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THE QUESTION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Original Party. 
 
 IN THE CASE OF 
 
 Dr. BRIGGS. 
 
 » 
 
 Argument prepared for the Synod of New York, 
 October, 1892, on a Complaint of 114 Ministers 
 and Elders Against the Presbytery 
 of New York, 
 
 by 
 
 PROF. FRANCIS BROWN, D. D. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 1892. 
 
THE QUESTION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Original Party, 
 
 IN THE CASE OF 
 
 
 Dr. BRIGGS. 
 
 Argument prepared for the Synod of New York, 
 October, 1892 , on a Complaint of 114 Ministers 
 and Elders Against the Presbytery 
 of New York, 
 
 by 
 
 PROF. FRANCIS BROWN, D. D. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 1892 . 
 
 ft 
 
PRESS OF “THE DRY GOODS ECONOMIST.” 
 
 78-80 Walker Street, N. Y. 
 
COMPLAINT TO THE SYNOD OF NEW YORK 
 AGAINST THE PRESBYTERY OF NEW YORK 
 FOR ITS DECISION OF THE QUESTION OF 
 THE ORIGINAL PARTY. 
 
 Complaint is hereby made before the Synod of New York 
 by the persons whose names are appended below, being all of 
 them persons subject to and submitting to the jurisdiction of 
 the Presbytery of New York, in accordance with Sections 83 
 and 86 of the Revised Dook of Discipline, against the action 
 of the Presbytery of New York, November 4, 1891, in sustain¬ 
 ing by a vote of 64 to 57 the ruling of the moderator, as 
 follows: 
 
 1. That the Committee which prepared charges against Dr. 
 Briggs, (presented to Presbytery, October 5, 1891) was a Com¬ 
 mittee of Prosecution under Section 11 of the Revised Book 
 of Discipline. 
 
 2. That this Committee was in the house on the day on 
 which the citation was returnable (November 4, 1891, as afore¬ 
 said) as an original party. 
 
 3. That the Committee, as an original party, was virtually 
 and practically independent of the Presbytery. 
 
 Against this action complaint is made for the following 
 reasons: 
 
 1. The records of Presbytery do not show that the Com¬ 
 mittee was appointed as a Committee of Prosecution under 
 Section 11 of the Revised Book of Discipline. 
 
 2. Section 10 of the Revised Book of Discipline declares 
 that “ When the prosecution is initiated by a judicatory, the 
 Presbyterian Church in the United States of America shall be 
 the prosecutor, and an original party.” But the Presbyterian 
 Church in the United States of America w r as represented in 
 
4 
 
 4 
 
 the house by the Presbytery of New York itself and not by 
 a Committee of the Presbytery. 
 
 3. Every committee appointed by Presbytery is subject to 
 the control of Presbytery, otherwise the creature is greater 
 than the body creating it, the sovereignty of Presbytery over 
 its members, its committees, and all the interests committed to 
 it by the laws of the Church, is seriously impaired, and an 
 undue power is placed in the hands of a few persons. 
 
 4. It was therefore competent for the Presbytery to discharge 
 the Committee on dismissing the case against Dr. Briggs. But 
 a motion to this effect was ruled out of order by the moderator, 
 on the ground of the Presbytery’s action in sustaining him, as 
 cited above (of. also Complaint 2). 
 
 5. The Committee being a creature of Presbytery, has no 
 right to appeal from the decision of Presbytery in voting by a 
 large majority (94 to 39) to dismiss the aforesaid case. Yet this 
 the action of Presbytery in sustaining the ruling of the modera¬ 
 tor, as above, permitted them to do. 
 
 6. By this appeal of the Committee, the Presbytery is 
 placed in the absurd position of being compelled to defend its 
 own action in dismissing a case, not against the complaint of 
 any individual, nor against the appeal of one who has suffered 
 personal detriment by a judicial decision, but against a Com¬ 
 mittee which was appointed by and derives all its authority 
 from the very body against whose judgment it now proposes 
 to maintain its opinion. This anomalous situation results from 
 the action of the Presbytery in sustaining the moderator as 
 above. 
 
 For these reasons, due notice of complaint having been given 
 to the stated clerk of the Presbytery of New York, within ten 
 days after the action complained of, according to Section 84 of 
 the Pevised Book of Discipline, Complaint is hereby made in 
 due form to the next higher judicatory, being the Synod of 
 New York, against the action of the Presbytery of New York 
 above described, and the Synod is most respectfully and 
 earnestly requested to entertain this Complaint and to take 
 therein such action as shall in its judgment appear wise and 
 
\\\ w 
 
 5 
 
 likely to promote good order, justice, and the peace, purity, and 
 welfare of the Church of Christ. 
 
 [Signed] 
 
 1 Francis Brown,* 
 
 2 Thos. S. Hastings, 
 
 3 Geo. L. Prentiss, 
 
 4 John R. Paxton, 
 
 5 George Alexander, 
 
 6 Jas. H. Mcllvaine, 
 
 7 Wilton Merle Smith, 
 
 8 H. T. McEwen, 
 
 9 Stealy B. Rossiter, 
 
 10 Edward L. Clark, 
 
 11 E. W. Hitchcock, 
 
 12 Chas. R. Gillett, 
 
 13 Anson P. Atterbury, 
 
 14 John Balcom Shaw, 
 
 15 W. R. Harshaw, 
 
 16 A. W. Halsey, 
 
 17 D. H. Overton, 
 
 18 Jas. E. Sentz, 
 
 19 George C. Lay, 
 
 Robert T. B. Easton, 
 
 Lester W. Hough, 
 
 20 William T. Elsing, 
 
 21 W. M. Martin, 
 
 22 Herbert Ford, 
 
 23 Andrew Shiland, 
 
 24 Joseph A. Saxton, 
 
 H. M. Humphrey, 
 
 William N. Crane, 
 
 Horace J. Fairchild, 
 
 25 Clarence P. Leggett, 
 
 George R. Aitkin, 
 
 26 Samuel Macauley Jackson, 
 William E. Dodge, 
 
 William W. Hoppin, 
 
 Henry D. Noyes, 
 
 J. C. Cady, 
 
 W. H. H. Moore, 
 
 S. J. Storrs, 
 
 D. Willis James, 
 
 John Crosby Brown, 
 Samuel Q. Brown, 
 
 27 Thomas S. Strong, 
 Clark Brooks, 
 
 28 William A. Wheelock, 
 _— 29 Henry Van Dyke, 
 
 30 Charles L. Thompson, 
 Arthur Mitchell, 
 
 31 Philip Schaff, 
 
 32 C. H. Parkhurst, 
 
 . C. A. Briggs, 
 
 33 George L. Spining, 
 
 
 
 34 James H. Hoadley, 
 
 / 
 
 ,35 Marvin R. Vincent, 
 
 36 Joseph R. Kerr, 
 
 37 Henry M. Field, 
 
 E. M. Kingsley, 
 
 Elisha M. Carpenter, 
 
 38 Vincent Pisek, 
 
 39 Daniel E. Lorenz, 
 
 40 John H. Edwards, 
 
 41 Theron G. Strong, 
 
 42 Charles H. Woodbury. 
 Theron E. Parsons, 
 
 43 A. G. Ruliffson, 
 
 44 Lewis W. Barney, 
 Walter P. Beers, 
 
 45 Henry B. Chapin, 
 Francis P. Freeman, 
 Joseph Gillet, 
 
 James Denholm, 
 
 46 W. W. Atterbury, 
 Henry R. Elliot, 
 Antonio Arrighi, 
 
 47 George S. Payson, 
 
 D. J. McMillan, 
 
 Henry Day, 
 
 48 George S. Webster, 
 Chas. O. Kimball, 
 Alfred E. Marling, 
 
 49 Henry Q. Hawley, 
 
 50 D. Stuart Dodge, 
 
 51 Geo. J. Mingins, 
 
 * The numbers ind'cate those who were present and voting when the decision was made. 
 The to al number of signers is 114. 
 
6 
 
 52 Sidney F. Wilcox, 
 
 Wm. A. Ewing, 
 
 ■—' Robert Jaffray, 
 
 53 Isaac M. Dyckman, 
 
 Allan Hay, 
 
 54 Robert Gentle, 
 
 Henry M. MacCracken (as to 
 the request), 
 
 55 Jesse F. Forbes (as to re¬ 
 
 quest), 
 
 56 F. H. Marling, 
 
 Chas. M. Earle, 
 
 George C alder, 
 
 ^ Thomas Bond, 
 
 57 Cleveland H. Dodge, 
 
 58 Samuel Reeve, 
 
 59 M. P. Brown, 
 
 '"v Albert Ledoux, 
 Daniel J. Holden, 
 Titus B. Meigs, 
 
 Wm. Rice, 
 
 60 A. C. Armstrong, 
 
 61 Erskine White, 
 
 62 Bartholomew Kriisi, 
 
 63 Henry Breunich, 
 James Robertson, 
 Frank Kunzmann, 
 
 64 John Stewart, 
 
 John Cepek, 
 
 65 Fred. N. Rutan, 
 Charles H. Trask, 
 
 66 J. P. Lestrade, 
 Hamilton Odell, 
 
 67 A. M. Mitchell. 
 
ARGUMENT PREPARED FOR THE SYNOD OF 
 
 NEW YORK. 
 
 [Part I. of this argument was delivered, with some omissions, 
 Oct. 20, 1892, before the Synod of New York at Albany, in 
 opposition to the pending motion to adopt the report of the 
 majority of the Judicial Committee of the Synod. This report 
 
 said: 
 
 u In the matter of Judicial Case IN o. 3 the committee find 
 the complaint to be in order, but recommend that it is inexpe¬ 
 dient to take action at the present time, for the reason that the 
 highest court has taken action covering the points at issue, and 
 the lower court is now in process under it.” 
 
 It had been the intention of the speaker to make this argu¬ 
 ment, as a complaint, on the question of entertainment. But 
 this question was not formally reached. He made it, there¬ 
 fore, simply as a member of the Synod. A substitute for the 
 majority report of the Judicial Committee was offered on the 
 following day, and finally prevailed. It is as follows: 
 
 “ In the matter of Judicial [Case No. 3 the committee find the 
 Complaint to be in order, but recommend that it is inexpedient to take 
 action at the present time, for the following reasons : 
 
 pq rs t_The case, through the action of the General Assembly and 
 of the Presbytery of New York, is again before the Presbytery, and 
 the complainants may there have their remedy in their own hands. 
 
 Second—In case the remedy there be found insufficient, they will 
 afterward have opportunity, by appeal or complaint, to bring the case 
 again before Synod.” 
 
 By adopting this substitute the Synod declined, in effect, to 
 hear discussion of the merits of the Complaint. Part II. of the 
 argument here printed was therefore not delivered.] 
 
 I. 
 
 Mr. Moderator , Fathers and Brethren :—The main Com¬ 
 plaint on which the Judicial Committee now reports, while it 
 has respect to a particular action of the Presbytery of New 
 
8 
 
 York, involves a Constitutional question of wide importance* 
 This question has arisen in connection with the case of the 
 Presbyterian Church in the United States of America against 
 the Bev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D. It cannot be discussed at 
 the present time without frequent reference to certain aspects 
 of that case. To the merits of that case, however, it has no 
 manner of relation. Upon the merits of that case the grounds 
 .adduced in support of the Complaint have no bearing. 
 Whether or not the errors alleged against Dr. Briggs are real 
 errors, whether or not he holds opinions at variance with the 
 Scriptures and the Confession of Faith, is not now to be dis¬ 
 cussed. These 114 Complainants do notjand can not ask of you 
 any expression of judgment on these points. No evidence is 
 at hand that they themselves are all agreed in regard to it. 
 Upon the issues involved in the Complaint they are agreed, 
 and upon these issues they ask your concurrence with them. 
 The interpretation of the Constitution of our Church that con¬ 
 cerns us now is one affecting every minister and elder and 
 private church member. It is proper, therefore, to urge you 
 to consider the representation of the Complainants as a matter 
 of constitutional law, and to determine its issues in the spirit 
 of constitutional liberty. 
 
 As the Complaint sets forth, the propositions affirmed by the 
 Moderator of the Yew York Presbytery, November 4, 1891, in 
 a single ruling, and sustained on appeal by the narrow majority 
 of 64 to 57 in one and the same vote or action of the Presby¬ 
 tery, being the action respecting which Complaint is now made, 
 were three in number, as follows: 
 
 “ 1. That the Committee which prepared charges against 
 Dr. Briggs (presented to Presbytery October 5, 1891) was a 
 Committee of Prosecution under section 11 of the Devised 
 Book of Discipline. 
 
 u 2. That this Committee was in the house on the day on 
 which the citation was returnable (November 4, 1891, as afore¬ 
 said) as an original party. 
 
 a 3. That the Committee, as an original party, was virtually 
 and practically independent of the Presbytery.” 
 
A. THE ACTION OF THE GENEEAL ASSEMBLY OF 
 1892 NO BAE TO THE ENTEETAINMENT OF 
 THIS COMPLAINT BY THE SYNOD. 
 
 Now a preliminary objection arises in the minds of some. 
 The Committee, whose existence and functions are involved in 
 the Complaint, has, in disregard of this Complaint, exercised the 
 power which the action complained of affirmed it to possess, 
 has appealed from the decision of Presbytery in dismissing the 
 case against Dr. Briggs, not to this body, but over your head to 
 the General Assembly, and the General Assembly has enter¬ 
 tained and sustained the appeal. This is matter of public 
 knowledge, and is officially before the Synod in the records of 
 the Presbytery of New York and the published Minutes of the 
 General Assembly of 1892. 
 
 THE QUESTION 
 
 that arises is this: Since, if the position of the Complain¬ 
 ants be correct, the Committee had no existence or func¬ 
 tion apart from the action of the Presbytery of New York, 
 and no right of appeal against a decision of the Presby¬ 
 tery, does not the action of the General Assembly in entertain¬ 
 ing the appeal finally settle the standing of the Committee in 
 a sense adverse to the belief of the Complainants, thereby 
 removing the Complaint from the jurisdiction of this Synod, as 
 a matter already disposed of finally, by the decision of the 
 higher court ? 
 
 We urge that this question should be answered in the nega¬ 
 tive, for such reasons as the following: 
 
 1. Because the questioni was not formally and directly 
 brought before the General Assembly. The decision respecting 
 which Complaint is now made was not a final judgment in a 
 judicial case ; it was therefore not subject to Appeal, which, by 
 our Book of Discipline, § 91, is permitted only from such a 
 judgment. Those who felt aggrieved by the decision had no 
 
10 
 
 other resort than Complaint, but Complaint, according to § 83, 
 must be made to the next superior judicatory, which in the 
 present case was not the Assembly, but the Synod. Complaint 
 was, at the time of the Assembly’s action, pending before this 
 Synod, where, alone, the matter could be legally and properly 
 adjudicated. The question not having been raised before the As¬ 
 sembly, no action taken by the Assembly in the circumstances 
 can deprive the Synod, the only Court before which the 
 minority could bring their contention, from exercising its un¬ 
 trammeled jurisdiction in the matter. 
 
 2. Because the Assembly did not pass upon the matter except 
 by indirection . The Assembly did, indeed, entertain and sus¬ 
 tain an appeal, purporting to come from a u Committee of 
 Prosecution.” and did to that extent and in that way recognize 
 the Committee as such. That is to say, an appeal being pre¬ 
 sented, and found in order, and no question being raised as to 
 the competence of the appellants, the Assembly assumed that 
 they were competent, and proceeded accordingly. There was 
 & primer facie case. The appellants had been recognized by the 
 Presbytery, and the action of the Presbytery had not as yet 
 been reviewed. The Assembly did not decide that they were 
 competent, because the Assembly was not asked, and could 
 not legally be asked, to so decide. In default of objection, the 
 Assembly took it for granted, in its action, that the appellant 
 had a right to appeal. There was a distinct avoidance of 
 the constitutional question which was concerned with the As¬ 
 sembly’s decision. Permit me to call attention to the official 
 
 record of the Assembly’s action : 
 
 (a) “ The Judicial Committee presented its Eeport in the 
 case of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. vs. Rev. 
 Charles A. Briggs, D.D., which was accepted, as follows: 
 
 «The Judicial Committee respectfully reports that it has 
 carefully considered the documents submitted to it in this case, 
 and adopted the following resolutions : 
 
 “ 1. That, in the opinion of this Commitee, the appeal taken 
 by the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, 
 an original party, represented by the 1 Committee of Prosecu¬ 
 tion,’ appointed under Section 11 of the Book of Discipline, 
 
11 
 
 has been taken from the final judgment of the Presbytery in 
 dismissing the case ; and that the said Committee had the right 
 to take this appeal representing the said original party. 
 
 “ 2. That it finds that the notice of the appeal has been 
 given, and that the appeal, specifications of error, and record 
 have been filed in accordance with Sections 96 and 97 of the 
 Book of Dicipline and the appeal is in order. 
 
 “ 3. That, in the judgment of the Committee, the appeal 
 should be entertained, and a time set apart for the hearing of 
 the case. 
 
 “ In view of these considerations, the Committee reports that 
 the appeal is in order, and that the General Assembly should pro¬ 
 ceed, in accordance with the provisions of Section 99 of the 
 Book of Discipline, by causing the judgment appealed from, 
 the notice of appeal, the appeal, and the specifications of the 
 errors alleged, to be read; then to hear the appellant by the 
 Committee of Prosecution; then the defendant in person or by 
 his counsel; then the appellant by the Committee of Prosecu¬ 
 tion in reply, upon the question i whether the appeal shall be 
 entertained.’ ” (Minutes, 1892, p. 90.) 
 
 Upon this report the following action was taken: 
 
 “ Resolved , That so much of the Report of the Judicial Com¬ 
 mittee as relates to the appeal being found in order be adopt¬ 
 ed.” (Minutes, 1892, p. 118.) 
 
 And further: 
 
 “It was Resolved , That the vote on entertaining the appeal 
 be now taken without debate.” 
 
 Again: 
 
 “ This part of the majority Report was then adopted, carry¬ 
 ing in the affirmative the question of the entertainment of the 
 Appeal.” (Minutes, 1892, p. 119.) 
 
 It thus appears that the Assembly voted to adopt the re¬ 
 port of the Judicial Committee in so far as it declared the ap¬ 
 peal to be in order, and also voted to entertain the appeal, but 
 took no action whatever with reference to the 1st Resolution 
 adopted by the majority of the Judicial Committee, which re¬ 
 lates to the standing of the appellants. Some have supposed 
 that the Assembly’s vote finding the Appeal in order included 
 
12 
 
 this 1st Resolution. But the opinion is erroneous. The Book 
 of Discipline defines, in section 99, precisely what is meant by 
 an appeal’s being in order, as follows: 
 
 “ When due notice of an appeal has been given, and the 
 appeal and the specifications of the errors alleged have been 
 tiled in due time, the appeal shall be considered in order.” 
 
 The questions answered in determining whether an appeal 
 be “in order” are thus purely formal questions. The compe¬ 
 tence of the appellants is not involved in answering them. 
 
 It follows that the “ Summary of Acts and Deliverances ” 
 (Minutes, 1892, p. 838) is in error in referring to this action 
 under the heading: “ Prosecution, Committee of, has right of 
 appeal in a judicial case, as representing an original party.” 
 This part of the book of course does not form part of the official 
 proceedings of the Assembly. 
 
 It may be that the Assembly was illogical in determining the 
 main question before it without passing upon the preliminary 
 and fundamental question; but if confusion result, the respon¬ 
 sibility lies with those who have created the illogical and anom¬ 
 alous situation. The action of the Assembly can be no bar to 
 the adjudication by the Synod, the only competent court, of the 
 fundamental question upon which the Assembly indicated its 
 opinion only by inference and indirection. 
 
 3. Because the right of prosecuting this Complaint was ex¬ 
 pressly reserved before the Assembly by the defendant in the case. 
 
 It is well known that the defendant in the case, who is one 
 of the complainants, was placed in the position of being obliged 
 to defend the Presbytery of New York, and as in effect counsel 
 for the -Presbytery, to oppose the entertainment of the appeal, 
 and also to argue against the proposal to sustain it. In the course 
 of his remarks he distinctly refers to this Complaint, and says: 
 
 “ This Complaint involves the very existence of this commit¬ 
 tee which has appealed, whether they were appointed as a pros¬ 
 ecuting committee, whether they are an original party, whether 
 they have any right to act independent of the Presbytery and 
 against the Presbytery. If the Synod should decide any of 
 these questions in accordance with the views of the com¬ 
 plainants, the appellants would have no present right of appeal, 
 and could not therefore appear before you as appellants at this 
 
13 
 
 time. The defendant does not raise those objections here be¬ 
 cause they go before the Synod of New York for its decision, 
 and he reserves the right with others, his co-complainants, to 
 argue these questions before the Synod or New York.” (Case 
 against Professor Briggs , pp. 94 and 95.) 
 
 And again, after the Assembly had decided to entertain the 
 appeal, the defendant said:—“You have decided to entertain 
 the appeal despite my protest and reservation of rights. It is 
 now necessary for me, before going a step further, to say that 
 I do not consent to your decision. I do not waive my rights, 
 or the rights of my co-complainants, to prosecute our Complaint 
 before the Synod of New York, in order that it may be deter¬ 
 mined there whether the appellants were appointed as a Com¬ 
 mittee of Prosecution by the Presbytery of New York, whether 
 they are an original party, and whether they can act as appel¬ 
 lants against the decision of the Presbytery to dismiss the case. 
 We reserve this right. The appellee does not waive his right 
 to seek any relief that may seem to be proper against your de¬ 
 cision to entertain the appeal. He enters upon his response to 
 the objections of the appellants with all these reservations of 
 right.” (Case aainst Professor Briggs, p. 125). 
 
 Against this reservation of rights no action of the Assembly 
 was taken, and, so far as appears, no protest or objection wa s 
 heard. It is thus evident that the Assembly understood that 
 this Complaint was to be prosecuted, and refrained from mak¬ 
 ing any objection to such prosecution, and that, therefore, the 
 action which the Assembly did take cannot operate as a barrier 
 to action on the Complaint by this Synod. 
 
 4. Because the General Assembly cannot deprive the Synod 
 of functions especially assigned to it by the Constitution . 
 Even if the Assembly had been less cautious than it was in the 
 matter of direct affirmation of the competence of the appel¬ 
 lants, the Synod would not have been debarred from enter¬ 
 taining this Complaint. No power, not even that of the highest 
 judicatory of the church, can destroy constitutional rights, as 
 long: as the constitution itself remains unchanged. Among the 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SYNOD, 
 
 with their corresponding duties, are these (Form of Gov’t, xi., §4)r 
 The Synod has power to receive and issue all appeals regu- 
 
 u 
 
14 
 
 larly brought up from the Presbyteries, provided that, in the 
 trial of judicial cases, the Synod shall have power to act by 
 commission * * * * ; to decide on all references made 
 
 to them ; its decisions on appeals, complaints and references 
 which do not affect the doctrine or constitution of the church 
 being final; to review the records of presbyteries, and approve 
 or censure them ; to redress whatever has been done by pres¬ 
 byteries contrary to order; to take effectual care that pres¬ 
 byteries observe the constitution of the church,” etc. These 
 functions it has a right to exercise. !No action of the As¬ 
 sembly can be so construed as to deprive it of that right. The 
 Synod, being authorized, for example, to decide on “ appeals, 
 complaints and references”, and a to take effectual care that 
 presbyteries observe the constitution of the church,” no action 
 of another court can stand in the way of its deciding on an 
 appeal, or a complaint, or a reference brought before it in an 
 orderly way, and of it using its own unbiased judgment in its 
 measures to secure observance of the constitution by the pres¬ 
 byteries. Of course the Assembly may overrule its decision 
 on further appeal or complaint, but the Synod stands between 
 the Assembly and the presbyteries, and has a right to stand 
 there ; the constitution sets it there ; and it has the first consid¬ 
 eration of these matters as they come up from the presbyteries. 
 They can reach the Assembly only through the Synod. 
 Action of the Assembly cannot be so determined as to cripple 
 the Synod in the exercise of these its ordinary and constitu¬ 
 tional rights. 
 
 5. Because no action of the Assembly can destroy the right of 
 
 Complaint . 
 
 THE EIGHT OF COMPLAINT 
 
 is bound up with the existence of free, as contrasted with 
 tyrannical, government. It is a right expressly reserved to any 
 and every person in the Church. It cannot be taken away with¬ 
 out revolution. But it would be taken away, or, what is prac¬ 
 tically the same thing, made of absolutely no effect, if this 
 body were estopped from considering on its merits, and with¬ 
 out reference to the action of any other court, the Complaint 
 now presented. 
 
15 
 
 The complainants, it is true, labor under the disadvantage of 
 complaining against action whose validity the higher court 
 has appeared to assume. To this extent the action of the high¬ 
 er court has tended to impair their free right of complaint. By 
 what it appeared to assume it has created a certain presumption 
 against the complainants, tending to prejudice their case before 
 the court. But it is respectfully submitted that this is in no 
 way or shape through fault of theirs, and that they ought not to 
 be made to suffer for it. They have done everything that in them 
 lay, to bring the matter before the Synod. The difficulty, such as 
 it is, arises from the action of persons over whom your com¬ 
 plainants have no control, and for whose actions they are not 
 responsible. These persons, knowing that notice of this Com¬ 
 plaint to Synod had been given, appealed, on the basis of a 
 claim that they formed a Committee of Prosecution, and were 
 an original party, competent to appeal. After giving verbal 
 notice of an appeal to Synod, they took the unfortunate step of 
 changing the court of their appeal to the Assembly. I have 
 called the step unfortunate, but it w r as worse than that. It 
 might be called ungracious, if that were not too mild a 
 word. It was of questionable legality and unquestionable im¬ 
 propriety, contriving to anticipate, as it did, by a demand for 
 action in its favor, by the Assembly, the discussion before the 
 Synod, where alone it could be discussed, of the very question, 
 whether it had any right to ask the Assembly for anything— 
 whether it had any existence or standing before the Assembly. 
 Without this contrivance, on their part, their appeal, if they 
 had chose to make one, would be now here, and all parts of the 
 case would be plainly before this Synod, where they of right be¬ 
 long, for adjudication. Will the Synod of New York permit a 
 body of complainants which,to say the least, is reputable, to pract- 
 tically lose their right of Complaint through the instrumentality 
 of action on the part of other persons which has roughly ig¬ 
 nored the rights of complainants, and has ignored, in so doing, 
 the claims of the Synod ? 
 
 B. The Synod has a duty in the Case. 
 
 But more than this :—Not only is the Synod at perfect lib¬ 
 erty, undeterred by any action of the higher court, to pass 
 
16 
 
 upon the Complaint, but the Synod has a duty in the matter 
 which it cannot evade. 
 
 It has the duty involved in the powers conferred by the 
 Form of Government, Chap. XI, § 4, particularly that of taking 
 “ effectual care that presbyteries observe the constitution of the 
 church.” 
 
 It has the duty involved in the right of Complaint, for 
 the right of Complaint u to the next superior judicatory” is 
 rendered of no effect unless that judicatory is bound to consider, 
 on its merits, a Complaint presented in due form and supported 
 by “ sufficient reasons”. (Book of Discipline, § 87.) 
 
 These duties always rest upon it. In the present case there 
 are additional considerations compelling the Synod to entertain 
 the Complaint,—considerations arising out of the relation of 
 Synod to both the higher and the lower court. 
 
 The especial duty of the Synod at the present time arising out 
 of its relation to the higher court, is to see to it that no action 
 of the higher court be allowed to deprive, or gain the appear¬ 
 ance of depriving, the Synod of any of its constitutional rights. 
 I do not desire to appeal to local pride or stir up feelings of 
 jealousy and resentment. The Synod is bound to pay all due 
 respect to the Assembly and scrupulously to avoid infringement 
 upon the rights of the Assembly and criticism of the Assembly 
 for action within those rights. But if, in these unpre¬ 
 cedented circumstances, if when the General Assembly has 
 entertained and sustained an appeal from one of the 
 presbyteries of this Synod, wdiereby the Synod has been 
 deprived of the opportunity, for which the Book of Discipline 
 and the time-honored usage of the church alike provide,—the 
 opportunity of first adjudicating upon any appeal from the ac¬ 
 tion of presbytery,—if when the General Assembly has not 
 merely entertained and sustained such an appeal, but done so in 
 the full knowledge that the competence of the appellants had 
 not yet been passed upon, but was awaiting the action of this 
 court,—the Synod should be deterred from fully examining and 
 adjudicating that question of the competence of the appellants, 
 brought before it in proper form, the Synod would be unfaith¬ 
 ful to its constitutional obligations. It would practically 
 acknowledge that a Synod possesses no rights which the higher 
 
17 
 
 court is bound to respect. It would practically affirm that a 
 Synod exercises its functions not under a constitution, and 
 according thereto, but at the pleasure of the General Assembly. 
 It would strike a deadly blow at constitutional liberty within 
 our church, and leave the way open to centralization and usur¬ 
 pation. I am anxious, in all calmness, but in all seriousness,— 
 not to persuade you to exhibit narrow or petty feelings, but— 
 to urge you, by your action on the matter before you, to do 
 what lies in you to restore and maintain that just and delicate 
 balance of responsibilities and powers distributed among the 
 different courts of our church which recent proceedings have 
 threatened if not actually impaired. 
 
 I shall not take the time to adduce all the grounds underly¬ 
 ing these statements, because I can refer you to the powerful 
 argument of the defendant in this case, in which, representing 
 the appellee before the General Assembly of 1892, he defended 
 clearly and energetically, not so much himself and his Presby¬ 
 tery,' as the rights of this Synod. With this argument you 
 are familiar. I dwell here upon two points only. 
 
 1. That “ the Complaint to Synod (the one now before you),, 
 signed by more than one-third of those who were present and 
 voting in the Presbytery, acts as a stay until the Synod decides 
 whether the committee has a right to exist, and therefore a right 
 of appeal ” (Case against Professor Briggs, p. 99). That is to 
 say, although the Presbytery decided that the committee was a 
 Committee of Prosecution, and had virtual and practical inde¬ 
 pendence, the Committee had no constitutional right to 
 exert an independence by appealing against the Presbytery’s 
 vote to dismiss the case, because the complaint against the deci¬ 
 sion of the Presbytery as to the standing and competence of 
 the committee was signed by a sufficient number of presbyters 
 to act as a stay. There has been some misunderstanding at this 
 point. A few words seem called for. 
 
 The law, as laid down in the Book of Discipline, § 85, is as 
 follows: 
 
 “ Whenever a complaint in cases non-judicial is entered 
 against the decision of a judicatory signed by at least one-third 
 of the members recorded as present when the action was taken, 
 
18 
 
 the execution of such decision shall be stayed until the final 
 issue of the case by the superior judicatory.’ 5 
 
 This law was applicable to the case in hand; the action 
 against which complaint was entered was not a judicial decision, 
 hut a vote to sustain the Moderator; it was signed by not 
 merely one-third of the members recorded as present when the 
 action was taken, hut by more than a majority of them. It 
 was therefore a legal stay, and the appellants, by acting on the 
 decision of Presbytery, and pressing the appeal from the vote 
 of dismissal, violated the Constitution. For this offence 
 there is no redress except such as may be secured through 
 the entertainment by the Synod of your complainants’ repre¬ 
 sentation. 
 
 The attention of the General Assembly was expressly called 
 to this provision of the law by the defendant in the case, in his 
 argument in behalf of the Presbytery against the entertain¬ 
 ment of the appeal. I am desirous, as I have already said, of 
 speaking with all possible respect of the Assembly. There 
 is reason to think that this action was largely determined by 
 assertions on the floor of the Assembly, which, if they had 
 been correct, would have deprived the citation from the Book, 
 just read, of all pertinence. It was affirmed by one of the 
 appellants, that since most of the names were attached to the 
 complaint after ten days had elapsed from the time of the 
 action complained of, the fact of their appearance there had 
 no significance, and could not operate as a stay. This state¬ 
 ment sounded plausible, and doubtless persuaded many. It 
 was, however, without foundation. If ignored the distinction 
 which the Book of Discipline, §§ 84, 85, carefully makes be¬ 
 tween the Notice of Complaint and the Complaint itself. The 
 former, the written Notice of Complaint, must be lodged with 
 the stated Clerk of the Judiciary complained against within ten 
 days after the action complained of. No provision in the Book 
 of Discipline relates to the numbers of the names attached to 
 the Notice of Complaint. The requirement concerning the 
 other document, the Complaint, is that it shall be lodged with the 
 stated Clerk of the Superior Judicatory before the close of the 
 second day of the next ensuing meeting of that judicatory. 
 It is the Complaint, and not the Notice of Complaint, which 
 
19 
 
 operates as a stay when the names of one-third of the mem¬ 
 bers recorded as present at the time of the action complained 
 of are appended thereto. As a matter of fact, in the present 
 case the Notice of Complaint was signed by yonr complainant 
 explicitly “ in behalf of himself and others agreeing with 
 him.” The requirements of the law of stay would not have 
 been satisfied if the names of one-third the Presbytery had 
 been appended thereto. They might have been so appended, 
 but they would have no effect as a stay. It would have been 
 necessary to append them to the Complaint also, which was 
 actually done. But the place in which the Complaint is to be 
 found is a matter of absolute and entire indifference as far as 
 the law is concerned, until the second day of the next meeting 
 of the judicatory to which complaint is made. There is no ten- 
 day limit in any way applicable to the Complaint—the document 
 that must bear the names—that it may operate as a stay, and 
 no requirement that the names shall all appear on both the 
 Notice of Complaint and the Complaint itself. 
 
 Therefore, the Complaint being abundantly signed, and the 
 Assembly being duly informed that it was abundantly signed, 
 and the Complaint being at that very time in the hands of the 
 Stated Clerk of this Synod, and its receipt attested by him, it 
 was able to operate, and should have operated, as a stay. 
 
 Not only, then, cannot the fact that the General Assembly 
 disregarded the stay, and took action which the Complaint 
 would have obstructed, be a reason why the Synod should fail 
 to consider impartially, and as a fresh matter, the Complaint 
 now presented, especially in view of the probability that the 
 Assembly was misled by the plausible but unsound argument 
 of the appellants, but, more than this, present action on the part 
 of this Synod affords the only possible redress for the wrong 
 done by failure to obey the law of stay, and the only means 
 now left of vindicating that law. 
 
 2. The other point to which I call particular attention relates 
 to the nature of the decision appealed from. Appeal to the 
 General Assembly from the action of the Presbytery in dis¬ 
 missing the case against Dr. Briggs was (a) illegal because no 
 
20 
 
 final judgment was given in the ease. Section 94 of the Re¬ 
 vised Book of Discipline reads as follows: 
 
 “ An Appeal is the removal of a judicial case, by a written repre¬ 
 sentation, from an inferior to a superior judicatory ; and may be 
 taken, by either of the original parties, from the final judgment of 
 the lower judicatory. These parties shall be called Appellant and 
 Appellee.” 
 
 The inquiry that is at once suggested is whether the action 
 of the Presbytery in the case of Dr. Briggs is a “ final judg¬ 
 ment ” in the sense of the Book of Discipline. It was appar¬ 
 ently assumed by the appellants that this was the fact. They 
 say, on the cover and title page of their pamphlet: “ Appeal 
 to the General Assembly from the Decision and Final Judg¬ 
 ment of the Presbytery of New York, Dismissing the Case ; ” 
 and on page 8 : “ the said Presbytery made and entered on its 
 records its decision and its final judgment in the said case.” 
 And of course, if it were not so, if the decision of the Presby¬ 
 tery to dismiss the case be not a “final judgment,” in the sense 
 of the Book of Discipline, Section 94, the appeal w T ould fall at 
 once. We cannot, therefore, expect to find any hesitancy at 
 this point on the part of the appellants. But just as little can 
 we leave to the exigencies of their situation the determining 
 voice. It is certainly conceivable that the Book of Discipline, 
 Section 94, intends by its “final judgment” any action by 
 which the consideration of a judicial case is terminated in the 
 lower judicatory. But it is also conceivable that the term has 
 here some specific and technical sense, which a careful reading 
 of the Book of Discipline will disclose. If this should prove 
 to be the case, w r e can learn whether or not an appeal can be 
 legally taken, in the present instance, only by finding out what 
 the specific and technical sense is. Light may be thrown on 
 the subject, either by precise definition or by consistent usage. 
 Precise definition is wanting. No sentence in the Book of 
 Discipline defines “final judgment” in set terms. But the 
 consistent usage of the Book reveals a specific and technical 
 meaning in the term which we are not at liberty to disregard in 
 Section 94. “ Judgment,” in the Revised Book of Discipline, 
 
 means a judicial decision , on the merits of a case , after fidl 
 trial. Not a single passage of the Book countenances the 
 
21 
 
 notion that it may be used of tlie termination of a case by dis¬ 
 missal. The word occurs twenty-three times; in three of these 
 it denotes opinion or general practical wisdom, simply, viz.: 
 in 48, 69, and 77; in 48 it is the “ judgment ” of a communi¬ 
 cant that he has no right to come to the Lord’s table; in 69 it 
 is the “judgment” of an appellate judicatory that new evi¬ 
 dence offered has an important bearing on the case ; in 77 “ its 
 own judgment” is to be exercised by each judicatory. The 
 remaining twenty instances of its use refer to a judicial verdict 
 in the strict sense—a determination, after full and regular pro¬ 
 cess, of the merits of a judicial case.* 
 
 This will be evident upon examination. 21 provides that if 
 an accused person does not appear, “the judicatory may pro¬ 
 ceed to trial and judgment in his absence.” 22 says, “If the 
 plea be 6 guilty,’ the judicatory shall proceed to judgment; 
 but if the plea be ‘ not guilty,’ or if the accused decline to 
 answer, a plea of ‘ not guilty,’ shall be entered of record, and 
 the trial proceed .” 23 says, after speaking of the taking of ev¬ 
 
 idence, the hearing of the parties and the going into private 
 session, “ the judicatory shall proceed to vote on each specifi¬ 
 cation and on each charge separately, and judgment shall be 
 entered accordingly.” 24 says, “The charge and specifica¬ 
 tions, the plea and the judgment, shall be entered on the min¬ 
 utes of the judicatory.” 26 says, “But the minister or elder 
 so engaged (as counsel) shall not be allowed, after pleading the 
 cause of the accused , to sit in judgment as a member of the 
 judicatory.” 47 contains the word four times, and is of the 
 nature of those exceptions that prove the rule, for it restricts 
 the consistent usage of the term in a particular case, and there¬ 
 by shows clearly what the Book intends by it when it is not 
 restricted ; the section is here given entire : 
 
 ‘ k If a person commits an offence in the presence of a judicatory, 
 or conies forward as his own accuser and makes known his offence, 
 the judicatory may proceed to judgment without process , giving the of¬ 
 fender an opportunity to be heard; and in the case first named he 
 may demand a delay of at least two days before judgment. The 
 record must show the nature of the offence, as well as the judgment 
 and the reasons therefor, and appeal may be taken from the judg¬ 
 ment as in other cases” 
 
 * It occurs in this sense in §§ 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 47, 79, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101. 
 
22 
 
 The plain meaning of this is that in other cases the jndg 
 men t” mnst he given after full process. 79 says of Reference 
 for trial that “it submits the whole case to th % final judgment 
 of the superior (judicatory).” 94 is the one under considera¬ 
 tion. 96 says that notice of appeal “ shall be given within ten 
 days after the judgment has been rendered.” 99 says “ t\\z judg¬ 
 ment, the notice of appeal . . . (etc.) shall be read”; under 
 
 given conditions 
 
 “the judgment of the inferior judicatory shall be affirmed. Ir one 
 or more errors be found, the judicatory shall determine whether die 
 judgment of the inferior judicatory shall be reversed or modified, or 
 the case remanded for a new trial; and th a judgment, accompanied 
 by a recital of the error or errors found, shall be entered on the 
 
 record.” 
 
 100 says: 
 
 ‘ ‘ When the judgment directs admonition or rebuke, notice of appeal 
 shall suspend all further proceedings ; but in other cases the judg- 
 ments shall be in force until the appeal is decided.” 
 
 Finally, 101 reads as follows : 
 
 “The judicatory whose judgment is appealed from shall send up 
 its records, and all the papers relating thereto, and filed with the 
 record. If it fails to do this, it shall be censured ; and the sentence 
 appealed from shall be suspended until a record is produced on 
 which the issue can be fairly tried. 
 
 This evidence of the definite and precise technical usage of 
 the word “judgment,” in the Revised Booh of Discipline, 
 might be safely left to make its own impression on all unpreju¬ 
 diced minds. Some passages are naturally less cleai than othcis, 
 but not one is inconsistent with the interpretation given, and 
 some demand it. Sections 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 47, 79 and 100 
 are clear enough to satisfy any reasonable demand. Section 99, 
 with its reference to a “ new trial,” plainly assumes that one 
 trial has already been completed. Section 101 actually uses the 
 terms “ judgment ” and “ sentence ” as equivalent in meaning. 
 It is true that the word “ final ” is not usually prefixed. ^ It 
 occurs only in Sections 79 and 94. But no one can claim that 
 the prefixing of this word makes the “ judgment ’ less final 
 than it would be without the prefix. The force of the prefix can 
 be only to lay stress on the finality of the judgment, not to con¬ 
 vert the judgment into a different act from that which it else- 
 
23 
 
 where denotes. The conclusion is strengthened by observing 
 the difference in language between Section 94 ff., referring to 
 Appeals, and Section 83 ff., referring to complaints. In 83 we 
 hear of “ any delinquency , or any decision , by an inferior 
 judicatory,” in 84 of “ action ” taken, and similarly in 88 ; in 
 85, twice of the “ decision ” of a judicatory ; over against 
 these terms the more precise judgment of 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 
 101, gains added force. 
 
 If we compare the language of the Revised Book with that of 
 the old Book, we notice a similar fact. The old Book was 
 more liberal in permitting appeals. It said : 
 
 “An appeal is the removal of a cause already decided, from an in¬ 
 ferior to a superior judicatory, by a party aggrieved.” 
 
 The new Book is much more definite. It restricts the right 
 of appeal to the “final judgment of the lower judicatory,” in a 
 judicial case. The added precision is a clear mark of the inten¬ 
 tion to exclude anything not conforming with technical exact¬ 
 ness to its new statement. 
 
 These things being so, it follows that no appeal was in order 
 from the action of the Presbytery of Hew York in dismissing 
 the case against Dr. Briggs. That action was not a “ final 
 judgment” in the sense of the Book of Discipline. It was 
 not a verdict on the merits of the case after full trial. It could 
 not be called a “ sentence.” It was not entered as a “ judgment ” 
 after a vote “ on each specification and on each charge sepa¬ 
 rately.” It satisfied none of the conditions of a “ final judg¬ 
 ment.” An appeal from it was not legal. The only ways of 
 bringing it properly before a higher judicatory were that of 
 General Review and Control, and that of Complaint. May it 
 not be that something like a sub-consciousness, at least, of this 
 state of the case was in the minds of the Appellants, giving rise 
 to the careful explicitness of their title page ; the somewhat too 
 much protesting of their reference (p. 8) to “ the aforesaid 
 action,” “ which was, so far as said Presbytery is concerned, the 
 final judgment of the said Presbytery”; and the anxious care 
 with which they, some nineteen times, repeat the words “ fina 
 judgment” in the course of their appeal, viz.: in the following 
 specifications: I., 1, 3, 4, 7 (twice), 9 ; II., 1 (twice), 2; III., 1 
 
24 
 
 IV., 1, 2 ; V., 1 ; VI., 1, 2 (twice), 3, 4, 7. More trustworthy 
 information as to the meaning of the Book of Discipline can 
 be found in the Book itself than is offered by the skillful inter¬ 
 pretation of even so ingenious a body of men as the Appellants. 
 
 In harmony with this obvious intention of the Book of 
 Discipline, are various other allusions and phrases, such as (99) 
 the provision for affirming, reversing or modifying “ the judg¬ 
 ment of the inferior judicatory,” for remanding the case “ for 
 a new trial ”—presupposing that one has already been had 
 and the “ grounds of appeal ” themselves (95), with their par¬ 
 ticular reference to the receiving of “testimony” such as 
 naturally and lawfully precedes the “ judgment,” but is not 
 allowable before the opportunity is given to a judicatory to 
 dismiss a case (22). The appellants labored with much in¬ 
 dustry to adduce all these grounds of appeal, but their diligent 
 efforts only make it the more glaringly evident that they were 
 trying to do what cannot be done, because the “ grounds of 
 appeal” in 95 were laid down in view of a veritable “final 
 judgment ” on the merits of the case, and have no applica 
 bility to a vote of dismissal. 
 
 (b) An appeal is illegal against a ref usal to dismiss a case, 
 therefore also against a dismissal. 
 
 That appeal in the present case was illegal appeals also from 
 another consideration. The theory of appeal includes as a 
 fundamental element the equal rights of both parties , 'i. e ., if 
 one party appeal from a final judgment, the other party would 
 have equal right to appeal from an opposite judgment. In the 
 case of a decision to dismiss, this condition does not exist. For 
 if a judicatory vote not to dismiss, the case proceeds, and the 
 judicatory’s decision on dismissal is not its final decision in the 
 case. The accused, therefore, would have no right to appeal 
 from the judicatory’s action in refusing to dismiss, but could 
 only complain. If, then, the prosecutor could appeal from a 
 decision to dismiss, the prosecutor has a distinct advantage over 
 the accused, in that at one point of the proceedings he may ap¬ 
 peal from a given decision, while the accused may not appeal 
 from an opposite or contrary decision. But this violates the 
 fundamental element in the theory of appeal referred to above 
 
25 
 
 viz., the equal right of both parties. Nothing of this sort can 
 have been intended by the Book of Discipline, nor, if it were 
 intended by the same, could it, in the absence of explicit pro¬ 
 vision, be tolerated as an admissible interpretation. 
 
 It follows from all these lines of evidence that no appeal can 
 be taken from a decision to dismiss a case, and that the only 
 way by which such action can be brought to the notice of the 
 higher court, other than by the routine course of General 
 .Review and Control, is that of Complaint. 
 
 The duty of the Synod as one of the established guardians of 
 the Constitution is very plain. Action by the Synod is the 
 only avenue toward righting of the wrong done by failure to 
 note the restriction of the right of appeal to a final judgment, 
 and toward a proper vindication of the law of the Church. 
 
 But the Synod has especial responsibilities in the present case 
 arising out of its relation to the Presbytery. The Synod is “ to 
 taJce effect ual care that presbyteries observe the Constitution of 
 the church. 
 
 1. The Presbytery of New York, by the action complained 
 of, condoned a violation of the Constitution, in that the modera¬ 
 tor had given a decision without allowing the parties to be 
 heard.” 
 
 Section 27 of the Book of Discipline says : “ Questions as to 
 order or evidence, arising in the course of a trial, shall, after 
 the parties have had an opportunity to be heard , be decided by 
 the moderator, subject to appeal.” Now, if this question, aris¬ 
 ing as it did, in the course of the trial, and after the moderator 
 had made the solemn announcement provided for by the 40th 
 General Pule for Judicatories, was one for the moderator’s de¬ 
 cision at all, it can have been so only because it was a question 
 of order or evidence. But in that case the requirement that the 
 parties be heard was in force, according to the section just read. 
 This requirement, however, was not observed. It is a matter 
 of common knowledge, for which testimony can be adduced if 
 the Synod so desire, that the moderator, on the 4th of Novem¬ 
 ber, 1891, decided the question as to the standing of th cm- 
 mittee very promptly as soon as it was raised, without giving 
 anybody an opportunity to be heard. He even refused the floor 
 
26 
 
 to the accused party who sought to take it. The decision of the 
 moderator was evidently prepared in advance and uttered, at 
 the first occasion. This violation of the constitutional piovision 
 is especially notable in view of the fact that at the previous 
 meeting of the Presbytery, October 5, 1891, a resolution was 
 introduced to the effect that the Presbytery “ deems it expe¬ 
 dient 
 
 TO AKREST THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
 at this point, and hereby discharges the committee from fur¬ 
 ther consideration of the case ” (Case against Professoi Priggs, 
 p. 58). The motion was entertained by the moderator and put 
 to the house. It involved the absolute right of the Presbytery 
 to control and discharge the committee, which the same moder¬ 
 ator, on November 4th, denied so absolutely that he lefused on 
 that day to entertain a motion to discharge the committee.. 1 et 
 on a point on which he himself had undergone so radical a 
 change of view, he failed to comply with the important consti¬ 
 tutional provision that the parties be heard. If, then, the 
 Presbytery’s vote to sustain him be allowed to pass unchal¬ 
 lenged, there is grave danger that an interpretation of an im¬ 
 portant matter of constitutional law, which was itself made in 
 an unconstitutional way, will be established in our chuich. 
 
 2. But further, the Presbytery of New York, by the action 
 complained of, countenanced an unconstitutional assumption on 
 the Moderator’s part, of power to decide questions of Constitu¬ 
 tional interpretation, as distinguished from questions of ordei 
 and evidence. 
 
 According to Form of Government, Cli. xix., ^ 2, The 
 Moderator is to be considered as possessing, by delegation from 
 the whole body, all authority necessary for the preservation of 
 order; for convening and adjourning the judicatory; and di¬ 
 recting its operations according to the rules of the church. 
 Book of Discipline, § 27 (already cited), says: “ Questions as 
 to order or evidence, arising in the course of a trial, shall, aftei 
 the parties have had an opportunity to be heard, be decided by 
 the Moderator, subject to appeal.” Pule 6, of the General 
 Pules for Judicatories, says: “ The Moderator may speak to 
 points of order, in preference to other members, rising from his 
 
27 
 
 seat for that purpose ; and shall decide questions of order, sub¬ 
 ject to an appeal to the judicatory by any two members.” But 
 neither these nor any other provisions of our law permit the 
 Moderator to announce his own interpretation of an article of 
 the constitution, and use this personal interpretation as a 
 standard for determining the action of the body. No Modera¬ 
 tor has a right to decide for a Presbytery a question of the in¬ 
 terpretation of the Confessions of Faith, and to refuse, e. y., to 
 entertain a motion to proceed with the licensure or ordination 
 of a candidate w T ho does not hold that Confession, Chap. x. § 3, 
 teaches that some infants, dying in infancy, are non-elect. But 
 if a Moderator has no right to impose his interpretation of one 
 part of the constitution on a Presbytery, no more has he the 
 right to impose an interpretation of another part,—no more 
 right to interpret authoritatively the Book of Discipline than 
 the Confession or the Catechisms. This is often lost sight of. 
 It was lost sight of by the majority of the Presbytery of New 
 York in sustaining the Moderator, November 4th, 1891, and 
 thereby recognizing his authority to make a ruling on the point 
 at issue. It w T as lost sight of by the Moderator himself, who 
 doubtless committed the error through inadvertence. When, 
 however, attention is once called to the matter, a simple state¬ 
 ment of it would seem to be sufficient. All questions of in¬ 
 terpretation, to whatever part of the constitution they relate, 
 belong to the courts of the church themselves. They must be 
 determined on motion, after full opportunity for debate. It is 
 not constitutional to allow them to be settled by a decision of 
 the Moderator. Otherwise the entire constitution is reduced 
 to the level of a set of Pules for Judicatories, and the glory 
 and strength of a constitutional church is gone. The Moderator 
 becomes a semi-dictator. If he were disposed to be domineer¬ 
 ing, he might prevent debate on the most serious matters by a 
 simple ruling. It is for this reason, that the powers of a 
 moderator are constitutionally restricted. The only safety is in 
 following the provisions of the constitution. An especial 
 responsibility rests now upon the Synod, not to allow r the action 
 of the higher court to affect its action on the Complaint, because 
 otherwise there is grave peril that a novel interpretation may 
 be established in the Church, which depends ultimately upon 
 
28 
 
 an unconstitutional act of the Moderator of the New ork 
 Presbytery in giving a decision upon a matter not belonging to 
 
 him to decide. 
 
 3. The especial responsibility resting upon the Synod not to 
 allow the action of the Assembly to deter it from deciding this 
 Complaint impartially, appears also in the fact that the action of 
 Presbytery against which Complaint is made, did not, as 
 there are good grounds for believing it did not, represent the 
 matured opinion of the majority of the Presbytery. The Pres¬ 
 bytery acted, it appears, under a misapprehension in sustaining 
 the Moderator, and action by this Synod is the only means by 
 which the injurious consequences of that misapprehension may 
 be averted. The existence of the misapprehension is proven, 
 not only by positive statements by members of the Presbytery, 
 after the vote was taken, and they perceived its bearing, but 
 also by the number of names attached to the Complaint. The 
 Presbytery voted, 64 to 57, to sustain the Moderator s ruling. 
 The minority numbered 57, but attached to this Complaint aie 
 the names of 67 who were present and voting when the deci¬ 
 sion was made, enough, if the question had been understood, to 
 secure a reversal of the Moderator’s ruling by a majority of 13. 
 No debate was allowed. The matter decided and the signifi¬ 
 cance of the decision were not fully comprehended at the time. 
 The Church ought not to suffer because of this misapprehen¬ 
 sion, The Synod cannot permit itself to be deterred from 
 considering, de novo , the question at issue, by an action of the 
 Assembly indirectly dealing with it. 
 
 4. I will add only this further consideration, viz.: that a 
 special responsibility rests upon the Synod to exercise its rights, 
 without regard to the action of the higher court, because of 
 the large number and the character of the Complainants. The 
 Complaint is not signed by one or two litigious persons. There 
 are 114 names appended to the document, a number equal to a 
 majority of the enrolled membership of the Presbytery of New 
 York, and to 
 
 AN ENORMOUS MAJORITY 
 
 of the members of that Presbytery ever actually present at a 
 meeting of the body; a number equal to the half of this Synod; 
 
29 
 
 a number including tbe ministers of most of the large and 
 energetic churches, all the active Professors in the Theological 
 Seminary who are members of the New York Presbytery, and 
 elders of the highest standing. 
 
 Probably no complaint was ever presented in any part of 
 our church which represented so emphatically the wisdom and 
 Christian efficiency of the body complained against. Every 
 complaint is to be treated with respect. A complaint signed 
 as this one is, is one which no Synod should be deterred from 
 considering by any action of the higher court. 
 
 A single word more and these long preliminary remarks are 
 ended. It is conceivable that after the Synod shall have fully 
 considered the matter, it will come to a conclusion on the merits 
 of the Complaint different from and opposite to that represented 
 by the vote of the Presbytery. It is the desire and aim of the 
 Complainants to bring the Synod to such a conclusion. The 
 Synod itself, as an impartial court, must recognize the possibility 
 of such a conclusion. But, it may be asked, what would be the 
 effect of such a decision, if reached, on the position of the 
 whole case ? Would it not be a conflict of authorities, con¬ 
 fusion of the minds of the Presbytery, a complete entangle¬ 
 ment in procedure from which the Piesbytery and the other 
 courts of the Church will find it impossible to extricate them¬ 
 selves ? Even if wrong has been done, is it not better to 
 acquiesce in it, rather than to drag the Church through long and 
 wearisome litigation over technical matters of law? 
 
 To this question, if it should arise, I am confident the Synod 
 would reply that acquiescence in wrong by the appointed 
 guardians of the right is never a path to lasting peace, that 
 relief from confusion in a particular case would be dearly 
 bought at the price of hasty and wrong interpretations of the 
 law, which alone can guard all cases against ending in confusion, 
 and that the Church can emerge from the legal difficulties in 
 which the case is already involved only by the determination of 
 each court to do its full duty, regardless of consequences. 
 
 Mr. Moderator , Fathers and Brethren of the Synod: I have 
 thus endeavored to set forth reasons why the recent action of 
 the General Assembly is no barrier to the entertainment of this 
 Complaint, and why, on the other hand, the circumstances are 
 
30 
 
 such, by reason of the gravity of the issues and the peculiar 
 stress of the situation, that the Synod cannot decline to enter¬ 
 tain and candidly consider it. . . 
 
 The questions involved in the Complaint were m no direct 
 
 and proper manner before the Assembly, the Assembly did not 
 pass upon them, except by assumption and inference, and the 
 rio-ht of prosecuting this Complaint was expressly reserved 
 before the Assembly, without protest or objection; the General 
 Assembly cannot deprive the Synod of functions especially as¬ 
 signed to it by the Constitution, nor can any action of the As¬ 
 sembly destroy the right of Complaint, by making a conit 
 incompetent to receive a Complaint; beside this, the Synod is 
 bound, as a constituted body, to exercise the functions assigned 
 and reserved to it by the Constitution; it is bound not to destroy 
 the right of Complaint; it is bound to uphold the Constitution, 
 the safeguard of us all, by resisting encroachments upon its 
 proper authority, and especially by refusing to be influenced by 
 action taken in violation of the law of stay arising from a Com¬ 
 plaint sufficiently signed; it is bound to prevent the establish¬ 
 ment of constitutional interpretations by unconstitutional 
 
 means_as by a decision as to which the parties were, in diso- 
 
 obedience to the Constitution, not heard; or as to which the 
 Moderator had no authority, and the Presbytery, therefore, no 
 right to sustain; or as to which the action of the Presbytery was 
 due to misunderstanding of the issue ; or against which the 
 weight of so many wise and good men is thrown, as have 
 
 attached their names to this Complaint. 
 
 For all these reasons, it is urged that the Synod entertain this 
 Complaint, and take such action as wisdom shall dictate. 
 
 II.* 
 
 We come now to the subject matter of the Complaint, and 
 the reasons adduced in its support. It would have been pos¬ 
 sible to complain on the technical grounds which have been 
 already brought in, in another connection. But a judgment of 
 the Synod on the merits of the question at issue was desired. 
 All that I shall have to say further relates to this question on 
 
 its merits. __ 
 
 *Wbat follows was not 
 
 delivered before the Synod, because no opportunity was allowed. 
 
31 
 
 The first point decided by the Moderator and sustained by 
 Presbytery was to this effect: 
 
 “1. That the Committee which prepared charges against Dr. 
 Briggs (presented to Presbytery October 5, 1891), was a Com¬ 
 mittee of Prosecution under Section 11 of the Revised Book 
 of Discipline.” 
 
 Respecting this your Complainants represent: 
 
 “ 1. The records of Presbytery do not show that the Com¬ 
 mittee was appointed as a Committee of Prosecution under 
 Section 11 of the Revised Book of Discipline ” 
 
 This representation is admitted on all hands to be literally 
 true. 
 
 It is admitted that the records of Presbytery do not explicitly 
 show the appointment of a Committee of Prosecution. There 
 is no statement that a Committee was appointed “ to conduct 
 the prosecution in all its stages,” nor is there any action of 
 Presbytery recorded in language at all resembling these words, 
 or implying the function set forth in them. The action from 
 which Committee derived ail its powers was taken by the Pres¬ 
 bytery, May 11, 1891, in the following terms: 
 
 Resolved , That a Committee be appointed to arrange and prepare 
 the necessary proceedings appropriate in the case of Dr. Briggs. 
 
 There is not a word here about acting as prosecutor, still less 
 about conducting the prosecution “ in all its stages, in whatever 
 judicatory.” The resolution, with its moderate and limited 
 provisions, lends no color to the view that in passing it the 
 Presbytery intended to provide for a committee with the large 
 responsibilities and powers conferred by the Book of Discipline 
 on a Committee of Prosecution. If it did, why was so inade¬ 
 quate a form chosen to convey so weighty a meaning ? Under 
 the resolution as passed, it would be natural for a Committee 
 to draw up a plan of procedure, including the nomination of a 
 Committee of Prosecution, or even, by giving the words of the 
 resolution a specific interpretation, to frame charges against a 
 person to be tried ; but no exegesis can make the resolution it¬ 
 self mean that a Prosecuting Committee shall be appointed. 
 The member of Presbytery, Rev. Mr. Andrew Shiland, who 
 moved the appointment of this Committee, has himself signed 
 
32 
 
 the Complaint to Synod against the Presbytery for sustaining 
 the Moderator in his decision, “that the Committee which 
 prepared charges against Dr. Briggs (presented to Presbytery 
 October 5,1891), was a Committee of Prosecution under Section 
 11 of the Bevised Book of Discipline.” It is evident, therefore, 
 that the mover of the resolution did not design to constitute 
 this Committee a Prosecuting Committee, hut simply a Com¬ 
 mittee to take such action as might he immediately necessary 
 in the case. Dow there is no safeguard against the abuse of 
 power by committees, unless the functions of committees aie 
 definite; they cannot he merely inferential; still less can they 
 be distinctly other than those laid down in the terms of appoint¬ 
 ment. It is impossible to carry on any system of constitutional 
 and representative government, if a committee, or any members 
 of the appointing body, be allowed to read into the act of ap¬ 
 pointment functions and rights not hinted at in the act itself. 
 There is no security unless precision and scrupulous observance 
 of what is specified he absolutely insisted on. 
 
 In the present case it appears that the Committee appointed 
 May 11th in the terms quoted, is referred to in the records of 
 Presbytery, May 17th and June 8th in the same terms : May 
 17th, 1891: “ The Moderator announced as the Committee 4 to 
 
 arrange and prepare the necessary proceedings appropriate to 
 the case of Dr. Briggs,’ Ministers,” etc. (the names follow); 
 June 8th, 1891: “The Committee having in charge the case 
 of Professor Briggs reported as follows: T our Committee ap¬ 
 pointed at the May meeting of Presbytery to arrange and pre¬ 
 pare the necessary proceedings appropriate in the case of 
 Professor Briggs reports progress,” etc. The records show no 
 appearance of the claim to be a Committee of Prosecution 
 under Section 11 (whatever language the Committee may have 
 used of itself in its sessions or in conversations of its members 
 with their friends) until October 5th, the day on which the 
 charges against Dr. Briggs were presented to the Presbytery 
 and distributed in printed form. The cover of this document, 
 emanating from the Committee which was appointed in such 
 different terms, gave the first intimation to Presbytery, as far 
 as the records show, that the Committee was a Committee of 
 Prosecution. Apparently it was an assumption, pure and sim. 
 
33 
 
 pie, of rights never conferred. It is not intended to say that 
 the Committee consciously usurped rights not its own, but sim¬ 
 ply that in styling itself a Committee of Prosecution it took 
 for granted what was not said in the act of appointment, leaving 
 out" of account the necessity of strict construction in all such 
 
 matters. 
 
 But it is claimed that Presbytery must have designed “ to ap¬ 
 point such a Committee, because it could appoint no other” (to 
 quote from the Report of the Committee appointed to answer 
 the Protest of Dr. Henry Yan Dyke, a document that has been 
 widely scattered over the Church). It would be sufficient to 
 reply, that, in view of human weakness, it is by no means safe 
 to infer that because the law requires a certain action at a cer¬ 
 tain time, therefore any action taken at that time must be the 
 action required by the law. Presbyteries are not infallible. It 
 might be that the Presbytery of Hew York did not do what it 
 ought to have done in the matter of appointing a Prosecuting 
 Committee. The statement in the Book, that such a Committee 
 is to be appointed, is not of itself sufficient evidence that such a 
 
 Committee actually was appointed. 
 
 But it cannot be seriously contended that the Presbytery 
 might not appoint a Committee to prefer charges, or that such 
 a Committee must be identical with the Committee which is to 
 be appointed “ to conduct the prosecution in all its stages.” It 
 is not necessary that the Committee for the latter puipose be 
 appointed at once, “ when the prosecution is initiated by a judi¬ 
 catory.” Section 19 says, “ When a judicatory enters on 
 the consideration of an alleged offense, the charge and specifi¬ 
 cations, which shall be in writing, shall be read,” etc.. But 
 this does not mean “ shall be at once read. In the case be 
 fore us, nearly five months elapsed between entering on the 
 consideration of an alleged offense and the reading of the 
 charges and specifications; yet no one pretends that in this 
 respect Presbyterian law was violated. In the same way it was 
 not obligatory on Presbytery to appoint a Prosecuting Com¬ 
 mittee under Section 11 on the 11th of May, 1891, and Pres¬ 
 bytery was perfectly competent to appoint another committee 
 for a different purpose connected with the case. The 1 lotest 
 Committee, already quoted from, well say that the “Committee 
 
34 
 
 to prosecute” is mentioned in Section 11, “ in a single connected 
 sentence, which we have no right to break, either in intent or 
 application.” It follows that an appointment which does not 
 correspond at all to that sentence cannot be regarded as intended 
 to correspond with it. 
 
 But it is claimed further by the Protest Committee that 
 failure to object to the term “ Committee of Prosecution,” and 
 to the reference to Section 11 in their Report, as well as ap¬ 
 proval of the minutes containing that Report, and approval of 
 the records of Presbytery by the Synod of New York, October 
 22, 1891, debar us from now raising any objection. But, to re¬ 
 fer first to the alleged failure to object—in fact an objection 
 was made at the time by Dr. Thompson, and the difference of 
 opinion in the Presbytery as to the status of the Committee was 
 fully developed. And the Presbytery did not at that meeting 
 decide the question. That objection was reserved for the 
 proper occasion, when the Committee claimed for the first time 
 the rights of a Committee of Prosecution (see stenographer’s 
 report). The fact that the name “ Committee of Prosecution ” 
 was allowed to go on the minutes without protest did not, in the 
 minds of the objectors, waive their right of objection at a later 
 stage, when for the first the Committee proposed to act as a 
 Committee of Prosecution. It is one thing to use language 
 improperly, and call one’s self or one’s committee by a wrong 
 title—acts of this kind are ignored or condoned every day—but 
 it is quite another thing to undertake to act in the capacity 
 involved in the wrong title. That is the critical moment, when, 
 if ever, objection must be made. In presenting charges and 
 specifications October 5th, the Committee appointed May 11th 
 was doing no more than might easily and properly be supposed 
 to fall within the terms of its instructions. But when, Novem¬ 
 ber 4th, it was attempted to give it another standing, to translate 
 its unauthorized title into unauthorized action, objection was 
 promptly made, and even without the possibility of discussion, 
 the Presbytery, as already stated, was almost evenly divided. 
 These proceeding do not show that there was acquiescence in 
 the assumption of the Committee, but the contrary. The action 
 of those who objected October 5th, like that of those who voted 
 against sustaining the Moderator November 4th, was consistent 
 
35 
 
 with only one view of the standing of the Committee, namely, 
 that having been appointed by the Presbytery “ to arrange and 
 prepare the necessary proceedings appropriate to the case,” and 
 for no other purpose, when the case was dismissed and no fur¬ 
 ther proceedings were “ necessary ” or “ appropriate,” their 
 function terminated. 
 
 With reference to the approval of the Minutes, as a supposed 
 bar to further objection, it is enough to cite without comment 
 the following action of the General Assembly in 1879 (Minutes, 
 
 1879, p. 613 ; Digest, pp. 663, 664): 
 
 u Overture from Bev. Luther Dodd, a member of the Pies- 
 bytery of Fort Dodge, asking the General Assembly to reply 
 to the following questions : 
 
 «1. Does the approval of the Minutes of a lower court, as 
 those of a Presbytery by a Synod, not necessarily carry with it 
 an approval of any and every judicial decision recorded in those 
 
 minutes ? 
 
 “ 2. Is it competent for a Synod, having approved the records 
 of a Presbytery, to remand a case recorded in those records 
 for new trial, on grounds reflecting censure on the Presbytery ? 
 
 “ 3. Or would it be proper for a Synod, in a case where they 
 approve the Minutes of Presbytery, to require a new trial on 
 any other ground than alleged new testimony ? 
 
 “ The Committee recommended the following reply : The 
 constituted right of appeal, 4 either from a part of the proceed¬ 
 ings of a judicatory or from a definitive sentence,’ and the 
 right of complaint 4 respecting a decision by an inferior judica¬ 
 tory,’ 4 either before its rising or within ten days thereafter, 
 cannot be in any way affected by the approval of the minutes 
 of the judicatory against the action of which the appeal or 
 complaint may be taken.” 
 
 Your Complainants respectfully submit that the recent ap¬ 
 pellants before the General Assembly were not a Committee of 
 Prosecution appointed in accordance with Section 11 of the 
 Book of Discipline, but a Committee appointed under the gen¬ 
 eral powers of the Presbytery, for a restricted purpose, and 
 that therefore whatever may be true of Committees of I rose- 
 cution, this Committee was, like other committees, subject to 
 
36 
 
 tlie control of Presbytery, could be discharged at the will of 
 Presbytery, and had no right of appeal from a judgment of 
 Presbytery. 
 
 But the Presbytery further sustained the Moderator in ruling: 
 
 “ 2. That this Committee was in the house on the day on 
 which the citation was returnable (November 4, 1891, as afore¬ 
 said) as an original party 
 
 On this your Complainants represent: 
 
 “ 2. Section 10, of the Pcevised Book of Discipline, declares 
 that c when the prosecution is initiated by a judicatory, the 
 Presbyterian Church in the Bnited States of America shall be 
 the prosecutor, and an original party.’ But the Presbyterian 
 Church in the United States of America was represented in 
 the house by the Presbytery of New \ ork itself, and not by a 
 Committee of the Presbytery.” 
 
 This representation is independent of your decision on the 
 question whether the Committee was a Committee of Prosecu- 
 tion. Even if it were, still it could not claim the standing of 
 an original party. Even a Committee of Prosecution derives 
 all its rights through the Presbytery that appointed it. 
 
 It can have no relations to the Church at large except through 
 the Presbytery. It cannot, therefore, thrust Presbytery aside, 
 and directly represent the Church at large. The Church at 
 large is not related to the Committee except through the Pres¬ 
 bytery ; the Committee, therefore, cannot represent the original 
 party, which is the Church at large, except (a) so far as the 
 Presbytery itself represents that original party, since the Pres¬ 
 bytery can confer no powers which it does not itself possess, 
 and (b) so far as the Presbytery actually does confer power by 
 appointing the Committee. 
 
 The contrary of this, it is true, is ingeniously argued. The 
 Protest Committee, several times referred to, have made out as 
 plausible a case in their behalf as we are likely to see. They 
 argue as follows : 
 
 “As it is impossible for the Presbyterian Church in the 
 United States (of America) to perform its functions directly it 
 must commission some individuals to represent it. As it is 
 
37 
 
 equally impossible for the whole Church to select and commis¬ 
 sion such individuals, the duty of so doing is properly relegated 
 to the particular Presbytery within whose bounds the offence 
 was alleged to be committed, which designates and elects them 
 as a Committee of Prosecution, in the name, not of the 1 res- 
 bytery, but of the Church at large, and sets them aside for that 
 definite purpose. For the time being, therefore, the Committee 
 so appointed is separate from the Presbytery, and independent 
 of it in the matter in hand, except as to the orderly arrange¬ 
 ments and processes of trial; responsible no longer to the Pres¬ 
 bytery, but to the Church at large, in whose name and behalf 
 it must conduct the case. It is, in this respect, unlike any other 
 committee appointed by the body ; is not in proper sense the 
 ‘ creature ’ of the Presbytery, but the creature of the Presbyte¬ 
 rian Church of the United States (of America), onl^y desig¬ 
 nated as to its component membership by the Presbytery, 
 which in such designation or appointment is acting as the agent 
 of the larger body ; and it is not subject to the will of the 
 Presbvtery except for the maintenance of constitutional order, 
 so long as the case continues. It takes the place of, and be¬ 
 comes, both de jure and de facto an c original party.’ ” 
 
 The reason assigned for this extraordinary situation is the 
 
 following: 
 
 “ A party accused must have a party accusing, each maintain¬ 
 ing its side. A process conducted before a Presbytery must, 
 therefore, have its two original parties. But as the Presbytery 
 becomes the court to consider, try and decide the case, it cannot 
 be one of those parties. Its position in the trial must be that 
 of strict impartiality.” 
 
 It is for this purpose, then, of enabling the Presbytery to 
 maintain this strict impartiality, which belongs to it as a court, 
 that the astounding restrictions are thrown about it, and the 
 astounding abridgements of its powers insisted on, which aie 
 contained in this theory. For unsupported theory it is. It is 
 nowhere hinted at in the Book, much less declared, that the Com¬ 
 mittee of Prosecution is selected “ in the name, not of the Pies- 
 bytery, but of the Church at large,” that it represents, “ not the 
 Presbytery, but the Church at large,” and that it is set aside foi 
 that definite purpose.” It is nowhere hinted at, much less 
 
38 
 
 declared, tliat the Committee so appointed is f 01 tlie time being 
 “ separate from tlie Presbytery, and independent of it, in the 
 matter in hand, except as to the orderly arrangements and pro¬ 
 cesses of trial ” ; that it is “ responsible no longer to the Pres¬ 
 bytery, but to the Church at large” ; that “ it is in this respect 
 unlike any other committee appointed by the body ’; that it 
 “is not in any proper sense the ‘creature’ of the Presbytery, 
 but the creature of the Presbyterian Church in the United 
 States (of America); only designated as to its component mem¬ 
 bership by the Presbytery,” and that “it is not subject to die 
 will of the Presbytery, except for the maintenance of constitu¬ 
 tional order.” Nothing of this is stated in the Book. The 
 Book knows nothing of any distinction between “ creating ” a 
 committee, and “ designating a committee as to its component 
 membership,” and all the rest. It is a series of a priori deduc¬ 
 tions j there is no countenance for them in Sections 10 and 11, 
 and if not there, then certainly nowhere. 
 
 The labored explanation given of the reason why the 
 Church at large relegates its appointing function to the Pres¬ 
 bytery is an imaginary construction, since the Book assigns no 
 such function to the Church at large, and says nothing of any 
 necessity laid upon the Church of “ commissioning some indi¬ 
 viduals to represent it.” In fact, just here is one great fallacy. 
 There is really no such necessity and no propriety in any such 
 action, for the proper representative of the Church at large is 
 already constituted, viz., the Presbytery. But it is said the Pres¬ 
 bytery cannot represent the Church at large, for it must, as a 
 court, be impartial. We shall notice this point more fully in a 
 moment. Observe now only this : that this, if pressed, would 
 prove too much. For if the Church, as a whole, has in this 
 matter any power of appointment which it may delegate, it 
 can have it only as prosecutor; if the Presbytery “ in such 
 designation or appointment is acting as the agent of the large 
 body,” it is acting as the agent of the prosecutor, and the very 
 infelicity which it is sought to avoid is present in the means 
 taken to avoid it, with this immense aggravation of the evil, 
 viz.: that if the Presbytery appoints by virtue of its own gen¬ 
 eral powers (in accordance, of course, with the provisions of 
 Section 11), it can then, in case it becomes convinced that the 
 
39 
 
 condemnation is, after all, needless, and prosecution therefore 
 a real wrong to tlie accused party, undo all it lias done, and 
 thus make some slight reparation to the needlessly accused, 
 while if it acts (in theory) at the behest of the Church as a 
 whole, and thus constitutes a committee over which it has no 
 further control, it is totally unable to do anything to save the 
 accused party from continued litigation in case it shall become 
 convinced that there is no sufficient ground for adverse judicial 
 action. This is impartiality with a vengeance—an impartiality 
 which works always, and only to the disadvantage of the very 
 accused party, whom the laws of all civilized states, and 
 presumably of all Christian churches, are framed to protect in 
 every possible right. 
 
 The matter will become perfectly clear if we observe how 
 it was, as a matter of fact and of history, that Sections 10 and 
 11 came into the Book of Discipline. The assertion that the 
 Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, finding 
 it impossible, in this instance, “ to perform its functions direct¬ 
 ly,” u must commission some individuals to represent it,’ is like 
 the social compact theory of government, an excellent repre¬ 
 sentation of the way matters occurred, if only they had actually 
 occurred in this way. The explanation forgets that the u Com¬ 
 mittee of Prosecution ” was not created in our Church by the 
 Revised Book of 1884-85. For several generations it has been 
 familiar to our procedure. At least, as long ago as 1821, the 
 General Assembly adopted and recommended to Presbyteries 
 the “ General Rules for Judicatories,”of which Rule XL11. pro¬ 
 vides for a Committee of Prosecution. The Rule is not man¬ 
 datory, but, in fact, Committees of Prosecution were frequently 
 appointed under it, and performed functions similar to those 
 assigned to such Committees by Section 11 of the Revised 
 Book. The differences in the provisions will be noticed pres¬ 
 ently. But the Committee of Prosecution was actually a fea¬ 
 ture of our courts long before the Presbyterian Church in the 
 United States of America was constituted the prosecutor, and 
 an original party, when process is initiated by a judicatory. 
 
 What took place at the revision of the Book of Discipline was 
 this:—the habitual procedure of our Courts in the matter of 
 Committees of Prosecution was taken from the General Rules 
 
40 
 
 for Judicatories and made a requirement in the new Book of 
 Discipline. The Buie stands unaltered, so that we have now, 
 within the same covers, the requirement of the Book of Dis¬ 
 cipline, Section 11, and the unchanged source from which it 
 came. In one important aspect the two are unlike. The Buie 
 allows a Committee of Prosecution in “ cases of process on the 
 ground of general rumor, where there is, of course, no par¬ 
 ticular accuse this is what the old Book of Discipline called 
 “ Common Fame ” (Chap, iv., Sections 2, 3). For this are 
 now substituted the cases “ when the prosecution is initiated 
 by a judicatory,” in which, according to another section, the 
 Presbyterian Church in the United States of America is re¬ 
 garded as the prosecutor. The Presbyterian Church in the 
 United States of America thus takes the position formerly held 
 in our system by Common Fame or General Bumor. The old 
 and constant element in the procedure is the Committee of 
 Prosecution, the new element is the Presbyterian Church in 
 the United States of America. It is thus perfectly evident 
 that the framers of the new Book did not begin with the 
 Church at large, and derive therefrom the notion of a Commit¬ 
 tee of Prosecution to represent the Church ; they started with 
 the Committee of Prosecution as a familiar fact in Presbyterian 
 usage, and provided it with a new background by calling the 
 Church at large the prosecutor. The functions of the Com¬ 
 mittee of Prosecution do not flow originally and directly from 
 the conception of the Church at large, but the Church at large 
 is now brought in as a new feature, for a purpose entirely dis¬ 
 connected from the primary purpose of the provision for Pros¬ 
 ecuting Committees. 
 
 I have it on the authority of two distinguished members of 
 the Committee on the Bevision of the Book of Discipline, that 
 that Committee inserted the provision that the accusation should 
 be brought in the name of the Presbyterian Church in the 
 United States of America “to avoid” (I quote) the old and un¬ 
 satisfactory provision which made “ Common Fame ” the ac¬ 
 cuser. It was said that c Common Fame was a lying jade.’ ” 
 
 The change, however, conferred no new status upon a Com¬ 
 mittee of Prosecution. The Committee was not an “ original 
 party ” when it represented (through the action of Presbytery) 
 
41 
 
 Common Fame or General Rumor. No more is it when it rep¬ 
 resents (through the Presbytery) the Church at large. . 
 
 Nor is the Presbytery deprived of its status or function, llie 
 new provision is simply a becoming and dignified form of no¬ 
 menclature to represent tbe Church at large as the original party, 
 behind Session, Presbytery or Synod, making the process con¬ 
 tinuous if it pass from one court to another. . 
 
 It will be seen that “ the Presbyterian Church m the U mted 
 States of America,” while in this connection a convenient anc 
 perhaps useful personage, is not required, and never was re¬ 
 quired, in order to secure the ends sought in the appointment of 
 
 a Committee of Prosecution. . 
 
 But all the talk made about securing the impartiality ot tlie 
 
 Presbytery as a court by the introduction of the Church at 
 large as prosecutor is made in view of a purely theoretical 
 situation. The attitude of mind of members of a Presbytery to 
 a case before them is not thereby in fact altered at all. At 
 best, it is not felicitous that the Presbytery may act as grand 
 jury before it sits in judgment. The evil is lessened by the 
 requirement that a Committee of its own members (why this 
 restriction, by the way, if it is acting as a mere agent of the 
 whole Church ?) shall be appointed to conduct the prosecution, 
 but it makes absolutely no practical difference to the menta 
 attitude of Presbytery as a court, whether Presbytery appoints 
 this Committee as a body with executive functions of its own, 
 or as the mere agent of the Presbyterian Church. The same 
 persons, holding the same views, and having the same likes and 
 dislikes, act in either case, and act in the same way; and win e 
 they undoubtedly, as far as they are worthy ministers and 
 elders, try to be impartial, it is no easier to be so because they 
 can say to themselves, “ This Committee we have appointed in 
 the name of the Presbyterian Church, and not in the name o 
 this Presbytery.” It may, indeed, be seemly that the whole 
 Church should be called the prosecutor; it gives formal con¬ 
 tinuity to a case if carried before higher courts; but the rea 
 
 situation is not changed. . _ .._ 
 
 The simple inference and natural interpretation ot all tins is. 
 
 that the Presbytery represents the Presbyterian Church m any 
 given case as prosecutor, but delegates the function tins 
 
42 
 
 acquired to a Committee of Prosecution, in order to leave itself 
 free to act as a court, not thereby relinquishing permanently 
 any of its inherent power over its Committee, and resuming at 
 will the active exercise of such power. 
 
 It follows that, while the Presbyterian Church in the United 
 States of America is formally the prosecutor and an original 
 party, the Presbyterian Church was on the 4th of November, 
 1891, represented in the Scotch Church, New York, by the 
 Presbytery of New York, and not by a Committee of the 
 Presbytery. The Committee appointed “ to prepare and 
 arrange the proceedings appropriate in the case of Dr. Briggs,’’ 
 even if a Prosecuting Committee according to Section 11, had 
 no standing or right except such as the Presbytery gave it. 
 
 It was not an original party, nor did it represent an original 
 party, except so far as the Presbytery, the real representative, 
 and not mere instrument, of the Presbyterian Church in the 
 United States of America, committed to it certain of its own 
 representative functions, doing through the Committee what it 
 could not becomingly do of itself. But the Presbytery, and 
 the Presbytery alone, was the direct fountain of all the Com¬ 
 mittee’s powers. 
 
 The third point decided by the Moderator, and sustained by 
 Presbytery, was this: 
 
 u 3. That the Committee, as an original party, was virtually 
 and practically independent of the Presbytery.” 
 
 On this, your complainants make the following representa¬ 
 tions : 
 
 “ 3. Every committee appointed by Presbytery is subject to 
 the control of Presbytery, otherwise the creature is greater than 
 the body creating it, the sovereignty of Presbytery over its 
 members, its committees, and all the interests committed to it 
 by the laws of the Church, is seriously impaired, and an undue 
 power is placed in the hands of a few persons. 
 
 “ 4. It was therefore competent for the Presbytery to dis¬ 
 charge the Committee on dismissing the case against Dr. Briggs. 
 But a motion to this effect was ruled out of order by the Mod¬ 
 erator, on the ground of the Presbytery’s action in sustaining 
 him, as cited above (cf. also Complaint 2). 
 
43 
 
 « 5. The Committee, being a creature of Presbytery, had no 
 right to appeal from the decision of Presbytery in voting by a 
 large majority (94 to 39) to dismiss the aforesaid case. T et 
 this the action of Presbytery in sustaining the ruling of the 
 Moderator, as above, permitted them to do. 
 
 “ 6. By this appeal of the Committee, the Presbytery is 
 placed in the absurd position of being compelled to defend its 
 own action in dismissing a case, not against the complaint of any 
 individual, nor against the appeal of one who has suffered 
 personal detriment by a judicial decision, but against a Com¬ 
 mittee which was appointed by and derives all its authority 
 from the very body against whose judgment it now proposes 
 to maintain its opinion. This anomalous situation results from 
 the action of the Presbytery in sustaining the Modelatoi as 
 above.” 
 
 To some ecclesiastical body the Committee must be subject 
 and answerable. It is claimed that this body is not the appoint¬ 
 ing judicatory, but the Church as a whole. We have seen that 
 there is no trace of this theory in any statement of the Book. 
 Granting it, however, for the moment, as a valid inference, h 
 involves another inference, which the appellants and theii 
 friends have overlooked. If the Prosecuting Committee must 
 not only be actually appointed by some ecclesiastical body, and 
 must be subject and answerable to some ecclesiastical body—-be 
 subject, therefore, to direction or to discharge, in the discretion 
 of that body—the same reasons which make it necessary, on 
 the hypothesis, for the Church as a whole to delegate its ap¬ 
 pointing power to a Presbytery make it necessary that it dele¬ 
 gate its power of control also to the Presbytery. Otliei'wise, 
 the Prosecuting Committee is, for a long period at least, totally 
 irresponsible, autocratic, an absolute oligarchy, with reference 
 to important matters of government and discipline. In what 
 absurdities this would land us it is easy to see. One or two of 
 them will presently be noticed. But observe now that the 
 whole assertion of the responsibility of the Committee of Pros¬ 
 ecution to the Church as a whole, and its independence of Pres¬ 
 bytery, rests upon the airiest of foundations. TV e are asked to 
 believe that our Book, which so carefully defines the rights 
 of the several judicatories, in legislating for a Church always 
 
u 
 
 jealous of the principle of local self-government, and especially 
 prompt to resist any infringement upon the rights of Presby¬ 
 teries, through the agency of which alone the higher judicato¬ 
 ries can be constituted, which in judicial process have reserved 
 to themselves the right first to bring their own members before 
 their own Ear—we are asked to believe that our Book ties the 
 hands of the Presbyteries in regard to an important part of 
 process, and puts them absolutely in the power of a Committee 
 of their own naming, without a line of statement to this effect, 
 that a constitutional right of far-reaching consequence, and a 
 barrier to excessive centralization can be infringed upon, and 
 in a particular case entirely removed, without any specif c pro¬ 
 vision, and merely through a series of labored and ingenious 
 inferences which are clearly in the interest, not of peace and 
 the proper Christian liberty of which we boast, but of litiga¬ 
 tion and individual oppression! The mere statement of the 
 theory refutes it. 
 
 Those who hold to it have not sufficiently considered the 
 bearing, in the present law and practice, of the former rule and 
 usage concerning Committees of Prosecution. We have seen 
 that the Committee of Prosecution of the present Book of Dis¬ 
 cipline is the old Committee of Prosecution of the General 
 Buies for Judicatories. That old Committee of Prosecution 
 was subject to its appointing judicatory. No one thought of 
 permitting it to act independently of that judicatory. When 
 the judicatory acquitted, or dismissed the case, the Committee 
 of Prosecution had no further function and was discharged. 
 The general rumor that was behind it gave it no right to exist 
 and act after the Presbytery had determined that it should cease 
 acting. “ No one ever thought of saying ”—to quote again 
 from a member of the Bevision Committee—“ that a Committee 
 representing Common Fame was independent of the judicatory 
 because it (the judicatory) was not Common Fame. And no 
 more did any one think of the independence of a Committee 
 representing a body acting for the Presbyterian Church. At 
 least no one spoke of such a thing, as I am assured by Dr. 
 -, who fully agrees with me.” 
 
 But let us carry the matter a step further. If, in the appoint¬ 
 ment of a Prosecuting Committee, the appointing power really 
 
4-5 
 
 lies with the whole Church, and the Presbytery is merely “act¬ 
 ing as the agent of the larger body,” it is interesting to consider 
 what the efiect would be if the whole Church, represented, let 
 us say, in the General Assembly, should conclude to exercise 
 its appointing power directly. Suppose a case in which a Pies- 
 bytery is directed by the Assembly to begin process. If the 
 Assembly, at the same time, should direct the Presbytei^ to 
 appoint certain specified persons from among its members to 
 act as a Committee of Prosecution; would Presbyteries sub¬ 
 mit to this \ Would it not be clearly a usurpation ? And yet 
 why should it be objected to if the Church as a whole is always 
 the direct source of authority in such appointment? drue, 
 Section 11 says the initiating judicatory shall appoint: but it is 
 quite as easy to read into that declaration the theory that the 
 Church at large, through the General Assembly, may direct it 
 whom to appoint, as the theory that in appointing it is acting 
 merely as the agent of the Church at large, when it designates 
 the Committee “ as to its component membership. Oi, it 
 might be maintained, with hardly more of absurdity, that when 
 a General Assembly directed a Presbytery to try a case, the 
 General Assembly was really the judicatory initiating process, 
 and that it might appoint a Committee of its own members to 
 prosecute the case before the Presbytery. No doubt some 
 interpretation of Section 18 might be devised which would 
 accord with this interpretation! Is it not evident that the ad¬ 
 vocates of the view upon which the Committee depends foi its 
 legal status are demanding of the provision of the Look which 
 makes the whole Church prosecutor and an original party, and 
 which is, at best, only a convenient legal fiction, an amount of 
 concrete service which it is in no way able to render, and which 
 it cannot be asked to render without exposing presbyteries to 
 serious humiliation ? 
 
 The only view consistent with the general powers of Presby¬ 
 teries, the only one conserving these with their proper safe¬ 
 guards, the only one to which the language of Sections 10 and 
 11 lends any real countenance, is the view that the Committee 
 of Prosecution, appointed by Presbytery, is a creature of Pres¬ 
 bytery, responsible to Presbytery for the proper discharge o 
 the duties entrusted to it, and subject to Presbytery, whic i 
 
46 
 
 may direct it in tlie performance of those duties, and may dis¬ 
 charge it when convinced that its work is properly at an end. 
 Where we should be landed by the contrary view will be clear 
 from a few illustrations. Suppose a Presbytery, after initiat¬ 
 ing a process and carrying it through, become convinced that 
 it had no real ground and votes unanimously to acquit the 
 accused party. On the theory of the appellants, the Prosecut¬ 
 ing Committee may, in its own discretion, uninfluenced by the 
 action of Presbytery, carry the case to higher courts. And yet 
 the Presbytery is the sole official representation of the whole 
 Church whose voice can be heard in the case. It is monstrous 
 that when the body, whose voice, until overruled, must stand 
 as the voice of the Church, lias spoken, the Church, through a 
 a Committee appointed by the body which has rendered a ver¬ 
 dict without dissent, should appear as taking action, opposing 
 that verdict! If the Synod should unanimously sustain the 
 Presbytery, the Prosecuting Committee need not be affected or 
 influenced thereby! One does not soon see why, if the General 
 Assembly should unanimously sustain the Synod, the Prosecut¬ 
 ing Committee might not, as such, appeal (according to this 
 theory) to the civil courts, if it judged that the Constitution of 
 the Presbyterian Church had been violated in the verdict; 
 appeal, not as individuals, but as a Committee! It is not credi¬ 
 ble, it is not conceivable, that the Church, in framing the Book 
 of Discipline, ever intended to lodge such enormous power in 
 the hands of a few persons. We say “a few persons,” but in 
 fact the Prosecuting Committee may consist of a single indi¬ 
 vidual, and there is no reason whatever why we might not, if the 
 doctrine advocated be established, see one contentious man 
 leading the whole Presbyterian Church a long and weary dance 
 through stage after stage of litigation, which every one but he 
 desired to have arrested, and all in the name of the very 
 Church for whose turmoil he would be solely responsible, and 
 as its official representative. 
 
 Let us suppose the court of original jurisdiction to be the 
 Session of a particular church. This “ judicatory finds it nec- 
 essary, we will say, u for the ends of discipline, to investigate” 
 dii alleged offense ” (Book of Discipline § 6). Suppose the 
 Session to consist of the minister and four elders. A Committee 
 
47 
 
 of Prosecution must be appointed. One elder is designated 
 for tlie purpose. The accused church member is tried. It 
 may be a woman. .As the result of trial, the Session 
 votes unanimously to aecpiit. Put the Committee of Prose¬ 
 cution—a committee of one—is pugnacious, or vindictive, 
 or has morbidly conscientious doubts about the veidict. 
 That one man may, and even must, appeal to the Pres¬ 
 bytery, for he represents the entire Church, and the Church 
 lias appointed him to prosecute, and only the Church can 
 dispense him therefrom. If the Presbytery goes againsi him 
 —even unanimously—he may, and even must, appeal to the 
 Synod. If the Synod decides—even unanimously—against 
 him, he appeals to the General Assembly. It is perfectly con¬ 
 ceivable that an unanimous vote of the General Assembly 
 against him might be the termination of his career as Commit¬ 
 tee of Prosecution, in the course of which he might have ex¬ 
 hausted the time and patience of four judicatories, destroyed 
 the peace and permanently damaged the reputation of an in¬ 
 nocent woman, and made himself and the Church that sanc¬ 
 tioned him and, on the theory, compelled him to play this part, 
 a laughing stock to the world, and an occasion of deep grief to 
 the godly in the earth. 
 
 Does any one here present believe that an interpretation of the 
 Constitution which could permit such a thing to occur is an in¬ 
 terpretation either tolerable or true ? 
 
 Another illustration is this. Suppose a Session or a Pres- 
 btery votes to condemn, and the defendant appeals \ suppose, 
 however, it becomes evident that the Prosecuting Committee 
 is lukewarm or incompetent. Has the judicatory no light to 
 insist upon its taking vigorous measures ? May not the com¬ 
 mittee be instructed ? May it not, if it persist in carelessness 
 or prove recalcitrant, be disharged and a new one appointed 
 that shall officially represent the judicatory ? Shall justice fail 
 because one or more members of the judicatory override the 
 judicatory itself? It is monstrous that a Session or Pres¬ 
 bytery should be suffered to lie helpless in the hands of one 
 
 man or five men. 
 
 Or we may look at the matter in another way. If a Com¬ 
 mittee of Prosecution directly represents the Presbyteiian 
 
48 
 
 Church at large, is it not then under obligation to prosecute 
 until the Church at large bids it cease ? What right has a 
 Prosecuting Committee to any judgment at all of its own ( It 
 is appointed to prosecute, in whatever court. It is faithless to 
 its trust if it do not prosecute. Its members may become con. 
 vinced that prosecution is unjust. Still they must continue to 
 prosecute. The assumption of the duties of a Prosecuting 
 Committee involves the persistence in the work of prosecution 
 to the bitter end, without any regard to individual opinion. 
 The only escape from the position that such a Committee has 
 excessive power is in the view that it has no power at all, that 
 it is a mere machine in the hands of a higher authority, the 
 Church is a whole,—an automaton, wound up by the Presby¬ 
 tery, but working thereafter by a compelling necessity,—pros¬ 
 ecuting, prosecuting, prosecuting. Evidently this was not the 
 view of that member of this Committee who called upon Dr. 
 Briggs a few days before the meeting at which the charges 
 were presented, and endeavored to persuade Dr. Briggs to 
 appear before the Committee and make such explanations as 
 would relieve them of the necessity of making charges. If this 
 Committee was ever a Committee of Prosecution it was so at 
 the time of that call, and in that case it was at that time respon¬ 
 sible directly to the Presbyterian Church in the United States 
 of America. It would appear, then, that this kindly meant 
 visit was really a breach of trust, for the Committee was, on 
 the theory, responsible to the Church at large simply for pros¬ 
 ecuting. Nothing else would have been permissible. Nothing 
 else can at any time be permissible until the whole Church 
 direct the Committee to cease prosecuting. This involves, of 
 course, the obligation to bring every case initiated by a judica¬ 
 tory before the General Assembly. Take the case of judicial 
 proceedings by a session, already proposed by way of illustra¬ 
 tion. It was suggested that the one member of session who 
 should be appointed to conduct the prosecution before the 
 session might be pugnacious, vindictive or morbidly zealous. 
 But it now appears, when we examine the matter thoroughly, 
 that he may be the most amiable of men, and the most desirous 
 to have the matter end with the session, and go no farther. 
 Not only may the Session be unanimously in favor of acquitting 
 
49 
 
 the accused person, but the prosecutor may be so too; he 
 may be full convinced of that person’s innocence, and of the 
 injustice of further proceedings; he may be thoroughly per¬ 
 suaded that previous injury to the cause of Christ will result 
 from allowing the matter to get beyond the Session. But he 
 is responsible to the whole Church,-not for using his best 
 judgment in the case, but for prosecuting, only prosecuting. 
 No case can be taken up by a session without its going up even¬ 
 tually to the General Assembly. “ Every case initiated by a 
 judicatory shall, if the accused be acquitted, be taken through 
 the higher courts, and shall under no circumstances be regarded 
 as finally adjudicated until acted upon by the General As¬ 
 sembly this would be the proper interpretation of the Book 
 formulated into a rule, if the claims put forth in behalf of 
 Committees of Prosecution should be sustained. It may be 
 that this is absurd. If so, does it not prove that the claims are 
 absurd, and is it not absurd to suppose that our Book, framed by 
 rational men, countenances any such absurdity i 
 
 Before closing, allow me to dwell a moment upon another 
 point. Modern jurisprudence lias for one of its principles the 
 careful guarding of all the possible rights of an accused person, 
 and the careful restriction of all the powers of a prosecutor. 
 No person may be put in jeopardy twice for the same of¬ 
 fence. Thus it would be utterly at variance with the whole 
 tendency of our time in matters of law, if a Committee 
 of Prosecution, which never acts on the ground of persona 
 injury, but simply as the representative of an ecclesiastical 
 body, should possess the right of appeal against the decision of 
 such a body. That would be wantonly to incite and even com¬ 
 pel the repeated jeopardizing of one already declared innocent 
 If that were the intention of our Book of Discipline it wouk 
 be a flagrant violation of the spirit of Christianity. It would 
 place the law of the Presbyterian Church on a plane of severity 
 and cruelty abandoned long ago by the practice of every 
 civilized nation. It would make Presbyterian law an instru¬ 
 ment of oppression and not of protection. It would lead to con¬ 
 tempt for the law without the Church and within it. It is not to 
 be believed that any such provision would be inserted in any 
 Christion lawbook. Only the utmost explicitness could con- 
 
50 
 
 vince Christian men that it is a fact, and would then irresistibly 
 arouse an indignation that would speedily sweep the evil thing 
 away. In the absence of such explicitness, an interpretation 
 involving such harshness cannot be tolerated. It cannot be the 
 true one, because it utterly violates our sense of right, and who 
 of us will impute such a violation to the Church which adopted 
 this Book of Discipline ? It is a shame to us, if we accuse the 
 Church of encouraging litigation and oppression, on the basis 
 of inferences from certain statements of the Book which admit 
 equally well, and even better, of a more Christian interpretation. 
 
 The positive doctrine of the Book as to the power of a 
 Prosecuting Committee seems to be this : A Prosecuting Com¬ 
 mittee is appointed by a Presbytery (supposing the process to 
 be there initiated) and entrusted with certain functions inherent 
 in Presbytery, which it is more seemly and conducive to 
 justice that the Presbytery should discharge through a commit¬ 
 tee ; the Committee can have no greater powers than the Book 
 confers upon the Presbytery; all Committees appointed by 
 Presbytery being Committees of the Presbytery, and subject 
 t° discharge at the will of the Presbytery. IS 1 or can any Com¬ 
 mittee of Presbytery do what the Presbytery has no power to 
 do. But no Presbytery, after it has given a verdict, has the 
 power to carry up a case by appealing from itself, against its 
 own decision, nor even by complaining, as a Presbytery, of its 
 own action. Ho more has it the right of appealing from its 
 own vote to dismiss (even supposing that appeal might be 
 taken in any circumstances from such a vote), or to complain 
 against its own action in dismissal. And what Presbytery can¬ 
 not do, no Committee appointed by it can do. If the Presby¬ 
 tery’s decision be adverse to the defendant, and he appeals, 
 then, without special action by Presbytery, the Prosecuting 
 Committee takes charge of the Presbytery’s case before the ap¬ 
 pellate court. But it seems certain that when the Presbytery in¬ 
 itiating process decides favorably to the defendant, the prosecu¬ 
 tion drops; the Prosecuting Committee has no further function. 
 It either is, ipso facto, discharged, or may be discharged by vote, 
 idle Pi esbytery cannot be placed in the absurd position of be¬ 
 ing compelled to defend its own action, not against the com¬ 
 plaint of any individual nor against the appeal of one who has 
 
51 
 
 suffered personal detriment by a judicial decision, but against 
 a Committee appointed by itself for a specific service, which 
 service the Presbytery regards as ended. 
 
 Mr. Moderator , Fathers and Brethren of the Synod : 
 
 Reasons appearing to your complainants cogent have been 
 presented for holding that the Committee, whose standing has 
 been discussed, was not appointed as a Committee of Prosecu¬ 
 tion under Section 11 of the Book of Discipline, and was not 
 one ; and also that every Committee of Prosecution appointed 
 by a judicatory is subject to that judicatory, has no right of 
 appeal against the judicatory that committed to it its powers, 
 and maybe discharged at the pleasure of the judicatory, since 
 the judicatory created it. You are asked on those grounds to 
 decide a constitutional question of great intrinsic importance 
 and far reaching consequences in such a way as to avoid the 
 centralization toward which we have been rapidly drifting, 
 guard the constitutional privileges of the lower judicatories, 
 and protect the officers and members of the Church in theii 
 sacred rights. P on are asked to sustain the Complaint. 
 

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