'A N EXAMINATION Of the late Reverend PRESIDENT E D W A R D s's ' Enquiry on Freedom of Will ;* More cfpecially the FOUNP \TlON PRTN"-: CIPLE of his Book, w ^ TENDENCY, and CONSEQUENCES^^ ..e Reafoniog therein contained. ^ , IN THREE pS.rts. Part. L Of the fappofed connexion of volitiqa with the higheft motive, PAViV II. Of the indif- fo'uble conae£ltoa of mo- ral caufcs and efFc^s. * Part IIL Mora! libeF-^ ty belongs to moral agents. Or Mr. Edwards's neceffi- ty, if true in theory, is not applicable to pra^ice* With an APPENDIX, containing a fpecimen of coincidence between the principles of Mr. Edwards's Book, and thofe of antient and modern FATALISTS. Seek not after thai which is too hard for thee^ £kii& fearch not into things that are above tlsy Jlrength. SONofbiRACH, // ;; not of him that willetk. St. PAULi BOSTON: ■printed by Daniel K?jeeland, oppofit? *the Court-Houfe in Queen-Street, fir Tkom.^ .Leverett, in Cora-.Hili, .M>D£CjLxx« PREFACE, f rrVlE puzde ' attending difputes on fncK X kind of lubjcas as Mr. EDWARDS's •book treats of-, is probably the principal rea(()a why n3 animadverfions on his difcourfe have been yet publilhed. It was prefumed, that fe\T vrho might read it would beftow attention enough fo undcrftand it ; and of thofe who fhould aiten- JKively read and underftand .it, few would admit its foundation principles. The author of the pre- fent examination is not without apprehenfion, thiat the rcafon, which hath difliiaded others, will be thought fufficient to have difTuaded him, froni fuch an undertaking. He acknowledgeth that he Kvas difcouraged with only reading this elabo- rate and intricate performance /ome years fince. yet from the great reputation of Mr. Edwards ^ 5^nd prevalence of his dodtrine, he came to a re- jblution of giving this book another and attentive reading : In confequence of which, the following ^remarks were drawn up ' the motive 'of his *prefenc 5vricing ' and publication * is a perfuafion of the falfhood of Mr. Edwards^s * fcheme -, and this perfuafion * he * grants and fees is neceffary," he f cannot help this judgment. ' ^ And as he hath po manner of doubt but the foundation princi- ples of the book before him are falfe, fo he efteem? |hqm of moft dangerous tendency. ^ J*5kfon on hum?n liberty, ia «ifvv;«c to Cato's letter?; iv PR E F JC E. In a fpeculative and metaphyfical view, the fulj- jeft hath been largely difcuffed by fome of the ableft writers. The reader may be afTured, that as little metaphyfical reafoning as pofTible is ufcd in the following pages. For fuch reafoning the author hath neither abilities, inclination orleifure; befides that there is no great occafion, and that, he perfuadts himfelf it would not be edifying. His principal aim is to conGder the fubjeft iri z fra5iical view. In ibis view of liberty and ne- cefTity there is no puzzle, whatever difficulties at- tend the fubjedt when confidered abftradly. • Thc^ inquifitive may find a fuHanfwer to the principal arguments of Mr. Ed'u:;ards[s book, fpecnlatively copiidered, in Dr. Samuel -Clark^^ Gemonftrati- on of the being and attributes of GOD, in ahfwcr to Holbsy Spiyi'oza, znd their followers; in th^ fame learned v/riter's replies to papers from Mr. Lethnitz^ and remarks on hir.- Collinses book oni human liberty -, in Jackfpn\ defence of liberty againft Cato's letters, and vindication of the fame fubje6l in anfwer to Collins, To whom the author gladly refers, as having faved him a tafk to which he pretends not to be equal. Others might be mentioned, who have anfwered fimilar argument? |wo thoufand year? ago. < ' ' ' xAlS we are immediately confcious of liberty, as it is a truth of the higheft importance, no embar- rafiments in theory attending the admifTion of it, can oblige us to give it up — cfpecially as the de- nial of It plungeth us into a deeper labyrinth. The human intelieft'is Imperfe^l ; cqnfequendy, things may be confillent though vve cannot f(^c J?P':c'. The principal pu rpofc meraphy ficks cart .fcrve on pradical fubjc6ls is to obfcure them. P R E F AC t. V Mr. Edwards indeed profefleth himfclf an ad- vocate for liberty. Had he profeffedly denied ir, ihe author would not have engaged in this intri- cate difpute : For he eftcems the denial of iiberty a like abfurdity and extravagance as the denial of ^motion ; or a material world ; botk which have been denied, and the contrary pretended to be demonilratcd, again ft the univerl'al experience of mankind. Thofe things which no man can deriy ^without impeachment of abfurdity and extrava- Ijgahce ; it feems abfurd to attempt a formal proof ^pf. Should a man, for example, endeavour to convince one who might require a ftririg of fyl- Jogifrris to prove, that the fun fhines in a clear day, at twelve o'clock, he would have a very idle 'imployment : Let him that queftions it open his eyes, and he cannot want convidion. Let a man look into his own breaft, and he cannot but per- ^ceive inward freedom^ — Inward freedom — For if ^Freedom be not in the mind^ it is no where. And liberty in the mind im^plks/elf-delermimllon. This y^/Wof liberty our author denies. In this fcnfe of liberty alone hath he any controverfy with the writers he oppofeth. His difagreemenc with Lord Kaims, -f is rather in words than any thing real, notwithftanding what our author hath pub- lifhcd to fcreen himfelf from the imputation of be- ing in the fame fcheme. Their general reafoning is the fame. They reafon on the fame princi- ples, and only differ about the meaning of the .^ord ueceffity, and a ifew other words and phrafes. Mr. Edwards affirms, that every volition and mo- ral adion is determined by a moral neceflity, which is as abfolute as natural s and that moral habits arc J Author of the cflays on the principles ofnioraiity and natural religion* tl P M E F A C g; are owirrg to the nature of things. He allows ort-f ly o^ external liberty, fuch as is the cfFedt of nc- cefTuy in the will — and eonflantly denies a powef of felf-determination. Lord Kaims and Mr. Hume affirm, ' that nian hath, in no cafe, a pow- er of rdf-deternninaiion •, but is, in all his afliondy determined by a moral neccflity' — which neceffity they hold to be as real as any other. The only difference is, that Lord Kaims, while he allows that GOD has implanted in man's nature an in- vincible feeling ot liberty, maintains, that this feeling is fallacious : And Mr. Hume denies the fubfiftence of any fuch relation as we fignify by the words caufe and eiTeft. But whether liberty, as maintained by Mr. Edwards, be not altogether hypothetic, may appear from the following pages. And as to his notion of caufe and of effed, when- ever he ufes the former word for any antecedent^ or the occafron of an event or thing, and the latter for the con/'::que7tce of another thing (as he tells us he fomctimes doth, p. 58. 59. jhe fo far agrees with Mr. Hume in words as well as ftnfe. The author hath only given the outlines of fome ( among many other) arguments which oc- cur'd to his mind to evince the afped Mr. Ed-- wards's fchcme hath on the rnoral perfedbions and government of GOD, and its confequenc pradlical tendency. Had he enlarged on them> it would have lengthened out the enfuing exa- jnination much beyond what cither he or Che reader would chuie. The number of pages is, now double to what he at firft defigncd. He hopes for the patience and candor of the public; to whofe opmion he fubmits ihefe remarks. If they are juft, they need no apology •, if not, no apology can be of any fcrvice* if any Ihould * " " fuppofe :P:R E F AC E. vli fuppofe that in .one refpefl.at left an apology Ihould be made, viz; for undertaking to criticize the writings of fo diftinguiftied an aurhor as Mr Edwards •, the aniwer is, that if the par- ticular defign of the propofed examination is properly purfued and executed, and that refpeft preferved which is due to the charat^er of * gentleman of Mr. Edwards's merit and cmi* nence, the author hath no: tranrgreffed : But of thefe he is not himfelf a proper judge ; though he hopes to be acquitted (in the lat- ter of thefe reipc6lscfpecially)by everyone chans. Whatever reception his performance may meet with, he is confcious of the redicude of his .•wn intentions. ti i««liill|iiM«l CONTENT; 8 T H E C O N T^E N T S: Introduction, exhibitirg a general view of Mr. Edwards's fcheme ; with the defrgn and mc^ thod propofed in thefe remarks. Part 1. On the conncdion of volitron with the highed motive. Sect. I. Mr. Edwards hath not fhewn where- in the ENERGY of motive confifts. Sect. 11". The will not neccfiarily determined by the higheft motive. Sect. III. Exfernal ad:icn not determined by the will, upon Mr. Edwards^ fcheme. Fart JL An examination of Mr. Edwards^s doflr'ns refpcfling the indiiToluble conne^^tion of moral caufcs and efTedt'S. - Sect. I. Whe-ther the v^ ill be nccefTmly de- termined by an exfrwjjc caufe. Sect. II. Or by an inirr/i/ic cziife. Sect. III. Upon Mr. Edwards's own fcheme,. there cannot be natural liberty without moral. Sect. iV. Of GOD's being ths author of fin r upon Mr. Edwards's fcheinc of nectlTiiy ; and irv what fenfe he admits this to be the confequence cf his do6>rine. 'Sect. V. On thz{\:x'^'^o{^A advantage of mcY>le performance great pains is taken to demonftrate, that moral ncceffity and liberty arc convertible terms. The perplexity, confufion, and uncertainty, which difquifitions of this fort are attended with, is fufficiently known. We fhail endeavour to keep out of the clouds as much as the nature of the fubjed v/ill admit. 'The pofition of chief importance,Vwe are told is. That the loill is necejfariiy determined by the Jirongeil motive ; meaning- by the ftrongeft mo- tive * that, which, m the mind's prefent viev/., hath the greaisll appearance of good.* ' Every ad of the will hath a certain fixed connedioa rlicreA'ith, and depends hereupon, as it*s caufe — - V INTRODUCTION. or ^he ground and rcafon of it.' ^ In fuppor-t of which it is faid, that 'nothing ever comes to pafs without a proportionable caule- — that the adts of the will, and material things, have a like necellary dependance on a caufe without them- felves— that moral caufes may be caufes in as- proper a fenfe as any caufes whatever — and morai ii^celEty may be as abfulute as natural.' f Indeed, by the word caufeMr, Edwards ex- plains himfelf to mean, not only' that which Jiath a pofnive efficiency^ or influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pafs i' but ' fomctimes any antecedent, cither natural or moral, pofitive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and circupr.flance of a thing, fo de- pends, th^t it \^ ihc ground and reajon^ in whole, or. in part, why it is rather than not ; or why it is as It -is, rather .than oiherwife.' J At the fame time he aiTerts, that every ad of the will is an '.effect neceirarily dependent and confe- quent on a. caufe, which he calls an efficient caufe ; to whofc' determination and command volition Js as m\^c\i fubje^^ 2iS the motions, of the hands and feet to the volitions which determine and command them — that the a£ts of the will are as '' paffive with reipedl to the antecedent caufe, ground, or reafon of them.' § He maintains, upon the whole, an univerlal neceffity — that all beings, all even s, the m^anner and ail the cir- cumiianctrs of things are neccfisrily determined. Yet he proftfTcth himfelf an ad/ocate for liberty, and labours a dillindion be:ween natural and moral =♦ Enquiry part i. k£\. 2. t Enquiry p. 30, 40, 48, 58, 01, 06, '^<^ pafTi.u. X Enquiry p. 57, 5S, I N r R D UC no N. .^5 .moral ncceflity, which diftinAion he apprehends important — natural necefTuy being incGnfiftenC with praife or blame, while moral is nor. The liberty he admits is, however, merely external, ;.and the refult oi neceffity in the mind. This is a general idea of his plan, fo far as it will fall under prefent confideration. I;i purfu- ^ ing our remarks on which, we fhall. First, Examine the fuppofed connedloxipf vvolition with the higheft motive. Secondly, The indiflToluble conpedlion of J moral caufes and effedls, i Thirdly, Shew thart internal, moral liberty, ,as diftinguilhed from . external, or natural, be-, longs to moral agents 2 Or admitting Mr. Ed- waras^s fcheme of necefllty to be true in theory^ it is not applicable to praofice. It is alfo pro- pofed to add, in an appendix, a fpecimen of coin- cidence between Mr. Edwards and fqme celc- ibrated infidels, antient and modern. N. B. We have made ufe of the Lond»n edi- t tion. Wherever the reader finds particular pages referred to by numerical figures inclofed in a parenthefis, fuch place in Mr. Edwards^s enqui- ;ry is meant, unlefs notice is given of our reter- ing to Tome other author. ^ART PART I On the 'Connexion of Volition with the ihlgh- ,efl Motive, SECT. I. Mr. Edwards hath not fiicwn wherein the entr- gy of motive confifts. THE enquiry in this place is not, Whether the higheft^notive hath always a caufal influence on the will ? But, admitting this to be the cafe, v/hat it is that caujeth any fuppofed mo- tive to he higheft in the mind's view ? wherein doth its energy^ or power confift ? In the next ledlion, we fhall examine, whether the will is jndeed determined, in every a<^, by the highcft .motive* « When, between two or more 6bje6ls in the mind's view, one appears mofl: agrea'ole \ (from whatever caufe,) this appearance is the highcft or flrongetl motive, according to our author. Now as there is a manifctl difrerence between an objeft's a 51 unliy appearing molt agreable, and the caufe of this appearance ; the proper quefiion, in the firft place, is. What is the ground, Teafon, or cauftt of the agr.?able appi-arance ;//^//. For admitting the ftrorg-ft motive to be the more immediate caufe of volition, how doth this prove ;that it h the original caufe ? IVhcnce is it that any propofed objctt hata the gr».^ate[l appearance of ^Qod ? From what caule ? t-iicher we muft w///- r. On iBe Ccnne5lion of Volltm' mately recur for the ground of volition ; [PcfTibfy not ftop here] Till ihcanfwer to this quefticn is found, the original ground of volition is not dif- covered. For if every circumftance of things hath an anTwcrable caufr; then there is a caufe why this or that motive is highcfl. ^ Though Mr. Edwards fuppofed the refoluti- on of this queOion was * not nectfTary to his pur- pofef,' J: yet he hath, in feveral particulars, re- marked what he apprehended may ' have in- fluence' in caufing ' the objediS of volition to ap- pear agrcabie to the mind.* He i-fTigns, for in- fiance, * *In the quefiion, Jir/>fl/ deicrmines the uUI ? it is ta- ken for grsntcd, ihzt /cmethtrg dcteimir.cs it. And the controveify on this head is, where the fcurdation of the will's determirsation is,' (p, 56. ) MT.Eduards faith cxprcfly, ' That the aft of volition itfeif (or the will ) is always determined by that in the mind's view of an objcd:, which ccufes it to appear moft agreable.* ('p. 11 ) Here, then, is the foundation of the will's determination. Mr. Edwards's bufmefs, there- fore, according to his own ftate of the qutftion, wa», to point out what caufeth an cbje^ to appear moft agreablc. For if that which causeth //)/; appear^ ance be the real caufe of volition, then the agreablc appearance itself cannot be the caufe. Thcagre- ab!e appearance, or highcft motive, as he cbfcrvcs, is nothing dijUn£i from volition, but the very things as will be particularly (hewn in the ncxtfeftion. We would here juft hint, by the way, that Mr. Edwards hath given ample teftimony againft * the pofition of 4-9^. "4' On the ConneBien of Volition ■ P. 39, 40. Our author obferves, that ^ into the meaning of the Vv^ord liberty \s not taken any thing of the caufe or original ot choice — how the pcrfon came to have fuch a volition ; whether it was caufed by ib me external motive, or internal, habitual bias •, v/hether it was necefiarily connec-: ccd with fomcthing foregoing, or not connedled. Let \hz perfon come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he i§ able, and there is no- thing in the way to hinder his purfuing and ex- ecuting his will, the man is fully and perfectly flee, according to the primary and common no- tion of freedom'. It hence appears, that Mr. Edwards edeem- ed it neither recenary nor ufeful for us to know the caufe or criiin of the will's determ^ination— * how a perfon comes to have fuch a volition.* And yet it was a main point in his view to fhevv, that the (Irongelt motive is the immediate caufe of every ad of choice. Now, as was before ob- ferved, it is juft as neceflary and important to know the orighial and ultimate^ as the next and more immediate caufe of volition. The nexc and immediate caufe is but the effedV of fome/>r^- ceedi?2g caufe -, this of another, and fo on. 'The determination of the v^iil, faith Mr. Edwards, fuppoferh an effed, which nmfl have a caufe. If the will be dettrm'ined^ihtxQ mud be a determiner^ ^ Granted. And if the ilrongeft motive be the determiner, this alfomuft be determined by fome preceeding caufe. There is a caufe or reafon of its being ilrongeil — fomething from which it de- rives, and wherein lies, its great flrength. If therefore, it was of any impciranGC CO Ihcw, (con- formable * P. ?; wiii the higheft Motive, 5 ■formable to Mr. Edwards's defjgn) what deter- mines the will, and to provs thaC the flrongefl: motive doth in •, it was at leaft of equal impor- tance to pomt our, v;hat it is that caufeth fuch moti/e to be, or appear, (irongefl:. The real caufe of volition is not found, till this matter is explained. The enquiry is not purfucd to the end, and the plan ot Mr. Edwards*^ book buc -^alf executed, ' Suppose a chain hung down out of the Hea- vens, frO;Ti an unkncjun height,^ and although •every link of it gravitated tov/ard the eanh, and what it hung upon' was not vifible, yet it did not defcend, buc kept its fituation : And, upoa ^ this, a ^quelcion fhould arife. What fupporred or kept up this chain ? Would it be a Tuakicnc anl.ver, to fay, that the/o^, or loweft link hung upon the fecond, or that ntiit above it ?* without proceeding to fnsw what the iecond hung upon: ; ' or rather, iht firfl and fee on d together ;' and lb on, until it was found ' whac fupported the sfjhols. Thus it is in a chain of ciules and ef- fects. The lall or lowed IS 7'^//)^;jr/t'ii upon the cauf- above it. This again, \^ it be. not the firil caufe, is fufpended, as jm efiecl, upon • fome- thing above it, &i\''^ The original (thdc is, the tru: and reel) caufe of volirion is,- therefore, yet t,o be explainedi For if it b,^ liie immedi- ate eitecl of motive, (liU this caufe is an effcdl: in regard to f^iieihing preceeding—and v/hatever is ih.:;,n:-xt or imo-)CJ!ate caafe ot the iirenofth or energy of moti^'e iilclf, this sgain is an tfiVct in relatjoii 10 a eaufc prcc.cjing, as wi:ll as ,a ""^ Wslla/li'ty p. ^$7. '$ Cm the'Connefilcn cf Volition canfe ni relation to motive— And thus the en* qurty ma.y .be purjued in inf.nilwtn. (Which fhevvs, by the way, x.htfuti!:ty^:M leall, of entering en fuch an enquiry as that which is the fubjed of Mr. Edzvardy^ bo«ok ) S.-iould ir, be faid, tiiat the energy of motive, in t:very cafe, is t3 b^ at- tributed tothe Erll and fuprcme cauie, as ihe im- mediavc tlTicient-^rh^s, -'kideci, is making (liort work •, but it is cutting the knot, rather thaa untying it. Haweve-s whc,n jt ihall.be {hc-^\n, that e/ery atlof will, in every creature, is an im- mediate, neceflary effect of the fa premecaule, the aif]^:u:e will at once be at r.n endc '^ The vulgar noihr, of blan^evvorthlnefs, fays Mr. Edwards^ is, a perfon's having his he.irc wrong, and doing wron^ -frum the heart ' ^ Now hath he :flievv'--n, ivhince a .perfon's heart comes to be wrono; ? He tikes nonce ofchis de- fed in' the Piithor of the efTiy on the frecaoqi 0L the w^ll in GOD and the cr If not, then, on Mr. Edit-ards's hypothefis, an innocent creature could never rebel. If, on the ^ther * P. 17J with the higheli Motive. it other hand, rebellion againfl the fupreme caufe had the appearance ot the greaiefl: good to Mam in innocence, and to apoftale angels be- fore their fall, how doth this eonfift with the general opinion that hath been entertained of the original extent of their rational faculties, and the fpiritual image of GOD with whicii they were endowed ? The powers of intellect ifi innocent Adam^ for example, have been fup- pofed fo great, that confiftently herewith it can- not be doubted but he had the fulled view of duty, and of his higheft intered as connedcd with it ; and confcquenfly could have no appa- rent fuperior motive to tranlgrefs. If in in- nocence he could not hefitate but ic was his higheft duty to refrain from the forbidden fruit, he could not, (by .fuppofition) hefitate but fuch acl of forbearance was alio his higheft hap- pincfs. Therefore the greateft apparent good was to recain his integrity. Confcquentiy, ia tranfgrefiing, his will was not determined h)\ but againjl^ the higheft motive. Nor can we conceive of ^ prefampuous fmner, on any other fuppofition- — meaning hereby, one who a6ts zg'um^prejent convidtion---ov dire^ly in oppofuion to the light be hath in the very article of finning^ It will, perhaps, be faid, that innocent AdanC^ higheft good was to forfeit his integrity. And indeed, on any other hypothefis, the controver-, fy fcems to be brought to an iftlie, and the opi- nion of being always neceflarijy determined by the higheft motive given up. Now ftiould this be faid, (which is at leaft imply'd, if not expref- fed, in what Mr. Edwards hath remarked ^ on D ' "" the * Part iv. Sc§. 9« 12 The will not neceffarily determimil the advantage of fin to the creation) we might a(k, whether fin could appear moft agreable to an innocent creature from the nature of the ohjeo} in itjetf ? This, we prtfumc Mr. Edwcrds would not fay. And if it could noe thus appear from its nacure, it will l>i difficult to (hew how fia could b^, in any lenfe, the creature's highefl good — Or how an innocent creature could appre^ hend'ii to be fo. But whenever it can be (hewn, that innocent man, or rebel angels before their fall, had a fall view cf the fuperior advantages cf fin above innocence and righteoufnefs, we be- lieve no body will think it worth while to con- trovert farther about any doctrine of religion. An hypothcfi^i ioeAtraofiiinary, requires extra- ordinary proof. We (hall have occadon to refume this point under anoiher part of our reiiiarks. I.H regarj to the fiiR entrance of fin into the. world, we acknowledge it is an eVenr, which alt denonVmaiions of p-rofefilng chriQ'uws are cq-ially ho)den to account for— yea, ddfts 2i% much as (hrillians. Even atkdfis are no ofhcr^'ife excu- fcd than as, by their principles, they are not obli- ged to account for any thing The truth is, no bLi^i can folve this matter. But if xhtfirH Jinfut volition was the necefiliry produdt of (he iiighelt motive \ then rebellion againll GOD was difcer- ned to be ihe highedgood, whsn rcafon andjudg' ment fy(e'y dilated and 2^QVirned) which they cer- tainly did whi.s the creature continued innocent* Yea, ic follows, that the higheft motive to the C/rJator^ as well as creature, was in behalf of moral evil. Hov/ then is fin fuch an vtfinit^ evil as we have been rciUght to belitve it } Does it n^ t turn out an i^^mi^ good ? Rather, how can chat d<;rcrve the name of^J;;, which appears hy the Jircngeji Mollvu >g ynxjft agrcaUt even to the Deity himfclf ? Or allowing fin to be the greatell evil, that man muft have an hard tafk, who un Jertakes to fhcw, that it is alio the grcaieCl good : And if not the" greattrt good, hosv k could have this appearance to creatures in a Hate of reditudt:— and even to Almighty GOD himfeif. Or if it could noc bave this appearance to any being in a Rate of rectitude, how v/as it then pofuble for beings niade upright to fall -, on fuppofuion that no infiance ot volition- cm be mentioned but what is the effcCl of, or determined by, the greateil apparent go')d ? The very idea of moral /certion of the felf-motivc power, as feeing the way is from walk'^ ing in it» Nor will it follow, becaufe the percep- tion of the underftanding is denied to be the imme- diate, efficient, neccflftiry caufe of the exertion of the felf-motive power, that therefore umntelligent matter maybe capable of fel f- motion ; any more than it will follov/, if a man's eyes be denied to be the im- mediate, efficient, neceiTiry caufe of his walking, that therefore the man ipay be capable of walking, though he has neither legs nor life. A man's un- derftanding judges of what he is to do, as his iyes difcern the way. But a blind or winking man has power to walk without feeing. What refemblance is there between an aSiion^ and a perceptian of the Wiind ? There muft therefore be fome diftindl prin- ciple of motion and aflion, independent on the per- ceptive faculty. That * exertion which makes ac' tion to be a^ion is entirely a diflin£l thing from that perception ox judgment^ by which a man determines beforehand concerning the reafonabUnefs or iitnefs of what he is about to aft : An agent not afting ac- cording to the lafl judgment of his underftanding, is like a man {hutting his eyes, and walking at a ven- ture down a precipice.* (Dr. Samuel Clark's an- fwer to a third letter from a Gentleman of the Uni- verfity of Cambridge, annexed to a colle^ion of pa- pers between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Claris) It fs no uncommon thing * for men to rM againjl ihe light, nat which they do, they allow not. The J2W in the msmb^rs warcth againftths iawin the mind. Jiiftea4 l6 ^hs wl/l not mceffarily deter mmd courfe,* M% Edwurd; tells us is this, * That the will is always determined hy the ftrongeft motive* This, he infifts, ' is the previous ground and reafm of every a^ of volition \ io that in the na- ture of ihin^s volition cannot take place without^ hut is connefled with it, as the producing, ef- yiciENT caujc* la this principle his whole fcheme —Video, mellera proboque ; Dettriora fequor. Infteadof fayingithatprefumptuous ofFenders followthe laftjudgment of their underjiandingywhen their thcughts the mean while accufe tkem^ it is more proper to fay, that they follow the didlateof /«//, pafflon, or appe- tite. Mr. Edvjards allows, that men cio not always. follow the dictate of r/^n : (p, 17) They there- fore fometimes follow the dictate of forne other fa- culty, diJlinSl from, and in oppofition to it. Mr. Edwardsy indeed, includes more than reafon and judgment in the phrafe, the dictate of the undcr- ilanding : But taking the unJetftanding in his fenfe for * the whole facultv of perception,* it is as difte- lent from animal affection and appetite as any two things can be. Ani ' \^ it/ict propriety of fpeccl; be infiftcd on/ a man muit be faid \o fo'low the. di(5tate oi that faculty which h.^.t!) il^e afcendant at any time ; whether it be the UM^erftindinii or linimai appetite : Otherwife we confound V\t ^'ift.rid-^ii between that faculty, in refpc<5t of wh^ch GOD hath taught us more than the bsafis of the fitid^ and the appetites he hath ^iven us in conimon with them. * Inteu.igent beings vQi fometimes on the view oijitcng motivej, fomit mes upon -iveak ones, fometimes wnere things are abfolutely indifferent. In which laft cafe there may be very good reafn to fl^, though two or more w^vj 28 j. 1 8 ^ifg will not nscejarily deter mned tio« or choice, is determined by that which* appears mqft agreabU, than tae preference or choice ITS£LF.' "^ Here it is fully declared, that, ^ properly fpcaking,' voiition and the hightft motive are not DISTINCT things — that the former is only as the laiicrr, and not determined by it. Motiye cannot be the grouTid and dete/miner of volition,'' and at the fame time the a3t of volition itjelf. It is not the cauje of volition, but the things * if llrid: propriety of fpecch be infifted on.* In- Itead of the ftrongeft motived being the caufe of volition, the real truth is, that volition is the caufe of external d^ion. It is this only, ' wh^ch is the immediate fruit and conffqucnce of the mind's volition, that is determined by^ the ftron- geft motive. The reafon is obvious : ' For an appearing mod agreabie to the mind, and the inmd*s actually preferring and chuf^ng^ are not aij- tinot^ but thejame thing. * It is not, therefore, good fenic* to lay the former determines the lat- ter— ^to ipeak of motive as the previous ground, reafon^ or cauje of the exertion of an ad of the will- — that volition cannot take place v/ithout this as the antecedent caufe. * It is not good fcnle tofpeak of volition as from motive — PROM THE INFLUENCE of the motivc^ and from the mflue^ice that the motive hath on the man for the production of an a6i of volition, ■\ V/hen Mr. Edzvards faith, ' it is the volunta-^ ry a^ion^ and not the will^ which is determined by the higheft motive,' there can be no doubc but he means corporeal adion : For thus he ex- plains !!* P, llall, t P«l*2> I23?. by the firongefl Motive: 29 plains himfelf, ' the voluntary aflion, which is iht fruit ^nd confiquence of the mind's voliiion or choice' — cxprelsly diftinguifhing it (as in the next following words) from ' the adl of voliti- on, or the preference and choice iifclf * Inftead of fhewing, therefore, (as he undertook; what determines the will, Mr. Edwards hath only la- boured ta prove, that the will determines the a£lions of the tody — For inftance, ' the will de- termines, by an ad of volition or choice, which way the hands ^nd feet fhali move.' * Bodily adlion is the ^ 1x5. l>y the firGngeft Motive^. f'lf chufe his own motives. But this is abfurd : For it fuppofcth the choice is already maJe, be- fore the motive has its efFe6t •, and that the vo- lition is already ex6t ted : That is, choice is prior to choice. Mr, Ed^wards recurs to the old ab- furdicy of one decerrn-nation before another, and the caufe of it ; and another before that, deter- mining that ; and fo on in infinitum.^ Thus mighc his cricicifm on Dr. Clark be replied to. Upon the whole : The queftion, What deter- •miaes the will ? is ' unanfwered, and yet re- turns ' For aught that appears from Mr. £i- wards^s difcourfe, the will is not properly deter- mined ac all. 'Inftead of folving the difficult ty^ or anfwering the queftion wuh regard to volition, namely, How it comes to exift ? (as he propofcch ic) he forgets himfeif, and anfwers another queftion quite diver fe, and wholly' re- mate, nan?*ely, What determines ;;?^/m^/a6Hon ? The queftion is, How volition itfelf comes to exiit ? By v/Iiar caufe it is produced ? ' Why the foal exerts fuch an aft, and not another ? Or why it adis with fuch a particular determina- tion ? Why its action is thus and thus limited, directed, determined ?' If it be laid, its a£ts pro- ceed from the ftrongeft motive, this is faying, they are fulf-determined -, (the ftrongeft motive and volition not being diftiniij which is, upon the whole, faying, they exift without a caufc. Therefore the fuppofed ftrengfh of motive ■■* affords no relief from the difficulties, which' •Mr. Eiwards's ' notion of 2 /elf-determimng pow- cerin the will is auendcd wiih .^ nor will it help, .ia '30 ^he will not nscejfarily determined^ Sec. in the leafl, its abfurdities and inconfiden- cies.' * Whether corporeal adion be always determined by the will, or the greateft appa- rent goodj we Ihall briefly enquire in tjie next fcdion. ♦ P. 67, 63, 71, :SECT. S E C T. III. External JSflon or Cofidu5f not dfter mined by the JVtli^ upon Mr, Edwards'j Scheme, ALL moral good or evil confifting in ihc diffoftiion ov Jlate of the mind or will^ ic is of iraall moment, comparatively, what deter- mines material adion. Suppofe this is indeed determined by the will, the enquiry of chief importance is, What determines the will irfelf. The queftion. What determineth the motions and adions of the body ? is (\u\iq foreign to the fubjed. But as Mr. Edwards affirms that the Willis the true caufe uf external action or con- dud, and makes the whole of liberty to lie here, we will examine this pqfition, on his own prin- ciples. *The voluntary adion, which Is the fruit and confequence of volition, is determined by that which appears moil agreable -,' or by the Will which ' always is as the greateft apparent good,' and ' not properly diftindt' from it. ' Li- berty is a power, opportunity any one has of doing, or conducing according to his will, be- ing tree from external hindrance or compul- fion. — Or a power of executing his will. There are two things that are contrary to liberty. One is conliraint ; the fame is otherwife coWtd force and coa^ion ; which is a pcrfon's being nccefTi- tated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is refiraint. ; which is his being hindered, ^nd ijoc having power to do according to his will^ '|i External Anion net determined ly tie will"* In the determination of the will /V feif^ he fuppofeth a man cancioc be fice. * To talk of liberty, or the contrary, as btlonging lo the very will i'fJf^ is not to Ipeak good {tn\c.'\ He Genfures Dr Whitby as faying, ' Ibat a man cxercifeth liberiy, not only in txier?ial adtions, but in the adls of the will thdmjelves' J Tp. y6^ 77) He luppofech there is a caufe, ^rz^r to the vwiirs own ads, detern:i!ning volirion. ' Let the perfon come by his voliiion how he will, if there is nothing in the way to hinder his ptrfuing and executing it, he is fully and pcrfedly Iree'. Up- on tne whole, liberty coafills nor in a power of willing •^ Parti. St-a. 5. t Part II. Sea. i. J P 76^ 77. J Qucere, When St. Fdul faith, ^To will h prefent with ine ; but how fo perform that which is gc^od I find net*, is he to be undeifl' od as fpeakir.g oi external zt .internal impediment ? if of the iarter,th;rn th^re are other thin-s oppofcd to liberty befidc outward con- ftraini. or rtitfaint. If o/ the former, this wholly frees from moral blame. When he alfo fpeaks of a man's * having powc:r oyer his own will'? (in a par- ticular inftance alluded to) doth he mean power o\'"er the external acfts ? U this be the meaning, cou-d a man have power here withouc fi R purpoftng in his heart to refiain in the thing ipokm of. And if in this purpofe he hath not pow.^r over hiinfcU ( i. c. if it be not his own purpoft) how could he be faid to have power ever the outward a6t I Again, the fame apoftle obfervrs, 'The fpirit lufteth againft the fl^'fh, and the fl^fn agair.ft the fpirit, fo th'it ye cannot do the thing: which ye would,* Is this to be unde-ftood q{ external in.pedimeni ? If the Maw in the m -mbers v/arring .i£>;ain{l the 'aw of the mind/ 2n external 'uw ? * The ;>ood that I would, I do not : But the evil which I \%ould not, that I do/ Is this -meaflt of an e^^uniul wilt I Willy Upon 7kfr Edward^'j SchemQ 3,3, willing, hwl \i^ an opportunity oi dcliig wh^it Is already willed — of ex^cut'ng a choice already made, not in a power oi' tbu/mg. it is nor ac all applicable to the ?;//«{*. 1 he /f<^/^ of the will is fixed by nectiTicy — and irora hence pro- ceed external adions. Now how is it pofTible that a6lion and con- dudl fhould be free and yet be the efftfts of a necefTary caufe ? * There is not more in the ef- fedl than in the caufe. Thofe things which areindifTolubly connected with other things that are necefTary, are themfelves necefTary/ How is corporeal aflion determined by the will, when ' the will in no inflance is ics own determin- er', conl'cquently net in the particular detfrmi- naiion to move the body ? At lead, the will de- termines this no otherwife than as it is itfelf de- termined hereto by an antecedent, neceilary caufe. Or how can that be called a voluntary determination, which is the effect of neccfTity ? or that a voluntary adion to which a man is ne- cefKirily determined ? If the ad of the will, which is fuppofed to determine and fix the exter- nal ads of the body, be not itfelf free, accord-^ ing to Mr. Edwards's own reafoning, the adi- ons proceeding herefrom cannot be io. ^ ' An ad of the will is an ad of choice'. Now if there be * Kad Mr. Edwards attended to his own rcsfoning:, he would not have afHrmed, that external adions might be Utc^ when thew 11, which determines them, is fubjed to necefTity. For, fays he, *- \i \h^ deter^ mining ad be neccflary, the man cannot be the fub- jcd of command or government in his external anions; l)ecaufe thefe are all necefTary, being the ne«ceil'iry cffeds of the ads of the wilfthemfclves*. (P» ^124, ai5, 256, alio p. 46, 47, 48.) 34 External Action not determined hy tie be no liberty exercifed in;chu^lng,prefcr^ing,whe^- inisllbcIxye;ie^ci^eGat all ? What ib€hoice didindt from liberty ? Yet we 'are tcid, that liberty is cxf rciitd only in the execution of choice. That "we nave not a power of election or liberty in the ad of volition, at lead not in the firtt and leading ad of choice, which determines all the reft. If, therefore, freedom be net in the will, we fhould be glad to know where it is ? Whether any being can be faid to do, or condutl according to his pleajure or choice. Choice and pleafure (Jo called) is fixed by a pievioos ncceiTary caufe — and doing or conduding fixed by volition — Now the immediate f roit and coniequences of volition muil be of the fame nature with their caufe — alike nccefTary. In other words, the will is no caufe at all. For a neceiTaiy caufe is not pro- perly f[:eaking a caufe ; it is nothing diftinct from a' meer infirun^ier>r. A caufe, ftriclly fo called, mult bt free -, at lead fo far as praife or blame, reward or punidimenr, belong to it. Upon the whole, external actions mud ulri- marely be determined, not by the will, but by that caufe which determlneth the will, agreable to our author's own principles. The will being in no indance it's own determiner, there is in no indance a power or capacity of choice in man- kind. For choice is the fame as the will's deter- mination : A power or capacity of choice, there- fore, would be a power of felf-determination, which Mr. Edwardi's whole fchemc is dcfigned to fnew the abfurdity of. The fum of Mr. Edwards^ fchemc appears to be this. Liberty confids in ^ man's power to cs scute WilU upon Mr Edwards'^ Scheme, 35 execute \\\% will — ^o d(r cr ^^«^ according to what is willed. His will is (not dtttrmined by^ but is) the greateft apparent good. And yet every volition is the necefiaiy effc5l of the greateft apparent good, produced and determined by it as the efficient CdxS^ — which caufe, however, is nothing diftmct from the efFefl produced. From what particular caufe any objedl comes to have the greateft appearance of good is yet a fe- cret, of no ufe to be known to nine hundred and ninety nine out a thoufand of mankind. Forthe fatisfadion of the thoufand th pcrfon, Mr. 'Edwards has laboured to explore this fecret -, and yet his * having failed here doth no: overthrow the po- fition, which was the thing of chief importance in his difcourfe ;* for it only remains to be— -1 explained and proved. Antecedent necefilty de- termines the will •, this determines corporeal alli- ens ; and aiflion is voluntary -, i. e. is Willed, or caufed to be willed — there is no outward compul- fion or reftraint in the cafe, but only a neceffary in^ ward determination. Liberty is indeed necefTary to praife or blame. But the a£ts of the body be- ing free from outward coaftion or impediment, there is no need of liberty in ihe mind^ as a foun- dation of moral government. These, as near as we can come at them, are Mr,Edward>^s fenciments : The mention of which, fufficiently expofeth the abfurdityof the fcheme — it's repugnancy to itfelf ; to common fenfe, toall morality and religion ; and confequently the per- plexity and folly of applying metaphyfical reafb- ning to a fubjedl, which can be obfcured only by the fubtilty of argument. g PART I? Frinctpks conf.dered as data PART II. ^jf ex^fBinalion of Air, Edwards'; do^irinerefpe^- ing the indijjoluhle conm5iion of moral caufts and effe^s. w ERE we remarking on the writings of an avowed Fatalist, a fomewhat diffe- rent method might be expected from what we Ihali purfue. But our controvcrfy being with un eminent christian divine, feveral things may be taken for granted, which, in arguing with a fatalift, would need proof. According- ly we dtfire thefe few obvious principles of «^- i'liral religion not lefs than chriftianity^ may be eonfidered as dala in the prcfent argument. First, That there is an intelligent, dffigning author of nature ; or original eaufe of all beings and things ; who (by the terms) is uncaujcd — ex- iting prior to, and exclufive of, all defign con- tributing, to his CAiilence. ^ Whence \i follows. Secondly^ f Mr. Edwards has intFrnated, incTeecT, ' that there Is in the nature of things a foundation for the know- ledge of the being of a GOD, without any evi- dence of it from his tvorks' — but adds, ' We have not flrength of mind to comprehend ' his exiftence* in thiS'-i/idef^endint manner'. The way that mankind come to the knowledge of his being is that which, the apoftle fpeaks of, i^<7.v;. i. 20. Wc hr A a fund and prove a po/lerioriy or fiom effi£is^ that there maft fee an eternal caule. And then, fecondly, prove by argumentation, not intuition, that this being muft be nectfTarily exiflent. And then, thirdly, front the proved neceffity of his exigence, we may defend^ aiid p«gve many gf his pcrfe^ions ap-'ion' (P. 60,6 i.^ in the prefent argu-men^^ 3.7 Secondly, That all things are originally 'wbd* tlM creator mad', them ^and intended they [kouid. he. Whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational, throyghout all worlds — they have all fuch powers ana properties, fuch relations, con- nedlions •But is it 2.xi\\\K\ In the prefent argument I gg? Foup.THLV, That the moral perfcflions of GOD correfpond to the moral difcemment be hath given to us. For when wc fay, God is holy, juft, good &c, we fpeak altogether unmtellig^blyjif we fuppo(e thele perfedions in him to beeffenti- ally Why then did theDr. lay down his two nrfl: propofitions ( p. 8, 1 1, j as the media of proof ? if neceflity * doth TiOt pr£juppofe., but irfer exif^encc ; yet the method the Dr. takes to prove this necelTitv presupposes a na- ture and exiftence : It fuppoitth that tnere exijis an eternal, independent being — the author of ail other beings. The very thing tp be proved. Admitting the Dr's poiition, that necrffity is the caufe of the divine exiitence ; to what purpofe is it wiih an atheift ? Ittalces for granted the thing in .q'jeftion. The ei-quiry is not. How GOD exifts ? but, H'hether he exifls ? Exillsnce, and the caufe of exiftence, are very diftindt. An enquiry about the latter plainly prefappofcth the former. So that while the Dr. endeavours to prove, that GOD exifts 'from a caufe within hinrifelf,' he takes for granted, that there is a GOD 'y and only accounts for a peculiar circumjfancey or this mode of his exiftence, that it is * by a necciHty of nature.' Whereas the fubjedt of enquiry between an atheift and a theift is not the niodui of exiftence, but the fimple truth or fa£i — is there in reality ' an eternal, independent being, the author of all other beings .'' Now from what can this point poflibiy be argued but from the phenomena of nature 1 if, from furveying vifible creation, the atheift is not convinced that GOD iS, how can we go a ftep farther with him ? Mufl he not think it imper- tinent, and petitio principii, if we undertake to Ihew him 'HOW GOD exifts ? Or to aflign z ground and reafon of an exiftence, which he believes nothing of ? But if from the frame of nature he is convinced of the certain exi/ience of GOD, he is no longer an atheift, and therefore needs not the argument a priori /or hi^ coavi<5tion. Or ^o Principles confJered as data ally different from the perceotions implanted m Isjs. . Not but the d^ity prffrffe h tnefc moral perfr^l ons in a dt^rte far above finite concep- tion i yef as m thele he propofeth his own ex- ample to our imication, io that which may be known Or fuppofe the ath?ift, for argument's fake, to a^mtt th.it GOD is, but ^cmands to have the caufe ox ground of hii exiilfnce adi/.n'd and explained. Is any theiil holden to (hew hm, how the divine beinsr ex'fted from eternity ? Can this be done f Hath Dr. Clark attempted it ? In one word, are the phaenomena of natu-e fufHcient to prove the being and perfect ons •of r]OD ? if th'v arc ; what need of any other ar. •gu !i':?iU than that a p?/ieriori} If they are not, it is certain the argument a priori can produce no con- viction ; For this refolves itfelf into the argument a po/ierjori. That the being of a GOD is indeed neceffary, eve- ry thing round us o'eclares. If the things that are fren were cheated and made y the fclf-exiftence and Cternitv of the creator is proved beyond d.>ubt For whatever hath a beginning exifts from fomc caufc without itfelf. Now as this can nor ipe faid of the creator o( all things and beings, it follows, tnat.h» muft h^Jelf-exiflent and iter nal. The Dr. tells us, that ' the eiernliy of GOD' (eltheir M parte cnts^ or a parte pofi) 'can no otherwife be p;o- vcd than by the argument a priori.'* But, .admitting an author of naiure^ doth ic not foUow, that he cx- ifttd, not mecriy from tie bej;inn=nor of the phreno- mena of nature, but from evsrlajlmgl aa-i bemg in- dependent, mail alwa s continue to fXiit.? Do not thefe things fol.ow, without cofiii.ierine the ' intrin- iic nature o^ neiejjary txijUnce" \ (which is allowed to be inexplicabU ) Do not they follow from this .fimple conficieration, that the ori;^inal caufe exiils from no external cauf- ? St t^aul fuppofeth fic Mfrnity of GOD is no lets evident from .the th;i?gs in the 'prefent a^gumeni, 41 known of God in this regud is manifcfl: from the moral faculy in man, whtrcrby he is a iaw to himfelf (Not meaning 10 exclude the help and imfrovement derncd from reveUiticn) Fifthly, That the moial (haradter (.fGod is ih2ii foundation of religion^ as the moiai liactrd of Rian IS o[ his accountablenefs Onj the tooting c^f ihelc principles, we fhall proceed to examine Mr. tdwards\ dodlrinc of neceffity. Sect.' that are made, than his exiftence, power, and god- head. J he inviJlbU things of him j horn the creation of the u-orld-^ are CLEav^LY Jeen^ bting under Jhod by the the things that are ma^r points of theology, infiead of relieving any phi- lolophic difficulty, hath, on the contrary, ^w^Vi great advantage to iiii(idelity. SECT. I. Whether the *will le necejfarily determined ly an extrinfic caufe ? MR. Edwards ^o\Ad hzv^ his readers 'oh- ferve, that when he fpeaks of connexion of caufes and efe£is^ he hath refped to moral eaufes, as well as thofe char are caHcd natural m diftindion from them — that the ads oi the will mzyh^ ^scer I airJy and iuoijlc'hii^iy count ded with the moral cauie, as natural effcds with their natural caufes — ^thac the connedion is as fure and perfect between moral caufes and efitds, as natural 5 that moral necefTuy may be as abjolute as natural jFiecefTity.' * Yea, he advertifeth us, that ' where he ukth this diilinction of moral and natural ne- ceffity, he would not be undcrfiood to fuppoie, that if any thing comes to pafs by the form.er kind of nectlfsty, the nature of things is net con- cerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do noc mean to determine, that when a moral motive is fo flrong, that the ad of the will infallibly fol- lows, this is not owing to the nature of things. I fuppofe that neceffity, which is called natural, in diftindioa from moral, is fo called becaufc ineer nature is concerned, without any thing of choice \ not becaufe nature has never any hand in our choice : For choice arifcs from nature as truly as other events.' So that, upon the whole, much the fame rules are fuppofcd to take place in. the moral world, in GOD's government of moral *Part i» Sed. 4. p. 30,31, 3«. ^ hy an extrlnfic catife ? 4j moral agents {fo called) as in ihe adjuftment anc difpolal of natural things. What Mr. Eduards intended by a moral eaufc, we cannot fatisfy our- felves. Sometimes he appears to reafon as if h- fuppofed there was really no dijtin^ion between ^ moral and natural caufc, (^i, 32.) or none to be perceived j while more generally he feems to fuppole a dflindion of great importance •, which, however, he hath not fo clearly pointed out as were to be wifhed. Indeed, if there be not a real and important; diftindion between moral caufes and natural, ic plainly follows, that Mr. Edwards hath takea pains to no purpofe to fhew, that natural neceffi- ty wholly precludes from praile or blame, while moral necefTicy doth not at all. And if there be a real and important diPdn^lion, it is of impor- tance that it be clearly feen. In the fedion lad referred to, Mr. Edwards fuggefts, that 'when we fpeak of choice as dif- thi6t from nature, ic is without refieclion and rejearch ; names being given to things according to what is mod obvious. But though the de- pendance and connexion between adls of volition or choice, and their caufes, according to eftabli/h^ id laws^ is not fo fenfible and obvious, as thac eftabhfhed law and order which is feen in the ma- terial world ; and though men make a diftindli- on between nature and choice as if they were compleatly and univerfally diftindt 5 yet choice arifes from nature as truly as other events How- ever, thefe are the names that thefe two kinds of neceffity have ufually been called by •, (viz. natu- ral and moral) and they mud be diilinguilhed by fome names or other 5 for there is a diltindion H or ^4 Whether tine tvu) hentcejfarlly dster?)iintd' or difference between them, that is very impor- tant in it's cofjfequenccs : Which difference does not liefo much in the nature oi ih^ conne^ion^ as in the two tefms connived.'' The difference is important^ but not fevjible and obvious . The eauk, with whkh the effed is connedted, is of a |>articijlar kind, viz of a moral nature — the effect affo is of a particular kind, being of a Hioral nature.' Bot are we not told ii^ this fame place, that the effect is alio conntded with the 7JaturaiQ2i^k^ and is owing toihie nature of things? I'here is the y^/«/ influence of moral and natu- ral necelfity in moral events — iHtir inHuence is cloiely linktd together. Now till the me^fure of influence to be afcrrbed to mral nectffity is dif- t.ndly apprehended, it is jmpofllbls ro tell when^ ar.d how ^r, a pcrfon is re ward able or punifha- ble-^nat-ural necc»%y (by fuppofuion; being in- confident wirh reward or punifhment. But let any one e;iam^ne Mr. Edwards's book, and fay, uheiher he hath fhewn when and how far the ads of ths will proceed from natural necefilty, and when, or how far fj'om moral. Whether the fo mueh labour'd dillindion, or difference between natural and moral caufes is not con- ' founded and exploded I It is difScalt to determine whether Mr. Ed- ^vcards fuppofed the ads of the will to be the ne- cefiary e^^e6ts of an intrwftc caufc, or an e^.trinfic, Thcfe are ufed fo promifcuoufly and indetermi- nately through his book, volition beii.g fome- timcs afcribed to the one, fometimes to theoiherj^ 5hat, though they are cflentially different and op- pofiie, it is hard to fay which he moreefpecially intended by that moral neceflity, to which he c.ytry where fuppoleih the will is iubjcd. Either iaternalj, '£y Ofi extrinfic cau/e ? .45 iftternal, original bias, or fomething ext-rlofic, is the caufe, to whofe efficiency, det^rminai-ion, ,<:o|nmand, decifion, the will is as much lubjcdt, as the motion of the body to the will— this being *as paftve and nectfiary wjth refpedt to ths an- ^epednt determining caufe of it,' as the motions ,of the hands and feet with refpea: to the detef- ,n)iiiation pf the wiH. ( »^3> ^^4 ) We rather think it was Mr. Edwards^ opinion, that the will is determmed by an exirin- fic caufe. But finccihis is by no means certain from his book— fince he hath not exprefffd hini- felf clearly, or we are incapable judges of this intricate fubje6t, we fliall lake liberty.^o examine his doftrin^ on both fuppDruions— either of an extrinfic, or intrinf.c caufe, The former fhall be the iubjedt of ttie prefent fc^ion. Whether volition is neceffarily determined by ^n extrinfic caufe ? Mr. Edwards afl^erts, that th.e ads of ibe will are not neccffary in ibem/ehes^ or in their own «^m.^ •, but by their connexion with fomc caufe that is ncctfTuy tn itfelf. In bis OW.B words, they 'are neceffary by a neceffity o^ conferiuence: The only way that any thing that is to come to pafs hereafter, is, or can be, ne- eJ^fTary, is by a connexion with fomething thaus rweceflary in it's own nature, or fomething that already is, or has be.^n ; To that the Pne being foppofcd, the other certainly follows* 1 his alio is the only way th.t all 'things paft, (excepting thofe which were from eternity) could be ne- e-ffa-y before they came to ff/s, or could come to pals nccdlanly •, and therefore the only way m wh ch any efYedl or event, or any thing whatloe- ver that ever has had, or will have a beginning, ' " ' haS* ly an extrinfic ^aufe ? 49^ ^e not the caufe of them themfelves ? By whom or what i^ the ftate of men's will determined ? According to Mr. Edwards, it is the ftrongefi: motive horn Without. But motives to choice are exhibited to the riiind by fome agent : By whom are they exhibited ? In regard to finful volitions, we know that one man enticeth another, end Satan enticeth all mankind. But this will nor be given^ as an anlwer to ourqueftion ; fince the fin- ful adl of one ftnner in enticing another, and of Sarao in tempting all men, mud be determi- ned by a previous caufe-^an antecedent highed motive exhibited by fome other agent. (Though, by the way, it may be difficult to (hew, how one man can be the caufe of fin in anoihcr, when he cannot be the caufe of it himfelf; What we are enq-iiring after is, the caufe of * the fr/l and leading finful volition, which determines the whols Affair.^ Nor is there any ftop,till we arrive at the firft caufe, 'whofe immediate condudl Mr. £^- w^j faith, is firft in the feri^sof events, con' nedted with nothing preceeding.* Will it now be faid, that GOD is the caufe of thofe difpofitions of heart, and a6ls of the will, which are fo odious in their own nature? On Mr. Edtuards*s fcheme this mud be faid. For the adls of the will, not being necefliry in their iwn nature, but by connection with a caufe that is fo j and no caule being thus necelTary but he who exifted from eternity, it undeniably fol- lows, that every finful volition proceeds ultimate- ly from him, as the caufe and fourcc of it. And to (ay, that the volitions themfelves are vicious, but that the caufe is not fo, equally militates agaJnft Mr. Edxvards'^ own fcheme, and commoa icnfc. O2T j;o Whether ihe will he necejfarily determined On reading fedlion r. parti V. of Mr. Edwards^ s book, it was matter of much furprize to find a gentleman of his abilities ufing fo weak an argu- ment, defcending to fo thin a lubtili:y, as this, *' that theeffence of virtue and vice is nor in their caufe^ but in their nature*' The pains taken with this, (argument (hall we call it ? ) the flrels laid upon it, is indeed no mark of a good caufe. But fince every thing advanced by fo eminent a writer may be thought to jnent attention, we fhall briefly confider the fubj^dt of this fection. IVir. Edwards^ own reafoning will aiTift us here, as in other parts of thefe remarks. For 'there cannot be more in the effedl thaa in the caufe.' ( bz. ) Volition therefore cannoc be virtuous or vicious farther than it's caufe is fo. We may not detach the nature of effefts from the efficient. ' It may be wickedneis ia the caufe, that ic produceth wickednels.' Suppo- fing then, that ' the wicked ad of the caufe in producing wickednefs, is one wickednefs ; and the wickednefs produced another' — what follows IS, that in every finful volition there are two wickednefTcs — one chargeable to the caufe, the other to the fubje(5l of the volition. Now if the caufe be 'diverfc from the fubjedl oP volition, how doth it relieve the difficulty at all, if upon the fcheme of neceffary conneflion, GOD (lands chargeable with doing wickedly ? And is not this the plain conftquence of the dodrine, *thaC the a6ts of the will are indiflfolubly connedcd with a caufe that is neceffary in it*s own na- ture' ? And if It will be allowed, that GOD can do wickedly confidered as the caufe of finful volitions, we may juft as well afcribc all moral evil to him, SECT; [5'1 SECT. li. Whether the will he. necejarily. determined ^• an iniiinfic caufe, Hov/EVER repugnant this hypotliefis Is t(> that already examined, yet it is frequent- ly made in- Mr. Edwards's book. Our bufi- nefs is not to reconcile him with himfelf, bus to remark on what we find. His meaning would d^ubtlels have been clearer, had the fubjedl he undertook been intelligible. He appears to have been bewildered at times in his own fubtilty. To ray,that the a^s of the will are necefTary from internal, original bias, is not very confident wit!% faying, they are the necefTary effeds of an extrin- fic caufe. For what is this but faying, they are necefTary in their own nature } therefore not ne- cefTary by a necefTity of confcquence ? Yet Mr.' Edwards exprcdy afTerts, that every thing which ever had, or will have a beginnings is necefTary only by a necefTjy of confequence. Now if the adlsof the will areefTeds of an extrinfic caufe on* ly, then they cannot be the efFeds of an intrin- fic canfe alfo. But original bia^ ^nd inclination is intrinfic. If this therefore necefTarily determi- neth volition, then the other pofition of it's pro- ceeding from an extrinfic, coniequential neccffity," (an eternal, necefTary caufe) muft be given upj For ' how can ihefe things hang together * ? Or will any fuppofe, that Mr. Edwards when he faith, ' the itate or ad of the will is from the J deterrninatign 52- Whether the ivili he nicejfarlly determined determination of an intrinfic caufe,' meant by this caufc the Deity inhabicing and a(5luating eve- ry intelligent creature ? by a pofitive efficiency producing every volition of theirs ? Such a fup- pofition, wc cannot believe any one will make, liowever neCeffary to reconcile Mr. Edwards to himfelf. This is a fenfc of GOD's wcrking in men to will^ and to do -, of cur living, moving, and jMiving our being in him, which we prtrfume none will efpoufc. For if it makes him the author cf mrtuous difpofitions in men, in the mod Jlrift and abjolute fenfc \ it will be remembered, that n alio makes him, in the fame fenfe, the author cf every vicious inclination and propenfity. On this hypothefis, there is properly but one agent in the univerfe, * Moral necefTity,' faith Mr. Edwards, 'Wcs in the will, and is the will's propenfity. How then does ic lie in fomething exhibited to the mind from without, which is prior to the will, and gives ic a necciTary detc-rminaiiori ? Surely the will's propcnfiiy is not prior to it's propenfity. No- thing /;; the -iiill itjef cm be the moral^ neceflity by which it is determined, if this neccfluy be re- ally prior to will. Bcfides, to be determined by a caufe in iifelf, is to be felf determined, if words have any meaning. And moreover, this is making the will neccltiry in it's own nature. Both which are contrary to fuppofition. What confoundirg. again of caufe and effed ! Volition is the antcccdenr, neceffary caufc of volition ! The will is neceffarily determined in every ad): by a necefTity prior and fuperior to it •, and yec this neccfTiiy is nothing diverfs or diflindl fron\ volition' ! ^creovcj ly an intrlnfic caufe ? ^ •Moreover, if an intrinfic caufc, or origi- Ijal bias and propenfiry, be that neceiTiLy by which the will is determined, what is this but being <2ccermiried by nature ? For original propenfitf is »^//r fcitution of the author of nature. Mo- ral events, Mr. Edivards indruds us, are ow- ing, t artly at leaff, to the nature of things — pro- ceed, at lead in part, from natural caufes, Nov/, .by his own principles,, ii; far as the nature of " ' things hy an intrinfic can(e ? g^ things operates to their produdion, neither good nor ill defcrt is applicable to the fubject of voli- tion. Had he told us in whac rtfpedls, and how far, volition is owing to natural nccefiity^ we might have known v/nerein, and how t-Ax, the creature is accountable. For herein, and fo far, Mr. Jidwards g^:in{s/n [volition] js not pro- perly his own a6t — he is not- the proper lubjed of command, & c. ' * If volition be partly owing to natural caufes, and the lubjedl lb far is not anfwerabi?: j what IS this but charging the moral turpi- tude of a fmful volition on GOD, fi far as it is the . effici of nalural neceffit'y ? Now as well may we attribute the whole moral turpi- tude lo God, as xhc haji msiifure of it. It moreover follows, that the holinefs of the angels, who never finned, being among .thofe moral events which are owing to the nature of things, is no holinefs ; unworthy of praife. The lame thing follows with refpedt to the holintfs of the man CHRIST JESUS„ and of GOD himrdf. For 'natural necefTi- ty is wholly inconfiltent with juil praife and . blame.' And would Mr. Edwards deny, that the holinefs of GOD, his moral reditude in gene- ral, is neceffaiy z>/ if s own nature ? And what is this, but to be necefTary by^aw^/ar^^/necefTuy ? Farther, by Mr. Edwardsh principles, all virtue and vice in creatures is native or original. For every a6t: of volition is the necefTary effe^ of internal, original bias — i.e. is owing to the original frame of the mind. The angels thac i"eli,anJour cornm;n progeiiitorsj were there- fore g$ Whether the will he meceJJ'arily 'determined fore 'made with a fixed, prcvail-ng principle of fin ixT the heart * Ochtrv^/ile tncir fin proceeded not from internal, origiiial bias — any more than from an 'indiiToluble connexion wiih a caufe ne- celTary in it's own nature/ If in truth their ori- ginal bias was not to evil-^if fhey were endow- C'J with the moral image of GOD, then their fin- ful volition was not the effect of original pro- pcnfifcy — nor did the neceiTity of it lie in the wilt^ in it's primitive ftate. Nor confequtntly will this account for the permanency of holinefs in the an- gels in heaven. This cannot be the rationale ^i the abiding principle of holinefs in them ; fince St appears from fidl, that creatures endowed with •t4ie moral image ofGODimay deface and forfeit ir. Suppose 'the efience of virtue and vice lie* In the nature of volition, not in the caufc' ; it then follows, that the intrinfic caufe, the internal bias or propenfity (which is fuppofed to be the moral neceffity that determines the will) is not that which conHitutes the goodnefs, or wiv.ked- nefs, of th^ acts of the will. A vicious man's bias and inclination to fin, is not that which makes him finful ; the tfTence of his fin Iving not in fuch bias or inclination, but in the nature of the wicked thing. A llirewd folution ! as if the <:hara61-cr of moral agents v/ere no: always eili- •mated from their propenfity to good or evil. If 'moral recefTity lies in the will, and is the will's propenfity,' ic either follows, that there is no good or evil in any difpofitions implanicd in the hearts of men by nature ; (contrary to affcrtion, ■p 3^3') or if tntrebe any o;ood or evil in fuch difpofitions, this is c.itirely a didind goodnefs or wicktdnefsfrom the volhioni themiclvcs, which they arcthc caufc of, 'ic would i.Tsply a conirti- , diCtioa iy an intrinfic caufe ? ^ didion to fuppofe, that thefc two arc the fame iti- dividual' goodnefs or 'wickednefs. Thc'good or •wicked a6l ofthc caufe, in producing' goodnefser •wickedncfs is one' goodnefs or 'wickcdnris ; and the' goodnefs or 'wickedncfs produced, if there be any produced, is another.' Will this be called arguing ! What doih it amount to ? The plairt truih is, that when we fe: ourftlves to judge of human adions, we mud have noconfideiation of the fource of them, buc entirely detach them from th.ir caufes. Be the efficient who or what it will, ail we have to attend to is, the effed pro- di'ced — by this we muil eftimate the goodnefs or wickcdntf. of men, whciher they determine themielves, or are determined ab extra — whether they have power over their own wills, or have not. He therefore that with one original talenc makes as great improvement as another with five, is no more praifeworthy — that is, is not ac- cepted according to that he hath. He that offends againft five degrees of light originally given, is guilty in no higher degree than he that offends againft but one degree of light. The volition. Or ad, in both cafes, we fuppofe to be the fame in regard to the fubjed matter of duty cr fin — the lame alfo in the general nature thereof. What then is the reafon of different degrees of punifhmenc for the fame crime in different per- fons ? Not the nature of the crim^e as abfirad- cd from tr.c circmnftances of the agent, but as ccnneded and compared herewith. Now if men are not the caufe of their own volitions, then a determination to fin againft ten degrees of light differs not]iing from the like determ,ina- tion againft a fingle degree of light : In both cafes, the determination itfelf is alike neceffary ^i^d un^yoidablc. So that there is no foundaiioa 5? Whether the will he necejfarily determined for different degrees of guilt ; becaufe, though we are won't to fpeak of luperiorand IcfTtr ad- van-ages, yet there is no real ground for this dlftin(5lton, intelligent creatures being in no cafe the cut-Ivors, the ..vol unrary dcfigning caufe of iheir in.wfard determinmions ; at lealt not of the firil and leading a6t, which decides the whole matter. How i;hen, without having recourfe to the cauie, canj.we judge of i\\'t naiute of fin ? lN;D,fiED had Mr. , Edwards {x^ccttcci in his atten-'pf to (hew, that the ''tfTnce of virtue and vice is -not in. thtircauie, but in their nature*', he would not have obviated the objtflion fo of- ten made to the do<^lrine of necctTity, but nevtr anfwcred, that it is charging GOD with fin. . >Foi^ ad?nitiing,GOD to be the original caufe of volition, but that being the caufe of a fir.ful yolit'ion in the creature is a diftindl wicked* ntfs kom that which the caufe produceth in the t^V^l •, ifill the Ibpreme caufe is fuppofed In fault i is charged ^nih prc-duci?ig^\n. Tntre i^ no evading the eonfequencejndeed, rh.at the who'e guilt of men's evil difpofiiionsis chargeable on- GOD, not themfclvcs, or on blind neceffity and fatality, if the things Mr. Edwards advanceth be true. For who will charge another with vvdiat Ive is acknowledged not to be the author or caufe of ? If therefore men's volitions are virtuous or vicious, and they not the defign-- ing caules of them ihemfclves •, { which Mr. Edwards throughout his book faith they are not ) it follows, that the virtue or vice of their volitions is to be afcribed to the caufe, whoever or whatever this caufe is. This cor-^ fequtnce may appear more plainly to follow from the icheme oi necefnty we are exami-^- ning, in the fiieceeding fedions. - •" "" gECT, SECT. Ill Upon Mr* Edwards'; own Scheme^ there cannot be natural Libtrty without moral. WE acknowledge the title of this fciflion contains a poHfion direcSlIy repugnant to Mr. Edwards^ whole fcheme, and yec trud we fnall make it appear that the thing alkrted plain- ly follows frbm things he hath advanccvd. Liberty with re^pe(5t to natural aflions can be neither more nor lefs than according to the freedom of the ^///, cr mind. For natural ani- ons, by luppofition, are dependent andconfequenc on, the fruits and effefls of, the will's determi- nation, which is the caufeof them. Now 'there cannot be more in the effed than in the caiife. Thofe things which are indifTolubl/ cOnneded with other things that are Leceiiary, are them- felves neceffary.' Therefore if the acfls of the will are necefTary, thofe outward acls, which arc the etfefts of necefiiiy in the will, mud be ne- cefTary ' by a necelUcy of confequence.' Now eve- ry a6t of the will is faid to be ntceifary. ' The foul itfelf is the obje(5tof fomething adlingupon, and influencing it. The firfl and determining zCi of choice, which decides the whole affair, is out of our power.' So that in natural adions we are ^cati/dd to a6l by fome other agent.' Mr. Edwards faith, ' it is no more a contradiction, to fuppofe that a6lion may be the efled of fomc Itbcr caufe, befides the ageni or king that a6ls., K than t6 Upon Mr, Edwards'j Scheme, there than to fuppofe that life may be the cffefl of fomc other caufe befides the liver, or being that lives, in whom life is caufed to be.' * ( 286. )The afti of the foul or will being, therefore, neceflary cfFc6ls of fome other caufe than the agent, let it be fhewn how there can be fo much as natural liberty — meaning hereby a freedom from out- ward conftralnt or reftraint. Mr. Edwards aflerts, *The liberty of the will is not cxcrcifed in any thing but what the will doei^, (99.) * The will in no inftance whatever is it's 6wn determiner'. Therefore the liberty of ihe will is not exercifed in any of the determinations of the will. Therefore not in determining to move the body. Therefore corporeal aftion is not vo- luntary. Therefore the will does nothing There- fore It is exercifed in nothing. Mr. Edwards promifeth to 'demonftrate',. that ' if the fir/l a6l in the train, determining and fixing the reft, be not free, none of them all are free.' And afTcrrs, that ' GCD's own immediate condudt is original in the lerics.' In one word,cxtcrnal a^lion is no more in our power than internal. To fay that the will deter- mines the former is not true : For this would be to fuppofe it is its own determiner at lead in this particular determination to move the body ; con- trary to alTertion, that it is in no inftance whatever it's own determiner. But fuppofe material adlions to be determined by the will, that herein men arc the voluntary caufes of their own adlions — this is really attributing no power to thewillor agent-^ fincc all the adtsof the will fuppofe an anfwcrabic caufe * Ii a man active in that adl by which he is brought into being ? cannot he natural Liberty without moral. 6i caufe without, as much as creation fuppofetha xrcator. (62.) If material a6lions are fubjedl to, andcommaed- ed by, the will, ftill this is fubjcd to and deter^ mined by preceeding neccfTity. So that natural liberty is given up. For that is a ftrange kind of liberty, which is founded in, and refulu out of, • RecelTity. Whether this ncceffity be natural or moral — whether it proceeds from an extrinfic or intrinQc caufe, it equally militates againft the fup- poficion of freedom. The intelligent fy Item is a curious piece of mechanilm. •Page 2^2 (and clfcwhere) Mr, Edwards hath an evafion, which Icarce deferves a ferious an- fwer. It is this, * that a man may be faid to have a thing in his power, if he has it at his tle5lioni i. e. if he now pleafeth, and has a dire^ and imme^ diate defirc for it, he is not unable to do \lJ^ This^ in tnoft writers, would be efteemed mecr quibbling. For if a man is morally incapable of a ' dired and immediate defire' to a thing, how can he be faid to .have it in his power ? Would Mr. A"^te;rtr io.~ and p. 402, 408. Now ^4 ^02) the Author of Sin; Now how doth it appear, on thcfe principles; that God is not the pofitivc caufe, and real fource of moral evil ? Every one perceives a difference between doing (or being xh^JuhjeB of) a wicked thing, and being the efficient cauje and fountain of it — Mr. Edwards allows, thaj the moral turpitude lies wholly in the inward pro- penfity, and can no farther be applied to the cor- poreal aflion, than as a vicious^principle is fup- pofed to be the fource of it. If then we have no power of felWeterminationin relation to the internfil a6ls and exercifes of the in;nd — if the only thing wherein human liberty confifts, is, a power of executing what is already willed — if volition fprings not from man as the fource, caufe, or efficient of it^ — if he is only ihtfubjeff^ the doer^ the aSfor of fin— Who then is the po- fitive caufe and fountain of it ? if not the crea- ture, who but the creator ? Every thing but the a5iion or doing of wickednefs, Mr. Edwards cxprelly affirms GOD to be the author of, and faith It is no reproach to him. So that unlefs he would confound caufe and effi?^ — unlels he would allow men to be ' the dcfigmng volun- tary caufe of their own volitions •,* (which I;ic conftandy denies) there is no evading the confe- quence, that GOD is the fource and fountain, the pofitive caufe and efficient, of moral evil — yea, Mr. Edwards faith, that he ' decifively or- ders all the volitions of moral agents by a pofi- tive influence'— (4.03) which is nothing Icfs than faying in exprels terms, that he is the pofitivc caufe and efficient of them. Mr. Edwards's notion of human liberty, ,a$ beincr exercifed and concerned in outward a'fli- ons only, in contradiftindtion from an inward power of felf-dctcrmination (or aiflivity in voliti- Mpon Mr, EdwardsV Scheme of Neceffjt'y, 65 •« — or liberty in the mind or will) if viewed in it's diredt and immediate conrequences, we think muft appear to fubvert the very foundation of religion and morality. This appears to be the plain confcquence by his own principles. For he very juftly obferves, that 'the eflence of all moral good or evil lies in the internal inclinaci- ons, dilpofuions, volitions* — that as thefe 'are the caufe of outward adlions, fo the moral good or evil of fuch aftions doth not lie at all in the aflions them/elves, which taken by themfelves are nothing of a moral nature •, but in the internal inclinations and volitions which arc the caufe of them' — (27b) that 'vice and virtue lie in the ftate or frame of the foul^ and in this only* — that ' the very willing is the doing ; v/hen once a man has willed, the thing is performed, and nothing clfe remains to be done — that the will itfelf is the proper object of commands, as well as thofc anions which are the effects of the will. It is manifeft the Joul only is properly and diredly the fubjed of precepts or commands, that only being capable of receiving or perceiving them. The motions or (late of the body are matter of command only as they are fuhjeii to the foul, and conneded with it's afts. ' ^ Now \i inward freedom enters not into the notion of human liberty (33, 38, 39,40, 131, 132, 189, 194, 113,-215, 234, 236,256,-289, andfajfim.) then we are not free in that wherein lies the ejfence of virtue and vice : And if we are not free in this refpeft efpecially, how are we free in any fenfe that is of the lead importance ? how can we be virtuous or vicious, if liberty (as Mr. Edwards grants) is neccflary to moral good or «vil ? Yea, if wc are not free with refped to the thoughts, ; Part 3. Scft. f & 5^ 66 COT> tfie Author of Sin, thoughts, affe(5lions and purpofes of our heart.v our inward inclinations aad volitions, hath not Mr. Edwards fllewn undeniably that we cannot be free in regard to outward adions ? 'If there be a feries of ads, the deter fnimng ad is more efpecially the fubjed of comn^and— becaufe ic is this ad that determines the whole afniir.' So that we are not at liberty in that which deter- mines the whole chamber. Nothing can be more futile than the evafion, that ' the eflenee of vir- tue and vice lies in the vature of volition, not ia the cauje" — as if meer effcds might be virtuous or vicious, and the caute that produceth them not fo — Or fuppofing the caufe (of a finful vo- lition, for inftance ) to be vicious, as if ihcpaffrce cffed would be another and diftmd wkkednefs. Befides, if the fubjed of fuch a volirion, who is altogether paiTive herein, is vicious notwithftand- ing, then how is liberty neceffary to praifc or blame ? If he is vicious at all, he is fo on account of the volition itfelf, and on this account only — Whether he has power or opportunity to exe- cute the volition, does not come into confide- ration. Moreover, outward adions being determi^ ned by the will, and partaking of the nature of moral good or evil only with reference to their caufe, viz. rnternaF volition — how is this (inter- nal voruiony virtuous cr vicious in it's cwn nature^ w'hen the ads of the body ate not ? Volition hath a caufe, a prior determiner, no Icfs than external condud. Why then are outward ads declared virtuous or vicious only with reference to their caqfc, while this is denied of volition ? Hath every ad cf • volition m antccedentj nccertary cauf*^ upon Mr. Ed^vards'; Scheme cfT^ectJfity. 67 caufe, which d 189; moral Evil to the Univerfi, 75 aird the wtfe and gracious intention of the Crea- tor — (and if fo, ' why did not GOD make them at firftwith a fixed prevailing principle of fin V) Yea, it follows, that intemperance, debauchery, opprtfllon, murther, malice, envy, all the lufts of the ficdi and fpirit, greatly conduce to the good of the world, and are perfe^ly agreable to the wife and good governor of it. What obli- gations do mankind ove to drunkards and gluttons, to fornieators and adulterers, to the fraudulent and oppreifors, to thieves and liars, and falfe fvvearers, to robbers and murtherers, and all that great mukuude, whom the faithful and rrue witnels hath exprefsly excluded from the heavenly Jcrulalcm, and configned to one common lake of fire and brimftone ! * Which judgment according to truth the world have been wont to teftify their approbation of in their treatment of fach perfons — -that is, their greatelt bcnefa6iors 1 Bafe ingratitude I Flow fin came to be permitted is more than we can comprehend. To fay it Could not have been prevented is faying more than any one knows. To fay that GOD chofe it, and deter- mined the will of the creature to it, is impious, "*ieven fuppofmg it is in fad followed with grea- ter good, than otherwile would have been — « which fuppofition is, however, but meer conjec- ture at brft, and without any folid foundation. For unlei's we can tell what would have been had fin never entered the world, it is impolTiblo we fhould be able to judge, by way of compari- fon, of the greater good confequent upon k ; ©r be able to fay, that ic was bcft upon the M whole, * Rev, xxl, 8. and xxii. 15. 'j6 ^hefuppofed Advantage of whole. From the miferies of ir, which we fee and feel, we have no fpecial reafon to infer its fuperior advantages, and good tendency. And notwithdandine ihe infinite reafon we have to receive it as a faithful faying^ and worthy of all acceptation^ that yESUS CHRIST came into ihe vjcrld to fave /inner s ; yet that he came to reflore mankind to a better ftatc than they would have been raifed to, had they never finned, is more than we have yet learned from the holy fcrip- lures. Be this as it will : Sappofe It to be indeed true, that the conftquence of fin is the greater good of the univerfe, it will not therefore fol- low, that GOD mud chufe and dcterniine ir. If an apoflle fuppofed their damnation to be jufl, who do evil with a vicvv to greater good ; ihall we venture to impute any thing like this to GOD ? Suppofc (in the inflanccs Mr. Edwards brings) JofepFs brethren had foreseen the con- fequences of their treatment of him, would this have judified their condudl, and rendered it me- ritorious ? — what as w*ife and good men they muH: have chofe ? (p. 374, ^j ^) The fame quellion, on the fame fuppofltion, ofi^crs itfelf in relation to the murderers of our Savior. To fay that GOD wills evil for the fake of its good tendency, is a reproach to an holy and good be- ing, who cannet chufe moral evil at all — any mure than a man of reafon and confcience can chufe what he knows ro be finful, from the cleared profpeft of great publick advantage. The moral Governor of the world will puriue the happinefs of it, in fuch ways, and by fucli means only, as are juft and holy. And we might with more propriety fuppofc, he will not take moral Evil to the Ufiivcrfei 77 tike care of the happinefs of his creatures at all, than that he doth this by chufing fin as the on-^ ly jure means of the greatcll good. ^ Tke late Rev. Mr. Clap, Prefidcnt of Yale- Colicge, in Connedicut, in his ' hiftory and vindication * To admit that any created being can z€t in a manner contrary to what it does, or fulfil any other end, is tantamount, faith Mr. Collins, to allowing it to be . independent of the Deity ; and confequently, to have it in its ele(5tion and power to thwart the fchemes of the great author and fupcrintendent of all things, l^c. His anfwerer very juftly replies, * All this is nothing but fuppofing it a contradiction that GOD fhould endue the human mind, or any creature, with liberty of a£tion. For if liberty is a perfection poiTible to be communicated to any creature, it follows from the nature of the thing, that it muit be in t\\t pswcr and ek^ion of the agent^ to a6l in a manner contrary to -what it does, and to fuU .fit another end. But this liberty does not at ail infer that man is independent of the Deity ; any more than the power of breaking human laws infers that fub- jecls are independent of their governors. Man is ever fubjedit to the providential government cf GOD, and accountable to him for his a£lions ; and, as he does good or evil to himfelf or others, is liable to receive rewards or punifhments. This fufiiciently faews the dependency of man upon GOD ; and as much Co, as if his actions were neceffary. For as in the latter cafe, he would depend upon GOD as an in- J}ru7ncnt only in the hands of an agent ; or, as the inaiiimate creation depends upon him, meerly as a machine upon the framer and dire6lor of it ; fo in the former cafe he depends upon GOD as a moral governor, who fuperintends his adllons, and from v/hom he has reafon to expe£t to be recompenfed 2ccor Jing to his worlc— And no power whatfoever can deliver him out of GOD's hands. Is fuch a . .creature then irJepsndmt of GQDP On the contrary. 7S ^hsfuppofed Advantage of vir.dication of the dodlines of the Nrw-Eng- !and churches,' (p. 19J has exhibited * a new jcheme of reHgion,* which he apprehended was prevailing, in oppofition to thofe dodrines— ^Mentioning ' this fundamental principle' of the new fcheme, ^Yhat the happinefs of the creatuye h the fole end cf the creation^ the worthy Prtfi- dent remarks, ' Tbis naturally leads to moft^ ij not alitor the reft' (meaning all the other errors of the new fcheme of divinity.) ' For this .rnuft be i\iQ Jole rule of all GOD's condud to- wards us, and of ours towards him ; and it is certain, that GOD'sJoie end and ultimate defign can never be fruftrated.' Whether the Pre- ■fidenc had Mr. Edwards's book in view, is un- certain. W^ can only lay, that befides the au- " ' , ■ ^ '' ' ihors as his fubjeiTtion to GOD's providential government and final judgment is the gteatcft, fo it is the only dependency which a rational creature as fuch can be under unto GOD. Nor again, is it any confequence of liberty, that man will have it in his eU6iu7i and power to thwart ihe fchejTies^ and reji/} the will of the great author of his being — For, la^.! ofmg human liberty^ it miift be fuppoled from the nature of it, that the will ofGOD, and the fcheme of his government formed by it, is a moral providence and fuperintendency, like that of a rational movi2irc\\ over his fubje(Sl:s, who gives them laws, er joining obedience to them, and eftab'ifhing them v.ith the fandtion of rewards and punifhmentsi. It is the wili of GOD, that we (hould aSt freely ^ and have it in our power cither to do or not do his commardments, that he may appear to be a moral snd righteous governor, by rewarding thofe who £huje to do that which is right and good^ and by pu- nifhin^ thofe who wilfully commit evil' Jack/on s vindication of human liberty againft J, Collins^ Ei^i p. 56,— 39. moral Evil to the Vniverfe. yg thors particularly fet down, he mentions ' other books' from which he made his colledion of errors, without infor2iiing us who the authors were. But though we apprehend Mr. Ed- wards*s book as exceptionable as any mentioned by rhe Prefident ; yec we rather think this book was not in his view. For we were fome years ago informed, (and upon enquiry found it to be true) that this book was introduced by the Pre- fident to be recited by the ftudents of the col- lege — and Tuppofe it is flill continued. SECT; ^o Obfervations mid Refledllons on the Scheme SECT. VI. Containing general Obfervations ^;/i Reflexions on the Scheme cf Necejfity exhibited in Mr* Ed- ., wards'j Book. ^TOTWITHSTANDING all Mr. Edwards % hath laid upon the diftindlion between na- tural and moral neceffity^ we cannot but think this * diilin6tion altogether inipertinenc in the prelent controverry.' For ' that which is neceflary, is necelTary, mud be, and cannot be prevented.' If there be a real necefiity on the mind in all its adts, it is quite immaterial whether this. necefTity, by which the mind is in every inftance determi- ned, be called natural or moral. Whether will and endeavour is overcome by external con- ftraint ; or v/hether fuch a ftate of the will or foul is produced by fome neceffary caule, extrin* fie or incrinfic, amounts to much the fame thing in the end. There is exa£dy the fame propriety in faying, that fuch a thing cannot be done, is im-pojjible^ unavoidable^ necejfary, &c, where there is a moral inability to it, as in applying thele epi- thets to 2.phyfical inability : For if the aind that hath wifdom, power &c, in a greater or lefs degree, according to the effeds afcribed to it. And if moral events, through a chain of fecond caufes, centre in the deity, as natural effedls do, what is this but running up morals to inechanifm ? any pains Mr. Edwards hath taken to avoid fuch an imputation on his fcheme notwithRanding. In our author's fcheme, necelTity is univerfal. The divine will is always determined by it, and the will of every creature. Now GOD Is either the author of this necefliiy, to which he himfelf is fubje6l, or he is not. If he is, then all the effe^ls cf it are to be afcribed to him as their proper caufe. If he is not, then there is foine caufe prior to the frjl caufe, binding and deter- mining hitr. — he is caufed to determine as he doth by fomething extrinfic ( For to fay he is determined by fomething intrin/ic, is to fay he is felf-dtter mined — contrary to fuppofition ) His being and volitions are effeots as much as thofe of linitc creatures. That necefliiy, which is faid cfNeceJfity exhibited in MnEdw^rds'sBook, Sj" faid to be the caufe of every determination of the divine will, the caufe and ground of his ex- igence and perfedtions, is prior, by fuppofition, to his exillence and volitions. And this necef- fity mufl; be determined by fomething preceed- ing,and fo on. Yea, Mr. Edwards- makes exprefs mention of the caufe of moral neceffity — and fays, that the caufe of this neceffity is equally ne- cefTary as of natural. That is, there is a necef- fary caufe of this caufe, and fo on in infinitum: Thus we are run back far into noa-enticy, and have to enquire, By what caufe the firft caufe exitls — which caufe is an effe6t in relation to fomething preceeding, and this an effrd: with relation to fomething flill preceeding, ^c. i^c* And if fomething exterior and prior to the Dei- ty determines him, what is this but affirming him to be the almighty minifter of/^/^ ? How- ever IMr. Edivards hath exprefled his difinclina- tion to fatalifm, (in which we doubt not his iin- cerity) we think his reafoning is plainly on the (iJe of abfolute fatality -, and fuppofe he was caught in his own fubtilty. Upon his fchsmc it follows, that the actions of all finite beings are the agency of the Deity ; and his is not properly fpeaking agency, but in(lrumentality — ' a fubjedion to blind neceffiiy and fate. There is no felf- mover, fclf- direction, felf-detcrmina-^ tion, or fource of adivity, in the univerfe. ' Li- berty is banifhed out of the world — and ths world mult have been eternal. Whether GOD could have a6led otherwife than he hath } is a curious rather than profita- ble enquiry. And as to the notion of fitneis of things, independent of the things themfelves, and wiihoac reference to the fovcrci^n mind,* ^' ^ N ■ It $4 Obfervations and Refleftions on the Scheme it is difficult even to imagine it ; to fay nothing of tlie impiety implied in Ibch a thought. We have reprefented what we apprehend is the plain tendency, and indeed only ccnfiftenc fenlcjof the fcheme of neceffity before us. Whe- ther it was copied from Mr. Hume, Hohhs^ ^pi- noza, or any of the old heathen Philofophers we do not r?.y. We hint the thing becaufe of a remarkable coincidence we have exhibited ac the cbfc of thefc remarks, in fome extrads from ihem, fee over againft fimilar paflagcs of Mr. Edwardsh book. Though we have a right to renew valid objcdions, how oft foever they have been m>ade belore, until fome tolerable anfwcr is given to them (efpecially when the old doc- trines, to which the Ike objcdions were former- ly made, but not anfvirered, are received.; Yet we would not repeat the charge, without giving a fpecimen in fupport of it. We really are per- fuaded, that there can be no pofTible confutation of fatalifm on the principles of Mr. Edzz^ards^s book. Hefpeaks with fatisfadtion of the progrefs o{ metaphyfic fcience \ (325 j of which and its' ter- rible doings,' his own book, among others on fatality, is an alarming proof. [Epicurus, Mr. Edwards reminds us, was ' the father of at heifm and licentioufnefs.'* David Hume, Efq^ is the fa- ther of modern epicurifrn : And whoever hath read his effays and Mr. Edwards* 9> enquiry is better able to judge than one can from the ftw fcle(^l pafTages we have extracted, of the agrcer ment between them.] Not that we fuppofe Mr. Edwards faw, or allowed, the tendency and confcquences of his fcheme to be fuch as we have here reprefented ; he wfNeceJfity exbihited in Mr, Edwards'^ Booh t$ he hath repeatedly declared the contrary. Still if the confequences are fairly deduced — if in ' ofc pafTages wherein he profefTcs himfelf a id to liberty he is cither repugnant to him- or allows no liberty that is of any moment, ' connedled with moral agency — let any reafon fay, whether his fcheme can be ^is dodlrine of neceflary connexion, if dacible to the confequences we have 1, if confiftenL with itfelf ooly in that \ave taken if, will be rejeded by all due regard to the moral perfedlions )r which w« doubt not in the leall (wards had a fupreme veneration, d good men. are not always wife. '\niuch Mr. Edwards*$ method to ons by endeavouring to reduce his ?dverfaries to the fame abfur^ chough it be a good argument ad 10 means rttisfadory. We mighc fome other anfwer in particular ns of the fate of the heathen^ ', making men machineSy making of fin^%% well as other objedions, , /en. But as we may prefume ve what appeared to him the -jfe and fuch like objedions to effity \ fo we conclude from the fubjed, no folid anfwer •fe objedions ; otherwife he ed the world with fuch an 'vafivc ones. Though we think thofe anfwers to ob- we muft take the liberty g6 Obfervations ^;^JRefie6lions on tbeScheme.Szc: TiicuGH we think no book hath been pub- lifhed in this country of more dangerous ten dency, yet did we not at the fame time f pofe the author to have been a ferious believer of religion, natural and revealed' zealoufly concerned for the intcreft of p; godlinefs, we fhould not have taken the to enter on this puzzling fubjed of hi recefnty — which, as Mr. Hume remark jncft contentious queftion of meraph' inoft contentious fcience.' If what remarked is fufficient to fnew the dangerous confequences of admitti fary connexion of moral caufes and the beginning of the world, or a fr tion of moral ads with afuppofed i preceeding, as of natural events ^ i€s ; the inconfiftence of our ai -with itfclf y and the perfed futi' into nice dilquifitions on fuch^ jnain end ofthefe remarks hith' anfv/ered. But as it may be t ho Eo have done this in fome meaft ceeding to exhibit a fcheme m truth and reafon, this is what in the following part of our fu' to moral Agents^ S9 their probation, poflcfs it in fome mcafure and degree. Mr. Edwards^ as hath been Ihtwn, denies all felf-detcrmining power, and inward liberty — af- ferting, that ' tvery determination of the will in chufing and refufing is neceffary.' (p in, 113) But that an inward principle of adlivity, and power of volition or choice, belongs to mankind, we think is in a manner fclf-evident. For it is granted on all hands, that moral good and evil lie in the ftate of the mind, or prevailing internal difpofition of the agent. Liberty therefore, if at all necelTary to virtue and vice, muft be ex- ercifed in that wherein the nature of morality and religion confifts — that is, in the inward man. A freedom from external conftraint is a liberty belonging to fools and madmen, and to the brute creatures. Thefe, therefore, are as capable of virtue and vice, praifc and blame, as beings endowed with, and in the exercife of reafon, if this external (hypothetical) liberty is the only thing neceffary to moral agency. Fools, madmen, and brutes, if they are not bound or imprif&ned, have natural liberty. They have a power, faculty, or property called* wilh Their adlions are as voluntary (in many refpedls) as thofe of mankind, who are of a found under- ftanding. The adtions of brutes proceed from inclination and defign — an inclination and de- fign proceeding from nature, or internal, ori- ginal bias. If then an a6lion's being voluntary (in the fenfe of Mr. Edwards's book) makes it virtuous or vicious, the lower animals are fo as really as intelligent creatures. As we arc not accuftom- ^ - ed '^Cr Internal" Libert^ hekvgs cd to tiilk of virtuous' or vicious herds of cattle,' the epithets, as applied to them, may found fomething odd and harfh at firft ; but by the help of metaphyfics we may in time be recon- ciled to fuch language. We are not, indeed, to fuppofe our oxen and horfes are morally good or bad in thofe acftions of tfieirs wh.ch are againft their m\h — to which they are externally impel- led — Or in regard to any inftances of forbear- ance, which are owmg to external impediment-—' to which they have a will, and endeavour to perform, but are hindered from doing as they would. But the caies of cca£lion and reftraint excepted, Itt it be fliewn, on the prefent hypothe- fis,that they are not proper fubjecls of commenda- tion or blame,reward or punifliment — and by the fame arguments we prefume it may be (hewn, that mankind are not. If power or opportuni- ty to execute a will or choice already produced by fome cxtrinfic caufe, be all that is meant by liberty, or that is neceflary to moral agency, li- berty is perfedtly ideal^ and the controveriy a- bout it is about a mecr word. But if liberty be really eflential to moral agency, as Mr. Edwards admits ; and if there cannot be liberty of adting or conduding farther than there is liberty of willing, chufmg, preferring, as hath been (hewn — the plain conlequence is, that liberty in the mind is effential to moral agency. Upon Mr. Edwards^ fcheme of liberty, it is not for the adts and exercifts of their minds that men arc accountable, but only for thtir outward actions. There is no moral turpitude in fuch a ftate of the foul or will as our Saviour defcribes. Matt, V. 18, 32, but only in the execution of fuch a difpofition. We know, indeed, that Mr. Ed- t^ards intcnded'ngc to afTcrt any luc^ thing as ' " " ^ " this, to moral Agentsl 4^ii this, that malice, envy, pride, impure defires; <^c. are innocent until they become effe(5ls : BuC is not this the confequence of his allowine;, that liberty is nscefTary to moral agency, while he makes this liberty confift only in a power a maa hzth to execute his will. If Mr. Edwards in^ tended not to aflcrt the above confequence, (as it is plain he did not) then in the enquiry where- in the liberty of man confifts, fom^ithing farther is to be confidered than material adlion — There mud be internal liberty, if liberty enters into the notion of a praife-worthy deed, or the con- trary. The proper queftioa, \%lVhether we have end exercife liberty in that wherein the nature of 'virtue and vice confijis ? And one might think this would not be made a queftion. To fay that the mind is necefTarily determin- ed in all its adts, is making mankind necclTary agents in that thing which diftinguiflieth them from the inferior creatures. Without mo- ral liberty, it is plain their adlions cannot be of a moral nature, any more than thofe can be cal- led naturally free adlions, which proceed from natural neceffity. Abridge a man's natural li- berty ever fo much, his moral freedom may re- main ; and if it doth, the willing or unwilling mind is rewardable or punifhable. On the con- trary, fuppofe moral liberty taken away, or ra- ther, never to have been poflfeiTed, and there is an utter incapacity of moral action. * O That: f « Man cither has within himfelf a principle of aSlion^ properly (peaking, that is, a felf-moving faculty, a principle or p9wer ofbtginning motion j or he has not. U he has within himfelf fuch a principle, then he is a Jree^ and not a mce£ar^ agm* For every majfarf ^i Internal Liberty belongs That we have internal liberty is apparent^ from our moral di/cernment, that faculty Mr. Edvoards himfclf fpeaks of. We fhall reft the whole proof of our dodrine on this fingle point. This , cgent Is moved necejj'ar'ily by fomething elfc ; and then that which mo'^ed it, not the thing itfelf which is moved, is the trut and or.h caufe of the acftion. If man has not within himfelf a principle or power of ' Jeif-motion^ then every motion and aSiion of man is ftridl- . Jy and properly produced by the ffficiency of feme ., extrinfic caufe : Which caufe muft be either what we ufually call the 77iotive or teajon, upon which a man t^s ; or c^i(z it muft be fome infenfiblc fuhtle rrMtery or (oHiCctker beirgox jubjlancevmk.\ng an imprcflion upon him. It tlie reafom or mauves upon which a n:an a£ts, be the immediate or effdent caufe of the e^ion ; then ei- - ther GlfiraSi notions ( as all reafons and motives are) arc \}[itv[\.\^\\Q% fiihjiances ; orelfe that which has itfelf no real fubfiancs can put a body into motion : Either of which is maRifeftly abfurd. If infenfiblc y«^//^ matter^ of any other heing or fuh-* Jiance^ continually making impreffion upon a man, be the immediate and efficient caufe of his a6linndu<^, either in ;but GOD's own -IMMIDiate condud'— and in re- gard ' to the ftate and atheir fin : But how this charge can be removed on the foundationMr. ^Yit'^r^J proceeds upon is difficult to moral Jgentsl 105 to conceive; nor indeed has he taken much pain^to remove it, though he allows it ' is infinitely to be abhorred, and denies it to be the eonfcquencc of what he has laid down.' In what fenfe he thought It was to be * abhorred,' and will not allow it to be the ' confequencc' of what he hath faid, has been already remarked. * However great that impotency is which mankind derive from y^<^^w,thereis a man ifeft difference beiweea a moral inability or neceflity derived from the fall of man, and a like kind of inability or ne- ceflity original to the human race. Mr. Ed- wardsh dodlrine of neceflity is inconfiftent witfi the opinion of our having loft our power in A-^ dam J fincc he could not hfe a power he never had. We have but one thing farther to add. While we acknowledge the fallen ftate of our nature, and the impotency derived from the fall, the proper queftion on the gofpel plan is, Whether falvation is offered to finners on pr amicable terms ? The offer prefuppoleth our lofl: and pe- rching ftate. Is it then adapted to this ftate of mankind ? Is there a poffibility of accepting it ? Rather, is there no impropriety, is there not a palpable contradidion, in fpeak- ing of an offt.r on terms known to be morally im- poflible ? The prefent queltion is not, Whether fallen man hath power, independently cf the aids €f grace y to accept the gofpel propofals ? but. Whether fuch afliftances are tendered with the call of the gofpel as that an acceptance of it is morally poffible I f S^, m Fart iii of theft r^marltt; io6 Internal Liheriy lehngi Or fuppofe it morally impoflible, that great numbers, who are externally called by the gof- pcl, (hould accept the invitation of it — fuppofe their final condemnation to be juft notwith- ftanding, in conlequence of their relation to Adam^ and the moral inability derived from him ; yet who will fay that they merit a forer punilhment, x greater damnation, when their re- je6ling the gofpel is fuppofed to be the necelTa- ry confequence of GOD*s withholding that af- Jifiance^ without which they can no: embrace it ? A propofal of pa'rdon and life to rebels againft heaven, on impraiticable terms, sc.ompanied with' a threatening of aggravated condemna- tion, feems hardly reconcileable with the difco-^ vcries GOD hath mauc of himfelf as having Hiewn the exceeding riches of his grace inCHRL'i^r JESUS — Not zvitting any Jhculd perifl:^ but that f.li PiOuld come to repentance — Cofnmanding all men every where to ? epent — tVhotvcr will, let him come^ and take the waters of life freely, -ir may be faid, ' True indeed, whofoever will \ci him come. We grant, if they have a will, they may come. But we afTcrr, that none but fuch as a61ually come can will to come.* Now what faith the fcripture ? When our Savi- our upbraids the Jews, ' Ye will not come to' me that ft might have life/ doth this imply that it was forever morally impoflible for chcm to haVeiome ? or doth it fuppofe, on the contrary, thal'they might have willed to come ? Why clf<; are they upbraided for not coming ? Hovr oft would he have gathered them, but they would not ^ Was there not a time, therefore, when they might have known the things belong- ing to ihcir peace ? 1 la before you life and deaths to moral Agents, 107 death, bleffing and curfing ; therefore chusb life — implying a moral capacity oi cbufing as well as CDYidutling according to choice : And indeed, without fuppofing the former, how caa the latter be faid to be in any one's power ? It is fo only in confequence of volition or choice. If the caufe be out of our. power, the effect mud be ofcourfe. Befides, * the very willing or chu* fing is the doing : When once a man hath wil- led or chofen, the thing is done,' Had not thac fervant, who received the fingie talent, a moral power to have improved that talent well ? In confequence of fuch improvement, would he not have received more ? According to thar> ' To him that hath, fhall be given,' ^c. Was he not condemned out of his own mouth ? Let us add here, that the fuppofition of (in- ners being abandoned and given up of GO D, im- plies, that they once had a moral power to turn and live — Always remembering to include the means and influences of grace when we fpeak of fuch a power. For it is GOD that worketh in us to will and to DO ^ which is the argument to ou'c work- ing out our own f ah at ion. Doth not the demand of the Prophet, What could have been done more, to my vineyard ? imply that means and influen- ces on GOD*s part are afforded, or tendered, in fuch meafure to finners, as renders their compli- ance with the terms of falvation poffible at lead ? We have, indeed, no warrant to fay abfolutely, that he could not have done more for the con- vcrfion of the Jews — that he could not have converted them by an immediate, irrefiftible in- fluence. He that ' is able to raife up children to Abraham out of the ftones,* could, no doubt, have done this, had he k^i^i fit. it is enough loS Internal Liherty belongs &c, that the means ufed with them were ftffficient, though not unconquerable. But we may difmifs this matter. Mr. Ed' wards'^ do6lrine is, that the Jirji fin of angels and man as was r^^/Zy neccfTary, as the wickednefs of abandoned (inners and apoftate fpirits — So that what hath been laft obferved, relating to the neceffity of the fins of fallen creatures, while on probation, and in the time of GOD's grace and vifitation, no way affedls our main argu- ment. Mr. Edwards hath offered a chain of feafoning in proof that man hath in no cafe, and never had, a power of fc If- determination ; but is, and always was, determined by a moral necef- fiiy^ which neceffity is as real as any other. This riecedity, he affirms, belongs to all finite beings, and to the Creator himfelf— At the fame time he hath taken great pains to (hew, that it is con* lilknc with the moft perfedl liberty. SECT, S E C T. IL . Internal moral liberty^ as dijlin^ from e^iernaly confiftent with the influence of motives, and ufe of commands^ exhortations^ promifes^ warnings^ threateningSy &c. WE readily grant, there can be no a6l of choice without feme motive or induce- .ment. But if what hath been obferved, with relpe6t to the power of creatures made uprighc to retain or forfeit their innocence. Be admitted, it clearly follows, that the application of com- mands, invitations, monitions, &c. is confiftent with a freedom to either fide. For who quefti- ons but rebel angels had the higheft induce- niems, before their fall, to abide in their firft eftate ? We need not fcruple to fay, the ftrong- eft pofTible motives could not be wanting in the prefence of GOD — that it was the higheil apparent good, as well as their higheft duty, and what they had a moral ability for, to continue fubjedl to the great Creator. And it is really one of themofl inexplicable events, that beings in their fituation fhould fall. This event fhews, beyond queftion, that a liberty to either fide is -confiftent with the moft powerful motives to bi- as and incline the will to one fide. So in the cafe of innocent Adam, no one mil /ay, that the motives in paradife, to hold faft his jnteority, were infufficient— or that their noc proving effeaual necefiarily proceeded from the ..original ijfy Infer ml moral Liherty^ original, moral (tate of his will, pOiTeiTed of the moral image of GOI?. That he had a moral capacity to fuftain the federal trial is here taken for granted. Among other commands, writ- ten on -his heart, or communicated by fpecial intercourfe with Deity, he had one prohibition properly pofitive, which was made the teft of hiS fidelity, acccmpanied with an exprefs threat, that he fhould die in cafe ot npn -forbearance in that in (la nee -, and implying a promife of life, if he refrained in this article. Whatever be un- dcrftood by the death threatened, the threaten- ing was lufficiently awful. Yet againfl: the cleared warning, againft the higheil motives to the contrary,he veLtnred to take and eat. Com- mands, invitations, prom/ifes, admonitions, &:c. are therefore confiitent with a moral ability tp hearken or not hearken to them. For the fame reafon that yF;^ couM not be mp- rally necefiaryat firft^ it will be difficult to prove, that the CQ.n{\Ti\:itd holinefs of good angels vyas morally neceflary from the beginning. Mr. Ed- .ivards Teems to fuppofe a difference as to the degree of m.oral neceffity i but exprefsly main- tarns, that the reality of it is the fame in all in- fiances. * That is to fay, though every act of every creature is certain and fixed decifively be- forehand, yet there are different degrees of ab- iolute certainty. Farther, with regard to fallen man, Mr. Edwards allows, that commands, &c. are given to, and means ufed with finners, in unregene- racy. From hence he partly argues his dodrine » Part III. Sea. iHcu 'cdtififtenf with the influence of Motive. 1 1 i of neceflity. f They have a moral underfland- ing, and the fame natural powers of adtion, with lioiy and good men — To which end moral ior duGcmcnts of various kinds are laid before them. The doflrine of necefraryconne6i:ion of means and ends, as ftated by Mr. Edwards^ implies one or other of the following things : Either that no means are employed with the unrcgenerate in order to their converfion — or none that have a tendency to the end — or that they have not a .moral power of ufing them — or their ufe of thenti is certainly and infallibly fuccefsful. That means are ufed with unregenerate fin- fiers^ Mr. Edwards grants. But fince the doc- trine he defends may feem to imply, that means are never ufed with the .finally impenitent, (at lead not to bring them to repentance, but only to confirm them in wickednefs, and lead them todcftrudion) we fhall juft hint, that the whole ceconomy of providence and grace is a means ufed with the righteous, and wicked in common, for the canfirmation, improvement and comforc of the former^ and convidion and reformation of the latter. Extraordmary and ordinary means are ufed tbvthls end. Of the former kind are miracles, prophecy, tongues, vouchHifed at fpe- cial feafons, and in divers manners -, together .with fingular and alarming interpofitions of pro- vidence. To the latter kind belong a written, {landing revelation, a public miniilry and infti- tutions of worfhip, the drivings of the divine fpirit, various providential allotments &c. The .word of truth in particular is an external ap- pointed t Ibid, and Se£t. 7. and p. 384.. ij 12 Unterml moral Lihertyp pointed means of regeneration, repentance from ■dead works, converfion, or that faith by whicK thofe live who are pafied from death to life. If any reject the tender of (alvation, the meffen- gers of it are diredled to wipe off the duli of their feet as a teftimony againfl the defpifers of their mcffage^ leaving with them this foleinn proteftation, ' Be ye fure of this, that the king- dom of GOD is come unto you.' We might mention the patience of GOD towards fmners, g^c. — v;hence it is apparent that means, power- ful means, are ufed for the converfion even of thofe, who are at length rcfigned up to their own hearts luft. But as this maaer appears not to be contefted .by Mv.Edwardh WQ fhail pafs to .the next, thing above mentioned. ' '"Whether the means ufed witli the isnregcn- crare have any tendency to the end ? The very propofing of this queftion is enough, For when- ever we ule the means, it is in relation to lome end. Wtf intend by it the 7nedia through which any end is attained. So^that tofpeakofmeans^and deny their conducivenefs to the end, is an affront to common fenfe, as nothing can properly be called a means farther than it hath, oris fuppofed to have, a tendency to accomphfh an end. And as all who maintain there are any inftituted n:\eans of converfion, allow them to have been ordained by infinue wifdpm, it would be impeaching lu- preme wifdom and goodnefs ro fay, they are not calculated in the beji manmr to lead finners to re- pentance. Not that any external means are efficacious in themielves, ba: only tnrough the divine concur- itcncc v/ith them. So ic is in temporal and world- conftftent with the influence of Motive. 1 13. ly matters ; and fo it is in the concerns of re- ligion. Means and endeavors do not enlure worldly fuccefs. They are in vain except GOD worketh with them. Yet whohcfitates one mo- ment, whether the divine concurrence is to ht cxpe£led in the ufe, and through the inftrumen- tality, of the means he hat^ prefcribed, or the contrary ? Exempt cafes there are wherem means are fuperfeded in mens temporal affairs : I'here may be like mftanccs in the affairs of falvation. But thefe being exempt cafes is a reafon why fpiritual blelTings are much rather to be expedcd in the ufe, than in the negledt of means. It is the united voiceof all Calviniftic divines, that there is the greateft poffible encouragement to the endeavours of unconverted men in the ufe of the means of falvation. Mr. Edwards al- lows, that moral inducements are ufed with them ; and fays, * it is of the nature of fuch in- ducements, that they have fomething inviting^ fome tendency to induce and dijpofe to virtuous volition ; to give the mind an inclination or bias to virtue — that they can operate only by biaffing the will, and giving it a certain inclination one way — (p. 119, 125.) that motives have in them- felves this nature and tendency in different de- grees, fome greater, others lefs.' Now by Mr. Edwards\ principles every inclination, however weak, is of the nature of a difpofuion ta virtue, and leading to it. (For there can be no induce- ments to virtue but fuch as operate by giving the mind an inclination to it.) If then ihe motives vifed with the unregenerate may excite a virtu- ous inclination, though in the kwejt degree, we may, for the fame reafon, Rjppofe this ir clination increafcd to that degree as to become />^^^<^^^^^^ through 114 Internal moral Liherijt through the influence of moral means and m- ducements, in fubordination to him who wor- keth all in all. And in proportion to the pre- ponderation of the mind in favor of virtue, js the degree of virtue. How confident thefe things are with Mr. Edwardi% 4th and 5th Sedt pare 3d. and other things faid in his book, thofe may judge, who will be at the pains to exanfiine and compare them. If it be faid, in the next place, that the un- regenerate have not a moral power to ufe the 7neans of grace : This is the lame abfurdity as to fay, the means have no tendency to the end. For how can means be faid to be afforded,which cannot be ufed ? At bed, they are as if not af- forded. How then can the gofpel be preached for a witnefs to fuch as finally rejed it i* Why is it taken from fome, becaufe they bring not forth the fruit of the kingdom, when they never had it in their power to receive its teftimony ? Can they be liable to an aggravated puniflim.ent for not ufing means, which they could not improve toany purpofe ? We repeat it to prevent miflakes that when we fpeak of the ability of unregenerate men to ufe the means of grace, we mean not an in- dependent power in themfelves : (This the regenerate have not) But that fuch influences of grace are vouchfafed, together with external means, as that thofe might embrace the gofpel i-all, who, in event, rejedl it againft ihemlelves. Moreover, there is a wide difl^erence in the characters of unregenerate men. Some fuch are nearer the kingdom of GOD than others. There is more hope of fome than others of this cha- rader-::! csnfifient with the infiuaice of Moihes* Xie^ fabler — Which things cannot be faid confident- }y v/ith the fuppofition of unregenerate men's being utterly incapable of any good cffedl from the means of grace,, through their own endea- vours in the ufe of them, and the conimon ftri- vings of GOD's fpirit. And yet, what lefs is implied in the aflertion, that they cannot ufe the means that are employed! with them, cannot improve a fappofed price in their hands ? For how then is the gofprl, a difpenfation qI grace to them ? Is it not father a difpenfation of wrath ? To fay that their incapacity is not natural^ but moraly is faying nothing to the purpofcy as ws truft hath been fhcvvu. If the incapacity be teal^ \i is no matter under v/hat name it goes. Is it determined beforehand, that any of the un- regenerate fhaU not ufe the means of grace, or fliall not fucceed ? If it is, let any man mewp how the gofpel can be a privilege to them, or they liable to a greater damnation for abufmg it. To fay laftly, that the ei^deavours of the unre- generate in the ufe of the means of grace are infa!-' libly conneded ^xihfuccefs^ is to fay, that no means ire employed with thofe who die in' their (ins ; contrary to what Mr. Edwards exprefsly al-* lows. And ye: he malt either f^^y this, or elfc that none but the regenerate can ufe the means of grace. We may juft as well affirm, that all converted men muft ^xo^i equally under the meanss offalvation, as that none can improve them at all but they who fucceed. One may venture to afTert, that fuch as hear the word, and anon with joy receive it, ufe the means of grace, thought they fhould endure but a while. The means of religion, as thofe of this life,' arc ufed with different degrees of application by ' R ^ ~ '" different ^i 1 6 Internal moral Llhcrtyy different perfons -, which is the true grouncf (ordinarily; cf their different fuccefs. But we' deny that any are commanded, invited, exhort- ed, &c. to exert powers and faculties they are not pofTclTed of — to ad from principles they arc not endowed with — to ufe means out of their power. Such faculties, principles, powers, and aiTedions as they arc pofTcffed of, fuch means as are within their power are the only ones they are porTcfTcd cf, fuch means as arc within their power are the only ones ihey can be required to ad: from and improve. Arguments la-d be- fore wicked men are adapted to operate on their reafon and moral difccrnment — on the principle of ingenuity and gratitude — on their hope, fear, joy, forrow, and the various movements of the mind. Nor cnn it be propofcd they fhould aft from the highefl fp'ritual principles while unre- generate, but from fuch as they are capable of being influenced by a? rcafcnable beings, pof- feflcd of a moral faculty, and fubjeds of moral government — who have an advocate for GOD \vithin rhem, to whom he hath deputed his]^ au- thority — a principle which is by v.^nu^ Jupreme^ and implanted to give law to the animal affedi- ons and appetites. *The end of laws, we acknowledge, is to hind to. one fide ♦, and the end of commands is to turn the will one way.' But we cannot agree with Mr. Edwards, 'that laws and commands are therefore of- no ufe, unlefs thty aSiiially turn the imi\ that wai* which they require, "^ Mr Edwards would not fay, that any of GOD's laws or com- mands are ufelefs — that he might not juftly re- quire fubjedion to his snointed from thofe who faid. Let us break their bands afundsr^ and .♦ Part III. Sea. 4th p. 216. ** mfident with the influence of MuHves. 1 1 J Jtaji away their cords from us. The title of the iedion, from which we have extra6ted the above ■words, iSyCommands confijlent with moral inability.. Now is the will of thofc, who are under moral :neceiruy of difobeying, turned and biafT^d that way the command is ? Mr. Edwards has oiiered many reafons why their will ought to be turned t-o this fide— to evince the propriety of ihe com- mands given them not withtlanding their ^nj^/w^/ inability to turn this way. But he hath not (licwn .clearly, that 'commands and laws are therefore of .no ufe^ becaufe the fubjedb will not be bound thereby. Or admitting he had fhewn this, we need not fay how much or how Vutle it makes >for his purpofe. One thing is hence obvious, -,that by his own confclfion and argument, com- mands, invitations &c, are of no ule where there ■is a moral neceffity of being biafled, or going, the CDncrary way. Moreover, as wicked men may have in- ducements to virtue, confident wich the fuppo- fition of their perfiding in vice ; in like manner good men have allurements to vice. Such al- lurements they meet wi'h from the flefli, the world, and the devil. Hence they are called to watch and pray, that they enter not into tempta- tion — to fightT-to drive for the tnaftery^ — :o .deny themfelves, and take up the crofs — to tak« heed left they fall — and in general to work out their own falvation with fear and trembling. Now temptations and allurements to fin ' operate by giving the mind an inclination to it — bialUng the will this way.' So that as inducements to holi- rjcfs may be confiftcntly ufcd with ihofe who at prcfent are under the dominion of fin, with % .prjlpeit of changing their prefent prevaihng bi- ^s and inclination j allurements to fin may aUo bs J 1 5 hlsrnal moral Liberty^ be laid befort thofe v/hofe prevailing bias is i(5 holincfs, not without a pofTibility and profped of their being overcome— with which view they are always propofed hy the tempter. Adam, en* dowed with the moral image of GOD, was over- come : And are his fallen fons exempt from danger ?' The regenerate fall from virtue fre- quently ihrough inadvertence, and the ftrength of a prcfent temptation. They are,* therefore, lender no moral neceffity of being perferJ^ nor in- ^ttd can be free from (m m this life. Or will any undertake to file w, that the fins they fall in- to are morally neceffary ? According to Mr. Edwards^ doCtrine they are fo indeed. To fup- pofe farther, as his doctrine doth, that the im- ferfe^ holincis of the faiocs in this life is necef- iary by amoral nec:flicy, is a palpable contra.- ^;7,' p, 81,82,112, liy 132 APPENDIX. Hohhsy Spimzdy Collins^ Leibnitz^ the authors ^f Cato*t letters, Humt^ among the Athtijli and Dtijii ; and Lord Kaims and Mr. Edwards among the advocates for reve^' laiion* Our author's agreement with thefe on the ar- ticle of neceilaty may more diftindly appear from the following cxtrafts. We fliall place the fimilar palTages over againil each other in different columns, that the ccadcf may have a readier view of the coincidences SPINOZA. It was impoflible f«r OOD to have produced things in any refpc£l dif- ferent from what they are. (Clark's demonftration, p. 27, 28, 29, 4Q, 50) Leibnitz. The fame. (Vid. papers between Liibnitz and ^r. Clarky {)• 159, i6r, 219, 133) Ho BBS. Every ciFe<^ muft needs be owing to fome caafe, and that caufe muft produce the cfFe<^ NECESSARILY. Becaufc if it be a fufficient caufe, the Q?t^^ cannot but fol- low ; and if it be not a fufScient caufe, it will not be at all a caufe of that thing:. {Clark's demon- ftration, p. 88) LsiBNITa* EDWARDS. • Neither the form, 'or- der, nor minutcfl circum- ftance or mode of exiftencc of any thing could pofH- bly have been in any re- fpe£t different. (En ?. p. i©2,— ig^. APPENDIX- U5 Leibnitz. Nothing happens without a fuffi- eicnt reafon why it is, or why it is thus rather than othcrwife. A man never has a fufficient reafon to a^y when he has not al- fo a fufficient reafon to a£l in a certain particular man^ mr. As often as a man has fufficient reafon for a ifingle a£tion ; he has alfo fufficient reafon for all its requifites.The overthrow- ing this great principle of a jufficient reafon to every fv^n/, would be overthrow- ing the befl part of all phi- lofophy. (Papers between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. •Clark, p. 55, 169, 171, 399) _ Hume. The conjunc- tion between motives and voluntary anions is as re- gular and uniform as that between the caufe and ef- fect in any part of nature. (Eflays, vol. iii. p. 137) P. 146. It is pretend- ed fome caufes are neccf- fary, others not : Let any body define a caufe with- out a neceflary connecti- on with its cfFecEt. Spinoza. The will can- not be called a free, but a nccefTary caufe. The will of any voluntary agent muft of neceffity be deter- mined by fome external ,ciufe,and not by any pow- er Mr. Edwards principle of a caufe, ground, or rca* Ton of every event, he fays extends to things, and the manner and circum- ftances of things. There muft be a fufficient reafon why an a6l of the will, or any other event, /j rather than not ; or why it is as It is rather than otherwifc. If this principle of com- mon fenfe be taken away, all arguing from efFefls to caufes ceafeth. (Part ii. fefl. 3, 4. and p. 83-!-8|^, ioz-^xo&) The ads of the will and material things have a like necefTary depend - ance on a caufe without. Moral neceffity may be as abfolute as natural. Vo- lition is as palTive with re- fpcift to the antecedent caufe, as the motions of the body to the volitions which determine them, (P. 183, 184— alfo p. JO, 40, 48, 58, 62, 66, &c.) Moral habits arc owing to the nature of things. (P. 31. 32 33) If the a£ls of the will are excited by ex- trinfic motives, thofe mo- tives are the caufes of thofc aits of the will j which makes. JJ4 A P P E N D t X. . Spinoza. er of determining itfelf, inkrentinhiclt. (Clark'i dcm. p. 09, 1 06) CATo.l'hefamc. (Let- ters, vol. iv. p. 174, 195, 196) P. 190, 191, 193. Scmething -muft deitxr. ir.ine the ^^iions of men, or elfc they couid not be iktermincd ; and it is no- thing to the ptH-pofe to {ay^ that their choice dc- teFmines them, if fome- thing. elfe muft determine that choice 5 for let it be what it wiiU the tff/d: rr.ull: bs necclTary, &c. &:c. Collins. Man is ne- ccfTjrily determined by particular, moral . caufes, and cannot pcilibly ?ft contrary to what it does. {Clark*^- reoiarks on 65/- lim, p. 18, 28) P. ij. To reprefent reafons to men — would be cf no ufc, if men had. free wills, or their wilU were not mov- ed by them* Edwards. maizes them necefTary, as cfF.cls neceilirily follow the efficiency of the caufe. (P. 103, 118, 261, 262, 278) The will is necelTarily determined in every one ot its acts, from a man's fiiir exigence, by a cauic bcfide the will, and m no inftanre whattver its own K;jr?w!sr. Vol. ili. p, 149, .150. Aiftions not prccerd- ing froRva pcr.iianenr,f:>c- ed caufe (th::: is, from ne- ctili:y) arc n-^ithcr virtu- . ous nor vicious^ detenniner. (P. . 113, et paflin) There ; is not, ,.£nd never can be, either , in exiftence or idea, a free- dom from moral neccilicy, o: a power or fclf-deter-^ mination. (P, 404)- Natural "teiidcncy snd iiii^uence fuppafes caufality, and that fuppo- fr;th neceiiity of events, (P. 315) Moral neceiTiry as mucri afcertains and fiKcs the event, as any. (c'.4o0 Laws and commands areoi noufe unlefs they . turiUhcwiU thafvvay which they require. (P. 226) '4 here is an eitablifhed conaecflion between means a::d end. I'he being of the eii-<5l is, on the one hand, conncded with the means; and the want of the efrc(?l:, with the want of the means (?, 309>"~-3i5) Sin and virtue come to pafs by a neceffity confid- ing in a fure, eflabiifhed Cv'nnv£l'cn oi caufes and APPENDIX. ^3S A Leibnitz. The mind a6ls by virtue of motives, which are its difpofuions to acl. Motives comprehend all the dijpofitions, which the mind can have to acl voluntarily. They in- clude, not only the rea" fons^ but alfo the inclina- iicns arifmg from paflions, cr other preceeding im- prefHons. (Papers of Z.n3- nitz and Clarke^ p. i66j 167) Leibnitz. Motives have the fame rel^^tion to the vyill of an inteiiigent agent, as weights have to a ballance ; fo that of two things abfolutely in- different an intelligent sgcnt can no more chufe either than a ballance can move itfeif when the weights on both fides are equal. (P. 121 of pa- pers, &c.) KuME. Liberty a pow- er of adding or not ading according to the determina^ iion cf the will — that is, if we chufe to remain at reft, we may 5 if we chuie to move, ws may. Nqw eff.as. (P. 3G9) Moraf habits are owing to the nature of things. (P. 31) The good or bad ftatc of the moral world depends on the improvement they make of their natural a- gency. (P. i6?J Moral caufes and mo- ra! motives and induce- m^'nts, fuch as habits and difpofuions of the heari-^h. moral habit, or motive^ (P 29. 3®) Every thing jhat is properly calJed a motive has a tendency or advan- tage to move the will pre- vious to the effc£i:, or to the aft of the will excit- ed. (P. 8, that is, a mo- tive, which is a moral ha- bit, is yet previous to and excites the moral habit) Mr. Edwards's applica- tion of gravitation and the fcale of a ballance (p. 93) to his fubjea, may ferve to fhew the coinci- dence in this place ; efpe- cially if hix general rcafon- . ing is alfo taken into COA- fidsration. Liberty is a power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has, to do as he pleafes — or power and opportunity to purfue and execute his choice — with- out taking into the mean« ing fs^ APPENDIX Now this hypothetical li- berty (as Mr. HumejuMy ftiles it) belongs (as he adds) to every body who is not a prtforter^ and in chains, (Vol. iii. p. 145) Collins. I contend /or liberty as it %niiies a power in man to do as he xvil/s or pUaJes, {Claris remarks on Collinsyi^^ 14.^ HoSBt. Though the ,ivili be neccflitated, yet ,the doing what we will is liberty. He is free to do a thing, who may do it if he have a will to do it,and may forbear, if he have ihe will to forbear, though the will to do the action be neceflary, or though there be a neceiHty that he fhall have a will to for- bear. He who takes a- way the liberty of doing cUording to our willsy takes away the nature of fin ; but he that denies the li- berty to will doth not do fo. The necclHty of an adlion doth not make the law that prohibits it un- juft ; for it is not the ne- cefTify, but the will to break the law, that makes the aflion unjuft ; and what nccefliry caufc fo- cver ingof the word any thing of the caufe or original of that choice. Two things are oppofed to li- berty, namely, conftraint and re/iraint. (P. 38, 39, 40, 300, et pajpm) To fay that a man exercifetk liberty, not only in exier" ntf/ actions, but Vx the ails of the will themrelves^ is to lay liberty confifts in wil- ling what he wills. (P. 74-, 75> 76> i86, 187; He cannot be faid to be unable to do a thing, who can do it if he will ; though fuch a will may be required by command as is forever impoilible. (Part iii, fed. 4) A free- dom from coacfion^ but not from necejjityy is eflcntial to virtue or vice,praire or dif- praife, reward or punifh- ment. ('P. 194, 213, it pajjim) Commands and obli;2;ations to obedi- ence are confiftent with moral inability to obey. (Partiiijfea. 4) The will in every in* ftance a£ls by moral necef- fity, (p. 130) and always has an inability to a£t o- thcrwife than it doth ; (p. 35) men are morally un- able to will otherwifc than they do will, as really, truly, and properly in ont inftance as another : yet the necefTity of the will never readers any thing improperlj APPENDIX; ^3f ever prececds an a£lion, yet if that adtion be for- bidden, he that doth it willingly^ may juftly be puniibcd. {H^hiiby on five points, p. 360, 361) CoLiiNs. GOD can- not communicate free-will to men, without being chargeable with their a- bufe of it. To admit that any being can a<^ in a manner contrary to what it does, ©r fulfil any other end, is tantamount to allowing it to be inde- pendent of the Deity ; and confcquently, to have it in its cledion and pow- er to thwart the fchcmcs of the great author and fu- perintcndent of all things. {Jack fan's vindication, p. improperly the fubjcft of command. The oppofiti- on or defc£l of the will in that which is its original and determining aii^ implies a moral inability. This inability alone (whick confifts in difinclination) never can excufc any per- foB. (Part iii, fe provided moral evil is not forthe bcft — that libc rty,a« oppcfed to ncceffity, argues an inferiority and fervitudc unworthy of the fuprcam Being ; really fubjeds the will of the Moft High to the will of his creatures, and brings him into a de- pendence on them. (353) '38, APPENDIX. Cato. The notion of liberty of a(5iion reflects upon GOD's wifdom or power — U intrenches up- on his providence and go- vernment of t h e univerfe, by giving p^rt of his pow- er out ot his own hands and by leaving it to the cJifcrction of inferior, weak beings to contradict him- felf, and difappcint his in- tentions. (Vol. iv. p. 179) Leibnitz's ' pre-erta- blifhed harmony/ anfwers to Cato's refcmbling the creation fnot excepting the intelligent part of it) to a machine ; which if not fo framed at flrft as to anfwer its end without the continual interpofai of the Creator, is fuppofed 10 imply a 6tk€t of wifdoin and power. (Vol. iv. p. 205, 206) Cato. Ail caufes muft fi: ft or laft center in the fupream caufe. (Vol. iv. Pt i74-> ^l^y Jt95> ^9^) The argument of the fatalifts from prefcience, is, either that all events are known and foretold by the gods, and therefore ne- ^#7 \ Unless his fcheme of necefTity be admitted, Mr. Edwards fays it will fol- low, that GOD muft be cxpofed to be conftantly changing his mind and in- tentions as to his future conduct J altering his mea- fures, relinquifhing his old defigns, and forming nev/ fchemes and projecflicns-- continually putting his fyftem to rights, as it gets cutoforder,and liable to be wholly frufirated of his end in the creation of the world, (?. i6c— 166, 353) On the fcherae of felf- detcrmiration, the will of man is left to the guidance of nothinf^ but blind con- tingeiice .-So tl^.at ifitmakes anyjdifFcrencebetween men and machines, it is for the worfe i for machines are guided by an underftand- ing caufe, by the fkilful hand of the workman or owner. (P. 318) Things, which ever had or will have a begin- ning, are not ncccfiary in their own nature, but are neccfiary by a connexion with what is from eterni- ty. (P. 25) GOD orders the vohti- oiis of moral agents,among other events, in fuch a de- ciftvc manner, that the c- vents arc infallibly con- nected A' P PEN D I X. 139 4fffary ; or fome things are nedled with his difpofal, neither known nor taken His own immediate con- care of by the gods. {Jitck- du(H: is original, or hrft im fon*^ anfwer to Cato, p. 72, the ("cries of events^ — and 73. Compare Mr. Ed^ fin comes to pafs bccaufe wardsy part ii. fe£l. ii. par- he Jees it needful and ofim- ticularly p. 160 — 166) portance that it fhould come to pafs. (Part iv, fed 9, 10, and p. 403, 405) Upon the whole : One of the famous obje(5lions of i\it fat alijis of old to the liberty of human anions, and which is urged for neceility by modern infidels, was, that every afiion refults from a precedent motive or ree- fon^ which rcafon or motive is out of out power, [Jack^ fin's anfwer to Cato, p. 100. ) We need not produce any pafTage from Mr. Edwards to fhew the coincidence. His whole fcheme is founded on this principle. We fear our quotations have already been too nti- fnereus, or it wefe eafy to add to them. Wc prefume they have been fufficicnt to fatisfy the attentive and impartial in regard to the coincidence we propofed to exhibit. What prefumption of the falfhood of Mr. Edwards's fcheme arifeth from it's agreement with the doflrine of thofe who rejcft the evidence of the chrifti- an revelation, and even believed not (fonieof them) in the perfections and moral government of GOD, we ihall not fay ; though the fufpicion that it h fallacious, arifing from the comparifon wc have made, will not, we trufl:, be thought inconftderable, whether it can or can- not be diflinCtly perceived where the fallacy lies. Af- ter all, we fhould not have troubled the reader with this appendix but for a reafon already aHigned. For if his fcheme hath the tendency, and is reducible to the confcquences, we have attributed to it, all but infidels will allow this to be a full demonftration of it's falfhood. Whether the fallacy of the reafoning of his book can be diftindlly traced, or with what clafs of writers it co- incides, is not the qucftion — But whether the confe- ci^ucncesarejuftly drawn. Ii :14a A P f E N D t X; If any, who may think the ^things which have beajl ^Hedged worthy of being read, orof fo much notice at to fay much about them, (kould have their indignatioil ofdifdain raifed,* we can truly fay, that we meant to i-aife neither. We fat down with a determination to avoid every thing perfonal. If we have broken through this determination) it is ail inadvertence we cannot re* coilc£l. Whatever we think of Mr. Edwards's fyftem, "We doubt not the gbodnefs of his heart ; and believe he Is entered into the reward of a goed and faithful fervant, where even great men fee they knew but in part whiFe they tabernacled in flefti, and perhaps entertained fome dangerous errors. For we have not fo learned Chrift as to infer the badnefs of any man's heart from the falihood of his fpeculativc opinions. The Printer defires the reader to cxcufc fome irre- gularity in numbering the pages in the beginning ©f this examination, and fome other typographical errors* The moft material that have been obferved are herie pointed out. P. 57. 1. igr. accepUd—]. 10, r. ihat'^p. 105. I. I^» for loofe r. lofe — p. 108, 1. 15. r. was as — p. 11^, 1* 15, for terms r. turns — p. 1x4, 1. 18, r. as ^ ifi ,^ere<-^p. 135. 1, 8. for faultier r. faithkfs. ?KiCtAJi^ ^/^2-