Practical lesson from the above inquiry. LECTURE IV. Analysis of the religious Consciousness, reflective and intuitive.—Relation of the reflective Consciousness to Theo- logy ; its reasonings sufficient to correct our conception of a Supreme Being, but not to originate it—examination of es -ο.... XIV CONTENTS. some current theories on this point—statement of the value of the reflective faculties within their proper limits. Reflection, as well as intuition, necessary to distinct con- sciousness ; but intuition is first in the order of nature, though not in that of time.—Two principal modes of reli- gious intuition—the Feeling of Dependence and the Con- viction of Moral Obligation, giving rise respectively to Prayer and Expiation Examination of these two modes of Consciousness.— Dependence implies a Personal Superior; hence our conviction of the Power of God—Moral Obliga- tion implies a Moral Lawgiver; hence our conviction of the Goodness of God.—Limits of the Religious Conscious- ness—Sense of Dependence not a consciousness of the Absolute and Infinite—opposite theory of Schleiermacher on this point—objections to his view.—Sense of Moral Obligation not a consciousness of the Absolute and Infinite. —Yet the Infinite is indirectly implied by the religious consciousness, though not apprehended as such; for the consciousness of limitation carries with it an indirect con- viction of the existence of the Infinite beyond conscious- ness.—Result of the above analysis—our knowledge of God relative and not absolute—the Infinite an object of belief, but not of thought or knowledge; hence we may know that an Infinite God exists, but not what He is as infinite — Further results of an examination of the religious con- sciousness.—God known as a Person through the conscious- ness of ourselves as Persons—this consciousness indispensa- ble to Theism ; for the denial of our own Personality, whe- ther in the form of Materialism or of Pantheism, logically leads to Atheism.—Summary of conclusions—our religious knowledge is regulative, but not speculative—importance of this distinction in theological reasoning—conception of the Infinite inadmissible in Theology.—Office of religious phi- losophy, as limited to finite conceptions.—Practical benefits of this limitation.—Conelusion. LECTURE V. Distinction between Speculative and Regulative Truth ii CONTENTS. XV further pursued.—In Philosophy, as well as in Religion, our highest principles of thought are regulative and not speculative.—Instances in the ideas of Liberty and Neces- sity; Unity and Plurality as implied in the conception of any object ; Commerce between Soul and Body; Exten- sion, as implied in external perception ; and Succession, as implied in the entire consciousness.—Illustration thus af- forded for determining the limits of thought—distinction between legitimate and illegitimate thought, as determined by their relation to the inexplicable and the self-contra- dictory respectively.—Conclusion to be drawn as regards the manner of the mind’s operation—all Consciousness implies a relation between Subject and Object, dependent on their mutual action and reaction ; and thus no principle of thought can be regarded as absolute and simple, as an ultimate and highest truth.—Analogy in this respect be- tween Philosophy and Natural Religion which apprehends the Infinite under finite forms—corresponding difficulties to be expected in each.—Provinees of Reason and Faith.— Analogy extended to Revealed Religion — testimony of Revelation plain and intelligible when regarded as regula- tive, but ultimately incomprehensible to speculation—cor- responding errors in Philosophy and Religion, illustrating this analogy.—Regulative conceptions not therefore untrue. —The above principles confirmed by the teaching of Serip- ture.—Revelation expressly adapted to the limits of human thought.—Relation of the Infinite to the Personal in the representations of God in the Old Testament.—Further confirmation from the New Testament.—Doctrine of the Incarnation ; its practical position in Theology as a regu- lative truth; its perversion by modern philosophy, in the attempt to exhibit it as a speculative truth.—Instances in Hegel, Marheineke, and Strauss.—Conelusion. LECTURE VI. Result of the previous inquiries—religious ideas con- tain two elements, a Form, common to them with all other ideas, as being human thoughts; and a Matter, peculiar to ΧΥΪ CONTENTS. themselves, as thoughts about religious objects — hence there may exist two possible kinds of difficulties; the one formal, arising from the universal laws of human thought ; the other material, arising from the peculiar nature of reli- gious evidence.—The principal objections suggested by Ra- tionalism are of the former kind; common to all human thinking as such, and therefore to Rationalism itself.— Proof of this position by the exhibition of parallel difficul- ties in Theology and Philosophy.—Our ignorance of the nature of God compared with our ignorance of the nature of Causation.—Doctrine of the Trinity compared with the philosophical conception of the Infinite and the Absolute, as One and yet as Many.—Doctrine of the eternal genera- tion of the Son compared with the relation of an Infinite Substance to its Attributes—Purpose of such comparisons, not to prove the doctrines, but to shew the weakness of human reason with regard to them—true evidence of the doctrines to be found, not in Reason, but in Revelation.— Further parallels.—Doctrine of the twofold nature of Christ compared with the philosophical conception of the Infinite as coexisting with the Finite—Reason thus shewn not to be the supreme judge of religious truth; for Religion must begin with that which is above Reason.—Extension of the same argument to our conceptions of Divine Providence.— Representations of General Law and Special Interposition —supposed difficulty in the conception of the latter shewn to be really common to all human conceptions of the Infi- nite.—Both representations equally imperfect as specula- tive truths, and both equally necessary as regulative.— Imperfections in the conception of General Law and me- chanical action of the universe—this conception is neither philosophically necessary nor empirically universal ; and hence it is not entitled to supersede all other representa- tions—it is inapplicable to the phenomena of mind, and only partially available in relation to those of matter.— Conception of Miraculous Agency, as subordinate to that of Special Providence—no sufficient ground, either from philosophy or from experience, for asserting that mira- CONTENTS. XVIi cles are impossible. — Comparison between the opposite conceptions of a miracle, as an exception to a law, or as the result of a higher law—both these conceptions are speculatively imperfect, but the former is preferable as a regulative truth.—Summary of conclusions—parallel diffi- culties must exist m Theology and in Philosophy —true value and province of Reason in relation to both. LECTURE VII. Philosophical parallel continued with regard to the sup- posed moral objections to Christian doctrines.—Error of the moral theory of Kant.— Moral convictions how far necessary and trustworthy, how far contingent and fallible —parallel in this respect between moral and mathematica] science, as based on the formal conditions of experience— possibility of corresponding errors in both.—Human mo- rality not absolute, but relative. —The Moral Law eannot be conceived as an absolute principle, apart from its ten- poral manifestations—parallel in the idea of Time and its relations.— Morality as conceived by us necessarily con- tains a human and positive element; and therefore cannot be the measure of the Absolute Nature of God.—Applica- tion of the above principles to Christian Theology.—The Atonement.—Weakness of the supposed moral obligations to this doctrine—such objections equally applicable to any conceivable scheme of Divine Providence.—Predesti- nation and Free Will—Predestination, as a determination of the Absolute Mind, is speculatively inconceivable, and therefore cannot be known to be incompatible with human Freedom—parallel in this respect between Predestination in Theology and Causation in Philosophy.—Eternal punish- ment—rashness and ignorance of rationalist criticisms of this doctrine—the difficulties of the doctrine are not pe- euliar to Theology, but common to all Philosophy, and belong to the general problem of the existence of Evil at all, which is itself but a subordinate case of the universal impossibility of conceiving the coexistence of the Infinite with the Finite.—Contrast between illegitimate and legiti- b XVill CONTENTS. mate modes of reasoning on evil and its punishment— illustrations to be derived from analogies in the course of nature and in the constitution of the human mind.— Extension of the argument from analogy to other religious doctrines—Original Sin—Justification by Faith—Opera- tion of Divine Grace.—Limits of the Moral Reason.—Con- clusion. LECTURE VIII. Right use of Reason in religious questions—Reason en- titled to judge of a Religion in respect of its evidences, as addressed to men, but not in respect of its correspondence with philosophical conceptions of the Absolute Nature of God.—No one faculty of the human mind is entitled to exclusive preference as the criterion of religious truth— the true criterion is to be found in the general result of many and various Evidences—practical neglect of this rule by different writers.— Comparative value of internal and externa evidences of religion, the former as negative, the latter as positive-—Cautions requisite in the use of the negative argument from internal evidence—external and internal evidence can only be estimated in conjunction with each other.—Distinetion between the proper and improper use of the Moral Sense in questions of religious evidence, —Application of this distinction to facts recorded in Sa- cred History.—Analogy between physical and moral laws as regards miraculous interventions. —Probable and partial character of the moral argument; error of supposing it to be demonstrative and complete ; possibility of mistakes in its application.—General summary of Christian Evidences— alternative in the case of their rejection—Christ’s teach- ing either wholly divine or wholly human.—Impossibility of an eclectic Christianity—Value of the ὦ priori pre- sumption against miracles—nothing gained in point of probability by a partial rejection of the supernatural.— Christianity regarded as a Revelation must be accepted wholly or not at all—Speculative difficulties in religion form a part of our probation—analogy between moral and CONTENTS. XIX intellectual temptations.—General result of an examination of the Limits of Religious Thought—Theology not a spe- culative science, nor in the course of progressive develop- ment.—Cautions needed in the treatment of religious know- ledge as regulative—this view does not solve difficulties, but only shews why they are insoluble.—Instance of the neglect of this caution in Archbishop King’s rule of scripture in- terpretation as regards the Divine Attributes.—No expla- nation possible of those difficulties which arise from the universal laws of human thought—such difficulties are in- herent in our mental constitution, and form part of our training and discipline during this life—The office of Phi- losophy is not to give us a knowledge of the absolute na- ture of God, but to teach us to know ourselves and the limits of our faculties. —Conclusion. ΦΥῊΝ by! ΔΗ ὅσα, doh v AY a ea UIE til Wheel oicivosine aus ie Me hewiety: tis ΠΝ A GL. & ἰηἰ δον A GER ἐν: ἷ ae ΔΛ aad! He. att abiasngny ony νι ited miss ἀπ τε μα ΒΝ sega” te οἰθξωρα, ΕΠ ἡ εὐ! as it tospenttet δ τὰς ' Palco 408 dun His fait tes | ita πο ἀν 20k Baral, ἡ ΜΕ ἫΝ ΓΕ ἫΝ One os iy ggbeiyera κα απ ΟΥ̓ ΘΑ dom fb ee Chae es Sh ine i 1 ὦ κα F | 7 : writ τῇ ry ia Se > +i . Th) Ἀν om Pe ‘a ; Hikes rae Ἂν if ad “ Ἶ ᾿ DEUTERONOMY IV. 2. Ye shall not add unto the word which I com- mand you, neither shall ye diminish ought From it. DOGMATISM and Rationalism are the two extremes between which religious philosophy perpetually oscillates. Each represents a sys- tem from which, when nakedly and openly announced, the well regulated mind almost instinctively shrinks back; yet which, in ἡ some more or less specious disguise, will be found to underlie the antagonist positions of many a theological controversy. Many a man who rejects isolated portions of Christian doctrine, on the ground that they are repug- nant to his reason, would hesitate to avow broadly and unconditionally that reason is the supreme arbiter of all religious truth; though at the same time he would find it hard to point out any particular in which the position of reason, in relation to the truths which he still retains, differs from that which it occupies in relation to those which he re- jects. And on the other hand, there are B Q LECTURE I. many who, while they would by no means construct a dogmatic system on the assump- tion that the conclusions of reason may always be made to coincide with those of revelation, yet, for want of an accurate distinction be- tween that which is within the province of human thought and that which is beyond it, are accustomed in practice to demand the as- sent of the reason to positions which it is equally incompetent to affirm or to deny. Thus they not only lessen the value of the service which it is capable of rendering within its legitimate sphere, but also indirectly coun- tenance that very intrusion of the human in- tellect into sacred things, which, in some of its other aspects, they so strongly and so justly condemn. In using the above terms, it 1s necessary to state at the outset the sense in which each is employed, and to emancipate them from the various and vague associations connected with their ordinary use. I do not include under the name of Dogmatism the mere enunciation of religious truths, as resting upon authority and not upon reasoning. The Dogmatist, as well as the Rationalist, is the constructor of a system; and in con- structing it, however much the materials upon which he works may be given by a LECTURE I. 3 higher authority, yet in connecting them to- gether and exhibiting their systematic form, it is necessary to call in the aid of human ability. Indeed, whatever may be their actual antagonism in the field of religious contro- versy, the two terms are in their proper sense so little exclusive of each other, that both were originally employed to denote the same persons ;—the name Dogmatists or Rational- ists being indifferently given to those me- dical theorists who insisted on the neces- sity of calling in the aid of rational principles, to support or correct the conclusions fur- nished by experience(1). A like signification is to be found in the later language of philo- sophy, when the term Dogmatists was used to denote those philosophers who endeavoured to explain the phenomena of experience by means of rational conceptions and demon- strations; the intelligible world being re- garded as the counterpart of the sensible, and the necessary relations of the former as the principles and ground of the observed facts of the latter(2). It is in a sense ana- logous to this that the term may be most accurately used in reference to Theology. Scripture is to the theological Dogmatist what Experience is to the philosophical. It supplies him with the facts to which his sys- B2 4 . Bae {ΠῚ Π, ἯΙ: tem has to adapt itself. It contains in an unsystematic form the positive doctrines, which further inquiry has to exhibit as sup- ported by reasonable grounds and connected into a scientific whole. Theological Dogma- tism is thus an application of reason to the support and defence of preexisting statements of Scripture(3). Rationalism, on the other hand, so far as it deals with Scripture at all, deals with it as a thing to be adapted to the independent conclusions of the natural rea- son, and to be rejected where that adaptation cannot conveniently be made. By fation- alism, without intending to limit the name to any single school or period in theological controversy, I mean generally to designate that system whose final test of truth is placed in the direct assent of the human consciousness, whether in the form of logical deduction, or moral judgment, or religious intuition ; by whatever previous process those faculties may have been raised to their as- sumed dignity as arbitrators. ‘The Ration- alist, as such, is not bound to maintain that a divine revelation of religious truth is im- possible, nor even to deny that it has actually been given. He may admit the existence of the revelation as a fact: he may acknow- ledge its utility as a temporary means of in- LECTURE IL 5 struction for a ruder age: he may even ac-. cept certain portions as of universal and _per- manent authority (4). But he assigns to some superior tribunal the right of determining what is essential to religion and what is not: he claims for himself and his age the privi- lege of accepting or rejecting any given re- velation, wholly or in part, according as it does or does not satisfy the conditions of some higher criterion to be supplied by the human consciousness(5). ; In relation to the actual condition of religious truth, as communicated by Holy Scripture, Dogmatism and Rationalism may be considered as severally representing, the one the spirit which adds to the word of God, and the other that which diminishes from it. Whether a complete system of sci- entific Theology could or could not have been given by direct revelation, consistently with the existing laws of human thought and the purposes which Revelation is de- signed to answer, it is at least certain that such a system is not given in the Revelation which we possess, but, if it is to exist at all, must be constructed out of it by human in- terpretation. And it is in attempting such a construction that Dogmatism and Ration- alism exhibit their most striking contrasts. 6 LECTURE I. The one seeks to build up a complete scheme of theological doctrine out of the unsys- tematic materials furnished by Scripture, partly by the more complete development of certain leading ideas; partly by extend- ing the apparent import of the Revelation to ground which it does not avowedly oc- cupy, and attempting by inference and analogy to solve problems which the sacred volume may indeed suggest, but which it does not directly answer. The other aims at the same end by opposite means. It strives to attain to unity and completeness of sys- tem, not by filling up supposed deficiencies, but by paring down supposed excrescences. Commencing with a preconceived theory of the purpose of a revelation and the form which it ought to assume, it proceeds to re- move or reduce all that will not harmonize with this leading idea; sometimes explaining away in the interpretation that which it ac- cepts as given in the letter; sometimes deny- ing, on a priort grounds, the genuineness of this or that portion of the sacred text; some- times pretending to distinguish between the several purposes of Revelation itself, and to determine what portions are intended to con- vey the elements of an absolute religion, valid in all countries and for all ages, and what LECTURE IL. 7 must be regarded as relative and accidental features of the divine plan, determined by the local or temporal peculiarities of the in- dividuals to whom it was first addressed. The two methods thus contrasted may ap- pear at first sight to represent the respective claims of Faith and Reason, each extended to that point at which it encroaches on the domain of the other. But in truth the con- trast between Faith and Reason, if it holds good in this relation at all, does so merely by accident. It may be applicable in some instances to the disciples of the respective systems, but not to the teachers; and even as regards the former, it is but partially and occasionally true. The disciples of the Ra- tionalist are not necessarily the disciples of reason. It is quite as possible to receive with unquestioning submission a system of religion or philosophy invented by a human teacher, as it is to believe, upon the authority of Revelation, doctrines which no human rea- son is competent to discover. The so-called freethinker is as often as any other man the slave of some self-chosen master; and many who scorn the imputation of believing any thing merely because it is found in the Bible would find it hard to give any better reason for their own unbelief than the zpse diait of oe 8 LECTURE I. some infidel philosopher. But when we turn from the disciples to the teachers, and look to the origin of Dogmatism and Rationalism as systems, we find both alike to be the pro- ducts of thought, operating in different ways upon the same materials. Faith, properly so called, is not constructive, but receptive. It cannot supply the missing portions of an incomplete system, though it may bid us remain content with the deficiency. It can- uot of itself give harmony to the discordant voices of religious thought: it cannot reduce to a single focus the many-coloured rays into which the light of God’s presence is refracted in its passage through the human soul ; though it may bid us look forward to a time when the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped*; when that apparent discord shall be known but as the echo of a half-heard concert, and those diverging rays shall be blended once more in the pure white light of heaven. But Faith alone cannot suggest any actual solution of our doubts: it can offer no definite recon- ciliation of apparently conflicting truths; for in order to accomplish that end, the hostile elements must be examined, compared, ac- commodated, and joined together, one with a Isaiah xxxv. 5. LECTURE 1 9 another: and such a process Is an act of thought, not of belief. Considered from this point of view, both Dogmatism and Rational- ism may be regarded as emanating from the same source, and amenable to the same prin- ciples of criticism; in so far as they keep within or go beyond those limits of sound thought which the laws of man’s mind, or the circumstances in which he is piece have imposed upon hin. In fact, the two systems may be considered as both aiming, though in different ways, at the same end; that end being to produce a coincidence between what we believe and what we think; to remove the boundary which separates the comprehensible from the incomprehensible. The Dogmatist employs reason to prove, almost as much as the Ra- tionalist employs it to disprove. The one, in the character of an advocate, accepts the doc- trines of revealed religion as conclusions, but appeals to the reason, enlightened, it may be, by Revelation, to find premises to support them. The other, in the character of a critic, draws his premises from reason in the first instance; and, adopting these as his standard, either distorts the revealed doctrine into con- formity with them, or, if it obstinately resists this treatment, sets it aside altogether. The 10 LECTURE I. one strives to lift up reason to the point of view occupied by Revelation: the other strives to bring down Revelation to the level of rea- son. And both alike have prejudged or neg- lected the previous inquiry,—Are there not definite and discernible limits to the province of reason itself, whether it be exercised for advocacy or for criticism ? : Thus, to select one example out of many, the revealed doctrine of Christ’s Atonement for the sins of men has been alternately de- fended and assailed by some such arguments as these. We have been told, on the one hand, that man’s redemption could not have been brought about by any other means (6): —that God could not, consistently with His own attributes, have suffered man to perish unredeemed, or have redeemed him by any inferior sacrifice (7):—that man, redeemed from death, must become the servant of him who redeems him; and that it was not meet that he should be the servant of any other than God (8) :—that no other sacrifice could have satisfied Divine justice (9):—that no other victim could have endured the burden of God’s wrath (10). These and similar ar- guments have been brought forward, as one of the greatest of their authors avows, to de- fend the teaching of the Catholic Faith on LECTURE [: 11 the ground of a reasonable necessity (11). While, on the other hand, it has been argued that the revealed doctrine itself cannot be accepted as literally true; because we cannot believe that God was angry, and needed to be propitiated (12) :—because it is inconsistent with the Divine Justice that the innocent should suffer for the sins of the guilty (13) :— because it is more reasonable to believe that God freely forgives the offences of His crea- tures (14) :— because we cannot conceive how the punishment of one can do away with the guilt of another (15). I quote these arguments only as specimens of the method in which Christian doctrines have been handled by writers on opposite sides. ‘To examine them more in detail would detain me too long from my main purpose. I shall not therefore at present consider whe- ther the conclusions actually arrived at, on the one side or on the other, are in themselves reasonable or unreasonable, orthodox or he- retical. I am concerned only with the me- thods respectively employed, and the need of some rule for their employment. May rea- son be used without restriction in defence or refutation of religious doctrines? And _ if not, what are the conditions of its legiti- mate use? It may be that this man has de- 12 LECTURE I. fended, on reasonable grounds, none but the most essential articles of the Christian Faith : but has he pointed out any rule which can hinder the same or similar reasoning from ἢ being advanced by another in support of the most dangerous errors? It may be that that man has employed the test of rea- sonableness, only in the refutation of opin- - ions concerning which the Church has pro- nounced no positive judgment: but has he fenced his method round with any cautions to prevent its being used for the overthrow of Christianity itself? If we can find no other ground than the arbitrary will of the man himself, why he should stop short at the particular point which he has chosen, we may not perhaps condemn the tenets of the indi- vidual, but we may fairly charge his method with the consequences to which it logically leads us. Thus we find a late lamented writer of our own day, and at that time of our own church, defending the doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ, on the metaphysical assumption of the real existence of an abstract humanity. “This,” he tells us, “is why the existence of human nature is a thing too precious to be surrendered to the subtleties of logic, because upon its existence depends that real man- LECTURE IL. 13 hood of Christ, which renders him a copart- ner with ourselves.” And again: “To the reality of this work, the existence of that common nature is indispensable, whereby, as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, He Himself took part of the same. Else, how would the perfect assumption of humanity have consisted with His retaining that divine personality which it was impos- sible that He should surrender ? Since it was no new person which He took, it can only have been the substratum, in which _ per- sonality has its existence (16).” In this case, our belief in the undeniable truth of the doctrine defended may dispose us to over- look the questionable character of the de- fence. But if we are inclined for a moment to acquiesce in this unnatural union of meta- physical premises and theological conclu- sions, we are recalled to ourselves by the re- collection of the fearful consequence which Occam deduces from the same hypothesis, of the assumption by Christ of a “substratum in which4personality has its existence ;”—a con- sequence drawn in language which we shud- der to read, even as it is employed by its au- thor, merely for the purpose of reducing to an absurdity the principles of his antagon- ists (17). 14 LECTURE I. There is an union of Philosophy with Re- ligion in which each contributes to the sup- port of the other; and there is also an union which, under the appearance of support, does but undermine the foundations and _ prey upon the life of both. To which of these two the above argument belongs, it needs but a bare statement of its assumption to deter- mine. It tells us that our belief in the doc- trine of God manifest in the flesh, indispens- ably depends upon our acceptance of the Realist theory of the nature of universal no- tions. Philosophy and Theology alike pro- test against such an outrage upon the claims both of Reason and of Revelation, as is im- plied in this association of one of the most fundamental truths of the Christian Faith with one of the most questionable speculations of medizeval metaphysics. What does Theology gain by this employment of a weapon which may at any moment be turned against her? Does it make one whit clearer to our under- standings that mysterious twofold nature of one Christ, very God and very Man?” By no means. It was a truth above human com- prehension before; and it remains a truth “above human comprehension still. We be- lieve that Christ is both God and Man; for this is revealed to us. We know not how He LECTURE L 15 is so; for this is not revealed; and we can learn it in no other way. Theology gains - nothing; but she is ii danger of losing every- thing. Her most precious truths are cut from the anchor which held them firm, and -cast-upon the waters of philosophical specu- lation, to float hither and thither with the ever-shifting waves of thought. And what does Philosophy gain? Her just domains are narrowed, and her free limbs cramped in their onward course. The problems which she has a native right to sift to the uttermost are taken out of the field of free discussion, and fenced about with religious doctrines which it is heresy to call in question. Nei- ther Christian truth nor philosophical inquiry can be advanced by such a system as this, which revives and sanctifies, as essential to the Catholic Faith, the forgotten follies of Scholastic Realism, and endangers the cause of religion, by seeking to explain its greatest mysteries by the lifeless forms of a worn out controversy. “ Why seek ye the living among the dead ? Christ is not here’.” But if the tendency of Dogmatism is to endanger the interests of religious truth, by placing that which is divine and unquestion- © able in too close an alliance with that which Ὁ St. Luke xxiv. 5, 6. 16 LECTURE I. is human and doubtful, Rationalism, on the other hand, tends to destroy revealed religion altogether, by obliterating the whole distinc- tion between the human and the divine. Ra- tionalism, if it retains any portion of revealed truth as such, does so, not in consequence of, but in defiance of, its fundamental principle. It does so by virtually declaring that it will follow reason up to a certain point, and no further; though the conclusions which lie beyond that point are guaranteed by pre- cisely the same evidence as those which fall short of it. We may select a notable example from the writings of a great thinker, who has contributed perhaps more than any other person to give a philosophical sanction to the rationalizing theories of his countrymen, yet from whose speculative principles, rightly em- ployed, might be extracted the best antidote to his own conclusions; even as the body of the scorpion, crushed upon the wound, is said to be the best cure for its own venom. _ Kant’s theory of a rational religion 15 based upon the assumption that the sole purpose of religion must be to give-a divine sanction to man’s moral duties(18). He maintains that there can be no duties towards God, distinct from those which we owe towards men; but that it may be necessary, at certain times and LECTURE I. 17 for certain persons, to give to moral duties the authority of divine commands (19). Let us hear then the philosopher’s rational ex- planation, upon this assumption, of the duty of Prayer. It isa mere superstitious delusion, he tells us, to consider prayer as a service addressed to God, and as a means of obtain- ing His favour(20). The true purpose of the act 15 not to alter or affect in any way God’s relation towards us; but only to quicken our own moral sentiments, by keeping alive within us the idea of God as a moral Lawgiver (21). He therefore neither admits the duty uncon- ditionally, nor rejects it entirely; but leaves it optional with men to adopt that or any other means, by which, in their own particular case, this moral end may be best promoted ;— as if any moral benefit could possibly accrue from the habitual exercise of an act of con- scious self-deception. The origin of such theories is of course to be traced to that morbid horror of what they are pleased to call Anthropomorphism, which poisons the speculations of so many modern philosophers, when they attempt to be wise above what is written, and seek for a meta- physical exposition of God’s nature and attri- butes (22). They may not, forsooth, think of the unchangeable God as if He were their fel- σ 18 SE, ROR Et low man, influenced by human motives, and moved by human supplications. ‘They want a truer, a juster idea of the Deity as He is, than that under which He has been pleased to reveal Himself; and they call on their rea- son to furnish it. Fools, to dream that man can escape from himself, that human reason can draw aught but a human portrait of God! They do but substitute a marred and mutilated humanity for one exalted and en- tire: they add nothing to their conception of God as He is, but only take away a part of their conception of man. Sympathy, and love, and fatherly kindness, and forgiving mercy, have evaporated in the crucible of their phi- losophy; and what is the caput mortuum that remains, but only the sterner features of hu- manity exhibited in repulsive nakedness ? The God who listens to prayer, we are told, appears in the likeness of human mutability. Be it so. What is the God who does not listen, but the likeness of human obstinacy ? Do we ascribe to Him a fixed purpose? our conception of a purpose is human. Do we speak of Him as continuing unchanged ? our conception of continuance is human. Do we conceive Him as knowing and determining ὃ what are knowledge and determination but modes of human consciousness? and what LECTURE I. 19 know we of consciousness itself; but as the contrast between successive mental states ? But our rational philosopher stops short in the middle of his reasoning. He strips off from humanity just so much as suits his pur- pose ;—“and the residue thereof he maketh a god ¢©;”—less pious in his idolatry than the carver of the graven image, in that he does not fall down unto it and pray unto it, but is content to stand afar off and reason concern- ing it. And why does he retain any concep- tion of God at all, but that he retains some portions of an imperfect humanity? Man is still the residue that is left; deprived indeed of all that is amiable in humanity, but, in the darker features which remain, still man. Man in his purposes; man in his inflexibility; man in that relation to time from which no philosophy, whatever its pretensions, can — wholly free itself; pursuing with indomitable resolution a preconceived design ; deaf to the yearning instincts which compel his creatures to call upon him (23). Yet this, forsooth, is a philosophical conception of the Deity, more worthy of an enlightened reason than the hu- man imagery of the Psalmist: “The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, and His ears are open unto their prayers ".” ¢ Isaiah xliv. 17. a Psalm xaxiv. see es 40 LECTURE I. Surely downright Idolatry is better than this rational worship of a fragment of hu- manity. Better is the superstition which sees the image of God in the wonderful whole which God has fashioned, than the philosophy which would carve for itself a Deity out of the remnant which man _ has mutilated. Better to realize the satire of the Eleatic philosopher, to make God in the like- ness of man, even as the ox or the horse might conceive gods in the form of oxen or horses, than to adore some half-hewn Hermes, the head of a man joined to a misshapen block (24). Better to fall down before that marvellous compound of human consciousness whose elements God has joined together, and no man can put asunder, than to strip reason of those cognate elements which together furnish all that we can conceive or imagine of conscious or personal existence, and to deify the emptiest of all abstractions, a some- thing or a nothing, with just enough of its human original left to form a theme for the disputations of philosophy, but not enough to furnish a single ground of appeal to the human feelings of love, of reverence, and of fear. Unmixed idolatry is more religious than this. Undisguised atheism is more lo- gical. LECTURE. I. 21 Throughout every page of Holy Scripture God reveals himself, not as a Law, but as a Person. Throughout the breadth and height and depth of human consciousness, Person- ality manifests itself under one condition, that of a Free Will, influenced, though not coerced, by motives. And to this conscious- ness God addresses Himself, when He adopts its attributes as the image under which to represent to man His own incomprehensible and ineffable nature. Doubtless in this there is much of accommodation to the weakness of man’s faculties; but not more than in any other representation of any of the Divine at- tributes. By what right do we say that the conception of the God who hears and an- swers prayer® is an accommodation, while that of Him in whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning‘ is not so? By what right do we venture to rob the Deity of half His revealed attributes, in order to set up the other half, which rest on precisely the same evidence, as a more absolute revelation of the truth? By what right do we enthrone, in the place of the God to whom we pray, an inexora- ble Fate or immutable Law?—a thing with less than even the divinity of a Fetish; since that may be at least conceived by its worshipper ¢ Psalm Ixy. 2; St. James v. 16. f St. James 1. 17 22 LECTURE | TL as capable of being offended by his crimes and propitiated by his supplications ? Yet surely there is a principle of truth of which this philosophy is the perversion. Surely there is a sense in which we may not think of God as though He were man; as there is also a sense in which we cannot help so thinking of Him. When we read in the same narrative, and almost in two consecu- tive verses of Scripture, “ The Strength οἵ. Israel will not lie nor repent; for He is not a man that He shouid repent:”’ and again, “The Lord repented that He had made Saul king over Israel®;” we are imperfectly con- scious of an appeal to two different principles of representation, involving opposite sides of the same truth: we feel that there is a true foundation for the system which denies hu- man attributes to God; though the super- . structure, which has been raised upon it, logi- cally involves the denial of His very existence. What limits then can we find to determine the legitimate provinces of these two opposite methods of religious thought, each of which, in its exclusive employment, leads to errors so fatal; yet each of which, in its utmost error, 1s but a truth abused? If we may not, with the Dogmatist, force Philosophy into δι Sam. xv. 29, 35. LECTURE IL. 23 unnatural union with Revelation, nor yet, with the Rationalist, mutilate Revelation to make it agree with Philosophy, what guide can we find to point out the safe middle course? what common element of both sys- tems can be employed to mediate between them? It is obvious that no such element can be found by the mere contemplation of the objects on which religious thought is ex-. ercised. We can adequately criticize that only which we know as a whole. ‘The objects of Natural Religion are known to us in and by the ideas which we can form of them; and those ideas do not of themselves constitute a whole, apart from the remaining phenomena of consciousness. We must not examine them by themselves alone: we must look to their origin, their import, and their relation to the _ mind of which they are part. Revealed Re- ligion again is not by itself a direct object of criticism: first, because it is but a part of a larger scheme, and that scheme one imper- fectly comprehended ; and secondly, because Revelation implies an accommodation to the mental constitution of its human receiver ; and we must know what that constitution is, before we can pronounce how far the accom- modation extends. But if partial knowledge must not be treated as if it were complete, 24. LECTURE: Ἢ neither, on the other hand, may it be identi- fied with total ignorance. The false humility which assumes that it can know nothing, is often as dangerous as the false pride which assumes that it knows every thing. The pro- vinces of Reason and Faith, the limits of our knowledge and of our ignorance, must both be clearly determined: otherwise we may find ourselves dogmatically protesting against dogmatism, and reasoning to prove the worth- lessness of reason. There is one point from which all religious systems must start, and to which all must finally return; and which may therefore fur- nish a common ground on which to examine the principles and pretensions of all. The primary and proper object of criticusm is not Religion, natural or revealed, but the human mind in its relation to Religion. Uf the Dog- | matist and the Rationalist have heretofore contended as combatants, each beating the air in his own position, without being able to reach his adversary; if they have been prevented from taking up a common ground of controversy, because each repudiates the fundamental assumptions of the other; that common ground must be sought in another quarter; namely, in those laws and _ processes of the human mind, by means of which both LECTURE I. 25 alike accept and elaborate their opposite sys- tems. If human philosophy is not a direct guide to the attainment of religious truth, (and its entire history too truly testifies that it is not), may it not serve as an indirect guide, by pomting out the limits of our fa- culties, and the conditions of their legitimate exercise ? Witnessing, as it does, the melan- choly spectacle of the household of humanity divided against itself, the reason against the feelings and the feelings against the reason, and the dim half-consciousness of the shadow of the infinite frowning down upon both, may it not seek, with the heathen Philosopher of old, to find the reconciling and regulating principle in that justice, of which the essen- tial character is, that every member of the system shall do his own duty, and forbear to intrude into the office of his neighbour ? (25) A Criticism of the human mind, in relation to religious truth, was one of the many un- realized possibilities of philosophy, sketched out in anticipation by the far-seeing genius of Bacon. “Here therefore,” he writes, “I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits and use of rea- son in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which for that it is not done, it 20 LECTURE I. seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that which is not re- vealed; and by pretext of enucleating infer- ences and contradictories, to examine that which is positive: the one sort falling into the error of Nicodenius, demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them, ‘Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex ?’ the other sort into the error of the disciples, which were scandal- ized at a show of contradiction, ‘Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis, Modicum, et non vide- bitis me; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis me ?’” (26). An examination of the Limits of Religious ‘Thought is an indispensable preliminary to all Reiigious Philosophy. And the limits of religious thought are but a special mani- festation of the limits of thought in general. Thus the Philosophy of Religion, on its hu- man side, must be subject to those universal conditions which are binding upon Philoso-- phy in general. It has ever fared -ill, both with Philosophy and with Religion, when this caution has been neglected. It was an evil hour for both, when Fichte made his first essay, as a disciple of the Kantian school, by an attempted Criticism of all Revelation (27). LECTURE I. 27 The very title of Kant’s great work, and, in spite of many inconsistencies, the general spirit of its contents also, might have taught him a different lesson,—might have shewn him that Reason, and not Revelation, was the primary object of criticism. If Reveiation is a communication from an infinite to a finite intelligence, the conditions of a criticism of Revelation on philosophical grounds must be identical with those which are required for constructing a Philosophy of the Infinite. For Revelation can make known the Infinite Being only in one of two ways; by presenting Him as He is, or by representing Him under symbols more or less adequate. A presenta- tive Revelation implies faculties in man which can receive the presentation ; and such facul- ties will also furnish the conditions of con- structing a philosophical theory of the ob- ject presented. If, on the other hand, Re- velation is merely representative, the accuracy of the representation can only be ascertained by a knowledge of the object represented ; and this again implies the possibility of a Philosophy of the Infinite. Whatever imped- iments, therefore, exist to prevent the form- ation of such a Philosophy, the same imped- iments must likewise prevent the accom- plishment of a complete Criticism of Revel- 28 LECTURE I. ation. Whatever difficulties or contradictions are involved in the philosophical idea of the Infinite, the same, or similar ones, must na- turally be expected in the corresponding ideas which Revelation either exhibits or im- plies. And if an examination of the problems of Philosophy and the conditions of their so- lution should compel us to admit the exist- ence of principles and modes of thought which must be accepted as true in practice, though they cannot be explained in theory ; the same practical acceptance may be claimed, on philosophical grounds, in behalf of the corresponding doctrines of Revelation. If it can be shewn that the limits of reli- gious and philosophical thought are the same; that corresponding difficulties occur in both, and, from the nature of the case, must occur, the chief foundation of religious Rationalism is cut away from under it. The difficulties which it professes to find in Revelation are shewn to be not peculiar to Revelation, but inherent in the constitution of the human mind, and such as no system of Rationalism can. avoid or overcome. The analogy, which Bishop Butler has pointed out, between Reli- gion and the constitution and course of Na- ture, may be in some degree extended to the constitution and processes of the Human LECTURE T. 29 Mind. The representations of God which Scripture presents to us may be shewn to be analogous to those which the laws of our minds require us to form; and therefore such as may naturally be supposed to have ema- nated from the same Author. Such an in-. quiry occupies indeed but a subordinate place among the direct evidences of Christianity ; nor is it intended to usurp the place of those evidences. But indirectly it may have its use, in furnishing an answer to a class of ob- jections which were very popular a few years ago, and are not yet entirely extinguished. Even if it does not contribute materially to strengthen the position occupied by the de- fenders of Christianity, it may serve to ex- pose the weakness of the assailants. Human reason may, in some respects, be weak as a supporter of Religion; but it is at least strong enough to repel an attack founded on the negation of reason. “We know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now [ know in part; but then shall I know even as also [am known".” Such is the Apostle’s declaration of the limits h 1 Cor. xiii. Q. 10, 12. 40 LECTURE I. of human knowledge. “'The logical concep- tion is the absolute divine conception itself; and the logical process is the immediate exhibition of God’s self-determination to Being (28).” Such is the Philosopher’s de- claration of the extent of human knowledge. On the first of these statements is founded the entire Theology of Scripture: on the se- cond is founded the latest and most complete exposition of the Theology of Rationalism. The one represents God, not as He is in the - brightness of His own glory, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto’; but as He is reflected faintly in broken and fitful rays, glancing back from the restless waters of the human soul. The other identifies the shadow with the substance, not even shrink- ing from the confession that, to know God as He is, man must himself be God (29). It turns from the feeble image of God in the soul of the individual man, to seek the en- tire manifestation of Deity in the collective consciousness of mankind. “ Ye shall be as gods*,” was the earliest suggestion of the Tempter to the parents of the human race: “Ye are God,” is the latest assurance of phi- losophy to the human race itself (30). Revel- ation represents the infinite God under finite Le Dim. wi. ἀν; k Genesis ill. 5. LECTURE I. a symbols, in condescension to the finite capa- city of man; indicating at the same time the | existence of a further reality beyond the sym- | . bol, and bidding us look forward in faith to the promise of a more perfect knowledge hereafter. Rationalism, in the hands of these ’ expositors, adopts an opposite view of man’s powers and duties. It claims to behold God as He is now: it finds a common object for Religion and Philosophy in the eaplanation of God (81). It declares Religion to be the Divine Spirit's knowledge of himself through the mediation of the finite Spirit (32). ἐς Beloved, now are we the sons of God; and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when He shall appear, we | shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is. And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as He is pure’.” Philosophy too confesses that like must be known by like; but, reversing the hope of the Apostle, it finds God in the forms of hu- man thought. Its kingdom is proclaimed to be Truth absolute and unveiled. It contains in itself the exhibition of God, as He is in His eternal essence, before the creation of a finite world (33). Which of these two representa- tions contains the truer view of the capaci- Ly St. John in. 2, 3. 32 LECTURE) I. ties of human reason, it will be the purpose of the following Lectures to inquire. Such an inquiry must necessarily, during a portion at least of its course, assume a philosophical, rather than a theological aspect; yet it will not perhaps on that account be less ulti- mately serviceable in theological controversy. It has been acutely said, that even if Philo- sophy is useless, it is still useful, as the means of proving its own uselessness (34). But it is not so much the utility as the necessity of the study, which constitutes its present claim on our attention. So long as man _ possesses facts of consciousness and powers of reflec- tion, so long he will continue to exercise those powers and study those facts. So long as human consciousness contains the idea of a God and the instincts of worship, so long mental philosophy will walk on common ground with religious belief. Rightly or. wrongly, men will think of these things; and a knowledge of the laws under which they think is the only security for thinking soundly. If it be thought no unworthy occupation for the Christian preacher, to point out the evi- dences of God’s Providence in the constitu- tion of the sensible world and the mechan- ism of the human body; or to dwell on the analogies which may be traced between the ELCTURE I. ao scheme of revelation and the course of na- ture; it is but a part of the same argument to pursue the inquiry with regard to the structure and laws of the human mind. The path may be one which, of late years at least, has been less frequently trodden: the lan- guage indispensable to such an investigation may sound at times unwonted and uncouth ; but the end is one with that of those plainer and more familiar illustrations which have taken their place among the acknowledged evidences of religion; and the lesson of the whole, if read aright, will be but to teach us that in mind, no less than in body, we are fearfully and wonderfully made™ by Him whose praise both alike declare: that He who “laid the foundations of the earth, and shut up the sea with doors, and said, Hi- therto shalt thou come, but no further,” is also He who “hath put wisdom in the in- ward parts, and hath given understanding to the heart”.” πὶ Psalm exxxix. 14. n Job xxxvill. 4,8, 11, 36. LECTURE II. i CIMOTHY Ι 20,21. Keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called; which some professing have erred concern- ing: the faith. A. PHILOSOPHY of Religion may be at- tempted from two opposite points of view, and by two opposite modes of development. It may be conceived either as a Philosophy of the Object of Religion; that is to say, as a scientific exposition of the nature of God; or as a Philosophy of the Subject of Reli- gion; that is to say, as a scientific inquiry into the constitution of the human mind, so far as it receives and deals with religious ideas. ‘The former is that branch of Meta- physics which is commonly known by the name of Rational Theology. Its general aim, in common with all metaphysical inquiries, is to disengage the real from the apparent, the true from the false: its special aim, as a LECTURE II. 35 Theology, is to exhibit a true representation of the Nature and Attributes of God, purified from foreign accretions, and displaying the exact features of their Divine Original. The latter is a branch of Psychology, which, at its outset at least, contents itself with investigat- ing the phenomena presented to it, leaving their relation to further realities to be deter- mined at a later stage of the inquiry. Its pri- mary concern is with the operations and laws of the human mind; and its special purpose is to ascertain the nature, the origin, and the limits of the religious element in man; post- poning, till after that question has been de- cided, the further inquiry into the absolute nature of God. As applied to the criticism of Revelation, the first method, supposing its end to be at- tained, would furnish an immediate and di- rect criterion by which the claims of any supposed Revelation to a divine origin might be tested; while at the same time it would enable those possessed of it to dispense with the services of any Revelation at all. For on the supposition that we possess an exact idea of any attribute of the Divine Nature, we are at liberty to reject at once any portion of the supposed Revelation which contradicts that idea; and on the supposition that we D2 36 LECTURE II. possess a complete idea of that Nature as a whole, we are at liberty to reject whatever goes beyond it. And as, upon either suppo- sition, the highest praise to which Revela- tion can aspire is that of coinciding, partially or wholly, with the independent conclusions of Philosophy, it follows that, so far as Phi- losophy extends, Revelation becomes super- fluous (1). On the other hand, the second method of philosophical inquiry does not pro- fess to furnish a direct criticism of Revela- tion, but only of the instruments by which Revelation is to be criticized. It looks to the human, not to the divine, and aspires to teach us no more than the limits of our own powers of thought, and the consequent dis- tinction between what we may and what we may not seek to comprehend. And if, upon examination, it should appear that any por- tion of the contents of Revelation belongs to the latter class of truths, this method will enable us to reconcile with each other the conflicting claims of Reason and Faith, by shewing that Reason itself, rightly inter- preted, teaches the existence of truths that are above Reason. Whatever may be the ultimate use of the first of these methods of criticism, it 1s obvious that the previous question, concerning our LECTURE II. 37 right to use it at all, can only be satisfactorily answered by the employment of the second method. The possibility of criticism at all implies that human reason is liable to error: the possibility of a valid critictsm implies that the means of distinguishing between its truth and its error may be ascertained by a pre- vious criticism. Let it be granted, for the | moment, that a religion whose contents are © irreconcilable with human reason is thereby | proved not to have come from God, but from man :—still the reason which judges is at least as human as the religion which is judged; and if the human representation of God is erroneous in the latter, how can we assume its infallibility in the former? If we grant for the present the fundamental posi- tion of Rationalism, namely, that man by his own reason can attain to a right conception of God, we must at any rate grant also, what every attempt at criticism implies, that he may also attain to a wrong one. We have therefore still to ask by what marks the one is to be distinguished from the other; by what method we are to seek the truth; and how we are to assure ourselves that we have found it. And to answer this question, we need a preliminary examination of the con- ditions and limits of human thought. Reli- 38 LECTURE II. ligious criticism is itself an act of thought ; and its immediate instruments must, under any circumstances, be thoughts also. We are thus compelled in the first instance to in- quire into the origin and value of those thoughts themselves. A Philosophy which professes to elicit from its own conceptions all the essential portions of religious belief, is bound to jus- tify its profession, by shewing that those conceptions themselves are above suspicion. The ideas thus exalted to the supreme cri- teria of truth must bear on their front un- questionable evidence that they are true and sufficient representations of the Divine Na- ture, such as may serve all the needs of hu- man thought and human feeling, adequate alike for contemplation and for worship. They must manifest the clearness and distinctness which mark the strong vision of an eye gaz- ing undazzled on the glory of Heaven, not the obscurity and confusion of one that turns away blinded from the glare, and gropes in its own darkness after the fleeting spectrum. The conviction which boasts itself to be su- perior to all external evidence must carry in its own inward constitution some sure ἱπᾶ!- cation of its truth and value. Such a conviction may be possible in two LECTURE IL. 39 different ways. It may be the result of a direct intuition of the Divine Nature; or it may be gained by inference from certain at- tributes of human nature, which, though on a smaller scale, are known to be sufficiently ‘representative of the corresponding proper- ties of the Deity. We may suppose the ex- istence in man of a special faculty of know- ledge, of which God is the immediate object, ‘a kind of religious sense or reason, by which the Divine attributes are apprehended in their own nature (2): or we may maintain that the attributes of God differ from those of man in degree: only, not in kind: and hence that certain mental and moral qualities, of which we are immediately conscious in ourselves, furnish at the same time a true and adequate image of the infinite perfections of God (3). The first of these suppositions pro- fesses to convey a knowledge of God by direct apprehension, in a manner similar to the evi- dence of the senses: the second professes to convey the same knowledge by a logical pro- cess, similar to the demonstrations of science. The former is the method of Mysticism, and of that Rationalism which agrees with Mys- ticism, in referring the knowledge of divine things to an extraordinary and abnormal process of intuition or thought (4). The lat- 40 LECTURE ‘II. ter is the method of the vulgar Rationalism, which regards the reason of man, in its ordi- nary and normal operation, as the supreme criterion of religious truth. On the former supposition, a system of religious philosophy or criticism may be con- structed by starting from the divine and rea- soning down to the human: on the latter, by starting from the human and reasoning up to the divine. The first commences with a supposed immediate knowledge of God as He is in his absolute nature, and proceeds to exhibit the process by which that nature, acting according to its own laws, will mani- fest itself in operation, and become known to man. ‘The second commences with an im- mediate knowledge of the mental and moral attributes of man, and proceeds to exhibit the manner in which those attributes will manifest themselves, when exalted to the de- gree in which they form part of the nature of God, If, for example, the two systems se- verally undertake to give a representation of the infinite power and wisdom of God, the former will profess to explain how the nature of the infinite manifests itself in the forms of power and wisdom; while the latter will at- tempt to shew how power and wisdom must manifest themselves when existing in an infi- LECTURE II. 41 nite degree. In their criticisms of Revela- tion, in like manner, the former will rather take as its standard that absolute and essen- tial nature of God, which must remain un- changed in every manifestation; the latter will judge by reference to those intellectual and moral qualities, which must exist in all their essential features in the divine nature as well as in the human. Thus, for example, it has been maintained by a modern philosopher, that the absolute nature of God is that of a pure Will, deter- mining itself solely by a moral law, and sub- ject to no affections which can operate as motives. Hence it is inferred that the same law of action must form the rule of God’s manifestation to mankind as a moral Go- vernor; and therefore that no revelation can be of divine origin, which attempts to influ- ence men’s actions by the prospect of reward or punishment (5). In this mode of reason- ing, an abstract conception of the nature of God is made the criterion to determine the mode in which He must reveal Himself to man. On the other hand, we meet with an opposite style of criticism, which reasons somewhat as follows: All the excellences, it contends, of which we are conscious in the creature, must necessarily exist in the same 42 LECTURE II. manner, though in a higher degree, in the Creator. God is indeed more wise, more just, more merciful than man; but for that very reason, His wisdom and justice and mercy must contain nothing that is incompatible with the corresponding attributes in their human character (0). Hence, if the certainty of man’s knowledge implies the necessity of the events which he knows, the certainty of God’s omniscience implies a like necessity of all things (7): if man’s justice requires that he should punish the guilty alone, it is in- consistent with God’s justice to inflict the chastisement of sin upon the innocent (8): if man’s mercy finds its natural exercise in the free forgiveness of offences, God’s mercy too must freely forgive the sins of His crea- tures (9). From the same premises, it is consistently concluded that no act which would be wrong, if performed by a man upon his own responsibility, can be justified by the plea of a direct command from God (10). Abraham may not be praised for his readi- ness to slay his son in obedience to God’s command; for the internal prohibition must always be more certain than the external precept (11). Joshua cannot be warranted in obeying the Divine injunction to exterminate the Canaanites; unless he would be equally LECTURE II. 43 warranted in destroying them of his own ac- cord (12). And, as the issuing of such com- mands is contrary to the moral nature of God, therefore the Book which represents them as so issued is convicted of falsehood, and cannot be regarded as a Divine Revela- tion (13). In this mode of reasoning, the moral or intellectual nature of man is made the rule to determine what ought to be the revealed attributes of God, and in what man- ner they must be exercised. Within certain limits, both these argu- ments may have their value; but each is chiefly useful as a check upon the exclusive authority of the other. The philosophy which reasons downwards from the infinite, is but an exaggeration of the true conviction that God’s thoughts are not our thoughts, nor His ways our ways*: the philosophy which reasons upwards from the human, bears witness, even in its perversion, to the un- extinguishable consciousness, that man, how- ever fallen, was created in the image of God’. But this admission tends rather to weaken than to strengthen the claims of either to be received as the supreme criterion of religious truth. The criticisms of rationalism exhibit the weakness as well as the strength of rea- 8. Isaiah ly. 8. > Genesis 1. 27. chlé +4 LECTORE IL son ; for the representations which it rejects, as dishonouring to God, are, on its own shew- ing, the product of human thought, no less than the principle by which they are judged and condemned. If the human mind has passed through successive stages of religious cultivation, from the grovelling superstition of the savage to the intellectual elevation of the critic of all possible revelations ; who shall assure the critic that the level on which he now stands is the last and highest that can be attained? If reason is to be the last court of appeal in religious questions, it must find some better proof of its own infallibility than is to be found in its own progressive enlightenment. Its preeminence must be shewn, not by successive approximations to the truth, but by the possession of the truth itself. Of the limits within which reason may be legitimately employed, I shall have occa- sion to speak hereafter. At present I am concerned only with its pretensions to such a knowledge of the Divine Nature, as can constitute the foundation of a Rational The- ology. There are three terms, familiar as house- hold words in the vocabulary of Philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of Metaphysical Theology. To con- LECTURE IL. 45 ceive the Deity as He is, we must conceive Him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause, is meant that which pro- duces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the Absolute, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being (14). By the Jn- finite, is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable ; and which consequently can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity. The Infinite, as contemplated by this phi- losophy, cannot be regarded as consisting of a limited number of attributes, each unlimited in its kind. It cannot be conceived, for ex- ample, after the analogy of a line, infinite in length, but not in breadth; or of a surface, infinite im two dimensions of space, but bounded in the third; or of an intelligent being, possessing some one or more modes of consciousness in an infinite degree, but de- void of others. Even if it be granted, which is not the case, that such a partial infinite may without contradiction be conceived, still it will have a relative infinity only, and be altogether incompatible with the idea of the Absolute (15). The line limited in breadth is thereby necessarily related to the space that 40 LECTURE II. limits it: the intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes, coexists with others which are thereby related to it, as cog- nate or opposite modes of consciousness (16). The metaphysical representation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknow- ledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality (17). “What kind of an Abso- lute Being is that,” says Hegel, “which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included (18) ?” We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation ; but the reason- ing is unassailable. Ifthe Absolute and In- finite is an object of human conception at all, this, and none other, is the conception re- quired. That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing ‘within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it 1s re- lated to that mode, and limited by it (19); and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation. Indeed ~ it is obvious that the entire distinction be- — tween the possible and the actual can have no existence as regards the absolutely infinite; for an unrealized possibility is necessarily a LECTURE IL. 47 relation and a limit. The scholastic saying, Deus est actus purus (20), ridiculed as it has been by modern critics, is in truth but the expression, in technical language, of the al- most unanimous voice of philosophy, both in earlier and later times (21). But these three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensa- ble, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attri- butes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute: the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and after- wards becomes a Cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was not from the first ? If Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits. Creation at any particular 48 LECTURE IL. moment of time being thus inconceivable, the philosopher is reduced to the alternative of Pantheism, which pronounces the effect to he mere appearance, and merges all real exist- ence in the cause (22). The validity of this alternative will be examined presently. Meanwhile, to return for a moment to the supposition of a true causation. Supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. [or a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If ne- cessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. | But consciousness again is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the — object is an object to the subject; and nei- ther can exist by itself as the absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between the abso- lute as related to another and the absolute as related to itself. The Absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious, provided it is LECTURE ΤΕ 49 only conscious of itself (23). But this alter- native is, in ultimate analysis, no less self- destructive than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the sub- ject’s existence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an ex- istence independent of it. In the former case, the object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends upon the ob- ject, and the object alone is the true abso- lute (24). Or if we attempt a third hypo- thesis, and maintain that each exists inde- pendently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for coex- istence, whether in Consciousness or not, 1s itself a relation. The corollary from this reasoning is obvi- ous. Not only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to any thing else; but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essen- tial relation within itself; as a whole, for in- stance, composed of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious sub- ject in antithesis to an object (25). For if there is in the absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true E δ0 LECTURE II. absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives (26). The almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pro- nouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of rea- son also, so far as reason has any voice in the matter (27). But this absolute unity, as in- different and containing no attributes, can neither be distinguished from the multipli- city of finite beings by any characteristic fea- ture, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity (28). ‘Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be con- ceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple: it cannot be conceived by differ- ence, neither can it be conceived by the ab- sence of difference: it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distin- guished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible. The fundamental conceptions of Rational Theology being thus self-destructive, we may naturally expect to find the same antagon- ism manifested in their special applications. These naturally inherit the infirmities of the LECTURE IE. 51 principle from which they spring. If an ab- solute and infinite consciousness 15 a concep- tion which contradicts itself, we need not wonder if its several modifications mutually exclude each other. A mental attribute, to be conceived as infinite, must be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is potential only with regard to those on which it is not exercised ; and an unrealized potentiality is a limitation. Hence every infi- nite mode of consciousness must be regarded as extending over the field of every other ; and their common action involves a_per- petual antagonism. How, for example, can In- finite Power be able to do all things, and yet Infinite Goodness be unable to do evil? How can Infinite Justice exact the utmost penalty for every sin, and yet Infinite Mercy pardon the sinner? How can Infinite Wisdom know all that is to come, and yet Infinite Freedom be at liberty to do or to forbear (29)? How is the existence of Evil compatible with that of an infinitely perfect Being; for if he wills it, he is not infinitely good; and if he wills it not, his will is thwarted and his sphere of action limited? Here, again, the Pantheist 1s ready with his solution. There is in reality no such thing as evil: there is no such thing as punishment: there is no real relation be- Ee 52 LECTURE II. tween God and man at all. God is all that really exists: He does, by the necessity of His nature, all that is done: all acts are equally necessary and equally divine: all di- versity is but a distorted representation of unity: all evil is but a delusive appearance of good (30). Unfortunately, the Pantheist does not tell us whence all this delusion derives its seeming existence. i Let us however suppose for an instant that these difficulties are surmounted, and the ex- istence of the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing to- wards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the Absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfec- tion; and therefore was not originally per- fect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfec- tion (31). There remains only the supposi- tion that the two states are equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference. LECTURE IL. 53 But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, or it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, and yet indifferent, we must admit the possibility of two conceptions of the absolute, the one as productive, the other as non-productive. If the act is not real, the supposition itself vanishes, and we are thrown once more on the alternative of Pantheism. Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be con- ceived as passing from non-existence into ex- istence. But to conceive an object as non- existent, is again a self-contradiction ; for that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; _ but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems forced upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the condition of that which already exists; and thus the creature is conceivable 54 LECTURE IL. only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the Creator (32). The whole of this web of contradictions (and it might be extended, if necessary, to a far greater length) is woven from one original warp and woof ;—namely, the impossibility of conceiving the coexistence of the infinite and the finite, and the cognate impossibility of conceiving a first commencement of pheno- mena, or the absolute giving birth to the relative. The laws of thought appear to ad- mit of no possible escape from the meshes in which thought is entangled, save by destroy- ing one or the other of the cords of which they are composed. Pantheism or Atheism are thus the alternatives offered to us, ac- cording as we prefer to save the infinite by the sacrifice of the finite, or to maintain the finite by denying the existence of the infi- nite. Pantheism thus presents itself, as to all appearance the only logical conclusion, if we believe in the possibility of a Philo- sophy of the Infinite. But Pantheism, if it avoids self-contradiction in the course of its reasonings, does so only by an act of suicide at the outset. It escapes from some of the minor incongruities of thought, only by the annihilation of thought and thinker alike. It is saved from the necessity of demon- LECTURE IL. 55 strating its own falsehood, by abolishing the only conditions under which truth and false- hood can be distinguished from each other. The only conception which I can frame of substantive existence at all, as distinguished from the transient accidents which are merely modes of the being of something else, is de- rived from the immediate knowledge of my own personal unity, amidst the various affec- tions which form the successive modes of my consciousness. ‘The Pantheist tells me that this knowledge is a delusion; that I am no substance, but a mode of the absolute sub- stance, even as my thoughts and passions are modes of me; and that in order to attain to a true philosophy of being, I must begin by denying my own being. And for what pur- pose is this act of self-destruction needed ? In order to preserve inviolate certain philo- sophical conclusions, which I, the non-existent thinker, have drawn by virtue of my non- existent powers of thought. But if my per- sonal existence, the great primary fact of all consciousness, is a delusion, what claim have the reasonings of the Pantheist himself to be considered as any thing better than a part of the universal falsehood? If I am mistaken in supposing myself to have a substantial existence at all, why is that existence more 56 LECTURE 11. true when it is presented to me under the par- ticular form of apprehending and accepting the arguments of the pantheistic philosophy? Nay, how do I know that there is any argu- ment at all? For if my consciousness is mis- taken in testifying to-the fact of my own ex- istence, it may surely be no less mistaken in testifying to my apparent apprehension of an apparent reasoning. Nay, the very arguments which appear to prove the Pantheist’s con- clusion to be true, may in reality, for aught I know, prove it to be false. Or rather, no Pantheist, if he is consistent with himself, can admit the existence of a distinction be- tween truth and falsehood at all. For if God alone exists, in whatever way that existence may be explained, He alone is the immediate cause of all that takes place. He thinks all that is thought, He does all that is done. There can be no difference between truth and falsehood; for God is the only thinker; and all thoughts are equally necessary and equally divine. There can be no difference between right and wrong ; for God is the only agent; and all acts are equally necessary and equally divine (33). How error and evil, even in appearance, are possible ;—how the finite and the relative can appear to exist, even as a delusion,—is a problem which no system of LECTURE II. 57 Pantheism has made the slightest approach towards solving (34). Pantheism thus failing us, the last resource of Rationalism is to take refuge in that which, with reference to the highest idea of God, is speculative Atheism, and to deny that the In- finite exists at all(35). And it must be ad- mitted that, so long as we confine ourselves to one side only of the problem, that of the inconceivability of the Infinite, this is the only position logically tenable by those who would make man’s power of thought the ex- act measure of his duty of belief. For the infinite, as inconceivable, is necessarily shewn to be non-existent; unless we renounce the claim of reason to supreme authority in mat- ters of faith, by admitting that it is our duty to believe what we are altogether unable to comprehend. But the logical advantage of the atheistic alternative vanishes, as soon as we view the question from the other side, and endeavour positively to represent in thought the sum total of existence as a limited quan- tity. A limit is itself a relation; and to con- ceive a limit as such, is virtually to acknow- ledge the existence of a correlative on the other side of it (36). By a law of thought, the significance of which has perhaps not yet been fully investigated, it is impossible to 58 LECTURE II. conceive a finite object of any kind, without conceiving it as one out of many,—as related to other objects, coexistent and antecedent. A first moment of time, a first unit of space, | a definite sum of all existence, are thus as in- conceivable as the opposite suppositions of an infinity of each (37). While it is impossible to represent in thought any object, except as finite, it is equally impossible to represent _any finite object, or any aggregate of finite objects, as exhausting the universe of being. Thus the hypothesis which would annihilate the Infinite is itself shattered to pieces against the rock of the Absolute; and we are involved in the self-contradictory assumption of a limited universe, which yet can neither contain a limit in itself, nor be limited by any thing beyond itself. For if it contains a limit in itself, it is both limiting and limited, both beyond the limit and within it; and if it is limited by any thing else, it is not the universe (38). To sum up briefly this portion of my ar- gument. The conception of the Absolute and infinite, from whatever side we view it, ap- pears encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in sup- LECTURE II. 59 posing it not to exist. There is a contradic- tion in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it asimpersonal. Itcannot without contradiction be represented as active ; nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of all exist- ence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum. A contradiction thus tho- roughgoing, while it sufficiently shews the im- potence of human reason as an @ priori judge © of all truth, yet is not in itself imconsistent with any form of religious belief. For it tells with equal force against all belief and all un- belief, and therefore necessitates the conclu- sion that belief cannot be determined solely by reason. No conclusion can be drawn from it in favour of universal scepticism ; first, be- cause universal scepticism equally destroys itself; and secondly, because the contradic- tions thus detected belong not to the use of reason in general, but only to its exercise on one particular object of thought. It may teach us that it is our duty, in some instances, to believe that which we cannot conceive; but it does not require us to disbelieve any thing which we are capable of conceiving. 60 LECTURE II. What we have hitherto been examining, be it remembered, is not the nature of the Absolute in itself, but only our own concep- tion of that nature. The distortions of the image reflected may arise only from the in- equalities of the mirror reflecting it. And this consideration leads us naturally back to the second of the two methods of religious philosophy which were mentioned at the be- ginning of the present Lecture. If the at- tempt to grasp the absolute nature of the Divine Object of religious thought thus fails us on every side, we have no resource but to recommence our inquiry by the opposite pro- cess, that of investigating the nature of the human Subject. Such an investigation will not indeed solve the contradictions which our pre- vious attempt has elicited; but it may serve to shew us why they are insoluble. If it can- not satisfy to the full the demands of reason, it may at least enable us to lay a reasonable foundation for the rightful claims of belief. If, from an examination of the laws and limits of human consciousness, we can shew that thought is not and cannot be the measure of existence; if it can be shewn that the con- tradictions which arise in the attempt to con- ceive the infinite, have their origin, not in the nature of that which we would conceive, but LECTURE II. 61 in the constitution of the mind conceiving; that they are such as must necessarily ac- company every form of religion, and every renunciation of religion; we may thus pre- pare the way for a recognition of the sepa- rate provinces of Reason and Faith. This task I shall endeavour to accomplish in my next Lecture. Meanwhile I would add but a few words, to point out the practical lesson to be drawn from our previous inquiry. It is this: that so far is human reason from being able to construct a scientific Theology, independent of and superior to Revelation, that it cannot even read the alphabet out of which that Theology must be framed. It has not been without much hesitation that I have ventured to address you in language seldom heard in this place,—to transport to the preacher’s pulpit the vocabulary of meta- physical speculation. But it was only by such a course that I could hope to bring the antagonist principles of true and false reli- gious philosophy face to face with each other. It needs but a slight acquaintance with the history of opinions, to shew how intimately, in various ages, the current forms of religious be- lief or unbelief have been connected with the prevailing systems of speculative philosophy. It was in no small degree because the philo- 62 LECTURE I. sophy of Kant identified religion with mo- rality, and maintained that the supernatural and the historical were not necessary to be- lief (39); that Paulus explained away the mi- racles of Christ, as misrepresentations of na- tural events (40); and Wegscheider claimed for the moral reason supreme authority in the interpretation of Scripture (41); and Rohr promulgated a new Creed, from which all the facts of Christianity are rejected, to make way for ethical precepts (42). It was in like manner because the philosophy of Hegel was felt to be incompatible with the belief in a personal God, and a personal Christ, and a supernatural revelation (43); that Vatke re- jected the Old Testament history, as irrecon- cilable with the philosophical law of religious development (44); and Strauss endeavoured by minute cavils to invalidate the Gospel nar- rative, in order to make way for the theory of an ideal Christ, manifested in the whole human race (45); and Feuerbach maintained that the Supreme Being is but humanity del- fied, and that the belief in a superhuman God is contradictory in itself, and pernicious in its consequences (46.) And if, by wander- ing for a little while in the tangled mazes of metaphysical speculation, we can test the worth of the substitute which this philosophy LECTURE II. 63 offers us in the place of the faith which it rejects; if we can shew how little such a sub- stitute can satisty even the intellect of man, (to the heart it does not pretend to appeal, the inquiry may do some service, slight and indirect though it be, to the cause of Christ- ian Truth, by suggesting to the wavering dis- ciple, ere he quits the Master with whom he has hitherto walked, the pregnant question of the Apostle, “Lord, to whom shall we go’.” When Philosophy succeeds in exhibiting in a clear and consistent form the Infinite Being of God; when her opposing schools are agreed among themselves as to the manner in which a knowledge of the Infinite takes place, or the marks by which it is to be dis- cerned when known; then, and not till then, may she claim to speak as one having au- thority in controversies of Faith. But while she speaks with stammering lips and a double tongue; while she gropes her way in dark- ness, and stumbles at every step; while she has nothing to offer us, but the alternative of principles which abjure consciousness or a consciousness which contradicts itself, we may well pause before we appeal to her decisions as the gauge and measure of religious truth. In one respect, indeed, I have perhaps de- ¢ St. John vi. 68. -- 64 LECTURE IL. parted from the customary language of the pulpit, to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary ;—namely, in dealing with the ideas common to Theology and Metaphysics in the terms of the latter, rather than in those of the former. But there is a line of argument, in which the vague generalities of the Absolute and the Infinite may be more reverently and appropriately employed than the sacred names and titles of God. For we almost instinctively shrink back from the recklessness which thrusts forward, on every occasion, the holiest names and things, to be tossed to and fro, and trampled underfoot, in the excitement of controversy. We feel that the name of Him whom we worship may not lightly be held up as a riddle for prying curiosity to puzzle over: we feel that the Divine Personality of our Father in Heaven is not a thing to be pitted in the arena of disputation, against the lifeless abstractions and sophistical word-jug- slings of Pantheism. We feel that, though God is indeed, in His incomprehensible Es- sence, absolute and infinite, it 15 not as the Absolute and Infinite that He appeals to the love and the fear and the reverence of His creatures. We feel that the life of religion lies in the human relations in which God re- veals Himself to man, not in the divine per- LECTURE II. 65 fection which those relations veil and modify, though without wholly concealing. We feel that the God to whom we pray, and in whom we trust, is not so much the Ged eternal and in- finite, without body, parts, or passions, (though we acknowledge that He is all these,) as the God who is “gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth Him of the evil (47)°” Those who have ob- served the prevailing character of certain schools of religious thought, in that country which, more than any other, has made Reli- gion speak the language of Metaphysics ;— those who have observed how often, in mo- dern literature, both at home and abroad, the most sacred names are played with, in fami- liar, almost in contemptuous intimacy, will need no other proof to convince them that we cannot attach too much importance to the duty of separating, as far as it can be effected, the language of prayer and praise from the definitions and distinctions of philosophy. The metaphysical difficulties which have been exhibited in the course of this Lecture almost suggest of themselves the manner in which they should be treated. We must be- gin with that which is within us, not with that which is above us; with the philosophy d Joel i. 13. | Ε 66 LECTURE I. of Man, not with that of God. Instead of asking, what are the facts and laws in the constitution of the universe, or in the Divine Nature, by virtue of which certain concep- tions present certain anomalies to the human mind, we should rather ask, what are the facts and laws in the constitution of the human mind, by virtue of which it finds itself in- volved in contradictions, whenever it ventures on certain courses of speculation. Philosophy, as well as Scripture, rightly employed, will teach a lesson of humility to its disciple; ex- hibiting, as it does, the spectacle of a creature of finite intuitions, surrounded by partial in- dications of the Unlimited ; of finite concep- tions, in the midst of partial manifestations of the Incomprehensible. Questioned in this spirit, the voice of Philosophy will be but an echo of the inspired language of the Psalmist: “'Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid thine hand upon me. Such knowledge is too wonderful for me: it is high; 1 cannot attain unto it °.” e Psalm cxxxix. 5, 6. LECTURE III. EXODUS XXXII, 20, 21, 22, 23. And he said, Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me, and live. And the Lord said, Behold, there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand upon a rock: and it shall come to pass, while my glory passeth by, that I will put thee in a clift of the rock, and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by: and I will take away mine hand, and thou shalt see my back parts; but my face shall not be seen. MY last Lecture was chiefly occupied with an examination of the ideas of the Absolute and the Infinite,—ideas which are indispensa- ble to the foundation of a metaphysical Theo- logy, and of which a clear and distinct con- sciousness must be acquired, if such a Theo- logy is to exist at all. 1 attempted to shew the inadequacy of these ideas for such a pur- pose, by reason of the contradictions which to our apprehension they necessarily involve from every point of view. The result of that attempt may be briefly summed up as fol- lows. We are compelled, by the constitution F 2 68 LECTURE IIL. of our minds, to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being,—a_ belief which appears forced upon us, as the com- plement of our consciousness of the relative and the finite. But the instant we attempt to analyse the ideas thus suggested to us, in the hope of attaining to an intelligible con- ception of them, we are on every side involved in inextricable confusion and contradiction. It is no matter from what point of view we commence our examination ;—whether, with the Theist, we admit the coexistence of the In- finite and the Finite, as distinct realities; or, with the Pantheist, deny the real existence of the Finite; or, with the Atheist, deny the real existence of the Infinite ;—on each of these suppositions alike, our reason appears divided against itself, compelled to admit the truth of one hypothesis, and yet unable to overcome the apparent impossibilities of each. The philosophy of Rationalism, thus traced up- wards to its highest principles, finds no legi- timate resting-place, from which to commence its deduction of religious consequences. In the present Lecture, it will be my en- deavour to offer some explanation of the sin- gular phenomenon of human thought, which is exhibited in these results. I propose to examine the same ideas of the Absolute and LECTURE III. 69 the Infinite from the opposite side, in order to see if any light can be thrown on the anomalies which they present to us, by a re- ference to the mental laws under which they are formed. Contradiction, whatever may be its ultimate import, is in itself not a quality of things, but a mode in which they are viewed by the mind; and the inquiry which it most immediately suggests is, not an iIn- vestigation of the nature of things in them- selves, but an examination of those mental conditions under which it is elicited in thought. Such an examination, if it does not enable us to extend the sphere of thought beyond a certain point, may at least serve to make us more distinctly conscious of its true boundaries. The much-disputed question, to what class of mental phenomena the religious conscious- ness belongs, must be postponed to a later stage of our inquiry. At present, we are con- cerned with a more general investigation, which the answer to that question will in no wise affect. Whether the relation of man to God be primarily presented to the human mind in the form of knowledge, or of feeling, or of practical impulse, it can be given only as a mode of consciousness, subject to those conditions under which alone consciousness % £LECTURE Ti is possible. Whatever knowledge is imparted, whatever impulse is communicated, whatever feeling is excited, in man’s mind, must take place in a manner adapted to the constitution of its human recipient, and must exhibit such characteristics as the laws of that constitution impose upon it. A brief examination of the conditions of human consciousness in general will thus form a proper preliminary to any inquiry concerning the religious conscious- ness in particular. Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object and another. To be con- scious, we must be conscious of something ; and that something can only be known, as that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is ποί (1). ΄ But distinction is _ necessarily limitation ; for, if one object is to ‘be distinguished from another, it must pos- sess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form which the other has. But it is obvious that the Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by the absence of any quality which the Finite possesses ; for such absence would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be dis- tinguished by the presence of an attribute LECTURE III. 71 which the Finite has not; for, as no finite part can be a constituent of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic must itself be infinite ; and must at the same time have nothing in common with the finite. We are _ thus thrown back upon our former impossi- bility; for this second infinite will be distin- guished from the finite by the absence of qualities which the latter possesses. A con-> sciousness of the Infinite as such thus neces- _ sarily involves a self-contradiction ; for it im- plies the recognition, by limitation and. dif- ference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent (2). That man can be conscious of the Infinite, is thus a supposition which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself. Consciousness is essentially a limitation; for it is the determination of the mind to one ac- tual out of many possible modifications. But the Infinite, if 1t 15 to be conceived at all, must | be conceived as potentially every thing and actually nothing; for if there is any thing in general which it cannot become, it is thereby limited ; and if there is any thing in particu- lar which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But again, it must also be conceived as actually every thing and potentialiy nothing; for an unrealized po- 72 LECTURE III. tentiality is likewise a limitation (3). If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very possibility marked out as incom- plete, and capable of a higher perfection. If it is actually every thing, it possesses no cha- racieristic feature, by which it can be distin- . guished from any thing else, and discerned as an object of consciousness. This contradiction, which is utterly inex- plicable on the supposition that the infinite is a positive object of human thought, is at once accounted for, when it is regarded as the mere negation of thought. If ali thought is limitation ;—if whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception, regarded as finite, —the infiniée, from a human point of view, is merely a name for the absence of those con- ditions under which thought is possible. ‘To speak of a Conception of the Infinite is, there- fore, at. once to affirm those conditions and to deny them. The contradiction, which we discover in such a conception, is only that which we have ourselves placed there, by tacitly assuming the conceivability of the in- conceivable. The condition of consciousness is distinction; and the condition: of distinc- tion is limitation. We can have no conscious- ness of Being in general which is not some Being in particular: a thing, in consciousness, LECTURE III. 73 is one thing out of many. In assuming the possibility cf an infinite object of conscious- ness, [| assume, therefore, that it is at the same time limited and unlimited ;—actually something, without which it could not be an object of consciousness, and actually nothing, without which it could not be infinite (4). Rationalism is thus only consistent with itself, when it refuses to attribute conscious- ness to God. Consciousness, in the only form in which we can conceive it, imples limitation and change,—the perception of one object out. of many, and a comparison of that object with others. ‘To be always conscious of the same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be conscious at all(5); and, beyond its human manifestation, we can have no conception of what consciousness is. Viewed on the side of the object of consciousness, the same prin- ciple will carry us further still. Existence itself, that so-called highest category of thought, is only conceivable in the form of existence modified in some particular man- ner. Strip off its modification, and the ap- parent paradox of the German philosopher becomes literally true:—pure being is pure nothing (6). We have no conception of ex- istence which is not existence in some parti- cular manner; and if we abstract from the 74 LECTURE III. manner, we have nothing left to constitute the existence. ‘Those who, in their horror of what they call anthropomorphism, or anthro- popathy, refuse to represent the Deity under symbols borrowed from the limitations of human consciousness, are bound, in consist- ency, to deny that God exists; for the con- ception of existence 1s as human and as li- mited as any other. The conclusion which Fichte boldly announces, awful as it is, is but the legitimate consequence of his pre- mises. “The moral order of the universe is itself God: we need no other, and we can comprehend no other (7).” A second characteristic of Consciousness 15. that it is only possible in the form of a rela- tion. ‘There must be a Subject, or person conscious, and an Object, or thing of which he is conscious. There can be no conscious- ness without the union of these two factors ; and, in that union, each exists only as it 18 related to the other(8). The subject is a subject, only in so far as it 1s conscious of an object: the object is an object, only in so far as it 1s apprehended by a subject: and the destruction of either is the destruction of consciousness itself. It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally — self-contradictory with that of the Infinite. LECTURE IIL. 75 To be conscious of the Absolute as such, we must know that an object, which is given in relation to our consciousness, is identical with one which exists in its own nature, out of all relation to consciousness. But to know this identity, we must be able to compare the two together; and such a comparison is itself a contradiction. We are in fact required to compare that of which we are conscious with that of which we are not conscious; the com- parison itself being an act of consciousness, and only possible through the consciousness of both its objects. It is thus manifest that, even if we could be conscious of the absolute, we could not possibly know that it is the absolute: and, as we can be conscious of an object as such, only by knowing it to be what it is, this is equivalent to an admissien that we cannot be conscious of the absolute at all. As an object of consciousness, every thing 18 necessarily relative; and what a thing may be out of consciousness, no mode of con- sciousness can tell us. This contradiction, again, admits of the same explanation as the former. Our whole notion of existence is necessarily relative ; for it 1s existence as conceived by us. But Ewistence, as we conceive it, is but a name for the several ways in which objects are pre- 70 LECTURE IIL. sented to our consciousness,—a general term, embracing a variety of relations. The Abso- lute, on the other hand, is a term expressing no object of thought, but only a denial of the relation by which thought is constituted. ‘To assume absolute existence as an object of thought, is thus to suppose a relation exist- ing when the related terms exist no longer. An object of thought exists, as such, in and threugh its relation to a thinker; while the Absolute, as such, is independent of all rela- tion. The Conception of the Absolute thus implies at the same time the presence and the absence of the relation by which thought is constituted; and our various endeavours to represent it are only so many modified forms of the contradiction involved in our original assumption. Here, too, the contra- diction is one which we ourselves have made. It dces not imply that the Absolute cannot exist; but it implies, most certainly, that we ᾿ cannot conceive it as existing (9). Philosophers who are anxious to avoid this conclusion have sometimes attempted to evade it, by asserting that we may have in consciousness a partial, but net a total know- ledge of the infinite and the absolute (10). But here again the supposition refutes itself. To have a partial knowledge of an object, is LECTURE IIL. 77 to know a part of it, but not the whole. But the part of the infinite which is supposed to be known must be itself either infinite or finite. If it is infinite, it presents the same difficulties as before. If it is finite, the point In question is conceded, and our conscious- ness is allowed to be limited to finite objects. But in truth it is obvious, on a moment’s re- flection, that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite can be represented in the form of a whole composed of parts. Not the Absolute ; for the existence of a whole is dependent on the existence of its parts. Not the Infinite; for if any part is infinite, it cannot be distin- cuished from the whole; and if each part is finite, no number of such parts can consti- tute the Infinite. | It would be possible, did my limits allow, to pursue the same argument at length, through the various special modifications which constitute the subordinate forms of consciousness. But with reference to the present inquiry, it will be sufficient to notice two other conditions, under which all con- sciousness is necessarily manifested ; both of which have a special bearing on the relation of philosophy to theological controversy. All human consciousness, as being a change in our mental state, is necessarily subject to the law of Time, in its two manifestations of 78 LECTURE III. Succession and Duration. Every object, of whose existence we can be in any way con- scious, is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time to some former object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a cer- tain portion of time. In the former point of view, it is manifest, from what has been said before, that whatever succeeds something else, and is distinguished frem it, is necessarily apprehended as finite; for distinction is it- self a limitation. In the latter point of view, it is no less manifest that whatever is con- ceived as having a continuous existence in time is equally apprehended as finite. For continuous existence is necessarily conceived as divisible into successive moments. One portion has already gone by; another is yet to come; each successive moment is related to something which has preceded, and _ to something which is to follow: and out of such relations the entire existence is made up. The acts, by which such existence is manifested, being continuous in time, have, at any given moment, a further activity still to come: the object so existing must there- fore always be regarded as capable of be- coming something which it is not yet actu- ally,—as having an existence incomplete, and receiving at each instant a further completion. It is manifest therefore that, if all objects of LECTURE III. 79 human thought exist in time, no such object can be regarded as exhibiting or representing the true nature of an Infinite Being. As a necessary consequence of this limita- tion, it follows, that an act of Creation, in the highest sense of the term,—that is to say, an absolutely first link in the chain of pheno- mena, preceded by no temporal antecedent,— is to human thought inconceivable. ‘To re- present in thought the first act of the first cause of all things, 1 must conceive myself as placed in imagination at the point at which temporal succession commences, and as thus conscious of the relation between a phenomenon in time and a reality out of time. But the consciousness of such a relation im- plies a consciousness of both the related mem- bers; to realize which, the mind must be in and out of time at the same moment. ‘Time, therefore, cannot be regarded as limited ; for to conceive a first or last moment of time would be to conceive a consciousness into which time enters, preceded or followed by one from which it is absent. But, on the other hand, an infinite succession in time is equally inconceivable ; for this succession also cannot be bounded by time, and therefore can only be apprehended by one who is himself free from the law of conceiving in time. From a human point of view, such a 80 LECTURE III. conception could only be formed by thrust- ing back the boundary for ever ;—a_ process which itself would require an infinite time for its accomplishment (11.) Clogged by these counter impossibilities of thought, two oppo- site speculations have in vain struggled to find articulate utterance, the one for the hypothesis of an endless duration of finite changes, the other for that of an existence prior to duration itself. It is perhaps an- other aspect of the same difficulty, that, among various theories of the generation of the world, the idea of a creation out of no- thing seems to have been altogether foreign to ancient philosophy (12). The limited character of all existence which can be conceived as having a continuous du- ration, or as made up of successive moments, is so far manifest, that it has been assumed, almost as an axiom, by philosophical theolo- gians, that in the existence of God there is no distinction between past, present and future. “In. the changes of things,” says Augustine, “there is a past and a future: in God there is a present, in which neither past nor future can be”(13). “ Eternity,” says Boethius, “is the perfect possession of interminable life, and of all that life at once” (14): and Aquinas, ac- cepting the definition, adds, “ Eternity has no succession, but exists all together”(15). But, LECTURE III. 81 whether this assertion be literally true or not, (and this we have no means of ascertaining,) it is clear that such a mode of existence is altogether inconceivable by us, and that the words in which it is described represent not thought, but the refusal to think at all. It is impossible that man, so long as he exists in time, should contemplate an object in whose existence there is no time. For the thought by which he contemplates it must be one of his own mental states: it must have ἃ be- ginning and an end: it must occupy a certain portion of duration, as a fact of human consciousness. There 15 therefore no manner of resemblance or community of nature between the representative thought and that which it is supposed to represent ; for the one cannot exist out of time, and the other cannot exist in it(16). Nay, more: even were a mode of representation out of time possible to a man, it is utterly impos- sible that he should know it to be so, or make any subsequent use of the knowledge thus conveyed to him. To be conscious of a thought as mine, 1 must know it as a present condition of my consciousness: to know that it has been mine, 1 must remember it as a past condition: and past and present are alike modes of time. It is manifest, therefore, G 89 LECTURE IIL. that a knowledge of the infinite, as existing out of time, even supposing it to take place at all, cannot be known to be taking place, cannot be remembered to have taken place, and cannot be made available for any pur- pose at any period of our temporal life (17). The command, so often urged upon man by philosophers and theologians of various ages and schools, “In contemplating God, transcend time” (18), if meant for any thing more than a figure of rhetoric, is equivalent to saying, “Be man no more; be thyself God.” It amounts to the admission that, to know the infinite, the human mind must it- self be infinite; because an object of con- sciousness, which is in any way limited by the conditions of human thought, cannot be accepted as a representation of the unlimited. But two infinites cannot be conceived as ex- isting together; and if the mind of man must become infinite to know God, it must itself be God(19). Pantheism, or self-ac- knowledged falsehood, are thus the only al- ternatives possible under this precept. If the human mind, remaining in reality finite, merely fancies itself to be infinite in its con- templation of God, the knowledge of God is itself based on a falsehood. If, on the other hand, it not merely imagines itself to be, but LECTURE III. 83 actually is, infinite, its personality 15 swal-_ lowed up in the infinity of the Deity; its human existence is a delusion: God is, lite- rally and properly, all that exists; and the Finite, which appears to be, but is not, va- nishes before the single existence of the One and All. Subordinate to the general law of Time, to which all consciousness is subject, there are two inferior conditions, to which the two great divisions of consciousness are severally subject. Our knowledge of Body is governed by the condition of Space; our knowledge of Mind by that of Personality. 1 can con- ceive no qualities of body, save as having a definite local position; and I can conceive no qualities of mind, save as modes of a con- scious self. With the former of these limita- tions our present argument is not concerned; . but the latter, as the necessary condition of the conception of spiritual existence, must be taken into account in estimating the philoso- phical value of man’s conception of an Infi- nite Mind. The various mental attributes which we. ascribe to God, Benevolence, Holiness, Just- ice, Wisdom, for example, can be conceived by us only as existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not G2 84 LECTURE UI. identical with any one of his attributes, but the common Subject of them all;—in one word, in a Person. But Personality, as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a relation (20). Our own personality is_pre- sented to us as relative and limited; and it is from that presentation that all our repre- sentative notions of personality are derived. Personality is presented to us as a relation between the conscious self and the various modes of his consciousness. ‘There is no personality in abstract thought without a thinker: there is no thinker, unless he exer- cises some mode of thought. Personality is also a limitation; for the thought and the thinker are distinguished from and limit each other; and the several modes of thought are distinguished each from each by limita- tion likewise. If i am any one of my own thoughts, I live and die with each successive moment of my consciousness. If I am not any one of my own thoughts, I am limited by that very difference, and each thought, as different from another, is limited also. This too has been clearly seen by philosophical theologians; and accordingly, they have main- tained that in God there is no distinction between the subject of consciousness and its modes, nor between one mode and another. LECTURE IIL. 85 “God,” says Augustine, “is not a Spirit as regards substance, and good as regards qua- lity; but both as regards substance. The Justice of God is one with His Goodness and with His Blessedness; and all are one with His Spirituality” (21). But this assertion, if it be literally true, (and of this we have no means of judging,) annihilates Personality it- self, in the only form in which we can con- ceive it. We cannot transcend our own per- sonality, as we cannot transcend our own relation to time: and to speak of an Ab- solute and Infinite Person, is simply to use language to which, however true it may be in a superhuman sense, no mode of human thought can possibly attach itself. But are we therefore justified, even on philosophical grounds, in denying the Per- sonality of God ? or do we gain a higher or a truer representation of Him, by asserting, with the ancient or the modern Pantheist, that God, as absolute and infinite, can have neither intelligence nor will (22)? Far from it. We dishonour God far more by identi- fying Him with the feeble and negative im- potence of thought, which we are pleased to style the Infinite, than by remaining content within those limits which He for His own good purposes has imposed upon us, and con- 86 LECTURE IIL fining ourselves to a manifestation, imperfect indeed and inadequate, and acknowledged to be so, but still the highest idea that we can form, the noblest tribute that we can offer. Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the absolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, more ele- vating, more religious, than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in which men babble about nothing under the name of the Infinite. Personal, conscious existence, limited though it be, is yetgthe noblest of all existences of which man ca dream; for it is that by which all existence is revealed to him: it is grander than the grandest object which man can know; for it is that which knows, not that whieh is known © Man” says Pascal, “is but a reed, {ΡΝ 65, in nature; but he is a reed that thinks. It needs not that the whdle universe should arm itself to crush him ;—a vapour, a drop of water, will suffice to destroy him. But should the universe crush him, man would yet be nobler than that which destroys him; for he knows that he dies; while of the advantage which the universe has over him, the universe knows nothing” (24). It is by consciousness alone that we know that God exists, or that we are able to LECTURE III. 87 offer Him any service. It is only by con- ceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can stand in any religious relation to Him at all; that we can form such a representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants, insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity. It is from the intense consciousness of our own real existence as Persons, that the con- ception of reality takes its rise in our minds: it is through that consciousness alone that we can raise ourselves to the faintest image of the supreme reality of God. What is reality and what is appearance, is the riddle which Philosophy has put forth from the birthday of human thought; and the only approach to an answer has been a voice from the depths of the personal consciousness: “I think ; therefore | am (25).” In the antithesis be- tween the thinker and the object of his thought,—between myself and that which 15 related to me,—we find the type and the source of the universal contrast between the one and the many, the permanent and the changeable, the real and the apparent. ‘That which I see, that which I hear, that which I think, that which I feel, changes and passes away with each moment of my varied exist-_ ence. I, who see, and hear, and think, and 88 LECTURE III. feel, am the one continuous self, whose exist- ence gives unity and connection to the whole. Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists: relation to personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist. And when, from the little world of man’s consciousness and its objects, we would lift up our eyes to the inexhausti- ble universe beyond, and ask, to whom all this is related, the highest existence is still the highest personality; and the Source of all Being reveals Himself by His name, I AM *(26). If there 1s one dream of a godless philo- sophy to which, beyond all others, every | moment of our consciousness gives the lie, it is that which subordinates the individual to the universal, the person to the species; which deifies kinds and realizes classifica- tions ; which sees Being in generalization, and Appearance in limitation; which regards the living and conscious man as a wave on the ocean of the unconscious infinite; his life, a momentary tossing to and fro on the shifting tide ; his destiny, to be swallowed up in the formless and boundless universe (27). ‘The final conclusion of this philosophy, in direct antagonism to the voice of consciousness, is, ἃ Exodus ii. 14. LECTURE III. 89 “ I think ; therefore I am not.” When men look around them in bewilderment for that which lies within them; when they talk of the enduring species and the perishing indi- vidual, and would find, in the abstractions which their own minds have made, a higher and truer existence than in the mind which made them ;—they seek for that which they know, and know not that for which they seek (28) They would fain lift up the cur- tain of their own being, to view the picture which it conceals. Like the painter of old, they know not that the curtain is the picture (29). It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile these two representations with each other; as our conception of personality in- volves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists any where but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of God. The apparent con- tradiction, in this case, as in those previously noticed, is the necessary consequenee of an attempt on the part of the human thinker to transcend the boundaries of his own con- sciousness. It proves that there are limits to 90 LECTURE ΗΠ. man’s power of thought ; and it proves no more. . The preceding considerations are equally conclusive against both the methods of meta- physical theology described in my last Lec- ture; that which commences with the divine to reason down to the human, and that which commences with the human to reason up to the divine. For though the mere abstract expression of the infinite, when regarded as | indicating nothing more than the negation of limitation, and therefore of conceivability, is not contradictory in itself, it becomes so the instant we attempt to apply it in reason- ing to any object of thought. A thing—an object—an attribute—a person—or any other term signifying one out of many possible ob- jects of consciousness, is by that very relation necessarily declared to be finite. An infinite thing, or object, or attribute, or person, is therefore in the same moment declared to be both finite and infinite. We cannot, there- fore, start from any abstract assumption of the divine infinity, to reason downwards to any object of human thought. And on the other hand, if all human attributes are con- ceived under the conditions of difference, and relation, and time, and personality, we cannot represent in thought any such attribute mag- LECTURE IIL. 91 nified to infinity; for this again is to con- ceive it as finite and infinite at the same time. We can conceive such attributes, at the utmost, only indefinitely: that is to say, we may withdraw our thought, for the mo- ment, from the fact of their being limited ; but we cannot conceive them as infinite; that is to say, we cannot positively think of the absence of the limit; for, the instant we attempt to do so, the antagonist elements of the conception exclude one another, and an- nihilate the whole. There remains but one subterfuge to which Philosophy can have recourse, before she is driven to confess that the Absolute and the Infinite are beyond her grasp. If conscious- ness is against her, she must endeavour to get rid of consciousness itself. And, accord- ingly, the most distinguished representatives of this philosophy in recent times, however widely diftering upon other questions, agree in maintaining that the foundation for a knowledge of the infinite must be laid in a point beyond consciousness (30). But a system which starts from this assumption postulates its own failure at the outset. It attempts to prove that consciousness is a de- lusion ; and consciousness itself is made the instrument of proof; for by consciousness its 92 LECTURE IIL. reasonings must be framed and apprehended. It is by reasonings, conducted in conformity to the ordinary laws of thought, that the phi- losopher attempts to shew that the highest manifestations of reason are above those laws. It is by representations, exhibited under the conditions of time and difference, that the philosopher endeavours to prove the exist- ence, and deliver the results, of an intuition in which time and difference are annihilated. They thus assume, at the same moment, the truth and the falsehood of the normal con- sciousness ; they divide the human mind against itself; and by that division prove no more than that two supposed faculties of thought mutually invalidate each other’s evidence. Thus, by an act of reason, philo- sophy destroys reason itself: it passes at once from rationalism to mysticism, and makes inconceivability the criterion of truth. In dealing with religious truths, the theory which repudiates with scorn the notion of believing a doctrine although it is incompre- hensible, springs at one desperate bound clear over faith into credulity, and proclaims that its own principles must be believed Je- cause they are incomprehensible. The rheto- rical paradox of the fervid African is adopted in cold blood as an axiom of metaphysical LECTURE ΤΙΣ 93 speculation : “ It is certain, because it 15. im- possible (31).” Such a theory is open to two fatal objections :—it cannot be communicated, and it cannot be verified. It cannot be com- municated ; for the communication must be made in words; and the meaning of those words must be understood; and the under- standing is a state of the normal conscious- ness. It cannot be verified; for, to verify, we must compare the author’s experience with our own; and such a comparison 1s again a state of consciousness. Let it be granted for a moment, though the concession refutes itself, that a man may have a cogni- sance of the infinite by some mode of know- ledge which is above consciousness. He can never say that the idea thus acquired is like or unlike that possessed by any other man ; for ~ likeness implies comparison ; and comparison is only possible as a mode of consciousness, and between objects regarded as limited and related to each other. That which is out of consciousness cannot be pronounced true ; for truth is the correspondence between a “conscious representation and the object which it represents. Neither can it be pronounced false; for falsehood consists in the disagree- ment between a similar representation and its object. Here then is the very suicide of 94 LECTURE III. Rationalism. To prove its own truth and the falsehood of antagonistic systems, it postu- lates a condition under which neither truth nor falsehood is possible. The results, to which an examination of the facts of consciousness has conducted us, may be briefly summed up as follows. Our whole consciousness manifests itself as sub- ject to certain limits, which we are unable, in any act of thought, to transgress. That which falls within these limits, as an object of thought, is known to us as relative and finite. The existence of a limit to our powers of thought is manifested by the consciousness of contradiction, which implies at the same time an attempt to think and an inability to accomplish that attempt. But a limit is necessarily conceived as a relation between something within and something without it- self; and thus the consciousness of a limit of thought implies, though it does not directly present to us, the existence of something of which we do not and cannot think. When we lift up our eyes to that blue vault of heaven, which is itself but the limit of our’ own power of sight, we are compelled to sup- pose, though we cannot perceive, the exist- ence of space beyond, as well as within it; we regard the boundary of vision as parting the LECTURE III. 95 visible from the invisible. And. when, in mental contemplation, we are conscious of relation and difference, as the limits of our power of thought, we regard them, in like manner, as the boundary between the con- ceivable and the inconceivable; though we are unable to penetrate, in thought, beyond the nether sphere, to the unrelated and. un- limited which it hides from us (32). The Absolute and the Infinite are thus, like the Inconceivable and the Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible. The attempt to construct in thought an object answering to such names, neces- sarily results in contradiction ;—a contradic- tion, however, which we have ourselves pro- duced by the attempt to think ;—which exists in the act of thought, but not beyond it ;— which destroys the conception as such, but indicates nothing concerning the existence or non-existence of that which we try to con- ceive. It proves our own impotence, and it proves nothing more. Or rather, it indirectly leads us to believe in the existence of that Infinite which we cannot conceive; for the denial of its existence involves a contradic- ‘tion, no less than the assertion of its con- 96 LECTURE Ir ceivability. We thus learn that the provinces of Reason and Faith are not coextensive ;— that it is a duty, enjoined by Reason itself, to believe in that which we are unable to comprehend. I have now concluded that portion of my argument in which it was necessary to in- vestigate in abstract terms the limits of hu- man thought in general, as a preliminary to the examination of religious thought in par- ticular. As yet, we have viewed only the negative side of man’s consciousness :—we have seen how it does not represent God, and why it does not so represent Him. There remains still to be attempted the positive side of the same inquiry ;—namely, what does our consciousness actually tell us concerning the Divine Existence and Attributes; and how does its testimony agree with that fur- nished by Revelation. In prosecuting this further inquiry, I hope to be able to con- fine myself to topics more resembling those usually handled in this place, and to lan- guage more strictly appropriate to the treat- ment of Christian Theology. Yet there are advantages in the method which I have hi- therto pursued, which may, I| trust, be ac- cepted as a sufficient excuse for whatever may have sounded strange and obscure in its’ LECTURE III. 97 phraseology. So long as the doubts and dif- ficulties of philosophical speculation are fa- miliar to us only in their religious aspect and language, so long we may be led to think that there is some peculiar defect or per- plexity in the evidences of religion, by which it is placed in apparent antagonism to the more obvious and unquestionable conclusions of reason. A very brief examination of cog- nate questions in their metaphysical aspect, will suffice to dissipate this misapprehension, and to shew that the philosophical difficul- ties, which rationalists profess to discover in Christian doctrines, are in fact inherent in the Jaws of human thought, and must accom- pany every attempt at religious or irreligious speculation. There is also another consideration, which may justify the Christian preacher in exa- mining, at times, the thoughts and language of human philosophy, apart from their special application to religious truths. A religious association may sometimes serve to disguise the real character of a line of thought which, without that association, would have little power to mislead. Speculations which end in unbelief are often commenced in a believing spirit. It is painful, but at the same time instructive, to trace the gradual progress, by which an unstable disciple often tears off strip H 98 ' BECTURE( IIL by strip the wedding garment of his faith,— - scarce conscious the while of his own in- creasing nakedness ;—and to mark how the language of Christian belief may remain al- most untouched, when the substance and the life have departed from it. While Philoso- phy speaks nothing but the language of Christianity, we may be tempted to think that the two are really one; that our own speculations are but leading us to Christ by another and a more excellent way. Many a young aspirant after a philosophical faith, trusts himself to the trackless ocean of ra- tionalism in the spirit of the too-confident Apostle: “Lord, bid me come unto thee on the water”.” And for a while he knows not how deep he sinks; till the treacherous sur- face on which he treads is yielding on every side, and the dark abyss of utter unbelief is yawning to swallow him up. Well is it in- deed with those who, even in that last fearful hour, can yet cry, “ Lord, save me,” and can feel that supporting hand stretched out to grasp them, and hear that voice, so warning, yet so comforting, “O, thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt ?” But who that enters upon his course of mistrust shall dare to say that such will be the end of it? Far better is it to learn at the b St. Matthew xiv. 28. LECTURE III. 99 outset the nature of that unstable surface on which we would tread, without being tempted by the phantom of religious promise, which shines delusively over it. He who hath or- dered all things in measure and number and weight’, has also given to the reason of man, as to his life, its boundaries, which it cannot pass*¢. And if, in the investigation of those boundaries, we have turned for a little while, to speak the language of human philosophy, the result will but be to shew that philoso- phy, rightly understood, teaches one lesson with the sacred volume of Revelation. With that lesson let us conclude, as it is given in the words of our own judicious divine and philosopher. “ Dangerous it were for the fee- ble brain of man to wade far into the doings of the Most High; whom although to know be life, and joy to make mention of His name; yet our soundest knowledge is to know that we know Him not as indeed He is, neither can know Him: and our safest elo- quence concerning Him is our silence, when we confess without confession that His glory is inexplicable, His greatness above our ca- pacity and reach. He is above, and we upon earth; therefore it behoveth our words to be wary and few (33).” ¢ Wisdom xi. 20. d Job xiv. 5. H 2 LECTUREAIV. PSALM LXV, 2. O thou that hearest prayer, unto thee shall all fiesh come. THAT the Finite cannot comprehend the Infinite, is a truth more frequently admitted. in theory than applied in practice. It has been expressly asserted by men who, almost in the same breath, have proceeded to lay down canons of criticism, concerning the pur- pose of Revelation, and the truth or false- hood, importance or insignificance, of parti- . cular doctrines, on grounds which are tenable only on the supposition of a perfect and in- timate knowledge of God’s Nature and Coun- sels (1). Hence it becomes necessary to bring down the above truth from general to spe- cial statements ;—to inquire more particularly wherein the limitation of man’s faculties con- sists, and in what manner it exhibits itself in the products of thought. This task I en- deavoured to accomplish in my last Lecture. To pursue the conclusion thus obtained to LECTURE IV. 101 its legitimate consequences in relation to The- ology, we must next inquire how the human mind, thus limited, is able to form the idea of a relation between man and God, and what is the nature of that conception of God which arises from the consciousness of this relation. The purpose of our inquiry is to ascertain the limits of religious thought; and, for this purpose, it is necessary to proceed from the limits of thought and of human conscious- ness in general, to those particular forms of consciousness which, in thought or in some other mode, especially constitute the essence of Religion. Reasonings, probable or demonstrative, in proof of the being and attributes of God, have met with a very different reception at different periods. Elevated at one time, by the injudicious zeal of their advocates, to a certainty and importance to which they have no legitimate claim, at another, by an equally extravagant reaction, they have been sacri- ficed in the mass to some sweeping principle of criticism, or destroyed piecemeal by mi- _nute objections in detail. While one school of theologians has endeavoured to raise the whole edifice of the Christian Faith on a basis of metaphysical proof (2); others have either expressly maintained that the under- 102 LECTURE IV. standing has nothing to do with religious be- lief, or have indirectly attempted to establish the same conclusion by special refutations of the particular reasonings (8). An examination of the actual state of the human mind, as regards religious ideas, will lead us to a conclusion intermediate between these two extremes. On the one hand, it must be allowed that it is not through rea- soning that men obtain the first intimation of their relation to the Deity; and that, had they been left to the guidance of their intel- lectual faculties alone, it is possible that no such intimation might have taken place; or at best, that it would have been but as one guess, out of many equally plausible and equally natural. Those who lay exclusive stress on the proof of the existence of God from the marks of design in the world, or from the necessity of supposing a first cause of all phenomena, overlook the fact that man learns to pray before he learns to reason,— that he feels within him the consciousness of a Supreme Being, and the instinct of worship, before he can argue from effects to causes, or estimate the traces of wisdom and benevo- lence scattered through the creation. But on the other hand, arguments which would be insufficient to create the notion of a Supreme LECTURE IV. 103 Being in a mind previously destitute of it, may have great force and value in enlarging or correcting a notion already existing, and in justifying to the reason the unreasoning convictions of the heart. The belief in a God, once given, becomes the nucleus round which subsequent experiences cluster and accumu- late; and evidences which would be obscure or ambiguous, if addressed to the reason only, become clear and convincing, when interpreted by the light of the religious consciousness. We may therefore without hesitation ac- cede to the argument of the great Critic of metaphysics, when he tells us that the specu- lative reason is unable to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, but can only correct our conception of such a Being, supposing it to be already obtained (4). But at the same time, it is necessary to protest against the per- nicious extent to which the reaction against the use of the reason in theology has in too many instances been carried. When the same critic tells us that we cannot legitimately infer, from the order and design visible in the world, the omnipotence and omniscience of its Creator, because a degree of power and wisdom short of the very highest might pos- sibly be sufficient to produce all the effects which we are able to discern (5); or when a 104 LECTURE IV. later writer, following in the same track, con- demns the argument from final causes, be- cause it represents God exclusively in the aspect of an artist (6); or when a third writer, of a different school, tells us that the pro- cesses of thought have nothing to do with the soul, the organ of religion (7);—we feel that systems which condemn the use of rea- soning in sacred things, may be equally one- sided and extravagant with those which as- sert its supreme authority. Reasoning must not be condemned for failing to accomplish what no possible mode of human conscious- ness ever does or can accomplish. If con- sciousness itself is a limitation ; if every mode of consciousness is a determination of the mind in one particular manner out of many possible ;—it follows indeed that the infinite is beyond the reach of man’s arguments; but only as it is also beyond the reach of his feelings or his volitions. We cannot indeed reason to the existence of an infinite Cause from the presence of finite effects, nor con- template the infinite in a finite mode of knowledge; but neither can we feel the infi- nite in the form of a finite affection, nor dis- cern it as the law of a finite action. If our whole consciousness of God is partial and incomplete, composed of various attributes LEGFURE ΤΥ. 105 manifested in various relations, why should we condemn the reasoning which represents Him in a single aspect, so long as it neither asserts nor implies that that aspect is the only one in which He can be represented ? If man is not a creature composed solely of intellect, or solely of feeling, or solely of will, why should any one element of his nature be excluded from participating in the pervading consciousness of Him in whom we live, and move, and have our being?* A religion based solely on the reason may starve on barren abstractions, or bewilder itself with inex- plicable contradictions; but a religion which repudiates thought to take refuge in feeling, abandons itself to the wild follies of fana- ticism, or the diseased ecstasies of mysticism : while one which acknowledges the practical energies alone, may indeed attain to Stoicism ; but will fall far short of Christianity. It is our duty indeed to pray with the spirit; but it is no less our duty to pray with the under- standing also”. Taking then, as the basis of our inquiry, the admission that the whole consciousness of man, whether in thought, or in feeling, or in volition, is limited in the manner of its operation and in the objects to which it is @ Acts xvii. 28. b y Corinthians xiv. 15. 106 LECTURE IV. related, let us endeavour, with regard to the religious consciousness in particular, to sepa- rate from each other the complicated threads which, in their united web, constitute the conviction of man’s relation to a Supreme Being. In distinguishing, however, one por- tion of these as forming the origin of this conviction, and another portion as contri- buting rather to its further development and direction, I must not be understood to main- tain or imply that the former could have ex- isted and been recognised, prior to and inde- pendently of the cooperation of the latter. Consciousness, in its earliest discernible form, is only possible as the result of an union of the reflective with the intuitive faculties. A state of mind, to be known ai all as existing, must be distinguished from other states; and, to make this distinction, we must think of it, as well as experience it. Without thought as well as sensation, there could be no con- sciousness of the existence of an external world: without thought as well as emotion and volition, there could be no consciousness of the moral nature of man, Sensation with- out thought would at most amount to no more than an indefinite sense of uneasiness or momentary irritation, without any power of discerning in what manner we are affected, LECTURE IV. 107 or of distinguishing our successive affections from each other. 'To distinguish, for exam- ple, in the visible world, any one object from any other, to know the house as a house, or the tree as a tree, we must be able to refer them to distinct notions; and such reference is an act of thought. The same condition holds good of the religious consciousness also. In whatever mental affection we become con- scious of our relation to a Supreme Being, we can discern that consciousness, as such, only by reflecting upon it as conceived under its proper notion. Without this, we could not know our religious consciousness to be what it is; and, as the knowledge of a fact of con- sciousness is identical with its’ existence,— without this, the religious consciousness, as such, could not exist. But notwithstanding this necessary cooper- ation of thought in every manifestation of human consciousness, it is not to the reflec- tive faculties that we must look, if we would discover the origin of religion. For to the ex- ercise of reflection, it is necessary that there should exist an object on which to reflect; and. though, in the order of time, the distinct recognition of this object is simultaneous with the act of reflecting upon it; yet, in the order of nature, the latter presupposes the former. 108 LECTURE IV. Religious thought, if it is to exist at all, can only exist as representative of some fact of religious intuition,—of some individual state of mind, in which is presented, as an imme- diate fact, that relation of man to God, of which man, by reflection, may become dis- tinctly and definitely conscious. | Two such states may be specified, as di- viding between them the rude materials out of which Reflection builds up the edifice of Religious Consciousness. These are the Feel- ing of Dependence and the Conviction of Moral Obligation. 'To these two facts of the inner consciousness may be traced, as to their sources, the two great outward acts by which religion in various forms has been manifested among men;—Prayer, by which they seek to win God’s blessing upon the future, and Lexpiation, by which they strive to atone for the offences of the past (8). The Feeling of Dependence is the instinct which urges us to pray. It is the feeling that our existence and welfare are in the hands of a superior Power ;—not of an inexorable Fate or im- mutable Law; but of a Being having at least so far the attributes of Personality, that He can shew favour or severity to those de- pendent upon Him, and can be regarded by them with the feelings of hope, and fear, and LECTURE IV. 109 reverence, and gratitude. It is a feeling si- milar in kind, though higher in degree, to that which is awakened in the mind of the child towards his parent, who is first manifested to his mind as the giver of such things as are needful, and to whom the first language he addresses is that of entreaty. It is the feel- ing so fully and intensely expressed in the language of the Psalmist: “Thou art he that took me out of my mother’s womb: thou wast my hope, when I hanged yet upon my mother’s breasts. I have been left unto thee ever since I was born: thou art my God even from my mother’s womb. Be not thou far from me, O Lord: thou art my succour, haste thee to help me. I will declare thy Name unto my brethren: in the midst of the congregation will I praise thee” With the first development of consciousness, there grows up, as a part of it, the innate feeling that our life, natural and spiritual, is not in our power to sustain or to prolong ;—that there is One above us, on whom we are de- pendent, whose existence we learn, and whose presence we realize, by the sure instinct of Prayer. We have thus, in the Sense of De- pendence, the foundation of one great ele- ment of Religion,—the Fear of God. εἰ Psalm xxii. Ὁ; 10, 19, 22. 110 LECTURE IV. But the mere consciousness of dependence does not of itself exhibit the character of the Being on whom we depend. It is as con- sistent with superstition as with religion ;— with the belief in a malevolent, as in a bene- volent Deity: it is as much called into ex- istence by the severities, as by the mercies of God; by the suffering which we are unable to avert, as by the benefits which we did not ourselves procure (9). The Being on whom we depend is, in that single relation, mani- fested in the infliction of pain, as well as in the bestowal of happiness. But in order to make suffering, as well as enjoyment, contri- bute to the religious education of man, it is necessary that he should be conscious, not merely of suffering, but of sin;—that he should look upon pain not merely as inflicted, as deserved; and should recognise in its Author the justice that punishes, not merely the anger that harms. In the feeling of de- pendence, we are conscious of the Power of God, but not necessarily of His Goodness. This deficiency, however, is supplied by the other element of religion,—the Consciousness of Moral Obligation,—carrying with it, as it necessarily does, the Conviction of Sin. It is impossible to establish, as a great modern philosopher has attempted to do, the theory LECTURE IV. 111 of an absolute Autonomy of the Will; that is to say, of an obligatory law, resting on no basis but that of its own imperative cha- _-racter (10). Considered solely in itself, with no relation to any higher authority, the con- sciousness of a law of obligation is a fact of our mental constitution, and it is no more. The fiction of an absolute law, binding on all rational beings, has only an apparent uni- versality ; because we can only conceive other rational beings by identifying their constitu- tion with our own, and making human reason the measure and representative of reason in general. Why then has one part of our con- stitution, merely as such, an imperative au- thority over the remainder? What right has one portion of the human consciousness to represent itself as duty, and another merely as inclination ? 'There is but one answer pos- sible. The Moral Reason, or Will, or Con- science, of Man, call it by what name we please, can have no authority, save as im- planted in him by some higher Spiritual Being, as a Law emanating froma Lawgiver. Man can be a law unto himself, only on the supposition that he refiects in himself the Law of God ;—that he shews, as the Apostle tells us, the works of that law written in his 112 LECTURE IV. heart’. If he is absolutely a law unto him- self, his duty and his pleasure are undistin- guishable from each other; for he is subject to no one, and accountable to no one. Duty, in this case, becomes only a higher kind of pleasure,—a balance between the present and the future, between the larger and the smaller gratification. We are thus compelled, by the consciousness of moral obligation, to assume the existence of a moral Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right and wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity(11). The conception of this standard, in the human mind, may indeed be faint and fluctuating, and must be imperfect: it may vary with the intellectual and moral culture of the nation or the individual: and in its highest human representation, it must fall far short of the reality. But it is present to all mankind, as a basis of moral obligation and an induce- ment to moral progress: it is present in the universal consciousness of sin; in the convic- tion that we are offenders against God; in the expiatory rites by which, whether in- spired by some natural instinct, or inherited from some primeval tradition, divers nations have, in their various modes, striven to atone d Romans 1]. 15. LECTURE IV. 113 for their transgressions, and to satisfy the wrath of their righteous Judge (12). How- ever erroneously the particular acts of reli- gious service may have been understood by men; yet, in the universal consciousness of innocence and guilt, of duty and disobedi- ence, of an appeased and offended God, there is exhibited the instinctive confession of all mankind, that the moral nature of man, as subject to a law of obligation, reflects and represents, in some degree, the moral nature of a Deity by whom that obligation is im- posed. ‘But these two elements of the religious consciousness, however real and _ efficient within their own limits, are subject: to the same restrictions which we have before no- ticed as binding upon consciousness in ge- neral. Neither in the feeling of dependence, nor in that of obligation, can we be directly conscious of the Absolute or the Infinite, as such. And it is the more necessary to no- tice this limitation, inasmuch as an opposite theory has been maintained by one whose writings have had perhaps more influence than those of any other man, in forming the modern religious philosophy of his own country; and whose views, in all their es- sential features, have been ably maintained I 114 LECTURE IV. and widely diffused among ourselves. Ac- cording to Schleiermacher, the essence of Religion is to be found in a feeling of abso- lute and entire dependence, in which the mutual action and reaction of subject and object upon each other, which constitutes the ordinary consciousness of mankind, gives way to a sense of utter, passive helplessness,—to a consciousness that our entire personal agency is annihilated in the presence of the infinite energy of the Godhead. In our intercourse with the world, he tells us, whether in rela- tion to nature or to human society, the feel- ing of freedom and that of dependence are always present in mutual operation upon each other ; sometimes in equilibrium; sometimes with a vast preponderance of the one or the other feeling; but never to the entire exclu- sion of either. But in our communion with God, there is always an accompanying con- sciousness that the whole activity is abso- futely and entirely dependent upon Him; that, whatever amount of freedom may be apparent in the individual moments of life, these are but detached and isolated portions of a passively dependent whole (13). The theory 1s carried still further, and expressed in more positive terms, by an English dis- ciple, who says that, “ Although man, while in LECTURE IV. 115 the midst of finite objects, always feels him- self to a certain extent independent and free ; yet in the presence of that which is self- existent, infinite, and eternal, he may feel the sense of freedom utterly pass away and be- come absorbed in the sense of absolute de- pendence.” “Let the relation,” he continues, “ of subject and object in the economy of our emotions become such that the whole inde- pendent energy of the former merges in the latter as its prime cause and present sus- tainer; let the subject become as nothing,— not, indeed, from its intrinsic insignificance or incapacity of moral action, but by virtue of the infinity of the object to which it stands consciously opposed: and the feeling of de- pendence must become absolute ; for all finite power is as nothing in relation to the Infi- nite (14).” Of this theory it may be observed, in the first place, that it contemplates God chiefly in the character of an object of infinite mag- nitude. ‘The relations of the object to the subject, in our consciousness of the world, and in that of God, differ from each other in de- gree rather than in kind. The Deity is ma- nifested with no attribute of personality: He is merely the world magnified to infi- -nity: and the feeling of absolute dependence re 116 LECTURE IV. is in fact that of the annihilation of our per- sonal existence in the Infinite Being of the Universe. Of this feeling, the intellectual ex- ponent is pure Pantheism; and the infinite object is but the indefinite abstraction of Being in general, with no distinguishing cha- racteristic to constitute a Deity. For the distinctness of an object of consciousness is in the inverse ratio to the intensity of the passive affection. As the feeling of depend- ence becomes more powerful, the knowledge of the character of the object on which we de- pend must necessarily become less and less; for the discernment of any object as such is a state of mental energy and reaction of thought upon that object. Hence the feeling of absolute dependence, supposing it possibie, could convey no consciousness of God as God, but merely an indefinite impression of de- pendence upon something. ‘Towards an ob- ject so vague and meaningless, no real reli- gious relation is possible (15). In the second place, the consciousness of an absolute dependence in which our activity is annihilated, is a contradiction in terms; for consciousness itself is an activity. We can be conscious of a state of mind as such, only by attending to it; and attention is in all cases a mode of our active energy. Thus the state LECTURE IV. 117 of absolute dependence, supposing it to exist at all, could not be distinguished from other states ; and, as all consciousness is distinction, it could not, by any mode of consciousness, be known to exist. In the third place, the theory is incon- sistent with the duty of Prayer. Prayer is essentially a state in which man 15 in active relation towards God; in which he is in- tensely conscious of his personal existence and its wants; in which he endeavours by entreaty to prevail with God. Let any one consider for a moment the strong energy of the language of the Apostle; “Now I be- seech you, brethren, for the Lord Jesus Christ’s sake, and for the love of the Spirit, that ye strive together with me in your prayers to God for me‘:” or the conscious- ness of a personal need, which pervades that Psalm in which David so emphatically de- clares his dependence upon God: “ My God, my God, look upon me; why hast thou for- saken me, and art so far from my health, and from the words of my complaint ἢ O my God, I cry in the day-time, but thou hearest not; and in the night season also I take no rest*:’”— let him ponder the words of our Lord himself: “Shall not God avenge his own elect, which e Romans xv. 30. f Psalm xxii. 1, 2. 118 LECTURE IV. cry day and night unto him® :”—and then let him say if such language 18 compatible with the theory which asserts that man’s person- ality is annihilated in his communion with God (16). But, lastly, there is another fatal objection to the above theory. It makes our moral and religious consciousness subversive of each other, and reduces us to the dilemma, that either our faith or our practice must be founded on a delusion. ‘The actual relation of man to God is the same, in whatever de- eree man may be conscious of it. If man’s dependence on God is not really destructive of his personal freedom, the religious con- sciousness, in denying that freedom, is a false consciousness. If, on the contrary, man is in reality passively dependent upon God, the consciousness of moral responsibility, which bears witness to his free agency, is a lying witness. Actually, in the sight of God, we are either totally dependent, or, partially at least, free. And as this condition must be always the same, whether we are conscious of it or not, 10 follows, that, in proportion as one of these modes of consciousness reveals to us the truth, the other must be regarded as testifying to a falsehood (17). 5. St. Luke xvii. 7. LECTURE IV. 119 Nor yet it is possible to find in the con- sciousness of moral obligation any immediate apprehension of the Absolute and Infinite. For the free agency of man, which in the feeling of dependence is always present as a subordinate element, becomes here the centre and turning-point of the whole. ‘The con- sciousness of the Infinite is necessarily ex- cluded ; first, by the mere existence of a re- lation between two distinct agents; and, se- condly, by the conditions under which each: must necessarily be conceived in its relation to the other. The moral consciousness of man, as subject to law, is, by that subjection, both limited and related ; and hence it cannot in itself be regarded as a representation of the Infinite. Nor yet can such a representa- tion be furnished by the other term of the relation,—that of the Moral Lawgiver, by whom human obligation is enacted. For, in the first place, such a Lawgiver must be con- ceived as a Person; and the only human conception of Personality is that of limita- tion. In the second place, the moral con- sciousness of such a Lawgiver can only be conceived under the form of a variety of at- tributes; and different attributes are, by that very diversity, conceived as finite. Nay, the very conception of a moral nature is in itself 190 LECTURE IV. the conception of a limit; for morality is the compliance with a law; and a law, whether imposed from within or from without, can only be conceived to operate by limiting the range of possible actions. Yet along with all this, eae our posi- tive religious consciousness is of the finite only, there yet runs through the whole of that consciousness the accompanying convic- tion that the Infinite does exist, and must exist ;—though of the manner of that exist- ence we can form no conception; and that it exists along with the Finite ;—though we know not how such a coexistence is possible.. We cannot be conscious of the Infinite; but we can be and are conscious of the limits of our own powers of thought; and therefore we know that the possibility or impossibility of conception is no test of the possibility or im- possibility of existence. We know that, unless we admit the existence of the Infinite, the existence of the Finite is inexplicable and self-contradictory ; and yet we know that the conception of the Infinite itself appears to involve contradictions no less inexplicable. In this impotence of Reason, we are com- pelled to take refuge in Faith, and to believe that an Infinite Being exists, though we know not how; and that He is the same with that LECTURE: IV. 121 Being who is made known in consciousness as our Sustainer and our Lawgiver. For to deny that an Infinite Being exists, because we cannot comprehend the manner of His existence, is, of two equally inconceivable alternatives, to accept the one, which renders that very inconceivability itself inexplicable. If the Finite is the universe of existence, there is no reason why that universe itself should not be as conceivable as the several parts of which it is composed. Whence comes it then that our whole consciousness is compassed about with restrictions, which we are ever striving to pass, and ever failing in the effort ? Whence comes it that the Finite cannot mea- sure the Finite? The very consciousness of our own limitations of thought bears witness to the existence of the Unlimited, who is be- yond thought. The shadow of the Infinite still broods over the consciousness of the finite ; and we wake up at last from the dream of absolute wisdom, to confess, “Surely the Lord is in this place; and I knew it not*.” We are thus compelled to acquiesce in at least one portion of Bacon’s statement con- cerning the relation of human knowledge to its object: “ Natura percutit intellectum radio directo; Deus autem, propter medium ine- quale, (creaturas scilicet,) radio refracto” (18). h (Jenesis xxvii. 16. 122 LECTURE ITV. To have sufficient grounds for believing in God is a very different thing from having sufficient grounds for reasoning about Him. The religious sentiment, which compels men tobelieve in and worship a Supreme Being, is an evidence of His existence, but not an exhibition of His nature. It. proves that God is, and makes known some of His re- lations to us; but it does not prove what God is in His own Absolute Being (19). The natural senses, it may be, are diverted and coloured by the medium through which they pass to reach the intellect, and present to us, not things in themselves, but things as they appear to us. And this is manifestly the case with the religious consciousness, which can only represent the Infinite God under finite forms. But we are compelled to believe, on the evidence of our senses, that a material world exists, even while we listen to the arguments of the idealist, who reduces it to an idea or a non-entity; and we are compelled, by our religious consciousness, to believe in the existence of a personal God; though the reasonings of the Rationalist, lo- gically followed out, may reduce us to Pan- theism or Atheism. But to preserve this be- lief uninjured, we must acknowledge the true limits of our being: we must not claim for any fact of human consciousness the proud pre- LECTURE IV. 123 rogative of revealing God as He is; for thus we throw away the only weapon which can be of avail in resisting the assaults of Scepti- cism. We must be content to admit, with regard to the internal consciousness of man, the same restrictions which the great philo- sopher just now quoted has so excellently expressed with reference to the external senses. “For as all works do shew forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image; so it is of the works of God, which do shew the omnipotency and wisdom of the maker, but not his image. ... Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and inforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate his power, is an excellent argu- ment; ... but on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persua- sion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe.... For the heathens themselves conclude as much in that excel- lent and divine fable of the golden chain: That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrari- wise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven (20).” One feature deserves especial notice, as common to both of those modes of conscious- 124 LECTURE. F¥V. ness which primarily exhibit our relation to- wards God. In both, we are compelled to regard ourselves as Persons related to a Per- son. In the feeling of dependence, however great it may be, the consciousness of myself; the dependent element, remains unextin- guished ; and, indeed, without that element there could be no consciousness of a relation at all. In the sense of moral obligation, I know myself as the agent on whom the law is binding: I am free to choose and to act, as a person whose principle of action is in him- self. And it is important to observe that it is only through this consciousness of person- ality that we have any ground of belief in the existence of a God. If we admit the arguments by which this personality is anni- hilated, whether on the side of Materialism or on that of Pantheism, we cannot escape from the consequence to which those arguments inevitably lead,—the annihilation of God himself. If, on the one hand, the spiritual ele- ment within me is merely dependent on the corporeal ;—if myself is a result of my bodily organization, and may be resolved into the operation of a system of material agents,— why should I suppose it to be otherwise in the great world beyond me? If I, who deem myself a spirit distinct from and superior to LECTURE .1iV. 120 matter, am but the accident and the product of that which I seem to rule, why may not all other spiritual existence, if such there be, be dependent upon the constitution of the material universe (21)? Or if, on the other hand, I am not a distinct substance, but a mode of the infinite,—a shadow passing over the face of the universe,—what is that uni- verse which you would have me acknowledge as God? It is, says the Pantheist, the One and All (22). By no means: it is the Many, in which is neither All nor One. You have taught me that within the little world of my own consciousness there is no relation be- tween the one and the many; but that all is transient and accidental alike. Hf I accept your conclusion, I must extend it to its legi- timate consequence. Why should the uni- verse itself contain a principle of unity? why should the Many imply the One? All that I see, all that I know, are isolated and uncon- nected phenomena; I myself being one of them. Why should the Universe of Being be otherwise? It cannot be All; for its pheno- mena are infinite and innumerable; and αἰ implies unity and completeness. It need not be One; for you have yourself shewn me that I am deceived in the only ground which I have for believing that a plurality of modes 126 LECTURE IV. implies an unity of substance. If there is no Person to pray; if there is no Person to be obedient;—what remains but to conclude that He to whom prayer and obedience are due, —nay, even the mock-king who usurps His name in the realms of philosophy,—is a sha- dow and a delusion likewise ? The result of the preceding considerations may be summed up as follows. There are two modes in which we may endeavour to contemplate the Deity: the one negative, based on a vain attempt to transcend the conditions of human thought, and to expand the religious consciousness to the infinity of its Divine Object: the other positive, which keeps within its proper limits, and views the object in a manner accommodated to the finite capacities of the human thinker. The first aspires to behold God in His absolute nature: the second is content to view Him in those relations in which He has been pleased to manifest Himself to his creatures. The first aims at a speculative knowledge of God as He is; but, bound by the conditions of finite thought, even in the attempt to transgress them, obtains nothing more than a tissue of ambitious self-contradictions, which indicate only what He is not (23). The se- cond, abandoning the speculative knowledge LECTURE IV. Lay of the infinite, as only possible to the Infinite Intelligence itself, is content with those 76- gulative ideas of the Deity, which are suffi- cient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect (24) ;—which tell us, not what God is in Himself, but how He wills that we should think of Him (25). In renouncing all knowledge of the Absolute, it renounces at the same time all attempts to construct a priori schemes of God’s Providence as it ought to be: it does not seek to reconcile this or that phenomenon, whether in nature or in revelation, with the absolute attributes of Deity; but confines itself to the actual course of that Providence, as manifested in the world; and seeks no higher internal crt- terion of the truth of a religion, than may be derived from its analogy to other parts of the Divine Government. Guided by this, the only true Philosophy of Religion, man is con- tent to practise where he is unable to specu- late. He acts, as one who must give an ac- count of his conduct: he prays, believing that his prayer will be answered. He does not seek to reconcile this belief with any theory of the Infinite; for he does not even know how the Infinite and the Finite can exist toge- ther. But he feels that his several duties rest upon the same basis: he knows that, if 128 LECTURE IV. human action is not incompatible with Infi- nite Power, neither is human worship with Infinite Wisdom and Goodness: though it is not as the Infinite that God reveals Himself in His moral government ; nor is it as the Infinite that He promises to answer prayer. “OQ Thou that hearest prayer, unto Thee shall all flesh come.” Sacrifice, and offering, and burnt-offerings, and offering for sin, Thou requirest no more; for He whom these pre- figured has offered Himself as a sacrifice once for all’. But He who fulfilled the sacrifice, commanded the prayer, and Himself taught us how to pray. He tells us that we are de- pendent upon God for our daily bread, for for- giveness of sins, for deliverance from evil ;— and how is that dependence manifested ? Not in the annihilation of our personality; for we appeal to Him under the tenderest of per- sonal relations, as the children of Our Father who is in heaven. Not as passive in contem- plation, but as active in service; for we pray, “'Thy will be done, as in heaven, so in earth.” In this manifestation of God to man, alike in Consciousness as in Scripture, under finite forms to finite minds, as a Person to a Per- son, we see the root and foundation of that religious service, without which belief is a i Hebrews x. 8, 10. LECTURE IV. 129 speculation, and worship a delusion ; which, whatever would-be philosophical theologians may say to the contrary, is the common bond which unites all men to God. All are God’s creatures, bound alike to reverence and obey their Maker. All are God’s dependents, bound. alike to ask for His sustaining bounties. All are God’s rebels, needing daily and hourly to implore His forgiveness for their disobe- dience. All are God’s redeemed, purchased by the blood of Christ, invited to share in the benefits of His passion and intercession. All are brought by one common channel into communion with that God to whom they are related by so many common ties. All are called upon to acknowledge their Maker, their Governor, their Sustainer, their Re- deemer; and the means of their acknow- ledgment is Prayer. And, apart from the fact of its having been God’s good pleasure so to reveal Himself, there are manifest, even to human under- standing, wise reasons why this course should have been adopted, benevolent ends to be answered by this gracious condescension. We are not called upon to live two distinct lives in this world. It is not required of us that the household of our nature should be di- vided against itself;—that those feelings of K 180 LECTURE IV. love, and reverence, and gratitude, which move us in a lower degree towards our hu- man relatives and friends, should be alto- gether thrown aside, and exchanged for some abnormal state of ecstatic contemplation, when we bring our prayers and praises and thanks before the footstool of our Father in heaven. We are none of us able to grasp in speculation the nature of the Infinite and Eternal; but we all live and move among our fellow men, at times needing their assist- ance, at times soliciting their favour, at times seeking to turn away their anger. We have all, as children, felt the need of the support- ing care of parents and guardians: we have all, in the gradual progress of education, re- quired instruction from the wisdom of teach- ers: we have all offended against our neigh- bours, and known the blessing of forgiveness, or the penalty of unappeased anger. We can all, therefore, taught by the inmost conscious- ness of our human feelings, place ourselves in communion with God, when He manifests Himself under human images. “He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen,” says the Apostle St. John, “how can he love God whom he hath not seen*?” Our hea- venly affections must in some measure take κα St John iy. 20. LECTURE IV. 131 their source and their form from our earthly ones: our love towards God, if it is to be love at all, must not be wholly unlike our love towards our neighbour: the motives and in- fluences which prompt us, when we make known our wants and pour forth our sup- plications to an earthly parent, are graci- ously permitted by our heavenly Father to be the type and symbol of those by which our intercourse with Him is to be regulated,— with which He bids us “come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need '.” So should it be during this transitory life, in which we see through a glass, darkly ™; in which God reveals Himself in types and shadows, under human images and attri- butes, to meet graciously and deal tenderly with the human sympathies of His creatures. And although, even to the sons of God, it doth not yet appear what we shall be, when we shall be like Him, and shall see Him as He is"; yet, if it be true that our religious duties in this life are a training and preparation for that which is to come ;—if we are encouraged to look forward to and anticipate that future state, while we are still encompassed with 1 Hebrews iv. 16. m 1 Corinthians xiii. 12. n + St. John ii. 2. K 2 ow 132 LECTURE IV. this earthly tabernacle ;—if we are taught to look, as to our great Example, to One who in love and sympathy towards His brethren was Very Man;—if we are bidden not to sorrow without hope concerning them which are asleep’, and are comforted by the pro- mise that the ties of love which are broken on earth shall be united in heaven,—we may trust that not wholly alien to such feelings will be our communion with God face to face, when the redeemed of all flesh shall approach once more to Him that heareth prayer;—no longer in the chamber of private devotion; no longer in the temple of public worship; but in that great City where no temple is; “for the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple of it?.” ° 1 Thessalonians iv. 13. P Revelation xxi. 22. LEGTURE ΟὟ" 1 CORINTHIANS 1, 21-24. For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolish- ness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. «'THOUGH it were admitted,” says Bishop Butler, “that this opinion of Necessity were speculatively true; yet, with regard to prac- tice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches; that is, to the whole of our present life. For the constitution of the present world, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is as if we were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded that, since the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, in- 134 LECTURE “V. clining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so. But the thing here in- sisted upon is, that under the present na- tural government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are or not” (1). That this observation has in any degree settled the speculative difficulties involved in the problem of Liberty and Necessity, will not be maintained by any one who is acquainted with the history of the controversy. Nor was it intended by its author to do so. But, like many other pregnant sentences of that ereat thinker, it introduces a principle ca- pable of a much wider application than to the inquiry which originally suggested it. The vexed question of Liberty and Ne- cessity, whose counter-arguments have be- come a by-word for endless and unprofitable wrangling, is but one of a large class of problems, some of which meet us at every turn of our daily life and conduct, whenever we attempt to justify in theory that which we are compelled to carry out in practice. Such problems arise inevitably, whenever we attempt to pass from the sensible to the in- telligible world, from the sphere of action LECTURE ν. 180 to that of thought, from that which appears to us to that which is in itself. In religion, in morals, in our daily business, in the care of our lives, in the exercise of our senses, the rules which guide our practice cannot be reduced to principles which satisfy our reason (2). The very first Law of Thought, and, through Thought, of all Consciousness, by which alone we are able to discern objects as such, or to distinguish them one from an- other, involves in its constitution a mysteyy and a doubt, which no effort of Philosophy has been able to penetrate :—How can the One be many, or the Many one? (3). We are compelled to regard ourselves and our fellow men as persons, and the visible world around us as made up of things: but what is per- sonality, and what is reality, are questions which the wisest have tried to answer, and have tried in vain. Man, as a Person, is one, yet composed of many elements ;—not iden- tical with any one of them, nor yet with the aggregate of them all; and yet not separable from them by any effort of abstraction. Man is one in his thoughts, in his actions, in his feelings, and in the responsibilities which these involve. It is J who think, 71 who act, I who feel; yet 1 am not thought, nor 136 LECTURE YV. action, nor feeling, nor a combination of thoughts and actions and feelings heaped together. Extension, and _ resistance, and shape, and the various sensible qualities, make up my conception of each individual body as such; yet the body is not its exten= sion, nor its shape, nor its hardness, nor its colour, nor its smell, nor its taste; nor yet is it a mere aggregate of all these with no prin- ciple of unity among them. If these several parts constitute a single whole, the unity, as well as the plurality, must depend upon some principle which that whole contains: if they do not constitute a whole, the diffi- culty is removed but a single step; for the same question,—what constitutes individu- ality ?—-must be asked in relation to each se- parate part. ‘The actual conception of every object, as such, involves the combination of the One and the Many; and that combina- tion is practically made every time we think at all. But at the same time, no effort of reason is able to explain how such a rela- tion is possible; or to satisfy the intellectual doubt which necessarily arises on the con- templation of it. As it 1s with the first law of Thought, so it is with the first principle of Action and of Feeling. All action, whether free or con- LECTURE V. 137 strained, and all passion, implies and rests upon another great mystery of Philosophy, —the Commerce between Mind and Matter. The properties and operations of matter are known only by the external senses: the fa- culties and acts of the mind are known only by the internal apprehension. The energy of the one is motion: the energy of the other is consciousness. What is the middle term which unites these two? and how can their reciprocal action, unquestionable as it is in fact, be conceived as possible in theory? (4). How can a contact between body and body produce consciousness in the immaterial soul ὃ How can a mental self-determination pro- duce the motion of material organs? (5). How can mind, which is neither extended nor figured nor coloured in itself, represent by its ideas the extension and figure and colour of bodies ? How can the body be de- termined to a new position in space by an act of thought, to which space has no rela- tion? How can thought itself be carried on by bodily instruments, and yet itself have nothing in common with bodily affections ? What is the relation between the last pulsa- tion of the material brain and the first awak- ening of the mental perception ? How does the spoken word, a merely material vibration 198 LECTURE V. of the atmosphere, become echoed, as it were, in the silent voice of thought, and take its part in an operation wholly spiritual? Here again we acknowledge, in our daily practice, a fact which we are unable to represent in theory; and the various hypotheses to which Philosophy has had recourse,—the Divine Assistance, the Preestablished Harmony, the Plastic Medium, and others (6), are but so many confessions of the existence of the mys- tery, and of the extraordinary, yet wholly insufficient efforts made by human reason to penetrate it (7). The very perception of our senses is sub- ject to the same restrictions. “No priestly dogmas,” says Hume, “ever shocked common sense more than the infinite divisibility of extension, with its consequences” (8). He should have added, that the antagonist as- sumption of a finite divisibility is equally incomprehensible; it being as impossible to conceive an ultimate unit, or least possible extension, as it is to conceive the process of division carried on to infinity. Extension is presented to the mind as a relation between parts exterior to each other, whose reality cannot consist merely in their juxtaposition. We are thus compelled to believe that ex- tension itself is dependent upon some higher LECTURE V. 139 law ;—that it is not an original principle of things in themselves, but a derived result of their connection with each other. But to conceive how this generation of space is possible,— how unextended objects can by their conjunction produce extension,—baffles the utmost efforts of the wildest imagination or the profoundest reflection (9). We cannot conceive how unextended matter can become extended; for of unextended matter we know nothing, either in itself or in its relations; though we are apparently compelled to pos- tulate its existence, as implied in the ap- pearances of which alone we are conscious. The existence of mental succession in time is as inexplicable as that of material exten- sion in space ;—a first moment and an infi- nite regress of moments being both equally inconceivable, no less than the corresponding theories of a first atom and an infinite di- vision. The difficulty which meets us in these problems may help to throw some light on the purposes for which human thought is de- signed, and the limits within which it may be legitimately exercised. ‘The primary fact of consciousness, which is accepted as regulating our practice, 1s in itself inewplicable, but not inconceivable. There is mystery ; but there is 140 LECTURE V. not yet contradiction. Thought is baffled, and unable to pursue the track of investigation ; but it does not grapple with an idea and de- stroy itself in the struggle. Contradiction does not begin till we direct our thoughts, not to the fact itself, but to that which it suggests as beyond itself. This difference is precisely that which exists between following the laws of thought, and striving to transcend them ; — between leaving the mystery of Knowing and Being unsolved, and making unlawful at- tempts to solve it. The facts,—that all objects of thought are conceived as wholes composed of parts ;—that mind acts upon matter, and matter upon mind;—that bodies are ex- tended in space, and thoughts successive in time ;—do not, in their own statement, seve- rally contain elements repulsive of each other. As mere facts, they are so far from being inconceivable, that they embody the very laws of conception itself, and are expe- rienced at every moment as true: but though we are able, nay, compelled to conceive them as facts, we find it impossible to conceive them as ultimate facts. ‘They are made known to us as relations; and all relations are in themselves complex, and imply simpler principles ;—objects to be related, and a ground by which the relation is con- LECTURE V. 141 stituted. The conception of any such rela- tion as a fact, thus involves a further inquiry concerning its existence as a consequence ; and to this inquiry no satisfactory answer can be given. Thus the highest principles of thought and action, to which we can at- tain, are regulative, not speculative :—they do not serve to satisfy the reason, but to guide the conduct: they do not tell us what things are in themselves, but how we must conduct ourselves in relation to them. The conclusion which this condition of hu- man consciousness almost irresistibly forces upon us, is one which equally exhibits the strength and the weakness of the human in- tellect. We are compelled to admit that the mind, in its contemplation of objects, is not the mere passive recipient of the things pre- sented to it; but has an activity and a law of its own, by virtue of which it reacts upon the materials existing without, and moulds them into that form in which consciousness is capable of apprehending them. The ex- istence of modes of thought, which we are compelled to accept as at the same time rela- tively ultimate and absolutely derived,— as limits beyond which we cannot penetrate, yet which themselves proclaim that there is a further truth behind and above them,—sug- 142 LECTURE VV. gests, as its obvious explanation, the hypo- thesis of a mind cramped by its own laws, and bewildered in the contemplation of its own forms. If the mind, in the act of con- ‘sclousness, were merely blank and inert ;—if the entire object of its contemplation came / from without, and nothing from within ;—no ' fact of consciousness would be inexplicable ; for every thing would present itself as it is. _ No reality would be suggested, beyond what is actually given: no question would be asked which is not already answered. For how can doubt arise, where there is no innate power in the mind to think beyond what is placed before it,—to react upon that which acts upon it? But upon the contrary suppo- sition, all is regular, and the result such as might naturally be expected. If thought has laws of its own, it cannot by its own act go beyond them; yet the recognition of law, as a restraint, implies the existence of a sphere of liberty beyond. If the mind contributes its own element to the objects of conscious- ness, it must, in its first recognition of those objects, necessarily regard them as something complex, something generated partly from without and partly from within. Yet in that very recognition of the complex, as such, is implied an impossibility of attaining to the LECTURE VV. 143 simple; for to resolve the composition is to destroy the very act of knowledge, and the relation by which consciousness is consti- tuted. The object of which we are con- scious is thus, to adopt the well-known lan- guage of the Kantian philosophy, a pheno- menon, not a thing in itself ;—a product, re- sulting from the twofold action of the thing apprehended, on the one side, and the fa- culties apprehending it, on the other. The perceiving subject alone, and the perceived object alone, are two unmeaning elements, which first acquire a significance in and by the act of their conjunction (10). It is thus strictly in analogy with the me- thod of God’s Providence in the constitution of man’s mental faculties, if we believe that, in Religion also, He has given us truths which are designed to be regulative, rather than speculative; intended, not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice; not to tell us what God is in His absolute nature, but how He wills that we should think of Him in our present finite state (11). In my last Lecture, I endeavoured to shew that our knowledge of God is not a consciousness of the Infinite as such, but that of the relation of a Person to a Person ;—the conception of personality being, humanly speaking, one of 144 LECTURE WY. limitation. This amounts to the admission that, in natural religion at least, our know- ledge of God does not satisfy the conditions of speculative philosophy, and is incapable of reduction to an ultimate and absolute truth. And this, as we now see, is in accordance with the analogy which the character of hu- man philosophy in other provinces would na- turally lead us to expect (12). It is reason- able also that we should expect to find, as part of the same analogy, that the revealed manifestation of the Divine nature and at- tributes should also carry on its face the marks of subordination to some higher truth, of which it indicates the existence, but does not make known the substance. It 15 to be ex- pected that our apprehension of the revealed Deity should involve mysteries inscrutable and doubts insoluble by our present facul- ties; while, at the same time, it inculcates the true spirit in which such doubts should be dealt with; by warning us, as plainly as such a warning is possible, that we see a part only, and not the whole; that we behold effects only, and not causes; that our knowledge of God, though revealed by Himself, is revealed in relation to human faculties, and subject to the limitations and imperfections inseparable from the constitution of the human mind. LECTURE ΟὟ, 14 We may πορ]θοῦ this warning if we please: we may endeavour to supply the imperfec- tion, and thereby make it more imperfect still: we may twist and torture the divine image on the rack of human philosophy, and call its mangled relics by the high-sounding titles of the Absolute and the Infinite; but these ambitious conceptions, the instant we attempt to employ them in any act of thought, manifest at once, by their inherent absurdities, that they are not that which they pretend to be ;—that in the place of the Absolute and Infinite manifested in its own nature, we have merely the Relative and ΕἸ- nite contradicting itself. We may indeed believe, and ought to be- lieve, that the knowledge which our Creator has permitted us to attain to, whether by Revelation or by our natural faculties, is not given to us as an instrument of deception. We may believe, and ought to believe, that, intellectually as well as morally, our present life is a state of discipline and preparation for another; and that the conceptions which we are compelled to adopt, as the guides of our thoughts and actions now, may indeed, in the sight of a higher Intelligence, be but partial truth, but cannot be total falsehood. But in thus believing, we desert the evidence’ i 140 LECTURE V. of Reason, to rest on that of Faith; and of the principles on which Reason itself de- pends, it is obviously impossible to have any ‘other guarantee. But such a Faith, however well founded, has itself only a regulative and practical, not a speculative and theoretical application. It bids us rest content within the limits which have been assigned to us; but it cannot enable us to overleap those limits, nor exalt to a more absolute character the conclusions obtained by finite thinkers under the conditions of finite thought. But on the other hand, we must beware of the opposite extreme,—that of mistaking the in- ability to affirm for the ability to deny. We cannot say that our conception of the Divine Nature exactly resembles that Nature in its absolute existence; for we know not what that absolute existence is. But, for the same reason, we are equally unable to say that it does not resemble; for, if we know not the Absolute and Infinite at all, we cannot say how far it is or is not capable of likeness or unlikeness to the Relative and Finite. We must remain content with the belief that we have that knowledge of God which is best adapted to our wants and training. How far that knowledge represents God as He is, we know not, and we have no need to know. ΠΕΟΤΌΒΕν. 147 The testimony of Scripture, like that of our natural faculties, is plain and intelligible, when we are content to accept it as a fact intended for our practical guidance: it be- comes incomprehensible, only when we at- tempt to explain it as a theory capable of speculative analysis. We are distinctly told that there is a mutual relation between God and man, as distinct agents ;—that God in- fluences man by His grace, visits him with rewards or punishments, regards him with love or anger;—that man, within his own limited sphere, is likewise capable of “ pre- vailing with God*;” that his prayers may ob- tain an answer, his conduct call down God’s favour or condemnation. There is nothing self-contradictory or even unintelligible in this, if we are content to believe that it is so, without striving to understand how it is so. But the instant we attempt to analyse the ideas of God as infinite and man as. finite ;— to resolve the scriptural statements into the higher principles on which their possibility apparently depends ;—we are surrounded on every side by contradictions of our own rais- ing; and, unable to comprehend how the In- finite and the Finite can exist in mutual re- lation, we are tempted to deny the fact of a Genesis xxxul. 28. Eo 148 LECTURE V. that relation altogether, and to seek a refuge, though it be but insecure and momentary, in Pantheism, which denies the existence of the Finite, or in Atheism, which rejects the Infi- nite. And here, again, the parallel between Religion and Philosophy holds good: the same limits of thought are discernible in re- lation to both. The mutual intercourse of mind and matter has been explained away by rival theories of Idealism on the one side and Materialism on the other. The unity and plurality, which are combined in every object of thought, have been assailed, on this — side by the Eleatic, who maintains that all things are one, and variety a delusion (13) ; on that side by the Sceptic, who tells us that there is no unity, but merely a mixture of differences; that nothing is, but all things are ever becoming; that mind and body, as substances, are mere philosophical fictions, invented for the support of isolated impres- sions and ideas (14). The mystery of Neces- sity and Liberty has its philosophical as well as its theological aspect: and a parallel may be found to both, in the counter-labyrinth of Continuity in Space, whose mazes are suffi- ciently bewildering to shew that the percep- tion of our bodily senses, however certain as a fact, reposes, in its ultimate analysis, upon LECTURE V. 149 a mystery no less insoluble than that which envelopes the free agency of man in its rela- tion to the Divine Omniscience (15). Action, and not knowledge, is man’s destiny and duty in this life; and his highest princi- ples, both in philosophy and in religion, have reference to this end. But it does not follow, on that account, that our representations are untrue, because they are imperfect. ‘To assert that a representation is untrue, because it is relative to the mind of the receiver, is to overlook the fact that truth itself is nothing more than a relation. Truth and falsehood are not properties of things in themselves, but of our conceptions, and are tested, not by the comparison of conceptions with things in themselves, but with things as they are given in some other relation. My conception of an object of sense is trwe, when it corresponds to the characteristics of the object as I perceive it; but the perception itself is equally a rela- tion, and equally implies the cooperation of human faculties. ‘Truth in relation to no in- telligence is a contradiction in terms: our highest conception of absolute truth is that of truth in relation to all intelligences. But of the consciousness of intelligences different from our own we have no knowledge, and can make no application. Truth, therefore, 150 LECTURE V. in relation to man, admits of no other test than the harmonious consent of all human faculties; and, as no such faculty can take cognisance of the Absolute, it follows that correspondence with the Absolute can never be required as a test of truth (16). The ut- most deficiency that can be charged against human faculties amounts only to this ;—that we cannot say that we know God as God knows Himself (17) :—that the truth of which our finite minds are susceptible may, for aught we know, be but the passing shadow of some higher reality, which exists only in the Infi- nite Intelligence. That the true conception of the Divine Nature, so far as we are able to receive it, is to be found in those regulative representa- tions which exhibit God under limitations accommodated to the constitution of man; not in the unmeaning abstractions which, aiming at a higher knowledge, distort, rather than exhibit, the Absolute and the Infinite; is thus a conclusion warranted, both de- ductively, from the recognition of the limits of human thought, and inductively, by what we can gather from experience and analogy concerning God’s general dealings with man- kind. There remains yet a third indispens- able probation, to which the same conclusion LECTURE V. 151 must be subjected; namely, how far does it agree with the teaching of Holy Scripture ? In no respect is the Theology of the Bible, as contrasted with the mythologies of human invention, more remarkable, than in the man- ner in which it recognises and adapts itself to that complex and self-limiting constitution of the human mind, which man’s wisdom finds so difficult to acknowledge. ‘To human rea- son, the personal and the infinite stand out in apparently irreconcilable antagonism; and the recognition of the one in a religious sys- tem almost inevitably involves the sacrifice of the other. ‘The Personality of God disap- pears in the Pantheism of India; His Infi- nity is lost sight of in the Polytheism of Greece (18). In the Hebrew Scriptures, on the contrary, throughout all their variety of Books and Authors, one method of Divine teaching is constantly manifested, appealing alike to the intellect and to the feelings of man. From first to last we hear the echo of that first great Commandment: “Hear, Ὁ Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord: and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might’.” God is plainly and uncom- promisingly proclaimed as the One and the Ὁ Deuteronomy vi. 4,5. St. Mark xii. 29, 30. 152 LECTURE V. Absolute: “I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God*:” yet this sublime conception is never for an instant so exhibited as to furnish food for that mystical contemplation to which the Oriental mind is naturally so prone. On the contrary, in all that relates to the feelings and duties by which religion is practically to be regulated, we cannot help observing how the Almighty, in communicating with His people, conde- scends to place Himself on what may, hu- manly speaking, be called a lower level than that on which the natural reason of man would be inclined to exhibit Him. While His Personality is never suffered to sink to a merely human representation ;—while it is clearly announced that His thoughts are not. our thoughts, nor His ways our ways‘, yet His Infinity is never for a moment so mani- fested as to destroy or weaken the vivid re- ality of those human attributes, under which | He appeals to the human sympathies of His creatures. “The Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend *.” He will listen to our supplications': He will help those that cry unto Him’: He reserveth ¢ Isaiah xliv. 6. d Isaiah ly. 8. ¢ Exodus xxxill.11. f Psalm exlii. 1, 2. & Psalm cil. 17, 18. cxlv. 19. Isaiah lyili. 9. LECTURE Υ. 158 wrath for His enemies": He is appeased by repentance’: He sheweth mercy to them that love Him*. As a King, He listens to the petitions of his subjects': as a Father, He pitieth His own children™. It is impossible to contemplate this marvellous union of the human and the divine, so perfectly adapted to the wants of the human servant of a di- vine Master, without feeling that it is indeed the work of Him who formed the spirit of man, and fitted him for the service of his Maker. “He sheweth His word unto Jacob, His statutes and ordinances unto Israel. He hath not dealt so with any nation; neither have the heathen knowledge of His laws”.” But if this is the lesson taught us by that earlier manifestation in which God is repre- sented under the likeness of human attri- butes, what may we learn from that later and fuller revelation which tells us of One who is Himself both God and Man? The Father has revealed Himself to mankind under hu- man types and images, that He may appeal more earnestly and effectually to man’s con- sciousness of the human spirit within him. The Son has done more than this: He be- h Nahum i. 2. i 1 Kings xxi.19. Jeremiah xvin. 8. Ezekiel xviii. 23, 30. Jonah 11]. to. k Exodus xx. 6. 1 Psalm v. 2; Ixxiv.12. Isaiah xxxiii. 22. m Psalm cll. 13. " Psalm ecxlvi. 19, 20. 154 LECTURE V-. came for our sakes very Man, made in all things like unto His brethren®; the Me- diator between God and men’, being both God and Man(19). Herein is our justifica- tion, if we refuse to aspire beyond those limits of human thought in which He has placed us. Herein is our answer, if any man would spoil us through philosophy and vain deceit‘. Is it irrational to contemplate God under symbols drawn from the human con- sciousness? Christ is our pattern: “for in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily " (90). [5 it unphilosophical that our thoughts of God should be subject to the law of time? It was when the fulness of the time was come, that God sent forth His Son‘ (21). Does the philosopher bid us strive to tran- scend the human, and to annihilate our own personality in the presence of the Infinite ? The Apostle tells us to look forward to the time when we shall “all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the mea- sure of the stature of the fulness of Christ*” Does human wisdom seek, by some transcend- ental form of intuition, to behold God as He is in His infinite nature; repeating in its own © Hebrews 1]. 17. P 1 Timothy ii. 5. 1 Colos- sians 11. 8. " Colossians 1]. 9. 5. Galatians iv. 4. * Ephesians iv. 13. LECTURE V. 155 manner the request of Philip, “Lord, shew us the Father, and it sufficeth us?” Christ Himself has given the rebuke and the reply : “He that hath seen me hath seen the Fa- ther; and how sayest thou then, Shew us the Father * ?” The doctrine of a personal Christ, very God and very Man, has indeed been the great stumblingblock in the way of those so-called philosophical theologians who, in their contempt for the historical and tem- poral, would throw aside the vivid revelation of a living and acting God, to take refuge in the empty abstraction of an impersonal idea. And accordingly, they have made various ela- borate attempts to substitute in its place a conception more in accordance with the sup- posed requirements of speculative philosophy. Let us hear on this point, and understand as we best may, the language of the great leader of ‘the chief modern school of philo- sophical rationalists. “To grasp rightly and definitely in thought,” says Hegel, “the na- ture of God as a Spirit, demands profound speculation. ‘These propositions are first of all contained therein: God is God only in so far as He knows Himself: His own self- u St. John xiv. 8, 9. 156 LECTURE V. knowledge is moreover His self-consciousness in man, and man’s knowledge of God, which is developed into man’s self-knowledge in God.” ...“ The Form of the Absolute Spirit,” he continues, “separates itself from the Sub- stance, and in it the different phases of the conception part into separate spheres or ele- ments, in each of which the Absolute Sub- stance exhibits itself, first as an eternal sub- stance, abiding in its manifestation with it- self; secondly, as a distinguishing of the eternal Essence from its manifestation, which through this distinction becomes the world of appearance, into which the substance of the absolute Spirit enters; thirdly, as an end- less return and reconciliation of the world thus projected with the eternal Essence, by which that Essence goes back from appear- ance into the unity of its fulness” (22). The remainder of the passage carries out this metaphysical caricature of Christian doctrine into further details, bearing on my present argument, but with even additional obscurity; —an obscurity so great, that the effect of a literal translation would be too ludicrous for an occasion like the present. But enough has been quoted to shew that if rationalizing philosophers have not made much progress, LECTURE Υ. 157 since the days of Job, in the ability to find out the Almighty unto perfection*, they have at least not gone backwards in the art of darkening counsel by words without know- ledge’. What is the exact meaning of this pro- found riddle, which the author has repeated in different forms in various parts of his writings (23) ;—whether he really means to assert or to deny the existence of Christ as a man ;—whether he designs to represent the Incarnation and earthly life of the Son of God as a fact, or only as the vulgar repre- sentation of a philosophical idea,—is a point which has been stoutly disputed among his disciples, and which possibly the philoso- pher himself did not wish to see definitely settled (24). But there is another passage, in which he has spoken somewhat more plainly, and which, without being quite decisive, may be quoted as throwing some light on the tendency of his thought. “Christ,” says this significant passage, “has been called by the church the God-Man. This monstrous com- bination is to the understanding a direct con- tradiction; but the unity of the divine and human nature is in this respect brought into consciousness and certainty in man; in that Job x1..7: Υ Job xxxviil. 2. 158 LECTURE V. the Diversity, or as we may also express it, the Finiteness, Weakness, Frailty of human nature, is not incompatible with this Unity, as in the eternal Idea Diversity in no wise derogates from the Unity which is God. This is the monstrosity whose necessity we have seen. It is therein implied that the divine and human nature are not in themselves dif- ferent. God in human form. The truth is, that there is but one Reason, one Spirit; that the Spirit as finite has no real exist- ence” (25). ; The dark sentences of the master have been, as might naturally be expected, vari- ously developed by his disciples. Let us hear how the same theory is expressed in the lan- guage of one who is frequently commended as representing the orthodox theology of this school, and who has striven hard to reconcile the demands of his philosophy with the belief in a personal Christ. Marheineke assures us, that “the possibility of God becoming Man shews in itself that the divine and human nature are in themselves not separate :” that, “as the truth of the human nature is the divine, so the reality of the divine nature is the human” (26). And towards the conclusion of a statement worthy to rank with that of his master for grandiloquent obscurity, he says, LECTURE V. 159 “ As Spirit, by renouncing Individuality, Man is in truth elevated above himself, with- out having abandoned the human nature: as Spirit renouncing Absoluteness, God has lowered Himself to human nature, without having abandoned his existence as Divine Spirit. The unity of the divinesand human nature is but the unity in that Spirit whose existence is the knowledge of the truth, with which the doing of good is identical. This Spirit, as God in the human nature and as Man in the divine nature, is the God-Man. The man wise in divine holiness, and holy in divine wisdom, is the God-Man. As a his- torical fact,” he continues, “this union of God with man is manifest and real in the Person of Jesus Christ: in Him the divine manifes- tation has become perfectly human. The con- ception of the God-Man in the historical Person of Jesus Christ, contains in itself two phases in one; first, that God is manifest only through man ; and in this relation Christ is as yet placed on an equality with all other men: He is the Son of Man, and therein at first represents only the possibility of God becoming Man: secondly, that in this Man, Jesus Christ, God is manifest, as In none other: this manifest Man is the manifest God; but the manifest God is the Son of God; 160 LECTURE V. and in this relation, Christ is God’s Son; and this is the actual fulfilment of the possibility or promise; it is the reality of God becoming Man” (27). But this kind of halting between two opin- ions, which endeavours to combine the his- torical fact with the philosophical theory, was not of a nature to satisfy the bolder and more logical minds of the same school. In the theory of Strauss, we find the direct anta- gonism between the historical and the philo- sophical Christ fairly acknowledged ; and the former is accordingly set aside entirely, to make way for the latter. And here we have at least the advantage, that the trumpet gives no uncertain sound ;—that we are no longer deluded by a phantom of Christian doctrine enveloped in a mist of metaphysical ob- scurity; but the two systems stand out sharply and clearly defined, in their utter contrariety to each other. “In an individual, a God-Man,” he tells us, “the properties and functions which the church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves ; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree. Humanity is the union of the two natures—God become Man, the > infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite Spirit remembering its infinitude: it is the child of the visible Mother and the LECTURE V. 161 invisible Father, Nature and Spirit: it is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of human history the spirit more and more completely subjugates nature, both within and around man, until it lies before him as the inert matter on which he exercises his active power: it is the sinless one, for the course of its development is a blameless one; pollution cleaves to the individual only, but in the race and its history it is taken away. It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven ; for from the negation of its natural state there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its finite cha- racter as a personal, national, and terrestrial Spirit, arises its union with the infinite Spirit of the heavens. By faith in this Christ, espe- cially in his death and resurrection, man is justified before God: that is, by the kindling within him of the idea of Humanity, the in- dividual man participates in the divinely human life of the species. Now the main element of that idea is, that the negation of the merely natural and sensual life, which is itself the negation of the spirit, (the negation of negation, therefore,) is the sole way to true spiritual life (28).” These be thy gods, O Philosophy: these are the Metaphysics of Salvation (29). This M 162 LECTURE V. is that knowledge of things divine and hu- man, which we are called upon to substitute for the revealed doctrine of the Incarnation of the eternal Son in the fulness of time. It is for this philosophical idea, so superior to all history and fact,—this necessary process of the unconscious and impersonal Infinite,— that we are to sacrifice that blessed miracle of Divine Love and Mercy, by which the Son of God, of His own free act and will, took man’s nature upon Him for man’s redemp- tion. It is for this that we are to obliterate from our faith that touching picture of the pure and holy Jesus, to which mankind for eighteen centuries has ever turned, with the devotion of man to God rendered only more heartfelt by the sympathy of love between man and man: which from generation to generation has nurtured the first seeds of re- ligion in the opening mind of childhood, by the image of that Divine Child who was cradled in the manger of Bethlehem, and was subject to His parents at Nazareth: which has checked the fiery temptations of youth, by the thought of Him who “was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin’:” which has consoled the man strug- gling with poverty and sorrow, by the pa- 2 Hebrews iv. 15. LECTURE. V. 163 thetic remembrance of Him who on earth had not where to lay His head*: which has blended into one brotherhood the rich and the poor, the mighty and the mean among mankind, by the example of Him who, though He was rich, yet for our sakes became poor”; though He was equal with God, yet took upon Him the form of a servant®: which has given to the highest and purest precepts of morality an additional weight and sanction, by the records of that life in which the mar- vellous and the familiar are so strangely yet so perfectly united ;—that life so natural in its human virtue, so supernatural in its di- vine power: which has robbed death of its sting, and the grave of its victory, by faith in Him who “was delivered for our offences, and was raised again for our justification “:” which has ennobled and sanctified even the wants and weaknesses of our mortal nature, by the memory of Him who was an hungered in the wilderness and athirst upon the cross ; who mourned over the destruction of Jerusa- lem, and wept at the grave of Lazarus. Let Philosophy say what she will, the fact remains unshaken. It is the consciousness of the deep wants of our human nature, that a St. Luke ix. 58. b 2 Corinthians vi. 9. ¢ Philippians ἢ. 6, 7. ὁ Romans lv. 25. M 2 104 LECTURE V. first awakens God’s presence in the soul: it is by adapting His Revelation to those wants that God graciously condescends to satisfy them. The time may indeed come, though not in this life, when these various manifes- tations of God, “at sundry times and in di- 6.55 vers manners‘,” may be seen to be but dif- ferent sides and partial representations of one and the same Divine Reality ;—when the light which now gleams in restless flashes from the ruffled waters of the human soul, will settle into the steadfast image of God’s face shining on its unbroken surface. But ere this shall be, that which is perfect must come, and that which is in part must be done away’. But as regards the human wisdom which would lead us to this consummation now, there is but one lesson which it can teach us; and that it teaches in spite of itself. It teaches the lesson which the wise king of Israel learned from his own experience: “I gave my heart to seek and search out by wisdom concerning all things that are done under heaven: I have seen all the works that are done under the sun: and, behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit. And I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly: I perceived that this also is vexation of ¢ Hebrews i. 1. f y Corinthians xiii. Io. LECTURE V. 165 spirits.” And if ever the time should come to any of us, when, in the bitter conviction of that vanity and vexation, we, who would be as gods in knowledge, wake up only to the consciousness of our own nakedness, happy shall we be, if then we may still hear, ringing in our ears and piercing to our hearts, an echo from that personal life of Jesus which our philosophy has striven in vain to pervert or to destroy: “ Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life: and we believe and are sure that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God +.” ® Ecclesiastes 1. 13, 14, 17. ἃ St. John vi. 68, 69. LECTURE VI. 1 CORINTHIANS. 1.11]. | for what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which ts in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. ‘VILE conclusion to be drawn from our pre- vious inquiries is, that the doctrines of Re- vealed Religion, like all other objects of hu- man thought, have a relation to the consti- tution of the thinker to whom they are ad- dressed ; within which relation their practical application and significance is confined. At the same time, this very relation indicates the existence of a higher form of the same truths, beyond the range of human intelligence, and therefore not capable of representation in any positive mode of thought. Religious ideas, in short, like all other objects of man’s con- sclousness, are composed of two distinct ele- ments,—a Matter, furnished from without, and a Form, imposed from within by the laws of the mind itself. The latter element LECTURE VI. 167 is common to all objects of thought as such: the former is the peculiar and distinguishing feature, by which the doctrines of Revelation are distinguished from other religious repre- sentations, derived from natural sources; or by which, in more remote comparison, reli- gious ideas in general may be distinguished from those relating to other objects. Now it is indispensable, before we can rightly esti- mate the value of the various objections which are adduced against this or that repre- sentation of Christian doctrine, to ascertain which of these elements it is, against which the force of the objection really makes itself felt. There may be objections whose force, such as it is, tells against the revealed doc- trine alone, and which are harmless when directed against any other mode of religious representation. And there may also be ob- jections which are applicable to the form which revealed religion shares in common with other modes of human thinking, and whose force, if they have any, is in reality di- rected, not against Revelation in particular, but against all Religion, and indeed against all Philosophy also. Now if, upon exami- nation, it should appear that the principal objections which are raised on the side of Rationalism properly so called,—those, 168 LECTURE VI. namely, which turn on a supposed incom- patibility between the doctrines of Scripture and the deductions of human reason,—are of the latter kind, and not of the former, Christ- lanity is at least so far secure from any ap- prehension of danger from the side of rational philosophy. For the weapon with which she is assailed exhibits its own weakness in the very act of assailing. If there is error or im- perfection in the essential forms of human thought, it must adhere to the thought criti- cizing, no less than to the thought criticized ; and the result admits but of two legitimate alternatives. Either we must abandon our- selves to an absolute Scepticism, which be- heves nothing and disbelieves nothing, and which thereby destroys itself in believing that nothing is to be believed; or we must confess that reason, in thus criticizing, has transcended its legitimate province: that it has failed, not through its inherent weakness, but through being misdirected in its aim. We must then shift the inquiry to another field, and allow our belief to be determined, not solely by the internal character of the doctrines themselves, as reasonable or unrea- sonable, but partly at least, by the evidence which can be produced in favour of their asserted origin as a fact. The reasonable LECTURE VI. 169 believer, in short, must abstain from pro- nouncing judgment on the nature of the message, until he has fairly examined the cre- dentials of the messenger. There are two methods by which such an examination of objections may be con- ducted. We may commence by an analysis of thought in general, distinguishing the Form, or permanent element, from the Matter, or variable element; and then, by applying the results of that analysis to special instances, we may shew, upon deductive grounds, the formal or material character of this or that class of objections. Or we may reverse, the process, commencing by an examination of the objections themselves; and, by exhibiting them in their relation to other doctrines be- sides those of Revelation, we may arrive at the same conclusion as to their general or special applicability. The former method is perhaps the most searching and complete, but could hardly be adequately carried out within my present limits, nor without the employment of a language more technical than would be suitable on this occasion. In selecting the latter method, as the more ap propriate, I must request my hearers to bear in mind the general principles which it is proposed to exhibit in one or two special in- 170 LECTURE VI. stances. ‘These are, first, that there is no rational difficulty in Christian Theology which has not its corresponding difficulty in human Philosophy; and, secondly, that therefore we may reasonably conclude that the stumbling- blocks which the rationalist professes to find in the doctrines of revealed religion arise, not from defects peculiar to revelation, but from the laws and limits of human thought in general, and are thus inherent in the me- thod of rationalism itself, not in the objects which it pretends to criticize. But, before applying this method to the peculiar doctrines of the Christian Revela- tion, it will be desirable to say a few words on a preliminary condition, on which our be- lief in the possibility of any revelation at all is dependent. We must justify, in the first instance, the limitations which have been assigned to human reason in relation to the great foundation of all religious belief what- soever: we must shew how. far the same me- thod warrants the assertion which has been already made on other grounds; namely, that we may and ought to believe in the existence of a God whose nature we are unable to com- prehend; that we are bound to believe that God exists; and to acknowledge Him as our Sustamner and our Moral Governor: though LECTURE VL. 171 we are wholly unable to declare what He is in His own Absolute Essence (1). Many philosophical theologians, who are far from rejecting any of the essential doc- trines of revelation, are yet unwilling to ground their acceptance of them on the duty of believing in the inconceivable. “'The doc- trine of the incognizability of the Divine essence,” says the learned and deep-thinking Julius Muller, “with the intention of exalt- ing God to the highest, deprives Him of the realities, without which, as it is itself obliged to confess, we cannot really think of Him. That this negative result, just as decidedly as the assumption of an absolute knowledge of God, contradicts the Holy Scriptures, which especially teach that God becomes revealed in Christ, as it does that of the simple Christ- ian consciousness, may be too easily shewn for it to be requisite that we should here enter upon the same: it is also of itself clear into what a strange position theology must fall by. the renunciation of the knowledge of its essential object (2).” As regards the former part of this objection, I endeavoured, in my last Lecture, to shew that a full belief in God, as revealed in Christ, is not incom- patible with a speculative inability to appre- hend the Divine Essence. As regards the. 172 LECTURE VI. latter part, 1t 15 important to observe the exact parallel which in this respect exists between the fundamental conception of The- slogy and that of Philosophy. The Principle of Causality, the father, as it has been called, of metaphysical science (3), is to the philoso- pher what the belief in the existence of God is to the theologian. Both are principles inherent in our nature, exhibiting, whatever may be their origin, those characteristics of universality and certainty which mark them as part of the inalienable inheritance of the human mind. Neither can be reduced to a mere logical inference from the facts of a limited and contingent experience. Both are equally indispensable to their respective sci- ences: without Causation, there can be no Philosophy ; as without God there can be no Theology. Yet to this day, while enunciating now, as ever, the fundamental axiom, that for every event there must be a Cause, Phi- losophy has never been able to determine what Causation is; to analyse the elements which the causal nexus involves; or to shew by what law she is justified in assuming the universal postulate upon which all her rea- sonings depend (4. The Principle of Caus- ality has ever been, and probably ever will be, the battle ground on which, from genera- LECTURE VI. 173 tion to generation, Philosophy has struggled for her very existence in the death-gripe of Scepticism ; and at every pause in the con- test, the answer has been still the same: “ We cannot explain it, but we must believe it.” Causation is not the mere invariable asso- ciation of antecedent and consequent: we feel that it implies something more than this (5). Yet, beyond the little sphere of our own vo- litions, what more can we discover? and within that sphere, what do we discover that we can explain(6)? The unknown some- thing, call it by what name you will,—power, effort, tendency,—still remains absolutely con- cealed, yet is still conceived as absolutely in- dispensable. Of Causality, as of Deity, we may almost say, in the emphatic language of Augustine, “Cujus nulla scientia est in ani- ma, nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat (7).” We can speak out boldly and clearly of each, if we are asked, what it 15 not: we are silent only when we are asked, what it 1s. The eloquent words of the same great father are as applicable to human as to divine Philoso- phy: “Deus ineffabilis est: facilius dicimus quid non sit, quam quid sit. Terram cogitas; non est hoc Deus: mare cogitas; non est hoc Deus: omnia quae sunt in terra, homines et animalia; non est hoc Deus: omnia que sunt 174 ΠΕ ΟΝ in mari, que volant per aerem; non est hoc Deus: quidquid lucet in ccelo, stelle, sol et luna; non est hoc Deus: ipsum cocelum ; non est hoc Deus. Angelos cogita, Virtutes, Po- testates, Archangelos, ‘Thronos, Sedes, Domi- nationes; non est hoc Deus. Et quid est ? Hoc solum potui dicere, quid non sit (8).” From the fundamental doctrine of Reli- gion in general, let us pass on to that of Christianity in particular. “The Catholic Faith is this: that we worship one God in Trinity, and ‘Trinity in Unity.” How, asks the objector, can the One be Many, or the Many One? or how is a distinction of Per- sons compatible with their perfect equality (9)? {s it not a contradiction to say, that we are compelled by the Christian Verity to acknow- ledge every Person by Himself to be God and Lord; and yet are forbidden by the Catholic Religion to say, There be three Gods, or three Lords (10) ? To exhibit the philosophical value of this objection, we need only make a slight change in the language of the doctrine criticized. Instead of a Plurality of Persons in the Di- vine Unity, we have only to speak of a Plu- rality of Attributes in the Divine Essence. How can there be a variety of Attributes, each infinite in its kind, and yet all together LECTURE VI. 175 constituting but one Infinite? or how, on the other hand, can the Infinite be conceived as existing without diversity at all? We know, indeed, that various attributes exist in man, constituting in their plurality one and the same conscious self. Even here, there is a mystery which we cannot explain; but the fact is one which we are compelled, by the direct testimony of consciousness, to accept without explanation. But in admitting, as we are compelled to do, the coexistence of many attributes In one person, we can con- ceive those attributes only as distinct from each other, and as limiting each other. Each mental attribute is manifested as ἃ sepa- rate and determinate mode of consciousness, marked off and limited, by the very fact of its manifestation as such. Each is developed in activities and operations from which the others are excluded. But this type of con- scious existence fails us altogether, when we attempt to transfer it to the region of the In- finite. That there can be but one Infinite, appears to be a necessary conclusion of rea- son; for diversity is itself a limitation: yet here we have many Infinites, each distinct from the other, yet all constituting one Infi- nite, which is neither identical with them nor distinguishable from them. If Reason, thus 176 LECTURE Vr baffled, falls back on the conception of a sim- ple Infinite Nature, composed of no attri- butes, her case is still more hopeless. That which has no attributes is nothing conceiv- able; for things are conceived by their attri- butes. Strip the Infinite of the attributes by which it is distinguished as infinite, and the Finite of those by which it is distinguished as finite; and the residue is neither the Infinite as such, nor the Finite as such, nor any one being as distinguished from any other being. It is the vague and empty conception of Being in general, which is no being in particular :— a shape, “If Shape it might be called, that shape had none Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb, Or Substance might be called, that Shadow seemed, For each seemed either (11).” The objection, “ How can the One be Many, or the Many One 2?” is thus so far from telling with peculiar force against the Catholic doc- trine of the Holy Trinity, that it has pre- cisely the same power, or want of power, and may be urged with precisely the same effect, or want of effect, against any conception, theo- logical or philosophical, in which we may at- tempt to represent the Divine Nature and Attributes as infinite, or, indeed, to exhibit the Infinite at all. The same argument applies with equal force to the conception of EECTURE: VL. LW the Absolute. If the Divine Nature is con- ceived as being nothing more than the sum of the Divine Attributes, it is not Absolute; for the existence of the whole will be de- pendent on the existence of its several parts. If, on the other hand, it is something distinct from the Attributes, and capable of existing without them, it becomes, in its absolute es- sence, an absolute void,—an existence mani- fested by no characteristic features,—a concep- tion constituted by nothing conceivable (12). The same principle may be also applied to another portion of this great fundamental truth. The doctrine of the Son of God, be- gotten of the Father, and yet coeternal with the Father, is in no wise more or less com- prehensible by human reason, than the rela- tion between the Divine Essence and its At- tributes (13). In the order of Thought, or of Nature, the substance to which attributes belong has a logical priority to the attributes which exist in relation to it. The Attributes are attributes of a Substance. ‘The former are conceived as the dependent and derived ; the latter as the independent and original existence. Yet in the order of Time, (and to the order of Time all human thought is limited,) it is as impossible to conceive the Substance existing before its Attributes, as N 178 LECTURE VI. the Attributes before the Substance (14). We cannot conceive a Being originally simple, developing itself in the course of time into a complexity of attributes; for absolute sim- plicity cannot be conceived as containing within itself a principle of development, nor as differently related to different periods of time, so as to commence its development at any particular moment (15). Nor yet can we conceive the attributes as existing prior to the substance ; for the very conception of an attribute implies relation to a substance. Yet the third hypothesis, that of their coexist- ence in all time, is equally incomprehensible; for this is to merge the Absolute and Infinite in an eternal relation and difference. We cannot conceive God as first existing, and then as creating His own attributes; for the creative power must then itself be created. Nor yet can we conceive the Divine Essence as constituted by the eternal coexistence of attributes; for then we have many Infinites, with no bond of unity between them. The mystery of the Many and the One, which has baffled philosophy ever since philosophy be- gan, meets it here, as every where, with its eternal riddle. Reason gains nothing by repudiating Revelation; for the mystery of Revelation is the mystery of Reason also. LECTURE VI. 179 I should not for an instant dream of ad- ducing this metaphysical parallel as offering the slightest approach to a proof of the Christ- ian doctrine of the Trinity in Unity. What it really illustrates is, not God’s Nature, but man’s ignorance. Without an Absolute Know- ing there can be no comprehension of Abso- lute Being (16). The position of human rea- son, with regard to the ideas of the Absolute and the Infinite, is such as equally to ex- clude the Dogmatism which would demon- strate Christian Doctrine from philosophical premises, and the Rationalism which rejects it on the ground of philosophical difficulties, as well as that monstrous combination of both, which distorts it in pretending to sys- tematize it. The Infinite is known to hu- man reason, merely as the negation of the Finite: we know what it is not; and that is all. ‘The conviction, that an Infinite Being | exists, seems forced upon us by the manifest incompleteness of our finite knowledge ; but we have no rational means whatever of deter- mining what is the nature of that Being (17). The mind is thus perfectly blank with regard to any speculative representation of the Di- vine Essence; and for that very reason, Phi- losophy is not entitled, on internal evidence, to accept any, or to reject any. The only N 2 180 LECTURE: VI. question which we are reasonably at liberty to ask in this matter, relates to the evidences of the Revelation as a fact. If there is suf- ficient evidence, on other grounds, to shew that the Scripture, in which this doctrine is revealed, is a Revelation from God, the doc- trine itself must be unconditionally received, not as reasonable, nor as unreasonable, but as scriptural. If there is not such evidence, the doctrine itself will lack its proper support ; but the Reason which rejects it is utterly incompetent to substitute any other repre- sentation in its place. Let us pass on to the second great doctrine of the Catholic Faith,—that which asserts the union of two Natures in the Person of Christ. “The right Faith is, that we believe and con- fess, that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man: God of the Substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and Man, of the Substance of His Mother, born in the world (18).” Our former parallel was drawn from the impossibility of conceiving, in any form, a re- lation between the Infinite and the Infinite. Our present parallel may be found in the equal impossibility of conceiving, by the na- tural reason, a relation between the Infinite and the Finite ;—an impossibility equally in- LECTURE VI. 181 surmountable, whether the two natures are conceived as existing in one Being, or in di- vers. Let us attempt, if we can, to conceive, at any moment of time, a finite world coming into existence by the fiat of an Infinite Cre- ator. Can we conceive that the amount of existence is thereby increased,—that the In- finite and the Finite together contain more reality than formerly existed in the Infinite alone? The supposition annihilates itself; for it represents Infinite Existence as capable of becoming greater still. But, on the other hand, can we have recourse to the opposite alternative, and conceive the Creator as evolv- ing the world out of His own Essence; the amount of Being remaining as before, yet the Infinite and the Finite both existing? This supposition also annihilates itself; for if the Infinite suffers diminution by that portion of it which becomes the Finite, it is infinite no longer; and if it suffers no diminution, the two together are but equal to the Infinite alone, and the Finite is reduced to absolute nonentity (19). In any mode whatever of human thought, the coexistence of the Infi- nite and the Finite is inconceivable; and yet the non-existence of either is, by the same laws of consciousness, equally inconceivable. If Reason is to be the supreme Judge of Di- 189 LECTURE VI. vine Truths, it will not be sufficient to follow its guidance up to a certain point, and to stop when it is inconvenient to proceed further. There is no logical break in the chain of con- sequences, from Socinianism to Pantheism, and from Pantheism to Atheism, and from Atheism to Pyrrhonism ; and Pyrrhonism is but the suicide of Reason itself. “ Nature,” says Pascal, “confounds the Pyrrhonists, and reason confounds the Dogmatists. What then becomes of man, if he seeks to discover his true condition by his natural reason? He cannot avoid one of these sects, and he cannot subsist in either (20).” Let Religion begin where it will, it must begin with that which is above Reason. What then do we gain by that parsimony of belief, which strives to deal out the Infinite in infi- nitesimal fragments, and to erect the largest possible superstructure of deduction upon the smallest possible foundation of faith ? We gain just this: that we forsake an incomprehen- sible doctrine, which rests upon the word of God, for one equally incomprehensible, which rests upon the word of man. Religion, to be a relation between God and man at all, must rest on a belief in the Infinite, and also on a belief in the Finite; for if we deny the first, there is no God; and if we deny the second, LECTURE VI. 183 there is no Man. But the coexistence of the Infinite and the Finite, in any manner what- ever, is inconceivable by reason; and the only ground that can be taken for accepting one representation of it, rather than another, is that one is revealed, and another is not re- vealed. We may seek as we will for a “ Reli- gion within the limits of the bare Reason ;” and we shall not find it; simply because no such thing exists; and if we dream for a moment that it does exist, it is only because we are unable or unwilling to pursue reason to its final consequences. But if we do not, others will; and the system which we have raised on the shifting basis of our arbitrary resting-place, waits only till the wind of con- troversy blows against it, and the flood of unbelief descends upon it, to manifest itself as the work of the “foolish man which built his house upon the sand.” Having thus endeavoured to exhibit the limits of human reason in relation to those doctrines of Holy Scripture which reveal to us the nature of God, I shall next attempt briefly to apply the same argument to those representations which more directly declare His relation to the world. The course of Divine Providence, in the 4 St. Matthew vii. 26. 184 LECTURE VI. government of the world, is represented in Scripture under the twofold aspect of General Law and Special Interposition. Not only is God the Author of the universe, and of those regular laws by which the periodical recur- rence of its natural phenomena is deter- mined’; but He is also exhibited as stand- ing in a special relation to mankind; as the direct cause of avents by which their tem- poral or spiritual welfare 15 affected; as ac- cessible to the prayers of His servants; as to. be praised for His special mercies towards each of us in particular’. But this scerip- tural representation has been discovered by Philosophy to be irrational. God is un- changeable; and therefore He cannot be moved by man’s entreaty. He is infinitely wise and good; and therefore He ought not to deviate from the perfection of His Eternal Counsels. “ The religious man,” says a writer of the present day, “who believes that all events, mental as well as physical, are pre- ordered and arranged according to the de- crees of infinite wisdom, and the philosopher, who knows that, by the wise and eternal laws of the universe, cause and effect are indissolubly chained together, and that one Ὁ Genesis 1.143; villi. 22; Job xxxvili, xxxix; Psalm xix. 1-6; Ixxiv.17; civ. 5-31; cxxxv. 7; cxlvili. 6. ¢ Psalm Ixv. 2; cil. 17,18; ciii. 1,3; cxlili. 1,2; exly. 19. LECTURE VI. 185 follows \the other in inevitable succession,— equally feel that this ordination—this chain —cannot be changeable at the cry of man. ... If the purposes of God were not wise, they would not be formed :—if wise, they cannot be changed, for then they would be- come unwise..... The devout philosopher, trained to the investigation of universal sys- tem,—the serene astronomer, fresh from the study of the changeless laws which govern innumerable worlds,—shrinks from the mon- strous irrationality of asking the great Archi- tect and Governor of all to work a miracle in his behalf—to interfere, for the sake of his convenience or fis plans, with the sublime order conceived by the Ancient of Days in the far Eternity of the Past; for what is a special providence but an interference with established laws? and what is such inter- ference but a miracle ?” (21). Now here, as in the objections previously noticed, the rationalist mistakes a general difficulty of all human thought for a special difficulty of Christian belief. The really in- soluble problem is, how to conceive God as acting at all; not how to conceive Him as acting in this way, rather than in that. The creation of the world at any period of time; —the establishment, at any moment, of im- 186 LECTURE VI. mutable laws for the future government of that world ;—this is the real mystery which Reason is unable to fathom: this is the repre- sentation which seems to contradict our con- ceptions of the Divine Perfection. To that pretentious perversion of the finite which philosophy dignifies with the name of the Infinite, it is a contradiction to suppose that any change can take place at any moment; —that any thing can begin to exist, which was not from all eternity. To conceive the Infinite Creator, at any moment of time, calling into existence a finite world, is, in the human point of view, to suppose an imper- fection, either before the act, or after it. It is to suppose the development of a power hitherto unexercised, or the limiting to a de- terminate act that which was before general and indeterminate. May we not then repeat our author’s objec- tion in another form ? How can a Being of In- finite Wisdom and Goodness, without an act of self-deterioration, change the laws which have governed His own solitary existence in the far Eternity when the world was not? Or rather, may we not ask what these very phrases of “changeless laws” and “far Eter- nity” really mean? Do they not represent God’s existence as manifested under the con- LECTURE VI. 187 ditions of duration and succession,—condi- tions which necessarily involve the concep- tion of the imperfect and the finite? They have not emancipated the Deity from the law of Time: they have only placed Him in a different relation to it. They have merely substituted, for the revealed representation of the God who from time to time vouch- safes His aid to the needs of His creatures, the rationalizing representation of the God who, throughout all time, steadfastly refuses to do so (22). If then the condition of Time is insepa- rable from all human conceptions of the Di- vine Nature, what advantage do we gain, even in philosophy, by substituting the supposi- tion of immutable order in time for that of special interposition in time? Both of these representations are doubtless speculatively 1m- perfect: both depict the Infinite God under finite symbols. But for the regulative pur- poses of human conduct in this life, each is equally necessary: and who may dare, from the depths of his own ignorance, to say that each may not have its prototype in the inef- fable Being of God ? (23). We are sometimes told that it gives us a more elevated idea of the Divine Wisdom and Power, to regard the Creator as having finished His work once 188 LECTURE VI. for all, and then abandoned it to its own unerring laws, than to represent Him as in- terfering, from time to time, by the way of direct personal superintendence :—just as it implies higher mechanical skill to make an engine which shall go on perpetually by its own motion, than one which requires to be continually regulated by the hand of its maker (24). This ingenious simile fails only in the important particular, that both its terms are utterly unlike the objects which they profess to represent. The world is not a machine; and God is not a mechanic. The world is not a machine; for it consists, not merely of wheels of brass, and springs of steel, and the fixed properties of inanimate matter; but of living and intelligent and free-acting persons, capable of personal rela- tions to a living and intelligent and free-act- ing Ruler. And God is not a mechanic; for the mechanic is separated from his machine by the whole diameter of being; as mind, giving birth to material results; as the con- sclous workman, who meets with no reci- procal consciousness in his work. It may be a higher evidence of mechanical skill, to abandon brute matter once for all to its own “laws; but to take this as the analogy of God’s dealings with His living creatures — as BE CEU RE! VE. 189 well tell us that the highest image of pa- rental love and forethought is that of the ostrich, “ which leaveth her eggs in the earth, and warmeth them in dust*” (25). But if such conclusions are not justified by our a priort knowledge of the Divine na- ture, are they borne out empirically by the actual constitution of the world? Is there any truth in the assertion, so often put forth as an undeniable discovery of modern science, “ that cause and effect are indissolubly chained together, and that one follows the other in inevitable succession ?” There is just that amount of half-truth which makes an error dangerous; and there is no more. Experi- ence is of two kinds, and Philosophy is of two kinds ;—-that of the world of matter, and that of the world of mind,—that of physical succession, and that of moral action. In the material world, if it be true that the re- searches of science tend towards (though who can say that they will ever reach Ὁ) the esta- blishment of a system of fixed and orderly recurrence ; in the mental world, we are no less confronted, at every instant, by the pre- sence of contingency and free will (26). In the one we are conscious of a chain of pheno- menal effects; in the other of se/f, as an act- d Job xxxix. 14. 190 LECTURE VI. ing and originating cause. Nay, the very conception of the immutability of the law of cause and effect, is not so much derived from the positive evidence of the former, as from the negative evidence of the latter. We be- lieve the succession to be necessary, because nothing but mind can be conceived as inter- fering with the successions of matter; and, where mind is excluded, we are unable to imagine contingence (27). But what right has this so-called philosophy to build a theory of the universe on material principles alone, and to neglect what experience daily and hourly forces upon our notice,—the per- petual interchange of the relations of matter and mind? In passing from the material to the moral world, we pass at once from the phenomenal to the real; from the successive to the continuous; from the many to the one; from an endless chain of mutual de- pendence to an originating and _ self-deter- mining source of power. That mysterious, yet unquestionable presence of Will :—that agent, uncompelled, yet not uninfluenced, whose continuous existence and productive energy are summed up in the word Myself: —that perpetual struggle of good with evil : —those warnings and promptings of a Spirit, striving with our spirit, commanding, yet not LECTURE VI. 191 compelling; acting upon us, yet leaving us free to act for ourselves :—that twofold con- sciousness of infirmity and strength in the hour of temptation :—that grand ideal of what we ought to be, so little, alas! to be gathered from the observation of what we are:—that overwhelming conviction of Sin in the sight of One higher and holier than we:—that irresistible impulse to Prayer, which bids us pour out our sorrows and make our wants known to One who hears and will answer us :—that indefinable yet. in- extinguishable consciousness of a direct in- tercourse and communion of man with God, of God's influence upon man, yea, and (with reverence be it spoken), of man’s influence upon God :—these are facts of experience, to the full as real and as certain as the laws of planetary motions and chemical affinities ;— facts which Philosophy is bound to take into account, or to stand convicted as shallow and one-sided ;—facts which can deceive us, only if our whole Consciousness is a liar, and the boasted voice of Reason itself but an echo of the universal lie. Even within the domain of Physical Sci- ence, however much analogy may lead us to conjecture the universal prevalence of law 192 LECTURE ΥΕ and orderly sequence, it has been acutely re- marked, that the phenomena which are most immediately important to the life and wel- fare of man, are precisely those which he never has been, and probably never will be, able to reduce to a scientific calculation (28). The astronomer, who can predict the exact position of a planet in the heavens a thousand years hence, knows not what may be his own state of health to-morrow, nor how the wind which blows upon him will vary from day to day. May we not be permitted to conclude, with a distinguished Christian philosopher of the present day, that there is a Divine Pur- pose in this arrangement of nature; that, while enough is displayed to stimulate the intellectual and practical energies of man, enough is still concealed to make him feel his dependence upon God (29) ? For man’s training in this life, the concep- tions of General Law and of Special Provi- dence are both equally necessary; the one, that he may labour for God’s blessings, and the other, that he may pray for them. He sows, and reaps, and gathers in his produce, to meet the different seasons, as they roll their unchanging course: he acknowledges also that “neither is he that planteth any LECTURE VI. 193 thing, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase*.” He labours in the moral training of himself and others, in obedience to the general laws of means and ends, of motives and influences; while he asks, at the same time, for wisdom from above to guide his course aright, and for grace to enable him to follow that guidance. Necessary alike during this our state of trial, it may be that both conceptions alike are but shadows of some higher truth, in which their apparent oppositions are merged in one har- monious whole. But when we attempt, from our limited point of view, to destroy the one, in order to establish the other more surely, we overlook the fact that our conception of General Law is to the full as human as that of Special Interposition ;—that we are not really thereby acquiring a truer knowledge of the hidden things of God, but are mea- suring Him by a standard derived from the limited representations of man (30). Subordinate to the Conception of Special Providence, and subject to the same Laws of thought in its application, is that of 7771- raculous Agency. I am not now going to waste an additional argument in answer to that shallowest and crudest of all the as- ¢ y Corinthians 11]. 7. Ό 194 LECTURE ‘VI. sumptions of unbelief, which dictatorially pronounces that Miracles are impossible ;— an assumption which is repudiated by the more philosophical among the leaders of Ra- tionalism itself (31); and which implies, that he who maintains it has such a perfect and intimate acquaintance with the Divine Na- ture and Purposes, as to warrant him in as- serting that God cannot or will not depart from the ordinary course of His Providence on any occasion whatever. If, as I have en- deavoured to shew, the doctrine of Divine Interposition is not in itself more opposed to reason than that of General Law ; and if the asserted immutability of the laws of nature is, at the utmost, tenable only on the suppo- sition that material nature alone is spoken of,—we are not warranted, on any ground, whether of deduction from principles or of induction from experience, in denying the possible suspension of the Laws of Matter by the will of the Divine Mind. But the question on which it may still be desirable to say a few words, before concluding this portion of my argument, is one which is disputed, not necessarily between the be- liever and the unbeliever, but often between | believers equally sincere and equally pious, differing only in their modes of representing LECTURE VI. 195 to their own minds the facts and doctrines which both accept. Granting, that is to say, that variations from the established sequence of physical phenomena may take place, and have taken place, as Scripture bears witness ; —are such variations to be represented as departures from or suspensions of natural law; or rather, as themselves the result of some higher law to us unknown, and as mi- raculous only from the point of view of our present ignorance (32) ? Which of these representations, or whether either of them, is the true one, when such occurrences are considered in their relation to the Absolute Nature of God, our igno-— rance of that Nature forbids us to determine. Speculatively, to human understanding, it appears as little consistent with the nature of the Absolute and Infinite, to be subject to universal law, as it is to act at particular moments. But as a regulative truth, adapted to the religious wants of man’s constitution, the more natural representation, that of a de- parture from the general law, seems to be also the more accurate. We are liable, in consider- ing this question, to confound together two distinct notions under the equivocal name of Law. The first is a positive notion, derived from the observation of facts, and founded, 02 196 LECTURE VI. with various modifications, upon the general idea of the periodical recurrence of phenomena. The other is a merely negative notion, deduced from a supposed apprehension of the Divine Nature, and professing to be based on the idea of the eternal Purposes of God. Of the former, the ideas of succession and repetition form an essential part. To the latter, the idea of Time, in any form, has no legitimate application ; and it is thus placed beyond the sphere of human thought. Now when we speak of a Miracle as the possible result of some higher law, do we employ the term /aw in the former sense, or in the latter? do we mean, a law which actually exists in the knowledge of God; or one which, in the progress of sci- ence, may come to the knowledge of man ?— one which might be discovered by a better acquaintance with the Divine Counsels; or one which might be inferred from a larger experience of natural phenomena? If we mean the former, we do not know that a more perfect acquaintance with the Divine Counsels, implying, as it does, the elevation of our faculties to a superhuman level, might not abolish the conception of Law altogether. If we mean the latter, we assume that which no experience warrants us in assuming: we endanger the religious significance and value LECTURE VIL. 197 of the miracle, only for the sake of removing God a few degrees further back from that chain of phenomena which is admitted ulti- mately to depend upon Him. A miracle, in one sense, need not be necessarily a viola- tion of the laws of nature. God may make use of natural instruments, acting after their kind ; as man himself, within his own sphere, does in the production of artificial combina- tions. The great question, however, still re- mains: Has God ever, for religious purposes, exhibited phenomena in certain relations, which the observed course of nature, and the artistic skill of man, are unable to bring about, or to account for ? I have thus far endeavoured to apply the principle of the Limits of Religious Thought to some of those representations which are usually objected to by the Rationalist, as in apparent opposition to the Speculative Reason of Man. In my next Lecture, I shall attempt to pursue the same argument, in relation to those doctrines which are sometimes regarded as repugnant to man’s Moral Reason. The lesson to be derived from our present in- quiry may be given in the pregnant sentence of a great philosopher, but recently taken from us: “No difficulty emerges in Thec- logy, which had not previously emerged in 198 LECTURE VI. Philosophy” (33). The intellectual stum- blingblocks, which men find in the doctrines of Revelation, are not the consequence of any improbability or error peculiar to the things revealed ; but are such as the thinker brings with him to the examination of the question ;—such as meet him on every side, whether he thinks with or against the testi- mony of Scripture; being inherent in the constitution and laws of the Human Mind itself. But must we therefore acquiesce in _the melancholy conclusion, that self-contra- diction is the law of our intellectual being; —that the light of Reason, which is God’s gift, no less than Revelation, is a delusive light, which we follow to our own deception ? Far from it: the examination of the Limits of Thought leads to a conclusion the very opposite of this. Reason does not deceive us, If we will only read her witness aright ; and Reason herself gives us warning, when we are in danger of reading it wrong. The light that is within us is not darkness; only it cannot illuminate that which is beyond the sphere of its rays. The self-contradic- tions, into which we inevitably fall, when we attempt certain courses of speculation, are the beacons placed by the hand of God in the mind of man, to warn us that we are de- LECTURE VI. 199 viating from the track that He designs us to pursue; that we are striving to pass the bar- riers which He has planted around us. The flaming sword turns every way against those who strive, in the strength of their own rea- son, to force their passage to the tree of life. Within her own province, and among her own objects, let Reason go forth, con- quering and to conquer. ‘The finite objects, which she can clearly and distinctly conceive, are her lawful empire and her true glory. The countless phenomena of the visible world; the unseen things which lie in the depths of the human soul ;—these are given into her hand ; and over them she may reign in unquestioned dominion. But when she strives to approach too near to the hidden mysteries of the Infinite ;—when, not content with beholding afar off the partial and rela- tive manifestations of God’s presence, she would “turn aside and see this great sight,” and know why God hath revealed Himself thus;—the voice of the Lord Himself is heard, as it were, speaking in warning from the midst: “ Draw not nigh hither: put off thy shoes from off thy feet; for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground!.” f Exodus iil. 5. LECTURE VII. EZEKIEL XVIII. 25. Yet ye say, The way of the Lord is not equal. Hear now, O house of Israel; Is not my way equal? are not your ways unequal? — «TF I build again the things which I de- stroyed, 1 make myself ἃ transgressor*.” This text might be appropriately prefixed to an examination of that system of moral and religious criticism which, at the close of the last century, succeeded for a time in giving a philosophical connection to the hitherto loose and floating theological rationalism of its age and country (1). It was indeed a mar- vellous attempt to send forth from the same fountain sweet waters and bitter, to pull down and to build up by the same act and method. The result of the Critical Philosophy, as applied to the speculative side of human Reason, was to prove beyond all question the existence of certain necessary forms and laws of intuition and thought, which impart a cor- responding character to all the objects of a Galatians 1i. 18, LECTURE VII. 201 which Consciousness, intuitive or reflective, ean take cognisance. Consciousness was thus exhibited as a Relation between the human mind and its object; and this conclusion, once established, is fatal to the very concep- tion of a Philosophy of the Absolute. But by an inconsistency scarcely to be paralleled in the history of philosophy, the author of this comprehensive criticism attempted to deduce a partial conclusion from universal premises, and to exempt the speculations of moral and religious thought from the rela- tive character with which, upon his own principles, all the products of human con- sciousness were necessarily invested. The Moral Law, and the ideas which it carries with it, are, according to this theory, not merely facts of human consciousness, con- ceived under the laws of human thought, but absolute, transcendental realities, implied in the conception of all Reasonable Beings as such, and therefore independent of the law of Time, and binding, not on man as man, but on all possible intelligent beings, created or uncreated (2.) The Moral Reason is thus a source of absolute and unchangeable reali- ties; while the Speculative Reason is con- cerned only with phenomena, or things mo- dified by the constitution of the human 202 LEC TU R'E) VII. mind (3). As a corollary to this theory, it follows, that the law of human morality must be regarded as the measure and adequate representative of the moral nature of God ;— in fact, that our knowledge of the Divine Being is identical with that of our own moral duties ;—for God is made known to us, as ex- isting at all, only in and by the moral reason: we do not look upon actions as binding be- cause they are commanded by God; but we know them to be divine commands because we are bound by them (4). Applying these principles to the criticism of Revealed Reli- gion, the philosopher maintains that no code of laws claiming divine authority can have any religious value, except as approved by the moral reason (5); that there can be no duties of faith or practice towards God, dis- tinct from the moral obligations which reason enjoins (6); and that, consequently, every doc- trine to which this test is inapplicable is either no part of revelation at all, or at best can only be given for local and temporary purposes, of which the enlightened reason need no longer take any account (7). Amid much that is true and noble in this teaching when confined within its proper li- mits, its fundamental weakness as an abso- lute criterion of religious truth is so manifest LECTURE VII. 203 as hardly to need exposure. The fiction of a moral law binding in a particular form upon all possible intelligences, acquires this seeming universality, only because human in- telligence is made the representative of all. I can conceive moral attributes only as I know them in consciousness: I can imagine other minds only by first assuming their likeness to my own. ΤῸ construct a theory, whether of practical or of speculative reason, which shall be valid for other than human intelligences, it 1s necessary that the author should himself be emancipated from the con- ditions of human thought. Till this is done, the so-called Absolute is but the Relative under another name: the universal consci- ousness is but the human mind striving to transcend itself. The very characteristics of Universality and Necessity, with which our moral obligations are invested, point to an origin the very re- verse of that which the above theory sup- poses. For these characteristics are in all cases due to the presence of the formal and personal element in the phenomena of con- sciousness, and appear most evidently in those conceptions in which the matter as well as the manner of thinking is drawn from the laws or formal conditions of experience. Of 204 LECTURE VII. these conditions, | have in a former Lecture enumerated three, Time, Space,. and Per- sonality: the first as the condition of human consciousness in general: the second and third as the conditions of the same conscious- ness in relation to the phenomena of matter and of mind respectively (8). From these are derived three corresponding systems of ne- cessary truths in the highest human sense of the term: the science of Numbers being con- nected with the condition of Time; that of Magnitudes with Space; and that of Morals with Personality. These three sciences rest on similar bases, and are confined within the same limits: all being equally necessary and valid within the legitimate bounds of human intelligence; and all equally negative and self-contradictory, when we attempt to pass beyond those bounds. The contradictions in- volved in the conceptions of Infinite Number and Infinite Magnitude find their parallel when we attempt to conceive the attributes of an Infinite Morality: the necessity which is manifested in the finite relations of the two former is the counterpart of that which accompanies those of the latter (9). That Moral Obligation, conceived as a law binding upon man, must be regarded as immutable so long as man’s nature remains unchanged, is LECTURE VIL. 205 manifest from the character of the conception itself, and follows naturally from a knowledge of its origin. An act of Duty is presented to my consciousness as enjoined by a Law, whose obligation upon myself is directly and intuitively discerned. It thus differs essen- tially from the phenomena of external na- ture, whose laws are not immediately per- ceived, but inferred from the observed recur- rence of facts. ‘The immediate consciousness of Law unavoidably carries with it the con- viction of necessity and immutability in rela- tion to the agent who is subject to it. For to suppose that a moral law can be reversed or suspended in relation to myse/f;—to suppose a conviction of s7ght unaccompanied by an obligation to act, or a conviction of wrong unaccompanied by an obligation to forbear— is to suppose a reversal of the conditions of my personal existence ;—a supposition which annihilates itself; since those conditions are implied in the attempt to conceive my per- sonal existence at all. The Moral Sense 15 thus, like the intuitions of Time and Space, an a priori law of the human mind, not de- termined by experience as it is, but deter- mining beforehand what experience ought to be. But it is not thereby elevated above the conditions of human intelligence; and the 400 LECTURE VII. attempt so to elevate it is especially inadmis- sible in that philosophy which resolves ‘Time and Space into forms of the human conscious- ness, and limits their operation to the field of the phenomenal and the relative. That there is an Absolute Morality, based upon, or rather identical with, the ternal Nature of God, is indeed a conviction forced upon us by the same evidence as that on which we believe that God exists at all. But what that Absolute Morality is, we are as unable to fix in any human conception, as we are to define the other attributes of the same Divine Nature. To human conception it seems impossible that absolute morality should be manifested in the form of a law of obligation ; for such a law implies relation and subjection to the authority of a lawgiver. And, as all human morality is manifested in this form, the conclusion seems unavoidable, that human morality, even in its highest eleva- tion, is not identical with, nor adequate to measure, the Absolute Morality of God (10). A like conclusion is forced upon us by a closer examination of human morality itself. To maintain the immutability of moral prin- ciples in the abstract is a very different thing from maintaining the immutability of the particular acts by which those principles are LECTURE VII. 207 manifested in practice. The parallel between the mathematical and the moral sciences, as systems of necessary truth, holds good in this respect also. As principles in the abstract, the laws of morality are as unchangeable as the axioms of geometry. That duty ought in all cases to be followed in preference to inclina- tion, is as certain a truth as that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. In their con- crete application both principles are equally liable to error :—we may err in supposing a particular visible line to be perfectly straight ; as we may err in supposing a particular act to be one of duty (11). But the two errors, though equally possible, are by no means equally important. For mathematical science; as such, is complete in its merely theoretical aspect ; while moral science is valuable chiefly in its application to practice. It is in their concrete form that moral principles are adopted as guides of conduct and canons of judgment; and in this form they admit of various degrees of uncertainty or of positive error. But the difference between the highest and the lowest conception of moral duty 15 one of degree, not of kind; the interval be- tween them is occupied by intermediate stages, separated from each other by minute and scarcely appreciable differences ; and the 208 LECTURE VIL. very conception of a gradual progress in moral enlightenment implies the possibility of a further advance, of a more exalted intel- lect, and a more enlightened conscience. While we repudiate, as subversive of all mo- rality, the theory which maintains that each man is the measure of his own moral acts; we must repudiate also, as subversive of all religion, the opposite theory, which virtually maintains that man may become the measure of the absolute Nature of God. God did not create Absolute Morality: it is coeternal with Himself; and it were blas- phemy to say that there ever was a time when God was and Goodness was not. But God did create the human manifestation of morality, when He created the moral consti- tution of man, and placed him in those cir- cumstances by which the eternal principles of right and wrong are modified in relation to this present life (12). For it is manifest, to take the simplest instances, that the sixth Commandment of the Decalogue, in its literal obligation, is relative to that state of things in which men are subject to death; and the seventh, to that in which there is marrying and giving in marriage; and the eighth, to that in which men possess temporal goods. It is manifest, to take a more general ground, LECTURE VII. 209 that the very conception of moral obligation implies a superior authority, and an ability to transgress what that authority commands; that it implies a complex, and therefore a limited nature in the moral agent; the intel- lect, which apprehends the duty, being dis- tinct from the will, which obeys or disobeys. That there is a higher and unchangeable principle embodied in these forms, we have abundant reason to believe; and yet we can- not, from our present point of view, examine the same duties apart from their human ele- ment, and separate that which is relative and peculiar to man in this life from that which is absolute and common to all moral beings. In this respect, again, our moral conceptions offer a remarkable analogy to the cognate phenomena on which other systems of neces- sary truth are based. Take, for example, the idea of Time, the foundation of the science of Number. We find no difficulty in con- ceiving that this present world was created at some definite point of time; but we are unable to conceive the same moment as the creation of Time itself. On the contrary, we are compelled to believe that there was a time before as well as after the creation of the world: that the being of God reaches back in boundless duration beyond the mo- P 20 ὁ LECTURE VIL. ment when He said, “Let there be light; and there was light.” But when we attempt to unite this conviction with another, neces- sary to the completion of the thought ;— when we try to conceive God as an Infinite Being, existing in continuous duration,—the contradictions, which beset us on every side, admonish us that we have transcended the boundary within which alone human thought is possible. And so too, while we are com- pelled to believe that the creation of man’s moral nature was not identical with the crea- tion of morality itself ;—that the great prin- ciples of all that is holy and righteous existed in God, before they assumed their finite form in the heart of man;—we still find ourselves baffled in every attempt to conceive an infi- nite moral nature, or its condition, an infinite personality: we find ourselves compelled to walk by faith, and not by sight ;—to admit that we have knowledge enough to guide us in our moral training here; but not enough to unveil the hidden things of God (13). In so far, then, as Morality, in its human character, depends upon conditions not co- eternal with God, but created along with man, in so far we are not justified in regard- ing the occasional suspension of human du- ties, by the same authority which enacted LECTURE VII. 911 them, as a violation of the immutable prin- ciples of morality itself. That there are limits indeed, within which alone this rule can be safely applied ;—that there are doctrines and practices which carry on their front convine- ing proof that they cannot have been revealed or commanded by God ;—that there are sys- tems of religion which by this criterion may be shewn to have sprung, not from divine ap- pointment, but from human corruption,—is not for an instant denied. In my concluding Lecture, I shall endeavour to point out some of the conditions under which this kind of evidence is admissible. For the present, my argument is concerned, not with special and occasional commands, but with universal and perpetual doctrines; not with isolated - facts recorded in sacred history, but with revealed truths, forming an integral portion of reli- gious belief. in this point of view, I propose to apply the principle hitherto maintained, of the Limits of Religious Thought, to the ex- amination of those doctrines of the Christian Faith which are sometimes regarded as con- taining something repugnant to the Moral Reason of man. The Atoning Sacrifice of Christ has been the mark assailed by various attacks of this kind; some of them not very consistent with P2 919 LECTURE VII. each other; but all founded on some supposed incongruity between this doctrine and the moral attributes of the Divine Nature. By one critic, the doctrine is rejected because it is more consistent with the infinite mercy of God to pardon sin freely, without any atone- ment whatsoever (14). By another, because, from the unchangeable nature of God’s laws, it is impossible that sin can be pardoned at all(15). A third maintains that it is unjust that the innocent should suffer for the sins of the guilty (16). A fourth is indignant at the supposition that God can be angry (17); while a fifth cannot see by what moral fit- ness the shedding of blood can do away with sin or its punishment (18). The principle which governs these and similar objections is, that we have a right to assume that there is, if not a perfect identity, at least an exact resemblance between the moral nature of man and that of God; that the laws and princi- ples of infinite justice and mercy are but magnified images of those which are mani- fested on a finite scale ;—that nothing can be compatible with the boundless goodness of God, which is incompatible with the> little goodness of which man may be conscious in himself. The value of this principle, as an absolute LECTURE VII. 216 criterion of religious truth, may be tested by the simple experiment of applying the same reasoning to an imaginary revelation con- structed on the rational principles of some one of the objectors. Let us suppose then, that, instead of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement, the Scriptures had told us of an absolute and unconditional pardon of sin, following upon the mere repentance of the sinner. It is easy to imagine how ready our reasoning theologians would be with their philosophical criticisms, speculative or moral. Does it not, they might say, represent man as influencing God ;—the Finite as control- ling, by the act of repentance, the unchange- able self-determinations of the Infinite? Does it not depict the Deity as acting in time, as influenced by motives and occasions, as sub- ject to human feelings? Does it not tend to weaken our impression of the hatefulness of sin, and to encourage carelessness in the sin- ner, by the easy terms on which he is pro- mised forgiveness (19)? If it is unworthy of God to represent Him as angry and needing to be propitiated, how can philosophy tolerate the conception that He is placable, and to be softened by repentance? And what moral fit- ness has repentance to do away with the guilt or punishment of a past transgression ? What- ever moral fitness there exists between right- 214 LECTURE VII. eousness and God’s favour, the same must exist between sin and God’s anger: in what- ever degree that which deserves punishment is not punished, in that degree God’s justice is limited in its operation. A strictly moral theory requires, therefore, not free forgive- ness, but an exactly graduated proportion be- tween guilt and suffering, virtue and happi- ness (20). If, on the other hand, we maintain that there is no moral fitness in either case, we virtually deny the existence of a moral Deity at all: we make God indifferent to good or evil as such: we represent Him as rewarding and punishing arbitrarily and with respect of persons. The moral objection, in truth, so far as it has any weight at all, has no special application to the Christian doc- trine: it lies against the entire supposition of the remission of sins on any terms and by any means: and if it has been more strongly urged by Rationalists against the Christian representation than against others, this is merely because the former has had the mis- fortune to provoke hostility by being found in the Bible. It is obvious indeed, on a moment’s reflec- tion, that the duty of man to forgive the trespasses of his neighbour, rests precisely upon these features of human nature which — cannot by any analogy be regarded as repre- LECTURE VIL. 215 senting an image of God (21). Man is not the author of the moral law: he is not, as man, the moral governor of his fellows: he has no authority, merely as man, to punish moral transgressions as such. It is not as sin, but as injury, that vice is a transgression against man: it is not that his holiness is outraged, but that his rights or his interests are impaired. ‘The duty of forgiveness is im- posed as a check, not upon the justice, but upon the selfishness of man: it is not de- signed to extinguish his indignation against vice, but to restrain his tendency to exag- gerate his own personal injuries (22). The reasoner who maintains, “it is a duty in man to forgive sins, therefore it must be morally fitting for God to forgive them also,” over- looks the fact that this duty is binding upon man on account of the weakness and ignor- ance and sinfulness of his nature; that he 15 bound to forgive, as one who bimself needs forgiveness, as one whose weakness renders him liable to suffering; as one whose self- love is ever ready to arouse his passions and pervert his judgment. Nor yet would the advocates of the Moral Reason gain any thing in Theology by the substitution of a rigid system of reward and punishment, in which nothing is forgiven, 216 LECTURE VIL. but every act meets with its appropriate re- compense. We have only to suppose that this were the doctrine of Revelation, to imagine the outcry with which it would be assailed— “Tt is moral,” the objector might urge, “ only in the harsher and less amiable features of human morality: it gives us a God whom we may fear, but whom we cannot love; who has given us affections with which He has no sympathy, and passions for whose conse- quences He allows no redress; who created man liable to fall, and placed him in a world of temptations, knowing that he would fall, and purposing to take advantage of his frailty to the utmost.” Criticisms of this kind may be imagined without number ;—nay, they are actually found in more than one modern work, the writers of which have erroneously imagined that they were assailing the real teaching of Scripture (23). Verily, this vaunted Moral Reason is a “ Lesbian rule” (44). It may be applied with equal facility to the cri- ticism of every possible scheme of Divine Providence; and therefore we may be per- mitted to suspect that it is not entitled to implicit confidence against any (25). The endless controversy concerning Pre- destination and Free Will, whether viewed in its speculative or in its moral aspect, is but LECTURE VII. 3 another example of the hardihood of human ignorance. The question, as I have observed before, has its philosophical as well as its theological aspect: it has no difficulties pecu- liar to itself: it is but a special form of the fundamental mystery of the coexistence of the Infinite and the Finite. Yet, with this mystery meeting and baffling human reason at every turn, theclogians have not scrupled to trace in their petty channels the exact flow and course of Infinite wisdom; one school boldly maintaining that even Omni- science itself has no knowledge of contingent events; another asserting, with equal confi- dence, that God’s knowledge must be a re- straint on man’s freedom (26). If philosophy offers for the moment an apparent escape from the dilemma, by suggesting that God’s knowledge is not properly foreknowledge, as having no relation to time (27); the sugges- tion itself is one which can neither be verified as a truth nor even intelligibly exhibited as a thought; and the Rationalist evades the so- lution by shifting the ground of attack, and retorts that Prophecy at least is anterior to the event which it foretells; and that a pre- diction of human actions 15 irreconcilable with human freedom (28). But the whole meaning of the difficulty vanishes, as soon as 218 LECTURE VIF. we acknowledge that the Infinite is not an object of human thought at all. There can be no consciousness of a relation, whether of agreement or of opposition, where there is not a consciousness of both the objects re- lated. That a man, by his own power, should be able with certainty to foretell the future, implies that the laws of that future are fixed and unchangeable; for man can only foresee particular occurrences through a knowledge of the general law on which they depend. But is this relation of cause to effect, of law to its cqnsequences, really a knowledge or an ignorance? Is the causal relation itself a law of things, or only a human mode of repre- senting phenomena? Supposing it were pos- sible for man, in some other state of intelli- gence, to foresee a future event without fore- seeing it as the result of a law,—would that knowledge be a higher or a lower one than he at present possesses ?>—would it be the re- moval of some reality which he now sees, or only of some limitation under which he now sees it(29)? Man can only foresee what is certain; and from his point of view, the fore- knowledge depends upon the certainty. But, apart from the human conditions of thought, in relation to a more perfect intelligence, can we venture to say, even as regards temporal LECTURE VII. 219 succession, whether necessity is the condition of foreknowledge, or foreknowledge of neces- sity, or whether indeed necessity itself has any existence at all (30)? May not the whole scheme of Law and Determinism indicate a weakness, rather than a power of the human mind; and are there not facts of conscious- ness which give some support to this con- jecture (31)? Can any thing be necessary to an intellect whose thought creates its own objects? Can any necessity of things deter- mine the cognitions of the Absolute Mind, even 1f those cognitions take place in succes- sion to each other? These questions admit of no certain answer; but the very inability to answer them proves that dogmatic deci- sions on either side are the decisions of ig- norance, not of knowledge. But the problem, be its difficulties and their origin what they may, is not peculiar to Theology, and receives no additional compli- cation from its position in Holy Writ. The very same question may be discussed in a purely metaphysical form, by merely substi- tuting the universal law of causation for the universal knowledge of God. What is the meaning and value of that law of the human mind which apparently compels us to think that every event whatever has its determin- 220 LECTURE VII. ing cause? And how is that conviction re- concilable with a liberty in the human will to choose between two alternatives? The answer is substantially the same as before. The freedom of the will is a positive fact of our consciousness :—as for the principle of causality, we know not whence it is, nor what it is. We know not whether it is a law of things, or a mode of human representation ; whether it denotes an impotence or a power ; whether it is innate or acquired. We know not in what the causal relation itself consists; nor by what authority we are warranted in extending its significance beyond the tem- poral sequence which suggests it and the ma- terial phenomena in which that sequence is undisturbed. And is not the same conviction of the ig- norance of man, and of his rashness in the midst of ignorance, forced upon us by the spectacle of the arbitrary and summary de- cisions of human reason on the most myste- rious as well as the most awful of God’s re- vealed judgments against sin,—the sentence of Eternal Punishment ? We know not what is the relation of Sin to Infinite Justice. We know not under what conditions, consistently with the freedom of man, the final spiritual restoration of the impenitent sinner is possi- LECTURE VII. 221 ble; nor how, without such a restoration, guilt and misery can ever cease. We know not whether the future punishment of sin will be inflicted by way of natural conse- quence or of supernatural visitation ; whether it will be produced from within or inflicted from without. We know not how man can be rescued from sin and suffering without the cooperation of his own will; nor what means can cooperate with that will, beyond those which are offered to all of us during our state of trial (32). It becomes us to speak cau- tiously and reverently on a matter of which God has revealed so little, and that little of such awful moment; but if we may be per- mitted to criticize the arguments of the oppo- nents of this doctrine with the same freedom with which they have criticized the ways of God, we may remark that the whole apparent force of the moral objection rests upon two purely gratuitous assumptions. It is assumed, in the first place, that God’s punishment of sin in the world to come is so far analogous to man’s administration of punishment in this world, that it will take place as a special infliction, not as a natural consequence. And it is assumed, in the second place, that pun- ishment will be inflicted solely with reference to the sins committed during the earthly life; 222. LECTURE VII. —that the guilt will continue finite, while the misery is prolonged to infinity (33). Are we then so sure, it may be asked, that there can be no sin beyond the grave? Can an im- mortal soul incur God’s wrath and condem- nation, only so long as it is united to a mortal body? With as much reason might we assert that the angels are incapable of obedience to God, that tne devils are incapable of rebel- lion. What if the sin perpetuates itself,—if the prolonged misery be the offspring of the prolonged guilt (34) ? Against this it is urged that sin cannot for ever be triumphant against God (35). As if the whole mystery of iniquity were contained in the words for ever! The real riddle of existence,—the problem which confounds all philosophy,—aye, and all religion too, so far as religion is a thing of man’s reason,—is the fact that evil exists at all; not that it exists for a longer or a shorter duration. Is not God infinitely wise, and holy, and powerful now ? and does not Sin exist along with that infinite holiness and wisdom and power? Is God to become more holy, more wise, more powerful hereafter ; and must evil be annihil- ated to make room for His perfections to ex- pand ἢ Does the infinity of His eternal nature ebb and flow with every increase or diminu- LECTURE VII. 223 tion in the sum of human guilt and misery ? Against this immovable barrier of the exist- ence of evil, the waves of philosophy have dashed themselves unceasingly since the birth- day of human thought, and have retired broken and powerless, without displacing the minutest fragment of the stubborn rock, with- out softening one feature of its dark and rugged surface (36). We may be told that evil is a privation, or a negation, or a partial aspect of the universal good, or some other equally unmeaning abstraction; whilst all the while our own hearts bear testimony to its fearful reality, to its direct antagonism to every possible form of good (37). But this mystery, vast and inscrutable as it is, is but one aspect of a more general problem; it is but the moral form of the ever-recurring se- cret of the Infinite. How the Infinite and the Finite, in any form of antagonism or other relation, can exist together ;—how in- finite power can coexist with finite activity : how infinite wisdom can coexist with finite contingency: how infinite goodness can co- exist with finite evil:—how the Infinite can exist in any manner without exhausting the universe of reality :—this is the riddle which Infinite Wisdom alone can solve, the problem whose very conception belongs only to that 224 LECTURE VII. Universal Knowing which fills and embraces the Universe of Being. When Philosophy can answer this question ;—when she can even state intelligibly the notions which its terms involve,—then, and not till then, she may be entitled to demand a solution of the far smaller difficulties which she finds in re- vealed religion:—or rather, she will have solved them already; for from this they all proceed, and to this they all ultimately re- turn. The reflections which this great and terri- ble mystery of Divine Judgment have sug- gested, receive perhaps some further support when we contemplate it in another aspect, and one more legitimately within the pro- vince of human reason ;—that 15 to say, in its analogy to the actual constitution and course of nature. “The Divine moral government which religion teaches us,” says Bishop But- ler, “implies that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. That such con- sequent punishment shall take effect by His appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be supposed that we are made acquainted with all the ends or reasons, for which it is fit future punishment should be inflicted, or why God has appointed LECTURE VII. 225 such and such consequent misery should fol- low vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the in- strumentality of what means; there is no absurdity in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to that in which many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present; poverty, sickness, infamy, untimely death from diseases, death from the hands of civil justice. There is no absurdity in sup- posing future punishment may follow wicked- ness of course, as we speak, or in the way of natural consequence from God’s original con- stitution of the world; from the nature He has given us, and from the condition in which He places us; or in a like manner as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural consequence, breaks his limbs, suppose; in the way of natural consequence of this, without help perishes (38).” And if we may be permitted to extend the same analogy from the constitution of exter- nal nature to that of the human mind; may we not trace something not wholly unlike the irrevocable sentence of the future, in that dark and fearful, yet too certain law of our nature, by which sin and misery ever tend to Q 226 LECTURE VII. perpetuate themselves; by which evil habits gather strength with every fresh indulgence, till it is no longer, humanly speaking, in the power of the sinner to shake off the burden which his own deeds have laid upon him ? In that mysterious condition of the depraved will, compelled, and yet free,—the slave of sinful habit, yet responsible for every act of sin, and gathering deeper condemnation as the power of amendment grows less and less; —may we not see some possible foreshadow- ing of the yet deeper guilt and the yet more hopeless misery of the worm that dieth not, and the fire that is not quenched? The fact, awful as it is, is one to which our every day’s experience bears witness: and who shall say that the invisible things of God may not, in this as in other instances, be shadowed forth to us in the things that are seen ? The same argument from analogy is in- deed applicable to every one of the difficul- ties which Rationalism professes to discover in the revealed ways of God’s dealings with man. ‘The Fall of Adam, and the inherited corruption of his posterity, find their parallel in the liability to sin which remains unex- tinguished throughout man’s moral progress ; and in that mysterious, though certain dis- pensation of Providence, which ordains that LECTURE VII. QQ7 not only bodily taints and infirmities, but even moral dispositions and tendencies should, in many instances, descend from father to son; and which permits the child of sinful parents to be depraved by evil example, be- fore he knows how, by his own reason, clearly to discern between right and wrong; before he has strength, of his own will, to refuse the evil and choose the good (39). There is a parallel too in that strange, yet too familiar fact, of vice persisted in, with the clearest and strongest conviction of its vicicusness and wretchedness: and the scepticism which denies that man, if created sinless, could so easily have fallen from innocence, finds its philosophical counterpart in the paradox of the ancient moralist, who maintained that conscious sin is impossible, because nothing can be stronger than knowledge (40.) Justi- fication by faith through the merits of Christ is at least in harmony with that course of things established by Divine Providence in this world; in which so many benefits, which we cannot procure for ourselves or deserve by any merit of our own, are obtained for us by the instrumentality of others; and in which we are so often compelled, as an indis- pensable condition of obtaining the benefit, to trust in the power and good will of those Q2 228 LECTURE VIL. whom we have never tried, and to believe in the efficacy of means whose manner of work- ing we know not (41). The operations of Divine Grace, influencing, yet not necessitat- ing, the movements of the human soul, find their corresponding fact and their corre- sponding mystery in the determinations of the Will;—in that Freedom to do or leave undone, so certain in fact, so inexplicable in theory, which consists neither in absolute in- difference nor in absolute subjection ; which is acted upon and influenced by motives, yet in its turn acts upon and controls their in- fluences, prevented by them, and yet work- ing with them (42). But it 1s unnecessary to pursue further an argument which, in all its essential features, has already been fully exhibited by a philosopher whose profound and searching wisdom has answered by anti- cipation nearly every cavil of the latest form of Rationalism, no less than those of his own day. We may add here and there a detail of application, as the exigencies of contro- versy may suggest; but the principle of the whole, and its most important consequences, have been established and worked out more than a century ago, in the unanswerable ar- gument of Butler. The warning which his great work contains LECTURE VII. 229 against “that idle and not very innocent em- ployment of forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes of governing it” (43), is as necessary now as then, as applicable to moral as to speculative theories. Neither with regard to the physical nor to the moral world, is man capable of constructing a Cos- mogony; and those Babels of Reason, which Philosophy has built for itself, under the names of Rational Theories of Religion, and Criticisms of every Revelation, are but the successors of those elder children of chaos and night, which with no greater knowledge, but with less presumption, sought to describe the generation of the visible universe. It is no disparagement of the value and authority of the Moral Reason in its regulative capacity, within its proper sphere of human action, if we refuse to exalt it to the measure and standard of the Absolute and Infinite Good- ness of God. The very Philosopher whose writings have most contributed to establish the supreme authority of Conscience in man, is also the one who has pointed out most clearly the existence of analogous moral diffi- culties in nature and in religion, and the true answer to both,—the admission that God’s Government, natural as well as spiritual, is a scheme imperfectly comprehended. “ | LECTURE VII. In His Moral Attributes, no less than in the rest of His Infinite Being, God’s judg- ments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out’. While He manifests Himself clearly as a moral Governor and Legislator, by the witness of the Moral Law which He has established in the hearts of men, we cannot help feeling, at the same time, that that Law, grand as it is, is no measure of His Grandeur, that He Himself is beyond it, though not opposed to it, distinct, though not alien from it. We feel that He who planted in man’s — conscience that stern unyielding Imperative of Duty, must Himself be true and righteous altogether; that He from whom all holy de- sires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed, must Himself be more holy, more good, more just than these. But when we try to realize in thought this sure conviction of our faith, we find that here, as every where, the Finite cannot fathom the Infinite, that, while in our hearts we believe, yet our thoughts at times are sore troubled. It is consonant to the whole analogy of our earthly state of trial, that, in this as in other features of God’s Providence, we should meet with things impossible to understand and difficult to believe; by which reason is baffled and. b Romans xi. 33. LECTURE VIL. 2a% faith tried ;—acts whose purpose we see not; dispensations whose wisdom is above us; thoughts which are not our thoughts, and ways which are not our ways. In these things we hear, as it were, the same loving voice which spoke to the wondering disciple of old: “What I do, thou knowest not now ; but thou shalt know hereafter.” The lu- minary by whose influence the ebb and fiow of man’s moral being is regulated, moves around and along with man’s little world, in a regular and bounded orbit: one side, and one side only, looks downwards upon its earthly centre; the other, which we see not, is ever turned upwards to the all-surrounding Infinite. And those tides have their seasons of rise and fall, their places of strength and weakness; and that light waxes and wanes with the growth-or decay of man’s mental and moral and religious culture ; and its bor- rowed rays seem at times to shine as with their own lustre, in rivalry, even in opposi- tion, to the source from which they emanate. Yet is that light still but a faint and partial reflection of the hidden glories of the Sun of Righteousness, waiting but the brighter ill- umination of His presence, to fade and be swallowed up in the full blaze of the heaven ¢ St. John xi. 7. 232 LECTURE VII. kindling around it;—not cast down indeed from its orbit, nor shorn of its true bright- ness and influence, but still felt and acknow- ledged in its real existence and power, in the memory of the past discipline, in the product of the present perfectness,—though now dis- tinct no more, but vanishing from sight, to be made one with the Glory that beams from the “ Father of lights, with whom is no varia- bleness, neither shadow of turning *.” a St. James 1.17. LECTURE VIII. ST. JOHN V. 36. The works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear wit- ness of me, that the Father hath sent me. LO construct a complete Criticism of any Revelation, it is necessary that the Critic should be in possession of a perfect Philo- sophy of the Infinite. For, except on the supposition that we possess an exact know- ledge of the whole Nature of God, such as only that Philosophy can furnish, we cannot know for certain what are the purposes which God intends to accomplish by means of Re- velation, and what are the instruments by which those purposes may be best carried out. If then it can be shewn, as I have at- _ tempted to shew in the previous Lectures, that the attainment of a Philosophy of the Infinite is utterly impossible under the exist- ing laws of human thought, it follows that it is not by means of philosophical criticism that the claims of a supposed Revelation can 984 LECTURE VIII. be adequately tested. We are thus compelled to seek another field for the right use of Reason in religious questions; and what that field is, it will not be difficult to determine. To Reason, rightly employed, within 108 proper limits and on its proper objects, our Lord himself and his Apostles openly ap- pealed in proof of their divine mission ; and the same proof has been unhesitatingly claimed by the defenders of Christianity in all subsequent ages. In other words, the legitimate object of a rational criticism of revealed religion, is not to be found in the contents of that religion, but in its evidences. At first sight 10 may appear as if this dis- tinction involved no real difference ; for the contents of a revelation, it might be objected, are included among its evidences. In one sense, no doubt they are; but that very in- clusion gives them a totally different signifi- cance and weight from that to which they lay claim when considered as the basis of a philosophical criticism. In the one case, they are judged by their conformity to the sup- posed nature and purposes of God: in the other, by their adaptation to the actual cir- cumstances and wants of man. In the one case they are regarded as furnishing a single and a certain criterion ; for on the supposi- LECTURE VIII. 235 tion that our reason is competent to deter- mine, from our knowledge of the Divine Nature, what the characteristics of a true Revelation ought to be, we are entitled, by virtue of that criterion alone, to reject with- out hesitation whatever does not satisfy its requirements. In the other case, they are regarded as furnishing only one probable presumption out of many ;—a presumption which may confirm and be confirmed by co- inciding testimony from other sources, or, on the contrary, may be outweighed, when we come to balance probabilities, by conflicting evidence on the other side. The practical conclusion, which may be de- duced from the whole previous survey of the Limits of Religious Thought, is this: that if no one faculty of the human mind is compe- tent to convey a direct knowledge of the Absolute and the Infinite, no one faculty is entitled to claim preeminence over the rest, as furnishing especially the criterion of the truth or falsehood of a supposed Revela- tion. ‘There are presumptions to be drawn from the internal character of the doctrines which the revelation contains: there are pre- sumptions to be drawn from the facts con- nected with its first promulgation: there are presumptions to be drawn from its subse- 236 LECTURE VIII. quent history and the effects which it has produced among mankind. But the true evidence, for or against the religion, is not to be found in any one of these taken singly and exclusively ; but in the resultant of all, fairly examined and compared together; the apparently conflicting evidences being ba- lanced against each other, and the appa- rently concurring evidences estimated by their united efficacy. A truth so obvious as this may perhaps be thought hardly worth announcing as the re- sult of an elaborate inquiry. But the whole history of religious controversy bears witness that, however evident in theory, there is no truth more liable to be neglected in practice. The defenders of Christianity are not alto- gether free from the charge of insisting ex- clusively or preeminently upon some one alone of its evidences: the assailants, under the influence of a still more exclusive re- action, have assumed that a method which fails to accomplish every thing has succeeded in accomplishing nothing ; and, flying at once to the opposite extreme, have in their turn appealed to some one infallible criterion, as constituting a royal road to philosophical un- belief. In the present day we are feeling the per- LECTURE VIII. 237 nicious effects of a reaction of this kind. Be- cause the writings of Paley and his followers in the last generation laid a principal stress on the direct historical evidences of Christia- nity, we meet now with an antagonist school of writers, who perpetually assure us that his- tory has nothing whatever to do with reli- gion (1); that an external revelation of reli- gious truth is impossible(2); that we may learn all that 15 essential to the gospel by inward and spiritual evidence only (3). In the spirit of the Pharisees of old, who said, “This man is not of God, because he keepeth not the sabbath day*,” we are now told that the doc- trine must in all cases prove the miracles, and not the miracles the doctrine (4); that the external evidence of miracles is entirely useless for the support of the religious philo- sophy of Christ (5); that man no more needs a miraculous revelation of things pertaining to religion than of things pertaining to agri- culture or manufactures (6). And, as is usually the case in such reactions, the last state has become worse than the first :—a slight com- parative neglect of the internal evidence on the one side has been replaced by an utter repudiation of all external evidence on the other: a trifling disproportion in the edifice ἃ St. John ix. 16. 238 LECTURE VIII. of the Christian Faith has been remedied by the entire removal of some of its main pillars of support. The crying evil of the present day in religious controversy is the neglect or contempt of the external evidences of Christ- ianity: the first step towards the establish- ment of a sound religious philosophy must consist in the restoration of those evidences to their true place in the Theological system. The evidence derived from the internal character of a religion, whatever may be its value within its proper limits, is, as regards the divine origin of the religion, purely nega- tive. It may prove in certain cases (though even here the argument requires much cau- tion in its employment) that a religion has not come from God; but it is in no case suf- ficient to prove that it has come from Him (7). For the doctrines revealed must either be such as are within the power of man’s natural reason to verify, or such as are beyond it. In the former case, the reason which is com- petent to verify may also be competent to discover : the doctrine is tested by its con- formity to the conclusions of human philo- sophy: and the wisdom which sits in judg- ment on the truth of a doctrine must itself be presumed to have an equal power of dis. cerning the truth. In the latter case, where LECTURE VIII. 239 the doctrine is beyond the power of human reason to discover, it can be accepted only as resting on the authority of the teacher who proclaims it; and that authority itself must then be guaranteed by the external evidence of a superhuman mission. To advance a step beyond the merely negative argument, it is necessary that the evidence contained in the character of the doctrine itself should be combined with that derived from the exterior history. When, for example, the Divine Origin of Christianity is mairftained, on the ground of its vast moral superiority to all Heathen systems of Ethics; or on that of the improbability that such a system could have been conceived by a Galilean peasant among the influences of the contemporary Judaism; the argument is legitimate and powerful; but its positive force depends not merely on the internal character of the doc- trine, but principally on its relation to cer- tain external facts (8). And even the negative argument, which concludes from the character of the contents of a religion that it cannot have come from God, however legitimate within its proper limits, is one which requires considerable caution in the application. The lesson to be learnt from an examination of the Limits 940 LECTURE VIII. of Religious Thought is not that man’s judgments are worthless in relation to divine things; but that they are fallible: and the probability of error in any particular case can never be fairly estimated, without giving their full weight to all collateral considera- tions. We are indeed bound to believe that a Revelation given by God can never con- tain any thing that is really unwise or un- righteous ; but we are not always capable of estimating exactly the wisdom or righteous- ness of particular doctrines or precepts. And we are bound to bear in mind that ewactly in proportion to the strength of the remaining evi- dence for the divine origin of a religion, is the probability that we may be mistaken in sup- posing this or that portion of its contents to be unworthy of God. ‘Taken in conjunction, the two arguments may confirm or correct each other: taken singly and absolutely, each may vitiate the result which should follow from their joint application. We do not certainly know the exact nature and operation of the moral attributes of God: we can but infer and conjecture from what we know of the moral attributes of man: and the analogy between the Finite and the Infinite can never be so perfect as to preclude all possibility of error in the process. But the possibility be- LECTURE VIII. 941 comes almost ἃ certainty, when any one hu- man faculty is elevated by itself into an au- thoritative criterion of religious truth, with- out regard to those collateral evidences by which its decisions may be modified and corrected. “The human mind,” says a writer of the pre- sent day, “is competent to sit in moral and spiritual judgment on a professed revelation ; and to decide, if the case seem to require it, in the following tone: This doctrine attri- butes to God, that which we should all call harsh, cruel, or unjust in man: it is_there- fore intrinsically inadmissible.”. .. “In fact,’ he continues, “all Christian apostles and mis- sionaries, like the Hebrew prophets, have al- ways refuted Paganism by direct attacks on its immoral and unspiritual doctrines; and have appealed to the consciences of heathens, as competent to decide in the _ contro- versy” (9). Now an appeal of this kind may be legitimate or not, according to the purpose for which it is made, and the manner in which it is applied. The primary and proper employment of man’s moral sense, as of his other faculties, is not speculative, but regu- lative. It is not designed to tell us what are the absolute and immutable principles of Right, as existing in the eternal nature of R 242 LECTURE VIII. God; but to discern those relative and tem- porary manifestations of them, which are ne- cessary for human training in this present life. But if morality, in its human mani- festation, contains a relative and temporary, as well as an absolute and eternal element, an occasional suspension of the human Law is by no means to be confounded with a viola- tion of the divine Principle. We can only partially judge of the moral government of God, on the assumption that there is an ana- logy between the divine nature and the hu- man: and in proportion as the analogy re- cedes from perfect likeness, the decisions of the human reason necessarily become more and more doubtful. The primary and direct inquiry, which human reason is entitled to make concerning a professed revelation, is,— how far does it tend to promote or to hinder the moral discipline of man. It is but a secondary and indirect question, and one very liable to mislead, to ask how far it is com- patible with the Infinite Goodness of God. Thus, for example, it is one thing to con- demn a religion on account of the habitual observance of licentious or inhuman rites of worship, and another to pronounce judgment on isolated acts, historically recorded as hav- ing been done by divine command, but not LECTURE VIII. 243 perpetuated in precepts for the imitation of posterity. The former are condemned for their regulative character, as contributing to the perpetual corruption of mankind; the latter are condemned on speculative grounds, as in- consistent with our preconceived notions of the character of God. “There are some par- ticular precepts in Scripture,” says Bishop Butler, “ given to particular persons, requir- ing actions, which would be immoral and vi- cious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action; and both constitutes and shews that not to be un- just or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must have appeared, and really have been so: which may well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it were commanded to cultivate the prin- ciples and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts which require only the doing an external action; for instance, taking away the property or life of any. For men have no right to either life or property, but what arises solely from the grant of God: R 2 944 EECTURE’ Vill. when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either: and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which without com- mand would be immoral, must make an 1m- moral habit; yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency.... There seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from their being offences: i. 6. from their being liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes; and, per- haps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not ob- jections against revelation; but against the whole notion of religion, as a trial; and against the general constitution of na- ture” (10). There is indeed an obvious analogy between these temporary suspensions of the laws of moral obligation and that corresponding sus- pension of the laws of natural phenomena which constitutes our ordinary conception of a Miracle. So much so, indeed, that the former might without impropriety be desig- nated as Moral Miracles. In both, the Al- mighty is regarded as suspending, for special LECTURE VIII. 945 purposes, not the eternal laws which consti- tute His own absolute Nature, but the created laws, which He imposed at a certain time upon a particular portion of His creatures. Both are isolated and rare in their occur- rence; and apparently, from the nature of the case, must be so, in order to unite har- moniously with the normal manifestations of God’s government of the world. A perpetual series of physical miracles would destroy that confidence in the regularity of the course of nature, which is indispensable to the cultiva- tion of man’s intellectual and productive energies: a permanent suspension of prac- tical duties would be similarly prejudicial to the cultivation of his moral character. But the isolated character of both classes of phe- nomena removes the objection which might otherwise be brought against them on this account: and this objection is the only one which can legitimately be urged, on philoso- phical grounds, against the conception of such cases as possible; as distinguished from the historical evidence, which may be adduced for or against their actual occurrence. Even within its own legitimate province, an argument of this kind may have more or less weight, varying from the lowest pre- sumption to the highest moral certainty, ac- 940 LECTURE VIII. cording to the nature of the offence which we believe ourselves to have detected, and the means which we possess of estimating its character or consequences. It is certain that we are not competent judges of the Absolute Nature of God: it is not certain that we are competent judges, in all cases, of what is best fitted for the moral discipline of man. But granting to the above argument its full value in this relation; it is still important to re- member that we are dealing, not with de- monstrative but with probable evidence, not with a single line of reasoning, but with a common focus, to which many and various rays converge; that we have not solved the entire problem, but only obtained one of the elements contributing to its solution. And the combined result of all these elements is by no means identical with the sum of their separate effects. The image, hitherto em- ployed, of a balance of probabilities, is, in one respect at least, very inadequate to express the character of Christian evidence. It may be used with some propriety to express the provisional stage of the inquiry, while we are still uncertain to which side the evidence in- clines; but it becomes inapplicable as soon as our decision is made. For the objections urged against a religion are not like the LECTURE VIII. 247 weights in a scale, which retain their full value, even when outweighed on the other side :—on the contrary, they become abso- lutely worthless, as soon as we are convinced that there is superior evidence to prove that the religion is true. We may not say, for example, that certain parts of the Christian scheme are unwise or unrighteous, though outweighed by greater acts of righteousness and wisdom :—we are bound to believe that we were mistaken from the first in suppos- ing them to be unwise or unrighteous at all. In a matter of which we are so ignorant and so liable to be deceived, the objection which fails to prove every thing proves nothing: from him that hath not, is taken away even that which he seemeth to have. And on the other hand, an objection which really proves any thing, proves every thing. If the teach- ing of Christ is in any one thing not the teaching of God, it is in all things the teach- ing of man: its doctrines are subject to all the imperfections inseparable from man’s sin- fulness and ignorance: its effects must be such as can fully be accounted for as the re- sults of man’s wisdom, with all its weakness and all its error. Here then is the issue, which the waver- ing disciple is bound seriously to consider. Taking into account the various questions 248 LECTURE VIII. whose answers, on the one side or the other, form the sum total of Evidences for or against the claims of the Christian Faith ;—the ge- nuineness and authenticity of the documents ; the judgment and good faith of the writers; the testimony to the actual occurrence of prophecies and miracles, and their relation to the religious teaching with which they are connected; the character of the Teacher Him- self, that one portrait, which, in its perfect purity and holiness and beauty, stands alone and unapproached in human history or hu- man fiction; those rites and ceremonies of the elder Law, so significant as typical of Christ, so strange and meaningless without Him; those predictions of the promised Messiah, whose obvious meaning is rendered still more manifest by the futile ingenuity which strives to pervert them (11); the history of the rise and progress of Christianity, and its com- parison with that of other religions; the ability or inability of human means to bring about the results which it actually accom- plished ; its antagonism to the current ideas of the age and country of -its origin; its effects as a system on the moral and social condition of subsequent generations of man- kind ; its fitness to satisfy the wants and con- sole the sufferings of human nature; the cha- racter of those by whom it was first promul- LECTURE VIII. 249 gated and received; the sufferings which at- tesfed the sincerity of their convictions; the comparative trustworthiness of ancient testi- mony and modern conjecture; the mutual contradictions of conflicting theories of un- belief, and the inadequacy of all of them to explain the facts for which they are bound to account ;—taking all these and similar ques- tions into full consideration, are you prepared to affirm, as the result of the whole inquiry, that Jesus of Nazareth was an impostor, or an enthusiast, or a mythical figment; and his disciples crafty and designing, or well-mean- ing but deluded men? For be assured, that nothing short of this is the conclusion which you must maintain, if you reject one jot or one tittle of the whole doctrine of Christ. Either He was what He proclaimed Himself to be—the Incarnate Son of God, the Divine Saviour of a fallen world,—and if so, we may not divide God’s Revelation, and dare to put asunder what He has joined together,—or the civilized world for eighteen centuries has been deluded by a cunningly devised fable; and He from whom that fable came has turned that world from darkness to light, from Satan to God, with a lie in His right hand. Many who would shrink with horror from the idea of rejecting Christ altogether, will yet speak and act as if they were at liberty 250 LECTURE VIII. to set up for themselves an eclectic Christ- ianity ; separating the essential from the ‘su- perfluous portions of Christ’s teaching; de- ciding for themselves how much is permanent and necessary for all men, and how much is temporary and designed only for a particular age and people (12). Yet if Christ is indeed God manifest in the flesh, it is surely scarcely less impious to attempt to improve His teach- ing, than to reject it altogether. Nay, in one respect it is more so; for it is toacknowledge a doctrine as the revelation of God, and at the same time to proclaim that it is inferior to the wisdom of man. That it may indeed come, and has come, within the purposes of God’s Providence, to give to mankind a Re- velation partly at least designed for a tem- porary purpose, and for a limited portion of mankind ;—a Law in which something was permitted to the hardness of men’s hearts’, and much was designed but as a shadow of good things to come‘;—this we know, to whom a more perfect Revelation has been given. But to admit that God may make His own Revelation more perfect from time to time, 15 very different from admitting that human reason, by its own knowledge, is com- petent to separate the perfect from the im- perfect, and to construct for itself an abso- Ὁ St. Matthew xix. ὃ. ο Hebrews x. 1. LECTURE VIII. 251 lute religion out of the fragments of an in- complete Revelation. ‘The experiment has been tried under the elder and less perfect dispensation; but the result can hardly be considered so successful as to encourage a repetition of the attempt. The philosophical improvement of the Hebrew Scriptures pro- duced, not the Sermon on the Mount, but the Creed of the Sadducee. The ripened intelli- gence of the Jewish people, instructed, as mo- dern critics would assure us, by the enlighten- ing influence of time, and by intercourse with foreign nations, bore fruit in a conclusion sin- gularly coinciding with that of modern ratio- nalism: “The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit “(13).” And doubtless there were many then, as now, to applaud this wonderful discovery, as a proof that “religious truth is necessarily pro- gressive, because our powers are progres- sive (14): andeto find a mythical or critical theory, to explain or to set aside those pass- ages of Scripture which appeared to incul- cate a contrary doctrine. Unfortunately for human wisdom, Prometheus himself needs a Prometheus. The lapse of time, as all his- tory bears witness, is at least as fruitful in corruption as in enlightenment; and reason, d Acts xxi. 8. 252 LECTURE VIIL. when it has done its best, still needs a higher reason to decide between its conflicting theo- ries, and to tell us which is the advanced, which the retrograde Theology (15). In one respect indeed, this semi-rationalism, which admits the authority of Revelation up to a certain point and no further, rests on a far Jess reasonable basis than the firm belief which accepts the whole, or the complete un- belief which accepts nothing. For whatever may be the antecedent improbability which attaches to a miraculous narrative, as com- pared with one of ordinary events, it can affect only the narrative taken as a whole, and the entire series of miracles from the greatest to the least. If a single miracle is once admitted as supported by competent evidence, the entire history is at once re- moved from the ordinary calculations of more or less probability. One miracle is sufficient to shew that the series of events, with which it is connected, is one which the Almighty has seen fit to mark by exceptions to the ordinary course of His Providence: and this being once granted, we have no a priori grounds to warrant us in asserting that the number of such exceptions ought to be larger or smaller. If any one miracle recorded in the Gospels,—the Resurrection of Christ, for LECTURE VIII. 253 example,—be once admitted as true; the re- mainder cease to have any antecedent im- probability at all, and require no greater evi- dence to prove them than is needed for the most ordinary events of any other history. For the improbability, such as it is, reaches no further than to shew that it is unlikely that God should work miracles at all; not that it is unlikely that He should work more than a certain number. Our right to criticise at all depends upon this one question : “ What think ye of Christ? whose Son is He?’”® What is it that consti- tutes our need of Christ? Is it a conviction of guilt and wretchedness, or a taste for Phi- losophy? Do we want a Redeemer to save us from our sins, or a moral Teacher to give us a plausible theory of human duties? Christ can be our Redeemer only if He is what He proclaims Himself to be, the Son of God, sent into the world, that the world through Him might be saved’. If He is not this, His mo- ral teaching began with falsehood, and was propagated by delusion. And if He is this, what but contempt and insult can be found in that half-allegiance which criticises while it bows; which sifts and selects while it sub- mits; which approves or rejects as its reason or ς St. Matthew xxii. 42. f St. John ii. 17. 954 LEC TURE Vili. its feelings or its nervous sensibilities may dic- tate; which condescends to acknowledge Him as the teacher of a dark age and an ignorant people ; bowing the knee before him, half in reverence, half in mockery, and crying, ‘ Hail, King of the Jews.’ If Christ is a mere hu- man teacher, we of this nineteenth century can no more be Christians than we can be Platonists or Aristotelians: He belongs to that past which cannot repeat itself: His modes of thought are not ours: His difficul- ties are not ours: His needs are not ours. He may be our Teacher, but not our Master ; for no man is master over the free thoughts of his fellow men: we may learn from him, but we sit in judgment while we learn: we modify his teaching by the wisdom of later ages: we refuse the evil and choose the good. But remember that we can do this, only if Christ is a mere human teacher, or if we of these latter days have received a newer and a better revelation. If now, as of old, He speaks as never man spake’ ;—if God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son ",—what remains for us to do, but to cast down imaginations, and every high thing & St. John vu. 46. h Hebrews i. 1, 2. LECTURE VIII. 255 that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and to bring into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ'. The witness which Christ offers of Himself either proves every thing, or it proves nothing. No man has a right to say, “1 will accept Christ as I like, and reject Him as I like: I will follow the holy Example; I will turn away from the atoning Sacrifice: I will listen to His teach- ing; I will have nothing to do with His me- diation: I will believe Him when he tells me that He came from the Father, because I feel that His doctrine has a divine beauty and fitness; but I will not believe Him when He tells me that He is one with the Father ; be- cause I cannot conceive how this unity is possible.” This is not philosophy, which thus mutilates man: this is not Christianity, which thus divides Christ (16). If Christ is no more than one of us, let us honestly renounce the shadow of allegiance to an usurped authority, and boldly proclaim that every man is his own Redeemer. If Christ is God, no less than man, let us beware, lest haply we be found even to fight against God ἢ. Beyond question, every doubt which our reason may suggest in matters of religion is entitled to its due place in the examination i 2 Corinthians x. 5. K Acts v. 39. 256 LECTURE VIII. of the evidences of religion; if we will treat it as a part only and not the whole; if we will not insist on a positive solution of that which, it may be, is given us for another purpose than to be solved. It is reasonable to believe that, in matters of belief as well as of prac- tice, God has not thought fit to annihilate the free will of man; but has permitted spe- culative difficulties to exist as the trial and the discipline of sharp and subtle intellects, as He has permitted moral temptations to form the trial and the discipline of strong and eager passions (17). Our passions are not annihilated when we resist the temptation to sin: why should we expect that our doubts must be annihilated if we are to resist the © temptation to unbelief? This correspondence of difficulties is so far from throwing doubt on the divine origin of Revelation, that it rather strengthens the proof that it has ema- nated from that Giver whose other gifts are subject to like conditions. We do not doubt that the conditions of our moral trial tend towards good and not towards evil: that hu- man nature, even in its fallen state, bears traces of the image of its Maker, and is fitted to be an instrument in His moral govern- ment. And we believe this, notwithstanding the existence of passions and appetites which, LECTURE VIII. Q57 isolated and uncontrolled, appear to lead in an opposite direction. Is it then more rea- sonable to deny that a system of revealed religion, whose unquestionable tendency as a whole is to promote the glory of God and the welfare of mankind, can have proceeded from the same Author, merely because we may be unable to detect the same character in some of its minuter features, viewed apart from the system to which they belong? It would of course be impossible now to enter upon any detailed examination of the positive Evidences of Christianity. The pur- pose of the foregoing Lectures will have been answered, if they can only succeed in clearing the way for a candid and impartial inquiry ; by shewing what are the limits within which it must be confined, and what kind of rea- soning is inadmissible, as transgressing those limits. The conclusion, which an examina- tion of the conditions of human thought un- avoidably forces upon us, is this: There can be no such thing as a positive science of Spe- culative Theology; for such a science must necessarily be based on an apprehension of the Infinite; and the Infinite, though we are compelled to believe in its existence, cannot be positively apprehended in any mode of the human Consciousness. The same impedi- 5 258 LECTURE VIII. ment which prevents the formation of The- ology as a science, is also manifestly fatal to the theory which asserts its progressive de- velopment. We can test the progress of knowledge, only by comparing its successive representations with the objects which they profess to represent: and as the object in this case is inaccessible to human faculties, we have no criterion by which to distinguish be- tween progress and mere fluctuation. The so-called progress in Theology is in truth only an advance in those conceptions of man’s moral and religious duties which form the basis of natural religion ;—an advance which is regulative and not speculative ; which is primarily and properly a knowledge, not of God’s nature, but of man’s obligations; and which is the result, not of an immediate in- tuition of the Nature of the Infinite, but of a closer study of the Laws of the Finite. A progress of this kind can obviously have no place in relation to those truths, if such there be, which human reason is incapable of dis- covering for itself: and to assert its appli- cability to the criticism of Revealed Religion, is to beg the entire question in dispute, by assuming, without the slightest authority, that Revelation cannot be any thing more than a republication of Natural Religion (18). — LECTURE VIII. 259 But, on the other hand, there is an opposite caution no less needed, in making use of the counter-theory, which regards the doctrines of Revelation as truths accommodated to the finite capacities of man; as serving for regu- lative, not for speculative knowledge; and as not amenable to any criticism based on hu- man representations of the Infinite. This theory is useful, not as explaining the diffi- culties involved in religious thought, but as shewing why we must leave them unex- plained; not as removing the mysteries of revelation, but as shewing why such myste- ries must exist. This caution has not always been sufficiently observed, even by those theo- logians who have shewn the most just appre- ciation of the limits of man’s faculties in the comprehension of divine things. Thus, to mention an example of an ancient method of interpretation which has been revived with considerable ability and effect in modern times,—the rule, that the Attributes ascribed to God in Scripture must be understood as denoting correspondence in Effects, but not similarity of Causes, is one which is liable to considerable misapplication: it contains in- deed a portion of the truth, but a portion which is sometimes treated as if it were the whole. “Affectus in Deo,” says Aquinas, s 2 260 LECTURE VIII. “denotat effectum” (19): and the canon has been applied by a distinguished Prelate of our own Church, in language probably fami- liar to many of us. “The meaning,” says Archbishop King, “confessedly is, that He will as certainly punish the wicked as if He were inflamed with the passion of anger against them; that He will as infallibly re- ward the good, as we will those for whom we have a particular and affectionate love; that when men turn from their wickedness, and do what is agreeable to the divine command, He will as surely change His dispensations towards them, as if He really repented, and had changed His mind” (20). This is no doubt a portion of the meaning; but is it the whole? Does Scripture intend merely to assert a resemblance in the effects, and none at all in the causes? If so, it is dif- ficult to see why the natural rule of accom- modation should have been reversed ; why a plain and intelligible statement concerning the Divine Acts should have been veiled un- der an obscure and mysterious image of the Divine Attributes. If God’s Anger means no more than His infliction of punishments; if His Love means no more than His bestowal of rewards; it would surely have been suffi- cient to have told us that God punishes sin and rewards obedience, without the inter- LECTURE VIII. 261 position of a fictitious feeling as the basis of the relation. The conception of a God who acts, is at least as human as that of a God who feels; and though both are but imper- fect representations of the Infinite under finite images, yet, while both rest upon the same authority of Scripture, it is surely going beyond the limits of a just reserve in speak- ing of divine mysteries, to assume that the one is merely the symbol, and the other the interpretation. It is surely more reasonable, as well as more reverent, to believe that these partial representations of the Divine Con- sciousness, though, as finite, they are unable speculatively to represent the Absolute Na- ture of God, have yet each of them a regula- tive purpose to fulfil in the training of the mind of man: that there is a religious in- fluence to be imparted to us by the thought of God’s Anger, no less than by that of His Punishments; by the thought of His Love, no less than by that of His Benefits: that both, inadequate and human as they are, yet dimly indicate some corresponding reality in the Divine Nature: and that to merge one in the other is not to gain a purer represen- tation of God as He is, but only to mutilate that under which He has been pleased to re- veal Himself (21). 262 LECTURE VIII. It is obvious indeed that the theory of an adaptation of divine truths to human facul- ties, entirely changes its significance, as soon as we attempt to give a further adaptation to the adapted symbol itself ;—to modify into a still lower truth that which is itself a modi- fication of a higher. The instant we under- take to say that this or that speculative or practical interpretation is the only real mean- ing of that which Scripture represents to us under a different image, we abandon at once the supposition of an accommodation tothe necessary limits of human thought, and vir- tually admit that the ulterior significance of the representation falls as much within those limits as the representation itself (22). Thus interpreted, the principle no longer offers the slightest safeguard against Rationalism :— nay, it becomes identified with the funda- mental vice of Rationalism itself;—that of explaining away what we are unable to com- prehend. | The adaptation for which I contend is one which admits of no such explanation. It is not an adaptation to the ignorance of one man, to be seen through by the superior knowledge of another; but one which exists in relation to the whole human race, as men, bound by the laws of man’s thought; as crea- LECTURE VIII. 263 tures of time, instructed in the things of eternity; as finite beings, placed in relation to and communication with the Infinite. 1 believe that Scripture teaches, to each and all of us, the lesson which it was designed to teach, so long as we are men upon earth, and not as the angels in heaven (23). I believe that “now we see through a glass darkly,’”— in an enigma;—but that now is one which encompasses the whole race of mankind, from the cradle to the grave, from the creation to the day of judgment: that dark enigma is one which no human wisdom can solve; which Reason is unable to penetrate; and which Faith can only rest content with here, in hope of a clearer vision to be granted hereafter. If there be any who think that the Laws of Thought themselves may change with the changing knowledge of man; that the limitations of Subject and Object, of Du- ration and Succession, of Space and Time, belong to the vulgar only, and not to the philosopher :—if there be any who believe that they can think without the conscious- ness of themselves as thinking, or of any thing about which they think; that they can be in such or such a mental state, and yet for no period of duration; that they can remember this state and make subsequent use of it, 264 LECTURE VIII. without conceiving it as antecedent, or as standing in any order of time to their pre- sent consciousness; that they can _ reflect upon God without their reflections following each other, without their succeeding to any earlier or being succeeded by any later state of mind :—if there be any who maintain that they can conceive Justice and Mercy and Wisdom, as neither existing in a just and merciful and wise Being, nor in any way dis- tinguishable from each other:—if there be any who imagine that they can be conscious without variety, or discern without differ- ences ;—these and these alone may aspire to correct Revelation by the aid of Philosophy ; for such alone are the conditions under which Philosophy can attain to a rational know- ledge of the Infinite God. The intellectual difficulties which Ration- alism discovers in the contents of Revelation (1 do not now speak of those which belong to its external evidences) are such as no sys- tem of Rational Theology can hope to re- move; for they are inherent in the constitu- tion of Reason itself. Our mental laws, like our moral passions, are designed to serve the purposes of our earthly culture and disci- pline: both have their part to perform in moulding the intellect and the will of man LECTURE VIII. 265 through the slow stages of that training here, whose completion is to be looked for here- after. Without the possibility of temptation, where would be the merit of obedience ? Without room for doubt, where would be the righteousness of faith (24)? But there is no temptation which taketh us, as Christians, but such as is common to man’; and there is no doubt that taketh us, but such as is common to man also. It is the province of Philosophy to teach us this; and it is the province of Religion to turn the lesson to account. ‘The proud definition of ancient sages, which bade the philosopher, as a lover of wisdom, strive after the knowledge of things divine and human, would speak more soberly and more truly by enjoining a Know- ledge of things human, as subservient and auxiliary to Faith in things divine (25). Of the Nature and Attributes of God in His In- finite Being, Philosophy can tell us nothing: of man’s inability to apprehend that Nature, and why he is thus unable, she tells us all that we can know, and all that we need to know. “Know thyself,” was the precept in- scribed in the Delphic Temple, as the best lesson of Heathen wisdom (26). “ Know thy- self,’ was the exhortation of the Christian ! 1 Corinthians x. 13.. 266 LECTURE VIII. Teacher to his disciple, adding, “if any man know himself, he will also know God” (27). He will at least be content to know so much of God’s nature as God Himself has been pleased to reveal; and, where Revelation is silent, to worship without seeking to know more. Know thyself in the various elements of thy intellectual and moral being: all alike will point reverently upward to the throne of the Invisible; but none will scale that throne itself, or pierce through the glory which conceals Him’ that sitteth thereon. Know thyself in thy powers of Thought, which, cramped and confined on every side, yet bear witness, in their very limits, to the Illimitable beyond. Know thyself in the energies of thy Will, which, free and yet bound, the master at once and the servant of | Law, bows itself under the imperfect con- sciousness of a higher Lawgiver, and asserts its freedom but by the permission of the Almighty. Know thyself in the yearnings of thy Affections, which, marvellously adapted as they are to their several finite ends, yet tes- tify in their restlessness to the deep need of something better (28). Know thyself in that fearful and wonderful system of Human Nature as a whole, which is composed of all LECTURE VIII. 267 these, and yet not one with any nor with all of them ;—that system to whose inmost centre and utmost circumference the whole system of Christian Faith so strangely yet so fully adapts itself. It is to the whole Man that Christianity appeals: it is as a Whole and in relation to the whole Man that it must be judged (29). It is not an object for the thought alone, nor for the will alone, nor for the feelings alone. It may not be judged by reference to this petty cavil or that mi- nute scruple: it may not be cut down to the dimensions and wants of any single ruling principle or passion. We have no right to say that we will be Christians as far as pleases us, and no further; that we will accept or reject, according as our understanding is sa- tisfied or perplexed (30). The tree is not then most flourishing, when its branches are lopped, and its trunk peeled, and its whole body cut down to one hard unyielding mass; but when one principle of life per- vades it throughout; when the trunk and the branches claim brotherhood and _ fellow- ship with the leaf that quivers, and the twig that bends to the breeze, and the bark that is delicate and easily wounded, and the root that lies lowly and unnoticed in the earth. And man is never so weak as when he seems 268 LECTURE VIII. to be strongest, standing alone in the confi- dence of an isolated and self-sufficing Intel- lect: he is never so strong as when he seems to be weakest, with every thought and resolve, and passion and affection, from the highest to the lowest, bound together in one by the common tie of a frail and feeble Humanity. He is never so weak as when he casts off his burdens, and stands upright and unincum- bered in the strength of his own will: he is never so strong as when, bowed down in his feebleness, and tottering under the whole load that God has laid upon him, he comes humbly before the throne of grace, to cast his care upon the God who careth for him”. The life of man is one, and the system of Christian Faith is one: each part supplying something that another lacks; each element making good some missing link in the evi- dence furnished by the rest. But we may avail ourselves of that which satisfies our own peculiar needs, only by accepting it as part and parcel of the one indivisible Whole. Thus only shall we grow in our Christian Life in just proportion of every part; the intellect instructed, the will controlled, the affections purified, “till we all come, in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of m 1 St. Peter v. 7. LECTURE VIII. 269 God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ: that we henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cun- ning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive; but speaking the truth in love, may grow up into Him in all things, which is the Head, even Christ; from whom the whole body, fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love®.” n Ephesians iv. 13-16. ᾿ ess aye Ἶ ls 'ω " Ν Ἶ by Grainy. ἮΝ ὙΠ te si Peas Piles a 4}}} ἄνω ἐδ ‘ve ae aT ik ols is va ὶ ls ater Silt | Buy, πολ Aaa ee “Py i τ ὍΝ ah a TT Ae Ἀν τὸν ἘΝ — : ΠΥ 26 Ἰὼ αν τ: Liss ‘ ts ; ὺ . ie 1 a ” * oe, ae’ a {7 Υ νῷ et - vig Γ΄, " ὶ Υ 4 ἢ δ᾽ ᾿. Φ ᾿ , ΟΝ i Ἵ , oy =e υἱ ν hb «= > sam ἂν κι 4 * Β ra ἢ ‘ -" " ι » ᾿ ᾿ Be | a ri, ἊΣ a, ἊΣ λυ re ᾽ a i NOTES. ΕΘ Meer Eee 8" LECTURE LI. Note l. pz 3: SEE Galen De Sectis c.1. In this sense, the Doqmatists or Rationalists were distinguished from the Empirics. For the corresponding philosophical sense of the term, see Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. 1. ὃ. 1—3. Note 2. p. 3. “Der Dogmatismus hat seinen Namen davon, dass er das Verhaltniss zwischen den Dingen an sich und den Erscheinungen als einen Causalzusammenhang zu demon- striren, ἃ. ἢ. dogmatisch festzusetzen, sich anmasst; und behauptet dass die Dinge an sich den Grund von allem enthalten, was wir an dem Menschen und in der Naturwelt wahrnehmen.” Poelitz, Kant’s Vorlesungen iiber die Meta- phystk. Einleitung, p. xxi. Note 3. p. 4. Of the theological method of Wolf, the leader of philo- sophical dogmatism in the eighteenth century, Mr. Rose observes, ‘“‘ He maintained that philosophy was indispens- able to theology, and that, together with biblical proofs, a mathematical or strictly demonstrative dogmatical sys- tem, according to the principles of reason, was absolutely necessary. His own works carried this theory into practice, and after the first clamours against them had subsided, his opinions gained more attention, and it was not long before he had a school of vehement admirers who far outstripped him in the use of his own principles. We find some of them not content with applying demonstration to the truth » 214 NOTES. of the system, but endeavouring to establish each separate dogma, the Trinity, the nature of the Redeemer, the In- carnation, the eternity of punishment, on philosophical, and, strange as it may appear, some of these truths on mathematical grounds2.” The language of Wolf himself may be quoted as ex- pressing exactly the relation between Scripture and human reason mentioned in the text. ‘ Scriptura sacra Theologie naturali adjumento est. Etenim in Seriptura sacra ea quoque de Deo docentur, que ex principiis rationis de eodem demonstrari possunt: id quod nemo negat, qui in lectione Scripture sacre fuerit versatus. Suppeditat igitur Theologiz naturali propositiones, que in ea demonstrari debent, consequenter philosophus eas non demum invenire, sed tantummodo demonstrare tenetur>.” The writings of Canz, a disciple of the Wolfian philo- sophy, are mentioned by Mr. Rose, and by Dr. Pusey, (Historical Inquiry, p. 116), as exemplifying the manner in which this philosophy was applied to doctrinal theology. The following extracts from his attempted demonstration of the doctrine of the Trinity may be interesting to the reader, not only on account of the extreme rarity of the work from which they are taken, but also as furnishing a specimen of the dogmatic method, and shewing the abuse to which it is liable in injudicious hands. “Cum character omnis substantiz in vi quadam agendi positus sit, Deus erit judicandus ex infinita agendi vi, idque generatim. La vis agendi, quoniam infinita est, com- plectitur omnes perfectiones, ideoque non ponitur in nuda facultate, quee ab exercitio agendi nonnunquam cessat, quod imperfectionis foret; non collocatur in viribus hoe aut istud solum agendi; quod similiter cancellos proderet ; sed in perdurante actu, eodemque purissimo, omnia oper- andi, queecunque perfectissime, ideoque et sapientissime, una agi licet. Est igitur substantia plane singularis. Cum Deus porro actus purissimus sit, qui omnia in om- a State of Protestantism in Germany, p.54. Second edition. Ὁ Theologia Naturalis, Pars Prior, § 22. LECTURE I. 975 nibus operatur, sequitur res finitas, quee esse possunt et non possunt, rationem suze existentie in se ipsis non inve- nire, sed in eo qui omnia operatur, i.e. Deo. Est igitur in Deo, quod primo loco intelligimus, Vis infinita Creandi. Sed quoniam, quee creata sunt, omnia, ut media et fines, se mutuo respiciunt, ipsa autem, ultimo scopo referuntur ad gloriam Dei, perspicuum est, esse in Deo infinitam Sa- pientiz Vim, seu, ut Scriptura loquitur, λόγον, qui, eum veritas in harmonia rerum sufficienti ratione coordinatarum et sibi succedentium ponatur, omnem omnino possibilem veritatem perspicacia sua comprehendat. Quemadmodum denique infinita in rebus creatis bona sunt, et vero Deus omnia operans et hee bona preestitisse judicetur ; ita non est intellectu difficile, esse in Deo sum- mam Amandi Vim. Ille enim amat, qui, quoties potest, aliorum felicitatem variis bonis auget. Subsistere dicitur quod existit, s1 complemento suo poti- tum est, nec procedit ultra. Fit enim progressus a possi- bili ad agendi vim, ab agendi vi, ad actum operandi, eum- que talem quem determinavi. ‘Tum subsistitur, nec proce- ditur quasi ultra. Quidquid hoe modo in existendo ultra non procedit, id ὑφιστάμενον vocant Metaphysici, cui si donum intelligen- tize seu ratio accesserit, tum existit Persona. His preemissis videamus an in Dei natura quidquam sit, quod trium Personarum titulo dignum. Est utique in Deo immensa vis agendi, ideoque Substantiz singularis- simze indicium. Invenire etiam licet triplicem actum, qui illam vim, omnia operando, in omni triplici rerum genere, complet. Triplex illa operandi actus non solum existit quia prae- struit vim agendi; sed et subsistit quilibet, quia nee pars est, nee pars socia alterius, nec denique operatio unius alterius est. Atqui cadit in hune triplicem immensum, qua divina vis completur, actum, sui conscientia, et preteritorum pariter ac futurorum sensus. Est igitur quisque intelli- gens, ideoque Persona. £2 276 NOTES. Cum tres ejusmodi actus sint in Deo, seu in Divina Na- tura, quee immensa vis agendi est, sequitur in eadem Tres esse Personas, que unam illam infinitam vim immensa ope- ratione triplici compleant et exerceant. Quoniam in omni quodcunque creatum et intelligendi facultate preeditum est, vis operandi, intelligendi, amandi, nen nisi Una operatione totali, seu Uno Actu compleri potest ; sequitur in omni finito non esse posse nisi unicam personam. Ternio igitur Personarum in Deo a-~Natura Infinita qua tali proficiscitur. Quod erat demonstrationis proposi- tum ¢.”’ Leibnitz, the great master of Wolf and his disciples, in the Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, prefixed to his Théodicée, § 59, decidedly condemns all at- tempts to render the mysteries of religion comprehensible by demonstration. Note 4. p. 5. Kant defines Rationalism, as distinguished from Natu- ralism and Supernaturalism, in the following terms. “ Der, welcher blos die natiirliche Religion fiir moralischnoth- wendig, d. i. fiir Pflicht erklart, kann auch der Rationalist (in Glaubenssachen) genannt werden. Wenn dieser die Wirklichkeit aller tibernatiirlichen gottlichen Offenbarung verneint, so heisst er Naturalist; lasst er nun diese zwar zu, behauptet aber dass sie zu kennen und fir wirklich anzunehmen, zur Religion nicht nothwendig erfordert wird, so wurde er ein reiner Rationalist genannt werden konnen ; halt er aber den Glauben an dieselbe zur allgemeinen Re- ligion fiir nothwendig, so wiirde er der reine Supernatural- ist in Glaubenssachen heissen kinnen4.” In the text, the term is used in a somewhat wider extent than that of the © Philosophie Wolfiane Consensus cum Theologia, Francofurti et Lip- sie, 1737. ‘This volume forms the third part of the Philosophie Leib- nitiane et Wolfiane usus in Theologia, of which the first part was pub- lished in 1728, and the second in 1732. ‘The third part is extremely rare. ‘The two former parts were reprinted in 1749. ἃ Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, (Werke, ed. Rosenkranz, x. p. 185.) For different senses in which the term Ra- tionalist has been used, see Wegscheider, Instit. Theol. § 10; Rose, ΝΕ FE Φ above definition. It is not necessary to limit the name of Rationalist to those who maintain that Revelation as ἃ whole is unnecessary to religion; nor to those whose sys- tem is based solely on moral principles. There may be a partial as well as a total Rationalism: it is possible to ac- knowledge in general terms the authority of Scripture, and yet to exercise considerable license in rejecting particular portions as speculatively incomprehensible or morally un- necessary. ‘The term is sometimes specially applied to the Kantian school of theologians, of whom Paulus and Weg- scheider are representatives. In this sense, Hegel declares his antagonism to the Rationalism of his daye; and Strauss, in his controversies with the naturalist critics of the Go- spels, frequently speaks of their method as “ Rationalism.” In the sense in which the term is employed in the text, Hegel and Strauss are themselves as thoroughly rational- ists as their opponents. Even Schleiermacher, though a decided antagonist of the naturalist school, is himself a par- tial Rationalist of another kind; for with him the Christ- ian Consciousness, 1. 6. the internal experience resulting to the individual from his connection with the Christian com- munity, is made a test of religious truth almost as arbitrary as the Moral Reason of Kant. On the strength of this self-chosen criterion, Schleiermacher sets aside, among other doctrines, as unessential to Christian belief, the super- natural conception of Jesus, the facts of his resurrection, ascension, and the prediction of his future judgment of the world ; asserting that it is impossible to see how such facts ean be connected wiih the redeeming power of Christ. Indeed in some of the details of his system he falls into pure Rationalism; as in his speculations on the existence of Angels, good and evil. on the Fall of Man, on eternal Punishment, on the two Natures of Christ, and on the equality of the Persons in the Holy Trinity. The so-called Spiritualism of the present day is again State of Protestantism in Germany, Introd. p. xvii. second edition ; Kahnis, Internal History of German Protestantism, p. 169, Meyer’s translation. © Geschichte der Philosophie, (Werke, xiii. p. οὐ.) f Christliche Glaube, § 97, 90. 278 NOTES. only Rationalism disguised; for feeling or intuition is but an arbitrary standard, resting solely on the personal con- sciousness, and moreover must be translated into distinct thought, before it can be available for the purposes of re- ligious criticism. Note 5. p. 5. - Thus Wegscheider represents the claim of the Rational- ists. ‘Sane rationi facultatem vindicant religionis doctri- nam qualemeunque a revelatione opinata supernaturali de- rivatam dijudicandi, ejusque argumentum non nisi ad leges cogitandi agendique rationi insitas exactum probandi.” Inst. Theol. §10. See also Rohr, Briefe iiber den Rational- ismus, P. 31. Note 6. p. 10. ‘“‘Quapropter si non decet Deum aliquid injuste aut in- ordinate facere, non pertinet ad ejus libertatem, aut benig- nitatem, aut voluntatem, peccantem qui non solvit Deo, quod abstulit, impunitum dimittere.”. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, i.12. ‘‘ Ipsa namque perversitatis spontanea satis- factio, vel a non satisfaciente pcenze exactio (excepto hoe quod Deus de malis multimodis bona facit) in eadem uni- versitate locum tenent suum et ordinis pulchritudinem. Quas si divina sapientia, ubi perversitas rectum ordinem perturbare nititur, non adderet, fieret in ipsa universitate, quam Deus debet ordinare, queedam ex violata ordinis pul- chritudine deformitas, et Deus in sua dispositione videretur deficere. Quze duo quoniam sicut sunt inconvenientia, ita sunt impossibilia, necesse est ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut poena sequatur.” Jbid.i.15. ‘Si ergo, sicut constat, necesse est ut de hominibus perficiatur illa superna civitas ; nec hoc esse valet, nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere, nisi Deus, nec debet nisi homo; necesse est ut eam faciat Deus homo.” Jbid. ii. 6. Compare Alex. ab Ales. Summa Theologi@, P. 111. Memb. 7, where the same argument is concisely stated. Note 7. p. το: Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 1. 11. e. 16. LECTU RE I. 279 Note 8. p. 10. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 1. 1. e. 5. Note 9. p. 10. Deus ita misericors est, ut sit etiam simul justus ; misericordia non excludit in eo eternam justitie regulam, sed summum et admirabile est in eo misericordiz et justi- tiz temperamentum ; ergo non potuit peccatum salva di- vina justitia absque sequivalente pretio in Dei judicio homini remitti. Nullum ergo aliud supererat remedium, quam ut ipse Dei Filius humanam naturam assumeret, ac in ea et per eam satisfaceret. Deus non debebat; homo non poterat.” J. Gerhard, Loci Theologici, De Persona et Officio Christi, ὁ. VIII. Note 10. p. 10. “ Quia nuda creatura non potuisset sustinere immensum onus ire Dei, totius mundi peccatis debitz.” Chemnitz, De duabus Naturis in Christo, e. X1. Note 11. p. 11. Such is the demand of Anselm’s interlocutor, which he himself undertakes to satisfy. ‘‘ Ut rationabili necessitate intelligam esse oportere omnia illa que nobis Fides Catho- lica de Christo credere precipit.” Cur Deus Homo, L. 1. e.25. ‘To arguments founded on this principle the judi- cious remarks of Bishop Butler may be applied, ‘“‘ It may be needful to mention that several questions, which have been brought into the subject before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here: questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his govern- ments.” Note 12. p.11. ἐς Τῃ what did this satisfaction consist? Was it that God & Analogy, Part II. Ch. 5. 280 NOTES. was angry, and needed to be propitiated like some heathen deity of old? Such a thought refutes itself by the very indignation which it calls up in the human bosom. ” Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, vol. ii. p.472. “ Neither can there be any such thing as vicarious atonement or punish- ment, which, again, is a relic of heathen conceptions of an angered Deity, to be propitiated by offerings and saeri- fices.” Greg, Creed of Christendom, p.265. “ The religion of types and notions can travel only in a circle from whence there is no escape. It is but an elaborate process of self- confutation. After much verbiage it demolishes what it created, and having begun by assuming God to be angry, ends, not by admitting its own gross mistake, but by asserting Him to be changed and reconciled.” Mackay, Progress of the Intellect, vol. ii. p. 504. Compare Weg- scheider, Lust. Theol. δ. 141. Note 13. p. 11. ‘“ Quid enim iniquius, quam insontem pro sontibus puniri, preesertim cum ipsi sontes adsunt, qui ipsi puniri possunt.” F. Socinus, Prelect. Theol., c. xviii. ‘That each should have his exact due is just—is the best for himself. That the consequence of his guilt should be transferred from him to one who is innocent, (although that innocent one be himself willing to accept it,) whatever else it be, is not justice.” Froude, Nemesis of Faith, p.70. Compare New- man, Phases of Faith, p.g2; Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 265. Cherubinischer Wandersmann, 1. 285. Quoted by Strauss, Christ- liche Glaubenslehre, I. p. 53. © Werke, XII. p. 307. LECTURE I. 293 sich selbst personificirende begreifen lernen.” This view is still more plainly stated in a fearful passage of his Leben Jesu, § 151, which the reader will find quoted at length in Lecture V. p.160. Feuerbach, in his Wesen des Christen- thums4, from a different point of view, arrives at a similar conclusion, maintaining that God is but the personification of the general notion of humanity. Emerson gives us oc- easional glimpses of the same philosophy. Thus in his “ Christian Teacher” he explains the Divinity of Christ : “ς He saw that God incarnates himself in man, and evermore goes forth anew to take possession of his world. He said in this jubilee of sublime emotion: ‘Iam divine. Through me, God acts; through me, speaks. Would you see God, see me; or see thee, when thou also thinkest as I now thinke”’’ And, in the “ Over-Soul,” in still more daring language, he says: ‘In all conversation between two per- sons, tacit reference is made as to a third party, to a com- mon nature. That third party or common nature is not social ; it is impersonal, is Godf.” Another form of this deification of humanity is that of M. Comte, who agrees with Strauss and Feuerbach, in finding God only in the human race. This discovery 1s announced as the grand consummation of the Positive Phi- losophy. “Cette appréciation finale condense lensemble des conceptions positives dans la seule notion d’un étre immense et éternel, [Humanité, dont les destinées socio- logiques se développent toujours sous la prépondérance nécessaire des fatalités biologiques et cosmologiques. Au- tour de ce vrai Grand-Etre, moteur immédiat de chaque existence individuelle ou collective, nos affections se con- centrent aussi spontanément que nos pensées et nos actionss.” From this grand ideal of humanity, un- worthy individuals of the race are excluded ; but, ‘si ces ἃ See Ewerbeck, Qu’est ce que la Religion d’aprés la nouveile Philo- sophie Allemande, pp. 271, 390, 413. © Essays, (Orr’s Edition, 1851,) p. 511. f Ibid. p. 125. & Catechisme Positiviste, p. 19. 294 NOTES. » produeteurs de fumier ne font vraiment point partie de PHumanité, une juste compensation vous prescrit de join- dre au nouvel Etre-Supréme tous ses dignes auxiliaires animaux,” Such is the brilliant discovery which entitles its author, in his own modest estimate, to be considered as uniting in his own person the characters of St. Paul and Aristotle, as the founder at once of true religion and sound philosophy i. “Oh worthy thou of Egypt’s wise abodes, A decent priest, where monkeys were the gods !”’ Note 31. p. 31. “Die Gegenstand der Religion wie der Philosophie ist die ewige Wahrheit in ihrer Objectivitat selbst, Gott und Nichts als Gott und die Explication Gottes.” Hegel, Phi- losophie der Religion, (Werke, xi. p. 21.) Note 32. p. 31. ‘So ist die Religion Wissen des géttlichen Geistes von sich durch Vermittlung des endlichen Geistes.’ Hegel, Werke, ΧΙ. p. 200. “ Wir haben die Religion naher bestimmt als Selbstbewusstseyn Gottes.” /bid. xii. p.191. Compare Marheineke, Girundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 420. ‘Die Religion ist demnach gar nichts anders, als das h Catechisme Positiviste, p. 31. Thus, under the auspices of the positive philosophy, we return once more to the worship of the ibis, the ichneumon, and the cat. The Egyptians had the same reverence for their ‘‘dignes auxiliaires animaux.” ‘ Nullam beluam, nisi ob aliquam utilitatem, quam ex ea caperent, consecraverunt.” (Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I. 36.) ‘This exquisite passage must be quoted in the original to be pro- perly appreciated. “En appliquant aussitét ce principe évident, je devais spontanément choisir l’angélique interlocutrice, qui, aprés une seule année d’influence objective, se trouve, depuis plus de six ans, sub- jectivement associée ἃ toutes mes pensées comme a tous mes sentiments. C’est par elle qui je suis enfin devenu, pour l’Humanité, un organe vraiment double, comme quiconque a dignement subi l’ascendant fémi- nin. Sans elle, je n’aurais jamais pu faire activement succéder la car- riére de saint Paul a celle d’Aristote, en fondant la religion universelle sur la saine philosophie, aprés avoir tiré celle-ci de la seience réelle.”— Préface, p. xxii. LECTURE I. 295 Daseyn des géttlichen Geistes im menschlichen, aber ein Daseyn, welches Leben, ein Leben, welches Bewusstseyn, ein Bewusstseyn, welches in seiner Wahrheit das Wissen ist. Dieses Wissen des Menschen ist wesentlich gottlich ; denn es ist zunichst das Wissen des gottlichen Geistes selbst, und die Religion an und fiir sich.” Note 33. p. 31. “ Die Logik ist sonach als das System der reinen Ver- nunft, als das Reich des reinen Gedankens zu fassen. Dieses Reich ist die Wahrheit, wie sie ohne Hiille an und fir sich selbst ist. Man kann sich deswegen ausdricken, dass dieser Inhalt die Darstellung Gottes ist, wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen vor der Erschaffung der Natur und eines end- lichen Gieistes ist.” Hegel, Logik, (Werke, iii. p. 43.) Note 34. p. 32. Clemens Alex. Stromata,i.2. Πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ καὶ ἄχρηστος εἴη φιλοσοφία, εἰ εὔχρηστος ἡ τῆς ἀχρηστίας βεβαίωσις, εὔχρη- στος. ts le goal ΤΕΣ ἘΝ LECTURE IL. Note I. p. 36. «UNLESS we have independent means of knowing that God knows the truth, and is disposed to tell tt to us, his word (if we be ever so certain that it is really his word) might as well not have been spoken. But if we know, independently of the Bible, that God knows the truth, and is disposed to tell it to us, obviously we know a great deal more also. We know not only the existence of God, but much con cerning his character. For, only by discerning that he has Virtues similar in kind to human Virtues, do we know of his truthfulness and his goodness. Without this a priori belief, a book-revelation is a useless impertinenee.” F. W. Newman, The Soul, p. 58. With this a priori belief, it is obvious that a book-revelation is, as far as our independent knowledge extends, still more impertinent; for it merely tells us what we knew before. See an able criticism of this theory in the Kclipse of Faith, p. 73 sqq.- Note 2. p. 39. “ Da uns ferner das, was ein grosser Theil der Philoso- phen vor uns fiir die Vernunft ausgegeben haben, noch unter die Sphare des Verstandes fallt, so werden wir fiir die héchste Erkenntnissart eine von jenen unerreichte Stelle haben, und sie als dicjenige bestimmen, durch welche findliches und Unendliches im Ewigen, nicht aber das Ewige im Endlichen oder Unendlichen erblickt wird.” Schelling, Bruno, p .163, (compare p. 69.) “ Es giebt aber noch andere Sphiren, die beobachtet. werden kGnnen, nicht LECTURE II. 297 bloss diese, deren Inhalt nur Endliches gegen Endliches ist, sondern solche, wo das Gittliche als an und fiir sich sey- endes im Bewusstseyn ist.” Hegel, Philosophie der Religion, (Werke, X1. p.196). In like manner, Mr. Newman speaks of the Soul as “ the organ of specific information to us’’ respecting things spiritual?; and Mr. Parker says, “ that there is a connection between God and the soul, as between light and the eye, sound and the ear, food and the palate, ἃς." Note 3. p. 39. “Cette substance simple primitive doit renfermer émi- nemment les perfections contenues dans les substances dé- rivatives qui en sont les effets; ainsi elle aura la puissance, la connoissance, et la volonté parfaites, c’est-a-dire, elle aura une toute-puissance, une omniscience, et une bonté sou- veraines. Et comme la justice, prise généralement, n’est autre chose que la bonté conforme & la sagesse, il faut bien 4] y ait aussi une justice souveraine en Dieu.” Leibnitz, Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, ὃ 9. “ Being con- scious that I have personally a little Love, and a little Goodness, I ask concerning it, as concerning Intelligence, —where did 1 pick it up? and I feel an invincible per- suasion, that if I have some moral goodness, the great Author of my being has infinitely more. He did not merely make rocks and seas and stars and brutes, but the human Soul also; and therefore I am assured, he possesses all the powers and excellencies of that soul in an infinitely higher degree.” F. W. Newman, Reply to the Eclipse of Faith, p. 26. ‘This argument, however true in its general principle, is able to considerable error in its special applications. The remarks of Bishop Browne are worth consideration, as fur- nishing a caution on the other side. “ To say that God is infinite in perfection, means nothing real and positive in him, unless we say, in a kind of perfection altogether incon- ceivable to us as it is in itself. For the multiplying or magnifying the greatest perfections whereof we have any direct conception or idea, and then adding our gross notion a The Soul, p. 3 ν . ε Ὁ Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 130. 298 : NOTES. only of indefinite to them, is no other than heaping up to- gether a number of imperfections to form a chimera of our imagination.” Divine Analogy, p. 271. | Note 4. p. 39. Compare Wegscheider’s definition of Mysticism, Ζ7ηδέν. Theol. § 5. ‘‘ Ad superstitionem propius accedit vel ejus spe- cies est mysticismus ille, seu persuasio de singulari anime, sensibus quidem acrioribus imbutz et phantasiz ludibriis deditee, facultate ad immediatum cum numine ipso aut natu- ris ccelestibus commercium jam in hac vita perveniendi, quo mens immediate cognitione rerum divinarum ac beatitudine perfruatur.”’ Note 5.’ p. 41. Fichte, Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung. (Werke, V. pp. 40, 115.) The following remarks of Mr. Parker are another application of the same principle, substituting however, as if on purpose to shew the contradictory con- clusions to which such a method of reasoning may lead, the conception of perfect love and future compensation, for that of a moral nature with no affections and no future promises. ‘“ This we know, that the Infinite God must be a perfect Creator, the sole and undisturbed author of all that is in Nature... .Now a perfect Motive for creation, —what will that be? It must be absolute Love, producing a desire to bless every thing which He creates..... If God be infinite, then He must make and administer the world from perfect motives, for a perfect purpose, and as a perfect means,—all tending to the ultimate and absolute blessedness of each thing He directly or mediately creates ; the world must be administered so as to achieve that pur- pose for each thing. Else God has made some things from a motive and for a purpose not benevolent, or as a means not adequate to the benevolent purpose. These suppositions are at variance with the nature of the Infinite God. I do not see how this benevolent purpose can be accomplished unless all animals are immortal, and find retribution in another life.” Theism, Atheism, and the Po- pular Theology, pp. 108, 109, 198. LECTURE IU. 299 Note 6. p. 42. “The nature of the case implies, that the human mind is competent to sit in moral and spiritual judgment on a pro- fessed revelation, and to decide (if the case seem to require it) in the following tone: ‘ This doctrine attributes to God that which we should all call harsh, cruel, or unjust in man: it is therefore intrinsically inadmisible.” Newman, The Soul, p. 58. For an able refutation of this reasoning, see the Defence of the Eclipse of Faith, p. 38. Note 7. p. 42. ‘To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not ceme to pass; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to suppose God’s Knowledge to be inconsistent with itself.’ Edwards, On the Freedom of the Will, part τι. sect. xi. Note 8. p. 42. “ Let us suppose a great prince governing a wicked and rebellious people. He has it in his power to punish, he thinks fit to pardon them. But he orders his only and well beloved son to be put to death, to expiate their sins, and to satisfy his royal vengeance. Would this proceeding appear to the eye of reason, and in the unprejudiced light of nature, wise, or just, or good?” Bolingbroke, Pragments or Minutes of Essays, (Works, vol. v. p. 289, ed. 1754.) Compare Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 92. See also above, Lecture 1. note 13. Note 9. p. 42. «ς [ntellectually, we of necessity hold that the highest human perfection is the best type of the divine... . Every good man has learnt to forgive, and when the offender is penitent, to forgive freely—without punishment or retri- bution: whence the conclusion is inevitable, that God also forgives, as soon as sin is repented of.” Newman, The Sou/, p-99. “It may be collected from the principles of Natural Religion, that God, on the sincere repentance of offenders, 900 NOTES. will receive them again into favour, and render them capa- ble of those rewards naturally attendant on right beha- viour.” Warburton, Divine Legation, b.ix. ch. 2. Compare, on the other side, Magee on the Atonement, notes iv. and xxiv. See also above, Lecture 1. note 14. Note 10. p. 42. “Α divine command is pleaded in vain, except it can be shewn that the thing supposed to be commanded is not in- consistent with the law of nature; which if God can dis- pense with in any one case, he may in all.” Tindal, Christ- canity as old as the Creation, p. 272, quoted and answered by Waterland, Scripture Vindicated, on Numbers xxi. 2, 3. id Note 11. p. 42. Newman, Phases of Fuith, p. 150. Parker, Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 84. Note 12. p. 43. Tindal, apud Waterland l.c. Newman, Phases of Faith, pea ai. Note 13. p. 43. Newman, The Soul, p. 60. Greg, Creed of Christendom, Ρ. ὃ. Note 14. p. 45. “The Absolute is that which is free from all necessary relation, that is, which is free from every relation as ὦ con- dition of existence ; but it may exist in relation, provided that relation be not a necessary condition of its existence ; that is, provided the relation may be removed without affecting its existence.”...The Infinite expresses the entire absence of all limitation, and is applicable to the one Infi- nite Being in all his attributes.” Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, pp. 36,37. The definitions may be accepted, though they lead to conclusions the very opposite of those which the ingenious author has attempted to establish. Note 15. p. 45. “ Infinitum absolute sic dictum est, quod continet omnem rem, sive omnem perfectionem que aut esse aut concipl potest: id vos infinitum perfectione vocare soletis. Lnfini- LECTURE II. 301 tum secundum quid, verbi causa, extensionem, est, quod om- nem extensionem complectitur, que esse potest et intelligi.” Werenfels, De Finibus Mundi Dialogus, (Dissertationes 1716, vol. 11. p. 192). In the latter sense, Clarke speaks of the error of “ imagining all Infinites to be equal, when in things disparate they manifestly are not so; an infinite Line being not only not equal to, but infinitely less than an infinite Surface, and an infinite Surface than Space infinite in all Dimensions’.” This remark assumes that an infinite ex- tension is a possible object of conception at all; whereas, in fact, the attempt to conceive it involves the same funda- mental contradictions which accompany the notion of the Infinite in every other aspect. This is ingeniously shewn by Werenfels, in the above Dialogue, p. 218. “ D. Sed tune existimas igitur, lineam infinitam omnino sine repug- nantia concipi non posse? Ph. Ita sane; et ab hac sen- tentia abduci nequeo, nisi solide quis vestrum ad hance demonstrationem respondeat ; eam autem, nisi vestra audi- endi patientia deficit, breviter hic denuo proponam. Vide- tis hance lineam ὁ a c. Constituamus eam esse in- finitam, et ultra terminos ὦ et ὁ in infinitum protendi. Dividatur hee linea in puncto a. Manifestum est has partes inter se esse eequales ; quia utraque incipit in puncto a, et protenditur in infinitum. Nunc te, Deedale, rogo; he due partes suntne finite an infinite? 1). Finite. Ph. Ita ex duobus finitis componeretur infinitum; quod repugnat. D. Fateor errorem. Infinite sunt. Ph. Jam in Seyllam incidis: ita partes essent eequales toti; infin- tum enim infinito zquale est. Preeterea vides, utramque partem in puncto a terminari; non igitur finibus et termi- nis caret. Quid tu, Polymathes, ad hec? Po. Habeo quod respondeam. Utraque harum partium ab una parte finita est, nempe in puncto a, ab altera infinita, quia ultra puncta ὦ et ὁ in infinitum extenditur. Ph. Callide, acute, nihil supra. At ego quero, an numerus partium talium, qualis linea αὖ et ac, in utravis sectione lineze infinite sit infinitus? Po. Aio. Ph. Sed num ille numerus cui eequa- © Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, Prop. I. 302 NOTES. lis potest addi, et cujus duplum non modo concipio, sed est revera in rerum natura, infinitus est? Quod si etiam hoe ais, numerus infinitus non omnes habet unitates, sed preter eum concipi possunt totidem unitates, quibus ille careat, elque possunt addi. Hoe autem si non repugnat, quid tandem erit quod repugnet? Po. Sed quid, si finito partium numero hujus magnitudinis qualis linea αὖ constare dico utramvis sectionem datz linee? Ph. Linea igitur data est finita; quia duo numeri finiti inter se additi effi- ciunt numerum finitum: id quod erat demonstrandum.” The contradictions thus involved in the notion of infinite magnitudes in space, are not solved by maintaining, with Spinoza and Clarke, that infinite quantity is not composed of parts4; for space with no parts is as inconceivable as space composed of an infinite number of parts. These contradictions sufficiently shew that relative infinity, no less than absolute, is not a positive object of thought at all; the so-called injfinites and infinitesimals of the ma- thematicians being in fact only negative expressions, de- noting magnitudes which bear no relation to any assignable quantity, however great or small. They are thus appre- hended only by reference to their inconceivability ; being merely the expression of our inability to represent in thought a first or last unit of space or time. See Leibnitz, Theo- dicée, Discours, ὃ 70. “*On s’embarrasse dans les séries des nombres qui vont ἃ Vinfini. On concoit un dernier terme, un nombre infini, ou infiniment petit ; mais tout cela ne sont que des fictions. Tout nombre est fini et assignable, toute ligne lest de méme, et les infinis ou infiniment petits n’y signifient que des grandeurs qu’on peut prendre aussi d See Spinoza, Epist. XXIX, Ethica, P. 1. Prop. xv; and Clarke, Demonstration, Prop. 1. A curious psychological discrepancy may be observed in relation to this controversy. Spinoza maintains that quan- tity as represented in the imagination is finite, but that as conceived by the intellect it is infinite. Werenfels, on the contrary, asserts that the imagined quantity is infinite, the conceived finite. The truth is, that in relation to Space, which is not a general notion containing indi- viduals under it, conception and imagination are identical; and the no- tions of an ultimate limit of extension and of an unlimited extension, are both equally self-contradictory from every point of view. LECTURE II. 303 grandes ou aussi petites que l'on voudra, pour montrer qu’une erreur est moindre que celle qu’on a assignée, c’est- a-dire qu’il n’y a aucune erreur: ou bien on entend par Yinfiniment petit, état de Pévanouissement ou du com- mencement d'une grandeur, congue a limitation des gran- deurs déja formées.”’ Compare Pascal, Pensées. Partie I. Art II. C’est-a-dire, en un mot, que quelque mouvement, quel- que nombre, quelque espace, quelque temps que ce soit, il y en a toujours un plus grand et un moindre; de sorte qu’ils se soutiennent tous entre le néant et linfini, étant toujours infiniment éloignés de ces extrémes.” Some ingenious rea- soning on this question will be found in a note by Mosheim on Cudworth’s Intellectual System, Ὁ. I. ch. V, translated in Harrison’s edition of Cudworth, vol. II. p. 541; though the entire discussion is by no means satisfactory. Note 16. p. 46. “Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoe est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unum- quodque zeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit. Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere. Quicquid enim im suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo atiributa negare possumus ; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad gus essentiam pertinet quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam incoloit.” Spinoza, Ethica, P. I. Def. VI. Note 17. p. 46. See Spinoza |. ¢.; Wolf, Theologia Naturalis, P. 11. 815; Kant, Aritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 450. ed. Rosenkranz ; Vorlesungen iiber die Metaphysik, ed. Poelitz. p.276; Schel- ling, Vom Ich, § 10. The assumption ultimately annihilates itself ; for if any object of conception exhausts the universe of reality, it follows that the mind which conceives it has no existence. The older form of this representation is criticised by Hegel, Hncyhklopddie, § 36. His own concep- tion of God, however, virtually amounts to the same thing. A similar view is implied in his criticism of Aristotle, whom he censures for regarding God as one object out of many. See Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, xiv. p. 283. 904 NOTES. Note 18. p. 46. Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, xv. p. 275. See also, Philosophie der Religion, Werke, xi. p. 24. Encyhlopddie, § 19, 20,21. Compare Schelling, Philosophie und Religion, p- 35, quoted by Willm, Historie de la Philosophie Alle- mande, vol. 111. p. 301. Schleiermacher (Christliche Glaube, § 80.) is compelled in like manner to assert that God must be in some manner the author of evil; an opinion which is also maintained by Mr. Parker, Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 119. Note 19. p. 46. “Ka res dicitur in suo genere finita, que alia ejusdem nature terminari potest. Ex. gr. corpus dicitur finitum, quia aliud semper majus concipimus. Sie cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur.” Spinoza, Ethica, P. 1. Def. 11]. Note 20. p. 47. See Aquinas, Summa, P. I. Qu. IT. Art 3. Qu. IX. Art 1. “ Actus simplicissimus,” says Hobbes contemptuously, “ sig- nifieth nothing®.” And Clarke in like manner observes, “ Kither the words signify nothing, or else they express only the perfection of his power f.” Note 21. p. 47. See Plato, Republic, 11. p. 381; Aristotle, Metaph. VIII. 3.15; Augustine, Hnarratio in Ps. 1X. 11, De Trinitate, ΧΝ. 6.15: Hooker, #. P. Ὁ. I. ¢.5; Descartes, Meditatio Lertia, Ὁ. 22. ed. 1685; Spinoza, Ethica, P. 1. Prop. xvii. Schol.; Hartley, Observations on Man, Prop. exv.; Her- der, Gott, Werke, VIII. p. 180; Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, § 54; Marheineke, Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 195. The conclusion, that God actually does all that he ean do; and, consequently, that there is no possibility of free action in any finite being, can only be © Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, Animadver- sions, No. XXIV. See, on the other side, Bramhall, Works, vol. IV. po 524: f Demonstration, Prop. 1V. See, on the other side, Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XIV. p. 290. LECTURE II. 305 avoided by the admission, which is ultimately foreed upon us, that our human conception of the infinite is not the true one. Miiller, (Christliche Lehre von der Siinde, 11. p- 251, third edit.), endeavours to meet this conclusion by a counter-argument. He shews that it is equally a limita- tion of the Divine Nature to suppose that God is compelled of necessity to realize in act every thing which he has the power to accomplish. This argument completes the di- lemma, and brings into full view the counter-impotencies of human thought in relation to the infinite. We cannot con- ceive an Infinite Being as capable of becoming that which he is not; nor, on the other hand, can we conceive him as actually being all that he can be. Note 22. p. 48. That a belief in Creation is incompatible with a philo- sophy of the Absolute, was clearly seen by Fichte, who con- sistently denounces it, as a Jewish and Heathenish notion and the fundamental error of all false Metaphysics. He even goes so far as to maintain that St. John, the only teacher of true Christianity, did not believe in the Creation, and that the beginning of his Gospel was designed to con- tradict the Mosaic narrative. See his Anweisung zum se- ligen Leben, (Werke, v.p.479). Compare Schelling, Bruno, p. 60, who regards the finite as necessarily coeternal with the infinite. Spinoza’s attempted demonstration that one substance cannot be produced from another 8, though in itself a mere juggle of equivocal terms, yet testifies in like manner to his conviction, that to deny the possibility of creation is an indispensable step to a philosophy of the Absolute. Cognate to these theories are the speculations of Hermogenes, mentioned by Tertullian, Adv. Herm. ec. 2; and of Origen, De Princ. I. 2.10. Of the latter, Neander well observes: ‘‘ Here, therefore, there oceurred to him those reasons against a beginning of creation generally, which must ever suggest themselves to the reflecting mind, which cannot. rest satisfied with simple faith in that which to itself is incomprehensible. Supposing that to create is & Kthica, P. I. Prop. vi. τς 306 NOTES. agreeable to the divine essence, how is it conceivable that what is thus conformable to God’s nature should at any time have been wanting? Why should not those attri- butes which belong to the very essence of the Deity, His almighty power and goodness, be always active? A transi- tion from the state of not-creating to the act of creation is inconceivable without a change, which is incompatible with the being of God h.” Note 23. p. 49. Arist. Metaph. X1. 9. Εἴτε γὰρ μηθὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν ; ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων. εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ᾽ ἄλλο κύριον (οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο 6 ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις), οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη. διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει... . Αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κρά- τιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. Plotinus, on the other hand, shews that even self-consciousness, as involving a logical distinction between subject and object, is incom- patible with the notion of the Absolute. See Han. V. LWA, δώ: Note 24. p. 49. Plotinus, Han. IIL. 1. IX. ¢. 3. Διπλοῦν δὲ τὸ νοοῦν, καὶ ee a \ ° Ν “ I] a a oo Ἂς ων 3 “ an αὑτὸ νοεῖ, καὶ ἐλλειπὲς, ὅτι ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ἔχει TO εὖ, οὐκ ἐν TH ὑποστάσει. Hnn. V.1.VI1.¢. 2. Πρῶτόν τε οὐκ ἔσται δύο ὃν, 6 τε νοῦς ὁ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχων οὐκ ἂν συσταίη μὴ οὔσης οὐσίας καθαρῶς nan A % Ν \ “ Ν BA 2 Ν Μ νοητοῦ, ὃ πρὸς μὲν τὸν νοῦν νοητὸν ἔσται, καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὔτε νοοῦν οὔτε νοητὸν κυρίως ἔσται" τό τε γὰρ νοητὸν, ἑτέρῳ" ὅ τε νοῦς τὸ ἐπιβάλλον τῇ νοήσει κενὸν ἔχει, ἄνευ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἑλεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ὃ νοεῖ. Hunn. V.1. VI. ο. 6. "Ἔπειτα οὐδ᾽ ἡ νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν. Δύο οὖν πάλιν αὖ ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίγνεται: τοῦτο δὲ οὐδαμῆ δύο. Cf. Porphyr. Sent. XV. Ei δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τὰ νοητά πολλὰ γὰρ 6 νοῦς νοεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἕν" πολλὰ ἂν εἴη ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αὐτός. κεῖται δὲ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν τὸ ἕν, ὥστε ἀνάγκη πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἕν. Note 25. p. 49. Clem. Alex. Strom. V.12.p.587. Οὐκ ἂν δὲ ὅλον εἴποι τις αὖ- τὸν ὀρθῶς" ἐπὶ μεγέθει γὰρ τάττεται τὸ ὅλον, καί ἐστι τῶν ὅλων h Church History, English translation, Vol. II. p. 281, Bohn’s edi- tion. LECTURE II. 307 πατήρ. οὐδὲ μὴν μέρη τινὰ αὐτοῦ λεκτέον' ἀδιαίρετον yap τὸ ἕν. Plotinus, Hnn. V.1. VI. ὁ. 5. Ὃ δ᾽ ἔστι πάντῃ ἐν, ποῦ χωρή- σεται πρὸς αὑτό; ποῦ δ᾽ ἂν δέοιτο συναισθήσεως; On this point, the earlier and later forms of Pantheism are divided against each other. Spinoza (Hth. P. I. Def. 6.) defines the Deity as composed of an infinite number of attributes. “ Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoe est, sub- stantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unum- quodque zternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.” He- gel, on the contrary, in his Lectures on the proofs of the existence of God, regards a plurality of attributes as in- compatible with the idea of the Infinite. ‘ Hier zeigt sich die Verschiedenheit, die Trennung, Mehrheit der Priadicate, die nur in der Einheit das Subject verkniipft, an ihnen selbst aber in Unterschiedenheit, womit sie selbst in Ge- gensatz und damit in Widerstreit kamen, waren, somit aufs entschiedenste als etwas Unwahres, und die Mehrheit von Bestimmungen als ungehorige Kategorie'.”. The lesson to be learnt from both is the same. No human form of thought can represent the Infinite :—a truth which Spinoza attempts to evade by multiplying such forms to infinity, and Hegel by renouncing human thought altogether. Note 26. p. 50. That the Absolute cannot be conceived as composed of a plurality of attributes, but only as the one substance conceived apart from all plurality, is shewn by Plotinus, Enn. V.1. VI. ¢. 3. Ei δὲ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲν κωλύειν φή- ὰ , ε 7 ᾿ > , Ν SS σουσιν, ἕν τούτοις ὑποκείμενον ἔσται" ov δύναται yap πολλὰ, Ν εν ἃ Ψ 3 9 not Ce) Qo Nog ee. \ U4 , μὴ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἀφ᾽ οὗ, ἢ ἐν ᾧ, ἢ ὅλως ἑνὸς, καὶ τούτου πρώτου τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμουμένου, ὃ αὐτὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ δεῖ λαβεῖν μόνον. Εἰ δὲ ὁμοῦ εἴη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, δεῖ τοῦτο συλλαβόντα αὐτὸ Ἂς SOA: “ S ἐν an + s\ ἍΝ ε Ἵ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅμως δὲ ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ὃν, ἐᾷν ὡς μετ ἄλλων, ζητεῖν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ὑποκείμενον τοῖς ἄλλοις, μηκέτι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτός Compare Proclus, Jnst. Theol. 6. τ. Πᾶν πλῆθος μετέχει πῃ τοῦ ἑνός" εἰ γὰρ μηδαμῇ μετέχοι, οὔτε τὸ ὅλον Ev ἔσται, οὔθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν, ἐξ ὧν i Werke, XII. p. 419. See also Encyklopiidie, § 28 (Werke, VI. p- 62.) X 2 908 NOTES. τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται καὶ ἔκ τινων ἕκαστον πλῆθος, Kat τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον, καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων τούτων ἕκαστον ἔσται πάλιν πλῆ- θος ἄπειρον. To the same effect is the reasoning of Augus- tine, De Trinitate, vi. c. 6.7. “In unoquoque corpore aliud est magnitudo, aliud color, aliud figura. Potest enim et diminuta magnitudine manere idem color et eadem figura, et colore mutato manere eadem figura et eadem magni- tudo, et figura eadem non manente tam magnum esse et eodem modo coloratum : et queecunque alia simul dicuntur de corpore, possunt et simul et plura sine caeteris commu- tari. Ac per hoe multiplex esse convincitur natura corporis, simplex autem nullo modo..... Sed tamen etiam in anima cum aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem, aliud acutum, aliud memorem, aliud cupiditas, aliud timor, aliud leetitia, aliud tristitia, possintque et alia sine aliis, et alia magis, alia minus, innumerabilia et innumerabiliter in anime natura inveniri; manifestum est non simplicem sed multi- plicem esse naturam. Nihil enim simplex mutabile est; omnis autem creatura mutabilis. Deus vero multipliciter quidem dicitur magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus, et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur: sed eadem mag- nitudo ejus est, que sapientia; non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute: et eadem bonitas que sapientia et magni- tudo, et eadem veritas que illa omnia: et non est ibi aliud beatum esse, et aliud magnum, aut sapientem, aut verum, aut bonum esse, aut omnino ipsum esse.” See also Aqui- nas, Summa, P. 1. Qu. III. Art. 5, 6, 7. Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, § 50. Note 27. p. 50. See Plato, Republic, 11. p. 380, VI. p. 511, VII. p. 517; Timeus, p. 31. Aristotle, Metaph. XI. 8,18: 10,14; Eth. Nic. VII. 14, 8. Cicero, Tusc. Quest. 1.29; De Nat. Deor. Iii. ‘Plotinus, En. 11. Ὁ. 1, TIL. 9,3, V, 4,4, 1 9,6. Proclus, Inst. Theol. ὁ. 1. xxii. lix. exxxii. Cle mens Alex., Strom. V.p.587. Origen, De Prine.1.1,6. Au- gustine, De Civ. Dei, VILI.6: De Trinitate, VI. 6, VII. 1, XV. 5,13. Aquinas, Summa, P. I. Qu. III. Art. 7, Qu. VII. Art. 2, Qu. XI. Art. 3. Leibnitz, Monadologie, ὃ 39, 40, 47. LECTURE II. 309 Clarke, Demonstration, Prop. vi. vii. Schelling, Vom Ich, §9; Bruno, p. 185. Note 28. p. 50. “Hine ergo clare patet, nullam rem unam aut unicam nominari, nisi postquam alia res concepta fuit, que (ut dictum est) cum ea convenit. Quoniam vero Dei existentia ipsius sit essentia, deque ejus essentia universalem non possimus formare ideam, certum est, eum qui Deum unum vel unicum nuncupat, nullam de Deo habere ideam, vel im- proprie de eo loqui.” Spinoza, Epist. L. Compare Schleier- macher, Christliche Glaube, § 56. Note 29. p. 51. “Quod enim dicebat sz possibile est, non ad potentiam Dei referebat solum, sed etiam ad justitiam ejus; quoniam in quantum ad potentiam quidem Dei, omnia possibilia sunt, sive justa sive injusta; quantum autem ad justitiam ejus, qui non solum potens est, sed etiam justus, non sunt omnia possibilia, sed ea solum que justa sunt.” Origen, in S: Matt. xxvi. 42 ; compare c. Celsum, ITI. 70. Origen speaks still more strongly in a remarkable fragment of the De Principiis, which has been preserved in the original: ᾿Εν τῇ ἐπινοουμένῃ ἀρχῇ τοσοῦτον ἀριθμὸν τῷ βουλεύματι αὐτοῦ ὑποστῆσαι τὸν θεὸν νοερῶν οὐσιῶν ὅσον ἠδύνατο διαρκέσαι" πεπερασμένην γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ λεκτέον, καὶ μὴ προφάσει εὐφημίας τὴν περιγραφὴν αὐτῆς περιαιρετέον" ἐὰν γὰρ ἢ ἄπειρος 7) θεία δύναμις, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μηδὲ ἑαυτὴν νοεῖν. The language of Hooker (£. P. b. I. ch. 2. § 3.) is more cautious and reverent, but contains the same acknowledg- ment of what, from a human point of view, is limitation. ‘If therefore it be demanded why, God having power and ability infinite, the effects notwithstanding of that power are all so limited as we see they are; the reason hereof is the end which he hath proposed, and the law whereby his wisdom hath stinted the effects of his power in such sort, that it doth not work infinitely, but cor- respondently unto that end for which it worketh.” Some excellent remarks on the limitation of man’s faculties with regard to the Divine Attributes, will be found in Mr. Mey- 910 NOTES. rick’s sermon, God’s Revelation and Man’s Moral Sense con- sidered in reference to the Sacrifice of the Cross, p.14. See the Collection of Sermons on Christian Faith and the Atone- ment, Oxford, 1856. Note 30. p. 52. Thus Spinoza (Zthica, P. I. Prop. 26.) says, “ Res quae ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario sic fuit determinata ;” and, carrying the same theory to its inevitable consequence, he consistently maintains (P. IV. Prop. 64.) that the notion of evil only exists in consequence of the inadequacy of our ideas. Hegel in like manner (Encyhl. § 35.), reduces evil to a mere negation, which may be identified with good in the absolute. See also above, note 18, p. 304. Note 31. p. 52. Plato, Rep. II. p. 381. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἑαυτοῦ; ᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται" οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν Θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι. ᾽Ορθό- τατα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λέγεις. καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἄν τίς σοι, ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε, ἑκὼν αὑτὸν χείρω ποιεῖν ὁπῃοῦν ἢ θεῶν ἣ ἀνθρώ- πων ; ᾿Αδύνατον, ἔφη. Compare Augustine, [n Joannis Hvan- gelium, Tract. XXIII. 9. “ Non invenis in Deo aliquid mu- tabilitatis, non aliquid quod aliter nunc sit, aliter paulo ante fuerit. Nam ubi invenis aliter et aliter, facta est ibi quedam mors: mors enim est, non esse quod fuit...... Quidquid ergo et a meliore in deterius, et a deteriore in melius moritur, non est hoc Deus.” And so Jacobi (Von den gottlichen Dingen, Werke, Il. p. 391.), says of the sys- tem of Schelling: ‘‘ Man erwige, dass der allein wahre und lebendige Gott (die Natur) sich weder vermehren noch vermindern, weder erhdhen noch erniedern kann; sondern dass dieser Gott, equal Natur oder Universum, von Ewig- keit zu Ewigkeit, sowohl der Qualitat als der Quantitét nach, immer einer und derselbe bleibt. Es wirde darum auch absolut unméglich seyn, dass er irgend emen Wech- sel in sich verursachte, sich als Verdnderungskraft darthiate, wenn er nicht die Veranderlichkeit, die Zeithchkeit, der LECTURE II. 911 Wecehsel selbst wire. Diese Verinderlichkeit selbst ist aber, sagt man uns, in ihrer Wurzel ein Unverinderliches, namlich die heilige ewig schaffende Urkraft der Welt; in ihrer Frucht hingegen, in der expliciten wirklichen Welt, em absolut Vertnderliches, so dass in jedem einzelnen be- stimmten Moment, das All der Wesen nichts ist. Demnach ist unwidersprechlich das Sch6pferwort des naturalistischen Gottes, welches er von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit ausspricht : Es werde Nichts! Er ruft hervor aus dem Seyn das Nicht- seyn; wie der Gott des Theismus aus dem Nichtseyn hervor- ruft das Seyn.” Compare Sir W. Hamilton’s criticism of Cousin, Discussions, p. 36; and see also above, note 22. p. oo Note 32. p. 54. “ What,” says Sir W. Hamilton, “is our thought of creation? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary, creation is con- ceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity.... And what is true of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of annihilation. We can think no real annihilation,—no absolute sinking of something into nothing. But as creation is cogitable by us, only as a putting forth of Divine power, so is annihilation by us only conceivable, as a withdrawal of that same power. All that is now actually existent in the universe, this we think and must think, as having, prior to creation, virtually existed in the Creator; and in imagining the universe to be anni- hilated, we can only conceive this, as the retractation by the Deity of an overt energy into latent power. In short, it is impossible for the human mind to think what it thinks existent, lapsing into absolute non-existence, either in time past or in time future *.”’ With all deference to this great k Discussions, p. 620. Compare a remarkable passage in Herder’s Gott, (Werke, VIII. p. 241.), where the author maintains a similar view of the impossibility of conceiving creation from or reduction to nothing. But Herder is speaking as a professed defender of Spinoza. Sir W. Hamilton’s system is in all its essential features the direct antagonist of Spinoza; and even in the present passage the apparently pantheistic hypothesis is represented as the result not of thought, but of an in- 912 NOTES. philosopher, I cannot help thinking that a different repre- sentation would have been more in harmony with the main principles of his own system. We cannot conceive creation at all, neither as a springing of nothing into something, nor as an evolution of the relative from the absolute; for the simple reason that the first terms of both hypotheses, nothing and the absolute, are equally beyond the reach of human conception. But while creation as a process in the - act of being accomplished, is equally inconceivable on every hypothesis, creation as a result already completed, presents no insurmountable difficulty to human thought, if we con- sent to abandon the attempt to apprehend the absolute. There is no difficulty in conceiving that the amount of ex- istence in the universe may at one time be represented by A, and at another by 4 - 8: though we are equally un- able to conceive how B can come out of nothing, and how A or any part of 4 can become B while A remains undi- minished. But the result, no less than the process, be- comes self-contradictory, when we attempt to conceive A as absolute and infinite; for in that case d+ B must be something greater than infinity. Note 33. p. 56. ἐς Der Pantheismus lehrt dass, alles gut sei, denn alles sei nur eines, und jeder Anschein von dem, was wir Unrecht oder Schlecht nennen, nur eine leere Tauschung. Daher der zerstérende Einfluss desselben auf das Leben, in dem, man mag sich nun in den Ausdriicken auch drehen, und an den durch die Stimme des Gewissens tiberall hervor- tretenden Glauben anschliessen wie man will, im Grunde doch, wenn man dem verderblichen Principe nur getreu bleibt, die Handlungen des Menschen fir gleichgiltig, und der ewige Unterschied zwischen Gut und Bése, zwischen Recht und Unrecht, ganz aufgehoben, und fur nichtig er- klart werden muss.” F. Schlegel, Ueber die Sprache und ability to think. Still it is to be regretted that the distinguished author should have used language liable to be misunderstood in this respect, especially as it scarcely accords with the general principles of his own system. LECTURE IL 313 Weisheit der Indier, Ὁ. Ill. ¢. 2, (Werke, VIII. p. 324). “51 c'est Dieu qui pense en moi, ma pensée est absolue ; non seulement je ne puis penser autrement que je ne pense, ...mais je ne puis choisir parmi mes conceptions, approuver ou rechercher les unes, rejeter et fuir les autres, toutes étant nécessaries et parfaites, toutes divines: je deviens enfin une machine & penser, une machine intelligente, mais irresponsable.” Bartholmess, Histoire des doctrines reli- gieuses de la philosophie moderne, Introduction, p. xxxvil. These necessary consequences of Pantheism are fully exhi- bited by Spinoza, Ethica, P. 1. Prop. 26; P. II. Props. 32, 33, 34,35; P. IV. Prop.64. Hegel, (Werke, XI. pp. 95, 208, 390), endeavours, not very successfully, to defend his own philosophy from the charge of Pantheism and its con- sequences. His defence amounts to no more than the assertion that God cannot be identified with the universe of finite objects, in a system in which finite objects have no real existence. Thus explained. the system is identical with Pantheism in the strictest sense of the term. All that is proved is, that it cannot with equal propriety be called Pantatheism. Note 34. p. 57. “The dialectic intellect, by the exertion of its own powers exclusively, can lead us to a general affirmation of the supreme reality, of an absolute being. But here it stops. It is utterly incapable of communicating insight or conviction concerning the existence or possibility of the world, as different from Deity. It finds itself constrained to identify, more truly to confound, the Creator with the ageregate of his creatures, and, cutting the knot which it cannot untwist, to deny altogether the reality of all finite ex- istence, and then to shelter itself from its own dissatisfaction, its own importunate queries, in the wretched evasion, that of nothings, no solution can be required: till pain haply, and anguish, and remorse, with bitter scoff and moody laughter inquire ;—Are we then indeed nothings?—till through every organ of sense nature herself asks ;— How and whence did this sterile and pertinacious nothing acquire its plural number ?— Unde, queso, hee nihili in nthila tam 914 NOTES. portentosa transnihilatio?—and lastly ;— What is that in- ward mirror, in and for which these nothings have at least relative existence?” Coleridge, The Friend, vol. [1]. p. 213. Note 35. p. 57. The limitation, speculative Atheism, is necessary; for the denial of the Infinite does not in every case constitute practical Atheism. For it is not under the form of the Infinite that the idea of God is distinctly presented in worship ; and it is possible to adore a superior Being, with- out positively asking how far that superiority extends. It is only when we are able to investigate the problem of the relation between the infinite and the finite, and to perceive that the latter cannot be regarded as expressing the true idea of the Deity, that the denial of the infinite becomes atheism in speculation. On the alternative between Christ- ianity and Atheism, some excellent remarks will be found in the festoration of Belief, p. 248. Note 36. p. 57. “Es pflegt viel auf die Schranken des Denkens gehalten zu werden, und es wird behauptet, es kénne iiber die Schranke nicht hinausgegangen werden. In dieser Be- hauptung liegt die Bewusstlosigkeit, dass darin selbst, dass etwas als Schranke bestimmt ist, dariiber bereits hinaus- gegangen ist. Denn eine Bestimmtheit, Grenze, ist als Schranke nur bestimmt, in Gegensatz gegen sein Anderes iiberhaupt, als gegen sein Unbeschriinktes; das Andere einer Schranke ist eben das Hinaus iiber dieselbe.”’ Hegel, Logik, (Werke, 111. p. 136). Compare Encyhlopidie, ὃ 60, (Werke, VI. p.121). In maintaining that a limit as such always implies something beyond, and, consequently, that the notion of a limited universe is self-contradictory, He- gel is unquestionably right; but he is wrong in attempting to infer from thence the non-limitation of thought. For that which is limited is not necessarily limited by some- thing of the same kind ;—nay, the very conception of kinds is itself a limitation. Hence the consciousness that thought is limited by something beyond itself, by no means implies LECTURE II. 315 that thought itself transcends that limit. A prisoner chained up feels that his motion is limited, by his inability to move into the space which he sees or émagines beyond the length of his chain. On Hegel’s principles, he ought to know his inability by actually moving into it. Note 37. p. 58. These opposite limitations fall under the general Law of the Conditioned enunciated by Sir W. Hamilton. “The mind is astricted to think in certain forms; and, under these, thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, but of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the other is necessarily true!.”” The lamented author has left us only a few fragmentary specimens of the application of this canon to the vexed questions of metaphysical specula- tion, and the principal one of these, in some of its details, may be open to objections; but the truth of the principle itself is unquestionable; and its value, rightly applied, in confining the inquiries of philosophy within their legiti- mate boundaries, can hardly be estimated too highly. Note 38. p. 58. “ Alles Endliche ist, vermége seines Begriffes, begrenzt durch sein Entgegengesetztes: und absolute Endlichkeit ist ein sich selbst widersprechender Begriff.” Fichte, Grund- lage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, (Werke, 1. p. 185.) Note 39. p. 62. Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, p. 98,122,137. For the influence of Kant on the rationalist theology, see Rosenkranz, Geschichte der Kant’schen Philo- sophie, b. III. cap. 2. Amand Saintes, Histoire du Rational- isme en Allemagne, |. 11. ch. 11. Kahnis, History of German Protestantism, translated by Meyer, p. 167. 1 Discussions, p. 618. 316 NOTES. Note 40. p. 62. Paulus, in the preface to his Leben Jesu. expressly adopts, though without naming the author, Kant’s theory, that miracles are indifferent to religion, and that the whole essence of Christianity consists in morality. Consistently with these principles, he maintains (§ 2) that the historical inquirer can admit no event as credible which cannot be explained by natural causes. The entire details of the evangelical narrative are explained by this method. The miracles of healing were performed by medical skill, which Christ imparted to his disciples, and thus was enabled to heal, not by a word, but by deputy. Thus he coolly trans- lates the words of the centurion, Matt. vii. 8, ‘‘ Wenn auch Er nur einen Befehl an einen der Seinigen geben wolle, um in seinem namen fiir die Heilung zu sorgen.” The feeding of the five thousand consisted merely in per- suading the richer travellers to share their provisions with the poorer. The stilling of the tempest was effected by steering round a point which cut off the wind. Lazarus and the widow’s son of Nain, were both cases of premature interment. Our Lord’s own death was merely a swoon, from which he was restored by the warmth of the sepul- chre and the stimulating effect of the spices. Such are a few specimens of /zstorical inquiry. The various explana- tions of Paulus are examined in detail, and completely re- futed by Strauss. The natural hypothesis had to be anni- hilated, to make way for the mythical. Note 41. p. 62. Wegscheider, though he expressly rejects Kant’s alle- gorizing interpretations of Scripture, (see Justitutiones The- ologi@, ὃ 25.) agrees with him in maintaining the supreme authority of reason in all religious questions, and in ac- commodating all religious doctrines to Ethical precepts. (Pref. p.viil. ix.) Accordingly, in the place of the allegory, he adopts the convenient theory of adaptation to the pre- judices of the age; by which a critic is enabled at once to set aside all doctrines which do not harmonize with his LECTURE II. 317 theory. Among the doctrines thus rejected, as powerless for the true end of religion, and useless or even prejudicial to piety, are those of the Trinity, the Atonement, the Cor- ruption of human nature, Justification, and the Resurrec- tion of the body. See ὃ 51. Note 42. p. 62. See his Grund-und-Glaubens-Sdtze der Evangelisch-Pro- testantischen Kirche, p. 70 (2nd edition). This work of Réhr was principally directed against the Lutheran sym- bolical books; but the Catholic Creeds are also included in his sweeping condemnations. Of the Apostles’ Creed he observes: “ Our age needs a more logically correct, and a more comprehensive survey of the pure evangelical faith than is afforded by the so-called Apostles’ Creed, which is good for its immediate and ordinary purpose, but too short, too aphoristic, and too historical for that which is here proposed.” (p. 49.) Of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds he remarks in a note: ‘‘ The Niceno-Constantino- politan and the pseudo-Athanasian Creeds, with their de- eidedly antiscriptural dogmas, are here altogether out of the question, however much they were admitted by the reformers, in ail honesty and faith, as truly scriptural.” Rohr agrees with Kant in separating the historical facts of Christianity from the religion itself (p. 157.), and in main- taining that morality is the only mode of honouring God. (p. 56). His proposed creed, from which every thing “ his- torical” is studiously excluded, runs as follows :— There is one true God, proclaimed to us by his only- begotten Son, Jesus Christ. To this God, as the most perfect of all Beings, as the Creator, Sustainer, and Go- vernor of the world, and as the Father and Instructor of men and of all rational spirits, the deepest veneration is due. This veneration is best rendered by active striving after virtue and righteousness, by zealous control of the inclinations and passions of our sensual and evilly-disposed nature, and by honest entire fulfilment of our duty, accord- ing to the exalted example of Jesus, whereby we may assure ourselves of the aid of his divine Spirit. In the 918 NOTES. consciousness of the filial relation into which we thereby enter with him, we may, in earthly need, reckon with con- fidence on his fatherly help, in the feeling of our moral weakness and unworthiness, upon his grace and mercy assured to us through Christ, and in the moment of death be assured that we shall continue to exist immortally and receive a recompense in a better life.” The celebrated Briefe tiber den Rationalismus, by the same author, have at least the merit of being an honest and logical exposition of Rationalist principles and their con- sequences, without disguise or compromise. The commend- ation, however, to which in this respect the work is partly entitled, cannot be extended to the concluding letter, in which the author endeavours to establish, for himself and his fellow rationalists, the right to discharge the spiritual functions, and subscribe to the confessions, of a church whose doctrines they disbelieve ; and even to make use of their position to unsettle the faith of the young committed to their instruction. Note 43. p. 62. The character of Hegel’s philosophy in this respect is sufficiently shewn by Strauss, Strevtschriften, Heft III. ἘΞ 57 Β6η, Note 44. p. 62. Vatke’s Religion des Alten Testamentes, forms the first part of his Biblische Theologie wissenschaftlich dargestellt ; Berlin, 1835. In the Introduction (§ 7, 12, 13.) the author lays down a law of the development of religion as a process of the infinite Spirit in self-revelation, according to the prin- ciples of the Hegelian philosophy. As a consequence of this law, he maintains that it is impossible for an individual to raise himself, even by the aid of divine revelation, above the spiritual position of his age, or for a nation to rise or fall from its normal stage of religious cultivation (pp. 87, 181). By this canon the entire narrative of Scripture is made to stand or fall. The account of a primitive revela- tion and subsequent alienation from God, must be rejected, because the human consciousness must attain to perfection LECTURE II. 319 through a succession of progressive stages (p. 102). The book of Genesis has no historical value; and we cannot de- cide whether the patriarchs before Moses had any know- ledge of the one true God (pp. 180, 184). Moses himself, as represented in the scriptural account, is altogether in- conceivable ; for he appears at a period when, according to the laws of historical development, the time was not yet ripe for him (p. 183). Much of the history of Moses must be regarded as a mythus, invented by the priests at a later period (p. 186). The political institutions attributed to him could not possibly have been founded by him (p. 211). The ceremonial laws are such as could neither have been discovered by an individual nor made known by divine reve- lation (p. 218). The Passover was originally a feast of the sun, in celebration of his entering into the sign Aries ; which fully accounts for the offering of a male lamb (p. 492). As regards the decalogue, the second commandment must be considered as an interpolation of a later date; for it implies a higher degree of abstraction than could have been reached in the Mosaic age (p. 234). The lapses into idolatry recorded in the book of Judges, are highly improbable ; for a whole people cannot fall back from a higher to a lower state of religious culture (p. 181). The books of Samuel betray their legendary origin by the occurrence of round numbers, and by the significant names of the first three kings (p. 289). The wisdom attributed to Solomon is irre- concilable with his subsequent idolatry; and the account must therefore be regarded as legendary (p. 309). Such are a few of the results of the so-called philosophy of his- tory, exercised on the narrative of Scripture. The book is valuable in one respect, and in one only. It shews the reckless manner in which rationalism finds it necessary to deal with the sacred text, before it can be accommodated to the antisupernatural hypothesis. ‘To those who believe that a record of facts as they are is more trustworthy than a theory of facts as they ought to be on philosophical principles, the very features which the critic is compelled to reject, become additional evidence of the truth of the scripture narrative. 320 NOTES. Note 45. p. 62. The Hegelian element of Strauss’s Leben Jesu is briefly exhibited at the end of the book (§ 150). The body of the work is mainly occupied with various small cavils of the very minutest philosophy, designed to invalidate the his- torical character of the Gospel narratives. Among these precious morsels of cxiticism, we meet with such objections as the following. That the name of the angel Gabriel is of Hebrew origin (δ 17). That the angel, instead of in- flicting dumbness on Zacharias, ought to have merely reprimanded him (idid.). That a real angel would not have proclaimed the advent of the Messiah in language so strictly Jewish (§ 25). That the appearance of the star to the magi would have strengthened the popular belief in the false science of astrology (ὃ 34). That John the Baptist, being an ascetic, and therefore necessarily prejudiced and narrow-minded, could not have considered himself inferior to one who did not practise similar mortifications (§ 46). That Jesus could not have submitted to the rite of bap- tism, because that rite symbolized a future Messiah (§ 49). That if there is a personal devil, he cannot take a visible form (§ 54). That it is improbable that Jesus, when he read in the synagogue at Nazareth, should have lighted on an apposite passage of the prophet Isaiah ($58). That Jesus could not have known that the woman of Samaria had had five husbands, because it is not probable that each of them had left a distinct image in her mind, and because a minute knowledge of the history of individuals is de- grading to the prophetic dignity (δ 69). That it is impos- sible to understand ‘“ how he, whose vocation had reference to the depths of the human heart, should be tempted to occupy himself with the fish-frequented depths of the waters.” (§71). That Jesus could not have ridden into Jerusalem on an ass whereon never man sat, because un- broken asses are difficult to manage (ὃ 110). That the resurrection of the dead is impossible, because the infe- rior principles, whose work is corruption, will ποῦ be in- clined to surrender back the dominion of the body to its ‘former master, the soul (δ 140). That the ascension of LECTURE II. 321 Christ is impossible, because a body which has fiesh and bones cannot be qualified for a heavenly abode; because it cannot liberate itself from the laws of gravity; and because it is childish to regard heaven as a definite locality (§ 142).—It is not creditable to the boasted en- lightenment of the age, that a work full of such petty quibbles as these should have obtained so much reputation and influence. In studying the philosophy which has given birth to such consequences, we see a new verification of the significant remark of Clemens Alexandrinus: Ἢ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν θείαν παράδοσιν φιλοσοφία ἵστησι τὴν πρύνοιαν καὶ βεβαιοῖ: ἧς ἀναιρεθείσης, μῦθος ἡ περὶ τὸν Σωτῆρα οἰκονομία φαίνεται τι, “" Strauss, the Hegelian theologian,” says Sir W. Hamilton, “sees in Christianity only a mythus. Na- turally: for his Hegelian ‘ Idea,’ itself a myth, and con- fessedly finding itself in every thing, of course finds in anything a myth.” As the labours of Strauss on the Gospel narratives have been sometimes compared to those of Niebuhr on the history of Rome, it may be in- structive to peruse the opinion of the great historian on the cognate theories of a few years’ earlier date. ““ In my opinion,” writes Niebuhr in 1818, “he is not a Pro- testant Christian, who does not receive the historical facts of Christ’s earthly life, in their literal acceptation, with all their miracles, as equally authentic with any event recorded in history, and whose belief in them is not as firm and tranquil as his belief in the latter; who has not the most absolute faith in the articles of the Apostles’ Creed, taken in their grammatical sense; who does not consider every doctrine and every precept of the New Tes- tament as undoubted divine revelation, in the sense of the Christians of the first century, who knew nothing of a ‘Theopneustia. Moreover, a Christianity after the fashion of the modern philosophers and pantheists, without a personal God, without immortality, without human indi- viduality, without historical faith, is no Christianity at all to me; though it may be a very intellectual, very ingenious philosophy. I have often said that I do not know what to m Stromata, I. 11. p. 296. n Discussions, p. 787. 322 NOTES. do with a metaphysical God, and that I will have none but the God of the Bible, who is heart to heart with us °.” Niebuhr did not live to witness the publication of the Leben Jesu ; but the above passage is as appropriate as if it had been part of an actual review of that work. Note 46. p. 62. With Feuerbach’s Wesen des Christenthums I am only acquainted through the French translation by M. Ewer- beck, which forms the principal portion of the volume en- titled, Quw’est-ce que la Religion d’aprés la nouvelle Philoso- phie Allemande. The following extracts will sufficiently shew the character of the work. “Le grand mystére, ou plutédt le grand secret, de la religion, le voici: Thomme objective son étre, et apres l’avoir objectivé il se rend lui- méme objet de ce nouveau sujet” (p. 129). ‘‘ Dieu est la no- tion, Pidée personnifiée de la personnalité, il est l’'apothéose de la personne humaine, le moi sans le toi, la fiére subjec- tivité séparée davec TPunivers, Pégoité qui se suffit a elle- méme” (Ρ. 219). ‘‘ Dieu est la notion du genre, mais cette notion personnifiée et individualisée ἃ son tour; il est la notion du genre ou son essence, et cette essence comme entité universelle, comme renfermant toutes les perfections possibles, comme possédant toutes les qualités humaines débarrassées de leurs limites” (p.271). ‘ La, ot la religion exprime le rapport entre Phomme et l’essence humaine, elle est bonne et humanitaire. La, ot la religion exprime le rapport entre Phomme et Pessence humaine changée en un étre surnaturel, elle est illogique, menteuse, et porte dans ses flancs le germe de toutes les horreurs qui désolent la so- ciété depuis soixante siécles” (p. 340). “ L’athéisme est le fruit de la contradiction dans VPexistence de Dieu...... On nous dit que Dieu existe réellement et non-réellement a la fois, nous avons done parfaitement le droit de couper court a cette existence absurde et de dire: il n’y a pas de Dieu.” (p. 350). “Nous inférons de ce qui précéde que la per- sonnalité divine, dont Phomme se sert pour attribuer ses propres idées et ses propres qualités ἃ un étre surhumain, © Life and Letters of B. G. Niebuhr, vol. 11. p. 123. LECTURE II. 323 n’est rien autre chose que la personnalité humaine mise en dehors du moi. C’est cet acte psychologique qui est de- venu la base de la doctrine spéculative de Hegel, qui enseigne que la conscience que homme a de Dieu est la conscience que Dieu a de lui-méme” (p. 390). The occa- sional notes which the translator has added to this work are, if possible, still more detestable than the text. So much disregard of truth and decency as is shewn in some of his remarks on Christianity has probably seldom been compressed into the same compass. Note 47. p. 65. “ Christ, who taught his disciples, and us in them, how to pray, propounded not the knowledge of God, though without that he could not hear us; neither represented he his power, though without that he cannot help us; but comprehended all in this relation, When ye pray, say, Our Father.” Pearson on the Creed, article I. Ν ΘΟ & LECTURE UL Note 1. p. 70. “A LLES, was fiir uns Htwas ist, ist es nur, inwiefern es etwas anderes auch nicht ist; alle Position ist nur méglich durch Negation; wie denn das Wort destemmen selbst nichts anderes bedeutet, als beschranken.” Fichte, Gerichtliche Verantwortung, (Werke,V.p.265). “Das Endliche besteht in Beziehung auf sein Anderes, welches seine Negation ist und sich als dessen Granze darstellt.” Hegel, Encyktl. § 28. (Werke, vi. p. 63.) Compare Plotinus, Enn. V. 1. III. 6. 12. To δὲ ἔστιν, dvev τοῦ τι, ἕν. εἰ γάρ τι ἕν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸ ἕν" TO γὰρ αὐτὸ πρὸ τοῦ τι. πη. Ν].1. VII. ¢. 39. Δεῖ γὰρ τὸν νοῦν ἀεὶ ἑτερότητα καὶ ταυτότητα λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ νοήσει. “Eautdv τε γὰρ οὐ διακρινεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἑτέρου σχέσει, τά τε πάντα οὐ θεωρήσει, μηδεμίας ἑτερότητος γενομένης, εἰς τὸ πάντα εἶναι. Spinoza, Hpist. 50. ““Ηξθοὸ ergo determinatio ad rem juxta suum esse non pertinet; sed e contra est ejus non-esse.” The canon, undeniable from a human point of view, that all consciousness is limitation, seems to have had some influence on modern philosophical theories concerning the Divine Nature. Thus Hegel maintains that God must become limited to be conscious of himself, and defines Religion as the Divine Spirit’s knowledge of him- self, by means of the finite Spirit >. Note 2. p. 71. “Tta nullis unquam fatigabimur disputationibus de in- nito. Nam sane quum simus finiti, absurdum esset nos a Werke, XI. p. 193. » Ibid. p. 200. LECTURE III. 325 aliquid de ipso determinare, atque sic illud quasi finire ac comprehendere conari.” Descartes, Principia, I.26. ‘The second reason of our short and imperfect notions of the Deity is, the Infinity of it. For this we must observe, That we can perfectly know and comprehend nothing, but as it is represented to us under some certain Bounds and Limit- tations... .Upon which account, what a loss must we needs be at, in understanding or knowing the Divine Nature, when the very way of our knowing seems to carry in it something opposite to the thing known. For the way of knowing is by defining, limiting, and determining; and the thing known is that of which there neither are nor can be any Bounds, Limits, Definitions, or Determinations.” South, Animadversions upon Sherlock, ch. 11. p. 55. ed. 1693. «Alles unser Denken ist ein Beschranken; und eben in dieser Ruicksicht heisst es degreifen; zusammengreifen etwas aus einer Masse von bestimmbaren ; so dass immer ausser- halb der gezogenen Grenze noch etwas bleibe, das nicht mit hineingegriffen ist, und also dem Begriffenen nicht zu- kommt.” Fichte, Gerichtliche Verantwortung, (Werke, V. p. 265). “ Was ich begreife, wird durch mein blosses Be- greifen zum Endlichen, und dieses lisst auch durch unend- liche Steigerung und Erhdhung sich nie ins Unendliche umwandeln.” Fichte, Bestimmung des Menschen, (Werke, {I. p. 304). “Das Subject ohne Prddicat ist, was in der Erscheinung das Ding ohne Eigenschaften, das Ding-an-sich ist, ein leerer unbestimmter Grund ; es ist so der Begriff in sich selbst, welcher erst am Pridicate eine Unterscheid- ung und Bestimmtheit erhalt.” Hegel, Logit, 'Th. II. (Werke, V. p. 70). Compare Philosophie der Religion, (Werke, XI. p.30). Enceyklopddie, ὃ 28, 29, (Werke, VI. p. 65). Note 3. p. 72. The opposite sides of this contradiction are indicated in the following passages. Aristotle, Phys. II]. 6,13: "Ἔστι γὰρ TO ἄπειρον τῆς τοῦ μεγέθους τελειότητος ὕλη Kal TO δυνάμει ὅλον, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ...... Διὸ καὶ ἄγνωστον ἣ ἄπειρον. εἶδος γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὕλη. Compare Metaph. viii. 8,16: Τὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι" τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυ- 326 NOTES. νατὸν καὶ εἷναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι τὸ δ᾽ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι, φθαρτόν... . Οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἁπλῶς δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὃν ἁπλῶς. For a full discus- sion of the distinction between potentiality and actuality, (the δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια or ἐνέργεια of Aristotle), see Trendelenburg on Arist. De Anima, p.295. Compare Arist. Metaph. viii. 6. 2: Ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν TO πρᾶγμα, μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει. Λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατὸς ἢ θεωρῆσαι" τὸ δ᾽ ἐνεργείᾳ. This distinction plays a part in the con- troversy between Bramhall and Hobbes, the former of whom says, “The nearer that any thing comes to the es- sence of God, the more remote it is from our apprehension. But shall we therefore make potentialities, and sueccessive duration, and former and latter, or a part without a part (as they say), to be in God? Because we are not able to understand clearly the Divine perfection, we must not there- fore attribute any imperfection to Hime.” To this Hobbes replies, “* Nor do I understand what derogation it can be to the divine perfection, to attribute to it potentiality, that 1s, in English, power 4.” “ By potentiality,” retorts Bramhall, “he understandeth ‘power’ or might; others understand possibility or indetermination. [8 not he likely to confute the Schoolmen to good purpose®?” Hobbes concludes by saying, “‘ There is no such word as potentiality in the Serip- tures, nor in any author of the Latin tongue. It is found only in School divinity, as a word of art, or rather as a word of craft, to amaze and puzzle the laity ‘” This charge may be answered in the words of Trendelenburg. “In expli- candis his notionibus, ex ipso philosophize secessu deprom- tis, Latinee lingue in philosophicis et laxa remissio et lzeva inopia in augustias quasdam nos rediget, ut perspicuitatis gratia ad scholasticos terminos confugiendum sit 8.” But to go from the word to the thing. The contradic- tion thus involved in the notion of the Infinite has given © Works, vol. IV. p. 158. d Works, ed. Molesworth, vol. V. p. 342. © Works, vol. IV. p. 425. ! Works, ed. Molesworth, vol. ΓΝ, p. 299. 5. In Arist, de Anima, p. 295- LECTURE III. 327 rise to two opposite representations of it; the one, as the affirmation of all reality; the other, as the negation of all reality. The older metaphysicians endeavoured to exhaust the infinite by an endless addition of predicates; hence arose the favourite representation of God, as the Huns per- fectissimum, or sum of all realities, which prevailed in the Wolfian Philosophy, and was accepted by Kant. On the other hand, the post-Kantian metaphysicians perceived clearly that all predication is necessarily limitation, and that to multiply attributes is merely to represent the infi- nite under a variety of finite determinations. The con- summation of this point of view was attained in the para- dox of Hegel, that pure being is pure nothing, and that all determinate being (Daseyn) is necessarily limited?. Hence his constant assertion that God cannot be repre- sented’ by predicates*. Both schools of philosophy are right in what they deny, and wrong in what they affirm. The earlier metaphysicians were right in assuming that thought is only possible by means of definite conceptions ; but they were wrong in supposing that any multiplication of such conceptions can amount to a representation of the infinite. The later metaphysicians were right in opposing this error; but they fell into the opposite extreme of ima- gining that by the removal of determinations the act of thought and its object could become infinite. In truth, a thought about nothing is no thought at all; and the re- jection of determinations is simply the refusal to think. The conclusion to be drawn from the entire controversy is, that the infinite, as such, is not an object of human thought. Note 4. p. 73. “The adding infinity to any idea or conception necessarily finite, makes up no other than a curious contradiction for a divine attribute.... You make up an attribute of know- ledge or wisdom infinitely finite; which is as chimerical and h See Wolf, Theologia Naturalis, Pars 11. § 6,14; Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 450, ed. Rosenkranz. i See Werke, III. p. 73; IV. p. 26, 27; V. p. 70; VI. p. 63. k See Werke, VI. p.65; XI. p. 31,153; XII. p. 229, 418. 328 NOTES. gigantic an idea as an infinite human body.” Bp. Browne, Divine Analogy, p. 77. Bedingungen des Unbedingten entdecken, dem absolut Nothwendigen eine Moéglichkeit erfinden, und es construiren zu wollen, um es begreifen zu k6nnen, scheint als ein ungereimtes Unternehmen sogleich einleuchten zu miissen.” Jacobi, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, (Werke, 1V. Abth 11. p. 153). ‘Du bist vom Endlichen nicht dem Grade, sondem der Art nach verschieden. Sie machen dich durch jene Steigerung nur zu einem grosseren Menschen, und immer zu einem grésseren; nie aber zum Gotte, zum Unendlichen, der keines Maasses fahig ist.” Fichte, Bestimmung des Menschen (Werke, Τ1. p. 304. Note 5. p. 73. ‘““Si supponeremus esse hominem, oculis quidem claris ceeterisque videndi organis recte se habentibus compositum, nullo autem alio sensu preeditum, eumque ad eandem rem eodem semper colore et specie sine ulla vel minima varie- tate apparentem obversum esse, mihi certe, quicquid dicant alii, non magis videre videretur, quam ego videor mihi per tactus organa sentire lacertorum meorum ossa. Ea tamen perpetuo et undiquaque sensibilissima membrana continguntur. Attonitum esse et fortasse aspectare eum, sed stupentem dicerem, videre non dicerem; adeo sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt.” Hobbes, Hlementa Philosophie, 1V. 25, 5. Note 6. p. 73. The paradox of Hegel, if applied, where alone we have any data for applying it, to the necessary limits of human thought, becomes no paradox at all, but an obvious truth, almost a truism. Our conceptions are limited to the finite and the determinate; and a thought which is not of any definite object, is but the negation of all thinking. He- gel’s error consists in mistaking an impotence of thought for a condition of existence. That pure being is in itself pure nothing, is more than we can be warranted in assuming; for we have no conception of pure being at all, and no means of judging of the possibility of its existence. The LECTURE III. 329 absurdity becomes still more glaring, when this pure no- thing is represented as containing in itself a process of self-development,—when being and non-being, which are absolutely one and the same, are regarded at the same time as two opposite elements, which by their union con- stitute becoming, and thus give rise to finite existence. But this absurdity is unavoidable in a system which starts with the assumption that thought and being are identical, and thus abolishes at the outset the possibility of distinguish- ing between the impotence of thought and its activity. Note 7. p. 74. Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine gottliche Welt- regierung (Werke, V.p.186). In a subsequent work written in defence of this opinion, Fichte explains himself as mean- ing that existence, as a conception of sensible origin, cannot be ascribed to God!. That the conception of existence is, like all other human representations, incompetent to express the nature of the Absolute, has been frequently admitted, by philosophers and theologians. Thus Plato describes the supreme good, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος Ὁ, and his language is borrowed by Justin Martyr and Atha- nasius, to express the absolute nature of God®. Plotinus in like manner says that the One is above being®; and Schelling, the Plotinus of Germany, asserts that the Abso- lute in its essence is neither ideal nor real, neither thought nor beingP. This position is perfectly tenable, so long as 1 Apellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus (Werke, Vp. 220). m Republic, VI. p. 509. n Justin, Dial. c. Tryph.c.4.’AdAd τι ὃν τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ, φημὶ, ὃν ἐπέκεινα , > , ἢ «ς A a» > \ AX A / Xr A Ν > 6 , πάσης οὐσίας, οὔτε ῥητὸν, οὔτε ἀγορευτὸν, ἀλλὰ μόνον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. Athanasius, c. Gentes, c. 2. 6 ὑπερέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἐπινοίας ὑπάρχων, ἅτε δὴ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὑπερκαλὸς ὦν. Compare Dama- scenus, De Fide Orthod. I. 4. οὐδὲν yap τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν" οὐχ ὡς μὴ ὧν, > a 1 Cae fe ν᾿ 4, See.) foe δ. “(Ὁ 2 GAN ὡς ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, Kal ὑπερ αὑτὸ TO εἰναι ὧν. © Enn. V. 1.10. τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος τὸ ἕν. Compare Proclus, Inst. Theol. 6.115. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶν ἐπέκεινα τῶν εἰρημένων ἅπας θεὸς, ov- σίας, καὶ ζωῆς; καὶ νοῦ. Ρ Bruno, p. 57. “ Das Absolute nun haben wir bestimmt als, dem Ξ : Ἵ Δαν 95 Wesen nach, weder ideal noch real, weder als Denken, noch als Seyn. 990 NOTES. it is confessed that the Absolute is not the object of theo- logical or philosophical speculation, and, consequently, that the provinces of thought and existence are not coextensive. But without this safeguard, there is no middle course be- tween an illogical theology and an atheistical logic. The more pious minds will take refuge in mysticism, and seek to reach the absolute by a superhuman process: the more consistent reasoners will rush into the opposite extreme, and boldly conclude that that which is inconceivable is also non-existent. Note 8. p. 74. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VIL. 311. Ὅλον δ᾽ ὄντος τοῦ καταλαμβάνοντος οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔσται TO καταλαμβανόμενον" τῶν δὲ ἀλογωτάτων ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι μὲν τὸν καταλαμβάνοντα, μὴ εἶναι δὲ τὸ οὗ eorly ἣ κατάληψις. Plotinus, an. V. IIT. το. Δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ νοοῦν, ὅταν von, ἐν δυσὶν εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἔξω θάτε- ρον, ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄμφω, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ἑτερότητι τὴν νόησιν εἶναι. Compare Hegel, Philosophie der Religion (Werke, X1.p.167), “Im Bewusstseyn, insofern ich von einem Gegenstande weiss und ich in mich gegen denselben reflectirt bin, weiss ich den Gegenstand als das Andere meiner, mich daher durch ihn beschrinkt und endlich.” Marheineke, Grundlehren, § 84. ‘ Dieses aber geschieht so, dass in der absoluten Idee, in der die Wissenschaft ihren Standpunct nimmt, das Subject nicht ein Anderes, als das Object, sondern, wie sie die Idee des Absoluten ist, als des Objects, es so auch in ihr, als der absoluten Idee, Subject, und also die absolute Idee nicht von Gott selbst verschieden ist.” Note 9. p. 76. In exhibiting the two universal conditions of human con- sciousness, that of difference between objects, and that of relation between olject and subject, 1 have considered each with reference to its more immediate and obvious applica- tion; the former being viewed in connection with the In- finite, and the latter with the Absolute. But at the same time it is obvious that the two conditions are so intimately connected together, and the ideas to which they relate so mutually involved in each other, that either argument LECTURE III. 331 might be employed with equal force in the other direction. For difference is a relation, as well as a limit; that which is one out of many being related to the objects from which it is distinguished. And the subject and object of con- sciousness, in like manner, are not only related to, but dis- tinguished from, each other; and thus each is a limit to the other: while, if either of them could be destroyed, a conception of the infinite by the finite would be still im- possible; for either there would be no infinite to be con- ceived, or there would be no finite to conceive it. The three Laws of Thought commonly acknowledged by logicians, those of Identity, Contradiction, and Exeluded Middle, are but the above two conditions viewed in rela- tion to a given notion. For in the first place, every definite notion, as such, is discerned in the two relations of identity and difference, as being that which it is, and as distin- guished from that which it is not. These two relations are expressed by the Laws of Identity and Contradiction. And in the second place, a notion is distinguished from all that it is not (A from not-A), by means of the mutual relation of both objects to a common subject, the universe of whose consciousness is constituted by this distinction. This mu- tual relation is expressed by the Law of Excluded Middle. Note 10. p. 76. “Though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a Being absolutely perfect ; such a one as is nostro modulo conformis, ‘agreeable and pro- portionate to our measure and scantling ;’ as we may ap- proach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms.” Cudworth, Intellectual System, ch. 5, (vol. II. p. 518, ed. Harrison). “ We grant that the mind is limited, but does it thence follow that the object of thought must be limited? We think not. We grant that the mind cannot embrace the Infinite, but we nevertheless consider that the mind may have a notion of the Infinite. No more do we believe that the mind, as finite, can only 332 NOTES. recognise finite objects, than we believe that the eye, be- cause limited in its power, can only recognise those objects whose entire extension comes within the range of vision. As well tell us that because a mountain is too large for the eye of a mole, therefore the mole can recognise no moun- tain: as well tell us that because the world is too large for the eye of a man, therefore man can recognise no world,— as tell us that because the Infinite cannot be embraced by the finite mind, therefore the mind can recognise no Infi- nite.” Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, p.12. The illustrations employed by both authors are unfortunate. The part of the mountain, touched by the hand of the man, or seen by the eye of the mole, is, ex hypothesi, as a part of a larger object, imperfect, relative, and finite. And the world, which is confessedly too large for the eye of a man, must, in its unseen portion, be apprehended, not by sight, but by some other faculty. If therefore the Infinite is too large for the mind of man, it can only be recognised by some other mind, or by some faculty in man which is not mind. But no such faculty is or can be assumed. In ad- mitting that we do not recognise the Infinite in its entire extension, it is admitted that we do not recognise it as in- finte. The attempted distinction is sufficiently refuted in the words of Bishop Browne. “If it is said that we may then apprehend God directly, though not comprehend him; that we may have a direct and immediate knowledge partly, and in some degree ; and though not of his Hssence, yet of the Perfections flowing from it: I answer, That all the Attributes and Perfections of God are in their real Nature as infinite as his very Essence; so that there can be no such thing as having a direct view of him in part; for whatever is in God is equally Infinite. If God is to be apprehended at all by any direct and immediate idea, he must be apprehended as Junfinite; and in that very act of the mind, he would be comprehended ; and there is no me- dium between apprehending an Infinite Being directly and andlogically?.” P Divine Analogy, p. 37. The author is speaking of our knowledge LECTURE III. 333 Note 11. p. 80. The brevity with which this argument is necessarily ex- pressed in the text, may render a few words of explanation desirable. Of course, it is not meant that no period of time can be conceived, except in a time equally long; for this would make a thousand years as inconceivable as an eternity. But though there is nothing inconceivable in the notion of a thousand years or any other large amount of time, such a notion is conceivable only under the form of a portion of time, having other time before and after it. An infinite duration, on the other hand, can only be con- ceived as having no time before or after it, and hence as having no relation or resemblance to any amount of finite time, however great. The mere conception of an indefinite duration, bounding every conceivable portion of time, is thus wholly distinct from that of infinite duration ; for in- finity can neither bound nor be bounded by any duration beyond itself. This distinction has perhaps not been sufficiently ob- served by an able and excellent writer of the present day, in a work, the principal portions of which are worthy of the highest commendation. Dr. M‘Cosh argues in behalf of a positive conception of infinity, in opposition to the theory of Sir W. Hamilton, in the following manner: “ ‘To whatever point we go out in imagination, we are sure that we are not at the limits of existence; nay, we believe that, to whatever farther point we might go, there would be something still farther on.” “Such,” he continues, ‘‘ seems to us to be the true psychological nature of the mind’s conviction in regard to the infinite. It is not a mere im- potence to conceive that existence, that time or space, should cease, but a positive affirmation that they do not cease 4.”” To this argument it may be objected, in the first place, that this “‘ something still farther on” is not itself primarily in a future state; but his arguments are more properly applicable to our present condition. 4 Method of the Divine Government, p. 534, 4th edition. 904 NOTES. an object of conception, but merely the boundary of con- ception. It is a condition unavoidable by all finite thought, that whatever we conceive must be related to something else which we do not conceive. I think of a thousand years as bounded by a further duration beyond it. But if, se- condarily, we turn our attention to this boundary itself, it is not then actually conceived as either limited or unlimited on its remoter side: we do not positively think of it as having no boundary; we only refrain from thinking of it as having a boundary. It is thus presented to us as i- definite, but not as imfinite. And the result will be the same, if to our conception of a thousand years we add cycle upon cycle, till we are wearied with the effort. An idea which we tend towards, but never reach, is indefinite, but not infinite; for, at whatever point we rest, there are con- ditions beyond, which remain unexhausted. In the second place, even if we could positively conceive this further duration as going on for ever, we should still be far removed from the conception of infinity. For such a duration is given to us as bounding and bounded by our original conception of a thousand years: it is limited at its nearer extremity, though unlimited at the other. If this be regarded as infinite, we are reduced to the self-contra- dictory notion of infinity related to a time beyond itself. is a thousand years, plus its infinite boundary, greater than that boundary alone, or not? If it is, we have the absur- dity of a greater than the infinite. If it is not, the original conception of a thousand years, from relation to which that of infinity is supposed to arise, is itself reduced to a non-entity, and cannot be related to any thing. This con- tradiction may be avoided, if we admit that our conception of time, as bounded, implies an apprehension of the in- definite, but not of the infinite. But possibly, after all, the difference between Dr. M¢Cosh’s view and that of sir W. Hamilton, may be rather verbal than real. For the subsequent remarks of the former are such as might be fully accepted by the most uncom- promising adherent of the latter. ‘The mind seeks in vain to embrace the infinite in a positive image, but is con- LECTURE III. 335 strained to believe, when its efforts fail, that there is a something to which no limits can be put.” All that need practically be contended for by the supporters of the nega- tive theory, is, first, that this inability to assign limits in- dicates directly only an indefiniteness in our manner of thinking, but not necessarily an infinity in the object about which we think; and, secondly, that our indirect belief in the infinite, whether referred to an impotence or to a power of mind, is not of such a character that we can de- duce from it any logical consequences available in philoso- phy or in theology. The sober and reverent tone of reli- gious thought which characterizes Dr. McCosh’s writings, warrants the belief that he would not himself repudiate these conclusions. Note 12. p. 80. For the antagonist theories of a beginning of time itself, and of an eternal succession in time, see Plato, Timeus, p- 37, 38, and Aristotle, Phys. VIII.1. The two theories are ably contrasted in Professor Butler’s Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. 11. p. 185 sqq. Plato does not appear to regard the beginning of time as the beginning of material existence, but only of the sensible phenomena of matter. The insensible substratum of the phenomena seems to have been regarded by him as co- eternal with the Deity". It has been conjectured, indeed, that to this matter was attributed a perpetual existence in successive duration, as distinguished from the existence of the Deity, in a manner devoid of all succession’. This hypothesis: perhaps relieves the theory from the apparent paradox of an existence before time, (before being itself a temporal relation,) but it cannot be easily reconciled with the language of Plato; and moreover, it only avoids one t See Timeus, p. 49-53. Plato’s opinion however has been variously represented. For some account of the controversies on this point, see Mosheim’s Dissertation, De Creatione ex Nihilo, translated in Harri- son’s edition of Cudworth, vol. III. p. 140; Brucker, Historia Philo- sophie, vol. 1. p. 676. Compare also Professor Thompson’s note, in Butler’s Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. II. p. 189. s See Mosheim’s note in Harrison’s Cudworth, vol. II. p. 551- 336 NOTES. paradox by the introduction of another, —that of a state of existence out of time contemporaneous with one in time. Note 13. p. 80. In Joann. Hoang. Tract. XX XVIII. 10. “ Diseute rerum mutationes, invenies Fuit et Erit: cogita Deum, invenies Kst, ubi Fuit et Erit esse non possit.” Compare Confess. XI. ¢. 11; Hnarr in Ps. 11. 7; De Civ. Det, XI. 21. See also Cudworth, vol. IT. p. 529. ed. Harrison; Herder, Gott. Werke, Ν 111. p. 139. Note 14. p. 80. De Consol. Philos. L. V. Pr. 6. “ Adternitas igitur est in- terminabilis vitee tota simul et perfecta possessio.” Note 15. p. 80. Summa, P. 1. Qu. X. Art. I. “Sic ergo ex duobus noti- ficatur eeternitas. Primo ex hoc, quod id quod est in eter- nitate est interminabile, id est, principio et fine carens; ut terminus ad utrumque referatur. Secundo per hoc, quod ipsa zeternitas successione caret, tota simul existens.” Compare Plotinus, Han. 11. 1, vii. 6. 2. Πάντα ταῦτα ἰδὼν αἰῶνα εἶδεν, ἰδὼν ζωὴν μένουσαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀεὶ παρὸν τὸ πᾶν ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νῦν μὲν τόδε, αὖθις δ᾽ ἕτερον, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τὰ πάντα. Proclus, 7η8έ. Theol. ¢. 52. Πᾶν τὸ αἰώνιον ὅλον ἅμα ἐστίν. Several historical notices relating to this theory are given by Petavius, Theologica Dogmata, De Deo, 1]. III. 6. 4. Note 16. p. 81. “Nec tamen fieri potest, ut recordemur nos ante corpus exstitisse, quandoquidem nec in corpore ulla ejus vestigia dari, nee «ternitas tempore definiri, nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest.” Spinoza, Hithica, P. V. Prop. 23. ‘“‘Kwigkeit 1m reinen Sinne des Worts kann dureh keine Zeitdauer erklirt werden, gesetzt, dass man diese auch endlos (¢ndefinite) annahme. Dauer ist eine unbestimmte Fortsetzung des Daseyns, die schon in jedem Moment ein Mass der Verginglichkeit, des Zukunftigen wie des Ver- gangenen, mit sich fiihret. Dem Unvergiinglichen, durch LECTURE III. 337 sich Unveranderlichen kann sie so wenig zugeschrieben werden, dass vielmehr sein reiner Begriff’ mit dieser zu gemischten Pantasie verschwindet.” Herder, Gott, (Werke, VIII. p. 140). ‘‘Insofern das Ich ewig ist, hat es gar keine Dauer. Denn Dauer ist nur in Bezug auf Objekte denkbar. Man spricht von einer Ewigkeit der Dauer (zeviternitas), d. 1. von einem Daseyn in aller Zeit, aber Ewigkeit im reinen Sinne des Worts (eternitas) ist Seyn in keiner Zeit.” Schelling, Vom Ich, § 15. Cognate to, or rather identical with, these speculations, is the theory ad- vocated by Mr. Maurice (Theological Essays, p. 422 sqq.), “that eternity is not a lengthening out or continuation of time; that they are generically different.” Note 17. p. 82. In the acute and decisive criticism of Schelling by Sir W. Hamilton, this objection is urged with great effect. “We cannot, at the same moment, be in the intellectual intuition and in common consciousness; we must therefore be able to connect them by an act of memory—of recol- lection. But how can there be a remembrance of the Ab- solute and its Intuition? As out of time, and space, and relation, and difference, it is admitted that the Absolute cannot be construed to the understanding. But as remem- brance is only possible under the conditions of the under- standing, it is consequently impossible to remember any thing anterior to the moment when we awaken into con- sciousness; and the clairvoyance of the Absolute, even granting its reality, is thus, after the crisis, as if it had never been.”’ Discussions, p. 23. Note 18. p. 82. See Augustine, Jn Joann. Evang. Tract. XX XVIII. το. ‘“Cogita Deum, invenies Est, ubi Fuit et Erit esse non possit. Ut ergo et tu sis, transcende tempus. Sed quis transcendet viribus suis? Levet illuc ille qui Patri dixit. Volo ut ubi ego sum, et ipsi sint mecum.”’ This precept has found great favour with mystical theologians. Thus Eckart, in a sermon published among those of Tauler, says, ‘‘ Nothing Δ 338 NOTES. - hinders the soul so much in its knowledge of God as time and place. Time and place are parts, and God is one; therefore, if our soul is to know God, it must know Him above time and placet.” And the author of the Theologia Germanica, c. 7: “If the soul shall see with the right eye into eternity, then the left eye must close itself and refrain from working, and be as though it were dead. For if the left eye be fulfilling its office toward outward things; that is, holding converse with time and the creatures ; then must the right eye be hindered in its working; that is, in its contemplation ¥.” So too Swedenborg, in his Angelic Wis- dom concerning Divine Providence, ὃ 48: ““ What is infinite in itself and eternal in itself is divine, can be seen, and yet cannot be seen by men: it can be seen by those who think of infinite not from space, and of eternal not from time; but cannot be seen by those who think of infinite and eternal from space and time*.” In the same spirit sings Angelus Silesius : “Mensch, wo du deinen Geist schwingst ἄρον Ort und Zeit, So kannst du jeden Blick sein in der Ewigkeit Y.”’ The modern German mysticism is in this respect nowise behind the earlier. Schelling says of his Intuition of the Absolute, “Das reine Selbstbewusstseyn ist ein Act, der ausserhalb aller Zeit liegt und alle Zeit erst constituirt?.” And again, “ Da aber im Absoluten das Denken mit dem Anschauen schlechthin Eins, so werden auch die Dinge nicht bloss durch ihre Begriffe als unendlich, sondern durch ihre Ideen als ewig, mithin ohne alle Beziehung, selbst die der Entgegensetzung, auf Zeit, und mit absoluter Einheit der Moglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, in ihm, als der hochsten Einheit des Denkens und Anschauens, ausgedriickt seyn *.” t Life and Sermons of Dr. John Tauler, translated by Susanna Wink- worth, p. 190. « Theologia Germanica, translated by Susanna Winkworth, p. 20. x English translation, p. 27. Υ Cherubinischer Wandersmann,I.12. Quoted by Strauss, Glaubens- lehre, 11. p. 738. z System des Transcendentalen Idealismus, p. 59. (Werke, III. p. 375.) Bruno, p. 58. LECTURE III. 339 Schleiermacher (Christliche Glaube, § 52) endeavours to find something analogous to the Divine Eternity, in the timeless existence of the personal self, as the permanent subject of successive modes of consciousness. The analogy however fails in two respects; first, because the permanent self cannot be contemplated apart from its successive modes, but is discerned only in relation to them; and, secondly, because, though not itself subject to the condition of sue- cession, it is still in time under that of duration. Kant truly remarks on ail such mystical efforts to transcend time: “Alles lediglich darum, damit die Menschen sich endlich doch einer ewigen Ruhe zu erfreuen haben méch- ten, welche denn ihr vermeintes seliges Ende aller Dinge ausmacht; eigentlich ein Begriff, mit dem ihnen zugleich der Verstand ausgeht und alles Denken selbst ein Ende hat >.” Note 19. p. 82. This is directly admitted by Fichte, who says, in his earliest work, ‘‘ Wie der unendliche Verstand sein Daseyn und seine Kigenschaften anschauen mége, kénnen wir, ohne selbst der unendliche Verstand zu seyn, nicht wissen ©.” But of the two alternatives which this important admission offers, Fichte himself, in his subsequent writings, as well as his successors in philosophy, chose the wrong one. See above, Lecture I. note 29. Note 20. p. 84. ‘* Veber den Sprachgebrauch der Worte Person, Persén- lichkeit, u. f. schlage man Worterbiicher auf... . alle sagen in ihren gesammelten Stellen, dass diese Worte ein Higen- thiimliches oder Besondres unter einer gewissen Apparenz bezeichnen ; welcher Nebenbegriff dem Unendlichen im Gegensatz der Welt gar nicht zukommt.” Herder, Gott, (Werke, VIII. p. 199). ‘ Was nennt ihr denn nun Persén- lichkeit und Bewusstseyn? doch wohl dasjenige, was ihr in euch selbst gefunden, an euch selbst kennen gelernt, und mit Ὁ Das Ende aller Dinge, (Werke, VII. p. 422.) © Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung, (Werke, VY. p. 42). Z 2 340 ~~ NOTES. diesem Namen bezeichnet habt? Dass ihr aber dieses ohne Beschrankung und Endlichkeit schlechterdings nicht denkt, noch denken kénnt, kann euch die geringste Aufmerk- samkeit auf eure Construction dieses Begriffs lehren.” Fichte, Ueber gittliche Weltregierung, (Werke, V. p. 187). Schleiermacher, in like manner, in his second Discourse on Religion, offers a half apology for Pantheism, on the ground of the limitation implied in the notions of personality and consciousness4?. And Strauss remarks: “Als Personen fiihlen und wissen wir uns nur im Unterschiede von andern gleichartigen Personen ausser uns, von denen wir uns un- terscheiden, mithin als endliche; in diesem Gebiete der Endlichkeit und fiir dasselbe gebildet, scheint folglich der Begriff der Persdnlichkeit ausserhalb desselben jeden Sinn zu verlieren, und ein Wesen, welches kein Anderes seines- gleichen ausser sich hat, auch keine Person sein zu kén- nen.”’ Christliche Glaubenslehre, I. p. 504. Note 21. p. 85. De Trinitate, XV. 6. 5. ““ Proinde si dicamus, Atternus, immortalis, incorruptibilis, vivus, sapiens, potens, speciosus, justus, bonus, beatus, spiritus; horum omnium novissimum quod posui quasi tantummodo videtur significare substan- tiam, ceetera vero hujus substantiz qualitates: sed non ita est in illa ineffabili simplicique natura. Quidgquid enim se- cundum qualitates illic dici videtur, secundum substantiam vel essentiam est intelligendum, Absit enim ut spiritus se- cundum substantiam dicatur Deus, et bonus secundum qua- litatem: sed utrumque secundum substantiam....quamvis in Deo idem sit justum esse quod bonum, quod beatum, idemque spiritum esse quod justum et bonum et beatum esse.” Ibid. VI. c. 4. ‘‘ Deo autem hoc est esse quod est fortem esse, aut justum esse, aut sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate, vel multiplici simplicitate dix- eris, quo substantia ejus significetur.” Compare Aquinas, Summa, P. 1. Qu. XL. Art 1: “ Considerandum tamen est, quod propter divinam simplicitatem consideratur duplex d Werke, I. pp. 259, 280. LECTURE III. 341 identitas realis in divinis, eorum que differunt in rebus creatis. Quia enim divina simplicitas excludit compositio- nem forme et materiz, sequitur, quod in divinis idem est abstractum et concretum, ut Deitas et Deus. Quia vero divina simplicitas excludit compositionem subjecti et acci- dentis, sequitur, quod quicquid attribuitur Deo, est ejus essentia: et propter hoc, sapientia et virtus idem sunt in Deo, quia ambo sunt in divina essentia.’”’ See also above, Lecture II. note 26. Note 22. p. 85. Plotinus, Hnn. VI. 1. ix. 6. 6. Πᾶν δ᾽ ὃ ἂν λέγηται ἐνδεὲς, τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ σώζοντός ἐστιν ἐνδεές" ὥστε τῷ ἑνὶ οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ βούλησις τοίνυν οὐδενός" ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ὑπεράγαθον, καὶ αὐτὸ" οὐχ ἑαυτῷ, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις ἀγαθὸν, εἴ τι αὐτοῦ δύναται μεταλαμβάνειν" οὐδὲ νόησις, ἵνα μὴ ἑτερότης, οὐδὲ κίνησις" πρὸ γὰρ κινήσεως καὶ πρὸ νοήσεως. Τί γὰρ καὶ νοήσει; ἑαυτόν. Πρὸ νοήσεως τοίνυν ἀγνοῶν ἔσται, καὶ νοήσεως δεήσεται, ἵνα γυῷ ἑαυτὸν ὁ αὐτάρκης ἑαυτῷς Spinoza, Lth. P. 1. Prop.17. Schol. “Si intellectus ad divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit, uti noster intellectus, posterior (ut plerisque placet) vel si- mul natura esse cum rebus intellectis, quandoquidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate: sed contra veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est, quia talis in Dei in- tellectu existit objective...... Quum itaque Dei intellectus sit unica rerum causa, videlicet (ut ostendimus) tam earum essentize, quam earum existentiz, debet ipse necessario ab iisdem differre tam ratione essentiz, quam ratione existen- tie. Nam causatum differt a sua causa precise in eo, quod a causa habet....... Atqui Dei intellectus est et essentiz et existentize nostri intellectus causa: ergo Dei intellectus, quatenus divinam essentiam constituere con- cipitur, a nostro intellectu tam ratione essentize, quam ra- tione existentiz differt, nec in ulla re, preterquam in nomine, cum eo convenire potest, ut volebamus. Circa voluntatem eodem modo proceditur, ut facile unusquisque videre potest.” Compare P. I. Prop. 32. Cor.1, 2, and P. IT. Prop. 11. Cor., where Spinoza maintains that God is not * eonscious in so far as he is infinite, but becomes conscious in man ;—a conclusion identical with that of the extreme 342 NOTES. Hegelian school; and indeed substantially the same with that of Hegel himself. See above, Lecture I, notes 29, 32. Note 23. p. 86. Anselm. Monolog. c. 66. “Cum igitur pateat quia nihil de hae natura possit percipi per suam proprietatem, sed per aliud, certum est quia per illud magis ad ejus cognitio- nem acceditur, quod illi magis per similitudinem propin- quat. Quicquid enim inter creata constat illi esse similius, id necesse est esse sua natura prestantius....Proculdubio itaque tanto altius creatrix essentia cognoscitur, quanto per propinquiorem sibi creaturam indagatur....Patet itaque quia sicut sola est mens rationalis inter omnes creaturas, quee ad ejus investigationem assurgere valeat; ita nihilo- minus eadem sola est, per quam maxime ipsamet ad ejus- dem inventionem proficere queat.” Compare Aquinas, Summa, Ὁ. I. Qu. X XIX. Art. 3. “ Persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, sive subsistens in rationali natura. Unde, cum omne illud quod est perfec- tionis, Deo sit attribuendum, eo quod ejus essentia continet in se omnem perfectionem, conveniens est ut hoe nomen, persona, de Deo dicatur, non tamen eodem modo quo dici- tur de creaturis; sed excellentiori modo: sicut et alia nomina que creaturis a nobis imposita Deo attribuuntur.” And Jacobi, at the conclusion of an eloquent denunciation of the Pantheism of his own day, truly observes, “ Kin Seyn ohne Selbststeyn ist durchaus und allgemein unmoglich. Ein Selbstseyn aber ohne Bewusstseyn, und wieder ein Bewusstseyn ohne Selbstbewusstseyn, ohne Substanzialitat und wenigstens angelegte Personlichkeit, vollkommen eben so unméglich; eines wie das andre nur gedankenloser Wortschall. Also Gott ist nicht, ist das Nichtseyende im hochsten Sinne, wenn er nicht ein Gest ist; und er ist. kein Geist, wenn ihm die Grundeigenschaft des Geistes, das Selbstbewusstseyn, Substanzialitat und Personlichkeit, man- gelt©.” In the same spirit, and with a just recognition of the © Ueber eine Weissagung Lichtenberg’s, Werke, III. p. 240. Compare also the Preface to Vol. IV. p. xlv. LEOTURE III. 344 limits of human thought, M. Bartholméss says, “Celui qui répugne ἃ emprunter quelques traits de ressemblance A la partie morale de la création, sera forcé d’en tirer de la partie physique, de la partie mathématique, de la partie logique ; il fera Dieu ἃ image du monde corporel, ἃ limage dune grandeur géométrique ou arithmétique, ἃ Vimage d’une abstraction dialectique; toujours, en s’élancant au Créateur, il s’appulera sur un endroit queleconque de la création f.” To the same effect, a distinguished living writer of our own country observes, ‘The worshipper carried through the long avenues of columns and statues, and the splendid halls of the ancient temple of Egyptian Thebes, was not conducted at last to a more miserable termination, when in the inner shrine he found one of the lower animals, than the follower of a modern philosopher, when conducted through processes, laws, and developments, to a divinity who has less of separate sensation, consciousness, and life, than the very brutes which Egypt declared to be its gods ἕξ." Note 24. p. 86. Pensées, P. 1. Art. 1V. § 6. In like manner, in another passage, Pascal says “ Tous les corps, le firmament, les étoiles, la terre, et les royaumes, ne valent pas le moindre des esprits; car il connait tout cela, et soi-méme; et le corps, rien },” The following spirited translation of Jacobi‘ is from the pen of Sir W. Hamilton, and occurs in the second of his Lectures on Metaphysics, shortly to be published. The entire Lecture from which it is taken constitutes a forcible and admirably illustrated argument to the same effect. “Nature conceals God: for through her whole domain Nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient causes without beginning and without end, excluding, with equal necessity, both providence and chance. An inde- f Histoire des doctrines religieuses de la Philosophie Moderne, Intro- duction, p. xli. & McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 461, (4th edition). h Pensées, P. 11. Art X. § 1. i Von den géttlichen Dingen, (Werke, III. p. 425). 344 NOTES. pendent agency, a free original commencement, within her sphere and. proceeding from her powers, is absolutely im- possible. Working without will, she takes counsel neither of the good nor of the beautiful; creating nothing, she casts off from her dark abyss only eternal transformations of herself, unconsciously and without an end; furthering with the same ceaseless industry decline and increase, death and life,—never producing what alone is of God and what supposes liberty,—the virtuous, the immortal. Man reveals God: for Man by his intelligence rises above nature, and in virtue of this intelligence is conscious of himself, as a power not only independent of, but opposed to, nature, and capable of resisting, conquering, and controlling her. As man has a living faith in this power, superior to nature, which dwells in him, so has he a belief in God, a feeling, an experience of his existence. As he does not believe in this power, so does he not believe in God: he sees, he expe- riences naught in existence but nature,—necessity,—fate.” Note 25. p. 87. Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, P. IV, Principia, P. I. §7. That the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum, is not intended as a syllogism, in which thought and existence are two dis- tinct attributes, but as a statement of the fact, that per- sonal existence consists in consciousness, has been suffi- ciently shewn by M. Cousin, in his Essay “ Sur le vrai sens du cogito, ergo sum.” The same view has been well stated by Mr. Veitch, in the introduction to his translation of the Discours de la Méthode, p. xxii. M. Bartholoméss (Histowre des doctrines religieuses, J. p. 23) happily renders ergo by cest-d-dire. It must be remembered, however, that the cogito of Descartes is not designed to express the phe- nomena of reflection alone, but is coextensive with the entire consciousness. This is expressly affirmed in the Principia, P. 1. ὃ 9. “ Cogitationis nomine intelligo illa omnia, que nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est. Atque ita non modo intelligere, velle, imaginari, sed etiam sentire, idem est hic quod cogi-— tare.” The dictum, thus extended, may perhaps be ad- LECTURE IIE. 945 vantageously modified by disengaging the essential from the accidental features of consciousness ; but its main prin- ciple remains unshaken; namely, that our conception of real existence, as distinguished from appearance, is derived from, and depends upon, the distinction between the one conscious subject and the several objects of which he is conscious. The rejection of consciousness, as the primary constituent of substantive existence, constitutes Spinoza’s point of departure from the principles of Descartes, and, at the same time, the fundamental error of his system. Spinoza in fact transfers the notion of substance, which is originally derived from the consciousness of personality, and has no positive significance out of that consciousness, to the absolute, which exists and is conceived by itself,— an object to whose existence consciousness bears no direct testimony, and whose conception involves a self-contra- diction. Note 26. p. 88. “Ich bin, der ich bin. Dieser Machtspruch begriindet alles. Sein Echo in der menschlichen Seele ist die offen- barung Gottes in ihr. ...Was den Menschen zum Mensch- en, d. i. zum Sbenbilde Gottes macht, heisset Vernunft. Diese beginnet mit dem—Ich bin..... Vernunft ohne Per- sonlichkeit ist Unding, das gleiche Unding mit jener Grund- materie oder jenem Urgrunde, welcher Alles und nicht Eines, oder Eines und Keines, die Vollkommenheit des Unvollkommenen, das absolut Unbestimmte ist, und Gott genannt wird von denen, die nicht wissen wollen von dem wahren Gott, aber dennoch sich scheuen ihn zu laugnen —mit den Lippen.” Jacobi, Von den géttlichen Dingen, (Werke, 111. p. 418). Note 27. p. 88. For notices of Schelling’s philosophy in this respect, see Bartholméss, Histoire des doctrines religieuses, 11. p. 116. “‘L’école de Schelling,” says Mme de Stael, ‘‘ suppose que individu périt en nous, mais que les qualités intimes que nous possédons rentrent dans le grand tout de la création éternelle. Cette immortalité-la ressemble terriblement a 346 NOTES. la mort Κ. The tendency of Hegel’s teaching is in the same direction; the individual being with him only an im- perfect and insignificant phase of the universal!: and a personal immortality, though not openly denied, seems ex- cluded by inference; an inference which his successors have not hesitated to make™. Schleiermacher concludes his Second Discourse on Religion with these remarkable words: “ Eben so ist das Ziel und der Charakter eines re- ligiésen Lebens nicht die Unsterblichkeit, wie viele sie wiinschen und an sie glauben, oder auch nur zu glauben vorgeben... nicht jene Unsterblichkeit ausser der Zeit und hinter der Zeit, oder vielmehr nur nach dieser Zeit aber doch in der Zeit, sondern die Unsterblichkeit, die wir schon in diesem zeitlichen Leben unmittelbar haben k6n- nen, und die eine Aufgabe ist, in deren Lésung wir im- merfort begriffen sind. Mitten in der Endlichkeit Eins werden mit dem unendlichen und ewig sein in jedem k De l’ Allemagne, Partie III. ch. 7. 1 Phainomenologie des Geistes, Vorrede, (Werke, 11. p. 22.) m See Michelet, Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie, Τ|. p. 638. Strauss, in his Christliche Glaubenslehre, § 106-110, gives an instructive account of some of the speculations of recent German writers on this question; his own commentary being not the least signi- ficant portion. “‘ Damit,” he says, “ legt ja das Ich den Willen an den Tag, nicht blos seine Subjectivitat tiberhaupt, sondern auch deren particulare Bestimmungen und Verhialtnisse, in alle Ewigkeit fortzu- fiihren, d. h. aus seiner Endlichkeit keinen Schritt herauszugehen.” And again: “Nur die Anlage der Gattung ist unendlich und uner- schopflich: . .. die des Einzelwesens, als Momentes der Gattung, kann nur eine endliche sein.” His inquiry concludes with the well known words, “‘ Das Jenseits ist zwar in allen der Eine, in seiner Gestalt als zukiinftiges aber der letzte Feind, welchen die speculative Kritik zu bekampfen und wo moglich zu tiberwinden hat.”? And Feuerbach, another ‘advanced’ disciple of the Hegelian school, has written an essay on Death and Immortality, for the purpose of shewing that a be- lief in personal annihilation is indispensable to sound morality and true religion ; that the opposite belief is connected with all that is ‘ satanic” and “bestial;”” and that temporal death is but an image of God, the “ great objective negation :᾿ and has indicated significantly, in another work, the philosophical basis of his theory, by an aphorism the direct contradictory to that of Descartes, “ Cogitans nemo sum. Cogito, ergo omnes sum homines.” ε LECTURE ΠῚ. 947 Augenblick, das ist die Unsterblichkeit der Religion.” And later, in his Christliche Glaube, § 158, while admitting that the belief in a personal immortality follows naturally from the doctrine of the twofold nature of Christ, he notwith- standing thinks it necessary to apologize for those who re- ject this belief on pantheistic principles: “ Denn von hier aus lasst sich auf gleiche Weise behaupten, einerseits dass das Gottesbewusstseyn das Wesen jedes im héheren Sinne selbstbewussten oder verniinftigen Lebens constituire, auf der andern Seite aber auch, dass wenn der Geist in dieser Productivitat wesentlich unsterblich ist, doch die einzelne Seele nur eine voriibergehende Action dieser Productivitat sei, mithin eben so wesentlich verginglich..... Mit einer solechen Entsagung auf die Fortdauer der Persoénlichkeit wurde sich eine Herrschaft des Gottesbewusstseyns voll- kommen vertragen, welche auch die reinste Sittlichkeit und die hochste Geistigkeit des Lebens verlangte.’ Mr. Atkin- son, from the side of materialism, arrives at a similar con- clusion: ““ What more noble and glorious than a calm and joyful indifference about self and the future, in merging the individual in the general good,—the general good in universal nature™.’” And M. Comte comes forward with his substitute of “subjective immortality,” i. e. being re- membered by other people, as a far nobler and truer con- ception of a future life than that held by theologians®. But the most systematic and thoroughgoing exponent of this philosophy is Schopenhauer. With him, the species is the exhibition in time of the idea or real being, of which the individual is but the finite and transient expression P. In the same sense in which the individual was generated from nothing, he returns to nothing by death. To desire a personal immortality is to desire to perpetuate an error to infinity; for individual existence is the error from which it should be the aim of life to extricate ourselves". Judaism, which teaches a creation out of nothing, consistently asserts n Letters on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development, p.t89. ο Catéchisme Positiviste, p. 169. P Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 11. p. 484, 487; 511. 4 Ibid, p. 482, 498. τ Ibid. p. 404. » 348 NOTES. that death is annihilation ; while Christianity has borrowed its belief in immortality from India, and inconsistently en- grafted it on a Jewish stem’. The true doctrine however is not to be found in these, but in the Indian Vedas, whose superior wisdom can only be ascribed to the fact, that their authors, living nearer in point of time to the origin of the human race, comprehended more clearly and profoundly the true nature of things t. Note 28. p. 89. “On a grande raison de se récrier sur la maniére étrange des hommes, qui se tourmentent en agitant des questions mal-concues. Ils cherchent ce quwils savent, et ne savent pas ce quwils cherchent.” Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, L. IT. Gh. τ ὅν τά: Note 29. p. 89. See the acute criticism of the Kantian distinction be- tween things and phenomena, by M. Willm, in his Histowre de la Philosophie Allemande, Vol. 1. p.177. “ Il π’ est pas nécessaire d’admettre que ce qui s’interpose entre les objets et la raison, altére et fausse pour ainsi dire la vue des objets, et il se peut que les lois de l’esprit soient en méme temps les lois des choses telles qu’elles sont. Hegel a dit justement qu'il se pourrait fort bien, qu’aprés avoir penétré derriére la scene qui est ouverte devant nous, nous ny trouvassions rien; ajoutons qu’il se pourrait que ce prétendu voile qui semble couvrir le tableau et que nous cherchons a lever, fit le tableau lui-méme.” Kant un- questionably went too far, in asserting that things in them- selves are not as they appear to our faculties: the utmost that his premises could warrant him in asserting is, that we cannot tell whether they are so or not. And even this degree of scepticism, though tenable as far as external ob- jects are concerned, cannot legitimately be extended to the personal self. I exist as I am conscious of existing ; and this conscious self is itself the Ding an sich, the standard S Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 11. p. 489. 617. t Ibid. p. 478. LECTURE III. 349 by which all representations of personality must be Judged, and from which our notion of reality, as distinguished from ‘appearance, is originally derived. Τὸ this extent Jacobi’s eriticism of Kant is just and decisive. “ Alles unser Phi- losophiren ist ein Bestreben, hinter die Gestalt der Sache. d.i. zur Sache selbst, zu kommen; aber wie kénnten wir dies, da wir alsdann hinter uns selbst, ja hinter die ge- samte Natur der Dinge, hinter ihren Ursprung kommen miussten ἢ ?” Note 30. ρ.9ι. The Intellectual Intuition of Schelling has been noticed above. See notes 16,17,18, pp. 336 sqq. The method of Hegel, in its aim identical with that of Schelling, differs from it chiefly in making thought, instead of intuition, the instrument of reaching the Absolute. As Schelling as- sumes the possibility of an intuition superior to time and difference, so Hegel postulates the existence of a logical process emancipated from the laws of identity and contra- diction. The Understanding and the Reason are placed in sharp antagonism to each other. The one is a faculty of finite thinking, subject to the ordinary laws of thought: the other is a faculty of infinite thinking, to which those laws are inapplicable. Hence the principles of Identity, of Contradiction, and of Excluded Middle are declared to be valid merely for the abstract understanding, from which reason is distinguished by the principle of the Identity of -Contradictories*. But this assertion, indispensable as it is to Hegel’s system, involves more consequences than the author himself would be willing to admit. The important admission, that an infinite object of thought can only be apprehended by an infinite act of thinking, involves the ἃ Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus, (Werke, 111. p. 176.) x See Logik, B. II. c.2; Encyklopidie, §. 28, 115,119, Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XV. p.598. See also his attempt to rescue speculative philosophy from the assaults of scepticism, Werke, XIV. p- 511,512. He charges the sceptic with first making reason finite, in order to overthrow it by the principles of finite thought. The defence amounts to no more than this: “ The laws of thought are against me ; but I refuse to be bound by their authority.” 350 NOTES. conclusion, that the understanding and the reason have no common ground on which either can make itself intelligible to the other; for the very principles which to the one are a criterion of truth, are to the other an evidence of false- hood. Moreover, the philosophy which regards the union of contradictories as essential to the conceptions of the reason, is bound in consistency to extend the same condi- tion to its judgments and deductions ; for whatever is one- sided and partial in the analysis of a notion, must be equally so in those more complex forms of thought into which notions enter. The logic of the understanding must be banished entirely, or not at all. Hence the philosopher may neither defend his own system, nor refute his adver- sary, by arguments reducible to the ordinary logical forms ; for these forms rest on the very laws of thought which the higher philosophy is supposed to repudiate. Hegel’s own polemic is thus self-condemned ; and his attempted refuta- tion of the older metaphysicians is a virtual acknowledg- ment of the validity of their fundamental principles. If the so-called infinite thinking is a process of thought at all, it must be a process entirely sui generis, isolated and unap- proachable, as incapable as the intuition of Schelling of being expressed in ordinary language, or compared, even in antagonism, with the processes of ordinary reasoning. The very attempt to expound it thus necessarily postulates its own failure. But this great thinker has rendered one invaluable ser- vice to philosophy. He has shewn clearly what are the only conditions under which a philosophy of the Absolute could be realized; and his attempt has done much to facilitate the conclusion, to which philosophy must finally come, that the Absolute is beyond the reach of human thought. If such a philosophy were possible at all, it would be in the form of the philosophy of Hegel. And Hegel’s failure points to one inevitable moral. All the above incon- sistency and division of the human mind against itself, might be avoided by acknowledging the supreme authority of the laws of thought over all human speculation; and by recognising the consequent distinction between positive LECTURE III. 351 and negative thinking,—between the lawful exercise of the reason within its own province, and its abortive efforts to pass beyond it. But such an acknowledgment amounts to a confession that thought and being are not identical, and that reason itself requires us to believe in truths that are beyond reason. And to this conclusion speculative philo- sophy itself leads us, if in no other way, at least by the wholesome warning of its own pretensions and failures. Note 31. p. 93. Tertullian, De Carne Christi, c.5. ‘ Natus est Dei Filius; non pudet, quia pudendum est: et mortuus est Dei Filius ; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est: et sepultus, resur- rexit; certum est, quia impossibile.” Note 32. p. 95. See above, Lecture II, note 36. Note 33. p. 99. Hooker, £. P. B. I. ch. 11. § 2. Compare the words of Jacobi, An Pichte, (Werke, 111. p.7.) ‘“ Kin Gott, der ge- wusst werden kénnte, ware gar kein Gott.” NOTES. LECTURE IV. Note 1. p. 100. THus Weegscheider, after expressly admitting (Jnstit. Theol. § 52) that the infinite cannot be comprehended by the finite, and that its idea can only be represented by analogy and symbol, proceeds to assert, with the utmost confidence, that the attributes of omnipotence and omni- science do not truly represent the internal nature of God (δ 69); that a plurality of persons in the Godhead is mani- festly repugnant to reason, and that the infinite God can- not assume the nature of finite man (§ 92); that the fall of man 15 inconsistent with the divine attributes (ὁ 117)5 that repentance is the only mode of expiating sin recon- cilable with the moral nature of God (§ 138); that the doctrine of Christ’s intercession is repugnant to the divine nature (§. 143). By a somewhat similar inconsistency, Mr. Newman, while fully acknowledging that we cannot have any perfect knowledge of an infinite mind, and that infinity itself is but a negative idea, yet thinks it necessary to regard the soul as a separate organ of specific information, by which we are in contact with the infinite ; and dogmatizes concerning the similarity of divine and human attributes, in a manner which nothing short of absolute knowledge can justify. (See The Soul, pp. 1, 3, 34, 54, 58). He compares the infinite to the ““ illimitable haziness” which bounds the sphere of dis- tinct vision. The analogy would be serviceable to his LECTURE IV. 353 argument, if we possessed two sets of eyes, one for clear- ness, and one for haziness; one to be limited, and the other to discern the limitation. The hypothesis of a sepa- rate faculty of consciousness, whether called soul, reason, or intellectual intuition, to take cognisance of the infinite, is only needed for those philosophers who undertake to develope a complete philosophy of the infinite as such. But the success of the various attempts in this province has not been such as to give any trustworthy evidence of the exist- ence of such a faculty. Note 2. p. 101. See above, Lecture I, note 3. Note 3. p. 102. See Mr. Rose’s remarks on the reaction against the Wolfian demonstrative method. State of Protestantism in Germany, p. 206 (second edition). Note 4. p. 103. See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 497. ed. Rosen- kranz. This admission, rightly understood, need not be considered as detracting from the value of the speculative arguments as auxiliaries. All that is contended for is, that the foundation must be laid elsewhere, before their assistance, valuable as it is, can be made available. ‘Thus understood, this view coincides with that expressed by Sir W. Hamilton, in the second of the Lectures on Meta- physics, shortly to be published, “that the phenomena of matter, taken by themselves, (you will observe the qualifi- cation, taken by themselves,) so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation,—that the study of the external world, taken with and in subordination to that of the internal, not only loses its atheistic tendency, but, under such subservience, may be rendered conducive to the great conclusion, from which, if left to itself, it would dissuade us.” The atheistic tendency is perhaps too strongly stated; as the same phenomena may be sur- veyed, by different individuals, in different spirits and with Aa 354 NOTES. different results ; but the main position, that the belief in God is primarily based on mental, and not on material phenomena, accords with the view taken in the text. Note 5. p. 103. Kant, Kritik der r. V., p. 488. Compare Hume, Dia- logues concerning Natural Religion, Part V. Kant’s argu- ment is approved by Hegel, Philosophie der Religion ( Werke, XII. p.37). ‘The objection which it urges is of no value, unless we admit that man possesses an adequate notion of the infinite as such. Otherwise, the notion of power inde- finitely great, which the phenomena certainly suggest, is, both theoretically and practically, undistinguishable from the infinite itself. This has been well remarked by a recent writer. See Selections from the Correspondence of R. E. H. Greyson, Vol. II. p. 329. 7 Note 6. p. 104. Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. 11. p. 405. Professor Jowett considers the comparison between the works of nature and those of art as not merely inadequate, but positively erroneous. He says, “ As certamly as the man who found a watch or piece of mechanism on the sea-shore would conclude, ‘ here are marks of design, indications of an intelligent artist,’ so certainly, if he came across the meanest or the highest of the works of nature, would he infer, ‘this was not made by man, nor by any human art and skill.’ He sees at first sight that the sea-weed beneath his feet is something different in kind from the produc- tions of man@.” But surely the force of the teleological argument does not turn upon the similarity of the objects, but on their analogy. The point of comparison is, that in the works of nature, as well as in those of art, there is an a This argument is substantially the same with that of Hume, Dia- logues concerning Natural Religion, Part II. ‘If we see a house, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder. ...But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause.” LECTURE IV. 355 adaptation of means to ends, which indicates an intelligent author. And such an adaptation may exist in an organ- ized body, no less than in a machine, notwithstanding numerous differences in the details of their structure. The evidence of this general analogy is in nowise weakened by Professor Jowett’s special exceptions. Note 7. p. 104. “* When the spiritual man (as such) cannot judge, the question is removed into a totally different court from that of the Soul, the court of the critical understanding. . .. The processes of thought have nothing to quicken the con- science or affect the soul.” F. ΝΥ. Newman, Fhe Soul, p- 245 (second edition). Yet he allows in another place, (not quite consistently,) that ‘pure intellectual error, de- pending on causes wholly unmoral, may and does perpe- tuate moral illusions, which are of the deepest injury to spiritual life.” p.169. Similar in principle, though not pushed to the same extreme consequences, is the theory of Mr. Morell, who says, “" Reason up to a God, and the best you can do is to hypostatize and deify the final product of your own faculties; but admit the reality of an intellectual intuition, (as the mass of mankind virtually do,) and the absolute stands before us in all its living reality>.”. This distinction he carries so far as to assert that “ to speak of logic, as such, being inspired, is a sheer absurdity ;” be- cause “the process either of defining or of reasoning re- quires simply the employment of the formal laws of thought, the accuracy of which can be in no way affected by any amount of inspiration whatever*.” Here he appa- rently overlooks the fact that the intuitive and reflective faculties invariably act in conjunction; that both are equally necessary to the existence of consciousness as such; and that logical forms are never called into operation, ex- cept in conjunction with the matter on which they are exercised. b Philosophy of Religion, p. 39. ¢ Ibid. p.173, 174. 356 NOTES. Note 8. p. 108. In acknowledging Expiation as well as Prayer to be prompted by the natural feelings of men, I have no inten- tion of controverting the opinion, so ably maintained by Archbishop Magee and Mr. Faber, of the divine origin of the actual rite of sacrifice. That the religious instincts of men should indicate the need of supplication and expiation, is perfectly consistent with the belief that the particular mode of both may have been first taught by a primitive revelation. That religion, in both its constituent elements, was communicated to the parents of the human race by positive revelation, seems the most natural inference from the Mosaic narrative’. Yet we may admit that the posi- tive institution must from the first have been adapted to some corresponding instinct of human nature; without which it would be scarcely possible to account for its continuance and universal diffusion, as well as for its va- rious corruptions. We may thus combine the view of Archbishop Magee with that exhibited by Dr. Thomson, Bampton Lectures, pp. 30, 48. Note 9. p. 110. That the mere feeling of dependence by itself is not necessarily religious, is shown by Hegel, Philosophie der Religion, (Werke XII. p.173.) Speaking of the Roman worship of evil influences, Angerona, Fames, Robigo, &c., he rightly remarks that in such representations all concep- tion of Deity is lost, though the feeling of fear and de- pendence remains. To the same effect is his sarcastic remark, that, according to Schleiermacher’s theory, the dog is the best Christiane. Mr. Parker. (Discourse of feeligion, Ch. 1.) agrees with Sehleiermacher in resolving the religious sentiment into a mere sense of dependence ; 4 Even Mr. Davison, who contends for the human origin of the patriarchal sacrifices, which he regards as merely eucharistic and penitentiary, expressly admits the divine appointment of expiatory offerings. See his Inquiry into the Origin of Primitive Sacrifice, (Remains, p. 121.) © See Rosenkranz, Hegel's Leben, p. 346. LECTURE IV. 357 though he admits that this sentiment does not, itself, dis- close the character of the object on which it depends. Re- ferred to this principle alone, it is impossible to regard religious worship as a moral duty. Note 10. p. 111. See Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Abschn II. (pp. 61, 71. ed. Rosenkranz.) His theory has been ably combated by Julius Miller, Christliche Lehre von der NSiinde, B. I. e. 2. Compare also Hooker, 1. P. 1. ix.2. Some excellent re- marks to the same effect will be found in M¢&Cosh’s Method of the Divine Government, p. 298, (fourth edition,) and in Bartholméss, Histoire des doctrines religieuses de la philosophie moderne, vol. i. p. 405. Note 11. p. 112. The theory which regards absolute morality as based on the immutable nature of God, must not be confounded with that which places it in his arbitrary will. The latter view, which was maintained by Scotus, Occam, and others among the schoolmen, is severely criticised by sir James Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philo- sophy, section III, and by Miiller, Christliche Lehre von der Siinde, B.I. 6.32. The former principle is adopted by Cudworth, as the basis of his treatise on Eternal and Im- mutable Morality. See B.I. 6.2. Β. IV. 6. 4. Note 12. p. 113. On the universality of expiatory rites, see Magee on the Atonement, note V. On their origin, see the same work, notes XLI, XLVI to LI, LIV to LVIII, and Mr. Faber’s Treatise on the Origin of Expiatory Sacrifice. Note 13. p. 114. Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, δ. 4. Note 14. p. 115. Morell, Philosophy of Religion, p.75. Mr. Morell here goes beyond the theory of his master, Schleiermacher. The latter, (Christliche Glaube, §. 4,) admits that this sup- 358 NOTES. posed feeling of absolute dependence can never be com- pletely attained in any single act of consciousness, but is generally suggested by the whole. Mr. Morell speaks as if we could be immediately conscious of our own annihilation, by a direct intuition of the infinite. Both theories are inadequate to prove the intended conclusion. That of Schleiermacher virtually amounts to a confession that the infinite is not a positive fact of consciousness, but a mere negation suggested by the direct presence of the finite. That of Mr. Morell saves the intuition of the infinite, but annihilates itself; for if in any act of consciousness the subject becomes absolutely nothing, the consciousness must vanish with it; and if it stops at any point short of nothing, the object is not infinite. Note 15. p. 116. That this is the legitimate result of Schleiermacher’s theory, may be gathered from a remarkable passage in the Christliche Glaube, δ. 8, in which the polytheistie and monotheistic feelings of piety are compared together. The former, he says, is always accompanied by a sensible representation of its object, in which there is contained a germ of multiplicity; but in the latter, the higher con- sciousness is so separated from the sensible, that the pious emotions admit of no greater difference than that of the elevating or depressing tone of the feeling. This seems to imply that, in Schleiermacher’s opinion, to worship a God of many attributes, is equivalent to worshipping a plurality of Gods. And to those philosophers who make the Infinite in itself a direct object of religious worship, this identifi- eation is natural; for a God of many attributes cannot be conceived as infinite, and therefore in one sense par- takes of the limited divinity of Polytheism. But, on the other hand, a God of no attributes is no God at all; and the so-called monotheistic piety is nothing but an abortive attempt at mystical self-annihilation. Some acute stric- tures on Schleiermacher’s theory from this point of view will be found in Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphiloso- phie, p. 84. LECTURE IV. 359 Note 16. p. 118. Schleiermacher himself admits, (Christliche Glaube, ἃ. 33,) that the theory of absolute dependence is incompatible with the belief that God can be moved by any human action. He endeavours however to reconcile this admission with the duty of prayer, by maintaining (§ 147) that the true Christian will pray for nothing but that which it comes within God’s absolute purpose to grant. This im- plies something like omniscience in the true Christian, and something like hypocrisy in every act of prayer. Note.1%,...p:.11s. Schleiermacher (Chr. Glaube, § 49) attempts, not very successfully, to meet this objection, by maintaining that even our free acts are dependent upon the will of God. This is doubtless true; but it is true as an article of faith, not as a theory of philosophy: it may be believed, but cannot be conceived, nor represented in any act of human consciousness. The apparent contradiction implied in the coexistence of an infinite and a finite, will remain unsolved; and is most glaring in the theories of those philosophers who, like Schleiermacher (§ 54), maintain that God actually does all that he can do. The only solution is to confess that we have no true conception of the infinite at all. Schleiermacher himself is unable to avoid the logical con- sequence of his position. He admits (§ 80) that God’s omnipotence is limited if we do not allow him to be the author of sin; though he endeavours to soften this mon- strous admission by taking it in conjunction with the fact that God is also the author of grace. Note 18. p. 121. De Augmentis Scientiarum, L. 111. 6.1. Compare Theo- philus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, I. 5. Καθάπερ yap ψυχὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ od βλέπεται, ἀόρατος οὖσα ἀνθρώποις, διὰ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ σώματος νοεῖται ἡ ψυχή, οὕτως ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τὸν Θεὸν μὴ δύνασθαι ὁραθῆναι ὑπὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, διὰ δὲ τῆς προνοίας καὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ βλέπεται καὶ νοεῖται. And f Compare a similar argument in bishop Berkeley. Minute Philo- sopher, Dial. IV. § 4. 360 NOTES. Athanasius, Contra Gentes, c. 35. "Ex yap τῶν ἔργων πολλά- Kis ὁ τεχνίτης Kal μὴ ὁρώμενος γιγνώσκεται, καὶ οἷόν τι λέγουσι περὶ τοῦ ἀγαλματοποιοῦ Φειδίου, ὡς τὰ τούτου δημιουργήματα ἐκ τῆς συμμετρίας καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν μερῶν ἀναλογίας ἐμφαίνειν καὶ μὴ παρόντα Φειδίαν τοῖς ὁρῶσιν" οὕτω δεῖ νοεῖν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου τάξεως τὸν τούτου ποιητὴν καὶ δημιουργὸν Θεὸν, κἂν τοῖς τοῦ σώματος ὀφθαλμοῖς μὴ θεωρῆται. On the other hand, Hegel, Philosophie der Religion, (Werke, XII. p. 395), insists on the necessity of knowing God as He is, as an in- dispensable condition of all Theology. Note 19) Ὁ 122. Justin. Mart. Apol. 11. 6. 6. To δὲ Πατὴρ, καὶ Θεὸς, καὶ Κτίστης, καὶ Κύριος, καὶ Δεσπότης, οὐκ ὀνόματά ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν εὐποιϊῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων προσρήσεις. Basil. Adv. Hunom. 1.12. Ὅλως δὲ τὸ οἴεσθαι τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων θεοῦ αὐτὴν τὴν οὐ- σίαν ἐξευρηκέναι, πόσης ὑπερηφανίας ἐστὶ καὶ φυσιώσεως :.... ἐξετάσωμεν γὰρ αὐτὸ» πόθεν αὐτῆς φησὶν ἐν περινοίᾳ γεγενῆ- αν ὡς eta! mn ™ 2 3 ἡ “ \ a \ \ > σθαι; ap ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας ; ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη τὸ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν, οὐ Ν - aes. ¢ / τὸ τί εἶναι ἡμῖν ὑποβάλλει. Gregor. Nyssen. Contr. Hunom. Orat. XII. Οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦ κόσμου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν » \ Ἂς lod Ne , 3 “ > 3 id οἴδαμεν, τὸν δὲ THs οὐσίας λόγον ἀγνοεῖν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα. Cy- 11]. Hieros. Catech. VI. 2. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστι Θεὸς ἔξηγούμεθα" 5 ace ον Ν ‘ > a 3 y 9 3 , GAA ὅτι TO ἀκριβὲς περι αὑτοῦ οὐκ οἴδαμεν, PET εὐγνωμοσύνης ὁμολογοῦμεν. Ἔν τοῖς γὰρ περὶ Θεοῦ, μεγάλη γνῶσις τὸ τὴν ἀγνωσίαν ὁμολογεῖν. Pascal, Pensées, Partie II. Art. III. δ 5. “ Nous connaissons qu’il y a un infini, et nous ignorons sa nature. Ainsi, par exemple, nous savons qu il est faux que les nombres soient finis: done il est vrai qu il y a un in- fini en nombres. Mais nous ne savons ce qu'il est. TI est faux qu’il soit pair; il est faux qu’il soit impair: car, en ajoutant lunité, il ne change point de nature; cependant e’est un nombre. ....On peut. done bien connaitre qu'il y a un Dieu sans savoir ce qu il est.” The distinction is strongly repudiated by Hegel, Werke, XII. p. 396. Cf. IX. p. 19. XIV. p. 219. In the last of these passages, he goes so far as to say, that to deny to man a knowledge of the infinite is the sin against the Holy Ghost. The ground of this awful charge is little more than the repetition of an obser- LECTURE IV. 36) vation in Aristotle's Metaphysics, that God is not envious, and therefore cannot withhold from us absolute knowledge. Note 20. p. 123. Advancement of Learning, p.128.ed. Montagu. Compare De Augmentis, III. 2. Nete 21. p. 126. This argument is excellently drawn out in Sir W. Hamil- ton’s forthcoming Lectures on Metaphysics, Lecture II. So Mr. F. W. Newman observes, acutely and truly, “ No- thing but a consciousness of active originating Will in ourselves suggests or can justify the idea of a mighty Will pervading Nature; and to merge the former in the latter, is to sacrifice the Premise to the glory of the Conclusion.” The Soul, p. 40, (second edition). Note 22. p. 125. Arist. Metaph. 1. 5. Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων Evioas.... τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἕν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν. Cicero, Acad. Quest. ΤΥ. 37. ‘“ Xenophanes dixit unum esse omnia, neque id esse mutabile, et id esse deum.”” Apuleius, Asc/e- pius Herm. Trimeg. 6. 20. ‘ Non enim spero totius majes- tatis effectorem omniumque rerum patrem vel dominum uno posse quamvis e multis composito nuncupari nomine: hune vero innominem vel potius omninominem, si quidem is sit unus et omnia, ut sit necesse aut omnia esse ejus no- mine aut ipsum omnium nominibus nuncupari.” Lessing, as quoted by Jacobi, Werke, IV. p. 54. “ Die orthodoxen Begriffe von der Gottheit sind nicht mehr fiir mich; ich kann sie nicht geniessen—Ev καὶ Πᾶν. Ich weiss nichts anders.” Schelling, Bruno, p. 185. “So ist die Allheit Einheit, die Einheit Allheit, beyde nicht verschieden, son- -dern dasselbe.” Note 23. p. 126. Clemens Alex. Stromata, V.11. Ei τοίνυν ἀφελόντες πάν- ra ὅσα πρόσεστι τοῖς σώμασιν, Kal τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀσωμάτοις, ἀπορρίψωμεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, κἀκεῖθεν εἰς τὸ ἀχανές ἁγιότητι προΐοιμεν, τῇ νοήσει τοῦ παντοκράτορος ἃμη- 362 NOTES. γέπῃ προσάγοιμεν, οὐχ 6 ἐστιν, ὃ δὲ pH ἐστι γνωρίσαντες. Augustin. Enarr. in Psalm Ιχχχν. 12. “ Deus ineffabilis est ; facilius dicimus quid non sit, quam quid sit.” Fichte, Be- stimmung des Menschen, ( Werke, I. p. 305). “* Du willst, denn du willst, dass mein freier Gehorsam Folgen habe in alle Ewigkeit ; den Act deines Willens begreife ich nicht, und weiss nur soviel, dass er nicht ahnlich ist dem meinigen.” Note 24. p. 127. The distinction between speculative and regulative know- ledge holds an important place in the philosophy of Kant ; but his mode of applying it is the exact reverse of that adopted in the text. According to Kant, the idea of the absolute or unconditioned has a regulative, but not a spe- culative value: it cannot be positively apprehended by any act of thought; but it serves to give unity and direction to the lower conceptions of the understanding ; indicating the point to which they tend, though they never actually reach it. But the regulative character thus paradoxically as- signed, not to thought, but to its negation, in truth belongs to the finite conceptions as actually apprehended, not to any unapprehended idea of the infinite beyond them. Every object of positive thought, being conceived as finite, is necessarily regarded as limited by something beyond it- self; though this something is not itself actually conceived. The true purpose of this manifest incompleteness of all human thought, is to point out the limits which we cannot pass; not, as Kant maintains, to seduce us into vain at- tempts to pass them. If there is but one faculty of thought, that which Kant calls the Understanding, occupied with the finite only, there is an obvious end to be answered in making us aware of its limits, and warning us that the boundaries of thought are not those of existence. But if, with Kant, we distinguish the Understanding from the Reason, and attribute to the latter the delusions necessarily arising from the idea of the unconditioned, we must believe in the existence of a special faculty of lies, created for the express purpose of deceiving those who trust to it. In the philosophy of religion, the true regulative ideas, which are LECTURE IV. 363 intended to guide our thoughts, are the finite forms under which alone we can think of the infinite God; though these, while we employ them, betray their own speculative insuf- ficiency and the limited character of all human knowledge. Note 25.. p..127: “The Scripture intimates to us certain facts concerning the Divine Being: but conveying them to us by the me- dium of language, it only brings them before us darkly, under the signs appropriate to the thoughts of the human mind. And though this kind of knowledge is abundantly instructive to us in point of sentiment and action; teaches us, that is, both how to feel, and how to act, towards God; —for it is the language that we understand, the language formed by our own experience and practice ;—it is alto- gether inadequate in point of Science.” Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p. 54, (second edition). ‘‘ We should rather point out to objectors that what is revealed is practical, and not speculative ;—that what the Scriptures are concerned with is, not the philosophy of the Human Mind in itself, nor yet the philosophy of the Divine Nature in itself, but (that which is properly Religion) the relation and connexion of the two Beings ;—what God is ¢o us,—what He has done and will do for us,—and what we are to be and to do, in regard to Him.” Whately’s Sermons, p. 56, (third edition). Compare Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. VII. § 11. ν al eae se LECTURE V. Note 1. p.134. ANALOGY, Part I. Ch. VI. Note 2. p. 135. “When he (the Sceptic) awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself; and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act, and reason, and be- lieve; though they are not able, by their most diligent inquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections which may be raised against them.” Hume, Essay on the Academical Philosophy, Part 11. Note 3. p. 135. See Plato, Parmenides, p.129, Philebus, p. 14, Sophistes, p. 251, Republic, VII. p.524. The mystery is insoluble, because thought cannot explain its own laws; for the laws must necessarily be assumed in the act of explanation. Every object of thought, as being one object, and one out of many, all being related to a common consciousness, must contain in itself a common and a distinctive feature ; and the relation between these two constitutes that very diver- sity in unity, without which no thought is possible. LECTURE V. 365 Note 4. p. 137. “Das commercium zwischen Seele und Korper ist eine wechselseitige Dependenz der Bestimmung. Wir fragen demnach zuerst: Wie ist ein solches commercium zwischen Der Grund, die Schwierigkeit dieses commercii einzusehen, beruht darauf: Die Seele ist ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes, und der Kérper ist ein Gegenstand des dussern Sinnes. An dem Korper werde ich nichts Innerliches und an der Seele nichts Aeusserliches gewahr. Nun lisst es sich durch keine Vernunft begreifen, wie das, was ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes ist, ein Grund seyn soll, yon dem, was ein Gegenstand des dussern Sinnes ist.” Kant’s Vorlesungen iiber die Metaphysik, (1821), p. 224. Note.5. p..137. ‘Quand on examine Vidée que lon a de tous les esprits finis, on ne voit point de liaison nécessaire entre leur volonté et le mouvement de quelque corps que ce soit; on voit au contraire quil n’y en a point, et quill n’y en peut avoir.” Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, L. VI. Part II. Ch. 3.“ L’homme est ἃ lui-méme le plus prodigieux ob- jet de la nature; car il ne peut concevoir ce que c’est que corps, et encore moins ce que c’est qu’esprit, et moins qu’aucune chose comment un corps peut étre uni avec un esprit. C’est la le comble de ses difficultés, et cependant e’est son propre étre.” Pascal, Pensées, Partie I. Art. vi. δ. 26. “Ich bin freilich genéthigt zu glauben, das heisst, zu handeln, als ob ich dachte—dass durch mein Wollen meine Zunge, meine Hand, mein Fuss in Bewegung ge- setzt werden kénnten; wie aber ein blosser Hauch, ein Druck der Intelligenz auf sich selbst, wie der Wille es ist, Princip einer Bewegung in der schweren irdischen Masse seyn kénne, dariiber kann ich nicht nur nichts denken, sondern selbst die blosse Behauptung ist vor dem Richter- stuhle des betrachtenden Verstandes reiner baarer Unver- stand.” Fichte, Bestimmung des Menschen, ( Werke, 11. p. 290.) Spinoza, Ethica, III. 2, denies positively that such 366 NOTES. commerce can take place. ‘ Nec corpus mentem ad cogi- tandum, nee mens corpus ad motum, neque ad quietem, nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinare potest.” Note 6. p. 138. The theory of Divine Assistance and Occasional Causes was partially hinted at by Descartes, and more completely elaborated by his followers, De La Forge and Malebranche. See Descartes, Principia, L. 11. § 36. De La Forge, Traité de Vesprit de Phomme, Ch. XVI. Malebranche, e- cherche de la Vérité, L. VI. P. Π. Ch. 3; Entretiens sur la Metaphysique, Ent. VII. Cf. Hegel, Geschichte der Phil. (Werke, XV. p. 330.) For Leibnitz’s theory of a Preesta- blished Harmony, see his Systéme nouveau de la Nature, δ 12-15, Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 127; Troisiéme Eclair- cissement, Ibid. p.134; Théodicée, ὃ 61, Ibid. p. 520. A brief account of these two systems, together with that of Physical Influx, which is rather a statement of the pheno- menon, than a theory to account for it, is given by Euler, Lettres ἃ une Princesse αἱ Allemagne, Partie 11, Lettre 14. ed. Cournot ; and by Krug, Philos. Lexikon; Art. Gemein- schaft der Seele und des Leibes. The hypothesis, that the commerce of soul and body is effected by means of a Plastic Nature in the soul itself, is suggested by Cudworth, Intellectual System, B. 1. Ch. 111. § 37, and further deve- loped by Leclere, Bibliotheque Choisie, 11. p. 113, who sup- posed this plastic nature to be an intermediate principle, distinct from both soul and body. See Mosheim’s note in Harrison’s edition of Cudworth, Vol. I. p. 248. See also Leibnitz, Sur le Principe de Vie, Opera, ed. Krdmann, Ρ. 429; Laromiguitére, Lecons de Philosophie, P. I. 1. g. Note 7. p. 138. These two analogies between our natural and spiritual knowledge are adduced in a remarkable passage of Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Kunomium, Orat. XII. Of the soul, and its relation to the body, he says: Ὅθεν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ πάντων διάγομεν, πρῶτον ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες. of ἄνθρωποι, ἔπειτα δὲ \ Ν a / rp / 5 “Δ lal 5 7 b) a ~ καὶ Ta ἄλλα πάντα. Tis yap ἐστιν ὃς τῆς ἰδίας αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς LECTURE V. . 367 4 λ 7 / . id c 5) N Drs Ν > / ἐν καταλήψει γεγένηται ; τίς ὁ ἐπιγνοὺς αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ; oh 4 ΝΡ XA 49 “9 lan re / XN \ ὑλικὴ τις ἔστιν ἢ ἄῦλος ; καθαρῶς ἀσώματος, ἢ τί καὶ σωματο- Ν ᾿ ἊΝ / a lal C ειἰδὲς περὶ αὐτήν; πῶς γίνεται; πῶς κιρνᾶται; πόθεν εἰσκρίνε- ἴω >) ’ “ n s Tat; πῶς ἀφίσταται ; τί τὸ συνδεσμοῦν Kai μεσιτεῦον ἔχει πρὸς \ nN , . τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν; K.t.A. (Opera, Paris.1615. Vol. II. p- 321.) Of body, as distinguished from its attributes, he 5 5 ’ ἃς / “a 3 Ν e says: Eav yap tis τῷ λόγῳ τὸ φαινόμενον εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν I sf \ , nt / 5 ᾽ c ~ σύγκειται διαλύσῃ, καὶ ψίλωσας τῶν ποιοτήτων, ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ κατανοῆσαι φιλονεικήσῃ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τί λειφθή ἢ ) on κείμενον, TL καταλειφθήσεται TH 7 - ” 7 3 “ lal θεωρίᾳ ov συνορῷ. ὅταν yap ἀφέλῃ τοῦ σώματος TO χρῶμα, TO an Ἂν > / σχῆμα, THY ἀντιτυπίαν, TO βάρος, τὴν πηλικότητα, THY ἐπὶ τόπου / Ν 7] εἶ / θέσιν, τὴν κίνησιν τὴν παθητικὴν TE καὶ ἐνεργητικὴν, TO πρός TL ΝΜ ς- e ION 390.35 6 “ lal if “ Ν Ν Ν πως ἔχειν, ὧν ἕκαστον οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμά ἐστι, περὶ δὲ τὸ la / 5 δ “ σῶμα τὰ πάντα, τί λοιπὸν ἔσται ὃ τὸν τοῦ σώματος δέχεται Cle ἡ lad a lad la λόγον ; οὔτε du ἑαυτῶν συνιδεῖν ἔχομεν, οὔτε παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς / na a a μεμαθήκαμεν: ὁ δὲ ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοῶν, πῶς ἄν τι τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν ἐπιγνοίη; Ibid. p. 322. Note 8. p. 138. Essay on the Academical Philosophy, (Philosophical Works, Poe LY. .p. 182.) Note 9. p. 139. The difficulty is ingeniously stated by Pascal, Pensées, Partie J]. Art II. ‘‘ Car qu’y a-t-il de plus absurde que de prétendre qu’en divisant toujours un espace, on arrive enfin a une division telle, qu’en la divisant en deux, cha- cune des moitiés reste indivisible et sans aucune étendue ? Je voudrais demander a ceux qui ont cette idée s’ils con- coivent nettement que deux indivisibles se touchent: si e’est partout, ils ne sont qu’une méme chose, et partant les deux ensemble sont indivisibles ; et si ce n’est pas partout, ce n’est done qu’en une partie; donc ils ont des parties, done ils ne sont pas indivisibles.” Note 10. p. 143. Kant’s theory, that we know phenomena only, not things in themselves, is severely criticized by Dr. MeCosh, Method of the Divine Government, p.536 (4th edition). 1 have before observed that Kant has, in two points at least, extended 908 NOTES. his doctrine beyond its legitimate place; first, in maintain- ing that our knowledge of the personal self is equally phe- nomenal with that of external objects; and secondly, in dogmatically asserting that the thing in itself does not re- semble the phenomenon of which we are conscious. Against the first of these statements it may be fairly objected, that my personal existence is identical with my consciousness of that existence; and that any other aspect of my personal- ity, if such exists in relation to any other intelligence, is in this case the phenomenon to which my personal conscious- ness furnishes the real counterpart. Against the second, it may be objected, that if, upon Kant’s own hypothesis, we are never directly conscious of the thing in itself, we have no ground for saying that it is unlike, any more than that it is like, the object of which we are conscious ; and that, in the absence of all other evidence, the probability is in favour of that aspect which is at least subjectively true. But when these deductions are made, the hypothesis of Kant, in its fundamental position, remains unshaken. It then amounts to no more than this; that we can see things only as our own faculties present them to us; and that we can never be sure that the mode of operation of our faculties is identical with that of all other intelligences, embodied or spiritual. Within these limits, the theory more nearly resembles a truism than a paradox, and con- tains nothing that can be regarded as formidable, either by the philosopher or by the theologian. In the same article, Dr. MceCosh criticizes Sir William Hamilton’s cognate theory of the relativity of all know- ledge. With the highest respect for Dr. M¢Cosh’s philoso- phical ability, we cannot help thinking that he has mis- taken the character of the theory which he censures, and that the objection which he urges is hardly applicable. He attempts to avail himself of Sir W. Hamilton’s own theory of the veracity of consciousness. He asks, ‘ Does not the mind in sense-perception hold the object to be a real object?” Undoubtedly; but reality in this sense is not identical with absolute existence unmodified by the laws of the percipient mind. Man can conceive reality as he con- LECTURE V. 369 eelyes other objects, only as the laws of his faculties permit ; and in distinguishing reality from appearance, he is not distinguishing the related from the unrelated. Both appearance and reality must be given in consciousness, to be apprehended at all; and the distinction is only between some modes of consciousness, such as those of a dream, which are regarded as delusive, and others, as in a waking state, which are regarded as veracious. But consciousness, whatever may be its veracity, can tell us nothing con- cerning the identity of its objects with those of which we are not conscious. Dr. McCosh, in the above criticism, also classes Pro- fessor Ferrier as a representative of the same school with Kant and Hamilton. This classification is at least ques- tionable. Professor Ferrier’s system more nearly ap- proaches to the Philosophy of the Absolute than to that of the Relative. He himself distinctly announces that he undertakes “to lay down the laws, not only of owr thinking and knowing, but of all possible thinking and knowing.” Such an undertaking, whether it be successful or not, is ‘in its conception the very opposite of the system which main- tains that our knowledge is relative to our faculties. Note ll. p. 143. See above, Lecture IV. note 25. Note 12. p. 144. “Π] en est de méme des autres Mystéres, ou les esprits modérés trouveront toujours une explication suffisante pour croire, et jamais autant qu’il en faut pour comprendre. I] nous suffit d’un certain ce gue cest (τί ἐστι) ; mais le com- ment (πῶς) nous passe, et ne nous est point nécessaire.” Leibnitz, Théodicée, Discours de la conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, § 56. Note 13. p. 148. Plato, Sophistes, p. 242. Τὸ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ᾿Ελεατικὸν ἔθνος, Ν Ψ ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος a Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 55. Bb 510 NOTES. TOV πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. 1. 225. ᾿Εδογμάτιζε δὲ ὃ Ξενοφάνης Ἂς Ν ᾿ ~ By τ /, / A 9 Ν fad Tapa Tas τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις ἕν εἶναι TO πᾶν. Arist. Metaph. 11. 4.30. Τὸ γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν, od = \ ,ὔ ’ , ΡΥ; ἃ el ὥστε κατὰ τὸν Παρμενίδου λόγον συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη ἕν ἅπαντα = Ν » \ “ ἊΝ Ν Ba . εἶναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὄν. Plato, Parmenides, p. 127. Πῶς, φάναι, ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις ; εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ 4 ε BA lal > ES 4 / > Ν > ὔ nn Ν Ἂς ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὑμοιὰ τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ») / > Ὁ , v4 / Ν / ἀδύνατον ......οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; Οὕτω, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα. Arist. Soph. Ellench. 10. 2. οἷον ἴσως τὸ ὃν ἢ τὸ ἕν πολλὰ ση- ‘A 3 Ν AT eS , ps A ) Ἂς ’ a δος ΡΝ @ c x / , \ ὄντων, ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν. οἷον ot περὶ Μέλισσόν τε καὶ Παρμενίδην. Diog. Laert. ἴχ. 24. (De Melisso). ᾿Ἐδόκει δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρον εἶναι, καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, καὶ ἀκίνητον, καὶ ἕν, ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ, καὶ πλῆρες" κίνησίν τε μὴ εἶναι, δοκεῖν δὲ εἶνα. Cf. Plato, Theeietus, p.183. Compare Karsten, Parmenidis Reliquie, p. 157, 194. Brandis, Commenta- tiones Eleaticce, p. 213, 214. Note 14. p. 148. Plato, Theet. p.152. ᾿Εγὼ ἐρῷ καὶ μάλ᾽ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, € yf ὰ Ἂς oe N te) CaN 5 / 3 DN) Sf us ὡς ἄρα ἕν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν TL προσεΐποις 3 a INI JC “ 2 EPA SIS ε , / AN ὀρθῶς οὐδ᾽ ὁποιονοῦν TL, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ κ A VON / a Cs t ε σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς Ν »» CN / \ Ψ «ς “ 3 Ν Ν (By μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς NTE OTOLOVODLY” ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς \ ΄ \ t \ » / / ἃ / TE καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, ἃ δὴ 5 ny t φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες" ἔστι μὲν yap οὐδέ- ’ 39 / SN XN 7 \ Ν ΄, «δε ς Ν ποτ᾽ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς. Diogenes Laert. 1x. 51. "EAeye τε (6 Πρωτ- αγόρας) μηδὲν εἶναι ψυχὴν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις. Aristot. De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, ¢. 5. (De Gorgia.) Οὐκ εἶναί 2 =] γα ἢ > CM hd ᾽ - Ξ 3 Ν \. ee Ν φησιν οὐδέν" εἰ δ᾽ ἔστιν, ἄγνωστον εἷναι" εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνωστόν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, συνθεὶς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα, ὅσοι περὶ τῶν ὄντων λέγοντες τἀναντία, ὡς δοκοῦσι», ἀποφαίνονται αὑτοῖς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἕν καὶ οὐ πολλά, οἱ LECTURE V. 371 δὲ ad ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ οὐχ ἕν. “ What we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.” Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Part IV. sect.2. “Tis confessed by the most judicious philosophers, that our ideas of bodies are nothing but collections formed by the mind of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities, of which objects are composed, and which we find to have a constant union with each other...... The smooth and unin- terrupted progress of the thought.. ... readily deceives the mind, and makes us ascribe an identity to the changeable succession of connected qualities.” bid. sect. 3. Note 15. p. 149. “Jl faut venir maintenant ἃ la grande Question que M. Bayle a mis sur le tapis depuis peu, savoir, si une Vérité, et surtout une Vérité de Foi, pourra étre sujette ἃ des objections insolubles....... Il croit que la doctrine de la Prédestination est de cette nature dans la Théologie, et celle de la composition du Continuum dans la Philosophie. Ce sont en effet les deux Labyrinthes, qui ont exercé de tout tems les Théologiens et les Philosophes. Libertus Fromondus, Théologien de Louvain, qui a fort travaillé sur la Grace, et qui a aussi fait un Livre exprés intitulé, Laby- yinthus de compositione Continut, a bien exprimé les diffi- cultés de un et de l'autre: et le fameux Ochin a fort bien représenté ce qu'il appelle des Labyrinthes de la Prédesti- nation.” Leibnitz, Théodicée, Discours de la conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, § 24. Compare Sir W. Hamilton’s Discussions, p. 632. Note 16. p. 150. See Bishop Browne’s criticism of Archbishop King, Pro- cedure of the Understanding, p.15. ‘He hath unwarily dropped some such shocking expressions as these, The best representations we can make of God are infinitely short of Truth. Which God forbid, in the sense his adversaries take it; for then all our reasonings concerning Him would Bb 2 372 NOTES. be groundless and false. But the saying is evidently true in a favourable and qualified sense and meaning ; namely, that they are infinitely short of the real, true, internal Nature of God as He is in Himself.” Compare Divine Analogy, p.57. “Though all the Revelations of God are true, as coming from Him who is Truth itself; yet the truth and substance of them doth not consist in this, that they give us any new set of ideas, and express them in a language altogether unknown before; or that both the conceptions and terms are so immediately and properly adapted to the true and real nature of the things revealed, that they could not without great impro- priety and even profaneness be ever applied to the things of this world. But the éfruth of them consists in this; that whereas the terms and conceptions made use of in those Revelations are strictly proper to things worldly and ob- vious; they are from thence transferred analogically to the correspondent objects of another world with as much truth and reality, as when they are made use of in their first and most /iteral propriety ; and this is a solid foundation both for a clear and certain knowledge, and for a firm and well grounded Faith.” Note 17. p. 15°. Augustin. Confess. 1. XIII. ὁ. 16. “ Nam sicut omnino tu es, tu scis solus, qui es incommutabiliter, et scis Incommu- tabiliter, et vis incommutabiliter. Et essentia tua scit et vult incommutabiliter, et scientia tua est et vult incom- mutabiliter, et voluntas tua est et scit incommutabiliter. Nec videtur justum esse coram te, ut quemadmodum se scit lumen incommutabile, ita sciatur ab illuminato com- mutabili.” Note 18. p. 151. See Hegel, Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, 1X. p. 238, 298; Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 356, XII. p. 119. Schleiermacher substantially admits the same facts, though he attempts to connect them with a different theory». He considers that there is a pantheistic and a Ὁ Reden iiber Religion, (Werke, I. pp. 401, 441.) LECTURE V. 373 personal element united in all religions: and this is per- haps true of heathen religions subjected to the philosophi- eal analysis of a later age; though it may be doubted whe- ther both elements are distinctly recognised by the wor- shipper himself. But even from this point of view, the Jewish religion stands in marked contrast to both Eastern and Western heathenism. In the latter forms of religion, the elements of personality and infinity, so far as they are manifested at all, are manifested in different beings: this is observable both in the subordinate emanations which give a kind of secondary personality to the Indian Pan- theism, and in the philosophical abstraction of a supreme principle of good, which connects a secondary notion of the infinite with the Grecian Mythology. The Jewish re- ligion still remains distinct and unique, in so far as in it the attributes of personality and infinity are united in one and the same living and only God. Note 19. p. 154. “iit Patrem quidem invisibilem et indeterminabilem, quantum ad nos est, cognoscit suum ipsius Verbum, et cum sit enarrabilis, ipse enarrat eum nobis: rursus autem Verbum suum solus cognoscit Pater: utraque autem hee sic se habere manifestavit Dominus. Et propter hoe Filius - revelat agnitionem Patris per suam manifestationem. Ag- nitio enim Patris est Filli manifestatio: omnia enim per Verbum manifestantur. Ut ergo cognosceremus, quoniam qui advenit Filius, ipse est qui agnitionem Patris facit cre- dentibus sibi, dicebat discipulis: ‘ Nemo cognoscit Patrem nisi Filius, neque Filium nisi Pater, et quibuscunque Filius revelaverit :᾿ docens semetipsum et Patrem, sicut est, ut alterum non recipiamus Patrem, nisi eum qui a Filio reve- latur.” Irenzeus, Contr. Heres. 1V.6, 3. Οὐκοῦν ἀκολούθως ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος σῶμα ἀνέλαβε, καὶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ὀργάνῳ κέχρη- ται, ἵνα καὶ ζωοποιήσῃ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἵν᾽, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ κτίσει διὰ τῶν ἔργων γνωρίζεται, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ἐργάσηται, καὶ δείξῃ ἑαυτὸν πανταχοῦ, μηδὲν ἔρημον τῆς ἑαυτοῦ θειότητος καὶ γνώσεως καταλιμπάνων. Athanasius, De Incarn. Verdi, ὁ. 45. “In qua ut fidentius ambularet ad veritatem, ipsa Veritas Deus Dei Filius, homine assumpto, non Deo consumpto, 9514. NOTES. eamdem constituit atque fundavit fidem, ut ad hominis Deum iter esset homini per hominem Deum. Hic est enim mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Jesus. Per hoc enim mediator, per quod homo; per hoe et via.... Sola est autem adversus omnes errores via munitissima, ut idem ipse sit Deus et homo: quo itur, Deus; qua itur, homo.” Augustin. De Civ. Dei, XI. 2. Note 20. p. 154. “Qui credimus Deum etiam in terris egisse, et humani habitus humilitatem suscepisse ex causa humane salutis, longe sumus a sententia eorum qui nolunt Deum curare quidquam.” Tertullian, Adv. Mare. II. 16. Note 2]. p. 154. It is only a natural consequence of their own principles, when the advocates of a philosophy of the Absolute main- tain that the Incarnation of Christ has no relation to time. Thus Schelling says: “ Die Menschenwerdung Gottes in Christo deuten die Theologen eben so empirisch, namlich, dass Gott in einem bestimmten Moment der Zeit mensch- liche Natur angenommen habe, wobey schlechterdings nichts zu denken seyn kann, da Gott ewig ausser. aller Zeit ist. Die Menschenwerdung Gottes ist also eine Men- schenwerdung von Ewigkeit. Der Mensch Christus ist in der Erscheinung nur der Gipfel und in so fern auch wieder der Anfang derselben, denn von ihm aus sollte sie dadurch sich fortsetzen, dass alle seine Nachfolger Glieder eines und desselben Leibes waren, von dem er das Haupt ist. Dass in Christo zuerst Gott wahrhaft objectiv gewor- den, zeugt die Geschichte, denn wer vor ihm hat das Unendliche auf solche Weise geoffenbaret°?” Hegel, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History4, thus comments on the language of St. Paul: “ Als die Zeit erfiillet war, sandte Gott seinen Sohn,” heisst es in der Bibel. Das heisst nichts ς Vorlesungen iiber die Methode des Academischen Studium, p. 192. Fichte speaks to the same effect, Anweisung zum seligen Leben (Werke, V. p. 482). ἃ Werke, IX. p. 388. LECTURE Υ. 875 Anderes als: das Selbstbewusstseyn hatte sich zu den- jenigen Momenten erhoben, welche zum Begriff des Geistes gehoren, und zum Bediirfniss, diese Momente auf eine absolute Weise zu fassen.” This marvellous elucidation of the sacred text may perhaps receive some further light, or darkness, from the obscure passages of the same author, quoted subsequently in the text of this Lecture; and such is the explanation of his theory given by Baur, Christliche Gnosis, p.715: “ Auf dem Standpunct des speculativen Denkens ist die Menschwerdung Gottes keine einzelne, einmal geschehene, historische Thatsache, sondern eine ewige Bestimmung des Wesens Gottes, vermége weleher Gott nur insofern in der Zeit Mensch wird (in jeden einzelnen Menschen) sofern er von Ewigkeit Mensch ist. Die End- lichkeit und leidensvolle Erniedrigung, welcher sich Christus als Gottmensch unterzog, trigt Gott zu jeder Zeit als Mensch. Die von Christus vollbrachte Verséhnung ist keine zeitlich geschehene That, sondern Gott versdhnt sich ewig mit sich selbst, und die Auferstehung und Erhéhung Christi ist nichts anders, als die ewige Riikkehr des Geistes zu sich und zu seiner Wahrheit. Christus als Mensch, als Gottmensch, ist der Mensch in seiner Allgemeinheit, nicht ein einzelnes Individuum, sondern des allgemeine Indivi- duum.” It is no wonder that, to a philosophy of these lofty pretensions, the personal existence of Christ should be a question of perfect indifference®. From a similar point of view, Marheineke says: “ Die Menschwerdung Gottes, be- griffen in ihrer Moglichkeit, ist zunichst die wirkliche Men- schlichwerdung der géttlichen Wahrheit, welche nicht nur das Denken Gottes, sondern zugleich sein Wesen ist, und Géttliches und Menschliches, obwohl noch unterschieden, doch nicht mehr von einander getrennt.” Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 312. It is difficult to see what © For a criticism of these pantheistic perversions of Christianity, see Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosuphie, p.247. ‘The consum- mation of the pantheistic view may be found in Blasche, Philosophische Unsterblichkeitslehre, § 51-53. Here the eternal Incarnation of God is exhibited as the perpetual production of men, as phenomenal manifest. ations of the absolute unity. 376 NOTES. distinction ean be made, in these theories, between the In- carnation of Christ as Man, and His eternal Generation as the Son of God; and indeed these passages, and those sub- sequently quoted from Hegel, appear intentionally to iden- tify the two. Note 22. p. 156. Encyklopidie, § 564,566. For the benefit of any reader who may be disposed to play the part of Gidipus, I subjoin the entire passage in the original. The meaning may per- haps, as Professor Ferrier observes of Hegel’s philosophy in general, be extracted by distillation, but certainly not by literal translation. “Was Gott als Geist ist,—Dies richtig und bestimmt im Gedanken zu fassen, dazu wird griindliche Speculation erfordert. Es sind zunachst die Siitze darin enthalten : Gott ist Gott nur in sofern er sich selber weiss; sein sich Sich-wissen ist ferner sein Selbstbewusstseyn im Menschen, und das Wissen des Menschen von Gott, das fortgeht zum Sich-wissen des Menschen em Gott. Der absolute Geist in der aufgehobenen Unmittelbarkeit und Sinnlichkeit der Gestalt und des Wissens, ist dem Inhalte nach der an-und-fiir-sich-seyende Geist der Natur und des Geistes, der Form nach ist er zunachst fur das sub- jective Wissen der Vorstellung. Diese giebt den Momenten seines Inhalts einerseits Selbststandigkeit und macht sie gegen einander zu Voraussetzungen, und zu einander fol- genden Krscheinungen und zu einem Zusammenhang des Geschehens nach endlichen Reflexionsbestimmungen ; ander- erseits wird solche Form endlicher Vorstellungsweise in dem Glauben an den Hinen Geist und in der Andacht des Cultus aufgehoben. In diesem Trennen scheidet sich die Form von dem Inhalte, und in jener die unterschiedenen Momente des Begriffs zu besondern Sphiren oder Elementen ab, in deren jedem sich der absolute Inhalt darstellt,—qa) als in seiner Manifestation bei sich selbst bleibender, Ewiger Inhalt ;—f) als Unterscheidung des ewigen Wesens von seiner Manifestation, welche durch diesen Unterschied die Erscheinungswelt wird, in die der Inhalt tritt;—y) als LECTURE V. 97 unendliche Riickkehr und Versdhnung der entiiusserten Welt mit dem ewigen Wesen, das Zuriickgehen desselben aus der Erscheinung in die Einheit seiner Fiille.” The passage which, though perhaps bearing more di- rectly on my argument, I have not ventured to attempt to translate, is the following, § 568. “Im Momente der Besonderheit aber des Urtheils, ist dies conerete ewige Wesen das Vorausgesetztc, und seine Bewegung die Erschaffung der Eischecnung, das Zerfallen des ewigen Moments der Vermittlung, des einigen Sohnes, in den selbststandigen Gegensatz, einerseits des Himmels und der Erde, der elementarischen und concreten Natur, andererseits des Geistes als mit ihr im Verhdltniss ste- henden, somit endlichen Geistes, welcher als das Extrem der in sich seyenden Negativitat sich zum Bosen verselbst- standigt, soleches Extrem durch seine Beziehung auf eine gegentiberstehende Natur und durch seine damit gesetzte eigene Natiirlichkeit ist, in dieser als denkend zugleich auf das Ewige gerichtet, aber damit in ausserlicher Beziehung steht.” Gorres, in the preface to the second edition of his Atha- masius, p. ix., exhibits a specimen of a new Creed on Hegelian principles, to be drawn up by a general council composed of the more advanced theologians of the day. The qualifications for a seat in the council are humorously described, and the creed itself contains much just and pointed satire. It will hardly, however, bear quotation ; for a caricature on such a subject, however well intended, almost unavoidably carries with it a painful air of irre- verence. Note 23. p. 157. See especially Phiénomenologie des Geistes, Werke, 11. p. 557; Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, 1X. p. 387; Phi- losophie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 2473 Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XIV. p. 222, XV. p. 88. Note 24. p.157. The indecision of Hegel upon this vital question is satis- factorily accounted for by his disciple, Strauss. To a phi- 918 NOTES. losophy which professes to exhibit the universal relations of necessary ideas, it is indifferent whether they have actually been realized in an individual case or not. This question is reserved for the Critic of History. See Strect- schriften, Heft 111. p.68. Dorner too, while pointing out the merits of Hegel’s Christology, admits that the histori- cal Christ has no significance in his system; and that those disciples who reject it carry out that system most fully. See Lehre von der Person Christi, p. 409. Note 25. p. 158. Philosophie der Religion, Werke, X11. p.286. In another passage of the same work, p. 251, the Atonement is e- plained in the following language: “ Die Moglichkeit der Versohnung ist nur darin, dass gewusst wird die an sich seyende Einheit der gottlichen und menschlichen Natur ; das ist die nothwendige Grundlage; so kann der Mensch sich aufgenommen wissen in Gott, insofern ihm Gott nicht ein Fremdes ist, er sich zu ihm nicht als iusserliches Accidenz verhalt, sondern wenn er nach seinem Wesen, nach seiner Freiheit und Subjectivitat in Gott aufgenommen ist; diess ist aber nur méglich, insofern in Gott selbst diese Subjectivi- tat der menschlichen Natur ist. Compare also p. 330, and Phiénomenologie des Gieistes, Werke, 11. p. 544,572. Philo- sophie der Geschichte, Werke, 1X. p.405. Geschichte der Phi- losophie, Werke, XV. p. 100. Note 26. p. 158. Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 319, 320. Note 27. p. 160. Ibid. § 325, 326. A similar theory is maintained, almost in the same language, by Rosenkranz, Encyklopadie der theologischen Wissenschaften, ὃ 26,27. The Substance of this view is given by Hegel himself, Werke, LX. p.394, 457; XV. p.89. Some valuable criticisms on the principle of it may be found in Dr. Mill’s Observations on the application of Pantheistic Principles to the Criticism of the Gospel, pp. 16, 42. LECTURE V. 379 Note 28. p. 161. Leben Jesu, § 151. English Translation, Vol. ITIL. p. 437. The passage has also been translated by Dr. Mill in his Observations on the application of Pantheistic Principles, ὅσο. Ρ- 50. I have slightly corrected the former version by the aid of the latter. A sort of anticipation of the theory may be found in Hegel’s Phdanomenologie des Geistes, Werke, af p. 569: Note 29. p. 161. “Nur das Metaphysische, keinesweges aber das Histo- rische, macht selig.” Fichte, Anweisung zum seligen Le- ben, (Werke, V. p. 485.) With this may be compared the language of Spinoza, Ep. XXI. ‘“ Dico, ad salu- tem non esse omnino necesse, Christum secundum carnem noscere; sed de eterno illo filio Dei, hoc est Dei eterna sapientia, quee sese in omnibus rebus, et maxime in mente humana, et omnium maxime in Christo Jesu manifestavit, longe aliter sentiendum.” ΝΖ es LECTURE VI. Note 1. p. 171. See above, Lecture IV. p. 122, and note 19. Note 2. p.171. Christliche Lehre von der Stinde, 11. p. 156. third Edition, (English Translation, II. p. 126.) The doctrine that the Divine Essence is speculatively made known through Christ, is a common ground on which theologians of the most opposite schools have met, to diverge again into most adverse conclusions. It is substantially the opinion of Eunomius@; and it has been maintained in modern times by Hegel and his disciple Marheineke, in a sense very dif- ferent from that which is adopted by Miller. See Hegel, Philosophie der Gieschichte, Werke, ix. p. 19. Philosophie der Religion, Werke, xii. p. 204, and Marheineke, Grrundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 69. Note 3. p. 172. See L. Ancillon, in the Mémoires de [ Académie de Berlin, quoted by Bartholméss, Histoire des Doctrines religieuses, I. Ρ. 268. On the parallel between the mystery of Causation and those of Christian doctrines, compare Magee on the Atonement, Note XIX. See also Mozley, Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, p. 19, and the review of the same work, by Professor Fraser, Essays in Philosophy, P- 274. , Note 4. p.172. Seven different theories of the causal nexus, and of the a See Neander, vol. iv. p. 60, ed. Bohn. LECTURE VI. 381 mode of our apprehension of it, are enumerated and refuted by Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p.611. His own, which is the eighth, can hardly be regarded as more satisfactory. For he resolves the causal judgment itself into the inability to conceive an absolute commencement of phenomena, and the consequent necessity of thinking that what appears to us under a new form had previously existed under others. But surely a cause is as much required to account for the change from an old form to a new, as to account for an absolute beginning. On the defects of this theory I have remarked elsewhere. See Hncyclopedia Britannica, eighth edition, vol. XIV. p.601. It has also been criticised by Dr. McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 529, fourth edition; by Professor Fraser, L’ssays in Philosophy, p-170 sqq.; and by Mr. Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infi- nite, p. 139 5464. Note 5. p. 173. That Causation implies something more than invariable sequence, though what that something is we are unable to determine, is maintained, among others, by M. Cousin, in his eloquent Lectures on the Philosophy of Locke. “ Par cela seul” he says, “ qu’un phénomeéne succéde ἃ un autre, et y succéde constamment, en est-il la cause? est-ce la toute Vidée que vous vous formez de la cause? Quand vous dites, quand vous pensez que le feu est la cause de l’état de fiui- dité de la cire, je vous demande si vous ne croyez pas, si le genre humain tout entier ne croit pas qu’il y a dans le feu je ne sais quot, une propriété inconnue quwil ne s’agit pas ici de déterminer, ἃ laquelle vous rapportez la production du phénoméne de la fluidité de la cire.” Histoire de la Philo- sophie au XVIII. siecle, Legon xix. Engel speaks to the same effect in almost the same words. ‘‘ Dans ce que nous appelons, par exemple, force d’attraction, d’affinité, ou méme d’impulsion, la seule chose connue, (c’est-a-dire représentée ἃ l’imagination et aux sens,) cest leffet opéré, savoir, le rapprochement des deux corps attirés et attirant. Aucune langue n’a de mot pour exprimer ce je ne sais quot (effort, tendance, nisus), qui reste absolument caché, mais que tous les esprits concoivent nécessairement comme 382 NOTES. ajouté a la représentation phénoménale?.” Dr. McCosh, (Method of the Divine Government, p. 525,) professes to dis- — cover this je ne sais quoi, in ὦ substance acting according to its powers or properties. But, apart from the conscious exercise of free will, we know nothing of power, or pro- perty, save as manifested in its effects. Compare Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. VII. §9. Herder, Gott, Werke, Wi pret: Note 6. p.173. That the first idea of Causation is derived from the con- sciousness of the exercise of power in our own volitions, is established, after a hint from Locke>, by Maine de Biran, and accepted by M.Cousin®. To explain the manner in which we transcend our own personal consciousness, and attribute a cause to all changes in the material world, the latter philosopher has recourse to the hypothesis of a necessary law of the reason, by virtue of which, it dis- engages, in the fact of consciousness, the necessary element of causal relation, from the contingent element of our per- sonal production of this or that particular movement. This Law, the Principle of Causality, compels the reason to suppose a cause, whenever the senses present a new phenomenon. But this Principle of Causality, even grant- ing it to be true as far as it goes, does not explain what the idea of a Cause, thus extended, contains as its consti- tuent feature: it merely transcends personal causation, and substitutes an unknown something in its room. We do not attribute to the fire a consciousness of its power to melt the wax: and in denying consciousness, we deny the only positive conception of power which can be added to the mere juxtaposition of phenomena. The cause, in all sensible changes, thus remains a je ne sais quot. On this a Memoires de Académie de Berlin, quoted by Maine de Biran, Nouvelles Considérations, p. 23. b Essay, B. 11. Ch. 21. §§ 4, 5. A similar view.is taken by Jacobi, David Hume, oder Idealismus und Realismus, (Werke, 11. p. 201.) ¢ See De Biran, Oeuvres Philosophiques, IV. p. 241, 273, Cousin, Cours de l’Histoire de la Philosophie, Deuxiéme Série, Legon το. Fragments Philosophiques, vol. ΕΥ̓; Préface de la Premiére Edition. LECTURE VI. 383 subject I have treated more at length in another place. See Prolegomena Logica, pp. 135, 309. And even within the sphere of our own volitions, though we are Immediately conscious of the exercise of power, yet the analysis of the conception thus presented to us carries us at once into the region of the incomprehensible. The finite power of man, as an originating cause within his own sphere, seems to come into collision with the infinite power of God, as the originating Cause of all things. Finite power 15 itself created by and dependent upon God; yet, at the same time, it seems to be manifested as originating and independent. Power itself acts only on the solicitation of motives; and this raises the question, Which is prior? ‘does the motive bring about the state of the will which inclines to it; or does the state of the will convert the coincident circumstances into motives? Am I moved to will, or do I will to be moved? Here we are involved in the mys- tery of endless succession. On this mystery there are some able remarks in Mr. Mozley’s Augustinian theory of Predestination, p.2, and in Professor Fraser’s Essays in Philosophy, p. 275, Note 7. p. 173. De Ordine, 11.18. Compare Jbid. 11. 16. “ de summo illo Deo, qui scitur melius nesciendo.” Note 8. p. 174. Enarratio in Psalmum LXXXV. 12. Compare De Trinitate, VIII. c. 2. Note 9. p. 174. F. Socinus, Zractatus de Deo, Christo, et Spiritu Sancto, (Opera 1656, vol. I. p. 811.) ‘* Ceterum vel ex eo solo, quod Deus unus esse aperte traditur, merito concludi potest, eum non esse nee trinum, nec binum. Opposita sunt enim inter se Unus et Trinus, sive Unus et Binus. Ita ut, si Deus sit trinus aut binus, non possit esse unus.” Priestley, Tracts: in Controversy with Bishop Horsley, p. 78. «They are therefore both one and many in the same re- spect, viz. in each being perfect God. This is certainly as “much a contradiction as to say that Peter, James, and > 984 NOTES. John, having each of them every thing that is requisite to constitute a complete man, are yet, all together, not three men, but only one man.” F.W. Newman, Phases of Faith, p-48. ‘If any one speaks of three men, all that he means is, ‘three objects of thought, of whom each separately may be called man.’ So also, all that could possibly be meant by three Gods is, ‘ three objects of thought, of whom each separately may be called God.’ ‘To avow the last state- ment, as the Creed does, and yet repudiate Three Gods, is to object to the phrase, yet confess to the only meaning which the phrase can convey.” Note 10. p. 174. Schleiermacher, (Christliche Glaube, § 171,) has some objections against the Catholic Doctrine of the Holy Tri- nity, conceived in the thorough spirit of Rationalism. In the same spirit Strauss observes, (Glaubenslehre, 1. p. 460,) “Wer das Symbolum Quicunque beschworen hatte, der hatte die Gesetze des menschlichen Denkens abgeschwo- ren.” The sarcasm comes inconsistently enough from a disciple of Hegel, whose entire philosophy is based on an abjuration of the laws of thought. In one respect, indeed, Hegel is right; namely, in maintaining that the laws of thought are not applicable to the Infinite. But the true conclusion from this concession is not, as the Hegelians maintain, that a philosophy can be constructed indepen- dently of those laws; but that the infinite is not an object of human philosophy at all. - Note 11. p. 176. Paradise Lost, B. 11. 667. Note 12. p. 177. Compare Anselm, De Fide Trinitatis, ec. 7. “At si negat tria dici posse de uno, et unum de tribus: ut tria non dicantur de invicem; sicut in his tribus personis et uno Deo facimus, quoniam hoe in aliis rebus non videt, nec in Deo intelligere valet; sufferat paulisper aliquid, quod intellectus ejus penetrare non possit, esse in Deo, nec com- paret naturam, que super omnia est, libera ab omni lege LECTURE VI. 385 loci et temporis ct compositionis partium, rebus que loco aut tempore clauduntur, aut partibus componuntur ; sed eredat aliquid in illa esse, quod in istis esse nequit, et acquiescat auctoritati Christiane, nee disputet contra il- lam.” Note 18. p. 177. See the objections raised against this doctrine by Mr. F. W. Newman, Phases of Faith, p.84. ‘The very form of our past participle (degotten),” he tells us, “is invented to indicate an event in past time.” The true difficulty is not grammatical, but metaphysical. If ordinary language is primarily accommodated to the ordinary laws of thought, it is a mere verbal quibble to press its literal application to the Infinite, which is above thought. Note 14. p. 178. The parallel here pointed out may be exhibited more fully by consulting Bishop Pearson’s Exposition of this Doctrine, On the Creed, Art. 1. and the authorities cited in his notes. Note 15. p. 178. On this ground is established a profound and decisive criticism of Hegel’s System, by Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, 6. 2. ‘“ Das reine Sein,” he says, “ ist Ruhe; das Nichts—das sich selbst Gleiche—ist ebenfalls Ruhe. Wie kommt aus der Einheit zweier ruhenden Vorstellungen das bewegte Werden heraus.” M. Bar- tholméss in like manner remarks, “ En convertissant ainsi Vabstraction en réalité, ce systéme attribue tacitement a ’étre abstrait des vertus, des qualités qui ne conviennent qu’a un étre concret et individuel, cest-a-dire a un étre seul capable d'action spontanée et réfléchie, d’intelligence et de volonté. II lui accorde tout cela, dans le temps méme quwil le représente, et avec raison, comme un étre impersonnel. Cet étre abstrait produit des étres concrets, cet étre impersonnel produit des personnes: il produit les uns et les autres, parce qu’ainsi l’ordonne le systéme!” Histoire des Doctrines religieuses, 11. p. 277. ce 386 NOTES. Note 16. p. 179. Schelling, Bruno, p. i168. “Im Absoluten ist alles ab- solut; wenn also die Volkommenheit seines Wesens im Realen als unendliches Seyn, im Idealen als unendliches Krkennen erscheint, so ist im Absoluten das Seyn wie das Erkennen absolut, und indem jedes absolut ist, hat auch keines einen Gegensatz ausser sich in dem andern, sondern das absolute Erkennen ist das absolute Wesen, das abso- lute Wesen das absolute Erkennen.” Note 17. p. 179. Aquinas, Summa, P. 1. Qu. XXXII. Art.1. “ Impossi- bile est per rationem naturalem ad cognitionem trinitatis divinarum personarum pervenire. Ostensum est enim supra quod homo per rationem naturalem in cognitionem Dei pervenire non potest, nisi ex creaturis. Creature autem ducunt in Dei cognitionem sicut effectus in causam. Hoe igitur solum ratione naturali de Deo cognosci potest, quod competere ei necesse est, secundum quod est omnium rerum principium : et hoc fundamento usi sumus supra in consideratione Dei. Virtus autem creativa Dei est com- munis toti trinitati: unde pertinet ad unitatem essentiz, non ad distinctionem personarum. Per rationem igitur naturalem cognosci possunt de Deo ea que pertinent ad unitatem essentiz, non autem ea que pertinent ad dis- tinctionem personarum.” ‘This wise and sound limitation should be borne in mind, as a testimony against that neo- platonizing spirit of modern times, which seeks to strengthen the evidence of the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, by distorting it into conformity with the speculations of Heathen Philosophy. The Hegelian Theory of the Tri- nity is a remarkable instance of this kind. Indeed, Hegel himself expressly regards coincidence with neoplatonism as an evidence in favour of an idealist interpretation of Christian doctrines.4. A similar spirit occasionally ap- pears in influential writers among ourselves. d Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, 1X. p. 402. LECTURE VI. 387 Note 18. p. 180. For the objection, see Catech. Racov. De Persona Christi, Cap.1. (Ed. 1609. p. 43.) ““ Rationi sanee repugnat. Primo quod duz substantiz proprietatibus adversze coire in unam personam nequeant, ut sunt mortalem et immor- talem esse; principium habere et principio carere; muta- bilem et immutabilem existere: deinde quod due nature personam singulz constituentes in unam personam conve- nire itidem nequeant ; nam loco unius, duas personas esse oporteret, atque ita duos Christos existere, quem unum esse, et unam ipsitis personam, omnes citra omnem contro- versiam agnoscunt.” Spinoza, Lpist. XAT. ‘ Ceterum quod queedam ecclesiz his addunt, quod Deus naturam humanam assumpserit, monui expresse, me quid dicant nescire ; imo, ut verum fatear, non minus absurde mihi loqui videntur, quam si quis mihi diceret, quod circulus na- turam quadrati induerit.” Similar objections are urged by F. W. Newman, The Sou/, p.116, and by Theodore Parker, Critical and Miscellaneous Writings, p. 320, Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 234. Note 19. p. 181. One half of this dilemma has been exhibited by Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 609. sqq. It is strange however that this great thinker should not have seen that the second alternative is equally inconceivable; that it is as impossible to conceive the creation as a process of evolu- tion from the being of the Creator, as it is to conceive it -as a production out of nothing. This double impossibi- lity is much more in harmony with the philosophy of the conditioned, than the hypothesis which Sir W. Hamilton adopts. Indeed, his admirable criticism of Cousin’s theory (Discussions, p.36,) contains in substance the same cli- lemma as that exhibited in the text. For some addi- tional remarks on this point, see above, Lecture II. note 32. Note 20. p. 182. Pensées, Partie Il. Art I. § 1. 388 NOTES. Note 21. p. 185. Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 248. sqq. Compare a cognate passages from other Authors, quoted above, Lec- ture [. note 21. Note 22. p. 187. For some remarks connected with this and cognate theories, see above, Lecture I. notes 21, 22, 23, Lecture III. notes 16, 18. Note 23. p. 187. “Cum enim longe aliud sit universe, rei impossibilitatem intelligere, aliud possibilitatem rei non intelligere; tum maxime in lis que tam vehementer ignoramus, sicut ea que sensui exposita non sunt, haud profecto impossibilia sunt continuo, quorum possibilitas, modus ac facultas nobis non perspicitur. Ergo, ut his utamur, philosophum non decet, universe negare divinam in condito mundo effi- cientiam, seu pro certo dicere, Deum ipsum (immediate) nihil quicquam conferre vel ad rerum naturalium consecu- tionem, veluti conservationem partis cujusque et -speciel, quam genus animalium aut plantarum amplectitur, vel ad morales mutationes, ut animi humani emendationem, aut fierl omnino non posse, ut revelatio aliave eventa extra- ordinaria divinitus effecta fuerint.” Storr, Annotationes quedam Theologice, p. 5. Note 24. p. 188. ‘Nam quum virtus et potentia naturee sit ipsa Dei vir- tus et potentia, leges autem et regule nature ipsa Dei decreta, omnino credendum est, potentiam nature infini- tam esse, ejusque leges adeo latas, ut ad omnia, quee et ab ipso divino intellectu concipiuntur, se extendant. Alias enim, quid aliud statuitur, quam quod Deus naturam adeo impotentem creaverit, ejusque leges et regulas adeo steriles statuerit, ut seepe de novo ei subvenire cogatur, si eam conservatam vult et ut res ex voto succedant. Quod sane a ratione alienissimum esse existimo.” Spinoza, 7vractatus Theologico-Polhiticus, cap. VI. ‘Hi nimirum, (Supernatu- LECTURE VI. _ 389 raliste) Deum sumunt res humanas naturali ordine in uni- versum regere, et, ubi ubi hic naturalis ordo voluntati ip- sius haud amplius satisfacere possit, miraculis patrandis ipsi quasi opem ac medicinam ferre: illi vero (Rationalistz) Deum statuunt ab eterno omnes res continua serie secu- turas tam sapienter disposuisse, ut que v.c. ante plura jam seecula evenerint, id quod nunc evenit, preepararent et efficerent, nec opus esset miraculis quibusdam quasi inter- ealaribus.” Wegscheider, Jnstit. Theol. § 12. From an op- posite point of view to that of Spinoza, Herbart arrives at a similar conclusion. “Ἢ Es fordert die Religion, dass der- jenige, der als Vater fiir die Menschen gesorgt hat, jetzt intiefsten Schweigen die Menschheit sich selbst tiberlisst. als ob er keinen Theil an ihr habe; ohne Spur aller solehen Kmpfindung, welche der menschlichen Sympathie, vollends dem Egoismus gleichen konnte®.” The simile of the eal- culating engine, acting by its own laws, is adduced by Mr. Babbage, (Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, ch. 2), “ to illus- trate the distinction between a system to which the re- storing hand of its contriver is applied, either frequently or at distant intervals, and one which had received at its first formation the impress of the will of its author, fore- seeing the varied but yet necessary laws of its action throughout the whole of its existence ;” and to shew “ that that for which, after its original adjustment, no super- intendence is required, displays far greater ingenuity than that which demands, at every change in its law, the direct intervention of its contriver.” Mr. Jowett, though reject- ing the analogy of the machine, uses similar language : “The directing power that is able to foresee all things, and provide against them by simple and general rules, is a worthier image of the Divine intelligence than the handi- craftsman ‘ putting his hand to the hammer,’ detaching and isolating portions of matter from the laws by which he has himself put them together f.” © LehrbuchHinleitung zur in die Philosophie, § 155 (Werke, I. p. 278). ΟἹ Epistles of St. Paul, vol. 11. p. 412. 390 NOTES. Note 25. p. 189. ‘The reason why, among men, an artificer is justly esteemed so much the more skilful, as the machine of his composing will continue longer to move regularly without any further interposition of the workman, is, because the skill of all human artificers consists only in composing, ad- justing, or putting together certain movements, the prin- ciples of whose motion are altogether independent upon the artificer.... But with regard to God, the case is quite different ; because He not only composes or puts things together, but is himself the Author and continual Pre- server of their original forces or moving powers. And consequently it is not a diminution, but the true glory of his workmanship, that nothing is done without his continual government and inspection.” Clarke, First Reply to Leibnatz, Deis. Note 26. p. 189. “1 do not believe,” says Theodore Parker, “ there ever was a miracle, or ever will be; every where I find law,— the constant mode of operation of the infinite God &.” Some account of my Ministry, appended to Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 263. Compare the same work, p- 113, 188; and Atkinson, Man’s Nature and Development, p.241. The statement is not at present true, even as re- gards the material world: it is false as regards the world of mind: and were it true in both, it would prove nothing regarding the “ infinite God.”’ For the conception of law is, to say the least, quite as finite as that of miraculous in- terposition. Professor Powell, in his latest work, though not absolutely rejecting miracles, yet adopts a tone which, compared with such passages as the above, is at least painfully suggestive. “It is now perceived by all inquiring minds, that the advance of true scientific principles, and the grand inductive conclusions of universal and eternal law and order, are at once the basis of all rational theology, and give the death-blow to superstition.” Christianity with- out Judaism, p. 11. LECTURE VI. 39] Note 27. p. 190. This point has been treated by the author at greater length in the Prolegomena Logica, p. 135, and in the article Metaphysics, in the 8th edition of the Encyclopedia Bri- tannica, vol. XIV. p. 600. Note 28. p. 192. See McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 162, 166. The quotations which the author brings forward in support of this remark, from Humboldt and Comte, are valuable as shewing the concurrence of the highest scientific authorities as to the facts stated. The religious applica- tion of these facts is Dr. McCosh’s own, and constitutes one of the most instructive portions of his valuable work. The fact itself has been noticed and commented on with his usual sagacity by Bishop Butler, Analogy, Part II. ch. 3. “ Would it not have been thought highly improba- ble, that men should have been so much more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions of the heavenly bodies, than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many other things, in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in astronomy {” Note 29. p. 192. “There are domains of nature in which man’s foresight is considerably extended and accurate, and other domains in which it is very limited, or very dim and confused. Again, there are departments of nature in which man’s influence is considerable, and others which lie altogether beyond his control, directly or indirectly. Now, on com- paring these classes of objects, we find them to have a eross or converse relation to one another. Where man’s foreknowledge is extensive, either he has no power, or his power is limited; and where his power might be exerted, his foresight is contracted.... He can tell in what position a satellite of Saturn will be a hundred years after this pre 392 NOTES. sent time, but he cannot. say in what state his bodily health may be an hour hence... . We are now in circumstances to discover the advantages arising from the mixture of uni- formity and uncertainty in the operations of nature. Both serve most important ends in the government of God. The one renders nature steady and stable, the other active and accommodating. Without the certainty, man would waver as In a dream, and wander as in a trackless desert ; without the unexpected changes, he would make his rounds like the gin-horse in its circuit, or the prisoner on his wheel. Were nature altogether capricious, man would likewise be- come altogether capricious, for he could have no motive to steadfast action: again, were nature altogether fixed, it would make man’s character as cold and formal as itself.” MeCosh, Method of the Divine Government, pp. 172, 174, (4th edition). Note 30. p. 193. The solution usually given by Christian writers of the difficulty of reconciling the efficacy of prayer with the in- finite power and wisdom of God, I cannot help regarding, while thoroughly sympathizing with the purpose of its ad- vocates, as unsatisfactory. That solution may be given in the language of Euler. ‘Quand un fidele addresse a pré- sent a Dieu une priére digne d’étre exaucée, 1] ne faut pas simaginer que cette priére ne parvient qu’a présent a la connaissance de Dieu. 11 a déja entendu cette priére depuis l’éternité; et puisque ce peére miséricordieux la jugée digne d’étre exaucée, il a arrangé exprés le monde en faveur de cette priére, en sorte que laccomplissement fut une suite du cours naturel des événements}.” In other words, the prayer is foreseen and foreordained, as well as the answer. This solution appears to assume that the conception of law and necessity adequately represents the absolute nature of God, while that of contingence and gpe- cial interposition is to be subordinated to it. The ἐγ ae h [Letters ἃ une Princesse d’ Allemagne, vol. I. p. 357, ed. Cournot. Compare McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 222. LECTURE VI. 393 ments of God in the government of the world are fixed from all eternity, and if the prayer is part of those arrangements, it becomes a necessary act likewise. It is surely a more reverent, and probably a truer solution, to say that the conception of general law and that of special interposition are equally human. Neither probably represents, as a spe- culative truth, the absolute manner in which God works in His Providence; both are equally necessary, as regulative truths, to govern man’s conduct in this life. In neither as- pect are we warranted in making the one conception sub- ordinate to the other. A similar objection may be urged against the theory which represents a miracle as the possi- ble manifestation of a higher and unknown law. There is nothing in the conception of /az which entitles it to this preeminence over other human modes of representation. Note 31. p. 194. Kant, though he attaches no value to miracles as evi- dences of a moral religion, yet distinctly allows that there is no sufficient reason for denying their possibility as facts or their utility at certain periods of the history of religion!. This moderation is not imitated by his disciple, Wegscheider, who says, “ Persuasio de supernatural et miraculosa eadem- que immediata Dei revelatione haud bene conciliari videtur cum idea Dei zterni, semper sibi constantis, omnipotentis, omniscii, et sapientissimi*.’” Strauss, in like manner, as- sumes that the absolute Cause never disturbs the chain of secondary causes by arbitrary acts of interposition ; and therefore lays it down as a canon, that whatever is mira- culous is unhistorical !. Note 32. p. 195. See, on the one side, Babbage’s Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, chap. 8; Hitchcock, Religion of Geology, p. 290. i Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. p. 90, edit. Rosenkranz. k Instit. Theol. § 12. 1 Leben Jesu, § τό. 394 NOTES. The same view is also suggested as probable by Butler, Analogy, Part I. ch. 4. On the other side, as regards the limitations within which the idea of law should be applied to the course of God’s Providence, see M°Cosh, Method of Divine Government, p.155. Kant, Religion innerhalb, u. 8.10. p. 102, maintains, with reason, that from a human point of view, a law of miracles is unattainable. Note 33. p. 198. Sir William Hamilton, Discussions, p. 625. δι. Δ 5. LECTURE VII. Note 1. p. 200. ‘THE Moral and Religious Philosophy of Kant, which is here referred to, is chiefly contained in his Metaphystk der Sitten, first published in 1785, his Avitik der praktischen Vernunft, in 1788, and his Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, in 1793. For Kant’s influence on the rationalist theology of Germany, see Rosenkranz, Geschichte der Kant’schen Philosophie, p. 323. sqq. Amand Saintes, Mistoire du Rationalisme en Allemagne, L.I1.Ch. XI. Rose, State of Protestantism in Germany, p.183 (2nd edition), Kahnis, History of German Protestantism, p.88,167 (Meyer's Translation). Note 2. p. 201. See Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 5,31,52,87,92; Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, p. 224 (ed. Rosenkranz). Note 3. p. 202. A similar view of the superiority of the moral conscious- ness over other phenomena of the human mind, as regards absolute certainty, seems to be held by Mr. Jowett. In reference to certain doubts connected with the Doctrine of the Atonement, he observes, “It is not the pride of human reason which suggests these questions, but the moral sense which He himself has implanted in the breast of each one of us@.” It is difficult to see the foree of the antithesis a Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. IL. p. 468. 900 ~ NOTES. here suggested. ‘The “‘ moral sense” is not more the gift of God than the “ human reason ;” and the decisions of the former, to be represented in consciousness at all, require the cooperation of the latter. Even as regards our own personal acts, the intellectual conception must be united with the moral sense in passing judgment; and in all gene- ral theories concerning the moral nature of God or of man, the rational faculty will necessarily have the larger share. Note 4. p. 202. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p.631. ed. Rosenkranz. Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 31. Religion innerhalb uy. s. w. p. 123. Note 5. p. 202. Religion u. 8. 10. p.123. Note 6. p. 202. Ibid. p. 122, 184. Note 7. p. 202. Ibid. pp. 123, 133. Compare Streit der Facultaten, Ρ. 304. Note 8. p. 204. See above, Lecture III. p. 83. Note 9. p. 204. On the existence of necessary truths in morals, compara- ble to those of mathematics, see Reid, Jntcllectual Powers, Essay VI. Ch. 6. (p. 453, 454. ed. Hamilton.) Note 10. p. 206. Compare Jacobi, An Fichte, Werke, [11]. pp. 35,37. “So gewiss ich Vernunft besitze, so gewiss besitze ich mit dieser meiner menschlichen Vernunft nicht die Vollkommenheit des Lebens, nicht die Fille des Guten und des Wahren ; und so gewiss ich dieses mit ihr nicht besitze, und es weiss ; so gewiss weiss ich, es ist ein hoheres Wesen, und ich habe in ihm meinen Ursprung... Ich gestehe also, dass ich das an sich Gute, wie das an sich Wahre, nicht kenne, dass ich auch von ihm nur eine ferne Ahndung habe.” That the LECTURE VII. ὃ B97 moral providence of God cannot be judged by the same standard as the actions of men, see Leibnitz, Théodicée, De la conformité &e. § 32, (Opera, Ed. Erdmann, p. 489.) Note 11. p. 207. ‘‘ Wherefore inasmuch as our actions are conversant about things beset with many circumstances, which cause men of sundry wits to be also of sundry judgments con- cerning that which ought to be done; requisite it cannot but seem the rule of divine law should herein help our im- becility, that we might the more infallibly understand what is good and what evil. The first principles of the Law of Nature are easy; hard it were to find men ignorant of them. But concerning the duty which Nature’s law doth require at the hands of men in a number of things particu- lar, so far hath the natural understanding even of sundry whole nations been darkened, that they have not dis- cerned, no not gross iniquity to be sin.” Hooker, Δ. P., Laie 2. Note 12. p. 208. This corresponds to the distinction drawn by Leibnitz, between eternal and positive truths of the reason. See Théodicée, Discours de la Conformité, &e. § 2. (Opera, Erdmann, p. 480.) The latter class of truths, he allows may be subservient to Faith, and even opposed by it, but not the former. Note 13. p. 210. That it is impossible to conceive the Divine Will as ab- solutely indifferent, is shewn by Miiller, Christliche Lehre won der Siinde, I. p.128. But on the other hand, we are equally unable to conceive it as necessarily determined by the laws of the Divine Nature. We cannot therefore con- ceive absolute morality either as dependent on, or as inde- pendent of, the Will of God. In other words, we are unable to conceive absolute morality at all. Note 14. p. 212. See above, Lecture I. note 14. 398 NOTES. Note 15. p. 212. ‘Sin contains its own retributive penalty, as surely and as naturally as the acorn contains the oak. . .It is ordained to follow guilt by God—not as a Judge, but as the Creator and Legislator of the universe. ..We can be redeemed from the punishment of sin only by being redeemed from its commission. Neither can there be any such thing as vica- rious atonement or punishment ... If the foregoing reflec- tions are sound, the awful, yet wholesome conviction, presses upon our minds, that there can be no forgiveness of sins.’ Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 265. “I believe God is a just God, rewarding and punishing us exactly as we act well or ill. I believe that such reward and punishment follow necessarily from His will as revealed in natural law, as well as in the Bible. I believe that as the highest justice is the highest mercy, so He is a merciful God. That the guilty should suffer the measure of penalty which their guilt has incurred, is justice. Froude, Nemesis of Faith, p. 69. Note 16. p. 212. See above, Lecture I, note 13. Note 17. Ρ.. 212. See above, Lecture I, note 12. Note 18. p. 212. See Newman, Phases of Faith, p.8. Compare Weg- scheider, Jnstit. Theol. § 141. Note 19. p. 213. Mr. Rigg justly observes of the theory of immediate forgiveness, as substituted for the Christian Atonement, ‘Let all men be told that ‘God cannot be angry with any,’ and that whatever may have been a man’s sins, if he will but repent, there is no hindrance to God’s freely forgiving him all, without the infliction of any punishment whatever, and without the need of any atonement or intercession. What would be the effect of such a proclamation? Would it make sin appear ‘ exceeding sinful’? Would it enhance LECTURE VII. 399 our idea of the holiness of God? Would it not make sin appear a light and trivial thing, tolerated too easily by a ‘good-natured’ God, to be held as of much account by man)?” Wegscheider indeed actually urges this argument against the Christian doctrine, which it suits his purpose to represent as a scheme of unconditional forgiveness. “Experientia docet, persuasionem hominum de peccatorum remissione absoluta a nequissimo quoque facillime obti- nenda, maximum semper vere virtuti δὲ probitati detrimen- tum attulisse.” Jnstit. Theol. § 140. Note 20. p. 214. Such is in fact the theory of Kant, See Religion inner- halb der Grenzen der blossen Venunft, p.84. He does not however carry his principle consistently out, but admits a kind of vicarious suffering in a symbolical sense ; the peni- tent being morally a different individual from the sinner. Even this metaphorical conceit is utterly out of place according to the main principles of his system. - Note 21. p. 215. Some excellent remarks on this point will be found in McCosh’s Method of the Divine Government, p. 475. (4th Edition.) Note 22. p. 215. “This natural indignation is generally moderate and low enough in mankind, in each particular man, when the injury which excites it doth not affect himself, or one whom he considers as himself. Therefore the precepts to forgive and to love our enemies, do not relate to that general indignation against injury and the authors of it, but to this feeling, or resentment, when raised by private or personal injury.” Butler, Sermon IX, On Forgiveness of Injuries. Note 23. p. 216. Thus Mr. Froude exclaims, “ He! to have created man- kind liable to fall—to have laid them in the way of a temptation under which He knew they would fall, and b Modern Anglican Theology, p. 317: 400 NOTES. then eurse them and all who were to come of them, and all the world, for their sakes!” Nemesis of Faith, p.11. This author omits the whole doctrine of the redemption, and treats the fall and the curse as if they were the whole manner of God’s dealing with sinners. His objection, stripped of its violent language, is but one form of the universal riddle—the existence of Evil. modov. Σωκράτης μὲν yap ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς οὐκ “ ‘ \ οὔσης ἀκρασίας" οὐθένα yap ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν Tapa τὸ > » βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν. Note 41. p. 228. For sundry rationalist objections to the doctrine of Jus- tification by Faith, see Wegscheider, § 154,155. He de- clares the whole doctrine to be the result of the anthropo- pathic notions of a rude age. 48. NOTES. Note 42. p. 228. ‘Unser Begriff von Freiheit schliesst ja tibrigens nie- mals Motiven des bewussten Handelns aus; Motiven aber sind nicht Zwangsveranstaltungen, sondern werden immer nur erst durch den Willen wirksam; Motiven fiir den menschlichen Willen konnen also auch von Gott ausgehen, ohne dass dadurch der Mensch gezwungen, ohne dass er unfrei, ein blindes Werkzeug der héhern Macht wird.” Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie, p.272. In like manner, Mr. Mozley, in his learned and philosophical work on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, truly says, ‘‘ What we have to consider in this question, is not what is the abstract idea of freewill, but what is the free- will which we really and actually have. This actual free- will, we find, is not a simple but a complex thing ; exhibit- ing oppositions and inconsistencies; appearing on the one side to be a power of doing any thing to which there is no physical hindrance, on the other side to be a restricted faculty” (p.102). Neither the Pelagian theory on the one side, nor the Augustinian on the other, took sufficient ac- count of the actual condition of the human will in relation to external influences. The question was argued as if the relation of divine grace to human volition must consist wholly in activity on the one side, and passivity on the other ;—in the will of its own motion accepting the grace, or the grace by its irresistible foree overpowering the will. The controversy thus becomes precisely analogous to the philosophical dispute between the advocates of freewill and determinism: the one proceeding on the assumption of an absolute indifference of the will; the other maintaining its _ necessary determination by motives. Mr. Mozley has thrown considerable light on the true bearings of the predestinarian controversy; and his work is especially valuable as vindicating the supreme right of Scripture to be accepted in all its statements, instead of being mutilated to suit the demands of human logic. But it cannot be denied that his own theory, however satis- factory in this respect, leaves a painful void on the philo- LECTURE VII. 409 sophical side, and apparently vindicates the authority of revelation by the sacrifice of the laws of human thought. He maintains that where our conception of an object is in- distinct, contradictory propositions may be accepted as both equally true ; and he carries this theory so far as to assert of the rival doctrines of Pelagius and Augustine, ‘“ Both these positions are true, if held together, and both false, if held aparts.”’ Should we not rather say that the very indistinctness of conception prevents the existence of any contradiction at all? I can only know two ideas to be contradictory by the distinct conception of both; and, where such a conception is impossible, there is no evidence of contradiction. The actual declarations of Scripture, so far as they deal with matters above human comprehension, are not in themselves contra- dictory to the facts of consciousness: they are only made so by arbitrary interpretation. It is nowhere said in Serip- ture that God so predestines man as to take from him all power of acting by his own will:—this 1s an inference from the supposed nature of predestination ; an inference which, if our conception of predestination is indistinct, we have no right to make. Man cannot foreknow unless the event is certain; nor predestine without coercing the result. Here there is a contradiction between freewill and predestination. But we cannot transfer the same contradiction to Theology, without assuming that God’s knowledge and acts are sub- ject to the same conditions as man’s. The contradictory propositions which Mr. Mozley ex- hibits as equally guaranteed by consciousness, are in reality ¢ P.77. To the same effect are his criticisms on Aquinas, p. 260, in which he says, “ The will as an original spring of action is irreconcilable with the Divine Power, a second first cause in nature being inconsistent with there being only one First Cause.’ This assumes that we have a sufficient conception of the nature of Divine Power and of the action of a First Cause; an assumption which the author himself in another passage repudiates, acknowledging that “As an unknown premiss, the Divine Power is no contradiction to the fact of evil; for we must know what a truth is before we see a contradiction in it to another truth.” (p. 276.) This latter admission, consistently carried out, would have considerably modified the author’s whole theory. 410 NOTES. by no means homogeneous. In each pair of contradictories, we have a limited and individual fact of immediate pereep- tion,—such as the power of originating an action, — op- posed to an universal maxim, not perceived immediately, but based on some process of general thought,—such as that every event must have a cause. ‘To establish these two as contradictory of each other, it should be shewn that in every single act we have a direct consciousness of being coerced, as well as of being free; and that we can gather from each fact a clear and distinct conception. But this is by no means the case. ‘The principle of causality, whatever may be its true import and extent, is not derived from the im- mediate consciousness of our volition being determined by antecedent causes; and therefore it may not be applied to human actions, until, from an analysis of the mode in which this maxim is gained, it can be distinetly shewn that these are included under it}. By applying to Mr. Mozley’s theory the principles ad- vanced in the preceding Lectures, it may, I believe, be shewn that, in every case, the contradiction is not real, but apparent; and that it arises from a vain attempt to tran- scend the limits of human thought. Note 43. p. 229. Analogy, Introduction, p. 10. h I am happy to be able to refer, in support of this view, to the able criticism of Professor Fraser, in his review of Mr. Mozley’s work. «The coexistence,’ he says, “οὗ a belief in causality with a belief in moral agency, is indeed incomprehensible; but is it so because the two beliefs are known to be contradictory, and not rather because causality and Divine Power cannot be fathomed by ainite intelligence ὃ Essays in Philosophy, p. 271. ἐν μίας ei ὑμὴν a ἃ LECTURE VIII. Note 1. p. 237. F. w. Newman, Phases of Faith, p.199. Reply to the Eclipse of Faith, p. 11. Note 2. p. 237. “Christianity itself has thus practically confessed, what is theoretically clear, that an authoritative external revela- tion of moral and spiritual truth is essentially impossible to man.” F.W. Newman, 706 Soul, p. 59. Note 3. p. 237. “Jn teaching about God and Christ, lay aside the wisdom of the wise: forswear History and all its apparatus : hold communion with the Father and the Son in the — Spirit: from this communion learn all that is essential to the Gospel, and still (if possible) retain every proposition which Paul believed and taught. Propose them to the faith of others, to be tested by inward and spiritual evidence only ; and you will at least be in the true apostolic track.” F. W. Newman, The Soul, p. 250. Note 4. p. 237. ‘‘This question of miracles, whether true or false, is of no religious significance. When Mr. Locke said the doc- trine proved the miracles, not the miracles the doctrine, he admitted their worthlessness. They can be useful only 412 NOTES. to such as deny our internal power of discerning truth.” Parker, Discourse of matters pertaining to Religion, p. 170. Pascal, with far sounder judgment, says, on the other hand, “ἢ faut juger de la doctrine par les miracles, il faut juger des miracles par la doctrine. La doctrine discerne les miracles, et les miracles discernent la doctrine. Tout cela est vrai; mais cela ne se contredit pas...... Jésus Christ guérit Paveugle-né, et fit quantité de miracles au jour du sabbat, par ot il aveuglait les pharisiens, qui disaient qu’il fallait juger des miracles par la doctrine.” .... ‘ Les phari- siens disaient : Non est hic homo a Deo, qui sabbatum non cus- todit. Les autres disaient: Quomodo potest homo peccator λας signa facere? Lequel est le plus clair??” In like manner Clarke observes, “’Tis indeed the miracles only, that prove the doctrine; and not the doctrine, that proves the miracles. But then in order to this end, that the miracles may prove the doctrine, *tis always necessary to be first supposed that the doctrine be such as is in its nature capable of being proved by miracles. The doctrine must be in itself possible and capable to be proved, and then miracles will prove it to be actually and certainly true.” The judicious remarks of Dean Trench are to the same effect, ““ When we object to the use often made of these works, it is only because they have been forcibly severed from the whole complex of Christ's life and doc- trine, and presented to the contemplation of men apart from these; it is only because, when on his head are ‘many crowns,’ one only has been singled out in proof that He is King of kings, and Lord of lords. The mira- cles have been spoken of as though they borrowed nothing from the truths which they confirmed, but those truths every thing from the miracles by which they were con- a Pensées, Partie II. Art. xvi. § 1, 5, 10. Whatever may be thought of the evidence in behalf of the particular miracle on the occasion of which these remarks were written, the article itself is worthy of the highest praise, as a judicious statement of the religious value of miracles, supposing their actual occurrence to be proved by sufficient testimony. » Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion, Prop. xiv. LECTURE VIII. 415 firmed ; when indeed the true relation is one of mutual interdependence, the miracles proving the doctrines, and the doctrines approving the miracles, and both held toge- ther for us in a blessed unity, in the person of Him who spake the words and did the works, and through the ‘impress of highest holiness and of absolute truth and good- ness, which that person leaves stamped on our souls ;—so that it may be more truly said that we believe the miracles for Christ’s sake. than Christ for the miracles’ sake¢,” Note 5. p. 237. Foxton, Popular Christianity, p.105. On the other hand, the profound author of the Restoration of Belief, with a far juster estimate of the value of evidence, observes, “« Remove the supernatural from the Gospels, or, in other words, reduce the evangelical histories, by aid of some un- intelligible hypothesis (German-born) to the level of an inane jumble of credulity, extravagance, and myth-power, (whatever this may be,) and then Christianity will go to its place, as to any effective value, in relation to humanizing and benevolent influences and enterprizes ;—a place, say, a few degrees above the level of some passages in Epictetus and M. Aurelius.......The Gospel is a Force in the world, it is a force available for the good of man, not because it is Wisdom, but because it is Power.... But the momentum supplied by the Gospel is a force which disappears—which is utterly gone, gone for ever, when Belief in its authority, as attested by miracles, is destroyed.” pp. 290, 291, 292. Note 6. p. 237. Parker, Some account of my ministry, appended to Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 258. Note 7. p. 238. “ Alle diese Kriterien sind die moralischen Bedingungen, unter denen allein, und ausser welchen nicht, eine solche Erscheinung von Gott, dem Begriffe einer Offenbarung © Notes on the Miracles of our Lord, p. 94. (Fifth Edition.) 414 NOTES. gemass, bewirkt seyn konnte ; aber gar nicht umgekehrt,— die Bedingungen einer Wirkung, die bloss durch Gott diesem Begriffe gemiiss bewirkt seyn kénnte. Waren sie das letztere, so berechtigen sie durch Ausschliessung der Causalitat aller iibrigen Wesen zu dem Urtheile: das ist Offenbarung; da sie aber das nicht, sondern nur das erstere sind, so berechtigen sie bloss zu dem Urtheile: das kann Offenbarung seyn.” Fichte, Versuch einer Kritihk aller Offenbarung, (Werke, V. p. 146.) Note 8. p. 239. «ς These... were the outer conditions of the life of Christ, under which his public ministry and his personal character reached their destined development. It is not in that development a/one, but in that development under these con- ditions, that the evidence will be found of his True Origin and of his Personal Preeminence.” The Christ of History, by John Young, p. 33. “‘ But this character, in its unap- proachable grandeur, must be viewed in connection with the outward circumstances of the Being in whom it was realised,—in connection with a life not only unprivileged, but offering numerous positive hindrances to the origi- nation, the growth, and, most of all, the perfection of spi- ritual excellence. In a Jew of Nazareth—.a young man— an uneducated mechanic—moral perfection was realised. Can this phenomenon be accounted for? There is here, without doubt, a manifestation of humanity; but the question is, was this a manifestation of mere humanity and no more?” Ibid. p. 2514. Note 9. p. 241. Newman, The Soul, p. 58. ἃ The able and impressive argument of this little work is well worthy of the perusal of those who would see what is the real force of the Christian evidences, even upon the lowest ground to which scep- ticism can attempt to reduce them. ‘Though far from representing the whole strength of the case, it is most valuable as shewing what may be etfected in behalf of Christianity, on the principles of its opponents. LECTURE VIII. 415 Note 10. p. 244. Analogy, Part II. Ch. 3. Note 11. p. 248. “ Although some circumstances in the description of God’s Firstborn and Elect, by whom this change is to be accomplished, may primarily apply to collective Israel, [many others will admit of no such application. Israel surely was not the child whom a virgin was to bear; Israel did not make his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death; Israel scarcely reconciled that strangely blended variety of suffering and triumph, which was pre- dicted of the Messiah,]” R. Williams, Rational Godliness, Ρ. 56. Ina note to this passage, the author adds, “I no longer feel confident of the assertion in brackets; but now believe that a// the prophecies have primarily an applica- tion nearly contemporaneous.” As a specimen of this application, we may cite a subsequent passage from the same volume, p.169. “ The same Isaiah sees that Israel, whom God had called out of Egypt, and whom the Eternal had denominated his first-born, trampled, captive, and de- rided; he sees the beauty of the sanctuary defiled, and the anointed priests of the living God degraded from their office, led as sheep to the slaughter, insulted by their own countrymen, as men smitten of God, cast off by Jehovah. Ah! he says, it is through the wickedness of the nations that Israel is thus afflicted; it is through the apostasy of the people that the priesthood is thus smitten and reviled ; they hide their faces from the Lord’s servant ; nevertheless, no weapon that is formed against him shall prosper: it is a little thing that He should merely recover Israel, He shall also be a light to the Gentiles, and a salvation to the ends of the earth.” There are few unprejudiced readers who will not think the author’s first thought on this subject preferable to his second. In the interpretation of any profane author, the perverse ingenuity which regards the Fifty-Third chapter of Isaiah, (to say nothing of the other portions of the pro- pheey, which Dr. Williams has divorced from their context, ) 410 NOTES. as a description of the contemporaneous state of the Jewish people and priesthood, would be considered as too extra- vagant to need refutation. That such an interpretation should have found favour with thoroughgoing rationalists, determined at all hazards to expel the supernatural from Scripture, is only to be expected; and this may explain the adoption of this and similar views by a considerable school of expositors in Germany: but that it should have been received by those who, like Dr. Williams, hold fast the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God, is less easily to be accounted for. If this greatest of all miracles be once conceded,—if it be allowed that “ when the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth His Son, made of a woman ;’—what marvel is it, that, while the time was still incomplete, a prophet should have been divinely inspired to proclaim the future redemption? Once concede the possibility of the supernatural at all; and the Messianic interpretation 1s the only one reconcilable with the facts of history and the plain meaning of words. ‘The fiction of a contemporaneous sense, whether with or without a subse- quent Messianic application, is only needed to get rid of direct inspiration; and nothing is gained by getting rid of inspiration, so long as a fragment of the supernatural 1s permitted to remain. It is only when we assume, ὦ priors, that the supernatural is impossible, that any thing is gained by forcing the prophetic language into a different meaning. Note 12. p. 250. Of this Eclectic Christianity, of which Schleiermacher may be considered as the chief modern representative, a late gifted and lamented writer has truly observed, “ He could not effect the rescue of Christianity on these prin- ciples without serious loss to the object of his care. His efforts resemble the benevolent intervention of the deities of the classic legends, who, to save the nymph from her pursuer, changed her into a river or a tree. It may be that the stream and the foliage have their music and their beauty, that we may think we hear a living voice still in the whispers of the one and the murmurs of the other, yet LECTURE VIII. 417 the beauty of divine Truth, our heavenly visitant, cannot but be grievously obscured by the change, for ‘the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another.’ Such ecclesiastical doctrines as contain what he regards as the essence of Christianity are received. All others, as being feelings embodied in the concrete form of dogmas, as man’s objective conceptions of the divine, he considers as open to criticism ..... Schleiermacher accounts as thus indifferent the doctrine of the Trinity, the super- natural conception of the Saviour, many of his miracles, his ascension, and several other truths of the same class. This one reply—‘ That doctrine makes no necessary part of our Christian consciousness,’ stands solitary, like a Cocles at the bridge, and keeps always at bay the whole army of advancing queries. But surely it does constitute an essen- tial part of our Christian consciousness whether we regard the New Testament writers as trustworthy or otherwise. If certain parts of their account are myths, and others the expression of Jewish prejudice, and we are bidden dismiss them accordingly from our faith, how are we sure that in what is left these historians were faithful, or these ex- positors true representatives of the mind of Christ? Our Christian consciousness is likely to become a consciousness of little else than doubt, if we give credit to the asser- tion,— Your sole informants on matters of eternal moment were, every here and there, misled by prejudice and im- posed upon by fablee.” Wote 13. p. 251. For the objections of modern Pantheism against the 1m- mortality of the soul, see Lecture III. note 27. Of the re- surrection of the body in particular, Wegscheider observes, “ Tantum vero abest ut resurrectio corporum cum sane rationis preeceptis bene conciliari queat, ut plurimis gra- vissimisque impediatur difficultatibus. Pramum enim dubi- tari nequit, quin hee opinio e notionibus mancis et im- perfectis hominum incultiorum originem traxerit, quippe qui, justa numinis divini idea destituti, vitam post mortem e Essays and Remains of the Rev. Robert Alfred Vaughan, Vol. 1. Ρ. 93. E @ 418 NOTES. futuram e sola vite terrestris natura sibi fingere soleant ; quo fit, ut apud complures gentes barbaras, itemque in Zoroastrica disciplina, e cujus fonte Judei ipsi hausisse videntur, eadem illa deprehendatur. Yum resurrectio cor- porum in 1]. N. T. tradita, quee inde ab ipsa apostolica etate haud paucis improbata fuit, tam arcte conjuncta cernitur cum opinionibus de Messia mythicis et cum narratione de Jesu in vitam restituto, ut non alia ratione ac mythi isti judicari et explicari possit..... Preterca Deo sanctissimo benignissimoque aperte non convenit, quod homini, qui sine corpore vitam veram degere nequeat, post multa demum annorum millia hoc corpus reddere fingitur.... His et aliis ducti rationibus haud fere levioribus, vel Jesum, ubi doe- trinam de resurrectione proposuisse perhibetur, popularium opinionibus indulsisse, vel potius discipulos ipsi tanquam Messiz, cujus provinciam e vulgaribus Judzorum com- mentis atque certis ejusdem effatis allegoricis atque ob- scurioribus perperam judicarent, ejusmodi sententiam ex suis subjecisse censemus‘.” Concerning angels and spirits, one of the most significant specimens of modern Sadducee- ism may be found in Dr. Donaldson’s Christian Orthodoxy reconciled with the conclusions of modern Biblical Learning, Ρ. 347. sqq. He holds, with regard to intermediate Intelli- gences, the same view which Wegscheider suggests with regard to the Resurrection: namely, “that our Lord, in his dealings with the Jews, rather acquiesced in the esta- blished phraseology than sanctioned the prevalent super- stition 8.” He adds that “‘in many respects, our Lord f Institutiones Theologice, § 195. ἔ P.363. That is to say, it is boldly maintained that our Lord, in order to humour the prejudices of the Jews of that day, consented to lend His authority to the dissemination of a religious falsehood for the deception of posterity. This monstrous assertion is stated more plainly by Spinoza, Tractutus Theologico-Polit. c.2. “ Quod nempe suas rationes opinionibus et principiis uniuscujusque accommodavit. Ex. gr. quum Phariseis dixit, Ht si Satanas Satanam ejicit, adversus se ipsum divisus est ; quomodo igitur stare potest regnum ejus? nihil nisi Phariszeos ex suis principlis convincere voluit, non autem docere, dari dzmones aut aliquod demonum regnum.” In like manner, Schleiermacher (Christliche Glaube, § 42) asserts that Christ and his Apostles possibly adopted the popular representations, as we speak of fairies and ghosts. LECTURE VIII. 419 seems to have approved and recommended” the views of the Sadducees; though “he could not openly adopt a speculative truth, which was saddled with an application diametrically opposed to the cardinal verity of his re- ligion®.” It is obvious that, by this method of exposition, “ Christian Orthodoxy” may mean anything or nothing: any doctrine which this or that expositor finds it con- venient to reject, may be set aside as a concession to popular phraseology ; and thus the teaching of Christ may be stripped of its most essential doctrines by men who profess all the while to believe in His immanent Divinity and Omniscience. Strauss arrives at a similar conclusion, though of course without troubling himself about Serip- tural premises. “ Hs ist also nicht genug, mit Schleier- macher, die Méglichkeit solcher Wesen, wie die Engeln sind, dahingestellt zu lassen, und nur so viel festzusetzen, dass wir weder in unserem Handeln auf sie Riicksicht zu nehmen, noch fernere Offenbarungen ihres Wesens zu erwarten haben: vielmehr, wenn die moderne Gottesidee und Weltvorstellung richtig sind, so kann es dergleichen Wesen iiberall nicht gebeni”’ In the same spirit, Mr. Parker openly maintains that ‘‘ Jesus shared the erro- neous notions of the times respecting devils, possessions, and demonology in general‘ ;”’—a conclusion which is at least more logical and consistent than that of those who acknowledge the divine authority of the Teacher, yet claim a right to reject as much as they please of his teaching. Note 14. p.251. Greg, Creed of Christendom, Preface, p. xii. Note 15. p. 252. The theory which represents the human race as in a constant state of religious progress, and the various re- Ὁ Pp. 372, 373: i Christliche Glaubenslehre, § 49. To the same effect are his remarks on Evil Spirits, § 54. Among the earlier rationalists, the same view is taken by Rohr, Briefe iiber den Rationalismus, Ὁ. 35. k Discourse of matters pertaining to Religion, p. 176. Ee 2 490 NOTES. ligions of antiquity as successive steps in the education of mankind, has been a favourite with various schools of mo- dern philosophy. Hegel, as might naturally be expected, propounds a theory of the necessary development of re- ligious ideas, as determined by the movements of the uni- versal Spirit!. It is true that he is compelled by the stern necessities of chronology to represent the polytheism of Greece and Rome as an advance on the monotheism of Judea™; and perhaps, if we regard the Hegelian philo- sophy as the final consummation of all religious truth, this retrograde progress may be supported by some plausible arguments". Another form of the same theory is that of Comte, who traces the progress of humanity through Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism, to culminate at last in the Positive Religion, which worships the idea of 1 See Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, 1X. p. 14. Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 76, 78. m See his Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 82. XII. p. 45. The superiority of the Greek religion appears to consist in its greater acknowledgment of human freedom, and perhaps in being a step in the direction of Pantheism. See Werke, XII. 92,125. Of the Roman re- ligion, he says that it contained in itself all the elements of Christianity, and was a necessary step to the latter. Its evils sprang from the depth of its spirit (XII. pp.181,184). The best commentary on this assertion may be found in Augustine, De Civ. Dei, Lib. VI. n Among the imperfections of Judaism, Hegel includes the fact that it did not make men conscious of the identity of the human soul with the Absolute, and its absorption therein (die Anschauung und das Bewusstseyn von der Einheit der Seele mit dem Absoluten, oder von der Aufnahme der Seele in den Schooss des Absoluten ist noch nicht erwacht, Werke, XII. p.86.) In another place (p. 161) he speaks of it as the religion of obstinate, dead understanding. Vatke (Biblische Theo- logie, p. 115) carries the absurdity of theory to its climax, by boldly maintaining that the later Judaism had been elevated by its conflict with the religions of Greece and Rome, and thus prepared to become the immediate precursor of Christianity. ‘The Hegelian theory is also adopted by Baur, as representing the law of development of Christian doctrines. ‘The historical aspects of the doctrine are to be regarded as phases of a process, in which the several forms are determined one by another, and all are united together in the totality of the idea. See especially his Christliche Lehre von der Versoéhnung, p. 11, and the preface to the same work, p. vi. LECTURE VIII. 42] humanity, including therein the auxiliary animals®. In theories of this kind, the distinction between progress and mere fluctuation depends upon the previous question, Whence, and Whither? What was the original state of re- ligious knowledge in mankind, and what is the end to which it is advancing? If Pantheism or Atheism is the highest form of religious truth, every step in that direction is unquestionably progressive: if otherwise, it is not pro- gress, but corruption. The previous question is clearly stated by Theodore Parker. “From what point did the human race set out,— from civilization and the true worship of one God, or from cannibalism and the deification of nature? Has the human race fallen or risen? The question is purely historical, and to be answered by historical witnesses. But in the pre- sence, and still more in the absence, of such witnesses, the a priori doctrines of the man’s philosophy affect his deci- sion. Reasoning with no facts is as easy as all motion 7 vacuo. The analogy of the geological formation of the earth—its gradual preparation, so to say, for the reception of plants and animals, the ruder first, and then the more complex and beautiful, till at last she opens her bosom to man,—this, in connection with many similar analogies, would tend to shew that a similar order was to be expected in the affairs of men—development from the lower to the higher, and not the reverse. In strict accordance with this analogy, some have taught that man was created in the lowest stage of savage life; his Religion the rudest worship of nature; his Morality that of the cannibal; that all of the civilized races have risen from this point, and gradually passed through Fetichism and Polytheism, before they reached refinement and true Religion. The spiritual man is the gradual development of germs latent in the natural manP.” © Cours de Philosophie Positive, Legons 52, 53. 54. Compare Cate- chisme Positiviste, pp. 31, 184, 243. P Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 68,69. A similar view is advocated by Mr. Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 223, and. by Mr. Greg, Creed of Christendom, p.71. Mr. Parker does not distinctly 422 NOTES. It is to be regretted that Professor Jowett has partially given the sanction of his authority to a theory which it is to be presumed he would not advocate to the full extent of the above statement. ‘The theory of a primitive religion common to all mankind,” he tells us, “has only to be placed distinctly before the mind, to make us aware that it 1s the baseless fabric of a vision; there is one stream of revelation only—the Jewish. But even if it were conceiv- able, it would be inconsistent with facts. The earliest his- tory tells nothing of a general religion, but of particular beliefs about stocks and stones, about places and persons, about animal life, about the sun, moon, and stars, about the divine essence permeating the world, about gods in the likeness of men appearing in battles and directing the course of states, about the world below, about sacrifices, purifications, initiations, magic, mysteries. These were the true religions of nature, varying with different degrees of mental culture or civilisation4.” And in an earlier part of the same Essay, he says, ‘‘ No one who looks at the reli- gions of the world, stretching from east to west, through so many cycles of human history, can avoid seeing in them a sort of order and design. They are like so many steps in the education of mankind. Those countless myriads of human beings who know no other truth than that of reli- gions coeval with the days of the Apostle, or even of Moses, are not wholly uncared for in the sight of God'.” It would be unfair to press these words to a meaning which they do not necessarily bear. We will assume that by the “earliest history,” profane history alone is meant, in opposition to the Jewish Revelation; and that the author does not intend, as some of his critics have sup- posed, to deny the historical character of the Book of Genesis, and the existence of a primitive revelation coeval with the creation of man. Even with this limitation, the adopt this view as his own, but he appears to regard it as preferable to the antagonist theory, which he speaks of as supported by a “ party consisting more of poets and dogmatists than of philosophers.” 1 Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. Il. p. 395. τ Ibid. p. 386. LECTURE VIII. 423 evidence is stated far too absolutely. But the words last quoted are, to say the least, incautious, and suggest coin- cidence in a favourite theory of modern philosophy, equally repugnant to Scripture and to natural religion. ‘Two very opposite views may be taken of the false religions of anti- quity. The Scriptures invariably speak of them as corrup- tions of man’s natural reason, and abominations in the sight of God. Some modern writers delight to represent them as instruments of God’s providence, and steps in the edu- eation of mankind. This view naturally belongs to that pantheistic philosophy which recognises no Deity beyond the actual constitution of the world, which acknowledges all that exists as equally divine, or, which is the same thing, equally godless; but it is irreconcilable with the belief in a personal God, and in a distinction between the good which He approves and the evil which He condemns. But men will concede much to philosophy who will concede nothing to Scripture. The sickly and sentimental morality which talks of the “ferocious” God of the popular theologys, which is indignant at the faith of Abrahamt, which shud- ders over the destruction of the Canaanites", which prides itself in discovering imperfections in the law of Moses:*, is content to believe that the God who could not sanction these things, could yet create man with the morality of a cannibal, and the religion of a fetish-worshipper, and ordain for him a law of development through the purifying stages which marked the civilization of Egypt and Babylon and Imperial Rome. Verily this unbelieving Reason makes heavy demands on the faith of its disciples. It will not tolerate the slightest apparent anomaly in the moral go- vernment of God ; but it is ready, when its theories require, to propound a scheme of deified iniquity, which it is hardly exaggeration to designate as the moral government of Satan. 5. Parker, Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 103, 104. t Parker, Discourse of Religion, p.214. Newman, Phases of Faith, p- 150. u Parker, Discourse, p.87. Newman, Phases, p.151. x Parker, Discourse, p. 204, 223. Greg, Creed of Christendom, p.75. 4924. NOTES. We must believe indeed that in the darkest ages of ido- latry, God “left not himself without witness :” we must believe that the false religions of the world, like its other evils, are overruled by God to the purposes of His good Providence. But this does not make them the less evils and abominations in the sight of God. Those who speak of the human race as under a law of vegetable development, forget that man has, what vegetables have not, a moral sense and a free will. It is indeed impossible, in our pre- sent state of knowledge, to draw exactly the line between the sins and the misfortunes of individuals, to decide how much of each man’s history is due to his own will, and how much to the circumstances in which he is placed. But though Scripture, like Philosophy, offers no complete solu- tion of the problem of the existence of evil, it at least dis- tinetly points out what the true solution zs not. So long as it represents the sin of man as a fall from the state in which God originally placed him, and as a rebellion against | a divine command; so long as it represents idolatry as hateful to God, and false religion as a declension towards evil, not as a progress towards good ;— so long it emphati- cally records its protest against both the self-delusion which denies that evil exists at all, and the blasphemy which asserts that it exists by the appointment of God. Note 16. p. 255. “Tt is an obvious snare, that many, out of such abund- ance of knowledge, should be tempted to forget at times this grand and simple point—that all etal truth is to be sought from Scripture alone. Hence that they should be tempted rather to combine systems for themselves accord- ing to some proportion and fancy of their own, than be content neither to add nor diminish any thing from that which Christ and his Apostles have enjoined; to make up, as it were, a cento of doctrines and of precepts; to take from Christ what pleases them, and from other stores what pleases them ; (of course the best from each, as it appears to their judgment, so as to exhibit the most. perfect whole) taking e. g. the blessed hope of everlasting life from Jesus LECTURE VIII. 425 Curist, but rejecting his atonement ; or honouring highly his example of humanity, but disrobing Him of his divinity ; or accepting all the comfortable things of the dispensation of the Sprrrir, but refusing its strictness and self-denials ; or forming any other combination whatsoever, to the ex- clusion of the entire Gosprei: thus inviting Christian hearers, not to the supper of the king’s son, but to a sort of mis- eellaneous banquet of their own; ‘using their liberty,’ in short, ‘as an occasion’ to that natural disposition, which Christ came to correct and to repair. ‘“ Now that by such methods, enforced by education and strengthened by the best of secondary motives, men may attain to an excellent proficiency in morals, [ am neither prepared nor disposed to dispute. I am not desirous of disputing that they may possess therein an excellent reli- gion, as opposed to Mahometanism or Paganism. But that they possess the true account to be given of their steward- ship of that one talent, rue Gospen irsetr, I do doubt in sorrow and in fear. I do doubt whether they ‘live the life that now is,’ as St. Paul lived it, ‘by the faith of the Son or Gon; by true apprehension of the things that He suf- fered for us, and of the right which He has purchased to command us in all excellent qualities and actions; and fur- ther, of the invisible but real assistance which he gives us towards the performance of them.” Miller, Bampton Lec- tures, Ὁ. 169 (third edition). Note 17. p. 256. “Thus in the great variety of religious situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and pecu- liarly constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved: and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will behave under and with respect to these difficulties.” Butler, Analogy, Part II. ch. 6. Note 18. p. 258. I do not mean by these remarks to deny the possibility of any progress whatever in Christian Theology, such for instance, as may result from the better interpretation of 490 NOTES. Holy Writ, or the refutation of unauthorized inferences therefrom. But all such developments of doctrine are admis- sible only when confined within the limits so carefully laid down in the sixth Article of our Church. “ Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that what- soever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an Article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation.” Within these limits, the most judicious theologians have not hesitated to allow the possi- bility of progress, as regards at least the definite state- ment of Christian doctrine. ‘Thus Bishop Butler remarks: ‘As it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be understood, before the restitution of all things, and without miraculous inter- positions ; it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at: by the continuance and progress of learning and liberty; and by particular persons attending to, com- paring, and pursuing intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the worlds.” And a worthy successor to the name has pointed out the distinction between true and false develop- ments of doctrine, in language based upon the same prin- ciple: “ Are there admissible developments of doctrine in Christianity? Unquestionably there are. But let the term be understood in its legitimate sense or senses to warrant that answer; and let it be carefully observed how much, and how little, the admission really involves. All varieties of real development, so far as this argument is concerned, may probably be reduced to two general heads, intellectual developments, and practical developments, of Christian doc- trine. By ‘ intellectual developments,’ I understand logical inferences (and that whether for belief or practical disc#- pline), from doctrines, or from the comparison of doctrines ; which, in virtue of the great dialectical maxim, must be true, if legitimately deduced from what is true. ‘ Practical developments’ are the living, actual, historical results of those true doctrines (original or inferential), when consi- 5. Analogy, Part 11. ch. 2. LECTURE VIII. : 427 dered as influential on all the infinite varieties of human kind; the doctrines embodied in action ; the doctrines mo- difying human nature in ways infinitely various, corre- spondently to the infinite variety of subjects on whom they operate, though ever strictly preserving, amid all their operations for effectually transforming and renewing man- kind, their own unchanged identity.... In the former case, revealed doctrines may be compared with one another, or with the doctrines of ‘natural religion;’? or the conse- quences of revealed doctrines may be compared with other doctrines, or with their consequences, and so on in great, variety: the combined result being what is called a Sys- tem of Theology. What the first principles of Christian truth really are, or how obtained, is not now the question. But in all cases equally, no doctrine has any claim what- ever to be received as obligatory on belief, unless it be either itself some duly authorized principle, or a logical deduction, through whatever number of stages, from some such principle of religion. Such only are legitimate develop- ments of doctrine for the belief of man; and such alone ean the Church of Christ—the Witness and Conservator of His Truth—justly commend to the consciences of her mem- bers.... But in truth, as our own liability to error is ex- treme, especially when immersed in the holy obscurity (“the cloud on the mercy-seat”) of such mysteries as these, we have reason to thank God that there appear to be few doctrinal developments of any importance which are not from the first drawn out and delivered on divine authority to our acceptance '.” It is impossible not to regret deeply the very different language, on this point, of a writer in many respects worthy of better things; but who, while retaining the essential doctrines of Christianity, has, it is to be feared, done much to unsettle the authority on which they rest. ‘“ If the des- tined course of the world,” says Dr. Williams, ‘‘be really one of providential progress, if there has been such a thing as a childhood of humanity, and if God has been educating t W. A. Butler, Letters on the Development of Christian Doctrine, PP: 55-59: 428 NOTES. either a nation or a Church to understand their duty to Himself and to mankind; it must follow, that when the ful- ness of light is come, there will be childish things to put away.... Hence, if the religious records represent faithfully the inner life of each generation, whether a people or a priesthood, they will all be, in St. Paul’s phrase, divinely animated, or with a divine life running through them; and every writing, divinely animated, will be useful; yet they may, or rather, they must be cast in the mould of the generation in which they were written; their words, if they are true words, will express the customs of their country, the coneeptions of their times, the feelings or aspirations of their writers; and the measure of knowledge or of faith to which every one, in his degree, had attained. And the limitation, thus asserted, of their range of know- ledge, will be equally true, whether we suppose the short- coming to be, on an idea of special Providence, from a par- ticular dictation of sentiment in each case; or whether, on the more reasonable view of a general Providence, we con- sider such things permitted rather than directed; the natural result of a grand scheme, rather than a minute arrangement of thoughts and words for each individual man. It may be, that the Lord writes the Bible, on the same principle as the Lord builds the city; or that He teaches the Psalmist to sing, in the same sense as He teaches his fingers to fight; thus that the composition of Scripture is attributed to the Almighty, just as sowing and threshing are said to be taught by Him; for every part played by man comes from the Divine Disposer of the scene ἃ, It is the misfortune of this sort of language, that it sug- gests far more than it directly asserts, and probably more than the author intends to convey. Dr. Williams probably does not mean to imply that we are no more bound by the authority of Scripture in matters of religion than by the primitive practice in sowing and threshing, or that we are as much at liberty to invent new theological doctrines as new implements of husbandry. But if he does not mean " Rational Godliness, pp. 291, 292. LECTURE VIII. 429 this, it is to be regretted that he has not clearly pointed out the respects in which his comparison does not hold good. Note 19. p. 260. Summa, P. I. Qu. II. Art. 2. Note 20. p. 260. See Archbishop King’s Discourse on Predestination, edited by Archbishop Whately, p.10. A different, and surely a more judicious view, is taken by a contemporary Prelate of the Irish Church, whose earlier exposition of the same theory* probably furnished the foundation of the Archbishop’s discourse. ‘Though,’ says Bishop Browne, “there are literally speaking no such passions in God as Love or Hatred, Joy or Anger, or Pity; yet there may be Inconceivable Perfections in Him some way answerable to what those passions are in us, under a due regulation and subjection to reason. It is sure that in God those perfec- tions are not attended with any degree of natural disturb- ance or moral irregularity, as the passions are in us. Nay, Fear and Hope, which imply something future for their objects, may have nothing answerable to them in the divine Nature to which every thing is present. But since our reasonable affections are real dispositions of the Soul which is composed of Spirit as well as Matter; we must conclude something in God analogous to them, as well as to our Knowledge or Power. For it cannot be a thought unworthy of being transferred to him, that he really doves a virtuous and hates a vicious agent; that he is angry at sin- ners; pities their moral infirmities ; is pleased with their Innocence or repentance, and displeased with their trans- gressions; though all these Perfections are in Him accom- panied with the utmost serenity, and never-failing tranquit- lityy.’ With this may be compared the language of Ter- tullian, (Adv. Mare. II. 16,) “ Quee omnia patitur suo more, x In his Letter in answer to Toland’s Christianity not mysterious. y Divine Analogy, pp. 45, 46. King’s Theory is also criticised more directly by the same author in the Procedure of the Understanding, 480 NOTES. quo eum pati condecet, propter quem homo eadem patitur, geque suo more.” Note 21. p. 261. Compare the remarks of Hooker, #.P. 1.3.2. ‘Moses, in describing the work of creation, attributeth speech unto God...Was this only the intent of Moses, to signify the in- finite greatness of God’s power by the easiness of his accom- plishing such effects, without travail, pain, or labour? Surely it seemeth that Moses had herein besides this a further purpose, namely, first to teach that God did not work as a necessary but a voluntary agent, intending beforehand and decreeing with himself that which did outwardly proceed from him: secondly, to shew that God did then institute a law natural to be observed by creatures, and therefore according to the manner of laws, the institution thereof is deseribed, as being established by solemn injunction.” Note 22. p. 262. “ But they urge, there can be no proportion or simili- tude between Finite and Infinite, and consequently there ean be no analogy. That there can be no such proportion or similitude as there is between finite created Beings is granted; or as there is between any material substance and its resemblance in the glass; and therefore wherein the Real Ground of this analogy consists, and what the de- grees of it are, is as incomprehensible as the real Nature of God. But it is such an analogy as he himself hath adapted to our intellect, and made use of in his Revela- tions; and therefore we are sure it hath such a foundation in the nature both of God and man, as renders our moral reasonings concerning him and his attributes, solid, and just, and true.” Bp. Browne, Procedure of the Understand- ing, p. 31. The practical result of this remark is, that we must rest satisfied with a belief in the analogical represen- tation itself, without seeking to rise above it by substi- p-11. Mr. Davison, (Discourses on Prophecy, p.513,) has noticed the weak points in King’s explanation; but with too great a leaning to the opposite extreme, which reasons concerning the infinite as if it were a mere expansion of the finite. LECTURE VIII. 431 tuting an explanation of its ulterior significance or real ground. | Note 23. p. 263. I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing, in the above words, my belief in the purpose and authority of Holy Scripture; inasmuch as it enables me to correct a serious misunderstanding into which a distinguished writer has fallen in a criticism of my supposed views—a criticism to which the celebrity of the author will probably give a far wider circulation than is ever likely to fall to the lot of the small pamphlet which called it forth. Mr. Maurice, in the preface to the second edition of his “ Patriarchs and Law- givers of the Old Testament,” comments upon the distine- tion (maintained in the present Lectures and in a small previous publication), between speculative and regulative truths, in the following terms. “The notion of a revela- tion that tells us things which are not in themselves true, but which it is right for us to believe and to act upon as if they were true, has, I fear, penetrated very deeply into the heart of our English schools, and of our English world. It may be traced among persons who are apparently most un- like each other, who live to oppose and confute each other. ... But their differences are not in the least likely to be adjusted by the discovery of this common ground. How the atmosphere is to be regulated by the regulative Reve- lation; at what degree of heat or cold this constitution or that can endure it; who must fix,—since the language of the Revelation is assumed not to be exact, not to express the very lesson which we are to derive from it,—what it does mean; by what contrivances its phrases are to be adapted to various places and times: these are questions which must, of course, give rise to infinite disputations ; ever new schools and sects must be called into existence to settle them; there is scope for permissions, prohibitions, compromises, persecutions, to any extent. The despair which these must cause will probably drive numbers to ask for an infallible human voice, which shall regulate for each period that which the Revelation has so utterly failed to regulate.” 432 NOTES. Now I certainly believed, and believe still, that God is infinite, and that no human mode of thought, nor even a Revelation, if it is to be intelligible by the human mind, can represent the infinite, save under finite forms. And it is a legitimate inference from this position, that no human representation, whether derived from without or from within, from Revelation or from natural Religion, can adequately exhibit the absolute nature of God. But I cannot admit, as a further legitimate inference, that therefore ‘“ the lan- guage of the Revelation does not express the very lesson which we are to derive from it ;” that it needs any regula- tion to adjust it to “ this constitution or that ;” that it re- quires “to be adapted to various places and times.” For surely, if all men are subject to the same limitations of thought, the adaptation to their constitutions must be made already, before human interpretation can deal with the Revelation at all. It is not to the peculiarities which distinguish “this” constitution from “that,” that the Reve- lation has to be adapted by man; but, as it is given by God, it is adapted already to the general conditions which are com- mon to all human constitutions alike, which are equally bind- ing in all places and at all times. I have said nothing of a revelation adapted to one man more than to another; nothing of limitations which any amount of intellect or learning can enable man to overcome. Ihave not said that the Bible is the teacher of the peasant rather than of the philosopher ; of the Asiatic rather than of the European; of the first century rather than of the nineteenth. I have said only that it is the teacher of man as man; and that this is com- patible with the possible existence of a more absolute truth in relation to beings of a higher intelligence. We must at any rate admit that man does not know God as God knows Himself; and hence that he does not know Him in the ful- ness of His Absolute Nature. But surely this admission is so far from implying that Revelation does not teach the very lesson which we are to derive from it, that it makes that lesson the more universal and the more authoritative. For Revelation is subject to no other limitations than those Which encompass all human thought. Man gains nothing LECTURE VIII. 433 by rejecting or perverting its testimony; for the mystery of Revelation is the mystery of Reason also. I do not wish to extend this controversy further; for I am willing to believe that, on this question at least, my own opinion is substantially one with that of my antagonist. At any rate, I approve as little as he does of allegorical, or metaphysical, or mythical interpretations of Scripture: I believe that he is generally right in maintaining that “the most literal meaning of Scripture is the most spiritual meaning.” And if there are points in the details of his teaching with which I am unable to agree, I believe that they are not such as legitimately arise from the consistent application of this canon. Note 24. p. 265. “There seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of reli- gion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in common affairs... Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and inference; that a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected with heedful attention to premises; this as much constitutes religious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behaviour, as any thing whatever does.” Butler, Analogy, Part. II. ch. 6. Note 25. p. 265. Plato, Rep. VI. p. 486: Kat μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή. Τὸ ποῖον; Μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας" ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξε- σθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους Cicero, De Of. II. 2: “Nee quidquam aliud est philosophia, si interpretari velis, quam studium sapientiz. Sapientia autem est (ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est) rerum divinarum et humanarum, causarumque, quibus hee res continentur, scientia.” Ef 494 NOTES. Note 26. p. 265. Plato, Protag. p. 343: Οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ ξυνελθόντες ἀπαρ- χὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέϑεσαν τῷ Απόλλωνι ἐς τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελ- φοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα & δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσι, Γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ 'Μηδὲν ἄγαν. Compare Jacobi, Werke, 1V.; Vorbericht p. xlii.: “ Erkenne dich selbst, ist nach dem Delphischen Gott und nach Socrates das héchste Gebot, und sobald es in Anwendung kommt, wird der Mensch gewahr: ohne gottliches Du sey kein menschliches Ich, und umgekehrt.” Note 27. p. 266. Clemens Alex. Pedag. II. 1: “Ἦν dpa, ὡς ἔοικε, πάντων μέγιστον μαθημάτων, τὸ γνῶναι αὑτόν. ἑαυτὸν γάρ τις ἐὰν γνῴη, Θεὸν εἴσεται. Note 28. p. 266. “It is plain that there is a capacity in the nature of man, which neither riches, nor honours, nor sensual grati- fications, nor any thing in this world, can perfectly fill up or satisfy: there is a deeper and more essential want, than any of these things can be the supply of. Yet surely there is a possibility of somewhat, which may fill up all our capacities of happiness; somewhat, in which our souls may find rest ; somewhat, which may be to us that satisfactory good we are inquiring after. But it cannot be any thing which is valuable only as it tends to some further end..... As our understanding can contemplate itself, and our affec- tions be exercised upon themselves by reflection, so may each be employed in the same manner upon any other mind: and since the Supreme Mind, the Author and Cause of all things, is the highest possible object to himself, he may be an adequate supply to all the faculties of our souls ; a subject to our understanding, and an object to our affec- tions.” Butler, Sermon XIV. Note 29. Ῥ. 267. “Christianity is not a religion for the religious, but a religion for man. I do not accept it because my tem- perament so disposes me, and because it meets my indi- vidual mood of mind, or my tastes. I aecept it as it is LECTURE VIII. 435 suited to that moral condition in respect of which there is no difference of importance between me and the man I may next encounter on my path.” The Restoration of Belief, p: 325. Note 30. p. 267. “The Scripture-arguments are arguments of induce- ment, addressed to the whole nature of man—not merely to intellectual man, but to thinking and feeling man living among his fellow men;—and to be apprehended therefore in their efect on our whole nature.” Hampden, Bampton Lectures, Ὁ. 92. “There are persons who complain of the Word, because it is not addressed to some one department of the human soul, on which they set a high value. The systematic divine wonders that it is not a mere scheme of dogmatic theology, forgetting that in such a case it would address itself exclusively to the understanding. The Ger- man speculatists, on the other hand, complain that it is not a mere exhibition of the pure ideas of the true and the good, forgetting that in such a case it would have little or no influence on the more practical faculties. Others seem to regret that it is not a mere code of morality, while a fourth class would wish it to be altogether an appeal to the feelings. But the Word is inspired by the same God who formed man at first, and who knows what is in man; and he would rectify not merely the understanding or intuitions, not merely the conscience or affections, but the whole man after the image of God.” McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 509. ir ate ; oe ᾿ a if tee δου ol my Shake ROE SS ee, to: y ASV! PAU ws OT δ ing aes eid ea . 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