REMONSTRANCE 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 Lord Vifcount Bolingbroke's 
 Philosophical Religion. 
 
 ADDRESSED TO 
 
 David Mallet, Efq; the Publifhen 
 
 By G. ANDERSON. 
 
 EDINBURGH: 
 ?nftt€d IB the Year H P G G L V I. 
 
To the READER. 
 
 /\F all that hath been puhlijhed againji Lord 
 Vifcoiint Bolingbroke'j fhihjophical 
 worksj I have only feen two letters. How 
 this hath come to pafs^ you are not much con- 
 cerned to know. To excufe my igfiorance^ I can 
 plead, that it was not owing to want of refpeSl to 
 thofe who have appeared before me, but to my 
 fuiation. By this incident, if you have not the 
 fullefl, you have my freeft thoughts on the fub' 
 je5i ; and you Jhould have had them fooner, had 
 health permitted. If this my Remonftrance is 
 done to your fatifaBion, and if it becomes a 
 means of reclaiming one fuigle perfon from irre- 
 ligion, or of confirming another in the perfuafion 
 that he is an accountable fubjeB of GOD' s moral 
 government, IJhall think my labour well beftow- 
 ed, Farewel, 
 
 z 2 CON- 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Sea Page 
 
 I. The Introdu5lion - - - i 
 
 II. Of logics^ metaphyjics, and ahjhaclion 14 
 
 III. Of eternal truth and righteoujnefs 34 
 
 IV. Of morality, and the moral law 88 
 v. The antiquity and umverjality an evidence 
 
 of religion - - -116 
 
 VI. The idea of GOD a demonjlration of his 
 
 exiflence - - - 142 
 
 VII. Of GOD* s moral attributes - 14^ 
 
 VIII. Of our imitation of GOD* s moral attri- 
 
 butes - - - 214 
 
 IX. 0^ GOD's preferving providence i^y 
 
 X.^ Of GO D*s governing providence 259 
 
 XI. Of the immateriality of the human foul 293 
 
 Xn. Of the immortality of the human foul, 
 
 and a future ftate - - 366 
 
 h 
 
A 
 
 REMONSTRANCE 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 Lord Vifcount Bo LING BR ore's 
 
 Philosophical Religion. 
 
 II — - ■ - - 
 
 SECTION I. 
 The Introduction. 
 
 To DAVID MALLET, Efq; 
 
 SIR, 
 
 ^ m "HHERE is no man alive fo much con- 
 cerned in the late Lord Vifcount Bo- 
 
 I 
 
 lingbroke's philofbphical works as you, 
 who have publifhed them ; for what end, 
 you yourfelf beft know. To publifh the works of 
 another, gives no great honour to one who hath pu- 
 bliihed his. own ; and adds no more to your reputa- 
 tion as a writer, than that of a bookfeller hke- 
 
 A wife. 
 
2 The IntroduB'wn. Se(5l.I. 
 
 wife. By your merit in the literary way, you have 
 acquired the military honour of an Efquirc, or 4rmi- 
 ger. I am pleafed to hear that your worldly circum- 
 ftances put you above doing a mean and dirty thing 
 for bread. By occupation you are neither bookfeller 
 nor printer, who, as fuch, are not fuppofed to know 
 more about books than what they bring in the way of 
 trade and bufinefs; but you can judge of their intrin- 
 flc value, and of their tendency to pronote the virtue 
 and happinefs, or the vices and mifery of mankind. 
 
 The book, as it hath your Imprimatur, muft like- 
 wife have your approbation. I have your word, and 
 I have no more than your word, that it is the late 
 Lord Bolingbroke's. Did I give credit to reports, 
 I might be induced to believe, that neither he was, 
 nor you are, the author of what you have publillied 
 in his name ; but. a certain Reverend D. D. Such a 
 one hath been accufed publicly for revifing and cor- 
 rcfting the work at leaft. The evidence mufl: be 
 flrong to make me believe, that any clergyman hath 
 had a hand in a work fo inconfiftcnt with his profcf- 
 fion and facrcd chara(fi:er. Infidel and Atheiltical au- 
 thors are apt to infinuate, that divines do not believe 
 what they teach. Thus your author or you have 
 dealt \\ ith Dr Clarke's memory. To fay one thing, 
 and to think another, is the common praftice of all 
 thofe who profefs Chriflianity, and at the fame time 
 difbelicve it. 1 have not heard that you have re- 
 nounced 
 
Se^. I. The IntroduBion, ^ 
 
 nounced your baptifm as yet ; but 1 think you have 
 renounced fincerity, by publishing to the world, that 
 the religion you profefs to believe is fable and fi6lion. 
 
 Were I vain enough to think it more honourable 
 to deal with the Noble philofopher, than with one of 
 no greater dignity than that of an Efquire, I jfhould 
 have fupprefled your name, and only mentioned you 
 as a bookfeller : but as I chufe to fpeak to the living, 
 rather than fpeak of the dead, 1 fhall charge you 
 with all the blunders, all the errors, all the immora- 
 lity, all the impiety, and all the Atheifm, that I find 
 in Lord Bolingbroke's philofophical works, and 
 for all the didervice they are calculated to do man- 
 kind. I fhall therefore have occafion to afk you ma- 
 ny queftions, and to make my demands on you to 
 reconcile many apparent contradictions, and to clear 
 and juftify yourfelf from the imputation of impiety 
 and Atheifm. 
 
 And I ail^: you, how you came to publilli a book 
 fo large, and fo confufedly written, without an inde>} 
 rerum? Was it becaufe you was not able, or not 
 willing to take the pains to do it ? or was it rather to 
 bewilder your readers with the diforder of the work ? 
 I do not complain of this negleCl without a reafon : 
 for I have found it more laborious and difficult to col- 
 lefl and join the fcattered paflages, than to refute the 
 reafonings contained in them. If you find it for your 
 A 2 purpofe 
 
4 The Introduclion, Se^. I. 
 
 purpofe to make another edition, do, give the public 
 an index verborum, if you ire not capable to give an 
 index rerum. 
 
 And I alk you again, what hath provoked, or ra- 
 ther enraged you, to give very hard words, when 
 fofter might have ferved your purpofe ? The expref- 
 iions ufed in fpeaking of the fundamental articles of 
 Chriftianity, are fo rude and fhocking, that I cannot 
 but judge the publication premature. The fall of 
 man is called profane nonfenfe ; and the doftrine of 
 redemption, founded on this fail, is reprefented in a 
 worfe light. And that none of his hard words may 
 be forgotten, he concludes his philolbphical works 
 thuSr " * If God mufl; appear to be the fountain 
 ** of all good, and the fble author of all the happi- 
 " nefs we can hope for ; can any nian now prefumc 
 " to fay, that the God of Moses, or the God of 
 " Paul, is this amiable Being ? The God of the 
 " firft is partial, unjud, and cruel; delights in blood, 
 «* commands aflafTmations, ma fiacres, and even ex- 
 " terminations of people. The God of the fecond 
 '* elefts fome of his creatures to falvation, and pre- 
 " deftinates others to damnation, even in the womb 
 *' of their mothers. The precept of the Gosfel, 
 " Thou jhalt love the Lord thy God ivith all thy 
 *' heart, cannot refer to fuch a God as either of 
 " thefe.'^ Such language might do, were the Bible 
 
 * Vol. V. p. -JLX-]. 
 
 aboliflied 
 
Seel. I. The Introduflm, ^ 
 
 abolifhed by law as an impious book : but whilfl: it is 
 reckoned the facred record of faivation, and efleemed 
 fuch by Chriftians of all denominations, it is intoler- 
 ably rude and offenfive. We ufe to fpeak with de- 
 cency, of things and perfons which thofe we addrefs 
 put a value upon, though we ourfelves may differ from 
 them in opinion. To do otherwife, is to infult them 
 out of conceit with their own, rather than to reafon 
 them into our way of thinking. 
 
 Surely, you and he muft have imagined, by 
 treating the religious part of mankind with fo much 
 contempt, that inftead of the Gospbl of our Lord 
 Jesus Christ, the time was at hand when the 
 Gospel of St Jok(N Lord Bolingbroke fliould 
 be the eftabliflied religion of the nation, and 'Squire 
 Mallet have the honour of his Evangelift ; and 
 without fuch hopes, however i^o vain, ye were both 
 idly employed at leaft. There may be fome who 
 are ready to impute his Lordlliip's antichriflian and 
 irreligious labours, to a fpirit of refentment and re- 
 venge againft his native country, for the negleft of 
 his great abilities in the adminiftration of national af- 
 fairs. Nor is this conjecture altogether without 
 ground ; for it is perfecSlly agreeable to his angry and 
 abufive ftyle. Solemn nonfenfe, cant, and jargon, he 
 fays, is part of the clergy's trade ; and that artificial 
 theology, that is, fuch tlieology as the clergy teach, 
 is blnfphemv and Atheifm, 
 
 The 
 
6 The Introduclion. StCtA, 
 
 The charafler or diftemper of madnefs he beftows 
 fo freely and frequently on thofe that differ from 
 him, that I have not yet determined whether I iliall 
 publiili thefe few jQieets with my name or without it. 
 For 1 do not like to be called a madman by name, 
 by any one of rank and reputation, and particularly 
 by David Mallet, Efq; and I prefume to put 
 him in mind, that fuch maltreatment is aftionable. 
 I do not like to be outdone in any thing I take in 
 hand : and though I think myfelf capable enough to 
 return hard words, perhaps with harder ; yet, becaufe 
 I acknowledge your fuperior talent in fcurrihty and 
 rufticity, I iliall endeavour to avoid returning you 
 the abufe you put upon as good men, and men as 
 learned, and as good reafoners, as you, or your Noble 
 Lord. 
 
 The weaknefs of infidel and athciftical writings, 
 is no rcafon for neglecting them, as unworthy of re- 
 gard or anfwer ; for the weakeft of them is Itrong e- 
 nough for thofe that are flrongly inclined to embrace 
 their principles ; of which there are but too many. 
 A religious author hath faid above a hundred years 
 ^go, " * When I confider thofe fcandals which the 
 *' loofenefs of our times have offered, even to the re- 
 " ligious, and the bold and horrid pride and pre- 
 
 * Seth Ward's philofophical efTay, fecond edition, anno 
 1655, intt. 
 
 " fumption 
 
Se(^. I. T^^^s IntroduEtioiu y 
 
 " fumption of Athelfts and Epicures, which, by pro- 
 " fane and confident alTerting the uncertainty of all 
 " things, (undervaluing the abilities of our nature, 
 " to raife an opinion of their own perfonal excel- 
 " lencies), have laboured to introduce into the world 
 " a general Atheifm, or at leaft a doubtful fcepticifm 
 '' in matters of religion ; and when we confider the 
 " nature of our minds, which are upon ill fuggeftions 
 " apt {till to receive ill impreiTions, (thofe things be- 
 " ing of like operations with calumny, which, if it 
 " be confidently and boldly charged, will be fure to 
 " leave fome fear behind it) ; when we obferve this 
 " ufe and inclination in ourfelves, which is in things 
 " where we have not a belief of what is fpoken, and 
 " do not give perfeft credit to an accufation, yet to 
 '' admit of a fufpicion that things may be as they 
 *' are fpoken ; and although our contrary belief do 
 " keep us from a full aflenting to the thing in que- 
 *' ftion, yet if it happen that the thing concern our- 
 " felves, and we have ufed to crofs our opinions 
 ** and our belief in the way of praftice ; fuch is the 
 *' pcrverfenefs of our hearts, that in fome cafes they 
 " will make ufe of the belief of others, (efpecially 
 " if they have the reputation of knowing men), to 
 " oppofe againft their own belief, and to interpofe 
 " betwixt the lalhes of their confciences and them- 
 *' felves." Few, if any, have attacked Chriflianity 
 more plainly and boldly, and with greater contempt 
 »nd indignation, than his Lordihip aud you j and no 
 
 writer 
 
8 The IntroduFlion, Seft.I. 
 
 writer hath more direftly endeavoured to root out of 
 the minds of men, a belief of the capital articles of 
 natural religion. Read thefe works who will, they 
 can never be the better for their pains ; and the dan- 
 ger of being worfe is truly great. The free and 
 frequent rejecting God's moral attributes, the imma- 
 teriality and the natural immortality of the foul, x 
 particular providence, and a future llate of rewards 
 and '^uniniments, takes off the horror which fuch 
 impious aflcTtions are apt to raife in the minds of the 
 truly religious; and weakens the influence which 
 the principles of natural religion, and the Chriftian re- 
 velation, commonly have on the minds of rhofc who 
 believe both. And certainly it is a difagreeable talk 
 (I fpeak from experience) for one who fears Gob, 
 and believes the Gospel, to employ his thoughts, 
 and to let them follow you through fhocking expref- 
 fioris into horrid and blafphemous conclunons. For 
 this I fee no remedy : for men cannot be hindered 
 or perfuaded not to read what others are allowed, 
 commended, and, perhaps, rewarded for publiihing. 
 
 It is faid by Lord Bolingbroke and by you. 
 That " * religion is necedary to llrengthen, and 
 " that it contributes to tlie fupport of government, 
 " cannot be denied without contradi£ling rcafbn and 
 *• experience both." This is fomething in favour of 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 4J. 
 
 religion, 
 
•Sc<5l. I. The Introdutlion. ^ 
 
 religion, but not faid with precifion. For if it is necej^ 
 fary, it muft be more than a contribution to the fupport 
 of civil government; and if it does but contribute, it 
 cannot be faid to be neceflary. But in as far as it con- 
 tributes, in fo far at leaft lliould civil governors fuf- 
 tain and fupport it. His Lordiliip, more to the pur- 
 pofe, fays, " * To make government effe^lual to all 
 *' the good purpofes of it, there muft be a religion ; 
 " this religion muft be national ; and this national re^ 
 " ligion muft be maintained in reputation and reve- 
 " fence." Thefe, in my apprehenfion, are the firft 
 principles of good policy. 
 
 Therefore you either a(5i: the part of a bad po- 
 litician, or tlie religion nationally eftabliftied in this 
 country muft be very abfurd, and even hurtful to fo- 
 ciety ; becaufe you attempt, and deliberately endea- 
 vour to expofe it to contempt and ridicule ; and not- 
 withftanding you fay, in Lord Bolingbroke*s name, 
 " t Suppofing Chriftianity," the religion profefTed and 
 believed in Great Britain, " to have been purely an 
 *' human invention, it had been the moft amiable and 
 *' the moft ufeful invention that was ever impofed 
 " on mankind for their good." As a Theift, a phi- 
 lofopher, and a politician, you have no reafon to find 
 fault with it, if it is really 3^our opinion, that 
 *' 11 Chriftianity is founded on the uiiiverfal law of 
 
 * Vol. iii. p, 330. 
 -j- Vol. iii. p. 24. 
 
 '! Vol. ji. p. 287. 
 
 B *' nature. 
 
lo The htrodu^'m. Se<ft. I. 
 
 " nature. I will not fay, that Chriflianity is a repu- 
 " blication of it; but I will fay, that the Gospel 
 '' teaches the great and fundamental principles of this 
 " law, (univerfal benevolence), recommends the pre- 
 *' cepts of it, and commands the obfervation of them 
 *' in particular inftances occafionally, always fuppofes 
 *' them, always inforces them, and makes the law 
 *' of right reafon a law, in every polfible definition 
 "of the word, beyond all cavil." And you further 
 add, " * The fyflem of religion which Christ pu- 
 " bliflied, and his evangelifls recorded, is a complete 
 *' fyftem to all the pnrpofes of true religion, natural 
 *' and revealed. It contains all the duties of the 
 '' former, it inforces them by aDcrting the divine 
 " miffion of the publiflicr, who proved his affcrtion 
 " at the fame time by his miracles." And again, 
 ** t Chriftianity, as the Saviour publiflied it," (Chri- 
 flians ufually fny our Saviour), " was full and fuf- 
 ** ficient for all the purpofcs of it. Simplicity and 
 " plainnefs iliewed that it was dcfigncd to be the re- 
 " ligion of mankind, and manifefted likewife the di- 
 " vinity of its original." Another good thing which 
 you fay of the national religion edabliflied in our na- 
 tive country is, That *' || the Chriflian law is no- 
 ** thing elfc than the law of nature inforced by a new 
 '* revelation, every friend to Chrillianity admits, and 
 
 *■ Vol. ii. p. 329. 
 ■\ Vol. iii. p. 96. 
 II Vol. iv. p. 26. 
 
 " the 
 
Sccfl. I. The IntroduBmu 1 1 
 
 " the woril of its enemies dares not deny, though he 
 " denies the reaHty of the revelation." 
 
 I lliould thank you for all thefe fine fayings, if I 
 thought they were fairly and honeftly faid ; though 
 in the lad you blunder. For no man that denies the 
 reality of the. Christian revelation, will fay that Chri- 
 flianity is inforced with a new revelation ; unlefs you 
 can make a new revelation to be no revelation. How- 
 ever, you are honeft enough, as far as defigned con- 
 tradiftions are confident with honedy, to decline call- 
 ing Christ your Saviour. Of the New Tedaraenr, 
 you only admit the Gospels to be genuine; and at 
 the fam.e time you pay but little regard to thefe re- 
 cords, or to the author of them. Without dopping 
 here, and entering into an examination of particulars, 
 I only indance, as want of refpeft to the founder of 
 the Chridian faith, thefe three things. i. Your ac- 
 cufation of our Saviour's judgment, given in the 
 cafe of divorce. 2. Your denying a particular and 
 imiverfai providence, which our Lord extends to fpar- 
 rows. And, 3. Your denying a hfe of future re- 
 wards and punifiiments, though Christ teaches it 
 plainly, fully, and exprefsly. Abdrafting from the 
 divine authority of the teacher, it can be made ap- 
 pear, that the fird is a decifion according to the rules 
 of morality, and that the two lad are articles of na- 
 tural religion. And as my defign is to correal your 
 many miftakcs in morality and natural religion, I 
 B 2 diall 
 
12 The lutroMtion. Se<fl. I. 
 
 fliall find a place to juftify Chriftianity in thefe three 
 inftances. 
 
 Without going further, I think it proper to in- 
 form the reader, that my defign is to give a diftin£l 
 defence of natural religion, without meddling with, 
 or mixing your objeftions againft revelation, with 
 thofe which you bring againft natural religion. You 
 fay, in name of your Noble philofopher, or rather he 
 fays without your alhftance, " * That the Theift is 
 " a much more formidable enemy to the Atheift than 
 " the divine. The former takes all the real advan- 
 '' tages againft a common adverfary, which the latter 
 '' has it in his power to take ; but he gives none a- 
 " gainft himfelf, as the latter is forced to do. When 
 " the divine writes or difputes on any fubje(St relative 
 " to his profcflion, he is always imbarraflcd by his 
 " theological fyflem. Whether his mind be fo or not, 
 " his tongue and his pen cannot be othervvi fc. A 
 " Theift is under no refhaint of this kind," True ; 
 provided he does not pretend to be a ChriHian, a Jew, 
 or Mahometan, or to believe any revealed religion, 
 *' He may fpeak the truth, fuch as it appears to him ; 
 " when the divine, though it appears the fame, mufl 
 " be filent. The Theifl may be filcnt, by regards 
 " of prudence; when the divine is obliged to fpeak, 
 "' by the obligation of his profcfTion, and to main- 
 " tain what he cannot defend, as well as what he 
 
 Vol. 
 
 r-3 
 
Seel. 1. The IntroduBion. 23 
 
 " can." He knew his advantage, and fb he takes it, 
 by a medley of objections againft natural and revealed 
 religion,/ in fuch an immethodical way, that it be- 
 comes very difficult to follow him foot by foot ; and 
 this, perhaps^ as I laid before, on purpofe to bewilder 
 •his readers with the diforder of the work, and without 
 doubt to cramp and ftraiten, or to flop the divine in 
 his examination of it. Did he not dread the divine as 
 an adverfary, he would have afforded him a plainer 
 and fairer field for debate. To fay that divines are 
 obliged, right or wrong, to maintain the do£lrine they 
 are by their profefTion obliged to teach, and to fpeak 
 and write againfl their own real fentiments, is invi- 
 dious, and injurious to men of as much probity and 
 piety as you or your deceafed Lord. However, in 
 reafoning on philolbphy, and morality, and natural re- 
 ligion, they do not expe6l to be telieved on the cre- 
 dit of their charafter, but on the ftrength of their ar- 
 guments. And though I have made many remarks 
 on what you fay againfl the Chriflian revelation, I 
 will trouble you with none of them, until I have fi- 
 niflied what I have to fay upon the fubjecl of natural 
 religion. For my own part, I can afliire my readers, 
 that, v/ithout breach of any profefhonal obligation, I 
 might have been filent, if I had pleafed ; and that 
 no temporal advantage, either in poflefilon or cxpc<rca- 
 tion, hath induced me to m.ake my thoughts public. 
 It is my concern in tlie fabjeft that harh made me im- 
 bark in the debate. 
 
 SECT. 
 
H 
 
 SECT. n. 
 
 Of logics, vieinphyfics, and abjiraclion. 
 
 YOuR Noble philofbphcr and you, in order tcf 
 accomplifh your undertaking of a new fyflem 
 of philofophical irreligion, bar two of the fciences 
 from your philofophical works, logics and metaphyfics. 
 Like gallant difputants, ye give the challenge, and 
 chufe the weapons. A necelTary precaution it is, for 
 one that pretends to know nothing of God, and the 
 duty he owes him, than hy fenje and experience. To 
 go no further, if he is not fure of victory, he is fure 
 of fafety. For it is impoflible to difprove what He 
 aderts of his own fenfations and experience ; but it 
 muft give furprife t» every man bcfides, that one pre- 
 tending to be a philofopher jfhould rejcft fuch ufeful 
 and neccdary parts of it. Logic is the organ of 
 fcience. It is the art of thinking, and the rule of 
 reafoning. It is the fquarc and plumb-line by which 
 our thoughts arc adjuned, and by which rational fy- 
 flems are ercftcd with order and fymmetr3\ There 
 is a natural logic with which every rational creature is 
 adorned ; fome in a higher, and otlicrs in a lower de- 
 cree. Artificial logic is the improvement and cultiva- 
 tion of it ; and to rcjcfl: the one, is to reject the otlier. 
 You may as well fay, that arithmetic, or the art of 
 mcafuring numerical quantity, is an ulclefs or a hurt- 
 ful 
 
Se«5l. II. Of logics^ mctaphyftcs^ &c. 1 5 
 
 ful part of mathematics. There never was an able 
 mathematician that defpifed, or did not underftand the 
 rules of arithmetic ; nor was there ever a good archi- 
 te<5i: who rejefted the ufe of the line and fquare. But 
 Lord BoLiNGBROKE is the firfl: who ferioufly rejedl- 
 ed the rule of rcafoning, as a hindrance to reafbning. 
 Had he taken pains to have fquared his loofe thoughts 
 and precarious conclufions according to the rules of 
 logic, his volumes of philofophy would have wanted 
 fewer of my corre(51:ions ; and inftead of five, lels 
 than one would have contained the whole that de- 
 ferves reading, either for the good or the ill to be 
 * found in them ; and he had faved hirafelf the trouble 
 of writing, and the public of reading, a great deal of 
 fmall talk. Your Lord approves of the fuccinft and 
 precife reafonings of the fcholaflics, though he doth 
 not approve, nor do I, of the many curious and 
 needlefs queftions which they decide. And this pre- 
 cifion in their writings is as much owing to their ob- 
 fervation of logical rules, as to their greatnefs of ge- 
 nius. An author univerfally learned, and much acu- 
 ter than Lord BoLiNGBROKE, is very far from judging 
 logic to be an impertinent part of philofophy *. 
 
 * Patet ex omnibus logicae nominibus et definitionibus, earn 
 cfTe difciplinam qua ingenium humanum efficltur idoneum ad 
 probandum bonis rationibus quod probaudum incumbit ; ad 
 detegendam falfitatem rationum quibus aliquid probatur; ad re- 
 Ipondendum difficultatibus in veritatem propofitis ; uno verbo, 
 ad fuperanda impedimenta quae veritatem nobis obtegunt. 
 Oeimres diierfei de M. Bayle, I'ol, iv, /. 206, 
 
 There 
 
1 6 Of logics, victaphjfics, Sccl. II. 
 
 There hath lately happened a deplorable inftance 
 of ignorance of logic. An Honourable author * 
 undertook to prove, that motion is eflential toimatter, 
 by this argument : A flone moves dov/nwards, and I 
 do not know why it doth not move upwards; there- 
 lore it moves itfelf. For this is concluding againfl 
 the prcmilles, and extracting knowledge froni his own 
 ignorance. I wifli he had publiilied his cflay apart, 
 and not difgraced an ufeful work with his blundering 
 {peculation. He gravely regrets the misfortune of 
 mathematicians for their want of logic. But to learn 
 that part of philofbphy, they muft have a better ma- 
 iler than Lord Kaims. Did he make good his point, 
 it would be a fupplemental improvemejit of the Epi- 
 curean and Lucretian Atheifm. But he knows bell 
 whether he intended it as fuch or not. 
 
 If it lies out of the way of a philofbpher to rejcft 
 logic, it is flill more out of his way to dcfjiiie meta- 
 phyfics. It treats of being in general, of eflentials 
 and accidentals ; and were it properly taught, it would 
 become a fyftem of axioms, definitions, and diftinc- 
 tions. It treats of the very firll principles of know- 
 ledge and ratiocination, and the crJcria of the truth 
 or falfity of all propofitions, in ethics, phyfics, mathe- 
 matics, and natural religion. For inflancc, to prove 
 that two contradicftory propofitions cannot be both true, 
 
 * Tlic Honourable Hcury Ilumc, Efq; a Senator of the col- 
 lege of JLiftice. 
 
 it 
 
Se6l. II. and abjira&ioii. ly 
 
 it is fufficlent to fubfume, that it is impofllble a thing 
 can be and not be at the fame time. And this axiom is 
 the foundation of all truth. And notwithftanding De s- 
 CARTEs's Cogito, ergo fum, it ftandS;, as it did long be- 
 fore, the principium ahfoluteprimum, and is the laft re- 
 fort in reafoning. And to fhew, that this principle was 
 not precarioufly eftablifhed as the very firft, that of 
 Descartes is no more than a repetition of the fame 
 thing. For / think^ is to be refolved into / am think' 
 ing ; and then his ergo is juft, / am^ therefore / am, 
 I am able to convi£l you and your Noble author, of 
 Tifing metaphyfical arguments ; and that metaphyfics, 
 which ye defpife, are your 72e plus ultra. He fays, 
 and you publifh, '' * I cannot foar fo high as Plato 
 *' and CuDWORTH ; I will not fink fo low as Pro- 
 " TAGORAS and other ancients, as Hobbes and 
 *' other moderns. The former amufe, inftead of in- 
 " ftruaing me ; and if I underftand the latter, I on- 
 " ly underftand them to know, that they impofe on 
 " themfelves, and would impofe on me the grofleft 
 " abfurdities. Strange extremes ! "WhenCuDWORTH 
 " holds up the metaphyfical glafs to my eye, I fee 
 *' fomething, I know not what ; fomething that glit- 
 *' ters at an unmeafurable diftance from me. When 
 " Hobbes holds it up, he changes the pofition, and 
 " 1 fee fomething monftrous at the very end of the 
 " glafs." The glafs which Cudworth nfes, is fi- 
 nilhed and fufficient : it ftiews truth at a very great, 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 349. 
 
 but 
 
1 8 Of logics ^ metnphjfics^ Seft. IL 
 
 but not at an iinmcafurable diftance ; it ilicws it in 
 fplendor ; not in glittering and corrufcation, but in a 
 fure and fettled light. For fuch truths are fixed and 
 immutable, as eternity itfelf. If fuch truths appear 
 to the author in a dazzling view, it mufl: be owing to 
 a defeft in his intellcftual eye ; or to a voluntary, and 
 therefore a greater imperfection : None fo blind as 
 thofe that will not fee. That fome men are capable 
 of fbme fciences, who are incapable of others, is but 
 common. His Lordfhip might have made wonderful 
 progrefs in hiftory and politics, in law and languages, 
 and even in the ufeful Icience of medicine, and the 
 noble fcience of mathematics ; while at the fame time 
 he had no turn of mind for metaphyfics. On the o- 
 thcr hand, a good metaphyfician may make but a for- 
 ry mathematician. This was M. Bayle's cafe, who 
 complained, that fractions, or broken numbers, would 
 break his head. Another reafon may be given for 
 calling metaphyfics a delirium of the underflanding. 
 In many inftances metaphyfics are againft liis Lordfhip. 
 And when reafon is againft a man obftinate and opi- 
 niatre, he will be againft reafon. Metaphyfics are 
 by Lord Verulam faid to be the trunk of all fcien- 
 ces, on which all others depend as branches. In this 
 the firft and univerfal principles of reafon are to be 
 found ; and it is to thefe principles that the laft ap- 
 peal is made in all matters of ratiocination. When 
 authors not much inclined to favour religion, find, 
 that abftraft reafoning doth not favour them, they de- 
 
 fpife 
 
Se(51:. II. aJ^d abJiraBion. 19 
 
 fpife the fcience from which fuch reafoning proceeds. 
 David Hume, Efq; a gentleman of fuch largenefs 
 of thought, that it takes in all religion as a very little 
 thing, to iliew his contempt of that as eftabiiflied 
 in England, calls the thirty- nine articles the meta- 
 phyfics of the church of England *. As I gave you 
 M. Bayle's judgment of logic, I here prefent you, 
 on the margin, with his opinion of metaphyfics \. 
 And I take the liberty to alfume, that no man de- 
 fpifes metaphyfics, but he who doth not, or pretends 
 not to underfland them ; and he who does not under- 
 ftand them, can never write on any fubje^t, and efpe- 
 cially natural religion and morality, corre£tly, and 
 with precifion. 
 
 After talking abftraftly about ab(lra£lion, his 
 Lordfliip fays 1|, " This abftradion becomes as great 
 *' a myflery as any myftery that religion holds out to 
 
 * Hiftory, p. 389. 
 
 f Quamvis metaphyfica verfetur circa res ab omni connexione 
 materiali fegregatas, ideoque poflulet fummam mentis atteiitio- 
 nem, ingratam tamen plerifque mortalibus, qui rebus tantum de- 
 le(5tantur ; nulla tamen eft difciplina dignior, in qua pevdifcenda 
 ardentillimo ftudio laboretur. Hasc enim eft quae generales dif- 
 ferentias perfcrutatur ; quse attributa efientialia a ceteris adjundis 
 rerum difcernere docet ; quae ideas, feu principia JEterns verita- 
 tis fuppeditat, quibus omnes veritates aliarum fcientiarum pro- 
 bentur ; et ad quse, tanqiiani ad regulam, expandentur omnia 
 difciplinarum principia peculiaria. Igitur neceflaria in pvimis eft 
 illis, qui non leviter imbui philofopbia, fed ad intimos ufquc re- 
 cefTus illius pervenire cupiunt. Oewvres cii'verfei, 10L iv. /. 464. 
 
 !i Vol. iii. p. 368. 
 
 C 2 " us." 
 
20 Of logics, metaphyficsj Se^l. II, 
 
 " lis." To have writ with precifion, he fhould have 
 faid revealed religion. For he cannot mean myfteries 
 in natural religion ; for he reje£ls all the articles of it 
 which he doth not comprehend. Natural religion is 
 the refult of reafon ; and no man will reafon out to 
 himfelf what he doth not underftand. I do acknow- 
 ledge, that the doctrine of ahjlra^ion and uni-jerfals 
 hath been the fubjecl: of much debate from Plato 
 down to this day. Ens rationis, or mental entity, 
 and univerfale a -parte rei^ or real univerfals exifting 
 independently of thought, have exercifed his Lord- 
 iliip's underflanding, and his readers patience, until 
 he is forced to confefs, that he underftands nothing 
 of the matter. His underftanding, fuch as it was, and 
 yours, fuch as it is, might ferve him, and may ferve 
 you ; but it cannot therefore be impofed on others 
 for the flandard of reafon. 
 
 Plato is accufed of holding ideas really exiflent 
 out of the divine and human mind ;> but he is accufed 
 unjuflly. There is no fuch thing to be found in his 
 writings, nor once mentioned by bis mofl famous di-r 
 fciples and followers. On the other hand, paflages 
 are brought to prove that he was of the contrary 
 opinion, and with which I do not think it proper to 
 flop myfclf and the reader from matters much more 
 material. This miflakc of Plato's do(ftrine gave 
 rife to a feft called the Nomimles ; who maintained, 
 that there were no imiverfals but in the mind which 
 
 framed 
 
Se6l. II. and abJlra8:ion. 21 
 
 framed them. Between them and the Peripatetics a- 
 rofe another debate. Thefe maintained, that there 
 were univerfals in rerum natura^ of which thefe men- 
 tal univerfals were but ideas and reprefentations. From 
 the Nominales, with whom the Stoics joined, the de- 
 bate defcended to the fcholaftics. The difciples and 
 followers of Scot us, or John of Dunce, your coun- 
 tryman, were of opinion, that the nature of a circle, 
 or of a man, was not made, or in itfelf univerfal, 
 but only difcovered to be fuch by the mind. On the 
 other hand, the followers of Aquinas held, that all 
 nature was contracted and lingular ; and that without 
 the operation of the mind thefe natures muft remain 
 lingular and contrafted, to the exclufion of all uni- 
 verjals. Hence arofe a diftin^lion between metaphy- 
 fical and logical univerfals *. The univerfale meta- 
 ■phyficum was faid by them to be that by which we 
 contemplate the edential parts of a fubjeft, feparately, 
 diftinftly, and by degrees. For as the eye cannot fee 
 at once the four (Ides of a fquare pillar, no more can 
 the mind take in at one view every property of the 
 thing to be confidered and examined. Let a circle be 
 the fubjecl of thought. The firft thing which offers 
 itfelf to confideration, is its extenfion, next the fi- 
 gure, and then what fort of f gure it is ; fuch as, it 
 
 * Of which they gave this definition, Vnum aptum itiejje, vel 
 pradicari de multis utii'voce et di'vijim. The word inejfe makes 
 uni'verfale metaphyjtcum, and the word pradicari makes uni<ver' 
 /ale logicum. 
 
 hath 
 
22 Of logicSf metaphyfics, Seft. II. 
 
 hath a centre, from which all lines drawn to the cir- 
 cumference are equal. And fuch univerjah are the 
 eflential ingredients of all fciences. Univerfale logi- 
 cum is that whereby the mind, cutting off all differ- 
 ences, takes into one idea the fimilitude, fpecifical or 
 generical, as the unity of many ; v.g. the humani- 
 ty of Socrates and Plato, and the triangularity 
 of all triangles of whatever particular fort. 
 
 These are the things which become a myftery to 
 your Noble and voluminous philofbpher ; and not on- 
 ly a myftery, but a mofl important myftery ; and a 
 more important myftery to all writers in matters of 
 fpeculation than he imagines. Without thefe things 
 nothing can be faid with exa£lnefs and prccifion. 
 " * For my own part," faith he, *' 1 know that I am 
 " not able to make fuch abftraftions. I am utterly 
 *' unable to elevate my mind from particulars to ge- 
 *' nerals." But he is able to contradict himfelf, and 
 fay -f, *' Out of a variety of ideas, the mind felefts 
 " fuch as have a more remote, and fuch as have a 
 *' more immediate rcfcmblance, and clafles them ac- 
 " cordingly. From this operation of the mind arifcs 
 "the fchool-diftin6tion of genus znd /pedes, and we 
 '< fpcak according to it intelligibly on this occafion." 
 And why not on all occafions ? The terms are ex- 
 plained, and you undcrftand them, though 3'ou call 
 them the gibberiili of the fchools. So far as you un- 
 
 * Vol. iii. rO^S- t Vol. iii. p. 354. 355. 
 
 dcrftand 
 
Sefl. II. and abfira^ion. ■ 23 
 
 derftand what is meant by gsntts^ and what is meant 
 by [pedes, you and the fcholaflics are agreed. But 
 whoever agrees with you in what follows, I can ne- 
 ver agree with you ; becaufe I do not like words that 
 have no meaning You fay, " As the mind is unable 
 *' by abllradion to comprehend any one fpecies, and 
 " much more any one genus, under one general idea, 
 " it comprehends one under one general name ; and 
 *' we fay, for inftance, man and animalP Thus, 
 when he fays, or you fay, man or animal, you Un- 
 derftand yourfelf, and I underftand you ; but you 
 mean nothing, becaufe you have not an idea that cor- 
 relponds with the word. The defign of language is 
 to make one's felf to be underftood ; and when you 
 and I underftand the word animal, it is not a mere 
 word to either of us, or a word without fignification, 
 as blichri. Abflraftion cuts off differences, and con- 
 fiders the animal nature, without the difference that is 
 between a man and a horfe -, and by not allowing this 
 difference to enter into the idea or conception, the 
 conception always leaves a remainder ; and this re- 
 mainder is intelligibly called animality, and fo under- 
 ftood by fuch as never learned either logics or meta- 
 phyfics. But his LordOiip's fubtraftion is fo fublima- 
 ted, that it leaves nothing. Ahjiraolion ox fuhtra^ion, 
 is to take away one part, and to leave another ; it is 
 therefore a divifion ; and a divifion which takes away 
 the whole, is a mathematical as well as a metaphyfi- 
 cal abfurdjty. And Lord Bolingbroke, when he 
 
 lays 
 
24 Of logics, 7netaphyfic5^ Seft. IL 
 
 fays man or animal^ means nothing ; and only ufes 
 found inftead of fcnfe. But for this he offers a fort 
 of reafon : " Some make themfelves and others be- 
 *' heve, that, from a muhitiide of particular ideas, 
 " one general nature and edence is abftrafted, which 
 '" is all of them, and none of them." I anfwer. 
 When many individuals agree in fbme attributes and 
 properties, as Socrates and Plato agree in the at- 
 tribute of rational ; and as it is faid, univoce et divi' 
 ftm, that Socrates is reafonable, and Plato is 
 reafonable in the fame way, without equivocation; 
 this agreement of rationality, or of their being reafon- 
 able, is the abftracled idea, and that by which all 
 thofe animals w^ho are adorned with this faculty of 
 reafon, are clafled in the fame fpecies. Whatever Mr 
 Mallet may think of me, I am not afhamed to ac- 
 knowledge, that I profefs to underfland logics and 
 metaphyflcs, abftraction and univerfals, and think the 
 knowledge of them a necefTary qualification of a phi- 
 lofbphical writer; and I know both formally and 
 fundamentally, and what tiniverfale is a parte mentis, 
 and what it is a parte rei : and I know that all fpe- 
 cifical and generical ideas are not the ideas of all men, 
 nor of all animals, nor the ideas t)f any particular 
 man or animal -, but the ideas of thofe powers, facul- 
 ties, and attributes, wdiich are common to men, and 
 to all animals as fuch. 
 
 Therefore it is not b)^ making one individual 
 
 man 
 
Sefl. II. afi(^ ahjiraciion. 25 
 
 man reprefent. all mankind that we generalize : for 
 one man cannot reprefent all men, but in that very 
 thing which is common to all. If from the /pedes 
 we. afcend to the genus, it will appear evidently, that; 
 a horfe cannot reprefent a man, nor a man reprefent 
 a-,horfe, but in thofe things in which they agree, viz, 
 in life, fenfe, and locomotive power. That my 
 reader may the better underftand my meaning, 1 
 fhall give it. in the words of Dr King's annotator *, 
 '' We are at firft only acquainted with particular fub- 
 " ftances ; but obferving, that as thefe particular fub- 
 " fiances differ in fome refpefts, fo they agree in 0- 
 '' thers, (i. e. though this particular excites in the 
 " mind fome fimple idea or ideas which another does 
 *' not, yet there are fome ideas excited equally from 
 " both) ; we take no notice of thofe ideas in which 
 " two or more particular fubftances differ, but felecl 
 " thofe only in which they agree, and conneft them 
 " into one complex idea, by giving them one name t 
 *' which complex idea becomes general ; that is, it 
 " may be affirmed of^ or belong to^ or is found in more 
 *' than one particular fubfiance f : and the feveral 
 *' fubftances of which it is affirmed, ^c are faid to 
 *' be contained under that general idea. General 
 *' ideas of fubftances therefore are not made, by add- 
 ** ing all or any of the particular ideas found in each 
 
 * The ingenious Edmond Law, Origin of ewl, /. 5.6. 
 •f This is ttnum aptum inejfe, vel pradicari de tnultis. 
 
 B ''fubilanccj 
 
26 0/ logics, metaphyftcs, Seft. II. 
 
 ^ fubftance; but only by leaving out all thofc 
 
 " ideas in which two or more fubftances differ, and 
 " retaining thofe in which they agree. And from ge- 
 " neral ideas thus made, we proceed to more general 
 " ones in the fame way, viz. by always dropping the 
 *' particulars in which they differ. Thus, by obfer- 
 " ving a certain agreement among individuals, and o- 
 " mitting the reft, we form an idea of the feveral 
 ** fpecies. In like manner, leaving out the diftin- 
 " guiHiing marks of each fpecies, we get an idea of 
 *' the ^tnui *. The method of making or forming 
 " general ideas, by making the idea of an individual 
 *' ftand for the whole fpecies, mufl be wrong on this 
 " very account, viz. according to the forementioned 
 *' fcheme, univerfals, fuch as (^«/;»^/ or matter , would 
 " have a real exiflence in the fame precife manner in 
 " which we confider them ; whereas, under fuch pre- 
 *^ cifions, they are confefledly the creatures of our 
 " own minds, and exift no where elfe. We have no- 
 " thing at all to do therefore with analogy in forming 
 " abflraft ideas : we can never come at them, by fub- 
 " ftituting one particular for the reft; but, on the 
 ** contrary, we muft conceive them, by removing all 
 " particularities of exillence, and leaving only what 
 ** remains in common." 
 
 The idea we have of man or animal, as fpecifical 
 or ^emrical, arc not the ideas of all men, and all ani- 
 
 * OrJgn of evil, p. S. 
 
 mals, 
 
Sc6l. IL and ahflraHion, iy 
 
 mals, (for as it is only in the mind, it hath no objec- 
 tive ideatum)', but the ideas of the agreement of 
 powers, faculties, and attributes, common to the 
 /pedes of mankind, and to the genus of animals : 
 and this idea is called general, becaufe it is to be 
 found in, or may be faid of many ; and is fignified, 
 and very well underflood by the abftra6l words, a^U' 
 mality and humanity. 
 
 Lord Bolingbroke with a good deal of aflu- 
 rance fays, we cannot abftraft whitenefs from all 
 things white. This is not a matter of fpeculation^, 
 but of experience. And if he cannot, it doth not 
 follow that no man can. And if you 'Squire Mal- 
 let cannot abftra£l whitenefs from all white things, 
 it muft be owing to your ignorance of implicit and 
 negative, and explicit and affirmative abftra£tion. By 
 the one we join the abjlra5} and concrete together, as 
 white ; which thert ceafes to be a mere abftradlion : 
 and in this fenfe neither you nor I can abftradl: white- 
 nefs from all white things. By the other we exclude 
 out of the idea or conception all white things, or eve- 
 ry particular thing that is white. This I can, and 
 you may eafily do, and you do it daily. A colour of 
 any kind may be confidered without its being inherent 
 either in cloth, or in ftone, or timber ; for as an- ac- 
 cident, it is feparable from the fubje£t. 
 
 t am afraid I have wearied the reader with the au- 
 P 2 thgr's 
 
28 Of logics y metaphjftcs, Seifl. ll. 
 
 tlior's affefted ignorance of the nature of abflractlon. 
 I fay affe^ed \ for every man is confcious of a power 
 of abftrafting. Though he fays he is not able to ele- 
 vate his mind from particulars to generals, yet he af- 
 firms, and that with reafon, that, without generali- 
 zing, there can be no ratiocination. 
 
 Ex particulari non licet fyllogizare. 
 
 His Lordfliip makes ufe of abftra£l terms as freely 
 and frequently as any modern writer does ; fuch as, 
 pqffibility, a^uality^ a5iivity^ and pqffivity. After 
 all his pains to introduce fenfe and experience as the 
 only ftandard of linowledge, he hath thefe words : 
 " * After faying fo much about thefe abftraft ideas, 
 " I mufl freely confefs, that I fcarce comprehend 
 *' what they are intended to be. Abftraftion is a 
 " myftery in philofophy.'^ He therefore hath no 
 right to admit or to rejefi: it, nor to ufe them, and far 
 )efs to abufe others for doing the fame. I do pre- 
 tend to underftand abflraiftion ; and have therefore a 
 better right to declare this operation of the mind, or 
 the capacity of the human underftanding to form ge- 
 neral ideas, to be real, than he hath to call it meta- 
 phyficai jargon. 
 
 Every reader will not cafily apprehend the Noble 
 author's defign of expunging abftraftion out of philo- 
 fophy. It is common to al|, that think, Ipeak, or 
 
 » Vol. iii. p. 368. 
 
 write J 
 
ScOl. II. and ahftraBio^, 29 
 
 write ; for there is no reafoninor without it. How this 
 comes to pafs, and for what purpofe, is not eafily ima- 
 gined. But I have learned from Dr Cudworth, 
 that Atheifts have the fame quarrel with innocent and 
 harmlefs abftraftion. He fays *, " Becaufe it is ge- 
 " nerally conceived, that an error cannot be fuffi- 
 " ciently confuted without difcovering the caufe of the 
 " miftake ; therefore Atheifts will undertake to fhew 
 " the original of the doftrine of incorporeal fub- 
 '* fiances, and from what mifapprehenfion it fprung ; 
 *' as alfo to take occafion from thence further to deny 
 " a Deity. They fay, that the original of this doc- 
 " trine of incorporeal fubftances proceeded chiefly 
 " from the abufe of abflraft names, both of fub- 
 " fiances, and alfb of accidents, when they are con- 
 ** fidered alone without their fubje<5i:s and fubftances. 
 
 *' As there is fbme ufe of thofe abflraft names, 
 
 " Co the abufe of them hath alfb been very great. 
 '* Though the eflence of this and that man is not any 
 " thing without the man, nor an accident any thing 
 '' without its fubftance; yet men have been led into 
 " a grofs miftake by them, to imagine them realities 
 " exifting by themfelves.'* For which the fcholaftics 
 are chiefly blamed. He quotes an author, then mo- 
 dern f, who fays, " It is 0. great abufe which fome 
 '' metaphyficians make of abfira<5l names, becaufe co- 
 " oritation can be confldered alone without the confi- 
 
 » Intelle^ual a-Rem, p. 67. edit. fol. 
 j' Ho'obes. 
 
 deration 
 
33 Of logics, juetaphyjtcs, Seft. 11, 
 
 *' deration of body, therefore to conclude, that it is 
 *' not the a£lion and accident of that body which 
 " thinks, but a fubflance by itfelf ; and that it is 
 *' upon this account, when a man is dead and buried, 
 *' they fay his foul (that is, his life) can walk fepara- 
 ** ted from the body, and is feen by night amongll 
 ** the graves." That abftraftion Jfhould be blamed 
 for fuperftition, is an accufation too finely fpun. And 
 who would think, that the vulgar ever learned from 
 the fcholaftics all their tales of fairies, apparitions, 
 and hobgoblins, and particularly by perufing their 
 quiddities, entities, ejfences, hacceities ? But to this 
 the Reverend and very learned author himfelf hath 
 returned a fatisfaftory anfwer * : " The belief of 
 ** ghofts and fpirits incorporeal, and confequently of 
 " an incorporeal Deity, fprung neither from any ridi- 
 ** culous miftake of the abflradl names and natures 
 " of mere accidents for fubftanccs, nor from the 
 " fcholaftic elTences faid to be eternal. As for the 
 " latter, none of ihofe fcholaftics ever dreamed, that 
 " there was any univerfal man, or univerfal horfe, ex- 
 *' ifting alone by itfelf, and feparate from all fingulars; 
 " nor that the abftra^t metaphyfical eilences of men, 
 " after they were dead, fubfifted by themfclves, and 
 " did walk up and down amongft graves." The reader 
 may perufe the reft of the anfwer. One can fcarce 
 forbear laughing, to hear men of common (enfc blame" 
 metaphyfics and abftraftion for the fuperftition of the 
 
 * IntellecluaJ fyftem, p. 835. 836. edit. fol. 
 
 vulgar. 
 
Se£t.II. dnd ahftraFiion, 31 
 
 vulgar. Thofe men who have impudence enough to 
 pretend to cenfure mankind for their folly and mad- 
 nefs in believing religion, and to account for the anti- 
 quity and univerfality of the miftake, ihould not look 
 upon their fellow-animals to be ftupid enough to be- 
 lieve, that thofe who never heard of Plato or the 
 fcholaftics, were induced by them to believe a God, 
 and a life of rewards and punifhments when this life 
 is ended. 
 
 I cannot fay that it is for this purpofe, directly and 
 immediately at leaft, that Lord Bolingbroke hath 
 attacked the do£lrine of abftraftion; but he hath done 
 it for a purpofe bad enough. " * Who can help 
 " fmiling," faith he, " when he is told, that, by the 
 " help of fuch ideas, and of certain felf-evident 
 " maxims, knowledge is a comprehenfion of things a 
 
 " priori ? Strange effefts of myfterious abflrac- 
 
 *' tion ! ftrange foundations of eternal and immutable 
 *' morality ! They might be rejefted with contempt, 
 " if they were abfurd only ; but they are carried fo 
 " far, that they become profane, a fort of metaphy- 
 " fical blafphemy, and deferve indignation." His 
 Lordihip fays, " f We can take the properties of 
 " things both phyfical and moral, into diftinft confi- 
 " deration. This philofophers have done, with ho- 
 *« nour to themfelves, and advantage to others. But 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 368. 
 + Vol. V. p. $8. 
 
 <' when 
 
2Z Of logics, metaphyjics, Stdi, II , 
 
 '' when they have been long accuftoraed to fuch 
 " abflraift confiderations, and have eftablifhed certain 
 *' mathematical and moral truths upon them, fome 
 " of thcfe philofophers alTume, that thefe general 
 " notions are natures, independent on God." Thefe 
 notions can never become natures ; nor can any phi- 
 lofbpher give being and exiflence to notions, and turn 
 his ideas into ideata. For this he blames logicians, 
 metaphyficians, and divines; and I have as good 
 a right, and I hope to make it appear that I have a 
 better right, to blame him for talking nonfenfe, on 
 purpofe to darken the firfi: principles of knowledge, 
 and to cad a thick veil over the moral attributes of 
 the Almighty, and to fap the foundation of mora- 
 lity and the moral law. When his Lordlliip looked 
 through Dr Cud worth's metaphyfical glafs, he 
 faw nothing fo horrid as blafphemy ; he faw fome- 
 thing that glittered, though he knew not what ; and, 
 fure, he did not fee glittering blafphemy. Metaphy- 
 iics are the famx thing now that they were then; and 
 why iliould he charge them not only with abfurdity, 
 but likewife with blafphemy ? The fcience treats of 
 being in general, and not of theology. If it is carried 
 too far, it is by departing from the fundamental truths 
 which it teaches. For this neither the fcience, nor thefe 
 truths are to be blamed. Be allured, 'Squire Mal- 
 let, that there is no more blafphemy in metaphy- 
 fics than in mathematics. All things which tliis phi- 
 lofopher doth not like, or that fland in the way of 
 his lyftem, muft be fwept away with flrong and ab- 
 
 ufive 
 
Seft. II. and ahjl ration. 33 
 
 iifive expre/Iions ; logics^ metaphyfics, divinity, and 
 even difputation, becaufe it is fraudulent; frau- 
 dulent, not fure, as managed by him ; but by all 
 that oppofe him or differ from him : and all this to 
 lay a new foundation of morality, not only in oppo- 
 fition, but in injurious contempt of all writers on the 
 fubje^l, except Mr Poiret, fo far as I know. To 
 charge the greateft philofophers and moralills with ab- 
 furdity, difcovers more vanity than wifdom, and 
 more rufticity than becomes a gentleman. But to 
 treat them as profane blafphemers, deferves fuch a 
 return as cannot decently be given to the dead ; and 
 I have no mind to enter the lifts with his Efquire 
 the publiiher, on the art of debating in ill language. 
 
 His Lordfhip's doctrine is. That the will of God 
 is to be learned from his works, and that there is no 
 other way of knowing it. Any one who is difpofed to 
 take repetition for reafon, would find this thefis or 
 pofition confirmed with forty arguments. And that 
 he had nothing to fay on the fubjecl, hwx. fo it is, is 
 to me evident, by his not bellowing one (ingle page 
 to fliew the connexion l^etween the works and the 
 will of God, as the rule of our behaviour, and a 
 law which we are bound to obey. Now, what I 
 have to fay on this, and other following afiertions 
 contained in this Nobleman's philofophical works, are, 
 in my opinion, the greateft: and moft important things 
 that can come under human conridcratioii. Quod 
 
 fELIX FAUSTUMCi,UE SIT. 
 
 E SECT, 
 
34 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of eternal truth and right eoufnefs, 
 
 IB E G I N with the author's thefis or pofition, 
 That the will of God, as the rule of our be- 
 haviour^ and a law which we are bound to obey^ is to 
 be learned only from his works. And it deferves the 
 firft place according to the rules of good order. For 
 Atheifts and Theifts agree, that there is a natural and 
 efTenrial difference between right and iTirong, juft and 
 unjufi^ moral good and moral einl. And how an 
 Atheifl: can have fuch a notion, I cannot undcrftand : 
 nor can Mr Mallet, if it is only by the works of 
 God that morality is to be learned ; for. an Atheifl 
 neither believes a God, nor that the world is his 
 work. 
 
 This new foundation of morality hath two faults 
 at lead:, ift, The works are not the only way of 
 knowing the will of God ; and, 2diy^ It is not the 
 proper and immediate way. And I fay, firfl, It is 
 not the only way of finding out, and of laying a 
 foundation for morality. For it is of his own ilicw- 
 ing, " * That a moral obligation may fubfill with- 
 " out a law, and a law may be fuch as to create no 
 [' moral obligation. "W hen we fpeak of moral obli- 
 
 * Vol. iij. p. 4C2. ad mar g. 
 
 " gations, 
 
Sect. III. Of eternal truth. Sec. 55 
 
 " gations, either we mean nothing ■ or we mean that 
 " we are tied, bound, and under an internal, that 
 " is, a moral neceflity, of conforming ourfelves to 
 " thole rules which are expreded in the conftitution 
 " of our nature, and on the obfervation of which 
 " the happinefs of our kind depends. Reafon is in 
 " this cafe the obliger. A rational creature is the 
 " obliged, and he is fo obliged as no law made by 
 " mere will can of itfelf oblige." Here he mufl 
 mean human laws, becaufe fuch laws may enaft im- 
 moral things. *' This order is inverted in the 
 
 divine law of nature. The moral neceffity of adt- 
 ing agreeably to it, in order to fecure the happi- 
 nefs which we are determined irrefiftibly to de- 
 fire, is a firft confideration, and is alone fufficient 
 to create obligation. In difcovering this law, we 
 are led to difcover the legiflator ; and will is add- 
 ed to inveft obligation with all the forms of law ; 
 the will of that Being who conftituted the obliga- 
 tion, when he made the human fyftem, and who, 
 by conftituting the obligation, made and promul- 
 gated the law.'* 
 
 His Lordfhip talks here beyond metaphyfics, and 
 beyond human underftanding. A moral obligation 
 without a law, is a law known independently of the 
 works and the will of God. In this cafe then it is 
 not by the works that we know the will of God. 
 To make a law without a lawgiver, is what neither 
 E 2 you 
 
36 Of eternal truth Sec^t. III. 
 
 yon nor 1 on do. P^ therefore, poftcrior to this 
 known lawlefs law, will is added to invert the ohli- 
 gallon with all the forms of Jaw. I afk. If before 
 this inveftment the obligation had the force of a law, 
 or not ? If it had the force of a law, it did not want 
 any additional forms ; and if it had not the force of 
 a law, it was not a law ; for a law without the force 
 of a law is an abfurdity. In difcovcring this law, 
 we are led to difcover the legiilator. The law, and 
 the knowledge of it, are antecedent ro the difcovcry 
 of the will of God known by his works. There 
 can be no law without a lawgiver ; and yet the law is 
 known before it difcovers the lawgiver. The moral ne- 
 cefTity of ading agreeably to the moral law, and the 
 fecurity of our own happincfs, is a firft confideration, 
 and is alone fufficient to create obligation. There- 
 fore this obligation wants no more force or form. If 
 happinefs is the firft confideration, and foundation of 
 the moral law, which lays us under a moral neceflity 
 to obferve it ; what is a moral law to one, may not be 
 a moral law to another ; becaufc men may, and of- 
 ten do differ in their opinions of happinefs. Reafbn, 
 he fays, is the obligcr, and the rational creature the 
 obliged. Well and wonderfully diftinguifhcd be- 
 tween a reafonable creature and his reafon ! This dif- 
 tinftion is fo fine that I cannot fee the difl^ercncc. 
 This reafonable creature is both the obligcr and the 
 obliged. He obliges himfclf .to himfelf; and fc? 
 leaves himfclf abfolutc mailer, without law and with- 
 out obligation. And \\o\\\ in th's cafe, wc can be 
 
 ticdj^ 
 
Seel. III. and right eoufnejs, 37 
 
 tied, bound, and under an internal moral neceffity 
 of conforming oiirfelves to the rules exprefled in the 
 confticution of our nature, cannot be underftood. A 
 law is given to thofe, and to thofe only, who may, 
 and can break or obey it ; and can therefore be under 
 no neceffity of a£ting according to any rules prefcri- 
 bed by it. Thefe rules are exprefled in the confti- 
 tution of our nature ; and are made obligatory by 
 the will of that Being who made the human fyftem. 
 This is, in Ihort, that God made man a reafonable 
 creature, and the dilates of his reafon a rule of 
 aftion. And this is all the fenfe that can be extra6t- 
 ed out of a heap of incoherent (luiF. 
 
 Morality is one thing, and the moral law is an- 
 other. We muft know what a6tions are moral, and 
 what are immoral, before we can judge of what is 
 commanded, and what is forbidden. The queftioii 
 arifing from this is, How do we know morality ? Lord 
 BoLiNGBROKE fays, by the will of God manifeftcd 
 in his works. But this is againft himfelf, and againft 
 univerfal experience. For, as I faid, men, whether 
 Theifts of Atheifts, have a notion of right and wrong, 
 juft and unjuft. The firft men, faith he, could not 
 difcover the being of God, until their underhand- 
 ings were ripened into maturity. And he fays *, 
 (though mofl: faifely), that " this was done fo ilow- 
 "' ly, that polytheifm was prior to monorhcifm.'' By 
 
 * Vol, i, p. zox. 
 
38 Of eternal truth Sea. Illi 
 
 this time men had formed themfeives into focieties. 
 And can one think, that, during fo large a fpace of 
 time, they did not know a diftinftion between jufl 
 and unjuit, equity and iniquity, moraHty and immo- 
 rahty ? A mere favage, a child, knows the difference 
 between an injury and a good office, without ever 
 thinkinfT of God, or of his works. And Grotius 
 faid, and faid well, that though it fliould be granted 
 there is no God, yet 'the diflinction betwixt ^'«/? and 
 unjuft would take place ; aliquem locum haberet. His 
 LordfliipdiiHnguiflies between the moral law, and the 
 ix)fitive law, that depends entirely on the will of 
 God ; which dilhnclion cannot hold, unlefs there is 
 fomething in morality confidered in itfelf, which 
 makes it independent of, or anterior, in our concep- 
 tion, both to the will and the works of God. 
 
 Allowing the moral fenfe to be nonfcnfe, and, 
 if you will have it, let it be ethical enthufiafm, and 
 let innate ideas or proleptical knowledge be difcarded 
 from philofophy; there remains no other way of 
 knowing jufi from unjujl, morality from immorality, 
 but by the ufc of underftanding and reafon. We 
 diflinguifli virtue from vice the fame way that we 
 dilVinguifh true {vomfa/fe. And we may as well fay, 
 that it is only by the works of God that we difcover 
 every mathematical truth and metaphyfical axiom, as 
 that it is only from thefc works that we can deduce 
 and conclude the elTenyal diifcrcncc between morality 
 
 and 
 
Se6l.III. and rtghteoiifnefs, 39 
 
 and immorality, Obferve, I do not fay /« and duty. 
 Is it not by reafon (his Lordfhip fays, by long and 
 ftrong reafoning) that we difcover the being of God, 
 his unity, and other attributes ? And had we no pre- 
 vious conception of power and wifdom, of goodnefs, 
 juftice, and truth, it is abfolutely impoffible that we 
 could conclude the unity, wifdom, and power, the 
 juftice, goodnefs, and veracity, and even the being of 
 God. To affirm, that it is only from the works of 
 God that we difcover his will ; and that it is owing 
 to his will, that two and two are equal to four, that 
 the caufe is prior to the effeft, and that juft cannot be 
 unjuft ; that power cannot be weaknefs, nor wifdom 
 folly, is really to reafon in the round. Thefe truths, 
 whether mathematical, metaphyfical, or moral, do 
 not depend on the arbitrary will and appointment of 
 God. We do depend on him in every thing ; for he 
 hath made us, and not we ourfelves. And he hath 
 made us capable to know truth from falfity, right 
 from wrongs as he himfelf knows, and as they really 
 are ; that is, antecedently and independently on his 
 will, as eternal, immutable, and independent on his 
 power and wifdom, or any other of his attributes, his 
 intelligence only excepted. As his own neceflary ex- 
 iftence and nature doth not depend on his will, no 
 more do neceffary truths depend on his pleafure. 
 
 It would coft more pains than the work would be 
 worth, to collect all the padages the author hath fcat- 
 
 tered 
 
40 Of eternal truth Se^.IIL 
 
 tercd in his voluminous philofbphy againfl eternal and 
 independent truth. In place of which, 1 ihall tran- 
 fcribc part of a paragraph *. " We fay, that the law 
 *' of nature is tiie law of reafon ; and To it is in this 
 " (Cicero's) lenfe, and thus far. A right ufe of 
 " this faculty which God hath given us, colle£ls this 
 " law from the nature of things, as they ftand in the 
 " fyllem which he hath conftituted. Reafon can look 
 " no higher, nor will right re^fon attempt it. For 
 " furely no difquifition can be more vain and need- 
 " lefs, than that which examines whether a£l:ions arc 
 " lawful or unlawful, debiti aiit i/lidii, becaufe they 
 *' are commanded or forbid by God ; or whether they 
 *' are fuch per fe independently of God, and there- 
 " fore nccefTarily, necejjario, commanded or forbidden 
 " by him, Grotius adopts the lart: of thefe no- 
 *' tions, and the general current of metaphyfical re- 
 '* finement runs that way. It afTumcs in man a com- 
 " munity of reafon with God ; and then it feems 
 *' confcquential to adlimc, that men, fuch at leafl as 
 " thefe reafbners imagine themfelves to be, are able 
 '* to difccrn natures, and to judge of things antece- 
 "■ ucntly to a6lual exiftence, and abflraftly from it: 
 " whereas, perhaps, to think rightly, we muft think, 
 " that thefe natures and things, con(idered abflraflly 
 " from the manner and the relations in which they 
 " exift, are nothing better than imaginary entities, ob- 
 " jefts of ill-chofen fpeculation, not of knowledge. 
 
 * "ol. iv. p. I z. I ^. 14. I X. 
 
Sea. III. <af»^ right eoujnefs. 41 
 
 *' He who thinks thus, will be apt to afk, What 
 
 " would become of juffice, if we fuppofe a fyftem 
 
 " wherein there was no property ? or what of tempe- 
 
 " ranee, if we fuppofed one wherein there is no ex- 
 
 ■" cefs P Such queftions, and many other objeftions, 
 
 " would not be eafily anfwered. And the fole effea: 
 
 « of this hypothefis muft be, as I think it hath been, 
 
 " to render our notions of natural laws difputable and 
 
 " undeterminable in many cafes. The difquifition is 
 
 " not only vain, but hurtful. It is needlefs too, ab- 
 
 " folutely needlefs. For will any man deny, that 
 
 *' however indifferent natures may hcperfe, and fim- 
 
 *' ply confidered, they ceafe to be fo when they are 
 
 " connefted with a fyftem, and cannot be feparated, 
 
 ** even in imagination, from the relations they bear to 
 
 " other parts of the fyftem, nor from the effects on 
 
 '' the whole ? The fyftem to which we belong, like 
 
 " every other fyftem, was made by the will of God ; 
 
 " and therefore all the creatures contained in it, both 
 
 *' phyfical and moral, are ordained by the faine will. 
 
 " It hath been faid, withfhocking impiety, by fchool- 
 
 " men, and others, That if things were made as they 
 
 " are by the mere will of God, and not according 
 
 " to the eftential differences, and the eternal inde- 
 
 " pendent nature of things, God might have mr.de 
 
 " our obl'gations to the law of nature to be contrary 
 
 " to what they are : He might have made it our du- 
 
 " ry to blafpheme, not adore him; to exercife inju- 
 
 *' ftice, not juftice, in our dealings v/ith other men. 
 
 F *' But 
 
42 0/ eternal truth Sea. Ill, 
 
 " But this is an inftance, and not the lead, of that ha- 
 " bitual prefumption which men contraft in the fchools 
 *' of metaphyfics and theology ; where they are ac- 
 " cuftomed to reafon about what infinite wifdom and 
 " power might or lliould have done, inftead of con- 
 ** tenting themfelves to know what they have done, 
 " and pronouncing for that reafon fitteft to be done. 
 *' In creating man, God defigned to create, not only 
 *' a rational, but a focial creature, and a moral agent ; 
 " and has framed his nature accordingly. If he had 
 '* defigned this world to be the habitation o^f devils, 
 *' he might have made us by nature what we fay they 
 " made themfelves by rebellion. But as vve ought 
 *' not to prefume to cenfure the divine perfeftions, 
 *' nor the proceedings of infinite wifdom, by our fan- 
 *' cy and precarious ideas ; fo it is worfe than pre- 
 *' fumption, to afcribe, even hypothetically, to the 
 *' all-perfcdt Being, any thing that is evidently re- 
 *' pugnant to our ideas of perfection. Once more, 
 *' therefore, let us be content to know things as God 
 " hath been plea fed to fliew them to us, and to look 
 " no further than our own nature for the law of it. 
 *' In that wc fliall find this law co-eval with our ly- 
 *' ftem, if not with the author ; and as immutable 
 '' as the lyflcm, if not as immutable as God." 
 
 To me it appears a wilful mifreprefentation of 
 abflrafl: eUences, to call them natures, and yet more 
 
 exprefsly 
 
ScSi. III. afid righieoiijnejs, 43 
 
 exprefsly fpiritual fuhftances. " * The eflences of 
 ** things, the ^eternj; verilateSy are incorporeal fub- 
 " ftances." For he muft know, that in truth they 
 are no more, and at prefent are held for no more, 
 than relations, which are imchangeable. For inflance, 
 the conformity or the agreement of the fuhje5l with 
 the predicate. It is certain, that every truth is fuch 
 an agreement; but every truth is not immutably fuch. 
 It is now true, that Peter was learned; but Peter 
 was not always learned, and Peter may forget all 
 his learning : but the equality of two and two to 
 four, (which is but a relation), always was, and al- 
 ways will be true, without arbitrary appointment, 
 and even though there was no mind to compare them. 
 For by comparing they are not made equal ; but be- 
 ing equal, they are found fuch when compared. So 
 is this truth. The caufe is prior to the effeft ; and this 
 other truth. Morality is the produft of right reafon, 
 or, Juftice is a conformity of our anions to the dic- 
 tates of it. It is no wonder your Noble author falls 
 into many blunders, when it is obvious to every read- 
 er the lead acquainted with fuch matters, that he 
 either doth not imderftand, or perpetually mifapplies 
 the common terms. For it is certain, that the rela- 
 tion of the fubje^um to the pradicatum is neither na- 
 ture nor fubflance. Subftances are made to exift, 
 and may be unmade : but though omnipotence may 
 deftroy, it cannot alter the eflences of things. This 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 346. 
 
 F 2 he 
 
44 Of eternal truth Sea. 111. 
 
 he acknowledges. Though all triangles were turned 
 out of the univerfe, and though no fuch figure exift- 
 ed in matter, ftill it would remain a truth, that a 
 triangle is a figure comprehended with three lines. 
 And were it not for fuch truths, we could prove no- 
 thing. 
 
 I have faid *, " That there are eternal and un- 
 " changeable truths, is as certain as that there is any 
 •* truth at all. Eflentials are invariable; and what is 
 " ellentially predicated of a fubjeft, is invariably true. 
 " For inrtancCj to the idea of man belong the ideas 
 *' of animal and reajonahle \ and therefore that man 
 *' is a reafonable animal, is an eternal and immutable 
 *' truth. It was a truth before man was made, and 
 
 "• will be a truth if man fhould be no more. 
 
 " And though God is infinitely free, and can do or 
 " not do whatever doth not imply a contradiction ; yet 
 " there mull: always be a diflerence in the things con- 
 " fidered in themfelves, not in the divine plealiire, 
 " to conflitutc fome pcjfible and others imiqffible-j 
 " othcrwifc God might make impojjible to become 
 '■* frjfilkr PoiTibility confifls in the confiflcncy of 
 attributes, confiftentia attrihtttorum ; and impofTibility 
 in their repugnance. And to make a thing confiflent 
 and inconfiftent at once, is the height of abfurdity, 
 and againft the firii and fundamental principle of ra- 
 tiocination. The root of polfibility, in part known 
 
 * Eftimate of religion, p. 82. 
 
 to 
 
Se^l.III. and righteoufnefs, 45 
 
 to us, and perfeftly known to God, is the immu- 
 table rule of his creation. And fo his knowledge of* 
 right and wrong, jujl and unjafi, is an invariable rule 
 of" his government of the world. As the divine know- 
 ledge of things pofTible doth not make them poITible, 
 (for it is the will that is operative) ; fo no more doth 
 the divine knowledge o^ jufi and unjujl make actions 
 either the one or the other. To the divine rnind, the 
 knowledge of ti'ue and falfe, right and wrong, is as 
 eflential as is his omnifcience. It admits therefore of 
 no change, no variation ; and what is thus fixed and 
 immutable, never had, and never can have any de- 
 pendence on the will. It therefore can be no objec- 
 tion. That " * God makes things dependent on him 
 " to exifl conformably to natures independent on 
 " him : " for, before exiftence, things have no de- 
 pendence on God ; and after exiflence, the nature 
 of thefe things remains the fame, as in a Hate of pof- 
 fibillty they were in the divine mind. Their exifl- 
 ence is owing to his will ; and as exiftent, they depend 
 upon him. But the eternal omnifcience of God, 
 by which not only things a(flual, butpoflible likewife, 
 are known, doth not depend on his will, becaufe it is 
 an edential attribute of his being. Notliing depends 
 on the fupreme Being, but what he v/ills to be ; and 
 he doth not v/ill himfelf to be omnifcient, for he is 
 fuch ellentially. You, or your Noble author, fay f. 
 That " God may have confcious knowledge of all 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 351. f VoLiii. p.378. 
 
 " things 
 
4^ Of eternal truth Sea. III. 
 
 " things pofTible, as we have confcious knowledge of 
 " our own exigence." Whatever God knows, he 
 knows intuitively : but I would not fay that this is 
 confcious knowledge, and fuch as we have of our 
 own exiftence; becaufe it founds as if poffibilities 
 vi^ere inherent and cffential to the divine eflence, and 
 knowledge and things known arc not jufl the fame. 
 God knows the equality of two and two to four, not 
 confcioufly, but intuitively. But his knowledge doth 
 not make the equality. For, upon fuppofition that 
 this equality never was, and never will be known, it 
 is ftill the lame in itfelf, independently of all intel- 
 ligence. 
 
 I will not deny that it hath been faid by fchool- 
 men and others. That if all aftions were indifferent 
 antecedently to divine appointment, and if their equi- 
 ty and iniquity depended on his will and arbitrary 
 pleafure; then might he have commanded what he 
 forbids, and forbidden what he commanded. And if 
 this is fhocking, it doth not follow from that which 
 he oppofcs, but from that which he vainl}^ and weak- 
 ly endeavours to llipport. He who makes all things 
 true, juft, and good, to depend on the arbitrary will 
 of God, m.ay be charged with this fliocking impiety; 
 but it is not to be placed to the account of thofe 
 fchoolmen and others who hold, that morality and 
 immorality, virtue and vice, are eflentially, eternally, 
 and unchangeably different. I give .you and your 
 
 Lord 
 
Se<5t. III. and righteoujjiefs. 47 
 
 Lord back your abfurdity, with the addition of an ad- 
 vice, Never to meddle with things too high for your 
 low underftanding, and who profefs to know nothing 
 but hy Jenfation and experience. 
 
 He imagines it a very puzzling quedion, and not 
 eafily anfwered, " What would become of juflice, if 
 *' we fuppofcd a fyftem wherein there was no pro- 
 " perty ? " A wonderful fyftem it muft be, which 
 doth not admit of intelligent beings. Exclude them, 
 and there remains no place for the knowledge and the 
 exercife of juftice. Admit intelligent beings, and 
 private right and property muft go along with them. 
 For every intelligent being hath a right and property 
 to what it is ; to his life and to his limbs ; which, 
 without a crime, he cannot forfeit ; nor other intelli- 
 gent beings deprive him of, without a violation of ju- 
 ftice. But upon fuppofition of no fyftem at all, 
 (and before the creation there was none), juftice 
 would be juftice, right would be right, and truth 
 would be truth, becaufe unmade and eternal. 
 
 It is further faid, '' Will any man deny, however 
 " indifferent a<ftions may be per fe, and fimply con- 
 " (idered, they ceafe to be fo when connefted with 
 " a fyftem, and cannot be feparated, not even in i- 
 " magination, from the relation they bear to other 
 " parts, nor from their effects upon the whole I " 
 That is to fay. That there were no truths, either 
 
 mathematical, 
 
48 Of eternal truth Scft. III. 
 
 mathematical, nietaphyfical, or moral, before this 
 or fome other fyftems were made. Before, it was 
 not true, that a triangle was a figure comprehended 
 with three lines ; nor was it true, that the caufe is 
 prior to the effe^l, and that there was nothing bad or 
 good ; but that all thefe things began to be when 
 the fyflem was made. He forgets that God knew 
 from eternity all poffibilities ; and therefore all a- 
 greements and dilagreements of things, and fo all 
 truths, were open to his omnifcicnt intelligence. 
 Thefe truths he did not make, as I have proved, 
 for he knew them from eternity; and nothing eternal 
 can be made. And if he did not make them from 
 eternity, he did not make them in time. If before 
 the commencement of the world no propofitions were 
 true, no anions juft ; then no propofitions were falfe, 
 no aftions unjuft ; true and falfc, jufl: and unjuft, 
 and 1 may add pcjftbie and impcjpiblef were unknown 
 to the omnifcicnt, the fupreme. Being, the Author 
 of our fyftem, and all other fyftems : than which 
 nothing is more abfurd, nothing more blafphemous. 
 
 There are truths neccfi^ry, and truths contingent ; 
 tliere arc fome anions in themfelves neceflarily good 
 and jufl, and others indifferent, or contingently fuch. 
 For the Noble philofophcr admits the dillindlion be- 
 tween the moral and podtive law. This is variable 
 according to circumflances and occafions ; but that is 
 fixed and immutable. It is a matter of inditference 
 
 to 
 
Scft. III. and right eoufiefs, 4p 
 
 to eat thrice or twice a-day. And our lawful fuperi- 
 ors and fbvereigns may determine which is to be done ; 
 and their commands become lawful and binding. 
 And God may bring us under many obligations to 
 aft in things, which he knows, and we know not, 
 that tend to our happinefs. And the difference be- 
 tween human and divine law, as contingent and pofi- 
 tlve, is, that human legislators may be miftaken, 
 but the divine legiflator never errs. But to break 
 or to perform a promife, is not a matter of indiffer- 
 ence ; but is determined to be moral or immoral, by 
 the diftates of right reafon, previoufly and independ* 
 ently of all appointment, and all authority, human 
 or divine. Had he faid, that all actions are indif- 
 ferent, until the conftitution of the fyftem makes 
 them otherwife, he had fpoken intelligibly, though 
 erroneoufly ; but to fay that fome aftions are indiffer- 
 ent until the fyftem makes an alteration, looks like 
 the fraud of difputation. For, becaufe fome aftions 
 indifferent become lawful or unlawful, by the mere 
 and arbitrary appointment of a fuperior and lawful 
 power, therefore all adlions are fuch, is fuch a con- 
 cIuGon that logic doth not admit. And for many 
 fuch arguments to be found in his philofophical v/orks, 
 it is no wonder he hath declared it impertinent to his 
 pixrpofe. 
 
 The men who maintain, that many actions arc jufi 
 and unjuji in themfelves, antecedently to divine ap- 
 
 G pointraent, 
 
50 Of eternal truth Se^. III. 
 
 pointment, do not in every cafe determine what in- 
 finite power and wildom lliould do. Many things 
 ftijl depend upon God's arbitrary will and pleafure. 
 He may create more worlds, (for extenfion is not 
 actually infinite), and he may preferve or reduce 
 thofe worlds which he hath made. But it is no dif- 
 credit to the fchools of metaphyfics and theology, 
 that in them they have learned, that God always a£ls 
 according to the re£litude of his efTence ; and that 
 therefore he cannot change neceflary and eternal truths 
 into error, nor neceflary and eternal righteoufnefs in- 
 to injuftice. Inftead of being guilty of prefumption, 
 it would be a neglect of duty in them, not to in- 
 quire into the equity and iniquity of a£lions, that 
 thereby they may know and obey the will of their 
 Creator ; and the fooner the better. I cannot there- 
 fore take your or your author's advice, and fufpend 
 giving judgment of the morality and immorality of 
 anions, until I have learned by their confequenccs, 
 what good or what evil thefe a£lions do. Place Mr 
 Mallet in any pod or ftation in this our fyftem, in 
 which he hath neither been nor aftcd ; if he will a£l 
 a reafonable and a moral part, he muft immediately 
 and firft of all have recourfe to the di£htes of his 
 reafon. And as this life is the only fcene of afting 
 and fuffcring, according to your opinion, you may 
 live forty years before you can flare the balance of 
 the advantages and difadvantagcs of morality ; and 
 confequently before you can fettle to yourfelf a rule 
 
 of 
 
Se<^. III. and right eouf 11 'fs. 51 
 
 of life. This metaphyfics and theology teach ; and 
 this every reafbnable and moral man ought to prac- 
 tife. He knows that it is his duty to a^t reafonably ; 
 but he cannot know the confequences with certain- 
 ty, until they happen. His certain knowledge is to 
 be his rule of action, and not thofe contingent confe- 
 quences, of which he hath no fixed and determined 
 knowledge. This is a rule of morality which good 
 Theifts do, and ought to obferve. To do what is 
 right, and to refer the confequences to God, who 
 lees, and can provide for them. And becaufe " it is 
 " worfe than prefumption, to afcribe to the all-per- 
 " fe£l Being any thing that is repugnant to our 
 " ideas of pcrfeftion," 1 do aflert, that there are 
 truths and aflions eternally and eflentially fuch, in- 
 dependently on the divine appointment ; and that 
 God cannot change the equahty of two and two to 
 four, nor command impiety and immorality. And 
 that God may command what he forbids, and forbid 
 what he commands, is not metaphyfical or theological 
 blafphemy, but a conclufion which follows from his 
 Lordiliip's principles ; that is, That the truth of all 
 propofitions, and the equity of all a6hons, depend upon 
 the arbitrary appointment of the fupreme Being. I 
 am content, as his Lordlhip advifes, *' to know things 
 " as God hath been pleafed to ihew them." But 
 if God hath been pleafed to make me underftand 
 things above your capacity of underlianding, and par- 
 ticularly, that fome truths and fome anions arenecellary 
 G 2 and 
 
52 Of eternal truth Seft. TIL 
 
 and eternal, thefe morally good, and thofe unchange- 
 ably true ; I am not obliged to flop when he fays 
 Halt, I am os ill pleafcd with the other part of his 
 advice, " To look no further than our nature, for 
 " the law of it.'* 
 
 My reafon for this is, that I find it laid down as 
 a principle by another writer, That *' * a£tions com- 
 *' mon to the nature of every fpecies, are confidcred 
 
 " by us as regular and gooJ. The laws of na- 
 
 " ture are to be derived from the common nature of 
 *' man, of which every perfon partakes who is not 
 
 " a monfler. And this is the ground-v/ork of all 
 
 " morality. We arc not left to gather our duty by 
 " abflraft reafoning, nor indeed by any reafoning. 
 " It is ingraved upon the table of our hearts. We 
 ^' adapt our a<5lions to the courfe of nature by mere 
 " inflincl, without reafoning or experience." This 
 I have already examined "f. It is true, his Lordfliip 
 of BoLiNG BROKE fays, that '' the lav/ of na- 
 " ture is the law of reafon j " but he admits it with 
 this reftriftion : " A right ufe of tliis faculty which 
 *' God hath given us, collects this lav/ from the na- 
 '' ture of things, as they jfland in the fyRem which 
 " he hath conftituted." Reafon then can only 
 make the difcovery, by obfcrving the courfe of nature 
 in the material, aniirial, and moral world, fo far as 
 
 * Lord Kainis's EfTiys, p. 37. 40. 316, 
 j- Eftimate, § iv. 
 
 wc 
 
Se5t.III. and right eoufnefs, 53 
 
 we know it. In the lower part, or mere material^ we 
 obferve order and regularity. But this is no foundation 
 for regulating our aftions according to the di(5i:ates of 
 reafon ; becaufe this material regularity doth not teach 
 us what is morally right, or immorally wrong. Tho' 
 his Lordfliip believed that he was made after the 
 image of fome beafl: or other, I am perfuaded he did 
 not think it his duty to live and a61: as brutally as 
 they do. He had too little realbn to live like a 
 moral man, and too much to live by mere inftind. 
 There is no other way left then to learn his duty, but 
 from the courfe of human life, as it ftands in our 
 fyftem. And to follow his human leaders, and in 
 his turn to lead the way in the pradice of virtue and 
 vice, without regard to the law of reafon, inforced 
 by divine authority, is a very bad fchool to learn 
 in, what is good and m/, right and 'wrongs juji 
 and Uffjuji^ unlefs by the confequences of his ac- 
 tions, founded on long experience. And I am of 
 opinion, that his Lordfhip's life was an inftance of 
 the vanity and uncertainty of fuch a moral fcience. 
 Better he had made ufe of his faculty of reafon in 
 the metaphyfical and theological way, ^ to have 
 learned his duty to God and man. Before I 
 have done, I do believe that I fliall make it ap- 
 pear, that his philofophy amounts to this. That 
 this world, and all other worlds that are, together 
 with their inhabitants, are neceflarily what they are, 
 
 and 
 
54 Of eternal truth Seft. III. 
 
 and cannot pofllbly be otherwife, either better or 
 worfe. 
 
 Before I leave what I have tranfcribed, the con- 
 clufion, which ought to be the moll: important part, 
 muft be confidered. His words are: '* In our nature 
 " we fhall find the law of nature co-eval with our 
 " fyflem, if not with the author ; and as immutable 
 " as the fyflem, if not as immutable as God." Sure, 
 no man writes with lefs precifion ; and no wonder, for 
 he confiders metaphyfics as the delirium of human 
 underftanding. Is the human nature the whole of our 
 fyftem ? Has man no relation, no connexion with 
 other beings ? We are but a fmall part of what we 
 know, and a much fmaller of the numberlefs and 
 unmeafurable imaginary worlds, and the author's ima- 
 ginary fcale of beings. If the law of nature is only 
 found in our nature, fuch as it is, and fuch as we find 
 it, it is idle to talk of a larger fyftem. This law, 
 you fay, is as immutable as the fyftem. What fy- 
 ftem.-* that of human nature, or that of the univerfe.'* 
 In the human, which I take to be the fuperior part 
 of our terreftrial globe, nothing is fixed, becaufe 
 there is nothing more various than man. Some agree 
 to-day, and differ to-morrow from one another; and 
 fome arc not the fame in principle and practice for a 
 day. To fay, that the law of our nature is as immu- 
 table as our fyftem, is no great encomium. It is ra- 
 ther conjtant in inconjlancy. Such a phrafc I have 
 
 heard 
 
Se6l. III. . and righteoufiejs. ^^ 
 
 heard in fpeaking of the human nature. But if the 
 law of nature is not mofe permanent, it is fo far 
 from being a law, that it is an archetype or pattern of 
 irregularity. I allow, that this irregularity is almoft 
 or very near co-eval with mankind. I likewife not 
 only admit, but affirm, that the law of right reafbn, 
 that teaches the eternal difference betwixt virtue and 
 vice, morality and immorality, is co-eternal with the 
 author of the univerfe, becaufe independent of all 
 arbitrary appointment, and therefore as immutable as 
 the fupreme Being. This his Lordiliip neither denies 
 nor affirms. And what hath he learned by fearching 
 our fyllem for the foundation of morality? Is not all 
 that he hath laid on the fubjeft no better than fmall 
 talk, feeing from it he can conclude nothing certain ? 
 But I have learned from him, that he knows nothing 
 of the matter. 
 
 On another occafion, notwithftanding, he talks 
 dogmatically on the fame fubje^l. " * We muft go 
 " through a procefs of reafoning, that connefts cer- 
 " tain evident truths intuitively together, and fb ar- 
 ** rive at demonftration. Though the Atheifl doth 
 " not conneft them into a demonftration of God^s ex- 
 " iftence, yet he knows them all to be truths, as well 
 " as the Theift. He knows they refult from the na- 
 " ture of things, he pronounces them therefore im- 
 " mutable and eternal: but he takes no fide of the 
 
 * Vol. Hi. p. 343. admarg, 
 
 " queflion. 
 
56 Of eternal truth Sc(fl. III. 
 
 " queflion, whether *hey are dependent or independ- 
 " e,\\l on God, fince he acknowledges no God." 
 In thefe few words, there are two errors of inadver- 
 tency, alias blunders ; fnch as, a procefs of reafcm- 
 ing, which connects evident truths vr.tuitrjely together. 
 Intuitive knowledge depends on no procefs or feries of 
 argumentation. The other blunder is, that the A- 
 theift dot'ii not determine, whether thcfc eternal and 
 immutable truths depend on God, or not, becaufe he 
 acknowledges no God. And becaufe he acknow- 
 ledges no God, he certainly determines in the nega- 
 tive. It is not for thefe remarks that I take notice of 
 the pafiage, but to iliew, that he is pofitivc and per- 
 emptory in averting the eternity and immutability of 
 ellences and edential truths, in which Theifts and A- 
 theifts are agreed. He further acknowledges, that 
 fbme truths are not only eternal, but alfo independ- 
 ent on God. " * Truths relating to God, always 
 " have been, and always will be the fame. They 
 *' are abfolutely from all eternity to all eternity in- 
 *' dependent on his will : for he is what he is, by the 
 ** ncccfljry of his nature ; and felf-exiileiicc is a part 
 " of his edence." A pert of his ejjence, I do not 
 Lke the cxpreifion. God's neceffary exigence is a 
 truth, and fuch a truth from which it aieccifarily fol- 
 lows, that he is not the caufe of his own exigence; 
 and from this truth follows another more general 
 truth, That nothing can make iifelf tp be; and this 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 343. ad marg. 
 
 great 
 
Sea. III. and r'lghteoufnefs. SJ 
 
 great truth. That this neceflarily-exiftent and un- 
 caufed Being is the caufe of all things contingent. 
 Whatever truths neceirarily follow from fuch as re- 
 late to the fuprerae Being, are of the fame nature 
 with thofe they follow from, and are therefore inde- 
 pendent of the divme will and appointment. This is 
 metaphyfics, which his Lordfliip treats with contempt ; 
 though without fuch principles, and fuch rcafoning 
 from them, he cannot conneft his ideas and notions 
 into a demonftration of the exiftence of God. He 
 often fpeaks of this truth as demonflrated a pojleriori; 
 and fo makes the exiftence of other beings the means 
 of knowing, not only the being, but likewife the 
 power and wifdom of God. He muft have known, 
 that Atheifts of all denominations drive to deftroy the 
 conneaion between our exiftence and the exiftence of 
 the fupreme Being ; yet in all his voluminous works 
 he takes no notice of their exceptions; which had he 
 done, he would have found it abfolutely necefTary to 
 take into his reafoning many metaphyfical maxims. 
 
 With the help of a truth which he acknowledges, 
 all this affair of dependence and independence of el- 
 fences and elFential truths is eafily determined. He 
 admits, and fo do I, that '' * God knew, from all 
 *' eternity, every fyftem, corporeal and intelleftual, 
 " which he created in time. He knew, by confe- 
 " quence, for he ordered the various manners in which 
 
 * Vol. i». p. 339. ,, 
 
 H "aU 
 
58 Of elernal truth Sea. III. 
 
 " all the parts of thefe fyftems, and the fyftems them- 
 " felves, fhould operate on one another ; the relations 
 " they iliould have ; the proportions they fhould bear; 
 " the ideas they fhould communicate to creatures fit- 
 " ted to receive them. All this he foreknew ; but all 
 " this did not therefore exift. Such an exiftence was 
 *' at moft eventual; and depended on the will, not on 
 " the knov/ledge of God, if we may diilinguifh them, 
 " to be a little more intelligible." Without this dif- 
 tinftion, what he fays niufl: have been perfect nonfenfe. 
 And it is much better founded than his dilVmftion be- 
 twixt a reafonable creature and his reafon, and better 
 than his diftincStion between God's necellary exiftence 
 and his eilence. If God knew ail things from eter- 
 nity, he cannot deny that fome truths are eternal in 
 the divine mind. His Lordfhip extends this know- 
 ledge to contingent truths, and cannot therefore put 
 necedary truths beyond the reach of omnifcrencc; If 
 God foreknew, that you and I fliould cxift, and be 
 perfuaded that two and two are equal to four, that a 
 triangle is a figure comprehended with three lines, 
 and that man is a reafonable animal ; and that we 
 know that an injury is not a good office, and that thefe 
 things cannot poffibly be otherwife : all thefe truths 
 mull have been known to God from eternity, fuch as 
 they are; the firlt as contingent, and the others as 
 neceflary and immutable. But that which I chiefly 
 fix upon, is Bolingbrokf/s difVmction between the 
 divine underdandinf^ and the di^inc will. And it is 
 
 allowed 
 
Se£l. III. and rightccufnejs. 5P 
 
 '«illowed by liim, that it is not the knowledge, but the 
 will of God, that makes being and reality. There- 
 fore whatever receives nothing from God, is inde- 
 pendent of him. The eflences and natures of iy- 
 Items made, or pofTible to be made, were eternally in 
 the divine mind ; and as fuch, they were and are the 
 obje£ls of his knowledge, biit not of his power or 
 Avill. Exiflence and eflence therefore are not the 
 fame. The divine knowledge is more extenfivc than 
 the divine will ; for God knows what is poffible, as 
 well as what is actual. All eflences and eflential truths 
 never were, and never can be dependent on God : 
 not on liis will ; for he muft firft know them, before 
 he wills them to be ; and knowledge makes no alte- 
 ration in the things ~ known. PofTibilities known to 
 God, remain poflibilities until produced into actuality : 
 and when produced, they retain the fame eflences 
 which they had in the divine knowledge previoiifly 
 •to their exiftence. In a ftate of mere poflibility, all 
 things only pofllble were independent ; and fuch things 
 -as do exift, depend only on God for their being and 
 exiftence. This, I believe, his Lordfliip was aware of ; 
 and therefore afTerts, that God makes things poflible. 
 Of this more hereafter. "That there are eternal truths, 
 metaphyfical, mathematical, and moral, independent 
 of divine appointment, is no hmitation of the divine 
 power, becaufe it doth not extend to impoflibilities. 
 Aiid impoflibility is a purum nihil, a mere nothing 
 H 2 obje<Elivel-y 
 
6o Of eternal truth Seft.III. 
 
 objeftively and relatively. And what is limited by no- 
 thing, is unlimited. 
 
 Descartes held all neceilary and eflential truths 
 to be immutable, but dependent on God. About 
 which, after your Lord had exhaufled his flock of 
 metaphyfics, he acknowledges that he hath done it 
 to no purpofe. For he fays, " It is now time to con- 
 *' elude a note too long perhaps already ; though I 
 " have hurried through it, and treated the matter 
 " more lightly than I could have done. I do not pre- 
 '* tend to decide the qucflion between him and his ad- 
 " verfafies. All I would inculcate from this is, that 
 " fince his opinion may receive a reafonabie interpre- 
 " tation, it lliould not be condemned as abfolutely 
 " and as dogmatically as it hath been ; and that it be- 
 " comes a Theift to incline always to the fide which 
 ** afcribes the greatefl: poflible power to God ; fince 
 ** that which even hath the appearance of limiting it, 
 " by maintaining an independency, whcna dependen- 
 ** cy on him implies no contradiction." This able 
 philofopher, after pleading to no purpcfe for the de- 
 pendency of eternal truth and rightcoufnefs on the 
 arbitrary appointment of God, humbly begs^ the fa- 
 vour of fuch Theifls as himlclf to incline, without 
 a rcafon, (for he gives none), to take part with Des- 
 cartes in tlic debate. 1 cannot grunt the favour; 
 bccaufe I have proved, that his Lordfliip's reafbnings 
 arc not only weak, but ablurd. If independency 
 
 hath 
 
Se6l. III. and right eoufnejs. 61 
 
 hath an appearance of limiting the power of God, it 
 is only to thofe that extend it to impofTibilities. 
 
 Perhaps he did not know, nor do you Mr Mal- 
 let, that fchoolmen diftinguifh poflibility into ob- 
 jeSiive and relative, or ad intra and ad extra. When 
 we conceive a confiftency of attributes and predicates 
 with one another, and with the fubje£t, we judge the 
 thing poffible, provided there is a power fufficient to 
 produce it. Some things are pofTible to human power, 
 and all things conceivable are poflible to omnipotence. 
 To find out what is poffible, we firft confider this con- 
 fiftency and agreement of the attributes with the fub- 
 je^.^and by this we pronounce it a pofTibility ; if in- 
 ftead of an agreement we difcern a repugnancy, it 
 becomes, in our idea, an impoffibility ; and compa- 
 ring the agreement of the fubjeft with its predicates, 
 and both with omnipotence, we declare it pcllible both 
 objedively and relatively, intrinfically and extrinfical- 
 ly. And I learn from Aq.uinas, that if abfolute 
 pofhbility was to be fought only in God's omnipo- 
 tence, this omnipotence could not be explained but 
 in the circular way. For if we fay, that God is 
 omnipotent, bccaufe he can do all things to which 
 omnipotence extends, (and it can extend no further) ; 
 this is juft to fay, that God is omnipotent, becaufe 
 he can do all things that he can do. 
 
 Though perhaps 1 am as weary of the fubje£l as 
 
 his 
 
62 -Of eternal truth Se<5l. III. 
 
 his Lord/Kip was, I cannot tliink of leaving it as he 
 did ; that is, juft -as he found it. He contends, in 
 contradiction to what he elfewhcre afTerts, that elTence 
 and exiflence is the fame ; and I abfolutely refufe it, 
 for the following reafon and diftinftion. The word 
 to I'C, ESSE, hath in philofophy three fignifications. 
 j7?. It is taken for exifience-^ it is, or it exifts. 
 2^//)', It is taken for the edence and nature of a thing. 
 For this Aristotle's authority is appealed to; who 
 fays, that a definition explains the w e^'e rei ; the be- 
 ing, nature, and eflence of a thin;; ; which fome call 
 the quiddity. And, 3c//v, It is taken for the connec- 
 tion of the predicates with tlie fubjeft ; as when we 
 fay a circle is round, and two and two are equal to 
 four. In the firfl: fenfe it is plain, that only God is 
 eternal. Univerfils do not exift really, but in fingu- 
 lars; and no fingulars, God excepted, do exift from 
 eternity. In the fecond fenfe, it is obvious, that ef- 
 fences and eternal truths are not really exiftent natures. 
 They are fomething real and pofitive in the divine in- 
 tclle6i:, but not out of it. But out of it thefe elTences 
 ^re but negatively eternal, in fo far as they are not 
 limited or circumlcribed with time. \\ hen we confi- 
 der human nature in itfelf, we abftract from all time, 
 and mentally feparate it from duration : for time 
 doth not in any manner belong to the human eHence. 
 2dl)\ It is certain, that thole [Topofitions in w hich the 
 lubjc<fl: and ellcntial attributes are connefted muft be 
 eternally true ; iiach as, A triangle is a figure com- 
 
 p;;ehendcd 
 
Se6l. Hi. and righteoufriefs, 63 
 
 preheaded with three lines ; Man is a reafonable ani- 
 mal. Thefe proportions are definitions which are 
 convertible with the things defined : for if we fay, 
 Man^ or, A reajonable animal^ we only fay the fame 
 thing in other words : and idem non eji aliud. This 
 always was, and always will be a truth ; and no time 
 can alter or change it, no not when men fhall be no 
 more. The definition of man may be divided into 
 two propofitions : Man is an animal \ and, Man is rea- 
 fonable : and as the whole definition is an immutable 
 truth, fo are the parts of it. This doth not hold in 
 propofitions contingently true, becaufe they depend 
 on time. For inftance, David Mallet, Efq; is 
 a philofopher ; and certain it is, that once he was nei- 
 ther Efquire nor philofopher. 
 
 Necessary, elTential, immutable, and eternal 
 truths, confift in the infeparable connection between 
 the fubjeft and the predicate, and the identity of the 
 definition with the thing defined. And it is by a con- 
 fiftency of attributes, and their conformity to the fub- 
 je£l, that we judge of the truth of things aftual, and 
 the poflibility of others. This conne£lion and con- 
 formity we cannot afcribe to the will of God ; be- 
 caufe, in our conception of efiential truth and poflibi- 
 lity, the confiftency is anterior to the divine appoint- 
 ment, as I have proved from Aq,uinas. And it is 
 by fuppofmg this confillcncy to be independent and 
 immutable, that, by a fcric5 of argumentation, v/e 
 
 arrive 
 
64 Of eternal truth Sc(5l.lII. 
 
 arrive at a demonftration of the being of God. It 
 would be a ridiculous circle, firft to prove that God 
 made truths, and from thcfe truths* to prove that there 
 is a God. The conclufion goes firft before the pre^ 
 mifles, and then follows them. 
 
 All truths of fpeculation are, or ought to be the or- 
 derly ground-work of action. " * 'Truth and ri^ht arc 
 " fo nearly related, that they are often put for one 
 " another. Cicero fays, tVhat is right, is alfo true. 
 " And the Lord Jesus Christ faith. He that 
 " doth the truth, cometh to the light. And the apoftle 
 " Paul fpeaks of thofe who obey not the truth ^ hut 
 " ohey unrighteoufnefs.''* Let it be obfervcd, that 
 I do not tranfcribe fcriptural phrafes and exprefTions, 
 as of divine authority, (for I write for thofe who do 
 not believe the Bible), but as fayings of fenfe and 
 antiquity. " A wicked a£tion is an opposition to 
 " truth, as well as a violence done to juftice. It is 
 " an error or a lie in action ; from which it follow- 
 *' eth, that the prima regula morufn, and the radix 
 " pojfibilitatis^ that is, the firft rule of morality, and 
 " the root of pofllbility, are the fame." As propo- 
 fitions arc fome necclTarily, and others contingently 
 true ; fo there are aflions, fome neccdaril}', and o- 
 thers contingently moral. And upon this is founded 
 the diftinflion of the moral and pofitrje law. As the 
 agreement of the fubjccl with the attributes is truth, 
 
 * Eftimatc^ p. 83. 
 
 and 
 
Se«5t;. IIL and righteoufhefi, 6^ 
 
 and their difagrcement falfity ; fb the re^tude an4 
 obHquity of a^cns is faid to be, and really is, the 
 equity and iniquity of a^ons. Reafbn is the faculty 
 by which we compare our fpeculative ideas, and judge 
 of their identity or diverfity ; and reafbn is the fa- 
 culty by which we judge of the equality or inequali- 
 ty of our doings. The meafure of this equality or 
 inequality, can be nothing elfe but right reafon. 
 And this is more obvious to the underflanding, than 
 moft truths of pure /peculation. It is confcious 
 knowledge, and fuch as we often perceive intuitively,' 
 and without argumentation. And I fuppofe it is from 
 this that the word confcience denotes our approbation 
 or difapprobation of what we call good and what 
 we call bad anions. And it is an obfervation of Lord 
 BoLiNGBROKE, that '< wc fcarch out and difcover 
 " mathematical truths ; but moral truths force them- 
 " felves upon the underftanding." And no man 
 capable to know that a whole is more than any of its 
 parts, but knows that a good office, and the mur- 
 der of a benefa6lor, edentially differ ; that the one is 
 difgraceful, and the other laudable ; that the one is 
 wrong, and that the other is right. And fince the 
 Atheift, who denies the divine being, and fince they 
 who have no rational convi£lion of it, know the dif- 
 ference ; it is certain, they neither do, nor can 
 confider morahty as dependent on the will of God. 
 All who allow the * diftinfiion between the natural or 
 
 * Vol. V. p. T93. 
 
 I moral 
 
66 Of eternal truth Seft.IIL 
 
 moral law, and the voluntary and pofitive law, mud 
 admit, that the one depends, and that the other is in- 
 dependent of will and authority, whether human 
 or divine. 
 
 It is the confiftency of the fubjeft with the attri- 
 butes which makes truth, whether we conceive the 
 fubjeft to be aftual, or only pofTible ; and it is the 
 conformity of the action to the dictates of right rea- 
 Ibn, that makes it morally good and juft. All thefe 
 relations are difcovered by reafon, and many of them 
 are even forced upon the underflanding ; and not by 
 the will, nor by a third unknown faculty of the foul, 
 nor by an unintelligible moral feeling. All things 
 are known to God, from everlafting to everlafling; 
 but as knowledge makes no alteration in the things 
 known, neither truth, poffibility, nor morality, de- 
 pend upon the arbitrary appointment of his will. 
 
 Willingly would his Lordfliip reflrift our facul- 
 ty of reafon, and confine all human knowledge to fen- 
 fation and experience. " * It is," faith he, " ab- 
 " furd to reafon about fubftanccs that are not aftual, 
 " though they may be pofTible." And this abfurdiry 
 mufl be the fame which Lucretius ftates againft 
 the being of God. 
 
 » Vol. i. p. S6. 
 
Se<^. IIL and right eoujnejs, 6y 
 
 ^ove modo eft unqttam vis cognita principiorum, 
 ^idnam inter fefe permutato or dine pojfent^ 
 Si non ipfa dedit fpecimen natura creandi ? 
 
 That is, " How could the Creator underftand the 
 *' force and pollibility of the principles, what they 
 " would produce when variously combined together, 
 " before nature and things themfelves, by creating, 
 '' had given a fpccimen?" The Noble philofopher 
 was not furprifed into this adertion; for in many 
 places he aflerts, that there can be no knowledge 
 but of things aftual ; and frequently diftinguifhes be- 
 tween real and fantaftic knowledge. To this I may 
 borrow an anfwer from himfelf ; for he fays, " * I 
 *' am far from faying, that we fhould not reafbn about 
 " things poffible, as well as aftual." And where 
 then is the abfurdity before mentioned ? He that pre- 
 tends to prove a pojleriori the being of God, and 
 to know his will by his works, cannot but maintain 
 moft abfurdly, that things mufl be prior to know- 
 ledge, and that he did not know them until they ex- 
 ifted. I am obliged to fchoolmen for their diftinc- 
 tion between aEiuals and pofjihles^ and for giving to 
 pofllbilities an effe cognitum, though not an ejje 
 oMuale, In the conception poilibilities have an en- 
 tity, or being, but not without the conception, 
 '*■ t It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern Atheillic 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 8r. 
 
 T Dr Cudv.'orth's intellectual fyftem, ?'73^' 
 
 I 2 " Wt■ItC^ 
 
6B Of eternal truth ScA. III. 
 
 " writer, that univerfals arc nothing elfe but names 
 " attributed to many finguiar bodies. ; bccaufe what- 
 "' foevcr is^ is finguiar. For though whatfoever ex- 
 " ids without the mind be finguiar, yet it is plain 
 ''-there are conceptions in our minds objecliz'ely uni- 
 *' verfal. WTiich univerfal objefts of our mind, 
 *' though they exift: not as fuch any where without it, 
 *' yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an 
 " intelligible entity, becaufe they arc conceivable : 
 *' for fince non-entity is not conceivable, whatfoever 
 *' is conceivable, and an obje£l: of the mind, is there- 
 *' fore fomething." So far is knowledge from de- 
 pending upon the exigence of fingulars, that, pro- 
 perly fpeaking, knowledge does notarife from them, 
 nor de|>end upon them at all. Nothing more true 
 than that of Boethius, Omne quod /cilur, noH ex 
 fua^ fed ex comprehendentiiim natura^ ^•/, ei facnhate 
 cognofcitur. " Whatever is known, is known not 
 " by its own force and pov.'er, but by the force and 
 *' power,, the vigour and aflivity of that thing itfelf 
 *' which knows and comprehends it.'' It is faid by 
 Aristotle, that *' there is no knowledge, even of 
 ** the univerfal theorems of geometry, by fenfe. Fot 
 *' if we could perceive by fenfe, that tlie three 
 " angles of a triangle arc equal to two right ; yet 
 *' ihould we not rcfl: fatisfied in this, as having a 
 " fufficient knowledge thereof, but wc would, feck 
 *' further after a dcnionfiration of it ; fenfe reach- 
 *' ing only to fingulars, but knowledge to univcr- 
 
 *^ fals." 
 
Se6t.IIL and righteoufiefs, 69 
 
 ** fals." When from the imiverfal or ab{lra£led idea 
 of a triangle, which is neither here nor there, nor 
 any where without our mind, but yet hath an ejfe 
 cognitum, or intelligible entity, wc fee a plain ne- 
 celTity, that its three angles muft be equal to two 
 dght angles ; then, and not till then, do we know 
 the truth of this univerfal theorem : and fo we under- 
 ftand that every fingular triangle hath this property 
 in it. From which it follows, that the knowledge 
 of this and the like truths is not derived from fin- 
 gulars ; nor do we arrive at them by way of afcent 
 or induftion ; but, on the contrary, having firfl 
 found them in generals and univerfals, we afterwards 
 defcending, apply them to particulars and fingulars. 
 Thus our knowledge is not derivatively from fingu- 
 lars, but in the order of nature before them. It is 
 not only poflible, but very probable, that there are 
 not in aftual exiftence, any ftraight lines, perfect cir- 
 cles, (quares, or cubes, as anfwer to the exachiefs 
 of our conceptions, nor ever will be ; yet they are 
 not therefore abfolute non-entities, becaufe we can 
 demonilrate things concerning them ; and though but 
 poHibilities, yet are they the foundation of many 
 mathematical and ufeful truths. It is fo far there- 
 fore from being abfurd to reafon about things pof- 
 lible, that the very firft principles of mathematics are 
 -no more than fuppofitions and polubilities. 
 
 Though his Lordfiiip admits, that the human 
 
 mind 
 
7<^ Of eternal truth Sca.Ilf. 
 
 mind can compound and decompound ideas ; yet he 
 maintains, that it cannot form any one fimple idea ; 
 and therefore all our knowledge muft be originally 
 owing to outward objeifts. The mind, admitting it to 
 be a fermentation of fome material parts, (and his 
 Lordiliip thinks it is), hath much more aftivity than 
 the fenfible objects which it perceives, and therefore is 
 fitter to form ideas than they. I have an idea of my 
 pen and of my paper ; and this idea muft either be 
 formed by them, or by my mind. If made by them, 
 my mind muft be a paiTive recipient, and my pen and 
 paper muft have aftivity, power, and faculty of ma- 
 king^ thofe ideas, not in themfelves, but in my mind. 
 If it is otherwife with your or your Lord's under- 
 ftanding, all I have to fay is, that our undcrftandings 
 diiier eftentially. 
 
 I do believe, that the Noble philofopher is the 
 firft who hath advanced, that God makes poflibilities. 
 *' * God," faith he, " made things aftual, becaufc 
 " he knew them ; and why fhould not I fay, be- 
 *' caufe he made them poffible ?" After faying this, 
 you may fay as much nonfenfe as you pleafe. Pof- 
 fihle and impojfible, or not pojftble^ are contradiftions. 
 And if impojfible can become poffible, then two con- 
 tradidlory propofitions can both be true ; and a thing 
 may be and not be at the fame time. Wiicn God 
 makes things pofllblc, it is by an a6l of tlie will ; for 
 
 * Vol. i. p. Si. 
 
 underftanding 
 
Seifl.III. and righteoujnefs . ji 
 
 nnderftandlng makes nothing, and thefe new-made 
 pofTibilities remain only poffibilities. And therefore, 
 upon the fuppofition that God makes pofTibihties, he 
 wills, and by his will produces nothing. The Noble 
 author, without fcruple, admits, that God, by one 
 llngle aft of his almighty will, created, preferves, 
 and governs the univerfe. Before aftual creation the 
 whole fyftem was poflible. It muft have been abfo- 
 lutely and independently pofTible, or it muft have 
 been made poflible. The firft is what I contend for. 
 But if the fecond takes place, that is, if the world 
 was firft made poffible, then its exiftence was not the 
 efFeft of one fingle volition, but of two. He had no 
 occafion to make polTibility depend upon the will of 
 God : for it is the objeft: of his knowledge ; and he 
 fays exprefsly, // is the range of infinite knoi^ledge, 
 A made pofllbility was not always a pofllbility ; be- 
 fore, it was impoflible, or not poflible ; and an impof- 
 fibility or non-pofllbility is not an objeft: even of divine 
 omnifcience ; and therefore it could not be made pof- 
 fible ; for God did not make what he did not know. 
 He muft therefore have waited until 
 
 Ipfa dedit Jpecimen natura creandi. 
 
 This is either his meaning, or he doth not underftand 
 what he fays in another place, viz. " * We do not, 
 " like reafoners a priori, imagine what may have 
 " been according to our abftraft reafonings, and fo 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 287, 
 
 '' conclude 
 
72 Of eternal truth Scft.III. 
 
 *' conclude from poiribility to a£tuality ; we proceed 
 " much more reafonably from actuality to poflfibility, 
 " in a method fo often, and fo abfurdly rcver(ed by 
 " philofophers." Philofophers can anlwer for them- 
 (elves', by affirming, that it is abfolutely certain, that 
 in. any cafe, except one, they never do conckide, 
 ^uch a thin^ /f pofibley therefore it is a^ual. The 
 cafe excepted, is the polTibility of one fupreme Be- 
 ing, felf-cxi< cent, and felf-fufficient; and if fuch a 
 Being is pofTible, it muft be aftual, becaule it cannot 
 be made to be fich. And 1 leave the author to an- 
 I'wer for his allowing nothing to be pofllble but what 
 is actual, and for numberlcfs contradictions ; many of' 
 which are induftrious and dcfigncd. 
 
 Philosophers, after eHabli filing certain mathe» 
 matical and moral truths upon abllra6l coniiderations, 
 *' * afTume," fays he, ** that thefe general notions 
 " are natures independent on God, and in themfelves 
 " of eternal ncceifity. God hath made triangles and 
 " men ; but triangularity, they fay, and they might 
 " jufl. fay as well humanity," (and why not?), " are 
 '* independent natures, antecedent to his will, and that 
 " do not owe their original to arbitrary pofitive appoint- 
 " ment. That there are ncccdary truths, mathemati-. 
 "■ cal and moral, and fuch mull be as long as there 
 " are men, and as the prefcnt fyftcm of things con- 
 *' tinncs, is certain : but thefe would not perhaps be 
 
 - Vol. V. p. 58. 
 
 •■' called 
 
Sea. Iir. and right eoufiefs, 73 
 
 '' called eternal truths, nor would thefe notions be 
 *' reprefented like eternal Independent natures, if it 
 " was more confidered, that the felf-exiftent Being is 
 " the fountain of all exiftence; and that fince every 
 " thing fubfi'ds by his will, it mull: exift according to 
 " his will. For which reafon it feems as abfurd to 
 *' fay, that when he made man, he could give him 
 " no other nature than the human, which was before 
 *' neccffarily, not abflraftly, given ; as it would be to 
 *' fay, that when he made a man, he did not make a 
 '' tree. A man with the properties of a tree, would 
 " not be a man ; a tree with the properties of a man, 
 " would not be a tree. The fame will which made 
 " each, made the properties of each. It is one and 
 " the fame a£l: ; and to fay, that the nature of any 
 *' thing, or the truths refulting from it, are independ- 
 " ent in any fenfe on the will that made them, feems 
 " to me therefore to imply a contradi6lion." 
 
 It hath been faid, and proved, that ejfeuce and ex- 
 ijlence are not precifely the fame ; and if any thing 
 his Lordfhip fays can give ftrength to an opinion, (for 
 he fays and unfays at pleafure), we have his word, 
 that they arc not precifely the fame ; becaufe he (ays, 
 that " God may deftroy the thing, but he cannot 
 *' alter the ejjence of it.'' And if he cannot alter it, 
 it cannot proceed from his arbitrary appointment, and 
 mull have been from eternity and to eternity the fime 
 in the divine mind. Dr Clarke fay=?, that " the 
 • K ** exigence 
 
74' Of eternal truth Sc^. Illi 
 
 '* exigence of things depends upon the arbitrary will 
 '' of God ; but when they are created, and as long 
 '* as they do exifl, their proportions, refpefls, and 
 " relations, are abllraftly of eternal neceffity, accor- 
 " ding to the different natures of things." And Lord 
 BoLiNG BROKE fays, that " * God inftituted mo- 
 " rai obligations, when he made moral agents ; that 
 '* the law of their nature, is the law of his will ; and 
 " that how indifferent foever we may prefume every 
 " thing is to him before his will has determined it to 
 " be, it becomes, after this determination, a necefla- 
 " ry, though a created nature. Such juflice is in 
 " man, though in God it may be nothing more than 
 *' one mode of his infinite wifdom. As long as there 
 '' are men, this nature mufl exifl. Where it will be, 
 " and what it will be, when they^ and this moral fyftem 
 ** is at an end, let thofe able perfons who know ^o 
 " well where and what it was before they both be- 
 *' gan to exift, determine. The Platoniffs affume an 
 " eternal morality, antecedent, not only to any fignifi- 
 " caron, but to any actual determination of the will 
 
 " of God. By this God publiilied a moral law 
 
 *' when he made moral agents, but he was not proper- 
 " ly the legiflator. The law exilled before them, 
 *' and it binds both him and them." 
 
 Of all this I do admit fomething to be right, but 
 much more I aflcrt to be wrong. And I obfcrve,/r/?, 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 64. 
 
 T\ 
 
 liat 
 
Se(fl:. III. and right eoufnefs, y^ 
 
 That phiJo/bphers, by abfl;ra£ling one property of a 
 thing from another, take them all by turns into dif- 
 tinft confideration ; and by accuftoming themfelves to 
 fuch abflra£l confiderations, they eftabliili certain ma- 
 thematical and moral truths upon them. — That there 
 are neceflary truths, both mathematical and moral, 
 and fuch there muft be as long as there are men, and 
 the prefent circumflances of things continue, is cer- 
 tain. Agreed. And I might fuppofe by this, that he 
 hath loft his averfion to cihjira^ion and to eternal 
 truth. I obferve, 2^^, That it is not true that any 
 of thefe philofophers alTume, that thefe general ?w- 
 tions are general natures. *' Since philofophers ab- 
 *' ftraft fo well, that they do honour to themfelves, 
 *' and fervice to mankind ; and from their abftrafted 
 " notions draw many neceflary truths, both mathema- 
 ** tical and moral; " it is to repay' good with evil, to 
 refufe them the ufe of the diftinftion between abftra- 
 ^um and concretum. In the firft cafe they fay, and 
 fay juftly, that thofe notions which they call ejfences, 
 (not natures), are neceflary, eternal, and independent ; 
 but in concrelo^ or a ftate of actuality, they are con- 
 tingent and dependent. Thefe men called philofo- 
 phers (and great men they were) diftinguiflied like- 
 wife between hypothetical and ahfolutc necefllty. In 
 the firft fenfe they held ejjences to be neceflary, and 
 in the other contingent. Hypothetically, man while 
 he exifts, is in concreto, and neceflarily too, a reajonahle 
 mimal\ but in ahjira^o he is abfolutely and neceflar 
 K 2 rily 
 
yd Of eternal truth Seft. III. 
 
 rily a reafonablc animal. I faid, that word est, it 
 is, in a third fenfe, is put for the connection between 
 i\\efubje^um and the pr^d/catum^ the fiibjeft and the 
 attribute; and this, when done without refpeft to 
 time, is negatively eternal ; as, Man is a reafonable 
 animal : for man always was, and is, and always will 
 be fuch. But the connefbion between Mr Mallet 
 and his philofophy is but temporary, and therefore 
 neither neccdiiry nor eternal. Your Lord admits, 
 that there are, and mud be moral truths, as long as 
 there are men. And Dr Clarke fays, that the ex- 
 iftence of things depends upon the arbitrary will of 
 God ; but when they are created, and as long as 
 they exift, their proportions, refpefts, and relations, 
 are abftrafily of eternal neceflity, according to the dif- 
 ferent natures of things. The fchoolmen alked no 
 more than this hypothetical ncccflity, and Icfs cannot 
 be allowed them. 
 
 His Lordlhip infifts. That as every thing exids by 
 the will of God, it muft exift in the way and man- 
 ner in which he wills it to be. Certainly. For in- 
 fcance, if God makes a man, he makes a rational ani- 
 mal. This is the to ejje rei\ the cllence of the thing 
 made and created. In a ftate of actual exift ence, this 
 cfTence is fomcthing pofitive, and therefore dependent 
 on the will of the Creator ; but not fo in a Mate of 
 abftraffion. The connection, or rather the identity of 
 ft reafonable animal with man^ is necclfary, independ- 
 ent. 
 
Sefl. III. and right eoufnejs. yy 
 
 ent, and eternal. By comparing Plato with 
 HoBBES, he reiefts both their doftrines. He rejects 
 that of HoBBEs juftly, in To far as he reprefents it; 
 that is, that " there was no dillinclion made between 
 *•' jufi and unjufi., moral ^ood and moral evil^ till the 
 '' will of man made this diftinftion by civil conititu- 
 " tions, and pofitive laws." But it will be foiuid, 
 though HoBBEs acknowledged no law, no ob- 
 ligation, until human conilitations made law and 
 obligation by authority and force, that he did admit 
 the dilhn^hon between j'ufi and nijuft^ not as an ob- 
 ligation, but as a ride. And this Atheifts do, and do 
 confiftently with their principles. The fault he finds 
 with Plato, is, that though God publifheda moral 
 law when he made moral agents, " yet he was not 
 " properly the legiilator. The law exifted before 
 *' them, and it binds both him and them." The dif- 
 tin^lion between ya/^ ^^^ unjufi^ right and wrongs was 
 as necelTary, eternal, and independent of all appoint- 
 ment, as the equality of two and two to four. And 
 though this was known to God, yet when he made 
 moral agents, he made their knowledge of it a law to 
 them ; and by fb doing he became very properly a le- 
 giflator. If by this law binding him as well as them, 
 he means, that God always a(5i:s accoiding to the rec- 
 titude of his own nature, and cannot aft otherwife, 
 the meaning is good, though the exprelfion is inde- 
 cent. And it derogates nothing from the majefty and 
 fovereignty of the Almighty, that holinels is one of 
 
 his 
 
78 Of eternal truth Se^. IIL 
 
 his cH^ntial attributes. A monarch who knows the 
 equity and iniquity of anions, and who makes laws 
 for the pra£lice of virtue, and for the avoiding vice 
 and wickcdnefs, is flill a legiflator : and if he is a 
 wife and o good prince, the fame that ferves his fub- 
 jects as a iav^-, ferves himfelf as the rule of his beha- 
 viour. Thus ALMIGHTY GoD and righteous Lord, 
 who knows and loves righteoufnefs, brings his intelli- 
 gent creatures under a moral law, as foon as they be- 
 come aftually rational. His Lordfliip would have al- 
 lowed, and I hope you will allow, that God is eden- 
 tially holy, (and fuch he is whether you allow it or 
 not) ; and whenever he exerts his power, it is always 
 in confiftency with this mod glorious attribute. From 
 the fanftity of the Deity flows his approbation of mo- 
 rality, and our obligation to the pra£lice of every good 
 and reafonable action. And God, in e{fe£l, fays to 
 all his reafonable creatures, Be ye holy, for I am holy 
 Our holinefs is imperfeft and contingent; but the ho 
 linefs of God is perfe£l, and as ncceflary as his be 
 ing. His is the pattern, the archetype, the para 
 digma ; and it becomes our duty to copy, tranfcribe 
 and imitate it as near as we can in all our actions. Be 
 caufe we know that God is holy, a God of truth 
 and without iniquity, and that juft and right is he 
 and that he therefore approves of ail our moral doings 
 and even of our moral endeavours ; it may be faid 
 that God's holinefs is to us a moral law, at leafl: the 
 iburce of it : and fince Goo wills, and afls fuitably 
 
 to 
 
Se^.III. and right eoufnefs. 79 
 
 to his holinefs, or moral attributes, and cannot a£l: o- 
 thervvife, the fame rules by which he governs the mo- 
 ral world become a law to us. And therefore, (ince 
 morality flows necedarily from the fanflity of God, 
 it is as neceilary, eternal, and independent -of his arbi- 
 trary appointment, as is his own being and eflence* 
 This I take to have been Plato's opinion ; and it is 
 my opinion that his Lordfhip maintains a worfe. 
 
 For he imagines he hath found out a medium be- 
 tween Plato's and Hobbes's doftrine. His words 
 are, " * God inftituted moral obligations when he 
 '^ made moral agents ; that the law of their nature 
 *^ is the law of his will ; and that how indifferent (b- 
 " *ever we may prefume every thing is to him, be- 
 " fore his will has determined it to be, it becomes, 
 " after the determination, a neceflary, though crea- 
 " ted nature : " That is, upon ftippofition that God 
 makes moral agents, it is neceflary to bring them un- 
 der moral obligations; but before thefe agents were 
 made, morality and immorality were indifferent to 
 the Deity. And how can any thing in itfelf and e- 
 ternally indifferent, become necell^ry upon any new 
 emergency whatever? And did not God, who made 
 this reafonable and moral agent, know that it was fit 
 and reafonable he fliould be under a moral law .'* If 
 he did not, then he a(5i:ed at random. And if he did 
 know it, then morality and immorality were not in- 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 62. 
 
 different 
 
8o' Of eternal truth Scft. Til. 
 
 different to the Deity, before the exigence of thefe 
 rational agents. If it is fit, if it is necefTary, that 
 every rational and intelligent creature fhould act 
 rationally and morally, and for that purpofe come 
 under a law ; this is what God previoufly approved 
 of. And if he approves of this re6tltudc in his intel- 
 ligent creatures, it is brcaufe he himfelf is eflentially 
 holy, and holy in all his works. From the works 
 of God his Lordfliip learns the exigence and the 
 will of the fapreme Being, his infinite wifdom and 
 power. And if his argument a pojlericri is good, 
 then our knowledge and approbation of what is good 
 and julT: proves, that God knows and approves all 
 goodnefs and juftice. He knows and approves what 
 is fuch in all cafes, aftual and polTible, and \vc only 
 in a few. But ftill we know, even againfi our in- 
 clinations, that there is an unchangeable difference 
 between right and wrong in general, and in many 
 particular inflances. His LordOiip thinks it fliocking 
 impiety to afTert, that God can command whatever 
 he forbids, and forbid whatever he commands ; and 
 fo do I ; and yet I cannot fee how tliis confcquencc 
 can be avoided, if it is true, that, before the creation 
 of rational agents, equity and iniquity were in thcm- 
 fejves, and to the Deity, indifferent. A man wlio is 
 ready to renounce his God, rather than believe that 
 he ftrengthens the hand of a parricide, when he 
 plunges a dagger into the heart of a fiuhcr, cannot i- 
 magine that the aftion, previoufly to the exigence of 
 
 the 
 
Seifl. III. and righteoufnefs, 8i 
 
 the murderer, was indifFerent to the Deity. For my 
 part, I am as confident, as I am certain of the be- 
 ing of God, that from eternity he difapproved all 
 iuch horrid crimes. 
 
 This faying, " The law of our nature is the law of 
 " God's will,'* appears to me to be an equivocation. 
 I fuppofe that by the law of nature is by all under- 
 ftood, the law which our reafbn and underHandings 
 di<5late to mankind for the rule of their righteous and 
 moral behaviour; which, whether they obferve or 
 negleft, (till remains a law to them. The law of 
 nature is the law which we difcover by the light of 
 nature ; but the law of our nature may fignify, and 
 I believe he intends it fhould fignify, the ordinary 
 courfe of human anions. It is his opinion, that God 
 hath made man fuch as he is, without obliging him 
 to be another kind of creature, or to obferve another 
 conduct above his prefent make and conllimtion. It 
 w^as the will of God he fhould be fuch ; and as he 
 is, fo he a£ls. And thus the hc'N of his nature be- 
 comes the law of God's will. An adventitious dif- 
 qualification to obferve the law of God and nature, 
 his Lordfhip ridicules. He was, during all the days 
 of his life, fuch as he was made ; and if he was not 
 a better and a more moral man, he could not be 
 blamed. But I leave it to David Mallet, Efq; 
 to reconcile this to the many faults which his con- 
 fcience accufed him of. For it witnefleth againfl you 
 
 L and 
 
82 Of eternal truth Se^. III. 
 
 and mC; and all mankind, for falling fhort of our 
 duty. 
 
 He that challenges an equivocation, is obliged, by 
 the rules of debate, to correct it with a dilt'nflion. 
 And as I have faid, there is an equivocation in thefe 
 words, 'The laiv of our nature is the law of God's 
 ivdlj 1 offer, in my defence, a double acceptation of 
 the will of God.' It is commonly faid, that God 
 wills things to be, when he makes things which were 
 not before. And in this fenfe his Lordfhip ufes it 
 frequently. For inilance, " God only knows how 
 *' many forts of beings his omnipotent will hath 
 *' made." Another fenfe of the will of God is 
 that whereby he commands fuch of his creatures as 
 are intelligent and rational, capable to underftand an4 
 to obey, to obferve fuch a condu^ and behaviour as 
 they dilcover to be prefcribcd and appointed by di- 
 vine authority. This my author likewife admits. 
 This I call the legiflative and imperatiue will of God ; 
 and the other I call his operative will. AVhen my 
 author fays, that the law of our nature is the law of 
 God's will, he underllands his opcratrje will, and 
 can underftand no other. The law of nature, and 
 the law of our nature, are different things. The one 
 is the courfc and tenor of the human life, and the o- 
 ther the di£lates of right reafon. This is fo perfect: 
 and complete, that the obfervation of it would ren- 
 der our ftate truly paradifaical. This the author ad- 
 mits 
 
Se£l. III. and righteotifnejs. 8^ 
 
 mits it would effect in fpeculation, but in practice it 
 would place man in a higher rank than he is fitted 
 or defigned for. But as for the law of our nature, 
 which he abufively calls the law of God's will, be- 
 ing only the effe6l of his operative will, it is not 
 tranfgrefllbie. As the nature of the vegetative part of 
 the univerfe, and of the animal fyftem, continues 
 the fame ; fo, according to my author's plan, doth 
 the human and rational continue the fame which they 
 were originally, beyond the power of thofe beings 
 to make any alteration. His Lordfhip objefts againfl 
 the law delivered by Moses, That it hath proved 
 more ineffeftual than any other law that can be quo- 
 ted. And if this be afcribed to the hardnefs of the 
 heart, and obflinacy of the people, to fave the ho- 
 nour of the law ; this honour will be little faved, 
 and its divinity ill maintained. " * The excufe 
 " might be admitted in the cafe of any human law ; 
 " but we fpeak here of a law fuppofed to be dictated 
 " by divine wifdom, which ought and would have 
 " been able, if it had been fuch, to keep in a flate 
 " of fubmiOTion to it, even a people rebellious and 
 " obflinate enough to break through any other." If 
 this is true, then the law which men break cannot be 
 the law of God. Therefore, according to this phi- 
 lofopher, whether the will of God be operative or 
 imperative^ it muft be irrefidible. How happy and 
 fafe are you, David Mallet, Efq; in this opinion? 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 362. 
 
 L 2 If 
 
84 Of eternal truth Se^.TII. 
 
 If you tranfgrcfs any law, if you make void all that 
 other men account obligation, your very tranfgreflion 
 provesj that it is not, nor can be the law of God, 
 though it may be one of the diflates of right reafon. 
 All your bufinefs is to follow your nature, lead whi- 
 ther it will. But mean time plealc to know, that you 
 then ceafe to be a rational, a free, and a moral agent. 
 And believe this if you are able. You make no ac- 
 count of the imperative will of God ; and that your 
 great principle, That the will of God is only to be 
 learned from his works, amounts only to his opera- 
 tive will. Thus, from firfl: to laft, your reafoning 
 from the works to the will of God, is but a para- 
 logifm, or rather a mofl: fraudulent fophifm. 
 
 *' As long as there are men, this nature" (that 
 is, the nature upon which truth and righteoufnefs is 
 founded) " muft exift. Where it will be, and what 
 " it will be, when this moral fyflem is at an end, 
 " let thofe able perfons \\ ho know fo well where 
 " and what it was before they both began to exift, 
 " determine." If there were no intelligent, rational 
 creatures, no moral agents, the exercife of all moral 
 virtues muft ceafe. But it is an immutable truth, 
 that fuch creatures owe obedience to God's will, 
 upon fuppofition of their exiflence. That virtue 
 and vice, equity and iniquity, are contradiliinguiihed, 
 and tlvat what is wrong cannot become right, is cer- 
 tain. As the equality of two and two to four, is not 
 
 a 
 
SeSt. III. and rtghieoufnefs. - . 2$ 
 
 a made truth by comparing, but upon comparing is 
 found to be fnch ; fo juftice is not a made virtue by 
 judging, but by judging is found fuch. And neither 
 juftice, nor the equality of two and two to four, are 
 made fuch by arbitrary appointment. And therefore 
 there is eternal truth, and eternal righteoufnefs. This 
 his Lordlhip inadvertently admits, when he main- 
 tains that God cannot make a rational creature, with- 
 out bringing him under a moral law. " As long as 
 " there are men, the law of nature muft exift,'* Be- 
 caufe it is commonly faid, that truth and righteouf- 
 nefs were eternally in the divine mind; to cut off this 
 refource of the eternity and independency of them, 
 he fays, ** Juftice in man may be a mode of divine 
 " wifdom." But as he fays much to the fame pur- 
 pofe, or the fame thing very often, I Hiall defer an 
 examination of this extraordinary doctrine, until I 
 come to the confideration of Goo's moral attributes. 
 Againft all I have faid, this Noble philofopher hath 
 a capital anfwer in referve. That it amounts to no 
 more than to the delirium and blafphemy of metaphy- 
 Ijcs. To which 1 return no other anfwer, than, had 
 he underftood ontology^ which is properly metaphy- 
 (ics, he had not committed ib many faults in his na- 
 tural religion. 
 
 It is a pity his Lordiliip had been fb idle as to 
 vvnie fo much to no purpofc. As he declined de- 
 ciding a preceding qneftion between Descartes 
 
 and 
 
^() Of eternal truth Se^fl.IIL 
 
 and his oppofers, he here again concludes to the ve- 
 ry fame purpofe. " * If I infifl much on this point, 
 I do not pretend to clear it of all the difficulties 
 that lie in the way, neither by what is faid here, 
 nor by what hath been faid elfewhere, nor by 
 what I may fay hereafter. There are many on 
 either fide that have perplexed, and may continue 
 to perplex better heads than mine. But, in the 
 firft place, I feel an infupcrable repugnancy to 
 own that any thing is independent on God ; and, 
 in the next place, I am Ihocked at the confequen- 
 ces that are drawn from this do£lrine." His feel- 
 ings are for himfelf, and he ought to allow others the 
 fame privilege. God's being and attributes, phyfi- 
 cal and moral, do not depend on his arbitrary will ; 
 and whatever neceflarily flows from them, is inde- 
 pendent likewife. But morality, as hath been pro- 
 ved, flows necedarily from the holincfs of the fu- 
 preme Being, and is therefore independent on his ar- 
 bitrary will and appointment. We, with all our fa- 
 culties, and all our knowledge, depend upon God, 
 and particularly our knowledge of right and ivrong^ 
 jujl and imjujl. But right and wrong do not depend 
 upon God's will and appointment. God cilentially 
 and neceflarily approves whatever is good and true, 
 and difapproves whatever is falfe and evil morally. 
 It is therefore plain, that his Lordfliip doth not fpeak 
 with prcciiion, when he fays, he feels an infupcr- 
 able repugnancy to own that any thing is independent 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 62. 
 
 on 
 
Se6t. III. and righteoufnejs, ^y 
 
 on God. For all the creation, all his doings ad ex- 
 tra^ depend entirely on his good will and pleafure ; 
 but true and falfe, right and wrong, are founded in 
 the divine fanftity, and therefore are as independent 
 on his will as his own being. He is the fuprema ra- 
 tio. From this all right reafon is derived. His on- 
 ly is the knowledge and the authority, to lay his in- 
 telligent creatures under an obligation to be holy, as 
 he is holy. Morality is one thing, and our obliga- 
 tion to pra6llfe it is another. The firft we know as 
 a capital and fanda mental truth ; a truth, I may fay, 
 indelibly imprinted on the human mind. Morality 
 in itfelf, that is, juftice, goodnefs, and truth, is in- 
 dependent on God's will. But our obligation to be 
 moral and holy, is founded in divine dominion and 
 authority, and imperative will and command pro- 
 mulgated by our own reafon and underftanding. 
 Whatever your Lord faw, or you fee, I fee no in- 
 fupcrable difficulty in this decifion. But as he lees 
 many on both (ides of the queftion, he ought to have 
 treated thofe who differed from him with more refpe£t 
 than he hath done; and particularly Dr Clarke, 
 who, in my opinion, had a better head than his own. 
 The confequences that follow from the fuppofition, 
 That the equity and iniquity of actions were indiffer- 
 ent in the divine mind, before the conflitution of anyr 
 moral fyflem, is, by his own confcffion, blocking 
 impiety ; and nothing follows from the other fide of 
 the quefiion that can give offence to the moft pious 
 
 underflanding. 
 
 SECT, 
 
oo 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of morality^ and the moral law. 
 
 I Have obferved, that Lord Boling broke lays 
 down as a principle, That the will of GoD is to 
 be learned from his works, and that there is no other 
 way of knowing it ; and from this concludes no more 
 than his wifdom and power. I did fay, that this prin- 
 ciple of his hath two faults, i//, That it is not the 
 only way to know the will of God ; and, idly. 
 That it is not the direft and immediate way. I have 
 done with the firfl ; and I hope to difcufs the fecond 
 in fewer words. His Lordfhip fliould have diflin- 
 guifhed between Jkill and wifdom. Formerly fuch 
 philofophers as you admitted no more than knowledge 
 and -power to be learned from the works of God ; 
 but, in place of knowledge, you have fliuffied in the 
 word wifdom^ but inconfiftently with your fcheme or 
 fyftem of natural religion, alias Atheifm. It will be 
 eafily admitted, that the make of the world, as far as 
 we know, doth difplay the wonderful and amazing 
 ikill of the artificer, and a power in proportion. But 
 wifdom confirts not in the work, but in the ufe and 
 end for which it is made. An architc^l builds a hou/e 
 which fpeftators take for an hofpital. The edifice is 
 exquifitely finifhcd. This flicws that he haih ikill; 
 but it is the end and ufe of the ercftion that ihews his 
 
 wifdom. 
 
Sc£t. IV. OfmoralUy, and the moral law. 89 
 
 wifdom. The mater'al parts of the creation, however 
 fo well fittcrd and adapted to one another, cannot pafs 
 for their ultimate end and ule. The defi^vn of the 
 grand artificer mud go beyond the order and (ymmetry 
 of the fabric. The hofpital mentioned was not m?dc 
 for fhew, but fuppofed to be for the benefit and ac- 
 commodation of the poor and indigent. The work in 
 that cafe would be morally good. Were the building, 
 by its beauty, fo contrived, as '.o infnare inhabitants, 
 in order to crufh them under its fudden ruin ; the end 
 would be bad, and the aftioii morally evil. To do 
 good, is wifdom ; and to do evil, is weaknefs and folly. 
 Therefore, before you can prove the wifdom of God 
 from his works, you muft prove, that they are finally 
 intended for holy and good purpofes ; good for him- 
 felf, or good for others. He is eternally and effen- 
 tially happy, and can receive no addition to his hnppi- 
 nefs from all the works that he hath made ; it muft 
 therefore be good for others ; for fiich beings as know 
 what is good, and what is evil ; that is, for intelligent 
 and reafonable creatures. And can any man, for the 
 Noble author, fearch out the Almighty and his 
 works unto perfection? This earth, and .ts rational 
 inhabitants, is the part of the creation we are belt ac- 
 quainted v\'ith. All the moral and rational inhabitants 
 he puts upon the fame level. The beft and the worft 
 of men he places within the reach of ihe wheels and 
 fprings of the«viecha".icai fabric, that keep their i:ated 
 courle, iomeinnes for the prefervation, and fometimes 
 
 M for 
 
po Of morality, and the vwral law. Stdi. IV. 
 
 for the dellru(5lion of the inhabitants. Famine and 
 peftilence, inundations and earthquakes, fweep away 
 into nothing millions of reafonable animals, without 
 difference and diftinftion. The author, who refufes 
 thefe multitudes any future life, and places individuals 
 below the care of divine providence, cannot pofhbly 
 from the works conclude the wifdom of God. But 
 if this furpaHes his /kill in philofophy, he hath found 
 out a very /hort conceit, to prove, that all the world 
 is wifely made, by Tub fuming, that God is infinitely 
 wife. This is a Iliameful, and even a flupid begging 
 the queftion. He undertakes to prove the wifdom of 
 God from his works ; and becaufe he cannot do it, 
 he puts the intended confequence in place of the an- 
 tecedent, and proves from that, that the world is 
 wifely made. 
 
 It is in God's dealings with the rational part of the 
 creation that he can be faid to do cither good or evil. 
 And if the Noble philofopher will take in his brethren 
 the beafls, and make them fufceptible of moral go- 
 vernment, and fcnfiblc of the obligations incumbent 
 on them to do their duty to God and to their fellow- 
 animals, he cannot make the divine wifdom any thing 
 more apparent. They all go the fame way into a flate 
 of eternal infenfibility. If the bealls have Icfs reafbn 
 and underflanding than men, they have lefs concern 
 for their lofs, and lefs anxiety for the prefervation of 
 life. The lamb licks the hand that holds the knife 
 
 lifted 
 
Sc«5l. rV, Of morality^ and the moral law. 91 
 
 Jifted up for its deftruftion : but I have feen inftan- 
 
 ces of dread and horror raifed in breads thought brave, 
 
 by the apprehenfion of approaching diflblution ; and I 
 
 have heard, that a Noble philofopher, for fear of death, 
 
 died mad and diftrafted. Not fo died Mahomet 
 
 Effendi, condemned for Atheifm at Conflantinople, 
 
 who fcorned to tell a lie to fave his life. I am very 
 
 fare that his Lordfhip, in his philofbphical works, hath 
 
 told feveral for a meaner purpofc, if induftrious and 
 
 defigned contradi£lions can be reckoned lies. The 
 
 difference between Effendi's cafe and his Lordfhip's 
 
 was, that Effendi was condemned by the civil ma- 
 
 giftrate, and his Lordfhip by his own confcience. 
 
 .^he fpirit of a man will jujiain his infirmity \ but a 
 
 wounded fpir it who can bear? 
 
 The author, who reduces all the divine attributes 
 into wifdom and power, and who, inftead of proving 
 wifdom from the works of God, only proves his 
 fkill and knowledge, can never difcover from them 
 the will of God as a law which we are bound to 
 obey. And when he attempts any thing of this kind, 
 (and 1 think he doth it twice), he prefently pafles 
 from the works to the neceflary exiftence and infinite 
 perfe£i:ion of the fupreme Being. I have faid, and 
 proved *, that morality hath no relation to the works 
 of nature or art, let them be ever fo exquifite. The 
 author whom I have examined had faid -f, '' A ftate 
 
 * Eftimate, p. 97. f Lord Kaim&'s EfTiys, p. 136. 
 
 M 2 " of 
 
pi Of vjoraJ'tty^ and the moral laiv. Se6V. IV. 
 
 " of nature is reprefented by all vrircrs as a ftste of 
 " war, nothing going on but rapine and bloodfiied. 
 " From this pifture of the firft men, one would be 
 " apt to conclude, that man by nature is a wild and 
 " rapacious animal, little better than a beaft of prey, 
 '* but for h'S inclination to fociety, which moulds 
 " him gradually into a rational creature. And from 
 " this original ftate of mankind, it would feem, that 
 " moral virtues are not natural, but acquired by 
 " means of education in a well-regulated fociety; 
 *' in a word, that the whole moral part of our lyllem 
 " is artificial." This he ftates as an obje^ion againft 
 what he faid concerning the moral fenfe. To which 
 he returns for anfwer what (Irengthcns the objeflion : 
 ** Savages, being confcious of nothing but diforder 
 ** and fenfual impuHe within, cannot be confcious of 
 " any thing better without them. Society teaches 
 " mankind felf-denial and improves the moral fenfe. 
 " Difciplincd in fociety, the talle for order and rcgu- 
 
 " larity unfolds iifclf And thus to fociety we 
 
 *' owe all the bleifings of life, and particularly the 
 *' knowledge of God." The Honourable author 
 remits mankind to learn morality from one another. 
 And certain it is, if they have not previous know- 
 ledge of right and wrong, all muil be founded on 
 cudom and praftice. What I have farther remarked, 
 I forbear to tranfcribe. 
 
 His Lordfliip of Bolingbroke pretends to learn 
 
 the 
 
Sefl.IV. Of morality^ and the moral law, p^ 
 
 the will of God froiti his works. Were all the ma- 
 terial world as open to his underftanding as the furface 
 of ray paper is to my eye, no conclufion could thence 
 be drawn for the government of rational creatures. I 
 do not think, that he takes the mere material and ani- 
 mal parts of the creation for his teachers. Intelli- 
 gences fuperior to himfelf he is not acquainted with. 
 Men alone muft be his mafters. Thefe he knows not 
 fo well as he doth himfelf. Lefs therefore lliould he 
 trull: to their practice, than to his own underftanding. 
 I recommend it to you, David Mallet, Efq; to 
 confult your own reafbn and underftanding, as the 
 fureft and only way (for you refufe revelation) to 
 know the will of God, as the law which you are 
 bound to obey His Lordftiip talks of learning the 
 will of God by experience. And what experience 
 can he hive of morality or the will of God, but by 
 the confequences of anions ? Were every good and 
 moral aftion attended with good and happy temporal 
 confequences, and every evil and immoral doing at- 
 tended with bad and hurtful confequences in this life, 
 (for he doth not admit another), he might learn mo- 
 rality by his own practice. But all the world knows 
 that this is abfolutely falfe. 
 
 Besides, to meafure the morality of actions by 
 the advantage and profit arifing from them, Lord 
 Shaftesbury holds not only to be mean and for- 
 did, but alfo reafon fufticient to deftroy the worth and 
 
 value 
 
5^4 0/ ^noralitj, aud the moral law. Se6l. iV. 
 
 value of them. Certain it is, that morality is good 
 and reafbnable, let the confequences be what they 
 will ; and that God is to be obeyed without referve. 
 In clofe contradiction to this, his Lordfliip fays, 
 " * The morality of actions does not, I think, con- 
 *' fift in this, that they are prefcribed by will, even 
 ** the will of God ; but in this, that they are the 
 *' means, however impofed the practice of them may 
 ** be, of acquiring happinefs agreeable to our nature." 
 And he fays, " "f When we have reafoned a pofteriori^ 
 *' from the works to the will of God, and from the 
 " conflitution of the fyftem wherein we are placed 
 " by him to our intereft and duty in it, we fhall have 
 " laid the foundation of morality on a rock. Let us 
 *' truft to pure intellect lefs than we are advifed, and 
 '* to our fenfes more." I can allow, that morality, 
 that is, goodnefs, juflice, and truth, are fuch ante- 
 cedently to the will of" God ; fuch in themfelves, 
 becaufe they flow from his eflential holinefs : and 
 though his Lordfliip doth not conceive how the prac- 
 tice of thefe virtues may be impofed, I do conceive 
 that it is the will of God that brings us under the ob- 
 ligation, and not that which we may efleem our hap- 
 pinefs in this life. If every man is left judge of 
 what will make him happy, and if his happinefs is 
 the firft and only rule of morality, I am convinced 
 that nothing can have a more precarious foundation 
 than virtue. And for that rocky foundation which 
 
 * Vol. ii. p. 250. f \'ol. iii. p. 384. 
 
 his 
 
Sefl.IV. Of morality i and the moral laiv. 95 
 
 his Lordfliip lays for morality, our intereft: and duty 
 as we find them in the fyftem wherein we are placed, 
 it is but a foundation for every wicked and profitable 
 work. Interefl: is the leading principle ; and if there 
 is any fubfequent duty, it is only to purfue it. And 
 can any man have worfe principles, than to make, or 
 jultify his making, his temporal intereft and advantage 
 take place of every confideration ? Mr Mallet, do, 
 renounce fuch villanous philofophy, for the fake of 
 your honour and reputation. God hath made us rea- 
 fonable creatures, and fuch he made Lord Boling- 
 BROKE ; but it was not God, but he himfelf, who 
 made him a vitious and immoral man. As we are 
 reafonable creatures, we are the work of God ; from 
 which we may conclude, that it is his will that we aft 
 and live reafonably. It is our reafon then that dif- 
 covers to us morality, and the moral law. But we 
 mull: not miftake our own works for the works of 
 God, and reafon from them, that it is his will that 
 we fhould principally and only confult our temporal 
 advantage in the fyftem in which we are placed. Had 
 God made us fuch as the beafts, only with animal 
 inftinfts, it had been vain in us to have attempted a 
 higher life. It is the will of God that beafts fliould 
 live as beafts, for he hath made them beafls : but if 
 men make rhemfelves beafts, and worfe than beafts, 
 it is their own will, and not his, that they live as fuch. 
 
 It is fomething extraordinary, that a ftir fhould be 
 
 held 
 
^6 Of morality J and the moral law* Sefl. IV. 
 
 held about the nature and origin of morality, and the 
 means of knowing it. One may as well pretend not 
 to fee, when his eyes are open and well difpofed, the 
 objeft at a due diftance, and the medium duly en- 
 lightened ; as to pretend, that the knowledge of right 
 and wrongy jiiji and unjuii, depends on a courle of 
 natural philofophy, or on a long obfenration of the 
 pra£lice of mankind. This piece of knowledge is ef- 
 fentiai to all rational beings. In men it begins with 
 reafon, if not before it, and continues while almoft 
 every other thing is forgot. It is pollible a man may 
 work himlcif up into a diitelief of a future (late of 
 rewards and punilhments, and even into Atheifm; 
 but it is not in his power to rafe out of his mind the 
 diftin£tion between the equity and iniquity of actions : 
 nor can lie hinder hirafclf to judge rhofe a£lions that 
 are right and equal, to be praifc -worthy and reward- 
 able ; and fuch alliens as arc bad and unjuft, to be 
 contemptible, hateful, and puniihable. Without of- 
 fence to Mr Mallet's, and to all other antichriftian 
 ears, on this head I may quote the Apoflle Paul : 
 * The Gentiles not having the laiJUy Wire a law unto 
 them [elves -, which Jkew the work of the law written 
 in their hearts, their conjcience alfo hearing witmfs^ 
 and their thoughts the mean while accujingy or elfe ex- 
 cufi^g one another. To make amends for any oflence 
 this quotation may give, 1 add the •f'taK;. i^i^A" of 
 Aristotle. Confcicncc, that is, confcious know- 
 
 • Rom. ii. 14. 15. 
 
 ledge. 
 
Se<5l. IV. Of morality^ and the moral law, 97 
 
 ledge, we have in ourfelves, without feeking it abroad ; 
 and we therefore know righi from wrong-» as we know 
 our own underftanding. 
 
 Though the knowledge o? right and wrong is 
 cflential to all rational beings, I do acknowledge, that 
 this doth not become a law, nor acquire the force of 
 obligation, until we confider ourfelves, our uoder- 
 ilanding, and other faculties, and particularly this 
 our knowledge of morality and immorality, as owing 
 to God. We then learn, that it is his will and com- 
 mand, that we live foberly, righteouily, and godly ; 
 and that we pra6life every virtue, and decline every 
 vice ; and that in all cafes, all times, and all circura- 
 flances, without regard to our temporal advantage or 
 difadvantage, we lliould a£l according to the dilates 
 of right reafon, and lead our lives in all godlinefs and 
 honefty. Thus, what is improperly called the law 
 of nature, becomes the law of God. To be a crea- 
 ture, and to be dependent on God the Creator, is the 
 fame. Every creature depends according to its nature. 
 Man muft de-^end on God, not only as an animal, 
 but as a rational animal ; and as fuch he cannot de- 
 pend without being lubjefted to a law. Therefore to 
 be rational, and to be a fubjecl of God's moral go-? 
 vernment, is the fame thing. 
 
 1 did fay, that the morality of an aftion is one 
 
 thing, and our obligation to pradlife it is another; 
 
 N and 
 
pS Of morality, and the moral law. Seft. IV. 
 
 and now I diftinguifh between morality and the moral 
 law. Morality is acknowledged by Atheifts and 
 Deifts; but a moral law cannot be acknowledged 
 by any one who does not believe himfelf a fubje£l of 
 the fupreme Being. The diftates of right reafon are 
 common to all reafonable creatures, and in fo far they 
 have a common influence on the conduft and beha- 
 viour of all men. And this makes place for another 
 diftinftion, too little obferved by philofophers, be- 
 tween a rule and a law. This I have already fet in 
 a clear and diitinft light * ; to which I now add two 
 authorities ; one from the rules of the civil law, viz. 
 Regiila juris non efl jus ; " A rule of law is not law :" 
 and the other is that of Hobbes, as quoted by the 
 Noble author -f ; " who, though he acknowledged 
 *' right reafon to be the rule, would not allow it to 
 " be the law of human aftions." Whether Hobbes 
 was an Atheift or not, his Lordfliip did not know : 
 but I know very well, that the law of nature can be 
 no more to an Atheifl than a rule. And this my au- 
 thor, and many better philofophers than he, do mif^ 
 take. •' II An Atheift," faith his Lordfliip, *' may 
 " think and call the law of nature, a law impofed 
 *' on him by the operation of a fuperior, though un- 
 *' intelligent power; the courfe of which he cannot 
 " alter, and therefore mull conform himfelf to it, 
 
 * Eflimate, § iv. & x. 
 •j- Vol. iii. p. 419. 
 II Vol. ii. p. 291. 
 
 '' in 
 
Sc<5l IV. Of morality^ and the moral law* 99 
 
 in order to be happy. And fomething of this kind 
 even Grotius hirnfelf was forced to allow, a 
 little unwillingly, when he faid, Et hac quidem 
 locum aliq^H^m haberent^ etiamfi daremus non ejje 
 Deum.'^ The author underftands Atheifln as little 
 as he does religion, when he makes the knowledge 
 of ris^bi and wro^g in an Atheift, the effeft of the 
 operations of a fuperior unintelligent power : for 
 chance and fatality exclude the operations of fupe- 
 rior caufes, whether intelligent or unintelligent. The 
 Atheift's unintelligent power and caufe that impofes 
 on him a natural law, nonfenfe as it is, anfwers the 
 purpofe of morality jufl: as well as his Lordfhip's be- 
 lief of a fupreme Being of knowledge and power, 
 but wanting every moral perfedion. The Atheift 
 cannot alter the coarfe of things ; and therefore con- 
 forms hirnfelf to it, that he may be happy. The au- 
 thor's God hath eftablifhed general laws with regard 
 to individuals ; thefe laws his Lordfhip cannot alter, 
 and therefore he conforms hirnfelf to them, that he 
 may be happy : and his happinefs and the Atheift's is 
 of the fame kind and duration. If there is any dif- 
 ference betwixt the author's philofophy and that of 
 an Atheift, it confifts in fpeculation, and fuch a fpe- 
 culation as occafions no difference in their conduft and 
 behaviour. 
 
 Had his Lordfhip perufed the paftage quoted from 
 Gjr.otius with attention, hemuft haveobferved, that 
 
 N 2 he 
 
^oo Of morality^ and the moral law. Se^. TV. 
 
 he very willingly admitted, that the knowledge of 
 good and evil^ right and ivrong, takes fome place 
 with an Atheifl:, and brings him under a reafbn, or 
 (if you will have it) a rational obligation to aft mo- 
 rally. The author, greni by name, but much greater 
 by abilities, draws it as a corollary from what he had 
 faid, and what he might have omitted, had he not 
 thought it an ufeful truth. However, I can eafily 
 cxcufe the voluminous pliilofopher for not obferving, 
 that Grotius doth not fay a word o^ obligation^ un- 
 til he had firft eflabliflied God's authority and domi- 
 nion over us : for it hath efcaped acmer writers, and 
 fome who have wrote as his commentators. Lord 
 BoxiNGBROKE yields this point to Grotius, by af- 
 ferting, that " the morality of a£hons does not con- 
 ** fifl: ifi this, that they are prefcribcd by will, even 
 " the will of God;" without obferving, that this 
 overturns his whole fyflem of morality from the foun- 
 dation. The capital point which he labours molt to 
 prove, is. That truth and righteoufnefs do depend on 
 the arbitrary will of the fuprcme Being. But, fays 
 he, the morality of anions confids in this. That they 
 are the means, however impofcd the prachce of them 
 may be, (whether thcfe aftions take their rife from an 
 intelligent or unintelligent power), of acquiring hap- 
 pinefs agreeably to our nature. At this rate, the mo* 
 rality of an Athclft and the morality of his Lordlhip . 
 is juft the fame, and equally inforccd, not by any \ 
 authority, but a dcfire of happincfs. 
 
 After 
 
Se(5l. IV. Of morality^ and the moral Idw» loi 
 
 After all the pains his Lordlhip hath taken to 
 fettle his principles of morality, he is not able to 
 fpeak lenfe on the fubje6t. The Atheift may have 
 regard to natural difTerences, and to ailing or not aft- 
 ing according to them. I allow he may. But I de- 
 fire to be excufed in not joining with the author in 
 what immediately follows. " The Atheift may fee, 
 " that human actions, confidered abftraftly from all 
 '* relations, circumftances, and confequences, might 
 " be deemed abfblutely indifferent ; yet no human 
 " aftion can be fo confidered." The Atheift may 
 therefore perform an impofTibility, and confider things 
 in a way in which they cannot be confidered. If this 
 is ill worded, his therefore fubjoined is as ill placed. 
 " The Atheift therefore may think himfelf under an 
 '* obligation of intereft, though he acknowledges no 
 *' divine legiflator." He means, or he ought to 
 mean, an obligation to live morally : and this is as it 
 happens. For he may occafionally think it his inter- 
 eft, even to break a promife, and betray his truft. 
 In which cafe, all his philofophy of right and wrong, 
 and all his rational morality, muft yield to his tem- 
 poral intereft and advantage. If the principles and 
 praftice of Atheifts were not too well known, his 
 Lordfhip would deferve thanks for informing the 
 world, " that the advantages and difadvantages an- 
 *' nexed, by natural confequence, to the obfervation 
 " or breach of the law of nature, without believing 
 '' a law in the ftridt fenfc of the word, but believing 
 
 " an 
 
102 Of morality, and the moral laiv, Seft.IV. 
 
 " an obligation in the ftrifleft, do determine him. And 
 " it is manifeft, that no other confideration can, 
 *' nor, on his principles, ought to determine him." 
 The law of nature, then, lays the Atheift under no 
 obligation. For, iji^ It is ftriftly and properly no 
 law to him. And, idly^ His own intereft, of which he 
 himfelf is the only judge, lays him under the ftrifteft 
 obligation. As he that hath not the beft: right, hath 
 no right at all; fo the ftrifteft obligation diUblves and 
 unties all others. And, 3^/7, His Lordlhip acknow- 
 ledges in fo many words, that it is manifeft, that no 
 other confideration (but felf-intereft) can, nor, on 
 his principles, ought to determine him. And to what 
 purpofe then doth his knowledge of the law of na- 
 ture, of right and wrong, of morality and immo- 
 rality, of the equity and iniquity of actions, ferve I 
 The grand and nobleft faculty of the mind, by 
 which we di (cover the difference between right and 
 wrong, or rather perceive implanted in our under- 
 ftanding, becomes entirely ufelefs, and fuperfluous, 
 and troublefome to every one who difregards the 
 imprefiion. For if this knowledge hath any place in 
 the human underftanding, I mean of an Atheift, it is 
 only in fubferviency and fubordination to what he 
 efteems his temporal intereft. 
 
 The Noble author, averle to ditTer from the 
 Atheift, freely acknowledges that the Theift, that is, 
 he himlelf, *' is determined by the fame advantages 
 
 " and 
 
Se6l.IV. Of morality^ and the moral laiv. 103 
 
 *' and difadvantages, ftill more ftrongly." If it hap- 
 pens, that no temporal advantages attend the praftice 
 of morality, then it takes no place with him. But 
 if what he efleems an advantage or happinefs, attends 
 immorality, then the Atheift and he aft upon the 
 fame principles. The difference mentioned is really 
 none. His advantages determine him more ftrongly, 
 *' becaufe he looks upon them as annexed, not only 
 " by natural confequence, but by pofitive and di- 
 " vine appointment." Is not an annexation by na- 
 tural confequence, and an annexation by pofitive and 
 divine appointment, the fame, if God is the author 
 of the efiablifhed courfe of nature ? But however 
 annexed the confequences of aftion are to the aftion, 
 it is certain, that they come alike to the Atheifl: and 
 to the Theift, in this life j and neither his Lordlliip, 
 nor you, nor the Atheift, expeft another. If there 
 are no worldly advantages at all attending moral aftions, 
 or if the advantages of immorality exceed thofe of 
 morality, you find yourfelf difchargcd from the prac- 
 tice of the firjft, and indulged, or rather injoined, the 
 praftice of the fecond. And thus you make God 
 authorife your obedience or difobedience to the moral 
 law, as it ferves your purpofe. For if your advan- 
 tage is the fundamental and formal reafon or motive 
 of your actions, then God cannot cominand one and 
 forbid another aftion, but in i'o far as they are fub- 
 fervient to what you imagine your happinefs. GoD 
 jdoth not fay, Be ye holy, that ye may be happy ; but. 
 
 Be 
 
104 Ofmoralitj, and the moral laiu, Se(5l.IV. 
 
 Be ye happy, that ye may be holy. His Lordfhip 
 fpeaks of morality in an Atheift as a duty; but it is 
 only a duty owing to himfelf, and not to God. 
 And this the Atheift does as well as he. All Theifts 
 who believe themfelves the fubjefts of God's moral 
 government, look upon the dilates of right reafon, 
 or the rule of right, of juftice, goodnefs, and truth, 
 that is, the law of nature, as the law of God, un- 
 changeable, (and fuch the Noble author admits it to 
 be) ; which they are bound to obey without referve, 
 let the confequences in this life be what they will. 
 It is their perfuafion, that inftead of temporal advan- 
 tages binding clofer and ftrifter than this law, they 
 look upon them as of no force, and no difcharge of 
 their obedience. Like the good fubjefts of a temporal 
 Ibvereign, they refer the confequences of their obe- 
 dience to divine providence ; and truft themfelves to 
 the difpofal of their fovereign Lord and Lawgiver, 
 who can and will provide a better for them than they 
 can do for themfelves. Whereas Atheifts and his 
 Lordfhip treat the law of nature worfe than it be? 
 comes fubjcfts to treat the laws of an earthly fove- 
 reign. He requires obedience without fubmitting to 
 them the perfbnal and public advantages that may at- 
 tend it. For were they left judges of the expe- 
 diency or inexpediency of the law, it would be no 
 more a law, and he neither fovereign nor lawgiver. 
 But whatever you or the Atheift may imagine, God 
 hath not, nay, cannot, furrender his moral governr 
 
 ment 
 
Sc<5l. IV. Of morality^ and the moral law, iq^ 
 
 ment into your hands, nor allow you to change or 
 abrogate his immutable law. 
 
 It is not eafy to underftand the Noble author's 
 meaning in thefe words. " Whatever anions are na- 
 " turally good or evil, muft appear to the Theift to 
 *' be fo morally. They derive their particular na- 
 " ture from the conftitution of our fyftem. They 
 " might not have been what they are, if this fyliem 
 " had not been what it is. And this fyftem had not 
 " been what it is, if God, who made it, had not 
 " willed that it Ihould be fo," The doctrine of a 
 fyftem runs through all his philofophical works, as if it 
 were a fettled point not to be miftaken ; and yet what 
 he means by it, I have not been able to underftand, 
 with any kind of precifion. Sometimes it is the 
 whole univerfe, confifting of parts connefted with, 
 and depending on one another. Of which, notwith- 
 ftanding the affiftance of modern aftronomers, he 
 knows as little of the morality or immorality of the 
 inhabitants of the vifible and inviflble heavens, as I 
 do. At other times this fyftem is reftri£led to our 
 terreftrial planet. And what leflbn of morality did 
 he learn from verdant fields and azure Ikies, from 
 fpreading oaks and large rivers, from ftupendous 
 mountains and impending precipices ? or did the 
 beafts of the field, the fowls of the air, or the fiili 
 of the water, teach him his duty to God, and to his 
 own fpecies : Therefore his fyftem, with which our 
 
 O moral 
 
1 06 Of morality^ and the moral laiu. Sc^. IV. 
 
 moral doings are connected, is refl:ri61:cd to rational 
 beings, and particularly to what he calls the human 
 fyjlem. He travelled far to fearch out what is only 
 found at home. Taking his Lordfhip's lyftem to 
 fignify human nature^ (and to take it in any other 
 fenfe, is impertinent), he (ays, aftions morally good 
 had not been fuch, if our fyftem, that is, human 
 nature, had not been what it is. I allow him, if 
 God had not made man a rational creature, he had 
 not been a moral agent, nor under a moral law. 
 But on fuppofition that he is what he is, (and no 
 more is contended for by metaphyficians, than a hy- 
 pothetical ncceffity), he is immutably and eternally 
 bound to conform his anions to the dictates of right 
 reafon. This is far from the author's meaning. He 
 fuppofes that God can make a fyflem of creatures, 
 in which what with us is accounted morale jQiall 
 with them be efteemed immoral^ and immorality iliall 
 pafs for morality, and virtue for vice, and vice for 
 virtue, and both with equal good reafon. Reafbncrs 
 a priori^ with whom he finds fault for teaching what 
 God may or may not, can or cannot do, never were 
 guilty of fuch horrid blafphemy as this. That our 
 holy God, our God of truth and without iniquity, 
 who is eflentially jufl: and right, can, if he plcafcs, 
 cftablifli iniquity by a law. The abfurdity of this 
 do6lrine is equal to the blafphemy of it. For it may 
 be as well fuppofed, that God can make a fyflem 
 wherein creatures, fuch as \^■e, or creatures far fu- 
 
 perior 
 
Se^l. IV. Of morality, and the moral law* 107 
 
 perlor to us in intelligence, fliall necefTarily and 
 truly judge, that two and two are unequal to four. 
 This the author may as eafily digeft, as he does 
 God's power to make what is abfolutely impoflible 
 to become poffible. His memory is no better than 
 his judgment. From the make of the mundane 
 fyftem, he concludes God's infinite wifdom and 
 power ; and from infinite wifdom and power, he 
 concludes the world could not have been better nor 
 worfe made ; and from this he mufi: allow me to 
 conclude, that, according to his principles, the pre- 
 fent fyflem cannot be altered, nor a new fyflem 
 made another way. He hath faid, that morality doth 
 not confiff in this, that it is prefcribed by will, even 
 the will of God. Let his Lordfliip make as many 
 fyftems as he can imagine, they muff: be the effedl of: 
 will : and as morality does not confifl in being pre- 
 fcribed by will, it cannot with them be changed or 
 altered. He further adds, " that upon fuppofition 
 " of eternal differences and independent natures,'* 
 that is, as I would word it, upon fuppofition of eter- 
 nal truth and righteoufnefs, " it would flill be true, 
 " that the will of God conftitutes the obligation of 
 " duty." I do admit, and I have proved, that it is 
 the will of God that conftitutes our obligation to a^ 
 morally. But it is his ellential holinefs from which 
 morality flows, not by an a£l of his arbitrary will, but 
 by a neceflary confequence. And therefore it is the 
 will, and muft be the will of God, that all rational 
 
 .0 2 beings 
 
lo8 Of morality^ and the moral law. Seft.IVa 
 
 beings conform their anions to the rule of jufticc 
 and equity. God, by making the human fyftem, 
 did not then, and not until then, make a difference 
 between jujl and unjujl \ nor did he confider all 
 aftions previoufly to the creation of the human race, 
 to be in themfelves indifferent. From eternity he 
 approved of what is good and juft; and could not dif- 
 approve or difregard it, without becoming himfelf an 
 unholy and an iinjufl being. If he hath pleafure in the 
 works of his hands, (and no doubt he hath pleafure 
 in whatever he does), no fyftem of rational creatures, 
 whether aftual or poffible, but muft be fubjcft to his 
 moral government. 
 
 Whoever overlooks the duty he owes to God, 
 will be found to build morality without a foundation. 
 His Lordfhip fays, *' God appears in his works, and 
 " from eafy deduftions of our knowledge of them, 
 *' to be the firli, felf-CAiflcnt, intelligent caufc, a 
 " being of infinite wifdom and power; and there- 
 " fore an obje(fl: to all rational creatures, not of cu- 
 " riofity, but of awe, reverence, of adoration, of 
 " gratitude, of obedience, and refignation." In no 
 lyflem therefore whatever can rational creatures be 
 freed from their duty to God, nor from the obfer- 
 vation of the law of nature. I know that fome dif- 
 tinguifh between morality and piety. By this they 
 underftand the duties iiiimediately owing to God, and 
 by that the duties which men owe to one another. In 
 
 place 
 
Se6t. IV. Of morality, and the moral law, 109 
 
 place of piety I /hould chufe the word godlinefsy as 
 of more reftri£led and precife fignification. With this 
 the author is not much concerned. He rather feems 
 to mock than recommend devotion, when he ridicules 
 prayer, and infinuates, that to give audience to all at 
 all times, is a trouble that God cannot take upon 
 him. As God's eilential holinefs is the fource of all 
 morality, of all folitary and focial, of all public and 
 private virtues, they muft be confidered as fo many 
 a£l:s of obedience to the divine will ; and as an ac- 
 knowledgment of his dominion o\er us, and of our 
 fubjeftion to his moral government. If we are godly, 
 if we are fober, if we are focial, we iliould always 
 have in our thoughts, that it is the will of God we 
 fhould be fuch. This fhould be our perpetual and 
 principal motive, in order to be really religious. Take 
 any other confideration or motive as the ground of our 
 moral and rational doings, and they will in many cafes 
 be found infufficient to inforce the practice of them. 
 For inftance, his Lordlhip makes the Ibcial duties, 
 and the bleffrngs of fociety, man's principal duty and 
 happinefs. 1 have already made appear, that, with- 
 out godlinefs and religion, he cannot perform the du- 
 ty, nor deferve the reward. I hope the reader will 
 not find my words a digreflion. Some plead againft 
 the neceifity of religion to this purpofe : *' * For their 
 " common fafety and comfort, men entered into fo- 
 *' ciety, and became mutually bound to one another 
 
 * EftimatC; p. 325. 
 
 " for 
 
110 Of morality, and the moral law, Secft. IV. 
 
 for mutual afliflance ; and as their fafety ftill de- 
 pends upon the peace and power of the community, 
 it is Itill the interefl: of every member to maintain 
 it, by performing every fbcial duty. Their own 
 happinefs (and there cannot be a greater) is mo- 
 tive fufficient to make them good citizens. And as 
 this is the Atheift; V [Lord Bolingbroke's, and 
 Mr Mallet's] ** only hfe, he is more obliged to 
 take care of the fociety, without which he cannot 
 take care of himfelf, than the religionifl, who ex- 
 pefts a better life when this is done. 
 
 *' I do allow, that it is better for fociety in general 
 " to obferve than to violate the mutual obligations 
 " w^hich it brings men under : but as this doth not 
 " hinder fome particulars from catching an advantage, 
 '' by betraying their truft ; it cannot oblige a perfon 
 " who only confiders hinifelf, and this life, as his 
 " ALL, to fuffer much for the eafe of others, or to 
 ** be a lofer himfelf for another's profit. It is a 
 '* truth, not of pure fpcculation only, but alfo of 
 *' experience, that it is poffible in a community, for 
 " a man to confult his own advantage to the detri- 
 " ment of the fociety of which he is a member : but 
 *' this religion doth not allow, and Atheifm doth. 
 ** An Atheift hath no interefl: but his own ; and as his 
 *' interefl: in this world is his only inrercfl, he is un- 
 " der the fl:rongefl: obligations, as he mufl: think, and 
 " under unfurmountable temptations, as religionifls 
 
 " %ak, 
 
Se^. IV, Of morality^ and the moral law, ill 
 
 *' fpeak, to confult and promote it at any rate; and 
 *' even to fell the fociety into the hands of the ene- 
 " my for his fuperior and only intereft. And this 
 " certainly they do mean, who plead, as the bads of 
 " their fecial virtues, that their own intereft obliges 
 " them to confult the good of the fociety, becaufe, 
 " their own depends upon it. For this very be- 
 " CAUSE or reafon will induce a man to ruin the {o- 
 " ciety when it is his own intereft to do it. For if 
 " intereji is a good reafon for entering into fociety, 
 '' it muft remain a good reafon for renouncing every 
 " focial duty, when, by fo doing, the Atheift can 
 " ferve himfelf to better purpofe. And his only in- 
 " tereft confifts in this life, and the appendent plea- 
 " fures of it. 
 
 " But the religious man hath an intereft to ferve 
 " of infinitely more value than all that he can gain 
 *' or enjoy in this life. And it is part of his religion, 
 " and a condition without which he cannot obtain his 
 *' glorious end, faithfully to perform all contrails, 
 *' formal or implicit, even at the expence of what the 
 '' Atheift efteems his chief happincfs. Therefore he 
 " is juft as much obliged to conflilt the advantage of 
 "' the fociety of which he is a member, and that to 
 " his own temporal lofs, as the Atheift thinks himfelf 
 *' obliged to prefer his own advantage in this world, 
 ■' to the advantage of fociety, when in competition, 
 ^' notwithftanding all the obligations he hath come 
 
 " under 
 
T 12 Of morality, and the moral law. Se£l. IV, 
 
 *' under to facrifice all for the fake of it. This life 
 '' is his chief happinefs, his all, to which every 
 " other confideration, however fo juft and generous, 
 " muft give place. 
 
 • " I am fure that no fociety upon earth would ad- 
 
 " mit a member on fuch a declaration as this. / do 
 
 " expctl your ajjiftance in every thing, and that all of 
 
 ** you will promote the happinefs of the community at 
 
 ** the hazard, and even at the expence of your lives ; 
 
 " and I iv'il likewije contribute thereto as far as is 
 
 *' confiflent with my per final inter ell : but feeing it is 
 
 *' for that that I now become a member of your fociety ; 
 
 " when that mujl be loji, I plead to be excufid ; yea^ 
 
 " rather than lofe myjelf, ye may expe£l that I will 
 
 " ruin you all. 
 
 *' Any man who would fpeak fb, would not be 
 " allowed the bleffings and advantages of fociety; 
 " and he that thinks fo, would not deferve them. 
 *' But fo thinks the Atheift, and fo in cfTe^l he fpcaks, 
 *' when he makes his own temporal and worldly in- 
 " tereft the only tie of fociety, and the only rcalbn 
 " for performing the mutual obligations of it. A 
 " community made up of fuch members (if it could 
 " be made up at all) would not laft for a day ; the 
 " very foundation being a fettled and fundamental 
 " reafon for the diflblution of it." 
 
 As 
 
Sc*n:.IV. Of morality, and the 7mrallaw, 113 
 
 As I promifed to call on David Mallet, Efq; 
 to reconcile what appears to me to be contradiftions, 
 contra boms mores, or the good of mankind ; I now, 
 in the moft ferioiis and folemn manner, call upon you 
 to fhcw the difference between your principles and 
 thofe of Atheifts, which lay a foundation for the pre- 
 ceding reflexions. You acknowledge no future (late 
 of rewards and punifhments. You confider yourfelf 
 as below the care of divine providence in this life ; 
 and what more doth Atheifm praftically amount to ? 
 You fay, that the advantages and difadvantages an- 
 nexed, by natural confequence, to the obfervation or 
 breach of the law of nature, do certainly determine 
 the Atheift, as believing it an obligation in the flrifteft 
 fenfe ; and that no other confideration ought to deter- 
 mine him. The Theift, fuch as you, is determined 
 by the fame advantages and difadvantages ; and there- 
 fore hath no more occafion for the law of nature, or 
 the law of God, to influence his choice. Well, but 
 the author and editor are determined more flrongly. 
 For what ? to pufh for their temporal intereft. Be it 
 fo. The reafon is not theological. It is not becaufe 
 it is the will of God, made known to them by the 
 dictates of their reafon ; but becaufe thefe advantage- 
 bus confequences are not only annexed to moral anions 
 naturally, but likewife by pofitive and divine appoint- 
 ment. To -him that pleads an univerfal dependence 
 of all nature and all natural confequences on the ar- 
 bitrary will of the fuprcme Being, the difiinftion of 
 
 P natural 
 
114 Of morality^ and the moral law. Sefl. IV. 
 
 natural and divine annexations muft appear imperti- 
 nent. The Arheifl is moral for his temporal advan- 
 tage, and for that only : and fuch a Theift as you, or 
 your Noble author, are preclfely moral for the very 
 fame, and no other reafon. If you have a greater re- 
 gard for thofe temporal inducements than the Atheift 
 hath, becaufe you confidcr them as of divine appoint- 
 ment, you only make God approve and patronize 
 your condu£l: in afting for your own advantage ; the 
 fame with that which the Atheift hath in view, and 
 that at any rate. His fuprema regula moriim, and his 
 fummum bonum, are reflrifted to this life, to which 
 actions, juft or unjuft, muft be fubfervlent ; and fo arc 
 yours. And thus you treat God rather worfe than the 
 Atheifl doth, who denies his being. "When you and 
 your ALL is to be totally and eternally loft: for per- 
 forming the obligations you owe to fociety, it is your 
 opinion, that God doth not only difpenfe with your 
 fidelity, but approves, and even commands your per- 
 fidy. His Lordiliip fays, that the reafon why men 
 fail in performing fecial duties is, becaufe they con- 
 fider themlelves as individuals. For this there is no re- 
 medy, nor is there- any occafion for it. Individuals 
 men are ; and as they are, fo they may and ought to 
 be confidcred. He further fays, that the law of na- 
 ture lays the whole fociety under an obligation to live 
 morally: and this all acknowledge; but every one 
 endeavours to become an exception v hen his cafe re- 
 quires it. Tills is to acknowledge, that fuch is the 
 
 conditiga 
 
Se6l. IV. Of morality, and the moral law, 1 15 
 
 condition of every one who looks on this as his only 
 life, that in fome circumftances it is his duty to z6t 
 reafonably, againft his reafon. The debate about utile 
 and honejium, honeft and ufeful, which hath lafted 
 from beyond the days of Socrates until now, can- 
 not be determined without a fuppofition of a future 
 ftate of rewards and punifhments. And if philofb- 
 phers fhould difpute on the head while the world 
 lafls, they muft talk nonfenfe and contradidlions. 
 But of this more afterwards. 
 
 P 2 SECT, 
 
ii6 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 The antiquity and univerfality an evidence of re-' 
 
 lioion. 
 o 
 
 IF the Noble author's morality is not good, it is 
 becaufe his theology is very bad. For he who 
 hath no right notions of the Sovereign and Governor 
 of rational creatures, can have no jufl: perception of 
 his Jaws. It is unaccountable, (if the whole perform- 
 ance was not fuch), that, writing fo voluminoufly on 
 natural religion, he Hiould fay fo very little on the 
 being and attributes of God, upon which all piety 
 and morality, our duty to God and man, is founded, 
 and by which it is inforced. One might have reafon- 
 ably expefted a fyflem of natural religion fet forth at 
 leaft in a new light and order. But fuch was his aver- 
 fion to revealed religion, and fuch his indignation to 
 the teachers of it, that he was even willing, that in 
 order to difcrcdit Chriftianity, natural religion Ihould 
 fhare the contempt. He fometimes mentions topics 
 11 fed in proving the divine exigence, but he follows 
 out none of them to a well-conne6led conclufion. 
 Some of them he refufes, particularly Descartes's, 
 from his idea of God ; and the univerfal confent of 
 mankind ; and he modeftly, but with authority, fays, 
 Dr Clarke's demonflration of the being and attri- 
 butes of God hath obtained more reputation than it 
 
 defervcs. 
 
SecH:. V. The antiquity and univerfaliiy , &c. 1 17 
 
 deferves. I fhall pafsall his faults of omiflTion, though 
 to him they are material ; but I have feveral faults of 
 commiiTion to lay to his charge; fuch as, i. Denying 
 any reafons, whether probable or demonftrative, that 
 eilablifh the belief of a fupreme Being. 2. He de- 
 nies God's moral attributes. 3. He forbids all imi- 
 tation of his moral perfections. 4. He holds a parti- 
 cular providence as a talk too arduous for infinite wif- 
 doin ai^.d power, or below the majefly of the Al- 
 mighty. 5. He admits the co-eternity of the ma- 
 terials with the maker of the vs^orld. 6. He denies 
 the immateriality of, the foul. And, 7. He denies 
 the immortality of the foul, and a future ftate of re- 
 wards and punilhments. 
 
 The univerfal confent of mankind in believing a 
 Deity, if not ftriClly demonftrative, is one of the 
 greateft probabilities that can be pleaded in any cafe. 
 This appears from the oppofition it hath met with 
 from all the learning that hiilory, modern travels, and 
 logics, can afford. M. Bayle in particular hath 
 wrote as much againft it as would make a volume as 
 large as one of Lord Bolingbroke's five. There 
 muil be a good deal of ftrength in it, or he mufl 
 have been idly employed. And whoever will exa- 
 mine the exceptions he makes, will find, that they 
 rather confirm than weaken the argument. Thofe 
 who ufe the argument, do not allert, that every indi- 
 vidual perfon believes the exifteoce of God, or that 
 
 in 
 
Ii8 The antiquity and univerfality Se<5l. V. 
 
 in every nation it is believed nationally. And I am 
 content with the univerfality, as it is allowed, and 
 mnfl. be allowed by Atheifts. His Lordfliip admits, 
 *' * That this confcnt is general enough to fhew the 
 ** proportion which this truth bears to the univerfal 
 " reafon of mankind." I likewife allow, that fome 
 errors have been as univerfally believed as the exig- 
 ence of God ; fuch as, the impoffihility of aniipcdes, 
 and the reft of the earth, and the motion of the hea- 
 vens. But then, no man can difpute the almoft un- 
 furmountable prejudice of fenfe and imagination, as 
 the fource of thcfe two errors. This doth not weaken, 
 but rather ftrengthen the argument, becaiife no fuch 
 thing can be pleaded for mens erring univerfally in be- 
 lieving a Deity. And I have his Lordfhip's authority, 
 " -f that prejudice was againft religion." M. Bayle 
 objefts further. That polytheifm was more univerfal- 
 ly believed than monotheifm. But all the world 
 knows, that polytheifm is a mifimprovcment of mono- 
 theifm ; and fo natural, fo common and infinuating, 
 that a great many learned and judicious Chriflians clin- 
 not be hindered, by their belief of the Gospel, 
 from making fubordinate gods and goddefTcs, who 
 hear their prayers, and vi(e their credit with the Al- 
 mighty to befriend them. The argument is not to 
 be ftatedthus, What all mankind believes, is true •, Lut 
 all mankind believes the being of God : therefore, &:c. ; 
 but thus, PFhat all mankind bejei-es without the :n- 
 
 * Vol. ii. p. 250. admarg. f Vol. v. p. 307. 
 
 fiumcc 
 
Sefl. V. an evidence of religion. 1 1 9 
 
 fiuence of prejudice^ is true. The argument is good, 
 xinlefs Atheifts, and thofe who deny it, can (hew any 
 prevailing prejadice, fuch as the impoffibility of anti- 
 podes, that firft gave rife, and continues to fupport the 
 belief of a God. After his Lordfhip had publifhed in 
 his own time, that " * Cud worth has endeavoured 
 " to prove, many have tliought, and I incline to think, 
 *' that the unity of a firft intelligent caufe was the 
 " original belief of mankind;" he retrafts. And I 
 am as fure that this was their original belief, as I am 
 that numbers are made up of units. But if there is 
 but a pofTibility of wandering from the road of reafon, 
 his Lordfliip is fure to go aftray. And notwithftand- 
 ing his inclination to believe what Dr Cudworth 
 hath proved, or what, as I think, is too plain to need 
 proof, he pofitively affirms, that polytheifm was the 
 iirft religion, and idolatry the firft woriliip -f. It is 
 his opinion, though a truth, it is fo far out of the 
 reach of ordinary underftanding, that it muft have 
 taken fome generations of men of mature and impro- 
 ved judgment, before it could have been difcovered; 
 that is, before they could . have learned to count one 
 before two. Such a blank in the progrefs of religion, 
 or fuch a neutrality between Atheifm and religion, at 
 the commencement of the human race, would effec- 
 tually defeat the argument drawn from the univerfal 
 conlent, to prove the divine exiftence. From this way 
 pf reprefcnting the primitive inhabitants of the earth, 
 
 * VoL V. p, 309. f Vol. i. p. 299. 
 
 Adam, 
 
1 20 The ontiquitj and univerfality Sert. V. 
 
 Adam, and his new cotemporarles, (if he had any), 
 were no more than overgrown children. But this 
 doth not go down with his Lordfhip ; who fays, 
 it * If vi^e are perfuaded that this world, and the in- 
 " habitants of it, had a beginning in time, we mud 
 *< of necefTity afTame, that the firft men and firft wo- 
 " men, and that one man and one wonian at leaft, 
 " were produced in full ftrength and vigour of body 
 " and mind." And I am perfuaded, that Adam, be- 
 fore he was forty years old, was a better philofopher 
 than Lord Bolingbroke. 
 
 Notwithstanding his Lordfliip fays, IF this 
 worlds and the inhabitants of it, had a be^inning^ he 
 hath wrote more than was juft neceflary to prove fuch 
 a beqinning ; and that this being a matter of univerfal 
 tradition, mufl: be true. From which it follows, 
 that from the beginning of the human race, to this 
 day, it was, and continues to be the belief of man- 
 kind, that they were made by the fupreme Being, 
 the firft intelligent caufe of their own and all other 
 beings. And this is a confequence he cannot refufe, 
 becaufe he reafons thus. " i" St r a bo reprefents 
 *' the Ethiopians rather barbarous than civilized ; and 
 " yet this people believed a fiipremc immortal Being, 
 " the firft caufe of all things. This people there- 
 ** fore believed that the world had a beginning." If 
 from the being of God, the Ethiopians believed the 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 43. t ^'°^- ^'- P- -^°' 
 
 world 
 
Seft. V. an evidence of religion, 1 2 1 
 
 world had a beginning, it was as eafy for all that 
 believed the world had a beginning, to conclude 
 that it proceeded from a prior canfe ; juft as eafy and 
 obvious as it is to me, who believe that a houfe is not 
 eternal, to conclude that it was made by a builder. 
 According to my author's opinion, the commence- 
 ment of the world is a ftronger proof of the exigence 
 of a Deity, than the exiftence of a fupreme Being is 
 of the beginning of the world. For he fays, " * I 
 " am far from refting the proof of God's exigence 
 " on the authority of this tradition. That the world 
 " began. I know we are able to demonftrate this 
 ** fundamental truth of all religion, whether it began 
 " or no." I am very fure he is miflaken, as fhall 
 afterwards be made appear. The matter of fad, and 
 the reafon of it, are eflentially conne£led ; and what- 
 ever proves the one, proves the other ; and there- 
 fore what difproves the one, difproves the other 
 likewife. So fays his Lordfliip, *' i" There is one 
 " fa6l conveyed to us by tradition, i/'/z. That the 
 " world we inhabit had a beginning in time ; the 
 *' truth of which we muft admit, becaufe it is abfurd 
 *' to aUumc the contrary." 
 
 Did he believe that the firft men fprung out of 
 the earth like muilirooms, and from fuch obfervations 
 as they were able to make on their ov/n and other 
 beings, they were obliged to provide for the fupport 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 311, -|- Vol. V. p. 236. 
 
 Q^ and 
 
122 Th: antiquity and unrcerfalhy Seft. V. 
 
 and prefenrarlon of their lives, he might indeed hold 
 it as an abfurditj, (as he doth), that they became 
 philoioDhers as foon as their feet were free from the 
 earthen womb. But to coofider man as the vvork- 
 manlhip of Gqd, (and he muft allow him to be fuch, 
 leeinfT he admits the world and its inhabitants to have 
 had a beginning), at his firft appearance, he was in 
 full ftrength and vigour of body and mind, perfe^k- 
 ly titred for evers' duty of humanity, whether reli- 
 gious or civil, folitary or fecial. No article of be- 
 lief aud perfuafion was more obvious to him, than 
 that he was made ; and that as he owed his being to 
 his Creator, fo he owed him obedience. All that 
 could be learned by a freih and vi~orous underftand- 
 ing, muft immediately, or very foon, be known to 
 him. And that God Ihould have had extraordbary 
 intcrcourfe with fixh a noble creature, the chief in- 
 haHtant of this planet, in order to his fpeedy quali- 
 fication for a£Hng a religious and reafbnable part, is a 
 fuppofition entirely unworthy of the ridicule wth 
 which his Lordfliip treats it. A fuppofition, had I 
 no regard for the Bible, I Ihould embrace with plea- 
 fure. For he that makes intelligent beings, hath 
 many ways, fuch as infpiration, revelation, and more 
 ways than we can imagine, to lead them to the know- 
 ledge of truth, and to prevent their falling into error. 
 It is what we do in (ome meafure to one another ; 
 and furely God can do it to all his intelligent 
 creanires, I can, and do believe, that the firft ani- 
 mals 
 
Sed. V". an evidence of reJigso}:. 1 25 
 
 mals were completely fine and finiihed; and that, for 
 inftance, the firft horfe excelled Bucepbarus ; and 
 that Adam, as foon as he became a living Ibu), was 
 fuperior to all his race in bodily and intellectjal 
 parts. He owed his being to immediate creation; 
 and Almighty God is no bungling artificer. The 
 firit complete man could not want paternal a^ection 
 to his pofteriry. For all that came into being by ge- 
 neration and birth, mull: have periihed as iocn as 
 procreated, without the care of thoie that came into 
 being by immediate creation. And as man is realbn- 
 able, as well as animal, he could not have failed to 
 h^ve inltructed his children in the duties they owed 
 to God and man. And why ihould it be thought 
 incredible, that the behef of a fupreme Being hath 
 been traditionally handed down from the firft man to 
 all his pofterity r And he who proves the commence- 
 ment of the world by tradition, ought in confe- 
 quence to admit, that the knowledge and belief of 
 God may be tranfraitted the fame way; for the one 
 fjppofition cannot ftand without the other. It is his 
 La-dihip's opinion, that " * no people vt^re wholly 
 " ignorant of the principles of religion ; and no go- 
 *' vemment could fublift withaut them.'' This imi- 
 verfal fpread, the remoteft antiquity, and long dura- 
 tion of religion, I impute panly to tradition, and 
 panly to this, " That the being of God is a truth 
 " that bears proportion 10 the general reafon of maru 
 *' kind.'' 
 
 f Vol. ir. p. 2CI. 
 
 Ct2 ThS 
 
124 "^^^ antiquity and univerfality Scft. V. 
 
 The Nobie author, as afraid that his traditional 
 proof of the commencement of the world fliould turn 
 out a traditional proof of the exiilence of a fupreme 
 Being, takes care to inform his unwary reader, that 
 the confequence will not hold, becaufe of the difpa- 
 rity between a matter of faft, and a matter of ratioci- 
 nation. Kis words are, " As much as I am convin- 
 " ced of the exiftence of a fupreme all-perfeft Be- 
 '* ing, as ferioufly as I adore his Majeity, blefs his 
 " goodnefs, and r&Cign myfelf entirely to his provi- 
 " dence ; I fhould be fbrry to relt my convi6lion on 
 " the authority of any man, or of all mankind ; 
 *' fince authority cannot be, and demonflration is the 
 *' fole proof in this cafe." And to what religious 
 purpofe hath he been at pains to prove by tradition, 
 that this world had a beginning ? If tradition proves 
 one, it proves both. Separate the commencement 
 of the world and the being of God, and all he 
 hath faid on the fubjcft: muft go for nothing. He 
 muft therefore prove, that the eternity of the world 
 is an abfurdity, or give up all arguments a fofteriori 
 for the being of God. He pretends to be able to 
 demonftrate this fundamental truth of all religion, 
 whether the world began or no. Though I am loath 
 to weaken any fupport of religion that men may fan- 
 cy fufficient, yet I cannot but declare, that 1 am 
 perfuadcd we are not able to demonllrate the being 
 of God, if the world is eternal. He with great 
 freedom accufes divines of betraying the caufe of 
 
 God ; 
 
StSi, V. an evidence of religion, 1 25 
 
 God ; but I can fay with better reafon, though not 
 fo triumphantly, that in this he betrays the caufe of 
 God, and mifleads his readers into Atheifm. How 
 ftrongly he is convinced of a fupreme ail-perfe6l Be- 
 ing, how ferioufly he adores his Majefty, blefles his 
 goodnefs, and how chearfully he refigns himfelf to 
 his providence, 1 cannot determine from any thing 
 that he hath publiilied on the fabje£t of religion. 
 Goodnefs is one of God's moral attributes, which he is 
 very unwilling to admit ; and a perlbnal providence he 
 denies. I am perfuaded he had too much humility, 
 or too little vain alPiirance, to have conlidered him- 
 felf in the fight of God as more worthy of his care 
 and regard than the reft of mankind. 
 
 He may be as forry as he pleafes, to reft his con- 
 viftion of a fupreme Being on the authority of any 
 man, or of all mankind, provided he is fure of bet- 
 ter proof. But I muft differ from him in the reafon 
 he afligns, that " authority cannot be, and de- 
 *' monftration is the fole proof in this cafe." This 
 is the utmoft demand an Atheift can make, and in 
 him a moft unreafonable demand it is. He holds 
 the negative part of the queftion, for which he is 
 not obliged to bring any proof ; nor is he able to 
 bring any, except the impolTibility of a fupreme Be- 
 ing. And rather than admit this as an impoffibility, 
 he fubftitutes the world, or the univerfal fyftem of 
 beings, which fome call an aggregate ^ and others one 
 
 fingle 
 
126 The antiquity and univerfality Se6l. V. 
 
 fingle being, in place of God. And all of them 
 afcribe to this grand being, or this one colieftion, 
 all pofllble perfection. This nonfenfe only fcrves as 
 an evafion from the force of the arguments ihat prove 
 a Deity, or as an excufe for not believing it. They 
 that can give no reafon for their difbelief, but their own 
 ignorance, obllinacy, and ftupidity, have no right to 
 infifi: upon the highefl: reafon from thofe who are will- 
 ing to teach and to inilruft them. Upon fuppofition 
 that the truth is on the fide of Theifts, it is no ex- 
 cufe for an Atheift, that the Thcifl is not able to de- 
 mondratc that truth to his conviction. For if it is a 
 difcoverable truth, the Atheift is as much obliged to 
 find it out and believe it as the Theift is. If the 
 Theill can bring any reafon, and the Atheift can 
 bring none for his opinion, not only the ftrongeft, 
 but even the weakeft reafon fliould carry the caufe. 
 And though I fiioiild allow, that the univerfal agree- 
 ment of mankind in the belief of God, is not a clofe 
 dcmonftration, it is certainly the higheft probability 
 that ever was pleaded in any cafe. His Lordfhip 
 finds fault with mctaphyficians for firft eftabliftiing 
 pofTibiliry, and thence concluding actuality ; whilft 
 he, with more precaution, firft cftabliflies a£tuality, 
 and thence concludes pofTibility. I conclude, that 
 the being of God is credible, bccaufe it is univer- 
 fally believed. What is credible is conceivable, and 
 what is conceivable is pofFible. And admitting the 
 podibility of the being of God, there can be no ob- 
 
 jeftiori 
 
Sefl.V. an evidence of religion. 127 
 
 je(ftion againft it. So far from that, the very fup- 
 pofition that fuch a being is poiTible, affords a de- 
 monflration of his aftual exiftence. For this poffible 
 being is either neceflary or contingent. If contin- 
 gent, it mufi: be caufed, it mud be made, it mufl 
 begin to be ; and (iich a being cannot be neceflary, 
 felf-exiftent, and (elf-fufEcient. Therefore fince the 
 divme Being is poffible, it mufl aiSlually be. 
 
 But admitting thefe inferences coald not be drawn 
 from the univerfal confent of mankind, that confent 
 confidered in itfelf would be fufficient to determine 
 my approbation of Theifm, and my difapprobation 
 of Atheifm. Atheifts prove nothing, believe nothing. 
 They remain on the defenfive, intrenched to the 
 teeth, in an obftinate negative. And whatever ob- 
 jeftions they may raife againft God's government of 
 the moral world, they have nothing to fay againft his 
 exiflence. Were the queftion put to me, (and I fup- 
 pofe myfelf a reafonable man). Whether, upon the 
 higheft probability, I would chufe to believe and live 
 like a Theifl ; or to believe nothing of the matter, 
 and to live independently of a Creator and Governor 
 of the world .'' I do think I fliould not, I would not 
 hefitate a moment. The Noble philofopher did not 
 confider, that Theifm and Atheifm are contradiilory 
 do6lrine's; and that both therefore fhould be adopted 
 or rejected upon equal terms. And yet nothing below 
 demonftration can fatisfy him that God is, when for 
 
 no 
 
128 The atittquitj and univerfality Sedl. V. 
 
 no reafon at all he holds the negative, and difbeljeves 
 religion. Were this a matter of pure (peculation, he 
 might divert himfelf with reafoiiings for and againji. 
 But when, upon the belief and perfuafion of the being 
 or not being of God, the conduft of life depends, 
 the debate ihould be determined as foon as pofTible. 
 He who refufes the principles of religion, does, by 
 his refufal, chufe Atheifm ; and thus, becaufe he 
 hath not the ftrongeft of all reafons to be a religionift, 
 he becomes an Atheifl: for no reafon at all. For be- 
 tween yes and no^ it is and it is not^ there is no me- 
 dium ; and between Theiliii and Atheifm there is no 
 neutrality. 
 
 Each of thefe opinions is attended with confc- 
 quences both oppofite and important. The belief of 
 God conftitutcs duty and obligation, regulates human 
 conduft, and bears home upon the mind impreflions 
 of divine (bvereignty, and our fubje£lion. The A- 
 thcijft confiders himfclf as an independent being ; and 
 though he knows right from wrong, and morality from 
 immorality, he is under no obligation to aft any other- 
 wife than he himfelf thinks advifable pro hv. t nunc. 
 If the Theift judges right, and in fo far as he lives 
 accordingly, he hath the approbation of his Lord and 
 Lawgiver. The other denies his fubjeftion, refufes 
 his obedience, and fcts up for independency, and 
 thereby incurs the divine difplcafurc, for no reafon 
 but his own ignorance and obftinacy. I fee no dan- 
 gerous. 
 
Seel. V. an evidence of religion, 129 
 
 gerous, nay no dlfadvantageous confequence attending 
 the belief of a Deity, upon fuppofition of believing 
 without grounds. But if the Ath^ifl is miilaken, the 
 confequence of his difbelief is the difpleafure of 
 God ; and what the effects of that may be, is dread- 
 ful to imagine. 
 
 I know, that fome Atheifts plead their honefly and 
 fincerity as their juftification in difbelieving the being 
 of God ; and perfuade themfelves, that, fuppofing 
 they are miftaken, they are as fafe from divine refent- 
 ment, as the firmeft believer of his bemg and attri- 
 butes. But they do not confider, that if there is any 
 duty owing to God from his intelligent creatures, the 
 firft of all is to know it. Ignorance therefore, not- 
 withflanding its apparent innocence, may be criminal. 
 Their fellows and equals in underftanding, and thou- 
 fands of them to one, did believe, adore, and obey a 
 fupreme Being. If they fucceeded in their inquiry 
 into this fundamental truth, and if the Atheift mif- 
 carries and errs, the difference cannot be in their ca- 
 pacities and opportunities to know the truth, (thefe 
 are fuppofed equal); but mufl proceed from fome- 
 thing blameable in their conduft, and in the manage- 
 ment of their reafon and underflanding. Did the A- 
 theift imagine himfelf Handing at the bar of an om- 
 nifcient and juft judge, pleading that his ignorance 
 was honeft and fmcere, what could he reply, if it 
 were anfv/ered. And fo were many thoufands honeft 
 
 R and 
 
130 The antiquity and univerfality Stdi.Y. 
 
 and fincere in their inquiries, vvlio had no advantage 
 of you in reafon and underftanding, and all opportu- 
 nities of knowing their dependence on God for their 
 being ; they believed, and you did not ; they ad- 
 mitted the evidence which you rejefted ; they have 
 fucceeded, and you have mifcarricd ? It may be faid, 
 and I know it hath been faid by fome Atheids, that 
 they are as willing to believe the being of God, and 
 their obligations to obey him, as the moil: fincere and 
 zealous religionift ; but it is not in their power to be- 
 lieve without evidence, and are really forry that they 
 cannot fee any. And fomething like this is faid by 
 Lord BoLiNGBROKE. "* There is nothing, philo- 
 *' fophically fpeaking, at leall: 1 could never find, to 
 " my ibrrow, that there is any thing that obliges us 
 *' neceflarily to conclude, that we are a compound of 
 " material and immaterial fiibllance. According to 
 " all appearances, we are plainly one fingle fubflance ; 
 " all the parts of which are fo intimately conne£ted, 
 *' and dependent on one another, that the whole pro- 
 " cceds and ends together." Of his do£lrine of the 
 immateriality and immortality of the foul, due notice 
 iliall be taken hereafter. That which I fix upon here 
 is his fbrrow. If it gave him trouble and lorrow of 
 heart to find, that the iyftcm of his being began, pro- 
 ceeds, and would end all together, it is furpriling, that 
 he fhould accufe thofe who are of another opinion, with 
 pneumatical madnefs. I have proved at fbme lengtli, 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 20. 
 
 tha^ 
 
Seel. V. an evidence of religion, 131 
 
 that both perfbnal and public advantages are on the 
 iide of religion, particularly the perfuafion of the im- 
 mortality of the foul, and a ftate of future rewards 
 and puniiliments *. And his Lordfliip, as hath alrea- 
 dy been made appear, admits the fubferviency, and 
 even the neceflity of religion, and panicuiarly the be- 
 lief of future rewards and puniiliments. But had he 
 been really forry that this doftrine was not better efla- 
 bliihed, at leaft to his conviction, I cannot fee any 
 reafon why he lliould triumph over, and even abufe 
 thofe who differ from him. If he was troubled in his 
 own mind that this ufeful doftrine was not better 
 grounded, it was cruel in him to take fo much pains, 
 and to ufe fo many infulting expredions, only to raife 
 difquiet in the minds of others, and to do mankind the 
 greateft diflervice. And you have not a£led the part 
 of a good and benevolent man, in proclaiming and pu- 
 blilhing fuch a doftrine to the world. Was it any lofs 
 to him, is it any lofs to you, that all mankind, you 
 only excepted, iliould believe themfelves obliged, un- 
 der the moft awful fandlions that can attend a law, to 
 live morally and virtuoufly, not only inoffenfively, 
 but iifefully ? On the contrary, it is your advantage : 
 for fuch, inftead of hurting you, will be, and are 
 bound to be your friends, your affiftanrs and pro- 
 te(5i:ors. His Lordfhip, who dealt the character or 
 diftemper of madnefs fo freely, did himfelf deferve it 
 as much as any man, except yourfelf. He was pru- 
 
 * Eftimate, § ix. x. 
 
 R 2 dent 
 
132 The antiquity and univerfal'ity Se6t. V. 
 
 dent enough to fu pprefs his philofophical works during 
 his life ; but you have had the imprudence, to fay no 
 worfe, to pubHfh them after his death. 
 
 Whatever force is in the univerfal confent of 
 mankind m believing a God, to infer that he really is, 
 it hath the fame to inforce the belief of a future (late 
 of rewards and punilhments : for the one is as an- 
 cient and univerfal as the other. His Lordfliip admits, 
 that, as far as hiftory or tradition go, the notion of an- 
 other life is to be found an eftabliflied article of reli- 
 gion. It is true, he fays it is a human invention. But, 
 to make good his aflertion, he ought to Ihew when, 
 where, and for what it was invented. \\Tien it was 
 firft invented, he cannot tell, becaufe it is beyond all 
 tradition. For the place where this notion took its 
 firil: rife, he would willingly pitch upon Egypt. And 
 Vanini, who alone, fo far as I know, is pofitive, 
 that it proceeds from a cuftom of preferving there the 
 bodies of the dead *. He might have added, from 
 DioDORUs SicuLus, the cuftom of judging, whe- 
 ther thefe corpfcs were to be honoured with funerals 
 or not. Notvvithflanding all the pretended antiquity of 
 that nation, the cuftom is not (b old as tlie belief of a 
 
 * Poft mortem puniendi et rcmunerandi mali ct boni homines, 
 initiiim duxit ab i5']gyptiorum lupeiftitione in aflervandis mor- 
 tuorum corporibus. Amphitkeat. xttrn^e proiidentia, />. S3. 
 
 future 
 
Seel. V. an evidence of religion, 133 
 
 future ftate *. Nor can It be imagined, that, from 
 that fpot of earth, it could have overfpread all man- 
 kind, as was found of old, and is now found to do. 
 Navigation and commerce is now improved beyond 
 the imagination of the ancients. And if it is the be- 
 lief of nations who never heard of the Egyptians or 
 their cuftoms, at this day, we may as well fuppofe, 
 that didant nations of old were as little, and lefs ac- 
 quainted with them, their fupcrftition and notions. If 
 America was not foon inhabited, it is certain the more 
 eaftern parts of Afia were ; and they believed a future 
 ftate of rewards and puniflimcnts. And the inhabi- 
 tants of the iflands in the Archipelago di Lazaro re- 
 tain this perfuafion, when it is forgotten, as is pre- 
 tended, that God made and governs the world. I 
 think myfelf obliged to do a very ingenious modern 
 writer \ the juflice to give in his own words the ac- 
 count of time, as pretended by three feveral nations, 
 and fettled by more candid and impartial chronologies. 
 The nations are, the Aflyrians, the Egyptians,* and 
 the Chinefe. " That the pretenfions of the Aflyrians 
 " were vain, may be concluded from hence, that 
 " Calisthenes going with Alexander the Great 
 " to the conqueft of Perfia, and being defired by 
 ** Aristotle to fearch into the antiquities of Ba- 
 ** bylon, prefervcd by the Chaldeans, (who were at 
 
 * The cuftom was pofterior to fuperftition, and fiiperftition 
 was pofterior to religion. 
 
 f CoUiber, EfTay on creation, p. 137, 
 
 " that 
 
134 '^^^^ aniiquiiy and uuherfilitj Se6l. V. 
 
 " that time a fct of Babylonifli philofophers), wrk 
 " back, that, after the moft diligent inquiry, he 
 *' could find no account above one thoufand nine 
 " hundred and three years. As for the account of 
 *' the Egyptians, we are afPured, that it did not ex- 
 " ceed the Chaldean account above fixty-feven years. 
 *' The difference between the Mofaic and the Chinefe 
 " account of time hath been fufficiently adjulted, 
 " and is found to extend no further than four thou- 
 " fand odd hundred years ; " that is, fome hundreds 
 above that of the Egyptians. Manetho's hiftory of 
 Egypt, and Berg sus's hiftory of the Chaldeans, did 
 not appear until the Old Tejtainent was tranflated into 
 Greek ; for which Mr Collider charges them with 
 fable and forgery. Of all the nations mentioned in 
 hiftory, Egypt, in my opinion, hath the worft claim 
 to the greateft antiquity. For it is not to be imagi- 
 ned, that a people or family would leave fertile and 
 high grounds, free from anniverfary inundations, to 
 tako, up their dwelling, to be fccured \\ ith great la^ 
 bour, as is done at this day. The firft inhabitants of 
 that great glen muft have been driven into it by a 
 more powerful people ; or if they went thither volun- 
 tarily, it muft have been when the neighbouring and 
 higher countries were overftocked. And as the Afty- 
 rians and Chincfc were more ancient and powerful 
 than they, and believed a firurc ftate of rewards and 
 punilhments, there is fcarcc a pofllbility of their ha- 
 ving 
 
Secl.V. an evidence of religion . 1 35 
 
 ving received the invention (as his Lordiliip calls it) 
 from the Egyptians. 
 
 But it was not the Aflyrians, the Chinefe, the 
 Eg}'ptians, the Ethiopians, but all the known world, 
 that believed a future life. Where-ever a people 
 were found, they were found with this belief and 
 perfuafion. This his Lordfhip acknowledges, and, to 
 his aftonifhment, makes the children of Ifrael the 
 only exception. I did promife not to mix his objec- 
 tions againft the Chriilian revelation, with his mifre- 
 prefentations of natural religion. But it cannot be 
 reckoned a departing from my refolution, to fhew that 
 he miflakes the cafe of Moses and the Ifraelites, in 
 an hiflorical way. It was, and is the opinion of fbme, 
 and particularly of Dr King, that man was created mor- 
 tal ; and though he does not, I know that others found 
 this opinion, on fuppofition that this earth mufl have 
 been in a very little time too narrow an habitation for 
 the inhabitants. Immortals begetting immortals, long 
 before now this earth would not have furniflied a 
 foot fquare for each perfon. But upon fuppofition 
 that man was created immortal, (I need iay nothing 
 ftronger), God could have difpofed of them other- 
 wife. And to fliew that they were to be removed 
 into other habitations, both foul and body, it is faid, 
 Enoch walked with God ; and he was not, for God 
 took him. Enoch's father lived nine hundred and 
 fixfy-five years j Enoch's fon lived nine hundred 
 
 and 
 
136 The antiquity and univerfality Secft. V. 
 
 and fixty-nine years ; and Enoch himfelf lived on- 
 ly three hundred and fixty-five years; and Moses, 
 as an hiftorian, gives this reafon w^hy God took him 
 away fo foon. That he vi^alked with God ; that is, 
 that he was pious. A happy immortahty was the re- 
 ward of his piety. And what God did to Enoch, 
 he would have done to all the race of Adam, had 
 they not difqualified themfclvcs for it. And had not 
 Moses believed, and had it not been the belief of 
 the Ifraelites, that there was a life after this, this 
 tranflation of Enoch had not been recorded and re- 
 ceived, as a peculiar reward of his piety. This in- 
 liance ferved likewife to prove another part of their 
 hiftory, liz. That death was the confequence of 
 difobedience. This happened in the antediluvian 
 world. Elijah was tranflated in the Mofaical 
 dilpenfation ; and the Lord Jesus Christ, after 
 death, arofe to life, and bodily afccnded into the 
 
 higher regions. The two laft inflances 1 do not 
 
 inlill upon in this place. 
 
 The Egyptians, though not invcnters of a future 
 life, even in the days of Moses, believed it nation- 
 ally; and both Moses and the Ifraelites took it for 
 a truth univerfally eltabliilied. At leafl no proof can 
 be brought that they did not believe as the Egyptians, 
 and all other nations did, unlefs it can be made ap- 
 pear that Moses denied it. So far this belief of a 
 date of rewards ajid punillaments after this life muft 
 
 Hand 
 
Sefl. V. an evidence of religion. 137 
 
 ftand confirmed by hiftory, that of Moses not ex- 
 cepted. From a cullom of preferving the bodies of 
 the dead in Egypt, even the belief of a future life 
 among the Egyptians could not proceed. For it ra- 
 ther fiippofes a previous perfuafion of a future life, 
 than that it is the foundation of it. To give the be- 
 lief of a future judgment the greater influence on 
 their virtuous and moral behaviour, they thought it 
 expedient to reprefent, or a6l this judgment on the 
 bodies of the dead. Boling broke fays, it was a 
 cuftom in Spain, to aft fome of the myfleries of the 
 Chriftian religion. And I have hiflorical evidence, 
 that Charles V. Emperor of Germany, and King 
 of Spain, witneded the afting of his own obfequies 
 in the abbey of St Just. No nation outdid the 
 Egyptians in the mifimprovement of natural religion; 
 •and no people added to it more of their own conceits. 
 And this of judging, whether the corpfes of the de- 
 ceafed were to be laid up in repofitories or not, was 
 one, and fuch as did not want its ufe; and mud: have 
 had as great an influence as pofuble upon their honeft 
 and moral behaviour, had they believed that God 
 would judge of the foul as they did of the body. If 
 other nations had learned the immortality of the foul 
 from the Egyptian cuftom of judging the bodies of 
 the dead, they muft, together with that opinion, 
 have adopted the cuftom, which oone of them did. 
 
 I fuppofe Mr Mallet may demand of me to ac- 
 S count 
 
138 The antiquity and univerfality Sc6l:. V. 
 
 count for the antiquity and univerfality of a belief of 
 a future fVatc, in order to fliew that it is not a hu- 
 man invention, eilnbliflicd without proof or divine 
 authority. And, with your leave, I will tell you 
 my tale. Though there are many reafons to induce 
 mankind to believe a future exiltcnce after dcjth/ 
 yet I do not think, that it was only for thefe rea- 
 fons that this belief and perfuafion was fb early and fo 
 univerfal. The thing in itfelf is not fo level to the 
 human underfianding as the being of God. It is 
 my opinion, that it owed its origin to divine authori- 
 ty. The firft man by difobedicnce bicame mortal. 
 The punifliment was not remitted. Die he muft, 
 and die he did. "But for his comfort, and for the en- 
 couragement of his good behaviour, until the execu- 
 tion of the fentence, another and a better life was 
 made known to him ; and this he taught his defcend- 
 ents. And fuch a promife and fuch afllirance was (o 
 reafonable, that without it there had been as little 
 encouragement for piety and morality, during the hrll 
 tranfgreflbr's reprieve, as Lord Boling broke liath 
 left as a legacy to the world. And if God thought 
 fit to continue the human race iubje^ts of his moral 
 government, it was fit they fliould know, that, ac- 
 cording to their good or ill behaviour in this life, 
 they were to be treated in another. For without 
 fuch knowledge man cannot be governed as a moral 
 agent. 
 
 From 
 
Se^. V. an evidence of religion. 139 
 
 From the firft man this do£l:rine of a future hfe 
 hath been handed down to this prefent generation, 
 notvvithftanding, as faith his Lordfhip, the appear- 
 ances are againft it. The credit of a divine tradition 
 prevailed againft them all, until there arofe fome 
 BoLiNGBROKEs and Mallets, who refufed to 
 accept of the telhmony of all mankind, and even the 
 teliimony of one rifen from the dead, for the truth of a 
 future ftate of rewards and punifhments. With theie 
 Greece was peftered and plagued. Other nations 
 retained the opinion upon credit of the tradition. It 
 is true, that thofe who denied a future ftate, denied 
 a providence ; and it is alfo true, that thofe who de- 
 nied a providence, denied confequentially a firft in- 
 telligent caufe, a fuprerae all-perfeft Being. In a 
 word, whoever believed a God, believed a future 
 ftate. Both riiefe truths, though grounded in the 
 ftrength of reafon, were originally and divinely 
 taught. BoLiNGBROKE, fpcakiug of the Commence- 
 ment of the world as a traditional truth, fays, "• * It 
 ** is relative no more to the particular charafter of 
 *' one people than of another. It favours no more 
 " one general principle of religion or policy than 
 " another. In a word, force your imagination as 
 " much as you pleafe, you will find unfurmountabie 
 '' difficulties in your way, if you fippofe the facft 
 *' invented. But thefe difficulties vanilh when you 
 " fuppofe it true. The umverjal conjent of mankind 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 279. 
 
 S 2 " follows 
 
r40 The antiquity and univerfality Se6l. V. 
 
 *' fclloivs naturally and necejjarily the tru.'h of the 
 " Z?^." If all mankind confentcd in the belief of 
 God, and a future (late of rewards and punifhments, 
 irmuft have fnitcd the natural and common difpofi- 
 tion, conveniency, and advantage of every people and 
 nation ; and if there had been any material and poli- 
 tical difference between the inclinations of one peo- 
 ple and another, then, upon fuppofition that thefe 
 two great truths had been a mere human invention^ 
 they might have been received by fome, but muft 
 have been rcjc61cd by others. *' Force your imagi- 
 " nation as much as you pleafe, and you will find 
 ** unfurmountable difficulties in your way," if you 
 fuppofe that the do^lrine of the being of God, and 
 a future ftate of rewards and puniflimcnts, is an in- 
 vention and an impofition. " The univerfal confent 
 " of mankind follows naturally and neceflarily the 
 " truth" of this fad, that God made mankind, and 
 taught them religion. Though this is not a cloi'e and 
 a fuccin£l: demonftration, yet it is a convincing proof, 
 that the being of God, and a future flate of rewards 
 and punifhments, is neither fable nor fiction ; and 
 as flrong and convincing as many mctaphyfical and 
 mathematical evidences. You cannot properly and 
 flriiftiy demonlh'ate to me that there is fuch an iiland 
 as Jamaica; but yon and 1 are as firmly perfuaded 
 of it, as we arc that all the angles of a triangle are equal 
 to two right angles. Upon fuch evidence we ven- 
 ture our lives ; but without any riik you may con- 
 
 dua 
 
SeSi.V, an evidence of religion, 141 
 
 duft yourfelf in this life, upon the evidence arlfihg 
 from the univerfal confent of mankind, that there is 
 another. Perhaps I had not faid fo much on this 
 topic, bad not his Lordlhip denied the validity of 
 the argument in the ftrongeft terms. And as I write 
 rather for religion than againft him, I prefume it 
 will not be taken for a digreflion. 
 
 SECT. 
 
142 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 The idea of God a demofj/Iration of bis ex'fetice* 
 
 AS I did not give up the univerfal confcnt of 
 mankind as a proof of the divine exiflcnce, 
 no more will I yield the famous argument of Des- 
 cartes drawn from his idea of God. The only 
 fault I find in it, is too much fubtilty and refinement 
 for antimetaphyfical underfiandings. The argument 
 hath undergone the narroweft examination ; and fuch 
 obje^lions and exceptions have been raifed againfl: it, 
 as have made Lord Boling broke conclude, that it 
 is a paralogifm. I mud therefore give my reafons 
 why I differ from him. 
 
 The argument, as I conceive it, runs thus. " What- 
 " ever I underhand clearly and dillinftly to belong to 
 ** the nature and efience of any thing, 1 can with ccr- 
 " tainty and truth affirm concerning it, as rotundity 
 ** to a circle ; but when I apply my thoughts in the 
 *' molt attentive and clofell: manner on the nature of 
 ** God, 1 find, that exilknce is one of his effcntial 
 " attributes: I therefore conckide, that it is as cer- 
 " tain that he a^lualiy cxiils, as that a circle is round." 
 To this Gassendi ohjcftcd, That from an ideal to 
 a real flate the confcqucnce doth not hold, Des- 
 cartes faid, that this is not his meaning. Nor in- 
 deed 
 
Se^.VI. The idea of GoT>, Sec, 143 
 
 deed doth he reft his proof on fuch a general propofi- 
 tion, as Gassendi certainly miftakes grofsly, fFhat- 
 ever we conceive, m'tft exijt ; but upon a reafbn pecu- 
 liar to the divine Being, to which exiftence is as eHen- 
 tial, as rotundity is to a circle. From the idea of an 
 all-perfe6l Being to his aftual exiftence, the confe- 
 quence is good, becaufe exiftence is a perfection. 
 The queftion then is. Whether we have fuch an idea 
 or not ? 
 
 If we can conceive any perfeftion, (and a great 
 many we find in ourfelves), we can eafily remove 
 from it all reftridion and limitation. Power in us is a 
 perfection ; remove from it all bounds and limitation, 
 and we have an idea of omnipotence ; as, by removing 
 from fpace and time all limitation, we have an idea 
 of infinity and eternity, or everlafting duration. 
 BoLiNG BROKE allows infinite power and wifdom to 
 God; and he that admits any one infinite perfec- 
 tion, muft admit all. Now, fuch a being, who hath 
 all perfc(5i:ion, never was, and never could be in a 
 ftate of mere polTibiiity. This is what the fchool- 
 men mean, when they fay, that God is aBus purus. 
 This bare fo hard upon Gassekdi, that he was ob- 
 liged to deny that exiftence is a perfe^ion ; though it 
 is not only a perfection in itfeif, but the ground of all 
 other perfections. 
 
 Instead of the v/ord exfjlence take independency^ 
 
 and 
 
J 44 The idea of God Sea. VI. 
 
 and then the argument will run thus. " An all-per- 
 *' feft being mull be an independent being; but an 
 " independent being muft be actually exiftent." The 
 fubfumption is evident; becaufe if from a flate of 
 mere polfibility it could become aftual, it mud owe 
 its a£lual being or exiftence to fome other being, and 
 io could not be independent, nor all-perfeft. It 
 therefore follows, that a<5hial exiitence is as edential 
 to an all-perfe6l being, as rotundity is to a circle. 
 
 Others allowing Gassendi's objeftion, That 
 from an ideal to a real (late the confequence doth not 
 hold ; yet maintain, that from an ideal to a pofTible 
 ftate the confequence is good. And they reafon right- 
 ly : for whatever we can clearly and diflin<n-iy con- 
 ceive, is poflible. And then from the pofl'ibility of fuch 
 a being as God, that is, an all-perfcft Being, they 
 argue his aftual exiftence ; becaufe if fuch a being is 
 made, or caufed to be, it could not be all-pcrfc£l; it 
 could not be a ncceflary, felf-exiftcnt, and felf-fuffi- 
 cient being, but dependent on fome other being v ho 
 made it. But turn the argument into what form you 
 pleafe, fliil it is true, that neceflary exigence is eficn- 
 tial to the divine Being ; and the very conception of 
 fuch a being is a proof of his a^lual exiftence. It 
 is only the clofenefs and the lliortncfs of the argu- 
 ment that makes it to be confidcrcd as a p/ira.'opjm. 
 And Descartes did not think himielf obliged, or 
 
 perhaps 
 
ScSi, VI. a demonflrat'wn of his exiftence, 145 
 
 perhaps thought it below him, to ufe many words, 
 when fewer were fufEcient for his purpofe. 
 
 To evade this argument, I can imagine no way, 
 except denying the poflibility of an all-perfeft Being. 
 And this no man can do who knows what perfeftion 
 and imperfection is. We conceive limited and unlimit- 
 ed^ finite and infinite \ and therefore that all pofTible 
 perfeftions, in the mod perfeft manner, perfections 
 fimpliciter fimplices^ belong to one fingle being. The 
 argument, as ftated by Descartes, turns upon ne- 
 ceflary exiftence as an eflential attribute of the fupreme 
 Being, and is much to the fame purpofe with one 
 ufed by Aquinas. '* All things," faith he, "are 
 " neceflary or contingent. If all were contingent, 
 " nothing could have been. Something therefore 
 " muft be necellary, one at leaft. And as there is no 
 " neceflity to imagine more neceflary beings than one, 
 " there mufl be one, and but one, neceflary, felf-- 
 '* exiftent, and felf-fufficient, the free and voluntary 
 " caufe of all contingent beings." This argument is 
 plain, fuccin6t, and invincible. Let this fuffice, be- 
 caufe more words cannot make it plainer, and poflibly 
 might make it more intricate and obfcure. 
 
 T SECT, 
 
1^6 
 
 SECT. VIL 
 
 Of God' s inoi-al attributes, 
 
 I Have faiJ, that the reafon why Lord Boling-* 
 broke's morality is not good, is, becaufe his 
 theology is very bad. I do not charge him with irre- 
 ligion only becaufe he denies the fufficiency of the 
 two arguments for the being of God, which I have 
 fupported. This is fo common, that every topic ufed 
 for that purpofe hath been rejected by one or other. 
 This was a trick of Vanini, who refufed all the ar- 
 guments for the divine exiftence, under a pretence of 
 giving better. But though my author had admit' cd 
 all the arguments commonly brought to prove the 
 divine exiftence; yet what he maintains concerning 
 God, muft defeat all that he admits for the glory of 
 God, and the good of mankind. " A neceflary con- 
 *' neflion between the phyfical and moral attributes 
 " of God, no man who believes in God will deny." 
 Thefe are his own words *. But they are words of 
 courfe, and complaifance to hisChriitian reader. And 
 becaufe it is not eafy to perfuade a candid and honeft 
 reader, that he, notwithitanding, denies the moral at- 
 tributes of the fupreme Being, I think it incumbent 
 on me to give his own words. And he fays, *' -|- The 
 *' knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts ne- 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 224. 'f- Vol. iv. p. 25. 
 
 " cefiary 
 
Se^l. VII. Of G o dV moral ottribufes, l^y 
 
 *' ceflary to fuch a creature as man ; and therefore 
 *' we are made able to arrive, by a proper exercile of 
 " our mental faculties, from a knowledge of God's 
 " works, to a knowledge of his exiltence, and of that 
 " infinite power and wifdom which are den lonftrated 
 *' to us in them. Our knowledge comernm^ God goes 
 
 " no further. How little rcafon have we to expeft 
 
 *' any knowledge of the nature and ellcnce of the in- 
 " vifible God, or of his phyfical and mora! attributes, 
 *' beyond what his works, and the effects of his na- 
 *' ture and attributes, communicate to us ? This de- 
 " gree, this fufficient degree of knowledge concern- 
 *' ing God, is a fixed point ; on one fide of which lies 
 *' Atheifin, and mctaphyfical and theological blafphe- 
 " my too often on the other." To this add another 
 paflage. " * Heathen philofophers di (covered in his 
 *' works a firft intelligent caufe of all things, a being 
 *' of infinite power and wifdom, whofe providence is 
 " over all his creatures, and whofe will relatively to 
 *' man is manifefted in the whole human fyitcm. 
 " Here was abundant matter of real knowledge. 
 " Thus far the fupreme Being lets himfelf down, if 
 *' I may ufe fuch an exprelFion, within the verge of 
 " human comprehenfion ; and of human alone, as 
 " far as we can judge of the animal world about us. 
 *' Beyond this fixed point we can have no real ideas, 
 '* and therefore no real knowledge. All that we imaf- 
 " gine we have, is, and mull be fantaltical. We are 
 
 * Vol. ii. p. 366. 
 
 T 2 '' no 
 
148 Of Go Ti's moral attributes, Seft. VII. 
 
 " no more able to acquire knowledge beyond, than 
 " other animals up to this point : and the divine na- 
 *' ture, the manner of being, the moral attributes of 
 " God, the general fyftem of his providence, are as 
 " infcrutable as to them." That is to fay in lliort, 
 that we know no more of God's moral attributes than 
 the bQafts. And to make his meaning ftill more plain, 
 he teaches plainly, that the moral attributes of God 
 are not real, but fuppofed. *' * We cannot rife from 
 ^ our moral obligations to the fuppofed moral attributes 
 * of God. I call them /uppojed, becaufe, after all 
 ' that hath been faid to prove a necetfary connexion 
 ' between his phyfical and moral attributes, the latter 
 ' may be all abforbed in his wifdom." And further, 
 ' f It is evident, that the firft and ftrongeft impref- 
 ' (ions that we receive of benevolence, juflice, and 
 ' other moral virtues, come from refle£lion on our- 
 felves, and from our dealings with one another ; 
 from what we feel in ourfelves, and from what we 
 obferve in other men. Thefe we acknowledge to 
 be limited and imperfe6l, the excellencies of our 
 own nature ; and therefore conceiving them with- 
 out any limitations or imperfeflions, we afcribe 
 them to the divine." And this all judicious and 
 orthodox Theiils do ; and they do well. But he is of 
 a contrary opinion, that is, they do ill ; for he adds, 
 '' they do worfe." And rather than not carry his 
 point againft the divine moral attributes, he affirms, 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 18. f Vol. iv. p. 19. 
 
 that 
 
Seft.VII. Of Go v>^s moral attributes, 149 
 
 that *' * the knowledge of the divine attributes is 
 *' impoflible and unneceflary for us to have, even on 
 *' the fuppofition there is a God." 
 
 I defire it may be obferved, that 1 have given his 
 aflertions againft the moral attributes or holinefs of 
 God, not in detached exprefTions, which very often 
 are mifreprefentations of an author's meaning, but as 
 they ftand connedled with a pretty large context. 
 And as he is not the firfl: that acknowledged in the 
 fupreme Being only power and knowledge, I need 
 fay no more to prove, that he abfolutely denies the 
 moral attributes of the Almighty. Here I have 
 omitted nothing material, except a practical inference, 
 afterwards to be confidered at large, viz. That we 
 are under no obligation to imitate God in his moral 
 attributes, and that it is even impiety to attempt it. 
 And, in confequence, he reje6i;s the diftindion be- 
 tween the moral and phyfical attributes of the fupreme 
 Being. " "f Divines have diftinguillied, in their bold 
 *' analysis, between God's phyfical and moral attri- 
 *' butes ; for which diftin£tion, though I fee feveral 
 *' theological, I do not fee one religious purpofe it is 
 *' neceffary to anfwer." 
 
 In profound fubmiffion to, and in adoration of the 
 fupreme Being, he refolves to know as little as pof- 
 iible of him ; and, with an air of piety, he dares not 
 
 ^ Vol. V. p. 224. -j- Vol.iii. p. 410. 
 
 raife 
 
I JO Of God's moral attributes, Sefl.VII. 
 
 raife his thoughts to that ineffable, and iinfpeakable, 
 and inconceivable Being, nor conform his condu£l to 
 the wife government of" his God in the adminiftration 
 of his providence. In this pious ignorance his Lord- 
 fliip follows the example of Vanini *, and the ex- 
 ample of thole who faid unto GOD, Depart from us, 
 for we de/ire not the knowledge of thy ways. I have 
 already obferved, that his Lordfhip acknowledges 
 God to be " the firft, felf-exiftent, intelligent caufe, 
 " a being of infinite vvifdom and power; and there- 
 ** fore an obje£l to all rational creatures, not of curio- 
 *' fity, but of awe, reverence, of adoration, of gra- 
 ** titude, of obedience, and refignation." And for 
 his own part, " he ferioufly adores his Majefty, blef- 
 " fes his goodnefs, and rcfigns himfelf entirely to his 
 ** providence." This is language becoming a The'il, 
 but fuch as he leaves no foundation for. For, upon 
 fuppofition' there is no moral perfection to be found in 
 the Deity, he may be an objcft of awe and terror, but 
 not of love and adoration. And how can he blefs 
 the divine goodnefs, or refign himlelf to his provi- 
 dence, who denies both ? It is not an eafy njatter to 
 talk of God, and to rejecft his goodncls, and other 
 moral attributes, and to blind the eyes of readers 
 from difcovcring the inconfiftency. Did he really be- 
 lieve that God is good andjufl, to what purpolb doth 
 he dbforb his moral attributes in his wifdom ? 
 
 * Quxris a me, quid fit Deus ? fi fciiem, Deus efTem. 
 
 Absor.1 
 
SeS:. VII. 0/ G o dV moral attributes, ijt 
 
 Absorb is not a philofbphical word. When' a 
 finall quantity is mixed with a quantity fo great that 
 the fmall quite difappears, it is then faid to be abforb- 
 ed. And can this be applied to the divine attributes, 
 which are all equal, all infinite? And when he hath 
 fwullowed up the goodnefs, juftice, and truth of God 
 into his wifdom, they thereby become imperceptible. 
 I defire your Efquirefliip to tell me, whether his wif- 
 dom is a phyfical or moral attribute. Your author 
 makes wifdom a phyfical attribute of the fupreme Be- 
 ing ; and yet he makes it comprehend all the moral 
 attributes, or rather he makes it extinguilli them all. 
 ** We cannot rife from our moral obligations to the 
 " fuppofed moral attributes of God. I call them 
 " fuppofedy And why ^ becaufe there is no necef- 
 fary connection between them and his phyfical attri- 
 butes. And why ? becaufe they all difappear, by be- 
 ing abforbed in the divine wifdom. Take notice how 
 he and you blunder away the wifdom of the fupreme 
 Being. That wifdom which fwallows up goodnefs, 
 mud be of the fame kind and nature with the good- 
 nefs which it devours. But this goodnefs is not real, 
 but fuppofititious, and therefore fuch is the wifdom. 
 And were not goodnefs and wifdom of the fame kind, 
 they could not be diluted into one another. And fee- 
 ing you acknowledge, that you know no more of 
 Go d's moral attributes than the beads, I am very fure 
 that you know as little of his wifdom. 
 
152 Of God's imral attributes, Sefl. VII. 
 
 I hope your Efquirefhip will allow, that if there 
 are no moral perfections in the Deity, neither are 
 there any immoral imperfections ; and therefore your 
 God can neither do good nor evil, and cannot there- 
 fore be an objeft of your love or of your dread : nor 
 can you have any greater regard to your Deity, than 
 an Atheift hath to his unintelligent caufe. With fuch 
 a caufe your do£lrine doth agree, but not with an in- 
 telligent firft caufe of infinite knowledge. You know, 
 and can diftinguifh between the equity and iniquity of 
 actions; and if GoD doth not know that, you know 
 more than he. You approve of what is juft and right, 
 and you difapprove of what is wrong and unjuft : but 
 a God of fuppofititious wifdom and goodnefs, who is 
 himfelf neither morally good nor immorally evil, is 
 neither pleafed nor difplcafed whether you be virtuous 
 or vitious. But if you will allow that God knows 
 as much as you, and that he is as good and juft as 
 you arc in theory and fpeculation, you rauft acknow- 
 ledge his moral attributes, or 3^ou muft deny that you 
 are a moral man in theory; though, for the (ake of 
 decency and conveniency, you may acknowledge you 
 are fuch in practice. 
 
 Though I have already faid, and proved, that 
 God is eflentially holy, and that his holinefs is the 
 foundation of morality; yet, becaufe this is a matter 
 of the higheft importance in natural religion, I pre- 
 fumc to infift ftiU more largely on the fubjeCl;. To 
 
 know 
 
Se6l. VII. Of God'/ moral attributes » T53 
 
 know the will of God as the law of our life and 
 aftions, reconrfe miift be had to his moral perfedions. 
 Admitting the phyfical perfections of the Deity, his 
 eternity, omnilcience, omnipotence, immenfity, felf- 
 exiftence, and felf-fufficiency, no conclufion can be 
 drawn from them to lay us under an obligation to be 
 moral and virtuous, good and jufl, unlefs we eftabliili, 
 it as a firft foundation of the will and law of God, 
 that he himfelf is holy, juft, good, and true. And 
 on this fuppofition and perfuafion that God is a holy 
 being, we conclude demonflratively, that it is his 
 will, his law, his command, that we be moral, juft, 
 and good. If it is God who hath made us capable 
 to know and to diftinguiili the equity and iniquity of 
 aftions, and to approve the former and difapprove 
 the latter, ahd hath put it out of your power to do 
 otherwife; you muft conclude, that as * he who 
 formed the eye, muft himfelf fee ; fo he who com- 
 mands you to be holy, muft himfelf be holy. Lord 
 Bolingbroke's zeal for infidelity, and his averfiori 
 toMosEs aod the Apoftle Paul, have obliged him to 
 aflert, in the ftrongeft manner, the juflice, goodncfs, 
 mercy, and truth of the fupreme Being. He accufes 
 them for afcribing to the Deity, fuch partiality, bar- 
 barity, and cruelty, as the moft arbitrary t3/raat would 
 fcarcely be guilty of; and fays, " -f" I would fooner 
 ** be reputed, nay I would fooner be a Pagan than a 
 " Ghriftian, an Atheift than a Theift, if to be one or 
 
 * Pfal. xciv. 9, \ Vol. i. p. 315. 
 
 U " the 
 
154 Of GoT>'s moral attributes. Sei^.VII. 
 
 " 'the other it was neceflary to believe fuch abfurdi- 
 " ties" as thefe two have taught. That is to fay, he 
 would iooiier disbelieve the being of God, than be- 
 lieve that God commanded what Moses commanded, 
 or what St Paul taught in, his name and authority. 
 And why all this, if God is not elfentially good and 
 juif ? If AIosEs and Paul found it expedient for 
 their teniporal happinefs to a6t fuch a part, they have 
 done no more than he juftifies in his own, and in the 
 condu^l of others. For take away God's moral attri- 
 butes, you can be under no obligation to live morally; 
 for he canjiot fub^e£l you to a moral law : and, as his 
 Lordfhip fays, you may as well, and more confillent- 
 Jy with yourfelf, be an Atheill: than a Theift. Had 
 1 only to do with you and your author, I might leave 
 the do»5i:rine of God's moral attributes as fufficiently 
 proved and acknowledged. But 1 write for the glory 
 of God, and only againll: you, as ye ftand in the 
 way to oppofe it. 
 
 To make a world, at leaft the mere material part 
 of it, power and Ikill were fufficicnt ; bur to make 
 out of mere matter, or to make without matter, ra- 
 tional creatures, and to rule and govern them when 
 made, requires wildom, jullice, truth, goodnefs, and 
 mercy. And as far as the moral exceeds the mere 
 material part of the creation, in fo far, in my appre- 
 heiilion, do the moral exceed the phyfical attributes of 
 God. The heavens declare the glory of God, by 
 
 difplaying 
 
Se<fl. VII. Of GoT>'s moral attributes, 155 
 
 difplaying his ikill and power: this they did not 
 from eternity, for they had a beginning. But God 
 is eflentially glorious in holinefs, from everialiing to 
 everlafting. Before there was any place for the ex- 
 ercife of his goodnefs, truth, and juflice ; before he 
 was the Creator and Governor of the world, lie was 
 juft, and true, and good. All that is in God is 
 God. His being doth not admit of magis and minus, 
 or of any degree of perfe6i:ion. Our nature doth ; 
 all human attainments of body and mind, are but mere 
 trifles in comparifon of virtue, probity, and morality. 
 An honefl man, faid his Lordfhip's correfpondent, 
 is the nobleft work of God. One had better be a 
 man of real virtue and piety, than be poiTefled of all 
 the learning and knowledge that ever adorned a hu- 
 man mind, and all the power of the greateft monarch 
 on earth, without piety and morality. Learning and 
 knowledge have been abufed, and power hath been 
 perverted to very bad purpofes. But virtue and 
 piety is the fait of the foul, incorruptible in itfelf, 
 and the prefervative of all attainments. Is it not 
 aftoniiliing, that you, or any man pretending to be 
 virtuous and honefl, fhould refufe to afcribe to God 
 all goodnefs, juflice, and truth? O holy, holy, 
 HOLY, Lord God Almighty ! If morality is the 
 brighteft ornament of the human nature, holinefs 
 muft be a moft fplendid and glorious attribute of the 
 fupreme Being. We have no way of knowing the di- 
 vine perfe(5lions, (and Lord Bolingbroke admits 
 
 TJ 2 they 
 
1^6 Of God s moral attributes. Se<^. VII. 
 
 they are infinite), but by confidering the perfeftions 
 which we ourfclves are pofTefTed of. We could not 
 know that the Deity is wife and powerful, if in our- 
 felves we experienced nothing of wifdom and power. 
 And we mult firft know by ourfelves, what is wif- 
 dom, and what is power, before we can afcribe thefe 
 attributes to the Deity. This you, moll inconfiftent- 
 ly with yourfelf, deny. *' * Let us not afcribe our 
 ** perfections to him, even according to the higheft 
 " conceptions we are able to frame of them ; though 
 " we rejeft every imperfe£tion conceivable, when 
 " imputed to him." By removing all imperfections 
 from our perfedions, we form the higheft concep- 
 tions of them. From finite and limited, we raifc 
 them up to infinite and unlimited. And by this me- 
 thod, and by no other, Bolingbroke hath found out 
 that God is infinite in wifdom and power. And what 
 danger can there be, or wherein doth the abfurdity 
 and blafphemy lie, to fay that he is infinitely holy ? 
 But I cannot imagine what can be faid of the fu- 
 prcme Being, though wc remove from him all im- 
 perfection, and afcribe to him no perfection at all. 
 Then he is no being ; for all beings are perfe(5t or 
 imperfect. We muft therefore fay nothing, and we 
 mult think nothing at all of God. And doth not 
 this amount to Atheifin ? There are Mahometan 
 philofophers, v^ho have refined their thoughts of 
 God into nothing. They will not lay that God is 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 2/0, 
 
 ONE, 
 
Seft.VII. Of GoTt's moral attributes. i^y 
 
 ONE, though it is the firft and fundamental article of 
 their religion. One of thefe puritans called the crier 
 a liar, when from the mofque he fummoned the peo- 
 ple to the woriliip of the One God ; and gave for 
 a reafbn, that God is God, and no more (hould be 
 faid. I am far from fufpecting you or your* Noble 
 author capable of fuch fuper-refined piety. On the 
 contrary, I have reafon to think, and 1 fhall afterwards 
 make appear, that he is willing to overlook the ju- 
 ftice of God, and, together with that, his goodnefs, 
 in fb far as he himfelf is concerned. " * Let us not 
 *' humanize God ; let us not meafure his perfe^lions 
 " by ours ; much lefs let us afcribe to him, as every 
 " fyflem of theology does, under the notion of good- 
 ** nefs, what would be partiality ; nor, under the no- 
 *' tion of juftice, what would be cruelty in man. 
 *' We have nothing to fear in one world more than 
 f' in another." 
 
 Though I am not obliged to know every fyftem 
 of theology, as his Lordfhip pretends to do, yet, fo 
 far as I am acquainted with thefe fyftems, I do not 
 find that they afcribed to God partiality inflead of 
 goodnefs, nor cruelty inftead of juftice. Not furely 
 the Jewiih fyftem ; which affirms, that their God is 
 a God of truth, and without iniquity, and that juft 
 and right is he. It was Abraham's opinion, that 
 God was the righteous judge of all the earth. It 
 
 ;* Vol. i. p. 269, 
 
 was 
 
1 58 Of Go dV moral attributes. Se^. VII. 
 
 was fung to his praife in their aflemblies, that he was 
 good, and did good. The Chriftian fyftem of theo- 
 logy, inftead of reprefcnting God as a cruel maftcr, 
 reprefents him as good and amiable. He will have 
 all men to be faved, and come to the knowledge of 
 the truth. For this purpofe he fpared not, but gave 
 his only begotten Son, that whoever believed in him, 
 might not perifh, but have everlafting life. As con- 
 querors afJume to themfelves new names, cxprefTive 
 of their brave and gallant exploits ; fo the Lord 
 God, when he had finiihed the grand plan of man's 
 falvatlon, a (Turned a new name inftead of Jehovah, 
 dven that of Love : For, faith the Apoltle John, 
 God is love *. If there are any fub-fyftems made 
 of the Chriftian revelation, which alcribe to God either 
 partiality or cruelty, I renounce them. I do not at 
 prefent undertake a defence of the Chriliian faith ; 
 but only taking it as I find it upon record, it is cer- 
 tain that Lord Bolingbroke mifreprefcnts it. And 
 I do think he miftakes the effe^s of God's abfolute 
 fovereignty for partiality. As the potter of the fame 
 clay makes one vedel for honour, and another for 
 lower and meaner ufe ; fo, without partiality, God 
 beftowed more underflanding on him, than upon his. 
 dog or his parrot. 
 
 The author's plain man, who will not reafon be- 
 yond his fenfe and experience, and thinks that his 
 
 * I Epiftle, iv. 1 6. 
 
 ov/n 
 
Se<^. VII. Of Govt's moral attributes, 159 
 
 own knowledge, whether owing to his ftupidity, negli- 
 gence, or to his inclinations, or whether it is accor- 
 ding to truth, or according to error, is juft fuch, and 
 as much as God requires or allows him to have, con- 
 cludes that God will deal with him hereafter, (if 
 there is an hereafter}, as he deals with him here. 
 " * In whatever ftate he is, he knows that God go- 
 *' verns, and hath nothing to fear in one more than 
 " in another. God is an all-perfe£l being." By 
 this Lord Bolingbroke, in the character of a plain 
 man, means, if he means any thing at all, that 
 God's adminiftration is as perfefi: here as it can be 
 hereafter ; fo that if there is another life, he cannot 
 be worfe off than he was in the life he lived here. 
 That is, a bungling minifler of ftate, a betrayer, or 
 a cobler of the conftitution of his country, who, for 
 fear his blood fliould be made a cement for a new 
 affbciation, fled to France ; and there learned French 
 enough to fpoil his Engliili i". That his political ta- 
 lents might not ruft, he entered into the fervice of a 
 new mafter, whofe fecrets he fold for a fafe return 
 to his native country : and in order to reinftate him- 
 felf in his former employment, quarrelled in vain 
 with his friend an3i protestor, and fpent the remain- 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 269. 
 
 •f To hold language. I come from reading. Had he tranf- 
 lated Irifh, he would have faid, / am after reading. It re-volts 
 me, from the word rebutety very ill tranflated ; and to infirm an 
 argument. 
 
 ins 
 
i6o Of GoT>'s vioral attributes, Se6l-. VII. 
 
 ing part of his time in difcontent ; and, pour tuer le 
 temp>^ he became writer againft the adminiftration^ 
 againft rehgion, and againft God and goodnefs. He 
 had all the charms of friendfhip^ but was not a friend, 
 was publicly faid of him in his lifetime. Such was 
 his life, and all the while he neglefted no animal 
 pleafure that he was capable of. If he did not ex- 
 pect a better life, and more happinefs hereafter, it 
 was not worth his contending for. His profpcft at 
 beft was but poor and mean, and fuch as no wife 
 man would defire. But upon fuppofition of an here- 
 after, the infinite perfections of the fupreme Being 
 cannot ailure the plain man, that it will not be worfe 
 than the prefent. For all perfection includes ju-* 
 ftice, or juftice muft be an imperfeftion. That his 
 Lordlhip was a finner, is notorioufly, and by his own 
 confeffion, true ; and therefore liable to be a fuflerer, 
 whenever God thought fit to call him into judgment. 
 But plain man Bolingbroke will tell his fovereign 
 and judge. Since you did not punifli me when you 
 knew me guilty, you have no right to punifli me 
 now. And this is all the ground of Lord Bo ling- 
 er oke's and your future happinefs or fafety, that 
 ye cannot be worfe or more mifcrable in another 
 world, than he was, or you are, or may be in this. 
 How dangerous is your cafe, and how defperate was 
 his! 
 
 There are many awful queftions concerning the 
 
 jullice 
 
Sc(n:.VII. Of God's moral attributes, i6i 
 
 juflice of Go D, the difculTion of which would be too 
 tedious, and unneceflary, in my animadverfions on 
 Lord Bolingbroke's philofophy. I have proved, 
 that truth and righteoufnefs are eternal, and indepen- 
 dent on God's arbitrary will and appointment. 
 Froni which it follows, that he is neceflarily and ef- 
 fentially true and juft ; and therefore he as necefla- 
 rily approves of what is juft and right, and difap- 
 proves of what is unjuft and wrong. Our know- 
 ledge therefore of what God is pleafed or difplea- 
 fed with, becomes to us the divine law, which we 
 are bound to obey. It is his iwera'ive^ not his ''pe- 
 rative will, which is inconfiflent with human reafon 
 and freedom. So far is the imperative will of God 
 from being inconfiftent - with our liberty, that it is 
 by our freedom of will that we become fubje£led to 
 a law, and become obliged to obey. The effe^ls 
 of God's pleafure and difplcafure, whatever they 
 are or may be, are a double fandion. And though 
 the light of nature cannot determine precifely what 
 thefe effefts are or may be, yet reafon can aifure us 
 that they are certain. A law without a fanftion is 
 vain, or rather a contradiction in terms ; and a fanc- 
 tion not to be put in execution, is none at all. The 
 righteous Lord, who loveth righteoufnefs, and, con- 
 fequently, who is angry with the wicked, (I fpeak 
 analogically to the manners of men), and who is 
 true, as well as juft, will reward and punifh his ra- 
 tional creatures, according to their good or bad beha- 
 
 X viour. 
 
1 62 Of GoT>*s moral attributes. Sc<fl. VII. 
 
 viour. That a vicarious puniflimcnt, at leaft, is ne- 
 cefTary to vindicate the divine juftice, was the opinion 
 of all thofe who offered facrifice. And it is for the 
 fake of fuch a piinifliment, that Chriftians believe, 
 that, on certain fecondary conditions, fins are pardon- 
 able. And finners of fuch a perfnafion comfort them- 
 felvcs in the mercy of God, and in the merits of 
 their Saviour ; and confidering themfelves under 
 the additional obligation of redeeming love, they are 
 delightfully led into repentance, and amendment of 
 life. Great mufl: their guilt be, and flrong their 
 difhclicf of the jufticc, truth, goodnefs, and mercy 
 of God, who treat the Gospel as a fable and 
 fiftion ; dreadful muft their apprehenfions be, on 
 every furmife of God's vindictive juftice. And 
 who can afTure himfelf, that all penal fanCtions an- 
 nexed to the moral law, are but empty threatenings, 
 which never will be executed? If there is a God, 
 this God is a holy being; and if he is a holy being, 
 then there is a moral law ; and then there is a fanc- 
 tion annexed to it, and the fanftion muft be execu- 
 ted ; and therefore the laft is as fure and certain as 
 the firft. His Lordfhip found no fafety, no refting- 
 placc for his finful foul, but in his impious and blaf- 
 phemous perfuafion, that God is not a holy being, 
 but an intelligent being, without every moral per- 
 fection. 
 
 He pretends to be pcrfe<5tly well acquainted v ith 
 
SeSt. VII. Of G o d'j- 7J2oral attributes, 1 6 
 
 3 
 
 Dr Cudworth's intellectual fyfl:em, and for his 
 learning he Ihews refped and deference. And had 
 he afted candidly, he ought to have confidered what 
 the Doctor had faid on the moral attributes of the 
 Almighty. The padage i^ too long for a quotation, 
 but too ftrong to be altogether omitted. " * Knowledge 
 *' and power alone will not make a GOD. For God 
 " is generally conceived by all to be a mod amiable 
 " and defirable being : whereas an omnifcient and 
 " omnipotent arbitrary Deity hath nothing either of 
 " benignity or morality in its nature to regulate and 
 " meafure its will ; as it could not be truly augufl 
 *' and venerable, according to that maxim, Sine boni- 
 '* tate nulla majefias. Neither could it be defirable, 
 *' it being that which only could be feared and dread- 
 *' ed, but not have any firm faith and confidence 
 
 ** placed in it." From Plutarch he fays, *' We 
 
 ** fear and Iknd in awe of the Deity, for its power ; 
 *' but we vt'orfhip it, that is, we love and honour it, 
 
 " for its juftice." —And he fays, " The whole 
 
 " Manichean hypothefis taken together, is to be pre- 
 " ferred before this of an omnipotent arbitrary Deity 
 " (devoid of goodnefs and morality) ruling all things ; 
 " becaufe there the evil principle is yoked with an- 
 *' other principle eflentially good, checking and con- 
 ** trouhng it. And it alfo feems lefs difhonourable to 
 *' God, to impute defeft of power, than of goodnefs 
 " and juftice, to him. 
 
 * Folio edition, p. 202. 
 
 X 2 " Neither 
 
1 64 Of G o dV moral attributes, Sefl. VI t. 
 
 " Neither can power and knowledge alone make 
 *' a being completely happy. We have all of us by 
 " nature a certain divination, prefage, and parturient 
 " vaticination (as both Plato and Aristotle call 
 *' it) in our minds of fome higher good and perfec- 
 
 " tion than either power or knowledge. It may 
 
 '' be proved from the nature of God, who is happy, 
 " not from things external, but becaufe he is eflen- 
 " tially moral and virtuous, that every man hath as 
 *' much happinefs as he hath of virtue and wifdom. 
 
 ** In what both Plato and Aristotle fay, 
 
 " there feems to be little more than what may be ex- 
 *' perimentally found in ourfelves; namely, that there 
 *' is a certain life, or vital or moral difpofition, which 
 *' is much more inwardly and folidly fatisfaftory, not 
 " only than fenfual plealure, but alfo than all know- 
 *' ledge and fpeculation whatever. Now, whatever 
 '' this chief good be, which is a perfection fuperior 
 " to knowledge and underftanding, Plato fays, that 
 *' it m'ufl: be firfl: and principally in God : and there- 
 " fore virtue is defined to be an aflimulation to the 
 *' Deity. Juftice and honefty are not fictitious things, 
 " made by the will and command of the more povver- 
 ** ful to the weaker ; but they are nature and perfec- 
 " tion, and dcfccnd downward to us from the Deity.*' 
 
 Dr Cudworth, though mafler of all the learn- 
 ing of Greece, docs not think it below him to look 
 into the Bible. '* The holy fcriptures, without any 
 
 " raetaphyfical 
 
Se(5l. VII. Of God's moral attributes. 1 6^ 
 
 " metaphyficai pomp or obfcurity, tell us plainly 
 *' what is that highefl: perfection of intelledual be- 
 *' ings, which is better than reafon and knowledge, 
 " and which alfo is the fource, life, and foul of all 
 " morality ; namely, love and charity." And, after 
 paraphrafing the Apoftle's words *, he fays, " What- 
 " ever dark thoughts men entertain concerning God, 
 *' it can never be conceived, that the moft felf-fuffi- 
 " cient and mofl happy Being ihould have any ma- 
 " lignant defpiteful thoughts towards his creatures. 
 " Never thelefs, becaufe fo many are apt to abufe 
 " the notion of divine love and goodnefs, and to frame 
 " fuch conceptions of it, as deflroy that awful and 
 '* reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, 
 ** and make men prefumptuous, and regardlefs of their 
 " lives ; therefore we think it fit here to fuperadd al- 
 *' fo, that God is no fond, foft, and partial love; 
 ** but juftice is an eflential branch of the divine good- 
 ** nefs, an impartial law, and the meafure of all 
 *' things and aftions. 
 
 " It is evident, that Atheifls themfelves, in the 
 " times of Paganifm, took it for granted, that good- 
 ** nefs was an effential attribute of the Deity, whofe 
 " exiftence they oppofed, (fo that it was generally 
 ** acknowledged fuch by Pagan Theifts) ; that is, 
 " they did think and m.aintain, that if there was a 
 *' God, he muft be holy. And to difprove the ex- 
 
 * I Cor. xiii. 
 
 " iftence 
 
1 66 Of God's imral aitribufef. Sea. VII. 
 
 " iftence of the Deity, they argued from the topic 
 *' of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and 
 " want of providence over human affairs ; which, if 
 " they were true, would not at all difprove fuch an 
 *' arbitrary Deity, (as is now fancied hy fome)^'* and 
 ftrenuoufly contended for by you and your Noble au- 
 thor, " made up of nothing but will and power, with- 
 *' out any eflential goodnefs and juftice. But thefe 
 *' arguments of the Atheifts are direfU}'^ levelled 
 ** againft the Deity, according to the true notion and 
 " idea of it; and could they be made good, would 
 " do execution upon the fame." 
 
 I fuppofe the learned author quotes the Apoftlc 
 Paul, not as a writer divinely infpired, (for he knew 
 for whom he wrote), but as a philor(>pher, (and a 
 philofopher is as fufcepiible of divine infpiration as an- 
 other man), when he makes love the higheft accom- 
 plilhment of a reafonable creature. And I prefume 
 to quote the Apoftlc Peter as a philofopher, who 
 exhorts Chriftians in thefe words, * ^s he who hath 
 called you is holy, fo be ye holy in all manner of conver- 
 fation i becaufe it is written. Be ye holy, jor I am holy. 
 And indeed mofl: philofophically, and even metaphy- 
 fically, he makes the holinefs of God the reafon, 
 ground, and obligation of our holinefs and morality. 
 For this he gives Moses as the autlior, who three 
 times delivers the command of God in thefe word?, 
 
 * I Ep'ift. i. ic. i6. 
 
 Be 
 
Se£t.VII. Of Go -d's moral attributes. 167 
 
 * Be ye holy^ fcr I am holy^ faith the LORD. The 
 credit of Moses as an hiftorian and divine apart for 
 this time, he certainly fpeaks and gives his orders as 
 a good moral philofopher. We can be under no ob- 
 ligation to live morally, nnlefs we are perfuaded, that 
 it is the will and law of God that we fliould ; and 
 we cannot be perfuaded that it is his will, unlefs we 
 believe that he himfelf is holy. Is it not v/ith you a 
 matter of the higheft affurance to affirm, that *' the 
 " knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts ne- 
 * ' cedary for fuch a creature as man -f" ? " For the a- 
 mount of your philofophy is, that your Creator hath 
 nothing to do with you, nor you with him. You pre- 
 tend to believe that God is a being of infinite know- 
 ledge and power ; and beyond this fufficient, this fix- 
 ed point, you are refolved to know no more : for this 
 reafon you think, that they who will know that God 
 is a holy being, run into metaphyfical and theological 
 blafphemy. 
 
 Were this true, it is fufficient to terrify a man of 
 piety from going beyond the fixed point of God's 
 power and knowledge. But how can he hinder him- 
 felf from inquiring, and endeavouring to know, whe- 
 ther this omnilcient and omnipotent Being is a moral 
 being or not ; whether he is good or evil, or neither ? 
 If he hath made, and if he governs the world, and 
 
 * Lev.xi. 44. xix. 2. xx. 7. 
 + Vol. ii. p, 2^. 
 
 governs 
 
1 68 0/GodV vioral attributes. Secfl.VII. 
 
 governs us as we are moral agents, we are more con- 
 cerned to know his moral, than his phyfical attributes ; 
 his truth, hisjuflice, his goodnefs, and mercy, than 
 his knowledge and power. It is our interell:, it is our 
 duty to inquire. It is to follow the diftates, and to 
 comply with the make of our mind and underftanding. 
 Whether our inquiry ends in truth or in- error, pro- 
 ceed we ought, and mull. I know, that the fchool- 
 men are accufcd by his Lordiliip of metaphyfical blaf- 
 phemy in their doftrine concerning the Deity. But 
 neither he, nor you for him, can fliew in their wri- 
 tings any thing unworthy of God, or unbecoming 
 the fupreme all-perfeft Being. On the contrary, 
 they have reafoned on his attributes with the greateft 
 reverence, caution, and accuracy. It were to be 
 wifhcd, that neither you nor he h.^d come nearer to 
 Athcifm, than they came to blafphcmy. One would 
 be apt to think that his Lordiliip was in jeft, in deny- 
 ing and affirming God's moral attributes, (if fuch a 
 ferious and awful fubjeft could bear a je(l). He 
 bledes God for his goodnefs ; though his goodnefs, 
 and other moral attributes, are as unknown to him as 
 to the beafls. All the moral attributes he q.z\\% fi'fpo- 
 fitili'MS^ with a reduplication : and yet, on repeated 
 occafions, he mentions and aOcrts the goodnefs, juitice, 
 and truth of the fupreme Being ; and rather than ex- 
 clude the moral attributes, he abforbs them all in the 
 divine wifdom. In his vindication, he owns he admits 
 them; but pleads that it is not in the fame fcnie in 
 
 which 
 
Sefl. VII. Of God's moral attributes, 1 6<) 
 
 which others do, who make the human and divine 
 goodnefs the fame either in kind or degree. That the 
 divine and human goodnefs is the fame in degree, no 
 theologifl:, no metaphyfician, ever fald. That intel- 
 ligent creatures may be completely moral, or without 
 fin againft God, is pofTible : and flich I fuppofe 
 thofe in the higheft rank of his Lordl]iip's hypothe- 
 tical fcale of beings, are. Notwithflanding, there is 
 ftill a diiference between the fanftity of God and the 
 fan^hty of thofe created and finlefs beings. For all 
 fuch beings are contingent ; and (b are all their per- 
 feftions, whether natural or moral. But God is a 
 necedary, felf-exiftent, and felf-fufficient being ; all 
 that he is, he is eUentially. Human or created good- 
 nefs, as it is contingent, may be loft by tranfgreffion 
 of the law of God ; but his goodnefs endureth from 
 eternity to eternity. The divine goodnefs is perfeft ; 
 but the goodnefs of the noblefl: created being is im- 
 perfe6l, becaufe it is not eflentlal to the nature of a 
 creature. But this doth not hinder even human good- 
 nefs to be goodnefs, and real goodnefs. But whether 
 the divine and human goodnefs are fpecifically and ge- 
 nerlcally the fame, is a debate that may admit of more 
 fubtilty than your Lord was, or you are capable to 
 underfland. It gives no offence, fo far as 1 know, 
 to the moft pious, to fay, that God is ens or bebi^^ 
 fubjtance^ intelligent Jpirit \ and that fuch likewife is 
 man or angel. And, except his Lordililp and you, 
 no good man ever took it amifs to hear God and man 
 
 Y fpoken 
 
170 Of Go Ti's moral attributes » Se<5l. VII. 
 
 fj^oken of with this difference, and no other, that the 
 one is a finite, and the other an infinite being. 
 
 I appeal to David Mallet, Efq; and to any 
 man capable of reflecting on his own mind, if he mult 
 not previoufly have ideas of knowledge and power, 
 before he can afcribe them to God in an unlimited 
 and infinite fenfe. And when he hath afcribed infi- 
 nite wifdom and power to the fupreme Being, doth 
 he at the fame time omit his primitive and original no- 
 tions of power and knowledge, and rale them entire- 
 ly out of his mind ? If thofe ideas are done away, 
 all that he afcribes to God is fomething infinite, or 
 mere infinity, and nothing elfe : and he ihould drop 
 the words knowledge and fower^ as he does their ideas. 
 To fpeak intelligibly, thefe original and previous ideas 
 of knowledge and power mufl remain in the mind, 
 when applied to the Deity in an unlimited and infinite 
 fenfe. But, to do juffice to his Lord/hip, it is proper 
 to take into due confidcration what he hath faid on this 
 fubjeCl. And in hopes the reader will be pleafed to 
 fee things in the Itrongefl and cleared light as ftated 
 by him, 1 preiume to give him the following extract 
 
 ** * God is, in the notion of Deifis," who be- 
 lieve another life, " nothing more than an infinite 
 " man. He knows as we know, is wife as we are 
 *' wife, and moral as we are moral : but his know- 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 296. 
 
 " ledge. 
 
Se^.VII. Of God's moral a f tributes. 171 
 
 " ledge, his wifdorn, and morality, are in their na- 
 " ture in^nite, though they are not exercifed alike, 
 " nor with a conftant harmony, nor confillency, in the 
 " produftion of all the phenomena. No man hath 
 *' been more dogmatical on this head than Clarke. 
 '' He is much fcandalized at thofe Theifts, among 
 " others, who, being fo abllird as to in agine, that 
 " goodnefs and jullice are not the fame in God which 
 " they are in our ideas, but fomething tranfccndent, 
 " think it is impoHlble wc fhould argue with any cer- 
 '' tainty about them. This opmion, he fays, doth 
 " not ftand on any confiftent principles, and muil fi- 
 " nally recur to abfolute Atheifin. -Now, I own 
 " very freely, that the opinion is mine, and that it 
 
 *' is one of thofe I think it impious to alter. Far 
 
 " from apprehending that I ihall be reduced to A- 
 ** theifm by holding it, the Dcxftor feems to me in 
 " fome danger of being reduced to manifeft ab- 
 ** furdity by holding the contrary opinion." 
 
 If juftice and goodnefs be not the fame in God as 
 in our ideas, then we mean nothing, when we fay, 
 that God is neceflarily juft and good. And for the 
 fame reafon it may as well be faid, that v/e know not 
 what we mean, when wc affirm, that he is an intelli- 
 gent and wife being. " Thefe are the Dodor's own 
 " words : and furely they fhew, that great men, in 
 " common eftimation, are fometimes great trifiers, 
 " Vriicn they who are of his opinion affirm, that 
 Y z " God 
 
172 Of Go -d's moral attributes. Sefl. VII. 
 
 " God is neccflarily juft and good, according to their 
 " prccife notion of juC.ice and goodnefs, they know 
 " indeed what they mean, and they mean very pre- 
 ** fumptuoufly. When they who are not of his opi- 
 *' nion fay, that God is juft and good, they too have 
 ** a meaning, which is not lefs reafonable for being 
 " more modcft. They afcribe all conceivable per- 
 " feftions to God, moral and phyfical, which can 
 *' belong to a divine nature, and to a fupremc being : 
 '* but they do not prefume to limit them to their con- 
 " ceptions; which is their crime with Dr Clarke. 
 '' Every thing fliews the wifdom and power of God, 
 " conformably to our ideas of wifdom and power in 
 ** the phyfical world, and in the moral : but every 
 *' thing does not fliew in like manner the juftice and 
 *' goodnefs of God, conformably to our ideas of thefe 
 " attributes in either. The phyfical attributes are in 
 " their own nature more glaring, and Icfs equivocal. 
 *' The divine and the Atheifl: therefore deny that to 
 " be juft and good, which is not one or the other, 
 " according to their ideas. The Theift acknowledges 
 " whatever God hath done to be juft and good in it- 
 *' felf, though it doth not appear to be fuch in every 
 ** inftance, conformably to his ideas of juftice and 
 " goodnefs. He imputes the difference to the dcfeft 
 " of his ideas, and not to any defeat of the divine at- 
 *' tributes. Where he fees them, he owns them ex- 
 " plicitly ; where he does not fee them, he pronoun- 
 ^ CCS nothing about them. He is as far from dcny- 
 
 "ing 
 
Se<?l:. VII. O/GodV moral attributes. 17$ 
 
 ** ing them, as he is from denying the wifdom and 
 ** power of God. In every cafe he knows what he 
 *' means ; and his meaning is in every cafe rational, 
 *' pious, and model!:. 
 
 " "Will the divine fay, that he does not deny the 
 *' juftice and goodnefs of God, becaufe he proves 
 *' them in general a priori ; and that when he denies 
 " them in particular, he only denies the complete ex- 
 *' ercife of them in this world, becaufe that is refer- 
 *' ved for another P When he proves then the juftice 
 *' and goodnefs of God, he proves them as he could 
 ^' not prove even his own intelligence, that is, a prio- 
 *' ri ; and when he denies them, his denial is abfo- 
 " lute, unlefs an hypothefis, — which may be denied 
 *' on much better grounds, be true. But what is this 
 *' proof a prion ? Does it prove, that jufhce and 
 '' goodnefs, though they are fo connefted with the 
 '* phyfical attributes, that when we afcribe one, we 
 *' are obliged, by necedary confequence, to afcribe 
 " the other to the fupreme Being, are yet fo diftin^l, 
 " that they may be feparated in the exercife of them, 
 " and that either of them may aft as independently on 
 ** his wifdom, as of one another .'* If this be faid, 
 *' they who fay it may affume, in confequence, that 
 " the fupreme Being is fometimes partial, inftead of 
 " being always jufl; and fometimes evil, inftead of 
 
 " being always good. And this fets the reafoning 
 
 '^ of fuch a divine as Clarke on principles as little 
 
 " confiftent 
 
174 Of GoTt's moral attributes. Sc«5l. VII. 
 
 " confiftent as thofe of an Athcift. Does the argu- 
 " ment « />mn prove, that the jullice, and good nefs, 
 " and wlfdom, and power of God, are fo intimate- 
 *' \y connefted, and are fo much the fame by na- 
 " ture, that they cannot be feparated in the exercife 
 " of them ? In this cafe his natural attributes abforb 
 " the moral, The will of God is not fometimes 
 " determined b}'' one moral attribute, and fometimes 
 ^' by another, like that of man ; but by a concur- 
 " rencc of them all with his wifdom in every aft of 
 " it. God is then infinitely wife : he does always 
 *' that which is fitteft to be done ; that which is fitted 
 *' to be done, is always juft and goodj and the dif- 
 " pute is over." 
 
 These words are his Lordfhip's flrong rcafons for 
 divefting the divine Majefty of all moral perfections, 
 and excluding the moral and excellent perfe£lions of 
 God from his firft philofophy. It hath been a point, 
 and a fettled point, that the way of coming to the 
 knowledge of God, is by negation and emineriLS : 
 that is, by removing from what we know of our 
 own or other minds all defcft and imperfeftion, and 
 by raifing our conceptions of our own abUities and 
 faculties above all refiridtion, bounds, cr limitation. 
 We know, for inflance, -what our own knowUdge is; 
 and we know, as 1 have juft now faid, w hat it is pre- 
 vioufly to our application of know ledge to God. Our 
 know lege is imperfcft j but knowledge in any degree 
 
 is 
 
Sc6l. VII. Of God's moral attributes. ly^ 
 
 is fb far a perfection, as it exceeds ignorance. And 
 when all limitation is removed from it, we afcribe it 
 to God, and pronounce that he is omnifcient. And 
 when we have done the fame by every thing that we 
 know is good and commendable in ourfelves, we form 
 as jut and perfe£t an idea of God as podibly can be 
 formed by human undedlanding, and perhaps by the 
 conplerefl created intelligence. We fay, and fay 
 without blafphcmy, that God is omnifcient, omnipo- 
 tent, infinitely wife, holy, juH:, good, and true: and, 
 confeqviently, we deny that God ever was, or can be 
 ignorant of any thing ; that he is weak ; that he mif- 
 takesthejufl means of creating, preferving, and go- 
 verning all his creatures, and all their aftions. We 
 deny that he is either malevolent or unjufi: ; and that 
 he can either be deceived himfelf, or deceive others. 
 A God with all thefe natural and moral attributes is 
 worthy of our adoration and obedience ; and much 
 more worthy than Bolingbroke's God, who wants 
 many of them. From which no man in the exercife 
 of a found judgment will conclude, that this is to 
 make God nothing more than an infinite man. Had 
 he any other way to come to the knowledge of God's 
 omnifcience and omnipotence, but by his previous 
 ideas of knowledge and power, he might with the 
 better grace maintain, that Chriftian philofophers 
 make God too much like to themfelves. But with 
 the fame reafon I do maintain, that he makes God 
 nothing more than an omnifcient and omnipotent man. 
 
 All 
 
176 Of Go'd's moral attributes, Sefl. VII. 
 
 Ail man's impcrfe£lions are left to hlmfelf" ; his er- 
 rors, ignorance, weaknefs, folly, malice, injuitice, 
 and deceit. Some virtues too remain his portion ; 
 fiich as, temperance, fortitude, prudence; becaufe 
 they can take no place in an omnifcient, holy, and 
 infinitely happy being. 
 
 All this I own is according to our ideas ; and do 
 think, that Dr Clarke is juftly fcandalized at thofe 
 Theifis, who are abfurd enough to imagine, that 
 goodnefs and juftice are not the fame in God that 
 they are in our ideas, but fomething tranfcendent. 
 For it is by our own ideas that we reafon and judge, 
 and by no other befidcs, whether fuperior or inferior 
 to them. And if it were polfible to have any thing 
 in our minds tranfccnding our ideas, we muft have an 
 idea of that tranlcendency. And if it is by this tran- 
 fcendency that we know, judge, and reafon, and at 
 the fame time we have no idea of it, it is impolfible 
 that wc can judge or reafon about it. "When he fays, 
 that God is infinitely good and juil, but not accor- 
 ding to his ideas of infinite goodnefs and juflice, but 
 in a way tranfcendent to them, of which tranfcend- 
 ency he hath no notion, (nor can he, for nothing 
 tranfccnds infinite); his meaning is, that he under- 
 flands nothing of divine goodnefs and jufficc. He 
 hath been at fome pains to prove, that there are ufe- 
 ful words which fignify nothing, fuch as Jorce and 
 
 chance. 
 
Se(5l.VII. Of God's moral affribufes. \y*j 
 
 chance. And fuch to him, and to you, are all the 
 moral attributes of God. 
 
 With this abfurdity Dr Clarke charges fiich 
 Theifts as his Lordfhip ; and he honeftly gives fome 
 of* the Doctor's words, but not all of them that 
 make for the Doctor's purpofe. He introduces his 
 anfwer with an indecent reflexion on the Doctor's 
 abilities, if tlie charadler of a great trifier fignifies any 
 contempt. He owns, the Doctor, and thofe of his 
 opinion, do know what they mean, when they fay, 
 that God is necedarily juft and good ; but they mean 
 prefumptuoufly : and he, and fuch as he, who ufe 
 the fame words, mean fomething as rationally, but 
 more modeftly. I cannot think, nor will I believe 
 on his authority, (and I have nothing elfe for it), that 
 he who judges and fpeaks according to his own ideas 
 and conceptions, does either prefumptuoufly or raflily. 
 And if his Lordfliip fpake and thought, and if you 
 fpeak and think below or above your ideas, you do 
 wrong ; I mean when you fpeak, for think you can- 
 not. He who fpeaks in words tranfcending his ideas, 
 when he fays, that God is good and juft, certainly 
 fpeaks without a meaning. ' He makes it a crime in 
 the Doctor, to limit the perfections of God to his 
 ideas and conceptions: but he who fays and thinks, 
 that the divine perfections are unlimited and infinite, 
 can never be guilty of fetting bounds and limits to 
 them. He conceives them unlimited, and therefore 
 
 Z includes 
 
178 Of- Go'd's moral attributes, Se(5l. VII. 
 
 includes in his conception the very thing which his 
 Lordlhip charges him with excluding. I defire you 
 would learn to dilVinguiih between apprehenfrce and 
 comprebenfive knowledge. There are but few obje6ls 
 of thought, if any at all, of which we have compre- 
 henfive knowledge ; but every thing that we do know, 
 we know apprehenfively. I do apprehend, that God 
 is an infinitely-perfect being ; but my knowledge of 
 him is not therefore -comprebenfive and adequate. I 
 know that I live and think ; and though I know this 
 intuitively and confcioufly, yet I do not fully com-^ 
 prehend what is my life, and what is my mind. I 
 have an apprehenfive knowledge of God's infinite 
 perfeftions, phyfical and moral ; but not a compreben- 
 five knowledge, and that becaufe they are infinite. 
 "When authors write philofophicvil volumes, theyiliould 
 learn philofophical language. 
 
 His Lordiliip fays, that he, and fuch as he, a- 
 fcribe all conceivable perfections to God, '■dohich can 
 belong to a fuprtme being \ but he doth not fay, that 
 holinefs, jufiice, goodnefs, and truth, do belong to 
 this fupreme being. This is playing the legerde- 
 main^ and dealing himfelf away from an abfurdity. 
 The queftion is not, Whether the fupreme Being 
 hath all the perfcClions that belong to fuch a being ^ 
 for that hath every thing ; but, more particularly, 
 Wliether jufiice, goodncls, and truth, are attributes 
 and perfections of the Deity? and fure he hath given 
 
 his 
 
Sc6l.VIL Of GoT>'s moral attributes, ly^ 
 
 his judgment for the negative oftener than once. He 
 knows no more of God's moral attributes than the 
 hearts ; no more than his omnifcience and omnipo- 
 tence : nay, with him they are all fuppofititious ; they 
 are abfbrbed in his wifdom ; there they all vanifh, 
 and the wifdom of his God along with them. 
 
 This 1 have proved. And I am not furprifed that 
 he fays, " I am as far from denying the moral attri- 
 " butesof God, as lam from denying his power 
 '* and wifdom." And as little do I accept as a tefti- 
 mony of his Deifm, thefe folemn words : *' * A ne- 
 ** celTary connection between the natural and moral 
 *' attributes of God, no man who believes in himy 
 " will deny. All the perfeftions of an all-perfe£l 
 *' being mud be confident and conne£ted ; to be o- 
 *' thcrwife, would be imperfeftion." For if no man 
 who believes in God, will deny the neceflary con- 
 nection between his natural and moral attributes ; and 
 if you and Lord Bolingbroke deny this connec- 
 tion, then he was, and you are • . Dr 
 
 Clarke's meaning 1 underftand, when he fays, that 
 juftice and goodnefs are the fame in God, that they 
 are in his ideas and apprehenfion : but for his Lord- 
 Ihip's meaning, he keeps it to himfelf ; and therefore 
 I cannot allow, that " his meaning is in every cafe 
 *' rational, pious, modeft;" I rather think it is irra- 
 tional and ablurd, impious and blafphemous, pre- 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 224. 
 
 Z 2 fumptuous 
 
i 86 Of Go D V moral attributes. Sea. Vll. 
 
 fumptuous and atheiftical. I am far from thinking 
 it " a fooliili and wicked rhodomontade in Dr 
 " Clarke, that the man who denies the moral at- 
 '* tributes, fuch as he and every Theilt apprehends 
 " (I do not fay comprehends) them to be, may be 
 " reduced to a ncceffity of denying the natural like- 
 " wife, and confcqucntly into abfolute Atheifm." 
 To fave himfelf, his Lordfliip pretends, that he ad- 
 mits moral attributes in general. But a general that 
 excludes particulars, is what neither he nor any man 
 can underdand. And for all the moral attributes of 
 God, mull we accept of his Lordiliip's cjis rationis ? 
 
 ' But there is nothijig mbre obviouflyfalfe, thail 
 the difference he makes in the facility and difficulty 
 of conceiving the natural and the moral attributes of 
 God. " Every thing fliews the wifdom and power 
 " of God, according to our ideas of wifdom and 
 *' power, in the phylical and moral world ; but every 
 *' thing doth not fliew in like manner, the juflice 
 *' and goodnefs of God, conformably to our ideas 
 " of thefe attributes in either." This laying is both 
 fliort and fenfclefs. Every thing doth not Jhew the 
 juftice and goodnefs of God in the phyfical world. 
 Nothing more certain ; but nothing to his purpofe. 
 A tree fliews neither the juftice nor goodnefs of God, 
 becaufe it is not a moral agent ; and therefore hath 
 no conne6i:ion with his moral attributes. But it doth 
 not therefore follow, that we cannot form an idea of 
 
 goodnefs. 
 
Sea. VII. Of Govt's moral attributes, i8r 
 
 p-oodnefs, or under (land what it is, as. eafily as we 
 underftand knowledge and power. 1 have jufl now 
 faid, (and I have reafon to repeat), that we muft 
 know what goodnefs and juftice is, before we can 
 affirm them of the Deity ; and fo mud we know what 
 power and wifdom is, before w^e can afcribe either. 
 to God. And the difference between good and evil, 
 juft and linjuft, is fooner and more eafily known 
 than power and wifdom. Children know when they 
 are ill and well ufed ; and can reafon on their right and 
 property, upon a good office and an injury, better than 
 on power and knowledge. This rational inflin^l (if 
 I may ufe the expreffion) is confirmed and ftrength- 
 ened by experience, and habit of deciding eafily, in 
 numberlefs inftances, where the equity and iniquity 
 of aftions lies, till at laft it is indelibly ingrained in 
 the human nature. If we call him a good man, who 
 is faithful, true, and juft, who is benevolent and be- 
 neficent to his power; furely we may call God a 
 good being, who is good to all, conformably to our 
 exa£teil: idea of goodnefs. It is therefore falfe, that 
 the phyfical attributes are more glaring, and lefs e- 
 quivocal, than the moral. But admitting this to be 
 as true as it is falfe, how can he conclude, that the 
 Atheifl muft deny that to be juft and good, v/hich is 
 not one or other, according to their ideas ? There is 
 no connection between thefe two propofitions. " The 
 " phyfical attributes of God are more glaring than 
 *' the moral ; therefore the Atheifl and the divine 
 
 " nuill 
 
1^2 Of GoT>'s moral attributes. Se^.V!!. 
 
 *' muft deny that to be juft and good, which is not 
 *' fo according to their ideas of either." The confe- 
 quence is true, but it doth not follow from the ajite- 
 cedent. This is an inftance of his impertinent logic. 
 And no lefs impertinently does he in the prefent cafe 
 join the Atheift and the divine together. The Athcift 
 denies the exiflence, wifdom, power, juflice, and 
 goodnefs of God, becaufe inconfiltent with his ideas. 
 The divine aderts the being, and all the phyfical at* 
 tributes of the Deity. The divine, befides, afcnbes 
 all moral perfections to God, according to his idea of 
 morahty. But his Lordfhip fays, that the divine 
 cannot have an idea of divine goodnefs. Here he 
 and the Atheift join, as they do in many other things. 
 It is his own cafe not to have, or to pretend not to 
 have, fuch a clear and certain idea of the divine 
 goodnefs and juftice, as he hath of the omnifcience 
 and omnipotence of the fupreme Being; but not the 
 cafe of the divine. For the moral attributes of God 
 are more ftrongly imprinted on the human mind than 
 the phyfical attributes. Mathematical and phyfical 
 truths we difcover by application of thought, but 
 moral and ethical truths force themfelves upon our 
 underftanding. So fays his Lordiliip. 
 
 Bolingbroke's Theift acknowledges whatever 
 God hath done to be juft and good in itfelf, though 
 it doth not appear fuch in every inftance : and fb 
 docs Dr Clarke ; lie confiftcmly with his principles, 
 
 but 
 
Sea. VII. Of GoTi' s moral attributes, 183 
 
 but his Lordfliip inconfiftently with the whole of his 
 fyftem of divine attributes. And never man was ^q 
 vain as to pronounce every particular adminiflration 
 of government to be juft and good, by reafbns a po- 
 Jleriori^ without knowing the cafe, and all the cir- 
 cumflances of it. We can reafbn fi'om the infinite 
 goodnefs and juftice of the fupreme Being ; and rea- 
 fon a priori^ that God's government of the moral 
 world is good and ju t. But nothing below omni- 
 fcience can determine the equity of every thing which 
 happens to intelligent and rational creatures. And 
 therefore his Lordfhip U'ljuftly and injurioufly im- 
 putes to Dr Clarke, that he denies the divine good- 
 nefs and jaitice in particular inftances. And, for what 
 I know, no Chriftian philofopher ever did. Becaufe 
 God is a being of all perfeftions, religious philofb- 
 phers conclude that he is therefore good and juft. 
 This is proof a priori. But his Lordfliip, who 
 knows nothing but by fenfe and experience, muft 
 call God to the bar of his fliallow imderftanding, to 
 juflify every aft of his adminiflration. " When he 
 *' fees things which God hath done to be good and 
 *' jufl, he explicitly owns them ; and when he doth 
 '' not fee them to be fuch, he pronounces nothing about 
 '* them." Wonderful modefty in dealing with an all- 
 perfeft being ! Though he doth not fee nor believe, that 
 this and the other aft of divine providence is either jufl 
 or good, he declines pronouncing any thing about 
 them. He imagines that he can fave every abfur- 
 
 dity, 
 
184 Of GoT>'s moral attributes, Se^. VII. 
 
 dity, by aderting that God is infinitely wife; and 
 therefore doth always that which is fittefl: to be done ; 
 and that which is fitted to be done, is always juft 
 and good. To let his argument ftand as he ftates it, 
 it is to reafon a priori. And why may not Dr 
 Clarke and others do the fame? The argu- 
 ment, however, is not diftinftly ftated; for the 
 works of God in creation and providence, are of 
 different kinds and forts. There is a mere material, 
 and a moral or rational world. With refpeft to the 
 material, ilvill and power is fufficient for its produc- 
 tion ; but the cafe is quite ditlerent with refpeft to 
 rational beings. In the firft inftance, neither the 
 goodnefs nor juftice of God take place ; for material 
 and unintelligent things are not fubjefts for the exer- 
 cife of thefe moral attributes ; and though they are 
 well and wonderfully made, they cannot be faid to 
 be made according to goodnefs and juftice, In the 
 fecond cafe, the creation of rational beings, -capable 
 to know the equity and iniquity of anions, divine 
 goodnefs and juftice do take place, as they do in the 
 government of them when made. God made them 
 all capable of being holy and happy, and of making 
 themfelves fuch. And as he put this in their power, 
 he confcquently left it in their power to make them- 
 felves vvorfe. But the do£trine of divine wifdom, which 
 abforbs all the moral attributes, whether real or fu]->po- 
 fititious, that makes them vanifli and difappear, can. 
 ^car no conclufion from them, to prove that rational 
 
 creatures 
 
Sea. VII. 0/ Go t)V moral attrihuies, ■ 1 85 
 
 creatures are either well or ill made, or governed 
 according to goodnefs and juftice. And that this is 
 no miftake of his real meaning, fhall be made ap- 
 pear when I CQiiie to confiJer his do6lrine of provi- 
 dence. 
 
 I cannot pafs over the argument drawn from the 
 infinite wifHom and power of God, to prove that all 
 which God hath done i^ juft; and good, without an- 
 other remark, "God is infinitely wife ; he does al- 
 " ways that which is fitteft to be done ; and what is 
 " fitted to be done, is always juft and good." A 
 being infinitely wife and powerful does always what 
 is fit to be done, but not that which is fitteft ; and 
 that becaufe he is infinitely wife and powerful. This 
 world is well and wonderfully made ; but in making 
 it, he hath not a£led adequately to infinite wifdoni 
 and power. Thefe attributes are inexhauftible. 
 God can make many more worlds, both material 
 and moral, than now exift; and with more know- 
 ledge in the one, and more fplendour and beauty in 
 the other, than I can imagine. It is likewife to be 
 obferved, that there is a fitnefs cf defign, and a fit- 
 nefs of means ; this is intermediate, and that is final. 
 This world is going on to perfedion, and to a con- 
 clufion worthy of infinite wifdom. If the parts bear 
 an analogy to the whole, it muft be fo. God doth 
 not make trees to ftart up at once out of the ground. 
 An oak is folded up in an acorn, and requires to be 
 
 A a nourished 
 
1 86 Of Go d'j- moral attributes. Sc<5l. VII, 
 
 nouridied in the earth for many years before it comes 
 to maturity. And from conception to birth, and 
 from birth up to maturity, do animals gradually arife. 
 Many things are fit and proper as means, that are not 
 finally fo. Therefore there is nothing more preca- 
 rious than what Lord Bolingbroke frequently in- 
 culcates, that the material and moral world is fuch 
 as it is, and could not, nor cannot polfibly be other- 
 wife ; in fo far that he makes the errors and immora- 
 lity of mankind to be a neceflary and eHential part 
 of their conlVitution. " Did man," faith he, " ob- 
 ** ferve the law of nature, this our habitation muft 
 " have been a paradife ; but then we had not been 
 " what we are, and what God defigned we lliould 
 *' be ; and a gap had been left in the fcale of beings." 
 Not only MosEs, but Heathen philofophers held, 
 that the materials of the vifible world were firfl a 
 chaos ; from this arofe all the order and beauty which 
 is now obferved. And until the confummation or con- 
 clufion of the grand plan, things will be carried on 
 from lower to higher degrees of perfection. Chrifli- 
 ans need not be furpiiled to fee fuch do&ine publiili- 
 ed as makes finners fafe in their own conceit ; being 
 forewarned by the ApolUe Petek *, "-Ihat there 
 Jhali come in the lajl dayi jccffer.^^ walking after their 
 own lufti, and faying. Where is the promife of his 
 coming ? for fruce the fathers fell qfieep, or, except 
 
 2 Epiftle, iii. 3. 4. 
 
 that 
 
Se^, VII. Of God's moral af tributes, 1 87 
 
 that the fathers have fallen afleep, a/l things cbntinue 
 as they were from the beginning of the creation. 
 
 But to return: That there are fome actions ne- 
 ceH^rily and eflentially good and jnft, and others evil 
 and unJLift, I have already proved, and that in the 
 fight of God and man. From which it follows, that 
 Dr Clarke hath well faid, that there is a rule of 
 aftion common to both ; and that this rule of aftion 
 confifts in the eternal and neceflary relation of things 
 to one another; that is, in the eflential difference be- 
 tween good and evil, juft and unjuft. And I think 
 his Lordfhip hath no where dire^lly denied this dif- 
 ference. So far from it, that he makes this difference 
 the principle on which he reafbns againft Hobbes. 
 And therefore, without contradifting himfelf, (which 
 is common enough), he cannot find fault with the 
 Doftor for demonflrating that there is fuch a differ- 
 ence. And if the Dofbor afhrms that men may. but 
 that God cannot miftake one thing for another, it doth 
 not follow, that he judges of God as he doth of man : 
 but it follows, that his Lordfhip is to the higheft de- 
 gree injurious, in aflerting that the Do6lor is to the 
 higheft degree impertinent. To this injury he adds 
 another. That he, and thofe of his profellion, ** feek 
 ** for nothing more than the honour of the gown, by 
 *' having the lafl word in every difpute." In this I 
 have no pcrfonal concern : for I am as little influen- 
 ced by temporal obligations or expeftations to defend 
 religion, as his Lordiliip had, or you have to oppofe 
 A a 2 it. 
 
l88 Of GodV moral attributes. Seft. VII. 
 
 it. But the third injury is the greateft of all, and 
 highly unbecoming men of any honour or honefty. 
 For he affirms, though not upon his own perfonal 
 knowledge, that Dr Clarke did not believe what he 
 wrote. It is faid,. that fome men lie for the fake of 
 the truth. But, for what he knew, his Lordfliip hath 
 litd moil fcandalouily for the fake of a fyftem of im- 
 piety and iniquity. Had he had a due value for his 
 own memory, he would not have afperfed the memo- 
 ry of another. 
 
 I take it now for granted, and for proved, that there 
 is an eflential difference between rtght and wrongs 
 equity znd tn.guiiy- and that God is eflentially and 
 necclTarJiy whatever he is, and man only contingent- 
 ly fuch ; that the rule of right is fixed and unchange- 
 able. This rufe God obferves b)' the rectitude of 
 his being, and that as unalterably as his being is un- 
 changeable. But man, w hofe nature is liable to change 
 and variation, is not eflentially good and jufi in all his 
 aftions, becaufe he is not a ncceflary and unchange- 
 able being. And though he doth not oblerve this rule 
 of righteoufnefs always, it doth not follow that God 
 dcth not. The rule is ftill the fame, and men ought 
 to obferve it, bccaule God doth. Add to this, that 
 it is God who hath made man capable to didinguiih 
 between right and wrong: and in \ain muft he have 
 bellowed th'S power on hiir., had it not been his will 
 and pleafure that iLan fliould be juft and good. From 
 
 what 
 
Seft.VII. Of GoJi's moral attributes. 189 
 
 what we know of ourfelves, we learn God's moral 
 attributes ; and from thefe we learn our duty to God 
 and man. But we do not form an idea of God on 
 the plan of human perfeftions. Thefe perfeftions 
 are only openings for a higher view of the Deity. 
 And from this view we know whole we are, and 
 what we ought to be and to do. So far is Dr Clarke, 
 and fo far are all religious philofophers, from making 
 God an infinite man, that they rather make man, 
 were he fuch as he ought to be, a diminutive god. In 
 profound piety, his Lordfhip did, and you do, de- 
 cline, or rather, in the vanity of heart, defpife the 
 dignity, as much more for your honour to be inde- 
 pendent, than a dependent being on the almighty 
 Creator of the world, 
 
 All that the Noble author hath faid againft Dr 
 Clarke's ideas of God's moral attributes, he re- 
 vokes in thefe words. " * We are forced to help our 
 '' conceptions of the divine nature by images taken 
 *' from the human nature ; and the imperfedions of 
 " this nature are our excufe. But then we mud: 
 " take care not to make humanity the mcafure of di- 
 " vinity, and much more not to make the laft the 
 " lead of the two. When we have raifed the idea 
 *' of any human excellency as high as we are able, it 
 *' remains a very limited idea. When we apply it to 
 ^' God, we muft add to it our negative idea, or our 
 
 * Vol. ii. p. 59. 
 
 " notion 
 
1 90 Of Go d'j moral attnhiites. Sec>. VII. 
 
 " notion of infinity ; that is, we mufl: not confine it 
 " by the fame, nor fuppofe it confined by any limi- 
 " tarions whatever." To add a negative idea, is a 
 very fiiiall addition. I do not think that infinity is 
 properly negative ; for bounds, and limitations, and 
 reftriflions, which hinder extenfion, are in themfelves 
 fomething negative. They ftop our thoughts from 
 rifing higher than their limited and imj-^erfeft objefts 
 permit. And nothing is more pofitive and real than 
 the divine perfeftions ; and the neareft and exa£lcft 
 conceptions that we have of them are fuch as exclude 
 all wants and dcfefts. And this exclufion of imper- 
 feftion we call ivfinitx. By this we dillinguiih the 
 fupreme Being from all other beings, and the almigh- 
 ty Creator from his works. Perfection is pofitive, and 
 imperfcftion is therefore negative. When from our 
 idea of the Deity we remove all imperfeClions, we 
 conceive God to be the mod: pofitive, the moft real, 
 the fuUeft, completeft, and moft perfect being. This 
 Noble author fhews as much difhonerty as ikill in wri- 
 ting on both fides of the queftion. 
 
 Of which take this other inflancc. Though no 
 man ever treated Plato with greater contempt, he 
 reverthelefs gives his theology the preference to all 
 of his own and fome fucceeding ages. " * There 
 '* are," faith he, " many notions fcattcrcd in the wri- 
 " tings of Plato, which the moft orthodox Theift 
 
 * Vol. ii. p. 379. 
 
 '' may 
 
Se(n:.VIl. Of GoTi's moral attributes, 191 
 
 " may adopt. He acknowledges one fapreme being, 
 " ineffable, inco nprehenfible, all-perfe£t, the felf- 
 " exiilcnt foantain of all exiftence, divine and hu- 
 *' man, himfelf above all elTence. God is truth, but 
 " above all truth ; intelligent as well as intelligible, 
 " bat above all intelligence; good, but above all 
 *' gooinefs. He is none of thefe, but the principle 
 " of then all; as the fun is the principle of light, 
 *' and as he makes all things to be feen, without be- 
 ** ing light or fight himfelf. In a word, Plato ac- 
 '' knowledged the omnifcience, the omnipotence, the 
 " omn'prefencc, the infinite power and wifdom of 
 " God. Thefe are very elevated fentiments, which 
 " may be coliefled from his writings. They are 
 " drained as high as the utmofi: pitch to which we can 
 *' carry our ideas, and they ftill point higher. And 
 " fo they (lioald : for after all the efforts that the 
 " mind of man is capable of making, our conceptions 
 " will fall infinitely lliort of their objeft, vi^hen this 
 '- objeft is the majefty of the all-perfe£l Being. Nei- 
 " ther Plato, nor they who received his philofbphy 
 *' four or five hundred years after his time, and who 
 " were even more extravagant, and lefs intelligible 
 " than he, could pufh their general or abftraft notions 
 " of this fort too far. The intelleftual profpe£t is 
 *' immenfe; and the intellectual fight muft be flrained 
 " from objects clearly and diftin£lly perceived, to 
 " fuch as are lefs fo ; and from thefe ftill farther, till 
 " it can be (trained iio more, land the mind is loft in 
 
 *' the 
 
192 Of God's moral attributes* Se6t. VII. 
 
 " the fablimiry of its own conceptions." To which 
 he adds, *' If thele fpcculations cannot difcovef 
 " by infinite degrees the whole truth, they cannot 
 '* lead us into any error ; and iTiay fcrve to maintairi 
 *' in our minds that awful fenfe of the fupreme Being, 
 " of the true God in the unity of his nature, which 
 " are due to him from every intelligent creature. 
 '' Thus far, therefore, and in this manner, Plato 
 " was an excellent mafter of hatural theology." 
 
 These things, and fayings, and fentimehts, faith 
 he, the moft orthodox Theift may adopt. Some of 
 them I do not, and fome he himfelf doth not adopt. 
 I cannot allow, that God is above all efPence, above 
 all truth, above all intelligence, above all goodnefs; 
 uhlels it be admitted, that this efTence, this truth, 
 this intelligence, is only fuch as is found in creatures. 
 For as thefe perfections are in God, he is not, nor 
 can he be above them, without being above himfelf. 
 The reverfe of which feems to me to be a do£i:rine of 
 the fame fort with Vai^ini^s, who denies that God 
 is ens, but admits that he is jjcniio ; fomething in 
 atftraSlo^ but nothing in lomre:^. And to me it ap- 
 pears plainly, that Boling broke makes the fame 
 nfe of God's being above all ellcnce. For he fays, 
 *•' * Though the Heathen philolophers fpake fome- 
 " times of the monade, or firll unity, alone, as God ; 
 ** yet they afcribcd often io much to the fccond God, 
 
 * Vol. iii, p. 1 16. 
 
 " that 
 
Se6l. VII. Of GoT>'s moral attributes, ipg 
 
 " that the firft became in fome fort a non-entity, an 
 " abftraft or notional being, a being without eiTence 
 *' or nature, becauje above them, and rather an intel- 
 '* ligible than an intelligent principle. Thus they 
 *' left no place to the true God in their conceptions, 
 " whilft they endeavoured to raife him above all con- 
 *' ception." And if a being above eflence is a non- 
 entity, his Lordihip, orthodox Theift as he is, muil 
 not adopt all that he imputes to Plato ; nor can he, 
 without running into Atheifm, and making God a 
 non-entity. And though he admits, that Plato 
 was extravagant, and thofe that received his philofb- 
 phy afterwards were more extravagant than he, in 
 pulliing their general and abftrad notions of the Deity ; 
 yet none of them could pufh them too far. Is not 
 this a contradiftion ? Whatever is extravagant, ex- 
 ceeds ; and notwithftanding this excefs, Platonic phi- 
 lofbphers ftill fell fhort. This is nonfenfe in terms. 
 And then, like one that doth not know nor care what 
 he fays, he finds fault with fuch intelle£liial attempts 
 to know God. ** * The divine nature cannot be ex- 
 " plained by human vvords ; for it cannot be concei- 
 " ved by human ideas : and therefore none but de- 
 " lirious metaphyficians, who impofe by their found, 
 " and have no determined ideas affixed to them," (lb 
 far is neither fenfe nor grammar), ** will ever at- 
 " tempt luch explication. All that the wit of man 
 " can do, is to fpeak cautiouily and reverently of it, 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 113. 
 
 B b " according 
 
194 Of God's moral attributes. Set^l.VII. 
 
 " according to thofe general notions of wifdomv and 
 " power, and majefty, and all other perfeftion? 
 " which we are able to coUeft a pojleriort ; that is, 
 " from the works of God ; and which fcrve ftill 
 *' more to fhew our ignorance than our knowledge *.'* 
 And it muft not be omitted, that, in order to carry 
 his point againft our knowledge of God, he affirms, 
 that " the knowledge of the divine attributes" (not 
 only the moral, but the phyfical) " is impofTible, and 
 *' unneceflary for us to have, even on the fuppofitioii 
 " there is a God." With what induftry doth he in- 
 culcate our ignorance of God ? For if upon fuppofi- 
 tion there is a God, and on flippofition that it is im- 
 poflible and unnecefTary to know whether this God 
 bath any natural or moral ' perfections or attributes ; 
 then fuch knowledge of the exiftence of a Deity is the 
 very fame to us as Atheifm. 
 
 From the works of God we learn no more a po^ 
 Jieriori than his knowledge and his power. But, as 
 Dr CuDWORTH hath demonflrated, knowledge and 
 power will not make a God. The rcfl therefore 
 muft be learned a priori ; fuch as, the unity, the eter- 
 nity, the immenfity, the independency, and the ne- 
 cellary exiftence of the fuprenie and all-perfefl Being. 
 And for all the delirium and blafphcmy of metaphy- 
 fics, it muft require fome ikill, cither natural or arti- 
 ficial, in that fcience, if we intend to acquire any 
 
 * V^ol. V. p. 224. 
 
 more 
 
SecHi.VIL Of Govt's moral attributes, i^s 
 
 more knowledge of God than what we can learn by 
 Jenje and experience *. What a noble philofopher 
 muft he be v/ho takes no other method to learn and 
 to teach P He hath no ufe for reafbn. But can he 
 demonftrate by his fenfe and experience, that all the 
 angfes of a triangle are equal to two right angles ? 
 that the earth moves every day round its axis, and 
 every year in an orbit, that touches the tropics of 
 Cancer and Capricorn ? He feems to be very certain, 
 without fenfation and experience, that there is no fu- 
 ture ftate of rewards and punifliments. Neither doth 
 he know by fenfe and experience, that God is om- 
 nifcient and omnipotent, the firft intelligent caufe, 
 and an all-perfeft being. For fuch philofophy, as 
 the greateft favage knows as well as his Lordfliip, one 
 fmgle page, inftead of five volumes, was more than 
 enough. Rather than know or admit the phyfical 
 and moral attributes of the Deity, he refolves not to 
 know, or nor to acknowledge that he knows any 
 more than the greateft favage, and fome beafts. 
 
 Mr Mallet, you and I know that every ftream 
 hath a fource, and that every fource is fufficient for 
 the ftream that flows from it. Many ftreams we have 
 feen, but the fources of few. If you and I ftiould 
 follow a ftream up to the unknown fountain, 1 would 
 defire you, when we reached it, to ftay a little, and 
 examine what this fource and fountaki is. You im- 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. -^12. 
 
 i B b 2 mediately 
 
196 O/'GodV moral attributes. Se<ft.VlI. 
 
 mediately return, and you know no more than you 
 did before, that this, as well as all other ftrearns, hath 
 a fource. 1 (lay, and, by examination, I find, that 
 this fountain receives no fupplies; and that it never 
 increafes nor decreafes, norwithltanding the ftream 
 that flows from it ; that in it was found every .ihing 
 that can fatisfy the largeft defires of a rcafonable foul. 
 I purfue the finiilitude no further. All that you know 
 is, that the world is a produftion, and that the produ- 
 cer IS fufficient to have produced it ; that he muft have 
 ikill and power enough for the piirpofe. But I know 
 beyond what you do, or rather will underftand, that 
 this Being who made the world is the firft caufe, and 
 therefore himfelf uncaufed ; therefore eternal, ne- 
 ceflarily cxiftcnt, and independent : and that therefore 
 no perfe(Stion, either phyfical or moral, is to be found 
 in his works, but what was and is in this firft caufe, 
 tliis fupreme Being, in an eminent way ; that is, with- 
 out reltriftion and limitation. God cannot limit him- 
 felf, and nothing elfe can. It is no lefs abfurd than 
 aftoniiliing, that one who acknowledges the omni- 
 fcicnce and omnipotence of a Deity, fhould deny his 
 holinefs, goodnefs, jufiice, and truth. Thele things 
 we reckon pcrfefticus in ourfelves ; and yet you refufe 
 them to God, and that becaufe in us they are no 
 more than human. With the fame reafon you may 
 argue, becaufe we are, God is not. 
 
 The difl.in£lion between the phyfical and moral 
 
 attributes 
 
Sc(5l. VII. OyGoD'j" 7noral attributes. 197 
 
 attributes of God, Bolingbroke frequently men- 
 tions and admits. But in greater iincerity of heart, 
 he fays, that ** * divines have diflinguifhed, in their 
 " bold analyfis, between God's phyfical and moral 
 " attributes ; for which diftin6Hon, though I fee fe- 
 *' veral theological, I do not fee one religious pur- 
 " pofe that it is neceflary to anfwer." And without 
 a perfuafion of the moral attributes of almighty God, 
 I do not fee that there can be any place, any pur- 
 pofe, for religion, and morality founded in religion. 
 For if I am not perfuaded that God is holy, (or mo- 
 ral), I can never know that it is his will that I Ihould 
 be fuch, or that I can procure his approbation by 
 regulating my conduft according to goodnefs, equity, 
 truth, and juftice. Wonderful was his Lordihip's 
 averfion to every thing that might bring him under an 
 obligation to obey the will of God ; and no lels 
 wonderful is his inadvertency, or infincerity ; for I 
 dare not fay his fhipidity. There is not a favage, 
 even the moft thoughtlefs, nor an Atheift, even the 
 moft obflinate, but knows the difference between a 
 good office, and the murder of a benefactor. And 
 doth not God, who hath made the favage and the 
 Atheift, the Noble philofopher and David Mallet, 
 Efq; know as much as they ? And if he knows what is 
 right and what is wrong, what is juft and what is unjuft; 
 which of the two we obferve and praftife, cannot be 
 to him a matter of indifference. It is not fuch to us. 
 
 * Vcfl. Jii. p. 410. 
 
 We 
 
198 Of GoT>'s moral attributes, Sc(ft. VII. 
 
 We approve of and commend morality in onrfelves 
 and in others, we difcommend and difapprove of all 
 immoral and wi<;ked doings ; and that becaule we 
 know the difference. And if Go d doth not know the 
 diflx-rence, he is not omnifcient ; nay, we know 
 more than he. And if he doth not commend all 
 good and condemn all evil aftions. Lord Boling- 
 BROKE was, and David Mallet is, a better be- 
 ing than the God who made them moral and rational 
 agents. This is horrid blafphemy ; but they are to 
 be blamed for it. * If our heart condemn us^ GOD 
 is greater than our heart, and knoweth all tbmgs ; 
 and particularly that we are juflly condemned. If 
 our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence to- 
 wards GOD, that neither will he condemn us. 
 
 Numberless are the contradictions to be found 
 in Lord Bolingbroke's philofophical works. For 
 notwithftanding all that he hath faid againfl God's 
 moral attributes, or againft any attempt to know 
 them, we are gravely told, that *' -j- the principles 
 " and duties of natural religion arife from the na- 
 *' turc of things, and are difcovered by the reafon 
 " of man," (therefore not only by fenfc and expe- 
 rience), " according to that order which the author 
 *' of all nature, and the giver of all reafon, hath 
 " cflablifhed in the human fyflem." And how is it 
 pofTible that God, who hath given reafon to man, 
 
 * I John iii. 21. f Vol. iii. p. 0. 
 
 by 
 
Se<^.VII. Of God's moral attributes, 199 
 
 by which he knows the principles and duties of na- 
 tural religion, can himfelf be deftitute of all holinefs 
 and morality ? If God hath beflowed reafon on man, 
 he is the author and original caufe of all the good and 
 noble difcoveries that men make, either in the phy- 
 fical or moral world, and particularly of the differ- 
 ence between the equity and iniquity of actions, and our 
 commendation of the firft and our condemnation of 
 the fecond. Our morality is the effed of God's 
 holy good will and pleafure ; and whatever is in the 
 cffeft, mud be prior in the caufe ; and in this parti- 
 cular cafe, mufl be eminently and infinitely ^o. But 
 all this is nothing to the author. He follows his 
 point through abfurdities and contradictions to the laft. 
 And becaufe I intend to follow him as far as he goes, 
 (for the fubje£l is of the greateft importance), I beg 
 the reader's leave to tranfcribe two paragraphs. 
 
 *' * Let us draw a line of leparation between na- 
 " tural and artificial theology. By that we are 
 " taught to acknowledge and adore the infinite wif- 
 " dom and power of God, which he hath manifeft- 
 " ed to us in fome degree or other, in every part, 
 " even the mod minute, of his creation. By that too 
 " we are taught to afcribe goodnefs and juftice to 
 " him, where-ever he intended we fhould fo afcribe 
 " them ; that is, where-ever either his works, or 
 '' the difpenfation of his providence, do as neceflari- 
 
 • Vol. V. p. i68, 
 
 ••ly 
 
200 Of God s moral attributes, Sc^. VII. 
 
 " ly communicate thcfe notions to our minds, as 
 " thofe of wifdom and power are communicated to 
 " us in the whole extent of both. Where-ever they 
 " are not fo communicated, we may aiTume very 
 " reafonably, that it is on motives flriftly conform- 
 ** able to all the divine attributes, and therefore to 
 " goodncfs and juftice, though unknown to us, from 
 " whom fb many circumflances, with relation to 
 " which divine providence afts, mufl: be often con- 
 " cealed. Or we may refolve all fuch cafes into 
 " the wifdom of God, and refigning ourfelves to 
 *' that, not prefume to account for them morally. 
 *' Thus we follow God, and pretend to have know- 
 " ledge of his moral charafter no further than he 
 *' gives it ; no further than thefe abflraft or general 
 '* notions, which we col left from the proceedings of 
 " his providence, are confirmed by the fame. 
 
 *' But we are taught a very different IcHbn in the 
 " fchoois of artificial theology. In tiiem all the no- 
 " tions of thofe obligations under which men lie to 
 " one another, by the conflitution of their nature, 
 " are transferred to God; and an imaginary con- 
 '' neftlon between his phyfical and moral attributes 
 *' is framed by very precarious rea((>nings a fn, ri ; 
 " all Q^ which is founded on that impertinent fup- 
 " pofition, that moral fitncfles and imfitnefles are 
 " known, by the eternal rcafon of things, to all ra- 
 " tional beings, as well as to God, They go fur- 
 
 " ther. 
 
Seft.VII. Of God's moral attributes. 20 1 
 
 " then As God is perfeft, and man very imper- 
 " £e6t, they talk of his infinite goodnefs and juftice, 
 " as of his infinite wifdom and power ; though the 
 *' latter may preferve their nature without any con- 
 " ceivable bounds ; and the former muft ceafe to be 
 " what they are, unlefs we conceive them bounded. 
 " Their nature implies neccfTarily a limitation in the 
 *' exercife of them. Thus, then, the moral attri- 
 " butes, according to this theology, require infi- 
 '* nitely more of God to man, than men are able, 
 " or would be obliged, if they were able, to exer- 
 *' cife to one another ; greater profufion in beftow- 
 " ing benefits and rewards, greater rigour in puniili- 
 " ing offences. This whole fyflem of God's moral 
 " obligations, or of divine ethics, being raifed a pru 
 " ori, and not a pojleriori, is a fyftem of the duty 
 " of God to man. Let the blafphemy of this ex- 
 '' preffion be charged to the account of thofe who 
 " make it proper and necefJary to be ufed, in order 
 *' to expofe their doftrine. It is a fyftem of what he 
 " ought, or is obliged by his attributes to do, and 
 " not a fcheme of what he hath done. It prefcribes 
 *' to God : and the difpenfations of his providence 
 " are acquitted or cenfured, us they are conformable 
 " or not conformable to it." 
 
 This paflage is fuch fublime nonfenfe, that it fur- 
 gaflcrh all underftanding. By natural theology we 
 acknowledge the infinite wifdom and power of God. 
 
 C c - Agreed. 
 
202 Of God s moral attribtifes. Se(5l.VIL 
 
 Agreed. By this we are taught to afcribe goodnefs 
 and juftice to him. And we are taught the fame by 
 artificial tJ-ieology ; that is, fuch theology as Chri- 
 ftian philolbphers teach. But this goodnefs and ju- 
 ftiec he afcribes to God only, when God intends 
 we fliould afcribe them. From v^'hich it follows, 
 that in fbme cafes it is not the intention of God, that 
 wc fhould afcribe goodnefs and juflice to him. And 
 how doth he learn the intention of God to be fome- 
 times worthy, and fometimes ur^worthy of the appel- 
 lation of good and jufi: ? or where doth he learn, 
 that God is fometimes good, and fometimes evil, 
 fometimes juft, and fometimes unjuft, or fometimes 
 3ieither '. This do&ine of yours fuits better an athe- 
 iftical unintelligent caufe, than a being of infinite wif- 
 dom and power. For if God is juft and good, he 
 is ncceffarily and eflentially luch ; and therefore ju- 
 fticc and goodnefs is afcribable to him at all times, 
 and in all cafes. But, fay you, God's intention is to 
 be known, and our duty of afcribing goodnefs and 
 juilice to him, by the works and difpenfations of his 
 providence, communicating to our minds as necefla- 
 rily thofe notions of juilice and goodnefs, as thofe 
 of wifdom and power arc commui-icated to us in the 
 whole extent of both. AVhich is to fay, when we 
 perceive as clearly the juliicc of every adminiftration 
 of his providence, as w c do his knowledge and power 
 jn his works of creation, then it is God's intention 
 tliat we fliould afcribe to him goodnefs and juflice : 
 
 buL 
 
'Sc<5l. VII. Of Go'd's 7noral attributes, 205 
 
 but if we' do not perceive the juftice of divine pro- 
 vidence, then are we forbidden to call him jufl;. His 
 Lordthip' c^n never pardon Dr Clarke for quoting 
 to a Chriflian audience an appeal faid to be made by 
 God to man, for the juftice and goodnefs of his go- 
 vernment : and, notwithftanding, he takes upon him- 
 ■felf to determine, whether this or the other event is 
 good or evil, juft or Knjuft ; and affumes, that it is 
 God's intention and command that he fliould do foi 
 Before he can juflify his God, and acquit him of 
 wrong and injuftice, he muft have as good evidence 
 of the juftice and goodnefs of every particular difpen- 
 fation of his providence, and adminift ration of his 
 government, as he hath of his wif<Jom and power. 
 Nor is this enough to ^bfolve him for afcribing good- 
 nefs and juftice to liim. He muft further be inftruft- 
 ed in the full extent of God's goodnefs, as the no- 
 tions of divine wifdom and power are communicated 
 to him in the full extent of both. No man but this 
 vain and conceited writer ever pretended to know the 
 utraoft extent of all that God knows and can do. 
 And if he will not (ay that God is good and juft, 
 until he knows the utmoft extent of divine know- 
 ledge, that is, until he himfelf becomes omnifcient, 
 be never will, he never can. I have faid that our 
 knowledge of right and wrong, juft and unjuft-, is in- 
 tuitive, and even conlcious ; and I have the teftimo- 
 uy of all mankind for it : and this our knowledge 
 fgxceeds in general that of ildll and power. And 
 
 C c 2 ' though 
 
204 Of Govt's moral attributes. Se^ft. VII, 
 
 though I cannot account for the juftice of every par- 
 ticular event, 1 may, and muft fay, that God is 
 ju(l and good. As we cannot account for every 
 phenomena of the material world, yet knowing 
 that they are the doings of omnifcience and omnipo- 
 tence, we conclude, and fo doth Bolingbroke and 
 Mallet, a priori, that thefe things are neither 
 idly nor ill placed, but rather to anfwer fome good 
 end, of which we are ignorant. And fo this oppofer 
 of God's moral attributes is obliged to acknowledge, 
 in contradiction to himfelf, that where-ever the good- 
 iiefs and juftice of particular difpenfations of divine 
 providence do not appear to us, we may afTume very 
 reafonably, that it is on motives ftn£i:ly conform- 
 able to all the divine attributes. In every cafe then, 
 and not occafionally, we conclude, that God is juft 
 in all his works, and righteous in all his ways. 
 
 But is this "to follow God, and to pretend to 
 " have knowledge of his moral chara^er no further 
 *' than he gives it ; no further than thefe abftrad and 
 " general notions, which we colle£l from the procecd- 
 *' ings of his providence, are confirmed by the fame?" 
 And you follow God ! and for what purpofe ? You 
 firft allow, that he is eflentially jull and good, and on 
 that account you afTume reafonably, that \\'hatever 
 God does, it is on motives ftriOly conformable to all 
 the divine attributes, though the juflice and goodnefs 
 of every particular difpenfation of his providence does 
 
 not 
 
Se6t. VII. Of GoTi's 7noral attributes, 205 
 
 not appear fuch to you ; and then you pretend to 
 have knowledge of God's moral chara<fter no fur- 
 ther than he gives it. And what more knowledge 
 would you have of God's eflential holinefs, than that 
 it is eflential ; or what lefs can you have ? And be- 
 caufe your words no further than he gives it are not 
 eafily underftood, you explain yourfelf in a way ftill 
 ftiore unintelligible : " No further than thefe abftradl 
 " and general notions, which we colleft from the 
 '' proceedings of his providence, are confirmed by 
 *' the fame." You colled, in the analytical method, 
 abftraft notions of the juftice and goodnefs of God, 
 from the proceedings of his providence. The parti- 
 cular events, the juftice of which you cannot account 
 for, are to you the proper means of knowing the 
 goodnefs and juftice of God ; and that is to fay, that 
 your coUeftion of fuch events is the reafon why you 
 cannot afcribe to the Deity any one moral attribute. 
 And if in this you are miftaken, it is not you that are 
 to be blamed: for you pretend to have no more 
 knowledge of God's moral chara£ler than he gives. 
 And thefe abftra^l and general notions of the goodnefs 
 and juftice of God in particular, (nonfenfe enough), 
 you admit no further than they are confirmed by the 
 fame, the, fame colle^ion. This is to begin at parti- 
 culars, and there to end with your inquiry and your 
 knowledge. To deny divine providence, and to ap- 
 peal to that for the goodnefs and juftice of God, is to 
 treat the reader with intolerable contempt. This is 
 
 not 
 
2o6 Of God's niord attributes. Se6l.VIL 
 
 not all. BoLiNGBROKE and you admit no other 
 fanftion of the moral law, than the natural confequen- 
 ces of our good and bad aftions. Thefe are not all 
 immediate. Some of them follow our doings at the 
 diftance of many years. And how then can you by 
 induftion make a full enumeration of particulars, to 
 juftify or to impeach tlie juflice and goodnefs of God ? 
 It is an obfervation of canfiderable antiquity. That 
 the righteous and the wije, and their 'u:orks, are in 
 the hand of GOD. No man knoweth e. ther love or 
 hatred by all that is before them. All things come a- 
 like to all : there is one event to the righteous and to 
 the wicked ; to the good and to the clean., and to the 
 unclean •, to him that facrificeth., and to him that facri- 
 ficeth not : as is the good., fo is the /inner •, and he 
 that fweareth., as he that feareth an oath. And if 
 fentcnce againft an evil work was immediately to be 
 executed, there would be no place left for repentance 
 and amendment. Of this more hereafter. He had, 
 more agreeably to his fyftem of natural religion, faid, 
 that God neither docs good nor evil, but that every 
 thing comes to pafs according to tjie neceflary confti- 
 tution of nature, or according to fatality. 
 
 Instead of troubling himfclf with God's moral 
 attributes, he and you think it a better way to refblve 
 or di(Ic)lvc all the collc^ions made from the proceed- 
 Sngs of providence, " into the wifdom of Gqd ; and 
 *' rcfjgnmg ourfelvcs to that, not prcfume to account 
 
 " for 
 
Seft.VII. Of Gon' s ?noral attributes, loy 
 
 '' for them morally." His attempt to abforb all 
 God's moral attributes into his wifdom, 1 have al- 
 ready proved to be nonfenfe. But it may be alked, 
 whether this wifdom is a moral or a phyfical attribute 
 of the Deity ? If it is a moral attribute, he only lliiftg 
 the word, and retains the thing. If it is a phyfical 
 attribute, implying Ikill and knowledge, morality hath 
 no relation to it. If he makes wifdom ftand for both 
 a phyfical and moral attribute, he is guilty of a con- 
 tradiftion becoming the greateft blunderer, by adert- 
 ing, that '' an imaginary connection is framed between 
 *' God's phyfical and moral attributes, by very pre- 
 *' carious reafonings a 'priori^ For how can good- 
 nefs and juftice be abforbed in the divine wifdom, if 
 there is no connection between them I 
 
 r The Noble author is pleafed to call Dr Clarke's 
 invincible demonftration an impertinent fuppofition. 
 The Doctor had made it plain, that morality is not 
 founded on pofitive and arbitrary appointment, (and 
 his Lordfhip fays the fame againfl Hobbes), more 
 than the equality of two and two to four, feeing ac- 
 tions in themfelves are fome fit and others unfit to be 
 done. And this is known, by the eternal reafbn of 
 things, both to God and man. The righteous Lord 
 loveth righteoufnefs; and God is good, and doth 
 good, and that according to the eflential rectitude of 
 his nature. And this juftice and goodnefs he eficn- 
 tially proportions and adapts in a \va;/ the raori: fit and 
 
 fuitable 
 
2 o8 0/ Go D V moral attributes. Secft. Vll. 
 
 fuitable to the fubje^ of his moral government. It 
 is therefore no objecffion againft God's moral attri* 
 butes, that they are limited in the exercife of them. 
 " Infinite wifdom and |X)wer may preferve their na- 
 " ture, without any conceivable bounds; but divine 
 " goodnefs and juftice muft ceale to be what they are, 
 *' unlefs we conceive them bounded." A little more 
 attention would have made his Lordfliip fee, that the 
 moral and natural attributes of God, and particularly 
 his power, are in the very (kme cafe as to the exercife 
 of them. I iliall fuppofe, that God made the man 
 BoLiNGBROKE by an aft of his infinite power; but 
 this man was not an infinite man, but a perfon limited 
 and bounded in power and underftanding ; and there- 
 fore the divine power in making him was limited in 
 the exercife of it. For as boundlefs as God's power 
 and knowledge are, yet are they both limited in the 
 exercife of them, unlefs God can make an infinite ♦ 
 creature ; than which nothing is more abfurd. To 
 give his reafoning the appearance of an argument, it 
 muft run thus. " If God is good and juft, he muft 
 *' always beftow the greateft bleffings and benefits, 
 " and exercife the moft complete and exaft juftice ; 
 " but he doth neither : therefore he is neither good 
 " nor juft." In anfwer, I deny the condition of the 
 firft propofition, or what logicians call the fequcla ma- 
 joris ; for the reafon immediately above ; and for an- 
 other rcafon ah-cady mentioned, that we have no 
 grounds of perfuafion that God muft immediately re- 
 ward 
 
Scifl. VII. Of God's moral attributes, 209 
 
 ward and punifli, poorly doth his Lordfhlp conclude, 
 that, " according to Dr Clarke's theology, God's 
 " moral attributes require infinitely more of God to 
 " man, than men are able, or could be obliged, if 
 " they were able, to exercife to one another ; greater 
 " profufion in beftowing benefits and rewards, and 
 " greater fe verity in punilhing offences." That God 
 exercifes goodnefs and juftice in a more complete and 
 better proportioned way than men exercife their good- 
 nefs and juftice to one another, all who believe in God 
 will admit. But his fuppofition of man's being as able 
 as God, is both idle and impious ; and not only im- 
 pious, but it defeats the purpofe for which he makes 
 it. The term require might admit an orthodox mean- 
 ing, if he did not refolve it, in the next fentence, into 
 duty and obligation. *' The whole fyftem of God's 
 " moral obligations, and divine ethics, being raifed a 
 " 'priori^ and not a pofieriori^ is a fyftem of the duty 
 
 " of God to man. It is a fyftem of what he 
 
 " ought and is obliged, by his attributes to do, and 
 *' not a fcheme of what he hath done. It prefcribes 
 " to God : and the difpenfations of his providence 
 " are acquitted or cenfured, as they are conformable 
 *' or not conformable to it." 
 
 That all reafbnings a priori are not precarious, 
 
 the author does allow. For, from the infinite wifdom 
 
 and power of God, he concludes the world is well 
 
 (not infinitely well) made. And from this it foilow- 
 
 D d cth, 
 
210 Of Gob s 7mral attributes. Sc(5t. VII. 
 
 eth, that God is a free and voluntary agent, becaufc 
 he might not have made it at all, or made it other- 
 wife than it is. No man ever carried this fuppofition 
 fo far as his Lordiliip, who maintains flrenuoufly, 
 that God can make a fyftem, wherein what is now 
 juft Ihall be unjuii, and wherein what is true fliall be 
 falfe, and two and two fliall be unequal to four. 
 God can do all his pleafure ; but he is plcafed with 
 nothing but what is good and juft. And though he 
 hath made every thing perfeft fuo ordins et genere^ 
 yet there is a ditfcrence in degree of perfection in one 
 creature from that in another. His Lordlliip's fcale 
 of being from an oyfter up to a man, and from a 
 man higher and higher than he can tell, all of which 
 being, in his opinion, mere mattei*, endued fome 
 with more, and fome with lefs elafticity ; it depend- 
 ed on God's free will to have made of the fame ma- 
 terials a he-goat or the man Bolingbroke. But 
 this man being once made a rational creature, capable 
 of knowing his duty to God and man, and thereby 
 the relation of a fovercign and a moral fubjedl: being 
 eftabliflied, he became obliged to obey the will of his 
 maker and mafter. God a^s as the fupreme Being, 
 the fovcreign Lord, and Ruler, and Governor of the 
 world, according to the eftential holincfs, morality, 
 and rectitude of his nature. And the eternal truth 
 and righteoufncfs, and the moral fitnefs of things, is 
 indeed the rule of God's condu<Sl with regard to man, 
 ai:d all ether rational creatures. It is likcwife a rule 
 
 of 
 
Sc^.Vll, Of Gojy's f)2oral attributes. 211 
 
 of condu^ to all fuch creatures ; and no more than a 
 rule to an Atheift ; but to a religionift it becomes a 
 law and obligation. It is therefore an unfair repre- 
 fentation of the fanftity of the fupreme Being, and of 
 Dr Clarke's demonftration of the certainty and obli- 
 gation of natural religion, to fay, That " the whole 
 '* fyilem of God's moral obligations, or divine ethics, 
 *' is a fyftem of the duty of God to man." Though 
 there may be a rule, there can be no obligation with- 
 out a law ; and there can be no law without a fupe- 
 rior; and the fupreme Being admits of none. In 
 confequence of God's having made reafonable crea- 
 tures, he becomes their Lord and Lawgiver, their 
 Ruler and their Judge ; and he rules and judges them 
 according to the fandlity and reftitude of liis own na- 
 ture, without coming under any obligation, but that 
 of his unerring wifdom, and holy will and good plea- 
 dire, which is eflentially good and jufl. Dr Clarke 
 did not pretend to give a fcheme of what God hath 
 actually done, becaufe that was not for his purpofc ; 
 but to fliew the grounds and evidences of natural re- 
 ligion, and the unchangeable obligations of it. And 
 this he hath done to the fatisfa£lion of every reader of 
 unbiafled reafon. His intention was, to iliew what 
 men are to believe and to expeft from a good and juft 
 God, and what they ought to do in order to procure 
 his approbation aiid proteftion. But this Nobleman 
 writer, (I beg pardon for having faid a Noble writer), 
 with an impious affeftation of wlr, mifiipplics the ternv 
 D d z obliged^ 
 
212 Of God's moral attributes, Std:.V\l, 
 
 obliged, intimating fome reftraint on the Almighty 
 by afting always according to his own attributes. '* It 
 *' is a (yftcm of what God ought or is obliged by 
 " his attributes to do." God, for the glory of his 
 being, always afts confiftently with his attributes ; 
 but cannot properly be faid to come under an obliga- 
 tion. But man, who is obliged by the law of God 
 to a£t reafonably and morally, doth not always aft 
 as he is obliged to do. The author therefore poorly 
 infinuatcs, that in this very thing man has the advan- 
 tage of his maker. '' The fame rule of conduft is 
 ** common to God and man, with this difference, 
 " that man may, but God never muft depart from 
 ** it." A poor advantage, for a reafonable creature to 
 aft unreafonably : and fuch a privilege it is, as it 
 would be for a wife man to become mad at his plea- 
 furc. His Lordfliip mufl: have imagined himfelf hap- 
 pier than God, becaufe he could depart from the 
 rule of realbn at his difcrction. How happier is he 
 who knows, that a reafonable and moral life is an ac- 
 ceptable fervice done to a God of holinefs, juflice, 
 goodnefs, and truth ; a God who knows all his good 
 doings and endeavours, and who can, and will pro- 
 teft, and plentifully reward him ; a God whom none 
 feek, whom none ferve in vain ? 
 
 Lord Bolingbroke, being refolved not to be 
 bullied by orthodox divines, hath exerted all his 
 (Irength in his lall and dying words, and fled from 
 
 life 
 
Sefl. VIL OfGoi>'s moral attributes, 2 1 3 
 
 life to take refuge in an everlafting infenfibility. How 
 vain, and how weak muft he have been ! proud of 
 his philofophical labours, but without fortitude to pu- 
 bliHi them during his life. The brave part he hath 
 left you to aft, and to maintain his philofophical in- 
 fidelity and Atheifm. And I have, a right to fay fo, 
 for fome more than this realbn, That a God of no 
 moral perfeftions cannot be the Sovereign and Go- 
 vernor of moral agents ; and therefore, as fuch, you 
 have nothing to do with him, nor he with you. 
 
 SEC T. 
 
214 
 
 SECT. VIIL 
 
 .Of our imitation cf God s moral attributes, 
 
 ONE would think, that he who denies God's 
 moral attributes, employs himfelf idly in the 
 debate concerning the imitation of them. But the 
 guthor knew his bufmefs better. For, upon fuppofi- 
 tion that he might not prevail in perfuading mankind 
 that God is neither good nor ju(l, he was refolved 
 that their cpiniatrete fhould profit them as little as 
 poflible. It is only on fuppofition that God is holy, 
 that he contends we ought not to prefume to imitate 
 him in holinefs. To prevent mifreprefentation, take 
 his opinion in his own words. " * I muft give fome 
 " anfwer to a queftion, which our good friend the 
 " B. of C. makes, Whether there is any abfurdity in 
 " fuppofing, that man fliould imitate the author of 
 '' nature as far as he is able r This is faid to be, not 
 *' only agreeable to the Chriftian plan, but alfo to 
 
 " that of the Stoics. In anfwer to this query, I 
 
 *' confcfs, and think myfelf obliged in confcience to 
 '* confefs, that I hold it to be abfurd, and vvorfe than 
 *' abfurd, to aflcrt, that man can imitate God, ex- 
 " cept in a fcnfc fo very remote and ib improper, 
 *' that the expreffion fliould never be ufed, and much 
 " Icfs fuch a duty recommended." After oblerving 
 
 * \'ol. iii. p. 410. 
 
 the 
 
Seel. VIII. Of our imitation, 6cc. i\ ^ 
 
 the diftinftion made by divines, of God's phyfical and 
 moral attributes, (which dillin6lion muft be admitted), 
 he fays, ** They admit, that though we cannot imi- 
 " tate God in the exercife of the former, they infiit, 
 " that we can, and ought to imitate him in the exer- 
 " cife of the latter. And to complete this proof, 
 " which confifts in affirmation rather than argument, 
 '' they maintain, at lead Clarke does fo, very per- 
 " emptorily, that the divine moral attributes, that 
 " is, holinefs, goodnefs, juflice, righteoufnefs, and 
 *' truth, are the very fame in God that they are in 
 
 " our ideas. And that God defires to be imitated 
 
 '' by men in thofe perfections, which are the founda- 
 " tion of his own unchangeable happinefs." 
 
 I willingly admit, and admit for the honour of the 
 Chriftian plan, that there is no abfurdity in fuppofing 
 that man Hiould imitate the author of nature as far as 
 he is able, and in fb far as the author of nature 
 is imitable. 1 likewile admit, that Dr Clarke 
 doth maintain, that the divine moral attributes are the 
 fame in God that they are in our ideas ; but I do 
 not find, that he makes ufe of this affirmation as an 
 argument for our imitation of thefe moral attributes. 
 And I further allow, that God defires, or rather 
 commands us to be holy, becaufe he himfelf is holy. 
 But this Nobleman writer thinks himfelf obliged in 
 confcience to confefs in the face of the world, that 
 he holds this to be abfurd, and worfe than abfurd. 
 
 In 
 
21 6 Of our hnitathn of Scifl.VIIL 
 
 In order to proceed to the examination of this 
 heavy charge brought againft Chriflians, and the befl 
 of Heathens, 1 defire you will be pleafed to let me 
 know, what fort of confcience is here to be under- 
 ftood, whether a private or a public confcience. As 
 a good citizen, he thinks it beft to difclaim private 
 confcience. For on every occafion, and fometimes 
 without an occafion, he tells us, that private confcience 
 is dangerous to the public peace and tranquillity. If 
 we are to underftand a public confcience, a pretence 
 to it in a Chriftian nation, againft the national pro- 
 feffion, if not the national principles of religion, is ^ 
 direft violation of that confcientious duty which you 
 owe to the (bciety whereof you are a member. As 
 this, I think, is the only appeal made to confcience, 
 (for I do not remember another inflance in all your 
 voluminous works), it is fit that this confcience of 
 yours fhould be narrowly looked into. A man is 
 bound in confcience, when his reafon dictates to him 
 what he ought to do, and what he ought to forbear. 
 Whatever a man ought to do, he is obliged to do. 
 This prefuppofes the knowledge of a duty, a duty 
 prefuppofes an obligation, and an obligation prefup- 
 pofes a law, and a law, as fuch, is indil'penfable at 
 the difcretion of the obligee. "Whoever therefore 
 Hands accountable to his own confcience, (lands ac- 
 countable to a fuperior Icgiflator, and to a legiflator 
 who knows the thoughts of his heart, his defigns and 
 his endeavours, as well as his actions. Confcience 
 
 therefore 
 
Seft.VIII. God'j moral attnhufes, iij 
 
 therefore belongs to no man but to him who beHeves 
 himfelf one of God's moral fubjefts, fenfible of his 
 fbvereignty, and of his own fubjedion. Leave the 
 man and his confcience fubje^l only to the authority 
 of his own underftanding, he will find himfelf ander 
 no obligation of confcience, but what is difpenfable at 
 his pleafure ; ajid fuch an obligation is none at alj. 
 So far as civil authority reaches, a fubjeft may find 
 himfelf bound by that authority to conform his con- 
 duct to the laws of the fociety, but no further 
 than the judge knows his obedience or tranlgreffion : 
 whereas a fubjeft of God's moral government hath 
 a religious confcience ; and this confcience binds and 
 obliges at all times, in all cafes, without referve or 
 exception. And how could he, or how can you 
 plead a religious confcience as diftatrix of what is 
 morally good and evil, when you deny God's moral 
 attributes? He was not balhful, and you are not 
 blate, to difcharge your confciences againft thofe who 
 think themfelves obliged to be holy in all manner of 
 converfation, becaufe God is holy, for the abfur- 
 dity, and worfe than abfurdity, in taking fuch an 
 obligation on them. And whatever in this cafe is 
 worfe than abfurdity, mud be impiety and blafphemy. 
 Abfurd is a word his Lordfliip ufes freely and fre- 
 quently; but had he known that nothing is abfurd 
 but what isderaonflrably fa'.fe, he had uf^d it more 
 fparina;ly. Notwithilanding he allows, that the iJhri- 
 -flian doftrine may bear an orthodox fenfe; but a 
 
 E e fenfe 
 
2 1 8 Of our imitation of Sc6l. VIII. 
 
 fenfe fb remote and fo improper, that the expreflfion 
 fliould never be ufed, and much lefs fuch a duty re- 
 commended. Whate^'Cr lie might fay as a nobleman, 
 it became him as a pliiloiopher to have pointed out 
 this remote and improper fenfe, that his reader might 
 judge whether the expredion was to be ufed, and the 
 duty recommended, or not. I cannot take his alfer- 
 tions, even his appeal to his confcience, for a deci- 
 five argument. 
 
 There are many generical attributes which may 
 be predicated of God and his creatures. To God 
 we and he afcribe being, exigence, intelligence, wif- 
 dom, and power; and Mr Mallet is a being ad- 
 orned with intelligence and power, and vvifdom too; 
 for he is not an idiot : and thefe things are faid of 
 him, and faid of God, univoce et dh-ifim. And there- 
 fore, without impiety or abfurdity, in fo far man 
 may be faid to be like to God. The difference 
 indeed is extremely great, and tlierefore plain. But 
 difference doth not take away the generical agreement. 
 Let reajonaule animal be the definition of man, in 
 which reajonahle (lands for the molt proper difference 
 between man and other animals ; it doth not take a- 
 way animalit}\ in which man and beajl agree gene- 
 rical ly. Man is flill a real animal ; and fuch is 
 a horfe. No more do the exigence, knowledge, 
 power, the goodnefs, and jultice of God, take 
 away the reality of jullice, goodnefs, power, intelli- 
 t'^ gence. 
 
Se<5l,VIII. God'j" moral attributes. 219 
 
 gence, and exiftence from man. To afcend with 
 Ills Lordfliip in his hypothetical fcale of beings, to 
 the higheft of them in the highefl rank, who never 
 departed from the rule of equity, who never tranf- 
 grefled the law of nature, and who never difobeycd 
 the will of his God, and whofe goodnefs and benefi- 
 cence extended as far as his power ; fuch a being 
 muft refemble a God of holmefs, more than Lord 
 BoLiNG BROKE evcr did. I do admit, and his Lord- 
 fhip admits it too, that between finite and infinite 
 there is no proportion : yet it doth not follow, that 
 the creature muft in every thing be unlike to the 
 Creator. For then it would follow, that if God is 
 an intelligent being, we muft be unintelligent ; and 
 if he exifts, we cannot be. And therefore, though 
 God is infinitely holy, we may be finitely fuch. 
 And fure 1 am, it is not our duty to God, to differ 
 from him in every thing, and to be wicked becaufe 
 he is good and juft. You would do well to confider, 
 that fuch profound piety and reverential awe of 
 God as hinders you from imitating in your conduft 
 the divine moral attributes, tends to make men im- 
 moral. On fuppofition that we are the fubjefts o(- 
 God's moral government, it is our duty to conform 
 our conduct to his known will, and to improve in pi- 
 ety and morality ; and all our endeavours to that pur- 
 pofe may be conftrued afpiring to a fimilitude with 
 our fovereign Lord and Mafter. It is making his 
 will the rule and foundation of our will; and of our 
 E e 2 works. 
 
220 Of our imitation of Seft.VIII. 
 
 works. And when we will and do the fame things 
 which God wills and commands us to will and to doj 
 in lo far we agree with him : and in this agreement 
 we refembie him more than the devil and damned 
 fpirits, who are fuid to a£l a contrary part. This is 
 what I underlland, and what all Chridans under- 
 ftand, and what the belt of Heathens did underftand, 
 by the imitation of God's moral attributes. 
 
 For this purpofe, among others, all religious 
 people and nations have inilituted a worfhip and ado- 
 ration of the Deity. When in the moft folemn and 
 ferious manner we employ our thoughts in contem* 
 plation of the fupreme Being, and with our voice 
 praife him for his glorious perfections, and hiefs him 
 for his gGodneJ.s^ we are led to love him; and whom 
 we love, we vvifli to relemble as far as we are able, 
 This is natural : and to defire to be like the being 
 whom we adore, is natural likewife ; io natural, that 
 wicked Heathers made their deities like themfclves. 
 The Siamites admire and adcre their god SoMMO^o- 
 coDPAM, who neither doth good ncr evil, that by this 
 adoration they may become the likcr to him in his per- 
 fecStions. And he who copies the completeft pat- 
 tern, will fooncr learn the bufinefs, though he doth 
 not come up to the original, than he who works 
 without any. But let us hear what his Lordihip fays 
 agaiiift the opinion of fo great and lo good a part of 
 mankind. And he in ys, 
 
 " They 
 
Se(fl. VIII. GodV moral attributes. 221 
 
 " * They would do well to confider, that if the 
 *' moral attributes of God were demonft rated by ar- 
 ^' guments a priori, and they are not fo even by 
 " them, to be the fame in God that they are in our 
 " ideas ; yet this general afTurance would be far from 
 ** making them objects of human imitation. To be 
 f' fuch, they muft be known a pojleriori, like his 
 " phyfical attributes : for we can have no knowledge 
 *' of either, except that which fenje and experience 
 " gives us. They muft be difcerned in the works of 
 <' God, and in the condu<^ of his providence. And 
 *' it is evident, that they cannot be fo difcerned in 
 '< them, as to be proper objects of our imitation. The 
 ^' divine attributes are exercifed in fuch innumerable 
 *' relations unknown to us ; though we are lure the 
 *' exercife of them, in the immenfity of the univerfe, 
 '* is always direfted by the all-perfe6l Being to that 
 " which is iitteft to be done on the whole ; yet the 
 *' notions of created beings, who fee them in one re- 
 *' lation alone, like us, cannot be applied to them 
 ** with any propriety, nor with any certainty, fuffi- 
 " cient to make them obje6ts of their imitation. This 
 " is fo true, that in many cafes we Ihould a£l in direft 
 *' contradiiftion to the law of our nature, if we made 
 " the conduft of divine providence the rule of ours. 
 ^' God makes the fun to rife upon the evil and the 
 ^' good, and he fends rain on the juft and unjuft. 
 ^' He involves the innocent with the guilty in great 
 
 * Vol, iii. p. 412. 
 
 " calamities; 
 
222 0/ our imitation of SccH:. VIII. 
 
 " calamities ; and there is no theme on which divines 
 " enlarge more pathetically than on the unjuft diltri- 
 
 " bution of good and evil. Are thefe appearances, 
 
 " however conftant fome, and however frequent o- 
 " thers, to ftand as objefts which we are to imitate in 
 " our moral conduct ? I think no man will fuppofe 
 " that they are, except thofe who have fo little re- 
 ** gard to confiftency, that they propofe the fir ft to 
 *' our imitation, whilft they aggravate the two laft to 
 *' fuch a degree, that they aflume the juftice and 
 *' goodnefs of God's difpenfations in this fyftem to 
 '' be capable of no other vindication, than that which 
 " fuppofes another. Thefe writers and preachers, 
 *■' therefore, muft mean, when they exhort us to imi- 
 '* tate God, not the God whom we fee in his works, 
 " and in all that his providence orders or permits ; but 
 " a God who appears in their reprefentations of him, 
 " and who is often fuch a God as no pious Iheift 
 '* can acknowledge." 
 
 In conforniity to this fchcme of judging of things 
 and a£lions only as they are circumftanccd, or in con- 
 creto, he denies that we can form any idea of juftice * 
 in alfiraSlo. And he gives for realon. That he knows 
 the real eftencc of juftice, and can define it ieveral 
 ways ; yet thefe definitions or their contraries, a con- 
 formity to one or the other of which conftitutes 
 every adlion juft or unjuft, cannot form in any mind 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 366. 
 
 one 
 
Se(5l.VIII. GodV moral attributes. 223 
 
 one abftraft idea of juftice. " We can contemplate 
 " each of thefe apart, and compare any particular 
 " a£tion with it ; but we cannot abftraft one general 
 *' nature, with which we may compare every aftion 
 " that falls under fome one of thefe definitions." 
 Before he can pronounce an action to be juft, he mud 
 compare it with the definition of juftice. And what is 
 this definition of juftice ? It is not the definition of a 
 particular juft aftion; for aftion is not compared with 
 itfelf, but with the idea of juftice. One muft be hard 
 put to it, to eftablifti and fupport a fyftem of religious 
 or irreligious philofophy, to be obliged to fpeak non- 
 kni^Q with fo much aHTurance, and fo direftly contrary 
 to the firft principles of ratiocination. But I have al- 
 ready fully anfwered all his obje^lions againft the doc- 
 trine of abftraftion. This however is the foundation 
 of robbing God of all his moral attributes, and con- 
 demning every attempt to imitate his holinefs in our 
 conduft. It may lerve the purpofe of one who pre- 
 tends to know no more of God's phyfical or moral 
 attributes than what fenfe and experience teach him ; 
 and that is juft nothing at all. He hath no ufe for 
 reafon.; and without it I know not what he can learn ; 
 for I do not remember that I ever was an irrational 
 creature. How doth he prove a -pofteriori^ that God 
 is omnilcient and omnipotent, without reafoning from 
 the efTcdl to the caufe, and from tlie nature of the ef- 
 fe£l to the nature of the caufe ? He can have no ex- 
 perience, that this world, material and moral, is the 
 
 M'ork 
 
224 ^f ^^^' iffi'f^fion of Se£t. VIII. 
 
 work of God. He did not fee it made, nor was he 
 witnefs of repeated zSis of creation. But this great 
 doftor of ignorance, and antirationai philofopher, can 
 reafon both a p'j/ienort and a priori, when he is in 
 one of his rational fits. " Though the divine attri- 
 ** butes are exercifed in innumerable relations abfb- 
 *' lutely unknown to us, we are fure, that the exer- 
 " cife of them, in the immenfity of the univcrfe, is al- 
 " ways directed by the all-perfe£l Being to that which 
 " is fitted to be done." And upon what grounds can 
 he be fure of this, but by realbning a prion, after 
 this manner : There is an ellential difference between 
 right and wrong, independently of all arbitrary ap- 
 pointment, human or divine ; from which arifes' a 
 fitnefs of fome aftions, and unfitness in others : and 
 this eternal independent fitnefs is a rule for God, as 
 well as for man : A being of all perfection, both 
 phyfical and moral, can never do any thing that is 
 unfit to be done ; and when we do that which is juft 
 and good, we obferve the fame rule of condu£l ; we 
 then co-operate with God, which, his Lordfliip fays, 
 is honour enough for the creature ? And may it not 
 then be faid, without impiety and blafphemy, that in 
 tliis we imitate God's moral attributes.'' 
 
 But he objects, " If we are to imitate God, wc 
 " muft imitate the works of his providence; and in 
 *' that cafe wc fliould a6i: in direft contradiction to the 
 " law of nature; bccaufe God makes the fun to 
 
 " rife 
 
Seft.VIII. GoTt's moral attributes, 225 
 
 *' rife upon the juft and the unjuft, and fends rain 
 *' upon the evil and the good; and he involves the 
 *' innocent with the guilty in great calamities." He 
 vindicates the divine goodnels and juftice in his govern- 
 ment of the univerfe, becaufe whatever he does, is fit- 
 ted to be done ; and in particular he impeaches his 
 God of maleadmlniftration. He makes the fun to 
 rife and the rain to fall upon the word and the beft 
 of men, without difcrimination ; and he involves the 
 innocent with the guilty into great calamities. And if 
 we fliould do fo, we ihould aft unjuftly. He kiiows> 
 that it is an article of the Ghriftian religion, that all 
 mankind are finners ; and every one who believes na- 
 tural religion, acknowledges, that in many things he 
 offends, and falls fhort of his duty. Thofe inno- 
 cents, therefore, who are involved in great calamities 
 •with the wicked, are not abfoluteiy^ but comparatively 
 innocent. God is omnifcient, and knows the cafe of 
 every individual ; but we are often ignorant of the 
 merit and demerit of men and nations. And if a hy- 
 pocritical knave is (ignally punijfhed by providence, it 
 can lay us under no obligation to hurt a man in whom 
 we perceive no fault. Our duty can never extend 
 beyond what we can poifibly know. And, to be fure 
 hot to err, we have nothing to do, but to aft accor- 
 ding to the rules of morality. And if his Lordlhip, 
 or you for him, pleafe to ftop, (as you frequently 
 advife others to do), without going beyond thofe du- 
 ties which we owe to God and man, you may afTure 
 F f yourlelf 
 
226 Of our imitation of Scdi.VlW. 
 
 yourfelf of the approbation of the fupreme Being. 
 There is no occafion for giving yourfelf any trouble 
 with God's government of the world: for you will 
 find yourfelf under no obligation to make the fun to 
 rife and the rain to fall upon the juft and the unjuft; 
 but you will find yourfelf obliged to extend your be- 
 nevolence and beneficence to the virtuous and to the 
 wicked. I fay to the wicked, as far as it tends to their 
 reformation, and is confiltent with the peace and fafe- 
 ty of the fociety : for to do good to thofe who deferve 
 evil, is often to do evil to thofe who deferve better. 
 Earthly fovercigns take into their own hands the ad- 
 miniftration of government, and the diftribution of re- 
 wards and punifhments ; and they make it a crime in 
 fubjecSls to invade this their prerogative. And it is 
 more criminal in men to invade the divine prerogative, 
 and willingly involve the innocent with the guilty in 
 any diicrcfs, becaufe God appears to us, by all ob- 
 ferviible circumflances of the cafe, to do fo. The 
 moft innocent of mankind arc infants; and yet I fiip- 
 pofe his Lordfhip would not have thought it an error 
 in God's providence, to have permitted AIoses to 
 have pcriflied in his ark of bulrtifhcs ; feeing thereby, 
 according to the courfc of caufes, his Lordlhip's cli- 
 ents the Canaanites hr.d not fuffered extermination. 
 And had Bolixgbroke died in his cradle, neither 
 his country nor mankind would have loli much ; no- 
 thing, 1 am Hire, but what might have been made up 
 many other ways. For one who pretends to believe 
 
 that 
 
Se(5l.VIII. God s moral attributes. 227 
 
 that God is the omnlfcient and omnipotent Creator 
 and Governor of the world, to examine and determine 
 that this particular difpenfation of his providence is 
 jurt or unjufl, is an impious invafion on the prerogative 
 of the fupreme Being, and a fcandalous contradiftioii 
 to his belief and perfuafion. At any rate, DrCLARKE, 
 and fuch divines as he, can fupport thejuftice and good- 
 nefs of God's government of the world, by the argu- 
 ment a priori, drawn from the divine wifdom and 
 power, in the prefent fyftem, as well as his Lordlhip 
 does, and that without finding fault with particular 
 events and cafes ; and in fo far better by fuppoling an- 
 other fyftem, than his Lordfhip did, or you can do 
 without it. 
 
 I have faid before, that by no manner of reafoning 
 can it be proved, that all, either the good or bad, con- 
 fequences of human actions mull be immediate. Lord 
 BoLiNGBROKE kucw morc of the world, than to have 
 imagined, that every great defign muft be carried on 
 by means with a dired tendency, a tendency obvious 
 to every one, to promote it. If, in the affairs of this 
 life, we muft wait for the ultimate and grand event of 
 many various aftions, in order to fee their influence 
 on the effe£l firft in view ; how can we be able to 
 pronounce, that this and the other difpenfation of di- 
 vine providence is well or ill adapted for the good of 
 the creation, and the glory of the Creator, before the 
 whole fcheme is finiflied ? Let a man be witnefs of 
 F f 2 the 
 
228 Of our imitation of Scft. VIII. 
 
 the greateft crime committed by a perfon of reputed 
 probity, who efcapes puniftiment during years; the 
 witnefs could not conchide, that the criminal therefore 
 muft efcape for ever. Hidden things of darknefs, af- 
 ter long delay, are wonderfully brought to light in the 
 prefent fyflem of things. God permitted ', and Eo- 
 LiNGBROKE fays, that God in his providence orders 
 or permits) Joseph to be fold to the Iflir.aelites, 
 and permitted them to fell him in Egypt. The iale 
 was cruel and immoral, and yet it was the means of 
 preferving his father and his family. This. 1 hope, 
 will not be taken for a fable, becaufe it is the founda- 
 tion of much real hifiory. It is really furprifing, that 
 any man who makes pretenfions to morality, fliould 
 maintain, that v\e cannot know a good from a bad 
 a£l:ion, either human or divine, but by the immediate 
 confequences of it. Poor is this / y iWi' rtgula Dii-rum, 
 That whatever action procures the greateft and moft 
 immediate good, is to be cholen as realonable and 
 moral ; and of this temporal and immediate advantage 
 every one muft judge for himfelf. This is to re- 
 nounce all fubjtftion to the great Sovereign of the uni- 
 verfe. I d(' think, that Dr Clarke, whom you de- 
 fpife and abufe, fpeaks n uch better fcnfe. " * The 
 " eternal and nccellary diflerences of things make it 
 " fit and reafonable for rtajonabie creatures to a6l 
 " reajcnabl),^^ (1 will not fay, that this caujes it to 
 he a duty, or lays an ob'ngatton upon them Jo to do), 
 
 * Evidence, propof, i , 
 
 " even 
 
Se<5l. VIII. God's moral attributes. 229 
 
 *' even feparate from the confideration of thefe rules 
 " being the pofitive will or command of God ; and 
 " alfp antecedent to any refpe£l or regard, expe£ta- 
 " tion or apprehenfion, of any particular, private, 
 ^' or perfonal advantage or difadvantage, reward or 
 " punifhment, either prefent or future, annexed, 
 *' either by natural confequence, or by pofitive ap- 
 " pointment, to the praclifing or neglefting thefe 
 ** rules." A great dealer in contradictions is his 
 Lordfhip, to maintain, that the morality of aftions is 
 only to be known by their good and bad confequen- 
 ces ; and to afTert, (as before obferved), that morality 
 is not made by will, either human or divine, but that 
 things are right or wrong abfolutely and in themfclves. 
 i may now conclude, that it is falfe and abfurd to af- 
 fert, as his Lordfhip hath done, that we know no- 
 thing of God's phyfical or moral attributes, but by 
 fenfe and experience ; and that we know nothing of 
 the morality and immorality of anions, but by their 
 immediate good or bad confequences ; and that there 
 is no way to know the holinefs of almighty God,* 
 but by the immediate confequences of every difpenfa- 
 tion of his providence. 
 
 With equal difrefpeCl to his intelligent and atten- 
 tive reader, and difcredit to himfelf, Boling broke 
 afTerts, that the moral attributes of God " muft be 
 *' difcovered in his works, and in the conduct of his 
 " providence j " when at the fame time he denies di- 
 vine 
 
23*^ ^f ^^^^ ini'tation of Se^. VIII. 
 
 vine providence, at leaft: as to individuals. From a 
 general providence that comes no further down than 
 to nations and communities, one may learn politics, 
 biit nothmg for his own perfonal conduft. This phi- 
 lofopher mufl: have imagined himfelf made only for 
 the management and adminiftration of public bufinefs ; 
 and that his perfonal conduft was below his own ele- 
 vated wifdom, and below the care of divine provi- 
 dence. Grant all this, and he was in the right to re- 
 fufe an imitation of God's moral attributes. The 
 phyfical and moral attributes of God are only dif- 
 cernible in the conduft of his providence ; and this 
 providence is not extended to individuals, and there- 
 fore can have no influence on any man's perfonal be- 
 haviour. And as little could he have been influenced 
 in a public ftation by a national providence. For he 
 finds fault with God's making the fun to rife and the 
 rain to fall on the juft and unjuft, and for involving 
 the innocent with the guilty in great calamities, and 
 that finally, according to his theology. From this he 
 'mufl: have learned, that an imitation of God's go- 
 vernment of the world was unjuft. Both in a public 
 and private capacity, he had no occafion for divine 
 providence as a rule and example for his behaviour. 
 All that he knew, and all that you know of God, is, 
 that he abandons every particular man to the conduft 
 of his own unJerflanding, with liberty to afl indepen- 
 dently on him ; and if he governs nations, it is in a 
 way that is not equal. His religion, and his know- 
 ledge 
 
Se<^. VIIT. God's moral attribufes, 231 
 
 ledge of the fupreme Being, had as little influence or 
 tendency to make him or yoa wifer or better men, 
 either in a perfonal or pubUc capacity, than he might 
 have been, or you may be, as an Atheifl. 
 
 To hear his Lordfliip conclude the debate about 
 the imitation of God's moral attributes, one would 
 be apt to think that he had learned nothing by his 
 ph iofophical inquiry into the nature of the fupreme 
 Being, but to contradi6l himfelf. *' Men fhould 
 " content themfelves to know God, as he hath 
 *' thought fit to be known by them. And why are 
 *' not divines, efj'iecially, io content ? He appears 
 " in his works, and by eafy deduft'ons of our knovv- 
 " ledge of them, to be the firft, feif-exillent, intelli- 
 " gent caufe of all things, a being of infinite wif- 
 " dom and power, and therefore an obje<5l to all ra- 
 '* tional creatures, not of curiofity, but of awe, of 
 *' reverence, of adoration, of gratitude, of obedi- 
 " ence, and refignation." This is in fb far true, 
 (and 1 have already acknowledged it) ; but it doth 
 not follow from his principles. "■ To what purpofe 
 ** then do divines contend to make him an objed of 
 " human imitation, by deductions from his nature 
 " and attributes, independently of his works, by 
 *' which alone they can have the little, inadequate, 
 " general, but fufBcient knowledge of his nature and 
 " attributes, that hath been mentioned ^. Do they 
 " hope to carry Theifm any further by nice meta- 
 
 '' phyficai 
 
132 Of our imitation of Se^t.VlII. 
 
 ** phydcal fpeculations, hard to be underftood, and 
 '* inconclLifive when they are underftood, than by 
 " thofe obvious proofs which God hath proportioned 
 *' to the comprehenfion of every man ? 1 conclude 
 ** therefore my anfwer to this query, by alking, in 
 " my turn, our excellent friend, whether the doc- 
 " trine of imitating God, even fo far as we are able, 
 *' does not tend to draw men off unneccflarily, and, 
 " if I may fay fo, wantonly, from real knowledge, 
 " into thofe abllraftions that have led fo many to 
 ** confound the divine and human nature ; to imagine 
 " an uninterrupted fcale of intelligence from man up 
 ^' to God; to flatter themfelves with notions not 
 *' only of imitating him, but of being united to him j 
 *' and to invent and adapt, in the licentioufnefs of 
 " imagination, all that metaphyfical and myflical 
 " blafphemy which hath palTed for the mod fublime 
 «' theology?" 
 
 I have faid, that I am content to know^ God as 
 he hath thought fit to be known. But I aai very fure, 
 that it is his will and plealurc, that I fliould know as 
 much of his phyfical and moral perft(fhons, as I am 
 capable to difcover : and tliereforc I am not con- 
 tent to limit my knowledge of him, to his knowlecigc 
 and his power. Beyond this his Lordfhip doth main- 
 tain we fhould not go; and that further we cannot 
 go; becaufe between Go 's phyfical and moral at- 
 tributes there is only an imaginary connection. But, 
 
 confidently 
 
Se(51:.VIII. GoT>'s vioral aiiributes. 23^ 
 
 confiftently with his method of learning, he cannot 
 arrive at the knowledge of the divine knowledge and 
 power. For neither fenfe nor experience can teach 
 him, that God made and governs the world. To 
 know more than, or to know any thing of God, he 
 muft reafon from what he lees and obferves ; and this 
 he will not do, becaufe fuch reafoning muft lead him 
 into metaphyfical abftraftion. More than this, if he 
 fhould miftake error for truth, he ought to be con- 
 tent with being deceived, becaufe it is God himfelf 
 who deceives him. Never was philofopher more idly 
 employed. For if the knowledge or ignorance of 
 God, if our conceptions of his being and perfe£lions 
 are according to truth, or according to error, it is the 
 fame thing to him, and confequently to every rational 
 creature. "What occafion then had he to trouble him- 
 felf and others with his fpeculations ? fince know- 
 ledge, error, and ignorance, in our conceptions of 
 the fupreme Being, are equally fit and proper, the 
 proper means appointed by God himfelf, for attain- 
 ing as much knowledge of our obligations to adore 
 and obey him, as is neceflary for us. Such a writer 
 is in the right to rejed logics and metaphyfics, and 
 together with thefe, to reje£l all reafoning ; and fb 
 he does on the fubject ofinatural religion. I know, 
 and I know it by abftra^l reafoning, that God is 
 iioly, juft, and good, and true. And if his Lord- 
 ihip knows no more than he learjis from fcnle and 
 cKpericnce, he hath no ufe for any deduftions, whe- 
 
 G £ tl^er 
 
234 0/ ^^^^ imitation of St^t.VWl. 
 
 ther eafy or difficult, to learn that God is the firft, 
 felf-exiftent, and intelligent caufeof all things. And 
 thefe deductions, eafy as they are, he hath never 
 once attempted, becaufe it cannot be done without 
 fomething of metaphyfics, artificial or natural. For 
 inrtance, if an infinite fucceflfion of caufes and effefts 
 is not impofTible, it cannot be demonftrated from the 
 works of nature, or from all that we fee and ob- 
 ierve in the material and moral world, that God is 
 the firfl: caufe of all. It is owing to metaphyfics, 
 and abftraft realbning, that we know the world is 
 made, and well made, becaufe it bears all the marks 
 of an intelligent and powerful architcCl:; and becaufe 
 nothing can make itfelf, fince in that cafe it muft be 
 both the caufe and the effe£l, prior and pofterior to 
 kfelf. From which it follows, that this world, and 
 the maker of it, muft be two diftinft beings. The 
 maker of the world muft be an unmade and un- 
 caufcd being, and therefore muft be a felf-exiftenr, 
 felf-fufficient, and all-perfe6l being ; a being who is 
 himfelf independent, and on whom all things made 
 to be, are dependent. This is no metaphyfical blaf- 
 phemy. It is the foundation of natural religion, and 
 the moft fublime theology. This is fo far from leading 
 men to confound the divine and human nature, or 
 confounding God and nature, as Atheifts do, that it 
 is the true way to diftinguilli them. 
 
 By our Imitation of God's moral attributes and 
 perfections, all that I underftand, or others undcr- 
 
 ftand. 
 
Sejfl.VIII. God'j moral attributes. 235 
 
 Itand, as far as I know, is our obligation to be holy, 
 becaufe the God whom we adore, is himfelf holy. 
 And can we overadl our part in morality ? Is it dif- 
 pleafing to the fupreme Being, that we fliould make 
 his holinefs an obligation on us to be holy, as far as 
 we are able ? Is it becaufe men of piety and morality 
 are liker to God than the devil and damned Ipiriis 
 are, that his Lordfhip forbids all imitation of his mo- 
 ral attributes ? I am fure, that they who believe the 
 moral perfeftions of the Almighty, and, in confe- 
 quence of their belief, ' make it their ftudy and en- 
 deavour to lead a pious and a moral life, a£l: a more 
 reafonable part, and do their Creator more honour, 
 than either his Lordfhip did, or you do, by denying 
 his moral perfedlions, and fetting men free from all 
 divine obligations to live righteoully and godly. Is 
 not the world wicked ei"K)ugh I It feems not, for 
 your purpofe. A very poor purpofe it muft be, to 
 majce mankind worfe than they make themfelves, and 
 to teach them to cut your throat for their own advan- 
 tage, whenever they find an opportunity of doing it 
 fafely. I fear no man who fears God ; but I fliall 
 never willingly truft myielf, or what belongs to me, 
 to any man who denies God's moral perfeftions, his 
 providence, and a future ftate of rewards and puniili- 
 ments ; becaufe it is his opinion, that he may do 
 every thing fafely, that he can fecretly. Are not 
 you afraid left a brother in unbelief fhould take the 
 firft opportunity to difpatch you, for fear you fliould 
 idifpatch him ? Prevention, between you and him, is 
 
 G g 2 thc/ 
 
236 Of our imitation^ Sec. Secfl.VlII. 
 
 the only means of fafety. Would it not be for your 
 advantage, that all mankind were honeft and moral ? 
 And for this purpofe divines and preachers exhort 
 their readers and hearers to imitate, as far as they are 
 iiblc, God's moral perfections. This, you fay, will 
 lead men unnecedarily and wantonly from real know- 
 ledge into metaphyfical blafphemy. But the reduc- 
 tion of all your means of knowledge into fenfe and 
 experience, is to lead men into a total ignorance of 
 God ; and if not into a perfuafive and reafoned, at 
 lead into a flubborn Atheifm ; that is, if not into a dif- 
 belief, at lead into an unbelief of the being and at- 
 tributes of God. In place of natural religion, it 
 tends to ellablifli an afleded, ftudied, a learned and 
 laborious, and confequently a wicked ignorance of 
 God, and of all the duties we owe to him, and to 
 one another for his fake *. In fine, I hope the re- 
 ligious reader will excufe me for faying, that 1 look 
 upon fo much of Lord Bolingbroke's philofophy 
 as I have examined, as difguifed Atheifm : and what 
 I have further to fay, I believe will confirm me and 
 my reader more and more in this opinion. 
 
 * No man who hath any right appichenfion of the holincfs 
 of God, and of the molality of human atHions, can forbid our 
 imitation of the divine moral attributes. His Lordfhip's doc- 
 trine fervcs no religious purpolo, but may be a cai'eat againft 
 tarrying the principles of Atheilm too far. For on luppolkion 
 that " ignorance and knowledge,- truth and falGty, fidelity 
 *' and perfidy, virtue and vice, aic ccjiially emanations iioni 
 ** the firfl: being," it were a dilfcrvice done to mankind to ttath 
 them to imitate fuch a being. 
 
 SECT. 
 
237 
 
 SECT. IX. 
 
 Of GodV preferving providence, 
 
 I Have faid, that Lord Bolingbroke's philofb- 
 phy leads to a total ignorance of God, and to 
 an unbelief of his being and attributes, fo far as I 
 have examined it. And what I have to fay, confirms 
 me ftill more in this opinion ; and particularly his 
 do£lrine of divine providence. For the fatisfa^tion of 
 readers not well acquainted with the fubjed, I Ihall 
 iirft ftate my notion of it ; and if 1 do not obviate, 
 I ihall afterwards anfv/er my author's objections a- 
 gainft it. 
 
 By the term providence^ I underfland in general, 
 the care which God takes of his creatures, confider- 
 ed as actually created. This, though true, is not 
 fufficient to grive us a diftinft notion of all that con- 
 cerns the fubjeCl ; and therefore it mufl be confidered 
 more fully and particularly. Scarce any ever denied 
 the whole of providence, except thofe who likewife 
 denied God's creation of the world. So clofe is the 
 connexion between thefe two, that by common con- 
 fent it hath paded for an axiom. If GOD is, the 
 world is governed by providence. It is true, the an- 
 cient Epicureans did, and modern Epicureans do, in 
 words, acknowledge a Deity ; but ftrongly oppofed, 
 
 and 
 
2^8 Of G o D ' J- preferv'ing providence, Seft . IX. 
 
 and ftill oppofe a providence ; and no wonder, for 
 they both deny a creation. The ancient Epicureans 
 were therefore juftly cfteemed Atheifls by men of 
 learning and folid fenfe. The Stoics taught other 
 and better things ; and if what they lay of fate, had 
 not hindered, they deferved applaufe for their doc- 
 trine : and it is pofiible that their meaning, even in 
 that, is not rightly undcrftoott. 
 
 , Upon fuppofition that God is tlic creator, I am 
 to maintain that he is therefore the curator of this 
 world. Nor is there any difficulty to demonftratc 
 this, by comparing the excellence of the fuprenie 
 ■Being with tlie manifold im perfections of the creature. 
 Seneca faid, and faid well, Non fine cuftode ft are 
 tantum opus. But more particularly, we are to con- 
 fider divine providence as it is exercifed with refpe£t 
 to thofe things that depend on it. In every being 
 produced by creation, there are two things to be 
 confidered, the permanency or duration in exiftence, 
 and its aftivity in operation. From this arife two dif- 
 tinct a(fl:3 of divine providence, (I mean relatively to 
 the effects), commonly and properly called conjerva- 
 iion and government '*. To prevent millakes, I do 
 not mean, that, in our conceptions of divine provi- 
 dence, by prefervntion is to be underHood a bare 
 •negative non-dejlrutlion of the things which God 
 
 * Confervatioii; pjefcrvalion, and fiiftcnt:U:on, are ufed 
 promifcyoufly. 
 
 might 
 
Se^.IX. Of Gold's preferviMgproviaeuce, 239 
 
 might or may deftroy or annihilate, if he pleafed. 
 They who feemingly admit divine prefervation, and 
 contend that there is no more neceflary to preferve 
 created beings in exiftence but divine permifllon or 
 indulgence, do but divert themfelves with a negative 
 and pofitive meaning of the word. They imagine, 
 that a thing once created ftands in need of no further 
 affiftance, but only to be left to itfelf in order to 
 continue in exiftence. But I undertake to prove, 
 that prefervation is an efficacious a6l of providence, 
 whereby things created are made to continue in be- 
 ing; JLift as the fun preferves and continues the day 
 as long as it is day : for it doth not only not deftroy 
 the meridian light, but by a very pofitive virtue and 
 influence, no lels efficacious than that by which it 
 produced the morning, it operates for the preferva- 
 tion of the day. 
 
 That prefervation is £omtx\\\ng pofitive , the ma- 
 nifeft imperfection of all created beings doth plainly 
 demonftrate. Every thing created is dependent, con- 
 tingent, and fucceflive in duration. This no man 
 who admits creation can deny. And no lefs certain it 
 is, that the permanency of a created thing in fuo efje, 
 in its own being, is not a mere nothing ; otherwife a 
 thing created would begin to be nothing as foon as it 
 began to be ; than which nothing can be more abfurd. 
 Duration, then, is fomething true and real. Not on- 
 ly fo, but this duration is fomething diftincl from the 
 
 firft 
 
240 Of GoTy* s frejerving providence. Scifl. IX. 
 
 firfl moment of exiftence. It is likewife certain, that 
 nothing of independency can belong to a created be- 
 ing. Therefore permanency in exiftence, which is 
 fomething and pofitivc, hath no place in fuch depend- 
 ent and created beings ; but is entirely to be afcribed 
 to an independent God, by whofe true and real in- 
 flux they all continue in exiftence. By creation they 
 became dependent, and by the fame productive power 
 they continue their dependency. As creation brought 
 them under the dominion of the Creator, their dura- 
 tion rather increafes than diUblves their fubjeClion. 
 
 By confidering the contingency of creatures with 
 refpeft to their duration, we jQiall find the fame con- 
 clufion. For what hath only a contingent being, is 
 no more determined to continue in exiflence than to 
 difcontinue. What of itfelf is determined, and able 
 to prolong its exiftence, can have no contingent, but 
 a necedary duration. If it is not permanent by the 
 nccelTity of its nature, its duration muft be owing to 
 the influx of fome other caufe. And of what caufe ? 
 Surely to the influence of that caufe which, from a 
 thing only pofllble, made it a6lual. All contingent 
 beings, that is, all the creation, owe their exigence, 
 and the continuaijion of it, not to themfelves, but to 
 that felf-exifl:ent caufe, that, from a ftate of poffjbili- 
 ty, raifed them up to a£lual and permanent exillence. 
 
 The fame conclufion follows no Icfs plainly from 
 
 '.I 
 
Scft. IX. Of Go Ws prefervhig providence, 241 
 
 a fucceflive duration in created things. The different 
 moments of a contingent and fucceffive permanency, 
 have no connexion one with another, and far lefs 
 have they any influence and caufaHty one upon ano- 
 ther. Certainly I am not now, becaufe I was an 
 hour before : nor doth it follow from my prefent 
 being, that I (hall be an hour after this ; otherwife 
 my duration would not be contingent, but neccHary. 
 For if the caufe of my prefent duration is my pre- 
 ceding duration, then my prefent duration muft be the 
 caufe of my duration hereafter ; and fo one moment 
 muft infure another, and that to all eternity. , Thus 
 it follows, that what of itfelf is infufficient to conti- 
 nue its exiftence for one moment, (and whatever lafts 
 by a contingent and fucceflive duration, is infufficient), 
 muft therefore owe its confervation, as well as its 
 creation, to an external caufe ; to God the firft caufe; 
 who, as he poflefl^s in himfelf duration in the moft 
 perfect manner, that is, eternity^ without contingen- 
 cy or fucceflion ; fo is he the fountain and fource of 
 all other beings, and of their duration, by a true and 
 real influence of his power. 
 
 To this it is objefted. That every thing of itfelf 
 can eafily retain what is once given it by creation, 
 without any additional influence, provided what is gi- 
 ven is not taken away. And to confirm the objection, 
 it is added, that it is fuperflaous and vain, and even 
 
 H h abfurd. 
 
242 Of God's preferving providence. Seft. IX. 
 
 abfurd, to fuppofe a new, needlefs, and real aftion, 
 to which no proper and pofitive efie^l: can be adigned. 
 
 To every creature exiftence is at once beflowed by 
 creation; yet its duration, which is fuccelTive, is not: 
 and as by a fuccelfive flux it cannot (iibfill altogether and 
 at once, fo no more can this fucceiTive duration be alto- 
 gether bellowed by one momentary a£l of power. An 
 inftantaneous and fuccelTive duration cannot belong to 
 one and the fame thing : therefore, to eltablifh a con- 
 tinued exiftence, recourle mull be had to a continued 
 produ(5lion. And its proper and fpecific effeft is the 
 exiftence of the thing preferved ; not as it came firft 
 from nothing or non-exjftence, (in that cafe it belongs 
 to creation), but in fo far as it is extended more and 
 more beyond its firft appearance in a world of beings. 
 On this account it is commonly, and well faid, that 
 prefervation is a continued creation. The fame aft of 
 God's almighty will gives being to things which be- 
 fore had none, and prolongs and continues them in 
 exiftence. It is therefore properly a continued, but 
 not a repeated creation. For it is obvious and known 
 by experience, that what exifts this moment doth not 
 ceafe to be the next; which it muft do, were the aft 
 of creat on perpetually renewed and repeated. 
 
 BoLiNGBROKE, and you, David Mallet, Efq; 
 lay, " * When we ipeak of the world as the work of 
 
 * Vol. ii. p. 59. 
 
 '' God, 
 
Secft. IX . Of G o D 'j preferving providence, 243 
 
 " God, we muft not conceive it to have been made 
 *' by a laborious progreiTion, and to have at lail re- 
 " mained imperfeft, as the works of men : we muft 
 " conceive, on the contrary, as well as we can, that 
 '^ God willed it to exift, and it exifted ; that he will- 
 *' ed it to continue, and it continues, diftinft from 
 " the workman, like any human work, and infinitely 
 ** better fitted and contrived, by the difpofition of it, 
 '' to anfwer all the purpofes of the divine architect." 
 To the fame aft of power and divine will all things 
 created owe their exlftenee, and the continuance of 
 them. They depend as much and as immediately on 
 omnipotent pleafure that they are now, as they do 
 that they once began to be. This you admit, becaufe 
 *' God wills things to exift, and to continue in ex- 
 " iftence." And it is only by that caufe that they 
 began to be, and ftill are. If creation is immediate, 
 fo is prefervation ; for it is an aft: of the fame effica- 
 cious power. He therefore who fuppofes that things 
 can fubfift without this perpetual and continued influx, 
 or without an interpofition of it, may as well fuppofe 
 that created things made and created themfelves. 
 
 His Lordfhip was dextrous in turning old objec- 
 tions into a new model, and pafling them upon the 
 world as his own inventions. He fays, (and it hath 
 been faid long before), " * It is injurious to true 
 *' Theifm, to afiume the immediate prefence of the 
 
 * Vol. ii. p. 58. 
 
 H h 2 " fupreme 
 
244 Of Gon' s preferv'tHg provlknce, Se6l. IX. 
 
 '* lupremc Being in all the operations of corporeal 
 ** nature, however the afTumption may be palliated 
 ** by metaphyfical di'iinftions, and how innocent fo- 
 " ever the intentions of thofc who do may be. They 
 " who do this, do in eff;:6t reduce God in their ideas, 
 '* norwithftanding all the magnificent expreifions they 
 ** employ, to a fort of plaftic intelligent nature, 
 " working conftantly on matter, if not in it." But, 
 before I return an anfwer to this metaphyfical re- 
 proach, I fhall add his appeal to the philofophers of 
 the Cape of Good Hope. " To think otherwile," 
 (that is, to think that God interpofes immediately and 
 continually in the confcrvation and operation of mate- 
 rial beings), *' is to meafure divinity by a more fcanty 
 '* meafure than humanity ; and becaufe we cannot 
 ** perceive how^ the operations of this vaft machine 
 " are performed, to account for them, by fuppofing 
 " it, in this inflance, lefs perfeft than a machine of 
 '* human execution. Carry a clock to the wild inha- 
 " bitants of the Cape of Good Hope, they will fbon 
 *' be convinced, that intelligence made it: and none 
 " but the molt flupid will imagine, that this inielli- 
 " gence is in the hand that they fee move, and in the 
 '* wheels which they fee turn. Thofe among them 
 " who pretend to greater fagacity than the reft, may 
 " perhaps fufpe^t, that the workman is concealed in 
 " the clock, and there condu6t^ invifibly all the mo- 
 '* tions of it. The firfl of thefe Hottentot philofo- 
 " phcrs are, you fee., more rational than Athcifls ; 
 
 " the 
 
Se6l. IX. Of Qo'd' s -preferv'tng -providence. 245 
 
 " the fecond are more fo than the Heathen natura- 
 " lifts ; and the third is juft at a pitch with (bme mo- 
 " dern metaphyficians." 
 
 Besides metaphyfical diftinftions, there are meta- 
 phyfical demonftrations : and this is one of them. 
 That whatever continues to exift of itfelf, is in fo 
 far independent. But upon fuppofition that created 
 things do continue in being of themfelves, then as to 
 this their duration they muft be independent. Now, 
 God the Creator is the only independent Being, and 
 by his work of creation all things do ejjmtialh; depend 
 on him. He muft therefore change the unchangeable 
 eflence of things, and dillblve the relation between the 
 Creator and the creature, before any created being 
 can fubfift independently on him. This I think his 
 LordHiip cannot decently refufe, becaufe he fays, 
 *' * That God is the abfolute maPjer and free caufe 
 " of all things, is a proportion which belongs to the 
 '* nature of the Creator ; That the creature is eflen- 
 *' tiaily dependent on GoD, is a propofition which 
 
 " belongs to the eflence of the creature. Thefe 
 
 *' propofitions are in truth identical ; and the one 
 *' belongs to the eftence of God as really as the o- 
 '' ther. And to fay that the creature depends on the 
 " Creator, or that the Creator is abfolute mafter of 
 '* the creature, is the fame thing." For this reafbn, 
 therefore, whoever imagines, muft imagine amifs, 
 
 * Vol, iii. p. 344.. ad tfiarg. 
 
 that 
 
2^6 Of G o D V prefewing -providence. Seft . IX . 
 
 that God may abandon the works of his hands, and 
 even dignify them with an intrinfic energy to remain 
 fuch as he hath made them, without any interpofition 
 of his power. This is his Lordfhip's do^trhie. But 
 though mailers may beftow hberty and independency 
 on their flaves, and, as far as is in their power, make 
 them their companions and equals ; yet this preroga- 
 tive of independency God cannot beltow on a crea- 
 ture, becaufe he cannot depart from his fovcregnty 
 and dominion over every thing that he hath made. A 
 power therefore to continue itfelf in being, is what 
 God by his eflence cannot bcflow, nor the creature 
 by its created eflence receive ; and that becaufe of the 
 mutual and immutable relation between them. I do 
 think it is no injury done to true Theifm to fay. That 
 God, by an a6l: of his omnipotent will, makes the 
 fun to rule by day, and the moon by night, and con- 
 'tinues every planet both in being and in motion ; 
 and that this is a part of his unalienable prerogative. 
 Though I cannot hinder men of wit and impiety to 
 lef/en the majefty of God, by uncouth comparifons ; 
 I do not fee, that thofe who afiert that the world fub- 
 fifts by a continued exertion of the divine power, the 
 fame power that made it, do thereby reduce God in 
 their ideas to a fort of plaflic intelligent nature. God, 
 as the God whom Chrifiians adore, is not an indolent 
 and idle Deity, like that of Epicurus; but a being 
 of fuch power, that all things are equally eafy to it, 
 and, as is allowed by Bolingbroke, whofc doings 
 
 arc 
 
Se<5l. IX. Of Govt's preferving providence. 247 
 
 arc neither operofe nor laborious^ : and therefore to a{^ 
 fert, that he works conflantly on matter, or in it, tends 
 rather to his glory, t lan to allert, that, after creation, 
 he leaves the material world to continue to be and 
 move, without any influx of his omnipotent will. To 
 make God work constantly on matter, or in it, is not 
 to leden his perfections. It is to fpeak and to think 
 of the fupreme Being fuitably to hi^ immenfity and 
 omnipotence : for matter doth not exclude his omni- 
 prefence, let it be ever fo large and fb folid ; for, 
 faith his Lordlhip, *' God is an infinite fpirit." 
 
 It being once admitted, (and it is proved), that all 
 that is befides the fupreme Being does fubfift by the 
 influence of his almighty will, it is a juft confequence, 
 that whatever exilts without this influence, were it but 
 for a moment, mull: for that moment be independent. 
 This independency it muft have of itfelf, and in it- 
 ielf; for God cannot give it; and he cannot give it, 
 for the reafbn juft now taken from Bolingbroke, 
 That it is eflential to the Creator to be mafter of the 
 creature, and eflential to the creature to depend on 
 the Creator. And indeed whatever exifts of itlelf, 
 though but for a moment, may fubfift to all eternity, 
 and .might have fubfifted from eternity. From all 
 which it follows, that all created beings depend on 
 God for the prolongation of their exiftence; and that 
 every thing which of itfelf fubfifts, muft be neceflary, 
 eternal, and felf-fufticient ; that is, it muft be God. 
 
 1 
 
24S Of Go dV preferring -providence, Seft. IX. 
 
 I know this can give no great offence to my authors; 
 for they have no quarrel with the eternity and inde- 
 pendency of matter. But I (liall find another place 
 to examine tliis Atheiftical conceffion. To think that 
 all the operations of the material world are performed 
 by the immediate influence of God's omnipotent will, 
 is not to meafure divinity by a more fcanty meafure 
 than that with which we meafure humanity ; nor is it 
 to fuppofc the work of God lefs perfect than the 
 work of human execution. An architeft builds a 
 houfe in fuch a durable manner, that the ftones and 
 timber remain in the fame fituation in which they 
 were placed, when all hands are removed from them. 
 We praife the induflry of artificers who make ma- 
 chines to laft and to move the befl: and longefl;, with- 
 out putting a hand to them to continue or renew the 
 motion. From which it hath been argued, before 
 BoLiNGBROKE, that unlefs we alcribe to God lefs 
 power and flcill than we do to fuch artificers, we 
 muft acknowledge that he can create, and doth create 
 beings, that may and do fubfill of themfelves, by bare 
 permidion or indulgence, without any pofitive influx 
 of power. But the cafes which are fuppofcd the 
 fame, difl^r widely. For, i/?. All thefe inventions 
 and contrivances fhew both the wants and the weak- 
 nefs of mankind. Could they meafure time without 
 clocks, or other machines, they would not make any; 
 could they raife and remove great weights without 
 counterbalances, or multiplication of fcrews, they 
 
 would 
 
Scft. IX.- Of Qo'd's -preferving providence, 249 
 
 would not fpencl their time, nor weary themfeives with 
 fuch work. Their underftanding and their power fur- 
 Inifhing ready and eafy means, they would make ufe 
 of them for every purpofe. But the doings of God 
 are neither operofe nor laborious. He performs all by 
 his will ; and all things obey, idly^ The materials 
 which the artificer ufes, are entirely independent on 
 him. He neither made them, nor doth he preferve 
 them. And, o^dly. The artificer himfelf, with all his 
 fkill, depends upon his maker and creator : there- 
 fore, whatever he is, and whatever he does, he does 
 it only as a fecond and dependent caufe. It is cer- 
 tainly a mark of fupereminent perfection, to have all 
 things every way dependent on it, when all this can 
 be had without trouble or pains. The more exten- 
 five dominion and power is, the more perfect and glo- 
 rious is that being to whom it belongs. And there- 
 fore, without denying his own perfection, God can- 
 not divert himfelf of his prerogative of having all 
 things, at all times, in the moft immediate manner de- 
 pendent on him. And, without doubt, he muft divefl 
 himfelf of univerfal fuperiority and dominion, and di- 
 miniih his own empire and kingdom, did he make be- 
 ings which could fubfift without the interpofition and 
 influence of his almighty will. His Lordiliip admits, 
 that it is a contradiction to fay, that Go d can make in- 
 dependent creatures. To Ihew that his objection drawn 
 from machines againft the continued influx of God's 
 1 i preferving 
 
2'50 Of Goth's preferving providence, Se<5l'.IX.- 
 
 preferving power is older than he, I here fubjoin both 
 the objection, and an anfwer to it *. 
 
 I am obliged to attend his Lordfiiip to the Cape of 
 Good Hope, in order to exhibit his clock to the 
 
 * Non diificilis eft difficultas alia petita ab artificibus, quo- 
 rum imprimis laudatur induftria, (i ftruant machinas, quibus ma- 
 ;ium admovere ad earundem confervationem nihil eft necefle. 
 Inde arguunt, minorem longe agnofci Dei quam hominum fapien- 
 tiam ac potentiam, nifi fateamur cum faltem producere pofle 
 creaturas quae ipfae per kit fubfiftere queant, folo numinis indul- 
 tu, citra uUum iftiufmodi continuatum confervationis influxum. 
 Sed non attendunt ifti quam quje duo tanquam paria hie compo- 
 nunt, toto coelo, revera fint difparia. Dedero quod ipfi con- 
 tendunt, (i machitiae cujufpiam a fuo opifice tantam efle depen- 
 dentiam deinonftraveriht, quanta creaturae cujufcunque eft a fuo 
 creatore. Profedto, uti fupereminentis perfeftionis atque excel- 
 lentias nota eft, res etiam perfcftiiTImas a fui, tanquam caufa, in- 
 fluxu habere pendentes omnimodo, (tantum (1 id continget abf- 
 que labore et defatigatione illius a quo pendent), ita non abfquc 
 ingenti tantx perfectionis abnegatione, hac fe praerogativa ex- 
 ueret cawfa perfeftiffima. Exueret revera, fi quid tale produce- 
 ret, quod perpetua fua manutenentia, quamdiu exiftet, non indi- 
 geret. Dixi, fi fine labore id fiat et defatigatione : abfque qua 
 quatenus artifex in rem arte faftam nee iufluit nee influere poteft, 
 induftriae alicujus atque peritis argumentum opera fabricare, 
 quas quam diutiflime per fe fubfiftent et durent, citra arthiteoti 
 fui manum atque caram. Sed quid hzec omnia ad ilium mundi 
 cuftodcm attinent, qui nulla unquam operis magnitudine diftra- 
 hitur nee fatigatur? cujufque a<51ivitas ideo, non abfque contume- 
 1/ae nota, cum laboriofo noftrorum fabrorum conamine confertur. 
 Gerardi De Vries exercitatioves rationaks rt'^ Deo di'vinifqui 
 perfeilionibus. 
 
 philofophers 
 
Se<^.IX. Of God's preferving providence, 251 
 
 philofophers there. Upon firfl fight they are all con- 
 vinced that intelHgence made it. Some of them ima- 
 •gine, that the intelHgence is in the hand which moves, 
 and in the wheels which turn. Others pretending to 
 -greater fagacity, fufpe£i: {*' and perhaps fufpeft") 
 that the workman is concealed in the work. Be- 
 fore I meddle with the comparifon between thefe 
 -opinions, and thofe of ancient and modern philofo- 
 phers, I defire it may be remembered, that it is his 
 LordHiip's opinion, and a firft principle, That we 
 cannot attain any knowledge of the natural and moral 
 attributes of God, but by fenfe and experience; 
 which, if true, is to make his Hottentots better phi- 
 lofophers than he is himfelf. They all of them im- 
 mediately fee the clock, and fee that it is made ; and 
 that the materials did not dilpofe of themfelves in 
 the order that caufes the motion ; and that therefore 
 the hand doth not move, nor the wheels turn, of 
 themfelves. But his Lordfliip, who knows nothing 
 of the matter but by fenfe and experience, doth 
 not know whether it moves of itfelf, or moves by 
 an impelling caufe. To put him in the cafe of the 
 Hottentot, whom he perfbnates, he never faw a 
 clock made; he never faw it firft ftop, and afterwards 
 winded up ; he never faw it taken down to pieces, 
 and then joined, and then fet agoing by a fpring or by 
 a weight. And therefore, until the machine is de- 
 mounted and mounted in his view, he is not in a 
 condition to determine whether it moves of itfelf or 
 
 I i 2 not. 
 
25- Of God's preferving providence, Seft.IX. 
 
 not. He makes all the Hottentots reafon, that no- 
 thing makes itfelf ; the clock therefore, they con- 
 clude, was made by a caufe diftinft from it; and 
 that the motion depending upon the conflru£^ion or 
 the make, the motion muft be the effect of the caufe 
 that made the maciiine. But I cannot allow his 
 Lordlhip to reafon after this manner, becaule all 
 his knowledge is founded on fenfe and experience. 
 The Hottentots are furc, that the make and mo- 
 tion of the machine are both of them the efleft of an 
 inrclligentr caufe; fome placing this intelligence in the 
 hand or wheels, and others perhaps Jiifp(5Jing^ that 
 the workman is concealed within the machine, and 
 invifibly and immediately direfts the whole work. 
 He who perhaps fufpefts, that the workman lurks 
 and plays his tricks to amufe a Hottentot, is juft at 
 a pitch with modern metaphyficians ; who maintain, 
 that God, by the immediate influence of his almighty 
 will, directs all the operations of the vafl machine of 
 the vifible world, and makes the fun to rife and the 
 rain to fall. With leave, it is not true, that modern 
 metaphyficians do only JufpetJ^ and perhaps Jujpe£i, 
 that the fun rules by day and the moon by night, 
 and that the whole creation depends immediately on 
 God, for exigence, prcfervation, and operation. 
 1'his they conclude, and this they demonllrate, from 
 a previous knowledge of many general truths. And 
 did he not defpife that part of philofophy, for mad, 
 delirious, and unintelligible jargon, (I believe, be- 
 
 caufe 
 
SeO:, IX. Of G o D V preferving providence, 253 
 
 caufe he did not underftand it, or becaiife it is fcarce- 
 ly ever on his fide of a queftion), he might have 
 faved himfelf from many blunders, and not a httle 
 impiety, to be found in his philofophical works. 
 
 His Hottentot philofbpher, who perhaps fufpefts 
 that the clock-maker is concealed in his clock, is in a 
 fairer and nearer way, by raifing his thoughts from 
 the fmali machine to the grand machine of the uni- 
 verfe, to find out, that the architeft is a being of 
 greater knowledge and power, than his Lordfliip was. 
 Whether the make and motion by which the world 
 fubfifts and is ruled, is inherent in itfelf, or depend- 
 ent on a diflinft caufe, he is not clear enough in his 
 judgment to determine. But his Lordfhip determines 
 one ftep backward (and fuch a ftep that he can never 
 recover) from the conclufion. He holds, that it fub- 
 fifts and operates without the immediate interpofition 
 of a diftinft caufe. He muft therefore firft deter- 
 mine, whether this felf-fubfiftence and operation is 
 eflential to the grand machine, or accidental only. If 
 it is accidental or contingent, it muft be made fuch 
 by a fuperior power, to which it owes, and on which 
 it depends for its independency. And a dependent 
 independency is fuch an abfurdity, that no Hottentot 
 can fwallow and digeft. If the fubfiftence and ope- 
 ration of the mundane machine is not adventitious, 
 but eflential to it, then from all that his Lordihip 
 hath learned by his fenfe and experience, and all that 
 
 his 
 
254 Of God's pre/erving provicJgnce, Seft.IX, 
 
 iiis reafbn can fupply, he cannot demonftrate the be- 
 ing of God, and his infinite wifdom and power. 
 Perhaps he did not intend it. And this is another 
 reafon that induces me to think that his philofophy 
 leads into Atheifm. 
 
 From what hath been faid, and proved, it follows, 
 that all created things depend on God for their be- 
 ing. For as creatures they could not begin to be, 
 nor continue to be of themfelves. All of them, as 
 fuch, have a dependent, contingent, and fucceflivc 
 duration. Whatever account we make of things cre- 
 ated^ whether we efteem them valuable or con- 
 temptible, ufeful or hurtful, excellent or mean, 
 they are creatures, and as fuch, mull: be under the 
 dominion of divine providence. No creature can be 
 fo perfect as to tranfcend its dependency on God, 
 and none fo mean and abje£l as to be below the in- 
 fluence of his preferving power, or to become un- 
 worthy of iiis regard. Go d doth not make things to 
 be thrown away for their meannefs, nor to furpafs 
 his preferving power, for their excellence and per- 
 fection. In a word, if there is any thing independ- 
 ent on God as prefcrver, it muft be independent on 
 him as creator alfo ; and fo muit be eternal, felf-ex- 
 iftent, and fclf-fufficient, as is the fupreme Being; 
 or rather, there can be no being fupreme, or fuperior 
 to it. His Lordlliip, . who acknowledges and refufes 
 at his pleafure, docs acknowledge a fupreme Being, 
 
 the 
 
Std:. IX. Of God's preferving providence, 255 
 
 the firft, intelligent caufc, and the fource of all other 
 beings ; and if he reafoned confequentially, he muft 
 therefore admit, tliat all things depend on him for their 
 exiftence, part, prefent, and to come. Whether 
 things are preferved by the mediation of fecond 
 caufes or without it, it is always owing to the firft 
 and creating caufe, that they fubfift and continue in 
 being, whether in their original, or nt^ flate and 
 condition. 
 
 All the works and doings of Gorr ad exfra are vo- 
 luntary, and purely arbitrary ; and all of them there- 
 fore liable to change. They depend totally on his good 
 pleafure. But then whatever alteration they undergo, 
 it is the effeift of his omnipotent will. And as prefer- 
 vation is not a repeated, but a continued creation, all 
 thefe changes and alterations do not imply any change 
 in the divine will. So reafons the Pfalmiji as a good 
 philofopher. * Of old thou haji laid the foundations of 
 the earth : and the heavens are the ivork of thy hands. 
 TJpey fhall perifh^ but thou JJjalt endure : yea, all of 
 them fhall wax old as a garment ; as a vefiure thou 
 fhalt change them, and they foall he changed. But 
 thou art the fame. For ~f" with him there is no vari- 
 ahlenefs, nor JJjadow of turning. All the changesr 
 that have happened or fhall happen in the creation, 
 are entirely confident with God's immutability. 
 
 * Pfal. cii. -,-. t James 1.17. 
 
 Descartes, 
 
1^6 Of God's preferving providence, Sefl.lX. 
 
 Descartes, and fbme of his followers, have 
 erred grofsly in maintaining, that the divine immu- 
 tability is a (landing reafon for the prefervation of the 
 fame quantity of matter and motion, without annihi- 
 lation of any part or piece of the univerfe. And 
 why ? becaufe, fay they, that would fpoil the beau- 
 ty and harmony of the whole mundane fabric. 
 Good ; if God had promifed, or could they prove, 
 from the perfection of the Creator, or from the na- 
 ture of the creature, that the ftupendous building of 
 the univerfe mufl: remain the fame. But as the 
 world was made, not by any fuppofable conne^-ion 
 between the divine perfeftions, and the exiftence of 
 any other being, and only by arbitrary will and plea- 
 fure ; it was made for no longer duration, in the pre- 
 fent, or any other order, than God, at the inflant of 
 the creation, or rather from eternity, was pleafed it 
 ihould continue by the influx of his preferving power. 
 God was in himfelf, independently of all things, be- 
 fore the creation ; fo if all that he hath made were 
 annihilated, his happinefs and felf-fufficiency would 
 ftill be the fame. Man, without doubt, is the prin- 
 cipal inhabitant of this our planet ; and if fuch crea- 
 tures as we can neither add to, nor diminifh the hap- 
 pinefs of the fupreme Being, what can beings more 
 glorious than we do more ? We and they, in that re- 
 fpeft, are upon the fame level ; for we and they are 
 the work of God's hands. The Almighty can eafjly 
 difpenfe with all revenue of reverence, adoration, 
 
 obedience, 
 
.Se61:. IX. Of GoTi's prefervhig providence, 257 
 
 •obedience, and refignatlon, of the noblefl: creature 
 that ever he made. We are dependent totally on 
 God, and God is totally independent on us. His 
 ielf-fufficiency is the eilential bafis of his own hap- 
 pinefs ; to which we cannot add, and from which 
 we cannot take^ any thing away. This is a piece 
 of ancient and fublime philofbphy. For Eliphaz 
 the Temanite hath faid, * Can a man be profitable 
 unto GODy as he that is wife is profitable to hini- 
 felf? Is it any additional pleafure to the Almighty^ 
 that thou art righteous ? or gain to him, that thou 
 wakeji thy ways ■perfect ? 
 
 Creation is an aft of power; and for that rea- 
 ibn annihilation is not a pofitive aft of power. And 
 they who imagine that an aft of power is requifite 
 to annihilate any part of the creation, or the whole 
 of it, muft conceive that there is fomething inhe- 
 rent in every work of God, and independent on 
 his preferving power. But, as hath been proved, 
 by virtue of his creating power, all things owe their 
 iiril being, and their continuance, to God; and there- 
 fore, to reduce into nothing, there is no more re- 
 quifite, than to witl>hold the influence or influx of 
 his power. A pofitive aft of power annihilation 
 cannot be, bccaufe God cannot exert fuch a power 
 in vain, or make nothing by it. I acknowledge, 
 •jthat it is not eafy to conceive how a thing can be 
 
 * Job xxii. 2. 3. 
 
 K k reduced 
 
2^ Of GoT>'s preferving providence. Se<*l.lX. 
 
 'reduced to nothing. But creation, or bringing 
 things into being which formerly were not, is not 
 more level to our comprehenfion. And fince we are 
 fure that God only is eternal, we are as fure that 
 this world, both the materials and the frame of it, 
 were made from nothing, juft as fure as we are that 
 the world at prefent exifts. And though natural rea- 
 fon cannot determine that annihilation will certainly 
 happen, yet it is certain that it poflrbly may ; becaufe 
 the beginning of beings, and their continuance, do 
 altogether depend on God's arbitrary will and mere 
 good pleafure. So much for God's preferving pro- 
 vidence. I fhall, in the next place, endeavour to 
 vindicate his governing providence, againfl. Lord Bo- 
 lingbroke's and Mr Mallet's mifreprefentations 
 and obje£lions. 
 
 SECT. 
 
259 
 
 SECT. X. 
 
 Of God'/ governing providence, 
 
 MODUS operandi fequitur modum ejfendi, is a 
 metaphyfical axiom ; and fignifies, that every 
 thing a£ls as it is, and not otherwife. And feeing the 
 whole creation depends totally on God, every crea- 
 ture that doth a£l, muft aft dependently on him. If 
 it afted otherwife than it is, I may fay, (for it hath 
 been faid), that in its being and nature it is a crea- 
 ture, but in its way of afting it mud be a God. On 
 the rational part of the creation God hath beftowed 
 powers and faculties of afting ; which powers and fa- 
 culties they ufe ; but then they ufe them dependently 
 on him who beftowed them : and therefore the fu- 
 preme Being, the author of all rational agents and all 
 their faculties, prefides over all their anions, and di- 
 rects all their doings, for the purpofe for which he 
 made the world. We obferve the ufes and ends of 
 innumerable creatures, and the wonderful agreement 
 and mutual fubferviency of one part with another. 
 And if the minuted parts are fo well contrived, there 
 is no doubt to be made, that the whole is perfectly 
 fitted for the great end and purpofe for which the 
 Creator made it. And can this be done, if all his 
 creatures and all their anions were not under the di- 
 vine fuperintendcncy and direftion ? 
 
 K k 2 I 
 
s66 Of Go D V gvoernhig providence, Se6l. X. 
 
 I do admit, that rational creatures are miflredes of 
 their own a£lions in the order of lecond caufes ; but 
 thefe a£lions of theirs, and their fecondary power over 
 them, do not exclude the over-ruling power and in- 
 fluence of the firfl caufe. They who fuppofe, that 
 every degree of liberty bellowed upon an inrelligenr 
 creature diminiflies as much of tlie dominion and au- 
 thority of God, neither underftand his power and au- 
 thority, nor the nature of liberty. For, on the con- 
 trary,- their liberty and their total dependence make 
 the more glorious difplay of divine wifdom and power. 
 A wile and a powerful monarch hath many ways, both 
 to induce his fubje^ls to act for the purpofes he hath in 
 view, and to hinder them from adting againft his de- 
 figns. And the wifer and more intelligent his fubjc^s 
 are, the more eafily are they governed. And at the 
 fame time he makes no incroachment on their freedom 
 of ailing. For fince liberty is eflential to all rational 
 Creatures, the more intelligent they arc, the a.ore li- 
 berty they muft be poilcflcd of. And can there any 
 reafon then be given why God cannot govern his ra- 
 tional creatures confiflently with their liberty ? If fome 
 things were more ealy, and others more difficult to the 
 Almighty, (which cannot be), I might affirm, that 
 the more intelligent, and the more rational, and con- 
 fequcntly the more freedom creatures pollefs, the 
 more caHly are they influenced and directed by divine 
 dominion. His Lordiliip lays, " * That the creation 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 2q6. 
 
 " of 
 
Se^l.X. Of GoW s governing providence, 16 1 
 
 ** of a man, or an angel, in the works of God, is not 
 " more confiderable than the creation of the meaneft 
 " infe£i^, nor requires that the divine energy ifliould 
 " be exerted in a longer or more operole procefs of 
 "nature." And fure any man, except his Lordfhip^ 
 muft think, that God can as eafily govern, as he 
 could make the world. 
 
 Though what I have already proved may furniih 
 fufficient anfwers to all the objections which Boling- 
 JBB.OKE and you have brought againft divine provi- 
 dence, yet I Ihall confider them more exprefsly and 
 particularly, that I may not feem to negleCi what he 
 did, and you do think very material. The reader 
 muft not CKpeft, that I am to give all that is faid on 
 the fubjeft in his Lordfhip's own words, (his words 
 are many) ; however, 1 fliall endeavour to make ule 
 of them rather than my own, as often as occafion al- 
 lows. There is no great danger of miftaking his 
 meaning; for it is too plain to be miftaken. He 
 fays, " * We have not in philofophical fpeculation, 
 " nor in our own experience, fufficient grounds to 
 " eftabliili the do^rine of particular providences, and 
 ** to reconcile it to that of a general providence." 
 And it is his opinion, that what hath been faid to re- 
 concile them, not only feems to him quite unintelli- 
 gible; but alfo to conceive fuch intcrpofitions pollible, 
 either in the material or moral fydcm, is to conceive 
 
262 Of God's governing providence, Se<n:. X. 
 
 a violation of the mechanical conftitution of the firft, 
 and the natural order of caules • and effects in both. 
 What he fays of the moral world, is fingularly remark- 
 able. *' * It is impolfible to conceive fuch occafional 
 *' interpofitions in the intelleftual fyftem, as Ihall give 
 " new thoughts and new difpofitions to the minds of 
 '* men, and, in confequence, new determinations to 
 " their wills, without altering in every fuch inftance 
 *' the orderly and natural progreflion of the human 
 *' underftanding, or without refuming that freedom 
 " of will which every man is confcious that he has. 
 " 1 confefs, that I comprehend as little the metaphy- 
 '* fical as the phyfical impulfe of fpirits; and that 
 *' the words fnggejlion^ ftlent communication^ Jiidden 
 *' influence, influx, or inject on of ideas, give me no 
 " determinate, clear, and diftinft ideas, nor even, as I 
 *' fuppofe, to the perfons who talk of them moft:.'* 
 And fo he confcfTes, that he fuppofes that thefe words 
 convey no determinate, clear, and diflinft ideas to him, 
 nor to any one befides. 
 
 It is well, however, that you admit a divine pro- 
 vidence in national affairs, though you exclude all di- 
 vine regard from individuals. You fay, " -j" It is 
 *' plain from the whole courfe of God's providence, 
 " that he regards his human creatures colleftively, 
 *' not individually, how \\'orthy foever every one oi 
 *' them deems him fclf to be a particular o\>]cEi of the 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 29. -}- Vol. V. p. no. 
 
 " divin.i 
 
Se£t. X, Of Go D V governltjg providence. 1 63 
 
 " divine care.'* Admire his Lordlliip's humility, in 
 deeming hirafelf the word, and the mod unworthy of 
 mankind, below the regard of God who made him. 
 He is welcome to do himfelf juftice, by acknow- 
 ledging his own infignificancy : but I cannot allow 
 him to impute to God a negle^i: of any thing which 
 he hath made. This modeft, this humble man, who 
 thinks himfelf unworthy of divine care, acknowledges, 
 notwithftanding, the obligation he owes to God, for 
 placing him in the human rank of beings, when he 
 might have made him an afs or an oyfter. He accepts 
 of all the good things his Creator beftows on him as an 
 individual. And how can he, as an individual, refufe 
 the divine juftice ? Sure he did not like to be an object 
 of it. " * Individuals are the objects of hjuman ju- 
 " ftice, focieties of divine." There needs no more 
 pailages to Ihew that his meaning is plain beyond mif- 
 take. 
 
 The firfl: obfervation that I make on this paradoxi- 
 cal blunder. That divine providence regards human 
 creatures collectively, not individually, is. That con- 
 {ideration fliould be had to the number of individuals 
 that compofe the different nations and focieties of men. 
 For if GoO had any regard to nations and focieties as 
 fuch, the greater the number, the greater muft the di- 
 vine regard be. According to fuch principles, the em- 
 pire of China requires more of a national providence 
 
 * Vol. V. p. I n. 
 
 than 
 
264 Of Goiy^s govenung providence. Se£l. X. 
 
 than the republic of Ragufa. A (ingle family is a fo- 
 ciety, and therefore an objeft of the divine care. And 
 if a family in a wildernefs, as a fociety, is under the 
 government of God, why may not a family in the 
 moft populous nation on earth be fubjeft, as a family, 
 to the protection or punifliment of divine providence ? 
 This philofopher of a nobleman might have been of 
 this opinion, and even without any detriment to his 
 blunder of a paradox. For he fays, that " * rea- 
 " fon, inftrufted by experience, fhews the law of 
 '' human nature, and the fanftions of it, which are 
 " as invariable and as uniform as the law. For in all 
 " the ages of the world, and among all the focieties 
 ** of men, the well-being or ill-being of thefe fbcie- 
 *' ties, and therefore of all mankind, has borne a 
 " conflant proportion to the obfervation or neglect 
 *' of it." If divine providence, in the government of 
 nations and focieties, leaves them in their colleftive ca- 
 pacity to the natural and unchangeable confequences 
 of their reaionable or unreafonable doings, (and he 
 admits of no additional interpofitions of providence), 
 then virtue and vice muft produce their natural effefts 
 where-ever and by whomfbever they are praftifed, 
 The fan£i:ion of the law of human nature is as un- 
 changeable as the law itfelf : and therefore individual 
 and pcrfonal happinefs muft be the confequence of 
 individual and perfonal virtue, and pcrfonal trouble 
 ' and diftrefs the infeparable confequence of perfonal 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 102. 
 
 vice, 
 
Se6t. X. Of G o d'j governing providence, 265 
 
 vice. And can ydn fay, or could he have faid, that 
 this is aftually the cafe of every individual ? If the 
 confequence of virtue is as fixed and uniform as the 
 law of right reafon, how comes it to pafs, that the 
 beft of men have often a fcanty portion of human and 
 temporal happinefs ? Muft all the good confequences 
 ©f morality, and all the bad confequences of immora- 
 lity, though neceflarily connected, be fufpended, un- 
 til the one fort overbalances the other in great collec- 
 tions of good and bad men ? If every virtuous and 
 moral man is not happy, and every wicked man is 
 not unhappy, whether in a folitary or focial flate, it 
 muft be owing to the over-ruling providence of God, 
 and to the fpecial inter pofitions of it. For his Lord- 
 fhip reje<5i:s Epicurean chance with difdain and indig- 
 nation. 
 
 All communities are made up of individuals ; and 
 tipon the orderly or diforderly behaviour of thefe in- 
 dividuals, the happinefs or mifery of the whole ^o- 
 ciety depends. Anil if God takes no care of twenty 
 millions of fuch individuals aflembled in one colle£l:ion, 
 but abandons every one of them to walk in their own 
 ways, and to the confequences of their good and evil 
 doings, how can l>e be faid to rule and govern the 
 whole nation ? A machine depends upon all its parts 
 for performance r and a monarch, whofe government 
 doth not extend to all his fubje(5is, can never take care 
 of ail his dominions ; for he that neglefts the parts, 
 iiegle«as the whole ; and if he ihould indulge but a 
 L I few 
 
266 Of GoT)' s governing providetice. Se(n:.X. 
 
 few to aft independently on him, thefe few might de^ 
 feat the beft contrived methods of promoting the hap-, 
 pinefs of all the reft of his fubjefts. And if divine 
 providence did not extend to individuals, it could ne- 
 ver extend to the government of kingdoms and em- 
 pires. How often are nations raifed to honour and 
 happinefs, and how often are they reduced to ruin, by 
 one (ingle perfon ? The wifdom and virtue of a good 
 prince, as a fecond caufe, makes his fubjefts happy; 
 and the pride and ambition of a vitious and foolifh 
 prince, brings his innocent and virtuous people into 
 mifery, captivity, and flavery. And if divine pro- 
 vidence does not extend to thefe men as individuals, 
 by confequence it cannot extend to mankind either in 
 their colleftive or perfbnal ftate. I am of opinion, 
 that though his Lordfliip might have thought himfelf 
 above or below the regard of divine providence, that 
 k is owing to this providence, that, as a fecond caufe, 
 he did not betray his country, and that in violation of 
 an oath, into the hands of an arbitrary fupreme ma- 
 giftrate. 
 
 Against this he objcfts, 17?, That *' * to fup- 
 ^' pofe a conftant feries of particular interpofitions 
 *' from above as neceflary to this purpofe," (that is, 
 to the government of the world), " feems, to my ap- 
 ** prehenfion, little leis abfurd, than to fuppofe the 
 ** neceflity of a perpetual and univerfal theocracy j 
 
 f Vol. V. p. 40. 
 
 *' and 
 
Sed.X. Of GoD^ s governing providence, ±6y 
 
 "' and to complain that fuch a government of the 
 "' world hath not been eftabliilied, is as filly as to 
 " complain that the golden age of the poets is end- 
 " ed." From this I fee no abfurdity that follows. 
 For if it is true that the whole creation depends on 
 God for its continuance in being, and that all active 
 creatures aR dependently, and as dependently as they 
 exilt, (and this I have demon(trated) ; then it follows, 
 not abfurdly nor fillily, that God's government of 
 the creation is perpetual and un/verja!, Inftead of be- 
 ing afhamed of this conclufion, I beg Mr M\ll£t's 
 leave to triumph in it. And if he means by theocra*- 
 cy any thing elfe than God's government, whether 
 mediate or immediate, I hope to be excufed for not 
 underftanding what he hath not faid. I know, that 
 the Jewifh government, from their exode, until the 
 eleftion of King Saul, is called a theocracy^ by rea- 
 fon of very remarkable interpofitions and dire(5lions of 
 divine providence. But unlefs it can be proved, that 
 the firft caufe doth not acl by fecond caufes, that na- 
 tion afterwards, and until now, is as really under the 
 divine dominion, as they were in the days of Moses 
 and of Jo SHU AH. And a firft and a fupreme caufe 
 is fo far from excluding the agency of fecond and 
 fubordinate caufes, that it fuppofes it. A fi'-ji with- 
 out 2i fecond^ is neither logic nor arithmetic. If fecond 
 caufes are not admitted, God muft be the only, and 
 not the firft caufe in every event. Were there any 
 things or events to which divine providence doth not 
 L i 2 extend, 
 
268 Of G o D ' J" governing providence i Seft. X. 
 
 extend, (mediately or immediately makes no difTer- 
 ence), or were there any temporary difcontiniiance 
 of it with refpeft to thofe things and events to which 
 it doth extend, there would remain a pofTibihty of 
 wrong events, or events unfit to anfwer the great and 
 ultimate end of the creation. And to fuppofe that in- 
 finite wifdom and infinite power can pollibly mifcarry 
 in any defign, is an abfurdity wiiich even his Lord- 
 Ihip doth not admit. 
 
 The fecond objection is fully as trifling as the firll^ 
 " * Particular providences would be miracles, if they 
 '* were real; and fuch they would be firiftly, whe- 
 " ther they were contrary to the eftabliflied courfe of 
 *' nature or not : for the miracle confifts in the e:j^- 
 " traordinary interpofition, as much as in the nature 
 " of the thing brought to pafs." And particular pror 
 vidences would be miracles JlriUly, whether contrary 
 to the eftahlijhed courfe of nature or not. This I take 
 for a clofe and clever contradiction. Tlie thing comes 
 to pafs according to the eftabliihed courfe of nature; 
 and if God a(5led in it as the firft caufe, then he 
 thinks it would be a miracle ftri^lly. Then all God's 
 doings are miraculous ; and therefore we can never 
 know what is a miracle, and what is not. He adds, 
 " If they are real." He denies that there ever were 
 any miracles, and fays, " they are founded on ridi» 
 ** culous (lories, which palled in times of ignorance 
 
 * Vol. V. p. %i. 
 
 " an4 
 
Se£l.X. Of Qo'd's governing providence, 26g 
 
 "' and fuperftition." I prefume it lay out of his way 
 to give a definition of a miracle, when in the fame 
 paragraph he denies them all ; and it lay juft as much 
 out of his way to call particular providences miracles. 
 He is lb far in the right to fay, that miracles are ex- 
 traordinary ; and in fo far he is in the wrong to fay, 
 that particular providences are miracles, whether they 
 come to pais in conformity or contrary to the efta- 
 bliihed courfe of nature or not. And he is again in 
 the wrong for faying, that the miracle confifts in the 
 extraordinary interpofition ; for, befides, it muft be 
 wrought for fome end and purpofe made known pre* 
 vioully to them who obferve the event. That the 
 fun rofe to-day, is owing to the providence of God ; 
 but not to a miraculous inter pofition of it, becaufe it 
 is ordinary : but if to-morrow, during twenty-four 
 hours, the fame fun Ihould be invifible to all the in- 
 habitants of the earth, it would be extraordinary, but 
 not a miracle ; unlefs an appeal was made to fuch an 
 event, as a confirmation of Ibme great and important 
 truth. It is God that makes grafs to grow for cattle, 
 and herbs for the ufe of man ; and by this God dis- 
 plays his wifdom and power as much as in the creation 
 and prefervation of man and beaft. For, as hath been 
 already obferved, his Lordlhip fays, " the creation 
 " of man, or angel, in the works of God, is not 
 " more confiderable than the creation of the meaneft 
 " infecl." That there is grafs^ that there are herbs, 
 that there are cattle, that there are men^ is owing to 
 
 ' the 
 
2;^o Of God's governing providence. Se6t. X. 
 
 the providence of God, not in a miraculous, though 
 in an infinitely wife, and in an omnipotent way. 
 
 I am unwilling to leave the matter here, (though 
 it might well be done), becaufe he attempts to carry 
 it further. He fays, " * The circumltances of in- 
 " diviJuals, the public conjuni^l:ur<;s wherein numbers 
 *' are involved, and the merits and de nerits of parti- 
 " cular men, as well as of collcclive bodies, are lb 
 " nearly alike, and they return io ofien to be equal- 
 
 " ly obje(5ls of thefe fuppofed providences, that 
 
 *' no one dares to pronounce where thefe providences 
 " have been employed, and where not." No man 
 indeed who confiders God as a i?eing of infinite wif- 
 dom, will take upon him to determine, that the divine 
 adminiftration midit have been better than it hath 
 been; nor will he fay, that all private and public 
 connections and relations wherein all mankind is in- 
 volved, and their frequent alterations, are too heavy 
 a charge for infinite wifdom and infinite power. This 
 mufl: be left to his Lordlliip, and Mr Mallet, who 
 fpeak and think moll: unworthily of the fupreme Be- 
 ing. For nothing can perplex infinite wildom, and 
 nothing can ftop or hinder infinite power. "- This 
 " fcheme, if true, would be univerfal in extent, and 
 *' continual in time." And fo it is, and fo it mull 
 be, as hath been already demondratcd. From which 
 he fays, " thefe great abfurditics would arife, that 
 
 « Vol. V. p. 86. 
 
 *' the 
 
Se(51 . X. Of Go d'j governing providence. 27 1 
 
 *' the world would be governed by miracles, unril 
 <' miracles loft their name." This is To much wit 
 thrown away, or laid out upon his own ignorance of 
 the nature of a miracle. For all events, even the 
 moft aflonifhing and fiirprinng, and fuch as nothing 
 but omnipotence can bring to pafs, are not miracles, 
 unlefs appealed to for the confirmation of fbme truth. 
 Let me fuppofe, that many more prodigies happened 
 in Egypt than are recorded by Moses, they would 
 not have been miracles, unlefs jMoses had appealed 
 to them as a proof -of his divine commiflion. 
 
 The other abfurdity is what I underfland as a 
 thnd objection againft particular providences. " That 
 " is, the eflablifhed order of natural caufes and ef- 
 " fefts would be fubverted, and the general rule 
 ** would be abforbed in the exceptions to it ; or that 
 *' God would govern his human creatures by two 
 " rules that do not confill: very well together : fince 
 " by one of them the wants and petitions of thefe 
 " creatures would be fubmitted to one common pro- 
 " vidcncc, which carried on the affairs of the world, 
 *' according to the firft conflitution and original laws 
 " of it ; and by the other, this common providence 
 *' would break, if I may fay fo, into a multitude of 
 " particular providences, for the fupply of thefe 
 ** wants, and the grant of thefe petitions; every one 
 f' of which is an appeal to the fecond rule of govern^ 
 ?* meat, againlt the firft." He had faid before, 
 
 " That 
 
272 Of GoD^s governing providence. Seft.X. 
 
 * That we have not in philofophical fpeculation, 
 in any hiflory except the Bible, nor in our own 
 experience, fufficient grounds to eflabliih the doc- 
 trine of particular providences, and to reconcile it 
 to the courfe of things in the material and intellec- 
 tual fyftems, as thefe fyftems were originally con- 
 
 ftituted by the author of nature. It is impof- 
 
 fible to conceive, that the courfe of the fun, or the 
 double revolution of the earth, fhould be fuf- 
 pended or altered by a temporary, nay, a mo- 
 mentary interpofition of fome particular providence, 
 or that any thing worthy of fuch an interpofition 
 fhould happen in the material world, without vio- 
 lating the mechanical conftitution, and the natural 
 order of caufes and efTe<^s." And what he adds 
 concerning the moral fyflem, amounts to this. That 
 God cannot meddle with his underftanding without 
 {polling it. 
 
 It was never thought, that the mechanic, by med- 
 dling with the machine of his own conflru£^ion, mud: 
 neccflarily fpoil it. And far lefs muft God, of ne- 
 ccffity, fpoil his own works, either by a general or 
 particular providence. Did a being of lefs knowledge, 
 ikill, and wifdom, but of power fufficient to Itop the 
 motion of the earth, meddle with the make of the 
 material world, he might pofTibly fpoil it: but God, 
 who made the univerfe, cannot, by any interpofition 
 
 * Vol. V. p. :8. 
 
 of 
 
Scd:. X. Of God's governing frovuknce* 273 
 
 of his providence, fo far diforder any fun or planet, 
 as to furpafs his wifdom and power to repair, and re- 
 ftore it to its original conflitution. To make the e- 
 ternity of the world pafs for credible, his Lordfliip 
 fays, '* * If a conftant rotation from exiftence to 
 *' non-exiftence, or from generation to didblution, 
 " maintains our world and the inhabitants of it in be- 
 " ing, why Ihould not fuch a rotation of worlds 
 " maintain the univerfe in being?'* It is furprifing, 
 that he who affirms that our world is continued in 
 being by reftoring it from corruption by generation, 
 and back from generation to corruption, fliould deny 
 that God can make the world continue in order, if 
 he interpofes by particular providences in the admi- 
 niftration of it. And though this nobleman of a 
 philofopher thinks it impolTible that any thing fhould 
 happen in the material world v/orthy of any altera- 
 tion, I think, though he does not, that God knows 
 when and where thefe alterations are fit and proper 
 for the government of the world, and for the go-? 
 vernmcnt of the intellectual part of it in particular. 
 
 Though it doth not belong to the prefent pur- 
 
 pofe, 1 cannot but obferve one of the greateft blun- 
 ders that ever writer, either peer or commoner, eccle- 
 fiaftic or laic, was guilty of. That is, " A con- 
 ^' flant rotation from exiftence to non-exiftence, and 
 ** fb back again, maintains our world in being." 
 From exiftence to non-exiftence, is not to maintain 
 
 * Vol. V. p. ■K'1,7. 
 
 ?»I m the 
 
2^74 Of Gory' s governing providence, Sc(ft.X. 
 
 the fame thing in being. It is to annihilate or\6 
 world, to make place for another. And what a ro* 
 ration forwards and backwards, of caufes and effects, 
 of annihilation and creation, and of creation and an- 
 nihilation, would contribute to maintain and continue 
 our world in being and in order, I leave to David 
 Mallet, Efq; to determine; or if he cannot fhew 
 what influence a rotation from exiftence to non-ex- 
 jltence hath to maintain the fame thing in being, ht 
 may leave it out of the next edition ; for it is enough 
 to difgracc lA>rd Bolingbroke's works, were they 
 ten times more voluminous. 
 
 It is another bold and falfe alTertion, That " we 
 *' have not in philofbphical fj->eculation, in any hi- 
 " ftory except the Bible, nor in our own expe- 
 ** rience, fufficient grounds to cilabliih the doftrine 
 " of particular providences." For it is certain, and 
 clear to demonftration, that, by philofophical (pecu- 
 lation, we know all things depend on God for their 
 being, becaufe he is their creator ; and that every 
 thing a£ls as it is, and not otherwife ; and therefore 
 they alfaft dependently on God» And this demon- 
 ftrated truth is in a great meafure confirmed by pro- 
 fane hiftory. As the order, harmony, and mutual 
 fubferviency of the parts of the univerfe, prove that 
 all is owing to a deligning caul'e ; fb the many fur- 
 prifing and appofitc events proper for the government 
 of mankind, are brought to pafs by a wife and jxjwcr* 
 
 ful 
 
Seer . X. Of God'/ governing providence, 275 
 
 ful governor. That his Lordfhip found nothing of 
 this in his own experience, I can eafily believe. For 
 he that thinks prayer impertinent, and aiferts that 
 God cannot give audience to all at all times, and 
 he who doth not confider God as the governor of 
 the world, cannot impute events, great or fmali, ge- 
 neral or particular, to his providence. Prayer, he 
 lays, " is no better than an appeal from the firit and 
 '' original rule of government to the fecond. * No- 
 " thing can be lefs reconcilable to the notion of an all- 
 ** perfeft being, than the imagination that he un- 
 '* does by his power in particular cafes, what his 
 " wifdom, to whom nothing is future, once thought 
 " fufficient to be eftablillied for all cafes." 
 
 If any one cafe is omitted in the general and ori- 
 ginal plan of providence, it is not fufficient for all 
 cafes, and infinite wifdom could not think it fuffi- 
 cient. He fays, that " -f the wnole feries of things 
 " is at all times a^ually prefent to the divine mind.'* 
 And here he fays, that nothing is future to infinite 
 knowledc^e. This is allowed him. But how doth it 
 follow from-particular providences, that God undoes 
 by his power in particular cafes, what he thought 
 fufficient for all cafes ? All cafes were known to 
 him, and all cafes arc provided for. " || The world,'* 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 35. 
 -f- Vol. V. p. 82. 
 |l Vol. V. p. 30. 
 
 M m 2 fays 
 
iy6 Of QoTt's governing providence. Se(5l. X. 
 
 fays his Lorclfliip, *' is governed by laws, which the 
 '* Creator impofed on the phyfical and moral fyflems, 
 
 *' when he willed them into exigence. Thefe 
 
 '* laws are invariable, but they are general ; and 
 " from this generality, what we call contingency 
 " arifes." Necejjary and contingent, is a diftinftion 
 ■which is juftly admitted, but fuch as can take no 
 place in events. They may be called ordinary or 
 extraordinary, but cannot be faid to be ncccflary or 
 contingent. For God alone is neceflary, and all o- 
 ther things depend on him ; and becaufe dependent, 
 they are contingent, and may be or may not be. \\ hat 
 he means by contingency muft be chance \ that is, e- 
 vents happening beyond the. original and general plan 
 of divine providence. Of thefe chances and extra- 
 providential events, the original and general plan ad- 
 mits of fuch a latitude, as is enough to abjorh the ori- 
 ginal and general rule of God's government of the 
 world. Aild he likewife realbns, that if God made 
 provilion for fuch events, it would render the ge- 
 neral rule of no ufe ; or he governs the world by two 
 inconfiftent rules, a general, and a multitude of par- 
 ticular providences. There are gtne.raii^ which in 
 their nature, and in our conception of them, take in 
 all particulars. And why God's general providence 
 Iliould exclude all particulars, is what I cannot un- 
 derftand, nor what you vmx any man can prove. The 
 di(lin£i:ion of ordinary and extraordinary is admitted ; 
 but a general providence, without particular provi- 
 dences^ 
 
Seft.X. Of QsO'q' s governing providence, lyy 
 
 dences, is nonfenfe, and a contradiction in terms. 
 Generals and particulars are relata and correlata^ of 
 which one cannot be without the other. 
 
 If thefe extraprovidential events, independent on 
 God as their caufe, and independent in their efTedh 
 on his government, are fo many that they ahforb the 
 general rule of divine government, he may fay, and 
 fay it in confequence of his principles, that God doth 
 not, neither can he govern the v^^orld. What 1 have 
 already obferved on this unphilofophical word abforb, 
 applied by him to the divine goodnefs being abforbed 
 in divine wifdom, is enough to prove, that, among a 
 multitude of chances and independent events, God's 
 general rule of governing muft be fwallowed up and 
 fmothered, and become ufelefs. He urges and infifts, 
 that if God took in all particular cafes into the origi- 
 nal and genera] plan of his providence, he muft undo 
 by his power in fome cafes, what in his wifdom he 
 thought fit to eftablifh for all cafes. This is to beg 
 the queflion, and to beg it abfurdly. For how doth 
 he know, that God in his wifdom hath eftablilhed a 
 general rule of government for all, without providing 
 for particular cafes ? This in itfelf is abfurd, as I 
 have proved ; but flill the more abfurd, by omitting 
 in the general plan as many chances and extrapro- 
 vidential events as defeat the general rule of govern- 
 ment. Known to Go d are all his creatures, and all 
 their a£lions. And is it to be fuppofed, that it was 
 
 inconfiftent 
 
2yS Of God's governnig providence, Se<n:. X. 
 
 inconfiftent with his wifdoai, to take his creatures and 
 ail their doings under his own government and domi- 
 nion ? Or was it fitter to leave them out of the origi- 
 nal plan, and in fnch numbers and multitudes, as to 
 fupprefs the very plan from which they are excluded ? 
 God mufl: govern all things without exception, or he 
 cannot govern the world perfectly. I am fo far from 
 taking his Lordfnip's word, (and I have no more for 
 it), that if particular cafes were comprehended in di- 
 vine providence, he would undo by his power what he 
 hath eftablifhed in his wifdom ; that, on the contrary, 
 I am obliged to believe, becaufe it is demonllrable, 
 that divine providence extends to all events, whether 
 they come to pafs in the ordinary courfe of things, 
 commonly called the courfe of nature^ or in the moft 
 extraordinary way. And thofe things which Boling- 
 BROKE calls contingent, are all of them under God's 
 government and direftion, as really as the rifing of the 
 fun, which comes to pafs once in the fpace of twenty- 
 four hours. " The laws of matter and motion are 
 *' fixed, no doubt, but within the latitude which 
 " they allow; though nothing happens which is re- 
 " pugnant to them, many things happen which feem 
 *' fo to us."- So fays his Lordiliip. But as a rea- 
 foner only a pofierion, he hath no right to fay fo. For 
 if any thing appears to him repugnant to the fixed laws 
 of matter and motion, he mult conclude they are real- 
 ly fo. And his right is Hill Icfs, as he pretends to 
 know nothing of God, nor of nature, but by fenfe 
 
 and 
 
Se^.X. Of GoT>'s governing providence, ly^ 
 
 and experience. The moft incompetent judge of 
 mankind mud he be, to determine what is within and 
 what is without the reach and dominion of divine 
 providence. 
 
 As he allows of an imaginary, precarious, and 
 prefumptuous latitude for independent events in the 
 material world, (b as precarioufly eftablifhes he a 
 greater latitude for fuch events in the moral world. 
 His words are : *' * There is no need of any great 
 " fagacity to perceive, that the cafe is much the fame 
 ** in the moral world ; nay that it is more liable to 
 " contingency than the natural. The moral world is 
 *' fubje<5i to the law of right reafon, fixed, unvariable, 
 ** promulgated in the very nature of things, and in- 
 " forced by the fanftions of rewards and punifh- 
 '' ments," (one would think it is Dr Clarke who 
 fpeaks), " which follow often the obfervation or the 
 *'^ breach of it. But then, inflead of two principles, 
 *' whereof the one is aftive, and the other palUve on- 
 ^' ly, as in the other cafe, there are in this two a(flive 
 " principles, the one flower than the other, Reafon, 
 
 *' and Paffion. Between both ftands the freedom 
 
 " of our will, which can determine either way." 
 On this pailagc I have two occafional remarks to make. 
 Firft, he fays, in the government of the natural ot* 
 material world, there are two principles concerned, 
 the one aftlve, and the other paOive : and thefb two 
 
 * Vol. V. 7.31. 
 
 mull 
 
28o Of God's governing providence. Seft. X. 
 
 mufl: be God and matter. And if matter is a collate- 
 ral principle with God, it mufl: be eternal, and as 
 abfolutely independent as he. That this is falfe and 
 abfurd, I hope to demonftrate. Until then, let us 
 fuppofe that matter is eternal. But it is not fo ftub- 
 born as to refift omnipotence. God can difpofe of 
 matter as he thinks fit : for, being pafTive, it cannot 
 difpofe of itfelf ; and by fermentation, fublimation, 
 and by a certain degree of elaflicity, he hath made 
 philofophers ; and, to take their own word, out of 
 lenfelefs and inaftive matter, he hath made Lord Bo- 
 LiNGBROKE, and David Mallet, Efq; and can 
 turn their intelleftuals into duft. However, let mat- 
 ter be only matter that is purely paffive, it can have 
 no part, as fuch, in the government of the world ; 
 no, no more than a ftone or a brick in your houfc 
 hath in the government of your family. 
 
 The other remark is, that though he had but jufl 
 faid, that the fan^ion of the law of nature, or the law 
 of right reafon, is as fixed and invariable as the law it- 
 felf; yet, in this palTage, he takes this connexion be- 
 tween the obfervation and the breach of this law in fb 
 Iowa fenfe, that it deffroys and dillblves the indilTbl- 
 vable union between the fanftion and the law. For 
 he fays, this law of right reafon " is inforccd by the 
 *' fanftion of rewards and punifhments, which follow 
 " ojten the obfervation or the breach of it.'* Accor- 
 ding 
 
Se<n:.X. Of GoT>'s governing providence. 28 c 
 
 ding to his principles, he ihould have faid, which fol- 
 low always. 
 
 To make place for chances in the government of 
 the moral world, he fays, that this world hath in it- 
 felf two aftive principles, PalTion, andReafon: and 
 that tliefe adlive principles may have room to exercife 
 themfelves, a latitude for extraprovidential events, 
 and a greater latitude mufl be allowed than is jull ne- 
 celJary in the government of the material world. His 
 Lordihip holds, that matter is eternal, and independ- 
 ent on God : but he mufl allow, that whatever he 
 makes of matter, in fo far as it is made, it muft de- 
 pend on him. Now, as our reafon and paffion, a de- 
 fire of good, and an averfion to evil, are entirely ow- 
 ing to God who made us, our animal and rational fa- 
 culties muft be entirely under his dominion. And if, 
 inftead of two, we had twenty a£i:ive principles in 
 our nature, they could never furpafs the wifdom and 
 power of their author to rule and govern them. His 
 Lordfhip cannot conceive how this can be done. And 
 no great wonder, for he forgets that he is fpeaking of 
 the fupreme Being of infinite wifdom and power. He 
 fays, " It is impoflible to conceive fuch occafional in- 
 '* terpofitions in the intelle6lual fyftem, as ihall give 
 *' new thoughts and new difpofitions to the minds of 
 " men, and, in confequence, new determinations of 
 " their wills, without altering in every fuch inftance 
 *' the ordinary and natural progrefTion of the human 
 N fl " underftanding." 
 
282 Of Go Ws governing providence, Se^l. X. 
 
 ** underftanding." And yet he himfelf hath endea- 
 voured to give new thoughts, and a new turn of mind, 
 not to one individual only, but to the far greater part 
 of niankind, and that without altering the ordinary 
 and natural progrelTion of the human underfianding. 
 Whether the human foul is material or immaterial, he 
 doth allow, that it is the work, and a creature of 
 God. And why may not God make a foul capable 
 to perfaade others into fuch fentiments as ihall induce 
 them to a£l any part that God thinks proper and fit 
 for their own and the government of the world P And 
 if he hath no determinate, clear, and diilinft ideas of 
 fuggeftion, filent communication, fuddcn influx, and 
 injedion of ideas, this his ignorance doth not prove 
 that there is no fuch thing. For he hath no fuch de- 
 terminate, clear, and diflinfi: conception of the rife and 
 occafion of every particular idea that came into his, 
 nor have you of every one thr>t comes into your mind. 
 For though God hath permitted him to write, and 
 you to publifh many things tending to the dilhonour 
 of your Creator, and to the hurt of mankmd, divine 
 providence can eafily prevent their intended bad con- 
 fequence. And I hope and pray, that my endeavours 
 may, as a fccond c lufe, contribute towards io good 
 an end. W ithout your knowledge of fudden injec- 
 tion of ideas, God can raile up, and make human 
 fouls qualified and fitted to anfwer his defign in go- 
 verning the world. This, according to Boling- 
 broke's doctrine, can be done by a llronger or 
 
 weaker 
 
Se6l . X . Of G o D ' J governing providence. 283 
 
 weaker fermentation, or by more or lefs elaflicity. 
 And admitting the human foul to be an immaterial 
 fubrtance, and a fpirit, God, who is himfelf a fpi- 
 rit, may have immediate accefs to human minds, in a 
 way which we can as httle comprehend as we do the 
 manner of his creating them. I believe it will be al- 
 lowed me, that God afts by his operative will, which 
 all things obey. By this he made, by this he pre- 
 ferves, and by this he governs the world, and by this 
 too he forms and informs the minds of men ; but how 
 this his will is operative, and how it operates, we can 
 as little comprehend, as we can create, preferve, and 
 govern the world. His Lordfhip's ignorance of the 
 manner wherein God gives new thoughts and new 
 difpofitions to the minds of men, is no argument a- 
 gainli his giving thefe new thoughts and new difpofi- 
 tions, no more than it can be againil: his making man. 
 
 It is owing to this affectation of knowing the works 
 and ways of God as he does the works and ways of 
 men, that his Lordfliip makes the government of the 
 world furpafs his infinite wifdom and power, and that 
 he makes fo many contingencies, exceptions from the 
 over-ruhng providence of God, left entirely to 
 chance and accident, or to the difcretion or indilcre- 
 tion of every individual moral agent. Without deter- 
 mining whether God made the world for the fake of 
 man, and man that he might communicate happinefs 
 to him, or not ; it is certain, and allowed as fuch by 
 N n 2 BoLiNG- 
 
284 Of God'/ governing providence » Se^. X. 
 
 BoLiNGBROKE, that man is the principal inhabitant 
 of our planet ; and if he pofTefTes fiich a rank in our 
 terreftrial world, it is aftonifhing that ever it fhould 
 come into the head of any one of the human fpecies, 
 that he is below the regard, below the care, and fo 
 turned out of the dominions of his Creator. If God 
 takes care of the dwelling-place made for the accom- 
 modation of the inhabitant, it is an abfurdity, and re- 
 proach to his Lordfhip's underftanding, to ailert, that 
 this inhabitant is of no confideration with the great ar- 
 chiteft of the world. From his own words I reafbn 
 againft him. The words are : " Whatever was the 
 " final caufe of the world ; whatever motive, for we 
 " fpeak after the manner of men," (and he jfhould al- 
 low others to do the fame), " the firft caufe had to 
 " create it, which motive could not arife from any 
 *' thing without himfelf, mud be therefore refolved 
 ** into his mere will. We conceive eafily, that infi- 
 " nite wifdom which determined, and infinite power 
 " which executed the plan of the univerfc, had fbme 
 '' fecondary,' fome inferior regard, in making this, and 
 " every otlier planet, to all the creatures that were to 
 " inhabit them. Neither any of thefe creatures, nor 
 " all of them, were, in a proper fenfe, the final 
 " caufe for which thefe planets were created." True ; 
 for God made all things for his own glory, or, as Dr 
 CuDWORTH fays, " the parts were made for the 
 ** whole, and the whole for the maker ; " and by his 
 
 providenct*. 
 
Seft. X. Of G o D 'j governing providence, 1 85 
 
 providence he hath conducted, and will conduct all 
 things to anfwer that end. 
 
 But if all events which his Lordfhip calls contin- 
 gencies in the material and moral world are placed 
 without the reach of God's providence, and if thefe 
 are fo many that they abforb the general rule of 
 God's government, even omnifcience and omnipo- 
 tence cannot infure the end, the glory and honour of 
 the Creator. All thefe extraprovidential events are 
 either of themfelves beyond the knowledge and power 
 of the fupreme Being, or he hath freely and abfo- 
 lutely beftowed exemption and independency upon 
 them. This cannot be done without divefting him- 
 felf of his dominion, and without making agents de- 
 pendent in being, independent in a6ling, or making 
 them aft otherwife than they are. And if thefe con- 
 tingencies are of their own nature beyond the know- 
 ledge and power of the fupreme Being, then he is 
 neither infinitely wife nor almighty. And thefe are 
 the only attributes which his Lordfhip afcribes to the 
 Deity. But, not to trufl any argument to the con- 
 cefTion of fuch an author, it is a contradiftion in terms 
 to affirm, that there can be any thing unknown to 
 omnifcience, or any thing that cannot be done by 
 omnipotence. 
 
 The fourth^ and the lafl: objeftion againfl divine 
 providence, the laft that I Jhall trouble my reader 
 
 with. 
 
286 Of Go D ' J governing providence. Seel. X. 
 
 with, is. That there are fo many mean and trifling 
 things done by mankind, and of fo little confeqiience, 
 that it is below the majerty of the fupreme Being to 
 regard them. This is altogether in the F.picurean 
 flyle. He that excludes all the individuals of man- 
 kind, that is, every fingle perfon, from the care and 
 regard of God, may well exclude their actions. But 
 that every individual and particular perfon and his ac- 
 tions depend on God, hath already been demonftra- 
 tcd. Nor is this below the majefty of God, fince it 
 was not below his majefty to create man. I cannot 
 believe, that the author had any but very mean appre- 
 henfions of the dignity of the Deity, by making him, 
 in imitation of his own pride and vanity, fb (lately as 
 to negle£l the works of his own hands. God cannot 
 be weary in caring for his creation, nor can the great- 
 efl variety of events perplex his infinite wifdom ; nor 
 can it furpafs his infinite power, to provide for them 
 all, and direft them finally to his own glory. If the 
 vegetative and animal parts are the works of God ; if 
 the lead and meanefl infeft is made by him, and are 
 likewife preferved by his providence, Ihall the rational 
 part be entirely negle^led ? 
 
 I am pleafed that his Lordiliip had fo much meta- 
 phyfics as to fee, that between the Deity and his cre- 
 ation there is an unmeafurable diftance, becaufe 
 between finite and infinite there is no proportion. 
 And if it is unworthy of God to regard the meanell 
 
 of 
 
Se^l.X. Of GoT>*s governing providence. 287 
 
 of his creatures, and the loweft of their aftions, upon 
 account of his infinite fuperiority and majefty, the 
 whole creation muft for that reafbn be below his pro- 
 vidence. Fo!, ftriiflly fpeaking, in an infinite di- 
 ftance in perfeftion, t>) ufe the author's co-marifbn, 
 man cannot be nearer his Creator than an oyfter; 
 nor all the univerfe nearer than the leaft part of it. 
 And To faid the prophet, or, if you pleafe, fo fung 
 the poet. * Behold, the nations are as a drop of 
 thi'. bucket, and are accounted as the fmall dufi of the 
 haance : behold, he taketh up the ijles as a very little 
 thing, AIL nations are before him as nothing. 
 
 That the aftions of men are, in appearance, 
 mean and trifling, and often worfe, I do admit; 
 they are to us, as he fays, no better than farces. 
 But mean as they are, they are not too mean for di- 
 vine regard, which nothing can exceed, and nothing 
 fall below. They are the aftions of his creatures, 
 whom he hath made to exift, fubfift, and aft. Tho' 
 not always to our obfervation, yet thefe farces, thefe 
 trifling occupations, often give rife to very great e- 
 vents. In the rational world the philofopher admits 
 a greater latitude for contingencies, than in the mere 
 material or animal world ; and therefore the moral 
 world requires a Angular adminiftration, fuited to the 
 nature of the moral fubjefts. I know no anions of 
 men more childiih and trifling than gaming ; and yet 
 
 f Ifaiahxl. 15. 
 
 the 
 
288 Of Go d'j" governing providence. Se6l. X. 
 
 the gain or lofs of a game at chefs gave rile to a 
 war between England and France ; and fince that 
 time thefe two nations never were good friends, but 
 rather conftitutional enemies. A debate occalioncd by 
 a cartful of ikins gave rife to a war, wliich cofl: a 
 Duke of Burgundy an army, and his own life. But 
 it is not my prelent bufinefs to write hiftory. 
 
 OxME would be apt to think, that his Lordfliip muft 
 have been very fiire of what he hath taken fo much 
 pains to prove, and yet he acknowledges he is not. 
 For he fays, " * Though there is little credit to be 
 " given to all that lying legends, fufpicious tradi- 
 " tions, and idle rumours, have reported concern- 
 " ing particular afts of providence, yet I will not 
 " prcfume to deny that there have been any fuch." 
 And if there have been any fuch, why not many 
 fuch P All thofe contingencies, or chances, are not 
 without the reach of divine providence. Any one 
 particular aft of providence deniolifhes all his argu- 
 ments that tend to prove tliat God hath no regard 
 to individuals. For if any one of thefe contingencies 
 are under the dominion and government of God, it 
 is impolfible to prove, and prefumption to allert, that 
 any one is exempted. For all events whatever are as 
 cafily provided for by infinite wifdom and power, as 
 any one of them. If a divine providence, then, is 
 not perpetual and univcrfal, it is not for want of 
 
 * Vol. V. p- 35. 
 
 knowledge 
 
Sefl.X. Of GoJ)' s governing providence, 289 
 
 knowledge and power/ but for want of will. And 
 how hath Lord Bolingbroke found out, that God 
 was unwilling to have any thing to do with him, and 
 that he had, by a fpecial grant, made him abfolute 
 mafter of himfelf ; that is, that God hath in many 
 inftances furrendered his right of dominion and fove- 
 reignty, a right founded in his creating and prefer- 
 ving power, and an edential perfeftion of his being ? 
 
 To what purpofe could his Lordihip have taken fb 
 much pains to deceive himfelf, and to deceive odiers, 
 with a conceit of independency on God ? I know 
 none, after trying the utmoll of my imagination and 
 invention, except that he had rather things Ihould 
 run at random in the material and moral world, than 
 that they Ihould be under the government and direc- 
 tion of an infinitely-wife and almighty being. He 
 might have thought, and fuch as he may think as 
 they pleafe, (and it is only becaufe they pjeafe); but 
 with pleafure, and with gratitude to God, I am con- 
 vinced that I am fafer in his difpofal, than in my own. 
 Velleius the Epicurean could not bear the thoughts 
 of having a God wreathed upon his neck, to be 
 dreaded day and night. " * And what man," faith he, 
 " would not dread a God, whofe providence is uni- 
 •' verfal, who knows and obferves, and claims a 
 " concern in every thing j a God fo full of bufinefs 
 " and employment ? " A flrong deflre to be freed 
 
 * Cicero de natura deoriirn, lib. i. 
 
 O from 
 
290 Of Go d'J" governing providence, Seft. X. 
 
 from thofe fears and terrors did induce the ancient, 
 and does induce the modern Epicureans, to rejeft a di-* 
 vine providence. The ancient Epicureans owned 
 the charge, and gloried in the difcovery ; and whe- 
 ther modern Epicureans confefs it or not, I cannot 
 hinder myfelf to think that the fame reafon is the 
 foundation of their doftrine. They may fay and un- 
 fay, (and no man does it more freely than his Lord- 
 Ihip), I do approve of an ancient faying, 'The fool^ 
 that is, the wicked man, hath /aid in his hearty There 
 is no GOD; to which I add, no providence, no 
 future ftate of rewards and punifliments. After all 
 the pains he hath taken to difprove a providence, 
 and a future ftate of rewards and punifhments, he is 
 not alhamed to fay, " * The ancient and modern 
 " Epicureans provoke my indignation, when they 
 " boaft as a mighty acquifition, their pretended cer- 
 ** tainty that the body and foul die together." Is it 
 credible, nay, is it polTible, that any man of can- 
 dour and finccrity can talk after fuch a rate, or that 
 any man of common fenfe fhould flatter himfclf, 
 that he can impofe on the world fuch a grofs and in- 
 duflrious con tradition, for a truth ? Such an ignoble 
 and difhonourable prevarication is enough to provoke 
 the indignation of a gentleman Athcift. 
 
 The amount of all the nobleman author's doc- 
 trine of providence comes to tliis, and no further, 
 
 * Vol. V. p. r25. 
 
 That 
 
^^. X. Of G o D 'j governing providence. 2 9 1 
 
 That God hath made the univerfe, and fet all the 
 Cuns and planets agoing, and furniftied every habita- 
 tion with materials for the accommodation and happi- 
 nefs of fuch as - do, or may inhabit them ; with 
 tliiiHes for afles, and proper food for other beafts, 
 and for men. To fome he hath beftowed inftin£l 
 and appetite, on others fagacity and reafon ; and hath 
 left to every creature the ufe of its faculties, and the 
 difpofal of itfelf ; with a large allowance of contin- 
 gencies and chances in the material world, for which 
 he hath made no provifion ; and with a larger in the 
 moral world, for which every moral agent muft make 
 provifion for himfelf, without any aOTiilance or fa- 
 vourable interpofition of his providence. He might 
 as well have faid in few words, that God doth not 
 govern the world ; that earthquakes and inunda- 
 tions, peftilence and famine, ftorms and tempefls, 
 which fweep off the inhabitants of this earth, M^ithout 
 difference of the good from the bad, are all of them 
 contingencies and extraprovidential events, not under 
 the dominion and government of the Creator. For 
 though he did forefee, or rather fees them, yet he 
 fees them as an unconcerned fpeftator. Nor have 
 the moft innocent and virtuous of the human race 
 reafon to complain of this adminiftration, becaufe he 
 hath furnifhed them with materials and faculties fuf- 
 £cient to provide for tlieir own happinefs. And tho' 
 fome contingencies fhould furmount their greatefl: 
 care and precaution, there remains no ground of com- 
 O o 2 ^ plaint. 
 
292 Of Go d'j governing providence, Seft, X. 
 
 plaint, and no ground of gratitude, for whatever 
 happens, becaufe none of thefe tilings are the doings 
 of their Creator. They have their lot in this world, 
 nor have they reafon to expert. another in a world to 
 come. 
 
 It was a ma\im admitted by all except the Epi- 
 cureans, Si DEUS eft, mundus rcgitur providemia. 
 And Epicureans were therefore juftly^ efteemed Athe- 
 ifts. Between the do£lrine of Epicurus and that of 
 BoLiNG BROKE, I fcc no difference in this capital 
 point of providence ; and I therefore conclude, that 
 fb much of his philofophy is Atheifm. 
 
 SECT, 
 
£p3 
 
 SECT. XL 
 
 Of the immateriality of the human fouL 
 
 AS the denying of divine providence, or abfurd- 
 ly limiting it to nations and focieties of men, 
 is Atheifm to all the purpofes and confequences of 
 Atheifm ; jfb doth the denying the immateriality of 
 the human foul clear the way, and lead into the 
 fame impiety. " * For as there were never any yet 
 " known, who a0erting incorporeal fubftance, did 
 " deny a Deity ; fo neither can there be any reafbn, 
 *' why he that admits one, fliould exclude the other." 
 A materialift may be, and really is an Atheift ; but 
 he that admits incorporeal fubftances, can have no 
 reafon to reje£l the being of a fpirit infinitely perfe£l, 
 and the father of Ipirits. Notwithflanding, his Lord-? 
 Ihip labours hard to prove, that all men are pneuma- 
 tically mad, who adert that there is any created 
 being but mere matter. And at the fame time he 
 would make the world believe, that he maintains this 
 with forrow of heart. For he fays, *' -f There is 
 " nothing, philofophically fpcaking, at leaft I could 
 *' never find to my forrow that there is any thing 
 *' which obliges necellarily to conclude, that we are 
 " a compound of material and immaterial fubftance." 
 As it is pointed, his meaning may be, that he never 
 
 * Cudworth, p. 135. f Vol. i. p. 20. 
 
 was 
 
294 Of the immateriality Sedl.XI. 
 
 was forry to find, that we are one fingle fyflem of 
 
 mere matter. -" For they denote plainly one fingie 
 
 " fyftem ; all the parts of which are fo intimately 
 " conne£led and dependent one on another, that the 
 *' whole begins, proceeds, and ends together." The 
 ancient and modern Epicureans provoke his indigna- 
 tion, by maintaining that we die whole, and that the 
 foul and body perilh together ; and therefore, fince 
 he is forry to find their opinion fo well grounded, he 
 fliould have been as much difpleafed with himfelf, 
 for maintaining his two favourite tenets, the materi- 
 ality and mortality of the foul. To fhew his fkill at 
 hedging, or fpeaking for and againft the fame thing, 
 and that too both diffidently and dogmatically, he 
 lays, " * I do not pretend to deny the polfible ex- 
 ** iftence of fpiritual, that is, according to the pre- 
 ** fent notion, of immaterial beings. I have no 
 " more right to deny that there are fuch, than others 
 " have to affirm it. God alone, the author of all 
 " beings, knows how many different kinds of fub- 
 *' ftances, how many various forts of beings, his 
 " omnipotent will hath made to exifl." It is reafon 
 that gives right to affirm or to deny. And if he hath 
 no more right to deny the exiftence of immaterial 
 beings, than his oppofers have to affirm it, reafons 
 muft be balanced on both fides ; and, he himfelf be- 
 ing judge, it muft be a needlefs debate ; becaufe he 
 cannot perfuade his opponent out of his own, into 
 
 • Vol. i. p. zcy. 
 
 the 
 
Se£l. XI. of the human Jouh 295 
 
 the author's opinion ; and after all he hath faid, or 
 can fiy on the fubjeft, he obliges himfelf to leave k 
 as he found it, that is, problematical. 
 
 All that I obferve more in this place, is, that 
 whatever kinds of fubftances, or how many various 
 forts of beings God hath made, they muft be either 
 material or immaterial ; for there is no medium be- 
 tween corporeal and not corporeal. That corporeal 
 is one branch or f pecies of being, he and thofe he op- 
 pofes do admit : and if there is any other fpecies, it 
 muft be incorporeal. And it is this incorporeal being 
 that muft have the variety of beings in it. And thefe 
 immaterial and fpiritual beings are made to aft, or be 
 afted upon, or both. If they are made to be only 
 aftive, or only paflive, they muft be of the fame 
 kind with pure body, or pure fpirit : and if they are 
 made to be both a£live and paflive, they can be nei- 
 ther purely body nor purely fpirit; but fomething 
 partaking of material and immaterial, fomething that 
 is, and is not. However, I do admit, and admit 
 chearfully, that as there are feveral degrees in the 
 corporeal world, fome more and fome lefs valuable 
 and perfect ; fo in the fpiritual world there are actual- 
 ly fome completer and more perfeft than others. But 
 all of the firft fort are material aiid corporeal, and all 
 of the fecond fort are immaterial and fpiritual. 
 
 But to take off the diflinftiou of material and im- 
 
 material. 
 
296 Of the immaterialUy Se^.XI. 
 
 material, which notwithftanding his Lordihip admits, 
 (for he does not take it on him to deny the pofTibility, 
 of immaterial beings), he fays, " * Though our idea 
 ** of thought be not included in the idea of matter or 
 ** body, as the idea of figure in that of limited ex- 
 " tenfionj yet the faculty of thinking, in all the 
 " modes of thouglit, may have been fuperaddcd by 
 ** omnipotence to certain fyftems of matter ; which 
 " is no lefs than blafphemy to deny." This is 
 ftrongly and terribly fpoken for one that believes and 
 adores the fupreme Being. Notwith (landing the dan- 
 ger of blafphemy, I am not fatisfied with his doc- 
 trine ; which he hath either borrowed from Mr 
 Locke, or he makes ufe of his authority to fupport 
 his own opinion. ** ■\ Locke," he fays, " finds no 
 " contradiction in it, that the firft, eternal, thinking 
 " being, iliould, if he pleafed, give to certain fy- 
 ** ftems of created fenfelefs matter, put together as 
 '' he thinks fit, fome degrees of fenfe, perception, 
 " and thought." This is fuch a fort of philofophy, 
 which his Lordlliip is far from admitting on other oc- 
 cafions. ** II Univerfal poiTibility is the range of di- 
 " vine, particular actuality, part or prefent, and that 
 '' in a very confined fyftem, of human intelleft." 
 He acknowledges himfelf an incompetent judge to 
 determine what God can or cannot polFibly do. AH 
 his means of knowledge is fenfe and experience ; and 
 all the objC(fi:s of fuch knowledge are things a(ftual, 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 21. f Vol.i. p. 212. II Vol. i. p. 189. 
 
 not 
 
Se^. XL of the human foiiL 297 
 
 not poflible. Senfation he hath in common with the 
 meaneft animal : and experience is the fchooh-niftrefs 
 of fools ; and of fome fort of animals too; fuch as, 
 his half-reafoning elephant, dogs, and others. I can- 
 not allow fo low a genius as his Lordfhip's to judge 
 of pofTihilities and impoffibillties ; of what doth, and 
 what doth not imply a contradlftion. I allow him ca- 
 pacity enough to determine, that all things a<51:iial are 
 and were poffible : but I do not allow him to find 
 fault with others for concluding a(5fuality from pofTibi- 
 Jity ; which never any man did, except thofe who 
 demonflrate the being of God from the poffibility of 
 fuch a being. In every other cafe all poIFibilities are 
 accounted contingencies. *' * Whenever we frame 
 " ideas without being authorifed by exiftence, thefe 
 " ideas muft be fantaftical." And what hath he then 
 to do with poffibilities ? 
 
 Neither Locke nor Bolingbroke write like 
 philofophers, when, to prove that matter thinks and 
 reafons, they appeal to the divine omnipotence to 
 make it capable of ratiocination. The queftion is not 
 precifely. What God can do? but. What he hath done, 
 that makes out the conclufion. Matter aSfually thinks? 
 His Lordfhip fhould give up his appeal to omnipo- 
 tence, becaufe tlie ideas he forms of poffibilities do 
 not conftitute real, but only fantaftical knowledge ; 
 and therefore he can as httle rely on Mr Locke's 
 
 * Vol. I. p. i8/j. 
 
 P P fuppofition. 
 
2^8 Of the immateriality Sc<5t. XL 
 
 fuppofition, for the fupport of the rnateriaHty of the 
 human foul. 
 
 Locke, 1 think, rather Hmlts than extends God's 
 infinite power; and that in two inllances. i/?, He 
 limits the power of fuperadding the facuhy of think- 
 ing to certain fyftems of created fenfelefs matter ; and, 
 2^/v, To foine degree of fenfe, perception, and 
 thought. For feeing the faculty of thinking is a fu- 
 peraddition to matter, it may be beftovved on all mat- 
 ter as fuch, or upon any part or particle of it, as 
 well as upon certain fyftems of it lirll: put together as 
 God thinks fit. Neither Locke nor his Lordiliip do 
 nor can make out, that thought and rcafon can be 
 produced by any difpofition of matter, without the 
 fuperaddition of a new power and faculty ; and they 
 therefore mufl admit, that omnipotence can beftow 
 this faculty of thinking on any part of matter, as well 
 as upon the moft refined and fubtilized. And thus a 
 pebble may become at once a fenfitive and percipient 
 fubftance. This ,his Lordfliip cannot well refufe, 
 who fays, " * No man living hath higher notions of 
 " divine omnipotence, nor carries them further than 
 " I do. An argument fairly drawn from the powTr 
 " of God will determine me at any time, and on 
 " any occafion." To this he adds, " I am perfua- 
 " ded," (he iliould have fiid fantafiically), *' that 
 *' God can make material fyilems capable of thought,, 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 135. 
 
 ^' and 
 
Se6l. XI. of the human foul. 299 
 
 " and that he hath done fo." If there is nothing m 
 matter, abftraaing from this poffible fuperaddition of a 
 power of thinking, and if, in oppofition to Locke's 
 fecond limitation, no reafbn can be afligncd why jcme 
 degree of fenfe, perception, and thought, may be fu- 
 peradded, and not the higheft that we know in created 
 beings ; then the pebble may be as full of thought and 
 knowledge, and may be internally as great a philofo- 
 pher, as either Locke or his Lord/liip. If the com- 
 parifon degrades the intelleaual powers of thefe two 
 authors ; upon their own hypothefis, it exalts the power 
 of the almighty and fupreme Being beyond any thing 
 that ever entered into their minds. 
 
 Every fuperaddition is fupernatnral, that is, above 
 the nature of the thing to which it is fuperadded. The 
 faculty of thinking fuperadded to fenfelefs matter, is 
 beyond all our ideas of it, as it is matter. If thought 
 could proceed from matter without this fuperaddition, 
 it muft flow from motion, or from red, to neither of 
 which it can eleftively determine itfeif. Motion, and 
 far lefs reft, in my conception, (of which only I can 
 fpeak With afTu ranee), hath no affinity to thought and 
 ratiocination. Nor do thefe two philofophers admit it 
 to be natural to corporeal beings. It is therefore eafier 
 to conceive, that thought proceeds from a fubftance 
 of quite another nature and conftitution, diftinft from 
 that which is merely material, than that a pebtle can 
 become an angel, or a being in the higheft round of 
 P P 2 the 
 
300 Of the hnmateriality Seft. XI. 
 
 the fcale of creation. This is no violence offered to 
 his Lordiliip's underftanding, who admits the poffibili- 
 ty of iminatcrial beings. Lord Bolingbroke and 
 divines are agreed, that there is in us a thinking Ihb- 
 ftance. Divines fay, that this thinker is a fubiiance 
 of a fort and nature dillinfl from matter. Lord Bo- 
 LiNGBROKE fays, that it is of the fame nature and 
 fort, not naturally^ but by a fuperaddition of an aftive 
 faculty, vv'hereby it is made capable of thought. Then 
 by the acquifition of this a£live faculty it lofes paflivi- 
 ty, and ceafes to be mere matter : and if it retains 
 both, it m\vX be a free and an aftive agent, and itfelf 
 a paflive fubjc^l for it to act upon. I fay, matter muft 
 retain both acHvity and palllvity : for a fuperaddition 
 to the nature of any thing, doth not change or deftroy 
 the nature of that thing to which the fuperaddition is 
 made. Addition and alteration are not the fame in 
 things themfelves, nor in my ideas of them. Alatrer 
 to which the fuperaddition of thinking is made, fill 
 remains matter without fpecific change or alteration, 
 and juft as incapable of thought after the fuperaddition 
 as it is fuppofed to have been before. It is not there- 
 fore a new-acquired faculty in matter. If, inftead of 
 nn additional faculty, Mr Mallet will admit a fu- 
 peri-nduclion of an immaterial and thinking fubiiance to 
 a lyftem of matter, divines and he are agreed. Bur 
 if he will infill, that only an additional faculty, and 
 fuperior to the nature of mere matter, is made, and 
 this matter remaining the fame that it was before the 
 
 fuperaddition. 
 
Se^. XI. of the human foul, 301 
 
 fiiperaddition, I do affirm, that matter can never think 
 and reafon. And the pains thai he takes to prove that 
 it may and doth think by thealledged fuperaddition, is 
 a fair acknowledgment, that it neither does nor can 
 think while it remains matter. 
 
 One would be apt to think, that Locke and his 
 Lordfhip ihould have faid, that divine omnipotence 
 can alter or change a piece or fyllem of matter into a 
 thinking fubdance ; but then they were aware, or 
 might be aware, that this change mud be total, that 
 is, from one nature to another, before it could anfwer 
 their purpofe. For let matter be condenfed into gold, 
 or rarefied into ether ; let it ferment, or let it cohere j 
 let it reft, or let it move ; let it move flowly or fwift- 
 ly, circularly, angularly, or ftraightly, upwards or 
 downwards ; it is ftill matter, without a total or a na- 
 tural change, and as unfit as ever to be capable of 
 thought and ratiocination. If the change is total, and 
 fuch as reaches tJie very fubftance of matter, it mufi: 
 be made immaterial ; that is, it muft be annihilated, 
 and a new immaterial being muft be made in its place. 
 
 How this nobleman writer came to borrow from 
 Spinoza, and do more than borrow, I cannot, nor 
 am I obliged to underftand. For he dcth not approve, 
 or pretends not to approve of the whole fyftem of that 
 Atheiftical writer ; and yet he allows \iJhould be faid, 
 
 " That 
 
302 Of the immaterialitj Sc6l.XL 
 
 it * That the vegetative and fenfitive, and even the 
 '* rational foul, can be nothing elfe than matter dif- 
 *' ferently fermented and fubtilizcd in fyftems of it 
 " differently organized," To fay it can be nothing 
 elfe^ is to determine dogmatically on a fubjeft which 
 he pretends to leave problematical. But he did not 
 confider, that by this he leaves no place for a fuppo- 
 fed and pofTible fuperaddition of a power of thinking 
 to be made to matter : fo that all he hath faid of his 
 own head, or from Locke, goes for nothing. For 
 matter as it is can do the whole bufinefs, by fermen- 
 tation, fublimation, and organization. I cannot fay 
 that this is an obje6lion againft what I have faid ; for 
 it is no more than a fimple and filly aflertion. 
 
 Of the fame (brt is what ma}^ be placed as a fecond 
 objeftion ; that is. That " -f it cannot be proved by 
 *' metaphyfical jargon, about edences, attributes, and 
 *' modes, that we are a compound of material and im- 
 " material fubftance." Not by jargon of any kind, 
 moft certainly, even though mathematical. But it 
 may be done by metaphyfics, provided the whole 
 fcience is not jargon. And that it is not jargon, or 
 words without meaning, is as certain as that the whole 
 is more than any of its parts, and that the caufe is 
 prior to the effect, and that every thing a6ls as it is, 
 and no otherwife. For thefe are mctctphyfical axioms. 
 His Lordfliip, when he finds it to his purpole, can 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 200. f Vol. i. p. 21. 
 
 make 
 
Se^. XI. of the human foul, 303 
 
 make ufe of metaphyfics. For by thefe he proves, 
 that man comes no nearer to infinite perfeflion than 
 an oyfter. It is fomething extraordinary for him or 
 you to imagine, that your readers will accept of fuch 
 language for argument. That no regard may be had 
 to your contempt of logics and metaphyfics, I have 
 already faid enough, and to which I refer my reader *. 
 
 A third objection, or rather an apology for a mate- 
 rial thinker, is taken from an article of the Chriftian 
 religion. " f The foul, the fpiritual monarch of the 
 human fyftem, doth not remain long in its govern- 
 " ment, becaufe the fyftem it governs is foon difTol- 
 " ved by death : but the ihort time it remains in it, 
 '^ decides of its ftate to eternity. It feems to be de- 
 " livered from the body, and to be reftored to the 
 full force of its nature, and to the free exercife of 
 " its powers, in order only to fuffer, for the moft 
 " part during an eternity, for what it did in the go- 
 vernment of the body, when it enjoyed neither du- 
 '' ring a moment. As foon as philofophers and divines 
 " are able to reconcile all this to the ideas of the wif- 
 " dom, juflice, andgoodnefs of God, the hypothefis 
 ''vvill be no longer neceffary to the former; fince 
 '' they will not find it at all more difficult to recon- 
 " cile thoughf to their ideas of the properties of mat- 
 '' ter." This palTage, which I have faithfully tran- 
 fcribcd, not for the elegancy, but rather to fliew the 
 
 * Sea. H. f Vol. ;. p. 202. 
 
 confufion 
 
304 Of the hmnatcriality Se(5l.XI. 
 
 confafion of it, is entirely impertinent. He who rea- 
 fons as a philofopher, fliould confine himfelf to liich 
 arguments as reafon dicftates. For admitting it an ab- 
 surdity, that God iliould punifli human fouls eternal- 
 ly for their mifgovernment of themfelves, and of the 
 body while they remained in it ; it will not juftify him 
 for making thought and ratiocination, fermentation, 
 fublimation, elafticity, and organization of matter; 
 becaufe one abfurdity cannot vindicate another. And 
 I do aflert, that philofophers, and divines as philofo- 
 phers, can fooner reconcile the punifhment of impe- 
 nitent finners with the juftice and goodnefs of God in 
 another life, than he can reconcile his notions of the 
 fupreme Being with common fenfe, and clear them of 
 Atheifm. 
 
 He fays, " * It is a common-place topic," {place 
 or tnfic would have lerved me), " that infidels are 
 " defirous to keep God at a diflance from them; 
 " though it is in him they move, and live, and have 
 '* their being. This charge cannot be laid juftly a- 
 " gainfl any man who believes a God. For a God 
 " without the attributes of an all-perfcft being, can- 
 
 " not be the fupreme Being. For my own part, 
 
 " I am fully perfuadcd, that there is a fupreme Be- 
 " ing, the fountain of all exiftence, by the efficacy 
 " of whofe will the whole univerfe was made, and is 
 " governed as well as preferved ; in a word, who is 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 256. 
 
 " the 
 
Scfl. XL of the human foul, 305 
 
 " the firft efficient of all things, and on whom all his 
 *' creatures depend." Now, all this orthodoxy is en* 
 tirely demoliflicd, not by omitting, but by exprefsly 
 denying God's moral attributes, as 1 have already 
 proved .*. From which either of thefe two things 
 follows, that boiinefs is not a perfection ; or if it is, 
 God is not an all-perfcft being. Holinefs is eflentiai 
 to the fupreme Being ; otherwife this great, this al- 
 mighty, this fountain of ail exiftence, this governor 
 of the univerfe, may be confidered as a tremendous, 
 but not as a dedrable and adorable fovereign. With- 
 out holinefs, or moral attributes, thofe who obey, 
 and thofe who difobey the law of right reafon, and 
 confequently what we call the law of God, (for 9 
 God without morality cannot be the author of a mo- 
 ral law), are to him equal; neither obje(fi:s of his plea* 
 lure or difpleafure, of reward or puniiliment. 
 
 His Lordfliip, with more contempt than philofb- 
 phers and Chrlll:ian divines defcrve, or becomes the 
 x:hara£ler of a gentleman to beftow, accufes them of 
 abfurdrty, and fometimes of blafphemy, for adertlng, 
 that God will punifh fouls in another life for tranf- 
 grefTmg his laws in this life; and that becaufe fuch a 
 procedure is, as he imagines, Inconfiftent with the 
 wifdom, juftice, and goodnefs of God* The incon- 
 fiftency of the punifliment of fouls in another life 
 with the juftlce and goodnefs of God, fuppofmg it an 
 
 * Seft. vii. 
 
 Q_q abfurdity, 
 
3o6 Of the immateriality Se^t.XI. 
 
 abfurdity, returns fully with as great ftrength on the 
 author, as he lays it to the account of Chriftian philo- 
 fophers and divines. They aflert, that God is good 
 and juft : he denies that he is either ; and yet main- 
 tains, that in fuch a cafe his juftice and goodnefs may 
 be impeached. As no moral attributes are by him 
 afcribed.to the fupreme Being, fo no immorality hath 
 place in his nature. Whether therefore fouls are hap- 
 py or miferable in the body or out of it, either here 
 or hereafter, it is not the doing of God ; who, accor- 
 ding to his Lordfliip's do£i:rine, does neither good nor 
 evil : and therefore he hath no right to reafon from 
 his moral attributes for or againft any procedure of his 
 providence. 
 
 "Whether his Lordfliip intended it as an objeftion 
 againft immaterial beings or not, yet what he fays a- 
 bout the origin of our ideas, were it true, muft de- 
 ftroy all that can be faid for the immateriality of the 
 human foul. " * We have no ideas until we receive 
 *' paflively the ideas of fenfible qualities from with- 
 " out. For though, from impreffions made upon the 
 *' mind by objects from without, another fburce is 
 " opened for our ideas ; yet all the thoughts proceed- 
 " ing from this new fpring, have either immediately 
 *' or ultimately corporeal things for their ohje^s.''^ (If 
 this is true, we can have no notion of the Deity, 
 but that of a material being). '* Senfation would be 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 22. 
 
 ^' of 
 
Bed.. XL of the human foul, 30/ 
 
 " of little ufe to form the underftanding, if we had 
 " no other faculty but mere paflive perceptions, 
 ** But without fenfation thefe other aftive and opc- 
 ** rative faculties would have nothing to operate 
 " upon. Reflection would have nothing to reflect 
 *' on. In this manner all our ideas arife from our 
 *' fenfes ; and there is nothing in the mind which 
 " was not previoufly in the fenfe. This is evi- 
 '* dently fo true, that even thofe ideas about which 
 *' our reafon is employed in the mofh abftraft medi- 
 *' tation, may be traced back to this original by a 
 *' very eafy analyfis. Since thefe fimple ideas are 
 ** the foundation of human knowledge, this know- 
 *' ledge can neither be extended wider, nor elevated 
 " higher, than in a certain proportion to them." Is 
 not this fomething like metaphyfics, and, I think, the 
 delirious part of it ? For if all this is true, and if our 
 moft abftraft thoughts can be eafily traced back to 
 fenfible fburces, then muft all our ideas have fbme 
 refemblance to, or rather fome connexion with cor- 
 poreal objefts. But this is fo far from being true, 
 that it is evidently falfe. '^ * The idea we have of 
 " thought by reflexion, is as clear as that which we 
 " have of extenfion by fenfation." Now I aik, as I 
 am allowed, what fimilitude, what proportion, what 
 connexion, is there between the idea of thought, 
 and any corporeal object, or any of its fenfible qua- 
 lities, fecondary and primary ? In our mojl abjtrafl 
 
 * Vol. i. p. vOT. 
 
 Q^q 2 • ' medl! aliens, 
 
3o8 Of the mmatenality Sca.XI. 
 
 meditations^ we view thought without regard to the 
 obje£l of it, whether intellectual or corporeal ; and 
 in fuch a cafe there is no analyfis that can trace back 
 fuch ideas to original fenfation ; no, r,oi pit niit/i- 
 mam confcqmntmm. If Mr Mallet fliould turn 
 the idea of thought, abOrafttd from every objcft of 
 it, until his head turned round, neither you nor any 
 man fhall be able to extraft any thing corporeal out 
 of it. For this reafon his Lordfliip gives up the caufe, 
 after pleading long and laborioufly for it. " * To a{^ 
 " fert that there is no other fource of ideas but fcnla- 
 " tion, is to aflert fomething moll evidently falfe. For, 
 " to explain what hath been touched already, cr hinted 
 *' at, at leaft, we have as deterniinate and as clear 
 " ideas of thought, as of extenlion orfuiiditj'; of 
 *' our inward faculties, and their operations, and of 
 ** the modes of thinking, as of the powers, the ac- 
 " tions, and the modifications of mere body. Were 
 " it otherv/ife, we fliould have no intelle<^ual ideas 
 " at air. For ideas, if they cannot be reprefented 
 " in thought without corporeal images, are not fuch 
 " mo(i certainly." All ihat his Lordil-^ip hath faid 
 (and he hath faid much to little purpofe) concerning 
 the rife of ideas, and the operative faculty of think- 
 ing, inftead of fupporting the materiality of the hu- 
 man foul, rather makes againll it. It is far from being 
 certain, that mere matter hath any operative or a<5>!ve 
 power, either eflcntially or advcntitioufly. Elfen- 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 129. 
 
 tlally. 
 
Se^.XL of the human foul, 309 
 
 tially, no man fince Hobbes, or at leaft fince Lord 
 Kaims, if he deferves to be mentioned, and no 
 man before Str^to, ever pretended that matter 
 hath. If mere matter acquires fuch a power, by ad- 
 dition, by dedu6Vion of parts, by confolidation or 
 divifion ; fuch a difpofition thence arifing, muft be 
 fupernatural, and beyond all the known * properties 
 of matter. Even a power of motion, either inherent 
 or adventitious, is an inexplicable and inconcei- 
 vable property of matter. And if ever matter, or 
 any part of it, great or fmall, hath a power of de- 
 termining itfelf to motion or to reft, it muft be by a 
 fuperaddition, fuch as his Lorddiip and Locke 
 makes the power of thinking to be. An operative 
 power beftowed on mere matter, if it is at all exert- 
 ed, it muft be on fomething diftinft from itfelf: 
 which is not the cafe of the human foul ; for it acts 
 on itfelf: it penetrates its own inmoft recedes, 
 fearches out, examines the ideas there laid up in 
 ftore, and makes an allbrtment of them ; it thinks 
 on its faculties, and thinks on its thoughts ; it com- 
 mands the body, it moves it by an 3(51 of its will, and 
 even commands or determines itfelf to confider this 
 or the other fubjeft with attention. And is all this 
 no more than mere matter r No, certainly. For no- 
 thing can be more unphilofophical, nothing more un- 
 accountable in his Lord (hip, than to maintain fuch 
 imin'elligible ftuff, when it might be avoided ; be- 
 caufe he doth not take on hini ro deny, that there 
 
 arc 
 
310 Of the hwnater'iarity Sc(5l.XL 
 
 are immaterial created fubftances. He fays, " * That 
 " we live, and move, and think, according to certain 
 *' human modes of thinking ; and that there mufl be 
 *' fbmething in the conftitution of our fyftem of be- 
 " ing, beyond the properties of matter to produce fuch 
 *' phenomena as thcfe, are undeniable truths. But here 
 *' certainty ends : what that fomething is, we know 
 *' not ; and furely it is time to be convinced that we 
 " cannot know it." And why then Hiould he dog- 
 matically aflert, that it is fermentation, fublimation, 
 and organization, or all of them, that produces the won- 
 derful phenomenon of thinking ? It is beyond the pro- 
 perties of matter, beyond all of them ; and therefore 
 can be none of them. Notwithflanding his Lord- 
 fliip's moderation in inquiring, he thinks nothing of 
 tranfgrelFing himfelf the limits he fets to human un- 
 derftanding, and going beyond certainty with an air 
 of afTurance ; when he fays, " •]" If we are to form 
 *' a conclufion from concurrent phenomena, without 
 " any further reafoning about them than fuch as they 
 " judify, what mud it be ? It mull be plainly this, 
 " that there is in the whole animal kind one intellec- 
 " tual fpring, common to every fpecies, but vaftly 
 " dillinguiihcd in itseffefts; that though it appears to 
 " be the fame fpring in all, yet it feems to be difler- 
 " ently tempered, and to have more elaflicity in 
 " {ome., and Icfs in others." This fpring he is plea- 
 fed to call an intclleftual fpring, though he knows 
 
 * Vo!. i. p. 206. f Vol. i. p. 229. 
 
 nothing 
 
Se6l. XI. of the human foul. 311 
 
 nothing of it, and though it is time to be convinced 
 that it cannot be known. And why not a material 
 fpring, fince the whole animal fyftem, and the hu- 
 man fyftem in particular, is not a compound of ma- 
 terial and immaterial parts ? He is willing to fet 
 bounds to the underftanding of all mankind, efpecial- 
 ly to the underftanding of thofe who cannot under- 
 ftand as he does ; but for his own part, he pretends 
 to extend it beyond a polTibility of conceiving. After 
 calling this fpring intelleftual, he at the fame time 
 makes it material, by giving it more or lefs elaflicityj 
 and ftill he knows not what it is. 
 
 In the character of a plain man, who hath formed 
 this general conclufion, that all animals think by one 
 common fpring, he fuppofes one a£[<:s him this trite 
 queftion, " Whether he conceives, that matter, how- 
 " ever figured or moved, fubtilized or fermented, 
 *' can be pleafure or pain, defire or averfion?" To 
 which I add, can it be demonflrative knowledge, 
 acquired by a procefs of reafoning, as long and as 
 large as to fill volumes with heaps of thoughts, 
 drawn up in order to produce conclufions, to eftablifh 
 truth, and to defeat error I ** To anfwer truly, I 
 " think he muft anfwer, that he cannot conceive 
 " matter to be any of thefe, or even how a fyftem 
 *' of matter can be capable of having any ideas ; but 
 *' that he cannot draw any other conclufion than this, 
 *' that all animal fyftems are material." A flrange 
 
 draught 
 
312 Of the immateriality Se^. XL 
 
 draught this mull: be. Conclufions are often drawn 
 from weak and indifficient premldes ; but tliis plain 
 man's conclufion is drawn dire£tly againli them. The 
 power of thinking is beyond the properties of matter j 
 and what this thinking principle is, he knows not j 
 neither can he conceive, that a fyfleni of matter can 
 be capable of having any ideas ; and therefore all 
 animal fyftems are material. Indead of this conclu- 
 fion, I fhould chufe to draw this other. That all ani- 
 mals are not merely material, or 1 do not know 
 what it is that makes any of them capable of thought. 
 
 " The plain man hath pullied his inquiry as far 
 
 /' as the true means of inquiry are open, that is, as 
 " far as the phenomena can guide him." What phe- 
 nomena ? Surely the phenomena of matter, and fuch 
 phenomena as he knows, extenfion, folidity, figure, 
 motion, reft, and all the fenfible qualities that be- 
 long to matter. But thinking is none of thefe, be- 
 caufe beyond them all, and becaufe he cannot con- 
 ceive that matter is capable of it. \\'hatever 1 con-p 
 ceive, I judge pofTible ; what I cannot conceive, may 
 be poffible in itfclf, but not in my judgment. In 
 my opinion, this plain man plays tricks with his un- 
 derftanding, and endeavours to put his tricks upon 
 mine, when he would teach me to conclude againft 
 my conception, and againft polhbility. With this 
 inconceivable and impoffible concluHon the plain 
 ipan muft be content, " * unlefs fome other can be 
 
 * Vol. 5. p. 230. 
 
 ** drawn 
 
Sefl.XI. of the human foul. 313 
 
 " drawn from the fame phenomena;" that is, until 
 from the known phenomena of matter we can draw 
 this conclufion. That thinking, which is beyond all 
 the properties of matter, and confeqnently none of 
 them, is a phenomenon of matter. Out of which, 
 to make another conclufion different from this con- 
 tradiftory conclufion, That therefore all animal 
 fyjtems are material^ it mufl be. All animal fyftems 
 are not merely material, or fyftems made up of mere 
 matter. 
 
 " The philofbpher is not content with the plain 
 ^' man's conclufions ; and if phyfics will not ferve 
 " his purpofe, metaphyfics and theology flialL 
 ** And becaufe the particular phenomena of the 
 " whole animal fyftem lead to a conclufion he does 
 " not like, he, refolves not to be determined by 
 *' them. And from his abftracl ideas, he draws a 
 '* conclufion as inconceivable as that which he re- 
 *' jefts." And a more inconceivable, and a worfe 
 connected conclufion, no man can draw. The phi- 
 lofopher's conclufion is. That thought proceeds from 
 another fort of being than matter ; that it neither is, 
 nor can be any of its known properties ; and as .no 
 unknown properties can be afcribed to matter, think- 
 ing is none of them. It is not only unknown as a 
 property of matter, bat beyond them all. And if 
 the properties of any thing are of the fame fort, and 
 .certainly they arc ; then thinking, which furpaffes all 
 
 R r -the 
 
314 Of the immatertality Se^.X!. 
 
 the properties of matter, never can belong to it. 
 The plain man is unable to explain how matter thinks, 
 " though the phenomena are fo many pofitive proofs, 
 " that oblige him to conclude that a material fyftem 
 " hath this power." Abfolutely falfe, as the author 
 ftatcs the debate. He will not take on him to deny, 
 that there are immaterial beings or fubflances: for 
 this phenomenon of thinking may, for what the plain 
 man knows, belong to this polTible immaterial fob- 
 ftancc. The immaterialift maintains, that thinkin^r 
 is no property of matter ; the materialift acknow- 
 ledges, that he cannot conceive how it can be ca- 
 pable of thinking ; and may not the philofopher 
 be allowed to conclude, that it is not his material 
 part, but an immaterial fubflance, his foul, his fpirit, 
 that thinks and reafons ? 
 
 The plain man however infifls, " That the pheno- 
 ** mena are fo many pofitive proofs, that oblige him 
 ** to conclude, that material lyftems have this power 
 " of thinking." The plain man hath an ill memory, 
 and a vi^orfc judgment. Thinking goes beyond all 
 the properties of matter, and therefore is none of 
 them ; and yet he concludes, and that moft obflinate- 
 ly and abfurdl}'-, that the phenomena oblige him to 
 conclude, tliat thinking is one of them. The philo- 
 fopher fays, as the debate is ftatcd, the plain man 
 jilainly begs the queftion ; becaufc he once admitted, 
 that thought may be a property of an immaterial fub- 
 flance. 
 
Se£l. XL of the human fiuh 315 
 
 ftance. The plain man decides pofitively for matter. 
 *' The philofopher decides negatively, on fuch proofs 
 " as abftraft ideas furnifh him, that no fyftem of 
 " matter thinks ; that omnipotence cannot any way 
 " communicate to it the faculty of thinking; and 
 " pofitively, that whatever thinks, is a fimple being, 
 " immaterial, indiflblvable. The plain man hath 
 " recourle once more to the phenomena, and objedls, 
 " That we muft be reduced, if we receive this hy- 
 " pothefis, to afiert, that other animals, befides man, 
 " have immaterial and immortal fouls j or that no o- 
 " ther animal befides man hath the faculty of think« 
 " ing." 
 
 This, I acknowledge, is a grand objeftion, and fuch 
 as well deferves an anfwer. And I freely join with 
 his Lordfhip in rejecting a modern fyftem, that makes 
 all bodily appearances to be delufions, though I never 
 faw what is faid in fupport of it; for I am refblved 
 to believe no delufions, knowing them to be fuch. 
 And I as freely join with him in rejedling the hy pothe- 
 fis of Descartes, which makes all animals, man 
 only excepted, mere machines, or automata. It is of 
 the author's own fhewing, that " * God alone, the 
 " author of all beings, knows how many different 
 " kinds of fubftances his omnipotent will hath made." 
 As in the material part of the univerfe there are feve- 
 ral forts of bodies, fo in the immaterial creation there 
 
 * Vol. i p. 207. 
 
 R r ? mav 
 
1 1 6 Of the iminaterialiiy Se6l. Xt. 
 
 jnay be feveral forts of fpirits. As the author's intel- 
 leftual and material fpring in animals hath in fome 
 more, and in others lefs clafticity ; fo in the world of 
 fpirits, fome may have more and higher, and others 
 fewer and lower faculties. All animals, all living 
 and fentient creatures, have a degree or fort of imma- 
 terial fubftance in them, fuch as anfvvers the end and 
 ufe for which they were made. That \Ahich makes 
 animals move, and live, and a£l, is not a part of the 
 body, or any thing material; but fome fort of fpirit 
 and immaterial fubftance ; of which there may be as 
 many forts as God pleafes, and many more than his 
 Lordfnip could have imagined. And as they are, f(> 
 they aft with a lower and weaker, and with a higher 
 and ftronger energy and activity. Tliough the author 
 may make a great difference between a lump of a 
 rock, and a piece of the fame or other matter fer- 
 mented into thought and ratiocination ; he thinks it 
 no Vv'ifc below his u nderf landing to maintain, that 
 " * it implies a contradiction manifellly, tliat a flib- 
 *' fiance capable of thought by its nature in one de- 
 " grcc or inftanee, is by its nature incapable of it in 
 " another." It were to be wiilied the author had ad- 
 verted, that the queftion is not, Wliat may be.'' but. 
 What is ? His own intelletlual fpring in all animals 
 hath not the fame elaflicity in an oyflcr, as it had in 
 his Lordfliip, or hath in David Mallet, Efq; And 
 why may not thcle immaterial beings or fubOances, 
 
 i. p. 236. 
 
 which 
 
Se(fl. XI. oj the human fouL 317 
 
 which I put in the place of his elaftic fprings, differ 
 as much as a phiJofopher diiFers from au afs ? In the 
 material world there is a difference between a mofs 
 and a mineral ; the one fit for many iifes, and the o- 
 ther fit only for fewel. All matter is extended and 
 folid, but all matter is not jSt for every thing. Even 
 thofe philofophers who make the univerfe out of a 
 colleftion of atoms, do not make all thefe atoms of 
 the fame fort, but of as many forts as there are ele- 
 ments. The atoms of which air is made, differ, as 
 they fay, from thofe of which water is made, and ter- 
 reftrial atoms from both. I do not fay, that all the 
 Democritical philofophers maintained or fuppofed a dif- 
 ference in atoms, but fome of them did. If in the 
 inanimated parts of the creation there is a fpecific dif- 
 ference, it implies no manifefl contradiffion to ailert, 
 that there are fbme fpirits, or immaterial fubflances, 
 capable of fome a6hons and padions, but incapable of 
 ethers. Lord Bolingbroke might have had a head 
 turned for mathematics ; but for metaphyfics, he had a 
 head or a heart turned againft them. All fpirits, in his 
 Lordlhip's hypothetical fcale of beings, were not made 
 with equal powers and faculties. And as they were 
 made, fb they aft. And this their make, and manner 
 of afting, is called their nature. It therefore to me 
 appears a contr?.di6lion to fay, that a fubftance capable 
 of ihought by its nature in one degree or inflance, is 
 by its nature capable of any other, even the higlied : 
 for ir? capacity i? its nature. We ourfclve^ have a 
 
 fentlenr 
 
3i8 Of the imviateriaJity Se6l. XL 
 
 fentient power, we have a percipient power, and we 
 have a power of reflecting on what we feel, and what 
 we perceive ; of comparing and compounding our fim- 
 % pie ideas, and a power of judging of their agreement. 
 But admitting that every animal is informed with an 
 •immaterial principle of aftion, it doth not follow, that 
 every one of them muft have the fame, or a principle 
 of a6tion perfectly equal. The fpirits of all animals 
 have a fentient power. They feel, they fee, they 
 hear, they tafle, they fmell ; and many of them pof- 
 fefs thefe fentient powers in a higher degree than man 
 doth ; and all of them have this power fo far as is ne- 
 cefiary for their prefervation. They have likewife a 
 power of diftinguifhing one objeft from another ; and 
 this power may be called ■percipetit. And therefore 
 they muft be allowed to have ideas : for idea and per- 
 ception is the fame thing ; though his Lordlliip, from 
 his 'averfion to logics, makes them different, by fay- 
 ing we perceive ideas ; or he mufl mean, that we per- 
 ceive perception. Upon fome animals I can bellow 
 memory, judgment, and even ratiocination. Obfer- 
 vations made on feveral forts of animals plead flrongly, 
 and, I think, unanfvverably for it *. 
 
 But the greateft difficulty confifts in a confequent 
 immortality. To me this is no difficulty at all. Nor 
 fhould it be any to Mr Mallet, vvhofe foul is nei- 
 ther tlie better nor the worfe in this, nor in another 
 
 * RoR ARIL'S de lationc hrutorum. 
 
 world, 
 
Seft. XI. of the human foul, 3 r 9 
 
 world, that thefe animal and brutal {pints do fubfifl: 
 after the diflblution of their material fyftem. I am 
 not able to believe, that human fouls always think, 
 though they always remain capable of thought. And 
 why may not the fouls of brutes remain the fame, 
 though they do not exert any of their aflive powers ? 
 Naturally they are as immortal as the foul of the 
 greatefl: philofbpher. They are both of them imma- 
 terial fubflances. Diflblution is the divifion and fepa- 
 ration of parts. Immaterial fubflances have no parts, 
 ^nd are naturally not diflblvable. We do not build the 
 immortality of our fouls upon their immateriality, as 
 his LordHiip ignorantly aflerts. We put the perpetui- 
 ty of their duration upon the good pleafure of the 
 creator and father of our fpirits. If the fupreme Be- 
 ing pleafes, he may continue the fpirit of every ani- 
 mal in being, or he may extinguifh them totally, or 
 annihilate them. It is not our knowledge in arts and 
 fciences, nor the fl:rength of our reafon, nor the im- 
 materiality of our fouls, that intitles us to immortali- 
 ty. It is nobler knowledge. It is the knowledge of 
 our God, and of his will, as the rule of our conduft 
 and obedience. And this even Lord Bolingbroke 
 is forced to o'^knowledge, when he diftinguifhes be- 
 tween ethics and phyfics. *' * The infinite wifdom 
 *' and power of God manifefled in the natural fyftem 
 " of the univerfe is the obje6l of one, and the will of 
 *^ God manifefted in the conftitution of our moral 
 
 * Vol. i. p, 74. 
 
 '' fyftem 
 
320 Of tb€ tr-jrjiteriiCify Sect XT. 
 
 " fyflea is die objeft c: fr." It is ths tfttt 
 
 isakes OS accoonszbie. : ajskes Tisim- 
 
 moctsL BackBBDt - — - - \. 
 
 ty that (fetensiMS (k: _: 
 
 tbe cfaoice we make, ' ijrt we a&, dot rezJcrs 
 
 ts objecb of axianec r^e, of tiie appro-, 
 
 banoaor £iappr;' ' z::ik]er and mailer. It 
 
 i$ tins that lays th- . - ^ i fatore (lirs in bap- 
 pnefi or in nnfery. 
 
 We a^ferre iscthing in odier anir^l^ diar cdo flimte s 
 tbeni fub^etr; of 2. rr.— ' '■— Tbey canncc be iaij 
 ehh^ to obferTr or : :t; and have nodsng to 
 
 anfvrer fc-r here :: hfrc^er. Many and wTJoderfid 
 Hnrks of ficiciry are to be feen in the brutal cres- 
 tion : b::r i: %vi: -ever c rffrrei, thst szy one of them, 
 for nie grcire:: crceiries eserdled on ooe anocfaer, 
 gave aisy ^zii of remorfe, regret, and repentance: If 
 Mr Mallet's cosch-horfe, or his est, knew as mucfa 
 as BoLiNGBiOKE hath wrote, and as he himlelf hath 
 MTcte or pc'- '--' . and, at the (aroe time, £d noc 
 knofv moral/ . immoralitj, -vice from \rBrtiie, 
 
 and ^ from doty, they cxwld have do t^k to re- 
 W2r<!s or pooifluneDts, or to a fonire esiftence. But 
 ^ mafter and thy maker, * O man, hmib fiiewed 
 tbet vshat is gtoi-^ mad wb^ i&th the LOR D rtqm 
 ef ihtt^ tm /9 d» j^tke^ U Urve merci^ mmi U temS^ 
 hmb^ 'sith thj GOD? For das knovrlo^e, fbr 
 
 • 12ca2i tL «. 
 
 this 
 
Seel. XI. of the human foul. 321 
 
 this gift, for this honour and dignity, we are anfwer- 
 able here and hereafter. It is not therefore to be 
 thought, that our fouls, and the fouls of fuch aoimals 
 as cannot dii^nguifh between vice and virtue, are to 
 be put upon the fame footing, to perifh alike in death ; 
 and if theirs and oun firvive the bodies, that both 
 muft rernain in a (late of infenfibility. Though the 
 parts, and pieces, and members of animals are turn- 
 ed into dull, yet they ftill remain matter. Nothing 
 of annihilanon is obferved, or pretended, flatter may 
 change its form, and pafs ftom the grodell: to the 
 fined, and from earth to erher, and back again, it 
 ftill remains. And there is no reafon to fufpect or 
 fappofe, that the human foul, or even the immaterial 
 principle of action in brutes, perilTi quite, and vaniili 
 into nothing. Dillblved thefe fpirits cannot be ; for 
 they are indivifible. If they remain at all, they muft 
 remain the fame in fubllance. 1 cannot think, that 
 the infinite] y-v.-ife Creator of the univerfe makes and 
 unmakes, creates and annihilates, either bodies or fpi- 
 rits. The firft he forms and models anew, to anfwer 
 the purpofes of his providence ; and to the fecond he 
 may give powers and faculties, higher or lower. The 
 belief of fuch a furanty narjrally leads into a reve- 
 rential awe of the Almighty ; it inclines us to a 
 chearful obedience to his will ; it makes us live and 
 act reafonably, that is, fuitably to our higheft facul- 
 ties and powers ; and tends to the improvement of our 
 namres : whereas they that think their whole being is 
 S f made 
 
^±1 Of the inmiatenality Seft.XL 
 
 made of mere matter, and that after death, and the 
 diflblution of their bodies, they are to be no more, 
 find little encouragement and inducement to live mo- 
 rally and reafonably. This life, fuch as it is, is their 
 all. Their temporal intereft and advantage is their 
 ■prima regu'.a morum, and the fupreme rule of their 
 aftions. This is the grand principle of materialifls, 
 and, when reduced to practice, renders them unwor- 
 thy of human fociety. 1 know they all deny the 
 praftical part of their philofophy; but if their princi- 
 ples do not fupport and inforce every fecial duty, and 
 efpccially if they hinder and obftru6l the performance 
 of any, their principles can neither be true nor natu- 
 ral. Strange infatuation, amazing meannefs of mind, 
 greedily to embrace an opinion that puts them upon 
 a level with the loweft animals, and that without any 
 pofitive proof, or demonftrative reafon for it 1 
 
 It is true, his Lordfhip, in the chara^er of a plain 
 man, affirms, that " * he fees no pofitive and deter- 
 *' mining proof for the immateriality and immortality 
 *' of the human foul ; and that all the phenomena, 
 *^ from our birth to our death, feem repugnant to 
 ** thefe two articles of natural religion and the Chri- 
 " flian revelation ; and that he is forced to conclude 
 " with Lucretius, 
 
 " Gigni par iter cum cor pore et una 
 
 " Crefcere fentimus pariterque Jenefcere tnenteni. 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 269. 
 
 '' That 
 
5e(5l.XI. of the human foul 323 
 
 *' That God hath given him reafbn to diftinguifh 
 *' and to judge, and external and internal fenfe by 
 " which to perceive and reflect ; but that this very 
 " reafbn fhewed him the abflirdiry of embracing an 
 *' opinion concerning body and mind, which neither 
 " of thefe fenfes fupports ; and that how fhort and 
 " imperfe£l: fbever the knowledge acquired by the 
 " phenomena might be, he was contented with it, 
 *' becaufe it was knowledge acquired in God's way; 
 " that is, the only way that God hath opened to our 
 " inquiries about the nature of things, cor[X)real and 
 " fpiritual. Nay, further, if he could fufpedl him- 
 "' felf to be deceived in this way, he would be con- 
 '' tented ftill. He would conclude on this and other 
 " occafions, that whether things appear to him as they 
 " are abfolutely, and fuch as the fupreme intelli- 
 " gence knows them to be, or not, they appear to 
 " him fuch as is fit for his nature they ihould a|>pear 
 '^ to him. On this undoubted truth the plain man 
 " would reft his mind, inftead of perplexing it about 
 " indeterminable queftions, and ftruggling prefump- 
 *' tuoufly and vainly to knov^' things otherwife than 
 *' his nature and theirs admit that he ihould know 
 *' them." 
 
 This paflage, in my opinion, is a fpecimen, and 
 a very extraordinary fpecimen, of enthuliaftical impie- 
 ty and blafphemy. If, by internal fenfe, he means 
 any thing befides rcafon, he means what neither he 
 S f 2 liimfelf. 
 
324 Of the immateriality Seft. XL 
 
 himfelf, nor any man elfe can underfland. Of fenfi- " 
 tive philofophy, I have already faid enough to fhew 
 that it is nonfenfe *. And becaufe neither his fenfc 
 nor his reafon afTord him a pofitive proof of the im- 
 materiahty of the foul, it would be abfurd in him to 
 embrace it. Senfc and experience are the only fources 
 of his knowledge ; and from thefe he cannot acquire 
 the knowledge of an immaterial being, I do admit : 
 but it is becaufe he will not hear reafon, that he re- 
 fufcs demonflrative proof that our foul is not a mate- 
 rial fubftance. But if it is an abfurdity to embrace 
 an opinion that cannot be fupported, it is an equal ab- 
 furdity to deny an opinion that cannot be difproved. 
 And he immediately adds, " -f On fuch principles as 
 " thefe, though he could not affirm, he would not 
 *' deny the immateriality of the foul.'* 
 
 Observe, the plain man is ftill uncertain of the 
 fbuPs materiality or immateriality, its mortality or im- 
 mortality. On this uncertain and undoubted truth he 
 refls his mind. And this uncertain and imdoubted 
 truth, the flay and prop of a ftupid head and a vitious 
 heart, is, Whether he is deceived, or not, in disbelie-^ 
 ving the immateriality of the foul, he is refolved to 
 adhere to the negative, and to hold fall his opinion ; 
 which he cannot embrace without an abfurdity; that 
 is, he chufes, as || he is made after tke image of other 
 animals, to live and die as thefe his brethren do, 
 
 * Eftimate, § i. f Vol.i. p. 270. ^\o\.\. y>-2\^. admarg. 
 
 Either 
 
Sei^t XL of the human fouL 325 
 
 Either in vain hath God beftowed more underftanding 
 on him than upon his brutal brethren, or he abufes it 
 criminally ; becaufe he chufes one of two uncertain 
 opinions. Were thefe opinions pure fpeculation, his 
 choice could neither do himfelf or others any hurt; 
 but in this particular cafe of the foul's materiality, 
 which prepares a way to the disbelief of its immorta- 
 lity, it is of dangerous confequence. It is then a 
 principle of condufl in all our doings. 
 
 It is true, he fays he is forced to conclude with 
 Lucretius, that the foul is generated, grows, and 
 decays with the body ; and that all the phenomena, 
 from our birth to our death, are repugnant to the im- 
 materiality and immortality of the foul. This is 
 flrongly faid, but not more ftrongly than falfely : for, 
 inftead of all the phenomena of human nature, there 
 is not fo much as one repugnant to the immateriality 
 of the foul. And if there were but one, it would be 
 enough for his Lordfhip's purpofe. But there are fe- 
 veral phenomena inconfiftent with the materiality of 
 the foul. I think I have already obferved, that bo- 
 dy doth not a(5l on itfelf ; for it is purely palFive and 
 impenetrable : but the mind a£ls on body, and on it- 
 felf likewife. It examines its own powers and facul- 
 ties ; it wills and refblves, and, I may fay, it com- 
 mands itfelf to take this and the other particular fub- 
 jedl: into confideration ; nay more, it judges, acquits, 
 er condemns itfelf. And this matter, while it is mat' 
 
 ter. 
 
326 Of the immateriality Se6l:. XI. 
 
 ter, cannot do. And the utmon: philofophical efforts 
 to make matter capable of thought, is only a fuperad- 
 ditional faculty ; which not only differs from all pro- 
 perties of matter, but is inconfiftent with them. And 
 if there is any one phenomenon which belongs to the 
 mind, and cannot belong to body, it mufl be a fub- 
 ftance diflinft from all matter. 
 
 Wonderful is Bolingbroke's averfion to fpi- 
 rits, when to fupport his opinion, not of reafon, but 
 of arbitrary choice, he is forced to conclude a falfity 
 with Lucretius. For if it were true, the biggeft 
 and the ftrongefl: man mufl have the mofl enlarged 
 and the flrongeft underflanding. When he loft a leg 
 or an arm, he muft lofe a proportion of his reafon ; 
 and as his bodily ftrength decayed, fo muft his mind. 
 None of which things hold. His Lordfliip's corre- 
 Ipondent Mr Pope was a man of a very fmall bodily 
 bulk, and yet he admires his parts, both as a poet 
 and a philofopher. Cervantes loft an arn. at the 
 battle of Lepanto, and afterwards was fecietary to 
 the Duke d'ALVA, and wrote the famous romance 
 of Don Ql'Ixote. Mr Locke, whom he calls 
 bis mafter, retained his judgment and underftanding 
 in a very weak and extenuated body : and when he 
 had fiirvived the time he foretold he was to die, 
 called for water to wafh his hands ; and being put 
 in mind of his miftake, he refufed the water, and 
 faid. Ills hands would fervc him as they were, and 
 
 died 
 
SccH:. XI. of the human JouL 327 
 
 died immediately. With what a wonderful capacity 
 of learning and knowledge doth mankind come into 
 this our world ? Left to themfelves to make their ob- 
 fervations on things that furround them, they are 
 able in a little time to diftinguifh one thing from ano- 
 ther ; to know pappa and mamma, tray and pufs ; 
 and fooner ftill to find out the breaft, and the way to 
 fuck it. And mean time their ears are not idle. In 
 two years time, and often lefs, they acquire the 
 names of things, and are able to pronounce them. 
 They make ufe of verbs as well as of nouns, and fpeak 
 a language better than fbme men at the age of twenty 
 can in fo fhort a time, with the ufe of a grammar 
 and an interpreter, learn to fpeak a language they 
 never heard before. The child's knowledge over- 
 grows his body, which, in bulk and ftrength, bears 
 no proportion to its mind. 
 
 "With his knowledge of the materiality and mor- 
 tality of the foul, Lord Bolingbroke is contented; 
 becaufe it is knowledge acquired in God's way. 
 Knowledge it cannot be to him, who knows not whe- 
 ther the foul is material or immaterial. Nor can I 
 call it a miftake, becaufe he doth not take it on him 
 to deny that the foul is immaterial. Unlefs he can 
 turn ignorance into knowledge, he can have no know- 
 ledge of the foul's materiality, either in his own or 
 in God's way. If he could fufpe£l himfelf to be 
 deceived in God's way, he would be contented ftill. 
 
 Such 
 
328 Of the immatertalifj St^.Xl. 
 
 Such writers as his Lordfhip are ready on all occa- 
 fions to accufe their oppofers of enthufiafm ; but I 
 defy them to fhew, in any ferious religious author, 
 fuch rank enthufiafm. I believe he is among the firft 
 that ever was contented to be •deceived. He defires 
 to be deceived, and he endeavours it fuccefsfuUy. 
 It is not only in this particular cafe, but on other oc- 
 cafions likewife, that he imputes whatever he believes, 
 or would willingly, or pretends to believe, to God 
 as his teacher or deceiver. "Whether things appear 
 to him as they are abfolutely, and fuch as the 
 fupreme intelligence knows them to be, or not, they 
 appear to him fuch as it is fit for his nature they 
 ihould appear to him. If plain Bolingbroke's na- 
 ture is any thing diftinft from human nature, 1 have 
 nothing to fay concerning it, becaufe 1 am unac- 
 quainted with it. But if he means human nature, 
 he muft have been extremely idle in writing volumes 
 for truth, and againft error. For whether what he, 
 or what you Mr Mallet, believe, or what you 
 teach, be true or falfe, it is the fame thing ; for it is 
 fittert for you to believe. And to what purpofc all 
 this pains to introduce a new fyftem of morality and 
 natural religion, when any fyllem, true or falfe, an- 
 fwers the purpofe ? And why jQiould you labour to 
 undeceive me, when I can anfwer as well as you, 
 that whether I am deceived or not, the thing in de- 
 bate appears to me fuch as it is fittefl: it lliould ap- 
 pear to my nature ? Whether things appear to you 
 
 liich 
 
Sr<51.XI. of the hmnan foul. 329 
 
 fuch as the fnpreme intelligence knows them to be, 
 or not ; they appear to you, and confequently to 
 every man, fuch as is fit they fhould appear. And 
 this, you fay, is an undoubted truth. A truth, 
 however, fcarce ever known before ; and a truth 
 that deftroys all other truths, and itfelf likewife. 
 From this it follows, that it is fit, and fitted for you, 
 to believe that the human foul is material, though in 
 reality it may be immaterial, and God knows it to be 
 fuch ; and the reafon is, becaufe God is the author 
 of your deception. Which two propofitions are fo e- 
 vidently abfurd, that fcarcely can words make the 
 abfurdity appear plainer. 1 faid, that this do6trine is 
 rank enthufiafm ; and fuch it is, if you really believe, 
 that it is God who makes you think right or wrong, 
 as is fitteft for your purpofe ; and if you do not, 
 it is a dodrine founded on this Aiheiflical maxim. 
 Whatever is^ is right. It is poflible you may de- 
 ceive yourfelf ; for others do. But I am perfuadcd, 
 that God neither doth, nor can deceive any man ; 
 for he is not a cunning and deceitful being, but a 
 God of truth, becaule he is an all-perfe£l being. 
 His Lordfhip, however, is not the fir ft that hath 
 given God the lie publicly. Lord Kaims, a fe- 
 nator of the college of juffice in Scotland, hath done 
 it before him ; and for which he hath received fuch 
 correftion *, as may well fuit his Lordfliip of Bo- 
 LING BROKE. Though it gives me pain to think, 
 
 * Eftimate^ p. iii. 137. 
 
 T t that 
 
330 Of the immaterialltj Sc6[.Xl. 
 
 that men of rank and liberal education fliould employ 
 their j^arts and learning to rnn down the labours of 
 thofe who employed themfclves for the glory of God 
 and the good of mankind ; yet it gives me plea- 
 fure to find, that all that they advance for impiety 
 aiid irreligion, ends in abfurdity and contradiction. 
 
 Instead of helping mankind on in their inquiries 
 after uleful truths, they would gladly reduce them 
 to a fuppofed ancient ftate of indolence and ignorance. 
 Of which take this for an inflance. " * Men were 
 " confcious, ever fince their race exifted, that there 
 ** is an aftive thinking principle in their compofition, 
 ** and that there is a mutual influence of body on 
 " mind, which fhews itfelf firfl, and of mind on 
 *' body, which appears a little after. "With this know- 
 " ledge men of common fenfe have contented them- 
 *' felvcs, whilft philofophers, thofe men of uncom- 
 " mon fenfe, have filled their own heads, and the 
 " heads of all thofe that have hearkened to them, 
 *' with fantaflical ideas and notions." That man- 
 kind did confider the mind and the body, not as the 
 fame, but as two different things, which mutually in- 
 fluenced one another, he doth admit. And though 
 this is confcious knowledge, and as ancient as man- 
 kind, yet it doth not well agree with his doftrine of 
 the ioul's materiality. With the knowledge of a 
 mutual influence of mind on body, and body on 
 
 * Vol. i* p. 243. 
 
 mind. 
 
Seft.XI. of the human foul. 331 
 
 mind, it is not true, that men of common fenfc con- 
 tented themfelves. For time beyond tradition, all 
 the ancient world believed, that the foul furvived the 
 body, and was immortal, as I have already proved *. 
 And indeed if men of common fenfe had contented 
 themfelves with the knowledge of two diftin6l parts 
 in their compofition," their fenfe mufl: have been very 
 fhallow. For if they did diflinguifli between this 
 thinking principle and the body, a further inquiry muft 
 foon have appeared fit and expedient. No fubjeft of 
 confideration concerned them fo much as themfelves. 
 It was natural to them to afk themfelves and others, 
 what this thinking principle was, how it came into 
 being, how and wherein it differed from the body 
 which it commanded and moved, and whether it fur- 
 vived the body, or was diUblved with it ? Perhaps 
 thefe queries would not occur to one who con- 
 fidered his whole being as one entire fyftem of mat- 
 ter, as you and his LordHiip do. But as ye ffate 
 the cafe, I cannot fee how thefe queflions could be 
 fupprefled; For this a<ftive thinking principle, which 
 makes but one part of the human compofition, mtrft 
 differ from all the other ingredients and compounding 
 parts. 
 
 With this knowledge of a thinking principle in 
 our compofition, it is only philofbphers, men of un- 
 common fenfe, who are not fatisfied. You bellow 
 
 * Sec^. V. 
 
 T t 2 the 
 
3?2 Of the immatericility Sc^, XL 
 
 the digrnity of a philofopher on Lord Bolingbroke, 
 (and I a;n perfuaded that he thought himfelf the 
 greatefl: philofopher of his own, or fbme preceding 
 ages); and why fhouki he find fault with his brethren, 
 men of thought and genius, and take part with the 
 unthinking and unattentive part of mankind ? His 
 Lordfhip here commits two miftakes. i//. He pre- 
 fcribes a rule in reafoning, which is not in our power 
 to obferve; and, 2^/y, A rule which he himfclf 
 does not obferve. While we have the power of rea- 
 foning, we can no more (lop the cxcrcife of it, than 
 we can hinder ourfelves from feeing with open eyes 
 and enlightened objefts. This pielcription is philo- 
 fophical Popery ; and it is a rule which he hinilelf 
 does not obferve. With the knowledge of a think- 
 ing principle in our compofition, and of a mutual in- 
 fluence of mind on body, and body on mind, he is 
 far from being farisfied. He inquires further ; and 
 finds out, that this thinking principle is matter fer- 
 mented and fubtilized, and that he is under a necef- 
 lity of concluding it is no more, even tl:iough he 
 fliould be deceived. And as if he had not faid 
 eiK)ugh to lupport his di. belief of the foul's im- 
 materiality, he adds, " * 1 am ready to think/ that 
 " God, who leaves us in many cales to colled his 
 " will, as he hath made us capable to colled it from 
 <' his works, fliews' manifeltly in this cafe, how re- 
 ^' pugnant it is to the defign of his all-wife provi- 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 257. 
 
 " dence^ 
 
Seft.XL of the human foul, 333 
 
 " dence, that we iliould attempt to acquire know- 
 " ledge of foul and fpirit." There is nothing nearer 
 to us than ourfelves, and nothing we are ixy much 
 concerned in. This -thinking principle, whatever it 
 is, is the nobler part of our compofition or fyftem, 
 and therefore the mod worthy of our confideration. 
 It is that by which we are rational, moral, and ac- 
 countable beings. And doth this phiiofopher think 
 that God forbids us to bellow any thoughts on it ? If 
 he is of that opinion, no man is guilty more dire£lly 
 of dilbbedience in this cafe than he, who hath thought 
 and written fo much on foul and fpirit, until he hath 
 reduced it into matter, fermented and fubtilized. 
 And as a conclufion that doth no great honour to his 
 fpeculations, he thinks it is not our bufinefs to know 
 what we are, while he maintains it is our duty (for 
 it is the defign of providence) " to employ our in- 
 *' duftry and penetration to acquire knowledge of 
 '* body terreftrial and celeftial, in order to promote 
 '' in general the advantages of human life, and thofe 
 ** particularly that refult from the admiration of the 
 *' fupreme Being." I do think he had much better 
 employed his time in writing almanacks, or in chymi- 
 cal operations, in fermenting and fubtilizing matter, 
 than in writing on natural religion. This, however, 
 is an acknowledgment of an unfuccefsful attempt on 
 the foul's immateriality; and that all he hath faid 
 againft it, doth neither fatisfy himfelf, nor can it fatif- 
 fy his reader. When men once intangle thcrafelves in 
 
 debate, 
 
334 Of the immateriality Se<^.XI. 
 
 debate, they are very willing to quit the fubjcfl, and 
 to introduce another. Whatever he may think, I do 
 believe, that every wife and religious man will think 
 it his bufinefs and his duty, rather to acquire know- 
 ledge of himfelf, tlian of things exterior to him. 
 But upon what grounds he finds it repugnant to the 
 defign of providence, that we fhould attempt to ac- 
 quire knowledge of foul and fpirit, is not eafily ima- 
 gined. Becaufe he cannot, or will not, believe that 
 the foul is an immaterial fubftance, mufl he conclude, 
 that it is God's defign, that neither he, nor any one 
 befides, fhould {q much as attempt to know what 
 this active thinking principle in our nature is P As he 
 charges his errors, fo he charges his ignorance to 
 God's account. This is blafphemy or Atheifm. 
 Whatever is right, whatever is done, is well done ; 
 and whatever is thought, is well thought. And this 
 finiilies a fyflem of fatality and of Atheifm. But until 
 he attempted in vain to acquire knov/ledge of foul 
 and fpirit, he did not know that it was unacquirablc ; 
 and until then he did not know that fuch an attempt 
 was repugnant to the defign of divine providence. 
 And, finally, he makes his own underlianding the 
 flandard of all human underflanding at leaft, and a 
 criterion of God's purpofcs and defigns. Which is 
 to tell his reader, " You need not trouble yourfclf to 
 " know what your thinking principle is ; for I have 
 " tried it without fuccefs ; and I am furc, that if God 
 '* had dcfigncd that any man fliould know more of 
 
 *' the 
 
Se<n:.XI. of the human foul. 2>Z5 
 
 *' the matter, he would have allowed me to have 
 " made the difcovery." This is to treat God and 
 man with contempt. The amount of all that he 
 hath faid on foul and fpirit, and the mutual influence 
 between it and the body, is. That he neither knows, 
 nor ought to know any thing of the whole affair. 
 One would be apt to think, that ignorance is the ul- 
 timate end that he and fuch writers have in all their 
 ftudies; while at the fame ti::ie they value themfelves 
 on their fuperior knowledge to that of the moft learn- 
 ed and knowing part of mankind. In all their de- 
 bates with philofophers, whether Chriftian, Maho- 
 metan, Jewifli, or religious Heathens, they under- 
 take the nevaiive. From fuch teachers one may un- 
 learn, but he can learn nothing that is worth learn- 
 ing, nothing that tends to God's glory, or the good 
 of mankind. 
 
 Before 1 finifli this article of the immateriality of 
 the foul, 1 am willing to take the affiftance of Dr 
 CuDWORTH, to whom Lord Bolingbroke jfhews 
 a greater regard than to Dr Clarke, or to Wolla- 
 STON. And he fays, " * The atomic or Dernocriti- 
 " cal, and the hylozoic or Stratonical, are the chief 
 " forms of Atheifn. The former of which, the De- 
 " mocritic, admitting a true notion of body, does 
 " therefore conclude, that all life and underftanding 
 *' in animals and men are generated out of dead and 
 
 * Intelleduai fyftem, p. 1 44, 
 
 " flupid 
 
33^ 0/ '^^ ;7777A/fl/mfl///)» Sccl.XI. 
 
 " ftupid matter, as refulting from the contextures of 
 *' atoms, or fome peculiar compofition of magnitudes, 
 " figures, fites, and motions ; and confequently that 
 '* they are themfelves really nothing elfe than local 
 
 *' motion and mechanifm. But the latter, the hy- 
 
 " lozoic, on the contrary, think, that life, cogita- 
 " tion, and underftaiiding, are entities really diltinft 
 ** from local motion and mechanifm ; and therefore 
 *' cannot be generated out of dead and fhipid matter, 
 *' but mufl needs be fomevvhere in the world, orij(i- 
 *' nalh\ eJJcntiaJ'y^ and fundamentally. Yet becaufe 
 '* they take it alfo for granted, that there is another 
 *' fubftance bcfides matter, do thereupon adulterate 
 *' the notion of matter, blending and confounding it 
 " with life, as making them two inadequate concep- 
 ** tions of fubftance ; and concluding, that all matter 
 " and fubftance, as fuch, hath life, perception, and 
 " imderftanding, natural and inconfccus^ efPentially 
 " belonging to It ; and that fenfe, or confcious rea- 
 " fon and underflanding in animals, arifes only from 
 *' the accidental modification of this fundamental life 
 " of matter, by organization. 
 
 " We conclude therefore, that if thcfe two A- 
 " theiflic hypothefcs, which are found to be the mod 
 " confiderable, be once confuted, the reality of all 
 " Atheifm will be 'pfo ta^o confuted." If this con- 
 fequence holds, I have good reafon to fupport the 
 aftual immortality of the foul, and fb hath MrA'AL- 
 
 L£T, 
 
Seft.XI. of the human fitih 337 
 
 LET, if you are not an Atheift, as well as the poflibi- 
 lity of It, which he and 1 admit. The author, I 
 mean Dr Cud worth, adds, " There is nothing 
 " more requifite to a thorough confutation of A- 
 " theifm, than the proving of thefe two things : 17?, 
 " That life and underftanding are not eilential to mat- 
 " ter as fuch ; and, 2d!y, That they can never pof- 
 *' fibly arife out of any mixture or modification of 
 " dead and ftupid matter whatfoever. The reafbn of 
 " vi^hich aiTertion is, becaufe all Atheifts, as before 
 '* obferved, are mere corporealifts : of which there 
 *' can be but thefe two forts ; either fuch as make 
 " life to be efTential to matter, and therefore to be 
 " ingenerable and incorruptible ; or elfe fuch as fup- 
 " pofe life, and every thing befides the bare fub- 
 " ftance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely 
 " accidental, generable and corruptible, as rifing out 
 '' of fome mixture and modification of it. And as 
 " the difproving of thefe two things will overthrow 
 ** all Atheifm, fo will it likewife lay a clear founda- 
 *' rion for demonftrating a Deity diftin6l from the cor- 
 " poreal world. 
 
 " Now, that life, perception, and underflanding-, 
 " fhould be eilential to matter as fuch, or that all 
 " fenfelefs matter fhould be perfectly and mtallibly 
 " wife, (though without confcioufnefs), as to all its 
 " own congruities and capabilities, which is the doc- 
 " trine of the Hylozoifts ; this, I fay, is an hypo- 
 U u *' thefis 
 
3^8 Of the mmateriality Seft. XL 
 
 " tbefis fo prodigioufly paradoxical, and fo outrage- 
 *' oiifly wild, that very few men ever could have A- 
 *' theiflical faith enough to fwallow, it down, and di- 
 *' geft it : wherefore this hylozoic Atheifm hath been 
 *' very obfcure ever fince its firfl emerfion, and hath 
 ** found fo few fautors and abettors, that it hath look- 
 *' ed like a forlorn and deferted thing. Neither in- 
 *' deed are there any public monuments at all extant, 
 *' in which it is avowedly maintained, ftated, and re- 
 *' daced into any fyftem ; infomuch that we lliould 
 *' not have taken notice of it at this time as a parti- 
 " cular form of Atheifm, nor have conjured it up out 
 '' of its grave, had we not underftood that Strato's 
 " ghoil had begun to walk of late; and that, among 
 " fomc v^'clJwifhers to Atheifm, defpairing in a man- 
 *' ner of the atomic fi)rm, this hylozoic hypothefis 
 " began already to be looked upon as the rifing fun 
 *' of Atheifm." 
 
 And it is becaufe I find his Lordfhip inclined to 
 one or other of thefe Atheidical fyftems, and fome- 
 times to both of them, that I have made this, though 
 a long, but 1 hope no ufclefs quotation. And to do 
 myfelf and his Lordlhip juftice, 1 here tranfcribe 
 what he fays on both thefe fyflems. " * The atomi- 
 *' cal fyftem, which Leucippus took perhaps from 
 " other philofophcrs," (perhaps he would give it 
 greater antiquity than it dcftrvcs), " which Demo- 
 
 * Vol. j. p. 226. 
 
 '' CRITUS 
 
Se^. XI. cf the human f All. 339 
 
 " CRiTUS took from Leucippus to Improve it, and 
 " which Epicurus took from Democritus to cor- 
 " rupt it, hath been revived with great reafon. Biit 
 " yet we muft not talk of matter, as if we knew it in 
 *' thefe firfl: elements or principles, and abftra^lly 
 *' from all the forms under which we perceive it." 
 And yet talk he will, and talk he muft of them ab- 
 ftraftly, if he believes that the atomic philofophy 
 hath been revived with great reafon. " Thefe origi- 
 " nal particles, in which the nature of it confifts, and 
 '' on v/hich the conftitution of it under all its forms 
 ** depends, are far beyond the reach of any analyfe 
 *' we can make, of any knowledge we can acquire. 
 " Whether thefe particles be uniform and horacgene- 
 " ous, or whether they be of different kinds, and dif- 
 " ferent even in fubflance, as well as in fjze, figure, 
 " or other circumftances or accidents, is as much un- 
 " known to the proudeft dogmatift as to you and to 
 *' me. Nay, whether many of thefe original particles 
 *' may not be endued with aftive principles, fuch, 
 *' for inftance, as caufe fermentation in fome, and 
 *' cohefion in all" (fermentation dilFclves cohefion) 
 *' bodies, is a point which none of them can deter- 
 " mine. And -yet one need not fcruple to fay, that 
 " the affirmative may be affumed on betrer grour.ds 
 ** than their hypothefes are, notwithiianding the re- 
 ** peated din of inert, fenfelefs, ftupid, and (iaiilar 
 " epithets, which they ring in our ears, whenever 
 '* they fpeak of body and matter. The whole dif- 
 U u 2 " courfe* 
 
340 Of the immateriality Se6l. XI. 
 
 '* coiirfe, when they go beyond fome apparent pro- 
 *' perties, whereof" we are fitted to have ideas, and 
 " which have been already difcovered, is one conti- 
 " nued petition of principle." 
 
 Now, the atomic and hylozoic philofophy, which 
 Dr CuDWORTH calls Jornr of A hciim, are dired^tly 
 oppofite to one another ; and yet, to fupport the mate- 
 riality of the human foul, his Lordfhip adopts both. 
 He fays, that the original particles may be endued 
 with active principles, may be alTumed on better 
 grounds than the atomic ; that is, he prefers the hylo- 
 zoic to the Democritical philofophy. He mufl there- 
 fore give up his fermentation and fubtilization, as the 
 foundation or formal caufe of thought and uixlerftand- 
 ing, or rather in itfelf thoitgl. t and ratiocitmtion. He 
 acknowledges, that fome matter is indeed inert, fenfe- 
 lefs, and flupid, in appearance. If it is indeed 
 inert, it mufl: be really, and not apparently only 
 pafllve. And all matter, except what belongs to the 
 animal kind, is equally inert, fenfclefs, and flupid. 
 And, notwithftandlng, rather than admit fpiritnal and 
 immaterial fubilances, he endeavours to pcrfuade him- 
 lelf and his readers, that many original particles of 
 matter are endued with aiftive princij->les. 1 leave it to 
 Air AIallet to decide the debate between Epicurean 
 and Stratonic matter : for 1 have nothing to do with 
 fuch hypothefcs, that dcfiroy one another. And in- 
 deed what his Lordfhip contends for keenly, dcllroys 
 
 both; 
 
Se6l.XI. of the human foul. 341 
 
 both ; that is, a pofTible fliperaddltional and fuperna- 
 tural faculty of thinking divinely beftow^d on fenfe- 
 lefs matter. Matter, in its original particles, is be- 
 yond his underftanding ; and " therefore the whole 
 " dikourfe, when it goes beyond fome apparent pro- 
 " perties, whereof we are fitted to have ideas, and 
 " which have been already difcovered, is one conti- 
 " nued petition of principle." This he hath certain- 
 ly fpoken againft his own underftanding, and the 
 whole fcheme of a material foul. If to go beyond 
 fome apparent properties of matter, is to beg the que- 
 ftion ; then he that goes fartheft, is the boldeft beg- 
 gar : and he that beftows the faculty of thinking on 
 certain modifications of matter, and life and under- 
 ftanding on all matter, goes far beyond all thofe who 
 afcribe nothing to matter that hath any thing of activi- 
 ty in it. 
 
 Dr Cudworth hath faid, that " * cogitation 
 " may be conceived without extenfion, as extenfion 
 *' may be conceived without cogitation ; " (that is, the 
 idea of cogitation) ; " whereas no mode of any thing 
 " can be conceived without that whereof it is a 
 " mode." And indeed thought or cogitation hath no 
 relation, no affinity, no manner of conceivable con- 
 nection, neither with the primary nor fecondary pro- 
 perties of matter ; neither with extenfion, folidity, im- 
 penetrability, or divifibility j nor with figure, or any 
 
 * Intellectual fyftera, p. 83c. 
 
 of 
 
34- Of the immateriality Se<51. XL 
 
 of its fenfiblc qualities; nor yet with motion, the 
 only thing in it that bears a refemblance to activity. 
 Thought is neither thick nor thin, broad nor narrow, 
 long nor fhort, circular nor angular, neither green nor 
 gray, motion nor reft ; and as little is cogitation eitlier 
 fermentation or cohefion. His Lordfhip, in my opi- 
 nion, hath unluckily pitched on fermentation, from 
 among ail the known properties of matter, as the 
 fountain and fpring of under/landing and ratiocination. 
 "While things are in a ferment, they are always confu- 
 fed and drumly. It may ferve for an eniblem of his 
 own undcrHanding, but can no wife reprefcnt the 
 Iburce of clear and diltinft thoughts. If his Lord- 
 fhip's foul was material, ahd if its aftivity confifled in 
 fermentation, his philofophical works are its genuine 
 produclion. The}^ are full of diforder, confufion, 
 perplexity, vain ftruggling, repugnancy, and contra- 
 di£l:ion. A dread of an omnifcient, almighty, and 
 juft judge, is the ycafl that hath let his foul a-working. 
 
 It was objeftcd, as he obferves. That " * fince 
 " thought is not tlie cflence of matter, nor any attri- 
 " bute of matter neither, in as much as it does not 
 *' flow neceffaril}'^ from that eflence, it cannot have 
 " been communicated or fuperadded even by omni- 
 *' potence to any fyllem of matter, becaufe eflences 
 *' arc unchangeable, and attributes incommunicable; 
 '' fo that matter cannot be made to think : for the 
 
 * Vol. i. p. z\z. 
 
 " moment 
 
St£t. XI. of the human fouh 343 
 
 ' " moment any fyftem begins to think, it ceafes to be 
 " material; and that which was matter becomes a 
 " fyftem of another kind." To which I add, that 
 whatever is naturally inert and inactive, can never 
 become naturally aftive, cogitative, and rational. If 
 it doth, the nature of it muft be changed, and cannot 
 therefore remain the fame thing. And therefore 
 whatever is made to think, cannot be matter; becaufe 
 it is impoflible for it to be a£i:ive and purely palTive at 
 once. To which, after his ufual flourifli of con- 
 temptuous language, he fays, " Thefe reafonings a- 
 " mount to no more than this : We metaphyficians 
 " and ontofophifts have fixed the efTence of matter j 
 " it can be no other than it is reprefented in onr ab- 
 " ftraft ideas, thofe eternal natures independent on 
 " God himfelf If you fuppofe it modified or mix- 
 *' ed, fo as to be no longer inert and fenfelefs, it is 
 " no more conformable to our ideas ; it is therefore 
 *' no longer matter, as it came out of the region of 
 " polfibility into that of aftuality." 
 
 No man who underftands metaphyfics ever faid, 
 that abftraft ideas are eternal natures, or fpiritual 
 fubftances, as he imagines, or rather as he falfely 
 afierts, that ontofophifts do. Nature is from natus or 
 najcendo, and regularly and commonly denotes fome- 
 thmg real and aflual. He who maintains that the e- 
 ternity of matter is confiftent with the exiftence of 
 one fupreme being, the firft caufe of all things, as 
 
 his 
 
344 Of the immateriality Sed. XI. 
 
 liis Lordfhip does, may well aflert that there are eter- 
 nal nat:cres independent an GOD himfe.'f'y but not 
 thofe who maintain that God alone is the only eter- 
 nal being. It is true, that a queftion hath arifen a- 
 bout truth and righteoufnefs, whether they are de- 
 pendent or independent on God's arbitrary appoint- 
 ment. But this queftion I have already ftated, 
 and decided *, and will fay no more on that fubjeft. 
 In analyfing the properties of matter, there is no oc- 
 cafion for abftraftion. The Icnowledge of them is 
 founded on experience. It is by phyfics, or natural 
 philofophy, which hath body or matter for its objeft, 
 that the properties and attributes of it are fixed and 
 determined. And naturalifts, as ontolbphifts, (for 
 there is no inconfiftency of thefe two fcienccs), may 
 reafon on thefe fixed properties, and likewife reafon 
 abftraftly. The atomic philofophy, which he fays 
 is revived with great reafon, doth make all matter ef- 
 fentially inert and inaftive. I would learn from him, 
 (for I cannot learn another way), if any of the raofl 
 eminent improvers of the corporeal fcience have, in 
 their difcoveries and experiments, found out any 
 thing inconfiltent with its vis iner/icf, or pure pafli- 
 vity. And if this hath not been done, metaphyfi- 
 cians arc as free as the mod eminent modern natura- 
 lifts, to hold, that matter is naturally fenfelefs, inac- 
 tive, and Ihipid. And I have the aflii ranee to con- 
 clude, that no piece of matter, great or fmall, round 
 
 • Scft. iii. 
 
 or 
 
Sc6t. XI. of the human fouL 345 
 
 or fquare, in motion or in reft, can be inert and alert, 
 purely paffive and active, at the iame time. The 
 paper on which I write was once flax, then linen 
 rags, but cannot be all the three at once. Though 
 body could be changed into fpiritp which I think is 
 impoffible, yet it cannot poflibly be both body and 
 (pirit at the lame time. To this he anfwers, with 
 the air of a moft mafterly teacher, " * Learn, that 
 " human knowledge is derived from exigence ; and 
 " that to be real, it muft: be conformable to things 
 " as they are. Conform your ideas therefore to 
 " them, and pretend no longer to controul or deter- 
 " mine particular exigence by abflraft notions." 
 Though the author fometimes allows me to extend 
 my reafbning to poiUbilities, yet in this cafe he con- 
 fines me to aftual exiftence. And 1 can fubmit to 
 his orders ; becaufe I do not want abftra^on, to know 
 the properties of matter, whether fimple or com- 
 pounded ; and to know, that, to the conftant expe- 
 rience of naturalifts, pafllvity is one of them. " As 
 *' long as matter is fenfelefs and inert, it is not a 
 " thinking fubftance, nor ought it to be called fb." 
 So far agreed. " But when, in any fyftem of it, theie 
 " eflential properties, exteniion and iblidity, ^c. 
 ** are maintained, the fyflem is ftili material, tliough 
 *' it become a fenfitive plant, a reafoning elephant, 
 " or a refining metaphyfician." I take the freedom 
 to fupply his ^c. with inertneis and paffivity, divifi- 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 219. 
 
 X X bility. 
 
34^ Of the imniateriality Se6l.XI. 
 
 bility, refinance, and impenetrability, which are all 
 of them as eflential to matter as folidity and extenfion. 
 And then let him put his own fermented underftand- 
 ing to the trial, to make any piece of matter, or com- 
 pofition of it, to be aflive and paflive, inert and 
 alert, divifible and indivifible, at the fame time. It 
 is true, he fays, " It is nonfenfe, and fomething 
 " worfe than nonfenfe, to affert, that God cannot 
 " give the faculty of thinking, a faculty in the prin- 
 " ciple of it entirely unknown to you, to a fyftem 
 *' of matter whofe eflential properties are folidity and 
 " extenfion, ^c. and not incogitativity." I have no 
 reafon to think tliat I fpeak nonfenfe, and worfe than 
 nonfenfe, when I fay that contradiftions are not in 
 the number of poffibilities. You aflert that omnipo- 
 tence can make matter think, by a fuperaddition of a 
 new* power or faculty, the principle of which is en- 
 tirely uttknowTi. The principle therefore to which 
 this new faculty belongs, is not matter, becaufe it is 
 very well known. If, together with the faculty of 
 tliinking, a new principle of it is fuperadded to mat- 
 ter, it mud be immaterial. And what do you gain 
 for a material foul, by your appeal to omnipotence ? 
 1 have faid before, tliat fuperaddition to the nature of 
 matter, doth not change the nature of it. For addi- 
 tion and alteration are not the fame thing. And tho* 
 I do not admit tlie term incogitativily^ yet matter, 
 while matter, is as cfleniiall}' inert and paflivc, as it 
 
Se^l.XI. of the human fold, 347 
 
 is extended and folid ; and cannot be a(5live and inac- 
 tive at the /ame time, 
 
 I freely allow, that the negative term immaterial 
 doth not denote the fubftance and eflence of the foul. 
 But this lliould give no offence to Mr Mallet, 
 w\iO maintains that all eflences are unknown to us. 
 We know indeed more properties belonging to matter, 
 and we can analyfe the idea of it into more attributes, 
 than we can that of the foul. And the reafon is plain. 
 Matter is compounded, and confifts of various parts, 
 fo far as we know it. But the foul is a fimple fub- 
 ftance ; and one fingle and fimple phenomenon dif- 
 covers as much of the principle of thinking, as all the 
 known properties of matter difcover of its nature and 
 eflence. His Lordfhip fays, " * Our ideas of foli- 
 " dity and extenfion do not include the idea of 
 " thought, neither do they include that of motion ; 
 " but they exclude neither : and the arguments 
 " which you draw from the divifibility of matter 
 " againft its cogitability, which you deny, might not 
 '' be ill employed againft its mobility.'* I cannot 
 admit, that Vv'hat is not included in an idea, is not 
 therefore excluded. For it is either com.prehended 
 in the idea, or not. If it is comprehended, it is in- 
 cluded ; and if it is not comprehended, it is excluded.: 
 The idea of a triangle takes in all forts of triangles, 
 "vvhether plain or fpherical, and every figure bounded 
 
 * Vol. 1. p. X20. 
 
 X X 2 bv 
 
34^ Of the immateriality Seft. XL 
 
 by three lines. But this idea does not include either 
 a circuLir or fquare form; and therefore excludes 
 them entirely from the conception of every triangular 
 figure. If there is any thing like argument in in- 
 cliiding and not excludingy it amounts to no more than 
 this, Becaufe I cannot prove from the extenfion and 
 folidity of matter that it is moveable, I ought to ad- 
 mit that matter thinks, though it doth not follow 
 from any of its known and eflential properties, that it 
 doth. Neither motion nor reft are inconfiftent with 
 extenfion, folidity, palUviry, and inertnefs. On the 
 contrary, as poflible modifications, they are included 
 in the idea of matter. As folid, it relifts ; as it refills, 
 it admits of pulfion ; and whenever this puliive force 
 is fuperior to the refiftance, move it muft. Matter, 
 befides its folidity and extenfion, is inert, ftupid, and 
 infenfiblc, dead and inaftive : but the thinker is ac- 
 tive and alive. Were cogitability and mobility equal- 
 ly connected with, and included in the idea of mat- 
 ter, I fliould allow that matter might be forced to 
 think as well as to move. 1 affirm pofitively, that 
 the idea of matter doth as certainly exclude the idea 
 of thinking, as the idea of a triangle excludes rotun- 
 dity, becaufe it is inconfillcnt with fcvcral of its 
 known properties. The thinker is alive, and matter 
 is dead. 
 
 Though perhaps the reader may be as weary of 
 the debate as I am, }Ct I beg his patience to hear liis 
 
 Lordiliip's 
 
ScCt, XL of the human foul, 349 
 
 Lordiliip's ftrongefl: reafon againft the immateriality of 
 the human Ibiil. " * lie who affirms, that there is 
 *' in the compofition of the human fyftcm a fubftance 
 " to which cogitability belongs, as well as a fubjeft 
 " to which mobility belongs, muft have ideas of the 
 " firfl: of thefe fubftances prior in the order of nature 
 " to that of its cogitability, as he has the idea of the 
 *' fecond prior in the fame order to that of its mobi- 
 " lity ; or he muft talk at random, and affirm what 
 " he doth not know. His fuppofed diilin^t fubftan- 
 " ces muft fink into nothing, or be confounded with 
 << one another. It will coft a reafonable mind much 
 " lefs to afilime, that a fubftance known by fome of 
 " its properties, may have others that are unknown, 
 " and may be capable of various fyftems of opera- 
 " tions quite inconceivable by \is, according to the 
 ** defigns of infinite wifdom, than to afi^umc, that 
 " there is a fubftance concerning which men do not 
 " pretend to know what it is, but what it is not." 
 Reafoners a pofteriori (and fuch is my author under 
 examination) are fo fully fatisfied to know in that me- 
 thod that the thing is, that they declare againft pro- 
 ceeding any further. And I acknowledge, that it is, 
 and wbai it is, are very different, and different fub- 
 je£ts of inquiry. By reafbning a pcjlerioriy he finds 
 that matter is extended and folid ; and I find befidcs 
 that it is inert ; and thougii he does nor, yet I find 
 that mobility hath a comicfticn with the folidlty of 
 
 matter. 
 
350^ Of the iimnaterialitj Seel. XL 
 
 matter. All that he knows is fome of its properties, 
 which do not lead him up to the knowledge of its ef- 
 fence. And if the property of thinking difcovers to 
 me a fubftantial thinker, I know the nature of this 
 thinker as well as he doth the nature and edence of 
 matter. When we fay, that the foul is immaterial, it 
 doth not follow that we know no more, or know no- 
 thing, about it: for we know befidcs, that it is a li- 
 ving and active fubftance, a fubftance that can com- 
 mand and move the whole human body from one place 
 to another ; that it can aft upon itfelf by refleftion ; 
 that it can draw conclufions, and form refolutions ; 
 and by an aft of its will put them in execution. All 
 this makes it plain and evident, that the human foul, 
 or thinking principle, hath an intrinfic energy, and 
 felf-determining power. But this, you think, fliould 
 be afcribed to matter, according to the Str atonic phi- 
 lofbphy ; or to a compofition of fome felcft parts of 
 it, according to the atomic or Demccritical philofophy ; 
 or to a fuperaddltion of a thinking faculty infufed in- 
 to matter, a fubjeft of itfelf incapable to receive it. 
 I have already obferved, that all thefe three fuppofi- 
 tions are inconfiftent with one another; yet his Lord- 
 fliip is willing to accept of them all, rather than fup- 
 pofe another fubflancc dKlinft from matter, as the prin- 
 ciple of fuch wonderful phenomena. Of the three 
 hypothcfes, he feems to make the Stratonic the laft 
 fupport of a material thinker. Strato's living ori- 
 ginal particles of niattcr, particles endued not only 
 
 uiih 
 
Se^.XI. of the human fjiiL 351 
 
 with life, but with nnderftanding, are either complete 
 animals in themfelves, or become fuch by addition 
 and multiplication. Leave thefe particles in their ori- 
 ginal ftate, you and I, and the whole, would have 
 been, and are but the minima nature. If by addition 
 and multiplication of thefe intelligent particles you are 
 become a poet and philofopher, you are not one 
 fingle, individual David Mallet, Efq; but a fwarm 
 of little thinkers. You may find, that " it will coll 
 " your mind lefs to adiime, that a fubftance known 
 " by fome properties may have others unknown, than 
 " to afTume a new fubftance for every unknown pro- 
 " perty." Thefe are your words, and the ftrength 
 of your alylum of a material foul. I think an un- 
 known property will never require a known fubjecl:. 
 And if you did not know the property of thinking, it 
 were needlefs, and even impoOTible, to inquire, whe- 
 ther thinking was a property of body or fpirit, of a 
 material or immaterial fubftance. But now that the 
 property of thinking is known, it cannot be afcribed 
 to matter, becaufe inconfiftent with feveral other well 
 known eflcntial properties of it. And when you a- 
 fcribe thinking to matter, you do it in an inconceivable , 
 and not (imply in an tmknozvn manner. His Lord- 
 fliip's, and your words are, *' A fubflance known by 
 " fome of its properties, may have others that are 
 " unknown ; and may be capable, in various fyftems, 
 " of operations quite inconceivable by us." Thefe 
 are your words, fuch as they are ; and if my reader 
 
 does 
 
35- Q/" '^^ immaierialHj Seft. XI. 
 
 does not iinderftand them, you are to be blamed for 
 not exprefTing yourfelf more diftinclly. All I ob- 
 fcrve, or have occafion in this place to obferve, is, 
 that it is your opinion, that it is quite-inconceivable 
 that matter doth tliink. And becaufe I cannot con- 
 ceive that matter in any fyftem is capable of thouglu 
 and rea Toning, I afcribe the wonderful phenomenon, 
 not to a material, but to a fpiritual and immaterial 
 principle and fubdance : and fo lliould you ; for to 
 do otherwife, is as inconceivable to you as to me. 
 AVondcrful is your averfion to fpiritual things, when 
 you had rather eftablidi the do^ine of the fouFs ma- 
 terialiry upon an inconceivable, and quite inconcei- 
 vable foundation, than admit there is any other crea- 
 ted fubUance than matter : for, as hath been obfer- 
 ved before, you have no more right to deny that there 
 are fuch immaterial beings, than I have to affirm it. 
 " God alone, the author of all beings, knows how 
 ** many different kinds of fubdanccs his omnipotent 
 *' will hath made to exifl.'* And why may not one 
 fort of fuch fubflanc^s be allowed to animate and in- 
 form, to dircfl: and to command the human body, 
 and to be the thinker in mankind ? This is not incon- 
 ceivable ; whereas the hypothefis which you adopt is 
 quite inconceivable, and indeed wrought up through 
 many manifeft contradictions : and therefore it will 
 coft a reafonabic mind lefs to afTume, that this facul- 
 ty of thinking belongs to a fpiritual and immaterial, 
 
 than 
 
Se«5l. XI. of the human foul, 353 
 
 than to aflume that it belongs, in an inconceivable man- 
 ner, to a material fubflance. 
 
 To conclude this feftion, 1 add, by way of Ap-* 
 PENDix, that CuDWORTH IS of Opinion, that difpro- 
 Ving the Democritical and the Stratonic Atheiftical hy- 
 pothefes, does ipfo fa£io demoliih all Atheifm ; and it 
 likewife lays a clear foundation for demonftrating a 
 Deity, diftin£l: from the corporeal world. To which 
 of thefe purpofes have you an averfion ? The pains 
 taken to difprove the immateriality of the human foul 
 Jhew, that you confider it as an article entirely incon- 
 fiftent with your lyftem of irreligion. And if matter 
 can think, know, and reafbn ; then may it know in 
 the higheft as well as in the lowell: degree. It may 
 be omnifcient; it may be God. His Lordiliip and 
 you are profefledly and learnedly ignorant of God's 
 moral attributes ; and as little do ye defire to know his 
 phyfical and natural perfeftions. Ye confels your- 
 felves guilty of an unpardonable preemption, for af- 
 ferting, that " * God is not a fyftem of matter, be- 
 " caufe there arife from the contrary fuppofition a 
 " multitude of abfurdities, that cannot deflroy the 
 *' demonftration of his exigence, but that are incon- 
 " fiftent with it." Tfiis is fo much well-conne£led 
 nonfenle. Thefe abfurdities that follow from the 
 fuppofition that God is a material being, he fays, can- 
 not deftroy the demonftration of his exiitence : but 
 
 ' * Vol. iii. p. 138. 
 
 Y y thefe 
 
354 0/ ^^^ immalerial'tty Seft.XI. 
 
 thefe abfnrdities, and the exiftence of God, cannot 
 (land ro'^erhcr, becau fc they are inconfiilent ; and 
 therefore the being of God, or his matcriahty, muft 
 go, unlels confillency and inconfiftqncy are the fame. 
 I have reafon to fufpeft, that he is not unwilling to 
 parr with both. To extenuate the guilt of an unpar- 
 donable prefumption, he appeals to the ignorance of 
 foine fathers of the Chriftian church of the nature of 
 the divine being, who fpoke in terms which made 
 hiin material, at leafl: not immaterial. Thefe fathers 
 fpake often figuratively ; which the author is apt to 
 take in a literal fenfe, as he does Dr Clarke's fay- 
 ing, that God hath a hearty concern for the happi- 
 nefs of mankind. And if it is impoflible to conceive 
 what thefe fathers thought of God, when they made 
 him neither material nor immaterial ; it is as impoflible 
 to know what you and your author mean, when you 
 fay, " * God is not a fyftem of matter ; but he is 
 ** not therefore a fpirit, fuch as we conceive fpirits 
 " to be." What your notion of fpirits is, ye your- 
 felves only know. However, ye admit, that the pre- 
 fent notion of fpirits is that of immaterial beings. 
 Between material and immaterial, corporeal and not 
 corporeal, there is no medium. And by this, if ye 
 mean any thing, ye mean, that God is neither a ma- 
 terial nor immaterial, but an inconfiflent, inconcei- 
 vable, and impo(TJble being. Afrer affuming, as a firfl 
 principle. That " -f the only criterion wc have where- 
 
 * Vol. i. p. 266. -f- Vol. i. p. 101. 
 
 " by 
 
Seft. XL of the human foul. 355 
 
 " by tojudgeof fpirit, or principle of thinking, is our 
 " own fpirit ; " he hath taken care to let the world 
 know what he takes his own fpirit to be ; that is, mat- 
 ter fermented, fubtilized, or endued with more or lefs 
 elafticity, according to the organized body it moves 
 and commands : all which, take it as you will, is but 
 a fyftem of matter. And therefore, according to his 
 only criterion whereby he judges of fpirit, God is a 
 fyftem of matter. When he fays we conceive, if he 
 means his conception of fpirit, he fpeaks nonfenfe, 
 when he fays, that God is not a fyftem of matter, 
 but he is not therefore a fpirit, fuch as we conceive 
 fpirits to be ; for he conceives fpirit to be nothing 
 but a fyftem of matter. All that I can make of his 
 words, and of his meaning, if he means any thing, 
 and which I make with grief and horror, is, that God 
 is either a material or an impoflible being. Perhaps 
 he means, that God is a material being, but a lub- 
 ftance of matter far fuperior to our fpirit, and of an- 
 other kind than the matter out of which the human 
 foul is made ; but ftill he is material. For if we 
 could divide matter into a thoufand clafles or fpecies, 
 all would ftill remain matter, and not fo much as an 
 atom become immaterial. Whatever he means, it is 
 certain, that he runs himfelf into number lefs abfurdi- 
 ties, by departing from the common way of thinking 
 and fpeaking of God, and of the fpirits whereof he 
 is the father. " 5'p/nV," he fays, " is not certainly 
 '* an univocal term, becaufe the diftance between 
 Y y 2 '' God 
 
35^ Of the ivwiateriality Seft.XI. 
 
 " God and the highefl created being is infinite. 
 " Thus we fhoLiId think and fpeak of God : but the 
 " men we have to do with, have accuftomed them- 
 " felves to think and fpeak in the fame manner, apd 
 " in the fame ftyle, of the divine and human fpirit, 
 " with no other dirterence than that of adding infinite 
 " to the one, 2iX\(\. finite to the other. They conceive 
 " them both to be immaterial beings, and fubltances 
 *' too." And to keep his infinite diliance from God 
 in fpeaking, he fliould have pointed out fome other 
 terms than^ni/t? and infinite^ as more proper for his 
 purpofe. If one cannot mend a fault, it is with an ill 
 grace that he pretends to find it. Would you have 
 thofe men with whom you have to do, deny of God 
 whatever they affirm of created beings ? If fo, yoi; 
 muft deny that God is a being. And then the di- 
 flance in your conception is as far as fomething is from 
 nothing. Becaufe you are a fubflance, does it follow 
 that he is none .'' For my part, I fee no ollence that 
 it can give to your pious ears to fay, that the human 
 foul is a fpirit, and that God is a fpirit ; that you are 
 a fubftance, and that God is a fubllance; and that 
 God is a being, and you another; that the Almighty 
 is the living God, and you a living animal. /\nd 
 the difference of finite and infinite, created and un- 
 created, is the mofl proper, and therefore the fitteft 
 to be ufed. It is good he doth not meddle much with 
 the nature and attributes of the fupremc Being ; for 
 
 he 
 
Seft. XI. of the human fouL 357 
 
 he feldom does without blundering, as will evidently 
 appear by what I have next to fay. 
 
 Our author Bolingbroke, in fpeaking of fpirit, 
 which, as he thinks, hath put mankind mad, fays, 
 t< * 'pi^g jjjg^s we have of fome few modes of think-^ 
 '* ing, are as clear as thofe which we have of num- 
 " berlefs modes of extenfion. So far then we have 
 " a criterion by which to judge of the immaterial 
 ^' fpirits we are pleafed to create. I call them crea- 
 ** tures of metaphyfics and theology, becaufe in 
 *' truth, confidered as diftinci: fubftances, they are 
 •" fuch. All fpirits are hypothetical, except the in- 
 <' finite fpirit, the father of fpirits, tlie fupreme Be- 
 *' ing." He who would not take on him to deny 
 that there are immaterial created beings, has at lad 
 found afTurance to affirm, " that all fpirits are the 
 '* creatures of metaphyfics and theology." That the 
 foul and body are diflin(51: fubllances, 1 have already 
 determined ; and the reafons I have given, I reft 
 upon. That we have in our make fbmething that 
 thinks, he admits ; and 1 am fure, that neither me- 
 taphyficians nor divine^ have created this thinker, 
 though they indeed judge it to be immaterial. But it 
 is aftonifhing that a man of common underftanding, 
 and a man of one half the author's learning, and who 
 is not an arrant and a profefTed Atheift, ihould fay, that 
 all fpirits are hypothetical, except the infinite fpirit, 
 
 * Vol. i, p. 102. 
 
 the 
 
358 Of the immateriality Sctft.XI. 
 
 the father of fpirits. This is too plain to pafs, or to 
 be excufed as a blunder. There are no fpirits but 
 hypothetical fpirits, and the fupreme Being is their 
 father. This can bear no meaning, except that God 
 is the chief, the father of imaginary fpirits, and the 
 grand bull-beggar of mankind. '•' All fpirits are the 
 '* children of metaphyfics and theology, and God is 
 " their father : and if children refemble the father, 
 ** God and they muft be of the fame fort." 
 
 By the many advices he gives his readers to flop 
 all inquiry concernmg the nature and attributes of 
 God, and by his own bad fuccefs, fo far as he hath 
 attempted it, it appears, that the Almighty, in his 
 opinion, is a being he neither knows, nor defires to 
 know. And all this affe(5led Atheifm and impiety, 
 he covers with a veil of the higheft efteem and vene- 
 ration for his unknown God. If the fubjeft were 
 not too ferious and important, one might divert him- 
 felf with what he fays to fhew the antiquity of the 
 belief of a material fupreme being. He fays, 
 « * -pi^g abfurdity of fuppofing him of matter, like 
 " other material beings^ was difcovered, and the no- 
 " tion of a fpiritual fubftance was eflabiifhed. Whe- 
 *' ther this notion was entertained firfl of the fupreme 
 *' Being, and was applied afterwards to the human 
 *' foul ; whether it was entertained firfl of the hu- 
 " man foul, and was applied afterwards to the fu- 
 
 * Vol. ii. p. 75, 
 
 " premc 
 
Se6l. XL of the human foul* 35p 
 
 " preme Being ; or whether the idea of fpirit and 
 " fpiritaal fiibftance was determined exactly, either 
 " by ancient philofophers and Chriftian fathers, as 
 " we have deter Tiined ours ; if ever it was, or is as 
 " much determined as we fuppofe it to be, I fhali 
 " not inquire at this time." The Noble author, or 
 rather, nobleman author, gives himfelf and his read- 
 er needlefs trouble, about the priority of two errors, 
 the immateriality of the human foul, and the im- 
 materiality of the fupreme Being. For if all fpirits 
 are hypothetical, and the fupreme Being the father 
 of them, the opinion of their reality, if an error 
 now, muft have been fuch from the beginning. 
 That the human foul is material, he contends obfti- 
 nately ; and if the fpirituality and immateriality of it 
 was firft eftablifhed, and if from that eftablifhed er- 
 ror, the immateriality of the fupreme Being follow- 
 ed, thefe two opinions are both of them alike errors. 
 And if from the immateriality of the fupreme Be- 
 ing, the immateriality of the human foul was efta- 
 blifhed as a confequence, and if this confequence is 
 falfe, as he contends, fo muft the antecedent be. 
 And, to fpeak my opinion, unlefs the phenomena of 
 our own minds convince us of its immateriality, we 
 can never arrive at a certainty that God is not a ma- 
 terial being. And my author having embraced the 
 opinion of the materiality of the human foul, he is 
 of confequence led to make God a kind of material 
 being likewife. He fays, " It is abfurd to fuppofe 
 
 "the 
 
360 Of the immateriality Se^l.XL 
 
 " the fupreme Being to be matter," but with this limi- 
 tation, like other mnteriP.l beings. Material beings are 
 fb many and vaHous, that few of them are in every 
 thing alike. His Lordfhip*s foul and a pebble are 
 both of them material, and both of them very differ- 
 ent. So far then, and for all that he hath faid, 
 God may be a material being, though different from 
 many other material beings, and from all the material 
 beingrs v/hich we know. And this I conceive to 
 have been his opinion, or what he intended fhould 
 pafs for his opinion ; becaufe, as I have jufl: now 
 obferved, he affirms that it doth not follow, that 
 God is a fpirit, from his not being a fyflem of mat- 
 ter. I leave it to the reader's judgment, whether or 
 not he doth not alcribe the immateriality of humarf 
 fouls, and of the fupreme Being, to the prevalence 
 of imagination over all our rational faculties. His 
 words are, *' * One may think that nothing can fhew 
 " fo marvelloufly the wanderings of the human mind, 
 " and the prevalence of the imagination over all the 
 " rational faculties, «s this inveterate habit of dog- 
 " matizing about fpirit and fpiritual things, and even 
 " about God, the father of fpirits." ^^'e are con- 
 fcious that we have fbme knowledge and fome power; 
 and, notwithffanding, he contends obftinately that we 
 arc but a fyflem of matter. And why may not he 
 afcribe all knowledge and all power to a material 
 fyflem infinitely tranfcending ours ? for it depended 
 
 * Vol. ii. p. 79. 
 
 on 
 
Seft. XL of the human fiiiL 361 
 
 on his own imagination to make of matter whatever 
 he plealed. It is an obfervation made by Dr Cud- 
 worth, and with which I began th's feftion. That 
 no man who acknowledged a God, ever denied the 
 Immateriality of the foul. And I may be allowed to 
 fay, that no man who makes the human foul material, 
 can have fufficient and demonftrative reafbn to believe 
 that God is an immaterial being. 
 
 I did obferve already, that to make matter co- 
 eternal with God, (and poflponed the confideration 
 of it), was to weaken the argument for his neceflary 
 exiflence. For whatever is eternal cannot depend on 
 any other being for its exiflence. It never began to 
 be ; it always was ; and therefore, as to its being and 
 exiflence, it mufl be as independent on God, as 
 God is independent on all things. A co-eternity of 
 God and matter, were to eflablifh the doftrine of 
 two independent beings : than which nothing can be 
 more abfurd. For whatever exifts independently and 
 eternally, rauft exifl neceflarily, or it con Id not exifl 
 at all. But two fuch beings are impofhble ; becaufe, 
 as they are eternally independent on one another, 
 they might fubfift, the one without the other, and fb 
 neither would exifl: necellarily. Not to repeat what 
 I have faid to this purpofe, I refer my reader to the 
 Ejtinmte *. How his Lordfliip is warranted to fay, 
 " -f" Though the univcrfe were conceived to be eter- 
 
 * P. 201. f Vol. V. p. 73. 
 
 Z z " nal, 
 
362 Of the immntmnVity Sc^ XL 
 
 *' iinl, it could not be conceived fe^f-esifient," is to 
 me inconceixablc. Yor whatever exifts eternally, 
 muft exift independently and neceflarily, and mu(l 
 be Jelf exijtcnty if any being is fuch. 
 
 I learn from Dr Cud worth, that " * fome 
 " Theifts perfuade themfclves, that the rcaiter 
 " and fiibftance at leafl: (if not the form alfb) of the 
 *' corporeal world did exirt: from eternity ; yet, ne- 
 ** verthelefs, they both alike proceeded from the 
 ** Deity, by way of emanation, and do continually 
 " depend upon it, in the fame way as light, though 
 " co-eval with the fun, yet proceeds from the fun, 
 *' and depends upon it." I cannot fay that this is 
 his Lord/hip's opinion. For I believe he was not fo 
 ftupid as not to fee, that all emanations from the Deity 
 inufl: be divine ; for they cannot be confidered as the 
 effcds of his arbitrary will and good pleafurc. And 
 this the comparifon with the fun and the light doth 
 confirm. For the I'glit is not the efTcft, but a part 
 of the fun (battered in panicles, which continually 
 flow from it. It is true, that fome talk of an eter- 
 nal eff'cft of an eternal caufe, (and I think the au- 
 thor fomewhere doesj. But this is a contradi<ftion in 
 the plainell terms; becaufe every efTe<^ hath a be- 
 ginning. And though God is an eternal being, yet 
 he was not a^ually a cau(e until he created the uni- 
 verfc. The divine attributes are lome of them rela- 
 
 * lutellcdtual fyllem, p. 84. 
 
 tk-e. 
 
Se£l. XL of the human felt!, 363 
 
 tive^ and otliers ahfolute. The relative are fuch as. 
 Creator, Governor, Preferver, and Judge ; for they 
 fuppofe the Creator's property in them. God's ahfo- 
 lute attributes are, i^Vi exigence and fufficiency, e- 
 ternity, power, knowledge, juftice, goodnefs, and 
 truth, and all other eflential perfeftions, wiihcut 
 which the Deity cannot be conceived. I do not blame 
 his Lordihip for aderting direftly the contrary. For 
 he holds, that ail other beinirs befides Gor> owe their 
 being to his omnipotent will. But whether this is 
 confiitent with the eternity and independency of mat- 
 ter, I leave to the reader, and to David Mallet, 
 Efq; to determine. 
 
 Before 1 conclude this fe^lion, I cannot omit 
 what Dr CuDWORTH hath faid on the fubject *. 
 *' The true and proper idea of God, in the moil 
 " reflrifted form, is this, A being abjoluiely per, e^ : 
 " for this is that alone to which neceflary exiftence 
 ♦' is eflential, and of which it is demonftrable. Now, 
 *' as abfolute perfedlion includes all that belongs to 
 " the Deity, fb doth it not only comprehend (be- 
 *' fides neceflary exiftence) perfeft knowledge and 
 *' underftanding, but alfo omni-caulality, or omni- 
 " potence in the full extent of it. God is not only 
 " the befl living being, or the mod powerful of all 
 " things, as fome materiarian TheifiS defcribed him," 
 (and fuch as his Lordfliip means by the fupreme Be- 
 
 * Intelleftual fyftem, p. 200. 
 
 Z z 2 inff), 
 
3<^4 Of the hnmaterinlity Sc<5l. XI. 
 
 jng), ** but as abfolutely omnipotent and infinitely 
 "• powerful ; and therefore neither matter, nor any 
 " thing elfe, can exill independently on God ; but 
 " he is the fole principle and iburce from which all 
 *' things are derived : " not necedarily, or by way 
 of enianation. As the effluvia, or imperceptible per- 
 fpiration in human bodies, doth not depend on the hu- 
 man will, but is a confequence of our vital conftitu- 
 tion; no more do Gou's works proceed naturally 
 from his eflence or being ; and therefore mult be the 
 effeft of his will and good pleafure. In my opinion, 
 fcarce any hypothcfis can be more abfurd, than that 
 which makes God, or the firfl: and beft living being, 
 and the moft powerful of all things, as materialifls 
 Jpeak, no more than a nccedary or material agent : 
 for fuch a being cannot be faid to a6i: at all. The 
 fun enlightens and warms the habitation of men, but 
 it hath not in itfelf the power of directing or fufjiend- 
 ing the emanations of light or heat. \\ ere it thus 
 with the fupreme Being, other beings, which are free 
 and voluntary agents, fuch as David Mallet, 
 would be the more noble being of the two. And as 
 the effect cannot be mere pcrfc61: than the caufe, 
 David cannot owe his reafon and underllanding, his 
 freedom and difpofal of his inherent powers and fa- 
 culties, to any being who is not hinifelf a free and 
 voluntary agent. From all which I may conclude, 
 that a being from which nothing but involuntary ema- 
 pations flow, can neither be the creator, prelcrver, 
 
 nor 
 
Se<n:.XI. of the human foul, 365 
 
 nor governor of the world, and confequently cannot 
 be even Lord Bolingbroke's God, who is wife 
 and powerful ; alias ^ the grand bull -beggar of the 
 children of men, or of men who, in underftanding 
 and fortitude, are no more than children. 
 
 SECT. 
 
366 
 
 SECT. XII. 
 
 Of the immortality of the human foul ^ and a fu- 
 ture fiat e. 
 
 AS his Lordlliip left the queftion about particular 
 providences, and that of the immateriality of 
 the human foul, feemingly undetermined ; fo he 
 makes the queftion about a future ilate of rewards and 
 punijGhments problematical. For he fays, *' * Reafon 
 " will neither deny nor affirm that there is to be a 
 *' future ftate ; and the doftrine of rewards and pu- 
 '' niihments in it has fo great a tendency to inforce 
 " civil laws, and to reftrain the vices of men, that 
 *' reafon, which cannot decide for it on principles of 
 " natural theology, will not decide againlt it on prin- 
 *' ciples of good policy. Let this doctrine relt on the 
 *' authority of revelation. A Theiil who doth not 
 " believe the revelation, can have no objection to the 
 " doftrine in general : and even a Theift who doth 
 *' believe the revelation, may rcfule to admit the 
 " doftrine on the principles on which it is ufually 
 " eftabliilied by divines." But this profefled neutra- 
 lity, and his {kill in politics, do not hinder him to di- 
 rcft all his reafonings againft a future ftate. The in- 
 equality in the diftribution of temporal good and evil, 
 hath from time immemorial been made a lufficicnt 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 311. 
 
 foundation 
 
Sec^. XII. Of the immoriaVity, Sec. 367 
 
 foundation for a future ftate of rewards and punifii- 
 nients. 
 
 Against this way of reafoning his Lordiliip un- 
 dertakes two things. \fi, " * The difpenfations of 
 ** providence in the diftribution of good and evil ftand 
 " m no need of any hypothefis to juftify them;" 
 and, :dv, " If they did, that of a future ftate would 
 " be infufficient." All the arguments ufed for a fu- 
 ture ftate^ the author at once dignifies with the epi- 
 thet of fophifms -f-. But this is owing to the imper- 
 tinence of his logics : an eminent inftance of which is 
 jull at Jiand. For tho' the reafonings for a future ftate 
 are at leaft regular, yet they may not be juft. The 
 premiftes may be ill founded, and therefore may be 
 denied, or difproved. But upon fuppofition of their 
 regularity, they cannot be efteemed captious and fo- 
 phiifical. And upon this fuppofition, that the reafon- 
 ings are regular, he enters into an examination of 
 them, and reprefents them in thefe words : " [| If 
 " there is not a future ft?te, God is neither good nor 
 *' juft, according to our ideas of goodnefs and juftice, 
 *' in his difpenfations; if he is not good and juft ac- 
 " cording to our ideas of thefe moral attributes, nei- 
 " ther can the phyfical attributes, fuch as infinite wif- 
 *' doai and power, belong to him ; and a being which 
 *' hath none of thefe, is not a God. But thtre is a 
 " future nate:' Kad he underftood I' art de penfer^ 
 
 * Vol.iv. p. 311. f Vol.iv. p. 207. I! Vol. iv. p. 312. 
 
 put 
 
368 Of the immortality of the Seft. XIL 
 
 put into his hands when he was young, he would not 
 have put a fubfumption in place of a conclufion : for 
 fo do his words ftand. That which religionifts intend 
 to pr6ve, is a future ftate ; and as a medium, they 
 make ufe of the divine attributes : but as he miferably 
 and ignorantly reprefents the argument, he makes the 
 divine attributes the point to be proved, and a future 
 ftate to be the medium. If I fliould fay, that this is 
 a fraudulent mifreprefentation, the accufation would 
 not be more unjufl than many with which he charges 
 as good men, and better rcafbners than himfelf. They 
 reafon, that there muft be a future ftate, becaufe God 
 is holy; and he makes them fay, that God is holy, 
 becaufe there is a future flate, that he may with the 
 more affurance aflert, " that divines have dared to 
 " argue, and I am juftificd in faying, that they be- 
 " tray the caufe of God to the Atheift, when they 
 " join with him in fo many points, that nothing re- 
 *' mains to be oppofed to him in defence of God's ex- 
 " illencc, but the problematical and futile reafonings 
 " they employ to prove a future ftate." Poor rea- 
 foncr ! I had almofl faid contemptible. If the pre- 
 midcs do not bear the concluHon, muft the difputant 
 therefore renounce them ? And upon fuppofition that 
 the rcligionift doth not make out a future ftate, is he 
 therefore obliged to deny the being of God ? This 
 may be his Lord/hip's meaning, and very likely it is. 
 May not the religionift, with the fame right which the 
 author pretends to ufe, let the conclufion remain pro- 
 blematical r 
 
Seft. XIL human foul J and a future flat e. ^6^ 
 
 blematical ? It is generally eftablidied as a maxim, 
 That matter neither dotli, nor can be made to think 
 and reafbn ; and if from this 1 lliould conclude, that 
 David Mallet neither thinks nor reafons, becaufc 
 he is entirely material, I am fare he would deny the 
 maxiai on which my conclufion is founded. That he 
 thinks and reafons, ftands in need of no proof. The 
 point then to be difcu(Ied is. Whether the human foul, 
 and David's in particular, is material or immaterial? 
 In favour of the maxim. That matter doth not rea- _ 
 fon, I muft conclude, and think it a juO: conclufion, 
 that his foul is immaterial. Nor hath he fuch grounds 
 to deny as I have to affirm that it is : for he and his 
 author do not take on them to deny that there are 
 created immaterial beings. And he hath faid, in the 
 prefent cafe, that reafon will neither deny nor affirm 
 that there is a future flate. And how then can reli- 
 gionifts, who maintain a future ftate as agreeable to 
 the divine moral attributes, be faid to betray the caufe 
 of God to the Atheift.'' Such are the vain and con- 
 founded cfTe^s of a fermented underftanding. AVhat- 
 ever rill-: religion may run by maintaining a future 
 (late of rewards and punilliments, the world can be 
 no greater lofer by it, than gainers by his Lordfliip's 
 philofophy. He. is himfelf a mere material fyftem, 
 made for a momentary life : his God is neither good 
 nor juft, according to any idea that we can form of 
 goodnefsand juftice : his God neither regards what 
 he does, nor what he fuffers, as being perfonally be- 
 5 A low 
 
370 Of the immortality of the ScCt, XII. 
 
 low his providence : that a life to come is but at bcft 
 an ufef ul fable : and if it is not a fable, he and eve- 
 ry other wicked and impious man are perfeftly fafe ; 
 becaufe God is an all-perfect being, and will deal 
 with him and them according to the perfeftions of his 
 own nature, and not according to the imperfections 
 of poor David Mallet, Efq; in particular. And 
 in all this fcheme, is there any principle, any rcafon 
 contained, why the faid poor David Mallet iliould 
 be a better man than an Athcift ? 
 
 The fame David Mallet makes his Lord/hip 
 ^-^y, That *' * no doctrines were ever inculcated more 
 *' ftrongly in the minds of men, nor inforced by more 
 " authority, than thofe of a future ftate. The infti- 
 *' tutors of religion, and the priefts of thefe religions, 
 ** were careful to eftablifli and maintain them in be- 
 " lief." The author, I hope inadvertently, makes 
 all religion a human inftitution ; and from this inadver- 
 tency he reafons confequentially, when he makes a 
 future ftate of rewards and puniiliments a human in- 
 vention. I fay, this is to reafon confequentially : for 
 if this doctrine of a future Hate is taken away, there 
 is no fuch thing as religion left. It is no wonder, 
 tiicn, that much pains are taken to maintain this doc- 
 trine, and jufl as much as to maintain religion. I am 
 very v.'cll convinced, that, without the belief of a fu- 
 ture ftate of retribution, religion, and the belief of 
 
 * \o\. iv. p. 3.16, 
 
 Lord 
 
Sefl. XII. human Jotil, and a future Jiate, 371 
 
 Lord Bolingbroke's God, would be of no life to 
 mankind, either in a fingle or focial ftate. He hath 
 faid, that " * the belief of future rewards and pu- 
 " niiliments was very /Kcejfary, and could not fail to 
 " have fom^ etFeft on the manners of men, to encou- 
 " rage virtue, and to reftrain vice." Now, if the 
 belief of future rewards and punifliments is not only 
 neceflary, but very necejjary, it muft not only have 
 (bme effeft, but a proportionable effe£l on the man- 
 ners of men. Take this belief away, and there is 
 nothing left to hinder a man from doing for himfelf, 
 and for his temporal eafe and advantage, whatever he 
 can do fafely. It is not at all therefore furprifing, 
 '' that fome at this day fcruple not to declare, that if 
 " this do6lrine is taken away, all difference between 
 " good and bad is taken away, and there is no fuch 
 " thing as religion left f ." Though jujl and utijaji, 
 eflentially, and eternally, and independently of di- 
 vine appointment, differ, as hath been fully proved ; 
 yet this difference brings no man under a formal oblir 
 gation to facrifice himfelf, and all his enjoyments and 
 expectations, for the fake of this his fpeculative know- 
 ledge. And, according to his Lordfhip's dc£lrlne, he 
 hath nothing to fear from God for chufing his tem- 
 poral happincfs, (and he expe<5ls nothing beyond this 
 life), becaufe he is an individual, and as fuch below 
 the care and infpection of divine providence. As fuch 
 lie is an extraprovidential being, whofc doings and 
 
 * Vol.iv. p. 207. N f Vol. Iv. p. 34.6. 
 
 3 x\ 2 whofe 
 
372 Of the immortality of the Sc^t.XII. 
 
 whofe fufTerings are entirely indifferent to his Deity. 
 If it is a matter of furprife, according to his Lord- 
 ihip, it muft be in favour of the fincerity and integri- 
 ty of Moses, " * that a doflrine fo uleful in all 
 *' religions, and therefore incorporated into all the 
 *' fyftcms of Paganifin, is left wholly out of that 
 '* of the Jews." And 1 am no lefs furpri(ed with 
 his ignorance: for that Moses taught, and the Jews 
 believed, the dodrine of a future (tate, 1 have alrea- 
 dy made appear from the inflance of Enoch's tranfla- 
 tion. And is it not dill more furprifing, that one who 
 makes profefTion of fome fort of religion, and ikill in 
 politics, iliould labour hard to prove, that this doc- 
 trine, fo ufeful to mankind, and incorporated into all 
 fyftcms of religion, is only a fable and hYtion, of pure 
 human invention. And though " -f Icgiilators and 
 " magiflrates have, for political purpofcs, authorifed 
 " the fame dodlrines, folemnized them by religious 
 *' inflitutions, confirmed them by laws-, and fct edu- 
 " cation, the great nurfc of theological opinions, on 
 " tlicir fide," (to excufe his contempt of this their 
 vvifdom, or of their real belief, he adds, though thefe 
 were great advantages), " we do not find that this 
 *' doftrine ever had an eficft fuitablc to it, or to the 
 " importance of it." But this he alleviates, by add- 
 ing, " that remote confidcrations, though they are 
 ** believed, haye net th,c fair.c influence w hich im- 
 " mcdirte objcffs have; bi;t they have en inf uence 
 
 * \'oI. iv. p. 2C~. f \o\. iv. p. •^.^7. 
 
 " proponionable 
 
Scift.XII. human foul, and a future fiate, 373 
 
 *' proportionable to the belief" of them, efpecially in 
 " a cafe like this, where the punifliments held out are 
 " nnavoidaljle ; and no man can hope, as every man 
 '' does in all other cafes, to efcape them." It can- 
 not be denied, that men are very ingenious in finding 
 out expedients to reconcile their religious principles 
 with their immoral practice ; and fometimes, with great 
 fuccefs, they plead in favour of their lufts and paf- 
 fions what would always flop them in the profecution 
 of tem}7oral things. To convince a man, that if he 
 proceeds in the execution of fome fuch views, he will 
 certainly repent his doings, infaUibly hinders him: 
 but with refpeft to another life, his repentance 
 (without which there is no pardon) is often his only 
 encouragement to undertake and to purfue his luft- 
 ful purpofes. This diforder of mind is not to be ac- 
 counted for, but by that general diforder of the hu- 
 man race taught in the facred records of the Chriflian 
 religion. 
 
 That men are governed by their pafTions and ap- 
 petites, and not by their principles, hath been main- 
 -tained by Mr Bayle ; and I have already made my 
 remarks on this his doctrine. But this nobleman of 
 an author, after many declarations made for the uti- 
 lity and necefflty of religion for the fupport and go- 
 vernment of fociety, as hath been before obferved, 
 fhould not fay, and cannot fay, without contradict- 
 ing hi.iifclf, that ir never had an clT^fl fuitablc to the 
 
 imnortnnce 
 
374 Q/' ^^-'^ imviortality of the St^t, XII. 
 
 importance of it. Though many who really believe 
 a life of rewards and punifliments when this life is 
 ended, do not a£l on all occafions ibitably to fuch a 
 perfuafion ; I am convinced, that numbers are ready 
 to forfeit any temporal advantages, and even their 
 lives, rather than forfeit their glorious hopes, and in- 
 cur the difpleafurc of their God in a future ftate. 
 Martyrdom his Lordfnip may, and does reckon mad- 
 nefs : but no man is, or can be admitted a member 
 of fociety on lower terms than the lofs of life when 
 juftice due to the fociety, and his implicit engagement, 
 require it. What an ill man was Lord Boling- 
 BROKE, and what an ill, or rather what a worfe man 
 is David Mallet, Efq; to write and publilli, in 
 their mother-tongue, fuch impious and injurious tenets 
 as tend to their own, and the ruin of mankind, to ba- 
 niili the fear of God from the earth, and to dilfolve 
 fociety, only that they may live as they lift, and die 
 like the beails ? 
 
 AivD the more unreafonable both of them are : fcr 
 they do not fay, " * that to believe a future ftate, 
 ** is to believe a vulgar error;" but this they fay, 
 that " it cannot be demonftratcd by reafon. It is not 
 '* in the nature of it capable of demonftration. It 
 " was therefore originally an hypothclis, and may 
 " therefore be a vulgar error." AVhethcr it is an er- 
 ror or not, neither tlic author nor the publiilicr know. 
 
 » Vg!. :v. p. 24S. 
 
 But 
 
Se^l.XII. human foul y and a future flat e. 375 
 
 But I know, that if it is an error, it is a moft won- 
 derful error ; an error, if not co-cval with mankind, 
 at leaft of the greateft antiquity and univerfality. 
 When none returned from the flate of death, nor any 
 animal, (if fome infefts may be excepted), how could 
 it come into the minds of men, that death was but a 
 paflage from this to another Ufe ? All the phenomena 
 of nature were againft this ancient and univerfal opi- 
 nion. It is wonderful, I fay, at any rate ; but ftill 
 more wonderful, had men ftarted into being, or grown 
 out of the earth like mulhrooms. But this wonder 
 ceafes, by fuppofing man to be made an intelligent 
 creature by an infinitely-wile Creator, who is himfelf 
 a fpirit, and the Father of our fpirits, who taught 
 man his duty, and the confequence of performing or 
 neglefting it. 
 
 I know for certain, that the belief of a future flate 
 is as ancient, as univerfal, and as ufeful, and as ne- 
 ceflary, as religion. And his Lordfhip admits, that it' 
 is not only neceffary, but very necejfary ; and £0 ne- 
 ceflary, that there can be no fociety nor government 
 without it. And if fociety is natural, fb muft all the 
 means, without which it cannot fubfift, be natural 
 likewife. Was this then an hypothefis made by fome 
 Egyptian legiflator ? Not by a prieft, for pricfthood 
 muft have been pofterior to religion. I fliould rather 
 believe, the neceffity of religion, abftra^ling from its 
 being directly taught by God, and particularly a fu- 
 ture 
 
37<^ Of the immortality of the Scft. XII. 
 
 ture flate of rewards and punifhments, forced itfelf 
 into the minds of men. To fhew the utility, neceifi- 
 ty, and truth of religion, I have already publiflied 
 itiy thoughts largely *. Of all which I only tran- 
 fcribe thefe words -f. 
 
 *' Though I fliould admit, that the ellential dif- 
 *' ference between moral good and moral evil, while 
 " the mind is affected with it, is a principle as flrong 
 *' as felf-prefervation ; and that all the motives for 
 *' being virtuous and honed:, and the motives for pre- 
 " ferving one's felf, jufl balance one another ; the 
 " cafe then would be a continual irrefblution, or a 
 *' perpetual contradiction. For this caufe the debate 
 " about utile and honejtiim was firft flarted, and con- 
 " tinned from beyond the days of Socrates until 
 " now, and will continue for ever undecided, accor- 
 " ding to the Atheiflical hypothefis. Between unan- 
 " fwerable arguments on both fides of a queftion, there 
 " always lies fome unknown truth, in wliich thefe un- 
 " anfwerable and contradi(51:ory reafbns muft centre. 
 *' And in the prefent cafe, it is the belief of God 
 " and his providence ; for this conclufion the debate 
 *' will bear : for, by our make and confiitution, vir- 
 " tue and honefty is to us good and eligible. That 
 " our happinefs is our chief end, and that we are wife 
 ** enough to confult it, is certain beyond debate. And 
 ** therefore there mufl: be fufficient provifion in ex- 
 
 ♦ Eftiinatc^ § ix. x. xi. f Sedl. x. p. 365. 
 
 " peClation 
 
Sefl. XII. human foul, and a future ft ate. 377 
 
 " peftation for the happincfs of thofe who chufe to 
 *'■ aft the virtuous and reafbnable part. This the 
 " great, the omnifcient, thejufl, and the almighty 
 *' God, the fupreme and fovereign being of the 
 " univcrfe, can only do. And this certainly he will 
 " do, if man is not a compodtion of contradiftions. 
 " There is no contradiftion in nature. We are told 
 *' by our reafon, that we ought to aft virtuoufly ; and 
 " the fame reafon tells us, that we ought to aft, for 
 *' our own happinefs. How eafy, how natural, and 
 *' how comfortable then is it to conclude, that there 
 " is a God, whofe kingdom is univerlal and everlail- 
 " ing, who will make all the Vrrtuous aftions of a rea- 
 " fonable man turn out to his happinefs, either here 
 *' or hereafter ? 
 
 " Our intereft and our reafon, our honefty and 
 *' our happinefs, honejium and utile^ are two colla- 
 " teral pillars fupporting human conduft, and reli- 
 " gion is the bafis of both. The natural fitnefs of 
 *' things, and the intrinfic reftitudc of virtue, is not 
 " the firft and original obligation of all. For, properly 
 *' fpeaking, it is no obligation ; and if it were, and 
 " whatever force it might have, our own happinefs 
 " and prefervation hath at leaft an equal, and fome- 
 " times an oppofitc force. Separately, thefe forces 
 " aft againfl one another. Intereft and honefly in 
 " this life, in many cafes are irreconcilable ; and it 
 *^ is hard for a reafonable man to part with either, 
 
 3 B " Here 
 
378 Of the hnviortality cf the Sea.XlI, 
 
 ** Here his reafoii leaves him, by becoming ufelefs. 
 " And if he retains it, it is to his trouble and dif- 
 " quiet. The brutal fpecies of beings, by their 
 *' conftitution, arc regularly over-ruled by their in- 
 " ftinft of fclf-prcfcrvation, without any obflruftion 
 '* from the philofophy of right and zvrong, or the 
 " diflinftion betwixt utt/e and bcnejlum. If the A- 
 " theift, like the beafl:, is to be eternally dillolved 
 " into the duft, be mufl: be at a lofs when his rcafon 
 " retrains him from the immediate life of every 
 " means that tends to the prefervation of his being. 
 *' More miferable than the beafl: mufl: that man be, 
 " when his noblefl: faculties become troublcfome and 
 " vexatious i If one eye rcprefcnts a plain, and the 
 ** other rcprefents it a precipice, both become ufe- 
 " lefs, and not only ufelefs, but perplexing to the 
 " traveller. This is his cafe, who fees the fame 
 " thing to be reafonable and ruinous, to be good and 
 " eligible in itfelf, but to him dreadful and deflruc- 
 ** tive. But put the force and influence of virtue 
 " and advantage, like two weights in the fame fcalc, 
 " and they become fufllcient to overbalance the 
 ^' fl:rongeft and the mofl: unruly paffions of human 
 *' nature. 
 
 " This conjunftion is only made, and eafily made, 
 " and always made, in religion. He that feparares 
 " utile from hcnejlum^ and virtue from happinefs, 
 '* has as little knowledge of the make of the human 
 
 '* mind. 
 
Se(n:.XII. human fiulj and a future Jiate, 379 
 
 " mind, as he hath of the make of the human body, 
 " who isibr cutting off one leg, that the man may 
 " ftand the firmer upon the other. We have no rea- 
 *' fon then to renounce religion and a mercenary mo- 
 ** rality, as libertines call obedience to God, and 
 '* the expectation of happinefs, to learn of them ge- 
 *' nerofity, brotherly love, and all focial duties and 
 " virtues. For by how much more religious any 
 " man is, the better man, and the better member 
 " of fociety is he." 
 
 I might here put an end to the difpute concerning 
 a future ftate of rewards and puniiliments ; but that 
 Mr Mallet, and fuch as he, may not triumph in 
 their objeftions as unanfwerable, I chufe to follow 
 his Lordlhip and him as far as they go. That all 
 rational beings are ellentially free agents, I have elfe- 
 where proved * ; and this my author, and Mr 
 Mallet for him, do admit. For they exprefsly 
 fay, that " f God, when he gave us realbn, left us 
 " to our free will, to make a proper or an improper ufe 
 " of it. So that we are obliged to our Creator for a 
 " certain rule, and fufficient means of arriving at 
 '* happinefs ; and have none to blame but ourfelvcs 
 *' when we fail of it. It is not reafon, but perverfe 
 " will, that makes us fall fhort of attainable happi- 
 *' nefs. The rule is certain, and the means fo fuf- 
 '' iicient, that they who deviate from them are felf- 
 
 * Eftlmatc. § ii. -{■ Vol. iv. p. 392. 
 
 :; B 2 " condemned.'^ 
 
380 Of the mmorfality of the Se^. XII. 
 
 " condemned." But from this rule, and thefe 
 means, all men do deviate, fome more, and fome 
 lefs. Th'.s rule, and thcfe means, are bcflowed on 
 man by his Creator ; and it is therefore his will and 
 pleafure, and conlequently his law, that we follow 
 the rule, and ufe the means. i\nd as there can be 
 no law without a fanclion, this fanftion may be im- 
 mediately executed, or it may be delayed. That 
 fentence againfl every evil work is not fpeedily exe- 
 cuted, no man will deny. It may therefore be de- 
 layed ; and, for all that can be remarked to the con- 
 trary, it is poflponed till after death ; and if it is not 
 executed tliert, the fanftion is vain, and fo is the law: 
 than which there cannot be greater blafphcmy. 
 
 Well, faith the author, they are puniflied here. 
 By their own fault they fall fhort of happincfs, and 
 are felf-condemned. That they are felf-condemned, 
 I do admit. But this felf-ccndemnation doth not 
 make void the law of God, by which they were 
 bound to obedience, nor annul the fanclion of it. It 
 is rather an homologation of the law, and of the 
 lanftion of it, than the punifliment of tranlgreffing it. 
 And it is nothing but the fear of merited puniHimenr, 
 that makes felf-condcmnation fo very fevcre and fmart- 
 ing. Without fuch troublcfome apprehenfions, crimi- 
 nals would be, and gcncinlly they are, as happy as 
 other men, or as ar.y Arheill in the world. And as 
 far as the courfe of nature, and the ordinary ftate cf 
 
 thing^^, 
 
Se«5t. XII. human f ml, and a future Jiate. 381 
 
 things, and the common ftandard of human affairs, 
 permit, he hath his fliare, and a very large allow- 
 ance, of all the happinefs that is to be found in this 
 life. It hath been obferved by an ancient Jewifh 
 writer, that * the wicked are not tn ircuhle as other 
 men : neither are they plagued like other men. — — 
 Their eyes Jland out with fatnefs : they have more than 
 
 heart could wi;K And they fay. How doth GOD 
 
 know ? and is there knowledge in the Moft High ? 
 Behold., thefe are the ungodly., who profper in the world. 
 And if it was not his Lordfliip's, and if it is not Mr 
 Mallet's cafe, it is the cafe of many wicked, and 
 even of the worft of men. The defires of mankind 
 are various; and what every man defires mod:, mufl 
 be his chief happinefs when obtained. And wonder- 
 ful is their choice. The Arabian in his tent, the 
 Tartar in his car, and the favage in his hut, are all 
 of them happy, in fo far as they enjoy what they 
 defirc. And he who fets his heart upon worldly plea- 
 fures and enjoyments, is in a fairer way of being 
 happier in this life, than the moft moral and reli- 
 gious perfon ; his glorious hopes, which often fill his 
 foul with joy unfpeakable, excepted. Mr Mallet, 
 who hath nothing to fear, and nothing to hope after 
 death, may be as eafy in the pra6tice of vice as in 
 . the praftice c^ virtue, jufl as his doings in either cafe 
 turn out to his temporal advantage. But he may al- 
 low others to think that a woful futurity awaits him, 
 
 * Pfalm Iwlli. 
 
 or 
 
382 Of the immortality of the Se<5l. XII, 
 
 or God hath given him no law, or he hath left it to 
 his difcretion, either to obey or to break it. On 
 fuch a fuppofition, God diverts himfclf of his fove- 
 reignty, in order to confer on his worthlefs creature 
 the fole difpofal of himfclf. How happy miifl that 
 man be in his own conceit, who imagines himlelf in 
 fuch ftate ? But O how unhappy, if after this Hfe he 
 finds himfelf to have miftaken the great bufinefs of 
 his being ! And he is neither fure> nor can be fure ; 
 and he fays he is not fure *. 
 
 " t Nothing," fay both the author and the 
 pubhlher, " feems more natural to man, than to 
 " live without reilraint or fear;" defirable to the 
 wicked it may be, but it is not natural ; *' and yet 
 '' how ready were the multitude in the Pagan world to 
 *' embrace the hope of immortality, though it was ac- 
 " companied with the fear of damnation r" And he 
 fiys, " II Strange vanity ! TheyafTume themfclves to 
 " be expofed to eternal damnation, and the reft of man- 
 " kind to be almoft entirely damned, ratlier than not 
 " afTume that their fouls arc immortal." And again, 
 *' ** They wlio giving man immortality, expofed 
 " him to eternal damnation by it, were fondly re- 
 " ccived." This, no doubt, the author thought 
 fine faying, fince he fays it fo often. It was highly 
 dclirabic to him, to live v.ithout rcftraint from the 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 39S. II Vol. i. p. 273. 
 
 f Vol. iv. p. 206. ** Vol. iii. p. 135. 
 
 Jaw 
 
Sc^l.XII. huinm foul, and a future Jl ate. 383 
 
 law of God, and fear of the fan^lion. Hovv 
 vain mu/l he think thofe who hope for a happy im- 
 mortahty? And how humble is he whofe defires 
 have led him to hope and to believe, that as an in- 
 dividual he lives mdependently on God in this world, 
 and hath nothing to fear in another ? But how the 
 belief of the immortality of the foul can expofe any 
 one to damnation^ is not to be conceived. The doc- 
 trine is at leafl; problematical ; and if there is any 
 danger in beHeving it, the danger muft be vaflly 
 greater in disbelieving it. And whereas the belief of 
 the foul's immortality tends to promote a regular, a 
 reafonable, and a religious life, and the disbelief of it 
 leaves the man without reftraint from vice, and in- 
 ducement to virtue, the danger is wholly on the fide 
 of disbelief. It is true, that he who believes a future 
 ftate of rewards and punifliments, fears more than he 
 who does not. But what does he fear ? He fears to 
 offend God, and he fears to tranfgrefs his law, the 
 law and diftate of right reafon. And the fear cf the 
 Lo^d is to depart jrotn evil. It is not then the be- 
 lief, but the disbelief of a future ftate of rewards 
 and punifliments, that expofes men to damnation. 
 
 Without the apprehenfion of danger there can 
 be no precaution. I acknowledge, that fometimes the 
 means ufed to prevent danger may be more trouble- 
 fome than the dreaded evil would be, did it happen : 
 but this is not the cafe of thofe who endeavour to pre- 
 pare 
 
3o4 Of the immortality of the Sefl. XII. 
 
 pare themfelves for a trial before the tribunal of the 
 great Sovereign and Judge of mankind. Upon the 
 hypothefis of natural religion, (for I do not fpeak of 
 revelation), all that God requires of man, is, that he 
 fliould live and aft according to the diftatcs of right 
 reafon. And fucli a life, and fuch a conduct, is the 
 only means that can procure happinefs in this world, 
 as his Lordfhip often allows and aflcrts. The belief, 
 then, of a future ftate of rewards and puniiliments, 
 inftead of occafioning trouble to the man of fuch a 
 perfualion, and who lives up to this principle and per- 
 fuafion, makes him happy here, and frees him from 
 all fears of unhappinefs hereafter. And who would 
 exchange fuch thoughts, and fuch a fituation of mind, 
 fuch eafe and comfort of life, for Lord Boling- 
 broke's uncertainty of a future ftate ; or for a per- 
 fuafion, that both here and hereafter (if there is an 
 hereafter) every individual is below the providence 
 and care of the Deity ? His Lordfliip ufes great free- 
 dom in beftowing the charafter of madnefs on thofe 
 who differ from him : and I may be allowed to fay, 
 that he is neither wife nor virtuous, who tlijnks it a 
 hardfliip to live a reafonable life, and a happinefs to 
 be free from all inducements and reafons to do fo. 
 
 But, fay they, it is man's own fault if he fails 
 in acquiring happinefs ; and is not this fanftion fufH- 
 cient, without any future fears or expcftations ? It is 
 pot fo in the prefent and fuppofed cafe : for it is pof- 
 
 fible 
 
$€(51. XII. human foul, and a future Ji ate. 385 
 
 Cble that a wicked man may be happy enough in this 
 life, by being fuccefsful in all the eleflions he makes, 
 of whatever kind they are. Were it his choice to live 
 without reftraint put on him by the law and dictates of 
 right reafon, he is happy if he fucceeds. He hath 
 his choice, he hath his vvifli, and more he cannot de- 
 fire ; and he who hath all that he can defire, muft be 
 happy. But this happinefs doth not exceed that of a 
 beaft. A mind capable of nobler and higher enjoy- 
 ments, mull: be brought very low, in order to be con- 
 tent with fuch mean attainments. Happy for fuch 
 they had never heard, never thought of a future ftate ; 
 and happy for them not to know the difference be- 
 tween right and wrong, vice and virtue ; and- happy 
 to know no more of their maker and mafler than the 
 beads of the field. And fuch a ftate fuits as ill the 
 make of the human mind, as a bull's head would be- 
 come a human body. Without future hopes of hap- 
 pinefs, and without an afliirance of the goodnefs and 
 mercy of God, fuch muft be the cafe, and even the 
 happieft condition of mankind. Better it were for an 
 Atheift to be an irrational, than a rational animal ; to 
 have no thoughts at all about futurity, and depend- 
 ence on God, and of his being a moral and an ac- 
 countable fubjeft of his government, than to have on- 
 ly fuch thoughts as are vexatious and troublefome. It 
 is not in the power of man to fupprefs all furmifes of 
 his being accountable to God, here or hereafter, for 
 all his traafgrefTions of the law of right reafon ; no 
 .3 C more 
 
o 
 
 26 Of the immortality of the Seft. XII. 
 
 more than it is in his power to change his nature, and 
 become a bcafl. It is therefore both natural and ne- 
 celTary for us to be perfuaded, that God, who hath 
 made us reafonable and accountable creatures, will 
 bring mankind to account either here or liercafter. It 
 is true, if God iliould exert all his right and power 
 to punifh finners, the thoughts of a future judgnienl 
 mufl: be terrible, and even diftrafting to all mankind : 
 but all that believe in God, whichever way it came 
 to pafs, believe, that as he is juft, fo he is good and 
 merciful. A Jewifli poet hath faid, * If thou, Lord^ 
 JJ:>ouldJl mark ijiiquitieSy O Lord^ ivho fljalljiand? But 
 there is forgivenefs with thee^ that thou mayji be 
 feared. And, i" Bleffed is he izhofe tranfgreffion is 
 forgiven^ ivhofefin is covered. Blejfed is the man un- 
 to 'iZ'hom the Lord imputeth not iniquity. 
 
 His Lordfliip hath exerted his utmofl: ftrength and 
 reach of invention, to prove, that the evils which be- 
 fal mankind in general are but itw, and thofe avoid- 
 able or fupportable ; and that if they are neither one 
 nor the other, we and our habitation is fo fmall a 
 point in the univerfe, and of fo little account in the 
 fight of God, that the very beft of men have no rea- 
 fon to complain of their lot in this world, even 
 though there fhould not be another. 
 
 I acknowledge, that I cannot argue fo flrongly for 
 * Pfal.ocvx. 3.4. '\ Pfal. xxxii. i. 2. 
 
 the 
 
Se<n:. XII. human fonl, and a future Jlate. 387 
 
 the remuneration. of the good and virtuous, as for the 
 punifhment of the wicked and vitious, in another life. 
 For as a Chriftian I believe, and fo may he that is but 
 a Deift, that all have finned, and come fhort of ren- 
 dering obedience, adoration, and glory to God. And 
 his Lordlliip and Mr Mallet do, and ought to allow 
 it. They fay, " * I ihould roufe in my mind a grate- 
 " ful fenfe of thefe advantages above all others, that 
 " I am a creature capable of adoring and worihip- 
 *' ping my Creator, capable of difcovering his will in 
 " the law of my nature, and capable of promoting 
 *' my happinefs by obeying it. I lliould acknowledge 
 " thankfully, that I am able, by the fuperiority of 
 " my intellectual faculties, much better than my fel- 
 *' low-creatures, to avoid fome evils, and to endure 
 " fome others which are common to us and to them. 
 " I fliould confefs, that as I proved myfelf more ra- 
 ** tional than they, by employing my reafon to this 
 '' purpofe ; fo I ihould prove myfelf lefs rational, by 
 " repining at my flate here, and by complaining that 
 *' there are any unavoidable evils. I Hiould confefs, 
 *' that neither perfefl virtue, nor perfcCl happinefs, 
 " is to be found among the fons of men ; and that 
 " we ought to judge of the one, as we may judge of 
 
 '' their perfeverance in the other. Not by this, 
 
 ** that we never fall from either; fince in that fenfc 
 '' there would be no one good man, nor no one hap- 
 *' py m.an in the world." Though we iliould not 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 396. 
 
 ;5 C ?. complain 
 
388 Of the immorfaliiy of tlii: Se^. XII. 
 
 complain of unavoidable evils in this world, ( * For 
 why jhould a living man complain^ a man for the pu- 
 wjldment of hiifins?)^ yet there are many fuch evils 
 to v/hich the beft and the worlt of men are fubjefled. 
 And in many cales, as is the righteous, fo is the wic- 
 ked ; and he that (acrificeth, as he that facrificeth not. 
 Though all have tranfgrefled, yet one may be allow- 
 ed to believe, that fome difference is to be made be- 
 tween one who raifcs in his mind a grateful fenfe of 
 his being a creature capable of knowing, adoring, and 
 worfliipping his Creator, of difcovering his will, and 
 promoting his own happinefs by obeying it; and an 
 arrant Atheift, who admits no diflinflion between right 
 and wrong, but in fo far as fuch doings tend to his 
 own temporal advantage ; and is as ready to ruin the 
 human race, as to preferve them, as the cafe may 
 turn out for his own pcrfonal fatisfadlion : or between 
 a man who believes natural religion, and lives up to 
 the rules and laws of it; and another who only pro- 
 fefles to believe it, and lives in a beaftly fenfuality in 
 his perfonal Ijtuation, and like a villain in every public 
 and fecial ftation ; and then dies mad for fear of death : 
 and, for fear he had not done enough to fignalizc him- 
 felf for vice and wickednefs during his life, leaves a 
 legacy, contrived to banifli the fear of God, and the 
 reverence and obedience due to him> froni among his 
 rational creatures, and to teach mankind to live im- 
 morally with fafety, aixl with aflurancc of impunity 
 
 * Lam. iii. 39. 
 
 both 
 
Setfl. XII. human foul, and a future ft ate. 3S9 
 
 • 
 
 both here and hereafter. And indeed a very ftrange 
 difference is Ibmetimes made in this life ; for the beft 
 men have often the lot that more juftly belongs to the 
 worft> and tiie word have that lliare of happinefs to 
 vt^hich the bed have a claim. I know, that, in parti- 
 cular cafes, it is hard to determine who is the beft, and 
 who is the worft : but certain it is, that the virtues of 
 one, and the vices of another, cannot be always mif^ 
 taken ; for they are often very confpicuous. The 
 wickednefs and immorality of fome is often open and 
 declared. And fo far we are fure. But whether the 
 good a6i:ions of others are done for a good or for a bad 
 purpofe, is not fo certain : only it is prefumable, that 
 the motive is as good as the aftion. Suppofe a man 
 who hath lived an inoffenfive and ufeful life, and hath 
 voluntarily undergone hardfhips and dangers for the 
 fake of others, and at laft perifhes by the hand of a 
 villain whom he had juft before delivered from death ; 
 and fuppofe that this ruffian profperoufly goes on in 
 crimes, and ends his days in peace ; can any one whoi 
 is perfuaded that both are the fubje^ls of God's moral 
 government, believe, that the affair is finally ended ? 
 For my part, I fhould embrace any hypothefis that is 
 not abfurd, which eftablifiies the belief of a future 
 flate of rewards and punilliments : and nothing lefs 
 than a demonftration of the impofTibility of it fhall 
 ever make me rejecl it. My authors attempt it, and 
 their attempt fliall be confidercd. 
 
3po Of the immortality of the Seifl. XII. 
 
 Dr Clarke is ufed very roughly, for prefuming 
 to fay, " * It is certain and neceflary, even as certain 
 " as the moral attributes of God," (and he had be- 
 fore affirmed, that the moral areas efTential to the 
 divine nature as the natural), " that there muft be at 
 ** fome time or otlier fuch a revolution and renovation 
 '/ of things, fucli a future flate of exiftence of the 
 *' fame perfbns, as that, by an exacl: difiribution of re» 
 " wards and puniiiiments therein, all the prefent dif- 
 " orders and inequalities may be fet right, and that 
 *< the whole fcheme of providence may appear at its 
 " confummation to be a defign worthy of infinite 
 " wifdom> juflice, and goodnefs." 
 
 " The hypothetical certainty and neceffity," fays 
 his Lordfhip, ** on which tlie Doflor is willing to riik 
 " our acknowledgment of a fupreme Being, is found- 
 " ed on this aflertion. That rewards and punifliments 
 " in general are neceflary to fupport the honour of 
 " God, and of his laws and government; and on 
 ** this aflumed propofition he concludes, that the con- 
 " dition of mankind in this prefent ftate is fuch, that 
 *' the natural Order of things is perverted, and virtue 
 " and goodnefs prevented from obtaining the proper 
 *' and due effefts." To this, in his ufual and un- 
 mannerly way, he begins his anfwer with an excla- 
 mation, " Audacious and vain fophifter ! " " The 
 ** Doctor's terms," he fays, " have a very folcmn 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 4. 
 
 *' air, 
 
SeS:. Xll. , hu?mn Joul, and a future ft ate, 391 
 
 " air, that may impofe on the unwary, and confirm 
 " the habitual prejudices of others." It is then his 
 opinion, that it is dangerous to believe a ftate of re- 
 wards and punifliments hereafter, though this belief 
 tends to the temporal advantage of men in their pri- 
 vate and public capacity and fituation, as he himfelf 
 hath, oftener than once, advanced. However, the 
 danger of feducing the inattentive reader into the be- 
 lief of a future ftate of retribution, is not great, if it 
 is true, that more ahfurdity cannot he fluffed in fo fewi 
 words. Wonderful is his acutenefs. For all the abr 
 furdities fluffed in the Do£tor's .words amount to this : 
 " His whole chain of reafoning from the moral attri- 
 " butes of God downwards, is nothing more than 
 *' one continued application of moral human ideas to 
 " the defigns and conduft of God ; and in diis cafe 
 '' he afTumes moft prefumptuoufly, that the fcheme 
 " and order of things whicii God hath eftabliilied in 
 " this fyftem of ours, cannot be reconciled even to 
 " the notion of human juftice." His Lordfliip throws, 
 away his wit, in calling the Do6l:or's doflrine of a fu- 
 ture ftate of rewards and puniiliments, a hypothetical 
 certainty and nccejfity : for that is not the Doftor's 
 meaning, but the Doftor's and his joined, but ill join- 
 ed together. And the only way that his Lordftiip 
 proves a future ftate to be an hypothefis, is, by aflert- 
 ing, that it was not revealed, but only invented by 
 the Egyptians. The Doftor pretends, and proves, 
 that future rewards and puniftiments, abftra£ting from 
 
 revelation. 
 
392 Of the immortality of the Se6b.XIL 
 
 revelation, are certain and neceflary ; or that God is 
 neither jufl nor good, according to any ideas that we 
 can form of juflice and goodnefs, in ohJlraElo or in 
 concreto. Could Mr Mallet, for his Lordfliip, de- 
 monftrate, that fuch a future ftate is impoflible, what 
 would follow from it ? Truly no more than both of 
 them teach, without proof, that moral attributes arc 
 not eflential to the Deity. It is faid by them, " * Ar- 
 " tificial theology pretends to conneft, by very pro- 
 " blematical rcafonings a friori, the moral attributes, 
 " fuch as we conceive them to be, with the phyfical 
 " attributes of God ; though there be no fufficienc 
 ** foundation for this proceeding in the phenomena of 
 ** nature, nay, though the phenomena are, as hath 
 " been faid already, in feveral inflances repugnant." 
 Dr Clarke makes the moral attributes of God as ef^ 
 fential as his natural attributes ; and from thefe attri- 
 butes reafbns into a concluhon of a future ftate of re- 
 wards and puniilimcnts. And he reafons like a reli- 
 gionift ; whereas the author and his editor reafon like 
 Atheifts, by maintaining, that the prefent ftate of this 
 world is repugnant to the juftice and goodnefs of the 
 fupreme Being, and that afterwards there is no place 
 for reparation. My authors deny the judice and good- 
 nefs of God ; for what reafon, it is hard to imagine, 
 except it be that they may not be obliged to admit a 
 future ftate : and this, in cffeft, is to acknowledge, 
 that if God is good and juft, a lover of rightcoufnefs, 
 
 * Vol, iv. p. 304. 
 
 and 
 
Sc<n:. XII. human fouly and a future jlate. 3(^3 
 
 and a hater of vvickednefs, there mnfl: be a futur© 
 Itate. Upon the Doftor's hypothefis, all the moral 
 attributes of God are faved ; and upon his Lordfliip's 
 they are all rejecflcd, as being inconfillent with the pre- 
 fent moral fyftem of things. Only a fermented un- 
 derftanding, fuch as his Lordihip acknowledges his 
 own to be, can accufe the Doftor, the great Doc- 
 tor, as an audacious and vain fophifter, and for cram- 
 ming as many abfurdities in a few words as words can 
 bear ; when he advances nothing but what he him- 
 felf contends for occafionally, except this conclufion, 
 There is a future Jlate : for if there is not, all that 
 follows, is, that God neither does, nor ever will ad- 
 minifter jullice in his government ; which to his Lord- 
 lliip is quod erat demonjirandum. He knew, and Mr 
 Mallet does know, the difference between right and 
 wrongs juji and unjuji, and they are irrefiftibly forced 
 to condemn the wrong, and approve the right : but a 
 God without moral attributes is not fb complete, fo 
 pcrfed, and fb defirabic a being, as either of them. 
 
 This nobleman of a philofbpher, who confefles 
 that " * we reafbn on human- ideas becaufe we have 
 " no others to rcafon on, will not allow us to reafbn 
 " on God's moral attributes, becaufe our ideas are 
 *' human, and not divine -f." Atheifts and divines rea- 
 fon a priori, from the affumcd attributes of the divi- 
 Tiity. " So they call their method of reafoning 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 318. f Vol, iv. p. 322, 
 
 3 D '''and 
 
SP4 Of the inimortality of the Scc^t.XlI. 
 
 " and fuch it is in a falfe fcnfc. It cannot be fuch 
 *' in a true fenfe, fince their ideas of thefc attributes 
 " arc very human ideas, applied arbitrarily to the 
 ** divine nature, not founded on any knowledge of 
 " it, that we have really." It is certain we have 
 no other ideas than human ideas ; and if we arc not 
 to make nfe of them, when we think and fpeak of 
 God, we nnift neither think nor fpeak of him at all. 
 And if this is not pofitivc, it is negative Atheifm. 
 "What he adds in the fame page is as falfe, as it is in- 
 jurious to the divine. " The prcmiiTcs wherein A- 
 " theifts and divines concur fb amicably, are plainly 
 *' contrived to eftabliili luch notions of the attributes 
 *' of God, as fhall appear repugnant to what v\'e fee, 
 *' and feel, and knov/, when they are applied to the 
 *■' conftitution of the world, and the ftate of man- 
 " kind in it." In this nobleman's opinion, therefore, 
 all the notions of the divine attributes eilabliflicd by 
 divines, are inconfiftent with the confiitution of the 
 •world, and the ftate of mankind in it ; and that it is 
 therefore matter of fafl:, that none of tliefc attributes 
 belong to the divine Being. And if this doftrine is a 
 ccnrrivancc, fuppofe of Dr Clarke, he muft have 
 been both ftupid and wicked to cftablifli God's mo- 
 ral attributes, only in order to \q]c6\. them, on ac- 
 count of the conftituiion of the world, and the ftatc 
 of mankind in it. Tlic Doctor doth cftablifh 
 (and thoufands join with him in cilablifliing) the 
 jjioral attributes of Qod, becaufe a God who is nci- 
 
 thci- 
 
Seel. XII. human foul, and a future ft ate, 3pj; 
 
 ther good, norjuH, nor true, is the fame thing with 
 no God ; feeing he mnft want all moral perfecftions, 
 and cannot be an all-perfe£l: being. And if his Lord- 
 flijp's God was fuch, his Lordiliip was an Atheift with- 
 out Dr Clarke's leave; and {o is Mr Mallet with- 
 out mine. " When Atheifts and divines," fay they, 
 " have fhewn that the prefent ftate of the world, 
 " and of mankind in it, is inconfiftent with the good- 
 " nefs and juflice of God ; a Collins concludes 
 " there is no God, and a Clarke, that there is a 
 " future flate of rewards and puniihm.ents." His 
 Lordfliip will conclude with neither ; but concludes 
 by himfelf, that if there is a God, he is neither juft 
 nor good, according to any idea he is able to form of 
 goodnefs and juftice ; that is, that all the moral attri- 
 butes of God are to him inconceivable, impoffible, 
 and abfurd. I have reafon to believe, that Collins 
 was perfuaded, that if there is a God, he mufl be 
 good, juft, and true. And as he beft knew his own 
 honefly and integrity in all his inquiries, ib he ex- 
 pefted to be dealt with after this life (if there was 
 an hereafter) as an honed and flncere man. My 
 reafon is as good, and better, for faying fb, than his 
 Lordlliip's was for faying and believing the contrary. 
 Tiiough all Lord Bolingbroke's ideas are human, 
 aiDt divine ; and though therefore he bath no right to 
 affirm any thing concerning God's moral attributes, 
 yc'i he retains a right to deny them. They are re- 
 pugnant to the conilitution of the wqrldj and the 
 
 .3 D 2 flare 
 
59^ Of the immortality oj the Sc6l. XII. 
 
 ftate of mankind in it. " * And it is from this con- 
 " ftitution, and this flatc alone, that wc can accjuirc 
 ■" any ideas of the divine attributes." This conUi- 
 tution, this (late, is repugnant to God's moral attri- 
 butes ; and there is no other way to know thcni;, 
 than that which difproves them. 
 
 To refute abundantly the two allies, and firft thfc 
 Atheill, he thinks it fufficient to fay, he cavils ; and 
 no more he fays, from the beginning to the end of his 
 philofophical works, againfl him. I have better rea- 
 fon to think, that he and the Athcift are confederates, 
 'than that Atheifts and divines arc allies. But to 
 confute the divine, the objeft of" his contempt, aver- 
 fion, and indignation, he is at fome more pains. He 
 pretends to put an end to his prefumption, by faying, 
 " *f I alfume no more than what is proved," (and ad- 
 mitted, and much better proved by divines than by 
 him), '* when I allcrt, that the fupremc Being is 
 *' infinitely wife, as well as powerful ; and if he be 
 *' infinitely wife, 1 need not ftand to prove that he 
 " always knows, and always does that which is fit- 
 " tefl: to be done." Agreed ; whether what he 
 doth ultimately, or what he doth as a fubfervicnt 
 •means to an ultimate end. The author laughs r.t 
 Moses's account of the creation, for finifliing it in 
 fix days ; and radicr believes a Tufcan jhilcfopher^ 
 v\h.o iaid it took up t!:c fpace of twelve thoufand 
 
 * \'gI. iv. p. 3:2. f Vcl. iv. p. 2iy 
 
 years. 
 
Sc»^. XII. hi(?fiim fiulf and a future Jl ate, %c^y 
 
 years. Had he been witncfs to this work from the 
 beginning of things until it was finiihed in the prefent 
 form, at firft he might have obferved in the proce- 
 dure, what to him did not difplay any thing of wif- 
 dom ; and far lefs could he fay that every thing was 
 ' done to the bed purpofe poffible, until he faw the 
 whole finifhed. He might believe, that every pro- 
 duction, and every advancement made in melioration, 
 was proper and fit for fome intended ultimate end ; 
 but this he mufl: have believed upon the credit and 
 charafter of the artificer, and not on any unfinifhed 
 piece of the work. One who knew nothing of 
 husbandry, (the comparifon is made by Dr King, 
 in his book of the origin of evil), admitted at firft 
 as a witnefs to fowing, mull think that the husband- 
 man does but throw away liis grain ; but after feeing 
 it grow, ripen, cut down, and threllied out into 
 twenty grains for one, which at firff he thought 
 thrown awa}"-, he concludes, that what at firft he 
 thought fooliflily, was well and wifely done ; not as 
 an ultimate end, but as a means of increafing the huf^ 
 bandman's flore. I am not pleafed with thofe who li- 
 mit the wifdom and power of God to the prefent con- 
 ftitution of the world. For all that I know of the fym- 
 metry, order, harmony, and the ufe and fubferviency 
 of every part of the univerfc to the whole, I dare 
 not fay that God can make no further improvements. 
 For as the firft materials being made, were afterwards 
 improved into the prefent form of the world j and 
 
 as 
 
398 Of the immortality of the Se(5l.XIL 
 
 as wc obferve feveral things in the material part of 
 the creation advancing from one degree to anotlicr, 
 into maturity ; fo I can believe, that every diforder 
 jliall at laft be re(5lified, and every thing, without 
 interruption from another, fliali be made perfeft in 
 its kind. Inundations, earthquakes, the devouring 
 fword and peftilence, which I confider in fome re- 
 fpefts as ccrre^ive, and in others as 'vindiBive pu- 
 nilliincnts, (and fo doth my author), and are now the 
 proper means for the reformation of manldnd, ihall 
 all ceafc when there Ihall be no more occafion for 
 them. And when the irreclaimably wicked jQiall be 
 fent to another place, the remainder lliall improve 
 in holincfs and happinefs, and God fliail wipe a- 
 way all tears from their eyes. 
 
 Though all things that may be, or not be, are 
 contingencies, and though fuch are all the doings of 
 the Lord God ad fAv;v/; yet fome think, that every 
 thing that is, could not pollibly be otherwife than it 
 is ; and that this world neither could nor can be bet- 
 ter or worfe than it is. To hear them, and to believe 
 them, one would think, that this world cannot admit 
 an additional pound weight, or a deduction of fo much, 
 or of a foot meafure, without undoing the whole. 
 " Know therefore," faith Dr King *, " it is necella- 
 *' ry you iliould be what you are, or not at all.'* 
 Sure he could not mean, that you could not have 
 
 * Otig'n of evil, chap. iv. ^5. 
 
 been 
 
Se(5i:.XII. human foul, and a future Jl ate, 399 
 
 been taller or lower, ftronger or weaker ; and that 
 you could not know either more or lefs than you ac- 
 tually do, and be neither a better nor a worfe man 
 tlian you are : and as your cafe is every man's cafe, 
 fo every man, and every thing, is what it is, and 
 could not pofTibly have been otherwife. But as this is 
 Fatal Atheif',71^ I cannot think it v/as his Grace's opi- 
 nion. And here I 'may be allowed the ufe of the 
 metaphyfical diflinftion into fenhis dlvifus, and fenfiis 
 compofitus. Every thing is what it is, while it is juft 
 the fame, I grant ; and this is fenfus compofitus : but 
 that thing might have been, apd may be otherwife ; 
 and this i^finfus diviftis. But fay the contrary who 
 will, 1 am very fure, that any man may be a better 
 man than he is, and notwithftanding continue to be 
 the fame perfon. 
 
 One would' think, that Mr Mallet, or his au- 
 thor, fliould have adduced clear proof of forae of the 
 abfiirdities fluffed in Dr Clarke's aflertion. That a 
 flate of rewards and punifliments is as certain as are 
 tlie divine moral attributes ; and for which he is call- 
 ed an audacious and vain fophifler. But, indead of 
 this, 1 find nothing but a definition of the terms good 
 and bad, happy and unhappy. And on this head he 
 talks and trWes, until he comes to deny particular 
 providences ; and then promifes to fhew, that " * God 
 ■' is v/ife, and man a fool," (and how does a fool 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 14. 
 
 ' know 
 
400 Of the hmmrtalitj of the Se(fl. XIL 
 
 know wifdom?); ''and that of all fools, the mofl: 
 ** preflimptuoLis, and at the fame time the mod tri-' 
 ** fling, are metaphyfical philofophers and divines." 
 "Whether he hath made good his promife or nor, the 
 reader may judge by v/hat I have already faid on that 
 fubje6V. Does not all the world know, and did they 
 not know fince the world was inhabited, that men 
 differ much in their morals ; and that the befl have 
 fomctiines the worll, and the worll: of them the belt 
 worldly lot? For his farisfa^lion, let Mr Mallet 
 try to find cut, among all his acquaintances, dead or 
 alive, a better man tliaii Ix)rd Doling broke. And 
 fince the beft and the worlt of men are unequally 
 dealt with in this world, the juflice and goodnefs of 
 God require, that this inequality be rcftified in ano- 
 ther life ; or this inequality is below the regard of in- 
 finite wifdom, or above the power of the Almighty 
 %o redrefs it. 
 
 Dr Clarke is an audacious and vain fbphilf, and 
 MrWoLLASTON is a madman. The accufation of 
 madnefs ought to be well laid ; and whether it is well 
 or ill grounded, can only be learned from what his 
 Lordihip hath quoted * from his Religion of nnture de- 
 lineated. " I am furc, that 1 am above lifelefs mac- 
 " tcr, above the vegetative tribe, and above the fen- 
 " fitive animals that I fee. I have not only imme- 
 " diate fenfations, but ideas of a higher order. I can 
 
 ■* Vol. iv. p. 37 ;. 
 
 '■' make 
 
Se^. XII. human foul y and a future Jiate. 401 
 
 *' make excurflons into futurity : I had almofc faid, 
 *' that I could, by drift reafoning, get into another 
 '^ world before-hand. Can I be made capable of 
 '' fuch great expectations, only to be difappointed at 
 " laft ? Can I have fiich overtures of immortality, 
 " if after all there is no fuch thing ? I make great 
 " improvements in knowledge, which I have no op- 
 " portunity of fliewing here : mud they not be pre- 
 '* parations for another world ? Can the author of my 
 ■" reafoning faculties be himfelf fo unreafbnable, as 
 *' to give them to no purpofe ? By the exaltation of 
 *' my reafon, and by the pra£lice of virtue, I ap- 
 '^ proach to a higher manner of being, and tafte al- 
 *' ready fomething fpiritual, and above this world. 
 *' Muft my private afts of religion be all loft ? Can 
 " God have fo little regard to me, who have fo much 
 '^ for God ? " Thus MrWoLLASTON is indicfted for 
 a madman. And yet all he fays amounts only to this. 
 That he was made for a more noble purpofe than to 
 eat and drink, to deep and wake, to laugh and weep, 
 to fpeak and write, to reafon about his own origin 
 and end, and to chop logics with his Lordfliip and JVIr 
 Mallet. However, they acknowledge, that " the 
 '* man who wrote all this nonfenfe, was a man of 
 '* parts, of learning, a philolbpher, and a geometri- 
 '' cian. But. he made one midake in the delirium of 
 " metaphyfics. Inftead of reafoning about a creature 
 " of God's, he reafbned about one of his own crea- 
 " tion." And for this he is one of the learned luna- 
 3 E * ties/ 
 
402 Of the hmmrtality of the Se6l. XII. 
 
 tics. It is to be obfcrvcd, that the author, as a ma- 
 fter of hard words, an attainment unbecoming a no-' 
 bleman, ufcs thofe who have writ with the greateft re- 
 putation on natural rehgion, with the greatefl: con- 
 tempt. So collic-dogs bark at mnltifTs. But this, 
 inftead of fhcwing the fuperiority of his .own under- 
 ftanding, only. Iliews, tliat he doth not know who 
 writes well, and who writes weakly on the fubjei^h 
 That WoLLASTON did improve his natural parts and 
 capacity, and that he with his faculties was a creature 
 of God his Creator, (for he did not make himfelf ) ; 
 this, I fay, is certain : but the improvement vhich, 
 by his natural power, and the freedom of his will, he 
 made in knowledge, did not make him a creature of 
 his own creation. If blunders, hcs, and indufirious 
 contradictions ; if contempt or ignorance of logics 
 and metaphyfjcs, arc fymptoms of a bad writer, there 
 never was a weaker or a more contemptible author 
 than his Lordiliip. And were it not for the fake of 
 the important fubjeft he writes on, i'Q\^; would read 
 them all, and none would read twice his philoibphi- 
 cal works. 
 
 To make good his charge againfl Wollaston for 
 a madman, and that the extract of io much from the 
 Religion cf nature delineated as he hath given, is all of 
 it nonfenfc, he fays, *' * After all endeavours to 
 ** iTiake a man a being lupcvior to the whole animal 
 
 • V^l.iv. p. 377. 380, 
 
 " kind. 
 
Sec^.XII. human Joul, and a future Jl ate, 403 
 
 " kind, rather than a fuperior fpecles of the fame 
 " kind, man will appear what he really is to every 
 •" unprejudiced niind." No man, no philofopher, 
 ever denied that man is an animal, and Wollaston 
 never attempted to take him out of that genus or kind. 
 And if man is a i^Vi^cnov /pedes in the kind of animals, 
 he muft be fuperior to all other animals. To all un- 
 prejudiced minds, I allow, man will appear what he 
 really is, the ruins of a noble creature ; but fuch ruins 
 as admit of reparation and improvement. No reli- 
 gionift ever faid direftly nor confequentially, as his 
 Lordfhip's accufation ftands, that '' the natural ftate 
 " of mankind is unnatural, a Hate neither agreeable 
 " to the nature of God himlelf, nor to that nature 
 " wherewith he hath dignified man." Man by na- 
 ture Is a free and a voluntary agent, and as fuch he 
 may ufe or abufe his natural powers. He may im- 
 prove in virtue and morality, or may milimprove in 
 vice and wickednefs, confidently with the dignity 
 wherewith his Creator hath honoured and dillinguifhed 
 him ; and that i]i a confiilency too with all the divine 
 attributes. Man's Hate is naturally a free Itate, and 
 this freedom effential to rational beings remains the 
 fame whatever ufe or abufe he makes of it. And this 
 ftate and condition of mankind, 1 acknowledge, is no 
 imperfeftion in the grand iyftem of the creation. The 
 great work of the grand architect of the univerle is 
 not as yet completed. The author fays, " The len- 
 '* fitivc inhabitants of our globe, like the drriwaiis 
 3 E 2 " perjcruv. 
 
404 Of the hmmrtality of the Sc(^.Xll, 
 
 " pcrfon-c^ have different chara£lers, and are applied 
 *' to diiierent purpofes of aftion in every fcenc." 
 Things therefore are carrying on to a conclufion of 
 the whole plan of God's creation. His Lord/hip al- 
 ways miftakes the means for the end, and concludes, 
 that every thing that is done, is done for no other pur- 
 pofe than for the fake of doing it. " The whole or- 
 *' der and fyftem of the drama would be fpoiled, if 
 " any alteration was made in it." So far from that, 
 that altcrarionsare made, and mufl: be made, in order 
 to finifli and complete the grand cfera of God's go- 
 vernment and creation of the nniverfe. His Lordfhip 
 is of another opinion : for he fays, " If man was a 
 *' creature fuperior or inferior to what he is, he would 
 *' be a very prepofterous creature in this fyftem. If 
 " our reafoning faculties were more perfeft than they 
 " are, the order of the intellectual fyflem would be 
 '* broken unneceflarily, and man would be raifed a- 
 *' bove his proper form, without any real advantage 
 *' to himfelf ; fincc the reafon he hath is fufficicnt for , 
 " him in the ftiite allotted to him ; and fince higher 
 " faculties and greater degrees of knowledge wouKl, 
 *' on one hand, incrcafe his prefimiption, and yet, on 
 *' the other, would rather excite <lian fate his curio- 
 " flty, by fhewing him more clearly the exte^it of bis 
 " own ignorance.^'' How cm his Lordfliip, or rather 
 Mr Mallet, know the c::tcnt of his own ignorance, 
 unlcfs his i2;norance and his knowlcdee are tlic farrc 
 thing ? 
 
Se<5l.XIL human Joul, and a future Jiute, 405 
 
 I think it beft, before I make any more obfcrva- 
 tions, to give my reader a view of what more my au- 
 thors fay on this head. And they fay, *' * In this 
 ** fcale of being, why fliould not we be the creatures 
 " we are ? " And that they mean we fhould be jurt 
 fuch creatures as we are,- neither better nor happier, 
 with neither more nor lefs knowledge, appears from 
 another paflage. " -f" We may prefum^e to fay, that if 
 '' it had been in the order of God's defign to make 
 *' the flate of mankind as happy as the univerfal law, 
 " and the fleady obfervation of it, would make it, he 
 " would have made the fanftions of the law as perfeft 
 " as the law: but we fee by what he hath done, 
 " which is the only fure way of knowing what he 
 " defigned, that we were made to live in a moderate 
 
 " and mixed ftate of happinefs. Had the fan£tions 
 
 *' of the law of nature been flronger, we fhould have 
 " rifen above this ftate; had they been weaker, we 
 " fliould have funk below it. Thus they are relative- 
 *' \y perfeft, relative to the defign of the lawgiver; 
 '* and neither the goodnefs nor the juftice of God 
 "*' require, that we fliould be made better or happier 
 " than we are." • And again, " |j If there had been 
 " no conflift between appetite and fluggard reafbn, 
 " and had all been done in a clofe conformity to the 
 ** law of nature, the moral flate of mankind had been 
 " truly paradifaical ; but it had not been human. 
 " \Vc fliould not have been the creatures we were 
 
 * Vol. Iv. p. 366. t Vol. V. p. I TO. « Vol.iv. p.Qg. 
 
 " defigned 
 
4o6 Of the immortality of the Seel. XII. 
 
 ' dcfigned to be, and a gap would have been left in 
 
 ' the gradation of created intelligences. The ta-" 
 
 ' bles of the law of nature arc hung un, and made 
 * obvious to the fight of man ; not becaufe we are 
 ' able to obferve them in their whole extent, and in 
 ' every part alike, but that we may keep them con- 
 ' flantly in view, and depart as little as polTible, in 
 ' the midfl: of fo many infirmities, and fo many temp- 
 ' rations, from them. God hath fliewn us wherein 
 ' our wifdom and happincfs, and the perfection of 
 ' our nature, confifl ; and hath left us to purfue the 
 ' end by the ufe of our own reafon." And, to add 
 no more, he faj's, " * It is true in faft, that neither 
 reafon nor revelation, neither Heathen nor Chri- 
 llian philofophers, neither human nor divine laws, 
 have been able to reform the manners of men ef- 
 fectually ; may we not, nay muji we not conclude, 
 that fuch a reformation is incohfifient with the origi- 
 nal conllitution of the human fyftem?- A\ hy 
 
 there is fuch a Hare as this, and how to reconcile it 
 to the ideas of holinefs andgoodnefs, let thole who 
 prefume to judge of divine goodnefs, judge accor- 
 dingly : but let you and 1 pronounce, that (ince 
 there is fuch a flatc as this in the univcrial lyltcm, 
 it was fit and right there fliould be llich a Hate. 
 On this head we may and ought to be dogmatical.'' 
 ^Vhat a field is this of nonlcnle, impiety, and Fata- 
 lifm ? 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 243.244. 
 
 'Til£ 
 
Set5l. XII. hmnan foul, and afuiure flute. 407 
 
 The whole univerfe is filled with beings material, 
 fenfitive, and rational, connefted in one immenfe de- 
 lign : from which i,t follows, that the defiga is not 
 yet attained nor accompli (hed. The theatre- fubfids, 
 and the dramatis perfon^ continue to acl their refpec- 
 tive parts; and as long as they do aft, the drama is 
 unfinifhed. Some great change, fome amazing alte- 
 ration to the better, is to be expected, for the greater 
 perfection of the fyftem, and for the manifeitation of 
 the glory and honour of the infinitely-wife and al- 
 mighty architect. To aft continually and everlaftiiig- 
 ly in the fame courfe and method, were to aft for the 
 fake of afting ; which is to aft rather without defign, 
 than with a view to an immenfe defign, a defign wor- 
 thy of infinite wildom and power. Whatever intelli* 
 gent beings or aftors there may be fuperior to man, 
 certain it is he is the only aftor, or at lead the princi- 
 pal aftor in this our globe, under the command of his 
 creator and the autiior of the whole drama. The di- 
 reftions given to us how to aft our part, are the law of 
 nature, or the diftatcs of right reafon. While we ob- 
 fcrve this law and this rule, we aft our part well ; and 
 when we depart from thefe direftions, we aft our part 
 ill : and therefore until the whole is finiilied, we can- 
 not expeft to be finally commended or blamed, re- 
 warded or punifhed. The fufferiags of the bcft, and 
 the enjoyments of the woril of men during the aftion, 
 are but the encouragements and correftions adminifter- 
 cd in the mean time, and not the total, reward or pu- 
 
 • iiiflinient : 
 
408 Of the immortality of the Sc6l. XII. 
 
 niflimcnt : for thefe arc to be complete. And it gives 
 me no wonder, that wicked men enjoy more happinefs 
 and profpcrity than the good and virtuous. There is 
 no man fo very wicked who does not fome good thing ; 
 and our God is to very good and jull, that no good 
 aftioii puiTes without a reward. Though the Egyptian 
 midwives told a lie, to fave alive the male children of 
 the Ifraelites, God rewarded them for their compaf- 
 fion. He built them houfes, or gave them good fet- 
 tlements in this world. And as little fhould the fuf- 
 ferings of the bed of men give any furprife, becaufe 
 they drd but corrective. This life is a ftate of mixed 
 happinefs and mixed mifery, of fufTerings and enjoy- 
 ments ;■ but that which is future to the conclufion of 
 the whole drama^ is final, and witliout mixture, all 
 reward or all punillim.ent. 
 
 That fome men grow in virtue and morality, and 
 that others degenerate into vice and wickednefs, and 
 even fhut their eyes againfl the knowledge of God, 
 and the duty which they owe him, is certain : thcfc 
 incrcale in number, and thofc decreafe in proportion. 
 And when, by prevailing wickednefs, this part of the 
 creation is overburdened with fm ajid iniquity, and 
 the diforders thereby occafioned hinder and obllru6l 
 the happinefs of a few worthy inhabitants, it appears 
 confer uous to divine wifdom, to take tliis frot of the 
 univerfe out of the grand fyftcm of the univerfc, or 
 iihange it iiuo another form, fitter for the belt inha- 
 bitants. 
 
Sc«51.XJI. human f ml ^ and a future fiat e. 409 
 
 bitants. It was faid by the author of the Chriftian 
 religion *, "The Son of man when he cometh^ fhall be 
 find faith on the earth ? And Chriitians therefore be- 
 lieve, that when this world of ours can bear no more 
 wickednefs, it is to be changed, and a feparation 
 made between the good and the bad inliabitants. 
 When mankind can be no longer governed by reafon 
 nor by faith, it is fit they be governed by fight, and 
 that a period be put to this onr earthly lyflem. I 
 beg Mr Mallet's excufe for troubling him with a 
 quotation from the Bible. So far am 1 from think- 
 ing, that the whole fyflem of the drama would be 
 fpoiled, if the leaft alteration were made in the ma- 
 terial or moral part of it, that I rather believe that 
 fbme alterations are fit and proper means for carrying 
 on the whole unto a glorious conclufion. By coun- 
 tcra6ling our port, we fpoil the harmony of this globe; 
 and to rc£tify this part of the grand fyftem, it is fit 
 it fhould be changed, fitted up, and filled with bet- 
 ter inhabitants. That inundations, earthquakes, fa- 
 mine, peflilence, and the fword, are corredive and 
 partial punifliments, and warnings io thofe who are 
 witnefles, and ftand in need of amendment, is the 
 opinion of his Lordfliip, as hath been alrdady obfer- 
 ved : and with thefe divine providence hath pro- 
 ceeded, and the order of the drama hath been hi- 
 therto carried on. And fure it cannot be faid, that a 
 total change of this earth, and of its inhabitants, can 
 
 * Luke xviii. 8. 
 
 3 F obftrua 
 
410 Of the immortality of the Scifl.XII. 
 
 obftruft the grand and ultimate defign of the Maker 
 and Governor of the univerie; and until this great 
 defign is fully accomplifhed, (and accompliflied it 
 fhall be), all changes and alterations are the proper 
 means of advancing God's great and glorious pur- 
 pofe. 
 
 When he fays, that the reafon which man hath, is 
 fufficient for him in the fhte allotted to him, he can- 
 not mean, that every individual hath as much know- 
 ledge as is proper and fit for him to have. For, in 
 that cafe, he and the Hottentot know enough for their 
 purpofe, and the bufinefs of their being. The 
 world therefore would have been as well without, as 
 with his philofophical works, or the works of the bed 
 mathematician or moralifl. God hath given reafon 
 to all mankind, and the means of improving it. 
 Thefe means fjme negleft, and are the caufe of their 
 own ignorance, errors, and mifcarriagcs in their con- 
 duct. " Had the fanclions of the law of nature 
 " been ftronger, we fhould have ri(en above this 
 *' Hate ; had they been weaker, we fliould have 
 " funk below it : " fo faith his Lordfliip. That is, 
 it is not the will of God, that man fliould know 
 more or lefs than he a(5tually does ; that he fhould 
 be better or worfe, more moral or more immoral, more 
 happy or unhappy, than he actually is. But I take on 
 me to afiirm, that though human knowledge were 
 more extended than it is, and though the will of man 
 
 were 
 
Se6^. XII. human /only and a future flat e* 411 
 
 were more obedient to liis underftanding, there could 
 not proceed from fuch knowledge, and fuch reftitude 
 of conduft, any inconveniency to himfelf, or to the 
 order of the univerfe. From the nature of our rea- 
 fon and underftanding, and from the improvements 
 already made in knowledge, (and they are amazingly 
 great), I can conclude, that the human mind is ca- 
 pable of more and higher degrees of knowledge and 
 wifdom. And were it not for his own, and the fault 
 of other men, both his knowledge, and the praftice 
 of his duty, would be far fuperior to what it is. 
 What if our reafoning faculties were raifed above 
 what they are, muft not our knowledge and our mora- 
 lity be raifed in proportion ? And though we fliould 
 become holy, harmlefs and innocent, ufeful and be- 
 nevolent, and thankful and obedient to God our 
 maker and our mafter, we fhould ftill be men. For 
 our ignorance of what we ought to know, and the 
 ncgleft of what we ought to do, are not eflential to 
 humanity, or to the nature of a reafonable foul. 
 On the contrary, thefe defeats and imperfe(ftions feem 
 to be acquired and adventitious ; and that oar facul- 
 ties muft be fome way or other fpoiled and perverted, 
 and not the fame that they were originally, nor 
 becoming the operation of a moft holy being. The 
 account we have from Moses of the creation, and 
 fall of man from his primitive ftate, with his Lord- 
 ihip and you pades for romance and forgery. But 
 how ye come to adert thlat it is an Egyptian allegory, 
 
 3 F 2 yc 
 
412 Of the immortality cf the SccH:. XIL 
 
 ye are flill to account. For ye ailert it without hi- 
 florical authority ; and, for what ye know, it might 
 have been a tradition lianded down to them from A- 
 dam's firil tranfgreirion. But revelation and conjec- 
 tures apart, I lay, though the reafonable human 
 foul might be proper to make up a fcale of beings, 
 it dotJi not follow, that acquired errors, induflrious 
 ignorance, vice, and immorality, are a neceflary part of 
 the great dramn^ or a link to connect a chain of beings. 
 On the contrary, they are defeats and irregularities, pro- 
 ceeding from man's counteradling his part. All which 
 fliall be fupplied and rectified, when this drama and 
 God's glorious dcfign fliall be finiflied. Better let 
 this gap in his Lordfliip's imaginary fcale of beings 
 ftand open, than to make our good and holy God 
 fill it up with the wickcdncfs and immorality of men. 
 
 This, 1 think, his Lordfhip with prcfumptuous 
 impiety does deny. For he prcfumes to fay, that 
 " if it had been in the order of God's dcfign to make 
 " the ftate of mankind as the law of nature, and the 
 " fteady obfervation of it, would make it, he would 
 " have made the fanctions of the law as jKrf cct as 
 " the law." This 1 fliould not have undcrltood, 
 had he not faid, that " the divine law fliould infurc 
 " obedience," By this he would teach the world, 
 that God inforccs his law witfi difJerent ianftions, 
 fomc weaker, and fome flrongcr. He admits, that 
 tlie law of nature is the hw of God, wliich he and 
 
 all 
 
Sc£l, XII. human foul, and a future Jiafe. 413 
 
 all men have tranfgrefled. He forgets, that every ra-* 
 tional creature is efTentially a free agent. And would 
 he have a law given to man, which would deprive 
 him of his eflential liberty ? With fuch an irrefidible 
 energy the law of God would be no moral law, and 
 man muft be no moral and free agent. The fan^lion 
 of the law of God and of nature, as it (lands difco- 
 verable, and actually difcovered by reafbn, is the 
 approbation, the protection, and favour of God on 
 the one hand, and his difpleafure on the other. And 
 what the effeCls of the pleafure and difpleafure of 
 almighty God on the obedient and difobedient may 
 be, muft equal, or furpafs our imagination. This 
 fanCtion, though fufficient in itfelf to influence and 
 direct our doings, yet on men fuch as this world is 
 furnifhed with, they make no fuitable impreffion. 
 The reafon is, they are not firmly believed, and 
 when believed, they are frequently adulterated with 
 referves and exceptions. liis Lordfliip adds, that 
 *' neither tlie goodnefs nor juftice of God require 
 " that we iliould be made better or happier than we 
 " are." To make us better and happier than we 
 arc, whether we will or not, were to unmake us, 
 and from free and voluntary agents, to convert us in- 
 to mere paffive beings. It is enough that God hath 
 made us capable to make ourfclves better and hap- 
 pier. And his Lord/hip fays, "God hath iliewn 
 " us, ^wherein our wifdom, our happincfs, and the 
 " perfeflion of our nature, ccnfift ; and hath left us 
 
 " to 
 
414 Of the hnmortality of the Se6l. XIL 
 
 *' to purfue thefe ends by the ufe of our reafon." 
 And if we do not purfue ihefe ends by the ufe of our 
 reafon, (and certainly we do not), it is our fault, 
 not the doing, though the permilTion of God, that 
 we are not better and happier men than at prefent 
 we are. And though neither the goodnefs nor juflice 
 of God require that he fhould make us either better 
 or happier than we are, and are willing to be made, 
 (for all God's operations ad extra are purely vo- 
 luntary) ; yet now that we are made rational and free 
 agents, his juftice requires that we fhould not make 
 ourfelves worfe than he hath made us, but rather that 
 we fhould grow and improve in the knowledge of 
 God, and in the knowledge and practice of every 
 duty we owe him. 
 
 " The tables of the law of nature are hung up 
 " and made obvious to the fight of men, not that we 
 " fhould obferve them punctually and in every cafe, 
 *' but only that we fliould depart as little as pofTibly 
 " from them." This is his Lordfliip's doftrinc. But 
 who gave him authority to reftric^ the law of God, 
 and the law of nature, to a partial obligation ? And 
 with what power was he inverted to iiululge the fub- 
 je£ls of God's moral government to tranfgrcfs his 
 laws at their own difcretion ? Allow him to plead in- 
 firmities and temptations, and there will be no end of 
 excufcs. But this is to plead, that a rational crea- 
 ture may reafonably acl irrationally. The law of 
 
 nature. 
 
$6(51. XII. human fouly and a future ft ate, 415 
 
 nature, as the law of God, is fixed and unchange- 
 able, as unchangeable as righi is into wrong ; and as 
 fuch it requires complete and perfect obedience. 
 But becaufe it is not obeyed perfectly, it doth not 
 follow, that it admits either of abrogation or deroga- 
 tion. And if the law fubfifts, fo muft the fandion. 
 
 But becaufe the fanction is not put in execution in 
 this life, his Lordfhip and Mr Mallet conclude that 
 it never will ; for there is not another. Whereas the 
 premides can better bear the contrary conclufion. For 
 our God is a God of truth; and whatever our rea- 
 fon difcovers to be his law, with the fanftion annexed, 
 we mufl: believe, that he who tranfgrefles incurs the 
 penalty, not to be remitted at the tranfgrenc)r's fancy 
 and pleafure. And becaufe men difobey the law of 
 God in this life with fafety, to conclude that all the 
 danger is over, is to reafon on the reverfe. The no- 
 bleman of a philofopher feems to divert himfelf, when 
 he fays, " * Some make good health and the advan- 
 ** tages of fortune conftitute principally happinefs, 
 " becaufe good men fomctimes accufe God for want 
 " of them : they pretend to keep an account between 
 " Gon and man, and to barter fo much virtue and 
 *' fo many afts of devotion, againft (b many degrees 
 " of honour, of power, of riches, and to have their 
 *' piety purchafed by the gratification of their paffions. 
 ^' If God exa(5ts the duty, he muft pay the debt. If 
 
 5 Vol. V. p. 13. 
 
 ''he 
 
41 6 Of the immortality of the Se(5l.XII. 
 
 ^' he does not pay it in this life, he muft pay it in an- 
 *' other. Till then they give him credit; and if he 
 " docs not pay it then, he is an unjufl and cruel be- 
 " ing." It doth not belong to the charafter of a good 
 man to accufe God of injufhce^ nor is it jiift to fay 
 fo. Neither doth it belong to a man of piety to make 
 God debtor to him here, or at Icafl hereafter, for ho- 
 nour, jx)wer, and riches, on account of fome afts of 
 virtue and devotion. And can his Lordlhip fay in 
 good earneft, that good men barter with their God ? 
 I rather take it for a burlefque both on virtue and pie- 
 ty. But if he muft (late an account between God 
 and good men, and that in jeft ; I prefume to ftate 
 another in good earnefl:. All tranfgreilbrs of the law 
 of God become debtors to divine juftice; and if the 
 debt is not cancelled by the mercy of' God on their 
 repentance in this life, it will certainly be puniJhed in 
 a life to come. This the divine jultice and holinefs 
 requires. 
 
 To prove that it is not our fault that We arc not 
 better and happier men than we actually are, he fays, 
 that the original conflitution of the human fyltem does 
 not admit of an effeftual reformation of manners and 
 morals. And his reafon is, bccaufc neither reafbn nor 
 revelation, neither Heathen nor ChrifVian philofophers, 
 neither human nor divine laws, have been able to ef- 
 fcfl fuch a reformation. From which it follows, that 
 it cither is the will of God that we fliould not obey 
 
 his 
 
Se<5l. XII. human f ml ^ and a future Jl ate. 417 
 
 his law, nor conform our condacl to It ; or that fome 
 way or other man hath diiabled and difqualified him- 
 felf for rendering fjch obedience. That vice and 
 wickednefs do abound among men, is a certain, and 
 forrowfui matter of fa£l. This I chufe to impute to 
 man himfelf, rather than charge it to the account of 
 my holy God. My author rather blames God for 
 not making him a being incapable of abufing and mif- 
 improving his nature. But, for the honour and digni- 
 ty of man, God hath given him power and dominion 
 over his own a(ftions. Upon man he hath beftowed 
 man himfelf, with power and ability to ufe or abufe 
 his faculties, but ftill accountable to his maker and 
 mafter for all his doings : for God cannot divefl him- 
 felf of his fovereignty. I appeal to Mr Mallet, 
 and to every man of common underftanding, if it was 
 not in his, and in their power, to have adled a more 
 reafonable part than in many cafes they have actually 
 done. It is therefore our own fault that we are not 
 better men than at prefent we are. And as there is no 
 man who does always that which is good and right, the 
 contagion and difqualification mufl be univerfal. It is 
 their own fault, an univerfal fault in mankind, as 
 much as it is mine and yours perfonally, when we 
 tranfgrefs the law of God, or the dictates of right 
 reafon, by omilFion or commiflion. I promifed not 
 to meddle with revelation, and therefore forbear to 
 mention the rife and origin of our inability to obey the 
 law of God to perfe£tion ; but fince it is univerfal, 
 3 G and 
 
41 8 Of the immortality of ihe Seel. XII. 
 
 and of the greateft antiquity, I may afTume, that it 
 proceeds from the firft of men, or the fir ft man. And 
 fince a good and holy God is not to be blamed, it 
 muft have been his or their fault. Can any imagine, 
 that a holy God could have created the firft man juft 
 fuch as v/e fee many of his pofterity ? 1 cannot per- 
 fuade myfelf, that fuch as Lord Bolingbroke was, 
 might be the immediate workmanftiip of Go d ; no 
 more than I can believe, that the righteous and holy 
 Lord approves of all his Lordftiip's doings. How- 
 ever it hath come to pafs, it hath happened to man by 
 his own fault, that he is not fuch as he was when he 
 came firft out of the hands of his Creator. He was 
 then pcrfecl, and fitted and finiflied to obey the will 
 of God ; and, by fuch a regular and fteady conduft, 
 to be a happy creature. God made man perfeft, 
 but man hath fought out many ruinous inventions. 
 
 Let us fuppofc a plain and a ftraight way, (and 
 wffdom*s ways are ways of fleafnntnefs, and all her 
 paths are peace)^ it may be thought prafticable to 
 walk in this way without ftraying or ftumbling : but 
 if he who attempts it fiiould always ftumblc, and fre- 
 quently fi\ll ; if, inftead of proceeding in a Itraight 
 courfe, he deviates fometimes to the one fide, ajid 
 fometimes to the other ; mult we not conclude, that 
 this traveller's feet are lame, that his eyes are dim, 
 or that his head is giddy and vertiginous ? Can man 
 be a reafonable creaturC; and at the fame time inca- 
 pable 
 
3e^. XII. human foul, and a future Jiate. 419 
 
 pable to a6l as fuch ? The fun obferves a regular 
 coiirfe ; and many animals, by mere inftin^l, keep 
 their flation : but thefe are immediately under divine 
 diredlion; and man, for his honour, is under the direc- 
 tion of his own faculties. He blunders in the bufinefs 
 of his being; and from one unreafonable adion to 
 another, he goes quite aftray from the law of God, 
 and the dicHiates of right reafon. The remains of rea- 
 fbn, and an occafional approbation of what is good and 
 right, fliew what man originally was, and to what a 
 low and lamentable condition he hath reduced him- 
 felf. Such thoughts as thefe difpofe me to believe 
 the Chriilian account of the forlorn ftate of mankind, 
 though it may difpofe Mr Mallet to laugh at me 
 for ray pains. However, I have proved, that all 
 irregularities, vice, and immorality, are owing to man 
 himfelf, and not to God. And I have reconciled the 
 human ftate to the ideas of the holinefs and goodnefs 
 of the Creator, upon fuppofition, and upon his Lord- 
 lliip's admifTion, that the great drama is not as yet fi- 
 niflied ; and that there fliall ,be a future ftate of retri- 
 bution of rewards and puniftiments. 
 
 From the incorrigible and incurable indifpofition 
 and diftemper of mankind, which neither reafon nor 
 revelation, neither Heathen nor Chriftian philofo- 
 phers, neither human nor divine laws, have been able 
 . to cure and to reform effectually ; from this, 1 lay, 
 his Lordlliip concludes, that fuch a reformation is in- 
 3 G 2 confillcnt 
 
420 Of the immortality of the Se<^. Xlt. 
 
 confident with the original conftitution of the human 
 fyftem ; though at the fame time he gives it np as in- 
 confiftent with the holincfs and goodnefs of God. His 
 words are : " ^Vhy there is fuch a ftate as this, and 
 " how to reconcile it to the ideas of holinefs and 
 " goodnefs, let thofc who prcfume to judge of divine 
 " goodnefs, judge accordingly." If it is prefump- 
 tion to judge of divine goodnefs and holinefs, and if 
 the original conftitution of the human fyftem is incon- 
 fifient with thefe divine attributes, he judges prefump- 
 tuoufly and peremptorily, that there are no fuch attri- 
 butes belonging to the Deity. But he adds, " Since 
 " there is fuch a flate as this, let you and I pronounce 
 " that it was fit and right there fliould be fuch a 
 " ftate:" A ftate, to be fure, which God never or- 
 dered, becaufe inconfiHent with his holinefs and good- 
 nefs. Perhaps every reader doth not know, that the 
 principles of Fatalifm or Fatal Athcifni are, That eve- 
 ry thing is what it is, and how it is, and could not 
 polTibly have been othcrwife; and therefore fit, and 
 right, and juft to be fuch and fo. All I obferve here 
 is, that men, by departing from the religious fclieme, 
 and a belief of God's creation and government of the 
 univerfe, (and this they do, that they may flatter 
 themfelves with impunity), are led from error to cr* 
 ror, until they lofc their rcafon, and run into A- 
 thciliu as their only refuge. I have dillinfruifhed be^* 
 iwccn the end and the means. AVhatevcr God docs, 
 whatever l:e permits ; if he delays, or executes judg- 
 ment 
 
Seft.XlI. human foul, and a future Jlate. 421 
 
 ment immediately ; it is fit and right for carrying oh 
 the great plan of providence, or the univerfal drama, 
 as his Lordfhip calls it, to a conclufion. Were this 
 prefent ftate of things to undergo no alteration, and 
 if it neither wanted nor admitted any ; then all that 
 is done here muft be final, and the prefent muft be 
 without relation and without connexion to futurity. 
 The nobleman of an author, who fays we are conneft- 
 ed with the animal race, and even with plants, and 
 all the parts of the univerfe connected with one ano- 
 ther, in one great defign, ought to admit, that the 
 prefent ftate of things is fubfervient, fit, and the right 
 means for carrying on the whole creation into greater 
 perfeftion, and for finiihing and completing the grand 
 drama that is now in aftlon. 
 
 The Noble author fays ftrangely, (and he hath 
 many ftrange fayings), that Wollaston is brought, 
 or hath brought his reader ** * to the very brink of 
 *' the precipice. He cannot believe a God unjuft, 
 '' cruel, unreafonable; but he may find it as difficult 
 *' to believe a God who a6ls againft his attributes and 
 " the perfections of his nature in one fyftem, only 
 ** to have a reafbn the more for a<^ing agreeably to 
 *' them in another." That God may inflift on the 
 good and the beft of men corrective puniihments, and 
 luch as tend to their improvement in piety and mora- 
 'tv, and to their future happinefs, is no v.'ife incon- 
 
 * Vol. :v. p. 373. 
 
 fifient 
 
422 Of the immortality of the Se6t. XIL 
 
 fiftent with the wifdom and goodnefs of God : but to 
 inflid fuch punifliments as tend only to render them 
 unhappy during the whole fpace of their being, upon 
 fuppofition of their perfcft innocence, would be cruel- 
 ty and injuftice. But this cruelty can by no means be 
 afcribed to Wollaston's fcheme, though it may be, 
 and muft be afcribed to Bolingbroke's. It is his 
 doctrine, that man is neither better nor worfe, more 
 moral nor immoral, than God defigned he ihould, or 
 has commanded him to be. And if he is unhappy in 
 this his only life, it is not his fault. It is his prefent 
 ftate, and it is fit and right it fliould be fuch. It is a 
 part of the univerfal fyflem, which admits of no alte- 
 ration. This philofopher admits but one grand fyftem, 
 one immenfe defign in the Deity : but here he divides 
 this grand fyftem into two, to make place for impu- 
 ting to WoLLASTON what I am fure he never faid, 
 and what I believe he never thought, that God a£ls 
 againft his attributes here, only that he may have an 
 occafion the more for acting agreeably to them here- 
 after. He may make as many fyftcms as he pleafes, 
 one for every individual man, which is finiflicd and 
 completed by death. But it is of his own iliewing, 
 *' * that it is a great truth, that the whole feries of 
 " things is at all times aiflually prefent to the divine 
 " mind." To God therefore all is one iyflem, who 
 cannot therefore mend in one wliat he did wrong in 
 another. It is therefore a vain and a dangerous prc- 
 
 * Vol. V. p. 82. 
 
 fumption, 
 
Se^. XII. human foul, and a future Jiate. 423 
 
 fumptlon, to aflert, that our ftate is final when this 
 life is ended : whereas this ftate of things is a part of 
 the great fyftem of God's creation and government, 
 which ftill fubfift. The paft, the prefent, the future, 
 are all connefted in the grand feries of things, always 
 prefent to the divine mind. 
 
 - Because fentence againfl an evil work is not fpee- 
 dily executed, my authors conclude, that it never will 
 be executed. But to make out this conclufion, it muft 
 be immediately executed : for if it is delayed a day, 
 it may be delayed a hundred years, and even poftpo- 
 ned till after death. But an immediate execution 
 would leave no place, as I obferved before, for re- 
 pentance and reformation, admitting the punilhment 
 to be total and final. With Mr Mallet's leave, I 
 will indulge myfelf in vindication of the wifdom of 
 God in the government of the moral world. If we 
 were witnefles of the fentence, and execution of it, 
 which for ever determines the (late of good and bad 
 men; did we fee a judgment-feat erefted, and an an- 
 gel of light placed thereon, (and it is faid, that there 
 are legions of them attending the throne of the Moft 
 High, and ready to execute his orders) ; did we hear 
 fentence paded, and fee it immediately put in execu- 
 tion ; and did this happen periodically in every parifh, 
 the confternation would be fo great, that the bufinefs 
 of this life would be neglefted. It Vv'ould then be- 
 come the wiih and prayer of every reafonable and li- 
 ving 
 
424 Of the immortalitj of the Se<5l.XII. 
 
 ving man, that their departed friends and acquaint- 
 ances might not be judged fo foon, and that tliefe pa- 
 rochial allizes might be adjourned until one great day, 
 until an end was put to the prefent fyftem, and until 
 the confummation of things ; when, by the dilTblu- 
 tion of all terrellrial relations and connections between 
 man and man, they may be enabled to bear an eternal 
 reparation from their jurtly-condemned friends and 
 former favourites. That the wicked are not imme- 
 diately and finally punilTied, nor the good immediate- 
 ly and totally rewarded, is (o far from being an ob- 
 jeftion againft a future ftate of rewards and punifli- 
 ments, that it is rather an argument for the cerwinty 
 of it. 
 
 To prove that no man, and in particular Mr 
 WoLLASTON, have any reafon to complain of the 
 evils of this life, my author affirms for a reafon, 
 that they are overbalanced by the good things he en- 
 joys ; and that it muft be i^o, fince if any charitable 
 pcrfon had offered to cut Mr Wollaston*s throat, 
 he would have been ill received. By an a<ft of re- 
 signation, his Lordfiiip pretends to make life and 
 death equally welcome. But had his Lordfhip been 
 in Mr Wollaston's fuppofed cafe, he would have 
 received the throat-cutter the fame way, becaufe 
 '* * having tafled exiftcnce, he abhorred non-entity." 
 3ut if the ofltT had been made to cither of them, to 
 
 • Vol. iv. p. 393. 
 
 live 
 
SecH:. XII. human foul, and a future flat e. 425 
 
 live the very fame life over again, without the leaft va- 
 riety, I doubt much if it had been thankfully received. 
 A prolongation of life, health, and ftrength, no man, 
 even in prifon, would refufe. He would be apt to 
 flatter hitnfelf, that his pafl errors in life, and the 
 remembrance of them, would make him more careful 
 and cautious than he was before, and wife enough to 
 embrace every opportunity of promoting and fecuring 
 his happinefs. 
 
 ■ Credula vitam 
 
 Spes fovet, et melius eras fore femper ait. 
 
 But as men are much the fame, I have reafbn to 
 think, they would deceive themfelves in their ex- 
 peftations. Some have unexpeftedly received a new 
 leafe of life, and even that hath been employed 
 much to the fame purpofe with the preceding part. 
 And fince, on a review of a long and profperous life, 
 there appears nothing in it, without fbme additional 
 variety, worthy of the pains of living it over again, 
 I conclude, that our defires are not to be fatished here j 
 and I further conclude, that we are made for more 
 noble bufinefs and enjoyment than this world caa 
 afford. Small and trifling fubje^s ingrofs our thoughts 
 when children. Youth is full of Ih'ong def^res, often 
 never gratified ; and when gratified, are often more 
 hurtful than profitable. After a buflle in the bufi- 
 nefs of life, and beftowing more pains on making ac- 
 3 H (juiliuons 
 
426 Of the immortality of the Seft.XlI. 
 
 quifirions than they are worth, we fit down ftill un- 
 fatisfied. We grieve and mourn, we langh and fing, 
 we deep, we wake, we eat and drink, and then 
 become hungry and thirfty, and the circle returns, 
 and then we die. And though you fliould call me 
 mad, as Lord Bolingbroke calls Mr Wollaston, 
 I cannot but believe that man was made for more 
 noble employment and enjoyment ; and if it is not 
 our own fault, we fhall at lad have none but regular 
 and reafonable defires, which never fliall be difaf'point- 
 ed ; and fo enjoy all the happinefs that our rational na- 
 ture is capable of. I add, only as my own opinion, 
 that our prefent faculties fhall not only be flrength- 
 ened and improved, but alfo that an addition of new' 
 ones fliall be bcflowed on us, to make us capable of 
 joys unfpeakable and full of glory. As the deaf 
 made to hear, and the blind made to fee, are fur- 
 prifingly delighted, the one with a variety of colours 
 and objc<5ls, and the other with the harmony of 
 founds; fo fliall the godly man be when he enters 
 into poflefllon of his great reward. Shall fuch great 
 and glorious views be renounced, for no other reafon 
 but that we may live and die like the beafls ? With 
 fuch hopes and expectations, inflead of dying mad 
 for fear of death, 1 have feen fome leave this world 
 with as much joy and pleafure, as ever his Lordfliip 
 of Bolingbroke lived in it. Miferable muft 
 thofe principles and opinions be, which fail when 
 
 their 
 
Se(5l. XII. human foul, and a future Ji ate. 427 
 
 their fupport is moft wanted. '' * Hope," faith his 
 Lordfhip, " is the cordial drop that fweetens every 
 " bitter potion, and even the laft." But thofe who 
 deny a future ftate, or look for nothing comfortable 
 in it, cannot partake of it in the laft, or extremity of 
 this life. I could indulge myfelf in meditating on 
 the glorious fubjeft of a blefled eternity : but I confi- 
 der, that I write not for thofe that do, but for thofe that 
 do not believe fuch a future ftate ; and from them, 
 while they perfifi: in infidelity and Atheifm, I expedl 
 no other return than the character of a delirious en- 
 thufiaft, or the Italian proverb, ^-ejio e bueno for 
 la predica. 
 
 If the happinefs of human life is exalted and mag- 
 nified on the one hand, the whole race of mankind 
 is made of fmall account on the other. " The evils 
 " we complain of," (it is his Lordfliip who fpeaks), 
 *' are the conftant or occafional effefts of the confti- 
 *' tution of a world which was not made for our 
 " fakes." Natural philofophers " have done more 
 " fervice to true Theifm, than all the metaphyfical 
 " reafoners a priori ; or, to fay fomething flronger, 
 " and equally true, have done it more fervice than 
 " divines and Atheifts have done it hurt." Thefe 
 men, he fays, " have made it evident, that we ought 
 *' to confider the world we inhabit, no othervvife 
 *' than as a little wheel in our folar fyftem, nor our 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 382. 
 
 q H 2 " folar 
 
428 Of the hnmortaUty of the Sccfl. XII. 
 
 '' folar fyftem any otherwife than as a little, but a 
 " larger wheel, in the immenfe machine of the uni- 
 *' verfe." By others this earth is reprefented as a 
 point, and this point as the dunghill of the creation, 
 and all its inhabitants as mulhrooms growing upon it, 
 when compared with other innumerable fub-iyftems 
 in that of the univerfe. 
 
 One would be apt to think, that thele aftronomers 
 and natural philjfoj^hers had been traniported to o- 
 ther planets, and had converfed with their inhabitaijts, 
 and brought from thence fyliems of their religion, 
 ethics, and politics, for our inltruftion, and for our 
 improvement in the knowledge of God, and in the 
 duty which we owe him, before it could be faid 
 that they have done more fervice to religion, than 
 either divines or metaphyfical reafoners a pricri. I 
 own the difcoveries they have made are admirable, 
 and that they ferve to dcii^-onf irate the wifdom and 
 power of the grand architect. They ferve, as far as 
 thcfc difcoveries are new, as new and additional 
 proofs of the exigence and being of God. The an- 
 cients, from what they knew, (though they knew 
 lefs), could, and did reafon themfelves into a per- 
 fualion that God made, and docs govern the world. 
 This metaphyfical reafoners a priori^ and divines, 
 did not, nor do they deny. Tliey make ufe of thefe 
 difcoveries, as well, if not better, than thole altro- 
 nomers who made them. They arc able to corre^ 
 
 our 
 
Sefft.XII. human foul, and a future Jiate. 429 
 
 our author for aderting, that the world or the uni- 
 verfe is tmmenl". For what is immenfe is unbound- 
 ed ; but all corporeal beings, in their nature, and in 
 our conception of them, do imply limitation. Let 
 the author make the univerfe as large as his imagina- 
 tion is able to make it, he can never make it immenfe 
 or infinite; But whatever his Lordfhip can make of 
 the power and knowledge of God, he is far from 
 concluding his moral attributes; and without a pcrfua- 
 fion of thefe, there is no motive, no means left to 
 render mankind better and happier than they are. 
 This I have already made appear. "W hatever altro- 
 nomers and divines may learn from the magnificent 
 works of God, his Lordfliip hath no occalion for 
 thofe difcoveries they bring from the ftars. For he 
 forgets that he hath faid, " * This world, which is 
 " the fcene of our aftions, is the fcene of our know- 
 *' ledge. We can derive none that is real from any 
 *' other, whatever intelieftual worlds we may ima- 
 " gine." 
 
 But however many habitations and inhabitants 
 there are, and how they are ruled and governed, is 
 not our bufinefs to know ; and did we know it, it 
 would make little to our purpofe. 1 acknowledge 
 that the world was not made for us, though his 
 Lordlhip blames all Heatlien and Chriilian philofo- 
 phers for maintaining it was. But he blames them 
 
 * Vol. in. p. 383. 
 
 without 
 
4;^o Of the immortality of the Sc(fV.XII. 
 
 without rcafon. Such nn article of belief he will 
 not find in any eftablifhed fyftem of Chriftianity. 
 He excepts Dr King ; and he might have likewife 
 excepted Dr Cudworth; who fays, " The parts 
 *' were made for the whole, and the whole for the 
 " Maker." It was a Chriftian who wrote this do- 
 xology ; * 'Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, 
 and honour, and power : for thou hajl created all 
 things ; and for thy pleafure they are, and were ere* 
 ated. But to pafs this, with which his Lordfliip 
 makes a mighty and impertinent din ; though the 
 world was not made fir us, yet we, and all things 
 befides, were made for the glory, and honour, and 
 good pleafure of our God and Creator. And though 
 there fliould be a million of millions of fyftems, as 
 large as our folar fyftem, filled with inhabitants fupe- 
 rior to us in knowledge ; yet fuch as our habitation 
 is, and we are, we are not below the care and in- 
 fj)c£i:ion of an infinitely- wife, powerful, good, and 
 holy God. Known to him are all his works, from, 
 and before the beginning of the creation. By his 
 power he upholds them in being ; by his providence 
 he rules and governs them ; and by his holinefs, or 
 moral attributes, he judges, rewards or punillies 
 all rational creatures, who, by being rational, are 
 free and moral agents, and who, by being fuch, are 
 the fjbjc.£ls of his moral government. If this earth 
 was not made for us, as little were we made for the 
 
 * Rev. iv. n. 
 
 earth. 
 
Se<5l.XII. human foul f and a future ftute. 431 
 
 earth. Our ftate, therefore, doth not neccflarily de- 
 pend on it, ' nor on the conftitution of the fyilem, 
 whereof our prefent habitation is a JDart. And let me 
 aflc Mr Mallet, " Why fhould the evils we com- 
 ** plain of, be the conftant or occafional efifeds of the 
 *' conftitution of a world that was not made for us, 
 " nor we for it ? " We are under the dominion, and 
 under God's moral government; and we are not 
 therefore necedarily fubje£ted to the changes and va- 
 riations to which our habitation is liable. Nor can it 
 be faid, confiftently with the divine attributes, that 
 our ftate and condition muft follow that of our pre- 
 fent dwelling, whether our condufl be pious or im- 
 pious, virtuous or vitious, moral or immoral. God 
 hath made no more worlds, no more intelligent and 
 rational beings, than he is able to govern. And let 
 this earth, and we that dwell thereon, be ever fb 
 comparatively mean and contemptible, we are part 
 of God's dominions, and he takes care of them all. 
 And this earth being but a fmall part of the univerfe, 
 were it to be neglefted in the grand plan of the Al- 
 mighty, fo might the whole. For all nations, all 
 worlds, are before him as a very fmall thing, as the 
 duft in the balance, as nothing. From all which I con- 
 clude, that ail the difcoveries that mathematicians and 
 aftronomers have made, and his Lordlhip hath made 
 from them, do not alter the cafe of mankind, nor 
 involve the good and the bad, without difcrimination, 
 into the fame ftate of happinefs or mifery. Whate- 
 ver 
 
4^2 Of the immortality of the SccH:. XII. 
 
 Ver fervice mathematicians and afh-onomers have done 
 to Thcifin, the life which his Lordlliip makes of 
 their lucubrations, is no better than blalphemy. That 
 is, God hath fb much to do with other fyftems, 
 and their inhabitants, that he cannot attend to what 
 palTes on our earth ; or that we who dwell thereon, 
 are not worthy of his infpe6lion, and that though 
 we and our habitation are the workmanihip of his 
 own omnipotent hand. 
 
 Whether he intended it as an objection againft a 
 future ftate of rewards and punifhments, or nor, it is 
 a very flrong one, if it were true, that God cannot 
 iDake men happy. After putting his reader in mind 
 that he hath reje6led all God's moral attributes, and 
 particularly his goodnefs, he fays, the argument which 
 divines and Atheifts draw from it to eftablifli a future 
 ftate of happinefs of thofe w ho fuffer for the fake of 
 righteoufnefs, proves a great deal too much. His 
 reafbn is, " * If goodnefs ought to be, as they af^ 
 ** fume, the directing principle in the cafe; and if 
 ** wifdom ought to contrive, and power to execute 
 " under this dirctffton; the happinefs of man ought 
 ** to be proportionable to the goodnefs of God, that 
 *' is, infinite : than which no greater abfurdity can be 
 *' conceived. But if we airuinc, in oppofition to thefe 
 *' confederates, that divine wi Mom, whereof we have 
 *' ideas much better determined than we have of di- 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 335. 
 
 " Vine 
 
Se61:.XIL hujTian fiiil, and a future Jl^te, 4-^3 
 
 <* vine goodnefs, ought to be deemed in this, as in 
 " every other cafe, the direfting principle of divine 
 " conduft; it will follovv, without any abfurdity^ 
 " nay moft agreeably to the reafon of things, that 
 " the effe£l: may be proportionable to the caufe, that 
 " is, infinite. It implies a contradi^ion to fay, that 
 " 'God ihoLild have made a creature infinitely happy; 
 *' but it implies none to fay, that he made a fyfteni 
 *' of creation infinitely wife, and the bell of ail pof- 
 " fible fyftems." The amount of this is. If God 
 makes good men happy, he muft make them infinite- 
 ly happy ; but he cannot make then infinitely happy, 
 therefore he cannot make them happy at all. The 
 whole paflage is a piece of fublime metaphyfical non- 
 fen fe. 
 
 First, He did fay, that all God's moral attributes 
 are abforbed in his wifdom ; and here he makes the 
 divine wifdom and goodnefs two different things, and 
 that our idea of the one is not fo well determined as 
 the idea of the other. Lord Bolingbroke might 
 a6l fometimes according to reafon, and then it was the 
 directing principle; and fometimes according to his 
 luffs and paflions. But God always a6ls in confiften- 
 cy with all his attributes ; nor does any one of them 
 command and direct the reft. Skill and wifdom are 
 different things. The one can never be ufed but 
 
 r, 
 
 or a good and important purpofe, but the other may 
 be exerted either for a triflincror for a bad end. God 
 
 1 T iii 
 
434 Q/^ f^^ immortality of the Se<5l.XII. 
 
 is not a necedary, but a free and voluntary agent vvitlt 
 refpe^ to all his doings ad extra. His Lordfhip is 
 much in love with his imaginary fcale of beings, and 
 ftiuft, in confequence of this his favourite notion, ad- 
 mit, that God makes fome more, and other things 
 lefs perfe£l:. But did he a£l neceflarily and adequate- 
 ly to all his attributes and perfections, he muft make 
 them all equally perfeft; that is, he muft make as 
 many Gods as beings, or make nothing at all. This 
 he may admit, but admit as an Atheill. 
 
 Secondly, He aflerts, that it is no contradiction to 
 fay, that God made a fyftem of creation infinitely wife. 
 This might pafs for Spinozian Atheifm, if he had not 
 faid, that God made this infinitely-wife fyftem. But 
 it can never pafs for common fenfe. For we cannot 
 fay that God hath made a world mfinitely wife, no 
 more tlian we can fay, that the houfe is as ikilful as 
 the architect who built it. 
 
 Thirdly, He aflerts, in fnpport of all this nonfenfe, 
 that divine wifdom ought to be deemed in every cafe 
 the directing principle of divine conduCt; that is, wil^ 
 dom without goodnefs : for he makes them different 
 attributes of the Deity, if not inconfiltent. But hov/ 
 is it polTible, how is it conceivable, that God hath 
 made the world for a wife, but not for a good, and 
 confequently not for an ill, and, by another confe- 
 quence, for no purpofc at ail .'' But admitting wifdom 
 
 to 
 
Sc^ XII. hitman foul, and a future Jlate. 435 
 
 to be the dire^ng principle, how can it follow, that 
 God hath made the world infinitely wife, that is, as 
 wife as himfelf ? He forgets that he had faid before, 
 *' * To maintain that the material world is a divine 
 " animal, a wife being, and a God, is blafphemous 
 " and abfurd." God, hath made the world freely, 
 not neceflarily, (this I am obliged to repeat) ; and, 
 by the freedom of his divine will, he beftows more 
 or lefs perfeftlon ; more upon a man than on an oyfler, 
 the loweft in his Lord (hip's animal fcale. He who 
 profefles to know nothing but by fenfe and experience, 
 (and this his Lordfhip does, as before obferved), can- 
 not want for affurance and ignorance to fpeak as much 
 nonfenfe, in the way of abftraftion, as he pleafes. 
 Did he ever, by any of his fenfes, perceive any wil^ 
 dom or underflandmg in ftones and plants ? If he 
 hath perceived fome wifdom in beafts, he hath percei- 
 ved more in himfelf. And he imagined, and faid, 
 ** -f- that he had no reafon to doubt, that there were 
 '* created beings above him poflelTed of greater wif- 
 " dom and knowledge than he was mafier of, but irj 
 " perfection infinitely below the fiipreme Being," 
 that is, God. The univerfe therefore neither is, nor 
 could be made infinitely wife : for infinity admits of 
 no degrees, nor can it be made up of finite and limit- 
 ed perfeftions. 
 
 Another, and one of his Lordfliip's flrongefl ob- 
 
 '^ Vol. iii. p. 414. -f- Vol. iv. p. 310. 
 
 3 I 3 je£lions 
 
43^ Of the hmmrtality of the SciH:. XII. 
 
 jeftions agajnfl: a future dare of rewards and punifli- 
 ments, is the evils and calamities which the bcft of 
 men fuffer in this life, and fuffer innocently. The 
 injury is done them ; arid all the reparation that can 
 be made them in another life, doth not acquit the ju- 
 ftice and goodnefs of God. This was not his Lord- 
 fhip's cafe, nor is it Mr Mallet's, nor is ir mine. 
 His Lordfhip and Mr Mallet confefs, that " * nei- 
 *' the'r perfect obedience nor perfeft happinefs is to 
 " be found among the fons of men ; and that we 
 *' ought to judge of the continuance of the one, as 
 *' we judge of our perfeverance in the other; not by 
 '* this that we never fall from either, fince in that 
 " cafe there would be no one good, nor no one hap- 
 " py man in the world." And if God, to train up 
 fome of thcfe for future happinefs, iliould chafiife 
 them with fuffcrings and afRi£l:ions; inflead of doing 
 them an injur}', he does them a favour. " Mortali- 
 " ty," his Lordfliip fays, ** is no hardfiiip." And if 
 God, in his wife providence, fliould n.akc it a good 
 man's duty (I might fay an innocent man's duty) to 
 lay down his life in the fcrvice and in obedience to 
 his maker and mafler, he only exchanges it for a bet- 
 ter. And it is only by a firm belief of a futufe ftate 
 of rewards and puniiliments, that a man can be en- 
 abled to fuifcr every thing rather than offend his 
 God. 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 396. 
 
 THi. 
 
Sefl. XII. human foul, and a future Jl ate, 437 
 
 The conclufion of the fourth volume, and the in* 
 tended conclufion of all his Lordfhip's philofophical 
 works, is fo extraordinary, that, in my opinion, it 
 deferves to be tranfcribcd for the benefit of thofe who 
 have not the book, and to fave thofe who have it the 
 trouble of confulting it. " He alone is happy, and 
 *' he is truly {o, who can fay. Welcome life what- 
 " ever it brings ; welcome death whatever it is : aut 
 " tran.sfert aut finit. If the former, we change our 
 " ftate, but we are flill the creatures of the fame 
 " God. He made us to be happy here ; he may 
 " make us happier In another fyftcm of being. At 
 *' leafl this we are fure of, we fnall be dealt with ac- 
 " cording to the perfection of his nature, and not ac- 
 *' cording to the imperfe^ion of our own. Refigna- 
 ** lion, in this inftance, cannot be thought hard to 
 ** one who thinks worthily of God ; nor in the other, 
 *' except to one who thinks too highly of man. That 
 *' you and 1, and even Wollaston himfelf, fhould 
 ^' return to the earth from whence we came, to the 
 " dirt under our feet, or be mingled with the allies 
 " of thole herds and plants from which we drew nu- 
 *' trition while v/c lived, doth not feem any indignity 
 " offered to our nature, fince it is common to all the 
 *' animal kind : and he who complains of it as fuch, 
 *' d<^es not leem to be fct by his reafbning faculties fb 
 *' f;^r abo\e them in life, as to deferve not to be \^-^(^\- 
 " led with them in death. We were like them be- 
 ''' fore our birth, that is, nothing \ fo iliall we be, 
 
 *'on 
 
4^8 Of the immortality of the Se(^. XIL 
 
 " on this hypothefis, like them too after death, that 
 " is, nothing. What hardiliip is done us? None; 
 *' unlefs it is a hardfliip that we are not immortal, be- 
 '* caufe we wifli to be fo, or flatter ourfelves with 
 
 " that expe£i:ation. If this hypothefis were true, 
 
 ♦* which 1 am far from afTuming, I fliould have no 
 " reafon to complain ; though, having tafted exift- 
 " ence, 1 iliould abhor non-entity. Since then the 
 " firft cannot be demonflrated by reafon, nor the (e- 
 ^' cond be reconciled to my inward (entiaient, let me 
 *' take refuge in refignation at the laft, as in every 
 *' afl of my life. Let others be fblicitous about their 
 " future ftare, or frighten or flatter themfelves, as 
 " prejudice, imagination, bad health or good health, 
 ** nay as a louring day or a clear funfliine, fliall in- 
 " fpire them to do ; let the tranquillity of my mind 
 *' reft on this immovable rock, that my future, as well 
 " as my prefent Rate, are ordered by an almighty and 
 " all-wife Creator ; and that they are equally foolifti 
 '' and prefumptuous, who make imagmary cxcurfions 
 *' into futurity, and who complain ot the prefent." 
 
 Observe the trimmer, or rather the prevaricator. 
 He is far from afTuming, that death is annihilation, or 
 a converfion of all our animal and rational faculties in- 
 to duft and dirr. This however he hath not only af- 
 fumed, but alfb endeavoured to demonllrate. And 
 trimmer as he is, or affects to be, he cannot forbear 
 degrading thofc wl;o differ from him, particularly Mr 
 
 AVOLLASTON, 
 
Seffc. XII. human foul, and a future flate, 43^ 
 
 WoLLASTON, and to condemn him to be mingled 
 with the afhes of beads and plants, for not making a 
 better ufe of his reafbning faculties ; that is, for not 
 reafoning himfelf, as his Lordfhip does, into a disbe- 
 lief of a future ftate. It is, fays he, equally foolifh 
 and prefumDtuous , that is, finfui, to make any imagi- 
 nary excurfions into futurity. To be no better nor 
 worfe after death than the dirt under our feet, and to 
 be put on the level with other animals, even with an 
 oyfter, is no indignity offered to our nature. To die, 
 and to be nothing after death, is no harddiip. To 
 foine wicked men it would be rather a favour, and it 
 IS generally fuch to thofe who delight in the doftrine* 
 The author is far from affuming, (and he afted as if 
 he had been certain, and advifes others to do the 
 fame), that there is no future ftate of rewards and 
 punifhments ; yet, contrary to his uncertainty, it was 
 his purpofe and refolution not to be felicitous about it, 
 nor to frighten or flatter himfelf with the confequen- 
 ces. Whatever he believed, or whatever he doubted, 
 he thought it befl to live here as unaccountable to his 
 God and Creator hereafter. The tranquillity of his 
 mind refled on this immovable rock, that both his 
 prefent and future ftate are ordered by an almighty 
 and all-wife Creator ; and that this almighty and all- 
 wife Creator will deal with us according to the perfec- 
 tions of his own nature, and not according to tlie im- 
 perfections of curs. 
 
 Had 
 
44<^ QT the hiimortality of the Se^. XII. 
 
 Had we nothing to anfwer for but the eflential 
 imperfe(5lion which" belongs to all created beings, the 
 perfeftions of our Creator would for ever be our fafe- 
 guard and proteftion. But the cafe is otherwife. We 
 are not only imperfcft, but we are criminals ; and fuch- 
 criminals, with his Lordfliip's and Mr Mallet's 
 leave, as condemn ourfelves, as his Lordfhip did; 
 and if Mr Mallet does not, I do. Surely God 
 knows as much as we, or he knows nothing; and 
 therefore knows that we defcrve to be condemned. 
 But, indead of begging or accepting pardon, upon 
 the terms of repentance and amendment, his Lordfhip 
 charges God with all the faults which he either did 
 or could commit. They are the neceflary confe- 
 quence of the neceflary and eflential imperfe(fl:ion of 
 his nature. It is his opinion, that we are neither bet- 
 ter nor happier, w^orfe nor more unhappy, than God 
 intended we fhould be ; that though the law of na- 
 ture is the law of God, yet it was not given to us to 
 be obferved, whenever we can plead, for our tranf- 
 greffion, infirmities and temptations. It was his opi- 
 nion, and it is yours, that a more exaftand (trift obe- 
 dience IS inconfiftent with the original conftitution of 
 our nature : but on other occafions, like one who fays 
 and unfays at his pleafure, he charges man with all 
 the faults he does commit, and blames thofe who go 
 fo far, as " * to impute to God the introduiTiiion or per- 
 " miflion of thofc very evils, that neither God is an- 
 
 * Vol. iv. p. 39,-. 
 
 " nverabie 
 
Se«5l. XII. human foul ^ and a future flat e. 441 
 
 " fwerable for, (if I may ufe fuch an exprefTion), nor 
 *' nature, nor reafon, but our own perverfe wills, and 
 ** the wrong eleftions we make." The perfcdlions of 
 God, our Governor and Judge, cannot be our refuge 
 againft the vices and immoralities which we commit, 
 nor againfl: the evils and calamities which w^e bring up- 
 on ourfelves in this life, nor againft the confequences 
 of them in another life, upon fuppoHtion that there 
 aftually is, or may be fuch another life. So far are 
 the divine perfeftions from the prote^flion of the irre- 
 claimably wicked, that they infure their punifhment. 
 A God of infinite perfections aKvays afts fuitably to 
 them, and proportions all his difpenfations, as the ma- 
 jefty of his nature, the univerfal good and happinefs 
 of the rational creation, require. And if, after death, 
 we do fubfift rational beings, and fubje£ls of the all- 
 wife government of the Almighty, I do conclude, 
 that if a difference is not made here, it muft be made 
 hereafter, between the gocxl and the bad. Every thing 
 that God does, or permits, is fit, but it is not final, 
 God * hath appointed a day wherein he wt It judge the 
 world in righteoujnefs. And though this day is not 
 yet come, yet \ God is not flu k concerning hts pro- 
 mife •, for one day is with the Lord as a thoufand years, 
 and a thoufand years as one day. The great drama is 
 not yet finiflied ; but when men have a£led their part 
 in this terreftrial fcene, and if they are to be employ- 
 ed hereafter in another, though his Lordiliip may 
 
 * Afts jivii. 31. f 2 Pet. iii. 8. 9. 
 
 3 K think, 
 
442 Of the immortality of the Seel. XII. 
 
 think, yet I cannot believe, that we fhall be employ- 
 ed again on the fame footing. " The tranquillity of 
 *' his mind refts on this immovable rock, that his pre- 
 *' fcnt and future ftate are ordered by God." And 
 becaufe they are ordered by God, he thinks it folly 
 and prefumption to be felicitous about it, feeing he 
 cannot change or alter it to the better or to the worfe. 
 Did not his Lordfliip, and doth not Mr Mallet, 
 provide for a futurity of years, months, and days, 
 iiotwithdanding his, and your prefent flate, are order- 
 ed by God ? The doctrine of fatality takes no place 
 but only on the moft important matters, where there 
 fhould be no place for it. Whether you are to be, or 
 not to be, and how you may be after death, is none 
 of your concern or bufinefs. That is ordered by 
 God, you mean by Fate; and you cannot change 
 it. But though what you fhall eat and drink to-day 
 or to-morrow is unchangeably ordered, yet you are 
 careful to provide for it. Is not this to make your- 
 felf ridiculous in your own eyes I 
 
 I did fay, *' * He that disbelieves a providence 
 *' that extends to men after death, can liave no prin- 
 ** ciple fuperior to the prcfervation of the prefent life ; 
 " and therefore cannot blame himfelf for making that 
 '' his chief and only end, to which all his philofophl- 
 " cal notions mufl: give way. 1 his is no weaknefs in 
 '' him ; it is his wildom, it is his virtue, it is his for- 
 
 * Eftimatc, p. 33^. 
 
 " titudc. 
 
Se61:. XII.' human foul, and a future Jiate, 443 
 
 titude. For to be content to be no more, for ha- 
 ving once been a philolbpher, is foolifli and unna- 
 tural. It is not only unnatural, but contrary to na- 
 ture, for a man totally to dellroy himfelf. The 
 gentlemen Atheifts, of whom I fpeak, do not want 
 to be taught by me how to reduce their fpeculat:ons 
 into praftice. For the fake of practice, many, if 
 not all of them, have adopted the fpeculation. And 
 that I do not mifreprefent their opinion, nor do 
 them injuftice, 1 here appeal to their apologift 
 M. Bayle. 
 
 " * One may reduce Atheifm to this general te- 
 " neti That Nature is the caufe of every thing; that 
 " it is eternal, felf-exiftent ; and that it always a^ts 
 " according to the utmoft extent of its power, and 
 *' according to unchangeable laws, of which it knows 
 " nothing. From which it follows, that nothing is 
 *' polTible but what it does ; and that it produces eve- 
 " ry thing that is poiTsble : that no human efforts can 
 *' alter the leaft thing, or break its cliain of caufes 
 " and effefts : that every thing comes to pafs by fa- 
 " tal and unavoidable necefiity : that no one thing 
 " is more natural than another, and neither more nor 
 " lefs convenient to the perfeftion of the univtrfe : 
 *' that in whatever condition the world is, it is always 
 " fuch as it ou[^ht to be or can be : that Nature be- 
 " ing a m ther who knows none of her children, 
 
 * Vol. iii. p. 400. 
 
 3 K 2 " hath 
 
444 QA '^^ immortality of the Se^. XIL 
 
 hath no predilection for any of them, and favours 
 none to the prejudice of others; but beftows on 
 every one of them all the attributes and qualities 
 which it ought and can have according to time and 
 place : and, finally, that Nature enads and appoints 
 no punifliment for what is called immoralities, and 
 no recompenfe for morality and lirttte) that is, 
 fuch as are future. 
 
 *' It is certain, that a man who carries the con- 
 " fequenccs o^ his Atheiflical principles fo far, may 
 " carry them a great deal further. He may per- 
 " fuade himlelf, that it is to him a matter of indiffer- 
 ** ence, (it is M. Balye who fpeaks), to do this, 
 *' or to do that ; that having no liberty nor choice 
 " of one thing more than another, and that all things 
 " coming to pafs according to blind and irrevocable 
 " fatality, he ought to maintain himfclf in a ftate of 
 ** tranquillity and ina6livity, without either care or 
 *' concern about any thing, and abandon all bufinefs 
 *' to the a6^ivity of nature ; and becaufe ignorance 
 " and knowledge, truth and fldfity, fidelity and 
 " perfidy, virtue and vice, arc equally emanations 
 " from the firll being, ar.d all of them equally ne- 
 '• celTary for the pcrfc(flion of the univcrfe, it is ri- 
 *' diculous to be at painsi for one's own, or for the 
 " reformation of others." Nov/, all thefc confc- 
 qucnccs here mentioned, arc dire<fily contrary to 
 what wc know, aud tt> uhat wc feci in ouiiblvcs. 
 
 Docs 
 
Se£t.XII. human foul, and a future Jiate, 445 
 
 Does any man, or can any man perfuade hlmfelf, 
 that it is a matter of indifference whether he does this 
 or that ? Can he believe, contrary to his nature and to 
 conftant experience, that he hath no hberty, nor 
 choice of one thing more than another ? Can he per- 
 fuade himfelf, that he ought to maintain himfelf in a 
 ftate of inactivity, and abandon all bufincfs to the ac- 
 tivity of nature ? or did we rcfolve on fuch idlenefs 
 and indolence, could we poffibly put fuch a refolu- 
 tion in execution ? Did we perfuade ourfelves that ig- 
 norance and knowledge, truth and falfity, fidelity 
 and perfidy, virtue and vice, are equally emanations 
 from the firfl being, and all of them equally necef- 
 fary for the perfe^lon of the univerfe ; we muft ac- 
 knowledge, that we are naturally and induflrioufly 
 idle, to make any diftinftion betwixt good and evil, 
 and what makes for our happinefs or our milery ; 
 and all the pains we take for our own, and the in- 
 formation of others, is officious and impertinent. 
 But before all ■ thefe confequences can be admitted, 
 we, with all our rational faculties, muft be unmade, 
 and turned into ftupid animals, and even into his 
 Lordihip's oyfters. Strange muft their averfion be to 
 God and to his government, thus to impofe on them- 
 felves principles inconfiftent with the make of their 
 own minds, and inconfiftent with their conftant exj-)e- 
 rience. And abftrafring from words of courfe, to 
 which his Lordftiip annexes ideas fuitable to the Athe- 
 iftical hypothefis, it will be found, that it was his 
 
 opinion. 
 
44^^ ^f f^^ iinmortality of the Seel. XII. 
 
 opinion, at leaft his doftrine, that all things go on 
 here, and will go on hereafter, according to un- 
 changeable fatality. Now, whatever fpeculations 
 and principles are inconfiftent with a reafbnable prac- 
 tice, mull:, for that very reafon, be falle and ab- 
 furd ; but fuch is the Atheiltical do^rine of fatality, 
 and therefore it is abfurd and falfe. What doth 
 knowledge fignify, if it can have no influence on our 
 conduft and behaviour ? But if it hath a tendency to 
 extinguifh our care about futurity, though this futu- 
 rity fliould not extend beyond this life, fuch philo- 
 fophicai learning is not only ufelefs, but even hurt- 
 ful. And you, and your author, have employed 
 your time not only idly, but to your lofs and hurt, 
 if you reduce your principles into praftice. I know 
 you do not, you cannot regulate your condu<5l ac- 
 cording to the do^hine of unchangeable fatality ; and 
 therefore you either do not believe fuch a do£Vrine, 
 or you believe againft your own underftanding, and 
 your natural freedom and liberty of acting for that 
 which you judge your intereft and your happinefs. 
 
 If any man could be allowed to be a proper judge 
 of Atheifin and religion, M. Bayle mufl: be unex- 
 ceptionable. For if he was not an Atheift, he was at 
 leail: a Sceptic, and as fuch, mofl: impartial. And, ac- 
 cording to his judgment. Lord BoLiNGBROKE ftands 
 conviftcd of Athcifm, in quality of author, and you 
 jN'Ir Mallet, as publiflier. \\irhout rcfaming what 
 
 I 
 
Se(fl. XII. human f Jill, and a future flate. 447 
 
 I have already obferved, I do aflert, that you have 
 publifhed as his Lordfliip's doctrine, what the learned 
 Mr Bayle declares to be Atheifm. To avoid repe- 
 tition, 1 recommend to you a review. Either you 
 Mr Mallet did not know the difference between 
 Atheifm and religion ; or you did know the difference, 
 and approved his Lordiliip's Atheiflical doftrine; or 
 you did and do condemn it. If you are in the firft 
 cafe, it is your duty, as an honeft and good man, to 
 beg God and your country pardon, for publifhing 
 things that tend to the difhonour of your Creator, 
 and to rebellion againft the Sovereign of the univerfe. 
 If you are in the fecond cafe, and of the fame opi- 
 nion with liis Lordfhip, all that at prefent I can do 
 for you, is to pity you, and pray for you. If you 
 are in the third cafe, and of a different opinion from 
 your author, you muft be one of the worft of men. 
 For your own profit and worldly advantage, you ex- 
 pofe fim-ple fouls, and fouls ready to run to their own 
 ruin, to eternal mifery and deftruftion. There is no 
 kind of barbarity fo great as this of yours. If the 
 murderers of human bodies are in the fight of God 
 and men highly criminal, what muft be the cafe of 
 fuch as murder human fouls, with everlafting deflruc- 
 tion from the prefence and favour of their God ? 
 You may chufe any of the three characters that fuits 
 you befl. For you could not pofTibly perfuade your-? 
 felf, that if Lord Bolingbroke's v.orks did not 
 good, they would do no ill to your readers ; or that 
 
 while 
 
44-8 Of the immortality of the Se^. XII. 
 
 while they ferved only for their amnfement and di- 
 verfion, they turned out to your worldly advantage. 
 This is more than you could be fure of. And you 
 have therefore rifked human fouls for the fake of a 
 frolic, or for a mean and fordid purpofe. * A man 
 ijoho deceive tb his neighbour, and then Jaith, Am not I 
 in [port ? is as a madman^ who cajieth firebrands^ 
 arroiv^^ and death. So faid Solomon. Chriftians 
 need not be furprifed, being forewarned, that fuch 
 teachers as Lord Boling broke, and his publiilier 
 David Mallet, Efq; fhould p«-;fe, who privily 
 Jhali bring tn damnable bereftes, and even publicly, 
 denving the Lord that bought them, and the God 
 
 who made them. And vlk^x Jhad follow ibeir per^ 
 
 nicious ways, by reafon of whom the way of truth 
 fhall be evil fpoken of ; and through covetous- 
 UEss fhall they wUh feigned words make merchandife 
 of you -}-. I fay, fince this hath actually happened, 
 it is rather a confirmation of the truth of the Chri- 
 ftian revelation, than a difcredit to the Gospel. 
 
 Though it is a repetition ||, I prefume to put 
 you in mind, that his Lordiliip of Boling broke 
 hath faid, and you have publiflied, tliar, *' to make 
 " government efle^lual to all the good purpofcs of it, 
 " there mufi be a religion, this religion muft be na- 
 
 * Proverbs xxvi. i8. ig. 
 ■j- 2 Peter ii. i. 2. 3. 
 |] Introdudlion, p. g. 
 
 '' tional. 
 
Seft. Xll. human foul, and a future Jlate. 44^ 
 
 " tional, and this national religion muji be maintain!' 
 " ed in reputation and reverence." This you fay 
 in contradiction to all that you have faid againft God 
 and his providence, and againft the great defign of 
 his Lordfhip's philofophical works. You condema 
 yourfelf ; and you muft allow me to join with you 
 in coiide'-nnlng you, for an unworthy citizen of 
 Great Britain ; not only as an unworthy, but as a 
 peftiferous member of any religious fociety. Sure, an 
 Atheifl can have noth'ng in view, in his perfbnal capa- 
 city, but his own intereft ; and in a civil or focial ca- 
 pacity, nothing but the happinefs and profperity of the 
 fociety, as far as his own depends on it. Let every 
 man then be an x^theift, and there is an end of all truft 
 and confidence, and an end of all fociety and go- 
 vernment. What your defign can be in declaring 
 yourfelf to be an Atheift, and in perfuading others to 
 disbelieve a God and his providence, which tends to 
 the didolution of fociety, and to the ruin of yourfelf 
 and others, furpafles my imagiaation. * Abraham 
 jaid^ Becaufe I thought. Surely the fear of GOD is 
 not in this place -, and they will kill me for my wife's 
 fake. And he had reafon to diftrufl one who did not 
 fear God, and had no occafion to be afraid of a 
 ftranger and fojourner. You Mr Mallet have been 
 recommended to the care of the civil magiflrate, who , 
 liath treated you with dili-cgard, and the works you 
 
 * Gen. x\. 1 1. 
 
 T L ' Iiavc 
 
45© Of the immortality i Sec. Se^l.XII. 
 
 have publifhed in name of Lord Bolingbroke, 
 with contempt. And I recommend you to the God 
 whofe being and dominion you deny, together with 
 my moft earneft prayers, that he may grant you re- 
 pentance and pardon for what you have done. 
 
 NTS, 
 
n 
 
^/