U9 ^CO^O>,,^iMivilM (jb'IjW |1'1'''°I°*''^ ""''"""'l u L E T X/J;^ Wherein all the Arguments in his Ej)ifioUry J)?/(07/?/^againft the Immortality cftheisOUL ■ , are particularly anfivereyl,., .and the Judgment ot the Fathers concerning that Matter truly reprefented. 'tf/- JL Together with ^i ^ r y^ | A Defenfe of an Argument made ufe of in the j above-mentioned Letter to Mr Dodw.dl^ ro prove \ the Immateriality and Natural Lwnortality of the SouJ. In Four Letters to the Author of Some Remarls on a preceiided Demonftrarion ot the fninurenaiuy and Natural Immortality of the S^ ul, in Dr CU;l(% Aiiiwer co Mr Dod»ea\ lacc EpiJhUry Dtfcomje, &c. To which is added, Some Rcflcaions on that Part of a Book called Amyntor, or the Defenle of ^Miltcn's Life, which rclan s to the Writings ot the Primitive Fathets, and tlie Canon of the New Tcftament, —^ By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D. Redor of St Jayjiess irejlmwfier. The Fifth Edition. LONDON: Printed by 7/7//. Botham ; for Jjmcs Kmpton, at the Cromi in St. RiuVs Church-Yard. 1 7 1 8. S"cc ^\ v\ A LETTER T O Mr D0DlVELL,8cc. SIR, T isa thing of very ill Confcquence, when Men oi great Reputation in the World tor Learning, in their Difcourles iipcn the mcft important Dodtrines of Religion, raflily and upon very little Grounds, allow themfelves to advance new and crude Notions, and extravagant Hypothefes-, which the Profane mil not, and the Weak are not abl^ to feparate, from the principal and fundamental and mcll neceilary Dodlrincs themfelves. For, as in ^Statural Philofophy and in the fearch after Phyfical Truth, the Syftems and Hypothefes which ingenious Men invent for ex- plaining the appearances ot Nature, and which for fome time are received with Applaufe, but af- terwards are confuted by Rca(c:)n and Experience ^ are apt to make Men think the Natural Caufes of things abfolutely impoffible to be difcover^d at all I and have really fuch an efFeft upcni very Many, as to make them rejett for their fake, or ^2 at A Letter to Mr Dodwell. at leafl: to call in quellion, even the certaineft Truths which hav e been difcovered by plain Ex- periments or clear Mathematical Demcnftration it felf : So in Matters ot Religion likewife, the iiiconfiderate and groundk-fs Notions, v/hich Men of great Learning and much Reading, have with too little Judgment fometimcs joined and inter- mixed with their Explications of feme of the greateft and mcft important Doftrincs of Re- ligion ^ when upon due Examination, the abfur- (dity and inconfiftency of fuch Schemes plainly appears ^ have been apt to raife Doubts in many Mens Minds concerning the Truth even of the certaineft Dodrines themfelves, which are either the mofl i)lainly difcovered by right Rcafon, or are moft clearly delivered in Scripture. You teach that tlie SomX of Man is 7tatuyaUy 7nor- ial, and will of it felf perifh and come to no- thing, if not upheld by the extraordinary Power of God, in a preternatural way. Many, who fee the imprudent Title of your Diic:ourfe, and will not take the pains to read the Book it felf, will conclude, that you fuppofe the Soul to perifh at the dilfolution of the Body •, And all Liber- tines, fi^hen they have read and confidered all that 5^ou offer, will ft ill conclude, that if (as you grant to them) the Soul muft of it felf naturally perifh fometime or other, there is no time fo probable when it fhould perifh, as at the diffo- lution of the Body ^ and they will eafily pcr- fwade themfelves to rely upon this, that God will not work a perpetual Miracle to preferve them pr^ternaturallf by jiis omnipotent Power, on pu'-pofe to inflict np(m them an eternal Pu- nif^i-iert, which by Nature they were not ca- pabl'^ of uuder^oin^. TheP ^ Letter to Mr Dodwoll. Thefe Mens Conclufion indeed is by no means right ^ But it is fuch a one, as is very natural tor Men of loofe Principles and vitious Lives to draw from 3^0Lir Doctrine ^ and therefore you ought to have been very careiul not to give them fuch an Occaiion of deceiving themieives, unlefs you had firft been very lure that your Notion was either very plainly contained in Scripture, or very clearly demonflrable by right Rep.fon : Which that it is not, I prefume will appear from the following Obfervations. You begin withaDiftindion (Prdmojt.SecI. 7,.) that the Souls of fome Men are made immortal by the Spirit of God, to Happinefs^ and the: Souls of iome others, by the J fill of God, toPa- nifhment. Novi^ what can be more precarious and groundlefs than this Diftinclion > For what real difference is there in the thing it felf, be- tween being immortalized by the Spirit, and hy the inil of God •, Eternal Life ami Happivefs is indeed conftantly attributed to the Spirit of God ^ that is, thofe only who have the Spirit of God, and are gvided by it, who obey the Will of God, and live in conformity to his holy Laws, fliall be partakers of Eternal Happimfs: And thus the Spirit of God is indeed neceffary to qualify Men for, and to m;:!ke them capable of, the Happir.efs cf Heaven. Bat if, to make good Men capable of an Eterihil Duration in order to that Happineis, it be necelTary that the Spirit of God give them a new Principle of Siihfjience^ or f^iperadd a 7iew Snhjlance to thci<- Souls •, (as your obfcure Expref- fions concerning the Acee(jion of an adjcititioiis Spirit 8cc. frequently feem to fignify^ and with- out which, there is no other difference than only in Words, between being immortalized by the Spirit and by the Tf'^ill of God^) then nothing A 9 can ji Letter to Mr Dodwell. can be more contrary to reafon, than to fuppofe any Men made immortal without the addition of that new Principle \ nor can any reprefenta- tion of God's Proceedings, be moreharih and in- credible, than to fuppofe him by his Omnipo- tent ir'ill and Power, eternally and miraculoufly preferving fuch Creatures unto cndlefs Punilh- ment, who never had in them, either omjvally or additionally, any Prijuiple of Immortality at all. How plaivly and how very much more agree- able to Reafon and to our natural Kotions of God is it, to fay that all Creatures who (hall ever undergo eternal Punifhment, are fuch as having been created vaturally immortal, and by wilful continuance in Sin, having fofar depraved themfelves as to become unrapable of eternal Happinefs, muft confequently hj the juft Judg- ment of God fall into fuch Mifery, as their im- mortal Nature fo corrupted neceffarily makes them liable to. When we fpeak of the Soul as created jiatjually immortal, we mean that it is by the Divine P'eafme created fuch a Sabftance, as not having in it felt any Compoiition, or any Principles of Corruption, will vciturally or of it felf continue for ever ^ that is, will not by any natural decay, or hy -auy Power of Nature, be diiTolved or deftroyed •, But yet neverthelefs de- pends continiially upon God, who has power to deftroy cr annihilate it, if he iliould fo think fit. When therefore you fay that the Original of the Immortii'.ity of fuch Sdiihas JJ^allhe eternally punifjed, jnaybe more agreeably derived from the Divine Pica- fuie, than from the Natne of the Soid-^ if thereby you mean that the Soul was made immortal by the 7}iere pleajiire of God, in oppofition to its being immortal by the necejfity of its orvn Nature, in the fenfe that God is immortal j then indeed not A Letter to Mr DodwelL not Vlato only, but all others alfo that ever held the Immortulit}'' of the Soul, have been and are of the fanie Opinion : But if by thole Words you mean, as through the whole of your Dif- courfe you txpresfly declare, that the Soul was created mortal, but by the M vine Omnipotence is upheld eternally ^ then it is, on the contrary, evidently far more agreeable to right Real^n and to our Notions of God, to derive the Immor- tality ot the Soul, and efpecially of a miferable one, from its omi Nature, than from the Divine Pleafwe • that is, to fuppofe the Soul to have been at firft created fiich a Subftance, as by the ordinary concourfe of Divine Providence would continue for ever •, than th.at it was created of a mortal and perilhable Nature, but by the extra- ordinary and miraculous Power of God, is con- tinually fnpported, only to endure Torment and Punillmienr, beyond the capacity of its ovvri Nature, to all Eternity. There cannot eaiily be made a worfe reprefen- tation of God's dealings with Mankind, than what you affirm (Pr6tmGn. Scc^. 4.) that if the Devils had not fallen^ there had. been no Hell at all-^ ?.nd that Mankind i^ no othe} wife concerned in it^ than as^ by joiviv^ thewfelves to the DeviVs Party, they ivtitle themfelves alfo to Im Pmupment. 'Tis true^ the Fire of Hell was frft and 01 igi7ially prepared for the Devils, becaufe they were the firj} ani original Oiienders. But to fay that, v/ithout their Fall, there never would have been any Hell at all-^ and that the fame or equal PuniHiment fhould not then have been inflided upon Wicked Men fr^r the fame Crimes, as there now (hall •, is reprefenting God like an Arbitrary Tyrant, who tvithout caring to make an exact, equal, and pavticular diftribution of Juftice^ deals wkh all A 4 Oxtendcrs S A Letter to Mr Dodwell. OjfFenders of all ranks and degrees alike, because the)^ have all iiiterpretatively joined in oppofing his Authority. You affirm expresfly (thid.) that the Sc trl does rot depend ov our grofs Orgavical Bodies^ nor perijl}es upon its dijfoht'wn from thofe Bodies. I befeech you, if the Soul be fuch a Subftance as is inca- pable of being hurt by fo great a change and diflblution, as is caufed in ns by a violent Death, fuppofe by Fire •, upon what Principle can it be imagined to be naturally mortal ^ or what Revolutions m Nature will it not be able to relift and ^fupervive'' You explain this further, by fa3'-ing, that Mens Souls do notfo depend on any ether aented Being, hut that they may jlill iontinue in their diirat:cn, whatfoever other created Injliu'nces he withdrcmnfrojn them, if God he phafed ftill tn ccr.timie that ordinary Providence, which is elje7!tijlly 7iecejfa-iy for their continuance. And is not this the very definition of hnmortality? or did ever any Man mean more than this, when he affirmed the Soul to hQ naturally Ivimortal? You diftin- guifh it indeed iTom the Natural hnmo) tality of Angels ; but by fuch a dijlinBion, as includes not in it any the Icaft di^erence. For what diffe- rence is there between affirming concerning Ait- gels, that it is in the Power and Pleafvre of Goi, , to avinihilate them when he thinh ft ^ and concern- ing Hwnane Souls, that they do not fo depend on any ether created Bangs, hut that they may Jlill con- tinue in theii Dwation, jvhatfoever other created In- fvetices he withdrawn from the??!, if God he pleafed fill to contimie that ordinary Providence, which is cfentiallx necejfa'iy for their Prefeivation ? And yet in tho very next Words, you very inconiifi:- cntly in'agine the Soul as being a mere Flatus, to have a jnore immediate Dependence on God than ether A Letter to Mr Dodwcll. other Oeatii.es^ than even the meaneft Particles ot lifekfs jyiatter have^ which jnnji make it ceaj'c to be^ rehenever h-^ is pleafcd to ceaj'e to breath it y e-s beivg miab'e to continue its Duration, by the Powers given it at its Jirfl ProduBion^ and the continuance of thoje general hifincnces which are requijite for the Jupport of Created Beings in general. According to thele laft Words, the Soul not being fo much as a Subftance of any kind at all, is likely to be more eHedually deftroyed by Death, than even the Body it felf. Whereas according to the Words juft preceding, your Scheme ought to have been on the contrary, that the Soul is by Nature Inwwrtal^ and muft be mortaVixed by the Omnipotence ot God, if ever it perifh y and not, that it is by Nature Mortal, and muft be ijnmortalized by a new Act of Omnipotence, to enable it to fubfift for ever. So that liere, you feem to have framed no coniiftent Notion even of your own Scheme. What3''ou advance (Pr&7non. Seel. <^J concern- ing its not having been culpable to hold com- munication and joyn with the Devil, before the Publication of the Gofpel ^ and that the Devil was not to be looked upon as a publick Enemy, before his bemg declared fo by the Gofpel :, is fo extravagant, that it needs no Confutation. Was not the Devil an Enemy whui he tempted our firlt Parent? And was he not publickly declare d to be fo, in the Curfe pronounced to him thereupc-n ? Is not the Devil defcribed as a pub- lick Enemy to God and good Men, in the Hi- ftory of Job? And as an Enemy to Ifrael, I Chron. 21,1? Or was he known to be an Enemy in Temporal Affairs only, (Pr^mon. pag. 41,) and could not be known to be fo in things relating to the Life to CQVQ>t > Or had the Pa- triarchsj to A Letter to Mr DodwelL triarchs, no expeftation at all of a better City t6 come, after the prefent Tabervacle wae dijOTolved ? Is not Idolatry in the Old Teitament conftantly branded with as fevere a character ot Rebellion againfl: Gcd, as in the New ? And in the Hea- then World, be tore the Goii^el was begun to be preached, (though the times of that kno. ajice God did indeed wink at^ that is, would not be fo fe- vere in ptinifhing them, as thofe who ihould afterwards lin againft greater Light f, j yet was it no Crime to woi-fiip the Crcjture more than the Creator ? was it no Fault that the World did KtiSrcti It -n^ mvc^f^ , lie under entire fubjedtion to the Evil 07ie, i Joh. 5'. T 9 ? and in the Power of Satan^ Ads 26, t8? Were riot the abominable Rites of the Heathen, plainly a facrificing to Devils? And do not all the Ancient Fathers, for whofe Judgment yon exprefs to great an efteem, fiippofe in all their Writings againft the Pagans, that before the propoling of the Gofpel to them, they ought to have known from the Light of Nature and Right Reafon, that thofe impure Spirits whofe worlhip was attended with all manner of bcftiality and wickednefs, werepro- feffed Enemies to God and Goodncfs ? N-iy, does not St. PcwHiimfelf expresfly affirm, th'dtThat which may he known of God, wp.s 7na7iifcJ^ enough to them, to have preftrved them from Idolatry ? and that, becaufe they did not like to retain God in their knowledge^ hut changed the Truth of God into a Lie^ for tliat Reafon God gave theyn up unto vile afeclicm^ Sec Nor is it lefs ahfurd, to found fas you do in the fame place) the Heinoufnefs of Sin and the Reafonablenefs of the Severity of its Punifti- ment, principally upon nshe'mg interpreted as a joyning with the l^cvil. Idolatry indeed, and Witchcraft, u4 Letter to Mr Dodwell. ii Witchcraft, and Profane Scoffing at God and all Religion, may juftly enougli come dircdtly un- der this Charge -^ and all other Sms alio may in etiett and in event, not Improperly be looked upon as a promoting the Interefl oi theDeil, and an oppofing the eftabliihment of the King- dom of God. But to make the for jnd Re af on, the heinoufnefs and demerit, not only ot Idola- try, "Witchcrait and Profane open Oppofition of Religion, but alio ot all other Sins u hatfoever, to conlifi: not fo much in the original depravity of the A:iions themielves, in their contrariety to Right Rcafon, and to the Light of Nature and Confcience, in their oppofition to the Nature and Will and Law and Authority of God, as in their hdng hit^^i pyetativ^ly a joyning and commu- nication with the Dev il •, To fuppofe God in- flicting upon Men fuch a Puniihment, not as their Sins deferve in their own Nature, and fucK as the Nature oi: their own Souls makes them capable oi falling into by' wilful and obftinate Corruption and depravation of themfelves, but fuch as ^ is dijpjojjoi tiovahle to their Nature^ v.n^* Prxmon; \ excecdivg the statural Powers of their degree of JB^-^' ??• ivg \ ar.d to account for this, only by faying, 23/ '^' that Chi iff t/iU fo ivterp^et their not joyning with Him, as if they had joyned themfelves to the Devil 5 Is not all this, to make God, in the hardcft Scnfe, ad "^ arl^it) m ily ^ * Prxmm, Your Interpretation of i^ow. 2, 12. and of?-*^* ^7- Joh. ^,19. {PrAmov. Se&. 6.) is fo loofe and Groundkfs, that av.y Text may in the fame manner be brought to prove ^w)i thim,.^Gt rather no Text can really prove miy thiyw at all. For if when St. Pi.ml fays, Rom- 2, 12. that as many as have fnmcl without Law, fiall alfo perijl) witho-it L<:trv ^ and as mciny as have fmied in the L.ur^ Jhall be judged hy ths I a A Letter to Mr Dodwell. the Law ^ the Word ^^er'ijJ) be not evidently Syno- nymous to Wiwg judged or condemned* and figni- fies that every Sinner's Condemnation or Puniih- iTicnt fhall be proportionable to the henioufneis of his Sin with refped to the Light he finned againft ^ but on the contrary from the Word [ Are there not in Gods Hoiife many Man- Jions P Or will Heaven ?.nd Hell be two fuch places, in which there will be no Differences of States, no Space for Order and variety of de- grees? Does not our Saviour himfelf expreslly tell us, that they who hiew not their Majlers ivill, and yet did things woithy of Jlripes, fiall be beaten with few pipes? And does not St. Paul, in the whole 2d Chapter to the Romans, plainly declare that Gentiles as well as Jews ihall be judged according to their Works > The reft of your Premonition, being upon a different Subjed, I forbear to confider at this time. I '^ IN the Difcourfe it lelf (Se& 2.) you propofe a moft dark and unintelligible Notion, conr cerning Ijlvm and 'sr^sO'^wi] Soul cind Spiiitj not only diftinguifhing the rational Soul from the fenjitive ; which was the Philcfopliy of many of the Antients ^ but moreover making the 5/;/- rit different from both, and wholb/ praternatu- ral to Man. The '^'\\o\c natural ^Qy\\ (■^vyj)) in- cluding both the JhiJitivJ and Rational part, f which m, 1 ^ A Letter to Mr Dodwell. fwhich you elfewhere call the two Fouls, pag' 2 20,) you fuppofe to be of it felf mortal, but to be wdde immortal in good Chriftians by the addition of the Sp'r.h, (by the AcecJ^on of an Adfcititlov.s Spiiit, as you fbmetimes expiefs it) and in the Rtjeders of the Grfpel to be made immortal without it. If by the Spirit you mean only an Operation of the Spirit of God upon our Souls, then (asl obierved before) there is no real difterence between being immorta- lized by the Spit it and by the // iZ/ of God. But if by the Spiiit you mean the addition of a new Subftance or Principle or Subiiftence to the Souls of good Chriftians in order to immortalize them, which 3''et in them that rejedt the Gofpel are immortalized without that addition •, is not this juft inch another fuppofition, as if you {liould fuppofe the UrJerjiavdiiig to be one Subftance in a Man, and the JHll another, and the Habit of Viitiie a third ^ notwithftanding that at the fame time it be confeffed that all thcfe things may be Faculties or Powers of one and the lame Sub- ftance? And your perverting the Words of St Paul to fervc your obfcure Hypothecs is very grofs. Does St Paul when he diftinguifhes the Tiatural Body {jlvyji^v (t^(m.'] from the Spiritual Body [yrvivuAViCfiy 7'^um.'] and calls the one cor- mptible, the other incomiptible •, mean that the oiatural Body [^-jv/xJ;' o-ci'fMi] is therefore corrupti" Me or mortal^ becaufe the Soul [■lv^»] or Pincip'e ' A?^. > of Life which is in it, is it fell a -^ ^/orta/ Prin- ciple? or t\\:itt\\tSpiritiulBody [yrifzvxa.iTAov (t~^m,,'] is made ijtcorruptible by the fuperaddition of a Spirit to the Soul that animates it ? The plain meaning of St Paid is only this, that the Body which ia this prefent fiate is dilTolvible and cor- ruptible, (hall after the Refarrccfion, by the Power ■ of A Letter to Mr Dodwell. i s of God, he madt incorniptible 'j without having any refped at all to the Soul, or the Nature or it, in his whole Bifcourfe. Again, when St Faiil derives our Title to the RefurreBwn oi the Body^ whoU}?- from Chrift j does he thereby mean to affirm, that, without the Refurredtion of Chrift, the Souh of Men muft alfo have ceafcd to exift ? On the contrary, for that very rea- fon, becaufe the Souls of Men would not have ceafed to exift ^ therefore Chrift thought them of value to redeem them from Mifery, by the Pur- chafe of his Blood, by his Death and Refur- redtion. And 'tis the worft reprefentaticn of Chriftianity, that can be ^ fomething that might indeed ^ be thought hard dealhig -^ to fuppofe''' ^''4* 5* (as you do) that the Gofpel of Chrift, which is every where in Scripture reprefented as the grca'teft Inftance of God's tender Mercy and Compaftion towards Men, ftiould upon the whole fo very difproporticirahly increafe the Mifery of /infnl Men, as that whoever difl^elieved or neg- leded that new Ofter of Grace and Favour, fhould from thenceforth be condemned to ever- lafting Torments i notwithftanding that other- wife Sin, in its own Mature, againft the Light of Reafon and Confcience and the natural Law of God, was fo little heinous, that had it not been for the Offer of this new extraordinary Grace and Favour, they that had lived in the utm.cft contempt of God and of his natural and eternal Law written in their Hearts, and in the moft unreftrained pradice of all poilible wicked- nefs, might have been fafe from .the fear of any other danger, than that of perilling finally by a natural Mortality. Your jm.. 1 6 A Letter to Mr Dodwell. Your Conclufion from our Saviour's dcfcrip- tion of the laft Judgment, Mat, 25. is very ex- traordinary ;, \ScB:. 3 •,] that becaufe the reward- ablenej'i ot the good Works of the Righteous, is there aicribed to their having been done for Chnjl's fake •, therefore no other Pcrfoiis Ihall be concerned in that Judgment but thofe to whom the Gofpel had been made known. You might exactly as well have concluded, that becaufe Charity and Unchayitahlenefs are the onl}'' particu- lar Adions there mentioned, for which Men fhall be adjudged to Reward or Punifhment ^ there- fore no regard fhall be had to any other Virtues or Crimes in that final Judgment. It is evident by comparing other places of Scripture, that all kinds of A3iom fhall then be examined j and it is as evident, that all forts of Perjoin fliall be fo too. Thofe who never heard of the Gofpel, 'tis true, cannot be judged b}' the fame Rule or Forviy as thofe who did hear of it^ But is it not very wonderful, to conclude from thence, that becaufe * Pag. 7« ^ fiich perfons miiji be judged by another form not fully and expresfly ffuppofe) mentioned in Scripture, therefore that forjn camwt at all he htoxprij what it is •, and if that form could not be knomij yet that therefore it ought not to be believed that there is any fuch form at all ? Docs not the fame Light of Reafon, which makes Men a a Lajp to themfelves, neceflaril}?' difcover alfo to them at the fame time what Rule they fhall be judged by ? Neither is it true therefore, that no fuch Form can be proved from the Scrii)tures : For do^s not St Paid, in the whole 2d Chapter to the Ro7navs, largely declare that there 15 fuch a Form, and alfo what that Form is? And does not the Scripture every where plainly fup- pcfe. A Letter to Ur D'odwell. i ^ pofe, that the Jiiflgment fhall be uiiiverfal ? The Phrafe oi judging the Jforld^ A6ts 17, ?i, niani- feftly implies it; and the dppofition l^etweeii Death and Judgment, Heb. 9, 27, though the ftrcfs of the Apofiles Armament does not in- deed lie upon it, and the univcfHil particle l^ll] is not added,, yet very evidently fuppoffs the Jiidgmevt to-extend to the very lame Perfons as Dcixth doth. And what difteren'ce is there, be- t^vveen faying that 'tis appointed for Meii oncer to die, or that 'tis appointed for All Men once to die ? It is not a juft anfwer here, to fay that Univerfal Ailertions are frequentty in Scripture to be underftood in a limited Senfe. That can only be fo, when either the common acceptation ot the words, evidently limits their fignification v as in that place you mention, Joh. 12, 19^ or* when fome other parallel places of Scripture, ex- presfly add a Limitation. Where this is not the' cafe, as it is not in the phrafe of Go^s judging the lyorld, Acts 17, ?i i the fame expreifion being in all other places of Scripture likewife uni- verfal I, if limitations may be added arbitrarily and at pleafure, there will then be no way left to diftinguifh at all, when any declaration is to be looked upon as iimvsrfalj and when as onl/ panicuhr. You your felt' are forced to allow the Jews, who lived before our Saviours coming, to be concerned in the Judgment ^ and not them on- 15^, but alfo Others who lived before the Law, in the Times of iVo..T/7 and the Patriarchs^ be- caufe {pag. 11,) as they were wtitled to the Spirit ; in Reverjion^ fo they iiiight be intitled to the Confe- qvejices of the Spirit, one of ndm h is Immortality, I fuppofe you will cafily grant, that the Know- ledge many of thefe Men had of Chii-ft, was B hxii I S A Letter to Mr Dodwell." ^ but implicit and very obfcure : And if tloat waS' fafncient to intitle them to Immortalit}^ why is it not as ealie to fiippoie that the Promile God made to Ad.wi might intitle all Mankind- to have feme benefit of the Redemption pur- chafed by Chrift, according to their . different proportions and capacities, tho' they never heard of him explicitly ? , ■ It may here be obferved alio hj tlie by, that, according to your obfcure and indeed contulcd manner of -cxpreffmg your ielf, you in this. Sedtion {pag. '^J fuppofe the Holy Spirit to hn- jnnrtal'txe Men to FmnJIrment •, and again {p---^. ? i ,) that Men are qiial'ifci for ths higher degree of FinnJJ)mejit\ by the Accejjion of the-adfchhmis Sphit^ vdji h makes them \le for Sodom and Gomoi rha .in the Day of Judgment, than for tliofe who rejedted the Gof])el when offered them ^ does it from thence follow, that tliofe ^ wicked People lliall rot becajR; into "^ outer djrk-'*- pag. 34^ 7iejs at all? When our Saviour threatens thatCt- peivamn, which was exacted to Heaven^ JJmnl.i he hr ought down to Hcll-^ is it not a very extraordi- nary Interpretation of the meaning of thofe Words, and as wonderful an Inlerence from theui, to conclude that thofe People, it our Saviour had not preached to them, would have t had Ho red-j. ^^^^ ,^^ fov to fear the Pavihnevt of Hell at all > An un- prejudiced Perfon would rather conclude on the contrary, that for that very reafon, becaufe they were iii danger of it, therefore our Saviour preached to them and exhorted them to repeyit and fee from the wrath to come. Laflly, if they that never heard of the Gofpel, fhall not indeed for their Unbeliet be fentenced to 1| that HfV, which \ p. tg. i9, was prepared for the Devil and hisAngels^ that is, to the fam3 Degree of Pmiifjment with thole who reject or difibey the Gofpel \ yet does it at at all from thence follow, that they iliall have 7to concern in the general Judgment, upon account of their having obeyed or difjbeyed the Law of Nature ? The Cafe {Se^. 6.) of that Text in St >/m, John $,28 and 29 ^ The Hour is coming, in the iphiih all that are in the Graves f Jail hear hiif^oia-^ B 2 i.n ao ^Letter to Mr DodwcB. and JI)allcome foith^ they that have done good, mifcP the RefwreBion of Life, and they that have done\ evil, inito the RefiirreBiojt of Da7)i7iatiov, isexaftly the fame with that hetore-mentioned, A3s 17, 51. The V/orUs are mnverfal ^ and the Injftances yGU bring of other imiverfal Affirirations, whicb iTQuft be underftood in a limited Senfe, have not the leafl: fimi-litutde with the Text 3^00 are con- fidering. If the Gibeovites umverfal Declaration to David, that for the?nhe flwuld not killavy Ma7t in Ifrael, inuft needs indeed be underftood in 3 limited Senfe, becaufe they themfelves expresfly" li7mtedit hj demanding feven ot SauVs Pofterity to be deliver'd to them to be put to death : If AhaFs(tnding to all Nations and Kingdoms to fearch for Elijah, muft indeed of nectifity, in the Nature ot the thing it felf, be underftood cw/y (f thofe that bordered upon him •, If St Paid's^ rwzVr/^Z Declaration, that he baptized none of the Corinthians, muft indeed be underftood witli an exception ^ becaufe he himfelf in the ver;^ next Words adds an exception expresfly f Is it juft to infer from thefe Inftances, that our Saviour's imiverfal Affirmation in this place, concerning the Refirrcftion, may likewife be miderftood in a limited Senfe, though neither in the Nature of the thing it felf, nor from the Context, there be any the leafl: Ground for fuch limitation? Nay though on the contraiy, all the parallel Texts, Vv'hieh are very many, be likewife umverfal ^ It is. a wonderful thing, to fee in what manner Learned Men can argue, when Prejudices prevail over their Judgment. .'rf.*^ Yo'jr ^ Letter W Mr Dodwell ai ■Your 7th Sedion, to ordinary Underftandings, •feems to bcMnere C.onfnfion. Ton fuppofe Man to confifl of three diftinct parts, Body^ Soul and Spirit: But they who made this diftindion, fup- pofed thefe three parts to be in all Men by A^a- -t^^'t-'j which will not ferve yoKr purpofe. 7'ou bring in Rrlo diftinguifhing Mind [N??] from [.-Ivxii] S021I, and niaicing the one mortal, the 0- tJicr immortal : But this likev/ife, being fp ken concerning the natural Forniaticn of ali Men, 15 nothing to your pnrpofe •, For in your Hypo- the/Is, you make the wholeM^n by nature Mortal. Tou mention Plato here (fag. 22 and 24, an(t ^gain pag. 59 & (^6, and Vvdnwn. pag. 21 J as a- vouring your own Notions : And yet in othier places, (aspag. 3:?, 60, & 66.,) youinconfiftejitiy fpeak of him as juftly blamed for holding the contrary Opinion, for affirthrg Our Do^inne of the Souls natural ImmoHaViiy^ pag. 35. Tou sifuym (pag. 29,) that there is no real difference between the Platonical Notions and thofe of the New Tcflament, only that That which the Platonifts call Mind [n.??] and make it Immortal, the Sacred M^'riters call [ '^vrCaa ] Spti it, as heing the Divine Breathing, j;)pofing the immortal Mhid of Man, that is,^'** B -; the %% ji Letter to Mr Dodweil. the rational Sou], both to the Body and to the fenfirive Soul, ftillfpeaks of them all as orzgnM/ and r.atv.rd Parts of the Man^'and therefore when 3' on appl}^ to your Hypothelis of an ai' fcithioiis Spiiit^ what he lays concerning this [•TrviVfMt ^r^loy'] DivhieSphk or Soul infufed into Man by God'g breathing. Gen. 2. 7 •, 3''oii again dircdlly contraditt your felt", by confounding the Spirit \^'7Thvy.A~] which you iuppofe immortal, v/ith the L-s-fCi)} Breafh or Soul which you make to be mortal. Im cite (pag. 26) the Words of ^ratJis, Tb >) }y y'ivQ- \. you make the Sovl, as being a mere Flatm, to have 3 more precarjons fubfiftence, even than mere Mat- ter it felf\ faying that ii is miable to covtivue its '(^wn Dnrapon by -the Powers given it at its frfi -''^ic dud ion, and the contiiniame. of thofe general In-. ^ :,•'■■. fiucnccs A Letter to Mr DodwelL 2 ^ iiucnces which are rcqniJJteforthefuppoit of Oca- ted Beivgs in geitevd : Yet in the lame page (as I oblerved beforej you lay that Souls do vnt jo depend on any other Created Beings but that they may JFiU co7itimie hi their Duration^ whatfoei>€r other created Jvfatejices be mthdraivn fvojn them, if ■God be ^leafed jiili to continue that ordinary Provi- dence ivhjch is eUejiiially nccejfary for their covtinu- affce : This is making them proper!}^ Immortal.Jn the Difcowfe it ieli, pag. 5 i, 3'"ou liip^pofe again that the Soul may defend on Matter^ as to its Be- ing and Frefervation, thougli it be not a Modif- caii'M of Adatter, but dijli-nci frorn it : Here you cxprefs your leltj as if you thouglit it a Sitb- Jfantial Form, a contradidory Chiuiiera, which aroie merel}'' from the milconiirudion of a Greek Word in AriJioth\ fignilying indifierentl}'' either Snbjlavtialox Ejjentlal: And again, /^j-^. 9 1 ,3'"ou fup- pofeinMke manner, that the Soul isfomcthing di- jUnci hoth from Spirit, andalfo/rwz Matter and Motion - that is to fay, a Material Form ^ an a^ivc Subfiantial Piindple^ dijlin^ from Matter , yet depending on Aiatter, in cile, in fieri, in operari, and which vinji accordingly he dijjolved on the diffohtion of that Matter on ivbich it depends. In pag. 220, you fuppofe, on the other hand, the Two Souk (as you call tliem) to be not only di- /m?, but alfo feparable: And pag. 218, you fecm to incline to the Notion of thofe Philofo- phers, who owned the -rfcw to h material like the Jhams of odoriferous Bodies ; irhich Conf.leration ' alone, you fay, isfujjicicnt to cut it ojf from an^ pretentions to any proper natural Immortality. Is not all this, the greateft Extravagancy and Con- fiifion that can be > Did not the "World know yon to be a ferious Perfon, thcfe things would lork B 4 niarh %^ ^ Letter to Mr Dodwell. much more like the Raillery of an Unbeliever, than the Rcatonir.gs of one that in earneft in- tended to eftabliih any conliftent Notion. In re- ality. That the Soul cannot polfibly be Material, js evident not only from thecondderatipn of its noble f'aculties, Capacities and Improvements, its large Compreheiiiion and Memory •, its Judg- ment, Power of Reatbning, and Moral Facul- t:ies :, which Arguments have been urged with pnanfwerable Strength by the wifefi: and moft coniiuciate Men in all Agrs i'rom the tjines of Socrates and Plato to this vcpj Day ^ but the fame thing is moreover demonftrable from thp ^ngle ccnfideration, even of bare Senfe cr Con- fcioufncfs it lelu For Matter being a divifible Subliance, ccnfifting always of feparable, nay of adually feparate and diftind parts, 'tis plain, that unlefs it were elTentially Confcious, in which cafe every particle of Matter muft con- lift of innumerable feparate and diflincl Con- fcioufnefles, no Syftem of it in any polTiblc Com- pofition orDivifion, can be an iiidividnal Con^ icious Being : For, fuppofe three or three hun- dred Particles of Matter, at a Mile or any given diftance one from anotlier ^ is it poiTible tliataU thofe feparate parts fnould in that State be one individual Confcious Being ? Suppofe then all thefe Particles brought together into one Syftem, io as to touch one anotl^er •, will they tlicreby, or by an}^ Motion or Compoiition vvhatfoever, be- come any whit lefs truly diftind: Beings, than they were when at the greateft diftance ? Ho\i/ then can their being djlpofed in apy polfible Sy- flem, make them one individual ccnfcious Be- ing ? If yon will fuppofe God by his infinite power fuperadding Cciifcioufncfs to the unite4 ) ^ -'• •';'-'■ ;■■■■'.'. ^ ■ ' fajy \A Letter to Mr Dodwell. a^ Particles, 3^et ftill thofe Particles, being really and neccHarily as diftindt Beings as ever, cannot •be themfclves the Subject in which that indivi- dual Confcioufnefs inheres, but the (Joniciouf- liefs can only be fuperadded by the addition of Something, which in all the Particles muft ftill itfelf be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whofe Power of Thinking is undeni- ably one Individual Confcioufnefs, cannot pofli- bly be a Material Subftance. And if it be nei- ther Matter nor any Modijjcatio7i of Matter, than (though you are pkafed to 'l* affirm fomewhattM- 5r» raflily , and without offering any reafon for youraflfiripation, that fuch Reafonhg is far from being Self-evidejit, 3^et it is really as notorioufly Self-evident as any thing in Nature, that it caimot pojibly depend upon Matter, as to its Beivg and Piefervatiov. For if even one particle of Matter camwt yojible depend upon another, as to its Being a7dPiefeyvation, (which I believe you will confefs to be Self-evident,) becaufe they are each of them diftind Beings •, muft it not be even 3''et lefs pojlible, for a Being which is neither Matter it felf, nor a Modification of Matter, but intirely diJlivM iiom Matter, ipc-g.^^i-,) to depend on Matter as to its Being and Prefervation ? It is not indeed of any great Moment in the prefent difpute \ but it feems to ihow in general fomething of haft and inconfiftency in your No- tions^ what you affirm concerning the Giants, (Seel. 8.) who you iay, defcended from the Sons of Seth and the Daughters of Cain •, and yet in the very fame Paragraph you call them the Cf- fp'ivg oj the fallen Avgels -, and, upon their ac- count, make two ^c/fff/o?/? of Angels, one before the F«ll ot Mam, the otiicr before the Flood. i-- . Yo\s i6 A Letter to Mr Dodwell. Ycu prcceed ( Se^. 9 ) to the Authority of the Fathers. Jujlht Mjrtjr, whom you begin with, fays indeed expresfly. that the Soul ought not properly to be called Immortal : But this he fays, not as you reprefent him, in oppofition to our Dod^rine, nor yet in oppofition to Plato, but in oppofition to the extravagant Notions of fome t pretended Eatomfts, who •*• Vi a^van^ bit 4i'>f«> taught fuch an Immotality as fc>4=v;i7©- cA,/,^/>? 'A^^;/ implied iiece/Iity of exipiice. "V'uicg^ cum. Tryph. bouls ought not to be cal- led hnvwital^ is becaufe ^ * 'AvayKii «J w 4vxt'( they had a hegimihg, and -^y'Avcti'-Uaesict^cii'iim. depend cotnhmaViy upon God for the Piefervation of their Behig. In which Scnfe, neither are At^gels Immortal ^ but t God ovly. All » \ ^^i^= ^ «»«'«]©- >^ that he fays therefore, does no(t Soul may be fuch a fubftance, as is able to conti" nue its own Duration for ever, by the Powers gi- ven it at its firft Produdlion, and the conti- nuance of thofe general Influences which are re- cjuifite for the fupport of Created Beings in gene- ral : Which is all that we mean by yiatural Immor- tality. Nay, that he did adually think the Soul to be in this ^tn^t Immortal, ma)^ juflly be gather- ed from thofe very words which you your felf )cite from him-: "o-nAvro^ f^ iy (r,^^TCi^ Sec JFhat Plato thought covcervjvg the JFcrld, that it vniji sieeds irJeed he in its Nature capable of bcivg de- ftroyed and brought to an End, hecaiije it had a Bcgi7wi7}g •, yet that God jpojild never actually ^ Letter to Mr Dodwell. 2 7 dejlroyjt : The fame may be thought concervhig tha Soul^ and coiicei tuvg all thitigs that are or can he^ excepting only God himfelf (oictn i^a.jta.vi'S^nva.i) that they are capable of being dejiroyed : Which laft words feem c' ^arly to explain what he means by the word i(;,da^Tov] ccrriiptihJe^ which he applies net oniv to the Soul of Man, but alfo to all .Created Beings whatloever^ namely, not to lig- jufy any Tendei:icy to Corruption in the Nature of the thing it felf, but only a Dependence upon the Will of God, in oppolition to Selfexiftence. He does indeed Cay, that the Souls of the Dam- ned Ihall continue tocxift as lung as God thinks fit ; and implies as if he thought they fliould final- ly be deftroyed, after very long Puniihment ; But this, net by a natural Mortalit}'', but by the Will ot God, who is as able to deftroy if he thinks fit, as to create: Which Opinion, if there was any ground for it, would yet fignifie no^ thing at all to your purpose. Tatians Opinion, if it was of any Authoritjr, would prove too much for you. For he fancied that the Soul was dilFolved with the Body, and rofe again with it at the Refurredion. This part you pleafantly call his Humane Reafoning (SeB. TO as if you thought all the reft of what he fa3''s-in the very fame Sentence, was immedi- ately Divine. Yet even He alfo is ex})res{]y 2- gainft you. For as he makes all Souk to die with the Body, fo he makes them all to rife a- gain with it alfo-, leaving none of them in their natural Mortality • butraifmg them all either to eternal Happinefs, or [ ^.vcr.izv J)u, v^aelai h a,^- i'a.c qinbus & initium ^he Soul, the Flatus vit^, and the iubftanriae 'habuir. Hcc au- tSp/jft R'/jfc/^ is a fmipk and tern ncq, Animae evenit^ tla. mwowpunded and indijj'olvible nn eft enim virs : neq-, r,,/,fl„,,.^ ^^^^,,0j /,g ; is „ot Spinrui ; inccmpofitus eft c- J, -/' 'i r r • id x? mm & fimplex Spiritus, qui the word L i>piramen J iireath^ refolvi non 'poreft, //i. $. in this Sentence an excel- §• 7- lent ground for your dj: ftinCtion •, that hen&us by denying that the Soul dies, docs not mean to deny that it a?e£, j4 Letter to Mr DodWell. ip dies', but only to deny that it dies in the fame Manner the Body doeSj-z'ix. by cealing to breathe } Again, He expresfly ajffirms that t the Sovl ani Sprit * "Oyr? -^ h -^vxn ^mrW^ is vet mortal : Bv this you ^ts to ^t'£u>c*, iib. 5. 15. r„,, u^ . 1 ^ ^u i. *!,». as che Words are cited by* fay he nieans only, that the ^^^ . ^, i-^.^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^j ^^ boul dees not aBuUy die jume Words ag^iln. when the Body diex :, but, be- ing alhamed of this Interpretation, you add immediately , that he means alfo further, that the Soul in hi own Nature^ does^ not cotjJiJI of contrary Principles^ tending to a DiJIohition by its' own Nature, as the Body does : This is expresfly giving up the whole Queftion •, and directly con- trary to what you add prefently after, that Death' is natural to the Soid on account of its natural Conjli- tiition. It is here further to be obferved alfo, that thefe laft words which you your felf cite out of Irendus, that the Soul and Sprit k 7Wt Moq-- tal, [jTi » 4.-JXri ^"riTo rnviZfM,^ are dirtotly con- tradiciory to the Notion you advance, j?^^. 3, concerning [jraiia. 4fX'*o''] the natural Body\ being therefore oppofed to [ymvudLvyJoi] 1 Cor. i ^, 44, be- caufe it has only a Mortal Principle [4vxi)] in it ', and alfo diredly contrp.didlory to what you infinuate pag. 41, concerning Trendus^s un- derftanding \jvoi) ^a^f] the Breath of Life, Gen. 2, % to be, what Tou all along would diftinfluilh it to be, a Mortal Principle : Which he is indeed fo fa? from fean doing, that, on thecontraiy, he, in that very Chapter from whence you have taken moft of ^''our Citations, declares [ 4.t,x,n ] the Soul , not to be mortal, for ^ that very * Qux func ergo mDrraliit reafon becaufe it h\'yrv^ii^m('\ corpora? nunquid *Z,o »,.«/,♦?, ^f T ffp n^ti /> -, Sed incorruptibiles Animar the Bieatb of Ltje Gtn. 2, J. ^^^^^,^ ad comparacione« NotWlthltandmg that he does morulium corporum. InfutSa- indeed, at the lame time, con- vie enim in fac-;em homiaia tradiHinguith J a A Letter to Mr Do dwell. jyens ffutum vit£ (Gen. 2,70 tradiftinguifli it, as St. P^n^ & faftus eft in ammam viven- ^ ^^^^ ^„, -^ ^a;o^c,«, • The tern; Flatunmcm viU, in' ^. y - ko,.,^ i • i . corporalis eft. Sed ne morca- '^^^^ 0'^''^". ^emg plainly lem quidcm poffunc dicere With him, as it is With St. Kiw/, hominem, ipfum flacuni v'nx that divine Power which Spi- exiftentem.Et propter hoc Da- ritualizes and Immortalizes, vid ait ; & a.nma mea illi i o i i ^ ^u u ? vivet ; tanquam immortali fub- «0t the Soul, but the Z^oij, at ftantia una ejus exiftente. lib. the Refurrcction. 5.C.7. IreyisLiis does indeed, with other Antient Wri- ters, allow, that whatever is ycwnthv or had a be- ginnhig, mull be ?-3rtfT3c, that k^ as Jjijlin Martyr exprefTes ix^'^Oiov 7ii^o.\ for mv part -, an- eording as he lliould behave ^-vcrmg to [^.f^^ T..'ro ?*.«V J ■u- r-ic T) LI ^7 in the preceding line ; As any hiinielt :^ But v/hether Adaifi one that pleates to compare before his Fall was in that Senfe your Book, may oblerve. naturally immoi td^ or naturally moital-^ what is this to the ib'07/Z ? which, fup- poflng Adam never fo viortal, you your felf ac- knowledge does not perifh by that Alortality which denominates a Man Mortal, that is, the Difiolution of the Body. His fajn'ng that from that Text, Gev. 2, 7, mojl Men [-srAf/'flcsfl ftiled theiS'ow/i?;/wf7rfcr/-, does not imply fas you imagine) that Theophilushim- ftlf thought it Mortal -J but it implies fome doubt concerning the proper ufe of the W'ord et^!vctj©-j which fas has been before noted) feemed to many of the Antients to imply as much as dykunOQ- NeceJarUy exijlkg, (in the Senfe that St Paul fays of God, i Tim 6, 16, y^cvO- 'ix'^" A^vuffiav that He only hath Immoi - ?t??70'p.or at lealt to fignify an indefeciiblc State ©f Virtue and Happinels : And theiefcire it is, that 3 A Letter to Mr Dodwelf. that he fays concerning Adam^ 'Er A^vcttav tlvrh at' d^yjti iTn-niiiKH, ^o;> a,v kynTrciimei ' If yldam had been male originally immoitaly he had been viade ct God. It is alfo further to be obferved from this paf- fage of Theophilm, that the Text you fo fre- quently allude to, Gen. 2, 7, was m^^ -roli -TrKuori by 7ttoJ} of the Antient, underftood in a Senfe di- rectly contrary to your Notion of the tj-oA fig- nifying in that place a Mortal Principle. And it is with very extraordinary difficulty, that you here labour to fuppofe, that [^\gio:/«<] thofe 7noJi Men whom Theophihs affirms to have collected the hunortality of the Soul from this Text cf Scrip- inre., were not Chrijiiam^ but either JewiJI) Pha- rifeea or Heathen Philofophers : which Sappolition of Heathen Philofojphers proving the Immortali- ty of the Soul from- a Text of Scripture ^ and that a Chriftian Writer fpeakirig of moft Mens Senfe concerning a Text of Scripture, fhould thereby mean the Senfe of Heathen Philofophers ; This, I fay, with all that follows in thatSedion, is fo extremely abfurd, as to need no Confuta- tion. TerfuJIian does indeed fuppofe the Soul to be Material •, from whence it muft alfo necelfarily be confeffed to follow that it vvould be naturally Mortal'., and no one can (as you fay, SeS. 14) believe fuch a Soul as he fuppofes, to be inde- pendent on Matter in its own Nature. All this is very true-, and yet even! hit feems to be no- thing to your purpofe. For though the natural Mortality of the Soul is indeed a' neceffary Covfe- quence oi TerUillian\T>odinnt \ yet, fincer^)t«/- limt did not fee nor o'.vn that GonfequeiKC ^ and, if * AHi immorcalcm Anim;rm'. cap. ^. A Letter to Mr Dodwell if he had feen the Confequence, would have dif-- owned the Dodtrine^ his Authority (which is what you would make ufe pfj is not for you, though the Covjcqimice of his DoBrim be \ And therelore you are guilty of a very manifeft Fal- lacy, when you fliy {fiag. 5 5 J that the Church had Tiot declared agaivjl this Do&riiie of Tertullian, Tphich Jiippofed the Souls natural Mortality : For his Dodtrine did not then fuppofe it, tho' cur Philofophy iliows it to be indeed a Confequence, He fays expresfly in many places of his Book de Anima^ that the Soul is immortal : He reckons this among thofe Opinions of the Philofophers which gave occafion to Here- jfies, that ^ fome of them denied the Immortality of the Soul : He denied t that the Soul grew or ivcreafed in fnhjlance., notwith- ftanding he thought it Ma- terial i leaji it f mild follow from thence^ that it was capable like- wife of perijlmg : He ftrongly II oppofes the Opinion of thofe who thought the Soul received Nomifment j leaJl from thence lihewife it JJjould follow that it was liable to perifl) : He expresfly affirms, ^ that all Manlind^ without exception, Jlhxll rife again to eternal Happijiefs or Vu- rtijlment : And many other fuch Paffages are to be found in his Works. You fecm to be aware of this, when you fay, that TennlUan does indeed own the aBual I?}imofta''iity of the Soul : But then, what you in- linuate in your next Words, [Efpecially of all C jpho 33 negane _ t Cas>erunTanlnTfamrubflart- tia creicere negandum ef>^ nee eciam decrefcere fubrtancia di" catur acqi ira & defeftum cre- dacur. cap, ^y, fl Auferenda efi Afgumenca- tori<; occafio, qui, quod anima defiderare videatur alimenca, hinc quoq; morra.'em cam in- tcllig.i cupir, quxcibis fufline- afur, dcniqv dercgaris eis ^vj- geCcar, poilremo lubcraais-in- cercidat. ctp. ^i. * Reftcuetiir ormic huriianum- genus « exinde in iinmen- lam xrerniratis ptrpccuicateni, IJ.. In Apohgetico. 34 ^Letter to Mr Dodwell. fpho were^ vpon that aceovTit^ obliged to eonie over as Pro/elites upon the PuUication of the Gofpel,'] is extren.elyuntair^ finceTeitiiUivi'sWo'cds, being every where as univerfal as can be, are dire6Hy central}'' to what you would insinuate by the Word Efpecially. And here upon occafion of the PalTages you cite out of Tci tullian^ concerning the Propagatmt of the Soul ex traducej and its having a Humayis bhape cntd Difeyejice of Sex ^ I cannot iorbearprc- pofing it to your more calm and ferious confider- atron, whether your manner of cirting the Fa- thers, by picking out chiefly fuch Sentences, V herein for v/ant of Philofophy they were evi- <3ently miftalcen, and which can only be of diC- fervice to Religion, and tend to confirm profane Men in their Mockery and Contempt ^ is not Jt very ill reprefentation of thofe Writers, and a very ill manner of lliowing your regard to them. I believe, fhculd any other Perfon do the like upon any other PhilofophicarSubjeft, you would immediately look upon him as doing it with an ill deiign, and deferving a very fevere Cenfure. What you fay (SeB.j6.) concerning TntwI- Tiflns deriving the Humane Soul from the Flatus: Vii& mention'd Gen. 2, 7 •, proves, r.ot that he thought the Soul Mortal, becaufe you ground- lesfly interpret that Te:ct fo -, but that he under- flood that Text contrary to what you have done, becaufe he clearly declares the Soul derived therxe to be immortal : As I have before fhoWB particularly concerning Iremiis. And what you offer in the reft of that Paragraph, concerning. proper hmnortality belonging only to God, is all entirely againft your felf, and not in the leaft againft our Notion; as has likewife been proved before. The- A Letter to Mr DocJv^elL j 5 The Words .you cite out of St Cypria?!, (St4i 18.) are evidently nothing to your purpofe 5 being fpcken onl}' concerning re^eneratlun or the new bh th in the .moral Senfe, without any the leaft hint of any mtiiral mortality of the Souh of thofe who are not regeverated. Aynohim, you your felf acknowledge to hav.e his Paradoxes cii this SjibjeB'^ that he v^as but a Catechmeitj when he wrote his Book ^ and was not truly irijirii'}ed in theChiifiian DoBrive. Eiit, you fa j'-, he is more to he regai ded when hefpeah cofifonnably to the Scyife of other CatholickDoBors of that early Age ^ that iS; when you think he fa3''s any thing agreeable to that Notion which you not truly attribute to the Fathers. And yet even He, does not fa/ any thing really agreeable to that N3ti(;n. For though he does indeed blame theboKlnefs of cer- tain Platonifts for fuppofing the Soul to be ^wf- ^ ^n|^«y,- cejfarily Imninrtal, to have come from Heaven, qui im- ^ and to return thither again of courfe at themorralisa difTolution of the Body ^ running out with '^"^'^ ^ much oratorical Liberty upon the weaknefs of^^^rraeuf^ thofe Mens Arguments for the Immortality of Sic. lib.\i the Soul- and docs Hi mfelf contend that the Soul is of a t middle Nature, neither mortal, nor immortal, ,/^^!l'-'lT "^'"^l-""' ^ but capable of either condition nacura, ^c. lib. 1. according to its behaviour 5, yet all this he does purely upon That Argument, that whatever had a beginning muft atfo ne-^ ceffarily be capable of being dcftroyed ^ and that whatever is pojible, muft needs in its Na- ture be liable to perifh •, anci accordingly there* fore applies it to Angels ^ and *Omr.is omnino, Dii, An- all other Created Beings what- g^Jw Daemones, auc aominc C 2 \ foever, 5 ^ A Letter to Mr DodwG^l. quocunq; funt alio, qualitatis foever, in the very fame Senfc &. ipfi func medix, & am- ^g he does to Men : which is bigu« lortis conditione niu- ^ ^u -vi ^- c -kk \-^ tabiles. lib. 2. "^^ ^"^ Motion 01 Mortahtj Toil are contending for. And vrhen he fuppofes the Souls of the Wicked ta periih finally, (which you imagine to be for your purpofe ;) he underftands it ot all the damned, as well thofe that hai hestri the Gofpel, as thofe that had mt-^ and thole that hai received. the Spirit^ as thofe that had wot-, conceiving; them ali to be deftroyed by the Power of God infli6l:ing fuch Punilhment upon them, and not that ayiy die by a ytatural mortality. La[ia)itm is throughout his whole Work as fall and exprefs againft you, as any Author that ever wrote either before or fmce. So that your perverting his Words to favour your Motion, is> really, what upon fecond Thoughts 3''ou your felf will hardly ejcufe. I (hall fiift ihow briefly^ how clearly he aflerts the natural Immortality of the Soul, and then confider in how very extra- ordinary a manner you mifreprefent him. He approves ^ that Motioii iml I'r '"""J ^' '"'7^ of Plato, which you ll fo often lit. 7. § 8. condemn, concernnig tfee ur* llpu^g. 33, 6'<, t^c. tural Immortality of the Soul: * Apparec animam non in- He declares that -^ the Soul does n'/r^-n"?^ '^•^°'''' ^n""^' ^wtpeiiSvorisdiffolved, hut en- nerc in Sempuernum lib. 7. 7 ^ r Ti - ^ § 9, diiresjor ever : He is very large II lib. 7, § 12 &c. and particular || in confuting *Q:Jodextcrrafuit,inTer. all Lucretm's Arguments a- get Semper, quoniam divinus ^7 or the Soul : He athrms, Spincus fempiternus eft. //■*. 7. that ^ at Death the Body re" § ^^ tinm to the Earth -^ kit That parlour of oiirfelves^ ^hicb God breathed wto m, exdiires j^ Letter to Mr Docfwell. fTdhres and lives [or ever ^ And again, that "^ the Soul is 7iot coy ruptihle^ hut ejidines for ever .^^ hecaufe it proceeded from cm e- temal Original: And concludes ^ 11 / thinks faith he, Ihave fuffci- eiit'y proved the Soul is not difol- vihlc. He exprefles himfelf in the very fame manner concerning the natural duration of wicked Souls, as of good ones. The Ef.'^ of that Death, faith ^ he, jp.bich mcked Souls arefitl/je& to, is not the extiyignijbivg of theniy hut the punijlmig them eternally : This PiiniJI)ment we call the fe- cond Death ^ which ii it felf alfo perpetual, {is eternal Happinef is ^ The fecond Death is the fuf- feyivy^ eternal Tormettt ; the damna- tion of Souls t.9 eternal FmiiJJ}- ment, according to their Dferts. Again : As the Life of the Soul, faith II he, is eternal, in which it injoys divine and iinfpeakable Happitiefs • fo its Death alfo viitj} needs be eternal, in which it indures everlafiing Puniflwient and enJlefs Torinents for its Sins. And a^ain : Death, faith "^ he, doei •not defray and extinguiJI) the 5o«/, hut fubjects it to eternal Tor- ments. And that all this might not polfibly be underllood either of your immortal'mng Spirit, or of the mere Will and Pleafure of God, iuftaii^r* hig the Soul and cauling it to enduie beyond the C 5 origi; 37 "^ Ergo anima, qua? fr.jgifis non eft, i« «ccrrium manec^ quoiiiaiTi Ori^o ejus accrna eft. ibui. \\ Dcclaravi, ur ppinor ani- marp aoatlTe folubileni. IU>. 7. S»5- * Cujus fmorcis^ noti ea vis e!l, uc iniuftas jnimas ex- tinguac omnino, ted uc punvac inxcenium. Eim pfnam, fe- cundam morcem nominamus, quae eft & ipla pcrpecua, ficuc & imiTiorcalicas, Mors Se- cunda, eft pecerni doloris per- pelTio ; Mors eft aninucum pro mericis a^ scerna fupplicia daninacio, Ub.2. § 12. II Sicut Vita Anim ' prtsfly * Quia temporalem vifam temporalis mors fequitur, con- fequens eft ut refurgant anim« ad vicam perennem, quia f^- nem mors temporalis accepic. lib. 7. § lo. 42 A Letter to Mr Dodwell. presfl)?- almr fl in every Page of his Book declares, it to be ? Bat auer all, this PafTage is not difficult to be recor.ciled : For when he who fays a hundred times in his Book, . that the Soul has no dependence on the Bod}'', but fub- £lis as well and better after it is feparated horn it, favs in one fingle Paflage that Mens Souls do \jefitrgere~\ rife again to eternal Life •, can any thing be more evident than that his meaning is , that the Sculs Ihall be H A Deo corporih|is in>^t©- yt- ny other place.. of his 0r..i. j:^:^:^^^:!::^:::^ contra uejttes-^ Itl ling the OOUl ^ia.iA.tKXc^ Orat, cont, Gent. ^ rational and immortal:, affirm- * t'i vv av m t^td "TrdKiv^ ing that jj when it is feparated " A-^yJ ^°}*^^ ^ a^voIQ- , from the Body, it jpiU have a '„„^ , ^ - v_, 7nuch dearer knuvAedge 0} ^ its own ^~ ^^^^^^ ctVoX^asT^ r ^/ f ^4fZ«''=•^*''*• Sold, being dijfind from the Body^ ' ^^,^^' ^ wufl be immortal: And again i , . ^ c. % •«. » Thejoiil, f^ith the, therefore ,j ^ ,',,'^,^^ ,2; ;^ .^mir, meditates and thinks upon things c.r^uH k] a^-'-vx}©- '^. Kat immo)tal and eternal, becaifc it /^yn^ Td (rafM^IB- ^"H-niTvy is it felf Immortal ^ For as the ^vv]&. ^miW ^9 cu t«t^ Body, being it felf Mortal, has ^-{^<^!J^^^^<^^^ ^TX'vl all itsSenJes employed about vior- v ^^j^i^^ d ^!yKn kj ccvtUm iaj things •, fo the Sou^^ ivhofc Fa- a-'^rxToy Cncu ^«^^C? • '^^^^ adiies ' 44 ^ Letter to Mr DodwelL CM\tie% are onployed about immortal thhigs, tntijf it felf of vecejjity be immortal and live for ever : Thefe Arguments are plainly drawn from the Nature ot the Soul it felf and are diredtly con- trary to your Notion of an Lnmortalizivg Spirit orfnUoiGod: And accordingly, fpeakjng of the Heathens, he exprefles himfelf in the very fame manner concerning Tfjeir ^ 'E/ 4"X^' el^t^aiv C '/. Souls ill particular ^ If they pre- mvx^<^iv'] 'i^ivy ^ i-m -nJ Ao- fevd to belisve, faith t he, that ^KcS- (,h^ (^ef^^^iv,^ eiKlTTot ^jjg jj^^,^ ^ 5^jj avdvahethefn- %X''-ni 4^:)(?V, yne^' ho-^^ J^'-^9 ^P^?^ *^"/ Rational fa- VpA,«.a£7, iCj ix. ct ieftion is not whether the Soul be Jynmortal, but whether it be Immortal in its own Nature-., you are guilty of a very great Fallacy : For if by the Souls being Immortal in its cTyV Nature J you intend to exprefs what we mean, tliat the Soul by the powers given it at its firft Creation is naturally able to continue for ever ^ then Atha7iafus\ AfTertion does concern your Caufe ^ becaufe, in all the places now cited, he expresfly maintains the natural bnmortality of the Soul in that Senfe: But if by Immortal in its own Nature, you mean neceffarily hnmortal, as God is ; then neither Athanajius, nor we, nor perhaps any A Letter to Mr Do dwell. 4y any Body elfe, ever meant that the Soul v/as hi- viortal iv its own Nature. From the PalTages therefore now cited, where- in Athavajim io expresfly and very largely aflerts the natural hwiorta'ity oi the Soul, 'tis very rea- fonable to conclude, that all thofe PalTages in Kis Book de hcaivatiove verbi Dei, which you underftand to ii'npl)'' a natural Mortality of the Soul, ought fthat they may not be inconfiftent witli what be fo fully and expresfly aflerts elfe- where J to be underfl:ood concerning that natural Mortality which is the Diflblution of the Body and Separation of the Soul, without determining what becomes of the Soul after that Separation- And thofe Paflages may the better be underftood 5n that Senfe, bccaufe they are all fpoken con- cerning that Mortality Adam incurred by his Sin in Paradice-, the Confequence of which Mor- tality, with refpeft to the State of the Soul fe- parated thereby from the Body, antecedent to the Promife of Chrift, was not a Quefl:ion ne* ceflary to be entered into. And this is fliill the more confirmed by This, that even thofe Phrafes, foLTn ^e^ tU^v and the like \ which feems at firft: fight to make the mofl: for your purpofe •, *tis plain need not be underfi:ood to exprefs the total ExtinBioti or utter Jvvihilation of Adam, if Chrift had never been promifed ; but either his having no ground to exped any Reftoration to his former flate by a Refurrellion of the Body •, which feems to be the meaning of them in ibme places-, or elfe ('which is evidently their Signi- fication in fome other places,) DeatFs cojitimmig to prevail and extend it felf over his; Poftei ity : Thus» 4.V,;: faith ^ he, D^^f^ e,:tred mU the If orJd ^ ^wi i-/;/^ Dfjlruc^ion prevailed more avd more over the tphole Race of Mav,hvd. For Meyi encreafed mtd midtiplied their Sim beyond ?mafw e : Ar,d therefore Death prev.uli?rg jnore and more, and this D-'Jintctiooi cc7itir.imig to have Doynimon over Men, the whole Race of Aiaw kiitd was lofi. The lame thing (namely that the Phrafes before-mentioned do not fig* nifie the total extindion of Adam both Soul and Body, if Chrift had never been pro- mifed ; but only That Alortality which is the Diflolution of the Body and feparation of the SoulO ^'<^J ^^-fo be gathered from thofe other Exprelfions of the fame Author in his Book de Inc oi'natione Chrijii, from fome of which you very unreafonably endeavour (pag. 85 J to conclude the dired contrary. For v/hen he fpeaks of the Souls being held \\v c/Ver^>t(i7<] in Bonds ^ and [gi' Aa-ixoli ^tural in the Bonds of Death ^ 'tis plain this does not lignify the Ex- ti?£ion rf the Soul, but its confinement to [*AcA««] the feparate State. And therefore, fpeaking of Chrifl:'s delivering Men from that Mortality which was the Confequence of Adam's Sin, he faith ^ ^ To that place where the Body of Man was corrupted^ thither did the Body of Chrij^ go ', ajid to that Flace, where the Snul of Man was detained in Death, thither did Chrijl go with his Humane Soulj Bcc. In which eTtlK! VTC" Xe/STSJ Tito *i'9f«- •mvlw -^v-yic iJ)i(tv haav, &c. De Jncain. Cbrijii fontra^pol- Unar. lib, i. A Letter to W Dodwell. .47 which Pairage 'tis evifient, that by the Words l^KiK^omt « 4-^X^ " V^rOfWTrifw iv ^vet-ra \ the Soul oj Mav v^as aeto.med hi Death^ is not meant the £x- thutkn of the Soul, but its Covlhiemevt to '[^\J^y\ that Jt'parate Sti^te, to which the Soul ot Chrift (defctnc'ed And in that very PafTage, where ■froni the bculs being concerned in the Sentence '[^varo a-m^.apti'^i thoufialt fio'ely die, you would infer t];e Est'nutwn ot the Soul •, if you had cited the Vv'cids at length, it would have appeared thvtjiij} the cojnrahy WRS intended: The Words are thefe-, God, faith t he, pa (Jed upon Man a double Sen , ^'. Az-srAn? » o 4t^>f j -Stt'i'aTw And tohis Soul, ThonJ/rnkfuvely frrv.^^.^ ■j.n.J^x'/'^^^'^-^ die • and jo the Man was fepa- ^^^^^ ^T«a')^^{ tm. ibid, rated, and condemned to depai t into two difeient places: From the laft of which Words it is ver}'' evident, that by a])plying that Threatnirg [say^Vw ct7iod-nvi)~\ thouJJ)att furely dis, to the Soul ^ he did not mean its Exti)iction, but its Si^paration and Confnement to L"Ac/Vf] the fe- parate State. Your laft Citation out of this Author, (pag. S6,) is very remarkable. Againfl certain Here- ticks who taught that the Soul was corporeal, he argues from thofe Words of our Saviour, Fear mt them that kill the Body, but cannot Mil the SouL If, faith ^ he, the Soul be, as ^ ^ . . 3 you Jppollinarih contend, cor- „ ^"t « f«f'"''" f -^^'/J^. pvreal -, why cannot it be killed ^j^^ ^ ^^^y.«a^'f^T=t. ; ^«« and periJI) with the Body ? and ^ ;^ licT-ffg^- tui «v '^A/y jphy doth St Peter, fpeaking of n^nx'^i^^^'^f 4»:^af. '^v'-^' fepj; ate 4^ \A Letter to Mr Dodwell. fwnt ov6fjJ.;- tjience and Revolutions of Souls, with natural Mortality. That which any of the Primitive Chriftians blamed Vlato and Origen for, was not theirafferting the hnmortality oi the Soul, but its TiA-exifience and everlafting Revohtiovs. Their Maxim, that whatever had a Beginnings mitjlthers-^ fore be capable likewife of having an End, does not kt all prove againft natural, but onl}'" againft ve- ^' ■'■' ccj'arj A Letter to Mr Dod well. % 5 cffary hnmortality, that 15, vecejfary and iudependert hxijieme ; As is evident trom what 3''ou 3''oiir lelt obierve, that nyon tiAs Prhiciple they owjicd rone Immoital t;iit God hmfelf -^ No not the ^'ngfls -^ 'And that the Apoftle affinns ot God, [^(uo^Q- e;)(,a.rctd*(a(7(str, I Tm 6, 1 6, 1 that H^ only has Imiiioriaiity, /m being the cIvto d^AutKn^ from whom All that mll.pl etemi to Immonality^ viup drive it, ard vGt from their own Katine j that is, not irom -the. Nccefity of their GTpn Nature, but trom the ff^itl of God ; who; was pleafed to create them hmnoital, and upon whom (notwithftanding their Immorta.- iity,that is» notwithftanding their natural Power of continuing for ever, without being liable to be dc-ikoyed by any created- Force, j they neverthe- lefs continually depend for their Prefervation. ■Aiiflotle by affirming the immQrtal Soul to be \^v£^^v'] from without^ means plainly that it is Something diJiinB from the Body, and not fas you interpret him piig. loi.j that it is not ivgyedient in the Covjlitution of Mankind in gene- raly or (as you * ellewhere esprefs your fclf j that * p,,^^^^ it is a pr&ternatural Principle ^ as if, natwady^ p,g. 2^^'^ JVkn had no rational Souls at all. Dijcourfe The other Maxim you mention. That nothing P-^i- ^^"^^ that is pafihle can be Immortal, proves like wife on- ly againft ^tecejfary , not againft natural Im- viortality. For a Thing's being capable to be adted upon, does not all prove that it is capable of being deftroyed by any natural Power. Every perfedlly folid Particle of Mat- ter it felf, is incapable of being deftroyed or even divided by any Power of Nature, though it is as capable of being moved and agitated and adted upon, as any compound Bod)r. The Soul may in like manner be very capable of fufFering tind of being adted upon •, and yet it v/ill not at 1) z all f4 A Letter to Mr Dodwell. all follow, that it is capable of being deflioy- ed by any ratural Power. Thofe of the Anti- ents,who proved that the Soul of the rich Man in the Parable, Tniifl have been Corruptible, hecavfe itfijfered Torinert ^ ycu acknowledge, prove at the lame time that it muJI likewife have been Coporeal : But the Corporality of the Soul, you know, was taught only by one or two Men. The reft were all of a different Opinion. And Lactartius is ver^ particular and exprefs in arfwerirg that Ob- jedion I ^ If the Soul be immor- tal, how then is It paffible and ca- pable of enduring PuviJImient ? aftdifithe capable of pain, how is it not capable of Dijfohition ^ The Anfwer he gives, is •, fiift, t that (according to the J>Iotion of the Stoicks) the Souh of Menl^ though by reafon of their Div'.ne Original they cannot indeed be ex- tingmj}}ed, yet by being imnierfei in Se7ije and depraved by Sin, they may become liable iio Mifery and FuniJImevt ; Secondly,!^ that tho' we indeed do net hicw hew Imma- terial Things can he acted upon, yet God has as imich Power over them, as ever corporeal Things : And Jaftly, H that in order to endure Punifiment , the Souls Jliall again be united to their Bodies. All which P^fTages undeniably fhow^ that LaRantius did not thinjc the Soul naturally corruptible, a^nd preferved praeternaturally by the Power of God ^ but on the contrary, that the Soul was ra- furall^ ^ Si efl immortalis anima; qucmcdo pacibiJis inducitur, ac iznx ftnciens i lib. 7. § lo. + Ejus nature rcddi anTmas, "t fi ncn cxtinguibifes in ro- tum, quoniam ex Deo funr, tamencruciabilesfjant per cor- poris iraculam, &c. ibid. * Tanram efie Dei pcrcfta- tfm, ur etiam incorpcrali^e comprehendar, & quemadmo- d»m yolueric, afficiat. Nam & 'Angcli Dcum meruunr, i^je. Quid ergo mirum, fi cum fine immcrrafes anims, ramen pa- Eibics (inr Deo.-' ibid. § 21. II Sed tamen decent nos findx liter <, quemadmcdum p;rna5 impii (int larurit. Nam tjuia peccara inccrporibufccTi- •traxeriinr, riirfus cnrne indu- cncur, ut in ccrporibuspiacu- lum fcivanc. iW. \/i Letter to Mr Dodwell. 5" 5- turally Immortal, but by the Power of God made capable of enduring Punilhment. If there was any fl:rcngth in the Argument you make ufe of. Sect 27 •, that hecavfe the adual Immortality of the Soul is a Revelation of the Gofpel^ therefore it is not capable of beivg proved by Reafon from ]the Katvreof the Soul it f elf -^ It would tol- ]ow by the fame Argument, that Moral Obligati^ . 07/5, beciaufe they are Revelations of the Will of God in the Gofpel, therefore are not capable of being proved by Reafon, from the Nature of God, of Men, and ot Things. Some things re- vealed in the Gofpel, are indeed of fuch a Na- tijfe that they could not have been known at all wii^hout Revelation : But others (of which the Inimoitality of the Soul is one,) arc fuch as were capable of being in great meafurel difcovercd by the Light of Nature and right Reaion ^ but 3''et by the Revelation of the Gofpel, are made known with much greater Ccrtaifityj greater Clearvefs^ greater Authority, and in a Aiamier much better fttei to all Capacities. Thisfeems to be the proper meaning of the Word \j>aTi(Tav7Q- 2 Tim. I, 10,] hoi brought to Lipht, has clearly difcovered, has umverfally and evidevily made htown, that which before was but ohfcurely and d?p;jdtly and imperfectly under flood. The AUudon you fuppofe to be between the Words [has brought Life avd Immortality to Light through the GofpelJ] and thofe other words of the Apoftle, \_an Irheritance ivcorruptible^ that fadeth vot aivav, of fhe Saints 7M Light,] is indeed feme little Similitude of Words ; the word Light being ufed in both places -, but not the leaft Allufion or Similitude in S.nfe. And indeed ycu feem your felf tobecon' D 4 fciuus f6 A Letter to Mr Dodwell. fcious of the weaknefs of your Argument in this whole Matter ; by your faying that the Iin- 4. ^^^^10(5. mortality of the Soul, at leaji t in Heaven^ is plainly fuppofed not to be kpown without divine fpag.io^. Revelation ^ and again, At leaji"^ mto the giving lis that ivimortal Lije in Heaven-^ and, That th^ Inamortality of the Soul could not have been o- jJ/'-i^.ioff. therwife known with jj that Ceitainty X^i\?iX might fiippoi t the Practife rrhich. Religion expects in covfe- quevce pj it -^ and again, That it could not have f pag ic^. been known, at leaJl '^'~ with that Aijtirance wh\c\\ y/as requifitefor the VraQtife which Rfj^ipti.reqiiii es piirfiia7it to the Belief of it.' ^ ^ • •.; ^ r That the MaW^j fil'ct. 28,) denied the Im- ' mortality of the Soul, is very true \ But then it i§ worth obferving, that the fame Men aflerted al- fo that there was m Rcfiirrection^ neither Angel \ vor Spirit J A6ls 23, '6. "Your interpretatipn of I which words, is very extraordinary. V^hat is \ the weaving of Spirit Ijere^ as it is joyned with An- gel, ycu fay is ma7nftfi'. It is that Immortalizing Spirit which malics us 'l(ra.yyiKv(j that is. Immortal a^jd entitled to Heavcv, as well ' as the Aitgelsaiej That fame Spirit indeed by which the ^7igels theni^ fe'ives are entitled to Tmmoi tality. — This therefor 1^ ohiigd thejn [the Sadduceesj to deny the actual hn- viQjtalixivg of either Avgehor Eiuuayie Soids, when they demed, ihejn Both ■ that Sph it which could alone -immoitali^: them. Thtfe Words,'! think, need |io Refiesipji to be made upoii tbem. ' Your Interpretation (Sect. ^lO of that Text, I Cor. 15', 22 -y As i'4 Adam all die ^ evenfoinChifi fballallhe 7V ade alive ; items vcr}'- forced and un- paluial. You undeifcand ^t to ilgnifie, thjit a;"? J|li who defcended frcm ^damfvau^ die^ ^o '■'-■'■■■■ All ji Letter to Mr Dodwell. f 7 All who are in Thrift, that is, all Chriftians, iliall be made alive. But this Interpretation, if it was true, would prove too iiiucji for you ; namely, that thofe only who embraced, not thofe who rejedted' the Gofpel, fhould be raifed again : And the general tenor of Scripture, which every where declares that Unbelievers, vyho never were in jObriJ}^ Ihail be railed to Condemnation 5 ihous plainly that 3' our Interpretation of thi§ ■yc^t is wrong. And how the falfe Notion cer- tain Hereticks had of a metaphorical Refurredi- on, 2 Tim. 2, 18, tends to prove that St Pauls true account of the literal Refurredion,' is to be i;ind'crftood ifi a particular and limited Senfe ^ i$ not eafie to. conceive. Your Inference ip the fame place, againft the Univerfality qf the Refurrcftion, from what the Apcftlefays concerning Bapijm -^ fcems like- wife wholly precarious. For the Apoftle does not in this Chapter fay apy thing, by which he might feem to ground the Refurredtion upon 'Baptifjn: But only, arguing againft thofe who pretended to be Chriftians, and yet did not be- lieve the Refurrcdion of the Dead, he fhows hcv/ abfurd it was i or fuch Perfon j to be baptized^ and thereby to expofe themifelvesio fuch hazards as they muft unavoidably do by their profelTmg Chiiftianity, if they had no expedation of a Refurredlion frcm the Dead. "U'hatever be the meaning ot that difBcult Phrafe, ot bting baptized for the Bead;^ the Srefs ot the Argument plainly lies upon thefe Wcrds. Jitd why Jlavd we in Jeo- pardy every Hour ^ That Baptifin, whatever it was, ejpofed them to fome hazard, and gave cccafion to their being peiftcuted t, and the A- poflks Argumuit is, that it was fpoliih for thenj ■''"'"• tQ 5? A Letter to Mr Dodwell. to expofe themfelves to fuch danger needltfly ?.nd to no purpofe , it there was to be no fuch thing as a Refurredtion from the Dead. The .Apcftle grounds the reafonabknels of being baptized, and of embracing Chriftianity, which was a perfecuted Religion •, purely upon the Hopes ota Refurrcdion from the Dead ^ But he does not at all ground the Refurreiftion upon Baptifm, nor fays any thing which does in the leaft infinuate that the Refurredion (hould not bjc univerfal. "" The Conclnfion you draw {SeB, 52.) from what St. Taiii teaches, Row, ^. is very obfcure. The Snm of the Apoftle's Dodrine, there, is that That Condemnation which was brought upon Men by ^dam^ they are delivered from by Chrift. Hew you can infer any thing from thence, againft the univerfal Immortality of the Soul, I ^p not perceive. You fuppofe that thofe over whom Death reigned between the times of Adam and Mofes, were extinguiihed by a total Mortality both of Soul Body •, But the Death there fpoken of, is plainly the fame Death to which all other Men likewife are fubjed : For 'tis not faid, that Death reigned over Them only ; but that Death reigned even over them alfo, as well as over the reft of Mankind ^ notwithftand- ing that they had not finned againft any poiitive Law, as Adam before ^ and thofe who lived un- der the Law did after •, but were fubjed to Death, only as it was a natural Confequence of Adam\ Tranfgreifion : To infer from hence, that their Souls as well as Bodies, were fubjed to that Mortality, is beeging the Queftion which was undertaken to be proved. Thofe who are fubjed ' tQ A Letter to Mr Dodwell yp to Death in confequence of Adatns Tranfgreflion, are indeed ftiled Maity. ver. 1 5; and 1 9 ^ as thofe to whom the the Benefit of Chrift's Death re- douuds, are alfo in the fame place ftiled Many : But thofe Many who die thro' the Offence of One, are, ver. 1 2 and 1 8, expresfly called All Men •, and there is no good resfon to fuppofe, but that the Death of Chrift, who was promifed immediately upon the Fall 0^ Adam^ may conditionally extend its Virtue, and Benefit under different Difpenfa- tions, to all Men likewife. To fay that the Dominion of Death, figniiies in this place fome- thing peculiar, under which all Men are not hi- chtdej '^ becaufe the 'Apoftle affirms that Death r eigne d from Adam to Mofes, even over thein that had not finned after the fvnlltiide cf Adarn^s Tranf grej/ions ; is very lingular and groundlefs : For the Dominion of Death is not there covfned (as you fuppofe it) to the fpace between Jdam and Mofes •, fo as to fignifie a particular kind of Death prevailing at that Time, an extindion of Soul as well as diifolution of the Body •, But. the Apoftle's alfertion is plainly This, that in Confequence of Adam's TranfgrefTion, Death (in the common acceptation of Mortality^ reigned in that fpace of time alfo, even over them that had not tranfgreffed any politive Law after the Jimilitude of Ad.vns Tranfgrejion^ as well as 0- ver thofe who had in their own Perfons difobey- ed pofitive Laws. From whence howan}'' thing can be colledled to your purpofe, is very diffi- cult to imagine. Whether that Text, Joh. i, 9, Th?it was the true Light, which lightcth every Man that cometh into the World ; v/asevcralledged hy Any, to prove. •'■•■ ' " that (5q ^ h^t^r to Mr DodwelL that'up. hnm'ntdi%hjg Spirit is gipejitoeieiy Rirfir jfiilar ky Cbiji hiv]felj ^ I cannot tell. But I 'tliiv-lc your Interpretation of it, (Se^. 53 J is ut- ^pag.i^S, .terly unintelligible. Ihe 'srfori^ you "^ fay, is Tbap which our J^yoJLeYiQit makes in all Men, [in every 'JMaJt thai ccnicth into the //"or/i,] ijtlightjied by the Tiiftation cf the A'oy©-, as an external Piinciple : 2'ep fo as not to make any change' in the Nature, in the l^erfon fo inljghtned, without peculiar divine Favour^ and difpojitiom in the recipient, for fwh an Uraon with the A'oy.©-, as may qualify it for the divine For voiir of raifng it above its own Natnr-ez Till then, they are feparable again, and this external Vifitation ^f the ^"-yQ- ,. leaves the vif.ted -ivxh, ^s Moitala^ it found it, rfhere th:re is no particular defign of God for Immoitalixivg it to Vv.rijlmient What thjp meaning of this, and all that follows in that Sedion is , and how you colled it from the forer cited Text of St. Joh^ j is not^ I believe, poiTi? tie to be nndeiflood. V/hen St. Faul fays, i Jheff. 4, 16, that the deadinChrijf ih^iWfift' pji •, Thefe words do not indeed prove that there muft afterwards be a He furred ion of them that never heard of Chrilt : becaufe the dead in Chriji, which are here faid to rifefij}, are not, 'tis true, cppofed in this place to the dead out ofChr'Jl, but to them that ihall be found alive in Chvifl at the time of the Judgment : 74J. 141. (V\' here note by the by, that you t mifmter- pret this Text, by oppollrg the dead in Chi if, and which are faid to rife frf^ not, as the Apoflle does, to them that iliali be found alive hi Chiif}-^ but to thofe who had been for meny in Chrift and did not dif in him, or to toofe who might have been 271 him if they had pjcajed, but never were in him a.Bii2lly.) But other places of Scripture, as has been A Letter ^o Mr "DaiweW. 6 v teen before {h own, do fiifTiciently pi'bi'e theUni- veriality ot the Reianredtion : And.particiilarly that parallel Text, i Cor. i^, 2V, where the fame Apoftie fays, that eveyy Mm ihall be raifed in his omi Order •, Ch-.i/l the Fiyji-fnih';, aftevwurds they that are Chrijis at his comiTig •, And then Com- eth the end, fcc. Which words being iin mediately" fubjoined to that univerial deciaraiion, As in A- dam all die ^ evenfo inChrifi (J) all a' I he made aliv-:-, cannot, without great iorce, be interpreted to any other Senfe, but that the End muft fignifie the general Refurrectron of all the Dead. ^t^Rev. 20, V. 5. 12 & 19. Your Interpretation (Seel. :? This certainly would have been rather the more confiftent Scheme of the two, and fome- what a more defenfible Explication of your Notion, (v/ith refpeft to the bare Reafon of the Thing,) than to affirm that all Souls are mturally wortal, and yet that none of them ever die by a wa- tiiral decay and Mortality. But your Hypothefis, however varied, would not yet have been truly confiftent. For why, Ibefeechyou,muft it needs be fuppofed, that God cannot difpofe of all his rational Creatures into States fuitable to their feveral Matures, and proportionable to their fe- veral tf 4 A Letter to My DodwelL veral capacities and defer ts, without deftro^ing and talcing away their Being ? And what can be more forced and difagreeable to Reafon, than to fuppofe that the Sodomites and Ninevites ando- ther Heathens of all Sorts, mull: indeed all appear at the Day of Judgment,but yet that their appea- *j-^;<^. 148. ranee there will be t mth no Dsjign of cor.cermng them in the Jiidgrncnt. of the Day, but onh in the retrofpe^ive part of the day^ for vindicating the Divine Fi evidence, in relation to what had been tranf- Ifi^i' 359- aBed by it formerly ? You imagine indeed, H that the Sodomites and Eygptia7js and other wicked Men to whom the Gofpel was never preached, wzi.t}' endure the Srfferings oj the future eterral Stat enduring the time of their Duration ; that is, from the tiyne of their * m'^l^' Death to the Day of Judgment -, And that ^ the hi- felicitiesgood Heathens may have fufcred in this Life, may he fvfficiently rewarded by the Mappinefs of the in- termediate fpace between th -ir Death ajid the Judg- ment, thoi{gh they have no pare in thofe Eternal Rewards which are to follow after the day of Judg- ment : But, Upon your Scheme, how can this be ■applied to thofe who fhall live at the End of the World, when there may be as good and as bad Men among the Heathens, as ever were in a- ny other Age, and yet thefe, according to your Notion, muft All periih together at the Confla- gration ? And belides, becaufe I prefume you will not be lefs moved by Authority than br Reafon ^ is not this extremely like one of thofe very Notions, which TertuUian, whofe Authority you are otherwife fo very defirous to make ufe of, blames the ^ Stoicks for, *Qai anlmj aliqnod tem- ^ ndicules them as vainlv pus indulgenr,ab excetiuulq; in -, con0.tgrationent univerficatis, uc ^^^^ Scoici, &c. TertuU. de Amma* \A Letter to Mr Dodu^elL 6^ ilrid + needlefly imagining, Tni/ -^ 4^yjiv "^.vvy^-rbM that the Souls of their Dif- r^-h^^^ct^rlu). 'OvKh-^CrjP ciples Oiould continue capable ^.^^ tJT"'?!:' w!^"^-" ot Inltruaion and Improve- ^«f ^(j^ i^xih rm/ /4o ^ ment in the feparate State , tnriJ^'icov fxi/ji -t ei<; yiv? *- when at the fame time they be- vAKvai.vi -^S ttavt^v &c< heved theywereall to perilh ^ Quis auccm illIispof}um« in the approaching Conjlagra- Erudici-nis ufus ac fruftus, fioM f* jamiarn conjf.igratme peritufis? Tertull de Anima. What you advance in your 4.1/ ani foVomri^ Secliom^ concerning the State and Condition of feparate Soiih, is in ever)^ re{i")e(9; too Uncertain to have any thing built upon it. Whether they who never heard ot the Gofpel in This Life, fhall hereafter have any new Offer made to them, and undergo any new Trial •, or whether all Mankind, even thofe who never heard ofChrift at all. fhall however, by virtue of the original Promile of the Melfiah made to Adam^ have fj much benefit of the Redemption purchafed by the Blood of Chrift, as that at the general Judg- ment thev {hall all in fome Proportions, and according to their feveral Capacities, have relief from the Equity and Mercy of the Gofpel-cove- nant ^ f which feems, of the two, to be much the more probable Opinion : For how fhall they who are found alive at the end of the "World, under- go any new Trial ? ) Which foever, I fay, of thefe ways be true, it makes little difference as to the main Qiieftion. That, upon the whole, God is no Refpetter of Perfons •, and that our Sa-* viour covU not covfne hh dejigit^ aVEKTISEA{ENT. WHereas the Author of certain Remarlcs upon the Sermons preached at Mr Boyles jLedlure in the Year 1704, has publiflied a Vin- dication of thofe Remarks, with more mifrepre- fentation of the Dodtrine contained in thofe Ser- mons, and in thofe preached in the Year 1705 i The Author of the faid Sermons, humbly con- ceiving that there is no Objeiiion either in the Remarks or in the Vindication of the Remarks, which has not been either prevented in the Ser- mons themfelves, or fully anfwered in the Pre- face to the fecond Volume ? and not thinking it fit to trouble the World with any further Re- ply to mere Calumny and ill Language -, defires to refer this matter wholly to the impartial Rea- der, who by comparing the Books themfelves, with the Remarks, will judge on which fide Truth and Reafon ilands. .F4 ( 7! ) DEFENSE 0( ai) ARGUMENT made ufe of in a Letter to Mr Dodzvelh to prove the Jmmaterialttj and Na- tural Immortaltty of the SOUL. IN a Letter to Mr Dodipell, upon occafion of his late Difconrfe concerning the Mature of the Soidy the following Argument was among - others particularly made- ufe of, to prove the hnmateriality and 7iaiiiral Immortality of the Soul. ' The farne thing, v'i%. that the Soul cavmt pof- Letter to ^ fihly be Material^ is moreover demonftrable<5W'- Dod- ' from the fingle confideration even of bare^^ • ^'^^ ' Senfe and Confcioufnefs it lel£ For, Matter * being a divilible Subftance, conlifting always * of feparable, nay of a6tually Separate and Di- * ftindt Parts ^ 'tis plain, unlefs it were elTenti- ■^ ally confcious, in which cafe every Particle of ' Matter muft confitt of innumerable feparate * and diftindt Confcioufnefles, no Syfrem cf it * in any polfible Compofition or Divifion can be i an Individual confcious Being. For fuppofe * tiirea ( 74 ) three, or three hundred. Particles of Matter, at a Mile, or any given diftance, one from another \ is it poifible that all thofe feparate Fa:ts Ihould in that State be one Individual confcious Being i* Suppofe then all thefe Par- ticles brought together into one Syftem, fo as to touch one another ^ will they thereb}?-, or by any Motion or Compoiition whatfoever, become any whit lefs truly diftind: Beings, than they were at the greateft diftance > How then can their being diCpofed in any pniFible Syftem, make them one Individual Confcions Being i* If you fuppofe God ^ by his Infi- nite Power fuperadding Confcioufnefs to the united Particles, yet ftill thofe Particles, be- ing really and necelTarily as diftinct Beings as ever, cannot be themfelves the Subjedt in which that Individual Confcioufnefs inheres ^ but the Confcioufnefs can onljr be fuperadded by the ad- dition of Something, which in all the Particles muft ftill it felf be but one Individual Being. The Soul therefore, whofe Pcwer of Thinking is undeniably one Individual Confcioufnefs, cannot poffibly be a Material Subftance. To invalidate the force of this Argument, the following Objeftions have been oftered to the publick. '■^ A Letter ' I. That ^ an Individual Pcwer 7;7.t)' refidein containing <■ ^ Material Syftem which confifts of aftually ^maALa.' feparate and diftina parts ; T/j^f an Individual freicnded * Power can be lodged by God in, or fuperadded Vemon. ' to That which is not an individual Being •, or jhatmy t j^ jj^^y follow from the Gompofition or Modi- ^^' P^S" * firation of a Material Syftem confifting of ' adlually feparate and diftindt Particles -, avd If 'A ( 75 ; /o, then the very Soul and Strength of the fore- going Demonftration is gone. That as to thls^ Matter of Fadi; is io plain and obvious, that a Man can't turn his Eye, but he will meet with Material Syftems, wherein there are Individual Powers, which are not in every one nor in any one of the Particles that compoie them, when taken apart and conlidered Singly. That a Rofe, for Example, confifts of feveral Parti- cles which feparately and fingly want a Power to produce that agreeable Senfation we ex- perience in them when united ^ And therefore either each of the Particles in that Union con- tributes to the Individual Power which is the external caufe of our Senfation ; or elfe God fuperadds the Power of producing that Senfa- tion in us, upon the Union of the Particles. That this may be the Cafe of Matters Think- ing. Thofe Particles which compofe the Brain may under that Modification, either have the Power of Thinking necelTarily flowing from them, or elfe may have the Power of Thinking fiiperadded to them by the Power of God, tho* fingly and feparately they may not have the Power of Thinking. A^^d That the Fallacy of the foie-mejit'ioved Argument lies in this, that by an Individual Power h there ynearit a Power that can only proceed firom, or recide in an Individual Being : Which is a plain begging of the Queftion. II. That thovQ^h a Syftem of Matter rvere allorped not to be capahk ofThivkivgj yet '^ ' it is evident, * p^g^^ i * that, accordhg to the foregoivg Argnmevt, the S" 9. * feparate and diftindl: Parts of Matter are ca- * pable of having a Power of Thinking, or an * Individual Coufcioufnefs fuperadded to each of ' them^ C 7 the greatefl: Strength of Reafon and Argument lies. Neverthelefs, the Candour and Ingenuity with which you have written, have once more engaged me to indeavour to give you fatisfadion in this matter •, by pointing out to you ibme of the prin- cipal Inftances, wherein you feem either to .have miftaken the Queftion itfelf, or to have mifunder- ftoodmy Argument upon it. But hereafter, unlefs any new Objeftions {hall be propofed, and not merely Repetitions and ingenious Reprefentations of the former Difficulties, you muft excufe me if I think not my felf obliged to do lb any more. in repeating my anfwer to your firft Objeftion, * Kfply^ you cite my Words thus-, ^ Tofiippofe any Power fage 10. Qf ^uility of this hwd^ ar'ifmg from^ or belonghig to the fever al Parts of which the Whole coiififts^ is a di- yeci and exprefs Coittradi^ioii : Whereas my Words were-, Tofiippofe any Power or ^lality of this kind arifmgfrnm or belonging to \ any whole Syjlem of Mat- ter^ without belonging to~] the fever al Parts of which that Jf^hole co?tfJis, is a direB and exprefs Contradic- t Defenfe tion t. I make no queftion but this is only a Fault fa^e 8i. of the Prefs in your Reply. Yet it was proper to take notice of it, becaufe perhaps every Reader will not be at the Pains to compare the Books ^ and it happens, as the PafTage ftands in your ci- tation to give a very difadvantageous Reprefen-* tation of my Senfe. In your preliminary defining the Signification * Reply^ of the Terms "^^ I cannot fee any Reafon, fun- page 10. jefs it \)Q to perplex.the Reader with a new Qiiefti- on, TFhether the Soul always ABually thinks or not^ which is wholly foreign to the Matter at prefent in Difpute •,) I cannot fee any Reafon, I fay, why you ( 93 ) you Ihould affirm that Covfcioufjiefs camwt be pro" perly hnployed tofgjiify the fa?ne thiug with a Power of Thhkivg^ imlefs by a Power ofThinkivg, be under- jiood, vot a Capacity to Thhk, but ABual Tbhthhig. For, the thing to be proved, being This, that a Divifible Subftance is not capable of a Power of Thinking •, what difference can it make, whe- ther by a Power of Thinking you under ftand aBual Thinki}fg, or a Capacity to think ? For I prefume you will not deny, but whatever is proved inca- pable of aBual Thinkings is alfo proved incapable (pardon the ExpreJ/ion) of a Capacity of Thinking ; land whatfoever is proved incapable of a Capa- city of Thinking, is alfo proved incapable of aBual Thinking. Wherefore there was no need of in- deavouring at this time to perplex and multiply the Qutftion by any fuch difputable Diftin6lion \ "Which kind of Difficulties, foreign to the thing at prefent under Conlideration, they who are de- firous to come at Truth, and to come at it the neareft way, ought always very carefully to avoid. Covfcioufnef^ in the moft ftrid and exaft Senfe i of the Word, fignifies neither a Capacity of Think- \ ingy nor yet A^ual Thinking, but the Refiex Acl \ by which I know that I think, and that my Thoughts * and Anions are my own and not Anothers. But in the prefent Qiieftion, the Reader needs not trouble himfelf with this Nicet}'' of Diftindtion 5 but may underftand it indifferently in all or any ■of thefe Significations^ bccaufe the Argument proves univerfally, that Matter is neither ca- pable of this Reflex Aci, nor of the firft Direcl All, nor of the Capacity of Thinking at all. n ( 94 ) By an IvTividual Vower I mean (in the Senle that Logicians commonly ufe the Word Ivdiv'idud when they oppofe it to Specifick,) fuch a Power as is really mid truly in the nature of the thing itfelf Ojje Tower, in oppofition to its being fuch merely in our ahJlraS: Complex Nct'ion. For Inftaiice : When I fpeak of my ov/n Confcioufnefs, and call it an hidividnal Power ^ I mean thereby to ex- " prefs that it is reall}^ and truly one undivided Confcioufnefs, and not a multitude of difiindt ConfcioufneiTes added together : Rut when I fpeak of the Blucnefs (fuppofe) or Rednefs, or Sweet- nefs of a Body, as of a Jivgle Power belonging to that Body-, 'tis evident I can mean only, that it is fuch merely in the ahjlract complex Notion ot Idea I frame in my Mind ^ that is, in the fame Senfc as we fay an Army or a Gtyis OvS', But that really and indeed it is a vaft Multitude of Blueneifes, Redncfles, or SweetnciTes •, or rather (to fpeak idriclly and properl}''^ a vaft Multitude of fuch Parts as excite in us the Senfations of Bluenefs, Rednefs or Sweetnefs. Now the thing to be proved, was that fuch an Individual Pov/er as Confcioufnefs, cannot polftbly inhere in or re- fult from a divifible Subftance. And this I did prove ^ not by defjthg or fn^pojiJig an Individual Power to be a Power that camiot pojjibly inhere in or reftilt from a divifible Siihjlaiice -^ (which would in- deed have been a Begging of the Queftion-,) but by devicvflratirg, that it would neceffarily imply a plain and dired Contradiction, for any Power which is reallv CV and not/(f.T7;v, (fuch as your felf acknowledged Confcioufnefs to be, by con- x p^^^ 1 5.- feihng it does not refide t in the fingle and fe- parate Parts cf fiie Brain,) to inhere in or refult fiom ( 95) ■ from a diviUble Subftance. Wherefore it is alto- gether without Reafon, that you indeavour to perplex your Reader by telling him that '*' a *P-^i^^^- Syjlan of Matter beivg fitppofed to be a Power htca- fctbleoj refidhig hi a Beivg that covjijls of Farts, the ^riejiion of Aiatter's Thiukiiig will amount to this, l/hether that which cavwt think, can think ^ When 3^ou well know that I made ufe of no fuch Sup- position, but indeavoured to ]^rove (and, I hope, have pioved with fome ftrength and clearnels) what you feem to infinuate as if I only fiippofed. I. You reply to my Anfwer to 3rour firft Ob- jctlion ^ that t it is nothing elfe hut Argmnentum t P^'i^ '2, ad JgTiorantiani : that in enumerating the forts of Poiren or Qualities of Matter ^ Ifuppofe that a Syjiejii of Matter has and can have only Powers of one fort or kind, fuch as Magnitude and Motion, which are cnly the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the fame kind •, Which, what is it elfe but to argue^ that be- cavfe we know of no ether Powers of a diferent kind in Matter f J om Magnitude and Motion, therefore it Has and Can have no ether Powers ? Now I cannot think, Sir, but a Man of your Underftanding, if you pleafe to confider the Matter a fecond time, will find it is by no means Jrgumentnm ad Jgnorantiam. For if a Disjundion be complete, ("as that in which I enumerate the feveral forts of Powers of which Matter is capable, either is ^ or elfe you ought to have proved that another Member could be added to it, to fhow that it was not^) it contains in it all the poffible particulars, ?.s well the unknown, as thofe that are ever fo well known. For how many particulars foever be fup- pnfed to be vrlnovn, and how impoillble foever it be fuppoftd to come at the knowledge of thofe ' ' ■ , _ ' ' ' • particulars i particulars ; yet if the Heads or Kinds be rightlf diftributed, they muft of Necejfity contain under them all the imknown particulars as certainly as thofe that are the ?noji known. All the poifible Qualities, I faid, or Powers of Matter, (whether known or unknown,) muft of Necelfity be either ^lalhies really inhevhtg in the Subject k felfto which they are afcribed ^ or Modes produced by it in fame other Suhjeci •, or elfe mere abjlva^ Ncimes jignifying certain Powers or Effiiis that do not properly refids rn any Subjecl at all. Now if this Disjunction be true^ and Thinking be at all a Qijality or Power of Matter •, and be confeiTed not to belong to either of the two latter forts-, it muft of ne-' ceftlty, fhow unknown foever the Nature of it be ctheiwife fuppofed to be,J be included in the former. And then the Argument holds unan- fwerably good •, that Thinking, (or, it' you pleafe to i ma gin ?.ny other .even yet more abftruCe Qiialities or Powers of Matter, even thefe alfo) as well as Magnitude and Motion, which I in- itanced in-, and whatever elfe be reducible to this Kind -, by truly and reall}'- inhering in the Subjed 'cfelf^ muft of neceifity inhere in. all and every one of the particles of the Syftem, taken iingly as well as together, Bccaufe, as I faid be- fore, to fuppofe any Power or Qiialit)'' of this Icind, arifing from, or belonging to any whole iiyftem of Matter, without belonging to the/f- veralTarta, of which that whole conlifts, is a diredt and ejprefs Contradidion: 'Tis fuppofing either an f/wzVj/i?/ to exift, without TcDticulars -^ or an EjfeB to be produced without a Canfe^ or to have more in it than was in the Cav.fe • or that a Quality is by the Power nf God^ made fo to arife out of Jsothing, as to [)e fupcraddcd to a Su'//ect, and to fubfft ( P7 ) fubfift without inhering in that Sabjeft to which to it is at the fame time fuppofed to belong. To this jT-ou Reply, "^ that to fuppofc a Porvey*ptget4. aujivg jioin A^cttter, without belov^mg tothePaits of which the Whole covjijh ; is not tofitppnfe an Uni- verfal to exijl without Fai ticuhrs^ hut a Particular Poiver exijiing^ to ivhich jever a. Particular Power scon- tJiLiite-^ {ji every MsiU is aV&xtk\}\ax A'an.thongh various Powers dre necefjary to conjlitute him of thai Species. But, Sir, il the Whole or refult, which you call a Paiticular Power, be entirely and Speci- jically different from all and every one of the par- ticular Powers contributing to it ^ as Thinkingma-- nifeflly is, frojn all the Powers of particles not indued with Thought :, you will find, it you pleafe to confider it carefully, that 'tis as certain and e- vident as any A'lithvutical Demonfl^ration, that fuch a Particuln Power is a Whole bigger than all its Parts -^ a Vhole, that contains fomething init befides Alland every one ot its Paits-^ that is, I think, ar\ l/jiiverfal without particulars. Itisex- adly as zf you Ihould afllrt, that a Smell and a Colour could be joyned together to make up a Sound '^ or as if Hardyiefs and Figure could be the particulars contributing to conftitntea Amotion. A Aian, it you mean the whole Man, the Thinking Perfon •, (as the Pleader may be apt to think you do-, and fuppcfe him to be confiituted of mere Matter, whofe fingle particles are none of them indued with Thought •, is fuch a contradidory Whole ; But it you mean, (as you feem to do,) the Body jatrifl r. with its Mechanical Powers •, then therJHFnothing in it, differing from the Powers ojHe fingle Parts ^ except onl3^tbe bare Kame, t^Abftract Notion of its being a irbole - G whicJhf ( pS ) which is a complex Idea in our Mind -, but in the Thing it felt tis nothing at all, but its being tht Sum of the Magnitudes, Figures, and Mo- tions of all the feveral parts ^ from which confti- tuent parts no Whole can (without an evident Contradi(Sion) differ any otherwife, than as in numbers a Tbovfavd differs from Ten himdred, or as in Weights a Poimd differs from fixieen Ounces^ or as an Ar7ny differs from all the Men that com- pofe it ^ that is, in nothing but the bare Name. You add : Nnther is it afiippojitig an EffeU pro- duced without a Caitfe : for the diferejjt Powers intho fnigle and feparate Parts of a Syflevi of Matter, by ttvitivg in (me Operation or Power to operate, are the Cavfe oj the Exigence of that Power which did r.ot ex* ijl ill the Pai tides Jivgly cofijidered. And th us in thofe Pai ticks which cojnpoje the Brain, Sec. Now here, Sir, I really cannot but wonder hov/ a Gentleman fo well skilled in Philofophy, as you are, canfuf- fer himfelf to be impofed upon by fo very grofs and palpable a Fallacy. For though the diffe- rent Powers in the iingle and feparate Parts of a Syftcm of Matter, (as, for inflance, their Magni- tude, Situation, Figure and Motion,) may by u- niting in cne Operation or Power to operate, be the Caufe of the Exiflence of another Power of the fame Species, which did not exifl: in the Parti- cles lingly confidered ^ that is, may conftitute another Magnitude, another Figure, another Mo- tion, than was in the fingle Particles •, juft as twenty different Numbers added together, confli- tute a new Number different from any of the Par- ticulars : Yet thofe Powers cannot, without an evi- dent Contradittion, be the Caufe of the Exifl:ence of any other Power of a dyjf event Species ; (as Think' ivgis confeffedl}'- of a different Species horn Mag- iiitudey C 99 ) vitide^ Figure^ Motiov, or whatever other proper- ties may belong to t/jtthhikhg Particles oi Mat- ter;) for the fame reafon as the Addition of diffe- rent Numbers in Arithmetick, cannot without a manitfcft Contradiction, be the Caufe of theEx- iftence of a Line or a Figure •, or the mixture of Tafls, conftitute a Colour ^ Namely , becaufe thus the BjfeB would contain more in it than was in the Cavj'e ^ that is, fomething would without any Efficient, be produced out of Nothing. In like manner-, though the different Powers in the iingle and feparate Parts of a Syftem of Matter, (their Magnitude fippofe^ Situation, Figure and Motion.) may, by unitiug in one Operation or 'Power to operate, be the caufe of the Exiftence of a Power to affeB fome foreign SithJIance, which PowTr did not exifl in the Particles iingly confi- dered ; that is, certain particles united, may prick the Skin and caufe Pain, which the fingle ones could not do •, or may ftrike the Eye fo as to excite the Senfation of Blew or Red, which thefingle ones could not do •, Juft as a Wedge may force it felf a paffage, where a Body of fome o- ther fhape could not : Yet thofe Powers cannot, without an evident Contradidion, be the caufe of the Exifl:ence of any new Quality r^f^//}! mherivg in theSiibjeB it felf -^ (as T/?zw^77/^ confeftedly is a Qiiality really hiheriiig in the Thinking Being it felf ^ and not bareh'' an ahftraB Notion^ or Pover of af- feBingfovie foreign Siihjlance •,,) for the fame Reaff n as the fharpening of the point of a Needle can- not poillbly be the Caufe that the Needle itfelf fhonld- feel pain. From hence it eafily appears how defeftive ^ p^„ , .^ your Similitude is "^ , when you fay it is wo Con- tradJBion to fuppofe a Power arifvg from Matter^ G 2 mth' f page IS' ( ICrP ) mthoiitheh'i'ghg to the Parts of which' the JFholeco^t^ fjh', vo more than to conce'ros that a If 'hole is not ths^ ^ fame with a peice of a Clock •, Wherein the Power r^^ fuk'.iig from the dijferevt co'ntrilmtivg towers iii the ^y-' jlem, neither belongs to any Part oj the S'Jiem when conf.ilerei by itfelf^ vor is it of the fame fort or IdnM n^ith (r>}y Power in any part of the Sy/hm. For that which you call the fower of a Clock, to fhow the time of the Day, is evidently nothing in the Clock ttfelj^ but the Figure and motion of its Parts •, and confequently not any thing of a different fort o? kind from the Powers inherent in the Parts : Whereas Thinkings if it was the refult of the Povr- ers of the different parts of the Machiiie ot the Body, or of the Brain in particular, would be fome- thing really inhering in the Machine itjelf fpeci- fically different from all and every one of the Powers of thefeveral Parts out of which itrefult- ed : Which is anexprefs Contradidion, a fuppo- fing the ijfi'^ to have more in it than theQ»/f.. And therefore, though you are pleafed.to make life of it as a Similitude ^ yet in reality this Power of Thinking, which truly and properly inheres in- its Subject, has not in an)?- refpedt the leaft ap- pearance of likenefs to the Power of a Clock to fliow the time of the da}'-, which is merely an ahfiraB complex Notion in the Man that beholds it, and nothing at all really in the Clock itfelL In like manner, when 3''ou fay t it may he con- ceived that there viay be a Power in all thnfe Parti- eles which compofe the Brain, to contribute to the Ac} of Thinking, before they are muted under that Form ; thoiighy while they are difunited, they have no jHore of Ccjfciovfnefs. than any Being which produces Sipeetjiefs in m (that is made up of Pai ts wherein dif" fcrejiS' C ip4 ) ffri;nt Powers hihere) when under a particular Form^ has a Power t.) produce Sweetnefi in m, when its parts qre difuvitcd and feparated ^ you tkll again into the fame Fallacy. For the Power of a Body to ejcite in us the Idea of Sweetnefs, is nothing elfe but a certain Figure and Motions refulting troni {different Figures and Motion, ot its original coiiftituent parts ^jufl: as the Power of a Pinto cauCe Pain j}\ us, is iiothing but its A^^otiou and tjic Iharp Figure ol' its Point, refulting ti:om dif- ferent Motions, Figures and Situations of its coiiftituent parts. And if the Effect of the Pow- ers, by which the feveral particles that compofe the Braiu, contribute (as your Phrafe is' to the Ad of Thinking, was likewife only the exciting of certain r/;oz(^/;ts in fomeLhing which was before a Thinking Subjlance^ your Similitude would have fometl,iing of likenefs in it. But tiiat Particles which in therafelves have no Thought, lliould e- ver contribute any thing towards making the 5>ubflance, which they conftitute a Thinking Be- ing ; this I am fure you can no more be able to clear from being an exprefs Contradictioj,! ^ ('though I doubt not but you can argue upon it as acutely as any One ^ ) than if you ihould under." tajce to prove, th^t a Solid Mafs of Marble is made up of Particles, which without liavingan^'* Solidity theqifelvcs, contribute by other un- known Powers to conftitute a Solid MaG •, or that a Foot-fquare of any Matter, is made up of Particles, which without having any Ex'tentioii themfelves, contribute by other different and un- known Powers, to conftitute an extended Solid (Quantity. € , ■ Ana ( lOi ) And here T cannot but take notice, that hefides the Contradictions before-mentioned, you have, by chooiiDg to annex Confcioufnefs to lo flux a Sub- ftance as the Erain or the Spirits in it, tallen into another very great Abfurdity. For if the Biain or Spirits be the Subjettot Confcioufnefs^ and the Parts of the Brain or Spirits be (as they certainly are, whatever Queftion may be made concerning any original Solid k^tamhm of the Body,) in per- petual flux and change •, it will follow that That Confcioufnefs, by which I not only Renmnber that certain Things were done many Years fince, but alfo ajn Coiifcioiis that they were done by Me^ by the very fame Individual f^ovfcious Being who now re- members them i it will follow, I fay, that That Confcioufnefs is transferred from one Subjefl: to another ^ that is to fa}^ that it is a real Quality which fublifls without inhering in any Subjedt at all. But to return to the Argument before us. You fuppofe that the Particles which compofe the Brain, though themfelves void of Covfcioufnef when taken imgly, may yet by other different Powers contribute towards the making up One Covfciovs JFhole. This I affirm to be, and I think I have proved to be, an exprefs Contradidion ^ an afTigning more to the t^e^i than was in the Cmfe-^ a making the irho'e bigger than all its Farts and Specifically different from All and every One of them. The occaiion, the common ground and foundation of Mens Erring in this whole ^t>emftJlr.Mntter^ I have "^ elfewhere largely difcovered ^ dftheBe- antJ f[-,a]] here repeat what I think may be fuffici- Jrf/ o/"^'^"^ to fatisfy an inquiiitive and unprejudiced Cod. Prop, Perfon. " Whatever can arife from, or be com- S.ssil.z, '«':::. "pounded ( ^03 ) " pounded of any Things ^ is ftill only thofe " very Things, of which it was compounded ; " And if infinite Compofitions or Diviiions he " made eternally, the Things will ftill be but " eternally the fame : And all their polfible Et- " feds, can never be any thing but Repetitions ^' of the fame. Forlnftance: Allpoinble Chan- ^* gcs of Fi^nre^ are ftill nothing but Figure : [All poilihk Variations, Compofitions and Divifions of Miigjutitde, are ftill nothing but Mjgnhude~\ ■' AUpollible Compofitions or EfFeds of Mo- " rfow, are ftill nothing but mere Motion: All Compofitions of Magnitude^ Figure and /'Jotion together, arc ftill nothing but M.ignitude^ Figure and Aiotioji : And how many other Qualities foever, hwmt or mihmmt, the Particles of Matter be fuppofed to be indued wieh •, thofe Qijalities can never in any Compofition or Divifion pro- duce any new Power fpecifically different from themfelves, unlefsa Caiife could, give more to the Ejfe^ than is in it felf. And confequently, if the Matter of the Brain be the Subject in which Confcioufnefs inheres, That Confcioufnefs can- not pollibly be the refult of any other known or unknown Powers of the feveral conftituent Parti- cles, but what muft themfelves have been origi- nally of the {ame Species, that is to fay, fo many feveral Confcioufnefl'es. " That which has been " apt to deceive Men in this Matter, is this ^ " that they imagin Compounds to be fomewhat *' really [fpecifically] different from the Things " of which they are compounded. "Which is a " very great miftake. For all the Things, of *' which Men fo judge-, either, if they be really " different, are not Compounds nor Eifeds of what " Men judge them to be, but are fomething to- G^ "tally ( I04 ) '* tally diflindt •, as when the Vulgar thinlcs " Colours and Sounds to be Properties inherent *' in Bodies, when indeed ihey are purely " Thoughts of the Miud : Or elfe, if they be " really Compounds and Effefls, then they are " not cifierent, but exadl}^ the fame that ever *^' they were •, As when two Triangles put td- *' gether make a Square, that Square is ftill no- " thing but tvvo Triangles •, or when a Square cut " in halves makes two Triangles, thofe two " Triangles are ftill only the two halves of a ^' Square ^ or when the Mixture of Blew and *' Yellow Powder makes a Green, that Green is '' ftill nothing but Blew and Yellow intennixt, " as is plainly vifible by the help of Microf^ " copes: And in fhoft,every thing by Compofiti- " on, Divifion or Motion ^ is nothing elfe but *' the very fame it was before, taken either in " whole or by Parts,orin different Place or Order, f fo as to excite in our Minds different complex Not'wm, and occafion new abjlracl Mwies of Things^ but by no means to produce any ncv\^ real Quali- ty in the Things themfelves, fuch as Covfcioufvcfs is agreed to be, inhering truly and properly in the Subjedt it is afcribed to.] The true ftate of this Cafe, feems in brief to be This. Sometimes we confider one and the fame Quality of a thing, in different Circurq- ftances and Refpefts. and with relation to other different things •, which relation may be changed by the alteration or removal of thofe other thing?", and a new EiFect be produced, without any alte- ration at all of the Thing itfelf or any of its Qua- lities ', and yet then we give it -a^ie^v A'ame^and are apt to think that new Name 2. vciv ^talhy. Some- times we conilder •feveral diftinct Qualities of ;•.■ -- ^ , . , diiierent different parcels of Matter, together •, and, be- caufe feme newEffedt is thereby occafioned in fome other Being, we give the imaghiary Whole a vcw Name, and think that mTt> Demmhiation a new ^lality. But with how little reafon this is done, will abundantly appear by the following Inftances. The fame particle of Matter, which makes a point in the Surface of a Globej may, by other parts being lliaved off, become the point of the Angle of a Cube, without under- going any alteration it felf ^ and produce an effedt, which it could not produce before : But is this truly a new ^lality or Poiver in the Point it felf ? Blue and l^ellow Powder mingled together, cccafion a new EfFedt, and are called by a nem j^ame. Green : But is this really a new ^laliiy or Power? is it not plainly the fame two Qua- lities, which they had when feparate, adting fl:ill diftindtly, as appears-in ?. Microfcope? That partiailar and detevmhiate degree of Velocity in a Wheel, whereby it turns once round precifely in twelve Hours, is that which 3''ou call the Power of a Clock to fliow the time of the Day : and be- caufe fuch a determinate Velocity of Motion is made ufe of by Us for the Meafure of Time, and has an ahjlract Nvne given it to exprefsthat ufe^ is it therefore really a new ^^tality or Power di- ftindt from the -Mo/7o« it felf ? And, to men- tion no more •, When a Ifaght in one Scale of a Ba- lance, does, hj taking out part of the Weight that was in the other Scale, begin to preponderate^ which it did not before-, is this any new ^lality QX real Power in the Weight that is not altered, ^liffercnt from what it had before > ( io6 ) I fhall obferve but one Thing more upon this Head -, and that is, that whereas I affirmed every Tower or ^lality that is or can be hihenvt in any S}Jtem of Mattt^r^ to be nothing elfe than the Smn or Aggregate of Jo many Powers or ^lalities of the fame Icind inhewig in all the Parts-j meaning that the Powers inhering in the feveral Parts, muft be of the fame kind, or Species with that Power, which h the refult of the IFbole ^ you feem all along to underftand it as if I had afferted that the Powers or Qualities inhering in the feveral Parts, muft needs be all of the fame kind or Species one with another 'j Thereby diverting your Reader from the true ftrengthof the Argument, and perplex- ing him with that which has no relation to the Queftion : For whether the Powers of the feveral Parts be all of the fame kind one with another ^ or of ever fo dif event kinds one from another ^ that which I affirmed, is ftill equally certain and ne- cefTary ^ that the Power of the VVhole, being but the Sum or Mixture of the Powers of the Parts, cannot poffibl)'' be of a different kind or Species from all the feveral Powers of the Parts, as Thhtkivg is of necelTity fpecificially different from all and every one of the Powers, known or un- known, of Particles which are confefTed to be void * tH' ^^'of Thought. "Wherefore when you fay, ^ he ought to have demonflrated, if he would have proved the point he undertook to prove, that there can be no other power in any Syfiem of Matter, hut what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers 0/ the fame kind-^ And t page 1 5. that t till it is demonfirated, that there can be no other Power in any Syftem of Matter, hut what is the Sum or Jggregate of Powers of the fame kind, it may as well be fuppofed that there are Powers of different k'mds in different Particles of Matter • And that 'tis ( «07 ) 'tis ^ fo far from hehig the Smn or Aggregate of Fow- f ibid* fvs of the fame ^iwJ, that the n^xp Power will he the Stun or -"Aggregate of Powers of a different kind •, And that t the Power of every Syjh:7?i will mt he t page 1 5. the Sum of Powers of the fame kind, hut the Sum of Powers of different kinds: All this is entirely bclidcs the Purpofe. Your Suppofition, ^ that the Matter of which "f- p.ige r5. an Egg covfijls^ doth entirely covjiitute the youvg one j and that the Action of Senfation began wider a par- ticular Difpoftion of the Parts by Motion, without the Addition of an Immaterial and hmn^rtal Soul ^ is in every part contrary to all the Difcoveries in Anatomy, and to all true Philofophy : For fo far is it from being true, that the Matter of the . Egg, by any particular difpofition of its Parts by Motion, is formed into or entirely con/Iitutes the young one, that it does not covjiitute it at all, not fo much as the Body of it j but only ferves it for nourijhment and groivth: It being as impoiTible that the Organized Body of a Chicken fhould by the Power of any Mechanical Motions be formed out of the unorganized matter of an Egg ^ as that the Sun, Moon and Stars, ihould by mere Mechanifm arife out of a Chaos. And that Seji- fation fhould be added to it by arifing from a par- ticular Difpoftion of the Paits by Motion^ is flill more impojfible 5 becaufe it i s fuppofing feme- thing to come out of that, in which it never was ; Than which, nothing in the World can be a more exprefs Contradidtion. You think it ridiculous to recur to the Addition of an Immaterial and Im- moi tal Soul : Let it be fo : I can as e a fily fjppofe, if you muft needs have an Hypnthefis; that the immaterial Subflance was not Jdded afterwards, bskt C fo8 ) liut was IB it from the beginning, from the time that the Seminal Principle it felf of the Orga- nized Body was framed ; And who lliall tell us when That was ? The deeper Difcoveries every Age makes in Anatomy by Microfcopial Obfer- yations, the further .all thefe things are found to be removed backwards from the iearch and com- mon Notions even of the moll inquilitive Men. Suppofe therefore we could, not frame any pro- bable Hypothecs at all, w'/j^wand how the imma.- terial principle of Senfation came in •, yet why ought this to incline any Man to doubt the Truth of a certain Proof which lliowshim that there Is fuch a principle ^ any more than the .d^ifgculty fwhich is altogether as great aji oije) of framing an Hypothecs how and whence the Organized Bo- dy came, make him disbelieve his Senfes which di/cover it to hjm ? */'4^e 16. You tell me again, ^ that Ihave not lighfy em- visrated the hiown Powers of Matter. To prove which charge,you repeat what you had before fajd, concerning Aggregates of Powers of the fame kind:, wherein I have alread}^ fhown that you lay ftrefs .npon that which is wholly foreign to the Queftion. And what you add concerning the pat ticular Tex- ture of a Body^ as being l^omething that is different from the Magnitude and Motion of its Parts, and on which depend certain Powers, as the Power of the Eye, for inftance, to he operated upon by exter- •nal ObjeBs, and to coyitribute to the AB of Vijion-^ which Power, becaufe it ceafes wholly upon the leaft Alteration of the Texture of any part of th^ Eye, 'tis evident does not inhere in the Parts of the Syftem, in the fame Senfe with Magnitude and Motion : This alfo is altogether foreign to the Queftion. C ^09 ) Qpeftion. For the Eye\ Power of Seehig, is not ^ as voiir Argument fuppofes, one of thoie Povver» which I ranked under the fiJI Head, that is, a Power which really inheres in the Syftem, and confequently in all the Parts of it -, But it is one of thofe Powers which I called the third fort, viz. which are 7nere ahfiract Names Jigvifying certain Powers nr E-fects which do jiot at all rejide in the Sub- ject. For the Eye does not See^ in the fame Senfe as the Thinkhtg Subftance Thinks-^ But Seeiitg in the E^ye^ is what Magnetifm is in the Load-Jlone y not a real inherent Quality, but merely a Situa- tion of parts and pores, fo as to be the occafion ct an Eflecl wholly extrinlical to it felf, an effedt produced in fome other Subftance by Kays tranf- mitted through the pores of the Eye, juft as the Magnetic Effluvia are through a Loadflone, or Corn through a Sieve. So that you might ex- adtly as well have compared the Power by which the Soul ThiJiks, to the Power by which a Sievg' tranfmits C01 n, as to the Power by which the Ey^ fees. You obferve, ^ that Sayiitg Covfcioufnefs is an in" ^ page 1% dividual Power ^ is hut calling Confcioufnefs by another Name^ and not giving an account ofwhatConjcioufnefs is J or wherein it conjijh ^ which is requifite to demon' fir ate from Confcioufnefs^ that Confcioufnefs cannot be added to a Being that conjifis of actually fe^.rr ate- and dijlinct Parts. 'Tistrue, my affirming Confcioufnefs to be an individnal Power, is not giving an ac- count of what Confcioufnefs is 5 neither was it in- tended to be fo. Every Man feels and knows by ex- perience what Confcioiifiiefs is, better than any Man can explain it : Which is the Cafe of all fimple Ideas : And it is not at all necefTary to define more particularly what ii is 5 but abun- dantly C no ) dantl)'- fiifficient that we know and agree what it is not, VIZ. that it is not a multitude of diftind: and feparate ConfcioufnefTes-, in order to prove that it does not and cannot inhere in a Being, that confifts of a Multitude of feparate and di- ftind Parts. You your felf acknowledge that the parts which conftitute the Brain,are not feparately and diftindly confcious-, that is, that tl^ Con- fcioufntfs of a Man, is not a Multitude of Gonfci- . oufnelTes, but One. This is all that I fippofe, when I call Confcioufnefs an Individual Power •, and from hence I think it is proved ftrongly, that Confcioufnefs cannot refide in a Being that confifts of a multitude of feparate and diftind: parts: Becaufe if it could, it muft neceffaril}'' fol- low, cither that it would become a Multitude of diftir.d ConfcioufnefTes, contrary to the Suppofi- tion which you your felf allow ; or elfe that an In- dividual Qiiality of each fingle particle, would become the individual Quality of every one of the refl likewife, which is a Contradidticn in Terms -, or elfe, that the Confcioufnefs would be one Power refalting from the contributing Powers of all thefeveral feparate and dil^inct Particles ; in which cafe, it would be, as I have before proved in enumerating the feveral kinds of Pow- ers, a mere ahjtract Name or complex Notion^ and not a real Qiiality refiding in an)^ Subjed at all. ""Tis therefore wholly without reafon, that you \ page 20. lay t Mr.CAsvYs calUvgCovfc70itf7i''fs a7f Tndhn:hal Povyer, hi his Strife of a7i IvVividv.al Power, is fup- pofing that Matter cannot thirki 3rd thr-t vou in- '^ page 21. linuate to 3^our Reader, "^ thi:it Covfionfnefs hnv^ mi Individual Power., in M .Ch\Ys Senfe of thofe Jf^ords^ is fuppcfing that it is a Power which can only refide in an Individual Bejng •, to prove which he has 7Wt ( m ) 7Wtfaiiaiiythwg, but barely by callhtg Confcmifnefi an hidividiial Power. For an Individual Power, in my Senfe of the Word, does not meayi in the I) f- nition a Power which can only rejide in an individual Being ^ but it fignifies 07te Power, in oppofition to a Multitude-, and I have jproT;^^that fuch a Pow- er can only relide in an Individual Being, (not by Suppofingit, but) by reducing the contrary Suppplition to an exprefs Contradidibn. "What you fay again ^, concerning Sums and* page 22. Aggregates of Powers of the fame kind; is repeat- ing the fame miftake, which I have before Ihown you to have fallen into, in underflanding Powers ofthefatne kind w'wh one another, inftead of Powers oi the fame kind [or Species] with the Jf hole that refiitsfrom them. You are pleafed to entertain j^-our felf and 3'"our Reader, t upon my accufmgyou with fuppoiing ^^ g ^^^ Sweetnefs to be in a Rofe. But I hope this will " appear ver}'' pardonable, fince it feemed necefTary to me to underftand you as I did, becaufe I could not otherwife apprehend what you faid concerning it, to be pertinent to your purpofe. For you com- pared the Power which refults from the feveral Particles of a Rofe, without being in the Particles themfelves feparately and fingly ; to the Power which refults from the feveral Particles of the Brain, without being in the Particles themfelves feparately and iingly : Now the Power which you fay refults from the difpofition of the feveral Particles of the Brain, is Confcioufnefs rejiding in the Brain itfelf: Either therefore b}'" the Power refulting from the difpofition of the feveral Par- ticles of the Rofe^ you muff mean Something re- fiding likewife in the Rofe itfelf-^ or elfe your Si- militude ( Hi ) imlitude is not at all parallel. Now that Power which refidcs in the Rofe it felf, as Confcioufnefs does in the Brain, and yet belcmgs not to the feveral conftituent Particles ot the Rofe, can nei- ther be Magmtiide nor Hgiire, nor Alotiov, (for thefe belong to the feveral parts iins,\y y) nor Tex- ture, ("for That, fo far as it differs from the for- mer, is nothing but a ?nerc abJiraB Notion, and nothing really in the thing it felf jj but muft be either Sweetnefs it felf, or fomething elfe equally unintelligible and inexplicable. If you will fay you mean a Power not refiding hi the Rofe at all, but refulting/roOT it, then, (befides that as I faid before, it is not pertinent to your purpofe J what is this, but fuppofmg a Power fubfifting without any Subjed at all ? a mere name ? In my Affertion, that the Powers in a Rofe are nothing elfe but a Number of Jmiilrr Mo- * page 2^' tlom or Figures, you * tell me there are trro thhigs to be proved, ift. That the mere figwe and Motion of the pai ts of a Rofe, do produce^ or are the fole external caufe of the Senfatiov caufcd by them. 2dly, That thofe Aiotions ajtd Figures are perfeBly jmilar. By Similar, I meant that they were fo i^ixfimilar, as the Smell or Colour of the Rofe was fimilar or homogeneous : But whether they be fmilar, or no, is ot" no concern at all in the prefent Queftion, nnlefs you ftill continue in your former miftake about Powers oi the Jame kind with one another., inftead of with the llFho]e. And as to the other thing which you fay wants proof-, I think I may appeal to your felf, whe- ther you can find or conceive any thing elfe in th® Rofe, which can be the caufe of our Senfati- en. C ii3 ) tri, befldes the mere Magvkude^ Figure ^ S'ltiutloir^y and perhaps Motion ot its parts*' You find fault with me t for aflerting that f p.tge ^^t Gravitation is the eft€& of the continued and re- gular Operation of fome other Being on Matter j iphereasj you think, it does not appear but that Mat- ter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally placed in it by God^ ajidis iioiv left to itfelfto act by tiwfe Oi i- riglnal Power Si This Opinion of yours, I cannot but think, ^ir, to be a great miftakein fourPhi- lofophy. For when aStonethat was at Reft, does of it felf, upon its Support being removed, be- gin to fall downward ; what is it that caufes the Stone to begin to move? Is it poiTible to be an Efteft produced without aCaufe? Is it impel- led without any Impeller ? or can a Law or Poiver, that is to fay, a 7nere ahftract Name or complex Notion, and not any real Beings impell a Stone and caufe it to begin to move? In a n}'' other' Cafe you would not doubt but this implied ail abfolute Contradiction. II. When in my Anfv^er to your fecond O^e- £lion, I faid that though the want ot' Individu- ality is indeed the fole reafon urged in the prefevt Argmnevt, why a Syftcm of Matte? cannot think ^ yet that it ought not therefore to be faid that Inviduality is the oiily thing required^ to render a Being a proper Sul)jedt of a Power of Thinking •, ('Becaufe I would not exclude anv o- ther Argument^ by which other inqnifitive Per- fons might prove other Conditions aUo, as w-11 as Individualit}'-, to be neceftary Reqnilites in or- der to a Subjed's being Cripable of Thinking:) You hereupon make the following Remark ^ ( "4 ) "j'rf^. 26. ^ Vpov thh I ohfei ve that Mr.Chr'k cfrfis tie Trvth of iny reufcmvgy vpoii the Siippojition^ that hdividiialityis only required by him in a SiibjeB of a Power oj Thivk-* ifig -, ( you (hould have added ^ and upon Sup- pciition alfo, that a Particle of Matter, could be truly an Individual-, ) but demes that I have avy reafon to infer that Individuality is only requi- red, frovi the WRwt of Individuality'^ /'fzV^ f/;e fole reafon urged why a Syjlem of Matter cannot hw&e apGTper of Jhinkivg •, Tf hich I cannot help thinking in be all one, ''till there is a Difircnce ajjigned between only required in the prefent Argument, and the fole reafon urged In the prefent Argument. Kow This isa very unfair Obfervat ion : Becaufe the Diffe- rence to be afTigned, and which I did aflign ex' presfl}'', was between the fole reafon urged in the prefent Argument, and what was only required (not in the prefe7it but) in any new Argument which C-* thers might make ufe of. *page 30. III. The Queftion correming the^ Alterations ef the Modes or ^lalities of Immaterial Beings, feem indeed to have fome Difficulties in it, but rot fuch as an}'' wav aifedt our prefent Argument. The Thing you objecled was, that though the' Subftance of the Soul were proved to be both' Immaterial and Immortal, yet it would not fol--^ lew that it muft be an Immortal Thinhiijg Sub- ftance, becaufe its r/;7WojV^ might perilh, though; its Svlfance did not. To this I reply'd :, that the Tor^er cf T/^/?;^??!^ cculd no more bcdeftrcj'^'d by any Katural Fewer, than the Subjiance it felf - becaufe the Qualities or Modes of au}'' Subftance not beirg alterableotheiwife,thanby frme alteia- ticn in the Subftance it felf:, 'tis manifeft that an Indifcerpible Subftance not being it felf alterable bj ( "y ) hj any natural Power, it inuft follow that Tiehhet tan any of its Qiaalities be altered by any natural Power, When theiefore I faid that all its Quali- ties and Modes are utterl)^ incapable of being affedled in any meafure, or changed in any degree, by any Power of Nature-, you had no re a ion to underftand this, as if I had afTcrted, that an Indiicerpible Subftance Could not be a^ed .vpon at allhj any Power of Nature ^ But my meaning was. rhat it could not be fo a£ted upon, as to dejiroy, chavge or alter any of its inherent Qualities or Powers •, which was all that the thing in Queftion required me to prove And that thiswas my meaning, you mightihave uii-: derftood from the Comparifon I ufed, of the o- riginal and perfedly folid Particles of Mat- ter. For as thofe Particles, being (not abfo- lutely in themfelves, but) f o any Power of Na- ture, indifcerpible •, are evidently incapable of having any of their Qualities or Properties al- tered in any meafure by any Power of Na- ture ^ that is, their Figure, their Magnitude, their Hardnefs, and all the rsfpective Etrects or Powers depending lipon thefe, can by no natural means be changed j and yet you could not' imagin me to mean, but thefe Particles itiight be aEied upon^ might hejiruch by each other might! be removed this way or that way, upwards or downwards ;, all which makes no real alteration in them : So an indifcerpible immaterial think- ing Subftance, though it may be transferred from one part of the Univerfe to another, though it may be acted upon by a rnultitude of things, though it may have different Ideas reprefented to' it, though the organs of the Senfes may at times tranfmit different Species or hinder them from Ha? ^^ r 11^ ) teing tranfmitted to it y yet all this malces^i>G^* real Alteration either in the Subftance or its in-* herent Powers-, nor can its Power ot TlAnldvg (which was the Thing in QueflionJ be dtilroy- ed or altered hj thefe or any other natural Pow- ers V any more than the Mobility or Hatdnefs of the original perfectly fblid Particles ot" Matter can be deftroyed by any of their Adings one upon- another. There is ilill leis weight in what you add •, * Mf 5°- f- New till Mr Clark ha^ a compleat Idea oj both Jolts of J5^z??^, [Material or Immaterial,! avd of their Ffrioers. avd Operatior.s ove on another ^ it 7s impojJiMe for him, in Mavy RefpeBs., to tell how far tht'y can ajfeB one awthers Operations. This is true indeed •, but what follows from it ? Be- caufe, in Many Refpe^s, I cannot t<^il how far they cayi affcdt one another's Operations-, does It therefore follow, that I cannot in any refpeB tell wherein they can not affect one another's Operations? All that I pretend t-o, is to deny the polTibility of fiieh ElFeds, as plainly imply a Contradiction ^ and this, 1 prefume, I may be allowed to do, though I were in ?/w7?r6j'/7^i?5 igno- rant how far Material and Immaterial Beings can effect rne another. Aato the Power of God to deftroy any Mode or Quality in an immaterial indifcerpibleSubftance, I faid nothing eoncerning it, neither is our Queflion at all concerned in it. But fin ce you' have thought fit to put the Queflion whether, atrcording to my Principles, God can deflroy a Mode or Qiiality in an Immaterial Being, with- out making feme alteration in the Subftance it felf -, I cannot but take notice, that all the An- fwers you have made for me to thisQjjeftion, are Cich as I cannot approve, and that therefore lam C M7 ) "not concerned in any of their Confequences. The Anfwer I would make for my felf, is, thatiup- pQjflng God to deftroy any Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, it is reafonable to imaginthat: Jie mul^: do it by making fome fuch Alterations in that Subjla^tce^ as may beanalogousor equivalent to alterivg the Difpoftioji of the Pa) ts itt a Material Sjib- jlance. Bat you ought not to have jumbled t thefe t/*'^' 32* two things together, (which I caretully diflin- :guifhedy> by fuppofing me t)0 anfwer, that God muftdo it by making an Alteration in the Pa^ti of the lmvmte)ial Suhjlawe (to which it is not pro- per to alcribeany IVf5,) and thence concluding that an Immaterial Subftance is as difcerpible by ihe Power of God, as a Material Subftance. Laflly, ycii tell me ^ that atter all I make the * P^i' 34» Immaterial Thinking ^Subftance to be in no other Senfe ImmoHal, than I make the original folid Patricks of Matter to be i->idtfcerpible ^ that is to fay, that the one is immortal and the other iniif- cerpible^ only with refpedl to the Powers of Na- ture^ but that in refped to the Power of God, neither is the one indifcerplbU^ nor the other im- viortal. Your Expreirmns; in this whole SejGioia Jie under fo much Obfcurity, that I can hardly he fure wheth r I undeiftand you right or nor. But if this be your Senfe •, I confcfs I do indeed make it fo ^ and I fuppo-fe no confiderate Man €ver made the Soul immortal in any other Senfe. For though I believe it is not difcerpible^ even by ihe Power of God •, yet he is undoubtedly able to deftroy it, ehheThy anmhiUt 2 n^ it ^ or perhaps by otherwife deprivivg it of all its Faculties, in ways vhich we can know nothing oi'. P 2 W^ C iis ) IV. To the Difficulties aiifing from the Suppoji- pon of Immateriality not exclading Extention 5 I anfiwrer, 1. That all thefe Difficulties are wide of the pain Queftion. For if the foregoing Proof, that Matter is incapable of Thinking, cannot be fnown to be defedive •, it follows necelTarily that the Soul muft bean Immaterial wdifcerpible Sub- Jiajtce, But the Difficulties that arife from any following Hypothefis concerning other Properties of that Immaterial Indifcerpible Subftance, as whether it he Extended or Uvextevded^ whether it ever ads trholly feparate^ or always in fome mate- rial Vehicle^ finer or groHer, and the like ^ the Diffi'culties, I fay, that arife from any of thefe particular Hypothefis, affed only the particular K3"pcthefis, from which they arife, and not at all the foregoing general Proof. I take it to be de- monftrated, that the ?iO\x\\s3X\hm7iaterial indifcer- pible Siibjlauce : lie that thinks the Difficulties arifing from the Suppofition of that immate- rial indifcerpible Subflance being Extended, to be unfurmountable ; may try if he can find fewer Difficulties in fuppofing it Unext'nded', And he that thinks the Difficulties that arife from fup- pofing it Unextended, are not to be got over-, may try to f jlve the Difficulties that arife from fup- pofing it Extended : but the main Argument rem.ains firm either way ^ and no difficulty ari- ling from following Kypcthefes can be fogreat.as to leflen the force of the foregoing pofitive Proof. 2. But conceiving Immaterialty not to exclude Extcnfion, and fuppofing the Difficulties arifing from that Hypothefis to be fuch as could not be dearly anfwered 5 yet this would not weaken the fore= (lip) fore,going Proof, unlefs that Argument could o^ therwife be Ihown to be in it felf defective. For there are many Demonftrations even in abftra(3; jvlathematicks themfelves, which no Man who underftands them can in the leaft doubt of the certainty of, which yet are attended with diffi- cult Confequencesthat cannot perfectly be clear- ed. The hifnite Dmfihility ^ of ^miiUty, is an inllance of this kind. Alfo the Eternity of God^ than which nothing is more felf-evident ; and yet the Difficulties confequent upon it, arefuch ^s have reduced moft of the Schoolmen to entertain that unintelligible Notion of a Nunc Stans. And his hmi-enfty, attended with much the like Diffi- culties. 3. But neither is this the trae ftate of the Cafe. For the Difficulties ariiing from the Suppolition of Immaterial indifcerpible Extention, are by no means like thofe before mentioned. Space, (which you miphilofophkally call the meer abfence of Bodies, and yet confefs it to be pofitively infi- nite,) is without difficulty confefTed b}'' you to be an Inftance of fuch an Extention-, An Extenfion whofe Parts (improperly fo calledj depend on each other for their Exiftence, not only becaule of its Infinity, but becaufe of the Contradidion which a Separation of them manifeftty v/ould im- ply. And the only Thing required in the prefent cafe, is, to conceive that God can create a finite Subftance, which (hall not, like the.folid, rigid, determined Extenfion of Matter, confift of Parts which are adually fo many diftinft Beings in- dependent on each other for their Exiftence ; but be a Subftance perfedly and elfentially One, fo to that purpofe any Divifion of it, ffiall necef- farily infer a DeftrudHon of the EfTence of that H 4 Sufj- ( T2.0 ) pubftance. This muft indeed be confefTed to be p confiderable Difficulty : But if the Difficultie? arifing upon any other Hypothecs, be (as they certainly are) at le.tfi as great •, nothing can thence be interred to the weakening of the foregoing Proof. Your applying the Argument, by which I pro- ved that Matter could not Think, in the fame Words, to prove that neither could Immaterial ^Libfiance be capable of Thinking •, is fallacious in the fiift Sentence. For the Suppofition of the Subftance being by the rower of God div'ided'into tivo Pa:ts, which concerning Matter is confeiled to be always poirible, may concerning Immaterial jSubftance (even tho'Extenfion be not excluded) be denied to be poibble, as being a Suppofition which deflroys the very EJfence of the fubftancQ > itfelf. V. As to 3'-our laf^ DifRculty concerning Brutes, I anfu'cr, that your Disjundticn is ftill imper- *if^^^-43-fect, when you r?.y •^ they ihufl: either necefTarily »nd agair. |jg annihilated fome time or other, or elie be ^' ^ ■ capable of Eternal Happinefs as well as Man. For tho' they fhould never be annihilated, yet why muft they needs be capable of Eternal Happinefs cs well as Mail ^ any more than their prelent Subfi- . ' fl:irg, implies that they muff needs be capable of the Expecfatiojts and Cojidkioiis of eternal Happi- nefs, as tvellas Matt ? But what is all this, to our purpofe? Cannot God, if he pleaft-s, caufe them to perifh at the diffolution of their Bodies ? Or cannot he, i; he pleafcs, annihilate them at any other time, when he fliall fo think fit ? Or cannot he, if he pleafes, without ever annihi- lating their, at nil, difpofe of them into Statee fuitable r I" ) ^uitatle to their particular Natures •, which yet rnaj in no propriety of Speech he ftiled a Capaci* of eternal Happinefs, as that of Man is > Having thus at large indeavoured, to give you particular Satisfaftion, in every one of theDiffi^ culties you propofed •, I {hall conclude with brief- ly repeating the Strength of the Argument, in a few plain and eafy Propojitiom ^ and fo leave it ito the Judgment of the inquifitive and impartial Jleader. No T E -^ by Confc'ioufTieUw the following Propofiti- ons, the Reader way ujiderftand indifferently either the Reflex Adt, by which a Man knows his Thoughts to be his rwn Thoughts; (which U the firi^ and poperefl Setife of the Word •^) or the Direft Aft of Thinking ; or the Power or Capacity of Thinking ;' or (which h of the fame import,') (Impie Senfation -, or ^/>? Power of Self-Motion, or of be- ginning Motion by the Will : The Arguthent hiding equally tn ail or any of theje Sen'es % oihasbten before jaid, I. Every SyJ}em of Matter confifts of a Multitude of d\Rin& Parts. This, I think, is granted by all. 11. Every real Quality inheres in fome Suh^ ]e&. This alfo, I think, is granted by All. For whatever is called a ^lality, and yet inheres yiot in any Subje^^ muft either fubfift of it felf ; and then it is a 5h^/^w6-^, not a ^talitj j orelfe it is nothing but a inere Name. ni. No ( 12.2 ) III. No hidividud or fmgle Quality of one particle of Matter, can be the Individudl or Jingle Quality of another particle. The Heat of one particle, is not the Htat of another. The Gravity^ the Colour, the Figure, of one particle, is not the fame individual Grye5 ( liy } flower of a P/w to prich, is nothing dlftinfl from its mere Figure permitting it to enter the Skin. The Power of a freight in one Scale of a Balance, to afcend or defcend, np- on increasing or diminifhing the Counterpoife in the other Scale •, is not a mw real ^lalhyy diftindl from its ahfolnte Gramty:, though it occafions a new Effect -^ there being no Alte- ration at all made in the Weight kfelf. The Porper of the Eye to fee, is not a real Quality 6i the Jrhole Eye, but merely an abflrac} Name fignifying a Tranfmittrng and Refradling of the Rays of Light in a certain manner through its fevcral Parts -, Which EfFed, by the interpo- Jition or removal of an Opake Body, h deftroy- ed or renewed, without any Alteration at all iti the Eye it felf, A Key, by having many new Locks made fit to it, acquires a 7iev^ Power of producing Effedls, which it could not be- fore 5 and 3''ctno new real Quality is produced, nor any Alteration at all made, in the Key if felf. And fo univerfally of all Powers of this kind. If thefe Powers were any thing elfe, Init meie ahftra^ Naiiies -, they would fignify Qiialities fubfifting without any Subjedl: at all ^ that is, fuch as muft themfelvesbe dif^indf Sub- flanees. Which is unintelligible. Vllf. Co7ifcionfnep is neither a mere ahfti*a^ "Name, (fuch as are the Poivers mentioned in Prop, Vl \ ^ nor a Power of exchhiq^ or occa- fiomng different Ixodes m a foretq^n Siibftance^ (fuch as are all the fenfihle Qitdlitjes oi Bo- dies, Prop. VI ^) but a real Quality, truly and properly inherent in the SithjeEi itfelf\ the 7hinkmg Subfance* I£ C ii6 ) if it was a mere ahftraB Name j it would Ld fiothing at all in the Perfon that Thinks, or in the Thinking Subflance it felf ^ but only a Notion framed by the imagination of fome Other Being. For all thofe Powers which are only ahfiraB Names, are not at all in the Thhigs whofe Powers they are called-^ but are only No- tiovs framed in Imagination, by the Mind that obferves, compares and reafons about diiterent ObjeBs without itfelf If it was a Power of excitivg or occafiormig iiferent . Modes ht a foreign Subflance ^ Thei^ the Power of Tbhikwg muft be before in that foreign Subftance^ and that foreign SuMance alone would in reality be Confcious, and not This which excites the different Modes in That foreign Subfance. For the Power that is in one Subftance, of exciting different Modes in another Subftance •, prefiippofes necellarily in that other Subftance the Fonvdatioyi of thofe Modes. Thus in the Cafe of all the feifible ^la- lities of Bodies ^ the Power of Thi7!kivg is be- forehand in that Being, wherein thofe Qiiali^ ties excite or occalion different Modes of Thinking. It remains therefore that it muft of necef- iity be a real Quality, tt tdy and properly ivheririg hi the Subje^ itfelf, the Thinking Suhjiawe • there being no other Species of Powers or ^lalities left, to which it can pofTibly be referred. And this indeed is of itfelf as evident by every Man's Experience, as it can be rendred by any Explication or Proof whatfoever. IX. No real Quality can refalt from the Com- fojition of different Qualities^ fo as to be a nev7 ftew QiJality in the fame Subjed, of a dif- ferent Kind or Species from all and every one of the Cowpeterxt Qualities, If it couW, it would be a Creation of Some- thing out of Nothing ; From compound Motions^ can arife nothing but Motion: From Mjgni- tiidesj nothing but Magnitude : From Figures, nothing but Figure : From compolitions ot Mag^ yiitude. Figure and Motion together 5 nothing but Magnitude, Figiire and Motion: From Mechanical Fowers, nothmg but Mechanical Poipers: From a compofition ot Colour s, nothing but Colour ^ which it felf (as appears by Microfcopesj is ftill the fimple Colours of which it was com- pounded. From mixtures of Chywical Liquor s, nothing but Fentmits-^ which are onljr mere Motions of the particles in mixing, fuch moti- ons as arife from the placing of Iron and a Load- Stone near each other. Gravity, is not a Quality ot Matter, arifing from its Texture or any ether Powers in it ^ but merely an Endeavour to Miotiofi, excited by fome foreign Force or Power. Magnetifm and FleBricity, are not new Quali- ties, refulting from different and unknown Powers •, but merei3r emilfions of certain ftreams of Matter, which produce certain determinate Motions. Compofitions oi Colours, can never contribute to produce a Sound ^ nor compofiti- ons of Aiagititude and Figure, to produce a Mo- tiofi', nor neceffary and determined Motions, to produce a fiee and in determined Fonder of Self Mo' tion ^ nor any Mechanical Fowers whatfoever, to produce a Power not Mechanical. And the fame muft of necelfity hold univeriltlly true, of all Qualities and Powers whatfoever, whether Itnov/n or unknown ; Becaufe otherwife, as hath C ii8 ) liath been before faid, there would in the Corrf- pound be fomething created out of Nothing. Confcioufnefs therefore bein^ a real Qiiali- ty, (Prop, Y III') and of a Kind fpecifically different ffom all other Qualities whether known or unknown, which are themfelves acknowledged to be z'o'i^/ of Confcioufnefs ^ can never poffibly refult from any Compofi- tiom of fuch Qiialities. This is as evident from the foregoing Propo- fitions, as that a Somid cannot be the refult of a Mixture of Cohurs and Smells ; nor Extevfion the refult of a compofition of parts imextended^ nor jSo/zi/ty the refult of parts not f olid -^ what- ever other different Qualities, known or un- Imown, thofe conftituent parts may be fuppo- fed to be endued with. xr. No Individual Quality can be tra?isferred from one SubjeEi to another. This is granted by All. xn. The Spirits and Particles of the Brain^ being loofe and in perpetual Flux^ cannot therefore be the feat of that Confcioufiefs^ by which a Man not only remembers things done many years fince-, but alfo is Confci- ous that He himfelf the fame IndividualCon- fcious Being, was the Doer of them. This follows evidently from the foregoing. XIJL ( up ) XIII. Th^ Confcionfnefs that a Maft has at one! and the fame time, is One Confciouftiefs y and not a MutHtude of Confcioufneffes ;, as the Solidity^ Motion^ or Colour of any piece of Matter is a Multitude of Jiftind Solidi- ties^ Motions^ or Colour s* This is granted by All, who deny tJiat tha particles of the Brain, which they fuppofe to conftitute a Confcious Sabftance, are them- felves each of them Confcious. XIV. Confcionfnefs thetefOre cannot at all refide ih the Subftance of the Brain, or Spirits^ or in any other material Syflejn as its Sub' jeB -^ but mud be a Quality of ^omt Imma^ teriat Suhftance* This follows neceflarily from the foregoing Propofitionscompared together. For fince every* poifible Power of Matter, whether known or unknown, muft needs be either, ift, a red ^lality of the Matter to which It is afcribed ^ and then it muft inhere in the feveral diftindt parts •, Or, 2dly a Power of exciting or occa- fioning certain Alodes in fome other SiihjeB ^ and then it is truly the Quality, not ot the Matter, but of that oth?r Snhje^ : Or, ?dly^ a mere ahJlraB Name or Notion of what is, proper- ly fpeaking, no real Quality at all, and in- heres in no real SubjeQ: at all : And Coiifciovf liefi is acknowledged to be none of thefe : It follows unavoidable, that it muft ofnecelfity be a Quality of fome Immaterial Siihfance. I XV. ( 15a ) XV. Di faculties that arife afterwards, con- cerning Other Qualities of that immaterial Subflajice^ as whether it be Exteiided or Uiiextended ^ do not at all aifed the prefent Argument. For thus even abftradl Mathematical De- inorjftrations ; as thofe concerning the IvjimU Dmfihilky of ^laJity, the Et entity of God^ and his hmneiifty •, have almoft infuperable Diffi- eulties on the other lide : And yet no Man, who underftands thofe Matters, thinks that thofe Difficulties do at all weaken the Force, or diminilh the Certainty of the Denion- ftratioHs. 6^6^^ ^i^^i^i. a^a^ist^i^^s/i^si^ Sy^e^^ir^e^^^ ^. 9^ A Third E F E N S E O F A N ARG U M E N T Made ufe of in a Letter to Mr D D W E L, to prove the Immateriality and Natu- ral Immortality of the S O U L. In a Letter to the Juthor of the Reflexions on Mr O2ixkQ\.SiC07td Defenfe, &c. The Third Edition. Argument sfddomvfoTk on Men of Wit and Learning, when they have once engaged themfeives in a contrary Opinion; Mr. Hobhs , We have as much Reafon to be fatisfied with our Notion of Immaterial: Spirit, as with our Notion of Body; and the Exiftence of the One, as well as the Ochcr, For it being no more a Contradiftion that Tbitil^jng fhould exift feparacc and independent from Solidity^ than it is a Concradirtion thac • Solidity fliouldexift feparate and independent: from Tijinl^irg-^ they being Both but Simple Ideas, independent or e frcsn another •, And having as clear and diftinft Ideas in us, of Thinl(ir.g, as of Solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a Thinl>ingthin^ without Solidity, that is, Imma^ ferial, to exift •, as a Solid thing without thinl^irg^thzK, \i. Matter, toexift. Wr Lock^'j EfTay. Book II. Ch.2'}. §. 32. Printed in the Year 171 8. c T33 ) A Third DEFENSE O F A N ARGUMENT, d^^. , SIR, IN my Laft Reply I perfuaded my felf I had fet the Queftion between us in fo clear a Light, that there would have been no need of any new Debate, or of giving our Readers any further trouble in this Matter. But feeing you have found out a ieemingly new DiJihiBion, by which you ftill indeavour to evade the Force of the Argument •, And, though your Evafion feems to Me indeed extreamly flight, yet feeing you have thought fit to infill upon itinfuch a manner, as if you your felf really believed there wasfome Strength and Weight in it^ I fhall indeavour to gratify the fincere Defire you profefs to have of difcovering the Truth, by fhowing briefly the weaknefs and inconclufivenefs of what you have advanced in your Reflexiom. In order to prove that Thinking cannot poffibly be a Qiiality or Power of Matter ^ I faid that all the jQiialities or Powers, which either Are in Matter, I 3 vvhe. ( i?4 ) whether they be known or unknov/n j or are vulgarly Afcribed to it •, mujR: of necejHty be either, iji. Real Qualities, truly and properly inher- ing in the Subjed to which they are afcribed : Such as are Magnitude m-\d Motion in Matter. Thefe are always the Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of the fame Khd^ inhering diftindly in the feveral Parts of the Material Subjcdt. Which not being true of ThhiJujtg, 'tis manifeft that Th'rdkifjg cannot be a Power or Quality of this Sort, inhering in a Syftem of Matter. Or 2dly, (Tualities, not really inhering in the Subject to which they are ufually afcribed, but being indeed Modes excited and refiding in fome ether Subject : Such as are Colours, Soumh, and all thofe which are commonly called the Senfible Qualities of Matter. Thefe do not exift at all in That Subjed to which they are ufually afcribed '5 but in feme Other Subject. And this alfo not being applicable toTlhihvg, 'tis manifeft there- fore that Thhldng cannot be a Power or Quality of this Kind, in a Material Subjeft. Oi o,dly. Qiialities, not really inhering in any Subjeift at all, but being mere Abftradl ISlames, of external Denominations, to exprefs certain com- plex Ideas framed in our Imaginations -, or cer- tain general extrinfick, and, relative Effedts, pro- duced upon particular Syftems of Matter by fo- reign Agents •, or certain Difpcfitions of the par- ticular Syftems of Matter, requilite towards the producing of thofe Effefts. Such as are Magvetifrn, F.leBrii2ty,Attya^ion,Rcjlex:hiiity, Refrangibility.^and the like. Thefe have no real exiftence b]^ way hf proper hiherhig, in any Subject. ' Which like- Wifp nnce it cannot be faid of Thhkhg, 'tis ma- i< .r- - ■ .''-■; nifeil jiifeft that ThinVnt^ cannot be a Power or Qiiality in a Material Syftem, of this Kind neither. You grant that ThJTilijig^ for the Reafons I urged, cannot be a Power or Quality of an}?- of Thefe Kinds : But yon Dijlivgnijl) upon the Firft Sort 5 and allege, That there are fome Real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in theSubjedt to which ihey are afcribed ^ which yet are not, like Magnitude and Motion, Sums or Aggregates ot Powers or Qua- litiesof the Jame Khid^ inhering diftindtlyin the feveral Parts of the Subjed : And that therefore Thiiiki7ig^ though it be not an Aggregate of Pow- ers of the/a?;jf Kivd^ may yet neverthelefs be a Real Quality inhering in Matter That Numerical Porpen, or payticidar and Indivi-Reffix. p. dual Modes, are fuch real inherent Qualities, re-r8 3i2o. iiding inaSjT'ftem of Matter, without inhering diftindlly in its feveral Parts : in contradiftindion to f!^enerical Porrers, fuch as Magmtitde and Alotiov^ which you acknowledge to be the Sums of the Magnitudes and Motions of the feveral Parts. Thaty for Inftance, the Power of the Eye, to con- pa^. 14. tribute to the acl of Seeivg -, the Power of a Cochy to fhow the hour of the Day ^ the Power of a Mnjkalpxg. r 5. Injinimejitj to produce in us harmonious Sounds •, the particular Fiy^iires in Bodies, fuch as RoiirJ7tefspj^, , j. or Squarenefs ^ and particular or individual Modes of AIotio7i, are fuch Numerical Powers, not at all xe-pag. 17, fulting from any Powers of the /iitw^iviwi inhering-^ 20. in the Parts of the Syftem : And that Thinking therefore in like manner, not being an Aggregate of Powers of the fame Kind, may yet inhere in a SA^ftcm f>f Matter, as one of thefe Numerical or In- pag. 2 1 , dividual Modes of fome Generical Power, I 4 That, ( I3<5 ) That, upon this Suppofition, o^Thinhrg being ^ Ni!7Ke: itjl Mode oi iome Generical Power ot Mat^ter ; i'-^i- -Pv it i. ay be conceived, that ^-j the Roimdefs of a Bo- 4), is vet the Simi of the Roimdjiejfes of the Pai ts j, nor the ^(juarenefs ot a Body, the Sum of the Sqiiaremft' p(t&- ^9- fes ot the Parts ^ noxthe Ponder of a Miijical hflni- tnerttocavje anhar7?w7U02is Soujid, the Sum of Powers of theJa7?ieKi7id hi the Parts Jiiigly co7tfidered 5 nor any particular Mode of Motio7i, the Sum of the fame pag. 20. Modes of Motion in all the feveral Parts •, So the Co7iJcioiif}iefs's thatinheresina Syftejn of Matter^ may yet 7wt he the Suvi of the Coifcionffiff of the Parts. That the Argument therefore drawn from Con- J.!g '5- fcionffiefs not being made up of /^u^raZ Coifciouf- fiejjes, conckdes no more againft the polTibility of its reliding in a Syftem of Matter ^ than the like Argument would cojichde agai7ijl the pojfibility of the piig %$• j^/jjiejice of Roundnefs, or any other Numerical Mf^de, ifi a Body. fag<, 25. For Rowidjiffs 710 7nore C07fjls of feveral Roinidnef- fes, thai! Thi7iki7fg or Co7ifcioitfinfs doesl of feveral , Co7ifciorfyieffes. fag. 2$. ' And Roujid^ief sis as fpecifc ally difiere7tt fio7n other figures of which it may be compofed, as Coiffci- oitfnefs is from a Circular Motio7t. page 2 2. So that Seyfatiov may be conceived to be in the Partsofan Ajiimal'sBodv.ju^ as Rointdnefs is in the Parts that co7fipofe a Round Body : Each Part has as much ofSafafion, fngly confidertd •, as each Part of a ^oundBody, has of Roundnefs : And when the Pa) ts are duly difpofed, rvhole Thitihing is performed, as whole Romthiefs exifts bytheConjunclion of Parts. ^ P ^. Tor Co7ifcioiifnefs, heingfuppofedtu be arealNu'• ^* ' merifal Power, fitch a^ Rojind7iefs is-., may refultfro)]^ the Co7npcftion of differejit Qualities, as Rcit7tdnefs dees fi om dif event Species cf Figure : Avi is confe- '■ . ■■ ' . •' ' ; ' ' ' ^ qmitly qiicvt^y a new ^laJity in the fame SuhjeB^ of a iiffe- rent Kind or Species from all the compcnent ^alities conjidered together. Wherefore, though Confciovfnef be a real ^lality^pag. 5^. and dif event from all other Qualities, whether known or imknown, which are thsmfelves acknowledged to be void ofConfciojfyiefi • yet it ynay refultfrom fiich ^na* lilies as Jingly conjidered are voi-l of Confcioifriefs ^ In like manner as Roimdnefs is a real ^lalityfpecifc al- ly different from other ^lalities void of Roiindnefs, and yet may be the refult or Cojnpoftion of Inch ^la" lities. That Confcicufnefs may be confidei'dparticu-prfi. ip* larly, as an individual A^ode or Species of Motion. ^^ ^ ^^• For, as nothing more goes to the Cojnpoftion of Komtdnejs^ than the Conjitnliion of fever al Particle s^"^' ^^* vot fngly endued with Roimdjiefs -, fd upon This Sup- poftion^ nothing more needs go to the Power of Ihivliivg^ than the ConjimBion of f'veral Particles not each endued with That Species of Motion called Think- ing. This, if I underftand you aright, is the Sum and full Strength of what jou have urg'd in your R>'Jlexions. s And to This, I anfwer as follows. It is abfolutely impoflible and an evident Con- tradiftion, that any Real Quality fhould truly and properly inhere in a Syfteni of Matter, with- out being the Sum or Aggregate of a Number of Powers Or Qualities, reliding diftindly in the fe- veral Parts of the J^yftem, and being always of the fajne Kind u ith the Whole that refults from them. For, as the SulJIance it felf 0^ a Sj'ftem of Matter, is nothing but the Sum of its Parts, exi- flmg «v. fling diftinfllv and independently from each o- ther -, and the Whole cannot but be ofthcJameKind with the Parts that conftitnte it : So no Power or ^lality of the Suljlavce can be any thing elfe, but the Sum or Aggregate of the Powers of the fe- veral Parts •, and That Sum or Aggregate, with- out a Creation of fomething out of Nothing, can- not but be of tlie fmne Kind with the Powers that conftitute it. If the Parts of the Subftance hefitii" lai% then the Syftem it felf is an miiform or ho- mogeneous Subftance: If the Parts be t?z^wf/ar, then the Subftance is djfform or Hetetogeneoiis: But ftill always of the fame Kind or Kinds with the Parts that compofe it. In like manner, if the Powers of the feveral Parts of the Syftem be fmilar^ the Power of the Whole will be a fmiple and zmiforni Power : If the Powers of the feveral Parts be difjimilar , the Pcwcr of the Whole will be a compound difform Power : But ftill al- ways necejTarily of the fame Kind or Ki^ids with the Powers of which it is compounded. Since therefore you acknowledge Thinking to be a Pew- er not compofed of a Multitude of Thi7ik2vgs ; and 'tis evident (as fliall in the fequel be made fully appear) that no Powers void of Thinking, can be of the fajne Kifid with the Power of Think- ing, fo as to be Parts of it, and that from a Com- poiition of Them the Power of Thinking may a- rife j it follows that ThxTtUng is not a Power made up at all of Parts, and confequentlv that it can- not refide in a Subftance that confifts of diftindt and independent Parts, fuch as all Matter is confefled to be. For the clear explication of which whole Argu- ment, and to vindicate the Notion from all the ■ Ob. ( 159 ) ObjedlioTis and pretended Inftances you have brought to the contrary •, it is to be obferved, that the Terms, Xf 77 J, and Species, and of the fajneKind or Species, are very ambiguous Terms, and ufed in great Variety of Significations : Though a- mong Men who leek Truth, and indeavour to ex- prefs themfelves with the greateft clearnefs they can, and are willing to underftand each others meaning ^ they do not often caufe any coniidera- ble Miftakes. For Example : Tis an evident Truth, that All Circles of four foot Diameter^ are oi one and thefaws Kind or Species •, and this is what the Logicians call Species fpecialijirm. 'Tis true in another Senfe, that All Circles Whatever ^ are of the fajne SpeciesAn another Senfe, thaty^// curvilinear Figures^ are of the faijie Species : In another, that All plain Figures both Jlr eight-lined andcurvilinear^ as oppofed tofolids^ are of they^T;^^ Species : And in another, that All Figures whatfocver, whether plain or folidy are of the fame Kind or Species ^ as contradiftin- guifhed from Motion or Thinking, or from any thing elfe of a totally different Kind. This is what they call the Genus gener alius. And beyond This, it is neiher Tr:ie nor good Sevfe, nor can it in any manner be faid , that Figure and Motion, or Figure and Colour, or Figure and Thought^ are of the fame Kind •, Becaufe there is nothing Common in their Ideas, by which they can be ranked or compared together j fave only as they are all comprehended perhaps under the mere Abftra6tName of ^^tality in general. In like manner-, Alt Squares of tvo foot diameter svefpecifcally different from All Squares of one foot diameter-^hut not in the fame Senfe, nov fo much,as Both are from Pavalclc^y diJlinB Confcioufneffes^ as there are Farticki of Matter, of which the Syjlem conflis •, which yoa do allow to he very ahfurd. But 2dly, Let us endeavour to imagine Confcioufnefs to be, not a Geyiericdl, but a Numerical Power or Quali-- ty, fuch as Roundnef is •, and fee what will fol- low from thence. It cannot be conceived that Confcioifnefs in general is a Numerical Power, any more than Fz^HJ'g in general, or Roundnefs in gejie-^ ral. But, as the i7idividual Roundnefs of a Glohe^ as a Numerical Quality of that individual Globe ; fo you can only fay that the individual Confcionf Tiefs, which I find in my felf at ^ny particular moment of Time, is a Numerical Mode of fome Power inhering in that Syftem of Matter which conftitutes my Brain. Now as the ijidividuai Rou7tdnefs of a Globe, is not indeed made up of a Number of the Like whole RoundnejJ'cs -^ (even as the Number a Hundred, is not made up of Hun- dreds , nor the Magnitude of a foot Cube, made up of feet Cube -, nor any irhoh whatever, made up of a Number of the like Ifholes;) but yet muft needs be made up of fuch Figures, as are Parts of Roundnefs, nay Parts endued with that particular mmeiical degree of Curvity or Roundnfs-^ K 2 and ( 148 ) and cannot be made up oi'JIraight Lhtes, nor of apy . Figures which are 7Wt Pieces ot toitvdv*-]^^ or wot Pieces endued VJith xh?A particii'ar detcrnavate de- gree of Cinvity orRcimdyiejs : So the ivdividnalCoii'- fcioitjriefs ih-dt I find in n\y felt at any particular moment of Time, (fuppoiingit to be a Quality inhering in a Syftem oi Matter,) muft be made up, though not indeed ot a Number of the very, fameCovJcioiifnelfes, yet of fuch Powers as are as. much of the fame Kivi with that JSJumC] icd Con- fciovfjiefsj 2is Arches of Circles 'dvt of the fame kind with the whole circular Circiwference ^ ox^flecesof Surfaces fpherically and coyicivtrically convex, are ot the fame kind with the whole Spherical Surface compofed ol: them all : That is, it muft be made up of Different ConfcioufnefTes indeed, but ftiii Confcioifneffes only, and not Motions or Figures or any thing elfe ^ any more than the Roundncf of a Circle can be made up oijiraight Lines^ or of C-j-^ lours, or Sounds, or any thing elfe befides lieces of circular Roundnefs ; or than the Surface of a Sphere^ can be made up of any thing elfe than little Surfaces having every ojie of them the very fams fpherical and concentrick convexity -, or than an Ea;- tcndedov Solid Swh^mict, can be made up of any other Ingiedients, than fuch as are Themfelves Pieces or Extended or Solid Suhftance. 'Tis by no means true, vv^hich you affirm, that Roundnefs is a new ^lality, of a diferent Kind or Species from paf. <^. all the component ^lalities coyfidered together-^ or ^ ^ ' that it may be the Refiilt or Cojnpofition of ^lalities void of Roundnefs ', Since it cannot be aflirmed of any pait of the Arch of a Circle, that it is whol- ly void of Circularity ^ as a Jlraight Lijie is : And in like manner, 'tis by no means poifi- ble, that Confcionfnefs ?nay refilt from fuch ^ta- lities^ ^'^• j> J49 ) Uties, ai fiigly confidevel are void of [all kind ot 1 Covjciovfvpfs-^ as Mot' on ov Figure is. Nay further : Every Pji t of the Circumference of a Cnrle, is not only not v?holly void of Round-nefs^ but has re?.lly as much Roundnefi orGnvity fas much in Degiee^ though not fo much of it in ^mi7:t'ty,) as the rrhole Circle it felf has •, For the fame Reafon as ovc Circle has as much Roundwjs, as twejity ^ or 071^ inch cube of boiling Water, as jmich Heat [in Degree] as twenty -^ or one foot fqiune of a white Surface, as much irhitenefs as tjvcnty : And tjierefore Clnfcioufnefs in like manner, it it was a (JHwlity anfwcring to, or that could be compared with, the Roundnefs of a Circle ^ muft coniift of Parts, every one of which would have as much Conjciovfnefs Tin Degree] as the Whole. prom the fame Priiiciples may tafily be fliown xht Abfutdity of all the reft that you have advanced, upon your favourite Inftance of ROUNDNESS. You fay that the Argument drawn from Con- fcioufneis's not being made up of (evcral Gon- fcioufnelTes, concludes no more againfl: the poln- bili.ty of Its refdingin aS3^ftem of Matter-, than the like Argument would conchde agaiufi the pfji- ptge 25. lility of the Exijlejice of Roundnefs in Body -, which 710 more conjijis of fever al Roundjicffes, than Thinking or Confciovfnefs does of feyeral Confcionfncjfes ^ and is as fpecifica'dy diferevt from other Figures, as Con- fcioifntfs is froTti a circular Motion. Kut I think I have Ihown, that the Inftances are not alike ; and that Roundnefs does not confift of CXualities/o different from P^oundwf, as )''ou fiippofe Covfci- oufnefs to be made up of Qiialities different from Covfcioufnefs-^ that is, that the Roundnefs of the K 3 whol^ ( MO ) irhole CirctnnfereTice of a Circle, is not/ofpecifically different from the Convexity of the little Arches, of which it confifts 5 or the Roimdnef of a whole Globe ^ from the little fpherically and concentrically convex pieces of Sw faces, of which it is compofed •, as Con- fcioufvefs is from a circular Motion, or from Motion in a Square or any Motion at all or any other, thing whatever that is wholly void, of Confc'ioiifnefs. For Komidnefs can confift of nothing but Pieces of Romdjiefs, that differ from it fyecifcally only in the very loweft Senfe of the woid-fpecificaliy-^ or ra- ther they do not differ from it at all fpecifically, but in Magnitude only, as the Part ixom the Jfhole •, it being hardly good Senfe, to fay that the Num- l>er Twenty d'l^exbfpecifcally from the Number Ten ^ or that 360 degrees, or 60 degrees, differ fpecifi- cally from 20 degrees or from 20 feconds, or from any ether part of One and the Same Arch ^ Every p<3!;t of which, has necefuirily (as I before faidj juft as much Roundnefs or Curvity j in Degree,] as the whole Arch or rphole Circle it felf has: But Thinking, if it be made up of Q\m\ities utterly void of Thought, as Motions, Figures, and the like ^ niufl confift of Qualities generically different from it felf, in the higheft Senfe of the word generically\, they being under no common genus, and having no Similitude, nothing common one with another in their Ideas -, and confequently cannot with any Senfe be compared at all one with another, or be compounded one of another ; any more than 0>- cles and freight lines,cv Colours and Somids, Num" hers and Tajis, Figures arid Motions, or any things whofe Ideas have nothing common or alike be- twixt them. pftgs 26. Again : You allege in behalf of Roiind7iefs as well ai Jhijikijfg, that 'tisfofarfroj?! being as certain a.y an ( 'r« ) AH Aiithmet'icd Dcmovjlrat'inn, that fitch a particular Power is a Ifbole bigger than all its IWts ^ that 'tis an Ayithm''tical Demoiijivation^ thatfuch a particular Power as Roundnefs fi, is hut jufi equal to all the Parts of which that Romdnefs conjifts. For what more goes to the Compoftion of Roiwdnefs^ than the CovjunBion of fever al Particles not pigly endued with Roundnefs ^ Jfid what more goes to the Power of Thinking, than the CovjunBion of feveral Pavticlesnot €ach endued with ThiiMng^ But here alfo your CompariTon is nothing to the Piirpofe. For, when you ask, what more goes to the Compoftion of Roundnefs, than the ConjunSion of fcv.'ral Parti- cles not fngly endued with Ronndncf / if by not fngly endued with Roundnfs^ you mean not fngly endued with [the fame whole] Roundnefs • then your Alfertion is no more than this, that the Parts of Roundjtefs are not a Number oi tlie fame Wholes \ or that the feveral Pieces of the Circumference of a Circle, are not fo many Whole [Same] Circum- ferences: And then I anfv/er, neither would the Paits of Thinking fif it inhered in a Syftem of Matter/ be fo many Whole [the Same J Thoughts . But if you mean, that a Round Figure is a Com- pofition of particles not fngly endued with [any Part of] Roundnefs any | Curvityl at a//-, then your alfertion is direftly falfe : And fuch a Round- ftefs, would be a Whole bigger than all its Parts •.. juft as I faid Confcioufnefs would be, if it was made up of Motions or any other Qiialities void of Confcioufnefs. If you imagined ThinVivg to be made up of innumerable different Confcioufneffes^ as the Roundnefs of the Circumferejice of a Circle is made up of innumerable convex Arches, which are Pieces of Roundnefs-, then indeed, and then only, jgut Comparifon would be good : But to K 4 fuppofa ( lyl ) fuppolfi Ihivhhg made up of PoWjCrs vtteyjy voU of Cojifcmifvi'fs, is like fuppcliiig the Circiimjeyenc& of a Ciide to be made up cf jlya'i^ht lines iitteily void of co7wexity •, (or rather lifce fijppofing it to be mafie up of Sonjidsov Coloins^ or whatever clfe ran be imagined even fiill more remote from the Idea of Roimiihfs:) And This is evidently making a If hole bigger than Allits Parts^ that is, containing fomcthing different from, fomething over and above, fcmethirg more than All its Parts taken together i nay, fuch a Whole, the Sum of whofe parts neither make up the Whole ^t felf, ncr any Part of it: Which is a p]aii> Contradiction. It is evident, that no Whoh can pcilibly differ frcm All its Paits in any thing elfe, but only in the Abftradt Name, the mere external Denomination of its being a jrhole ^ which is nothing at all in the Thing it feU, but merely a manner of Conception, a Conjundion of Ideas in the Imagination of the Perfon that beholds or thinks upon it. Thinking, if it was the Qi ality of a Syflem of Matter, that is, the Sum or Whole of the Pcwers of its Parts j muft difrerfrom the diftinsS Powers of thofe Parts, no otherwife than as the Idea ct the Koundnefs cf a Circle differs froni the Idea oi the Roundnefs of Uvo Semithcles (or of foW ^ladraiiU) joined to- gt'ther •, or as the Idea of Trrice Six, differs from the Idea of the Number l\velve. If therefore TJjivUvg was, as you fnppofe, a Compofition or Refult cf feveral Pcwers •, and thofe Powers fuch, as were Themfelves utterly void of Confcioufmfs •, Tbinliivg would be either a mere oiitrpard Dennmi- fiation, and nothing at all really in the Thinking Subl^ance it fclf; jufl as a Dozen is only a mere |s^3me, and nothii:'g at all differing really in the ' thing C in ) thing it felf from Twelve Umts-^ Which is what 3^ou will not affirm : Or elfe it muft unavoidably be a Whole bigger than Jll its Parts-, that is, containing y^ll its Parts^ and Tlmkijig befides : Juft as the Curve Cinvmferetjce of a Circle would contain 7?iore of curvity in it than All its Parts takeji together, if it 'could be compofed of Lines that had none of them fingly any Curvity at ail-, or a Cube would be bigger than Ml its Parts, if it were made up of Parts that had none of them lingly any Magnitude at all. '[It upon this you wiU for fake your firft In- flance, .and, feeking fliil for new Similitudes, allege that a Square Figure ('fuppofej may confift of Parts, that are nore of them iingly endued with any thing like Squarenefs: I anfwer, that the Squarenefs oi the Figure of a Body, is a mere external Dencviination, a mere relative cojtiparivg to- gether in the Imagination the Bounds of a Suiface, the Situation of four firaight lines with refpeci one to another ; ,and has not properly any real Ex- iftence in Things themfelves, fo as Confcioiifnefs is acknowledged to have in the Thinking Sub- ftance. The like may be faid concerning all o- ther Qiialities, whofe Eflence confifts merely in the relative comparing the fituation or other RefpeBs of the Pai ts of a tody one torvards another : Such kind of Qualities having really no proper Nu- jaerical Exiflencc, fave only in the Idea. And Roundnefs it feif, being confidered in the fame manner, might this way likerrife ?iffoYd a juft An- fwer to ycur Argument drawn from thence.] Laftly, You affirm that Senjation /V in the Paits P-i;e 3J»-" oj an Animal, as Roumhcfs is in the Pai ts which cowpol} a Round Body : Each Part has as much of ^evfation. pi^ly cc^ihdcred, as ea( h pai t of a Rnun4 ■ ' ■ Body ( 154 ) ^^^3* ^^^ Pf ^'^""^w^y* i ^>J^ JJ'^^w the Parts are duly difpofed, vfhole Thvtkmg is pe; formed, as whole Roufidvefs exij}s, by the CovjiivBiun of Parts. But from what hasbeen already faid, I prefume it is evident enough, that Senfelefs Figure or Motion cannot be fo a Part of Senfatioji or a Piece of a Thought, as a Semicircle or ^ladrant is a Viece of a Circle. To affirm that it can ^ viz. that Figure or Motion wholly void of Sevfe, can be/> a Part of Sevfation \ is plainly (as I have before fhown) the very fame Thing, as if 3'-ou llioiild affirm that a Line wholly void of Curvity, could htfo a piece of the Circumference of a Circle, as the ^rch of a ^adrant is •, or that fomething that has na Soli- dity and no jixtenfwn, might yet be a Conftituent Part of an Extended and of a Solid Subftance. I have fhown that no part of the Circumfe- rence of a Circle, is wholly void of Roundnefs. If therefore Sevfation is ^according to 3^our Af- lertion) in the Parts of an Jnimal, as Roundnefs is in the Parts that compofe a Round Body ; and each par has as much of Senfation, fingly conjidered, as each part of a Round Body has of Roundnefs ^ It will follow, not (as you intended/ that Seifation can arife from a Conjundtion of Particles utterly void of Senfe •, (for the circumference of a Circle cannot be made by a Conjunction of Lines, or the Super- ficies of a Sphere by a Conjunflion of Surfaces, ut- terly void of Curvity :) but, on the contrary, it will follow that fome degree of Sejfation is really in every part of the Animal, fingly confidered ; as fome degree of Curvity is necefTarily in every part of the circumference of a Circle, or of the Surface of a Sphere. And f) you run unavoidably page 20. i^'^tio that confeffedly ahfiird Notion, that there are as many dijlind Coifcioufjiejfes, as there are Par- t'lilcs ( 'jr ) tides of Matter, of which the Thinking Syjlem coyijijls. I am afraid our Readers are fufficiently tired with ROUNDNESS. The other Inftance you allege, to prove that a Quality or Power inhering in a Syftem of Matter, need-: not be the Refalt of Powers or Qualities of thefawe Khidy reliding in the Parts of the Syftem ^ are ftill lefs to your purpofe. For it is very evident concerning Thofe and All other polTible Inftances, that they never arc nor can be any thing elfe, but the Sums of Powers or Qualities of the fame particular imform Khid with the Whole, when that "Whole is Simple and Hojnogcveous •, or of the fame General Kind with it, when it is Complex and Heterogeneous. Which fince you acknowledge cannot be the Cafe of Thinkings it will follow that Thinking cannot be a Power or Qiiality refiding in a Syftem of Matter. The Tower of a Clock to ftiow the Hour of the Day, is not indeed a Refult from the like individual Pomers reSiding in the feveral Parts-, any more than the Number a Thoiifajid^ is the Refult of a Compofition of Thoufvids ^ or Any If hole, a Com- pofition of a Multitude of the faine Whole : But, as the Number a Thoufand is the Sum of a great many Nimhers, but cannot with any Senfe be imagined to be a Comjpofition nf Sounds or Colours-^ fr.) the Numerical Power of a Clock, being it felf nothing but Motion and figvre, cannot be thi Refult of anv other Powers in the Parts, butfuch as are themfelves fingly of the fame Kitid, in the roanner before explained ^ namely. Motions and Figures. And in like manner my piefnt Nmneyical Cojfcicufiiefs, if it were at all a Qialit}- inhering • " in yage 15. C 15/5 ) in a Syftem of Matter 5 though it need not in- deed be the Sum of a Multitude of the like ifidi- vidiial Thoughts, inhering in the feveral diftintt Parts of the Syftem •, yet it muft be the Sum of Siiih Powers in the Parts, as would themfelves iingly be of thefajne Khidj namely Co7ifcmifiiejfes or Thoughts: It being equally, and for the very fame reafon, impolfible that my Coufcioufmifs fliould be the Refult of fuch Powers in the Parts of my Brain, as arc totogenere different from Thivkkg, and have nothing in their Ideas com- mon with it or alike to it :, (fuch as are Figure and Motioji, and all other Powers which are void of Confcioufnefs •,) as that the fore-mentioned Number a TbojifanJ, fliould be a Coinpofition of Sounds or Colours, or of any thing elfe but Nuin-^ hers. The Tower of a Mvjical hijlrumevt to produce Har- viomom Soujids, is not indeed a Refilt from the like i^tdividual PoTpersreHdrng in the feveral Parts of the Inftrument ;, any more than the Circumfe- rence of a Circle is made up of a Number of the like whole CirciimfereyKes : But, as the Circumferewe cj a Circle is the Sum of a Multitude of convex jirches of like On vity, but cannot be an Aggregate of Straight Lines or of Cubic Bodies or of Arches of imlike Cmvity-j So the Harmon) produced by a Mufical Inftrument, being it felf, in the Mind that perceives it, nothing out Sound ', and, in the Inftrument, and in the Air, and in the Organs of Senfation, nothing but a Motion of Parts ^ can- not be the Refult or Compofition of any other Powers, but what are themfelves fingly of the fame kind in the feveral Subjeds refpedively ^ namely, in the Mind that perceives them, Sounds iikewife j and, in the Inftrujnent it felf, and in the ( M7 ) the Air, and in the Organs oi' Senfation, Motion of the Parts. And in like manner Covjciojifnefs, if it were a Power inhering in a Syftem of Matter, could ndt be the Refult of any other Powers in the Parts, hut. fome forts of Cojifciovfvefs -, for the very fame realbn ?.s the Ckcmnferewe of a Circle cannot (as was before faidj be an Aggregate of ftrajgbt Lines, or of Cubic Bodies -, nor an Harmo- viom Soimd a Composition of Coloursj or of any thing elfe befide Sounds. i:he Power of the Eye to See, is nothing elfe but P^*^. M. inch a Power, as is in the Obje^ Glajfes of Tele- '^ ^^''^^ fcopes, oiTrafmittivg and RefraBijig Rays of Light, fo as to paint the Image of the Object in the bot- tom of the Eye. And This is evidently nothing but the Sum of Powers of the fame Kind, namely Powers of Travf?nittivg and RefvaBivg of Rays, re- iiding diflindly in the leveral Parts of the Eye or of the Glafs. Every Part of the Eye, Travfmits and RefraBs Rays ; and thofe Rays pamt feveral Parts of the Image : And the ff 'hole Image, differs no otherwife from all its Parts -, nor That which you call the Numerical Power of the Jf^hole Eye, from Xhtfivgle Powers of all its Parts, than the Idea of apczen differs from the Idea of Twelve Units : Which, if it be as great a Difference, as is be- tween the Idea of Covfcioifnefs and the Idea of a Circular or avy other Motion, I will confefs I have/'-^i- 2$. loft my Underftanding. But there is if ill a further peculiar unhappinefs in your choofirg to inftance in the Power of the Eye to contribute to the Aci of feeing, as a Numerical Power ofaSy/lem of Matter, that does not inhere in the Parts of that Syftem -, and in your affirming, that upon dividing or varying the leaf} part of the p^i. H- Eye, the Power of covtributiug towards the Ati ofVi- fcn ( lys ) fm h entirely at an End.fov fo far is this from being' true, (excepting only accideiitally upon account of the Softneis and Fluidity of the Matter of the Eye,) that on the contrary, not only^i^^r^' Paito{ the Eye (as I new faid) Travfmits and RefraBs Rays^ in order to paint at the bottom the feveral Parts of the Image of the Obje<3: ^ (and the Power of the TFhole hye,is nothing more than the Sum of thofe Tranjvnjfiom and RefraBions -.) but moreover even every Part of the Eye has the fame Power as the J-Hjole , (differing only in Degree,) of painting at the bottom the W^hole Image of the Object. For, as each Half of a broken Objed Glafs of a Telefcope, or any Piece of it that retains the polifh on both Surfaces, will reprefent diftindly the Whole Ob- ject, only with lefs Brightnefs and Luminoufnefs than the whole Glafs would do ^ So each part of the Eye, paints every part of the whole Objeft : And, if half of the Eye, or almoft the Whole Eye be covered, fo that you look only through a Pin- hole placed on the right fide or on the left fide or upon the middle of the Pupil-, flill the whole Objed: is feen diftinftly, even by that very fmall part of the E)^e •, And confequently the Power of the Eye is the fame both in the Whole, and in every Part. And the fame that has been faid concerning thefe feveral Inftances you chofe to infifl upon,may with very little variation be faid likewife con- cerning all other Powers whatfoever that do or can refide in any Syftem of Matter •, The right expli- cation of the nature of which Powers, fhows even your own Inftances to be fo many unanfwerable Arguments againfl: the Affertion you brought them to fupport. This-, ( IT9 ) This, I prefame, may be fufficient to prove a* gainft you in the general, that Every Power or Quality refiding in any Syftem of Matter, muft ot Necelfity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the fame Khid, reiiding dillindly in the feveral Parts of the Syftem : And confequently, that Whatever Power is rot an Aggregate of fuch Powers i as you confeis Covfdoifnefs or Thhikivg is not ; cannot be at all a Power or Quality of Matter. Not without fome unwillingnefs you feem at laft to determin in particular what Sort of Gene- rical Power in Matter, 3''ou imagine T/?2«fcz\«[ to be a Numerical Mode ot. You fippofe Coftfcioifnefs top.tg. 19. he a Mode of Amotion : You fpeakof Thought disaP'^i- ^^' Impedes of Mct'ion : And you conceive it a proper ExprelTion, to mention a certain Species of Moti- pag. 26. on, called Thinkivg. You defire indeed it may nothe imputed to you as your Op}mo7i, fince you ojily take the Liberty to Siip-P^&- ^9' pofe it. But This will not ferve you for an Evafion, when theAbfurditycf the Notion is proved upon 3"ou. For you declare it as your pofitiveOpz7/fo«, that Human Covfdoifnefs or Thinking is a Mode of Some Generical Power in Matter. What that Gene- pJg- 2 2. rical Power is, you will not pofitively determine ^ But you Svppofe it to be Motion. Now I prefume you Svppofe That which you judge the moft pro- bable, and which you think will beft ferve your purpofe in explaining the Nature of Thinking. I Ihall prove prefently, that Nothing can be more abfurd, than to Suppofe Thinking to be a Mode of M'-.tion. The fame Arguments will prove nolefs ftrongly, that it is not polTible for Thinking to be a Modi C i6a ) Mode of Tigiire^ or of any other hiown Property of Matter •, And alfo that it is not polTible for it to be a Mode ot any mihiown Power of Matter, which in the general is void of Thhikmg-^ Bccaiife every jmhiown Power which isvoidof Thinldvg^ is as dif- ferent from Jhivhng^ as Motion it felf is,or Figure, or any other known Power ^for the fame reafon that a Smell or a Tafie^ or any other hiown or unknown Quality which is not a Colour, muft of Meceliity be as dirlerent from Blue or Scarlet, as the Sound of a Trumpet is. When therefore I have fhown the f:tg. 1 9. AbfurUity of your Suppojition, that Tl/niking is a Mode of Motion •, I Ihall likewife have ihownthe pag. 22. Abfurdity of your declared Opivicn, that Human Coifcioifnejs or Thinkhig is a Mode of Some Qeneri- cal Power in Matter. Kow to prove the Abfnrdity of Suppoftng Con- fciovfnefs to be a Mode of Mlotion^ I ofter the fol- lowing Arguments. I. Every Mode of any Fower or ^tality, is no- thing elfe hut! hat Foweror ^tality of which it is a Mode, underftood with fome particular Limita- tion ; that is to fay, 'tis noticing but a pai ticrtlar Jnjiance of that general Fewer or ^lality ^ nothing but the ^^w^raZ Poir^y or .^iiaVity, confidered under this or that particular Modification. Blue and Red, and all other Modes oi Colour, are nothing but fe- veral particular Colours ^ and can contain nothing in their Idea,beyond the Genus 0^ Colour. Acute and Grave, and all other Modes of Sound, are nothing but feveral particular Sounds -, and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the Qenus of Sound. ' Circular and Triangular, and all otlier Modes of Figure, are nothing but feveral particular Figures; and can contain nothing in tlieir Idea, beyond the Germs oi Figure. In like manner All Modes ot Motion, are nothing elfe but 7}ierely particular Mo' C i6i ) Aloilons ^ and cannot contain ?.ny thiug in their Idea, beyond the Genus of Motion. Now if Simple Ideas be the Foundation of all our Knowledge ^ and clear and diJlinB Feycepi'ion oi the Agreement or Difagreemeyit ot thole Ideas, be thebeft and great- eft Criterion of Truth, that our Faculties inable us to attain to; then it is as evident as any Trnth in the World, that Confciovfnefs cannot pollibly be a Mode of. Motion. For I have as dear mid di^ jlinB a Perceptions that the Idea of C ovfcioiifnefs contains fomething initbefides and beyond the Genus of Amotion, as I have that it contains fome- thing in it beyond the Ge^ms of Figure. The Idea of Confcioufnefs is as totally and generically difte-^ rent from the Idea of a Circular Motion ot an Ellip- tical Motion or any other Mods cf Motion whatfo* ever, as it is from the Idea o^ a Circle or a Culje or any other Mode of Figure whatfoever. I have there- fore exadtly the fame intuitive certainty, that Con- fcioufnefe cannot be a Mode of Motion., as I have that a Circle or a Cube is not a Thought, or that an Acute Sound is not a Fur pie Colour, or that any one thing in the World is not another, whofe i- dea is the remoteft and moft 'different from it, that can be imagined. To fuppofe Confcioufnefs to be a Mode of Motion, is really a greater Ab-*' furdity, (if poflible) than it would be to fuppofe Roundnefs to be a Property of a Square 5 Becaule the Idea of Local Motion and the Idea of Thinking, having no common Genus, nothing wherein they* agree or can be compared together^ are evident- ly ?7zoye different one from another, than tlie Ideas of any two plain Figures can be, which h^ve a com- mon Genus. And your Queftion, l^hat more goes p.t^.i^, to t/;^ Pojp^r 0/ Thinking, than the ConjimBion of feveralPai ticks not each eiiduedv^ith That Species of L Motr ( t61 ) Motion called Thinking ? Is truly more ridj'ca- lous, than if a Man Should afk, Jfhat more goes to the makivg up of a Scarlet Colour, than the Con- jmiBioTi of feveral particles not each ettdiied with "That Species of Sound, called Scarlet ? Becaufe no two Sen- iible Qualities are in their Ideas fo different one from another, as the Idea, of Cofifcmifnefs is from the Idea of Local Motion. Local Motio7i can have no other effe£t upon any Syftcm of Matter, than only producing in it a dif- ferent ynxt^po/F^zowot Parts. To which to afcribe Thinking, MrZoc^himfelf, who had no preju- dice againftthe PofTibility of Matter's Thinkii g, acknowledges it is very Abfurd. Tofuppofe, faith Book IV. he, the Eternal thiTikivg Being [or any finite think- ch. 10. §. ing Being"! to be nothiitg elfe but a Cojnpofition ofPar- *^' tides of Matter^ each whereof is incogitative-^ is to af- cribe all the Ififdom and Knowledge of that EtervaS Being [or the Wifdom and Knowledge and all the Powers of the Finite thinking Being! only to the jiixta poftion of Parts. Than which nothing can be more abfurd. For vnthinhfig Particles of Matter, however put together, can have tiothing thereby ad- ded to them ^ hut (^^new relation ofPofition, which his imp ojjible fJmidd give 'thought and Knowledge to them. 2. If "Thinking was any Mode or Species of Mo- tion, it would follow that Ml Motion would be fome degree or kindoi Thinhing. For Motion, in the thing Moved, excepting only the difference of de- grees of its Swiftnefs or Slownefs, is a Si7mlar ^la- lity, and has no variety in it : All its different Determinations, or thofe v/hich you call its Modes and Species, being nothing really in the Body it felf that is moved •, but mere Abjirati Notions or ex- ternal Denominations, conceived, cnly in our Imagina- tion, Fory moving with one Deterinination, or with tvith another-, from North to South, ot ftoiti South to North ^ is mei ely relative, and not real- ly a different thing in the Body mof ed j that one of thofe Motions Ihould be Cojifcionfnefs^ the other Hot. In like manner Circular Motmt, or Motion in any other higiire, is net any thing really and truly inhering in the Bod}'' it fcif, diiterent from Motion i n ajtraight Line. For the Determination of any Body that moves in a Circle, is nothing elfe, at any given Point of Time, but a Determination to tnove in a certain jlraigbt Line 5 and, at another given Point ot Time, to jnove in another fir aight Line •, and fo on : fo that there is no fuch thing as a circular Motion of any particle of Matter, coexi- ftent at once ;, but all Motion is, ftrictly and properly fpesking, a fimilar and uniform Qjiali- iy, viz. a Body's Going on according to its De- termination •, Which Determination is always in a ftraight Line; and caufes the Body to go on aflually in a ftraight Line, where it meets with iio Reliftance 5 and where it meets with Refi- ftance by Intervals, there to go on into new ftraight Lines fuccelFively, into which it is divert- ed by fuch Refiftance; and, v/hereit meets with continual Reliftance, there to go on in a Curve Line, into which it is continually diverted : And * See Bfi-*" every fuch curvilinear Motion, whether circular or °f ^°P of a7iy other Species whafoever, is but the Idea of a Jy^^^ 5^^^ Number of Succeffive Motions of a Body, never mon on exiftent together ; a pure Ens Rationis, or Opera- Immorta- ration of the Mind -, which confidering PaftMo-l^^y °* ^^^ tion and Future, and rccolleding the irhole by n°Vn/ '^' the Memory and Fancy, calls ^ That irhole {owe- Dr Benf. times by one Denomination and fometimes hj^-^'^ Ser- another. How then can any of thofe Modes of Mo- ^^"'s l*"^ tion be the E§cient q^ Thought, or (according to ^.^yj-e.^di^" L 2 yours5. ( 1^4 ) your Sappofition) be themfelves Thought ; when they are evidently nothing but the E^fed and Pro- diiB of it, vix.. Ideas framed merely by the Imagi- nation and Memory ? And the fame that has been faid concerning the Modes of Motion oiafnigle Body^ may eaiiiy be ap- plied to the Modes of Motion of any Number of Bo- dies^ in any Syfiem or Compoftion whatlbever. It being very evident, that it the Progrejwn of 0ns Partide of Matter direBly in a Straight Line, be not Confciovfnefs or Thought ; the like Progrefjion of Twenty Particles at the fame time in Straight Lines, cannot be Co7{/cio7{/7/f/} neither : The Polition of thofe Lines with relpeft one to another, which determines the particular J^ode of Motion of the whole Svftem,being merely imaginary, rclative,^dXi6. comparative -, a figment only in the Mind or I- magination, and not any thing really exifting in the Bodies themfelves, at any one and the fame MamentofTime. In like manner the Impulfe alfo, or Beating of one particle of Matter againf another, is a thing ii- milar and in all C?ies alike -, differing in nothing, but in the Degrees or Quantity of the Force : And therefore muft always and in all Cafes, if ever in Any Cafe atall,befome Degree of Thought. From whence it would follow, that there niufl be as many feveral incoherent Confcioifneffes, as there are Particles of the Brain or Spirits or of any o- ther Matter in any Syftem, that ever dalli one againfl another : Which is v/hat you are not wil- ling to affirm. g. If Confcioifnefs were a Mode ox Species of Mo- tion ', then Motion would be the 7nore generical Power ; containing Thinking under it, as (in the Language of Logicians) the Genus does the Spe- cies. But on the contrary 'tis evident (as I before ob- C i<5y ) obferved) that Thiftkivg (though fimple and not compounded of Parts,) is, in /he Senfe we are now fpeaking of, a Power infinitely more generic al than eitlieir Aiotlon or Figure or any other Power of Matter •, and confequently cannot be a Mode or 5;;i?cz>5ofanv of them. There are as many Ideas ofUgiii e,as there are Figures -. and as many Ideas of Motiov^ as there are Modes of Motion ^ and as many Ideas of other things, as there are other things in the World, that can be thought upon: And all thcle Ideas, are Modes and Sorts or Kinds of Thinking, Now if Thinking is a Power more va- rious, more extenfive, more gencrical, than /Jfo- tio)i-^ 'tis manifcft it cannot be a Aiode or Species of Motion, as Roundnefs is a illoJ^ or Species of Figure. If Thivkivg is a Power y/ior^ genericaJ, than Figure or Motion ox any other Pow'^'r of Mat- ter :, if it is a Power as univerfal, as all things taken together, that can be thought upon •, 'tis certainly a ^^7/:)7V^/ Power in the high c^ degree-. And confequently, (if it be at all a Pender of Mat- ter,) it will oblige you to run into the Abfurdity 3^ou declare you would avoid. For, by your own Confcffion, you would grant readily^ that, wasCoyi-pag, 2c, fcioufnefs a generical Power like Figure an I Mo- tion (like Figure and Motion it is not, but in- finitely more generical than either of them,) it would be likewife the Sinn and Refult of the Coyifci- ovfnefles of the fever al Parts •, and fo there would he as many difinB Confciouf^iejfes, as there are Particles of Muter, of which the Syjlejn confijls -^ irhich you do allow to be very Abfurd. As Figure is the Genus of all the Species of Figure fo the Idea of Figure is the Genus of all the Ideas of all the Species of Figures: And fo the Idea of Mo- tjo7i, is the Gejtus of all the Ideas of all the Species of L 5 Motions-'^ ( i66 ) MoUors ^ and the Idea of Colour, is the Gemis of the Ideas of all the Species of Colours •, and the' Idea of Somid, is the Gcmis of the Ideas of all the Specie^ of Soiivds •, and tYiQ Idea of an Ammal^ is the Genus of the Ideas of all the Spcdes of Ammads. The Ge- neral Ideas of Figure, Alction, Colour ^ Souvd, Jiii- mal, &c. are^f^j-rnVc?/ Powers of the Mind-, And Thhikijig is the Gcr.us gerier alius o^ all thofePowers^ With what Senfe then can it be faid to be one of the lender Species, or a Numerical Mode of One of thofe Powers? 4, If it was the Motion of the parts of a Cor- poreal Syftem, on which its Thinking depends v all the Thoughts There, vivfl he unavoidably accidental and limited ^ becaufe each one of the Pm tides, that hy Motion caufe Thought, being in itfelf without any jI bought^ cannot regulate its own Motions; mmh lefs he regulated by the Thought of the Whole ; fnce that Thovght of the Whole, is not the Caufe of Motion, (for then it miifl be antecedent to it, and fo without it,) but the Covfeqimtce of it : JThereby Freedojn^ Power, Choice, and all rational and wife thinking or aUing, will be quite taken away : So that fuch a think- ing Beings would be no better nor wifer, than pure blind Matter ^ fnce to refolve all into the accidental migiiided Motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on iinguided Motions of blind Matter, . is the fame thing : Not to mention the narrownefs of fuch Thoughts and Knowledge, that mufl depend on the Motion of fuch parts. But there needs no enumera- tion of any more Ahfurdities and hnpojibilities in this Hypothefis, (however full of them it be,) than That pefore-mejitioned; fnce, let this thinking Syfiem be All or a Part of the Matter of tU Univerfe, it is impofible that any one Particle flwidd either know its cs^r, or the Motion of any other Particle j or tk$ '" ■ ' ' ' P%le w ( '67 ) ^^Qle htow the J'ylotion of every pai tlcutar •, an.Jfo regulate its own TJjoiights or Motions, or indeed havs any Thought refitUing j'rotn fnch Motion. This Ar- gument, is Mr Locks owns Words, (Boole IV. ch. JO. SeU. 17.) to which I cannot but fuppofe you will give feme Deference. 5 . If Thinking was a Mode or Species of Motion ^ then in like manner as it is a proper ExprelHon to fa}'', that Circu'arity is one Species of Figu'.^ and Sqnavenefs a fecond, and Cubicalnefs a third, and Elliptic abiejs a fourth •, fo it would be proper alio to lay, that Circular Motion is one Species ot Mo- tion, and Motion in a Square a fecoud, and Mo- tion in an EUipJis a third, and ThhMng or Confci- oufnefs a fourth •, and, I appeal to the common Senfe of all Mankind, whether I may not add with exadly the fame reafon, that a Tree is a fifth, and a Syllogifm a fixthj and Ferfonality a feventh, &c. [If to this you will reply, that you do not mean as you fay, that any particular Motion is it felf Thought, but that Thought may be the Refult of fome particular Motion •, I anfwer in the words of Mr Bohbs, that ^ no Refult of Motion can ^ v &«**• ever be any thing elfe but mere Motion ftill : „}ij!i'gene- fWith a different Juxta-pofition of Parts perhaps •, r.it pnter of which before, pag. 29.) And confequently all ^i«yn. the fore-going Arguments hold equally good, a- L^^''*=- . gainft one Notion as againft the other.] ^* '' Some of thefe Abfurditiesare fb very grofs, and 5^et fuch obvious Confequences of your Notion, that it can hardly be imagined you fhould have over-looked them. And indeed you do at laft indeavour to obviate them in a very effcciual man- per-. In fuch a manner, by which you may, h 4 when- i:iZS 6c. whenever you plcafe, anfwer all the Arguments upon any Queftion in the World ^ and remove out of your way, not only any Demonfnatiov^ but even Ivtuhive K7W'^li'Jge it felf. You tell me, ■pr,;'e ^9. ^hat I imagine Cojifdonfnefs to be Sojncthhig dfs them Trhat you contcv'd'it is ^ ' That the Term ofCon- fag. 60. fcioufiiefsjlavds with You, in another Serfc than fii' 59. with Me : That with You, it signifies a Nu- merical Fower^ avjwerhig to Romuh^efs in cf. Body^ or to a A'lotioji peciijiarto aSyfiern of Matter ^ but that with Me, it relates to a Omnevd 'or Idea of my own framivg. Now to This I reply in the Words of Mr Locli ^ (Book 4. ch, 1. 5^c7. 4.) A Man infallibly kmrvs^ (TJfoGji as ever he has thejyi 471 his Mivdy that the Ideas he calk White and Round, are the very Ideas they are ^ and that they avQvot other Ideas^ which he calls Jled or Square. "S" ' • . I think I know infaliibly, alToon as ever I Jiave it in my Mhid, that the Id/a I call Confci- pif7iefs, Perception or Thinkings is the very Idea it is^ and that it is not another Idea, which I call circular Motion, or Elliptical Alction, or Motion in a Square^ or the Motion of. a Watch or of any other Alachine-. And I appeal to what every Man finds in his own Mind •, v/hether my Account of Co7t- fcioifnefs^ or yours which makes it to be merely ^ Mode of Motion^he the more Chiinerical Idea. Simple Ideas cannot be defined nor defcribed. When any Difpute is carried fo far, as to termi- nate in quefti-^ning the Idea itfdf-^ there is no- thing then left but to appeal to the Idea which pvery Man has in his ov/n Mind. If I affirm that thif Paper isUlntc^ and you will contend that it is ^?d \ we cannot confute one another by ^Arguments, but niufi: appeal to the Judgment of ': ■'■ '■■■■■■' ' :-:■■■- ^]^s C 1^9 ) ths World. If a Man will tell me, that by Scar- let 'Colour ht does not mean That Chimerical Idea which I frame in my own Mind and call by that >lame ^ but that He means thereby, only a certain Numerical Mode of Soimd^ I know not how he can be confuted, but by appealing to every Man's own Ideas. The Idea of Confcioufnefs which I have in my Mind, appears to Me an Idea, which I think I clearly and diftinftly perceive to be al- together as different from the Idea of any pojfible Niunei ical Mode of Figure or Motion^ as my Idea of Scarlet-Colour is different ffom my Idea of t/;e Sound of a Tj mnpet. If any other Perfbn thinks his Idea of Covftioifnefs, to be the fame with his Idea of a circular Motion or of any other numerical Mode of Moti'.n •. I conceive there is nothing more to be done, but to permit him to have the plea- fure of continuing to think fo, as long as he pleafes. The Sum is This. I affirm that Thinking, can- not pofTibly be a mere Mode of Motion ^ becaufe the Idea of Thinkiiig and the Idea of Motion or any of its Modes, have not the leafl likenefs or affinity between them. This, you fay, proves nothing ; becaufe My Idea of Thinking, is a mere Chimera ^ but Your Idea of it, is the fame as your Idea of fome Numerical Mode of Motion. I reply -, If this proves nothing, then neither can any Argument in the World ever prove any thing. For, Suppcfe the thing in difpute be, whether a Square is a Circle, or whether Bhenefs is aTaJie: I contend this cannot polTibly be, be- caufe my I Jea of a Square incUicics in it nothing of that Roundncfs which is my Idea of a Circle -, End my Idea of Bhenefs inchides in it nothing like That Senfation^ which is my Idea of a Tafte. May (. I/O ) May not another Perfon anfvver, that This proves nothing ? becaufe my Idea of a Square, or of Blnsnefs, is a mere Cliimera -, but His Idea of a Square, is the fame as his Idea of a round Figure ^ and his Idea of Bluenefs, the fame as his Idea of fome certain Tajfe. To conclude. In reviewing this whole Matter, I can hardly perfwade my felf, but that you have miftaken your own Argument. Some ingenious Perfons in the prefent Age have indeed undertaken to maintain, that God, by the immediate exercife of his Omnipotence, may make Matter Think ^ notwithftanding it be impoflible that Tbi7ik2ng fhould rcfult naturally, from any Compofition or Divifion of the original Properties of Matter. I fuppofe they meant, that to Matter difpoled in a certain Manner, and put into fome particular Modes of Motion, Omnipotence could Superadd the Power of Thhiking. I think the Argument drawn from the Divifibility of Matter, proves that Matter is not a Subjed capable of fuch a Su^ peraddition: And if it be not •, then recurring to the Divine Omnipotence for the making nut an Impoffibility, is not magnifying but dejlioyijtg the Power of God ^ as indeed all contradidlory Ap^ prehenfions concerning any of his Perfedions, are jeally and in event deftrudive of our whole No- tion of God ^ and have no other Eflfedt, than to give profane Men an occafion of fcoffing at Re- ligion. However, that aflertion had the appear- ance (tho' a very falfe one) of being founded in a certain modeft apprehenfion concerning the In- conceivable Extent of the Divine Power. But that any A^ode of Motion fhould be (not a previous difpofition or qualification, towards capacitating' Matter for the ^^itlition of fuch a Power ^ but that ( 17' ) that it fhould be) Thinkhtg it felf -^ when all the Matter fuppofedto be in that Motion, is acknow- ledged otherwife to be void of Thought : This is fuch an Extravagant Abfurdity, as ma}^ juftly raufe wonder how it ftiould ever enter into the Heart of any rational Man ^ efpecially in an Age, wherein Philofophical Knowledge has received fo ' coniiderable Improvements. Having thus particularly anfwered the Argu- ment wherein you placed your main Strength ^ It remains that I take notice of fome Incidents in your Refexiom, wherein I think you have either greatly mifreprefented Me, or given very difad- vantageous Reprefentations of your own Philo- fophy. In the Qiieftion, V^ ether a Syftem of Matter can have a Power of Thinking or an Individual Con- icion^nt^sfupev added to it, or jiuwirigfrom any Mo' dijication of that Syjlem ^ you faid, you underftood by a Fover of Thinking^ only ABml Thinking, and not a Capacity of Thinking. I replied, there was no need of making any fuch Diftindtion ; becaufe my Argument was of equal force, in whatever Senfe the Term Confciouf- ftefs was underftood •, whether to iignify the Ca^ pacity of Thinkijig^ or ABiial Thinking, or the Re- flex A6t of being Cojfcioiis that I Think, Upon this, you make a long Expoftulation, jfhat occafon I had for contending with you ahovt the pag, $. Senfe you fixed to the Terms. I did not contend much about it : But the Occafon of faying what I did, was, becaufe in all Qucftions, the greater Latitude of fgnifcation the Terms may be al- lowed to be underftood in, without making any Alteration C 172^ ) Alteration in the Strength of the Proof, the clearer and ftronger fuch Proof always is^ and the lefs perplexity, or room for quibbling, re- mains in the Queftion • it felf pag. 5. You ask j Have you 7Wt imderjiood me fw a Senfe that atifwered all the Ends and Purpojes of my ^rgih mevt ? My Argument was indeed conclufive in the Senfe you underftood me in : But I had no rcafon to approve of your confining me to that Senfe only, when the Argument was equally con- clufive in any other Senfe the Reader might hap- pen to underftand the Terms in. y>ng.i. You fay, y ou have taken but the fame Liberty \ allow to every other Reader. But, if I mi flake not, there is fome Difference between allowing the Reader to take the Term Confcioufnefs in which of the Three fore- mentioned Senfes he pleafes-, and allowing You to confine it to One of thofe Senfes, escluiix^e of the others. I affirmed that the Reader needs not trouble h'lm-^ felf with the Nicety of DifinBion between a Capacity of Thinkings aSiial Thi7!kirg^ and the Refieni A^ of Thinking ^ but may imderfland Confcioufnefs indiffe- rently in all or any of thefe Significations. 5. This Sentence, you think, contains one of the vicej} difiinBioyis that ever you met with ^ being as much as to fay, that the Reader need not underfland Confcioufnefs indifferently in any of the before-men- tioned Sigyiifications, and yet may imderjland it in-, differeiitly in any of thcfe Significations. But Where IS the Nicenefs (the Ridiculoufnefs I fuppofe you mean) of faying that the Reader 7nay take a Word in a Senfe, which yet he is not under a necejjity of taking it in, but 7?iay likewife take it in fome Other Senfe if he pleafes ? You ( n3 ) You add : For you cannot See^ hut that whoever h^ge 6. imierjiands Conjdovjnej's m any one of thofe Sigmfica- tiom, mnft ufe that nicety of DlfihiB'ion I complain of, whether he iviU or no ^ For by Reftraining Co7i- fcioiifiiefs to anj One of thofe Significatioits, he ne- cejfarily diftingiiifies That One from the other two : And that tuerefove you imifi needs ojpn.you cannot See the leaji reafon I had to blame you for a needle fs Di' JiinBion, when I allow you to imderjiand Cojifcioufaefs indifferently in three Significations, one of which you did ajlign as your jneaning or Idea of that word. But, if you plcafe to look once again, I fuppofe you yNiWhe able to See, that there is no abfohite Ne- cefTity for hiyn that itnderfiands Confcioufnefs in any One of thofe fore-mentioned Significations, to Re- ftrain it to That One Signification ^ as you defired to do. Laftly, You allege that the whole Difpute turns pitg.^Sc^. vpon the prefent DiJIin&ion of the Significations of the word Confciovfnefs; And to prove that it does fo, you cite a Sentence out of my Letter to Mr Dodwell, wherein the word Co^^/tfom cannot be un- derftood in any other Senfe, than to lignify adual Thinking. 'Tis true ^ in that Sentence the word was fo ufed •, And in the very fame Sentence it was alfo ufed Otherwife. Now, becaufe in that palTage which you made the Occafwn of our pre- fent Debate, I once ufed the word in fuch a man- ner, as that the Nature of the Thing accidentally confined it to that Signification ^ though in the more emphatical part of the very fame Sentence, it was ufed in a larger Senfe ^ Does this prove that the whole Difpiite now turns upon any Diftindtion of the Signification of that Word ? You might as well have faid, it proves the remoteft thing in the W^orld from our prefent Quefticn. The Sen- tence ( 174 ) fence it felf was This : "Tis phlv, iinlefs Matter ioere ejfentially Coyifcioiis, no SyJIe7n of it in ayiypojfible Cojnpojition or Divijion cajt be an Individual Covfciom JBeifig. My meaning was, that unlefs Matter were eflentially Ccnjliojis, that is, unlefs it were ellentially indued with aBiial Thinking •, it might be proved from its Divilibility , that no 8y- ftem of *it in any poffible Compofition or Divifion, could ever be an individual Co^T/cfoz/j Being, that is, could ever either :aBually Think or attain a Capaci- ty ofThinkifig. How does it follow now from hence, that becaufe in the former part of this Sentence, the word Confcious happens to fignify only a^iial Thinking ^ therefore in the O^ueflion, [Whether Cojifcioiifnefs can inhere in a Syjlem of Matter^ the word Co7ifcioufnefs may not be underftood at large, to fignify either [aBital Thinking or ^Capaci- ty ofTbinkiJig ? Between which, after all, there is no great Difference at the bottom. Upon the whole ^ why you fhould be difpleafed with me for allowing the Terms of the Queftion to be underftood in the greateft Latitude, and for endeavouring to prove more than you expefled, vi%. that no Syftem of Matter could either have aBiial Ihinking, or fo much as any Capacity of Thinking •, I could not imagine. And why you made fuch a Stir about a Uiftinftion, which did and ftill^ does appear to me to be very needlefs ^ I could conceive no other Caufe, but only that you might perplex the Queftion. V^&' 8. Thus I have given you the Reafon^ you Demand- ed, of my Condiid: in this Matter : I do not Demand of Toil, but leave it to your Difcretion, to choofe whether you will give any Reafon of yoiirs^ or no : For, (if you will give me leave to ufe your own Ui 8 Expreffion) / cayinot ajfipi a good one for you. You You afk y If the Soul or Frificiple of ThhihTig be pag. 73* Uvdlv'ided^ how can it think fuccejfvely^ divide^ ah' • Jlra^^ combine orampliate^ retain or revive Impveffi- onsin the Memory ? and how can it he capable^ partly or wholly to forget any thing ? And the Corporeity of theSoul,you think,is further proved experimental- ly, from our being tired with contemplating^ as much as with/w^7«^ and dancing •, from the Rea&ion of our Thoughts or of our Ideas and Words, mutually ex- citing each other •, and from the Forgetfulnefs of Children and Old People^ ui^on any caufe that difcoyn" pofes the Organ. To this I anfwer. The Reafon why the Soul or Principle of Thinking, though it felf Undivided, yet thinks fucceilively, divides, abftrafts, com- bines or ampliates, retains or revives Impreflions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets Things ; is becaufe The Whole Soul thinks fuccef- ^vely, divides, abftrads, combines or ampliates, retains or revives Impreffions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets things : And none of thefe Phenomena can be explained by the vari- ous Ads of the various Pat ts of a Bodily Organ alone. Our he'mgtired with Contemplation :, the mutual Rea^ion of our Ideas a7jd Words -^ ouv For get fidnefs that follows upon certain Defects or Difcojjipofures of the Brain, &c ^ do not prove that the Soul it felf is a Bodily Organ -, but only that it ABs upon, and is ABed vpcjiby, Bodily Organs-, and isalli- fted b}'' them, as Inftruments in its Operations. Experience (hows us, that the Sight is bettered by good Telefcopes, and the Hearing by Inftruments of conveying Sounds -, but not that thofe Inftru- ments therefore Hear or See : That all Sevfati- €7} C 17^ ) on is bettered by good Organs of Senfe ;' but not that the Organs themfelves are Sen-' fible : That Imagination diVid. Memory depend on the Brain •, But not that the Brain imagines or remembers. The Organs of the Senfes arc entirely diftindt from one another •, But the Thing which perceives by thofe different Organs, is One and the Same Thing-, one Thinking Being, which every Man calls Himfelf. And this One Thinking Being, has not fome Powers in fome Parts,and other Powers in other Parts ; fome Ani- ons in fome Parts, and other Adions in other Parts j But all its Powers, are the Powers of the Whole ^ and All its Actions, are the A6lions of the Whole.The "Whole Thinking Sabftance.Sees both the Whole Object, and every Part of it ^ The fame Whole Subftance Hears every Sound, Smells ever}'' Odour, Ta ft s every Sapour, and Feels every thing that Touches any Part of the Body. Every Imagination, every Volition, and every Thought is the Imagination, Will, and Thought, of that Whole Thinking Subftance, which I call I ?nyfdf. And if this One Subftance (which we ufually if ile the Soul or Miitd) has no Parts, that can A& fepa- rately ^ it ma}'' as well be conceived to have none, that can Exiji feparately ^ and fo, to be abfolute- ly Indivijible. I alledged that it is Ahfiird to annex Covjcioiifnefs to fo flux a Sub fiance as the Brain or Spirits ^ becaiife if fiich a Subjlance could be the Seat of that Confcioufnefs, by which a Man vol only revieynbers things done many Tears fnce, but alfo is Coyfcious that He himfelf^ the fame individual Being, wns the Doer of them \ it jpould follow that Confcioufnefs could he transferred fro?n one SubjeB to another :, that zV, that a ^lality could fuhfiji without inhering in any Sitbjeli at all, which all rational Men ( tBe()ucilion,'l3y z^ummg ?ly\ hnpofihle Hypotjie- is. But fuppciing it were pojilde, that xheMemG- ry in general of fuch or iuch an Actions having, been clone, might be preferred in the Manner you fuppofe ^ yet it is a manifeft Contradidion, that the Co7ifcioiif7iefs of its being done by AU^ by 7})y own Individual Self in particular, Ihould con^ tinue in me after my whole SuLftance is changed 5. unlefs CoTifciovfiiefi could be be transferred from one ^"ubject to another, in the abfurdeft Scnfe of thofe Words. For to fuppoie tiiat One Subftance iliould be Covfcious of an Adion's having been, done by it fell, which really was not done by It,, but by Another Subftance ^ is as plainly fuppo- iing an Individual Quality to be transferred from One Subject to another, in the moll abfnrd Senle^^. as 'tis plain that Confcionfnefs is a red ivdir-idud ^lality^ and different from bare genr.d Me- mory. It therefore you willanfwer, (which is the on- ly pcffible feem.ing Evafion in this Cafc,) that That which we call Covfciovfiiefs, is notafixt indi- vidiiahimnerical ^lality, like the numerical Figure or Motion of a folid Body ^ but a -fleetim transfer- ribU Mode or Fower, like the Round nefs or the Mode of Motion ot Circles upon the Face of a running Stream^ And that the Pdrfon may ftili be the fame, by a continued Superaddition ol the like Cojifcioifinfs-^ notwithfianding the Whole Sub- Jlartce be changed : Then I fay, you make, hidivi-* mat Ftrfonality to be a mere external imaginary Dc- 7io7m7iatio'}t^ and nothing at all in reality r Juft as a Hjip is called the fame Ship, after the \\ hole Subftynce is changed by frequent Repairs-, or a River is called the fajrie River, though the Water of it be every day new. The Name of the Ship, is the ikmey ( ^79 ) fame j tut the Ship it'fiJf, is not at all the fame? •, And the continued A^ajiie of the River fignifies Wa-*' tcr running in the fame Channel, but not at all thcfavie y'ater^So if a Man at forty Years of Age, has nothing of the fameSabOance in him, nei-* ther material nor immaterial, that he had at twenty •, he may be called the fame Ferjon^ hj a mere extenial imaghmry denomination ^ in fuch a Senfe as a Statue may be called thefame Statue^ af- ter its whole Subftance has been changed by piece- meal : But he cannot be really and truly the fame Perfon, unlefs thefame ijidividual mimericdl Confci- oifnefs can be transferred from one Subjedl to ano- ther. For, the continued Addition or exciting of a like Covfciovfnef in the new acquired parts, after the manner you fuppofe^is nothing but a De- ception and Delufion, under the Form of Memo- ry •, a making the Man to feem to himfelf to be Confciousof having done That, v/hich reall/ was not done «by Him, but by Another. And f ich a Confcioufnefs in a Man, whofe Subilance is v/holly changed, can no more make it Jufl: and E- quitable for fuch a Man to be punifhed for an Adi-* on done by another Subftance ; than the Ad- dition of the like Confcioufnefs 'by the Power of Godj to two or more new Created Men ^ or to any Number of Men now living, by giving a like Modification to the Motion of the Spirits in the Brain of each of them refpedively ; could make them All to be One and the fame individu- al Perfon. at the fame time that they rem.ain feveral and diftindt Perfons ^ or make it juft and reafonable for all and every one of them to be puniflied for one and the fnme individual A6ion, done by One only, or perhaps by None of them at all, M 2 Mr ( i8o ) Mr Lock hlmfelf, in the very place where hd* Contends that Covfcioiijvefs makes the Jcvne indivi- dual Ferfcm^ notwithftanding that the I/' hole Siib- Jlance be fuppofed to be changed ^ acknowledges e.\-presfly, {Book Il.ch. 2-j. Si?c?. 19.) that fuch a continuation of the/iw/£: Covfcioufjiefs in a fleeting Subftance, would be a repejeiiti7ig That to th& Mind to have beeji, ji-hich j eally vtver jvas •, a re- frefevtivg to Oyie intelleBiial Siihjlance m done by it jelf^ what it 7iever did, and was perhapi done by fame other Agent j a reprefentation without reality of Mat- ter of Fall, as fever air eprejcntations in Dreams are-^ a Tra-tjsf erring by a fatal Hi r or from One to Another^ Tljat Confciovfnejs which draws Reward or Pimijhnent mth it •, a making Two [or Two Hundred ) Think- ing Svbjlajices, to be but One [Individual] Perfon ^ And leaves it to be confidered^ how far this may he an Argimmit againjl thofe who would place Thi7ikiifj in a Syjlem of fleeting Anijual Spirit's. To fay here, that Gods Jujiice a:dd Goodnefs will Mot permit him to put any fuch inevitable Deceit upon Men ^ is nothing to the Purpofe. For if it be but naturally puljihle for him to do That, which, upon Suppclition of the Truth of 3rourKotiou,will be a plain Contradiclion ^ this is a certain Demon- ftration that A'-our Notion is Falfe. And I think it is a Cor.tradiBion plain enorgh^ to fa}^ that Gods im- prefTing permanently upon icco MensJvIinds,af- ter the manner of the reprefentation of a Dream, the like Confcicufnefs with that which I find in my own Mind •, would make every Oi^ of them^ to be, net Perfonsli/c^ me, but the fame Individu- al Perfon with my felf. According to ilich Rea- foning as this, Accidents need not have any ne- ceiTary Dependence on their Subftance -. And the fame individual Subftance niay as weJJ be concei- ved < ^8f ) J7.c(l to exift in a thoufand places at oijce, und-qr like Accidents ; as the fame hdividiiathig Ac- cidents or Qualities can inhere in a Thoufand dif- feicnt Subftances at once. By which fame Subtilt)% ,fas Believing too viiich and too little,ha.v€ common- ly the i.uck to meet together, like things moving two contrary ways in the fame Circle J' all the Abfijrdities in the Doctrine of Travjiihjlmthition may eafdy be reconciled. You ievyt})atwshaiie avy Cojifcloiifnefs at all, that p^t^. 57^ si'e coTithnie the javie hidwidual Being at dijferevt t'nfie.s. It' fo ^ it can be to no great purpofe tor us to difpute about Any Thing : For, beiorcyou re- <:eive my Reply, you may happen polfibly to-be Citirely changed into another Subftanee ^ cud, the ^lext timeyx)u write, ma}'' deny that j^cu have any Confcioufnefs atalf that you continue the fame In- dividual Being who wrote this Remarkable Sen^ ,tence. But to the Ailertion,! anfwer : Either Con- fcioufnefs proves a Man to be the fame Individui- ^1 Bcijig at different tim^es •, Or elfe it is a mere Deceit and Pelufion ; and by being added in like manner toother Subftances,might fas I fdd) mak^ an Hundred other Men with equal juliice liable to the fame punilliment Math himfelt" for any One- Individual Adlion done by Him. But of this more, when I come tofpeak of the ufefulncfs and importance of the prefent ArguineAt to the Ends and Purpofes of Religion. ' ^ You affirmed, that The A^atter, of which an Egg covjijls, doth ciitirely covjl'itiitc the young One • and that ^^' t-he J^l'ion of SevfatioTi began uvder a partiadar dif- pojitwn of the Fa) ts by Motion : To this I anfwered ^ l\\?,tfo far IS it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, //)• any ihvticuUr Difpoftwn of its Parts by M 3 ^ Moy ( i8z ) Motmr, is formsihito or evtirehj covj^itiites the yoim^ One I, that (accordhi' to the heji Difcoveries by Microf- CGpes and in Anatomy) H does not covjlitute it at all, vot fo much as the Body of it-^ but only ferves it for f'?^. 31. Noiiyijlmient and Growth, you reply : If by our 'Ejes-a^e can perceive the orgam%edBodyof the Animal to be Part ot" the Matter of the Egg ^ no Alicrofcopi- cal Ohfervation can dejlroy fiuh Matter of Fa^, and 7nake iis See Aothin?. jphere we do See Some- thing. Now I am very forry, Sir, to find you in a feriousand important Qiieftion defcend to fo ex- tremely mean and trifling a Quibble. For, This is exadly the fame thing, as if youfhould fay, that hyyow Eyes )'-oucan perceive an inclofed Worm to be Pait nf the Matter of the Nut it feeds on ^ or that by your Eyes 3''ou can perceive a Man to be Fart of the Matter of the Houfe he dwells in. I called Gravitation the FfjeB of the continued a7id regular Operation offo?ne Other Being on Matter. You. }^i- 34- replied -, thatit doesnot appear., but that Matter gra- vitates by virtue of Powers originally ph ed in it by God, and is now left to it felf to a& by thofe original Powers, To this! anfwered ; that a Law or Power, that is to fay ^ a mere abjiract Name., or complex Noti- on., which is no real Beirtg •, cannot impel a Stone, and caufe it to begin to Move. You reply again ^ that pii<^. 5$. you deny not the neccj/tty of a Being impelling another, in order to caufe that Mode of Motion called Gravita- tion : That you fuppofe it to be caufed b]'' the hn- fa^, 16. pnlfe of Other Bodies : And, to fpeah your own Opini- en., it feejns Matter of Fact to You, that the external F.gJire and internal ccnjignration of the Parts of Mat- ter, are thofe Powers in Matter., by which it receives that peculiar Mode of Mction called Gravitation, from the circvjrambicnt impelliiig Bodies. I did imagine, Bit J when I expreffed m}^ felf with fuch brevity in 'i ^/ '■ ' . - my ( 1^5 ) •my fiift Anfvver, you had been fo well acqnain- ttd with Natural Philofophy, as not to be igno- rant that it has been demonftrated even Mathe- matical!}'', that Gravitation cannot arife from the ,^^ . covfvv.vat'ionavd texture of the paits of Matter, and ^om'ura-' from the ciycin;Lvnhie7it impel ifjg Bodies -^ becaule, hie Sir if it (lid, it would not be proportionable to the iftic Nexv. Qiiantity of Matter or the Solid Content of aW^^"} ^^'^" BocHeSjVvithout any regard to their Superficial Pro- Jifronch- ptrtion j :as we find by Experience it is ^ feeing all out • ''and Bodies, of all Textures, and all confic^urationsoffhe Ohx- Parts, .and all varieties of fuperficial Proportion \ ^Jf\'^\ , la bullet, or a Feather, or a piece ot Lear-Gold, j^^^,, £j|. or a Sheet of Paper ^ ] defcend in Vacn i with equal cion of his Swiftncfs. And if Material hnpulfe, be not the ^/'•'■''••^^» Caufe of Gravity •, thenfome Being that is iiotALi- teii.il, (for Lavs.ov Poweishve notlnng but mere empty Words,") muft of necelTity be allowed to be the Caufe of it. But it feems you are, notwith- flpnding the Force even of Demonftration it felt, flill of Opinion that Gravitation is purely owing to png. -,7. the outward Figure and inward Configuration of the parts of A'latter, and the impulfe of circumam- bient Bodies. For, drop a pomid of Lead, in the ptg. 7,6. Form of a Vidlct, from the top of a Tower ; and it defccnds in a very quick fpace to the gromtd 7 Var\ the external Figure of the Bidlet, by beating it broad vnth a Hammer -.aiiditfrendency dommard decreafs : Vary the cmfgiiration of its Vart^ by Fire •, cnid it will afcend, in- jiead of defc ending. Certainly the Reader cannot but he greatly fjrprized, to meet with fuch Philofophy as This, in our prefeyit Age, For, what has All This to do with Gravitation ? or with the Caufe of Bo- dies Tendi77g downward*? Has a Pound of Lead in the Form of a Bullet, a greater Tendency downward, jhan under any other Form •, becaufe tlie Air M 4 niaking C 184 ) making lefs Jlefiftance to it when in .that Form, iufiers it to fall more fwiftly ? Or when it is bea- ten out into a thhi Plate, which is ftill of a Fomid- p^ejght ^ does nsl ejidevcy downward decreafe^ becaufe the Air making greater Reflfian.ce to it when under that new Form itsSuperficits is inlarged, fuffers it jicw to fall but flowly ? You might by the fame Ph'ilofophy, and exactly with the fame Truth, affirm that a Hinidred-pomid-wejghty fo long as yoil jTupport it with your Hands, has loft its Teyukiicy 'downward, becaufe jt does not ,defcend ^ But, I pre- lume, Experience will eafily convince you of the contrary. In like manner ^ when Lead being eva- porated by Fire, afccnds in the Air injlead of de- fcevdhig, becaufe it is carried upward by the Moti- on of the Air, which afccnds being rarefied with Heat •, is therefore its Tendency dow7nvardsdecreaf€d ^ you might exattly with the fame reafon have af- firmed that a Pound of Lead in one Scale of a Ba- lance, lofes its Tcjidency downwards \ whenever a greater Weight in the oppofite Scale, forces it to afccidhi [lead of dcfcciidivg. The Truth, }s plainly This : Asa Pound of IFood, during the time otit3 afcending from the Bottom of a Pail pf Water to- wards the Top, js as much a Poundrweight added to the weight of tlie "Whole Water, as a Pound of Lead is, thgt lies ftill at the Bottom •, ?ind confe- guently the Tendency of the Wood downwards, is always the very fame, whether it be afcending in Water, or defending in the Air -^ So your Bullet^ whether it falls fvviltl}?- in the form of a Btdkt, or flcwly in the form of a thin Plate, or falls not j^t all while it is fipported hj yow Hand, or on tHe contrary aicends in the form of Pmne, fin which cafe, It is in the Air, exadtl}'' what P^ood is in the ^"ater,} |i:ill its Te^demy down.vard^ that is, ifs ;. .>, :■ .. . ; : • ■ • ■'■ ■ Grs^ Gravitation, continues always the fame, without any thelcaft decreafe or increafe: Which is the di- re dt Coiitradiftory to your Aflertion. As iii Vacuo all Bodies, ot" all Figures, and all Textures what- foever, adiually defccnd with equal Swittnefs ^ fo in the open Air, and every where elfe, their Ten- devcy dorrvwards^ that is, their Gravitation, whe- ther they afcend or defcend, whether they fall fwiftly or flowly, -or not at all, continues always invariabl}'' the fame ^ and cannot be htcreafed or decreajed by any change whatfoever, of their ^xr terval Figure^ or ot the irterrial covfguration of their ParU^ or of the chcumamh'ie'iit impellhig Bodies. Gravitation therefore cannot poihbly arife from tlie extevrial Figure^ nor hitenial covfguration of the Parts of Matter^ nor from the circuviainhient impel- ling Bodies •, fince by no alteration of Any or All of thefe thing'?, can the Gravitation of any Body be in the lean: ivcre.nfed ov dljnijtijljed-j And confe- quently Gravitation is quite another thing, than 3''ou feem to have at all thought of, when you fpoke your Opivion about whnt feemed Matter of pag. ■^S, Fact to you^ and talked of the Decreafe of a Bul- lets Tendency dow)i}PCi,rd^ upon the variation of its Figure; .[Whoever will explain Gravity^ which by Ex- perience is always proportionable to the Solid Con- tent of Bodies •, muft aihgn fuch a Caufe, as can aft upon Bpdjes in proportion to their Solid Cov tent, without any regard to their Superfcial Pro- portion •, that is to fay, fuch a Caule, as can reach and pcnetiate to the very Center of every folid . particle of Matter : Wliich I fu]-)poie you will hardly affirm your circitmamhicvt Bodies^ hov/ Ijtjbtle foever, are capable of doing.] Aad ( i8<5 ) And not content to have erred fo very grosdy, in the firft Foundation of all Natural Philofophy ^ you could not forbear profcffing further, that you t'^i' 57- have ojten Aim'ired that Gravitation jimiild be ejleem" ed a matter of fuch Difficulty amovg Philofophers ^ and that you think it to be lb evident and necelTary an Eifed of Matter in covjlant Mctioyt perpetually ft} ikivg one part againft another^ that you wonder every Bo- dy ihiould not fee it. I fuppofe the reft of the "World will no lefs ^i7«7V^ at Toiij for imagining that by fo flight an Admiration you could at once fet afide all the Pr opolitions in that moft excellent Pr'mh'u Book before-mentioned ^ wherein it is made appear Fhilofo- by ftridly Mathematical Demonftrations, drawn piyi£ Afa^ fj-oni the Laws of Motion nov/ agreed on by Ma- ihemat'icx thematicians and eftablifhed by Experiments, and from the Phenomena of the Heavenly Bodies ^ that the prefent Operatiors of Nature, depending upon Gravitation, cannot poifibly be Mechanical Ef- feds of Matter in conftavt Motion perpetually ftr iking one part againft another. Not much unlike to This, was Mr Hohhs's fancy- ing that he had confuted all the Propofitions in ^.udid, hy Admiring at T^nc/zJ's Definitions of Lines and Surfaces: And all Men ever iince, thatunder- ftand the firft Elements of Geometry, have Ad- mired at Him for fancying fo. But that which follows, is flill the moft won- paie 38 & derful cf all. You fay : iFhether you tale Mr 39. Clarke? 7^/;t or no, the incomparable Sir Ifaac Newton (in the Preface to his Piincipia,) is of Opinion, that *' fever al PhAnomena of Nature may depend on cer- *' fazw Forces or Powers, whereby from Caufes yet " Undifcovered, the Particles of Bodies are juutualy " ifnpeV.ed^ again]} each other^ or recede and are " diivcnfrom one itnother : Which Forces or Prwers ■ ' ■ '" hehig ( iS7 ) * being yet mihwivjt, the Vhilnfophers hitherto have alternated Nature in vain. Now to infiriuate to ycuv Reader by inch a Citation, that This Great Man is of ycur Opinion in the prcfent Qiieftion-, when on the ccntrarj, the very Sentence you cite, was fpokcn by him ('as appears from the words immediately preceding thofeyou have cited, ^ not concerning Gravitation^ hut concerning Other jnore particular Phenomena of Nature, in exprefs Coriradijliitclioii to thofe of Gravitation •, and when in that whole Book, from one End to the other, he is profefTedly confuting and fliowing the ab- folute ImpoiTibility of your Notion of Gravita- tion ^ and when he has '^ elfewhere in exprefs "^ optk. M'ords declared, that by the Terms, Forces and f'^* 322* Powers, he does not mean fas You did by Powers originally placed in A'latter by God) to fignify the Efficient Caiife of certain determinate Motions of Matter, but only to exprefs the A^ion it felf by which tlie Effeft is regularly produced, without determining the immediate Agejit or Caufe of that Adion : After all this, I fay, toinlinuate toyour Reader by the citation of a piece of a fingle Sen- tence, that That Great Man is of your Opinion ^ is (to uCc your own ExpreiTions once more,) fuch a CondvB, as the World may jnflly demand a Rea- p.t^, 8,. fon of from your felf ^ for I cannot afign a good one for yov. LalHy: As you declare it to be 3''onr Opinion, that Gravitation is caufi^d by Material Lnpulfe • fo 3'ou think it impoifible, that it fhonld be owing to any Immateiial Canfe: And yon believe it to be as iviel'igihk, that Matter vii^ht a^ withojit ImpiiJll\ by Powers placed in it by God ^ as that an Immate- rial Being [Imiild move Altttcr without being able to im^ell it by CovtaS. • ^ This ( 188 ) This Belief of yours is founded wholly upoii the ir^upppfition, that there is nothing in the World but Tangible Subftance ^ Which Opinion you give no Reafon for \ and therefore it is a 7ner3 Prejudice. But further : I prefume you will hardly deny, but God hiinfelf is an hiwhiteiial Behig j and that He can move Matter, though he does iiot hnj^ell it by Contaci. Other Immaterial Beivgs therefore, though they do not im^eli Matter by Cantall^ yet it does not from thence follow that they cannot move it at all •, Becaufe from God's moving it, it is m.anifeft that there are other waj^s of moving it, befides that of iwr ■pellivg by ContaEJ:. But Formers or Laws, are not real Beings j They are nothing but mere Words, or Notions ^ and can neither a£t in any Senfe, jior move Matter either with Conta£t or without It, I conceive an ordinary Reader may be able to difcern the Difference, between affirming that an hnmaterial Siibjiance^ a real Being, though not hard and folid, may move Matter^ and affirm- ing that a Law or Tower, a mere Word or Tenn .of Art, which is reall}^ ]SIo Thing, and has not truly any Being or Exiftence, fave only in the Imagination, can caufe Matter to move. Upon the Whole •, All that you have advanceql in thefe Seftions about Gravitatwv, is fuch mar- vellous Reafoning, to be made ufe of in the pre- fent Age, after fo many great Difcoveries, found- ed upon Experience, and even Mathematical De- mon/tration ^ that though I havje no caufe at all to be difpleafed with you, for arguing i\i fuch a manner •, yet I believe your Readers cannot but think you might very well have forborn going out of your Way; to give fo very difadvan- tageous a Reprefentation of your own Philofo- 9 ( tSp )■ I have beerf the longer upon this Head, ^caufe the true Theory ot Uravitcition, as it has been r^ade out by that excellent Perfon whom you juft now fo unlrortunately cited, does in its obvious and neceilary Confequences, more entirely fubvert the very Foundations ot" all pollible Hypothefes, v/herewitli MaterialiJIs would undertake to explain the Ph^Euomena oi Nature Mechamcdly by the mere Powers ot Matter and Motion ^ than any Difco- very in natural and experimental Phriofophy, that has ever yet ]:)een made in Any Age : Show- \ ing the Matter ot the Univerfe to take up almoft an infinitely fmall and inconfiderable part of that Space, which you fuppofe to be filled with it ^ bearing in truth far lefs Proportion to it, than a Tennis Ball does to the Body of the Earth : And confequently, that the great Phenomena of Na- ture cannot polfibly depend upon any Alechankal Powers of Matter and Motion, but muft be pro- duced by the Force and Atlion of fome higher See sir Principle: And fo leading us even with Mathe- ■^■^'^'^^^^.'*'- matical Certainty, to Immatenal Powers t, and fi- f "^ ^^'"^"'' ftall}'- to the Author of all Power, the Great Crea- ff :^'/^6. tor and Governow of the J^orld. LxcEdit, I afifirmed, that there are many Bemovjlratiom^ even hi ahjiracl Alathe7?iatkks themfdves^ which no Man who imderjlanda them, can hi the leajl doubt of the Certainty oj -^ which yet are atteiided with difcult Confequences, that cajinot he perfectly cleared : As, for infl:ance, thofe concerning the ijifvrts Divif- bility of ^lavtity, and the Eternity and Lmnenfty of God. In Anfwer to this, you fay that ifthere are ^ ,. any fuch Demonffcrations, from whence any Con- tradi^ions or AbfurditieshWow in our wa}'' of con- ceiving things, &c. And again; Jbfurdities and page ^2. Con- ( ipo ) tags 45. CoMradi&ions, &c. And again : Aofurdlty^ Cdn- pageA'>. tradution, or Difagreevient of Ideas -^ &c. And again : You reqiih e me to prove that any Abfiir- dity or Covtradictio7i fbllcws either from the infinite Diviiibility of Matter, or from the Eternity or Immensity of God, in our way of conceiving •, and if I cannot, I have no ground, you fay, from thofe Inftances, to put Human Nature in fuch a iState of Sceptkijm and Ahfiirdity. Now, hy all the pagei^^. Rules of Aiifwering, (to ufe your own Expreffion you ought to have changed my Words, Di/-- ficidt Covfequences that camiot he perfectly cleared ^f '■ into Ahfurd'ities, CoritradiLtiom^ and Difagreements of Ideas ; Becaufe Abfurdhies^ Contradictiom, and Difagreements of Ideas, are things juft as different from Difadt Confeqiiences of Demonft rated Truth &j which cannot he perfectly cleared •, as 'Light is from Darhiefs. Ahfiirdities^ Contradictions^ and Difagree- 7ne7its of Ideas, arc things already perfectly cleared-^ that is, things proved with perfect clear7tcjs\ to be Falfe and Impoilible : But Difcidties that cannot he perfectly cleared, may attend things either pof- fihly or certainly True. Abjurdities, Cojitradictions, and Difagreements of Ideas, do with as perfect clear- 7Jofs prove a thing to be Falfe •, as a poftive De- jnovfiration proves a thing to heTrue : . And there- fore it is abfolutely impoffible, that they can Both be applied to the fame thing ^ even juft as impof- iible, as that the fame thing lliould at the fame time be both true and falfe. But Dijicnlt Covfe- quences that canytot perfectly he cleared, maybe, and x^xj often are, found to attend Things whi-^h are Demonftrated to be True. The Reafon is ; be- caufe Diffculties that cannot perfectly he cleared, do not (^like Ahfurdities and Contradictions) a rife from a Perception of the Bifagreenient of Ideas, but barely from- ( 19' ) from the Defect or hriperfechtefs of the Ideas them' felves. Our lieafon is able to apprehend clearly the Demonftration of the Certaint}^ of the Exiftence of feme Things, where the IviapvatioTt is not able to co7npreh€nd the Ideas of the Things themlelves. This is plainly the Cafe of the hfriite DiviJibiUty of ^lavithy, of Iv§ivty and Eternity in general, of the Jctiovs of Immaterial Siibfiances itpojt Matter^ and of many other Things. Here therefore I have jufi- Caufe (if I may ufe your own Expreilion once Hgainj to devhwd a Reafon of your Coidiict •, and tof"^^^ 8* complain that you have greatly departed from that Fairnefs, for which your former Papers were juftly commended. And you can ftill the more hardly be excufed in this Matter •, becaufe ^''ou knew I had before expreifed my felf very particularly and fully con- cerning the fame Thing, in a Book which you your felf cite upon another occafion in the very next Page to That wherein you accufe me fo wrongfully. My Words were Thefe: ( Demorifirai. of the Being and Attrib. of God, p. iT.j " Since in all Queftions concerning the Nature and Per- " feftions of God, or concerning any Thing to **■ which the Idea of Eternity or Infinity is joined ^ " though we can indeed demonftrate certain Pro- " pofitions to be true ^ 3''et it is impoffible for us '* to comprehend or frame any adsequate or com- *' plete Ideas of the Manner How the things fa " demonftrated, can Be: Therefore when once " any Propofition is clearly demonftrated to be " True ^ it ought not to difturb us, that there " be perhaps perplexing Objedions on the other *' fide, which for want of ad^pquate Ideas of the " Manner of theExiflence of the Things demon- *^ firated, are not ealie to be anfwered. Indeed, " were- " were it poiTible there ihould be any Propofition,' .' which could equall}'- be Demovjlrateil on both '.' fides of the Queftion, or which could on both fides be reduced to hnfly a Contradiction, \jis Some have too iyicovjiderately aiTerted -,] This it muft be confelled, would alter the Cafe •, Upon this abfurd Suppofition, all Difference of True and " Falfe, all Thinking and Reafon.ing, and the: Ufe of all our Faculties, would be entirely at " an End. But when to Demonftration on the one fide, there are oppofed on the other, only *' Objedlions raifed from our Want of having " adequate Ideas of the Things themfelves \ this " ought not to be efteemcd a Real Difficulty. 'Tis " pofitively and clearly Demonflrable, that Some- " thing has been frorn Eternity : All the Objedti- " ons therefore raifed againft the Eternity of any " thing, grounded merely on our Want of having " an adequate Idea of Eternity •, ought to be lookt " upon as of no real Solidity. Thus- in other the " like Inflanccs: 'Tis Demonftrable, for Ex- " ample, that Something mnft be a<^nally /«- ** finite : All the Metaphyfical Difficulties there- " fore, which arife ufualiy from applying the " Meafures and Relations of Thing.s Finite to " what is Infinite •„ and from fuppofing Finites " to be [Aliquot] Parts of /w/wti?, when indeed " they are not properly fo, but only as Mathe- *' matical Points to Quantity, which have no " Proportion at all •, [and from imagining all/«-» fiiites to be Equal, when in thine^s defperdte they manifeftly are not fo •, an. infinite Lin^, being not only not equal to, but infinitely kfs than an infinite Surface ; and an infinite Hurface, than Space infinite in all Di?nenfions{\ *' ought to be efteemed vain " and of no Force. Again •, 'Tis in like manner •» " Demon-' ( 193 ) ** Demonftrable, that Qiiantity, is infinitely T>}. " vifible : All the Objedtions therefore raifed [by fnppofing the Simis Total of all Ivfriltes to be equals when in defperate Parts they manifejftly are not fo ^ and ] " by comparing the imaginary Equality " or Ivcquality of the Number of the Parts of Un- *' equal Quantities, whofe Parts have really no *' Number at all, they all having Parts without " Number •, ought to be look'd upon as weak and *':altogether Inconcliiiive: ^£, Concerning the '^lejlions. Whether Immaterial Subftances be extended or not ^ avd Whether, upon iSu ppoiition ot their being extended, they may not neverthelefs be of fuch a Nature, as not to confifl: of Parts which (like the Parts of Matter) are them- fclves every one of them compiete diftind Beings, feparable, and wholly independent of each other: -:u<3ive of Religion. And in what refpeds it I^ ia 4(& ( I 94 ) is fo, I fhall give you an Inftance or two to con* fider of •, and lo conclude. i/ then i If the Mijid of Man, were nothing but a certain S\J}em of Matter ; and Thinking, no- thing but a certain ^Hode of ilf ofio?; in that Syftem : It would follow, that, iince every Determination of Motion deY>ends7iecej]arily upon the Impiilfe that caufes it, therefore every Thoitght'm 2i Man's Mind muft likewife be t necejfai'y, and depending bove -, pag. wholly upon external Caufes ^ And there could be 53. &34. no fuch tiling in Us, as Liberty, or a Power of Self-determination. Now what Ends and Purpofes of Religion, mere Clocks and Watches are capable of ferving, needs no long and nice Confideration. 7dly. If Thiv.hitJg-, in a Man, be nothing but a Mode of Motion or of any other ^lality of Matter ^ it will be but too natural a Confequence, to con- ceive that it may be only the fame thing in all * F/r co/:-^^^^^ Katicjial J5aKgi likewife-, and even in Goi cerning tbc himfelf. And what a Notion of God This would VfcofKea- give US, js not difficult to imagine. A Friend of /on in Pro. yours has given us a very broad hint, whither This VffcTv"-' ^^"^^ ' ^^^" ^'^ ^^^^^ "^ ^^^^ ^ thegreateji Freedom (ience ^^ Liberty we can conceive to belong to A NT B E- rvhsreofde- 1 NG, is fuch as he there largely explains to be fends uHn ^^^ Liberty at all, but abfolute Neceiiity, fuch as iiumanTe- ^| j^ro^ion of a Watch or Clock is determined Jttmony. - :■• 3^/)'. If the SojiT, be nothing but a SyJIem of Matter-^ and Thinking, nothing but a Mode of Mo- tion or of fome ether •Power of Matter-^ the Doc- trine of the RefurreBion^ (^s I before obferved, pag. 66, &c.) will be inconceivable and in- credible^ and thejuftice of future Rewards and Puniftiments, impoilible to be made "out. The |Jotloa of the SouTs Iminateriality, evidently fa- 'i- : ■ cilitatcs *\ C »py ) cilitates the Belief of a RefvrreBhn and of a fu- ture Retribution, by fecuring a Principle of Per- fmial Utdividiiality, upon which the Juftice of all Reward or Punilhment is entirely grounded : But it Tbirildfig be in reality nothing but a Foiver or Mode, which inhering in a loofe and fleeting Syftcm of Matter, perilhes utterly at the Dif- folution of the Body •, then the reftoring the Power of Thhihing to the fame Body at the J^efmveBi'm^ will not be a Raifing again ot the fame hidhidital Perfon-^ but it will be as truly a Creation of a fiejv Perfon, as the Addition ot the like Power of Thmkivg to a new Body A^w, would be the Creation of a imv Man. For, as Xjod's fuperadding Now to a new parcel of Mat- ter, the like Covfciovfiiefs with what I at this time find in my lelf,. would not make that new parcel of Matter to be the fame individual Perfon with vie, but only another Perfoyi Like me ^ fo his fiiperadding That Cojfcioifnefi at the RefmreBion, to the fame particles of Dufi:, of which my Body was formerly compofed •, will not be a Rcjloration of the fajne Perfon, but a Cre- ation of a nev; one like me. For, the famenefs of the fenfelefs Particles of Duft, 'tis evident from the flux nature of the Subfl:ance of our Bodies, is not that which Notp makes me to be the fame Perfon -, and therefore cannot be that, which will Then make me to be fo. If my prefent Coifcioufnefs, be nothing but a Mode of Motion in the fleeting particles of my Brain or Spirits •, \h\sConfcioifnefs will be as utterly defl:roy- ed at the DifTolution of my Body, as if the very Subftance of my Body was annihilated: And it would be jufl: as pofllble for the fame Individual Perfon to be created again, after an ahfohtc An- K 2 . fiihi'aticrt\ ( t5?<5 ) fihilatioft •, 3S to be rcjlorect agalr^ after fujch ^ JSlljohtmh But new, it the faine Jeijcv. after j4ni fiihUatiov, cculd, by rcftoring of the fame Covfci- c?f/j/r/},becrtated again ^ he might as pclfibly be created ,pg. You begin with charging ine, that out of Four 3* OhjeBhm injified on in your Kefiexions, I have dropt the ccmJideraUo-n of Ihree. Whether this be true, or no •, they who pleafe to compare the Papers, may find. I am not fenfible, that I have pailed over any of your Objections, or any part of any of them, unanfwered : Only, where you have repeated the fame Things again, (as, for Inftance, in that poor Objedion drawn from our Ignorance of the vianner how God will difpofe of the Soiih of Brutes 'J inftead of repeating m/ Anfwers, I have only referred to them as they flood in my former Defenfes •, which is ultimately appealingtothe Judgment of the intelligent Rea- der: And for this Complaint, I (hall give you more frequent Occalions hereafter. fag. 5 & 4. ^^^^ ^*^' anfwer to y ourf oiirth hje^ion^ you fay I amfofar from flmwing fas I ought to have done,) that if Confcioufnefs did inhere in a Syf^em of Matter, it muftconfifl: of the Covfcioifneffcs of the' Parts ^ that on the contrary I have only endeavoured to pove^ that^ as Rovndnefs miijl confiji of fever al Pieces of Roimdnefs^ or Tendencies totrW^ Roimdnefs -^ fo, if Confcioufnefs did, in like manner with Round- nefs, inhere in a Syftem of Matter, It muft confifl of feveral Tendencies toward s Confcioufnefs. And this you call an apparent Deferiion of my Argu- ment. Now to this, I reply- that, covfjlivg of the Con- . fcioufnefs of the Parts^ and confjl'nig of feveral Ten- dencies t07j7(3:j'£jjCo7//tioK/77f/}, is the very fame thing. For, as nothing that is not Gnve^ can have any Tendency towards Curvity ^ as nothing that is net Colour^ can have any Te^waVjfc)' towards Co/oHJ--, as nothing that is net Soimd^ can have any Tendency towards *. ( ^^3 ) towards 5oimi; So nothing that is not Co^r/cfo://?/^, can have any Ttvdt7uy tov/ards Cojffciovfiiefs. Diffe- rences indeed and Degrees there may be, of the diftindinefs of Cqvfcioiifnefs and vigor of Thhiking-^ as thtre are different degrees of theC»rw/)i of a Line, different degrees of the ^n^/jtK^Ti- of a Colour, and difrerent degrees of the Clearvefs cf a Somid : But as it is plainly impoffible that any Colour ihouldhavQ any Tendency towards being an}?" Sound, or that any Figure fhould have any Tendency towards being any Motion ^ fo it is likewife ridiculous to imagine that any Motion, or any other Qiiality of Matter void of Confcioufnefs, fhould have any 'tendency to- wards being Confcioufnefs. Befides : The Curvitiesofthefeveral little Arches ■that conititute the Circumference of a Circle, are not properly Tendencies towards Roimdnefx, ffora RxYt has no more Tcjidency to the Whole by Com^oji- tion, than the If hole has a Tendency to its Fart by l)ivifwn\) but thejr are themfelves, being taken to- gether, the whole Circle, or the i^orw^?;?/} it felf : bo that Roundnefs is not a new real Qualit}^, refult- ing from the Curvities of the feveral parts ; but only a Name of the If hole, a mere external Dejwmi- Ses Third jiation: Even in the fame manner as the Twelve ^'^/^'•7^ Units that conftitute the Number a Doz*'?;, are not ^^^ ^""f' properly fo many Tendencies towards a Dozen, (as £V;r.^* towards any real new Thing or Quality^) but are Themfelves, being taken together, the Number a Dozen-, which Name is nothing but a 7jiere Tervi^ an external Denomination of the If hole, and nothing at all really in the Things numbered. Confciouf- nefs therefore in like manner, if it was nothing but the Sum of thofe Motions or Modes of Af otion, which you call Tendencies to\\^ards Confcioufnefs - would not be a difiindt Qiiality rcailj inhering in ( 264 ) in theThinlcingSubftance, (as every Man feehhf Experience, and you 3''cur felt grant that it is •,) but it would be a mere Word or Tenn of yht, nothing Thhi De but a Name or extciral Denotfiination^ fuch as are fence^ pag. thofe Qualities which I ranked under the Third '34. Sort. Anfn>. CO Wherefore when you confefs, that the Parts, (of Third DC- Ronndnefs, fuppofe,) miifl be fo far of the fame jenje, ffig. j(jjj^^ ^ ^^ jj^^^ ^ Tendency to that hdiv'idml Fi- gure of which they are a Part : And that in that Ssyfe you have always allowed Corfcioifnfs to covffl of Powers of the fame Kind •, hecarfe if Covfciovficfs in- heres ill a Syjicm of Aiatter^ it iniijl necejjarily he allow ^ ed that the diJlinB Beings in that Syjlem contribute to- wards Thinkings as the Pieces of a Circle do towards a Circle, or as all the Parts of a Syfcm of Matter con- tribute towards the Syfiem : And again •, that What rs fag.''22. faid in the Third Dcfevfe^ may, for ought you hiow, he a Vindication of the Conclvfion before-cited, (vizi. p*g. 4. x]j^i If Confcioifnefs did inhere in a Syjiejn of A^.atter, it vnift coifijl of feveral Tendencies towat ds Confc'r- ^^f' '^ oujnefs:) And again-. You do, in that Senfe, allow Confcioufnefs to covfiji of Powers of the fame Kind y For, according to You, it confjls of Pai ts which have a Tendency to Ihinking or (^07fc70uf7iefs, as Rounds iiefsdoes of Parts that have a Tendency to Roimdvefs: In all thefe Paffages you clirt6t]y give up theQiie- flion. For, thofe Modes of Motion for of any o- ther Quality of Matter) which vou call Tejidencies to Confcioufnefs, either are theinfelves Coifciovfielfes and Thoughts, or not. If they be -, then, as the whole Curvitv of a Circle is made up of the Cur- vitiesof the feveral little Partsor Archesof which it is compofed, fo whole Covfioufnefs or ThivJang v^'ill likewife be made up of feveral p.ntial Conjcioufneffes or Thoughts j which is giving up the dneition wifh one ( iOT ) cne Hand : Or if they h vnt •, then, as the Round- nefs ot a Circle, fo far as it differs frojn the Cur- vities of the little Arches ot which it is compofed, is nothing but a kv e JSlaine ot a Whole^ a mere ex- tenial Demimvatkn ; fo Covfciovjnejs, as tar as it diiters Irom thofe conftituent Modes that are no Covfctoufvejfes^ will be only a ISIame of a Whole^ a were txteinal Devovihrnt'ion^ and nothing at all really in the Thinking Subftarce it felf 5 Which is giving up the Queliion with the other Hand. Y^^ reprefentmeall along fpeaking, as if my whole Argument was toundedupon theSup- pojfition, that in the Idea of an hnmaterUl Being N£. 5. Kxtenjion is covtahied. That Extended Being of pjg, ^^^ Mr Clark's. You think him mijlaken in making pag, ^g^ the Soii^. an Extended Being. In making an Extended p^g^ jq^ Beings asfiich^ &c. An Immaterial Subjlance and a pag. 5c. t lock agree ^ according to A^r Clark, in being Extend- ed : And , to make Immaterial Being Extended^ as Mr pg' ^l^ Clark does. This is neither doing Me nor your Readers Ju- fiice. For my Argument is not at all founded up- on any Suppofition either ot Immaterial Subftance being Extended or Unextended. That which I undertook to prove, was, that Matter, (all whofe Iblid Farts are fo many diftin£t, feparable, inde- pendent, unconneded Beings •,) could not be a Subjeft capjable of Individual Confcioufncfs \ And that therefore Confcioufhefs muft have fome other Subjedt to refidein. "Whether That other Subjedt be Extended or Unextended, (whatever you may fuppofe m}'' Opinion to})e, upon other Grounds, j the prcfent Argument determines not •, but leaves every Reader at Liberty to judge as he Ihall find Keafon. Only I affirmed by the l?y^ for Argument's (205) fake, that I thought the Difficulties arifing from the Suppoiirion ot Immaterial Subftance being Ex- tended, were not greater, but rather lefs, than thofe which arife horn the Suppofition of its be- ing Unextended. See Seco7td Defevp^ pag. 118, 119, 120. jSnfrv. to It is here alfo further to be obferved incidental- 3/Def. ]y 5 that, when you aft, JFhat other Argimetit can f'ii 5. ^e made iife of to prcv^ all M atter divijible by the Pow- er (j-God, but what is drawn frojn the confiderationof its t'xtejijwjt ^ and affirm, that if Matter, as an ex- tended Being, is divifible •, all extended Bei7tgs nmjl be fag. 8j. diviftle : and, that I have 71.0 other Reafon to 7nalie all Matter divifble, hut hecanfe it is Exte7ided : and, when you mention the Divijibility, add by way of Explication, or (which is ail 07te) the Exte7ifion, of a?n; '" ■^''''^f^^ ' You feem to forget, that j^ou )7-our felf ex- firfi Dcf. presfly allowed 5p^c^, though extended, tobeab- P-^i- 59- folutely Indifcerpible • And, therefore )''ou your }ea^n' ^^'^^i^^^^^'^^^fer divifible, not barely ^^ a7t Ex- ■zdDcl tendfd Being, but zsfi7utely Extended •, And, that ?/^. 4;. I gave ftill another Reafon for fiiling Matter divi- iit Def. lible ^ viz. God's having by his own Wi 1 and gooi S4^* ^^^^^^"^^ created it fuch a Subftance, all whole fo- l)ei\fag, ^^^ Parts we find by Experience to be fo many di- ■^i^,- " ftindi Beings, loofe, independent onefrom another, [ and unconnected •, that is, having no eflential con? ncxion one with another, nor any dependence one upon another for their Exiftence : as the Parts of Space evidently have,even feparatefrom theCon- f (deration of its being abfolutely Infinite ^ and as the Parts of Time have, fforafmuch as every Mot jiient. co-exifling with all the Parts of Space, isyet both indivifihle in it felf, and i7fepayahle from the other Parts of D??r.Tf;",rr^ ^) and as the Parts, impro- perly Co called, of Immaterial Sabflances may have. C ao; ) have, for any thing that can ever be proved to the contrary, on Suppofitionot their being Extended. But all this is belide the main Argument, which (as I have faid) does not neceflarily imply any fuch Suppolition. Tn like manner^ when' you make a long and pom- •^»/»'- '• pous Dilcourfe about ^^dequate and Inadequate I- ^''''^^_ deas, and about Bijjicidties that cannot be ^erjeBly^^^^^^ cleared \ fthat is, which cannot be cleared wholly, but yet may in great ^art^ and enough to fatis- fy any reafonable perfon •, though, it feems, you know no {^jlqIy Difference :) When, I lay, )''outalk ^' pag. 6» bout thefe things as of great necelfity to be premi- led, and as if you would have the Reader think the Whole Argument depended upon the right fla- ting of them •, whereas in reality they have no re- lation at all to the A rgument, but were ftarted on- ly upon occaiion of that foreign and incidental Queftion concerning the Extenjion of Immaterial Siihjiance ^ In all this Matter, you have by no means made a right Reprefentation of things. However, as to the Diftindtion it felf, between Ahfurdities or Contra diet ion s.znd Difficulties that can- not he perfeUly cleared -. I defire only, that what I have faid upon this Head, (^d Defcnje^^ag. 189, 1 90 J may be compared with what 3^01/ have faid lipon it, (Arfw. pag. 6 — 1 6 -J And whether then I had not reafon, fnotwithftanding the Amufement of Ten Pages about Dficulties arifvg from the Per- hn(w. p4g. ception of the Difagrecment of per fed: or adequate I- ^> ^^' deas.avd Dificiiltica aiijhig from the Pcrceptianofthe Difagrcemevt ofimpeifc& or inadequate Ideas •, when on the contrary I had expresfly faid, that the Diffi- culties I meant, did not arife from the Perception of any Dif agreement of Id-^ai at all, but merely from ^ dur ( ^oS ) €i,ir having in our hnagivatjon either 710 Idras^ .or Iqch vtiy iniptrie 61 ones as cannot well be compa- red togeiher, ot Things whofe txillence or^Cer- taintywe can neverthtkfsdemonftrably pro.ye.by Reafon^ and apprehend man)' ot their Propertjts by the Unierjlandrng -^ Which every one, that un- derftands the fiift Elements cf Mathematicks, knows to be the.Cafe .of All Soits oj hfjiites and of So7ne Fhntes : Whether I fa}'', 1 had not good reafon) tor the Diftinction I made, I am willing any one, who pleafes to compare the Books, fhould jud^e. pal 6. Vou afk, T/'Jjat is a Difficulty which camot be pev" fe^ly cleared by reafon of defeB'ive Ideas, but a Difficulty which arifs from the Perception of the Dif- iTgj eemmt of fhofe Ideas ? I anfwer 3 'Tis a Difficul- ty ari/iiig, not from the Perception of any Difa- gieemevt oi Ideas, but from the want or Defe^weiiefs of Ideas in the Imagination -^ which the^jrefore we cannot compare fo as to Imagin diftinftl)'' how they cf^ree, thoigh we can by our Reafon and Ujiderjtand^ hig demonftrate ^t is hnpojfible they iliould dijagree. This is plainly the Cafe in moft Queilions, ,coiir ctvninu, h'teivity. Ijnmcfifty, Sec. 7bz/ declare your fell ot another Opinion .i^ And, that you think, ivhatever f:an be deuionjirated^ can be i*^. S4. pei-f(,<^^ ]y cleared from all Objediojis and Diffictdties i Ard^ that all the Di£icidties that may be urged againjt the Immenfty and Eternity of God, Sec which Mr C\-d\\fayi cannot be dearly arfw^'^ed^ are to be dearly arfwei ed ; And, in order to anfwer them cleai ly, y( u rvov.Ul only reqxth e thefe equitable Conditions of him, that he would defve the Terms, Immenfty. Eternity, hnm-'.tnial'Envg &c. It is a pUafant Inftance of fin Emiitable Cvrditit?:, that you deiire me to ^iye a Pe= t)e£riition, tliat is, to expref} the Idea, 6f tiling^' whereof I coiiterid we have no Ideas or very iiii"' perfect ones, (feeing we can only give Negative Defciiptions of them ^) though We have certaiii Demcnftrations of their Exiftence. And 'tis no left remarkable, that notwithftanding all this jfilr a- bout the Fcrceptiov of the Agreemevi or Dijag: eemevt dfldeasj yet you yourielf, when you come to dif- courfe more particularly concerning the nature of Thinking, talk ci^ Pawei in Matter inihwwn to us^P-'^i^ 1^* and of we which have wo Idea ^ cf which neverthelefs you venture to affirm that it may cojjiprehevdmider it ThiiikiJig and its Modes, as h'igvrS does Roiindnefs. But, to {pafs this over : Since it is your declared Opinion, that all the Sorts of Dimculties now- mentioned, ma^'' be clearly anfwered ^ I cannot but think you would very much oblige the World, irl anfweringthem clearly. Afid I will offer ycii a fair Opportunity of doing it ^ by reconciling, if yoil pleafe, the two following Accounts together ; or clfe by maintaining either of them, and anfwering clearly the Objedions and Difficulties contained in the other. It is evidevt to w^, that God ?}infi he an Immaterial Be- ingy that is, a proper limnate' lial Beingy a Being without any oj the Propet ties of Matter ; vithovt Solidity, Extenfon, ^r Motion ^ and that exijls in No Place ; and not a Being that has Extenjion, ajid confeqiientiy exiJIs in Place and has Parts. — Thinki7ig in God, cannot he founded on any OhjeBs a^rng The next Ahfurdity charged en the Attrihv.te of Eternity, is ^ How God fioidd co-exij} with all the Differences ofTi7ne, and yet there /^ ?fo S U C C E S S I^ O N in his Being. This I own to be as abfurd, as- — •, and that there is a manifejl Contra'^ diBion in this Notion or Con* ception. For if by Succeffiori in God\'; Being , is under fioodf {and I hnow not what other ( I'lO ) vpon hhn '^wrcanThivJaiig hi Senfe to put upon ff,) co^exifi- him be SV CCES IV h or ivg wth alt the V'-if^rences of covfift of Parts •, nor can his Time ^ then the Difcidty is, Thinkivg have any MODES, bojp to conceive God to co-exifi hecaiife Modes ofjhinking are with all the Farts of Tijuej ami DI f5 T I K C T ACTS of yet not to co-exiji with all the Thinking. But as lis Efjence is Differences of I ime. Now I eternal and immutable^ without acknowledge I cannot do This, any the leafi Variation or Jlte- But in behalf of Gods Ete; nity ration v fo his Thiniiyig is one I beg leave to plead^ that if Nu7neyicaU'^DlYlDV AL God does ^ co-exiJi with the A^t comprehending all Things Differences of Time, then he arJ all the Pojibilities of Things does co-exiJl with the Diffe- at one View ♦, and is asfxt and rences of Time •, avd it by 7ra ^ermanejit and nnvariable^ and means can be f aid, that he does- as much without S U CC E S- not co-exifl with all the Dffe- S I O N au^ parts, as his Ef' rences cj Time, if it be trv.e^ fence. A nfwer to Mr. C/ar^ '5 that he does co-exiJi with all 3d Defenfe, pag. 3 3, 34. the Differences of Time. — To fay, God exifis all at once, is to' fay that he aBually exifis in time pa fi, pre fcnt, avd t& come ^ that is, that Time pajl is not paji, and that Time to come is come, and was always come. Bvt to pvefome SatisfaBion to thofe who think it an Imperfe- iiionfor Goi to co-exifl with the f ever al PaUsofTiwe, Idefire it may he confidered, that if God Operates at different Times, and takes up the Space of Six Days in the Creation of the iVcrld, redeems Ma7tkind 4.C00 Tears after, %ndwill judge Men in a Time not yet come •, then he Operates not all at once : And if he Oyerate^ mt allot oyice, then he Exiffs not all at once : For if * Note : All tharis here argued concerning Gods cr-eKirting with the Differences of Time, may in the very fame manner be applied to his co-exiftiog with the different Pares of Plaee or Exteuffax h ( iti ) he exjjlei all at owe, there covU hs rd diJlifiHioii of Time in its Opcratioiis Pajl, prefent^ and to corns y invjl he attributed to the Being that Operates, as welt as to its Uperations, becaufe Operatiom at ai^eient 7i7ne!!.fiipp(fe SucctiTion in the Nature of Things and Exijiirg ad at o^ice.fitppofes no Succeilion : -ifd con-^ fcqite7itly. if there is a SuccefTiojizV; the Nature of Things there is vofuch Thing in Nature as Exifirgalt at once. Now if there is no Imperfe&ion in Juppojing that God A^s at different Times ^ as there is mt .* V'^hat hnperfeSion can there he in fiipp^fing that hi does not exif now at the time of the genfral JiidgMcnt, any 7?iore than that be is not flow judging the y^orld ? ElFay concerning the life of Reafon, &c. pag. 53, 54- This Difficulty voiimiifl: hyno meanspnfs over* nnfatisfied ; becaufe the Author of the ElTay her^ cited, is believed to be a Perfon, whofe Ileaibniiig you cannot flight. But to proceed novf (as you fay) to the ^i^Jfioii it Arifvv'./'< i8* three Heads there mentioned. I anfwer .■• Tfljole Romidnefs (as you call it J that is, the Name of the Siiiti of the Curvities of the lit- tle Arches that conftitute a Circle •, And, th^tphols Mode cf Motion of a Clock, that is, the Name of the Sum ofacertain Number of Motions-, And, Covfcioufnefs or Thinkings that is, as yoU fuppofe^ the Name of the Sum of ten Thoufand dijlinct Mo-pd^. j^, O 2 ^% twfii, cr of a number of any other Qua-ities void of Ccnfc icufuefs . do all pla-inly belong to tht Thii d fort of Qualities I mentioned •, That is, they are all plainly nothing but bare ]SJa})ies oj Wholes^ mere extcival I)e7W7nhtatwvs^ fo far as their Idea is difte- %li^tae ^^^^'^ ^^^^" ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ conftitnent Parts •, and are 151, 152, nothing at alljjeally in the Things themfelvee. 1 5g', 1 $4,' Which whether It can pcfTibly be the true> J$*^of Confricufnefsi making it nothing at all really in the Thinking Kibfiance it felf , but a mere emp- ty and foreign Kama •, I leave every Man to judge frcm his own Experience. For my contending that Thhikhg was not fuch a bare external Name of a number of Qualities, but it lelf a real diJlhiB ^lality in the Thinking Sub- ji^effeB. on ftance : you before called my Idea of ThivUvg a art' De- jnere Chimera of viy omiframmg, (though! believe tenfe, M- ^q j^^gj-, (.3^ }^^]p beine confcious of the like Chi- 60. • 1 • r ir A 1 jrfw.to ^f^^^^ in himleir •,") And now you repeat it again^ ^ciDejenfe,ln anfwer to which, I refer )''ou to what has been fag. 19. already faid, 7,d Defevfe^ pag. 168, 169.) and to what you will prefently give me Occafion to add further upon this Head. 20 Anfw. pag, Ycu allcv? that no ^lalhy cat! refde hi a Syjle?}! of Mi^tter. hilt what imijl he ahmysm a certain Senfe of the fa?fie hivd with the If hole that refiilts from the Farts •, (that is to fay, of the fame kivd with It felf-^ But I fuppofe 3^ou mean, of the fame hvd with its ccvflitv(rt Paits {) >Jamely, that the Parts vivjl he jo far of the fwie iiivd, as to have a Tendency, &c, j4vd that in That Sejfe^ you have always allowed Con- fciovfvpf to covfijl of Powers of the fame kind. 3d* Def. But I have proved at large in my Third Defevfe, faj^m* that Motions (or any other Qualities void of Con- fcioufnefs) can be in no S^nfe ol the fame kind with Con- fag. 20 ( "3 ) Conrdoufnel^-. -And I have fhownyw/w»', that See afj^ye, they cannot poiilbly in any Senfe have any Ten-'^^- 202, dency towards it, any more than Colours or Modes °5* of- (Colour, can have any Tendency to Soimi or Smell The iiphiBBehigsin a SyJIetri of MatterjContribute, AnCvf.pas, yoiafay, towards Thinkhig ; as (be Pieces of a Circle 21* do towards a Circle. That they cannot do fo •, and that there is no Analogy, no Smilitude in the leaft, between the Things you compare together , I have (hown at Isge in my Third Bcfevfe •, and particiiUrly pag. 148, 149. to which I refer you and the Rea- der. You allege, that in order to contradiB you, it mujlp.ig. 2r» he affirmed^ that every ^lalitythat inheres in aSyJlem of Matter^ mnfl inhere Wholly in each Part of it: That Roundnefs is an Injlajice^ that a Power may inhere p.tg.^ti* hi a Syflem of Matter, jpithout being the Sum of Powers of the fame hnd^ that is, of Whole RoundnefTes : , That ft is as iijipo^ble that Whole CovfcioufnefsJljould.p'^*'^9* exij} in each of the diffin^ Parts of a Sy/hm of Mat- ter, as that Whole Roundnefs fJjouldexijl in each Part of a Cin]e : And that, vvhfs in a round Figure each ^ ^ ^. part mufi be Wholly round \ and in a confcions Syjlem of Matter^ each part mujl be Wholly confcims ; and in that Sen&conjifl of Powers of the fame kind ' not onejlep can be taken in defenfe of Mr ClarkV Argu- ' ment. To all this, I thinlc I have already given a clear and diftind Anfwer. Third Defenfe^ pag. 148, £51, Inreprefenting Part of which Anfwer, you make?*<£' ^^- it amount to this ridiculousPropDlition-, that though Roundjiefs covjijls of Parts, none of which can pojibly O 2 he C 2.14 ) ]}e Rcvfid •, yet, ifCovfciovfrffs Inheres In a SyJIetn of Jl^atlei in like vianytey with Koimdnefs-^ that is, if^P Covjijlsoj Paits-^non-" 35, where, you ieem willing to allow, that That 3<^j 3S. Power in Matter, whereof 3''ou contend Thinking to be a Mode, is a Power jou pretend not to know ^ a VowQs: mthwnn to iis, ^nd. of which we have no Idea, no diJiivB Conception in our Minds ^ and which you kjiow not whether it be Motion or no. See above, "Whatever it be, I have fhown that the fame Ar- fag. 214, guments hold equally againft Thinking's being **^ a Mode of that unknown Power, as againft its being a Mode of Motion. But that which I would here remark, is this. If it is ahfohitely impofile (as Aofw. ^ag. you elfewhere affirm) to prove that there are two 7^' di-ferent Subjiajtces in the World^ becaufe we have not Ideas of them ^ how can we know there is any fuch unknown Power in Matter, without having an Idea of it ? And if it can be known that thtxt is ?i ^lality in Matter, of which we have wo Idea • why can it not as well be known that there is a SiibfioJtce in the World, of which we fag^^ 1^. have no Idea ^ If there be (^syou fay) vo other J'ejl of Truths but the Perception of the Agreement or Djj agreement of Ideas \ how can we affirm any thing concerning a ^laliiy^ of which we have vo Idea ^ If Vificiilties which cannot be perfeBly cleared, are (according to you) Contradi^ions and P£' ^6. ^hfurditiss ; why is this important Difficulty- left uncleared ? Again : If it be true fas you fag.^u affirm in another place J that iinlefs we have an ' Idea of the Creation of Matter out of Nothings we vivft inevitabh conclude Matter a Selfexijient Being ♦, . hrw comes it not to be as evident, that, unlefs we have an Idea of the formation of a Thought out of fuch Qiialities of Matter as we have no Ide ii ( ail ) tdcci of, i^^e muft inevitabl}'- conclude tliat Mattcf cannot think ? and, that, unlefs we have Ideas of thofe Qualities which we have vo Ideas of^ there can be no fuch Qualities in Matter ? But all this, is only upon \ cur ovn Siippoftiom : For the im- hwwn ^mliti you make Me to afcribe to Matter, M- 3f^ in order to enable it to aft upon immaterial Sub- fiance •, is not (as I juft now iTiew) a real ijihe- See abovtf rent Quality, but only ^ Power oi Qcca[i07i oi ex-i"^^- 21^, citing Modes in another Siihjed. You obferve further, that if the Soul be an ^"Z"'- i"^^ Immaterial Subftance, it is a great Diffculty to ^ 5* conceive how by a mere Preference of the Mind we can move our Hand, and caufe it to reft again, when we will : Whereas, if Thinking be nothing but a Mode of Motion^ or Matter in Motion, TJjat Dif- ficulty is entirely at an End -, there being then no- thing in it harder to be underftood, than how the Hand of a Qoch is moved by the 1 f eights or Syring. 'Tis very true : If there be no Liberty of jVillat all, then all the Difficulties concerning the Man- ner of it, are entirely at an End. Thus Des-Cartes put an End to all the Dijicidties concerning the Kncii ledge and Perception of Brutes^ by denying thatjthey have any fuch thing as Sevfe, Ki-owlcdgc^ or Perception at all : And it' you had deprived your human Machifies, as he did his Brutal ones, of all Senje and Perception, all Knowledge and Underjlani- hg, as well as all Liberty of inil \ fome further Dijficulties^iW^ concerning the Nature oiThijilavg and Perception in general, would have been alfo entirely at an End. And thus, if I fhouldfay I 'could entirely put an End to all the Difficulties a^ bout Opticks, by fuppoling that Men have no Byes et all, I Ihould likewife fay very true : But who would ( ill ) would thank me for the notable Difcoverj, I caflf- not tell, ^nd yet there is a Difficulty even upon your own Suppofition, greater than you feem to be aware of. For by what Impilfe, by what Frefereme^ by what Poj^gr,That Matter frji and orighially hegarito move, SeeBoytes which you fuppofe impells both the Weights of a fhf year Clock and the Thkkivg AJaterkh in a Man •, is juft 1704, ta^.^^ dijicvh to conceive, as how, by a 7nere Preference ^6,?ic. of the Mivdj without any external Impulfe, we 2(^ Edit, can caufe our Hands to move, fag. 122, Edit, Vou go on in the next place to confider my Ar- guments againft the Pollibility of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion. To my firft, viz. that Modes of Motion are no- thing hilt particular Amotions, and cannot contain any thing in their Idea heyoiid the Geniis of Motion •, and that therefore we have the fame intuitive ceitainty that Confcioiifnefs cannot he a Mode of Motion., asrve have that any one thing is not another^ whofe Idea is Anfw. pg. themoji remote frojn it that is pojible : You reply ; ^^iSloi^'Jhat we have no Idea of all the pofjihle Modes of Motion ; That though we have indeed Ideas of the 7nore fi?nple Modes of Motion., yet of the very com- plex ones we have no diJlinEi Conception in our Minds ; Th at therefore we can no more prove or hiow thai Thinking is not one of thefe more complex Modes of Motion, than we can hww whether two things a- gree or differ from one another, that we have no /- dea^ at all ^ That it is vat poffihle for us to fay that Thinhing does not cojijifi in the peculiar Motion of theSphits in the Brain, till we have a particular Idea of the Motion of thofe Spirits, and an Idea of Thinking as fomethivg diJlinB from a Mode of Motion ; That Thinking has the gems of Motion^ h hf arijivg from Motioiij by being varied by Mo^- tion^ by producing ether Motions, by having Sue- cejjion and Pai ts and innumerable Modifications ; That 710 Idea of hmnjin Confcioufnefs can be produced be' pnd the gemis of Motion ^ That faying ipe have an iJituitive Certaiyity that Confciovfnefs cannot be a Mode of Motion., k only affirming the ^lejfion In de- bate^ which can figmfy nothing to any Body that wants ConviSion, Sec. Now in all this, you have at 1 aft plainly de- clared the T^^-nv -^iiiSi©- of your whole Hypothe- cs ^ namely, that you intend to malce Thialdng not a real ^ualitr^ but a 7nere empty Name or extern ^d DeF. ^al Devo7mnatio7tj fuch as I at firfl" ranked under f'^« i54» the Ihiid Head. For the mcft complex Modes of Motion poifible, whatever A^ame we call them ^>y, are flill nothing but Motions ^ and the Na7ne we give them, is nothing but a mei-e extcr- 7:al ]Jeno7}iination. 7hi7iki7tg therefore, according tp ycu, being only a very complex Mode of Mo- tion [ox of any other Quality of Matter'] is likewife nothing but a rnere external Name or Deno7?ii7}ation of that Mode. Which Notion of 3''ours concern- sse ^nr^^, ing Thinking, is certainly a mere Chi7nera ^ and to ^d Def*. a very abfurd one. f^g- ip- Every Man has within himftdf the Idea, (or,^-5 ^f all Others the moft intallibk way, of knowing a thing to be true. AnCvt.pag. We cannot indeed frame in our Minds diftind 36' Images of the more complex Modes of Motion, as we can of the more fimple Ones : But are we not, neXrerthelefs, equally certain that they are all a- like Imaginable, though our narrow Imaginations cannot comprehend them ? And that, if we could reprefent them to our Imaginations, they would all appear as remote from the Idea of Thinkings as any One of them does ? Becaufe we cannot comprehend in our Imagination a diftinft Con- ception of a vajl number in Arithmetick, as we can ofafmall one •, do we not therefore know, but that a vaji number may poffibly prove fo diffe- rent from a Small one, as to turn into a Flant or an Animal ? Becaufe we cannot form in our Minds an Image of a Space Ten thoufand Aiilliom of A/f/^5 fquare, as we can of ten foot fquare ; are we not therefore fure, but that the great f\:)ace may pofilbly be fomething, whofe true Idea fnallhave no i no Simlitude, no Relation to Extenfion ? If I fhould plead in Fa\70iir of A < oti 071' sh^mg 9. Mode of Jhigme, (as you do for Jhivhvgs being a Mode of Motion^ that, though we have mieed Ideas of pag. ^i. the more jimple Modes of Figure, yet of the very com* jilex ones we have no diflhiB: Cotice^^^tion in our Minds i and that therefore, though we are fare indeed that a Triangle or a Square is not a Motion, yet we can no more prove or kjww that Motion is not one page 57, of the vwre co?fiplex Modes of Figure, than ws can know whether two things agree or differ from one, another, that we have no Idea tf at all: If I fhould argue thus, I fay, I know well what Ma* thematicians would argue concerning Me : And I can guefs what Anfwer I ihduld deferve, if I fhould tell the World further, that it is rot yofji- ^^^_ ,3 hie for us to fay that Colour does not confifl in a & 37". peculiar mixture of ten Thoufand various Sounds, till we have a paiticidar dif}in& Idea of the refult of the mixture of thofe ten Thoufand Sounds. / may call Scarlet-colonr, if I pleafe, a very com- plex- Mode oi: Somid ; and who fhall confute m^,. hy producing the particular diflinB Idea of the refult /j.rg. 57, of a peculiar mixture of ten Thoufand Sounds ? And you may callThinking, if you pleafe, a very complex Mode of Motion: Yet neither of them will, by either of our Confidence in giving Things Names, be ever the nearer becoming fjch in reality. This I think, clearly fhows your Notion to be fomething more than a di^culty that camiot be perfeclly cleared ; that is, (according to youj fomething 7nore than aji Jbfurdity and Con" tradition •, But / will be content to look upon it, as being but barely contnidiBory and abfurd. P Te C ii(S ) To my fecond Argument, vi%. that, ifThhilh^ Upas a Mode or Species of Motion, it would jolloiv that all Motion woidd be a decree of Ihiukiug: You pi. 40. reply, that you do allow, that eveiy Motion is a degree of Thought, in that Seyfc wherein it is proper to fay that every Motion is a degree of Fire, See, That is ; you allow every Motion, to be as much a degree of the Senfation itfelf-^ of Heat, for in-^ fiance, or of any other Seiifation or Thought ari- iing in the A'lind -, as it is a degree of that Mode of Motion in Matter, which excites in us fuch or fuch a particular Senfation: You allow every the floweft Motion of a Needle to be as much and as properly a degree of Pain, as it is a degree of that Motion which caufes it to prick the Skin ; You allow every Motion of a particle of Air, to be as truly a degree of the Thought and Reafon of a Man •, as it is a degree of that Mode of Motion, which, ftriking the Ear, excites in us the Senfa- tion of Sound: You muft by the fame reafon have allowed, if it had been defired of you •, that a Streight Line is as much a Piece of a Motion, as at is a piece of the Figure of a Triangle. But I accept contentedly what you do allow -, and I do not defire to be allowed any more. To m^y third Argument, viz. that if Thinking was a Mode of Motion, then Motion would be a more generical Power than Thinking ^ whereas on the con- fag. 40. trary, Sec. Your Reply is fo uncertain and ob" 1'' 4^) fcure, that 'tis hard to know what to make of it. The Strength of the Argument, which you pre- tend you cannot underftand, was plainl}'' this : That no particular Mode of any Power, can contain mider it fo great a Variety of Modes, as the Superiour Power it f elf does; for the fame reafon that Quadri- lateral i t 227 ) lateral Figure^ which is a Mode of Figure^ caiiiioi contain mider it fa great a Variety of Alodes^ as I^i^ gure in general does: Aiid that therefore^ if Thinking was a pa} ticidar A'^ode of Motion, there could 7ict pojibly he fo many Modes of Thinking, as there are of Motioji. But now, on the contrary^ tis evident there are more Modes of Thifiking, than there are of Mo* tion ^ becaufe every Mode of Motion has a Mode of Thinking [an Idea] anfwering to it, and there are in- mimerable other Modes of Thinking befdes : Thinking therefore camiot pojjibly be a Mode of Motion, j^ And the fame Argument holds againjf the VoJjibiUty of its being a Mode of atiy other Power of Matter whatfo- ever.] This is in fhort the Sum of that Argu- ment, which, 3^ou Ccif, yon are perfe^ly at a lojs to know what it means. To knew what it means, 1 be- lieve ever}'' Man, except your felf, is very able 5 But to know what to anfwer to it, you itilght v/ell be perfectly at a lofs. Inflead of anfwering it therefore, you were refolved to be even with me for offering you an Argument you could not nn- derftand ^ and would needs fay fomething in op- i)ofitian to it, vvhich yoii were fure neither / nor any Body elfe could underftand ; namely, that Ideas are not Alodes, but Objects of Thinkincr.^:^^' 43" . However, this being maniicftly abfurd, you con- 22' 2'-^ tradicl your felf again in the next page, and f^.y it miijl be allowed that every difinct Thought, | that^.r^. ^^; is, every Idea] is a particular Mode of Thinking -, and fo Thinking vnij} in its have a great number of Modes. But yet, for all that, you fay, our Thoughts are finite and limited ^ and we comprehend only th^ iiioT e fiviyle Modes of Motion and Figure; and, fincQ our Thoughts are all limited in point of Nuynher^ you fee no reafon from their Variety 7iece(farily to p^g, 4^^ conchidcj that hnjnan Thinking cannot be a Mode P 2 / (f C ii8 ) of AJctmu You fee m refolved incleed not to/^e the Keafcn: But the Reafon is vifible enough, and will force any Man to fee it, that does not {hut his Eyes-, viz. that, there being mor6 Variety of jy.odes of Thirkivg, than there is of Abodes of Mo^ twit -J and ail the Alodes of Mctioii (^though we cannot actually attend to them, becaufe theif t^umber is infinite,) anfwerirg only to ctiefpecies of the Modes of Thwhug^ fwhich Modes of Thinking under that om fpecies^ are likewife in- f nite in number •, ) 'tis plainly, and for the very fame reafon, as impolTible that Ihhiklvg fhould be any one of the infinite Number of iht Modes cf Alcticji, as that Figure in geveral {hoold be any one of the infinite number of ih^ Modes of ^a- dj Hater al Figure. Pi' A")' Ycu add : If we ccvjider hut the prodigious Va- riety of Souvds^ which are called diflim t Modes of Sovjjd-^ it is as eafy to conceive^ that upon fuppoftion of Thiiihivg heivg a Mode of Alotiori, itjhoiild have the fcveral Modes that we are ccvfcious it has-, as that Souvd fliQiild have all the dijliitct imnnnerahle Modes which That has. But from what has been faid, 'tis evident, that as all the Modes of S'oin/i, though infinite in Number, yet bear no Propoi- ticn to the infinite Variety of the Modes of in- f nite other things put all together ^ fo the infi- nite Mofles of Motion, and their correfpondent Ideas, bear no proportion to the infinite Varie- ty of infinite other Modes of Thinking t And that therefore Thinking with its infinite Variety of Modes, can no more pclTibly be a Mode of Motion^ though the Modes of Motion be allowed to be capable of infinite variation \ than Colours^ or Smells, or any other thing that has no flmilitude to ( 22P ) to tliefe, can be any of the infinite number of tlie Modes of Sound. My fourth Argument, was drawn from the Authority, ^nd hom the Reafomng oi Mv Lock. I The Authority, you profefs to defpife. pag. 45- 'To the Reafoning, you anfwer \ that UliLoclis pag. 45. whole dejign in the Piijfage I cited, was not to prove thixt Human Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion^ but that Thinlwig in ths Deity cannot depeitd on the Motion of the Parts of a Corporeal Syf}m \ and that, a<: the ^ejlion is not the fame, fo fom<^ of the Covfeqiiences that Mr Lock draws from thofd Principles, a feet only that real'y ahfnrd Snpp fition of Thinkings being a Mode of Motion in God. I reply : 'Tis very true, that Mr Loc/i indeed is not there pro\nng that Thinking in Man., but that Thinking in God cannot be a Mide of Motion-^ and that Some of the Confequences he there draw.s, do indeed afiedl only the latter Qjieftion, and not the former. But, if the Reafoning he ufes, be as ftrong in one cafe, as in the other i and the Con- fequences I made ufe ot from him, were only fuch as afPed both Queftions alike ^ (for which I ap-Seeg^D^- peal to every Reader-,) 'Twas by no meanscon-/'^'/'^' P-jS- fiftent with Ingenuity and Candor, for ynu to in- ^^5, 160. deavour to impofe upon your Readers with fo Vireak an Anfwer. To my laft Argument, Twhich alfo you feemAafvv./'^£. unwilling to under ft and,) viz.. that, if Thinking^^^ was a Mode or Species of Motion •, then, in like man- ner^ (US it is a proper Exprejfion to fay, that Circu-r larity is one Species of Figure, and Sqvarejiefs a ft- cond., and Cubicalnefs a third, and Elliptic ahiefs a fourth ^ fo it would be proper alfo to fay., that Qr- P 3 cular C ^30 ) citJav Motion 7^ one Sjjecies of Motion, and Aiptlo7i In a Square a fccnvii^ and Amotion hi an Ellipjis a third^ and Tinnking or Confcloufncfs a fourth •. (which Confequence, I think, is abundanty abfurd:) You reply, by quibbling upon the word proper^ that the Argument has relation only to propriety jf*"|- 47' of Language^ and that jt-ou fee not what ground I have to contcjl this Language with you : "Whereas the Qiiefticn was net whether it was proper with refpcdt to the Lavgv.age^ but with refpedt to the Senfe i, that is, whether it was True according to 3^our Hypothecs, and a jvjl and necejfary Confe- quence from it, to fay that Thinldng difters no qtherwife from Ch'cular Aiotion^ than Circular Mo- tion does from Elliptical Motion or from Motion in a Sqrare : And this, it feems, ^'^as you are indeed this time very liberal in 3''cur ConceiFi- ons,j you are willing to gr^mt ; And I am \yell contented with the Conctnion. Aufw.fag. T Tpon the Queftion, r;hether ituliindual Ferfonallty 5"> 5f> can be preferved by a continual tr an f erring of ^'^' Confcioif fiefs frojn one parcel of Afatter to another^ in Jo flitx a Subfa?ice as the Brain or Spirits ^ )''oii repeat what you had before advanced in your Rc' fexions. In anlwer to which, I fhall net repeat, but only defire the Reader to compare what I of- fered in my Third Defofe.x^ag. 176-132,6?' 19^-- 198. And I fliall here make only fome brief in- cidental Obfervations on what feems new in youi reply. See §<£ In the firiR: place 3^ou difown none of the Ab" Vtfcfifc, f^^j.^ Confequences I charged on your Hypothefls. ^^' 10/ You deny not, but One ~Snh(lavce may he Confcio^^s 5^.' of an Actions having been dojse b\ itfelf which really was vet dc^e by h, bid by Amthey Sitbfance ^ you make ( ijl ) iTialce huJivldual Ferfoiiality to be a inere exterval^^f^v.pag imagwaiy Dewmmxtion^ and all Self-Cojifci ohfuefs <3r ' °7» 7}iere Dreaiii and Delujion ^ you own that 07w Man may pojjibly he two Ferfons^ and 2 or 2 co Me7i w/^ compare FerfoVj that is, not Ferjons exaBly Like one another, ^dDe fen fe^ but all really and truly one and the fame individuals^' ^'^'^'•> Perfon, at the fame time that they continue fo many l^^'^^!^'^ diJHnB, intelligent, rational Men. Thefe Abfurdi-yi, 74. tics, I fay, you have not denied to be unavoid- •able Con'fequences of yom Hypothecs ; nor have you done any thing towards clearing them from being Abfurditics-, but inftead thereof-, have only "^' ofltred fome loofe Objedions againft what I pro' pofcd under this Head. You fay you arefm e, that my calliytg your Hy- ^ f»>.p,^, pothefs an impoJJiLle one, and injlead of faying a ^ ^' JFord to prove it i7npoJible, i?nmediately arguing on thefuppofticn of its Fojjibility •, is begging the ^lejlion, midfuppofng what I was to prove. The particular Hypothefis here referred to, (vi'x.. that Memory 7nay be prsfcrved in a Jleeting Suhjlance, by continu- ally repeating the Ideas^ and impiinting them afrep ' upon new pai tides of Matter perpetually fucceeding in the room of thofe that pafs away.) was, I faid, ai| impolfible Hy\:othefis-, And an impoifible Hy- pothecs it will always appear to be, till you can £i]d out fome new Hypothecs, by which to make it intelligible, how it is polfible that new Ideas printed upon new Particles, fhould be a Memory of old Ideas printed upon old Particles. But I did not enlarge upon this •, becaufe, fuppofing the Poffbility of it, yet it would avail nothing to- wards your main purpofe •, the Queftinn being, not whether 5the Memory in general of fuch or fiich an Adtion's having been done, might pof- iibly be preferved in the manner you fuppofe •, P 4 but; b ( 2.5i ) but whether the Cojifcioitfuefs of Its being done by Me, by 7fiy own hidividiiai Selfin particular, could in this manner be continued. ISIow how it was in me a b^gghig of the ^leftion^ to argue, that, even on Suppofition of thePoilibility of the Hypothe- sis now mentioned, yet it would never thelefs be impoffible for you from thence to make out the Conclufion you were to prove ^ I confefs, I un- derhand not : Neither do I underftand how you can prevail upon your felf to difpute in fuch a manner. P^S 65. A Matt, you fay, who, during a; JImrt Ffcjiz^y^ kills Sinoxh(:T. atid theji retmtisto himfelf, without the leafr Covjcio^ifnefs of what he has done • cannot attri- bute that ABion to Himfelf-^ and therefore the mad, ?ylan and the fober Man are really two as difiina Per- fon as any two other Men in the World, and will be fa cc7ijidered in a Court of Judicature. Extraordinary Reafoning indeed! Bccaufe im figurative SenCe a. Man, when^ he isirad, is faid tiotto he Hittifelf-^ and in aforeffick Senfe, is looked upon as not an- fwerable for his own Actions \ therefore in the Natw ral and Philofophical Senfe alu), his Actions are not his own Actions, but another Perfons j and the fame Man is really two dijlinct Perfons ! f. •aBions that never were^ to a new created Body noiv -^P'^- ^7* as to add an imaginary Covfciovfnef extending to paj Aflicvs that were done by one Body, to another Body at the Eefirre^ion. So that from your Opi- nion it u]"!avoidably follows, that I may ikw at this prcfent Time aspoffibly be created a-new a iid h^ve ancthcr 6V//'-ciificLt at the feme time with me. C 254 ) me, by God s adcing to the Under]} andlvg of a new- See Anfw. made Body fo firojig a Reprefe7itatmi of my paft P^i' 65 Adions,that That Other My-felf could not dijlingu'ijl) ^* thejnin his Mind fromth'ings really done by him -^ (as you exprefs your felr in a like Cafe :) This, I fay, is exactly as poilible, in your Hypotheiis ^ as it is for me to be raifed again at the Refiirredtion. f<*g' ^9^ Your Argument, by which you endeavour to 70 & 7<5, yetort upon me, that, according to my Notion of Individual Perfonality, there can be no Refurredi- on, nor any fuch thir.g as Perfonal Idenity at all ; is founded upon a fallacious Reprefentation, as if, by the fa/ne indiyidv.al nuvmical Ccnciojifnefs, I un- derftood the fame individual numerical A^ of Think- hig : Whereas the ijuiividual umiierical Cojifcioiifnefs^ which Identifies the Perfon, is that Perception, by which the Perfon is fenfible, that his Paji Acts of Ihinldng were his own Thoughts and not another^ ^ Which Perception, in the fame continued Being, is a true Memory, and can hetrue in that one nume^ rical Being only •, But in your fleeting Being, it would be afa'fe Memory^ a mere Delufton, and might be impreffed on any number of Beings at one and the fame time : All v/hich, diftinft, intelligent,ra- tional Beings, becaufe they happened to be in the !>»£• 72. fame Dream, you would affirm to be one and the fame individual Perfon •, And, for the fame rea- fon, if twenty Piecesof Money happen to be ftampt with fo like an Impreffion, that the}^ could not be diftinguifhed one from another-, you muft affirm them all to be one and the fame Individual Shilling, rotwithfiauding their being different Pieces of Silver, paving C i^y J) Having granted, that if everfo fnany Thinkhg K.7», 7?t Be'ivgs have, f not qvs mid the Same mimerical Con- Jciovfnefi^ as by your Comparifon of a vaft bulk of fenfdt[fs Matter being added to a A-Ian's Body, yoa v/ould very artfully insinuate, incontradiftionto the whole courfe of your Argument and mo ft ex- prefs Conceifions ; but) having granted, I fay, and contended, that if ever fo many dijlhiU Thhikmg Be'ivgi have within themfclves a Like Coufci' oiifvefs^cv a Like prefevt Reprfentation of paJiA^i- pm^ they cayi all coyijlhiite hut one and the fame Per- fon ^ You ask me, whether each of thefe diftindt Thinking Beings muft not unavoidably think himfelf the fame Perfon that did the Adion, and the fame Perfon that every one of the reft will likewife diftindly think himfelf to be ? I an-See-t^avr, fwer, as before ^ They muft indeed miavoldahlyPi- '^'i^* think fo ; But in fo doing, they muft alfo una- voidably be vujlakcn : And fo, according to your Notion, we are all miavoidably we know not who^ and do but fancy and dream our felves to be the Perfons we think we are, and write and reada-5^Def. bout we hww notlFhomnorWhat. V-^i ^8a» To your taking Refuge in the Jujiice of God, I have already anfwered •, that the Qiieftion is not, whether God will do an abfurd thing, but whether in the nature of things it be poffible to be done. And whereas you allege that if God f mild M^'Pl^ caufe to cxijl twenty prefert Keprefevtations of the^^' fame pajlfinful Anions in fo many diJlinB Beings^ the , confequevt Punipment would he twenty times as much as thefnjul Actions dtferved and his Jitjlice required ^ and that therefore God will not do any fuch thing : I reply •, The Difficulty does not lie there ^ Becaufe the Puniiliment due to the iingle Perlbn's finful Actions, might be divided proportionably among 75. ( i3<5 ) aniong the twenty diftindl intelligent Beings, which in your way are One and the Same In- divi£l4jal Perfon •, and fo accordivg to you, there would be no Injuftice done, becaufe the Punifli- ment would not be more than the Offences de- ferved : And yet 'tis manifeft, that hi reality^ 1 9 at leaft of thefe 20 diftinct intelligent Beings would be punifhed unjuftly, how fmall a propor- tion foever they bear of the Punifhment ^ be- caufe they would be punifhed for what they had never been'guilty of at all, however by a falfe Covfcjoiifiicfs they might hnaghia themfelves to have doyie what they 7iever did. The Cafe you put, of a Perfon living well for fome Years, and afterwards forgetting that he had done fo, and then living for the future in all manner of Debauchery ^ is fo far from being zr\ Ahfiirdityy as you call it, upon my Notion of Perfonal Identity^ that, on the contrarr, there is no manner of Difficulty in it. The Man is not two Perjons, as much a% any two Men in the iForld are two Perfom ^ (which you declare he muft he, in confequence of joztr Principles-, A Confequence fufficient to have convinced almofl any Man, of the Falfity of the Principles from which he fees and owns fuch an Abfurdity to toUcw -J But he is, I confefs, fas you add in the next Words,) asi much two Perfom as the fa?ne Man Mad and Sober is two Perfojis •, that is, he is not at all tvo Perfovs.hMt plainly one and the fame Perfon ^ and fhall juflly be punifhed as his Iniquities deferye. P^s- Si, You urge, that my Argument is no more ufc- ^'^' ful to the Ends of Religion, than yours •, becaufe, imlefs the Soul, as ap Immaterial Being, did perptuah b\ C ^57 ) Jy Tlmfk ^ a Vroof of the Immate) iaUty of the Soul, would not necelTarily prove a future State of Re- wards and PinnJ})mejits : And upon this you are pleafed to make your felf merry, in a very needlefs manner. Now what Connexion there is between the Soul's Immateriality, and its Perpetual Thivkivg-^ has been confidered elfe where. InthisiftDcf, place it may be fufficient to add, that whether the^"^ ^5, hnmateriality and Immortality o^ the Soul neceflarily'^'^'fj'pf^ infer its perpetual adlual Thinking, or not, yet mypag, i \^^ Argument is evidently ufeful to Religion, bye^rc proving at leaft the Pofinlity and great Probability of a future State of Rewards and Punil"hments \ And yours is evidently i^/n/ff;i;e of Religion, by n>aking a Future State of Rewards and Punifh- inents not only Improbable^ but Impojjible -, feeing it infers (as I have at large fhown) an abfolute impofibility of a Rejiirre&2c?t of the fame Perfon j And if a Refurredion were polTible, yet, by in- troducing fuch an abfolute and fatal Ndcej/ity of all human Actions, as Mr Hobbs and Spinoza formerly attempted to eftablifh by the fame m- Tnerical Argument, (though from your Thijiking in the fame way^ I would not conclude you All to be the fame Individual Perfon ; ) it manifeftly makes all future Reward unreaforable^ and all PuniJImient unjujl : Of which m.ore, immediately. My fiift Argument to prove your Notion de- ftrudive of Religion, was, that by irf erring the Ne- cejjity of all Human ABiovs^ it makes Men to be SubjeHs no more capable of Religion^ than Clocks and Watches are. To this you reply, Fiift, that Thinking's being^'^f^- to a Mode of Motion in anySyfiem of Matter, (which is r^'f'^ ^^' the Suppofition I refer to, that deftroys all Liber- 55'^'^'^' (y of Will,) is 910 where affirmed by you. But this 3s a mere Quiblcj as I have iliown at large. Third Def. pag. 159. And above pag. 214, 215. ibid. 111 the next place therefore, you aniWer feri^ oufly ; that Meit avdOoch Ag^.eeivg ijt beiiig oie- cejjarily deter7mnedin alltheir JBions^ does no more , prove tbem to be alike incapable of Religioji •, than an *Seerf. Immaterial Siihjlance and a Clock's agreeing in be- ^jw,^t£. ing ^ extended, poves them to be a ike incapable of Religiofi. Had I not feen it, I could not hav be- lieved that either you or any reafonable Man could have given fuch an Anfwer. Necejfity, if Men and Clocks agree in it, muft make them both alike incapable of Religion ^ becaufe Nccejji- ty is the very thing, that makes any Being in- capable of Religion : But Extevfoii, fuppofing(m- anaterial Subftarice and Clocks to agree in That,- would not make Them both alike incapable of Religion ^ becaufe Extenfon is not the thing, that makes any Being incapable of Religion. Neceffity, you vmjl reply^ is not the thing that makes any Being incapable of Religion ^ What is it then, that incapacitates for Religion > l^ant Anfvi.'pag.of miderjlanding, you fay: For JHjat excludes a 55. Clock frc7n being a proper Snhje^ of Religion, but the lFa7tt of a human Under Jiandi^ig ?" and IFhat is it that viakes a Man a proper SubjeB of Religion, but his Un- ierftanding ? I anfwer : 'Tis not Underfi.^.v.ding, but Ifill^ that makes a Man capable of Reliction ; and 'tis not irantof Under (landing, but Want of mil and of a Power of a&ing freely, that makes a' Clock in- capable of Religion. For, fuppoimga Clockto have the Underftanding of a Man -, yet if, for all that Underftanding, it continued fo be moved' by the Weights as neceffarily as it is Now, 'tis manifeft it would Then have no more Power of do'm^ chhQY good or evil, than it has Ihw 5 And ths ( i3P ) _ the only difference would be, that it would then Know and undeiftand it felf to be incapable of Religion, whereas now it is incapable of Religi- on without undei Handing or being fenfible that it is fo. And to make it appear, that NeceJ/ity in an In- telligentj as well as in an Unintelligent Being, in- capacitates for Religion ; and that there can be no Religion without Freedom of inil •, I offer on- ly the following Argument. Religion fuppofes a future State of Rewards and 'PimiJImievts -^ and a/«- tiire dtate of Rewards and Fiinijlnnevts, fuppofes that God is ^leafed and difpleafed with the different Adions of Men ^ and God's manifcfl:Ing his dif-^ pkafure towards certain Perfons by pumjimig them finall}'", fuppofes that fuch Fimijhment is jujl and that the Perfons deferred it : For God camiot err. Kow, if Men, with all their Under Jlandivg^ were under the fame Necejfity in all their Adions, as a Clock is in its Motions ^ then, though 3''ou would unreafonably imagin perhaps it might ferve/o?ne Z)^7^7w, of human Government, top,'/// and draw^ to drive and p?//; fuch necellary Agents with the Screws 'dwd. Spriifgs of Rewards avd Pnvifijfteiits.zs Men govern their Clocks by the Ad- dition and Subfl:raction of Weights ^ yet neither from the Hands of God or -^^o/ could the good or evil Adions of fuch intelligent Machines Deferve either Reward or Punifhment : nor could there polfibly be any JuJIice in Gods final diftribution of Rewards and Punifhments -^ nor is there an}'' rcafon why any Man fliould reproach himfelf, or be hlavied by others, (even by thofe who would be fo unreafonable as to pimijl) the MacJiine,) for any Profanencfs, Impiety or Wickednefs whatfo- ever, for murdering 2 Man ffor inftance) wirli iiis Sword, when his Hand was moved nsccfari'.y to do ( 240 ) do it, by the Adtion of Subtle Matter upon his • Brain and Spirits •, any more than it he had done it by another Man's forcibly uling his Hand and Sword : Neither is it polFible that God fhould be pjeafed or angry with any Man, for doing what he could not avoid doing ; any more than a Man can be angry with his Clock for going wrong', even fuppofing the M achine indued with Under- ftanding enough, to feel and be fenfible that its Weights neceifitated it to do fo. The Notion therefore you maintain, of Mens Adions being all Neceffaryj is totally deftruftive of Religion. Till you can give a dear Anfwer to this Argu- P'ii' 5^. ment, you ftand obliged by Promife to allojp that Mav is 710 more a Subject oj Religioji, than a Clock 5 wav, to go further J and allow that there can be 710 fuch thing as Religioti. Though, I hope, you will be better than your Word ^ and own rather, that there is no fuch thing as Neceffity. fag. 61, Before we difmifs this Argument, yon^'illex- ^■^' pe£t I fhould anfwer the two Queftions you put to me ad hojninem. Though indeed you have no reafon to expcdt it •, becaufe you knew, f but, for Reafons beft known to your feU, took not the leaft notice of it,) that they were Both of them direBly and clearly anfwered in the places from whence you had them. Fiift, you defire Mr. Clark, mho maivtaim (you fay) the Certainty of all Events, tofeow jvhjt dif- ferent Jvfliience the fiippofed 't^eceiVity of cur ABions can have on the Power of Self-determination, that the Siippoftion of the Certainty of our Aftions has 9iot. I anfwer ; Your fnppofed Neceffity is diredly contradiftory to the Vower of Self-determination^ and therefore maniftftly inconfiftcnt with it ^ But the Certaiyity I fpeak of in the place you cite, has BO ( C 241 J no ihconfiftency at all with the Power of Self-He^ ^'>y!e'i term'ivatmi^ bccaufe it means ^as is there largely Y\(i^ ^A* explained) only that 7nere Futurity, which you ^^^. 2*15, your felf muft confefs all Adiuns had while they 117. ^ were yet future, even upon Suppofition of the 2d Edic. Power of Self-determhiat'icn. For you can fuppofe, ^'l^g/^'^' what you will ?wt grant^ a Power of Self-ietermhia- tlon. And, I prefume, you cannot (itnj but every yajl Adion had, and Gvery future Adtion has a Futurity, (which is all that was meant by Certainty of Event in the place now referred to,) notwithftanding that fuppofed Power of Self-deter- jnivatioft. Secondly^ You ask, if (as Mr Clarh affirms) Bo)!e% the neceflary and eternal different Relations, j--^^^*^^" which different things bear to one another, always ^^^ 2=;5,* and mcejfarily do determin the Will of God -, and and 128. God is unalterably determined to do always what is 2d Edit, beft in the whole ^ then how can he have a Power of P,^'^^°^' Self-determination^ I anfwer^ The iV^'^^fj' there fpoken of, is only a Moral Neceifity ^ which, as to the Efe^s, may be depended upon with infalli- ble Certainty, {viz. that a Wife Being will not a£t foolifily, and a Goo^ Being will not do Evil-,) hut, as to the thing it fdf 'tis in the natural andphilofo- ^^ ^ phical Senfe, of which we are now treating,)^ no ^^j* ^^^^ NeceJ/ity at all, but mere Self-drtennination: As isat 140,2373 large explained in the Book you refer to. Which, 243, ^c. if you would have ^ taken to your felf the Chara&er l'^\^<^' of anhmmwm Adverfary, certainly 3''0u ought to ^,^^_ ,,J^ have taken fome notice ot. For t when Terms are 1 1 1, 1 :; ?, defined and Injlanccs agreeing to thofe Definitions given^ 'Po, &c. whereby all Doubt fulnejs about one another s meaning is i^^^^^'J*^ 177.' the mofl efe&iial manner exchded; To cite an Au- ^joefcnfc, thor's Words, notwithftanding this, and apply p.t^ 2S. them to a Senfe diredly contrary to what the Au- 1 i^'d^p-is. , O thor"'* . C 242- ) thor largely and exprefsly explains he intends they fhould he taken in, is no fair way of managing a Controverfy. My fecond Argument to prove your Notion de- JlriiBive of Religmtj was drawn from the Conlide- ration of the Mature of Perfoval Ident'ty, and of the pag. 230, Rfin reBiott of the fame Feijov. To which all the Re- ^c. ply you have made, has been confidered already. Anfvi.pag. To your Argument, that, if we have -w Idea of 77) &C' the Stihjlarce of Matter and of the Siihjiance of Sprite 'th hnpofjible to prove that one is vot the other ; It might be fufficient to Anfwer, that an unprejudi- ced Perfcni would be apt to think it as eafy to prove, that there is a Suhfance in the World, of which we have m Idea, totally different from the SiihflajKe of Matter-^ as that there fhould be a ^ta- lity in Matter, of which v/e have 710 Idea, totally pti' ^4» different from all the known ihialit'ies of Matter. 35' 38. gy^ t-Q pafs this over : I affirm, that from our Knowled ge ofany Being's having certain Properties incompatible with the £y^7/tzjl Properties of Matter, we may certainly infer that the Subftance of that Being 'and the Subftance of Matter are not the fame, though we have no Ideas of the Subftances themfelves. We have no Idea of hifinits •, and yet every Mathematician can demonftrate concerning Many Infinites, that one is not another -, and in fome, the exad Proportion between One and Ano- ther^ without having an Idea of either. And to pag. 33. yoiiyfelf you fay, ^tis evider.t that God mvjl he an Immaterial Beivg^ becaufe he is without Any of the Py Gperties of Matter : ( I hope you mean the pecii- liai Properties of Matter-, Otherwife £a-77?^W6-^ will be one of its Properties, as much as any of thofe you C 245 J) you mention.) The moil: EJJhitia! Piopertics of Matter v/c know, are, I think, Impmetrabiity, Di- vijihiity^ and that which Mathematicians call its Vishieuj&. If you will fay, that though thefe Properties belong indeed univerfally to all the Matter we have any knowledge of, yet, for ought we know, there nia)r be other Matter which wants thefe Properties •, and fo thefe Properties may pof- iibly not be Effeiitlal, but only Accidental to Mat- ter •, Then, 1 fay, you either mean nothing at all by the Word Matter, or q\^q yow mean by it the fame as you do by the Word Siibftar.ce ^ and then your affirming God to he ImmateriaU will be as .,- much as affirming him to have ;ro Exijlcnce. And, as to the Thhilavg Suljlavce in Man •, When 3''cu Ihall declare, that by theThhikhrg Sypm of Matter in the Brain^ you mean a Syftem ot fuch Matter, as has no Impenetrability, no DnuJiliUty, and no Fis LtertiA •, we Ihall then difpute upon a new Foot. In the mean time, iwthing feeim clearer to you^^^, gj, at prefevtj than that the Ejfence or SubJIance of Matter conJifts in Solidity-^ and that, to be Solid, is to he co-extended with the Faits of Space. Iffo^ Then the Omniprefeyit God cannot co-exift with all the Parts of Space, without being Material : And I de- fire you would be pleafed in your next, to Anfwer the Difficulties objcdted againft your Notion of Gods Immateriality J as they areexprelTed in the paf- fage I before-cited out of the Effay concerjiing the Ufe 5^^ ^^^^^ of Humane Reafon-, fubftituting only the words ^^co-pa^. 209. exifl with all the dif event Parts of Space'] all along inftead of the words [co-exifl with all the Dijfi'yctces of Time,'] and \Jmmcnfty~\ inftead oi [Eternity T] And this I infifl: on the rather^ and dt fire it the more earneftly ^ becaufe fas I before obferved J it is ge- nerally believed that That EfTay was written by a Q_ 2 Peifon, (^44 ) Perfon, with whofe Reajoimfg Cfor we are not td give any'deierence to Mthonty) you are thoroughly acquainted. As to what I faid againfc material Impiilfe being Anfw, fai, t^^-e Caufe of Gravitation •, the Ifhole^ you fay, is 83, ?4. fcvvdcdcvthh^ that becmife a Bullet^ a Feather^ ani a Piece of Leaf Gold defceud with equal Swiftvefs in Vacjio^ the- efore viateualhiipitlfe camwt be the caiife ofGiaiitatiofi. Whereas, en the contrary, this was only en incidental Infiance, to ihow by a grofs and vulgar Experiment, (what Mathematicians 3cnow there are Proofs enough of in Nature,) that Gravity is exactly propoitionable to the Quantity nf Solid Matter contained in Borlies, and not at all to the Quantity of their Supnfcies. This Pro- portion it is, that evidently Ihows Gravitation not to be caufed by Material Impulfe. And unlefs you could have found an Hypothecs, whereby either the Qiiantity of Solid ?.( atter in Bodies, and the Quantity of their Siiperfcies, could be made one and the fame ^ or, upon Mechanical Principles, Bodies could, by Stipe; fcid Contaft, receive Im- pulftspropoitionalto the Quantity of Solid Matter contained in them -, you would much moreadvan- tagioufiy to your felf, have acknowledged the firft palpable Errour; than by a heap of things befide the Purpcfe. have indeavoured toamufe only fuch Readers, a^ want Skill in Mathematicks. My faying that 37'on indeavoured to inlinuate to vfi^r Reader, that That excellent Perfon, Sir Jfaac Nevptoi.. was of your Opinion in the prefent t^tg' S 5. Qre ftion •, you affiive the Reader , is a p'lire FiBiori. But I hope you will take it in good part, that I was fo comiplaifant to you as to imagin, that you were C 2.45" ) were not your felf fo fenfible of the N^cdlefn^f-; of your Citation out of his Book, as you now ac- knowledge that you were. Yo^ *^^1 "S •, Ifn^e have not an Idea of the Creation ^xg, 91 • of Matter out of Nothing, we 7nvfi inevitably con- dude Matter a Self-exipnt Being : I anfwer ^ By the fame Argument it follows on the contrary, that if we have not an Idea of the Self-ex':J}ence of Matter^ [that is, that every diftind particle of Matter in the Univerfe, is a NecefTary, Independent, Self- exiftent Being,] we muft inevitably cojichde Matter to he a Created Bein? : And by a better Argument it follows-, ifjve have an Idea of the PoJ/ihility of the Non-E/iftence of Matter^ that is, if we have an Idea that Space can {without a (^ontradiBion) exijl vyithout Matter in it ; we nnft inevitably conclude Matter not to be a neceffarily ex'ijiing^ but a created Being. In like manner: By the fame Argument with yours, it follows, that, if we have not an Idea fas "^ you own '^ p-tg, 35. we have not) of the inherence of Thinking in M.itter^ we mujlinevitably conclude it to inhere infomething Immaterial: And by a better Argument it follows •, if we fee a dijagreemcnt of Ideas in fuppofng Thinking to inhere in Matter, we mujf inevitably conclude it to in- here in Immaterial Subjlance. What the reft of your lonfe and uncertain Dif- pug. 87, courfe about Creation and Self-Exijlence tends to, I ^c. do not well underftand : Only, I am fure, it is foreign to our prefent Qiieftion. Yet two thingSj there are in it, which, I think, deferve to be re^/ marked incidentally. ^ The firft, is •, that from thefe "Words of mine, [0« whatever Hypothefn they (that is, Athcifts") pvo- ceei. Nothing is fo certain^ cv: that Man, con'iderei JFithoht the Pi-otecfio7i and Condu^ of afupmor Bc^ Q. 3 m^ C m6 ) irg^ is in a far vorfe cafe^ than itj^cn the fnppojition ■cf the Bemg mid Goverv.mevt of God, and of Mens ' h'wg imd^er his peculiar Ccjtdiict, Frotection and Fa- voh'r{] 3'-cu iTioft 11 nca lid idly infer, that AtheiJIs, pag. 89. avcordiyg to Mr Ciaik, even while they covtimiefo^ have vo rcafcntofear ar.y thing for their disbelief tap ^Z. '^^'^ itcoiid, is this •, that, to gratify that Dejire ivhieh even Atheifs have to fee a Ti nth ejlablified, fo vnuh for t he Benfit of AJc7i •, y cu Jl)all conclude this 9' debate (yon fay,y' with an BJfay^ Jhowing a way how fug. 50. iQ demcnjlrate the hxijlence of Gcd-^ viz. by proving the Creation of Matter out of Ncthi?ig : And this you tag, 92, do, by oviittivg for the prejent fo if e fid a Dejipi^ and leaving it intirely tofovie of thofe Gentlementhat are appointed ammally to preach at the LeBiirefoimded by the HQ7ioi!ral/k Robert Boyle. Inficad of concluding therefore, as you promir fed, with an E§ay for/mg a way how to demonfirato theExijicjiceoj God^ you almoft in the fame Breath repent of fo noble an Undertaking, and end your Difcourfe with a pretended Cojnplirimtt to Me ; that you will give me upon this Cccafon a Tefimony in my TavGiir ^ viz. that you verily think I neither believe too little nor too 7niich ^ but am perfeHly and exa&ly Cj thcdox^ and in all likelihood will cvvfumefo. And fttg. 4p. confidering we have had (you fay) the Happivefs in England, to have fuch rational Farliaments and Con- vocations., that have eflab^ifjed jwthing but Truth ^ I Ihould have taken this as a Teftimcny very much in my Favour indeed ^ had you not elfewhere T^i 4$' dropt fome expreffinns concQinmg projiitutivg C071- . fcience fo far as tofvhjiit to any mere human Atttho- lag' 46. rity, ?iT[d to the Decijins and Determinations of thofe A'en., that in every Country have worldly Preferments to bejiow : Which yet iince you make no Applica- tion ( ^47 ) Hon of, neither fhall I. Only, in return for your Favour^ I fliall, inftead of giving any Teftimony concerning low, conclude with moft hearty "Wiihes, that yoM would be very careful, while you are difputing about Aieta^hyfxh, not to oppofe the In- tereft of true Religion and Virtue^ without which nothing is truly valuable or praife-worthy among Men. POSTSCRIPT. WHereas there has lately been publifhed a rude and fcurrilous Book, entituled. The Holy Spirit the Author of hnmortality. Or, A Vindication of Mr Bodwell's Epfiobry Dif" fourfe. Which Vindication the Learned Mr Dodwellhzs been fo far from difappro ving, (as there was Reafon to expedt he Ibiould have done,) that on the contra- ry he has referred to it in the following Words. The Defenfe of what I have formerly produced from the The Scrip- Fathers, I left to the Abler advocate for myCaufe, ^^i^e-^c-^ raifed up for me by Divine Providence. And again : '^thTetertut IJIwuld now have proceeded to have Vindicated my In- nervards terpretation of &c. if God himfelfhad not partly fu- or PunJfh- perfeded that part of my V'^ork, by raifing me up a more "^^nts^i^c. Able Patron. that fo Excellent a Perfon, /ojl^'.'aif utterly miknorvn to me^jlwuld prevent jne with a Defenfe fo much Better than I could have made for my f elf ' ■ I leave fo much of my T^^sky to him Q. 4 who ( 448 •) tpjjo is fo much Fitter for it- It hoh to me, like a Divivie hteryojitioti, &c. And again : How W^' 253. -much J am indebted to Providence that has appeared on this occajion, and to the Worthy Inftrument n-'ho has fo readily anfwercd the Call of Frovidencs, &c. It cannot therefore be improper nor unfeafon- able, to give the World a few Inftances of the Great Abilities That Author has difcovered in his fo highly commended Performance. In that Part which relates to the Fathers. Vhdk.if, /-p HEY {faith he) [the Philofophers] mahitahi' Pod wdl'^ -*- ^^ '^^ ^ Immiortality of the Soul] by way of EpijhUry •^^'^i'^^'^$^^'^^'^->hythelu^^ Difcourfe, Preface^ |2' ll' To' what purpofe, thepretendednaturaJ Im?fiortality ? To e^'cijl vitally for ever, foinothiugi fag. 43. The Original Belief of a Natural Immortaliiy, fug* §ppd by th^DGvil, jyas ahk,^ ..... f*Og ( ^49 ) » 'Ou jS Ji' et't/r;? SS7 7B (nv, tJi 7« ©£«. [Thus rendred, vind^cat; very learnedly.] It is iwtfo of it felf to live^ as it isP^^' ^3 7» of God. * i. e. The Soul hath not Life from Icfclf, as God hat from T^;e Refurreaion is of the FleJI) that fell; for the Spi- ^"^^ ^»^^' rit doth not fall • What then ? if it doth fome- thing ^ analogous to falling, it's as much to our Purpofe. ^ .That isy if it dies, though without fallhg to the Ground^ at the B()dy does. A very learned Diftinftion. The Soul in its natural feparation — , though Alive, f^^i- ir." h no more to the Man, than the Dead Carkafs. No created Beings can Z'^ naturally immortal, le-pgi 2$* caiife by being fiich they would be t Equal unto God, not interiour or fubjedt to him, but independent on him. t Contrary to common Senfe, and to the exprefs Declarations of All that defend the SouVs Natural Immortality, ^lemadmodum igitur Apojlolus, &c. Sic Gf pag. 27, Dens &c. [Thus rendred, without any Senfe.] Whereas the Jp^Jlle &c , So God &c, ^ In eo quod dicunt &c. [Thus tranflated, with P'^i- 4^» no Senfe.] At the fame thne they affirm &c. * i. e. In or by their atfirming. If [ the Soul be'] a God in 07ie refpedir, or as to p^^, 45. "^ One Attribute -, why not as to all the reft ^' (^ 2d * Vi^, a Created Inimortalitj', owing wholly to the Good rart,p,tg. Pleafwrc of Gcd. 14.) . Though ( 25"0 ) fag. 6i. Though he [^Athenagoraf\ fays indeed, that Men have Ferdnration without any Interruption, with refped to the Soul ^ yet this is not to be taken in a proper, but in a ^fgurative Senfe. + What is living for ever, in a Figurative Senfe P pag. 120. Then from this Opinion [of the Souls natural hn- 7nortality,~\ it will follow that its Life is ^ neceffary^ . or its Exijience ^ and why not its Propenfwm and Inclhiations ? If (b •, then the Man in confequence ■ Incapable of Sin, and no way Obnoxious to Judgment 01 Penalties on that account. Then hence it will follow, that to be Virtuous ox Vicious, is ^n Indiffe- rent thing, &c. * A'athinglefs, fug. 133. B Ex rebus igitur diverlis ac repugnantibus HOMO fadus eft ^ ut, fi &c, fit Immortalis. Si autem &c.—^ fit in tenebris fempiternis & in morte. [Thus rendred'] ^ The S O U L is made of different and repugnant Principles : So that, if &c-^ IT fhould be^Immortal : But and if, &c ^ SHE fhould be in everlafting Darknefs and Death. II i. e. M A N « made up of tn>0 different and contrary Partf, (viz. 5ok/ and BoJy :) That if, &c ; then H ¥. jJmld.be immor- tal, and injoy perpetual Light : But if, &c ; then H E jhould be in everlafling Dark^nefs and Death. The EffeEi ef which Death is rot to Kill wielded Souls, but to punifli them eternally; a^c. And much more follews, to the fame purpofe. ' * Note, fn the Errata he has put [^/Wan'] for [_t he Soul], Euc even That Correftion does not make the wiiole Senfe right. fag, 130. I amfenfible this Paraphrafe of mine, will be looked upon as Forced, byithe"^ prejudiced and ig- norant : But I matter not That. ■ * That is, by all but Himfelf. Tunc ' C ^n ) Tunc cum Anima focietate Corporis liberata, in P^tg. 130 folo Spiritu vivit : U hen the Soul behtg delivered'^ '5"' from the Society of this Earthly Body, lives or exijls in the Spirit alone. That is, (fuppoling La&antim to fpeak in a ^ Chrijlian Senfe^) when the Soul and Body Both fliall be Spiritualized^ Im7nortalized, &c. ♦ i. e. ill Mr Dodrvel'i Stiife. Homo configuratus eft ex Animo, 8cCoi-Tag.i\o, pore ; — ^terno, ^c Temporali : J^km is fajinoned, of, Soul and Body, — — Eternal and Tempo- ral, &c. There may be fome advantage taken from this Place, I forefee : But I tliink it's eafilir anfwered by this Diftin£lion : Either LaBantim here argues from Principles allowed by the Philo- fophers ^ Or elfe ^ owns an Actual Eternal Princi- ple in Man, refulting from the Spirit of God, the TO ^fTov, the quiddivimim, fuperadded by Baptifm. * i. c. Suppofmg h'rrt, again, to fpe^k '" *5Wr. Dodweri- Senfe ; it will then follow indeed, that he docs fpeak in Mr. DodwelV aenfe. Cum pofffct femper fpiritibus fuis immortalibus p^tg- 1415 innumerabiles animas procreare, ficut Angelosge- '42. nuit : Whereas he might always have procreated inmt- vierahle SouJsv/ith their Immoytal Spirits, as he gene- rated the Angels. I cannot queftion, whilft he ^ mentions Spirits in conjundion with Soids as caufes of their Perduration, and irnmortaJizivg them • but he means their being united with the Eternal Di- vine Spiiit •, And btcaufe He is collated on every Individual m Baptifm : fpeaks of liim improperly, as if He was a pat ticidar Sph it to every Soul that is hnmortaVizcd. ^ The Author ev'.dently means m (nch thing, 'M J'i d^'oyf-'v ["^'w^""^ i-r'tynQ- ^-m ffWdt-m^- fJg' 75. (^5*2.) liirtt^XH }y a TtKivviTQ-' [Thus interpreted.] TJje^ irrational Soul, be27ig earthly as to its Orrghiat'ion, • dieth together with the Body : But the Soul of (The'^Av^^arof ot) Man, {wider fuch limitations as are here^ fiippofed of beiiig united with and iin' der the guidance of the Spirit J exijis for ever^ani JI)all have no End of its Exigence. * jl The Soul of irrational Creacure5, he jhould have rendrgdit, * Suppofed by his cwn Imagination. fag* I77» 2Jf.3-jT©- «r^|a«T®-, }^>iiC st'^-X?;, «'e^' 'g^ o(aohJ^vv jui- Sft4vx" •* [Th^s explained.] Man is a compounded, tiot afmp^e Being, not confjlhtg offimilar Farts, but of an incorporeal Mind {or Spirit,) [he doth not fay, •^cp(,i), tSo7i/,] «MJo/a Concupifcible Body or ani- mated by^yxw, Soul.] {Excellently dijlingmjl)ed I) ftti- 179. J ^^ ^gji ajp^yg f^^t j})jfie jj^ay j^g ready to carp at this my Varaphrafiical Verfwn •, viz. that it's Forced and Extorted. All IJImllfay by way of Anticipation, is only this ^ that either the Senfe I have given, is ge- miine; or that it's ifnpojible to reconcile it to a^ Chriftian Senfe. * That is, to MtDodivel's Senfe. And fo every Author mufi ■needs fpeat^ OAr DodwelV Senfe ^ or e//e the fame great Abjur. dity will certainly folloro, viz. th.it he does not Jpeaf^ Mr Dod- welV Senfe, f(tg. 234i Granting any Beimg to he aBually Immortal, there's no need offuppof7ig it any further dependent on its Creator for Exijience ; but is now as Self-fuffi- cient and Independent, as That Being that produ- ced it. 4dad Had he hen Jo created, Man would have heen a pag, 22 tt God. The natural ImmortaVity of any created Beh% wUlP'^i- 23^. imply * necf fiary Exiftence to all Eternity a parte poft, as much as of God himfelf. * Nothing lefs. To fay that the Soul is naturally Immortal, andpag. 237. can in its oTvn Nature ^ in corfequevce of the Defign of God in its O eaticji^ perfevere in vital Bxijlence for ever, and JI)all never die ^ is to make it in a Jiri[l ajid proper Senfe necelTarily-exiftent, independent, and its Death itfelf or Annihilation impoffible even to ^ Omnipotence itfelf * Though it exifis only in confequence of God's Defign and Will in creating it -^ oi it expreffed in the ver^fame Sentence In the Other Part. SUch a Criticifer (he fays) as Mr Clark, I forefeepag, 37. may takefovie Advantage of niy -^ feeming Mif- application of this Text : But, Sec. ♦ Nay, xery reaJ. Might not this very Notion [the Heathens Notion] o/The One God, terminate even in the Devil hifnfelf the very Source of Error and Idolatry ? This pretended univerfal Confent of the Heathens.M^ 74. of owning One God, the Creatorof all things •, in ihem isplaijily a Lie, though in Us the grandej} truth ; Be- BecaJife hy this One God, ^ they meant the Devil. The a&ml Knowledge of God, 7}uiji be from Re- velat'ioii, either by God or the Devil j vay, by Both -, and camot be obtained\by mere Natural U^ht. And that this tv7o-fold Revelation, &c. *God forbid. frff. 133. Hath Mr Clark ^ proved -^ — that Men are avy my INTERESSED in the Yital Exjfcnce of the Soul after Death, anymore than in their dead. Bodies ? Wid, 0^ '^^w ^^ ^ P''^"^^ ^^^"^^ ^^'^ "M'^^^rO- [the Man is Concerned in the happy or mlierable exz-' fence of one Elfential Part, fppofe the Soul -, whVfl the other [the Body] is in ajhte of InfcvfihiVity ? or fthat the Man is concernedl in the happy or mile-' hhlQpte of Both the epjiiial Pmts, whilji alhallj feparated from each other ? * One would thinly, thejc needed no proof. fag. 13$. So then we have gained One Soul : The other Iths Rationat] he muft yield m-. Then here are Twa Souls, &c. m- H^y Is it pojible for Compojjtum to confft of contrary H7- confitiient Parts ? jroidd it not he viorfvomfor Man to confji of two ef[entialconfitvent Paits, whereof one is dead, the other 'alive -, or one Subjed to difTolution, the other not ? Or, is it not certain that the Soul is naturally mortal, "^ BECAUSE the Body is ? Orjs it not certain, that Both hisconfntnent ejjcn'- tial Parts, as animal and reafonaUe, mnjl partake of the fame Nature as to Mortality ^wi Immortality ?■ Is not this SELF-EVIDENT ^i to both States, This ajid the future? 'f- A mofi dear and Self evident Confeqnene indeed ! 7/ hat ( ^yy ; Pl)at Jigmjies tlefeparate ''^ V I T AL exijlejtce ofpag, 149. the Soul, to the Man ? If the" hv^^u'sQ- [the Man} be dead^the Soul is dead to him as aBiiallyas the Body^ 8cc. '* Thatis j there «, no diffi rence between bewg Alive dnU Dead. "When he \^Jdain\ was punifhed for his Tmn^-pg, 157. greflion, — The Breath of Life, that is, the Spirit of him who faith / am the Life^ withdrew from this Flefi of an earthly original, and the Animal dropt into Death ^ the Immortality of the Soul being preferved, becaufe it was only faid to the Flefl}^ Biiji thou art, 8cc. Cyril. Alex.] Here I can confefs, J^t Cyril differs fomerph at ^ but agrees, in the main--' that the hnmoitality of the Sou\ was preferved, becaufe he luppofes the Spirit ^ did not recede from It. '^ I h^t is to fay. The Soul at death dia nor recede from the Soulf as it didfrom the Body. Neither did thefe Avtient Vhzlofophers, as our hn-pa^e 196. 7naterialifls, opijie, that the Spirituality or Immate- riality of any Being argued its Rationality, or on the other hand its Rationality Jtr^i/^Jzts Immateriality in theSenfe of our Neotericks, or that its Spirituality inferred its Immortality. At this rate, the very ^THER, wa> WINDS would be Rational ^wi Immortal. Thefb are fome few of the innumerable Inftances of the •Sfj/gn/flry^/^zImV J of that Author, whom the Learned Mr Dodwel fo highly commends. Who- ever cafts his Eye upon this Specimen, 'tis prefu- mcd will not expert that any One fhould think it worth his while, to follow more particularly fo ftrangely Stupid a Wxitct^ through twice 200 Pages of thick Darknefs, even Darknefs that may be felt, SOME C ^n ) SOME REFLECTIONS On that part of" a took caiUecl'^ A^y^ AMYNTOR, OR THE DcfcnCc of Milton's hife^ which relates to the Writiings of the Primitive Fathers and the Canon of the New Tefta- ment. SIR, THE Defign which the Author of the Defenfs of Milton s Life profefl'es that he had, in writing that part of his Book which relates to' the Writings of the Primitive Fathers, and the Canofi oftheNewTeftament, was only to vindicate him- felf from the Charge of devyiiig the Scripture and declariv^ his doubt that feveral pieces mider the nams of Chrili and his Apoftles, received now by the whole K ChriJliaH- C 158 ) Chrlfiian Church, are fttppojitkiom -^ by (hewing that what he had faid in the Life of Milton^ con- cerning the fpurioufnefs ot feveral pieces imhr the Tiame of Chriji and his Apojiles^ was meant not of thofe Writings which are now received by the whole Chrijlian Church, but of thofe Apocryphal Pieces, which were in many places received and approved in the Primitiije Times. This is what the Author profefles to be the only defign of this part of his Book : And though for his own fake I cannot but heartily wifti it were really no other •, yet becaufe there are feveral PafTages, wherein he either fo expreifes the very flight efteem that he has for the Primitive Fathers, as feems to refledt upon our Religion it felf j or raifes fuch doubts about the authority of the Canon of the New Tefl:a- ment, as Heretich (to ufe his own words) may draw imfchievous inferences from, and by which Scruples may be put into the minds of Sincere Cbriffians\ I have therefore fent you fiich ihort remarks as upon reading the Book have occurred to me, and as I hope may be of fome ufe to others on this Occalion. The Principal Propofitions which our Author maintains, and which I thought mofl to deferve confideration, are thefe three. I'^g- 3^» Firjl, That the Booh afcribed to the Difciples and 39- Companions of the ApoJIles, which are fill extant, and at this time thought geymine, and of great Aur thority ^ fuch as the Jipijlle of Clemens to the Co- rinthians, the Epifiles of Ignatius, the Epijlle of Polycarp to the Philippians, the PaJIor o/Hermas, and the Epijile 0/ Barnabas-, ffor about the reft which he mentions, there is no great Contro- verlie ^) are all very eafly proved to be f pur ions , and frauduleyitly i??ipofed upon the credulous, Seco7idly, r i^9 ) SecorJty, That 'tis the eajieji task k the v^drU, to pg- ^t Jl)ew the ignorance and fiiperfiition of the irviters of ihefe Books: That Barnabas has ma^iy ridicuhus paf-pi^- 4ji fages-^ and by fa)iyi^ that the ApoJIles before their Converfon were the greateft fnners in nature^ robs us of an argument we draw from their integrity and jimplicity aga'inft Infidels: That the Pafior o/Hermas is the flliefi Book in the World: And that J^M<;t- pag. 4^, tiiis fays, the Virginity of Mary was afecret to the Devil 5 which, I fuppole, he cites as a ridiculous faying. Thirdly^ That they who thijik thefe Books £r^wz/7W/S'^ ought to receive them into the Canon of Scripture^ fince the reputed Authors of them were the Com- panions and fellow-labourers of the Jpojlles^ as well as St. Matk, or St. Luke, which is the only reafon he ever heard of why thefe two Evangelifts areP^g- 4^'' thought Infpired. For to fay that thefe Books ought 9iot to be received now into the Canon^ becanfe the Ancients did not think fit to approve them^ is but a. ?nere evafion ^ fince many Books now received as Cano' Tiical, were not approved by the Ancients-^ and fomep^^i ^ft received by the Ancier.ts^ are now rejected by the Mo^ derjis'j and Mr. Doiivel owns, that anciently no difference was put by the Church het\i>sen the Apocry- pag, 73, phal and Canonical Books of the New Teftavieyit i and befides, no Jirefs can be laid on the TejHntnny of the Fathers 'j fince they wot 07ily contradict one pig, Teitnllian, by \\ Origen, II yyom. 8. num. lib. i, 2. cr , -^ r^, ^77 « u r a. de Princip. Comment! in Mat. by Clem. Akxanl &C. whofe ^ow. 37» /M Luc. wK/fz/^i 4/Jw in Teftimonies are fet down at io:is^ large by iVico/. de Nourry at the end of his Apparatus ai BibUothecajn maxhnam veterum Patnim, and prse- fixed to the Oxford Edition of Hermas^ and to that of Cotderim. Whether the Author of this Book be the fame Hermas that is mentioned by St. Paul, though it is"affirmed by many of the beft and moft judicious writers, yet is it not fo certain, nor of fuch confequence, that we fhould be ob- liged to defend it. 5:. The Epiftle of Barttabas is alfo without con- troyerfie antient, a Work of the Apoftolick Age, being quoted by almoft all J Clem, fx sirom. ^.J^ ^^^ ^ Primitive Fathers-, as Tit: §, ^c, ■ ■ ypu niay fee by the Teftimo- nies fet doiyn at large, in all ihe fame Authors with the Teftimonies concern- ing HefW'M, ' t^pon ( ^^? ) Upon thefe great j^j^thontiesihtn^ though we cannot be abfolutely fure that thefe Writings are Genuine, yet we may well conclude and believe ithem to be fo, notwithftandin^ the fafpitions which feme have raifed to the contrary. There are alfo fundry other Arguments, which may be drawn from the fimplicity of the ftile and way of arguing ufed in thefe "Writings, agreeable to the cuftom of the Age in which they arc fuppofed to be written •, from the conformity of the mat- ters contained in them, to the Doftrine and Dif- cipline of thofe times •, and from the exad Agree- ment of all the Quotations of the moft antient Authors, to the Copies extant at this day : All which taj:en together, afford {ogooi Reafon to be- lieve tiiefe Books to be genuine, that whofoever confiders them, may very well wonder at the confidence of Mr. T. who is pleafed to affirm that Yn the eajiefl Task in the jyprld to prove all thefe V^rit'mgs fpitriomj and fraudulently impofed up- on the credulous. II. Secondly, Though thefe Writings are not ireceived as of the fame Authority with the Ca- nonical Books of the Kew Teflament, yet ought they to have a proportionable Verier at'ion paid to them, both with refpedt to the Authors and to the irritings themfelves. Clemens was a Companion of the Apoftles, and Ignatius and Polycarp their immediate SuccefTorsj and if the Authors of the Epiftle of Barnabas and of the Pallor of Hernia were not the fame with the Fellow-Labourers and Contemporaries of the Apcftles, known by thofe >ilames, yet are they fo undeniably antient, (being certainly of the firft Age,) as to challenge all the refpedt that can pofllbly be due to any Writers upon the ac- " ' R 4 count ( ^^4 ) count of Antiquit)'-. And as to the Writing? themfelves, though Mr. T. will not be perfuaded to grant with the Learned =^ in his Difcourfe of the j^^ ^ j^.^y that they contain Anchoruy ot the genuine E' ^7 ^ t -n '^i r^i -n biaies, page 175. */^f ^^'"^ and pure Faith ofChnJi, without the leafi Error intermixt with it-^ yet this we may be bold to affirm, that in general they are fo tar from betraying either the Ig7iorance or Superfiition of their Authors, which Mr. T. fo confidently charges them with, that they contain a very good account of that DoBihte and Difcipline of the pureft ages of the Church, which all learned and good Chriftians heartily wifh could be reftored at this day. I . The Epiftle of Clemens is ftiled by Eufebius, fas I have already obferved) a great and admirable Epijlle-^ and was publickly read in the Chriftian Churches both before and in his time; " And " indeed it does not at all come ftiort of the '■ higheft Praifes which the Ancients have given '* to it ^ being a Piece compofed with fuch an " admirable fpirit of Love and Charity ^ of *'' Zeal towards God, and of Concern for the " .Church •, of the mofl excellent exhortations *' delivered with the greateft plainnefs and (im- " plicity of fpeech, and yet prelled many times *^ ■ with fuch moving eloquence too •, that I can- *' not imagin what could have been defired in " fuch an Epiftle, more proper for the end *"' for which it was compofed j what could have " httxi written more becoming an Apoftolical "age, and the Pen of one of the moft eminent " Biihops of it, Thus the Learned Dr. Wake. His making the Scarlet thread liung out hj |?^Z)a^ to the Spies, a Type of the Blood of ChriJ -, liawever it may pojfibly feem ftrange to fuch as Mr. T. r( a^oyk/uS^rii( 76^s/H v Euleb. Hift.l, 4. c 3. All ( ^6^ ) All the Objeaions which I think have been hitherto made to this Book,are thefe : That ^ h contahnfahii- " UhnUhulofi funr, in quibu 7 rr-r 'TX, *. "x J,"! *„^ contra Apouolicum ronlenlun loiisVi]iom:Th^t it makeUoo idamtutLiberHm Arbitrium,un much for free-will : That it af- Panitenm, Solitudo J^onaJlica,8i fgvs to every Man two Avgeh: quod raemoratu dignutn, purga That It favoitrs the Novatians to".T "^ f " 'i"^**^ 1" T^^"* „ / , ■ n X wrca profenur. Scultetus di in allowwg but ove Repevtance : script, Aptch. That it favours MonkiJ/) Soli- tude : and, that it fpeaks of Purgatory. The three iirft of thefe Objections we fhall conlider immedi- ately ; But the three latter are fo dire&ly falfe, that one would wonder how prejudice could poiEbly be fo ftrong as to make Men fee in any Author thofe things, of which there is not the leajl fyllahle or hint in the whole Book. That theViJiom contained in it are fabulous^ we ought not to fay, unlefs we be fure, either that God never afforded any Vifions to the iirft Chri- fiians j or that thefe Vifions have fome particular Circumftances, which prove that they could not come from God. But if it were fo, yet taking that which is ufed in this Book to be no other than a Parabolical way of Writing, wherein the Church is introduced as reprefenting its own Do- ctrine and Difcipline to a Perfon in a Vifion, it ought not to beftiled fabulous, any more than ^ other Books * Parable of the Pilgrim of of that kind which are writ- ^^^ Prodigal, &c, ten in our Age. That^maintaining the freedom of Mans ^fW, in the fenfe that Hermas afferts it, is a good Objedtion againft a Book, I fuppofe neither Mr. T. nor any Man elfe, at this time of day, will contend. That ( a<58 ) That Hermas afTigns to every partlciilar Man two .Angels, if the Titles of the Chapters were of any Authority, could not indeed be queftioned. But in the Book it felf there is no fuch thing exprejly af- firmed : All that the Author there fays, is only '* Duo funt nuntii cum homi" in general, That ^ there are two ne ^ unus asquitatis, & unus ini- Angels with Man-^ oneofRighte^ quicatis. Mandaf. 6. mijnefs, the other of Iniquity'^ and that when good thoughts arife in a Mans hearty then the Angel of Righteonfnefs ('that is, feme good Spirit) is with him •, and when evil thoughts arife in his hearty then the Angel of Iniquity, (that is, fome evil Spirit) temptshim : Which perhaps is no more, than what all Chriftians bc4ieve. So that Cotele- riiis in his Notes upon the place, might have fpa- red the pains of proving other Fathers to have been of the fame opinion with Hermas, till he had fliown that thefe words do neceffarily fignifie that Her-mas himfelf was of that Opinion. That Hermas by allowing hut One Repentance for great and fcandalous Crimes, favours the No- vatians, whofe ■ Herefie conlifted in allowing no other Repentance at all, than that of Baptifm, is fo tar from being true, that he in exprefs words op- pofes his One Repentance to Baptifn, and fays more for the validity and efficacy of that after- Repen- tance for Crimes committed by Baptized Chrifti- ans, in this one little Book, than perhaps is to be found in all the other Writers of the three firft Centuries put together •, infomuch that Tertullian^ after he turned Montaynjl, and had embraced the * Cede- Opinion of the Novatiam, ^ exclaims with all im- rem tibi, - fifcripturj Paftoris, qua? fola mxclios amat, non ab omnijconcilio Eccle- flarum inter Apocryphal &; falfa judicaretur, adulcera & ipfa, & in- dc pairona fociori«ra, De Pudicifia.' maginable (169-} 'ginatle bitternefs agalnfl this Book for that very reafon, becaule it was more favourable than any other Book then extant, in allowing Repentance to Adulterers after Baptifm, which the Novatians denied. That this Book favours AJohIzt/I} SoUtiiie, is alfo fo far from being true, that on the contrary it e- ven exprefly allows ^ Second Marriages^ which was * j^an- more than moft Writers of that Age were willing dat. 4. to do. Laftly, So far is this Writer from eftablifhing the Dodtrine of Purgatory, that there is not oitefylla- ble about it in the whole Book : All the places where he fpeaks of Mens undertaking many hard- fhips, and fo purging themfelves from their fins, being as plainly meant of the Penances to be gone through, according to the then eftablifhed Difci- pline of the Church, as 'tis poiTible for any thing, to be expreffed by words. 5. The Epiftle of Barnabas was very much efteemed among the Antients : And though, it muft indeed be confelled, that it contains fome very ftrange and allegorical Interpre- tations of Scripture •, yet he that confiders liow much that manner o£ Interpretation was antient- ly in ufe among the Jews in their Targums, and how many important truths v/ere that way con- veyed, fo that the Apoflles themfelves in their arguing with the Jews did often make ufe of it, as we fee in their uncontroverted Writings ^ I fay whofoever confiders thefe things, will rather chufe modeftly to fufpend his Judgment, than rafhly to upbraid this Author with the Terms of foolijh and ridkuloHi, And ( i-,0 ) And as to his faying that the Apojlles before the'i*' Cofiverfwn were the greatejl Jiimers in ftdture •, thi^ does not at all rob us of the Argument we iife to dram from their hitegrity and Simplicity a^ainfi Infdels. For fuppofing them to have been never fo wicked, were they the lefs Simple and Illiterate for that ? Or is their Wickednefs before their Converiion any way inconfiftent with their Integrity aftei! it > But befides, thefe Words might be fpoken with relation to fuch fins, as though very great in themfelves, yet fincere and well-meaning Men might be guilty of in their Ignorance \ as St. Paul fays of himfelf, that before his Converiion he was the chief of [inner s^ in refpedt of his blafphe- mingChrift and perfecuting Chriftians even to Death, for Chrift's fake. In {hort, though it muft after all be confeft, that the Authors of thefe Writings ufed a plain, popular and unpolite Stile -^ that they Were guilty of fome Miflakes, in things wherein the whole world at -that time erred with them ^ ffor which Mr. T. is pleafed to ftile them Ignorant J and that they delivered divers things, which tho' very agreeable to the ftridnefs of their Difcipline in the Primi~ tive Church, yet the prcfent times will not fo well bear ; (for which Mr. T. calls them Superjii-, tioiis i ) Tho' I fay, all this muft be granted ; yet fince in general the Matter of thefe Writings is fuch, that not only the Ancients thought fit to cite them in their Books and read them in their Churches, but alfo the Learnedft and moft Judicious Criticks of our own times, as well Laicks as thofe of the Clergy, have recei- ved them as genuine, and recommended them as containirg the true and pure Faith ofChriJf ^ I cannot but think that tlie very great fcorn and con*» ( 270 contempt,wherewith Mr.T. hath thought Et to treat them, is a very bold afluming to himleif, and under- valuing the Judgment ofthe greateftMenbothof the Ancient and Modern Church, and confequently a Reflexion upon our Religion its felfj and that alter all, we have very good Reafoyt, as well as very great -^Mt/;o> ft}', though not to receive thele "Writings as ct the fame Authority with the Ca- nonical Books of the New Tcftament, yet to pay thtm-d proj^ortmiMe Veneration, both with refpedt to the Authors and to the Wr'nmgs themfelves. \ • III. r/jzVJZ)!, "Neither the Belief of the Genuinenefs of thefe Writings, nor the refpeft paid to them as fuch, does in the leaft diminilli from the Authority ofthe Mew Teftament, or tend to makethenumber of the Canonical Books uncertain or precarious. This is the difficulty, on which Mr. T. feems particularly to infift, as if it were impolTible for thofe who believe the Genuinenefs of thefe Writ- ings to give any tolerable reafon why they do not admit them into the Canon of the New Tefta- ment, as well as feveral others, which are now received : And therefore I Ihall indeavour to be fomewhat more exadt and particular in giving an Anfwer to it. I. Firft then, tho' we have great Reafon to believe thefe Books to be Genuine, 3'^et have we not the fame certainty of it, as we have of the Genuinenefs of the Books received into the Canon of the New Tcftament. The Books of the Nen^ , Tejlament, as it might be proved of every one of them particularly, were received at their firft coming forth as being written by Divine Infpira- t ion, and were quoted as fuch by Irenms ando- thers ( ^72^ ) thers of the Ancienteft Fathers : And though up- on occafion of fome Difputes that arofe afterwards among Chriftians, the ADthorit)^of fome few of thofe Books came to be called in Queftion ; (not to fpeak at prefent of thofe Hereticks, the Cerin- thiajis, Marcionitesj Mamchees, and others, who re- jeded whatfoever made againft their abfurd Opi- nions ',) yet thofe few Queftioned Books were fo far from being (as Mr. T. falfely alfertsj rejeBed a lo7}g time by all ^hriftians almofl with imiverfal confent, that even thofe Books were not only kept entire from the beginning,but (as Ew ^ TvaexfMit^' hv ouuf tb/j febhis exprefly teftifies) were ^ '^^^l''~ "-^^ '^ ^^ '^^^ owned by mofi Doftors of the "I^^hTiTc^Z' ''''"'''" Church, and' were all along ulTp»erguT4£5tcj«'x«f<:0tf3Tf- Tead together with the other Ttfiv y.jv, ^mt 'TTA^fiKm^f/.iv, Scriptures -, and^at lafl, up- %fx^i d OTXAoJf x?"*^/^®- ?>^; on the full and exadt ex- ^nyes^fSvZ.^.cr ammation of all Circiim- liances , the matter bemg put out of Queftion , they were unani- moufly received, as well by thofe Churches where they were doubted before, as by all other Chrifti- an Churches, into the Canon of Scripture ) and fo have been continued ever lince by univerfal confent, and by the uninterrupted Succellion of Chriftians in all Ages. Whereas of thofe Writings which we are now fpeaking of, that which is the leaft controverted, viz. the Epiftle of Clemens, was for manv Ages thought to be uttterly loft : and though upon Its appearing again, the beft Criticks in the World thought they had gooi reafon to pronounce it Ge7iuine •, yet the)^ could not be fo fure that it was free from corruption and interpolation, as we are of thofe Writings which were never loft. And now ( }n J. iiotv this Argument is of peculiar force agalnfl Mr. T. For if he thinks, as he fa\s, that he cart with all the eafe in the World pio"*>e thcfe Wiit- ings fpurious ^ (which notwithltanding his vain boaft, he will never be able to perform -J he may at leaft allow thofe, who do not doubt but they are Genuine, )''et not to advance them above their own rank, and place them among thofe which by the Univ^erfal Church have been received into the Canon of the New Teftament. 2. Secondly^ Though the matter of thefetYnt- ings be fuchj'as that they do therefore defcrve very, great veneration and refped ^ yet is there plain- ly fometliing himiane, fomcthing oiivjirmhy, iomc-< thing of hifjlUhility in them, lor ivliich they aro with all reaion thought inferior to the Writings of the Apoftlcs. And this Argument is aifo pe- culiarly ftrong againft Air. T. For if he thinks, as he fajj's, that he can with all the cafe in the Woild Ihow the huoramc and Siij/erfitlon of the Authors of thefe Writings-, well may he allow thofe, tvho i'o far diffei from him in this, as to think they deferve the high Charader cf Primitive, Ho- ly, and Apcftoliral Men, yet not to prcfume to equal them with the Apoftles themfelvcs. ^. Thirdly, When we have made the btfl: judg-- ment of things, that we can pclfibly at this di- Ifance of time, we cannot alter all but par lome deference to the judgment of the Ancients, tfpe- cially whtn afftmbied in a Council •, and allow them to judge fomewhat better in the Ages ncxC after our Savirur, what Writings Were of Au-* thority to be made the Statndard and Rule of Faith, than w»-' can alter feventeen hundred S ■ years ' ( ^74 ) years : Efpecially lince ot the doubted Books, which were fometime read promifououfly with theuncrntroverted/tis plain they received fuch only into the Canon, whofe ftile, and mat- ter, and agreement with the reft of the Apoftoli- cal Writings, do fufhciently prove them to have judged wifely and upon good Grounds. Butthis Argument is of no torce with Mr. T, 4. FcmthJy, Therefore, and which is a diredt decificn of this Qiieftion, I add, that the true reafon wh}'^ fuch a certain and determinate num- ber of Writings are received as the Canon of Scripture, that is, as 'an Authoritative Rule of F^ith and Manners, is becaufe they were written by the ApoJIles themfches. (who are acknowledged to have been guided by an infallible Spirit,) or which is all one, were dictated, reviewed and appro- ved by thew or fome of the7?i. All the Books of the New Teftament, except the Gofpels of St. Mark, and St. Luke. 2Lnd the A3softhe Apojiles^sre therefore received as Canon ical,becaufe the Church upon un- doubted Groundsbelievesthem to be written immedi' citely hy the Apojlles themjehes ^ and thefe three Books are therefore received as Canonical likewife,becaufe W5 believe them to have been diBated, reviewed arJ approved hy feme of tie Apojlles. And this is a plain and ciredt resfon, though Mr. T. is fo pag. 4S. modeft to fay he never heard of it, why the Writ- ings cf St. Marl, and Liike^ who were only Com- psniors cf .the Apcftles are received among the Canonical Writings of the Apcftles ^ and 3^et the Epiflles cf C/fwiO'.y and Barnabas^ who were Fel- low-labours with the Apoftles, are not. And that this is indeed the true reaf^n, why fome Eccks are received as of infallible Authorit}^ and others not j ( ^75 ) not ; may be fufficiently proved to any unpreju- diced perfon, from what we find in the Anci- ents concerning this matter. That all Booh achiow ledgedto be W}itte7ibythe ApoJIles^ were always recei- ved /it of miquejiiomble Authority is evident. The Queftion concerning any doubted Book, beirg not whether the Writing ot an Apoflle llionld Le re- ceived as of good Authority or not, bur whether that Writing faid to be an Apoftle's, were indeed the Writing of him whofe name it bore. That the reafrm why the IVrithigs of St. Mark avd St. Luke were always received as of certai7i Authority^ was not becaufe they were Contemporaries with theApc- ^\^^, (for fo were Clemeyn and Hervms^ and Bania- has^) but becanfe their Writings were particularly approved and authorized by the Apoftles, is plain from Eiifebius ; who tells us exprefly that St. Peter received and approved the Go- ,,,,„, ,, ,, , fpel of St. Mark, and that Ij it .^^^rrVX^TjA^l v^ tbjs approbation that autbo- c. 15, ri'z.ed it to be received by the Churches : In like manner, ^ *;HcA,c^ M*'fx« y^ Ahk^ ^ That St.^ohn reviewed all the '^^'^ ^i't^. 6.*7^=.Ai^. T£^?;c=/i. Gojpels, and confirmed the tnitb ec7:t<^^A.^i uiv (pam. «A«a«ai/ of them: Irev&iis likewife tells du-nii iTnua^vj^it^vTu. I. i.e. us"^ that what St. Mark wrote, 44- was di&ated by St. Peter -, and * ^J''"!' ^'^^'palus 3c inter- that t the Gofpel of St. Luke ^^, .^^^^^ '^^Idic. 3. c.p. i. v^as only a Travfcript of St. , , . _ j. ,. Paul s Preaching: St. Paul him- i„o pr^iicabarur, Evangdium ia lelr plainly refers to it, l Cor. Libro condidic. ibid, !<).$. where declaring unto the Cnritithians the Gofpel which he had before Preached, he puts them in mind how that Chrifl rofe from the dead acccordirg to the Scriptures, and that i^e was Jeen of Cephas, &c. which 'appearance S 2 of ( ^^6) of our Saviour to Peter ^ is nowhere fnentioned but in iSaint Lukes Gpfpel, Luke 24. 7,^. And in the firft Epiftle to Timothy 5. 18. he quotes it with the cxprcfs Title of Scripture •, The Scripture faith ^ The Labom er is worth) of his Hire 5 whicli words are no where found in Scripture, but in St. Luh\ Gofpcl, Luh lo. v.-]. So that 'tis without great reafon, that Learned Men have judged it to be St. Liiles Gofpel, which the Apo- M^cdMshis orrnGofpel^ 2 Tim. 2. S. and elfcwhere. And then for the A^s of the Apojties, 'tis plain they are an Account of St. Pmds Travels, \\ writ- ^^^^^'^'•tmhdois his Death; fo that they are with all reafoiji believed to have been approved by him ^ and if they were not, yet "^be- ing andently the fame Book wiih the Gofpel of St. Luke, they were undoubtedly review- ed by St. Johji, together with it, and their Authority M^as hardly ever, that I knov/ of, called in gueftion by any, but t Marcion the Her. tick. Laft- ly, That no other Books^ how- ever wi ittcn by the Co7itev2pora' rhs of the Apofles were received hy the Amients ^s of infdlibile ami decifive Authority mnmttcrs of Difpute is evident. Eifebius tells us ex« prefly that the Authority of the Epiftle to the He- hew^ was queftioncd by fome, not bccaufe they doubted whether it ivas written in the Age of the '^ rsvhii^rHi(0.in 7^ -s-^V Apoflles, (^for that they could not,) bqt ^ becgufe the Churc?i of Rome thought it not to be written by St. Paul. The Pa- llor of Hertfifs alfo (as || the fame Baron.' ^ Sunt enim AHz Jivrs?®- ejus operis Ae>©- cujus v^iStzv h'o'jjv ipfe fuutn agnofcic Evan- gelium. Afla poflea ob Evan- Jio divulfcrunfj quibus commodi- f]s vifuni, ob locoruni faciliorcm expeditioremque invicem com- parationern,EvangcIifla£ fepara- to codice ccmplcifti, & ab Adis fccerncre. Vodwell. DilTercat. i. |n Irenmm, t Vid. Tertull. adverfus Mar" €lo3. Jib. <. Tub. initio. Jib. 5. cap. ?: !| idem ibidcui '?• ( ^17 ) fame Author tells us) was efteemed fo much as to be read publickly in Churches and yet never received as of infallible Authority : Nay Orhgen goes farther, and thinks it to be not only a w/^i// Book.but written ^ even with ^_ ^ . ,,, ., . fome decree of Infpiration ^ ,.* Q"/ ^"'j;"" valde m,hi and yet \ unpoles it not up- ^us iafpirata. Or/^en. ia Rom. on any one to be received as i(>. u. Scripture \\ S' *^"^ "men Serjptura \\\ In like manner the Epiftle 'i';'^^'^^^ ''^'''''- '^''^"'' ''^■"' of Cle7}iejts, though the niofl: unqucftioned Piece in all Antiquity, and (as Eufebim ftiles it) '^ uv:ofj.oMyi^jMvn '^ttf^ 7rtC