A FEW WORDS 
 
 IN 
 
 VINDICATION OF THE ACTION 
 
 Cntrrt af SBisljups, 
 
 CONVENED AT CAMDEN, N. J., 
 
 SEPTEMBER, 1853. 
 
 by </ 
 
 ALFRED LEE, 
 
 BISHOP OF THE DIOCE8E OF DELAWARE 
 
 ■»» ^ »■»» 
 
 H. HOOKER, CORNER OF CHESTNUT AND EIGHTH STREETS. 
 
 1854. 
 
Entered, according to act of Congress, in the year 1854, by 
 
 William S. Yocng, 
 
 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 
 W. S. YOUNG, 50 N. SIXTH ST., PEINTER. 
 
THE ACTION 
 
 COURT OF BISHOPS. 
 
 The members of the late Episcopal Court at Camden have not 
 evinced any particular anxiety to obtrude themselves upon the 
 public, in defence of the decree which was then pronounced. Their 
 silence on this subject is not to be attributed to the belief that their 
 action met the universal and unqualified approval of the Church. 
 They did not, it is presumed, expect at the time that such would be 
 the effect. They were prepared for some degree of disappointment 
 on the part of many who were anxiously watching their proceed- 
 ings. And their decision has been the subject, in some quarters, of 
 no very friendly or flattering remark. Neither, in the opinion of 
 the writer, is their neglect to set forth more at large, than in the 
 formal decree, the motives by which they were influenced, to be 
 attributed to indifference as to the opinion that might be formed 
 of their action by an enlightened community, and a deeply inter- 
 ested Church. Such indifference would ill become men to whom 
 character is more precious than aught, except the approval of God, 
 and of their own consciences. To those occupying the position 
 in which they have been placed, it is emphatically true, that "a 
 good name is better than riches." Their influence for good is in- 
 separably connected with the confidence reposed by their fellow- 
 men in their integrity and purity; and they must, of course, be 
 deeply concerned that this confidence should not be impaired. But 
 the writer would venture to suggest that this silence is rather at- 
 tributable to the conviction of the members of the Court, that the 
 matured and dispassionate verdict of the community would sustain 
 and confirm their conclusion; that when the difficulties of their po- 
 sition were understood, and a candid estimate formed of what would 
 have been the probable results of a difierent action, there would 
 be a general sentiment of acquiescence in their course, and a jus- 
 tification of their motives. They were not so troubled with mis- 
 givings as to the propriety of their decree, as to feel it necessary 
 to hasten before the public witli explanations and vindications. 
 They were content to wait the safer and slower verdict of mature 
 
consideration. Having done what they thought right and allowa- 
 ble, they were satisfied to leave their action open to the examina- 
 tion of the world, in the belief that it would eventually be accep- 
 table to the great body of the unprejudiced, sober-minded and 
 peace-loving members of their Communion. They might, it is hum- 
 bly suggested, count upon the candid and kind consideration of their 
 brethren of the clergy and laity, and suppose that those who had 
 known them, long and intimately, would give them credit for ho- 
 nesty, and purity of intention, until the contrary was shown. The 
 members of the Court were men of public character. They had 
 been before the community and the Church for years, under circum- 
 stances well-calculated to bring out their principles and show what 
 manner of men they were. A considerable number of them had 
 been prominent in the exercise of the discipline of the Church upon 
 brethren occupying the very highest ecclesiastical positions, and 
 had incurred thereby no small measure of abuse and obloquy. 
 Their lot had been cast for the last ten or fifteen years in no peace- 
 ful times for the Church; and, amid unwonted agitations, they had 
 been exposed to a somewhat severe ordeal of faith and character. 
 Might they not fairly presume that those who had sustained and 
 sympathized with them in former conflicts, would be slow to attri- 
 bute to them, in the present case, forgetfulness of their principles 
 or betrayal of their trust? 
 
 Inasmuch, moreover, as the decree of the Court was unanimous, 
 there was no opportunity furnished for stating the views and grounds 
 of action of individual members, as in the case of divided judg- 
 ment, or of dissent from the decision of the majority. The Court 
 spoke judicially by its decree. No single judge had any authority 
 to speak for the Court, and, inasmuch as he concurred in its action, 
 had no right to put on the record the reasons for his own particu- 
 lar concurrence. Since the adjournment of the Court, no one was 
 authorized or empowered to speak for his brethren, neither did 
 any Bishop feel forward to appear as the volunteer advocate of a 
 decision in which his own share was scarcely one-twentieth. The 
 members of the Court were glad to return to other and more press- 
 ing duties. The General Convention, with its absorbing claims, 
 followed almost immediately, and the neglected interests of dio- 
 ceses and parishes have since left them very little of leisure or 
 thought for a painful and unpleasant subject. This is presumed to 
 be the explanation of the silence of the judges of that Court, in 
 reference to their decision. To explain or vindicate it was not es- 
 
pecially the business of any of them, and they were not unwilling 
 to dismiss from their minds a matter that had always been unwel- 
 come. Nor were they greatly disquieted as to the opinion which 
 the community generally would settle upon. Had they been more 
 anxious or more doubtful, they would have been more eager to de- 
 fend themselves before the public. If any of their highly-respected 
 brethren of the clergy or laity were disappointed or dissatisfied, 
 it was of course to them a subject of regret, but they relied, some- 
 what confidently, upon the subsidence of excitement and more de- 
 liberate consideration. 
 
 The question may be very promptly determined by an individual 
 invested with no especial responsibility, and not chargeable with 
 any of the consequences of a decision, that the Court should at once 
 have proceeded to a trial, or that, in the event of a majority de- 
 ciding not to proceed, the minority should have protested to the last 
 against such a decision. But as the question was presented to the 
 minds of the appointed judges, upon whom lay the whole burden 
 of accountability, and who could not but look forward to the pro- 
 bable results of their procedure, it was exceedingly grave and dif- 
 ficult. 
 
 The writer of the present statement was not particularly con- 
 cerned in the arrangement of the case which was effected at Cam- 
 den. Having been one of the Court at Burlington, and having put 
 on the record the reasons of his dissent from the decree then pro- 
 nounced, he was not placed upon the committee who digested and 
 proposed to the recent Court the preamble and orders which they 
 adopted. His position at Camden was rather that of an acquies- 
 cent than an actor. But he is not disposed on this account to shrink 
 from his full and proper share of responsibility. lie has always 
 recognised the principle that the official conduct of the Bishops of 
 the Church is open to the freest examination. They ought to sanc- 
 tion nothing which they are not prepared to maintain. And when 
 they are misapprehended or misrepresented upon matters of im- 
 portance and general interest, they ought with candor to state the 
 motives which influenced their own conduct, whether those mo. 
 tives do or do not commend themselves to all to whom they may be 
 submitted. He had hoped that some of his brethren, more com- 
 petent than himself to present the subject, and who might have 
 appended to it names of greater weight, would have addressed the 
 Church. But this not having been done, he feels it due to himself 
 to make public the views of the case upon which he individually 
 acted. 
 
6 
 
 The Court was influenced in the final decision of the case by 
 various considerations, recited in the preamble of their order dis- 
 missing the presentment. Some of these reasons weighed more 
 forcibly upon one mind, and others upon another; but all combined 
 produced convictions so strong as to lead to the unexpected and 
 remarkable result of an unanimous action. 
 
 The first considerations referred to in the preamble are "serious 
 embarrassments thrown in the way of the action of this Court — 
 first, by the postponement of the trial of the original presentment, 
 and afterwards by the decree and orders of the Court of Bishops, 
 assembled in October, 1852." The ordinary course of judicial 
 action had become embarrassed, in the first place, by the postpone- 
 ment of the time of trial by the late venerable Bishop Chase. This 
 proceeding, however well intended by that respected and lamented 
 father in our Church, was wholly unwarranted and uncanonical, and 
 gave rise to difficulties from which the case was never afterwards 
 relieved. On this account the presenting Bishops made a second 
 presentment of the Bishop of New Jersey, thus virtually super- 
 seding the first. When the court met in 1852, it was urged, on 
 the part of the Respondent, that the action of the Convention of 
 New Jersey was prior to that of the three Bishops, inasmuch as it 
 anticipated the date of the second presentment. The Court at 
 Burlington, consisting of but fourteen Bishops, (many others having 
 been prevented from attending by the postponement of the trial,) 
 sustained, by a vote of eight to six, the objection thus made, and, 
 by certain orders, which it is not necessary here to recapitulate, 
 acquiesced in the conclusion of the Convention of New Jersey, re- 
 specting many of the specifications, and referred the ascertainment of 
 the fact, whether there was or was not ground for presentment in 
 the remaining charges, to the same Convention. The committees 
 appointed by that Convention subsequently reported that such 
 grounds did not exist, and the Convention accepted and sanctioned 
 their report. When the Court assembled, in September last, the 
 decision of the previous Court, and the consequent action of the 
 Convention of New Jersey, were pleaded, in fact if not in form, as 
 a bar to the presentment, inasmuch as the charges, contained in the 
 third presentment, were virtually the same as those embraced in 
 the second. Upon the validity of this argument, the Court evi- 
 dently was greatly divided. The opinion of the six judges who 
 formed the minority of the former Court was, it is presumed, un- 
 changed as to the decision made in October, 1852. They had seen 
 
no reason to vary their views of the nature of that decision, or to 
 modify in any manner the dissent which they expressed at the time. 
 Had precisely the same question been again presented, they would 
 have given the same answer. But the question was not now the 
 same; it was materially changed. Here was a decision of a Court 
 of competent jurisdiction, (of the same canonical tribunal, in fact,) 
 pleaded by the Respondent. If under that decision he had acquired 
 any rights, although the decision itself might be erroneous, he 
 might with reason claim that those rights be respected. It was 
 strongly urged that the effect of that decision, indicating to the 
 Respondent and his diocese a certain line of conduct, and of their 
 procedure consequent thereupon, was and ought to be held as a 
 final disposition of the case, and that the Respondent could not be 
 again put in jeopardy upon the same charges. It was in effect as 
 if the very Court, which had made the previous order, were called 
 upon to regard its own action, and respect concessions which it had 
 itself granted. 
 
 Upon the weight to be given to this objection, there was, as be- 
 fore remarked, a considerable diversity of opinion in the minds of 
 members of the Court. A number of the judges appeared prepared 
 to sustain it. Others, among whom was the writer of this state- 
 ment, had it been brought to a vote, would have overruled it. Yet 
 even they could not but feel, in a greater or less degree, the force 
 of the objection. The fact that it appeared so weighty to many of 
 their brethren, and especially to those among them who had not 
 been present at the former proceeding, and were wholly uncom- 
 mitted thereto, could not but have its influence with them. To 
 proceed to so important and responsible an act as the trial, in the 
 face of grave objections, felt to some extent by all the Court, and 
 by many deemed insuperable, could not but be contemplated with 
 the utmost reluctance. So serious a matter as the possible result 
 of a trial, the taking away from a Bishop of the Church, and one 
 strongly sustained by his own diocese, of his office, character, means 
 of usefulness, and support, required the way to be plain and unob- 
 structed. The Episcopal Court then assembled was, under the ex- 
 isting law of the church, a Court without appeal. If it erred in its 
 procedure or decision, there were no means provided of rectifying 
 the error, or remedying the evils that might ensue. The conse- 
 quences of their action would be fixed and irremediable. It was 
 of the greatest moment that the verdict and sentence of the Court, 
 if such should be rendered and pronounced, should be liable to no 
 
8 
 
 just exception, before the Church, or the tribunals of civil justice. 
 That it would be subjected to the most searching examination was 
 palpable. The Court must be prepared to abide their decision be- 
 fore the civil tribunals, if questions, resulting therefrom, should 
 become the subject of litigation, as well as before the Church, of 
 which they were members and pastors. The gravity of the diffi- 
 culties thus interposed was so deeply felt, that a proposition was 
 introduced, on the eleventh day of the session, that the case be 
 stated, with the consent of the parties, and laid before three of the 
 most eminent jurists of the land, for their opinion on the legal 
 objections that had been raised. The discussion of this proposition 
 occupied the greater part of the day ; but before a vote was taken 
 thereupon, a substitute was proposed, and adopted by the Court, as 
 follows: 
 
 " Ordered, that Bishops Brownell, Otey, Polk, Elliott, Freeman, 
 Williams, Wainwright, (being the Bishops who were not members 
 of the Court assembled in October last for the trial of Bishop 
 Doane,) be a committee to confer with impartial counsel, learned 
 in the law, how far the action of the Court then held ought to in- 
 fluence and control our present decisions, and also to confer with 
 the presenting Bishops and Kespondent, to ascertain whether they 
 cannot come to some understanding which shall be mutually satis- 
 factory, and also fully answer the purposes of justice ; and that, in 
 order to give them opportunity to discharge this duty and pre 
 pare a report, this Court does now adjourn until Thursday next." 
 
 The object of this action was twofold — first, to obtain that aid 
 from legal science which might assist the Court in coming to a right 
 conclusion upon the question then before them; secondly, to ascer- 
 tain, by conference with the presenting Bishops and Respondent, 
 whether an understanding might be arrived at which would satis- 
 factorily terminate the case. It is humbly submitted that this step 
 was, under the circumstances, wise and justifiable. It discovered 
 the difficulties under which the court labored, and their desire to 
 effect, if possible, their removal. It showed a disinclination on 
 their part to precipitate action, or recklessly to disregard the real 
 obstacles in their way. 
 
 In the view of the undersigned, the main bearing of the latter 
 clause of the order was to discover if any acknowledgment of mis- 
 conduct could be obtained from the Respondent, that would satisfy 
 the minds of the presenting Bishops, and enable them, consistently 
 with their views of duty, to withdraw the prosecution. It has been 
 
said that this was an extraordinary step on the part of judges. It 
 cannot be claimed that it was strictly a judicial act. But it should 
 be remembered that the judges were not an ordinary civil tribunal, 
 deciding an e very-day case of property or wrong. They were also 
 members and pastors of the Church of Christ. They were deeply 
 interested, as every member of the Church must always be, in its 
 harmony and peace. They were placed in a position to feel, more 
 keenly and painfully than others, the evils that ensue from discord 
 and division. They foresaw, as the result of a trial, a fearful 
 prospect of strife and bitterness; the Church distracted, for years, 
 with a conflict of the most irritating personal character; and a 
 flame of discord kindled that would not speedily be quenched. It 
 was apparent that the Court could not go into a trial of the case 
 with any thing like unanimity — nay, that such a step could be car- 
 ried, if at all, by a majority exceedingly small. A trial nnder such 
 circumstances, and before a Court destitute of the powers of civil 
 tribunals, would be clogged at every step with great impediments, 
 and little satisfaction could be expected as the result. It was very 
 painful to contemplate a verdict of condemnation or acquittal 
 passed by a bare majority. Diversity of opinion among the judges 
 would greatly detract from the moral weight of the decision. And 
 if it could be alleged that the variance of opinion, on the merits 
 of the case, corresponded with their respective opinions on theolo- 
 gical and ecclesiastical points, then a most plausible pretext would 
 be furnished for the dissatisfied to impute the decision to party 
 preferences and associations. Recent painful experience had 
 plainly shown the certainty of such a result, as well as its unhappy 
 consequences upon the peace and prosperity of our Church. 
 
 Such then was apparently the prospect in the alternative of a 
 trial — a Court divided in its inception and progress, a constant and 
 desperate struggle as it proceeded, a greatly divided verdict, a re- 
 sult wanting in moral force, and liable, whether justly or unjustly, 
 to the imputation of being influenced by party feeling — and, be- 
 yond that, a most harassing and interminable conflict, agitating 
 and convulsing the Church, and, not improbably, making its gene- 
 ral and diocesan Conventions arenas of embittered contention. It 
 is not claimed that these and similar considerations would be suf- 
 ficient to warrant a Court in refusing to try a case, when no other 
 reasonable objections could be urged against proceeding, and the 
 trial was demanded by the prosecutors. In the reasons for his 
 dissent from the Burlington decision, the undersigned stated his 
 2 
 
10 
 
 decided conviction that the apprehended consequences of a trial 
 would not justify a Court in refusing to proceed; and he has no 
 wish to retract any argument or opinion there expressed. But in 
 the peculiar circumstances of the case before them, encountered 
 by the serious obstacle of the former decree, he did and does con- 
 ceive it justifiable for the Court to pause, and inquire whether these 
 foreseen evils were inevitable. Must the Church be so deeply 
 afflicted for years to come? Must it be exposed to the hazard of 
 being rent in pieces by internal dissensions? Must its future be 
 one of division and discord, brother arrayed against brother, and 
 Bishop against Bishop, in fraternal strife? If the Respondent could 
 be induced to make a candid acknowledgment of those faults which 
 had given occasion to this prosecution, the presenting Bishops might 
 feel themselves at liberty to withdraw their presentment. In this 
 way the honor of the Church might be vindicated, and its peace 
 preserved. Yet it was perhaps too much to expect from persons 
 in their position, charged as public prosecutors with the mainte- 
 nance of the laws of the Church, having taken so public a stand as 
 accusers, desirous to bring forward their proofs and evidence, 
 having been exposed to much unjust obloquy in the conscientious 
 discharge of what they deemed a painful duty — it was probably 
 too much to expect that they should consent to such a withdrawal. 
 The committee reported, accordingly, that " they found that no un- 
 derstanding could be come to of the sort contemplated in the order 
 of the Court, the presenting Bishops feeling themselves unable to 
 withdraw their presentment, under any such acknowledgment of 
 error as the Respondent would be willing to make." They go on, 
 however, to state that " they conferred with the Respondent, who 
 expressed himself quite ready to acknowledge, as he had already 
 done to some extent in open Court, such error as his conscience 
 accused him of," the result of which conference the committee had 
 u embodied in the preamble and orders which they submitted as the 
 basis of a settlement of this vexed and painful question." 
 
 The most important feature of the report of this committee, and 
 that which principally led to the result, was the acknowledgment 
 made by the Respondent, as follows: 
 
 " The undersigned, in prosecuting his plans of Christian education, in connex- 
 ion with St. Mary's Hall and Burlington College, found that the expenses of the 
 •enterprise greatly exceeded his calculations; while the assistance, on which he 
 had confidently relied, perhaps too sanguinely, fell altogether short of what he 
 deemed his reasonable expectations. In this condition of things, being en- 
 
11 
 
 tirely left alone, and without advice, every step which he advanced involved 
 him more and more deeply in pecuniary embarrassments. He admits that he 
 made representations which, at the time, he believed to be correct, but many 
 of which turned out in the event to be erroneous. He was also led, by his too 
 confident reliance on anticipated aid, to make promises which he fully ex- 
 pected to perform; but which, experience has taught him, were far too strongly 
 expressed. He was also induced, for the sake of obtaining money to meet his 
 necessities, to resort to methods, by the payment of exorbitant interest on loans, 
 which he did not suppose were in contravention of the law, and which common 
 usage seemed to him to justify. He also, in entire confidence in his ability to 
 replace them, made use of certain trust funds, in a way which he deeply re- 
 grets, and, although they have long been perfectly secured, does not now jus- 
 tify. 
 
 The embarrassments here referred to were followed by a long and well nigh 
 fatal illness, which, withdrawing him entirely from the business which he had 
 carried on alone, was mainly instrumental in the entire failure of his pecuniary 
 aflairs. The perplexity arising from this failure, with the protracted infirmity 
 which followed his sickness, made him liable to many errors and mistakes 
 which might easily bear the appearance of intentional misrepresentations. In 
 connexion with the assignment of his property, he set his name under oath to an 
 inventory of his goods, and also to a list of his debts, which he believed to be 
 correct — an act which, he grieves to find, has given rise to an impression in the 
 minds of some that he exhibited an insensibility to the awful sanctions of the 
 oath of a Christian man. But, while he laments the impression, he declares 
 that this act was only done under legal advice, and in firm conviction of its cor- 
 rectness. 
 
 Some time after his recovery from the illness above alluded to, but while he 
 was still in the midst of his perplexities, smarting under his heavy disappoint- 
 ments, and wounded by the imputations to which in some quarters he was sub- 
 jected, the letter of the three Bishops came to him. He has no disposition to 
 ascribe to them any other than just and proper motives in thus addressing him. 
 But, at the time when he received the communication, he viewed it otherwise, 
 and under the strong excitement of the moment penned a pamphlet, parts of 
 which he does not now justify, and expressions in which, in regard to those 
 brethren, he deeply regrets. 
 
 In reference to his indebtedness, he now renews the declaration of intention 
 which he has constantly made, and has acted on to the utmost of his ability thus 
 far, to devote his means, efforts, and influence, in dependence upon God's bless- 
 ing, to the payment, principal and interest, of every just demand against him, 
 an expectation which there is reasonable hope of having fulfilled, since a com- 
 mittee of the trustees and friends of Burlington College, by whom both institu- 
 tions are now carried on, have undertaken an enterprise, which is nearly com- 
 pleted, to discharge the whole of the mortgage debt, and thus secure the pro- 
 perty at Riverside and St. Mary's Hall, with that of Burlington College, to the 
 Church forever for the purpose of Christian education. And this done, the 
 trustees have further agreed to appropriate during his life the surplus income of 
 both institutions to the liquidation of all his other debts in carrying on the said 
 institutions. 
 
12 
 
 That in the course of all these transactions human infirmity may have led 
 him into many errors he deeply feels. He does not wish to justify or excuse 
 them. If scandal to the Church, or injury to the cause of Christ, have arisen 
 from them, they are occasion to him of mortification and regret. For these 
 things, in all humility and sorrow, before God and man, he has always felt him- 
 self liable to, and willing to receive, the friendly reproofs of his brethren in Christ 
 Jesas, and especially of the Bishops of this Church. 
 
 G. W. Doane. 
 Bishop of New Jersey." 
 
 The reading of this paper produced upon the Court a marked and 
 favorable impression. If their accused brother were willing, in 
 the spirit of penitence, to confess his faults, and make reparation 
 to those who had suffered by them, might not his judges, as Chris- 
 tian brethren and Bishops, respond to this appeal in kindness and 
 forbearance? Upon this statement the Court was disposed to put 
 a candid and generous construction. It purported to be an acknow- 
 ledgment by the Respondent of " such error as his conscience ac- 
 cused him of." As such the Court received it. No minute com- 
 parison was instituted between the several particulars of the ac- 
 knowledgment, and the various specifications of the presentment. 
 The Court did not inquire to what extent each particular of the 
 accusation was noticed in the admission. They took it as a whole, 
 and acted upon it as a sincere and candid representation of Bishop 
 Doane's own convictions of past error and misconduct. A ray of 
 cheering light broke upon them through the hitherto dark and 
 lowering sky, and they feared to extinguish it. 
 
 The Court felt that the above was a large and painful admission 
 for the Respondent to have made. Some of the acts charged 
 against him it acknowledged. It was accompanied, indeed, with 
 a denial on the part of the Respondent of intentional fraud. It 
 stated such exculpatory considerations as seemed to him at the 
 time to excuse his conduct. It dwelt upon the various difficulties 
 which he had encountered in his extensive educational plans, from 
 the failure of others to fulfil expectations which ho deemed rea- 
 sonable, and assurances in which he had placed confidence, and 
 from the breaking down of his own health in the height of his em- 
 barrassments. 
 
 But would it have been the part of equity and Christian kind- 
 ness in the Court to have refused him permission to adduce, in con- 
 nexion with this mortifying acknowledgment, any mitigating cir- 
 cumstances? Must they decline to listen to any suggestions that 
 
13 
 
 seemed to extenuate the acts charged against him? The main 
 thing, indeed, in this paper, was his admission of certain facts. 
 All that could be proved by evidence adduced to any specification 
 would be the fact charged in that specification. But the degree 
 of blame and criminality involved in a particular act would de- 
 pend, in foro conscientice, on many circumstances, and very ma- 
 terially on the intentions with which it was committed. The same 
 act might be an imprudence or a crime, according to the intent of 
 the actor. In the opinion of the writer at the time, the paper 
 subscribed by Bishop Doane was equivalent to a plea df guilty, 
 as to several charges in the presentment. But the Court, in re- 
 ceiving this acknowledgment, could not refuse the Respondent the 
 benefit of stating such considerations as he might wish to urge in 
 palliation of his conduct. The Respondent was not willing to plead 
 guilty, nakedly and unqualifiedly. He was ready to admit the 
 truth of certain acts complained of, but he claimed the privilege, 
 in so doing, to represent his own views and intentions, and to dis- 
 avow criminal purposes and fraudulent designs. How far these 
 acts were excused by the attendant circumstances, is a question 
 upon which the opinion of many others might vary from his own. 
 But certainly it would have been a hard thing for the Court to have 
 refused to listen to them, or to have declined to allow them any 
 weight whatever in their own estimate of the matters confessed. 
 
 In this paper, the Respondent also expressed his regret for harsh 
 expressions, in reference to the course of the presenting Bishops, 
 which had been published in his pamphlet, penned at the time of 
 receiving their first communication, under strong excitement, and 
 disclaimed any present disposition to impute to them other than 
 just and proper motives in thus addressing him. 
 
 He declared his intention to devote his means, efforts, and influ- 
 ence, in dependence upon God's blessing, to the payment, principal 
 and interest, of every just demand against him, and referred to a 
 plan then on foot for raising a large sum of money, as furnishing 
 reasonable hope of fulfilling this purpose. 
 
 He moreover disclaimed the wish to justify or excuse any errors 
 into which he might have been led. " If scandal to the Church and 
 injury to the cause of Christ have arisen from them, they are oc- 
 casion to him of mortification and regret. For these things, in all 
 humility and sorrow, before God and man, he has always felt him- 
 self liable to, and willing to receive, the friendly reproofs of his 
 brethren in Christ Jesus, and especially, the Bishops of the Church." 
 
14 
 
 In this paper, then, was laid before the Court an admission of 
 certain acts of misconduct charged against the Respondent. And 
 this admission was accompanied with expressions of humility, sor- 
 row and regret. The introduction of exculpatory considerations 
 does not affect these important points. To the latter the Court 
 might attach what weight they considered them entitled to, and 
 the Church and the community at large will do the same. But to 
 argue that they invalidate the acknowledgment to which they are 
 appended, and therefore render it an insufficient basis for the action 
 of the Court, is wholly unreasonable. The facts are one thing — 
 the qualifying considerations are another. The Court, by exami- 
 nation of witnesses, could only arrive at the facts. But, even if 
 proved, the Respondent would not be precluded from urging in 
 defence any thing that could go to palliate or excuse his conduct; 
 and all such arguments would have their weight, even in case of 
 conviction, in determining the sentence. 
 
 When the above report of the committee was laid before the 
 Court, the presenting Bishops claimed the right of making an ar- 
 gument against the adoption of its recommendations. But, after a 
 somewhat protracted private conference with the committee, they 
 waived this right, and presented that statement of their legal po- 
 sition which is published in the record of the Court. This waiver 
 was not without effect — more, perhaps, than they themselves meant 
 or apprehended. 
 
 The report and orders proposed were then adopted by an unani- 
 mous vote. 
 
 Doubtless different members of the Court were actuated by dif- 
 ferent motives in coming to this conclusion. It was not the dispo- 
 sition of the case which many or most of the judges would have 
 preferred. It was open to opposite objections from those, respec- 
 tively, who had taken opposite views during the previous history of 
 the case. It was the result of mutual concession, and the expres- 
 sion of the very earnest desire of all the Bishops to maintain, if 
 possible without the sacrifice of principle, the oneness and harmony 
 of the Church, and to set forwards, as much as in them lay, quiet- 
 ness, peace and love among Christian people, and especially among 
 those committed to their charge. As one concurring in this action, 
 and willing to bear my proper share of the responsibility attach- 
 ing thereto, I was influenced in the final vote by the following con- 
 siderations: 
 
 1. The necessity was thus avoided of deciding upon the ques- 
 
15 
 
 tion of the degree of Weight to be attached to the action of the 
 Court held in October, 1852. For the present Court to have un- 
 qualifiedly confirmed that decision would have been to my mind a 
 very lamentable thing. It would have sanctioned a contravention 
 of the law of 1844, a virtual denial of justice, a nullification of 
 rights granted to the Bishops, a prostration of the judicial autho- 
 rity of the Church at the feet of a diocesan Convention, a heavy 
 blow struck at our present orderly and beautiful confederation, at 
 our oneness, strength and discipline as a national Church. 
 
 Yet, on the other hand, to have so overruled it as to disregard 
 wholly its effect upon the position of the Respondent, might havo 
 appeared like a disregard of the plighted faith of the Church, as 
 represented by the former Court, and the infringement of a privi- 
 lege then conveyed to him by a solemn decision. Be it that the 
 decision itself was. erroneous; does that conclusion quite invalidate 
 the Respondent's claim that the privileges which it had given him 
 should be respected? He and his Convention had complied with 
 the terms of that decree. They came before the Court to present 
 the result of an inquiry which the previous Court had ordered and 
 sanctioned. Now shall the present Court wholly ignore or disavow 
 the action of the former? Shall it not merely repudiate the prin- 
 ciple of the decision, but go on and strip the Respondent of any 
 benefit that had enured to him from such decision? The Respond- 
 ent comes before the same tribunal, the Bishops of the Protestant 
 Episcopal Church. He argues: 'Relying upon your former deci- 
 sion, I have acted as you prescribed. Here is the evidence of my 
 conformity to your directions. Let me not be the sufferer. The 
 responsibility of that decision was yours, and not mine; and since 
 I have conformed thereto, I claim that you cannot disregard it.' 
 
 Now it would be indeed a blot upon the fair fame of the Church, 
 if she should appear indifferent to the sacredness of her plighted 
 faith. It would be a sad reproach, if no confidence could be re- 
 posed in her decisions, and the most precious rights of her minis- 
 ters might be placed at the mercy of an accidental majority. 
 
 For the interests of truth and justice, indeed, it is important that 
 the principle of an erroneous decision should not be permanently 
 established. But, in doing this, it is not less important that no 
 just imputation should attach to the highest judicial tribunal of 
 the Church, of forfeiting its own pledges, and taking back to-day 
 what it had given yesterday. The decision of the court at Camden 
 avoided each alternative of this dilemma. The former action was 
 
16 
 
 overruled, so far as it was an erroneous interpretation of the law. 
 The correct principle was established, that a diocesan Convention 
 cannot properly claim to interpose between presenting Bishops, 
 exercising their canonical right, and the appointed tribunal. Thus 
 the administration of justice in the Church was guarded against 
 future interruption on account of the precedent of the decree of 
 October, 1852. At the same time, there was no withdrawal from 
 Bishop Doane of any right that he might possibly have acquired 
 under that decree. The decision of the former Court, so far as 
 legal principle was concerned, was overruled ; so far as the Re- 
 spondent was individually interested, its concessions were not re- 
 tracted or violated. 
 
 2. My concurrence in the decision at Camden was mainly secured 
 by the acknowledgments of Bishop Doane above recited, and the 
 expressions of regret and sorrow for the past with which they were 
 accompanied. In this statement I was willing to repose confi- 
 dence, to receive it as an act of reparation and contrition, and to 
 afford a brother, to whom the large majority of his diocese ap- 
 peared to cling with unwavering confidence and affection, the full- 
 est opportunity of retrieving his errors, and regaining the confi- 
 dence of the Church at large. 
 
 3. It is a well-known maxim of law that, where there is reasona- 
 ble doubt on the mind of a juror, in a criminal case, the accused 
 is entitled to the benefit thereof. The case presented to the court 
 at Camden was embarrassed by doubts of a grave and serious cha- 
 racter. Was it not their duty to give to the Respondent the bene- 
 fit of those doubts? Finding great difficulty in deciding which was 
 the proper course to pursue, were they not justified in allowing 
 this consideration to turn the balance? 
 
 4. They were exercising as Bishops the discipline of the Church 
 of Christ, and could not forget the injunction in the consecration 
 office: "Be so merciful, that ye be not too remiss; so minister dis- 
 cipline, that ye forget not mercy. 11 Neither could they shut out 
 from their minds the still more sacred injunctions of Holy Writ of 
 the same tenor: "Brethren, if a man be overtaken with a fault, ye, 
 which are spiritual, restore such an one in the spirit of meekness, 
 considering thyself lest thou also be tempted." The Respondent 
 urged very strongly upon his brethren of the Court that, during 
 the years wherein these alleged acts of misconduct occurred, the 
 rumours of which were extensively circulated in the public prints, 
 none of them had ever admonished him in private of the scandal 
 
17 
 
 that was said to have been thereby caused, and the appeal was not 
 unfelt. 
 
 5. With regard to the alleged violation of law, by an extra-ju- 
 dicial proceeding, it is submitted, that there may reasonably be 
 conceded, to an ecclesiastical (I do not say an episcopal) Court, a 
 measure of discretion beyond that ordinarily exercised by civil 
 tribunals. The differences between the two are great and mani- 
 fest. The civil tribunal is composed of judges who are entirely 
 devoted to this function, and who have been trained for it by a long 
 course of previous study and practice. The administration of jus- 
 tice is the business of their lives. They are in constant session. 
 They have all the light which can be thrown upon disputed points 
 by the arguments of able counsel. They have the assistance of a 
 jury to determine questions of fact. They are sustained in their 
 proceedings by the whole power of the State; can constrain the 
 attendance of witnesses; compel them to testify, no matter how re- 
 luctant; require the production of documents; punish contempts; 
 and enforce their decisions with a strong hand. They have the aid 
 of a vast amount of recognised principles and adjudged cases to 
 guide them to a right conclu6ion- 
 
 Xow how entirely different the case of an ecclesiastical Court ! 
 The judges are not trained for such a function. If any of them 
 should chance to have had a legal education, it is accidental, and 
 without the view of the church legislation constituting them judges. 
 They are not familiar with practice. Their assemblage for judi- 
 cial purposes is a rare event. The time occupied for a trial must 
 be taken from the pressing and more congenial occupations of a 
 very different sphere of action. It summons them to duties quite 
 foreign to their usual avocations. They are almost wholly desti- 
 tute of precedents in their own line; and to search for them in the 
 bulky libraries of the civil or common law, would be as laborious 
 as unprofitable. They have no opportunity, under our present ca- 
 non, of hearing counsel, unless the accused choose to introduce them. 
 They are without power to compel testimony; the witnesses must 
 be volunteers. And if material witnesses are unwilling to testify, 
 the Court is powerless. The judges must decide the case according 
 to the evidence brought before them in Court, and yet the very evi- 
 dence, indispensable to a right decision, may be wilfully withheld. 
 And when their decision is pronounced, its effect very much depends 
 upon its consonance with public opinion, since they could with dif- 
 ficulty enforce a sentence, however just and righteous, if the ac- 
 3 
 
18 
 
 cuscd should be contumacious, and any considerable portion of the 
 Church should sympathize with him. 
 
 Such being the comparative impotence of ecclesiastical tribunals, 
 is it reasonable that they should be subjected in their proceedings 
 to inexorable necessity ? Destitute of the authority of civil courts, 
 must they be as stringently tied to a prescribed routine? Where 
 there is so little power, should there not be allowed more liberty? 
 And since cases may occur, wherein, without fault of theirs, a trial 
 could only result in disappointment and disaster, and the object 
 may be otherwise secured, may they not be permitted to take a 
 previous survey of the circumstances of a peculiar case, estimate 
 the probability of reaching the end proposed, and then determine 
 whether a trial should or should not be had ? No special claim is 
 here made in behalf of inherent episcopal powers. But there is 
 claimed for every ecclesiastical tribunal, whether composed of 
 Bishops, Presbyters, or laymen, some enlargement of discretion be- 
 yond what would be conceded to an ordinary tribunal. The cases 
 before them will usually be of a more delicate character, personal 
 rather than pecuniary, affecting mainly character, influence, repu- 
 tation, domestic peace and privacy, and the interests of religion, 
 and the Church of Christ. Publicity is far more injurious, scandal 
 more rife, suspicion more alert, and calumny more censorious. 
 The ascertainment of truth is indispensable to a correct decision, 
 and yet the means of ascertaining truth are restricted or denied. 
 It is exceedingly doubtful whether the Court can procure the evi- 
 dence on which to base a right decision. And if the question be 
 one on which the different sections of the Church have taken oppo- 
 site ground, then it is morally certain that the decision, even if it 
 be right, will not satisfy a large proportion of those whom it may 
 affect. Now while all these reasons do not justify ecclesiastical 
 judges in shrinking from manifest duty, they do, I conceive, entitle 
 them to a fuller latitude as to the disposal of a case in its different 
 stages. They may be, and I think must be, allowed to survey the 
 whole ground before them, contemplate the issues of their action 
 in this or that direction, and have some liberty of determining as 
 to the expediency and necessity of a trial in peculiar and doubtful 
 cases. Against the abuse of such discretion, there is, I apprehend, 
 a safeguard in the amenability of every such body to the great bar 
 of public opinion, and in the legislative authority of the Church. 
 The recent Court was very solemnly warned that their own trial, 
 before the Church and the community, would follow immediately 
 
19 
 
 upon their decision. The temper of the times, both within and 
 without our Church, is any thing but favourable to unregulated or 
 arbitrary authority. This is no period for the encroachments and 
 graspings of undefined prerogative. In his place in the legislative 
 councils of the Church, the undersigned has always been opposed 
 to action by the Bishops of the Protectant Episcopal Church on the 
 ground of inherent powers, unrecognised by express law. lie be- 
 lieves that the just influence of the Bishops will be far better main- 
 tained by their scrupulously confining themselves within prescribed 
 legal limits. This principle was never more strongly maintained, 
 in both houses of the General Convention, than during the recent 
 session. The shadowy claim of mere prerogative was effectually 
 put to flight, and there is little ground for apprehension that it can 
 ever be reasserted with success. In the jealous vigilance that 
 watches, eagle-eyed, any reappearance of this unpopular pretence 
 of inherent episcopal right, there is a sufficient safeguard against 
 its encroachments. And to this corrective may, it is submitted, be 
 safely left the exercise of discretion by judicial tribunals. If all 
 such latitude be denied them, and they be constrained, while des- 
 titute of all the power of secular judges, to pursue the same un- 
 deviating course, it may become with many a strong conviction that 
 they must decline altogether a duty so responsible, so ungrateful, 
 and so impracticable. 
 
 6. Let me be permitted to add another word respecting an im- 
 putation that has been cast upon the recent Court, on account of 
 their not inflicting any censure or admonition upon the Bishop of 
 New Jersey, after receiving the above-mentioned acknowledg- 
 ments. To infer from this omission that the acts confessed were 
 not, in the judgment of the Court, deserving of censure, would be 
 altogether unwarranted. The Respondent himself declined to jus- 
 tify many of these acts, virtually admitted that scandal had thence 
 arisen, and declared it to be cause to himself of mortification and 
 regret. So far as the writer was concerned, it seemed to him that 
 a formal admonition would have scarcely added any thing to the 
 burden which already had pressed heavily upon his accused bro- 
 ther. If disappointment, reproach, and anguish of mind be pun- 
 ishment, can we say indeed that he had not been punished? Is it 
 a small thing for a chief pastor of the Church to be held up before 
 the Christian world as a dishonest man? To be charged, in three 
 successive presentments, with a series of acts, appearing on the 
 face of them fraudulent and deceptive ? To have the many-tongued 
 
20 
 
 press proclaiming from Xorth to South, and from East to West, his 
 alleged delinquencies? To be arraigned before his peers, on two 
 occasions, and subjected to the immense sufferings consequent upon 
 standing at their bar under serious accusations? To have all his 
 pecuniary transactions, and even the privacy of his domestic life, 
 exposed to the gaze of the multitude? And to be constrained to 
 make at last an acknowledgment so unpleasant and mortifying? 
 May not the Court, in disposing of the case, take into view the 
 sharp mental agony that must have been preying for months and 
 years upon their brother? May they not consider the distress and 
 humiliation to which he has been already subjected? A present- 
 ment itself of a Christian minister, and especially of one so con- 
 spicuous and observed as a Bishop; the bringing of one invested 
 with the sacred office as a criminal before a censorious, mocking 
 world, is itself, however it may terminate, a fearful thing. What 
 would have been the addition of a judicial censure to one already 
 so sorely visited? That the conduct confessed was, to the minds 
 of the Court, censurable, no one can doubt. The very requirement 
 of the acknowledgment is evidence that they so regarded it. But 
 in place of proceeding to a trial, they had consented to receive this 
 acknowledgment. The infliction of a canonical penalty would have 
 been extra-judicial and unauthorized, and might have been open 
 to the charge of being illegal and oppressive. The Court trusted 
 that the great end of justice had been attained. And, inasmuch as 
 the Respondent had been for a long time subjected to extreme pain, 
 inconvenience, suffering and reproach, by reason of the charges 
 against him, and the several prosecutions instituted thereupon, 
 might they not, in the termination of the case, act in the spirit of 
 generosity, and forbear to add another burden to the weight under 
 which he had been almost crushed? 
 
 7. And, finally, the undersigned was induced to concur witli his 
 brethren in the Court, by his earnest desire for the restoration of 
 harmony to the Church. He was willing, for the sake of peace, to 
 concede any thing but truth and justice, and he acted under the 
 impression that the concession required fell short of such a sacri- 
 fice. That the desired result did flow from the conciliatory ad- 
 justment of this case, the recent General Convention affords stri- 
 king evidence. On the last day of the session, the following re- 
 solution, proposed by the Rev. Dr. Stevens, was passed by the House 
 of Delegates: "Resolved, that this House cannot close its session 
 without humbly recording its fervent gratitude to Almighty God, 
 
21 
 
 who alone maketh men to be of one mind, for the remarkable degree 
 of harmony and Christian courtesy which have marked the pro- 
 ceedings of the Convention, and for the evidences of increased 
 zeal in the work of church extension, manifested in the new im- 
 pulse given to missionary labours by the election of two Bishops 
 for the Pacific border." 
 
 The Christian Witness, in commenting upon the doings of the 
 Convention, remarks:* "In view of what has been done, and espe- 
 cially in view of the truly Christian feeling which has been mani- 
 fested by all parties, there is abundant cause for gratitude to God. 
 The session might have been shorter, but could hardly have been 
 more harmonious." "The fact that, notwithstanding the earnest 
 and prolonged discussions, in which the members were singularly 
 divided in their views, yet almost every important measure was 
 passed with great unanimity, (the yeas and nays having been called 
 but once or twice during the entire session,) and the disposition 
 manifested, on all sides, to withdraw propositions which met with 
 any very considerable opposition, in order so to modify them as to 
 render them more acceptable to the house, proved that a spirit of 
 peace and concord was animating the hearts and minds of the mem- 
 bers, and which, we trust, was none other than that divine influ- 
 ence which was daily invoked." 
 
 That the action of the Court at Camden had very much to do 
 with this pacific and Christian temper of the Convention, will 
 scarcely be questioned. Had the Court proceeded to trial, and that 
 trial been interrupted, as it would have been, by the session of the 
 General Convention, who can doubt that the character of that Con- 
 vention would have been widely different. Is there not every 
 reason to suppose that, instead of being remarkable for mutual con- 
 cession, kindly conference, and fraternal feeling, it would have been 
 equally remarkable for strife and acrimony. Greatly was it to be 
 apprehended that the bonds of Christian fellowship and brotherly 
 love would have been so violently ruptured as scarce to admit of 
 being reunited, and that the session would have been occupied with 
 irritating and discordant debates, upon what would probably have 
 been the most engrossing subject before them. That the concilia- 
 tory spirit which animated the last Convention will continue to shed 
 its influence over the Church, is earnestly to be desired. Even if 
 differences of opinion continue as broad as ever, it is exceeding 
 gain to be able to meet and discuss them in the spirit of harmony 
 
 * Witness of November 4, 1853. 
 
22 
 
 and mutual respect, and for members of the same Communion to 
 take counsel together as brethren upon the great interests of the 
 Church of Christ. 
 
 The undersigned has sought, by the above imperfect remarks, 
 to present the view of this painful and perplexing case under 
 which he himself acted, and which he has not since seen cause ma- 
 terially to change* If he could think that the benefits anticipated 
 from the decision have been purchased, or the apprehended evils 
 of a different course averted, by the sacrifice of principle, or the 
 preference of expediency to right, he would most deeply regret the 
 decision, and unite in pronouncing its condemnation. The late 
 Episcopal Court, composed of frail and fallible men, may have erred ; 
 if so, time, the certain revealer of truth, will make manifest their 
 error. But it is firmly believed that, in such event, it will also 
 discover that the error was not inconsistent with honesty of pur- 
 pose, and anxiety faithfully to discharge the important trust con- 
 fided to them. Their aim was so to minister discipline, as to forget 
 not mercy; to promote the repentance of an accused brother, ra- 
 ther than contribute to his ruin; and, without compromising truth 
 and righteousness, to "follow the things which make for peace." 
 Whether in this attempt they were justifiable, or whether they 
 have been successful, must be for others than themselves to deter- 
 mine. 
 
 ALFRED LEE. 
 
 THE END.