!r«— /_ Sec op THE Theological Seminary, \ PRINCETON, N. J. Shelf ^ Book, iiii{iiiiiiiiii[iiiiiiiriii ' H I THE RELIGION O F NATURE DELINEATED. ^^itli^v tIu) 'Euo-e/2eia^ Plutarch. Tiro5 «i^ :cct, ^,, xcti et:n3^,iy a-;ro9vW«, aVoS^Wii'. Plato. The Fifth Edition. L O N 'D O N: Printedfor James and John Kn A PTON at the Cro7i^^ in St. Pau/^a Church-yard. Md^cxxxi. Adveitifement. Few copies of this hooh, tho not originally intended to he publijh- ed, were printed off in the year I J 12. but, it being tranfcribed for the prefs hajiily, and correct- ed under great difadvantages, many errata and mijiakes got into it, which could not all be pre- fently obferved, fFith a great part of them A 2 there- Advertifement. therefore flill remaining four or five of the co- pies were afterwards given away ; and fome more^ taken from the print ing-houfe^ p^Jf^^ through hands unknown to the author, and he fuppofes were fold privately. There has, hefide, been fome talk of a piratical defign upon it : and if that fhould take effe^, both it and he might fuffer extremely. For thefe reafons he has thought fit to reprint it himfelf more corre^ly, with fome fmall alterations (in things not ef- fential to the main defign) and fome additions, Tho he cannot hut he apprehenfivCy that flill there may he many things, which have efcaped his eye, or his attention. The Tl:)e Religion o/Nature delineated. To c^. F. Efq; WAS much furprifed, S JR., when (fomc time ago) you kim^onunaxely deCned ffiy thougbts upon thefe queilions, I . Is there really any fuch thing as natural rcY\gior\,propcrly and truly fo called ? II. // there is, ivhat is it ? III. Hoixi may a man qualify himfelf^ fo as to he able tojudge^ forhimfelf.^ of the other religions prof efi in the world; tofettk bis own opinions in difpiit able matters; and then to enjoy tranquillity of mind^neither difturbing others^ nor being diflurbed at what pajfes among them ? With what view you did this j whether in expe£tation of fome little degree of fetisfaftionj ormerely to tiy my abilities) or (which I rather think) out of kind- 2 B ncf"^ 6 The Religion of Nature. nefs to amufe me at a time, when I wanted fomething to divert melancholy reflexi- ons, I fhall not venture to guefs. I fhall only fay, that could I have forefeen in due time, that fuch a task was to be impofed upon me, I might have been better pre- pared for it. I might have marked what was fuitablc to my purpofe in thofe books, which I have red, but fhall fcarce ever return to read anymore: many more I might have red too, which, not wanting them for my own conviction, I have neglected, and now have neither leifure nor patience to perufe : I might have no- ted what the various occuixences and cafes, that happen in life, fiiggeiled: and, in general, I might have placed more of my time on fuch parts of learning, as would have been direftly ferviceable to me on the prcfent occafion; However, as I have not fpent my days without //;/«^?'«g and reflefting fe- rioufly within my felf upon the articles and duties of natural religion., and they are wzj //jw, by comparing the forefaid afts with which it might appear, to which kind they rcfpettively belong ■=. And tho men have not yet agreed upon any one, jet one ccitainly there muil be ^. That, which I am going to propofe, has always feemd to me not only evidently true, but withal fo obvious and plain, that per- haps for this very rcalbn it hath not merited the notice of authors : and the ufe and application of it is fo eafy, that if things are but fairly permitted to fpeak for themfelves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found themfelves to proclaim their own reftitude or obliquity j that is^ whether they are difagreeable to it, or not. I fhall endeavour by degrees to explain my meaning. I. That a£l, 'which may be denominated morally good or evil, muji be the abl of a beingcapabk of diftinguifing., chooftng., and aElingfor himfelf ^ .• or more briefly, of an intelligent and free agent. Becaufe in proper fpeaking no a6t at all can be afcribcd to that, which is not indued with thefe capacities. For that, which cannot di- ■ So, in Fkto, Socrates requires ofEuth^phro not st rt» ^Jo h^aiat^ xo».Z-, ia-tur «»' c^/.im scira ii'iJ"®-, i ■xv.rra. to, ctriKctrici i^-i, xr}. And again, ravrtw toiiuu fUji auTt.v Sii'ai_ct t'v 'l^icti Tii z-eri inv iiricv li'iM- 4' «» /A>i T-otSj-M, /*« 4)5. -pofce exemplar honefti. Luc. i" oih ro -/" aixiof, xavm 5" xuaS f/,»lay. Ei'.rip. Adfit Regula, peccatis qn& pcenas irroget dquas, fays Horace.' Now by thefame>-»/f, by which punifhments are juftly proporriond, crimes mufl: be diftinguiflid among themfelves ; and there- fore much more, crimes from no-crimes, and crimes from good aftions. So that it is at bottom a r«/e which can do this, that is required. « Formula qmilam conjlituenila efi : quam fi /eqiiemur incompa- ratione rerum, ab officio nunqitam recedemus. Cic. <* n«5 ^rw t£ a.rix.fj,a.^Ta. inm iC, anu^iTa rti iwy- Ka.oTola t'v K.Cfffls-si?; E!-i»s'» [K-Avmri^^ Arrian. < U6i virtuj./inMJitum eft in ipfis noiis t Cic. nij^om n-iinn -imy ijin-nnits yn'p lo^y misn!? ny-) asj nsina cm>i b's'p niw-i. Maim. mman n\-i r\w~\r\. nahh. Ab. B z iHnguifli, 8 The Religion of Nature. Seel, I. ftinguifh, cannot choofe : and that, which has not the opportunity, or hberty of choofing for itfelf, and afting accordingly, from an internal principle, a£ts, if it acts at all, under a neceflity incumbent ab extra. But that, which afts thus, is in reality only an injlrument in the hand of fomething which impofcs the necef- fity j and cannot properly be faid to vhat bis a meaning, may be either true ox falfe : which is as much as can be faid of any ver- bal fentence. When Popilius Lcenas foUcited to have Cicero profcribed, and that he might find him out and be his executioner % would not his carriage have fufficicntly^^- Tiified to any one, who was ignorant of the cafe, that TuJly either was fome very bad man, and deferved capital punilhment j or had fome way gricvoufly injured this man ; or at leaft had not Hvved his life, nor had as much reafon to expeft his fervice and good offices upon occafion, as he ever had to expect 7«//>'s ? And all thefe things being falfe, were not his behaviour and actions exprefjive of that which was falfe, or contradidiions to truth ? It is certain he aEled as i/thofe things had been true, which were not true, and as if thofe had not been true which were true (in this confifted the fault of his ingratitude) : and if he in words had faid they were true or not true, he had done no more than talk as if they were fo : why then fhould not to ^2^ as if they were ti ue or not true, Avhen they were o- therwife, contradict truth as much as to fay they were fo, when they were not fo'^? A pertinacious objcSor may perhaps ftill fay, it is the bufinefs of foldiers to de- fend themfelves and their country from enemies, and to annoy them as opportu- nity permits > and felf-prefei-vation requires all men not only barely to defend themfelves ag^iinft aggrelTors, but many times alfo to profecute fuch,and only fuch, as are wicked and dangerous : therefore it is natural to conclude, that they are enemies againtt .whom we fee foldiers defending themfeb.cs, and tliofe men wic- ked and dangerom, whom we. fee profecuted with zeal and ardor. Not that ' Where we find (f'Aa? te (fiAoi?, j^ tcAiVk? ^rex'rctii si« ;K'~f«< «»iiA(ii? iX^ovTcii. TfjHrjd. ■ •• Tkc CLKu>n «; !ToAj.u,us« ij^mcyro. DioJ.S. ' Val.Max. ^ ' Avtca^tis-iv am l;ef?» a-»n V 7C(u,'u.arm-tf.j yAaor^)- i^Jii* irAsoy. Zitrif. ^uafi interjit, aHiliam, an lideam. Cic. tliofc lo r/)^ Religion of Nature. Se^l.T. tliofe acEls of defending and profecutingy^rai: or fignify fo much : but corije£hires are raifed upon the common fenfc) which mankind has of fuch proceedings. Jnf. If It be natural to conclude any thing from them, do they not naturally convey the notice of fomcthing to be concluded ? x^ind what is conveying the notice of any thing but notifying or fignifying that thing ? And then again, if this fignifi- cation is natural and founded in the common principles and fenfe of mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning which refults only from the ufe of fome particular place or country, as that of language doth ? Ifvffhould enter into a compafbwith B, by which \\Qpromifes znd ingagcj never to do fome certain thing, and after this he does that thing : in this cafe it mull be granted, that his a£t interferes with his promife, and is contrary to it. Now it cannot interfere with his promife, but it muft ulfo interfere vi'ith the truth o£ that propo/ition, which (Iiys there was fuch a promife made, or :hat there is fuch a compad fubfifting. If this propoCtion be true, A made fuch a certain agreement with B, it would be denied by this, A never made any agreement with B. "Why ? Becaufe the tmth of this latter is inconfiflent with the agreement aflertcd in the former. The fonnality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a de- nial, \st\i\s, inconfiflence. If then the behaviour of yf be inconfiflent with the a- grecment mentiond in the former propofition, that propofition is as much denied by y/'s behaviour^ as it can be by the latter, or any olh&x propofition. Or thus, If one propofition imports or contains that which is contrary to what is containd in another, it is faid to contradict this other, and denies the exiftence of what is containd in it. Juft fo if one aft imports that which is contrary to the import of another, it contradiEls this other, and denies its exiflence. In a word, if ^ by his aftions denies the ingagements, to which he hath fubjefted himfelf, his ani- ons deny them > juft as we fay, Ptolomy by his writings denies the motion of the earth, or his writings deny it ^ AVhcn the -queftion was asked, WhofefJicep arc thefe ? the anfw'er was, ^y^gon^s, : for he committed them to fny care >> (he ufes and difpofcs of them as his}. By this ixSt'Damatas underftood them to be his ; and if they had not been his, but Jl- phonclas'sov Melibceus's, ty£gon^ by an lan- fwer^ that fo fhe might \vi\e been, tho Ifaac had told him by words that fhe w;i3 his wife. And it is fufficicnt for my purpofe, and to make a<5bs capable of contra- difting truth, if they may be allowd to exprefs things as plainly anddeterminaiely as words can. Certainly Abimekk gave gi'catCT credit to that information which pafled through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear <^ j and to what Ifaac did, than to what he fatd. For Ifaac had told him, that flie was not his wife, but his filler ^. A certain author « writes to this purpofe, " If a foldier, who had taken the *' oath to Cafar^ fliould runovei" to the enemy, and ferve him againft C-^y^r, " and after that be talcen j would he not be punifhd as adefeiter, and aperjur- *' ed villain ? And if he ihould plead for himfelf, that he never denied Cafar j *' would it not be anfwerd, 'That with his tongue he did not deny him, but with *' his aclions for by faftsj he did ? " And in another place, " Let us, fays he^ *' fuppofe fome tyrant command a Chriftian to bum incenfe to Jupiter.^ without *' adding any thing of a verbal abnegation of Chrift : if the Chriftian fhould *' do this, would it not be manifeft to all, that by that very aSl he denied him j " (and I may add, confequently denied thofe ^ro/>o/?/;'o«j which affirm him to be the Chrift a teacher of true religion, and the like ^) ? When a man lives, as if he had the eftate wliich he has not, or was in other regards (all faii^ly call up) what he is not, what judgment is to be pafled upon him ? Doth not his whole condu6t breath untruth ? May we not fay (if the pro- priety of language permits), that he lives a lyet} In common fpeech we lay fome aftions are infignificant, which would not be fenfe, if there were not fome that -xxtfignificant, that have a tendency and mean- ing. And this is as much as can be faid of aiticulate founds, that they are either fignificant or infignificant ^. » inOD WDU)0. lR»fl,i. b Only pnmi piU73 jny according to Aifljek. = "fir. .^ rvf^i.- W «»^f^T.i,^Zy. Herod. <» Thatinftanceof Aff»f//jm and hisgueft Alexan- der imA-rian, might befubjoindtothis. U tU ninU uh (piXc^^nx/^ist, i^^As?, «otV»o-£v «» t-Z Mi'cm cine iiV»!( (fiiPiK? »uT,si. e Be Dupl. Mart. f Something like this is that in one of Greg. i>^/ii.'s orations. When fome Chriftians, who had been inlharcd hy Julian, asked, s-as Xjircv i^my^iS*; they were anfwerd i'rt »«7-a 5" ti;^o; £3-VjiA.«(r«rf. S Ta -4/£v^S v^affAdTo. ^luKm. Chryf. K«.' ^oXiVfjuoi «»J"fo? ,C, yi^ui, >^ fiKf/^x Tia^ci kvxfyiM 'osi aCrS, as Bafil fpcaks : wd therefore greater things mufl do it more. b As that BAiVf. af. Diog. L, in v, Zen. It 12 The Religion of Nature.' Sed. I. It may not be improperly obfei-ved by the way, that xkcfigmficaKcyhcce attri- buted to mens afts, proceeds not always from nature, but fomctimes from cuftom and agreement among people ^, as that of words and founds moftly doth. Ads of the latter kind may in different times and places have different, or even contraiy fignifications. The genendity of C/:?r//?zVj«;, when they pray, takeoff their hats : the Jeivs^ when they pray ^ or fay any of their Berakotb^ put them on. The fome thing which among Chriftians denotes reverence, imports irre- verence among the Jews. The reafon is, becaufe covering the head with a hat (if it has no influence upon one's health) is in itfelf an indifferent thing, and peo- ple by uHige or content may make it intcrpretable either way. Such acts feem to be adopted into their l;mguage, and may be rcckond part of it. But a£ts of the fonner kind, fuch as I chiefly here intend, have an unalterable fignification, and can by no agreement or force ever be made to exprefs the contraiy to it. a/£^o«'s treating the flock, and difpofing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought to fignify, that it was not his. From whence it appears, xhTitfaEts exprefs more ftrongly, even than -words themfclves <^ j or to conti-adict any propofition by fach is a fuller and more effefbua^contradiftion, than can poffibly be made by words only '*. iVords are but arbitrary figns ' of our ideas, or indications of om- thoughts (that w<5rd, which in one language denotes _pow?/j *, in another de- notes riches s) : hnxfA^s may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the thoughts ikemfehes produced into ail j as the very conceptions of the mind brought ' » Ar/Kirlio* — ru. ^i>».u itknn, 'tfi/xnXn rcTcrt a»6((ri K>9-^axeiiri iritratla ttS^iu ri Kat MfMiii, k.tX, ■({irotl. •> — nbi.TO vi;N-\D--nb3nn "noy Nb bbsnon. Maim. ^ «/. pajf. « ©£«» ;/iA6A»VKir(» li^'wi, TtiTi 5 f?yi'rj r «o,u,«3-6i> «/i»sVC fi^f^^i-, ; that it is [only] fuch as is fufficient ^^^sv ,:lov ty-ci^of ifi X 6>-fcF ; fuch as may render them y.arx tI e'jy^ov i',«,.5ia— Tor« ;T(!«y^«(ri», &c. That lepi- dHm&fefliviim argtitnentHm, which P. iiighlius. ap. A. Cell, makes ufe of to fliew, cur -vidtri po£Jnt ■^eria e(ft mturalia mugis quam arbitrary, deferves only to be laughd at. « wnHf^r. « XI/'"* Arab. ' So Ah. Ezra obferves that n^ii ■" W'^- '= ^o will, in^r«*. to nill (tho in Arab, the word is written .ik): and ia another place, that the//iwc word even in thtfatne language fometimes fignifies nam -im, a thing and its contrary. And every one knows, that the greater part of our words have different fenfesand ufes. TUV in Arabic, according to Ciggeius and Golim, has 70 or 80, and fome (twoat leaftj contrary the one to the other. Of Moral Good and Evil. 1 3 forth, and grown to maturity ; and therefore as the moft natural and exprefs re- prefentations of them. And, befide this, they bear certain refpeEls to things, which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any ratio's are in mathematics. For the fa£ts and the things they refpeft are jujl ivhat they are, as much as any two given quantities are j and therefore the refpefts interceding between thofe mull; be as fixt., as the ratio is which one of thcfe bears to the other : that is, they mull remain the feme, and always fpeak the fune language, till things ceafc to be what they are. I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, TJmt whoever acis as if thitigs •werefo, or not fo^ doth by his ails declare^ that they are fo^ or not fo-y as pLiinly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwifc, his ads contradid thofe fropofitions, which alTert them to be as they are ». IV. No a£l (whether word '' or deed) of any being, to 'whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes 'with any true propofition, or denies any thing to he as it is, can be right. For, 1 . If that propofition, which is falfc, be wTong '^, that acb which implies fuch a propofition, or is founded in it, cannot be ri^ht : becaufe it is the veiy propofition itfelf in pradice. 2. Thofe propofitions, which are tiiic, and exprefs things as they are, exprefs the r^/<2/;o« between the fubjcd and the attribute as it isj that is, this is cither affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of that relation. And fur- ther, this relation (o\; if you will, the nature of this relation^ is determind and fixt by the natures of the things themfclvcs. Therefore nothing can interfere with any propofition that is true, but it muft likewife interfere with nature fthe nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themfelvestooj, and confe- quently be unnatural, or ivrong in nature. So very much are thofe gentlemen mil- taken, who by folloiving nature mean only complying with their bodily incHnati- ons, thoinoppofition to truth, or at lead; without any regard to it. Tnjthisbut a confonnity to nature : and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth '*. • This is roiHi ■vj/eu^®^. Apocal. Plato ufcs the fame way of fpeaking. -fiv^^, fays he, fjun^u^ f/,>iS0i — M-DTt Ao'/ai fju^ri ej'/m a-fajsis. The contrary to this is in Ariftotle iM^iunt iwaiu^ ci ^vei5 ^ Tf«|e(ri»; and c* /8;'«u aXrihiut. And in S. B. n>3N2 nD*?, and PDN ~\^\^^. ^ ASt\xm ge^nle •verbum f/l, five verbis five re qhid agatur. Juftin. Dig. = As it raufl be, becaufe '0=ht » iAn.9-fi' asi. Soph. '' Ti AoyixsJ (^o)!f li cctirn v^x'itc, kxtu (puirif sVi >^ kcctu. >.i>-/oii ( that is, ac- cording to truth, which it is the office ofrcafon todifcover). Anton. Nunquam aliud nztura, aliud fipientia dicit. ]vlv. C 3. IF 14. The Religion of Nature. Se<£l. I; 5. If there is a fupreme being, upon whom the exiftence of the world de- pends i and nothing can be in it but what He either caufes, or permits to be ; then to own things to be as they are is to own what He caufes, or at leaft permits, to he thus can fed or permitted : and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His conllitution of the world, and to fubmit to His will, reveald in the books of nature ". To do this therefore muft be agreeable to His •will. And if fo, the contrary muft be difagreeable to it > and, fince (as we fliall find in due time) there is a perfeft rcftitude in His will, certainly "wrong. I defire that I may not be mifunderftood in refpecb to the aftings of wicked men. I do not fay, it is agreeable to the will of God, that what is /// done by them, fhouldbe/o donej i. e. that they fliould ufe their liberty ill: but I fay, when they have done thi.s and committed fome evil, it is agreeable to His will, that we fhould allow it to have been committed : or, it would be difigreeable to His will, that we fhould deny it to have been committed. As the owning of things, in all our condud, to be as they are.^\i dire£t obedi- ence ^ : fo the contrary, aot to own things to be or to have been that are or have been, or not to be what they are., is dire6t rebellion againft Him, who is the Author of nature. For it is as much as to fay, *' God indeed caufes fuch a *' thing to be, or at leaft permits it, and it is > or the relation, that lies be- « tween this and that, is of fuch a nature, that one may be affirmed of the o- *' ther, i^c. this is true : but yet to me it {h-xW not be fo : I will not indure it, « or a£t as if it were fo : the laws of nature are ill framed, nor will I mind *' them, or what follows from them: even exiftence fhall be non-exiftence, *' when my pleafures require ". Such an impious declaration as this attends eveiy voluntary infrachion of truth. 4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in any injlance or manner nvhat- foever^ without contradidting axioms and truths eternal. For fuch are thefe : every thing is what it is ; that which is done., cannot be undone ; and the like. And then if tRofb truths be con fidcrd ashavingahvaysfubfiftcd in the Divine mind, to which they have always been true, and which diifers not from the Deity himfelf, to do this is to a6t not only inoppofitiontoHis^owr«ww/ or fovefaignty^ but to His ••"E^-WKtv [i Oili'] uyrl i^iXrH T xif/Aov. Chryf. >• What HierocUs fays of his iyy-'ocftjiet ©f- t\, is true in refpeft of every thing. T J &ij> •o/a? '^'^^u.x.fiXiif-snui i'^t tSto aurw £iV«i Ti'S-icSj, i ■ytykyairi. There is a paflage fomewhere in S. Iqqar. much like this : where it is faid (as I remem- ber) that he, who worfhip« an Angd H H^bu; l '131 nnii X-ipj n"3pn. in Kef,, hhokm. & al. And S. Chryfojlom definM truth in the fime %vords, which philofophcrs apply to the Deity. 'AA^S-s.* ro Uac, o.. b -AA^^sia ^ i^^^^^^ ©£?. Ph. Jud. " nji,«,!.a? ui avi-^sm ?j;«"' is in Sofh. the charafter of Ajax, when his head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monftrous and mad extravagances of C. Ca- ligula one is, that he treated his horfe Incitatus as a man. Suet. ^ Horace argues after die fame manner. Si quis leciicn nitidum geflare amst agnam. ; Huic vef.em, tit natx, paret, &c. Inter- diclo htm omne cidmut jus rr contradifted in this as in the former inllance. Again, there are fome ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not ^xmynature and truth are denied. If a man does not defire to prevent evils, and to be hapny, he denies both his own nature and the nature and definition, of happinefs to be what they are. And then further, willingly to neglcft the means, leading to any fuch. end, is^th'e fiime as not to propofe that end, and mufl fall under die fame cenfure. As retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards- it, and » Tlura vera (lifcrepantm ejfe non foffunt. Cic. ^ P- ^°' t OMiviene volunr iHrin. Cic. tha£'. Of Moral Good and Evil. 17 that may be confiderd as an a£t, many omifTions of this kind may be turned over to the other fide* ^ and brought under the foregoing proportion. It muft be confeft there is a difficulty as to the means, by which wc are to Gonfult our own prefeivation and happinefs > to know what thofe arc, and what they are with refpcdt to us. For our abihties and opportunities are not equal : fome labor under difadvantages invincible : and our ignorance of the true natures of things, of their operations and cffciSls in fuch an irregular dif- temperd world, and of thofe many incidents, that may happen either to further or break our meafures, deprive us of certainty in thcie matters. But Hill we may judge as well as we can, and do what wc can'' j and the neglefh to do this will be an omiflion within the reach of the proportion. There are omiflions of other kinds, which will deferve to be annumcnited; to thcfe by being cither total^ or notorious, or upon the fcore of fome other circmnfiance. It is certain. I fliould not deny the PhoeniJJ'a oi Euripides to be an excellent drar/ia by not- reading it : nor do I deny Chihil-menar to be a rare piece of antiquity by not going to fee it. But lliould I, having leifure, health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in or- der to improve my mind, and attain iuch knowledge as may be iifeful to mcj I fhould then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what it is. And if it doth not appear precifely, into what kind of ifudies this re- fpect to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how far it will oblige him to continue his puifuit after knowledge, and where the difcontinuance begins to be no offence againil tmth, he muft confult his own opportunities . and genius, and judge for himfelf ^j well as he can'^. This is one of thoie Ciiles . which I laid before were not fo well deterraind. If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom L am under no parti- cular obligation, I do not by this deny them to be poor, any more than I ihoulJ deny a man to have a fquaUd beard by not fliaving him, to be nafty by not walliing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back. Many things arc lierc to be taken into confideration ( according to the next propolitionj : perhaps I might intrench upon tmth by doing this j and then I cannot hy not doing it-"*. But if I, being of abiUty to afford now and then-, fomething in charity to the poor, .ihould yclnever give them any thing at all, " In the Civil Law he is faiJ to nci, who doei omit, ^ui non facit q^aod fucere debet, liJetur hccTC adverfus ea qu£ non facit. Dig. b Efi quodam frodire Senus. Hor. ' Bijces qu^im- - dm lolei: tamdiii amem velle debcbis, quoad re, quantum frojicias, non fcenitebk, iiys Cuero to he's .'■j!!. t ^-tll* vtrtHS virtffti oontrarm ejl. Sen. Llliould'. i8 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. I. I fliould then certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is : and thus truth would be injured. So, again, If I fhoiildnot fiiy my prayers at fuch a certain /-'(7«r, or infucha cext-xmplace and fmnner, this would not imply a denial of the exiftence of God, His provi- dence, or my dependence upon Him : nay, there may be reafons perhaps againft that particular time, place, manner. But if I fliould never pray to Him, or worfhip Him at all, fuch a?o/,3/omiflion would be equivalent to this ailertion, 1'hereisnoGoely who governs the world ^ tobe adored : which, if there is fuch a be- ing, muft be contrary to truth. A\^o geiierally and notorioujly to neglect this du- ty ('permit me to call it foj, tho not quite always, will/jcor, if not dircftly proclaim the fiime untruth. For certainly to worfliip God after this manner is on- ly to worfhip him accidentally^ which is to declare it a great accident that he is wor- iiiipd at all, and this approaches as near as it is poffible to a total negleft. Be- fide, ilich a fparing and infrequent worfliiper of the Deity betrays fuch an ha- bitual difregard of Him, as will render eveiy religious aft infignificant and null. Should I, in the laft place, find a man grievoufly hurt by fome accident, fain down, alone, and without /re/i;// help Uke to perifh j or fee his houfe on fire, no body being near to help, or call out : in this extremity if I do not give him my afliftance immediately, I do not do it at all: and by this refufing to do it according to my ability, I deny his cafe to be what it is j human nature to be what it is ; and even thofe defires and expectations, which I am conicious to my felf I fhould have under the like misfortune, to be what they are. VI. In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it mufl be conjiderd not only what it is in itfeif or in one refpeEl, but alfo what it may be in any other refpeEl, which is capable of being denied by faHs or praSlice : and the whole defcription of the thing ought to be taken in. If a man Heals a horfe, and rides away upon him, he may be faid indeed by riding him to ufe him as a horfe, but not as the horfe of another man, who gave him no licence to do this. He does not therefore confider him as being what he is, unlefs he takes in the refpeft he bears to his true owner. But it is not necefiiu-y perhaps to confider what he is in rcfpcftto his color, fhape or age: be- caufe the thief's riding away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be of any particular color, ^'c. I fay therefore, that thole, and all thofe proper- tics, rcfpcfts, and circumllanccs, which may be contradiftcd by praclice, are to betaken into confideration. For otherwifc the thing to beconfidcrd is but Of{jMoral Good and Evil. ip imperfeftly furveyd ; and the whole compafs of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is in part only, and in other re- fpefts perhaps as being ivhat it is not. If a rich man being upon a journey, flaould be robbed and ftript, it would be a fecond robber)^ and injufticc committed upon him to take from him part of his then character, and to confider him only as a rich man. His charac- ter completed is a rich tnan robbed and abu/cd, and indeed at that time a poor man ' and diftreft, tho able to repay afterwards the affiftance lent him. Moreover a man in giving affift'ance of any kind to another fhould confider what his own circum fiances are, as well as what the others are •>. If they do not permit hira to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to want it : but if he fhould give it, and by that deny his own or his family's circumftances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And fince (as I have oblenxd already) all truths are confiftent, nor can any thing be true any fuither than it is compatible with other things that are tme > when both parties are placed in a right light, and the cafe properly ftatcd for a judg- ment, the latter may indeed be truly fitid to want ailiilance, but not the affiftance of the former : any more than a man, who wants a guide, may befiiid to want a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be truly known what the latter is with refpect to the former. The cafe becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under fome promife or compaSl to affift another (B), and at the fame time bound to confult his own happinefs, provide for his family, Csfc. and he cannot do thefe, if he docs that, effectually . For Avhat muft A do? Here are not indeed oppofite truths, but there are truths on oppofite fides. I anfwer : tho there cannot be two incom- pat:'*e dut'-'s, or tho two inconfiftent acts cannot be both A"s duty at the fame time (fbr then his duty would be an impoflibility) > yet an obligation, which I will call »;/.%■/, may arife out of thofe differing confiderations. A fhould afiiftBj hMifo, ^j not to neglect himfelf and family, i^c. and/c/ to take care of himfelf and family, as not to forget the other ingagement, as ivell and ho- tiejlly as he can. Here the importance of the truths on the one and the other fide fhould be diligently compared : and there muft in fuch cafes be alwa)-s fome exception or limitation underftood. It is not in man's pov/er to promife « ny\i; nniSiS •'jy .• according to that determination in a cafe fomething like this, which ocrurs in Talm. MajJ. The. ^ Vtrique Jimttl confulendttm eft. I3nl>9 fgftti i fed tit ipfe nor^egeam, &,c. Sen. Ita tt alkrum rKiftrefcM, ne tui dies mifero'.r Pi*ut, ebfolutcly.. 20 The Religion of Nature. Se61:. L abfolutely. He can only promife as one, who may be difabkd by the weight and incumbency of truths not then exifting. I could here infcrt many inftanccs of /ar/zW thinking, which occur in au- thors; but I fliall choofc only to fet down one in the margin ^. In fhort, when things are truly cftimated, perfom concerned, times^ places \ ends intended ", and effects that naturally follow, muft be added to them. VII. JVJoen any aSl would be wrongs the forbearing that a£l mujl be right : likevjife ivhen the omijjion of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it (i. e. not omitting it) mufi be right. Bccaufc contrariorum contraria efi ratio. VIII. Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong. For that cannot be good, which is wrong j nor that evil, which is right. IX. Every aEl therefore of fuch a being., as is before defcribed, and all thofe omiffions which interfere with truth (i. e. deny any propofition to be tiiie, which is truej or fuppofe any thing not to be what it is, in any regard "^J are morally evil, infomc degree or other : the forbearing fuch aHs, and the a£ling in oppofitiost to fuch omiffions are morally good : and when any thing may be either done, or not done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent. I would have it to be minded well, that when I fpeak of acts inconfiftent with trath, I mean any truth i any true propofition whatfoever, whether con- raining matter of fpeculation, or plain fact. I would have eveiy thing taken to be what in fa^ and truth it is ^ 3 Sfxttts Emp. feems to be fond of that filthy faying of Zeno, in relation to what is ftoried of yocalla ind Oedipus : //.tt ccravm mxi to ^yoji'ov TV,', f^tjTM^ T«i'4''"j "■''• any more, than to ru?* 'vith the hand any other part of her, when in piin. Here only r^i^n is confiderd ; as if'£i was nothing more, hut barely t^^h ; but this is an incomplete idea of the aft. For Tfi'i^i? ?^oji» is more than Tf.'-|<5 by it felf : and r^i-\'iz ? f*6fi'« ■^ fJ-^i^k is ftill more : and certainly t^i'Suv th> x"?'^ '^V X"t' >« a different thing from T^!t to ^.ofi'o» Tii' fjuo^m, gee. He might as well have faid, that to rah^ red hot piece of iron with one's bare hand is the lame as to rub one that is cold, or any other innocent piece of matter : for ail is but rj.^"'?. Thus men, affefting to appear free-thinkers, fliew tbemfelves to be but half-thinkers, or lefs : they do not take in the whole of that which is to be confiderd. ^ Sunt res qn^Jam ex tetnfore, ^ ex confilio, nan ex fuanatura confiderandi. — &iiidtempora pe, tnnt, aitt quid perfonis dignumjit, confiderandum ejf. See. Cic. ■■' Ou Asysi? 3-o»o» r a/31 vxi. ^KTKxeim uyv^vx'rcc.. AvT. jimico £gro aliquis ajpdet : probamus. at hoc fi htreditatis causa facit, tultur ejl, cadaver expeclat. .Sen. "i O^J y «5 i^y>, or more truths may be violated one way than another <^ : and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be c- qually f one as well as the other j iliid to be crimes, but not equal crimes ^. If A fteals a book from B whicli was pleafing and ufeful to him, it is true A is guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B, who is the proprietor of it, and one whofc happinefs partly depends upon it : but ftill if A fhould deprive B dt-xgood ejiate, of which he was the true own- er, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we fuppofe the book to be worth to him one pound, and the eflate loooo/. that truth, which is violated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated loooo times by rob- bing him of his eftatc. It is the fame as to repeat the theft of one pound 1 0000 times over: and therefore if loooo thefts for crimes) are more, and all together greater than one, one equal to lOOoo muff be greater too : greater than that, which is but the i ooooth part of it, fure. Then, tho the conve- nience and innocent pleafure, that B found in the ui'e of the book, was a degree of happinefs : yet the happinefs accruing to him from the ejlate, by which he was fupplied not only with neceflarics, but alfo with many other comforts and hamilefs injoyments, \-afl:ly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in the former cafe was, B had a property in that, isuhich gave him fuch a degree of happinefs : that violated in the latter, B had a property in that, ivhich ^ve him a happinefs vajily fuperior to the other. The violation therefore in the latter cafe is upon this account a vaftly greater violation than in the former. Laf.ly, the tmths violated in the former cafe might end in B, thofe in the latter may perhaps be repeated in them of his family, who fubfift alfo by the eflate, and ' Notwithftanding that paradox of the i'rt;«, "On iVa rk kfija^iiiiMTO,, ti ru. x.cf.Tc^^afjja.-ra., ^p. Cic.Flut. T)iog. L. (y al. which might eafily be confuted from their own words in Cicero. For if finning be like paffing a line, or limit ; that is, going over or beyond that line : then, to fin being equal to going beyond that line, to go more (or farther) beyond that line rauft be to fin more. Who fees not the falfity of that, nee bono viro meliorem, nee forti fortiorem, nee fapiente fapientiorem pojfg fieri i And to on. Nullum inter fcelus e^ erratum difcrimen facere (as S. Hier. expreflcs their opi- nion: if thatepifllc to Celantia be his) is to alter or deftroy the natures of things. '^ Sure that Wife- man was but a had accountant, whoreckond, riv f/jiyl^Lu i!M/« kfija^Tnyjcir'^ , 5.e thing like that, is to fay nothing. For how fliall one know what is truly laudabilc > Kf^^^ V and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right reafon is meant that which is found by the right ufe of our rational faculties, this is the fiime with truth : and what is Ciid by them, will be comprehended in what I have Hiid. But the manner in which they have deliverd themfelves, is not yet explicit enough •=. It leaves room for fo many difputes and oppofite right-reafons,, tliat nothing can be fettled, while every one pretends that his reafon is right. And befide, what I have faid, extends Eirther : for we are not only to refped: thofe truths, which we difcover by reafoning, but even fuch matters offa£l^ as are fairly difcoverd to us by our fenfes. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which way foever we come to the knowledge of them. Tfesy, who contenting themfelves with fuperficial and tranfient views, de- duce the difference between good and evil from the common fenfe of mankind ^^ and ctrtmn principles ^ that are born with us *, put the matter upon a \^-y infirm foot. For it is much to be fufpefted there are no fuch innate maxims as they pretend, but that the impreflions of education are miftaken for them : and be- fide that, the fentiments of mankind are not fo uniform and conflant^ as that we may lafcly tioifl fuch an important diflinftion upon them g. • Vtvere ex hom'mis natura. Cic. It is true he adds, undique perfeild ^ nihil requirente: but thofe words have either n& meaning, or fuch as wiil not much mend the matter. For what is natura un~ dique perfecla ^ nihil requirens r Belide, moral religion doth not confift in following nature already per. i'eA, but by the pradice of religion we aim at the perteiling of our natures. >> Celebrated every where. ' Tc^ »» ktw ^ejiV*)^ 7a? ay«.9-«5 ^^i^lii, Tci<; Kark f M&« y«6^/«c >.iyot. 'i '■«! 3-i>»!)«a;.Ts»«»Ti'(j», UXr^-'ii'ii, Cm sVi ^Uxvet Ta?spK|^? ^i^'ii(kk- vx" iffixiTo) proceeded fo far in his averfion to labor, xh^Mejus latns ilienohhoTe conJoluit — .• qui cam tiJiJfet fodientem, (j' altih raftrum Mevantem, lajfumfe fieri {i^'/ftjuXxtm, in Athen.) queftus letnit ilium opus in con/peciu fuofarere. Sen. ^ Ad hue [yoluftntem, <^ doloron^^ ^ qui. fequamar, ■f^ qui fuginmus, refert omnia lArifiipf us]. Cic. ' Velim definias, quid fit ■voluftMs: de quo emnis hi«3-«s-«,«,«Tixz, &c. Cic. Diog. L. & al. ** Negat Epicurus ju- tunde ■viii ftfi> nifi cum -virtute vivatur. Cic. But for all that their pleafures have not continued to be always like thofe in the little gardens of Gargettus. Nor mdeed do they feem to be very vir- tuous even there. For Epicurus not only had his Leontium (or, as he amoroufly called her, Aimra.- fiw,) a famous harlot j but fhe a-So-i Vt Tor^'Es-txisjsieis rmim ci T-ai? x^Vm;. Athen. Andin bis book «!£< tsAk? he is faidto have written thus, Oi ^ I'/afi 'ix,<» rt toior>, Athen.) rScnti- u.(?a.i:m '3 ji t<<; ^! k^^ck- Arift. Perhaps Tythagoras (and after him Tlato, and others), when he faid {af. Vitg. L.) tV kfirh «p/*e««» iT»n, jnight have &me liict thought as this. couM Of Moral Good and Evil. 2 5 could only defign to be underftood of fuch virtues, as have extremes. It mull be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward either extremCj muft be fo far wrong or evil -, and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) di- vides the diltance, and declines neither way, mujl be right : al/o, Umt this notion fupplies us with a good direSlion for common ufe in m;my cafes. But then there are feveral obligations, that can by no means be derived from it : fcarce more than fuch, as refpecl the virtues couched under the word moderation. And even as to thefe, it is many times difficult to diicern, which is the middle pint ». This the author himfelf was fenfible of''. And when his mailer Plato makes viituc to confift in fuch a likenefs to God %_ as we are capable of (and God to be the great exemplar).^ he fays what I flaall not difpute. But fince he tells us not how or by what means we may attain this likenefs, we are Httle the wifer in point of practice : unlefs by it we un- derftand the praftice of truth,God being /r«//;,and doing nothing contrary to it **. Whether any of thofe other foundations, upon which morality has been built,, will hold better than thefc mentiond, I much queftion. But if the formal ratio of mord good and evil be made to coniiil in a conformity of mens a6ls to the truth of the cafe or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the diJiinRion feems to be fettled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by a true propofition and matter of faH is perfectly underftood by every body j fo will it be ealy for any one, fo fai- as he knows any fuch propofitions and fadts, to compare not only 'words^MX. alfo aStions with them. A very little skill and attention will ferve to interpret even thefe, and difcover whether they /peak truth, or not «. X. If there be moral good and evil, dijlinguiflid as before, there is religion -, and fuch as may mofl properly befiyled natural. By religion I mean nothing elfe but an obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind. I fay, to do) what ought not to be omitted, and to for bear what ought not to be » When he fiys, it muft be taken iV«5 a* «» » k^'"i Ac-/©- ^ferai:^, it is not by that afcertaind. See before. ^ Ou<^ fxo.r, ^le^la-ai to xSj, y^ j-iVi, >.A. Therefore R..<4/^o might havefpared that cenfure, where he blames him for expreffing himfelt' too generally, when he fays, iiNIU/ IDD,- ♦li^nn Cmpom Mi<-in nvai without telling him what that manner, time, place is. ' That man, lays he, cannot be negleftcd, who endeavours ^ik«(®' yijJEj^, >^ txim^iuur aciTr,v, I15 Jrov ouuic rn i.,Asa-a c//mS^ B-iti'. And in another place, our ip yn ci^s'/^i is' o/*oi'«o-i; S-iio x»t« to Suuictw St. Augullin {kerns to agree with him, in that fentence of his, Religiomsfummaejlimitari qusmcolis] * U-^jx'/i^Ki f^iuT>;S-ii<;, tI TTeiitrin atitfa-ci 9-ti 'djMoioj, '^(pyj, i'av aMi^-^ucrt. Stob. « There ii certainly not that difficulty or perplexity in morality, which Cicero feems to fuppoie, when he lays, Cmfuetudo txercittnioque capiendo, ut boni ratiocimtores officiorum ejfe fojpmm. I done. 26 The RELIGIo^r of Nature. Sed>. I. done. So that there muftbe reUgion, if there are things, of which feme ought not to be done, fome not to be omitted. But that there are fuch, appeai-s from what has been faid concerning moral good and evil : becaufe that, which to omit would be evil,and which therefore being done would be good or well done,ought certainly by the terms to be done ; and fo that, which being done would be evil,and implies fuch abfurdities and rebeUion againft the fupreme being, as are mentiond under propofition the IVth. ought moft undoubtedly not to be done. And then ■fince there is religion, which follows from the diftinftion between moral good and evil j fince this diftinftion is founded in the refpea,which mens afts bear to truth ; and fince no propofition can be true, w^hich exprefles things otherwife than as they are in nature : fince things are fo, there muft be religion, which is founded in nature, and may upon that account be moft properly and truly called the religion of nature or natural religion ; the great law of which religion, the law of nature, or rather (as we fliall afterwards find reafon to call it) of the Author of nature is, XI. "That every intelligent, aSlive, and free being fJoould fo behave himfelf, as by no a£i to contradiSl truth ; or, that hefiould treat every thing as being -what it is '. ObjeSiions 1 am fenfible may be made to almoft any thing i' > but I beheve none to what has been here advanced but fuch as may be anfwerd. For to confider a thing as hcmgfomething elfe than what it is, or (which is the fame) not to confider it as being what it is, is an abfurdity indefenfible. However, £or ^fpecimen, I will fet down a few. Let us fuppofe fome gentleman, who has not fufEciently confiderd thefe matters, amidft his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after fome fuch manner as this. " If every thing muft be treated as being what it is, what ^' rare work will follow ? For, i . to treat my enemy as fuch is to kill him, or re- « venge my felf loundly upon him . 2 . To ufe a creditor, who is a fpend-thrift, or " one that knows not the ufe of money, or has no occafion for it, as/ac^, is not to " pay him. Nay further, 3 . If I want money, don't I aft according to truth, if I " take it from fome body elfe tofupply my own wants? And more, do not I a6t « contrary to truth, if I do not ? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a de/iga « of kilhng another, or doing him fome great mifchief, if he can find him, fiiould « ask me where he is, and I know where he is ; may not I, to fave life, fay I do « not know, tho that be falfe? f. At this rate I may not, in ^frolick, break a " glafs, or burn a book : becaufe forfooth to ufe thefe things as being what they • What it is in nature. 5»in\y HO '3t3, to ufe Malm.'s words. And thus that in Arrianus is true, N«,«,©- ^<«TiK55 £>-» KT©-, Vi iKiAaS-o. Tj; . Omni in re quid jh vers, -videre ©> tueri de- cfi. Cic. This is indeed the way of truth. » Becaufe there is fcarce any thing, which one or other will not lay. ^uid enim poteji did de illo, ciuinigram dixit # nnem, &c. Laft. Of Moral Good and Evil. 27 « are, is to drink out of the one, not to break it j and to read the other, not " burn it. Laftly, how fhall a man know what is true : and if he can find out " truth, may he not want the power of afbing agreeably to it ? " To the firji objection it is eafy to reply from what has been already faid. For if the objeftor's enemy, whom we will call E, was ««//^/>^ wsre than his enc my, there might be fome force in the objeftion ; but fince he may be con- fiderd as fomething elfe befide that, he muft be ufed according to what he is in other refpects, as well as in that from which he is denominated the ob- jeftor's ( or O's J enemy. For E in the firft place is a man ; and as fuch may claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is : and if O denies it to him, he wounds truth in a very fenfible part. And then if O and E are fellow-citizens^ living under the fame government, and fubjeft to laws, which are fo many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, eftate, ^c. O cannot ti-eat E as being what he is, unlefs he treats him alfo as one, who by common confent is under fuch a protcftion. If he does otherwife, he denies the exiftence of the forefaid lav.'s and public compacts : contrary to ti-uth. And befide, O fliould act with refpect to hiinfelfzs being what he is ; a man himfelf, in fuch or fuch circum (lances, and one who has given up all right to private revenge ( for that is the thing meant herej. If truth there- fore be obferved, the refult will be this. O mufl treat E as fomething com- pounded of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three : that is, he muft only profecLite him in fuch a way, as is agreeable to the ftatutes and methods, which the fociety have obliged themfelves to obfen'e. And even as to legal profecutions, there may be many things flill to be confiderd. For E may fhew himfelf an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are fuch things, as really affect \h& fafcty or happinefs of O or his family, then he will find him- felf obliged, in duty and fubmiffion to tmth, to take refuge in the laws ; and to punifh E, or obtain fatisfaction, and at leaft fecurity for the future, by the means there prefcribcd. Becaufe if he does not, he denies the nature -MAfenfe of happinefs to be what they are > the obligations, which perhaps we ihall fhew hereafter he is under to his family % to be what they arej a dangerous and wicked enemy to be dangerous and wicked ; the end of laws, and fociety itfclf, to be the fafety and good of itsmembersjby preventing injurieSjpunillimg offenderSjC^f^. • Conzeniet cum in J.i>iJo miinificum ejfr, mm in exigenJo son acnliim : a litibiis ^cre quan- tum liceat, ^ nefcio an pauloplus etiam quam liceat, aikorrmlcm. H^hinda eft autemrMio ret familiarii, qmm qaidem dilaii fnere Jlagitioftim eft. Cic. which 28 The Religion of Nature! Se61:. I. v/hicb it will appear to be, when that matter comes befo- e us. But if the enmity efE nies not beyond trifling, or more tolerable inftances, then O might aft againft truth, if he fliould be at more charge or hazard in profecuring E than he can afford, or the thing loft or in danger is worth j fhould treat one that is an enemy in lit- tle things, or a little enemy, as a great one > or fliould deny to make fome al- lowances, and forgive fuch peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature makes it neceffary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. Laftly, in cafes, of which the laws of the place take no notice, truth and nature would be fufficicntly obferved, ifO fliould keep a vigilant eye upon the fteps of liis adverfary, and take the moft prudent mcafures, that are compatible with the chara£ter of a private perfon, either to affwage the malice of E, or prevent the effects of it j or perhaps, if he fliould only not ufe him as a friend ^ For this if he fliould do, notwithftanding the rants of fome men, he would cancel the na- tural differences of things, and confound truth with untruth. The debtor in the fecond objeftion, if he a£tsas he fiys there, does, in the firft place, make himfelf the judgs of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays him under a heavy fentence, an incapacity in effcft of having any eftate, or any more eftate. In the next place, he arrogates to himfelf more than can be true; that he perfeftly knows, not only what his creditor and his circumftances («rf, but alfo what they ever will be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwife. j^nd, which is to be confiderd above all, he direftly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be the creditor's. For it isfiippofed to be owing or due to him (otherwife he is no creditor) : and if it be due to him, he has a right to it : and if he has a right to it, of right it is his (or, it is his). But the debtor by detaining it ufes it, as if it was his own, and therefore not the other's ; contrary to truth. To pay a man what is due to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him ex- travagant, ^c. or any other truth j that aft has no fuch iignification. It only lignifies, that he who pays thinks it due to the other, or that it is his : and this it naturally doth iignify. For he might pay the creditor without having any other thought relating to him, but would not without this. Anf to objection the 3d. Afting according to truth, as that phrafe is ufed in the objcftion, is not the thing required by my rule > but,fo 'o aft that no truth may be denied by any aft. N ot taking from another man his money by violence is a forbearance, which does not fignify, that I do not want money, or wliich denies any truth. But taking it detiies that to be his, which fby the fuppofition) Of ijMoral Good and Evil. 29 is his. The former is only as it were filcnce, which denies nothing : the lat- ter a dire£t and loud aflertion of a falfity ; the former what can contrad'6t na truth, becaufe the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extra- vagance and vic To that queftion. Si Hfjii'ss ad te confugiat, qui menJacio tuo fojfit a morte lidefari, nan es ment'iturm ! S. Aufl'm anfwers in the negative, and concludes, Refiat at mtnqmm boni mentiantur, Quanta fortius, quantc excel- lentih dices, necprodam, necmtntiar. ' In fuch preffing cafes, under imminent danger, the world is wont to make great allowaaces. Cun ii^j« wy»; Sato, tu •.|/yji'« >.iyit ; Oir., u ri ctiin- .«/ ys « ■if'^c^^ 3i< hdn. and T'y ^3^y i^na -ip'j;Dn. fay aifo -iniD tmbvi; a^^'^b bym. S. Hharei (& al. p^tJf.K AnAAb. Ezra fays of Abraham, nyu;n TIlS ^SD Qn^nn "fbo^i^ nm. In n-.ort, fome have permitted, in defperate, cafes, mendacio tanqitam ■venenqfun. Sext. Pythag-. «* 1D1 inann vbo inwb— IiDN. S. Hhaf « who doth not detell tit thought of Cali- gula de Humeri curmimbus abolendis, £cc ? Suet. thaa Of CMoral Good and Evil. 3 1 thanbypreferving or reading them : the number of which, large enough ah-ca- dy, I wilh you may not think to be incrcafcd by this, which 1 here lend you. Here /TOO things ought to be regarded, i . That tho to a£t againll; truth in any cafe is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things, in fome cafes the importance one way or t'other maybe lo little as to render the crime evanefcent or almojl nothing ». And, t. that inanimate beings cannot be con- fiderd as capable of wrong treatment, if the refne(5l they be;u-toiiving beings ij feparated from them. The drinking-glafs before mentiond could not be confiderd as fuch, or be what it now is, if there was no drinking animal to own and ufe it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing it felf, which is void of all life and perception. So that when we compute what fuch things are, we mulK take them as being what they are in reference to things that have life. The lail and moft material objeBion^or qiiejlion rather, fliall be anfwerdhy and by. In the mean time I fliall only fiy, that if in any particular cafe truth is inacce.Tible, and after due inquiry it doth not appear •zt'/.;^/, or how things are, then this will be true, that the cafe or thing under confideration is doubtful : and to a£t agreeably unto tliis truth is to be not opinionative, nor obftinate, but modeft, cautious, do- cile, and to endeavour to be on the fafer fide. Such behaviour fliews the cafe to be as it is. And as to the want of power to act agreeably to truth, that cannot be known till trials are made : and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour, he may take to himfclf the fatisfiction, which he will find in fed. IV. S E c T. II. Of Happinefs. THAT, which demands to be next confiderd, is happinefs ; as being in it felf moft confiderablc ; as abetting the caufe of truth > and as being indeed ^o nearly allied to it, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the refpcfts due to one, unlcfs we regard the other. Happinefs muft not be denied to be v.^hat it is : and it is by the practice of tmth that we aim at that happiqefs, which is true. In the few following propofitions I fhallnot only give you my idea of it, but alfo fubjoin fome obferz-atio^is, which tho perhaps not necefliuy here, we may fome- time hereafter think no lofs of time or labor to ha\'e made en pafj'ant : fuch .as • The Sto'ici muft certain]y therefore be much too fcrupulous, when they affirm (if thev were id earneft), that iTi r J^«>-.r»A<.» «; irt;^^ belUiam hoc maximemtereft, qitodhM ad id folum qtiod ade(l, quodque prifensefl,fe acccmmodat, fJiululum »dmodum fentiens frsteritiim aut futuru/n, &c. Cic. Hoi^-ueytturotorqucmur ^prxterito. Timoris tnim tormentum memoria redtuit, pro'jidentia antkipat. Nemo txntum pnfentibus mifer eft. Sen. * Frifem tempus brevijftmum tft, adeo quidem, ut quibu/dam nullum -videatur, 8cc. Sen. "orav •jCi der Of Happinefs. y^ der of time, that is equal to little more than nothing : tho this may perhaps be more applicable to fome animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unneccflarily j. when it is killed, that it may have as few moments of pain as may be ' j and that no young be left to languifh. So much by the way here. ir. Pain confidcrd in it [elf is a real evil^ pleafure a real good. I talce this as a that will without difficulty be granted. Therefore, III. By the general idea of good and evil the one [pleafure] is in it [elf defirMe^ the other [pain] to be avoided. What is here faid, reipects mere pleafure and pain, ab- ftracted from all circumftances, confequences, i^c. But becaufe there are fome of thefe generally adhering to them, and fuch as enter fo deep into their nature, that unleis thefe be taken in., the full and true character of the other cannot be had, nor can it therefore be known what happinefs is, \ muft proceed to feme other propo- fitions relating to this fubject. IV. Pleafure compared ivith pain may either he equal, or more, orlcfs : alfo plea' fures may be compared with other plcajures '', and pains -with pjins. Becaufe all the - moments of the pleafure muft bear fome refpect or be in fome ratio to ail the mo- ments of pain : as alfo all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other : and fo muft thofe of one pleaiure, or one pain, be to thofe of another. And if the degrees of intenfenefs be multiplied by the moments of duration, there muft ftill be fome ratio of the one product to the other. That this propofition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind j tho in fome particulars they may err, and wrong themfelves, fome more, fome lefs. For what doth all this hurry of bufmefs, what do all the labors and tra- vels of men tend to, but to gain fuch advantages, as they think do exceed all their trouble? What are all their abftinencesand felf denials for, if they do not think fome pleafures lefs than the pain, that would fucceed them ? Do not the various methods of life fhew, that men prefer one fort of pleafure to another, andfub- mit to one foit of pain rather than to have another ? And within our felves we cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, Avhether we have the » 'm Djn noro monw ysn au>n p*?. Ab. ex.. 'oi ;nb 5<3— -Qan r\i2n:±> lyv rtwy. S. Hhas. ^ The rants of thofe men, who affert, i^t Silg-cpi^ia iiJo»i> i^av'^c, yw/jjas iiiTm ti iTmr. nay, (pu t/yat is, fuch pains as no man would choofe to fuffcr for any pleafure whatever, or at leaft any that we know of in this world. So that it is poflible the difference, or excefs of pain, may rife fo high as to become im- menfe : and then the pleafure to be fet againft that pain will be but a point, or cypher ; a quantity of no value. VII. Happinefs differs not from the true quantity of pleafure, unhapplnefs of pain. Gr,any being may befaid to befo far happy, as his pleafures are true. Sec. That cannot ' Nocet (fit noxa) em^ta More •volupas. Hor. And — muho corrufta ttohre lolupt/a. Id. >> As when that Vompcj mantiond by Val. Max. by burning his finger efcaped the torture. « Bt,!Ujl^^eu rij ivpeciwonL-y Arid. *• Or Jievji y.aS-tucuvTOi xaTarao".;, ^rij. lip. Diog. L. F VIII. That 38 y^^ Religion o/' Nature. Se6t.II. VIII. That being may he [aid to ha ultimately happy ^ in fame degree or other^ the fum total of ijohofe pkafures exceeds the firm of all his pains : or, ultii?iate happinefs Is the fum of happinefs^ or true pleafurCf at the foot of the account. And fo on the other fide, that being may be [aid to be ultimately unhappy^ the fum of all ivhcfc pains exceeds that of all his pkafures. IX. To jnake itfelf happy is a duty^ which every beings in proportion to its ca- pacity .^ owes to itfelf ; and that., which every intelligent being may be fuppofed to aim at., in general =>. For happinefs is fome quantity of true pleafure : and that pleafure, which I call true, may be confiderd by itfelf, and fo will be jullly defirable ^according to prop. II, and HI). On the contrary, unhappinefs is certainly to be avoided : becaufe being a quantity of mere pain, it may be confiderd by it felf, as a real, mere evil, i^c and becaufe if I am obliged to purfue happinefs, I am at the fame time obliged to recede, as far as I canj from its contrary. All this is fclf-evident. And hence it follows, that, X. We cannot a6l with refpeSi to either our [elves., or other men., as being what ive and they are, unlefs both are confiderd as beings fufceptive of happinefs and unhappinefs, andnaturally defirous of the one andaverfe to the other. Other animals may be con- fiderd after the fame manner in proportion to their feveral degrees of apprehenfion. But that the nature of happinefs, aud the road to it, which is fo very apt to be miflaken, may be better underflood j and true pkafures more certainly diflinguifhd from falfej the following propofitions mufb flill be added. XI. yis the true and ultimate happinefs of no being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things : fo neither can thepraiiice of truth make any being ultimately unhappy. For that, which contradicts nature and truth, oppofes the will of the Author of nature fvvhofe exiflence, fj'i;. Ifhall prove afterwards) ; and to fuppofe, that an inferior being may in oppofition to His will break through the conftitution of things, and by fo doing make himfelf happy, is to fuppofe that being more potent than the Author of nature, and con- fequently more potent than the author of the nature and power ofthat very be- ing himfelf, which is abfurd. And as to the other part of the propofition, ir is aifo abfurd to think, that, Ly the conftitution of nature and will of its author, " This is truly Bonum /ummum, epib tendimus omnei, Lucr. ''A-t«vt« y^ i>i uttuv, inps >jafi» «.l- any Of Happinefs. 39 any being fhould be finally miferable only for conforming himfelf to truth, and owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It is much the fame as to fay, God has made it natural to contradift nature; or un- natural, and therefore punifhable, to a£t according to nature and reality. If fuch ablunder(excufethe boldnefs of the word)could be, it muft come either through a defeat of pcwer in Him to caufe a better and more equitable fcheme, or from fome delight^ which he finds in the mifery of his dependents. The former can- not be afcribed to theFirft caufe, who is the fountain of power: nor the lat- ter to Him, who gives fo many proofs of his goodnefs and beneficence. Many beings maybe faidtobehappy; and there are none of us all, who have not ma- ny injoyments = : whereas did he delight in the mfelicity of thofe beings, which depend upon Him, it mull be natural to Him to make them unhappy, and then not one ofthemwouldbeotherwifeinanyrefpe£t. The world in that cafe inftead of being fuch a beautiful, admirable fyllem, in which there is only a mixture of e\ ils, could have been only a fcenc of mere mifery, horror, and torment. That either the enemies of truth {wicked men) fhould be ultimately happy, or the religious obfervers of it (good men) ultimately unhappy, is fuch injuftice, and an evil ib great, that fure no Mamcbean will allow fuch ^fuperiority of his evil principle over the good, as is requifite to produce and maintain it. XII. The genuine happinefs of every being muft befomething^ that is not incompatible ^jsilh ordeftruSli'veof its }7ature^y or the Juperior or better part of it, if it be mixt. For inftance, nothing can be the true happinefs of a rational being, that is incon- fiilcnt with reafon. For all pleafure, and therefore be fure all clear pleafure and true happinefs muil be fomcthing agreeable (pr. I.) : and nothing can be agreeable to a reafoning nature, or (which is the fime) to the reafon of that nature, which is repugnant and difagreeable to reafon. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational being, which is not agreeable to reafon, it is plain his reafon is loft, Ms nature depreft, and that he now lifts himfelf among irrationals, at leaftasto that particular. If a being finds pleafure in any thing unrcafonabk, he has an unrea- fonab^e pleafure j but a rational nature can like nothing of that kiad without a contradiction to itfclf. For to do this would be to act, as if it was the contrary to what it is. Laftly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with rea fon, interferes with truth, and to contradict either of them is the Hime thing > then what has been faid under the former propofition, does alfo confirm this- us what has been faid in proof of this, docs alfo confirm the former. ' Kon d.-it Deiij ienejtci.i. Unde ergo qus fr/jides ? qitd Sea. ^ nxnl r\ TtusU (pJirit Jc-jTx y-ay.ix, kJ /.^ixosai/Ao.i* ij-i. Arr. F i XIII. rijofe 40 The Religion of Nature. Sedt. II. XIII. Thofe pleafures are trm^ (oid to he rcckond into our happpinefs^ againji which there lies no reafon. For when there is no reafon againft any plealiare,. there is always one for it % included in the term. So when there is no reafon for un- dergoing pain (or venturing it', there is one againft it. Obf. There is therefore no neceffity for men to torture their inventions in find- ing out arguments to juilify themfelves in the purfuits after worldly advantages and injoyments, provided that neither thefeinjoyments, nor the means by which they are attaind, contain the violation of any truth, by being unjuflr, immode- rate, or the like •>. For in this cafe there is no reafon why wefhould not defire them, and a dire<5t one, why we fhouldj "viz. becaufethey are injoyments. XIV. To conclude this fe.xiJjQavc^^: Simpl. "Ricie fucit, Mimo qunnjo oifequitur fuo : auod omnes hcmines facere ofartet, dum ij moJo fiat bor.o. Piaur. '' Habebit phih/ophui arn- tlas opes J fed r.ulli detraiiai, &c. Sen. Here he ftems to confefs the foUy oith^Stoics, who denied themfolvcs miny pleafures, that were honeft and almoft neceffaryi living in tubs, feeding upon raw herbsandwater, goingabout inafordidgarment, witharoughbeard.ftaffandfatcbel, eyf. ' ^uid reHHin Jit, affaret: quid exfediat, ehfcurum ejl ; itn tumen, ht dnb:tiire non poJfimM, quin e» naximi condHcant, qutfmt rellij/ima. Cic. Sect. Of Reafon, and the ways, &c, 4 1 Sect. III. Of Reafon, and the ways of difcovering truth, MY manner of chinking, and an objeSlion formerly " made, oblige me in the next place to fay fomething concerning the means of knowing, what is true: whether there are any, that are /«rf, and which one may fafely rely upon. For if there be not, all that I have written is an amufement to no purpofe. Be- fides, as this will lead me to fpeak o? reafon ^^c. fome tniths may here (as fome did in the former feftion) fall in our way, which may be profitable upon many occafionsj and what has been already aflerted, will alfo be further confirmed. I. Jin intelligent beings fuch as is mentiond before '', mufi have fome immediate oh- jeSfs of his under ftanding j or at leaf a capacity of having fuch . For if there be no ob- je£t of hisintelleft, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there are no immediate obje£ls, there can be none at all : becaufc every obje£l muft be fuch fan objeftj either in itfelf immediately ; or by the intervention of another, which is immediate : or of feveral, one of which muft at leaft be immediate. II. Jn intelligent being among the immediate objelis of his mind may have fome ^ that are abflraSl and general. I fhall not at prefent inquire, how he comes by them (it matters not how)^ fince this muft be true, if there is any fuch thing as a rational being. For that reafon is fomething different from the knowledge of particulars may appear from hence j becaufe it is not confined to particular things or cafes. What is reafon in oneinftancc, isfoin another. What is reafonable with refpcft to ^inllius, is fo in rcfpcd of A'^f'y/w '. Reafon is performed in 7^e«Vj, A ratio- nal being therefore muft have fome of th£{e fpecies (I mean fpecificandabftraft ideas) to work with 5 or fome fuperior method, fuch as perhaps fome higher order of reafoners may have, but we have not. The knowledge of a particular idea is only the particular knowledge of that idea or thing : there it ends. But reafon is fomething univeifal, a kind of ge- neral inftrument, applicable to particular things and cafes as they occur. We reafon about particulars, or from themj but not by them. » The laft objeftion, f. 17. "^ Seft. I. prop, I, ' ^uis hoc Jlatiiit, ijucj Aejium fit ia &um{iinm, id iniquum ejfe in ii Avium f Ck. In 42 r/'^ Religion of Nature. Sedl. III. In fact wc find within our fclves many logical, metaphyfical, mathematical tdeas^ no one of which is limited to any particular, or individual thing : but they com- prehend whole clajfes and kinds. And it is by the help of thefe that we reafon, and demonftrate. So that we know from within our felves, that intelligent beings not only may have fuch abftraft ideas, as are mentiond in the propofition, but thatfomei3t7«rt//)' ha-je them: which is enough for my purpofe. Wl.Tbofe ideas oyobjeHs, that are immediate., will be adequately and truly knoivn to that mind, ivhofe ideas they are. For ideas can be no further the ideas of any mind, than that mind has for may havej a perception of them : and therefore that mindmuft perceive the whole of them j which is to know them adequately. ^gain, thefe/W^^jbeingimmediate, nothing (1?y the termj can intervene to in- creafc, diminifh, or any way alter them. And to fay the mind does not know them truly, implies a contradiftion : becaufe it is the fame as to lay, that they are mil- reprefented ; that is, that there are intervening and mifreprefenting ideas. AndlaJIly, there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is notj nor therefore of any immediate objeft otherwife, than as it is. We have indeed many times wrong notions,and mifperceptions of things : but then thefe things are not the immediate obje£bs. They are things, which are notified to us by the help of organs md media, which may be vitiated, or perhaps are defeftive at beftand incapable of tranfmitring things as they are in themfelves, and therefore occafion imperfect and ialfe images. But then, even in this cafe, thofe images and ideas that are immediate to the percipient, are perceived as they are: and that is the very reafon, why the originals, which they lliould exhibit truly, but do not, are not perceived as they are. In fhort, I only fay the mind mull know its own immediate ideas. IV. H'^bat has been faid of thefe ideas, -which are immediate, may he [aid alfo of thefe relations or refpeEls, -which any of thofe ideas bear immediately each to other : they tiiufl he known immediately and truly. For if the relation be immediate, the ideas can- not fubfiit without it > it is of their nature : and therefore they cannot be known adequately, but this mull be known too. They are in this refpecl hke the ideas of whole and part. Tlie one cannot be without the other : nor either of them not difcover that relation, by which the one mull be always bigger and the other lefs. To fay no more, we may fatisfy our felves of the truth of this, as well as of the foregoing propofitionSjfrom the experiences of our own minds: where we find ma- 4 ny Of Reafon, and the ways, &c. 43 ny relations, that are immediately feen, and of which it is not in our power to doubt'. Wc are confcious of a knowledge, that confiftsin the;K/«///o«of thcfe relations. Such is the evidence of thofe truths, which are dually called axi- oms, and perhaps of fome fliort demonftrations. V. 'Thofe relations or refpeSIs, which are not immediate, or apparent at the fir Ji vie-uj, may many times he difcoverd by intermediate relations; andvjith equal certainty . If the ratio of B to D does not inftantly flrew itfelf j yet if the ratio of B to C •> does, and that of C to D ', from hence the ratio of B to D '^ is known alfo. And if the mean quantities were ever fo many, the fiimc thing would follow; pro- vided the re afon of every quantity to that, which follows next in the ferics, be known. For the truth of this I vouch the mathematicians ^ : as I might all> that know any fcience, for the truth of the propofition in general. For thus theorems and derivative truths are obtaind. VI. If a propofition be true, it is always fo in allthe inflames and ufies, to which it is applicable. For otherwife it muft be both true and falfe. Therefore VII. By the help of truths already known more may be difcoverd. For I . Thofe inferences, which zrlCcprefently from the apphcation of general traths to the particular things and cafes containd under them, muftbejuft. Ex. gr.The whole is bigger than apart: therefore A ({omeTpanicuhrihing) is more than half A. For it is plain that ^ is containd in the idea of whole, as half y/ is in that of pait. So that if the antecedent propofition be true, the conicqucnt, which is included in it, follows immediately, and muft alfo be true. The former cannot be true, un- lefsthe other be fo too. What agrees to the genus, fpecies, definition, whole, muft agree to the fpecies, individuals, thing defined, the part. The exiftence of an f/>ifZ infers direftly that of a caufe ; of one correlate that of the other ; and fo on. And what is fiid here holds true (Ijy the preceding propofition) not only in reipedt of axioms and firft truths, but alio and equally of theorems and other general truths, when they are once known. Thcfemay be capable of the hke applications : and the truth of fuch confequences, as are made by virtue of them, will always be as evident as that of thofe theorems themfelves. TOtCOVTt , Tt • ' That queftion in Plato, Ti' «» tij sx" -rix-m^im >.5ra5%r|«i, «"«? J'foHo nt iV&s ai rt! ■- rtfcf r.a,^i'J^oft^, y^ ■zknu. a 2\^vo\s^i^i». o.^sfflrlo/^" ■ >"■>• may have place among the velitations of phi- lofophers : but a man can fcarce propofe it ferioufly to himfelf. If he doth, the anfvver will attend J''- '' = a. ^ =■ c. t' s-ji; ra 2«- '^6 The Religion of Nature. Sed. III. It cannot be amifs to note further^ that tho a man, who truly ufes his ratio- nal powers, has abftraft and univerfal ideas, obtaind by reflexion ; out of thefe frames to himfclf general tmths, or apprehends the ftrength of fuch, and ad- mits them, when they occur to him j by thefe, as by fo many ftandards, mea- fures and judges of things j and takes care to have the materials, which he makes ufe of in reafoning, to be rivetted and compared together by them : yet by a habit of reafoning he may come to fcrve himfclf of them, and apply them fo quick, that he himfelf fhall fcarce obfcrve it. Nay, moft men fcem to reafon by virtue of a habit acquired by convcrfition, praftice in bufmefs, and exam- ples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives the foHdity even to their own iuft reafonings : juft as men ufually learn rules in arithmetic, govern their accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the ufe of them without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the demonjiration of any one of them. But ftill tho this be fo, and men reafon without advert- ing upon general ideas and abftraft tmths, or even being aware that there are any fuch, as it were by mle or a kind of rote ; yet fuch there are, and upon them refts the weight of reafon as its foundation. This, by the ivay^ helps us to deteft the caufc, why the generahty of people are fo little under the dominion of reafon : why they facrifice it to their interells and pafli- ons fo eafily ; are fo obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their company, and din of a party > fo apt to change, tho the cafe remains the very fame > fo unable to judge of things, that are ever fo little out of the way > and fo conceited and po- fitive in matters, that are doubtful, or perhaps to difcerning perfons manifeftly filfe. Their reafoning proceeds in that track, which they happen to be got into^ and out of which they know not one Hep, but all is to them Terra incognita j be- ing ignorant of the fcientific part, and thofeuniverial, unalterable principles, up- on which true reafoning depends, and to find which and the true ufe of them are required cool hours and an honefi application, befide many preparatives. \nthc next place it muft be noted, that one may reafon truly from that, which js only probable, or even falfe ^ Becaufe juil inferences may be made from propo- rtions of thefe kinds : that is, fuch inferences may be made as are founded in cer- tain truths, tho thofe propofitions themfelves are not certainly true. But then what follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or falfe, according to x»aT»5 1) ;k;«j^£4i4VT©- ii'o'(^, thAixStov j^ rut J'Jhs/aiv avrx, y^ t\v (fpo»,!(rjv, Xj Si^voMv u.iu>,oyo-» U\a. to draw diagrams^ and put cafes in our own imagination j to con-e6t the images there, compound them, divide them, abflraft from them j to turn over our memoiy, and fee what has been enterd and remains in that regifber j even to confult books, and life pen and ink. Infhort, we affembleall fuch axioms, theorems, experiments and obfeiTations, as are already knov/n, and appear capa- ble of ferving us, or prefent themfelves upon the opening and (??/$ iVw; ti^ aTflfcr. Sext. Emf. Nor do I well comprehend St. Chryfoflom's meaning, v/hen heiays. To AovurfAcK 1^:pnhix,^lv, x«» iAji^sj ^, ihlxa TrXr^aqia^tm T^ -^fxi ^"f^X'l} 'b '^'^" '*«»i»- For as no man truly believes any thing, unlefs he has a reafon for believing it : fo no reafon can be ftronger than itmonftration, which Of Reafonj and the ways, ^c, 4p ■which thefe truths may be immediately applied, or from whence deduftions may be made after the forementiond manner, new truths may be thus collcfted. And llnce thefe new truths, and the numerous dcfccndents, that may fpring from their loins,may be ufed ftill in the lame manner, and be as it were the feed of more truth, ■who can tell at what undcfcried fields of knowledge even men may at length arrive? At leaft no body can doubt, but that much truth, and particularly of that kind, which is moil: ufcful to us in our conduct here, is difcoverable by this method. They, who oppugn the force and certainty of reafon, and treat right rcafon as a Cbim^ra^ mull argue againft reafon either with reafon, or without reafon. In the latter way they do nothing : and in the former they betray their own caufe, and eilablifh that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no fuch thing as right reafon by any good argument, is indeed impoffible : becaufe that would be tofhew there is fuch a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not. Andfurther, if this propofitionbe not true, there is no right reafoning in Eu- clid ; nor can we be fure, that what is there demonftrated, istme. But to fay this I am fure is abfurd. Nor do I dcfire, that this propofition, which I here main- tain, fliould be efteemd more certain than thofe demonilrated by him : and fo cer- tain it muft be ; becaufe there can be no certainty in them, if this be not true. The great objcElion againft all this is taken from the many inftances of falfe rea- foning and ignorance, with which the pra6tices, difcourfes, writings of mankind are too juftly taxed. But,in anfwer to it, I would have it minded, that I do not fay, men may not by virtue of their freedom break off their meditations and inquiries prematurely, before they have taken a fufficient furvey of things ; that they may not be prepoflelTed with inveterate errors, biailed by intereft, or carried violently down with the ftream of a fed or fafhion, or dazled by fome darling notion or bright name ^ j that they may not be unprovided of a competent ftock o'^pr^cognita and preparative knowledge ; that (among other things^ they may not be ignorant of the very nature of reafoning, and what it is that gives finews to an inference, and makes it juftj that they may not want philofophy, hiftory, orother leai-ning requifite to the undcrftanding and ilating of the qucffion truly ; that they may not have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which they have not, and boldly to judge of things, as if they were quahfied, when they are not ; that tliey may not be impotent in their elocution,and mifreprefent their own thoughts, by cxpreffing themfelves ill, even when within themfelves they reafon well ; that many under- llandings may not be naturally grofs, good heads often indifpofed, and theableft judges fomctimes overfeen, through inadvertence or hafte : I fay none of thefe ' Hand iilio fdei fron'wrt lit^'if, ^uam ubi falft rei grui/is itut»r exijlit. Pliny. things, go The Religion of Nature. Se6l, III. things. The contrary I confefs is manifcfl: : and it is in oppofition to thofe er- rors, which appear in thefe cafes under the name of reafon, that we are forced to add the epithet right, and to lay right reafon inftead oi reafon only j to diftin- giiilTi it from that, which wrongfully afllimes that appellation. Nor, more- over, do I fay, that by reafoning the truth is to be difcoverd in every cafe : that would imply an extent of knowledge, which we cannot pretend to. I only fay, that there is fuch a thing as right reafon, and truth dilcoverable by it. I might add, that he, whofe faculties areintire and found, and who by a proper exerciie of his mind in fcientific ftudies firlt opens and enlarges its capacity, and .renders his intellectuals aftive and penetrating > takes care to furnifhhimfelf with fuch leading truths, as may be ufeful to him, and of which he is afTured in hig own breif j and in treating any fubjecl keeps them ftill in his eye, fo that his difcourfe may be agreeable to them : I fay, fuch a one is not in much danger of concluding faliely. He rauft either determin rightly, or foon find, that the fub- jeft lies out of his reach. However he will be fenilble, that there are many things within his fphere, concerning which he may reafon j and that there are trutlis to ,be found by this ule of his faculties, in which he may fecurely acquiefce. Thus that queftion fuppofed to be asked p. 27. How {hall a man know, what is true ? is in part anfvverd. More fhall be added by and by : only apropofition or .two, which ought not to be omitted, muft be firftinferted. X. To acl according to right reafon, and to act accordingto truth are in effect the fame thing. For in which fenfe focver the word reafon is taken, it will ftand either for truth itfclf, or for that, which is inllriimental in difcovering and proving it to be fuch: and then, with refped to this latter fenle, whoever is guided by that faculty, whofe office confifts in dilfinguifhingand pointing out truth, mull: be a follower of truth, and act agreeably to it. For to be governed by any faculty or power is to a6l according to the genuin decifions and dictates of it. That reafon, which is right (by the meaning of the words) mufl: conclude rightly : but this it cannot do, if the conclufion is not true, or truth. That is ffor fo I would be underltood}, if the principles and premifles from whence it refults are tnie =", and certainly known to be fo, the conclufion may be taken as certain and abfolute truth : but otherwife the truth obtaind at the end of the argument is but hypothetical, or only this, that fuch a thing is fo, if fuch another, or fuch otliers are fo or fo. » That manner of demonftration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced direftly from that which is falfe, is only a way of O.ewing, that an affcrtion is true, becaufe its contradidlory ij talle; founded in that known rule, Ccntratliclori* necfmul -ven, nee fmul falfs. effe pojfuat, &c. XI- To Of Reafon, and the ways, &c. 5 f XI. ^0 be governed by reafon is the generalla-j; impofedhy the Author of nature » upon them^ tvhofe uppermoji faculty is reafon : as the dilates of it in particular cafes are the particular laws, to which they are fuhjeil. As there are beings, which have notfo much as fenfe, and others that have no Eiculty above itj ib thei-emaybe fome, who are indued with reafon, but have nothing higher than that. It is fuf- ficientat prefent to fuppofe there may be fuch. And then if reafon be the upper ~ rnofi faculty, it has a right to control! the reft by being fuch. As in fenfitive ani- mals fenfe commands gravitation and mechanical motions in thofe inftances, for which their fenfes are given, and carries them out into fpontaneous a£ts : fo in ra- tional animals the gradation requires, that reafon fhould command fenfe. It is plain, that reafon is of a commanding nature ^ : it injoinsthis, condemns that, only allows fome other things, and will be paramount fin an old word ri iys. i«.o»tx«»') if it is at all. Now a being, w^ho has fuch a determining and governing power fo placed in his nature, as to be elTential to him, is a being ceitainly framed to be governed by that power. It feems to be as much defigned by na- ture, or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals fhould ufe their rea- fon, and fteer by it; as it is by the ihipwright, that the pilot lliould direftthe veflel by the ufe of the rudder he has fitted to it. The rudder would not be there, if it was not to be ufed : nor would reafon be implanted in any nature only to be not cultivated and neglefted. And it is certain, it cannot be ufed, but it muft command : fuch is its nature. It is not in one's power deliberately to refolve not to be governed by reafon<^ For (here the fame way of arguing may be ufed, that' was lately) if he could do this, he muft either have fome reafon for making that rcfolution, or none- If he has none, it is a refolution, that ftands upon no foundation, and there- fore in courfe falls: and if he has fome reafon for it, he is governed by reafon^ This demonft rates that reafon muft govern. XII. If a rational being, as fuch, is un-der an obligation to obey reafon, and this obedience, or practice of reafon, coincides with the obfervation of truth, thefe things plainly follow. 'Cujus Ifummi reBoris ©• domim^ ad naturam apta ratio vera ilia (^ fumma lex a philofafhis- duitHr. Cic. No^.(^ ^Vj^-,; i offl«5 A«y©-, ix, ^)> "S hX,'^ it's h»'^ 3-»»t5 ip3-«jT«?, ci x«^=r,J\'o &t5. Ph. Jud. ' To ;,yi. f^myl, y: y.v^aucv ■f ^tjy}, becaufeto him nothing can be right, that interferes with reafon, and nothing can interfere with truth, but it muft interfere with reafon. Such a har- mony there is between them. Forwhateveris known to be true, reafon either finds it, or allows it to be fuch. Nothing can be taken for true by a rational being,if he has a reafon to the contrary. 2. That there is to a rational being fucha thingas?-f//gzo» which may alfo upon this further account properly be called natural. For certain- ly to obey the law, which the Author of his being has given him, is religion : and to obey the law, which He has given or reveald to him by making it to refult from the ri"-ht ufc of his own natural faculties, muil be to him his natural religion. 3 . A careful obfen-ation of truth, the v>ay tohappinefs, and the practice of reafon are in the ifllie the fame thing. For, of the two laft, each falls in with the firfl:, and therefore each with other. And fo, at lall, natural religion is grounded uponthi^ ti-iple and ftrift alliance or union o£ truth, happine/s, and rea/on ; all in the fame in- tereft,and confpiring by the fame methods,to advance and perfed human nature : and its trueft definition is, Thepurjuit of bappincfs by thepratlice of reafon and truth. Permit me here again to infert an obfervation obiter. Obf. The "/;"?'»» of right reafon and truth, or that which is to be regarded in judging of right and truth is private : that is, every one muft judge for himfclf. For fince all reafoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's ov.'n pri- vate ideas, by virtue of which he becomes confcious of fome firfl truths, that are undeniable ; by which he governs his fleps in his purfuits after more truths, i^c. the criterion, or that by which he tries his ownreafonings, and knows them to be right, mufl be the internal evidence he has already of certain truths, and the agrceablcnefs of his inferences to them. One man can no more difcern the objedls of his own underllanding, and their relations, by the fiiculties of a- nother, than he can fee with another man's eyes, or onefhip can be guided by the helm of another. They mufl be his own fiiculties and conicience, that muft determin him. Therefore to demand another man's afTent to any thing without conveying into his mind fuch reafons, as may produce a fcnfc of the tmth of it, Js to ered a tyranny over his underllanding, and to demand a tri- bute which it is not poffible for him to pay ^ It is true indeed, tho I cannot fee with another man's eyes,Yet I may be affilled by another, who has better eyes, in finding an objea and the circumftances of it} and fo men may be affified in making their judgments of things. Tliey maybe informed of things, which they did not know before, and which yet require a place among thofe that are to be * Rsligk cogt non }otefi ,verbis potiiis qn^m lerheribHS res a^end.i ejl, ut Jit voluntas. Laft. confiderd i Q/'Reafon, and the w^ys, &c, 53 confiderd : and they may be dircftcd what to adveit principally upon > how to ftatc the queftion ; how to methodize their thoughts,and in genend how to reafon : efpe* cially if they want learning, or have only that part ofit, which is little converfant in clofe reflexions, and doth not teach them to reafon, or (as the cafe too often is) teaches them not to reafon. But llill this is all in order to produce fuch a light in them, that by it ?^y may fee and judge for themfelvcs. An opinion, tho ever fo true and certain to one man, cannot be transfufed into another as true and certain by any other way, but by opening his underflanding, and aflifting him fo to ordct his conceptions, that he may find the reafonablenefs of it within himfelf. To prevent mitlakes I pray take notice here, that, tho I fay men mu ft judge for themfelves, I do not fay they muft in all cafes a5i according to their private and lln- gle judgments. In refpeft of fuch things, as are private, and concern themfelves only^ or fuch as are left open and fubjeft to every man's ownfenfe, they may and ought j only prefen'ing a due deference to them, who differ from them, and are known upon other occafions to have more knowledge and literature than them- felves : but when a fociety is concerned, and hath determind any thing, it may be confiderd as one perfon, of which he, who difients from the reft, is only perhaps a fmall particle ; and then his judgment will be in a manner abforbedand drowndin that of the majoritv, or of them to whom the power of judging is intrufted. But I muft not digrefs too far from the main bufinefs, the ways of coming at truth. XIII. The reports of fenfe are not of equal authoritywith the clear demonjlrations of reafon^ when they happen to diffir. It is true, the ideas caufed by the impreflion of fenfible obje£ts are real ideas, and truly known to the mind as they arc in themfelves ■■, and the mind may ufe them, and reafon truly upon them : that is, the mind may make a right ufe of the ideas., which it finds in itfelf But then whe- ther thefeare the true ecb}-pes of their originals, and drawn to the life, is many times a queftion > and many times it is evident they are not. For that which has been anticipated under pr.III. but properly belongs to this, muft be acknowled- ged. They are conveyd through media and by inftruments fufceptive of different difpofitions and alterations, and may confequcntly produce different reprefentati- ons : and thefe cannot all be right. But fuppole thofe inftruments and media to be as intire and pure, as when intireft and pureft -, yet ftill there may be in many refpefts an incapacity in the faculty to notify things juft as they are. How mightily are theftiapeand fizeof a vifible objeft varied upon us according to its diftance, and the fituation of the place, from whence the profpcft is taken ? Now thefe things cannot be fiid of the reports, or rather determinations of rea- fon. For in pure reafoning we ufe our own ideas for themfelves., and fuch as the mind knows them to be, not its rcprefentatives of things, that may be falfely H exhibited. 54- T*/?^ Religion o/" Nature, Se6l. III. exhibited. This internal reafoning may indeed be wrongly applied to external things, if we reafon about them as being what they are not : but then this is the fault not of reafon, but of fenfe, which reports the cafe wrong ; or per- haps of the pcrfon, who has not been fufficiently induftrious to inform himfelf. That fame familiar inftance of vifion proves further, that reafon may be appli- ed to over-rule and coireB fenfe. For when the pictures of obje6bs arc pricked out by the pencils of rays upon the retina of the eye, and do not givethe true figure of thofe obie<5ts fas they not always do, being diverOy projected, as tlie lines proceeding from the fcveral points happen to fill upon that concave furfaccj j this, tho it might impofe upon a being, that has no faculty fuperior to fenie, ibth not impofe upon our reafon, which knows bow the appearance is alterd, and why. To think the fun = is not bigger, than it appears to the eye to be '', feems to be the laft degree of ilupidity. He muft be a brute ffo far from being a philofopher), who does not know, that the fame line (v. g. the diameter of the fun) at different diftances fubtends different angles at the eye. A fmall mat- ter of reafon may ferve to confute fenfe in this and the like cafes. Obj. How can reafon be more certain thzn fsnfe^ fince reafon is founded in ab- llradions, which are originally taken from fenfible objects ? Jnf. Perhaps the mind may by being exercifed at firft about particular objefts by degrees find in itfelf this capacity of confidering things by their /pedes, making abftraftions, ^c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of thefe particulars. But then after it has found.this capacity in itfelf, and attaind to the knowledge of abftra6t and general ideas, I do not fee why this capacity of reafoning by the help of them may not be ufed, upon this proficience, to cenfure and cor- rect the advices of fenfe concerning even fuch particulars, as firfl gave occafion to the mind to exert this capacity and raife it felf Is it a new thing for a fcho- lar to make fuch a progrefs in learning, as to be able afterward to teach the mafler, from whom he received his firft rudiments ? May not the modern phi- lofophers correft the ancients, becaufe thefe firft iTiewd them the way, and led them into the Itudy of nature ? If we look impartially into the hiltory of learning, and even of religion, we fhall find that truth has generally advanced by de- grees, and many times fvery many j as if that was the method of introducing knowledge among men) rifen out oi fable and error, whicli gave occafion to thofe inquiries, by which themfelves were detected. Thus blind ignorance was fucceeded by a twilight of fenfe : this brightend by degrees : at lail the fun as • Xvitulus ilk fol. Lucr. Poor creature! ' Kec nlmio foln major rota Ejfe potejl^ noflris e reports of fenfe may he taken for true, when there is no reafon againji it <=. Becaufe when tliere is no reafon not to believe, that alone is a rcafon for believing them. And therefore, XV". In this cafe to a^ according to them (J. e. as taking the informations of fenfe to be titie) is to all according to reafon and the great law of our nature. Thus it appears that there are two ways, by which we may afTure our felves of the truth o£many things '' j or at leaft may attain fuch a degree of certainty, as will be fufficient to determin our praElice : by reafon, and by fenfe under the government of reafon; that is, when reafon fupports it, or at leaft doth notop- pofc it. By the former we difcover fpeculative truths j by the latter, or both together matters of fad. XVI. Where certainty is not to he had^, prohahility muft be fuhfituted into the place of it : that is, it mufl he confderd, which fide of the que f ion is the moreprohahle. Probability, or that, which in this cafe may inchneonc to believe any propofl- tion to be true rather than falfe, or any thing to he rather than not to be, or the " Natura etiam nulla docente profeHa ab tis, quorum, ex prima ©> inchoata Intell'igentia, genera cognovit, confirmut ipfa per fe rationem, (^ perjicit. Cic. •> Semina nobis fcier.ti£ detlit [natu- ra,'] fcientiam non detlit. Sen. « Sifanifunt \_fenfus], ^vnlentes, ^ omnia removentur, qua obflant cr> impedium. Cic. <• Socmteis faying, ap.Cic. nihil fe fcire, nifi;id ipfu?n, favours of an aft'cftcd humility, and muft not be undcrftood ftriftly. But they, whofollowd, wentfurtiier (' '""»«•' fi^ne veteres: qui nihil cogvofci, nihil percipi, nihil fciri pojfe dixerunt) : and particularly Arcefilas negabat effe quulqu.im quod fari fojjct, ne illud quidem ipfam, quod Socrates fibi reliqniffet. ^ And thus the abfurdity grew to a (ixe, that was monftrous. For no man can aft, or even be alive,, if he knows nothing at all. Befide, to know that one knows no thing, is a contradiiftion : and-nof" to kno\-,-, <-''at he knows even that, is not to know, whether ho kno\vs any thing or not; and that is to know for ought he knows. ' Nee fcire fas efl omnia. Hor. ^ Hi contrary. ^6 The Religion of Nature. Sedt. III. contrary, will generally fhew itfelf upon the application of thefe and fuch like rules. I . That may be reckond probable, which, in the eftimation of reafon, appears to be more agreeable to the conftitution of nature. No body can certain- ly foretell that /ff- and the effeft may be taken as probable, if in the cafe before us there doth not appear fomcthing particular, fome reafon for exception. No man can demon- itratc, that the fun will rife again, yet every one doth, and muit aft, as if that was certain ^ : becaufe we apprehend no decay in the caufes, which bring about this appearance, nor have any other reafon to miftrall: the event, or think it will be othcrwife a few hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodidi- cal argument to prove, that any particular man will die : but yet he mull be more than mad, who can prefume upon immortality here, when he finds fo many generations all gone to a man, and the fune enemies^ that have laid them proltrate, Hill purfuing their viSlories. Thefe and fuch like, tho in ftridbnefs per- haps not certainties, arc juftly current for fuch. So great is their probability. There are other oblervations, which, tho not fo infallible as thofe, deferve yet to be thought of, and to have a fliare in the direction of our judgments. Ex.gr. There have been men in the world and no doubt ftill are, who, having had op- portunities of impofing falfities upon mankind, of cheating, or committing o- ther wickednefs, have yet in Ipite of temptation prefervcd their integrity and virtue : but, fince opportunity h;is fo fcldom faild to corrupt them who have been in pofi'effion of her, and men's interefts and paffions continue in general the fmie, it is more probable her charms will ftill have the fime power and ef- fcft, which they ufc to have ; which whoever doth not mind, will be wofuUy obnoxious to be abufed by irmAs pious and impious^. Briefly, when there is no particular reafon for the contraiy, what has oftneil: happend, may from experi- ence moft reafonably be expected to happen again. 3 . When neither nature nor other obfervations point out the probable conjefture to us, we muft be deter- mind (if it be nccefiary for us to be determind at all) by the reports, and fenfe of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the beft skiU wc > "ibin nn3>33 abljr. b -,3t ^,±, p^N,, >nS,Prov. (whkhfureone may copvertthus, >Jin >r3 -o-y bpb i>06>on.} f have §8 The Religion of Nature. SedJIL have% tohemo^ bwdOing ^ ■xvAhoncJl ^. Of allthefe mles the/r/? is that which deferves the principal regard : the other two are of ufe, when nature fo utterly ex- cludes us from her bofom, that no opportunity is allowd of making a judgment. Z^y?/}', when nature, the frequent repetition of the fame event, and the opinion of the beft judges concurr to make any thing probable, it is lb in the higheft degree. It appears from what hasbeenfaid concerning the nature and foundations o? pro- bability^ that the force of it refults from obfeivation and reafon together. For here the one is not fufficient without the other. Reafon without obfervation wants matter to work upon : and obfei-vations are neither to be made jultly by our felves, nor to be rightly chofen out of thofe made by others, nor to be aptly applied, without the afliftance of reafon. Both together may fupport opinion and prafticc in the abfence of knowledge and certainty. For thofe obfervations upon the na- ture of men and things, which we have made our fclvcs, we know ; and our own reafoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know : and from hence there cannot but arife in many cafes an internal obligation to give our aflent to this, rather than that J or to aft one way, rather than another. And as to the obfervations of others, they may be fo cautioufly and skilfully felefted, as to be- come almofl: our own} finceour own reafon and experience may dire6l us in the choice and ufe of them. The remarks and advice of old men\ who have gone throughvariety of fcenes, lived long enough to fee the confequences of their own and other peoples aftings, and can now with freedom ^ look back and tell where they en-ed, are ordinarily fure to be preferred to thofe of young and raw aftors. The 2;;'o»;^, apologues, ^c. of tvife rdcn^ and fuch as have made it their bufinefs to be ufeful fpics upon nature and mankind, national /^r^wrZ-j, andthehke*, may be taken as maxims commonly true. Men in their ieveral profcflions and arts, in which they have been educated, and exercifed themfches all their days, mull be fuppofed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can ufually » StMuere enim, qui fit frf tens, fd maximezuktur ege fafienti!. Cic. ^ Kon ntimero luc 'uilicantHr, fed pondere, as jTa/^ fpeaks upon another occafion. Therefore I cannot without a degree of indignation find a fort of writers pleafing themfelves with having difcoverd fome uncivilized na- tions, which haveUttleor no knowledge oi the Deity, ej-.f. and thci. applying their obfervations to the fervice of atheifm. As if ignorance could prove any thing, or alter its nature by being general! ^ uirijlotle's known rule is ''£»^4a ras ^oxincc trSo-iv, « to^ TZAilron, i! ro~i a-o « roii tr/.sVoi?, « Tot's /^KAtra v»»?'V-""5 'i '^"^'I'^i- But it is not applicabje to all cafts. <* Aiix;'r f'" Xfii"*' ^"P' lis'Twy [jr^iu-t-JTu:~\ xujjbca'S'.., airai^ riva, iicn %^oihr,>\vdigm, m >^ if/Mi ira; dii,s-j sre- {w'eoSJ. a-o;« rti hi. Plato. ^ When Sophocles, now grown old, was asked, Xlui.'iyji trflf rVipfo^.Via, he anfwerd, Eu^;?/*:., a atS-fi-m- airfS,uhaM fS/j TCI uuro aJSiCp-jyet, UTTt'.P Xvr'.mra rim >^ ay|io/ ha-airljj ^pi/yw. savraTairi yj T '/i Tciirm ci t/ -/«»« ^OM ii^m yi'C "i ^'"^'^- have ; Of Reafon, and the ways, &€. 59 have : and therefore, if through want of capacity or honcfly they do not either lofe, or belie their opportunities and experience, they are in refpeft of thofe things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to be relied upon. And, laftly, hifiories written by credible and induftrious authors, and red with judg- ment, may fupply us with examples, parallel cafes, and general remarks, profit- able in forming our manners, and opinions too. x\nd by the frequent perufal of them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious cafes is ac- quired. Much of the temper of mankind, much of the nature and drift of their counfels, much of the courfe of Divine providence is vifible in them. To conclude J that we ought to ^o\\o\y probahility, when certainty leaves us is plain : becaufc then it becomes the only light and guide we have. For unlefs it is better to wander and fluduate in abfoliite uncertainty than to follow fuch a guide i unlefs it be reafonable to put out our candle^ becaufe we have not the light of the y^///, it mull: be reafonable to direct our lleps by probabiUty, when we have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reafonable, we are obliged to do it by prop. XI. When there is nothing above probability^ it doth govern ; when there is nothing in the oppofite fcale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the courfe of nature mull: turn the beam. Tho a man, to refume the inftance be- fore, cannot demonftrate th.2.tfice-ace will come up before ambs-ace, he would find himfelf obliged (if he could be obliged to lay at all) to lay on that fide : nor could he not choofe to do it. Tho he would not be certain of the chance, he would be certain of his own obligation, and on which fide it lay. Here then is another way of difcovering, if not truth^yct what in praftice may be fuppofed to be truth. 'That is, we may by this way difcover, whether fuch propofitions as thefe be true, / ought to do this, rather than that ; or, to think fo, rather than the contrary. Obf. I have done now what I chiefly intended here. But, over and above that, we may almoft from the premifles colleft, Firji, the principal caufes o^ error, which I take to be fuch as thefe. i . Wane o? faculties ; when men pretend to judge of things above them. As fome (ftray- ing out of their proper element, and falling into the dark, where they find no ideas but their own dreams, come toj afiert what they have no realbn to alTcit : fo others deny what there is the higheil reafon tobelievc, only becaufe they can- not comprehend it. z. Want of due reflexion upon thofe ideas we have, or may have : by wluch it comes to pafs, that men are dcftitute of "^hat knowledgcj which is gaind by the contemplation of them, and their relations j mifapply names, confufedly ; and fomctimes deal in a fet of words and phrafcs, to which I &o do The Religion of Nature. Se61:. III. no ideas at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Of kin to this is, 5. Want of proper qualifications and TfoT«.^s;/x,«r«. As, when illiterate peo- ple invade the provinces of fcholars j the half-letterd are forward, and arro- gate to themfelves what a 7mdefl^ fludious man dares not ' , tho he knows more > and fcholars, that have confined themfelves to one fort of literature, lanch out into another : unfuccefsfully all. 4. Not underflanding in what the nature and force of a jull confequence confifrs. Nothing more common than to hear people afiert, that fuch a thing follows from fuch a thing j when it doth not follow : t- a. when fuch a confequence is founded in no axiom, no theorem, no truth that we know of f . Defers of -memory and imagination- For men in reafoning make much ufe of thefe : memory is upon many occa- fions confulted, andfornetimes draughts made u^onihc pb ant afy. If then they depend upon thefe, and thefe happen to be weak, clouded, pencrted any way, things may be mifreprefented, and men led out of the way by mif-fhapen ap- paritions. There ought to be therefore a little dijlruft of thefe faculties, and fuch proper helps ought to beufed, as perhaps the bejl judgments want themoft- 6. Attributing too much to fenfe. For as neceflixry as our fcnfes are to us, there are certainly many things, which fall not within their notice j many, which cannot be exhibited after the manner of fenfible objeds, and to which no images belong. Every one, who has but juft faluted the mathematics and philofophy, mull be convinced, that there are many things in nature, which feem abfurd to fenle, and yet muft be admitted. 7. Want of retirement^ and the praftice of thinking and reafoning by our felves *>. A rambling and irregular life mull be attended with a loofe and in-egular head, ill-connefted notions, and fortuitous conclufions. Truth is the offspring o? file nee, unbroken medi- tations, and thoughts often reviled and correflcd. 8. The ftrength of appetites, paffions, prejudices. For by thefe the underllanding may be conupted, or over- born : or at leall the operations of the mind muft be much obftructed by the in- trufion of fuch folicitors, as are no retainers to the rational powers, and yet ftrong, and turbulent. Among other prejudices there isoneof a particular nature, which you muft have obl"er\-ed to be one of the greatejl caufes of modern irreligion. Whilft fome opinions and rites are carried to fuch an immoderate height, as ex- pofes the abfurdity of them to the view of alraoft every body but them who raife them,not only gentlemen of the belles lettres, but even men of common fenfe, many • Sicht ciixta^M /£■ .9^f«ir©-, Ao'/ir/Aes j ok»»» , and flying from nothing fo much as from themfelves and the quiet retreats proper for meditation and reaibning : others become involved inbufinefsand the intri- cate affairs of hfe, which demand their attention, and ingrofs their time : others fall into a flothful negleft of their iludies and diilife of what they have learnt, or want help and means to proceed, or only defign to deceive life and gratify themfelves with the amufements and fenfual parts of learning : and others there are, whofe misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the conclufion ; taking their opinions from places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to their fituation in the world, and the conditions of that imployment, by which they are to get their bre-ad, before they have ever confiderd them j and then mailing the i'ubfequent bufinel's of their lives to dilpute for them, and maintain them, right or wrong. If fuch men happen to be in the right, it is luck, and part of their portion, not the effect of their improvements : and if they happen to be in the wrong, the more they ftudy, and the more learning they gei, the more they are confirmed in tlieir errors j and having fet out with their backs upon truth, the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of negative quantity, fomuchworfe or lefs than no knowledge. Of this fort there are many : and veiy few indeed ('with refpeft to the bulk of mankind^, whofe de- terminations and tenents were ever in the form of quellions : there could not other- wife be fo many feds and different denominations of men, as there are, upon " AU'is nullus eft ieorum refpecius, aliis fu.lendas. Plin. Sen. The former part of this obfervition is in truth the effe(5t of the latter. J; ?iidet dicere frei^tKniiam [niutandi, 8cc, Hieron. I the 62 The Religion of NATUREe Sed. IV. the face of the earth. The fum of all in a few words is this: many qudificati- ons arerequifite in order to judge of fome truths, and particularly thofe which arc of greatejl importance : proper learning and penetration, \acancy from bufi- nefs, a detachment from the interell: of all parties, much fincerity and a perfect refignatkn to the government of reafon and force of truth ; which are things not to be reconciled with the ufual ignorance, paflions, tumultuary lives, and other circumftances which carry moil men tranfverfe. Sed:. IV. Of the Obligations ofimperJeB Beings "with refpe^ to their power of ading. THere remains yet another queftion, fuppofed alfo to be propofed by an objeftor, which muft not be forgot > and upon which I fhall beftow this very fhort fc£tion. The queftion was this, If a man can find out truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it ? I. Nothing is capable of no obligation. For to oblige nothing is the fame as not to oblige. II. So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, fo far is that being incapable of any obligation to do it : or, no beingis capable of any obligation to do that, which it has not power or opportunity to do. For that being, which has not the faculties or opportunity neceflary to the doing of any thing, is inrc- fpe£b of that thing a being utterly unaftive, no agent at all, and therefore as to that aft nothing at all. To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power fuperiorto thercfiftence to be met within doing it. To require him to apply fuch a power is the fame as to require that his power of fuch a kind and degree be applied. But if he has no fuch power, then his power , but that much is left to their own conduct "=. Up and try '^. Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth : if it is, it is alfo in his power to forbear excefs in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his own feet, fo as to go either this way or that or no whither, as fure he has, it is in bis power to abllain from ill company and vicious places. And fo on «. This fuggefts a very material thought : that forbearances^ at Icaft in all ordinary cafes, arc within our power ^ > fo that a man may if he will, forbear to do that, which contradicts truth : but where afting is required, that very often is not in his power. He may want abilities, or opportunities ; and fo may feem to contradift truth by hisomiflion, which, if his infirmities and difodvantages were taken into the account, and the cafe was rightly ftated, he would be foimd not to do. » T« JJfijr' i,TiraM,£(l«, >^ '/lyiua-y-ou)/.. Our. (w.sct'if!^ sf- ci "fi k^yix,', ujro, x.X. Eurip. t jisjg in Arabit is to dk : and from hence the word fatum feems to come (as many Latin words do from that and other Bafterrt languages), death, if any thing, being fatal and neccflary. Yet it doth not fol- low, that therefore the time or manner of dying isunmoveably fixt. OJ 7ri.na. x.ciB-u^Si i^i ^i'-??'"'- ^jji/ i Uwa^Sjj/i •afct.'xi', ii»' iVa xkS-c'ak. Fltit. Chryffpits ap. A. Cell, fecms to explain himfelf much- after the fame manner. The ancients moreover feem many times to make fate conditional. Similis fi euro, fuilfet. Nee pater omnipotens Trojam, nee fata iietabimt Stare, ^c. Virg. c what the Fharifees fay, according to Jofephus, feems to be right. Oi ji^J h xi >,£yKc-i» i^yc; TIM 4' ^> ''^- ccn^StT®- kv- 7-8 TT^oii'ui zooxc,, vt «pUy^iSl(, yAai-lav, xA. Tlut. That in Tibullus, Cam bene juravi, pet tamen ipfi- redit, is a- little poetic fally. t "OAw« -j ?ru hy fenfe, or reafon, or both. I fhall now fpecify fome of thofe truths., which are of greateft importance and influence, and require morereafoning to difcover them ; leaving the reft (common matters of fa^j to the common ways of finding them . They reipefbprincipally either the De- ity., or ourfehes., or the rejl of mankind. The firft fort are the fubje6t oithis feftion. I. Where there is a fub ordinal ion of caufes andeffeEls., there muft necej/arily be a. caufe in nature prior to the refl, tmcaufed. Or thus, IVhere there is a feriesy in which the exifience of one thingdepends upon another, the exiflence of this again upon fome other, and fo iip'vjards, as the cafe JJjall be, there muft be fome independent being upon ivhom it doth originally depend. If Z (fome bodyj be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by \V it is plain that X moves Y, and Y moves Z only as they are firft moved, X by W and Y by X : that Z, Y, X are moveds, or rather Z more Y more X, taken to- getliei" ^, are one moied: that W ftands here as the firft mover, or author of the motion, unmoved by any other : that therefore without W there would be a moved without a mover, which is abfurd ^ : and laftly, that of what length foever I htferies may be, the cafe will be ever the fame j i.e. if there be no Firft mover ^ unmoved, there muft be a moved without a mover. Further, if W, whom we will fuppofe to be an intelligent being, and to have a power oC beginning motion, hath this power originally in himfelf and independently of all others, then here not only the firft mover in this feries,hut ti Firft being and original caule is found. Becaufc that, which has a power of beginning motion in dependent of Any oihev, is a mover independent; and therefore is independent, or has ;;n independent exiftencc, fince nothing can be a mover without being. But if \V * ZTTTx". •= One might with the STotoST-ai (fo calkd hy Ari/lorle, ap. S. Emp.) as welj «ieny, that there is any fuch thing as motion, as fay there is motion w/'thout a mover ; or, which is tiieiame, a/r/t mover- f nfarcv «,i!«f«»ci. £/,•?/«.. 'A^'i x-trntui KTrxtrnz. Id, U^ZrotKitiy. Arifl.^ 2 baa- 66 The Religion of Nature. Se^l. V. has not this power independently in himfelf, then he muft receive it from fome o- ther, upon whom he depends, and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of conferring a faculty of fvodMcingmotion originally and independently in himfelf, here will be a Firji^ independent caufe. And if it can be fuppofed, that he has it not thus, and that xhzferies fhould rife too high for us to follow it ; yet however wc cannot but conclude, that there is fome fuch caufe ^ upon whom this train of beings and powers muft depend, if we reafon as in the former paragraph. For, JJjuverfally^ if Z be any effetl wbatfoever^ proceeding from or depending upon Y asther^///^ of its exiftence, Y uponX, X upon W, it ismanifefttbatthecx- iftence of all, 2, Y, X docs originally come from W, which itands here as the Supreme caufe, depending upon nothing: and that without it X could not be, and confequently neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effects (or dependents , or rather Z more Y more X one effetl, withou: W there would be an effeft without a caufe. Lafth', let this retrogreilion from effcfts to their caufes be continued ever fo far,the fame thing will ftill recur, and without fuch a caufe as is before mentiond the whole will be an effeft without an efficient, or a dependent without any thing to depend upon j /. e. dependent^ and not dependent. Obj. Tbeferies may afcend infinitely ^, and for that reafon have no firft mover or caufe. jlnf If a feries of bodies moved can be fuppofed to be infinite, then taken together it will be equal to an infinite body moved : and this moved will not Ms re- quire a mover than a finite body, but infinitely more. If I may not be permitted to place a firft mover at the top o{ the feries, becaufeit is fuppofed to be infinite, and to have no beginning j yet ftill there muftofneccfTity he fome caufe or author 3 The greateft men among the ancients denied the poflibility of fuch an afcent. OiVs -^ riJl' c« Txh S-vu>xTct I's'vjti he, iri^oK Arift. If there could be fuch a procefs, then all the parts of it but the laft would be ft>iK. Simpl. Not only thole Arabian philofbphers •aP-ed Hebr. mnm):, Arab. poi'DriD'?!!.?, but many of the elder 7"^^ have agreed with the Greeks ki this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former ieellor. nebok. ej> al. particularly S. Kozri : where their lirft argument fecms to be ftiong (and much the fame with the fourth in 5'. Zm:i^ Ttoth). va r-iNTH nyn -ly qbinn joia D'liii'D^n o^w^Nn n:n n^WNi ir" p>j q?m rrin czn byisn "VS n:/'' iub n^bDn lb (^KU; HDI Cni' n'b^n. For tho, as Mufiatm obferver, thefe tea- fonings of the Medabbenm [mion] rjsb vn \\)i~\b vd'-> y^t ^°^ certainly let the feries of caufes Snd e&dts be what it will, it is juft as long dosenward as ufvard; and if they are infinite andinc.x- Isauflible one way, they muft be fo the other too : and then what Saad. Ga. lays, takes place Sib DS4 1D1 r\T\i a^ ly^N HMnn yun. There is another argument of this kind in Jujim M. which de- fcrves notice, what flrefs foever may be laid upon it. E<' to ix.iXf.m yt,i^<^ % ZV'", lays hr., x-u if' "I' 3 >^ TO yijcPi? K.f'j(^ 5';t'"S ''"'^ ? ymSl^ i/iOlsor ht «-« oVs ci» iv to ysyov;; ^i^'©' i /;?"*• f " ' Of Truths relating to the Deity. 67 of the motion % different from nil thcfe bodies, becaufe their being {by the fuppofition) no one body in the fcries^ that moves the next, but only in confe- quence of its being moved firlt itfelf, there is no one of them that is not movedy and the whole can be confiderd together but as an infinite body moved, and which mull: therefore be moved by fonielhing. The fiime kind of anlwer holds good in refpeft of all effcfts and their caufes in general. An infinite fucceflion of effeds will require an infinite efficient, or a caufe infinitely effeclive. So far is it from requiring none. Suppofe a f^«;"« '' hung down out of the heavens from an «»,^koto« height, and tho every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was not vifible, yet it did not defcend, but kept its fituationj and upon this a quelli- on iTiould arife, IVhat fupportcd or kept up this chain : would it be a fufficientan- fwer to lay, that the firft (or loweftj link hung upon the fecond (or that next above it% the fecond or rather the firft and fecond together upon the third^ and fo on ad infinitum ? For what holds up the luhole ? A chain of ten links would fall down, unlefs fomething able to bear it hinderd : one of twenty^ if not flaid by fomething of a yet greater llrength, in proportion to theincrcafe of weight: and therefore one of infinite links certainly, if not fuftaind by fomething infi- nitely ftrong,and capable to bear up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a chain of caufes and efFefts <= tending, or as it were gravitating, towards fome end. The lafi: (or lowefl:) depends, or (as one mviy fayj is fufpended upon the caufe a- bove it : this again, if it be not the firft caufe, is fufpended as an eflfed upon fomething above it, i^c. '^. And if they fhould be infinite, unlefs (agreeably ■ Ariftotle himfelf, who aflerts the eternity of motion, alTerts alfo the neceflity of a firft and eternal mover. ^ ^st^Kv pcp-Jimiu t^ iic/M^st — -. Horn. Aurea de ccelo — -/wn/i is mcntiond too by Lucr. <= r-iib^D Tl^^ Vm blbyi nbyD p3V b^V^nvy'U; -WUBH >h. S. Iqqur. Where more may be ften of this .'~ll!7Vi;brni'n out of Jbn Sinai, Maim. Qnc. i The chain muft be feftend nfe* f'o' Oii/c/'^s-ojo. Jnvenietur, lays Macroiiui, prej/ius intuemi a fummo Dec ufque ad ultimum rerum fictm connexio: (^ hue eft Homeri catena aurea, quam fentlere d« cxio in terras Deum jujpjfi commemorat. This m^ittcr might be iUuftrated by other fimilitudes (even ,— [bnpn r~lyW?U? might ferve for one) : but I fl;all ftt down but one more : and in that in- deed the motion is inverted, but the thing is theiame taken cither way. It occurs mHhob.halleb. and afterward in Kefti. hhokm. Suppofc a row of blind men, of which the laft laid his hand upon the fliOulder of the man next before him, he on the ihould'r of the next before him, and fo on till the foremoftgrew to be quite out of light; and fome bojy asking, what guide this firing of blind men had at the head of them, it fliould be anfwcrd, that tht-y had no guide, nor any head, but;^one held by another, and fo went on, adinfin. would any rational creature accept this for ajull anfwer? Is it not to fay, that mfinite blindnefs (or blindncls, if it be infinite) fupplies the place of light, or of a guide ? to 68 The Religion of Nature. Se61:. V. to what has been fiidj there is fome caufe upon wliich all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite effeft without an efficient : and to aflert there is any fuch thing, would be as great an abfurdity^ as to fay, that a finite or little weight wants fomething to fiilbiin it, but an infinite one or the great ejl does not. II. A Caufe or Being, that has in nature mfuperior caufe, and therefore ('by the termsj isalfo unproduced, and independent, mufi be felf-exifent : i. e. exiftence muft be effential to him; ox, fuch is his nature, that he cannot but be ^. For eveiy be- ing mull either cxifl of itfelf, or not of itfclf : that which exifts not of itfelf rnuil derive its exiftence from fome other, and fo be dependent : but the Being mcntiond in the propofition is fuppofed to be independent, and uncaufed. There- fore He muft exift, not this way, but the other. The root of His exiftence can be fought for no where, but in His own nature: to place it any where die is to make a cmie fuperior to the Supreme. III. There wiifi be fuch a Being. For f'befide what has been faid already; if there was not at leaft one fuch Being, nothing could be at all ■'. LFor the tmi- verfe could not produce itfelf <" ; nor could any part of it produce itfelf, and then produce x.\\treji: becaufe this is fuppofing a thing to a5l before it is. » So Arijlotle fays of the Firft mover, Oir. c'vSixrrxi i».ui 'ixi'' ^% a-^f'-ii «Vi, y.>.. And af- ter him the uiral/ic philofophers, Maimotiula, Alho, j^ al. p.ijf. teach all that God exifts necepniy. myn -ipVDn [n-. to fuppofe him not to be implies a fallity; or, He cannot be fuppofed not to be. This feems to be the import of that name, by which God calls himfelf in Mofes's hiftory ; -|U/>J n'HX n^njs ; or in one word, n^niJ; which in the mouth of one who fpeaksof Him in the third perfon is rrn> or nin>. So Philo explains it ; £»«, ^np-y.^. So Abarbanel; O n'HNM; inya nriN ':x ■•Oyya N^N inbnn ■'ibn ^mK'YD !>N; adding moreover, that it iliewd God to be not, like other beings, niN^:/Dn nvyS^N, but lOyy nVO niN'^nn n^mC, iHeceffary being. And foR. L. b.GerfJy, iruovyo NVDi -itfX NVOjn ii^nu; awn ni n-i1\ I omit others, who writeafter the lame man- ner. There have been even Heathens, who feemd to think, that fome fuch name as this belongd to the Deity, and for the fame reafon. For as Hinv^ and thence nin> are ufed abov^, fo Plutarch fcys, that in addreffing to Him the fecond perfon E? (,-|in.n, or ninn; is ^""^'^"^^ *^ ©sS T^.rava- j<& f^yfw //,«>.« a-«(r«'K!!(r«/ n,y 5" flu, xf.rayo^^^r... 'H.u-Hr ,4^ .^ ii™« ? um, u.iT-:r>y «^'»- it is r, n^ >.5b b^D S<^r.3 -^m : every thing cannot be riiM'i'D 1«?3il. &c- Mor. neb. &- «l- ' This needs no demonftration. But there is a ver)- old one in S. Zm^n. and alter in ^hob.Mleb^JV^l^V >>Aur\^iV}\ imn -in>? in ^n>>n anip ic:.-y pn nu;yvi; anm ^ju;n •^x^^■o w>o> ^n id^V ns» . '13» -iWSN. IV. Such Truths relating to the Deity. 6<^ IV. Such a Beings as is before defcribed^ niufl not only be eternal, but vifinite. Eternal He muft be, becaufe there is no way, by which fuch a Being can either begin or ceafe to be, exiftence being of His eiTence. And infinite He mult be, be- caufe He can be liniitedhy no other as to his exiftence. For if there was any beino- able to Hmic Him, He muft be inferior to that being. He muft aUo in that cafe he dependent: becaufe he muft be beholden to that being for his being 'l:; hat He is, and that He is not confined within narrower Hmits. Befide, if His prefetice (whatever the manner of it is) was any where excluded, He would not be there : andif «£>/ there. He might be fuppofed to be f^ct clfcx-here : and thus he might be fuppofed «o? to be at all. But fuch a Being, as is defcribcdin the II. prop, cannot (o much as he fuppofed not to be. V. Such a Being is abo've all things, that fall under our cognizance : and there- fore his manner of exiflence is above all our comeptions. For He is a necejfary cx- iftent; but nothing within our comprehenfion is of this kind. We know no bei.ng, but v\'hat we can imagine not to be without any contradidion or repug- nance to nature : nor do we know of any befide this Supreme being himfelf. For with rcfpect to Him indeed we know, by reafoning, that there »;,-.^ be One be- ing who cannot be fuppofed not to be j juft as c-crtainly as we know there is any thing at all : tho we cannot know Him, and how he exifts. Adequate ideas of eternity * and infinity are above us, us finites ''. » what relation or analogy there is between time (a flux of moments) and eternal (unchangeable) exigence; how any being fhould be not older now, than he was fcco )-ears ago, c^c. are fpecula- rions attended with infuperable difficulties. Nor are they at all cleard by that of Tmms ap. Plat. 'Hi TOT iiAoy ■aa.fccS'uyfita T i'^i»«xo» y/ia-fhm iJi a^uvoi iyeiiu^r,, isTai 415 vfc^ Tia^ihi'/fjux T aima o^e Xf»®- o-o» Koo-jt** i^ctfjum^'/iB^ii i or that in Philo, 'Aiau «K«vp«^£Ta» 5' kiitS /Si&^ y.itrj/,H, ui ai'c&jjTa Xfc)®-. Many philofophers therefore have thought themi'clves obliged to deny, that God exirts in time. To, T inv, ri, r With X?""^ ysyoi-^T-©- tie';:, (f tjioj-s; ^ny^avci&fi im ti)» a'ihcv itrl'M, cm ifSSq, x>.. Plato. "Efiy 0£«5, ;(^«ti (pMX,i, <£ iVi xar' i^Jvec Xf'"'' k*'^ ::cir)i T a.iZict, T a'x.i'i;-ei', ^ axcoim i kj/ixAj" roz, ^ s ■JTfi'.THt.i, ioit iViv, i.i=iy.t, y.>.. Plut. 131 JDin P31 ira Dn> r>l n^yn^ awn. Maim, ior^ iijjq iy>.>. U. Alio has a whole Chap. ter to (hew JoTH rinn h'iJU Ij^N ^"HW. But then he owns, that their Raiiis do not mean m^WD IDTH, or aHD JUT, or that r—tTn^^if^ Qlip ,— THU; -['COn ><'m "WlU'Dl 1303 TlV^ o '7:i:':ini but 01 mbvya (ot ab a^jDT tno !>5-ip3 ^.•ib.'in ryi^nn -iyiy;!:n pin. inflwr, they reckon (to ufe R. Gedd's words) JOT ino 13iN ^Wnm M-i23 iJlH ^nDKH {DIW. And fo what they fay, doth not include all the prefent difficulty, time in their ufe of the word being confi- ned to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. Yet fee b. i. c. 19. >* X ' Wn abfyn m~i2U?3 ib n^nu? nooi -iin ■■d^d ib T^^'nv; noo avn jct -trw t? wu; v'?y -i)2N''U.' iiA©-, 5;se{. T5 3 T»? is'i "^ri!*. So Chryfojlom. K In 'jo The Religio^j of Nature. Sed. V. In inquiring after the caufes of things, when we find (or fuppofe) this to be the caufe of that, another thing to be the caufe of this again, and fo on, if we can proceed, it may always be demanded with refpeft to the lall caufe that we can comprehend, PFbat is the caufe of that ? So that it is not poffible for us to terminate our inquiries of this kind but in fomcthing, which is to us incotnpre- henfihle. And therefore the Supreme caufe mull certainly be fuch=. But tho it is impoffible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of exiftence, yet we may be fure that, Yl.Heexlfisinamamier^ which is perfeB. For He, who exifts ofhimfelf, de- pends in no regard upon any other, and (lis being a Supreme caufe) is the fountain of exiftence to other beings, mull exill in the uppermof and l;ef manner of ex- ifting. And not only fo, but (fince He 's infinite and illimited) He muft exill in the beft manner illimitedly and infinitely. Now to exift thus is infinite good- nefs of exiftence j and to exift in a manner infinitely goed is to be pcrfcil. VII. fbere can be hut One ftich Being ^. That is, as it appears by prop. III. that there mull be at leaft one independent Being, fuch as is mentiond in prop. I. fonow, that in reality there is but One ". Bccaufe his manner of exiftence being perfect and illimited., that manner of being ('if I may fpeak fo) is exhaufl- edhy Him, or belongs folcly to Him''. If any other could partake with Him in it. He muft want what that other had > be deficient and limited. Infinite and iUimitcd inclofe all ^. If there could be /iL'o Beings each by \\\mM't ahfohitcly perfect, they m.uft be either of the fame., or of different natures. Of the fame they cannot be j becaufe thus, both being infinite., their exiftences would be coincident : that is, they would be but the fame or one. Nor can they be of different natures : becaufe if their na- tures were oppofite or contrary the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and every where meeting the one with the other), the one would ]\:ik defray or be » Ssmomdes had good reafon ftill to double upon Hkro the number of days allowd for anfwering that queftion, ^uid, aut quale Jit Deus f Ap. Cic. "^ ^cc viget quidqu.im fmile aiit fecun- di'.m. Hor. ' In Mor. neb. Maimcnides having proved, that there muft be fome Being, who cxifts r.ecej[arily, or whofe exiftence is necejfary lO^y n:)Ta3, proceeds from this neccffity o!: exi- ftence to derive wfor/>o)-f/>y, Molaie fimfliaty, lerfeBwu, and particulirly ««/>^, rnii''ixn D'-'incn >D1 "iH Ibibl r\ry,-\ >ib'hb'D ni^DU-'n iri -^\I;^:^5 ^N. '* Therefore by Plato He :s called 'O sK, (he One. '^ Ueiis, fi ferfeilus efl, M ejfe dtbet, r.on fcteji cjfe ni^ unus, ut in- to fint omnia. If there could be more Gods than one, tiwtitr/i Jingulis dterit, q,u.intum in cxierit flier it. L3£L the Truths relating to the Deity. ji ■die negation of the other * : and if they are fuppofed to be only different, not op- pofite, then if they differ as difparates, there muft be fome genus above them ; which cannot be : and however they differ, they can only be fiiid at moft to be beings perfeft in their refpeBive kinds. But this is not to be abfolutely perfeft ; it is only to be perfect in //;/'; or that refpect : and to be only thus implies im- perfection in other refpects. What has been here laid is methinks fufficient to ruin the Mauichean caufc and exclude the independent principle of evil. For if we cannot account for the exiftence of that ew/, which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but one inftanceoutof many of our ignorance. There may be reafons for it, tho we do not hiov} them. And certainly no fuch experience muff make us deny axioms or truths equally certain >>. There ai-e, befide, fome things relating to this fub- ie£t, which defcrveour attention. For as to moral good and evil, they feem to depend upon ourfelves"^. If we do but endeavour, the mofi we can, to do what we ought, we fhall not be guilty of «o/ ^«'«_g it (fe£t. IV.): and therefore it is - our fault, and not to be charged upon any other being '^, if guilt and evil be in- troduced by our negle£b, or abufe of our own liberty and powers ^. Then as to /)/;_y/?i::/,a» fl-t/s-Ko-ft;. Baf. There can be no fuch law between them, as is faid to be among the Hea- then deities. 0£ciiri ^J afl' 'ix,1 w/i®". OdoiU u.vutr»i /ix>S.ai KfaBvijuU Ty, J S^UorT®-, k>.. Eurip. •> 'Az-oAwAa i a>.>^tt\ sVsi a-u i'v^v^iTi: Id. ' ^'^Z'-' ^X.i'i a-jTilia-iif s -^ xaTtt yintri* e/A«frav£ic, ijri xara -ruyj/jj Tutiiiu^, juA. Cjr. Hier. '' 'si' airrci u kJ^*®-, Tgraj t«5 afX"? fjjyi ^iiTiirij? irieuB-it. S.Baf. ' MuJ God extlnpiijlj fun, moon, and Jlars, bicaufe fome peo- fle worfljip them ? Mifhn. AbtS ri iXcS^n a.rU, ©si? «.a.V(3>-. M.J.X. T. ^ '» e^'^* ? «■«- fti,xTt Tajac-xdC/a^si v.hn.» tutZ, xX. Max. T. This obfervation m>ght be extended a great way. If there was, v. g. no fuch thing as poverty, there could be no riches, or no great benefit by them, there would be fcarce any arts or fciences, ^c. 'A» '^ knXy, t\i ^dUy, ;? /3i'k thj c-uVoso-f, uviiXi; U7rcarx.j, xA. Chryf> ^ Ta fiiUi Sfo? avri to oAev h't a-y-oxm, it ci^j/j^Mry, t iff*0TlewT« c>/.£ivj- (with more to this purpofe). Hot. '' V. Mor. netok- 3.14. ! Oo/Ki^ii? ^ S ©eS iVsT-fixij'. Simpl, l* K-UKict l3?M?-r,fjba, i^ iiAj)?. Flut. K i to 72 The Religion of Nature. Se61:. V. to ask, why he permits a material world, or fuch a being as man is " j indowd in- deed with feme noble faculties, but incumberd at the fame time with bodily paf- fions and propenfions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He permits any imperfect being; and that is, any being at all : which is a bold de- mand, and the anfwer to it hes perhaps too deep for us. If this world be de- fignd for ^palieftra^ where men >> are to cxercife their faculties and their virtues, and by that prepare themfelves for a fuperior ftate "^ (and who can fiy it is not ?j there niu^he. difficulties and temptations, occafions and opportunities for this cx- ercife. Laftly, if there are evils, of which men know not the true origin ; yet if they would but ferioufly refledl upon the many marks of reafon, ivifdom and goodnefs every where to be obferved in inftances, which they do or may under- ftand, they could fcarce doubt but the fime things prevaild in thofe, which they do not underftand. If I fliould meet with a bonk, the author of which I found had difpofed his matter in beautiful order, and treated his llibjefts with reafonand exaftneis; but at laft, as I red on, came to a/^w leaves written in a knguage which I did not know : in this cafe I fliould clofe the book with a full perfuafion, that the fame vein of good fenfe, which fliewd itfelf in the former and much greater part of it, ran thro the other alfo : efpecially having argu. ments a priori, which obliged me to believe, that the author of it all was the llime perfon. This I fhould certainly do, rather than deny the force of thofe arguments^ in order toaflert two authors oiihe. fame book. But the evil prin- ciple has led me too far out of my way, therefore to return. VIII. Jll other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propoji^ tions for their exiflence. For fince there can be but one perfect and independent being, the reft muft be imperfed and dependent : and fince there is nothing elfe, upon which they can, ultimately, depend befide Him, upon Him they viufl and do depend. IX. He is therefore the Author of nature : nor can any thingbe, or he done, hut •what He either caufes (immediately, or mediately), or permits. All beings (by the laft) depend upon Him for their exlilcnce: upon whom depends their cxiilence, upon him alfo muft depend the intrinfic manner of their exiftence, or the natures of thefe ^ To that queftion. Why are we not fo made, iVs /^^^s /IxXofS^cig ii;/Ai liraj;^"' ''<' ^/Jt'xsrmnr. S.BMfil anfwers, Becaufe a^en ck xjoaifso-sw^ i^ cxrx, t| ufufxia ylytrut. And he who blames theDeL ty becaufe we are not impeccable, i^\v Iti^oh >i ry,> aAoyev (putriv t^ AoyjxJ? tjotijU/S, -^ t-/,' axlniToy }^ «Mf M)>j7-o» •j^ ■jTfcai^iTixri', trctt «f£T?«, as Fhilo. ' In Chryfi^'i flyle, «j£T«« ijriju/sAsri^, (£• x«.9-«3-£f ci 3-«A«iVp« hi 5'jTesfo^T©- /8('» wywu'^scE^, tm (^^ to X-jB-nteci r beings lorn s Truths relating to the Deity. 73 beings; and again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend the necejfary cffetli and confequences of their being, and being fuch as they are in thcmfelves. Then, as to the aSls of fuch of them as may he free agents, and the ef- fefts of them, He is indeed t2ot the Author of thofe j becaufe by the terms and fuppoiltion they proceed from agents, who have no ncceility impofed upon them by Him to act either this or that way. But yet however thefe free agents mull depend upon Him as fuch : from Him they derive their power of afting : and it is He, who permits them to ufe their liberty ; tho many times, through their own fault, they ufe itamifs. And, laftly, as to the nature of thofe relations^ which lie between ideas or things really exifiing, or which arifc from Ei£ts already done andpaft, thefe refult from the natures of the things themfelves : all which the Supreme being either caufes, or permits fas before). For fince things can be but in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratio's, agreements, dilagrec- ments, tffr. are nothing but their manners of being with reipect to each other, the natures of thefe relations will be determind by the natures of the things. From hence now it appears, that whatever expreflestheexiftencesor non-ex- iftences of things, and their mutual relations ^j they are^ is traehy the con/}itutio» of nature: and if fo, it muft alfobe agreeable to His perfect comprehenfion of all truth, and to His will, who is at the head of it. Tho the aft of A (fome free a- gent) is the eflPeft of his liberty, and can only be fliid to he permittedhy the Su- preme being j yet when it is once done, the relation between the doer :i.ndithe deed, the agreement there is between x\ and the idea of one who has committed fuch a faft, is a fixt relation. From thenceforward it will always be predicable of him, that he was the doer of it : and if any onefliould deny this, he would go counter to nature and that great Author of it, whofe exiftence is now proved. And thus thofe arguments in le6t. I. prop. IV. which turned only upon ^fup- pofition that there was fuch a Being, are here confirmed zvA made abfolute. X- The one fupr erne and perfe£i Being, upon whom the exifience of all other beings and their powers originally depend, is that Being, whom I mean by the word GOD. There are other truths ilill remaining in relation to the Deity, which we may know, and which are neceff'ary to be known by us, if we would endeavour to de- mean our felves toward Him according to truth and what Heis. And they are fuch, as not only tend to reftify our opinions concerning His nature and attri- butes i butalfo may ferve at the fame time as///r//:7fr/)roo/i of His exiftence, and an amplification of ferae things touched perhaps too lightly. As, XL GOD 74- The Religion of Nature. Sedl. V, XI. GOD cannot be corporeal : or, there can be no corporeity in God. There are many things in matter utterly inconfiftent with the nature of fucha Being, as it has been demonftrated God muft be. Matter e-iCAs.mparts^ everyone of which, by the term, is imperfe 12 " : but in a Being abfolutely pcrfeft there can be nothing that is imperfed. Thefe parts, tho they are many times kept clofely united by fome occult in- fluence, are in truth fo many diftinEl bodies, which may, at leaft in our ima- gination, bedisjoind or placed otherwifc: nor can we have any idea of matter, which does not imply a natural difcerpibility and luiceptivity of various Ihapes and modifications : i. e. mutability feems to be effcntial to it. But God, exill- ing in a manner that is perfeft, exifts in a manner that mufl be uniform, always one and the dune, and in nature unchangeable. Matter is incapable of acling, pajfive only, and ftiipid : which are defects, that can never be afcribed to him who is the Firft caufe or Prime agent, the Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect. Then, if He is corporeal, where ever there is a vacuum. He muft be excluded, and fo becomes a being bounded, finite, and as it were full of chafms. La%, there is no matter or body, which may not be fuppofed not to be -y whereas the idea of God or that Being upon whom all others depend, involves in it exiftencc. XII. Neither infinite fpace, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended, or eternally exifting, nor any, nor all of thefe taken together, can be God. For, Space taken fcparately from the things, wliich poflefs and fill it, is but an empty fcene or vacuum : and to lay, that infinite fpace is God, or that God is infinite fpace, is to fay that He is an infinite vacuum : than which nothing can be more abfurd, oxblafphemous. How cm fpace, which is but a vaft void, ra- ther the negation of all things, than pofitivcly any thing, a kind of diffufed no- ' Ei'u-Z/Ai hi, (puirn 'o T^tJ^a-r<^ ix^i^il^ofS/iy, Ui JrAsw, «ar«» T («,!»2« wv. to uuto tlvai (f. %ai) tJ oX ? As infante [pace cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or fpace ; fo tho He is eternal, yet eternity or infinite duration itfelf is not God ^. For duration, abftracled from all durables, is nothing adually exifting by itfelf; it is the duration of a beings not a being. Infinite fpace :in^ duration., taken together, cannot be God; bccaufe an inter- minable fpace of infinite duration is ftill nothing but eternal fpace > and that is at moil but an eternal vacuum. Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconfiftent with Divine perfeftion, tho matter ihould be infinitely extended., or there fhould be an infinite quantity of it, yet ftill, where ever it is, it canies this inconfiflence along with it. If to matter be added infinite duration^ neither does this alter the nature of it. This only fuppofes it to be eternally what it is, /. e. eternally incapable of Di- vine perfection. And if to it you add the ideas of both infinite extenfion (ox fpace) and dura- tion too } yet ftill, fo long as matter is matter, it rauft always and every where be incapable of Divinity. Laftly, not the univerfe^ or fum total of finite beings, can be God. For if it is, then (?w?7 //.;/»^ is divine, everything God, or of God j and fo ^//things together muft make but one being <=. But the contrary to this we fee, there be- ing evidently many beings diftinct, and feparable one from another, and inde- pendent each of other. Nay, this diftinftion and fcparation of exiflence,^ be- lide what we fee without us, we may even feel within our felves. We -xxefe- verally confcious to our felves of the individuation and diftinction of our own > They, who call God aipo, do it lOlpU bDH pNI bjH inipO I>iinu; ^s!?. Thlflibi. Or, as Thil. Aquin. from the ancients, 1DipD ID^iy t'!*?! D^IV '^U' aipD n'apn. Oi yi -^^ixfrcn [o &!«;], kxtsx. '^ix,i 1-0 ^^». Ph. Jud. By which ways of fpeaking ('tho there is a Cabbaliflic reafon affigned too) they intend chiefly to exprefs his omniprefence and immenfity. That in Act. Ap. icenis to be of the fame kind, '£» u.^r^ ^^ C'^/'V; 'ii xijb^£.9-«, xssi' ic-fH/j. t Such things as thefe, how incongruous and wild foever they are, have bin affirmed ; that God is infinite du- ration, fpace, (^c. What can be meant by that, KizaSs av At'yoiTo i aim bur, in Vlot'mtn f ' Were not they, who convcife with Looks, accuftomd to fuch trials, it would be (hocking to find Balbtis in Cicero aflerting, ejfe mundum dmm : and yet in another place, that it is ij««// communis de- orum, atque hominu?n donius, aut urbs utrorumque ; and deorum, homitiu>nque caujh faftus: inano- tlier, providemia deorum jntindiim, ^ omnes mundi partes ^ initio con^itutas eJfe, & omni tempore edmiaijir^iri: ia another, mundnm ipfam tmiir.i admi/iiftrari; with other like inconiiftences. a minds 7(5 The Religion of Nature. Sefl. V. minds from all other: nor is there any thingj of which we can be more cer- tain. Were we all the fame being, and had one mind, as in that cafe v. c inuft have, thoughts could not be private, or the peculiar thoughts of any one perfon ; but they mull be common acts of the whole mind, and there could be but one confcience common to xss^W ». Befide, if all things conjunctly are God or the Perfect being (I dread the mention of fuch things, tho it be in order to refute them), how comes this remarkable inftance of imperfection, among many others, to cleave to us, that we fhould nvt know even our felves, and what we are '' ? In lliort, no colleSlion of beings can be one being ; and therefore not God. And the univerfe itfelf is but a collection of dilHnct beings <^. XIII. // is fo far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no fuch thing as either matter or motion, if there was not fome Superior being, upon ■whom they depended. Or, God is fuch a being, that ivithout Him there could be nei- ther matter nor motion. This muftbe true of^ matter : becaufe it has been proved alreadv, that there can be but one independent being ; that he is incorporeal j and that the exiftence of all other beings muft depend upon Him. But the fame thing may be proved othenvife. If matter (I mean the exiftence of ii) does not depend upon Ibmething above it, it muft be an independent being ; and if an independent being, a neceiTIiry being j and then there could be no fuch thing ^3. vacuum: but all bodies muftbe perfectly folid; and, more than that, the whole world could be but one fuch body, five times as firm asbrals, and incapa- ble of all motion. For that being which exifis necejj'arily does neceffarily exijl : that is, it cannot not exift. But in ^vacuum matter does not exift. Moreover, \i matter be an independent, neceffaiy being, and exifts of itfelf, this muft be true of every particle of it : and if fo, there could not only be no vacuum • ' Aroxtf h fjutii i ii/iti Qyu;^'^] J^ i eiiiv «»»• spKf?' ^ ^."'S a,i&avoia/^s, si a.»\m ki&'xnS^, li 'i- AUi if/joTsxim v.fjiMi Ts Tifoi i».yMi, y^ irfc5 to irSv. Plot. Here this author is dear, tho at fome other times very dark. •> Cur quiilquam ignoraret animus hominis, ft ejfet Dens? Cic. '■' The fyftem of Sfinofa is fo aftarenily falie, and full of impieties and contradiftions, that more needs not be faid againft it : tho much might be. What Velleins fays in Cicero, is not only true, Si mundtti eft dmi, del membm partim ardentia purtim refrigerate dicenda funt : but, if there is but one fub- ftance, one nature, one ieitig, and this being is God, then all the follies, madnefles, wickednelTes that are in the world, are in God,- then all things done and fufferd are both done and fufferd by Hinij He is both caufe and efteft; He both willes and nilles, affirms and denies, loves and hates rhefame things at the fame time, &-c. Tliat fuch grofs Atheifm as this fhould ever be fafliionible ! ^theifm: for certainly when we inquire, whether there is a God, we do not inquire, whether we ourfelvcs and all other things which are vU'ible about us do exift : fomething different from them muft be in- tended. Thei-efore to £y, there is no God different from them, is to fay, there is no God at all. )- but Truths relating to the Deity. 77 but every particle muft be every where. For it could not be limited to occupy only a place of fuch certain dimenfions by its own nature ; fincc this confinement of exigence within certain bounds implies non-exiftence in other places beyond thofe bounds, and is equal to a negation of exiftence > and when exiJiencexstScn' tial to any being, a negation of exifience cannot be fo. Nor, in the next place, could its exiftence be limited by any thing elfe, becaufe it is fuppofed to have its exiftence only of itfclfj i. e. to have ^principle of exiilence in itfelf, or to have an exiftence that is ijot dependent upon or obnoxious to any other. And I may add iHll, if matter be felf-cxiftenr, I do not fee, not only how it comes to be reibaind to a place of fome certain capacity, but alfo how it comes to be limited in other refpeEls ; or why it fhould not exift in a manner that is in all refpeEls pcrfc6t. So that thus it appears, matter muft derive its exiftence from fome other being, who caufes it tobejuft what it is. And the being, 'who can do this, muft be God. It is to no purpofe to object here, that one cannot conceive, how the exiftence of matter can be derived from another being. For God being aboze our conceptions, the manner in which He operates, and in which things depend upon him, muft alfo be unconceivable. Reafon difcovers, that this vifible world muft owe its ex- iftence to fomeinvifible Almighty being > /. e. it difcovers this to be faft, and we muft not deny fids becaufe we know not how they are effected. It is for from being new, that our ficulties ftiould difclofe to us the exiftence of things, and then drop us in our inquiiy how they are. Thus much for matter. As for motion; without a Firftcaufe, fuch as has been defcribed, there could be none : and much IcCs/uch motions as we fee in the world. This may be immediately deduced from the foregoing paragraphs. For if matter itfelf could not be without fuch a caufe, it is certain motion., which is an aiFeftion of matter, could never be. But further,there could be no motion,un[efs either there be in matter itfelf a pow- er of beginning it ; or it is communicated from body to body in an infinite fuccefion^ox in a nVr/e, and fo has no beginning J or elfe \s producedhy fome incorporeal being, or beings. Now as hardy as men are in advancing opinions that favor their vices, tho never fo repugnant to reafon, I can hardly believe any one will afTert, that a par- cel of7nere matter (let it be great or fmall, of any figure whatfoever, ficc.j left alto- gether to itfelf, could ever ofitfelf^f^/« to move. If there is any fuch bold afTertor, let him fix his eyes upon fome lump of matter, ex. gr. ^Jlone, piece oftitnber, or a clod (cleard of all animals}, and perufe it well ; and then ask himfelf feriouHy, whe- ther it is poflible for him in earneft to believe, that that/ow, log, or clod, tho no- thing corporeal or incorporeal iTiould excite or meddle with it, might fome time or other of itfelf begin to creep. However, to be Ihort, a power of beginning motion ■ L is 78 Th0 Religion V Nature. Se6l:. V. is not in the idea of matter. It is pafHve, as we fee, to the impreflions of mo- tion, and fufceptive of it ; but cannol produce it. On the contrary, it will al- ways perfift uniformly in its prefent ftate^ either of reft or motion, if nothing ftirs, diverts, accelerates, or ftops it. Nor is there any thing in all phyfics bet- ter fettled than that, which is called vis inerliie^ or the inertia of matter. The propagation of motion from body to body, tvithout any Firft mover, or immaterial caufe of motion, has been proved impoffible, prop. I. The fuppofition of a perpetual motion in a circle is begging the queftion. For if A moves B, B moves C, and fo on to Z, and then Z moves A j this is the fame as to fay, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D, Z ; that is, A moves itfelf, or can begin motion ^ It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from fome mover incorporeal: which muft be either that Supreme and felf-exifting fpirit himfelf, who is Godj or fuch, as will put us into the way how to find, that there is fuch a Being. Turn back to p. 6f . If we confider our/elves, and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may there fee the thing exemplified. We move our bodies or fome members of them, and by thefc move other things, as they again do others j and know thefe motions tofpring from the operations of our minds: but thenweknowalfo, that we have not an independent power of creating motion. If we had, it could jjot be fo hmited as our loco-motive faculties are, nor confined to fmall quan- tities and certain circumftances only : we fhould have had it from eternity, nor could we ever be deprived of it. So that we are neceflitated to look up and acknowledge fome Higher being, who is able not on\y to produce motion, but to impart ^faculty of producing it. And if the petty motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a God, much more may t\\o^e greater motions we fee in the world, and xhcphano- ntena attending them : I mean the motions of the planets and heavenly bodies. For the fe muft be put into motion, either by one common mighty Mover, aft- ing upon them immediately, or by caufes and laws of His appointment j or by their refpeftive movers, who, for reafons to which you can by this time be no ftranger, muft depend upon fome Superior, that furniflid them with the power of doing this. And granting it to be done either of thefc ways, we can be at no great diftance from a demonftration of the exijlcnce of a Deity. » what Cf?i/or/K;« charges upon many great men (but upon fome of them furcly anjuftly) is to me unintejligiblc. He fays, they believed femper hm'mes fuijfe, (^c. and then, Itirrjie ty omnittm, qtu in [efKfiteruo ifio mundo femper fuertmf, fuluraque ftmt., tiiunt frincifium fuijfe nullum; fed orbem ejfe e^mmdamgerhrnntitini, nnfcmiiiiniiue, in quo uniitffujiifi^iie geniti initiumfmul (^ftiis eJfe \ijeatur. 4 li^ Truths, relating to tie Deltyr^ 7P It may perhaps be faid, that tho matter has not the power of moving itfelf> yet it hath an attractive force, by which it can move other parts of matter: fo that all matter equally moves 7m or at leaft who, fome way or othei-, imparts this force. For attraSlion, accord- ing to the true fenfe of the word, fuppofcs one body to aft upon another at a diftance, or where it is not } but nothing can be an agent, where it is not at all. Matter can a6t only by cental, impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put into motion by fomething elfe, or refifting thofe which ftrike againft it, when it is at reft. And this it does as matter j i. e. by being impenetrable to other matter : but attraftion is not of the nature or idea of matter. So that what is called attra^ion^ is fo called only becaufe the fame things happen, as if the parts of matter did mutually attrad : but in truth this can only be an effeft of fome- thing, which afts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of matter feem not only to gravitate towards each other, but many of them to fly each other. Now thefe two contrary motions and feeming qualities cannot both proceed from matter qua matter j cannot both be of the nature of it : and therefore they muft be owing to fome external caufe, or to fome other being, which exites in them this, as it were love anddifcord '. Befidc, as to the revolution of a planet about the fun, mere gravitation is not fufficient to produce that cffeft. It muft be compounded with a motion of/iro- jellion, to keep the planet from filling direftly into the fun, and bring it about : and from ivhat hand, I defire to know, comes this other motion (or direction) ? Who imprefted it ? What a ^■aft field for contemplation is here opend ! Such regions of matter a- bout us, in which there is not the leaji particle that does not cany with it an ar- gument of God's exiftence j not the leaft ftick or ftraw, or other trifle ih3.t falls to the ground, but ihewsit j not the flighteft motion produced, the leaft whifl- per of the air, but tells it. XIV". The frame and conftitution of the world, the aftoniflnng magnificetice of it, the various phienomcna and kinds of beings, the unifoimity obferved inthe pro- duEliuns of things, the ufesand ends for tvhich they ferve, ^c. de allflyew that thcit is fome Jlmighty deflgner, an infinite ivifdom and power at the top of all thefe things: • So what we call attraftion and averfion (centripetal and centrifugal forces) feem to have bech ■called by EmpeJodes: ifiPi.a ;i £:«( [? ^ rci;!;"^], (fvti)-.©- uS'txr^inlct. Diog.t.{v.I^p)V.Arifl- Cic. c- "A L Z fuch 8©: The Religion of Nature* Sedt. V. fuch marks there are of both*. Or, Ged is that Beings •without -whom [uch a frame or conflitution of the worlds fuch a magnificence in it, l^c. could not be. In order to prove to any one the grandnefs of this fabric of the world, one needs only to bid him confider the fun with that infupportable glory and luftre that furrounds it : to demonftrate the vaft diflance, magnitude, and heat of it ; to re- prefent to him the chorus of planets moving periodically, by uniform laws, in their feveral orbits about it j affording a regular variety of afpe£l:s ; guarded Ibme of them by fecondary planets, and as it were emulating the ftate of the fun j and probably all pofleft by proper inhabitants : to remind him of thofe furprifing vifits the comets make us i the large trains, or uncommon fplen- dor, which attends them j the far country they come from j and the curiofity and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other planets, who alfo may be up to fee the entry and progrefs of thefe minillers of fate •> : to dire6b his eye and contemplation, through thofe azure fields and vaft regions above him, up to the fi.- and therefore fure a magnificent fbudure, and the work of an infinite Architcft. But if we could take a view of all the particulars containd within that aftonifhing compafs, which we have thus haflily run over, how would wonders multiply upon us? Every corner, every part of the world is as it were made up of other worlds. If we look upon this our feat (I mean this • So far is that from being true, Nequaquam — div'mitus effe creatam Naturam mundi, qu£ tanta eft fridita culf^-I-Hcret. Menraflily(impiou(ly) cenfure what tiiey do not underftand. Like that king oiCafiile, who fancied himfelf able to have contrived a better fyftem of the world ; becaufc he knew jjot what the true fyftem is, but took it to be as afcribed to him by R. If. at. Sid, and other aftrono- mers of thofe times. •> Since they have, or may have great eifefts upon the feveral parts of the folar fyftem , one may fpeak thus without falling into the fuperftition of the multitude, or meaning what is intended by that, Nm^tMm calo fpeilatum impine comet en (inClaud.), or the like. "^ fi- Mi*t, e^ iitjinito fimilis. Plin. earth^j Truths relating to the Deity. 8 c earthj, what fcopc is here for admiration ? The great variety of mountains, hills, valleys, plains, rivers, feas, trees, plants! The many tribes of different animals^ with which it is Hocked ! The multifarious inventions and 'ujorks of one of thefc j that is, of us men^ &c. And yet when all thefe (heaven and earth) are llirveyd as tiicelyzs. they can be by the help of our imafTifted fenfes, and even of telefcopical glafTes, by the aflillaiice of good microfcopes in \ try f mall parts of matter as ma- ny new wonders ' may perhaps be difcoverd, as thofe already obferved ; new kingdoms of animals ; new arcbiteSlure and curiofity of work. So that as before our lenfcs and even conception fainted in thofe vajl journeys we were obliged to take in conlldering the expanfe of the univerfej fo here again they foil us in our refearchcs into the /in««/M and conitituent parts of it. Both the beginnings and the ends of things, the leajl and the greatejl, all confpire to baffle us : and which way ever wcprofecute our inquiries, we ilill fall in with frcj]} fubjeftsof amaze- ment, and frej]} reaibns to believe that there are indefinitely Ilill more and more behind, that will for ever efcape our eagcrelt purfuics and deepcfl penetration. This mighty building is not only thus grand, and the appearances ftupendous in it, but the manner in which things are effe£ted is commonly unintelligible, and their caufes too profound for us. There are indeed many things in nature, which we know; and fome, of which we feem to know the f^«/^.f ." but, alas! how /ew are thefe with refpeiSt to the whole fum ? And the caufes which we af- fign, what are they ? Commonly fuch, as can only be exprefled in general terms, whilft the bottoms oi things remam unfathomable. Such, as have been coUefted from experience^ but could fcarcely be known beforehand, by any ar- guments a priori^ to be capable of rendering fuch effeds: and yet rill caufes are known after that manner, they are not thoroughly underftood. Such, a.s feem difproportionate and too little^ and are fo infufHcient and unfatisfaftory, that one cannot but be inclined to think, that fomething inimaterial and invifi- bie mull be immediately concerned. In fliort, we know many times, that fuch a thing will have fuch an eflcft, or perhaps that fuch an effeft is produced by fuch a caufe, but the manner how we know notj or but grolly, and if fuch an hypotbefis be true. It is impcflible for us to come at the true prin- ciples of things, or to fee into the oeconomy of the fineft part of nature and workings of the jirfi fprings. The caufes that^ appear to us, arc but effeils of other caufes : the vejfels^ of which the bodies of plants and ani- mals confiil, arc made up of other^ fmaller veffels : the fubtilejl parts of matter, which we have any notion of (as animal fpirits, or particles of ligh:}, h-xvc their parts, and may for ought we know he compound hodks: and as to the /kbjlances ' IIciKi^f, 5-«t>^«T8fy(«. Plot. f them- ■82 The Religion of Nature; Sed. V. ^themfelves of all thefe things, and their internal conjiitution, they are hid from our eyes. Our philofophy dwells in the furface of nature. However, in the next place, we ourfelves cannot but be witnefles, that there Axe fiatcd inethods.) as fo many fet forms of proceeding, which things punftu- ally and religioufly keep to. The fame caufes^ circumftanced in the lame man- ner^ have always the fame fuccefs: all theT^m^J of animals, among us, are made according to one general idea j and fo are thofe of plants alfo, and even minerals : no new ones are brought forth or arifen any where : and the old arc preferved and continued by the old ways. Laftly,it appeals I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world,that there is a contrivance and a refpe<5t to certain reafons and ends. How the /un is po- fitednear the middle of our fyftemforthe more convenient difpenrmgofhishemgn influences to the planets moving about him ; how the plain of the earth's o'qua- tor interfefts that of her orbit., and makes a proper angle with it, in order to diverfify the year.^ and create a ufeful variety of feafons., and many other things of this kind, tho a thoufand times repeated, will always be pleafing meditati- ons to good men and true fcholars. Who can obferve the vapors to afcend, cfpecially from the fea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condenfation, and not underftand this to be a kind of diflillation in order to clear the water of its grofier filts, and then by rains and dews to fupply the fountains and rivers with frelh and wholfom liquor > to nourifh the vegetables below by fhowcrs, ■which defcend in drops as from a watering-pot upon a garden, I3c. who can view the ftruHure of a plant or animal ; the indefinite number of their fibres and fine veflels, the fortnation of larger vcfTels and the fcveral members out of them, and the apt difpofition of all thefej the way laid out for the reception and dillribution of ruitriment ; iheeffeii this nutriment has in extending the veflels, bringing the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expanfion, continuing the Wition of the feveral fluids, repairing the decays of the body, and prefei-ving life : who can take notice of the fevcval faculties of animals, their arts of faving and providing for themfelves, or the ways in which they are provided for j the nfes of plants to animals, and of fome animals to others, particularly to man- kind ; the care taken that the fevei-al /pedes iliould be propagated out of their proper feeds ( without confulion ^^, th; Ib-ong inclinations implanted in animals for that purpofe, their love of their youngs and the hke : I fliy, who can do this, and not fee a deftghi, in fuch regular pieces, fo nicely wrought, and / preferved? If there was but one animal, and in that cafe it could not bedoubt- » If anyone, fitting upon mount Jda, had feen the Gresh army coming on in proper order [ij^iTi K<.»,5 .-o-«,t 1? ri.h'^'.roiii !r£«(fi5 s-ftfriSo-Ki-], he ought mod certainly, notwithftanding what 5fA.7. &K6er.favs, to have concluded, that there was fomcccmmanjer, under whof-- conduct they moved. ej Truths relating to the Deity, 83 cd but that his eyes were made that he might fee with them, his ears that he might hear with tlicm and fo on, through at leaft the moll; confiderable parts of him • if it can much lefs be doubted, when the fame things arc repeieJ'm the individuals of all the tribes of animals > if the like obfcrvations may be made with refpcct to vegetables, and otha- things : and if all thefe kinds of things, and therefore much more their particulars, upon and in the earth, waters, air, are unconceiv- ably numerous (as mod evidently they arej, one cannot but be convinced from that, which is fo z-ery ob\'ious to every underftanding, and plainly runs through the nobler parts of the vifible world, that not only they, but other things, even thofe that feem to be lefs noble, have their f«^^ too, tho not fo well underllood. And now lince we cannot fuppofe t\\t parts of matter to have contriz'ed this won- derful form of a world among themfelves, and then by agreement to have taken their refpeftive ports, and purliied conftant ends by certain methods and mea- fures concerted (becaufe thefe area£ts, of which they are not capable}, there muft be fome other Being, whofe wifdom and power are equal to fuch a mighty work, as is the fru^ure and prefervat i on o£ the world. There muft be fome almighty Mind, who models and adorns it > lays the caufes of things fo deep; prefcribes them fuch uniform and fteady laws ; deftinesand adapts them to certain purpo- les ; and makes one thing to iit and anfwer to another =. Th:\t fiicb a beautiful fcheme,y///.{)■ put, it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as regularly (or the laws of na- ture have as regular an effe£l:),when a monfier is produced, as when the ufual ilTue in common cafes. Under thefe circumftances the monfter is the genuine iflue : that is, ' Hoc qui exi(limat fieri fotuijfe, non intellige cur nm Idem pint, fi innumerabilei un'iHi ^ xiginti forms literarum, aHquo conjiciantnr, fojfe ex hn in terram excitjjh annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi fojjir.t, effici: quod nefcio aiine in wio quidem rtrfu fcjfit tantum '^alcre fortima.Cxc. But alas, what are Znnius's annals to fuch a work as the world is ! ''He was ~.v'/^x,!>I/M®^ ttMB-u /at3>,iut.D.L. But that part of his phyficsis heremeant, in which he treated of the origin of the world; or rather of infinite roorUji which makes his thought the groll'er ftill. For in- finite worlds require infinite chances infinitely rcpetcd. Truths relating to the Deity.' 85 m the fame circumftances there would always be the fame kind of produ£tion. And therefore if things are now and then mif-fhaped, this infers no unlleadinefs or millake in nature. Befide, the magnificence of the world admits of fome perturbations ; not to £\y, requires ibme variety. The queftion is, Could all thofc things, which we do knoiv to have ufes and ends, and to the produftion of which ilich wonderful contrivance and the combinations of fo many things are required, be produced,and method and regularity be prefencd/o/^r (?x;7 is if nothing but blind chance prefided over all ? Are not the innumerable inlknces of things, which are undeniably made with reference to certain ends, and of thofe which are propagated and repeted by the fame conftant methods, enough to convince us, that there are ends propofed, and mles obferved, even where wc do not fee them. And, lalUy, if we iTiould defcend to particulars, what are thofe feemingly ufelefs or monftrous produftions in refpe£t of the ?-?/?, ih-At plainly de- clare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by the ufual ways, with the ufual perfeftion of their fcveral kinds ? If the com- parifon could be made, I verily believe thefe would be found to be almoll infi- nituple of the other ; which ought therefore to be reputed as nothing. They, who content themfclves with words, may afcribe the formation of the world to fate or nature., as well as to chance., or better. And yet fate., in the firll place, is nothing but ^.feries of events, confiderd as necelTai-ily following in ibme certain order ; or, of which it has always been true, that they ijuou/d be in their determinate times and places. It is called indeed a feries oicaufes " .■ but then theyarefuch caufesasare alfofjfec?^, all of them, if there is no Firft caufe j and may be taken for fuch. So that in this dcfcription is nothing like fuch a eaufe^ as is capable of giving this form to the world. A feries of events is the flame with events hz^Tptningferiatim : which words declare nothing concerning the caufe of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, ne- cefTity are but circumftances of things that come to pafs ; not caufes of their ex- iftence, or of their being as they are. On the contrary, fome external and fupe- rior caufe muft be fuppofed to put the feries in motion, to project the order, to connect the caufes and cfTecls, and to impofe the necefTity ^. • Series imflexa cuiifarttm. Sen. '' Ser.ecu fays himfcif, that in this feries God is frim* emniam catifi, ex o^ua aten per.ilem. Indeed it is many times difficult to find out what the an- cients meant by fate. Sometimes it fcems to follow the motions of the beaienly bodies and their afpcdls. Of this kind of fate is tliat paifage in Suetonius to be underftood, where he fays that Titc Tins was addictus mathematics, perfuafionifque pleiius cuncla. fato agi. Sometimes it is confounded with, fortune. So in Lucian we find t'/,» -rvx/fl x^xlya-xt rtt fx,ifA,ot^sc^ti, tij a, i| afz?5 t)-.*?* sVs- K>M&yi. And fometimes it is the fame with God : as when the Stoics fay, 'iv n £^»»' S'.o' tij »ay c^ ifj'^^l^Hi >'^ A,'«, up. Biog.L, and the like cKe>vherc. M Thca 86 The Religion o/' Nature; Se6l. V. Then for nature, i . If it be ufed for the intrinfic manner of exifting j that con- ftitution, make, or difpofition, with which any thing is produced or born, and from which refult thofe properties, powers, inclinations, paffions, quahties, and manners, which-xx tc:A\cA natural (and fomctimes «a/H?-f\inoppoiitiontofuch as are acquired, adventitious, or forced ('which ufe is commonj : then to fay, that nature formed any thing, or gave it its manner of exiftencc, istofiy, that it formed itfelf, or that the effect is the efficient''. Befide, how can »/^»«er (man- ner of exifting) be the caufeof exifting, or properly do any thing. An agent is an acting being, fomc fubilance, not a manner of being, z. If it be ufed in that other fenfc, by which it ftands for the ideas of things, what they arc in thcrafelves, and what in their circumftances, caufes, confequences, refpe£ts ; or, in ftiort, that which determines them to be of this or that kind (as whenwcfliy, the nature of juftice '' requires this or that ) i. e. the idea of juftice requires or fup- pofes it : a crime is of fuch a nature } that is, bears fuch a refpeft to the law, and is attended with fuch circumftances, or the like) : then nont o? ihefe fenfcs . can do an atheift any fervice. 3. If it be ufed for the ivorld " (a.s, the laws of nature may be underftood to be the laws of the world, by which it is govern- ed, and the phenomena in it produced; after the fiime manner of fpeaking as when we %, the laws of England, France, &c.j then it ftands for that very thing, the former and architeft of which is the object of our inquiry j and there- fore cannot be that architeft itfelf. Under this fenfe may be comprehended that, when it denotes reality of exiflence, as when it is iaid that fuch a thing is not in nature (liot to be found in the ivorhl). 4. If it figniiies the forementiond laws themfelves ; or that courfe, in which things by virtue of thelc laws pro- ceed (as when the eff'efts of thefe laws areftyled the works of nature) : then, laws fuppole fome legiflator, and are pofterior to that of which they are the laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people arc of which that nation confifts. f . If it be ufed after the fame manner as the word habit fre- quently is ; to which many things are afcribed (juft as they are to nature), though it be nothing exifting diftinft from the habits, which particular men or bci.ngs contract : then nature is a kind of abfratl notion, which can do nothing. Per- haps nature may be put for natures, all natures, after the manner of a collective noun } or it may be mentiond as an agent, only as we pcrfonify virtues and at- tributes, either for variety, or the fnorter and more convenient exprefling of a As when Strata Lump, according to TiiUy, docet omnia ejfe effecia r.atura. ^ Vis &• natura jufliti^. Cic. ' Almoft as if it ffood for nr.tit, or res nati i all things, that are pro- duced. {So fitura feems to be put fomctimes for ftnts.) Sunt, qui omnin mtur* nomine apfel- Itnt ; lor^cra, ©> imne, ^ita^ta his ncciikist, Cic. things Truths relating to the Deity. 87 things. Laflly, if it denotes the Author of nature, or God> (the effeSl feeming, tho by a hard metonymy in this cafe, to be put for the efficient) : then, to Him it is that I afcribe the formation of the world, ^c. To all which I muft fub- join, that there is an unaccountable liberty taken in the ufe of this word: and tliat frequently it is ufcd merely as a ivord, and nothing more, they who ufe it not knowing themfelves, what they mean by it >>. However, in m fenfe can it fuperfede the being of a Deity. XV. Life, fenfe, cogiiation, and the faculties of cur ozvn minds fJjcjj the eK-iflence offome fuperior Being, from vjhom they are derived. Or, God is that Being, 'with' cut whom neither could thcfe be, any more than the things before mentiond. That they cannot flow from the nature of any matter about us as matter, or from any modification, fize, or motion of it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps be proved more fully afterwards. And that our fouls themfelves are not felf- exiftent, nor hold their faculties independently of all other beings, follows from pr. IV. and VII. Therefore we muft neceflarily be indebted for what we have of this kind to fome great Benefaftor, who is the fountain of them. For fmce we are confcious, that we have them, and yet have them not of our felves, we muft have them from fome other. A man has little reafon, God knows, to fancy the fuppofitum of his hfe fenfe and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he confiders how tranftoryi\\\di. uncertain at beft his life and all his injoyments are ; ivhat he is 'whenceht came, znd -whither he is goings The mind a£ts not, or in the moft imperceptible manner in animalculo, or the feminal ftate of a man j only as a principle of vegetation in the ftate of an embryon j and as a fenfitive foul in the ftate of infancy, at leaft for fome time, in which we are rather below, than a- bovc, many other animals. By degrees indeed, vv'ith age and cxercife and pro- per opportunities, it fcems to open itfelf, find its own taknts, and ripen into a rational being. But then it reafons not without labor, and is forced to take ma- ny tedious fteps in the purfuit of tmth j finds all its powers flibjeft to great eclip- ' Nalura, inquh, h£c mihi prdjiat. Non intcUigh te, cum hoc dicis, mutttre nomen Deo ? 3nid en'tm al'tud eft Natura, qttam Deus, (^ divina ratio, &c. r Sen. When it is faid, Necejfe eftmundnm tffum natura adminiftrari, ap. Cic. what fenfe are thofe words capable of, if by nature he not really meant Cod t For it muft be fbmething different fi-om the world, and foraething able to go- vern it. *> Alii naturam cenfent ejfe tjim quandam fne ratio7ie, cientein motus in corporibus Mcejfarios, &c. fays Balius in Cic. What can this vis be : vii by itfelf, without the mention of any fubjedt, in which it inheres; or of any caufe, from whence it proceeds ? Afiul of the world, plaftic nature, hylarchic principle, h'yls V^U;, and the hke, are more intelligible than that. <■ yn ■131 T^in nriiM {n>i nsa tno. p. ai>. M 2. fes 88 The Religion of Nature. Se6l:. V. fes and diminutions, in the time of flcep, indifpofition, ficknefs, ^c. and at beft reaching but a few objecls in refpeft of all, that are in the immenfity of the univerfe ; and, lailly, is obnoxious to many painful fcnfations and reflexions. Had the foul of man the principle of its own exiftcncc and faculties 'within it- feJf^ clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all thefe limitations ^n^^de- feEts^ to all thefe alterations ^nd remcves (rom one ftate to another: it muft cer- tainly be conftant to itfelf, and pcrfift in an uniform munmr of being. There may be perhaps who will fay, that the foul, together with life, fenfe, ^c. are propagated by tradu5lion from parents to children, from them to their children again, and fo from eternity ^ : and that therefore nothing can be colleft- cd from the nature of them as to the exiftence of a Deity, ^nf. If there could be fuch a tradu6tion, yet to fuppofe one traduced to come from another traducec', and fo al> ieterHO, without any further account "of the original of mankind, or taking in any author of this traduftivc power, is the fime as to fuppofe an in- finite feries of moveds without a mover ^ or of effeBs without a caufe : the abfur- dity of which is fliewn already prop. I. But concerning this matter I cannot but think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by tradux animiS ought to be clearly explaind : for it is not eafy to conceive how thought, or thinking fubftances, can be propagated after the manner of branches^ or in any manner that can be analogous to it, or even warrant a metaphorical ufe of that phrafe ''. It fhould alfo be told, whether this traduftion be made from one or from both the parents. If from one, from ivhich of them is it ? And if from both, then the fame /r«(/»A' or branch muft always proceed from two ftocks: which is a thing, I prefumc, that can no where elfe be found, nor has any parallel in na- ture. And yet fuch a thing may much better be fuppofed of vines, or plants, than oi thinking beings, who are fimple and uncompounded fubftances ". * For I cannot think that any body will now ftand by that way of introducing men firfl into the world, which is mentiond by DioJorus Sic. but aflcrted by Lucretius. IToi qu^qiie loci regio tpportuna dabatur, Crefcebant utiri terra radicibus afti, &c. What by TertuUittn in one place is called anima ex Air,m truAux, in another is -velut furcidus c^aidam ex matrice Adam in frc- paginim dcducia, and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain liimfclf better, when he confe/Tes there to be duas (pedes feminis, corporalim ^ animalem fal. corporis femen e^ animi): or more fully femen animate ex animn. dilliUatione, ficiit (^ virus illud, corporate femen, ex carnis defdc.xtioiie- ' According to the fore-cited author the foul is derived from the fnther only, ©> genitn/ibus fdmi- nafoveis commendata: and all fouls from that of Ad.tm. Definimus animam, fays he, Dei flxtti na- tam, ex una redundantem : and in another place, ex una homine tota h&e animarHm redtmddntia agi- tur. But this dotJi not well confift with his principal argument for traduftion, that chi dren take after their parents. For befide what will here he faid by and by, if there is a traduftion of all men from one man, and traduftion caufts likcnefs ; then every man muft be like the firft, and (confe- quently) every other. This Truths relating to the Deity. 8p This opinion of the traduBion of fouls fecms to me to ftand upon an unfound foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on ihefe two things : the fimilltude there is between the features, humors, and abiHties of children and thofe of their parents ' j and the difficulty men find in forming the notion of a fpirit '°. For from hence they arc apt to conclude, that there can be no other fub (lance but matter : and that the foul refulting from fomc difpolition of the body, or fomepart of it, or being fomc merely material appendix to it, muft attend it, and come along with it from the parent or parents j and as there is a derivation of the one^ fo there mull be alio of the other at the fame time. Now the former of thefe is not always true ; as it ought to be, to make the argument valid. Nothing more common than to fee childi-en differ from their parents, in their undcrftandings, inclinations, fliapes, complexions, ^nd (I am fure) one from another. And this diffimilitude has as much force to prove there is not a traduftion, zsftmilitude^ whenever that happens, can have to prove there is. Befides, it feems to me not hard to account for fomc Hkenefs without the. help of traduction. It is vifible the meat and drink men take, the air they breath, the objefts they fee, the founds they hear, the company they keepjfiff. will create changes in them, fometimcs with rclpe6l to their intcllc6luals,fome- times to their paffions and humors, and fometimes to their health and other cir- cumllances of their bodies : and yet the original Jlamina and fundamental parts of the man remain ftill the fame. If then the femina^ out of which animals are produced, are (as I doubt not) animakula already formed "^ ; which being dif- tributcd about, efpecially in fome opportune places, are taken in with aliment, or perhaps the very air j being feparated in the bodies of the males by ftrainers proper to every kind, and then lodged in their feminal velTels, do there receive fome kind of addition and influence ; and being thence transferred into the wombs of the /fw/ij/w, are //ji(?rf nourifhd more plentifully, and grow, till they be- come too big to be longer confined '^ : I fay, if this be the cafe, why may not the • Unde, oro te, fays the Tame author, fimilitudine animi. quoque parmtlbus de ir.geniis refponde. mm-, fmon ex anim£fem'me educimur? Then to confirm this, he argues like a father indeed, thus; in illo ipfo voluf talis ultimo tftn quo genitale -virus expellitiir, nonne aliquid de anima, quoque fentimus exire ? 1 am afliamed to tranfcribe more. '' Therefore the faid father makes the foul to be corporeal. ' This might feem to be favord by them who hold, that all fouls were crea- ted in the beginning (an opinion mentiond in Nahh. ab. ^ al. often) , did not the fame authors de- rive the body nnnO nStSO : as may be feen in P. Abb. (^ pujf. Particularly R. D. ^inihhi Ciy&. of man, inai&i Dibntt^'u; -ly ayo bxv a^i/oi u~b ~jDnn iu;n yiin na^iCD ><-i23 lao- * This account deftroys that argument, upon which Cenforinus fays many of the old philofophers aficrted the eternity of the world : quod negent omnino pojfe reperiri, ave/ne mite, an ova generate fmt ip6 The Religion of Nature. Sed. V. the nutriment received from the parents, being prepared by their vefTels, and of the fame kind with that with which they themfclves are nourifhd, be the fame in great meafure to the animalcula and embrya that it is to them, and confcquent- ly very much aflimilate their young, without the derivation of any thing elfe from them? Many imprcfllons may be made upon the/^/«i, and many tinftures given to the fluids communicated to it from the parents ; and yet it, the animal itfelf., may not be originally begun in them, or traduced from them. This hypothefis (which has long been mine) fuggefts a reafon, why the child is fometimes more like the father^ fometimes the mother : viz. becaufe the veflels of the animalculum are difpofcd to receive a greater proportion of aliment fometimes from the one, fometimes from the other : or the fluids and fpirits in one may ferment and ope- rate more ftroHgly than in the other, and ib ha\'e a greater and more fignal eflPedt. (Here it ought to be obferved, that tho what the animalculum receives from the father, is in quantity little in refpecl of all that nutriment, v\^hich it receives by the mother} yet the former, being the firft accretion to the original /^w/«(Z, ad- hering immediately, and being early interwoven with them, may afFe6t it more.) Since there cannot be a proper tradu^ion of the child (one mind, and oneho- dy) from both the two parents, all the fimilitude it bears to one of them muft proceed from fome fuch caufe as I have afligned, or at leaft not from tradu&ion. For the child being fometimes like the father, and fometimes the mother, and the traduftion either always from the tather, or always from the mother, there muft fometimes be fimilitude, where there is no traduEiion : and then if the child may refcmble one of them without it, why not the other too ? The ac- count I have given, appears, many times at lead, to be true in plants, which raifed from the fame feed, but in diffetent beds and foil, will differ. The dif- ferent nutriment introduces fome diverfity into the feed or original plant, and aillmilates it in fome meafure to the reft raifed in the fame place. The other thing, which I take to be one of the principal fupports to this doc- trme o? tradu^ion (a fiippofition, that the foul is merely material, or but the rcfult of fome difpofition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter. But I may premife this here : tho we can have no image ofafpirit (becaufe no being can be portraid or reprefentcd by an image, but what is matcrialj, yet we may have reafon to afTert the cxiftcnce o? fuch a fubftancc ^ Mitter is a thing, which we converfe with, of which we know pretty well the nature, and pro- fmt ; chm o- ovum jine ave, 0> avis fmi ovo ^^gni non fojjit. This queftion was once much agitated ill the world, as may be feen by M^creiius and Plutarch i who calls it, tc aTro^cr >^ Kaii^a 7!fk-/fi,it\» ' TJ;is is as much as Epicitr»s lud to fay for his atoms : for they v/ere only TajMiTct hiya 3-iu- 4 perries j Truths relating to the Deity. 91 perties j and fince we cannot find among them any that are cogitative^ or fuch a thing as Ufe^ but feveral things inconfiftent with them, we are under a neceffity of confefling that there is fome othsr fpecies of fubftance befidc that which is corporeal, and that ouv fouls are of that kind (or rather of one of thofe kinds, which arc not merely corporeal : for there mull be more than one), tho wecan draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all furprifing, that wefhouldJ not be able to do this : for how can the mind be the objed: of itfelf = ? It may contemplate the body which it inhabits, may be confcious of its own afts, and reflcft upon the ideas it finds : but of its ownfubftance it can have no adequate notion, unlefs it could be as it were objeH and fpe^ator both. Only that per- fect Being, whofe knowledge is infinite, can thus intimately know himfelf. They, who found the traduBion of the foul upon this prefumption, that it is material^ and attends the body as fome part or affcftion of it, feem further to be moft wofully miftaken upon this account: bccaufe the body itfe If is not propa- gated by traduftion. It pafles indeed through the bodies of the parents, who af- ford a tranfitory habitation and fubfiftence to it : but it cannot he formed by the parents, or grow out of any part of them. For all the vital and ejjcntial parts of it muft be one coeval fyrtem, and formed at once in the firft article of thenafcenc aniiimlcultim ; fince no one of thefe could be nouriflod, or ever come to any things without the rert: on the contrary, if any one of them could prevent and be be- fore the rert, it would foon wither and- decay again for lack of nourifhmenc re- ceived by proper veflcls j as wc lee the limbs and organs of animals do, when the fupply due from the animal oeconomy is any way intercepted or obitructed. And fince an organized body, whicli requires to be x.\\\.k frmultaneoufly made (fa- fhiond as it were at one llrokej cannot be the effect of any natural and gradual proccfs, I cannot but conclude, that there were animakula of every tribe origi- nally fomied by the almighty Parent, to be the/f^fl' of all future generations of animals. Any other manner of produftion would be like that, which is ufual- ly called equivocal or fpontaneous generation, and with great reafon now gene- rally e>iploded. And it is certain, that the analogy of nature in other inflances, and microfcopical obfcrvations do abet what I have {-xvii flrongly. Lalfly, if there is no r^fe of men that hath been from eternity, there is no man who is notdcfcended from twofirflpannts : and then the fouls of thofe two firft parents could be traduced from ;w other. And that there is no fuch race fnonc that has been upon this earth from eternityj, is apparent from the face of earth- ly things, and the hiflory of mankind ">, arts, and fciences. What is objected . » Ob y> cl TM ^ta^nft^a TO ^ta^:Ti. Flat. ^ Si nulla fait genitalis origt Terrai (Sf caU—— Cur fufra Mlum Tkebmttm f^ ftinem Trc^A Nwalim alii c^uoque res ceciaere }oeu, Lucr. a^ainft 92 The Religion of Nature. Sed:. V. againft this argument from foncied inundations^ conflagrations, ^c. ' has no weight with me. Let us fuppofe fome fuch great calamity to happen now. It muft be either univerfal, or not. \iuniverfal, fo that no body at all could be faved, then ci- ther there muft never be any more men, or they muft begin again in {ome. firft pa' rents. \?it\vas only topical, afFedting fome one tra6l of the globe, or if the tops of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remaind unaft'e£led, or if there were any natural means left by which men might efcape, confiderable numbers muft certainly y«rwi-'f.- and then it cannot be imagined, that they ftiould all be ahfolutcly fo ignorant of every thing, that no one fhould be able to give an ac- count of fuch things as wtrt common y no one able to write, or read, or even to rccoUeft that there were fuch things as letters j nonc,that underftood any trade j none, that could tell what kind of habitations they had, how they ufed to be clothed, how their meat drcif, or even what their food was : not can it be thought, that rt// books, arms, manufaftures of every kind, fhips, buildings, and all the produft of human skill and induftry now extant in the world fhould befoaK/"- verfally and utterly abolifhd, that no part, no lefligium of them fhould remain j not fo much, as to give a hint toward the fpeedy reftoration of neceflary arts at leaft. The people efcaping muft fure have clothes on, and many neceflarics a- bout them, without which they could not efcape, nor outlive fuch a dreadful fcenc. Infhort, no conflagration, no flood, no deftruElionczn(ei-\ex.\\cob]&£t.ox$ purpofe, to reduce mankind to that ftate, which by ancient memoirs and many undeniable fymptoms we find them to have been in net many thoufands of years fince J I fiy, no deftru£lion can feive his purpofe, but fuch an one as makes thorough work, only fparing two or three couples, ftriptof every thing, and the moft ftupid and verieft blocks ^ to be picked out of the whole number : natural fools, or mere homines fylveflres would retain habits, and fall to their old way of liv- ing, as foon as they had the opportunity to do it. And fuppofe they never ftiould have fuch an opportunity ; yet neither would this ferve him eJfFe£baally : fince with- out CoTnefiipernaiural Power interpofing fuch a revolution could not be brought a- bout, nor the naked creatures prefcrved, nor the earth reformed out of its afhcs and ruins after fuch a calcination, or diflblution, fuch a total demolition of every thing. To this give mc leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes, vul- cano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries ; yet there is no memo- jy or teftimony of any fuch thing, that has ever been univerfal '^, except pcr- •rie^fdt >^ xscTcc 7roXt.ci ^B-cfisii yiy'o)iuu'iv kv^pcJTTC'iVi y^ io-cyrcii. Z'v^i f/, y^ vdUri y/iyt^ect, T'^tO> f" Ts; iiypa«.fo«TS« >^ a/^so-as, as P.Vi/o fpeaks. ' For what has been faid only in genera', and prcfumptively, to ferve a caufe, figni^es nothing : no more tlian ihat leftimony in Arnob'sur, where he feems to allow, thar there hare b^. univerfal conflagrations, ^iiamh, fays he, mundiis uncenftis in fiiiilUs (^ cineres diJfolHtits eft I Non ante rm I I haps Truths relating to the Deity. p^ haps of one deluge : and as to that, if the genius of the language in which the relation is deliverd, and the manner of writing hiftory in it were well under- ftood, fome labord and moliminous attempts to account for it might have been prevented. And befidethat, the £\me record, which tells the thing was, tells alfo how immediately God was concernd in it j that fome perfons aclually were laved > and that the people who then perifhd, as well as they who furvived, aU defcended from two fir fi parents : and if that authority be a fuflicient proof of one part of the relation, it muft be fo of the reft. We may conclude then, that the human foul with its feculties of cogitation, &c. depends upon a Superior being. And who can this be but the Supreme be- ing, or God? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that, XVI. Though His ejjence and manner of being is to us altogether incomprehenfi- hle^ yet z:e may fay with ajfurance.^ that He is free from all defeats : or One, from ivhom all defeats muft be removed. This propofition hath in efFedt been proved already '. However I will take the liberty to inlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are /»//■?, they cannot without a contradiftion comprehend what is infinite. And if they were inlarged to ever fo great a capacity, yet fo long as they retain their ge- neral nature, and continue to be of the fame kind, they would by that be only renderd able to apprehend more and more finite ideas > out of which, howfoever increafed or exalted, no pofitive idea of the. perfection of God can ever be form- ed. For a PerfeB being muft be infinite, and perfeftly One : and in fuch a nature there can be nothing finite, nor zny compofition of finites. How iTiould we comprehend the nature of the Supreme incorporeal being, or how He cxifts, when we comprehend not the nature of the moft inferior fpirits, nor have any conception even of matter itfclf divefted of its acci- dents ? How fhould we attain to an adequate knowledge of the Supreme au- thor of the world, when we are utterly incapable of knowing the extent of the world itfelf, and the numberlcfs undefcried regions, with their fevcnil ftates andcircumftances, containd in it, never to be frequented or vifited by ourphi- iofophyj nor can turn otir felves any way, but we are ftillaccofted with fomc- thmg above our underllanding ? If we cannot penetrate fo far into effeHs, as to difcover them and their nature throughly, it is not to be expected, that we fliould, that we can ever be admitted to fee through the myftcries of His nature, • Prop. V, VI. N who P4. The Religion of Nature. SecS. V. who is the Caufe, fo far above them all. The Divine perfection then, and man- ner of being muft be of a kind different from and above all that we can conceive. However, notwithflanding our own defects, we may pofiiively affirm there can be none in God : fince He is perfe^^ as we have feen, He cannot be defetlive or imperfeSl. This needs no further proof But what follows from it, I would have to be well undcrftood and rememberd : viz. that from Him muft be re- moved want of life and aHivity.^ ignorance^ impotence^ adfing inconfiflently 'with reafon and truth., and the like. Becaufe thefe are defecls ; defect of knowledge, power, (j'c. Thefe are defeats and blemilTies even in us. And tho his perfection is above all our ideas, and of a different kind from the perfections of men or any finite beings ; yet what would be a defe£t in then?, would be much more fuch in Him, and can by no means be afcribed to Him ^. Though we underftand not His manner of knowing things ; yet ignorance being uniform and the fame in every fubjeCt, we underjland what is meant by that word, and can literally and truly deny that to belong to Him. The like may be faid with refpeCt to His power, or manner ot operating, 8cc. And when we fpeak of the internal effential attributes of God politively, as that He is omnifcient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the intent is only to fay, that there is no objeCt of knowledge or power, which He does not know or cannot do. He exifts without beginning and end, &c. and thus we keep ftill within the limits allowd by the propofition '>. That is, we may fpeak thus without pr£- tending to comprehend His nature. And fo, XVII. We may confider God as operating in the production and government of the "world, and may draw conclufions from His works, as they are called, notwith- ftanding any thing which has been faid''. Becaufe this we can do without com- prehending the manner of His exiftence. Nay, the contemplation of His works leads us into aneceffity of owning, that there muft be an mcomprchen. fiblc Being at the head of them. Though I do not comprehend the mode, in which the world depends upon Hini sind He influences and difpofes things, becaufe this enters into His nature, and the one cannot be underftood without the other : yet if I fee things, which I know ciinnothe f elf- exijlent, and obferve plainly ^noeconomy and de/ig^i in the difpofition of them, I may conclude that there is fame Being, upon whom their cxiitence doth depend, and by whom they are modeld j may call .^his If that in Terence had been (not a queftion, as it is there, but) an affirmation. Ego homtmcio l/oc nonfacerem, what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the heathen deity ? •= Aiyoj^ i . H sViy. 8 Aiye/4"' P^O"'"- i '''^y'3'3 ^i^^** ^X'^T\'V "JIT {^N. Maim. Being I ts-i»- Truths relating to the Deity. 95 Being GOD, or the Author and Governor of the world, ijc. without con- tradiRing my felf or truth : as I hope it will appear from what has been faid, and is going to be faid in the next propofition. ^ XVIII. God^ who gives exijfe^ce to the ivoild, does alfo govern it by His pro- vidcnce. Concerning this grand queftion, Whether there is a. Divine providence^ or not ^ I ufe to think, for my /e!f, after the following manner. Fir/, The world may be faid to be governed fat leaft cannot be fiid to be iy.v?i^>,r(^^ or left to fluctuate fortuitouflyj, if there are /iZW5, by which natural caufes 'i.di, the feveral /'/'^«o;»^«(T in it fucceed regularly, and, in general, the conftitution of things is preferred : if there are rules obfenxd in the produftion oi herbs, trees, and the like- if the feveral kinds o^ animals are, in proportion to their feveral degrees and ftations in the animal kingdom, furniflid with fa- culties proper to direfl and determin their aftions ; and when they a6l accord- ing to them, they may be faid to follow the lazv of their nature : if they are placed and provided for fuitably to their refpeftive natures and wants % or ('which amounts to the fame thing^ if their natures are adapted to their cir- cumftances ^^ : if, lalUy, particular cafes relating to rational beings are taken care of in fuch a manner, as will at Lift agree beft with reafon. Secondly, If there are fuch laws and proviji on s, they can come originally from no other being, but from Him who is the Author of nature. For thofe laws, which refultfrom the natures of things, their properties, and the ufe of their faculties, and may be faid to be written upon the things themfelves, can be the laws of no other : nor can thofe things, whofe very being depends upon God, exift under any condition repugnant to His will ; and therefore can be fubjeft to no laws or difpofitions, which He would not have them be fubject to ; that is, which are not His. Befide, there is no other being capable of impofing laws, or any fcheme of government upon the world j becaufc there is no other, who is not himfelf /;^r/ of the world, and whofe own cxiilence doth not depend upon Him. Thirdly, By the providence of God I mean His governing the world by fuch laws, and making fuch provifions, as arc mentiond above. So that if there ^vcfuch, there is a Divine providence. • DOD 'i-'3 ny D^CN-i ■'npT, as the Jevis fpeak. >= I fW] not pretend here to meddle with particular cafes relating to in.tnim.ite or irrational beings ; fuch as are mentiond inMo.nebok. (a leafs falling from a tree, a fpider's catching a flie, ^c.) and which are there faid to be ~>TD5 mpD3 . Tho it is hard to feparate thefe many times from the cafes of rational beings ; as alfo to compre- hend vvliat ~\ro> .""npo, prfect accident, is. N i Laflly, pd The Religion of Nature. Sed. V. Laftly^ It is not impojjible^ that there fhould he fuch : on the contraiy, we have juflreafons to believe there are. It would be an abfurd afTcrrion to fay, that any thing is impojjible to a being whofe nature is infinitely above our comprc- henfion, if the terms do not imply a contradiSlion : but we may with confidence aflert, that it is impojfibk for any thing, whofe exijlence flows from fuch abeing, ever to grow fo far out of His reach, or be fo emancipated from under Him, that the manner of its exiftence fhould not be regulated and determind by Him. As to inanimate fubjiances^ we fee the cafe to be really juftas it was fiippofed before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their ftations, or pcrfevere to go the fame circuits over and over by a certain law. Little bodies or particles, of the fmie kind, obferve continually the fame rules of attrading, repelling, y c . When there are any feeming variations in nature, they proceed only from tlie different circumftances and combinations of things, afting all the while under their ancient laws. We are fo far acquainted with the laws of gravitation and motion, that we are able to calculate their effefts, and ferve our felves of them, fupplying upon many occafions the defect of power in our felves by mechani- cal powers, which never fail to anfwer according to the ejiablijhment. Briefly, we fee it fo far from being impojjibkiy that the inanimate world fhould be go- vernd by laws^ that all the parts of it are obnoxious to laws by them inviolable. As to •vegetables^ we fee alfo how they are determind by certain methods pre- fcribed them. Each fort is produced from its proper fecd> hath the fame tex- ture of fibres j is nourifhd by the fame kind of juices out of the earth, digefl:- cd and prepared by the fame kind of veflels, ^c. Trees receive annually their peculiar liveries, and bear their proper fruits : flowers are dreft, each fa- mily, in the fame colors, or diverfify their fafhions after a certain manner /ro- per to the kind, and breath the fame eflences : and both thefe and all other kinds obferve their feafons ; and feem to have their feveral profefiions and trades appointed them, by which they produce fuch food and manufactures fpardon the catachrefijy as mzyfatisfy the wants of animals. Being fo very neceflaiy, they, or at leall the moll: ufeful, grow eaftly : being fixt in the earth, infcn- fible, and not made for fociety, they are generally %«»&.'a« : being liable to a great confumption both of them and their feeds, they yield great quantities of thefe, in order to repair and multiply their race, ^c. So that here is evi- dently a regulation, by which the feveral orders are preferved, and the ends of them anfwerd according to their firfb e/lablifiment too. Then as to animals, there are laws, which mut. mutand. are common to them with inanimate beings and vegetables,or at leail: fuch as refemble =" their laws. The » P/wv in his chapter De eriiine mturA infatis, Sec. treats of trees in terms taken from animals. individuals Truths relating to the Deity. 97 individuals of the fcvcral kinds of thofe, as of thefe, have the fame (general) fhape and members, to be managed after the fame manner : have the fame veflels replenillid with the fame kinds of fluids, and furnillid with the fame glands for the fep-.Txationanddiftribution of fuch parts of them, as anfwer the /ij»2? inten- tions in them all : are ilimulated by the fame appetites and uneafinefTes to take in their food, continue their breed, ^c. And whatever it is, that proceeds thus in a manner lb like to that of vegetables, according to fx( methods, and keeps in the fame general track as they do, may be faid to obferve and be under fome iike rule or law., which either operates upon and limits itab exlra, or was given it with its nature. But there are, moreover, certain obligations rcfulting from the feveral degrees of reafon and fenfe, orlenfeonly, of which we cannot butbecon- fcious in our felves, and obferve fome faint indications in the kinds belows us, and which can be lookt upon as nothing lefs than laws, by which animals are to move and manage themfelves : that is, otherwife exprell:, by which the Author of their ns.z\ires governs them. 'Tis tme thefe laws may not impofe an abfolute necelTity, nor be of the fame rigor with thofe of inanimate and merely paffive beings, becaufe the beings which are fubjedlto thefe fmen at leaft) may be fuppofed infomemeafure free,and to aft upon fome kind of principles or motives : yet flill they may have the nature oflatvs, tho they may be broken ; and may make a part of that providence by which God adminifters the affairs of the world. Whatever adv;intages I obtain by my own free endeavours, and right ule of thofe faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effefts ofGod'sprovideiue and government, as if they were given me immediately by Him, without my acling j fince all my faculties and abilities ("whatever they are) depend upon Htm, and are as it were inftruments of His providence to me in relpeft of fuch things as may be procured by them =. To finilli this head : it is fo fir from being impojfible, that the feveral tribes of plants andanimalsfubfiiience ye/ out for them> and as they go off, (ncce.'Ioxs appointed to relieve them, and carry on the fcheme, Sec. that the pojjil/ility only ofa^rac;-<2/ providence lliould be allowd, is ceitainly /oo tnodeji a demand. We fee, or may fee, that ;V; fa5r there is fiich a providence ". The great difficulty is, how to account for that providence, which is called par- ticular ; or that, wliich refpects ^principally) particular men. For rational beings and free agents are capable of doing and deferving ivell., or ///. Some will make a right ufe of their faculties and opportunities, iome will not : the vicious may, or may not repent^ or repent and relapfe : fome fall into evil habits through inadver- tence, bad examples, and the like, rather than an)' defign : and tliefe want to be re- claimd: fome may be fuppofcd to worfliipGodandto crave His protection and bleffing, £5?4y-i>l h-y J>ilOD tit? n-pD mm SJ-riD. Whichfame j>hceRaJI,i expkinsafter the famemanner; ViNb ^y'>r\ £r\ £ 7r/'.2Cf>Tuv f^ /io^iicv ■/)'j;!i;TO is-(.T»iur«f i ~, varoV i 3 y£«f"/c5 >;Tti uiTci ^ xracpiu;, ii>iio». ^ Some have talked to this purpofe. So R. Alio 6ys ot fbme prophets and hhajidim, ^^ y3ton ^Yi}^■\i3 \Z^\^1';;^:L ,— I^nvi;i. So R. if. Ahuh. that the good or evil, which happens to a man in this world by way of reward or punifhment, .""i^inn ID IViirV inOJ D3 !>4ini DJH n^yyOD p-| HT J'K x=t?^v 'vw i-injn Ninu;. So Ahnrb. 'm inn:(\yn3 D''y3rcn ,'-^3W)^ Nin inbsjn nbo\i. And accordingly in Sed. teph. we find this thankfgiving : 130y ai> ho'X^ "i'D3 h'y-— 13n3S» D'llD. loo The Religion of Nature. Se6l. V. •way^ : nay, it is impojjible^ that He fhould not do it. We our felvcs, if we are fatisfied of the goodnefs of the materials of which a machine is made, and underftand the force and determination of thofe powers by which it is moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the effeft of it. And as to thofe things which depend upon the voluntary motions of free agents, it is well known, that men (by whom learn how to judge of the reft) can only be free with refpect to fuch things as are within thck Jphere ; not great, God knows : and their free- dom with refpect to thefe can only confift in a liberty either to net, without any incumbent neceflity, as their ow» rf^/cw and judgment fhall determin them j or to !2egk& their rational faculties, and not ule them at all, but fuffer themfelves to be carried away by the tendences and inclinations of the body, which left thus to itfelf acts in a manner mechanically. Now He, who knows what is in mens power, what not} knows the make of their bodies, and all the me chant fm and propenfions of them j knows the nature and extent of their underlkndings, and what will determin them this or that way j knows all the procefs of natu. ral for fecondj caufes, and confequently how thefe may work upon them '' : He, I fay, who knows all this, may know "what men will do, if He can but know this one thing more, -viz. whether they will ufe their rational ficultics or not. And fince even we our felves, mean and defective as we ai-e, can in fome meafure conceive, how fo much as this may be done, and feem to want but one ftep to finiflithe account, can we with anylhewof reafondeny to a Perfell being this one article more, or think that He cannot do that too ; efpecially if we call to mind, that this very power of ufing our own faculties is held of Him '^ ? Obfei-ve what a fagacity there isinfomewf«, not only in refpect of phyfi- cal caufes and effects, but alfo of the future actings of mankind j and how very eafie it is many times, if the perfons concernd, their characters, and cir- cumftances are given, to forefee what they will do : as alfo to foretel many general events, tho the intermediate tranfactions upon which they depend are not known ^. Confider how much more remarkable this penetration is in fome men, than in others : confider further, that if ihere be any minds more perfect than the human, (and who can-befo conceited of himfelf as to quefti- on this?) they muft have it in a ftill more eminent degree, proportiona- ble to the excellence of their natures : in the lall place, do but allow » U'hat Seneca fays of the Gods fin the heathen ftyle), may be faid of the true God. Nouefiillj oferlsfHtferies: omniumque illi rerum per munus funs itiirarum fdenlia in aferto femper el i nobis ex abdito fubit, 0'C. ^ O 'j'J i^aioB-Aas'i); -ttoi ij^-xrct ra iccvrS kxXSi; ^nfj^m^yniAiara. ih.fud, « lfj& nofln voluntMes in caufarum ordir.e funt, qui certus ejl Dee, ejufqt/e fnfcientia cominetur, Q'C. S. Auft. ^ Etfi quern exitum acies habitum ft, tlivinare nemo fotefi; tamen belli exitiim video, Cfc. and after, qucm ego tarn lideo animo, quam eft, qus oculis cernimus. Cic. Truths relating to tie Deity. lof (:i5 you muftj this power of difcerning to be in God prcportionabk to His nature, as in lower beings it is proportionable to //j«>j, and then it becomes /»/?«;■/? > and then again, the future actions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and cxpofed to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited t« things /a/? ox prejent or which come to pafs necejfarily. After all, what has been faid is only a feeble attempt to fliew, how far even lur can go toward a conception of the manner^ in which future things may be known : but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfect Being, His powers, and among them Y{\%po-wcr of knoiving^ muft infinitely pafs all our un- derftanding. It mull be fomething different from and mfinitely tranfcending all the modes of apprehending things, which we know any thing of ^ We know matters of fa£t by the help of our fenfes, the ftrength of memory ^ impreflions made upon/)/jtf «/)■, or the rf/)or^ of others (tho that indeed is compre- hended under fenfes. For that, which we know only by report, in proper fpcak- ing we only know the report of, or we have heard it) > and all thefe ways do fup- pofc thofe matters either to be prefent.) or once to haie been : but is it therefore mpoj/ibie, that there fhould be zny other ways of knowing? This is fo far from being true, that, fince God has no organs of fenfation, nor fuch mean faculties as the bell of ours are, and confequently cannot know things in the way which we know them in, if He doth not know them hy(omc other way. He cannot know them at ally even tho they were prefent : and therefore there mufi: be o- tber ways, or at leall another wzy of knowing even matters of fa6l. And fince the difficulty we find in determining, whether future matters of fa£t may be known, arifes chiefly from this, that we in reality confider, without minding it, whether they may be known in our ivay of knowing; it vanifhes, when wc recoiled:, that they are and mull be known to God by fome other way : and not only fo, but this mull be fome way, that is perfeft and worthy of Him. Future^ or what to us is future, may be as truly theobje£l of Divine knowledge, as /rfy?«/ is of ours ; nor can we'' tell, what xti^tct pajl^p-ejent^ to come, have to the Divine mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no fuch thing zsfound, to blind no fuch thing as light or color : nor, when theie things are defined and ex- plaind to them in the bell manner, which their circumftanccs admit, are they ca- pable of knowing ^ozy they are apprehended. So here, we cannot tell /jci-zt; future things are known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what founds or co- lors are, and how they aix perceived j but yet there may be a v/ay of knowing rhofey • unyn'' ^op nyn^ .-it ^^x. Maim, it differs not rti^^yrjn pro H-nu nai? uyoai'a-^a. // ? ^nari, quid queat ejje, ^itid nequeat : louk Lu(rctini's words more proper! v. O ' a^ f02 The Religion of Nature. Se(5l. V. as well as there is of perceiving thefe. As they want ^ fifth fenfe to perceive founds or colors, of which they have no notion : fo perhaps we may want ifixtb fcnfe, or fame faculty^ of which future events may be the proper objcfts. Nor have we any more reafon to deny, that there is in nature fuch a fenfe or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny, that there is fuch aienfeasthat of hearing er feeing. We can never conclude, that it is impojftbk for an infinitely perfc6t Being to know what a free agent will choofe to do, till we can comprehend all the powers of fuch a Being, and that is till we our felves are infinite and perfe<5t ». So far are we from being able to pronounce with anyfhew of reafon, that it isimpofftble there fliould be fuch knowledge in God. In the lall place, this knowledge is not only not ;>»/'o^Wf, but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfeftion doth nccefTarily infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if ignorance be an imperfedi- on, the ignorance of future a£ts and events muft be fo : and then if all imper- fedtions are to be denied of Him, this mufl. There is indeed a common prejudice againftthe prefcience{^% it is ufually call- ed) of God i which fuggefts, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows them infalUbly or certainly : and if fo, then they are certain ; and if certain, then they are no longer matter of freedom. And thus prcfcience and freedom are inconfiftent. But fare the nature of a thing is not changedhy being known, or known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is ; and therefore is not alterd by this. The truth is, God forefees, or rather fees the actions of free agents, becaufetheyif;// be; not that they will be, becaufc He fore/ees them *>. If I fee an object in a certain place, the veracity of my faculties fup- pofed, it is certain that objeft is there : but yet it cannot be faid, it is there becaufc I fee it there, or that my feeing it there is the caufco't its being there: but be- saufe it is there., therefore \fce it there. It is the objeft, that determins my fen- fation : and fo in the other cafe, it is a future f/;ow of the free agent, that deter- mins the prelcience, which yet may be infallibly true <^. Let us put thefe two contradiftory propofitions, B (ibme particular manj isjill go to church next Sunday., and B ii-ill not go to church next Sunday ; and let us fup- • To attempt fo comprehend the manner of Gods knowing is the fame as to endeavour nr-12\I? Kin iinjN. MHim. *■ lynao -ivusNn nmn t^i^^r t^i? n>n>xi;nD3 inyn\ Maim. Much might be inferted upon this fubjeft (out of Abarb. particularly) which I (hall omit. '= Sicut tnim tu memoria tui noncvgi! fttaa ejfe rj«« interiirmt ; fit Dens pr^centid Ja^ ncn cogit facierM jjwis fiiturn fitnt. £. Auft. . Truths relating to the Deity. 103 pofewithall, that B is/f-^if, and that his going or not going depends merely upon liis o-jun will. In this cafe he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but one of thefe two things, either ^o, or not go i and one he muftdo. One of thcfe pro- pofitions therefore is now true > but yet it is not the truth of that propofition, which forces him /o do what is containdin it: on the contrary, the truth of the propolition arifes from what he ftiall choofe to do. AnA if that truth doth not force him, the foreknowledge of that truth will not. We may fure fuppofe B hmifelf to know eertaitsly before hand, which of the two he will choole to do, whether to go to church or not (I mean fo far as it depends upon his choice on- ly^ : and if fo, then hci-e is B's own foreknowledge confiftent with his freedom : and if we can but, further, fuppofe God to know as much in this refped as B does, there will be God's foreknowledge confiftent with Ws freedom. In a word, it involves no contradiSlion to afTert, that God certainly knows what any man will choofe j and therefore that he lliould do this cannot be faid to be impejjible. t. It is not impoffibk, that fuch /«wj of nature, and fuch a y^rw of caufes and cffedts may be originally defignd, that not only general provifions may be made for the fcveral fpecies of beings, but even particular cafes, at Icail many of them, may alio be provided for without innovations or alterations in tlie courfe of na- ture '. It is true this amounts to a prodigious fchcmc, in which all things to come are as it were comprehended under one view, eftimated, and laid together : but when I confider, what a mafs of wonders the univerfc is in other regards j what a Being God is, incomprchenfibly great and perfeft } that He cannot be igno- rant of any thing, no not of the future wants and deportments of particular men i and that all things, which derive from Him as the Firft caufe, mull do this fo as to be confiftent one with another, and in fuch a manner, as to make one compact fy- rtcm, befitsing fo great an Author : I fay, when I confider this, I cannot deny fuch an adjufment of things to be within His power ^. The order of events, pro- ceeding from the fettlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and rea- fonable fuccefs of my endeavours and prayers (as inconfiderable a part of the world asl amOj ^s with ^nj other xhingor phanomenon how great foever. * Things come to pafs '^ xara (fivtriM^ ay-nXn^ln^ & xxtx /iyo.- and even rd TfjjixfliTt^a. i'uciwri- ityjia-i <£ inMv(pu>^xi icy.i[^ii<. Plot. That in Senica looks fomething like this ; Hoe dico, fulm'mK 7ion mini » Jo-vt,fed fie cmnm diffofita, ut ea etiam, qui ab illo non futnt, tummfint rnmne non ^ant: qu* illius eft. N^m etfi Jufiter illn nunc mn facit, fecit utfier^it. ^ Thisfcem."; to be what Eufebius means, when he fays, that Divine providence does (among other things) riX; c«To? vvf/j^UiDsri r'tfi h\i~t sfj/a^er, in flAlo'f. words. O 2 Perhaps 1 04. The ReligiOxV of Nature. Sed. V. Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppofe M (fome man) certainly to foreknow fome way or other that, when he ihould come to be upon his death-bed, L would petition {ov{ome particular legacy > in a manner fo earneft and humble, and with fuch a good difpofition, as would render it pro- per to grant his requell : and upon this M makes his laji will, by which he devifes to L that which was to be asked, and then locks up the will; and all this many years before the death of M, and whilft L had yet no expectation or thought of any fuch thing. When the time comes, the petition is mndc, znd granted; not by making any new will, but by the oU one already made, and without altera- tion : which legacy had, notwithllanding that, never been left had the petition never been preferred. The grant may be called an cfFe6b of a future a6t, and depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the aft. So if it had been forefeen, that L would not fo much as ask, and had therefore been left out of the will j this preterition would have been caufed by his carriage, tho much later than the date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted, if M be allowd to foreknow the cafe ^ And thus the prayers, which good men offer to the All-knowing God, and the negle^s of others, may find fitting effefts already forecafted in the courfe of nature. Which poffibility may be extended to the labors of men, and their behaviour in general. It is obvious to evciy one's obfervation, that in fact particular men are very com- monly (at Icaft in fome meafurcj rewarded or punifhd by the ^ewr^/ laws and me- thods of nature. The natural ftho not conllant) attendents and confcquenccs of virtue are peace, health, and felicity > of vice, lofs of philofophical pleafures, a difeafcd body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be virtuous and happy, C vi- tious and at lall ni'ferable, laboring under a late and fruitlefs remorfe ; tho this comes to pafs through the natural tendence of things, yet thefe two cafes, being (uppofed fuch as require, the one that B fhould be tavord, the other that C Ihould fuffcr fc-r his wickednefs, are as effectually provided for, as if God ex- erted his power in ibme peculiar way on this occafion. 3. It is not impoffible, that men, whole natures and actions are foreknown, may be introduced into the world \v\{\ichtimes^laces, and other circumflance$,-&s,thzt their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with thegeneral plan of things, but alio anfwer many /iri%»;/?«•»?, without having their natural powers of attraftion (or the force of that which is equivalent to attra£bion_j or any of the laws of motion re- ftraiad or alterd. On the contraiy, being rightly placed, they by the obfei-vation of thefe become fubfei-vient to the main defign. Now why may there not be in the Divine mind fomething like a projcclion of the future hljlory of mankind, as well as of the order and motions and various afpects of the greater bodies of the world ? And then why fhould it not be thought pojjibk Gormen, as well as for them, by fome fecret law, tho of another kind, or rather by the prefi- dence and guidance of an unfeen governing power, to be brought into theii' places in fuch a manner as that by xhe free ufe of their faculties, the conjunctions and oppofitions of their interefts and inclinations, the natural influence and w^eight of their feveral magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, i^c. they may confpire to make out the fcheme ? And then again, {met generals confift of par- ticulars, and in this fcheme are comprehended the aftions and cafes o? particular men, they cannot be fo fituated refpeftively among the reft of their fpeciesasto be ferviceable to the principal intention, and fill properly into the general dia- gram of affairs, unlefs they and their feveral aftings and cafes do in the main cor- refpond one to another, and fit among themfelvcs, or at Icaft ai-e not inconfiflent. Here is no implication of any contradiSlion or abfurdity in all this : and therefore it may at leaft be {\ix\y fuppofed. And iffo, it will follow, that -x particular proiiidence may be compatible with the na.t\ira.\ freedom of mens adtions. Such a fuppofition is certainly not beyond the power of an almighty, perfeEl Being ; it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon thofe words, and take their import, muft believe. The ancients I am peifuaded had fome fuch thoughts as thefe. For they were generally /-a/^/i/?/, and yet do not feem to have thought, that they were 7i!)t majlers of their own a&ions^ 4. It is not impojfible (for this is all that I contend for herej, that many things, . fuitable to feveral cafes, may be brought to pafs by means o{ fecret and fome- i\mt% fudden influences on onxmindis^, or the minds of other men, whofe afe may. affeft us. For inftance ; if the cafe fhould require, that N iliould be dc • • Tlato and the Stoics, ap.Flm. make fate to be (rvii^Xcxry Linuv tith'/i^mj, tV v's-biatAoxv >i r'- s«f' visas' a!,-f T-i fSf) iif/>(»fB-cci, ra 3 i>ii«,Kf9-«i. '' The Heathen were of this opinion: other- wife Homer could have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he doth. tS iiwx.Zz^ii 'A^m' 'A».u ti; u^aviiTm r^i^i (^eitxi- and the like often. P!:ititrch exphias theft paflages thus. Ovx iwijSjra ttshT ['O.iAJif©'] t .9-£o». «»« x.i»£vt« tjiv s-«a/«sir.!- a4' ofi**? ff- "/aO/^ov, uXfM that we fo frequently find thoughts a- riiing in our heads, into which we arc led by no difcourfe, nothing we read, no clue of reafoning ; but they furprife and come upon us from we know not what quarter ''. If they proceeded from the mobility offpirits, ftraggling out of or- der, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were of the nature of ^r^^wj-, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are ? Not to add, that the world has generally acknowledged, and therefore feems to have experien- ced fome alHltance and dirc£tions given to good men by the Deity j that men have been many times infatuated, and loll to themfelves, ^c. If any one fhould objeft, that if men are thus over-ruled in their aftings, then they are deprived oiihck liberty^ &c. the anfwer is, thattho man is a free agent, he may not be free as to every thing. His freedom may be reftraind, and he only ac- countable for thofc afts, in refpedl of which he is free. If this then be the cafe, as it feems to be, that men's minds are fufceptive of fuch infinuations and impreffions., as frequentlv by ways unknown do affect them, and give them an inclination toward this or that, how many things may be brought to pafs by theie means without fixing and rejixing the laws of natm-e: any more than they are unfixt, when one man alters the opinion of another by throwing a book, proper for that purpofe, in his way ? I fliy, how many things may be brought about thus , not only in regard of our fe/ves, but other people^ who may be concerned in our actions, either immediately "=, or in time through perhaps many intermediate events ? For the profperity or improfperity of a man, or his fate here, docs not intirely depend upon his own prudence or imprudence, but m great meafiire upon his Jituation among the re it of mankind, and Avhat they do. The natural effcft of his management meeting with fuch things, as are the natural effcfts of the actions of other men, and being blended with them, the refult may be ibmcthing not intended or foreleen. f. There pojjibly may be, and molt probably are beings invi/ible, and fupe- rior in nature to us, who may by other means be in many refpefls rninijlers of ' When Hamil/tii was in fight of Rcme, mn aufus efl obfiden. S. Hitr. Sed rcligione quxdam gbfi'mHtt, qiioJ dictrit, capiendo urtis modo nm dart xoluntatem, modo non dari fucultuKtn, ut teflatur ^ Ovofius. Schol. *> Xo» enim cuiquam in foie(late eft quid ■veniat in mentem. S. Auft. t Thsy who cill'i Smomidei out from Scepai and his company, as if it wei c to fpmk with him, iived his ]:tb.- The Hory known, God's jo8 The Religion of Nature. Sed.V. God's providence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men, without altering the laws of nature. For it implies no contradiclion or abfunli- ty to fay there are fuch beings : on the contraiy we ha\'e the greateft reafon to think what has been intimated already j that fuch imperfed beings, as we are, are far below the top of the fcale. Tho pictures of fpiritual beings cannot be drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal ; yet to the upper and reafoning pait of the mind the idea o£ fpiritual fubftance may perhaps be as clear, as that of corporeity ^ For what penetrability is, muft be known juil as well as what^a?- penetrability is : and fo on. Andfnice it has been proved (p-jj, 78), that all corporeal motions proceed originally from Something incorporeal^ it mufl; be ascertain, that there are incor- poreal fub fiances, as that there is motion. Befide, how can we tell but that there maybe above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capa- ble of mighty things, which yet may have corporeal vehicles as we have, butjf. tier and invifibk ? Nay, who knows but that there may be even of thefe many orders.^ riling in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above ano- ther ? It is no way below xhc philofophy of thefe times, which feems to delight in inlargingthe capacities of matter, to aflert tho. pojjibility of this. But how- ever, my own defects fufficiently convince me, that I have no pretcnfion to be one of the firft nmk, or that which is next under the All-perfect. Now then, as ive cur felvei by theufe of our powers do many times interpofe and alter the courfe of things within our fphere from what it would be, if they were left intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being faidto alter t\\ok laws; fo may thefe fuperior beings likewife in refpect of things with- in their fpheres, much larger be fure, the leaft of them all, than ours is : only with this difference, that as their knowledge is more extenfive, their intellects purer, their reafon better, they may be much properer inftruments of Divine providence with refpect to ax, than we can be with refpect one to another^ or to. the ariimalshclow us. I cannot think indeed, that the power of thefe beings is fo large, as to alter or (ufipend the general la-ws of the world; or that the world is like a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be oft fet backward or forward by them ; or that they can at pleafure change tlieir condition to ape us,or inferior beings j and confequently amnotapthalHly to credit ftories of portents, Sccfuch as cannot be true,unlefs the natures of things and their manner of being be » Thr;/, who believe thae is nothing but what they can liandle or fee (11 iam «»o eiifSfia uvea S B i> sCtay^ os!^?'? Toti ^tmn A«c££^ 7^0,9 3 to xo^arct six iin^tzi/O/jet in; ci siri«« ^if^O ^6 ^ JPl/Jto reckond to be void of ail philofophy, kujiitiroi, imM^el, atnTuan, vma i-j aujisiroi. quite Truths relating to the Deity. 1 09 quite renverfed : yet (I will repeat it again) as men may be fo placed as to become, even by the free exercife of their own powers, injiruments of God's particular providence to other men (or animalsj ; fo may we well fuppofe, that thefe higher beings may be fo^//?r/^«/^i through the univerfc, and fubje£t to fuch an ceco- nomv(tho I pretend not to tell what that is),as may render them alfo inftrumcnts of the lame providence > and that they may, in proportion to their greater abi^ lities, be capable, conftftently ivitb the laivs of nature, fome way or other, tho not in our way, of influencing human afFliirs in proper places. La/lly, what I have ventured to lay before you I would not have to be foun- derrtood, as if I peremptorily ajjerted things to be juft in this manner, or pre- tended to impofevny thoughts upon any body elfe: my defignis only tofhew* how I endeavour to help my own narrow conceptions. There muft be other ivays above my undcrftandmg % by which fuch a Being as God is may take care of private cafes without interrupting the order of the univerfe, or putting any of the parts of it out of their channels. We may be fure He regards every thing as being what it is ; and that therefore His laws muft be accommodated to the true genius's and capacities of thofe things, which are affefted by them. The. purely material part of the world is governd by fuch, as are fuited to the ftate of a being, which is infenfible, pajjive only, and every where and always the fame : and thefe feem to be fimple and few, and to carry natural agents into one conftant road. But intelligent a5live, frceheings muft be under a govern- ment of another form. They muft, truth requiring it, be confiderd as beingst who may behave themfelves as they ought, or not ; as beings fufceptive of plea- fure and pain ; as beings, who not only owe to God all that they are or have, but are ('or may bej fenfibleof this, and to whom therefore it muft be naiuralu^on many occaftons to fupplicate Him for mercy, defence, direction, affiftancej laftly, as beings, whofe cafes admit great variety : and therefore that influence, by which He is prefent to them, muft be different from that, by which gravitation and common phenomena are produced in matter. This fecms to be as it were a pub- lic influence, the other private, anfwering private cafes, and prayers i this to o- perate directly upon the body, the other more efpecially upon the mind, and up- on the body by it, i^c. But I forbear, left I lliould go too for out of my depth : on- ly adding in general, that God cannot put things fo far out of His own pow- er, as that He ftiould not for ever govern tranficlions and events in His own world 5 nor can/fz/ff? knowledge and power ever want /'/■o/'cr means to atchieve » 'Oa;^ 5/*«»5 «»%ws®- «/zd' £rj',. ? 0s;?. Th.JitJ. P what no The Religion of Nature. Sed:. V. what is fit to be done. So that, tho what I have advanced ihould ftand for nothing, there may K\\\ht■^ particular providence ■aot\v\t\\^z\-\6.mgx\\& foremcn- tiond difficulty. And then, if there w^j- ^f one, it will unavoidably follow, that there is one: becaufe in the dcfoription of providence, p. pf, nothing is fuppo- fed with refped to particular cajes^ but that they fliould be provided for in fuch a manner as will at laft agree befi -ivith reafon ; and to allow, that this may be done, and yet fay, that it is not done, implies a blafphemy that creates horror i it is to charge the Perfetl being with one of the greateft imperfe5lions^ and to make Him not fo much as a reafonable being. I conclude then, that it is as certain, that there is a particular providence^ as that God is a Being of perfe^l reafon. For if men are treated according to reafon, thev m.ull: be treated according to what they are : the virtuous, the jull, the com- pafiionate, ^c. as fuch, and the vitious, unjuft, cruel, ^c. according to •what they are : and their feveral cafes muft be taken and confiderd as they are : which cannot be done withouty«c^ a providence. Againft all this it has been, as one might well expe£t, objeBed of old, that things do not feem to be dealt according to reafon, virtuous and good men very oft laboring under adverfity, pains, perfecutions, whilft vitious,wicked, cruel men prevail and flourifh ^ But to this an anf-wer ("in which I fhall a little further ex- plain my felf ) is ready. It might be taken out of that, which has been given to the Manichean objeftion under prop. VII. But I Ihall here give one more direft : and let that and this be mutually ailifting and fupplements each to the other. I. We are not always certain, who arc good, who 'u;ickcd'°. Ifwetruil to feme and reports, thefe may proceed, on the one hand, from partid friendlliip, or flattery i on the other, from ill-natured furmifes and conftruftions of things, envy, or malice ; and on either, from fmall matters aggrandized, from mif- take, or from the unskilful relation even of truth itfelf. Oppofite parties make a merit of blackening their adverfaries % and brightening their friends, » Sicurent [Dijl homines, bene bonis fit, mule msths: quod nunc abeji. Ap.Cic. Thtjett^s, who call this cafe lb Hal yWT lb yil p''"!-', have written many things about it, to te leen in their books: Mo.ntbok. S. Iqquar. Men. htimma. Nahh. ab.&c. So have the Heathen philofophers too i Seneca, Plutarch, Plotinus, Simplicius, al. But the anfwcrs of neither are always juft. God forbid that fl.ouM te thought true, which is afferted by Glauco, Ap. Plat, that the juft, if they had Cyges's ring, woulddo as the unjuft, and sri iS'di Ua> .. Or that in S. Hhapd. znd Men. hamma. V'-i^'^ X^ p^""-^ ''^ i'"^^ P^""^- '^^^ reafon afl'igned for this cafe in another place is fomething better : P''"!^ H'H iib nmiOH H'H N? tZJN nON' vb^ >1D. But the way of falving it in Nijiim. hhgiy. by niQVL';n hy>b:>, or what the Cabhalifts call ~>12'y, is worft of all. " CaUit O'lt.iphcus, jiiftilfimus unus Shii fuh in Tcucrii, ^ fervmtijjimus tqui. Dis aliter vi/um. Vijg. ' Virtutes ipfiis imsrtimHS. Hor. undcfervediy Truths relating to the D dty, 1 1 r nndefervedly and unmeafurahly : and to idle companions and goflips it is diverfi- on, and what makes the principal part of their converfation % to rchearfe the charadlers of men, dreft up out of their own dreams and inventions. Axvi. befide all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great meafure upon mean people, who carry their ftories from fiimily to fimily, and propagate them very faft: like little infers, which lay apace, and the lefs xh&fafter. There are few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to repre- fent things truly ^. Befide the matters of faft themfelves there are many cir- cumjlances which, before fcntence is palTed, ought to be known and weighed, and yet fcarce ever can be known, but to the peifon himfelf who is concernd. He may have other views, and another fenfeof things, than his judges have: and what he underftands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a y^^r^? confined to his own brefl. A man may through bodily indifpofitions and faults in his conftitution, which it is not in his power to correct", be fubjefb to Jl arts and inadvertencies^ or obnoxious to yJ;:.9-fi«. Greg. Kaz. t> Theretore, with Socrates in Plato, we ought not mucli to care what the multitude [ii 77oXs<,'] fay of us, a»' i', n i i;7x,iut Wy T hy-uim, i' kd\^ii Neq; mala -vel bona, qu£ vulgus ftitat : multi, qui confiiclan tiiherfs videntur, beati ; ac pleriqi quanquam magnas per opes, mi/erri/ni, (^c. Tacit. '■' Feli- ■ dorem tu Mec£natem pittas, cut amoribus anxio, ^ morojd uxorh quotiJinna ripmlin dcfienti, fomnus fir fymphonlaritm eantum, ex longinquo bene refonarnium, qmr'ttur ? Mero fe licet fopiat, ; tarn ■vigilabit in plumd, qiiamille [Regitlus^ in cruce. lU diibium [r.on~\ fit , aneleciione fati dMa,p!ures Heguli najci, quam Meanates velint. Sen. Ijli, qiios pro felicibus afpicitis, fi non qua occurrunt , [ed qua latent, viderilis, miferi funt.ld. '' .Archimedes, having found the way of folvinga problem (examinandi, an corona aurea prorfus ejfet), ran in an ecftafy out of the bath, crying Ku^kku : but who tvt: heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the injoyment of a woman, ran cut thus, cry- ing Bi/Sfft'x;^, or nf(fii'/i)K«? Hut., injpy.- Truths relating to the Deity. 1 1 2 fnjoyments and all his fufFcrings ". Many misfortunes are compcnfated ^ by fomelarger indowments, or cxtraordinaiy felicities in other refpecls. But fup- pofe the pleafures of Ibme, and thefufferings of ibme others, to be juft as they appear: '^'xWwtkno-^ not ihtconfequcnccs of them*^. The pleafures of thofe men may leadtomiferies greater than thofe of the latter, and be in reality the greater misfortune : and, again, the fufferings of thefe may be preludes to fuccecding advantages ''. So that indeed we know not how to name thefe outward appea- rances of particular men, nor which to call /xT/>/)/«(?/f, which, the contrary, un- lefs we knew the inward fenfe of the perfons themfelvcs, all their true circum- ftanccs, and what will be hereafter confequent upon their prefcnt fuccefs or adverfity. 3. Men ought to be confiderd as members of families, nations, man. kind, the univerfe, from which they cannot be feparated : and then from the very condition of their being it will appear, that there muft be great inequali- ties ^ } that the innocent cannot but be fometimes involved in general calamities or punilTiments, nor the guilty but fhare in public profperities ^ > and that thegood oi the ■whole fociety or kind is to be regarded preferably to the prefent pleafureof any individual^ if they happen to clailr s. Laftly, if the virtuous man has under- gone more in this life, than it would be rtafonablehellrouldfufflr, if there was mother; yet thofe fufRrings may not be unreafonable, 1? there is another. For they may be made up to him byfuch injoyments, as it would be reafonable.for him to prefer, even with thofe previous mortifications, before the pleafures of this life with the lofs of them. And moreover, fometimes the only way to the felicities of a better Hate may lie through dark and difficult pafles, difci- pline to fome men being neceflary, to bring them to reflefV, and to force them into fuch methods as may produce in them proper improvements ; fuch as otherwife and of themfelves they would never have fain into. On the o- ther fide, if vitious and wicked men do profper and make a figure j yet it is poifible their fufFerings hereafter may be fuch, as that the excefs of • • Ftitis contraria fata repndem. Virg. See whatP% writes of Agrippa, the other great favorite and minifter of Augujlus, whom he reckons to he the only inftance of felicity among them who were called Agrippx. U quoq; adverfa pedum laletttdine, mifera juvmta, exercito £vo inter armn mortefc^ue, — hifelici terrb ftirpe omni—prdterea brezitate £'u},~m tormenth adulteriorum cmjugis, foceriqi pragravt fervitio, luijfe atigurium prxpofterinatalhexijiimattir. ^ '0«;>i/<,«„ y\; i^fp^-j .:vTWi,, 4'i'»Ti S if ^a«7«T<, for how can he be negleded of God, who (ludies according to his poor abilities to be like Him ? Tlatih. « Who blames a drama, becaufe all the perfons arc not heroes ? Flot. ^ f nn nnN (1T3 Ql^iyn. Abarb. 8c pajf. ^ M..®^ /^,; ;;«« iAw them. 114 The Religion of Nature.' Se6t. V. them above their pad injoyments maybe equa] totheyay? mulcl of their villanies and wickednefs. And further, their worldly pleafures ('which muft be fuppofed to befuch as are not philofophical, or moderated and governed byreafon and ha- bits of virtue^ being apt to fill the mind, and ingrofs the whole man, and by that means to exclude almoft all right reflexions, with the proper applications of them, may be the veiy caulcs of their ruin j whilft they leave them under fuch defedts at the end of their day s.^ as we fliall fee afterward tend to unhappinefs. If what is obje£ted be in many inflanccs true, this only infers \\\c.mcej]iiy of a future ftate : that is, if good and bad men are not relpe£tively treated ac- cording to reafon in thh life, they may yet be fo treated, if this and another to follow be taken together into the account =. And perhaps it is (as I have been always apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future rtate, that inftances of that kind have been fo numerous. For he mufl not only be guilty of blafphemy, but reduced to the greateft abfurdity, who, rather than he will own there is fuch a ftate, is forced to make God an unreafonabk Be- ing '' : which I think amounts to a firong demonftration, that there is one. But of that more hereafter. XIX. If we would lie have ourfelves as being ivhafwe cannot hut he fenfible -we ate, towards GOD as being ivbat He is according to the foregoir,g propofitions ; or, if we would endeavour to behave our felves towards him according to truth, wz mufi ebferve thefe following and the like particulars. 1 . We mufl not -pretend to reprcfent Him by any pi&ure cr image whatfoevcr <=. Becaufe this is flatly to deny his incorporeity, incomprehenfible nature, (^c ^. z. PFe ought to be fo far from doing this, that even the language we ufe, when. we /peak of Him, and efpecially of His pofitive nature and effential properties, ought not only to be chofen ivith the utmofl care, hut alfo to be underflood in the fubli- mefi fenfe : and the fame is true with tyfpeEl to our thoughts, mut. mutand «. Or thus : • Divine providence and immortality of the foul niuft ftmd and fall together. Qu-nfoi i*. 'Uu ^ '^>.t-7:uii ktsUfZii u. duti^cv. Tlut . ^ Tsro lavrct hi re jjuy, 'cucB-xi hvxi ©=«• r, Ivra fx,'r, r:fc»oiir v Tfo>ohT» f*n iyaS-M hvui $ ^Uu,m. Hierocl. ' Sure no body ever did in reality pretend to do this. According to Diog. L. the Egyftiam fet up uyaXfj:,a-a. in their temples rui fi,r, s'lAwf t'?h 5' ©<5 |*o^- 4ii,'v : for that very reafon, becaufe they did not know his iTiape ; or, how to repreicnt Him. Their images fcem to have been fynibols or hieroglyphics, cxprefling fomething of their fenfe or opinioi concerning Him. FoT,as iIiii!?3onitles obfcrvc?, no man ever did or ever will worfhip an idol, made of metal, ftone, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth '' Ncn eji Juiium, quin religio nulla fit, ubicunqi fimulxchrum ejl. La6l. ' iis ^ f^Y" (ra/i«T®- to (ra«,»T(x2{ n lir»- we Truths relating to the Deity. \ 1 5 we muft endeavour to think mdfpeak of Him in the moft reverent terms and molt proper manner we are able ' ; keeping withal this general conclufion, and as it were habitual reflexion in our minds, that, tho we do the beit we can. He is ftill fomething ahve all cur conceptions; and defiring, that our faint cx- preflions may be taken as aiming at a higher and more pioportionable meaning. To do otherwife implies not only, that H's mode of exiftence and cfTential at- tributes arecomprehenfiblc by us, but alfo (which is morej tliat our words and phrafes, taken from among our felves •> and theobjefts of our faculties, are ad- equate expreflions of them : contrary to truth. To explain myfelfby a few inlfances. When we afcribe wzer^j to God, or im- plore His mercy, it muft not be underftood to be mercy like that, which is called compajjion in us. For tho this be a very diiHnguilliing affeftion in human nature "^j to which we are made fubjeft for good realbns, the conftitution of the world and circumitances of om- prefent ftate making it necellary for us to compajfio- »a/? each the fufFerings of another J yet it is accompanied with, utte a fine fs, and muft therefore not be afcribed ftriftly to God in thaty^wy?, in which it is ufed when afcribed to our felyes. It perhaps may not be amifs to call it Divine mer- cy, or the like ; to diftinguifh it; and to fitew, that we mean fomething, which, tho in our low way of fpeakingand hyivay of analogy we call it by the fame name, is yet in the perfect nature of God very different. Or we may confider it in general as the manner, in which God refpells poor fuppliants and proper objcfts for their good. For certainly the refpcSl or relation, which lies between God, confiderd as a.n unchangeable Being, and one that is humble and iupplicates and endeavours to qualify himfelf for mercy, cannot be the fame with that, which lies between the fame unchangeable God and one that is obftinate, and will not lupplicate, or endeavour to qualify himfelf^;' that is, the fame thing, or Being, cannot refpe6t oppofite and contradiStory characters in the lame man- ner5 hira who does behave himfelf as before,' and him who does not. Therefore whenweapply tothemercy of God, and beg of him to pity our infirmities and wants, thedelign is not to move His affeSlions, as good fpeakcrs move their audi- tors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs by importunities and tearsi but to exprefs our own fenfe of our felves and circumitances in fuch a manner? as may rciderus more capable oi the emanations of Divine goodnefs, and// « GfojTfsTS^ «5r«fTa,v«svr(«. S.Cbryf. •> We ufe them (ind fpcak, as thcjfcws everywhere inculcate, Cni* 133 P^l73) only a-o^U om'm-, Tr^oa-n'/o^^'xi- ra my.oira^ii^' y.fMi U'/y-Tn^-M- »a tiy-iaipifcvm. Vlot . ' MolUJfima conl.% Humano generi dare fe natura fiitctur, ^m la- chrymas dedit, hxc nojiri pars optima fenfiis. fefarat hocnos k gregemxitOTum, (°nc. Juv. ^ T lie rath of G to M f qis different from that of G to M— q : and yet G remains unalterd, I io J 1 6 The Religion of Nature^ Sedl. V. to receive fuch inftances of His beneficence, as to us may feem to be the effcfts of compajjion^ tho they proceed not from any aheration in the Deity. For it may be, and no doubt is agreeable to perfed reafon always and without alteration, that he^ who labors under a fenfe of his own dcfefts, honeftly ufes his beft endeavours to mend what is amifs, and (^imong other thingsj flies for relief to Him, upon whom his being and all that he has do depend, fliould have many things granted him, which are not given to the carclefs, obdurate, unasking " part of mankind ; tho his expreilions and manner of addrels, with all his care, are Hill inadequate, and below the Divine nature. In fhorr, bv our applications we cannot pretend to produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in ourfelves we may al- ter the relation or reipecl lying between him and us. As God is a pure, uncompounded Being, His attributes of mercy, juflice, 8cc. cannot be as we conceive them : bccaufe in him they are one. Perhaps they may more properly be called together Divine reafon : which, as it exerts itfelf upon this or that occafion, is by us varioujly denominated. Here it mull not be forgot, that metcy or mercies are many times taken for ad- vantages or benefits injoyd by us : and then they are properly afcribed to God, from whom they proceed as the effefts of His beneficence and providence. When we fpcak of the knowledge of God, we muft not mean, that He knows things in the way that we do : that any intention or operation of His mind is rc- quifiteto produce it: that He apprehends things by any impreflions made upon Him: that He reafonsby thehelp of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which in us is moft intuitive and immediate, docs in any degree come up to the mode in which He knovv's things. We mull: nathcr intend, in general, that there is nothing, of which He is, or can be ignorant : which has been faid already j and is, I am afraid, as much as we can/afely (ay. Whenglory, honor, prai/e^zrc given to God; or He is faid to do any thing for His ownglory, or we to propofe the glory of His nam.c in what we do j thofc words fhould not be taken as Handing for that kind of glory and applaufe,which is fo indul-. trioufly fought, and capricioufly " diilributed among us mortals, and which I will take this opportunity to handle a little more largely, in order to give here a fpecimcn of the world, and lave that trouble in another place. Among us fome are celebrated ' Uai a-i Bolr, riS i!^i% t«5 o«jo!/a5 omt^X'Tm fhn atru'Tt o Mitm xt^mai; ©=05 ; Hierocl. ^ TZ/ ke,Uu, ij ^'iXrm. Therefore 0m« ^ rUyxliv are abovepraife. Arift. O.' T»5 ^tU f'-TaH-Bsrss yiXoTot iiTiv . if.u themfelves toward the acquifition of them : whilftreal virtue and induilry ('which, even when unfuccefsful,orop- preft by ill health or unkind fortune, give the truefi title to praifej lie difregarded. Thiril after glory, when that is defircd merely for its own fake, is founded in ambition and vanity " : the thing itfelf is but a dream, and imagination j fince, ac- cording to the differing humors and fentiments of nations and ages, the fame thing may be either^/ono«; or inglorious : the effeSioiii, confiderd Hill by itfelf, is nei- ther more health, nor eftate, nor knowledge, nor virtue to him who has it j or if that be any thing, it is but what muft ceafe when the man '^dies : and, after all, as it lives but in the breath of the people, a little fly envy or a new turn of things extinguillies it % or perhaps it goes quite out of itlelf <". Men pleafe them- felves with notions of immortality, and fancy a perpetuity of fame fecured to themfelves by books and teftimonies of hifl:orian3: but, alas! it is a fl:upid delu- fion, when they imagin themfelves prefent, and injoying that fame at the read- ing of their ftory after their death. And, befide, in reality the man is not known ever the more to pofterity, becaufe his nam.c is tranfmitted to them : he doth not live, becaufe his name does. When it is faid, J. C^far fubdued GauJy beat Pompey, changed the Roman commonwealth into a mon^irchy, i^c. it is the iame thing, as to fiy, the conqueror of P6»;/)fj, &c. was Cafar : that is, . C^far and the conqueror of Pompey are the fame thing j and Ctefar is as much known by the one dcfignation as by the other. The amount then is only this : that the conqueror of Pompey conquerd Pompey 5 or fome body conquerd Pom- • What Seneca fays of Alexander, is true of many an other heroe : fro virtute erat felix temeri- tm. ^ Tumes alto Druferumfanguine, tam^nam Feceris iffe aliqui.-l, (yc. Juv. ' Glo. ria quantaliiet quid erit, fi gloria tanlum eji > Juv. "^ Tl CDpn "inpa "IDDI ;ND Qm HDn nnm. S.Hhaf. <• K.t5^« ^fvr«.roy. Fh. Jud. * Even the great fymmid in Egyft, tho it Hill remains, hath not been able to preferve the true name of its builder; which is loft, one may juftly wonder how. Q- pey; II 8 r/j^ ReligioxV o/' Nature. Sedl. T. pey i or rather, fince Pompey is as little known now as Ciefar^ fame body con- querd/ome bvdy*. Such ^poor bujinefs is this boafted immortality ^ : and fuch, as has been here defcribed, is the thing called glory among us ! The notion of it may ferve to excite them, who having abilities to ferve their country in time of real danger, or want, or to do fome other good, have yet not philofophy enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to fee through the glories of the world (jufl: as we excite children by praifmg them ; and as we fee many good inventions and improvements proceed from emulation and vanity) : but to dil- cerning men this fame is mere air, and the next remove from nothing "j wliat they defpife, if not fhun. I think there are two confiderations, which may juftify a defire o?fome glory or honor : and fcarce more. When men have per- formed any virtuous adions, or fuch as fit cafy upon their memories, it is a reafonabk pleafure to have the teftimony of the world added to that of their own confciences, that they have done well '^: and more than that, if the repu~ tation acquired by any qualification or aftion may produce a man any real com- fort or advantage (if it be only protection from the infolencies and injuftice of mankind > or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to have this privilege muft be a great fitisfaftion, and what a ivife and good mzn may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propofe to himfelf But then he pro- pofes it no farther than it may be ufeful: and it can be no farther ufeful than he 'wants it. So that, upon the whole, glory, praife, and the like, are either mere vanity, or only valuable in proportion to our defe£is and ivants. If then thofc words are underftood according to the import and value they have among men, how dares any one think, that the Supreme being can propofe fuch a mean end to Himfelf as our praifes ? He can neither want, nor value them. Jlexan- der, according to his tafte of things, it may well be fuppofed would have been proud to have heard that he fhould be the fubjeft of fome fecond Homer % in whofe fheets his name might be imbalmed for ages to come } or to have been celebrated at Jthens, the mother of fo many wits and captains : but fure even he, with all his vanity, could not propofe to himfelf as the end of all his fatigues and dangers only to be praifed by children, or rather by worms and in/efls, if they were capable of iliewing fome faint fenfe of his great- » Tu ovif/jccTti T V!4\cii zreXvvyjrirat wi T^met TU* y>.uas!iift,x,Ta. sfl. M. Anton. ^ Mix^cf 'art yi Tcitz^i^x?\ui nS^tijKira. Id. ' Expende Hunvibalem : quot libras in ducefummo Invenies ? *' Mi'vji rSsi i^ '/a-aiwi a.\iiy.roi Liriv, ii? cirov lit i i-u-n^fhii®^ '/""fCjl ^"■"■'i'" '"f yiiy<>f''-'uv Tfoo-oi' iccv-rif TO ^Im^ tStc, «»,. Luc. ' lU'.y.it(liriii icirlf ['A;iji»,£«]] in r^ CS> ^lASfrirS, >^ riMu- tieCs*. Truths relating to the Deity. up ftefs ". And yet how far fhort is this comparifon ! In conclufion therefore, the men have been accuftomd to fpeak of the Deity in terms taken from princes, and fuch things as they have, in their weaknefs, admired > tho thefe are now incorporated into the language of Divines ; and tho, confldering what defe£ls there are in our ways of thinking and fpeaking, we cannot well pait with them all : yet we muft remember to e.y:alt the fenfe of them, or annex fome mental qualification to the ufe of them. As, if God be faid to do things for His own glory, the meaning \ humbly conceive muft be, that the tranfcendent excellence of His nature may be coUefted from the form of the world and adminiftra- tion of things in it ; where there occurr fuch marks of inexprefTible wifdom and power, that He needed not to have given us greater, had He only intend- ed His own glory : or fomething to this purpofe. Or if the glory of what w^ do, be afcribed to Him; by this muft be fignified, that no glory is due to us, who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him j and that wc defire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which is laudable in us ''. When we thank God for any deUverance or injoyment, this muft not be fb underftood, as if He couldvalueHimfelf upon our ceremonious acknowledgments, or wanted complements, or any return from us. It is rather a profcffion of the fenfe ive have of our wants and defefts, of the beneficence of His nature, and the gieatnefs or feafonablenefs of the mercies received ; an effort of a poor dependent being, who defires to own things, as far as he is able, to be what they are "^ > and efpecially to beget in himfelf fuch a difpofition of mind, as he ought to have towards his Almighty benefaHor. When we are faid to hefervants of God, or to feiz-e Him, or do Him fervice, thefe phrafcs are not to be taken as when one man is faid to be feivant of ano- ther, ov to do him fervice. For here it implies the doing of fomething, which is ufcful and beneficial to the man who is feiTed, and v/hat he zvants, or fmcies he wants : but nothing of want can be fuppofcd in God, nor can we any way be/>ro- f table orferviceable to Him. To ferve Hlra therefore muft rather be to ivorfiip or adore Him fof which fomething by andbyj. And thus that word in another language, of which our ferie is but the tranflation, is frequently ukd : -xstoferve * As Tfeiphon was celebrated by the blnls. Tinging M/-/«; .9-so? -^ufim. M. Jyr. ^ Honori- ius aucii ciim diis gratiis agimtts, turn nihil no/In lattdi ciffumftum arbitramur. Cic. "On kv iy«9^o» z-^ccrlvii lii Silt amrrsu/TTi. A faying of Bias ap. Diog. L. ' £(' y^ "^ jM-I Butafjui^a, !c»t' «|/<«» ^»Ti tsto !70iiiirai,— — «;»i' o//b; t>iv xa.Ti'. ^^vxiMy »yivi'/Kii-/ Iv^a^tfMt i'tKnto) 'an tiJ). Chryf. 120 rZ?^ Religion o/* Nature. Se6l. V. ft graven image ^ is to worJJnp the image ; but cannot fignify the doing of any thing, which may be ferviccable or ufeful to the dead flone. Or to fcrve God may be un- derllood in a fcnfe fomething like that : Serve the king of Babylon ''. For they were faid to ferve the king oi Babylon^ who ownd his authority, and Hved according to his laws, tho they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be parti- cularly y^rt'iV^a^/c to him : and fo they may be faid to ferve God^ or to be His fer- vants, who live in a continual fenfe of His foveraign nature and power over them, and endeavour to conform themfclves to the laws which He has impofed upon thcm'^. In thefe fenlcs we pray, that we may live to ferve Him : that is, we pray, that we may live to worfhip Him, and pradtice thofc laws of reafon and yirtu.^, to which rational natures are by Him fubjeftcd ^. Many more reflexions might be made upon epithets and ways of fpeaking^ intro- duced by cuftom, from rude antiquity, or by neccflity following from the nar- rownefs cither of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that love^ anger ^ hands^ eyes^ 5cc. when afcribed to God, cannot import fuch bodily parts or paffions as are found in us. Even the pronouns w/j, tby^ his fas His people, His houfc, i^c.) require much temper in the ufe of them =. 3 . JVefli all find ourfelves bound to worflnp Him^ in the befl manner we can. For by worfhipping Him I mean nothing but owning Hmi to be what He is, and ourfelves to be w/j^/ we are^hy i^ome more folcmn and proper aft: that is, by ad- dreffing our felvcs as His dependents to Him as the Supreme caufc, and Governor of the world, with acknowledgments of what we injoy, petitions for what we really want, or He knows to be convenient for us f, and the like. As if, ex. gr. I fliould in fome humble and compoied manner s pray to that Almighty being, upon whom depends the exifenceofthe world, and by wbofe providence I have been preferved to this ■foment, and injoy d many imdeferved advantages, that He would gracioufly accept my nateful fenfe and acknowledgments of all His beneficence toward me: that he would deliver me from the evil confequenccs of all my tranfigreffions and follies : that He would indue me with fuch difpofittons and powers, as may carry me innocently and fafely » DnDiy vn an>b'D3 nx ; bos nniy H'j, (^Jim. pajf. Deut. u. mention is mide of the places, 'U1 CZJiUn DVinnny IxyN : mCbM.par. m>3, 5c/!f . iAaTffi^irai' (in the eccleiiaftical Tenfc), Vulg. V. coliierunt. "> 'vnn "(i'D >— IN \^':yV. ' ^la'o applies the word/frre even to the laws themfelves in tliat phrafc, J^s/.i^s.y roTi viy^ci. "* "Eks.'.j. i^u i|« ipu.o^ia-.rcrx v'''/*»? B-««'v<,iT£5. Th.Jud. « J'3^ h'^DV^D. * Care muft be taken how we pray, left we fliouId ask what may be hurtful to us. oUouv ^oy.t^ 3-o»« iTf»^!)9-ii'«5 yt ■^(wh'!^, 'oituc j/,, Ado-ii to, ivxa, it/;^;iu,i,©- f/jiyi.Xu. y-a-y-c/., hii<.m ci' aya5-a. Plao. Evertere domos mas, optantihus ipjis, Di faciles, {^c. is a poet's obfervation. The author of S. Hhaf. adds, that we fliould not pray for that rwvvb -iwsN ^Nu;, or ynan ^33 r\^y: i^sju', or ns<-n M-'ivv, or abiy ^uwa dj n'apn nvDv^w through Truths relating to the Deity. 121 through all future trials ; and may inabk tab upon all occafims to behave my Jelf con- formably to the laws ofreafon, pioujly^ and ivifely : that He would fuffcr no being to in' jure me, no -misfortune to befall we, nor me to hurt myfelf by any error or mif'conduU of my own : that He would -jouch/afe me clear and diJlinSl perceptions of things \ with fo much health and profperity^ as may be good for me : that I may at leaf pafs my time in peace^with contentment^ and tranquillity of mind: and that ^ having faithfully dif- charged my duty to my family and friends^ and endeavour d to improve myfelf in vir- tuous habits and ufeful knowledge^ I may at lafi make a decent and happy exit, and then find my felf in fame better flate. Not to do this, or fomcthing like it, will certainly fall among thofe criminal omiffions mentiond fe6l. I. prop. V. For never to acknowledge the injoyments and privileges we have received, and hold of God, is in effe6l to deny that we receive them from Him > not to apply to Him for what we want is to deny^ either our wants, or His power of helping us j and fo on ; all contrary to truth ». It mull ever be ownd, that no worfhip can be proportionable to the Divine na- ture and perfections ; but yet that we are obliged to do what we can : therefore I added thole worc's in the befl manner we can. And it muil be acknowledged further, that thofc words do not oblige us to be always at our devotions neither ''. For as in the woriliip of God we own Him to be what He is, fo muil we do this as not denying our fclvcs to be u-hat we are : beings not capable of bearing continual intention of mind j bcing'^, that arc incompafled with many wants, which by theconltitution of our nature require to be fupplied, not without care and a^ivity joind to our prayers ; beings, that are made for many harmlefs injoy' merits j beings, that have many offices to perform one for another ; and beings in whom, all things confiderd, it would be lefs refpeSl to be conllantly in the for- mal aft of devotion, than it is to addrefs our felvcs to Him with prep:u-cd minds, at certain times, or upon certain occafior.s. To be always thus ingaged, if it could be, would be to make God what He is not : flnce it feems to fuppofe that He wants it and we merit of Him by it } or that He is bound to give what we ask, without our endeavcu'iig ; or, atleafl, that He is a Being obnoxious to importunity and teafing. For thefe reafons I have alfo in the explication o*^ my meaning inlcrtjd that iimitarion, b}J;me lOkmn and proper a^. Tho every man knows beil his own opportunities and circumflances, and there- fore may be moil able to judge ;■ a hirafcit, how he may befl perform this duty j » nm'^nn \n nynoD qDy—-r -:.':'; a.'o. 01 li'^'yion^anny; ;>qn> nnairn3j'')3!^rD'7D. Id. ^ Like thofe 'Am, •i,»7«. at C. . l.i,.tiur^U particularly, who continued divine fervice night and day rrithotst intermifflcn. Or tlie M.J'...ih>jj perhaps fpt'^O, 'E.vx'-ri^.t), who placed (or pretended to place) all religion in prayer, y^^, ^c/..-^:.? r'^ ■'■(■"H'yJ} ^(i>trjoiiiA,iyii. V. Suit, yet 12 2 The Religion of Nature. Sed. V. yet in general it may be faid, that to the doing of it /o/f ;»«/>• and in the befl man- ner we can thefe things are required : an intent mind % proper times and places, a proper form of words, and a proper pojiure. For if the mind be abfent, or attends not to what is faid, it is not the man that prays : this is only as it were the noife of a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without any con- fcioufnefs of its own act. To repeat one's prayers with moving //>/, but ali- enated thoughts, is not to pray in the bejl manner we can : becaufe it is not in a manner agreeable to what we are, or to truth. For this is to do it only ■is.fpeak- ■ing^ and not as thinking beings. Upon this account it will be certain, that j// times and places cannot be equal- ly proper ''. Some times are ingroflcd by thebufinefs of life, andibme places lie expofed to interruptions. Thofe of retreat znAftlence ought to be fought, and, as far as Eiirly it may be, contrived. And for this further reafon, becaufe the farther we are removed from the notice of others, the clearer we Hand of all ojlentation : that is, the more we do it upon the fcore oi truth and duty j and this is again, the more trucly and dutifully we do it. Our next care is a proper /orw of words. All prayer mufl; either be vocal, or mental. Now even that which is called mental can icarcc be made without words '^ •or fomething equivalent '^. (I believe, that even the deafznA dumb form to them- felves fome kind of language : I mean fomething, which fupplies the room of language.) For thoughts in their naked ftatc, devefted of all words, and taken merely by themfclves, are fuch fubtle and fleering things, as are fcarce capable of making any appearance in the mind > at Icall of being detaind, compared toge- ther, and ranged into fentences. If a fentcnce may be ib made up of fenfible ideas as to fubfiilinthemindby the help of thole images which remain in thephantafy, after the manner of a fentence cxpreil in piBures, or by hieroglyphics : yet fuch a fentence mull be very imperfed, through the -want of grammatical inflexions, particles, and other additions neceflary to modify and conned the ideas, of which >n^Qnn3''5»n3nDD njii;;!; n^Snbrj.M/jiw.l^^nMbn nbsnn. 5. H^^i/: and the like every where. '' "This in general is true: notwithftanding which I do not deny but there may beoccallons, when sJ«» sSy «5r»fTiir«5 t« ivx*-^' 'l'«'' '^ '/■"«""« «A«K«r»v KMli}c>!iray k, WiffyZa-av ayci/iM^xi J15 r« i^uvh ry ^t'^avra tu;)i«5 srci""^ sxTSvi??, xA. S. Chryf. ' 'O //-wAr/®^' £, ^i'£,k/i-- rmi, ■Efe< m a> u-MTiv. KniioVlotiiMS, 'O <^ »/^//"j or he may lay before him a prayer in writing., and fo carry his eyes and his mind toge- ther through it} or he may go over a form of words imprinted on his memory ; . or he may put words together in his mind extempore : but ftill in all thefeways words and language are ufed. And fince to think over a fet of words cannot be a more adequate manner of addrelfing to God (who neither fpeaks, nor thinks like usj than to [peak it over and think too ; and moreover, fince the \ cry found of the words affe£ts us, and, when the form is ready prepared, and the mind freed from the labor of compofing, doth really help attention^: I fay, fince this is the cafe, it muft be better, when we have opportunity, to pronounce a pray- er ^, than only to think it over. But then it fiiould be fpoken no louder (\ mean when we pray privately j, than juft to make it audible to our felves^. It is not upon God's account that we fpeak, fince he would know even our thoughts : ' Malta funtveria, qUit, quafiarticu'i, conneclunt membra oration'is, qtit formari fimilitHdint kuIU fogtmt.Cic. tnowj N>3 t]uj njONbjn'pQn.NaM.ai^. ^Alclli.i.. "i 131 njiDa i ■voce veneremiir. Cic. . ^SXruf aXSm ^aut bzo cS, Ai(r7ri>Ta,x.^iiT]^vi< yi'/i-juyjiv,riira tuz rS syAoysw iciyotArtJ-ijT-a Tpsrsj, fays 5«/o~ >»c» in his prayer /i^.y^/. 'This we find often among the Dinim of theje-ws. "jny [bo nia"13,-! -iDINNinu; nr2V:]n'7y<12W^W.Maim. AndR.TUz.^m/iuKri, leaving cited this paffagc, addsUD^^DH 'OINyiNbvjTN^yDWnN^CriNU; aipDISnnn. Maiwonhles in anotlicr place cxprefies himfelf thus: wnba rjTNb y^owDi maujj anmn -fnnD t-ibx [-13^] nbn ■'7>3n^ >^X (That nab I inferted from Shulhh, amk.) The fame occurs in Or hhadnjli, o- p/jfi. 4, but I2ZJ. The Religion of Nature. Se61:. V. but it is upon our oiu» account, and to make our adorations, tho impcifeft at the bcil, as compleat as we are able, f Which, by the way, is an aniwer to them, whoobjeft againft prayer the impertineme of talking to God.j This being pre- niifed, and it being found that we mu ft make ufe o^i words, it cannot be denied that we ought to ufe the bcjl and properefl we can. This cannot be dcmc in cxtcm' poramous efFufions : and therefore there mull be hm\s premeditated ; ihcbejl, that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worfhip God to the bell of our capacity. Asa prayer ought to have all the marks of lerioufncfs and being in earnell, it ought to be the plainejl, and at the fame time is perhaps the harde/l of all compofitions. It ought to take in a general view of v hit we have tnjojd, what we want, what we have done, Sec. and every thing ought to be expreil with method, in phrafes that are grave and pointing, and with iuch a /j-«f eloquence, as ingages all our attention,and rcprefents our decp;/l fenfe, without affeSiation or need- lefs repetitions. Theie confiderations have caufed me many times to wonder at thofe men, who difpute againfl pre-conceived forms of prayer. They, who talk fo much of thefpirit of prayer, feem to know but little of it. As to thcpofture, that is bell, which beil esprcjfes our humility, reverence », and earnellnefs, and affefts us mofl. Tho perhaps fome regard is to be paid to the cu- ftomsofthe/'/.3«wherewearei orof our own ro««/r;', to which we have been mofl ufed. Several nations may denote the lame thing by different gclhires : and we may take thefe, as we do their wordsi ;. e. as having that fignification which they put upon them. Tho I have not hitherto mentiond it, there ought to be zlfoi public worjlnp of the Deity. For a man may be confiderd as a member of a fociet)-, and asfuch he ought to worfhip God (if he has the opportunity of doing it : if there are proper prayers ufed publicly, which he may relbrt to j and his health, l^c. per- mit]. Or the /o«V /J may be confiderd as 0/.'f ^(jii'j, that has common interefts and concerns, and as fucb is obliged to worlliip the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Befide, there are many, who know not of themfelvcs, how to pray j perhaps cannot fo much as read. Thefe too mull; be taken as they are, and con- fequently Ibme time and place appointed, where they may have fuitable prayers red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And further, toward the keep- ing mankind in order, it is neceff'ary there fhould be fome religion profell, and even eflablifhd ; which cannot be without fome public woilliip. And were it not for that fenfe of virtue, which \s principally prefcrved (fo far as it is prefervedj by national /erm and habits of religion, men would foon lofcit all, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what elfe the word of lavages do. • 131 n;i3n r\Tyii ^'^>^iO mu/n^— "vbDnfon, or hk-iiy. But Truths reletting to the Deity, 125 But how does xhis, public worfhip, it maybe demanded, comport with that re- treat ^ndiprivacy recommended above ? Anf. I fpokc tliere of prayer in general^ to which thofe circumftancesgive a great advantage: but then they are recommend- ed no farther, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them- Excufe a fhoit reflexion here, which if it be not directly for the purpofe, is not al- together foreign to it. Tho he who reads the form of public prayer reads it to all at the fame time, that all may unite in one common a6t, which otherwife they could not do: yet ftilleveiy/^rZ/Vw/arperfon, who minds the prayei-s atall, has a feparate perception of the words in his mind, and there he offers them, or the fcnfe containd under them, with more or lefs application and ardor. And fince no man can be faid to pray any further than he dees this > and it cannot be known to -any body in the congi-egation befide himfelf, how for he doth do it j his prayer i s in reality as private, as if he was inclofed within a thoufand walls. So that, though there are reafons for a public worfhip, yet I will venture t-o affirm, that all true prayer is/nw/f.- and the true feat of it being in the w/W, toward the interefting of whofe powers all the circumftances of worfliip are mainly defigned to con- tribute, it may be fiid upon that account to be always made in the molt retired and tindifcerncd of all retreats " : nor can more be liiid in refped of a worlliip, which by the terms is in other refpefts public. A man may be prefent in a congrega- tion, and either pray the fame prayer in which others feem to join, or fome o- ther, or none at all '', for ought any body there can tell befides himfelf. I am not infenfible how much I may expofe myfelf by thefe things to the laugh- ter of fome, who are utter ilrangers to all this language. What a ilir is here, fay they, ^o\it praying ? "Who c\'er obfervcd, that they who pray are morefuccefsful or happy, than they are who do not? yf«/. AUoblervations of this kind muftbevery lubricous and uncertain. We neither- know what other men are inwardly and really S nor how they pray 64 c* rj} Ur-^r.^ia, — — >9 '|s;/;o'-"''«', >^ ix-cto!iJ5>7-»5. D.L. •• C. Ceftius ap. Tac. ftys, finacij>es njiidetn mflar deortim ej[e : fed nc(^ite a diis nifi ju^as faffllcum freces audiri. « Sometimes jtAjsv «K,ii, : that is, as Flato paraphrafes tho& words of Hejiod, To i-jwio-a 5" T.ci'rci s-5a«x(5 iVi ffAs'jy, h^in-i-i i to /,o£» o>.V) XsiyAuaa Q-.wiZi'sc, xA. f 6)uid quod Ijle Cttl. culicandorelaudatus diei orighicmmali habuit? Qttxvtmultos accepta nffiixen iwferitt I ^mm mukoi bond perdider'e, Cr ultimii merfcre fuffUciis I Plin. R who 12(5 The Religion of Nature. Sedt. V. who endeavour to worship God in a proper and reafonable manner, whatever it is, perhaps it might be lefs, if they did not j or their misfortunes might be greater : who can be certain of the contraiy ? If thefe gentlemen have any way of difco- veringit, I wifli they would impart thek fecret. In the mean time fure they cannot expefb, that even in the moft imperfeft sketch of natural religion the worJJjip of the Deity fliould be omitted : that very thing, which hath been principally intended by the word religion '. 4. And laftly, to deliver what remains, fummarily } Rational kings, or they^ to u-hom reafon is the great law of their nature, if they would behave themfelvesas above, floould confider in earnejl, what a mighty being He is, who by the confiitu- iion of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governed by it, and isohofelaws the dilates of right reafon may be f aid to be. They ought to keep it well impreft upon their minds, that He is the being, upon whom their very ex- iflence depends : that it is He who fuperintends and adminifters the aftairs of the the world by Hit providence : that the eflfefts of Wxspower and influence are vifible before their faces, and round about them, in all the phanomena of nature, not one of which could be without Him : that they are always in Hisprefence : that He is a being of perfeU reafon : that, if it be reafonable, that the tranfgreflurs of reafon fliould be punifhd, they will moft certainly, one time or other, be punilhd, i^c. And then, if they do this, it is eafy to fee what effect it muft have upon all their thoughts, words '', and anions. By what is faid here, no fuperftition is intended to be introduced : it is only the prafbice of reafon and truth, which is required : and any thing, that is not inconfijient with them, may be freely done, though under the infpedion of our great Lawgiver himfelf. * Keligio detrum etdtu fo cominetur. Cic. ^«( omnia, que ad cultum deemm pertinerent, dill- genter retraSartnt, (^ tanquxm relegerem, funt diili religiofi, &c. Id. '' Particularly with refpeft to ctiflomary fvcaring; which, befide the ill confequences it has in making oaths cheap, e^<-. is a great inftance of difregard and irreverence. For they, who ufe themfclves to it do, at leaft, nuke the tremendous name of God to ferve for an exfkttve only; and commcnly to rude, paflionate, or dt- bauched difcourfe (Aoywr «v«;TAi-'f;4>;Ai« Trciiwsm to uytir-Krct tC^ B-uiv tii[/,ti. Vh.Jud) Sect. Truths r ef peeing MdLnVlnd J &c, 127 Sect. VI. Truths refpeHing Mankind in ge- neraly antecedent to aJl human laws. TTN this and the following fe£tions I fhall proceed as in the foregoing. I. Every man hatb in himfelf a principle of individuation, ivbich diftinguijhes and feparates him from all other men in fiich a manner, as may render him and them capa- ble of diJiinEl properties in things {ox diftindlfubjedls ef property). That is, B and G are fo diftinguifhd, or exift fo difiinEtly, that if there be any thing which B can call his, it will be for that reafon not Cs : and v. v. what is C's will for that reafon not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own confcience. Let us fee then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his. II. There are fome things, to -which (at leafl before the cafe is alterdby voluntary fubjeEtion, compaif, or the like) every individual man has, or may have, fuch a na- tural and immediate relation, that he only of all mankind can call them his. The life, limbs, &c. of B are as much his, as B is himfelf '. It is impoffible for C, or any other to fee with the eyes of B : therefore they are eyes only to B : and when they ceafe to be his eyes, they ceafe to be eyes at all. He then has the fole property in them, it being impofliblc in nature, that the eves of B iTiould ever be the eyes of C. Further, the labor of B cannot be the labor of C : becauil- it is the application ofthe organs and powers of B, not of C, to the efteftingoffomethingj and there- fore the labor is as much B's, as the limbs Mid faculties made ufeof are his. Again, the effeB or produce of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C : and therefore this effed or produce is B's, not C's j as much B's, as the labor was B's, and not C's ''. Becaufe,what the labor ofB caufes or produces, B produces ' 'Ou^ir Urui iwiTi^iv iV(», k v"-"? i/Mi avT*Tc. Xen. b And therefore the produce of a man's labor is often ftill called his Uhr. So ly^V DnT tiy : and bjun fiSD yy, in Vfulm. & xl. fujfm, lliiid:nn^ue loior lejies, Virg. R 2 by 128 The Religion o/* Nature. Sefl. VI. by his labor j or it is the product of B by his labor : that i?, it is B's produft, not C's, or any other's. And if C fhould pretend to any properly in that, which B only Ciin truly call his^ he would a£t contrary to truth ^ Laftly, there may be many things, which B may truly call his in fome (nch fen fe, er upon fome fuch account, as no other can> and to which C has no more right than D, norD thanF, (yc. the. property oi which, will therefore be inB. Becaufe C has no more title than D, nor D than F, (^c. and that, to which every one hef.des B has an equal title, no one befides B can have any title to at all '', their pretences mutually balancing and dejlroy'mg each other, whilft his only remains. And in this cafe a fi-nall matter, being oppofed to nothing, will be ftrong enough to maintain the claim of B. III. Whatever is inconfifient 'with the general peace and 'welfare (or good) of man- kind^ is inconfifient with the laws of human nature^ 'wrong, intolerable. Thofe max- ims may be erteemd the natural and true laws of any particular fociety, which nre moft proper to procure the happinefs of it. Becaufe happinefs is the end of fo- ciety and laws : ctherwife we might ivi^'goic unhappinefs to be propofed as the right end of them j that is, unhappinefs to be defirable, contrary to nature ■xnd. truth. And what is faid of a particular fociety is not lefs true,, when applied to the univerfal fociety of mankind . Now thofe things are moft apt to produce hap- pinefs, which make the moft men happy. And therefore thofe maxims or princi- ples, which promote the general /ra;;^«i7///)' and wf// ^f/«^ of mankind, ifthoie^ words exprefs the /^^/>/)/«f/5 of mankind, muft be the rra^'lawsof humanity, or the bafis oi them : and all fuch praftices, as interfere with thefe, mull alio in- terfere with thofe. It is contradictory to fay, that any thing can be a general law ©f human nature, which tends only to favor the pleafures of f»me particulars to the prejudice of the reft, who partake of the fame common nature j and ef- pecially if thefe pleafures are of the lower and brutal kind. As a million of men are more than one ; fo in fixing the public laws of human nature, and what ought to be, or not to be, they muft in reafon be more regarded by a million of times : for here we confider men only as men. It will be cafy now to flaew, that the tranfgreffion of thefe laws, conducing to the general good of the world, \s'wrong'\x\di morally evil. For if mankind may be iaidingeneraltobea?«//o««/ animal., the general welfare of it muft be the wel' fare of a rational nature : and therefore that, and the laws which advance it, » If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the cafe. He may commute them for money, becaufe they are his. * Tanquam Sparti illi foeturttm, fic fi mvieem JHgulant, Ht nemo ex Qmnibtu refiet, as L/tilaaeiits fays in another cafe. muft Truths reppefilng Mankind, &c, 1 29 miifi: be founded in reafon ; nor can be oppoftd by any thing, but what is op- pofite to reafon, and confequently to truth. Lee us fuppofc fome rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern themfelves, it would be in general good for the world : that is, llich a praftice would be agreeable to the nature and circumjlances of mankind. If rf/ZmenlTiould tranfgrefs this rule, what would be the confequence of fuch an univerfal revolt ? A general evil, or fomething difagreeable to our nature and the truth of our circumftances : for of contrary pra£lices there muft be con- trary effefts } and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the fame thing. This then would be wrotig by the terms. And as wrong it would be in any one man : becaufe all the individuals have equal right to do it, one as much as ano- ther j and therefore all as much as znjone. At leaft it is certain, that whoever fhould violate that rule, would contribute his fhare towards the introduction of univerlal diforder and mifery ; and would for his part deny human circumftances to be what they are, public happinefs to be what it i s, and the rule to be what it real- ly is, as much as if all others confpired with him in this iniquity and madnefs. With what face can any particular man put his own humor or unreafonable pleafure into the fcale againft fuch a weight of happinefs as that of all the world ? Does not he, who thus centers mhimfelf, difregards the good o? every body elfe,. and intirely feparates his injoyments andinterefts from thofe oi xhe public -j does not he, I fay, ftrike himfelf outof the roll of mankind ^ ? Ought he to beownd as one of them ? Ought he not rather to be repelled, and treated as an alien and €• nemy to the common happinefs and tranquillity of omjpecies ? IV. Whatever is either reajonable or unreafonable in B with refpecl to C, would be jufi the fame in C with refpeU to B, if the cafe was inverted ^. Becaufe reafon is univerfal, and refpefts cafes =, not perfons. ^See fed. III. pr. II.) Cor. Hence it follows, that a good way to know what is right or wrong in re- lation to other men, is to conlider what we Ihould take things to be were we in their circumftances ^. V. In aflate of nature nun are equalinrcfpeSl of dominion^ . I except for the pre- fcnt the cafe oi parents and their children, and perhaps of iome few other near relatr- - • ' At^fa7! When the Romans, in Liiy, asked the Galls, ®iwdnazn id JHs effet, aptim h pojfefforibus petere, ant minari arrna, they anfwerd, fe in srmis jtfj Jerre, 0' omnia fortium virorum ejfe. Like baibarians iadeeJ ' '^ • ' rather. Truths refpeciing Mankind, &"€, \ 3 r rather. For then to oppofe the man who has this/oa^r, as far as one can, or (which is the liimej as far as one has the /oitw to doit, would not be wrong: and yet fo it muftbe, if he has a right to dominion, or to be not oppofed. Moreover, that a man fhould have aright to anything, merely becaufe he has the power to take it, is a doftrine indeed, which may ferve a few tyrants, or fome banditi and rogues, but direftly oppofite to the peace and general good of mankind j and therefore to be exploded, by prop. IK. It is alfo what the powerful themfelvcs could not allow, if they would but imagine themfelvcs to be intheftateof the •weak andmorc defencelefs i and therefore unreafonable, by prop. I V^ ». VI. No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happinefi of another. Be- caufe, inthefiril place, thisfuppofes a dominion over him, and the moft abfohite too that can be. In the next, for B to begin todifturb the peace andhappinefs of C is what B would think unreafonable^ if he was in C's cafe. Inthelaft, fince it is fuppofed, that C has never invaded the happinefs of B, nor taken any thing from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the ivhole tranfaBion begins oricri- nally from B (for all this is couchd in the word begin)^ C can have nothing that is B'sj and therefore nothing, to which C has not at lead as good a title asBhzsi or, in other words, nothing, which C has not as much right to ^ff/i as B to claim. Thefe two rights being then at leaf equal, and counterpoifing each other, no al- teration in the prefent ftate of things can follow from any fuperiority of right in B : and therefore it muft of right remain as it is j and what C has mull, for any right that B has to oppofe this fettlement, remain with C in his undifur bed po{- fejllon. But the argument is Hill llronger on the fide of C : becaufe he fcems to have fuch a property in his own happinefs, as is mentiond in prop. II. fuch a one as no other can have ''. VII. Tho no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happinefs^ or to hurt him j yet every man has a right to defend himfelfand his againf violence^ to re- cover -what is taken by force fromiiim, and even to make rcprifals^ by all the means that truth and prudence permit •■'. We have fcen already, that there are fome things,which ' J*fep^'H> when he fays, scf/^ov yi ^"m aet(3^, ^ T«pk S-nfo-i'v i'^w«'t«t«», Ic- a-«f« a»,9-p«;roi5, iiKsm 7CK di/jjicTUTiccit, can only mean, tha" necefllty, or perhaps prudence, obliges to do this j not anyjavv in the drifter fenfe of that word. '' Societxtis [inter bomines] arclij^mum linculum eft maris ariitrari effe contra mturam, hominern homini detrahere,fui commodi ciiufa, qiiam omnia incommodn (ubire, &c. Cic. f All this is fuppofed to be in a lUte of nature and the abfence of humaa iav.-£. amaa. 131 The Religion" o/* Nature.' Sedl. VI. a man may truly call his ; and let us for the prefent only fuppofe, that there may- be more. This premifed, I proceed to make good the propofition. To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to afiert, contrary to truth, either that he has not the fiiculties and powers, which he has ; or that the Author of na- ture has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not nfe them ? And how may he ufe them, if not for his ownprefervatm, when he is attacked, and like to be abufed, or perhaps dcftroyd. All animah have a principle Oifelf-prefcrvation, which exerts itfelf many times with an uncontroulable impetuofity. Nature is uniform in this, and every where conftant to itfelf 'E.vcn inanimate hodixcs, when they are adtcd upon, rea£t. And one may be fure, that no pofition can have any foundation in nature, or be con- fiftent with it and truth (thofe infeparable companions^, which turns upon nature itfelf, and tends to its definition. Great part of the general happinefs of mankind depends upon tho^emeans, by which the innocent may be faved from their cruel invaders : among which the op- portunities they have o^ defending themfelvcsmaybe reckond the chief There- fore to debar men of the ufe of thefe opportunities, and the right of defending themfelves againft injurious treatment and violence mull be inconfillent with the laws of nature by prop. III. If a man has no right to ^e/e «i himfelf and what is his, he can have no right to anything (the contrary to v%?hich has been already in part, and will by and by be more amply proved^ i fincethat cannot be his right, which he may not maintain to be his right. If a man has no right to defend himfelf againft infults, (^c. it muft be becaufe the aggrefTor has a right to a fail the other, and u/urp what is his : but this pretenfion has been prevented in the foregoing propofition. And, more than that, it includes a great abfurdity, to coramence an injury, or to ^^^/« the violence, being in nature more than only to repell it. He, who begins, is the true caufe of all that follows : and whatever falls upon him from the oppofltion made by the defending party, is but the effect of his own aft : or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, rc~ fleeted back upon himfelf It is as when a man Ipits at heaven, and the fpittle falls back upon his own face. Since he, who begins to violate the happinefs of another, does what is "xrong-, he, who endeavours to obviate or put a flop to that violence, does in thatrcfpect whatisn^.6/, by the terms. Laftlv, fince every man is obliged to confult his own happinefs, there can be no doubt but that he not o\^\via^, but even oi:^:t to defend it (fed. II. prop. IX.)} in Truths refpe&ing Mankind, &c. 153 in fuchamannerl mean, as does not interfere with truth', or his own dcfignof being happy. He ought indeed not to xSiraJljlj^ or do more than the end propof- ed requires : that is, he ought by a pmdent carriage and wife forecall to lliut up, // he can, the avenues by which he mav be invaded j and when that cannot he done, to ufe arguments and perfuafivcs, or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm : but when thefe meafures are ineffectual or imprafticable, he muft take fuch other as he can, and confrontforce with force. Othcrwife he will fail in his duty to himfelf, and deny happinefs to be happinefs. By the fame means, that a man may ^^/ra^whatishis, he may certainly endea- vour to rfco^'^r what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him. For it has been fhewn already, that the /)o-a;fr to take any thing from another gives no right to it. The right then to that, which has been taken from its owner againft his will, remains ftill where it was : he may ftill truly call it his : and if it be his, he may ufe it as his : which if he who took it away, or any other, flrall hinder him from doing, that man is even here the aggreflbr, and the owner does but defend himfelf and what is his. Befides, he, who ufes any thing as his, when it is his, afts on the fide of truth : but that man, who oppofes him in this, and confequently aflerts a right to that, which is not his, a£ts contrary to truth. The former therefore does what cannot be amifs : but what the latter does, is wrong by that fundamental propoGtion, fe£l. I. prop. IV. Then further, if a man hath ftill a right to what is forceably or without his con- fent taken from him, he muft have a right to the value of it. For the thing is to him what it is in value to him : and the right he has to it, may be confiderd as a right to a thing o? fuch a value. So that if the veiy thing which was taken be deftroyd, or cannot be retrieved, the proprietor neverthelefs retains his right to a thing oi fuch a value to him ; and fomething muft be had in lien of it : that is, he has a right to make reprifals. Since eveiy thing is to every man what it is in value to him, things of the fame value to any one may be reckond as to him the fame, and to recover the equivalent xhz^zxaf::^ to recover the thing itfe If : for othcrv/ife it is not an equiva- lent. If the thing taken by way of reprifal ftiould be to the man, from whom it is taken, of^r^/^r value than what he wrongfully took from the recoverer, he muft charge himfelf with that lofs. Ifinjufticcbe donehim, it is done by himfelf, the other has no more than what he has a right to. To which add, that as a man has a right to recover what is his, or the equivalent, from an invader ; fo he ieems for the ftme reafons to have a right to an equivalent for the expenfe he is at in recovering his own, for the lofs o£ time and quiet, a.nd(or the troul;le,hazards, tirxd dangers undev » For sio ctJixai xxxai ~oiiT, i mtittoiSii xxy.Zixht r.riot xoia KitKui, x«» ajAn>)TKi. Max. T. S ' gone : 1 34 The Religion oJ Nature. Sefl. VI. gone; becaufe allthefeare the effects of the invafion, and therefore to be added to the invader's account. VlW.the firflpojejfionof a thing gives the poffeffor a greater right to it^ than any other man has, or can have^ till he and all, that claim under him, are extinSl. For, I . till then no other man can be thefirjipojj'ejfor again : which is more than nothing -, fince he comes into it by God's providence, and as it were donation. 2. That, which no man has yet any title to % the finder may take without the violation of ^«/ truth. He doth not deny that to be another man's, which is another man's : he doth not begin to interrupt the happinefs of any body, i^c. Therefore to poflefs him- ielf of it IS not wrong. So far from it, that, fince every man is obliged to confult his own happinefs (that is, his own intereft and advantages, whenever he can do it without the violation of truth) not to a£t confonantly to this obligation is an omif- fion that would be zvrong. What he does therefore is right. And then if hedoes right in taking poflcflion of it, he mull: from thence be the rightful pojfejfor ; or, it becomes his. 5 . There are many things, which cannot be polTeft without cultiva- tion and the contrivance and labor of the firft poflelTor. This has generally been the cafe of lands : and thefe are indeed more eminently meant by the word popjji- ens. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of his otvn cares and fweat, and to enter upon it, as if it was the eflfcct of the intruder's pains and travel, is a moft mani- feft violation of truth. It is aflerting in fa£b that to be his, which cannot be his. See prop. II. 4. The contrary doftrine, viz. th^t prime occupancy gives no right, interferes with prop. III. for it muft certainly be inconfiftcnt with the peace and happinefs of manldnd in general to be left in endlefs wars and ftruggles for that, which no man can ever have any right to. And yet thus it mull be, if thatdoftrinewas true: becaufe it has been demonftrated, xh'xipower confers no right ; and therefore the fir Ji right to many things can only accrue from the firft pofTeflionof them, f • If B fhould endeavour by force (or fraud) to eje£t C out of the pofleffion of any thing, which C injoys, and obtaind without expelling or difiurbing any body, he would cenainly do that, which he himfclf would judge unreafonable, were he in C's place. Therefore he afts, as if that was not rcafon with refpeft to C, which would be reafon in refpe£t of B j contrary to the nature of reafon, and to prop. IV. 6. To endeavour to turn a man violently out of his poflcflions is the fame as to command him to leave them, upon pain of fuffering for non-obedience. But this is ufurping ^dominion, which he has no right to > and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can expell another out of his » N.iOT p'otTU relliiris hirum nururz ntq; ilium, iiume, nee ftemttam JlittHit . Hot. poflcuion Truths refpe^ing Mankind, &c. 435 poflefllon without beginmng to interrupt his happinefs : nor can any one do this without contravening the truth containd in prop. \T This therefore fccurcs the pofTcflbr in his pofleffion for ever : that is, it confirms his right to the thing pofleil. Laftly., the firfi poJJeJJ'or^ of whom I have been fpcaking, has undoubt- edly a right to defend his perforiy and luch other things as can only be his, againft the attempts of any aggreflbr (fee prop. II.): therefore thefe no one can have a right to violate. And therefore again, if he cannot be forccably difpoflcll without violence oflFerd to thefe, no one has any right to diipoflefs him. But this muft be the cafe, where the poflefTor docs not quit his pofleilion 'VJilling- ly. The right confequemly muft remain folely in him, unleis he confents to quit it. N. Thsfiiccefors of an invader, got into pofleflion wrongfully, may acquire a right in time % by the failure of fuch, as might claim under him who had the right. For he, who happens to be in pofTellion, when all thcfe are extinft, is in the place of a prime occupant. IX. A title to many things may he transferred by compact or donation ''. If B has the fole right in lands, or goods, no body has any right to the difpofal of them befides B : and he has a right. For difpofing of them is but ufing them as his. Therefore the aft of B in exchanging them for fome thing elfe, or beft owing them upon C, interferes not with truth : and fo B does nothing that is wrong. Nor docs C do any thing againft truth, or that is wrong, in taking them : becaufc he treats them as being lahat they are j as things, which come to him by the afb of that perfon, in whom is lodged the fole power of difpofmg of them. Thus C gets the title innocently. But in the cafe ofcompaSi the reaibn,on which this tranfIx£lion ftands, is more evi- dent ftill. For the contradtors are ilippofed to receive each from other the (?^.'«'ya- lent of that which they part with, or at leail what is equivalent to them refpeSlively, or perhaps by each party preferable. Thus neither of th&m is hurt : perhaps both advantaged. And fo each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the innocent exchange, as hemgivhat it is : better for him, and promoting his con- venience and happinefs. Indeed he, who receives the value of any thing, and what he likes as well, in effect has it ftill. His property is not diminiflid : the fituation and matter of it is only alterd. f/A'Qiirv/. ifocr. ^ To this may be reduced that title to things, which T'«//)' mentions as con. ferred by fome law (/fjej ; and even thofe, wh.\c\i3.ccx\ie conditione, or forte. Fori fuppofe the go- vernment to have a right of giving them thus. S i Mankind 10,6 The Religion of Katvre, SedV.VI. Mankind could not well fubfift without bartering one tiling for another : therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourfe, is incon- fiflent with the general good of mankind, ^c. If a man could find the neceja- rjes of life without it, and by himfelf, he muft at leaft want many of the com' forts of it. X. There is (hen fitch a thing as property^ founded in nature and truth ' ; or, there are things, which one man only can, confidently with nature and truth, call his: by prop. II, VIII, IX. ^ 'Xl.Thofe thing!, which only one man can truly and properly call his, mufl remain his, till he agrees to fart with them {if they are fuch, as he may part with) by com- pa5l or donation > or ('which muft be underftood) till they fail, or death extin- guifhes him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man. Becaufe no one can deprive him of them without his approbation, but the de- priver muft ufe them as his, when they arc not his, in contradi6tion to truth. For, XII. To have the property of any thing and to have the fok right of ufing anddif- foftng of It are the fame thing : they are equipollent exprefjions. For when it is faid, that P has the property, or that fuch a thing is proper to P, it is not faid, that P and Q_or P and others have the property (proprium limits the thing toPonlyj : and when any thing is Md to be his, it is not faid that part of it only is his. P has therefore the all or all-hood <= of it, and confequently all the ufe of it. And then, fince the all of it to him, or all that P can have of it, is but the ufe and difpofal of it \ he who has this has the thing itfelf, and it is his ^ Laws * Which rauft not give way to opinions of fitnefs. See. The mafter was in the right, who cor- rected Cyrus for adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the little. He was not t5 Upuiir, oyT(^ »f »T>i?, but of property. Omnium, qu£ in hominum dociorum difputatione -verfan' tttr, nihil ejl profeBo prsJlaiiUui, quam plane intelligi nos ad juftitiam ep natos, neqiie opinione, fed natura conjlifutum effe jus. Cic. ^ There is another way of acquiring a title mentiond : which is, by the right of war, as it is called. Sunt privata nulla natura: fed autve- leri occupatione, ut qui quondam in -vacua -veaerunt j aut -viaoriA, ut qui hello potiti funt. Sec. Cic. And fo in Xenophon it is faid to be an eternal law among men, that if a city be taken in war. the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror's; and they may poflefs them as their own, not ■. S. Chryf. Tirm /*i> but in tmth the ufufruftuary has a temporary^ or limited property ; and the proprietary has a perpetual ufufruft, either at prcfent, or in reverflon. Propriety without the ufe (if the ufe is ne\ er to come to the proprietary) is an empty found. I have before upon fome occaiions taken it as granted, that he, who ufes any thing as his^ when it is not his^ afts againfl truth, 6cc. but now I fay fur- ther, that, XIII. He, who ufes or difpofes of any thing, does by that dechreitto be his. Be- caufe this is all, that he, whofe it really is, can do. Borrowing and hiring af- ford no objeftionto this. When the borrower or hirer ufes the thing borrowd or hired, he ufes what /; his own for the time allowd : and his doing lb is only one of thofe ways, in which the true proprietary difpofes of it. XIV. To ufurp or invade the property of another man is injufiice: or, more ful- ly, to take, detain, ufe, deftroy, hurt, or meddle ^ with any thing thatishiswithouf his allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or even to attempt any of thefe, or afjifi them, who do, are aEls of injujiice. The contrary j to render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is juflice. Def. XV. He that -would not violate truth, miifi avoid all injujiice : or, all injufiice is "wrong and evil. It interferes with the tmths '' here before laid down, and per- haps more. It denies men to hcjubje£ls capable of diftinft properties: in fome cafes it denies them to have a property even in their own bodies, life, fame, and the like : the pradice of it is incompatible with the peace and happinefs of man- kind : it is what every man thinks unreafonable in his own cafe, when the inju- ly is done to himfelf : to take any thing from another only becaufe I think I want it, or becaufe I have power to take it, and will have it, without any title !Tfo9-s(rj«/i« ■xciftX^y, Tyinjcavra, x«p«A«ba;v «»©- iiraAau'si t5 ovifjuar®^. LuC. ' ^ui te pafcit tiger, tuusefi,biic. Horace, alluding to this truth. Ui(l wanU, f^ysFlato, i> i(i&a ToioVJi ^tTivi/At- f/jot jStxim TTt^f rav x»,iT^io.'v fA,>i}ifU. i^m^a (pUuv fAf^oi iyar and then proceeds, /*■-)/'' «u xf'3^/ii,),^i„ Tav "S 3-iAa?, ia.t yly, ■niar^ rm >:!x.Ti;fA,ive,if, ktX. In Vluturch the thing is carried farther : where it is faid, that a man palTing by another man's door ought f/^tt fiM^m uru, xA. according to a faying of Xenocrates, l^r/tv ^ic: or doing what one can to achieve that which is evil: and to do this, by the terms, mull; be -xrong and evil. Even the deftre of obtaining any thing unjuftly is e\ il : becaufe to dcfire to do evil, by the terms again, is an evil or criminal r^efirc. If the aft follows fuch a defirc, it is the child and produ6l of it : and the defire, if any thing renders the fulfilling of it imprafticable, is the aft obftrufted in the beginning, and iHflcd in the womb. Let it be obfei-ved here by way oi fcholion concerning the thing called cove- toufnefs, that there feem to be three forts of it. One is this here mentiond : a defire of getting from others, tho it be unjujlly. This is wrong and wicked. Another is an immenfe defire of heaping up what one can by juft methods, but without any reafunable end propofed '', and only in order to keep '^, and as it were hury if^ : and the more he accumulates, the more he craves*. This alfo in- trenches upon truth, and feems to be a vice. But to covet to obtain what is another man's by jujl means, and with his confent, when it may contribute to the happinefs of our felves or families, and perhaps of the other perfon too, has nothing furely that looks unfriendly upon truth, oris blameable, in it. This, if it may be called covetoufnefs, is a virtuous covetoufnefs. ' Account TO (r«» («<3io» iro» Iivai, ri ^\ i>^o3-fi«, »ff--£f eV""", i»o7»«v. Ipicl.'s words. jHJlitU pri- miim mtmus eft. ut ne cui quis mceat, nifi lacejfitus injuria ; deinde, m commtmibm fro coinmitnibus utatur, frivatis ut fuis. Cic. This is to ufe things as being what they are. >= Blepfiai i ^a- .:-.5-i?, in Lttcian. dies of hunger (Ai,*: a.9-Ai©- ixtyiro kzi.Y„.t,«.,). Ridiculous enough. c Or only a-f^s to Ic^Aihiiv, as Anacharfis faid of fome Greeks. Athen. <^ As that man, in Athe- mus, indeavourd literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money, before he died he fwallowd as much of it as he could {x.u.Tx,^imn i«. ix.'yxi y^vri; ^-TsS-avi:,) . ' Of fuch it is, thatD/'o^f^fJufedto fay, '0///o"B5 ts? 4)i;^«,'vfj»5 toX^ iS'fu-n'in, r.x. Stob. The Mamfiilim, mentiond in N.ihh. Ab. compare them HHU'^V; my 1p3 O Q^mbOH Cl^Dno nr\'i!W iSJD^/b I XVI. fFhen Truths refpe^tng Mankind, &"€. 1 39 XVI. fFhen a man cares not -what fufferings he caufes to others, and efpecially if he delights in other men's Jufferings and makes them his /port, this is -what I call cruelty. And net to be affeSied with the fufferings of other people, the they proceed not from us, but from others, or from caufes in which ive are not concerned, is un~ mercifulne/s. Mercy and humanity are the revcrfe of thefe. XVII. He, tahoreligioujly regards truth and nature, will not only he not unjuji, but {more) not unmerciful, ami much lefs cruel. Not to be afFe£ted with the affliSti- ons of others, fofar as we know them, and in proportion to the feveral degrees and circumilances of them, tho we are not the caufes of them, is the fame as to confider the afflided as perfons not in affliftion > that is, as being not what they are, or ("which is the fame) as being what they are not: and this contra- di£ts matter of faSi. One can icarce know xht fufferings of another without having at leaft fome image of them in his mind : nor can one have thefe images without being confcious of them, and as it were feeling them. Next to fuffering itfelf is to cany the reprefen- tation of it about with one. So that he, who is not affe£ted with the calamities of others, fo far as they fall within his knowledge, may be flxidto know and not to knowj or at leallto cancel his knowledge, and contradi6l his own confcience. There is fomething in human nature ^ refulting from our very make and conftitu- tion, while it retains its genuin form, and is not a//^r^byvitious habits; notper- i.'f r/e^ by tranfports of revenge or fury, by ambition, company, orfalfephilofo- phy ^ ; nor oppreji by ftupidity and negledting to obferve what happens to others : I fay, there is fomething, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, caufes us to fympathize with them, and almoft comprehends us in their cafe. It is grievous to fee or hear (and almoft to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in tor- ment. This compaffon appears eminently in them, who upon other aecounts are jultly reckond amongft the beft of men": in fome degree it appears in almoft all ; nay, * Properly called humanity j becaufe nething of it appears in brutes. nu/U/im mspD HJ^N nonn nmin lyy^. S.Hhaf. ^ \iheaSeneca fays, Clementiam omnes ieni fnfiabunt, m'lje- ricordiam autem litalpunt, he feems only to quibble. He ha: tr.aiiy other weak things upon this I'ub- jeft. Thit, fuccurret I fitpieni] alienis lachrymis, non accedet, owns one uft of tears: they obtain fuc- coureven froma Stoic. ' 'AyuH-d xftiax^vii a.opsr. They, whoof all writers undertake toimi- tatc nature moft, oft introduce even their heroes weeping. (See how Homer reprefents UlyJfesOi.t. If J, 2, 7, — 8.) The tears of men are in truth very different from the cries and ejulations of children. They xefilent ftreams, and flow from other caufes i commonly fome tender, or perhaps philofophical, reflexion. It is eaiy to fee how hard hearts and dry eyes come to be fafhionable. But for all that, it is certain the glanduU lacrymales are not made for nothing, even 140 The Religion of Nature. Se ftript by thieves j ruind in his fortunes and un- done by knaves ; ftruggling to no purpofe, convulfed and agonizing under the knife of fome truculent ruffian j or the like. The fame is altogether as plain in the cafe of adultery '', when any one <^ infnares, and corrupts the wife of another j notwithftanding the protection it gains from falfe notions, great examples '^, and the commonnefs of the crime =. For (the na- ture ohnatrimony being for the prefent fuppofed to be fuch, as it will appear by and by to he) the adulterer denies the property a husband has in his wife by compaft, the moft exprefs and fxcred that can pofiibly be made : he does that, which ' Eft hominum naturd, quitm feqiii tlehmus, maxime inim'tcacrudelitits. Cic. "^ Asik* u,fy i x.>\.i7rTyic, a>i.' xx i'"" '^i « /J^o'Z'^i Chryf. '■' One of the Sub^tjjores aliemrum matrimoni- oriitn, as they are called in Val. Max. ^ Falam app»ret, adhuc state Divi Hieronymi adttU terium capite folere funiri : nunc magr.mum Itifus eft. Schcl.m S. Hier. « For hence follows impunity, o>c. OMa n a''Q ipos a''SN3D mWD. Mijlm. W T tends 14-2 The Religion of Nature. Sedl.VI. tends to fubvert the peace of Eimilies, confounds relation, and Is altogether in- confiftent with the order and tranquillity of the world, and therefore with the laws of human nature : he does what no man in his wits could think reafonabky or even tolerable, were he theperfon wrongd^ : briefly, he impudently treats a woman as bis own woman for wife ''), who is not his, but another's, contrary to jujlice, truth mAfa^ ". Nor is this fimple injuftice only, but injulHce, for which no reparation can be made if the injured man thinks fo j as he generally does (fee fe<5t.II.prop.I. obf. 4.) injuftice accompanied with the greateft cruelty; (c> complicated, as fcarce any other can be. The husband is for ever robbed of all that pleafure and fatisfadion, which arifes from the wife's fidelity and af- fection to him ^ } prcfuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner of his bed, but the companion of his life, and fharer in all his fortunes ^ ; and into the room of them fucceed painful and deftruftivcpaflions. The poor wowaw ^ herfelf, tho fhe may be deluded g, and not fee at preicnt her guilt, or the con- fequences of it, ufually pays dear for her fecurity and want of guard, the hus- band becoming cold ^ and averfe to her, and fhe full of apprehenfions and fears ', with a particular dread of his further refentment . And their affairs,m this disjointed and diftra£led condition, are negleftedj innocent childrendightcd, zndlehunpiO' vided for,without fo much as the comfort of any certain relations to pity x.hcm^,i^c. The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by fuch impertinent fimik\ and rakilh talk, as are commonly ufed for that purpofe '. When any one wrongs another of his property, he wrongs \\\\\\oi whatitisto him, the proprie- tor : and the value muft be fet according to what he efteems it to be, not what * Is, qui nulliits non uxcrem concupifcit, idem sixorem fuam afpici non -vult : ey fidei acerrimus txuBor, ef perfidus: Si mendich perfequieiir, ipfe perjurui. Sen. ^ IPU/N, tkv iavra yt^vZixct- c What amonflcr in nature muft he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare toadlagainft all theft, (to u& Seneca's vfords agiin) fatis juftam cxufam putat amandi, quod xliena eft [«A:or]? <''OkJs '/i t5t' £i£!-(v i.TTHY, iii^ TO a-uujO. fiiavov i^wcj/,iy::i yuuuixli, «;a' :(' sii TuM^Si iijrm, ii ■i/vA 3-fo t£ Faf/jicT®- ii<; a^oTfiwo-iK i^ii^tTai, ^i^ii!Txcf/,ir,i TsmTO, Trivet ii7z?-si(piS^ y^ fiiiriiy T av^^cc, x^ irrlov «» f" ^tm', " '"» [mg-®" i-'Jilxnro i[/u(pa:U, xrX. Vh.Jnd. e Marriage is xtniuna Trarrli '§ ^l^^. oixfioTi'ja <£" f/jui^uv 't 'da^uv ^xemuifiStJ. Jfocr. ' 'At«Ao» ^aav. S. Self. ''£s-£(r«?j . ili^u-^m, fays the penitent woman in Soph. ap. Vlut. ^ -ivxi" a-ajav-aAira.a T%it»i kkica l^nxn©~. Soph, > ^uid enim falvi eft mulieri, amijft pudicitia I Livy. ■■• Oi f^-ioh wix-n- xirii K&/M01 TiM^ii f-1^' fJ-ffM ymi ^^etrvi/AriB'Uvcti JV^ajU/SHX, ^i) rs tJ tS yi)j«/«»T©^, /*>i T£ roi iS u,ciy,S. Vh. y. ' Such as AriftippUJ ufts to Diogenes, ap, Athen. ''Apa yi y^ii n tret ktos-oj i^i riro'lipn. iV«? . Senfelds fluff. Nor is that of the adulterous woman in Vrov, S, better; where ntby^ ~\'2> Ti"l is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of aferpcnt upon a rock, and of a (hip in the fea, ^yw "inil -\0V tnu;n n3 n'iJy N?u; • and therefore (he )>^ H^S nnspD niflC, and then thinks that pN ^n>yS S^i^ IDli" "tDUI HI inN. See ^i& vena^i. A « the Truths refpe^ing Mankind, &'c. 143 the injurer, who perhaps has no tafte of virtuous pleafures, may think it to be. (See p . 3 3 . obf. 3, 4.) Nor may thefe thefts be excufed from their fecrecy. For 1 . the injuftice of the fad is the fame in itfelf^ whether known, or not. In either cafe m//^ is denied : and a lie is as much a he, when it is whifperd, as when it is prodaitnd at the market-crofs. 2. It has been fhewd (fc£b. II.) that the re£bitude of our aftions and way to happinefs are coincident ; and that fuch a£bs, as are difa- greeable to trutli^ and wrong in themfelves, tend to make men ultimately unhappy ». Things are fo orderd and difpofed by the Author of nature, or fuch a conflitution of things flows from him, that it mufi be fo. And fince no retreat can be impervi- ous to his eye, no corner ib much out of the way, as not to be within his plan, no doubt there is to every wrong and vitious aft a fuitable degree of unhappineis iind punifament annext, which the criminal will be fure to meet with fame time or other ^. For his own fake therefore he ought not to depend upon thedarknefs of the deed. But lajlly, it can hardly be, but that it muft be difcoverd<^. People ge- nerally rife in vice, grow impudent and vain and carelefs, and difcover themfelves ^i the opportunities contrived for it mull be liable to obfervation : fome confidents muffc be trufhcd, who may betray the fecret, and upon any little diftaftc probably 'will do it : and befidc, love is quick of apprehenfion ^. It will be eafily perceived from what has been faid, that if to murder, roby &c. are unjuft and crimes of a heinous nature, all thofe things which have any tendency toward them, or affinity with them, or any way countenance them, muft be in their degree criminal f; becaufe they are of the fame complexion with that which they tend to, tho not of the fame growth, nor matured into thegrofsaft, or perhaps do not operate fo prcfently, apparently, or certainly. Envy, malice, and the like, are conatus's toward the deftru£tion or ruin of the perfon, who is the objccb of theie unhappy paffions. To throw dufi i upon a man's reputation by innunendo's, ironies, ^c. may not indeed fully it all at once, as when dirt is thrown, or grofs calumnies j yet it infedls the air, and may deflroy it by a lin- gring poifon. To expofe another by the ftrength of a jefling talent, or harder temper of face, is to wound him, though it be in an invifible a Nemo mains felix : m'mime conuftor, ^c. Juv. 1= 'Avtcri^^xi-®- yi i 3-u®^ »ou,©^. plot, ■^ K«i 'f> a» TztcfiUTixa Kfv'^'yi, i/ri^o/ etp^nTVi. Ifocr. Mce^vfiitrisirK i KXlvti (^ o Aii^/©' i MtyxTrL- B-)sc. Luc. "* 'H^m //.o -^ uTTcirrut kXecl^mir»Toy. phto. ' ^Htd non fentit amor > Ov. f 'A'/x^M » TO jiiii ksir.'S), a,».x to ,«,)], that proceed not to confummate wickednefs, nor perhaps are intended to be carried fo f;ir, may yet divert peoples afFeftions from their proper objeft, and debauch the mind '^. Eyjiories or infmuaUons to fow xhc feeds of dif- cord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them, by another hand. Even for men to intermeddle in other peoples affairs, as bufy bodies and k».n^i»- ,3r.Vxo-T<>i do, is to affume a province, which is «o/ theirs ; to concern themfclves with things, in which they are not concernd j to make that public, which in '\x.k\i IS private; and perhaps to rob theperlbn, into whofebufmefs they intrude themfelves, of his quiet^ if of nothing elfe. For indeed this intermeddling looks hke fetting up a pretence to fomething further > like an unjuft attack be- gun at a diitance. All which declares what an enemy, and how irreconcilable to truth.^ this pragmatical humor is. And fo on. If thefe things arefo, how guilty muft they be, who are defignedly the/iro- moters or infruments of injuftice and wickednels > fuch as mercenaiy fwearers, and falfc witneflcs} traders in fcandal > folicitors in vice > they who intend by their converfation to relax mens principles too much, and (as it feems) prepare them for knavery, lewdnefs, or any flagitious cnferprize '^. There aie other crimes, fuch as infidelity to friends or them who intruft us with any thing, ingratitude, all kinds of wilful perjury, and the like, which might have been»«e«//o«.<.iu.ct « rl Ictn ,.u.%o; Izl -cctu. «'/(!» ipiAoK(K5n-i«, xA. S. Baf. ' Omnes tnim immeworem beneficii oilerunt. Cic. And the fame ii»y be laid of the unfaithful, perjured, ^c. m Sect* Truths ref peeling particular Societies, S^c. 14.5 Sect. VII. Truths refpecfing particular Socktks ^offjMen^ or Governments. r. "ly X J N is a facial creature : that is, a fingle man, or family, cannot fuhfifl, I Y I or not ivell, alone out of all fociety. More things are neceflary to fuf- tainXiic, or at Icaft to make it in any degree pleafant and deiirable, than it ispof- fible for any one man to rsiake and provide for himfelf merely by his own labor and ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothing , and houfe, and that frugal furniture which isabfolutely requifite, with a little neceflary phylic, fuppofe many-M-i^-xnd trades, many heads, and many hands. If he could make a fhift in time of health to live as a wild man under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon fuch fruits, herbs, roots, and other things, as theearthfhould afford, and happen to prefent to him ; yet what could he do in ficknefs, or old age, when he would noc be able to ftir out, or receive her beneficence. If he fhould take from the other fex fuch a help, as the common appetite might prompt him to feek, or he might happen to meet with in his walks j yet ftill if- the ^i?«^; are doubled, t\\&ivants are doubled too: nay more, additional wants, and great ones, attending the bearing and education of children. If we could fuppofe all thefe difficulties furmounted, and a family grownup, and doing, what a y?«^/^ family is capable of doing by it fclfj fupporting them- felves by gai'dening, a little agi-iculture, or a few cattle, which they have fome - how got, and tamed (tho even this would be hard for them to do, having no mar- kets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandly, or of their, little flock, or herd for other things ; no fhops to repair to for tools j no fer- vant, or laborer to aflift ; nor any public invention, of which they might ferve themfelves in the preparation of their grain, dreffing their meat, manufacturing, their wool, and the like) > yet ftill it is only the cortex of the man, which is pro- vided for : what mull become of the interior part, the minds of thefe people ? How would thofc be fed, and improved ^ ? Jrts and fciences, fo much of them - as is neceflary to teach men the ufe of their faculties, and unfold theu" reafon, . are not the growth of fingle famihes fo imployd. And yet for men to lay out *^^id. ergo, animn mdkne habet alimenta froprU .' an ejus efcafciem'a nobis viditKr ! S. Auft, i4'6 T/>^ Religion o/' Nature. Se6l. VII. all their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood and humors in circulation^ without any further views, or any regard to the nobler part of themfelves, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being foim- ed for rational extvc'i^Qs.. If iiWxhc exceptions zgzm&. this feparate way of living could be removed j yet .as mankind increafes, the little plots^ which the feveral families polTefs, and cul- tivate, mull be inlarged, or multiplied : by degrees they would find themfelves .ilraitend : and there would foon be a collifton of interefts, from whence difputes and quarrels would enfue. Other things too might minifler matter for thefe. And bellde all this, fome men are naturally troublefome, vitious, thievifh, pug- nacious, rabid ; and thefe would always be dillurbing and flying upon the next to them : as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have any advantage or luperiority in power, would not fail to make themfelves yet greater or flronger by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments they might grow to he formidable '. Under fo many wants, and fuch apprehenfions, or prefent dangers, neceflity would bring fome families into terms oi friendjlnp with others for mutual com- fort and defence: and this, asthereafonofit increafed, would become flronger, introduce ftriftcr ingagements, and at lafl bring the people to mix and unite. And then the weak being glad to fhelter themfelves under the proteftion and condu6b of the more able, and fo naturally giving way for thefe to afcend, the feveral forts would at length fettle into their places, according to their fcveral weights and capacities with refpeft to the common concern. And thus fome form of -xfociety mull aiife : men cannot fubfift othenvife. But if it was poflible for a man to preferve life by himfelf, or with his petit company about him: yet nobody can deny, that it would be infinitely better for him, and them, to live in a fociety, where men are fer^'iceable to them- felves and their neighbours at the fame time, by exchanging their money, or goods, for flich other things as they want morej where they are capable of do. 'Wiggood offices t-xch. for other in time of need> where they have the prcteSion of laws, and a public fecurity againil cheats, robbers, ad^iiTmes, and all enemies to property j where a common force or army is ready to interpofe between them and foreign invaders > and where they may injoy thofe difcoveries which have been made in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by con'verfu- tion and innocent conflifts of reafon, and (to fpeak outj may be made men. • Alter to alnrius exitium hvi comfendit ducitur. Sen. Truths refpe&ing particular Societies, &c. 1 47 If, ^vhell we have the prhilege of fociety and laws, we can fcarce preferve our own, or be fafe, what a woful condition fhould we be in without them j ex- pofed to the infults, rapines, and violence of unjull and mcrcilcfs men, not having any /a«iS«£?0', any thing to take refuge in? So again, if notwithlland- ing the help of friends and thofe about us, and fuch conveniences as may be had in cities and peopled places, we are forced to bear many pains and melan- choly horns, how irkfome would life be, if in ficknefs or other trouble there was no body to adminirter cither remedy or confolation ? Lailly, fociety is what men generally deftre. And tho mttch company may be attended with much vanit}', and occafion many evils * yet it is certain, that ab- foluteand perpetualyo/zY/^ii? has fomething in it very irkfome and hideous ''.Thus the fecial life is natural to man j or, what his nature and circumftances require. ILthe end of fociety is the common iiielf are and good of the people ajfociated. This' isbut the confequenccofwhat has been jullfaid. Forbecaufe men cannot fubfifb wf//, or not /o u'f//, feparately, therefore they unite into greater bodies : that is,, the end of their uniting is their better fubfiftence ; and by how much their manner of living becomes better, by fo much the more effedually is this end anfwerd. ? . III. A fociety^ into nuhich men enter for this end^fuppofes fame rules or lazvs^ ac~ cording to which they agree all to be governed.^ with a pozujer of altering or adding is ■ them as occafion fiall require. A number of men met together without any ra/w, by which they fubinit to be governed, can be nothing but an irregular multi- tude. Every one being ikiWfui juris, and left intirely to his own private choiccj by whatever kind of judgment or paflion or caprice that happens to be de- termind, they mult needs inter jere one with another : nor can fuch a concourie of people be any thing different from an indigcifed chaos of diflenting parts, which by their cenfufed motions would damnify, and deftroy each other. This muft be true, if men differ in the fize of their underftandings, in their man- ner of thinking, and the feveral turns their minds take from their education, way of living, and other circumftances j if the greateft: part of them are un- der the direftion of bodily affe£l:ons j and if thefe differ as much as their iTiape.^, their complexions, their conftitutions do <^. Here then we find nothing but conftifion and unhappinefs. ' ^WWefiysagoodmanwouldbe neither aipiA©-, nors-oA^/'^iA^. Thisis juft. Therefore ^fs^M feems to go a little too far, when he writes, Omnes amicos habere cpere/um ejfe, fatis ejfe inimicos Km habere. ^ Zaot a-uvityOiecriKii/ i coSfrnr^, S.Baf, « Man is, mGre^. Haz.'s words, TO 7ro>Mrgo7!aTciToi T ^im, y^ !7oi»(AaT«Toy. Such 148 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. VJI. Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their common gcod znA bappinefSf muft be fucha one as in the firft place, may render them compatible one with another: which cannot be without ruks^ that may dire<5t and adjult their feveral motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to feme de- gree of uniformity^ or at leaft rellrain fuch excurfiom and enormities^ as would render their living together inconfiftent. Then, there mull be lome exprefs declarations and fcita to afcertain properties and titles to things by common confent : that fo, when any altercations or difputes ihall happen concerning them (ws be i'ure many muft in a world fo unreaibnablc and prone to iniquityj, the appeal may be made to their own fettlemcnts; and by the application oi a general undifputcd rule to the particular cafe before them it may appear, on which fide the obliquity lies, the controverfy may be /^/r/j decided, and all mouths eternally flopped. And then again, that they may be protected and perfevere in this agi-eeable life, and the injoymcnt of their refpeftivc properties hefecuredio them, feveral things muft be forecafted by way of precaution a- gainft foreign invafions ; punilhmentsrnuft be appointed (or offences committed amongft themfelves, which being known may deter men from committing them, ^c. Thefe rules, method?, and appointments of punifliments, being in- telligibly and honertly drawn up, agreed to, and publilhd, arcthe -mutual com-. pads ' under which the fociety is confederated, and the laws of it. If then to have the members of a fociety capable of fubfifting together, if to have their refpective properties afcertaind, if tobe/i/eand^///>/ inthepofteflion of ihcmbdor ihc general good of the fociety, and thefe things cannot be had •without laws; then a fociety, whole foundation and cement is the public good, muft have fuch laws, or be fuppofedat leaft to defign fuch. As to the making of any /rtr//;fr laws, when the public intereft and welfare re- quire them,that is but repeating the fame power in other inftances,which they made ufe of before in making their firft laws : and as to altering orrcpealing, it is certain the power of making and unmaking here are equal. Belide, when men are incorpo- rated and live together for their mutual good, this end is to be confiderd at one time as much as at another ; not only in their firft conftitution and fcttlement. W .Thefe laws and determinations mufl be fuch, as are not inconfiflent with natural jujiice. For i. To ordain any thing that interferes with truth is the fame as to or- dain, that what is /r«fftiall be /^//e; oxv.v^. which is abfurd. z. To pretend by a law to make that to be juft, which before and in itfclf was unjuft, is the fame as to ordain that which interferes with truth : bccaufe juftice is founded in • nS; sViv^n/.:^ -aoXtii; c-m(:ikii x'.t-.^. Bemojlh. •> Ni^(,©-iVi i oir^tv^tc. Stoi.iPLu. truth Truths refpe&ing •particular Societies, &c. 1 4 9 truth (as before), and every where the fame ». Therefore, 5 ■ by a law to enact any thing which is naturally unjuit is to cna6t that winch is abfurd ; that which by fc6t. I. is morally evil } and that which is oppofite to thofe laws, by which it is manifeftly the will of our Creator we fliould be governed''. And to enaft what is thus evil mull: be evil indeed. LaJIly, to eilablilli injuftice muft be utterly inconfiflent with the general good and happinefs of any fociety 5 unlefs to be unjuftly treated, pilled, and abufed can be happincfs ^. And if fo, it is utterly inconfiftent with xhtend of fociety j or, it is to deny that to be the end of it, which is the end of it. V. J fociety limited by laws fuppofes magi fl rates, and a fubcrdination of powers : that is, it fiippofes a government of fame form or other. Bccaufe, where men are to aft by mles or laws for the public weal, fome mull: of neceflity be appointed to judge, when thole laws are traiifgreft, and how far} xo decide doubtful cafes, and the like : there muft be fome armed with authority to execute thofe judg- ments, and to punifj offenders : there mull: be perfons chofen not only to punifli :xn6. prevent public evils, but alfo to do many other things, which will be re- quired in advancement of the public good : and then the power of making new lawSy and abrogating or mending old ones, as experience may direft or the cafe at any time require, as alfo of providing prefently and legally for the iafety of the public in time oi fudden danger, mull be lodged fomev.'here. If there are no executors of the laws, the laws cannot be executed ; and if fo, they are but a dead letter, and equal to none : and if the fociety has none, it is in- deed no fociety, or not fuch a one as isthefubjeft of this propofition. Guardi- ans and executors of laws are therefore the vitals of a fociety, witho~ut which there can benoaVijaA-z/iwof juftice in it, no care of it taken, nor can it conti- nue. And fince men can be but in one place at once, there mull be numkcrs of thefe proportionable to the bigncfs and extent of it. AiV.c.ov ^:Vl., kx-'iy. :. Arift. tTiTci y-u ■:=6,«X, ^i£y b Even the Heathens believed, tint above all human y.-A^^jyi'^-xTu. there vvfre Mu,iy.ei, which mortals ought not to tranfgrefs : b yus n rji -/£ x«;t;.9-£? k.i! kCi sroTs l^,T»jTa,. Sofh. Nee fi rcgannte Tarqninio nulla erat Roinj: fcriptu /cv ile fltipris, id- circonon contra Ugcwfemfucrnr.m Sex. Titrquinl:ts ih?) Lucretia — eltulit. trirt er.im ratio pro- fe.la a rerum nature, j* ad rcHa faciendum impellcns, Cp « deliclo a-voca-in : qus non turn dcniqi incipit lex ejp, cum fcripta eft, fed tmn cum orta eft. Orta aiitem Jimiil eft cttm mente divina. Cic. c Si tanta feteftas eft fttdtorumfentemiis atq; jitjjis, ut eorum fip-agiis reriun natura, vcrtctur; cur non f^nciunt, ut, qus. mala perniciofaq; [ant, hitt/eantur pro tcnis, ^,c falutaribui >. atit cur, cmnjusex it.jnyia kx fiicere poip:, bcnmn eadm facere ):on po£it ex muh? Cic. V And I 50 The Religion of Nature. Sedl:. VII. And further, fince the concerns of a whole fociety, and fuch things as may fall within the compafs of a Itatutc book, are various^xQc^wixing fcveral forts and fizes of abilities^ and lying one abo^ae another in nature j fince not only private men want to be in/peEtecJ^ but even magiftrates and officers themfelves, who (tho they oft for- get it) arc ftill but men ; and iince the whole focicty is to be one, one compafl bo- dy : I fiy, fince the cafe is thus, there mufl be men to aft in feveral elevations and qualities as well ^s. places^ of which the inferior fort in their feveral quarters mufr aft immediately under their refpeftive [uperiors ; and fo this clafs of fuperiors in their fcveral provinces under others above them ; till at laft the afcent is terminated m (ome bead^ where the legillative power is depofited, and from whence fpirits and motion are communicated through the whole body. An army may as well be fuppo- fed to be well difciplined,well provided, and well condufted without either general or officers, as a fociety without governors and their fubalterns, or ('which is the fiime) v/ithout forxe form of government, toanfwer the end of its being. VI. yf man may part ivith fame of bis natural rights, and put himfelf under the government of laws, and thofe, ijoho in their feveral Jiations are intrujled with the execution of them, in order to gain the prote^ion of them, and the privileges of a re- gular fociety. Becaufe by this he doth but exchange one thing for another, which he reckons equivalent, or indeed preferable by much : and this he may do without afting againil (JKj/rw/^. For the liberties and natural rights, which he exchanges, are his own, and therefore no other man's property is denied by this: nor is the nature of happinefs denied to be what it is, fince it ishappinels which he aims at in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend a- gainft truth, and deny happinefs to be what it is, if he did not do it; efpecial- ly feeing, that here his own happinefs coincides with the general happinefs and more convenient being of the kingdom or commonwealth, where his lot falls, or his choice determins him to live. If the qucfiion fhould be asked, what natural rights a man may part with, or how far he may part with them i the generaUn{^cr, I think, may be this. Somethings are eJJ'ential to our being, and fome it is not in our power to part with. As to the re [I, he may depart from them fo far as it is confiftent with the end, for which he does this : not further, becaufe beyond that lies a contradiftion. A man cannot give away the natural right and property he has in any thing, in order to preferve or retain that property : but he may confent to contribute />.'?;'/ of hiseftate, in order to prcferve the ref, when othcrwife it might all be loft j to take his fhare of danger in defence of his country, rather than certainly perifh, be inflaved, or ruind by the conqueft or opprellion of it j and the like. VII. M:n Truths refpefting particular Societies, &c, 1 51 VII. Me-a may become members of a fvckty (i. e. do 'what is mentiondinthe fare' goir.g pvGpofitio-'i) by giving their confcnt^ either explicitlyy or implicitly. That u man may fubjcd himfelf to laws, \vc have fecn. If he does this, he muil da it cither in his own perfon; or he muftdo it by ^ome proxy, whom he fubftitiitca in his room to agree to public laws > or his confcnt muft be colkclcd only from the conformity of his carriage, his adhering to the focictv, -accepting the be- nefits of its conftitution, and acquiefcing in the cftablifliu methods and what is done by virtue of them. By the two fir ji ways he declares himfelf fA-///W//j, and direSlly : nor can he after that behave himfelf as if he was no member of the fociety, without acling as if he had not done what he has dene. And xhvs is the cafe not only of them, who have been concerned in the f.r(l formation of any government, but alfo of them, who have in the faid manners ' given their confent to my fubfcquent aces, by which they ovs-nd, confirmed, and came into what their anceitors had done, or who have by oaths put themfelves under obligations to the public. By the lajl of the three ways mentioiid a man's confcnt is given indeed implicitly^ and Icfs directly ; but yet it is given, and he becomes a party. For fuppofe him to be born in fome certain kingdom or com- monwealth, but never to have been party to any law, never to have taken an\- oath to the government, nor ever formally to have ingaged himfelf by any other a6l. In this cafe he cannot methinks but have fome love :Lndfympathy for that place, which afforded him the firft air he drew j fome gratitude towards that conftitution, which protefted his parents, while they educated and provided for him > fome regard to thofc obligations, under which perhaps they have laid him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of the world by them) conveyd to him his very life. If he inherits or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he Iws no indefeafiblc right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could not tell how to get, or keep, without the aid of laws and advantage of fociety > then, when he takes this inheritance, or whatever it is, with it he takes and owns the laws which give it him. Indeed fince ihcfcciirity he has from the laws of the country in refpeclof his perfon, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happen to be hereafter, is the general equivalent for \i\^ fubmijjion to them, he cannot accept that\ni\\- out being obliged in equity to pay this. a In perfon, or by proxy. V 2 Nay T^i The ReligioiV of Nature. Se6l. VII. Nay, laftly, his very continuing and fettUug in any place fliews, that either he likes the conftitution, or likes it betier than any other, or at leaft thinks it bet- ter in his circumflances to conform to it than to feek any other : that is, he con- fents to be comprehended in it '. VIII. J-Fhen a man is become a member of a fociety, if he would behave himfelf according to truths he ought to do thefe things : viz. to cowMqx property as founded not only in nature^ but alfo in lav: j and men's titles to what they have, as ftrengtiiend by that, and even by his own concejjion and covenants ; and therefore by fa much the more inviolable and facred : inftead of taking fuch meafures to do him- felf right, when he is molefted, or injured, as his ownpradence might fuggeft in a ftacc of nature, to confine himfelf to fuch luays as are with his own confent markt out for him: and, in a word, to behave himfelf according to his fubordination or place in the community, and to obfcrve tlielawsof it. For it is containdinthe idea of a law, that it is intended to be obferved : and therefore he, who is a party to anv laws, or profcfTes himfelf member of a focicty formed upon lav.'s, cannot willingly tranfgrefs thofelaws without denying laws tobeu'^^j^ theyare^ or him- felf to be what he isfuppofed or profcfles hmik\£ to be : and indeed without con- tradicting all or moll of thofe truths containd in the foregoing propofitions. IX. In refpcH cf thsfe things, ivhicb the laivs of the place take no cognizance of^ or ivhen if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of thofe laws cannot be had (for fo it may fomctimcs happen. I fay, in refpecl of fuch things), be 'Uibo ts a member of a focicty in other refpeUs retains his natural liberty, is fiill as it were in a ft ate of nature, and mufi endeavour to a£l according to truth and his be ft prudence. For in the former cafe there is nothing to limit him, by the fuppofirion, but truth and nature. And in the other it is the fame as if there was nothing j fincc inefeSi there is no law, where no effect or benefit from it is to be had. As, for example, if a man ihould be attacked by thieves or murderers, and has no op- portunity or power to call the proper magiltrate or officer to his afliftance. There is a third cafe, which perhaps may demand admillion here: and that is, when laws arc plainly contrary to truth and natural jufiice. For tho they may pafs the ufual forms, and be llyled lawsj yet, fince no fuch law can abro^ gate that law of nature and reafon» to which the Author of oui- being hath fubjected us, or make falihood to be truth j and two inconfiftent laws cannot • Tlaso fays, when any man has fecn our form of government, f^e, and remains Ender it, >i'<^? belt Truths refpeBlng particular Societies, &c. r 5 3 both oblige, or fubfifl: together; one of them muft give w;iy : and it is eafy to difcern, ijDhich ought to do it ^. There remains one truth more to be annexed here, which may be contra- difted by the praftices and pretences of Enthufialls ''. X. The focieties intended in this JeBion^ ftich as kingdoms and common'-dticahhs, may defend tbemfehes againjl other nations : or, -x-^r may lawfully be -waged in de- fence and forthefecurity of afociety^ its members and territories, or for reparation of injuries. For if one man may inaftate of nature have a right to defend himfclf, (lee fe£l. VI. prop. VII.j, two may, or three, and fo on. Nay, perhaps two may have a double right, three a threefold right, £5?^. At Icaft, if the right be not greater, the concern is greater : and there will be more reafon, that two, or three, or more fhould be faved, than one only ; and therefore that two, or three, or more lliould defend themfelvcs, than that one fliould. And if this may be done by men in a ftate of nature, it may be done by them when corr- federated among themfclves : becaufe with rcfpc6t to other nations they are ftill in that fiate. I mean, fo far as they have not limited themfclves by leagues and alliances. Befidc, if a man may defend himfclf, he may defend \\vm^e\?hyvfhxi methods he thinks mofl: proper, provided he trefpalTes againft no truth j and therefore, by getting the aid and afliftance of ethers. Now when war is levied in defence of the public, and the people in general, the thing may be coiifiderd as if every particular man was defending himfelf with the afliilance of all the re/?, and fo be turned into the fame cafe with that of 0. fingle man. In truth the condition of a nation feems to be much the fame with that of a ftngleperfon when there is no law, or no benefit of law, to be Iiad : and what one m;m may do to another in //;^;/6»/z//o«,may bedone by one nation or politic body with refpecl to another : and perhaps by this rule, regard being had to what has been deHverd in fe6t. VI. the jujlice of foreign wars may be not untruly eftimated. Mutual defence is one of the great ends of fociety, if notthegreateft, and in a particular and eminent manner involves in it defence zgmiilforeign ener/iies. And whoever fignalizes himfelf, when there is occafion for his iervice, merits the grate- ful acknowledgements and celebrations of his countr)'-men : fo far at leaftas he adsgeneroufly and with a public fpirit, and not in purfuanceo»/y oi private viezvs. • lUud fiuhijjimum, exifiimxre omnia jufta ejfe, qu.i/citafnt in fopalorum inftitutis, HHtlegiius. — Si populorum JHjp, fi princifum Jecreti:, /ifententtisjtidicum, jura conftititerenttir, jus effet latrocinarit jus, adulterare : jus, tiftamcuta fdfafHppontre, fi luc fuffi-ngii: autfcitii mHltilHilsiiis probarentur. Cic. * Mdaicheans of old, andfbme moderns. As 1 54 ^^^^ Religion of Nature. Se6l. VIII. As to thofe wars^ which arc undertaken by men out of ambition % merely to inlargc empire, or to lliew the world, how terrible they are, how many men they arc able to flay, how many ilavcs to make ^, how many famdlies to drive from their peaceful habitations, and, in fhort, ho\y much mifchicf and mifcry they are able to bring upon mankind; thcfe are founded upon filfe notions of glory: imhellifid indeed by Icrvile wits and mifplaccd eloquence, but condemned by all true philofophy and religion. Sect. VIII. Truths concerning Families and Relations. T HIS lection lliall begin as relation itfelf does, with marriage. I. The end of marriage is the propagation of mankind^ and joint happinefs of the couple intermarrying, taken together; or the latter by itfelf'^. The difference of the fexes, with the flrong inclination they have each to the injoyment of the o- ther'', is plainly ordaind by the author of nature for the continuance ofthey/>Jrij A&©- . V And Truths concerning Families, fe^c. 155 And then as to that other thing, which either accompanies the aforefiiid end of marriage, or is fas in many cafes it can only be) the end ufdf^.^ the joint happinefs of the conjuges^ no body can be fuppofed to marry in order and on fet purpofe to make him or herfelf unhappy : no nor without a pre- famption of being more happy. For without an apprehenfion of fomc degree of happinefs to accrue, or what prefents itfelf to the imagination as fuch, and is taken for fuch, what can induce people to alter their condition ? Something there muft be, by which (however things prove upon trialj they think to better it. And indeed if their circimftances are fuch, as may inablethem to maintain a fa- mily, and provide for children, without difficulties and an over-burden of caresj and if they in good earnefi refolve to behave themfelves as they ought, and recipro- cally to be helpful and loving each to other, much comfort and happinels '' may juftly be expected from this intimate union <^, the interchange of affections, and a confpiration of all their counfels and meafurcs '', the qualities and abilities of the one fex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For to pais over in filence thofe joys, which are truell when mofc conceald % many things, there are, Vv hich may be ufeful, perhaps neceflary to the man^ and yet require the delicatcr hand or nicer management and genius of the ivoman ^: and fo, vici£in?y a That fure is a hard law in Vlato, which injoins uTrix,'.^ Scfisuc, S-^AEtk? z:a(nii;, t'v i^ fxl, lii-jXeno at c-;i 6:;;^ TO (r.ra^i.'. 'I hat mentiond in S. Hhared. fays otherwift : H^^ IDJiy tmM C3"ob y"D 01 nimyo inu;&5W3. Many opinions are taken, up upon flight rcalbns. When OceUtis Lucmn i-/,-,:hir.i Inxa ej'c^ o-^'^Jsti;;;:;', «»i6 t?; £('« t:v uii %sow/ S'MUieyr,'; rS '/sW, how doth he know that they were not given for both thefe ends, in a regular way? And &> when Clemens Alex, ftews his zeal againft rui aKccczm rsrs'as, rn ir^s? rk? iyy.'jn', hjMXiai, (^c. adding^ tj-i^ii •>§ iJi»>i, xav ci yay.'j 7:0.- f a>.»;cA, S, Chryf. z th.e 1 55 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. VIII. the wow^K cannot but want many things, which require the more robuft and ac- tive powers or greater capacity of the man '. Thus, in lower hfe, whilll the wheel, the needle, (^c. imploy her, the plough or fome trade perhaps demands the mufcles and hardinefs of /;/»? ; and, more generally, i£ fie infpects domeftic affairs, and takes care, that every thing be pro\'ided regularly, fpent frugally, and injoyd with neatnefs and advantage, he is buficd in that profcflion, or the overfi"-ht and improvement of that eftate, which mult fuftain the charge of all this i he prefidcs, and directs in matters of greater moment ; preferves order in the family by a gentle and prudent gov emment, ^c ''. As then I founded the greater fccieties of men upon the mutual convenience, which attends their living regularly together j fo may I found this lefs, hut Jiric- tcr alliance between the man and the woman in their joint-happmefi^. Nature h:ys ■Si further aim, the prefeivation of the kind. II. That marriages arc made byfomefolcmn contraB, vtm^cr oath (andihefe perhaps attcndedv^ithfome pledge, or nuptial rites) '^i by ix)hich the parties mutually ingage to live Arifl. ^ Sec the convcrfition between Ifchomxchtis and his wife in Xtrtophon. = Tho Vl:)to (like tr.oftoi the old Creeks and Remans) among many very fine things hath now and then fome that arc weak, and even abfurd ; yet I cannot think, that by his community of women he meant any ihing like that, which is faid, at. Atl?en. to have been pradtilcd 5r«f« Tv^fumi; luTaTrac, Tp'^iJa-etnv i or that his thought could be fo grofs, as L.iilantius reprcfents it : Sci icet »t ad eandem muUerem multi lirl, tanqnamcMes, conflaerent. For thus, property being taken out of the world, a great part of virtue is extinguiflid, and all indaftry and improvements are at an end. And befide tliar, many of the mod fubftantial comforts and innocent delights of this life are defiroyd at once. Siomncs cm- nii'.m fuerint ^ mariti, ^ patres, ©• iixores, & Hieri, qu/i ift.-i conf:ifo generis h]:m,ini c^t f • ^uui attt -vir mtdurem, atit muli:r --Jrum c'iligit, r.iji hf.bitaverlnt ftmfer una, ? nifi deiota mens, & fir-' vat a hivicim fides hidividiiam fecerit caritatem. Sec. U. However it muft be confeft^ that Tlato has advanced ir.ore than was confiflfnt with his own gravity, or with nature. The bcft cxcufe to be made for Y\m, that I know of, is that in Athcnasis, "toir.-j i uxkruv ;/,'>, rcTi 'ae-iv U;Sr^oi7! i; y^!t.-^M TB? vijM/'Js, '*'■>'« ''"''~? "•"' ■'"^S ha.7:>^a.Tiou.'ttci^ : or perhaps to fay, tbat he wjs fo intent upon ftrengthcning and defending his com men- wealth, that he forgot, if men mull, live after "his manner, there would be little in it -morth defsndiiig. After all, his meaning to me is not perfectly clear. "1 Everv one knows how marriages were made among the Romans, confarreatione, coemptione, tifu : of- which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies : and the legiiima. t^bclU or at leafl confirnt of friends (which could not be given without lomc folemnityj preceded all, nufpkia were ufually taken, public notaries and witncfles afiifted, cy-r. Among the Greeks men and women v.-ciccrpouicdby mu'ual promifcs of fidelity : tclldc v.'hich there were witnefTcs, and dotal writings Truths concerning Families, 6*^. 157 Vive together in Icve^ and to he faithful^ ajftfling^ and the like^ each to other, in all circumjlances of health and fortune, till death farts them ', I take for granted. For all nations have fome form or other upon thefe occafions : and even pri- vate contra6bs cannot be made without fome ivords in which they are containd, nor perhaps without fome kind of fignificant, tho private, ceremony between the lovers ; which lofe nothing of force with refpefb to them by their being both parties and initnejfes themfelves. Something mufl pafs between them^ that is declarative of their intentions, exprejfes their vows, and binds them each to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of man and ivife upon any other foot. III. That intimate union, by which the conjuges become pojfejl each of the other'' s perfon '', the mixture of their fortunes ", and the joint- relation they have to their chil- dren \ all Jlrengthen the bonds and obligations of matrimony. By every a£l done in purfuance of a covenant, fuchas the matrimonial is, that covenant is ownd, ratified, and as it were made de integro, and repeted. PoJJ'effion is certainly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a former title, the title mull needs be corroborated. When tisio perfons throw their all into one ftock 2.% joint-traders for life, nei- ther of them can confiftently with truth and honefty take his fhare out and be gone (i. e. diflblve the partnerfhip) without the concurrence of the other j and fometimes it may not be eafy, perhaps poflible, to do it at all. Each therefore is even by this bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other. And as to the prefent cafe, if the marriage to be not altogether unfruitful, fince both the parents are immediately related to the fame child, that child is the medium of a fixt, unalterable relation between them. For, being both of the fame bloodwith (Tp6i»i») ; at the wedding, facrifices to Diana and other deities, and the ya^ixmi lvx»i ; and after tiiat, perhaps the being (hut up together, eating the y-v^mmv, a formal At-Vi; ^mr,, &c. The I'U/np of the Rent's have been performed riD3D, or nBW3, or nu^nn-. the ceremonies accompanying which may be feen particularly in Shulhh. at. with the additions of K.Mo. Ifirles {Eben ez.) And (topa^ by other nations) the form of folemnization of matrimony, and the manner, in which perfons mar- ried give their troth each to other among us, are extant in our public offices : where they may be feen by fuch, as feem to have forgot what they are. ' Connubio ftabili. Virg. b 01 v^in nan 5i to fi,ff®^ a».oTfiot, «»« zccn iBiotiyiTr- £■«;, >^ lAv^ii a.».n^km, Pltlt, <» 2-jj^i(rfj.(^ rx. rUm, ^oy.ii iMt. jirJfl. X the 158 The Religion o/* Nature; Sed:.VIII. the child ', they themfclves come to be of they^w^ blood: and fo thzt relation which at firft was only moral and legal, becomes natural; a relation in natui'e, which can never ceafe, or be difannulled. It follows now that, TV . Marrymg^ivhenthere is little ormprofpeEloftrue happinefs from thematch\ and efpecially if there are plain prefages of unhappinefs ; after marriage adultery j all kinds of infidelity ; transferring that affeSlion, which even under the decays of nature ought topreferve its vigor ^ and never to degenerate (at worfl) but into a friend- flnp of a fuperior kind ', and the like, are all wrong *■. Bccaufe the firfi of thefe is belying ones own fenfe of things, and has an air of difra^ior: ; or however it is to aft as if that was the leajl and moft trifling of all tranfiftions in life, which is certainly one of the greaiejl and moft delicate. And to offend in any of the 0- iher ways is to behave, as if the end of marriage was not what it is ; as if no {uch league had been made between the perfons married, as has been made, a5lu- al/y, zndfolemnly, and is ^i\\ fub/ijling between them; as if they were notpof- fefl each of the other ; their fortunes not interwoven ; nor their children fo e- qually related to them, as they arej and therefore the misbehaviour, being re- pugnant to truth, is a fin againft it, and the mighty Patron of it. If the moft exprefs ^ndfolemn cont\-\&.s, upon which perfons, when they mar- ry, do fo far depend, as in confidence of their being religioufly obfcrved to alter quite their condition, begin a new thredof life, and rifque all their fortune and happi- nefs : I fay, if fuch facred compafts as thefe are allowd to be broken, there is an end of ^\ faith ; the obligation of oaths (not more binding than marriage vows) ceafes> no jujlice can be adminifterd; and then what a direful influence muilthis have upon the affairs of mankind upon/^«/, and other accounts «? » In rtfpeft o^ which that in Tlutarcb particularly is true, 'H (pua-a fbiym(ri 2^ ¥ e-uf/^xrun i/^S?, iV £| iy-xTic'M fA,i^^ >i«fao-a, >Cj rvfyjxira, x.emii i/wfioT-i^oj? iinda to yaif^ov- ^ Socrates ab Ktlohfeentulo quoilam confnltus, uxorem duceret, an fe omn't matrimonio ai>(lineret, reffondit, Utrum eorum fecijfst, n^urum pcenitentiam. Hk te, inq:iit, foUtiulo, hie orbitas, hie generis interims, hie hi- res ulienus excifiet: illic ferfetuafolicitHdo contextus querelarum, — ineertus liberorum eventus. Val.M. « XpoM fvm^i'ti'; cixtKBO-);? ax^®^ «i^ re icytf^Zi tTrnimS/.ov. Flttt. <• It is viTible that polygamy, pellicate. Sec. mud be included here. They are not only inconfiftent with our forms and the very letter of the marriage-contradt, but with the f/fncc of marriage, which lies in fuch a union and love as can only be between typo. Ariptle doth not allow there can be even -peTkA friendfiip between more than two: much lefs therefore, ^erfeAlove. Ho^ior? s.-vai ^.'- ^o», xuru t!,» TfA£i«» o/?//i'^ pleafures, but alio in lejjming pains and wants j whilftthe pair have each in the other a refuge at hand. N. I have defignedly forborn to mention that authority of a husband over his wife, which is ufually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by laws J becaufe I think it has been carried much too high. I would have them live fofir upon the level, as (according to myconltant leflbnj to be governd ^o//:; by rcafon '. If the man\ reafon be ilronger, or his knowledge and experience greater (as it is commonly fuppofed to bej, the woman will be obliged upon that {core to pay a deference, and fubmit to him ''. Having now confiderd the man and woman between themfelves, I proceed in the order of nature to confider them as parents j and to fee (in a few propofiti- ons following) how things will be carried between them ^rv^thdx children, as alfo between other relations, coming at firft from the fame bed, i? truth and matters of fact (to be named,where the argument fliall call for them) are not denied. V. Parents ought to educate their children, take the beft care of^them they can, endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to afjiji them. Becaufe other- wife they do not carry themfelves towards their children as being what they are, children and theirs : they do not do what they would dcfu'e to have done to themfelves, were they again to pafs through tliat feeble and tender ftatejor perhaps what has been done to them ' : and befide, they tranfgrefs the law ella- bliilid by nature for the prefeiTation of the race, which, as things are, could not without a parental care and affedion be continued j a law, which is in force among all the other tribes of animals, fo far as there is occafion for it. ii" a-vfi.7:i^ oiKoiJtraroT-,)?, Ic" iya ku^m $ iiy-ohcTTHtu.. ./ip. eund- '' Kolat (puciv ol ec^^iviq i f^ovov cv Tei'q civB^fayroi';, u^x ;^ c* Tot$ cd^ct^ ^^6t^ cif^tstri. FliftO ftp. J^JOg. L. c noAwsAiS-fif? A' trot yulac, aU^ij T«Tpo5 ^ raZr iai\ix.fblijj ■xa.ca. Eur. VanntCi 1-0! fikndc nepo- tiitn nittriendorum dtbito {ft ^nii ejl pudor) alligaznunt. V. M. X Z Not 1 60 The Religion of Nature, Sedl. VIII. Not to do what is here required, is not barely to a£l againft truth and nature, not ofi^y fuch an omiffion as is mentiond in left. I. pr. V. but a heinous inftance of" cruelty. If any one can deny this, let him better confider the cafe of an infant-) neglefted, helplefs, and having nothing fo much as tofolicite forhim,buthisfr/Vi and (that which will do but little in this world) his innocence : let him think what it would be to turn a child., thoalittlc grown up, out of doors, dcflitute of every thing, not knowing whither to fly % or what to do > and whether it is not the fame thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body elfe hereafter., or (in general^ to conflift with nsoant and mifery : let him reflcft a while upon the circumftances of poor orphans ^ left unprovided for, to be abufed by every body "y i^c. and then let him fay, whether it is peffiblc for a parent to be fo void of bowels, as not to be moved with thefe confiderations ; or what epithet he deferves, if he is not. If any of them who have been thus abandond, and turned adrift, have done well, thofe inftances ought to be placed a.mong parti- cular providences : as when a veflel at fea, without pilot or fiiloi', happens to be blown into the port. Not only the care, but the early care of parents is required, left death fhould prevent themj death, which skips none, and furprifes many. Not to remem- ber this, and aft accordingly, is in praftice to contradift one of the mofl cey tain and obvious of all truths. VI. In order to the good of children, their education, tcc. there mujl he fome authority over them lodged by nature in the parents : I mean, the nature of the cafe is fuch, as neceffarily requires there fJmdd be in the parents an authority over their children in order to their good. At firfl if fome body did not nurfe, feed, clothe, and take care of children, the interval between their firil and lafl breath would be very fhort. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly their parents : to do this is their duty by the foregoing propofition. But then they mufl do it as they can, and according to their judgment : and this is plain- ]y an aft oi authority, to order and difpofe of another according t© one's judg- ment, tho it be done according to the befi of one's judgment. As the child grows up, the cafe is flill the fame in fome degree or other, till he arrives at the age reckond mature ; and very often longer. He is become able perhaps to walk by himfelf, but what path to choofe he knows not ; cannot a inctrtus quofnta. ferant, tibi (iflere detur, in the poet's language. '' See that moving defcription of the 'llji^a.^ ce(puviy.c, in Homer. <= I could never think of that Arabic faying without pity, The barber [C3NAn!?N] learns to (!)xve ufon the head of nn orphan. 4 " diftinguilii Truths concerning Families, &c. l6i diftinguifh his (afety and his danger, his advantages and difadvantages ; nor, in general , good and evil : he muft be warned, and direfted, and watched ftill by his parents, or fome body intruded by them, or elfe it might have been pofli- bly much better for him to have expired under the midwife's hands, and pre- vented the efFeds of his own ignorance. When he not only runs about, but begins to fancy himfelf capable of go- I'erniug him/elf, by how much the more he thinks himfelf capable, by fo much- the le/s capable may he be, and the t?iore may he want to be governed. The^ avenues oi fenfe are opend : but ihcjiiclgment, and intelleElual faculties are not ripend but with time and much praftice. The world is not eafily known by per- fbns o? adult abilities > and, when they become tolerably acquainted with if,, yet they find things in it fo intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times hard iortbemx.o refolve, what meafurcs arc fitteftto be taken: but they, who- are not, or but lately, paft their nuts, cannot be fuppofed to have any extent of knowledge, or to be, if they are left to themfclves, any thing elfe but a. prey to the villain who firft feizes upon them. Inftead of judgment and experience we find commonly in youth fuch things as are remoteft from them, childifh ap- petites, irregular paffions, peevifh and obftinate humors; which require to be fubdued, and taught to give way to wholfom counfels. Young people are not only obnoxious to their own humors and follies, but alfotothofe of their compa- nions. They are apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one anothers mif- conduft : and thus folly mingles with folly, and increafes prodigioufly. The judgment therefore of the parents muft ftill interpofe, and prefide, and guide through all thefc Jlages of infancy, childhood, and youth ; according to their power improving the minds of their children, breaking the ftrength of their in- ordmate paffions, cultivating rude nature, forming their manners, and fhewing them the way which they ought to be found in. Thefe things are fo infaSf, and a. parent cannot acquit himfelf of the duty impo- fed upon him in the preceding propofition, if he a£bs fo as to deny them : but then he cannot aft fo as not to deny them (that is, fo as to fubdue the pailions of the child, break his ftomach, and caufe him to mind his inftruftionsj with- out forae fort of difcipline, and a proper feverity > at leaft very rarely ^. To all this, and much more that might be urged, muft be fuperadded, that the fortunes of children, and their manner of fetting out in the world • For certainly, when it can be. Hoc patrmm ejl, fptifu (oafuifacere filiumfuufponte reile facere', ^uam ttlkno mette. Ter, depending i6z The Religion o/' Nature. Sedl.VIII. depending f commonly; upon their parents, their parents mud upon this account be their directors, and govern their affairs. N.I. It appears now from the premifles, that even parents have not properly a dominion over their children^ fuch as is intended fe£t. VI. prop. V. from which this parental authority is a very different thing. This only refpefts the good of the chil- dren, and reaches not beyond the means, which tYit parents^ ading according to the bell of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find moft conducive to that end: but dominion only refpefts the ivillo? the lord, and is of the fame extent with his pleafure. Parents may not, by virtue of this authority, command their children to do any thing which is in itfelf ew7; and if they do, the chil- dren ought not to obey ^ Nor may they do any things what they pleafe, to them. They may not kill, or maim, or expofe them *> : and when they come tobe men or woifien, and are poflell ofeftatcs, which either their parents ("or any body elfe) have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor, management, or frugality, they have the i'a.me properties in thefe with refpe£t to their parents^ which they have with refped to other people : the parents have no more right to take them by force from them, than the reft of the world have^. So that what occurs in the place abovementiond remains 7?r«?, notwithftanding any thing that may be objeded from the cafe of parents and children. And moreover, N. 2. They, who found monarchy in paternal authority, gain little advantage with refpe£t to defpotic or abfolute power. A power to be exercifed for the good o£ fubje£ts (iikethat of parents for the ^ooi'/ of their children), and that principally, where they are incapable of helping themfelves, can only be derived from hence. The father of his countrey cannot by this way of reafoning be demonftrated to be the abfolute lord '* of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to difpofe of them as he pkoifes ^. The authority of parents goes not this length. Befidc, if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the eldeji fon ftiould have the fame authority, be it what it will, over his brothers • n«? TciZroi, /jMct iTi'9-2»rs4 '/ovturi, n-po? a y^ ccutoi rcTi dilute, t-Mcii » TTudeitTai. Hierocl, *• The barbarity of the thing at length put a Hop to the cuftom of expofing children : but it had been praftifid by the ?erfmns. Creeks, &c. Komulus's law only reftraind it, but did not abolilh it. For it injoind his citiietis only, a,T«r*v 'c.iOita, »/«skv (yur^iOii, >^ B-vyxnoay rxi TrtMTcynvm- ^-ny-.iB- iv;«i k u,ri^'c> Tat '/iio^ifitiy miTi^ai T-piiTss, ffAiiv uti ysiioiro !r«i^o» dyaTm^es, xA. Dioil. Halicarn. And bcfide, K!cct.irct.v, »s (^hv, s^wxa £|»ir/«» a'ssTfi x«6' ii2, lij ^sc^ct ■nana, T y /3iK %^oyo', xA. Id' c 'VufjMMi K.9-K ii'ioy hi xr'Hj/M 'QiivTuy 'in T Trccri^av, «»« )C -rst x^^fba-ra, i^ t« trif/inrci. t vcn^m o, Ti /3b-Ao»3 :i|*Ti.9-£j«i TO?; n-«j-p«(ri» ^-nj^^clizi. Jd. Thefe are intlances of fuch laws, as (houldnotbe, by prop. IV. feft. VII. " Rom:i patrem patria Ciceronem libera dixit, Juv. f 'fis ^^c/ikZ' r.f/jm u[\oy. jirr. and Truths concerning Families, &c, 163 mi'i/tjfers : and much lefs, that the heir of the firft parem iliould in fucceeding ge^ nerations have it over all the collaterals. The very relation between them foonva- nifhes, and comes at laft in effeft to nothing, and this mticn^-'iih r... VII. /is parents are obliged to educate their children^ &:c. fo children ought to confider parents as the immediate authors {authors under the firjt and great Caiife ') of their being; or to [peak more properly.^ of their being born. I know children are apt (not very refpeftfuUy, or prudentlyj to fay j that their parents did not beget them for their fakes., whom they could not know before they were born, but for their ownpleafure. But they, who make this a pretext for their difobcdience, or dif- regard, have not fufficiently thought, what pain., what trouble., how mzwy frights and cares^., what charges., znd what felf-denials parents undergo upon the fcore of their children : and that all thefc, if parents only ruHid into pleafure, and confulted nothing elfe., might eafily be avoided, by negleSfing them and their wel- fare '. For as to thofe parents, who do this, let them fpeak for themfelves : I ihall not be their advocate. VIII. /i great fubmiffion and many grateful acknowledgements., much refpeB and piety are due from children to their parents. For if there is an authority in parents (as before) this mull be anfwerd by a proportionable fubmiffion on the other fide : fince an authority, to which no obedience is due, is equal to no authority. If the thought oi annihilation be generally dilagreeable, as it feemstobe, then merely to be confcious oi exiflence muft have in it fomething defireablc^. And if fo, our parents muft be confiderd as the authors, or at leaft the inftrumcnts o^that good to us, whatever it is : which cannot be done, unlefs they are treated with dijlin&ion and great regard, being to us what no other is, or ezer can be. God, as the firft caufe of all beings, is often ftyled metaphorically, or in a large fenfe of the word, the Father of the world, or of us all : and, if we behave our fclves towards Him as being fuch, we cannot ('according to left. V.pr. XIX. n. j.j but adore Him. Something analogous, tho in a low degree, to the cafe between God and his offspring there feems to be in the cafe htiwten parents and their children. If that requires divine worf^ip, this will demand a great refpecl and reverence ^. » arTTiI/n psniU? jnu-'b^:;. s. Hhared. •= XJt'mam oculos in fe&om popr.t Inferere, (^ f atrial intm defrerJere curai. ' I confefs, in Seneca's words, minimum ejfe beneficium fa- tris matrifque concubitiim, niji accejjerint alia, qiu frofequerentttr hoc initium mtinetis, C^ aliis off- ciis hoc ratum facerent. ^ To a,iSla.yiSK, en ^jj x vMw y.a^' auri- (putri 'fi a'/cc^c« i $«•!• uiriJI. The fenfe of life (of being alive) feems to be fomething more than what Seneca calls mufca- rum ac lermium honum. « Oi ai^iaia t Vujjjxiut yif/iot, x/.— — al p sti r»A«(3Tijoi ros-tsrt z Nor . i6j^ The Religion of Nature. Sedl. VIII. Nor can I believe, that a child, who doth not honor his /)^rf«/, can have any dif- pofition to worfhip his Creator ". The precept of honoring parents^ to be found in almolt all nations and religions, leems to proceed from fome fuch fentiment : for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that of woyjliipping the Deity ^. In laying children under this obligation they have all confpircd, tho fcarce in any thing elfe ^. The admonitioni of a parent muil: be of the greatefl weight with his children, if they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repeted occafions to confuier things^ and ohfewe events; h:ith cooler paj/ions, as he advances in years, and fees things more truly as they arc ; is able in a manner to predict what tbey themfelves will defire to have done, when they fliall arrive at his age > may upon thefe accounts, ordinarily, be prefumed to be a more competent ^/wi/^^ than them- felves''} and lalHy from his relation to them mull be more fine erely inclined to tell them truth, than any other per/on in the world can be fuppofed. to be«. I Ciy, if young people refle£l well upon thefe things, they cannot in prudence^ or even kindnefs to themfelves^ but pay the utmoil: deference to the advertifements and dire<51:ions of a parent. And to conclude, li parents want the afiiftance of their children^ efpecially in the declenfion of their age, and when they verge towards :\.helplefs condition again they cannot deny or withhold it, but they muit at the fame time deny to requite the care and tendernefs fhewd by their parents towards them in their helplefs and dan- gerous years i that is, without being ungrateful; and that is, without being «»/«/?, if there be injuftice in ingratitude ^. Nor (which is more ftillj can they do this with- ' Meo jud'uh pietas fundamentum eft tmnium lirtntum. Cic. The fame author reckons among thofe things, that are laudable, farentem vereri «;deum {neq; enim multo fecus parens liberis). OuS' a-j !r«Ai» yj'ASfn £Ti(j£i|i5 uSrta yiyan ■f 13& yem', oAiywp/as >i, ^X-tifAjfUit^nKi. Hut. ^ n«B- rs? Xiysari >^ li'^iriv, oij yenZon Ti/Jtitm fhiru S-taj Tr^arn' '^ /AsyiVii' '» n ipuinc, 'o, ri rvn (pua-iv c-a^/miifji,®^ Ic^icSxx.i.Plut. TcMi'v riju/W j«/£T« 7-i)j TT^ci Quv i'lvrifctv £7-i«|f [Miirii?]. j^o/. We indeed ufually tlivide the two tables oi Mofes'shvrCo, that the fifth commandment (Honor tl^y father and thy mother) falls in the fecond: but the Jews themfelves divide them otherwiie j i^ fiW -f p^ /aiS? -/p«(?)«; nv kf/j^' Bkv y^ TTKTi^ct. 5" !7«»r'=:, TO -'J «-f>.@- '/««5, kX. Ph. Jud. Agreeably to this, Jofephus fays that «/ oix.a Aoi-i^KT, T»v i^mfJi'lw. Pint. ' ll^l'l T^N bn-i! : ask thy father, emd In willfiew thee'. Deut. ' Aogis 4' «' s^e«?'?« '/<>'^"ifi« and rpeffsr^ were reckond due. And he, who doth not requite to Jiis parents IHlbO^lVi; n^lton. is called x«t' fb^i' y^-\ in S. Uhar. out Truths concerning Families, S^r. i (^5 out denying what they may in their turn require of their childi-en ». In effect they do thus bv their actions deny that to have been, which has been ; and thole things to be pofTible, which may be hereafter. Notonly bodily infirmities of parents, but fuch decays of their minds zsmny happen, ought to be pitied, their little hallinefles and miftakcs dilTcmbled, and their dcfe£ts fupplied, decently '', IX. That s-T/" or afe^ion onboth ftdes^ which naturally and regularly is in parents towards their children, and viciffim ', ought to be obfcr-ved and folloijud^ ivhen there is no reafon to the contrary. We have feen before, and it is evident from the terms, thitfenfe ought to govern, when reafon does not interpofe ; i. e. when there is no reafon, why it ihould not. If then this ^-ofv'^ or mutual affe6tionbe an inward fenfe of thecaie between parents and children, which, without much thinking upon it, fs felt by them, and fits upon their natures '*, it may be comprifed in prop. XIVj and XV. of fed. III. But whether it is or not, the fame may be faid (which muft be repeted in another place^^ of every affection, pafilon, inclination in ge- neral. For when there is no reafon, why we fiiould not comply with them, their own very foUicitation, and the agreeablenefs we apprehend to be in com- plying, ^Q preponderating arguments. This muft be true, \£fomething is more than nothing ; or that ought to be granted, which there is no reafon to deny. So that if this f'pyi be only taken as a kind o( attraSiion, or tendence, in the mere matter of parents and children j yet ftill this phyfical motion or fympathy ought not to be over- ruled, if there be not a good reafon for it. On the contrary, it ought to be ta- ken as -A-fuggeftion of nature, which fhould always be regarded, when it is not fuperfeded by fomething/zz/fwr} that is, by reafon. But further, here reaibn doth not only not gainfay, by its filence confent, and fo barely leave its right oi' commanding to this bodily inclination j but it comes in flrongly to abet and inforce it, as defignd for a reaibnable end : and therefore not to aft according to it is not to aft according to reafon, and to deny that to be which is. X. The fame is true of that affeSlion, which other relations naturally have, infome proportion or other, each for other.To this they ought to accommodate themfelvcs • ToisT©- yun -^z&i Txi '/««!?, 018? kv Ji/|«i9 >!SCt trtavrcv yevt'i^ rtsi nccvrS Teusac,. Ifocr. ^ TIia<: epithet }ihs (fiiu Mneai) fhines in Virgil. ' Pofita eft inter farentes ac liberos honefta con- tentio, dederins rmtjora, an receperint. Sen. <* That is, methinks, a moving defcription in 5. Bajil (nitl tA«.£|J of a conflidt which a poor mao had within himfelt, when he had no other way left to prefcrve life but by felling one of his children. Y where J 66 The Religion of 1^ AT V RE. Se. R. Elaz. Azq. (^ pajf. ' 'H o-vy.lKv.i rdliAial CpxitiT-xk TToXvu^y,!, thai, >i ^jtScSJ tiZtc. cit T^ TTxreiyJii- cl y!,yC.(i «? '/J rJf-/»] TJJ cit T ccutZv TFt^vx-iVxt, 'Av/tj/tot I) Ic" el XeiTToi trvy'^svil^ — - — tv X33 T uvtSv kWc yifvavrui o\^ ei f^ iiKiioTi^ci, c'i 4' «;»oTji»7-ifoi, y.r>,. Arift. ^ ^itam cofwfr fttavitatis ilia recordatio eft'. J« eodem dfnicilio, antequam nafcerer, h.xbitavi : tn iifJem incunabnUs infantia temtora feregi : eofJem uppdUii pxrentes, ^c. Val. Max. ' There is no name for any defcendent, who is more thin trinepas. * It becomes kim^^k, Anir. Riiod. If Truths concerning Families, ^c. i6j If then wefuppofe this afeclion or lympiithy, when it is permitted to act re- gularly :ind according to nature, no reafon intervening to exalt or abate it, to ope- rate with a llrength nearly proportionable to the quantity or degree of relation, computed as above, we may perhaps nearly difccrn the degrees of that obliga- tion, which perfons related lie under, to aflift each other, frotn this motive. But there are many circumftances and incidents in life capable of affecting this obligation, and altering the degrees ot it. A man mufl weigh the wants of him/elf znd his own family againft thofe of his relations: he mull confider their fex, their age, their abilities and opportunities, how capable they are of good offices, how they will take them, what ufe they will make of them, and the like. He, who del'igns to act agreeably to truth, may find many fuch things demanding his regard ; fomejuftly moving him to compafTion, others holding back his hand. But however this may in general be taken as evident, ih'M next after our parents and own offspring ' nature directs us to be helpful, in the fir fi plMe to brothers and fillers, and then to other relations according to their re- fpective diftances in the genealogy of the fxmily, preferably to all foreigners ^. And tho our power, or opportunities of helping them in their wants fhouid be but Uttlcj yet we ought to prefen'eour affection towards them, and adifpofi- tion to ferve them, as far as we honeftly and prudently can, and whenever the proper opportunity iliall prefent itfclf. This nature and truth require. Sect. IX. Truths helonging to a Private Man, and refpecting (dire^ly) only himfelf, I. 'T'V E R Y man knovcs (or may <^ knoiv) beft, what his own faculties, and per- final circumftances are, and confequently what powers he has ofaEliHg, and governing himfelf. Becaufe he only of all mankind has the internal knowledge of himfelf, and what he is ; and has the only opportunity by reflexion and es' periments of himfelf to find, what hi? own abilities, paflions, (^c. truly are ^. » Man and Jl^ife are luppofed to be one, and therefore have no place here ; any more than a man and his felf. Otherwife confiderd diftindlly, the one of them ought always to be the Jirjl care of the other. *" Mij^e xuirr/riri} iVon aoiuS^ iraTpm. Hef, ' For many I acknowledge there are, who feem to be without reflexion, and almoll thought. Ti? cc/voiX ni ciKtieiv (puint ; s-oA- Aci- rx'/.o'. p !r«»T£5 ~Mv iXtym. S. C.hryf, *■ Nec fe quxfnerit extra, Y i 11. He 7 68 The Religion of Nature! Se6l. IX. II, He^ that li'ell examines himfelf, I fuppofe^ iviJlfirul thefe things to he true^. I . That there are fome things common to him not only inith fcnfitive animals und vegetable, but alio with inanimate matter: as, that his body is fubject to the general law of gravitation; that its parts are capable of being feparated, or diflocated; and that therefore he is in danger from falls, and all impreffions of violence. z. That there ^rt other things common to him with vegetables rind /en/itive ani- mals : as, that he comes from a feed (fuch the original animalculum may be taken to be) ; grows, and is prefcrved by proper matter, taken in and diflributed through a fet of vcflels ; ripens, flourillies, withers, decays, dies -, is fubject to difeafes, may be hurt, or killed ; and therefore wants, as they do, nouriih- ment, a proper habitation, protection from injuries, and the like. 3. That he has other properties common only to him and the fen/itive tribe: us, that he receives by his fenfes the notice of many external objects, and things , perceives many affections of his body j finds pleafure from fome, and pain from others J and has certain powers of moving himfelf, and acting: that is, he is not only obnoxious to hurts, difeafes, and the caufes of death, but alfo feels them''; is not only capable of nourilhment, and many other provifions made for him, but alfo injoys them ; and, befide, may contribute much himfelf to ei- ther his injoyments, or his fufferings. 4. That be^de thefe he has other faculties^ which he doth not apprehend to be cither in the inert mafs of matter, or in vegetables, or even in the lenfitive kind, at Icaft in any confiderable degree ; by the help of which he inveftigates truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, or not, after the manner fet down in feet. III. or, in a word, that he is animal rationale ". f. That he is confcious of a liberty in himfelf to act or not to act ; and that therefore he is fuch a being as is defcribed feet. I. prop. I. a being, whofe acts may be morally good or evil. Further, 6. That there are in him many inclinations and averfions; from whence flow fuch aff^ections, as defire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, forrow, pity, anger, (^c. all which prompt him to act this or that way. 7. That he is fcnfible o? great defeats and limitations in the ufe of his rational faculties, and powers of action, upon many occafions ; as alfo, that his paffions » lllud 7»23-i triavT^i noli putare ad arrogantiam mmuendam folum ejjfe dictum, verltm etiam ut ht- r.» nojlm ncrimus. Cic. ad Qu. fr. ' Non [entire main fun non eft horr.inii: (^ xon/erre non eft iiri. Sell, who condefccnds here to be fomething like other men. As alfo when he fays. Alia, ^tfttt, qui fafieiitem feriimt, etiatnfi non fervertunt ; ut dolor capitis, ^c. Hic nm nego [entire [ap- tmem, &cr. f £1"' f^ 'ff' "^W il'quidfentiet Ji habere divinum, &c, Cic. arc Truths hdonging to a Private Man, &c. 1 6g are many times apt to rake wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, excefllvc '. In other words, that he is in many rcfpccls fallible, and infirm ''. Laftly, that he defires to he happy : as every thing muft, which undcrftands what is meant by tliat word. IIT. Jf he doth find thefe things to befo, then if he will a5l as he ought to do {that is, agreeably to tmth and hEt) he mujl do fuch things as thefe. I . He muJlftihjeEl his fenfual inclinations.^ his bodily paffions.^ and the motions of alt his members ' to reafon > and try e'very thing by it. For in the climax fetdown he cannot but obferve, that as the principle of w^f? ' A}ii.ix«.'o> i^»M 'Ay. Sp«TOK Tito. iw/Aw^T^lov. Chryf. c The author of S.Hhared. reckons d^ht, the right ufe of which comprehends all praftical religion : the heart, the eye, the mouth, noft, ear, hand, foot, and n^nn WMI. The duties refpefting thefe are the fubjeft of that (not bad) book. ^ Cum triafint hic, ejfe, vivere, intelligere : (^ lapis eft, f^pecus vivit, nee tamen lap'tdtm ptito vivere, aUf pecui melligere : qui autem intelligit, eum o' ep ^ livere certijjlmum eft. ^uare non dubito id txcellentius judlcare, cui omnia tria in/unt, quam id cui duo vel unum dejit. S. Aug, Thus reafon ftts man above the other vifible orders of beings, ^c. ' Tnflo eft domina omnium ©> reginn tutie . Hm Ht imperet illi parti animi, qux cbedire debet, id videndum eft iiirt, Cic. 5 Mi I JO 7"^^ Religion o/* Nature. Seel:. IX. his nature: and that is to ddert mankind', znd to defjy himfclf to be what he knows himfelf by experience and in his own confcience upon examination to be, and what he would be very angry if any body fhould fay he was not. If a heajl could be fuppofed to give up his fenfe and activity j neglect the calls of hunger, and thofe appetites by which he (according to his nature) is to be guided ; and refuting to ufe the powers, with which he is indued in order to get his food and preferve his life, lie ftill in feme place, and expect to grow, and be fed like a plant ; this would be much the fame cafe, only not fo bad, as when a man cancels his reafon^ and as it were ftrives to metamorphize himfelf into a brute. And yet this he does, who purfues only fenfual objects, and leaves him- felf to the impulfes of appetite and paflion. For as in that cafe the brute neglects the law of bis nature, and affects that of the order belozv him : fo doth the man diibbey the law of his nature., and put himfelf under that of the lower animals } to whom he thus makes a defection ''. If this be fo, how wretchedly do they violate the order of nature, and tranfgrefs againft truth, who not only reje£l the condu6t of reafon to follow fenfe and paflion, but even make \t fiibjervient to them '^ ; who ufe it only in finding out means to effed their wicked ends '', but never apply it to the confideration of thofe ends, or the nature of thofe means, whether they are jull or unjuft, right or ivrong ? This is not only to deviate from the path of nature, but to invert it, and to become fomething more than brutilh j brutes ivith reafon, which muft be the moft enormous and worll of all brutes. When the brute is governed by fenfe and bodily appetites, he obferves his proper rule j when a man is governed after that manner in defiance of reafon, he violates his ; but when he makes his rational powers to ferve the bru- tilh parr, toaffiftand promote it, he heightens andincreafes the brutality, inlarges its field, makes it to aft with greater force and effect S and becomes a mon/ler. His duty then, who is confcious to himfelf of the truth of thofe things recounted under the foregoing propofition, is to examine every thing carefully, and to fee • AbjeSo homirte infyhefire animal tranjire. 'Ev tJ A '"'''' ^"f*"- ■ "Oj« «» fbii T» 3-4)5 415 irr,c!m TTctiKTifi. Arr. fertinet ad omnem offcii qtuponem fetnper in fromftu ha- bere, quantum natura hominis fecudibus reliquifque belluis anteceJat. Cic. *' Hfh fin tS» 9-mu> a/.o'/Ua (MTTis-aj. Chryf. ' A thing too often done. ^u£ enim libido, qua avaritist, quedfaciiius aut fufcifiturnifi confdio cafto, autfine—rationefirfcituri Cotta ap.Cic. '' Some- thing like him, who in Chryfoflom''s words, :^ V omkuv y-xra^ua to c-xutpS^'. « This makes Cotta fay, Satius fiiit nullam omnitio nobis a diis immortalibiis datam effe rxtionem, quam tr.nta cum pernicie datam: wirh other bitter things. Tho an anfwer to this may be given in the words which follow afterward : A deo ta/ithm rationem habemtii, Ji modo habimus: bonamautem rattorem, ant non bonam, a nobis, I that Truths hehnging to a Private Man, &c\ 1 7 1 that he complies with no corporeal inclination at the expenfc of his reafon ; but that all his affeHions, concupifcible and irafciblc, be direfted towards fuch ob- jetls, and in fuch meafure^ time^ wd place, as that allows. Every word = and ac- tion, every motion and ftep in life flaould be conduced by reafon ^. This is the foundation and indeed the fum of all virtue. z. He muji take care not to bring upon himfelf ' want, difeafes, trouble j bnf, on the contrary, endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable fiibfifience, as far as he can without contradicting any truth '^ (ihxi is, without denying matters of fact, and fuch propofitions, as have been already or will in the fequel here be fhewn to be true, conserning God, property, the fuperiority of reafon, Scc.j To explain this Hmination: if a man fhould confidcr himielf as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, difeafcs, andthereji; then, tofup- ply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property > and at laft, in vindica- tion of himfelf, fay, " I a6t according to what I am, a being obnoxious to " hunger, i^c. and to aft otherwife would be incompliance with truth " j this would not be fufficient to juftify him. The grand rule requires, that what he does, fliould interfere with no truth : but what he does interferes \^it\\ fcveral. For by taking that, which (by the fuppofition) is his neighbour's, he a£ts as if a This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off thofe reftraints which men have from nature or a modeft education, and is fo utterly deftrudlive of virtue, that Arijlotle baniflies it out of the commonwealth, "oxuc, 'p: kix^nXoyUi cm -f tioXs-j^ atrjuf «»» ti, Ar r »ejM,s- ^iilw f|»Ji','i>- c>x. ? Y^ h-/,iia<, /.sysiv otiSv x ai^jZv tC, t\ ■zt.iS, e-miyrv^. b True, manL reafon : which is a very different thing from that fuperftitious precifenefs, which carries things too far. A^ v. g. when the Jews not contented to condemn n!?^] -^^t or nsn nib33, and every where to exprefs "tlDNn ^TO,, go fo far as to comprehend under ir TV^n WTAM} nbp nn^u; '^SN invi;i4 iTDy ; and to add, 131 ,— l>!23l7 y~ll J^i^ll/IDD r^'7\j'±> ."— ibo t<>Yl)D. There areotherfay- ings of this kind to be feen, many of them, among thofe, which R. El. de Vidas has coUeded: as that particularly. '131 n^tsnb lU^yinb l>4bvi' "n^ mNI J>3y p. What ^lian reports of Annxa- goras and others, belongs to this place j that they never laughed : with m»ny other unnecefTary au- fterities, which might be added. « ''i' ^O ^b UN J'N QN. P. ui6. si/fi«t ^ iKr\i at x.a.T Uii-c/y 6iU-/ini -t iu^aiiuonKc,. Arift. They, who treated the body and things pertaining to it as merely a»i)rj;«, diftinguiihing between T* xfA^iTi^x. and ru. ? B-if^ii'X^, making thcfe latter to be »!?'(/ t^«? iyMi, and leaving the body as it were to icfelf (ir^ro [ra^^mr] (bi^ij/^vaTu, — I'l n ^i^i): they, I fay, might injoy their own philo- fophy ; but they would fcarce gain many profelytes now a days, or ever perfuade people, that the pains they feel are not theirs, or any thing to them. Nor indeed do I much credit many ftories that are told of fonie old philofophers : as that of Anaxarchits, when he was put to a moft cruel death by Nieoereon; i (PfevTiircttrcc rp TiubacleKi, itTciii Xlrio^i T 'Ara|««^8 9-»As' Oind decently, i. e. asfuchj and moreover, fuch as are made by this means lighter •> .* for when they cannot be to- tally prevented, as much of the effeSl muft be prevented, or taken off, as can be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks > efpecially the laft, great one '. 3 . He muft confder even bodily and fenfualaffeUions,paf ions, and inclinations as in- timations, uhich many times he not only may, but ought to hearken to. What is faid be- fore of the fubjcftion of paflions and appetites to reafon muft always be rememberd. They are not to prcceed from unjuftifiable caufes, or terminate in wrong objefts j « N< offer fimus nos periculh fine catifa : quo nihil potefl ejjejlultius. In trant^uillo tempeftatem ad- virfam of tare dementis eft. Cic. •> Levins fit patientia, ^Htcqmd corrigere e/l nefas. Hor. e MOitm S^aFBTB was a great man's definition of fhilofoffy. not Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c, ijo not be unfeafonable or immoderate. Being thus regulated, fet to a tme biafs and freed from all eruptions and violence, they bccome///i:/:» as are here intended j o-entle ferments working in our brealb, without which we fhould fettle in inaftivity j and what I think may be taken for juft motives and good^xrgnmenis to a6t upon. Forif a man finds, that he has wo/ only a fupcrior ficulty of reafon, but alfo an inferior appetitive faculty, under which are containd many propenfions and aver- fions, thefe cannot be denied to be any more than that ; tho they muft be taken in- deed for what they really are^ and not more. Wlien they are checked by reafon and truth, or there lies a reafon againji them fas there always will, when they are not within theforelaidreftridionsj, they muft be taken «; dogd with, thiscircum- ftance, as things overruled and difabled : but when they are under no prohibition from the fuperior poivcrs and truth., then they are to be confiderd as unfetterd and free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been obferved upon a par- ticular occafion before p. i6f.) when there is. no -reafon againft the complying without fenfes, there is always one for ithy prop. XI\'. fed. III. the inclinati- on itfelf, being precluded by nothing above it, is in this cafe uppermoji, and in courfe takes the commanding port : and then a man muft a6t as being what he is in n. 3. under prop. II. of this fedion. The /^?'7«^; of all human adionsare in fa£t, either a fenfeof (/a/j, oraprofpect of fomc pie afure or profit to be obtaind, fome evil or datjger to be avoided; that is, either the rcafonablenefsof what is done, or the manner, in which fomething doth or is like to affect the agent: and that is again, human actions are founded either in reafon., or pa/f on -md inclination. (I need not add they may be in both.) This being fo, what fhould hinder, when reafon does not work, but that the inferior fprings iliould retain their nature, and act. Bodily inclinations and pallions, when they obferve their due fiibordination to reafon, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to be as it were ancftbrs to it upon the throne, are of admirable ufe in life, and tend ma- ny times to noble ends. This is applicable to the iraiciolc, as well as the concu- pifcible affections and the whole animal fyilem. Love of that which is amiable compafjion '° toward the miferablc and hclplefs, a natural abhorrc-nce and refcntment = a 'Ho'j;y« u>t;);a«» i^a> hiyi.'^ii,. Chrvf i' Wheiithe Stoics fay. tliat a wife man may relieve one, who wants his help, without fitymg him ; I own indeed he may, but I very much doubt whether hewouU. If he had not fome compafllon, and in fome meafure tek the aiis or wants of the other, I fcarceknow howhefliould come to rake him for an object of his charity. -•' 'O «/:» t^' iicJiT, yjoi5«sro;-7ij u (J^iVo? Uvm n-^c? t« aia-x^si >C aT-oAu,®-. Tlut. ' A wife man is not a^rxSrr.c, but ^ir^ioKa^c.^ifi. ap. Diog. L. * A« r Cojj»^i>|U,sv j and always carry about him the fenfe of his being but a man. He who doth not do this, doth not conform himfelf to the feventh particular under the preceding prop, ('doth not own that to be true, which he is fuppofed to have found true in himfelf j ; denies a de^ feSl to be what it is, to be fomething which requires to be fupplied, or amend- ed} and is guilty of an omijfon, that will fall under fe£t. I. prop.V. I might here mention fome precautions, with fome kinds and degrees o£ mor- tification or felf- denial, which men will commonly find to be neceflaiy. But I ihall not prejcribe j leaving them, who befl know their own weak places and difcafes, to fele£t for themfelves the proper remedies. I fhall only take notice, that fince the felf-denial here recommended can only refped things in themfelves lawful and not unreafonablc, and in favor of fuch our bare inclinations have been allowd to be taken for arguments and dire£bions, it looks as if this advice to deny ones felf ox inclinations inferred a ccntradidion. But this knot will be quickly untied. For when we deny our inclinations in order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho to follow thofe inclinations might otherwife be right; yet mtbefe circumflances and under this view there a- rifes a good reafon againft it, and they, according to the eflablifiid rule, muft therefore give way ; which is all that is intended ^ • 'Ayta-iXxM f*f'xfJ T c(^^u.\j/,Zv Tr^etriX^m o '/ra;, inav^K Un fVi (u^aii -f ■■^vx'iu Max, Tyr. To appoint things, as the Jeroijl) Doftors have done, to be r-mnb yo, or nx p^n-inb nD mnyn \o anNn, would be right, if they were judicioufly chofcn, and not fo very particular and trifling. Some of their cautions are certainly juft: as that -iN^i/ai U^X nu/N3 anr.J ^TI^nDi iD\ MijU. c ^a monkery no fuperflitious or phantaflical mortifications are here recommended. Z i The 1 7<5 The ReligiOxM of Nature. Sedl. IX. The l;ift claufe of the propofition takes in a great compafs. It will oblige men, if they do but think well what they are, and confcqucntly what others of the fame kind with themiclves alfo are, not to be proud, coriceited, vainj but modeft, and humble, and rather diffident of themfelves ; not to cenfure the failings of others too hardly, not to be over-ievere in punilhing or exa£lingjuftice% and parti- cularly not to be revengeful ; but candid, placable, manfuete : and fo forth. f . He ought to examine ^ bis oivn actions and condu6i^ and -where he finds he has tranfgrejfed \ to repent. That is, if the tranfgreffion be againft his neighbour, and the nature of it admits, to make reparation, or at leaft as far as he can : in other cafes, when that which is done cannot be recalled, or repaird, or termi- nates in himfelf only, to live however under a fenfe of his fault, and to prove by fuch afts as are proper, that he dt^ixiis forglvenefs, and heartily wifhes it un- done j which is as it were an eflay towards the undoing of [t\ and all that now canbe« : and laftly, to ufe all poffible care not to relapfe. All this is involved in the idea of a fault, or aftion that is wrong, as it prcfents itfelf to a rational mind. For fuch a mind cannot approve what is unreafonablc, and repugnant to truth ; that is, what is wrongs oxz fault : nay more, it cannot but difapprove- it, deteft it. No rational animal therefore can aft according to truth, the true nature of himfelf and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not to commit it ; and, when it is committed, to repair it, if he can, or at leaflihew himfelf to be penitent *". If when a man is criminal, he doth not behave himfelf ^//wf^j or, which is the fame, behaves himfelf as being not fuch, he oppofes truth confidently. And further, to act agreeably to what he is fuppofed to find himfelf to be, is. to aft as one who is in danger of rclapfing :. which is to be upon his guard for the future. 6. He mujl labor to improve his rational faculties by fuch means, as are (fairly) praElicable by him, and conftftent with his circumfiances. If it be a difadvantage tO' be obnoxious to error, and aft in the dark, it is an advantage to know fuch truths as may prevent this: if fo, it is a greater advantage to know, or be capa- ble of knowing, ^^ore fuch truths s ; and then again, not to endeavour to improve « jnn ,'— niWD n^JsV nmts ,— rvyiy nion Cwhkh words I underfiand in the fenfe, that V^jlii feems to put upon them. Gen. xliv. lO.) " Hv; !raf£'S>i»j n J' 5^4*; nfioi Ji'oy ax iriM&)i J .Aur. CHrm. c T/; yi it's T' oi.yZ.iii, 5^ /3i'k iraf ASsw a.-TU7<^ lynirt ; r/; i"' i^ u~cirr.Oi&iii; iy^Mfi,u> i fjut, «ri>»«xi{. Th.fud. ^ ^Hem finitet peccajfe, pene eflinnocens. Sen. 'Even a Jere fays, r-1131-|pn ^'D n:i3D r-T!?ipM; [.— aiu;n]. S.Hh.^Jld. ^ f ■EA«;*jf,i(r«?; IvxiyvKTor i7t>.f> Arifioile being asked, ifhat hie got by philofif/jy, anfwerd. To uhzituk' Tini-zoCiii X. T(»:? iiJA T i^-TB X louiut tpaSov 7Tu»ra. And another time, hore the learned differ d from ■ ike unleamed, iaid, Ora et !^im% 't T-OT/tiKirm- Ttit :Tuieuav lAtyo cu f^ ivrv^M-.i iiyxi x-'jCf/mt, cv "j raP, u,rvx,ix.n rMTuq-jyvi. D. Lacr!. ' 'AJVVarev -^j ii » fVAo!-, r\ y-u.>M 7rcar,uv axefiyKTa- tiro.- !r<;»« ^ ^ ■::^L-f\iiai y.-xTtkr.i^ ^l if'/d-.uy, xrA. ^ifi. ^ HAIti fuit quidii^m temptts, fwn in iigr'is homines pajjim beftiarum tnodo va^nbantur, ^-c, Cic, J 7- ^^' lyS The Religion of Nature. Se6!:. IX.' 7. He mujl attend to inJlru5lion % and even ask advice ; efpeclally in matters of confequence. Not to do this is to deny, that his faculties are limited and defec- tive, or that he is fallible (which is contrary to that, which he is prefumed to be confcious of^ i and perhaps, that it is poffible for another to know what he doth not. Mvica every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improve- ments are, the more doth truth prefs him to fubmit to the counfel and opinions of others. Nor is every one only capable^ but every one wants upon fome occafions to be informed. In how many countrey affairs muft thtfcholar take the rujlic for his mafter ? In how many other men of bufinefs, traders and mechanics ? And on the other fide, in refpeft of how many things does the generality of the world want to be taught by them, who are learned and honcfi ? There is or fhould be a commerce or interchange of counfel and knowledge, as well as of other things : and where men have not thefe of their own growth^ they ihould thankfully receive what may be imported from other quarters. I do not mean, that a man ought implicitly and blindly to follow the opinion ofanother''('thisotherbeing/<:z////!'/ftoo, as well as himfelf), unlefshehas;■«/J/;«- y^//■agoodreafonfo to do, which many times happens} but by the affiflance of another, and hearing what he has to fiy, to find out more certainly on which fide reafon^ truth, and happinefs (which always keep clofe together^ do lie. And thus it is indeed a man's ozvn reafon at kll, which governs. He, who is governed by what another fiys for does) without underftanding it and making the reafon of it his own, is not governed by his own reafon, and that is, by no reafon that he has. To fay one is led by the nofe (as we com- monly fpeak <=) gives immediately the idea of a brute ^. » The efieft, which Xenocrates's kdhire had upon Poletno, is remarkable : umus orationis faUtber- nma medUma fanatus, ex mfami ganeone nmxlmus fhilofophus eva/it. Val.M. •> Likcthem, who fubmit to their Hhakamim, '131 h-iiOU; t^inw iv-y- ^7^ nON> lb-'S><. In S. Iqqar. Many more inftanccs might eafily be given. ' Not only we. Tw piw; s'axss^ was ufcd in the fnv.e fcnfe by the Greeks. ^ Nihil mdgis fraftamlum eft, qiiam ne, fecorum ritu, feqmmtir mteceikntium gregem, fergentes non qM eundum eft, fed qun itur. Sen. Something may perhaps be erpefted in this place concerning -vogue and fa/liion, which feem to be public declarations of fome general opinion j lliewing how far they ought to fway with us. I think, fo far as to keep us fi cm being contemned, derided, or marked, where that may lawfully and conveniently be done ; cfpccially in refpeft of trifling and little matters. But further a wife man will fcarce mind them. Tiiat is a good fentence in Z)c»J(;j)/;;i/«, rioili « r-sfiai uyxi xnAtt, xat ^aay f/jifi^vii a^oij;.®- '^d Laftly, Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c, 1 79 Laftly, He mtijl labor to char his mind of ihofe preoccupations and incimhrances ivbichhang about it, and binder bim from reafoning freely, and judging impartially. We fet out in life from fuch poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under fuch remains of fuperftition and ignorance, fuch influences of company and fafliion, fuch infinuations of pleafurc, i^c. that it is no wonder, if men get ha- bits of thinking only in one ivay ; that thefe habits in time grow confirmed and obliinate ; and fo their minds come to be overcaft with thick prejudices, fcarce penetrable by any ray of truth or light of reafon. He therefore, who would ufe his rational faculties, muft in the firft place difentangle them, and renda- them Jit to be ufed : and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not intend to ufe themj that is, he proclaims h\xn(t\'t irrational, con- trary to truth, if fuppofition the fourth be true. The fum of all is this : it is the duty of every man, if that word exprelTes fuch a being as is before defcribed, to behave himfelf in all refpe£ts (Syhich I cannot pretend to enumerate^ as fiir as he is able according to reafon. And from hence it will follow, further, that, IV. Everyman is obliged to live virtuoujly and pioujly. Becaufe to praftice reafon % and truth'^ is to live after that manner. For from the contents of the foregoing fe61:ions it is apparent, that one cannot praftice reafon (or aft accor- ding to truthj without behaving himfelf reverently and dutifully toward that Almighty being, on whom he depends j norwithout7«/?w and a tender regard to the properties of other men : that is, unlefs his injoyments be free from im- piety, virtuous and harmlefs. And as to thofe virtues, which refpedt a mans felf, the fame thing '^ will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by fome of the principal ones. Prudence, the queen of virtues, is nothing but choofing (after things ^ have been duly weighd) and ufing the moft reafonable means to obtain fome end, that is reafonable. This is therefore direSlly the exercife of reafon. Temperance permits us to take meat and drink not only as phyfic for hunger and thirftjbut alfo as an innocent cordial znd fortifier againft the evils of Iife,or evenfome- times, reafon not refufing that liberty, merely as matter ofpleafure. It only con- fines us to fuch kinds, quantities, and Jeafons, as may beft confift with our health % * Ipf» virttii brevijfime recla ratio did poteft. Cic. ^« Idem ejfe dicebat Socrates veritatem ^ wrtutem. Id. ' Viz,. That a man cannot praftiferea- fon without praftHingthcni. * T»' r' hsTu, r» r tos-iyjax, ir^'a t' iovTic. ' That faying of Ttmothetis to Plato, with whom he had flipped the night before in the Academy, fhouy bercmem- berd. 'Xj/iiTi h hiTtntTt— — £('5 TiJw^ uTifxictv — —iif/ji^eis.Ap, Athen> the i8o The Religion 6/ Nature. Sedl.IX. the life of our faculties % our fortune, i^c. nnd flicw, that \vc do not think our felvcs made oh/j to cat and drink here '' j that is, fuch as fpeak us to be what we are. Cbaflity does not pretend to extinguifi our tender pailions, or cancel one part of our nature: it only bids us not to indulge them againil reafon and truth "^ » not give up the man to humor the hrute^; nor hurt others to pleafe our felves j to divert our inclinations by bufincls, or fome honeft amufement, till we can gratify them laivfully^ conveniently^ regularly^ ; and even then to paiticipateof the myfteries of love with W(?ie/?j)', as within a veil or facred inclofure, not with a canine impudence ^. Frugality indeed looks forward, and round about j not only confiders the man himfelfy but compafllonates his family j knows, that, when the exadeft com- putation is made that can be beforehand, there will ftill be found many unfore- feen defiderata in the calendar of his expenccs j is apprehenfive of the world, and accidents, and new occaflons, that may arife, tho they are not yet in be- ing gj and therefore endeavours wifely to lay in as much, as may give him fome kind of fecurity againll future wants and cailialtics, without which provifion no man, whofe fenfe is not quite loll, or circumfcribed within the prefent mi- nute, can be very cafy '\ To this end it not only cuts off" all profufion and ex- travagance^ but even deducts fomething from that, which according to the prefenc appearance might be afforded ' > and choofes rather that he fhould live upon half allowance now, than be expofed (or expofe any body clfej to the danga- of ilarving hereafter '^, when full meals and former plenty fhall make poverty ^ndfajiiug more infupportable. But Hill it forbids no inftance of gene- ■rofity^ or even magnificence^ which is agreeable to the man's liation and circum- llances, or fwhich is tantamount) to the truth of his cafe '. ' Corf Its onHfeum Heficrnis-vitiii aniinum qnpi^i prd£ravat una, (^c. Hor. '' ^uibus in folo Vivendi caufapalatoeft. Juv. Sic prandete commilitones tanijtiam apud inferos an/tturi (Leonid. ap.Val M.) may be turned to a general memento, no man knowing, ho-vv near his death may be. ' T('I(^£5j y.n.Xr,); 't.T:a,yi T y-Mifj:. Arr. ^ Venerem incertxm r.ipientes, more femrttm Hor. e In which words are comprehended naturally (To ^ij t*; ■^a^a. ipuVw ifJ^bw? Ji©- Kiiv). f "Hoi is Crates znd Hippurchia (of whom fee D/cj. L. Sext. Emp. df at.), and indeed the Cynics in general are faid to have done : quibus in propatulo coire cum conjiigibiis mos fuit. Laftant. Of whom therefore Cicero fays with good reafon, Cynicorum ratio [al. natio] tota eft eji- cienda. Eft enim inimica verectmdii, fine qua nihil recfur/i ejfepcteft, nihil honeftum. Vi'y inU;j< "^iJ t^yjyl [W^N'. i\ Hhas. That in Herodotus, "Aia,u. y.^Srun ci-Jao/z-ivM c-vy-yj^irai ^ rr.t i.iia y-jn., eight not to be true. Verecund'a naturali habcnt provifum lupanaria ipfifecretum. Aug. * EiS ro T-Js r'JX,iK a.T.%}hairii atpocZtnx,. Vh. f. '' Simonides was wont to fay, BBAoii*;)! «» ^- &«»»•» T015 ix,^^'"i ^a,%3» 'ii ^&» Sit^ r cp'.Xm. Stob. ' Kon intelligunt homines quAm mignum veHigal fit pxrf.monia' Cic. ^ Like them, who oV t^vsotjiti ra f y^fas tfiocixz-po- »»T«v«A((r)'-Ks-.», as in Atken. ' £;» liber.ilitsie tttamur, quA profit arnicis, nocext nemini- Cie. After Truths helonging to a Private Man, &€, 1 8 1 After the fame manner I might proceed upon other particular virtues. But my notion oi them mull by this time be fufficiently underftood : and therefore I flinll only give this general advice. That you may take the truer profpe£t of any aft, place your felf in your imagination beyond it (beyond it in time), and. fuppofe it already done^ and then fee how it looks j always remembring, that a long repentance is a difproportionate price for ^.fiort injoyment. Or, fancy it done by fome other man^ and then view it in that fpeculum : we are commonly fliar- per-fighted in difcerning the faults of others, than of our felves ». And further, as to thofe virtues, which arc faid to confift in the mean, it may be fomctimes liifer to incline a little more to one of the extremes, than to the other : as, rather to ftinginefs, than prodigality ; rather to inflexibility, and even a degree of ill nature, than to dangerous complaifance, or eafinefs in refpe<5t of vice, andfuch things as may be hurtful; and fo on*". Since then to live virtitottjly is to pra£life reafon and aft conformably to truth, he, who lives fo, muft be ultimately happy, by feft. II. prop. XIV. and therefore not only the commands of reafon, but even the defire of happinefs (a motive, that can- not but work ftrongly upon all who think) will oblige a man to live fo. It may be coUefted even from experience, that the 'virtuous life compared with the contrary, if one looks no further than the prefent ftate, is the happier life "^ ; or, that the virtuous pleafures, when the whole account is made up, are the truer ''. Who fees not, that the vitious life is full of dangers and folicitudes, and ufually ends ill J perhaps in rottenncfs and rags, or at leaftin a peevilla and defpicable difcon- tent « ? I am not of opinion, thxtvirtue can make a man happy upon a rack *,underavio- lent fit of the Itone, or the like g ; or that virtue ^nd prudence can always exempt him from wants and fufferings, mend a ilrait fortune, or re£tify an ill conftitu- • Nonejl incommodnm, quale qiiojqi ft, ex aitis judicare: ut ft quid dedeceat in aliis, vi- iemus& ipft. Fit enim nefcio quo moJo, ut magis in aliis cernamus, quam in nobifmet ipjis, fi quid delinqnitur. Cic. ^ Oto/, ov d-U-vu, Trcozmi th ai-^ir^arn ft,yt ^u Sen. Tully reports the finie. S It is in the power of very few to a& like him, qui dum varices exficandas pnberet, legerelibrum pcrfeveravit : or him, qui non dejiit ridere, cum ob hoc ipfum irati tortores omnia inftru- menta crudelitatif experirentur. Sen. A a tion : J 82 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. IX. tion : amidft fo many enemies to virtue, fo many infirmities as attend life, he cannot but hefomefimes affeHed. But I have faid, and fliy again, that the nalu- ral and ttfual cfFe£t of virtue is happinefs j and if a virtuous man fhould in fomerefpefts be unhappy, yet ftill his virtue will make him lefs unhappy : for at leaft he injoys inward tranquillity, and a breaft confcious of no evil. And which kind of life I pray ought one to prefer : that, which naturally tends to happinefs., tho it may be difturbed ; or that, which naturally tends to unhappinefs ? In brief, •virtue will make a man here.^ in any given circumrtances, as happy as a man can be in thofe circumftances : or however it will make him happy hereafter in fome other ftate: for ultimately ., all taken together, happy he muft be. Some may pofTibly wonder, why among virtues I have not fo much as once named one of the cardinal.) and the only one perhaps which they pretend to : I mean fortitude. That that.^ by which fo many heroes have triumphed over enemies, even the greateft, death itfelf ; that., which diftinguifhes nations, raifes empires, has been the grand theme of almoft all wits, attracts all eyes, opens all mouths, and afflunes the name of virtue by way of excellence j that this fhould be forgot ! To attone for this omiflion I will make this appendix to the foregoing brief account, li fortitude he. taken fornatural courage (i. e. flrength, aftivity, plen- ty of fpirits, and a contempt of dangers refulting from thefe), this is conftitu- tion and the gift of God », not any virtue in us : becaufe if it be our virtue, it mufb confift in fomething, which we produce, or do our felves ''. The cafe is the fame with that of fine features and complexion, a large inheritance, or ilrong walls, which may indeed be great advantages., but were never called vir- tues ". To have thcfe is not virtue} but to ufe them rightly, or according to reafon, if we have them. That this isjuftly faid, may perhaps appear from what is to be kid on thec- ther fide. It may be a man's misfortune, that he has not more courage, a grea- ter ftock of fpirits, firmer health, and ftronger limbs, if he has a juft oc- cafion to ufe them j but it never can be reckond a vice or fault not to ufe what he has not : for otherwife it might be a crime not to be able to carry ten thoiif ind poimd weight, or outrim a cannon-ball. • Ei';u,«A« xa^i^k ! M'^' ^uTixZi »« to rrut, ^>i.m 'in umi -^yjii xni~r»i, JcA. Oreg. Thaum. ^ Which, «? hj:t~y, iinii irt r icur^inm, Artetn. <= "05r« i /8«(r(A£o{, V i-xiX ;^ ci ^c^v(pa^i>r ^o^vficfot ii icurS-tia-iii ? vS, -sfet x.itp»M' irm. th. f. •• Ta Itjifri ^ vafAiai^ «Aoy« if it, i«v' or«v i^f^r, yhtirai, (rsiVaVT©- iiirTi^ iviaq ^ XoyKrftii,7!iCvTet, i-iray.rcci ti nwrntat i vTrxxivu. Tlut. ' Nos »e nunc ajiidem octtlis cernimus ea, qu£ videmus : neque enim eft ullui fenfus in cor fore, fed -vU ojuufi qu&dam funt ad ocidos, ad aures, ad r.ares afcde tinimi perforata. Jtaque fape aut coghatkne, ant aUqtia, vi morh't hnpd'tti, aprt'n atqiie integris & tculis & auriiui, nee videmus, nee audimus : ut facile intelUgi pcfjit, a.iimutn 0- lidere, <^ audire, von eas partes, tpa quafi fetteftr* fmt animi : quibits tamenfemire nihil ^eat mem, nifi id agat, cJ* adjit. Cic. Upon Truths helongmg to a Private Man, &€. 1 85 Upon amputation of a limb ' this thing ('whatever it is) is not found to be eliminifljd^^ nor any of its facuhies lojl. lis fphere of a£ting,^|^e it is con- fined to the body, is only contrafted, and part of its inJle^^KJ^i^. It can- not make ufe of that which is not, or which it has not. ^^ If the eyes be fhut, or the ears ftopt, it cannot then fee, or hear : but remove the obftruftion, and it inftantly appears that the faculty, by which it apprehends the impreflions made upon the organs of fenfation, remaind all that while intirej and that fo it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had never been opend again j or, if the eyes had been out, or the ears quite difabled. This fhews in general, that, when any fenfe or faculty feems to be impaird or loft by any bodily hurt, after a fever, or through age, this doth not come to pafs, becaufe it is the body that perceives and has thefe faculties in itfelf j but becaufe the body lofes its in- firumentality, and gives that which is thttruefubjeSl of thefe faculties no opportu^ nity of exerting them, or of exerting them well : tho it retains them as much as in the cafe before, when the eyes or ears were only fliut = . Thus diftinct are it and its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the foul. Again, as a man perufcs and confiders his own body, doth it not undeniably appear to be fomething different from the confiderer ? And when he ufes this exprefTion my body, or the body of me, may it not properly be demanded, who is meant by me, or what my relates to ? It cannot be the body itfelf : that can- not fay of itfelf. It is my body, or the body of me. And yet this way of fpeak- ing we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual fenfe of our felves, and what we are, even tho we do not advert upon it. What I mean is this. A man being fuppofed aperfon confifting of tivo parts» foul and body, the whole perfon may fay of this or that part of him, jhcfoulof me, or the body of me : but if he was either <3// /oa/, or all body, and nothing elfe, he could not then fpeak in this manner : becaufe it would be the fame as to fay the foul of the foul, or the body of the body, or the I of me. The pronoun there- fore (in that faying my body, or the body of 7m) muft ftand for fomething elfe, to which the body belongs ^; or at leaft for fomething, of which it is only a parr, viz. the perfon of the whole man ^ And then even this implies, that there is another part of him, which is not body. * Or even i/f/riififi) cortore mtiho, as Lucretius fpeaks. •> no»«xi; i^ x x^iim ^ t sro^an 1»M' Mf^lA,-,^,, i;.cv.>.„f(^ ULrA \y. ■^■jxy,'] ,^i,H. Chryf. c ThevdoTe .^riftotk fays, if an old man had a young man's eye, ^AeVoi «» auind aro the hJj : fo far are they from being the fame thing. Laftly, there is wcmzy perceive fomelhirig ivifhinus, which fupports the body (keeps it up}, dircfts its motion for the better prefervation of it, when any hurts or evils befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the lilce j without which it would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. Thc^o- dy therefore mull be confidcrd as being under the dire^ion and tuition of fome other thing, which is (or fiiould be!) the governor of it, and confequently upon this account mull be concluded to be different from it. VII. 'the foul cmnot he mere matter. For if it is, then either all matter muft think } or the difference muft ariic from the different modif cation^ magnitude-^ figure^ or motion '° of fome parcels of matter in refpeft of others j or a faculty of thinking muft he fuperadded to iome fyftems of it, which is not fuperadded to others. But, In the firft place, that pofition, which makes all matter to be cogitative, is con- trary to all the apprehenfions and knowledge we have of the nature of it} nor can it be true, unlefs our fenfes and faculties be contrived only to deceive us. We per- ceive not the leaft fymptom of cogitation^ or fenfe in our tables, chairs, i^c. Why doth the fcene of thinking lie in our heads., and all the minifters of fenfi- tion make their reports to fomething there., if i?// matter beapprehenfive, and co- gitative ? For in that cafe there would be as much thought and underftanding in our heels., and every were elfe, as in our heads. Hall matter be cogitative, then it muft be fo quatenia matter,o.nd thinking muft be of the eflence and definition of it : whereas by matter no more is meant but a fiibftance extended and impenetrable to other matter. And fince, for this reafon, it cannot be Kf^e^rj for matter to think (becaufe it may be matter without this property), it cannot think as matter only. If it did, we fhould not only continue to think always, till the matter of which weconfiftis annihilated, and fo the afiertor ofthisdo£brine would ftumbleupon a ^uiviTcct cv ecvTtii; y^ li^a rt TFXpcc T Xoyov TTi^VKS^^ 'o fiju^irut Tt ^oyu. jirijl. *> Whether any form> modification, or motion of matter can be a human foul, feems to be muchfuch another queftion as that in one of ^WfM's epiilles, Anjujlitiei, mfortitiido, frudentiet, c(ter£(iue ^ir- tutes, animaliit fint. immor- Truths hehnging to a Private Man, &c, 1 87 tmrnortality unawares j but wemuft alfo have thought always in iimepajl^ ever fince that matter was in being ; nor could there be any the leall interniiflion of aSlual thinking : which does not appear to be our cafe. If thinking, felf-confcioufners, ijfc. wtxQ e£ential to matter, every part of it mull have them: and then no fyji em could have them. For a fyftem of mate- rial parts would be a iyllem of things confcious every one by itfelf of its own ex- iftence and individuality, and confequently thinking by itfelf: but there could be no one a^ of felf-confcioufnefs or thought common to the whole. Juxta- pofition in this cafe could fignify nothing : the diilinftion and individuation of the feveral particles would be as much rctaind in their vicinity, as if they were feparatcd by miles. In the next place, the faculties of thinking, i^c. cannot ariie from the. ftze^ figure^ . texture, or motion of it : becaufe bodies by the alteration of thefe only become grea- ter or lefs i round or fquare, ^c. rare, or denfe j tranflated from one place to another with this or that new direction, or velocity ; or the like : all which ideas are quite different from that o^ thinking; there can be no relationhetwcen them^ Thefe modifications and affeftions of matter are fo flu- from being principles or caujes of thinking and afting, that they are themfelves but e/i-ff j, proceeding from the adtion of fome other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its paffivity, deadnefs, and utter incapacity of becoming cogitative. This is evident to fenfe. They, who place the eflence of the foul in a certain motion given to fome matter, fif any fuch men there really bej fhould confidcr, among many other things, that to move the body fpontaneoufly is one of the faculties of the foul ^ j and that this, which is the fame with the power of beginning motion, cannot come from motion already begun, and imprefl ab extra. Let the materialifl examine well, whether he docs not feel fomething within himfelf, that afts from tin wternal principle: whether he doth not experience fome liberty fome powerof^owr«/«^ himfelf, ^nd choofng: whether he does not injoy a kind odnvifble empire, in which he commands his own thoughts, fends them to • this or that place, imploys them about this or that bufinefs'^, forms fuch and fucb » No«« »fl£» o-uujX yinZ- ttZc, yi «» t« kvinru. iiuu yimfrti. Sallufi. *> That the fbul is tbe principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (tho it wants no teftimony) often faid by the ancients, tao-; ^ swm, (^ fA«A(,-a, (f Tr^anui -^ivxyii men t« Ktyiw. Arifi. H 4'VX'' to wJe9-«, xivcvfrk is y^cim, »A, M/IX, T, defigns J 88 The Religion of Nature. Se6t. IX. defigns and fchemes: andwhether there is any thing like this in W^-zwrt/^ffr", how- ever fafhiond, or proportiond ; which, if nothing Ihould protrude or communicate motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place where it happens to be, an e- ternal monument of its own being dead. Can fuch an a£fi've being as the foul is '', the fubjeft of/o many powers^ be itfelf nothing but an accident ? When I begin to move my felf, I do it for fomc reafon, and with refpefb to fome end, the weans toeffe£l which I have, if there be occafion for it, concerted within my felf: and this doth not at all look like motion merely material (or, in which matter is only concernd), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine matter to be moved by arguments j or ever iphcedjyllogifms and demonfirations among levers and puUies ? We not only move our felves upon reafons, which we find in our felves, but up- on reafons imparted by words or writing from others, or perhaps merely at their dellreorbarefuggeftion. In which cafe, again, no body fure can imagine, that the •words fpoken or written (the found in the air, or the ilrokes on the paperj can by any natural or mechanical efficience caufe the reader or hearer to move in any determinate manner (or at all). The reafon, requeft, or friendly admonition, which is the true motive, can make no impreflionupon matter. It mull be fome other kind of being, that apprehends the force and fenfe of them. Do not we fee in converlation, how a pleafint thing faid makes people break out into laughter, a mdctlixnginto pajfion, and fo on ? Thefeaffeftions cannot be the pbyfical effects of the words fpoken : becaufe then they would have the fame effed, whether they were underflood, or not. And this is further demonftrable from hence, that tho the 'words do really contain nothing, which is either plea- fant, or rude ; or perhaps words ai-e thought to be fpoken, which are not fpoken j yet if they are apprehended to do that, or the found to beotherwife than it was, the effeft will be the fame. It is therefore the fenfe of the words, which is an immaterial thing, that by paffing through the under/landing and caufing that, which is the fubjeft of the intelledual faculties, to influence the body, produces thefe motions in the fpirits, blood, mufcles. a What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the foul is that in Lucretius? Vb'i propellere membra, Cowif ere ex fomno corpus, ^c. videtttr (^mruinnil fieri fine t^Bu pop videmus. Nee taHum parrofine corpore); nonne fatendum efl Corporea m.tura animum conftare, animamq, I If nothing can move the My, but another body, what moves this ! The hoay might as well move itfelf, as be moved bj one that does, \ icty^i^it nsc,- :^ zi/.iTt,c, ^) r^tx^i. Thai, ap, Diog. L. 4 They, Truths hlon^ing to a Private Man, &c. 1 89 They, who can fancy, that matter m^y come to hve, think, and a£t fpontanc- oufly, by being reduced to a certain magnitude, or having its parts placed after a certain manner, ox being inverted with fuch -3. figure, or excited by fuch a particular motion: they, I fay, would do well todifcoverto us that J^^gree of finenefs, that alteration in the fituation of its parts, l^c. at which matter may begin to find itfelf alive and cogitative ; and which is the critical minute, that introduces thefe impor- tant properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon a.ny particular cri- Jis, it is a fign they have no good reafon for what they fay. For if they have no rea- fon to charge this change upon zny particular degree or difference, one more than an- other, they have no reafon to charge it upon any degree or difference at all; and then they have no reafon, by which they can prove that fuch a change is made at all. Befides all which, fmce magnitude, figure, motion are but accidents of matter, not matter, and only the fubftance is truly matter ; and fince the fub fiance o^ any one part of matter does not differ from that of another, xiany matter can be by nature cogitative, all muft be fo. But this we have feen cannot be. So then in conclufion, if there is any fuch thing as matter that thinks, &c. this muft be a particular privilege granted to it : that is, a faculty of thinking niufl: htfuper Added to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, muft infer the exiftence of fome Being able to confer this faculty j who, when the ineptnefs of matter has been well confiderd, cannot appear to be lefs than omni- fotent, or God. But the truth is, matter feems not to be capable of fuch im- provement, of being made to think. For fince it is not of the effence of mat- ter, it cannot be made to he fo without making matter another kind of fubftance from what it is. Nor can it be made to arile from any of the modifications or accidents of matter j and in rcfpedof what elfe can any matter he made to dif- fer from other matter. The accidents of matter are fo far from being made by any power to produce cogitation, that fome even ofthemihew it incapable of having a faculty of think- ing fuperadded. The very divifibility of it docs this. For that which is made to think muft cither be one part, or more parts joind together. But we know no fuch thing as a part of matter purely one (or indivifiblcj . It may indeed have pleafed the Author of nature, that there fliould be atoms, whofe paits are aBually indifcerpible, and which may be the principles of other bodies ; but ftill they confift oi parts, tho firmly adhering together. And if the feat of cogi- tation be in more parts than one ('whether they lie clofe together, or are loofe, or ina ftate of fluidity, itisthefame thing), how canit beavoided, but thateither there muft be fo many feveral minds, or thinking fuhftances, as there are parts (Ixnd then the confequence, which has been mentiond, would return upon us again) ; Bb «v ipo The Religion 0/ Nature. Sedl:. IX. or elfe, that there vnw^hz fomething elfe fuperadded for them to center in, to unite their afts, and make their thoughts to be cm ? And then what can this be, but fome ot\\cx fubfiance, which is purely one ? Matter by itfclf can never intertain abJiraSled and general ideas, fuchas many in our minds are ". For could it reflc£l upon what pafTes within itfelf^ it could pollibiy find there nothing but material and particular impreflions ; abilradlions and metaphyfical ideas could not be printed upon it*". How could one abftradfc from matter who is himlelf nothing but matter ? And then as to material images themfelves, which are ufually fuppofed to be imprefl upon the brain (or fome part of it^, andftock the phanta/y and memory, that which perufes the impref- flons and traces there (or anywhere) mull: be fomething diftinct from the brain^ or that upon which thefe impreflions are made: otherwife it muft contemplate itfelf, and be both reader and book. And this other diftin£l contemplating being cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think without a foul. For fuch a corporeal being muft require fenje, and fuitable or- gans, to perceive and read thefe characters and vefligia of things j and fo another organized body would be introduced, and the fame queftions and difficulties re- doubled, concerning the foul of that body and its faculties "=. If my /o«/ was mere matter, external viiible objcds could only be perceived within me according to the imprejjions they make upon matter, and not other- wife. Ex.gr. the image of a cube in my mind (or my idea of a cube) muil be always under fome particular />ro/2'^t?, and conform to the rules oi perfpeRive ; nor could I otherwife reprefent it to my felf : whereas now I can form an idea of it as it is in itfelf, and almoft view all its hedra at once, as it were incom- pafling it with my mind. I can within myfelfforrcc? the external appearances and impreflions of objedsj and advance, upon the reports and hints received by my fenfcs, to form ideas of things that are not e.\-tant in matter. By feeing a material circle I may learn to form the idea of a circle, or figure generated by the revolution of a ray about its cen- ter : but then recollecting what I know of matter upon other occafions, I can con- clude there is no cxaSl material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was railed from the hints 1 rcceivcd/r&??i without, but is not truly to be found there. If I fee a /o:wr at a great diftance, which according to the impreflions made upon my • Diogenes, tho he couU fee the table, and the fot, could not by his eyes fee flute's rjaxf^aros, & x-jn^oT-.K. Biog. L. >> Tlato, 8c ci (rsipii (more generally) fay, that the foul indeed perceives objeftsof fenfe byjSafc mediation of the body ; but there are tiy.To'^ which it doth y.«y iuw ci&u- /Aa:3j. Id. c Such a foul muft be indeed as Greg. Thunm. has it, o-Sjok* "niA^vyfit. ''atctto ^ ■^■j^iii -vj/^'i* ^s'ys". material ..Truths hehngtng to a Private Man, &.c. 191 material organs fecms little and round^ I do not therefore conclude it tohc either : there is fomething within, that rcafons upon the circumftances of the appeai'ance, and as it were commands my fenfc, and corrects the imprcllion: and this muft be fomething fuperior to matter, lince a material foul is no otherwife impreilible itfcif, but as material organs are. Inrtances of this kind areendlefs. (v. p. j-3, ^a.) If we know any thing oi matter, we know, that ^;' /Vy?// it is a lifelels thino-, inert, and pafsive only > and ads neceffarily (or rather is TiCttd) according to the laws of motion and gravitation. This pafsivenefsfcems tobe^^^«//«/ toit. And if we know any thing of our /elves, we know, that we are confcious of our own exillencc andafts (i.e. that we live); that we have a degree o£ freedom ; that we can move our i'elvcs fpoutaiieoufy ; andinfhort, that we can, in many inllances, take off the effeft of gravitation, and imprefs new motions upon our fpirits (or give them new direftions), only by a thought. Therefore to make mere matter do all this is to change the nature of it j to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into cogitativity, necefsity into liberty. And to fay, that God m-xy fuperadd a faculty of thinking, moving itfelf, lyc. to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be the fuppofitum of thefe faculties (that fubftance, in which they inhere), is the fame in effed: as to fay, that God may fuperadd a faculty of thinking to incegitativity^ of ading feely to necejjity, and fo on. What fenie is there in this .' And yet fo it muil be, while matter continues to be matter. Thzt faculty of thinking, fo much talked of by fomeas fuperadded to certain fyftems of matter, fitly difpofed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it be fo called, muil in reality amount to the fame thing as ■a.rxother fubjlance with, the faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking alone will not make up the idea of a human yo«/, which is indued with many faculties ; apprehending, refle<5t- ing, comparing, judging, making deductions and rcafoning, willing, putting the body in motion, continuing the animal fun£lions by its prefcnce, and gi- ving life ; and therefore, vuhatever it is that is fuperadded, it muft he fomething which is indued with all thofe other faculties. And whether that can be a/«- culty of thinking, and fo thefe other faculties be only faculties of a facuh iy' } or whether they muft not all be rather the faculties of fomey«^- • This is worfe than ■•J't'^i 4'^;;?; in Max. Tyr aaJ the place juft before cited. The author of the 'Ejfuy cone. Hum. Underfi. has himfcll^ exploded it, or what is very like it. To ask, fays he, ■tcheth^r the will Lis freedom, is to ask, vehether one povrer has another povner, one ability another abi- lity; a queftion at flrji Jight too grofty abfurd to make a difpute, or need an anfrrer. For who is it that fees not, that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of fubfiances, and not of porvers them' jvlvesl There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another paffage tome where in the lame book as much (or more) to my purpofe: but at prtfent I cannot find it. B b i fance ', ipi r/j^ Religion o/' Nature. Sedl. IX» fiance % which, being (by their own concefsion^ fuperadcle.i to matter, muft be different from it, I do leave the unprejudiced to dctermin. If men would but feriouily look into themfelves, I am perfuaded the/ov/ would not appear to them a^z. faculty of the body, or kind o? appurtenance to \t; but ra' ther as [omcf/i!;Jiance, properly placed in it, not only to ufc it as an inftrumcnt, and act by it, but alio to govern it (or the parts of it; as the tongue, hands, feet, 1^^.) according to its own reafon. For I think it is plain enough, that the mind, tho it ads under great limitations, doth however in many inftances^o-:;!?;;; the body ar- bitrarily : and it is monftrous tofuppofe this governor to be nothing but fome fit difpofition or accident (fuperaddedj of that matter which is governed. A fi:ip it is true would not be fit for navigation, if it was not built and provided in a proper manner : but then, when it has its proper form, and is become -xfyfle \. of materials fitly difpofcd, it is not iW\% difpofition that governs it. It is the man, that other fub- ftance, who fits at the helm, and they,wlio manage the Pails and tackle,that do this. So our "veffels without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be capable ofbeingaftcdas they arc; butftillit is not the fhape, or modification, or any other accident, that can govern them. The capacity of being governed or ufed can never be iht governor, applying and ufing ^ that capacity. No there mult be at the helm fvmetbing difiinH, that commands the body, and without which it would run adrift, or rather fink. For the foregoing reafons it fcems to me, that »^^//f;- cannot think, cannot ^c made to think. But if a faculty of thinking can be fuperadded to a^ fyftem of matter, without uniting an immaterial fubftance to it ' ; I fay, i^ihis can be, yei zhuman hody is not fuch a fyftem, being plainly void of thought, and organized in fuch a manner as to tranfmit the impreffions of ienfible objeds up to the brain, where the percipient, and that which refieSls upon them, certainly refides : and therefore that, which /^f>-^ apprehends, thinks, and wills, muft he that fyfiem of matter to which a faculty of thinking is fuperadded. All the premifies then well con- fiderd, judge I befeech you, whether inftead of faying, that this inhabitant of our heads (the foul) is a fyftem of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is ' fuperadded, it might not be more rcafonable to iiiy, it is a thinking fiubfiance in- timately united to fome fine material vehicle, which has its refidence in the brain. • If the foul is only an accident (or attribute) of the li^fly, how comes this accident to have (or be the fupport of) other accidents, contrary ones too ? As when we fay, '131 n^^D WS31 noDn VUQJ S. Huemm. ^ "Erifc ^„ rori xs^f^"" 'b ? ^S''*'- Pluu. ' Or, if to a thinking fu6- [tance can be fnfertidiledthe tnodifUation of [olidity. Which way of fpeaking, tho I do not remember to have met with it any where, nor doth if feem to differ much from the other, yet would pleafe Bie better. Tho Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 1 9 3 Tho I undcrftand not pcrfe£tly the manner, how a cogitative and fpiritual Cub- ftmcc can be thus clofely united to fuch a material vehicle; yet I canunderftand this union as well, as how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as how the particles of the body irfelf cohere together), and much better than how a thinking faculty can be fuperadded to matter: and befide, Ccver.x\ pL-eucKfiefm may more ealily be folved by this hjipothe/is ; which (tho I fhall not pcrtinacioufly maintain it) in fhort is this. Plz. that the human yo«/is a cogitative fubftance, clo- thed in a material vehicle, or rather united to it, andasit were infeparably mixt (\ had almoft faid incorporated) with it ^ ; that thefe acl in conjuncfion^ that, which af- fects the one, affcfting the other : that the foul is detaind in the body (the head or brainj by iome fympatby or attra&ion between this material vehicle and it, till the habitation is fpoild, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned into an averfion, that makes it fly off), by fome hurt, or difeafc, or by the de- cays and ruins of old age, or the like, happening to the body : and that in the inte- rim by means of this vehicle motions and impreisions are communicated to and fro. But of this perhaps fomething more by and by. VIII. Tbefoulofmanfubfijts after the dijfolution of his body : or, is immortal. For, I . If it is immaterial, it is indifcerpible, and therefore incapable of being dif- ' folved or demolifhd, as bodies are ''. Such a being can only perifh by annihila- tion: that is, it will continue to fubfift and live, if fome other being, able to do this, doth not by a particular aft annihilate it. And if there is any reafon to believe, that at the death of eveiy man there is always fuch a particular anni- hilation, let him that knows it produce it. Certainly to reduce any fubftance into »o/Z';'«^ requires juft the fiime power as to convert nothingmio fomething: and I fancy they, who deny the immortality of the foul, will be cautious how they admit any fuch power. z. If the foul fo«/rf^^ material i that is, iftherecouldbeanywa/Zfr, that might- be the fubjed of thofe faculties of thinking, willing, (^c. yet ftill, (ince we cannot but be fenfible, that all thefe are faculties of the felf -fame thing ; and that all the feve„ ral afts of the mind are afts oHhe fame thing, each of them individual and truly one ; 1 fay, fince it is fo, this matter muft be fo perfectly united in itfelf, fo abfo- * Jt ii vorth our conftderation, rrhether aclhe forcer he not the proper attribute ef fpirit, and palfve ■ f over of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created fpirtts are not totally feparate from matter,, iecaufe they are both aciive and pajjive. Fure fpirit, viz. God, is only a^i-ve i pure itmttef is only faf~. fixe; thofe Beings, that are both acitie and paJJive, toe may judge to partake of both. Hum. Underft. . t" This is Socrates's argument in Plato. The foul is altogether a<^ia/.^7■@>-, and therefore ivaAiS-f©-, >'hich Cicero interprets thus : nee difcerp, nee diftrahi feteft j nee mierire iptnr. 3 liitdy. 194 r/?^ Religion o/' Nature. Sedl. IX. lutely one, as no matter knowable by us can be. And then the kajl that can be allowd is that itfhould be truly folid, and not aSlm/Iy cl'rjifibk ; that is, fuch as no natural caufe could deftroy. To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or a thinking matter, is to in- troduce matter with a new and oppofite property ; and that is to introduce a Kf to /'pedes of matter^, which will differ as eflcntially from the other common unthink- ing kind, as any fpecies whatfoever doth from its oppofite in/w/<^ pnedicamentaU, even as body doth from fpirit. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal and incorporeal. And if fo, this thinking matter muft always continue to think, till either it is annihilated, or there is a iranfmutation of one fpecies into ano- ther : and to take refuge in either of thefe expectations is at leait to expcd om- nipotence fhould interpofe to help out a bad caufe. If any one lliouldfay, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence fuperadd to certain parcels of matter a fourth dimenfton, I fhould not perhaps difpute the Divine power : but I might fay, that fuch matter, exilling under four dimenfi- ons, would ejfentially dti^exixoxa. that, which cannot exilf under four, or which can exiftbut only under three; and that this four-dimenliond matter mvi{\: always remain fuch, becaufc no fubiVance can be changed into or become another, ef- fentially different, nor do we know of any, that by thecourfeof nature ceafes totally to be, or is reduced to nothing. 3 . TJie next argument Iball proceed by way o?obje6lion and anpwer. Becaufe a removal of the principal objection againjl any thing is a good argument /or it. Obj. It fcems as ii thinking was not eflential to the foul, but rather a capacity of think- ing under certain circumftances. For it doth not think, when it lies conceald in the primitive rudiment of the man, in the womb, perhaps in the beginnings of infan- cy, in flcep, in a fwoon : and the reafon of this fecms to lie in the circumftances of the body, which either is not lufficicntly extended, and prepared j or for a while im- ploysthe fpirits wholly in the digcftion of its aliment,and other offices in the animal ccconomy > or by fome extei-nal attack, or the working of iome enemy got into it, hath its parts diforderd, and the paflages fo pofleft, that the blood and other fluids can fcarce break through} or after fome fuch manner is pretcrnaturally affccled. And therefore the queftion to be refolvcd is not, whether the foul is material or im- material ; and much Icfs, whether it will be annihilated at death ; but, whether that foul (be it what it wiiy, which ceafes to think, when the body is not fitly difpofcd, ' Lucretius {eems to be aware of this, fim triflex animi el natura reperta : Kec tamen hscfit runt ad [mfiim cnnBa, crccmdum. ^c. ^mrta quo^i his iptur quEcdam natura necejfi eft Attrihua- tur : ea ejt omnino nominis expers. Truths heJongkg to a Private Man, &c, 1 9 5 ' can think at all, when the body is quite dijfohed^ and leaves the foul no opportu- nity of aduating it any more, or operating by it ^. Anf. If this objeftion can- not be fully anfwerd, till we know more of the nature oi fpiritual beings, and of that vinculum, by which the foul and body are connefted, than we do at prefent, it muft not therefore be lookd upon as certainly unanfwerable in it fclf j and much lefs, if only it cannot be anfwerd by me. It may perhaps be pofliblc to turn it even into an argument /trZ/jc immortality of the foul. The foul it cannot be denied is a limited being, or a being, which aflrs undsr li- mitations: thefe limitations at different times are rf/jfer^Kf, its aftivity and faculties being more obftruded or clogd at one time thzn another, andmoftof allinfleep, ox-ideliquium: as thefe obftrudlions are removed, it acts more f/f^r/j zndi freely ; and therefore if the rtatcof the foul in the body {'its confinement therej may be confiderd as one ge^e.^alzrid great limitation, why, Avhen this limitation fhall be taken off fthis great obfiruction removed j, may it ^ not be allowd to act with flill greater freedom and clcarncfs > thegreatejl it is capable of? Whilft it remains in the brain, it can as it were look out at a. few apertures ; that is, receive the no- tices of many things by thofe nerves and organs, which are the inftruments of fenfation: butifany of thofe avenues to itbellopt, that branch of its knowledge is for a time cut off. If thofe tracks in the brain, or thofe marks, whatever they arc, and where ever they are imprinted, upon which our memory and images of things feem to depend, are filled up or overcaft by any vapor, or otherwife dar- kend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is difperfed. (For it cannot r^«i what is not legible, and indeed for the prefent not there.) And fince even in abftracled reflexions the mind is obliged to make ufe of laords % or fome kind of figns, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and ftable enough to be pcru- fed, compared, ^f. and this kind of /r?»^««^^ depends upon memory; whilllthis is intermitted, the ufe of the other is taken away, with all that depends upon it. This is the prefent Jl ate of the foul: and from hence the reafon appears in fome meafure, why we do not think in iound fleep, Sec. but it does not follow from hence, that the foul cannot fubfiil and act under more inlarged circumftances. That, which, being confined to the body, and able to act only according to the op- ' If I.Hcan hy fenfus means all manner of apprehenfion and knowledge, there is no room for that disjunftion: Aut nihil ejl fensAs animis a morte reliBum, Aut mors iffa nihil. For if the former part be true, the other will follow. ^ V'eliu e diutino carcere emijjus [ani/nus]. Sen. ' Thofe kinds of animals, which do not /peak, do not reafon : but thofe, which do the one, do the other. T.herefore i^nD in (or Ami. pt3S<3) is a rational animal; and m'/O" iigiiifies hoth ffeecb and reafon, as going together, I portunitics 1^6 The Religion ^Nature. SedlJX. portunlties this affords, can now perceive vifible objects only with two eyes (lit two windows ^j, becaufc there are no more, might doubtlefs fee with four. If there were fo many properly placed and difpofed ; or If its habitation were all eye (window all round), might fee all round. And fo, In general, that, which now can know many things by the imprclTions made at the ends of the nerves, or by the Intervention of our prcfent organs, and in tlus fit tint ion and indofurecxn know them no other way, may for all that, when it comes to be loofed out of thatprlfon '', know them immediately, or by fome other medium. That, which is now forced to make fhlftwith tvords a.ndjigi3s of things In its reafonings, may, when It fhall be fct at liberty and can come at them, reafon upon the intuition of things themfehes, orufealangu5igemorcy^;>//«^/or ideal. I fay, it is not impofji'ble, that this fhouldbethccafe j and therefore no one can fay, ivith reafon, that it is not : efpeclally, fince we find by experience, that the foul Is limited j that the limitations are variable ; that we know not enough of the nature of fpirit to de- termln, how thefe Umitations are effefted : and therefore cannot tell, how far they may be carried on, or taken off. This fuffices to remove the force of the objec- tion. But further, A man, when he wakes, or comes to himfelf (which phrafe implies what I am go- ing to fayj. Immediately knows this, and knows himfelf to be xhc fame foul that he was before his fleep, or fainting away. I will fuppofe, that he is alfo confcious to himfelf, that In thofe intei-yals he thought not at all (which is the fame the objedor mufl fuppofej : that is, if his body had been cut to pieces, or mouldcrd to dufl:, he could not have thought lefs : for there is no thinking lefs than thinking not at all. From hence then I gather, that the foul preferves a capacity of thinking, i^c. under thofe clrcumftanccs and Indifpofitions of the body, in which it thinks no more, than if the body was deflroyd ; and that therefore It may, and will preferve it, when the body is dcllroyd. And If fo, what can this capacity be preferred for ? Certainly «c)/, that It may «fwr be exerted. The Author of nature doth not ufc to act after that manner. So that here is this dilemma to be oppofed to the objec- tion. Infleepandfwoonings the foul doth either /Z;/«^, or w/. Ifit^t)^.f, the objec- tion has no foundation ; and if it doth not, then all that will follow, which I have juft now faid. If we fhould fuppofe the foul to be a being by nature made to inform fomc hody^ and that it cannot exift and act in a ftate oftotalfeparation from all body; it would not follow from hence, that what we call death, muft therefore reduce it Truths hehnging to a Private Man, ^c. ipj to a ftate of abfolute infcnfibility and ina&ivity^ which to it would be equal to mn-exiflence. For that body^ which is lb nccelTaiy to it, may be Comefim nor the foul, by confequence, have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correfpondence with them, any other way. And as we fuppofe the foul to receive notifies of things from without inthis manner, fo let us fuppofe, on the other fide, that by mo- ving its own vehicle it may produce motion in the contiguous 7^/>7/.f and nerves, • So Hi erodes diftinguiflies ra uw/tuHi ywZt irafjua, i y^ -^vxHi Aottoi/ ix.'>l^*i from that, which he calls TO br^Tcy y.wav Q-oifhci, and to which the former communicates life. Ta kvycuS,"; ifAm c-a- ftari 7rj^ciri 'o«. Jd. This fine body he calls alfo 4"-';i;"«''' iff>a. In Niflym. hliaiy. there is much concerning xhtX fine body, in which the foul is clothed, and from which it is never to be feparated, according to an old tradition. Men. b, Ifr. gives us the funi of it in fuch words as thefe. abiyi^ nijia aia ,— iDUrjn wnbriD n mD ny pn r|ij u;i . gnj 3f_ terward, ynaHD a"3nn D^pT (ri'Dw:! Dy nnvi'pj njiw^-in ariNnan ,— idh rniDu/jn a^-l3^ nn>^ a:ii icy cnrnn d;>ji qiib cMn mip dn abiy ^o^ hz) a-''3nnn 13UD. S.^adUs long before him joins to the foul pT DYy ; which lie fays is I'O [71 inT'] rjT D^'?:,b;in, &c, C '^ and ip8 The Religion of Nature. Sed. IX. andfo move the body : I mean, when nothing renders them unfit to be moved. Let us fuppofe further, that the foul by means of this vehicle feels or finds thofe prints and portraits, or thofe effe&s and remains left by objects on the mind in fome manner or other, which caufe the remembrance of words and things : I mean again, when they are not filled up, or obfcured by any thing j or, when there are any fuch to be felt. And laftly, let us fuppofe, that if the fvul'm its more abflracied Mid purer reafonings, or rnorefpiritual afts, has any occafion for matter^ to feive it, the matter of this -vehicle is that which is always with it, and ferves it. All which it is eafy to underftand, and perhaps not very difficult to fiip- ..pofe. On the contrary, by many fymptoms it appears moft probable, that that matter, to which the mind is /«zwffl'w/c/jprefent, and in which is its irwsfiekinah^ is not the whole grofs body, hut^ome fubtile body^ placed (■xs I have fiid) in the region of the brain. For there all the conveyances of fenfible fpecies confpire to meet, and there in reflexion we find our felves : when a limb is lofb, the foul, 'tis true, lofes an opportunity of receiving intcUigence from or by it, andofufing it, but perceives no lofs in itfelf: and tho the body^ many parts of it at leaft, are in a perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the fubftance, which thinks within me now (ox rather, which is I', is, notwithftanding all the changes my body has undergone, the -very fame which thought above fifty years ago, and ever fince 3 when I pLiyd in fuch a field, went to fuch a fchool, was of fuch a univerfity, performed fuch and fuch exercifcs, i^c ^ If you would permit me to life a fchool term, I would fay the cgoity '° remains . Now to anf^^er the objedi- on, and apply all this to our purpofe. Why do we not perceive external objefc in our Jleep^ or a f-woon? Becaufe the paj'ages ai-e become impradlicable, the win- dews fhut, and the nerves^ being obftrudted, or fome how renderd for the time ufelefs, can tranfmit no information to it. Why however does it not reafonand think about fomething or other ? Becaufe, all the marks by which things are remem- berd being for the prefent choked up or diforderd, the remembrance of thofe c^- jeBs^rhont which it is wont to imploy itfelf, and even of the 'words (or other figns), in which it ufes to reafon, and to preferve the deduftions and conclufions it makes, is all fufpended and loft for the time ; and fo its tables being coverd, its books clofed, and its tools locked up, the requifites for reafoning are wanting, and no fubjeft of- fers itfelf, to exercifc its thoughts, it having yet had httle or no opportunity to • Cum rarpera quetidie noftra fiaxnt, ^ aut crefcant ant decrefcant, ergo tot erimui homines, quot quotidie commutamur ? aut alius fiii, cum decern anr.omm ejfem ; alius, cum triginta ; alius c'Um quiaqua- fir.ta, alius, cumjumtoto canocafite [nmtS. Hier. So it mull be, if ourfouis are nothingdi.Terent from our bodies, ^ Tilly has Lemulitai and ^fpiet.is ; in the fame form, tho lict juft the like ienft. 3 take Truth belonging to a Private Man, ^c. ipp take in bl^,:cr objecli and more re fined mat tcriox contemplation. And to conclude, ifitbe demanded, why any oncfliould imagin, that thc/i^zi/ may think, perceive, act after deatb, when it doth not do this inflcep, die. the anfwer is ; bccaufc ihofc incloftires and impediments^ which occafiond the formcntiond intermiffions, and thofe great limitations under which it labors at all times, will be removed with its inlargement out of the body. When it iTiall in ks proper vehicle be let go, and take Its flight intd the open fields of heaven, it will then be bare to the immediate impref- ilonsofobjedls: and why fhould not thofe impreflions, \yhich z^eStcdtht nerves that moved and affected the vehicle and foul in ix.^affc£l the vehicle immedialelj^when they Tive immediately m:idQ upon it, without the interpofition of the nerves? The haud^ which feels an object at the end of ^ftaff^ may certainly be allowd to feel the liune much better by immediate contaEl^ without the ftafF. Nay, why fhould we not think, that it may admit oi nme objcfts and the knowledge of more things,than it can now > fince being expolcd all ruiwd to the influences of them,it may be moved not only by viiible objedls juftat the extremities of the optic nerves, by founds at the ends of the auditoiy, &c. but become as it were all eye to vifible objects, all ear to audible, and fo on ? An/d why flaould we not think this the rather, becaufe then the foul may be alio perceptive of T^werimpreflions and e//:?^re^/ contacts, and con- fequently oi more kinds oi oh]ects, fuch as we are now incapable of knowing? And then, this being fo, why fhould we not prefage, that other indois:ments^ as fliculties ofreafoning, communicating thoughts, and the like, will be proportionable to fuch noble opportunities of knowledge ? There feems to be nothing in this account impojfible; and therefore nothing, but what w«^_y ^^. If we do but attend, we muft fee eveiy w^here, that many things are by ways, which we do not., nor can underftand > and therefore we mufl be convinced, even from hence, that »;or^ may bej and therefore that the objection before us, tho we could not falve the difficulties in it, and what is fuppofed here ihould be all rejected as chimerical^ yet ought to be no prejudice againft the belief of the immortality of the foul, if there is rt»y (but one) goodreafon for it. But if we can in any tolerable manner (which in our prefcnt circumftancesisas much, as can be expected) account for the difficulties objected, and thofe the |;rM- /^y? belonging to this matter, andfltew how it is/(j^W^ that they may confift with immortality, this will greatly corroborate the arguments for it, if not be one/V- felf. This I hope is done : or if I have not fpoke directly to every part of the ob- jection, from what has been done that defect may eafily be fupplied. 4. We may conclude the fouls of men to be immortal from the nature of Godr" Forif hci8(which fure no body doubts) a Perfect being, He, as fuch, can do no- C c a thing 200 The Religion of Nature. Se61:. IX. /thing inconfiftent with perfeEl or right reafon. And then no beings nor a'uum-\ fiance of any being, can come from Him as its caufe, which it is not agreeable to fuch reafen diould be : or fwhich is the famej, He cannot but deal reafonably with all His dependents. And then again, if we are in the number of thefe, and the mortality of the human foul does not confift with reafon, we may be fureit is immortal: as fure as we can be of any thing by the ufe of our faculties ^ and that is, as fure as we can be of any thing. Whether therefore that doth conftjl Avith reafon, or not, is to be inquired. To produce a being into a llate of clear happinefs, in any degree, can be no in- ■ jury to it ; or into a Itate of mix t happinefs, provided the happinefs certainly o'ver- balances the contrary, and the unhappy or fufferingpartbe not greater than what that being would choofe in order to obtain the happinefs, or rather than lofe it. Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producmg a being fubjeSl to more mifcry than happinefs, if that being hath it in his own power to avoid the mifcry, orfo much of it, as may leave the remainder of mifery not greater, than what he would rather fuftain than mifs the proportion of happinefs. The only cafe then, by which wrong can be done in the produftion of any being, is, when it is neceffcirily and irremediably to be miferable, without any recompenfe, or ba- lance of that mifery " : and this indeed is a cafe fo grievous, fo utterly irrecon- cilable to all reafon, that the heart of a reafoning and confidering man can fcarce bear the thought of it. So much every one mull: underftand of the nature of reafon and juftice as to allow thefe things for truths inconteftable. Now then he,who fays the foul of man is mortal, muft lay one of thefe tzvo things : either that God is an unreafonable, unjull, cruel Being j or that no man in rcfpe£t of this life (which according to him is «//), has agreater {h^xcoi imkxy, unavoidable, than of happinefs. To lay the former is to contradict that, which I prefume has been proved beyond contradidion. To which I may add here, that this is to avow fuch an unworthy, impious notion of the Supreme being, as one would not entertain without caution even of the tuor/? of men; fuch a one, aseventheperfonhimfelf, who ftys this, mull know to befalfe. For he cannot but fee, and mull own many inftances of the reafonabkncfs and beneficence of the Deity : not one of which could be, if cruelty and unreafonablcncfs were His inclination j fincc He has power to ex- ecute His own inclinations thoroughly, and is a Being awi/orw? in his nature. Then to fay the latter is to contradift the whole fiory of mankind, and even ones ownfenfes.y » That paflige in 5. Jg^^r. imports much the fame thing, that has been laid here : !>iir5 PM -ini.in >4in yin a>ji nsd^u; '164i i3i;,n Nin aian on yini amn \n miyD imi4''yD\i; 5>iyT3'ii; UNI. 1 Gonfi- TriHhs belonging to a Private Man, &c, 2o'i Confider well the dreadful eftefts of many wars, and all thofe barbarous defola- tions, which we read of : what cruel tyrants there are, and have been in the world, who fat leaft in their fits) divert thenifehes with the pangs and convulfi- ons of their fellow- creatures = : what Jla-very is ^, and how men have been brought into that lamentable ftate : how many have been ruind by accidents unforefeea: how many have fufferd or been undone by unjufi laws, judges, witnefles, i^c <". how many have brought incurable difeafes, or the caufcs of them, and of great torments, into the world with them ; how many more, fuch bodily infirmities and difad vantages, as have renderd their whole lives uneafy : how many are born to no other inheritance but invincible poverty and trouble? Infcances are endlefs : but, for a little tafle of the condition of mankind here, reflect upon that ftory related by Straho (from Polybius) and Plutarch, where, even by or- der of the Roman fenatc, P. l gJ!"' or:? iJ'iKisfASiros xj 7:eoz-/iXnxt?^iiJji»cc ^ jm,!) iio?TS tVi'y aWoj icuTx /3oi)3^s.v, f)v^i a»aj « in x^^>,t»i. ' Thofe a'fOr.Tcn ^ airiroi ^v^uyjui, which the TiXuvai had brought upon the cities oi Afia, are too many to be tranfcribed : tut fome account of them is to be feen in ?lut. v. Luc. which may ferve for one inflance out of thoufands. It may be reckond madnels \n^eeA,maximas virtmes, quafi gm-vijjima deUcia,{t.mazement, horror, tears. One can icarcelook into a news-paper^ or out at his ivindow, but hardl"hips and fufferings prefent themfelves, in one lliape or other. Now among all tbo/e millions, >¥ho have iufferd eminently, can it be imagind, that there have not been multitudes., whofe griefs and pangs have far outweighdaU. their injoyments ; and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their fjji-ra irac-u? irvyfmiac,. •> MentionJ by Cicero with PhaJaris. He was tyrant of Cnjfzndria, and is reprclented (out oi Tolyinus) zs (pmi.-.i-x,^ <& af/joTdTi^ Trivrav, eo-oi !r«»' "E».))(riv ii T«f«B««Bit- pcti i-v^xrr^irav. Yet MUanfkys, 'Ex. S oitiS l-aytilpM'/iuifi®^ t o!ri|«xl«/.t.!v©-, £yi«r» ^odKarsfos, «.A. « It is faid of Sylla's peace, after Mariiis's party were Iwoken, Fax cum hello de crudelitate certavit, ^ •atcit. S. Auft. * ^ui ita e'vifcerafus, ut cruci^itiiiis membra deejfer.t, imflorans cslojuftitiam,' torvhn renidens fundaio peclore manft immobilis, Sec. In the reign of Conftantius. « Mirebant- ijue docli quidam, quod aptul Atlanteos nxti non effent, ubl memorantur fcmnia non zideri. * V. Vlut. s/iv. Artex. S Ob noxam wiiiis omms prepinquit.'Js peril. Amm. Marc. prudence. Truths heJonging to a Private Man, &^c, 203 prudence, or any power in them, toefcape that bitter draught, whicli they h^ve drunk ? And then, how can we acquit ihejuflice and reafomblemfs of that Being,N upon whom thefe poor creatures depend, and who leaves them fuch great lofers by their exigence, if there be no future fiatc^ where the proper amends maybe made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable iflue> if the foul o£ manis.not mrnortal, cither there is no God, upon whom we depend; or He is an unreafomble Being ; or there never has been any man, whofe fuffcrings in this world have exceeded his injoyments, without his being the caufe of it himlelf. But furely no one of thefe three things can be laid. Ergo — . That, which aggravates the hard cafe of the poor fufferers mentiond above, if there be no future fiate, in which their paft fufferingsmay be brought into the ac- count, and recompenfed, is, that many times their pcrfecutors and tormentor i pafs their lives in plenty and grandeur : that is, the innocent have not only the portion, that properly belongs to the criminal and unreafonable part of mankind, but the guilty have that, which belongs rather to the innocent ^ Such a tranfpo- fition of rewards and punilTiments, ending in itfelf, without any refpe6tto fome- thing which is to follow hereafter, can never confift with the nature of a Go- vernor, who is not very muchZ'^/ow rational : a thought, which God forbid zny onefhould dare to admit of Him. To fuppofe the virtuous and -wife left ultimate- ly but in the lame ftate with the unjufl; and profligate is to fuppofe fuch aconjii- tution of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reafon, a God o? truth ^nd. equity : and therefore fuch a conltitution, as leaves the former in a awyj con- dition than the other, can much lefs be fuppofed. ^ Obj. It hath been faid, that virtue tends to make men's lives happy even here, ^c. and how then can the virtuous be fuppofed ever to be fo very miferable ? Anf. In or- dinary cafes virtue doth produce happinefs : at leaft it has indeed a natural tendency to it } is the mean,by which it is moll likely to be attaind ; and is therefore the way, which a wife man would choofe for his o'vvn fake. But then it doth not follow from hence, that there are wo perturbations in human affairs j no cafes, in which the ufual effe£t of virtue may be over power d by difcafes, violence, dyfafters. It doth not ren- der men invulnerable ; cannot command ihc feafons ; nor prevent many great cala- mities, under which virtue and vice mull: fall undifinguifid. fThere may be a direSl road to a place, and fuch a one, as he, \vho fets out for that place, ought to be found in, and yet it is poflible he may meet with robbers or accidents in it, that may incom- mode, or hurt him in his journey .) On the other fide, vice and wickcdnefs may be fo * Dies defickt, ft v dim niimerare, qiiiiiis bonis male evenerit : nee minus, ft commemorem, quiiits impniis oftime. Cic. This ijjullly laid, tho I account his inftances not the moft appolite. ii cir- 204 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. IX. circumftantiated as to be attended with mvichgxfxt&v flea fur e th-xnpain^ contrary to the tendency of its nature : that is, a ivicked man may be of a healthful make, born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining them j and from the advantage of a ftrong body, an ample fortune, many friends, or lucky hits, he may derive />/^^y«reJ, which ihail exceed the prefent i/;i;o»'ueK/>»f^j zndi fufferings naturally folio v/ing from his vices =. Men's circtmftances have a natural influence with refped to the prefcnt pleafures or fufferings, as well as their wV//.'f owice. No body fure ever faid, that «// de- pends only upon thcfe : nor, when the natural tendence of them is aflerted, is the natural tendence or eflfcct of the other denied. Therefore indeed, when it is faid that virtue naturally tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is, that it tends to make men happy in proportion to their circumftances j and vice does the contrary. It is naturally productive of that part of happinefs, which is in our own power, and depends upon otirfelves ; makes men more truly happy, whatever their circumftances are, than they could be without it, and commonly tends to mend their worldly circumftances too : but it is not aflerted, that vir- tue can always intirely corre£b them, or make men fo completely happy in this life, as that their injoyments fhall exceed their mortifications ; no more than the vices of fome particular men, tho they bereave them of many folid pleafures, and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly injoyments from be- ing greater than their prefent fufi"erings. Not only our being, but our place, with the time, and manner of our being in this world depend upon the Author of the fcheme the manner of behaving our fehes in our ftation ^according to our in- dowmcnts, and the talents we hSvcj only depends upon us. And perhaps (which has been hinted already) He h;is fo orderd things on purpofe, xh-xt^xomxhti-arious compofttioHS of men's circumftances with the natural effects of their virtues and vi- ces, and tKe many inequalities arifing thence, they might fee the necejjity andf^r- tainty of another ftate : and that for this reafon there Ihould always be fome re- markable inftances of opprejl innocence in litat avraiKij Sfo? EujJai «, like /e^jw; one gene- ration drops, and another fprings up, to fall again, and be forgotten ^. As we come into the world with the labor of our mothers^ we foon go out of it with oar oww. Childhood zndi ;'(?«?/j are much of them loft in infenfibihty or trifling, vanity and rudenefs ; obnoxious to many pains and accidents j and, when they are fpent in thebeft manner, are attended with labor and difcipline. When we reach that flage of life, which ufually takes us from our neareft relations, and brings us out into the world, with what difficulty are proper imphynients and ftations found for us ? When we are got out, and left to fcramble for ourfelves, how many hardfnps and tricks are put upon us, before we get the fagacity and dexterity to fave ourfelves ? How many chances do we ftand ? How troublefome is hujinefs made by unreafonablcnefs, ill nature, or trifling and want of punftuality in the per- fons with whom we deal ? How do we find ourfelves inftantly furrounded with fnares from defigning men, knaves, enemies fof which thebeft men have fome^, oppofite intereib, factions, and many times from a mifchievous breed, whofe chil- difJj or diabolical humor feeks pleafure in the uneafinefs of other people ? Even in many of thofe injoyments, which men principally propofe to themfelves, they are greatly difappointed, and experience fliews, how unlike they are to the an- tecedent images of them. They are commonly mixf-' : the apparatus to moft of them is too opcrofe :* the completion of them feldom depends upon ourfelves • Et xtdet annnles noftrorum audiri laborum. For, as Senecx izyi, Nulli contigit impune nafci. '"OiDTsp that is, either for «of»^ at all, or for the punifimeiJ of one, whom Ifuppofe never to have hurt him, nor ever to have been capable ' Serfiblc of this, Socrates u'ed to fay, ^t~v rm it^ma',, fu/, T«f' 'a/i^m, «»« Totf ii/x,2<' B^nfa^. Stoi, *Senex, ^ h-vijpmis t^uociicurts imfar : as Seneca, of himfelf, inTac. f Kof«; afiiciendus tmnta, Conjugii, ^c Juv. f Spi'xja sraPiai* <3n d^ivn. r.Atsth. ' O fi poJ/?s in ilia fMtmi ffecida conflitutus oculoi tuos iufe- rere fecretis, recliidere cubiculorum obdncias fores, ^ ad con/cientiam Itiminiim pemtmlia occulta re- ferare, i^c. Cypr- Dd i pro- 2o8 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. IX. propagating empty and fenfelefs opinions with bawling and fuiy the great bufi- ndsoi this world? And are notallthefe contrary to reafon? Can any one then with reafon imagine, that reafon fhouldbe given, tho it were but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then extinguipd? May we not rather conclude, that there muft hefome world^ where reafon will have its turn, and prevail and triumph? Some kingdom o£ reafon to come^? r. In the laft place, th-xx. great expeElation^ which men have, of continuing to live in another ftate, beyond the grave, has I fuppofe been commonly admitted as one proof, that ihcy Jhall live; and does feem indeed to me to add fome weight to what has been faid. That they generally have had fuch an fA'/)e<3^/;'oK, canfcarce be denied. The hiftories of mankind, their deifications, rites, ftories of appari- tions, the frequent mention o£ a. hades, with rewards and punilhments hereafter, (^c. all teflify, that even the Heathen world believed, thattheyo«^ of meny«ri;/- Vfi^ their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the feats and circumftances of the de- parted has begot many errors ^ndfuperfitions ; and thefe have been multiplied by licentious poets zndidlevifonairs : but this, being no more than what is ufual in the like cafes, ought to be no prejudice againft the fundamental opinion itfelf. Cicero '', tho he owns there were different opinions among the Greek philo- fophers about this matter ; that, quod Uteris extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit, animos hominum ejfe fempiternos y that Pythagoras and his fchool confirmed this opinion $ that Plato was the man, who brought a reafon for it, i^c. yet tells us plainly, naturam ipfam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare ; that nefcio quomodo inharet in mentibus quafi fiiA)jo-o iA-^Tii i'x«!to{, xtA, P/«f , ^ In T«fc. dif^. Fancy Truths helonging tc a Private Man, &c. 209 Fancy a man walking in fome retired field, far from noife, and free from pre- judice, to debate this matter with himfelf : and then judge, whether fuch me- ditations as thefc would not be juft. " I think I may be fure, that neither lifelefs *' matter, nor the vegetathe iril;e, that ftone, that flower, that tree have any *' reflex thoughts : nor do xhtfenfitive animals, that fheep, that ox, fcem to have " any fuch thing, or but in the loweft degree, and in refpeft of prefent objcfts " only. They do not reafon, nov difcourfe. I may therefore certainly pretend to " be fomething much above all thefe things ^ I not only apprehend and confi- *' der thefe external obje^s afting at prelent upon my nerves, but have ideas " railed within my felf of a higher order, and many : I can, not only reprefent " to my felf things, that are, ox have been, but rf'(?^«(rf many other from them,. " make excurfions into futurity, and forefee much of what will be, or at leaft " may be j by ftrid thinking I had almoll faid, get into another world before- " hand: and, whether I fhall live in fome other ftate after death, or not, I am *' certainly a being capable of fuch an expeHation, and cannot but be foUcitous a- " bout it : none of which things can be faid of thefe clods, or thofe brutes ''. Can *' I then be defignd for nothing further, than juft to eat, drink, fleep, walk about, " and a6l upon this earth ■•' j that is, to have no further being, than what thefe " brutes have, fo far beneath me ? Can I be made capable of fuch great expe6lati- *' ons, which thofe animals know nothing of (happierby far in this regard than I " am, if we muft die aMfj, ovAyiohedifappointedat lafi?ThusY'^3.ccA, juftupon " the confines of another better world, and fed with hopes of penetrating into it, *' and injoying it, only to make ixjhort appearance here ^, and then to hejlmt out " and totally funk ? Muft I then, when I bid my laft farewell to thefe walks, when " I clofe thefe lids, and yonder blue regions and all this fccne darken upon me and " go out, muft I then only ferve to furnilh duft to be mingled with the allies of " thefe herds :aid plants, or with this dirt under my feet ? Have I been ktfa far a' *' bove them in life, only to be leveld with them at death ? This argument grows fironger in the apprchenfion of one, who is confcious of a- bilities and intellectual improvements, which he has had no opportunity here of fhewing and ufing, through want of health, want of confidence «, want of pro- * Methinks thofe philolbphers make but an odd appearance in fl-ory, who, looking big and faftu- ous, at the &nie time profeffcd, that their own fouls were not fuperior to thoie of gnats, (^-c, ii !^ (Tvii -^vx^i Tiw (j-.<>(ro(paT(XTa/ 4''-'?^'i'' as EufeL '' jilex.tnder after death might be in the fame flate with his miiletier (M. Anton.), but fure not with his mule. '- Bre-vis eft hie frnSlus homulUs, may be juflly faid for all Lucrelim. * 'O -x.oT-f*,®' o-K-m, per ijo The Religion o/' Nature. Se6l.IX. per place, want oHiberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge confequent upon them, cannot ulthnately refpcft //w7?(^/(? ; they can be only an inlargement, and preparation for another. That is all they can be : and if they are not that, they are nothing. And therefore he may be fuppofcd thus, further, to argue within himfclf. " Can the Author of my reafoning faculties be Himfelf fo unreafonaUe " as to give me them, cither not to imploy them, or only to weary my felf with " ufekfs purfuits, and then drop me ? Can He, who is privy to all my circum- " fiances^ and to thefe very thoughts of mine, be fo infenfible of my cafe, as to " have no regard to it, and not provide for it ? It grows Jlronger Jlill upon the mind of one, who reflefling upon the hard treatment he has met with from this world, the little caufe he has given for it, the pains and fecret uneafinefs he has felt upon that fcorc, together with many other fufFerings which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a filent^ humble appeal to thM Being, who is his laji and true refuge, and who he muft believe will not de/ert him thus. h^aiy, itis Jlrongefi of all to one, who, befidesall this, endeavours in the con- du£tof hislifeto obferve the laws of «a/o« fthatis, o£ his nature; and that is, of the Author of nature, upon whom he depends^ ; laments, and labors againfl his own;«/r«//?V;> implores t\\e'Divine mercy; ^nays for fome better fate hereafter > acts and lives in the hopes of one ; and denies himfelf many things upon that view : one, who by the exaltation of his reafon :ind upper faculties, and that, which is certainly the effe£t of real and ufeful philofophy, the practice of virtue, is ftill approaching toward ahigher manner of being, and doth already taftefomething Ipiritual and above this world. To fuch a one there muft be a ftrong expc6ta- tion indeed, and the argument built upon it muft be proportionable. For can he be indowd with fuch capacities, and have as it were overtures of immortality made him, if after all there is no fuch thing ? Muft his private ads and conceald exercifes of religion be all loft = ? Can a perfeft Being have fo little regard to onr, who however inferior and nothing to Him, yet regards Him according to his bcft abilities in the government of himfelf? Are fuch meditations and reflexions as thefe well founded, or not ? If they arc, it mull; be reafonable to think, that God will fatisfy a reafonable expectation. There are other arguments for the immortality of the foul, ^wo of which I will leave with you, to be at your leifure ponderd well. The one is, that, if the fuuls of men are »>c/r/rt/ (cxtinguiflid at death), the cak of brutes is by much preferable to that of men. The pleafurcs of hmtes, tho but fcnfual, are more fmccre, being I Hie pietittis honos ? palled Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c, 2 r i palled or dirainifhd by no diverting confideration : they go uiholly into them; and when they have them not, they Teem Icfs to want them , not thinking of them. Their fufferings ■art attended with no reflexion % butarefuch as they are faidto be p. 34. obf. 8. They are xo'ido? cares -y are under no apprehenfion for famihes and poftcrity; never fatigue themfelves with vain inquiries, hunting after (^«ow- Jedge which muft perifh with them ; are not anxious about their future Jiate'^, nor can be diftppointed of any hopes or expeftations ; and at laft feme fuddcn blow (or a few minutes o£ unforefeen pain) finifhes them, having never /o much as knoiun that they were mortal. The o/^er is, that thefoul isa/ir/wz/i/^ c/"/(/>; that, which brings vitality to the body. For how fliould that, which has been proved to be a fubftance, and at the fame time is alfo a principle of life, and as fuch (as being what it is) is aUve; I fay, how can that die <=, unlefs it is annihilated ? Here I begin to be very fenfible how much I want z guide. Butastherelif^ion o? nature is my theme, I muft at prefent content my felf with that light which nature ■x^ords ; my bufinefs being, as it fcems, only to iTiew, what a Heathen fhilofopher.^ without any other help, and almoft uvToS-:^a.y.T^^ ^-^^y j,e fuppofed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing elfe containd in this Delineation, can be the leaft prejudice to any other true religion. Whatever is immediately re-oeald from God, muft, as well as any thing elfe, be treated as be- ing what it is : which cannot be, if it is not treated with the higheft regard, lelievedznd. obeyd. That therefore, which has been fo much infiftcd on by me^ and is as it were the burden of my fong, is fo far from undermining true reveald religion, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this oppor- tunity to remark to you once for all. Andfo returning to my philofopher, I can- not imagin but that even he would have at leaft fome fuch general thoughts as thefe, which make up almoft the remainder of this laft feftion. * Ten ferkula, qun liJent, fugiitm : cum effiigere, fecun funt, &c. Sen. >= J>il? 'Ol Dn>J3 r-IlD^ DSIDW tnnyvro anvnn nytsy. S. Iq^nar. c sic mihi perfunji, fie fentio, cum femfer agitetur animus, nee princifium mot us habeat, quia /e ipfe moveati »e finem quidem hubiturum ejfe motus, quia tmnquatn fe ipfe fit reliffurus. Cic. That in Greg. Thaum. is like this thought of Tully: 'H tJ/iv^d, at-Toxi.DTo? xiroi, bssVote ? sirai S'MXu'^if ux.eMs^i7-^ tS «v. TOKiLTi, TO xil K..1I7-M Uvccf To j ail Ktr^Tct a7ra-j.^l„ E5-(, y.x. But that n S.Auflin corees fomething nearer to my meaning ; I.ft animus vita qudilam, unJe omne quod animatum eft viiit, Non ergo tot eft animus mori. Namficarere potent vita, nonsaimus/ed animatum aliquid eft, IX. ns 2 1 2 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. IX. IX. The foil !^ when it parts from this grofs body, will pafs by fome law into fume new feat, or fate, agreeable to the nature of it'. Every fpecies of beings mufl belong to fowe region, or ftate. Bccaufe nothing can be, but it muft be fame where, Mid fame how: and there being different kinds of abodes and man- ners of fubfifting in the univerfe, and the natures of the things, that are to exift in them, being alfo different, there will be a greater congruity between thefe feveral natures reipe£tively and fome particular places, or Jlates, than there is between them and others j and indeed fuch a one, that out of thofe per- haps they cannot fubflft, or not naturally. To thofe therefore muft be their re- fpedive tendemes : to thofe they are adjudged by the courfe of nature, and con- ftitution of things, or rather by the Author of them ^. While the foul is in the body, it h;is fome powers and opportunities of moving it fpontaneoufly, or otherwifc than it would be moved by the meer laws of gra- vitation and mechanifm. This is evident. But yet, notwithftanding this, the weight of that body, to which at prefent it is limited (^among other caufes) con- ftrainsit to aft for a while u'^on this fl age. That general law, to which bodies are fubjeftcd, makes it fink in this fluid of air, ib much lighter than itfelf j keeps it down i and fo determines the feat of it, and of the foul in it, to be upon the furface of this earth, where, or in whofe neighbourhood it was firft produced. But then, when the Ibul fhall be difengaged from the grofs matter, which now inclofes and incumbers it, and either become naked fpirit, or beon- Iv veild in its own fine and obfequious vehicle, it muft at the fame time be ei- ther freed from the laus of bodies, and fiiU under fome ether, which will cai-ry it to fome proper manfion, or ftate ■= j or at leaft by the old ones be capable of mounting upwards \ in proportion to the volatihty of its vehicle, and of e- merging out of thefe regions into fome medium more fuitable, and (ifthephi- loibpher may fay fo) equilibrious. Thus much as to the general fiat e o£ ionh after death. But then, , The tranfinigration of fouls has been much talked of ; but at fenteitla,—quoniam riilicuU, (y mime digyiior q^uam fchoU, ne refelli quidem ferie d ebet i qu»d qiu facit, -Lidetur vereri, ne qun id^re- dat. So Laclantius. Indeed who can but laugh, when he reads in Lucmn of Homer's having been a camel in B«c7rM,&;c. b Xs-pHJ -/^ «»«.>.)) ri i'^oiov ^«5 ^^ iiioio.. Hterocl. <" 1.x humili tttque deprep in eum emicabit locum, quifquii ille ejl, qui folutas vinculis animas beau recifit finu. Sen. 'H V ^rnr'ii trfoo-ffaS-sia; 'bin^cM, v(rii xeo5 T T xaA«» x«- S-«j« ri^ot, it', 7^// &fi' and fo their reafon is not gene- ral, nor has its due extent, or influence. Others, whofe reafon is uncultivated and weak, the they have virtuous inclinations, many times fall into fuperfiition and abfurdities j miffed by authorities, and over-awed by old or formal modvis of fpeaking, and grave non-fenfe. Many, if not the moft, feem to have fcarce any notion of reafon or virtue at all, but ad foituitouily, or as they fee other folks ad } moved either by bodily propenfions, or by example. Some/^s; there are, who endeavour to miprove their underftandings, to difcover what is agreeable to reafon, and to fix their opinions ; and condud their lives accord- ingly. And in all thefe feveral kinds there arc various degrees of elevation in knowledge and virtue, and of immerfion in vice and ignorance, and new diffe- rences arifing endleffy. All this is vifible. • The Jews, who generally fay, that by the praftice of religion the foul acquires perfeaion and life eternal, lay fuch a ftrefs upon httbits of piety, that R. Albo nukes the cffeifl of giving looo x.uz.in In charity at once by no means equal to that of giving one i«i and repeating it looo times rncnn rnN ays xinn bysn rciwyo ^\b^■^> inv n:j-nD n:p> n^iyi nn^j bys ^^■'■in pi^d -ini< wsn. ;/. Lev. E e Now 214 The Religion ^Nature. SecS.IX. Now the foul, reflefting, finds in itfelf /wo general faculties, one, by which it underftands, and judges, and reafons fall which I comprehend under the term ra. tional faculties, or reafon); :xnd another, by which it wills, or determins to a6t, according to the judgments and conclufions made in the upper part of it. And the more perfeHly it performs thefe operations (I.e. the more truly it reafons, and the more readily it wills and executes the decifions of reafonj, the more perfeEi certainly it mull be in its kindj and the more impeifeftly, the more imperfect. The accomplilTiments therefore and perfeBions of human fouls, aiid the contra- ry, mull be in proportion to the forementiond differences. XII. jlccording to thefe differences then it is reafonahle to think the fouls of men '•mil find their fations in the future ivorld^. This is but a corollary from what goes before. Obj. Why fhould we think, that God caufes things to be in fuch a manner, as that in the future flate men fhall be placed and treated according to their merit, and the progrefs they have made in reafon and virtue, when we fee the cafe to be widely different in this? jlnf It muft be rememberd, that this is one of thofe very reafons on which the belief of the foul's immortality is found- ed. Now, if it be reafonablc to believe there is a future ftate, becaufe things ai'e dealt unequally now, upon that very fcore it will be reafonablc to think, that they are dealt equally ^ in that other ftate. Here bodily wants and affeftions, and fuch things as proceed from them, do inter- mix with human aftairs, and do confound wfm \f\i\\ demerit, knowledge with, igno' ranee : and hence it comes to pafs many times, that bad men in joy much, and good men fuffer, and both are, if there is no other ftate, in their wrong places. But, when the corporeal caufes of mifplacing fhall be Temoved,fpirits (or fpirits and their o-»/^«t« ;5-;»,u,«7iKa) may be fuppofedmore regularly to take their ^«e ports and privileges : the impudent and vitious will have no fuch opportunities of getting into circum- ftanccs, of which they arc unworthy, nor improvedand virtuous minds find fuch objlrucfions to keep them down in circumftances unworthy of them. Be fure the more advanced and pure any ftate is, the more properly will the inhabitants be rank- ed, and the jufer and more natural will the fubordination of its members be. Even here we commonly find men in that kind of bufinefs, for which they are educated :ind prepared; men of the fame profefTions generally keeping together j the virtuous and reafonable defiring to be ftho they not always can be) with their like *^ j • Tc^xi. ^^cir hl^xTrui liuro ,AvTi^»j-«i iyx^ii, E.plat, I and Truths helonging to a Private Man, &c. 2 1 5 and the vitious (as they fcarccly cannot bc/with theirs. And why llioiild wcnot think, that an ^/t-W nor, on the other fide, why any dedu£tions ihould be made from the future happineis of a good man upon the fcore of thofe innocent injoyments which arc the genuinfruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and found reafoning. Cor. Wicked men will not only be lefs happy than the wife and virtuous, but be nally unhappy in that fiate to come. For when all the happinefs, that anfwei-s to thofe degrees of virtue, which they had, and thofe iufferings, which they imderwent, above what was the natural effect of their wickednels 3 I fay, when > Oi 7!Kpi>.ciso» T afhUcTTiyMTm MAx^iTsii [i ^,'x!«i©-] sr|0(&^x, Ee a that 2i6 r/j^ Religion o/' Nature. Secfl. IX. that is fubtnctexi, what remains upon the account will be fomething below no- bappineis: which mull be ibme quantity o? pofitive unhappinefs, or mifcry. Thus there will be rewards^ and funijlyments hereafter : and men will be hap' py\ or unhappy^ according to their behaviour, injoyraents, and fuflferings in this prefcnt life. But, XV. If the immortality of the foul canmt be demonjlrated, yet it is certain the contrary cannot '. To fay, when a boufe is nainous and ftln, that it once had an inhabitant, and that he is efcaped out of it, and lives in fome other place, can involve no contradiftion, or abfurdity ''. And, XVI. If the immortality of the foul fliould be confiderd only as a probability, or even as a chance poffible, yet flill a virtuous life is to be preferred before its contra- ry. For if the foul be mortal, and all perception perillies for ever at our death, what in this cafe does a good man lofehy his virtue ? \^ery rarely more than fome afts of devotion, and inftances of mortification, which too by cuftom grow habitual and cafy '', and it may he pkafant by being (or feeming at leaft to be) reafonable. On. the other hand, what does a vitious man ^.t/w .? Onlyfuchin- joyments, as a virtuous man leaves: and thofe are fuch, as moft' commonly owe their being to a vitiated tafte; grow infipid in timej require more trouble and. contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth; go off" difagreeably j • Sure thoft arguments in Lucretius can convince no body. Kunc quoniam, qunjfatis undique va- fis, Diffihm hun)orem, (^ laticem difcedere cernis; Crede auimam quoque difundi, &c. And Treterea gignifuritercHm ccrpore & una Crefcere fentlmns, furiterque fenefcere mentem. Sec. ^ii.ire animum quoque diffolvi fau»re necejfe eft ^ _®Handoquidem fenetmnt in earn com agin morbi. Nor thofe ia Tliny (N.H. 7. SS-)'- "^ '^^re realty are any at all. For to plead the amegeuitale exferimeTitum is to beg the queftion j which may be put thus, Whether we fhal! after death be more confcious of our exiftence, than we were before we were born. And if Dicdarchus's LesbiAci were extant, I be- lieve we fliould find nothing ftronger in them. The truth feems to be, o; /SsAs-rai i ymkU kB-uicin^ s~»»i 7^-'^' iiVTs -^-jxy.y : but he comforts himfelf with this thought, that i /*ix« ti-u'if.rct ncaua. ixvri will prevent future fufferings. This is 115 ■>"' f^'i "'"" y-uTx(p!jyi. Hierccl. ^ Nor that the foulftillexiftssf>!j«.o» K»r«>.iTSira ^4«5 r i.ft^tTt^n ci*e». Pi J. D$mus ab hxbitattre deferta dikbitHr> e^ corfus, reliBum abanima, defiuit. Lail. ' Mukjos 3 ^ «jS-»05 iJi/*i>5 tV ejarifp [if st'v], K«i TcnyjJi t« ■x^Zrc;: f'.Tii* i' tii »y.^ta Ixtiui, 'tni^r, ^' riauTd Tiihd. Hef, 5 arc Truths hehnging to a Private Man, ^c. 2 1 7 are foUowd many times by fharp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear ; and at bed altera ihort time end in nothing, as if they had never been. This isdls But then if the ibul prove to be immortal (as we have all the rcafon in the world to think it wil!^', what does the virtuous man gain ? His prefent pleafures (if not lb many) are more fmcere ^ and natural '^5 and the eflfeft of his felf-denials and fubmillion to reaibn, in order to prepare himfelf for a future ftate, is thehappi- nefsof that Hate: which, without pretending to defcribe it, may be prefumed to be immortal^ becaufe the foul is lb; and to be purer and of a more exalted na- ture (i. e. truer^ and greater) than any of thefe low injoyments here, becaufe that ftate is every way in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked man lofe ? That happinefs, which the virtuous gain as fuch; and he finks, be- fide, into fome degree of the unhappinefs of that future ftate : of which one may fay in general, that it may be as much greater than the mihappinefs or fuf- f^rings of this world, as the happinefs and joys of that are above thofe of this. In a ftate that is fpiritual and clear every thing will be purer, and operate more direftly and ftrongly, and (if the expreffion may be tolerated) with more fpirit: there will be fewer obftruftions to either happinefs or unhappinefs: the foul will lie more open^ and have more immediate and acute perceptions of ei- ther : fo that each of them in their kind will be more intenfe^ the one nearer to pure or mere happinefs, the other to the contrary ''. But to enter further into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is too arduous an un- dertaking for- my philofopher. I'lhall only add, that the reafoning and virtuous man hasatleaft this advan- tage over the foolijh and profligate^ that, tho his wifdom and virtue cannot al-^ loays rectify that which is amifs in himfelf or his circumilances, they will find means to alleviate his prefiures and difrdvantnges, and fbpport him under all the anomalies of life, with comforts of which the other knows nothing : par- ticularly this, the injoyment of an humble, but well grounded expedation of felicity hereafter^ fincerc and durable ^ • C,ifXi xM^Zrai. Hieroch. > If the foul was mortal, yet the virtuous man tIm Uut% nXuirtirtt iin^icc/jutaiuy, to itKuot xafni- ^1V65 a'/o.^", iv^ui/A^m iuru^ iVt ^ lAMxK^tci. (f '^ ^ ro c"*^*, xtA. Simpl. i "il^t fjul, f/,i,tv ru KX>^ at^iuiui r s-.TKJWroj 'S l!, a>tu & uvry, t^ iacty nx.S.i, ^i i!» f/jotrjt ^ox.i7n\ y.a,Vi«.i i fii*>.«« is-K'/ii^. Hier. « O' 'f- olxv.tci r i^i'>!w», u u,>,iiy «*« z-MovinTsriy, and fometimes to add weight 5 but chiefly to di- vert you, who know very well how to improve any the leaft hint out of the Ancients, and I fear will want to be diverted. I have alfo printed a few copies of this Sketch, not with any defign to make it public, but merely to fave the trouble of tranfcribing " ; being minded, fince I have made it, to leave it not only with you, but perhaps alfo with two or three other friends : > Ttos-©^ "^ ©iS .9-ff«!r£i«« K7-C5 i'- CTIO NSy morally good i z 5*-'-Pir.-.-xr3 or evil, in whatcrea- feme have an unalterable mean- A 5^^ tures to be found ing il/id f~:sT,^S^ P- 7) 8 what conftltutes their depravity fj>^A:-'s their fpring 173 i? -are expreflive as well as what makes them unnatural /W. -jvoi-as S— 13 morally good or evil, which 20 -maybe fignificant or infignificanc good, not equal 22 II F f Adions IN D E X. Actions, fuppofe the agent fufceprible of happinels or mifery 38 ' according to right realon, and according to truth, the iame 50 pubhc not to be determind by private judgment 53 Adultery, its heinous nature laid open 141, 142 Affeftion, natural, its dictates to be foUovv'd 1 5) Agent, its difference from inftrument 8 Agents, neceflary, have no '■■~'' ibid. Animals, the wifdom exprefled in their ftructure ^2, 83 — the laws by which they are govern'd 96, 97 Aflronomy affords noble proofs of a deity 78— 80 Attraftion, what ^ 79 how lodged in matter ibid. B. BElngs, different orders thereof ic§ Brutes, their fufterings and death not like to thofe of men ■ cautions to be obferved in killing them for ufe 3 > > their difference from men 2 1 o, 211 CAufes, when fatisf^ictorily knoWn 81 the fame with effcfts ihid. Chance, what 23 no caufe Zl, 84 Chaftity, what _ iSo Children, whence like their parents 8p,5)o theirduty to parents 163 — Comets, their motions and phEEno- mena 80 Common-fenfe, no proper judge of aftions 23 CompafTion, a natural principle in man 139, 140 moft vifible in the beft men ibid. Conflagrations , whether any have been univerfal 91 — pj Confequences, when jufl 44 Covetoufnefs, its leveral kinds 158 may be virtuous tbid. Crimes may be evanefcent 31 -fo many afts of injuftice 141 of a lefs heinous nature repre- fented 144 Criminals, their difl'erence 34 Cruelty, what 139, 140,141 inconfiftent with truth and na- ture I3P, 140 D. DEath may enlarge the faculties of the foul 199 Defence, mutual, one end of fociety Deluges, whether any have been uni- verfal 91 — 93 Defpotic power not founded in pater- nal authority 162,165 Dominion not given, or loft, by pe- fonal excellencies , or de- feels 130 Doubtful INDEX. Doubtful cafes, how to proceed in them 3 h 5^,59 Duration, what 7) Duties of rational agents, what 63 of parents to their children 1)9— 163 «. of children to their parents 1(53—165 — oxvinqtoremoterelations i6$- 167 EDucation of children incumbent on their parents 160,161 Endeavour, what it means 63 Enjoyments, when lawful 40 Error, itscaufes 59— 6^ Evil, its degrees how to be rated no independent principle of it 71 • whence it may proceed 71,72 • its formal >'^f'» ^^8 F. FAds more expreflive than words 12,13 help us to judge of good and evil -^ Faculties remain in the body, tho their inftruments are loft i85,ip6,ip8 Falflioods e:-.preffible by aftions II Fame, what ii7j ^^^ Fate, what ^ 'l''^- Freedom, whether in man 63, 54 Forbearance from aftion in the power of man 64 Fortitude, what {82,185 Frugality, what 180 Farure-ftate, the nccefTuy i hereof 113, 114 the expeftation cfit juft andreafonable 15)3—211 G. C~1 Eneration of animals, how pcr- J form'd Sp— 91 Glory, what 116— 119 the delire of it, when juftif.able 118 God, feeksnotthe unhappinefs of his creatures 39 how he conceives cf things 45, lOl his exiilence proved by the chain ofcaufes 65 — 68 hisexiftence proved by the facul- tiesof themind 87 — 93 neceliarily exiftent 68 produced every thing ibid. {hewn to be infinite 69 his manner of exiflence incon- ceivable 69, 70 exifts in a perfeft manner 70 is but one 70, 71 fupports all other beings 72 is the Author of nature jz, - 73 not the immediate Author of the acts of free agents 74 not fpace, duration or matter 74—7^ not the univerfe 75, 76 the caufeof matter and motion 76—79 the Author of the univerfe 79-87 F f 2 God IN D E X. God, is free from defeds 93, 94 is incomprehenfible ibid. operates in the government of the world 94, 95 ; — — governs the world by his provi- dence 95 — 114 his foreknowledge reconcileable with human liberty 99 — 103 the duty which men fliould have towards him 1 14 — ii6 how to be conceived of by man ibid. • his attributes, how to be under- ftood ibid. Goodandevil, coincident with pleafure and pain jj ■ how imputable to intelli- gent beings 53 Government, its origin 149, 150 Gravitation not alone fufficient to produce the motions of the heavenly bodies 79 Guilt, its degrees vary with the im- portance of things 3 1 H H. Appinefs, nearly allied to truth how to be eftimated 33 -coincident with the tnie quantity of pleafure 36, 37 — whether capable of exifting without pleafure 37 ultimate, what 38 the cKuy of every intelligent being to procure 38 ultimate, not procurable but by the practice of truth ^38, 39 never deftruftive of the na- ture of the creature 7,^ — wherein it confifts 40 — coincident with truth ibid. — the end of religion ibid. — hard to judge of it in others iio— 114 — every man's property 131 — ought to be defended 132, »3J -how obtainable 2 18 Heavens, figns of providence therein 104, 105 Honour, how to be given to God 116—119 Honours, what 118, 119 ■' when the defire of them jufti- fiable 118 Humanity, what 139 Human life, its hiftory 201 — 208 IDeas,immediate,adequatelyknown to the mind 42 their immediate relations known to the mind 42, 43 Indentity, in men, what 127, 198 Inanimate beings capable of no obli- gation 65 govern 'd by certain laws 95 Individuation, a principle in man 127 Inilolence, a happinefs infinitely di- minifli'd 37 Injullice, a violation of truth 137, 13.8 Innate maxims no proper judges of right and wrong 2-3 Intelligent beings have immediate ob- jefts of their underftandings 41 Intelligent INDEX. K Intelligent beings have general ideas . 41 .. are under obligations in proportion to their faculties <53 Irregularities in nature, whence 84, 8j Irreligion, its principle caufe 60, 61 Judgment, how to be form'd in dubious cal'es 58, 59 Juftice, what 137 the praftice of it right 141 K. Indred, to find the degrees of ob- ligation between them 167 the diftates of natural at- feftion for them to be re- garded 165 — 1(57 L. AW of nature what 26 I Laws obtAinirg in the univerle 96, 91 — offociety, natu'al 12S, 148 miift confift with na- tural juftice 148, 149 • — iT;uft be oblerved 152 where theyfai!, thci'e of nature take plare ibid what to be done when they oppofe the laws of nature 152, 153 Liberty, wherein it confifts id' Ufage, proves poflefTion 10, 137 Ufurp^tion of property, in juftice 137 V. VApors, the wifdom and good- nefs exprefled in their for- mation 8 a Vegetables, the wifdom exprelfed in their ftrufture il'id. ■ - ■ the laws by which they are regulated 96 Vice, the caufe of unhappinefs 31 j, its effefts and confequences 2i(?, 217 Virtue, whether feated betwixt ex- tremes 24, 25 the praftice of it recommended 179—1^3. produftive of happinefs 182 203 — 208, 2x7 W. INDEX. W. lefs expreifive than fads tz World, a fun'ey thereof and its fur- WARfhewn to be lawful I5J, niture 87 154 — laws of nature obferved therein Writing, why beft praftifed in our 75— 9S mother-tongue 12 j Worfhip, how to be given to God. Words, what 12, 123 120 — 1^(5 r——— their ufe in thinking 122, 123 ;■ — publick, why neceflkry 124, 122 FINIS. 'i .~^^ipll^