ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY BY THE REV. EDWARD F. MURPHY, M. A., Society of St. Joseph for Colored Missioris DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic Uni- versity of America in partial fulfilment of the require- ments for the Doctorate in Philosophy. Jr5M97 Catholic University op America Washington, D. C. MCMXXI ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY BY THE EEV. EDWARD F. MURPHY, M. A., Society of St, Joseph for Colored Missions DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic Uni- versity of America in partial fulfilment of the require- ments for the Doctorate in Philosophy. Catholic University of America Washington, D. C. MCMXXI ERRATA. Page i — Millennium. V — "Though" for "through" (lint 4). 11 — Rational. Note 100: totum, omnia. 14 — "Individual" for "individuals" (line 13). 15 — "From" for "for" (1st line). 16— Odious. 24 — Expedience. 45 — Plausible. 48 — Insert "not" between "has" and "only" (line 11); "be exercised" for "be excused" (line 12). 49 — Nullo modo. 55 — Insert "in" between "is" and "the" (line 10). 60 — Transpose lines. 62 — Opprobrious. 63 — "Neat" for "near." 72— "Com. Eth." for "Coth. Eth." 75 — Vagabonds. 77 — "Statues" for "statutes." 83 — Counsellors. 86— Judicial. 87 — "Becomes" for "become." " 94 — "Signifies" for "signified." 97 — Equally. Insert "as" (line 35). 100 — Reconstruction. 105 — Feugueray — Pensee — Gouvernement. " 106— Enhanced. " 107— Feu— . " 108— Royalty. " 109— Guage. 117 — Carthaginian. 124 — Disparage. 129^ — Principantes. " 131— Delete lines 1, 2, 4, 11, 14, 17. 150 — "Make it impossible" (line 19). 167 — "Ever" for "even" (line 17). 179 — Insert "but" between "not" and "be democratic" (line 12). 180 — Procuring. " 188 — "For then" for "for them" (line 8). " 206— Shibboleth. " 209— Subjects. 210 — "Unavoidably" for "avoidably." " 216— "Exculpate it" (line 29). " 222 — "Ignoring" for "ignorant" (line 21). "Imperil" for "imperial." " 226 — Affection. " 261— Bluntschli's. 262 — Sicut principale. Assumebatur. " 266— Ultimately. 272— Ecclesiastical. 276 — Conscience. " 279— Actual. " 294— Tournai. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2015 https://archive.org/details/stthomaspoliticaOOmurp_0 CONTENTS Introduction i-xiv Chapter I. — Origin of Society and State 1 Chapter II._Power— The Motor 26 Chapter III. — People — The Sourer of Power 57 Chapter IV.— Rulers— The Wielders of It 81 Chapter V. — Governments — The Method of It 99 Chapter VI.— Purpose— The Object of It 139 Chapter VII. — Right and Liberties — To be Protected by It. 179 Chapter VIII. — Menaces and Problems — To be Met by It. 213 Conclusion 266 ST. TIIOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY 1 INTRODUCTION Though the political panacea of the day, democracy is still insufficiently understood by the many whom it affects most. The qualities of it are better known than are the qualifications for it ; the ends than the means. It is airily esteemed the great emancipation, the crown of the glorified people, the tomb of autocracy, the gate-way to the millenium, etc. But its demands are proportionate to its favors ; and there can be no true concept of democracy which ignores the preliminaries which induce it and its success. The meaning of the word, from the time of Thucydides^ who first used it, until now, is popular rule.- As one reviewer says, "Democracy is the state of an autonomous people".'^ Still, if a people are not intellectually and ethically equipped for self-government, a democratic regime would not be demo- cratic at all. It would be demagogic, or '^the government of the people by the boss of the group." It would be, save by miracle, or through the discipline of experience and time, a species of chaos. ^ Tyranny and its equally odious opposite — lack of all rigor — are none the less political calamities when they obtain in the many. The definition of democracy would be improved by the linking of the adjective '^qualified'' to "autonomous.'' Democracy is an ideal form of government; but, like all ideals, it has not always proved the best for practical purposes. For nations have not invariably measured up to its require- ments, and hence have not always been prepared for its privi- leges. Since it is a system which, in a manner, makes rulers of the many, it demands that the many have the mental and II, 15. 2 "Demos", people, and "kratos", rule. 3Borrell, Art. L'Idee de Democratie, Revue de Philosophie, XII, p. 114. 4 This is why democracy is criticized as a disintegrating force which "dissolves communities into individuals, and collects them again into mobs." Criticism should more justly be reserved for the abuse of democracy and the disqualification of certain peoples for its reign. The fault is not in democracy, but in democrats. Cf. Croiset, Les democraties antiques, p. 335. ii ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy moral virtues requisite to regency. Until a people have evolved to the due political degree, democracy could only be a Pan- dora's box in their possession. If it is the best of the forms of government, its place in political progress is last; and the belief that it is the best for the future implies at least a conces- sion that it may not always have been the best in the past. Athens was ready for a democratic era only in the Golden Age of Pericles (445-431 B. C.) ; and even then her particular brand of popular rule which Lloyd calls "the most pure and the most important democratic government the world had ever, — nay has ever seen",^ was far from ideal. Theoretically, the people ruled ; practically, Pericles. His spirit and influence leavened the whole polity, as in a form of monarchy. The Demos discussed and decided; but it was only a segment of the population. In a city-state where one regarded it a real hard-ship to have to live with less than half a dozen helots at beck and call, and the number of free citizens, Attic-born and bred, who alone enjoyed the right of suffrage, was a startling minority, democracy, in our modern sweeping sense, was far from regent.^ But the truth is that to support even this narrow democracy, w^hich was really but a broad aristocracy, Athens needed a citizenry with brains. That she happened to have it, is the great reason why the era was golden, Galton declares*^ that the average ability of the Athenian race was at the very lowest estimate two grades higher than our own ; and this, if so, means that the Hellenes intellectually surpassed us quite as much as we ourselves out-step the African negro to-day. He recalls as evidences of the nimble intelligence and keen aesthetic sense of the Attic, the elaborate works of literature and art w^hich were presented as a matter of course by their creatoi's for his criticism and appreciation. If Athenian morals 5 The Age of Pericles, Vol. II, p. 97. 6 Wilson in The State, p. 600, mentions the difference between ancient and modern democracy, (a) The former was immediate; modern is immediate, or representative, (b) In the former the officers were the State — unimpeachable, and accountable only after their term; in the latter, all officers are representative, (c) Ancient democracy was really a glorifiea aristocracy; in modern, citizenship is co-extensive with population and suffrage is as wide as qualified citizenship. (d^-In former, the individual lived for the State; in modern, the State exists for the individual. 7 Hereditary Genius, p. 342. ST. THOMAS POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 111 measured up to Athenian minds,^ perchance the fate of the most famous of ancient democracies would have been less swift and tragic. This classic example is of much modern political importance. The need for democracy is not solely rule by and for the people, but much else which this entails. The faculty of reason must be strong and active in the people; without it there can be no genuine autonomy. Secondly, a sense of responsibility must animate the populace ; else law and order would be tossed to death on the crest of passion's wave. Thirdly, there must be a constant increase in personal intellectuality and powers of determination, for knowledge is never exhausted, nor is moral judgment ever too perfect. The field for advancement in these regards is vast. And, besides, the difference between a democracy and a pure, or ideal, democracy admits of a myriad degrees. The individual must be awakened as never before, his mind wide open to the day, his heart strong, his arm ready; otherwise the theor}^ of self-government were fan- ciful. Democracy means the rise of the individual to a kind of kingship. It is not primarily a political scheme of votes, privileges, exemptions, or reforms; but rather a spiritual force arousing the individual to self -consciousness, apprecia- tion, ambition, expression, and service in civil society and state affairs. It does not equalize men in the concrete. What could do that but a dream, and who but a dreamer?^ But it does make them equal in a legal sense, and does, as Tocqueville would have it, equalize opportunity. Maumus writes that democracy necessitates an application to the social order of four principles: 1 — The equality of all citizens before the laws. 2 — The possibility of all citizens attaining civil honor and service without any title other than personal merit. 3 — The proportional division of public charges, or relative equality in the matter of taxation. 4 — The right of all to be heard, directly or through repre- 8 Cf. Idem, p. 343. 9 (l)See Hill's Ethics, p. 265. Cf. Montesquieu's, L'esprit des lois, VIII, 2. IV ST. THO-MAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY sentatives, when there is question of legislation or of the form of govern ment.^° The nature of these principles indicates the need of morality and intelHgence for their realization in civil society. Just laws require just legislators. The offices of the State should be open only to the competent; and if they are to be open to all, all must be competent. Only the voice of truth has a right to be heard in the State; and if all voices enjoy such a right, all should be ethical. Hence democracy seems primarily moral, then social, and at last political. It must first arouse the individual to a keen knowledge and sense of right and wrong, and a robust ap- preciation and pursuit of right. It thus renders him an im- portant item of the group-life in which he moves; an asset to the sum and quality of its thought; an increase to its power. The greater the number of rightly thinking minds and rightly feeling hearts in society, the greater is the practicability of a popular form of government.^^ And so a defintion, accrediting all this, might be: Democ- racy is the state of a people who, individually qualified by intellectual and moral progress, and eager for further advance- ment, rule themselves either by themselves, or through their representatives. A corollary would be that such a people with such a regime enjoy "the maximum of self-expression with the minimum of restraint," or, as Pasteur expresses it, ''the true democracy is that which permits every individual to put forth his maximum strength. 10 LVgrZise et la drmocratie, pp. 18-19. 11 Cf. Nelson— How Christ ivould organize the world, p. 23: "Democ- racy is an ideal, which must develop and exist in the hearts of a people before it can become an established principle of their gov- ernment." 12 Other corollaries could be drawn also, and pass for definitions, such as Mr. Gilette's sociological appreciation: "I shall therefore proceed to define democracy as the right of the masses to participate m all the essential satisfactions of life and of their future right to control the social agencies by means of which those satisfactions are d^istributed."— Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XIV, Art. Dem,ocracy and Partisan Politics, p. 39; and Mr Bailey's politico-psychological concept: "Democracy is a state of society It is such a constitution of the social order as allows each member to develop his personality to the full and at the same time to participate in public affairs on his own motion."— WTiai is Democracy^ p 35 ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy v Thus understood, democracy is far from conflict with Catholic conceptions. The Church has never forgotten the practical side of life in her appreciation of the spiritual and ideal. Through her fundamental teaching, ^'upon which in the last analysis", a writer obsen es, '^all advance of democracy must be based'V^ dignifies each man as the image of his Maker and claims for all men the same purpose of existence, she has ever recognized that there is a wide twilight zone of human individual differences between this common origin and end. She has consistently hoped and allowed for racial progress. She has never committed herself to a policy of thrusting governments into the control of multitudes unprepared to receive them, appreciating that the people must be guided until such time as they are capable of guiding themselves; but she has never discountenanced that a people, individually or collectively, should evolve their powers to the fullest. For to deny or combat this, would have been to discount her very doctrine that men must tend to their end which is excellence itself — God. And so we find her wielding her influence in medieval and modern times to promote the advance of indi- vidual and society, warning against temerity indeed, but in season welcoming any theory of government which honestly precludes peril and promises success.^^ She has never frowned on democracy as such, and could not. Rather she has ex- haled it-s spirit in her teaching from the start : so much so that it is no longer considered absurd to suggest that back in the Middle Ages, in the calm of the cloisters, long before Protestant monarchs snapped their fingers at Rome, and, as some writ-ers say, it became expedient for Catholic scholar to wither royalty in order to water the Pope, the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people was born. One ought not forget that kings did not rise to supreme power in Europe until the Medieval Era had almost passed. In the period of the Popes, feudalism was tempered by the i3Chas. B. Macksey. Sovereignty and Consent, p. 1. 14 In his encyclical, Immortale Dei. Pope Leo XIII asserts that "the right to rule is not necessarily bound up with any special mode of government," and that "it may take this or that form, provided only that it be of a nature to ensure the general welfare." vi ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY Muild system. The people were in process of formation for self-government; only their own handicaps, incidental to their late emergence from barbarism, delayed the inevitable day of their return to their civil birth-right. But theories of government, contrariwise to Catholic, came to dim the prospect; notwithstanding that the Reformation is wrested by some of its fervent admirers to explain the l)irtii of modern democracy. The Wittenburg friar's wanton injunction to princes as to the treatment of the underlings — ^'drive, beat, choke, hang, burn, behead, break upon the wheel"!-'^ — appears to express a pathological hostility, if any- thing, to the democratic ideal. Calvin, around whom swirled popular blood in Geneva; high-handed Henry and equally autocratic Elizabeth: these betray little regard for the people and less interest in releasing political power to them. Royal might, in the sixteenth century, seized on the ecclesiastical; and under this unbridled assumption the masses seemed more menaced than ever.^^ Stemmed was the promising tide of civil liberty, and weakened was the hitherto increasing con- sciousness of responsibility which animated Christian rulers. i-.Werke. Erlangen Ed., 15(2), 276. Quoted by Rahilly, Studies, Art. The Catholic Origin of Democracy, Mar., 1919, p. 4. in John Neville Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius. p. 81: "In fact, the religion of the State superseded the religion of the Church. Its first form was the Divine Right of Kings. Luther and Machiavelli were two of the most important factors in the change." The extravagant mental juggling which Figgis indulges to justify this extreme claim of "divine right" by kings is of interest: "The only way to escape from the fetters imposed by traditional methods was to assert from the old standpoint of a Scriptural basis and to argue by the accus- tomed fashion of Biblical quotations, that politics must be freed from theology and that the Church must give up all attempts to control the State. The work of the Reformation was to set men free in all departments of thought and inquiry from subjection to a single method and a single subject. In the case of politics the achievement of this result was possible only through claiming at first theological sanction for the non-theological view of politics. Only when the result is achieved will politics be free to develop theories which shall be purely philosophical or historical Politics were able to enter upon their modern age, only because the theory of Divine Right having done its work had emancipated them from medieval fetters and had in so doing become obsolete itself.'' The passage is a classic of subterfuge, and abundantly speaks for itself. See Figgis, The Divine Right o' Kings, pp. 259-260. Rahilly disallows any ne- cessity of seriously refuting "this practical joke which converts Henry VIII and James I into far-seeing democrats." ST. THOMAS POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY VU To minimize Rome, Protestantism magnified monarchs; and the disastrous slogan ''The king can do no wrong" rang out the death-knell of the democratic promise and possibility of medieval political principles. The goodly solidarity which a common Faith, doctrine, and spiritual leadership had afforded Europe, was shattered. A synthetic force yielded to one of disintegration. Individualism was doubtless thus enhanced and the purpose of future democracy served ; but the crowning glory of Medievalism, ''individuality through communal uni- ty' which could not but induce a most desirable type of democracy, had vanished. The civil power, become minotaur, had devoured all. Saurez, as also his twin gladiator, Bellarmine, essayed to slay the injurious pretension with the sword of Catholic tradi- tion. Standing in the morning of the Modern Age, this celebrated later Scholastic, in the spirit and tone of the ecclesi- astical era, indeed in the very voice of the Angel of the Schools, vindicates the rights of the people and thus preambles the long and mighty drama of popular emancipation. He maintains that, fundamentally there is no reason why one man should have political jurisdiction ; also that the subject of political power is not the individual, nor any number of individuals, but the community. In order that such power might pass by just title into the hands of one man, it is neces- sary that the people consent.^^ Alfred Rahilly has attested the heavy debt which democracy owes to its correct and courageous exposition by the doctrinal aggressor of King James and able representative of medieval political theory. He sees it struggling to life in the unrest and aspirations of the English Whigs and Puritans and burst- ing into rich blossom in our own American Declaration of Independence, whose principles of natural equality and pop- 17 Cram, The Great Thousand Years, p. 47. 18 Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, p. 104: "Doleman, Bellarmin and Suarez are the betes noires of Anglican divines. Against them as the preachers of resistance and inventors (?) of the theory of original compact, the heavy artillery of the royalist pamphleteers is always directed." 19 De Legibus, Lib. Ill, cap. Ill, 1. 20 Idem, Lib. Ill, cap. IV, 2. Viii ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY ular consent, intentionally or not, are unmistakably Suare- zian.2i And the doctrine has re-flowered in the famed and familiar utterances of Woodrow Wilson, in a manner to fill the race with enthusiasm. If it is true that, tracing back the rise of modern democracy, we at length find ourselves clasping the hand of a Spanish Jesuit, it is also a fact that the latter represents the writings of one Thomas of Aquin, and in this wise links the modern period with medieval political doctrine. Much as is the in- debtedness of the son of St. Ignatius to the son of St. Dominic, however, some mild protest must be made against Dr. William Dunning's possibly semi-facetious assertion that 'Svhere Aquin- as is unclear or incomplete, it is Suarez's aim to clarify and supplement; where Aquinas takes an untenable position, Su- arez reverently and with the subtlest distinction and discrimina- tions proves that the master must have meant something dif- i-'l See Art. Suarez and Democracy. Studies, Vol. VII, No. 25, Mar. 18. Equally interesting, too, is the assertion of Mr. Gaillard Hunt, of the Library of Congress, that Thomas Jefferson was a borrower of Bellarmine. See Catholic Historical Review, Oct. 1917, p. 286, Art. "Virginia Declaration of Rights and Cardinal Bellarmine." As Rahil- ly observes: "Filmer's Patriarcha was certainly well known — Jefferson's own copy of it still exists in the Library of Congress." And Sir Robert Filmer translates and quotes a particularly popular paragraph which he declares to comprise "the strength of all that he had ever read or heard produced for the natural liberty on the subject." The paragraph might well have been written by a sincere American colon- ial sire. It is certainly a pre-expression of the patriotic minds of Mason and Jefferson. See Studies, June, 1919, Art. The Sources of English and American Democracy, pp. 206-207. Also J. A. Ryan's Catholic Doctrine and the Right of 8 elf -Government, p. 13. Filmer's quotation from Bellarmine is to be found in Ch. I of his Patriarcha, Henry Moreley's edition of Locke's Two Treatises, p. 14. Filmer is as alien to the Cardinal, as America had to be to Filmer. He finds it convenient to spatter ink at Rome and vents the now-tiresome com- ment (p. 14): "Late writers have taken up too much upon trust from the subtile schoolmen, who to be sure to thrust down the king below the pope, thought it the safest course to advance the people above the king, that so the papal power might take the place of the regal. Thus many an ignorant subject hath been fooled into this faith, that a man may become a martyr for his country by being a traitor to his prince; whereas the new-coined distinction of subjects into royal- ists and patriots is most unnatural " Filmer's doctrine would make our Revolution look like a sacrilege. If the political princi- ples which yielded the world its greatest example of representative democracy be Romanism, then there is naught for us but to say, with apologies to Patrick Henry: "If this be Romanism, make the most of it!'" ST. TilOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY ix ferent from what he said.-- The Jesuit was a worthy medi- um of the message of the former. Aquinas hardly took posi- tions which Suarez found ''untenable/' and among his pro- nounced merits in his Treatise on Laws are clarity and com- pleteness. St. Thomas of Aquin came into the world of thought when Europe was in a critical stage of transition (1227-74). Towns- folk were then seeing their rights more clearly and were wringing recognition from feudalism in the form of charters. Many of the cities glistened as tiny gems of democracy. Quick- ened by their industrial associations, which in some particular cities numbered as many as fifty, the masses were feeling their muscles. In St. Thomas' own Italy, medieval muni- cipalities enjoyed particular advancement. The Lombard League, the victory of Legnano, and the Peace of Constans, are brilliant spots in the history of the principle of liberty and self-det«rmination. Unfortunately, however, the independen- cies used their powers against each other in a series of midget, but sanguinary, wars. It was in this clangor of petty arms that St. Thomas appeared and was educated. The necessity of toning down prevalent politics to the possibility of true liberty, by submitting it to the directive influences of charity and justice, must have been paramount in the thought of the scholar. The situation in our Saint's day was similar to that which now confronts the world. The solutions which he presents in his political theories perhaps have some of the same pertinence to the present as to the medieval past. He saw democracies rise and ride to ruin. He studied the reasons: ignorance and dearth of moral restraint. He be- held tyranny grasp when and where the popular grip weak- ened — Hellas repeating itself! He travelled in Germany and France, with little political detail, we may well imagine, es- caping his eye. Over and above the vivid obser\'ations of his own intense life-time, he could and did advert to the political knowledge of his predecessors. Just as Azpilcueta, Molina, Lessius, Bannez, and Suarez would lat^r draw on his mind, so 22 William A. Dunning, A History of Political Theories, from Luther to Montesquieu, p. 136. X ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY (lid lie supplement his own intellectual treasury with the riches of preceding centuries. He indeed fills his lamp with the oil of the past; but it glows, by his own genius, with principles which serve for the whole future. He joins the Medieval with the Ancient. He takes the thought of paganism and burnishes it with Christianity. Filtering through the mind of Aquinas, Aristotelian notions are separated from their coarser elements. Especially valuable is his teaching, in that it not only holds aloft ideals for the guidance and perfection of the State, but also prescribes practical remedies for its sores; thus winning a place above the purely abstract systems which Figgis would call ''the besetting sins of politics from Dante to Karl Marx." In our study of the political mission and message of the Angelic Doctor, we shall, of course, have much recourse to his De Regimine Principum. There is well-founded sus- picion that this work is spurious from the middle of the second book to the end ; but the probability is that the treatise was finished by a hand and mind skilled and sympathetic in the discipline of Aquinas. Likely the Doctor himself left material which Tolomaeus of Lucca, his disciple, arranged and amplified.23 The aurora of political enlightenment, which is the Com- mentary on the Politics of Aristotle, surely need not be re- nounced as unrepresentative of Thomistic thought. It is not all the personal effort of the Saint, for Tolomaeus himself says so, and Peter of Auvergne is mentioned as concluding 23Crahay, La politique de saint Thomas d'Aquin. Introduc, p. XXIII: "plusieurs manuscrits tres importants portent — ils, apres le 4-e chapi- tre du Il-e livre, des annotations analogues a celle-ci: Qui finisce secondo il beato Tommaso d' Aquino, poscia compiuto da Fra Tolomaeo da Lucca (Mss. du pape Alexandre VII)." See Jouradin, t. I., Philosophie de S. Thomas, pp. 146-7: "II resulte, en somme, de I'ensemble des investigations auxquelles on s'est livre: 1* — que saint Thomas n'avait conduit le traite du Gouvernement des Princes, que jusque vers le milieu du seconde livre; 2* — que I'ouvrage fut ensuite continue selon toute apparence, des materiaux laisses par I'auteur " See Mandonnet's catalogue of the works of St. Thomas, according to the Vatican manuFcript, lat. 3847: Les ccrits authentiques de saint Thomas d'Aquin, Revue Thomiste, 1909, III, p. 268. See Zeiller, LHdce de Vetat dans saint Thomas d'Aquin, pp. 5-11. ST. TPIOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY xi the enterprise.2^ But it is all in the Master's vein.^s And the fact that it mirrors the mind of the Philosopher, is no proof that it does not reflect, at least moderately, the thought and sentiment of Saint Thomas himself. Although the latter very probably failed to be as perfendd as an Averroes,^^ who reverenced i^ristotle's doctrine as supreme truth and his intel- lect as the human pinnacle, he must have succumbed to the spell which filled the thirteenth century\ In politics, the greatest of the Greeks was preeminence itself. It was he who endowed the study with the character of an independent science, by distinguishing it from ethics. His investigations covered prac- tically all the Hellenic and barbarian systems of government.^ Aquinas would have been less great, had he been blind to a greater. The strong indication is that, save in notes decidedly dissonant with Christianity, our Saint is very much in har- mony with the "Philosopher." We may believe with Bau- raann^^ that the Angelic Doctor would have hesitat-ed to com- ment the Politics, if he could not quite commend it. He was seriously making it, through his commentary, mental pabu- lum for his age. The proof of his approval and appropriation of its lessons is his frequent references to them throughout his Summa. As for his De Regimine, it is largely a reflex of the more sterling principles of the Politics. But we should be warned by the cautious opinion of such as Antoniades and Jourdain^ not to identify the Saint with the Stagirite, and 24 Jourdain, Philosophie de S. Thomas, 1, p. 88. 25 Crahay writes: "L'on peut conjecter toutefois que le continua- teur a termine I'ouvrage d'apres des notes laissees par saint Thomas, et par consequent, il n'est peut-etre par interdit d'utiliser les quar- tre livres, dans une mesure restreinte." Op. cit., introduc, p. XVIII. 26 Cf. Com. de Coelo et Mundo, Lib. I, lec. 22. 27 Cf. Dunning, Political Theories, Ancient and Modern, p. 50. 28 Baumann, Die Staatslehre des h. Thomas von Aquino, p. 103: "Wo daher Thomas mit Aristoteles nicht stimmt, und es gab solche Punkte namenlich in der Religion, da sagt er es ausdriicklich." Ibidem: "Das Mittelalter eignete sich den stgiriten an, in dem es ihn erklarte." 29 Antoniades, De Staatslehre des Thomas ah Aquino, p. 3: "Allein das Bild, welches uns in dem thomistichen Commentar zu Aristoteles' Politik entgegentritt, reprasentirt nicht die thomistiche Lehre." Jourdain, Philosophie de S. Thomas, p. 84: "Telle est cependant la reserve de saint Thomas qu'il se contente d'analyser le texte d'Aris- tote sans se permettre ni une critique, ni une approbation motivee, ni meme un developpement de quelque etendue." ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY always to remember the narrow but deep Christian chasm between their mentaHties. Anent the legitimacy of accredit- ing Aquinas with thoughts which are expressly the Philoso- pher's, it is well to recall that the doctrine which the world freely attributes to Plato is, on the Broad-Browed's own testi- mony, Socrates' ; and St. Thomas is to Aristotle w^hat Plato was to Socrates. As for the unauthentic four books, we shall use them in the "restrained measure" w^hich Crahay deems per- missible, since they were possibly composed from the Doctor's notes and are the work of one w^hom Tolomaeus calls his most faithful disciple.30 The tract de Legihu^^ in the Siimma will be of much im- port^mce to our purpose. Here and there in the other w^orks of the Angelic Doctor, teachings of political value flash. These too shall be duly noted and utilized. The trend of democratic thought will be traced. Much that the modern mind might, at first blush, find repugnant to popular favor, may be indicated in the pages of the Master. A closer scrutiny, however, will invariably reveal that it is really the distortions and misconceptions of democracy, and not the principle itself, which are disrelished and criticized. In this, Aquinas but accords wdth the best thought of all time. Plato could see no wisdom in having uninstructed masses rule.^^ Aristotle placed democracy in his list of the corrupt forms of government but by it he understands the abuse of popular rule, and not popular rule itself. The latter idea he calls Polity (politeia) and, quotes it with approval. Cicero, w^hile admitting the merits of democracy, was wide-eyed to its dangers.34 Dante thought it shameless; Mill, impracti- cable; and Rousseau believed that, in its purity, it w^as fit for 30 Hist. Eccles.. Lib. XXIII, c. XI: "Sed hos libros complevit magister Petrus de Alvernia fidelissimus discipulus ejus." Quoted by Jour- dain, op. cit. p. 88. See also Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 382. 31 la, 2ae, qu. XC— CVIII. 32 Rep., V, 473. 33 Politics, III, 7. St. Thomas (De Reg., Lib. I, cap. I) himself fol- cratia' nuncupatur. " 34 De Republica, I, 29. lowing Aristotle, says: "Si vero iniquum regimen per multos, 'Demo- ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy xiii gods and not for men.'^'* Aquinas manages to avoid all heat and to present a cool opinion. And who, considering certain countries of the world today, more aroused by democracy than ready for it, convulsed in problems of their own creation, grappling desolation to their souls and deluding themselves that it is self-determination, would judge the prudence of the Angel of the Schools as prejudice? Still the amount and merit of the democracy to be found in his doctrine are remarkable. Then again, they are not; for the very rule under which he lived gave his mmd a certain democratic turn. ''It is a fact beyond all doubt and beyond all question," obsen-es M. F. Morris, ''that the first distinct and positive illustration of constitutional government is to be found in the monastic orders. The very word Constitution in the technical sense in which we now use it, was iirst em- ployed by them, and Constitutionalism in government may in fact be said to have originated with them. The Constitu- tutions of Saint Anthony, and Saint Augustine, and Saint Francis of Assisi, and Saint Dominic, and subsequently the Constitution of St. Ignatius of Loyola, Saint Francis de Sales, and others were the first schemes on record of strictly con- stitutional government. ''-^^ Sifted, this sentence still shows much truth. And the government of the Dominican Order, of which Aquinas is the great luminary, was a model of the representative democracy which, we shall see, met his favor for the State and has been adopted by the progressive modern age. The Order was governed by a master-general; the prov- ince by a provincial prior ; the convent, by a conventual prior. The last was elected by the friars of the convent : the provin- cial prior, by a provincial chapter composed of the conventual priors and tivo friars from each convent elected hy a full meet- ing of all the friurs of the convent; the master-general, by a general chapter composed of the provincial priors and two friars from each province elected by the provincial chapter.-^' AVhen in subsequent pages we find St. Thomas claiming for all the citizens in the State some share in the government. 35 Cf, Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Jan., 1921. p. 77. History of the Developvient of Constitutional and Civil Liherty, p. 57. xiv ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY and giving for his reason that such a polity is better loved, and hence better served,^ we suspect that his devotion to the Order of his choice is not altogether silent. In fact, we shall find througliout his doctrine that his church-relations in nowise prevent, but rather promote, the popular tendencies; we shall understand with Mandonnet w^hy post- Reformation absolutistism could show ^'little sympathy for the democratic constitution of the Preachers." 37 Barker, The Dominican Order and Convocation, pp 14-15 1919^ pp io^f" ^^'^ ^""^^^^^^^ Origin of Democracy, Studies, March, Cf. H. O. Taylor, The Medieval Mind. 1, 361-3 38 la, 2ae, qu. CV, a. 1. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 1 CHAPTER I ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SOCIETY AND STATE Deep in man's nature, St. Thomas seeks and finds the seed of society .^^ The first chapter of his De Regimine Principum is a page of Social Psychology in which the earnest servdtors of a science which we are inclined to fondle as the child of the par- ticular genius of our own day, would find much interest. It is characteristic of Aquinas that he should gaze beyond the external circumstances which assuredly occasioned and accelera- ted the rise of particular societies. He does not obtrude on the field of the historian, but focusses on the fundamental causes, human and divine, of society as such. He regards society as a union of many individuals in the pursuit of a common end.^^ Civil society, or the State, is a more specialized form in which men by means of law and order seek a degree of temporal happiness w^hich would be unattainable by individual effort.^^ CAUSES OF SOCIETY 1. — The Philosophical Explanation St. Thomas discerns three causes as operative in the origin of society. First, the big individual and human motive."*- For 39 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 1: "Naturale autem est homini ut sit animal sociale et politicum, in multitudine vivens, magis etiam quam alia animalia." 40 Schwalm, Lecons de philosopMe sociale, t. I, p. 2. 41 Com. Evang. Matt., c. XII. 42 And as a writer critizing William McDougall's latest book, The Group Mind (New York, G. P. Putman's Sons, 1920), remarks: "one can safely assert that no collective psychology will go far or go deep which starts from the group as a whole rather than from the disposi- tion individuals to form groups." Walter Lippman, in the Neiv Repub- lic, Vol XXV, No. 315, p. 86. 2 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY the individual, isolation would have meant limitation. Wants would have been stan-ed ; growth, stunted; existence itself, prob- lematic. Man is endowed with instincts and reason : both must have combined to articulate his interests with those of his fellow- men ; the latter convincing, the former compelling. His instinct for self-presen-ation was stronger than his means. Brutes with their natural equipment were fitter for the vital contest.*-^ Too, they knew by nature the dangerous and the safe, while man's enlightenment was empirical and, if he remained apart from his fellows, it could have been, at most, meagre."^ More markedly than the lesser animals had man a disposition to communication and self-revelation, of which his gift of speech gives evidence. His mental power must have enabled him to find the way of satisfying the urge into which his instincts merged. By vers- means of his reason he must have seen that reason was a liability as well as an asset, a hindrance as well as a help : for, while inferior animals without it fared well, he, with it and on account of it, was thrown on his own resources. It was a light, in which he percieved his weakness and wonderful possibilities of strength. It discovered to him that he could not achieve a sufficient amount of knowledge alone and that he required the comple- ment of other intelligences and experiences.^"^ Still more elemental, however, than reason and the tenden- cies mentioned, as causes of society, was, in all probalnlity, man's paternal instinct. It gave rise to the family, which, as we shall later see, St. Thomas esteemed the unit of society. It doubled the individual's interests and problems. It brought him into intimate relation with a fellow creature. In a word, it ser\^ed to waken his other instincts and his reason ; for it in- spired a sense of responsibility and power.^*^ Thus it would seem that St. Thomas chiefly attributes society to the instinct; and the higher form of society called the State 43 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 1. 44 Ibidem. 45 Cow. Eth., Lib. II, Lec. 1; Summa TJieoH. 2a 2ae, qu LII a 1 ad 1- Contra Impug. Relig., Cap. Ill; De Verit.. qu. II, a. 1. Aquinas speaks also of intelligent foresight— Com. Perih.. Lib I lec '> 4« Com. Pout Lib. I., lec. 2; Com. Eth.. Lib. VIII, lec. 12. Cf. Cicero's De Ojg^ciis, I, 17. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 8 to reason.4^ To the former, the origin ; to the latter, the evohi- tion. Such conchisions in Aquinas' doctrine are not too broad nor abrupt ; for his premises, though brief, are pithy. In them are to be found a serious investigation and appreciation of phycho- logical values. He sees not only the positive in man, but the negative as well ; not merely qualities, but likewise the require- ments which qualities create. He considei^ man not only as struggling for existence, but also for the perfection of existence."*^ He finds him both fitted for social life and, in a manner, forced by his very fitness into it. The advantages of such a state of exist- ence are magnetic. Human thoughts are increased by being shared ; hearts are eased by being emptied into each other.^^ In- teriorly and exteriorly, a man's nature finds invitation and stim- ulation to association. He cannot but be in relation to others. No life is lived to itself .'^^ Society is so natural*"*^ that, even had original sin never obtained, and the primal state of innocence and perfection re- mained, man still would have been social.-^- Such an authority as Bluntschli deludes himself that Catholic theologians regard the State as a consequence of man's fall from grace."'*'^ For Aquinas clearly expresses the opposite view ; as do also the great thinkers of the sixteenth century, Suarez"*^ and Bellarmine.^^ St. Augustine saw sin as causal in civil society.-''^' Gregory XII was certainly of this sombre conception. John of Salisbury, too, could be cited as a scintillant predecessor of St. Thomas, 47 We are not adopting Hegel's distinction between State and Civil Society, by which he views the former as a complete organic unity in which individuals as such do not exist, and the latter as the relative totality of individuals. There does not seem to be any notion akin to this in the politics of St. Thomas. We feel justified in using the words "state" and "civil society" interchangeably. 48 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 14. 49 Com. Eth., Lib. IX. no Contra Gentiles, Lib. Ill, lec. 130. Antoniades, Die Staatslehre des Thomas ah Aquino, p. 13 •■>2 Summa TheoL, la. qu. XCVI, a. 4. 53 Vareilles — Sommieres, principes fondamentaux, p. 67. ^De Opere Sex Dier., Lib. V, cap. 7. 5") De Laicis, Lib. Ill, cap. 6. 56 De Civitate Dei, Lib. Ill, cap. 5; Lib. XV, cap. 1; Lib. XIX, cap. 15. 57 Lib. VIII, ep. 21, Migne, Tome 148. 4 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY who held the State a necesary evil rather than a necessary good.^s But Aquinas luis the courage to wave aside such authority and to express the opinion which, despite Dante, has since remained common in Catholic thought. From his psychological exposition of the birth of society, we j)iiss to St. Thomas' teleological explanation. In the former he applied the great Aristotelian principles of Potency of Act to a concept of social genesis ; seeing man endowed with powers and inbued with needs which could find expresion and gratification only in intercourse with other mortals. Now he uses the Philosopher's principle of Finality, and, through it, beholds a mightier urge than the personal, at work to effect and affect not only the rise of society but also its course. It is plain that man must have had a purpose in forming and entering society. His reason demanded this.^ But his object was not exclusively the naked necessities of life. A whole chapter in the Commen- tary of Thomas on Aristotle's Politics convincingly teaches that civil society is formed not so much out of the lower needs of na- ture as for the attainment of the higher.^^ And he adverts to God as the ultimate beginning and end of man. He teaches that the rational creature is subject to the Providence of the Deity in a most excellent way : being a partaker of Providence by being provident both for himself and others.^^ Having a natural in- clination to his proper act and end, man has a share in the Eter- nal Reason. Thus human reason is a reflection of the divine, as is also human providence. And civil society, growing out of both, is heavenly-human in origin. St. Thomas offei*s no deistic concept of the world. He sees God brooding over his creation, operating on and in it, seeking His human ones and desiring to be sought by them, inviting and urging them to Himself, the Supreme Good. God is good ''per essentiam"; but all else is good only ''per participationem." Nothing is Polycraticus Lib. VIII, cap. 17. •'•9 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 1. fio Ibidem. 61 Lib. Ill, cap. 7. 62 Summa TheoK 1 a. 2ae, qu. XCI a. 2. Ibidem. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 5 good save in so far as it possesses some semblance to the divine goodness. God is the '^good of all good."^ From these principles it is clear that man could never have remained indifferent to his human en\dronment, without re- maining indifferent to his God, Who is reflected in His crea- tures..^ With a common Author, a common Master, and, most significantly, a common Destiny, mankind could not but have felt and appreciated, from the start, an impulse to union. The paternity of the Divinty implies the fraternity of humanity.^^ True, St. Thomas is no ontologist nor traditionalist. He teaches plainly that the concept of God is neither innate nor primary, but that it is acquired through creatures.^"^ But when it is attained, surely, in its light, one can understand much which would have remained mysterious. Whether the first founders of society realized it or not, God was working in and through them, that mankind might work for and to Him.^^ Man's body may be content with lower gratifications, but his spirit craves higher objects and relations, and these lead on to the Supreme Good.. In this, his teleological view, St. Thomas could not have pene- trated more deeply into the origin of society. His psychologi- cal explanation brought us into the mind and heart of the in- dividual ; this second elucidation carries us beyond to the Being Who is the Alpha and Omega of the individual's existence and Who implanted in humanhood both reason and instinct. With Creator and creatures clearly in mind, Aquinas sees two sets of relations ; those of men to God, and those of men to men.^^ The means by which God's human creatures should and do perpetuate, if not originate, a union are no less ethical than psychological. If God is fii^t and last, and men come from and must return to Him, mankind constitutes a vast brother- hood under the Divine Plan.'^o The inter-relations which such 64 Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, cap. 40. 65 Idem, Lib. Ill, cap. 19. 66 Summa Theol., 2a, 2ae, qu. CLXXXVIII, a. VIII, ad. 5. Here is the best basis for that international understanding which Wells seeks in his The Outline of History. He gives Kant credit; why not Aquinas? 67 Summa Theol., la, qu. LXXXVIII, a. 3. 68 Idem, 1 a, qu. XII, a. 12; Contra Gentiles, Lib. Ill, cap 19. 69 Com. Eth., Lib. I, lec. 1. 70 Summa Theol., la, 2ae, qu. XCI, a. 1. 6 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 11 condition entails suggest the ethical foundation of society St. Thomas is not content with teaching the mere social good which association affords. If this were the main cause of con- gregation, it is conceivable that civil society might not have arisen ; for primitive men in Rousseau-manner might have pre- ferred to tend to individualism. But Aquinas, in his ethical explanation, says that men must come together, for they have duties towards their Maker and each other. To accomplish the former, they require mutual aid, intellectual and moral.'^ Their mutual obligations, namely, charity and justice, are facilitated by inclinations. It is natural for them to love the Source of their blessings'-^ and all that suggest it. An elementary conscience directs them that they must not use badly what is good.'* Thus the love of neighbor and justice toward him are sufficiently primary forces to shed light on the question of social origin. They involved relations which required association. And so we find Aquinas observing that individuals are united in society by love and that the true nature of the bond among the members of a community is virtue.'' 5 Love is a general virtue which proposes and promotes the others.'^ The others, without it, are ineffectual.'^' It en- sures justice. It is at once a bond and corner-stone of civil society; and the indication is that it must have been one of the strongest factors in the origin thereof. 71 De Reg., Lib. 1, cap. 14. ~2 Contra Gen., Lib. Ill, cap. 128. To be able to do without the in- estimable aid of his fellow-creatures, man would have to be a beast — or a God. (See Com. on Aristotle's Politics, Lib. I, lec 1.) It is only the genuine exception among mortals who can live apart from the multi- tude, neither asking nor receiving. As such, St. Thomas cites John the Baptist and Anthony the Anchorite. {Com. Polit. Lib. I, lec. 1.) But he evidently appreciates that only the average individual is to be regarded in a theory of society. Com. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 1: "et sic homini auxiliatur multitudo civilis — non solum quantum ad corporalia — sed etam quantum ad moralia — ." 7"5 Siimma Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. XXIV, a. 2. 'i^ Contra Gen., Lib. Ill, cap. 128. De Caritate, qu. I, a. 1. 76 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 6. n Contra Gen., Lib. Ill, cap. 130. ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy 7 2. — The Actual Rise of Society So far we have considered the philosophical explanation of society and the State, according to St. Thomas. We have seen the psychological, teleological, and ethical basis of his teaching. We must next attend to his account of the actual appearance of the phenomenon of civil society. There is some controversy as to whether man's nature or his consent was the primar\^ cause in the orientation of the State. St. Thomas recognizes the element of consent.'^^ And we have already seen how essentially suited to society he considered manJ^ We, therefore, conclude that he believed man's nature to have urged him into civil life and consent followed. In primitive society agreement came as a matter of coui*se. Man was born into domestic relations, and his nature took as smoothly to association with his kind as a swan to a pond.^^ But doubtless volition figured more vitally in the rise of civil society ; for here a question of sacrifice was involved. The in- dividual was to invest himself in a communiity ; the procedure would at once limit and enlarge, restrain and enrich him ask much but give more. Thought was required. Reason lit the way, and will followed. Here volition may have been more or less explicit.^- St. Thomas is not categorical on the question ; for so natural is it for man to live in society, that deliberation in 78 See Costa-Rosetti, Philosophia Moralis, p. 579. Too, the Angelic Doctor implies consent in the first chapter of the first book of his De Regimine. St. Augustine teaches the origin of civil society by consent: "generale quippe pactum est societatis humanae oboedire regibus suis — ;" Confessionum, Lib. Ill, 8. Also in Ep. 138, and in De Civ. Dei. Lib. XIX, 21, and Lib. IV, 4. Thus St. Thomas continues the doctrine of his great predecessor. And Suarez (De Op. Sex. Die?-., Lib. V, 7) continues the doctrine of St. Thomas. 79 Cf. Lactantius, Divin. Instit., Lib. VI, cap 10. 80 This follows from the doctrine of man's sociability. And hence His Holiness, Leo XIII, in his Encyclical Diuturmim. pronounces against Rousseau's maintenance: "Sed magnus est error non videre, id quod manifestum est, homines cum non sint solivagum genus, citra liberam voluntatem ad naturalem communitatem esse natos; ac praeterea pact- um, quod praedicant, est aperte commentitum et fictum — " 81 Com. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 1. 82 In his Com. on Aristotle's Politics, Lib. I., lec. 1, St. Thomas states the Stagirite's opinion that men have a natural tendency to society as to virtue, and that as a virtue is acquired by exercise, so are states founded by the work of men. 8 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY the matter is not pronounced. A man can refuse to breathe, if he wishes ; but nature sanctions no such folly. So is the case of society. Vareilles-Sommieres is of the opinion that the original ap- proach of men to each other was voluntary ; but that, once as- sociated, they were in civil society, willy-nilly.*^-^ He does not appear to distinguish sufficiently between primitive and civil society. The former was indeed potentially the latter ; but the latter is an improvement and development of the former. A horde of barbarians temporarily banded together to sack a city, is an example of an association that is not civil. When they submit to a permanent and more or less regulated existence, a State is truly started.^* And it would seem that their consent must be present either tacitly or expressly. Consent does not cease to be such because it is gradual and complies with a natural tendency. We may hardly deduce from the fact that St. Thomas describes man as ''social" and "political,'' that he be- lieves civil society to have been absolutely forced by nature on the race. He teaches that natural necessity does not preclude volition.^^ Individual states may be born in violence through the powers of some great personality or other circumstance ; but if consent does not follow, we can hardly picture a very durable institution. The elements of state would fall apart as soon as the hand of the founder became gripless in death, or as speedily as the causal condition would dissolve. Consent is social cement ; and without it, the general fact of civil society is inexplicable.^^ There can be no doubt that St. Thomas, who appreciated human values so highly, considered it a main power in the actual for- mation of the State. The voice of the thirteenth century harmonizes with modem 83 Op. cit., p. 62. 84 Com. Polit., Lib. II, lec. 2. Artistotle's Politics, VII, 8. Cf. Locke's Two Treatises of Government, Bk. II, ch. 2, p. 128. 85 Summa Theol., la qu. LXXXII, a. 1, ad 1. We are minded here of Hegel's doctrine of Objective Spirit, in which he avers that man's inner life finds outlet in external institutions, which at first seem for- eign to the individual, and yet are but expressions of his true self. 86 Janet, Paul. Historic de la Philosophie morale et politique, t. II, p. 288: "La societe est naturelle, cela est incontestable; mais la societe politique implique evidemment certaines conventions." ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy 9 doctrine, as to the first unit of society .^"^ McDougall refers to Prof. Keane, in the latter's Ethnology, as declaring that the issue of the hvely discussion on the origin of society is that the family was the earliest form.^ This is St. Thomas' conclusion. He considers a society perfect in proportion to its ability to supply the requirements of life.^^ The family furnishes inti- mate and immediate necessities,^^ and is therefore primary. He notes three kinds of domestic relation: that existing between parent and child, between husband and wife, and between ser- vant and master.^i The character of these relations indicates an institution at once distinct, sacred and invioable.^- The family cannot be lost in any larger community for, as St. Thomas clearly offers, it has functions which are essential and peculiar to itself. It is a vital integer, capable of union with others of its kind, but not of absorption. Families cluster and form a village ; and many villages joining themselves into one society constitute a state. The justification of the State is that it assures the needs that give it birth; and, doing this, it is the perfect community .^-^ The consummate community, however, is the kingdom, or, as we should say today, the nation. Though Aquinas certainly w^ould not have subscribed to the sinking of the State totally in a greater society, it seems that he would have favored no ineffectual aggregation of petty independencies such as our Thirteen Original Colonies constituted under the Articles. 87 The meaning of the word family has suffered much shifting. The Hebrew expression seems to be derived from a word signifying a head, prince or lord. The Greek term is oikos, suggesting house. Aristotle thinks a family is that society which nature has established for daily support. Charondas, before him, considered as a family (homosipuoi) those who fed together out of the same pannier. Epimenides regard- ed those who sat by a common fire (homokapnoi) as a family. (Cf. Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, p. 25). Also Aristotle's Politics, Bk. I, Ch. II. St. Thomas follows Aristotle, He uses the word "domus." 88 See Social Psychology, Wm. McDougall, p. 274. 89 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 1. 90 Ibidem. 9100771. Evang. Matt., C. XII; Com. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 2. 92 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. VII, ad 2. McDougall remarks that "all who have given serious attention to the questions are agreed that the stability of the family is the prime condition of a healthy state of society and of the stability of every community" — Social Psychology, p. 274. This, too, is the Thomistio thought and teaching. 93 (7am. Evang. Matt., c. XII. 10 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY of Confederation. 9^ AVhere there were fear of foe, says he, there could be no enduring state. Therefore, it is requisite that there be a community of many states making one kingdom. In this opinion he exceeds the concept of the Philosopher. The greatest of the Greeks saw the city-state as the acme of social evolution i^^^ the Angel of the Schools gazes more keenly, and farther. He introduces ''regnum'" fully into political phil- osophy. Evidently Christianty afforded his vision a more synthetic quality and a finer sweep. Dante, who reverently breathed the intellectual atmosphere of Aquinas, dreamed in his De Monarchia of a universal Christian empire; much the same as the best thought of the world today is weaving a League of Nations. Who can say to what degree the medieval poet was indebted to the Master for his magnificient fancy 3. — The Democratic Value of Thomistic Theory In the ideas of St. Thomas which have thus far been exposed, an ingredient of democratic thought is constantly present and apparent. We find that man is, not because the society and State are; but they are, because he is. The individual is con- ceived and regarded as prior to all organization. It is for his advantage, material and spiritual, that communities are formed. Out of his nature and needs they rise. Just as Aquinas pre- serves the family in his theory of State, and the State in his idea of ''regnum," so does he safe-guard even in a more earnest manner, the individual. This concept of the individual as the efficient and final cause of society, under God, is a solid foun- dation for a truly democratic polity. If such is "one based upon the knowledge and dignity of man, and on the right which he possesses of enjoying a certain amount of liberty conformable 94 Ibidem. 05 Com. Polit., Lib. I, Lec. 1: "est civitas principalissimum eorum quae humana ratione constitui possunt." 06 Suarez, the interpreter of St. Thomas, touches this question of union in his De Lege Humana et Civili, Lib. Ill, cap. II, 6. He does not think that all men should unite in one political community. This would be neither practical nor necessary. But all states should be united by mutual aid and pledges to promote peace and justice. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 11 to reason and justice, we may well conclude that St. Thomas of the thirteenth century was quite as modern as the intelligent expondent of Democracy today. His consideration of man is complete, because it ends in man's Maker.^^ His thought goes l)eyond the animality of humanity to the spirituality ; and his investigation ceases only in the first and final Reality. In this he surpasses Aristotle and perhaps all other political thinkers, with the exception of Augustine of Hippo and his own followers; being more ready to render to God the things that are God's.^'^ His speculations on elementary politics are deeper, for they go to the First Cause ; more reasonable, for they seek conformity with the Author of Reason ; more fruitful, for they discover for the race an infinite ideal. He sees man in relation to his Maker, and hence in greatest diginity. He can endorse no political doctrine which would tarnish that glory. He does not envisage the State as a mammoth frakenstein, gulping down the individuals who create it,^^^ but he beholds it as a creation of purpose, interest, love and duty, in which each one adjusts himself to the common good instead of the particular, or rather makes the two weals concentric. He even ensures the individual's standing to the extent of allowing that private good may sometimes be superior to public. He does not see society as a spawn of Chance and man as a blind and negligible social atom. He detects a plan, wholesome, rationel, and operative in humanity ; and every indi- vidual is safe-guarded by the natural law of love and justice, according to which no man may be ignored or annihilated, but 97 Balmes' Protestantism and Catholicity Compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe, p. 364. 98 Considering man in relation to his Creator, the medievalist draws a very democratic conclusion. God did not create two Adams from whom respectively descended nobles and plebians. De Erud. princ, I, cap. 4. Cf. Dante and Catholic Philosophy, by Frederick Ozanam, p. 321. 99 John Locke, too, manifests this spirit strikingly. According to him, as to Aquinas, men are "all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about his business: they are His prop- erty, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not another's pleasure." Two Treatises on Government, Bk. II, Ch. 1, p. 194. 100 "Homo non refertur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totem et secundum omnit' sua." Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XXI, a. 3. 101 Summa Theol., 2a, 2ae, qu. XLVII, a. X, ad 2. 102 Idem, qu. CLII, a. IV, ad 3. 12 ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy each must be acknowledged and aided. He believes that so- ciety owes the individual a sufficiency of temporal goods, just as the individual owes society a life of virtue.^*^'^ Thus in the very beginning of his politics, Aquinas both discovers the indivi- dual, and champions him. Than this nothing could be more democratic. 4. — Contrast with Other Theories The democratic value of hisi doctrine on the origin of society and the State is sparklingly evident from a terse contrast with the teachings of his predecessors and successors on this topic, so potent in influencing the ideals and practical tendencies of the world's political thought. Plato indeed prizes men's desires and needs as a primary social cause.^^"^ He soon slips from the psychological, however, into a conception of civil society, at once beauteous and symmetrical, but patently artificial, in which the individual fig-ures no more vitally than a brick or a dash of mortar. To realize this ideal of State Absolutism, he would render the individual unreal. Democracy is as far from his aristocratic brain as the Thirteenth Century from the Age of Pericles. The difference between his thought and that of St. Thomas is vast. Though the bulk of his political doctrine deals vdih. the State not as it is, or was, but as it should be, it is easy to discern from his aspirations the anti-democratic character of his pre-conceptions.^^^ Aristotle's speculations are, to be sure, quite consonant in many respects with those of Aquinas. But Thomas regards man more earnestly than does the Philosopher.i^^^ The latter 103 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 15. 104 RepiiUic, II, 366. Cf. Dimning's Political Theories, VoL I, p. 28. lOo Cf. Acton, History of Freedom, p. 71: "Plato would not suffer a democratic polity — . The prodigious vitality of his writings has kept the glaring perils of popular government constantly before mankind; but it has also preserved the belief in ideal politics — . There has been no fiercer enemy of democracy; but there has been no stronger advocate of revolution." 106 Aristotle painfully presses the inequalities of human nature. In the first book of his Politics, ch. IV, he speaks of "the born slave." And Jean Jacques Rousseau feels called on to retort: "S'il y a done des esclaves par nature, c'est parce qu'il y a en des esclaves contre nature. La force a fait les premiers esclaves, leur lachete les a perpetuus; — " Contrat Social, Lib. I, ch. II. ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy 13 lacks in his Paganism an appreciation of the later Christian mes- sage of brotherhood, and so is inferior in thought to his own follower. He neither sees, nor expresses, nor defends the in- dividual so clearly as does the Angel of the School.^O' He is blind to man's deep spiritual significance, and to the spiritual bond among men, of which any merely political scheme of union were but a shadow and effect. He did not know, as Aqui- nas so well realized, that humanity had a personal as well as a single Source, and was therefore one great family; that the race of men must ever have experienced an attraction one to another and each to all ; that because each was the image of that Author, all must reverence Him. In Athens, four centuries before the Dawn in Bethlehem of Judea, even such an intellect as Aris- totle's could but grope in darkness. Lucretius (91-51 B. C.) view^s man as originally belligerent, rather than social or political. For him, society and Sate are expediencies rather than natural expressions and requirements. His conception of man is less noble than that of St. Thomas ; he sees him fighting against his fellows and finally reacting into ways of peace; in other words, degenerating into reason and virtue. According to him, civil society appears as a protest and protection against anarchy and despotism. His premise is pernicious to any political theory; for, if man is naturally hostile to man, civil society must, theoretically at least, be an unnatural restraint. This idea induces a logical return to the anarchism which the Latin poet declares the State appeared ex- pressly to oppose. His image of man as the natural son of Mars is extreme. It does not explain the origin of civil society so well as it suggests the mysterj'^ of it and warrants the dissolution of it. It inspires no democracy ; for it makes the source of so- ciety a fever. The law of fraternity, justice and love, which St. Thomas so plainly beholds as elemental in the race, does not even remotely suggest itself to the mind of the mouth-piece of Epicureanism. Polybius (167-151 B. C.) evinces an equally unflattering esti- mation of man. He does not see him as fire, but as clay. In 107 In his Ethics, he condems democracy, even with a property quali- fication; though in his Politics he amends his views. Cf. Acton, op. cit, pp. 71-72. 14 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY iiian's meek sulmiission to the rule of the strongest and the boldest, "even as it is among bulls, bears, and cocks," lies the ex])lanation of the earliest civil society.i^s He is just a pawn, moved by the law of reaction from one form of civil society to another/ Unmistakably Polybius fails to find the individual so dynamic as a democratic trend of thought demands and Aquinas freely concedes. Cicero (106-43 B. C.) is more at harmony with St. Thomas in ascribing society to man's social instincts and require- ment^.i^'> He finds in nature a law of justice.iio and a dispo- sition to love.ii^ -Qyj^i expressions are general. He speaks of the people; for him "res pubHca" is "res populi."ii- The individuals, however, seems to slip from his mental grasp. This may be because his conception of nature and the natural law, as A. J. Carlyle observes, does not lack ambiguities and inco- herencies.ii'^ St. Thomas far excells Cicero in his analysis and use of these ideas. Christianity poised man's minds above the earth and enabled them to realize more fulh^ than even the best representatives of Stoicism could enunciate, the oneness of humanity. It inter- preted the erstwhile mysterious yearnings of mankind, of which all forms of society were an evidence and expression. It pointed to God as the Origin and the End of humanity, and revealed the wondrous rays of Providence between. Saints Ambrose, Augus- tine, and Gregor\' the Great are the chief writers, before Aqvn- nas, to view political facts through Christian concepts. The practical democratic value of Christianity finds early indication when the holy Bishop of Milan beards autocratic Theodosius and, with the principles of the new religion, saves the people lOSSee Wm. A. Dunning's Political Theories, p. 115; also Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, p. 23. 101) Z)e Repuh., I, 25. But Cicero conceives a lower estimate of human nature; weak, idle, craven, lustful, albeit containing the divine spark This corruption originates and necessitates conditions and distinctions that may be somewhat unnatural. (Cf. Carlyle's History of Mediaeval Political Theories. Vol. I, p. 12.) noDe Leg., I, 14-16. 111 Ibidem, I, 15-43. 112 De Repulica, I, 25. See Carlyle's A History of Mediaeval Political Theory, Vol. I, p. 1-18, and Dunning's Political Theory, Vol. I, p. 118-125. iia See A History of Mediaeval Political Theories. Vol. I, p. 18. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 15 from him, and him for himself. But it is St. Augustine (354- 430) who applies religion directly to political thought. His results, however, do not prove so happy as do later achievements. Heresy restoring choas to the religious world; Alaric and his Visigoths tearing Rome and terrifying civilization; Augustine's own early subjections to the world and the flesh ; these sombre facts, even apart from theological impressions, must have served to darken his views. He is deeply impressed with sin and its consequences. He teaches that in the original order of things men would have been free and equal.^^* But the Fall brought what Seneca conceived as the Golden Age of humanity to an abrupt close. Man passed, by ensuing necessity, into the con- ventional institutions of society. These afford a discipline by which his new and evil tendencies are corrected. Augustine sees the State essentially as a correction of man ; Aquinas, as an expression. Gregory the Great (590-604) declares that men are equal. And, for him, this condition is neither hypothetical nor past; it is of present and living import, a^ is evinced by his admoni- tion to masters to remember that their slaves are as themselves, inasmuch as they share the same nature. But this doctrine, which is of paramount significance in a democratic theory of society, will be found much better advanced in the writings of St. Thomas. In the galaxy of political authors whom the Modern Age has produced, Hobbes, Grotius, Suarez, Locke and Rousseau are among the most brilliant names. Some of these seem to have been influenced by the tradition of Aquinas, directly or indirect- ly, in their doctrine on the origin of society and State. None of them presents principles of more truly democratic value. The Angel of the Schools is no less heartily democratic than modem 114 De Civ. Dei, XIX, 15. Cf . A. J. Carlyle's History of Mediaeval Po- litical Theory, Vol. I, p. 114. 115 But again we must notice that St. Augustine was a supporter of the contract theory of society. In his De Givitate, XIX, 21, he refers to Cicero's definition: "Res Publica res populi. Populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus sed coetus multitu- dinis juris consensu sociatus" (De RepuMca, I, 25). And in cap. XIX, 17, he speaks of human society as involving a "compositio vol- untatum." 16 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY thinkers, because he is more rationally so; not less sincerely, because more restrainedly. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) takes all that his ancient pred- ecessor Lucretius has to give. For him man is primarily not a social but a martial animal, inclined to throttle his fellow- being rather than to respect his rights or enlist his aid.^^^ As we have already observed, such a t€net is pregnant not with democracy but anarchy. Hobbes' doctrine of the dawn of civil society is purely Epicurean up to a point where he surpasses his patron saint and slays every hint or hope of democracy. He is deservedly praised for his precise and explicit theory of social contract ; but his total surrender to state absolutism in his teach- ing that power, once yielded up to a sovereign prince or body, can not be recalled,^^^ is as odius to the twentieth-century brain as it would have been to the thirteenth. He makes the most of the individual, only to obliterate him. He lets him enter the State, never to return. How democratic the Thomistic doctrine seems in comparison with this image of ci\dl society as the bourne, from which no individual returns! Aquinas refuses to allow the individual to be lost, which may be one of the reasons why he, in these later days, has been rediscovered. It is well known that Thomas Hobbes in Paris enjoyed the ac- quaintance of Gassendi and Decartes. From the former he probably adopted his Epicurean views; by the latter, he must have been brought into intimate contact with Scholastic princi- ple. Rene Decartes, educated by the Jesuits, ever esteemed them and never forgot La Fleche ; and, at this time, the political views of that very distinguished son of the Order, Suarez were particu- larly important in the world of thought. Hobbes' mind could be swayed, as his sympathy for royalty and his consequent teaching on the irrevocability of the social contrast suggest. There is as much reason to deduce that he might have drawn some of the better bits of his doctrine from Scholastic sources as that he accepted his Epicurean elements from Gas- sendi. The mingling of Epicurean and Scholastic thought results llfi Leviathan, De Homine, cap. IV. 117 Idem, De Civitate, cap. XIX. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 17 in a hybrid political theory more or less alien to either source. The social contract as found in St. Thomas, does not affect so- ciety as such, but civil society. Men were led by their own social nature into association ; it is only in civil life that a contract po- tently figured. But Hobbes would posit the agreement as the explanation both of society and the State. As for his conceit on the adamantine character of the con- tract, St. Thomas could never subscribe to it. We shall later see that he teaches the right of subjects to revolt and considers those enactments of rulers which outrage reason, not binding. The intellect of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) must also have been stirred by the dispute between James of England and the dauntless Jesuit Suarez, and by the latter's scholarly triumph over regal pretensions. The views of the Protestant Nether- lander on the origin of society and State are, to a degree, Suar- ezian and Thomastic.^^^ He repeatedly adverts to the social nature of man, and seems to hold that society is due to instinct and the State to contract. Finally, he teaches that transferred rights may be recalled. However, his doctrine is democratic- ally marred by concessions to absolute monarchy. Suarez (1540-1617) is in the closest intellectual accord with Aquinas. He sees all men free by nature. He reconciles this fact with the further fact of society and State by teaching that man is a social being. He beholds a fundamental unity in the race, the source of which is the social instinct.^^^ He recognizes the importance of the indi\ddual but does not sacrifice the com- munity to him; nor does he immolate the individual to the community. He strikes the balance which suits a sanely democratic ideal. For him the State is the creation of a com- pact on the part of the people. Not individually but collectively are they the depositary of civil power; else there would be no community and hence no State. As a community, they can 118 Cf. Wm. A. Dunning's His. of Polit. Theories, Vol. II, pp. 171-186, and Dr. Albert Stockl's Grundriss de Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 206. See De jure belli et pads (tr.), Bk. I, ch. IV., par. 7: "But we must observe that men did not at first unite themselves in Civil Society by any special Command from God, but of their own free Will, out of a Sense of the inability of separate Families to repel Violence; whence the Civil Power is derived — ." 119 Traotatus de Legibus, Lib. II, cap. XIX, sec. 9. 120 Idem, Lib. Ill, II, sec. 4. 18 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY | change the form of their society. Their pledge is not immut- i able.121 John Locke (1632-1704) is enshrined and incensed as the founder of the poHtical philosophy from which modern demo- cracy was born. He sees man primarily as rational and dis- posed to good ; contrariwise to Hobbes' pessimistic picture and concordantly with the doctrine of Aquinas. The natural law precedes civil society, which is consequent to contract. The people determine the State. The individual is not absorbed; his natural rights limit the power of the community, just as they diminished, in ''state of nature," the power of other indivi- duals.^ AVhich is but a more modern expression of St. Thomas' simple doctrine of justice. Locke studied at Oxford when Scholasticism was still very much alive there. Suarez was dead ; but the memory and the efiPect of his vigorous encounter with the English Monarch were still green in the intellectual world. The Two Treatises on Government are a refutation of the idea of iron-clad monarchy which Suarez antagonized and Filmer sustained. The politics of Aquinas could not have been un- known to the talented Englishman, who is no more original in his democratic principles than Suarez who claims no origin- ality at all. Certainly, too, he is indebted to Grotius, whose treatise De Jure, Belli et Pacis widely affected ethical and poli- tical speculation. "The idea of a law of nature, which forms the background of Locke's political theories," writes Ritchie, "and which from Locke passed on to Rousseau, and to the fathers of the American Replublic, comes to Locke mainly from Grotius and Pufendorf. The other writer whom he most quotes, is 121 Idem, Lib. Ill, cap. Ill, sec. 7, et 8. N. B. — It must not be neglected, however, that Suarez opposed unstable government. He believed that a people and their posterity should be true to a chosen polity, unless the rulers break faith with them and seriously abuse their powers. But of course there would be little reason for them to be false, if the government remain faithful to the popular interests. Suarez is like St. Thomas in granting the right of revocation of power, but only for a good reason. Hobbes' theory of rigid irrevocability is dismally dif- ferent. 122 "The State of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions." Two Treat- ises of Oovemment, Bk. II, ch. II, pp. 193-194. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 19 Hooker ; and Hooker is the medium through whom the ethical and poHtical philosophy of Thomas Aquinas finds its way into English popular thought. "^^^ And so, is it unwarrantable to view St. Thomas as passing through some of the best minds to a mighty modem influence? What is democratically commendable in their respective teach- ings on the origin of society and State, is to be found at least germinally also in his. On a scholar's answer to the initial question of the foundation of man's civil existence, depends the character of his consequent political theories. Lucretius and Hobbes, with their doctrine of original intensive idividualism and natural w^arfare, founded the State on a volcano. It is pa- thetic to discover the author of Leviathan endeavoring to elude the anarchistic logic of his own teaching, by tying up his sav- ages in an eternal contract. It is only in the light of the fact that man is a social being that the State, with its complex system of regulations and limitations, can be seen as something better than an imposition. It is only on this firm fact that the stabilit}'' of civil society could ever be assured. It is because man is a rational animal that he can never be content with the separatism of the brutes, but finds his best self-expression in his relations with his fellow-men. The democracy which would chop up society into squirming, mutually-opposed segments is bedlamism. The democracy which aims to establish the indi- vidual as an entity with a mind and a heart of his own, but not without moral duty and natural necessity of adjusting them to others, is the helpful and wholesome type which plainly appears in the pages of the Angel of the Schools and in the thought of all who have written under his aegis. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), so far as the valuable portion of his message is concerned, teaches nothing new. The 12S Natural Rights, p. 39. See also, Macksey, Sovereignty and Con- sent, p. 9: "Though Hooker may seem unaware of the chorus of Cath- olic theologians, who in his time were defending, against the Divine Right of Kings, the origin of society by consent and the primary recep- tion of sovereignty by the people (i. e., to whole community)? his indebtedness to St. Thomas Aquinas is freely admitted." See Ra- hilly The Sources of Eng. and Am. Democracy, Studies, June, 1919: "Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity — a striking tribute not only to the Catholic conception of the Church but to the Schoolmen's teaching on natural laws and civil government." 20 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY ideas of social contract and natural equality were very venerable at his birth. But he rejuvenated them with a few mental move- ments which at once carressed and crushed democracy. He finds man naturally good, orderly, and just;i24 hence quite per- fect. His difference from Hobbes in this is so violent as to sug- gest that both he and the Englishman may be somewhat mis- taken. St. Thomas, more realistically, sees man not as perfect but perfectible. The individual being so excellent, however, according to the author of the Contrat Social, there is little need of society to improve him.^^ The first land-grabber who found folk foolish enough to believe his ''This is mine," was the founder of ci\dl society a peculiarly pessimistic deduction from the extremely optimistic premise of man's perfection ! It is hard to consider human beings, so richly endowed as Rous- seau pictures, being corralled into states like ''dumb, driven cattle," by petty schemers. St. Thomas' explanation is much more psychological and at harmony with human diginity But this great inconsistency of Rousseau's is followed by greater. Like Hobbes, he magnifies the individual only to pulverize him. He sees in his ideal state the total alienation to the whole com- munity of each associate with all his rights.^^^ Yet we know that man cannot part with his natural rights ; they are inalien- able, if our Declaration of Independence and the doctrine of St. Thomas count for aught.^^ Rousseau later concedes to 124 Lettre a Mgr. De Beaumont: "rhomme est un etre naturellement bon, aimant la justice et I'ordre." Cf. Crahay, op. cit., p. 16. St. Thomas taught a natural law, but did not conclude from the existence of the law to the perfection of its subjects. 125 "Je voudrais bien qu'on m'expliquat quel peut etre le genere de misere d'un etre libre dont le coeur est en paix et le corps en sante." Discours sur Vorigine de Vin^galiU parmi les hommes. Cf. de Vareilles- Somi^res, op, cit., p. 73. 126 See Discours sur Vorigine de Tinegalite, seconde partie. Crahay op. cit., p. 12. 127 Contrat Social, I, 6: "Ces clauses, bien entendu§s, se reduisent toutes k une seule; savoir, I'alienation totale de chaque associe avec toutes ses droits k toute la communaute." Thos. Hobbes' contract differs from Rousseau's. He sees the rights of the individual alienated to a sovereign individual or to sovereign individuals. His form of contract is this: "Ergo huic homini, vel huic coetui, authoritatem et jus meum regendi meipsum concedo, ea conditione ut tu quoque tuam authorita- tem et jus tuum tui regendi in eundum transferas." Leviathan, De Civitate, cap. XVII. But Rousseau would alienate the rights of the individual to the whole community, and not to any sovereign. 128 Summa Theoh, 2a 2ae, qu. CIV, a. 5, ad 2. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 21 the individual the rights for which the State has no use ; but this doctrinal generosity comes too late. The whole contract theory- is discredited ; for, if men alienate themselves in toto, how can they keep a contract and how can they receive rights? Besides, Rousseau's contract is unlike St. Thomas', in being purely con- ventional, arbitrary, and artificial, with no human impulse in it, nor throb of natural law. He declares that the earliest and only natural society is the family, and that even the family is kept together only by a convention.i^^ And so his singular brand of social agreement would require renewal in each genera- tion^ and the continuity of the State would be hardly better than a much broken chain. Whereas Hobbes founded society on a volcano, Rousseau rears it on shifting sands. St. Thomas is safer, for his basis is man's rational, moral, social, and poli- tical nature. Again, it may be observed that what is soundly democratic in Rousseau's doctrine perhaps owes itself to the influence of Locke. The effect of England on the French enlightenment in the eighteenth century was signal. Rousseau could hardly have been proof against a charm which completely enslaved his illustrious contemporaries, Voltaire and Montesquieu. The best notes of his message are old enough to be echoes; the rest are so discordant with the best democracy that they cannot but be discarded by such thinkers as incline to the reasonable and safe. To these opinions of the most celebrated political thinkers, thus summarily presented, we may well append a brief consid- eration of the traditionalist theory ; and, in conclusion, we shall review a typical twentieth-century answer to this fundamental question in politics as to the principiants of society and State. Louis Gabriel de Bonald (1754-1840) denies the social con- tract.^^^ He finds in man's gifts of language an indication of the naturalness of society. He teaches that is is necessary for man to think his words before he expresses his thought ; that is, man cannot think without words. Then language must have been God-given ; and the fact of language demands the existence 129 Gontrat Social, Livre I, ch. II. i30Th6orie du pouvoir politique et religieux. Of. Dr. Albert Stokl's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 317; and Dr. Wm. Turner's History of Philosophy, p. 603. 22 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY of some sort of social organization from the start. But St. Thomas regards language only as the symbol of that instinct of communication from which society so largely fiowered.^-^^ It is certain that he did not esteem language the great solution of society, as does de Bonald. He mentions it only incidentally ; while he carefully emphasizes man's social nature. De Bonald's conclusion from the primitive necessity and existence of lan- guage that society was not contractual, is logical ; but his further idea that civil society likewise lacked contract does not follow. He might find Aquinas friendly in his first opinion ; hardly in his second. Aquinas preserves the more democratic view-point which treates men as human beings, not as automata, and would attribute the origin of the State to a human act. His fer\^ent faith in God did not at all mar his philosophy of man. The latest explanations of the origin of society and State are obviously affected by the industrial character of the day. Main- ly the causes are found not within man, but without. Not the urge of his nature, so much as the press of objective circumstan- ces, explains his social and political condition. Psycholog}^ must walk behind economics. Dr. Franz Oppenheimer is a good representive of the school.^^^ Platonic and Marxian absolutism, Manchester liberalism, the contract theory of Rousseau, and the robber elucidation of Carey: all these conflicting views weary him, for from them it is impossible to draw a fixed principle. Naturally he neglects to turn to the pages of a medievalist for the solidity he seeks. He repudiates the idea that man's social nature is the fount of society. He obsen^es that every state is a class state and that such a state, with its different layers of power and dignity, superior and inferior social groups, is not a natural but an artificial organization. Thus far is he faithful to the cult of Jean Jacques Rousseau. He fastens his eye on the form of the State and misses the main issue, which is, an investigation of the underlying causes thereof. He declares that the state, as an example of caste, could not have originated otherwise than 131 He observes that brutes, too, express their feelings mutually, but declares that man's tendency in this regard is stronger. Com. Pol., Lib. I, lec. 1. 132 His book, The State, is translated into English by John M. Gitter- man. Ph. D., L. L. B., and published by Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1914. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 23 through conquest and subjugation. He need not go so far as Aristotle and hold that some men are natural slaves, in order to feel the fallacy of his position. It would be sufficient for him to acept the Christianized version of the Philosopher's view, which St. Thomas presents. In human rights, men are, accord- ing to Aquinas, equal : but their personal and social capabilities and capacities are evidently not so. It is natural for a man to accept the position to which he is best suited, at least till he has qualified himself for a better. Oppenheimer theorizes on the assumption that state classes are the creations of force ; whereas they can be quite the natural expression, intellectual and voli- tional, of different grades of ability. "The State, completely in its genesis, essentially and almost completely during the first stages of its existence," he maintains,^^^ "is a social institution, forced by a victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole pupose of regulating the dominion of the victorious group over the vanquished, and securing itself from revolt from within and attacks from without." Truly there is an absence of psychology in a view which gives man credit for but one crav- ing — power. Thomas Hobbes was munificent enough to con- cede two aspirations : power and liberty.^^^ St. Thomas' searches more deeply than either Hobbes or Oppenheimer and finds as many instincts at work in the generation of the State as would a modern social-psychologist. He does not visualize man as a lustful creature, animated solely with the desire of climbing to material success on the outraged backs of his fellow-men and deriving a diabolic joy from it all. There is, however dimly, a law of love and justice in every human life, which the materialist does not perceive but which ever guided and clarified the politicial thought of Aquinas. "Everywhere," Oppenheimer gloomily avers, "we find some war-like tribe of wild men breaking through the boundaries of some less war-like people, settling down as nobility and founding its state. "1^^ He does not seem to realize that a war-like tribe, 1.33 The state, p. 15. 134 "Quod homines, libertatis et dominii, per naturam amatores — Leviathan; de Civitate, cap. XVII. 135 The State, p. 16, Cf. Edward Jenks' idea that the origin of the State is to be found in the progress of War. Law and Politics of the Middle Ages, pp. 72-73. 24 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY which can conquer another, may be already an organized so-^ ciety, having a degree of permanency and order, and that, there- fore, the explanation of its organization may lie farther back than its exploitation of its less bellicose victim. The difference in political thought between the thirteenth-century writer and the twentieth, is that the former essayed to explain the origin of civil society; while the latter offers what really amounts to an explanation of the enlargement, localization, or development of states. And even as such, the explanation is too sweeping. States have not infrequently in History been the outcome of pacts, instead of conquests. Our own Thirteen Original Colo- nies united themselves in a manner which Oppenheimer appears to have forgotten. Besides, the pioneers in our country did not exploit the Indians and thereby found a class state; they ex- ploited their own energies and built up a free one. They were more eager to expell the aborigines than to exploit them. Oppenheimer may mention in support of his theory of the ori- gin of the State the instances of Babylonians, Persians, Mongols, the Doric States, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Saxons, etc. These are examples which may be answered with other examples. Unlike Aquinas, Oppenheimer confuses an effect or an occasion of states with the cause; an expendience with a necessity; a re-formation with a formation. His statement that "the basic justification of the state, its raison d'etre, was and is the economic exploita- tion of those subjugated, refutes itself as a theory of the origin of civil society. The origin of the state is its foundation and not its justification. His theory of civil society suits an economic age better than it interprets the facts. Aquinas seeks the source of the State within the human beings who make and constitute it, appre- ciating that historical explanations are, at most and best, super- ficial. History cannot sound deep causes. Philosophy is in- dispensable to an understanding. History gives particular facts ; philosophy looks behind them and finds general processes. Significantly, there is no democratic savor to this typically up-to-date doctrine of civil society, which Oppenheimer presents. In it, we find the faults of preceding views, plus new ones. 136 The state, page 30. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 25 The unflattering implication is that men are but thistle-down on economic winds; their subjective powers are far exceeded by objective and adverse forces; they are not the stuff of which democracy is made. But Aquinas finds reasons to credit man with the possession of potentialities which, evolved, can render him God-like. At the same time, he beholds the race express- ing itself in society, rather than society repressing the race. These two views ai'e premises with promises. In the vista of the first, logically Aquinas must detect final democracy, or self- rule, provided that individuals take care to advance toward the Ideal. In the second, he sees the justification of law and order ; for it were folly for man to decry a goodly expression of his own rational nature, such as the State is, and to renounce the positive advantages that accrue to him from a civil status. Even as Herbert Spencer, is St. Thomas conscious that, while in the body the parts exist for the sake of the whole, in society the whole exists for the sake of the parts.^^"^ His theory of State is solid because his principles are deep and grounded not in any such variable as economics, but in the very constancy of human nature itself. It should be acceptable to the twentieth centur^% for it presents the best and most ra- tional basis for democracy. Having seen St. Thomas' primary political doctrine both in itself and in contrast to the efforts of later and allegedly greater authorities, we may pass to a consideration of his idea of State. 1S7 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. IX, ad 3: "Bonum commune est finis singularum personarum in communitate existentium, sicut bonum totius est bonum cuiuslibet partium." 2(3 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY CHAPTER II POWER Saint Thomas teaches that the individual, if able to live by himself, would, under God, be his own king.^-"^ The ne- cessity for rulers would be nil. The hypothetical character of the assertion saves Aquinas from sounding like Rousseau. It is because the human being, w^ith an endowment of reason, ap- proaches the divine, that the Angelic Doctor has some of the enthusiasm with which Democritus of old, regarding man a god, glowed. The Deity governs according to reason, and His rational creatures share in His regime. Reason is the principal of human acts, their rule, and measure.^^^ It is there- fore fundamental in the State. We need look for nothing radical in St. Thomas' doctrine. Its constant aspiration to reasonableness precludes any comfort to either the bolshevist or the ultra conserv^atist. Because he devotes so much consideration t-o the rational aspects of man, he can never forget the individual's powders, prerogatives, and place in the divine plan. Every reasonable human w^ant is of the utmost importance; for all spring from a nature that is god-nke.140 1. — Ethical Aspect of Power In the preceding chapter, an ethical element in his answer to the primary question of politics w^as observed. Very im- portant in his conception of the foundation of the State, this same moral aspect is even more so in his idea of its structure. We have seen his explanation of the appearance of civil society. Now his thought practically tends more and more to the ideal. r.iS De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 1. Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XC, a.2. 140 He warns ua, though, that in adjudging what is natural to man, we must consider those things which are strictly according to his nature and are not corruptions of it. Com Polit., Lib. I, lec. 2. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 27 Being a psychologist, however, he does not soar off to any such beautiful but unreal realms as Plato's Republic, Campanella's City of the Sun, Moore's Utopia, or Bacon's Atlantis. He stands firmly in reality, though ever pointing to a noble purpose for which the State was conceived and by which it must be guided. He sees man's human relations revolving on the four car- dinal virtues. For him, as J. Martin Littlejohn notes, 'Tolitical ethics may be characterized as individual ethics extended to the political domain. "^^^ His whole science is impregnated with the morality of which man's rational nature is the norm, and without which, as up-to-date thinkers are coming to realize, democracy is sheer fancy. Littlejohn, however, is wrong in his further opinion that St. Thomas bases his politics entirely on abstract principles of human nature and has no concern with the facts of the external world. The intimacy of Aquinas with the eminently empirical Aristotle, whose researches covered so many constitutions, and his varied contact ^^dth the intense times in which he himself lived, must have rendered him keen to the actual. His writings prove that he was.^*^ He peers so closely into the human heart and mind because he realizes that right here is the source of the actual ; he is equally inter- ested in the ethical, because it leads to the ideal. He is, first and last, but never solely, a philosopher. Among the practical sciences, Aquinas finds ethics the first ; and in ethics a most important department is politics, inasmuch as it considers the ultimate and perfect good in things human. Morals are great agents in St. Thomas' construction of the State; in this, he differs from the Machiavellian separation of the political virtues from the moral. He rejects the idea of 141 The Political Theory of the Schoolmen and Grotius. p. 58. 142 See Vol. XIV of the Publications of the American Sociological Society, The Pi'ohlem of Democracy ; Art. on A Woi^king Democracy. by Frank W. Blackmar: "But in reality democracy is something more than a form of government. It is the co-operating spirit life of the people working in harmony to establish justice among all for all." P. 4. 143 We find in the prologue to his Com. on Aristotle's Politics: "ne- cesse est banc scientiam (i. e., politicam) sub practica philosophia con- tineri, cum civitas sit quoddam totum, cuius humana ratio non solum est cognoscitiva, set etiam operativa." 144 Prologus ad Com. 28 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, that there is only an extrinsic bond uniting the community. He bases the State on natural law and a common social nature, and therefore sanctions it both extrinsically and intrinsically, physically and ethically. 2.— Law In any state, the most prominent feature is law. From the very purpose of law is evinced its necessity; and St. Thomas gives the topic abundant attention. "To the medieval mind," Carlyle observes, "the law was the practical form of justice, and it is in the due maintenance of law^ that men found the security for justice and for all good in life.''^^^ The justice which law expresses and which Aristotle calls "the political good." since it is "in the interest of all" (Politics, III, 12), is demo- cratically defined by Aquinas as a constant and perpetual will to concede every man his rights.^*^ At the bottom of the law, Aquinas places love. He sees all men striving toward the same goal, and hence a union existing among them. Mutual sacrifice, aid, and forbearance are imperative. And law is regulative of these important relations which love either inspires or confirms.^^^ It is the result and cause of organization and, as Dante calls it, "the bond of society." The democracy of the Angelic Doctor's teaching on the common destiny of men is equal only to the beauty of it. Aristotle is more impressive than adequate when he declares that "law^ is an agreement, and as the sophist Lycophron says, a pledge between the citi- zens of their intending to do justice to each other" (Politics, III, 9) . Aquinas comprehends and expresses in his writings the highest reason and motive for such an agreement. In no part of his politics is he in finer accord with the fairest democratic sentiment than in his treatise on Laws. His text is warm with a popular message. The people are both protected and enriched by the principles which he proposes. i45iTis. of Med. Polit. Theory, Vol. Ill, p. 37. Cf. St. Augustine, De Civiiate Dei, lib. IV, c. 4: "Remota itaque justitia, quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia?" 146 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 1. 147 Summa Theol., 2a or 2ae, qu. XCIV, a. 2. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 29 Primarily, law must be reasonable. For as reason is a par- ticipation of the eternal law of God, so is human law but a derivation from reason. Each man has reason; each man shares in the eternal law. A necessary conclusion from St. Thomas' fundamental proposition on the necessary reasonable- ness of law is that each individual has implicit part in the formation of the human law, as each has a share in the natur- ^1 148 r^Y^Q vigor legis is not in the particular pleasure of any- body, but in the rational nature of the people. A decided advance indeed on the autocratic maxim of the Digest: "The pleasure of the prince is the strength of the law."^^^ Decrees may be fulminated by sovereigns, but if these enactments violate the reason with which every man is endowed, they are unjust and not binding.^^^ True, law may be enforced; but only when and because it is truly just. As such, it is not a diminutor of human liberty, but a director and protector. It is not required for those who are using their liberty in society, so much as for those who are abusing it. It makes the path clearer for the good; it brings the bad back into the path. Its restrictive quality is exercised per accidens, i. e., when one departs from the way which represents the best of human reason and experience and is manifested by the law itself. The virtuous act freely accord- ingly to rule and reason, and law therefore is no circumscrip- tion to them.i^i rpj^g gyj}^ injuring themselves, must not be allowed to spread their misdeeds to others. It is the perversity in man that rebels against law, not the rationality. The first lesson of the natural law is that no one has a right to do wrong.i^- Human law, by preventing wrong, helps the individual to do right. St. Thomas sees nothing unnatural in what is but a concrete reflection and expression of rational nature. In this he is antithetical to such as Hippias of Elis, who maintained, according to Plato, that law is a tyrant out- 148 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XC, a. Ill, ad 1. 149 See P. Janet, Histoire de la philosophie morale et politique, Vol. I, p. 315. 150 Summa 'Theol., la 2ae, qu. XCI, a. IV, ad 3. 151 Contra Gen., Lib. Ill, cap. 128. 152 Cf . Fox, Religion and Morality, p. 183. 30 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY raging nature. Men of good will are generally of good reason ; and these, the normal representatives of the race, would find it easier to agree with Aquinas than with the cynical Greek sophist. License is gripped and crushed by human law, but under a just sceptre or constitution, liberty is as free as ever.^^^ St. An- selm, over a century before St. Thomas, had worked out the problem of law and liberty on ethical grounds in his De Libero Arbitrio and De Concordia Praescientiae cum Libero Arbitrio, showing that freedom does not consist in the power of sinning and that no will is more free than a good man's. Hegel gives it a modern presentation in his doctrines that, according to the law of development, freedom is realized through its opposite, necessity. But Aquinas himself expresses the consonance of liberty with law better than both, when he writes that, as to restraint and co-action, the just are not, so to speak, under law at all. They are a law unto themselves. They are free — "in eos non habet lex vim coactivam sicut habens in injustos.''^'** This is the reason for Aristotle's contention that "the govern- ment of free-men differs from the government of slaves not less than slavery and freedom differ from each other in their nature."^^ The element of force in St. Thomas' idea of law is tempered to a nicety. The law, for him, is primarily doctrinal and direc- tive, not disciplinary^ It represents a balance of good will in the community. It means the rationality of the majority against the unreasonableness of a minority.^^^ It should induce rather than coerce.^-^''' It should be a gradual rather than a sudden force,^^ and neither inhumanly rigid nor absolute. Charity often requires that the law itself be judged before judgment be passed according to the law.^^^ Finally, he does not consider its scope universal: it must not essay to abolish all vices, but only the more grevious, and especially those 153 Cf. Cicero, De RepuhHca, 1, 2 ; also Pro Cluentio, par. XLIII. i'>4 Summa TheoL, la 2ae, qu. XCVI, a. V, ad 1. loo Politics, VII, 3. 156 Summa TheoL, 2a 2ae, qu. XVI, a. II, ad 2. ir)7 Idem, la 2ae, qu. XCV, a. 1, ad 1. 158 la 2ae, qu. XCVI, a. II. ad 2. 159 De Dilectione Dei et Proximi, pars 2a, XI. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 31 which are of injury to others and without the prohibition of which human society could not be saved.^^ Accordingly, too, he believes that the law should limit itself to those virtues which are ad bonivm commune. Caesarism and socialism find no favor. The law is for the people, even as is the State. The convei*se cannot be tolerated, if liberty is to be sustained and psychology respected. Over and above its reasonablenes, the law" must redound to the general good. The State is instituted for the benefit of its members; it is by law and consequent order that this purpose is achieved. No ukase w^hich favors individuals or a class, to the detriment of others, is just.^^^ As all are represented by reason in the State, so all must profit by the reasonableness of the State's rulings. This great element in the doctrine of law, ad bonum commune, represents St. Thomas' distinct and democratic contribution to jurisprudence. Greek philosophy had considered law an impersonal conclusion of reason. The Romans saw in it either a conclusion of reason or a manifesta- tion of will. Aquinas conjoins it directly with the interests of the people and finds its chief reasonableness here. But the practical difficulty of the people meeting and ruling themselves, as did the demos of glorious but diminutive Athens,!^- must have appealed to St. Thomas. The different grades of human understanding too necessitated a difiFerent system. Though the natural law^ was equal for all, private inter- pretation of it would vary according to the acuteness and good will of different individuals. The best interpretation would, of course, be the one for embodiment in human law; and naturally this could be expected from the man or men whom the community placed before itself in leadership — their view being larger and their sympathy broader. Thomas, therefore, sees as a requirement of human law that it be administ-ered by those in charge of the community. A corollary of this teaching would be : accordingly as citizens become better quali- 1^0 gumma Theol., la 2ae, qu. XCVI, a II, ad 2. 161 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 1. Cf . Locke's Two Treatises, Bk. II, ch. XI, 134. 162 Aristotle believed that the State should be small; for, if it is large, "it will be very difficult to find a form of government for it." See his Politics, VII, 4. 'A2 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY fied, mentally and morally, to deal with the natural law, the need of rulers for that pui-pose would be less. In other words, as the people approach the ideal of equality in mental and moral superiority, the purer the resulting democracy can be.i^ This thought is vital in the Angelic Doctor's politics, that law must represent the best interests of the people and be ordained for the people either by the people or by those who represent the people.i^ And the closing line of that tiny masterpiece of an oration with which Lincoln comforted our sires, half a century ago, did not gleam with a spirit more democratic than this doctrine of a monk of the thirteenth century. Lastly, he teaches that law must be brought to the people whom it is to profit. It must be promulgated. As rational beings, they must see and know it before they can accept it. An assurance of its reasonableness seems to be acceptance by the people. If custom arises counter to it in the course of time, this is a proof at least of its inaptitude, at most of its injustice.^^^ St. Thomas' doctrine of law leaves no room for despotism or anarchy. He makes it at once potent and personal to all God's human creatures by associating it with the personal power of reason in each and tracing its justification to a per- sonal God. His is a unified concept of Law.^^^ The eternal law is the divine reason governing the universe; the natural law is a reflection, in the very nature of creatures, of the divine; positive law is man's interpretation and application of the natural ;i^'^ positive divine law is God's communication of principles of the eternal law to creatures by revelation, for the purpose of leading them to their supernatural end.^^ The 163 Com. Polit.. Lib. II, lec. 1. Cf. Laveleye, Le Gouvernement dans la Dcmocratie, t. I, p. 28. Anarchy? No. The Thomistic doctrine is always for government, but tends to the democratic form thereof. Dupont White calls attention to the fact that the activity of the State increases with the advance of civilization, whereas, in the primi- tive society, liberty is nearer to absolute. His work VIndividu et ri^tat, quoted by Laveleye, op. cit., pp. 28-29. l(H Feugeuray. Migne, Dictionnaire de Theologie Scholastique, II, p. 1415. i(i"> Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XCII, a. Ill, ad 2. 160 Ibidem. 167 la 2ae, qu. XCl, a. 3. 168 Cf. Dante's De Monarchic, III, 16. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 33 last is an illumination and guide to human reason and to human law, and of inestimable import to the reign of justice.^^^ By the nautral law God stoops a man; by human law man strives to God's justice ; by divine law God aids him. It is axiomatic with Saint Thomas that God is good and wills the good of His creatures. His eternal law is the height of love and justice. It is reasonableness itself. In a certain sense all law comes from Godj^*^^ and therefore the reason- ableness of obedience is richly manifest. Human enactments do not bind in conscience insofar as they are human. One man has no right to command another. If the mandates of mere men deserve respect, it is because and only insofar as they are derivations of the eternal law and hence refer to God to whom alone obedience is due.^'^ Men are not trees nor stones, and God does not treat them as such. Even the insensate things of creation participate in his eternal plan, but not in the rational way which is vouch- safed to men. Things are largely craven to the laws of mechan- ism; men, as rational beings, govern themselves. And thus St. Thomas posits the best justification for a democratic polity which can be conceived. God not only endows the individual with reason but per- fects that reason with the extra gift of grace,^'^^ ^^id thus ren- ders the race even more capable of self-government. Reason is the same for all human beings; and in this re- spect all men are equal, for all have reason. It is in the capa- city for development and exercise of this faculty that individuals manifest themselves as unequal. All men are wholly subject to the natural law ; in this respect, too, their equality is evident. King and slave alike must bow. Consequently, in St. Thomas' view, an assertion like that of Hobbes w^ould singularly lack point: ''Outside the State any man may be justly robbed and murdered by any other man ; within the State, by one only." This condition does not change w^hen the natural law is ex- 169 Summa Theol.. la, 2ae, qu. C, a. 1. 170 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 8: "Mens humana universalis boni cognosci- tiva est per intellectum, et desiderativa per voluntatem. Bonum autem universale non invenitur nisi in Deo." 171 Cf. M. H. Feugueray, op. cit., p. 1415. 172 Summa TheoL, la 2ae, qu. XCIV, a. 3. 34 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY pressed in the human positive law. If men are equal before the former, so must they be before the latter. Man's reason does not perfect the natural law ; it detects the perfection of it. And, then, it embodies these precious obser- vations in statements which are the substance of human law. Natural law gives us a bird's-eye view of the ethical field ; hu- man law attends to the details. Natural law offers general principles; human law, particular applications. Natural law demands that the rights of all be respected; human law de- fines the rights and enforces the respect. Natural law is, rela- tively to Grod's purpose, complete and perfect; human law is to be perfected in proportion to human advances in the under- standing of the natural law-^*^^ Men must not rely solely on the beliefs of their ancestors as to what is good and bad in law-making. The old must yield to the new, if the new is better.i'''^ Incidentally, here Christianity conferred an inestim- able benefit on the race. It brought a beacon of ethical light ; and laws, more humane and in harmony with reason, appeared. Human and natural law need a complement; for the end of life is not death. Man's lasting city lies beyond. A regu- lated existence here helps to fit him for his destiny ; but his destiny being above earth, a word from heaven is necessary. It comes in God's Scriptures. These are the message and test of justice, revealing the perfection of it and the supernatur- alization of it, and affording the highest motive and sanction for it. Human law must no more conflict with the divine law than the natural, for the natural is but the dimmer image of the divine. In case of apparent clash, human law dis- credits itself. It is manifestly erroneous in reason, since the Author of Reason can not be irrational in his rulings. Just as in the natural law men find their rights, and find them fortified by duties,!^^ so in the divine law do they discover them anew ; but here with a purpose and a sanction which renders them reasonable beyond expression. Men may err in their deductions nssumma Theoh, la 2ae, qu. XCVII, a. 3; et la 2ae, qu. CIV, a. 3. 174 Kuhlman, Der Gesetzeshegriff heim St. Thomas von Aquin im Lichte des Rechtsstudiums seiner Zeit. p. 180. Baumann, Die Staats- lehre des h. Thomas von Aquino, pp. 80-81. Com. Polit.. Lib. II, lec. 12. 175 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. V. ST. THOmaS' political DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 35 from the natural law; the divine law is infallible, and, there- fore, can ever readjust their thought to the good and true. Thus St. Thomas not only exalts reason in affairs of State, but points to reason's guide. Civic justice, then, is doubly assured,^'^^ and the truest foundation for democracy securely laid. A doctrine on laws which claims justice for all and explains how it may be secured, is both critical of wrong civic measures and constructive of right ones. It is democratic in scope and spirit ; it regards all in the interest of each and each in the interest of all. 3. — Source of Authority From Saint Thomas' concept of law, his idea on the source of authority is evident. All law, to be just, is modelled on the divine reason. If just, it is binding. Its authority is ultimate- ly from God-i^"^ The Angelic Doctor finds himself but echoing the teaching of St. Paul: that all power is from God.^"^^ It is hardly necessary to remark, however, that Aquinas does not mean that illegitimate power is also from God; for such does not partake of the character of authority at all. In his Com- mentary on the Epistle to the Romans, chapter XIII, he ex- presses himself succinctly: if considered in itself, power is from God; as to its possession, it is likewise from God, pro- vided it is acquired not by perversity, ambition, nor in any other unworthy way; and, finally, in its use, it must be godly and be wielded according to the principles of divine justice. He does not consider it the creation of any man or men. God, the Author of Justice, is the primary source of that by which 176 Kuhn, Die Problevie des Naturi^echts hei Thomas von Aquin, p. 32, 177 In the De Reg., L/ih. Ill, cap. I, we find proofs of this proposition, Scriptural and rational. Of the latter, the first is: "quia oportet omne ens ad ens primum reducere sicut ad principium omnis entis, ut et omne calidum ad calidum ignis " The second: "omnis ab uno procedit, et per unum menstruatur ' The third: "virtus est proportionata enti cuius est virtus, et adaequatur ei: quia virtus fluit ab essentia rei " The second chapter draws a proof from the axiom: "omne quod movetur ab alio movetur." The third, from the argument of finality, 178 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. XCVI, a. IV, ad 1, 36 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY justice may be enforced. This doctrine is pregnant with democracy; for St. Thomas' God, like St. Paul's, is no respecter of persons, but is equally the Author, Provider, and Father of All. But since it is natural for men to form civil society, they must have from the Lord of nature that which is required for its support. Civil authority is necessary in the State, just as is the soul in the body, the sun in the heavens, or God in the universe.i^ And whatever has parts constituting a whole, shows the marks of some one thing governing and another gov- erned; e. g., the intellect in man, or the father in a family. Without a guiding power, each member of society would seek gratification in his own way,^^^ and, as a result, the State would dissolve, or, at best, eke out a violent and unhappy existence.^^- Man indeed has a certain aptitude for virtue, but still he needs to be disciplined from his irrational inclination to the irration- al.^^ If perfected in virtue, man is the best of terrestrial beings ; if separated from discipline, he is the worst, for his very gift of reason enables him to devise the grossest depravities and a perverted will would have him execute them.^^ In regard to necessary rule, he is hardly self-sufficient,^^^ being prejudiced in his own favor and prone to seek his own interest at the expense of others. As it is reasonable that there be law, so is it reasonable that there be an authority to administer it. Law is the channel of political authority. God is the ultimate source. The important question arises: to whom does the Deity give the sovereign power? St. Thomas is interpreted by such 179 Cf. Taparelli, Naturel Droit, p. 138. 180 See De Reg.. Lib. I, cap 1. 181 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XCV, a. 1. 182 So necessary is power, to the Angelic Doctor's mind, that he teaches that dominum politicurn would have come into existence even in the state of innocence, though not dominum servile. Cf. Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XCVI, a. 4. 183 Cf. Dante's thought that, in spite of reason and grace, human passion would storm disastrously, were not men, like horses astray in their brutishness, held to the road by bit and rein. De Monarchia. Ill, 16. 184 Summa Theol, la 2ae, qu. XCV, a. 1. 185 Ibidem. 186 Le Pouvoir civil devant V ensignempnt catholique. pp. 3 et 4. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 37 authorities at Feret,^^^ Costa - Rosetti/^'^ and Vareilles - Som- mieres/^ as responding that it is given directly to the people who form society. This would be the Angelic Doctor's ob- vious answer; for, in his politics, men are ever esteemed as rational beings and all his thinking is relative to this fact. After endowing men with reason, God may not be conceived as ignoring His own gift to them by directly placing a power over them which would move them as so many puppets. We have seen that the Doctor taught principles from which logi- cally flowed the doctrine of social compact; also that laws are but the concrete statements of the findings of man's rational nature. If civil society comes from human consent as well as exigency, and laws spring from human reason, the indica- tion is that power, too, has a popular source. We have direct assertions of St. Thomas. He believes that, since authority is to be exercised for the people, it is of the people. The purpose is the people's ; so must be the power, because "to order to an end is the property of him whose end it is."^^^ The power behind laws is either in the people or in those who represent them.^^^ This question of the immediate conference of power to the people by God, again appears, as Cra- hay notes, in another question : can custom achieve the force of law? In his answer, St. Thomas distinguishes between a re- public and an absolute monarchy, a free state and a bound. In the former, the people largely reserve the power to their own body politic, as in our own country; in the latter they surrender it to their monarch. In the former case, a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance, than does the authority of the leader, who has not the power to frame laws except as the people decree. And even in the latter, a prevailing custom obtains force of law, insofar as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for the people: be- 187 Philosophia Moralis, pp. 603-605 188 Les principes fondamentaux du droit, p. 349: "Saint Thomas la (souver. du peuple) prof esse dans plusieurs passages." 189 E. g. : With regard to the dominion of princes over their subjects, he writes: "quod dominium introductum est de jure gentium, quod est jus humanum" (Summa, 2a 2ae, qu. XII, a. 2) 190 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu, XC, a. 3. 191 Ibidem. 38 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY cause by the very fact that they tolerate it, they seem to ap- prove.i^'- This does not mean, as Crahay seems to think, that St. Thomas holds nothing definite with regard to the popular seat of power.1^3 Aquinas could not but have much regard for the popular significance of custom. To the medieval mind, "law was primarily custom, legislative acts were not expres- sions of will, but recognitions or promulgations of that which was recognized as already binding upon men."^^* Thus custom largely ante-dated law, and law in large measure served but to perpetuate custom. This fact brings one very close to a popular and rational source. But Crahay concludes somewhat like Gierke.^^*"^ He sees in the Thomistic text merely the pronouncement that the people may have the civil power or not; hence he insinuates that power, according to the mind of St. Thomas, is not, neces- sarily, immediately in the people. But here the thought of the Angelic Doctor could be more accurately comprehended by an adversion to his more elementary political views. It is not only permitted, but it is necessary, to interpret his remarks in the light of his principles. In the veiy beginning of his De Regimine, he makes the democratic utterance which we have already noticed: that, since all men are equipped with reason by the Creator, each one, save for his social necessities, would be his own king. Hence men naturally are free and enjoy the power that freedom entails. Civil association would 192 Summa TheoL, la 2ae, qu. XCVII, a. Ill, ad 3. 193 La politique de saint Thomas d'Aquin, p. 49. l94Carlyle, His. of Med. Polit. Theory, Vol. Ill, p. 41. See also p. 45: "The first element In the conception of feudal law is that it is custom, that it is something not made by the king or even by the community, but something which is part of its life." 19.") Gierke holds that St. Thomas attributes sovereignty sometimes to the people and sometimes to the prince, regard being made to the different constitutions of different states. — Political TheoHes of Mid- dle Age. p. 151. De facto, this is so; there are democracies and there are monarchies. But the question here is not of this common-place fact, so much as of the causation and operation behind it. And the Thomistic thought seems to be that the People have power and can transfer it to rulers. In this idea, Aquinas would be at one with the Roman law: "Le loi romaine suppose que le peuple, vrai souverain, delegue son autorice h I'empereur par une sorte de pacte: Populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestntem conferat:' (Digest., lib. I, De Constitutionibus principum, tit. IV, Lugduni MDCIIII, p. 86). Montague, Origine de la societv, Revue Thomdste, VI, 1898. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 39 be irrational, if it demeaned them to the will of a superimposed monarch without any benefit of reference to their own. Since the State comes from the people and is not clamped down on them by God, the power in the State is the property of the organized people. They may exercise their freedom to transfer it to a sovereign in large or small measure ; but not wholly nor absolutely, for this course would appear irrational. The De Regimine tells us that sovereignty is to be limited. ''This limi- tation of all derivative sovereignty," observes Rahilly, "is ex- pressed in various ways by Catholic writers. The people retain authority in habitu or in radice; or they retain its possession and alienate only its exercise or use.^^"^ St. Thomas offers no explana- tion ; but it is enough for democracy, that he teaches an amena- bility of rulers to the ruled. On Thomistic ground, Spinoza's social contract by which the individual surrenders to the com- munity every right, except that of thinking, speaking, and writing freely could not be justified; much less Rousseau's magnificent and miserable sacrifice even of these; and least of all Hobbes' total and eternal extravagance. Though Aquinas does consider the case of a people who have subjected them- selves in perpetuo}^ and Suarez believes that the people, once power is transferred, may not revoke it at will. Both the Angelic Doctor and his Jesuit follower hold that the contract of the community (as a moral personality) with the rulership should be observed, even by future generations, unless its conditions be violated or the ruler abuse his office to the serious injury of the people.^oo The presumption is against change; wisdom reverences the past which mothered it. Aquinas and Suarez are not advocates of rash and unreasonable revolution ; 196 On Christian principle Aquinas could not regard as ethical such an alienation as Plautus describes (Amphitryon, Act I, Sc. I, v. 102, 103), and Grotius quotes (De Jure Belli et Pacis (tr.) Lib. II, ch. V. 31). "Themselves, and whate'er's divine and human. Their town, their Children, all is surrendered To the Thebans, and to their Discretion left." 197 Studies, Art. The Sovereignty of the People, March, 1921. 198 Cf. Vareilles-Semmieres, op. cit., p. 105. 199 De. Reg., Lib. I, cap. 6. 200 See Rickaby's Political and Moral Essays, p. 108, and Ryan's Catholic Doctrine on the Right of Self -Government, pp. 20-21. 40 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY and neither of them believes that the people have a right to be fickle in the weighty concerns of government ; nor do they hold, like Rousseau, that authority rests inalienably in the people. Suarez calls attention to custom, and so at least indi- cates an opinion that the present generation, by a tacit accept- ance of the polity, implicitly renew the contract of their for- bears and thus are not so much bound as they bind them- selves.201 This would be the Thomistic view, too; for the principles of Aquinas are clearly against any rigid artificialism in politics. But that the people have the power to transfer power is the more important point in democratic thought; and it follows from St. Thomas' teaching that they have. Which would be but a sequel to the Scholastic doctrine of civil contract.^*'- This does not mean, however, that he believed sovereignty to have existed in the individuals prior to their congregation in civil society. Suarez, of whom Bossuet aptly observes, "In him one sees the whole school," expresses the Scholastic position clearly, and cites St. Thomas and Cajetan, his commentator, as sponsors of it.^os He admits that since the State rises by popu- lar consent, it would seem that from popular consent comes the supreme power ;2^ but he maintains that, previously to politi- cal society, political power is non-existent, wholly or partially, in any individual or individuals.-^^ This declaration, of some- what anti-democratic sound, is really a boon to democracy; 201 De Legihus, Lib. Ill, cap. IV, 4. 202 For the Scholastic doctrine of contract, see Suarez, De legihus, Lib. Ill, cap. Ill, 6, et cap. IV, 2; Op. sex dier. Lib. V, cap. VII; Lib. Ill, cap. VIII; Defensio fidei. Lib. II, cap. II, 6, 7. Cf. Vareilles-Som- mieres, op. oit., pp. 106-113. Suarez holds that the contract is bi-lateral and does not exceed the intention of the people in making it: "Haec est veluti conventio quaedam inter communitatem et principem, et ideo potestas recepta non, excedit modum donationis vel conventionis" — De legibus. Ill, cap. IX, 4. He declares that this idea is not new and finds it implied in St. Thomas, and also in the Saint's commentators and adherents — Cajetan, Victoria, Soto and Molina. See Suarez and Democ, Alfred Rahilly, Studies, Mar., 1918, p. 13. Cathrein (Philosophia Moralis) admits that popular sovereignty was the doctrine of almost all the Schoolmen; A. J. Carlyle, too, regards its place important in medieval political thought. See Ryan, op. oit., p. 6. Zeiller, Art. Uorigine du pouvoir politique. Revue Thomiste, vol. XVIII. 203 Le legibus, Lib. Ill, cap. IV, 2. 204 Lib. Ill, cap. Ill, 1. 205 Ibidem. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 41 for it reveals the belief of the Schools that there are no born kings. Civil authority appears only with the appearance of civil society; and it comes from God immediately to the united people whose consent has given being to the State. Of themselves the people have nothing; by God they rise in glory. Power does not come from individuals; but coming to the corporate people from on high, it is regulated by the corporate consent, explicit or implicit, and so may be transferred in any rational degree to rulers. St. Thomas' text on custom, therefore, does not militate against the democratic idea of the immediate sovereignty of the people. The Angelic Doctor merely con- siders two cases: one in which the power has been transferred in somewhat Hobbish fashion; or one in which, rather Rous- seau-like, it has not.2<>6 Again, St. Thomas' teaching on the manner of dealing with a tyrant manifests the democracy of his doctrine on sovereignty. His De Regimine, in which his views are exposed, and which was written for the guidance of a king of Cyprus, is of sufficient force to shock autocracy and regal smugness. It would bran- dish an intellectual sword in the face of any ruler who mis- represents the empowering people, and seeks only his own interest. Aquinas, however, would not have the arch-malefactor arraigned by the private presumption of any citizen.-^" He evidently believes that, when sovereignty is woefully abused, it returns to its original source, the political body of the people, even if they have surrendered it in perpetuo; for the contract (quod ei pactum a subditis) is broken for the people, if the ruler infracts it for himself.-^ And so Aquinas teaches that by public authority (auctoritate publica) the reckless regent is to be met: a suggesstion that political authority is in the 206Rahilly, however, offers a different explanation: "This is what he (St. Thomas) calls 'a free people,' not in contrast to a people which has slavishly alienated all its power to an assembly, or a person (a type of government which he did not consider rational) but rather as distinguished from a sub-community, one of those largely autono- mous aggregations — duchy, fief, or town — which were commoner in the federalistic society of the middle ages than in these days of cen- tralized despotism." Studies, March, 1920; Art. The Democracy of St. Thomas. If this be the true meaning of the Saint's text, then the immediate sovereignty of the people is enhanced in his doctrine. 207 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 6. 208 Ibidem. 42 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY community and not in the individuals composing it. Punish- ment is the privilege of the whole people and not of any particular person; for power is of the whole people.-^'-^ Too, when St. Thomas mentions as a characteristic of tyranny, that the king rules his subjects in spite of them {De Reg. I, 1.), we have further indication of his profession of popular sover- eignty. St. Thomas uses the hypothetical expression, ''if it belongs to the right of a people to choose a king" (si vero ad jus multi- tudinis alicujus pertineat sibi providere de rege)2io in connec- tion with the justice of extreme procedure against a tyrant, out of reverence for the exceptional cases where, in Holy Writ, God intervenes and, by special agent, chooses the sovereign Himself, as exemplified in Saul and David. St. Thomas' politi- cal thought, of course, is never counter to Scripture. All his treatises are gemmed with appropriate quotations, which prove his deference and devotion. He considers also the case in which the people have yielded to some individual the right to provide them a king.^n Then to their representative they must have recourse, if the received ruler prove tyrannical. While consistently teaching political liberty, and implying popular sovereignty, Aquinas careful- ly avoids a doctrine of ready revolution and civic turmoil ; and so stems the tragic tide of abuses which scholars like St. Al- phonsus Liguori,^^^ see swelling from such a democratic con- cept. The reasonableness of casting aside a broken contract; the unreasonableness of any individual acting independently of the body politic against a ruler; the necessity of the moral personality of the community to act: these are the items in Thomistic doctrine which at once enfold equity and safety. Besides, Thomas is quite as earnest as Bossuet and Taparelli in counselling piety and patience in the face of the irremedi- able.213 Prudence, too, even when success promises, is his 209 Aquinas does not favor tyrannicide, but a more restrained re- sistance to the tyrannical regime. See De Reg. I, cap 6; and Summa, 2a 2ae, qu. XLII, a. 2, et LXIX, a. 4. 210 Z)e Reg., Lib. I, cap 6. 211 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 6. 212 St. Alphonsus, however, is an apostle of the sovereignty of the people. See his Theol. Moralis. de legihus. n. CIV, I.e. 213 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 6. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 43 prescription. If greater evils would likely follow from the overthrow of the despot than from the toleration of him, the latter were the better course.^i* Aquinas could not smile an approval on soviet Russia today. Crahay concedes a certain value to the thesis of the sov- ereign people in the Thomistic text already referred to: ^^or- dinare autem aliquid in bonum commune est vel totius mul- titudinis, vel alicujus gerentis vicem totius multitudinis" {Summa, 2a 2ae, qu. XC, a. III). In fact he considei^ this passage the only one in Aquinas' doctrine which is of impor- tance in this regard '■^^^ for herein either the people are author- ized to make laws, or he who represents them. But then this writer proceeds to criticize such an appreciation of the text and proffers the possibility that a conclusion from it as to the immediate power of the people may be too broad. He scrutinizes the expression, ^'gerentis vicem totius multitudinis,'' and, though seeing in it the meaning, "holding the place" (tenir la place) of the people, he does not gather the signifi- cance that the vicegerent of the community necessarily de- rives his power from the people.^i^ It would seem that he bears too heavily on this single text and does not consult the larger spirit of St. Thomas' political doctrine in the inter- pretation of it. For Aquinas, civil society is natural; and, under the force of this principle, all artificial constructions on his teachings are inadmissible. We have seen the glimmer 214 Idem, Lib. I, cap. 5. St. Thomas observes that, more often than not, it is bad men who undertake to slay the tyrant. And since such are opposed to a good monarch as well as to an evil one, the recognition of a right of private citizens to kill would be hazardous in the extreme. To lose a king need not mean to escape a tyrant. Dunning avers that "the anarchic character of the argument for tyrannicide has never been more clearly exposed, or its conclusions more concisely refuted, than by St, Thomas" — Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval, p. 20. Cf. Summa. 2a 2ae, qu. XLII, a. 1, ad 3. Happily in the Thomistic view, we find lacking the venom of Jean Petit, who held that a tyrant might be killed by anyone. The Council of Constans condemned this dangerous excess. See Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, Vol, III, p. 257. 215 Op. cit, p, 49. 216 Idem, p. 50: "Mais, pour tenir la place qu'occupe normalement la communaut^, pour exercer une fonction dont elle est incapable, dans une hypothese donnee, faut-il n^cessairement deriver ses pouvoirs de la communaute meme ? Cette deduction depasserait manifestement les premisses." 44 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY of social contract in his pages. We must accept a pari that, if God granted men the choice of forming the State, He hkewsie gave them to appoint their rulers. Else where would be His respect for that rational nature in men which is the image of His own? Suarez and Bellarmine saw this, and read the mind of Thomas accordingly. Moreover, if power were ever vested immediately by God in rulers, how could democracy be sufficiently justified? And yet, as will later appear, Aquin- as mentions democracy under the name of "politia," as one of the good forms of government. Finally, if popular sov- ereignty were foreign to his politics, how could he, consistent- ly, admit the right of revolt? If the people can take away power, the correlative notion is that they primarily have it and can give it.-^^ The theory of evolution has flung a cloud around the ques- tion of sovereignty as well as most others. From an agnostic view-point, it is hard to see a condition in primitive society so finely democratic as St. Thomas' opinion postulates. Man may originally have been as simian or as lupine, as Darwin or Hobbes might wish. From such a base beginning, the rise of the race to civic status could be logically explained only by the climbing of the few on the shoulders of the many; and sovereignty would be of him who could ascend rather than of him who deser\^ed. It would be natural for him to be head of the people who could be. Power would be identical with force. Might would be right. St. Thomas, however, regards man not as evolving into a rational animal, but as being such from the start. Incident- ally, up-to-date thought is inclined to reject Spencerianism for the havoc it has wrought with its assumptions in scientific fields; as witnesses, for example, Dr. Lowie's recent work on Primitive Society And the pendulum of opinion is swinging 217 Cf. Locke's teaching: "For all power given with trust for the attaining of an end being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed, the trust must necessarily be for- feited and the power devolve into the hands of those who gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security"— Ti^-o Treatises on Government. Bk. II, ch. XIII, 149. 218 See also Creation versus Evolution, by Philo Laos Mills, Wash- ington, 1920. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 45 back to the past. It is conceded as possible that man may have been man from the early morning of the race, and rational man at that. If so, a rational theory of the State and itc3 elements, such as St. Thomas propounds, is of valid appeal. Not only of the ideal State, but also of the primitive. Aquinas, politically, reasoned on the basis of the best that was in man ; evolutionists tended to be impressed with the w^orst. With justice, present-day writers are reverting, though unconscious- ly perhaps, to a Scholastic starting-point in political investi- gation and estimation. There are four ways of considering sovereignty; the evolu- tionistic explanation by force j^^^ the theistic, in which God gives power directly to rulers, conformably to the seeming convictions of Dante, the majestic dreamer ,220 and the auto- cratic sovereigns of modernity; the popular, in which it is given immediately to the people and thence, by the people, to rulers; the theistic-popular, in which the people appoint their rulers and God empowers them. The first would be more plausable in an atheistic or deistic world; also if the memory of Charles Darwin were as green as at the close of the nineteenth century and the name of Herbert Spencer were still so unmistakably one with which to conjure. The second is untenable, as the soul of St. Thomas' doctrine implies, and as Suarez,22i and Bellarmine, in tones reverberating down to our own day and hour, testify. The fourth is a compromise between the second and the third, and seems a strange attempt both to grant the people something and take it away. If they have only the power to point a helpless finger in the direction of the individuals of their choice, their might is scarcely worth mentioning. It is really incredible that the Absolute should be bound by the beck of a finger ; and nothing could have been farther than this idea from the mind of St. Thomas, who be- 219 We find in Woodrow Wilson's The State, this view: "The essential characteristic of all government, whatever its form, is force. There must in every instance be, on the one hand, governors, and, on the other hand, those who are governed. And the authority of governors, directly or indirectly, rests in all cases ultimately on force. Govern- ment in its last analysis is organized force," p. 593. 220 De Monarchia, III. 221 Cf. Suarez and Democracy, Rahilly, Studies, March, 1918. 46 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY held man as the fellow of God's knowledge and providence by intellect and will, and consequently a powerful creature of personal responsibility. Aquinas saw the State potential in human nature ; there is no compelling reason to beheve that he did not view authority as potential in the State — it not being God's way with the world to make positive institutions or do- nations, as Suarez would say, distinct from the production of human nature. The third concept, by 'itself, appears to be the best explanation and the one which Aquinas prefers. 4. — Title to Authority More light on the views of St. Thomas regarding this signifi- cant question of sovereignty is shed in his teaching on the title to power. Briefly, he holds that a supereminence of worth is a man's recommendation to office.^^^ He shares the common- sense view of Aristotle : the best flute is not to be given to those who are of the best family, for they will never play the better for that; but the best instrument should go to the best artist (Politics, III, 12). It is not a man's merit that gives him authority, however; it is the office to which his merit fits him and the people rationally raise him. And the people, having created the State, also create the positions in it. We cannot find Aquinas submitting that virtue automatically makes a man a sovereign.223 With the phenomenon of self-regard so univer- sally present, society would have almost as many monarchs as members; and St. Thomas, psychologist as he is, could counte- nance no theory which would lead to the fatuous.^^* Nullus in eadem causa est actor, et judex (Summa Theol., Sup., LXII, a. 3). He must have meant that the worth of a man signals him out to the community as a fitting repository for power. In- deed, fitness for rule gives a certain right to rule. For it is but reasonable that the community should want the right man and 222 Com. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 10. Cf. also Aristotle's Politics, I, 2. 223 In fact St. Thomas refers to the virtuous as lacking a just power (Com. Pol., Dib. V, cap. I). If they have not the power, it is because the community has not conceded it to them. 224 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 7. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 47 that the right man should have a right to be wanted.^^^ And so St. Thomas says in his Commentary on Aristotle's Politics that indisputable captains of the people who do not come forth in a crisis to steer the ship of State, are guilty of sin.^-^ They owe it to themselves to devote their gifts to the common cause.^^^ The people could not, with reason, refuse to have the best at the helm ; and the common good, always the lode-star of St. Thomas' political thought, demands it.^^s The judgment is current in these opinions of Aquinas that the investiture of power in the rulers by the people may be either expressed or implied. An ignorant community would transfer authority with little or no thought and less formality, time confirming the transaction, and their own will in the matter becoming ever vaguer. One intellectually awakened would be less prodigal of concession; like the Italian cities of the Doctor's own day. Applying the touch-stone of his politics, reasonableness, we find that the more advanced a community becomes in mentality and morality, the less need it has of extravagantly empowered sovereigns. And in proportion as this necessity recedes, the democratic form of government may commendably appear.229 The spirit of democracy is always present in St. Thomas' political ideals; but on the exigencies and advantages of the State, and therefore of the people who form it, depends the outward form of its expression. Aquinas makes this important emendation to his doctrine on the sovereignty of the people. Since the State is conceived in reason, and must therefore live through reason, the people constituting it must be the kind to hearken to the voice of reas- on and therefore to that of virtue. The implication is that God withholds power in a community in which spiritual and social chaos thrive. The State must first be formed and put in order before it can become authoritative. A people absolutely 225 Lib. V, lec. 1. 226 Ibidem. 227 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XCVI, a. IV, ad 2. 228 Aquinas notices that excellence and fitness are not always so manifest as they should be and that the people may badly deceive themselves in their choice. Com. PoUt., Lib. II, lec. 4. So he would not have the worthy and efficient hesitant in coming forward with their gifts to the State. ^9 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 8. 48 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY beyond the pale of rational and political purposes and ideals, are not sovereign. But this is mostly a hypothetical case ; for such folk would not have instituted a civil society in the first place. St. Thomas clearly expresses the condition, "if they come into one" (si in unum conveniant).-^^ If the State is an organization which seeks the well-being of its members in an orderly way, it would have no appeal to the brutish among men ; and, even if it did, it would reform them.^si As for the ordinary community in which reason and prudence predominate, even though individuals may be weighed and sometimes found wanting, authority has only been present in it, but could and perhaps should be excused more directly by it, rather than absolutely through a few men of integrity 5. — Election Aquinas approves the system of election, but with reserva- tions. He warns that the public trust must not be betrayed for pecuniary profit. He recognizes the temptations which lurk in civil station. And so he believes that a poor man would be at a decided ethical disadvantage in office, and con- sequently would have a right to waive aside any preferments. One who inclines to lucre and declines from virtue, to any degree, cannot be the ideal statesman. But the De Regimine asserts that neither w^ealth nor poverty can form an absolute impediment, and that a man's personal worth is what really counts.233 The doctrine of election well show^s the democracy of Thomis- tic politics. But the Doctor does not blind himself to the desira- bility of a certain aristocracy of intellect and virtue. He re- 230 Ibidem. 231 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 9: "et manifestum est quod istam (multi- tudinem bestialem) non expediate domanari aliquo modo, quia sine- ratione est conjunctim et divisim." Cf. Ryan's Catholic Doctrine on the Right of Self -Government, p. 16. There the general principle is stated: that uncivilized and perhaps partially civilized peoples some- times lack the moral right of self-government. 232 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 9. Summa TheoL, la 2ae, qu. XCVII, a. 1. 233 De Reg., Lib. IV, cap. 20. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 49 quires that the best should be the civil servants of the people.^^* And what though he demands a mental standard,-^^ in those who are permitted to choose the fittest? Lecky and a hundred other modern writers on democracy and liberty will echo him in that.236 The significant fact is that he recognizes the relation between power and the body politic, between the governed and the governors; and so does his share to pave the way for later medieval and modern political reform.^s^ Aristotle favored election as opposed to heredity, in that the latter system often placed unworthy princes over the people, and hereditary rulers leaned to excess, forgetful of the public good because independent of public opinion. But Aquinas is not expressly against heredity. The white gleam of King Louis' saintly reign perhaps gave him pause. Maybe, too, his was a prudent as well as a sentimental abstinence from final judg- ment. Rulers of his time were hereditary, and his De Regimine was written for such a regent. That Aegidius, his disciple, plainly held heredity preferable to election, hardly determines the mind of Aquinas in the matter. The texts in favor of popular participation in governmental affairs show that the Doc- tor was of the opposite opinion. He words his tenets with care. He is no bearer of revolutionary banners. Of course, we miss in his dispensation the loud notes which later apostles of popular rights sound. But he wields principles, instead of a sword. He is more a scholar than a reformer. 234 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 5. 235 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, cap 9. 236 See Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, Vol. I, pp. 90-92. 237 He writes in his Commentary, Lib. Ill, lec. 9, that the people should retain their power "saltern quantum ad consiliativum et judica- tivum." He also observes the dangers that lie in a State where popular participation in government is wanting; "Si multitude nulla modo par- tieipat principatu, sequentur multa mala, sicut seditio et turbatio in civitate." Ibidem. 50 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 6. — Miscellaneous Confirmations of St. Thomas' Belief IN Popular Sovereignty The impression one derives from his works, Crahay avers, is that he did not probe ex professo the origin of power. But truly in various subtle and sometimes frank ways, he indicates the penultimate source. In his sentences, the word ''people" precedes the term for rulers ; and his maintenance is strong that no private person is authoritative in government; that the most that individual influence can be, is admonitory ; and that coercive power resides only in the people or their representative. Nor does he consider this pubhc vicegerent self-appointed. He speaks of the public office as being committed to rulers; thus revealing his idea of the corporate people as yielding power to regents. To use his own similitude: as a patient surrenders the care of his body to his physician, in such wise has the state-appointed sovereign control of the community. Through it, he governs it, for it.^^s As an, added indication of St. Thomas' belief in popular sovereignty, his close accord with Aristotle is important. The stand of the Philosopher on this question of power appears in Dunning's observation: "But above the officer he (Aris- totle) insists must be the impersonal factors in the constitution — namely, public opinion and customary law."^^^ Too, the Macedonian holds that the court of final appeal in state affairs (hence, it would seem, the source of primal power) is the people. He rejects the opinion that the few rather than the many are the logical sovereigns in the sense that they can serve better judgment in cases of election and censure of officials. Plainly he thinks "the verdict of the general public is valid in politics just as in musical contests and in banquets; not the musician and cook, but they who hear the music and eat the dinner are best qualified to render judgment."-*^ Under such a praeceptor, the mind of Aquinas would naturally take a democratic mould. 238 Summa Theol, la 2ae, qu. XC, a. Ill, ad 2. 239 His. of Political Theories. Vol. I, p. 95. 240 Idem, p. 70, also Com. Polit., Dib. Ill, lec. 9. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 51 Again, the figures of speech which Aquinas uses in his De Regimine,^"^^ to describe the necessary presence of power in the State, and which we have already noticed, suggest that he pictured authority, primarily, as diffused in the body politic. His use of the soul as a comparison is especially interesting; inasmuch as he considers the soul present in the whole body. God is in the whole universe. The light of the sun is in the whole visible heavens. May we not then judge, in the spirit of St. Thomas' rhetoric, that power is in the whole people? The idea is still further warranted by the fact that he holds the people responsible for governmental excesses;-^ which would hardly be, unless he were convinced that power were primarily invested in them. Impressively he declares that the leaders act by the authority and choice of the people. Most assuring, too, is the interpretation which Cajetan, the distinguished and best commentator on the Summa, makes on this point. He finds Aquinas teaching that the people them- selves are the primary power and either seek the common weal themselves or commit it to the care of others. Otherwise, he proceeds to explain, the ruler of the people would not be a prince but a tyrant.243 And Rahilly places the popular sovereignty in St. Thomas" doctrine beyond cavil; for, resorting to thirty commentators, he convincingly finds that all hold the same view as Cajetan.^^ Too, Cajetan's observations on the subject, "Utrum regnativa debeat poni species prudentiae"( Summa TheoL, 2a 2ae, qu. L, a. 1) are of finely popular import; he sees in the thought of Aquinas that a royal regime depends on the election of the people and that the power of the com- munity is transferred to the favored one in such a way that the appointed ruler is merely the representative of the people ( vices popuU)?"^^ The roster of believers and teachers of popular sovereignty among the later Scholastics is long and glittering. Locke's glory must pale before a realization that his central doctrine was well propounded and preached long before he 241 Lib. I, cap. 1. 242 Quodliheta, XII, a. XXIII, ad 1. 243 Com. la 2ae, qu. XC, a. 3. Leonine Ed., VII, 151. 244 Studies, March, 1921. Art. — The Democracy of St. Thomas. 245 Leonine Ed. VIII, 375. 52 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY wrote, and was sounding all the time he was writing. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rang with learned voices. (Consult Costa-Rosetti, Philosophia 31 oralis, pp. 607-609.) 7. — Later Doctrines That these democratic ideas were of Thomistic origin is again suggested by the fact that they grew with the spread of his political doctrine. At the end of the thirteenth century (1297), scarcely more than two decades after St. Thomas' death, we find the "Model Parliament" in England. The fourteenth century, signallized with the energetic struggle between eccles- iastical and secular powers (Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair, John XXII and Lewis of Barvaria), brought his principles to the keenest test. We find Enghelbert,-^^ Abbot of Admont, writing somewhat in the tone of Aquinas, between 1307 and 1310; and also Durandus (1333). Then the unmitigatedly democratic Marsiglius of Padua, whose politics did their full share to enliven the time, may have drawn some inspiration for his sounder thoughts from Thomas, despite their antipodal separation on several points of doctrine. In his Defensor Pacis he leans heavly on Aristotle.^*^ And we cannot forget that it was Aquinas who made the great Greek a force in the age and through whom the Philosopher's democracy passed on unadul- terated, indeed enhanced. AVilliam of Ockam, in the fifteenth century, appears in political relation to the Angelic Doctor and to Aegidius Ro- manus, the Saint's faithful disciple. John Gerson (1429), John Major, and Peter Alliacensis (1425) likewise present themselves.248 And their doctrines, disengaged from the ecclesi- astical setting, were of the highest importance to the destiny of 246 His work is entitled De ortu et fine Romani imperii, Goldast, Politica Imperialis, Francfort, 1614. 247 See Dunning, Political Theories, Vol. I, p. 239. Also, Zeiller, Uidee de Vctat dans St. Thomas d'Aquin, pp. 179-180. 248 Costa-Rosetti, op. cit., p. 605. Rahilly, indeed, has personally and at first hand verified the doctrine ot popular sovereignty in the writings of no less than sixty Scholastic predecessors of Suarez. See Studies, Art. The Sovereignty of the People. March, 1921. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 53 modern political philosophy. They perpetuated the popular note which Aquinas trumpeted, amplified it, and made it vibrate into the dawn of the new era. And when in the six- teenth century we behold, for example, the Catholic League in Paris, resisting Henry IV, and anticipating many of the fea- tures of the French Revolution of 1789, we realize to w^hat a degree democracy had leavened the mass mind.^^^ The message of these early champions of the people is a sort of microscope, which, applied to the politics of Aquinas, reveals the potential- ities of his principles. The merits of their teaching may be called his; the exaggerations and misapplications are their ow^n. For it must be freely acknowledged that he was calm and careful in his political enunciations. These qualities pre- vented any untoward statements with regard to the glorification of the populace. His was a time when the firm hand of leader- ship was most necessary in every state. Emerging and stum- bling from darkness into light, the people of the thirteenth century would have been sore afflicted, had Aquinas happened to be a Voltaire or a Rousseau. It were much better at that point of European story that the terms of the civil contract be more severe than a modern democratic sense would approve. And Aquinas, seeing the excesses to w^hich medieval democracy was prone, restrained himself from a too frank statement of the popular opinions which he so plainly implies. Or, again, it may be that Thomas was impressed with a truth which AVoodrow Wilson expresses: "Authority was not independent of the consent of those over whom it was exercised ; and yet it was not formulated by that consent. Consent may be said to have been involuntary, inbred. It was born of the habit of the race. It was congenital. "^'^^^ There can be no doubt that Aquinas held that it was as natural for mankind to have leaders as to have the State; but if the State has its life from the natural consent of the people, so have the rulers their political place and all that goes with it therefrom. The crux is that consent is so natural that it may often have the com- plexion of compulsion. And this in part accounts for the many 249 Art. — The Guild State, by G. R. S. Taylor, in the Nineteenth Century. 250 The State, p. 595. 54 ST. THO^EAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY clouded views on the subject of sovereignty and the primacy of the people. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, shocked with the spectacle of revolution which brought the age of the Encyclo- pedists to a tragic end, witnessed a certain reaction against the Thomistic-Suarezian tidings of popular sovereignty. Distorted and abused by Rousseau, it had served for woe as well as for weal. Yet, in its original Scholastic character, it w^as as stimu- lating as noble, and as safe as an incorrect conception of it was dangerous. In the clearer atmosphere of our own day, this appears; and we are in a position mildly to criticize the methods by which ferv^ent but fearful thinkers, even up to the close of the last century, have sought to minimize the multitude. De Maistre and de Bonald behold God as determining the subject of power by directing both history and the human will.2^1 Which would be an ill answer to the question, why has the Deity endowed people wdth intellects and wills of their OTO? And, on the other hand, to attribute a Caligula or a Nero to the direct operation of God would be beyond the bounds of reason and reverence; but such a course seems unavoidable with such a premise. It is meet to charge up the mistakes of history to humanity; and that the people are permitted to choose badly, or to tolerate unwisely, is at least an evidence that they have the power of choosing and of tolerating. Having that, how could they have lacked authority? No one gave more humble cognizance to the pervasion of God's influence in the universe than he who was called ^'no less the most learned among the saints than the most saintly among the learned." Yet the tenor of the politics of Aquinas is quite apart from these Maistre and Bonald convictions. Taparelli, like St. Thomas, considers ability and fitness (vir- tus) the title to power. Even though requiring that the people accord their consent, however, he denies that they have the primal power.252 Since he goes so far, one cannot but see and wish that with a mere touch from the De Legibus of the illus- 251 See Crahay, op. cit., p. 62, and Vareilles-Sommi§res, op. cit., pp. 407-418. 252 See Vareilles-Sommieres, op. cit., pp. 433-439; and Macksey, Sov- ereignty and Consent, p. 26. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 55 trious Jesuit opponent of King James, or the Suiinn a of Aquin- as, he might go a bit further. Since it was easy for a monk of the thirteenth century to be so democratic, even in Italy, it ought not to have been too difficult for a keen scholar of the nineteenth, expressing Catholic thought, to be at least equally so, and to distinguish more clearly between the merit and the abuse of popular theory. M. de Vareilles-Sommieres teaches that political power does not come from the people, because no individual originally is invested with it, and hence it is the category of res nulliusr''^ But what belongs to no one, can be justly possessed by anyone who finds and takes it. Power then goes naturally to him who is superior in force, aptitude, or merit ; for he is the one to meet and keep it. The defect in this thesis seems to be that power, expressly according to Suarez and implicitly according to St. Thomas, is not res nullius?^ It is the property of the community. Varielles-Sommieres may regard the proposition ultra that the multitude could possibly command and obey itself, as a primary tenure of power would entail. He merely proposes a fact and a necessity which St. Thomas recognized: that authori- ty is alienable. ^"^'^ Furthermore, the people formed civil society not to obey themselves but the commands of reason ; in other words, to lead a more rational and hence more profitable exist- ence. Thus the Scholastic concept gives to authority "a local habitation and a name:" while Vareilles-Sommieres imagines it as a vague something floating aimlessly about somewhere 25.3 Op. cit., p. 210. 254 With regard to possession, St. Thomas holds that the community is prime {jus naturale) ; the right of private possession is conditioned by reason and enactment (secundum humanum condictum) , and is therefore jus positivum. (Summa, 2a 2ae, qu. LXVI, a. II, ad 1). Here he is speaking of property; but his idea would apparently be likewise in the case of power. 255 Burri, La Teorie politche di San Tommaso. p. 51. One gathers from the De Reg., Lib. Ill, cap 4, that this alienation is less necessary according as three virtues are present throughout the State: love of country, zeal for justice, and warmth of civil benevolence. The writer claims that these "meruerunt dominium." We have but to refer back to the observation of both Aristotle and Aquinas that there are more of such virtues in the many than in the few or in the individual; and so can we clearly see the natural seat of power. 56 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY somehow. Of these two views, it is easy to judge which is the more natural and the more acceptable to a rational doctrine of State. The contrast of Aquinas with modern thinkers, therefore, is apt to disclose strikingly the quality and quantity of his democ- racy. More justification for modern political programs may be found in his writings than in many a nineteenth-century tome. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 57 CHAPTER III THE PEOPLE 1. — Meaning of the Word with Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Moderns Now that we have traced power to its primary source in the doctrine of St Thomas, it is of interest to ascertain what and whom be understood by "the people." First one should gaze into the mind of his Master, x^ristotle identifies the People with the citizenry and characterizes a citizen as one who has some share in the government. -^^ Children, criminals, and slaves are not in this category. They are wanting in qualifica- tion, mental or moral, for the necessary participation in affairs of State. Sojourners, too, are barred ; for their contribution to the communit}^ is incomplete. The aged are beyond politics, being past service. Women are not mentioned ; possibly because the Philosopher is impressed with a line from Sophocles which he sees fit to quote : "Silence is a woman's ornament. "^^"'^ In the Grecian democracy, where the individual's tongue was as essen- tial as his brain, a member of the gentle sex, if silent, would be unserviceable, and, if natural, would be shocking. In his definition of a citizen, Aristotle, despite his narrow use of the word, has a democracy in mind, and says so. One could not carp at his exclusion of boys, degenerates, and helots from citizenship ; resentment, however, may be stirred by his expressed attitude against old men and his implied political suppression of all women ; and resentment can become irritation in the modern mind when, almost with the same breath in which his! proclamation of democracy sounds, he calmly questions the inclusion of mechanics as citizens. For him, these were what the great industrial and self-supporting class are for us. He mentions without criticism and, it seems, with commendation, 256 Politics, III, 1. Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 4 257 Politics, I, 13. 58 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY a law at Thebes, whereby no one might share in the government before having retired from gainful labor for ten years.^^ He observes that in the best states, laborers are political nonentities. So that; democratic as he was, it is patent that his democracy was rather a puffed aristocracy. His concession that trades- men may be admitted to civil rights in a polity, especially if they become rich, is large.^^^ Still, justice to the Philosopher requires an appreciation of the reasons for his restrictions. He saw citizenship as more than a name. It necessitated a personal and active service in the Athenian common-wealth, where every^ member of the demos had a voice and used it. It demanded much more from its pos- sessor than does modern citizenship in our mammoth democra- cies which the boldest Hellenic fancy would not have bodied forth and which representative government has brought. Edu- cation, in Aristotle's day, belonged only to the upper class; and, reasonably enough, he regarded only the educated fit to rule. Though a Macedonian, he apparently fostered the average Athenian's horror of hoi barbaroi and the ignorance which symbolized them. His Greek education would have been in vain, had not exclusiveness entered his concept of democracy. But he is impatient, nevertheless, as artificial standards of citizenship, and both disproves and discards the Attic idea of a citizen as a person who has at least one parent a citizen. If he exalts wealth as a requirement, it is not because of riches in themselves but by reason of the culture and leisure which they can secure and assure. Aquinas is influenced by whatever merit these opinions of the Philosopher manifest, but he appears proof against the note of excess in them. A Christian and saint, he founds his concep- tion of the people not on citizenry but on the divinely human value of man's nature, and, secondly, on the general purpose of the State. Civil society is the creation of reason with which every man is endowed. And it exists solely for the common good in which each individual has some part. These tw^o prin- 258 Politics, III, 5. 2")9 III, 5. But he also expresses a doubt with regard to the mono- polization of citizenship by the rich. Com. Polit., Lib. III. lec. 1. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 59 ciples, of democratic sound and soul, reveal that the People are all those who constitute a state and live under its laws, ir- respectively of their direct share in the government of it or not. And St. Thomas identifies the constituents of a state with those who aid each other in the right living for the attainment of which civil society exists f^'^ those who are served by the state and who conserve its existence. We do not find him drawing cir- circles around cla^jses, like Aristotle. No doubt he believed, with the Philosopher, that activity in governmental concerns was the mark of citizenship ; but such citizenship, to his mind, was the active sort. He sees also a passive variety, which Aris- totle, apparently, did not wholly grasp.^^- All who form a state are represented in it by the reasonablenes which reigns in it; in this sense all, as rational beings, share in the polity, and all are citizens. Aquinas does not look to Greece for his image of the People. Christianity drew his glance in an oriental direction. Too, his Latin sensibilities quivered at a civil prospect in which the sword of slavery sliced the population in two, never to be joined; where the voice of work-men affected the sway of politics no more than the surge of the Aegean on the sands of Piraeus; where a few fortunate families had risen to the top, rich with the very substance of all below. St. Thomas was by no means hostile to aristocracy, when, as the best of the people, is sought the best for the people. But an aristocracy passing for a demorcracy, yet lashing slaves up to the construction of the glittering Acropolis in record time, and ignoring the rights of the industrial-power of the state, save to press it the more, could not find favor in the scholar's head nor the saint's heart. Here was a situation quite opposed to his ideal of the common good. Consistently with his political premises and his psycho- 200 Summa. Theol., la, qu. XXI, a. 1, ad 2: "Populus enim est multi- tudo hominum sub aliquo ordine comprehensorum." Vide la 2ae, qu. CV, a. 2; 2a 2ae, qu. XLII, a. 2; la 2ae, qu. CV, a. 3, ad 2. 261 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 14. True he adds, "Si enim propter solum vivere homines convenirent, animalia et servi essent pars aliqua con- gregationis civilis." But this merely means that he does not consider slaves an active part of the polity. Their share in the State is indirect, and so their political standing is negligible. 262 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 1. De Regimine., Lib. I, cap. 14. 60 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY logy, Aquinas turned his eyes reverently to the Hebrews. In the story of these chosen ones, he found his democratic dream more fairly realized.-^'^ Israel knew no aristocracy of race. All her sons were equal in their descent from their father Abraham ; just as all Christians were one in their splendid origin from Him of AVhom x\braham was only a meek and weak type. All her children were of the same blood ; and St. Thomas thrilled that all mankind were unified in the impartial blood of the Redeem- er. Each Israelite had his share in the land, and so was assured of the life-necessities which Aquinas demanded for every member of the State. With the Hebrews, labor was not con- temned as in proud Hellas. By the rule of Thebes, no Jew would ever have attained citizenship ; for all vrorked. In his selection of Israel for his political model, the demo- cracy of St. Thomas' idea of the People is placed above a doubt. When he mentions the People, as Feugueray notes, he means the he has in thought only a portion of the People. Aquinas en- true people.-^-* When Aristotle, on the other hand, thus speaks, dows the term with a new and potent significance in political philosophy. This is the direct result of his Christian valuation of the individual. "A fugitive glance at Medieval Doctrine," says Gierke, ''suffices to perceive how throughout it all, in sharp contrast to the theories of Antiquity, runs the thought of the absolute and imperishable value of the Individual...."265 Too, one recalls Hegel's assertion, in his Philosophy of Mind, that "according to Christianity, the individual, as such, has an in- finite value as the object and aim of divine law." St. Thomas, no more than his times, could forget ''the least of these" with whom the God-Man identified Himself; and this, perhaps, is the best explanation and proof of his democratic appraisal of the People, whom he refuses grossly to regard as a monster with countless heads, to whom Burke would "never consent to throw 263 Cf. M. H. Feug-aeray — Migne, Encyclopedic Theologique. Ill, Serie 22, t. II, p. 1414. (The Jews indeed admitted slavery, but only the hu- mane form.) 264 Idem. St. Thomas uses the word "populus" to include both rulers and subjects, as well as in the restrictive sense. Cf. Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. CIV, a. 4. 2(>o Political Theories of Middle Age, p. 82. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 61 any living sentient creature whatsoever, no not so much as a kitHng, to torment." We are not surjorised to find his thought expressing itself in his Commentary on Aristotle's Politics, where he emphasizes rather the potential than the actual participation in government as the mark of citizenship. Even Aristotle concedes a cer- tain citizenship to those whom he excludes from it,267 by recog- nizing their civil potentiality ; which, after all, indicates at least an elementry democracy of the pure type. This w^as something for the Angelic Doctor to grasp and weave into a broader con- cept. It is the Philosopher's definition of a citizen, rather than his idea, which is fatal to a full appreciation of the People. If participation in civil concerns were the essence of citizenship, then, in a monarchy, citizens, theoretically, would be either reduced to a minimum or annihilated as a class, and the ''people" wwld be only a poltical fiction. St. Thomas, on the contrary, safeguards the People just as well in a monarchy as in a democracy ; his basis of estimation being different. Aristotle places the characteristic of the ''people" in an accident — the tenure of civic station or the eligibility to it ; Aquinas finds it in human dignity and prerogative. This difference in views meant much to the course of political science. Under the old Aristotelian idea, the democratic spirit was too cramped for a healthy growth; in the new broad- mindedness, the final triumph of democracy became certain.^^s In its catholicity and sympathy, St. Thomas' idea of the People, when compared with modern notions, appears even more democratic than when juxtaposed to Aristotle's. In the English world, it seems, the word "people" has always preserved much of the nobility with which writers like Aquinas gifted it ; but, as 266 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 1. 2(57 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 4. 268 The word "people" is a generalization of "person." The charac- teristics of person are: 1) unity and 2 ) rationality. Cf. Philippe Bor- rell. Revue de PhilosopMe, XII, p. 114. St. Thomas fully recognizes these notes of unity and rationality in the body politic. So that his concept of the people appears perfect. He never forgets the indivi- dual and his rights; and so he anticipates that political development v,'hich Dunning calls distinctly English: the closer definition of people in terms of the individuals composing the aggregate, and a more precise ascription of rights to each. Cf. Political Theories, Vol. II, p. 220. 62 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY ^^^th Aristotle, its scope was narrowed. With the British, how- ever, it served to express the lower and the middle class ; while to the Stagirite, it signified the upper.^eo To St. Thomas, it included all. In the continental countries, the term was dragged in political mire, and became a thing of horror and reproach. It was the power that pierced the arteries of France in 1789. Napoleon, identifying himself with the People, vaunted: "Je suis moi-meme sort! de la canaille." It meant for distraught Europe what the ochlo-s (rabble), in contradistinction to demos, meant to the Greeks. The German volk and nation were as approbrious as the French canaille and peuple?'^^ And a cer- tain centempt for the Russian bolsheviki is one of today's many commonplaces. It will be seen that St. Thomas' concept of the People approaches that which has come to be formed in America. 2. — Equality and Inequality ; Order Aquinas teaches unequivocally that men are equal in na- ture.2''i But he does not mean thereby that civil society is to be conceived as a dead level.-^^ jj^ refers to the metaphysical notes in the essence of humanity : animality and rationality. These are alike for all, and are the nature of all. But physically, the fact is different. Men are the products not only of nature, but of long series of circumstances.^^^ The race is a unit and hence a sort of channel for all the helps and harms of the past. Just as equality obtains in the ideal order, so is inequality a fact in the 269 still the Philosopher was not so partial, doctrinally, as he may seem Cf. Acton, op. cit., p. 72: "he (Aristotle) would admit even the poorer citizens to office and pay them for the discharge of the public duties." Not as a right, however, so much as an expedience. 270 Cf. Civil Liberty and Self -Government, by Francis Lieber, pp. 346- 347. We may neglect such caustic characterizations of the People as, for example, Mr. Heir.zen's: "The real peple is in America, as well as in Europe, little more than a voting and paying machine" — What is real democracy? — p. 62 2712 Sent., d. 6, qu. I, a. 4, ad 5. 272 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 1: "si tollatur dissimulitudo civium non erit civitas." Which is equivalent to Jean Bodin's assertion that there never was even a democratic polity in which the citizens were quite equal (De Repuhlica I, 6). 273 Cf. Montesquieu, De VEsprit des Lois, VIII, 3. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 63 ralm of reality. Different degrees of physical and psychical favors in the people are too evident to require much emphasis ; although modem political theories, with more heat than light, too often ignore the obvious. St. Thomas never forgets the two facts, equality and inequality ; and his politics presents as near an articulation of the conclusions accruing from each, as does his harmonization of liberty and law. Leaders there are and must be. The State demands themj^"** and individual inequalities supply them. Those who are best fitted to work should work; just as those who are best fitted to rule should rule,-'^^ which is indeed a higher but also a harder kind of work, especially in the face of St. Thomas' dem- ocratic demand that self-interest be suppressed and the common good solely sought.-^^ The briefest consideration reveals that the plan of things does not run on a plane surface. In harmony, there is ever a tonal dominant ; in man, the soul is superior to the body ; among the brutes, there is always a ''first." Nature is constantly running up and down a scale of power, ability, or merit. Thomas defers to her whimsies, and sees that his theories do not offend them. Carefully, however, he draws the line between equality and inequality, that there may be no over-lapping of the provinces and hence no cause for civil injustice, rancor, or strife. His division is one of the most notable lessons in his politics. The better part of man — the mind — is always sm. juris; and in this all men are equal.-~ Over those things which appertain to the intimate, interior life of the rational being, the soul is exempt from civil sway. God alone is king.-^^ It is only in the externals of life, which constitute the empire of evident inequalities, that man defers to man.-^^ And even there, in such matters as appertain to the nature of the body, e. g., nourishment and gen- 274 Com. Polit., Lib. II, lec. 1. 275 Ibidem. Prolog, in Metaph. 276 De Reg., Lib. IV, cap. 23. 277 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. CIV, a. 5. Cajetan comments that the equality may consist in this: no one has power over another in those things which relate to nature. See Summa, Leonine Ed., IX, 391a. 278 Ibidem. 279 Cf. Laski, The Prol)em of Sovereignty, p. 67 : "A state that de- mands the admission that it sconscience is supreme goes beyond the due bounds of righteous claim." ()4 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY eration of off-spring, the individual is beholden only to his Maker. The political liberty of the people was evinced and respected in the contract by which concessions were made to law and order and the State was formed; it is still recognized in the essential reasonableness of government. That order may pre- vail in the State, however, subordination is most necessar}^ With all as rulers, there would be no rulers at all, and no State. According to St. Thomas, subjection is threefold: to reason, to regents, and to God.^so xhe People's activities and endurances are to be inspired and directed by their noblest faculty. "Where there is rationability," Scotus Erigena had written, ''of a neces- sity there is liberty." Aquinas is of the same conviction. He elevates the people by subjecting them to the best that is in them. Any other measure would be a degradation. To bend to God is to rise in the clean and sturdy manhood by which democracy can and must be reared. His laws are essentially reasonable; the Source of Reason is He. Again, St. Thomas submits in his Summa the doctrine of his De Regimine: God and Reason would be sufficient guides for man, if solitude were natural to him.281 Each man, alone, would be his own king under Hea- ven. The inequalities which social and political life and for- tune bring into prominence would not so strikingly appear.^^s But it is nature's decree that this should not be, and a sea of vivid disparities stretches before us. Being evident, they can be more readily controlled. The revelation of them which the State makes is really a blessing. Civil society does not create them ; it finds and evinces them. It must be formed according to them. The best should be first. And just as Aquinas would have men subject themselves to the best that is in themselves, and to the best above them, which is God, so would he have them defer to the best among them. Reason finds fittest expression in the State, with the best in the highest places. The spirit of equality if not at war with wisdom. As Montesquiu observes, there is the difference of heaven and earth between true equality and extreme equality. 280 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. LXXII, a. 4. 281 Ibidem. 282 Cow. in Joh, cap. Ill, lec. 2. 2^3 De VEsprit des Lois, VIII, 3. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 65 The Angelic Doctor applies the principle of order to the life of the comunity, and shows both its naturalness and its necessity. Even in the unit of society, the family, all are not and cannot be equal as regards authority. In many respects the rule of the father must be supreme. Wife, children, and servants bow to him ; it is best for the home and hence for those who constitute it.284 Husband, father, and master, a man is to be in his own immediate little world. In the expansive civic constitution, which in a manner presents a picture of a magnified family, there is a proportionate need of system; and so distinction is made between rulers and the People though the former are of the latter, just as the father is part of the family, and the dis- tinction must never amount to a separation; inasmuch as sov- ereigns derive their power from the People, and, wielding it, they are only expressing the rational will of the community of which they are a part. Thirdly, the People have innumerable rela- tions to each other,^^^ in which superiority and inferiority are constantly aired. Finally the People of a state comport them- selves superiorly to out-siders ;-'^" chastising enemies, conde- scending to receive strangers, et cet. All this arrangement spells an ordered existence; and equally it expresses the inequality with which those who live and think in a world of reality must always reckon, and which even the most fervad political vision- aries of ancient or modern times have not been able absolutely to dream away. Concentrating on civil system, Aquinas finds that, without it, the People would be the losers ; for the common good could never be achieved. The different species and degrees of capability in the citizenry make it natural. The different needs of the citizenry render it necessary. Such demands as a judiciary, a soldiery, artificers, and a farm-force are vital to a plan of state.-^ But no matter how many orders are exigent and cre- ated, all may be reduced to three : the lowest, the middle, and the highest; infimi, medii, and suprefmi. Here St. Thomas' inclu- '2MSumma Theol., la 2ae, qu. CIV. a. 4. ^S5 It) idem. 28G Ibidem. 287 Ibidem. '2SS gumma Theol., la, qu. CVIII, a. 2; Com. PoUt., Lib. VII, lec. 6. 66 ST. THOMAS' rOLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY sion of all classes in his concept of the People is again mani- festo^ This division of society into grades may, despite his efforts to show it natural, seem slightly at variance with his doctrine of fundamental equality. But he hastens to lay down a democratic principle which proves how little he thought of order as an end, and how earnestly as a means. The more a being can communicate his ability or the achievements of it to others, the higher the order to which he belongs. One can as- cend, accordingly as one can sen^e. The highest class, in a sense, should be more sendle than the lowest. Here, as every- where in Thomistic politics, the common good is sought and the democratic note sustained. There is order in heaven. Aquinas beckons Dionysius forward to tell us of Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones, in the first celestial choir ; of Dominations, Virtues, and Powers, in the second; of Principalities, Angels, and Archangels, in the third. And, the more, must he see the existence of order jus- tified on earth. It is one recipe for aiding earth to be heavenly. It is of the supernal entities he speaks when he expresses the utilitarian principle of superiority to which we have already ad- verted.291 But he evidently intends his observations on the empyrean state to parallel his political theories ; for half of the article is devoted to the terrestial. In the angelic society, he believes, all spiritual favors are in common ; but some of them are more excellently posessed by certain spirits than by others. The power to communicate the gift is a guage of the perfection of it.^^^ In the human order, the corresponding thought would be that the great gift of reason is in all men, but that some have it more excellently than others, inasmuch as they can exercise it for the good of others more effectively; and consequently theirs is a more exalted place in political domain. The best elements of aristocracy are to be used to perfect democracy. St. Thomas is a friend of the middle class, calling it "the honorable people." To him, as to the sober minds of to-day, 289 Summa Theol.. la, qu. CVIII, a 2. 290 Ibidem. 291 Ibidem. 202 Summa Theol., la, qu. CVIII, a. II, ad 2. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DE^EOCRACY 67 it represents the back-bone of the nation. To crush it would be suicidal; civil order, on which alone the ascent to general prosperity can be made, would be ruined. The nature of so- ciety would be outraged. Aquinas maintains that inequality is so indigenous to order, and order is sb natural to men, that even had there been no Fall, inequalit}'^ would have been pre- sent.^'^ In fact, order is a form of justice. Thomas holds with Augustine that it consists in assigning each object its due position (sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio) ; and in reference to men, this principle would merely mean that it is meet for the right persons to be in the right places: the best first, the least last, but the last first in the mind and heart of the best. The common good demands that no elements of discontent seethe at the bottom of society. Each person in the State has the same ultimate end as his fellow.^^* All must be considered and aided, else the purpose of civil society is perverted. And the fittest leaders will attend to the least in the State first, who naturally need the help of the State most.-^^ Another plea for order lies in the fact that the good in the State must be used for the State. The superiority of science, justice, etc., which some possess, should be exercised to the ad- vantage of others.-^^ Not to have it so, were waste and worse. The use can be made authoritatively only in office; hence a hierarchy in politics, to suit degrees of merit, is required. The objection that order endangers the People by inducing oligarchy and tyranny, is weak to Aquinas, for, with him, only the just are eligible to elevation in the State ; and, according to him and Augustine, the just rule not in lust of power but in the pursuit of the purpose for which the State exists.^^^ The original human differences which signify inequality and necessitate order are divided by Thomas into those of body 293 la, qu. XCVI, a. 3. 294 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 14. 295 This point will be more apparent in the following Chapter on Rulers. 2msumma Theol., la, qu. XCVI, a. 4 297 Ibidem. 68 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY (sex, age, strength, etc.,)^^ and those of soul. In the latter he sees many degrees of knowledge, justice, and executive abil- ity. All men have free will with which to apply their powers to the acquisition of facts, virtues, and arts. Differences in effort and in native ability mean differences in results.^^ Since these disparities, according to St. Thomas, would have occurred even in the state of innocence, much more must they manifest themselves now. And a regime which ignores them is so ideal- istic as to remain only a dream, or unreasonable enough to strike the State into ver^^ real confusion. 3. — Virtue We are led by the subject of ability into a consideration of what Aquinas intends by the quality which he demands in all those who essay to play a role in the rule of civil society: virtus.^^ Feugueray expounds the Scholastic sense of the w^ord. Virtue in general is the quality which rendei^ the man good w^ho possesses it, and the deed good which he does. Political virtue is, therefore, that which makes a citizen and his civic sendee commendable. And since the interplay of authority and obedi- ence is constant in the State, political virtue is the kind which enables one both to give and receive orders, with dignity and effect, according to occasion. Feugueray, analyzing it, dis- covei-s the elements of knowledge, and a certain liberal culture of soul, by which, in all probability, he wishes to signify a psychological insight and a sense of ethical values. He declares that the term may be compared to the word ''capacity.''^^^ Ra- 29Sin an interesting sentence, St. Thomas teaches the influence of nature on the body: "Et sic nihil prohibet dice re, quin secundum di- versam dispositionem aeris, et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui robus- tiores corpore generarentur, quam alii, et majores. et pulchriores, et melius complexionati." Summa. la. qu. XCVI, a. 3. 2f)9Swwi7na Theol. la, qu. XCVI. a. 2. 300 Aristotle believed that Liberty, Wealth, Virtue and Good Birth, were the contestants for supremacy in the State. He reduces Good Birth to long-standing Wealth and Virtue. (Cf. Dunning, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 75) St. Thomas rightly selects Virtue as the just claimant. For Virtue ensures Liberty and a more equitable distribution of Wealth. 301 See op. cit. Cf. Crahay, op. cit., pp. 50-51. ST. THOMAS' rOLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 69 hilly succinctly translates it as ''merit."^^^ gt. Thomas him- self reveals his own meaning at length in the Summa. There we find him explaining virtue under different headings. First, he regards it as a habit. A psychical power, unlike a physi- cal one, is in nowise determined to a particular purpose. It must be directed by the light of reason; but it freely follows on.303 It becomes a human act; and resulting in many acts, it develops into habit — a virtue. The Angelic Doctor also sees in it a form of order. It implies love for an ethical standard and a consequent subordination of act to it.-^^ Thus in \drtue St. Thomas beholds an ideal, cognition, volition, deed, and repetition. These are found in every rational creature ; each has virtue, and inasmuch as political virtue is but the application of ordinary virtue to the interests of the State, each can be a force in civil society. Here the basic democracy of Thom- istic politics is again evinced.^^^ But his teaching on inequali- ties, which holds true here, must be recalled. For he would not admit anyone and everyone to the care of the State. All the members of civil society potentially are leaders of it; whereas, actually, a very small percentage are or can be. Thus demo- ocracy is sustained and, at the same time, order is saved. Next Aquinas speaks of virtue as a practical habit. It is not solely a thing of thought or an immanent power. It has an executive character. It is a doing, as well as a being able to 306 The Doctor notices the occasional mistake which super- ficial people make in judging some visible favor of a person as a virtue. They take a quality of body for one of soul, and for- get that virtue is a principle of operation as well as of being.-^^ Aquinas, in seeking leaders, would look not at the surface of men but at the power within and the inner ability to project it without. And here the best interests of democracy are served. Thirdly, St. Thomas insists that virtue is and should be a good habit. Every evil implies a defect of object, or of sub- 302 studies, March, 1920. Art. The Democracy of St. Thomas. 303 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. LV, a. 1. 304 Ibidem. 30oCf. Burri., Le teorie politiche di San Tommaso, p. 59. Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. LV, a. 2. 307 Ibidem. 70 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY ject. Virtue is guided by reason and fired by will. It is a power and a perfection. ^os if it is wrested to express anything evil, the sense is metaphorical; e. g., a good thief or robber.^oa Therefore, the xlngelic Doctor in placing virtue as the pre-re- quisite of the servers of the State, ensures the reign of justice in which each man receives his due and the deepest and truest democracy is sensed. In the Comme7itai-y, he presents a concept of political virtue, opening up the mind of Aristotle. The question whether the virtue of a good man is identical with that of a good citizen advenes. There can be a difference. A person censurable enough in private life, may perform his civic duties perfectly and therefore be accounted a good citizen. While the thoroughly good man is consistently so. But the good citizen who is also a good man, is, of course, superior to the merely good man ; for to the ordinary virtues, he adds political temperance and jus- tice.310 The State is concerned more with external action than with internal dispositions ; and yet, since the former depend so intimately on the latter, the virtue which St. Thomas describes in his Summa seems essential to a polity. Aristotle's idea is not so full and ethical as the Angelic Doctor's; which is evident when he tells us that the virtue of a good man consists in being able to command, but that of a good citizen renders him equally fit for commanding and obeying.^i^ When the Angelic Doctor requires virtue in the wielders of political fortune, he asks more than Aristotle, because he con- ceives deeper. He asks not only efficiency, but the morality on which the highest efficiency is founded and guaranteed. The "\drtus" of his description, is not to be seen, in notable degree, in every member of the commonwealth ; and only those who possess it sufficiently should be factors in statecraft. The others are better represented by their betters than they could be by Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. LV, a. 3. 309 Ibidem. 310 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 3 311 Politics, III, 4. ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy 71 themselves. '^12 It may be objected, against Aquinas, that de facto this has not been so in political history ; that those who held the power of State, used it to crush the helpless. The retort is that St. Thomas, requiring virtus, requires goodness which is essen- tial to it; and that, therefore, he considers those who exercise authority unjustly, as lacking a title to it. Theoretically, he strips the monarch or the assembly, abusing the popular trust, of the means of excess. When the People are oppressed, they arise, the stronger; fortified with the power which rulers, lacking- virtue, forfeit. The moral force which the Doctor gives the word is a first aid to democracy. He makes it a term that teaches justice to the People, for which genuine democracy stands. Aristotle's meaning, on the other hand, is not so clearly safe and acceptable. He uses the expression phronesis, signifying practical wisdom or caution, and sometimes, in a bad sense, pride or presumption. Walford opines that, applied to the private citizen, this word, according to the Philosopher, expresses that which enables one to perform one's duty or task (ergon) ; but that, when he (Aristotle) uses it in reference to a ruler, he intends a moral value.^^^ This however, is not so plain as in the doctrine of St. Thomas; and the probability is that the Philosopher prescribed a cunning prudence rather than any moral norm for those in power. Common welfare is not so much assured by a crafty carefulness in rulers as by an ethical code with rigid sanction above them.^^* The 'Virtue" of Aquinas seems as superior to Aristotle's as Christianity to Paganism. It is significant that St. Thomas places knowledge and good- will, the two essentials of virtue, so prominently in his plan of citizenry. The necessity of public education, religious and 312 This subordination of the right of suffrage to the conditions of intelligence need not signify that St. Thomas believed the right itself of suffrage to be hypothetical, as Crahay deduces (op. cit. pp. 105-107). It may mean rather that the right to exercise the right is dependent on those qualifications. Or again, suffrage is not a natural but a civil right; and the State has a right to protect itself by with- holding this weapon from the obviously incompetent, Cf. Laveleye, Le Government dans la Democratie, t. II, p. 49. 313 Note. Translation of Aristotle's Politics and Economics, p. 88. 314 St, Thomas' meaning of "prudence" is the virtue "ex qua omnes virtutes morales dependent." Com. Polit., Lib, III, lec. 3, 72 ST. THOMAS* POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY secular, follows/^i^ Without it, the bulk of the People are hardly prepared to enter into their own, and the State must be adminis- tered by the efficient few. When the Angelic Doctor wrote, the Univei-sity of Paris was diffusing its rays through the century ; all roads led to the city on the Seine. The medieval world, awak- ened to learning in the eighth century, was re-aroused in the thirteenth. The voice of Aquinas echoed far. With Blessed Al- bert and St. Bonaventure, he filled his day and did more for the cause of education, which is the cause of modern democracy, than the world is always willing to grant. His facts were the natural equality of men, the evident inequalities, and the ne- cessity that the best guide the rest. He saw that education, mental and moral, produced the best. We can well understand his zeal for teaching. Each man, w^on to education, was the State's gain. The more extensively 'Virtus" appeared in the State, the greater was the number of individuals capable of shar- ing in civil rule. In the vista of the future, with the onward march of mind and morals, Aquinas could not but see the democratic spirit of his doctrines crystallizing into a political fact.316 But he was writing for his own day as well as for the future. And all will agree that, then, the time was not ripe for the uni- versal reign of the People. Feudalism was doomed and dying ; but just as its grow^th was gradual, so should be its decline, else its departure might have worked more mischief tlian its pres- ence. The Magna Charta had been signed. The English House of Commons Avas born. The Italian Cities glistened in their liberties ; though often the lustre gloomed into ruby. The time was replete with promise, which Aquinas reinforced with principle. But the truth remained, that ignorance still held large sections of the continent in shadow, and morality too often was only a veneer. Political disparities were inevitable ; And St. Thomas was too wise to waste energy against them. Rather than be perpetually querulous, he often seeks whatever logic there may be in a situation to which his opinions 3l5Cot7i Eth., Lib. II, lec. 1. Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 3. Cf. Bor- rell, UId(^.e de D^mocratie, Revue de Philosophie., XII, pp. 117-118. Also, "Pas de Democratie sans progres moral," p. 117. 31C Cf. Com. Polit., Lib. II, lec. 1. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 73 seem opposed, and makes himself temporarily contented. He is a better philosopher than a reforaier, and a better reformer for being such a good philosopher. His mission is always more of peace than of the sword ; but his arguments are the kind of which effectual weapons can be forged. 4. — Slavery : Due to Lack of Virtus Slavery, so-called, existed in St. Thomas' day ; and he was not the one to deal it the final and fatal blow. Christ had not preached against it openly, but, in the subtlest and surest man- ner, prepared for its dissolution. His medieval servant follow^ed the divine example. And if the Galilean's message of universal brotherhood is the finest expression of democracy, then the doctrine of Aquinas is well attuned to the democratic ideal. The Angelic Doctor could not take slaves for granted, as did superb Athens, raised aloft on the thews of four-hundred thou- sand of them, twenty times the number of her free citizens.^^"^ He would have repudiated historical slavery as vehemently as an abolitionist on the eve of our own Civil War. For him, the sys- tem could be condoned in Christendom on a basis of charity. St. Thomas insinuates this into his commentary on "the natural slave"3i8 It is but charity to direct those who cannot direct themselves ; and this seems Thomas' great reason for acceding to the system. He does not call the unfortunate a "natural slave," but quasi servus. Nor does he speak of him, like Aristotle, as "having no share in happiness. "^^^ But the Doctor's tolerance and faith may seem slightly amusing to those who advocate liberty-at-any-price and offer pyrotechnics instead of proofs. "Whatever any race or class of men has the where- withal to be," offers a discreet speaker on democracy, "it must take the necessary time and pay the average price of working toward its salvation through the intermediate stages. There is no spring-board from which it can cover at one leap the gap between what it is when it is delivered over to itself, and what it 317 Athenagoras, Bk. VI, quoted by Montesquieu. 318 Lib. I, lec. 3. 319 Politics, III, 9. 74 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRIXE AXD DEMOCRACY has tlie potency to become.''32o plume ourselves on the Emancipation Proclamation which flung milUons of colored peo- ple on their own pathetic resources; nominally we granted them liberty, but practically they have had the problem of ac- quiring it for themeslves ever since. Medievalism did more for its serfs: not by freeing them with the mouth, but with the truth which makes all men free ; not by flinging them aside to whatsoever fate, but in guiding them through the stormy night of transition. Aquinas admitted inequality. Slavery was but the lower end of the admission. Yet the lowest in his political theory, is not without relation to the highest There is a common fibre of na- ture in all, which religion accentuates and strengthens. It is to be suspected that the infimi of St Thomas' time were in some respects better circumstanced than our free working-men of to- day. Certainly when one honestly considers the character of the Middle Age, they were better off. They were in immediate connection with the class which could help them most. Theirs was not the woeful separation which, in modern times, has done so much to retard social progTess. The Church, with its con- stant insistence on the greatest two Commandments, was an in- calculably democratic force; and while the surface of medieval society presented more spires and hills than the modern sense approves, popular leaven was steadil}^ at work in the medieval mass. Aquinas helps to hasten the passing of the system of slavery with his teaching that it is against the initial decree of nature. He considers it the result of a disorder which sin brought into the world.321 ^he conclusion is that, accordingly as virtue tri- umphs and the divine place is repaired, slavery must go. The Fall was tragically real to Aquinas. Minds of a materialistic bias are ready enough to differ from him, and the idea of Adam's 320 Albion W. Small, Pub. of Am. Sociological Society, Vol. XIV, p. 59. 321 Swmma Theol., la 2ae, qu. XCIV, a. 5; la, qu. XCVI, a. 4. Aris- totle's "natural slave" (phusei doulos) is not of St. Thomas' teaching. As Rahilly well remarks: "The Aristotelian conception of a natural slave is as incompatible with Christianity as the Nietzschian ideal of a super-man." Studies, March, 1920. Art. St. Thomas and Democracy. Vide Sent. II, dist. 44, qu. I, a. 3; Summa, la, qu. XCVI, a. 4; la 2ae, qu. II, a. 4. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 75 transgression is widely lampooned as a bit of ''theological moon- shine." On the other hand, many are repudiating the whole- sale demands and extreme conclusions of Evolutionism. So modern thought is as ready to consider things from a Thomistic point of view as from any other. The Angelic Doctor is not singular when he traces ser^dce to sin. He has more than six thousand years with him in the belief that the outraged Deity's decree, "In the sw^eat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return to the earth, out of which thou wast taken" (Gen. III. 19), is of the most solemn import. His science is all the more solid for being founded on the rock of religion. Slavery is tolerable, to St. Thomas, not in itself, but in the advantages which it brings to its subjects.^-- Pufendorf has such an idea, too, when he criticizes the absence of slaver\^ among Christian nations as one of the causes of the great number of thieves, vagabands, and hardy beggars.^^^ Aquinas is interested in the interests of the servant, as in those of the master.^-* He quotes from Proverbs: "the fool shall serve the wise" (XI, 29) ; for it is wisdom in the fool to do so.^--^ Incidentally, he reveals his belief that a person who stands out from the socially inca- pable class logically is no slave,^26 ^nd that masters have no right to be such, who are not the mental and moral superiors of those beneath them. The system of slavery, says Thomas, is of human foundation. It is therefore amenable to social conditions, advances in under- standing, and growth of sympathy. Human institutions are variable. True, that which is natural to an immutable nature 322 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XCIV, a. 5., et 2a 2ae, qu. LVII, a. Ill, ad 2: "Utile est hunc quod regatur a sapientiori " 323 De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Lib. VII, ch. I, 4. Dunning, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 321. Cf. Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pads (tr), Bk. II, ch. V, par. 27, n. 2: "Now perfect and utter Slavery, is that which obliges a Man to serve his Master all his life long, for diet and other common Necessaries; which indeed, if it be thus understood and confined within the Bounds of Nature, has nothing too hard and severe in it; for that perpetual Obligation to Service is recompensed by the Certainty of being always provided for; which those who let themselves out to daily Labour, are often far from being assured of." 324 Even Aristotle taught the idenity of interest between the master and the slave. Politics, III, 6. St. Thomas seems to go so far as to place the relations of the slave to the master on a par with those of the son to the father. Summa, 2a, 2ae, qu. LVII, a. IV, ad 2. 325 Contra Gentiles, Lib. Ill, cap. 81, et cap. 78, 3. 326 Com. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 10. 76 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY is without change. But human nature is not immutable ; and, even that which is natural to man, may sometimes prove an imperfection. Looking more deeply into the mind of Aquinas, we find an underlying thought which all but the extreme radicals of to- day must suspect: the necessity of a senace-force in exery state. This truth has thrust itself into the modern consciousness as never before, in the industrial stress, with its innumerable strikes, consequent to wartime conditions. The community equally requires brains and bodies. Aquinas is not to be blamed for considering the service of the former nobler than that of the lat- ter. But he was fully alive to the imperativeness and import- ance of physical labor ; and, realizing that the God-man was the foster-son of a carpenter, he must have appreciated the dignity of it too .328 He does not teach that the sen^ant-class is to be so hedged about that no member of it can escape. Each worker is an image of the God to whom all men must tend, and, as such, has potentialities which are not to be repressed. Manual work must be. Jt is the Lord's mandate; it is the natural need. But if the spark of reason in a humble toiler should grow into great- ness, it were unseemly, according to Thomistic principle, that the State should not profit by the erstwhile lowly one's ability, and that he should not be pennitted to rise.^^^ He believes, too, that there can be no true libeily in society, without virtue in its subjects, and that virtue is the occasion of liberty and its warrant. Also, he frowns on class distinctions which are based not on nature but on some artificial standard.^^*^ Aquinas does not consider the slave an active part of the polity.-^3i For the State is a work of reason ; and reason is weak 327 Summa Theol., 2a, 2ae, qu. LVII, a. 2, ad 1. On the merit of the following principle too, the final abolition of slavery is forecast: "Jus- titia quidem perpetuo est observanda; sed determinatio eorum quae sunt justa, oportet quod varietur secundum diversum hominum statum" —Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. CIV, a. 3, ad. 1. With the progress of morality in the masters, and of intellectuality in the slaves, the system would pass. 328 Com. Pout., Lib. I, lec. 3. 329 Com. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 4. It is significant that Aquinas should link "freedom" with "virtue." Com. PoUt.. Lib. Ill, cap 14. 330 Co?/i. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 4. 331 De Reg., Lib. I., cap. 14. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 77 in a slave, else he is not rightly one. Thomas does not exclude him from the polity. His incompetence is the bar. He is better served by the reason of others than by his own.^^ The Angelic Doctor discerns that the common-good can be secured only by the most intelligent enactments, and that the required intelligence is not found in the lower levels of the State. He could not utterly ignore Aristotle's mention that the very worst form of democracy is ''that which gives a share to every citizen — a thing which few cities can bear."^^^ He was doubtless impressed, too, with the effort of Aristotle to place slavery on a rational basis ; for he himself uses the Phil- osopher's arguments on the inequality of human nature and the utility of service. But he Christianizes them, and thus prepares them to blend into the larger concept of liberty which we claim to-day. He softens the Philosopher's harsh idea that the slave is a living possession (res possessa animata) or instru- ment for practical purposes, like the statutes of Daedalus or the tripods of Vulcan.^2* He will not forget the soul which is in each one and which cannot be transgressed by another.^s^ If St. Thomas did not regard slaves as persons, in reference to civil rights, it was because he felt that they were better represented in the wisdom of their masters. He accredits their psychologi- cal and ethical personality. And he is refreshingly far ad- vanced from the Aristotelian persuasion that they have no rights against their masters, and that, though they ought not be treated cruelly, the wanton lord does not really violate their rights at all. A man may sell his muscles to another, but no more.^^ Any measures on the part of masters, contrary to 332 Com. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 3. 333 PoZ., VI, 4. Politics, I, 4. Com. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 3; Com. in Epist. ad Titum, cap. Ill, lec. 2. 335 gumma Theol., la. 2ae, qu. CIV. a. 5. Cf, Dubray's remarks on Human Personality, Introductory Philosophy, pp. 509-10. "Some men are not persons with regard to certain rights (e. g., outlaws)." 336 Such sentences in Thomas' doctrine as "quia quidquid servus habebat, et etiam ipsa persona servi, erat quaedam possessio domini" (la 2ae, qu. CV, a. IV, ad 3), are to be interpreted by his doctrine that souls are ever free and bodies, too, in their natural requirements. (2a 2ae, qu. CIV, a. 5). Slavery, violating these liberties, would lack all justification. Summa, 2a 2ae, qu. CXXII, a. IV, ad 3: "est autem homo alterius servus, non secundum mentem, sed secundum corpus." 78 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY this fact, are unjust. And inequalities, to the mind of Aqui- nas, are not static, so far as individuals are concerned. He manages to view the subject of slavery democratically. He teaches that, absolutely, there is no natural cause why one should be a slave more than another. The strongest justification he offers for it is the one, which, if observed in this era of free- dom, might have prevented the present social upheavals. He finds rationality in the system insofar as, by it, he who needs a guide gets one. The master must take a personal interest in his slave ; else he is unworthy of himP'^ The relation between the former and the latter must be on a truly Christian basis; intimate, cordial, and beneficiaL^-^^ The word "slave" has been so be-smirched, rolling down the centuries, that we veer from it; forgetting that intrinsically it is not so for- midable after all, and that, on the lips of Aquinas, it is almost as innocuous as our own word "servant" to-day. His is a concession of service and of dependence, rather than of slavery. He will not allow the personality of the slave to be destroyed. He remembers that all men are equal. He recalls the old Hebrew law which required that slaves be treated as human beings.^^^ He demands that they have their weekly day of rest and devo- tion.340 He does not forget the natural law in which every human being has a share and from which natural rights flow. He vindicates all the natural rights of the low^ly.^^i On this point Rahilly remarks: "We have here a clear doctrine of equal natur- al rights, which, while it is fruitful in social and political appli- cations, is not based on any impossible or Utopian hypotheses. Every man has the same inalienable right to spiritual freedom 337 Cf . Phillips, American Negro Slavery, p. 307 : "There was clearly no general prevalence of severity and strain in the regime. There was, furthermore, little of that curse of impersonality and indifference which too commonly prevails in the factories of the present day world where power-driven machinery sets the pace, where the employers have no relations with the employed, outside of work hours, where the pro- prietors indeed are scattered to the four winds, where tlie directors con- fine their attention to finance, and where the one duty of the superinten- dent is to produce a maxim output at a minimum cost." 338 Com. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 4. 339 Summa Theol., la. 2ae, qu. CV, a. 4. 340 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. CXXII, a. 4, ad, 3. 341 Swmma Theol, Supplementum qu. LII, a. 2. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 79 and to the exterior conditions of human existence, whether proprietary, personal or marital. "^^^ Thus St. Thomas is not faithless to democracy; in fact he is more consistent with it than many an enlightened modem. Jourdain tells us that the Latin language had only the word "servus" to cover three different ideas : first, slavery properly so- called, or the possession of man by man ; secondly, the service of the soil, which was a milder form ; and thirdly, domesticity .^^ This writer warrantably teaches that St. Thomas does not in- tend the first significance, which is paganic, so much as the other two. The Angelic Doctor uses the diction of Aristotle, but not the thought. He thinks for himself, and he is a Chris- tian. Feugueray's complaint that the Doctor follows Aristotle and not St. Paul, and respects antiquity to the extent of forget- ting Christian liberty and equality would seem unjust.^^ Thus though St. Thomas did not view slaves as active citizens and parts of civil community, he granted them a passive 342 studies, The Democracy 0/ St. Thomas, March, 1920. 343 La Philosophic de Saint Thomas, t. I, p. 419. Grotius, too, men- tions several mild significations of the word "slave." See De Jure Belli et Pads, Bk. II, ch. V, par. XXX. 344 Jourdain, p. 422. M. Delecluse (Gr^goire VII, saint Francois d' Assises et saint Thomas d'Aquin, Paris, 1844, t. II, p. 421, et suiv.) is also quoted as unfavorably regarding St. Thomas' view. Both Feugueray and Delecluse measure the mind of the Angelic Doctor with the stan- dards of a remotely modern century and fail to consider sufficiently the character of his age. They must at least admit, with Jourdain, that Aqui- nas did not consider slavery a political expedient, nor a means of government, and that he did cleanse the concept with Christianity. See Schwalm, Legons de Philosophic sociale, t. I, pp. 180-181, for a clari- fication of Thomistic views. Cf. Phillip's American Negro Slavery, p. 514: "The government of slaves was for the ninety and nine by men and only for the hundreth by laws. There were injustice, oppression, brutality and heart-burning in the regime, but where in the struggling word are these absent? There were also gentleness, kind-hearted friendship and mutual loyalty to a degree, hard for him to believe who regards that system with a theo- ristic eye and a partisan squint. For him, on the other hand who has known the considerate and cordial, courteous and charming men and women, white and black, which that picturesque life in its best phases produced, it is impossible to agree that its basis, and its operations were wholly evil, the law and the prophets to the contrary notwithstanding." Such is the conclusion of the latest and perhaps the ablest critique of slavery as an American fact, from a conscientious study said to cover twenty years of research. And yet, the slavery of St. Thomas' conniv- ance was much more humane in principle than the American brand. It demanded freedom for the subject in all that pertained to the soul and to the nature of the body. 80 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY share in it and found a place for them in his broad concept of the People. He sees the People pressing upward to the heights of virtue: the best leading on; the stronger helping the weaker; the weaker supplying the stronger with ordinary needs, while the latter engage in the greater purposes of the State. When a sufficient number attain the objective, political democracy may begin ; and, acordingly as those above raise up those below, it is perf ect.345 gt. Thomas knew that Christian endeavor would do more for democracy than a frenzied theory, whirling destruc- tion and enkindling hate. The pure Christianity of his princi- ples is the greatest merit of his politics and his best contribution to the cause of liberty. Let us recall, too, that the revered pioneers of liberty in our own land took the institution of slavery for granted: and that political ex- pediency was a primary object of the Emancipation Proclamation of one of the kindest and fairest souls which have graced the story of America. No more may we impugn the politics of Aquinas for its tolerance of slavery than that of the leaders of American liberty; and perhaps less. 345 He does not believe, however, that the flow of democracy is to be the ebb of government. His idea is somewhat like that expressed by Dupont-White : "Quant a votre objection que la moralite croissante des hommes doit se resoudre en une reduction croissante de gouvernement, je responds que le fait d'une elit, et il ne puet devenir celui des foules que sous le poids d'une forte contrainte (here Aquinas may differ). Au debut, tout progres doit a'imposer, et ensuite, tout progres accepte donne lieu k la conception d'un progres nouveau parmi les natures superieures. Autrement a quoi servirait leur superiorite? Tel est le jeu des inegalites dont le monde est fait." Quoted by Laveleye, Le Gouvernement dans la Democratie, p. 35, t. I. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 81 CHAPTER IV RULERS The lowest levels of civil society suggest^ by contrast, the highest points. The apex of the State is its ruler.^^^ Authority, in the degree in which it rises up from the State, extends down through it. The democratically erect pyramid properly ex- presses the ideal political vision of Aquinas ; not the tipsily in- verted one of some other medievalists who would have God empower the one and ignore the many. 1. — Aristotle's Views In his Commentary on the Politics, Aquinas considers with Aristotle the absolute ruler and the possible unnaturalness of his position in the State. The Philosopher, however, regards the matter from the viewpoint of the Athenian democracy in which all the citizens were as nearly equal as possible and each was fitted to take active part in the administration of the government, even to the holding of public office, as appears from the custom of voting by lot. In the case of only a few military and moral positions, w^hich required unique qualification, was there recourse to the ballot.^*"^ He deems it unworthy that one citizen should have control over so many equals, for two rea- sons: first, nature requires that the same right and rank exist among equals secondly, just as it is harmful for those of different physical constitutions to have to follow the same regimen, so it is wrong that those who are equal in civic merit should be unequal in civic station. He advances, then, that 346 St. Thomas sees the necessity of rulers in the exigencies of social life. There must be some custodian of the common good, since each one is apt to be too interested in his individual inclination and welfare. Summa Theol., la, qu. XCVI, a. 4. See also De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 1. 347 Cf. Philip Van Ness Myers' History of Greece, pp. 255-256, and Aristotle's Politics, III, 1, 2, 4. 348 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 15. 349 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 15. 82 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY law should govern, instead of any citizen.^^^ Whoever is ap- pointed to office in a democracy is only a guardian or ser^^ant of the law. We shall presently see how democratically far Aquinas agrees with these statements, even when their substance is applied to kingly polity. The Philosopher expresses him- self like a good medievalist when he writes that to make the law supreme means to make God likewise.^^ He somewhat sacrifices truth to fervor, however, when he adds that to en- trust the sovereign power to man is to fling it to a beast. He esteems the law to represent the intellect dispassionately, and hence to be the ideal ruler; for appetites and passions some- times vitiate the judgments of even the best of men.^-^^ St. Thomas remembers this fact and weaves it into his treatise on rulers. But Aristotle proposes that the law have a living exponent. Of itself, it is cold and impersonal; and its verv^ virtues may prove defects. Perchance a man who knows the art of ruling and brings a warmth of charity, wisdom and justice, to the interpretation and application of the statute, would make the law rule much more effectively than it could by itself. As Aristotle astutely obser^-es, the sick physician does not depend on his medical books, but calls in another brother of the profes- sion. Too, the law is limited. It is good as far as it goes; but just exigencies and exceptions, for which it does not provide, are constantly cropping out. The human element is needed to supply the deficiencies.^ The Philosopher therefore proposes the perplexity : is it preferable that the best man should govern or the best law? St. Thomas, it will appear, opines that they should go together. Aristotle suggests the irrationality of one-man rule with the common-place observation that a single person cannot see better with one pair of eyes, hear better with two ears, nor do better with two hands, than many can with many.^^ He also offers that, since a supreme magistrate cannot possibly attend ."ioODib. Ill, lec. 8. 351 Cf. Com. Polit.. Lib. III. lec. 15. 352 Ibidem. 35.3 Ibidem. 354 Ibidem. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 83 to all his duties himself and simply has to employ several sub- ordinates, it would have been just as reasonable to have had many rulers in the first place, instead of one.^-^-"^ Again, if one man is able to rule, two would be so much more so. A brace of quotations from the Iliad — 'Tet two go together," and ''Were ten such faithful cousellors mine own!"^-^^ are used by the Philosopher gracefully to press this point. Finally he observes that a monarch delegates part of his power to friends; but a friend is an equal and like to his friend; if, therefore, the king concedes that his friend should govern, ipso facto he submits that those who are his equals should rule : and theoreti- cally monarchism softens into liberalism. -^^^ 2. — St. Thomas' Views: (1) Qualifications for Rulers; (2) Duties It will be clear in the following pages that St. Thomas is in- terested in this array of observations, and that he gives them due respect in his thought on rulers. He does not appropriate them wholly, however; for they are as unusual as the Greek setting which inspired them. The Athenian democracy, with a citizenry which for equality was unique in history, had grown dim in a past which seemed wholly out of relation to the thirteenth century. Since Pericles, great historical events had wrenched the world from the classic era; and St. Thomas appeared at a time and in a locale as different from those in which Anaxagoras, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, and Thucydides flourished, as a star from a shadow. The city-state had now expanded to a kingdom. The people were not severely separated into the ruling and the enslaved classes, but degrees were present between and, in evidence of evolution, were con- tinually increasing.^^s Proportionally, there were infinitely 355 Ibidem. ^56 Iliad, X, 224, and II, 371. 357 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, cap. 15. 358Rickaby, Political and Moral Essays, p. 53: "The Greek City State was fullblown, and had no future before it: while the large and cum- brous masses of medievalism had in them the potency of the modern world, a world at once better and worse than the medieval, but any- how more vast, more complex, and more marvelous." 84 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY fewer perfect citizens than in the Periclean Age; potentially, there were inconceivably more. Aquinas thought and wrote for the Middle Age, even as Aristotle for the Attic ; though their principles were perennial. It is impossible altogether to prevent the character of the period in which one lives from coloring one's thoughts, words, and deeds. In his De Regimine, the Angelic Doctor writes from a mon- archical point of view. He had to deal with crowns, just as the Philosopher had to consider the absence of them. He was writing to royalty. But his advices to kings would be just as practical in many respects for presidents. And, for that matter, Aquinas himself no doubt realized that Pericles, of democratic Athens, was much more imperial than that forgotten little ruler of Cyprus; even as the head of the United Stat-es today is much stronger than many a weak monarch. He appreciated that, whatever the form of government, good leaders would be necessary. Mont- esquieu declares that the great motor of the people is their own passions; Cicero complains that they condemn what they do not understand; Virgil pictures them with many mouths, many tongues, throats of brass, and lungs of iron, but omits the detail of a head of brains; Horace judges them fickle. Social Psychology corroborates these findings and contributes to them. Even when it is recalled that true democracy can exist only when all the populace have risen above the rabble level, it must be appreciated that the instincts of man can never be cultivated away and that, where, among many, each has a voice, a psychical Vesuvius is ever possible. Even the Greek assembly of the Golden Age was boisterous, and, without the dominating personality of Pericles, it might have dissolved, of its own energy. As for the modern representative democracy, obviously, from its character, it requires leadership. A mon- archy or an aristocracy, strong in organization and tradition, could bear on largely by its own momentum. But a popular government, of so many individuals and temperaments, is, without proper direction, a prime uncertainty. 359 Cf. Puh. Of Am. Sociological Soc, Vol. XIV, p. 10. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY 85 An unguided democracy is a misguided one. Claudian's lines have their political truth : 'Tallitur egregio quisquis sub principe credit Ser\'itum ; numquam libertas gratior extat Quam sub Rege pio " And the words of the Commentary on Aristotle's Politics are likewise expressive: *'To live according to the State is not to be considered slavery, but liberty and safety."^^ The greater the role of the people in the government, the more vivid must be the standard of action before them. A subjective norm ever tends to be a selfish one, and more often than not leads away from the common good. An objective directive is more dependable; and it best appears in the pur- poses and principles of some representative person or persons apart from the crowd. The popular intelligence and good-will are still necessary, even under leadership; for citizens in a democracy hold the key to authority, and they must not submit it lightly. They should be critical, and select only such as will well and truly represent the public interest. The more of mind and morals among them, the fairer their choice of a representative ; the better their choice, the more prosperous the State. Even among leadei*s there is always a bell-wether. From Pericles down to Wilson, the history of democracy is a succes- sion of them. But Aquinas evinces how democracy may exist even in the shadow of ''one only man," by teaching that any supercargo on the ship of State, no matter how powerful he may be, does not really rule. Justice is king, and every sov- ereign must be its slave.^^ When St. Thomas speaks of the king as above the law (ruling secundum virtutem) , he but means what we should concede in the case of a judge; for, in the past, royalty exercised the judicial power. The judge who wields the law is above it, except in an ethical sense. The Doctor writes that, in matters touching his own person, a man must form his own conscience from his own knowledge; but 360 Lib. V. lec. 7. 361 Summa, la, qu. XCVI, a. 4. See also Contra Gen.. IV, 76. 362 Cf. De Reg., 1, 12. 80 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY ill matters concerning public authority, conscience must be formed in accordance with knowledge attainable in public ju- cial procedure. -"^^ He would have the king no more arbi- trary than a just judge.^^ This subjection of the ruler to jus- tice is the formula of freedom. ''During the Middle Age," Gierke notes, ''we can hardly detect even the beginnings of that opinion which would free the Sovereign (whenever he is acting in the interest of the public good) from the bonds of the Law of Nature."^^'^ He also declares that "medieval thought gave to the Monarch a representative character. However highly his powers might be extolled, the thought that Lordship is Office had remained a living thought. "^^^ We see then, from the times of St. Thomas and from his own statements, what slender foundation the baser autocracy can find in the ecclesiastical era. If Aristotle improved the politics of Aquinas, medievalism did not injure it. The Angelic Doctor does not tolerate the shabby ambitions and purposes which too often stimulate the seeking of civil station. His candidate, to be a proper servant of the people, must be a fit serv-ant of God. He must be a man of purest motive. His own good must be sought only in that of the public. Politically he exists for the benefit of the people i*^^"^ and any direct concessions on his part to the call of fame and fortune are a betrayal of his trust. Aquinas knows how nature rebels, even in the best, against such mortified comport- ment. He finds the tendency to self-seeking universal.^^ Man must have a reward. And so Aquinas points his finger to Heaven with the advice that "when the chief shepherd shall appear," the "crown of unfading glory" shall be bestowed.-^^'^ sas Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LXVII, a. 2. 364 Cf. Summa, la 2ae, qu. XCVI, a. V, ad 3. 365 Political Theories of Middle Age, p. 86. 366 Idem, pp. 61-62. 367 Cow. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 5. Also De Reg., Lib. I, cap 1. Cf. Moore's Utopia, Bk. I, p. 67. 368 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 7. 369 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 8 et 9. But in Lib. II, cap. XI, of the De Reg., we learn that, though kings are to receive their real reward from above, they are not to be denied the temporal glories and trap- pings of their station. These aid respect, obedience, and confidence. In the authentic part of the book, Lib. II, cap V, this same idea is in the way of being expressed, when the hand of Aquinas ceases its task forever. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 87 Good rulers may hardly be expected from the ranks of the irre- ligious, who seek office not so much for what they can bring into it as for what they can get out of it. The wages the world pays for the service which governors render, is always small and sometimes cynical. It has been observed over and over again that democracies particularly are ungrateful. A material- minded man would consider himself foolish not to seize on the State for his personal aggrandizement; and the public good could be but a detail or an incident in his ministry. St. Thomas sees six reasons why the people should be careful to elect a leader who looks up.^^^ First, the worldly individual, not satis- fied with mere honor and glory, would crave wealth and luxur- ies. One with an inferior aim is apt to have a superior appe- tite. Reason is silenced ; impulse rules. Either the people are relieved of their money through unjust taxes or burdened with toil, to supply the dissipator's unholy cravings; or the folly falls on neighboring states in the form of war, for which the people pay not only in property but in blood. Secondly, there are so much labor and care entailed in just rule that a just man, sustained by the best principles, alone would serve; especially for the natural wages of the position. Since nothing is frailer than human glory; nothing more fickle than popular favor. Thirdly, the danger of a government's degenerating into ^^poli- ties'' always menaces, if merely the worldly wise hold sway. They are beholden only to those whose regard they covet ; and the common good is forgotten in an effort to exalt those few. A ruler should be able to stand alone ; and this he cannot well do unless fortified by God with Whom he always constitutes a majority. 3*^1 In proportion as he seeks the unjust support of others and sacrifices principle to them, he is inefficient and faithless to the State. Each favor he guiltily accepts, helps to tie his hands. His liberality become less and less. Fourthly, the religious man is not a politically pernicious seeker of re- nown. Though in this very fact, he has it the more ; according to a finer sense of values. Aquinas quotes Sallust's eulogy of Cato : ^'The less he sought glory, the more he secured it ;" and 370 De Reg., Lib. I, cap 7. 371 Cf. Cronin, Science of Ethics, p. 603. 88 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY also the assertion of Fabius: ''He who spurns glory will indeed possess it." Convincingly, too, he refers to Christ's disciples. Fifthly, the chase of fame makes hypocrites. Again Sallust speaks through the lips of Aquinas to tell us that ''ambition forces many men to be false." The Angelic Doctor warns how harsh were the words on the lips of the gentle Savior Him- self, in denunciation of this peculiarly despicable vice of hypo- crisy. However, he believes that glory-seeking is more par- donable in a ruler than a quest for the crasser objects of wealth or pleasure would be; since the former indicates some vestige of virtue, insofar as it aims at the approbation of good people and implies an unwillingness to offend them. Thomas does not deny that a man with only natural good qualities might succeed as a leader of the people. But since the public trust is too sacred to be trifled or experimented with, and the com- mon good so essential to civil society, it were wisdom to have only an unmistakably moral man at the helm of State; and, to the Doctor, ethics has its best sanction and assurance in the things of Faith. Primarily, then, a man fit for office is one of religious persua- sion and conviction. He must be the eyes, the lips, the hands, and the heart of justice. He is thus the servant of God as well as of man.3'^2 With justice equally he must manifest mercy. Tenderly as the members of his own body, must he regard the individuals of the State.^"^^ They are parts of the political corpus of which he is head. No more should he needlessly hurt the least of these than himself. These qualities of equity and clemency are the two great instruments of rule, and in the very words of St. Thomas "the especial property of kings." The work of the State should, for the ruler, be a labor of love. Otherwise, it will be poorly performed and the people will have to bear the result. And he who loves his own interest more than his office, will be only too ready to stoop to shame, losing his own self-respect and the reverence of his subjects.^^- The sympathies of the ruler must be democratic and spread through the length and breadth of the land. He must be one 372 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 14. 37.3 Ibidem. 374 Lib. I, cap. 10. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 89 with the people.^'^^ His heart, large enough to hold all. His taste, catholic.^'^^ He must rise superior to party interest. He must be a responsible person. Aquinas would favor no executive who possessed less mentality than sentimentality. Prudence is paramount in government, and it implies intelli- gent f ore-sight. ^"^^ On the other hand, intelligence is energized and directed by moral principles. The ruler should comport himself as an example. He is the visible symbol of law and order to the people. The government is no better than its administrators. St. Thomas could no morfl have connived at the royal excesses which aroused revolution in Europe in modern times than the people themselves. The doC' trine that the king can do no wrong, is distinctly not his. The ruler must walk before the people and be perfect; but that he ought to be perfect does not mean that he is. He must bring virtue to his position and exercise it there. His office does not give it to him. Civil society is no higher than its head. The better the example of the ruler, the more successful will be the mission of the State. For all eyes naturally look to him, and public opinion is largely formed on his deeds and utterances. He is the measure of the successs or failure of the polity. He is the city on the mountain, which cannot be hid. And man is instinctively an imitator. It is most important that the ruler have a sufficiency of power to discharge the duties of his station. A ruler must rule ; else, he is a political superfluity and encumberance. Ruling, he must have free hands. Aquinas, however, does not plead for plenteous power for regents. He believes that their authority should be proportionate to the service required of them. In a democracy, the sway of leaders is more moral than political ; the people maintain the ultimate mastery. But those who are chosen by the community for definite positions of State would 375 Dib. I, cap. 2. 376 Cap. 1, et 7; Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. XLVII, a. X, ad 2. 377 Com. PoUt., Lib. I, lec. 1. De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 15. 378 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. XLVII, a. 10. See the De Reg. Prin- cipum of Egidius Colonna (Fr. version, Molenaer), I, 7-9. Cf. Aris- totle's teaching on the qualifications for governance. He finds three essentials: affection for the established constitution, ability, and vir- tue and justice. Politics, V, 9. Com. Polit., Lib. V, cap. 7. 90 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY be useless without that particular empire which gives political service a meaning. The ruler is to be a force ; else he is with- out reason or excuse in civil society. But the State must always be bigger than its head. With this teaching, St. Thomas defends democracy in any form of government. He would have adjudged the French king demented in his proclamation, L'etat c'est moi. For him, even the absolute monarch is no more the State than the cranium is the whole body. He would have stamped approval on the phrase, der Fiirst ist der erste Dierner seiner Staats. It is plain enough in his politics that a king is only the chief servant of the community ,3"^^ and is powerful for this purpose. One would look in vain through his pages to find any teaching which even vaguely resembles that anti-democratic dogma which Alexander Pope aptly expresses as ''the right divine of kings to govern wrong." He vindicates the eminence of sov- ereigns, but the dazzle of the sun does not blind him, like Bossuet, to the spots on it. His politics really coronate the community, rather than the king; since it is for the former that the latter exists. The duties of a ruler are the just demands of the State. Or- dinarily, there can be no progress without peace. And, since the State was formed for the benefit and advancement of its members, the sovereign must see that dissension within and without be quelled. Unity is prerequisite to concord.^^ The ruler, from his very position as chief, helps to secure it; but he must be actively interested in its further attainment. As far as prudence will permit, he must endeavor to remove class divisions. He must purpose motives of common interest and zeal, and promote rational patriotism. Aquinas does not pre- scribe that rabid love of country w^hich brooks no consideration of the unity of humanity and incites the people to trample on the rights of other states in order to magnify their own. Still he is not a pacifist in the opprobrious acceptation of the word. 379 Surnma Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 5. Cf. Dante's De Monarchia, Lib. I, cap. XII, 3. ;iSO Contra, Gen., iv., 76. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 91 Not only must the ruler strive for the preservation of the commonwealth, but also for its prosperity. He is a '^smaller world/' because in him is found a type of God's providence which guides creation. Reason is in man, as God is in the universe: authoritatively. Accordingly as a ruler is reasonable, his rule is right. And reason opens up wonderful vistes for his political endeavors. Let the ruler realize that he should exercise the power invested in him as God, in similar situation, would wield it. His interest must not be isolated but must seep through the whole State; for, according to Thomistic description, he is in the State as the soul in the body and as God in the world.-^^^ These strong sim- iles show how sacred and import^mt Aquinas regarded the just authorities of the commonwealth, and what a scope and signi- ficance he saw in their duty. If they but realize that, in a sense, they represent both God and the very best that is in men, i. e. reason and reasonableness, equity and charity would flow freely from their ministry.^^^ They should feel possessive and paternal, never exclusive nor selfish, if they would see their obligations and find stimulation to fulfill them. Aquinas would have the sovereign provide for the health of the people, and not only for the necessities of their livelihood, but also for their creature comfort. Likewise he should look to the public defence.^^ He must remember the morals of the people; courts of justice are to be fostered. St. Thomas is modern enough to believe that prevention of crime should be as much an object of the ruler as punishment of it. The government should stimulate the best in the people, as well as repress the worst.^* The workingmen, on whom the prosperity of the State so largely depends, are not to be forgotten. Nor is a general interest sufficient. Thomas requires that the ruler consider the individual as well as the generality, and see that his needs are supplied.-^^^ So far as possible, each should be 3SlZ)e Reg., Lib. I, cap. 12. 382 Ibidem. Cf. Lib. II, cap. 15. 383 Lib. I, cap. 13 et cap. 15. 384 Com. de Epis. S. Pauli ad Romanos, cap XIII. 38.5 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 13; Summa Theol.. 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a.5. He mentions Moses and his successors as ruling the people with an individual interest in each and everyone of them — Summa, la 2ae, qu. CV, a. 1. 92 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY given an opportunity to advance. Certainly no class of free- men is to be exploited by another, with royal permission. These functions of rulership are so important to the mind of Aquinas, that he makes them primary. They are to be up- permost in the heart and thought of the ruler who has any- thing to do with the formation of a city, even before the first path is cleared and the first brick laid. They must animate him and his successors. The ruler should not be politically purblind, but must let his gaze pierce far into the future; always remembering that to govern a state means duly to guide it to its end.^^ Aquinas t-eaches that the State is not an end in itself.'^s"^ He is no Hegeli- an assuming that it exists not for the men who compose it, but for the ethical idea it embodies. In a synthesis which the patron of triadism could not surpass, the Doctor holds that the State exists for the good of the individuals within it. It is important to notice that he does not place the end of the State solely in men themselves. This would be an inferior ideal, under which justice could never arise, nor democracy prevail. If the State cared only for the bodies of the people, the people would care little for the rights of each other. Full stomachs and empty souls form an evil recipe for a polity. The baser elements in men are surfeited when the spirit is starved. In modern par- lance, Aquinas stands equally for full dinner-pails and full hearts. The ruler who neglects the fact of the soul will never secure the true good of the commonwealth ; for under material prosperity, however specious, will lie dangerous explosives which the leasts circumstance may ignite. A state is not a stat-e, except of confusion, without ethics and ethics is as impalpable as air, without God. Aquinas bids the ruler not leave the Deity, who is the great end of all, out of his reckon- ing.^ The ruler should carry his religion, though surely not his bigotry, into office and permit it to inspire and increase charity and justice in his ministry. St. Thomas could not 386 De Reg., Lib. I, cap 14. 387 Ibidem. 388 Cf. St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei., c. IV. De Regimine, Lib. II, cap. 5. '^9De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 14. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 93 •commend the man who wears his convictions like different suits of clothes, according to occasion. He would have the ruler bring all the best that is in him and consecrate it perseveringly to the benefit of the commonwealth. He would have him true to his better self, and consistent, in order to be of real value to the polity. He would have him, who presumes to rule others, also rule himself .^^^ 3. — Relation of St. Thomas' Views to Democracy. All this suggests how exalted w^as the Angelic Doctor's opin- ion of the proper qualifications for power. And inasmuch as, in a democracy, the people are sovereign, it is evident that their merit must be of high degree, if their government is to escape disaster. St. Thomas does not conceive democracy as the self- expression of an ignorant and immoral miltitude. He rightly judges it better than the nation be guided aright by one or more good men, than that it go wrong by itself. But he is con- siderate of Aristotle's criticism of monarchy to the degree that he would have the royal authority limited. He recognizes that, when great power is vested in a sovereign, practically an invitation is extended to tyranny.^^i In another chapter, we shall see more about his governmental preferences and restric- tions. It is enough to notice here that he holds that the people should retain some of their authority and so rule conjointly with their sovereign. this manner, Aquinas seems to meet Aristotle's objection against kingship, that two heads are better than one. As for the Philosopher's proposition that delegation of power to friends, on the part of rulers, is an admission that equals should rule, St. Thomas appears not so much impressed; for likely, he senses the sophistry that the term "equal," as applied both to friends and to rulers, is not univocal. If we may be permitted further to express the mind of Aquin- as on rulers, by turning the pages of the book De Eruditione 390 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. XLVII, a. XII, ad 3. 391 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. CV, a.l, ad 2. ^92 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. CV, a.l. 94 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY Principum, which Frederick Ozanam cites as the Doctor's own composition,393 some striking and significant ideas are avail- able. There the nature of nobility is democratically described, and the fact that a bond of relationship exists between the humblest and the highest is featured. God is the first cause of all ; hence He ennobled all. As for the secondary and created cause of the human race — our first parents — they transmitted one and the same nature to all. This fact is unforgetably phrased: "God did not make one man of silver to sire the patricians, and another of mire for the plebs.''^^* Everyone can basely be traced to the slime of the earth, and gloriously to the Almighty. St. Augustine's characteristic remark is quoted: ''Consider Adam and Eve, and we are all brothers." This thought is strikingly developed. From the same source proceed the high and the low; the same ear yields wheat for kings and bran for swine; the same stem gives the rose and the thorn; the same tree produces good fruit and bad; the same book contains w^holesome thoughts and evil. The message of the De Eruditione Principum is that honor and shame from no condition rise; true nobility is within a man. And here the innermost soul of democracy is touched; a new^ science of values, for which democracy stands, and which makes a man's mind and heart, instead of his external circumstances, the criterion of his worth, is fully introduced. According to this principle, sceptres and plows are not w^orlds apart after all. There is no sovereign who has not had slaves among his an- cestors and there is no slave who is not the descendant of roy- r^l^y 395 'pj^g proposition is spurned that birth signified w^orth.-"^^^ A man is not w'hat his parents were, but what he is himself. 393 See Ozanam's Dante and Catholic Philosophy, p. 491. But Man- donnet writes: "Echard estime que cet ouvrage (De Erud. Prin.) appartient k Guillame Perraud, un dominicain lyonnals mort vers 1250. Scriptores ordinis Praedicorum, I, pp. 134-55. Je crois, pour des raisons qu'il serait hors de propos de faire valoir ici, que I'ouvrage de Vincent de Beauvais." At all events, its tone and spirit are Thomistic, and it reflects some of the most striking popular thought of the day which the Angelic Doctor dominated. All the editors of St. Thomas include it in their collections, save Bernard de Rubeis. See Jourdain, Philo- sophie de S. Thomas, t. I, p. 149. 394 De Erud. Prin., Lib. I, cap. 4. 395 Idem, Lib. I, cap. 4. 396 Ibidem. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 95 The book then abounds with advice to rulers: page after page, illumined with Scripture and patriotism, replete with practical wisdom. Pride is proscribed. Let no ruler imagine himself great because his position is high; a tiny grain of millet is not a whit the larger for being on top of a mountain. Humility is prescribed. The King of Kings was democratic; can the mortal monarch rise up in superiority ?^^^ Falsehood, vanity, ostentation, and luxury are sketched in all their folly. Truth, clemency, faith, hope, fear of the Lord, and love of God and neighbor — all necessary in every man but especially in a leader of men — are earnestly proposed. Introspection, respect for the possessions of subjects, fore-thought as to whether a measure is licit, expedient, and fitting; meditation, good com- pany, amenability to counsel, restraint and prudence in accept- ing favors, are some more of the royal jewels which the book exhibits. One can clearly see that autocracy is opposite to the con- ception of government here set forth. The ruler is not for him- self, but for God and the People. Right alone is his might. Whatever a regime under such a leader is called, it would, at least in results, amount to the best achievements of a democracy. 4. — Comparison of Thomistic Teaching on Rulers with Later Doctrines It reveals much, to compare St. Thomas' thoughts on rulers briefly with those of some other writers. Dignified as he con- sidered the office of king, he did not presage a Calvinistic view and claim that servile obedience is due the sceptre and that "even an individual of the worst character, one most unworthy of all honor, if invested with public authority, receives that illustrious divine power which the Lord has by His Word devolved on the ministers of His justice and judgment, and accordingly — insofar as public obedience is concerned, he is 397 Idem, Lib. I, cap. 6. 398 Ibidem. St. Augustine is cited : "Ecce habemus humilitatis exem- plum, superbiae medicamentum. Princeps tuus humilis est, et tu su- perbus? Caput est humile, et membrum superbum?" 96 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY to be held in the same honor and reverence as the best of kings. He would not have the people writhe helplessly, while their chief representative plays the fool. We have already seen that Aquinas democratically teaches that, when prudence and patience are exhausted, the people are free to act, through their representatives. The king should be for the good of the State ; if his reign prove vicious, it may be for the good of the State to be rid of him. The Angelic Doctor does not permit piety to exclude practicality. He does not place royalty beyond the reach of the hands which empowered it. The Machiavellian conception of the ruler as a combination of lion and fox is much too pagan to compare wdth the ideal of Aquinas who advises wisdom, but not cunning; strength, but not brutality. He would not have the king govern by fear, when favor fails, but alw^ays by justice and mercy .^^^ He insists that royalty ring true and not assume virtue to mask political extravagance. The difference betw-een Aquinas and the author of II Pnncipe on the subject of rulers is that of body and soul, mind and matter, justice and expedience. It is evident that Thomas stands exceedingly better by the ideals of democracy. Grotius, after championing the doctrine of social contract and thereby abetting the people, surrenders his case by acceding to absolute monarchy. He wTites that the transfer of popular sovereignty may be inspired by the purpose of w^arding off peril; or that it may depend on Aristotle-'s principle that cer- tain men are natural slaves. Some nations, like some individu- als, are fit only for subjection.^oi Grotius proceeds to cite the Cappadocians as an example ; and also the remark of Philostra- tus that it would be folly to set the Thracians, Mysians, and Getae at liberty, ''since they don't like it." The Netherlander does not distinguish sufficiently betw^een the necessity of aliena- tion of power and the total alienation of it. No nation could rationally will to be in puppet-dom to royalty, though many a one has been well pleased w^ith the paternalism and easy sw^ay ^99 Institutes, Bk. IV, ch. XX, par. 25. Quoted by Dunning, Political Theories, II, p. 29. 400 Of. De Erud. Prin., lAh. I, cap. 6. Contrast Machiavelli, II PHncipe (tr), p. 104. 401 De Jure Belli et Pads, Bk. I, ch. HI, par. 8, n.l. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 97 of a royal regime. Too, he teaches the unt-enabiUty of the doc- trine that the end of all government is the good of the governed. Dunning expresses his position thus : ^'A monarch, and especial- ly a monarch with sovereignty in full proprietorship, may rule, like the master over his slaves, for his own interest, or like the husband over the wife, for the joint interest. "^^^ Now St. Thomas considers no nation so abject as to be absolutely incapa- ble of some share in its own rule. His doctrine of rationality evinces this. Individuals may be incapable ; but the aggregate in a state always represents a degree of intelligence and responsi- bility which must be regarded and respected. One draws from the Doctor's views that no ruler is or can be absolutely adequfiiQ^ much less superior, to the community. The natural l^w ig^ bigger than he ; and he is less than the People. The m^^eva^ monk saves democracy, whereas Hugo de Groot, who" liold-^ such an important place in the story of the evolution of jioliticiftj liberty, would sacrifice it. The Hollander's other cont^tio^ that government is not necessarily for the common gooq^;"%u»^ equally counter to democracy and Aquinas. ^ • 7 Hobbes lifts a sceptre to the stars with one hand, while throttles democracy Avith the other. He repudiates the kind of natural law which St. Thomas regards as reigning in all men, endowing them with a dignity akin to the divine, in- spiring the charity and justice without which democracy is a far cry, and uniting them into a glorious brother-hood. He depreciates as mere conclusions and theorems, those findings of man's rational nature which take expression in law and cus- tom. Law proper, he teaches, is the voice of the king."^^^ The dangers of such a doctrine are as evident as the merit of the opposite principles which are proposed in the politics of St. Thomas. Again Aquinas stands forth, by contrast, in demo- cratic high-light. Locke's best contribution to political theory, is his doctrine of natural rights. He refuses to make the subject the pawn of the king. Life, liberty, and property are as sacred to the inferior to the superior. "Absolute arbitrary power, or governing with- 402 Op. cit., p. 185. See the De Jure, Bk. I, ch. Ill, par. 8, n. 2. 403 Leviathan, De Homine, cap. XV. 98 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY out settled standing laws/' he teaches, ''can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under, Avere it not to preserve their lives, liberties, and fortunes; and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. Certainly, in such tenets, the mind of St. Thomas is respected. Aquinas is all the more refreshing, for being so much the earlier, with a presentment of these richly democratic elements. But the Englishman's distinction lies in the degree of definiteness with which he applies principles, which may be found in Thomistic pages. Much of Aquinas' political doctrine is incidental and fragmen- tary; but Locke treats politics ex professo and proposes clearlj^ many points which Thomas merely implies or urges in a general way. The interesting and important fact is that, on the sub- ject of rulers, they appear to be kindred souls. The Father of Modern Liberty could in this, as in other political views, be the son of Thomas of Aquin. 404 Treatises on Government, II, sec. 137. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 99 CHAPTOR V FORMS OF GOVERNMENT 1. — Governments St. Thomas' classification of governments is based on Aris- totle's. The Philosopher views polities as consulting the com- mon weal or not, and accordingly they are either good or bad. But as to power, he finds it in the hands of one, the few ,or the many: and, from this aspect, governments are monarchical, arstocratic, and political or democratic. These forms have their opposites: tyranny, oligarchy, ochlarchy.^^^ Aristotle uses the word ''polity" to express our word ''democ- racy;" a name which, as he himself observes, is common to all other fair governments. He apparently sees the true democratic spirit present in each and every just regime, and, indeed, as the basis of all ; resulting in an organized pursuit of the general welfare and, consequently, a decent and consistent general re- gard for the good of the individual. Both Aquinas and the Philosopher consider a man to be as much a man under a king as in a republic ; and neither of them finds any reason why he should be treated as less. Both of these superior minds manifest a degree of indiffer- ence to the type of government, so long as the purpose of the 405 See Politics, I, 2, and the De Reg.. I, 1. (Cf. Plato's classification Repub., VIII, 1, 2: Aristocracy, the best form, and its corruptions. The latter are: timocracy, wherein property was a condition of citizen- ship; oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.) But in the 4th book, ch. 7th, of the Politics, Aristotle classifies govern- ments as monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and aristocracy; which is slightly different from St. Thomas' classification. He mentions, too, the polity. (For an explanation of this particular form of government, see Thirwall, History of Greece, I, ch. X, p. 158.) It seems that the Philosopher takes liberties with his original classification, which is the one adopted by Aquinas, and quotes democracy and oligarchy as good forms; though he considered aristocracy and polity the better. 100 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY people is achieved.^oe Aristotle in his Politics, 111, 7, and Aqui- nas in his De Regimine, I, 1, present the list of polities and ex- pose the forms into which they may deteriorate. The king who seeks his own interest and not the people's, says St. Thomas, turns the government into a tyranny, oppressing by power instead of ruling by justice. The aristocracy which honors opulence more than ethics, is no aristocracy at all, but a base bureaucracy, differing from a tyranny only numerically. Final- ly, a people, rising up in defiance of conscience and overwhelm- ing justice with numbers, is a mammoth despot and most un- democratic. Aquinas believes injustice to be injustice, whether it is committed by one or many. Differently from such as Hegel, Ruemelin, Treitschke, and Bernhardi, he does not lift the State above the moral law. Nor does he place civil, or any other species of morality, on a shaky Bentham basis of the ' 'greatest good for the greatest number." For him, the many are as obliged to the simple dictates of conscience as the one. The wrongs which the few do them, cannot be righted by wrongs on their own part. When the State requires reconscruction, radicalism rather than justice is destruction rather than relief. The facility with which unjust governments often turn into each other instead of into their betters, is a lesson of Thomistic politics. The tide of reckless and ruthless revolt may sweep away an autocrat, only to throw up another or others into his place. And blood, profusely shed, calls to heaven in weary per- plexity : when an obtuse people change their rulers and delude themselves that they have changed their rules .^^^ For a mod- ern instance, Nicholas was only palely imperial besides some of the present Russian personalities who are supposed ta represent the total departure of the old order. 406 Cf. Woodrow Wilson's ''The State,'' p. 598. See Montagne, Rev- ue Thomiste, Vol. 8, 1900, art. La pense de saint Thomas sur les for- mes, de government "Le saint Doctour n'est pas une adversaire pre- venu, mais une juge clairvoyant et impartial. II examine avec atten- tion, il prononce sans parti pris, il parle sans amertume; mais il s'ex- prime aussi sans flatterie, sans reticences, sans deguisement, avec le calme, la serenite, et la noble independence du philosophe consciencieux qui n'a cure de I'opinion des hommes et que preoccupe seulement la recherche de la verite." 407 See De Reg., Lib. I, ch. 5. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 101 The Philosopher and the Doctor's classification of governments has passed into a tradition and is generally accepted. Still it has had to encounter much criticism some of which is men- tioned by Crahay.*^^ Passay repudiates the principle of such a division, believing that the ancients wrongly judged power to be sovereign and that those who possessed it had the right to impose their will on everybody else.^o^ He declares that the difference among governments consists rather in their relations with the governed ; and, on this ground, he finds two kinds of polity, republican and monarchical, according as the people exer- cise, or not, the fullness of civil power.^^^ But this classification is fundamentally Aristotle's and St. Thomas', only that theirs is more thoughtful. He makes the relation between governors and governed the point of differentiation; but such relation is occasioned and characterized by the transfer of power, as he himself admits. Now the transmission must be made to the one, the few, or the many, in gTeater or less degree ; and, if so, Passy agrees with Aquinas and the Philosopher. It is evident, we shall see, that they did not deem the alienation of power in- variably as total. De Laveleye believes that the line of division may be better determined by the asking ^'Who actually exercises the sover- eignity and enacts the laws — the king or the nation If the former, the regime is autocratic, even though there is a parliament; if the latter, the rule is democratic, even though there is a king. One can see the inadequacy of such a criterion, and appreciate that of Aquinas all the more by comparison. De Laveleye seems to forget that in every good government the people are ultimately the ruling power; for from and by them the rulers are empowered, and act in justice and prudence only when they are directed by the best of public opinion, since their own thought would be inadequate, not only in itself but in its efficacy ."^^^ It is only in virtue of their public office that 408 Op. cit., pp. 70-72. 409 Des formes de gouvernement, p. 11. 410 Idem, p. 7. Cf. Montesquieu's division of governments into re- publics, monarchies, and despotisms; and de Haller's, into monarchies and polyarchies. 411 Le gouvernement dans la democratie, t. I, p. 197. 412 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XC, a. 3. 102 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY they are potent at all. They are the servants of the common- wealth, and a means by which it secures the blessings of civil existence to itself: at least, in the thoroughly democratic Thomistic sense.^i-^ And, therefore, w^hat Laveleye would call autocracy, St. Thomas would likely denominate tyranny. Be- sides, Laveleye's classification is too general, and is almost as unsatisfactory as that of St. Thomas w^ould have been, had he contented himself with mentioning that politics are of tw^o kinds, excellent and evil. The Angelic Doctor gives the species as well as the genera. The question is, should the quanity of rulers or the quality of the rule determine the nature of the State? Those who think that Aquinas considered numbers the only determinant, disre- gard that he mentions also merit. For him, polities must be primarily marked off as just or unjust ; and only then are they differentiated by the number of their rulers. Blunchli observes that difference in number is in relation to difference in charac- ter>i* This may be so. But Aristotle and Aquinas realize that the truest test of a polity is its promotion of the public good ; and this is not so dependent on the number of rulers as on the supremacy of right. Wherever they speak of a good polity as a monarchy, an aristocracy, or an out-and-out democracy, they always mean one in which the good of the people is para- mount, equity prevails, and a popular interest is awake. 2. — Monarchy According to St. Thomas Aquinas does not seem explicitly to choose any government, since considerations are so many and cases so diverse. But in his distinctive work De Regimine he writes mostly on monar- chy; because this purely political piece is addressed to a king. It is necessary to view his thoughts on sovereigns without preju- dice. He offers no apology for the rulers who wTapped royalty in opprobrium. His denunciation of them, is forceful and fiery 413 Z)e Reg., Lib. I, cap. 3. 414 Th. gcner. de V£tat. Liv. VI, ch. 1, p. 295. Antoniades, Die Staats- lehere des Thomas ah Aquino, p. 21. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRIXE AXD DEMOCRACY 103 with philosophy and Scripture. But he beheves that there should be a central personality in a polity to give it consistency and unity : a theory to which we ourselves today certainly sub- scribe, with our President, governors, and mayors. Translated into modern thought, St Thomas says that the State must not be all body and no head. Contrary to modern conception, he does not teach that monarch}^ is exclusively the rule of an hered- itary dynasty.4^^ As Crahay notes in the Doctor's teaching: the hereditary monarchy is on\j a type, and, at that, not the most characteristic. According to St. Thomas, the monarchy is the rule of one who owes his authority not only to merit but to the election of the citizens. A search for any sanction of evil historical absolutism in the politics of St. Thomas, is futile. He indicates that monarchies should be elective. Which is the teaching also of his Commentary. The chief objection of his- tory to dynasties is that they foisted inefficiency and depravity on the State. The main demur of psychology is that the ra- tional nature of the people is contemned, when no word in the selection of those whom they are supposed to obey, is conceded them. Aquinas honors both these attitudes, by affirming that election is superior to succession. It is better, he says, that a ruler be appointed in the way in w^hich per se it happens that the better man is found ; but by election the better man is more surely secured than by succession ; for here there is a field for choice. Besides, election is more consistent wdth the rational appetencies of the people.^^^ Nevertheless, as elsewhere noted, he teaches that per accidens the hereditary monarchy may not be such an evil after all, when compared with the commotion and base politics which a frequent change of rulers can occa- sion : conditions of which we ourselves are painfully aware, in our own countrv^*^^ Again, Aquinas notices the incongruity which arises when my equal of today becomes my superior of 415 See Crahay, op. cit., p. 73. 416 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 14. 417 Such a writer as Lecky says. "In my own opinion, the ballot, in any country where politics rests on a really sound and independent basis, is essentially an evil." Democracy and Liberty, I, p. 89. St. Thomas refuses to go so far. For him the ballot may be accidentally an evil, but is not essentially such. 104 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY tomorrow ; as is the case where election ser\'es.4i8 But these de- merits do not quash his tenet that the democratic designation of rulers is the better plan. It should be remembered, however, that, even when a government is hereditary, St. Thomas regards the people as its foundation. The popular choice merely goes farther back, and is renewed in a tacit acceptance of successive sovereigns. It is possible for even an elective government to be absolute. And the question as to whether Aquinas regarded royal power as unlimited, is pertinent. Crahay answers with a distinction between the ideal monarchy and the concrete. As an ideal, the Angelic Doctor seemingly favored the absolute form, where- in the king is amenable to no law, save his own conscience f-^ in the practical order, however, he expressly abondoned it. One may be unduly influenced by etymology in adjudging St. Thomas' meaning when he uses the word monarchy. But words are living things, and grow and change in significance. It is better to interpret St. Thomas, when he uses the expression, not etymologically but from the spirit of his politics, which is popular. We should be cautious in attributing even a theore- tical absolutism to him ; for, as we have already seen, his esti- mation of the character of custom was too high to permit him to place a monarch, ruling even without a single wTitten law, much higher. True, he admits that a good sovereign may legitimately adopt drastic measures; but he amends that this may be done only when the public good demands.^^i And, then, the people cannot he unwilling that their interests be advanced and that their ruler have the power to advance them. The Thomistic monarch is always a democrat; for he must forget himself in his people. He is powerful insofar as he is faithful to the public trust.*- A casual recall of the virtues which Aquinas prescribes for rulers and the limitations which he throws around their exercise of authority (see ch. IV) will suf- 418 Com. PoUt., Lib. Ill, lec. 14. 419 Op. cit., pp. 74-75. 420 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. CV, a. 1, ad. 5. 421 Ibidem. 422 Cf. Woodrow Wilson's The State, p. 594. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 105 fice to suggest how little he inclined to absolutism, even in a so- called absolute monarchy. Feugeuray does not strike conviction when he presents St. Thomas' mind on monarchy. The Doctor, in speculation, ac- cording to him, believes that royal authority has no legal limits, that the king is obliged to conform to no laws but those of his conscience, that he governs by his own will, that he is the source of law and that he personifies in himself the totality of power.*23 All of w^hich jars miserably on the Thomistic theory of law and popular representation, and tends to falsify it. To accept Feu- gueray on this point would be to sacrifice Aquinas. The latter's idea of monarchy ought not be considered apart from his other concepts. It is an historical fact that some monarchs were absolute. This was so because it was permitted to be so. Aquinas real- ized and recognized the situation, but does he theorize on it as an ideal? On the contrary, he advises the people to temper the power of their rulers.*-"^ He does not explain in detail how sovereignty should be shortened, in his De Regimine. Succeed- ing years were largely to solve that part of the problem. When Feugueray writes that he has searched without success in Thom- istic pages for a single line on the limitation of royal power, such as parliaments, congresses, or the matter of taxation, some retorts are befitting. As Crahay remarks, to csLrp at the Angelic Doc- tor's reticence in these regards would be to blame the silence of the dead."*25 Both his De Regimine and his Summa lie un- completed by his own hand. Secondly, he was writing in the former work to, for, and npt against, a supreme, though petty, sovereign. Thirdly, strong monarchs were necessary in that rest- less^ medieval period in which the din of arms was incessant. Fourthly, all those judging the Saint a theoretical absolutist who gave no circumscription of roj^al omnipotence, should have read the De Regimine, not as an isolated book, but in re- lation to other Thomistic works. Aquinas' theory^ of mixed government with which we shall deal presently, sanctions the re- 423 Feugeuray, op. cit., quoted by Crahay, p. 76. 424 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 6. 425 Op. cit., p. 77. 106 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRIXE AND DEMOCRACY pression of royal power in a manner which an exacting modern and democratic mind would find reasonable and satisfactory^ It is in justice to the politics of St. Thomas to read autocracy into them, becauuse he deems the government good which has a firm centre, and devotes so much attention to the subject of unity. This is no more dissonant with democracy than the voice of a staunch American. How much the nation will de- pend on a personal hub for its motion, Thomas democratically leaves it to the nation to determine. But without a pivot, pol- itics is madness. If he suggests that the civil axis should sometimes be a strong one, so as to ser\'e w^ell the whirl of affairs, he is wise. Few rulers have ever been politically braw- nier than the brainy ones behind the best democracies in history. It is St. Thomas' idea that, of the public servants of the State, one should be chief, which is most valuable and telling. Every ship should have a captain, though the crew and the passen- gers are much more precious and important. We repeat that Aquinas approves of monarchy only when and insofar as the best interests of the people are enchanced and advanced ])y it.^-^ And therefore he is irreproachably democratic even in his monarchical approaches. He teaches that the excellent polity is that which accords with the wishes of the governed.^^r St. Thomas' conception of tyranny sets in high light the de- mocracy of his idea of monarchy. He resolves this wrong of gov- ernment into three elements: first, self-seeking on the part of the sovereign ; secondly, rule of the people not in conformity with their consent and in spite of their dissent ; thirdly, the mailed fist.^28 ^ tyranny is, to him, the worst form of misrule ; and he is at pains in his De Regimine (cap. Ill) to show how civil rights and ideals are wronged by it. He approves of limited monarchy on the obvious ground that the absolute brand, to be just, would require a sovereign of perfect virtue. And since such virtue is found in few, and hence the slip into tyranny would almost always be imminent, he is alert to find his ideal in some such form of government as we see realized in England 426 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 2. 427 Com. Pout., Lib. II, lec. 1. 428 Z)e Reg., Lib. I, cap. 1. et 10. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 107 or America today .^^^ There is little doubt that a world weary of political strife would welcome the advent of a sufficiency of of saint-scholars to assume the leadership of each nation, to re- lieve the people of political care, to govern in accord with the best rational experience of the best minds of the respective peo- ples, and to procure the reign of perfect justice. Who would object to investing such manifest personifications of efficiency and merit with plenipotentiary powers? Aquinas means little more than this, when he praises the rule of one.^s^ As a prevention of governmental excess, the admonitions of Aquinas, though terse, are helpful today as when first couched. The people must take the appointment of their ruler seriously and tr}^ hard to place the right man in the right place. '^^^ Here Thomas touches the vice of civil indifference which explains most of our modern political corruption. Secondly, the power of the sovereign is to be tempered.*^- This proposition is pregnant with the solutions of the problems of the proper exercise of sovereignty, which Fuegueray says he could not find. It must have fired the imagination of the thirteenth and succeeding centuries. It would not be too rash even to offer that the Thomistic doctrine on royal repression contains in embryo the idea which exalts Montesquieu: the separation of the departments of governments, whereby limi- tation of sovereign power is so effectually secured. We shall see more of this in the Commentary on Aristotle. Thirdly, St. Thomas teaches that the vicious laws of the extravagant and unjust ruler do not bind the people in con- science. A man is directly answerable only to God, and to rulers only insofar as they represent and reflect in their own measures the goodness of His law. The Doctor mentions the three ways in which civil acts may be seen as fair and worthy of obedience: ex fine, when they are for the popular good ; ex forma, when the burdens which they entail are distributed impartially; ex auc- tore, when they do not exceed the authority of the legislator.^^^ 429 Si/ mma Theol., la 2ae, qu. CV, a. 1, ad 2: Cf. Montagne, Revue Thomiste Vol. VIII, 1900, p. 688. 430 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, VII, 14. 431 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 6. 432 Ibidem. 4.33 Swmma Theol., la, 2ae, qu. XCVI, a. 4. 108 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY These norms, one or more, are violated in the unjust poHty ; and hence Aquinas, in such condition, would have the individual free, save insofar as the obligation of avoiding scandal or dis- turbance obtains.-^^-^ The texts of the Commentary in which monarchy is described, are not at all disproof of what has already been said anent Aqui- nas and theoretical absolutism. Therein he interprets Aris- totle and describes governments as they were, rather than as they should be. The Philosopher put in his pages what he saw in his life, and Eastern autocracy was certainly a large part of his intellectual vision. It is fair to remember that Aquinas offers description rather than apology when he writes that the out-and-out monarch is a self-sufficiency whose code is his own will.^"^'^ He plainly refers to the absolute regime of a solitary sovereign not as monarchy itself, but as a certain type of mon- archy suggesting again that he admits the popular form fav- ored by modern political development. In fact he admits the admission.^37 ^he whole tenor of the thought of Aquinas on monarchy nms toward a wise liberalism. The advantages of a strongly centralized government, were clear and bright to him. The main fault of feudalism, that it thrust the king into the clouds and allowed a scale of isolated subordinates to press down the people, was evident too. Europe needed a vigorous rule by a two-handed man, Charlemagne-like, in those turbulent times when the coUosal Empire was breaking up. Aquinas would have been fully justified in teaching explicitly the desirability of highly empowered royality for this time. Rut possibly he foresaw what the political unrest of the area would mean for the people of the future, if it were permitted to yield its natural results. He realized that feudalism had two redeeming quali- ties: it was a step nearer to popular government ; and, secondly, it could not last. He did not obviously try to kill an institution quite capable of dying by itself. But he did seek to keep alive the best advantage that feudalism offered, which was the check it placed on royal assumptions. Though kings were essen- 434 Ibidem. 43.-, Com. Polit.. Lib. Ill, lec. 15. 430 Idem., Lib. IV, lec. 4. 437 Ibidem: Alia est politia polyarchica in qua plures principantur." ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 109 tial to his day, and strong ones too, he preferred somewhat to sacrifice utiUty to a principle which he perceived would even- tuate in greater future utility. Certainly he draws a signifi- cant circle around the throne, which marks a limit to monarchi- cal power rather than a bar to the will and influence of the peo- ple. And here in the Middle Ages is the first doctrinal expo- sition of a brand of politics, limiting governors and freeing the governed, which grew into the richly democratic constitutions of later centuries. It cannot be over-emphasized that, when St. Thomas praises monarchy, he is speaking particularly for his own time when it had its advantages, and the world was not yet ready for a wave of democracy. Referring again to his Commentary on Aristotle's Politics, we find many details on monarchy, the venerable form of govern- ment which is more maligned than understand in our age of freedom. Let us recall Aquinas' doctrine on the purpose of the State. Not merely livelihood, nor mutual service, nor wealth, is the rational objective of civil society, but a good and happy life for the people. Modern thought has fixed ''liberty" as the guage of political success; and whatever portion of our enthu- siasm has not been consecrated to the toppling of thrones, is devoted to socialistic programs of robbing rich Peter to pay his poor and extremely plural brother Paul. Aquinas shows that liberty and riches are neither fitting repositories for civil power nor meet purposes for it, and that the most satisfied citizens are not the unrestrained kind, who have quaffed the beaker of Life to the dregs, nor the sorrier type, who have been able to buy everything subject to the magic of money, only to be bored. He teaches that virtue can give truer and deeper satisfaction than all the hectic experiences in all the abandoned careers in the world. His politics pleads for an ordered and regulated existence, whereas modern thought pictures the millenium as the flight of all restraint. His stand is against the unwhole- some struggle for wealth and novelty, and for the inspiration of simpler and saner motives. Shall we grant with him that the main labor of the State does not consist in making life more free for the individual? Surely, we must concede that the indivi- dual wo\ild be much more free, for that matter, if the State never existed, and that, therefore, lack of circumscription is not 110 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY exactly tlie supreme good of civil society. Besides, what is lib- erty? ' Different peoples have conceived it differently, as Montes- quieu observes. Some place it in the power to depose a tyrant ; others in the faculty of electing governors ; others in the right to exercise force; others in rule by laws; still others even in the wearing of a long beard.^^^ America finds it largely in self-ex- pression. But reason tells us that we have no right to express the wrong that is in us. Montesquieu well asserts that, in a State, liberty properly consists in the untrammelled power of doing what one ought to will, and in not being forced to do what one ought not will, rather than of doing what one wills.^^^ Shall we agree with him that, while the State should assure the individual of opportunity to secure the necessities of life, it does not exist essentially to make all its members wealthy? This should not be too difficult, in our dawning realization that 'Sve must cease our efforts to make men comfortable and begin to make them better.''-^ Then we can see the logic of his con- tention that the polity which knits a nation together best, supplying the unity which makes for peace and the order which promotes virtue, may not be the worst form of government after all, even if it does not admit of so many so-called liberties and harmful luxuries. But with Aristotle he pondei^ carefully whether monarchy is better adapted for practical purposes than any other regime. He follows the Philosopher's division of royalty into four types : (1) The Spartan variety which was a sort of persistent gen- eralship.^i The kingly power descended from the skies, ac- cording to Miieller,'*^- and did not rise up from the people. If so, the Doric regiilation of regal power by law, in peace, seems somewhat inconsistent. AVe are brought to recognize a genn of liberalism even in Spartan rigor. 438 Cf. Uesprit des lois. Livre XI, ch. 2. 43t» Ibidem. 440 See Dr. G. T. Patrick's Psychology and Religion (Houghton, Mif- fln, 1920). 441 As Mueller observes {Dorians. Vol. II, ch. 6.), the Spartan sov- ereigns were, in war both priests and princes like Homer's Agamemnon and Vergil's Anius. 442 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 13. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 111 (2) The extreme hereditary type. The Philosopher asso- ciates it with barbarism. In it, he declares, kings are invested with power almost to the point of tyranny ; but the people are still safe-guarded, inasmuch as the monarch is bound by the laws and customs of the land. It is the polity most prevalent in the Orient. Aquinas, commenting, does not use the word ^'barbar- ian" in the conceited Greek sense of non-Hellenic, but with the natural meaning of non-awakened or intellectually-iacking. He again gives emphatic evidence that when he speaks of mon- archy as ideal, he does not intend the Oriental type — constructed of a supine people and a solitary individual. He has much finer and more democratic aspirations for the AVestern world, es- teeming it the fitting portion of the earth for the development of free-er poltical institutions. The calibre of the Occident so requires.-^ The only rational explanation he can find for Eastern absolutism is the people themselves. He lays down the psychological principle : ''That which is according to incli- nation is natural and voluntary. ''^^ And he applies it to poli- tics. He charges the polity directly to the people.-*^^ The democracy of his thought shines forth even when Asia is his subject. Shifting the explanation and justification of a polity to the people, and out of the realm of autocracy, he does for politics, in company with the Philosopher, something akin to that which Copernicus accomplished for astronomy. The mon- arch is no longer the genuine force even in an oriental-politi- cal extravagance, but the people who accredit and empower him. (3) Aquinas presents an elective system of monarchy which combines all the features of absolutism. The Greeks called it Aesymneteia. In this unusual polity, authority was not held by 443 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, cap. 13. 444 Ibidem. 445 Ibidem. 446 Ibidem. "Et ideo isti barbari sustinent principatum dominativum sine tristitia, quia inclinatonem habent ad sustinendum ipsum." Cf, Thirwall's History of Greece, Vol. I, ch. X, in which he declares that the cause of the abolition of royalty in early Hellas is to be sought "in that same energy and versatility which prevented it from ever stiffening even in its infancy, in the mould of oriental institutions; and from stopping short, in any career which it had once opened, before it had passed through every stage." 112 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY the monarch for life, but until some necessary object of State was attained. The Greek Aesymneteia may be said to correspond to the Roman dictatorship. It combined the character of tyran- ny with that of monarchy : the former, because in the words of Saint Thomas, the leaders reigned principatu dominativo ; the latter, because they thus ruled by consent and through elec- tion. Now knowing that Aquinas held tyranny a corrupt form of government to be shunned, we at once realize that he lacked sympathy for this hybrid Graeco-Oriental type. He does not condone tyranny even when the people do ; and, in this respect, his thought and sentiment bestride the crest of democ- racy. Pie deems it unworthy of a people to genuflect before their rulers and rise up — slaves. Like Aristotle, he could ac- cept absolutism in the practical order only as a temporary exi- gency. He saw it as an abnormality and extremity, justifiable only as promissory of an extraordinar}' good to the State. (4) The limited monarchy, such as obtained in heoric times, next engages his interest. It implies : first, a free people ; sec- ondly, submission to a royal rule; thirdly, the subjection of kingship to the laws and customs of the land. A consideration of this polity brings us back to the very morning of the race and the birth of the first states. Here at the basis of civil society Aquinas finds freedom, and opens a pure spring of democracy which bubbles through his political doctrine, keeping it fresh and wholesome. Leaders of men there were, from the start ; yet their ability alone did not make them such, but their ability plus the consent of the people.^^ The proximate causes of their elevation were some signal services to the populace in arms or arts. St. Thomas mentions, for instance, the case of Saturnus who was the first to teach Italia to sow wheat and who thereby won the reputation of a god among his fellow-men. Again, these early heroes may have achieved eminence by collecting the people into states or procuring possessions for them. But Aquinas repeats that their power was the concomitant of popular consent and was limited. He even refers to them, despite their prestige and potency as quasi rulers; for he is not unmindful '^1 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, cap. 14. 448 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, cap. 13. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 113 that the people had customs and unwritten laws before the ad- vent of their heroes, and, since these men were just benefactors, they ruled in accord with the best traditions and were duly sub- ordinate to them. Aquinas mentions that their power shrank in the course of time to the most meagre proportions.^^ He is con- scious from history of the mutability of polities and hence does not advocate a rigid regime in the face of shifting conditions. His ideal government would be firm but not adamantine. Still, let us remember, he does not think that authority, once vested in a particular form, should be lightly withdrawn. So long as the chosen government remains just and is achieving the pur- poses of the State effectively, he sees popular unrest as unrea- sonable. In fact he even speaks of such a condition as the peo- ple usurping power. Though it coimes from them, he evi- dently believes that they have no right to reclaim it, after ex- plicity or implicity alienating it, unless it is abused or injudi- ciously wielded (see Chapter II). (5) Finally he mentions the government which is absolutism full-blown. These five forms, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, really fall into two : monarchy according to law, and monarchy accord- ing to the %*irtue of the ruler ; in more modern words, constitu- tional and unlimited.^'^^ There is no doubt that the latter kind, in the impossible case of a paragon of a king, wooed the imagination of the Angelic Doctor. It meant compactness, and unity. His thought was too synthetic to separate aesthetics even from politics. Aristotle puts the question squarely for Aquinas and all the world to ponder : is it best to be governed by the best of men, or by the best of laws?*^^ Neither the Philosopher nor the Doctor is arbitrary in his response. In favor of government by the just and efficient individual, we recall their observation that the language of law is general, whereas life is composed of partic- 449 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, cap. 13. 450 Ibidem. Cf. de Haller's classification of monarchies: (1) Hereditary and ter- ritorial; (2) Military; (3) Spiritual. Restauration de la Science poli- tique, t. II, ch. XXIV. Politics, III, 15. Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 14. 114 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY iilarities. Law lacks the delicate and sympathetic touch of humanhood. So that the best man, with prudence, good will, and judgment, would fill the requirement better.^-^^ According- ly as law is defective, the personal element is needed to perfect the polity. The indication, then, is that a combination of mon- arch and law give a prudent regime.^-^^ On the other hand Aquinas examines and admits the virtue of that form of government which is solely according to law. It is plain to him that the ruling force, whether personal or constitutional, should have a universal field and no favor.^^ He believes that the head should lead the heart in politics, and not vice versa. The law is as cold, firm, and unmistakable as an obelisk, obvious to all, alike for all. The Doctor finds a hardy element of democratic assurance in this fact which seems to strike his fancy .^•'^^ Still he does not see why this should cast the idea of human rule into the discard. For a man, though emotional, is also de- liberative. He can control his prejudices and passions, investi- gate cases carefully, and make decisions justly. Aquinas does not care to have the State a complete political mechanism, as it would doubtless be, if an impersonal code were its only motor. He wishes the living brains which created civil society constantly to share in its conservation and advancement. It is not enough for the nation to set up a constitution and then sit back to rest indefinitely, as though the ultima thule of politics were attained. He holds that neither the best law nor the best man is nearly so rich an asset to the commonwealth as both together. In this de does not sacrifice democracy, so much as he safeguards it. 3. — Aristocracy With Aristotle, St. Thomas next considers whether it would be better to have several good men ruling according to law, than one, i. e., should aristocracy be preferred to monarchy? His 4o2 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 14. 453 See Ch. IV. 454 Com Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 14. 455 Ibidem. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 115 answer is critical. In an aristocracy, dissention would readily arise in those cases not easily determinable by the established law; whereas the single ruler could carr}^ the situation with more calm and expedition. Nevertheless, since two or more heads are better than one, an aristocracy should be able to effect wiser measures than a monarchy .^^^^ This, of course, would apply to the many much more pertinently than to the few ; and democracy at this point scores heavily in the doctrine of the Stagirite and Aquinas. They point to another fact which enhances democracy: many are less liable to corruption than few or one. The broad ocean is more free from contagion than a brooklet could be. In numbers is safety. Moreover, while a single ruler could easily be conquered by his own distem- pers, it w^ould be comparatively difficult for a whole community thus to be overcome.*^' Treading firmly on democratic ground, they agree that, if the people are the liberty-loving, intelligent, and virtuous type, there is no reason why their voice should not be dominant.^'"^^ Though they were really discussing aris- tocracy, their thought at this juncture had taken a democratic turn. In answer to the objection that in a rule of many there would be much division and little unity, they state that men of quality are capable of finding, and agreeing on, a common basis, while their very character renders them superior to the petty .^^^ The Aristotelian and Thomistic doctrine informs us that mon- archy was probably the first form of government, for the simple reason that, in the morning of humanit}^ it was impossible to find many persons pre-eminently qualified for general rulership, especially as the original commonwealths were smalL"^^^ We are free to infer that St. Thomas looked upon monarchy as often more necessary than natural, and the more liberal forms of gov- ernment as frequently more natural than necessary. The de- scription of the passing of one polity into another under the impact of conditions of State is a prominent feature of the Saint's doctrine on political forms. Extreme monarchies, w^hen 456 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, cap. 14. 457 Ibidem. 458 Ibidem. 459 Ibidem. 460 Ibidem. 116 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY just, being chiefly expediencies, were not to enjoy an exceeding duration. When many persons of equal ability would appear smultaneously and refuse to brook a superiority, the crown would vanish and an era of aristocracy would begin. Then aristocracy, losing its first fervor, would batten on the common- wealth and fall into an oligarchy. According as one of the rulers became richer and mightier than his colleagues, he sub- jugated them, and the tyranny of the few became that of one man. At this state, the people, awakened to a realization of their rights by their wrongs, would rise up and eject the tyrant and the day of democratic glory would break. We have seen the objections of the Philosopher and the Doc- tor to absolute monarchy, in the practical order. So we may now pass directly to a view of the free-er forms, to which their approval of the limitation of sovereignty is such a fitting pre- lude. Like Aristotle, Aquinas perceives the link between the na- ture of the people and the form of their government ; just as nations differ, so do and should their polities. Those accus- tomed to the guidance of a family of eminent virtue and sub- missive by nature, are fitted for monarchy. Those w^ho are quickened and keen to the desire and delight of freedom, and are naturally restive under royal reign, are better suited to aris- tocracy. While the fully aroused populace, with open minds and hearts, yet with a talent for obedience as well as for com- mand, are ready for a democracy It is largely a question of national quality and character: a fact w^hich ought not be ignored in our more vehement than well-advised campaigns to launch democracy wholesale on the world today. Nations should be free ; but each should choose for itself its own kind of government. To force democracy on any people would be highly undemocratic. In respect to the people, there are two kinds of government, from which the others are derived. Aquinas compares them to the pair of winds, Australis and Borealis, which sweep the earth ; or again to the tw^o species of music, Doric and Phrygian. Poli- 461 Com. Polit., Lib. Ill, lec. 16. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 117 ties of the many, and those of the few : this is the division be- yond monarchy.^6- Let us consider first the good government of the few, which is aristocracy. AVe may ehde oHgarchy ; for though Aristotle, after stigmatizing it as a corrupt form of government, apparent- ly does not reject it as such, Aquinas and history do.*^ The Philosopher and the Doctor are of the opinion that the state which is governed by the very best men, absolutely fit in every ethical and political sense, has a right to be called an aristo- cracy.*^^ Not only the best men, but also the best principles, are essential to such a polity in its purity. Three types of aris- tocracy which decline from the ideal are mentioned: first, the kind in which wealth is mingled with excellence as the stan- dard for ci\al position secondly, the Carthaginan species of aristocracy, admitting the elements both of wealth and democ- racy;*^^ thirdly, the simple Lacedaemonian model, in which wealth did not figure, but virtue and the democratic strain. Finally, whenever any free state tends to the domination of the few, its polity may in the broad sense, be called aristocratic. By a free state is meant one in which the democratic proclivity is pronounced.*^^ Thus we come \ds-a-vis to democracy in the politics of Aristotle and Aquinas. 4. — Democracy Though Aristotle places democracy in his list of inferior gov- ernments, it is not wholly objectionable. It is in contrast with a polity that it appears defective. But a polity is, in the Phi- losopher's mind, as w^ell as the St. Thomas', merely democracy at its best: duly pared down to proportions of stability, safety, and success. It can be readily seen that a polity does not rep- resent pure democracy; yet, according to the Philosopher, it 462 Com. Polit., Lib. IV, lec. 2. 463 Cf. Thirwall, History of Greece, Vol. I, ch. 10. 464 Com. Polit., Lib. IV, lec. 6. 465 Ibidem. 466 Ibidem. 467 Ibidem. 468 Idem., Lib. IV, cap. 7. 118 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRIXE AXD DEMOCRACY means the best democracy. This is significant. It advises that citi- zens with suffrage should know how to use it well, and have some leisure to devote to state-affairs ; else the common good were constantly imperilled. The poHty excludes the dregs of society. Undiluted democracy is defined in the Commentary as a state wherein the freemen and the poor, as a majority rule.469 Aqui- nas rejects as inaccurate that characterization of democracy as the form of government whereby the supreme power is lodged in the people. For, as we have already observed, the term '^people" is catholic, and, in politics, may mean anything or nothing. A democracy in name might be far from democratic in reality. Power, the presence of which in a particular class of the State gives character to the rule, is a changing quantity, very sensitive to circumstance. NominallV, sovereignty in a democracy is popular; yet if, for example, the rich few should be able and permitted to sway the civil situation, democracy would be stultified to the extent of really amounting to oligar- chy. It is sound advice in x-Vristotelian-Thomistic politics that democrac}^, to be genuine as a form of government, must not only regard the people as the ultimate source of power; it must also prevent any particular portion of the people, repre- senting interests apart from the whole, to absorb the civil force.^'^ The purest democracy, Aristotle declares, is that which is so called chiefly because of the equality which reigns in it.*'''^ Still this equality is political only ; for men will always be un- equal in reality. And it can be readily seen, since such is so, that under any other form of good government according to law, the same effect of civil equality is achieved. For law, to be such, must be alike for the whole citizenry and binding on all. A more distinguishing mark of democracy is the one which the Philosopher mentions farther on ; that, if lib- erty and equality are to be found principally in a democracy, this requisite is best realized by every department of government being alike open to alL*^^ Democracy, like monarchy, has 469 Cow. Pout., Lib. IV, lec. 1. 470 Cow. Polit., Lib. IV, lec. 2. 'i'l Politics, IV, 4. 472 Ibidem. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 119 diverse modes. "^'''^ The Aristotelian division which Aquinas adopts, is of modern import : (1) Democracy in which all the citizenry vote. (2) Democracy in which suffrage is tied up with some slight property qualification. (3) Democracy in which all the citizens are possibilities for the tenure of office, so long as their name lacks social or civil smirch. It appears to differ from the first type in that here the government is "according to law." (4) Democracy in which all restriction to the seeking of office is swept away, and anyone within the State is liable to choice. In this case, too, the government is in the law\ (5) Democracy in which the people are superior to the law, and measures are determined and adopted by votes and not by statute. St. Thomas observes that this last form of democracy is really the same as the first and that Aristotle merely repeats himself in a more specific manner.-^'^ He inspects and presents the demerits of this extravagant species of popular government. Here, incidentally, is one of the most valuable bits of his and Aristotle's contribution to the subject of democracy. Primarily, such a government means a brood of demagogues. The State is strong with voices, and weak with the unsubstantiality of them. Very likely. Homer, whom Aristotle quotes, was struck with the terror of tongues when he sang that "ill it fares, when the multitude hold sway.""*"-^ Freedom from fixed law, which indeed is not so much freedom, in the political sense, as it is license, means that the masses darken into many of the manifestations of despotism. The public ear is easily tickled by designing flat- terers. And presently a full-fledged tyranny, all the more ter- rible by its great proportions and corresponding ruthlessness, is lumbering in the State, crushing the best individuals, who are the fewest, and thus destroying the means of escape from the bondage of itself.-*"^ The ancient yet ever new trick of politicians, which seems 473 Com. Polit., Lib. VII, lec. 6. 474 Com. Polit., Lib. IV, cap. 4. 4lo Politics, IV, 4. 476 Com. Polit., Lib. IV, cap. 4. 120 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY to be in continental evidence today, is effectively suggested. The ambitious individual who would climb to the civil pin- nacle may be a fire-breathing preacher of revolution. On the ruins of an old order, and in the new and popular day, he can quietly restore the old system by artfully assuming the place of the deposed monarch. And while the people are felicitating themselves that their freedom is absolute, their savior is be- coming their tyrant and law is being re-established in his will.^""^ Here the Commentary and the De Regimine repeat each other. Finally, Aristotle and Aquinas maintain that this extreme form of democracy is not democracy at all. For, if democracy is to be reckoned among the good forms of gov- ernment, we cannot mean by it a system of inevitable abuse and anarchy. Law is essential;*'^ without it, there is politi- cally no freedom, for rights are unprotected and wrongs spring up on every side. It must be supreme, if the protection and perfection which civil society is to secure the people are not to be merely prospective. The acts of a lawless democracy would have no lasting value, nor universal application; they would be conceived and exercised only Mc et nunc for particular exigencies and aims. Thus government would be unsettled, choppy, indefinite, and inharmonious, until some master hand would grasp the segments and crush them back to some sem- blance of unity, which would mean the end of democracy; or until the people themselves would revert to the necessity of law, which would be the rational limitation of democracy .^"^^ But, as we have already insinuated, law, written or unwritten, is an element of governmental forms other than democracy; and therefore the three species, monarchy, aristocracy, and de- mocracy, when wielded by prudence and justice, are seen to look very much alike. Aquinas apprehends this fact, and explains how a monarchy may be clearly distinguished from an aristocracy or democracy, since they meet and apparently merge in the fact of law which is common to all. In a mon- 477 Ibidem. 478 Com. Polit.. Lib. IV, cap. 4. 479 Recall the Athenian Constitution, according to which the classical example of democracy operated. Tr. by F. G. Kenyon, London, 1891. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 121 archy, he \rates, the law is in the mind and heart of the ruler. (He is referring to the absolute brand.) In the others, it is concreted in code or constitution. Or to use his exact expres- sion, it is written.4^0 This elucidation, however, is not so very strong and is offered only to clarify the thought of the Philoso- pher. It merely throws the distinction back on an accident. Written or unwritten, law, according to Thomistic principles, must be just and advantageous to the people ; else it is no law at all. And so all good governments in the politics of Aquinas are one, inasmuch as reason is their common soul and justice their object. The next appropriate question, then, is: what form of gov- ernment did St. Thomas prefer and prescribe for the majority of cases? Or rather, w^hich one did he think would answer best the needs of the average nation ? We find Aristotle teach- ing that the best polity is comparable to the best-tempered harmony .4^1 Aquinas does not comment on this, but there is no doubt that he accepts it, since it expresses well the spirit of his politics. When the Philosopher, however, identifies dem- ocracy with the soft, and dulcet moods of melody, the Angelic Doctor perchance disagrees. And this would explain his silence with regard to the text. He knew that periods of national transition, so significant and critical, cannot be entrusted to the mutitude but require genuine leaders and guides. Democracy is for periods of peace; but times of stress may dispense with the leadership of the right man or men no more than an army with a commander. It is simple fairness to the politics of the Saint to remember the activity of medieval arms when we are inclined to forget or to minimize the amount of democracy in his doctrine on the species of government. 480 Com. Polit., Lib. IV, cap. 4. 481 Politics, IV, 3. 122 st. thomas' political doctrine and democracy 6. — St. Thomas' Favored Form of Government: the Mixed Type To appreciate the new form of rule which we shall find in his Summa, let us re-consider his De Regimine, where he speaks so highly of monarchy^ and recollect that he was writing to a monarch, and naturally regarding government from the royal point of view, conceding whatever merit it presented. Though the letter is frank as regards kingly duties, it is duly diplomatic in its strictly political references. When he extolls unlimit.ed monarchy, he is star-gazing; for he knows that, in our world of flux and discords, a general reign of the single- sovereignty plan would be as unattainable as a universal and permanent peace, and that the only absolutely absolute ruler that ever was, or will be, is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. The golden shadow of his sanctity falls on his politics ; and, even from a democratic view-point, does it not enhance and beautify his message? It is the office of the earth, as of the individual, to tend to the Creator. The interests of democracy are not injured, but advanced, by a yearning towards idealistic unity and peace, which are finally realized only in the Begin- ning of all things. Who is the End. Even the Pagans were awed with the divinity of monarchy. From Thales to Cicero, the belief in a supernal hegemony is intense.^^^ ''The members of the body constitute a unity only by their submission to a principal organ," writes Erdmann ; ''the powers of the soul are united only by their subjection to reason ; and the parts of the world form one whole only by their subjection to God. "4^^ Here is a pure echo of Aquinas. Submission to reason and to God; these are the motif of the Saint's politics. A spiritual estimation of the world will always reveal an ab- solute monarchy, in which God reigns by His august will and men, by reason, duly obey. It is a concept vast and yet simple. 4S2Cf. Lactantus, Epit.. c. 4. 483 Johann Edouard Erdmann, His. of Phil.. Vol. I, p. 438. Cf. Plato's idea that there is no greater evil for a State than "that which tears it to pieces and makes it many instead of one," and no greater good than "that which binds it together and makes it one." — Republic, V, 5. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 123 Aquinas could not but touch on ineffable unity in his politi- cal doctrine, since he was so conscious of the unity of a God, as present to the world as an artist to his instrument, and of the common gift of reason in man. With such thoughts, he would have been untrue to himself if he did not call monarchy the ideal form of government.^^ But, as usual, he is practical as well as idealistic and, Dunning declares, "his general dis- cussion of the subject is characterized by great moderation and good sense. "^^^ Right here prosaic facts must have served to place his feet firmly on earth. Man is incomparably less than his Maker; and therefore in nowise is there a parity of reason why any individual should rule his fellow-men in the manner in which God rules the world.^^^ Yet on the other hand, the kingship of the Creator, though absolute, is peerlessly democratic; for it regards and respects every individual, his freedom and his needs. Aquinas never tires of teaching the just and necessary tendency of all creatures to God. And, interpreting his politics in the light and spirit of this princi- ple, we find the most admirable democracy in his doctrine. Men may be able in the course of mental and moral advance- ment, to rule themselves ; but they must ever be as children in the tremendous hand of their Maker. Aquinas would be eager to welcome the day in which democracy could prevail, so long as, in it, the hearts of all individuals would acknowledge and turn in abjection and subjection to the one true King, ac- knowledging His absolute sovereignty. Then the kingdom of God would have truly come ; and the Angelic Doctor's doc- trine of absolute monarchy as the supernal ideal would have been magnificently vindicated. Such a dream is of poets, saints — and Christians. It is the breath of the Lord's Prayer. There is no evolution without an ideal. Christianity and Aquinas have served the cause of democracy pricelessly, by furnishing 484 De Reg., Dib. I, cap. 12: "Inventum autem in rerum natura regi- men universale et particulare. Universale autem, secundum quod omnia sub Dei regimine continentur, quia sua providentia universa gubernat; particulare autem regimen maxime quidem divino regimini simile est, quod invenitur in homine, qui ob hoc, minor mundus appel- latur, quia in eo inventur forma universalis regiminis." "i:^ Political Theories, Ancient and Med., p. 200. 486 Cf. Antoniades, Die Staatslehre des Thomas ah Aquino, p. 39. 124 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY an ideal which is ineffably powerful in attraction and stimula- tion, not only spiritually, but also politically. For the creature will never fully enjoy his rights, until those of the Creator are fully reverenced. A flight from petty politics to divine ! This is the turn w^hich Thomistic doctrine takes, though the An- gelic Doctor will not let himself disregard the very real impedi- menta of a personal devil, a stinging flesh ,and a clamorous world.^87 It is evident in the De Regimine, w^hen Aquinas praises monarchy, that he is really occupied with concern for the w^el- fare of the State. One can readily see that he does not wish to disaparge democracy. All that he repudiates is political un- rest. There is a great probability that the State wall be afflicted with storms and the public good ship-wrecked if many rule and altogether disagree.^^"^ Thus St. Thomas does not make an absolute statement. He frankly posits the condition (si omnino dissentirent) .^^^ He does not deny that the government of the harmonious many is not the best. In emphasizing the utility and necessity of a focal personality in a polity he but recognizes what every modern representative democracy, without the slightest detriment to its character, admits. He feels that the State falls more naturally into oneness, if it has a single head. Unity is his object, not monarchy for unity means the peace and prosperity of the people. If this unity happens to obtain better in a democracy, Aquinas w^ould grant his approval without stint to that particular form. Then again he is mindful that the corruption of a popular government is apt to be more dire in consequence than that of a per- sonal polity ,4^2 ^ tyranny is not less but even more probable in the government of many than of one. It can be better hidden. And so we see that, w-hatever praise is meted 487 Com. Pout., Lib. Ill, lec. 6. 488 De Reg.. Lib. I, cap. 1. 489 Ibidem: "Manifestum est quod plures multitudinem nullo modo bene regerent, si omnino dissentirent." N. B. — The Farm. Ed. brings out even better St. Thomas' regard for the pople in his criticism of the government of the many; for there the reading of this text is "multi- tudinem nullo modo conservant, si omnino dissentirent." 490 De Reg. Lib. I, cap. 1. 491 Ibidem. 492 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 5. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRIXE AND DEMOCRACY 125 out to monarchy, is inspired by something beyond and above it. The modern mind too readily identifies monarchy with tyranny and recoils. Aquinas would turn with equal disgust from tyranny, which he denounces as the worst form of gov- ernment.^^^ But he differs from us in that he saves his emo- tions not for a man of straw, but for a truly guilty reality. His monarchy is the kind in which charity and justice are triumphant and on which no one could reasonably carp. In the theoretical case, as Borrell observes, where a people are con- scious of their incapability of governing themselves, it would be a much more democratic act to confide themselves to a sover- eign than to sink into a republican demagogy.*^ This is the idea also of Saint Thomas, if one is to judge from his princi- ples of popular worth and the common good. Thomas' commendation of monarchy, it is fair to say, is not necessitated by his Catholicism. Montesquieu has thrown dust in the eyes of the world by teaching that the Catholic religion is more agreeable to a monarchy, and that Protestant- ism accommodates itself better to a republic. The thought of Aquinas is, of course, very representative here; and we can- not find any such a thesis in Thomistic pages either directly or indirectly. We have seen that his praise of pure monarchy is because of its rank in the ideal order. His attitude is prac- tically different and abundantly democratic in the world of reality. If Montesquieu means that the Catholic Church is more consonant with that form of government which best ensures the rights of God and man, he is at one with Aquinas. But since these blessed rights are as well and often better safe- guarded in a less rigid but more enlightened regime, the choice of the Church and of her most intellectual son is indefinite. For them, all just governments are good until they prove themselves inadequate, weak, or generally bad. The best is the one which performs its mission best. The Church is as indifferent to the form as she is concernful of the success. Her scholars may speculate as to the respective and relative merits 493 Idem, cap. 2. 494 Revue de PhilosopMe, XII, p. 119. 126 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, but she herself thinks in practical terms of results, and approves or disapproves ac- cordingly. Politics may be somewhat explained by climate. Aquinas and Aristotle, we remember, drew a contrast between the quiescent East, favorable to one-man rule, and the dynamic West, suitable to democratic approaches. But religion requires a loftier elucidation. It transcends temperature or political expedience and experience. It is, among other things, an ultimate attitude. It is universal, and can thrive just as vig- orously, with the sceptre or the flag, or under the cross. Its external manifestation prospers wherever justice does not fail. Montesquieu ignores that Catholicism has found acceptance in every part of the world, and is as vital in our democratic era as it ever was in the monarchial past. The celebrated French- man is unconscious of the oddity of conditioning theology on geography. He describes the North of Europe, which broke away from Rome and embraced Protestantism, as possessing a spirit of independence and liberty which the more southern countries lacked somewhat oblivious of the burst of autocracy which followed the Reformation in the very region of its birth, as well as of the pure democracy of the Italian cities in the very shadow of Rome and in the Age when the Roman Church was at the zenith of its prestige. Great movements are to be explained by essentials, not accidents. Character is something more than a creature of climate. Men can be Catholic, despite the latitude and longitude of their country. Of all possible reasons which could be advanced to explain the Reformation, geography is the least convincing, except, perhaps, Taylor's skull theory that ''the dolichocephalic Teutonic race is Protest- ant, the brachycephalic Celto-Slavic race is either Roman Catho- lic or Greek Orthodox. "^96 To argue that the Catholic religion is non-acceptable to the North or more adaptable to monarchy, because farenheit is lower in Berlin or because an Italian's head may be more egg-shaped than a German's, is to draw an ex- ceedingly long bow. Imagination wounds prudence in the process. 495 L'esprit des Lois, Liv. XXIV, ch. 5. 496 The Origin of the Aryans, p. 247 ; quoted by Ross in his Social Psychology, p. 6. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 127 The government which St. Thomas proposes as ordinarily best, in his greatest work, not written to a prince but to pos- terity, which is the court of final appeal in determining his thought, is the moderated type, in which, Montesquieu avers, political liberty can alone be found.*^" It is a commixion of the three good forms: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy There is no inconsistency between the teaching of his De Regi- mine and this different doctrine; for in the former, while he thoroughly accredits the monarchical phase in rule, he does not teach that it should be the only one. In the Summa, he lays down the governmental principle which the succeeding story of European politics has well vindicat-ed and which has blazed the way to true liberty. He teaches that, no matter w^hat the form of government, all should have some part in it."^^^ Here he shows how well he is thinking in the practical order and that he has indeed descended from the summits of sacred abstraction which he scaled in his letter to the king of Cyprus. We are more convinced than ever that his epistle had a predominantly pious purpose. He compares the earthly monarch to the divine; he washes the former to gaze upon the super-terrestrial exemplar, and profit. This is the key to the idealism of the doctrine of the document. And now, in the Swmma, he gives free play to the political wis- dom which he has drawn form Christianity, Aristotle, and his own meditation, and the democracy of his mind satisfactor- ily manifests itself. In his declaration that all should have a share in the rule, St. Thomas brushes away the old property requirement which the Philosopher believed to be so important to the qualification of a citizen. His religion had taught him a nobler democracy than the superb Macedonian approved. The type of the latter could be stretched to include only two classes: the rich and the bourgeoisie. The Angelic Doctor 497 Op. cit., Liv., XI, ch. 4. 498 Feugueray, op. cit. Migne, III, Serie 22, Dictionnaire de Theologie Scholastique: "Le gouvernement le plus parfait, selon Saint Thomas, n'est ni la monarchie, ni I'aristocratie, ni la republique; c'est celui ou ce trois formes de gouvernement sont melanges de manniere a reunir les avantages et a neutraliser les inconveniants de chacun d'elles." 499 Summa Theoh, la 2ae, qu. CV, a. 1. 128 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY takes in the best of the poor class too.^^ Christ's dispensation had changed the idea of poverty. It was no longer an exact synonym for abjection, ignorance, and knavery. Medieval and monastic religion and zeal removed many clouds from the pic- ture; and St. Thomas could behold virtues and possibilities in the lower ranks of society, which, continuing to develop, would fit them well for the duties of active citizenship. The broadness of his view is identical with American principle; though, as already suggested, he was more careful in the concession of suffrage than we have always been, requiring a higher degree of mental and moral qualification. His practical reason for prescribing the popular spirit in government is three-fold: peace appears more probable in such a polity; patriotism is more ferv^ent; and there is no doubt that the people will rally to the civil defence whenever and however attack occurs.^^^ Here Aquinas could be writing of our own country, so surely does he express the cause of her security from the menace of bolshevism, and the explanation of the love of her children. It is by her adherence to popular principle, that she has risen as a goddess of liberty to the nations and an earnest of political inspiration and hope. It is because our civics has adopted the generous view, of such as Aquinas', toward the people, and not the narrow Aristotelian concept, that we have a more or less satisfied lower class today. The Angelic Doctor teaches that this respect and provision for popular participation in government should be primary. The question of the form of the polity is secondary.^^^ ^ matter of fact, his favorite practical government, from his own popular demand, just mentioned, is a democracy. In it, the people predominate; for all have a share. But he w^ould add to it the best that the other good forms have to offer. The Greek city-state, we know, had politically widened into the medi- eval province ; w^hich in turn was overflowing into the modern kingdom or nation. Thomas brings to the attention of Europe 500 Though Aristotle, too, believed that "keeping quality in view, it is fit to make the franchise as extensive as possible, so that those who share in it shall not outnumber those who do not." Pol., IV, 13. 501 Summa Theol, la 2ae, qu. CV, a. 1. 502 Ibidem. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 129 the possibility of representative government, which would mean the inversion of feudalism. Medieval rule, beyond the Italian independencies, was from the top down; Aquinas would have it, first from the bottom up; and then, and only then, down. He is in logical accord with his theory of the origin of the State and the transference of power. In this mixed government, which he finds the most practical and the best, he would have the monarchical form represented by a single person who is chosen for his merit and presides in the State. It is to be noticed that Aquinas does not speak of such a one as ruling, so much as presiding. The monarch, in the strong sense, which we met in iVristotle's Politics and in the Commentary, is the sole regent and his rule is according to virtue, not law. But the influence of the chief in the Angelic Doctor's mixed government would be more moral than material, executive rather than legislative. Next, Thomas would have the aristocratic element present in a body of picked men. These are to be the practical rulers. He describes them as principantes. The real weight of the government is in their hands. Finally, democracy is genuinely and plentifully present in the fact that these rulers should be chosen from the people and by the people. This Thomistic teaching was very valuable to political science. Aquinas forsees, in the immensity of nations, the necessity of some scheme for handling the popular will. So his state- ment is of a nature to leave room for any suitable plan. The viva vox of Athens, or the Teutonic disapproval by a general murmur and approval by the clashing of javelins, would hardly suit the new democracy. The people could more conveniently express themselves through the lips of their representatives. Modern thought wholly agrees. The up-to-date indirect democ- racy of our own country is the kind which St. Thomas declares to be proper in his best practical form of government.^^* He does not teach the choice by lot, which was the feature of Greek democracy and was more or less practical in the unusual Hellen- 503 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. CV, a. 1: "unde optima ordinatio principum est in aliqiia civitate, vel regno, in quo unus praeflcitur secundum virtutem, qui omnibus praesit; et sub ipso sunt aliqui principates secundum virtutem; et tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet; tum quia ex omnibus eligi possunt; tum quia etiam ex omnibus eliguntur." 130 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY ic situation. But neither does modern democracy teach or de- mand it. The size of the modern nation, and the variety which it includes, forbid. The AngeHc Doctor unfortunately does not mention explicit- ly the necessity of a constitution according to which the rule should operate. But piecing together the other sections of his politics, we see that he implies it. And we are sure of it, when we recall that his model, the Mosaic rule, had its written code. At any rate, he offers us an outline of an excellent polity, combining the best results of the world's civil experience and giving democracy its due. He was not blinded by Aristotle's aura and subdued by his authority into accepting aristocracy as the peerless practical regime. He reaches beyond culture and wealth to the popular heart and mind, and raises them to their proper place in an enlightened prospectus of government. The idea of mixed rule was not new; but to Aquinas is the credit of having revived it in his age; thus making it a factor in modern political history. In accrediting it, we do not ne- glect the eminent thinkers who worked out a similar solution of the problem of government long before. Plato, in his trea- tise on Laws descends from the Olympian heights of his Re- public and offers a practical political schema with popular respect.^^ He teaches that authority and liberty, the tenors of monarchy and democracy, should be preserved; because neither of them could subsist without the other. He pru- dently offers that the ruler and the ruled should make mutu- al concessions, in order that the two important principles of polity might live and thrive. But his mixed government is inferior to that of Saint Thomas, because he ignores the means by and in which this harmony is secured: the aristocracy .^^^ There is no middle layer to his plan. Aristotle, with his presentation of governments, works in and out, praising here, criticizing there, but failing to deliver such ^Laws, IV, 712 sq. See Dunning, Political Theories, Ancient and Modern, p. 37. 505 See Crahay, op. cit., p. 98. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 131 took in the ephoralty. The oligarchical element, Aristotle sub- could afford. Moreover, tne people elected the senate and par- a clean-cut final opinion as we find in Aquinas. He lauds the to education; rich and poor were reared alike. The economic middle state, quoting Euripides : ''The middle state is best ; that state be mine, What'er my city be."506 Though favoring aristocracy, he evidently likes the balance and poise which a mingling of forms would effect. He devotes some space to political admixture and signals out the corn- Democracy in that singular state was operative with regard posite character of Lacedaemonian polity for consideration, line of social demarcation was quite removed ; the public tables knew no favorites; the rich wore only such clothes as the poor mits as an opinion, consisted in the fact that officers were chosen by vote and not by lot. And the ruling body made up the aristocratic feature.^^" The Philosopher is more concerned with the fact of mixed government than with its degree of desirability. Aquinas goes further, perfecting and prescribing the principle. He owes more to Polybius and Cicero in his theory than to Aristotle. For these two writers were express apostles of the three-fold polity. The former adopts the Philosopher's view of six species of government, three good and three bad. He be- lieves that one type should be used to off-set the other, according to the happy combination of Lycurgus, in whose requblic the king, the nobles, and the people, had the sovereign power ap- portioned among them in a degree which produced equilibrium instead of sacrificing it. Each power respects the other. The Polybian principle would read like the Dumas motto of "one for all and all for one." Our historian finds his ideal crystal- 50Q Politics, IV, 11. Eurip., Ion. 632. W. L. Newman declares: "In all probability his mind was under the influence of two conflicting views, that which he inherited from the Politicus and the Republic of Plato, and that which was more especially his own — the view that there is nothing in the supremacy of law whicl^ should make it out of place even in the best constitution." — Politics of Aristotle, Vol. I, p. 281. 507 Politics, IV, 9. 132 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY lized in the Roman constitution of the time of the Punic wars. There the three governments were so commingled that it was impossible to distinguish any one of them.'^o^ But the Roman consulate, or supreme magistry, was split. And thus the State was somewhat abnormal with its two heads. Aquinas improves on Polybius and the Tiber city by advocating the more natural apex of a single leader. Dunning has to say of Polybius' analysis of the Roman system that ''it is interesting as the first formal exposition of the principle of check and balance in constitutional organiza- tion."^^ It is of interest, too, that St. Thomas should fasten on its merits, and add to them the symmetry which Dunning declares to be absent, in order to create the more perfect State. Cicero, though favorable to royalty, is fascinated with the system of equilibrium which so pleases Polybius. He is im- pressed with the instability of any polity in its purity; though, like Aquinas, he believes the monarchy best for unity, the aristocracy for counsel, and the democracy for liberty.^^^ All extremes are converted into their contraries. As Janet remarks, the orator but appropriates and clothes in his own beautiful diction the main preoccupations of Polybius.^^- But Dunning insists that Cicero made some contributions to the theory of mixed government, e. g., that his idea of check and balance was less mechanical than his predecessor's and that he appealed more to political principles than to political persons (magistrates, senates, and assemblies) in the process of equi-posing.^i^ "With St. Thomas the leader is chosen secundum virtutem; and those beneath him rule secundum virtutem. Crahay is loath to yield that Aquinas profited from the con- clusions of the famous ancients. He believes that it is from Moses and the Old Testament that he draws his theory of mixed 508 Paul Janet, Histoire de la philoso2)hie morale et politique, tome 1, pp. 193-194. Vide Polybius, Lib. VI. 509 Op. cit., p. 117. 310 Z)e Rep., I, 31, ?,2. Also I, 35: "Ita caritate nos capiunt reges, consiliis optimates, libertate populi, ut in comparando difficile ad eligendum sit quid maxime velis." 511 Idem, 45: Vide I, 29. 512 Op. cit., p. 191. De RepuUica, I, 45. Idem, II, 23. 513 Op. cit., p. 123-4. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 133 government.^i* This is the truth, though perhaps not the whole of it; for the article in which he proffers his conception is conclusively entitled ^'Utrum convenienter lex vetus de prin- cipibus ordinaverit."^^^"* And, in the body of it, he shows how well the type was attained among the Hebrews. The prophet and his successors were quasi-monarchs ; under them were the seventy-two elders, who represented aristocracy. These in turn were chosen from and by the people. But there is apparently a slight difference between St. Thomas' idea of mixed government and its scriptural prototpye, which could perhaps be traced to his political musings on history and pro- fane texts. He does not grant the sovereign the quality and quantity of power which the Hebrew leaders enjoyed. Natur- ally; for Moses, Josue, and the Judges, were cedars of Libanas. He tempers his theory to less spectacular periods and more ordinary people than those of the Old Testament. Besides, Je- hovah reserved to Himself the right of selecting the sovereign prince; though regularly, according to Thomistic implication, it resided in the people. But whether he had recourse to pagan sources or not for my part of his message on mixed government, the fact is that lie actually has seized, knowingly or not, the best that the past had to offer in this regard and, with a few pregnant and Lnmistakable phrases, has presented it as something slightly better. For the Angelic Doctor, Moses was, politically, of great- er stature than any of the other ancients ; and Holy Scripture superseded Greek science. Thomas was not the kind to ignore aay valuable and available pagan utterance ; but he was always at pains to place it in the service of a larger truth, and so to prove its worth. Question CV., art. 1, of the Prima Secundae of the Summa would give no indication that he owed anything to piofane authors for his theory of mixed government. But his other articles and books, using so many quotations from the best minds of the past and indicating such familiarity with them, suggest that he was at least indirectly influenced by them. 514 Op. cit., p. 100. 515 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu, CV, a. 1. 516 Ibidem. 134 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY This theory of mixed government has been more praised in modern times than the scholar who improved and transmitted it to us. Its reasonableness could not but make a wide appeal from the start. Gerson commended the French polity, inasmuch as it com- bined royal and aristocratic elements, but carped on the fact that it fell short of the ideal which, we have just seen, St. Thomas upheld: the Mosaic commonwealth.^!'^ ''The clean-cut and acute, but never intemperate, pleas of Gerson and his allies," writes Dunning, "in behalf of limited government, the reign of law, and the subordination of strict law and tradition to the requirements of equity and the general welfare, received the complet^st ratification in the decrees of the council of Con- stans, and thus became merged in the intellectual consciousness of the time."-^!^ The theory of St. Thomas was bearing rich fruit. For this Council, says Figgis, "set forth a system of politics which was consistent yet scarcely doctrinaire, which saved the rights of the crown while it secured the liberties of the people; it paved the way for the constitutional re- formers of future generations."^!^ And the soul of Aquinas brooded over Constance and was felt and respected, as even Martin Luther, in his graphic parlance, admits. "The source and cess-pool of every error," he bitterly styles the Angelic I>oc- tor, for his moral predominance at the deliberations. Fortescue, in the latter half of the fifteenth century, carried Thomistic influence into his day. He taught that a mixed polity was proved by experience to merit special praise. He calls attention to Israel, Rome, and England.^-^ It would have been highly appropriate for him to point a finger to the Summc. Bellarmine (1541-1621) repeats Aquinas and advocates mixed government as the best form in the practical order.^^i Althusius (1604-1638), severe Calvinist as he was, showed 517 Tract, de Pot. Eccl., 8. See Dunning, op. cit., pp. 269-270. 518 Op. cit., p. 270. Co. of Constans: 1414. 519 Pontics of the Council of Constance, in the Transactions of tie Royal Historical Society, 1899, p. 103. Quoted by Dunning, p. 270. 520 Cf. Dunning, Polit. Theories, from Luther to Montesquieu, p. 2)2. 521 Cf. Idem., p. 129. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 135 himself Thomistic to the extent of teaching the naturalness of the composite polity.^^^ Harrington (1658) tied up his political theory insufferably with property relations. He regarded mixed government as natural only where the land was in the possession of a few people; and absolute monarchy, when some unconscionable Croesus owned everything.^^^ Aquinas is no party to any such artificial concept. His theory is purer and far more promissory of the reign of true democracy; for he makes virtue, and not property, the entrance to political power. Harrington thinks that the prerequisite for the stability of the State is that su- preme authority be placed in owners; Thomas, more sensibly and safely, would have the people place it in the best and fittest. Bodin (1578) and Hobbes (1668) are inimical to the mixed form. Advocates of autocracy, twentieth century thought must dismiss them, if not with some contempt, at least with much pity. We can appreciate how far the Angelic Doctor had democratically advanced beyond these early thinkers of the modern age, when we read the dictum of the former that ^'sov- ereignty is supreme power over citizens and subjects, unre- strained by law,"^24 Qj. ii^Q assertion of the latter that the power of the king or assembly must be unlimited.^^^ Consistently they could not approve of a liberty-fostering polity. And so, from one point of view, they set back the cause of the people. From another, they advanced it. The very extravagance of their offering was an irritant which helped to stir up those whom they would clamp down. Aquinas has the merit of profiting the people by the directness of his doctrine and not by antithesis. Bossuet (1677), it seems, was as captivated by St. Thomas' remarks on monarchy as unmindful of his sentiments on democracy. There was much more reason for Aquinas to be a royal enthusiast than the French orator, double related to no- bility as he was, through both his parents, and contemporary 522 Cf. Idem., op. cit., p. 67. 523 Idem., p. 250. 524 "Majestas est summa in cives ac subditos legibusque soluta po- testas." Quoted by Dunning, op cit., p. 96. 525 Elementorum Philosophiae, De Give, cap. VI, par. 18. 136 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY and intimate of the illustrious Louis IX. But it was Bossuet who strummed out the most loyal of royal rhapsodies on his literary lyre, elating Louis XIV, but not representing medieval tradition. Fenelon (1721), with his doubts that any single human being could be adequate to civil demands, and his preference for a sort of aristocratic monarchy, somewhat representative, better bodies forth the mind of the Angelic Doctor. ^-^ Locke (1690) takes the theory of mixed government for granted. He writes: 'The majority having, as has been shown, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and exe- cuting those laws by officers of their own appointing, and then the form of government is a perfect democracy; or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors, and then it is an oligarchy ; or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy; if to him and his heirs, it is a hereditary monarchy; if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nomi- nating a successor, to return to them, an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. "^2'' This is practi- cally an epitome of the Thomistic doctrine on governments. By Locke's time, the theory of mixed polity was sufficiently fixed and accepted; so that he was free to go beyond it and devise further means of ensuring the liberties of the people and the life of justice. He introduces the idea of a separation of powers.^-^ But even here he is anticipated by St. Thomas, in whose mixed form of government the position of the politi- cal chief seems to be mostly of executive character, and the ruling or law-making power is in the hands of the subordinate body. 526 Cf. Janet, op. cit., t. 2, p. 292. See Bossuet, Politique tiree de V^criture sainte, 1, IV, a. 1. 527 Two Treatises of Government, II, ch. X, sec. 132. It will be noticed that he does not use "oligarchy" in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense. 528 Idem, II, ch. XII, sec. 144. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 137 It is to Montesquieu, whose reputation de Haller sourly but significantly declares too great, that the credit goes for the tri- partite division which has become a political commonplace. He changes Locke's enumeration of governmental departments (legislative, federative, and executive) into legislative, execu- tive, and judicial,^^^ thus harking back to iVristotle and Aqui- nas, who are quite neglected in the effulgence of his fame. In the fourth book of his Politics, chapter XIV, the Stagirite sets forth the division of every republic as deliberative, executive, and judicial. It is hard to see much improvement on this pres- entation, and hence originality, in the offering which Dunning honors as appearing in, political philosophy, for the first time, from the pen of Montesquieu. Aquinas was cognizant of the classification some centuries before the Frenchman conceived it, and set himself the task of commenting on it.^-^^ As to the teaching that the separate powers should be exercised by different organs, Aquinas had gathered this also, from Aristotle, and presented it to the Middle Age. The doctrine of the Phil- olospher and St. Thomas is more comprehensive than Montes- quieu's. They give us four alternatives for the disposition of the deliberative power: (a) to all the people; (b) to a few only; (c) to all in some matters; (d) to some in some matters. Mag- istrates are seriously considered, as to their number, their tenure of office, and the class from which they should be chosen.^^'^ They divide the judicial department into several sections: (a) a court of judicial scrutiny; (b) one to punish public malefac- tors; (c) to handle civil affairs; (d) to consider appeals of private citizens from the fines imposed by magistrates; (e) to settle disputes on contracts; (f) to judge between aliens; (g) to deal with the different kinds of murder cases.*'^^^ It looks as though the incomparable English system to which 529 Sec. 145-146. "There is another power in every commonwealth the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the trans- actions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth, and may be called federative if any one pleases." 530 Uesprit des lois, Liv. XI, ch. 6. Cf. Franck's Reformateurs et PuMicistes de VEurope. p. 280. 531 Com. Polit., Lib. IV, lec. 12 : "Determinat de quibusdam partibus republicae, scilicet de consiliativo et dominativo et judicativo." 532 Politics, IV, 15. Com. Polit., Lib. IV, lec. 13. 533 Politics, IV, 16. Com. Polit., Lib. IV, lec. 15. 138 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY Montesquieu thrills, and which he traces back to the old Ger- mans of Tacitus,^^* could be at least partly accounted for by the book that St. Thomas made powerful in the politics of the later Middle Age. The Angelic Doctor gave Europe a theory of State which appealed to the liberty-loving and order-re- specting people of the West. England found that it agreed with her own yearning and aspirations. Langdon had begun the work of reform, which Montesquieu prefers to trace so much farther back to the shade of Teutonic forests. Aquinas gave the sanction of his political philosophy to a wholesomely popular concept of the State. And so the enterprises of reconstruction went on consistently, if not apace, culminating in the modern consitutions to which we refer with pride as evidence of the evolution of the race. 534 Op. cit., XI, 6. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 139 CHAPTER VI PURPOSE OF THE STATE St. Thomas teaches that the common aim of states is something more than mere self-preservation. It would have to be ; else self- preservation could never be assured. He finds the mission of the State to be general and particular. The general purpose is to supply a fuller and more perfect life for its members ; the partic- ular may be considered as four-fold: economic, ethical, social and, in a sense, ultramundane. His is a complete program, and one towards the realization of which the best democracy of today is groping. Other plans of states should be subordinated to these, which are essential. 1. — Limitations of Civil Scope: First, Individuality First, let us consider what Aquinas regards as the limits of civil scope ; then we can more correctly appraise his doctrine of civil purpose. Primarily, he refrains from committing a modern folly of making the State more real than those who compose it. He deaf'ens himself to the Platonic siren-^ong against which Hegel's ears were not waxed. A conception of the State as "the highest evolution of the Absolute," "the realization of the moral ideal," "the concretization of the divine will," or "the substance of individuals," would not be acceptable to him. He guards against the fallacy of separatism. For him, men cannot be parted from the State ; they constitute it. The State may not be parted from them, else it were an emptiness. In this, as ever, his view is realistically synthetic. He does not sacrifice society any more than a Schelling, a Saint-Simon, or a Comte ; neverthe- less, he democratically does what they do not — he saves the indi- vidual. ^^'^ Here then is his first limitation of the State: it must 535 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 14 et 15. 536 Cnvi. Polit., Lib. I, lec. 1. Cf. Fouillee, La science sociale contem- poraine, pp. 23-24; Schwalm. Lemons de pTiilosopMe sociale, I, p. 155. 140 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY not destroy individuality. It must not usurp the souls of its subjects.^^ Man is man, before he is citizen; and the State is in his mind, before he projects it into the external world and realizes it there. Humanity is superior to the civil society it creates. There is much of man which has not gone into the State at all ; and, over this, the State has no direct control. Individual Rights The Doctor's first limitation of civil power being based on the principle of individuality, his second is inspired by the indi- vidual's rights, which are granted by the natural law, and accord- ing to which the State must always reckon.^^ With regard to them, the State may not interfere, as we have already noticed, save to define and defend.^ Any measure in defiance of them or detriment to them, is not law but a corruption of it. We have only to recall the Angelic Doctor's theory of law, to see how firmly he attributes human rights to the reality of rational nature and not to any artificiality of civil concession.^^^ We find him warding off aggression from those precious prerogatives which enter so largely into the constitution of a democracy, particularly liberty of conscience and liberty of education. As regards the former, he holds that anyone outside the fold is not to be forced into it. Free-will is to be respected. Faith, he maintains, involves freedom.^*^ However, by this he does not mean that deliberate opposition to religious truth, blasphemies, seductions, and frank affront, should not be repulsed. It may be that he was impressed with the ethical significance of liberty of conscience, more than with its political bearing. Cajetan com- ments on Aquinas' view, in effect, that, if it is an evil for 537 Cf. Laveleye, Le Gouvernement dans la Democratie, I, p. 109. o38Keesen, La mission de Vetat d'aiwes la doctrine et la methode de saint Thomas d'Aqtiin, p. 17. Crahay, op. cit., p. 138. oZ^Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. XCV, a. 2. Cf. Leo XIII's Encyc, De condit. opif.: "est autem ad praesidium juris naturalis instituta oivitas non ad interitum." "40 Cf. Leo XIII's Encyc, De praecipuis civium christianorum officiis. 541 Summa Theol. 2a 2ae, qu. X, a. 8. Cf. Deploige, La question juive, p. 9. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 141 a Christian to live as a pagan, it is a greater wrong for a con- verted pagan to don in private v^hat he has doffed in public. But the principle of freedom is there, for all that ; and, for politics, this is the pearl of great price. The Angelic Doctor further limits, or rather defines, freedom of conscience by assuming a different attitude toward those who have freely accepted but then rejected the Faith. For here a solemn pledge is broken and truth is outraged. They may be compelled to keep their Christian oath.^^ It is to be noticed that St. Thomas speaks explicitly only against heretics, or those who, with their message, rend the peace of the State, which, as we shall presently see, he considers primary. As for those who think for themselves^"*^ and whose thought has a portion of truth in it or at least is not fatal to the interests of the Christian State, he is quite tolerant.^** He believes it is at least as grave a matter to cornipt the Faith, which is the life of souls, as to falsify money, w^hich procures the needs of bodies. And that exceptional monarch of his own day, Saint Louis, had ordained punishments for malefactors of the latter type. The spiritual life of men is nobler than the corporal. Yet, if we punish with death those who slay the flesh, who should object to a similar fate for murderers of the spirit ?^'*^ Thomas further offers that, even though unsuccessful at corrupting others, heretics may be capitally punished or dispossessed, for their blasphemy and false faith ; since their example has had a dele- terious effect on the community. All this doctrine is, of course, chargeable to the medieval view- point, which the modern thinker finds hard to comprehend and excuse, and still harder to reconcile with the idea of democracy. It is only when we project our thoughts into the mind, heart, and environment of the thirteenth century, that whatever virtue 542 Siimma Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. X, a. 8; et idem, ad 3. 543 He teaches further that, when a person is capable of thinking for himself, he may choose for himself; that, at miost, persuasion should be used on him, and never force; and that, even in the face of parental opposition, he may do what he considers right and just. Stimma Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. X, a. 12. . . oii Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. X, a. 9. 545 IV Lib. Sent., dist. XIII, qu. II. a. 3. 142 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY this particular and peculiar teaching possesses can appear to us. Then the Church and the State were united as never before nor since ; and a revolt against religion practically amounted to trea- son and presaged bloody warfare. The Albigensian heresy was filling France with woe in the Doctor's own day. The dove of peace was wounded and bespattered. And the infamous sect, called the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit, which repells us as the serpent of the century, was grievously offending the public with unclean excesses. The Waldenses and the Cathari continued and increased the confusion. Aquinas could not but see that the all-important political principle of the common good was far from being enhanced by this pandemonium and that the sponsors of these heresies were more carnal than spiritual, and more erratic than sincere — or, if not so, at least blind beyond belief to the logic of their own premises. With the exception of the Waldensian doctrine, each of them afforded an invitation and foundation to turpitude. In St. Thomas' attitude, aside from his zeal for truth and the God of it, we can see two democratic facts. First, his cham- pionship of the spiritual rights of individuals. No more may a man be robbed of his religion than of his life. Burglars and murderers whose outrages are material, are admittedly outlaws ; much more, the assaulters of souls. Aquinas stands against the principle of would-be dissenters seizing hold of the ignorance of the medieval masses, and administering their doctrinal poisons. He is no opponent of intellect, as his thoroughly reasoned tomes testify.^"^^ He w^ould have the people able to argTie for the Faith within them.^^^ But he does not consider it just that any and every one who, like Peter Waldo, may have been stirred to sud- den religious fervor by the death of a friend, or who may have 54GBlakey writes: "It must be borne in mind that the scholastic writers greatly aided the cause of religious and civil liberty and en- lightenment by their claiming unreserved intellectual discussion." — The History of Political Literature, Vol. I, p. 219. 547 St. Thomas does not consider the authority of any Father, whose doctrine may be contradicted, as superior and final; but the authority of the Church. Summa Theol., 2a 2ae. qu. X, a. 12. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 143 conceived a brainless passion for ripping the moral, political, and social fabric, should be given a free field to contradict author- ities gTeater than himself and accomplish chaos. The masses of the Middle Age had to be safe-guarded all the more carefully, for the fact that they could not discern the true from the false. Education was general then, as now, but very weak with youth. To Aquinas, it was a most serious matter to attack a mind incap- able of defending itself ; just as violence committed on the body of a child would be much more criminal than in the case of an adult. He does not aim at the limitation of anybody's right to think freely, but rather at the protection of everybody's right to the truth. And so, secondly, he seeks the good of the many. The right of the people to the truth and to be protected in its possession, is superior to that of any individual to free speech. The question is : where and what is truth ? The Angelic Doctor pointed to an authoritative, divinely instituted Church. And for him the keenest and surest intellect could not soar beyond the principles which Christ, through the living voice of His Spouse, enunciated. Aquinas repeats Augustine, that the extreme punishment of heretics is undesirable. But as in the house of David there could be no peace until impious Absolom, warring against his own father, was removed by fate: so in Christendom calm can be secured only by the ejection of the disturber. Many may be free, when one is bound.^^^ Each individual has his rights ; but these do not exceed the cumulative rights of the multitude and must not be sought at the expense of the whole people. True democracy does not teach that everyone should be allowed to do everything, but that verity and equity should have free access to all. Thomas takes no liberty from the people in g-uarding them against the enemies of the truth which makes all men free. However, we must never forget that he was writing on this point for a world which was substantially a politico-religious unit ; and, with this unique state of affairs vanished, his doctrine would not please modern mentality and sentiment. But the Church of St. Thomas realizes as well as her most intelligent 548 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. X, a. 8, ad. 4. 144 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY enemies could inforin her, that the twentieth century is not the thirteenth; that the principles of the Angelic Doctor are more valuable than his applications of them ; and that, while his serv- ice to truth is great, his is not necessarily the last word on a sub- ject. Aquinas himself believed that law should relax or con- tract, to further enlightenment and to new necessities; all the more would he admit advancement and development in doctrine. It is sufficient that he advocates spiritual freedom and even strenuous means of attaining and maintaining it, to evince the democratic essence of his thought. Toleration The State is limited, too, by the demands of tolerance. Human government is derived from the divine, and should imitate it. Now God, omnipotent and good as He is, permits much in the world which, of course, could be prevented ; lest in the prevention, gTeater good should be sacrificed or worse evil folloAv.^^ The State must not attempt to do everything. In many things, its action should be the last resource, rather than the first. But St. Thomas, apparently, intends this prin- ciple to apply to a civil society in which the cultural and spir- itual influences of the domestic and ecclesiastical institutions are fully operative. It seems certain that he would concede a wider state action today, when religion has broken down so pite- ously in men's lives, and industrialism has so grievously damaged domesticity. The Sanctity of the Home Aquinas also closes the door of the home against the State, with his insistent teaching that the child belongs to its parents, and that to stand between them and it, is to violate natural justice.^ Until the babe grows to the estate of reason, he is under parental care as in a certain spiritual womb. They who Summa TheoL. 2a 2ae, qu. X, a. 11. ooO Siiwma Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. X, a. 12. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 145 brought him into the world have a right to think and do for him until he is able to think and do for himself. The hand of the State may not rob the cradle, as in the Platonic Republic and a Socialist's dream, to mould future citizens to its purposes. Still, the Thomistic principle does not mean that parents may not partially surrender to the State their privilege and permit their children to be educated at piiblic expense, nor that the State may not step in when parental duty is not and cannot be ful- filled. It merely announces a great human right. It recognizes that individual claims may exceed a demand of State, and that the true individual good is not to be sacrificed to a too idealistic scheme of the common good. Finally, the State must not force the minds of its subjects. Initiative is not to be crushed.^^-'^ The individual spirit is not to be broken nor is the body ordinarily to be bound.^^ In other words, the State must respect all the sacred rights of man's nature and limit itself exactly to the sum and scope of authority which the people have given to it. We can see, then, that St. Thomas did not over-estimate the mission of the State as universal.^ He introduces enough cir- cumscription to rescue individuality and domesticity. Heart and hearth hold the hope of progress in a state. ' 'Reason and Ignorance," writes Thomas Paine, "the opposites of each other, influence the great bulk of mankind. If either of these can be rendered sufiiciently extensive in a country, the machinery of Government goes easily on. Reason obeys itself ; and Ignorance submits to whatever is dictated to it."^^ But Thomas Aquinas stands first, last, and always for reason. He makes the indi- vidual vivid and electric ; a real force in civic development and ooi Summa TJieol., 2a 2ae, qu. CIV, a. 5: Here Seneca is quoted with approval: "mens quidem est sui juris." 552 Ibidem. Ibidem. 554 In accordance with the principle "Omnis ratio operationis variatur secundum diversitatem finis" (Contra Gentiles, Lib. Ill), Aquinas must have believed that the duty of the State essentially lay in accomplish- ing that of which groups, families, and individuals are incapable. As Crahay observes (op. cit., p. 147) : "une force superieure ne doit jamais etre employee la ou une energie moindre suffit." 555 Rights of Man, p. 161. 146 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY political evohition.^^ Evidently the State must help the indi- vidual to help himself. 2. — The General Mission of the State And thus we again face Aquinas' theory of civil mission. Let us first consider the general purpose of the State according to him. His doctrine amounts to this : that the State is an organ- ized effort for the hest interests of men.^^" Happiness is the magnet of hearts. Unalloyed, it cannot be attained here below first, because it involves the complete satisfaction of intellect and will ; secondly, since such satisfaction implies the universal truth, as the object of the intellect, and the universal good, as the aim of the will ; but, thirdly, the universal truth and good do not exist in any created thing, for every creature has some limitation. They are found only in God to Whom whatever reality they possess is due and to Whom they should lead.^^ Man is capable of an imperfect happiness on earth, however ; and the duty of the State is to help secure it in as large a meas- ure as possible. Explanation must be made as to what Aquinas signified by the happiness at which the State should aim.^^ He 556 Such sentences as the follo^^ing reveal the Saint's faith in the individual and the human nature which he represents: "bonum politi- cae virtutis commensuratum est naturae humanae; et ideo absque auxilio gratiae gratum facientis potest voluntas humana in illud ten- dere, licet non absque auxilio gratiae Deo." — S. T., 2a 2ae, qu. CXXXVI, a. 3, ad. 2. But he warns: "sed in natura corrupta praevalet incli- natio concupiscentiae, quae in homine dominatur; et ideo pronior est homo ad sustinendum malum propter bona, in quibus concupiscentia delectatur praesentialiter, quam tolerare mala propter bona fu- tura. ..." 557 Cf. Com. Polit., Lib. VII, ch. 1: "Finis autem optimae reipublicae est optimus finis hominis, quia respublicae non est aliud quam ordo civitatis. ..." 558 Summa Theol., la 2ae, qu. II, a. 1-8. 559 Idem, a. 8. 560 By happiness St. Thomas naturally did not mean pleasure. He was no utilitarian, and would have been duly shocked by Bentham's belief that "pushpin is as good as poetry, provided the pleasure be as great." Cf. William McDougall's Social Psychology, p. 161. St. Thomas does not confine himself to the psychological, like McDougall, in his conception of happiness. With Aristotle, he considers the psychological phase of happiness contingent on the ethical, and enhanced by the material. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 147 means as much as Aristotle and more. The Philosopher sees happiness in a possession of spiritual, bodily, and external good.^^ By spiritual good, he signifies the moral virtues. A man could not be happy, he teaches, who had no justice, temper- ance, prudence, or fortitude, but would be afraid of the flies that whirred about him. Happiness is far from the wretch who is a slave to himself, or who Avould crimson his hands in the blood of his friend for a farthing. Xo more than an infant or a maniac, can the individual scale the heights of temporal bliss, who deserves to be classed with them. Virtue is indis23ensable. They delude themselves who think a little virtue and much external property are the correct recipe for equanimity. Virtue can be provided to be more essential than external goods, both practically and thoretically. Practically, because men originally do not acquire it through external goods, but rather external goods through it. Theoretically, because external goods have a limit, which virtue lacks ; secondly, because the soul is superior to the body, and qualities differ in importance according to the subjects in which they reside; and, thirdly, external goods exist for the sake of the soul, but the soul does not exist for the sake of them.^^ He is happiest whose morals are the most pure, whose mind is the best cultivated and whose material effects are in decent moderation. External goods are useful ; but, in excess, they are largely inutile, and may be harmful. True happiness is proportionate to one's possession of mentality and morality and to the obedience with which their dictates are met. For the truth of this, we have the evidence of God Himself, who in Himself alone is perfectly happy.^^^ The state which is and acts best, is the happiest.^ St. Thomas not only subscribes to Aristotle's three-fold divis- ion of natural desires, but unfolds the content of it. The fol- lowing tabulation reveals the range of his thought and his human interests : 561 Com. PoUt., Lib. VII, cap. 1. 562 Cf. Com. Polit., Lib. VII, cap. 1. 563 Ibidem. Cf. Aristotle's Politics, Walford, p. 232, n. 2. oU Com. Polit., Lib. VII, cap. 1. 565 Ibidem. 148 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY Classes of Goods Objects Food Pleasure (Con. Gen. 3, c. 27) Sex Pleasure (ibid.) Health (Con. Gen. 3, c. 32) Goods of the Body ! Beauty (ibid.) Strength (ibid.) Activity (2— 2ae, Q. 65, a. 3) Integrity (ibid.) Goods of the Mind External Goods ^ Body . . f Things . Persons Things Knowledge (1— 2ae, Q. 3, a. 7; ibid. Q. 32, a. 8) Virtue (1— 2ae, QQ. 58-67; 2— 2ae, QQ. 23-171) Meat (la, Q. 78, a. 2, ad. 4; Q. 97, a. 3, a. 4) Drink (ibid.) Clothing (2— 2ae, Q. 169, a. 1) Money (1— 2ae, Q. 2, a. 1; 2— 2ae, Q. 118) Houses (Joan 1 c. 4, lec. 1) I Friends (2— 2ae; QQ. 23-46; 1— 2ae, Q. 4, a. 8) Mind . . . {Honor (1— 2ae, Q. 2, a. 2) Fame (1— 2ae, Q. 2, a. 2) Glory (Con. Gen. 3, c. 29) Power (Con. Gen. 3, c. 31) Persons 5 Friends (2— 2ae. QQ. 23-46) l(5od (ibid.; De Dilection€)566 Such of these cravings, as can, should be kept in ken by the State. They are ingredients of the happiness which civil society should seek to secure and assure. They are to be inspected, when the question of natural rights and the definition of them arise. In their entirety they constitute the larger life for which St. Thomas teaches, the State was conceived. A glance through the list will show that nature and the individual him- self have much to do with the presence of many of these goods. But it is clear that the State can serve materially in the attain- ment for the people of as many more. And its general pui^pose is to offer such service without stint, consistently with the indi- vidual's effort and ability.^ 566 Henry Ignatius Smith, 0. P., Cldssification of Desires in St. Thomas and in Modern Sociology, p. 31. 567 Cf. Aristotle, Politics. VII, 13. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 149 On the basis of this classification, the Doctor's positive theory of civil purpose should be considered. The endeavor of the State to obtain benefits for the people constitutes, according to the nature of such benefits, a social, an economic, and an ethical aim ; then again, since nothing is good except insofar as it reflects the goodness of God, and nothing is to be sought save inasmuch as it leads to Him, the State should possess and manifest a godly spirit in its entire enterprise. PkEKEQUISITE TO THE SOCIAL MiSSION Let us proceed to investigate, first, the social mission. It can never be achieved apart from the attainment of two conditions : peace and unity. Aquinas carefully expresses what he would recognize as peace. It is a more comprehensive condition than mere concord, which it includes and complements. Concord is among men ; peace is a quality within men themselves. There may be concord where there is no peace ; though, where there is peace, there is always concord.^ The latter is superficial and may be false. Agreement can be forced, as when a tyrant super- imposes his will on the people and they, through no option, acquiesce.^^ This certainly is not peace, which requires free and tranquil compliance. When St. Thomas teaches that the State must secure peace, he means that it must do so on the terms of the people; else, clearly from his conception, there could be no peace. Mere concord in civil society does not suf- fice ; it may mask a state of smoldering hate on the part of the populace and be a mere prelude to internecine terrors : a point which our reconstruction program today cannot afford to ignore. From his further development of the idea of peace, one can see how truly Aquinas defers to the psychology of the indi- vidual. He holds that peace entails not only assent but also consent ; not only conviction but also persuasion ; not only mind and will, but also feeling. Evidently the State must present a reasonable attraction to the individual, with all that this o6S Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. XXIX, a. 1. 5G9 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. XXIX, a. 1, ad 1. 5lOSuvima Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. XXIX, a. 2, ad 1. 150 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY democratically implies, in order that the peace of St. Thomas, which is unmistakably that of democracy, may prevail. It is not enough for peace that the individual be satisfied in himself. He must be content with his neighbor, and his neigh- bor with him. The Gospel lesson breathes fragrant in the Saint's political philosophy. In the common love of God, all should be mindful of each other. Man must be willing to fulfill the just will of his neighbor, as well as his own.^"-*^ Aquinas quotes Cicero, to the effect that it is the property of friends to seek and to spurn the same objects. But friendship, he echoes from Aristotle, does not mean harmony in mere opinions so much as in important issues. It does not preclude petty disagreements ; for these indeed may but lend it zest, provided, of course, that charity is not lost and prudence is present.^^^ Briefly, peace is the proper act and expression of charity.^^^ And so the State, to promote it, must first subject itself to the law of love. Directly an achievement of charity, peace is also, indirectly, a work of justice; . for justice removes the obstacles which makes it possible, and gives every man his due.^^* It is significant that Aquinas makes charity the essential force in internal peace. For him, the State is not an impersonal machine, set up to grind out justice inhumanly. It is a throb- bing thing of hearts — a living democratic unit. Yet in Thomistic doctrine, the purpose of peace does not exclude the necessity of w^ar. Those who assume arms desire to secure the peace which they judge themselves to lack. With grievances gnawing at the souls of nations, concord there may be, but peace never. In the throes of a just conflict, true peace may be born. While Aquinas would have men love one another, he apparently would not have them foster injustice by too meekly submitting to it. Aquinas no more sacrifices justice to love than love to justice ; he surrenders ideals to practicality no more than he renounces practicality for ideals. He teaches that the State 571 Contra Gentiles, Lib. Ill, cap. 128. 572 8u7nma Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. XXIX, a. 3, ad 2. 57.3 Ibidem. 574 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. XXIX, a. 3, ad 3. Cf . Taparelli, Naturel Droit, p. 134. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 151 should guard the people well from the attacks of enemies. He sees little astuteness in attaining internal prosperity, and neglect- ing external menaces. A stream of invasion could, destroy in a twinkling all the merits of a state which was strong within but weak without. St. Thomas is an apostle of preparedness.^^^ It would seem, how^ever, that he is speaking in this regard, espe- cially for his own bellicose times. But that he would approve of the plan of universal disarmament today, is improbable ; for, if permitted to stand among us in the twentieth century and view the international situation, he would adjudge Faith not suf- ficiently fervent to assure the observation of treaties. In an age when economics supersedes religion, expediency is the guide of human action. Pacts shrivel up to ''scraps of paper" in the heat of selfishness. And Aquinas always sanctioned the use of prudence, and used it always himself. Peace, in the Doctor's mind, implies unity, just as unity sug- gests peace. He identifies them when he writes that the benefit and even the salvation of civil society, demands that ''its unity be preserved, which is called peace."^^^ Without unity, civil purpose is impossible of attainment. Advantage fades from social life; the bond of love becomes a chain of hate.^^^ The government must earnestly strive to secure this blessing of blessings, this unity of peace (pads unitatem) ; and Aquinas tells how it can succeed. That polity will the more efficaciously provide it, which is the most beneficial to the popular interests ; i. e., which more truly guides the people to the advantages for the attainment of which the State exists.^'^^ His belief that this unity is best achieved with one man at the head, need not arrest our attention here. His principle is what counts. It is of importance to note that Aquinas does not advocate unity through violence; for such a course would defeat its own purpose and fail by far to evoke the interior disposition without which peace is impracticable and unity itself a sham. He is not for a drastic, but for a prudent, centralization and unification. 575 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 15. 576 Idem, Lib. I, cap. 2. 577 Ibidem. 578 Idem, Lib. I, cap. 15. 152 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY The Social Purpose \\^ithin these great purposes of unity and peace, several atten- dant ideals must be sought. Thomas is explicit that the State should improve the people and make life lighter for them, imply- ing that otherwise its existence is in vain; indeed, worse than in vain — unjust; for it takes much and makes meager return. The duty of government is three-fold : first, to see that the people have a good living; secondly, to make this fact permanent as Avell as paramount, and not permit it to fluctuate into periods of stress and want ; thirdly, to be unsatisfied even with satisfac- tory civil conditions, and ever to strive to better them.^'^ These necessities are full of sugg-estion ; and, analyzed, they reveal the Angelic Doctor's consideration for all the social, economic, and ethical values which a democracy must secure, if it is to endure. But it should be emphasized that Aquinas does not esteem the goods of life as ends in themselves. He takes pains in his Summa and Contra^ Gentiles to show that happiness does not really consist in them and that they are at most only means to it. But without them, the "good life" which the State is to assure, cannot obtain. And certainly Thomas includes them, when he speaks of the civil mission. Since much of his politics appears only transiently, it is neces- sary often to bring the scattered parts into relation, in order to discover his thought on a given political subject. The bare prin- ciples sometimes appear in one book, while in another the con- tent, application, tone, and color of them are to be found. When Aquinas writes that the government should promote the general welfare, we must infer from his further statements what and how much he meant. The common good may first be treated under its social aspect. ''It was not till Aristotle's Politics were rediscovered in the thirteenth century," Carlyle declares, ''that St. Thomas Aquinas under their influence recognized that the State w^as not merely an institution devised to correct men's vices, but rather the necessary form of a real and full human life."^^ However uncertain the first half of this assertion may 579 Ibidem. 580 Hi*. Of Med. Polit. Theory, Vol. Ill, p. 5. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 153 be, the second is firm. The Doctor did recognize the State as the means to a fairer and finer expression of individuality through communality. Civil society must clear the way and hold up the standards to greater progress. And its interest must not rest v^ith the mass, but seek out the individual. We find in the De Regimine the democratic monition that every person in civil society is to be assured of his necessities '^accord- ing to his condition and state" (secundum uniusquisque consti- tutionem et statum). Otherwise the State cannot last.^^-*- Aquinas does not scorn, but rather accentuates, a material element in the purpose of civil society .^^ The State is to be vitally concerned with the health, labor, and enjoyments of the people; not entering unduly into their intimate affairs, how- ever, but rather affording them the opportunity and stimulation to express the best that is in them. As regards health, Thomas requires that the State have care for creature-needs. His doc- trine here deals with the founding of cities and is addressed to a king ; but he expressly intends that the advice should hold true in the subsequent history of the city and that the government should see that it does.^^^ When he speaks of the suitable site, elevated, unclouded, free from chills, open to the view of the heavens, neither hot nor cold, afar from the miasms of the marsh, and clean-swept by breezes, we immediately realize that he would be dissatisfied with congested conditions of our large cities.^^ Good air is essential.^^ He stresses the necessity of a decent water-supply, declaring that the health of the body depends exceedingly on such a common necessity, l^ext to the purity of the air, nothing is more necessary to the health of a city than good water.^^^ The government should strive to provide and protect these needs. Aquinas was sufficiently modern to sense a certain relation between laws and lungs. One cannot but 581 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 13: "Demum vero providendum est ut sin- gulis necessaria suppetant secundum uniusquisque constitutionem et statum: aliter enim nequaquam posset regnum vel civitas commanere." 582 Idem, Lib. I, cap. 1. 538 Idem, Lib. I, cap. 13: "Non igitur gubernationis officium plena cognosci poterit. si institutionis ratio ignoretur." 5.S4 De Reg., Lib. II, cap. 2. 585 Ibidem. 586 Ibidem. 154 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY moon that, if the modern State had discerned and regarded it so well, the reign of the white plague among us would hardly have reached its present proportions. He interestingly observes that the looks of the people are the index of a city ; and who will gainsay that his method of gauge is quite as effective, more graphic, and much more human than statistics ? The bright complexion, the sinewy arm, the well-knit frame, tell a tale, and fairly well answer whether the State is a success. Children, many and mirthful, and a goodly number of old people, also are excellent evidences.^^" On the contrary, the sunken cheek, the stooped back, the slender limb, silent child- hood, and scarce old age, are a tragic indictment. It is the Thomistic idea that the government should use its reason and imagination, see such conditions before they occur, and stave them off. If despite all efforts, or because of no efforts at all, the people find themselves in misery, Aquinas would have the government do its best to draw them out. The faces of the people are the glory or the shame of the polity. Also the question of housing the people, he believes, should engage civil concern. A decent district is to be laid out for them.'^^^ The food problem gives him pause.^^ He mentions that when Xenocrates, the skilled builder, remarked to Alex- ander the Great that, on a certain mountain, a wondrous city could be constructed, the incomparable leader inquired whether there were near-by fields to supply the proposed city with food. Keceiving nay for an answer, he spurned the project.^^ Aquinas believes that food is a foremost civil concern, and that the mind of the government should be devoted to the subject of its supply. His interest reminds one of that of Pope Gregory I, who is said to have done penance by keeping to his room for three days, because a person had died of hunger in Kome. He offers two plans. Let the State be interested in the soil, seeing that it is cultivated and not allowed to lie fallow. As an infant is de- 587 Ibidem. oSSDe Reg., Lib. I, cap. 13: "Si autem institutioni civitatis opera detur, providere oportet . . . quis locus artificibus singulis depu- tandus." 589 Idem, Lib. II, cap. 3. 590 Ibidem. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 155 pendent on the maternal breast for its nourishment and growth, so is the city bound to the bosom of nature.^^^ The people are in relation to the food. The land must be made fertile and abun- dantly productive of the necessities of life. Secondly, the State should encourage commerce, especially when the soil fails. But here Aquinas takes a stand for the simple life. He prefers that the wants of the peoj^le be of such a nature that they can be satisfied for the most part at home; and that only when the immediate supply is insufficient, should ships set sail. A state ought develop its own potentialities to the fullest and rely no more than necessary on others. It can often furnish enough enterprise right within its own confines for the people ; and educated in time of peace to self-sufficiency, it w^ill be triumphant in the event of war.^^- His arguments against commerce are unique. The first of them is doubtless inspired to a degree by the sombre side of the Crusades which brought back oriental vice and the penalty of it a-plenty into Europe. He indicates that, opening its gateways to the world, a state lets into its life a power of adulteration. Men of different laws and customs, afar from home, and free from restraint, pour in, and, attractive by novelty, they exercise a sinister influence on the people.^^ One cannot but be impressed with the practical truth of this observation, in a recollection of our own American fads of foreign origin. Thomas offers as a second argument against a mercantile state that such a one is prone to luxury and vice.^^* Gold is god. Faith falls ; fraud rises ; the public good is slain by selfishness ; virtue yields to advantage. Thirdly, the people, under a commercial regime, are weak- ened spiritually and physically.^^ Delicacies produce delicacy ; the firm hand and the strong heart, which make for civil success, are among the missing. Finally, cities become too congested and new evils sprout.^^^ 591 Ibidem. 392 Ibidem. 593 Ibidem. 5W Ibidem. 595 Ibidem. 596 Ibidem. 156 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY Souls jostle each other, as well as bodies; friction, contention, and sedition dispel the peace which is so important to the State, ^s'o more than the thinking modern, can Thomas see the sense of a feverish pursuit of temporalities, wherein the winners so often lose what is best in life and purchase what is worst, while the losers are more deplorably circumstanced than before. He would have the State try to direct the gregarious instinct of the people, so far as possible, and inspire a love for the land. [N'ever- theless, the merits of moderate commerce and industry elicit his praise, and he considers the state imperfect which does not admit them. Although his gaze could not penetrate the intensive era of modern industrialism, at any rate he somewhat saw it in medie- val miniature, and knew whereof he spoke. The guilds and the commercial activities of the Italian cities foreshadowed the present day and furnished him much material for observation. He speaks with authority in his critical realization that a state, in which commercialism is altogether untrammelled and the political organization is of such a nature that no civil interfer- ence in the bustling campaign for money is made, does not fulfill its mission of the common good. He does not abet our present system of unbridled competition which creates the multi-million- aire and the pauper ; but his remedy is not rancor. He sees that the clash of classes would be suicidal to the interests of the State. He holds that in the clear open-places, under the innocent skies of heaven, men could better find peace, and plenty, and God. The gi'ind of industry must be ; but it need not be first. The State should have a correct sense of values and assist the masses to act according to it. Farms first, factories second, and sea-ports third, would seem to be the right modern expression of Thomistic advice, and of the order which the interest and aid of the State should follow. Aquinas teaches that the State ought to be solicitous that the refining effect of beauty reach the people.^^^ He would have the lives of the multitude not only wholesome but also sweet. He 597 In his own words, "quoddam bonum et diliglbile," "quoddam sola- tium et dulcedinem naturalem." Com. PoUt., Lib. Ill, lec. 5. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 157 hears the cry of the soul as well as of the senses. The craving for beauty is important, just as the demand for food, and must likewise receive the attention of authority .^^^ The Angelic Doctor expects the government to see that boulevards are laid,^^ and that houses are built a decent distance apart, so that refresh- ing bits of landscape may lie between. He is against the ruth- less utilitarianism which swings an axe at every tree, consider- ing it only so much wood for burning or building, instead of so much perfection for delighting. The State should attend that there are many of these leafy avenues of cool enjoyment for the people.®^^ The natural charms of a city are to be enchanced and not concealed. St. Thomas takes care to advise, however, that love of nature and the satisfaction of it be duly regulated. It may lead to defects. It is plain that he would not apotheosize Athens, who lived for beauty, rather than for virtue, and whose architecture proved purer than her ethics. He describes how this worship of nature may subtly soften judgment in an excess of heart,^-^ and quotes Aristotle for confirmation. The sentiments, being blind, are to be led. Delight does not satisfy the appetite so much as it whets it. If he advocates that the government supply and protect public beauty, he does so because and only insofar as, aesthetics is a natural right and necessity of the people. And having in mind perhaps the extravagant spectacles with which the Roman emperors regaled the masses and cheaply bought their favor, pleasing their eyes but poisoning their brains, he denounces civic munificence in this regard. Men should be guided to abstain from superfluous pleasures, that they may comply with reason the better and enjoy the simpler joys the more.^^ Quality is the criterion, not quantity. The State ought endeaver to dispel indigence rather than to increase wealth. St. Thomas traces the degeneration of opulence, through indolence and effeminacy, to poverty, and thence to the 598 Be Reg., Lib. II, cap. 4. 590 There is a chapter in the unauthentic part of the De Reg. devoted to the subject of public roads. Lib. II, cap. 12. 600 Be Reg., Lib. II, cap. 4. 601 Ibidem. 602 Ibidem. 158 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY frequent exigence of crime.^^ He views concentration of wealth as a gi-eat cause of poverty, and legacies as a sometimes curse. The ideal he presents the State is much like that which was a reality in Longfellow's Acadia 'Vhere the richest were poor and the poorest lived in abundance."^ The law-abiding indi- vidual has a right not only to a decent livelihood, but also to a certain amount of recreation and enjoyment. Pleasure is a condiment, and, used as such, it makes life more palatable and energy more apt. The people have a better claim to a fit and happy existence than any one of them has to a golden life of harmful luxury, to which indeed, from an ethical angle, no one has a right at all. St. Thomas observes how inefficient and use- less to the purposes of the State are the idle rich,^^ and insin- uates how pernicious. Civil society is perfect in ratio to its assurance to the individual of the requirements of a good liveli- hood.^^ Here the right of property is wholly respected, but its abuse in excessive amassment of wealth receives no sanction. Aquinas repeats the statement of Valerius Maximus anent the old Romans, to the effect that they i3referred to be poor in a rich state than rich in a poor.^^ The Economic Purpose And thus we are led to the economic field of the State. One of the reasons why civil society arose was to ease the struggle for existence. Work is the law of men. It remains for the State not only to help regulate labor but also to see that it may be obtained ; for, without it, society does not yield a sufficiency of necessities and the common good is seriously hurt. St. Thomas teaches not only that men should work, but proposes that each has a right to work. He offers four proofs : 603 De Reg., Lib. II, cap. 4. 604 Ibidem. 605 Ibidem. 606 Be Reg., Lib. I, cap. 1. 607 Summa TheoL, 2a 2ae, qu. XLVII, a. X, ad 2. We find in the De Regimine, Lib. IV, cap. 15, a helpful distinction between voluntary poverty and necessary. Here the suggestion is that we should move away from poverty as a condition but toward it as an ideal. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 159 First, and principally, mouths must be fed. The voice of Genesis still vibrates through human destiny, and '^work'' is written large on the wall of Life. Without it, man cannot comply with the law of self-preservation. Secondly, idleness is as much the source of evils as work may be the means of blessings. Virtue is in close relation to industry. Thirdly, by labor the call of the flesh is weakened. Con- cupiscence is restrained, and the spirit purged. Fourthly, men must have work and wages, in order to fulfill the Christian law of charity. In this, Aquinas seems to recog- nize that the honest hard-serving person is entitled not only to the requisites of life but also to a surplus. Each man has a right to the thrill of helping those who cannot help themselves.^ The possessors of wealth are the stewards of it; out of their abun- dance, they must succor the less fortunate, l^o greater luxury can be purchased with riches than the joy of charity. From labor, the logical transition in the Thomistic doctrine of civic purpose is to the subjects of money and taxation. In the De Regimine, two sets of reasons are advanced for coinage. First, the image of the sovereign is stamped on the pieces of gold or silver, and nothing could keep the memory of the repre- sentative of law and order (and incidentally civil ideals) more green than this frequent passing from hand to hand of the inscribed coin of the realm. ^ Secondly, money is a conven- ience for the people, and, duly accredited by the stamp of the State, it saves them from fraud.^-^^ Thus in the time of Christ, when Roman ascendency w^as supreme, there was only one kind of coin in the empire, and Caesar's image frowned from it, for justice as well as domination. St. Thomas' views on money should be of interest to an age of finance like ours. For him, specie is primarily an instru- ment of exchange,^-^- for the convenience of men but not at all 608 Sumnm TheoL, 2a 2ae, qu. CLXXXVII, a. 3. 609 De Reg., Lib. II, cap. 13. 610 Ibidem. 611 Ibidem. 612 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu, LXXVIII, a, 1. Of. Aristotle's doctrine that usury is money born of money, not of work, and that, of all means of money-making, it Is the most contrary to nature. — Politics, I, 10. Cf. Albertus Magnus' Corri, Polit., Lib. I, cap. 8. 160 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY for the making of magnates. He does not regard it as productive in itself, but solely as a symbol of production. For him it is criminal that anything should be sold fraudulently for more than a just price.*^^^ Money is an institution of the State for the common good and should be maintained as such. Abuse is not to be tolerated. Even in cases where cheating does not figure, it must be borne in mind that buying and selling are transactions for the benefit of both parties concerned, one sup- plying what the other lacks ; and the equity of the process should be perfect. If the price exceeds the value of the object, or con- versely, justice is injured; and, therefore, to sell too dearly or to buy too cheaply is illicit.^-^* But Aquinas introduces also the instance in which a man suffers a loss over and above the intrin- sic value of the transferred article, in supplying the purchaser,and declares that then something over and above the worth may be asked. And no one should sell what is not absolutely his own.^^^ The law must forbid whatever injures the social life of men {quae destmunt hominum convictum) ; but he realizes that its influence is limited and that, if civil society had to depend on it solely, each man in the State would probably need to be per- sonally policed. So he tells the profiteer of God's vision which pierces every injustice, and of His justice which exacts the last farthing. To be sure the State should do as much as it can to secure justice ; but the final issue is with the individual himself, whom Thomas always refuses to sacrifice, and in whose powers for good he does not surrender confidence. Yet this does not prevent him from explaining the State's duty in the matter. Standardization must vary in different places, according to sup- ply and demand ; hence, in every polity the government should reflect on conditions and then determine the standard of justice. The rulings of just authortiy or of custom in this regard must not be transgressed.^^^ The Doctor mentions varieties of fraud in business — (a) 613 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. LXXVII, a. 1. 614 Com. Polit., Lib. I, cap. 6. et Com. Eth.. Lib. V, cap. 5, et Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LXXVII, a. 1. 615 Ibidem: Suvima. 616 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LXXVII, a. II, ad 2. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 161 adulteration of goods; (b) false measure; (c) misrepresenta- tion of merchandise.^-^^ In these directions, the eye of the State must search and the force of law be wielded. Profit should be permitted only when its purpose is honest and necessary. This condition is met when the emolument is moderate, applies to the support of the home, benefits the needy, or results in public util- ity, so that those things which are necessary to the life of the State may not be lacking. Lucre is never to be sought as the end of business but as to the reward of honest labor.^^^ As for multi-millionaires, St. Thomas would approve their benefactions but not always their methods. Their remarkable energy and genius might have been better devoted to the welfare of their native land and of humanity than to the accumulation of colossal wealth for themselves. He believes that every man should have opportunity to make enough money, by body or brain, for his own needs and his family's ; but this is as far as he would have the savor of self to travel ; all other profit should be inspired by, and devoted to, purposes of altruism. He judges a man by what he is, not by what he has ; he insinuates that, if a man has more than he should, he is not what he ought to be. He does not decry capitalists, but rather greed, fraudulency, and inordinate selfishness. Here again he inculcates the Christian princij^le and spirit of the stewardship of wealth. In the ideal State, strength must supplement weakness ; and surplus gain should be devoted, not through civil coercion, indeed, the office of which is limited to social essentials, but, through the free and noble spirit of the opulent individual, to social improvement. He further solves the problem of distribution with his doc- trine that money should not, of itself, be esteemed fruitful. For him, interest is usury and frank injustice, because, by it, ^'that is sold which is not." Iso one should be required to pay for the use of a thing when the use means the loss of it; for then one would be paying for the same thing twice. This is the case with 617 Ibidem. Qis Sunima Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LXXVII, a. 4. 619 Cf. Aristotle's teaching that courage is intended to inspire forti- tude, not to earn money; that the end of the soldier's and the physi- cian's vocation is victory and health, not gain; that it is unjust and unseemly to make the higher motive less than the lower. — Politics, I, 9. 162 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY money.^ His tenet is of course due to his conception of money essentially as sterile and a medium of exchange. Whereas, in modern times, it has become a thing-in-itself. Its purpose is subordinate to its possibilities. A symbol that can be handled and hoarded, it invites accumulation, readily loses its original innocence, and departs on a career of social crime. St. Thomas believes that lack of state-action on the abuse of money is excusable only on the gTound that human laws, as noticed, are limited in scope, because of human imperfection, and that much bad is often permitted in order that more good may not be impeded. A stricter stand for justice on the part of the State, however, would require drastic measures.*-^ The Angelic Doctor surely would champion civil intervention today, when the individual conscience is comparatively dull and justice so readily accedes to Mammon. He concedes that he who makes a loan with risk, or with sacri- fice, may exact a degree of interest. But his teaching is for free and ready lending, with humanity and benevolence for their own reward.^-- He would have social reinforcement possible to every worthy individual. He has confidence in every individual who has not forfeited the right to it, and even then the spirit of his writings evinces that he has hope ; while in any event, his charity is certain. To recapitulate his doctrine of the duty of the State in the economic question of a more equitable distribution of wealth : (1) He accentuates man's right to life, and the means of securing sustenance for it, as well as the protection and perfec- tion of it : work. Which necessitates that the State endeavor to provide opportunity equally for all; and since it does not defend without first defining, the right of the individual to a 620 See Von Roey, La Mor.naie d'apres Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Revue. Neo-Scholastique, XII, 1905. For Thomistic doctrine on money beyond the Summa, III Sent., dist. XXXV] I, qu. I, a. 6. Quodmeta. III. a. XIX. De Malo, qu. XIII, a. 4. De Emptione et Venditione ad tempus, In duo praecepta caritatis et in decern Legis praecepta expositio (c. XXIV), et in psalmos Davidis expositio (ps. XIV) (Von Roey). fi2l Summa TheoL. 2a 2ae, qu. LXXVIII, a. 1, ad. 3. 622 Idem, ad. 4. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 163 profitable position should be made the subject of legislation.^^ Such is the legitimate conclusion from the Doctor's principles of the common weal, the protectorate character of the State, the guarantee of law, and the supremacy of right. (2) The State must not assume the place of the individual, but enable him, insofar as it is fitting and necessary, to play his own part and play it well. (3) Capitalism should be repressed to the proportions of justice, (a) by the civil action of fair and standard prices and (b) by a prudent limitation of interest. (4) The spirit of charity and fraternity should be fostered and spread. Under the economic mission of the State is to be considered also the question of taxation. The government is not to seek its own interest or glory, but the people's. The fire of Ezechiel's diction is hurled by St. Thomas against avaricious polities ^'like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood, and to destroy souls, and to run after gains through covetousness" (Ezech. XXII, 27). ''Woe to the shepherds of Israel," he cries with the Prophet, "that fed themselves : should not the flocks be fed by the shep- herds ? You ate the milk, and you clothed yourselves with, wool, and you killed that which was fat: but my flock you did not feed" (Ezech. XXXIV, 2, 3). Only in real necessity, such as the national defense, or the fitting support of the administrators of the government, are taxes to be levied ; and then, the Doctor observes, it is only rational that the people render that with which their common utility is procured.^""^ Aquinas democrat- ically regards taxes from the view-point of those on whom they are laid, rather than from that of those by whom. If they result in ultimate advantage to the people, they are just;^^^ if not, the State has stumbled in its mission. Taxes must always be moderate. And if a ruler greedily exacts more than is meet, he is guilty of grave wrong, and is 623 Cf. Karl Mueller, Die Arbeit (nach den moral-philosophlschen Grundsatyen des hi. Thomas von Aquln), p. 93. Also, S. Thomae Contra Retrahentes Horn, a Relig. Ingressu. Cf. Ratzinger, Geschichte der Kirchlichen Armenpflege, p. 541. 624 De Reg. Judaeorum ad Ducissam Brabantiae. 625 Ibidem. 164 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY bound to restitution. In general the government should carry on with its ordinary and established revenues and trouble the people as little as possible.^^^ Ethical Purpose Throughout the social and economic phases of the State's mission, a trend of ethical necessity is observable. There could be neither peace nor unity, if the hearts of men were severed. There could be no lasting civil success, if selfishness were king. As for the economic storm, it could never be stilled save by the Christ-like principles of charity and justice. Moral itself, the State must strive to render and keep the people so. The happiness which civil society should seek for the people, as we have already seen, is dependent on the things of the spirit. Happiness, Aquinas asserts in his Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, is according to perfect virtue and the per- fect exercise of virtue.^^^ And in his Commentary on the Poli- tics, we learn that felicity is more apt to be the portion of those whose morals are purest and whose intellects are best cultivated. External goods are essential, but only in moderation.^^ Virtue is the child not solely of sentiment, imitation, or custom. It requires a rational foundation. Its deep and consistent presence requires the education of the individual. Aristotle and Aquinas agree that virtue and education are the props and principles of well-living.^ The great political good is justice; and this is the good of all.^-'- It can never be realized and the State cannot be preserved, unless the people be trained particularly in a democracy. And so, of all the elements of State, education in the laws and purposes of the polity is chief. The psychological reason which Aquinas would offer is that one loves only what one knows, and knows to be fair. The more one knows, the 626 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. LXVI, a. 8, ad 3. 627 Regimine Judaeorum. 628 Lib. I, lec. 2. 629 Lib. VII, lec. 1. 630 Com. PoUt., Lib. Ill, lec. 11. 631 Idem, Lib. Ill, lec. 10. 632 Idem, Lib. V, lec. 7. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 165 more one may be expected to love ; and the more one loves, the better one serves.^^ The logical reason which he would advance is that man is by nature intellectual and is therefore most nat- ural, personal, and free, when he acts according to reason. By reason, a citizen can see the reasonableness of the State and of living as it directs. Therefore by education, which develops reason, the individual and the State are at once preserved;^* for the educated individual must confess that to live in civil society is to his advantage rather than not, and is not slavery, but liberty. It is explicit in the Commentary on the Politics that education may be within the province of legislation though elsewhere, as we have seen, St. Thomas teaches that parental and other rights, bearing on this point are to be respected. But education is so important that, when prior institutions are unable fully to supply it, the State rightly steps in, to supplement rather than assume or supplant. The Thomistic view of education is broad and well-ordered. With Aristotle, the Doctor sees the functions of man as divided into two parts, the rational and the irrational, the higher and the lower. The rational, or higher, is sub- divided, as to object, into the theoretical and the practical, of which the latter is inferior to the former and hence sub-serv- ient.^^ Man ought always be taught to seek the higher, and to accept the lower only as a means thereunto; e. g., war for peace, or the useful for the worthy. Law and government should fol- low out this idea. The people must be trained to work for their country and to defend it ; not for labor and war in themselves, as with inhuman Sparta, but for rest and peace. They should be instructed in what is necessary and useful, but only for the purpose which renders it noble. The militaristic state is as cen- surable as the hedonistic, since both make a lower end their 633 Ibidem. Also Com. Polit., Lib. VII, cap. 11. 634 Ibidem. 635 R, L. Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought, p. 246: "Nor oan we omit to note the emphasis with which Thomas main- tains that it is the duty of the state to provide for the education of all its members and to see that no citizen suffers want." 636 St. Thomas considers speculative knowledge superior to practical, because its object is universal and immutable truth, and it soars above turmoil and matter, to the spiritual. — Com. Polit.. Lib. VII, lec. 11. 166 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRIXE AND DEMOCRACY object. The ultimate object of human life, declares St. Thomas, does not consist principally in what appertains to the body, for the body and its perfections are on account of the soul {propter animam) ; but in what belongs to the soul, which is the more excellent part of man.^* It is as important that the State should be imbued with a correct sense of values in education as that it should be interested in education at all: Freedom of thought, as we have elsewhere observed, does not mean that known error should be allowed free circulation. The Angelic Doctor would not have the State rule the minds of the people, any more than he would have it trammel their bodies ; but he does believe that befitting direction of thought is no more servi- tude than is decent protection of corporal welfare and preven- tion of crime, and that society owes something to souls as well as to bodies. It is wrong for government to encourage systems of education in which what Revelation offers and mankind has so long held dear is sacrificed to a pseudo-liberty, and in which the interests of the people are truly imperilled, all the more so because they temporarily seem to be improved. Aquinas was not behind Aristotle in the conviction that government should consider the best for its present and future citizens (Pol., VII, 14). He traces with Aristotle a suitable line of education, in which spiritual and temporal significances are fitly regarded. In the order of time, the body demands care previously to the soul.^ But the appetites must be trained for the sake of the mind, and the body for the sake of the soul. The cradle contains the future. Thomas and the Stagirite begin there, and offer their detailed instructions for the mental, bodily, home and civic training of future citizens.^ ^^"aturally Aquinas gives morals a greater role in training 637 Ibidem. 638 Politics, VII, 15. 639 Politics, VII, 17; VIII, 1-3; Com. Pol., Lib. VII, lec. 12, et lib. VIII, lec. 1. Cf. schema of education repeated by Aegidius Colonna, disciple of St. Thomas. Li Livres du Gouvernement des Rois (Xlllth Cen. French version— Molenaer) , Bk. II, part II, chs. XV-XVIII. Cf. W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, 1, pp. 372-73. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 167 than does Aristotle.^^ His ideas on ethics, thanks to Chris- tianity, are much fuller and more definite than the Philosopher's. His thoughts on the virtue of justice, which the State should exercise and uphold, are especially useful from a political as well as an educational point of view. The people, men, women, and children, are to be taught the significance of justice, and the government itself must be animated with the same realization. Without justice, unity or peace can hardly obtain.^^ An unjust regime insults the rational nature of man and arouses the pas- sions. The State is to be swayed with the will to ensure the rights of all.^^ This entails an active, though not aggressive, interest and enthusiasm for the ascendency of the moral virtues ; since without them, civil justice were impossible.^^ The justice which Aquinas advocates is a combination of prudence, forti- tude, temperance, love, and law. The government is not to be apart from the people and impersonal. It is to be a living expres- sion of the best that is in them ; and it must even make its appeal to the best, in order that the best may be ever further expressed. It reflects back what it receives. Fed by justice, it lives for it and advances it. Justice must be in the people, if it is to be in the democratic State; but a great purpose of the State is not only to exercise it, but also, insofar as possible, to inspire it among the people. St. Thomas teaches that the whole people, or he to whose guidance they have committed themselves, must decide, in sincere conformity with reason, what is to be con- sidered just in set cases. Rights must be carefully defined ; not only the general ones, but those of particular classes of the people, such as the military, the magisterial, etc. Each man is 040 In the work De Eruditione Principum are miany excellent chap- ters, as replete with Christian spirit as advice, on parental solicitude for the education of children, the reprehensibility of neglect; the value of an early start, the necessity of a religious element, the choice of a teacher, instruction in morals, discipline, the inculcation of humil- ity, patience, obedience, the shunning of bad company, the chief evils of youth, the timely word of warning, etc., etc. See Lib. V, cap. 1-49. 641 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 2. 042 Cf. Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 1. 043 Summa Theol, la 2ae, qu. LX. a. 2. 044 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVII, a. 2. 168 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY to be accorded that which befits his office and station.^^ This requires the reign of good will. The virtue of giving every one his due cannot be traced to the sensitive appetite of man, and hence not to the emotional side of human nature, but to the rational appetite, and therefore to the will.^^ Sporadic senti- ment and periodical reforms will not induce justice; the State must help to elevate and strengthen the inner life of the people. Christian education is imperative. Only with a permanent foundation can justice be a constant factor. It implies and resembles charity,^^ save that its aim is lower ; love ordains all to the divine good, but justice (legal) to the common weal.***^ The latter ordination, however, is assured and reassured in the former; for the divine good demands the common, and men are most willing to grant others their due, when they are eager to give God His. The people must not be content to have justice only in the abstraction of the State, but also in the reality of themselves. Legal justice indeed directs man immediately to the common good, but only mediately to the good of any particular person. Consequently there must be some particular justice which im- mediately stimulates a man to the good of his neighbor. He^-e again we meet the necessity of love. Civil justice deals only with the external relations of men ;^^ but since these are so largely dependent on the internal disposi- tion of the individual, the requirement of charity is evident. Justice pertains to the will of the individual indeed,^ but love perfects volition. St. Thomas conceives true justice as warm, inviting, and fruitful. Mercy, liberality, and other sterling vir- tues are its issue.^^ Therefore, according to Aquinas, a system of education which does not include justice, and a family or state which takes no interest in the inclusion, are exceedingly defective. For justice 645 Idem, a. 4, ad 3. 646 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 4. 647 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. LIX, a. 4. ^■iS Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. LIX, a. 6. 649 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 8. 650 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 8, ad 1. 651 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 11, ad 1. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 169 is the chief of the moral virtues, striving for the good of all in society, and expressing the rational appetite of man, his reason and his will, which are his noblest possessions. It is essentially altruistic and democratic. St. Thomas repeats Aristotle (I. Rhetor., cap. IX) that those virtues are the greatest which are the most beneficial to others and that, while such qualities as bravery are useful in time of war, justice, superiorly, is needed both in clangor and calm.^- The Angelic Doctor may be said to arraign injustice on the ground of its undemocratic character. It includes contempt for the public good, and injures the individual rights of others.^ The inequality is intolerable, when one-man claims more riches and honors than another, and at the same time refuses to face as many labors and losses as his neighbor.^ The opportunity which the State should offer equally to all, is not evident, if such assumptions are civilly countenanced. Though every individual in the State must have his rights, none is to be exalted beyond his deserts.^^ Such is the only kind of practical equality which genuine democracy may demand, which Aquinas sincerely pro- poses, and which his doctrine of justice, to be taught to all, plainly expresses. Ultkamuxdaxe Purpose Throughout these purposes of the State, social, economic and ethical, as presented by St. Thomas, runs a thread of finality glinting with religion. The State cannot be an end in itself. Its mission is bigger than itself, and beyond ; just as a port ex- ceeds the ship that sails to it. In fact, Aquinas uses this very simile and draws it out. The ship of State should protect well its precious cargo, the people, and bear on through this world to a further and final goal. If man's destiny were merely earthly, an epicurean polity would appear rational, and the State would 652 Sumnia Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. LVIII, a. 12. 653 Sumnia Theai., 2a 2ae, qu. LX, a. 1. 654 Ibidem. Qoo Summa Theol.. 2a 2ae, qu. LX, a. 2. 170 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY be hardly more than a squat and aimless house-boat.^ Beyond food, drink, shelter, a little education, less ethics,, and certainly much amusement, life would hold nothing. Under such a ma- terialistic delusion, men seem to be laboring today. The State which does not reach beyond itself will stoop to measures beneath its dignity. It will be either autocratic, and therefore intolerable, or lackadaisical, and hence useless. Fiber will either be feigned in it or frankly lacking. There is nothing solid to hold it up, if it lets go of the ideals which are so asso- ciated with another world, that they seem illogical, if severed from it, and lack intrinsic attraction. The combined genius of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adams, Hume, Bentham, and Mill could not give us a good substitute for the natural law which receives its universal and binding character from the God whom it expresses and to Whom, out of this world, it leads. The best that materialism, deism, phenome- nalism, or associationism can do for morals is to make them the best policy. Religion alone renders them the prime necessity. The society which lacks a spiritual and ultramundane outlook is as unstable as human impulse itself, by which it is largely ruled.^^ Seeing no end above itself, it makes itself its own end. It focusses on terrestrial affairs without reference to aught higher, and renders the people low in ambition and aim. It champions progress, not upward, but on a plane surface, and considers its success commensurate with its territorial expan- sion; thus furnishing a fruitful cause of war. It stresses ma- terial things, and then trembles when the masses rise to demand what they have been taught to consider alone worth while. It permits ease to pile up on one side and misery on the other, for it lacks an immutable and compelling standard of justice. It glitters, but decay is within ; for no system which withholds the souls of men from soaring and which blots out the view of a better world, the striving towards which spells genuine progress in this, can permanently satisfy. It would be easy for Aquinas 656 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 14 : "Quod si homo non ordinaretur ad allud exterius bonum, sufficerent homini curae praedictae (temporales)." 657 Thus, as Erdmann puts it: "The aim of the (Christian) State is to bring its citizens nearer their highest goal, the condition of blessed- ness. ..." ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 171 to explain the modern restlessness, which our romantic literature and the daily press feature. He would judge that the vision of the people has been limited and their ideals stunted ; that racial energy has been turned back on itself to combat itself; that a higher outlet is wanting ; in a word, that the potent principle of finality has been thwarted. St. Thomas would have society enjoy, in a rational measure, all the reasonable good which a materialistic presentment could boast, but also more.^ He would open up an infinite ideal to the race ; teach it to fly as well as to creep ; present solid princi- ples for g-uides ; place a conscience in the State that would direct the government and the people onward, rather than inw^ard or backward. But he would give the people today, who have re- linquished faith, credit for at least retaining logic.^^ If the end of man were earth and the purpose of the State were itself, ethics might rightly be repudiated; for certainly it is something of a hamper in the struggle for existence. But this fallacy, which today is being so extensively lived, if less intensively believed, is denounced by Aquinas. Neither men nor the State exist for themselves. The latter is for the sake of the former ; the former gather into the latter that they may the more easily live well. But there is no good life save that which is lived according to virtue; every other kind is confusion. Xow the question pre- sents itself: will natural virtue suffice, or must the supernatural prevail? Aquinas answers that the former might, if man had no super-terrestrial destiny; we ourselves may respond that it does not, from our sufficiency of experience in a period which has snapped its relations with the divine. St. Thomas insists that, since man is intended for a higher state, his virtue must bear reference to sacred things. For virtue, no more than the State, is an end in itself.^^-*^ It is a means of attaining to the supernal life which signifies not only beatitude in the realm of soul-survival, but also the greatest amount of inner happiness here. 658 Be Reg., Lib. I, cap. 15. 650 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 14. 670 Ibidem. 671 Ibidem. Contra Gentiles, Lib. Ill, cap, 34. 172 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY Thomistic politics now reaches the border line of the purely spiritual, where the mission of the State, in a manner, both begins and ends. If men could achieve, bv merely human effort, their supernatural destiny, -which is written partly in the stars and fully in Revelation, the duty of civil government would be to direct them to it.^*"^ But a supernatural object necessitates a supernatural guidance. Here the State itself cannot guide, but must itself be guided.^'^ In other words, there must be a spiritual magisterium, to keep the morals of the individuals in the State at their purest and best, to appeal to the individual conscience and responsibility, and to point an unfailing finger to the highest goal of humanity.^ '"^ Rightly understood, this part of Thomistic doctrine in which religion takes on where politics proper leaves off, is an asset to democracy. Aquinas would have the people secure from the tyranny of rulers by subjecting rulers to the principle of jus- tice.^"^ But justice is a vague thing, unless it is concreted and 672 De Reg., Lib. I, cap. 14. Deploige, L correlative terms as husband and wife. So, let us turn to a con- sideration of his doctrine in regard to a topic which has become intense in our day and is styled Feminism. We may expect little enthusiasm from the monk-scholar, whose bias, if he had any, was against the allurements of the sex and whose historical en- counter with a depraved female in the days of his youth was one of the painful spots of his life. But he presents much which the impartial would have to recognize as good sense. If we bring his thoughts into relation with our modern ^'Woman's Movement," however we find that he could hardly be reckoned among the sup- porters. Proof would he be against the claim of the Feminists that the success of their campaign would mean the transforma- tion of woman from a drudge to a partner, a plaything to a friend, a servant to an equal ; knowing, as he does, that Chris- tianity, if anything could, would secure these blessed advan- tages of the sex and, in fact, has. He believes that woman has her sphere and that it is not man's. If she assumes the duties of a larger life in addition to those of domesticity, she would be more of a "drudge" than ever. While he, of course, admits that woman is intended to be man's help-mate, he guards against the magnified estimation which Feminists make of this fact. Prop- erly interpreted, the sentence from Genesis, according to Aquinas, means that woman is man's co-partner in generation ; certainly not his aid in every other operation, since, the Doctor significantly remarks, man is more conveniently helped by other men in aught else.^^^ And so he concludes that woman has her own sphere of activity and should remain in it. He cannot well conceive of her as breaking into the outside world, ante-dating the era of industrialism as he does, and believing that by nature she has a right to be exempt from the sterner demands of the struggle for existence. 'No doubt he pondered too, if the ques- tion arose in his super-active mind at all, that, if woman should tu rn from the home to the forum, she would be less efficient as a 820 Summa Theol., 1 a. qu. XCII, a. 1. 260 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY wife and mother ; if she should turn from the forum to the home, her value in the political world would depreciate ; or turning to both, she would excel in neither, and the world and herself would be little the loser if she stayed where she was. At any rate, he submits that she is most superior when she is subject to her nat- ural circumstances; for the subjection which he prescribes for her is really the kind that elevates. Reviewing his doctrine on woman, her nature, and her rela- tive inferiority and superiority, we may adjudge what political significance it holds. First of all, he expresses the broad scrip- tural characterization of her as man's ''help-meet like unto him- self."^--"^. And so he tacitly concedes that, being like man, she may be capable of much of his spirit and many of his acts. But the point for him is one of ''ought" and not of "able." I^ot, could she advance into the masculine sphere? but, should she? is the question which interests him. His reasons for a negation are: 1. Her physical inferiority. Man is better helped in the struggle for existence by his own sex than by hers.^^^ Here the Doctor does not foresee the gauche modern transformation in in- dustry which would draw woman from the home and often place her shoulder to shoulder with her mate, in a manner to prove her physical inferiority not so pronounced after all. Abnormal times have placed her in an abnormal situation, and she has shown herself capable of responding lightly to heavy demands. Still it is as true today, as when Thomas wrote, that women as a class are naturally intended for something better than the masculine daily grind, and that they have certain physical limi- tations which are periodically increased by the advent of mother- hood. 2. Her biological inferiority. Aquinas, prescinding from all higher considerations, grants that man is a more perfect product of generation than woman, inasmuch as he contains the active principle of reproduction. But, as regards the universal plan of nature, the Doctor is careful to attest that woman is no 821 Ibidem. 822 Vide supra. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 261 incidental, but is of essential importance in the great life-func- tion, God-willed and given from the beginning. Yet, since the passive is, in a metaphysical sense, always less than the active, Aquinas, from the abstract point of view, holds man superior. 3. Her origin in man, who is indeed the principle of the whole species. All things come from God, but He permitted the whole human order to come from Him through His Own image and likeness — man. 4. Her inseparability from man. x\quinas holds that the love and faithfulness which man owes woman is dependent on the fact that he is, in a sense, her source and she is his care, and both are each other's complement.^^ 5. Her amenability to his domestic headship. Thomas can- not admit of a two-headed home. He declares that man does not relinquish his- identity as an active principle, nor woman hers as a passive, outside of generation. Their characters as such re- main throughout their mutual life. Woman has her duties ; man, his. His may be superior in one regard ; hers in another. She is supreme in her own sphere, and, by moral influence, she may rule also in his. To all appearances and purposes, though, he is, and should be, normally the head.^^^ 6. Aquinas sees in the Sacrament of Matrimony a beautiful figure of the '^union of Christ and His Church."^^^ The latter, sweetly submissive to the Savior, expresses His doctrine and spirit, and reigns in glory as the mother of His children. The exalted nature of this simile discovers in the Angelic Doctor a deep regard and reverence for the sex, and hope for its advance- ment. He would not have the Church lead a cramped and crip- pled life. ^Neither, we judge, would he have woman, whom he compares to the Church, socially impoverished. But just as he 823 Summa Theol, la, qu. XCII, a. 1, ad 2. Also, Quodliheta, 3-11-25. 824 Suninia Theol., la, qu. XCII, a. 1. 825 Ibidem. Of. Aristotle's Ethics, VIII, 12. 826 Summa Theol., I a., qu. XCII, a. 1. Cf. Cato's famous remark: "all men rule over women, we Romans rule over all men, and our wives rule over us." 827 Ibidem. Figgis observes with as much pertinence as point: "If Blunchli's much canvassed statement that the State is male and the Church female be accepted, we must regard the Middle Ages as the period par excellence of woman's rights " From Gerson to Grotius, p. 81. 262 ST. THOMAs' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY sees the Church advanced by Christ, its Head, so would he have woman improved by him to whom she is a help-meet. This would not mean that woman, of herself, would have nothing to do toward her own success ; but whatever she does, ought not to be in opposition to man, any more than what the Church does should be in opposition to its Founder. Man must work for woman; woman for and with man.^^^ The progress of both sexes would then be better assured. 7. Her comparative lack of hardihood in temptation. As an indication, Aquinas naturally points to the error of Eden, and applies its circumstances to a general idea of temptation.^-^ Psychologically, his thought would be that woman is weaker in the sense of being more emotional and impulsive than man ; more generous too, perhaps, and less inclined to reckon the cost.^^^. She succumbs too readily to suggestion. If so, however, Aquinas, with a mind which always turned in many directions, must have seen that here was a truth which would work both ways : capable of failures, woman would also be equally capable of achievement. He seems to grant this ; but he still holds that she requires the more prosaic direction of the male. 8. Her power to inflame the worst in man, as well as the best. Thomas states the fact, but does not blame her for it. She may be quite unconscious of her effect on man, and her beauty and charm, independently of her, may be used by the arch- tempter to ensnare the male.^-*^ The point is well chosen by the Saint, and would appear to be especially serviceable for consider- ation today when women are jostling men in exposed careers. The necessary inference from the Doctor's idea is that, propor- tionally as women should become common-place and lose their appeal on men's ideals, they would, wittingly or not, unleash his brute passions. Then equality would violently pass into infer- iority. Stirring up the volcano of man's lower nature, women 828 Summa Tlieol., 1 a., qu. XCII, a. 3. 829 Summa Theol, 2a 2ae, qu. CLXV, a. 2; et ibid., ad. 1. 830 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. CXLIX, a. 4. 831 For he describes the first temptation thus: "in actu tentationis diabolus erat sicutprincipale a gens: sed mulier assume batur quasi instrumentum. . . . (Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. CLXV, a. 2, ad 1). See also 2a 2ae, qu. CLXVII, a. 2. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 263 would have to suffer from the ensuing eruption. Only by being as true to their sex as possible, apparently does Thomas believe that they can be safe from man, worshipped by him, and helpful to him ; not by being politically equal.^^^ Modem equality would likely mean, to his medieval mind, a considerable step back to ancient inferiority. But he is careful to express just what kind of subjection woman should tolerate. And it is not at all the kind which could be called outrageous even by the advanced repre- sentative of the sex today. Far from slavish is the docility he describes and prescribes. He would have woman no more a minion to her household and her husband, than a free citizen to his government. He distinctly draws the line between servitude and wifehood. Woman's correct submission is the kind which really assures the best benefit and the most advancement ; for it is akin to the civil subjection by which the ruler uses his sub- jects for their own advantage and good.^^ Aquinas remembers what it would not be well for the modern woman to forget : that the masculine brain has done the bulk of the world's business thinking for centuries, is capable of doing so for centuries more, and consequently, though it may not be exempt from the charge of bias and much else, there is strong probability that its judg- ments in social, civil, and economic matters, may be a whit more beneficial than woman's. Flatly Aquinas declares that man has a greater stock of rational discretion.^^* If experience teaches, man indeed should. But the Angelic Doctor is merely express- ing a fact. He does not deny the possibility of woman's attain- ing the masculine amount of practical wisdom; though the im- probability of it, if she remains faithful to domesticity, as she should, is certainly one of his impressions. The home and woman 832 Com. Polit., Lib. II, lec. 5: "vita oeconomica, in qua quidem vita mulieres habent quaedam propria opera, quibus oportet eas intendere, et abstinere semper ab operibus civilibus.'' It may be worthy of note here, however, that the Saint does not deny the right of woman to mingle in civil affairs, but emphasizes the inadvisability. Besides, suffrage is a civil right, not a natural. The grant of it is always sub- ject to prudence. S33 Siimma Theol, 1 a., qu. XCII, a. 1, ad 2. 834 Ibidem : Cf. Li Livres du Gouvernement des Rois, Bk. II, part I, chs. XI-XII. 264 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY thrive better, he believes, when man keeps guard, and himself alone weathers the tempests without, in order that his loved ones may be exempt from doing so and able to develop the more deli- cate and beautiful phases of civilization. Saint Thomas does not over-estimate man in giving him the prose of Life, nor un- derestimate woman by allotting her the poetry. Modern exist- ence, with its ruthless exactions, has perhaps turned his prescrip- tion back into an ideal ; or, again, what was ideal for the Middle Ages, may in these new and cogent circumstances of today, fall foul of the distinction. Still, the Thomistic doctrine has an in- sistent appeal, which suggests merit. The Saint does not admire the qualifications of the sex the less, because he perceives the fit- ness of men for the duties of political life the more. He is not really unkind to w^oman, because he is keen to her psycholog}^ and honest in his opinion. His is a doctrine which should stim- ulate woman to her best ; for it is frank enough to show her her worst, and Christian enough to accredit her dignity and tender powers. That she should not have her place in the State, Aquin- as is far from contending; but he is convinced that that place is in the all-important unit of society, the cradle of its hope, and the measure of its success : the home. She gives most to the State, when she gives all to the home. Is the Doctor's opinion on woman's political position, or lack of it, a mark against his democracy ? Hardly. Or, at least, not formally. For his earnest belief is that her best advantages and her truest individuality are developed within the domestic and not the political circle. She is not the less free in being wholly faithful to her peculiar duties. An up-to-date contention, which would antagonize Aquinas, is that woman could not be free un- der feudalism, patriarchism, nor priestcraft, but only in an era of democracy. Yet Aquinas, when he wrote, was conscious that the sex was not being exactly retaded. Woman's step from ser- vile inferiority to gleaming stardom, perfected in his own day, was decidedly more important than her trip from domesticity in- to the humdrum world, accomplished in our modern period of cheap schemes and expensive failures. Aquinas' doctrine is an im- plicit expression of her right to be relieved of the necessity of encountering the coarser aspects of life with which man is nat- ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 265 urallj more able and fitted, and, therefore, ought, to cope. He would keep her hands free from the outside world, that they may be better prepared to serve in the sheltered domain where she is, in her own peculiar right and duty, indisputably superior. He would enshrine her in the homes of the State as his Church has enshrined the Blessed Mother in the hearts of the faithful. He would have her dear and precious to man as the Church to Christ, and man beneficent and tender to her, as Christ to the Church. The Angel of the Schools, he is also the Angel of the Home. He planned more brilliantly for the woman of all times, than the modern woman has succeeded in planning for herself. Thomistic principle stimulates political measures to ease wom- an's conditions. Through no fault nor desire of their own, mil- lions of modem women are compelled to toil outside the home. Now the Angelic Doctor teaches that the State should help each of its children to secure a sufficiency of life-necessities. Decent salaries for men, widows' pensions, and all kindred plans to re- lieve the economic stress and free woman from baneful necessity, would be quite in line with his doctrine and are its implicit sug- gestion. Only that Aquinas does not depend too much on laws written on paper ; he sets more store on those which are lived and loved in hearts. Again, his great specific is Christianity ; and his great confidence is in its administrator, with whom Christ promised to be all days, even to the consummation of the world : the Church. 266 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY CONCLUSION Thomistic politics begins with the individual and its scope IS commensurate with the natural expansion of his sympathies and needs. Macksey harks back to Thomistic thought when he writes, "society implies fellowship, company, and has always been conceived as signifying a human relation, and not a herd- ing of sheep, a hiving of bees, or a mating of wild animals. The accepted definition of a society is a stable union of a plurality of persons co-operating for a common purpose of benefit to all. The fullness of co-operation involved naturally extends to all the activities of the mind, will, and external faculties, commen- surate with the common purpose and the bond of union ; this alone presents an adequate, human working together. "^^^ Aqui- nas finds the individual not as an egotist, nor an altruist, nor a solitary with the ''desolate freedom of the wild ass," but as a be- ing together with others of his kind to whom humanhood and society relate and obligate him. To the native rights of the individual, the Angelic Doctor adds civil rights for some of the people and civil advantages for all. As regards natural rights, his teaching amounts to this: that the state in no wise assists at their birth, cannot legislate them away, must not attempt to do so, and should ever seek to protect them.'^^^ Still, because of the close relation of individual to individual in society, and the consequent and constant dan- ger of misunderstanding, selfishness, and turmoil, a reasonable limitation of the exercise of natural right is necessar^^ and may be the subject of civil enactment.^' Aquinas demands a "full" life for the individual in the State ; but not one full of discords, such as a continual and unregulated encounter with other in- ^i'^Cath. Ency., XIV, p. 74: Art. on Society. 836 Cf. John A. Ryan's Distributive Justice, p. 56: "Since a natural right neither proceeds from nor is primarily designed for a civil end, it cannot be annulled, and it may not be ignored, by the State." 837 Cf. Williamson, Art. Democ. and Revolution. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Jan., 1921, p. 55: "The crux of the discussion today is as to the possibility of restriction of individual liberty leading untimately to lib- erty all round." ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 267 dividuals would mean. Even Fichte, with all his ''ego," taught that the individual's liberty should be so limited that others might be free along with him. The individual is enlarged by his social relations. This is the compensation for whatever limitation civil society may be compelled to impose. And the individual, despite Kropotkine, has obviously the better part of the bargain. As regards civil rights, e. g. voting or holding office, the Doc- tor would have the State grant them to those who are intellect- ually, ethically, and otherwise fitted to exercise them. He saw slaves withheld from such rights because of their mental or moral lack; women, because of their domestic encumbencies. But civil rights are only accidental perfections of the individual ; and Aquinas escapes blame because of his consistent claim for essential, i. e. natural, rights for all. He does not stultify the value of civil society like Rousseau ; for, even though it places certain circumscriptions on all its members and denies civil rights to some, on the other hand it supports the natural rights of all and affords inestimable opportunity for the development of each with its discipline, peace, aid, economy, and purpos- iveness , The power in the State rests in no individual but is primar- ily an attribute of the whole body, and derivatively the posses- sion of the ruler. Thus the people as the corpus communitatis are highly reputed in Thomistic politics; and in this appraise- ment, the subject is enriched as an integral part of a powerful whole, while the ruler is seen to be but the official and trusted servant of the body politic, the ultimate power. The right of revolt, within rational and prudential confines, is championed ; in suggestion that power, despite alienation, is ever related to the people, and, if arrogant sovereigns stret<^h it too far, it may snap back to its source. Power rightly shifts to the side of justice ; otherwise it is illegitimate force or tryan- ny 838 Quaestiones Disputatae, Be Caritate, qu. I, a. 4, a. 2 : "Est quoddam bonum proprium alicujus hominis in quantum est singularis persona; est autem quoddam bonum commune quod pertinet ad hunc vel ilium in quantum est pars alicujus totius: sicut ad militem in quantum est pars civitatis." Cf. Kropotkine, Uanarchie, sa philosophie son ideal, pp. 58-59, 268 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY Right is might. The people are mightiest when most guided by the principles of morality which are founded on man's ra- tional nature and reflect the nature of the God of all power. The amount of popular morality is but the total of individual morality. St. Thomas did not see society mechanically drift- ing into the millenium. It must be propelled from within ; and, within, there are only individuals. The success of the State therefore, lies with them ; and these are no better nor worse than their morals. Whatever beauteous mantles of law, project, or theory the St-ate chooses to fling around herself, she will be, un- derneath, much the same as before. ^'Planning a perfect State," declares Dr. E. T. Shanahan, ''is not so much like novel-writ- ing that one may manage the characters at will, and make all the future citizens of Altruria automatically good and moral, merely by the literary expedient of arranging all the circum- stances to that end beforehand, and by killing off the marplots and imdesirables before the last and crowning chapter is reached. Morality is not transferred to the individual from the ex- ternal conditions under which he lives. It does not exist ready made in any surroundings Custom and circumstances may indeed modify morality for good or ill, but it is beyond their power to create it. Character is something we have to work for in any institution, not a magically bestowed gift. And until the social optimist of the day can show that custom and cir- cumstance may create morality, as well as modify it, he has not advanced a single step in the direction of proving his Utopian thesis."^ Aquinas would approve this modern expression of his own conviction. The external form of government is not nearly so important as the spirit within. Every polity, to be just, must grant civil rights to all who qualify for them. The greater the number of able and active citizens, the less powerful personally the pre- siding officials need be, and the nearer would be the approach to popular rule.^^ Accordingly as the members of civil society S39Art., The Unconsidered Remainder, Catholic World, Feb., 1914. p. 585. 840 Cf. Hooker, Laics of Ecclesiastical Polity. Bk. VI, ch. 18: "Auth- ority is a constraining power; which power were needless, if we were all such as we should be, willing to do the things we ought to do without constraint." ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 2G9 reach the degree of perfection which ensures the same amount of benefit to all from "liberty" as was erstwhile secured by re- straint, restrictive law may pass. The flow of virtue is to be the ebb of force.^'*^ However, directive legislation will always be more or less necessary in even the most democratic state, and the potentiality of coercion will ever have to be implicit in it: the difference from the non-democratic regime being that coer- cion will be exercised less, the laws themselves will be fewer, and the observance of them better. The more morality takes defin- ite shape in the consciousness and affection of the people, the less it will have to be deposited in an extrinsic law which whips until it subdues. All these views of Aquinas, explicit in his writings or logical- ly deducible, constitute a trove of democratic principle. They discover, criticize, and stimulate the individual in the State. They exalt him as the symbol of politics, and measure the com- mon good by his contribution to it. They teach with Herbert Spencer that ''while each individual is developing, the society of which he is an insignificant unit is developing too."^*- Without making him all or the State all, they give due credit to each person and a meet share of both responsibility and power. "They are called wise," runs the first sentence of the Contra Gentiles, "who put things in their right order."^*^ This Aqui- nas endeavors to do with regard to the individual and the State ; and who may deny that he has done so, to the complete satisfaction of true democracy? His is not the individual of Hobbes' and Rousseau's hypothetical State of nature, but the individual as solidary with his fellows. The conclusion which the appraisal of his politics relatively to democracy thrusts upon us is interesting and significant: there can be no true democracy without morality ; there can be 841 Cf. Montesquieu, op. cit., Livre III: "II ne faut pas beaucoup de probite pour qu'un gouvernement monarchique ou une gouvernement despotique se maintiennent ou se soutiennent. La force des lois dans Tun, le bras du prince toujours leve dans I'autre, reglent ou contennent tout. "Mais, dans un Mat populaire, il faut un ressort de plus, qui est la vertu." S^2 First Principles, p. 559. 843 Proemium. 270 ST. THOMAS^ POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY little consistent morality without religion ; but religion finds its highest expression and assurance in the Church. In his own way, Aristotle, the pagan, realized this. Strongly he asserted that the chief necessity of the State was the care of the sendee of the gods.^ Cicero was of similar opinion.^^ A Chistian country and era ought concede no less. The proposition is of evident truth to those who think more than they feel. And, too, even from a purely natural view-point, it has a sentimental ap- peal as well as the ring of reasonableness. If all the churches of as well as the ring of reasonableness. If all the churches of the land were closed and all religion erased from the hearts and minds of people to-day, the amount of beauty and wholesome- ness Life would lose would be exceeded only by the horror it would find. Even with all the spiritual helps at hand, the race is often a dark ethical spectacle ; what would it be if the Star of Bethlehem were indeed extinguished and the gospel of peace and good will lost forever? Only a cord of religion kept the pa- gan world from falling apart through sheer rottenness, centur- ies before the end ; and when decay finally ate into the cord it- self, disintegration was rapid. Greece began to be lost when its intellectuals laughed at Olympus ; or earlier still, when Hellen- ic irreverence made Zeus and his divine household aesthetic exponents of vice. Yet poets and philosophers tried to nail the shadow of religion to the floor of the State; for even that had beauty and healing, and Hellenicism could not bear to see it go. Could the Christian world stoop to a measure which Paganism, even in its giddiest moments, somehow saw as folly? Should Christ be obtruded from the momentous deliberations across the sea? Should the thousands of churches in our country con- stitute but a cob-webbed corner of our nation, and claim a wearied attention only on Sundays? Our independence was claimed on a religious basis. The illustrious document of 1776 contains four references to the Deity as Creator, Pro\ddence, 844 Politica, VII, 8. Though Aristotle places it as fifth in his list of state-needs, he consi- ders it first in intrinsic importance, 845 De Natura Deorum, I, 2: "Hand scio an pietate adversus deos sublata, fides, etiam, et societas humani generis, et una excellentissima virtus, justitia, tollatur." ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 271 Supreme Judge, God. Washington kissed the bible on which he swore fealty to his country. From him to Mr. Harding, the words of Holy Writ have consecrated the lips of our leaders, on the day of their entrance to high office. A paragraph from our present President's inaugural address still lingers in memory: "I accept my part with single-mindeness of purpose and hu- mility of spirit and implore the favor and guidance of God in His heaven. With these I am unafraid and confidently face the future." W^e have been able to preserve a goodly degree of democracy, because we have not been altogther wriggled out of the bond of brotherhood, and respect for each other's rights, which Christianity inspires and "the divine inspiration of the founding fathers" expressed. But how much higher that de- gree can and will be, when we fully awake again to the message of the churches! Every church, insofar as it is at all true to the teaching of Christ, must be beneficial to virtue and democracy. But Aquinas spoke for one that dated back to apostolic times, was buffeted by Roman Emperors, survived Arianism (which comparatively surpassed modern Protestantism as a blow), and civilized Europe. It never occurred to him to doubt the effici- ency and divinely appointed mission of the barque of Peter. His eyes were fully open to the unw^orthiness of many ecclesias- tics in high places ; but, for him, their demerits were no more an argument against Catholicism than Iscariot was a syllogism against Christ. The Savior did not make men saints auto- matically. He democratically helped them to bestir them- selves. He wished the individual to be conscious of his own cap- abilities and, in correspondence with grace, to exercise them. He respected human nature. He developed character. And so a regenerate Magdalen and a sad-eyed Peter appear as eloquently human passages in His divine story. His Church, as Himself, was to have experience wdth sin. His mystical body could be lacerated and crucified; but its resurrection was eternal. Not in their religion, but in themselves, St. Thomas saw the cause of the acts of medievalists who associated the Church with shame. His words on scandal and holiness, if read and pondered by the monk of Wittenburg, might have tended tO prevent the misfor- tune which has kept modern Christianity nailed to a cross. Those who are truly good and perfect, the Angelic Doctor 272 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY taught, firmly cleave to the Rock of Ages ; and if they adhere to their superiors, it is only inasmuch and insofar as these sup- eriors are friends and followers of the Savior .^^ ''Be ye follow- ers of me," quotes the Saint from the first Epistle to the Corin- thians (IV, 16), "as I also am of Christ." For the faithful, the Redeemer is always the same — perfect, immovable, God. No breath of human vice can tarnish his lustre. The unworthi- ness of His minister but manifests the beauty of His patience or the quality of his meekness. Hence, with those who perfectly trust in the Master, the Saint asserts, no scandal is to be found. Furthermore, according to Aquinas, the person who is easily scandalized will often find that the cause is not so much in the offending instances as in himself:^''' an observation, to the vali- dity of which the honest and discerning mind will readily as- sent. Thomas peers behind the mask of piety which scandal ordinarily wears and finds pruriency or some other personal weakness. From his doctrine, we should infer that he would view the Reformation mainly as the issue of the psycho- logies of its leaders, so far as scandal figured as a projective. As such, it could not in the least injure the intrinsic value of the old Church. Modern thought is coming to appreciate that per- sonalities swayed the great religious movement more elementally than principles, and that there really never was anything in the Catholic doctrine itself to arouse fear, resentment, or dis- edification, much less revolution. While the study of St. Thomas reveals that there was much indeed in the old Faith to incite, sanction, and inspire the very best of modern achieve- ment, especially in the political order. This must at least be granted by the critics : that the thought of the Angelic Doctor, so characteristically Catholic, is abundantly democratic in the C[uiet and reasonable manner which our present-day thinking too often lacks, and our best thought seeks. His devotion to the ecclesiastical institution did not diminish his estimation of the individual or the people at all, but heightened it. He beheld the Church as the powerful guide to individual perfection, which is the prelude to fitness for a place in a free state; and 846 Swmma Theol., qu. XLII, a. 5. S^T Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. XLIII, a. 6, ad 1. ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy 273 to the best Christian ideals, without which democracy would mostly be trying to raise itself by its own petards. Athens, with its little religion, and that mostly naturalistic, was able to be democratic because of its small size: one citizen could watch the other, and each all. But the large representative democracies of to-day depend very heavily on faith and trust, which do not and cannot widely reign, when moral principle is known to be absent, or not known to be present. Religion is the best security the world knows of, for its presence. The promoter of religion would obviously be the Church founded by Christ Himself; and that for Aquinas was unquestionably the Roman Catholic. Despite the hopeless difficulties of getting it into the heads of antagonists of the Faith, Catholics really do restrict their alle- giance to the Pope to spiritual matters. What they bring of their belief into civil affairs is the purity of intention and the virtue which it inspires; and these are positive assets to democ- racy. Pope Pius VII, even before he achieved the eminence of Peter, expressed the service of religion to democracy perfectly, just at the junction of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which were so fraught in political significance. ''The form of democractic government, adopted by you," he declared to the Cisalpine Republic, which was recognized in 1797, "is not in op- position to the maxims which I am going to express to you ; it is not repugnant to the Gospel. On the contrary, it demands those sublime virtues which are acquired only in the school of Jesus Christ. If you practise them religiously, they will be the pledge of your happiness, your glory, and the splendor of your Republic Virtue, the need of which is indicated to us by natural light and completely manifested by the Gospel, is alone capable of perfecting man, of conducting him to supreme happiness. It alone should be the firm foundation of our demo- cracy. The moral virtues which consist in the love of order will render us good democrats, but of that pure democracy, which redounds incessantly to the common good, and which, abjuring hates, perfidies, ambition, is also as quick to respect the rights of others as to fulfil the duties of one's own. In such wise will equality be confirmed, which in its just acceptation, manifests the law, rising above all the members of the social body, to di- 274 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY rect, protect, punish ; which, ordered after the plan of the divine and human laws, preserves to each the faculties necessary to the accomplishment of duty, and which, a guarantee of the happi- ness of the indi\'idual, as well as the happiness of all, traces for each interger of the democratic state the just measure of that which he owes to God, himself, and his fellow-men. Civil equality, derived from natural law and enriched by the moral, makes a harmonious polity, when each works for the common good according to his physical and moral ability, and^ in return, receives from social protection all the advantages which he has a right to receive from it Make yourself attain the very height of virtue, and you will be true democrats ; faithfully fulfill the gospel precepts, and you will be the joy of the Republic Christian obedience to those in authority, accomplishment of duty, zeal for the common good, will be, wdth divine grace, a new source of merit Be all Christians, and you will be excellent democrats. These thoughts and sentiments are no less Thomistic than dew is water. They ex- press the Church in her true role and service : as the purifier of the forces behind politics, but not a meddler; as a positive help, and by no means a hindrance, to equity ; as an internal agent, whose effect on civil society could at most be only indirect and must always be, if successful at all, for the best. Littlejohn construes Aquinas incorrectly in offering : "He did not conceive of a Christian politics or a Christian state, on parallel lines with a Christian theology and a Christian Church, each equally in- dependent. His politics becomes a department of theology, and his state a part of the Church. As well accuse a pupil of being a portion of his teacher ; or mark the moon, reflecting the light of the sun, as a bit of the blazing body itself. The Doc- tor plainly expressed the spheres of Church and State as distinct in themselves ; but he did not and, in the interest of ethics, could not withold the influence of the former from the latter. Neither does Littlejohn, despite his criticism ; since he goes on to say, "Had he (Thomas) adopted the idea of a Christian State puri- fied as the Church from ancient errors, of a Christian politics ele- 848 Tr. from the quotation in R. P. Maumus, USglise et la Democra- tie. pp. 1-3. 849 The Political Theories of the Schoolmen and Grotius, pp. 198-199. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 275 vated above partisanship, tyranny and bigotry, and made social- ly, as well as morally just, without transferring these in toto to the sphere of religion and the Church, his view would have been complete. "^^^ Yet as the foregoing pages show, Aquinas prescribed such a state as the gentleman describes and did not deluge it in ecclesiasticism. His politics would have been an elaborate uselessness, if he regarded the Church as the only institution ; and no one had a much better sense of the value of time than this medieval monk who lived only about half a cen- tury and wrote, in his Summa alone, three thousand articles and answ^ered ten thousand objections. A religious and an intimate friend of the papacy, he would have wasted no energy nor ink on the subject of the State, if he believed that the Church alone mattered. And when he expressly disclaims any such extrava- gance of thought, his reviewers ought to pay him the courtesy of believing him. Sounder thinker than John of Salisbury before him and Tommaso Campanella after him, he merely means that the Church, as an institution spiritually superior to the State, should be its light and leader in distinctly ethical and religious concerns. Neither he nor his theory was to blame that it took both these great societies a long time to adjust their claims, and that bickering and bitterness were betimes occasioned. These facts are incidents and accidents which do not affect the validity of his idea in the least, and only denote the effort which human- kind must always exercise to gain a correct realization of values. Adverse cirtics like Little john might advert with profit to the simple but significant truth, which Aquinas apprehended, that the same men and women in a truly Christian nation belong to the Church and the State. And so the two societies meet in the in- dividual. The one arouses virtue in him ; the other seeks the com- mon welfare, which is conditioned on his virtue. Unless we should be willing to eliminate this rather essential detail of vir- tue, we must have a certain union between religion and civics, and hence between the institutions which are the embodiment of them — the Church and the State. From the preceding pages, no one can doubt the democracy of Thomistic principles; and His Holiness, Leo XIII, by con- 850 Op. cit., p. 199. 276 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY ' stituting Aquinas the prime representative of Catholic thought, manifests how favorable the Church is to prudent popular gov- ernment and how little she believes in power as an end in itself. She would have the State attend to temporalities and externalities, while she devotes herself to spiritualities and interior regeneration. As to those of her duties which lap over into the civil province and those of the State's obligations which turn into hers, she would make them the subject of a concordat. She would diffuse ''the glow of su- pernatural sanction" through civil society, but no more possess the State than the breath of spring possesses the meadow on which it blows, the star the sky in which it shines, or the flower the air which it perfumes. Aquinas does not betray his politics for silver pieces of ecclesiastical praise ; nor does the Church dis- honor him by thinking so. He but perfects it with religion, which; after all, is the best emollient of human passions, which are the worst enemies of any political theory. He renders demo- cracy more possible, by making virtue more probable. He sug- gests to us moderns that we have sought to silence, and succeeded in ignoring, our best teacher of ethics ; even as frivolous Athens exiled its Anaxagoras and slew its Socrat^, to continue the pseudo pesice of a narrow mind and a closed heart. The State with a clean canscience, an active sense of justice, an inclin- ation "to live the truth," to bend the knee, and to make the sign of the Cross : that is the Thomistic Utopia, which is as ideal as any which lesser scholars have conceived, but much more prac- tical. The world of wishes must always float far above men, if the very means by which they try to grasp it push it away. Who would be so fatuous as to pursue a toy-baloon with a pitch-fork ? Aquinas was not. He knew that godless, materialistic methods could never gain such spiritual prizes for the State as justice, peace, and mercy. He did not place the. worse half of man, the body, above the better, the soul. Much less did he indulge the modern intellectual pastime of ripping the soul altogether out of psychology and sewing up ethics without a heart. His politics, by favoring the religious element, made an appeal to the bosom as well as to the brain, and so doubly prepared the ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 277 individual for his political birth-right.^^ Dunning has mot be- gun to understand the Saint, when he dismisses the latter's doctrine on religion in politics as "the long familiar case for ecclesiastical hegemony, thinly veneered with Aristotle." Seeing that Europe succeeded in progressing from savagery to civilization through the Church of Christ, Aquinas also saw every reason to conclude that she could and would ascend from culture to social and political perfection, if she remained spirit- ually true to the traditions which raised her from the mire; and so he built a fair and slender Gothic steeple on his politics to point to the supernatural. The Catholicism of Aquinas gave humanity wings ; the modern spirit, locomotives. We have in- deed gone fast without the Church which the Angelic Doctor thought so essential ; but has not our travelling been in a circle, leaving us still on earth with the creeping things? Instead of soaring above our modest little globe, we have been skimming the surface, learning about the many things of creation but unlearning the things of creation's God. Matter has meant more to us than morals. There is little wonder that modern life is so intensely "of the earth, earthly," teeming with mater- ial questions and concerns, which make socio-political regenera- tion more imperative than possible. Souls are, for political theory, ultimate. Panaceas throw a covering about them ; but the restlessness of immorals is practically certain to throw it off. If calmed with religious sentiments and schooled in religious truth and practise, souls are plastic to idealistic planning ; and the millenium would be aeons nearer — though its orthodox location will always be across the "great divide," where the One who knew most about it placed it. If men would take up the thread of religion at the point, not where a certain fiery friar four centuries ago broke off, but where the reverent fingers of a son of St. Dominic and of the Roman Catholic Church were forced by the end of a brief but devout and devoted life to leave 851 Cf. Bossuet, Exhortation aux nouvelles catholiques. Also Schwalm, Legons de philosopMe sociale, t. I, p. 191: "ce n'est pas I'Eglise catholique qui a donne aux Franks de la conquete I'amour de la vie rurale et de I'independence, ni aux Yankees I'initiative per- sonelle. Mais c'est elle qui a donne aux Franks* plus de respect pour le colon et le serf, et qui pent empecher rindividualisme american de se tourner en egoisme dur." 278 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY off , they would have something to guide them out of their dis- tress, social, spiritual, and political. Clasping the hand of Christ; heedful of His voice sounding through His one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church ; filled with the reverence which Plato called the special gift of a philosopher aquiver to con- quer self first and then help others to do the same : they would be well qualified for the democracy they crave. For, as Croiset re- marks, if democracy differs from other regimes, it does so in the fact that it demands more virtue in individuals, since it supplies each of them a grander role in communal activity .^^^ 852 Theaetet., 155. D. 853 Les democraties antiques, pp. 333-334 ST. THOMAs' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 279 INTRODUCTION 7. — Idea of Democracy. II. — Rise of Modern Democracy in Catholic Sources. III. — Thomistic Significance. IV. — Political Works of Aquinas. CHAPTER I ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SOCIETY AND STATE /. — The Philosophical Explanation: 1. Psychological: a. Conscious Isolation of the Individual ; b. Conscious Lack of Self-Sufficiency ; c. Urge of Instinct; d. Work of Reason. 2. Teleological: a. God the Ultimate End; &. Providence; c. Relations of Creatures to Creator and of Creatures to one another. 3. Ethical: a. Necessity of Men congregating, because of common Duties toward God and each other; b. Elementary Conscience. II. — The Acual Rise of Society: 1. Subjective: a. Consent : a) Naturalness of it in Primitive Society; b) Its more pronounced Character in civil Asso- ciation; c) Opinions contrary to St. Thomas', considered. 2. Objective: b. Gathering of Families: a) Home; b) Village; c) City; d) Kingdom. III. — Democratic Elements in St. Thomas' Theory: 1. The State for Man; 2. The Priority of the Individual; 3. The Dignity of the Individual; 4. The Finality in the Angelic Doctors Doctrine which refers the Individual through the State to highest Purposes. IV. — Contrast with other Theories: 1. Ancient: a. Ancient; b. Plato; c. Aristotle; d. Lucretius; e. Polybius; f. Cicero. 280 ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy 2. Earlier Christian: a. St. Augustine; 6. Gregory the Great. 3. Modern : a. Hobhes; 1). Grotius; c. Suarez; d. Locke; e. Rousseau; f. de Bonald. 4. Present-day : Oppenheimer. CHAPTER II POWER 7. — Ethical Aspect. II. Law : 1. Aims: a. Justice; h. Love; c. Order. 2. Necessity. 3. Character: a. Reasonable; b. Distinctive; c. Coercive; d. Consonant with Liberty: a) Conducive; b) Gradual; c) Limited. e. For the Common Good; /, By Public Authority; g. Promulgated. 4. Democracy of Concept. 0. Kinds of Law. 6. Mutability. III. — Source of Authority: 1. God. 2. Man: a. Directly to Rulers or mediately through the People? b. Arguments: a) From Thomistic Principles: aa) Principle of Civil Contract; bb) Principle of Man's Rationality; cc) Texts. b) Custom; c) Fitness; d) Conservation of Individuality; e) Testimony of Suarez; f) Doctrine of St. Thomas on Revolt. 3. Crahay's Opinion on the Sainfs Teaching on Popular Sover- eignty criticized. Jf. Effect of Evolution on the Idea of popular Sovereignty, o. Four Explanations of Authority. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 281 IV. — Title to Authority: 1. — In Rulers: a. Merit; h. Election of People: b) Ordinarily; h) Extraordinarily the right Man may assume the Place to which he has a Right; since the People cannot rationally be unwilling. 2. In People: a. Rational Life; b. Civil Formation. V. — Election: 1. St. Thomas' Approval. 2. His Warnings. 3. Democracy of his Idea. VI. — Miscellaneous Indications of St. Thomas' Belief in Popular Sov- ereignty. VII. — Later Doctrine: 1. Medieval: a. Engelbert; b. Durandus; c. William of Ockam. 2. Modern : a. De Maistre and de Bonald; b. Taparelli; c. de Vareilles-Sommi&res. CHAPTER III THE PEOPLE I. — Meaning of the Term: 1. With Aristotle: a. The Exclusiveness of his Concept; b. Reason therefor. 2. With Aquinas: a. Christian Influence on his Idea; b. His Choice of Israel as a political Model; c. Significance of the Thomistic Concept to Democracy. 3. With Moderns: Opprobrium and Limitations of the Concept. II. — Equality and Inequality: 1. Order: a. Men, metaphysically alike; in the Physical Order. different; b. Difference in Degrees of Ability ; hence a social Scale; c. Natu7'al Existence of Leaders; d. Necessity of Subordination along with Freedom. 2. Order applied to Life of Community: a. Its Existence in the Unit of Society — the Family; b. In the State; c. Its Advantages. 3. Terrestrial Order as a Reflection of Celestial. 282 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AXD DEMOCRACY 4. Practical Reasons for esteeming Order: a. It means a strong middle Class; b. It is a Form of Justice; meaning each Person i?i his proper Place; c. It means the common Good of the State. III. — Virtue — the essential Requirement for civil Eminence: 1. St. Thomas' Meaning: a. Interpretations; b. The Teaching of the Summa: a) Elements of the Concept; b) Virtue, a practical Habit; c) Virtue, a good Habit; d) Political Virtue: aa) St. Thomas Concept deeper than Aris- totle. bb) Its democratic Significance. IV. — Slavery — lack of Virtue: 1. Moderation of Saint's View. 2. Corollary of Inequality. 3. Aquinas speeds the Passing of the Systein by teaching: a. Slavery is vs. the initial Decree of Nature; b. It is tolerable only in its Advantages, not only to the Master, but to the Slave himself. These lacking, the System is irrational. c. Amenability of the System to human Progress; d. The Slave Class, not rigidly set. Jf. He does not exclude Slaves from civil Rights, so much as their own Incompetence. 5. Teaches that Men are ahvays intrinsically Free. 6. Difficulties in the word "servus". Different Significations. CHAPTER IV RULERS I. — AHstotle's Opinions: 1. Whether Law should Rule. 2. Whether there should be a Ruler besides the Law. 3. Whether there should be One Ruler or Many. II. — St. Thomas' Views (affected by Aristotle and Medievalism ) : 1. Qualifications for Rulers: a. Religion; b. Love for Polity and Interest in it; c. Democracy; d. Intelligence ; e. Character; f. Authority. 2. Duties to secure: a. Peace; b. Prosperity ; c. Comfort; d. Defense: a) General; b) Particular: aa) Spiritual; bb) Economic. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 283 III. — Relation of St. Thomas' Views to Democracy. IV. — Comparison of them with later Doctrines: a. Calvin; b. Machiavelli; c. Grotius; d. Hobbes; e. Locke. CHAPTER V FORMS OF GOVERNMENT 7. — Governments : A. — Division: 1. — Ancient Meaning of Democracy. 2. — Thomistic Indifference to Governmental Form: a. Exposition of all Forms; b. Their Corruptions. B. — Criticisms of Division: 1. — Passy. 2. — Laveleye. 3. — Blunchli. II. — Monarchy according to St. Thomas: A. — St. Thomas' Belief in the civil Nee:d of a central Personality, whose office is B. — Non-hereditary and elective: 1. Pros and cons for Arguments for and against Election; 2. — Thomistic Idea of Democracy even in Form of heredi- tary Monarchy. C. — Should the sovereign Power be limited? 1. — Caution in adjudging the Saint Thomas' Opinion: a. Difficulty from Etymology ; b. From Concession to Sovereign; c. Feugueray's Difficulty: a) Its Inconsistency vnth Thomistic Prin- ciples. b) Its Answer in Thomistic Circustanccs and Doctrine. 2. — Democracy of St. Thomas' Response: a. Evinced especially by his Doctrine on Tyranny; b. On Limitation of Power; c. Non-binding Character of Mis-enactments of rulers. 3. — Difficulties in Commentary explained. 4. — Reasons for St. Thomas' Laud of Monarchy. 5. — Doctrine of the Commentary on Monarchy; a. The Idea behind it as Compared with the Spirit of Modern Civil Society; b. The Varieties of Monarchy: a) Spartan; b) Extreme hereditary; c) Eclective (aesymneteia) ; d) Limited; e) Absolutism. 284 ST. Thomas' political doctrine and democracy c. Their tioo-fold Division into: a) Monarchy accd. to Law; &) Monarchy accd. to personal Virtue of Ruler; c) The Thomistic synthesis. III. — Aristocracy — Rulership by the Feio: A. — Introduction: 1. Disadvantage. 2. Advantage. 3. — Expedience in a given Case. B. — Three Types or Aristocracy. IV. — Democracy — Rulership hy the Many: A. — The Polity. B. — Pure Democracy. C. — Five Species of Democracy. V. — St. Thomas' favored Form of Government : A. — His monarchical Interest: a. Based on his Piety hut tempered hy h. His Knowledge of Human Fact, and democratized hy .c. His Concept of God and d. His civil Concern. e. His Catholicim not necessarily causal in his monarch- ical Favor. B. — The mixed Form: a. Apparent Inconsistencies in the Saint's Teaching ex- plained; h. His Advance on Aristotle's Idea; c. Elements in his Theory; d. Critique; e. Other Doctrines of mixed Government: a) Plato; h) Aristotle; c) Polyhius; d) Cicero. C. — Sources of St. Thomas' Idea: a. Scriptural; h. Profane. D. — Idea of mixed Government in modern Age: a. Gerson; h. Fortescue; c. Bellarmine; d. Althusius; c. Harrington; f. Bodin and Hohhes; g. Bossuet; h. Fenelon; i. Locke; j. Montesquieu. CHAPTER VI. PURPOSE OF STATE 7. — Introduction — The Limitation of civil Scope hy: 1. Individuality. 2. Rights of the Individual, pai^ticularly : ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 285 a. Liberty of conscience; J). The Right of the Parents over the Child. -1. The General Mission of the State. The State must aid in the Securing for its Subjects of: a. Goods of the Mind; b. Goods of the Body; c. External Goods. 2. The particular Mission, based on the Thomistic Classification of human Desires, is social, economic, ethical, and to a Degree, ultramundane. A. — Social Purpose: a. Prerequisites: a) Peace; b) Unity. b. Assurance of Life-Necessities: a) Health: aa) Good Air; bb) Decent Water-Supply ; cc) Houses. b) Food: aa) Agriculture; bb) Commerce: 1. Necessity of; 2. Arguments against. c. Wholesomeness and Beauty of Life: a) State should see that the Beauties of Nature are not destroyed; b) It should guard against Indiscretion and Excess in public Spectacles. d. Indigence to be dispelled: a) By aiding the Individual; b) By withholding the Climbers from out- raging the Rights of others. B. — Economic Purpose: a. Work : a) Its Necessity; b) Its relation to Virtue; c) Its restraining Power; d) It yields the Laborer the Means not only of securing his own Good but of helping others. a) Reasons for Coinage: aa) It represents the Government ; b b ) Convenience ; cc) Surety against Fraud. b) Just Price. c) Fraud: aa) Adulteration; bb) False Measure; cc) Misrepresentation. d) Interest: aa) Legitimacy and Illegitimacy of it; bb) State Action vs. it. e) Taxes: aa) Justice and Injustice of them; bb) Moderation. 286 ST. THOMAS* POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY C. — Ethical Purpose: a. Education: a) Necessity; &) How it is within the Province of the State; c) Character and Program of Education. 7). Christianity and Democracy in Thomistic Idea of Education. D. — Ultramundane Purpose: a) The Inexpediency of the Ethics of Ex- pediency; b) The Instability of Civil Society without Principle; c) The Necessity of a great Ideal; d) The Insufficiency of merely natural Virtue in the Face of Man's super-terrestrial Destiny. b. The Church as the Guide to the True End — God: a) Aids to Democracy, of this part of the Saint's Teaching; b) The Thomistic Theory on Church and State need not be repugnant to modern Sense. CHAPTER VII THOMISTIC AND AMERICAN RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES I. — Parallel of St. Thomas' Teaching with the Virginian Bill of Rights on: 1. Equality, Life, Liberty, Property; 2. Popular Sovereignty ; 3. Common good; If. Fairness; 5. Separation of Civil Powers; 6. Free Election and Suffrage; 7. Taxation; 8. Speedy Trial by Jury; 9. Exemption from Excessive Punishment ; 10. Sanctity of Home; 11. Freedom of Thought; 12. Popular Militia; 13. Uniform Government ; 14. Civil Virtue; 15. Liberty of Conscience. II. — Parallel of St. Thomas' Teaching with the Massachusetts Declara- tion of Rights: 1. Civics and Religion; 2. Amenability of Governors to the Governed; 3. Right of Individuals to Protection; 4. Self-defense ; 5. Judicial Procedure: 6. Redress of Grievance; 7. Deposition of Ruler; 8. Adjustment and Remedy of Law; 9. Taxation without Representation; 10. Retroactive Law; 11. Court-Martial. ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 287 ///. — Parallel of 8t. Thomas' Teaching with the Declaration of Inde- pendence '. 1. Equality; 2. The Creator and inalienable Rights; 3. Government ; i Consent; 5. Revolt; 6. ReconstruQtion ; 7. Endurance; 8. Freedom. lY. — Parallel of St. Thomas' Teaching with the projective Principles behind our Constitution: 1. Civil power; 2. Limitation without Loss of Dignity and Efficacy; 3. Alienation of petty State-power. V. — Conclusion. CHAPTER VIII CIVIL MENACES AND PROBLEMS 7. — External Evil: War: 1. Justification in se: a. Final Cause; J). Conditions: a) Declaration by proper Authority; b) Just cause; c) Right Intention. 2. Just in Method: a. vs. Objectors ; b. Fright fulness. II. — Internal Evils; Sedition, Vice, Poverty: 1. Sedition: a. Difference from War and Strife; b. Culpability; c. Unwarrantableness ; d. Condemnation on democratic Basis. 2. Vice : a. Limitations of State in its Regard; b. Supplementary Service of Church; c. Instances; d. Democratic Significances. 3. Poverty : a. Solution in Commentary on Aristotle: a) Negative — vs. Plato and Communism: aa) Necessity of Variety; bb) Necessity of Classes; cc) Necessity of Rulers and Ruled; dd) Necessity of civil S elf- Sufficiency ; ee) Inconsistencies; ff) Democracy of the Contention. b) Positive: aa) Let natural Ownership prevail; bb) Let Morals and Law remedy the Abuses; cc) Injuries to the Individual of opposite Course : 288 ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 1. Prevention of best Self-Expression ; 2. Incitation of Worst. dd) Training of the Inidvidual to the true Course; ee) Objections: 1. To brute Models in sociological Theory ; 2. To Unnaturalness in Theory; In- stances of this Quality in Com- munistic Plan. b. Solution in Summa: a) Vindication of Rt. of Property: aa) Property as a Motive; bb) Cominon Good; cc) Civil Calm. b) Limitation: aa) Possessors of External Goods should be ready to share; bb) Scriptural Source of St. Thomas' Doc- trine — Moses; cc) Profane — Aristotle. c) Chrstianity in St. Thomas' Solution: aa) In itself; bb) In its sociological Significances. III. — Nationality and Self -Determination: 1. Psychological Criteria and Warrants. 2. Moral Personality of a State. IV. — Individuality and individual Concerns: , 1. Marriage: a. Limitations of Civil Action in its Regard; b. Field of civil Action in its Regard. 2. Children : a. Defectives: a) Aristotle's Doctri^ie on Treatment of them; b) St. Thomas'. b. Birth-Control: a) Aristotle's Teaching; b) St. Thomas': aa) Unnaturalness of Practise; bb) Ideal of Sex-Life; cc) Religious Fact; dd) The Common Good. c) Quasi-Justification by Aristotle. 3. Divorce : a. In Modern Society; b. In Thomistic Doctrine: a) Purpose of Marriage; b) Reasons for Permanency of Bond; c) Unnaturalness and Danger of Divorce; d) Recognition of Separation. c. Remedies: a) Modern; b ) Thomistic. 4. Woman: a. Her Place; b. Her Powers: ST. THOMAS' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 289 a) Dependency on Man; ft) Relative Inferiority in some Respects, and Equality and Superiority in others; c) The Manner of her Subjection; d) The Doc. of St. Thomas on Woman not un- democratic. CONCLUSION 7. — Vindication of the Individual in St. Thomas' Politics: 1. Politics based on Psychology. 2. Rights of Individ, championed. II. — Vindication of the People: 1. Mediate Source of Power. 2. Right of Revolt. 3. Popular Foundation of Virtue in the State. 4. The Spirit of the People more significant than the Form of Government. III. — The Political Message of Aquinas: No true Democracy without Religion: 1. Intrinsically Religion awakens the Individual and the Race to a Knowledge and a Sense of Justice. 2. Extrinsically it prevents Rulers from Excesses against the People. 290 ST. THOMAs' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES Thomae Aquinatis. Opera Omnia; 36 vols., Paris Edition, 1883-1889, Frette. Opera Omnia: jussu impensaque Leonis XIII edita, cum commen- tariis Caietani, Romae, 1895. Summa Theologica (Eng. trans.), London, 1912. De Regimine, Neapoli, 1849, Opus I; — Parisiis, 1875, Tomus XXVII. Com. Polit., Parisiis, Tomus XXVI. Com. Eth., XV, XVI. Com. Perihermenias, XXII. Summa Contra Gentiles. XII. De Regimine Judaeorum, XXVII. IV Lihros Sent., VII, VIII, IX, X. Quaestiones Disputatae, XIII, XIV, XV. Quodlihetae, X\ . Omnes Ep. Pauli, XX, XXI. Contra Errores Graecorum, XXIX. 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Democracy and Revolution, Irish Ecclesias- tical Record, Jan. 1921. Zeiller, Jacques. L'origine du pouvoir politique d'apres Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Revue Thomiste, XVIII. ST. THOMAs' POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 297 VITA Edward Francis Murphy was born in Salem, Mass., July 21, 1892. His early studies were pursued in St. Mary's Paroehical School of that city. In 1907, he entered the Society of St. Joseph of the Sacred Heart for the Conversion of the Colored People of America; following the classical course in Epiphany Apostolic College, Walbrook, Md., and the philosophical and theological lectures at St. Joseph's Seminary and St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, Md. From St. Mary's, he received the degrees B. A., M.A., and S. T. B. Ordained to the priesthood in 1917, he entered the graduate school of the Catholic Uni- versity in 1918. His instruction was in the History of Philoso- phy, under the Rt. Rev. William Turner, S. T. D. ; Thomistic Philosophy, under the Rev. H. I. Smith, 0. P., Ph., D. ; Social and Genetic Psychology, and the Philosophy of Evolution, under the Very Rev. Edward A. Pace, Ph. D., S. T. D., and LL. D. ; Sociology, under the Rev. William J. Kerby, S. T. L., LL. D. ; and Educational Psychology, under the Rev. Leo Mc- Vay. To these professors, and to the Rev. James J. Fox, A. B., S. T. D., the writer expresses sincere gratitude and appreciation. Date Due ,