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 A 
 
 PHILOSOPHIC At 
 
 I N Q U I R t 
 
 '" Concerning 
 
 HUMAN 
 
 -The third ^ditio7i corre^ecti 
 
 LONDON 
 
 Printed for R. Robinson, ^^/fe Golden Lior^ 
 i^L Paul's Ghurch-Yard, MDCCXXXV/ 
 
m 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 j much care cannot be ta- 
 ken,^ to prevent being mifun-- 
 derjlood and prejudg'dy in 
 handling quejlions of fuch nice 
 /peculation^ as thofe ^Liber- 
 L ty ^;2^ Neceffity: and therefore^ tho^ I 
 ! might injuftice expeB to be read befon* any 
 \ judgment be pafs^d on me^ I think it pro- 
 per to premife the following ohfervation^._ 
 
 I. Firji^ tho^ I deny liberty in a certain 
 meani?2g of that word ; yet I contend for 
 liberty, as itfgnifes, a power in man, 
 to do as he wills, or pleafes j which is 
 the notion of liberty maintain d by Kxi^ 
 STOTLE, Cicero, Mr. Lock, and fe- 
 deral other FhilofopherSy antient and mo- 
 dern. And indeed after a careful exami- 
 nation of the bejt authors zvho have treated 
 
 of 
 
IV Preface. 
 
 5/^ liberty, / may affirm y that however 
 cppojite they appear in words to one ano" 
 ther, and how muchfoeverfome efthemfeem 
 to maintain another notion of liberty 5 
 yet at the bottom^ there is an almoji uJii" 
 verfal agreement i?i the notion defended by 
 me, and all that they fay ^ when examirHd, 
 will be found to amount to no more. 
 
 2. Secondly, when I affirm neceflicy; 
 I contend only for what is called moral 
 neceffity, meant ^ig thereby, that man, 
 who is an intelligent and fenfible being, 
 is determined by his reafon and his 
 fenfes ; and I deny man to be fubjeB to 
 fuch neceffity, as is in clocks, watches, 
 
 andfiich other beings, which for want of 
 fenfation and intelligence arefubjetf to an 
 abfolute, phyfical, or mechanical ne- 
 ceffity. ^nd here alfo I have the concur- 
 ence of almoji all the great ejl Affierters of 
 liberty, who either ey^prejly maintain mo- 
 ral neceffity, or the thing fignifed by thofs 
 words. 
 
 3. Thirdly, I have undertaken to fjew^ 
 that the notions, I advance, are fo far 
 
 from being inconfijient with, that they are 
 thefole foundations of morality and laws, 
 4ind of rewards andpunijhrnents infociety-, 
 
 and 
 
Preface. 
 
 and that the notions, I explode , are fuh- 
 'uerfive of them, This 1 judg''d necejjary 
 to make outy in treating afubje5i that has 
 relation tfi morality : becaufe nothing can 
 be true which fubverts thofe things ; and 
 all difcourfe muji be defeBivCy wherein the 
 Reader perceives any difagreement to mo- 
 ral truth; which is as evident as any fpe- 
 culative truth, and much more necejfary 
 to be rendered clear to the Reader s mind, 
 than truth in all other fciences. 
 
 4. Fourthly, I have intituled my dif- 
 courfe^ a Philofophical Inquiry, &c ; be- 
 caufe I propofe only to prove my point by 
 experience and by reef on, omitting all con- 
 f derations friflly theological. By this 
 method I have reduced the matter to afoort 
 compafs : and hope, I fall give no lefs 
 
 fatisfaSiion, than if I had confider\i it 
 alfo Theologically \ for all but Enthufi- 
 afts, mif think true Theology conffent 
 with reafon, and with experience, 
 
 5. Fifthly, if any foould ask. Of what 
 utefuch a Difcourfe is ? I might offer to 
 their confideration, frf, the ufefulnefs of 
 truth in general : and fcondly, the ufe- 
 fulnefs of the truths I maintain towards 
 
 B efablifmng 
 
vi Preface* 
 
 eftabli/hing laws and moralityy rewards 
 and punijhments infociety : but Jhall con- 
 tent myfelf with obfervingy that it may be 
 of ufe to all thofe who dejire to know the 
 truth in the queji ions I handle, and that 
 think examination the proper means to ar- 
 rive at that knowledge. As for thofe, 
 who either make no Inquiries at all, and 
 concern not themf elves about any /pecula- 
 tions \ or who take up with /peculations ; 
 without any examination ; or who read 
 only books to confirm them/elves in the /pe- 
 culations they have received -, I allow my 
 book to he 0/ no ufe to them : but yet think 
 ^ they may allow others to enjoy a ta/ie dif- 
 ferent from their own. 
 
 CON- 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 TH E IntroduEtion, n:iewing that men 
 may exprefs their Thoughts and Opini- 
 ons wich equal clearnels upon all fub- 
 jeds. page lo. 
 
 The queftion, whether man he 'a free or a 
 nee ejfary agents explain'd. p. i6. 
 
 I. Firft Argument, wherein our experience 
 is confider'd. p. ij. 
 
 Under this head are, 
 
 Firfl, feveral confiderations on the argu- 
 ment of experience. lb. 
 
 Secondly, an account of our experience in 
 the exercife of the Power of Perceivings of 
 Judging^ Py^ii lings and Doing as we will. p. 32* 
 
 And lailly, the Adions of men and infe- 
 rior intelligent agents are compared. p. 49. 
 
 II. Second Argument, to prove man a ne- 
 ceifary agent, taken from the impojfihility 
 of liberty T* 5-- 
 
 III. Third 
 
CONTENDS. 
 
 III. Third Argument, taken from the irnper^ 
 fe^lon of liberty^ and the perfe^ion of neceffi- 
 iy, p. 56^ 
 
 IV. Fourth Argument, taken from the con- 
 fideration of die {iivif^e Prefcience, Y* 1 ^* 
 
 V. Fifth Argument, taken from the nature 
 and ufe of rewards and punijloments in focie- 
 
 ty- p. 75- 
 
 VI. S'Xth Argument, taken from the n^L- 
 tmt o^ morality. V* 11 ' 
 
 Several Objedions confider'd. p. 78. 
 
 1. That ;/ men are neccjjary agents ^^ pun'' Jh merits 
 are iinjiifi^ Ih. 
 
 2. That if men are necejjary agents^ pumjhments 
 are u fete fs^ p. 82 
 
 0,. That if men are necefjary agents., reafoningy 
 intreatieSy admonitions^ hlame^ and praife are 
 vfelefs, ^ ^ ^ p. 85, 
 
 4. That if the period of man's life he fix d^ 
 ph\fick^ &c, is ufelefs^ p. ^y. 
 
 5. How can a man a^ againfl his confcience^ and 
 bow can his confcience accufe him, if he knows 
 he aBs necejjarily^ &c. p. 89. 
 
 6. How can fuch an aulion as the murds^ of Ju- 
 lius Cafir in the fenate he necejjary^ &:c. 
 
 r- 9®. 
 
 Authorities for what i)as been advanc'd. 
 
 p. 91. 
 
 The notion of Liberty maintained by the Au- 
 
 tlior. ^ p' 97* 
 
 A 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL 
 
 INQUIRY 
 
 Concerning 
 HUMAN 
 
 LIBERT Y, 
 
 <C 
 
 cc 
 
 <c 
 
 7^0 Lucius, 
 
 Here fend you in writing 
 ^' my thoughts concern- 
 *^ ing Liberty and Ne- 
 *' CESsiTY, which you 
 
 have fo often defired of me : and in 
 drawing them up, have had regard 
 to your penetration, by being as fhort 
 as is confiftent with being underftood, 
 and to your love of truth, by faying 
 nothing but what I think true, 
 and alfo all the truth that I apprehend 
 relates to the fubjeft, with the fince- 
 rity belonging to the converfation of 
 friends. If you think me either too 
 Ihort in any refpeft, or to have omit- 
 ted the confideration of any objeftion, 
 
 !' by 
 
JO An Inquiry concerning 
 
 '^ by Its not occurring to me, or, that 
 '^ you think of importance to be 
 ** confider'd: be pleas'd to acquaint me 
 ^*^ therewith, and I will give you all the 
 ^' fatisfaftion I can. 
 
 IntrodudiOii' 
 
 'Tis a common obfervation, even a- 
 mong the learned, that there are certain 
 matters of fpeculation, about which it 
 is impoffible, from the nature of the 
 fubjefts themfelves, to fpeak clearly and 
 diftinftly. Upon which account, men 
 are very indulgent to, and pardon the 
 unintelligible difcourfes of Thcologers 
 and Philofophers, which treat of the 
 fublime points in theology and philofo- 
 phy. And there is no queftion in the 
 whole compafs of fpeculation, of which 
 men have written more obfcurely, and 
 of which it is thought more impoffible 
 to difcourfe clearly, and concerning 
 which men more expeft, and pardon 
 obfcure difcourfe, than upon the fub- 
 jefts of Liberty and Necejity. But this 
 common obfervation, is both a common 
 and a learned error. For whoever em- 
 ploys his thoughts either about God or 
 the Trinity in Unity, or any other pro- 
 found 
 
Human Liberty. 1 1 
 
 found fubjed, ought to have fome Ideas, 
 to be the objefts of his thoughts in the 
 fame manner as he has in thinking on 
 the moft common fubjefts : for where 
 Ideas fail us in any matter, our thoughts 
 muft alfo fail us. And it is plain, when- 
 ever we have Ideas, we are able to com- 
 municate them to others by words -f- : 
 for words being arbitrary marks of our 
 Ideas, we can never want them to figni- 
 fy our Ideas, as long as we have fo ma- 
 ny in ufe among us, and a power to 
 make as many more as we have occa- 
 fion for. Since then we can think of no- 
 thing any farther than we have Ideas, 
 and can fignify all the Ideas we have 
 by words to one another , why fliould 
 we not be able to put one Idea into a 
 Propofition as well as another ? Why 
 not to compare Ideas together about 
 one fubjedl as v/ell as another ? And why 
 not to range one fort of Propoficions in- 
 to order and method, as well as another? 
 When we ufe the term God, the Idea 
 fignify 'd thereby, ought to be as diftind: 
 <^ and 
 
 ^ 1 do not mejri unkmivn JIfKp/e T^eas. Tb-'f; can at firjl snly te 
 madt kr.civn by application of the ohjeSi to the faculty : hut wben they 
 ba've been once percei'v'd, and a common n.ime og' ad upon to fignify 
 ibim, ticy can be c:m!riunicJted by U'o'ds. 
 
tz An Inquiry co?icerni?ig 
 
 and determinate in us, as the Idea of a 
 triangle or a fquare is, when we dif- 
 courfe of either of them; other wife, the 
 term God is an empty found. What 
 hinders us then from putting the Idea 
 fignify'd by the term God into a Prcpo- 
 fition, any more than the Idea of a tri- 
 angle or a fquare ? And why cannot we 
 compare that Idea with another Idea, as 
 well as any two other Ideas together : 
 fince comparifon of Ideas confifts in ob- 
 ferving wherein Ideas differ, and where- 
 in they agree : to which nothing is re- 
 quifite in any Ideas, but their being di- 
 ftindl and determinate in our Minds ? 
 And fince we ought to have a diftinft 
 and determinate Idea to the term God, 
 whenever we ufe it, and as diftinft and 
 determinate as that of a triangle or a 
 fquare : fince we can put it into a Propo- 
 fition : fince we can compare it with o- 
 ther Ideas on account of its diftinftnefs 
 and determinatenefs ; why fiiould we not 
 be able to range our thoughts about 
 God in as clear a method, and with as 
 great perfpicuity as about figure and 
 quantity. 
 
 I 
 
Human Liberty. 
 
 I would not hereby be thought to fup- 
 pofe, that the Idea of God is an ade- 
 quate Idea, and exhaufts tbe fubjeft it 
 refers to, like the Idea of a triangle or a 
 fquare; or that it is as eafy to form in 
 pur Minds, as the Idea of a triangle or 
 afquare; or that it does not require a 
 great comprehenfion of Mind to bring 
 together the various Ideas that relate to 
 God, and fo compare them together; 
 or that there are not feveral Propoiitions 
 concerning him that are doubtful, and 
 of which we can arrive at no certainty ; 
 or that there are not many Propolitions 
 concerning hirn fubjefl: to very great Dif- 
 ficulties or objeftions. All thefe I grant : 
 but fay, they are no Reafons to jaitify 
 Obfcurity. For, firft, an inadequate Idea 
 is no lefs diftinft^ as fuch,than an adequate 
 Idea, and no lefs true, as far as it goes ; 
 and therefore may be difcours'd of v/ith 
 equal clearnefs and truth. Secondly, 
 Tho' the Idea of God be not fo eafy to 
 form in our Minds as the Idea of a trian- 
 gle or a fquare, and it requires a great 
 comprehenfion of mind to bring together 
 the various Ideas that relate to him, and 
 compare them together ; yet thefe are 
 only reafons, for ufing a greater appli- 
 cation, or for not writing at all. ^Iliird- 
 
 C ly. 
 
1 4 -^^^ I/iquiry . concerning 
 
 ly, if a writer has in relation .to his fub- 
 jeft any doubts or objeftions in his mind, 
 which he cannot refoive to his fatisfafti- 
 on^ he may exprefs thofe conceptions 
 or thoughts no lefs clearly, than any o- 
 ther conceptions or thoughts. He fhould 
 only take care not to exceed the bounds 
 of thofe conceptions, nor endeavour to 
 make his reader underftand what he 
 does not underftand himfelf : for when 
 he exceeds thofe bounds, his difcourfe 
 muft be dark, and his pains ufelefs. To 
 exprefs what a man conceives is the end 
 of writing ; and every reader ought to 
 be fatisfy'd, when he fees an author 
 fpeak of a fubjeft according to the light 
 he has about it, fo far as to think him a 
 clear writer. 
 
 When therefore any writer fpeaks ob- 
 fcurely, either about God, or any other 
 Idea of his mind, the defect is in him. 
 For why did he write before he had a 
 meaning ; or before he was able to ex- 
 prefs to Others what he meant ? Is it not 
 unpardonable for a man to cant, who 
 pretends to teach ? 
 
 Thefe general reflexions may be con- 
 firm'd by matter of fad from the writings 
 of the moft celebrated dogmatical au- 
 thors. When 
 
Hu??2an Liherty. 15 
 
 When fuch- great men asGASSENDus, 
 CartesiuSj Cudvv^orth, Locke^ Bay- 
 LE^ Sir Isaac Newtow, and Mr. De 
 FoNTENELLE treat of the moft profound 
 queftions in metaphyficks, mathematicks, 
 and other parts of philofophy ; they by 
 handling them as far as their clear and 
 diftindlldeas reach'd, have written with 
 no lefs perfpicuity to. their proper rea- 
 ders, than other authors have done a- 
 bout hiftorical matters, and upon the 
 plaineft and moft common fubjefts. 
 
 On the other fide, when authors, who 
 in other refpe£ls are equal to the fore- 
 going, treat of any fubjefts farther than 
 they have clear and diftin£l Ideas ; they 
 do and cannot but write to as little pur- 
 pofe, and take as abfurd pains, as the 
 moft ignorant authors do, v/ho treat of 
 any fubjeft under a total ignorance, or 
 a confus'd knowledge of it. There are 
 fo many examples of thefe latter occur- 
 ring to every reader , and there are fuch 
 frequent complaints of mens venturing 
 beyond their ability in feveral queftions; 
 that I need not name particular Authors, 
 and may fairly avoid the odium of cen- 
 furing any one. But having met v/ith a 
 paffage concerning the ingenious Father 
 C ^ . Male- 
 
l6 An Inqntry concerning 
 
 Ma LEE RANG HE in th^ Letter s of MTo 
 Ba y le, who was an able judge, a friend 
 to him and a defender of him in other 
 refpe(?cs, I hope I may without being lia- 
 ble to exception produce Father Male- 
 bra N CHE as an examole. He has in fe- 
 veral books treated of and vindicated the 
 opinion of feeing all things in God y and 
 yet fo acute aperfon as Mr. Bayle, af- 
 ter having read them all, declares, that 
 he lefs comprehends his notion from his laji 
 hook than ever.^' \¥hich plainly fhows 
 a great defeft in F. Malebranche to 
 write upon a fubjed he underftood not, 
 and therefore could not make others un- 
 derftand. 
 
 You fee, I befpeak no favour in the 
 
 queftion before me^ and take the whole 
 
 fault to myfelf, if I do not write clearly 
 
 to you on it, and prove v/hat I propofe. 
 
 And that I may inform you, in what 
 
 I think clear to myfelf, I will begin with 
 
 explaining the fenfe of the Queftion. 
 
 .p,,„o„,c. Man is a neceffary Jjgent, if all his 
 
 iuo.ijucd. ^£x-^ns are fo determined by the caufes 
 
 preceding 
 
 * y'a: pr.rc::irH !e r.rweau Livre du Pere Malebranche contrc Mr, 
 y^rnauU: <^ j^ '^i fioini compris e^uc jctf:ats fa pretention, que hs I- 
 tle'cs, par lefqusUes ncin ccr.no'JJlns Its Oi>j:ts, font en Dieu, & non 
 dms notre yime. II 'v a la du fr.uI-entyJu : cefont, ce me fcnibie; des 
 e-yir.rjvqucs pe^petuctui^ Letter of the l6th cf Otlobcr 17^5* tO 
 
Human Liberty. 17 
 
 preceding each a£lion, that not one paft 
 action could pofiibly not have come to 
 pafs, or have been otherwife than it hath 
 been j nor one future aftion can poflibly 
 not come to pafs, or be otherwife than 
 it fhall be. He is 2ifree Agents if he is 
 able^ at any time under the circumftan- 
 ces and caufes he then is, to do different 
 • things : or, in other words, if he is not 
 unavoidably determined in every point 
 of time by the circumftances he is in, and 
 caufes he is under, to do that one thing 
 he does, and not poffibly to do any other. 
 
 in our Exp&- 
 rience is con* 
 fidered. 
 
 I. This being a queftion of fa£t con- nfentwhere 
 cerning what we ourfelves do ; we will, 
 firfr, confider our own Experience ; 
 which if we can know, as fure we may, 
 will certainly determine this matter. And 
 becaufe experience is urg'd with great 
 triumph, by the patrons of Liberty, we 
 will begin with a few general refleftions 
 concerning the argument of experience : 
 and then we will proceed to our experi- 
 ence itfelf. 
 
 I. The vulgar, who are bred up to Rc^eSons 
 believe Liberty or Freedom^ think them- ^""ent'of ex 
 felves fecure of fuccefs^ conftantly ap- 
 pealing to Experience for a proof of their 
 
 freedom. 
 
 perie 
 
1 8 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 freedom, and being perfuaded that they 
 feel themfelves free on a thoufand occa- 
 (ions. And the fource of their miftake, 
 feems to be as follows. They either at- 
 tend not to, or fee not the caufes oftheir 
 aftions, efpecially in matters of little 
 moment, and thence conclude, they are 
 free, or not mov'd by caufes, to do 
 what they do. 
 
 They alfo frequently do aftions where- 
 of they repent : and becaufe in the re- 
 penting humour, they find no prefent 
 motive to do thofe aftions, they con- 
 clude, that they might not have done 
 them at that time they did them, and 
 that they were free from neceflity (as 
 they were from outward impediments) 
 in the doing them. 
 
 They alfo find, that they can do as 
 they will, and forbear as they will, with- 
 out any external impediment to hinder 
 them from doing as they will ; let them 
 will either doing or forbearing. They 
 likewife fee, that they often change their 
 minds ; that they can, and do chufe dif- 
 ferently every fucceffive moment ; and 
 that they frequently deliberate, and 
 thereby are fomstimes at a near ballance, 
 .and in aftate of indifference with refpeO: 
 
 to 
 
Human Liberty. 19 
 
 to judging about fome propoGtions , 
 and willing or chufing with refpeft to 
 fome objefts. And experiencing thefe 
 things, they miftake them for the exer- 
 cife of Freedom y or Liberty from NeceJJity. 
 For ask them, whether they think them- 
 felvesy^^^ ? and they will immediately 
 anfwer, Tes : and fay fome one or other 
 of thefe foregoing things, and particu- 
 larly think they prove themfelves free, 
 when they affirm, they can do as they 
 wilL 
 
 Nay, celebrated Philofophe'rs and 
 Theologers, both ancient and modern, 
 who have meditated much on this mat- 
 ter, talk after the fame manner, giving 
 definitions of Liberty , that are confiftent 
 with Fate or NeceJJity 5 tho' at the fame 
 time they would be thought to exempt 
 fome of the aftions of man from the 
 power of Fatey or to affert Liberty from 
 NeceJJity. * Cicero defines Liberty to be, * Opera 
 a power to do as we will. And therein Ed. cron. 
 feveral moderns follow him. One f de- ^ pj^^„^^^ 
 fines Liberty to be, a power to aBy or jiot ^.nltf' 
 to adt, as we will Another defines it in ^"'^■'^' '• 
 more words thus: ^ a power to do zvhat ^ 
 we willy arid becaufe we will ; fo that if ru/rlxfft'* , . 
 T.c'.f did not will it ^ we JJ^mld not do it-^ we t fsz!* 
 
 JJ:ouUl 
 
20 An Inquiry conierning 
 
 Jhould even do the contrary if we willed /A 
 ^ Lock'. And another^ f a power to do or forbear 
 ^I'lvn.an a^ioriy according to the determi?iation 
 tT^'.^2^ or thought of the mind y whereby either is 
 ^' ^' preferrd to the other. On all which de- 
 finitions^ if the Reader will be pleas'd to 
 reflefl:, he will fee 'em to be only defini- 
 tions of liberty or freedom from outward 
 impediments of aBioUy and not a Freedom 
 or Liberty from Neceffity ; as I alfo will 
 Ihew them to be in the fequel of this Dif- 
 courfe, wherein I (hall contend equally 
 with them for fuch a power as they de- 
 fcribe, tho' I affirm. That there is no 
 Liberty Jrom Necejjity. 
 Fabrkii Alexander the Aphrodifaan, (a 
 ^^/•jv^j. moft acute Philofopher of the lid Centu- 
 r^df phn.f. ^y^ ^^^ ^^^ earlieft commentator now 
 '^- ext^LUt upon Ari/iotky and efteemed his 
 
 beft Defender and Interpreter) defines 
 Liberty to be, * a power to chufe wh.:t to 
 * De fato. do after deliberation and conjultation, and 
 to chufe and do what is moft eligible to our 
 reafon-j whereas otherwifcy we Jhould fol- 
 low our fancy. Now a choice after deli- 
 beration, is a no lefs neceffary choice, 
 than a choice by fancy. For tho' a choice 
 by fancy, or without deliberation, may 
 be one way, and a choice with delibe- 
 ration 
 
 p.m 
 
Human Liberty, zi 
 
 ration may be another way, or different; 
 yet each choice being founded on what 
 is judged beft, the one for one reafon, 
 and the other for another, is equally 
 neceflary; and good or bad reafons, 
 hafty or deliberate thoughts^ fancy or 
 deliberation, make no difference. 
 
 In the fame manner, -f* Eifhop Br a m- bairi 
 HALL, who has written feveral books -jzl''^' 
 for Liberty, and pretends to affert the 
 Liberty taught by Aristotle, defines 
 Liberty thus : He fays, 'That aH which 
 makes a Man's adlions to be truly free, is 
 eleftion ; which is the deliberate chufing 
 or refujing of this or that means ^or the accept 
 tat ion of one means before another, where di- 
 vers are reprefented by the underjlanding* 
 And that this definition places Liberty 
 wholly in chufing the fceming heiimeaf2S, 
 and not in chufing the feeming worft ^_ ^^.^ 
 means,equally w^ich the beftj will appear 
 from the following palTages. He fays,^i5?/- ^^^^ 
 ons dene injudclen and violent pajfions , are net 
 free\ becaufe there is no deliberation nor elec- 
 Bion,'"Tofay the will is determined by mo- 
 tives, that is, by reafons or dijcourfes, 
 is as nnich as to fay that the Agent is de* 
 termiffd by himfelf, or is free. Becaufe mo- 
 tives determine not naturally, but moral- 
 D // i 
 
2 2 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 ly ; which kind of determination is conjt- 
 Jient with true Liberty-"-' Admitting that 
 the will follows necejjarily_ the lafi diBate 
 of the underfianding, this is not dejlru5tive 
 of the liberty of the zvill J this is only an 
 hypothetical necejjlty. So that Liberty, 
 with him, confifts in chufing, or refu- 
 fing neceflarily after deliberation ; which 
 chufing or refufing is morally and hypo- 
 thetically determined, or neceffary by 
 virtue of the faid deliberation. 
 
 Lajily, A great jirminian Theologer, 
 Bibi. cho'if. who has writ a courfe of Philofophyy and 
 ^r.3^";4. enter'd into feveral controverfies on the 
 fubjea oi Liberty, makes Liberty to con- 
 fift in '^ an indifferency of mnd while a 
 thing is under deliberation. For, fays he, 
 while the mind deliberates, it i^free till the 
 moment of a^ion-y becaufe nothing deter- 
 mines it necejfarily to aB, or not to aB. 
 Whereas, when the mind ballances or 
 compares Ideas or motives together, it is 
 then no lefs necejfarily determin'd to a 
 ftate of Indifferency by the appearances 
 of thofe Ideas and motives, than it is 
 necejfarily determin'd in the very moment 
 ofaBion. Were a man to be at liberty 
 in this ftate of indifferency, he ought to 
 have it in his power to be not indifferent, 
 
 at 
 
Human Liberty, z^ 
 
 at the fame time that he is indiffe- 
 rent. 
 
 \i experience therefore proves the li- 
 berty contended for by the foregoing af- 
 ferters of liberty^ it proves men to have 
 no liberty from necejjity, 
 
 2. As the foregoing aiferters of hber- 
 ty, give us definitions of Liberty, as 
 grounded on experience, which are con- 
 fiftent with Necejjity ; fo fome of the 
 greateft Patrons of hberty, do by their 
 conceilions in this matter, fufficiently 
 deftroy all argument from £i?cp<?r;Vw^^. 
 
 Erasmus in his treatife for Free-wilh » o^,,,^ 
 againft Luther^ fays, * l^hat among the J^^.'J'^' 
 difficulties which have exercised the Theo- 
 Jogers and Philofophers of all ages, there 
 is none greater than the quejlion of free^ 
 izill. And Mr, Le Clerc, fpeaking of 
 this Book of Erasmus, fays, f that the JJibi. 
 que/Hon of free-will, was too fubtile for J^^'^f"' 
 Erasmus, who was no Philofopher 5 which 
 makeshitnofencontradiflhimfef fEx-por. 
 
 The late Bifliop of Sa rum f, tho' he ^- -''• 
 contends. Every Man experiences liberty \ P^g-^-i- 
 yet owns, thit great difficulties attend the 
 {uh]e^ on all hands, and that therefore 
 he pretends not to explain or anfwer them. 
 
 The flimous Bernard Ociiin, a 
 D 2 great 
 
^4 ^n Inquiry concerning 
 
 Italian Wit, has written a moft fubtile 
 Printed at ^od ingenious bock, intituled. Labyrinths 
 ^■'•^^* concerning Free-will and PredeJIination, 
 &c. wherein he fliews, that they who 
 ailert, that Man afts freely, areinvolv'd 
 in four great difficulties ; and that thofe 
 who aflert that Man ads neceffarily, fall 
 into four other difficulties. So that he 
 forms eight Labyrinths, four againft Li- 
 berty, and four again ft Neceffity. He 
 turns himfelf all manner of ways to get 
 clear of them ; but not being able to find 
 any folution, he conftantly concludes 
 with a Prayer to G o d to deliver him 
 from thefe Abyifes. Indeed in the pro- 
 grefs of his work, he endeavours to fur- 
 nilh means to get out of this prifon : but 
 he concludes that the only way, is to fay, 
 with Socrates, Hoc imumfcio quod ni- 
 hil fcio. We ought, fays he, to reji con- 
 tented, and conclude, that God requires 
 neither the affirmative nor negative cf us. 
 This is the title of his laft chapter, ^a 
 via ex omnibus fupradiSis Lahyrinthis 
 cito exiri pojfit, quce doBa ingnorantice via 
 vocatiir. > 
 
 A famous Author *, who appeals to 
 
 On--. Mali? common experience, for a proof of liber- 
 
 ■ " ' ty, confeffes, that the quejlien of liberty 
 
 is 
 
Human Liherty. ^ z^ 
 
 is the moji obfcure and difficult quejil on in 
 all Philofophy : that the learned are ful- 
 ler of contradi5lions to themjelveSy and to 
 one another^ on this, than on any other fub- p^^ ^^^ 
 je[l : And that he writes againfi the com- ^^g- toj 
 mon notion of liberty ^ and endeavours to ^n- «»7 
 eftablifh another notion, which he allows 
 to be intricate. 
 
 But how can all this happen in a 
 plain matter of fail, fuppos'd to be ex- 
 perienced by every body ? What difficul- 
 ty can there be in ftating a plain matter 
 of faft^ and defcribing what every body 
 feels ? What need of fo much Philofophy} 
 And why fo many contradi£lions on the 
 fubjeft ? And how can all men experi- 
 ence Liberty y when it is allow'd, that the 
 common notion of liberty is falfe, or not 
 experienc'd ; and a new notion oi Liberty^ 
 not thought on before (or thought on 
 but by few) is fet up as matter of expe- 
 rience ? This could not happen, if mat- 
 ter of faft was clear for liberty. 
 
 3. Other Afferters of Liberty feem 
 driven into it on account of fuppos'd in- 
 conveniences attending the doftrine of 
 Necefjity, The great Episcv:>pi us, in his 
 TreatifeofFree-zvilly acknowledges in cf- 
 feft, that the afferters 0^ Nece/Jity have 
 
 feemJno; 
 
 9 
 
26 An Inquiry concernhig 
 
 feeming experience on their fide, and 
 vow'^ are thereby very numerous ; -f They, as 
 loo*/^^' heobftrves, alledge one thing of moment ^ 
 in which they triumph, viz. ^^ that the 
 '*" will is determin'd by the underftand- 
 ^^ ing : and ajfert^ that unlefs it were fo j 
 *^ the will would be a blind faculty, and 
 '*■ might make evil, as evil, its obje£t > 
 *^ and rejeft what is pleafant and agreea- 
 *^ ble: And by conlequence, that all 
 **" perfuafions, promifes, reafonings and 
 *'' threats, would be as ufelefs to a Man 
 "'^ as to a ftock or a ftone. " This, he al- 
 lows to be very plaufibhy and to have 
 the appearance of probability ; to be the 
 common fentiment of the fchools • to be the 
 rock on which the ablejl dejenders of liber- 
 ty have fplit, without being able to anfwer 
 it ; and to be the reafouy or argument (or 
 rather the matter of experience) which 
 has made men in all ages, and not a few 
 in this age, fall into the opinion of the fa* 
 tal necefjity of all things. But becaufe it 
 makes all our aBions neceffary^ and there- 
 by, in his opinion, fubverts all religion, 
 lawsy rezvards and punifiments ; he con- 
 cludes it to be moji certainly falfe : and 
 religion makes him quit this common and 
 plaujible opinion. Thus alfo many other 
 
 ftrenuous 
 
Human Liherty. 2*] 
 
 flrenous Aflerters of Liberty, as well as 
 himfelf,are driven by thefe fuppofed diffi- 
 cuIties,to deny manifejl experience. I fay, 
 manifeji experience, for are we not mani- 
 feftly determin'd by pleafure or pain, 
 and by what feems reafonable or un- 
 reafonable to us, to judge or will, or 
 aft ? Whereas could they fee that there 
 are not grounds for laws and morality, 
 rewards and punifliments, but by fup- 
 pofmg the doftrine o{ Necejftty ; and that 
 there is no foundation for laws and mo- 
 rality, rewards and punifhments, upon 
 the fuppofition of man's being a free a- 
 gent, (as fhall evidently, and demon- 
 ftratively appear) they would readily 
 allow experience to be againft Free-will, 
 and deny Liberty, when they fhould fee 
 there was no need to affert it, in order to 
 'maintain thofe neceffary things. And as 
 a farther evidence thereof, let any man 
 perufe the difcourfes written by the a- 
 bleft authors for liberty, and he will 
 fee (as they confefs of one another) that 
 they frequently contradict themfeives, 
 write obfcurely, and know not where to 
 place Liberty ; at leaft, he will fee that 
 he is able to make nothing of their dif- 
 courfes 5 no more than * Mr. Locke 
 
 Lettert. 
 was ^.jai. 
 
/>. lO 
 
 Z 8 An Inquiry concer?iing 
 
 was of this treatife of E p i s c o p i u s, who 
 in all his other writings, Ihews himfelf 
 to be a clear, ftrong, and argumentative 
 writer. 
 
 4. There are others, and thofe con- 
 tenders for Liberty^ as well as denyers of 
 it, who report the perfuafions of Men, 
 as to the Matter of fad, very differently, 
 and alfo judge very differently them- 
 felves about the faft, from what is vul- 
 garly believed among thofe who main- 
 tain B^ree-wilL 
 t Aiexan- ^u ancicnt author fpeaks thus + : Fate^ 
 
 «ier de Fato ^ ^ A ' 
 
 fays he, is fvfficiently proved from the gene- 
 ral receivd opinion and perfuafwn of Men 
 thereof For^ in certain things, when Men 
 all agree, except a few^ who dijjent from 
 them on account of maintaitiirig Jome doc- 
 trines before taken up, they cannot bemifla- 
 ken, IVheref ore Ai^ AX AGo^ AS the Cla- 
 zomenian, tho^ no contemptible Natura- 
 liji, ought not to be judged to deferve any 
 regard, when oppofing the common p erf ua- 
 fon of all Men he ajferts^ '' That nothing 
 ^' is done by Fate j but that it is an emp- 
 ^^ tyname/' And according to all au- 
 thors, recording the opinions of men in 
 this matter, the belief of Fate, as to all 
 Events, has continued to be the moft com- 
 mon 
 
Human Liberty. 29 
 
 monperfuajiony both of Philofophers and 
 People ; as it is at this day the perfuajion 
 of much the greateft part of mankind^ 
 according to the relations of Voyagers. 
 And tho' it has not equally prevail'd a- 
 mong Chriftians, as it has and does a- 
 mong all other religious parties ; yet 
 it is certain, the Fatalifts have been, and 
 are very numerous among Chriftians : 
 and the free-will-Theologers themfelves 
 allow, * T^hatfome Chrifiiamare as great *^^','7^'j* 
 Fatalifts^ as any of the ant ie72t Philofophers li^^'^^l^^- 
 were, cfProv, 
 
 p. 66. 
 
 The acute and penetrating Mr. 
 Bayle, reports the faft, as very difte- 
 rently underftood by thofe who have 
 thoroughly examin'd and confider'd the 
 various aftiohs of Man, from what is 
 vulgarly fuppos'd in this matter. Says 
 he, -f* They who examine not to the bottom 
 what pajfes within therUy eajily perjuade naire^ / 
 themfehes, that they are free : but^ they 
 who have confidered with care the founda- 
 tion and circumjiances of their aBions^ 
 doubt cf their freedom y and are even per* 
 fuudedy that their reafon and underjland^ 
 ings are Slaves that cannot repfi the force 
 which carries them along. He fays alfo, in 
 a familiar Letter, That the left proofs al- 
 E ledgd 
 
 1497. Id, 
 edit. 
 
30 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 fflh^eT'of ^^^g'^fo^ Liberty are^ that without it> 
 i^^cember ]^^^ ^^^^/^ ^q^ p^ ^^^ fj^^f Q^j would be 
 
 1696, to the ' ' 
 
 Abbot Du f}^^ author of evil, as well as good thoughts'^'. 
 
 And the celebrated Mr. Leibniz, 
 
 that univerfal genius on occafion of 
 
 Archbifhop King's appeal to experience^ 
 
 (in behalf of his notion of liberty y viz. A 
 
 DeOiig. faculty, whichy being indifferent to objeBSy 
 and over-ruling our pajjions, appetites , 
 fetifationsy and reafon, chufes arbitrarily 
 among objeBs y and renders the ohjedl cho- 
 fen agreeable, only becaufe it has chofen it) 
 denies, that we experience fuch, or any- 
 other Liberty ; but contends that we ra- 
 ther experience a determination in all 
 Remar- Qur a£lions. Says he, ff^e experience 
 
 ques lur le ^ ^ '' ^ 
 
 iiv. de r o- fbmethingr in us which inclines us to a choicer 
 
 rig. du ma], ^ , . . 
 
 ?' '^' and if it happens that we cannot give a 
 reafon oj all our inclinations, a little at- 
 tention willjhow us, that the conftitution 
 of our bodies, the bodies encompajjing us, 
 the prefent, or preceding ft ate of our minds, 
 and fever al little matters comprehended 
 under thefe great caufes, may contribute 
 to make us chufe certain oljeSfs, without 
 having recourfe to a pure indifference, or to 
 I know not what power of the Soul, which 
 does upon objeBs^ what they fay colours do 
 npon the Camelion. In fine^ he is fo far 
 
 from 
 
Huma?i Liberty. 3 1 
 
 from thinking thac there is the leaft 
 foundation from Experience, for the faid p^z- 84. 
 notion of Liberty, that he treats it as a 
 chimera, and compares it to the magical 
 power of the Fairies to transform things. 
 
 Lafly, The Journalifts of Paris are 
 very far from thinking Archbifhop 
 King's notion of liberty to be matter of 
 experience, when they fay. That Dr. 
 Ki^G,not fatisfy'd with any of the for-- 
 mer notions of Liberty, propofes a new no- 
 tion ', and carries indiffereiice fo far, as 
 to maintain that pie afure is not tie motive 
 but the effedi of the choice of the zvilt ; pla- 
 cet res quia eligitur, non eligitur quia 
 placet. This opinion, add they, m.akes'^jou 
 him frequently contradiSi himfelf^. the 16 of 
 
 So that upon the whole, the affair of 
 experience, with relation to liberty, 
 ftandsthus. Some give the name Liber- 
 ty to aftions, w^hich when defcribed, are 
 plainly A6tions that are neceflary ; O- 
 thers, tho' appealing to vulgar experi- 
 rience, yet inconfiftently therewith, 
 contradift the vulgar experience, by 
 owning it to be an intricate mat- 
 ter, and treating it after an intricate 
 manner ; Others are driven into the de- 
 fence o{ Liberty, by difficulties imagined 
 E 2 to 
 
 irnal 
 des Savansof 
 
32 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 to flow from the doftrine of Neceffit)\ 
 combating what they allow to be matter 
 feeming experience ; Others, and thofe 
 the moft difcerning, either think liberty 
 cannot be prov'd by experience, or 
 think Men may fee by experience, that 
 they are Tiecejjary Agents j and the bulk 
 of Mankind have always been perfuaded 
 that they are neceffary Agents. 
 ourexperi- Having thus pav'd the way by fliew- 
 confidered. J ng that liberty IS Hot a plam matter or 
 experience, by arguments drawn from 
 the afferters of liberty themfelves, and 
 by confequence fubverted the argument 
 from experience for liberty j we will 
 now run over the various aftions of Men 
 which can be conceiv'd to concern this 
 fubjeft, and examine, whether we can 
 know from experience, that Man is a 
 free or a neceffary Agent. I think thofe 
 a£tions may be reduc'd to thtle four : i. 
 Perception of Ideas. 2. Judging of Pro- 
 pofitions. 3. WiUing. 4. Doing as we 
 will. 
 fc-ccrtJoa I. Perception of Ideas. Of this there 
 can be no difpute but it is a neceffary 
 aftion of man, fince it is not even a vo- 
 luntary aftion. The Ideas both of fen- 
 fation and refleftion, offer themfelves to 
 
 us 
 
 :f Id 
 
Human Lilwrty. 33 
 
 us whether we will or no, and we can- 
 not rejeft 'em. We muft be confcious 
 that we think, when we do think ; and 
 thereby we neceffarily have the Ideas of 
 Reflexion. We muft ah^o ufe our fenfes 
 when awake ; and thereby neceirarily 
 receive the Ideas of Senfation. And as 
 we neceffarily receive Ideas, fo each I- 
 dea is neceffarily what it is in our mind : 
 for it is not pofTible to make any thing 
 different from itfelf. This firft neceffa- 
 ry a£tion, the reader will fee is the foun- 
 dation and caufe of all the other intelli- 
 gent aftions of man, and makes them al- 
 fo neceffary. For, as ajudicious author *Locke»3 
 and nice obferver of the inward aftions ^ », x. 
 of Man, fays truly, ^ Te?nplcs have their 
 J acred images, and we fee what influenee 
 they have always had over a great part 
 pf mankind. But in truth, the Ideas 
 and images in mens minds ^ are the In visi- 
 ble Powers that c on/i ant ly govern them^ 
 and to thefe, they univerfally pay a ready 
 fub?niJJion, 
 
 2. The fecond aftion of man is judg* judg-ngof 
 ingofpropofitions. All propofitions muft 
 appear to me either felf-evident, ore- 
 vident from proof, or probable, or im- • 
 probable, or doubtful, or falfe. Now 
 
 thefe 
 
34 -^^i Inquiry conoernin^ 
 
 thefe various appearances of propoliti- 
 ons to me, being founded on my capa- 
 city, and the degree of light propofici- 
 ons ftand into me ; I can no more change 
 thofe appearances in me, than I can 
 change the Idea of red rais'd in me. Nor 
 can I judge contrary to thofeappearances: 
 for what is judging of propofitions:, but 
 judging that propofitions do appear as 
 they do appear ? which I cannot avoid 
 doing, without lying to myfelf ; which 
 is impoffible. If any man thinks he can 
 judge a propofition, appearing to him 
 evident, to be not evident ; or a proba- 
 ble propofition, to be more or Icfs proba* 
 ble than it appears by the proofs to be ; 
 he knows not what he fays, as he may 
 fee, if he will define his words. The ne- 
 ceffity of being determined by appear- 
 ances, was maintained by all the old 
 Philofophers, even by the Academicks 
 or Scepticks. Cicero fays, Tou muff 
 Arsdtm. fake from a Man his fenfes^ if you take 
 \\h.z. from him the power of ajjenting \for tt ts 
 as necejfary the mind Jloould yield to what 
 is clear, as that a fcale hanging o?i a haU 
 lance y JiouJd fink with weight laid on it. 
 For as all living creatures cannot but de- 
 fire -.vhat is agreeable to their natures^ fo 
 
 they 
 
Human Liberty. 35 
 
 the^; cannot but ajfent to what is clear, 
 Wheyeforey if thofe things whereof we clif 
 pute are true \ it is to no purpofeto /peak of 
 ajfent. For he who apprehends or perceives 
 any thing, affents immediately* Again, 
 a[jmt 7iot onlj precedes the praBice of vice ; 
 but of virtue, the Jleady performance 
 *whcreof and adherence to wh ich, depend 
 on what a man has ajfent ed to and ap- 
 proved, ^nd it is necejjary, that J ofne thing 
 JhouJd appear to us before we atfy and 
 that wejhould ajjent to that appearance. 
 JVhsrefore he "who takes away appearances 
 and afjent from tnan^ dejiroys all a5iion in 
 hira. The force of this reafoning manl- 
 feftly extends to all the various judg- 
 ments men make upon the appearances 
 of things. And CrcERo, as an Acadc- 
 mick or Sceptick, muft be fuppos'd to 
 extend necejjity to every kind of /W^.^^w^ 
 or ajfent of man upon the appearances 
 (or as the Greeks call them ^loj^oy^va and 
 himfelf the Vifa) of things. Sex t us ]jjf^;y\ 
 E M p I R r c u s fays, they who fay, the Seep- -• ^' *°* 
 ticks take away appearances, have not con- 
 vers'd with them, and do not underjiand 
 the7n. For we dejiroy not the pafionsy to 
 which our fenjes find themjelves e^pos'^d 
 whether we zvill or 7io^ and which force us 
 
 t9 
 
36 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 to fubmit to appearances. For when it is 
 aili'd us^ whether objefts are fuch as 
 they appear ? zve deny not their appear- 
 ances nor doubt of them, but only queJUony 
 'whether the external objects are like the 
 appearances. 
 Willing. 3. ^Filling, is the third aftion of 
 
 man, which I propofe to confider. It 
 is matter of daily experience, that we 
 begin, or forbear, continue or end feve- 
 ral aftions barely by a thought or pre- 
 ference of the mind, ordering the doing 
 or not doing, the continuing or ending, 
 fuch or fuch aftions. Thus before we 
 think or deliberate on any fubjeft, or 
 before we get on horfe-back, we do 
 prefer thofe things to any thing elfe in 
 competition with them. In like manner, 
 if we forbear thefe aftions, when any of 
 them are ofFer'd to our thoughts : or if 
 we continue to proceed in any one of 
 thefe aftions once begun : or if at any 
 time we make an end of profecuting 
 them ; we do forbear, or continue, or 
 end them on our preference of the for- 
 bearance to the doing of them, of the 
 continuing of them to the ending them, 
 and of the ending to the continuing them. 
 This power of the man thus to order the 
 
 beginning 
 
Huma?i Liberty. 37 
 
 beginning or forbearance, the continu- 
 ance or ending of any aftion, is cali'd 
 the will, and the afl:ual exercife thereof, 
 willing, , 
 
 There are two queftions ufually put 
 about this matter : Jirji, Whether we 
 are at hberty to will, or not to will ? fi- 
 condlyy Whether we are at liberty to 
 will one or the other of two or more ob- 
 jefts ? 
 
 I . As to the firft, whether we are at li- 
 berty to will, or not to will ? it is mani- 
 fell:, we have not that liberty. For let 
 an adion in a man's power be proposed 
 to him as preiently to be done, as for 
 exam.ple, to walk ; the will to walk, or 
 not to walk, exifts immediately. And 
 when an adlion in a man's power is pro- 
 pos'd to him to be done to morrow, as 
 to walk to morrow , he is no lefs oblig'd 
 to have fome immediate will. He muft 
 either have a will to defer willing about 
 the matter proposed, or muft will imme- 
 diately in relation to the thing propos'd : , 
 and one or the other of thofe wills muft 
 exift immediately, no lefs than the v/ill 
 to walk, or not to walk in the former 
 cafe. Wherefore in every propofal of 
 fomething to be done which is in a man's 
 F power 
 
3B An Inquiry concerning 
 
 power to do^ he cannot but have fome 
 immediate will. 
 
 Hence appears the miftake of thofe 
 Locke of who think men at liberty to willy or not 
 un7i. i. to wilh bfcaujiy fay they, they canfuf- 
 fend willing y in relation to a6tions to be 
 done to morrow ; wherein they plainly 
 confound themfelves, with words. For 
 when it is faid, man is neceflarily deter- 
 mined to will J it is not thereby under- 
 ftood, that he is determin'd to will or 
 chufe one out of two objefts immediate- 
 ly in every cafe proposed to him (or to 
 chufe at all in fome cafes; as whether 
 he will travel into France or Holland), 
 but that on every propofal he muft ne- 
 cefTarily have fome wilL And he is not 
 lefs determin'd to will, becaufe he does 
 often fufpend willing or chufing in cer- 
 tain cafes : for fufpending to willy is it- 
 felf an aSl of willing y it is v/illing to de- 
 fer willing about the matter propos'd. In 
 fine, tho' great ftrefs is laid on the cafe 
 oi fufpending the willy to prove liberty, 
 yet there is no difference between that 
 and the moft common cafes of willing 
 and chufing upon the manifeft excellen- 
 cy of one objeft before another. For as 
 when a man wills or chufes living in En- 
 gland 
 
Human Liberty, 39 
 
 gland before going out of it (in which 
 will he is manifeftly deterniin'd by the 
 fatisfaftion he has in living in En^ 
 gland) he rejeds the will to go out of 
 England', fo a man, who fufpends a will 
 about any matter, wills doing nothing 
 in it at prefent, or rejefts for a time wil- 
 ling about it J which circumftances of 
 wholly rejefting, and rejefting for a time, 
 make no variation that affefts the quefti- 
 on. So that willing or chufing fufpenfion, 
 is like all other choices or wills we have. 
 2. Secondly, let us now fee, whether 
 we are at liberty to will or chufe one or the 
 other of two or more objeBs. Now as to 
 this, we will, firjly confider, whether 
 we are at liberty to will one of two or 
 more objefts wherein we difcern any dif- 
 ference: that is, where one upon the 
 whole feems lefs hurtful than another. 
 And this will not admit of much difpute, 
 if we confider what wiUing is. Willing 
 or preferring, is the fame with refped to 
 good and evil, that judging is with re- 
 fpeft to truth or falfhood. It is judging, 
 that one thing is upon the whole better 
 than another, or not fo bad as another. 
 Wherefore as we judge of truth or falf- 
 hood according to appearances j fo we 
 E 2 niuft 
 
Locke's 
 Efiay ofHu- 
 man Und. ). 
 
 40 j^/i Inquiry concerning 
 
 muft will or prefer as things feem to us, 
 
 unlefs we can lye to ourfelves, and think 
 
 that to be worft, which we think beft. 
 
 An ingenious author exprefles this 
 
 \d:ll: ^stter well, when he fays, '' the que- 
 ^' Jion, whether a man be at liberty to 
 will which of the two he pleafes, mo- 
 -^ tion or reft ; carries the abfurdity of it 
 ^' fo manifejily in itfelj] that one might 
 ^' hereby be fufficiently convinced, that li- 
 ^^ berty concerns not the will For to ask, 
 *^ whether a man be at liberty to will 
 '^ either motion or reft, fpeaking or fi- 
 ^*' lence, which he pleafes ? is to ask, 
 ^^ whether a man can will what he wills ^ 
 ^^ or be pleas'* d with what he is pleased 
 ^^ with ? A quejiion that needs no an- 
 f ' fwer. '' 
 
 To fuppofc a fenfibie being capable 
 of willing or preferring, (call it as you 
 pleafe) mifery, and refafing good, is to 
 deny it to be really fenfibie ; for every 
 man, while he has his fenfes, aims at 
 pleafare and happinefs, and avoids pain 
 and mifery ; and this, in wiUing aftions, 
 which are fuppos'd to be attended with 
 the moft terrible confequences. And 
 therefore the ingenious Mr. Nor r is 
 
 '•-^''^^9?" + very juftly obferves, th^t all li'ho com- 
 mit 
 
Human Liberty . 41 
 
 mlt jiny think it at the infiant of com mi f- 
 fto:i ail things confider'dy a lejfer evil \ 0- 
 therwijc it is impojjibk they Jhould com- 
 mit it :.and he inftances in St. Peter's 
 denial of his Mafter, who, he fays, 
 jiulg'd that part moji eligible which he 
 chofe '^ that is ^ he judg'd the Jin of denying 
 his Mafter, at that prefent jun^ure, to be 
 lefs evily than the danger of not denyi?2g 
 him, andfo chofe it, Otherwife, if he had 
 then actually thought it a greater evil, all 
 that whereby it exceeded the other, he 
 would have chofen gratis, and confequently 
 have willed evil as evil, which is impof- *^^^i^ 
 fible. And another acute Philofopher ^PrSr"" 
 obferves, * that there are in France many ]%,'^'^' 
 7jew converts, who go to mafs with great 
 reluBance. They know they mortally of- 
 fend God, hut as each offence would coji 
 them (fuppofe) two pijhles, and having 
 reckon'^d the charge, and finding that this 
 fine paid as often as there are feftivals and 
 fun days, would reduce them and their fa- 
 milies to beg their bread, they conclude it 
 is better to offend God, than beg. 
 
 In fine^ tho' there is hardly any thing 
 fo abfurd, but feme ancient philofopher 
 or other may be cited for it; yet accor- 
 ding to Plato "f*, none of t hem were fo 
 
 abfurd 
 
4Z An Inquiry concerning 
 
 EdS^'" ^^//r^ to fay that men did evil voluntari- 
 
 "•Tl^/sf ^' and he afferts, that// is contrary to 
 
 3*^' the nature of many to follo%v evily as evil, 
 
 and not purfue good ; and that when a man 
 
 is compelled to chufe between two evils, you 
 
 will never fnd a man who chufe s the grea- 
 
 tejly if it is in his power to chufe the lefs ; 
 
 SfMrnhaU'^ and that this is a truth manifeft to alh 
 
 Works t J -J 
 
 656, and * And even the greateft modern advocates 
 for liberty allow, that whatever the will 
 chufethy it chufeth under the notion of good-, 
 and that the objeEl of the will is good in 
 general, which is the end of all human 
 anions. 
 
 This I take to be fufficient to fliew, 
 that man h not at liberty to will one or 
 the other of two or more objefls, be- 
 tween which (all things confider'd) he 
 perceives a difference ; and to account 
 truly for all the choices of that kind, 
 which can be affign'd. 
 
 But, fecondly, fome of the patrons of 
 liberty contend, that we arc free in our 
 choice among things indifferent, or a- 
 like, as in chufing one oi^t of two or 
 Nmore eggs; and that in fuch cafes the 
 man having no motives from the objefts, 
 is not neceflitated to chufe one rather 
 than the other, becaufe there is no per- 
 
 ceiveable 
 
Human Liberty. 43 
 
 ceivable difference between them, but 
 chufes one by a mere a^: of willing with- 
 out any caufe but his own free aft. To 
 which I anfwer, i . Firft, by asking whe- 
 ther this and other inftances like this are 
 the only inftances wherein man is free to 
 will or chufe among objefts ? If they are 
 the only inftances wherein man is free 
 to will or chufe among objefts, then we 
 are advanc'd a great way in the quefti- 
 on ; becaufe there are few (if any) ob- 
 jefts of the will that are perfeftly alike; 
 and becaufe neceflity is hereby allow'd 
 to take place in all cafes where there is 
 a perceiveable diiFerence in things, and 
 confequently in all moral and religious 
 cafes, for the fake whereof fuch endea- 
 vours have been us'd to maintain fo ab- 
 furd and inconfiftent a thing as liberty or 
 freedom from necejjity. So that liberty is 
 almoft, if not quite, reduc'd to nothing, 
 and deftroy'd as to the grand end in af- 
 ferting it. If thofe are not the only in- 
 ftances wherein man is free to will or 
 chufe among objefts, but man is free to 
 will in other cafes, thefe other cafes 
 (hould be affignM, and not fuch cafes as 
 are of no confequence, and which by 
 the great likenefs of the objefts to one a- 
 
 nother 
 
44 -^^ Inquiry concerning 
 
 nother, and for other reafons make the 
 caufe of the determination of man's will 
 lefs eafy to be known^ and confequent- 
 ly ferve to no other purpofe but to dark- 
 en the queftion, which may be better 
 determined by con(idering> whether man 
 be Jree to will or no in more important in- 
 llances. 2. Secondly, I anfwer, that 
 whenever a choice is made, there can be 
 no equality of circumftances preceding 
 the choice. For in the cafe of chufing 
 one out of two more eggs, between 
 which there is no perceiveable difference j 
 there is not nor can there be a true equa- 
 lity of circumftances and caufes preced- 
 ing the aft of chufing one of the faid 
 eggs. It is not enough to render things 
 equal to the will, that they are equal or 
 alike in themfelves. All the various 
 modifications of the man, his opinions, 
 prejudices, temper, habit, and circum- 
 ftances are to be taken in and confider'd 
 as caufes ofekBion no lefs than the ob- 
 jefts without us among which we chufe j 
 and thefe will ever incline or determine 
 our wills, and make the choice we do 
 make, preferable to us, tho' the external 
 objefts of our choice are ever fo much a- 
 like to each other. - And, for example, 
 
 in 
 
Human Liberty. 45 
 
 in the cafe of chufing one ouc of two eggs 
 that are alike, there is, firft, in the per- 
 fon chufing a will to eat or ufe an egg. 
 There is, fecondly, a will to take but 
 one, or one firft. Thirdly, confequent 
 to thele two wills, follow in the fame 
 inftant chufing and taking one ; which 
 one is chofen and taken moft commonly, 
 according as the parts of our bodies have 
 been form'd long fince by our wills or 
 by other caufes to an habitual praftice, 
 or as thofe parts are determinM by fome 
 particular circumftances at that time. 
 And we may know by refleflion on our 
 adlions that feveral of our choices have 
 been determin'd to one among feveral 
 objefts by thefe laft means, when no 
 caufe has arifen from the mere confide- 
 ration of the objefts themfelves. For 
 we know by experience, that we either 
 ufe all the parts of our bodies by habit, 
 or according to fome particular caufe 
 determining their ufe at that time. 
 Fourthly, there are in all trains of caufes, 
 that precede their efFefts, and efpecially 
 eftefts which nearly refemble each o- 
 ther, certain differences undifcernable 
 on account of their minutenefs, and alfo 
 on account of our not accuftoming our- 
 G felves 
 
A 6 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 felves to attend to them^ which yet in 
 concurrence with other caufes as necef- 
 farily produce their efFeft, as the lafl: 
 feather laid on breaks the horfe's back, 
 and as a grain neceflarily turns the bal- 
 lance between any weights, tho' the 
 eye cannot difcover which is the great- 
 eft weight or bulk by fo fmall a diffe- 
 rence. And I add, that as we know 
 without fuch difcovery by the eye, that 
 if one fcale rifes and the other falls there 
 is a greater weight in one fcale than the 
 other, and alfo know that the leaft addi- 
 tional weight is fufficient to determine the 
 fcales ; fo likewife we may know that 
 the leaft circumftance in the extenfive 
 chain of caufes, that precede every ef- 
 fed, is fufficient to produce an effecft ; 
 and alfo know, that there muft be caufes 
 of our choice (tho' we do not or cannot 
 difcern thofe caufes) by knowing, that 
 every thing that has a beginning mufi have 
 a caiife. By which laft principle we are 
 as neceffarily led to conceive a caufe of 
 adlion in man, where we fee not the 
 particular caufe itfelf ; as we are to con- 
 ceive that a greater weight determines 
 a fcale, tho' our eyes difcover no diiie- 
 rence between the two weights. 
 
 But 
 
Hu?72an Liberty , 47 
 
 But let us put a cafe of true equality 
 or IndifferenGe^ and what I haveafferted 
 will more manifeftly appear true. Let 
 two eggs appear perfeftly alike to a 
 man ; and let him have no will to eat or 
 ufe eggs. (For fo the cafe ought to be 
 put, to render things perfectly indiiFe- 
 rent to him j becaufe> if once a will to 
 eat eggs be fuppos'd, that will muft ne- 
 ceffarily introduce a train of caufes which 
 v/ill ever deftroy an equality of circum- 
 ftances in relation to the things which 
 are the objefts of our choice. There 
 will foon follow a fecond will to eat one 
 firft. And thefe tisoo wills muft put the 
 man upon aftion and the ufage of the 
 parts of his body to obtain his end ; 
 which parts are determined in their mo- 
 tions either by fome habitual praftice or 
 by fome particular circumftance at that 
 time, and caufe the man to chufe and 
 take one of them firft rather than the o- 
 ther.) The cafe of equaHty being thus 
 rightly ftated, I fay, it is manifeft no 
 choice would or could be made ; and 
 the Man is vifibly prevented in the be- 
 ginning from making a choice. For eve- 
 ry man experiences, that before he can 
 make a choice among eggs, he muft 
 G 2 have 
 
48 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 have a will to eat or ufe an egg ; other- 
 wife he muft let them alone. And he 
 alfo experiences in relation to all things 
 which are the objefts of his choice, that 
 he muft have a precedent will to chufe ; 
 otherwife he will make no choice. No 
 man marries one woman preferable to a- 
 nother, or travels into France x2iXhQx than 
 into another countrey, or writes a book 
 on one fubjeQ: rather than another, but 
 he muft firft have a precedent will to 
 marry, travel, and write. 
 
 It is therefore contrary to experience, 
 to fuppofe any choice can be made under 
 an equality of circumftances. And by 
 confequence it is matter of experience, 
 that man is ever determined in his willing 
 or afts of volition and choice. 
 D-Mngaswe 4. Fourthly, I ihall now confider the 
 aSions of men confequent to willing^ and 
 fee whether he h^ free in any of thofe 
 adlions. And here alfo we experience 
 perfedt neceility. If we will thinking or 
 deliberating on a fubje^fl;, or will reading, 
 or walking, or riding, we find we muft 
 do thofe a6tions, unlefs fome external 
 impediment, as an apoplexy or fome 
 intervening caufe, hinders us ; and then 
 we are as much neceilitated to let an 
 
 aftion 
 
 wjil 
 
Human Liberty, 49 
 
 aftion alone, as we are to ad: according 
 t® our will, had no fuch external impe- 
 diment to aftion happen'd. If alfo we 
 change our wills after we have begun a- 
 ny of thefe adions, we find we neceffari- 
 ly leave oiF thefe adlions and follow the 
 new will or choice. And this was Ari- 
 stotle's fenfe of fuch aftions of man. 
 
 y, r % ' ' IT '1 r Ethica /. 7. 
 
 ^5, lays he, tn arguing we necejjanly aj- c.s.ap.ope- 
 
 Edit. 
 
 Cent to the inference or cone tii lion drawn p^r. voi. 11. 
 from premifeSy fo if that arguing relate to 
 praBiccy we necejjarily aB upon fuch infe- 
 rence or conclufion. ^s for example^ when 
 we argue thus, whatever is fweet is to 
 be tafted, this is fweet, he who infers, 
 therefore this ought to be tafted, necef- 
 farily tafles that fweet thing if there be 
 no objiacle to hinder him. 
 
 For a conclufion of this argument 
 from experience, let us compare the 
 anions of inferior intelligent and fenfible 
 agents, and thofe of men together. It 
 is allow'd that hearts are neceffary a- 
 gents, and yet there is no perceivable 
 difference between their aftions and the 
 anions of men, from whence they fhould 
 be deem'd neceffary and men /rt'^ a gents. 
 Sheep, for example, are fuppos'd to be 
 necejfary agents, when they ftand ftill, 
 
 lie 
 
50 An hiqidry coricemiiig 
 
 lie down, go flow or faft, turn to the 
 right or left, skip, as they are diffe- 
 rently affecSed in their minds ; when 
 they are doubtful or deliberate which 
 way to take ; when they eat and drink 
 out of hunger and thirft; when they eat 
 or drink more or lefs according to their 
 humour, or as they like the water or 
 the pafture ; when they chufe the 
 fweeteft and beft pafture; when they 
 chufe among paftures that are indiffe- 
 rent or alike; when they copulate; j 
 when they are fickle or ftedfaft in their \ 
 amours ; when they take more or lefs 
 care of their young ; when they aft in 
 virtue of vain fears ; when they appre- 
 hend danger and fly from it, and fome- 
 times defend themfelves ; when they 
 quarrel among themfelves about love or 
 other matters, and terminate thofe quar- 
 rels by fighting ; when they follow thofe 
 leaders among themfelves that prefume 
 to go firfl ; and when they are either o- 
 bedient to the fliepherd and his dog, or 
 refraftory. And why fliould man be 
 deem'd free in the performance of the 
 fame or the hke aftions ? He has indeed 
 more knowledge than flieep. He takes 
 in more things, as matter of pleafure, 
 
 than 
 
HumiVi Liberty. 5 'f 
 
 than they do ; being fometlmes mov'd 
 with notions of honour and virtue, as 
 well as with thofe pleafures he has in 
 common with them. He is alfo more 
 mov'd by abfent things, and things fu- 
 ture, than they are. He is alfo fubjefl: 
 to more vain fears, more miftakes and 
 wrong aftions, and infinitely' more ab- 
 furdities in notions. He has alfo more 
 power and ftrength, as well as more art 
 and cunning, and is capable of doing 
 more good and more mifchief tohis fel- 
 low-men than they are to one another. But 
 thefe larger powers and larger weakneflT- 
 es which are of the fame kind with the 
 powers and weakneffes of flieep, cannot 
 contain liberty in them, and plainly make 
 no perceivable difference between them 
 2nd men,as to the general caufes of aftion, 
 in finite intelligent and fenfible beings; 
 no more than the different degrees of 
 thefe powers and weakneffes, among the 
 various kinds ofbeafts, birds, fifhes, and 
 reptiles do among them. Wherefore I 
 need not run thro' the aftions oi foxes or 
 any of the more fubtile animals, nor the 
 actions of children, which are allow'd by Brsmbair^ 
 the Advocates oi liberty to be allneceffa- ^l^l%l: 
 ry. I Ihall only ask thefe queftions 
 
 concerning 
 
52 ^n hiq^uiry concerni?tg 
 
 concerning the laft. To what age do 
 children continue neceflary agents, and 
 when do they become yr^^ ? what diiFe- 
 rent experience have they when they 
 are fuppos'd to be free agents, from what 
 they had while necelTary agents ? And 
 what different aflions do they do, from 
 whence it appears, that they are necef- 
 Jary agents to a certain age, and/r^^ a- 
 gents afterwards. 
 
 ad Argu 
 ment taken 
 
 from the im- II. A fecond reafon to prove man a 
 ofLiberty. neceflary agent is, becaufe all his ani- 
 ons have a beginning. For whatever has 
 a beginning muft have a caufe ; and e- 
 very caufe is a neceffary caufe. 
 
 If any thing can have a beginning 
 which has no caufe, then nothing can 
 produce fomething. And if nothing can 
 produce fomething, then the world 
 might have had a beginning without a 
 caufe : which is not only an abfurdity 
 commonly charg'd on Atheifts, but is a 
 real abfurdity in itfelf. 
 
 Befides, if a caufe be not a necef- 
 fary caufe, it is no caufe at all. For if 
 caufes are not necelfary caufes j then 
 caufes are not fuited to, or are indiffe- 
 rent to effefts y and the Epcurean Syjlem 
 
 of 
 
Human Liherly. 53 
 
 of chance is rendred poffible ; and this 
 orderly world might have been produc'd 
 by a diforderly or fortuitous concourfe 
 of atoms J or which is all one, by no 
 caufe at all. For in arguing againtl: the 
 Epicurean fyftem of chance, do we not 
 fay, (and that juftly) that it is impoffible 
 for chance ever to have produc'd an or- 
 derly fyftem of things, as not being a 
 caufe fuited to the effeft j and that an 
 orderly fyftem of things, which had a 
 beginning, muft have had an intelli- 
 gent Agent for its caufe, as being the 
 only proper caufe to that effeft ? All 
 which implies, that caufes are fuited or 
 have relation to fome particular effefts, 
 and not to others. And if they be fui- 
 ted to lome particular eifeft and not to o- 
 thers, they can be no caufes at all to 
 thofe others. And therefore a caufe not 
 fuited to the effeft, and no caufe 5 are 
 the fame thing. And if a caufe not fuit- 
 ed to the eifeft, is no caufe ; then a caufe 
 fuited to the effeft is a necefTary caufe : 
 for if it does not produce the efFeft, it is 
 not fuited to it, or is no caufe at all of it- 
 Liberty therefore, or a power to adt 
 or not to aft, to do this or another thing 
 under the fame caufes, is an impofjiblity 
 
 and atheifiicaL 
 
 H And 
 
54 -^^ Inquiry concerning 
 
 And as liberty ftands, and can only be 
 grounded on the abfurd principles of £- 
 picurean Ath6fm ; fo the Epicurean A- 
 theijls^ who were the moft popular and 
 moft numerous fedl of the Atheijls of an- 
 * Lucretius tiquity> were the great * afferters of £/- 
 
 /. 2, V. Z5'0, 
 
 &c. Euf. 
 Prep- Ev. /. 
 
 &c. Euf. jj^^fy . ^g Qj^ ^^ Other fide, the -f- Stoicks^ 
 
 ^' '- 7- who were the moft popular and moft 
 
 ,^.^^^^^^ numerous fefl: among the religionaries 
 
 Nat. Deor. of antiquity> were the great afferters of 
 
 fate and neceffity. The cafe was alfo 
 
 the fame among the Jews^ asamongthe 
 
 Heathen : the Jews, I fay, who befides 
 
 the light of nature had many books of 
 
 Revelation (fome whereof are now loft); 
 
 and who had intimate and perfonal con- 
 
 verfatlon with God himfelf. They were 
 
 principally divided into three fefts, the 
 
 Sadducees, the Pbarijees, and the EJfenes. 
 
 jofcphus 'pj^g Sadducees^v^ho were efteem'd an ir- 
 
 '• *• religious and atheiftical feft, maintain'd 
 
 the liberty of man. But the Phartjees, 
 
 who were a religious fed, afcriFd all 
 
 things to fate or to God's appointment y 
 
 M /.2. ^^^ ^^ ^^^ the fir ft article of their creed ^ 
 
 '' "' that fate and God do all ; and confequent- 
 
 ly they could not affert a true libet ty^ 
 
 when they aiferted ^libertf together with 
 
 this 
 
Human Liberty. ^^ 
 
 t\\\s fatality and necejjity of all things. 
 And the Effenesy who were the moji re- 
 ligiousfedf among the Jews^ and fell not 
 under the cenfure of our Saviour for 
 theJr hypocrify as the Pharifees did;, 
 were afferters o{ ahjolute jate and necejji- 
 ty. 5/". Paul, who was a P^^r//>^ ^^^ a^^x i. 
 thefonofaPhariJee^ is fuppos*d by the 
 learned Dodwell, to have received his Proieg.ad 
 
 /» 7 Stearn. de 
 
 doHrine of fate from the mafersef that ohkm.kas 
 fe6iy as they received it from the Stoicks. 
 And he obferves further, that the Stoick 
 Philofophy is necejfary for the explication 
 of Chrijiian Theology \ that there are ex* 
 amples in the holy fcriptures of the holy 
 Ghoji'^s fpeaking according to the opinions 
 of the Stoicks j and that in particular, the 
 Apojlle St. Paul in what he has dijputed 
 concerning Predejiination and Reprobati- 
 on, is to be expounded according to the Sto- 
 icks opinion concerning fate. So that liber- 
 ty is both the real foundation of popular 
 Atheifm, and has been the profefs^d 
 principle of the Atheifts themfelves j as 
 on the other fide, fate or the neceftty of 
 events, has been efteem'd a religious opi- 
 nion and been the profefs'd principle of 
 the religious, both among Heathens and 
 Jews, and alfo of that great Convert to 
 H 2 Chriftianity 
 
5 6 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 Chriftianity and great converter of o- 
 thers, St. Paul. 
 
 3dArgu. Ill- Thirdly, Liberty is contended 
 
 fTom^he^'m- ^^^ ^J ^^^ patrons thereof as a great /^r" 
 n£fr''/^^^'^^^- In o^d^^ therefore to difprove 
 all pretences for it, I will now £how^ 
 that according to all the various defcrip- 
 tions given of it by Theologers and 
 Philolophers, it would often be an im" 
 perfe5lion^ but never 2.'perfe5iion^ as I 
 have in the lafl: article fhow'd it co be im- 
 pojfihle and atheijUcaL 
 Tecierc ^* \i Ubefty be defin'd, a power to pafs 
 
 Bibi.choif. different judgments at the fame inftant of 
 f. 8 8, sp. time upon the fame individual propojittons 
 that are not evident (we being, as it is 
 own'd, neceffariiy determin''d to pafs but 
 one judgment on evident propofitions) icwill 
 follow, that men will be fo far irration- 
 al, and by confequence imperfccf agents, 
 as they have that freedom, of judgment. 
 For, fince they w^ould be irrational a- 
 gents, if they were capable of judging 
 evident propofitions not to be evident j 
 they muft be alfo deemed irrational a- 
 gents, if they are capable of judging the 
 felf-fame probable or improbable pro- 
 pofitions not to be probable or impro- 
 bable. 
 
Human Liherty. 57 
 
 bable. The appearances of all propo- 
 fitions to us, whether evident, probable, 
 or improbable, are the fole rational 
 grounds of our judgments in relation to 
 them : and the appearances of probable 
 or improbable propofitions, are no Icfs 
 neceffary in us from the refpeftive rea- 
 fons by which they appear probable or 
 improbable, than are the appearances 
 of evident propofitions from the reafons 
 by which they appear evident. Where- 
 fore if it be rational and a perfection to 
 be determin'd by an evident appearance, 
 it is no lefs fo to be determin'd by a pro- 
 bable or improbable appearance j and 
 confequently an imperfeftion not to be 
 fo determined. 
 
 It is not only an abfurdity, and by 
 confequence an imperfcBioriy not to be 
 equally and neceffarily determin'd in our 
 relpe£tive judgments, by probable and 
 improbable, as well as by evident ap- 
 pearances, which I have juft now prov- 
 ed ; but even not to be neceffarily deter- 
 min'd by probable appearances, would 
 be a greater imperfe^ioriy than not to be 
 neceffarily determin'd by evident ap- 
 pearances : becaufe almoft all our actions 
 are founded on the probable appear- 
 ances 
 
58 An Inquiry C07icermng 
 
 ances of things, and few on the evi- 
 dent appearance of things. And there- 
 fore, if we could judge, that what ap- 
 pears probable, is not probable but im- 
 probable or falfe ; we fliould be with- 
 out the beft rule of aftion and affent, we 
 can have. 
 
 a. Were liberty defin'd, a power to 
 (njerc$me our reafon by the force of choice, 
 as a celebrated Author may be fuppos'd 
 »Kingde to mean^ when he fays, * the will feems 
 «3i. to have JO great a power over the under- 
 
 Jianding being over-ruPd by the elediion of 
 the will, not only takes what is good to be 
 evil, but is alfo compelled to admit what 
 is falfe to be true ; man would, with the 
 exercife of fuch a power, be the moft 
 irrational and inconfiftent being, and by 
 confequence, the moft imperfe^ under- 
 ftanding being, which can be conceiv'd. 
 For what can be more irrational and in- 
 confiftent, than to be able to refufe our 
 affents to what is evidently true to us, 
 and to aifent to what we fee to be evi- 
 dently falfe, and thereby inwardly give 
 the lye to the underftanding ? 
 
 3. Were liberty defin'd, a power to will 
 
 ^•^•'^' evil (knowing it to be evil) as well as 
 
 good J that would be an Imperfeftion in 
 
 man 
 
 Cheyne s 
 Phil. Prin 
 
Human Liherty. 59 
 
 man confider'd as a fenfible being, if it 
 be an imperfe£lion in fuch a being to be 
 miferable. For willing evily is chufing 
 to be miferable, and bringing knowing- 
 ly deftrudion on ourfelves. Men are al- 
 ready fufRciently unhappy, by their fe- 
 veral voHtions ; founded on the wrong 
 ufe of their faculties, and on the miftak- 
 en appearances of things. But what 
 miferable beings would they be, if in- 
 ftead of chufing evil under the appear- 
 ance of good (which is the only cafe 
 wherein men now chufe evil) they were 
 indifferent to good and evil, and had the 
 power to chufe evil as evily and did ac- 
 tually chufe evil as evil in virtue of that 
 power ? They would in fuch a ftate or 
 with fuch a liberty be like Infants that 
 cannot walk, left to go alone, with li- 
 berty to fall : Or like Children, with 
 knives in their hands : Or laftly like 
 young rope-dancers, left to themfelves, 
 on their firft effays upon the rope, with- 
 out any one to catch them if they fall. 
 And this miferable ftate following from 
 the fuppofition of liberty, is io vifible to 
 fome of the greateft advocates thereof, choiL 
 
 Tom. 
 
 XJI. 
 
 that they acknowledge, that created be- p, ,5. 
 ings^ when in ajlate of happi?7efs cs^fe to workt'^' 
 
 have^''''^ 
 
6o An hifury concerning 
 
 have liberty (that is, ceafe to have liber- 
 ty to chufe evil) being inviolably attached 
 to their duty by the aBual enjoyment of 
 their felicity, 
 
 4. Were liberty defin'd, as it is by 
 fome, a power to will or chufe at the fame 
 time any one out of two or more indifferent 
 things ; that would be no perfeftion. For 
 thofe things call'd here indifferent or a- 
 like, may be confidered, either as really 
 different from each other, and that only 
 feem indifferent or alike to us thro' our 
 want of difcernmentj or as exaftly like 
 each other. Now the more liberty we 
 have in the firft kind, that is, the more 
 inftances there are of things which feem 
 alike to us and are not alike ; the more 
 miftakes and wrong choices we muft run 
 into. For if we had juft notions, we 
 fhould know thofe things were not indif- 
 ferent or ahke. This liberty therefore 
 would be founded on a direft imperfec- 
 tion of our faculties. And as tp a power 
 of chufng differently at the fame time a- 
 mong thi?igs^ really indifferent ; what 
 benefit, what perfeftion would fuch a 
 power of chufing be, when the things 
 that are the fole objefts of our free choice 
 are all alike ? 
 
 5. L^/^ty, 
 
Human Liberty, 6i 
 
 ^. Laftly, a celebrated Author feenns 
 to underftand by liberty, a faculty^ 
 which^ being indifferent to objeBs^ and 
 over-ruling our paffions^ appetites^ fenfa- 
 tionSj and reafin^ chiifes arbitarily among 
 objeBs ; and renders the ohjeB chofen ogree^ 
 able, only becauje it h.is chofen it. 
 
 My defign here is to conlider this de- 
 finition, with the fame view, that I have 
 confider'd the feveral foregoing definiti- 
 ons, viz. to fhow, that liberty, incon- 
 Jijient with neceffity, however defcrib'd 
 or defin'd, is an imperfeBion. Referring 
 therefore my reader for a confutation of 
 this nezv notion of liberty to the other 
 parts of my book, wherein I have al- 
 ready prov'd, that the exiftence of fuch 
 an arbitrary faculty is contrary to expe- 
 rience, andimpoffible; that our /?u^"'(?;;j, 
 appetites, fenfations, and reafon, deter- 
 mine us in our feveral choices , and that 
 we chufe objeds becaufe they pleafe us, 
 and not, as the author pretends, that 
 objects pleafe us, only becatfe we chufe 
 them : I proceed to fiiew the imperfec* 
 tion of this laft kind of liberty. 
 
 I. Firft, the pleafure or happinefs 
 accruing from the liberty here afferted 
 is lefs than accrues from the hypotbefis of 
 neceffity, I All 
 
J07, I08. 
 
 t ^. 107. 
 
 6z An Inquiry conceding 
 
 All thepleafure and happinefs faid to 
 attend this pretended liberty confifts ^ 
 wholly in -f- creating pleafure and happi- 
 nefs by chufing objects. 
 
 Now man, confider'd as an intelli- 
 gent neceffary agent, would no lefs create 
 this pleafure and happinefs tohimfelfby 
 chufing objeSls ; than a being indu'd with 
 the faid faculty : if it be true in fad:, that 
 things pkafe us, becaufe we chufe them. 
 
 But man, as an intelligent neceffary 
 agent, has thefe further pleafures and 
 advantages. He, by not being indiffer- 
 ent to objeSs, is mov'd by the goodnefs 
 and agreeablenefs of them, as they ap- 
 pear to him, and as he knows them by 
 refleftion and experience. It is not in 
 his power to be indifferent to what caufes 
 pleafure or pain. He cannot refift the 
 pleafure arifing from the ufe of his paili- 
 ons, appetites, fenfes, and reafon : and 
 if he fufpends his choice of an objeft, 
 that is prefented to him, by any of thefe 
 powers as agreeable \ it is, becaufe he 
 doubts or examines, whether upon the 
 whole the objefl: would make him hap- 
 py; and becaufe he would gratify all 
 thefe powers in the beft manner he is 
 able;, or at kaft fuch of thefe powers as 
 
 he 
 
Human Liberty. (^2> 
 
 he conceive tend moft to his happinefs. 
 If he makes a choice which proves difa- ^ 
 greeable, he gets thereby an experience, 
 which may qualify him to chufe the next 
 time with more fatisfaftion to himfelf. 
 And thus wrong choices may turn to his 
 advantage for the future. So that, at 
 all times and under all circumftances, 
 he is purfuing and enjoying the grcateft 
 happinefs, which his condition will al- 
 low. 
 
 It may not be improper to obferve, 
 that fome of the pleafures he receives 
 from objefts, are fo far from being the 
 efFe<fl of choice^ that they are not the 
 efFeiEt of the leaft premeditation or any 
 adl of his own, as in finding a treafure 
 on the road, or in receiving a legacy 
 from a perfon unknown to him. 
 
 2. Secondly, this arbitrary '^ faculty ^ r. xs,-, 
 would fubjeft a man to more wrong^'''^''' 
 choices, than if he was determin'd in his 
 choice. 
 
 A man, determin'd in his choice by 
 the appearing nature of things, and the 
 ufage of his intelleftual powers, never 
 makes a wrong choice, but by miltaking 
 the true relation of things to him. But 
 a being, indifferent to-f all cifjecrs, and j.,^' '^^^' 
 I 2 fv/ay'd 
 
'7, II? 
 »39, 141- 
 
 H7' 
 
 64 y^/t Ifiqidry concerning 
 
 fway'd by no motives in his choice of 
 objedls, chufes at a venture; and only 
 lorf'ii'r"^* "^'^^^^^ ^ x\^\t choice, when || it happens 
 (as the author juftly expreffes his notion) 
 that he chufes an objedl^ which he can 
 by his creating power render fo agree- 
 able^ as that it may be call'd a rightly 
 chofen ohjeB. Nor can this faculty be 
 improv'd by any experience : but muft 
 ever continue to chufe at a venture, or 
 '^s \t it happens. For if ihls/aculty^ im- 
 proves by experience^ and will have re- 
 gard to the agreeablenefs ordifagreeable- 
 nefs of objects in themfelves; it is no 
 longer the faculty contended for, but a 
 faculty mov'd and aifeded by the nature 
 of things. 
 
 So that man, with 'if acuity of choice 
 indifferent to all objects, muft make more 
 ivrong choices, than man confider'd as a 
 neceifary being ; in the fame proportion, 
 as arting as it happens^ is a worfe direc- 
 ricn to chufe right, than the ufe of our 
 ienfes, -experience, andreafon. 
 
 3. Thirdly, the exiftence of fuch an 
 arbitrary faculty, to chufe without re- 
 gard to the qualities of objefts, would 
 deftroy the ufe of our fenfes, appetites, 
 paflions, and reafon s which have been 
 
 given 
 
Human Liberty . 6 ^ 
 
 given us to direft us in our inquiries af- 
 ter truth, in our purfuit after hap pinefs, 
 and to preferve our beings. For, if we 
 had a faculty y which chofe without re- 
 gard to the notices and advertifements of 
 thefe powers, and by its choice over- 
 ruled them y we fhould then be indu'd 
 with a faculty to defeat the end and ufes 
 of thefe powers. 
 
 But the imperfeSion of liberty incon- ThePer- 
 fiftent with necellity, will yet more ap- ncceffny. 
 pear by confidering the great perfeHion 
 of being neceffarily dctermin'd. 
 
 Can any thing be perfefl:, that is not 
 neceflarily perfeft ?. For whatever is not 
 neceffarily perfeft may be imperfed:, 
 and is by confequence imperfeft. 
 
 Is it not a perfed:ion in God neceffarily 
 to know all truth ? 
 
 Is it not a perfeftion in him to be ne- 
 ceffarily happy ? 
 
 Is it not alfo a perfeftion in him to will 
 and do always what is beft ? For if all 
 things are indifferent to him, as fome of Kbgde 
 the advocates of liberty affert, and be- ""^'^^ 
 come good only by his willing them 5 he 
 cannot have any motive from his own 
 Ideas, or from the nature of things, to 
 unll one thing rather than another ; and 
 
 confequentlv 
 
 mali. 
 
concernrno' 
 
 o 
 
 6G An Inquiry 
 
 confequently he mult ivill without any 
 reafon or caufe : which cannot be con- 
 ceiv'd poflible of any being-, and is con- 
 trary to this felf-evident truth, that 
 whatever has a beginning mufi have a caufe. 
 But if things are not indifferent to him, 
 he muft be necelfarily determined by 
 what is beft. Befides, as he is a wife 
 being, he muft have fome end and de- 
 fign: and as he is a good being, things 
 cannot be indifferent to him, when the 
 happinefs of intelHgent and fenfible be- 
 ings, depend on the will he has, in the 
 formation of things. With what con- 
 fiftency therefore can thofe advocates of 
 liberty affert God to be a holy and good 
 fsgfxx--. heing, who maintain that all things are 
 indifferent to him before he wills any 
 thing ; and that he may will, and do all 
 things^ which they themfelves efteem 
 ivicked and unjuft ? 
 
 I cannot give a better confirmation of 
 this argument from the confideration of 
 the Attributes of God, than by the 
 judgment of the late Bifhop of Sarum ; 
 ^ v/hich has the more weight, as proceed- 
 ing from a great aiTerter of liberty, v/ho 
 by the force of truth is driven to fay what 
 he does. He grants, that infinite per- 
 
 fe^ion 
 
Human Liberty. 67 
 
 feBion excludes fuccejjive thoughts in God; 
 and therefore that the EJence of God is one ^.f^ff;. 
 perfeB thought, in which he' views and 
 wills all things. And though his tranfient 
 aBs fuch as creation, providence and mi- 
 racles, are done in afuccejjion of time-, yet 
 his immanent aBs, his knowledge and de- .. 
 crees, are one with his e fence. And as 
 he grants this to be a true notion of God 
 fo he allows that a vaft diffictdty arifes 
 from it againft the Hberty of God. For, 
 fays he, the imnment aBs of God being 
 fuppos'^d free, it is not eafy to imagine how 
 they foould be one with the divine efence ; 
 to which, neceffary exiftence does mo ft cer- 
 tainly belong. And if the immanent aBs 
 of God are neceffary, then the tranfent 
 mufi be fo like wife, as being the certain 
 effeBs of his immanent aBs : and a chain 
 of neceffary fate mufi run through the whole 
 order of things : and God himfelf then is 
 no free being, but acts by a neccffity of na- 
 ture. And this neceflity, to which Go d 
 is thus fubjea, is^ adds he, no abjurdity 
 to fome. God is^ according to them, ne- 
 ceffarily jufl, true, and good, by an in^ 
 trinfck neceffity that arifes from his own 
 infinite perfeBion. And from hence they 
 have thought^ that fince God aBs by . in- 
 finite 
 
68 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 Jifiite wifdom a?id goodnefsy things could 
 not have been otherwije than they are- for 
 what is infinitely wife or good cannot be 
 alter'^d, or made either better or li^orfe. 
 And he concludes, that he muft leave this 
 difficulty without pretending to explain it^ 
 or anfwer the obje^ions that arife againfi 
 all the fever al ways by which Divines have 
 endeavour d to refolve it. 
 » , ,M Again, are not Angels and other hea - 
 Works, p, venly beings efteem'd more perfeft than 
 men ; becaufe, having a clear infight 
 into the nature of things, they are ne- 
 celfarily determined to judge right in re- 
 lation to truth and falfhoo d, and to chufe 
 right in relation to good and evil, plea- 
 fure and pain ; and alfo to aft right in 
 purfuance of their judgment and choice ? 
 And therefore would not man be more 
 perfeft than he is, if, by having a clear 
 infight into the nature of things, he was 
 neceffarily determin'd to affent to truth 
 only, to chufe only fuch objefts as would 
 make him happy, and to a£t according* 
 ly ? 
 
 Further, is not man more perfeft^ the 
 jnore capable he is of conviftion ? And 
 will he not be more capable of convifti- 
 on> if he be neceifarily determin'd in his 
 
 affent 
 
Human Liberty. 6g 
 
 aflent by what feems a reafon to him, 
 and neceirarily determined in his feveral 
 volitions by what feems good to him ; 
 than if he was indifferent to propoficions 
 notwithftanding any reafon for them, or 
 was indifferent to any objefts notwith- 
 ftanding they feem'd good to him? For 
 otherwife, he could be convinced upon 
 ho principles, and would be the moft 
 tindifciplinable and untradable of all 
 Animals. All advice and all reafonings 
 would be of no ufe to hirn. You might 
 offer arguments to him, and lay before 
 him pleafure tind pain ; and he might 
 ftand unmov'd Lke a rock. He might 
 reje£l what appears true to him, affent 
 to what feems abfurd to him, avoid what 
 he fees to be good, and chufe what he 
 fees to be evil. Indilference therefore 
 to receive truth, that is, liberty to deny 
 it when we fee it ; and Indilference to 
 pleafure and pain, that is, liberty to re- 
 fufe the firft and chufe the laft, are direft 
 obftacles to knowledge and happinefs. 
 On the contrary, to be neceffarily de- 
 termined by what feems reafonable, and 
 by what feems good, has a dire£l tenden- 
 cy to promote truth and happinefs, and 
 K is 
 
An Inquiry conceniinfr 
 
 is the proper perfeftion of an underftand- 
 ing and fenfible being. And indeed it 
 feems ftrange that men fhould allow 
 that God and Angels aft more perfe^!:!}" 
 becaufe they are determined by reafon ; 
 and alfo allow, that clocks, watches, 
 mills, and other artificial uninteUigent 
 beings are the better, the more they are 
 determined to go right by weight and 
 meafure : and yet that they fhould deem 
 it a perfeftion in man not to be deter- 
 mined by his reafon, but to have liberty 
 to go againft it. Would it not be as 
 reafonable to fay, it would be a perfefti- 
 on in a clock not to be neceffarily deter- 
 min'd to go right, but to have its motions 
 depend upon chance ? 
 
 Again, tho' man does thro' vveaknefs 
 and imperfeftion fall into feveral miftakes 
 both in judging and willing in relation 
 to what is true and goodj yet he is ftill 
 lefs ignorant and lefs unhappy by being 
 nccefTarily determined in judging by 
 what feems reafonable, and in willing 
 by what feems beft, than if he was capa* 
 ble of judging contrary to his reafon and 
 willing againft his fenfes. For, were 
 It not fo, what feems falfe^ would be as 
 
 juft 
 
Human Lil'crty. 71 
 
 juft a rule of truth ; and what feems evil^ 
 as juft a rule of goody as what feems good. 
 Which are abfardities too great for any 
 to affirm ; efpecially if we confider, that 
 there is a perfeftly wife and good Being, 
 who has given men fenfes and reafon to 
 condafl: them. 
 
 Laftly, it is a perfeftion to be necefla- 
 rily determined in our choices, even in 
 the moft indifferent things: becaufe, if 
 in fach cafes there was not a caufe of 
 choice, but a choice could be made 
 without a caufe 3 then all choices might 
 be made without a caufe, and we (hould 
 not be neceffarily determined by the 
 greateft evidence to a (lent to truth, nor 
 by the ftrongeft inchnation for happinefs 
 to chufe pleafure and avoid pain ; to all 
 which it is a perfedion to be neceffarily 
 determin'd. For if an aftion whatfoever 
 can be done without a caufe ; then ef- 
 fects and caufcs have no neceffary rela- 
 tion, and by confequence we fhould not 
 be neceffarily determin'd in any cafe at 
 all. 
 
 IV. A fourth argument to prove man Fourth argu- 
 a neceffary agent, fhall be taken from fvomthe 
 the confideration of the divine prefcience. o 
 ■ K z The '" 
 
 conli-lcr^TTn 
 
72 A?i Inquiry concemincf 
 
 The divine Prefcience fuppofes, that all 
 things future will certainly exift in fuch 
 time^ fuch order^ and with fuch circum- 
 ftances \ and not otherwife. For if any 
 things future were contigent, or uncer- 
 tain, or depended on the liberty of man, 
 that is, might or might not happen j 
 their certain exiftence could not be the 
 objc£t of the divine prefcience : it being 
 a contradiftion to know that to be cer- 
 tain, which is not certain : and God him- 
 felf could only guefs at the exigence of 
 fuch things. And if the divine prefci- 
 ence fuppofes the certain exiftence of all 
 things future, it fuppofes alfo the necef- 
 fary exiftence of all things future ; be- 
 caufe God can fore-know their certain 
 exiftence only, cither as that exiftence 
 is the cfFeft of his decree, or as it de- 
 pends on its own caufes. If he fore- 
 knows that exiftence, as it is the effeft 
 of his decree ; his decree makes that ex- 
 iftence neceffary : for it implies a con- 
 tradiftion for an all-powerful being to 
 decree any thing which fhall not necef- 
 larily come to pals;. If he foreknows 
 that exiftence, as it depends on its own 
 caufcs 5 that exiftence is no lefs necefla- 
 
 ry: 
 
Human Liberty. 73 
 
 ry: for it no lefs implies a contradiftion, 
 that caufes fhould not produce their ef- 
 fefts (caufes and eiFefts having a necef- 
 fary relation to and dependance on each 
 other) than that an event fhould not come 
 to pafs, which is cjecreed by God. 
 
 Cicero has fome paflages to the pur- ^^ p. 
 pofe of this argqmept. Says he, i^/vin.c.*. 
 -potefl provideri quidquam futurum ejfe 
 quod neque caufam habet ullarn, neqiie no^ 
 tarn, cur futuramfit ?• — ^id eji igitur, 
 quod cafu fieri aut forte fortunay pute- 
 
 mus? Nihil e/l enirn tarn contrarium 
 
 rationi & conjiantice quam fortuna ; ut 
 mi hi ne in Deum cade re videatur^ utjciaf, 
 quid cafu ^fortuito futurum fit. Si enim 
 fity certe illud eveniet. Sin certe eveni- 
 cty nulla eft fortuna. Eft aut em fortuna. 
 Rerum igiiur fort uit arum nulla eJi prefen^ 
 tio, Alfo that illuftrious Reformer Lu- 
 ther fays, in his treatife againfi free- ^^ 
 will :C one ejfaa Dei prcefcientia & 0?nnipo- 
 tentia, fequitur naturaliter irrefragahili 
 CGnfequentia, nos per nos ipfos non efie fac- 
 tor, nee viverey nee agere quicquaniy fed 
 per illius omnipote?7tiam. Cum autem tales 
 nos ilk ante prcefcierit futuroSy talefque 
 
 nunc faciafy moveat, ^ gubernet ; quid 
 
 potefi 
 
74 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 potefi jingi quafo, quod in nobis liberum 
 Jit, aliter i^ aliter fieri y quam ille prcefci- 
 erit, aut nunc agat? Pugnat itaque ex 
 diametro prcefcientia & o?n?iipotentia Dei 
 cum noflro libera arhitrio. Aut enim Dcus 
 falletiir prcefciendo, errabit & agendo 
 (quod cfl impo/Jibile) aut nosagemus ^ age* 
 mur fiecundum ipfius prcefcientiam & a^io- 
 Vol. III.* nem. And our learned Dr. South fays, 
 t&e fibre-knowledge of an event does cer- 
 tainly and necejfarily infier, that there mujt 
 be finch an event ; for as much as the cer- 
 tainty ofi knowledge depends upon the cer- 
 tainty of the thing known, ^nd in this 
 f^nfie it is, that God's decree and promife 
 give a neceffary exiftence to the thing de^ 
 creed or promifedy that is tofiay, they in^ 
 fer it by infallible confequence ; fo that it 
 was as impofjibJe for Chrifl not to rife from 
 the dead, as it was for God abfiolutely to 
 decree and promife a thing, and yet the 
 thing not come to pafs. 
 inJng^othcrs I couM alfo bring in the greateft Di- 
 p!;sf A:t"* vines and '* Philofophers who are affer- 
 LmtT,^27. t^^'s of liberty, as confirming this argu- 
 ^''°^'t! ment -, for * they acknov/ledge, that 
 
 •icrmons. 
 
 Shilling, they are unable to reconcile the divi7ie 
 chrift'sfa- freficic7Kc and the liberty of man toge- 
 
Human Liberty. 75 
 
 ther : which is all I intended to prove by 
 this argument, taken from the confide- 
 ration of the divine Prefcience* . ^.,, 
 
 •J Fifth argu- 
 
 ment taken 
 from the na- 
 
 V. A fifth argument to prove man a tureofre- 
 
 ^ ■*■ wards and 
 
 necelfary agent, is as follows : If man p«niiiiments. 
 was not a necelfary agent, determin'd by 
 pleafure and pain, there would be no 
 foundation for rewards and punifliments, 
 which are the -f ejjential fupports of fo- 
 ciety. 
 
 For if men were not neceffarily deter- 
 min'd by pleafure and pain, or if plea- 
 fure and pain were no caufes to deter- 
 mine mens wills ; of what ufe would be 
 the profpeft of rewards to frame a man's 
 will to the obfervation of the law, or 
 punifliments to hinder his tranfgreffion 
 thereof? Were pain, as fuch, eligible, 
 and pleafure, as fuch, avoidable ^ re- 
 wards and punifliments could be no mo- 
 tives to a man, to make him do or for- 
 bear any aftion. But if pleafure and 
 pain have a necefl^ary effeft on men, and 
 if it be impoflible for men not to chufe 
 whatfeems good to them, and not to a- 
 
 j- Solon rempublicam continerl dicebat duabus reJvis, prarniic & 
 pcena, Cicero Epifl. z j. ad Brutum, 
 
 void 
 
7 6' An Inquiry concerning 
 
 void what feems evil; the neceffity 
 of rewards and punifliments is then evi- 
 dent, and rewards will be of ufe to all 
 thofe who conceive thofe rewards to be 
 pleafure, and punifliments will be of 
 ufe to all thofe who conceive them to be 
 pain ! and rewards and punifliments will 
 frame thofe mens wills to obferve, and 
 not tranfgrefs the lawo. 
 
 Befides, fince there are fo many rob- 
 bers, murderers, whoremafl:ers, and o- 
 ther criminals, who notwithfl:anding the 
 punifliments threatn'd, and rewards pro- 
 mis'd, by laws; prefer breaking the laws 
 as the greater good or lefl^er evil, and 
 rejeft conformity to them as the greater 
 evil or lefltr good : how many more 
 would there be, and with what diforders 
 would not all focicties be fill'd, if re- 
 wards arid punifliments, confider'd as 
 pleafure and pain, did not determine 
 fome mens wills, but that, inft:ead there- 
 of, all men could prefer or will punifli- 
 ment confider'd as pain, and rejeft re- 
 wards corifider'd as pleafure? men would 
 then be under no reflrraints. 
 
 VI. My 
 
Human Liberty. 77 
 
 Vl. My fixth and laft aro;ument to ^'^^^^'.s"- 
 
 J to ment taken 
 
 prove man a neceflary agent is : if man ^H"^^^^^^^^ 
 Was not a neceflary agent determined by "^'^y» 
 pleafure and pain, he would have no 
 t\ot\on oi morality, or motive to pradife 
 it : the diftindion between morahty ^nd 
 immorahty, virtue and vice would be 
 loft 5 and man would not be a moral a- 
 gent. 
 
 Morality or Virtue, confifts in fuch Locke's 
 actions as are in their own nature, and und. j. n. 
 upon the whole, pJeafant\ and immora- je.nL'sSoiid. 
 hty or vice^, coniiits in luch actions as cd,/.zis. 
 are in their own nature, and upon the 
 whole painful. Wherefore a man mufl: 
 be affe£led with pleafure and pain, in 
 order to know what morality is, and to 
 diflinguifh it from immorality. He mufl: 
 alfo be aftedted with pleafure and pain, 
 to have a reafon to practife morality 3 for 
 there can be no motives, but pleafure 
 and pain, to make a Man do or forbear 
 any aftion. And a man mufl: be the 
 more moral, the more he underftands or 
 is duly fenfible, what aftions give plea- 
 fure and what pain > and mufl: be perfeft- 
 1/ moral, if neceflarily determin'd by 
 L pleafure 
 
78 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 pleafure and pain, rightly underftood 
 and apprehended. But if man be indif- 
 ferent to pleafure and pain, or is not du- 
 ly affefted with them j he cannot know 
 what morality is, nor diftingaifh it from 
 immorality, nor have any motive to 
 pradtife morality, and abftain from im- 
 morality ; arid will be equally indiffer- 
 ent to morality and immorality, or vir- 
 tue and vice. Man in his prefent condi- 
 tion is fufficiently immoral by miftaking 
 pain for pleafure, and thereby judging, 
 willing, and praftifing amifs : but if he 
 was indifferent to pleafure and pain, he 
 would have no rule to go by, and might 
 never judge, will, and praftife right. 
 Tho' I conceive I have fo propofed 
 
 Obieftions t - 1 n 
 
 anfwer'd. j^y arguments, as to nave obviated molt 
 of the plaufible objeftions ufually urg'd 
 againft thedoftrine of neceffity j yet it 
 may not be improper to give a particu- 
 lar folution to the principal of them. 
 I, Firft then it is objefted, that * ;/ 
 
 Fiift objec- , , 
 
 tion. men are nee e [Jar y agents and do commit 
 
 Geiiii no- neceflarih all breaches of the law, it would 
 
 ftes Att. i. ^ . / . /T r / 7 • 7 ^ 
 
 «c.2. ife unjuft to pump them jor doing what 
 they cannot avoid doing* 
 
 To 
 
Anfwer. 
 
 Human Liherty, 79 
 
 To which I anfwer, that the fole end 
 of punifhment in fociety is to prevent, as 
 far as may be, the commifRon of certain 
 crimes : and that punifhments have their 
 defigned eifeft two ways; firft, by re- 
 ftraining or cutting off from fociety the 
 vicious members ; and fecondly, by cor- 
 recting men or terrifying them from the 
 commiilion of thofe crimes. Now let 
 punifhments be inflifted with either of 
 thefe views, it will be manifeft, that no 
 regard is had to any free-agency in man, 
 in order to render thofe punifhmens juft ; 
 but that on the contrary punifhments 
 may he juj}ly inflifted on man tho' a ne- 
 ceffary agent. For, firft, if murderers 
 for example, or any fuch vicious mem- 
 bers are cut off from fociety, merely as 
 they are pubhck nufances, and unfit to 
 live among men ; it is plain, they are 
 in that cafe fo far from being confider'd 
 ^^ free- agent Sy that they are cut off from 
 fociety as a canker'd branch is from a 
 tree, or as a mad dog is kill'd in the 
 ftreets. And the punifhment of fuch 
 men is ;///?, as it takes mifchievous mem- 
 bers out of fociety. Alfo for the fime 
 reafon, furious madmeriy whom all allow 
 L 2 to 
 
8o An Inquiry concerning 
 
 to be neceffary agents, are in many 
 places of the world, either the objefls of 
 judicial punifhments, or are allow'd to 
 be difpatch'd by private men. Nay, 
 even men infe6led with the plague y who 
 are not voluntary agents and are guilty 
 of no crime, are fometimes thought to 
 be juftly cut off from fociety, to prevent 
 contagion from them. Secondly, let 
 punifhments be inflifted on fome crimi- 
 nals with a view to terrify^ it will appear 
 that in inflifting punifhments with that 
 view, no regard is had to ^inj free-agen- 
 cy in man^ in order to make thofe punilh- 
 ments jujt. To render the punilhment 
 of fuch men ju/}y it is fufficient that they 
 were voluntary agents, or had the will 
 to do the crime for which they fuffer for 
 the law very juftly and rightly regard- 
 eth only the will, and no other preced- 
 ing caufes of aftion. For example, fup- 
 pole the law on pain of death forbids 
 theft, and there be a man who by the 
 ilrength of temptation is neceffitated to 
 ileal, and is thereupon put to death for 
 it y doth not his punilhment deter others 
 irom theft ? Is it not a caufe, that others 
 ileal not ? Doth it not frame their wills 
 
 to 
 
Human Liberty. 8 i 
 
 tojuftice? Whereas, a criminal who is 
 an involuntary agent, (as forinftance, a 
 man who has kill'd another in a chance 
 medly or while in a fever, or the like) 
 .cannot ferve for an example to deter 
 any others from doing the fame-, he be- 
 ing no more an intelligent agent in doing 
 the crime, than an houfe is, which kills 
 a man by its fall : and by confequence 
 the punifhment of fuch an involuntary 
 agent would be unjuft. When there- 
 fore a man does a crime voluntarily, and 
 his puniihment will ferve to deter others 
 from doing the fame, he is jiijlly punijh- 
 ed for doing what (thro' ftrength of 
 temptation, ill habits, or other caufes) 
 he could not avoid doing. 
 
 It may not be improper to add this 
 farther confideration from the law of 
 our country. There is one cafe, where- 
 in our law is fo far from requiring, that 
 the perfons punifh'd fhould he free- agents, 
 that it does not confider them as volunta- 
 ry agents, or even as guilty of the crime 
 for which they fuiFer: fo little \s free- 
 agency reijuifite to make punifhmencs juft. 
 The children of rebel-parents fuffer in 
 their fortunes for the guile of their pa- 
 rents i 
 
fijrer. 
 
 Sz An Inquiry C07icer?iing 
 
 rents ; and their punifhment is deem'd 
 juft, becaufe it is fuppos'd to be a means 
 to prevent rebellion in parents* 
 
 i^^^""^' ^^' Secondly, it is objeded, that it is 
 yfelefs to threaten punijhment or infli[l It 
 on men to prevent crimes^ when they are 
 necejfarily determined in all their actions. 
 Firfian- I- To which I anfwer, firft, that 
 threatning of punijhment s is a caufe which 
 neceflarily determines fome mens wills 
 to a conformity to law and againft com- 
 mitting the crimes to which punifhments 
 are annex'd > and therefore is ufeful to 
 all thofe whofe wills muft be determin'd 
 by it. It is as ufeful to fuch men, as 
 the fun is to the ripening the fruits of 
 the earth, or as any other caufes are to 
 produce their proper effefts ^ and a man 
 may as well fay the fun is ufelefs, if the 
 ripening the fruits of the earth be necef- 
 fary, as fay, there is no need of threat- 
 ning punifhment for the ufe of thofe to 
 whom threatning punifhment is a necef- 
 fary caufe of forbearing to do a crime. It 
 is alfo of ufe to fociety to i?2Jii£i. punifh- 
 ments on men for doing what they cannot 
 avoid doing, to the end that neceffary 
 
 caufes 
 
Hurdan Liberty. 83 
 
 caufes may exift, to form the wills of 
 thofe who in virtue of them neceflarily 
 obferve the laws j and alfo of ufe to cut 
 them ofFas noxious members of fociety. 
 
 2. But fecondly^ fo far is threatning secon^i 
 and inflicting punilhments from being ^'^ '''''* 
 ufelefs, if men are neceifary agents, that 
 
 it would be ufelefs to correal and deter 
 (which are the principal effefts defign'd 
 to be obtained by threatning and inflift- 
 ing punifhments) unlefs men were ne- 
 ' ceffary agents, and were determined by 
 pleafure and pain; becaufe, if men 
 were free or indifferent to pleafure and 
 pain, pain could be no motive to caufe 
 men to obferve the law. 
 
 3. Thirdly, men have every day ex- Thk^; 
 amples before them of the ufefulnefs of "^'^^ 
 punifliments upon fome inteUigent or 
 fenlible beings, which they all contend 
 
 are neceffary agents. They punifh dogs, 
 horfes, and other animals every day 
 with great fuccefs, and make them leave 
 oiF their vicious habits, and form them 
 thereby according to their wills. Thefe 
 are plain fafts, and matters of conftant 
 experience, and even confirm'd by the 
 evafions of the advocates of liberty, who 
 
 call 
 
84 An Inquiry coficerning 
 
 worlt'/! call the rewards and punijhments us'd to 
 ^^^' brute beafts analogical j and fay, that 
 
 heating them and giving them viBuaJs^ 
 have only the JJjadoiv of rewards and , 
 punijhments. Nor are capital punifh- 
 ments without their ufe among beafts and 
 Quod bru- birds. RoRARius tells us, that they 
 
 ta anim. &c. - n i • \ r • ; • 7 
 
 1.2. />. 109. crucify lyons m Airica to drive away other 
 lyons from their cities and towns \ and that 
 travelling thro the country of Juliers, he 
 obferv'^dy they hanged up wolves to fecure 
 their flocks. And in like manner with 
 us, men hang up crows and rooks to keep 
 birds from their corn, as they hang up 
 murderers in chains to deter other mur- 
 derers. But I need not go to brutes for 
 examples of the ufefulnefs of punilhments 
 on neceflary agents. Punilhments are 
 not without effed: onfome idiots and mad- 
 men, by reftraining them to a certain 
 degree ; and they are the very means 
 by which the minds of children, are 
 form'd by their parents. Nay^ punilh- 
 ments have plainly a better eiFefl: on chil- 
 dren, than on grown perfons ; and more 
 cafily form them to virtue and difcipline, 
 than they change the vicious habits of 
 grown perfons, or plant new habits in 
 
 them. 
 
Human Liberty. 85 
 
 them. Wherefore the Objeftors ought 
 to think punifhments may be threatned 
 and inflifted on men ufefuily, tho' they 
 are neceffary agents. 
 
 3. Thirdly, it Is objefted, if men are objca,on, 
 neceffary agent 5 y it is of no ufe to reprefent 
 reafom to them, or to entreat theniy or to 
 admonijh theniy or to blame them, or to 
 praife them. 
 
 To which I anfwer, that all thefe, ac- Anfwcr, 
 cording to me, are neceffary caufes to 
 determine certain mens wills to do what 
 we defire of them \ and are therefore 
 ufeful, as acting on fuch neceffary agents 
 to whom they are neceffary caufes of 
 aftion ; but would be of no ufe, if men 
 had free-will, or their wills were not 
 mov'd by them. So that they who make 
 this objeftion muft run into the abfur- 
 dities of faying, that that caufe is ifeful, 
 which is no caufe of a^ion, andferves not 
 to change the will ; and that that caufe is 
 ufelefs, which necefitates the effect. 
 
 Let me add fomething further in re- 
 
 fpefl: of praife. Men have at all times 
 
 been prais'd for aftions judged by all 
 
 the world to be neceffary. It has been 
 
 M a 
 
S6 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 a {landing method of commendation ^ 
 
 mong the Epick Poets, who are the 
 
 greateft Panegyrilb of glorious adtions, 
 
 to attribute their Hero's valour and his 
 
 great aftions, to fome Deity prefent 
 
 with him and affifting him. Homer 
 
 gives many of his Hero's a God or a God- 
 
 defs to attend them in battle, or to be 
 
 ready to help them in diftrefs. Virgil 
 
 defcribes JEneas as always under the 
 
 divine direftion and affiftance. And 
 
 Tasso gives the Chriftians in their holy 
 
 war divine affiftance. 
 
 Orators alfo and Hiftorians, think ne- 
 ceffary actions the proper fubjefts of 
 oiatiopro praife. Cicero, when he maintain'd, 
 that the Gods mfpir'd Milo with the 
 defign and courage to kill Clodius, did 
 not intend to leffen the fatisfaftion or 
 glory of Milo, but on the contrary to 
 augment it. But can there be a finer 
 commendation than that given by Vel- 
 LEius Paterculus toCATo, that he 
 "doas good by nature^ becaufe he could not 
 be otherwife? For, that alone is true 
 o-oodnefs which flov/s from difpofition, 
 whether that difpofition be natural or 
 acquired. Such goodnefs may be de- 
 pended 
 
Huma?i Liherty. 87 
 
 pended on; and will feldom or ever faiL 
 Whereas goodnefs founded on any rea- 
 fonings whatfoever^ is a very prec^^rious 
 thing ; as may be feen by the lives of 
 the greateft Declaimersagainft vice, who 
 tho' they are conftantly acquainting ' 
 themfelves with all the topicks that can 
 be drawn from the excellency of good- 
 nefs or virtue, and the mifchiefs of vice; 
 the rewards that attend the one, and 
 the punifliments that attend the other : 
 yet are not better, than thofe, who are 
 never con verfant in fuch topicks. Laft- 
 ly, the common proverb, gaudeant ben€ 
 natiy is a general commendation of men 
 for what plainly in no fenfe depends on 
 them. 
 
 4. Fourthly, it is objefted, that if all Fourth 
 events are nece[jary^ then there is a period 
 fixd to every man s life : and if there is 
 a period fix'd to every man's life, then it 
 cannot bejloortned by want of care or vio- 
 lence offer dy or difeafes j nor can it be pro- 
 long' dby cjre er phyfick : and if it cannot 
 be JJjortned or prolonged by them, then 
 it is iifelefs to avoid or ufe any of tkefe 
 things, 
 
 M 2 In 
 
88 An Inqiiiry concernhig 
 
 "^"^ In anfwer to which, I grant, that if 
 
 the period of human life be fix'd (as I 
 contend it is) it cannot but happen at 
 the time fix'd, and nothing can fall out 
 to prolong or fhorten that period. Nei- 
 ther fuch want of care, nor fuch violence 
 ofFer'd, nor fuch difeafes can happen as 
 can caufe the period of human life to fall 
 ihort of that time j nor fuch care, nor 
 phyfick be us'd, as to prolong it beyond 
 that time. But tho' thefe cannot fo fall 
 out, as to fliorten or prolong the period 
 of human life \ yet being neceflary caufes 
 in the chain of caufes to bring human life 
 to the period fix'd, or to caufe it not to 
 exceed that time, they muft as neceffa- 
 rily precede that effeft, as other caufes 
 do their proper effefts ; and copfequent- 
 ly when us'd or neglefted, ferve all the 
 ends and purpofes, that can be hop'd for 
 or fear'd from the ufe of any means, or 
 the negleft of any means whatfoever : 
 For example, let it be fix'd and necefla- 
 ry for the river Nile annually to over- 
 flow ; the means to caufe it to overflow, 
 muft no lefs neceflarily precede. And as 
 it would be abfurd to argue, that if the 
 overjiowing of the Nile was annually fix'^d 
 
 and 
 
Anfwcr. 
 
 Human Liberty, 89 
 
 (ind necejfary, it would overfow, thd* the 
 necejfary means to make it overfiow did not 
 precede ; fo it is no lefs abfurd to argue 
 from the fix'd period of human life, a- 
 gainft the neceffary means to bring it to 
 its fix'd period, or to caufe it not to ex- 
 ceed that period. 
 
 5. Fifthly, it is ask'd, how a man can Fifth 
 ^^ again/} his confcience, and how a man's ^^J'^""' 
 cojifcience can accufe him^ if he knows he 
 a^s necejfarilyy and alfo does what he 
 thnks beji when he commits any fin ? I re- 
 ply, that confcience being a man's owri 
 opinion of his aftions with relation to 
 fome rule, he may at the time of doing 
 an aftion contrary to that rule, know- 
 that he breaks that rule 5 and confequent- 
 ly adt with reluctance, tho' not fufficient 
 to hinder the aftion. But after the ac- 
 tion is over, he may not only judge his 
 action to be contrary to that rule j but 
 by the abfence of the pleafure of the fin, 
 and by finding himfelf obnoxious tp 
 fhame, or by believing himfelf liable to 
 punifliment, he may rea/Iy accufe himfelf j 
 that is, he may condemn himfelf for 
 having done it, be forry he has done it, 
 
 and 
 
90 An hiquiry concerning 
 
 and wifh it undone, becaufe of the con- 
 fequences that attend it. 
 
 Sixth 6. Sixthly, it is objected, that if all 
 
 Ohjeaion, ^ n ' ' mi 
 
 events are necejjaryy it was as tmpoj/wle 
 (for example)yir Julius C^sar not to 
 have died in the Senate, as it is imfojjible 
 
 for two and two to make fx. But who 
 mil fay the former was as impoffible as the 
 latter is, when we can conceive it pojjible 
 
 for JvLivs C^sAR to have died any where 
 €lfe as well as in the Senate, and impojji- 
 hie to conceive two afid two ever to make 
 
 Anfwer. To which I anfwer, that I do allow, 
 
 that if all events are necejfary, it was as 
 impojjible for Julius Ctesar not to have 
 died in the Senate, as it is impojjible for 
 two and two to make fx : and will add, 
 that it is no more poffible to conceive 
 the death of Julius Caesar to have hap- 
 pened any where elfe but in the Senate, 
 than that two and two fhould make fix. 
 For whoever does conceive his death 
 poffible any where elfe, fuppofes other 
 circumftances preceding his death than 
 did precede his death. Whereas Iqz 
 them fuppofe all the fame circumftances 
 
 to 
 
Human Liberty. 9 1 
 
 to come to pafs that did precede his 
 death ; and then it will be impoffible to 
 conceive (if they think juftly) his death 
 could have come to pafs any where elfe, 
 as they conceive it impoffible for two 
 and two to make fix. I obferve alfo, 
 that to fuppofe other circumftances of 
 any a£lion poffible, than thofe that do 
 precede it, is to fuppofe a contradiftion 
 or impoffibility : for, as all actions have 
 their particular circumftances, fo every 
 circumftance preceding an aftion, is a$ 
 impoffible not to have come to pafs, by 
 virtue of the caufes preceding that cir- 
 cumftance, as that two and two fliould 
 make fix. 
 
 Having, as I hope, prov'd the truth TheOpini- 
 of what I have advanced, and anfwer'd jeTrneJ^'on- 
 the moft material objeftions that can be bmy"^^" 
 urg'd againft me •, it will, perhaps, not 
 be improper to give fome account of the 
 ientiments of the learned in relation to 
 my fubjeft, and confirm by authority 
 what I have faid, for the fake of thofe 
 with whom authority has w^eighc in mat- 
 ters of fpeculation. 
 
 The 
 
gi An Inquiry concerning 
 
 The queftions of liberty ^ necejjity^ and 
 chance y have been fubjefts of difpute a- 
 mong Philofophers at all times; and 
 moft of thofe Philofophers have clearly 
 aflerted necejjityy and deny'd liberty and 
 chance. 
 
 The queftions of liberty and necejjity^ 
 have alfo been debated among Divined 
 in the feveral ages of the Chriftian 
 Church, under the terms oi free-will and 
 predejiination ' and the Divines who have 
 deny'd free-will and afferted predejiina- 
 tion , have inforc'd the arguments of the 
 Philofopher, by the confideration of 
 fome doftrines pecuhar to the Chriftian 
 Religion. And as to chance, hazard, 
 ox fortune, I think. Divines unanimouf- 
 ly agree, that thofe words have no mean- 
 ing. 
 
 Some Chriftian communions have even 
 proceeded fo far in relation to thefe 
 matters, as to condemn in Councils and 
 Synods the doftrine oi free-will as here- 
 tical i and the denial thereof is become 
 a part of the ConfeJJions of Faith, and 
 Articles of Religion of feveral Churches. 
 
 From this ftate of the fad:, it is mani- 
 feft, that whoever embraces the opinion 
 
 I 
 
Human Liberty. 03 
 
 1 have maintain'd, cannot want the au^ 
 thority of as many learned and pious 
 men, as in embracing the contrary. 
 
 But confidering how little men are 
 mov'd by the authority of thofe who 
 profelfedly maintain opinions contrary 
 to theirs, tho' at the fame time they 
 themfelves embrace no opinion but on 
 the authority of fome-body ; I ftiall wave 
 all the advantages that I might draw 
 from the authority of fuch Philofophers 
 and Divines as are undoubtedly on my 
 fide : and for that reafon (hall not enter 
 into a more particular detail of them ; 
 but fhall offer the authority of fuch men, 
 who profefs to maintain liberty. There 
 are indeed very few real adverfaries to 
 the opinion I defend among thofe who 
 pretend to be fo ; and upon due inquiry 
 it will be found, that moft of thofe vv ho 
 affert liberty in words, deny the thing, 
 when the queftion is rightly ftated. For 
 proof v/hereof, let any man examin the 
 cleareft and acuteft authors who have 
 written for liberty, or difcourfe with 
 thofe who think liberty a matter of ex- 
 perience, and he will fee, that they al- 
 low, that the will, follows the judgment 
 N ./ 
 
^ An Inquiry concernhig 
 
 of the urderfianding ; ancU^^^ 'when fwo 
 objeBs are prefented to a fnari's choice, one 
 whereof appears better than the other, he 
 cannot choofe the ijuorf ; that is, cannot 
 choofe evil as evlL And fince they ac- 
 knowledge thefe things to be true, they 
 yield up the queftion of liberty to their 
 adverfaries, who only contend, that the 
 will or choice is always determined by 
 what feems beft. I will give my reader 
 one example thereof in the moft acute 
 and ingenious Dr. Clark, whofe au- 
 thority is equal to that of many others 
 put together, and makes it needlefs to^ 
 cite others after him. He afTerts, that 
 Demonf^. of the Will is determin'd by moral motives ^ 
 andAtirf- 2Xi'A calls thc neceftt)', by which a man 
 /'.'tot. of '^' choofes in virtue of thofe motives, moral 
 '^■i^yfo. necefity. And he explains himfelf with 
 his ufual candor and perfpicuity by the 
 following inftance. A man, fays he, 
 intirely Jree from all pain of body and dif 
 order cf mind, judges it iinreafojiable for 
 him to hurt or dejlroy him elf \ and being 
 under no temptation or external vio^encCy 
 he CANNOT POSSIBLY a5l contrary to this 
 judgment ; not becaiife he waJits a statural 
 or phyfccd power Jo to do^ but becaufe it 
 
 is 
 
HuP2an Liherty. 95 
 
 is abfurd and mijchievous, and morally ^ 
 impopible for him to choojc to do it. Which 
 alfo is the very fame reafon, why the mojl 
 perfeSi rational creatures^ fuperior to men^ 
 .cannot do evil 5 not becaufe tkey ivant a 
 natural power to perform the material ac- 
 tion, but becaujc it is morally impojjihlc^ 
 that with a perfeB knowledge of what is 
 be/f, and without any temptation to evil^ 
 their will Jloould deter?nine if elf to choofe 
 to adlfoolijhly and unreafonably. 
 
 In this he plainly allows the necefity» 
 for which I have contended. For he al- 
 figns the fame caufes of human aftions 
 that I have done j and extends the ne- 
 cefity o{h\in)2X\ adions as far, when he 
 alfertSj that a man cannot under thofe 
 caufes, pojjibly do the contrary to wh.it 
 he does '^ and particularly, that ^ man un- 
 der the circumftances, of judging it un- 
 reafonahle to hurt or defiroy himfelf, and 
 being under no temptation or external vio- 
 lence, cannot pojjibly alH contrary to that 
 judgment. And as to a natural ox phf 
 cal power in man to a5i contrary to that 
 judgment, and to hurt or deiiroy himfelf, 
 which is aifcrted in the foregoing paf- 
 fage 5 that is fo far from being inconii» 
 N % itenc 
 
9 5 ^f'^ Inquiry concerning 
 
 ftent with the doftrine of necejjltyy that 
 the faid natural power to do the contrary ^ 
 or to hurt or dejiroy himfelf, is a conf^- 
 quence of the dodtrine of neceffity. For, 
 if man is necejfarily determin'd by parti- 
 cular moral caufes^ and cannot thenpojjibly 
 d^ contrary to what he does ; he muft 
 under oppofite moral caiifesy have a 
 power to do the contrary. Man, as de- 
 termin'd by moral caufes, cannot pojjibly 
 choofe evil as evil, and by confequence 
 choofes life before deaths while he ap- 
 prehends life to be a good, and death to 
 be an evil; as, on the contrary, he 
 choofes death before life, while he ap- 
 prehends death to be a good, and life to 
 be a?2 evil. And thus moral caufes, by 
 being different from one another or dif- 
 ferently underftood, do determine men 
 differently; and by confequence fop- 
 pofe a natural power to choofe and aft 
 as differently, as thofe caufes differently 
 determine them. 
 
 If therefore men will be governed by 
 authority in the queilions before us, let 
 them fum up the real afferters of the 
 liberty of man, and they v/ill find then; 
 
 rot 
 
not to be very numeraus ; but on the 
 contrary, they will find far the greater 
 part of the pretended afferters of liberty, 
 to be real afferters oinecejjlty. 
 
 I fliall conclude this Difcourfe with ^^^^ ^'•'- 
 obferving ; that tho' 1 have contended, oiuuny, 
 that Liberty from Neceffity is contrary to 
 experience; that it is impofilble ; anc} 
 ifpoffible, that it is imperfeftion; that 
 itis inconfiitentwith the divine perfecti- 
 ons 3 and that it is fubverfive of laws 
 and morahty : yet, to prevent all ob- 
 jeftions to me, founded on the equivocal 
 ufe of the word Liberty^ which like all 
 words eniploy'd in debates of confe- 
 quence has various meanings affix'd to 
 it, I think myfelf obiig'd to declare my 
 opinion, that I take man to have a truly 
 valuable liberty of another kind. He 
 \r.\s a power to do as he wills, or pkafes. 
 Thus, if he wills, or pleafes to fpeak 
 or be filent ; to fit or ftand, to ride or 
 walk i to go this Vv^ay or that v/ay ; to 
 move faft or flow; or, in fine, if his 
 will changes hke a weather- cock, he is 
 able to do as he wills or pleafes : unlefs 
 
 prevented 
 
98 An Inquiry concerning 
 
 prevented by fome reftraint or compuh 
 fion, as by being gagg'd ; being under 
 an acute pain ; being forCd out of his 
 place J being confin'd ; having convul- 
 five motions ; having loft the ufe of his 
 limbs j or fuch-hke caufes. 
 
 He has alfo the fame power in rela- 
 tion to the aftions of his mind, as to 
 thofe of his body. If he wills or pleafes, 
 he can think of this or that fubjeft ; 
 ftop fhort or purfue his thoughts ; de- 
 liberate or defer deliberation or refume 
 deliberation as he pleafes j refolve or 
 fufpend his refolution as he pleafes ; 
 and, in fine, c^n every moment 
 change his objedl when he pleafes : 
 unlefs prevented by pain, or a fit of an 
 apoplexy ; or fome fuch intervening re- 
 ftraint and compulfion. 
 
 And is it not a great perfeftion in 
 man to be able, in relation both to his 
 thoughts and aftlons, to do as he wills 
 or pleafes, in all thofe cafes of pleafure 
 and intereft ? Nay, can a greater and 
 more beneficial power in man be con- 
 ceived 
 
Hu/72an Liberty. 
 
 ceiv'd, than to hc able to do as he wills, 
 or pleafes ? And can any other liberty 
 be conceived beneficial to him ? Had 
 he this power or liberty in all things, he 
 would be omnipotent ! 
 
 99 
 
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