Vl^lUQ Section • V\33 V. \n \ I 1 THE HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES VOLUME SEVENTEEN HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES /f EDITED WITH THE COOPERATION OF VARIOUS SCHOLARS BY CHARLES ROCKWELL LANMAN PROFESSOR IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY, HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL, THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY (lONDON), AND THE DEUTSCHE MORGENLANDISCHE GESELLSCHAFT, ETC., CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE (aCAD^MIE DES INSCRIPTIONS ET belles-lettres) IDolume Seventeen CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS Zbc Ibarvarb ipress 1914 THE YOGA-SYSTEM OF "PATAN JALI ®r tbe ancient Ibinbu Doctrine of Concentration of fiDinO EMBRACING THE MNEMONIC RULES, CALLED YOGA-SUTRAS, OF PATANJALI AND THE COMMENT, CALLED YOGA-BHASHYA, ATTRIBUTED TO VEDA- VY ASA AND THE EXPLANATION, CALLED TATTVA-VAigARADI, OF VACHASPATI-MigRA TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSKRIT BY JAMES HAUGHTON WOODS PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS Cbe Ibarvarb lllnivereiti? press 1914 The volumes of this Series may be had, in America, by addressing Messrs. Ginn AND Company, at New York or Chicago or San Francisco, or at the home-office, 29 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. ; in England, by addressing Messrs. Ginn & Co., 9 St. Martin’s Street, Leicester Square, London, W.C. ; and in Continental Europe, by addressing Mr. Otto Harrassowitz, Leipzig. — For the titles and descriptions and prices, see the List at the end of this volume. PRINTED FROM TYPE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD, ENGLAND BY HORACE HART, M.A. PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY First Edition, 750 Copies, October, 1914 HVNC • LIBRVM IN • MVLTIS • ET ■ LONGINQVIS • TERRIS ELABORATVM • ATQVE • NVNC • DENIQVE ■ CONFECTVM SOCIIS ■ FIDELIBVS QVORVM • MEMORIA- LABOR - ILLE- FELICITER-COMPENSATVR ALMS • MAGISTRIS • OMNIBVS • SEMPER - AMICIS y Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2016 https://archive.org/details/yogasystemofpataOOpata CONTENTS Preface page 1. Eeasons for taking up the work ix 2. Difficulties of comprehending the work ...... ix 3. Difficulties of style . ......... ix 4. Translation of technical terms ........ x 5. Punctuation ........... x 6. Texts and manuscripts ......... xi 7. Acknowledgements xi Introduction 1. Authorship of the Yoga-sutras : The two Patahjalis .... xiii 2. Tradition of their identity not earlier than tenth century . . . xiii 3. Comparison of philosophical concepts does not confirm the tradition . xv 4. Date of the Sutras (between a. d. 300 and 500) ..... xvii 5. Date of the Bhasya (between a. d. 650 and 850) ..... xx 6. Date of Vacaspatimi 9 ra’s Tattva-vaifaradi (about a. d. 800 to 850) . xxi Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras 1. Book 1, Concentration (samadhi) ....... xxiv 2. Book 2, Means of attainment (sadhana) ...... xxv 3. Book 3, Supernormal powers (vibhuti) ...... xxvii 4. Book 4, Isolation (kaivalya) . ....... xxviii The Yoga-sutras translated without the Comment or the Explanation Being the Sutras translated in groups, with group-headings by translator xxx Translation of Patanjali’s Yoga-sutras or Mnemonic Eules Together with the Comment or Yoga-bhasya, attributed to Veda-vyasa And Vacaspatimifra’s Explanation or Tattva-vai^aradl 1. Book 1, Concentration (samadhi) ....... 1 2. Book 2, Means of attainment (sadhana) ...... 101 3. Book 3, Supernormal powers (vibhuti) ...... 201 4. Book 4, Isolation (kaivalya) ........ 297 Appendixes 1. Bibliography of works referred to in this volume .... 351 2. Index of quotations in the Comment, in the order of citation . . 359 3. Index of the same grouped according to their sources .... 361 4. Index of quotations in the Tattva-vai^aradl, in the order of citation . 362 5. Index of the same grouped according to their sources .... 364 6. Quotations not yet traced to their sources ...... 365 7. Index of words in the Yoga-sutras 366 niMtu> I PREFACE 1. Eeasons for taking np the work. — It is not without misgiving that one ventures to render into English the texts of an intricate system which have never, with the exception of the sutras, been translated in Europe or America. But the historical importance of those texts, as forming a bridge between the philosophy of ancient India and the fully developed Indian Buddhism and the religious thought of to-day in Eastern Asia, emboldens one to the attempt. For this system, together with the Nyaya and Vai^esika systems, when grafted upon the simple practical exhortations of primitive Buddhism, serves as an introduction to the logical and meta- physical masterpieces of the Mahay ana. 2. Difficnlties of comprehending the work. — Even after a dozen readings the import of some paragraphs is not quite clear, such for example as the first half of the Bhasya on iii. 14. Still more intractable are the single technical terms, even if the general significance of the word, superficially analysed, is clear. This irreducible residuum is unavoidable so long as one cannot feel at home in that type of emotional thinking which culmi- nates in a supersensuous object of aesthetic contemplation. 3. Difficulties of style. — The Bhasya and, still more, the Tattva-vai§aradi are masterpieces of the philosophical style. They are far from being a loosely collected body of glosses. Their excessively abbreviated and disconnected order of words is intentional. The Mimahsa discussed first the meaning of words (jpadartha ) ; then in a distinct section the meaning of the sentences (vdkydrtha ) ; and finally and most fully the implication (bhdvdrtka) of the sentences as a whole. Wherever the sentence-form is lacking, I have intro- duced in brackets the words needed to make a declarative clause. Much more obscurity remains in the bhdvdrtka section of the Bhasya. For here many extraneous technical terms are surreptitiously introduced under the guise of exegesis. Thus polemic with an opponent whose name is suppressed b [h.o.s. 17 ] I Preface [x creeps into the argument. The allusions are suggestive, but obviously elusive. The passage at iii. 14 might be quite simple if we had before us the text which it criticizes. 4. Translation of technical terms. — A system whose subtleties are not those of Western philosophers suffers disastrously when its characteristic concepts are compelled to masquerade under assumed names, fit enough for our linguistic habits, but threadbare even for us by reason of frequent transpositions. Each time that Purusa is rendered by the word “ soul ”, every psychologist and metaphysician is betrayed. No equivalent is found in our vocabulary. The rendering “ Self ” is less likely to cause misunder- standing. Similarly, and in accordance with the painstaking distinctions made at the end of ii. 5, it is most important to remember that the term a-vidyd, although negative in form, stands for an idea which is not nega- tive, but positive. Bearing in mind the express instructions of the text, I have adopted “ undifierentiated-consciousness ” as the translation of avidyd. Another word, which Professor Garbe discussed more than twenty years ago (in his translation of the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya, S. 70, Anm. 1), is guna. I prefer to translate this term by “ aspect ” rather than by “ con- stituent ”, because, in addition to the meanings “ quality ” and “ substance ”, it often seems to have the semantic value of “ subordinate ” as correlated to pradhdna. Three other words sattva and rajas and tamas seem untrans- latable, unless one is content with half-meaningless etymological parallels. In another case I have weakly consented to use “ Elevation ” as equivalent to prasamkhydna ; the original word denotes the culmination of a series of concentrations; the result is the merging of the Self in the object of contemplation. 5. Punctuation. — 1. Quotations from the Sutras are enclosed in single angular quotation-marks (< >). 2. Quotations from the Bhasya are enclosed in double angular quotation-marks (« »). 3. Quotations from authorita- tive texts are enclosed in ordinary double quotation-marks (“ ”). 4. Objec- tions and questions by opponents, and quotations from unauthoritative texts, are enclosed in ordinary single quotation-marks (‘ ’). Hyphens have been used to indicate the resolution of compound words. A half-parenthesis on its side is used to show that two vowels are printed in violation of the rules of euphonic combination (Lanman’s Sanskrit Reader, p. 289). xi] Preface 6. Texts and Manuscripts. — The text of the sutras of the Yoga system, like that of the sutras of all the other five systems, except perhaps the Vai^esika, is well preserved; and there is an abundance of excellent printed editions. The most accessible and the most carefully elaborated of these books is the one published in the Ananda 9 rama Series and edited by Kafinatha Shastri Aga 9 e. Variants from twelve manuscripts, mostly southern, are printed at the foot of each page; and Bhojadeva’s Vrtti is appended ; also the text of the sutras by itself and an index thereto. Another edition, in the Bombay Sanskrit Series, by Rajaram Shastri Bodas, is also an excellent piece of work. I have, however, made use of the edition by Svami Balarama (Calcutta, Sarhvat 1947, a.d. 1890; reprinted^ in Benares a.d. 1908) because it is based on northern manuscripts and because of the valuable notes in the editor’s tippana. Of manuscripts, I have collated, with the kind permission of the Maharaja, during a charming week’s visit at Jammu just below the glistening snows above the Pir Panjal, two of the oldest manu- scripts in the library of the Eaghunath Temple. In Stein’s Catalogue these are numbered 4375 and 4388 and the former is dated Sarhvat 1666. Two other manuscripts were lent me, one by the courtesy of the most learned Gangadhara Shastri, the other the very carefully written Bikaner manuscript, sent to me by the generosity of the Bikaner government, which proved to be extremely valuable for disputed readings in the Tattva-vai^aradi. This latter manuscript seemed to be about a hundred and fifty years old and is described in Rajendralala Mitra’s Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Library of His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner (Calcutta, 1880) under the number 569. An old Sharada manuscript, which, by the kind mediation of Mukundaram Shastri of Shrinagar, was put into my hands, proved, upon critical examination, to have been so badly corrupted as, on the whole, not to be worth recording. 7. Acknowledgements. — At the end of one’s task comes the compensation of looking back to old scenes, and to the friends and helpers who have watched the progress of the book. First of all I remember the delightful In the reprint, the pagination is unchanged, but the lines vary a little. Hence there are some small apparent inaccuracies in the references. The reprint may be had from Harrassowitz in Leipzig ; it is catalogued there as Pdtanjala-dar^anasya yoga-tattva. Preface [xii visit on the island of Fohr, where, besides the long friendly walks upon the sands, I enjoyed the inestimable opportunity of reciting and reading the Yoga-sutras with Professor Deussen. The next winter, at Benares, Mr. Arthur Venis opened the doors of the Sanskrit College to me and with the utmost generosity smoothed my way through my first winter in India and initiated me into the methods of many controversial sutras. Since my return he has always been ready to assist, and I thank him for illuminating for me the perplexing debate on the sphota in iii, 17. Besides all this I am most grateful to him for an introduction to the lamented Shriman Mukunda Shastri Adkar, a scholar who has put the wealth of the ancient tradition and his own ripe scholarship at my disposal for many years. To many other scholars in Benares and in Kashmir and in Poona I wish to express my thanks, especially to Dr. Shripad Krishna Belvalkar and to Mr. V. V. Sovani. To Professor Arthur W. Ryder, of the University of California, I am also much indebted. Furthermore, my thanks are due to Colonel George A. Jacob of the Bombay Staff Corps for his courtesy in searching after quotations, and to Dr. Frederick W. Thomas of the India Office Library for similar favours too many to enumerate or to repay. My deepest insight into this system and into what little I know of the philosophy of India I owe to Professor Hermann Jacobi of Bonn. Each visit to the little city on the Rhine adds to my debt of gratitude to him and reveals to me the beauty of the scholar’s life. On my return from each visit to India I laid the work in its several stages before Professor Lanman, my teacher in my student days and now my colleague. To him I owe the revision of the manuscript for the press and a comparison of most of the translation, either in manuscript or in proof, with the original. His rigorous criticism has detected many over- sights which strike a fresh pair of eyes more quickly than those of the author. For his ready and ungrudging help through many years of intimate friendship my hearty thanks. Harvard University, July, 1914. James Haughton Woods. INTRODUCTION 1. Authorship of the Yoga-sutras. — Identity of Patahjali, author of the sutras, and of Fataujali, author of the Mahabhasya, not yet proved. The opinion in India and in the West that the author of the Yoga-sutras is also the author of the great grammatical comment upon Panini has not been traced definitely any farther back than to the tenth century. The Yoga-bhasya (about a.d. 650 to 850) makes no statement as to the authorship of the Yoga-sutras, unless the benedictory verse at the be- ginning be regarded as valid proof that Patanjali wrote the sutras. Still less is there any statement in the Yoga-sutras about the author of the Mahabhasya. And conversely there is no reference in the Mahabhasya to the author of the Yoga-sutras. On the other hand, there is ground for believing that the author of the Comment on Yoga-sutra iii. 44 may have had the author of the Mahabhasya in mind when he quotes a certain formula and ascribes it to Patanjali. This is the only mention of Patanjali in the whole Comment. The formula is Ayutasiddha^avayava-bheda^anu- gatah samuho dravyam-, and although it is ascribed to Patanjali (iti Patanjalih), it has not been found in the Mahabhasya. Nevertheless the Yoga-bhasya does here seem to contain an allusion, more or less direct, to the theory of the unity of the parts of concrete substances as set forth in the Mahabhasya. But the allusion is not direct enough to serve by itself as basis for the assertion that the Yoga-bhasya assumes the identity of the two Patanjalis. In other words, it does not justify us in assigning to the tradition of their identity a date as ancient as that of the Yoga- bhasya (eighth century). The allusion is, however, significant enough not to be lost out of mind, pending the .search for other items of cumulative evidence looking in the same direction. 2. Tradition of identity of two Patanjalis not earlier than tenth century. — So far as I know, the oldest text implying that the Patanjali who wrote the sutras is the same as the Patanjali who wrote the Maha- bhasya, is stanza 5 of the introduction to Bhojadeva’s comment on the Yoga-sutras, his Rajamartanda. This I would render as follows : Victory be to the luminous words of that illustrious sovereign, [Bhoja] Rana-rahgamalla, who by creating his Grammar, by writing his comment on the Patanjalan [treatise, the Yoga-sutras], and by producing [a work] on medicine called Rajamrganka, has — like Patanjali — removed defilement from our speech and minds and bodies. Introduction [xiv Bhoja’s Grammar, his comment called Rajamartanda, and his medical treatise are all extant. The stanza must mean that Patanjali and Bhoja both maintained a standard of correct speech, Patanjali by his Mahabhasya and Bhoja by his Grammar ; and that both made our minds clear of error, Patanjali by his Yoga-sutras and Bhoja by his comment upon them ; and that both made our bodies clear of impurities, Patanjali by his medical treatise and Bhoja by his Rajamrganka. This certainly implies that the writer of this stanza identified Patanjali of the Yoga-sutras with Patanjali of the Mahabhasya. If the writer of the stanza of the introduction is the same as the Bhojadeva who wrote the Rajamartanda, we may note that he is called Ranarangamalla here, Maharajadhiraja in the colophon in Mitra’s edition, and Lord of Dhara or Dhare^vara in the colophon in the edition of Aga9e. There were a number of Bhojadevas ; but whichever of them the author of the Raja- martanda may be, no one of them is earlier than the tenth century of our era. The tradition of the triple activity of Patanjali as a writer on Yoga and grammar and medicine is reinforced as follows : Yogena cittcib-ya, padena vdcdm 'tnalam, carlrasya tu vdidyakena yo ’pdkarot, tam pravaram munlndm, Patanjalim prdnjalir dnato ’smi. This is cited in Qivarama’s commentary on the Vasavadatta (ed. Bibl. Ind., p. 239), which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century. The stanza occurs also in some MSS. just before the opening words of the Mahabhasya (Kielhorn’s ed., vol. I, p. 503) — that is, not under circumstances giving any clue to its date. We may add that an eighteenth-century work, the Patanjalicarita (v. 25, ed. of Kavyamala, vol. 51), vouches for Patanjali’s authorship in the fields of Yoga and medicine in the following gUi stanza : Sutrdni yogacdstre vdidyakacdstre ca vdrttikdni tatah krtvd Patanjalimunih pracdraydm dsa jagad idam trdtum. As to the precise medical work of which Patanjali was the author or with which he had to do, all three stanzas leave us uninformed. Not so the following stanza from the introduction to the commentary on Caraka, composed by Cakrapani, who (according to Jolly’s book on Medicine in Blihler’s Grundriss, p. 25) wrote about 1060 : Pdtanjala-Mahdhhdsya-GarakapratisamskrtdiJi mano-vdk-kdyadosdndm hantre ’hipataye namah. Introduction xv] This agrees in sense with the other stanzas, and in addition informs us that Patanjali’s medical work consisted in a revision (pratisarhskrta) of the great compendium of Caraka. Accordingly, the Bhoja-stanza appears to be the oldest external evidence thus far at hand for the tradition as to the identity of the two Patanjalis, and this tradition is not older than the tenth century, a thousand years and more after Patanjali the author of the Mahabhasya. 3. The identification of the two Patanjalis not confirmed by a comparison of philosophical concepts. — Inconsistent use of terminology and con- flicting deflnitions of concepts in the case of a single writer of two books are frequently explained by the fact that quite distinct subjects are dis- cussed in the different works. In other cases the subject under discussion is the same and such an explanation of the inconsistency does not hold. An instance of the latter is the discussion of the nature of substance {dravya) in the Yoga-system and in the Mahabhasya. In the commentary on Yoga-sutra iii. 44 we have the following definition, “A substance is a collection of which the difierent component parts do not exist separately {ayutasiddha^avayava-hheda^anugatah samuho dravyam iti Patan- jalih)” and the definition is attributed to Patanjali as being consistent with his sutras. This quotation is of the most technical kind and is in the same style as the Nyaya-sutras. A similar use of language, for instance, is found in Nyaya-sutra ii. 1. 32 (Vizianagaram edition, p. 798). On the other hand this phrase is not to be found in the Mahabhasya, which however does repeatedly analyse the concept of substance. And, what is more important, nothing so precise as the formula attributed (iii. 44) to Patanjali is found in the Yoga-sutras themselves. Yet substance is partially defined in Yoga-sutra iii. 14, “ A substance (dharmin) conforms itself to quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external-aspects {dharma).” In this terminology dharmin and dharma of the Yoga-sutra are substitutions for dravya and guna of the Mahabhasya. In neither case is the description of substance discriminating. Yet such as it is, the difference is very slight. In the Mahabhasya it is substance, we are told, which makes the difference in weight between iron and cotton of the same bulk and dimension (Mahabhasya, Kielhorn’s edition, vol. II, p. 366^®) ; and it is that which causes the difference between penetrability and impenetrability. Or again it is that which does not cease to be, even when a succession of properties appears within it (vol. II, p. 366^^). Of what kind then is this form of being {tattva) ? The answer is that when the various reds and other properties of a myrobalan fruit, for instance, successively appear within it, we have the right to call it a substance. In short a substance is a concretion of properties {guna-sanidravo dravyam Introduction [xvi iti, Kielhorn, vol. II, p. 366^®) ; or, as it is put elsewhere, it is a collection of properties {gxma-samuddya) such that the various states (bhdva) depend upon it (II. 200^^). This collection is loosely paraphrased as being a group (samgha) or mass {samuha, II. 356®). In order, however, to make the comparison of the dharmin of the Yoga- sutras with the dravya of the Mahabhasya, we must assume that the interpretation of the Yoga-sutras, as given in the Comment, correctly represents the concept in the mind of the author of the sutras. There might well have been a series of redactions of the works of Patanjali, as of those of Caraka. The later interpretation, such as the formula in the Comment on iii. 44, might give us the original thought in more tech- nical form. If this be so, we find a great similarity in the discussion of the relation of whole and parts in the two works. In the Comment on the Yoga-sutra iii. 44 a collection (samuha) is of two kinds: 1. that in which the parts have lost their distinctness, for example, ‘a tree’, ‘a herd’, ‘ a grove ’ ; 2. that in which the parts are distinctly described, for example, ‘ gods and human beings.’ The second class has two subdivisions : 2®. one in which the distinctness of parts is emphasized, for example, ‘ a grove of mangoes ’ ; 2’’. one in which the distinctness is not emphasized, for example, ‘ a mango-grove.’ From another point of view a group is two- fold : 1. a group whereof the parts can exist separately, for example^ ‘ a grove ’, wherein the trees exist separately from the aggregate whole ; 2. a group whereof the parts cannot exist separately, for example, ‘ a tree ’ or ‘an atom’. The question now arises. To which of these kinds of groups does a substance belong? A substance (dravya) is an aggregate of generic and particular qualities (sdmanya-vicesa-samudaya). This is the definition of substance from the point of view of its relation to its qualities. Furthermore, the substance is a group of the second subdivision of the second kind ; it is ‘ a collection of which the different parts do not exist separately ’. This then is the resultant definition of substance according to the traditional interpretation of the Sutras. What now is the relation of whole and parts in the Mahabhasya, with especial reference to the substance and its qualities ? A collection (samu- daya) is loosely paraphrased as being a group (samgha) or mass (samuha, Kielhorn, vol. II, p. 356®). It is, etymologically at least, a concretion of properties (guna-samdrava II. 366^®). It is a collection of parts ; the characteristics of the parts determine the characteristics of the whole (III. 3^^ ; avayavair arthavadbhih samudaya apy arthavanto bhavanti 1. 217^® ; I. 30^®“''^'^ ; avayave krtam liHgam samuddyasya vicesakam bhavati I. 2892 f; and I. 377”). All these cases would belong to the first subdivi- sion of the second kind of group, whereof the parts can exist separately. Introduction xvii] Yet a collection (samuddya) is not merely an assemblage of parts, but is a unity performing functions which the parts by themselves cannot perform, for example, the blanket, the rope, the chariot, as compared with the threads, the fibres, the chariot-parts, I. 220^®“^®. All these cases would belong to the second subdivision of the second kind of group, wherein the parts cannot exist separately {ayutasiddhdvayava). Such then are the different groups [samuddya). With regard to the substance (dravya), its relation to its qualities (guna) is analogous to the relation of the parts to the group, I. 220, vart. 11. Just as a collection [samuddya) is characterized by its parts [avayavdt- maJca) III. 3^^, so the substance [dravya) is characterized by its qualities [guTidtmaJca) or is a collection of qualities [gunasamuddya) II. 200^®. This last formula is given tentatively as a not quite final conclusion ; yet the definition is not rejected. And elsewhere, I. 411^®, II. 356^^, II. 415^®, and especially II. 366^'^"^®, it is accepted as a working definition. Some qualities like sound, touch, colour, and taste belong to all substances ; they at least are present I. 246*^^ II. 198®^*^. Nothing, however, is said about a generic-form being required to constitute a substance [dravya). At the most it is true that when one asserts the reality of a species [dkrti) one does not deny the reality of the substance [dravya); and conversely. For each person who makes the assertion, the reality of both is asserted. Either the species or the substance may be dominant in anything, and the other subordinate. It is only a matter of the relative emphasis in the use of words. But the word substance is used for mass of particular qualities ; it is not a concretion of species and qualities, but is contrasted with species. Accordingly even if we admit that the formula ascribed to Patanjali in the Comment on iii. 13 is the correct rendering of the thought in the mind of Patanjali, the author of the Yoga-sutra, it is not true that Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, when speaking of a substance [dravya) means what is contained in this formula. And there is nothing here to indicate that the tradition which identifies the two Patanjalis must be correct. 4. Date of the Yoga-sutras between A.D. 300 and A.D. 500. — If Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, is not the author of the Yoga-sutras, when were they written? The polemic in the Yoga-sutras themselves against the nirdlambana school of Buddhists gives the answer. Very probably in the two Yoga-sutras iii. 14 and 15 and certainly in iv. 14 to 21 this school is attacked. The idealism of the Vijndna-vdda is attacked in iv. 15, 16, and 17. We cannot, it is true, maintain that the Vijiidna-vdda here attacked by the Sutra must be the idealism of Vasubandhu. But the C [h.o.s. it] Introduction [xviii probability that the idealism is Vasubandhu’s is great. And the earlier limit would then be the fourth century. There surely were idealists before him, just as there were pre-Patanjalan philosophers of yoga. Yet we have the great authority of Vacaspatimi 9 ra to support the obvious probability that the school of Vijiianavadins is here combated by Pataiijali. He accepts the interpretation of the Comment which intro- duces a Vijndnavddinani Vdindcikam (p. 292*^, Calc, ed.) as being intended by the author of the Sutra. It is true that the Sutra itself obviously does not make explicit references to this or any other school. Still the fact remains that the Sutra is attacking some idealist ; that the Comment explicitly states the idealist’s position ; and that Vacaspatimi^ra identifies the idealist as being a Vijndnavddin. Elsewhere Vacaspatimi^ra contrasts this school with other Buddhist schools. And the possibility that he is referring to some Vijndna-vdda other than Vasubandhu’s is remote. If this be so, it becomes clearer why Nagarjuna (a little before A.D. 200), the great expounder of the Qunya-vdda, does not, so far as we have discovered in the portion of the Mulamadhyamika-karikas thus far published (fasc. I-V), mention Patahjali. Yet from the Chinese transla- tions of Nagarjuna it is clear that he was familiar with the philosophical yoga. For example in the Chinese translation,^ made in a. d. 472, of Nagarjuna’s Upjiyakau^alyahrdaya-^astra (Nanjio, No. 1257), eight schools of philo- sophers and logicians are enumerated; 1. Fire-worshippers, 2. Mimahsakas, 3. Vai^esikas, 4. Sathkhya, 5. Yoga, 6. Nirgranthas, 7. Monists, 8. Pluralists. There was then a philosophical school of Yoga about A.D. 200.^ Pataiijali was not unknown to Buddhist writers. But there is nothing to indicate that Nagarjuna is referring to Pataiijali, the philosopher, who would then have preceded both nirdlartibana schools. More probably, we may suppose, he refers to some one of the authorities on Yoga, such as Jaigisavya or Pafica^ikha who are quoted in the Yoga-bhasya. With regard to the later limit, a reference, if historically sound, would make it certain that Pataiijali lived before a.d. 400. In the Mahavansa, chap. 37, vs. 167 (Tumour, p. 250 ; compare Dines Andersen, Pali Reader, I, p. 113, st. 3), we have the words Vihdram ekam dgamma rattlm Pdtanjali-matam parivatteti. The verse refers to Buddhagho.sa, who lived in the first half of the fifth ’ I am indebted to the Rev. Kentoku Hori of Tokyo for this reference. Professor Jacobi has proved the existence of a philosophical Yoga system, resting upon logical inferences and not upon intuitive processes, as early as 300 b.c. (SB. der konigl. preuss. Ak. der Wiss., 13. Juli 1911). xix] Introduction century. But unfortunately the Mahavahsa proper, the work of Maha- nama, ends, according to the judgement of Professor Geiger, at chapter 37, verse 50, at which point also the tlka stops. The quotation therefore belongs to the Culavahsa. And if, as Professor Geiger concludes, the work of Mahanama is to be placed in the first quarter of the sixth century, the verse in question comes later, and probably later to such a degree that its value as evidence is almost nothing. If this be so, one can easily explain how it is that Buddhaghosa in the whole Visuddhimagga and in the Atthasalini makes no allusion to Patafijali. Much more conclusive is the fact that Umasvati in his Tattvarthadhigama- sutra ii, 52 refers to Yoga-sutra iii. 22. There can be little doubt of the reference since Umasvatys Bhasya repeats (Bib. Ind. ed. p. 53^^ and 65^) two of the illustrations given in the Yoga-bhasya, of the fire set in the dry grass and of the cloth rolled up into a ball. Other references (Tattvartha- dhigama-sutra xii. 5 and 6 and ix. 44—46) are quite as likely allusions to ancient Jain formulae as to Patanjali. By how much Umasvati’s date precedes that of his commentator, Siddhasena, cannot be said until the complete text of Siddhasena is published. The date for Siddhasena is set by Professor Jacobi (ZDMG. 60. 289, Leipzig, 1906, reprint p. 3, Eine Jaina- Dogmatik) at the middle or end of the sixth century. Umasvati precedes him; and Patanjali the philosopher would not be later than a.d. 500 and might be much earlier. On the other hand I should guess that he is not much earlier. Because, for one reason, as Professor Stcherbatskoi reports, Dignaga (about A.D. 550 or earlier) seems to know nothing of him. And secondly because it is improbable that the Yoga-bhasya was composed very much later. Other confirmatory evidence, somewhat later but more certain, would be the reference to Yoga-sutra i. 33 in Magha’s Qi^upalavadha iv. 55. Professor Hultzsch has kindly pointed out another reference at xiv. 62 of Magha’s poem. In respect of the date of Magha, Professor Jacobi concluded (WZKM. vol. Ill, p. 121 ff.) that Magha lived about the middle of the sixth century. But Mr. Gaurishankar Ojha’s discovery of the Vasantgadh inscrip- tion dated Vikrama 682 adds new and most convincing evidence. Professor Kielhorn (Gottinger Nachrichten, philol.-histor. Klasse, 1906, Heft 2, p. 146) is of the opinion that Magha, the grandson of a minister of the King Varma- lata, must be placed at about the second half of the seventh century. Still later, Gaudapada (about a.d. 700), in his comment on the Samkhya- Karika 23, quotes Yoga-sutra ii. 30 and 32 and names Patanjali as the author. The conclusion would be then that Patanjali’s sutras were wi'itten at some time in the fourth or fifth century of our era. Introduction [xx 5. Date of the Yoga-bhasya between A.D. 650 and A.D. 850. — Of this tlie limits are easier to fix. Three pieces of evidence help us to determine the earliest limit. A. The Comment could not in any case be much earlier than a.d. 350. For (at the end of iii. 53 or 52) it quotes Varsaganya in the words murti-vyavadki-jdti-hhecldbhdvdn ndsti mulapfihaktvam iti Vd,rsaganyah. And again (iv. 13) the Comment quotes from a cdstrdrhucdsanam as follows : Gnndnobfn paramam rupani na drstipatfiam rcchati yat tu d^tipatham prdptam tan mdyeva sutucchakam. Fortunately Vacaspatimi^ra offers us the information that this is an exposi- tion of the teaching of the Shasti-tantra. And furthermore, in the Bhamati on Vedanta-sutra ii. 1. 2. 3 (Nirnayasagara edition, 1904, p. 352, line 7 of the Bhamati), we are told that it is Varsaganya, the founder of the Yoga system, who said these words (ata eva yoga-cdsfram vyutpddayitd, dha sma Bhagavdn Vdrsaganyah gundiidrii paramam . . .”). Thus the Comment contains two quotations from Varsaganya. There is little reason to doubt that Varsaganya was an older contemporary of Vasubandhu. Professor Takakusu^ by a combination of dates centering about the Chinese translation of Paramartha’s Life of Vasubandhu estimated that Vasubandhu lived from about a.d. 420 till 500. Professor Sylvain L^vi (Asahga, vol. II, pp. 1 and 2) accepted the result of these discussions. But Professor Wogihara’'^ had conjectured that the date of Vasubandhu must be set back. An elaborate confirmation of his suggestion is now offered by Monsieur Noel Peri,^ who places the death of Vasubandhu at A.D. 350; and by Mr. B. Shiiwo,^ who estimates that Vasubandhu’s life was from a.d. 270 to 350. This is a return to the fourth century, the date for Vasubandhu which Biihler ® favoured. Accordingly the Bhasya must in any case be later than A.D. 350. B. Another kind of evidence which helps us to determine yet more closely the earliest limit is the fact that the decimal system is used by way of ’ Bulletin de I’lilcole Fran 9 aise d’Extrcme- Orient, 1904, tome IV, pp. 48 and 56 ; and JRAS. Jan. 1905, pp. 16-18 of the reprint. ® Asahga’s Bodhisattvabhumi, Leipzig, 1908, p. 14. ® “ A propos de la date de Vasubandhu ” (Bulletin de I’Bcole Fran 9 aise d’Ex- treme Orient, tome XI, 1911, p. 339). * “ Doctor Takakusu and Monsieur Peri on the date of Vasubandhu ” in the Tetsugaku Zasshi, vol. 27, Nov.-Dee., 1912. I am indebted to Mr. K. Yabuki for this. ® “ Die indischen Inschriften und das Alter der indischen Kunst-Poesie,” in Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserl. Akad. der Wiss., Wien, 1890, p. 79 f. Introduction xxi] illustration in the Comment on iii. 13. The oldest epigraphic ^ instance of the use of the decimal system is in the Gurjara inscription of a.d. 595. With one obscure and doubtful exception, there is no literary evidence of the use of the decimal system before Varahamihira, who lived in the sixth century. If we consider this kind of evidence alone, it is improbable that the Comment precedes the year A. D. 500 ; it is probably later. C. There is evidence which determines that the earliest limit of the Comment is still later, as late as the seventh century. In the stanza iv. 55 of the ^igupalavadha by Magha (circa a.d. 650), not only Yoga- sutra i. 33 is referred to, but also the words of the avatarana in the Comment. In the Comment the parikarma of the citta is enjoined. This is an uncommon term. Even if citta-parikamma might be found in Buddhist books, the fact that it here immediately precedes the quotation from sutra i. 33, makes it almost certain that such a mixture of termino- logy is impossible. In fact the stanza is full of specific yoga-terms in each line to such an extent that reference to any other system, much less to some heretical book, is quite excluded. The point is then that the words citta-parikarona together with the first word of the sutra have been wrought into the metre of the poem as one word. The poet, as we saw, probably lived in the second half of the seventh century. If this is trustworthy evidence, the Comment cannot be earlier than A.D. 650. D. The later limit is set by the date of Vacaspatimi 5 ra’s Nyaya Index, A.D. 841 — see below, page xxiii. Accordingly the date of the Bhasya would be somewhere between about A.D. 650 and about a.d. 850. 6. Date of Vacaspatimigra’s Tattva-vai 9 aradi about A.D. 850. — In the verse at the close of his Bhamati-nibandha, Vacaspatimi 9 ra gives the names of his works, seven in number : Yan Nydyakanikd-Tattvasamiksd-Tattvabindubhih I Yan Nydya-Sdmkhya-Yogdndm, Veddntdndni nibandhandili ii Samacdisam mahat punyam, tat phalani puskalam mayd i Samarpltam ; athditena prlyatdm Paramecvarah ll. The Nydya-vdrttiJca-tdtparya-tikd is on the Nyaya system ; the Tattva- ^ See p. 78, of Buhler’s Palaeographie, in his Grundriss. In his Notes on Indian Mathematics (Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, July 1907, vol. Ill, number 7, p. 482, note 5), Mr. G. R. Kaye gives a list of epigraphical in- stances of the notation in which “ place-value ” is utilized. Most of these he thinks are worthless as evi- dence for the introduction of the decimal system. The same conclusion is reached in a later article (JR AS. July 1910, p. 749). Introduction [xxii haumudl is on the Samkhya system; the Tattva-vdicdmdl is on the Yoga; the Nydya-kanikd, a gloss on the Vidhi-viveka, is on the Mimahsa; the Tattva-bindu is on Bhatta's exposition of the Mimahsa ; the Tattva-samiksd and the Bhdmatl are both on the Vedanta. In the same verse at the end of the Bhamati he speaks of himself as living under King Nrga: tasmin mahipe mahanlyakirtdu Qriinan-Nrge ’kdri mayd nibandhah. Unfortunately there is (as Professor Liiders informs me) no epigraphical record of this king and we cannot say when or where he lived. Vacas- patimi^ra was a native of Mithila/ the northern part of Tirhut, and the latter part of his name would indicate, as Fitz- Edward Hall has pointed out, that he was a native of Gangetic Hindustan. In the introduction to his edition of the Kusumanjali (Calcutta, 1864, p. x). Professor Cowell thinks that Vacaspatimi 9 ra lived in the tenth century. Barth (Bull, des Bel. de I’lnde, 1893, p. 271) would set him at the end of the eleventh or beginning of the twelfth century. Professor Macdonell (Hist, of Sansk. Lit., p. 393) places him soon after a.d. 1100. These judgements rest, more or less, upon the opinion that the Raja-varttika, quoted by Vacaspatimi 9 ra in his Saihkhya-tattva-kaumudi on Karika 72, was composed by, or for, Bhoja Raja, called Ranarahga Malla, King of Dhara (1018-1060). This opinion accords with the assertion of Pandit Ka 9 inatha (^astrl Astaputra of Benares College, who assured Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall that a manuscript of the Raja-varttika had been in his possession several years (Hall’s edition of the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya, 1856, p. 33). But the visible basis for this assertion that the Raja in question is Bhoja is not now at hand. Similarly, Professor Pathak in his article on Dharmakirti and Shankara- carya (see Journal of the Bombay Branch RAS., vol. XXVIII, no. 48, 1891, p. 89, and also the table in the same Journal, p. 235, no. 49, note 74) is content to rest his conclusions as to the date of Vacaspatimi 9 ra upon the fact that Qribharatl, the pupil of Bodharanya, in his edition of the Sathkhya- tattva-kaumudi (Benares, Jainaprabhakara Press, 1889, p. 182), prints, in a note at the end, the word Bhoja before the word Raja-varttika. Thus it would appear that this varttika is by Bhojaraja and that Vacaspatimi 9 ra, who quotes it, must be later than Bhojaraja, that is, later than the tenth century. But we are not at all sure from other manuscript evidence that the word Bhoja should be read before the word Raja-varttika, and the date of this Raja-varttika is therefore undetermined. ' See the beginning of the Nyayasutro- prasad^astrl. Notices of Sanskrit MSS., (Idharah by Vacaspatimifra Qrlvaca- Second Series, vol. II, p. 98). sj)at/mi(rena Mithile(^varasurind (Kara- i xxiii] Introduction By way of contrast we now have the direct statement of Vacaspatimi^ra that he finished his Nyayasucinibandha in the year 898. For on the first page of this appendix to the Nyaya-varttika, as given in the edition of the Nyaya-varttika in the Bibliotheca Indica, 1907, he says that he is about to compose an index for the Nyaya-sutras Cru'dcaspatimicrena mmyd sucl vidhdsyate. And in the colophon he says that he made the work for the delight of the intelligent in the year 898. Nydyasuclnihandho ’sdv akdri sudliiydih mude Crivdcaspatimicrena vasv-anka-vam-vatsare. It remains to determine whether this year belongs to the era of Vikrama- ditya or of Qalivahana. In the introduction to his edition of Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts (Bibl. Ind., 1910), Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad Shastri gives the date as belonging to the second era, to Qaka 898. He says (p. iii) that the author of the Apohasiddhi “ takes a good deal of pains in elaborately refuting the theory of Vacaspatimi 9 ra”, and that he does “ not quote or refute Udayana, whose date is Qaka 905 = a.d. 983”. In his Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts, second series, vol. II, p. xix, this distinguished scholar had come to the same conclusion with regard to the era to which this date of VacaspatimiQra should be assigned. This conclusion seemed doubtful to Mr. Nilmani Chakravarti, M.A., in his valuable Chronology of Indian Authors, a supplement to Miss Duff’s Chronology of India (Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. 3, 1907, p. 205). And one cannot refrain from thinking that the other era is presumably more likely for a Northern writer ; and that more especially a great difficulty is created if only seven years are supposed to separate Vacaspatimi 5 ra and Udayana. The difference between the two philosophers is of such a kind that one must assume a much longer interval between their writings. And furthermore, would it not be an extraordinary coincidence that the author of the Apohasiddhi should be so minutely familiar with the work of Vacaspatimi 9 ra, and yet not have the dimmest sense of the existence of Udayana, the light of a new dawn in the world of Nyaya? Accordingly, the date of Yaeaspati’s Nyaya-index would appear to be Samvat 898 = A.D. 841 ; and the dates of his six other works, including the Tattva-vai 9 aradi, may be presumed to be not many years earlier or later. We are therefore safe in making the statement that the date of the Tattva-vai 9 aradi is not far from the middle of the ninth century, or approximately A.D. 850. I ANALYTICAL SUMMAEY OF THE YOGA-SUTKAS BOOK FIRST— CONCENTRATION PAGE 1. Reasons for beginning the book ....... 3 2. Characteristic mark of yoga is the restriction of fluctuations . . 8 3. Intelligence in the state of restriction ...... 13 4. Intelligence in the state of emergence ...... 14 5. There are five fluctuations . . . . . . . . 17 6. List of the five fluctuations ........ 19 7. The first fluctuation is the source of valid ideas .... 20 8. The second fluctuation is misconception ...... 24 9. The third fluctuation is predicate relation ..... 26 10. The fourth fluctuation is sleep ........ 29 11. The fifth fluctuation is memory ....... 31 12. Two methods of restriction of the fluctuations ..... 34 13. The first method is practice ........ 34 14. The confirmation of practice ........ 35 15. The second method is passionlessness ...... 36 16. Characteristic mark of the highest passionlessness .... 37 17. Result of these methods is conscious concentration of four kinds . 40 18. Characteristic mark of unconscious concentration . . . . 41 19. A first way of approach to unconscious concentration ... 43 20. A second way of approach to the same as used by yogins ... 45 21. Gradations of methods and intensities ...... 47 22. Yet another way of approach ........ 48 23. Devotion to the l 9 vara is this way of approach .... 48 24. Characteristic mark of the devotion to the l 9 vara .... 49 25. The l 9 vara is unexcelled in his power of knowing .... 55 26. The l 9 vara has no limit in time ....... 59 27. The symbolic expression of the l 9 vara ...... 60 28. Description of the devotion . . . . . . . • 61 29. Two results of this concentration ....... 62 30. List of nine ohstacles removed ........ 63 31. Five accompaniments of the obstacles ...... 65 32. Prevention of these bj’ calming the mind-stuff ..... 66 xxv] Analytical Summary of the Yogci-sutras PAGE 33. Four ways of calming the mind-stuff ...... 71 34. Breathings calm the mind-stuff . ....... 72 35. Fixed attention steadies the mind ....... 72 36. Fixed attention to processes of thought steadies the mind ... 74 37. Attention to the mind-stuff of great yogins ..... 76 38. Fixed attention to objects seen in sleep . . . . . . 76 39. Contemplations of the most desired object ..... 77 40. Mastery of the mind-stuff the result of attentions .... 77 41. Balanced state of the steady mind ....... 77 42. Balanced state with regard to a coarse object ..... 80 43. Balanced state with regard to a super-coarse object .... 82 44. Balanced states with regard to subtile and super-subtile objects . 88 45. Extent of the existence of subtile objects . . . . . . 91 46. These balanced states are seeded concentrations .... 92 47. Eesult of the super-subtile balanced state ...... 93 48. Truth-bearing insight ......... 94 49. Object of the truth-bearing insight ....... 94 50. Latent impressions from this insight inhibit others .... 96 51. Seedless concentration is the restriction of even these impressions . 98 BOOK SECOND— MEANS OF ATTAINMENT 1. Yoga of action ........... 103 2. Eesult of yoga of action ......... 105 3. The five hindrances .......... 106 4. The root of the other hindrances is undifferentiated-consciousness . 106 5. Undifferentiated-consciousness is the first hindrance . . . .110 6. Feeling-of-personality is the second hindrance . . . . .115 7. Passion is the third hindrance . . . . . . . .116 8. Hatred is the fourth hindrance . . . . . . .117 9. Will-to-live is the fifth hindrance . . . . . . .117 10. Eemedy for hindrances when subtile ...... 119 11. Eemedy for fluctuations which result from hindrances . . .120 12. Latent-deposit of karma the cause of hindrances .... 121 13. Three kinds of fruition of karma . . . . . . .122 14. Eesults of fruition .......... 131 15. Pleasure to be rejected, inasmuch as it is intermingled with pain , 132 16. A. Future pain avoidable . ........ 139 cl [h.o.s. it] Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras [xxvi PAGE 17. B. Cause of future pain. Correlation of seer and seen . . . 140 18. Nature of an object for sight ........ 144 19. Subdivision of objects for sight . . . . . . .148 20. Nature of seer ........... 154 21. Object for sight subordinate to seer ....... 157 22. Plurality of objects for sight ........ 159 23. Nature of the correlation . . . . . . . . .160 24. Undifferentiated-consciousness the cause of the correlation . . 166 25. C. The escape from pain is the isolation of the seer .... 168 26. D. The method of escape is discriminative insight .... 169 27. Seven forms of discriminative insight ...... 170 28. Means of attaining discrimination . . . . . . .172 29. The eight aids to yoga . . . . . . . . .177 30. i. The five abstentions . . . . . . . . .178 31. Qualified abstentions ......... 180 32. ii. The five observances ......... 181 33. Inhibition of obstacles to abstentions and observances . . . 183 34. Nature of perverse-considerations ....... 183 35. Consequences of abstention from injury ...... 186 36. Consequences of abstention from lying ...... 186 37. Consequences of abstention from stealing ...... 186 38. Consequences of abstention from incontinence ..... 187 39. Consequences of abstention from property ..... 187 40. Consequences of observance of cleanliness ...... 188 41. Further consequences of cleanliness . . . . . . .188 42. Consequences of observance of contentment ..... 189 43. Consequences of observance of self-castigation ..... 189 44. Consequences of observance of study ...... 190 45. Consequences of observance of devotion to the l9vara . . . 190 46. hi. Nature of postures ......... 191 47. Ways to success in postures . . . . . . . .192 48. Consequences of postiu’es ......... 192 49. iv. Nature of restraint of the breath ....... 193 50. Three kinds of restraint of the breath ...... 193 51. A fourth kind of restraint of the breath ...... 195 52. Consequences of restraint of the breath ...... 196 53. A further consequence is fixed attention ...... 197 54. V. Nature of fixed attention ........ 197 55. Consequences of fixed attention ....... 198 xxvii] Analytical Summary of the Yoga-siltras BOOK THIRD— SUPERNORMAL POWERS PAGE 1. vi. Characteristic mark of fixed-attention ...... 203 2. vii. Characteristic mark of contemplation ...... 204 3. viii. Characteristic mark of concentration ...... 204 4. The three last together are called constraint ..... 205 5. Consequences of mastery of constraint ...... 206 6. Three stages of constraint ........ 206 7. Last three aids more direct than first five ...... 207 8. Even last three less direct than seedless concentration . . . 208 9. Characteristic mark of restricted mutations ..... 208 10. Peaceful flow of mind-stuff due to subliminal impressions . . 210 11. Nature of mutations in concentration ...... 211 12. Characteristic mark of focused mutations . . . . . .211 13. Mutations of external-aspect and time-form and intensity . . .212 14. Characteristic mark of a substance ....... 224 15. Reason for the order of mutations ....... 229 16. Consequences of constraint upon the mutations .... 232 17. Consequences of discriminating things from words and ideas . . 233 18. Consequences of direct perception of subliminal impressions . . 247 19. Consequences of direct perception of presented-ideas of another . 249 20. Object of such a presented -idea not perceived ..... 249 21. Consequences of constraint upon the form of the body . . . 250 22. Consequences of constraint upon karma . . . . . .251 23. Consequences of constraint upon acts of sympathy .... 252 24. Consequences of constraint upon powers ...... 253 25. Consequences of constraint upon luminous processes .... 253 26. Consequences of constraint upon the sun ...... 254 27. Consequences of constraint upon the moon ..... 260 28. Consequences of constraint upon the zenith ..... 260 29. Consequences of constraint upon the navel ..... 260 30. Consequences of constraint upon the throat ..... 260 31. Consequences of constraint upon the tortoise-tube .... 261 32. Consequences of constraint upon the radiance in the head . . 261 33. Consequences of constraint upon the vividness ..... 261 34. Consequences of constraint upon the heart ..... 262 35. Consequences of constraint upon knowledge of the Self . . . 262 36. Consequences of direct perception of the Self ..... 265 37. Supernormal powers obstructive to concentration .... 265 38. Mind -stuff penetrates into the body of another 266 39. Consequences of constraint upon Udana 267 Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras [xxviii PAGE 40. Consequences of constraint upon Samdna ...... 268 41. Consequences of constraint upon relation between the ear and air . 268 42. Consequences of constraint upon relation between body and air . 271 43. Dwindling of the obscuration of light ...... 272 44. Atomization and other supernormal powers ..... 273 45. Perfection of body .......... 278 46. Method of mastering the organs ....... 280 47. Consequences of mastering the organs ...... 280 48. Mastery over all matter ......... 282 49. Means of attaining Isolation ........ 283 50. Means of reducing opposition to Isolation ..... 284 51. Consequences of constraint upon moments and their sequence . . 285 52. Object of discriminative perception ....... 287 53. Characteristic mark of discriminative perception .... 290 54. Consequences of the discrimination ....... 294 55. Isolation is purity of the sattva and of the Self ..... 295 BOOK FOURTH— ISOLATION 1. Different causes of supernormal powers ...... 299 2. Reasons for mutations into another birth ...... 300 3. No impulse given by karma ........ 301 4. Created mind-stuffs .......... 303 5. Mind-stuff which gives the impulse ....... 303 6. No latent-impressions in created mind-stuffs ..... 304 7. Varieties of karma .......... 305 8. Latent impressions conform to karma ...... 306 9. Continuity of impressions ......... 307 10. Latent impressions from time without beginning .... 309 11. Termination of impressions ........ 314 12. External-aspects in aU three time-forms ...... 315 13. External-aspects phenomenalized or subtile ..... 317 14. Activity of a thing due to a single mutation ..... 318 15. Things and mind-stuff on different levels ...... 323 16. Things not dependent upon a single mind-stuff . .... 325 17. Rejection of idealism ......... 327 18. The Self undergoes no mutations ....... 328 19. Mind-stuff does not illumine itself ....... 328 20. Fallacy in confusing thinking-substance and thing .... 330 21. One mind-stuff not illumined by another 331 xxix] Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras PAGE 22. Intelligence aware of its own mind-stufif ...... 332 23. Mind-stufF, when affected, capable of perceiving all objects . . 334 24. Intelligence distinct from mind-stuff ...... 336 25. Change in the habits of the mind-stuff ...... 337 26. Change in the nature of the mind-stuff ...... 339 27. Disturbances in the discriminating mind ...... 339 28. Escape even from subliminal-impressions ..... 340 29. Means of attaining the Eain-cloud ....... 340 30. Consequences of the Eain-cloud ....... 341 31. Condition of mind-stuff in the Eain-cloud ..... 342 32. End of the sequences of mutations ....... 343 33. Characteristic of a sequence ........ 343 34. Nature of Isolation 347 TRANSLATION OF THE YOGA-SUTRAS WITHOUT THE COMMENT OR THE EXPLANATION Being the Sutras translated in groups, together with GROUP-HEADINGS ADDED BY THE TRANSLATOR BOOK FIRST— CONCENTRATION Goal of Concentration i. 1-4. Yoga is the concentration which restricts the fluctuations. Freed from them, the Self attains to self-expression. i. 1 Now the exposition of yoga [is to be made], i. 2 Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff, i. 3 Then the Seer [that is, the Self] abides in himself, i. 4 At other times it [the Self] takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuff]. Forms of the mind-stuff i. 5-11. The fluctuations are all exposed to attack from the hindrances and are five in number: 1. sources-of-valid- ideas ; 2. misconceptions; 3. predicate-relations; 4. sleep; 5. memory. i. 6 The fluctuations are of five kinds and are hindered or unhindered, i. 6 Sources-of-valid-ideas and misconceptions and predicate-relations and sleep and memory, i. 7 Sources-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and verbal-communication, i. 8 Misconception is an erroneous idea not based on that form [in respect of which the misconception is entertained], i. 9 The predicate-relation {vikalpa) is without any [corre- sponding perceptible] object and follows as a result of perception or of words, i. 10 Sleep is a fluctuation of [mind-stuff] supi^orted by the cause of the [transient] negation [of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations], i. 11 Memoiy is not-adding-surreptitiously to a once experienced object. Methods of restricting fluctuations i. 12-16. An orientation of the whole life with reference to one idea; an emotional transformation corresponding to this focused state. i. 12 The restriction of them is by [means] of practice and passionless- ness. i. 13 Practice is [repeated] exertion to the end that [the mind- xxxi] Translation of the Yoga-siitras stuff] shall have permanence in this [restricted state], i. 14 But this [practice] becomes confirmed when it has been cultivated for a long time and uninterruptedly and with earnest attention, i. 15 Passionlessness is the consciousness of being master on the part of one who has rid himself of thirst for either seen or revealed objects, i. 16 This [passion- lessness] is highest when discernment of the Self results in thirstlessness for qualities [and not merely for objects]. Kinds of concentration i. 17-18. Four kinds of conscious concentration, and the concentration of subliminal-impressions alone. i. 17 [Concentration becomes] conscious [of its object] by assuming forms either of deliberation [upon coarse objects] or of reflection upon subtile objects or of joy or of the feeling-of-personality. i. 18 The other [concentration which is not conscious of objects] consists of subliminal- impressions only [after objects have merged], and follows upon that practice which effects the cessation [of fluctuations]. Degrees of approach to concentration i. 19-23. The worldly approach ; the spiritual approach ; the combina- tions of methods and intensities ; and the devotion to the highest Self. i. 19 [Concentration not conscious of objects] caused by worldly [means] is the one to which the discarnate attain and to which those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary-matter attain, i. 20 [Concentration not conscious of objects,] which follows upon belief [and] energy [and] mindfulness [and] concentration [and] insight, is that to which the others [the yogins] attain, i. 21 For the keenly intense, [concentration] is near. i. 22 Because [this keenness] is gentle or moderate or keen, there is a [concentration] supexdor even to this [near kind], i. 23 Or [concentration] is attained by devotion to the l 9 vara. Analysis of the highest Self i. 24-28. Unique quality of the highest Self ; proof of His existence ; His temporal priority ; His symbolical realization, i. 24 Untouched by hindrances or karmas or fruition or by latent-deposits, the l 9 vara is a special kind of Self. i. 25 In this [l 9 vara] the germ of the omniscient is at its utmost excellence, i. 26 Teacher of the Primal [Sages] also, forasmuch as [with Him] there is no limitation by time, i. 27 The word-expressing Him is the Mystic-syllable, i. 28 Kepetition of it and reflection upon its meaning [should be made]. i j I [xxxii Translation of the Yoga-siitras Obstacles to the calming of the mind-stuff i. 29-34. The inner sense is exposed to distractions which may be over- come by focusing the mind ; by the cultivation of sentiments ; one may also practise breathings. i. 29 Thereafter comes the right-knowledge of him who thinks in an inverse way, and the removal of obstacles, i. 30 Sickness and languor and doubt and heedlessness and worldliness and erroneous perception and failure to attain any stage [of concentration] and instability in the state [when attained] — these distractions of the mind-stuff are the obstacles, i. 31 Pain and despondency and unsteadiness of the body and inspiration and expiration are the accompaniments of the distractions, i. 32 To check them [let there be] practice upon a single entity, i. 33 By the cultivation of friendliness towai’ds happiness, and compassion towards pain, and joy towards merit, and indifference towards demerit, i. 34 Or [the yogin attains the undisturbed calm of the mind-stuff] by expulsion and retention of breath. Attainment of Stability i. 35-39. Suitable objects for fixed-attention and contemplation. i. 35 Or [he gains stability when] a sense-activity arises connected with an object [and] bringing the central-oi’gan into a relation of stability, i. 36 Or an undistressed [and] luminous [sense-activity when arisen brings the central-organ into a relation of stability], i. 37 Or the mind- stuff [reaches the stable state] by having as its object [a mind-stuff] freed from passion, i. 38 Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by having as the supporting-object a perception in dream or in sleep, i. 39 Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by contemplation upon any such an object as is desired. Mastery and concentration i. 40-47. Classification of concentration with reference to different single objects or absence of objects, or to the mental act, or to a fusion of object and knower. i. 40 His mastery extends from the smallest atom to the greatest magnitude, i. 41 [The mind-stuff] from which, as from a precious gem, fluctuations have dwindled away, reaches the balanced-state, which, in the case of the knower or of the process-of-knowing or of the object- to-be-known, is in the state of resting upon [one] of these [three] and in the state of being tinged by [one] of these [three], i. 42 Of [these balanced-states] the state-balanced with deliberation is confused by reason of predicate-relations between words and intended-objects and {xxxiii without the Comment or the Explanation ideas, i. 43 When the memory is quite purified, [that balanced-state] — which is, as it were, empty of itself and which brightens [into conscious knowledge] as the intended-object and nothing more — is super-delibera- tive. i. 44 By this same [balanced-state] the reflective and the super- reflective [balanced-states] are also explained, i. 45 The subtile object also terminates in unresoluble-primary-matter (alihga). i. 46 These same [balanced-states] are the seeded concentration, i. 47 When there is the clearness of the super-reflective [balanced-state, the yogin gains] internal undisturbed calm. Normative insight i. 48-51. After-effects of concentrated insight efface after-effects of con- centration upon objects. i. 48 In this [concentrated mind-stuff] the insight is truth-bearing, i. 49 Has another object than the insight resulting from things heard or from inferences, inasmuch as its intended-object is a particular, i. 50 The subliminal-impression produced by this [super-reflective balanced-state] is hostile to other subliminal-impressions, i. 51 When this [subliminal-impression] also is restricted, since all is restricted, [the yogin gains] seedless concentration. BOOK SECOND— MEANS OF ATTAINMENT Devices for weakening hindrances ii. 1-11. Aids serviceable to the beginner who is on the path to con- centration. ii. 1 Self-castigation and study and devotion to the Ifvara are the Yoga of action, ii. 2 For the cultivation of concentration and for the attenuation of the hindrances. ii. 3 Undifferentiated-consciousness {avidya) and the feeling-of-personality and passion and aversion and the will-to-live are the five hindrances, ii. 4 Undifferentiated-consciousness is the field for the others whether they be dormant or attenuated or intercepted or sustained, ii. 5 The recognition of the permanent, of the pure, of pleasure, and of a self in what is impermanent, impure, pain, and not-self is undifferentiated-consciousness [avidya). ii. 6 When the power of seeing and the power by which one sees have the appearance of being a single self, [this is] the feeling-of-personality. ii. 7 Passion is that which dwells upon pleasure, ii. 8 Aversion is that which dwells upon pain. ii. 9 The will-to-live sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature exists in this form even in the wise. ii. 10 6 [h.o.s. 17 ] [xxxiv Translation of the Yoga-siitras These [hindrances when they have become subtile] are to be escaped by the inverse-propagation, ii. 11 The fluctuations of these should be escaped by means of contemplation. Karma ii. 12-14. Origin of karma in hindrances; result of karma in state-of- existence, length of life, and pleasure or pain. ii. 12 The latent-deposit of karma has its root in the hindrances and may be felt in a birth seen or in a birth unseen, ii. 13 So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from it [that is] birth [and] length-of-life [and] kind-of-experience. ii. 14 These [fruitions] have joy or extreme anguish as results in accordance with the quality of their causes whether merit or demerit. All is pain ii. 15. Present and future and past correlations with objects result un- avoidably in pain. ii. 15 As being the pains which are mutations and anxieties and subliminal-impressions, and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations of the aspects (gum ), — to the discriminating all is nothing but pain. There is an escape ii. 16. Only yogins are sensitive to future pain. This may he avoided in that it has not expressed itself in actual suffering. ii. 16 That which is to be escaped is pain yet to come. Cause of pain ii. 17-24. The Seer-sight relation implies 1. complexes of potential stresses between aspects (guna) and between sense-organs and elements, 2. the power of the Seer who is undefiled by aspects, 3. the actual correla- tion until the purpose of the Seer, which is to differentiate consciousness, is completed. ii. 17 The correlation of the Seer and the object-of-sight is the cause of that which is to be escaped, ii. 18 With a disposition to brightness and to activity and to inertia, and with the elements and the organs as its essence, and with its purpose the experience and the liberation [of the Self], — this is the object-of-sight. ii. 19 The particularized and the unparticularized [forms] and the resoluble only [into primary matter] and irresoluble-primary-matter — are the divisions of the aspects (guna). ii. 20 The Seer who is nothing but [the power of seeing], although undefiled (^uddha), looks upon the presented idea. ii. 21 The object- of-sight is only for the sake of it [the Self]. ii. 22 Though it has xxxv] without the Comment or the Explanation ceased [to be seen] in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others [besides himself], ii. 23 The reason for the apperception of what the power of the property and of what the power of the proprietor are, is correlation, ii. 24 The reason for this [correlation] is unditferentiated-consciousness {avidya). The escape ii. 25. Positive state of Isolation follows the ending of the correlation. ii. 25 Since this [non-sight] does not exist, there is no correlation. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer. Means of escape ii. 26-27. The act of discrimination leading up to the act of insight. ii. 26 The means of attaining escape is unwavering discriminative discernment, ii. 27 For him [there is] insight sevenfold and advancing in stages to the highest. Eight aids to yoga ii. 28-29. To purify the aspects and to intensify intuitive thinking there are five indirect aids and three direct aids. ii. 28 After the aids to yoga have been followed up, when the impurity has dwindled, there is an enlightenment of perception reaching up to the discriminative discernment, ii. 29 Abstentions and observances and postures and regulations-of-the-breath and withdrawal-of-the-senses and fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration. First indirect aid : i. Five abstentions ii. 30-31. The elements and degrees of morality in the form of prohibi- tions. ii. 30 Abstinence from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from incontinence and from acceptance of gifts are the abstentions, ii. 31 When they are unqualified by species or place or time or exigency and when [covering] all [these] classes — there is the Great Course-of-conduct. Second indirect aid : ii. Five observances ii. 32. Advances in morality in the form of voluntary action. ii. 32 Cleanliness and contentment and self-castigation and study and devotion to the l9vara are the observances. Results of tbe abstentions and observances ii. 33-45. Persistent inhibitions of certain kinds reorganize an increase of activity of the opposite kind. ii. 33 If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations, there should be [xxxvi Translation of the Yoga-sfitras cultivation of the opposites, ii. 34 Since perverse-considerations such, as injuries, whether done or caused to be done or approved, whether ensuing upon greed or anger or infatuation, whether mild or moderate or vehement, find their unending consequences in pain and lack of thinking, there should be the cultivation of their opposites, ii. 35 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from injury, his presence begets a suspension of enmity, ii. 36 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from falsehood, actions and consequences depend upon him. ii. 37 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from theft, all jewels approach him. ii. 38 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from incontinence, he acquires energy, ii. 39 As soon as he is established in abstinence from acceptance of gifts, a thorough illumination upon the conditions of birth, ii. 40 As a result of cleanliness there is disgust at one’s own body and no intercourse with others, ii. 41 Purity of sattva and gentleness and singleness-of-intent and subjugation of the senses and fitness for the sight of the self. ii. 42 As a result of contentment there is an acquisition of superlative pleasure, ii. 43 Perfection in the body and in the oi’gans after impurity has dwindled as a result of self-castigation, ii. 44 As a result of study there is communion with the chosen deity, ii. 45 Perfection of concentration as a result of devotion to the Ifvara. Third indirect aid : iii. Postures ii, 46-48. Bodily conditions favourable to concentration. ii. 46 Stable-and-easy posture, ii. 47 By relaxation of effort or by a [mental] state-of-balance with reference to Ananta. ii. 48 Thereafter he is unassailed by extremes. Fourth indirect aid : iv. Restraint of the breath ii. 49-52. Calming of affective states is favourable to concentration. ii. 49 When there is [stability of posture], the restraint of breath, a cutting off of the flow of inspiration and expiration, follows, ii. 50 [This is] external or internal or suppressed in fluctuation and is regulated by place and time and number and is protracted and subtile, ii. 51 The fourth [restraint of the breath] transcends the external and the internal object, ii. 52 As a result of this the covering of the light dwindles away. Fifth indirect aid : v. Withdrawal of the sense-organs ii. 53-55. The span of attention is confined to an inner object. ii. 53 For fixed-attentions also the central organ becomes fit, ii. 54 The withdrawal of the senses is as it were the imitation of the mind-stuff as it is in itself on the part of the organs by disjoining themselves fi’om their object, ii. 55 As a result of this [withdrawal] there is a complete- mastery of the organs. xxxvii] without the Comment or the Explanation BOOK THIRD- SUPERNORMAL POWERS First direct aid; vi. Fixed-attention iii. 1. The knower focuses the process of knowing upon the object to be known. iii. 1 Binding the mind-stuff to a place is fixed-attention. Second direct aid : vii. Contemplation iii. 2. A two-term relation between the process of knowing and the object to be known. iii. 2 Focusedness of the presented idea upon that [place] is con- templation. Third direct aid : viii. Concentration iii. 3. A fusion of the knower and the process of knowing with the object to be known. iii. 3 This same [contemplation], shining forth [in consciousness] as the intended object and nothing more, and, as it were, emptied of itself, is concentration. Transition to seedless concentration iii, 4-10. The direct aids in combination result in insight and restricted subliminal-impressions and the calm flow of the mind-stuff. iii. 4 The three in one are constraint, iii. 5 As a result of mastering this constraint, there follows the shining forth of insight, iii. 6 Its application is by stages, iii. 7 The three are direct aids in comparison with the previous [five], iii. 8 Even these [three] are indirect aids to seedless [concentration], iii. 9 When there is a becoming invisible of the subliminal-impression of emergence and a becoming visible of the subliminal-impression of restriction, the mutation of restriction is inseparably connected with mind-stuff in its period of restriction, iii. 10 This [mind-stuff] flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal- impression. Mutations of substances iii. 11-15. In the focused state the concentration holds two time-forms within the span of attention. Mutations are in fixed orders of subliminal- impressions in the restricted state. iii. 11 The mutation of concentration is the dwindling of dispersiveness and the uprisal of singleness-of-intent belonging to the mind-stuff, iii. 12 Then again when the quiescent and the uprisen presen ted-ideas are similar [in respect of having a single object], the mind-stuff has a mutation single-in-intent, iii. 13 Thus with regard to elements and to organs, mutations of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity have been enumerated, iii. 14 A substance conforms itself to quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external-aspects, iii. 15 The order of the sequence is the reason for the order of the mutations. Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xxxviii Application of constraints to different orders of mutations iii. 16-52. Given a single mutation of external-aspect or time-form or in- tensity, the vphole sequence comes under control of the concentrated insight, iii. 16 As a result of constraint upon the three mutations [there follows] the knowledge of the past and the future, iii. 17 Word and intended- object and presented-idea are confused because they are erroneously identified with each other. By constraint upon the distinctions between them [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the cries of all living beings, iii. 18 As a result of direct perception of subliminal-impressions there is [intuitive] knowledge of previous births, iii. 19 [As a result of constraint] upon a presented-idea [there arises intuitive] knowledge of the mind-stuff of another, iii. 20 But [the intuitive knowledge of the mind-stuff of another] does not have that [idea] together with that upon which it depends [as its object], since that [upon which it depends] is not-in-the-field [of consciousness], iii. 21 As a result of constraint upon the [outer] form of the body, when its power to be known is stopped, then as a consequence of the disjunction of the light and of the eye there follows indiscernibility [of the yogin’s body], iii. 22 Advancing and not-advancing is karma ; as a result of constraint upon this [two- fold karma] or from the signs of death [there arises an intuitive] knowledge of the latter end. iii. 23 [As a result of constraint] upon friendliness and other [sentiments there arise] powers [of friendliness], iii. 24 [As a result of constraint] upon powers [there arise] powers like those of an elephant, iii. 25 As a result of casting the light of a sense-activity [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the subtile and the concealed and the obscure, iii. 26 As a result of constraint upon the sun [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the cosmic-spaces, iii. 27 [As a result of constraint] upon the moon [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement of the stars, iii. 28 [Asa result of constraint] upon the pole-star [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of their movements, iii. 29 [As a result of constraint] upon the wheel of the navel [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement of the body. iii. 30 [As a result of constraint] upon the well of the throat [there follows] the cessation of hunger and thirst, iii. 31 [As a result of constraint] upon the tortoise-tube [there follows] motionless- ness of the mind-stuff, iii. 32 [As a result of constraint] upon the radiance in the head [there follows] the sight of the Siddhas. iii. 33 Or as a result of vividness the yogin discerns all. iii. 34 [As a result of constraint] upon the heart [there arises] a consciousness of the mind-stuff, iii. 35 Experience is a presented-idea which fails to distinguish the sattva and the Self, which are absolutely uncommingled [in the presented-idea]. Since the sattva exists as object for another, the [intuitive] knowledge of the Self arises as the result of constraint upon that which exists for xxxix] ivithout the Comment or the Explanation its own sake. iii. 36 As a result of this [constraint upon that which exists for its own sake], there arise vividness and the organ-of-[supernal]- hearing and the organ-of-[supernal]-touch and the organ-of-[supernal]- sight and the organ-of-[supernal]-taste and the organ-of-[supernalJ-smell. iii. 37 In concentration these [supernal activities] are obstacles ; in the emergent state they are perfections {siddJii). iii. 38 As a result of slacken- ing the causes of bondage and as a result of the knowledge of the procedure [of the mind-stuff], the mind-stuff penetrates into the body of another, iii. 39 As a result of mastering the Udana there is no adhesion to water or mud or thorns or similar objects, and [at death] the upward flight, iii. 40 As a result of mastering the Samana [there arises] a radiance, iii. 41 As a result of constraint upon the relation between the organ-of- hearing and the air, [there arises] the supernal-organ-of-hearing. iii. 42 Either as a result of constraint upon the relation between the body and the air, or as a result of the balanced-state of lightness, such as that of cotton-fibre, there follows the passing through air. iii. 43 An outwardly unadjusted fluctuation is the Great Discarnate ; as a result of this the dwindling of the covering to the brightness, iii. 44 As a result of con- straint upon the coarse and the essential-attribute and the subtile and the inherence and purposiveness, there is a mastery of the elements, iii. 45 As a result of this, atomization and the other [perfections] come about, [there is] perfection of body ; and there is no obstruction by the properties of these [elements], iii. 46 Beauty and grace and power and compactness of the thunderbolt, — [this is] perfection of body. iii. 47 As a result of constraint upon the process-of-knowing and the essential- attribute and the feeling-of-personality and the inherence and the purposiveness, [there follows] the subjugation of the organs, iii. 48 As a result of this [there follows] speed [great as that] of the central- organ, action of the instruments [of knowledge] disjunct [from the body], and the subjugation of the primary-cause, iii. 49 He who has only the full discernment into the difference between the sattva and the Self is one who has authority over all states- of-existence and is one who knows all. iii. 50 As a result of passionlessness even with regard to these [perfections] there follows, after the dwindling of the seeds of the defects. Isolation, iii. 51 In case of invitations from those-in-high- places, these should arouse no attachment or pride, for undesired consequences recur, iii. 52 As a result of constraint upon moments and their sequence [there arises the intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination. Culmination of concentration iii. 53-55. The particular which is indiscernible in respect of class or term or point-in-space is intuitively discerned ; the widest span of objec- tivity is also discerned. This is the attainment of Isolation. Translation of the Yoga-sfitras [xl iii. 53 As a result of this there arises the deeper-knowledge of two equivalent things which cannot be distinctly qualified in species or characteristic-mark or point-of-space. iii. 54 The [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination is a deliverer, has all things as its object, and has all times for its object, and is an [inclusive whole] without sequence, iii. 55 When the purity of the sattva and of the Self are equal there is Isolation. BOOK FOURTH— ISOLATION Substances and subconsciousness iv. 1-13. Correspondence between imperceptible forms of substance and latent-impressions of concentrated states. iv. 1 Perfections proceed from birth or from drugs or from spells or from self-castigation or from concentration, iv. 2 The mutation into another birth is the result of the filling in of the evol\dng-cause. iv. 3 The efficient cause gives no impulse to the evolving-causes but [the mutation] follows when the barrier [to the evolving-cause] is cut, as happens with the peasant, iv. 4 Created mind-stuffs may result from the sense-of-personality and from this alone, iv. 5 While there is a variety of actions, the mind-stuff which impels the many is one. iv. 6 Of these [five perfections] that which ju’oceeds from contemplation leaves no latent-deposit, iv. 7 The yogin’s karma is neither-white-nor-black ; [the karma] of others is of three kinds, iv. 8 As a result of this there follows the manifestation of those subconscious-impressions only which correspond to the fruition of their [karma], iv. 9 There is an uninterrupted-causal-relation [of subconscious-impressions], although remote in species and point-of-space and moment-of-time, by reason of tlie coiTespondence between memory and subliminal-impressions, iv. 10 Furthermore the [subconscious-impressions] have no beginning [that we can set in time], since desire is permanent, iv. 11 Since [sub- conscious-impressions] are associated with cau.se and motive and mental- substrate and stimulus, if these cease to be, then those [subconscious- impressions] cea.se to be. iv. 12 Past and future as such exist ; [therefore subconsciou.s-imj)ressions do not cease to be]. For the different time- forms belong to tlie external-aspects. iv. 13 These [external-aspects with the three time-forms] are phenomenalized [individuals] or subtile [generic-forms] and their essence is the aspects (giina). Polemic against Idealism iv. 14-23. Knowledge of the stream of consciousness is impossible unless it be a permanent order as contrasted with a succession of transient appearances iv. 14 The that-ness of a thing is due to a singleness of mutation. xli] without the Comment or the Ex])lanation iv. 15. Because, while the [physical] thing remains the same, the mind- stulfs are different, [therefore the two are upon] distinct levels-of-existence. iv. 16 And a thing is not dependent upon a single mind-stuff, [for then in certain cases] it could not be proved [by that mind-stuff ], [and] then what would it be? iv. 17 A thing is known or not known by virtue of its affecting [or not affecting] the mind-stuff, iv. 18 Uninter- mittently the Master of that [mind-stuff] knows the fluctuations of mind-stuff [and thus] the Self undergoes-no-mutations. iv. 19 It does not illumine itself, since it is an object-for-sight. iv. 20 And there cannot be a cognition of both [thinking-substance and thing] at the same time. iv. 21 If [one mind-stuff] were the object-for-sight for another, there would be an infinite regress from one thinking-substance to another thinking-substance as well as confusion of memory, iv. 22 The Intellect {citi) which unites not [with objects] is conscious of its own thinking-substance when [the mind-stuff] takes the form of that [thinking- substance by reflecting it], iv. 23 Mind-stuff affected by the Seer and by the object-for-sight [leads to the perception of] all intended-objects. Complete Self-realization of the Self iv. 24-34. All hindrances subside ; all acts of the Self are spontaneous and free ; absence of limitations which thwart one who wishes to attain the ultimate ideal of his own nature. iv. 24 This [mind-stuff], although diversified by countless subconscious- impressions, exists for the sake of another, because its nature is to produce [things as] combinations, iv. 25 For him who sees the distinction, pondering upon his own states-of-being ceases, iv. 26 Then the mind- stuff is borne down to discrimination, onward towards Isolation, iv. 27 In the intervals of this [mind-stuff] there are other presented-ideas [coming] from subliminal-impressions, iv. 28 The escape from these [subliminal- impressions] is described as being like [the escape from] the hindrances, iv. 29 For one who is not usurious even in respect of Elevation, there follows in every case as a result of discriminative discernment the concentration [called] Kain-cloud of [knoAvable] things, iv. 30 Then follows the cessation of the hindrances and of karma, iv. 31 Then, because of the endlessness of knowledge from which all obscuring defilements have passed away, what is yet to be known amounts to little, iv. 32 When as a result of this the aspects {guna) have fulfilled their purpose, they attain to the limit of the sequence of mutations, iv. 33 The positive correlate to the moment, recognized as such at the final limit of the mutation, is a sequence, iv. 34 Isolation is the inverse generation of the aspects, no longer provided with a purpose by the Self, or it is the Energy of Intellect grounded in itself. f [h.o.s. 17] BOOK FIRST CONCENTRATION 1 [h.o.s. 17 ] NOTICE TO THE READER Patanjali’s Mnemonic Rules or Yoga-sutras are divided into four books as follows : Book 1. Concentration or Samadhi, with 51 rules or sutras, — Book 2. Means of attainment or SMhana, with 55 sutras, — Book 3. Supernormal powers or Vibhuti, with 55 sutras, — Book 4. Isolation or Kaivalya, with 34 sutras, — pages 1 to 100 ; pages 101 to 200 ; pages 201 to 296 ; Images 297 to 348. In all, there are 195 rules. Their extreme brevity is apparent when they are printed continuously, as at the end of the Ananda>-'a 9 raraa edition, where the entire text of the rules occupies only between four and five pages. The Comment or Bhasya, usually after a brief introductory paragraph or phrase (called avatarana), takes up the rules, one by one, and gives first the text and then the meaning thereof. Vacaspatimi 9 ra’s Explanation is of course in the first instance an explanation of the Comment ; but since the Comment comprehends also the Rules, it is in fact an explanation of both Rules and Comment. In the body of this volume, the Explana- tion is not put all together by itself, but is made to keep pace with the Comment, rule by rule. Meaning of the Diflferenees of Type The translation of the Rules is set in pica type of full-faced Clarendon style ; The translation of the Comment is set in pica type of Roman style ; The translation of the Explanation is set in long primer type of Roman style. Single angles (like these < >) indicate that the words which they enclose are taken from the particular Rule or Yoga-sutra under discussion. Double angles (like these ») indicate that the words which they enclose are taken from the Comment or Yoga-bhasya. Double quotation marks (“ ”) indicate that the words which they enclose are taken from some authoritative text. Single quotation marks (‘ ’) indicate that the words which they enclose are the objections or questions of an opponent, or are a quotation from some unauthoritative text. A half-parenthesis on its side {'■>) is used between two vowels to show that they are printed in violation of the rules of euphonic combination. BOOK FIRST CONCENTRATION May he, who, having abandoned his primal form, exercises his power to show kindness to the world in many ways — he with the beautiful hood and many mouths, possessed of deadly poison and yet abolishing the mass of hindrances — he the source of all know- ledge, and whose girdle of attendant snakes produces continual pleasure, — may he, the divine Lord ^ of Serpents, protect you, with his white stainless body — he, the giver of concentration {yoga), and himself concentrated in concentration. 1. Now the exposition of yoga [is to be made]. The expression indicates that a distinct topic ^ commences here. The authoritative book which expounds yoga is to be understood as commenced. [To give a provisional definition :] yoga is concentration ; but this is a quality of the mind-stuff (citta) which belongs to all the stages. The stages of the mind-stuff are these : the restless {hsipta), the infatuated {mudha), the distracted {viksipta), the single-in-intent and the restricted {niruddha). Of these [stages the first two have nothing to do with yoga and even] in the distracted state of the mind [its] concentration is [at times] overpowered by [opposite] distractions and [consequently] it cannot properly be called yoga. But that [state] which, when the mind is single-in-intent, fully illumines a distinct and real object and causes the hindrances (klega) to dwindle, slackens the bonds of karma, and sets before it as a goal the restriction [of all ^ See Linga Purana, I., Ixiii. 22-37. * There are six kinds of sutras according to the Mimahsa : the definition (sarhjnd), the key to interpretation (paribhasd), the statement of a general rule (vidhi), the restrictive rule (niyawa), an original statement (adhikdra), an analogical application {atideca). The word atha may introduce a toi^ic {adhikarci'^ariJia), or give the purport {prastdva'^a?iha), or state the subject-matter of the dis- cussion (drambha'^ariha). This is dis- cussed in ^loka-varttika i. 1. 22-24. i. 1-] Book I. Coyicentration or Samadhi [4 fluctuations], is called the yoga in which there is consciousness of an object {samprajndta). This [conscious yoga], however, is accompanied by deliberation [upon coarse objects], by reflection [upon subtile objects], by joy, by the feeling-of-personality {asmitd). This we shall set forth later. But when there is restriction of all the fluctuations {vrtti) [of the mind-stuff], there is the con- centration in which there is no consciousness [of an object]. I prostrate myself before him who is the cause of the world’s origination, before Vrsaketu, who — although for him fruition and other results of karma proceeding from the hindrances have ceased — is yet kindly [to the world he has made]. Prostrating myself before Patanjali the sage, I proceed to set forth a brief, clear, and significant explanation of the Comment by Vedavyasa. For here the Exalted Patanjali — wishing to announce in brief the import of the book which he is about to begin that he may thus assist the procedure of men of understanding and that he may, more especially, make the hearer easily comprehend — composed this sutra : 1. Now the exposition of yoga [is to be made]. Of this [sutra] the first portion, the word , he [the author of the Comment] discusses in the phrase «The expression indicates that a distinct topic commences here.^ [The word is used] as in [the sutra] “ Now ^ this is the Jyotis ”. It does not imply that it is to be preceded [by condi- tions as in the first Brahma-sutra]. Now by the word he means the authoritative book in the sense that it is that whereby a thing is expounded. Moreover the book may enter upon its activity when preceded not only by calm“ and the other [five conditions required by the Brahma-sutra]; but it must be preceded also by [Patanjali’s] desire to announce [his] truth. [Calm], on the contrary, would follow when once there had been a desire to know and when the knowledge [had entered into action]. As it is written [BAU. iv. 4. 23 or 28], “ After that, calm and subdued and retired and resigned and concen- trated let him behold himself in the Self only.” Although it would be possible [for the book to enter into action] immediately after advantage had been taken of such things as students’ questions or performances of austerities or elixirs of life, [still these are] not mentioned. The reason for this is that these things would be of no use either to the student’s knowledge or to [his] feeling inclined {pravrtti) [for it]. [What then would be advantageous? The book’s authori- tativeness.] If the book be authoritative, then, even if there are no [questions or austerities or elixirs], the exposition of yoga is to be accepted ; but if not authoritative, then, even if [there be questions and all the other conditions, still] ‘ These words are from the Tandy a-Mahabr. soma. See Caland and Henry : L’Agni- xix. 11. 1 (Biblioth. Ind.). The jyotis stoma, I, p. 166. And compare (,!astra is a chant by the iidgatar in the Agni- Dipika (Benares edition), p. 230-®. stoma directly after the filtering of the See Vedanta Sara 4 and 14 and 17. 5] Conditions required for a beginning [ — i. l the book is to be rejected. Thus it is [by insisting upon the authorita- tiveness of the book] that [Patanjali] refuses to say that [the book may begin] immediately after his understanding the truth and his desire to announce. But if it be agreed that [the word indicates] that a distinct topic commences, then when once yoga has been mentioned as the topic of the book the student easily understands the announcement of the import of the book as a whole and is started into action. — Now every one knows from Qruti and Smrti and the Epics and the Puranas that concentration is the cause of final-bliss [and that yoga is authoritative]. Some one might ask, ‘ If the word indicates that a distinct topic commences in all those works to which it is attached, then, if this is so, would not such an announcement^ as, “Now therefore the inquiry into Brahma [is to be made] ” also be included ? ’ To prevent this mistake [the commentator] uses the word «here.» [Again], some one cites the Yogiyajna- valkyasmrti, “ Hiranyagarbha and no other of ancient days is he who gave utterance {vaMa) to yoga” and asks how it can be said that Patanjali gives utterance to the authoritative book on yoga. In reply the author of the sutra says signifies that here a dis- tinct topic commences, then the point of the statement is quite consistent. — Accordingly he says, ^The authoritative work which expounds yoga ... as com- menced». Here an objector interrupts, ‘ The topic which is commenced here is not the authoritative work, but yoga in so far as it is taught.’ In reply to which, he says «is to be understood. 2> True, we are beginning yoga in so far as it is taught. But the instrument which is to teach this [yoga] is the authori- tative work which deals with the same. Moreover the teacher’s activity has to do more immediately with the instrument than with the thing he works upon. Accordingly, with emphasis upon the activity of the author {kartf), we are to understand that the authoritative work which deals with yoga is commenced. But the topic commenced is that yoga only which is limited in its activity by an authoritative work. This is the real point. — And one must suppose that the hearing of the word , which means that a distinct topic has com- menced, suggests — like the sight of a water-jar^ carried [on a girl’s shoulder at early morning] — another meaning, [namely,] it serves as an auspicious beginning. — Doubt as to the actual thing [yoga] is occasioned by doubt as to the meaning of the word [yoga]. This [doubt] he removes by stating that [^yoga:^ in the phrase] «yoga is concentration)) is etymologically derived from the stem yuj-a [Dhatupatha iv. 68] in the sense of concentration and not from the stem yuj-i [vii. 7] in the sense of conjunction. Another objection is raised, ‘ The yoga which is to be described is a whole, and concentration is a part of it ; and a mere part is not the whole.’ The reply is ^ Brahma-sutra i. 1. 1. ^ This is in the list of auspicious objects to which one makes a circumambulation {pradaksina), Visnu-smrti Ixiii. 29. i. 1-] Book I. Concentration or Samcidhi [6 in the words ^But this.» The word ca has the sense of «but» and distin- guishes the whole from the part. — «Which belongs to all the stages^ refers to the stages or states which are to be described : Madhumatl [iii. 54], Madhu- pratika [iii. 48], Vi 9 oka [i. 36], Samskarafesa [iii. 9]. These belong to the mind-stuff. In all these [stages] is found that yoga the [more] special mark of which is the restriction of the mind-stuff. But concentration is a part [of this] and has not this as its special mark. And the words «yoga is concen- tration» are a statement for etymological purposes only, in so far as one is not dwelling upon the difference between the whole and the part. But [when he is referring to] the practical purpose of what he calls «yoga,» [he says] it is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff : this is the stricter sense of the term. To those [Vai 9 esikas] who hold the view that fluctuations are sensations inherent in the soul and that therefore the restriction of them would also involve the soul (dtman) in which they inhere, — to these in rebuttal he says, «a quality of the mind-stuff.» — The term (citta) he uses as a partial expression for the inner-organ ’ {antakJiarana), the thinking-substance {huddhi). The point is that the Absolutely-eternal Energy of Intellect [cUi-gakti), [since it is] immutable, cannot have sensations as its properties ; but the thinking-substance may have them. — An objector says, ‘ This may be so. But if yoga belongs to all its stage.s, — why then ! Sir, [since you concede that] the restless and the infatuated and the distracted states also are stages of mind-stuff, and [since] there would be among these states, reciprocally at least, also a restriction of fluctuations, — then would have to include these states also (tatrapi).’ In replying to this difficulty he makes clear which stages are to be included and which not included [in yoga] by the words beginning with i. The restless incessantly thrown by force of rajas upon this or that object is excessively unstable ; ii. the infatuated because of a preponderance of tanias is filled with the fluctuation of sleep ; iii. the distracted differs from the restless in that, although prevailingly unstable, it is occasionally stable, this prevailing instability being either natural or generated by diseases and languor and other obstacles later [i. 30] to be described ; iv. the single-in-intent is the focused ; v. the restricted mind-stuff is that in which all the fluctuations are restricted and in which nothing remains but subliminal-impressions [samskdra). In spite of the fact that certain fluctuations of the restless and the infatuated, [the first two] of these [five stages], are restricted each by the others, still, since these two are not even indirectly causes of final bliss and since they contend against it, they are so far removed from [the possibility of] being called yoga that he has not expressly denied that these two are yoga. But in the case of the distracted [state], since occasionally it has stability when directed towards a real object, he denies that it can be yoga in the words «Of these stages.» When the mind is distracted, the concentration which is the occasional stability of the mind-stuff Compare Qaiiikara Bhasya on ii. 1. 6 (Niiijayasagara edition, p. 711"). 7 ] [-i. 1 States of mind-stuff ft for Yoga when directed to a real object, cannot properly be called yoga. Why [cannot this be called yoga]? Because it has come under the adverse influence of distraction, which is the opposite of this [yoga]. When fallen into the hands {antargata) of a troop of opponents, it is hard for a thing to be even what it is and it is still harder for it to produce effects. Just as any one can see that a seed which has fallen into the fire and stayed there three or four moments has not power, even if sown, of sprouting : this is the real meaning. If then concentration which has come under the adverse influence of distraction be not yoga, what then is yoga ? To this he makes answer, By the word «real^ {bhuta) he excludes [any] imaginary [object]. Since sleep, a fluctuation of mind-stuff, is also single- in-intent with regard to tamas, — a real {bhuta) object, the peculiar (wa) [aspect of a substance'] upon which it [sleep] depends {dlambana), — so he says «distinct^ (sad) ; which means is clear {gobhana), in which the sattva [aspect] becomes evident in a very high degree. But that thing is not clear in which the tamas is in preponderance, inasmuch as it, [the tamas{\ is the cause of hindrances. Now the perception of a thing either by verbal communication [agamai] or by inference may, we grant, be luminous [dyotanam, bhavad api) ; still, in so far as it is mediately known, it does not destroy undifferentiated-consciousness {avidya) which we directly experience. For in such [illusions as the sight of] two moons or a defective sense of orientation, [verbal communications or inferences] do not destroy undifferentiated-consciousness. Accordingly he uses the word «fullyS> {pra), because it means luminous to the full extent [pra-lcarsam) and because it alludes to immediate perception [in the case of yoga]. The feeling- of-personality (asmita) and the other hindrances have their root in undifferen- tiated-consciousness {avidya). Furthermore, since knowledge [vidya) destroys undifferentiated-consciousness [avidya) ; and since, when knowledge emerges, the hindrances [arising] from undifferentiated-consciousness and so on are destroyed, inasmuch as they are contrary the one to the other, and inasmuch as [then] the cause [of the hindrances] would be destroyed ; therefore he says «and causes [the hindrances] to dwindle. This, then, is the reason why [yoga] slackens the bonds which consist of karma. — And in this passage by a figurative use of the cause for the effect he employs the word , whereas subtile-influences [apurva) are intended. — The word ^slackens» means brings [them] down from their operation. For later [ii. 13] he says, “ So long as the root exists, [there will be] fruition from it.” And finally it ^sets before it as a goal the restriction [of all fluctuations].» — Moreover since this [yoga] conscious of objects is four-fold, he employs the words [beginning] He describes [the yoga] not conscious of objects with the words ^aU the fluctuations.^ [In other words,] we know (Mia) that sources-of- valid-ideas and other fluctuations (pramanddivrtti) made of rajas and tamas are ' ‘Aspect of a substance’ is dharma (see iii. 13) or parindma. i. 1-] Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [8 restricted in [yoga] conscious [of objects] while fluctuations of sattva are retained ; but that in [yoga] not conscious [of an object] all fluctuations whatsoever are restricted. Therefore [the final result] is established (siddham) that ^belonging to all stages^ means occurring in all these [four] stages, Madhumatl and so on, which [four] are [all] included in these two stages [of the conscious and the unconscious yoga]. The intent of the following sutra is to state the distinguishing characteristic of this [yoga]. 2. Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuflf. By the non-use of the word ‘ all ’ [before : in substances- as-effects (vi(;esa) and substances-as-causes (avi(}esa) and in the Unga and the lihgin [see ii. 19] and the Self. Still it has not the capacity for merit and [rightful] supremacy since it lacks activity. With regard to this he says ^pervaded by rajas only.)^ In other words when rajas is the active agent, merit and the rest do persist. Accordingly for the two middle classes of yogins,‘ the ' See below, hi. 51, and cf. Kern’s ‘ Lotus ’, SEE. xxi. 387. 11 ] Functions of the mind- stuff [ — i. 2 MadhubhOmika and the Prajhajyotis who have attained to concentration con- scious [of an object], the substance {sattva) of the mind-stuff is included. — He now describes the state of the mind-stuff of the fourth class of contemplators, the AtikrantabhavanTya, with the words «the same.» Since the stain of the last vestige of rajas is removed, the mind-stuff is grounded in itself. Now the gold of the substance {sattva) of the thinking-substance (jbuddhi), — when once the stain of the rajas and tamas is purified by the joining [of the upper and lower parts] of the crucible {puta-pdJca), which are practice and passionlessness, and when it has withdrawn [see ii. 54] the organs which are concerned with objects- of-sense, and is grounded in itself, — has still a further function to perform {para karya), namely, the discriminative discernment [referring to the sattva and the Self], which performs its function in so far as its task {adhikara) is un- finished. With this in mind he says ^the mind-stufif.» The mind-stuff which is nothing else than the discriminative discernment referring to the sattva and the Self tends towards the Contemplation [called] the Rain-cloud of [knowable] Things. The Rain-cloud of [knowable] Things will also be described [iv. 29]. He tells what is perfectly clear to yogins with regard to this [state] in the words, <5Cthis ... is the highest.^ The mind-stuff which is nothing else than the discernment of the difference between the sattva and the Self and which lasts until the Rain-cloud of [knowable] Things, is designated by contemplators as the highest Elevation. And if one does not wish to make the distinction between the substance and its property, [this Elevation] may be regarded as having the same office as the mind-stuff [:the mind-stuff itself is the Eleva- tion.] — In order to introduce the Concentration of Restriction as the ground for rejecting the discernment of the difference and as the ground for accepting the Energy of Intellect, he shows the excellence of the Energy of Intellect and the inferior value of the discriminative insight by the phrase «the Energy of Intellect» and the following words. — Impurity has as its essence pleasure and pain and infatuation. For even pleasure and infatuation give pain to the man of discrimination [ii. 15] ; therefore, like pain, they too are to be escaped. Moreover exceptional beauty also comes to an end and so gives pain. Accord- ingly, that too the man of discrimination can only reject. Since this same impurity and this coming to an end do not occur in the Energy of Intellect [which is] the Self, it is said to be ^undefiled and unending.3> An objection is made, ‘ How can this {iyam) [Energy of Intellect] be free from defilement, if, in being aware of things which have as their essence pleasure and pain and infatua- tion, it assumes their form ? and how can it be unending if it accepts and rejects their forms ?’ In reply it is said «it has objects shown to it.^ It [the Energy of Intellect] is that to which the various objects are shown. That [objection] would be sound, if, like the thinking-substance {buddhi), the Energy of Intellect assumed the form of objects ; but it is the thinking-substance only which, because it undergoes mutations {parinatd sail) in the form of the objects, shows the object to the Energy of Intellect, which [latter however] does not take their Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [12 1 . 2 — form. And when this happens, the Self is then said to become aware [of the objects]. The objector asks, ‘How can the Energy of Intellect unless it strike upon the thinking-substance which has taken the form of some object, know [that] object ? or, if it do strike upon [that] object, how is it that it does not undergo a change into the form of that [object] ? ’ To this he replies ^does not unite [with objects].S> Union is contagion ; not any of this is in Intellect : this is his meaning. If any one asks why there is no [union] of this [Intellect with objects], the reply is, it For this same [seedless concentration], he indicates the proper technical term which is current among yogins when he says «In this state nothing.2> He sums up with the words «the yoga [which we have defined as] the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind-stuff is two-fold.^ The mind being in this [unconscious] state, what will then be the condition of the Self? For it is the essence {dtmari) [of the Self to receive] knowledge {bodlia) [reflected upon it] by the thinking-substance (huddhi), [as this in its turn receives the impression of external objects, and in this case] there is a [total] absence of objects [in the thinking-substance]. 13] [— i. 3 Consummation of Yoga 3. Then the Seer [that is, the Self,] abides in himself. At that time the Energy of Intellect is grounded in its own self, as [it is] when in the state of Isolation. But when the mind-stuff is in its emergent state, [the Energy of Intellect], although really the same, [does] not [seem] so. To introduce now the next sutra, he raises the question beginning «The mind being in this [unconscious] state . . .» The question has the force of an objection; ‘ Now this Self, whose essence is [that it receives] the knowledge {bodlia) [reflected upon it] by the thinking-substance which is mutated into the form of one [object] after another, is always undergoing an experience, [but there is] no [experience] when [the Self] is deprived of the knowledge from the thinking-substance. For the very nature of this Self is the know- ledge (bodha) thrown upon the thinking-substance precisely as shining is [the nature] of the sun. Moreover this [knowledge of the thinking-substance] does not occur in that kind of mind which consists of subliminal-impressions (samsMra) only. And further a thing cannot exist without its own nature. If this is so, then why does not the Self know that thinking-substance also which consists of subliminal-impressions only?’ To this he replies «there is a [total] absence of objects.)5> The thinking-substance as such {buddlii^atra) is not the object of the Self, but (api tu) only in so far as it fulfils the purposes of the Self [iv. 32]. Now the two purposes of the Self are discriminative insight and the enjoyment of objects ; and these do not exist in the restricted state [of the mind-stuff]. Thus the [total] absence of objects is established. The rebuttal is [also] given in the sutra : 3. Then the Seer [that is, the Self ] abides in himself. The words mean that the peaceful and the cruel and the infatuated nature falsely attributed [to the Self] has ceased. For the Self’s Intelligence {caitanya) is himself [svarupa], [and is] not conditioned ; while the knowledge of the thinking-substance has the various forms peaceful and other. And so it is subject to conditions just as the crystal which is in its own nature absolutely transparently white [is subject to conditions] : the redness of the [crystal] is its condition of being near the China-rose. And when a condition ceases, there is no cessation of the thing conditioned ; since this would prove too much. This is the real point. And although [the Seer] in himself [svarupatah) cannot [actually] be divided,* still when-he [the author of the Comment] -supposes-a-predicate-relation {vikdlpya) [between the drastr and his svarupa], the words {svarupe) are put in the locative case. This same meaning is made clear by the author of the Comment when he says «grounded in its own self.» <^CAt that time» means in the state of restriction [and] not in the state of emergence. [The objection is made,] ‘ This may be true. But if while in the state of emergence the Energy of Intellect is not * Literally, although the essential-attribute (sraritpa) cannot be divided [from the Self]. i. 3 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samcldhi [14 grounded in itself and while in the state of restriction is grounded [in itself], then it would enter into mutation; or else if in [the state of] emergence it [remains] grounded in itself, [then there would be] no difference between emergence and restriction.’ In reply to this he says «But when the mind-stuff is in its emergent state.S> Never does the Energy of Intellect, [in that it is] absolutely eternal, deviate from itself. Accordingly, as [it is] in restriction, just so [is it] in emergence also. Assuredly, mother-of-pearl as such [svampa) does not suffer increase or decrease of being, no matter whether the perception (jhana) which refers to it [gocara) be the source of a valid idea {pramana) or [the source of] a misconception. The observer however, although the thing is really the same, is under the illusion that it is not so {atathatvena). Compared with the concentration of restriction, even [the concentration that is] conscious [of an object] is nothing more than emergence. How in that case [is it that the Energy of Intellect does not seem the same in the emergent state] ? [The answer is,] Since objects' are shown to it. 4. At other times it [the Self] takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stufi*]. In the emergent state [of the subliminal-impressions], the Self has fluctuations which are not distinguished from fluctuations of the mind-stuff ; and so we have a sutra [of Pancacikha^], “ There is only one appearance [for both], — that appearance is knowledge.” The mind-stuff is like a magnet ; and, as an object suitable to be seen [by the Self as Witness], it gives its aid [to the Self] by the mere fact of being near it, and thus the relation between it and the Self is that between property (svam) and proprietor [svdmiri). Hence the reason why the Self experiences (bodha) the fluctuations of the mind-stuff is its beginning-less correlation [with the thinking-sub- stance]. To introduce the next sutra, he inquires «IIow in that case ?» If [the Energy of Intellect], though really the same, [does] not [seem to be] so, in what kind of a way in that case does it assume an appearance ? such is the meaning. He supplies the words «Since objects are shown to it» which give the reason, and [then] rehearses the sutra. 4. At other times it takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stufif]. Compare Vi.mu Pur. i. 14. 35. ’ See Garbe : Paiicafikha und seine Frag- mente in Feslgruss an Roth, Stuttgart, 1893, p. 75. 15] The Self correlated ivith its thinking-substance [ — i. 4 state ;» are the tranquil and the cruel and the infatuated ; «not distinguished» means not different. These [three] ai-e those [fluctuations] which the Self has. — in these words the word ‘ same ’ is synonymous with ‘ one What he means to say is this : when, by reason of nearness to each other, the difference between [the colour] of the China-rose and of the crystal [vase], or analogously, between the thinking-substance and the Self, does not come to consciousness {a-hheda- graJie), then the individual by wrongly attributing the fluctuations of the thinking-substance to the Self, recognizes [wrongly] that he is tranquil or pained or infatuated. Likewise, wrongly supposing that his face when reflected upon the dirty surface of a mirror is itself dirty, [the individual] bemoans himself at the thought that he is dirty. Although^ the fluctuation of the thinking-substance, like the perception of sounds or other [perceptible] things, is also wrongly attributed to the Self, and although in so far as it is primary- substance it should be experienced as being unintelligent, nevertheless by transferring the quality of the Self to the thinking-substance, [the fluctuation of the thinking-substance] appears as if it were a fluctuation of the Self, as if it were an experience [of the Self]. And so although the Soul [atman) has no misconceptions, it seems to have misconceptions ; although not an ex- periencer, it seems to be an experiencer ; although it lacks the discriminative discernment, it seems to be provided with it, [and] it shines forth by the discriminative discernment.^ And this will be set forth in detail in this [sutra] [iv. 22], “The intellect (citi) which unites not [with objects] is conscious of its own thinking-substance when [the mind-stutf] takes its form [by reflecting it] ; ” and in this [iii. 35], “ Experience is undistinguished from a presented- idea on the part of the sa^tea-aspect and of the Self, each absolutely uncom- mingled [in the presented idea].” And this has been established in another system also [the Saihkhya]. Accordingly with the words 4Cand so» he intro- duces {aM) the sutra of Pancafikha the acarya, “ There is only one appearance [for both], — that appearance is knowledge.” The question is raised, ‘ How is there one appearance ? considering that you say that the fluctuation of the thinking-substance — occupied on the one hand with the different kinds of things, and occupied on the other hand with insight, and perceptible as being unintelligent in so far as it is primary-substance — is appearance ; and [considering that you at the same time say that] the Self’s intelligence [caitanya), which is different from this and which is the perception, is [also] appearance.’ * Literally : Although yet another Self- wrong-attribution possesses a fluctua- tion of the thinking-substance like the perception of sounds and so on, and although . . . “ Reading iva vivekakhyatyd. Or : it seems to be provided with it up to discrimi- native discernment \that is, so long as there is no discriminative discernment : reading iva a vivekakhyatyah]. Or : it seems to be provided with it during the time of non-discriminative discern- ment [reading iva a-vivekakhydtydm]. i.4-] Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [16 To this he reiDlies [in the words of Panca^ikha] «that appearance is know- ledge.)^ When he says «only oneS>, he says it with reference to ordinary (IduJcika) knowledge, [which is] a fluctuation subject to origination and dissolu- tion.' But knowledge (kliydti) is not intelligence {cditanya), [which latter is] the very nature of the Self. On the contrary that [i.e. intelligence] is concerned not with an ordinary perception {tohapratyaksa), but rather with verbal-com- munication and inference. Consequently after [the author of the Comment] has shown that undifferentiated-consciousness {avidyd) is the original cause [of making wrong attributions] in the emergent state, he suggests that this [consciousness] is the cause of the contact [of the Self with the thinking- substance], and also that the relation between property and proprietor is the cause of experience. He makes this [series of assertions] consistent by saying «the mind-stuff’.» Mind-stuff is the property of its proprietor, the Self: this is the connexion [of the statements]. The objection is made that that-by- which-one-is-intelligent (cetana), [namel}’^,] the agent that is Master of the mind-stuff, accepts aid {upakdra) afforded by the mind-stuff, whereas it is impossible that he [the Master of the mind-stuff should accept] aid afforded by this [mind-stuff]. The reason for this is that there is no correlation [of the Self] with this [mind-stuff], since [the Self] cannot be aided [by it]. But on the other hand [ca) if it be the case {-tve) that there is a connexion with this [mind-stuff] or that aid is accepted from it, one would have to admit that [the Self] enters into mutation. In reply to this objection he says «like a magnet ; and, as an object suitable to be seen [by the Self as Witness], it gives its aid [to the Self] by the mere fact of being near it.» The mind-stuff is not in connexion with the Self, but is near it. [This] nearness, moreover, does not result from a correlation either spatially or temporally of the Self with it [the mind-stuff]. But the distinguishing characteristic [of this nearness] is [that the Self stands to the mind-stuff in a relation of] pre- established harmony {yoyyatd). Moreover the Self has the capacity for being the experiencer [while] the mind-stuff has the capacity for being experienced. Accordingly [mind-stuff] is described «as an object suitable to be seen.» In other words it is described as an object-for-experience when it enters into mutations which have the forms of various kinds of things ((;abdddi). Although experience is a fluctuation in the form of sounds and of other [perceptible] things and is an external aspect (dharma : see iii. 13) of the mind-stuff, still it [experience] belongs to the Self, because the Self [that is, because they result fi’om the false supposition of an identity between mind-stuff and intelligence (cditanya) : this is what is ' The original, udaya-vyaya-dharmini, may be a reminiscence of one of the most famous of all Buddhist gathas, anicca vata sankhdrd uppdda-vaya-dhammino, Digha-nikaya, ii. 157, ed. PTS. But Vacaspati seems to understand it more pregnantly here as ‘subject to rising into and passing out of conscious- ness ’. 17 ] [— i. 5 Five hinds of fluctuations meant. Therefore although there is no correlation with the mind-stuff, still it is established that the Self accepts aid afforded by it, and that it does not enter into mutation. A question is raised, ‘The relation of property and proprietor is [we grant] the reason for experience and is subject to the condi- tions of undifferentiated-consciousness. But subject to what conditions is undifferentiated-consciousness ? Not subject to conditions (as everybody admits) no effect is produced. As they say, “ Is there any commencement of un- diflferentiated-consciousness for him [that is, man] as in the case of sleep and so on?”’ While apparently summing up, he [in fact] removes this doubt with the words [means] among [them]. That they occur there means that they are in themselves quite unhindered although they occur in the stream of the hindered. Surely a Brahman, although he reside at ([Jalagrama which is crowded with hundreds of Kiratas, is not [on that account] a Kirata. This is an example of what is meant by [occurring] in the midst of the xmhindered. And in so far as they are found among the hindered, the unhindered, without being suppressed by the hindered, do after all, as gradually their own subliminal- impressions come to fruition, suppress the hindered. •^Corresponding» means that unhindered subliminal-impressions [are produced] by unhindered fluctua- tions. This is that wheel of fluctuations and subliminal-impressions which ceaselessly rolls on until the concentration of restriction [is attained]. Operating in this wise, the mind-stuflf reaches the state of restriction and, coming [then] to consist of nothing but subliminal-impressions, abides in its own likeness {dtmakalpena) : this is the superficial view. Or else — and this is the stricter view — it becomes resolved into primary substance. — He joins together the meaning of sutras [5 and 6] by the word «These.^ — The word «five-fold» [literally, five times] is an expression of the sense merely ; but it is not a literal rendering of the force {vrtti) of the termination (fa&da), because it is not taught [by Panini, at v. 2. 42] that the termination taya {tayap) has the meaning of ‘ kinds ’. 6. Sources-of-valid-ideas and misconceptions and predicate- relations and sleep and memory. These [five] he announces by their technical names. 6. Sources-of-valid-ideas and misconceptions and predicate-relations and sleep and memory. [The compound] is analysed according to the order of words in the enumeration [of the sutra]. The compound is a copulative {cdrthe dvamdvah, Panini ii. 2. 29) in i. 6 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [20 the sense of mutual conjunction. — Just as once more in the statement [ii. 5], “ The recognition of the permanent, of the pure, of pleasure, and of a self in what is impermanent, impure, pain, and non-self, — is undifferentiated-conscious- ness,” such illusions as the loss of the sense of orientation or as the fire-brand [whirled about so as to be seen as a] circle, are not expressly excluded, — so here also, even in the mentioning of the sources-of-valid-ideas and the rest, since doubt as to the real existence of other fluctuations would not [otherwise] be excluded, in order to exclude them [these others], the words ‘ of five kinds ’ should be added. Thus it becomes clear that fluctuations are just so many and no more. 7. Sources-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and verbal-communication, i. Perception is that source-of- valid- ideas [which arises as a modification of the inner-organ] when the mind-stuff has been affected by some external thing through the channel of the sense-organs. This fluctuation is directly related to that [object], but, whereas the intended-object (artha) consists of a genus ^ and of a particular, it [the fluctuation] is chiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the particular [the genus being subordi- nate in perception to the particular]. The result [of perception] is an illumination by the Self {'pduruseya) of a fluctuation which belongs to the mind-stuff, [an illumination which is] undistinguished {a-viyista), [that is, one in which the Self does not distinguish itself from the thinking-substance], [as] we shall explain in detail hereafter [ii, 17] in the passage ^ beginning “ Self is conscious-by- reflection of the thinking-substance.” ii. Inference is [that] fluctuation [of the mind-stuff] which refers {-visayd) to that (tat-) relation {samhandha) which is present in things belonging to the same class as the subject- of-the-illation {anumeya) and absent from things belonging to classes different [from that of the subject-of-the-illation] ; and it is chiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the genus. Thus, for instance, the moon and stars possess motion, because, like [any man, for instance,] Chaitra, they get from one place to another ; and because [negatively] the Vindhya [mountain-range] does not get [from one place to another, it] does not possess motion, iii. A thing which has been seen or inferred by a trustworthy person is men- ' Compare ii. 14, p. 214^ ; iii. 44, p. 257^ (Calc. ed.). ^ Compare also i. 29; ii. 20; iv. 19. 21 ] [— i. 7 Sources of valid ideas tioned by word in order that his knowledge [thereof] may pass over to some other person. The fluctuation [in the mind-stuff] of the hearer which arises from that word and which relates to the ohject- intended by that [word] (tad-artha-visaya) is a verbal-communica- tion. That verbal-communication is said to waver, the utterer of which declares an incredible thing, not a thing which he himself has seen or inferred ; but if the original utterer has himself seen or inferred the thing, [then the verbal-communication] would be un- wavering. Among these [five], [of one, that is,] the fluctuation which is the source-of-valid- ideas, he gives {aha) [what may pass as the naturally expected] general dis- tinguishing characteristic {tahsana), by analysing [that one into three and saying] : 7. The sources-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and verbal-communication. A valid-idea (prama) is an illumination of a thing ^ not already presented and is caused by the operation of the Self. The instrument for this is the source-of-the-valid-idea {pramana). And the mention [of the sources-of- valid-ideas] analytically [is] for the purpose of definitely excluding either a less or a greater number. i. Of these [three] he gives first the distinguishing-characteristic of percep- tion, since it is the root of all the [other] sources-of-valid-ideas, in the words beginning ^of the sense-organs. » By using the words The word ca [after the word Vindhya] carries with it a reason. — Because the Vindhya [range] has no motion, therefore it does not get [from one place to another]. Hence, as there is an absence of motion ® {gati-nivrttau), there is an absence of getting [from one place to another]. [And conversely,] because they do get from one place to another, the moon and stars, like Chaitra, do have motion. Thus [the point] is established, iii. Of the fluctuation which is a verbal-communication he gives the distinguish- ing characteristic in the words [to some other person] means that in the mind-stuff of the hearer there arises [into consciousness] knowledge similar to knowledge found in the mind-stuff of the trustworthy person. To effect this [passing], ^a thing is mentioned» [that is,] is made known, as a means to obtain what is good for the hearer and to avoid what is bad [for him]. The rest is easy. The verbal-communication indicates the thing to be characterized ; the words and so on [give] the distinguishing characteristic. A form which appears [in conscious- ness] as an idea {jndna) is un-based on that form, [or, to put it as does the sUtra,] . As, [to give another example in which the negation applies to the action* and not to the object,] ‘ One who eats not the funeral-feast.’ Accordingly doubt also would be included [in the definition of misconception]. But there is a distinction to this extent : in this case [the case of doubt] the failure to be based [on the true form] is overridden by a [clear] perception {jndna ) ; but [in the other case], such as [the vision] of two moons, [the misconception is over- * Compare Visnu Pur. i. 5. 5. 7-upa. Compare PataSjali : Maha- * A case of prasajya-pratisedha. The nega- bhasya, Kielhorn’s edition, i, p. 215, tion applies to pratisthd and not to last line; 221“; 319*-; 34P. 25] [-i.8 Nature of misconception ridden] by the perception of the inhibition [of the one idea by the other idea]. An objector says, ‘ If this be granted, the predicate-relation [vikalpa), in that it is not based on the true form, would also upon consideration prove to be a mis- conception.’ In reply to this he says «an erroneous perception.» For these words describe an inhibition familiar in common experience to everybody.^ Now this [inhibition] occurs in misconception ; but not in the predicate-relation, for- asmuch as the business-of-life [is done] by this [predicate-relation], and because, on the other hand, only the learned kind of persons when they might be engaged in reflection would have in this matter any idea of an inhibition. — [The author of the Comment] puts forward the objection ^Why is it not a source-of-a-valid- idea ? » The point is that a previous [perception] should not be inhibited by a later [perception] which has incurred contradiction ; on the contrary’' the later [perception should be inhibited] by just that previous [perception] which occurred first and has not incurred contradiction. He gives the rebuttal in the words For this rule [of the Mimahsa] applies (evam) when a later [perception] arises in dependence upon a previous. But in this present case two perceptions, each from its particular cause, in entire inde- pendence of each other, spring up. Accordingly the later [perception] does not attain to a rise [into consciousness] unless it has destroyed the earlier [perception] ; and in fact its rise [into consciousness] has its being in the removal of that [previous perception] by inhibition. But it is not true that the rise [into con- sciousness] of a previous [perception] has its being in an inhibition of the later, for the reason that, at that time [the time of the earlier perception], this [later per- ception] does not yet exist. Hence the fact that [one perception] has not incurred contradiction is the reason why [another perception] is to be inhibited ; and [hence also] the fact that [a pei’ception] has incurred contradiction [is the reason] why it should act as inhibitor. Consequently it is established that the source-of-a- valid- idea, because its object is a positive fact, can inhibit the source-of-an-invalid-idea. An example is given in the words What subject {vi^esya) is in the attributive-relation (vyapadi^yate), that is, is defined (vigesyate) by what [other] thing ? For when there is identity, there is no rela- tion of subject and predicate. Because [for instance] a cow cannot be defined as a cow ; but by something different [from herself], by Chaitra. To this he replies by the phrase Surely it cannot be urged in a Samkhya system that there is a certain quality in perceptible-objects called non-existence and that the Self could be defined by this. — Sometimes there is found a reading ‘ Qualities of a perceptible thing are negated ’. The meaning of this would be that negated [qualities] are those concomitant with negation ; qualities of [perceptible] objects cannot be concomitant with this [negation], because [in them] there cannot be a connexion between an existent and a non-existent. While on the other hand in this way [by the predicate-relation] there is distinct-knowledge. — In the words «The arrow is coming to a standstill)^ he gives an example from everyday life. Now just as when we say ‘ he cooks ’ or ‘ he chops ’, we mean that the accumu- lated moments of an action in serial order and characterized by a unity in the result are distinctly known, so it is also quite as truly a serial order to which he refers when he says «comes to a standstill.» When he says ^wili come to a standstill, has come to a standstill,2> — then some objector may say, ‘If we grant [that the action of coming to a standstill is] like that of cooking, then the arrow could have as its attribute an action, namely, stopping still, ^ which is in a serial order and is over-and-above {hhinna) the arrow itself.’ To this he replies, [that stopping still is not a series of actions, but that] «The bare meaning’* of the verbal-root is understood to be ‘not to move’.» To begin with {tavat), not-to-move is a mental-structure {Jcalpita) ; then too (api) the exis- tence-in-positive-form [hliavanipatva] of this [non-moving (reading tasya api)~\ [is a mental-structure] ; [and] then too a serial order in this [existence-in-positive- form] [is again a mental-structure] — if that’s what you mean {iti), whew! what a string of mental-structures ! — such is the intention [of the Comment.] — [On the other hand,] a non-existent is conceived [gamyate) as in relation with all the Selves, [although not with perceptible-objects,] not only (ca) as if it were an existent, but also {ca) as if it were inherent (anugafa) — [provided it be] a mental- structure.® But a [non-existent is] not any kind of a property [existentially] distinct from the Self. By way of another illustration, he says, «So too .... * The words sthasgafi, sthita and so forth explain the succession inqfiied in the word tisthati. ® Compare Patafijali ; Mahabhasya on Pa- nini i. .8. 2, vart. 11 (Kielhorn i. 258'*^). ® The Self (pnrusa) can he defined in terms of assertion, but no less also in terms of negation, and both may be equally inherent in the concept of the Self, as when we say ‘Not coming into exis- tence is a property of the Self’, or ‘ The Self is un-changing ’. 29 ] Nature of sleep — l. 10 the property that it does not come into existence.S> — Many thinkers [of the Mimahsa and Nyaya schools] have advanced the assertion that there is no fluctuation [called] predicate-relation other than the source-of-valid-ideas or the misconception. To enlighten them, is, as we may suppose, the purpose of this abundance of illustration. 10. Sleep is a fluctuation [of mind-stuff] supported by the cause {pratyaya, that is tamas) of the [transient] negation [of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations].^ And this [fluctuation] by [the operation of] connecting-memory becomes, upon awakening, a special kind of presented-idea {pratyaya). How is it that one can reflect : ‘ I have slept well, my mind is calm, it makes my understanding clear ; I have slept poorly, my mind is dull, it wanders unsteadfast ; I have slept in deep stupor, my limbs are heavy, my mind remains unrefreshed [Manta) and languid and as it were stolen [from my grasp] ? ’ [The answer is : ] the man [just after] awakening would of course not have this connecting-memory, had there not been [during sleep, some] experi- ence of [this form] of a cause [pratyaya, that is tamas) ; nor would he have the memories based upon it and corresponding with it [at the time of waking]. Therefore sleep is a particular kind of pre- sented-idea [pratyaya) ; and in concentration it also, like any other presented-idea, must be restricted. 10. Sleep is a fluctuation [of mind-stufi] supported by the cause of the [transient] negation [of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations].^ For, the word ‘ fluctuation ’ given-in-the-topical [sutra i. 5] is made-the-subject-of- an-assertion [here]. Because, with regard to sources-of- valid -ideas and misconcep- tions and predicate-relations and memories being fluctuations, there is no disagree- ment among investigators, — therefore this word is-made-the-subject-of-an-assertion [anudyate] [namely, that one of the fluctuations is sleep,] in order that this particular [fluctuation] may be mentioned. But as to whether sleep is a fluctua- tion or not, there is disagreement among investigators. Accordingly it must be expressly said that it is a fluctuation. And the fact that the matter-in-hand [namely, that one of the fluctuations is sleep] is made-the-subject^-of-an-assertion cannot serve as an express statement [to the effect that sleep is a fluctuation]. ^ The point here is that sleep is a positive experience and not, as some Vedantins, Udayana, for instance, would teach, the absence of a fluctuation. It is there- fore of sufficient importance to require an explicit assertion. ^ Compare Jacobi : Anandavardhana’s Dhvanyaloka, p. 23, note 1. i. 10—] Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [30 Consequently the word fluctuation is used [here] again. That fluctuation is called sleep the object or support of which is a cause [praiyaya), that is, a cause {karana), — the tamas which covers over the substance {sativa) of the thinking- substance, — of the [transient] negation of the fluctuations of waking or of dreams. For the substance of the thinking-substance has three aspects ; and when tamas, the coverer of all the organs, preponderates over sattva and rajas and becomes manifest (ai'is), then, because there is no mutation of the thinking- substance into the form of an object, the Self, aware of a thinking-substance which consists of intensified tamas, is in deep sleep and inwardly conscious. Thus it is explained. [An objection :] whj^ not consider sleep to be merely an absence of fluctuations, as in the case of restricted isolation {Mivalya)? He answers «This.» And this [fluctuation] by [the operation of] connecting-memory, that is, a remem- brance which can be made the basis of an argument [sopapattika), is a special kind of presented-idea. How [is the argument ? He replies] : When clarifies it, in other words. But when tamas is manifest in company with rajas, then the connecting- memory is of such a kind that he reflects (aha) «I have slept poorly,3> in other words, my mind is dull and unfit for work. Why? Since it wanders unstead- fast. [The author of the Comment] describes the connecting-memory, of a man [just] awakened, with reference to a sleep in which tamas, preponderating altogether over rajas and sattva, comes-quite-to-the-fore (samullase), in the words «I have slept in deep stupor, my limbs are heavy, my mind remains unrefreshed and languid and as it were stolen [from my grasp]. ^ — In the words ^ ... of course not have this . . he gives a negative instance of the middle- term (hetu), [that is, experience,] in order to show that the major-term (sadhya) [that is, memories] does not exist. «Awakening» means just after awakening. «[Had there not been during sleep, some] experience of [this form] of a caused means [had there not been] an experience of the cause of the [transient] negation of the fluctuation. «Based upon it» is said with reference to the time of waking. An objection is made that sources-of-valid-ideas and other fluctuations have their locus in the emergent mind-stuff and must be restricted because they are enemies to concentration ; but that sleep, since it amounts to a fluctuation single-in- intent, is in no wise a foe to concentration. To this he replies with the words «And in concentration.» Sleep, to be sure, does amount to [a fluctuation] single- in-intent ; but, because of its quality of tamas, it is a foe to concentration-with- seed and to seedless-[concentration], [that is, concentration without subliminal- impressions]. And therefore it also must be restricted : this is the meaning. 31] Nature of Memory [ — i. n 11. Memory {smrti) is not-adding-surreptitiously [asampra- mosa) to a once experienced object. Does the mind-stuff remember the presented-idea or does it [remember] the object ? The presented-idea, if affected by the object-known [grahya), shines-forth-in-consciousness {nirhhasa) in a form ^ of both kinds, both of the object-known and of the process- of-knowing [grahana), and gives a start to the corresponding subliminal-impression. This subliminal-impression [of these two kinds changes into] its phenomenal [form ^] by the operation of the conditions-which-phenomenalize {vyanjaha) it {sva) [that is to say, the subliminal-impression], and brings forth [in its turn] a memory which [also] consists of the object known and of the process-of-knowing. With regard to these two {tatra), — in the case of the idea (buddhi), the form of the process-of-knowing is predomi- nant ; and in the case of memory, the form of the object-known is predominant. The latter [that is, memory] is of two kinds, in that the-things-to-be-remembered are imagined (bhdvita) or not imagined. In a dream the-things-to-be-remembered are imagined, whereas in waking the-things-to-be-remembered are not imagined. AU memories arise out of an experience either of sources-of-valid- * The object as such is not directly per- ceived, but only its form (dkcira) as reproduced in the thinking-substance (buddhi-sattva), which in its turn reflects the image cast upon it by the Self. ^ Literally, “ possessing a manifestation of the manifester of itself.” (1) The word sva denotes some mutation or time- form or intensity [iii. 13] yet to he phenomenalized. Anger or fear would serve as an example. (2) The word vyanjaka denotes the conditions which transform the unphenomenalized-form into a phenomenon. The approach of the tiger would be a concrete example. (3) The word anjana, that is praka^ana or dvirbhdvaka, is the presented-idea of the tiger. The discussion is not with regard to things in themselves, but to their phenomenal forms. A phenome- nalized-form (vyakti) is in Vacaspati- mi 9 iu’s terminology equivalent to a fluctuation (vrtti). And this pheno- menalized-form is further conceived to be any change in a substance (dharmin) which realizes some purpose (arthakriydkdntva). When we so regard a substance that we see it doing any- thing which interests us, we call it a thing, in other words, a mutation {yarindma) or a phenomenalized-form {vyakti). Consequently things do not arise and pass out of existence, as Buddhists would contend ; hut our conscious experience temporarily iso- lates successive phenomenal aspects of permanent substances. In fine, all phenomena are latent or implicit in the substance and become fluctuating or explicit under certain determined conditions. i. 11 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [32 ideas or of misconceptions or of predicate-relations or of sleep or of memory. And all these fluctuations have as their being pleasure and pain and infatuation ; and pleasure and pain and infatuation are to be explained among the hindrances [ii. 3-9] ; “ Desire is that which dwells upon pleasure ” [ii. 7] ; “ Aversion is that which dwells upon pain ” [ii. 8] ; while undifferentiated-consciousness is the same as infatuation. All these fluctuations must be restricted. Because it is [only] upon their restriction that there ensues concentration whether conscious or not conscious [of objects].^ 11. Memory {smrti) is not-adding-surreptitiously {asampramosa) to a once experienced object. This not-adding-surreptitiously-to, which is the same as not stealing for, an object once experienced by means of sources-of-valid-ideas and other fluctuations is memory. For in the case of knowledge produced by nothing but a subliminal- impression, the object which appeared in that experience which was the cause of the subliminal-impression, is the own peculiar [object of that knowledge]. But the appropriation of any object in addition to that [own peculiar object] is a surreptitious addition, that is, a stealing [from other experiences]. Why [is there any stealing at all] ? Because there is similarity [betw'een the subliminal- impression and other experiences]. — Since this word ^surreptitious adding» {sam- pra-mom) is etymologically derived ^ from the root mus ‘ to steal ’. What he means to say is this : all sources-of-valid-ideas and other fluctuations give access (aclhi-gam), either by the generic or the special form, to a hitherto inaccessible object. But memory does not go beyond the limits of a previous experience. It corresponds wuth that [previous experience] or corresponds w'ith less than that, but it does not correspond to [any experience] in addition to that. This fact distinguishes memoi’y from other fluctuations.— He puts forth for discussion the problem «Does [the mind-stuff remember] the presented idea ?» Because experience {anuhhava) directs itself towards the object-known, [therefore] the subliminal-impression resulting from it (taj-ja), [that is, from experience,] since it has no [present] experience of its own, makes us remember only the object- knowm : this is one view of the case. [Another view is that the subliminal- impression makes us remember] only the experience [of knowing], for the reason that [subliminal-impressions] are derived solely from experience. After putting forth this problem, [the author of the Comment,] byway of bringing the two view’s into consistency, decides that remembrance must be of both kinds. In so far as it directs itself towards the object-knowm, [the subliminal-impression] is affected by the object-known. But, strictly speaking, it makes-to-shine- forth-in-consciousness, [that is,] it illumines, not only the object-known but also ^ Compare the definition of memory as a tion ’, at Philebus 34 a o-ooTrjpia alndq- ‘ keeping or maintenance of a sensa- treais. ^ Dhatu patha i. 707. 33] Contrast between perception and memory [ — i, ii the process-of-knowing, that is, the form of both kinds, the nature of the two. This [subliminal-impression] is thus described as one which has the manifesta- tion {anjana) or form [aMra) of the manifester (vyaujaJca) or cause {karana) of itself, in other words, which has the foi-m of the cause of itself. [The subliminal- impression produces a memory corresponding to the cause of that impression, that is, to the experience (anubhava).] Another interpretation would be that [this subliminal-impression is one] which has the manifestation {anjana) or the bx’inging-to-the-point-of-fruition (phalabhimukhikarana) of the manifester {vyafijaka) or suggestive-stimulus {udbodhaka). An objection is made : ‘ If, in so far as both refer to the cause [that is, to experience], there is a similarity between the idea {buddhi) and the remembrance, then what difference is there between them ? ’ In reply to this he says ^With regard to these two . . . the process-of-knowing. » i. [Perception ;] the process-of-knowing (graJiana) is an apprehending (upadana). And there cannot be an apprehending of that which is [already] known. Accordingly an idea (buddhi) is said to be an illumination (bodhana) of that which has not been already got at (adhigata) by this [process-of-knowing]. This [idea] is that in which the configuration (akara) or form (rupa) of the process-of-knowing is the predominant or principal [element]. Though the relation between the idea and the process-of-knowing is one of identity, [still] ^ by predicating [the one of the other] the relation may be treated here as if it were that of principal and subordinate, ii. [Memory :] that whose predominant or primary [element] is the configuration of the object-known. This same predominance of the object-known in the configuration of the object-known lies in the fact that the object-intended (artha) has already been made the object of one of the other [four] fluctuations. Accordingly memory is declared to be concerned with objects which have already been made the object of one of the other fluctuations : this is precisely what is meant by not adding surreptitiously [to the once experienced object]. It might be urged that there is even in memory a surreptitious addition. For in a dream one’s parents and others deceased who have been experienced in one time and place are brought [by memory] into relation with another time and place not previously experienced. The reply is «The latter [that is, memoiy] is of two kinds that [memory] by which imagined or mentally-constructed things are to be remembered ; [that memory by which] not imagined, that is, not mentally-constructed [or] real things [are to be remembered]. This [memory of imagined things] is not [really] memory, but is misconception ; because it agrees with the characteristic-mark [i. 8] of this [misconception]. But it is called memory in so far as it resembles memory, just as that which resembles a source-of-valid-ideas is called a source-of-valid-ideas. This is his point. — But why is memory placed at the end [of i. 6] ? To this he replies ^All memories. » Experience (anubhava) means getting to [an object]. Memory is a fluctuation preceded by a getting to [an object]. [Not until] after this [getting to an object] * Literally, ‘ a relation of principal and subordinate is here (ayani) predicated.’ 5 [h.o.s. it] i. 11—] Booh I. Concentration or SarnCtdhi [34 do memories associate themselves [with the subliminal-impression and with the experience]. The objection is made that a reasonable person should restrict those objects only which hinder * a man. Moreover the hindrances [affect him] thus ; but fluctuations do not. Why then should these [fluctuations] be restricted? In reply he says « And all these. ^ [The rest is] easy. N ow what means are there for the restriction of these [fluctuations] ? 12. The restriction of them is by [means of] practice and passionlessness. The so-called river of mind-stutf, whose flow is in both directions, flows towards good and flows towards evil. Now when it is borne onward to Isolation \hcdvalya\ downward towards discrimination, then it is flowing unto good ; when it is borne onward to the whirlpool-of-existence, downward towards non-discrimination, then it is flowing unto evil. In these cases the stream towards objects is dammed by passionlessness, and the stream towards discrimina- tion has its flood-gate opened by practice in discriminatory know- ledge. Thus it appears that the restriction of the mind-stuff is dependent [for its accomplishment upon means] of both kinds, [practice and passionlessness]. With the word «now^ he asks what is the means for restriction. He gives the answer in the [following] sutra : 12. The restriction of them is by [means of] practice and passionlessness. If the restriction is to be effected, then both [these] distinct activities, practice and passionlessness, must operate together, but not either one or the other separately. “ Accordingly he says «The river of mind-stuff.» The words ^borne onward to^ [connote] a continuous connexion ; «downward towards^ [suggest] depth or bottomlessness. 13. Practice {abliydsa) is [repeated] exertion to the end that [the mind-stuflf] shall have permanence in this [restricted state]. Permanence is the condition of the unfluctuating mind-stuff when it flows on in undisturbed calm. Practice is an effort {prayatna) with this end in view, — a [consequent] energy, a persevering ' Read klignanti. with the distinction that there be [two] ^ Literally,There is [= must be] a piling-up- subordinate activities, but not analter- together (samuccaya) [= simultaneous native [action], action] of practice and passionlessness. 35] Restriction of fluctuations hy 'practice [ — i. 14 struggle, — the pursuit {anustlidnd) of the course-of-action-requisite thereto with a desire of effectuating this [permanence]. Of these [two], he characterizes practice by telling what it is [svarupa) and what its purpose is, [and does so in the words] 13. Practice is [repeated] exertion to the end that [the mind-stuff ] shall have permanence in this [re- stricted state]. This he discusses in the words <5Cof the . . mind-stuff. » The word «unfluctuating)^ means without fluctuations of rajas and tamas. Its flowing on in undisturbed calm is stainlessness, is the flowing on of the fluctuations of sattva ; it is singleness-of-intent ; it is permanence. It is with this end in view [that there is practice]. In the words is the practice in that vision of the Self who has become accessible through verbal- communications and inference and the instruction of teachers. [This practice] is a constantly reiterated performance — through this. Purity of this vision is a focusedness upon sattva in so far as rajas and tamas have been rejected. Resulting from this [purity] is that perfect discrimination between the qualities and the Self — to the effect that the Self is pure and exists from time-without- beginning, whereas the qualities [in respect of which it is not contaminated] are the opposite of this — by which [discrimination] the thinking-substance of the yogin is satiated {a-pyayita). It is to such a yogin that reference is made. Now these same words [anena) describe the concentration called the Rain-cloud of [knowable] Things [iv. 29]. A yogin of such a kind as this is altogether passion- less with regard to qualities {gum), whether their properties be developed or undeveloped, — that is to say, even to the extent that he is passionless with regard to the discernment of the difference between sattva and the Self, [for to this discernment] qualities are essential. — ^Thus» that is, therefore, passionlessness is of two kinds. The first is when the substance {sattva) of the mind-stuff has [all] its tamas washed aw’ay by the excess of its sattva, and when the mind-stuff’s sattva^ is in contagion with a tiny stain of rajas. This [passionlessness,] * This use of sattva is an intentional am- sartm (as a which in the higher biguity. Sattva is not only the ‘ sub- stages of attainment preponderates in stance ’ (of the mind-stuff), but is also the citta (Saihkhya-sara, iii, near beg.). 39] Undisturbed calm of the Self [ — i. ig moreover, is common to those also whose wishes have been fulfilled {taudiJca).^ For they also have by virtue of the same [discrimination] been merged in primary matter. In this same sense it has been said [Sarhkhya-karika 45] From discrimination results resolution into primary-matter.” Among these, that is, of these two [kinds of passionlessness] the latter is nothing but an undisturbed calm of perception. The use of the words ^nothing but2> indi- cates that this [passionlessness] is without any object. For it is the mind- stuff’s substance (sattva) of precisely such a kind as this that is untouched by the stain of even a particle of rajas. This is the substrate for that [kind of passionlessness]. For this very reason it is called the undisturbed calm of perception. Because the substance (sattva) of the mind-stuff, although by nature undisturbed, [sometimes] experiences defilement from contact with rajas and tamas. But when all defilement by rajas and tamas is washed away by a stream of the undefiled water of passionlessness and practice, it [the substance of the mind-stuff] becomes absolutely undisturbedly calm and becomes so that nothing more is left of it than an undisturbed calm of perception. He shows its qualities so that we may be inclined to receive it. He says «at the rising of this.^ The meaning is : When this [state] arises, then the yogin — on whom this insight has dawned ; in other words, when there is this particular insight [that is, the undisturbed calm,] — has present insight [that is, the Eain-cloud of knowable Things]. «That which was to be found» that is. Isolation, has been found. In this sense he will say [iv. 30] “ Even while living the -wise man becomes hberated.” The reason would be that what is nothing but subliminal- impression has its root [in undifferentiated-consciousness] cut : this is the point. How is it that [Isolation] has been found ? Since all the hindrances which should have dwindled, — undifferentiated-consciousness and the [four] others together with subconscious-impressions (vasana), — have dwindled. It is urged as an objection that there is a mass of merit and of demerit ; there is the succession of existences-in-the-world, the unbroken sequence of birth and death for [all] living creatures. How then can there be Isolation ? In reply to this he says distinguish [concentration conscious of an object] from [concentration] not conscious [of an object]. Now by what means is that concentration produced which is not conscious of any object or what is its nature ? 18. The other [concentration which is not conscious of objects] consists of subliminal - impressions only [after ^ The word sthula is used here in the sense of product as contrasted with siiksma in the sense of cause : cp. iii. 44. 6 [h.o.s. it] i. 18 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [42 objects have merged], and follows upon that practice which effects the cessation [of fluctuations]. The concentration which is not conscious [of objects] is that restriction of the mind-stuff in which only subliminal-impressions are left and in which all fluctuations have come to rest. The higher passionlessness is a means for effecting this. For practice when directed towards any supporting-object is not capable of serving as an instrument to this [concentration not conscious of an object]. So the supporting-object [for this concentration] is [the Fain-cloud of knowable things] ^ which effects this cessation [of fluctuations] and has no [perceptible] object. For (ca) [in this concentration] there is no object-intended. Mind-stuff, when engaged in the practice of this [imperceptible object], seems as if it were itself non-existent and without any supporting-object. Thus [arises] that concentration [called] seedless, [without sensa- tional stimulus], which is not conscious of objects. To introduce [the topic of] [concentration] not conscious [of objects] which comes next in order, he asks «Now?» 18. The other [concentration which is not conscious of objects] consists of subliminal-impressions only [after objects have merged], and follows upon that practice which effects the cessation [of fluctuations]. The fii-st ^ clause [] relates to the means ; and the last two ^ words [from from calamities which follow upon a deviation from the way. This is a particular kind of volition and it generates an exertion directed towards the object desired. So he says are undifferentiated-consciousness and the rest [ii. 3]. The are good [kufala) or evil. The is the consequences which these [evolve]. The (dfaya) are subconscious-impressions {vdsand) corresponding to these [fruitions]. These [hindrances and karmas and fruitions and latent-deposits], although they are found in the central-organ {manas), are attributed to the Self. For it is he that is said to be the experiencer of the results of these [in the central- organ]. Just as the victory or defeat which depends upon the combatants is attributed to [their] lord (svdmin). For, the l 9 vara is a special kind of Self who is untouched by this [kind of] experience. Then there are those who have obtained Isolation ; and those who are in Isolation {kevalin) are many.^ Now these by severing the three instruments of bondage ^ have obtained Isolation ; and the l 9 vara’s relation to this [Isolation] belongs neither to the past nor to the future, [but is eternal]. Thus it is not with Him as with the [ordinary] liberated [Self] that there has been expressly made known a terminus a quo of bondage {purvd bandhakoti). Nor is it with Him, as it is with one [whose body] is resolved into primary-matter, that there is a terminus ad quern, when bondage * According to Samkhya-sutra i. 91-92 the l 9 vara should be classed as one of these. “ The three bandhana would be l.prakrti, 2. vikdra, 3. daksind. Compare Sam. 7 [h.o.s. 17] Tat. Kaum. xliv. The three vipdka are jdti, dyiis, and bhoga (ii. 13). These three are also the upasarga (Vacas- pati-micra, i. 29, Calcutta edition, p. 66iq.' i. 24 — ] Booh I. Concent7'ation 07 ' Samadhi [50 might recur. But He is at all times whatsoever liberated and at all times whatsoever the I^vara. But it might be asked, ‘ That universally admitted eternal superiority (utkarsa) of the I^vara which results from his assuming a sattva of perfect [pi'ahrsta) quality — has that any proof [to authorize it], or is it without proof? ’ [The reply is, His] sacred- books {pdsti'o) are its proof. [But then] again [it may be asked], what proof have the sacred-books ? [The reply is] they have their proof in the perfect quality of [His] sattva. Inasmuch as both [the sacred-books and the superiority] reside in the l 9 vara’s sattva, there is a never-beginning relation between the two. From these [sacred-books, therefore] this proves to be true that He is at all times whatsoever liberated and at all times whatsoever the l 9 vara. Now this His pre-eminence {ai^varya) is altogether without any- thing equal to it or excelling it. For, to begin with, it cannot be excelled by any other pre-eminence, because whatever might [seem] to excel it would itself prove to be that very [pre-eminence we are in quest of]. Therefore that is the l 9 vara wherein we reach this uttermost limit of pre-eminence. Nor again is there any pre-emi- nence equal to His. [Why not ?] Because when one thing is simultaneously desired by two equals, the one saying ‘ let this be new ’ and the other saying ‘ let this be old ’, if the one wins his way, the other fails in his wish and so becomes inferior. And two equals cannot obtain the same desired thing simultaneously, since that would be a contradiction of terms. Therefore [we maintain that,] in whomsoever there is a pre-eminence that is neither equalled nor excelled, he is the l 9 vara, and He is, as we said, a special kind of Self. He anticipates the objection that ‘ the universe (mfva) is pervaded by animate and inanimate [beings] only and by nothing else. Consequently if the I^vara be inanimate, then He is primary-substance {pradhana), since what is evolved from primary-substance also falls within primary-substance. And by this hypothesis he could not be made inclined since he is inanimate. Or on the other hand, if he be animate, still, — since the Energy of Intellect is indifferent {audaslnya) and since in so far as it is not in the round-of-rebirths it has no feeling-of- personality or other [hindrance], — how can the Energy of Intellect be inclined, [or] how can profound-desire [have anything to do with Energy of Intellect] ? ’ 51 ] The Igvara and the other Selves [ — i. 24 In alluding to this he says «But now .... primary-substance.» He gives the reply to this objection in the following sutra. 24. Untouched, by hindrances or karmas or fruition or by latent-deposits the Igvara is a special kind of Self. «The are undilferentiated-consciousness and the rest^, for it is these that, by the stroke of various kinds of misery, hinder a man within the round-of-rebirth. «Good (kiigala) or evil)5> are merit and demerit ; and by a figurative expression they are called karma, because they proceed from karma. «Fruition^ is birth and length-of-life and the [kind ofj experience [ii. 13]. «Corresponding to these :» the subconscious-impressions corresponding to the fruitions. These subconscious-impressions are called latent-deposits because they lie in the ground of the mind-stuff. For, until [that particular] karma, [that is, some demerit], which precipitates {nirvartakaY the birth [of an individual] as a young elephant, makes manifest an impression [bhavana] [latent in his mind-stuff] which is characterized by a previously (prag) [existing] and potential kind of experience [proper to] a young elephant, — for so long [that karma] is not capable of [producing] the experience proper to a young elephant. Therefore it proves to be true that the impression which produces the experience (anubliava) of being born as a young elephant corresponds to the fruition as a young elephant. It might be said : ‘ Such things as hindrances, inasmuch as they are properties of the thinking-substance, can by no means whatsoever touch the Self. Accord- ingly merely by mentioning the word the absence of any trace of these [hindrances] is established. Consequently what need is there of the words and the rest?’ In reply to this he says «These.» These [hindrances and karmas and fruitions and latent-impressions] although they reside in the central-organ (manas) are attributed to the Self who is in the round-of-rebirths. Why? ^For it is he that is said to be the experiencer of the results of these [in the central-organ].» That is to say, he is the thinker {cetayitr). Consequently the l 9 vara, because he is a Self, comes into relation with these. For this reason, [because these are only attributed to the Self], it is consistent to make a denial of this [relation]. This he does in the word ^who.» For the l 9 vara is a special kind of Self who is untouched by this [kind] of experience, namely, that also found in the thinking-substance and common to the Selves in general. — It is in that it is specialized [and] discriminated from [all] other Selves. Desirous of pointing out what is not to be included in the words In the case of the l9vara there does not exist as in the case of the ordinary man a relation, caused by undifferentiated-conscious- ness, of proprietor to his property, with the sattva of the mind-stuff. But [the relation is that] expressed by the resolve, ‘ By the teaching of knowledge and right-living [dharma) I will lift up beings, encompassed by the three anguishes, from the great sea of the state after death (preti/a).’ And this [knowledge and right-living] cannot be taught unless there be an abundance of excellence in the adequacy of [His] knowledge ' and of [His] activity. And there cannot be this [abundance of excellence] unless a sattva be assumed which has been purified from stains by the removal of rajas and tamas. With this resolve the Exalted One reflects, and assumes a sattva of perfect quality. Although He is untouched by undifferentiated-consciousness, it appears as if He were under the illusion of identifying Himself with undifferentiated-consciousness and as if He were ignorant of the real nature of undifferentiated-consciousness. But He does not deal with undifferentiated-consciousness as if it were undifferentiated-consciousness as such. The actor who takes the role of Kama and represents the different kinds of behaviour [belonging to the character] is not of course confused [as to his real personal identity]. For he knows that this [role] is only a deliberately assumed form and not his [form] in reality. An objector might say, ‘ This may be so. It may be true that the Exalted One must assume sattva in order to uplift [the world]. On the other hand His desire to lift it up is based on His assumption of Coni})are ^veta 9 vat. Up. vi. 8. 53 ] The Igvara mid the worlds [ — i. 21 this [sattvd] ; and inasmuch as this [desire] is also derived fi-om primary-matter [the fallacy of] mutual interdependence results.’ In reply to this he says «Etemal.» This [objection] might be true, if this were the very first creation. But the succession of creations and contractions [of worlds] is from time-without- beginning. And when the period of the desire for contraction has come to a full end, then the Exalted One, while in the act of contemplating within Himself, ‘ I must assume a sattva of perfect quality,’ contracts the world. At that time the sattva of the Igvara’s mind-stufi" becomes subconsciously-impressed by the contemplation. And although the l9vara’s mind-stuff be tending towards a homogeneity with primary-matter, still, — when the period of the great mundane- dissolution has come to a full end, under the pressure of the subconscious- impression of the contemplation, — it enters into a mutation of precisely the same kind as a state of sattva. In precisely the same way Chaitra contemplates ‘ To-morrow I must get up just at day-break ’ ; and then after having slept gets up at that very time because of the subliminal-impression resulting from his con- templation. Consequently since [the woidds] are from time-without-beginning, and in so far as the Ifvara’s contemplation and His assumption of the sattva are eternal, there is no [logical fallacy] of interdependence. Nor can it be urged ^ that the sattva of the l9vara’s mind-stuff does not pass out [of the phenomenal state] into homogeneity with pi’imary-matter. Eor that which [by reason of its subconscious-impression] never becomes homogeneous with primary-matter is not secondary-matter [pradhanika). And again it is not the Energy of Intellect, because it is non-perceptive {ajfia). This being the meaning, one might assume another [kind of] thing which could not be proven by any source-of-valid-ideas. This too would be a quite groundless [assumption]. — Because there is no other [kind of] thing distinct from primary-matter and the Self, has this kind of universally admitted and eternal superiority of the l9vara any proof [to authorize it, and] is it based on any soui-ce-of-valid-ideas, or is it without proof [and] not based on any source-of-valid-ideas ? The answer is in the phrase ^sacred-books (rastra) are its proof.» The sacred books are the Eevealed-Word {gruti) and the Tradition {smrti) and the Epics and Puranas. — He brings forward an objection in the words This is what he intends [to say]. Incantations {mantra) and the Medical Vedas are composed by the l9vara. In these [two] cases their authori- ' Cp. Comment iii. 13. i. 24 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [64 tativeness is granted by reason of their adequacy in action. [This adequacy] is undoubted because there is no failure to effect purposes, [The authoritativeness is granted. He shows that it is not based upon experimental evidence.] And in the case of the different herbs and of the particular combinations of one [herb] with another, and in the case of the incantations in so far as single syllables are connected or excluded, no one who uses only profane methods of proof, could, even in a thousand lives, make the connexions and exclusions. — Furthermore there is no ground for asserting that connexions and exclusions [of the proper hei'bs or syllables] are a result of verbal-communication {dgama) and that verbal- communication is a result of these [connexions and exclusions] on the ground that the succession of these two [1. verbal-communication, 2. connexions and exclusions] forms a series from time-without-beginning. The reason for this is that the succession of these two is severed at the time of a great mundane dissolution. Neither [is there ground for saying that] there is no method of proving that there is this [great mundane dissolution]. For he will set forth in detail [iii. 13] that the world is an evolved-foi'm of primary-substance and is identical [with it in substance]. There is evidently a heterogeneous mutation [e.g. curds] of the [original] homogeneous mutation [e.g. milk]. Analogously, milk or sugar-juice or similar substances assume various forms such as curds or treacle [and so forth]. And it is evident that the heterogeneous mutation presupposes the homogeneous mutation. So in the point at issue, the primary- substance can also have heterogeneous mutations by assuming such forms as the Great [thinking-substance] and the personality-substance ; occasionally also it can have a homogeneous mutation. And its homogeneous mutation is the state of equipoise [of the primary-substance]. This, moreover, is the great mundane dissolution. [There is therefore a great mundane dissolution.] [To revert to the argument that the authoritativeness of the sacred books is not experimentally to be found.] Accordingly, the Exalted One is first of all the composer of the Incantations and of the Medical Vedas. Hence it must be acknowledged that, in so far as the obscuration due to the stains of rajas and of tamas has been removed, the substance of [His] thinking-substance illumines everywhere. To resume the argument {tatha ca). Because He was aiming to give instruction in [worldly] happiness and in [eternal] bliss [incapable of test by experience here], the Vedas as a whole were composed by the l 9 vara and must also be supposed to have their source only in the perfect quality of His thinking-substance. And in the superiority of the substance (sattva) there is no possibility of error or deceit, wdiich have their origin in rajas and tamas. This [then] is established that sacred books have their proof in the perfect quality of His sattva . — [A further objection.] ‘ This may be so. But then if the sacred books make known the perfection in so far as they are the effect of the perfection, there would be an inference from effect to cause' {(;esavaf). But that would not give us a verbal ' See Nyaya Bhasya xviii. 4. 55] The Igvara and the Sacred Word [ — i. 25 communication [agama).’ Eeplying to this he says ^Inasmuch as both.» The sacred books do not make known a relation of cause and effect, but do make known the correspondence * from time without beginning between the word- expressing-a-meaning {vacaka) and the thing-expressed {vacya). For the perfection has its existence in the substance of the Ifvara’s thinking-substance ; and the sacred books, in that they give expression to this [thinking-substance], also have their existence in it. In summing up he says ^From these. From these sacred books, which give expression to the perfection of the substance of the Igvara’s thinking-substance, this proves to be true, [that is] is known, — since the object [visaya) [the sacred books] is the distinguishing-characteristic of that-to- which-the-object-refers [visayin) [the Ifvara], — that Why is this ? The reply is and has been described. — In the case of two objects which are totally irrelevant to each other, prolonged meditation on either one unfits one for a direct perception of the other. Whereas prolonged meditation upon one object proves to be of service for the direct perception of another similar to it. Similarly the study of one book proves to be of service for the acquisition of knowledge of another book similar to it. As for (tu) immediate-perception [pratyasatti), it is the cause of direct perception with regard to one’s own self, but not with regard to another self. [Thus by meditating upon the l9vara, we learn about our own selves.] Thus the argument is cleared up. But what are these obstacles ? Those which distract the mind- stuff. But what are these [that are distractive] and {vd) how many are they ? [He replies.] 30. Sickness and languor and doubt and heedlessness and listlessness and worldliness (avirati) and erroneous perception and failure to attain any stage [of concentration] and insta- bility in the state [when attained]— these distractions of the mind-stuff are the obstacles. There are nine obstacles, the distractions of the mind-stuff. These appear together with the fluctuations of the mind-stuff. And they are not found where the aforesaid fluctuations of mind-stuff are not. Sickness is a disorder in the humours [of the body] or in the secretions or in the organs. Languor is a lack of activity in the mind-stuff. Doubt is a kind of thinking which touches both alter- natives [of a dilemma], so that one thinks ‘ This might be so ; might not be so.’ Heedlessness is a lack of reflection upon the i. 30 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [64 means of attaining concentration. Listlessness is a lack of effort due to heaviness of body or of mind-stuff. Worldliness is greed of the mind-stuff ; and its essence lies in addiction to objects of sense. Erroneous perception is the thinking of misconceptions. Failure to attain any stage is not attaining any stage of concentration. Instability in the state [when attained] is the failure of the mind- stuff to remain in the stagje attained. If the concentrated stage of development had been reached, [the mind-stuff] would, of course, have remained in it. — Thus it is that these distractions are called the nine blemishes of yoga [and] the nine foes of yoga [and] the obstacles of yoga. He asks a question by saying See i. 12. As, for example, by Dharmakirti. ® This same word also has the meaning of ‘ concentrated ’. * See Colonel Jacob’s Handful of Popular Maxims, Part 1, 2nd ed., p. 25. Com- pare Sarvadarfana-samgraha (Anand^ 9 rama ed.), p. 15'. 67] One common substrate of ideas [ — i. 32 Moreover if the mind-stuff is to be [one idea after] another, then [the Buddhist who holds this opinion] denies the experience of his own self. How does the idea ‘ I ’ in such expressions as ‘ I am touching what I have seen ’ and ‘ I am seeing what I have touched ’ inhere in one common [abheda) substrate-of-ideas, if all the ideas have nothing in common ? How could the idea ‘ I am this un- divided self’ — which has a single idea [‘ I ’] as its object and which persists in absolutely different mind-stuffs — become hypostasized (aprayet) in one generic substrate-of-ideas ? The idea ‘ I am this undivided self’ is knowable in one’s own experience. Moreover the authority of a perception is not overthrown by [that of] any other source-of-valid-ideas. Whereas any other source-of-valid- ideas comes into use only by virtue of a perception. Consequently the mind-stuff is one [and] has many objects and is stable. He introduces a sutra which summarizes the meaning which he has been stating. This he does by saying Furthermore [that is] after the meaning which he has been stating. The connexion [of the sentences] is that he sums up by reciting this sutra. The reason why [the distractions] must be restricted is told in the words By the same two already character- ized, by practice and by passionlessness, [distractions are] to be restricted. The words «of theseS> [mean] of these two, namely, practice and passionlessness ; the words «the practice», that which is to be described next. 32. To check them [let there be] practice upon a single entity. A single entity, that is, the l 9 vara. For [He] is the subject-matter [of the discussion]. — According to the Destructionists the mind-stuff as a whole is single-in-intent, [that is] is not in any degree whatsoever distracted. Consequently their teachings and their actions subservient to their teachings are meaningless, as he says in the words ^But one whose.^ [He refers to one] in whose opinion [the mind-stuff] is directed to one object after another whether to one [at a time] or to more than one [at a time]. Limited [in time], that is, present {samutpamia) only so long as the intended-object is vivid {ahhasa), [and] ending just there [and] not going else- where. ‘ Why not first take the foremost intended-object and afterwards take the next object?’ In reply he says In his system, if singleness-of-intent is to be the property of the mind-stuff conceived as a stream or of a serial-order of mind-stuff, then the stream of mind-stuff is not a unit and is not persistent in the p resen ted-ideas as they successively arise. Why [is this so] ? Because in your system whatever is at all is all of it momentary, and there is nothing not momentary : this is the point. He takes up the other alternative in the words «If however.^ A pre- sented-idea which is a portion of [this whole] subjective (sdihvrta) stream might be real. For this reason the singleness-of-intent with reference to this presented- idea would be a property [belonging to a portion of the stream] [and] to be obtained by an effort. He shows the fault [in this alternative] by saying Hence also mind-stuff is one and has many objects and is stable as he explains by saying «Furthermore if.^ For just as Chaitra cannot be he who remembers the book read by Maitra and just as Chaitra cannot be the enjoyer of the fruit of the latent-impressions of karma, heaped up by Maitra, mth which he has had no connexion, whether meritorious or bad, so likewise something seen by one presented-idea cannot be remembered by another presented- idea ; nor can the fruit of a latent-deposit of karma heaped u^) by one presented-idea be experienced by another idea. [The Destructionist might reply that his doctrine of momentariness] does not prove too much, provided we add the qualification ‘ if there be a relation of cause and effect For in such cases as the funeral- sacrifice (rraddha) and the vdicvdnarl sacrifice {isti) [at the birth of a son] we find that the fruition [of the sacrifice] passes [in the one case] to the father and mother and [in the other case] to the son, whereas none [of the three] is the actual agent' [in the sacrifice]. Or [again] in such cases’* as that of the [bitter] * In the grdddha the son sacrifices for the of the two sacrifices is found in the benefit of the father ; in the vdicvunarl, Bhasya on Jaimini-sutra iv. 3. 38. the father for the son. For the latter This seems to refer to Kumarila’s refuta- see Taittiriya Ar. ii. 6. A discussion tion of the Buddhists in Qlokavarttika, 69 ] [— i. 32 Permanence of the ego mango-seeds that have been nourished with sweet juices [we see] that the fruition by an indirect process must become sweet. [Thus the effort of one momentary idea could find its result in another idea single-in-intent and indirectly related to it through a serial-order.] In reply to this he says «Even if this could in some way be harmonized. 2> The connexion of thought is this. What shall we say is the difference between ideas resident in one serial-order and different ' ideas resident in another serial-order, so that — when [something] has been experienced or ^ when [some] latent-impression of karma has been heaped up by an idea resident in one serial-order — [another] idea belonging to the same serial-order should be the one to remember or to enjoy it and not an idea belonging to a different serial-order? For this that we call a serial-order is not such a [materially] real thing that it could [as such] distinguish the unit-in-the-serial-order [santanin) from [ideas] resident in other serial-orders. Furthermore an imaginary distinction cannot consistently exert activity. Surely the Brahman-boy cannot cook with fire that he imagines to be present. Moreover the relation of cause and effect is also nothing that is [materially] real [in this case of the two ideas, one of which appears in a series after the other has disappeared]. Because it is impossible that there should be in the present time a substrate for two things which are not co-existent, just as there cannot be [a substrate] for two things [separate in space] like the left horn and the other horn which do however coexist [in time]. For the past and the future cannot function as the present by being-partially-in-relation-and- partially-out-of-relation® {vyasanj) [since momentariness is byhypothesisassumed]. Consequently ideas are not under the limiting-conditions either of a serial- order or of a causal relation which is a part of their being ; [and], because they are real, they cannot, in so far as there are no reciprocal contacts, be dis- tinguished from other ideas whether resident in the same serial-order or in other serial-orders. This same line-of-reasoning is continued by an allusion to the cow-dung and the milk ; cow-dung is milk, because it is a product of the cow, like milk, which both sides admit [to be a product of the cow]. [The Buddhist argument] In other woi’ds, of which stable mind-stuff this is the purification. The sutra begins with the words 33 . . . friendliness and compassion and ends with the words undisturbed calm .... When towards those who are happy the mind-stuff^ cultivates friendliness, that is, cordiality^, [then] the taint of envy ceases. When towards those who are in pain [the mind-stuff] cultivates compassion, that is, a desire to destroy pain in another as if it were his own, [then] the taint of a desire to injure others ceases from the mind.’’ When towards living- creatures whose disposition is meritorious the mind cultivates joy,® that is, gladness, [then] the taint of jealousy ceases. When towards those whose disposition is demeritorious, the mind cultivates indifference, that is, neutrality, [then] the taint of wrath ceases. And then, after the qualities (dharma) made of rajas and of tamas have ceased, the white quality made of sattva comes into being. One may say that he becomes endowed with a superiority of sattva. When there can- properly-be-said-to-be {palisa) a restriction of the fluctuations, his mind-stuff. * These form the chapter on the Brahma viharas in the Visuddhi-Magga. ^ Compare the statements in iv. 7 on white and black karma ; and in ii. 13 on the rise of white karma. * This construction is a good instance of djro Koivov (Tcahaksi), * This form (sauhdrdam) does not seem to accord with the examples given in Siddhanta kaumudi on vi. 3. 52 (Nirn. Sag. ed., 1904, p. 207^. ® Medhatithi on Manu, in a characteristi- cally Schopenhaurian frame of mind, informs us that friendliness is the absence of aversion {dvesdbhdva) and not an attachment to one’s friends. For that would be bondage. Similarly joy is the cessation of grief hut not positive gladness. Because that would be the result of passion. See Balarama’s notetp.77 (Calc.ed.). I have not traced the passage to Medhatithi-bhatta. i. 33—] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [72 because its true nature is undisturbed calm, becomes undisturbedly calm. And when undisturbedly calm, by means which are to be stated,^ it becomes single- in-intent and gains the stable state. But if there be no cultivation of friendliness and the other [feelings] these means are not adequate for stability. 34. Or [he gains stability] by expulsion and retention of breath. Expulsion is the ejection of the abdominal air through the aper- tures of the nose by a special kind of effort. Retention is restraint of the breath. — by these two he should attain to a stability of the central-organ. He now states these means of [obtaining] stability. 84. Or [he gains stability] by expulsion and retention of breath. The word signifies that there is a choice with regard to other means [now] to be stated, but not with regard to cultivation of friendliness and of the [other] feelings ; because [the alternatives now mentioned] are in addition to that [cultivation]. He explains the expulsion by saying «of the abdominal.^ By a special kind of effort, described in books of Yoga, by means of which the abdominal wind is gradually emitted through the apertures of the nose. He explains retention by saying «Eetention is restraint of the breath.)^ It is the restraint of that portion of the abdominal wind that is emitted breath ; it is the keeping of it outside ; it is, on the other hand, not allowing it to enter suddenly. By these two, the expulsion and retention of wind, his body becomes light and his central organ gains the stable state. In this [sutra] we have to supply {cikrs) the word ‘ stability ’ from the phrase ‘ comes into a relation of stability ’ found in the next sutra ; and this is to be connected with the words ‘ should attain ’ as is understood from the context {artha). 35. Or [he gains stability when] a sense-activity {pravrtti) arises connected with an object [and] bringing the central- organ into a relation of stability. The consciousness of supernormal (divya) odour in one who attends fixedly to the tip of his nose is sense-activity with odour [as object] ; on the tip of the tongue, the consciousness of supernormal taste ; on the palate, supernormal colour ; on the middle of the tongue, the consciousness of touch ; on the root of the tongue, the conscious- ness of sound. These sense-activities when arisen bring the mind- stuff into a relation of stability [and] dispel doubt and become a way of approach to concentrated insight.^ Thus sense-activity ^ Book ii. Iff. * Compare i. 20. 73 ] [ — i. 35 Steadying the mind-stuff with regard to the moon or the sun or planets or gems or [the rays of] a lamp or similar objects, when it arises, should be regarded as being connected with an object. For although the true nature of things as they really are ^ becomes accessible by means of the various sciences and by inferences and by the instruction of masters, — since these [means] are adequate to inform us of the things as they are, — still, so long as any part whatsoever has not become consciously knowable by the appro- priate organ, the whole seems mediately-perceived. And the thinking-substance is not made to arise firmly with regard to such subtile intended-objects as Release. Therefore [if] only for the sake of reinforcing books and inferences and the instruction of masters, some one particular thing must necessarily be made an object of perception. Then after a portion of the intended-object as taught by these [three means] has been made the object of per- ception, the whole, even unto such an exceeding subtile object as Release, is thoroughly believed. For precisely this purpose the purification ^ of the mind-stuff is enjoined. If there are fluctua- tions unrestrained [as contrasted with this portion], then, when the Consciousness of being Master with regard to these has been pro- duced, [the mind-stuff] would be adequate to effect a perception of these various intended-objects. And this done, [the yogin] will without hindrance acquire belief [and] energy [and] mindfulness [and] concentration [i. 20]. He tells of another means for stability. 35. Or [he gains stability when] a sense-activity (pravrtti) arises connected with an object [and] bringing the central-organ into a relation of stability. He explains by saying «in one who attends fixedly to the tip of his nose.» In one performing fixed- attentions [and] contemplations [and] concentrations there arises, as a result of success in these, that direct-perception which is a supernormal consciousness of odours. Similarly [what is said] is applicable to the other sense-activities also. And this is to be believed on the strength of the authoritative-word ^ and not from probable-reasonings (upapattitas). An objection, ‘This may be ' This word yathdhhuta is thought by Mrs. Rhys Davids to be ‘specifically and uniquely Gotamic’. (C. A. F. Rhys Davids : Seeing Things as they Really are, in Buddhism, vol. i, no. 3, p. 382, March, 1904.) The fact that it occurs 10 [h.o.s. it] here is another proof of the intimate connexion between the Yoga system of philosophy and Buddhism. “ See also above, p. 70 end, or text, p. 77* (Calc. ed.). * Compare Maitri Up. vi. 20. i.35 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [74 so. But of what use is this kind of fluctuations which are of no service as regards Isolation?’ In reply he says «These.» These fluctuations, when once arisen, in a very short time bring the mind-stuff" into a relation of stability with the object whether it be the I^vara or the discriminative discernment. Another objection, ‘How could a fluctuation in relation to one object bring [the mmd-stuff] into a relation of stability with another object?’ In reply to this he says is all-pervading. «The feeling-of-personality and nought beside^ is a form in which the splendours of various kinds do not reoccur. He makes his own opinion accord with another authoritative-work [agama) by saying «With regard to which. With regard to which this has been said by Pancafikha. It is called an atom because it is hard of access [to knowledge]. The self has the personality-substance as its basis. Pondering [that is] reflecting [upon it], one knows in the same way as when one knows ‘ I am ’. An objector says, ‘ This may be true that the luminous [sense-activity] * See Mand. Up. 9. * So MSS., not susumna. ® See Sam. Ear. xxv. i. 36—] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [76 assumes various forms of splendour, but how can the luminous [sense-activity] assume the form of the feeling-of-personality and nought beside ? ’ In reply to this he says «This ... is of two kinds. ^ The point is that the sense-of- personality is itself, when cleansed from the defilement of rajas and tamas, lumination. He states also the consequences of the two-fold luminous [sense- activity] by saying by the words «both of these kinds.» He tells of the secondary results of mastery by saying <5CSo ... of mastery.)^ Now when the mind has reached stability, what is the balanced- state {samdpatti) as such {svarupa) and (vd) as directed to an object ? This is told [in the sutra]. 41. [The mind-stuff] from which, as from a precious gem, fluctuations have dwindled away, is, with reference either to i. 41 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [78 the knower or to the process-of-knowing or to the object-to- be-known, in the state of resting upon [one] of these [three] and in the state of being tinged by [one] of these [three], and [thus] is in the balanced-state. The meaning of the words refers [to the mind-stutf] of which the presented- ideas have come to rest. He takes as the example the words ^ Just as a crystal is tinged by the various colours of the different things next to which it lies and appears as having the form of the coloured (rupa) thing-next-to-which-it-lies {updgraya), so the mind-stuff is influenced by referring to the object-to-be-known and comes into a state-of-balance with the object- to-be-known and appears as having the form of the object-to- be-known as it is in itself. Influenced by a subtile element it comes into a state-of-balance with the subtile element and seems to be the subtile element itself. Likewise, influenced by referring to a coarse [element] it comes into a state-of-balance with a coarse form and seems to have a coarse form. Similarly, influenced by particu- lar things of the world it comes into a state-of-balance with the particular thing of the world and seems to have the form of the world. An analogous situation would be found to exist also with reference to the processes-of-knowiug, [that is] in the organs of sense. Influenced by referring to a process-of-knowing it comes into a state-of-balance with the process-of-knowing and appears as having the form of the process-of-knowing as it is in itself. Simi- larly, influenced by referring to the Self as knower it comes into a state-of-balance with the Self as knower and appears as having the form of the Self as knower. Similarly, influenced by referring to a liberated Self it comes into a state-of-balance with the liberated Self and appears as having the form of the liberated Self. Thus it is that the mind, which is like a precious gem, in the state of rest- ing upon [one] of these, upon the knower or upon a process-of- knowing or upon the object-to-be-known [that is] upon the Self or a sense-organ or an element, [and which is] in a state of being tinged by [one of] these, [that is] while resting upon [one of] these, Compare Qakuntala, First prose speech after ii. 7 (Pischel, p. 125'*). 79] Conscious balanced-states [ — i. 41 changes into their form — this [mind] is said to be in the balanced- state. Thus the means for stability of the mind-stuff have been stated. The mastery of that mind-stuff which has reached stability has also been shown. Now a question is asked, ‘ When the mind has reached stability, what object has [concentration] conscious [of an object] and what is [concentration] itself?’ This he asks by saying ^Now.» Referring to this he introduces the next sutra by saying ^This is told.» He recites the sutra 41. [The mind-stuff] .... as from a precious gem .... the balanced-state. He explains this by the words means changed into its likeness. It appears as if marked by the form of the red or blue or other colour which is peculiar to the thing next to which it lies. He applies [the illustration] to the thing illustrated by saying ^so .... the object-to-be-known.» It is influenced by, [that is] it penetrates into, the object-to-be-known to which it refers. In this way he distinguishes the object-to-be-known from the knower and from the process-of-knowing. [The mind-stuff] covers over its own peculiar form as inner organ and comes into a state of balance with the object-to-be-knovvn ; or it might be said that it seems to change into an objective state of being known. As a result of this it appears as having the form of the object-to-be-known as it is in itself. Influence (upardga) comes only from an object-to-be-known. [This] he subdivides into subtile and into coarse [forms] by saying «a subtile element.» The particular things of the world are evidently those with an animate nature, for instance, cows ; and those with an inanimate nature, for instance, water-jars. In accordance with this it has been shown that there are two concentrations : that accompanied by deliberation [upon coarse objects] ; and that accompanied by reflection [upon subtile objects]. When he says ^An analogous situation .... also with reference to the processes-of-knowing, [that is] in the organs of sensed he means that sense-organs are processes of knowing in that by them intended-objects are known. He makes the same clear by saying The balanced-state in general has been described. By classification into sub- divisions there are four kinds of it : deliberative and super-deliberative, reflec- tive and super-reflective. Of these [four] he describes the state-balanced in deliberation [upon a coarse object] in the sutra beginning with the words 42. Of these and ending with the words balanced-state . . . [that is] from among these balanced-states it is the state balanced in deliberation that is to be understood. Of what kind is this [balanced-state] ? Although in reality diverse, words and intended-objects and ideas have predicate-relations because the words and the other [two] are attributed the one to the other. And the predi- cate-relation represents the diversity that there is in one thing and the identity that there is in diverse things. Consequently [the balanced-state] is confused or mixed with predicate-relations between words and intended-objects and ideas. When he says «For example . . . the word ‘ cow ’» it is evident that there is a predicate-relation which identifies the word with the intended-object and the idea, both of which have been appropriated by the [word] ‘ cow ’. When he says «the intended-object ‘ cow ’» it is evident that there is a predicate-relation which identifies the intended-object with the word and the idea, both of which have been appropriated by the [intended-object] ‘ cow ’. When he says ^the idea ‘ cow ’3> it is evident that there is a predicate-relation which identifies the idea with the word and the intended-object, both of which have been appropriated by the [idea] ‘cow’. Thus in ordinary life it is evident that, although word and intended-object and idea are distinct, in the process of knowing they are not dis- tinguished. If in the process of knowing they are not distinguished, why then should there be any distinction ? In reply to this he says <3CWhen these are dis- tinguished. When in accordance with methods of agreement and difference they are distinguished by experts, then 1. properties of words are of one kind [that is] a word which is nothing but a mutation of sound has such properties as high [pitch], 2. [properties] of an intended-object are of another kind [that is] such properties as insensibility and [definite] shape, 3. properties of an idea are of another kind [that is] illumination and no [definite] shape. Therefore the level [panthan] of their existences is distinct [that is] the way which leads to the various things themselves. When it is said that a yogin has come into a state of balance with one of these intended-objects, such as a cow, then the lower perception of the yogin has been described. — The rest is easy. 1 1 [h.O.S, 17j i. 43 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [82 When however the memory is purified from [remembrances of] the conventional-use [samheta) of -words and when the concentrated insight is free from predicate-relations [in the form] of ideas either of inferences or of something that has been heard, the intended object remains as it is in itself and nothing more, and is specifically characterized as having just that form which it has in itself and as nothing more. And this is the super-deliberative balanced- state. This is the higher perception. And this is the germ of inference and of anything that has been heard. From it inference and anything heard have their being. Moreover this knowledge {dargana) is not accompanied by an idea either of an inference or of anything that has been heard. Therefore the yogin’s know- ledge derived from super-deliberative concentration is not con- fused by any other source of a valid idea. He illustrates the dis- tinguishing characteristic of the super-deliberative concentration by the sutra. 43. When the memory is quite purified, [that balanced- state]— which is, as it were, empty of itself and which brightens [into conscious knowledge] as the intended object and nothing more— is super-deliberative. That insight which, wdien the memory is quite purified from pre- dicate-relations [in the form] of ideas either of inferences or of any- thing that has been heard, and from the conventional usage of words, is influenced by the thing in itself {svarupa) which is to be known ; and which, after as it were in its form of insight throwing off itself, the essence of which is a process of knowing, becomes the thing-intended {padartha) and nothing more ; [and becomes] as it were changed into the thing in itself which is to be known, — this is the super-deliberative balanced-state. And as such it has [just] been explained. For to this [balanced-state] the world [so far as it is visible], whether [it be an animate object] such as a cow or whether [it be an inanimate object] such as a w^ater-jar, is 1. the formation of a single mental -act (huddhi), 2. its essence is an intended-object, 3. [and] its essence is that it is a special kind of conglomeration of atoms. And this particular kind of arrange- ment ^ [which constitutes the object] is an apparent-form (dharma) ^ For this word saihsthuna see pp. 170'^, 205^®, 216^^ 272'' (Calc. ed.). [ — i. 43 83] The coarse object and nothing more common to the subtile elements [which compose it] and it is in- ferred [as being a whole] from its phenomenalized effects ^ ; it is self-dependent and presents itself by [changing] into its pheno- menal ^ form by the operation of the conditions-which-phenomena- lize it {sva) ; and it disappears when another apparent-form arises in consciousness. This same apparent-form is called a whole [avayavin). And it is this that is one ® and great or very small and tangible and that in which actions occur and impermanent. By this [kind of] wholes the business-of-life is carried on. But one to whom such a particular conglomeration is not [perceptibly] real — since by an indefinite-first-impression ^ (avikalpa) a subtile cause is imperceptible — for him, since there is no whole, nearly every- thino-, in accordance with the statement that an erroneous idea is not based upon the form [i. 8] of that [in respect of which the idea is entertained], is reduced to erroneous ideas. And then what would be a complete idea, seeing that there are no objects to which it would refer? For whatever is perceived, all that is a bit influenced by its nature of being a whole-having-parts. Therefore a whole exists which becomes changed by receiving what is called sizes and the like. This is the object of the super-deliberative balanced-state. In order to show the connexion of the sutra he explains first super-deliberative [concentration] by saying ^When however.)^ — Purification is removal. For certainly inference and verbal-communication begin to function when occasioned by memories of the conventional use of words. And this conventional-usage has its essence in the false attribution to each other of the word and the intended object and the idea ‘ cow ’. And as a result of this the two predicate-relations in the form of an idea either of an inference or of a verbal-communication arise. So when occasioned by one of these, concentrated insight still has deliberation [upon some coarse object]. But when the mind, — in so far as it is absorbed in the intended object and nothing more and is zealous for the intended object and for nothing more, — reaches by practice upon this [intended object] a state of inseparable fusion [with this object], [then] the memory of conventional-usages ^ The atom carries within itself the minia- in Nyaya-sutra ii. 1. 36 and iv.2. 14 ff., ture of its efFects. and also in Udayana’s Atma-Tattva- ® The expression sva-vyanjaka-anjana also Viveka. occurs at pp. 37®, 112®, 207®, and 282^ * All the MSS. including the Bikaner and (Calc. ed.). Gangadhara Shastri’s MSS. omit this ® The relation ofwhole and part is discussed word. i. 43 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [84 is thrown off. And when these are thrown off, predicate-relations in the form of an idea either of an inference or of anything heard, which two are rooted in memory, are thrown off. Then in the concentrated insight, freed from these predicate-relations, the intended object remains as it is in itself and nothing more ; and becomes accurately characterized as having just that form which it has in itself and as nothing more, and as not having any form of predicated-relation. This is the super-deliberative balanced-state. This is the higher perception of the yogin, since in it there is not even a trace of false attribution. An objec- tion might be raised, ‘ This may be so. But yogins, having known the that-ness of the intended object, make it consistent [with other knowledge] and teach it. And (m) how can this intended object be taught by verbal communication or be made consistent by inference which is intended for another, both of which cases not referring to that [object which is intended in the higher perception] ? Accordingly verbal-communication and inference [must] refer to that [higher object]. And since these two are predicate-relations, the higher perception is also nothing but a predicate-relation.’ In reply to this he says «And this . . . anything heard.^ For if this [knowledge], like that with deliberation, were accompanied by inference or by anything that had been heard, that is, if it had been tainted by either of these, then it would be confused. But it is only the germ of these two. For from it inference and anything that has been heard have their being. And it is not the rule that whatever is a cause of an effect has the same object as itself as its effect. For because the idea of smoke is the cause of the idea of fire, it does not therefore have this [fire] for its object. Con- sequently [the yogins] having known [the thatness of the intended object] by a perception free of predicate-relations *, teach it and make it consistent through the medium of predicate-relations. He sums up by saying «Therefore,» and shows the connexion with the sutra which is to be explained by using the word ^super-deliberative.3> The sutra begins with the words 43. When the memory is quite purified. The purification ^ is the removal of the memory which follows {tasmud) upon the predicate-relation which is nothing but the idea of the inference and of anything that has been heard and of the con- ventional-usage of words. When this occurs {tasyam). And in this case the purification from the memory of conventional-usages is the cause (hetu), and the purification from the memory of ideas, such as, of anything that has been ' A favourite verse to illustrate the gradual advance from the first dim impression to an assertion in distinct predicate form is Magha’s verse in 9i9upalavadha i.3. First a ball of light ; then a body; then a person is seen ; finally one says “ It is Narada ! ” as one beholds him falling from the sky. * This purification seems to be a relaxation of attention which has been given to a too closely limited field. Our deepest convictions may speak to us in dissociative processes wherein any fixed succession of apperceptive acts has ceased. The purification lies in a distribution of attention so that it regards a whole and disregards the successive parts. 85 ] [— i. 43 Nature of the subtile object heard, is the effect [lietumant ). — And the word «inference]^ is to be understood as expressing the object ‘ of the action [as expressing that which is inferred, and not that from which an inference is drawn] ; it is a word denoting the thing to be inferred. — The word ^as it were^ (iva) in the clause {svam iva) is out of its right position and should be construed after the words ^throwing off.2> — He rejects the theory ^ that there is [in this state] a diversity of objects by saying «to this ... a single.» It is 1. the for- mation of a single mental-act, in the sense that it forms ^ or brings forth a single mental-act. Consequently since it is [single], the atoms, in that they are many, are not the objects of the super-deliberative [balanced-state]. What he has wished to say is this : Assuming that they are fit [to be the object of the balanced-state], still, in that they are very subtile, and because they are collected into a manifold [each unit of which has its own subtile idea], they are not fit to be the object of a presented idea which brightens [into a conscious know- ledge] of the unity of the single intended-object which has magnitude [mahattva as contrasted with anu\. An objection, ‘ Granted that the atoms are real ‘ exis- tences, then the [so-called] coarseness would be [only] a subjective [samvrta) property of that which shines clearly [in consciousness].’ In reply to this® he says ^2. its essence is an intended object.» The point is that when once a coarse object [as a whole] has been established in experience, it cannot, unless there be something inhibitory, be denied. — To those [Vai 9 esika] who think that [animate things] like cows and [inanimate things] like water-jars are produced ® by binary and other atoms in gradations, he says «3. conglomeration of atoms. » A conglomeration of atoms is a mutation in gross form and this [form of] mutation difierentiates ’ it from other [coarse] mutations. That of which this [differentiated] mutation is the essence®, in other words, the-thing-itself (svari/^a), is that which is called [ in the genitive case, he indicates that there is in some respects a difference ; and by the words «it is self-dependent)^, that there is an identity. [It is inferred] by its phenomenalized effects : phenomenalized in the sense that its [effect] is ex- perienced ; and phenomenalized in the sense that it [serves] the business-of-life. [And] it is proven by inference to any one who takes the opposite view. And in so far as it is identical with its cause, we may consistently say that it has the form of its cause. Accordingly he says ^by [changing] into its phenomenal form by the operation of the conditions-which-phenomenalize it.^ — ‘ Is this apparent- form {dharma), which is identical with it, permanent ? ’ He gives a negative answer in the words «when another apparent-form.» Another apparent-form [that is,] as a potsherd [is another apparent-form of a water-jar broken in pieces]. — That this whole has a form not-to-be-found {vydvrttam) in the atoms he shows by saying ^This same.» For it has properties, which give it a specific-character, such as the holding of honey or of water, which actions are other than actions which could be accomplished by atoms.^ [The whole is known] not only by [perceptual] experience, but also by the business-of-life since the conduct of men depends upon these [wholes]. This he states in the words ^and by this.» A [Buddhist] objection, ‘ This may be true. If there were nothing to contradict, experience might establish [by the help of inferences] that [the mutation in its gross form] is a whole-having-parts. But (ca) there is a contradiction. [For in the line of reasoning,] — (a) All that exists is without parts, {fi) like thought {vijharm), and (y) such things as cows and water-jars exist, — we have a natural [and valid] middle-term ^ [that is, existence]. [But the point is made that there * The system insists that not even the * This is a term of the “ Eastern school ” of subtile (siiksma) is perceptible to the Logicians, equivalent in their usage to avikalpita type of thinking. an unconditioned middle term, which 87 ] Subtile object 2^ermanent and impermanent [ — i. 43 is no existence in coarse form.] For existence is subsumed {vyapta) under absence of contradictory qualities.^ And connexion with contradictory qualities, which is contradictory with it [that is, existence], being found to exist in a thing-having-pai-ts, excludes existence also, since in such a case something contrary to the subsumer [which is, absence of contradictory qualities] has been found. And so [to revert to the original point] there is in the whole a connexion with con- tradictory qualities, for example, belonging to that place and not belonging to that place, being covered and not being covered, being red and not red, moving and not moving. [Accordingly wholes in gross form do not exist.] ’ In reply to this he says <5iBut one to whom.» The intention [of what was first asserted] is this. [The whole in gross form is now said to be given in experience and to be an action realizing a purpose.] The existence which is given as the middle - term {Jietu) must either be given by experience and be such as even a ploughman with dusty feet can understand, or it must be other than what is given by experience. Of these two the latter is not a middle-term since it is not given in experience, [that is, it must itself be established as existing in the middle-term]. But water-jars and such things have an existence given in experience, namely, activity realizing a purpose. [This form] is not other than its gross [form]. This [form given by experience and realizing a purpose] is the middle-term, [that is, existence], and by removing [the existence of] coarseness [as thus defined, this middle-term] destroys itself. In reply to this [the Buddhist] says, ‘ Existence is not [a permanent] coarseness, but is the negation of non-existence. And coarseness is negative non-coarseness. Moreover negativations differ according to the variations of the things negatived. So even when there is no coarseness, there is no destruction of existence.’ [The reply to this would be :] By reason of variations in the negativations we may admit that there is a variation in the objects of the determination [avasaya). But would you. Sir, be good enough to say what the object is of the source-of-the-valid-idea which is not a first faint impression {vikalpa), and which is the necessary-condition (purvaka) for the determinations ? For if you say that the atoms of colour which arise con- tinuously, and the minute that-ness of which is unknown, [are the object], the reply is. Very well. These are intermingled ® with the atoms of odour and taste and touch and are [therefore] not continuous. Therefore if it be unaware of the would not be a hetvahhdsa, but a valid (sad) term. The later term would be sad-anumdna. See Nyaya-Koca, s.v. Such terminology points to the Eastern country as the home of Vacaspati- mifra. Compare for this kind of logical language Dharmakirti’s Nyaya-bindu- tlka (Peterson’s ed.), p. 104. ’ See Nyaya-bindu-tika ii. 2 (Peterson’s ed.), p. 106b ^ Compare Patanjali : Mahabhasya on i. 1. 23 (Kielhorn i. 81*). * One does not see merely the colour series. For this is intersected by the taste and smell and touch series. On the other hand the continuum of colour is not an illusion as the Vedantin, Udayana for example, would say (Atma-Tattva- Viveka, Jibananda’s ed.. Calc., 1873, p. 83*). The Yogasystem explains these series as the mutations of a substance. i. 43—] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [88 intei’inediate [atoms], this indefinite-first-impression, based upon the atoms, like the presented-idea of a forest as single and as dense [although it too is full of intermediate spaces,] would be false. Accordingly the indefinite-first-impressions proceeding from this [other first faint impression] are not even mediately in relation with a [perceptible] object. Thus how could one succeed in establishing that there are no parts in existences which are determined by these [indefinite-first- impressions]? Therefoi’e if one desires to hold to the validity of perceptions which are definite-later-impressions, the existence of that very coarseness which is being experienced by this [perception] must be admitted, [even] if one does not assent to that which is to be determined by [perception which is] definite- and-later-impression. To proceed : if existence inhibits this [kind of percep- tion], it would inhibit itself. That the atoms are exceedingly subtile and that they become the objects of experience through the medium of other kinds of atoms — to acknowledge this is self-destructive. Having this in view he says «One to whom this particular conglomeration which is not [perceptibly] real» [is the object of a perception which is a definite-and-later-impression], one, that is, who says that the subtile atoms should therefore be objects of percep- tions which are definite-and-later-impressions — to him he replies ^ince by an indefinite-first-impression a subtile cause is imperceptible. ;?> For the reason that for him there is no whole, everything, — according to the characterization given [i. 8] that “ an erroneous idea is not based on that form [in respect of wliich it is entertained],” — is reduced to erroneous idea, all that which rests upon coarse- ness and all that which rests upon the existence which is the locus of this [coarseness]. — It might be objected that even so [and finally] knowledge is not erroneous in regard to one's self, because this does not appear as a whole having parts. In reply to this he says ^Nearly. » The objector might reply ‘What even if it be so?’ In reply to this he says «And then.:^ If such an idea as that of existence be erroneous, then such an idea, caused by existence or something of the kind as this that there are no wholes having parts, would also be erroneous. Because its object also, in so far as it is something to be determined, is certainly nothing coarse ^ [and this latter is] not concerned with definite-and-later-impressions. And this [object] does not exist. Such is the meaning of the argument. And if it be asked why there is no object, he replies with the word [for instance] above or below or at one side. «Time» [for instance] the present. ^Cause)^ [for instance] the atom of earth is produced by the five fine elements among which the fine element of odour predominates. Likewise the atom of water [is pro- duced] from the four fine elements among which the fine element of taste pre- dominates. Likewise the atom of fire [is produced] from the three fine elements, excluding the fine element of odour and of taste, and among which the fine element of colour predominates. Likewise the atom of wind [is produced] from the [two] fine elements beginning with odour, and of which [two] the ^ Vijfiana Bhiksu glosses mahad-vastu with the words ‘ coarse ’ {sthula) and ‘ modifi- cation only ’ (kevalavikrti). This is the use of the word in iii. 44. * The two kinds must be the super-delibera- 12 [h.o.s. 1?] tive and the super-reflective ; and not, as Vijnana Bhiksu says, the reflective and the super-reflective. This would be a gross inconsistency. For the reflective kind has predicate relations, i. 44—] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [90 fine element of touch predominates. Likewise [the atom] of air from the fine element sound alone. — This is the cause in the case of the subtile elements. These [subtile elements] are experienced when they have a place and a time and a cause. An idea (huddhi) which is capable of being particularized does not follow unless it be particularized by [such] an experience. An objector might ask, ‘ What similarity is there between [the balanced-state] with delibera- tion and [that] with reflection ? ’ In reply to this he says ^In this case also.» For the atom of earth which consists of the conglomeration of the five fine elements may be apperceived by a single idea. Similarly the atom of water and the other atoms [too] which have as their essences four or three or two or one fine element may be apperceived by a single idea. — ^Uprisen» means a present apparent-form ; [the element]' would be particularized by that. And finally with regard to this [uprisen apparent-form], it is pointed out that there is an interpenetration of the predicate-relations of verbal-communications and of inferences by the memory of the conventional-use [of words]. For when something coarse is the object of perception, the atoms do not appear. But [they do appear objectively] as the result of verbal-communications and of infer- ences. Thus it is consistent that this [balanced-state] should be confused. — He describes the super-reflective [balanced-state] in the words «Quiescent» are past. ^Uprisen» are present. ^Inde- terminable» are future apparent-forms. [Atoms] are not characterized by these. Not being characterized by apparent-forms, is it quite right to say that atoms are unrelated to them ? In reply to this he says «correspond to all apparent- forms.» — With “ which kind of a relation do these atoms correspond to apparent-forms ? In reply to this he says ^are the essence of all apparent- forms.» In other words, the apparent-forms are different from the atoms in some respects and in other respects not different. — But why has this balanced- state this kind of an object ? In reply to this he says ^Since ... of this character.» In other words, having an apperception of the that-ness of a per- ceptible object, it does not become active with regard to that which has not this that-ness. — Having stated the object of this [balanced-state], he tells what it is itself by saying ^Moreover the insight.» Bringing the [four] together, he ' The termination tasi is the same as tasil sy am thinks that some words have been (Pan. V. 3. 7). lost at this point from the Tattva * RaghavanandaYatiinhis PatanjalaRaha- Vai 9 aradi of Vacaspati-mi 9 ra. 91] The limit of subtile objects [ — i. 45 describes the object as being serviceable to distinguish what they are them- selves by saying «0f these. » He sums up with the word «Thus.^ «0f both kinds^ means both its own [super-deliberative] and also super-reflective forms. 45. The subtile object likewise terminates in unresoluble- primary-matter {alinga). In the case of the earthen atom the fine element of odour, [which is the cause of the atom of earth,] is the subtile object of the [reflec- tive and super-reflective] balanced-states ; in the case of the v'atery atom the fine element of taste [is the subtile object] ; in case of the fiery atom the fine element of colour ; in case of the windy atom the fine element of touch ; in case of the aerial atom the fine element of sound. The personality-substance which is the cause of these [elements is also the subtile object of this balanced-state]. Resoluble-primary-matter-as-such {lihgamdtra) [which is the cause] of this [personality- substance] also is the subtile object [of the balanced-state]. Unresoluble-primary-matter [which is the cause] of this [resoluble-primary-matter-as-such] also is the subtile object [of the balanced-state]. And beyond the unresoluble-primary- matter there is nothing subtile. If the objection be raised that the Self is subtile, the reply is that this is true. The subtilty of the Self in relation to the resoluble-primary-matter [thinking-sub- stance] is, however, not that of the unresoluble-primary-matter to the resoluble-primary-matter. For the Self is not the material cause [anvayin] of resoluble-primary-matter, but the instrumental cause ihetu). Accordingly it is explained that subtilty reaches its utmost degree in the primary-substance. Does the balanced-state, which has a thing-to-be-known as its object, end in the subtile element only ? No. But, 45. The subtile object likewise terminates in unresoluble-primary-matter {alinga). That state of the flne element of odour which is in relation to the earthen atom is the subtile object of the balanced- state. Similarly in the later cases also the connexion is to be made. The resoluble-primary-matter-as-such {linga-mdtra) is the Great Principle [that is, the thinking-substance (buddhi)^. For it goes to dissolution (laya) in the primary- substance. Unresoluble-primary-matter is primary-substance. For it does not dissolve into anything. This is the meaning. He says that subtilty terminates i. 45 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [92 in unresoluble-primary-matter in the words As a result of this, the four balanced- states, the object of which is the thing-to-be-kno^vn, are limited in so far as they are seeded. The seeded state, however, is not limited [to the thing-to-be-known], since, even in the case of the balanced-state the object of which is the knower or the process-of-knowing, it persists, not being negated by the distinction into predicate-relations and unpredicated-relations [with reference to the thing-to-be- known]. So with regard to the thing-to-be-known there are four balanced-states and four in respect of the knower and the process-of-knowing : thus there are eight’ of these [concentrations]. The Comment is explained by a [mere] reading. ’ The Bikaner MS. and the Bombay San. Ser. text read siddha in place of te. 93] Internal undisturhed calm L — 1. 47 47. When there is the clearness of the super-reflective [balanced-state, the yogin gains] internal undisturbed calm. When freed from obscuration by impurity, the sattva of the think- ing-substance, the essence of which is light, has a pellucid steady flow not overwhelmed by the rajas and tamas. This is the clear- ness. When this clearness arises in the super-reflective balanced- state, then the yogin gains the internal undisturbed calm, [that is to say] the vision by the flash {sphuta) of insight which does not pass successively through the serial order [of the usual processes of experience] and which has as its intended-object the thing as it really is. And in this sense it has been said,^ “ As the man who has climbed the crag sees those upon the plain below [bhumistha), so the man of insight who has risen to the undisturbed calm of in- sight, himself escaped from pain, beholds all creatures in their pain.” Of the four balanced-states which have as their object the thing-to-be-known, excellence belongs to the super-reflective [balanced-state]. [This] he describes in the sutra 47. When there is the clearness of the super-reflective [balanced* state, the yogin gains] internal undisturbed calm. He describes the meaning of the word by [the words beginning with] ^impurity Impurity is an accretion of rajas and tamas. And it is the defilement which has the distinguishing-characteristic of obscuration. [Clearness] is freed from this. «The essence of which is lights means naturally light. For this reason the sattva of the thinking-substance is not overwhelmed. An objection is made, ‘ This may be true. But if the balanced-state has as its object the thing-to-be- known, how could the undisturbed calm have itself as its object ? ’ To this he replies with the words And this is a [term] whose meaning is intelligible of itself ; [this insight] bears truth ^ and nothing else ; in it there is not even a trace of mis- conception. And in this sense it has been said, “By the Sacred Word [and] by inference and by eagerness for practice in contemplation, in three ways he promotes his insight and gains the highest yoga.” With regard to this same point he gives the consensus of yogins by telling of the term current among yogins which itself expresses the intended-object. 48. In this [calm] the insight is truth-bearing. The Comment is easy. By the expression ^Sacred Word» is meant the hearing {^ravana) prescribed by the Vedas ; by the expression ^inference^ is meant consideration (manana). Contemplation is reflection. Practice in this is following it up one time after another. Eager- ness for this is close attention [to it]. So in this way absorption (nididhyasana) is described. But this [insight] — 49. Has an object other than the insight resulting from things heard or from inferences inasmuch as its intended- object is a particular. is knowledge derived from verbal-communication. This deals with generic objects. For a particular cannot be con- noted by a verbal-communication. Why [not] ? Because a word does not have its conventional-usage established by the particular. Similarly inference deals with generic objects only. [For instance, compare i. 7], we say, where there is getting [to a place], there is motion ; and where there is no getting [to a place], there is no motion. And by an inference we get a conclusion in generic [terms only]. Therefore no particular can be the object of verbal- communication or of inference. And of this subtile and hidden and remote ^ thing there is no knowledge by ordinary percep- tion. Furthermore we cannot assert that this particular has no validity and does not exist. Therefore this particular as object, whether it belong to a subtile element or to the Self, is apper- ' See iii. 51. ^ Patanjala Rahasyam gives the gloss : dtma-fattvam. ’ Compare Sariikh. Kar. vii. 95 ] Normative insight [ — i. 49 ceptible by the concentrated insight only. Consequently this insight has an object other than [the object of] the insight result- ing from a thing heard or from inference, inasmuch as its intended- object is a particular. The objection is made, ‘ This may be true. But the super-reflective [balanced- state] which is produced by perfection of impressions whose objects ‘ refer to that which is known by verbal-communication or by inference can refer [gocarayef) only to the objects of verbal-communication and of inference. For surely a sub- liminal impression derived from the experience of one object is not able to pro- duce knowledge with regard to another. For that would be an unwarranted assumption. Therefore if the super-reflective [balanced-state] is truth-bearing, verbal communications and inferences must also be assumed to be this [that is, truth-bearing].’ In reply to this he says 49. Has an object other than the insight resulting from things heard or from inferences inasmuch as its intended-object is a particular. For the sattva of the thinking-substance is naturally bright ; although it has the power of seeing all intended-objects, it becomes obscured by tarms ; only when by rajas it is set-free-to-stream-forth, then only does it know [the object]. But when by practice and passionlessness the defilement of rajas and tamas is cast off and it shines forth spotlessly clear, then passing beyond the limits of all measures {mdna) and of all things measurable {meya) and having endless brightness — what then, pray, can there be that is not within its scope ? He explains [the sutra] in the words It might be admitted that then we have ordinary perception irrespective of a knowledge of the relation [between the word and the thing-expressed] and that this [perception] does not deal with generic objects only. In reply to this he says, ^And of this . . . no.^ It may not be admitted that ordinary perception depends upon a knowledge of the rela- tion [of word and thing-expressed] ; but it must be admitted that it depends upon ^ The sequence is, first an amihhava, next a saniskara, and then a smiii. i. 49 — ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [96 the senses. And with this [higher insight] the senses have no pre-established harmony. This is the meaning. It is objected that if the individual is not within the scope of verbal-communications and inferences and perceptions, then it does not exist. For there is no source-of-valid-ideas for [it]. In reply to this he says «Furthermore . . . not.» For a source-of-vahd-ideas is not [necessarily] a pervader nor a cause of the object-of-knowledge (prameya) to the extent that, if that [source-of-valid-ideas] should cease, the [object-of-knowledge] would cease to be. For surely, when the moon is a slender crescent {kalavant), those who accept sources-of- valid-ideas do not doubt the real existence of the deer’ which is situated in the other part [of the moon’s sui’face not then visible]. «Therefore,» for this reason it ^is apperceptible by the concentrated insight only.^^ And here the atoms and the selves which are subjected to [this] discussion are endowed with a particularity peculiar to themselves, because, being substances, they are distinct from each other. Whatever things, being substances, are distinct from each other, these are endowed with particularity peculiar to themselves, like a cripple or a man with a shaven head. According to this inference, and to the verbal-com- munication which is devoted to teaching what the truth-bearing insight is, [the pecuhar individuality of this insight has been defined]. Although the individual is described, still in the absence of such a description doubt might arise, because it has been obtained by a line-of-reasoning ; yet in so far as it is not far “ or re- mote, this sattva is brought, with some difficulty, within the scope of verbal-com- munication or of inference. But they do not [make evident the existence of the particular] by as direct an experience as words of connexion, for instance, through their application of gender and number, [bring] the meaning of the word ‘ and ’ [within the scope of verbal-communication or of inference]. Therefore it is established that [this insight] has an object other than the insights resulting from things heard or from inferences. When the yogin has gained concentrated insight, the subliminal- impression made by the insight is reproduced again and again. 50. The subliminal-impression produced by this [super- reflective balanced-state] is hostile to other subliminal- impressions. The subliminal-impression arising from concentrated insight inhi- bits the latent-impression from the emergent subliminal-impres- sion. After emergent subliminal-impressions have been repressed. ’ Compare Subhasitaratnabhandagaram (Nir. Sag. fourth ed.), p. 318, no. 162, s.v. ankam ke 'pi. See also Kuvalaja- nanda Karika (Nir. Sag. ed.), p. 27’. * According to Patanjala Rahasyam the meaning of ‘ not far ’ is that from which there results a generic idea (samanyato hodhayatah ) ; and of ‘ re- mote ’, that from which there results no particular idea vifesato na bodh- ayata iti. 97] Inhibition of emergent subliminal-impressions [ — i. 50 the presented-ideas arising from them do not occur. When presented-ideas are restricted, concentration follows after. Then concentrated insight ; after that, subliminal-impressions made from insight ; thus latent-impressions from subliminal-impressions are reproduced again and again. Thus first comes insight and then [follow] subliminal-impressions. How is it that this excess of sub- liminal-impressions will not provide the mind-stuff with a task ? [The answer is :] these subliminal-impressions made by the insight do not provide the mind-stuff with a task since they cause the dwindling of the hindrances. For they cause the mind-stuff to cease from its work. For the movement of the mind-stuff termi- nates at [the time of] discernment (khydti). ‘ Let this be granted. Let the [concentration] conscious [of an object] have a reality as its object by the practice of the aforesaid means. But this concentrated insight may be obstructed by beginningless emergent subliminal-impressions in so far as it is closely enveloped [by them], like minute flashes [of light] from a lamp in the eddy of a whirling wind.’ To remove this doubt he introduces the next sutra with the words ^concentrated insight.^ He recites the sutra 50. The subliminal-impression produced by this [super-reflective balanced- state] is hostile to other subliminal-impressions. The word refers to the super-reflective balanced-state. The word describes the emergence. It is the nature of thoughts to incline’ to intended-objects as they really are. This instability continues unsteady only so long as it does not reach the reality [literally, that-ness]. After reaching that and because it has taken a stable position there, [this] idea from the subliminal-impression does most certainly inhibit the series of ideas from subliminal-impressions which refer to what is not reality, even although [this series] is beginningless and rolls on as the wheel ^ of the series of [fluctuations and] subliminal-impressions. And in this sense outsiders^ also say, “ There is no inhibition of the unviolated essence of a thing- as-it-really-is by contradictions even although these latter be from time without beginning. For it is the nature of the mind to incline to things as they are.” The objector would say, ‘ This may be true. We may admit that, as a result of concentrated insight, there is a restriction of a subliminal-impression produced during the emergent state. Still there exists uninjured (avikala) an excess of subliminal-impressions which is produced by concentration and which causes the generation of the concentrated insight. So the fact that the mind-stuff" has a task still remains.’ — With this in mind, he raises an objection, ^How is it that ’ Compare Samkh. Tatt. Kau. Ixiv. tion is found in Vacaspatimifra’s Bha- * Compare i. 5, p. 20^ (Calc. ed.). matl (Jiban. ed.), p. 60“b ® Either Jains or Buddhists. The quota- 13 [h.o.s. 17 ] i. 50 — ] Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [98 this,» which he removes with the words This is the use ^ of self-castigation. And this [kind of self-castigation], not being inhibitory to the undis- turbed calm of the mind-stuff, is therefore deemed [by great sages] to be worthy of his {anena, the yogin’s) earnest attention, dlecita- tion> is the repetition ^ of purifying formulae such as the Mystic Syllable {pranava) or the study of books on Liberation. is the offering ^ up of all actions to the Supreme Teacher or the renunciation of the fruit of [all] these [actions]. If it be objected that the First Book described yoga with its means [and] with its subordinate divisions [and] with its results, and that no reason remains why a Second Book should be begun, he replies in the words ^has been stated.» For in the First Book practice and passionlessness were described as means to yoga. And since these two, for one whose [mind-stuff] is emergent, do not instantly come into being, he stands in need of the means taught in the Second Book in order to purify the sattva. For by these he quite purifies the sattva and performs the protective ordinances and daily ' Similarly i. 41, p. 85® (Calc. ed.). ® Contrast this with i. 23 and see also Lihga ^ See ii. 44 and compare Linga Pur. viii. 39. Pur. viii. 40. [104 ii. 1 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana cultivates practice and passionlessness. The state of being concentrated is the state of being undistracted. — How could even a man whose mind-stutf is emergent be, because concentrated (yukta) by the means which are to be taught, a yogin? This is the meaning. From among those observances which are to be described, having made a selection [of some] as being rather more service- able to the beginner, the author of the sutras first of all teaches [what] the yoga of action [is]. 1. Self-castigation and study and devotion to the iQvara are the Yoga of action. Action which is itself yoga is the yoga of action since it is a means-of-effecting yoga. Therefore, in the Visnu Purana, in the dialogue between Khandikya and Ke 9 idhvaja, starting with the passage,* ‘ At first the yogin who is [just] beginning to apply himself is called a novice iyoga-yuj),’ self-castigation and recitation and the like are set forth. With the words «in him who is not self-castigated)^ he shows by a negative instance that self-castigation is a means. By the words «from time without beginning» he shows that self-castigation has a subsidiary function which is serviceable as a means* [of attaining yoga]. Variegated by reason of the subconscious- impressions, from time without beginning, coming from hindrances and from karma, [and] therefore that in which [the meshes of] the net of objects have found entrance, that is, inserted themselves, impurity, which is the excess of rajas and tamas, is not thoroughly reduced without self-castigation. Eeduction is the thorough thinning out of that which was closely woven. — The objection is raised : ‘ Even if we have recourse to self-castigation, still — in so far as it causes disorders of the humours — it is hostile to yoga ; how then is it a means [to attain] this [yoga]?’ In reply to this he says, ^And this’ [kind].)» Self-castigation should be performed only so long as it does not bring on a disorder* of the humours. This is the meaning. «Such as the Mystic Syllabled that is, such as, the Hymn to the Purusa [EV. x. 90] or the Eudra- mandala’ or a Brahmana or the like from the Vedas, or the Brahma-parayana® from the Puranas. — l 9 vara, that is, the Supreme Teacher, the Exalted, — to him. With regard to Whom this* hath been said, “Whatever I do, whether auspicious or inauspicious, whether intentionally or unintentionally, all that is committed unto Thee. Moved by Thee I do [it all].” — Eenunciation of the fruit of [all] these [actions] is doing the actions without attachment to the fruit [thereof]. And with regard to this it hath been said,® “You are concerned with actions only and never with fruits. Do not be one whose motive is the fruit of actions. Nor let your attachment be to inaction.” * VP. vi. 7. 33. See also Naradiya Pur. xlvii. * Literally, is serviceable by being a means, upagatd'.’upayoginam. ^ As opposed, for instance, to VP. ii. 11. * Compare i. 30, p. 67* (Calc. ed.). ’ This seems to refer to the ^atarudriya- homamantras, TaittirTya-samhita iv. 5, Vajasaneyi-sariabita xvi, Kathaka xvii. ® Refers perhaps to Visnu Purana i. 15. * Vijnana Bhiksu calls this smrti. ® Bhagavad Gita ii. 47. 105] [ — ii. 2 Purposes of the yoga of action Now this yoga of action is — 2. For the cultivation of concentration and for the attenua- tion of the hindrances. For when the yoga of action is given earnest attention, it cultivates concentration ; attenuates the hindrances to an extreme degree ; [and] will make the hindrances, when they are extremely attenuated, disqualified for propagation, like seeds burned by the fire of Eleva- tion {prasamkhydna). But the subtile insight, which is the dis- criminative discernment between the sattva and the Self, untouched by the hindrances because they are so much attenuated, with its task finished, will be ready for inverse-propagation ^ {pratiprasava). In order to mention the purpose of this [yoga of action] he introduces the Sutra with the words «For the.)^ 2. For the cultivation^ of concentration and for the attenuation of the hindrances. It is objected that if the yoga of action alone is able to attenuate the hindrances, then there is no need of Elevation. To this he replies with the words ^the extremely attenuated. » The yoga of action operates only for the extreme attenuation, but not for the sterilization of the hindrances, but Elevation [operates] for the sterilization of those [hindrances]. The words «like burned seeds2> indicate that the burned seeds of winter rice [and the hindrances] are of the same kind in so far as both are sterile. The objector says, ‘ This may be true. But if Elevation alone can disqualify the hindrances from propagation, then there is no need for their attenuation.’ In reply to this he says, ^of these.)^ For if the hindrances are not attenuated, the discriminative discernment between the sattva and the Self, submerged {grasta) by mighty foes, is incapable even of uprising, still less of sterilizing them. But when the hindrances are quite thinned out and impotent, [the discernment], although in opposition to them, does, with the aid of passionlessness and of practice, finally arise. And when the discernment which is nothing more than the [sense] of the difference between the sattva and the Self is finally arisen, it is un-touched by them, — that is, not overwhelmed by them, — for just so long as it is not touched [by them]. «The subtile insight)^ is so-called, because its object is subtile inasmuch as its object is beyond the range of the senses. «Will be ready for in verse-propagation, » that is, for resolution. Why? Because its task is finished. [In other words,] that is said to be of this kind by which, acting as a cause, the task of giving starts to the effects of the aspects [guna] has been finished. * Compare ii. 2, p. 107®; ii. 10, p. 120*; Deussen’s excellent rendering of this word ii. 27, p. 167“; iii. 50, p. 265“; iv. 34, is Verinnerlichung. p. 319“ (Calc. ed.). 14 [h.o.s. it] [106 ii. 3 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana Now what are these ^ hindrances and [vd) how many are they ? 3. Undifferentiated-consciousness {avidyd) and the feeling- of-personality and passion and aversion and the will-to- live are the five^ hindrances. This means that the so-called hindrances are five misconceptions [i. 8]. These when flowing out make the authority (adhikdra) of the aspects {guna) more rigid ; make a mutation more stable ; swell the stream of effects and causes ; and, becoming interdependent upon one another for aid, bring forth the fruition of karma. He raises a question by saying «Now)^ and replies [to it] by the sutra upon «Undifferentiated-consciousness.^ 3. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) and the feeling-of-personality and passion and aversion and the will-to-live are the five hindrances. He explains the word Balarama says, ‘ Undifferentiated -con- Balarama explains the word anu^erate sciousness is inseparably -connected by saying ‘become inherent in ’ (ani<- with hindrances ’ {kle^esv avidyanvTya). gatd bhavanti). 109] Undifferentiated-consciousness the source of hindrances [ — ii. 4 of seed)^ their potentiality of action is indicated. To meet the question why, in the case even of one who has discriminative discernment, hindrances are not dormant, he says, «for one who has [reached] Elevation.^ <5Cln his last body,» in other words, in his case no other body will be produced with reference to which [this] body of his could be called prior. ^Not in other persons,^ in other words, not in the discarnate and similar cases. An objection is raised, ‘ Since there is no total destruction of any existing thing, what, we ask, becomes of the force of the magical powers of this kind of yoga? Ai’e not the hindrances awakened when face-to-face with objects ? ’ In reply to this, he says, «existent.» Although the hindrances are existent, still in their state as seeds they are burned by the fire of Elevation {prasamhhyana). This is the meaning. — 2. The opposite of the hindrances is the yoga of action ; by the cultivation, by the following up, of this, the hindrances become overpowered, that is, attenuated. Or we may say that thinking-focused-to-a-point [saiiiyag-jncina) is the opposite of undifferentiated- consciousness ; that the knowing of distinctions is [the opposite] of the feeling- of-personality ; that the detached attitude {madhyasthya) is [the opposite] of passion and aversion ; [and] that the cessation of the thought of continuance is [the opposite] of the will-to-live. — 3. He describes the interception with the words ^When this is the case.» Either because overcome by any one of the hindrances which moves actively forth, or because resorting excessively to objects, they intercept repeatedly and move actively forth in one form or another, that is, come into appearance {avirhhavcmti), either as the result of using aphrodisiacs and the like or as the result of the weakness of [the other hindrances] which overcome it. By the repetition he signifies the reiteration of the interruption and of the moving actively forth. Thus the difference [of this] from the afore- said dormant [hindrance] has been described. When love moves actively forth, anger which is different in kind is overpowered ; or again love itself set upon one object overpowers, though like in kind, another love which is set upon a different object. This he states by the word «love.)^ — The fluctuation which is yet to come is to be understood as having a three-fold course according to circumstances. With this in mind he says, «For this.)^ The pronoun [‘ this’] refers only to the hindrance from the fluctuation which is yet to come ; it does not refer to Chaitra’s love, just because that [love] is intercepted. — 4. He describes the sustained [hindrance] in the words ^upon an object.» If some one suggests as an objection that the sustained [hindrance], since it hinders men, might be [properly] called a hindrance, but that the others do not hinder [and so can] by no means be called hindrances, he says in reply «all these [four].» They do not pass beyond the limits of the hindrances, that is, beyond the limits of the thing expressed by the word hindrance, when they become changed into the sustained state. Therefore they too are to be rejected. This is the point. — Presupposing the unity of the hindrances * he raises an objection in the words Literally, Presupposing a unity in so far as the quality of being a hindrance goes. [110 ii. 4 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana «If this is so, what.» He rebuts it by showing that although they are of the same kind in so far as they are hindrances, they are particular because of the different previously described states. This he does in the words The abode is the mother’s womb polluted by such things as urine ; the seed is the mother’s blood and the father’s semen. The sustenance is formation into juices of the food eaten and drunk ; for by it the body is held together. Exudation is sweat. And death defiles the body of even a scholarly man. Inasmuch as a bath is required after his [dead body] is touched. — An objector might say, ‘If the body is impure, there is no use in cleansing it with earth and with water.’ To this he replies «because it needs [constant] cleaning.^ Although the body is naturally impure, purification must be applied [to it], just as women produce fragrance [by applying] ointments * This illustration occurs in Siddhanta 2. ‘ Measure ’ •pramdne ; thus gospada- KaumudI, § 1060, on Pan. vi. 1. 145. mutram = hsetram. The word has the two meanings given * Patanjali discusses the word Vdiyasikih in the Comment: 1. ‘ Not-visited ’ in the first varttika on iv. 1. 97. (asevife); thus gospadany = aranydni ; 113] Undifferentiated-consciousness is something 'positive [ — ii. 5 to the body. He completes the half-finished statement by saying «Here . . . in the impure. » The meaning is that it is impure on the grounds stated before. He describes the recognition of purity [in the impure] by the words «the new.» in order to indicate the relation between them, that is, the capacity to be an enjoyer and to be objects to be enjoyed. — He elaborates the sutra by saying ^The Self.)^ — It might be asked, ‘ Why, since ^ This is the sixth fragment of Pahcafikha according to Garbe. Compare Bh. Gita vi. 41. ii. 6 — j Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [116 they are perceived as identical, should they not be identical and why should [the appearance of] unity hinder the Self? ’ In reply he says «he who has the power of the enjoyer . . . that which has the power of being enjoyed.^ He who has the power of the enjoyer is the Self ; that which has the power of being enjoyed is the thinking-substance. These two are as distinct as possible. If it be asked, ‘ Whence comes this distinction ? ’ the reply is, «as unconfused as possible.^ Immutability and other [qualities] are the properties of the Self ; mutability and other [qualities] are the properties of the thinking-substance. Thus there is no confusion. Thus by these words it is asserted that the identity, although presented-as-an-idea, is not in-the-strict-sense-real. — The words «failure to dis- tinguish» state the fact that hindrances exist. After having given an affirmative [line of reasoning], he states a negative [line of reasoning] in the words by the word «That.» 8. Aversion^ is that which dwells upon pain. That repulsion [or] wrath [or] anger, on the part of one acquainted with pain, ensuing upon a recollection of pain, for either the pain or for the means of attaining it, is aversion. 8. Aversion is that which dwells upon pain. The words by the word «that.^ Kepulsion in the sense that it repels. The same he elaborates by synonyms, [for instance,] «wrath.» 9. The will-to-live {ahhinivega) sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature ^ exists in this form even in the wise. In all living beings this craving for one’s self ceaselessly rises, ‘ May I not cease to live ! May I live ! ’ This craving for one’s self does not arise except in one in whom the experience of death resides. And from [the existence] of this [hope] the experience of other births is made clear. And this is that well-known hindrance [called] the will-to-live. This [fear of death], inconceivable as a result of either perception or inference or verbal-communication, sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature, as a vision of extermi- nation, forces the inference that the pangs of death have already been experienced in previous births. And just as it is evident that this fear is to be found in the unspeakably stupid, so also even in the wise, who have some understanding of the prior limit [of human lives], [that is, the round-of-rebmths,] and of their final * Professor Deussen quotes most appositely Spinoza, Ethica iii. 13, Scholion, nihil aliud est, quam laetitia concomi- tante idea causae extemae; et odium nihil aliud, quam tristitia concomitante idea causae externae. * See Ruyyaka : Alamkarasarvasva (Kavya- mala 35), p. 55‘, interprets the word as meaning merely eo ipso or by its own nature. Compare Ramananda Yati in Maniprabha (Benares Sanskrit Series), 1903, p. 30^, vdsana-dsahgah svarasah. [118 li. 9 — ] Booli II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana limit [that is, Isolation]. Why is this ? Because this subconscious- impression, the result of the fear of death, is alike in both fortunate and unfortunate. 9. The will-to-live sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature exists in this form even in the wise. He discusses the meaning of the term ^will-to-live^ in the words «all living beings.)^ «This craving for one’s self» is the longing for one’s self expressed in the words «May I not cease to live,» that is, ‘ May I not become non-existent,’ [and also expressed] in the words «May I live [bhuyasam)y> [that is] ‘ May I be alive {jivyasam).' The longing for one’s self is not possible unless the living creature have had residing in himself an experience of death. It is he only that has this craving for himself, [that is] the will-to-live, the fear of death. In the course of the discussion (prasangatas) he refers by the words, «And from [the existence] of this)^ to a heterodox-person {nastika) who denies that there is another birth. From the fact that the present body is being held together, it follows that there is an experience of a previous birth. In other words, a birth is a conjunction ‘ [of the soul] with a body and sense-organs and feelings which are different from those of any previous [conjunction] and are characterized by the [definite location] in the collection. This [birth] is experienced [or] attained. And it is this [experience or attainment] that is made clear. How is this ? In reply he says «And this is that well-known will-to-live.» Breaking off the sentence in the middle he tells of its hindering character in the word «hin- drance.» This [will-to-live] is called a hindrance because it hinders, [that is] pains, living-creatures with unkindly actions and the like. He finishes what he had begun to say by the words ^sweeping on by its own nature.» It has a disposition to sweep on by virtue of its own nature in the form of subconscious- impressions. But this disposition is not accidental. Even in the case of a worm just born [that is] full of pain and low in intelligence [this disposition] is not accidental. He tells the reason for this in the words ^as a result of perception.» This fear of death, being inconceivable, that is, not acquired in this present {pratyudita) birth as a result of perception or inference or verbal-communication, it must be inferred that the pangs of death have been experienced in a previous birth. This is the point at issue. For even a child just born trembles at the sight of a murderous thing. And from this peculiar quivering [the child] infers the nearness {pratyasatti) to himself of the experience of death and is found to be afraid of it. Thus we see that fear results from pain or from whatever leads to pain. Moreover in this birth he has not experienced or inferred or heard of death. So we gather that he has known only in a previous [birth] the pains [of death] or that which leads to the pain. And from this a memory of himself as he was in that condition persists. This moreover does not occur unless there be subliminal- impressions. Furthermore this subliminal-impression [cannot occur] without experience and the experience does not belong to this life. Therefore the only * See Qamkara on Brahma-sQtra ii. 2. 23 with Anandagiri’s gloss. 119] Removal of hindrances by contemplation [ — ii. lo remaining alternative is [a subliminal-impression] from a pre-existent birth. Thus there was a connexion with a previous birth. — The word requires a correlative ^just as.» Thus by supplying the word ^just as» from the sense of the sentence, he shows, in the words «just as . . . this,^ how the meaning of the sentence would be. — «In the unspeakably stupid)^ means in the most sluggish intelligences. — He shows [what the kind of] learning is by saying ^ome understanding of the prior and of the final limits [of human lives].» The limit is the end. Now the prior limit of man is the round-of- rebirths ; the latter is Isolation. He by whom this has been understood from things heard or from inferences is called [one who has understanding of the prior and of the final limits]. — This Avell-known fear exists [and] has become established in the case of the worm and of the wise man. It might be objected that in the case of the unwise fear-of-death is conceivable, but not in the case of the wise man, since [in him] it has been eradicated by knowledge. Or else if the fear-of-death has not been eradicated, it would be eternally present. With this in view he asks 4lWhy is this The answer is ^Because . . . it is alike.» He does not refer to the wise man who has conscious [concentration], but to him who discriminates upon the basis of things heard and of inference. This is the point. 10. These [hindrances] [when they have become] subtile are to be escaped by the inverse-propagation.^ These five hindrances when they have become like burned seeds, after the mind which has predominated over the deeds of the yogin is resolved [into primary matter], come with it to rest. Thus the hindrances have been characterized, and of those which should be escaped, four states, the dormant and the attenuated and the intercepted and the sustained, have been shown. But ‘ why is not the fifth state, which is subtile, mentioned by the author of the sutras, inasmuch as it is in the state of burned seed ? ’ To this he replies, 10. These [hindrances] [when they have become] subtile are to be escaped by the inverse-propagation. It is that of course which is within the scope of the exertions of man which has been described ; but the subtile is not within the scope of a man’s exertions that he might escape (hdna) [it]. It may, however, be escaped [that is] by a reduction of the mind-stuff, which is an effect and which is characterized by the feeling-of-personality, to the state of its own cause, [the thinking-substance]. He explains [the sutra] by the word The dwellers in the under- worlds are those who make latent-deposits of karma as a result of which certain underworlds, such as the Cooking Pot,* are reached. These have no latent- deposits to be felt in a birth seen [in this life] For no human body nor any kind of mutation of it can endure such torment (vedand) as is to be endured by them and uninterruptedly for thousands of years. The rest is easy. 13. So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from it [that is] birth [and] length-of-life [and] kind-of-experience. While the hindrances exist, the latent-deposit of karma starts the fruition, but not so the cut root of the hindrances. Just as the ' This sentence is omitted in the Bikaner * Mann xii. 76 ; Bhag. Pur. v. 25. 13 ; com- MS. It might well be a gloss. pare Jataka, vol. iii, p. 43, no. 314. * VP. i. 11. 24 with the context. 123] Three-fold fruition of karma [ — ii. 13 grains of rice, when encased within the chaff, as seeds in an un- burned condition, are fit for propagation, but neither the winnowed chaff nor seed in the burned condition is so [fit], similarly the latent-deposits of karma, when encased within hindrances, are pro- pagative of fruition, but neither the winnowed hindrances nor seed in the condition of having been burned by the Elevation {pra- samkhydna) [is propagative]. And this fruition is of three kinds, birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience. In regard to these [three,] this is under discussion, whether 1. one karma is the cause of one birth, or whether 2, one karma gives the impulse to more than one birth. There is a second discussion as to whether 3. more than one karma projects more than one birth, or whether 4. more than one karma projects one birth. Now it is not true 1. that one karma is the cause of one birth. Why so ? Because if the karma remaining over, accumulated from time-without- beginning and innumerable, and [the karma] of the present, should not have in their results an order limited [in its time], discourage- ment would be inflicted upon everybody. And this is prohibited. Neither 2, is one karma the cause of more than one birth. Why is this ? Because if, while there were more than one karma, only one karma at a time were to be the cause of more than one birth, a lack of time for fruition would be inflicted upon the remaining karmas. And that too would be prohibited. Neither 3. is more than one karma the cause of more than one birth. Why is this 1 Since it is impossible that more than this one birth should occur simultaneously, it must be supposed that they occur successively. This, likewise, would involve the same difficulty as in the last [case]. The result is then 4. the diverse accumulation of latent-deposits of karma, whether of merit or of demerit, made between birth and the end of life, remains in a relation of subordinate [parts] and a dominant [part]. This is made manifest at the ending of life after growing compact by one single impulse [ekapraghaUahena). After accom- plishing death, it assumes a rigid form and causes a single birth only. And this birth receives its length from that same karma. And again in that same length-of-life from that same karma it attains to its kind-of-experience. This latent-deposit of karma since it is the ii. 13 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [124 source of the birth and the length-of-life and the kind-of-experience, is said to have a three-fold fruition. Consequently [this] latent- deposit of karma is said to have [its limit in] one existence. On the other hand [a latent-deposit of karma] which is to be felt in [this] seen birth is said, since it is the cause of the kind-of-enjoyment only, to originate a single [kind of] fruition [and not a single existence]. Or, when it is the source of the length-of-the-life and the kind-of- enjoyment, it is said to originate two fruitions, as for instance in the case of Nandl9vara or of Nahusa. But this mind-stuft* like a fish -net made in different shapes on all sides and having, from time without beginning, a form-fixed {sammurchita) by subconscious impressions, which are like knots, caused by the experience of the fruition of the karma from the hindrances, is spread abroad. Therefore these sub- conscious-impressions are said to be preceded by more than one existence. It is this particular latent-deposit of karma, however, which is said to have [its limit] in one existence. Those sub- liminal-impressions which produce memory^ are said to be sub- conscious-impressions (yasand) and these are said to subsist from time-without-beginning. But that latent-deposit of karma which has [its limit] in a single existence has both a fruition limited [in time] and a fruition which is without limit [of time]. Of these two [orders], the limitation [in time] [niyama), [in so far as it has its limit in one existence], belongs only to the fruition which is to be felt in a birth of [this] seen [life] and which is limited [in time] ; whereas the fruition which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is without limit [of time] does not [have the limit in time which has its limit in a single existence]. Why so ? Because that fruition which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is without limit [of time] has three kinds of outcome ^ {gati) : Either 1. it is annihilated (ndga) when this [latter] fruition is finished and become unfruitful ; or 2. it is cast away [dvdpa-gamana) into the dominant karma ; or 3. it may continue for a long time, subjected to the dominant karma which has a fruition limited [in time]. Of these [three], 1. the annihilation of [the karma] which is finished and become unfruitful is like the annihilation in this present ' See iii. 18, p. 230^ (Calc. ed.). ^ Consult 9abda-Kalpa-Drunia, p. 846"^. 125] Three outcomes of karma [ — ii. 13 world of the dark karma when once the bright karma has dawned. With regard to which this has been said, “ Verily indeed karmas should be known to be by twos and twos, A single mass made of merit destroys [the dark and the dark-bright] evil ^ [mass]. Wish thou then to do well-done deeds. Right here to thee the wise make karma known.” — 2 . Casting away into the dominant karma : with reference to which it has been said^, “Should there be a very slight admixture of guilt in the sacrifice, it is either to be removed or to be overlooked. [Therefore this admixture is] not enough to remove the good-fortune [won by merit]. Why [not] ? Because in my case there is much other good-fortune. Where then this [admixture of guilt] is cast away [into the dominant karma], even in heaven it will make only a slight reduction [of merit].” — 3. When he said, ‘ it may continue for a long time subjected to the dominant karma which has a fruition limited [in time],’ how was this ? [The answer is], because, in the case of the karma the fruition of which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is limited [in time], death is said to be the appropriate cause of the manifestation. Not so, however, in the case [of the karma] the fruition of which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is without limit [of time]. On the contrary, [in this latter case], karma the fruition of which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is not limited [in time], either is annihilated or is cast away or is quiescent (updslta) in subjection [to the dominant karma] for a long time until the appropriate manifesting-conditions of the cause of the karma bring it close to its fruition. But since of this very fruition [of karma] the place or the time or the cause is none of them determinable, therefore it is that the ways of karma are [known as] mysterious and not easily discernible. Moreover, since the general rule is not broken down, even if there be exceptions, ’ The genitive is object of apahanti ac- cording to the Varttika, which refers to Panini ii. 3. 56. Vacaspatimi 9 i-a makes krsna-krsnagukle an accusative object of apahanti. In this case papa- kasija would mean belonging to a sinful man (see p. 129®^ below). ^ See the careful discussion of this fragment of Panca 9 ikha in Garbe’s translation of the Samkhya Tattva Kaumudi, 1892, p. 538, note 2. Compare also ^andilya- sutra xc (1861) and Cowell’s translation (1878), p. 96. ii. 13 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [126 therefore the latent-deposit of karma having [its limit in] a single existence [must] be acknowledged. [The objector says,] ‘Let this be granted. Since the latent-deposit of karma is based upon undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya), there may result, after the production of knowledge [vidya), a destruction of undifferentiated-consciousness, and so there might not be any subsequent latent-deposit of karma. Still the latent-deposits of karma, done previously and accumulated by the succession from time without beginning of innumerable births, being unsettled in their period of development, it would be impossible by realizing the effects to cause [these latent-deposits] to dwindle in so far as they might be experienced. Because of this it would be impossible to cut off the round-of-rebirths.’ To this he replies with the sutra 13. So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from it [that is] birth [and] length-of-life [and] kind-of-experience. What he means to say is this. The result of the latent-deposit of karma is pleasure and pain, and, in so far as both birth and length-of-life have the same purpose [as the latent-deposit] and are the necessary consequence of it, [these two] are also propagated [by the latent deposit]. Moreover pleasure and pain are attached to passion and aversion. And the latter are the necessary conditions [for pleasure and pain], since pleasure and pain are not possible in the absence of these [that is, passion and aversion]. Furthermore it is impossible to say that that wherein a man is pleased or disgusted is not to him, as the case may be, either a pleasure or a pain. So this soil of the self sprinkled with the water of the hindrances becomes a field propagating the fruits of karma. Thus it is true that the hindrances co-operate with the latent- deposit of karma for producing also the after-effects of the fruits. So when the hindrances are quite cut off, [the latent-deposits] are deprived of this [aid] also. Therefore, although the latent-deposits are endless and their period of ripening is unsettled, still, when in their condition as seeds, they are burned by Elevation {prasamkhyana), they cannot be in a position to bear fruit. The sense expressed is made clear by the Comment in the words, «While . . . exist.)^ With regard to this same point he gives a simile «Just as . . . the chaff.» Although they have their chaff, their condition as seed is burned by heat {sveda) and in other ways. He applies the simile to the point-to-be- illustrated by saying, «similarly.2> If it be objected that the hindrances cannot be removed, because no [really] existing things are removed, he replies in the words, «:nor seed in the condition of having been burned by the Elevation.^ He shows the threefold character of the fruition in the words, «And this.)^ Fruition is that which is brought to fi-uition or brought to perfection by karmas. The first point-under-discussion [1. and 2.] deems the unity of karma to be fixed and considers whether births are one or more than one. The second [3. and 4.], however, deems the manifoldness to be fixed and considers whether births are one or more than one. Thus there are four alternatives 127] Limits of time for fruition [ — ii. 13 (viJcalpa). Of these he refutes the first with the words «Now it is not true 1. that one karma is the cause of one birth.)^ He asks, [that is] birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience. Those with merit as cause have pleasure as result ; those with demerit as cause have pain as result. And just as the nature of this pain is counteractive, so for the yogin, even at the moment of pleasure in an object, there is nothing but counteractive pain. It has been stated that karma is rooted in hindrances and that fruitions are rooted in karma. Now the question is, ‘ of what are the fruitions the root, since you say that these are to be renounced ? ’ In reply to this he says, 14. These [fruitions] have joy or extreme anguish as results in accordance with the ii. 14 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [132 quality of their causes whether merit or demerit. He explains the sQtra in the words, « [that is] birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience.» Although birth and length-of-life, since they precede joy and extreme anguish, do have the latter as their results, — whereas the kind-of-experience follows the rise [in consciousness] of joy and extreme anguish and in fact has its essence in the [direct] experience {anubhava) of them, — still in so far as being [directly] experienced is the same as a kind-of-experience {bhoga), we may suppose that [joy and extreme anguish] are results of the kind-of-experience only so far as they are the objects of the kind-of-experience. It is objected, ‘ The birth and length- of-life and kind-of-experience, which are the results of extreme anguish, are things to be rejected {heya), since they are felt to be counteractive. But why should those [fruitions] which have merit as cause be renounced? they have pleasure as their result since they are felt to be co-active [anukula]. Nor can their co-activity, which may be felt by every one, be gainsaid by even a thousand verbal communications and inferences. Moreover neither joy nor extreme anguish can exist without the other. For while joy is being received, extreme anguish, since it cannot be driven off, may also fall to one’s lot, because the two have separate causes and because they have separate forms.’ In reply to this he says, «And just as . . . this.» Although ordinary individuals, at the time when there is pleasure in objects, are not conscious of them as counteractive, still yogins are conscious of this [counteractiveness]. How can this be accounted for ? 15. As being the pains which are mutations and anxieties and subliminal-impressions, and by reason of the opposition ^ of the fluctuations of the aspects {guna), — to the discriminat- ing all is nothing but pain. 1. For every one this experience of pleasure is permeated with passion and is dependent upon animate and inanimate instruments. In this case we have a latent-deposit of karma arising from passion. Likewise also [a man] hates the instruments of pain and becomes infatuated [by the instruments of infatuation]. Thus there is also a latent-deposit made by aversion and by infatuation. And in this sense it has been said, “ Enjoyment is impossible unless one has killed some living creature.” Therefore there is also the latent- deposit of karma, effected by killing, belonging to the body. Thus it has been said, “ Undifferentiated-consciousness {avidya) ' This sutra seems to have influenced Umasvati : Tattvarthadhigama-sutra vii. 6. 133] Inevitability of imin [ — ii. 15 is pleasure in an object of sense That which is the subsi- dence of the organs because of their satiation with enjoyments is pleasure ; after there has been a craving, the failure to subside is pain. And by the application of the organs to enjoyments one cannot make one’s self free from thirst [for enjoyment]. Why is this? Since passions increase because-of applica- tion to enjoyments, and the skill of the organs also increases. Therefore application to the enjoyment of pleasure is not a way of approach [to freedom from thirst for objects]. Surely one aiming at pleasure and permeated by objects is sunk in the deep bog of pain, like the man who, while in fear of the scorpion’s poison 2 is bitten by the poisonous snake. This is the so-called painfulness of mutation; it is counteractive; even in a condition of pleasure it hinders the yogin himself. — 2. Now what is the pain- fulness of anxiousness ? Every one has the experience of anxious- ness ; it is permeated by aversion and is dependent upon animate and inanimate instruments. Here w^e have a latent-deposit of karma arising from aversion. And [a man] yearning for the instruments of pleasure, throbs in the body and in [the organs of] speech and in the central-organ [manas). Since it then aids or (ca) thwarts others by aiding them or by injuring them, it amasses right-actions and wrong-actions. This latent-deposit of karma is the result of greed and of infatuation. For this reason it is called the painfulness of anxiousness. — 3. But what is the painfulness of subliminal- impressions ? There is a latent-deposit of subliminal-impressions of pleasure arising from the experience of pleasure ; and there is a latent -deposit of subliminal-impressions of pain arising from the experience of pain. Thus analogously (evam), w'hile the fruition from the karmas is under experience, there is on the other hand an accumulation of a latent-deposit of karma. Thus this stream of pain from time-with out-beginning, spreading wider and wider, agitates even the yogin because its essence is counteractive. Why is this ? It is because a wise man is like an eyeball. Just * Perhaps an allusion to the phrase sukha- khydtir avidyd (ii. 5, Calc. ed. IIP). * Colonel Jacob (Second Handful of Popular Maxims, 2nd ed., 1909, p. 76) points out that Vacaspati uses this nyaya again in the Tatparyatika (1898), p. 53'^. ii. 15 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [134 as a fine thread of wool fallen upon the eyeball by its touch gives pain, but not so when it falls upon other parts of the body, so these pains [from subliminal-impressions] hinder the yogin only, who is like an eyeball, but not any other perceiver. But upon the other, [not a yogin], — who casts off the pain received time after time which has been brought upon him by his own karma, — and who receives the pain cast off time after time, — and who is as it were permeated through and through from all sides with fluctuating mind-stuff complicated from time-without-beginning with its subconscious-impressions, — and who under [the influence of] undifferentiated-consciousness [avidya) conforms [himself] to the ‘ I-substance ’ and to the ‘ Of me-substance ’ with regard to those very things which are to be rejected, — upon him, horn again and again, the triple anguishes from both kinds of causes, both inner and outer, sweep down. This being so, the yogin, having seen himself and the whole multitude of creatures borne away by this stream of pain from time-without-beginning, seeks refuge in the focused-insight {samyag-daiyana), the cause of the dwindling of all pain. — The aspects {guna) of the thinking-substance in the form of bright- ness and of activity and of inertia, having become interdependent by aid given each to the other, give rise to a presen ted-idea either tranquil or cruel or infatuated, [either one or the other] of just these three aspects. “ And because the changes {vrtta) of the aspects {guna) are unstable, the mind-stuff is in rapid mutation.” Thus we have been told.^ “ The [outer] forms [when developed to] a high degree and the [inner] fluctuations [when developed to] a high degree oppose each other ; but the generic forms co-operate with [these when developed to] a high degree.” Thus since these aspects {guna) have presented-ideas of pleasure and of pain and of infatuation obtained by reliance of one [aspect] upon another, each {sarve) [of them] has the form of each of [the others]. But the distinction between them is due to their being either in a subordi- nate {guna) or in a dominant state. Therefore So the seed out of which this huge aggregate of pain grows forth is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyd). And the reason for the failure-of-growth (abhdva) in this \avidya\ is the focused-insight. — Just as a system of medicine has four divisions, [on] Disease [and on] Cause of Disease [and on] Health [and on] Remedy, so this system also has four divisions, [on] the Round-of-Rebirth [and on] the Cause of the Round-of- Rebirth [and on] Release [and on] the Way to Release. Of these [four], the Round-of-Rebirth with its mass of pains is that which is to be escaped ; the conjunction of the primary-cause and of the Self is the cause of this which is to be escaped iheya) ; the final destruction of the correlation is the escape {liana) ; the means of escape is focused-insight. In this [focused-insight] he who escapes — as he is in himself — can neither be accepted nor rejected {Jieya). For if there be a rejection (hdna), that would involve the doctrine of the extermination of him [who escapes]. And ^ if there be an acceptance [that would involve] the doctrine [that he has] a cause. And ^ by denying both [the rejection and the acceptance], we have the doctrine [that the Seer as he is in himself is] eternal. This is the focused-msight. In order to account for this he introduces the sutra after first asking the question, «How can this be accounted for?:^ The stitra begins with the word 15. . . . mutation and ends with the word discriminating . . . [The compound in the sutra is analysed,] mutation and anxiety and subliminal-impression — these themselves are the pains — it is by these . . . He describes the painfulness of the pleasure in objects of sense in so far as mutations are painful by saying, «For every one this.» Pleasure is surely impossible unless it be permeated by passion. For one cannot possibly say that one finds no happiness in a thing and at the same time take pleasure in it. Moreover, since pleasure leads to action and action causes a latent-deposit of merit and demerit, there is also a latent-deposit of karma produced by passion, because a thing which does not exist cannot be produced. Under these circumstances (tada), a man experiencing pleasure and feeling attachment to it, feels aversion towards the instruments of pain with an aversion that is in an intercepted state. Furthermore, being unable to prevent these [instruments of pain] he becomes infatuated. Thus there is also a latent-deposit of karma made by aversion and by infatuation. And there is nothing contradictory in making infatuation, whose other name is misconcep- tion, the cause of a latent-deposit of the karma of infatuation also. If it be asked, ^ Omitted in most MSS. il. 15 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [136 How can a man in love feel aversion or infatuation, since, when he is in love, aversion and infatuation are not evidently existent, he replies, «And in this sense it has been said» by us when explaining [ii, 4 j hindrances with intercepted states. In this way merit and demerit have been shown as produced by sense- activities of speech and mind. Because a mental volition produced by passion, so that one wills, ‘ this must be done,’ is also not to be distinguished from the verbal form [of the volition] in so far as it is equally desired. As they say, ‘A volition with desire does not go beyond intended-objects which can be expressed by words.’ He also shows a latent-deposit of karma belonging to the body in the words, ^“Impossible . . . unless one has killed”^. Hence authors of the Law Books say [Manu iii. 68, Visnu lix. 19], “ Five kinds-of-slaughter are open to the householder.” The objector says, ‘This may be true. Yet it is not fitting that a yogin should reject pleasure in objects-of-sense which can be felt by anybody. For that would be running counter to experience.’ In reply to this he says, ^it has been said, “ Undifferentiated-consciousness {avidya) is pleasure in an object-of-sense ”» by [us when] showing [ii. 5] that undifferentiated- consciousness is characterized by four kinds of misconceived ideas. The ancient sages {vf'ddha) do not pay heed to anything merely at the first impression. There is of course, merely at the first impression {apatatas), an experience which any one can feel of pleasure which follows even after eating food mixed with sweet poison ; but after a lapse of time there is no pleasure. And as such it has been shown by The Exalted [Ifvara in the Gita xviii. 38], “ After there has been contact of the sense-organs with objects, that pleasure which is at the beginning like nectar and in the course of time like poison is known to be full of rajas.” He raises a doubt by saying, «which . . . with enjoyments.^ The objector says, ‘ We do not accede to the statement that pleasure is the joy in objects. On the contrary, when men are not satiated and when their minds are afflicted with yearnings for one object after another, it is the very thirst itself that is the great pain. And this [thirst] does not subside unless enjoyment follow. Furthermore the full subsidence of this [thirst] is not permeated with passion and similar [states of mind]. Thus it cannot be said that this subsidence has the painfulness of mutation.’ This is the point. — ^Because of their satiation» means : Because the thirst [for enjoyment] has dwindled, there is a subsi- dence of the organs, in other words, there is no activity [of the organs] with regard to objects-of-sense. He makes this same clear by a negative instance in the words ^arising from a craving.» He rebuts an objection with the words «And ... by the organs . . . not.^ The word ^[because of [anu]'^ is used in the sense of cause. It is true that the dwindling of thirst [for objects] is the flawless ^ pleasure. But application to enjoyment is not the cause of this [dwindling of thirst] ; but it is the cause of the thirst Avhich is just the opposite of this [dwindling of thirst]. Just as they say,^ “Lust by the enjoyment of * Without the flaw of ?v7pra. Naradiya Parana xxxiii. 38; Linga ^ See Manu ii. 94 ; Visnu Puruna iv. 10. 9 ; Parana Ixvii. 17. 137] Pain is past and present and future [ — ii. 15 lusts never subsides ; just as by the butter-oblation the flames flare up yet once again.” — The rest is without obscurity. — 2. He asks a question with regard to the painfulness of anxiety in the words, «Now what?» The answer is «every one.» As everybody knows what it is, he does not make a detailed statement of it as such. And the detailed statement is analogous to that of the painfulness of mutation. — 3. He asks about the painfulness of subliminal- impressions by saying ^what?)^ He gives the answer in the words ^the experience of pleasure.^ For an experience of pleasure gives rise to a subliminal impression and this to a memory of pleasure ; and this to a passion ; and this to movements of the central-organ and of the body and of [the organ of] speech ; and this [gives rise] to merit and demerit ; from these [comes] the experience of fruition ; from this a subconscious-impression. Thus there is a beginningless [chain]. Here the connexion should be understood in this way. There is a memoiy of pleasure and of pain according to the variation in the degree of the subliminal-impressions of pleasure and of pain ; and from this comes passion and aversion ; from these two come karma; from the karmas, fruition. Streaming on in this way the stream of pain hinders the yogin only, but not the other perceiver, [that is] any ordinary person, as he says in the words ^Thus this . . . from-time-without-beginning.» But the triple anguishes sweep down upon the other. This is the construction [of the sentence]. — In so far as the two anguishes, that from the gods and that from the elements, are [each] external, their unity is emphasized. — Since it is a fluctuation in the mind-stuff, undifferen- tiated-consciousness {avidya) is said to be ^fluctuating mind-stuff.» Under [the influence of] this, ^with regard to those very things which are to be rejected» [that is] with regard to the thinking-substance and the organs and the body and so on [as the ‘I’,] and with regard to wife and children [as the ‘of me’], «he conforms [himself] to the ‘ I-substance ’ and to the ‘ Of-me-substance.’:» This being the case, there is no other refuge for him than the focused-insight. So he says ^This being so.^ This being so, he has mentioned the extrinsic {aupadhika) painfulness of the pleasure in objects as a result of mutation and of subliminal-impressions and of contact with anxiousness. He [now] indicates the intrinsic [painfulness] by saying ^^ He explains [this part of the sutra] by saying ^brightness.» Brightness and activity and inertia are the forms, in so far as they are forms of the thinking-substance, which enter into mutation. The aspects {guna) are sattva and rajas and iamas [and they] are interdependent upon each other. They give rise to either 1. a tranquil (its essence is pleasure), or 2. a cruel (its essence is pain), or finally (eva) 3. an infatuated (its essence is dejection) presented-idea of [these] three aspects, although its form is an experience of pleasure. And not even this mutation of this [thinking-substance] having such a presented-idea as its form is fixed. Because of this he says <5C“And because the changes of the aspects {guna) are unstable, the mind-stufi" is in rapid muta- tion. ”» It is objected, ‘ [There is] one presented-idea ; how can it at one time 18 [h.o.s. 17 ] ii. 15 — ] Booli II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [138 make known tranquillity and cruelty and infatuation, which are opposed to each other?’ In reply to this he says, Consequently by men of insight pain should be escaped {heya). And it cannot be escaped unless its cause (niddna) be escaped. Moreover it cannot be escaped unless its cause be thoroughly understood. So he shows w’hat its radical cause is in the w'ords, «:So ... of this.)^ That seed out of which the aggregate of pain grows forth [or] arises. He shows the reason for the extermination of this grow'th in the words «And ... in this.2> Now he shows that this system which has entered upon its activity for the sake of showing favour [i. 1] to all is similar to another system of the same kind by saying, exclude the past and the present. He makes this consistent by saying «pain past.^ If it be objected that present pain now in experience is not to be transferred beyond experience, he replies «And present.^ Easy. Therefore the cause of this same thing that is described as some- thing to be escaped is once more specified. 17. The correlation of the Seer and the object-of-sight is the cause of that which is to be escaped. The Seer is the Self conscious by reflection of the thinking- substance. Objects-of-sight are all external-aspects {dharma) which have struck upon the sattva of the thinking-substance. So this same object-of-sight giving its aid, like a magnet,^ by the mere fact of being near, becomes, by reason of its being an object-of-sight, the property of the Self, its proprietor, whose nature is seeing. It becomes changed into an object upon which experience operates, — in so far it has the nature of another. Having acquired [this new] being, although self-dependent, [it becomes] by serving one-not- itself,^ dependent on one-not-itself. The correlation of these two, the power of seeing and the power by which one sees, is from time- without-beginning and is effected for [two] purposes. [This corre- lation is] the cause of that which is to be escaped, in other words, the cause of pain. And in this sense it has also been said, “ By avoidance of the cause of correlation with this [thinking-substance] the antidote for pain would be absolute.” Why [would this be so] ? Because we know the antidote to prevent the cause of pain. For example, we know that the liability-to-scratches inheres in the sole of the foot, the power to scratch inheres in the thorn, the prevention [of scratching] is either by not stepping with the foot upon the thorn or by stepping [upon it when the sole of the foot] is covered by a foot-protector. Whoever understands these three [scratch and cause and prevention] has begun the antidote therefor and is not exposed to the pain from scratches. ' Compare i. 4, p. 17‘ ; ii. 18, p. 143* ; iv. 17, 300'^ (Calc. ed.). * Compare iv. 24. [ — ii. 17 141 ] Cause of pain Why [is this] ? Because of his power to apperceive the three-fold character [of the case]. And to resume the argument {atrdpi), the sattva, the castigated, comes under the ownership of rajas, the castigator. Why [so] ? Since it stands in a passive relation to the activity of the castigator. The act of castigation affects the sattva as a passive object, but does not affect the immutable and inactive Soul {ksetrajna). [Why inactive ?] Since it has objects shown to it. But if the sattva be under castigation, the Self, it appears, conforming itself to the form of this [sattvail is itself castigated along with [the sattva]. That which is to be escaped has been described. Its cause {nidana) is [now] described 17. The correlation of the Seer and the object-of-sight is the cause of that which is to be escaped. He tells of the Seer himself in the words ^The Seer . . . conscious by reflection of the thinking-substance. » The intelli- gence {citi) belonging to the Self {Pums), although it is detached, becomes con- scious by reflection of the thinking-substance, and this consists in the thinking- substance being imaged [cJiat/a) [in the intelligence]. It is objected that ‘ even if this be so, [the Self] could see the thinking-substance only, but could not see the various things {^ahdddi) which are absolutely shut off [from it] ’. To this he replies, ^Ohjects-of-sight . . .the [sattva] of the thinking-substance.^ When by the channel of the senses the thinking-substance enters into mutations having the forms of various things and when it is an object-of-sight, the various things, the external-aspects, are also objects-of-sight. It is objected, ‘ In so far as the thinking-substance has assumed the form of these [things], it may have the form of the various things. But if, in the case of the Self, his relation to the think- ing-substance be assumed, he would be mutable. Yet if there be no relation between them, how can the various things, although present in the [sattva) of the thinking-substance, be objects-of-sight? For surely an object-of-sight not in relation with the Seer cannot be called an object-of-sight.’ To this he replies, «this same object-of-sight.)^ All this has been given in detail by us in Book First, where we showed [i. 7, p. 22] that the sattvaoi the thinking-substance, although not in combination with intelligence [cditamja], in so far as it is absolutely clear, still, in so far as it contains the image [himba] of the intelligence, seems to come into a balanced state [with the intelligence] and [so] experiences the various things. Hence also the Seer, enjoying within himself the pleasures and other [experi- ences] offered by the sattva of the thinking-substance which has entered into mutation in the form of the various things, becomes the proprietor. And the sattva of the thinking-substance [having mutations] of such a kind becomes his property. So this same sattva of the thinking-substance, containing the forms of the various things, becomes the object-of-sight ; and being like a magnet, it becomes the property of the Self whose nature is seeing and who is the proprietor. ii. 17 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [142 Why [is this] ? He says, ^the experience.)^ Because [the sattva of the think- ing-substance] is changed into an object upon which experience operates. The «experienceS> is the enjoyment on the part of the Self ; the «operation» is the activity ; the ^object^ is the condition of being enjoyed ; because it is «changed into:^ this, it becomes the property [of the Self]. — The objection is made, ‘ How can the sattva of the thinking-substance, which is luminous in itself, be the object of an experience ? ’ In reply to this he says, «in so far as it has the nature of another.» For if the sattva of the thinking-substance were really like the intelligence (caitanya), it would be luminous in itself. But it has acquired [this new] being, it is property (sva), it is other than intelligence (caitanya), and inert in nature. Therefore it is the object of the experience on the part of this [intelligence]. It is objected, ‘ One thing is dependent upon another thing, when in some way or other it exerts itself for the sake of the other. Whereas the sattva of the thinking-substance does not in any way exert itself for the Self which is detached [from it]. And how can [the thinking-substance] be depen- dent on this [intelligence] ? And this being so, it cannot be an object upon which [the Self] operates.’ In reply to this he says, «although self-depen- dent.)^ ^By serving the purpose of one-not-itself,S> by serving the purpose of the Self, it becomes ^dependent on one-not-itself,^ dependent upon the Self. The objector says, ‘ This relation between the power of seeing and the power by which one sees must be either natural or accidental. If it be natural, since the two terms of the relation are permanent, the relation is one that cannot be exter- minated ; and this being so, the round-of-rebirth would be permanent. But if it be accidental, then in so far as hindrances and karma and its subconscious-im- pressions are fluctuations of the inner-organ, the former exist only so long as the inner-organ exists, and if at the same time (ca) the inner-organ is to have these as its cause, there would be the fault of mutual interdependence ; and [you could not explain this fault away by bringing in a series without begin- ning,] because it is impossible that there should be anything from time-with- out-beginning at the beginning of the creation, for then the round-of-rebirth would not be produced at all. On which point it has been said, “ Even in the opinion of those who think that the Self is not an agent, how can the aspects (gund) bring about the very first activity ? For then karma does not yet exist. Neither is there then an erroneous idea nor passion nor hatred nor similar [hindrances]. For all these are fluctuations of the central-organ and the central - organ has not been produced at that time.” ’ This doubt he removes by the words, «The correlation of these two, the power of seeing and the power by which one sees, is from time-without-beginning and is effected for [two] purposes.^ It is true that the relation is not natural, but accidental. But it is not to be supposed that it has a beginning. For in so far as it is the result of a cause (nimitta) which is from time-without-beginning, it itself is also from time- without-beginning. Furthermore the uninterrupted succession of hindrances and karma and subconscious-impressions of these is from time- without-beginning. 143] Return to the state of equipoise [ — ii. 17 And although at the time of [each] reversal of creation [this succession] has been reduced to the state of equipoise {samya) in the primary cause, still at the beginning of a creation it becomes again as before, just as some kinds of plants ‘ {udbhijja), reduced at the end of the rains to a state of earth, when the rains [return], assume again their proper form. More than once this has been made known previously. In so far as it brings it to growth, undiflferentiated-conscious- ness is the cause of the correlation ; in so far as it is the reason for [its] stability, the purpose of the Self is the cause. For this [conjunction] is stable by virtue of this [purpose of the Self]. It is this that is stated in the words, ^effected for [two] purposes.» «And in this sense it has also been said» by Panca^ikha.^ ^By conjunction with this» means by conjunction with the thinking-substance. This same is the cause of pain. By the avoidance of this [conjunction] this antidote for pain would be absolute. So what is implied is [arthdt] that pain results from a failure to avoid it. In connexion with this same point he states an extremely well-known simile in the words, This same object-of-sight enters into muta- tion as elements and as organs, — as elements such as earth and the others in coarse ^ and in subtile [form]. It enters likewise into mutation as organs such as the organ-of-hearing {protra). But it is not without an impelling force. On the contrary, it acts only by accepting an impelling force. For the object-of-sight exists for the sake of the experience and the liberation of the Self. Of these [two], experience is the ascertainment of things with desirable qualities and of things with undesirable qualities so long as this [ascertainment] does not divide [the Self from the thinking-substance]. Liberation is the ascertainment^ of the * Compare iii. 44, p. 254’ (Calc. ed.). of Balarama in notes 1 and 2 of p. 144 ’ This refers forward to the important and (Calc. ed.). peculiardefinitionsofcoarseand subtile ^ Compare drastuh svarupopalabdhih so in iii. 44. See the illuminating words 'yavargah, ii. 23, p. 157* (Calc. ed.). [ — ii. 18 145 ] False ohjectijication of the Self enjoyer himself. Thus there is no other process-of-knowing in addition to these two. And in this sense it has been saidd “ But he who in the three aspects [guna) which are agents and in the Self which is not an agent, — but which is of the same kind in some respects and of a different kind in other respects, — sees all the produced states presented to the fourth, the witness of their action — he has no suspicion that there is another kind of know- ledge [the pure intelligence].” ‘ How is it that these two, experience and liberation, made by the thinking-substance and existing in the thinking-substance only, are attributed to the Self?’ Just as a victory or a defeat on the part of actual fighters ^ is ascribed to their commander, for he as we know is the experiencer of the result, so bondage and release, existing in the thinking-substance only, are ascribed to the Self. For he as we know has the experience of the results of these. Bondage is of the thinking- substance only and is the failure to attain the purposes of the Self. Release is the termination of the purpose of the Self. Thus it is that processes-of-knowing and processes-of-retention and compre- hensions-of-particulars ^ {uha) and removals-of-faults {apoha) and real-knowledge and the will-to-live, [all] existing in the thinking- substance, are assumed to exist in the Self. For he as we know has the experience of the results of these. He explains the object-of-sight by the sutra beginning with the word 18. . . . brightness and ending with the words object-of-sight. Brightness is a portion of the sattva ; it is influenced by dejection which is a quality of tamas or by pain which is a quality of rajas. Similarly it must be understood in the case of the quality of rajas and the rest. It is this that is stated in the words «with the [three] separate parts influencing each other.» <5CWith external -aspects {dharma) in conjunction or in separation» with [or from] the Self. As it is written [^vet. Up. iv. 5], “ One male goat [i.e., the unborn soul] has pleasure in leaping upon the one female goat [i. e. primary matter] which is * This is Garbe’s eighth fragment of PaSca- cikha. It is introduced to support the statement that experience consists in determining the nature of the gunas which have been identified with the Self. Although the three gunas are active agents, the indiscriminating man looks upon all things as the deeds 19 [h.o.s. 17 ] of the Self, who never acts, who is different in nature from the gunas, and who merely witnesses their changes. He does not suspect the existence of an intelligence which is an insight discriminated from the gunas. “ Compare i. 24, p. 55'* (Calc. e'd.). “ See Nyaya-sutra i. 1. 40. ii. 18 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [146 red and white and black and which brings forth many offspring like herself ; while another male goat deserts her after having enjoyed her.” — Limitations-in- extent, such as earth, are those which have been brought about by basing them upon interdependence of one upon another. The objector says, ‘ This may be true. When a quiescent idea is to be produced by sattva, since rajas and tamas also, in so far as they are accessory to sattva, are the causes of this [idea], there is a power in them. If this be so [iti), and whenever rajas or tamas might be principal, then always a quiescent idea might arise, not a cruel nor an infatuated one, just as in the case when sattva was dominant.’ In reply to this he says, «with separate powers, although in subservience to each other, still unconfused.^ Let it be granted, when a quiescent idea is to be produced, that rajas and tamas are in an accessory relation, still their powers are not com- mingled. For the fact that their powers are not commingled may be inferred from the fact that there is no commingling of effects. Whereas effects of the quiescent and cruel and infatuated forms are seen to move actively forth in so far as their form is uncommingled. Thus it is established that the powers are unconfused. The objector says, ‘ Suppose this be granted. If the powers are unconfused, then the aspects (guna) cannot be supposed to work harmoniously together. Evidently things whose powers are different never have effects that are produced by a harmonious working together. Threads, for instance, and lumps of earth and diy grasses do not work harmoniously together and produce a jar.’ In reply to this he says, ^with conformations according to various dis- parate and comparate powers.^ Although the power of serving as material cause is in [a thing which is] comparate [with its effect], and not elsewhere, and although the power of serving as co-operative [cause may be] in disparate things, still when it is a water-jar that is to be generated, it is not in the power of the dry grasses to serve even as co-operative [causes], and this being so, these [grasses] do not work harmoniously with threads. This is the point. — [He analyses the compound.] Those are referred to whose character it is to conform to certain kinds of powers with regard to possible disparates and comparates. — «At the time when they become dominant.» When a super- normal body is to be generated, the sattva is dominant and the rajas and tamas are accessory. Similarly when a human body is to be generated, the rajas is dominant and the sattva and tamas accessory. Likewise when an animal body is to be generated, the tamas is dominant and the sattva and rajas are accessory. Thus these aspects [gu7ia) have their presence manifested at the time when they become dominant. In other words, they contribute to the effect in proportion as they become reintensified. And the word ^dominant» is to be taken as the abstract form of dominance ' {bhavapradhana). * He wishes to exclude the other meaning this word has the sense of ‘dominant ’ of pradhana, that is, primary cause. and of ‘ primary cause ’. See Pan. Just as ‘ one and two ’ have an iii. 4. 69. abstract and a particular sense, so also [ — ii. 18 147 ] The aspects are foreign to the Self Just as [in the phrase of Panini’s sutra i. 4. 22,] “ The dual and singular are used in case of two and one ”, [the words two and one are] in this case to be understood as twoness and oneness ; in other cases [such as of measurable numbers], they are to be understood as two and as one. — An objector says, ‘ At that time [of dominance], it is possible to say that the dominant exists in so far as it is in its intense form. But is there any source-of-valid-ideas [to prove] the real existence of its accessories which are not in the intense form ? ’ In reply to this he says, <5^although subordinate.^ Although not intensified, stiU, because they have no discrimination [to recognize that they are themselves inanimate], and [yet] because they do work harmoniously together, — from the mere fact of their functional-activity in so far as there is co-operation, — their existence is inferred as being included in the primary cause. The objector says, ‘ We may grant that the aspects {guna) have faculties and work harmoniously together, but why do they perform this [co-operation] ? For surely just because one says there is a faculty, one generates no [actual] effect on the ground that there may not be any cessation in the production of effects.’ In reply to this he says, ^employed as effective for the purposes of the Self.2> After this [purpose has been effected], when all the purposes of the Self have been ended, the aspects [afterwards] cease and produce no effects. This is what he means to say. If it be asked, ' How can a thing which does not aid the Self, use impelling force as being a purpose of the Self,’ he replies «aid given merely by being near.:S> It is objected that ‘ the impeller of the aspects is a cause characterized only as being merit and demerit ; but can [these aspects be made to produce effects] when impelled by the purpose of the Self?’ In reply to this objection he says, «without any external cause.^ — [He explains the phrase.] ^The rest^ [of the aspects], even «with- out any external-cause (jpratyaya)y> [or] efficient-cause (nimitta) such as merit, ^following the fluctuation of any one of them,» either of sattva or of rajas or of tamas, as dominant and as being active towards the production of its own effect. In which sense he will say later [iv. 3], “The efficient-cause gives no impulse, but [the mutation] follows when the barrier to the evolving-causes is cut, just as in the case of the peasant.” — The construction of the sentence is, these aspects (guna) are denoted by the word primary-cause (j)rad]iana). According to its derivation [the word pradhdna] is that by which the universe is produced (jpradhlyate) or put forth. ^ This is said to be the object-of-sight. — Having mentioned the nature of the aspects (guna) he describes the effect of this disposition in the words, «this same.)^ In order to establish the doctrine of the pre-existent effect (satMryavada), he says that a thing enters into mutation as a form of that thing, whichever it may be, that is its essence. He makes clear that its essence is elements and organs by the words begin- ning, «as an element.)^ To the words, which are a part of the sutra, he gives an introduction by saying «not without an impelling- force.» He elaborates the word by saying «of these [two].» For pleasure and pain belong to the thinking- substance as such in so far as it has three aspects (gum). Because this thinking- substance enters into mutation as being of such a kind [as one that has three aspects]. There is said to be experience in so far as there is an ascertainment [of the things] as belonging to [these] qualities.' Accordingly he says, ^so long as undivided.» And this has been made known by us more than once. — He elaborates the word by saying ^of the enjoyer.^ Liberation is that by which one is liberated [literally, wrenched off]. He states that there is no other impelling-force [than these two] by saying ^in addition to these two.:^ — «And in this sense it has been said» by Panca^ikha in the words «“ But he who An objection is raised, ‘ As matters of [perceptible] reality, experience and liberation are made by the thinking-substance. How are they attributed to the Self who is neither their cause nor their locus?’ In reply to this he says, «These two.» And that the Self is enjoyer has been explained and will be stated later [iii. 34]. But in the strict sense it is as the text says, «Bondage is of the thinking-substance only and is the failure to attain the purposes of the Self.3> «Thus» means in the way that experience and liberation are mentioned as being related to the Self. [So] processes of-knowing and the rest are also to be understood as being related to the Self. Of these, «the process-of-knowing)^ is the thinking of the intended- object as it is in itself ; the process-of-retention is memory with regard to this [object] ; «comprehension-of-particulars {ulia)'^ is the maintaining {uhana) of the particulars belonging to a thing ; ^removal-of-faults (apoha)'^ is the removal for statable reasons (yukti) of particulars when falsely attributed ; it is by these two only, by comprehension-of-particulars and by removal-of-faults, that the given thing is determined, that is, that there is real knowledge ; and will-to-live is rejection or acceptation preceded by this determination of the reality. This sutra is begun with the intent of determining the various forms of the aspects [guna), the objects-of-sight. 19. The particularized and the unparticularized [forms] and the resoluble only [into primary matter] and irresoluble*- primary-matter — are the divisions of the aspects {guna). Of these [four], the elements air and wind and fire and water and earth are the particularized [forms] of the unparticularized fine The Varttika says istanistagundh are three ‘ aspects ’ to the common use of sukhaduhkhdtmakdh. This illustrates the term as ‘ quality ’. the closeness of the term guna as the ^ Compare i. 45. 149] Successive developments of the aspects [ — ii. 19 elements {tanmdtra) sound and touch and colour and taste and smell. Similarly the organs of the thinking-substance are ear and skin and eye and tongue and nose, and the organs of action, voice and hands and feet and organ-of- excretion and organ-of-generation. And as the eleventh the central-organ which has all kinds of things as its intended object. These are the particularized [forms] of the unparticularized [personality-substance] which is characterized as having the feeling of personality. This is the sixteen-fold mutation of the aspects {puna). The unparticularized [forms] are six, namely, the fine element of sound and the fine element of touch and the fine element of colour and the fine element of taste and the fine element of smell. Thus, as we know, sound and the rest with one or two or three or four or five distinguishing-characteristics are five unparticularized [forms]. And the sixth is that of which we can only say that it is the feeling-of-personality. These are the six unparticularized forms of the Great thinking-substance of whose being we can only say that it exists. That which is prior to the unparticularized [forms] is that of which we can only say that it is resoluble [primary-matter], the Great' Substance {mahat-tattva) . Remaining in this Great Being {dtman) of which all that we can say is that it exists, these [six] unparticularized [forms] experience the limit of development. And reversing the process of creation they remain in that same Great Being of which all that we can say is that it exists, and revert to that which has neither existence nor non-existence, from which both existence and non-existence have been removed, from which non-existence has been removed, to the unphenomenalized and unresoluble primary-cause. This [Great Being of which all that we can say is that it exists], is the [first] mutation of these aspects. And that [Being] which has neither existence nor non-existence is the mutation [of these aspects] which is unresoluble [primary cause]. So the purpose of the Self is not the reason for the unresoluble state. Since the fact that the Self has a purpose is not known {hhavati) at the beginning as the cause of the state unresoluble [into primary matter], therefore the fact that the Self has a purpose is not a cause ^ of this [state]. ' See i. 45, p. 96® (Calc. ed.). ii. 19 — ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sadhana [150 And since that state is not effected by the purpose of the Self, it is called permanent. But at the beginning of the three states that are particularized, the fact that the Self has a purpose is known to be the cause. And this purpose is known to act as purpose and as efficient cause. Hence this state is called impermanent. But the aspects, which conform themselves to all kinds of external- aspects {dharma), neither cease to be nor come into being, but appear as if they had the properties of coming into existence and of passing out of existence by reason of the [individual] phenome- nalized forms, past and yet to come, going and coming, inseparably connected with the aspects. As for example we say, ‘ Devadatta is poor’. Why ? ‘ Because his cows are dying.’ Since his poverty is due to the dying of his cows and not to his loss of himself, the parallel [samadhi] [to the going and coming of the phenomenalized forms as affecting the aspects (guna)'] applies (sama). — That of which we can only say that it is resoluble [into primary matter] is next [in development] to that which is irresoluble [into primary matter]. Formed therein it becomes distinguished from it [as its effect], since the order [of the development of the mutations] is not transgressed. Likewise the six unparticularized [forms] formed in that of which we can only say that it is resoluble [into primary matter] become distinguished [from it]. Because the order of mutations is fixed. Similarly the elements and organs formed in these unparticularized [forms] become distinguished [from them], as has been already described. There is no other entity (tattva) beyond the particularized [forms]. So there is no mutation into any other entity beyond the particularized [forms]. But their mutation into external-aspect and time-variation and intensity are to be explained [iii. 13] later. «This sutra is begun with the intent of determining the various forms of the aspects [guna], the objects-of-sight.» The sutra begins with the words 19. The particularized and ends with the words divisions . . . He mentions the particularized [forms] which are the evolved-matter {vikara) of the unparticula- rized [forms] which [latter] are without the serene and cruel and infatuated characteristics — [the evolved forms], but not the [forms] evolving' other entities (tattva). He describes the [forms] belonging to these [entities] in the words, ' See the discussion by Vacaspati in Samkbya Tattva-Kaum. on Kar. iii. 151 ] Mutations of primary substance real [ — ii. 19 «0f these [four], . . . air.2> The order of explanatory-statement follows exactly the order of production. The organs of intelligence (buddhi) are particu- larized [forms] of the [personality-substance {aliamMra)] which is characterized as having the feeling-of-personality, and which has sattva as its dominant [aspect]. But the organs of action [are particularized forms of the personality-substance] which has rajas as its dominant [aspect]. Whereas the central-organ {manas), the essence of which is of both kinds, must be supposed to be the [particularized form of the personality-substance] which has both kinds [that is, rajas and sattva] as its dominant [aspects]. And [there is an inference] on this point, that the five fine elements have the thinking-substance as their cause, because they are unparticularized [forms], like the feeling-of-personality. Moreover, being an unparticularized form is [the same as] being the cause of evolved matter ; and both in the fine elements and in the feeling-of-personality there is nothing particularized. — After grouping them together he enumerates the particularized [forms] in the words, «This ... of the aspects.» He numbers the unparticu- larized [forms] also with the word «[six.S> He groups them together and sums them up with the word «namely.» Now the prior is particularized by the subsequent. So smell itself [together with the subsequent four] has five' characteristics ; taste itself [together with the subsequent three] has four characteristics ; colour itself [together with the subsequent two] has three characteristics ; touch itself [with the subsequent sound] has two characteristics ; sound has the characteristic of sound only. ‘ But of what are these six unparticularized [forms] the effect?’ In reply to this he says «These .... of which we can only say that it exists.^ The existent (sat) is that which is capable of actions fulfilling a purpose ; having existence (sattd) is the abstract form of this. The Great Substance is that which is made of this. In other words, whatever action fulfilling a purpose there be, whether its characteristic be enjoyment [of various things] from sound downwards, or whether its characteristic be the discernment of the difference between the sattva and the Self, it is all of it comprehended in the Great Thinking-substance. By saying «of whose being» he shows what it really is and denies that it is nothing at all (tuccha). This is equivalent to saying that this first mutation of primary matter is a real thing, and not an appearance (vivartta). That which is prior to these, [that is] distant in time as compared with the unparticularized [forms] which are near in time, is that of which we can only say that it is resoluble [primary-matter], the Great Substance (mahat-tattva). Eemaining in this Great Being of which all that we can say is that it exists, these six unparticularized [forms], — since it is established that the effect pre-exists [in its cause], — experi- ence [or] reach the limit of development. On the other hand, of these non- particularized which have particularized [forms] there are also the mutations of external-aspect (dharma) and of time-variation and of intensity. It is this that is the limit of development, that is, the limit of mutation of these particu* ' See Garbe : Samkhya Philosophie, p. 236, note 3. ii, 19 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Scidhana [152 larized [forms]. Having thus mentioned the order of growth he describes the order of dissolution in the words, «reversing the process of creation.» «Ke- versing the process of creation» [means] becoming resolved [prallyamana) [into primary-matter]. In other words particularized forms are resolved into their own form, that is, become non-particularized. And they remain [or] are dissolved {nillya) in that same Great Being of which all that we can say is that it exists. And then even with the Great [Being], these unparticu- larized [forms] revert to unphenomenalized [primary-matter], called unre- soluble because in none (a) else are they resolved {li). This same [unphenomenalized primary matter] is qualified by the words, «Cwhich has neither existence nor non-existence.^ Existence is that which is capable of acts fulfilling a purpose of the Self. Non-existence is worthlessness {tucchata) as regards the purpose of the Self. That is so-described [as having neither existence nor non-existence] which is beyond-the-range of both existence and non-existence. What he means to say is this. The state when sattva and rajas and tamas are in equipoise is never of use in fulfilling a purpose of the Self. And so it is not existent. Neither does it have a worthless kind of existence like the sky-lotus. Therefore it is also not non-existent. The objector says, ‘ This may be so. Still in the unphenomenalized state there are the Great [Thinking- substance] and the other [entities] in so far as these are identical with this [unphenomenalized state]. For there is no utter annihilation of the existent, or if utterly annihilated it cannot be made to grow again. For because one cannot make the non-existent grow, the Great [Thinking-substance] and the other [entities] would really exist [in the unphenomenalized state] and therefore might function as acts fulfilling the purpose of the Self [and so the unphenomenalized state might be said to exist]. Then how could you say that it has no existence ?’ In reply to this he says, «from which both existence and non-existence have been removed. » [The non-existent] is a cause which [exists] beyond any existing effect. Although in the causal state the effect does exist as potential being {gaktydtmana), still in so far as it does not fulfil its peculiar purpose it is said to be non-existent. This cause does not however have an effect [worthless for the purpose of the Self] like a hare’s horns. Accordingly he says ^from which non-existence has been removed. » [A cause which exists] beyond an effect that is non-existent or worthless [with regard to the purpose of the Self]. For if that were so, the effect would not be produced from this [cause] any more than the sky-lotus [would be produced from this cause]. This is the point. He brings the [topic of the] reversal of creation which has been described to a close in the words, «This ... of these.^ The word ^This» points back to that which has been stated just prior to that which immediately precedes. The states beginning with that of which we can only say that it is resoluble [into primary matter], since they are effected by a purpose of the Self, are not permanent. Whereas the state which is unresoluble [into primary matter], since it is not effected by a purpose of the Self, is permanent. He gives the reason 153 ] [— ii. 19 Order of development fixed for this in the words, ^of the state unresoluble into primary matter. » But why is the purpose of the Self not a reason ? In reply to this he says, ^not ... of the state unresoluble. By using the object [visaya) [the purpose of the Self] in place of that which contains the object {visayin) [the unresoluble state], he partially describes the knowledge [in the Self of this state]. What he means to say is this. For this being so, it should be known that the purpose of the Self acts as a cause in the state unresoluble [into primary matter], provided the state unresoluble [into primary matter] could produce [nirvartayeta) the enjoy- ment of objects or the discernment of the difference between the sattva and the Self, [either of which is] a purpose of the Self. When however these two are produced, there can be no longer a state of equipoise. Therefore this [unresoluble state] is not known as a cause of the fact that the Self has a pur- pose. Thus the fact that the Self has a purpose is not the reason for this [unresoluble state]. He concludes with the words, ^that . . . not.» The word iti is used in the sense of therefore. — He describes the impermanent state in the words means who is nothing but the power of seeing untouched by any qualifications. This Self becomes conscious-by-reflection (pratisamvedin) of the think- ing-substance. He is not homogeneous with the thinking-substance nor utterly heterogeneous. Why [do we say that the Self] is not even heterogeneous [to the thinking-substance] ? Because the thinking-substance is something that enters into mutations,^ inasmuch as an object is known or not known [according as the thinking-substance has or has not changed into the form of that thing]. And the fact that an [external] object, for instance, a cow or a water-jar, is sometimes known and sometimes not knowm, proves that the thinking-substance is something which enters into mutations. Whereas the fact that, in the case of the Self, its object is always known, proves that the Self does not enter into mutations. Why [do we say this] ? Because it surely is not possible for the thinking-substance to be an object to the Self, and at the same time be something now comprehended and something again not comprehended [by the Self]. Hence it is proved that the Self always knows its object. And from this it follows that the Self does not enter into mutations. Moreover the thinking- substance exists for the sake of another, since it acts by combining ^ causes. Whereas the Self exists for its own sake. Thus [continuing the argument], the thinking-substance is a complex of the three aspects, because it determines ® each thing (sarva-artha) [as consisting of one or another of the three aspects, that is, as pleasurable or as painful or as indifferent]. And since it consists of the three aspects [guna), it is inanimate. The Self, on the other hand, is that which later beholds the aspects [by being reflected in them]. Hence it is not homogeneous with [the ’ Compare ii. 15, p. 135”; ii. 18, p. 152'*; ^ Compare Mrcchakapka, act 10, verse 59 iii. 35, p. 244’ ; iv. 17, p. 301* ; iv. 22, and YS. iv. 24. p. 306*; iv. 33, p. 316 (Calc. ed.). * The concept is de6ned in the comments on Samkhya-karika xxiii. 155] Presented-ideas instruments of the Self [ — ii. 20 thinking-substance]. ‘ [Very well] then, suppose the Self to be heterogeneous [to the thinking-substance].’ [Still], it is not utterly heterogeneous. Why [do we say this] ? Because though pure '■ in itself, the Self beholds the presented-ideas, that is to say, it beholds that [mutation of matter which the thinking-substance undergoes when it takes the form of an object, and] which is a presented-idea of thinking-substance {hauddha). Looking [thus] upon this [change in the thinking-substance] the Self seems to be it [the thinking-substance], although it really is not it [the thinking- substance]. And in this sense it has been said,^ “ For the power of the enjoyer enters not into mutation nor unites [with objects]. Seeming to unite with a thing in mutation [the thinking-substance], it conforms itself to the fluctuation [which that thinking-substance undergoes]. And it is commonly termed a fluctuation of the thinking-substance in so far as it resembles {anukdramdtratayd) a fluctuation of thinking-substance that has come under the influence (upagraha) of intelligence {cditanya)." «The object-of-sight has been explained. Now this sutra is introduced with the intent of determining what the Seer as such is.» 20. The Seer, who is nothing but [the power of] seeing, although undefiled [ruddJia), looks upon the presented-idea. He explains [the sutra] by the words «nothing but [the power of] seeing.» The qualifications are the properties. «Un- touched» by these in this way shows the import of the words «nothing but.» An objector says, ‘ This may be true. If the power of seeing is without all qualifications, then [the various things] from sound downwards would not be known. For the object-of-sight cannot be something out of contact with the seeing.’ In reply to this he says, «This Self.» The union (samkranti) of the reflection of the Self with the mirror of the thinking-substance is itself the Self’s consciousness by reflection in the thinking-substance. And so the [various things] from sound downwards become connected with the thinking-substance which has been changed into the likeness [chaya) of the power of sight. In other words, [they become] objects-of-sight. The objector says, ‘ This may be true. Still why is not the unity, even in the strict sense, of the thinking- substance and of the Self to be accepted ? What is the use of changing it into the likeness of this [Self] ? ’ In reply to this he says, «It is not homogeneous with the thinking-substance.)S> ‘ In this case it would be difficult for it to change into the likeness [of the Seer].’ In reply to this he says, «nor ^ That is to say, unspecialized. “ This is Pahcafikha’s ninth fragment. It is quoted again in iv. 22. ii. 20 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [156 utterly heterogeneous.)^ Of these [two], he rejects the homogeneity in the words, «not even homogeneous.» The reason [for this] he asks by saying «why?)S> For the heterogeneity he gives a reason which itself contains a reason, in the words, «known or not known.2> Because the thinking-substance enters into mutations, it is heterogeneous. When, as we know, this [thinking- substance] changes into the form of [the various things from] sound down- wards, then the object, having the distinguishing characteristics of [the various things from] sound downwards, becomes known to this [thinking-substance] ; but when not so changed into the form of these [things], the object does not become known to it. And so only occasionally it assumes the forms of these [things] and enters into mutations. And the argument is [of this kind] : The thinking-substance enters into mutations ; since objects are [sometimes] known and [sometimes] not known by it ; just as the organ of hearing and other organs [are sometimes active and sometimes not]. And the Self proves to be of different properties to this, because the middle term [that is, always-known] is contrary to this, as he says, «always known.» The objector says, ‘ This may be so. But if the Self always has its object known, then he could not be isolated.’ With this in mind, he asks, ^Why [do we say this]?» He gives the answer in the words, ^iBecause surely . . . not ... for the thinking- substance.:^ In the state of restriction the thinking-substance may exist and at the same time there may be no process of apperception [by the Self]. Therefore in order to indicate the contradiction, it is said, «an object to the Self.» So the first ^and^ {buddhig ca) has an accumulative force and makes the thinking-substance an object; but the two remaining «ands» {visayag ca and ’grahlta ca] are to make the contradiction clear. The argument, however, is this. The Self enters not into mutation ; because objects are always known to it in the conscious and emergent states ' ; whatever enters into mutation does not always have its objects known ; just as the organ of hearing or other [organs]. This is a negative instance of the middle term [sada-jnatavimyatvat]. He gives another [instance] of difference in properties in the words, «Moreover . . . for the sake of another. For the thinking-substance, in so far as it fulfils the purpose of the Self by combining with hindrances and karma and sub- conscious-impressions and with objects and organs, is for the sake of another. The argument, moreover, is this : The thinking-substance is for the sake of another ; because it acts by combining causes * ; like a bed or a seat or an ointment. But the Self is not like that, as he says ^the Self exists for its own sake.:^ Everything serves the purpose of the Self, but the Self serves no other. This is the point. He gives yet another [instance] of difference in properties in the words, «Thus . . . each thing. » The thinking-substance determines all things as being serene or cruel or infatuated when it mutates into their forms. And these [three] are mutations of the sattva and rajas and tamas aspects. Thus ^ This excludes the state unconscious of objects. ^ Compare Samkhya-karika xvii. 157 ] All objects subordinate to Selves [ — ii. 21 it is established that the thinking-substance is a complex of the three aspects. And again the Self is not like that, as he says, «The Self, on the other hand, later beholds the aspects.» It beholds them in that it is reflected in them, but it does not become mutated into their form. He brings the discussion to a close with the word, ^Hence.)^ «:[Very well] then, suppose . . . heterogeneous.» [But] it is not utterly heterogeneous [to the thinking-substance]. Why [do we say this] ? Because though pure in itself, it looks upon the presented-ideas. And that this is so, is [also] stated in these [words i. 4], “ At other times it takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuif].” And in this sense it has been said by Pancafikha «“ For the power of the enjoyer enters not into muta- tion.”» [The power,] in other words, the self (atman). And therefore it does not unite with the thinking-substance. that is to say, the object- of-sight itself (svarupa) exists only for the sake of the Self. But inasmuch as it is itself only so long as it has acquired its being as having the form of another, it is no [longer] seen by the Self when once it has accomplished the purpose of the Self, [of giving the Self] experience and liberation. So by escaping from itself it attains cessation ; but it does not utterly cease to be. ii. 21 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [158 Having stated what the Seer and the object-of-sight are, he says that the object-of- sight serves the purpose of the Self. [And this purpose is] based upon the relation characterized as being that of proprietor and property. 21. The being {atman) of the objeet-of-sight is only for the sake of it [the Self]. He explains [the sutra] in the words, «who is so much [rupa) seeing {drfi).2> Since the object-of- sight has become the object-of-action {karma-rupata), [that is] has been changed into the object-of-experience by the experiencer [that is] the Self who is so much seeing, — therefore the being of the object-of-sight must be only for the sake of the Seer, but not for the sake of the object-of-sight. The objector asks, ‘ How can the being [atma in drgyatma] be for the sake of this [atma in tadatma] [that is, the Self] ? ’ In reply to this he says, ^is itself.» What he means to say is this : The object-of-experience is the object-of-sight as having pleasure or pain. And pleasure and pain being co-agents or counter-agents persist as such (tattvena) only for this purpose [of acting with or against the Self]. For the [various things] from sound downwards as objects-of-sense are co-agents or counter-agents [for the Self] only because they are identical [with pleasure and pain]. And it cannot be said that they exist to be co-active or to be counter-active to themselves. For that would be a contradiction of a fluctuation with itself. Therefore by a process of elimination it is the power of intellect (citi) only for which they are co-active or counter-active. Consequently the object-of-sight is for this [Self] and not for the object-of-sight [itself]. And therefore the not for the sake of the object-of-sight. Because (yat) it is itself as long as the purpose of the Self continues. And when the purpose of the Self is complete it is also completed. Accordingly he says, ^But . . . it . . itself.)^ But the object-of-sight itself is inert {jada), yet it has acquired its being [that is] it is experienced as having the form of another [that is] the form of the soul {atman) [that is] the intelligence [caitanya). When experience and liberation have been accomplished it is no [longer] seen by the Self. [This was] the kind-of-experience,* the perception {anubhava) of sound and the other [perceptible] things. Liberation is the perception {anubhava) of the difference between sattva and the Self. Both these two kinds [of things, experience and liberation,] belong to the Self only who, by reason of the fact that the likeness of the Self becomes changed by the inert thinking-substance, [does know them both]. And so when experience and liberation have been accomplished for the Self, [the subservience of] the object-of-sight to the purpose of the Self is finished. Hence it is said, «when once it has accomplished the purpose of the Self.» Meanwhile he raises an objection in the words, «by escaping from itself. » He rebuts [this] with the words, ^but it does not utterly cease to be.» * Vijnana Bhiksu expands this definition and emphasizes the fact that experience is a fluctuation of the mind {sukhaduh- khdtmakagabdddi vrttih). 159] One primary substance and many Selves [ — ii. 22 Why [does it not utterly cease to be] ? 22. Though it has ceased [to he seen] in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others [besides himself]. Although the object-of-sight has ceased in so far as one Self whose purpose has been accomplished is concerned, it has not ceased to be, because it is common to others besides him. Although it has ceased so far as one fortunate man is concerned, [still] it has not ceased in the case of unfortunate men, since their purpose has not been ful- filled. So for these persons it becomes the object-of-the-action of seeing and receives its form of being as having the form of another. And therefore since the power of seeing and the power by which one sees are permanent, the conjunction [of the two] is said to be from time-without-beginning. And in this sense it has been said, “ The substances being in correlation from time without beginning, the external-aspects in general are also in correlation from time without beginning.” An objector says, ‘ If [the object-of-sight] is absolutely inapperceptible, how is it that it does not cease to be?’ With this in mind he asks, ^Why [is this]?^ In the sutra he tells the answer beginning with the words 22 . . . whose purpose is accomplished and ending with the words since it is common to others [besides himself]. A Self _ whose purpose has been accomplished is of such a kind. For him the object-of-sight although it has ceased [to be seen], has not ceased [to be]. Why? Since it is common to all Selves fortunate or unfortunate. He explains [the sutra] in the words, «one whose purpose has been accomplished.» Cessation is the absence of that by which one sees. But the object-of-sight has not ceased to be, since it is common to other Selves. Hence the nature {rupa) of the being {dtman) who is higher than the object- of-sight is intelligence (cditanya). So {tena) here we have that [being] which is made known in the Sacred Word and the Sacred Tradition and in the Epics and Puranas, the unphenomenalized, the whole-without-parts, the one, the independent, all-pervasive, permanent, [and] capable of producing-all-effects. Although [the object-for-sight] is not seen by the fortunate man, since for him its effect has been accomplished, it is not, however, something not seen by the unfortunate man. For because colour is not seen by the blind man, it does not become non-existent, since it is seen by the man who has eyes. For the Self is not, like the primary cause, only one. Because its plurality is established ' in so far as there is the orderly arrangement of births and deaths, pleasures and ' Compare Saiiikliya-sutra i. 149. ii. 22 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [IGO pains, later kind-of-experience and release and round-of-existence ; and because the passages of the Sacred Word which teach the unity [of the Self] and which contradict the other sources-of-valid-ideas, can somehow be made consis- tent, as partial statements, by supposing that there is no division * in place or in time ; and because the fact that primary matter is one and the Selves many is expressly taught by the Sacred Word’ itself, “ One male goat [the unborn Soul] has pleasure in leaping upon the one female goat [primary matter] which is red and white and black and which brings forth many offspring like herself, while another male goat deserts her after having enjoyed her,” And the meaning of this same Sacred Word is said over again by this sutra. Although the object-for-sight has ceased [to be seen], still so far as another Self is concerned it has not ceased to be. Therefore, since the power of seeing and the power by which one sees are permanent, their correlation is said to be from time-without-beginning. He states that those who have the tradition ’ (agamin) concur with this teaching, as he says, «And in this sense it has been said.^ Since the correlation of substances, in other words, of the aspects {gum), with the souls is from time without beginning, [so] in the case of the mere external aspects {gum), such as the Great [thinking-substance], there is a correlation from time without beginning. The correlation of the Great [Thinking-substance] and of the rest, one by one, although from time without beginning, is not permanent. Still it is permanent when we regard the Great [thinking- substance] and the rest as a whole, since [these external aspects] are common to the other Selves. Accordingly he says «the external-aspects in general.» The words «in general» {mdtra) point out the comprehensive character [of the compound]. Hence what follows is this : Although the correlation of one Great thinking-substance has become changed so that it is past, still the correlation of one Self‘ with another Great [thinking-substance] is not past. So [the correlation is] said to be permanent. The intent of this sutra is to describe what the correlation itself is. 23. The reason for the apperception of what the power of the property and of what the power of the proprietor are is correlation. The Self as proprietor becomes correlated for the purpose of sight ‘ The Patanjala Rahasyam says that the unity of all souls is only figurative. All Selves are permanent and all- pervasive. The unity is that of a collection, like that of a forest or of an army, in so far as no division is made in time or in place. ’ Qvet. Up. iv. 5. ’ The attribution of this quotation to Pancafikha rests upon the authority of Vijnana Bhiksu. * ’Rending puimsantarena with the Bikaner MS. 161] Explanations of non-sight of the Self [ — ii. 23 with the object-for-sight as property. That apperception of the object-for-sight which results from this correlation is experience. Whereas the apperception of what the Seer is, is liberation. Since the correlation lasts until sight is effected, sight is said to be the cause of discorrelation. Since sight and non-sight are opposite to each other, non-sight is said to be the instrumental cause of corre- lation. Sight in this [system] is not the cause of release ; but the absence of bondage results from the absence of non-sight. This is release. Where there is sight, non-sight, which is the cause of bond- age, ceases [to be felt]. Thus the perception which is sight is said to be the cause of isolation. And what is this so-caUed non-sight ? 1. Is it the authority [adhihara) of the aspects [guna) [over the Self] ? 2. Or is it the case that, when in [the equipoised state of] the primary-cause, the mind-stuff, by which the objects are shown to the proprietor in his capacity as Seer, fails to produce [effects], there is non-sight,^ although the property, the object-for-sight, exists ? 3. Or is it that the aspects [guna) possess the intended- objects [in potential form] 4. Or is undifferentiated-conscious- ness [avidya), which, together with its own mind-stuff, has been restricted, the seed for the production of its peculiar mind-stuff ? 5. Or is it the manifestation of subliminal-impressions in motion [gati) after the subliminal-impressions in equilibrium [sthiti) have dwindled away ? Of which [theory] this has been said,^ “ The primary cause if it existed, on the one hand, in equilibrium [sthiti) only, would be a non-primary cause, because it would not cause any evolved effect. Similarly, if on the other hand it existed in motion [gati) only, it would be a non-primary cause, because the evolved effects would be permanent. And since it does act ^ in both ways [equilibrium and motion] it is ordinarily termed primary substance ; not otherwise. Also with regard to other supposed causes the same reasoning [applies].” 6. According to some non-sight is nothing but the power by which one sees, as the Sacred Word says, “The primary cause acts with the intent of displaying itself.” The Self capable of illuminating all illuminable ^ Compare iv. 34. ^ Udasina Balarama attributes this to Panca 9 ikha. ^ Reading vrtti. 21 [h.o.s. 17 ] ii. 23 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [162 things does not, before the primary cause acts, see. [On the other hand], the object-for-sight capable of making all kinds of effects is not then [without the Self] seen. 7. According to others non- sight is a property of both kinds also. From this point of view, this sight, although independent of the object-for-sight, requires a presented-idea [that is, the reflection] of the Self ; and so is a property of the object-for-sight. Similarly sight, although not independent of the Self, still requires a presented idea in the object- for-sight ; and appears as if it were actually a property of the Self. 8. Certain others assert that non-sight is only the perception [of things only] by sight. These are the alternatives found in the books on this [topic of the nature of non-sight]. These many alter- natives deal with a common subject-matter, the correlation of all the Selves with the aspects (guna). Thus the serving the purpose [of the Self] as the cause of correlation has been stated. And as incidental [to this] the cause of the permanence of the primary cause and the cause of the permanence of the correlation in general have been stated. With the intent to describe what correlation itself is, in other words, its special particular [nature], the sutra has come into being. 23. The reason for the apperception of what the power of the property and of what the power of the proprietor are is correlation. Because the object-for- sight is for his sake, therefore the Self, accepting the aid rendered by this [object], becomes its proprietor. And the object-for-sight becomes his property. And the correlation of these two which has had a merely potential arrangement is the reason for the apperception of what the two are in themselves. This same is made clear in the commentary in the words «The Self.)5> The Self as proprietor merely by [his] pre-established harmony becomes correlated with the object-for-sight as his property for the sake of sight. The rest is easy. An objector says, ‘ This may be true. Liberation may be said to be the apperception of what the Seer himself may be, [that is, it may be] that by which he is liberated. And moreover release is not the effect of means. Should this be so, it would cease being what could be rightly called release.’ In reply to this he says, «until sight is effected.^ Until sight is effected there is a correlation of a particular Self with a particular thinking-substance. Thus sight is said to be the cause of discorrelation. ‘ But how does correlation last until sight is effected?’ In reply to this he says, ^non-sight.» Non-sight, undifferentiated- consciousness {avidya), is said to be the instrumental cause of correlation. He makes clear the meaning of what he said before by saying, «in this [system] . . . not.» The objector says, ‘ Sight may quite remove non-sight, its opposite. But how can it remove bondage ? ’ In reply to this he says, ^tis sight. ^ Kelease has 1G3] The Self and the aspects [ — ii. 23 been stated [i. 3] to be the self’s [atman) abiding in his own form as dis- criminated from the thinking-substance and other [substances]. And the means for effecting this is not only sight, but the removal of non-sight. This is the meaning. — In order to obtain a particular kind of non-sight as the special reason for the correlation he puts forth the following alternatives with respect to non-sight in the words, «And what is this.» 1. Assuming that [non-sight] is some positive thing {^aryudasd)^ [not sight] he asks, «1. Is it the authority of the aspects (guna) [over the Self] Authority is the competency to initiate effects. For it is as the result of this that the correlation, which is the reason for the round-of-existence, is produced. — 2. Assuming that [non-sight] is a negation where there is a possibility of an affirmation {prasajya-pratisedha),^ he puts forth a second alternative with the word, «2. Or.» [Non-sight] is the failure, by the mind-stuff which shows objects-of-sense [to the Self], to produce either the [various things] from sound downwards or the [discrimination of] the difference between sattva and the Self. It is this that is made clear by the words, «the property.» The object-for-sight is [both] the various things from sound down- wards and the difference between sattva and the Self. The primaiy cause is in motion only so long as it has not completed the two-fold sight. But when both kinds of sight have been accomplished, it desists [from being further in motion]. — 3. On the assumption that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth the third alternative, «3. Or is it that the aspects {guna) possess the intended-objects [in potential form] ?» For if the doctrine of pre-existent causes {satharya) is established, experience and liberation are also yet to come in so far as they are [at present] indeterminable. This is the meaning. — 4. Assuming that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth the fourth alternative and asks «4. Or is undifferentiated-consciousness {avidya ) . . .?» At the time of the reversal of creation, it is restricted together with its peculiar mind-stuff [that is to say] it is reduced to the state of equipoise in the primary cause, the seed for the production of its peculiar mind-stuff. To this extent {tend) a subconscious-impression of undifferentiated-consciousness is other than sight and is precisely what is called non-sight.^ — 5. Assuming that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth the fifth alternative and asks, ^5. Is it ... in equilibrium?:^ When the subliminal-impressions in equilibrium, [that is] existing in the primary cause, and flowing on in a succession of mutations in the equipoised [state of the primary cause], have dwindled away, there is a start given to evolved-effects {vihara), such as the Great [thinking- substance] and the rest, — this is motion {gati). The reason for this [start given] is a subliminal-impression of the primary cause, the subliminal-impression in motion. The manifestation of it is its readiness to produce effects. He says that another theory admits the real existence of subliminal-impressions of both ' Compare PataSjali : Mahabhasya (Kiel- 343®*^ ; iii. 35® ; and elsewhere. bom’s ed.) i. 93®; 101®; 167®; 183''; ® Compare p. 24, note 2 ; and p. 113, note 4. 216'; 319'®; 334< ; 341®; ii. 338®; ii. 23 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [164 kinds in the words, Some heterodox person makes fun of this teaching with regard to Isolation by [telling] the anecdote of the impotent man. He tells the anecdote of the impotent man by the words, ^simple-minded. » The word treason {art/ja)» in the expression «for what reason» signifles a ground, because a motive is also a ground. He draws the analogy with the anecdote of the impotent man in the words, ^Similarly since this.2> ‘This existing perception of the discernment of the difference between the aspects {guna) and the Self does not cause a repression of the mind-stuff ; what expectation is there that the mind-stuff, when it together with its subliminal-impressions is restricted by virtue of the higher passionlessness, will cease to be ? The point is that a thing has an effect when it exists ; and not, when it does not exist.’ With regard to this he gives a rebuttal by means of an opinion which partially [agrees], ^On this point one who is almost a master.^ One who is little short ^ of a master. A master, moreover, has his characteristic given in the declaration of the Vayu,^ “ One who not only collects {acinoti) the meaning of the books, but also makes the people steadfast in good conduct, and observes {dcarate) good conduct himself, he is a master {dcdrya),” Release is nothing but the repression of the thinking- substance which has entered into mutations in the form of experience and of ^ See Panini v. 3. 67. ^ See Vayu Parana Ixix. 2 ; and Linga Parana x. 15-16. ii. 24 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or SadJiana [168 discriminative discernment. But there is no repression of the thinking-substance as such. This [repression], moreover, takes place only after the [thinking- substance] is established in the discriminative discernment which lasts up to the Kain-cloud of [Knowable] Things (dhanna-megJia). Even though the thinking- substance abides as itself and nothing less, [still it does exist elsewhere]. He makes this clear by the words, «non-sight.)^ There is a repression of the thinking-substance when there is no non-sight [which is] the cause of bondage. And this non-sight [which is] the cause of bondage ceases as a result of sight. But as for the repression of sight, [that] is to be effected by the higher passionlessness. The point is, although the thinking- substance abides in itself and nothing less, there is release. Having cleared up the opinion which partially [agrees], he states his own opinion in the words, «Then release is nothing but the cessation of the thinking-substance. » An objector asks, ‘ Have you not already* said that, when seeing is repressed, there results soon after a repression of the mind-stuff itself. How then can [this repression] be the result of sight ? ’ In reply to this he says, ^Why then is there this confusion of ideas of his that is so much out of place The meaning is this. If we were to admit that sight is the direct cause of the repression of the mindstuff, then we should be subject to this rebuke. But we take our stand upon the view that discriminative sight reaches its limit of perfection when the mind-stuff is repressed and when it is subservient to the abiding of the Self in his own form, according to its degree of perfection in the cultivation of restricted concentration. How then should we be subject to this rebuke ? The pain which is to be escaped and the cause of pain, the so-called correlation, together with their reasons, have been described. Next the higher escape {hcina) is to be described. 25. Since this [non-sight] does not exist, there is no correla- tion. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer. Since this non-sight does not exist, there is no correlation of the thinking-substance and of the Self, in other words, a complete ending of bondage. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer, the unmixed state of the Self ; in other words, the state in which [the Self] is not again correlated with aspects [guna). Upon the repression of the cause of pain there follows the ending of pain, the escape. Then the Self is said to be grounded ^ in his own self Having thus spoken of two divisions, with the intent to desciube the third division, he introduces the sutra with the words, ^The pain which is to be * See p. 162* (Calc. ed.). MS. and the Anandaframa ed. (96*'*). * Reading °hurvTmahi, with the Bikaner * Compare i. 3. 169] Means of attaining escape [ — ii, 26 escaped.^ 25. Since this [non-sight] does not exist, there is no correlation. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer. He explains the sutra in the word, ^this.» For even in the great mundane dissolution there is no correla- tion. For this reason he uses the word «complete.» The words <5Cthe ending of pain, the escaped show that this is a fulfilment of the purposes of the Self. The rest has nothing obscure. Now what is the means of attaining escape 1 26. The means of attaining escape is unwavering discrimina- tive discernment. Discriminative discernment ^ of the presented-idea of the differ- ence between sattva and the Self. But this discernment wavers when erroneous perception is not repressed. When erroneous perception, reduced to the condition of burned seed, fails to repro- duce itself [vandhya-prasava), then the flow of the presented-ideas of discrimination — belonging to the sattva, which is cleansed from rajas belonging to the hindrances, and which continues in the higher clearness [and] in the higher consciousness of being master — becomes stainless. This unwavering discriminative discernment is the means {updya) of escape. After this, erroneous perception tends to become reduced to the condition of burned seed. And its failure to reproduce itself is the Path {mdrga) to Release, the way-of-approach i^pdya) to escape. Wishing to denominate the fourth division as having the distinguishing- characteristic of the means of escape, he introduces the sutra with the word «CNow.» 26i The means of attaining escape is unwavering discrimina- tive discernment. Even by verbal communication and by inference there is discriminative discernment. This [kind of discriminative discernment] does not, however, repress emergence or the subhminal impressions from emer- gence, because these two latter follow a man who has both [the verbal- communication and the inference]. Accordingly in order to repress this [emergence] he says, ^unwavering.^ Wavering is erroneous perception ; [unwavering] is free from that. What he means to say is this. He obtains discrimination by perception derived from something heard ; and he makes this logically tenable [vyavasthapya) [by ideas] derived from reasonings. The discriminative discernment, which in concentration has reached the utmost perfection of cultivation for a long time, uninterruptedly, and with earnest ^ Discussed in Samkhya Tattva Kaumudl on Ear. 51. 22 [h.o.s. 17 ] ii. 26 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [170 attention, [and which] has direct perception and has uprooted erroneous per- ceptions together with their subconscious impressions, [and which is thus] unwavering, — this is the means of escape. The rest of the comment is easy. 27. For him [there is] insight seven-fold and advancing in stages to the highest. The words refer ^ to him ^ in whom discernment is re-uprisen. The word means that the insight of the discriminating [yogin], after the removal of the defilements from the covering of impurity, when no other kind of presented-idea is generated in the mind-stuff, has just seven forms, as follows. 1. The thing to be escaped has been thought out ; nor need [the yogin] think it out again. 2. The reasons for the thing to be escaped have dwindled away ; nor need they dwindle away again. 3. The escape is directly perceived ® by the concentration of restriction ; [nor need anything beyond this be discovered]. 4. The means of escape in the form of discriminative discernment has been cultivated ; [nor need anything beyond this be culti- vated]. So this is the four-fold final release {vimukti), belonging to insight, which may be effected. But the final release of the mind- stuff is three-fold [as follows]. 5. The authority of the thinking- substance is ended. 6. The aspects [guna), like rocks fallen from the top of the mountain peak, without support, of their own accord, incline towards dissolution and come with this [thinking- substance] to rest. And when these [aspects] are quite dissolved, they do not cause growth again, because there is no impelling- cause. 7. In this stage the Self has passed out of relation with the aspects [guna), and, enlightened by himself and nothing more. ' See Nyaya-Kofa, s.v. pmtyamnaya * TheVarttikainsiststhatis rather and that it refers to the means of escape. It denies that the reference is to the Self since there is no mention of the Self in the previous sutra. Bala- rama replies that the Comment ex- l^ressly wishes to avoid reference to the means of escape in the previous sutra and that it says that means ^him in whom discernment is re-uprisen.^ This explanation is cor- roborated by the use of the words vivekino bhavati. ® See i. 3 and compare iii. 16, p. 218^ ; iii. 18-19, pp. 230® and 231'®; iii. 26, p. 24P; iii. 51, p. 266^; and iii. 52, p. 269® (Calc. ed.). 171 ] [— ii. 27 Seven stages of insight is stainless and isolated. — The Self beholding this seven-fold insight advancing in stages to the highest is denominated fortunate [kugala). Even when there is also the inverted generation of the mind-stuif the Self is said to be released [and] fortunate, because he has passed beyond the aspects (guna). He describes the goal as such which belongs to discriminative discernment in the stitra 27. For him [there is] insight seven-fold and advancing in stages to the highest. He explains [the sutra] by saying ^;^ ^In whom discernment is re-uprisen», that is to say, theyogin in whom discernment is present. The word Of these [seven], from among the four stages which may be completed by a man’s effort, he takes up the first with the words, <5Cl. The thing to be escaped has been thought out.^ Whatever is an effect of the primary-cause, all that is surely nothing but pain by reason of the pains due to mutations, to anxiety, and to subliminal impressions, and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations, — and is therefore to be escaped. This has been thought out. — He shows what the advancement to the highest is in the words In this stage, even while alive, the Self is called fortunate [and] released, since [this] is his last body. Accordingly he says, ^this.2> He says that [the yogin] is not released in a figurative ^ sense [as merely being free from his last body] in the words, ^inverted generation.^ Even when his mind-stuff is resolved into the pi'imary cause, he is said to be released and fortunate,® because he has passed beyond^ the aspects {gum). When discriminative discernment is perfected there is the means of escape. And there is no perfection without the means [of attaining it]. So this [topic of the means] is begun. 28. After the aids to yoga have been followed up, when the impurity has dwindled, there is an enlightenment of percep- tion reaching up to the discriminative discernment. The aids to yoga are the eight which are about to be enumerated. As the result of following them up there is a dwindling or cessation of the five-sectioned [ii. 3] misconception. Upon the dwindling of this follows the manifestation of focused thinking. And in pro- portion as the means [of attaining discriminative discernment are followed up], so the impurity is reduced to a state of attenuation. And in proportion as it dwindles, the enlightenment of perception also, in accordance with the degree of dwindling, increases. Now this same increase experiences a perfection reaching up to discrimi- * Compare ii. 10, p. 120® ; ii. 24, p. 162® ; iii. 55, p. 274®. The phrase carita-arfha occurs iii. 50, p. 265® (Calc. ed.). ® Compare aupacdriham aigvaryam i. 24, p. 59® (Calc, ed.) ; and for definition of aupacdriham iii. 55, p. 274® (Calc. ed.). See also for use of word iv. 10, p. 286®. ® Fortunate because he is free from attach- ment to the consequences of his own actions which are the cause [of bond- age]. Because of this he is not bound, {hefusu karmasu phalasanga- rahitatvdn na baddho hhavatiti ku^a- latd.) — This is the suggestion of the Patanjala Rahasyam. For other in- stances see i. 24, p. 54^ ; ii. 9, p. 119* ; iv. 30, p. 314® (Calc. ed.). * Compare Bh. Gita xiv. 20. The nine causes [ — ii. 28 173] native discernment [or] up to the perception [ii. 26] which dis- tinguishes between the aspects {guna) as such and the Self. The following up of the aids to yoga is the cause of discorrelation [viyoga) with impurity, just as an axe [is the cause of the disjunc- tion (yiyoga) of a tree] which is to be cut [from its root]. Now [the eight aids] are the cause of attaining discriminative discern- ment, just as right-living {dharma) is [the cause of getting] to happiness; in other ways it is not a cause. — Furthermore how many of these causes, according to the system, are there ? J ust nine, he ^ says, as follows, “ Cause is nine-fold, rise [into conscious- ness] and permanence and manifestation and modification and presentation and attainment and disjunction and transformation and sustentation.” Of these [nine], 1. The cause of rise [into con- sciousness], [is for instance] the central-organ [as the cause] of a mental-process {vijhdna ) ; 2. the cause of permanence : [for instance] the fact that the Self has purposes [is the cause of the permanence] of the central-organ, just as food [is the cause of the permanence] of the body ; 3. the cause of manifestation [is for instance] the shining [of the Self upon a fluctuation as the cause of the manifestation] of colour, just as the perception of colour [which is in the fluctuation, is the cause which manifests the shining of the Self] ; 4. the cause of modification [is for instance] another object- of-sense [which modifies] the central-organ, just as fire [is a cause which modifies] food to be cooked; 5. the cause of presentation: [for instance] the thought of smoke [is the cause of the presenta- tion] of the thought of fire ; 6. the cause of attaining : [for instance] the following up of the aids to yoga [is the cause of attaining] discriminative discernment ; 7. the cause of disjunction [is for instance] the same [following up as the cause which disjoins the Self] from impurity ; 8. the cause of transformation is for instance the goldsmith [as the cause which transforms] the gold. Similarly if a single presented idea of a woman has the quality of infatuation, undifferentiated-consciousness {gvidyd) [is the trans- forming cause] ; if it has the quality of painfulness, hatred [is the transforming cause] ; if it has the quality of pleasurability, passion ‘ Apparently this is a saihgraha^loka. Vijnana Bhiksu says karikoktcini nava kcirandni. ii.28 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [174 [is the transforming cause] ; if it has the quality of the detached attitude,^ the recognition of the reality [is the transforming cause] ; 9. the cause of sustentation [is for instance] the body [as the cause which sustains] the sense-organs, and these [organs as the cause sustaining] this [body], [and again] the great elements [as the sustaining cause] of bodies, and these [elements] reciprocally of all [elements], since human and animal and supernormal bodies depend upon each other. — So much then for the nine causes. And these so far as possible are also to be applied to other things. But as for the following up of the aids to yoga, it comes into play as cause in two ways only, [as the cause of disjunction and as the cause of attainment]. So much for the four divisions which have been described. Since discriminative discernment, the means of escape, which falls within these [four], cannot be perfected before [one follows up the means], as in the process of milking a cow : and since what is not perfected cannot be a means [to something else], he proceeds to describe the means for its perfection in the words, ^When . . . perfected. » At this point the way by which the means-of-attainment, which are about to be mentioned, serve as a means for discriminative discernment is shown by the sutra which begins with the word 28. . . . yoga and ends with the word discernment. For the aids to yoga, according to circumstances, by seen or unseen* methods, cause the impurity to dwindle away. That misconception has five sections must be understood as a partial statement, since merit and demerit, in so far as they are causes of birth and of length- of-life and of kind-of-enjoyment, are also impure. The rest is easy. Since we find that causality is multiform, what kind of causality belongs to the following up of the aids to yoga ? In reply to this he says, . Since it disjoins the sattva of the thinking-substance from impurity it is the cause of disjunction from impurity. He gives a simile in the words, ^just as an axe.» An axe disjoins the tree to be cut from its root. The sattva of the thinking-substance, when disjoined from impurity, causes one to attain to discriminative discernment, Just as merit is [the cause of attaining] pleasure, so the following up of the aids to yoga is the cause of attaining discriminative discernment. And [it is a cause] in no other form. So he says, «Now . . . discriminative insight.^ Having heard the denial in the words ^n other ways . . . not,» he asks, «Furthermore how many of these The answer is, <5CJust nine.» He shows what these are by a memorial verse (kdrika), «as follows, “ . . . rise [into consciousness ].”» He gives an illustration * Read the tale in H. C. Warren : Buddhism * A visible means would be ^auca ; an in- in Translations, p. 298. visible means would be svddhyaya. 175 ] Causes as aids to yoga [ — il. 28 of this in the words, ^Of these [nine], 1. The cause of rise [into consciousness].» 1. The central organ is the cause of the origin of a mental process because it brings out a mental process from an indeterminable stage to the present stage. 2. The cause of permanence [is for instance] the fact that the Self has purposes. The central organ rising [into consciousness] out of the feeling-of-personality lasts only so long as the two-fold purpose of the Self is not fully accomplished. When the two kinds of purposes of the Self are accomplished it passes out of permanence. Therefore the fact that the Self has purposes is the cause of the permanence of the central organ which has risen [into consciousness] out of its own cause. He gives a simile in the words, ^just as food is of the body.)» 3. The eflScient cause of perceptive thinking, the preparation (sarhslcriya) of an object either of itself or by a sense-organ, is manifestation. The cause of this manifestation [is for instance] the shining [of the Self upon a fluctuation as the cause of the manifestation] of colour. 4. The cause of modification [is for instance] another object-of-sense [which modifies] the central organ. For just so Mrkandu, whose central organ had become con- centrated, heard the fifth * note ripening upon the lute, and lifted up his eyes and beheld the heavenly-nymph Umloca in the perfection of beauty and loveliness, so that he lapsed from concentration, and his central organ became attached to her. He gives an instance bearing upon the same point in the words «just as fire.;^ For just as fire is the cause of the modification of a thing to be cooked, like rice, in such manner that a thing whose arrangement of parts was compressed becomes loosely conjoined in parts. 6. An object which is definitely existing is the cause of presentation [just as] the thought of smoke [is the cause of the presentation] of the idea of fire. What he means to say is this. The thought [jriana) is that which is thought ; and the thought of fire is fire and it is thought [that is, it is a descriptive compound].^ 6. The cause of attainment. The natural action of effects belonging to causes which are independent is [what he means by] attainment. Occasionally there is an exception to this [action of the effects, which is the] non-attainment. Just so waters whose nature it is to flow down a slope [nimna] are held back by a dam. Similarly also in this case, the sattva of the thinking-substance, which is disposed to pleasure and bright- ness, is by its own nature the producer of pleasure and of discriminative dis- cernment. This is attainment. Sometimes this [attainment], because it is held back, by reason of demerit or of tamas, does not follow. When by reason of merit or of following up the aids to yoga this [holding-back] is removed, then as a reason merely of the nature of the fluctuations of the thinking-substance’s sattva when not held back by this [demerit or famas], and in so far as it [this sattva] is the producer of this [pleasure and discernment], [this sattva] attains [them], ^ See Raghuvah 9 a ix. 26 and 47 ; Karpura- ^ Compare MBh. i. 4821 = i. 123. 64. manjari i. 16® (HOS. vol, 4, p. 228). ® The compound is not a genitive depen- The seventh note of the lute resembles dent (sasthTtatpw'nsa) , but rather a the cooing of the koil. descriptive (karmadMraya). ii. 28 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [176 as* he will [iv. 3] say, “The efficient cause gives no impulse, but [the muta- tion] follows when the barrier to the evolving causes is cut, just as in the case of the peasant.” Thus there is said to be a cause of attainment only with reference to the effect characterized as discriminative discernment. 7. In respect to anything subsidiary [to discriminative discernment] the same thing would be a cause of disjunction. So he says, «7. the cause of disjunction.^ 8. He describes the cause of transformation in the words «the goldsmith . . . the gold.» In so far as the emphasis is upon the difference with respect to the gold, which is both different and not different from the bracelets and ear-rings and anklets, and in so far as the emphasis is upon the absence of difference [in the gold], which is not different from the bracelets and other things, there is a cause which transforms [the gold] from the bracelet [into something else]. And the goldsmith, who made the bracelet, in so far as he transforms the gold, which is [now] identical with the ear-ring, becomes the cause of transforma- tion. Although fire [given as an example of 5. modification] is a cause of transformation with respect to the thing to be cooked, still since the difference between the substance “ and the property, the rice-grains and the lump of rice, is not emphasized, therefore even though the properties come and go, still the substance persists. It is not possible therefore to say that [the fire] is a cause of transformation. For this reason it was said that the fire is a cause of modification. And accordingly there is no cross-division. Moreover it should not be supposed that the cause of transformation in the case of the substance is merely a difference in the arrangement of parts. For this would be incon- sistent with the words «the goldsmith.» Having made clear what the cause of outer transformation is, he illustrates the inner [cause] in the words «Similarly if a single.^ «Undifferentiated-consciousness [avidya),'^ that is, such a thought as ‘ This girl is to be loved ’. The very same presented idea of a woman becomes, in the case of Chaitra, in consequence of his complete infatuation, infatuated, that is to say, dejected. For he says to himself, ‘ Alas ! that jewel of a woman has come into the hands of that lucky Maitra, not into the hands of me, bereft {lima) of luck.’ Similarly the rival wives’ hatred of her is the cause of the painfulness of the idea of [this] woman. And again the passion of her husband Maitra for her is [the cause] of the quality of pleasurability in this same idea of the woman. The recognition of the reality, that the body of the woman is a congeries of skin and flesh and fat and bones and marrow, and is impure because of its [first] abode® [and] because of its origin and the rest, becomes, in the case of the discriminating, the cause of the detached attitude [that is to say] passionlessness. 9. The cause of sustentation is that which sustains the body and organs. And in the case of the body it is the organs. For the five breaths, beginning with the vital air, are functions * Compare ii. 18, p. 144® (Calc. ed.). * Compare Patanjali : Mahabhasya, vol. I, p. 7 middle (Kielhorn’s ed.). ® Compare ii. 5, p. 111*. 177] [ — ii. 29 Eight aids to yoga of the organs in general. For if they were not, the body would fall. Similarly in the case of the parts of the body, the flesh and the other [parts], there is the reciprocal relation of sustained and sustainer. Likewise the great elements, that is, the earth and the other [elements] ; and these [elements] are in the reciprocal relation [of sustained and sustainer] in the case of bodies dwelling in the worlds of human beings or of Varuna or of the Sun or of the Wind {gandhavaha) or of the Moon. Thus in the case of earth, which has the qualities (guna) of odour and taste and colour and touch and sound, there are five great elements standing in the reciprocal relation of sustained and sustainer ; in the case of water there are four ; in the case of fire three ; in the case of wind two. Furthermore animal and human and divine [bodies] stand in a relation of sustained and sustainer. Some one asks, ‘ How can this [reciprocal relation of sustained and sustainer] be so, if the bodies are not in the relation of holder and held?’ He replies, ^ince human . . . depend upon each other.» For the human body is sustained by the use of the bodies of tame animals and of birds and of wild animals and of plants. Similarly bodies like the tigers [are sustained] by the use of the human bodies and those of tame and wild animals and of others. And again in the same way the body of the tame animal and of the bird and of the wild animal [is sustained] by the use of plants and similar things. Likewise the divine body [is sustained] by the use of sacrifices, of goats and deer and the flesh of grouse and ghee and baked-rice-cakes ^ and branches of mango {sahakdra) and handfuls-of-darbha grass (prastara), offered by human beings. In the same way the deity also sustains human beings and the rest by granting boons and showers. Thus the dependence is reciprocal. This is the meaning. — The rest is easy. In this [sutra] the aids to yoga are determined. 29. Abstentions and. observances and postures and regula- tions-of-the-breath and withdrawal-of-the-senses and fixed attention and contemplation and concentration are the eight aids. The following up of these must be performed in succession. And what they are we shall describe. Now with the intent of excluding either a larger or a smaller number he determines what are the aids to yoga by saying <5Cln this [sutra] the aids to yoga are determined.^ The sutra begins with the word 29. Abstentions and ends with the word aids. Practice and passionlessness and belief and energy and the rest [i. 20], both by reason of their own selves and in so far as they are indispensable, are also properly to be included among these same. ' Their use is described in Apastamba- in ^atapatba-Brahmana i. 2. 2. 1 f. Yajna-Paribhasa-Sutra xcix and cxxix And again in Manu vi. 11 and vii. 21. (SBE., vol. xxx), and their preparation 23 [ho.s. 17 ] ii. 30 — ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [178 Of these [eight] — 30. Abstinence^ from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from incontinence and from acceptance of gifts are the abstentions. Of these [five] abstinence from injury means the abstinence from malice towards all living creatures in every way and at all times. And the other abstentions and observances are rooted in it. In so far as their aim is the perfection of it, they are taught in order to teach it. And in this sense ^ it has been said, “ Surely this same brahman in proportion as he desires to take upon himself many courses-of-action,^ in this proportion refraining from heedlessly giving injury, fulfils [the abstention of] abstinence from injury in order to give it the full character of its spotlessness.” Abstinence- from-falsehood (satya) means speech and mind such as correspond to the object-intended ; and speech and mind corresponding to what is seen or inferred or heard. ^ If speech is spoken in order that one’s own knowledge may pass to some one else, it should not be deceitful or mistaken or barren of information ; [then it would be abstinence from falsehood]. It should be used for the service of all ; not for the ruin of creatures. And even when used thus, should it be only for the ruin of creatures, it would not be an abstinence from falsehood ; it would be nothing less than wrong. In so far as there would be a false kind of merit [and] a resemblance of merit, it would become the worst of evils. Therefore let [the yogin] consider [first] what is good ® for all creatures and [then] speak with abstinence-from-falsehood. — Theft ® is the unauthorized (afdstrapurvaka) appropriation of things-of-value from another. While abstinence-from-theft, when free from coveting, is the refusal to do this. — Continence is control of the hidden organ of genera- tion. — Abstinence -from -acceptance -of- gifts is abstinence -from - appropriating objects, because one sees the disadvantages in acquir- * This sutra and the following are quoted in Gaudapada’s Bhasya on Samkhya- karika xxiii. * Similar plans of life in Bhag. Pur. xi, second half. * JAOS. Proceedings, xi. 229. * Compare Linga Purana viii. 13. ® The principle would seem to be that a speech which does not harm any one and which does some good, although untrae, must be regarded as true. See Manu iv. 138 and viii. 138. ® Compare Linga Purana viii. 15. Five ahstentions 179 ] [ — ii. 30 ing them or keeping them or losing them or in being attached to them or in harming them. These then are the abstentions. Having announced the aids [to yoga] of which the first are the abstentions and the observances, he introduces a sutra which specifies the abstentions by saying «of these [eight]. » The sutra begins with the words 30. Abstinence from injury and ends with the word abstentions. He describes the aid to yoga [called] abstinence from injury by saying, <5Cin every way.^ He praises such abstinence- from-injury with the words, «And the other.^ ^Kooted in it» would mean that, even if these are performed without observing abstinence from injury, they are as if they had not been performed, since they are quite fruitless. This is the meaning. The following up of them has nothing as its aim but the perfec- tion of this [abstinence-from-killing]. ‘ If abstinence-from-killing has the others rooted in it, how can it be that they aim at the perfection of the abstinence- from-injury ? ’ To this he replies, «in order to teach it.^ «Perfection» [in other words] the rise into consciousness of a thought. An objector asks, ‘ This may be true. But if the others exist for the sake of knowing abstinence from injury, what need of them, since this thought comes from the other source?’ In reply he says, ^its spotlessness.» If the others were not followed up, abstinence-from- injury would be defiled by falsehood and other [vices]. With reference to this same point he tells of a concurrent opinion of those-who-have-the-tradition (agamika) in the words, ^And in this sense it has been said.» Easy. — He gives the distinguishing characteristic of abstinence-from-falsehood in the words, «speech and mind such as correspond to the object-intended.^ The word such {yatha) raises an expectation which is fulfilled by the words ^corresponding to what is seen.» He brings this into connexion with the correlated word «corresponding-to {tathd)'^ in the expression ^speech and mind corresponding to.» [This should be,] whenever there is a desire to say [something]. [If spoken] otherwise [than as seen], it is not abstinence-from-falsehood. This is stated with an explanation in the words «to some other person.» In order that knowledge thereof may pass to some one else, speech is spoken [or] uttered to produce know- ledge similar to one’s own knowledge. If it is not deceitful [or] the cause of deceit, [it is abstinence-from-falsehood]. Just as when Drona the Master [MBh. vii. chap. 190] asked Yudhisthira [the king] with regard to the death of his own son Afvatthaman, ‘Venerable sir [dyusman), thou who art rich in truth, has Afvatthaman been slain ? ’ And he having in mind the elephant who had the corresponding name said, ‘It is true, Afvatthaman is slain.’ This is an answer which does not make Yudhisthira’s own knowledge pass to [the other person]. For his own knowledge derived from the sense-organ' had as its object the slaying of the elephant and this [knowledge] was not passed [to Drona]. But quite another knowledge, that of the slaying of the latter’s son, was formed [in Drona’s mind]. — «Or mistaken» means due to a mistake, either ' Reading indriya-janmd with the Bikaner MS. and the Bombay and Poona editions. ii. 30 — ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [180 at the time when one desires to say something, or at the time of determining what the object-to-he-perceived is. — «Barren of information» is barren as regards information, as for instance an outlandish tongue is barren of information to Aryans ; or it might be purposeless, as for instance speech the utterance of which is not meant to be uttered. For in this [latter case], although one’s own knowledge does pass to the other person, still it is exactly the opposite of making [knowledge] pass [to another], because it was not purposed.' An abstinence- from-falsehood even when it has these distinguishing characteristics, if it results in injury to another, would be a false kind of abstinence-from-falsehood, but would not be abstinence-from-falsehood, as he says in the words, ^f it.^ For example, one who practises austerities in abstinence-from-falsehood, when asked by robbers which way the rich merchant had gone, told the way the rich merchant had gone. «:It should be used,» that is, uttered. The rest is easy. — Since an [explanatory] negative idea depends on that of the positive he explains the distinguishing characteristic of theft by saying, <5CTheft is the unauthorized.)^ Here the generic idea is characterized by a qualification. This is the meaning. Since verbal and bodily operations are preceded by mental operations, it is the operation of mind, because it is dominant, that is mentioned in the words, ^free from coveting.» — He tells what continence is in the word