LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Theological Seminary, 
 
 PRINCETON. N. J. 
 
 Shelf 
 
 noo/,- 
 
 BL 240 .W4 1876 
 
 Welch, Ransom B. 1824-1890 
 
 Faith and modern thought 
 
FAITH 
 
 MODERN THOUGHT 
 
Faith 
 
 Modern Thought 
 
 RANSOM B. WELCH, D.D., LL.D. 
 
 Professor in Union College. 
 WITH INTRODUCTION 
 
 BY 
 
 TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS. 
 Fourth Avenue and Twenty-Third Street. 
 1876. 
 
Copyright. 
 PUTNAM'S SONS. 
 1876, 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 IN HARMONY WITH THE AUTHOR'S DESIGN TO SEEK AND 
 
 SERVE THE TRUTH, HE HEARTILY DEDICATES THIS 
 
 VOLUME TO THE MANY STUDENTS WHO 
 
 HAVE ACCEPTED HIS GUIDANCE IN 
 
 THE SAME SEARCH AND 
 
 SERVICE. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 '' I ^HE occasion of this little volume may be found 
 -■- in the spirit of modern discussion. 
 
 The title — Faith and Modern Thought — was 
 chosen by the writer long before he knew that a 
 similar subject — Christianity and Modern Thought — 
 had been proposed for a course of lectures in Boston, 
 during the winter of 1875-6. 
 
 The material is composed, in part, of essays pre- 
 pared for special occasions, and subsequently pub- 
 Hshed in Quarterly Reviews. 
 
 If, in defence of certain positions, plain words 
 have been employed, they are in reply to plain 
 words employed in attack. 
 
 If it be questioned whether the spirit of the 
 book is in too close sympathy with the spirit of the 
 time, the author has no reply to make ; if it be 
 asserted, he has no apology to offer. 
 
 Earnest inquiry everywhere prevails. Old theo- 
 ries are scrutinized ; new theories are criticised. 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 By the best and safest thinkers, the new is not 
 discarded because of its novelty, nor the old because 
 of its antiquity. By the common consent of all 
 whose judgment is worthy of consideration, truth is 
 no less desirable for having never been refuted ; nor 
 is error more desirable for having never been vindi- 
 cated. 
 
 Now, as ever, the paramount inquiry should be 
 for the true, the beautiful, the good. Spurious 
 theories invented for special purposes should 
 share the same fate, be they modern theories or 
 ancient. The laws of thought have not changed, 
 nor have the principles of taste, nor the sanctions of 
 reason and conscience. Modern complaining can 
 not annul or transform the past ; modern contriv- 
 ing can not create or preform the future. Mere 
 Philistinism can effect nothing in either direction. 
 Candid criticism alone can avail us. As great ques- 
 tions like evolution, and correlation, and descent, 
 are not to be dismissed with prejudgment or without 
 examination ; so, essential doctrines of religion are 
 not to be condemned and abandoned because they 
 seem to be disturbed by innovation. 
 
 Manly fairness and patient courage are demanded. 
 It is not yet clear how far Science has advanced 
 toward the solution of its own problems ; nor how 
 such solution, if reached, would affect the more re- 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 mote questions of life, and thought, and being, — in 
 a word, the ultimate principles of origin, and order, 
 and design, and consummation. 
 
 At last, as at the first, these questions meet us : 
 What are the laws of thought ? What are the prin- 
 ciples of faith ? Where can Science find a resting- 
 place? Where can religion find repose? Toward 
 this goal we are to direct impartial inquiry. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Introduction xi 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 The Modern Theory of Forces. The True Evolution? 3 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 Faith and Positivism. The Field of the Philosophic 
 
 AND Finite 57 
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 
 Faith and Positivism. The Field of the Religious and 
 
 Infinite no 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Faith and Positivism. The Written and the Living 
 Word 144 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Admissions of Philosophical Skepticism 176 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Modern Thought , 223 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 T~\R. WELCH is a very calm writer; he is also 
 ^-^ remarkably clear. Both of these qualities of 
 style are characteristic of strength. Without pre- 
 tentiousness, or anything like polemical display, 
 they indicate the confidence of strong conviction 
 and of thorough insight. The questions presented 
 are fairly as well as ably treated. The reader will 
 find here no underrating the strength, or the posi- 
 tions, of those with whom the author is contending. 
 There is no declamation about the extinction of the 
 purest hopes, and of the most elevated motives of 
 human conduct, that must be the result of the uni- 
 versal prevalence of a soulless materialism. The 
 authors and defenders of such a hopeless view of 
 the. human origin and destiny are supposed to know 
 all that. There is a keen sarcasm in some parts of 
 this book, but no trifling witticism, as though the 
 opinions of Spencer and Tyndall could be refuted 
 by a jest or a ludicrous illustration. There is no 
 
Xll INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 appeal to prejudice, literary or religious, no use of 
 the argiimcntuin ad verecundiani, no attempt to 
 arouse, either the popular feeling, or the theolo- 
 gical odium, against the scientist as one who de- 
 grades the human dignity by maintaining our kins- 
 manship with the ape or the kangaroo. The subject 
 is too grave a one for such treatment. Dr. Welch 
 is too grave a writer thus to handle it. He reveres 
 his Bible, too, and he knows in what language the 
 Scriptures describe the lowliness of man's physical 
 origin, his first condition as " of the earth earthy," 
 representing it as allied to all below, comparing him 
 to ''the worm," to ''corruption," to "earth and 
 ashes," or to sum up all, solemnly Imnouncing that 
 as he was made from the dust of the earth, so 
 unto dust should he, again, because of sin, return. 
 
 It is not for maintaining man's natural that the 
 author contends with Darwin and Tyndall, but for 
 denying his supernatural. It is not because they 
 make him a physical product, or from the earth, as 
 the Scripture does— from "the lowest earth," the 
 lowest nature, de profundissimis natures — but be- 
 cause they deny the divine inspiration, the seahng 
 image which first made the species homo, the true 
 creating Word which pronounced him finished man, 
 a "new thing" upon the earth which before was 
 not. It is not because they treat him as a physical 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. XIU 
 
 being, a '' natural man," "kvxtm avdpuTzo^, animalis homo, 
 as the Apostle styles him, in his fallen state, but 
 because they deny the spiritual, to TrvevfiaTiKov, which 
 he originally had, and that restoring grace which 
 revives him again, and makes him a '' new man " 
 after his terrible lapse into nature and animality. 
 In short, the great strength of this book is in its 
 higher psychology, its view of man's spiritual and 
 of its divine origin, as not only overruling the low 
 conclusions of the physicist, but as confirming the 
 glory of this divine human, this redeemed human, 
 by the closest comparison with those alleged scien- 
 tific statements that would make man notJmtg but 
 dust, nothing but nature. 
 
 It is not formally laid down anywhere in Dr. 
 Welch's book, but it is, nevertheless, a thought 
 suggested in every chapter, and in almost every 
 argument : Only let our Psychology be high enough, 
 and we need never be afraid of naturalism. Let 
 our view of the human spirit only be in accordance 
 with the teachings of the Scriptures, and the noblest 
 human philosophy ; let it take into account the 
 greatness of man's rational and moral being, his 
 insight of eternal and necessary truth as reflected 
 from the infinite on the finite mind, — in a word, his 
 reason, comprehending not merely the halting sense- 
 induction of 2., first cause, but the a priori necessity 
 
XIV INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 of an eternal personal mind, the ground and source 
 of all truth, of all rationality, making as certain as 
 that proposition, cogito ergo sum, the belief in a 
 higher mind, a higher thought, as the most necessary 
 of all truths (if there be any truths to which the 
 laws of our thinking compel us to give that name) — 
 let us hold fast to this — let us study our own souls, 
 look into our own souls, until we see it there, and 
 we need have no fears of nebular principia, or evo- 
 lution, or development, or any of the bugbear names 
 by which a certain class of scientists may assail our 
 faith. *' As Jehovah liveth and as thy soul liveth." 
 This sublime Hebrew oath contains all that we need. 
 '* He that formed the eye, shall He not see? He 
 that giveth man knowledge, shall He not know? 
 Shall He not know us ? We may give it any name ; 
 call it God or Nature as we please, but personality 
 as well as intelligence, a near personality, the infi- 
 nitely near, as well as the infinitely far, and the infi- 
 nitely great, are inseparable from the idea, as the 
 idea is inseparable from the necessities of our own 
 thinking, finite though it be. ''Mens, ratio, in nobis, 
 nonin coelof^ Mind, reason, in us, and not in any 
 sphere above? The exclamation of Cicero comes 
 as much from the a priori reason itself as the 
 enthymeme of Descartes. 
 
 * Cicero, De Legibus. Lib. II., i6. 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. XV 
 
 We have expressed this in our own way, and, 
 perhaps, very imperfectly, but it gives us the spirit 
 and the substance of Dr. Welch's strong reasoning, 
 not as confined to one chapter, but as pervading 
 the whole book. God and soul present themselves 
 as directly to the reason, or to faith, which is reason 
 in its highest or divinely quickened exercise, as na- 
 ture mirrors itself in the eye of sense. '' The elejtckos, 
 the conviction of the things unseen," whether we 
 call it reason or faith, is to be received with as much 
 confidence, to say the least, as the piece-meal reve- 
 lations of ''the things seen," of which we only 
 know in part (k fief>ov') as the Apostle says, — and oh, 
 how small a part, how infinitesimal a part, as com- 
 pared with the great whole, without a knowledge 
 of which our inductions, even according to Bacon 
 himself, must ever be unsafe, — as far short of cer- 
 tainty, in fact, as the knowledge of a single leaf falls 
 short of enabling us to decide, by sense alone, in 
 respect to the extent, or design, of an Amazonian 
 forest. There is a real sense in which it may be 
 said that faith is essential to a true discernment, 
 even of '' the things seen," if we would contemplate 
 them in their substantial relations, as something 
 more than dead sequences, the only view which this 
 positive sense-philosophy can take of them without 
 trespassing on domains of thought which it con- 
 
XVI INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 temptuously disowns as forming any part of science, 
 or as, in fact, having any reality. Shutting out 
 everything else but the antecedence and conse- 
 quence of facts, without any other causal binding, 
 they make nature and the world a phantasmagoria, 
 a fleeting series of unconnected phenomena. It 
 might have been anything else ; it might have had 
 any other sequences ; it may go on ; it may sud- 
 denly and universally disappear. There is no rea- 
 son in it, as there is no real nexus of causation. 
 The moment we seek this we are departing from 
 sense ; we are in the region of the unseen, or, to 
 give the substance of Dr. Welch's varied argument, 
 we are in the province of faith. He means by this 
 not simply religious faith, in the more common 
 acceptation of the word. The drift of his reasoning 
 is to show that, in the end, this doctrine of bare 
 sequences, with its claim to be the only real and 
 positive knowledge, is the annihilation of science 
 as well as of theology. 
 
 Another aspect of the matter shows the same 
 result. In the extreme nominalism to which it con- 
 ducts us, not only are there no universals, as the 
 elder thinkers of this school maintained (while they 
 admitted the existence of individual things capable 
 of being classified by specific differences), but even 
 individual things themselves disappear. They have 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. XVll 
 
 no true -individuality, nothing which makes a thing 
 to be a thing with a generic character, separating it 
 from all other things. The atoms are the only 
 realities. There is no fixed being beside them. 
 All the classifications on which science has hereto- 
 fore built up herself are flowing quantities. They 
 are ever losing specific character, or that which 
 makes each thing, man included, to be what it 75, 
 a something more than a changing mass of atoms, 
 having no more of true being, of true individuality, 
 to say nothing of personality, than the ever-shifthig 
 sand heaps of the Sahara. Nothing remains the 
 same for two consecutive moments, however swift, 
 or however slow, to our keener or duller sense-per- 
 ception, the rate of movement, or rate of time, 
 through which the change is disclosed. Nothing 
 stands, as some of the old philosophers said. Give 
 it time enough, and everything will become in the 
 future, — as it has repeatedly become in the long 
 past, and as it is now tending to become, — every- 
 thing else. 
 
 In those three chapters, having the word for 
 their special heading, faith would seem to be used 
 by Dr. Welch as almost synonymous with reason ; 
 and yet it is not, by any means, out of harmony 
 with the Christian Scriptures. The applications, 
 too, to scientific reasoning seem warranted by the 
 
XVIU INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 Apostle's wide definition of faith as '' the elenchos 
 or conviction of the things unseen," (Heb. xi, i) and 
 his making it (Heb. xi, 3) the ground of our '' under- 
 standing " (our spiritual discerning) that the worlds 
 were organized {Ka-npriGdai, brought 07it in order, 
 evolved, if any prefer the term), by the Word of God, 
 so that the things which are seen were not made (or 
 had their being, ytyovhat) from things that do appear, 
 £K ^aivo/xevo)v. In Other words, the world of sense came 
 from " the things unseen," which are the objects of 
 fatt/i, whether philosophical or religious — or visibilia 
 ex invisibilibus, as the Vulgate and Syriac have it. 
 So when Paul says, 2 Cor. iv. 18, 'The things that 
 are seen are temporal," {7:p6aKaipa) belonging to time, 
 '* the things unseen are eternal," he certainly could 
 not have meant things now hidden from sight, and 
 to be shown to sense in some future existence, but 
 rather the supersensual world of truth and true 
 being. Sight is representative here of all sentiency, 
 and Paul seems to use the contrasted terms " seen " 
 and '' unseen," very much as Plato uses his bparh and 
 cJaVra as contrasted with the hu6fi and the vorira, though, 
 on the part of the Apostle, with a far higher and 
 holier aim. There is no improbability in the sup- 
 position that he may have heard this, and similar 
 language, in the schools of Tarsus, before employ- 
 ing it in this grand application to the things neces- 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. XIX 
 
 sary and eternal, whether as contemplated from the 
 philosophical or the Christian standpoint.- 
 
 Dr. Welch's broad view of faith as given in 
 chapters II, III, and IV, no more than the definition 
 of the Apostle himself, excludes the peculiar saving 
 faith in Christ, and in his sacrifice upon the cross, 
 which is the ground of the Christian's hope of salva- 
 tion. But the province of faith as the divinely 
 quickened reason, or " spirit in man," extends to all 
 the unseen world. It is that which, in its spiritual 
 essence, characterized the Old Testament saint, as 
 well as the new : the " enduring as seeing Him who 
 is invisible." In no irreverent way may we also 
 affirm, that it is the ground of the purest insight in 
 philosophy and science, as well as in religion. 
 Without the cognition of the sphere of '' the unseen 
 things," lying above sense, and above the science 
 that acknowledges nothing deeper than sense, the 
 universe is but a shadow, with motion, force, and 
 matter, as its only realities. 
 
 As suggestive of the train of thought on which 
 we have been dwelling, and of similar related ideas, 
 reference might be made to other portions of this 
 book, and especially to chapter VI, entitled " Mod- 
 ern Thought." We can only touch briefly on some 
 leading points : Reality demands two things. These 
 are •' a substance underlying the phenomenon," and 
 
XX INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 '' something to cognize the impression or sensation " 
 which it makes. The appearance is simply evidence 
 of something ''unseen" that may be said to appear 
 throiigJi it. Thus the phenomenal world lies 
 between the unseen substantial, and soul as such 
 cognizing power. Both are essential to all phenom- 
 enal existence. '' Modern thought " tends to regard 
 the middle or intervening sphere as the only reality, 
 and as furnishing the only field of science. Very 
 clear and able is the refutation given of this funda- 
 mental falsehood, and of the various forms in which 
 it is presented. To notice them specially would 
 interfere with the design of an introductory notice, 
 and with the limits of the space to which it is ne- 
 cessarily confined. We can only refer, therefore, to 
 the manner in which the author meets the declara- 
 tions of Spencer respecting '' force as the ground of 
 all phenomena," and his dictum that force itself is 
 unknowable. According to Spencer, thought can 
 go no farther. No other cause can be known ; no 
 other cause, therefore, can be assigned. This he 
 would strangely propose as a sort of reconciliation " 
 between science and religion ; if he can be regarded 
 as really in earnest, and not satirical, in presenting 
 such a view of the problem. In an animated 
 passage, the author asks : " Is science, whose very 
 office it is to know — is science satisfied with this 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. XXI 
 
 proposed reconciliation," thus terminating in a con- 
 fession of utter ignorance in respect to " the ground 
 of all phenomena ? " '' Can it consent to a postulate 
 which is suicidal, — an ultimate which would swallow 
 up eveiy scientific labor and success in fathomless 
 nescience." '' Can religion accept this theory," is a 
 question which he next presents, and presses still 
 more earnestly. But we are here principally con- 
 cerned with it as showing why Spencer's '' force," or 
 '' first ground of all phenomena," is to him unknow- 
 able. It is simply because he will not acknowledge 
 the decision of consciousness that force is knowable 
 only through spirit as an idea, that, in the order of 
 our thinking, must go before. Force is antagonism, 
 resistance, or it is nothing. Without such idea of 
 resistance it is inconceivable ; and equally unthinka- 
 ble, again, is this idea of resistance without that of 
 will as belonging to a conscious sentiency. In other 
 words, without it force can never appear. If there 
 were no conception of a conscious sentiency in the 
 universe, as an antecedent ground in our think- 
 ing, force could not be distinguished from motion, 
 even though the latter be conceded as thinkable 
 without a farther causal ground ultimately implying 
 mind and will. But in the total absence of such 
 consciousness, force, both as phenomenon and as 
 idea, is gone. Even the sense of sight implies 
 
XXU INTRODUCTORY XOTICE. 
 
 resistance, though in an infinitesimal degree, per- 
 haps, compared with touch, or sound. But could 
 we indulge the supposition of an entirely antitactic 
 beholding, we might boldly say that forcc\ to it, 
 would disappear, and a phenomenon of cliange 
 alone remain. The explosion of a dynamite maga- 
 zine would give only the thought of scattered 
 motions. Nay more, solidity or hardness would be 
 inconceivable, unthinkable. The granite, and the 
 most yielding fluid, would be alike incapable of 
 giving the idea of resistance, of effort, of power in 
 any form. The mightiest collisions would, in this 
 respect, be like the whirling dust, or the spray of the 
 ocean. In the absence of mind, force, as we now 
 concei\'e it, as luc are 7wzi' compelled to think it, 
 would vanish from the universe. It would have no 
 mode of manifestation. . It would present no test 
 of what we call reality. This inherent connection 
 between the dynamical and the spiritual idea has 
 also been ably set forth by Dr. Martin, of the New 
 York University. As the argument is used here by 
 the author, in opposition to Spencer, it is unanswer- 
 able. This doctrine of force as the sole '' ground of 
 all phenomena" may be called the key position of 
 the anti-religious scientist. To turn it, as we think 
 both of these writers have done, is, in fact, to enter 
 the citadel. 
 
IX TROD I'C TORY XOTICE. XXiil 
 
 But what right, it may be asked, has one who 
 does not claim to be a scientinc man, or to have 
 made any one branch of science his special study, to 
 enter upon such discussions ? It is no small merit 
 in Dr. Welch's book that it exposes the arrogant 
 falsehood on which an exclusion of this kind is 
 grounded. A man of liberal culture, with a knowl- 
 edge of science such as belongs to general liberal 
 education, (without that special devotion to any one 
 branch that makes what we call a scientist") may be 
 amply qualified to detect false logic, even in what is 
 styled scientinc reasoning. ?^Iuch more may he do 
 this when those whom he opposes step far out of 
 their own proper province, and, in the name of sci- 
 ence, invade other departments of thought and 
 knowledge, higher than their own, more important 
 in their aims, and more deeply grounded in the 
 universal human consciousness. ''He that is spirit- 
 ual judgeth all. whilst he himself is judged of no 
 one : " It may seem like an arrogant and almost 
 profane accommodation of a most pregnant passage 
 of Holy Writ ; but it suggests, nevertheless, an idea 
 having a close application to our subject. The 
 demands of thought transcending the physical must 
 determine the bounds of the physical, and of physi- 
 cal knowledge : whilst this hyperphysical region 
 itself can have no limitations set to it bv anv thinsf 
 
xxiv INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 below. Some of these specialties of science may 
 actually narrow the thinking range of those most 
 devoted to them, preventing the just appreciation of 
 what Hes beyond them, and over them, or making 
 the occupants of these limited departments the least 
 free in their judgments of what is elsewhere thought 
 and known. 
 
 It is to this cause we may trace some of those 
 extremely deficient and one-sided views with which 
 the scientific boasting, so common with a certain 
 class of lecturers, has infected even our literary world. 
 A few examples of this may suffice. There is, in the 
 first place, that unceasing talk about " law." Empty 
 reiterations are producing the impression upon such 
 as have no time to think, that, until quite lately, this 
 idea of " physical law," and its regularity had been 
 a stranger to the human mind. No less a writer 
 than Dr. Draper has the hardihood to represent the- 
 ologians, and religionists generally, as believers in 
 perpetual miracle. Such a view is constantly put 
 forth in defiance of the fact, that, in the very earliest 
 Scripture, (Gen. viii, 22) there is the most solemn 
 declaration of the constancy of nature, and a most 
 solemn guaranty given of it for our behef, stronger 
 than any ever furnished by any inductive or experi- 
 mental science. This claim for " modern thought " is, 
 moreover, in defiance of what an ordinary scholarship 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. XXV 
 
 would be sufficient to prove, namely, that the unity 
 and harmony of the cosmos — whence the very name — 
 was an idea inseparable from that of law, and that it 
 belonged, not only to the oldest forms of philosophy, 
 but to the current thinking, as manifest in the cur- 
 rent speech of the race. There is no position of the 
 lecturing scientist more calculated to move indigna- 
 tion for its shallow untruthfulness than this foolish 
 claim, that the idea of " the reign of law " is wholly 
 due to modern discovery and to modern thought. 
 
 Take another example. It may be safely main- 
 tained, that along with the universal belief in genera 
 and species, out of which physical science itself has 
 been evolved, thoughtful observation long ago 
 detected apparent deviations, apparent commin- 
 glings of kinds, apparent hybrid varieties, prevailing 
 to a limited extent, showing either defect in our 
 classifications, or some permitted diversity in nature, 
 though always ultimately checked by the great con- 
 trolling law revealed in the first chapter of Genesis. 
 But this is now treated as though it had been wholly 
 a new discovery. From a few observations of this 
 kind in respect to " pigeons " and *' pitcher plants," 
 there is made a sweeping generalization, and that 
 opposed to all previous generalization, and carried 
 even to the denial of all essential species, or of any- 
 thing like fixed being in the universe. 
 
XXVI INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 Again, — the Influence of the body upon the soul 
 is another of these oldest, and most universal, of 
 human beliefs. It has been the theme of the poet 
 and the moralist, as well as of the physicist. The 
 Bible most plainly declares it, and the theologian has 
 ever found in it a practical lesson of pious interest. 
 But it is now presented as an entirely new idea ; men 
 had not thought of it, says one ; the erring preacher 
 had wholly overlooked it in his spiritual exhortations. 
 Science has changed all this. It has not only taught 
 us what poor creatures we are — the Bible had 
 abounded in that lesson — but has used this very 
 new discovery as the foundation of the grossest 
 materialism, making us all matter, all body, and 
 wholly extinguishing soul. 
 
 Another " phase " of this " modern thought " we 
 find in the continual treatment of pure hypothesis 
 as though it were '' established science." This 
 chorus, too, a portion of the literary and editorial 
 world has taken up, as though, from its continual 
 repetition, there could be no kind of doubt about it. 
 It is all '' established science ; " they have no time 
 to inquire ; but so the savans talk, and even if not 
 yet quite proved, it cannot be far from it. Espe- 
 cially does this '' phase " show itself in what is so 
 confidently said about atoms. These are treated as 
 though their existence, as an undeniable reality in 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. XXVI 1 
 
 reriim natura, had been at last positively settled. 
 Our periodicals occasionally present some curious 
 illustrations of this haste to believe in anything that 
 calls itself -science. Lucretius, for example, is 
 praised for his wonderful forecasting ''genius in 
 having anticipated one of the most brilliant of mod- 
 ern discoveries." The reference is to what he says 
 about atoms, as though it were any more, or any 
 less, hypothetical in the brilliant Latin poet, than as 
 it now appears even in some of our scientific text 
 books. The hypothesis of Dalton, and of our latest 
 scientists, may have more of what may be called a 
 scientific look ; but atoms are still a sheer imagina- 
 tion. No eye has ever seen an atom ; no microscope 
 has ever brought one into visibility. They belong 
 to the ''unseen world," not of spirit but of sense. 
 They lie as far below all sense vision, with its high- 
 est instrumental aids, as they did in the old days of 
 Democritus. Lucretius had a most ingenious mode 
 of getting the atoms at work, in his hypothesis of 
 an infinitesimal deviation from the perpendicular, 
 or the original direction of their motion. This 
 would be enough, in time, to set them all impinging, 
 and therefore, in a still longer time, of running 
 through all possible collisions and cohesions until 
 they had produced this present " aspectable world," 
 as he styles it. It had as much " established science " 
 
XXV iii INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 in it as any modern hypothesis built on similar prem- 
 ises. So was it with the older atomism of Democ- 
 ritus. Given an eternity to work in, wdiat would 
 they not accomplish ? Infinite incongruities falling 
 at last into congruities ; or after infinite misses mak- 
 ing, at last, some lucky hits, so as to get in some 
 kind of position, and so on, and so on, until, after 
 another immeasurable time, some kind of embryo 
 world would begin to appear. Tremendous leaps 
 did these old world-builders make, but not more 
 tremendous than are now made by the modern cos- 
 mologists. The maxim of these older men seems to 
 have been w^ ?}//<(7i'fp}oi», *' the beginning is the half 
 of the work." Get the atoms in motion, get them 
 " deviating from the perpendicular," let them begin to 
 impinge upon one another, making their congruities 
 and their natural selections, and the business might 
 be regarded as virtually done. The world, — w^ith all 
 its freight of life organic, vegetable, animal, wdth all 
 its load of sin and death and corruption, with all its 
 forces, with all its mind and consciousness, would 
 come at last, as it would all, in like manner, at last 
 disappear. Only give it time enough, and, in a sim- 
 ilar process, all things would come out of the nebula, 
 that favorite hypothesis of modern times. We are 
 not exaggerating the features of resemblance. Any 
 one who will turn to Aristotle's Physica, Lib. Ill, 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. XXIX 
 
 Chap, vlli., ''^' will see how old is the doctrine of 
 " natural selections." and " survival of the fittest," 
 out of which Darwin would make all species. 
 
 The unscientific mind, it is said, is not competent 
 to deal with these matters. The objection involves 
 an egregious fallacy. It is a fact, and the scientific 
 men who make this plea should be plainly told it, 
 and made to confess it, that there is a region acces- 
 sible to the common cultivated mind, and especially 
 to such a thinker as the author of this book, where 
 the Darwins, Tyndalls, and Huxleys — giving them 
 all due credit for the great eminence they have 
 attained, and the great value of their science, so far 
 as they have established it — are simply on a par 
 with other men of intelligence. By the thoughtful 
 man this science-transcending region is soon reached. 
 A few steps, and we are where the great philosophers 
 of old, and the great schoolmen of later times, (de- 
 fective as may have been their science) showed an 
 acuteness in discussing these questions of primordial 
 
 * The passage is quoted and well translated by Mivart in his 
 book on the Genesis of Species, page 306. It is thus Aristotle states 
 the opinion of the old atheists whom he refutes : " For when the 
 very same combinations happened to be produced which the law of 
 final causes would have called into being, those which proved to be 
 advantageous to the organism were preserved, while those that were 
 not so, perished like the minotaurs and sphinxes of Empedocles." 
 
 The illustrations are crude, but there is as much "established 
 science " in the ancient as in the modern Darwinism. 
 
XXX INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 
 
 causation, and a power of thought, of which the 
 keenest thinkers of this or any other age might well 
 be proud. Inductive science, the highest range of 
 sense-knowledge, gives no advantage here, except 
 as all culture quickens the mental powers, and ex- 
 tends the sphere of philosophic insight. It is not 
 presumptuous, therefore, in men like Dr. Welch to 
 enter upon discussions like these, and the same might 
 be said of Professor Martin, Mr. Bowne, and others 
 in our own land who have boldly analyzed the boast- 
 ful pretentions of what calls itself " modern thought." 
 We are tempted to say more of this little book, 
 but the Introduction ought to bear a due proportion 
 to the modest volume it announces to the public. 
 Our thanks are due to the publishing house of 
 Putnam's Sons for the service they have rendered to 
 the cause of religion and revelation by adding this 
 to the valuable course of similar healthful works 
 they have lately given to the world. 
 
 Tayler Lewis. 
 
 Schenectady, February 3, 1876. 
 
FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 
 
 'T~^HE theory of force is as old as the process of 
 -^ speculation. But the theory of forces as ap- 
 plied to the great questions of physics and philos- 
 ophy is of modern origin. 
 
 Let us examine this modern theory : first, in the 
 light of its own definitions, its consequences, and its 
 confessions ; and, secondly, in the light of conscious- 
 ness, reason, and revelation. 
 
 This theory proposes not only to explain the 
 phenomena of nature, but to solve the problem of 
 being — to tell what is, and how^ it is — what is primi- 
 tive and what derivative — where the process of 
 derivation began, and how ; and how it proceeds, 
 including within its range, not only matter and mind, 
 but problems of life, and liberty, and morality, and 
 religion. 
 
4 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Wide as is this range, it is to be penetrated 
 everywhere by the light of science, which is to guide 
 the explorer in every direction to the desired solu- 
 tion. In this bold venture science claims to be pos- 
 itive, and to rest solely on demonstration. 
 
 The canon proclaimed as regulative, at least 
 theoretically regulative, is : *' In positive science 
 nothing can be assumed." 
 
 How this canon is observed, and this claim 
 is maintained by the modern theory of forces, will 
 the better appear as we advance. 
 
 Observation and experiment have ascertained 
 the convertibility of light, heat, electricity, magnet- 
 ism, chemical affinity, etc. Hence has been deduced 
 the principle of correlation of forces. And, as these 
 forces are only transmuted, not destroyed, by this 
 correlation, another principle has been deduced — the 
 conservation of energy, or the indestructibility of 
 force. Indestructibility relates to the quantity of 
 force ; convertibility relates to the quality of force. 
 
 For ourselves, we are ready to admit that there 
 is a theory of forces which is both ultimate and 
 unquestionable — that there is an equivalence and a 
 correlation of forces which the world has been only 
 too slow to recognize — that the conservation of force 
 is a principle which science may well maintain — that 
 the persistence of force, if properly explained, must 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 5 
 
 commend itself to universal acceptance, and that the 
 doctrine of evolution, if relieved of absurdities, is 
 valid. But this conclusion turns, mainly, upon the 
 conception of forces and the scope of their correla- 
 tion, and involves the essential question, whether life 
 and mind are forces — a question which runs through 
 the entire discussion. 
 
 It will be remembered that Prof. Grove, among 
 the first to introduce the terms correlation and con- 
 servation, speaks of forces as related to matter, and 
 the conservation and correlation of forces as confined 
 within the range of material nature. (See his Lec- 
 ture, 1842, quoted approvingly by himself in later 
 lectures.) 
 
 M. Faraday, who regarded the conservation and 
 correlation of forces as the highest law hitherto dis- 
 covered in physics, also employed the term force as 
 related to matter, and applied correlation and con- 
 servation of forces within the range of material 
 nature. 
 
 We are ready not only to accept but to maintain 
 this view of the correlation and conservation of forces 
 as presented by Grove and Faraday, and other ear- 
 lier advocates of the theory of forces. 
 
 But within the last decade the notion of force 
 has been enlarged, and the scope of correlation has 
 been extended far beyond the realm of matter. 
 
O FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Although the general principle is correct, viz. : 
 Conservation and Correlation ; yet, the theory of 
 forces, amplified as it is, and diverse and contradic- 
 tory as we shall see, shows how immature are many 
 of the notions on this subject, and how easy it is in 
 the enthusiasm of scientific speculation to fall into 
 error in applying the general principle. 
 
 Let us examine this theory in the light of its 
 own definitions. While these definitions should be 
 clear they should not be contradictory. They should 
 mark, at once, the precise and permanent limit to 
 the application of the theory. It is preposterous to 
 talk of the correlation of forces without understand- 
 ing what force is. It is still more preposterous to 
 talk of forces as affections of matter without under- 
 standing what matter is — whether force is matter, 
 and whether mind, as some affirm, is the most 
 highly concentrated force. 
 
 In the slightest hazard we cannot submit to guid- 
 ance which does not know its way. A fortiori^ we 
 cannot submit ourselves to unwitting guidance, when 
 the very nature of matter and mind is involved, 
 when our own origin and destiny, the very origin 
 and destiny of thought and being, are involved. 
 
 According to Mr. Grove, force, though so subtle 
 as to elude the senses, is real and casual — the pro- 
 ducer or cause of motion ; (passim). 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 7 
 
 While this definition may apply in dynamics, it 
 is evidently inadequate in statics, as Mr. Grove him- 
 self admits, '' in the case of equilibrium of two arms 
 of a balance ; " and so, we may add, in every case of 
 statics where balanced forces of indefinite degree 
 may produce static repose in any degree. 
 
 Dr. Mayer, of Heilbronn, in his paper on " The 
 Forces of Inorganic Nature," p. 251, says: ''The 
 term force conveys the idea of something unknown 
 and hypothetical." 
 
 On the other hand, he tells us, p. 252, that 
 *' forces are indestructible, convertible, imponderable 
 objects." 
 
 Dr. Bray, in his Anthropology, etc., p. 164, de- 
 clares with scientific enthusiasm : " Force is every- 
 thing." And, doubtless to be more explicit, he says 
 on p. 220, " The scientific idea of force is the idea of 
 as pure and mysterious a unity as the one of Par- 
 menides. It is a noumenal integer phenomenally 
 differentiated into the glittering universe of things." 
 
 It is a relief to turn from this dazzling definition 
 to the milder utterance of Faraday : " What I mean 
 by the word force is, the cause of a physical action." 
 
 As this restricts the effect to the limit of physics, 
 so it would seem to restrict the cause — though the 
 statement is indefinite. 
 
 Dr. Bastian, in his labored work on " Force and 
 
8 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Matter," I. p. 4, explains force to be a mode of mo- 
 tion, differing again from all that precede him in 
 regarding force as neither effect nor cause, but as 
 the mode of an effect. 
 
 Herbert Spencer, First Princ, p. 266, says : 
 " Force, as we know it, can be regarded only as a 
 certain conditioned effect of the unconditioned cause, 
 as the relative reality, indicating to us an absolute 
 reality by which it is immediately produced." And 
 Prof. Barker, as if deliberately to increase the con- 
 fusion, says in a lecture devoted to the elucidation 
 of this subject : *' By actual energy as contradistin- 
 guished from potential energy is meant motion. It 
 is in this latter sense that we shall use the word 
 force in this lecture." (Correlation of the Vital and 
 Physical Forces, p. 7.) 
 
 This is a sample of the definitions which could 
 be greatly extended. And, yet, under the threat of 
 censure from this school of '■'■ more advanced think- 
 ers," as Prof. Barker styles them, we are required to 
 adopt their theory of forces. 
 
 From these confused and contradictory defini- 
 tions of force, we turn to the view of matter as pre- 
 sented by this modern theory. Does it distinguish 
 or identify matter and force ? 
 
 As we have already seen, Mr. Grove says, 
 " Forces are the affections of matter," thus distin- 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 9 
 
 guishing between the two ; while Faraday declares, 
 '* matter is force," thus identifying the two. Fara- 
 day reached this decision, as we learn from his *' Life 
 and Letters," after the maturer experience of a life 
 spent in scientific observation, pushing his analysis to 
 the ultimate conclusion that the " atoms of matter 
 are centres ot force." 
 
 Winslow says, p. 70, '' Matter is of itself a mere 
 vehicle. Its fundamental nature is to possess and 
 hold force as a bladder holds water ; a sack, meal." 
 
 Balfour Stewart, in his recent work on ** The 
 Conservation of Energy," says, p. 133, *' Matter is 
 essentially dynamic." 
 
 Bastian, one of the most radical supporters of 
 the modern theory of forces, says " Forces are the 
 qualities of matter " ; while Bray, no less radical 
 than Bastian, says " Matter is force." 
 
 Professor Spiller (see Popular Science Monthly, 
 Jan. 1874, p. 351), asserts that " no material consti- 
 tuent of a body, no atom, is in itself originally en- 
 dowed with force, but that every such atom is abso- 
 lutely dead and without any inherent power to act 
 at a distance." 
 
 He fundamentally distinguishes matter and force, 
 and goes on to show that force is an entity having 
 an existence substantial and independent of matter. 
 
 And among the latest utterances in the same 
 1* 
 
10 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 direction, Prof. Stallo (P. S. Monthly, p. 351), con- 
 demns both the hypothesis of " corpuscular atoms " 
 as advocated by Spiller and others, and the hypoth- 
 esis of ''centres of force " as advocated by Faraday 
 and others ; and to complete the confusion in regard 
 both to force and matter, affirms that there is no 
 force without matter, and no matter without force, 
 but that neither of these elements has any reality as 
 such. 
 
 We confess our inadequacy to adopt these con- 
 tradictory definitions, as well as our growing suspi- 
 cion of a theory built upon such a foundation. 
 
 Like disagreement prevails among this school of 
 scientists in regard to Life. 
 
 "What is its origin," Prof. Tiedemann declares, 
 *' is beyond the range of experiment." Dr. Bastian 
 declares life to be " the result of molecular combi- 
 nation," and, together v/ith his coterie, vociferously 
 teaches archebiosis — the old theory of Needham 
 and Redi, and older still of Ovid and Lucretius, 
 that " living things can take origin from non-living 
 materials." 
 
 While another coterie as vociferously deny arche- 
 biosis and teach panspermism — the theory of Spal- 
 lanzani and Bonnet, etc., that the atmosphere bears 
 with it everywhere the germs of infusorial animalculae 
 and of other organic forms, from which generatio'n 
 
THE MODERN THEOR V OF FORCES. 1 1 
 
 proceeds, generation apparently but not really spon- 
 taneous. 
 
 '' Life," says Schelling, " is the tendency to in- 
 dividuation." Herbert Spencer says, '' Life is the 
 continuous adjustment of internal relations to ex- 
 ternal relations." 
 
 Dr. Meissner, who informs us that he " succeeded 
 in directly producing life in inanimate bodies," 
 and therefore ought to know, says 'VLife is but 
 motion." 
 
 We had supposed it neither difficult nor uncom- 
 mon to transmit motion to inanimate bodies ; but 
 this error Dr. Meissner would promptly correct by 
 the oracular announcement, that '' motion is an act- 
 ual tangible substance." 
 
 Prof. Owen says : *' Life is a sound expressing 
 the sum of living phenomena." 
 
 Now, we are arrested by the advocacy of epi- 
 genesis, with the rallying cry from its supporters : 
 " Omne vivum ex ovo," with an occasional modifi- 
 cation : " Omne vivum ex vivo." Anon, the adverse 
 claims of heterogenesis gain the ascendant ; and, 
 now, homogenesis increases the confusion. Discord 
 becomes contagious as the scientific coteries concen- 
 trate upon their favorite and diverse issues— biosis 
 and archebiosis, spontaneity and heredity, homogene- 
 sis and heterogenesis and epigenesis and pangenesis. 
 
12 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Dr. Bastian concluded that he had produced 
 " truly organized plants and small ciliated infusoria," 
 out of inorganic matter. But Schultz and Dalle 
 claimed to correct the hasty conclusion by their 
 failure to vitalize lifeless matter, organic or inorganic. 
 
 Dr. Bray declares that Hfe proceeds only from 
 life ; while Mr. Crosse, it will be remembered by the 
 readers of '' The Vestiges of Creation," by a solution 
 of silex in water, created the late lamented insect, 
 so precocious that it promptly became a shining 
 mark for death, but which during its brief and brill- 
 iant life received the name of its fond creator — 
 Acarus Crossii — the first, alas, I believe, the only 
 one of his spontaneous offspring. 
 
 On the one hand, are arrayed " the advanced 
 thinkers " from Lamarck and Burdach to Bastian 
 and Pouchet. 
 
 On the other hand, are arrayed '' the advanced 
 thinkers" from Schwann and Schultz to Pasteur 
 and Duthiers. 
 
 But this discord is aggravated by the special 
 disagreement of what were deemed friends in the 
 larger strife. Even Pouchet cannot agree with Bas- 
 tian, nor Burdach with Lamarck. 
 
 Pineau in 1845, as he tells us, actually watched, 
 step by step, the heterogenetic origin and develop- 
 ment of one microscopic fungus, the penicilium 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 1 3 
 
 glaucum, and of two infusoria, a vorticella and a 
 monas lens ! ! 
 
 While the materialistic Biichner says of life : 
 *^ The final results are separated from the original 
 causes by such a number of intermediate links that 
 their connection is not easily established." 
 
 And Bray, one of the most advanced of *' the 
 more advanced thinkers," says : " Life, so far as we 
 yet know, proceeds only from life ;" and he quotes in 
 confirmation the statement of Prof. Huxley, that 
 ** constructive chemistry could do nothing without 
 the influence of pre-existing living protoplasm." 
 (Bray, p. 34.) 
 
 But we need not multiply instances of disagree- 
 ment and contradiction among these modern theo- 
 rists on life and matter and force. 
 
 Vagueness in the general statement allows ap- 
 parent agreement ; and verbal legerdemain serves 
 the double purpose of relieving the initiated, and 
 deceiving the uninitiated. 
 
 It is under the cover of such indefiniteness that 
 an illicit process has crept in which would forsooth 
 clandestinely commit us all, and all things, to a vague 
 theory of the correlation and conservation of forces. 
 It is because of this very indefiniteness of terms that 
 so many vagrant and diverse theorizers can be clas- 
 sified as members of this modern school of scientists. 
 
14 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Precision would greatly check the enthusiasm of 
 their support and their mutual admiration. And 
 yet, with a charitable profession that would hide a 
 multitude of faults, and at the same time prevent 
 scrutiny from without and from within, Prof. You- 
 mans industriously heralds the new scientific broth- 
 erhood with this announcement : '' It is now an 
 axiom that not he who guesses is to be adjudged the 
 true discoverer, but he who demonstrates the new 
 truth." 
 
 This confusion would be comparatively harmless 
 and insignificant, like the play at blind man's buff, 
 did it concern only the players. While this theory 
 confined itself to the material field, if not helpful, it 
 was at least harmless. Although it could not agree 
 upon a definition of force, nor of matter, nor of for- 
 ces — now distinguishing and now identifying that 
 which it had just distinguished, and so plunging 
 itself and those who relied upon it into inextricable 
 confusion ; yet the speculative and the practical 
 thinkers remained unaffected — accepting the conclu- 
 sions of this theory, and disregarding its verbal 
 contradictions — as hitherto, so now, applying forces 
 freely and converting them into each other as occa- 
 sion demanded. 
 
 But overstepping this limit and applying its hy- 
 pothesis to life and thought, this modern theory of 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. I 5 
 
 forces by its rough play of confused definitions and 
 eager generalizations, and scientific dogmatizing, can 
 but work mischief; for, though it cannot tell what 
 force is, nor what is matter, nor what are forces ; 
 yet, it declares that vitality and thought, life and 
 mind, are the same as matter — forces the same in 
 kind as physical forces— thus destroying all funda- 
 mental distinctions ; correlating thought with heat, 
 choice with physical compulsion, and life with the 
 sweep of a lever ; correlating, confounding, human 
 morality with material mechanism, freedom with 
 fate, moral government with natural necessity ; in a 
 word, making life and mind material, the same in 
 kind as a stock or a stone, imperiling, at once, moral 
 government, human responsibility, and individual 
 freedom. 
 
 Such is the scope of the theory logically implied 
 and openly avowed. 
 
 That I do not overstate this, a few references 
 will abundantly prove. 
 
 Dr. Maudsley in his '* Physiology and Pathology 
 of the Mind," styles mind " the highest development 
 of force," where it appears in its most compressed 
 form as consciousness. 
 
 Dr. Hammond in his " Physics and Physiology 
 of Spiritualism " says : '' Mind is a force, the result 
 of nervous action." 
 
1 6 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Dr. Bray in his " Manual of Anthropology " says 
 concisely : '' Mind is force." In the same category 
 he places heat, light, electricity, chemical affinity, 
 life and mind, as forces known to us only in their 
 modes of motion ; and characterizes heat as the 
 most diffuse, and mind as the most condensed form 
 of force. " Therefore mental philosophy becomes a 
 pure system of dynamics or measuring of forces." 
 
 Prof. Youmans, after enumerating the forces 
 manifested in the living system, — mechanical, chem- 
 ical, thermal, luminous, electric, nervous, sensory, 
 emotional, and intellectual, asserts : " That these 
 forces are perfectly coordinated . . . does not 
 admit of doubt." And, kindling with enthusiasm, 
 he exclaims : " This law of force spans all orders of 
 existence, not only governing the motions of plan- 
 ets, but ruling the actions and relations of men." 
 (" Correlation, etc., p. xli.) 
 
 Moleschott declares : '' Thought is a motion of 
 matter." 
 
 Buchner, in his work on " Force and Matter," 
 clamorously avows blank materialism., and proposes 
 to establish the identity of the laws of thought with 
 the mechanical laws of external nature, and con- 
 cludes with this materialistic quotation : '* The senses 
 are the source of all truth and of all error, and the 
 human mind is the product of the change of matter.' 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 1/ 
 
 Carl Vogt, courageously pressing the modern 
 theory of forces to its logical materialistic limit, 
 asserts that thought is a secretion of the brain, that 
 •'just as the liver secretes bile, so the brain secretes 
 thought." 
 
 Herbert Spencer says : '' Those modes of the 
 unknowable which we call motion, heat, light, chem- 
 ical affinity, etc., are ahke transformable into each 
 other, and into those modes of the unknowable 
 which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought ; 
 those in their turns being directly and indirectly 
 re-transformable into the original shapes." 
 
 Prof. Youmans does not, indeed, claim that this 
 has been proved, only that " it seems abundantly 
 evident." As if willing to set logic at defiance, he 
 argues thus : " If the forces are correlated in organic 
 growth and nutrition, they must be in organic 
 action ; and thus human activity in all its forms is 
 brought within the operation of this law " — the 
 correlation of forces. Even the logic of the most 
 modern science must rebuke the rashness of such a 
 defence. Apparently rebuked by his own reflec- 
 tion, he offers this apology : '' From the great com- 
 plexity of the conditions, the same exactness will 
 not, of course, be expected here as in the inorganic 
 field." 
 
 We would say — the greatness of the issue in- 
 
l8 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 volved demands at least equal exactness. We com- 
 mend to the careful consideration of the professor, 
 his own axiom marked with his own emphasis . 
 *' Not he \n\vo guesses is to be adjudged the true 
 discoverer, but he who demonstrates the new truth." 
 — p. xvi. 
 
 Prof. Barker supplements the want of demon- 
 stration by this appeal : '* Can we longer refuse to 
 believe that our thought is in some way correlated 
 to the natural forces ? And this," he significantly 
 adds, '* and this even in the face of the fact that it 
 has never yet been measured." 
 
 Really the refusal does not seem to us difficult ; 
 indeed, according to the axiom of popular science 
 announced by the American editor, it seems to us 
 obligatory. Verily, the supporters of the modern 
 theory of forces exhibit remarkable facility of belief 
 in this direction. 
 
 Their readiness to adopt the modern theory 
 awakens the suspicion of a zeal not according to 
 knowledge. They may moderate their zeal by 
 reflecting upon the involuntary confession of Prof. 
 Tyndall : " The passage from the physics of the 
 brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is 
 unthinkable ; " or, upon the friendly warning of Dr. 
 Bray : '* There is no bridge from physics to meta- 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 1 9 
 
 physics — there is no road that way ; the only road is 
 from metaphysics to physics." 
 
 It is not at all surprising that Prof. Barker, in 
 view of the difficulty in his line of advance, should 
 prefer appeal to demonstration. An authority on 
 this point, whom Prof. Barker will neither gainsay 
 nor suspect of unfriendly prejudice, Dr. Bastian, 
 frankly admits that " however probable it may be 
 that what we know as sensation and thought are as 
 truly the direct results of the molecular activity of 
 certain nerve-centres, as mechanical energy is the 
 direct result of a muscle, this cannot be proved!^ (The 
 Beginnings of Life, I. p. 49.) 
 
 While Herbert Spencer, for whose authority 
 Prof. Barker will entertain no less regard, favorably 
 discussing this very question (Principles of Psychol- 
 ogy, 1869, p. 194), asserts: "There is no fixed or 
 even approximate quantitative relation between the 
 amount of molecular transformation in the senti- 
 ent centre and the peripheral disturbance originally 
 causing it. Between the outer force and the inner 
 feeling it excites, there is no such correlation as that 
 which the physicist calls equivalence — nay, the two 
 do not even maintain an unvarying proportion. 
 Equal amounts of the same force arouse different 
 amounts of the same feeling, if the circumstances 
 differ. Only while all the conditions remain constant 
 
20 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 is there something hke a constant ratio between the 
 physical antecedent and the physical consequent." 
 
 At this essential point the case requires, and we 
 demand, a precise statement of the correlation if it 
 exist, and an exact quantitative estimate of the 
 relation assumed by this theory. 
 
 On the contrary, we are met by the admissions 
 of Barker, and Bastian, and Bray, and Spencer, and 
 Tyndall, that it is a hopeless attempt to establish 
 anything like a quantitative estimate. 
 
 Thus the modern theory of forces breaks down 
 of its own weakness at its very entrance upon this 
 disputed field. Viewed in the light of its own defi- 
 nitions and consequences and confessions, it is inevi- 
 tably condemned ; awaiting greater condemnation, 
 as vv'e shall see, when viewed in the higher light of 
 consciousness and reason and revelation. 
 
 It may well be questioned whether this modern 
 theory of forces would ever have received the advo- 
 cacy of such confessors, were not the theory sup- 
 posed to be serviceable to another, dear as a nursling 
 to this school of thinkers — a theory of evolution. 
 But it is quite illogical and imprudent to support 
 a fallacy in order to maintain a dependent hypoth- 
 esis. A fallacy can be serviceable only in maintain- 
 ing a fiction, like this counterfeit theory of evolution 
 — for there is a theory of evolution that is true. 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 21 
 
 If, we ask, the modern theory of forces proves so 
 defective and treacherous on the very margin of this 
 disputed territory in estimating the quantitative 
 equivalent of the nervous system, " because the 
 manifestations of this activity are so subtle and 
 eluding," what must be its more disastrous failure 
 when the complication is increased by the addition 
 of other factors no less elusive, such as muscular 
 activity mingling with nervous, and physical nutri- 
 tion mingling with both, and yet other factors no 
 less elusive and still more subtle, — consciousness and 
 volition and conscience and reason ? 
 
 From its definitions confused and contradictory, 
 its confessions of inconclusiveness and invalidity, and 
 its inevitable consequences of materialism and 
 fatalism, we pass to consider this theory in reference 
 to life and mind, and examine it in the light of con- 
 sciousness, reason, and revelation. First, in refer- 
 ence to mind. 
 
 In this higher field of observation the subject is 
 psychical, not ph3^sical, else it were the same field 
 still, lan^uaq;e itself were false, consciousness itself 
 deceptive, and the term correlation meaningless, and 
 all measurement impracticable, for matter cannot 
 measure itself, and all knowledge impossible, for 
 there would be nothing that could know, perhaps 
 nothing that could be known. Who, at least, could 
 
22 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 say that there would be anything that could be 
 known ? This alternative would prove more disas- 
 trous to the supporters of this theory than to admit 
 the existence of mind. In this higher field, then, 
 the subject is psychical, not physical ; the agent is 
 spontaneous, not mechanical ; hence, no common 
 gauge can here apply its measurement. More than 
 this : in this higher field, this psychical subject, this 
 spontaneous agent, is a rational person, not a mate- 
 rial thing — knowing itself and knowing surrounding 
 things, but not known of them ; knowing forces, con- 
 trolling, employing, applying forces, yet not itself a 
 force ; capable of thinking, of feeling, of willing, as 
 forces are not ; competent to reflect, reason, love, 
 and worship, as forces are not ; conscious of freedom 
 and obligation and responsibility, as forces are not ; 
 cognizant of justice and injustice, of right and wrong, 
 of merit and demerit, as forces are not. No theory 
 of forces, however modern, can degrade a person, a 
 psychical, spontaneous person, to a force. Conscious 
 of such a nature and such ability, the mind sees, be- 
 tween itself and material things, a distinction which 
 no theory of forces can obliterate — a distinction 
 more indestructible than any force. 
 
 Through the mind we learn of matter by tracing 
 material facts, although matter cannot reverse the 
 process and learn of mind. To know matter we 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 23 
 
 must study the facts ; so to know the mind we 
 must study the facts. While the facts of mind are 
 utterly diverse from those of matter, they are, to 
 say the least, no less certain. The knowledge of 
 mind is, at least, as valid as the knowledge of matter. 
 Only by our knowledge of mind can we verify any 
 knowledge of matter. Mental consciousness is the 
 primary essential. In this fact of mind our knowl- 
 edge begins, and through it absolutely does our 
 knowledge extend ; and by this testimony we learn 
 how distinct and different are the fundamental char- 
 acteristics of mind and matter. Consciousness and 
 thought and choice, which are characteristic of the 
 one, are impossible to the other. Again we ask, 
 what common measurement can be applied to such 
 diverse facts? What common gauge will answer for 
 mind and matter? 
 
 But more than this : how can we know ourselves ? 
 Only by our own consciousness. And how shall 
 others know us ? Not by the appliance of any me- 
 chanical measurement, but by studying our manifes- 
 tations of mind and character in the light of their 
 own consciousness. Our deeds may be entirely de- 
 ceptive. How, then, does the estimate of their ap- 
 parent and their real values vary ? The very action, 
 which at first the public deemed commendable, may, 
 when understood, appear culpable. Why is this? 
 
24 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT, 
 
 Because conscious intention gives real character to 
 human action. " A man may smile and be a villain." 
 On the other hand, a frown may be in sport, like the 
 play of a father with his children, and thus be a sign, 
 not of anger, but of love. The same blow may smite 
 down an enemy, or quicken the merriment of a 
 friend. The same act may be the salutation of a 
 saint, or the kiss of Judas betraying Jesus. And so 
 these words of Solomon have been accepted by the 
 world as a proverb : " Faithful are the wounds of a 
 friend ; but the kisses of an enemy are deceitful." 
 Why, again we ask, why this varying estimate and 
 this varying value of human actions ? Again we 
 reply, because the conscious intention gives real 
 character to the action. Thus, we understand, 
 through our own consciousness, the apparent para- 
 dox, but the real propriety, of the statement so 
 beautifully made by the poet-king of Israel : " Let 
 the righteous smite me ; it shall be a kindness." 
 
 But no such rule can be applied to the move- 
 ments of matter. It is utterly impossible even to 
 attach to them any character, either of merit or de- 
 merit. The blow from a falling hammer may kill a 
 man, and yet, by universal consent, involve not the 
 least moral character ; while that blow, if impelled 
 by malice prepense, becomes murder, and the perpe- 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES, 25 
 
 trator is, by universal consent, condemned as guilty 
 of a capital crime. 
 
 But more than this : long before the public may 
 have understood his conduct and character, the man 
 himself has understood both, as he, at first and fully, 
 was conscious of his own intention ; and long after 
 the public may have rendered its verdict of praise or 
 blame, the man himself has known whether he was 
 rightly judged. 
 
 As we study the facts of matter and of mind, 
 further and further do we get from the correlation of 
 material forces with mental action. 
 
 But more than this : while no keenness of obser- 
 vation and no mechanical gauge can possibly deter- 
 mine the character of an external process such as the 
 stern, persistent, and painful surgery of Dr. Brown 
 Sequard in the critical case of Mr. Sumner, which 
 seemed intended to kill, but was designed to cure — 
 the man may even misjudge his own physical acts, 
 unless he study his own consciousness and thus 
 know himself. 
 
 In St. Vitus' dance how shall others understand, 
 how shall the man himself understand his strange 
 actions, unless he question his own consciousness, 
 and know whether these actions are wdth or without 
 the consent of his will ? whether they are the effect 
 of mental choice or the effect of physical disease? If, 
 
26 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 on the one hand, action be known by the testimony 
 of consciousness to be involuntary, and thus adjudged 
 to have no moral significance ; so, on the other hand, 
 may inaction, as in the case of paralysis, be known 
 by the testimony of consciousness to be involuntary, 
 and so be adjudged to have no moral significance. 
 Thus, within the range of human actions, the same 
 act may, in the true light of consciousness, have 
 different character and value, and totally different 
 acts may, \x\ the same true light, have the same 
 character and value ; while opposite action and in- 
 action may have precisely the same value with- 
 out any character — as in St. Vitus' dance and in 
 paralysis — or have the same value with a different 
 character, or have different values and different 
 characters. Not only may precisely the same kind 
 of action have an utterly different character and es- 
 timate, according to the mental intention, but it may 
 produce an entirely different effect, according to the 
 mental intention which prompted it — now with a 
 friendly intention imparting pleasure, and now with 
 an unfriendly intention imparting pain ; thus, in its 
 result, differing both in quality and quantity, accord- 
 ing to the mental intention — baffling the calculation 
 of the most watchful mechanical gauge. So, the 
 same word, producing the same material vibrations, 
 will, according to the feeling it represents, awaken 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 2/ 
 
 joy or grief, pride or shame, attraction or repulsion, 
 defy and elude the most skillful mechanical measure- 
 ment. No fixed mechanical gauge, then, can be 
 applied in this higher field ; no material measurement 
 is possible ; a fortiori, no quantitative equivalent can 
 be found. 
 
 If, then, from the standpoint of experiment, Prof. 
 Barker and Bastian and Bray and Spencer and Tyn- 
 dall found it ** a hopeless attempt to establish any- 
 thing like a quantitative estimate," from a still 
 higher standpoint, in consciousness itself, we see the 
 attempt is hopeless. 
 
 Now, of these factors, — force, matter, mind — 
 which do we know best ? We know matter only 
 through force. But are we conscious of force ? No ; 
 we are conscious of its impressions on us, its attrac- 
 tions and repulsions, gravitation and diremption, 
 soUdity and extension, etc., which are the results of 
 force, and of these we are conscious only through 
 the senses. 
 
 Are we conscious of thinking and feeling and will- 
 ing? We are directly conscious of these ; but these 
 are spiritual acts — at least, different phenomena 
 from solidity and extension. If, as Mr. Spencer is 
 compelled to admit, '' The utmost possibility for us 
 is an interpretation of the process of things as it pre- 
 sents itself to our limited consciousness " (see Bas- 
 
28 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 tian, p. 2), this is especially true when we pass from 
 the realm of things to the realm of persons. It is 
 not through the bodily senses, but through con- 
 sciousness itself, that we know the mind ; and thus 
 our knowledge of mind is at once more direct, more 
 complete, and more trustworthy. This decisive 
 point Mr. Spencer is compelled to concede : " The 
 personality of which each is conscious, and of which 
 the existence is a fact beyond all others the most 
 certain, etc." {First Prin. p. 66) ; and Mr. J. S. Mill 
 {Introduction to Logic) is compelled to assert : " What- 
 ever is known to us by consciousness, is known 
 beyond the possibility of question." Now, if con- 
 sciousness is ** the light of all our seeing," both what 
 is within and what is without, it is obvious how much 
 of our knowledge it includes. In this light of con- 
 sciousness we may learn, each for himself, and better 
 than his neighbor can tell him, what mind is. 
 
 And the first answer of consciousness is, that 
 mind is distinguished from matter — the self from 
 the not-self — in which simple judgment two impor- 
 tant things are involved : the one, that the mind or 
 self is ; and the other, that mind is distinct from 
 matter. 
 
 Again, the answer of consciousness is, that mind 
 is a spontaneous agent, acting without compulsion, 
 and even in spite of compulsion ; again, that mind is 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 29 
 
 a rational agent, capable of knowing itself and of 
 knowing the material universe, capable of recog- 
 nizing and obeying obligation. But not only does 
 the mind see itself as person, and not thing, pos- 
 sessed of a will in liberty and a rationality to guide 
 that will, and a conscience to respond joyously to 
 the harmony of the will and the reason, or sadly to 
 their discord ; the mind not only sees what it is, but 
 also shows what it is. Superior to material forces, 
 it brings them into a higher unity than of themselves 
 they could ever attain, making them subserve a 
 human organism ; elevates the life-principle to a 
 higher service than mere instinct ; exalts the senses 
 to a nobler office than that of mere sensual srratifi- 
 cation ; em.ploys all these, at the behests of its own 
 rationality, to serve and secure a higher and still 
 higher manhood. This is utterly different, both in 
 kind and degree, from what pertains to physical 
 forces. Thus, by the right of its own conscious 
 excellence, it holds dominion, and for the purpose of 
 augmenting that excellence, it puts all physical 
 forces and all life-instincts and all the bodily senses 
 in subjection to this higher unity. 
 
 By this twofold process of induction and deduc- 
 tion, from the standpoint of scientific experiment 
 and from that of philosophic observation, w^e see 
 how " hopeless is the attempt to estabhsh anything 
 
30 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 like a quantitative equivalence ; " how hopeless the 
 attempt to establish a correlation between the forces 
 of matter and the activities of mind. 
 
 But the direct argument from mind is by no 
 means exhausted. Moral government exists. We 
 recognize its obligation upon ourselves ; we impose 
 the same obligation upon others. It is vindicated 
 by the individual conscience and by the public con- 
 science, and sanctioned by common law, and ap- 
 pealed to in every struggle for freedom, justice, and 
 reform. This recognition, this vindication, this 
 sanction, this appeal, are all confirmed by the indi- 
 vidual conscience, making each a law unto himself; 
 leaving each at liberty within this moral realm, yet 
 holding each responsible, with supreme sanctions of 
 commendation or condemnation, which the human 
 soul cannot escape — a confirmation superior to all 
 skeptical reasoning or theoretical contradiction or 
 scientific adjustment. Nothing of this kind can be 
 said of material forces ; it cannot but be said of 
 mental activities. There can be no correlation be- 
 tween them, either quantitative or qualitative. On 
 the one hand, material forces never become respon- 
 sible, however much they may be employed by the 
 mental activities ; on the other hand, mental activ- 
 ities never become irresponsible, however much they 
 may employ the material forces. The distinction is 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 3 1 
 
 essential and immutable. Correlation here is impos- 
 sible. And yet, the modern theory of forces con- 
 tradicts this highest dictate of the soul, and — in 
 spite of the evidence of literature and law, of private 
 and public recognition, of conscience and reason — 
 denies the possibility of moral government and of 
 moraHty. It places in the same category material 
 forces and intellectual and voluntary action, denying 
 all difference in kind and quality. " All actions," 
 says Bray, p. 309, *' organic or inorganic, mental or 
 material — all actions being equally necessary, there 
 can be ?io iyitrinsic differeyice between them." Merit 
 and demerit, praise and blame, at once perish. Dr. 
 Meissner proposed to show not only that heat is a 
 mode of motion, but that vegetable and animal life, 
 and human will and love and thought, and even 
 God, himself, are but motion ! — the one, no less than 
 the other, subject to necessity and destitute of 
 morality ! ! 
 
 Its logic is sound, if its premises are valid. Merit 
 and demerit are not predicable of mere force ; and 
 voluntary action is, by this theory, transformed and 
 degraded into mere force. Hence, merit and de- 
 merit are not predicable of human action ! Accord- 
 ing to the modern theory of forces, both morality 
 and moral government, therefore, are impossible ! ! 
 
 We would not discard this theory, solely or pri- 
 
32 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 marily, because of its consequences ; but, because it 
 is unsound, we discard the theory with its conse- 
 quences. 
 
 But, not to dwell longer upon the argument 
 from mind, we pass to another direct argument, — 
 the argument drawn from life. 
 
 After the admission of Bastian, that ''the inter- 
 mediate links in the life-process are not easily estab- 
 lished ;" and Virchow's statement, that ''chemistry 
 has not succeeded in forming a blastema (the gen- 
 eral formative compound of tissues), nor physics in 
 forming a cell — what does it matter ; " and Spencer's 
 confession, " The forces which we distinguish as 
 uicntal come within the same generalization (as the 
 nervous). Yet, tJicre is no alternative biU to make the 
 assertion ; " and Prof. Tiedeman's declaration, " The 
 origin of organic xnatter and living bodies is alto- 
 gether beyond the range of experiment ; " and Bray's 
 assertion, " The first requisite is life, which, so far as 
 we yet know, proceeds only from life ; '' and Hux- 
 ley's admission, in his inaugural address before the 
 British Scientific Association, (1871) ; " Looking back 
 through the prodigious vista of the past, I find no 
 record of the commencement of life, and, therefore, 
 I am devoid of any means of forming a definite con- 
 clusion as to the conditions of its appearance : " 
 after such admissions it is not necessary to linger 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 33 
 
 long upon the question of life as related to the mod- 
 ern theory of forces, however fully we may choose 
 to consider it for the sake of the discussion. Evi- 
 dently, the process in nature is to evolve life from 
 life ; vegetables from the living seeds (each after its 
 kind) ; fish from the living spawn ; animals from the 
 egg or living germ ; and man from the living germ 
 or the &^%. 
 
 The earth brings forth, not something from 
 nothing, as it would if life — the greater — were 
 evolved from mere physical forces — the less — but 
 what it has received as a living conception, the 
 physical forces (heat, light, electricity, magnetism, 
 chemical affinity) each and all aiding to develop, but 
 not creating, the life. 
 
 If spontaneous generation ever be effected by 
 the skill of man through strange and arbitrary com- 
 binations, yet, spontaneous generation is not nature's 
 method. 
 
 Everywhere through nature's realm, so far as w^e 
 can trace it, in the present or in the past, life pro- 
 ceeds from life. The scientific rule is scrupulously 
 observed : Causa ceqitat effcctmn. The vegetable 
 takes lifeless mineral ingredients, and, applying 
 light and heat, transforms these lifeless ingredients 
 into living matter ; this is effected, as Bastian himself 
 admits, " under the influence of pre-existing proto- 
 
34 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 plasm." (II : p. 'j']^ Crystals, evidently, as Bastian 
 also admits, are statical aggregates ; living organisms 
 are dynamical. Crystals, in forming, emit heat ; 
 organisms, in growing, absorb heat. Organic mole- 
 cules or atoms have mobility; inorganic molecules 
 have immobility. Inorganic bodies are built up 
 from without by accretion ; organic bodies grow 
 from within by assimilation. Organic, living bodies 
 have the power of reproduction or self-multiplica- 
 tion ; inorganic, lifeless bodies are incapable of self- 
 multiplication or reproduction. In the life-process 
 there is a ceaseless strife between vital affinity and 
 chemical affinity — the former proceeding to build up, 
 the latter to destroy, the organism. The life-process 
 is the triumph of the former, which not only employs 
 other physical forces, but subjects even chemical 
 affinity and gravity to its high purpose. Indeed, 
 Prof. Clark asserts ('' Mind and Nature," p. 7), " Or- 
 ganized beings exist in direct opposition to natural 
 chemical affinity." If this be true, we see the less 
 probability that chemical agency, however skillfully 
 employed, can create life, and the greater propriety 
 in Huxley's statement : " Constructive chemistry 
 could do nothing without the influence of pre-exist- 
 ing protoplasm." (Bray, p. 35.) 
 
 To careful, and even to careless observation, life 
 ever appears employing forces, superintending and 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 35 
 
 directing their service, using them as constructive 
 aids to bring it nourishment and to build up for 
 itself a fitting organism, so that every seed shall have 
 its own body, and every plant its own distinct form, 
 and every animal its own characteristics, and every 
 man his own individuality or personality. For its 
 use, life seeks out appropriate forces, separates them 
 from the inappropriate, and subjects them to its 
 service, producing a higher unity by its own mastery, 
 and a greater diversity for its pleasure and profit. 
 
 We would not, then, style life a force — not even 
 a vital force — but an activity, or life-power; while 
 mind is not a force — not even a spiritual force — but 
 a spiritual activity, or mental power. 
 
 The distinction is by no means illusory or unim- 
 portant. It reveals the barrier between matter and 
 life, between matter and mind — a barrier which we 
 have no fear that scientific progress will ever break 
 down or remove, however much some scientists 
 desire to effect this. 
 
 There may be vital forces — chemical, like the di- 
 gestive force of the stomach, which may be imitated 
 in the chemical laboratory ; mechanical, like the pro- 
 pulsive force of the heart, following the most precise 
 rules in hydraulics ; muscular force, moving the limbs 
 like the mechanical action of a lever ; there are these 
 vital forces which, together with physical forces, like 
 
36 FAITH A AW MODERN' THOUGHT. 
 
 heat and light, the Hfe uses in its activity and power ; 
 forces which are correlated to each other but 
 which the life uses instinctively and directs not as 
 equals, but as servants to accomplish its higher 
 ends. 
 
 Prof Barker labors through successive pages to 
 prove, what we readily admit and assert, that all 
 these physical operations under the supervision of 
 Hfe are in correlation. While he admits, inevitably, 
 that vital force (as he styles the life-power) is different, 
 dominating the physical forces, asserting its superior 
 right, " uniting substances which in inanimate nature 
 ever flee from each other, separating that which is 
 incessantly striving to unite " (p. 4) ; and, without 
 even pretending to demonstrate, he merely assumes 
 correlation in such contingent phraseology as : 
 *' Chemistry doubts not her ability to produce." 
 . . *' A few years hence will doubtless give 
 us," etc., etc. 
 
 Life is a feeling of want or need which goes forth 
 into spontaneous activity and reproduction. Do 
 those who clamor for spontaneous generation (arche- 
 biosis), and pretend to effect it, produce such life? 
 As a power, life is as primitive and independent in 
 its origin, as are the forces in their origin. While it 
 differs from them in kind, it is also their superior 
 in degree ; the life-instinct, whenever and wherever 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 3/ 
 
 it appears, directly going forth with original autlior- 
 ity to take for its service and assimilate to itself 
 whatever it may select from earth and air and sea 
 and sky. In the simplest processes of the life-power, 
 this authority is manifest in its on-workings, and 
 within this whole range instinct rules. In the higher 
 processes of this same life-power, within the range 
 of sentiency, sense, with instinct, rules ; and in the 
 highest processes of this same life-power, within the 
 range of rationality, reason, with sense and instinct, 
 rules. So that within the human sphere, as not 
 within the animal or the. vegetable, even sense and 
 instinct are attended by the informing presence of 
 reason. 
 
 There is, then, between the physical force and 
 the life-power, a distinction that is fundamental, 
 characterizing the force as mechanical, the power as 
 living ; making this the user, that the used ; and by 
 the very distinction in kind, ruling out correlation of 
 forces as not applying in terms, nor possible in fact. 
 
 This view of life is confirmed rather than confuted 
 even by the explanation of Dr. Carpenter. As Dr. 
 Carpenter is conspicuously put forth by the American 
 editor as the representative of the modern theory of 
 forces in its application to life, we shall be pardoned 
 for referring more freely to his lecture. (See " Cor- 
 relation of Forces," etc., edited by Prof. Youmans, 
 
38 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 pp. 401, 402, 41 1, 412, 414, 419, 420, 421, 425. See, 
 also, Balfour Stewart's " Conservation of Energy," 
 p. 161. Also, Le Conte, pp. 185-6-8, 197, 201.) 
 
 We have presented the negative argument drawn 
 from the admissions and discordant definitions of 
 the advocates of this theory, and the positive argu- 
 ments drawn from the nature of mind and of life. 
 By this two-fold process of argumentation — direct 
 and indirect — we have shown the invalidity of the 
 modern theory of forces. 
 
 It is obvious to remark that the view we have 
 taken accords with sacred Scripture, as might be 
 shown by repeated references from Genesis to 
 Revelation. 
 
 As indications of the scriptural doctrine on this 
 subject, we refer to Gen. ii. 7 : " And the Lord God 
 formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed 
 into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man became a 
 living soul." Job. xxxiii, 4 : " The spirit of God hath 
 made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given 
 me life ; " and the significant question of Jesus, Matt, 
 vi. 25 : " Is not the life more than meat, and the body 
 than raiment ? " and his sublime prophecy, John v. 
 28, 29 : " The hour is coming in the which all that 
 are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come 
 forth ; they that have done good unto the resurrec- 
 tion of life ; and they that have done evil, unto the 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 39 
 
 resurrection of damnation;" the Apostle Paul's ser- 
 mon at Athens, which not only bears directly upon 
 the origin of life and all things, but seems as perti- 
 nent to the vagaries of modern speculation as to 
 those of the Attic type,— Acts xvii. 23-31 : 'Tor as 
 I passed by and beheld your devotions, I found an 
 altar with this inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN 
 GOD. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him 
 declare I unto you. God that made the world, and 
 all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven 
 and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands ; 
 neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though 
 he needed anything ; seeing he giveth to all life, and 
 
 breath, and all things ; For in him we live, 
 
 and move, and have our being ; as certain also of 
 your own poets have said, For we are also his off- 
 spring. Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of 
 God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is 
 like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and 
 man's device. And the times of this ignorance God 
 winked at, but now commandeth all men everywhere 
 to repent ; because he hath appointed a day, in the 
 which he will judge the world in righteousness, by 
 that man whom he hath ordained ; whereof he hath 
 given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised 
 him from the dead ;" and, finally, not to multiply 
 examples, the Saviour's warning to his disciples, 
 
40 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Matt. X. 28 :" Fear not them which kill the body, but 
 are not able to kill the soul ; but rather fear him 
 which is able to destroy both body and soul in hell." 
 
 Here, then, we reach the limit of the specific 
 discussion involved in this chapter ; and here we 
 can logically rest. Yet it may be justly expected 
 that we refer to the modern theory of evolution, 
 based, as it is, on the modern theory of forces. 
 
 We admit an evolution originated by a divine 
 Creator, guided by a divine intelligence, and gov- 
 erned by a divine purpose, an evolution consistent 
 with the conservation and correlation of forces 
 throughout the material universe. But the modern 
 theory of evolution, based upon the modern theory 
 of forces, discards a divine Creator, a guiding intelli- 
 gence, a controlling purpose, and assumes a force 
 that is physical, persistent, ultimate, unintelligent, 
 unconscious, unknowable, which evolves itself into 
 all things that are, — matter, life, mind, or, to be 
 specific, into heat, light, electricity, magnetism, chem- 
 ism, consciousness, reason, volition. Now, it fol- 
 lows from what has been said, that evolution based 
 upon correlation and conservation of forces, as appli- 
 cable equally to life and mind and physical forces, is 
 untenable. If life and mind are fundamentally 
 and essentially distinct from physical forces, the 
 modern doctrine of evolution is impossible. If life 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 4 1 
 
 and mind are not convertible into heat, light, elec- 
 tricity, magnetism, and chemical affinity, and these 
 physical forces convertible into mind and life, then 
 the modern theory of evolution fails. 
 
 This theory of evolution is unsound, not only in 
 its foundation, but unsound in itself: 
 
 1. It is assumed by its leading advocates, hke 
 Mr. Spencer, as the settled and only theory, when it 
 is not demonstrated nor proved. Thus it violates 
 the very principle on which positive science presumes 
 to rest, and invalidates its own process. As an 
 historical fact, this theory of evolution is not proved ; 
 as a scientific fact, " an absolute law," without a 
 law-giver, it is not demonstrated. We might safely 
 go farther and say, what is not necessary here to 
 affirm, that in the nature of the case it never can be 
 verified by induction (historic or scientific), never can 
 be demonstrated by positive science. 
 
 2. This theory assumes that force, out of which 
 all things are to evolve, is unknowable. Now, by 
 what authority of positive science does it make this 
 assertion? How does it know so much. about this 
 force as to warrant the assumption that it is unknow- 
 able ? Granting, for the sake of the theory, that it 
 may as yet be unknown, does it therefore follow 
 that it is unknowable ? 
 
 3. It assumes this force to be the ultimate, the 
 
42 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 primary or first. But this contradicts the preceding 
 assunnption that it is unknowable. If it is unknow- 
 able, how can it be known as primary or ultimate? 
 And more, there is no proof that this unknowable 
 force (as Mr. Spencer styles it) is ultimate. Mr. 
 Spencer admits that there is no such proof. Why 
 stop with force as the ultimate ? Our consciousness 
 forbids this — e.g.^ our consciousness declares that in 
 personal experience an exercise of will is before 
 force. More than this, our observation forbids it. 
 When the person dies and the will ceases or is with- 
 drawn from the human frame, personal force ceases. 
 
 4. It assumes that this unknowable force is 
 physical — i. e., force without intelligence, or wisdom, 
 or purpose ; blind force, acting by chance or by 
 necessity, *' whirling and whirling evermore until it 
 becomes selfconscious," and thinks and reflects. 
 
 To say that this force is physical contradicts the 
 assumption that it is unknowable. More than this, 
 experience and observation forbid this fourth assump- 
 tion — e. g., observation indicates that all force in the 
 material world is wisely ordered, and that all organ- 
 isms are skillfully adapted : the eye to seeing, 
 the ear to hearing, the generative organs to 
 reproduction ; so that long before they are needed, 
 as they form in the womb, it is in exact and complex 
 accordance with the laws of optics and acoustics 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 43 
 
 and reproduction, precisely adapted to future use in 
 these directions. And these are samples of universal 
 nature. At the same time, our experience declares 
 that force adapted to a purpose is guided by intelli- 
 gence — a declaration which no logic can confute. 
 More than this, we infer the nature of a cause from 
 the nature of the effect. But for this principle in- 
 duction itself were invalid, and positive science 
 utterly inconclusive and useless. So here the effects 
 bear the marks of intelligence, of wisdom, of pur- 
 pose ; therefore, the cause must be intelligent and 
 wise, and not mere physical force. 
 
 5. This theory of evolution assumes not only 
 that this force is unknowable, yet, at the same time, 
 ultimate and physical, but also that it is unconscious. 
 Again we reply, this contradicts the primary assump- 
 tion that it is unknowable. If unknowable, how is 
 it known to be unconscious? Thus the contradic- 
 tions involved in this theory multiply. It contradicts 
 in the sixth place, a fundamental axiom in reason- 
 ing, causa cequat effectum — an effect can not be 
 greater than its cause. But here is a physical force 
 without intelligence, wisdom, or purpose ; an uncon- 
 scious force evolving (according to this theory of 
 evolution), forces that are living, conscious, intelli- 
 gent, wise, and moral ! Here is the greater constantly 
 evolving from (coming out of) the less — ^^the higher 
 
44 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT, 
 
 from the lower ! " Causa czquat effectum,'' say these 
 '* more advanced thinkers," the effect equals the 
 cause — and with mathematical precision they demon- 
 strate, if a cause (C) produces an effect (E), then E=C. 
 So, if E produces another effect (S), then S=E=C. 
 Therefore, by the on-working of these causal forces, 
 no degree or equivalence of force is destroyed or 
 annihilated, so that the effect shall become less than 
 the cause, whether to the tenth or ten-thousandth 
 link in the chain of progress. And so we say as 
 earnestly and confidently, causa cequat effecticm — the 
 cause equals the effect ; therefore, by the on-working 
 of these causal forces from the first, no degree or 
 equivalence of force is produced or created, so that 
 in any case the cause shall be less than the effect, 
 whether to the tenth or ten-thousandth link in the 
 chain of regress. This rule evidently works both 
 ways. It is as applicable to the evolution based 
 upon the modern theory of forces, as to conservation 
 and correlation of forces. Nothing else and no 
 more can be evolved than what was at first involved. 
 This axiomatic rule, which Liebig so elaborately, yet 
 so unnecessarily, demonstrates, proves too much for 
 the doctrine of evolution. The simple and homo- 
 geneous, which, in the hands of Mr. Spencer and 
 the evolutionists, grows up into such heterogeneity 
 and complexity, must, at the outset, according to 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 45 
 
 the remorseless axiom, be and contain all the com- 
 plexity and heterogeneity. Hoist by its own petard, 
 this false evolution disappears, and with it the 
 clearly implied, if not carefully concealed, atheism ; 
 and theism appears, indestructible and persistent, 
 and with it involution — for God, as author and 
 finisher, is all and in all — and with this the true 
 evolution, as we shall presently see, for He is before 
 all things, and by Him all things consist. 
 
 7. It contradicts its own principle, — that no force 
 is created by the exercise of force. Yet it would, 
 by the mere exercise of force, lift up a lower force 
 to a higher plane than the lower force could of itself 
 attain. 
 
 8. This theory is deceptive. It assumes a false 
 name, — evolution ; while, by its own showing, it is 
 not evolution, but involution. 
 
 9. Positive science boasts of its method of experi- 
 ment and observation, and claims to rely upon facts. 
 By what process of observation or experiment is it 
 discovered that force is eternally persistent ? Does 
 this rest upon fact, or upon assumption ? Here 
 again the theory contradicts the method. No pos 
 sible induction can demonstrate such a conclusion, 
 no fact does or can verify it. Besides, according to 
 the. theory, this force is unknowable. How, then, 
 can it be declared persistent ? and especially, how can 
 
46 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 it be declared eternally persistent? The declared 
 eternal persistence of force inevitably involves the 
 theory in a two-fold contradiction. Perhaps the 
 force which seems so persistent may have had a be- 
 ginning somewhere in the past ; perhaps somewhere 
 in the future it may end. There is nothing in pos- 
 itive science that can or dare deny this. 
 
 '* Existence," says Mr. Spencer (F. Pr. vol. I., p. 
 146), ''existence means nothing more than persist- 
 ence." Existence, then, may have had a begin- 
 ning—by the self-silencing admission of this theory 
 — so it may have an end. Besides, if persistence is 
 existence, from what, we ask, does this persistent 
 force stand out, or exist — from itself.^ This is a 
 supplemental contradiction which ranks as an 
 absurdity. 
 
 These '' advanced thinkers " cannot know, with- 
 in the Hmit of their theory, what force is ; by w^hat 
 possible right, then, consistent with their theory, can 
 they postulate that force is the cause of all mani- 
 festations within us and around us — the ultimate, 
 the persistent cause ? Positively none. Their only 
 answer is given in these words of Mr. Spencer : '* We 
 cannot go on merging derivative into wider and still 
 wider ! " 
 
 But, w^e reply, why not go on ? By what right 
 do they stop at this point? Evidently none. Do 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 47 
 
 they know that they have found the ultimate cause? 
 Certainly not. Do they even know what they have 
 found ? Do they know that force is persistent and 
 indestructible ? We affirm that they do not know. 
 The very admission of Mr. Spencer is : " Force is 
 an unknown cause, . . . and the persistence of 
 force is a truth which transcends experience." Here, 
 Mr. Spencer, together with his school, abandoning 
 induction, stands no longer on experience or demon- 
 stration, but on assumption postulated as an ulti- 
 mate ! His own theory forbids his occupying this 
 position, and condemns it as wholly untenable for 
 these theorists. He does not know the ground he 
 occupies. He does not know whether force — his 
 assumed ultimate — is eternally persistent or not. 
 According to his own admission, he does not know 
 whether force itself may not be self-originated then 
 and there ; or whether it be originated by chance, he 
 does not know ; or whether it shall abide, he can- 
 not tell ! 
 
 This physical philosophy leads to interminable 
 difficulties. While it leaves unsolved the pro- 
 foundest problems of existence, it starts more ques- 
 tions than it settles. Thus the mechanical theory 
 is partial and unsatisfying. 
 
 The very assumption that force — physical force — 
 is the basis of being, ultimate and persistent, while 
 
48 FAITH AXD MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 it discloses the unity indicated by science, discloses, 
 also, the insufficiency of force as the assumed first 
 cause ; and presses the mind to seek a sufficient 
 cause of force itself and of all things, till some of 
 these more advanced thinkers are compelled to 
 declare, with Bray (p. i68): *' All force is mental 
 force, such ' will-power ' as we are conscious of exer- 
 cising in our small individuality ; " and with Sir 
 J. F. W. Herschel (p. 224): "The prescience of 
 mind is what solves the difficulty ; " and, with 
 Wallace (p. 224) : " The inference is, that force is 
 produced in the only way we know force to be pro- 
 duced, by the will of conscious beings." 
 
 Thus science, whether with willing or unwilling 
 footsteps, is led by its pathway of induction toward 
 an ultimate, persistent, intelligent, and so, sufficient 
 causation. And scientists are doing in the interest 
 of science just what is needed in the interest of 
 religion, to show force and law, unity and multipli- 
 city, pointing back to God. 
 
 10. This theory assumes that life and mind are 
 convertible with material forces, thus destroying the 
 fundamental <listinction between mind and matter 
 and impeaching consciousness, which declares mind 
 distinct from matter — the one knowing, the other 
 incapable of knowing; the one moral, the other in- 
 capable of morality ; while mind is an activity which 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 49 
 
 uses matter, subjecting the material to the service 
 of the mental. 
 
 11. It assumes a correlation quantitative between 
 material forces and life and mind, yet admits (see 
 ]\Ir. Spencer and others) that this has not been 
 proved and cannot be — that the task is hopeless. 
 
 12. It assumes that, because God cannot be 
 detected by experiment or discovered by scientific 
 methods, therefore, he is not ; bowing him out of 
 the universe because he is not indispensable to the 
 hypothesis of positive science, or ruling him out of 
 existence because he does not appear within the 
 range of the telescope. 
 
 To this arbitrary rejection of God, it is sufficient 
 to reply, that this modern theory of forces and of 
 evolution is, by its own confession, self-silenced. 
 
 It does not know, a fortiori it cannot deny. It 
 has not, forsooth, proved that there is a God — 
 certainly it has not proved that there is no God. 
 But more than this, by this virtual and unequivo- 
 cal rejection of God, this theory virtually and 
 unequivocally commits itself to atheism and chance. 
 There can be no middle ground. It is either theism 
 or atheism — God or chance, the author of the 
 universe. Necessity is only another name for 
 chance, blind as well as capricious I 
 
 Here, in addition to all the contradictions already 
 
50 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 specified, we find a defect sufficient of itself to con- 
 demn the theory as invalid. 
 
 Ill this emergency, to save the name and the 
 fame of modern evolution, a certain class of 
 advanced thinkers earnestly call upon evolutionists 
 everywhere to adopt archebiosis. It would be re- 
 markably convenient, were it possible, thus to save 
 evolution from breaking down, as it otherwise does, 
 by the absurdity of evolving the greater from the 
 less, and so evolving something from nothing. But 
 archebiosis is only another horn of the dilemma alike 
 fatal to evolution. The process of archebiosis is a 
 process of chance. It is possible, not through order 
 but disorder, the like producing the unlike, the life- 
 less the living, the inorganic the organic ; and arche- 
 biosis abandons evolution to the reckless sport of 
 chance. 
 
 We said that either process is fatal to evolution. 
 If heterogenesis be accepted, the process is confess- 
 edly capricious. It is either a living or a lifeless 
 process, as it may chance, working toward the 
 assumed result ; and the result is inevitably capri- 
 cious, for the effect may be precisely similar to the 
 cause, — life from life; or precisely dissimilar — life 
 from lifelessness. From the same process the result 
 is living or lifeless, as it may chance. If there is any 
 law recognizable, it is lawless caprice, which no sci- 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 5 1 
 
 ence can formulate, or even allow. If heterogenesis 
 be rejected, evolution, as proposed by this modern 
 theory of forces, is still by chance ; for intelligence 
 and design are deliberately ruled out from the begin- 
 ning, and the result is an effect greater than the cause, 
 viz. : life and intelligence evolved from a cause which 
 possesses neither — evolved from physical forces, a 
 result possible only by chance. The absurdity is 
 equal, at least, to that involved in heterogenesis, since 
 the effect is not only different in kind from its cause, 
 but different in degree — greater than the cause, so 
 that for evolution, whichever way it fly, is chance ; 
 and, in itself, 'tis chance. 
 
 Evolution, be it remembered, evolution based 
 upon the modern theory oi forces, assumes the task 
 of evolving all things, even life and mind, from phys- 
 ical forces ; and by either process,of heterogenesis or 
 homogenesis, is involved in the fatal dilemma of 
 chance, and the result is an inevitable absurdity. 
 Chance can be excluded only by the presence of an 
 intelligent and almighty power, with a wise and free 
 purpose originating and ordering all forces. There 
 is an evolution consistent with such a purpose, and 
 subject to such a power, by whom *' we understand 
 the worlds were framed ; so that things which are 
 seen were not made of things which do appear " 
 (Heb. xi : 3) ; so that forces which mold and move 
 
52 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 the universe are the expression of his will, existing 
 henceforth — i. e., standing out from God — as efficient 
 realities in space and time, subtler than the fiery 
 mist or the star-dust, subtler than the attenuated 
 nebula of the modern evolutionist, yet no less real, 
 and more ancient, with causal energy unsurpassed 
 by that assumed in the modern theory of forces. 
 
 These divinely created forces, by their intervvork- 
 ing and counterworking and onworking, as secondary 
 but efficient causes '' make the things which do 
 appear" {i.e., the material phenomena), and mold 
 and move the atoms and the worlds ; at the wise 
 behest of their divine Author they constitute these 
 Vv'orlds into a universe of order, and, at the same 
 behest, continue the universal order. 
 
 Hence, the forces are persistent or indestructible 
 beyond any possibility of finite use or change. Only 
 he who, at his own behest, put them forth into space 
 and time, as local and temporal efficiencies, can 
 reverse or recall them. 
 
 He7ice, the forces arc correlated to each other in 
 their very constitution, and are convertible by finite 
 use or change, as we see continually in the material 
 modifications and in human appliances. 
 
 Hence, forces maybe multiplied and varied at the 
 divine behest, to build up and adorn and perfect the 
 material universe, and fit it better to become the 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 53 
 
 abode of living things, as clearly appears to have 
 been done. Upon the primal forces of cohesion and 
 repulsion and revolution, other forces being divinely 
 begotten or superinduced, the world-process ad- 
 vanced until light and heat and electricity and mag- 
 netism and chemical affinity all mingled in harmoni- 
 ous efficiency ; and the primeval chaos was gradually 
 transformed to a universe of order and pervaded with 
 light and beauty. 
 
 Hence, the forces have evolved not something 
 greater than they involved at first, but what was at 
 first involved — ^just this in kind and degree ; evolved 
 not as it may chance, but as it should be in the 
 view of eternal wisdom ; evolved not by " the fortui- 
 tous concurrence of mystic atoms " inert, but by the 
 orderly on-working of efficient forces, controlled ever- 
 more by the divine power and guided by a divine 
 purpose. 
 
 Thus, in the true view, evolution has a divine 
 origin and a divine purpose ; and the universe is com- 
 prehensible and the order of the universe, rational. 
 In the false view, evolution has neither origin nor 
 purpose ; the universe, as a ceaseless series of the 
 conditioned, is incomprehensible, and the order of 
 the universe is mechanical and irrational. The 
 former view culminates in knowledge, comprehensive 
 and satisfying : '' For the invisible things of him 
 
54 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 from the creation of the world are clearly seen, 
 being understood by the things that are made, even 
 his eternal power and Godhead " (Rom. i : 20). The 
 ^latter view ends in nescience, perplexing and dis- 
 heartening. Within its distant but darkened range 
 science, material science, pursues its weary way in 
 the tread-mill of experiment amid material forces ; 
 seeking for life which can never be phenomenal, but 
 ever and forever evades our physical senses ; seeking 
 at nerve-centers to detect and dissect mind itself, 
 which ever and forever eludes the search, replying 
 evermore to the deluded seeker, that while it acts 
 in time it is not confined to space ; seeking in every 
 nook and corner of the material universe for the 
 great First Cause, if haply it may feel after him and 
 find him, but with the eye of intuitive reason closed, 
 failing to see him, though he be not far from every 
 one of us ; terminating its unsuccessful search in 
 utter nescience and despair. Nothing but perfect 
 demonstration can ever establish such a result or 
 authorize such a conclusion. And in the very na- 
 ture of the case, demonstration of this negative con- 
 clusion is impossible. *' All that induction can do, 
 as scientific, is to observe phenomena and sequences 
 in nature, and put them into convenient generaliza- 
 tions." 
 
 This modern theory of evolution is not only 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 55 
 
 unsatisfactory and invalid ; it is wholly uncalled for, 
 and, therefore, even the presumption is against it. 
 We are not, needlessly, to multiply hypotheses. 
 The old dictum of Occam remains valid : Entia non 
 miiltiplicanda sunt praeter neccssitatem. 
 
 Let Occam's razor be applied to this needless 
 hypothesis of evolution. This presumption is 
 strengthened by the presence and prevalence of an 
 older theory, and a better — an evolution at once 
 comprehensive and satisfactory, comprehending all 
 the facts of material science and satisfying all the 
 spiritual demands of the soul. 
 
 The real issue, then, is between the false and the 
 true theory of evolution — between atheism and 
 theism — chance and God. The true view is not 
 only sublime, but is full of sympathy and support 
 and guidance — almighty support and guidance for 
 the material universe — almighty guidance and sup- 
 port and sympathy for man. Whatever changes 
 may occur in material nature — and what finite mind 
 can forecast the possibility? — whatever changes ma}^ 
 occur, yet, by the wise behest of Almighty God, 
 order — divine and benign order — shall evermore be 
 preserved ; and man may evermore trust in God and 
 not be afraid ; and, in the light of His divine pres- 
 ence and the strength of His divine aid, go on to 
 
56 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 improve and enjoy the life which now is and the life 
 which is to come. 
 
 The false view, though but a step removed from 
 the sublime, is — it must be confessed — utterly de- 
 void of sympathy, of support, of guidance and 
 rational government. By it we are plunged into 
 the frightful abyss of nescience. If force be im- 
 personal, what are its powers and possibilities — 
 whether it be mechanical necessity, or capricious 
 chance, or blind fate ; whether it be malicious or 
 merciful, as a friend, a fury, a fiend, or a phantasm — is 
 unknown. This were a conclusion horrible enough, 
 were we permitted by this modern theory of evo- 
 lution to hope in a God behind the unknown force, 
 and superior to it, who might rescue us from the 
 frightful abyss. But to be denied even this hope, 
 and to be left to sink at last in the fathomless vortex 
 of atheism, at the mercy of a blind but tremendous 
 and pitiless force, forever unknown and unknowable 
 — this is the depth of woe, the climax of horror. 
 
 And to this we are driven by the modern theory 
 of evolution, based upon the modern theory of 
 forces. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 5/ 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Faith and Positivism. 
 
 SHALL faith be ruled out ? This is not exclu- 
 sively a question between philosophy and the- 
 ology, but it is also a question of philosophy with 
 philosophy. It has of late been fashionable in cer- 
 tain quarters to satirize Christian faith as folly, to 
 admit nothing but " positive knowledge," to sneer at 
 belief as irrational. 
 
 One class of these pretentious foes to faith, who 
 occupy the realm of sense, assume the modest 
 appellation of philosophers, yet magisterially limit 
 all knowledge to this realm. What appears to sense 
 they know. The phenomenal is the real — the only 
 real. Just what it is, they are not able to say ; but 
 that it is, they. know. The senses are the media of 
 communication, and the senses are the source of 
 knowledge — the source of all knowledge. 
 
 Another class, in the same field of the sense, de- 
 spising the appearance of modesty, reject the name 
 philosopher ; affirm the paradox that " there are 
 more false facts than false theories " (Lewes' Biograph- 
 
58 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 ical History of Philosophy, etc.) ; and resolutely 
 press their theory to its legitimate conclusion, *' that 
 a valid philosophy is impossible," " that science is 
 radically opposed to and excludes all philosophy and 
 theology." As said the sophists, so say they, that 
 nothing is truly known ; and the logical result is 
 utter skepticism. ''The ancient researches," says 
 Lewes, " ended in skepticism, common-sense, and 
 skepticism again. The modern researches ended in 
 idealism, skepticism, common-sense, and skepticism." 
 
 The question, then, whether faith is entitled to 
 any place and prerogative, concerns not theology 
 alone, but philosophy as well ; even science itself is 
 not unconcerned. 
 
 The entire range of this discussion includes two 
 fields : one, the philosophic and finite ; the other, 
 the religious and infinite ; the former regarding 
 matter, mind, and morals ; the latter regarding 
 God, immortality, and religion, especially the Chris- 
 tian religion. After a brief survey of the ground, and 
 a due limitation of terms, we shall follow two lines 
 of argument, the indirect and the direct; by the first 
 to vindicate a place for faith by the admissions (pos- 
 itive or implied,) of objectors themselves ; by the 
 second, to establish a place for faith on positive and 
 reliable grounds. The higher domain of faith, the re- 
 ligious and infinite, will then challenge our inspection. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 59 
 
 The objectors to faith may be ranged in four 
 classes : The first class object to faith because it can 
 not be verified by sense; the second, because it 
 can not be verified by the understanding. The third 
 class object, that faith transcends reason. The 
 fourth class object, that nothing can be believed, 
 that doubt is universal. 
 
 We reply to the fourth objection, that it ends in 
 sheer negation, not only of material substance and 
 phenomena, but of mind and thought itself, even 
 the very thought which gave it birth. The objection 
 is suicidal ; it does not allow us to believe that we 
 doubt. To the third objection we reply, that al- 
 though faith may transcend, it does not contradict 
 reason. But this objection and reply belong espec- 
 ially to the second branch of the subject. 
 
 The first and the second classes object, that faith 
 can not be verified by the sense, nor by the under- 
 standing. Yet both believe in principles which can 
 not be verified by the sense, nor by the understanding 
 (as we shall show in the proper place) ; and these 
 very principles underlie the processes, both of the 
 sense and of the understanding, and even the possi- 
 bility of these processes. " Natural phenomena are 
 ever fundamentally inexplicable by physical science 
 alone." * 
 
 *Mivart's " Genesis of Species," p. 287. 
 
6o FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 This belief, then, of these objectors, which is 
 positive, vindicates a place for faith, even for reli- 
 gious faith, as will appear in the progress of- the 
 discussion. We say this belief of the first and the 
 second classes of objectors relies upon reason for its 
 existence, and for the principles which it recognizes. 
 Reason verifies for the sense and for the understand- 
 ing, in regard to these necessary principles or facts. 
 So may it in regard to things spiritual and infinite. 
 If it be said : Belief does not depend upon reason, 
 but is ultimate and postulatory in reference to the 
 sense and the understanding, we reply, this is only a 
 stronger vindication of a place for faith ; for so it 
 may be said, ad Jwmineni, in reference to religious 
 faith, it is ultimate and postulatory. 
 
 Faith, as a term extensive, is belief founded upon 
 evidence, belief in every direction, toward the sense, 
 the understanding, the conscience, the reason, and 
 revelation, toward the finite, or the infinite, belief 
 whether philosophic or religious. Faith as a term 
 intensive or specific, is Christian faith, including not 
 mere belief, but all else that may be involved in faith. 
 As the former, in its lowest and simplest definition, 
 then, faith is belief founded upon evidence ; in the 
 highest and complete definition, it is saving trust in 
 the Redeemer. As an essential in this definition of 
 terms, we have inseparably joined with belief, the 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 6 1 
 
 phrase, founded upon evidence, whether the belief be 
 lowest, in reference to mere matter, or highest in ref- 
 erence to spiritual things, even Christian faith. This 
 definition at once and finally excludes from the dis- 
 cussion whatever does not rest upon evidence, be it 
 credulity, superstition, or fancy. Faith evermore waits 
 upon authority. It must have evidence of some sort : 
 sense, or reasoning, or human testimony, or con- 
 science, or reason, or revelation. Faith is not first, 
 but knowledge, of some sort and degree is first. We 
 can not believe concerning that of which we have no 
 possible apprehension, of which we know absolutely 
 nothine. We believe in the existence of an external 
 world, or, at least, of external phenomena ; but this 
 belief is based upon the testimony of the senses. 
 Thus founded, our belief may be so complete as to end 
 in certainty. Distrusting the testimony of the senses 
 may lead to the denial of an external world. So in 
 regard to the understanding and its judgments, to 
 the reason and its intuitions, to the conscience and 
 its witness, to revelation and its teachings. In each 
 direction faith relies upon appropriate evidence. 
 There can be no primitive beliefs even, in the sense 
 that they precede all evidence, all authority, all 
 knowledge ; or, in the sense that, if not preceding 
 they are independent of these. Such faith would be 
 irrational and blind. If we may entertain such faith 
 
62 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 then we may believe what we please, with or with- 
 out evidence. 
 
 Again, in reference to different truths, faith (be- 
 lief) rests upon different authority : the authority or 
 evidence of sense in reference to phenomena external 
 or internal ; the evidence of the understanding in 
 reference to logical reasoning, inductive or deductive; 
 the authority of reason for necessar}^ and universal 
 truths ; the authority of conscience with reason for 
 spiritual truths within the compass of finite discov- 
 ery ; and the authority of revelation for spiritual 
 truths which lie beyond. So, different truths reach 
 our belief or faith through different avenues. The 
 truths differ, the avenues differ (sense, understanding, 
 reason, conscience, revelation), the faiths differ, and 
 the results differ. Yet in all, reason with its light as 
 belonging to a rational soul is more or less present, 
 is never wholly absent. Reason, as locus principi- 
 oruvt, belongs to the soul, not as pre-existent accord- 
 ing to Plato, but by the constitution of the soul, 
 personal, rational. As thus constituted it can not 
 be like a piece of blank paper passively awaiting the 
 inscriptions of experience. Coming into being as a 
 soul in the image of God (or if it be objected as too 
 early in the discussion to make this reference), com- 
 ing into being as a soul, it has reason, conscience, 
 and a self-determining will, as well as perception. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 63 
 
 By the constitution of the soul, no faculty (be it 
 sense or understanding) acts wholly alone. No faculty 
 is ever purely akoyov, says Aristotle (De Anima, Lib. 
 ill. 9, 2). Reason gives to sense more than mere 
 phenomena. Reason gives to the understanding 
 more than mere qualities. Without reason, as every 
 one must admit, we should have only an inferior in- 
 terest in the things of sense ; even an inferior interest 
 in the processes of the understanding. Now, with 
 intense interest we are brought face to face with the 
 great questions: What? How? and Why? with all 
 that they imply. Even the child is not satisfied with 
 knowing what is, but, by the soul's own impulse, asks 
 the cause and the purpose ; and the thoughtful mind 
 eagerly inquires the real meaning of the universe. 
 Reason and conscience, attracted evermore toward 
 a higher unity, long to rest in the all-encompassing, 
 supreme design. Hence not merely physical and 
 intellectual, but rational and spiritual issues move 
 the world. Hence questions concerning faith can 
 not diminish, but must ever increase in interest. 
 Then, as with all other exercises of the soul, reason 
 is present, so reason (this is our point) should go 
 with faith even in its highest exercise. '* By the eye 
 of reason through the telescope of faith, i. e. Reve- 
 lation, we may see what without this telescope we 
 could never have known to exist. But he who blinds 
 
64 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 the eye of reason and pretends to see by an eye of 
 faith is not guided by the h'ght, but sees Hke a man 
 in his sleep " (Jeremy Taylor). " For though reason 
 is not the positive and affirmative measure of our 
 faith, and our faith ought to be larger than our 
 (speculative) reason, yet in all our creed there can 
 be nothing against reason." Pascal sententiously 
 remarks, that '' faith is reasonable though not 
 reached by a chain of reasoning." Bedell (Internal 
 Evidences of Christianity, Philadelphia Lectures,) 
 says: ''Christianity requires a faith which is rational, 
 i. e., which is conformed to the laws of our thinking 
 nature ; and she submits all the grounds of this faith 
 to the judgment of enlightened human reason." The 
 Apostle enjoins (i Peter, iii. 15): *' Be ready always 
 to give an answer to every man that asketh you a 
 reason of the hope that is in you." A recent evan- 
 gelical writer, in refuting rationalism (Dr. Fisher, 
 Boston Lectures), asserts, that " no amount oi evi- 
 dence can justify belief in propositions that are either 
 self-contradictory or in conflict with known truth," 
 thus guarding faith that it be not irrational, while he 
 maintains that *' the human soul has a native recog- 
 nition, however obscure it may have become through 
 sin, of the verities of natural religion — God, freedom, 
 accountableness, immortality." Says Halyburton 
 (Inquiry, p. 356) : " Faith must be founded or 'tis 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 65 
 
 irrational, brutish;" (p. 357) ''Sufficient evidence 
 must always determine our assent ; to resist it is 
 irrational." 
 
 We have multiplied statements on this point, 
 not because the reader may require it, nor because 
 the position seems doubtful, but because we would 
 guard against the common but false charge of men 
 like Hume and Gibbon of the last century, that 
 Christian faith is maintained in the absence or in the 
 face of unanswerable arguments ; and of men like 
 Abbott and Herbert Spencer at the present day, 
 that faith is utterly blind and credulous, spurning 
 rational evidence, going against reason as readily as 
 with it ; and for another reason, that some men like 
 Jacobi the German, and Proclus the Greek, have 
 held that " faith is the foundation of our knowledge," 
 that " in belief we have the revelation of all reality 
 — all original cognition," as Algazzali the Arabian, 
 says : " Radix cognitionis fides." Sir William 
 Hamilton ransacks the records of philosophic 
 thought to find authority and precedent to fortify 
 his conclusion " that in the last resort we must, 
 perforce, philosophically admit that belief is the 
 primary condition of reason, and not reason the ulti- 
 mate ground of belief; that we are compelled to 
 surrender the proud intellige ut ere das of Abelard, to 
 content ourselves with the humble crede ut intelligas 
 
66 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 of Anselm, by misconstruction, we think, appro- 
 priating to his purpose the practical motto of the 
 logical Anselm, and violently pressing even Augus- 
 tine into the same strange service. While, on the 
 one hand, we should not exaggerate reason to deny 
 all need of revelation, as do the rationalists, neither, 
 on the other hand, should we disparage reason that 
 we may exalt faith. Happily has Dr. McCosh said 
 (Intuitions of the Mind) : It is good neither for faith 
 nor reason to be alone. 
 
 The schoolmen, indeed, like Anselm, styled phi- 
 losophy the ancilla, handmaid, of religion, yet not a 
 foe but a friend of faith, regarding faith with *' its 
 root deep in our moral and spiritual nature, as in 
 the highest sense reasonable." In this they but 
 reflected the view of their acknowledged leader, the 
 great Augustine, who, least of all men, shrank from 
 the Apostolic injunction, " Be ready always to give 
 an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of 
 the hope that is in you." 
 
 It is easy to see how accumulating errors might 
 spring up as the natural outgrowth from the funda- 
 mental error of divorcing reason and faith, as does 
 Kant in his dual hypothesis of the speculative reason 
 and the practical, making the speculative (or pure) 
 reason reject what the practical reason (or faith) 
 accepts, leaving faith to roam the field of morals and 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 6/ 
 
 religion not only alone, but blind and unreasoning. 
 Combining this error of Kant with another grave 
 error of the sophists, that " nothing is truly known," 
 Herbert Spencer (First Principles, p. 88) unfairly no 
 less than unhesitatingly remands religion to " the 
 sphere of unknown realities," makes faith only ** an 
 indefinite consciousness which can not be formula- 
 ted," and pronounces *' the ultimate religious truth 
 of the highest possible certainty " to be this, that 
 " the Power which the universe manifests to us is 
 utterly inscrutable," the religious altar is *' to the 
 unknown and unknowable God," and faith in her 
 devotions is blind and irrational. 
 
 If, in the spirit of the Rationalist and the Soph- 
 ist, the statement is made that a proposition may 
 be false to the reasoning faculty yet true to faith, 
 we reply: though false to reasoning, it is true to 
 reason, if true to faith. Against all such disparage- 
 ments of faith, the view we have already presented 
 is a complete vindication. To recur to our defini- 
 tion : Faith, in every direction, is belief founded 
 upon evidence — at the lowest degree as belief in 
 matters of sense, and in the highest degree as belief 
 in the things of the spirit, even saving trust in the 
 Redeemer. 
 
 From this limitation of terms we turn to our 
 first line of argument,— to vindicate a place for faith 
 
68 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 by the direct or implied admission of objectors, 
 mindful, within this field of the philosophic and 
 finite, of the maxim that " false metaphysics can be 
 effectually counteracted by true metaphysics alone." 
 
 One class of objectors occupy the field of sense, 
 and " positively " limit all knowledge to this field. 
 What appears to sense they know. The phenom- 
 enal is the real, the only real. True, the senses are 
 not always uniform in their reports ; they may be 
 deceived ; they may be impaired ; they differ in 
 different persons. The phenomena are fleeting, con- 
 fused, contradictory. Philosophy, with no guarantee 
 or guide but sense, it would seem, might easily hear 
 the rebuke of its arrogance coming from every quar- 
 ter of its monopolized domain, and learn a lesson of 
 humility. But whether or not it listen to this .rebuke 
 and learn this lesson, it is at least compelled to trust 
 in the senses for what it claims to know, and 
 thus all along practically to admit and employ the 
 very principle which theoretically it excludes and 
 scorns. 
 
 For example, Mr. Huxley, speaking, (it is to be 
 presumed) according to the rules of ** positive phi- 
 losophy," of the molecular particles of water and of 
 their natural disposition or inherent power to change 
 into steam or into ice, says : ^' We call these prop- 
 erties of water, and do not hesitate to believe that 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 69 
 
 they result from the properties of the component 
 elements of water." This philosophic statement, as 
 well as the announcement of his unhesitating belief, 
 he makes without the witness of any observed fact 
 or any attempted proof. 
 
 But Mr. Huxley, walking by scientific faith, ad- 
 vances to a more commanding position. He believes 
 that originally " living protoplasm was evolved from 
 non-living matter," by natural conditions, and that 
 these conditions may hereafter be artificially pro- 
 duced so that matter will assume the properties we 
 call '* vital." 
 
 " This opinion," he is careful to say, '' is an act 
 of philosophic faith." Supported in another step 
 by philosophic faith, (although he is not careful to 
 specify at every step.) Mr. Huxley advances to the 
 belief that the human soul is produced by molecular 
 matter properly disposed. It does not appear that 
 his guide conducts him much farther in this direc- 
 tion. Indeed it would not seem necessary, since at 
 this point scientific faith reveals to him the identity 
 of matter and mind, or the indifference of both, for 
 Mr. H. is left at liberty to accept or deny either, or 
 deny or accept both. Brought to this position of 
 security and freedom. Prof. Huxley takes time to 
 look about him and prove his devotion to philosophic 
 faith by a demonstration of his iconoclastic zeal. 
 
70 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 " The theology of the present age," he declares, 
 ''begins to see the necessity of breaking in pieces 
 the idols built up of books and cobwebs, and of 
 cherishing the noblest and most human of man's 
 emotions, by worship for the most part of the silent 
 sort at the altar of the Unknown and Unknowable." 
 Where and how, we would ask, has Mr. Huxley 
 ascertained that there is an Unknown and Unknow- 
 able ? and how, especially, that he has an altar? and 
 how, that worship is agreeable to him or appropriate 
 to mortals ? and how, that the human emotions, 
 which lead to such worship, are the noblest belong- 
 ing to man ? How is it that this class of writers 
 know that the object of this worship is unknowable ? 
 Is this ** positive knowledge ? " 
 
 But Prof. Huxley is urged to this by the pressure 
 of science, based upon or embodied in *' the fixed 
 order and unchanging causation of nature." But 
 how has he found that there is a fixed order and un- 
 changing causation ? Has his observation compre- 
 hended and penetrated all nature? Has the obser- 
 vation of all the explorers in the field of positive 
 science accomplished this ? And thus has there 
 been discovered a " fixed order and unchanging cau- 
 sation of nature?" Or is this, again, a matter of 
 philosophic faith ? As '' organic chemistry, mole- 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 7 1 
 
 cular physics and physiology are yet in their 
 infancy," ^ it would seem to be the latter. 
 
 Here, in passing, we should not neglect to notice 
 the fact that if it were possible that nature be thor- 
 oughly and perfectly observed, not by one individual, 
 (for this is not supposable) but by successive scien- 
 tific explorers, still the conclusions in regard to the 
 fixed order of nature and unchanging causation 
 would depend upon their reports, and in the final 
 analysis be a faith based upon testimony. 
 
 But we can not dismiss this objection so lightly, 
 for it is at just this point that much of the opposition 
 to Christian faith concentrates. 
 
 Mr. Huxley claims that " stress of science em- 
 bodied in the fixed order and unchanging causation '* 
 of nature constrains him to his peculiar attitude to- 
 ward the theology of the present age. Now we 
 do not question his loyalty to science. We are quite 
 willing that he shall stand forth as its redoubtable 
 champion. We have no doubt that the science 
 which he so zealously defends is embodied in nature, 
 indeed this gives it its very " form and feature," that 
 it is thus embodied exclusively, as though there were 
 nothing but nature — nothing above or beyond. 
 That one loyal to such a master should feel pressed 
 
 * For this and the preceding qu9tations from Mr, Huxley, see his 
 " Lay Sermons, Addresses and Reviews." 
 
72 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 by a great stress, we do not wonder, even if in the 
 line of his asserted " unchanging causation " of na- 
 ture, he should feel the stress of fatality. But in 
 regard to this " fixed order and unchanging causa- 
 tion of nature," which so impresses Mr. H., is it an 
 order fixed and unchanging? Mr. H. is the champion 
 of a science which professes to be a science of fact. 
 
 Is he not over-confident just here, as well as over- 
 zealous? Has his science demonstrated that the 
 order of nature is fixed and unchanging? We need 
 not stop to cite phenomena which indicate the con- 
 trary, which constrain those who regard only ante- 
 cedence and sequence to exclaim with the old Ionics: 
 " All things perpetually flow," and to sympathize 
 with the common feeling of uncertainty, and the 
 common expectation of changefulness — rather than 
 changelessness. Countless illustrations are at hand; 
 but Mr. Huxley admits the difficulty of predicting 
 the future in even the simplest possible case, aban- 
 dons ** positive science," and reluctantly but legiti- 
 mately raises the question : '' How can we know 
 that the next stone which we throw into the air 
 will descend?" ''The answer is that we do not 
 know, but believe " that the stone will fall. 
 
 Hume declared that, in the last analysis, in varia- 
 bleness of antecedence and sequence is all that expe- 
 rience tells us of causation. Mr. Lewes, the biogra- 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 73 
 
 pher of philosophy, accepts this statement as right, 
 and affirms that '' all our ideas are derived from 
 experience," and that " philosophy must end in 
 skepticism." Yet even Mr. Lewes, one of the most 
 positive of the positivists, says : " If we believe that 
 similar effects will follow whenever the same causes 
 are in operation, if we believe that fire will burn, we 
 are simply believing in our experience — that is irresist- 
 ible. Custom has primarily nothing to do with the 
 belief; if we had only one experience of fire, we 
 should believe that it would burn." 
 
 Some friendly apologist of Huxley may term his 
 the incautious language of a bold experimental- 
 ist. But however this apology may be regarded by 
 the fearless Professor, it is inapplicable to the cau- 
 tious Lewes, and especially inapplicable to the copi- 
 ous but careful author of Mill's Logic. This precise 
 dialectician is never, even in the moments of most 
 earnest advocacy, betrayed into verbal rashness. 
 Yet in his treatise on that most precise of precise 
 sciences, Logic, we find statements (not isolated) of 
 which the following may be taken as a specimen : 
 " To certain facts, certain other facts always do and 
 as we believe always will succeed " (B. IIL Ch. V., 
 Sec. 2). And again Mr. Mill observes : *' We believe 
 that fire will burn to-morrow because it burned to- 
 day and yesterday, but we believe precisely on the 
 
74 FAITH A AW MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 same ground that it burned before we were born," 
 etc. Here is belief admitted — belief in a principle 
 which certainly has never been demonstrated by the 
 "positive" philosophy, and never can be — belief in 
 this principle as fundamental and essential to every 
 inductive process ; and also a belief in human testi- 
 mony for establishing the uniformity of a mere phe- 
 nomenon, so far as the memory of man reacheth, and 
 elevating the precedent into a fundamental, change- 
 less law, when he says : "■ The proposition that ' the 
 cause of nature is uniform * is the fundamental prin- 
 ciple, or general axiom of induction." We do not 
 stop now to question the validity of this axiom of 
 positive philosophy ; we merely call attention to the 
 ready faith of the positive philosophers. We do not 
 dispute the axiom itself of positive science. We 
 might admit it upon the authority of reason, or of 
 reasoning, inductive or deductive. But what right 
 has the " Positive Science " to this axiom as a fun^ 
 damental principle ? Has experience shown it ? 
 Such a complete axiom of positive science demands 
 a complete experience. The frank admission of 
 Prof. Huxley is more consistent with logical truth 
 and fairness than the careful assumption of Mr. Mill : 
 " We do not know, but believe /' and the fullness of 
 logical truth and fairness in this direction would be 
 reached by an admission from the whole positive 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 75 
 
 school that, according to their system, such behef is 
 bhnd and unauthorized. 
 
 Limited as these philosophers are by self-confine- 
 ment to the sphere of sense, what advantage do they 
 possess above the animal in respect to knowledge ? 
 If sense is all ; if sequences make up the sum of 
 knowledge ; if the phenomenal is the only real, why 
 may not the brute animal, with keener instinct and 
 stronger senses, surpass the human animal in the 
 possibility of knowing, and at length monopolize the 
 realm of positive knowledge ? The positive philoso- 
 pher, at least, can not know, that this may not yet 
 occur. Upon his own broadest claim he only knows 
 what is — not at all what may be, much less (if there 
 be a less than the least) does he kno-w what must be. 
 Doubtless he feels himself to be secure against the 
 brute monopoly of knov/ledge, and believes himself 
 to be master of the situation — believes. 
 
 But passing by this repeated fundamental 
 admission of the principle of belief, how, we ask, 
 does the human animal differ from the brute animal 
 in regard to knowledge ? First, we pause for a mo- 
 ment in the very field of the sense, common to both. 
 Both conjoin phenomena in time, both construct 
 phenomena in space. May we not, in such processes 
 of the sense, at length completely fill all space and 
 exhaust all duration, till there be no more time for 
 
^() FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 conjoining or space for constructing? Evidently 
 neither the brute nor the man, furnished only v/ith 
 sense according to this theory, is authorized to deny 
 that this may at length occur. Sense knows only 
 what is, phenomenally. It can not say that space and 
 time are infinite. This has never appeared to finite 
 sense — never can appear to it. Indeed, sense can 
 not say that there is any space beyond what appears 
 to it already occupied by space-constructions. Now 
 the brute cares not, believes not, beyond this (is not 
 authorized or capacitated to by his senses) ; thinks 
 not of space or time beyond what his experience has. 
 in some way, traversed. The man, alike in sense, 
 is different in thought, different in behef. He be- 
 lieves there will be time after the present ; that there 
 is space beyond what his eye, or any eye, has tra- 
 versed ; that though construction be added to con- 
 struction in space, yet there will be room and still 
 room for more ; and, unlike the brute, he pushes 
 out in successive projections into the all-surrounding 
 space, and long after locomotion flags and the eye is 
 weary, he puts ideal constructions into the beyond, 
 unoccupied and illimitable. Whence this difference ? 
 Whence this idea of time and space to the man, and 
 not to the brute ? Have we found the ultimate 
 ground on which human belief in space and time 
 reposes? — reposes rationally not blindly, securely not 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. yj 
 
 contingently — a ground underlying all the actual 
 operations of human sense, all the possible operations 
 of human sense ? Shall faith — we appeal to the 
 positive philosopher — shall faith be ruled out ? 
 
 Sense perceives the collocation and succession of 
 phenomena. This is its strength ; this, too, is its 
 weakness. Unaided by any higher faculty of the 
 soul, this would be all it could accomplish ; is all 
 legitimately and logically, according to the theory of 
 Brown and Hume — a theory so commonly pervading 
 and moulding the modern positive philosophy, yet 
 so often unacknowledged. But not only the general 
 faith, the philosophic faith, also, passes beyond this. 
 Logically, according to the sense-philosophy, this, 
 its own faith, is blind ; but really it is far-seeing in 
 the light of reason. Logically, according to the 
 sense-philosophy, it is false ; really, it is true, con- 
 firmed by the authority of reason, which, by imme- 
 diate beholding, affirms for the sense in all its 
 possible experience this primitive intuition : the 
 reality of space and time, illimitable each and both. 
 
 By the admissions of these philosophers, who are 
 so often arrayed against Christian faith, we vindicate 
 a place for faith. In tracing this philosophy, so often 
 arrayed against Christian faith, we find a belief 
 cherished, though by the system unsupported ; and 
 we find a support for it in the highest human reason. 
 
78 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Thus it is that reason in man helps out sense, for so 
 is the human soul constituted that not even sense 
 nor the sense-philosophy is left without the regula- 
 tion of the reason. Significant in regard to the sense, 
 as weU as true, was the statement of Aristotle : 
 
 *' ovx wf aKoyov not to aad^TjTixov&eLr] av riq padlcjg. * 
 
 But, perhaps few thinkers, philosophic or non- 
 philosophic, limit themselves, even theoretically, to 
 the range of the senses, regarding the phenomenal 
 as the only real and sequences as making up the 
 sum of knowledge. Most persons recognize another 
 realm of knowledge, the realm of the understanding, 
 another process besides that of merely collocating 
 phenomena, the process of connecting the phenom- 
 enal with the substantial, regarding sequences not 
 only as following antecedents but as related to ante- 
 cedents — qualities not as independent and alone, but 
 as depending upon something which possesses these 
 qualities and presents these appearances. They 
 speak of attributes and substances, and believe in a 
 real connection. They speak of causes and effects, 
 and believe in efficient causation. 
 
 Now we commend this as highly rational, and 
 therefore we are not a little surprised by the manner 
 in which some of this class treat the question which 
 underHes this discussion, satirizing faith as irrational, 
 
 * Arisfotle, De Anima, Lib. III., 9. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 79 
 
 and magisterially deciding that it be ruled out. We 
 remind this whole class of objectors (be they few or 
 many) that they have already adopted the principle 
 of faith into their system and applied it in their 
 practice ; that they have asserted their behef in the 
 Unseen, even in substance as underlying qualities 
 and attributes — in substance, which according to 
 their philosophy, is never seen or heard or felt — in 
 substance which never appears, but always eludes 
 the keenest sense or the most curious search. The 
 understanding, "judging according to the sense,'' as 
 it must, with no other guide (and these objectors 
 recognize, and by their philosophy, can claim no 
 other guide) makes a strange leap to a conclusion. By 
 what authority, w^e demand, does it connect quality 
 with substance? Though its appropriate function be 
 to make such connections if the correlates exist, 
 where has it found the correlates ? Not from itself. 
 It connects, only as the two — qualities and sub- 
 stance — are given. Not from the senses. They 
 report only phenomena. Yet, these philosophers, 
 who especially plume themselves upon rigid logic 
 and discard faith in the unseen, believe in substance 
 and allow the understanding to connect the attribute 
 wath the unseen underlying something, the phenom- 
 enal with the real. They speak freely of cause and 
 effect and believe in efficient causation. Even Mr. 
 
8o FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Mill says (Logic, B. III. c. xxi. sees. 4 and 5) : " The 
 law of causation must be received . . . as a law 
 . . . of that portion of the universe which is with- 
 in the range of our means of sure observation with a 
 reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases," 
 and (B. III. c. xiv. sec. 7) : " To endeavor in con- 
 formity with known laws to conjecture what colloca- 
 tions now gone by, may have given birth to individual 
 facts still in existence, is the strictly legitimate 
 operation of inferring from an observed effect in time 
 past of a cause similar to that by which we know it 
 to be produced in all cases in which we have had 
 actual experience of its origin." (The italicising is 
 ours.) Mr. Lewes, to be still more explicit, says : 
 *' If we had only one experience of fire, we should 
 believe it would burn. To say that we can not 
 know this cause, (that is, of any phenomena) can not 
 perceive the relation, is no more a ground for the 
 denial of the causal nexus than it is for a denial of an 
 external world." And certainly the causal nexus 
 connecting the antecedent and the consequent, com- 
 pletes the idea of efficient causation. 
 
 Mr. Darwin, on the Origin of Species, (summary 
 of chap. V.) says : " Our ignorance of the laws of 
 variation is profound ; " and in the conclusion of his 
 chapter on variation he affirms that, " whatever the 
 cause of each slight difference in the offspring from 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 8 1 
 
 their parents, a cause for each must exist!' etc. Prof. 
 Huxley, in reviewing Darwin's theory, declares that 
 ''the co-existence of a tendency to minor variation 
 with the tendency to general similarity, whatever be 
 its cause, is of vast importance in its bearing on the 
 (question of the Origin of Species," (Lay Sermons, 
 Address and Reviews, p. 264), and again (p. 265), in 
 reference to the Ancon Sheep and the Gratio Kelle- 
 ian family, he says : '* Doubtless there were determin- 
 ing causes for these as for all other phenomena ; (p. 
 266,) " Varieties obey the fundamental law of 
 reproduction that like tends to produce like," etc. ; 
 (p. 282,) "A phenomenon is explained when it is 
 shown to be a case of some general law of Nature ; " 
 and, to conclude these citations, (p. 283) : '' Harmoni- 
 ous order governing (governs) eternally continuous 
 progress." 
 
 Whence, we ask, have they derived the principle 
 of efficient causation in the material world ? (for we 
 have not yet spoken of a spiritual or non-material 
 world. Indeed most of those who condemn faith as 
 irrational, deny the spiritual and affirm only the ma- 
 terial.) Not from the senses. They report only 
 phenomena in space, sequences in time. Not from 
 the understanding. It judges only by sense. The 
 causative force does not appear. The most that 
 sense can say is, that one event follows another — 
 4* 
 
82 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 that appearances succeed each other. Yet, as in 
 regard to substance, so in regard to causaHty, these 
 satirists of faith beHeve in efficient causation. This 
 process, logically illicit, is their all-pervading practice 
 in thought and action. We commend to these 
 logicians their own standard rules in " The Art of 
 Reasoning ; " and suggest a critical self-examination 
 before they rule out faith. 
 
 By the admissions then of philosophic objectors 
 in the realm of sense and of the understanding, we 
 vindicate a place for faith ; and certainly in the 
 presence of public opinion, faith as a principle stands 
 uncondemncd. On the other hand, the principle is 
 approved by the common reliance upon human tes- 
 timony by which questions of history are settled, 
 questions of science accepted, cases of life and death 
 decided, individual reputations, dearer than life, 
 made and lost. 
 
 In this connection we should not fail to notice 
 the theory of Herbert Spencer, which, while it allots 
 to religion the sphere of the unknown and unknowa- 
 ble, and claims for science the province of known 
 appearances, admits more than enough to vindicate 
 a place for faith. Indeed he avows that " belief 
 is our sole warrant for every truth of immediate 
 consciousness." "^ Even " In the proposition ' I am,' 
 
 * First Principles, p. 28. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 83 
 
 no proof can be found for it except the invariable 
 existence of tlie belief in it."* We would ask is 
 not this belief first and forever founded upon the 
 consciousness of existence? And is not that very 
 consciousness the proof, unceasing and unquestion- 
 able proof, of the fact of our existence ? Each for 
 himself accepts the truth not by blind credulity, 
 not by stubborn determination whether reasonable 
 or unreasonable ; but because it is real, seen to be 
 such by the reason, and therefore accepted without 
 question. The reports of sense are accepted not 
 merely because thus reported, for the senses may 
 be disordered, and so the reports be viewed with 
 distrust until corrected and adjusted by a higher 
 authority — reason. But if reason itself be disordered 
 there is no appeal for the soul — all is confusion. 
 Even the senses, then, are trusted and convey to us a 
 knowledge, not because external phenomena are the 
 most reliable, not because knowledge of the external 
 world is the only or the real knowledge, not because 
 of " the invariable existence of belief" in the senses, 
 but because reason sees that this is rational and 
 secure. All things, indeed, end in mystery (as the 
 schoolmen say) no less for sight than for faith ; i. e., 
 something is final — seen to be rational by the reason 
 and therefore accepted, and not arbitrarily assumed 
 
 * First Principles, p. 27. 
 
84 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 by the weary or willful seeker for the sake of a finality 
 and rest. 
 
 We seek an ultimate datum or postulate, as 
 Herbert Spencer * well asserts. But where shall it 
 be found ? In mere belief, as he affirms — mere be- 
 lief however dark and uncertain ? Or, shall it be in 
 the light and security of the reason intuitively be- 
 holding the ultimate datum and pronouncing the 
 postulate rational? 
 
 It is easy to see how Herbert Spencer, holding 
 that knowledge is only relative and that nothing is 
 truly known, would be driven to mere belief as the 
 ultimate postulate and in the final resort strive to 
 confirm this postulate not by reason, but by a 
 broader and still broader generalization, until, if 
 possible, he could ascertain the belief as invariably 
 existing. Yet, it is evident that this task is really 
 impossible, for human observation must be incom- 
 petent to establish a generalization as universal — a 
 behef as invariably existing. And so, Mr. Spencer, 
 rejecting reason as intuitive and reliable — rejecting 
 reason and failing, as he must fail, to make a gen- 
 eralization universal, loses his " warrant," his '' sole 
 warrant" for every truth of immediate consciousness, 
 as well as for every primary generalization of the 
 
 * First Principles, p. 14. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 85 
 
 truths of immediate consciousness, and is logically 
 adrift without an ultimate datum or postulate. 
 
 Thus the positive system, which in its credulity 
 founds upon mere belief, and not upon reason, and 
 while it objects to faith more than vindicates a place 
 for faith, by its own definition annihilates the very 
 postulate upon which it founds, and sinks into inev- 
 itable skepticism ! 
 
 Even belief, then, must be founded upon some- 
 thing which is ultimate, something which reason 
 intuitively sees and pronounces to be ultimate ; a 
 postulate, not because believed, but believed, be- 
 cause reliably pronounced a postulate. This postu- 
 late is either furnished by the human reason in its 
 own light, or seen in the light of a divine revelation 
 which the human reason recognizes as superior but 
 not contradictory to itself; so in regard to mathe- 
 matics ; so in regard to aesthetics ; so everywhere. 
 
 The revolution of the earth is true, not because 
 of the invariable existence of such a belief, for it has 
 never been invariably believed, but because it has 
 been seen by the human reason to be true. Not 
 because it has been invariably believed, is it true 
 that the blood circulates, but because, since the time 
 of Harvey, it has been seen to be true. So in refer- 
 ence to Christ as a Redeemer, and Christianity as a 
 faith. 
 
86 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Does not Mr. Spencer make belief — mere belief — 
 the basis of the Positive Philosophy? Can the party 
 of positivists logically repudiate the platform ? 
 
 This *' positive " conclusion shows how readily 
 objectors adopt, as a philosophical necessity, the 
 principle which they impugn when held in the inter- 
 ests of religion ; with what facility religious skepticism 
 can pass to the extreme of credulity in the domain 
 of philosophy. Such men, we suggest, should be 
 slow to stigmatize Christian faith as folly, and 
 Christians as credulous. 
 
 In closing our indirect argument, we commend to 
 the author of "■ The Biographical History of Philoso- 
 phy," and to all who maintain that " all our ideas 
 are derived from experience," the remark of Euler 
 after having demonstrated certain properties of 
 arches : " All experience is in contradiction to this ; 
 but this is no reason for doubting its truth." 
 
 The positive school, who reject faith in reason 
 and revelation, while they adopt it stubbornly and 
 blindly in regard to sense and understanding, judg- 
 ing according to sense, clamor for laiv. What is 
 this vaunted shibboleth of a system wdiich assumes 
 that " all our ideas are derived from sensation ? " 
 Not a principle binding together by inherent force 
 and authority, but a mere generalization from suc- 
 cessions, not even a connection or relation. To-day, 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 8/ 
 
 it may be ; to-morrow, it may change, by a new 
 observation. The law is, by the very system, made 
 dependent on the generahzation, not the generahza- 
 tion dependent upon the law ; the principle depend- 
 ent upon the process, not the process dependent 
 (as it should be) upon the principle. Such a law, we 
 submit, is null and void — its binding force is equal 
 to that of a rope of sand. 
 
 We ourselves believe in law no less heartily than 
 do the most positive of the positivists. We not 
 only believe, without misgiving, in the lower law 
 which pervades all nature, and which the scientist 
 is noisily and haughtily pursuing, while the philos- 
 opher is silently and reverently tracing ; but also a 
 higher law, (and a law-giver) which comprehends 
 and controls all things. Indeed, in the very exist- 
 ence of law, even in the lower law, for which the 
 revilers of faith clamor, we may, as we proceed, find 
 a vindication for faith ; and in the lower and the 
 higher circuits of law, may there not be found to 
 reside a resistless authority for faith ? Faith is a 
 phenomenon by no means rare. Does it not exist 
 by law as really as does any phenomenon in material 
 nature ? It would be well for the objector to pon- 
 der this question before hastening to decide that 
 faith be ruled out. Employed in its true sense, we 
 like this term law, just now so pretentiously monop- 
 
88 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 olized by those who " positively " emasculate the 
 vital force of the term. It involves much of the 
 case at issue. Involving more than the materialist, 
 more than the fact-philosopher admits or logically 
 can allow, it proves too much for him, — that faith as 
 a fact will not, can not be ruled out. It may even 
 appear that whoever undertakes this, makes more 
 than a futile, makes a suicidal attempt. 
 
 Law, if it exist at all, exists not as a general- 
 ization, but independently of the generalization and 
 before it, as an informing, controlling, connecting 
 principle — detected perhaps by the generalizing pro- 
 cess, but not as the generalization which the observer 
 makes, but as the basis of it, without which even the 
 generalizing process would not be scientific but ar- 
 bitrary. It is only thus that each particular science 
 can legitimately seek (as it does seek) *' a principle 
 of unity," which will '* account for the phenomena 
 in its own realm," which is not a mere verbal fiction, 
 as it must be in the *' positive philosophy," but a 
 real force and law, as it is in nature. So, universal 
 science, or philosophy in its highest range, may legit- 
 imately seek for a higher law, a principle of absolute 
 unity. Whether by human searching it be found or 
 not, what man of science practically doubts its exist- 
 ence ? What true philosopher, what real Christian, 
 doubts its existence ? (And law implies a law-giver. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 89 
 
 and has " its seat in the bosom of God." But this 
 point must be postponed to its proper place.) We 
 can well sum up our thought upon law by the 
 incidental reference of Dr. Tayler Lewis upon a very 
 different theme : "■ The forces and laws of nature are 
 not properties of matter ; that would be sheer mate- 
 rialism. They are not the offspring of matter, born 
 of it, but the seminal powers themselves mysteriously 
 working in matter, controlling matter, making the 
 earth and the waters bring forth the living forms. 
 They were sown when ' the Spirit brooded upon the 
 waters,' in that first mysterious night of Creation." 
 
 The existence of natural laws underlies science 
 and gives it possibility. Observation, which leads 
 to science, proceeds upon this very principle, the 
 existence of natural law. As we believe in the one 
 as a grand reality, so we believe in the other as a 
 grand possibility. We have no quarrel with science. 
 On the contrary, we welcome its advance. We hail 
 it as it has ever proved itself to be, when matured 
 by reflection, the friend of faith, the ally of religion. 
 Science as dependent upon human observation has 
 its appropriate range, and within that range may be 
 a desirable guide. It can give us classified knowl- 
 edge. It can elaborate a system of general princi- 
 ples, but not a system of universal and necessary 
 principles. As observation proceeds, science must 
 
90 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 readjust itself. Complete scientific knowledge is 
 possible only with complete experience ; and where 
 shall such experience be attained ? Scientific con- 
 clusions, lodged as they are in human opinion, must 
 be held subject to possible modifications, by possibly 
 new observations, the hypothetical *' may " forever 
 hesitating to rise into the positive "must." How 
 can science positively deny a God when by its very 
 nature it proposes to traverse only the finite ? How 
 can it positively deny spiritual realities on which 
 religious faith fastens, when it contemplates only 
 the phenomenal? How can it positively deny a 
 first cause, when it is wholly uncertain whether it 
 has traced the complete length of nature's line ? 
 How, if it positively deny a First Cause in the line 
 of nature, can it deny an originator of nature and of 
 natural causes, even a Creator? How can it posi- 
 tively deny a final cause or final causes, when its 
 observation has not yet reached the end, as it has 
 not yet reached the beginning of nature ? How can 
 it be positive even within its own narrow range, 
 when its observations are as yet only partial, its 
 classifications contradictory, and its theories hypo- 
 thetical and conflicting ? How, in fine, can its arro- 
 gance reach so far as to demand that faith be ruled 
 out, when its own ultimate basis is belief? 
 
 Within this field of the philosophic and finite we 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 9 1 
 
 have traced the admissions of objectors, vindicating 
 a place for faith, until by logical necessity they end 
 in making faith — belief — the " ultimate datum or 
 postulate," the "sole warrant for every truth of con- 
 sciousness, and generalization, and demonstration," * 
 a warrant not even claiming the authority of reason ! 
 a belief that is blind ! Such admissions should, to 
 say the least, silence objection against faith. 
 
 This indirect argument, arguinentiivL ad Jiominem, 
 which we have employed only as a defense, can 
 easily be seen to furnish a direct support, since it 
 shows that the ability for faith and the tendency to 
 faith are native to the human soul. 
 
 But we do not depend upon the admissions of 
 objectors. We turn from the indirect to the direct 
 argument to establish within the field of the philo- 
 sophic and finite, a place for faith upon positive and 
 reliable grounds. This argument we base {a) upon 
 facts of Intelligence ; {U) upon facts of Conscience ; 
 (<;) upon facts of Volition. 
 
 {a) The philosophy which would confine itself to 
 fact and discard faith has not exhausted all possible 
 facts when it has traversed the entire material world 
 and penetrated all the mysteries of physical nature. 
 If nature be known, it is known as what ? Accord- 
 ing to the first objector, only as material phenomena 
 
 * Herbert Spencer's " First Principles," p. 28. 
 
92 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 collocated in space, conjoined in time ; according to 
 the second objector, only as material being and phe- 
 nomena related, or as effect and cause connected. 
 But now suppose, " Man is descended," according 
 to Darwin, *' from a hairy quadruped, furnished with 
 a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in its 
 habits, and an inhabitant of the Old World," yet we 
 have men to deal with, human nature to observe 
 and study scientifically. This study, to say the least, 
 is as important and exalted as the study of material 
 or brute nature. 
 
 In the utmost range of physical sense, thought is 
 not included, although it is the most common of all 
 facts, ever present and ever-changing. Affections, 
 passions, are not included, although they are 
 cherished by all, and are unquestioned facts. Moral 
 acts, choosing, willing, are not included, for, although 
 exercised by every person, and constantly exercised, 
 they elude the observation of the five senses. 
 
 Here, then, is a world of facts so different from 
 those of the material world, that the very senses 
 which give us a knowledge of the latter, utterly fail 
 to give us the least notice of the former. What 
 world is this ? — certainly not the material. The 
 order of facts by which it is known is metaphysical. 
 How shall these facts be perceived ? How shall we 
 hold communion with this world of thought and 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 93 
 
 feeling and volition ? It matters not what this 
 world be called. Call it inind, or spirit, or soul ; it 
 is at least not material, not physical. This world is 
 not without, but within us. Any person to know it, 
 must know himself; that is, be self-conscious. Any 
 person to study it, must attend to his self-conscious- 
 ness. We, then, have found this second world, so 
 entirely different and distinct from the material 
 world ; and found the means of observing its facts. 
 This second class of facts is especially worthy of our 
 observation as related to our very being, and most 
 accessible as lying within the soul's self-comprehen- 
 sion. The boastful philosophy of fact is positively 
 and logically bound to self-attention and self-study. 
 
 It may be claimed by some persistent objector 
 that even this new world we occupy in common 
 with the brute, for the brute thinks and feels and 
 wills. We do not stay to discuss this incidental 
 question whether in mind the man is superior to the 
 brute. If the philosophic objector insists that men- 
 tally the brute is his equal, we shall not insist to the 
 contrary ; and, if he prove his assertion even to a 
 demonstration, we only reply that in all fairness it 
 entitles the brute to the same intellectual credit and 
 advantage with the philosopher. 
 
 In this world of thought what are some of the 
 distinctive facts which we are to observe ? First, 
 
94 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 not only that there is thought, but the consciousness 
 of something thinking — the self-assertion of a mind 
 or soul, and not only a soul and thought, but thought 
 about an external event as different from the think- 
 ing, or about an external object as different from the 
 thinker; and further still, about an external object 
 as the real substance, non-appearing, but underlying 
 certain qualities which do appear, and about an 
 event as produced by some cause. While, then, 
 there is the fact of self-recognition — the fact of con- 
 scious self-activity — the fact of sharp and decisive 
 discrimination between self and not-self — between the 
 internal and the external phenomena, there is also the 
 assertion, as a fact, that the soul is the cause of the in- 
 ternal phenomena and not of the external, and thus 
 there is a distinction not only between the two kinds 
 of phenomena, but also between the two kinds of 
 causality, as distinct as the two kinds of phenomena. 
 And further, there is the assertion not only that the 
 event has a cause and the quality a substance, but that 
 every quality, every attribute, is thus related, and that 
 every event has a cause. This the soul unhesitatingly 
 believes. How, we demand, are we to account for 
 this not general but universal, not adventitious but 
 necessary conclusion ? However we have felt im- 
 pelled to ask a similar question before, in view of the 
 principles of space and time as conditional to all the 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 95 
 
 processes of sense, and of the principles of substance 
 and causality as conditional for all processes of the 
 understanding, we can not longer postpone the ques- 
 tion. Whence do we derive not only these con- 
 ditionals for the sense and the understanding, but 
 these ideas of the universal and the necessary ? No 
 perceptions of sense can discover these. No gener- 
 alizations of the understanding can reach, much less 
 furnish them. To deny their possibility is fallacious, 
 for already we have them. They are in the mind. 
 They are in the world. Whence are they ? They 
 are fundamental affirmations of the mind itself It 
 is itself the place of these principles. Call it, if you 
 please, the high intuitions of the soul. Call it 
 reason, as higher than the senses or than the discur- 
 sive logical understanding. These principles exist, 
 are employed, and are thus furnished. If these be 
 furnished by the reason, then it would be, to say the 
 least, irrational to ignore or disbelieve them. If 
 furnished by the soul in the exercise of its higher 
 power of whatever nature, it is equally irrational to 
 disbelieve or ignore them. They are intellectual prin- 
 ciples or starting points for all our positive knowledge, 
 empirical or philosophic, intuitive or adventitious. 
 
 In thus tracing the line of mental facts we have 
 reached a point which separates between man and 
 brute. In the former we find this place of principles. 
 
96 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 which is wanting in the latter. Whatever of sense 
 or understanding the brute may possess, he does not 
 possess human reason, the place of principles — first 
 principles — belonging to the very furniture of the 
 human soul, necessary and universal, like the notion 
 of all-pervading space and of all-enduring time, of 
 substance related to attribute and attribute to sub- 
 stance, universally by and necessarily related ; of effect 
 related to cause, and cause to effect, universally and 
 necessarily related. 
 
 Here, then, in the possession of reason, and not 
 merely of reasoning as judgment according to the 
 sense, is the human mind immeasurably exalted 
 above the brute. Sublime as are the terms in which 
 the great English dramatist characterizes the human 
 reason, they are more than deserved. 
 
 Here, also, are principles universal and necessary, 
 furnished by reason, which the individual and the 
 general faith accepts. Here are facts of intelligence 
 which, within this department of the philosophic 
 and finite, furnish positive and reliable grounds for 
 faith. We might specify other facts of intelligence : 
 aesthetic principles, which are the source and the 
 security of fine art ; mathematical and philosphical 
 principles, which guide and govern science in its 
 varied directions ; but we turn to consider another 
 class of facts, — 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 97 
 
 {b) Facts of Conscience. We have a sense of 
 right and wrong, of obHgation, of responsibiHty. 
 We feel complacency or displacency as we recognize 
 this standard in our actions, yield to this obligation 
 and meet this responsibility, and we apply substan- 
 tially the same principles to our own expectations 
 and estimates of others. The terms merit and de- 
 merit are applied everywhere, and everywhere to 
 human agents, and not only are innocence and guilt 
 ascribed, but reward and retribution are universally 
 expected. Not only do we feel assured that these 
 are applicable to man, but as surely that they are 
 not applicable to animals. By the necessity of the 
 case, the boldest objector admits the theory of morals 
 in respect to man, and by the same necessity he 
 does not, can not, predicate morality of a thing or 
 an animal. As well speak of '* a pound of virtue or 
 a peck of truth." We cross a permanent line of sep- 
 aration before morality begins. Without reason and 
 conscience there can be no free-will. Without 
 reason, and conscience, and free-will there, can be no 
 responsible action. The beast has cognition, and 
 feeling, and choice, or selection ; but it has not rea- 
 son and conscience, and in consequence, no free-will, 
 and therefore no morality. Hence it is evermore 
 thing, and not person. This the objector must admit, 
 but the admission is vital in its relation to faith in 
 
9o FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 man and to the faith of man. The animal may ex- 
 ercise prudence at the dictate of the understanding, 
 and as a result of experience. But morality appears 
 only in the presence of reason and conscience. 
 "■ Conscience," as has been well said by Pres. Mc- 
 Cosh, *' Conscience discerns moral quality only in 
 voluntary acts, and pronounces its decisions upon such 
 acts alone." " The soul itself asserts for man the 
 duty to resist and subjugate all the clamorous appe- 
 tites of sense and hold them in perpetual servitude 
 to its own ethical end." (Pres. Hickok.) Experience 
 everywhere confirms the soul's prejudgment, that if 
 ** we bow our personality to the ends of animal grati- 
 fication, and in our depravity make the ethical to 
 serve the sensual, degradation and debasement shall 
 inevitably follow and remorse torment us as a gnaw- 
 ing worm." (Hickok.) The human soul in the 
 possession of reason and conscience, and a will at 
 liberty to obey or disobey, stands forth a moral be- 
 ing, a person and not a thing. Across this line of 
 separation the brute never passes. Within this 
 higher moral realm, dull matter is never for a moment 
 thought to enter. Everywhere in this realm of fact 
 conscience appears, and here alone — conscience ac- 
 cusing or else excusing ; witnessing evermore to the 
 principles of right, obligation and duty. These 
 ethical facts pervading the human soul and peculiar 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 99 
 
 to it, SO far as our observation has yet reached — 
 these facts demand the consideration of even the 
 most positive philosopher, with a claim at least as 
 exalted as the facts of dull matter. 
 
 Whence the principles which underlie these moral 
 facts? Not from material nature, though watched 
 by every sense. Not from generalizations, however 
 broad or skillful. The law is not from without, but 
 from within — " the law written in the heart." It is 
 the soul itself with the highest reason asserting this 
 claim in its own right ; and the witness of conscience 
 is, evermore, that although the spirit of a man may 
 sustain his infirmity, a wounded spirit none can bear. 
 Here, in the light of reason, and with the witness of 
 conscience this law appears, binding together the 
 moral facts to which we have referred, and itself a 
 fact pervading every human consciousness — a law 
 higher in its authority and in the estimate of the 
 human soul than any other law within the realm of 
 sense or the sphere of the understanding, and there- 
 fore every possible end within those limits must be 
 subordinate to this ethical end. In the soul's just 
 estimate, moral character is of highest worth. To 
 deny this, would be to deny one's own reason ; to 
 disbelieve, would be to impugn the testimony of 
 one's conscience. In the presence of this inalienable 
 right, the human soul becomes conscious of its in- 
 
lOO FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 herent personality ; and responsible choice becomes 
 possible. The will may go forth by the authority of 
 reason and the witness of conscience to choose the 
 good, to act worthy of itself, when reason and un- 
 derstanding and sense are in accord, and if they are 
 in conflict, still to act worthy of itself by choosing 
 the good and refusing the evil. The common faith 
 asserts itself in the supreme authority of the right, 
 and in the superior worth of virtue or obedience to 
 this authority. In this statement the principle or 
 basis of the right is not specified, nor is it affirmed 
 that the determination of this principle is always the 
 same ; but this being determined, as it always is for 
 the soul in some way, the statement remains true 
 that the common faith has always regarded the right 
 as of supreme authority, and virtue or obedience to 
 this authority as of superior worth. 
 
 And here we may say in reply to any philosophic 
 skepticism, that if, in the processes of perception, 
 we may proceed on the belief or assumption of 
 space and time for conjoining all phenomena, if in 
 the processes of the understanding we may proceed 
 on the assumption or belief in substance as the 
 ground of connecting phenomena, why in the higher 
 process of morals is it irrational or unscientific to 
 proceed on the belief or assumption of the principle 
 of right with its accompanying consequences of 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. lOI 
 
 obligation and responsibility? We do not say, how- 
 ever, in either case — whatever the skeptical objector 
 may assert — that we proceed upon assumption, but 
 rather upon the most valid ground, the principles of 
 human reason. Indeed, we have carefully observed 
 the legitimate rule of induction : that, " in the uni- 
 verse objectively considered there is an intelligent 
 and wise adaptation of powers and laws to natural 
 ends, and that the same is true of the relation of 
 the universe to the knowing mind." (Pres. Porter.) 
 
 At this point of our advance, with the unques- 
 tionable facts which we have attained, we pause to 
 ascertain the mutual attitude of faith and reason- 
 intellectual or historical faith, for we have not 'yet 
 reached the field of Christian faith. Is it an attitude 
 of repugnance ? On the contrary we confidently 
 declare a harmony between faith and reason. 
 
 Has it not been the common faith of the learned 
 and the illiterate, that there is in nature substance 
 as well as quality ? That the phenomenal is related 
 to the real, and must be so related ? That causes 
 produce effects, and that every effect must have a 
 cause ? That there is space beyond the reach of 
 the longest human vision, even immensity? That 
 there is a past beyond all finite experience, and a 
 future no less extended, even infinite duration? 
 That there are phenomena unlike material phenom- 
 
102 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 ena? That there is an internal world different from 
 and distinct from the external world ? That this 
 world of thought and feeling and volition is as real 
 as the world of extension and figure and weight? 
 That the human soul, the knower, is as real as mat- 
 ter, the thing known ? That the will can choose 
 between good and evil, since there is a rule of right 
 to which the human conscience doth witness ? That 
 not the thing is responsible, not the animal, but the 
 person thus morally endowed ? 
 
 Instead of discord, thus far, between faith and rea- 
 son, we find that faith has relied upon the authority 
 of reason for these fundamental beliefs, and thus faith 
 has been throughout consistently rational — saved, 
 on the one hand, from credulity, or believing with- 
 out facts, and on the other hand, from superstition, 
 or magnifying facts without reason. Thus in this 
 highest sphere which we have yet reached — although 
 there remains a higher still for us to consider — faith 
 is shown to be not only consistent with reason, but 
 as it has been beautifully defined to be : ** The fealty 
 of the finite will and understanding to the reason." 
 (Webster's definition quoted from Coleridge.) 
 
 {c) Facts of Volition. Here we reach another 
 question of Faith, closely allied to what shall follow 
 — in a certain sense fundamental to it — the question 
 of human depravity. The human will at variance 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. IO3 
 
 with reason and conscience constitutes depravity. 
 In regard to this it is undeniable that a behef in 
 human depravity has been the common faith of 
 mankind. Whether this is authorized, is rational, 
 may be positively determined. The facts are quite 
 within the reach of our present advance, although 
 we are yet wholly within the sphere of the human 
 and the moral. This doctrine has not been origi- 
 nated by any religion, certainly not by the Christian 
 religion. Yet it is common to all religions. By the 
 terms of the statement, (depravity is the will at 
 variance with reason and conscience) as well as in 
 the nature of the case, it is evident that depravity is 
 a fact originating from within the human soul, and 
 not an effect wrought by an external force like ne- 
 cessitated causation in the material world. Neither 
 can it ever become a necessitated cause producing 
 unavoidable effects like those in the material world. 
 It is not imposed upon the soul, to be inevitably 
 suffered as misfortune, for it is the will itself in its 
 own act at variance with reason and conscience. 
 " Sin is a quality of voluntary acts. It always re- 
 sides in some mental affection or act in which there 
 is the exercise of free-will. The guilt of the sin thus 
 always lies with him who commits it." * And again 
 on the other hand, '' Moral good lies in the region 
 * Dr. McCosh's Intuitions of the Mind. 
 
104 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 of the will. By this I mean that every truly virtuous 
 act must be a voluntary one." ^ *' Sin is a malady 
 which has infected mankind, differing from any other 
 disease only in this, that it emanates from the will 
 and involves guilt." f 
 
 Depravity is not introduced into the soul surrep- 
 titiously, exonerating the soul from responsibility, 
 and transferring the guilt to another. It is the will 
 itself in its own act, at variance with reason and con- 
 science. If depravity exists, it is subject to the 
 inspection of self-consciousness. The question is one 
 of fact. The consciousness of the race can testify 
 directly and conclusively. Each person feels it for 
 himself; and almost every one confesses it of him- 
 self, or asserts it of his neighbor. If any deny this, 
 they are at most only a persistent i^\\% hardly enough 
 to furnish the desirable exception requisite to prove 
 a rule. The best men daily and penitently make 
 humiliating confession ; and bad men more than 
 admit the fact by their denial. The purest 
 man sadly finds how difficult the task to master 
 appetite and desire and passion and self-love ; to 
 control the senses ; to govern the thoughts ; to regu 
 late all the words ; to guide the whole conduct in 
 every relation ; to bring all into strict and willing 
 conformity with the rule of his own reason and con- 
 
 * Dr. McCosh's Intuitions of the Mind. 
 f Dr. Fisher's Boston Lecture. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM, 10$ 
 
 science. This is the testimony of self-consciousness 
 in the case of the individual. '' But when he hath 
 parents and children, friends and enemies, buyers 
 and sellers, lawyers and clients, a family and a neigh- 
 borhood — then it is that every man dashes against 
 another, and one relation requires what another 
 denies ; and when one speaks another will contra- 
 dict him ; and that which is well spoken is sometimes 
 innocently mistaken ; and that upon a good cause 
 produces an evil effect ; and by these and ten thou- 
 sand other concurrent causes man is made more than 
 most miserable." These statements of Jeremy 
 Taylor commend themselves to human experience 
 and observation. His illustration of this moral truth 
 is so apt, that we shall be pardoned for transcribing 
 it : '' This being the case of all the world, what is 
 every man's evil becomes all men's greater evil ; and 
 though alone it is very bad, yet when they come to- 
 gether it is made much worse. Like ships in a 
 storm, every one alone hath enough to do to outride 
 it ; but when they meet, besides the evils of the 
 storm, they find the intolerable calamity of their 
 mutual concussions ; and every ship that is ready to 
 be oppressed with the tempest, is a worse tempest to 
 every vessel against which it is violently dashed. 
 So it is in mankind." So this testimony of the indi- 
 vidual self-consciousness becomes but a sample and 
 
I06 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 a part of the accumulated testimony of the general 
 consciousness of mankind. This appears in universal 
 language and literature, in law and religion, in the 
 demand for government and the difficulty of govern- 
 ing well, in the rule and the misrule which make up 
 the political history of the world. These words, 
 this literature, these laws, these religions, etc., exist 
 in the world as facts which none are at liberty to 
 ignore, and, least of all, the positivist or fact-phi- 
 losopher. These facts are the outgrowth and the 
 witness of the human consciousness ; and prove, as 
 no fact can be more strongly proved, human deprav- 
 ity, the will at variance with reason and conscience, 
 choosing not everywhere and always the highest 
 good — not always and everywhere unswervingly pur- 
 suing the right. 
 
 Depravity is a fact, '' which all deep-thinking 
 men, heathen or Christian, have united in deploring, 
 a fact which Seneca declares almost in the language 
 of Paul," — a fact recognized and emphasized not only 
 in the Bible, but in the Promethean fable of Asia 
 Minor, in the Brahminical writings of India, in the 
 significant symbol of Cupid and Psyche ; pervading 
 indeed all the myths of the Greeks and the Romans, 
 and constituting the chief element in the mythology 
 of the East and of the West. 
 
 The most positive of the fact-philosophers can 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 10/ 
 
 not impugn or condemn our method of determining 
 this question, severely inductive as it is; asking as 
 we have done, not what may be, but what is — not 
 even what is the law, but what are the facts ; receiv- 
 ing testimony not alone from the senses, which might 
 be deceived, but taking the testimony of the individ- 
 ual consciousness and the conclusive testimony of 
 the common consciousness of the race. Pantheistic 
 and materialistic atheists, ancient and modern, have 
 suppressed this confession only by denying the dis- 
 tinction between right and wrong — a distinction 
 which we have already found pronounced by reason, 
 and witnessed by conscience, and accepted by the 
 common faith of mankind as inherent and essential. 
 By such denial they have disqualified themselves in 
 the presence of reason and conscience as witnesses 
 upon the question just now at issue, — the question 
 of depravity. 
 
 The belief of mankind, then, in human depravity 
 is confirmed by fact: and, by the decision of reason 
 should not be ruled out — can not be. Sin is in the 
 world, and guilt, with their attendant evils. To 
 what extent sin has impaired any of our faculties, 
 even the noblest, and thus necessitated divine help 
 in our weakness, and divine light in our darkness, we 
 need not here attempt to determine. Sin is in the 
 world. The great question confronting us here is, 
 
I08 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT, 
 
 How shall sin be treated? With punishment, or 
 atonement ? Shall there be redemption, or judg- 
 ment ? If atonement be allowed, how and on what 
 conditions shall it be made, and how shall it become 
 available for sinners ? This question, which concerns 
 us most, this greatest question which can possibly 
 meet a world of sinners, human reason can not answer. 
 This must rest not with the sinner, but with the 
 moral governor. This necessity impels our inquiry 
 to another and higher field, — the infinite, the religious. 
 Thitherward faith, rising above the philosophic and 
 the finite, looks intently, anxious for light and help. 
 The revelation may, must transcend human reason, 
 not to contradict, but to save. As Lessing, who will 
 not be suspected of partial witness here, has said : 
 " 'Tis a proof of the truth of Revelation, if reason 
 finds in it truths which exceed reason. Whoever 
 despoils his religion of such truths has as good 
 as none ; for what is a revelation which reveals 
 nothing? " 
 
 By indirect argument, then, and by direct argu- 
 ment, within the field of the finite and philosophic, 
 we not only vindicate a place for faith, but establish 
 it upon positive and reliable grounds ; and thus 
 exclude skepticism as irrational and philosophically 
 impossible. 
 
 As incidental to the main discussion, it is obvious 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. IO9 
 
 to remark that the view presented utterly precludes 
 mere Materialism on the one hand, and mere Ideal- 
 ism on the other. If this view be correct, there is 
 both a material universe of ever-changing phenomena, 
 produced by ever-acting causes, related to ever- 
 during substances ; and a (mental) spiritual universe, 
 no less real, no less active, no less multifarious in 
 phenomena. 
 
 It is also obvious to remark that, according to 
 this view, the final centre, around which the universe 
 of matter and the universe of mind revolve, can not 
 be pantheistic ; for mind everywhere and always 
 recognizes its individual personality, freedom, and 
 responsibility — its own self-hood, separating it not 
 only from all surrounding material objects, but also 
 from all other minds. This very assertion of self- 
 hood denies, with all the emphasis of endless and 
 countless iteration, the possibility of pantheism. 
 The centre, self-supporting, all-supporting centre, is 
 beyond the finite and philosophic. There is not 
 a pantheistic whole, and the centre can not be 
 pantheistic. 
 
no FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT, 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Faith and Positivism. 
 The Field of the Religioiis and Infinite. 
 
 T^ROM the field of the philosophic and finite,* 
 -*- it is easy to pass to that of the religious and in- 
 finite. Indeed, true philosophy not only points out 
 the direction, it conducts us far along the way. In 
 this connection positivists will readily recall the say- 
 ing of Bacon, distinguishing between shallowness and 
 depth in philosophy ; and rationalists will not forget 
 the declaration of Coleridge, that ** philosophy leads 
 us ultimately to religion." It is unnecessary to 
 recount the long list of eminent names to show that 
 the great leaders in philosophic thought have been 
 profoundly religious. Not only has philosophic 
 prose been religious, but philosophic poetry has 
 taught us to '' look through nature up to nature's 
 God." 
 
 While common poesy has fondly and freely 
 roamed the field of devotion, poetic genius, like that 
 
 * See Chap. ii. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. Ill 
 
 of Milton and Dante and David, has attained its 
 loftiest flight in sacred song. While philosophy 
 points us beyond the present and the visible, it is 
 especially true that religion points to the invisible 
 and the eternal. Even Comte, at the bottom of 
 the scale, striving to be persistent in positiveness, 
 sought to deify the phenomenal, but was carried 
 beyond himself to acknowledge a Religion of Hu- 
 manity and adore the Grand ^tre, while woman was 
 chosen only as the symbol of the real divinity he 
 would revere. Herbert Spencer bids us worship, 
 not the sensible and the finite, but the mysterious 
 and the infinite. Religion has been no more preva- 
 lent than irrepressible in its impulse to trust and 
 worship something other and higher than itself, and 
 to look to something superior to the present — the 
 climax, both in power and permanence, of what 
 faith, in its varied surroundings and its various 
 stages of development, could reach. This appears 
 in every form of religion. With the cultured and 
 the uncultured, having the same object in view — 
 resting satisfied only with an object for its worship 
 and dependence higher than the finite and the de- 
 pendent — one that could defend, protect and bless 
 the worshiper. 
 
 Not only, then, is it a fact that religious faith 
 does point and impel us toward the infinite, the 
 
112 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 supreme, but it requires only a moment's reflection 
 to see that in the nature of the case it must do thus. 
 Nothing less than the Supreme can defend, protect 
 and bless the trusting soul. Anything less must, 
 by the very terms of the supposition, be untrust- 
 worthy. We are led by both lines of thought, — 
 the physical and the metaphysical, the scientific and 
 the religious — to the urgent question of the day, the 
 paramount question for all time: Is there such an 
 object ? Is faith in God valid ? 
 
 In reply we pursue, in this field, as in the field 
 of the philosophic and finite, two lines of argument : 
 the indirect and the direct — by the first, to vindicate 
 a place for faith, by the admission of objectors — by 
 the second, to establish a place for faith upon posi- 
 tive and reliable grounds. 
 
 We indicate, by a few examples, the line of 
 indirect argument, which is capable of indefinite 
 extension. 
 
 At the outset we meet this universal admission 
 of objectors, — the acknowledged inability to prove 
 that there is no God. By this one fatal admission, 
 all atheistic arguments remain self-condemned as 
 inadequate and inconclusive. 
 
 Again, all skeptical theories admit that some- 
 thing is. (We do not even reckon as a theory the 
 suicidal assertion that nothing is, for then the doubter 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. II3 
 
 is not, and can not even doubt.) All these theories 
 admit that something is ; and by the labored at- 
 tempts to account for its existence, they imply the 
 obligation to answer the great questions which press 
 upon us evermore: Whence? and How? and Why? 
 Now, within the limit of this admission, what are 
 we to account for? 
 
 Even Mr. Spencer, positivist as he is, accepts 
 the testimony of consciousness, and admits that we 
 know ourselves at least as well as we know the 
 material world which lies around us. " The person- 
 ality of which each is conscious, and of which the 
 existence is to each a fact beyond all others the 
 most certain," etc., etc.^ The admission is by no 
 means gracious, for "Positive Science," so far forth 
 as it is a science, has its real basis not in external 
 nature, but in the mental constitution of man. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer admits still further,! that " it is 
 rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge 
 is a knowledge of appearances only, without at the 
 same time conceiving a reality of which they are the 
 appearances ; for appearance without reality is un- 
 thinkable." And Mr. J. S. Mill (Introduction to 
 Logic,) admits : " Whatever is known to us by con- 
 sciousness is known beyond the possibiHty of 
 question." 
 
 * First Principles, p. 66. f Ibid. p. 88. 
 
114 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT, 
 
 Now, we are conscious of thought, and of our- 
 selves as thinking. It is obvious to remark that, on 
 the one hand, material nature can be known only as 
 there is a mind to know it, in a word, only as there 
 is a knower; and, on the other hand, that while we 
 can know it, yet material nature can not know 
 us. There is this ineradicable distinction between 
 mind and matter. 
 
 But, farther, will any positivist admit that there 
 are any other beings like himself, other minds 
 capable of knowing and being known ? The admis- 
 sion outruns the inquiry, and becomes a positive 
 assertion as strong as the knowledge of his own 
 existence. But that other minds exist, he can not 
 know by self-consciousness, as he knows himself, nor 
 by perception, as he knows matter ; yet, he may 
 know by many infallible proofs — proofs of intelli- 
 gence, of emotion, of volition, proofs of reason and 
 of conscience; and the knowledge is, henceforth, 
 valid and rational. Since by this general admission, 
 whatever is, needs accounting for — by this special 
 admission the knower and the known, mind and 
 matter, both must be accounted for, and, according 
 to the farther admission that we may know, as ex- 
 isting, other minds than our own — know not by self- 
 consciousness nor by perception ; but by a process 
 valid and rational, even by undeniable proofs of 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 11$ 
 
 mentality — the limit and the significance of the task, 
 both, are multiplied. This admission, which is inev- 
 itable, opens at once a logical and valid way of 
 approach to the knowledge of God, the Infinite 
 Mind. This may not be the only way, it may not 
 be the best way, but it is at least as valid as the way 
 by which we reach the knowledge of other minds. 
 Indeed, the knowledge gained by this way of 
 approach to the Infinite may, by its repetition and 
 accumulation, become much more abundant. 
 
 But, here, we shall be met by a school of nescients 
 with the objection that God is infinite, and there- 
 fore, we can not know him, that God is not bounded 
 by finite relations, while our knowledge is relative. 
 
 In this very objection there as involved an impor- 
 •tant admission,— the admission that God is, and that 
 He is infinite. But farther, it is not only admitted 
 but asserted that He is infinite ; hence, especially, 
 comes the theory of nescience in respect to God. 
 But in all logical fairness, does not the admission or 
 assertion prove too much for the objector? How 
 can he assert that God is infinite unless he knows 
 that God is not finite ? By the very terms of the 
 admission does he not claim to know the Infinite, as 
 sustaining to everything else the relation of the 
 unlimited to the limited ? This is sufficient for our 
 
Il6 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 But we pause here long enough to ask these 
 knowing nescients if, according to their admission, 
 God is, does he not sustain the relation of Creator, 
 (not as dependent, but as originating,) of Upholder 
 (not as dependent, but as sustaining) and Governor of 
 all things, self-acting, self-sustaining, self-regulating? 
 
 Sir William Hamilton asserted all this promptly ; 
 and Mr. Spencer admits that, ** to say, we can not 
 know the absolute is, by impHcation, to affirm that 
 there is an absolute," and, if absolute, then Author 
 and Finisher. 
 
 If it still be insisted by the school of nescients, 
 that we do not know God adequately or completely, 
 and therefore we do not know him ; we reply, that 
 although we do not know him entirely, we may 
 "know in part," and, so far forth, know him really. 
 Though we do not know him adequately, yet we 
 " know in part," and, so far forth, know Him. The 
 most persistent theist would claim no more than this. 
 The school of nescients admit and assert that we 
 know finite minds and finite matter. But, we ask, do 
 we know matter and mind completely ? Not even su- 
 perior men, like Hamilton and Spencer, would make 
 this claim. They and their disciples would readily 
 admit a want of complete knowledge, — a knowl- 
 edge only in part. This admission, again, proves 
 too much for their objection to a knowledge of the 
 
THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES. 11/ 
 
 infinite — for, is not their knowledge of finite mind 
 and matter, though incomplete and *' in part," yet 
 real knowledge so far forth ? This school of object- 
 ors, by their very claim of nescience, have denied 
 themselves all possibility of reply ; and, from this 
 point henceforth, so far as pertains to the knowledge 
 of the infinite, must remain in self-adjudged silence. 
 But we notice another grave and general admis- 
 sion. This is implied in the labored, repeated, and 
 unsatisfactory attempts to account for what is, and 
 for what appears, issuing in theories which ignore or 
 deny God's existence — theories which have been 
 proposed and withdrawn by the originators — theories 
 which have been offered to the public and rejected 
 — theories at first carefully elaborated and then 
 modified, subsequently changed and changed after- 
 ward, and then changed again and again, and at 
 length appearing as modern theories with modern 
 form, but with antique lineaments betraying their 
 real ancestry, as if skeptical selection or atheistic 
 preference had played the scientific trick of Rever- 
 sion, and, at one fearful leap, had bounded back, 
 sheer across the interval of civilization to the period 
 preceding even Comte's lowest grade of human 
 thought (styled) '' the theological." Were all these 
 theories authoritatively challenged to give their name, 
 the answer would be : We are legion. These theo- 
 
Il8 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 rics, fanciful and varied as they have been from 
 Democritus to Darwin, we need not trace ; theories 
 too narrow to account for Hfe and inteUigence, and 
 more especially too narrow to account for reason, 
 free-will, and conscience, which demand an adequate 
 cause, and reiterate this demand, in the dignity and 
 light of their own authority. It is easy to see, that 
 because of inability to meet this very demand, 
 skeptical theorizing has veered toward materialism. 
 
 But we pass to the direct argument, the positive 
 answer to the question : Is faith in God valid ? The 
 idea of God is in the world. However well or ill 
 .conceived, however strongly or feebly held, philo- 
 sophically developed it implies supreme Being, 
 supreme in all excellences which reason, the lowest 
 and the highest reason, can discern : Supreme exist- 
 ence or self-existence, su'preme action or self-action, 
 supreme government or self-government, that is, a 
 personality Supreme. The idea of God has univer- 
 sally prevailed. It has persistently endured amid 
 all the shock of contradiction and question, amid all 
 the change of philosophies and policies and politics, 
 showing its deep and ineradicable acceptance in the 
 hearts of men. To question it now, or attempt to 
 invalidate, is logically to assume the omis probandi. 
 It is absurd to say that the idea is irrational, for 
 it has been accepted by the profoundest thinkers. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM, II9 
 
 To say that it is difficult to reach is no less absurd, 
 for the lowest civilization as well as the highest, has 
 heartily and pertinaciously held it. To say that it is 
 the outgrowth of civilization is as absurd, for the 
 earliest history and language have it, and have it in 
 its purest and loftiest form ; for instance, the history 
 and language of the Hebrews. No expression of it 
 in modern or mediaeval times has excelled or equaled 
 its early majestic statement. This appears every- 
 where in the Old Testament, to which we refer not 
 now as inspired, but simply as historic records uni- 
 versally admitted to be of the highest antiquity. To 
 say that the ontological argument or any of the the- 
 istic arguments is irrelevant, or inadequate to estab- 
 lish the conclusion, does not avail, for the conclusion 
 has been reached by common consent since these 
 arguments have been criticised, and long before they 
 had critic or champion, perhaps before they were 
 formally stated, possibly before they were even 
 thought of. 
 
 The idea originated and has been perpetuated in 
 the public and the philosophic mind, in some way 
 that seemed at first, and has ever seemed relevant 
 and valid. It were well, at the outset, to detect 
 this way and follow it in the line of our direct argu- 
 mentation, noting at the same time the accessory 
 proofs that lie along the way. 
 
I20 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 This is not the way of the senses merely, for 
 never until man appeared on the earth was the idea 
 of God entertained ; and since that time it has been 
 entertained by man alone. However superior the 
 senses of beasts, or however sure the brutal instinct, 
 the brutes regard not, seek not, know not God. 
 
 It is not the way of the understanding, judging 
 according to sense, for the understanding, as the 
 word implies and as its office necessitates, refers the 
 phenomena of the sense to the substance in which 
 such phenomena originate, and the substance to 
 the phenomena. 
 
 But a higher human faculty, the reason, looking 
 above and beyond sense — looking above and beyond 
 the understanding, may, does, see a profounder rea- 
 son as fundamental for its own finite self, and a 
 fortiori, fundamental for the sense and the under- 
 standing, a being unconditioned, as origin for its own 
 conditioned being. 
 
 This far-reaching conclusion of the highest faculty 
 of the human soul is regulative for itself, and, again 
 a fortiori, can not be denied or questioned by the 
 inferior faculties of the soul, the perceptive and 
 the elaborative — that is, the sense and the under- 
 standing. 
 
 Even if God should reveal himself to the human 
 senses, either visibly or audibly, the sense must 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 121 
 
 appeal to reason to decide, whether it be the 
 reveahng of God or of something else — whether for 
 example, it was an earthly dove from the dove-cotes 
 of Jericho flying down to the Jordan, or the Holy 
 Spirit descending like a dove from heaven and rest- 
 ing upon the Son of man — whether it was an earthly 
 sound striking upon the ear of Adam, or the voice of 
 God walking (coming) through the garden in the 
 cool of the day to commune with the first-born of 
 the sons of men. 
 
 So, a fortiori, any premises furnished by Sense 
 for the Understanding to place in syllogistic array 
 for a demonstration of the Divine existence, would 
 demand the criticism and supervision of the higher 
 faculty, the Reason, to ascertain whether the prem- 
 ises were vahd for the Sense, and whether the 
 logical process of the Understanding were licit, before 
 the soul would rely upon the conclusion as trust- 
 worthy. This may be found in our higher spiritual 
 nature, in which man essentially differs from the 
 brute. It is opened to us by the affirmations of the 
 Reason — of the reason as more or less developed — 
 of the Reason without which man would not, could 
 not, rise to the idea of God. That this view harmo- 
 nizes with divine Revelation will more fully appear 
 in the proper place. It is, however, important to 
 remark here, in passing, that the Scriptures refer to 
 II 
 
122 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 this greatest of all truths, — the Divine Existence — 
 not in the method of proof, but of illustration. 
 Taking for granted this fundamental truth, the 
 Scriptures appeal for its recognition to the human 
 soul as already informed of it, so that, at all times 
 and to all men, this appeal may be justly made. 
 Gen. i. i ; John i. i. et passim. 
 
 This view best explains, and is at the same time 
 confirmed by, the fact that religious faith pervades 
 humanity. While this remarkable fact demands ex- 
 planation, it has, also, the force of a two-fold argu- 
 ment. The fact is indisputable, its antiquity is 
 settled, its universality is admitted, its tenacity has 
 overcome all open violence or concealed treachery 
 that would subvert or destroy it. It has ever har- 
 monized with the loftiest aspirations of mankind, 
 contributed to their best welfare, resisted and suc- 
 cessfully held in check their baser passions and evil 
 tendencies. 
 
 The view just hinted at as the philosophic and 
 scriptural one, explains this ; reveals at once the 
 source and the strength of religious faith ; shows 
 that it originates in man's higher, spiritual nature, 
 and relies upon the unalterable affirmations of the 
 reason, the far-seeing faculty, and the regulative 
 authority of the human soul. 
 
 As a fact ineradicable from human nature, it has 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 23 
 
 the force of a convincing argument ; and, again, as 
 a fact ineradicable from human history, it has the 
 argumentative force of immemorial possession. Log- 
 ic and law always admit the force of this argument, 
 and, if, according to the view of common law, a few 
 years confer the right of possession, how shall the 
 force of argument be multiplied immeasurably, when 
 the possession doth extend as far as the history of 
 man runneth ? 
 
 But this view requires careful limitation. It is 
 sometimes asserted, as by Rothe, Schleiermacher and 
 others, that we have an immediate consciousness of 
 God. This statement is apt to mislead, on the one 
 hand, by confounding the reason's affirmation of God 
 with the consciousness of external phenomena by a 
 sense-perception, or of internal phenomena by self- 
 consciousness ; but, never thus can we have a knowl- 
 edge and consciousness of the Divine Being, nor, on 
 the other hand, by confounding the knowledge and 
 consciousness of God wich the consciousness of sub- 
 stantial things and of logical forms and conclusions 
 furnished by the understanding in its discursive pro- 
 cess of connecting phenomenal properties with sub- 
 stantial realities, or logical premises with real truths. 
 These appear in the light of consciousness, as the 
 valid results of the discursive faculty, the under- 
 standing. But by no merely discursive process, 
 
124 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 through logical premises or phenomenal properties 
 can we see God. 
 
 Intuitive beholding by sense and the consequent 
 consciousness refer exclusively to finite phenomena. 
 But God is infinite and is not phenomenal. Logical 
 beholding by the understanding and the consequent 
 consciousness refer to the substantial realities to 
 which phenomenal properties are related. But God 
 is not revealed to our consciousness as the under- 
 lying substance of phenomenal properties : a fortiori, 
 we have not thus a consciousness of God. 
 
 It is only the highest faculty of the soul, the 
 Reason, which can *' reach the height of this great 
 argument." To this, our spiritual vision alone, doth 
 God reveal himself. As the Father of our spirits, 
 the infinite Spirit appears to us, not comprehensible 
 by us — known only in part, yet known so far forth 
 as he doth reveal himself — known more and more 
 clearly as the eye of reason is undimmed and single, 
 till the body is filled with light. 
 
 Suppose reason wanting ; by consequence, the 
 knowledge of God is wanting. There can be neither 
 the rational vision nor the consciousness. So it is 
 with the stock and the stone, so it is with the 
 animal. It is not necessary to the purpose of our 
 argument, as we employ it, to determine how the 
 reveahng of God to the reason is accomplished, 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 12$ 
 
 whether immediately or mediately, or both. The 
 revealing of God to the reason, this is our 
 point, the revealing of God is affirmed by the 
 reason, and by this highest authority of the human 
 soul we have the consequent consciousness of God, 
 not that he appears, phenomenally, nor logically 
 that he must be ; but, rationally that he is as he 
 doth reveal himself. This affirmation of reason 
 perhaps involves, though it rises higher and stronger 
 than, animal instinct which never reaches God — 
 perhaps involves, though it rises higher and stronger 
 than, generalizations of causal power, which, however 
 extended, never reach him " who is before all 
 things and by whom all things consist." This af- 
 firmation of the reason does involve, though it 
 rises higher than, the feeling of dependence and 
 the impulse to worship, which witness to some 
 outv/ard object corresponding to the inward impulse 
 in analogy with all the instincts of our nature, 
 but which only feel after God if haply they may 
 find him ; higher and stronger than " the poet's in- 
 terpretation of nature"* which may 'Mook through 
 nature up to nature's God," or may idealize the 
 universe as only '' haunted forever " f by a subtle 
 but atheistic imagining. All these may be involved 
 as subordinate ; but the rational beholding of God, 
 
 * f See British Quarterly Review. — July '71 
 
126 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 *' of whom are all things," is man's spiritual vision, 
 the highest prerogative of his nature, elevating him 
 above all that surrounds him, animate or inanimate, 
 and exalting him to fellowship with heavenly minds, 
 to the knowledge and communion of God. So 
 the soul may be said to believe in God for the 
 strongest of all reasons, because it can not do other- 
 wise. But this statement, also, is apt to mislead, 
 for the necessity is not blind and fatalistic, but 
 rational and luminous. It is not a necessity which is 
 fatalistic, for it may be resisted like all rational 
 necessity. If the bodily eye may be closed or 
 turned away from the sun, so may the soul wilfully 
 turn away from God and wander into outer darkness 
 the more perilous because the more profound. 
 The free will may rebel and resist even to its own 
 ruin. Those who do not like to retain God in 
 their knowledge, he may give over to a reprobate 
 mind that they should believe a lie.^ 
 
 The ease with which all the arguments fall into 
 their proper place, in accordance with this view, 
 indicates that we have the clue to the labyrinth. 
 This arrangement, while it does not attach equal 
 value to the several arguments, does not, on the 
 other hand, exclude any valid proofs in the line of 
 direct argumentation. We cannot agree with those 
 
 *Rom. i. 25.-2. Thess. ii. 11. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 12/ 
 
 who reject the argument from Design as worthless ; 
 nor, yet, with those who rely upon it, to the exclu- 
 sion of all other proofs. Logical arguments in their 
 entire range, whether inductive or deductive, whether 
 from premises furnished by. moral, mental, or mate- 
 rial facts, have their value in reference to the 
 great conclusion, and a special adaptation to differ- 
 ent minds. The proof furnished by the affirmations 
 of the reason does, to some extent, reach every 
 mind. But some minds are more or less disqualified 
 to receive it, by internal or external circumstances, 
 by surrounding darkness, by native grossness and 
 earthliness, by absence or fault of education, by 
 habit or by prejudice ; sometimes, by careless or by 
 careful disregard, blunting the rational instincts or 
 perverting the moral choice until the fool doth say 
 in his heart: There is no God. To the mind unbi- 
 assed and open to its influence, this proof is at once 
 the most clear and convincing. As such it must 
 appear to superior and holy intelligences who behold 
 the beauty of the Lord as they inquire in his heav- 
 enly temple. As such it must appear to the higher, 
 purer intellects of earth, who in spirit, like Enoch, 
 walk with God and commune with him in the temple 
 of his material universe. 
 
 While, for ourselves, our estimate of the value of 
 the different arguments varies, we remember that to 
 
128 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 many, perhaps to most minds, the lower proofs are 
 the best adapted and the most convincing. 
 
 As all human minds, whatever height of knowl- 
 edge they attain, pass through the stage of weak- 
 ness, so all minds have followed, to some extent, 
 the same pathway, and somewhere in their course 
 have mastered, or at least met with, the same early, 
 simple means of knowing — the same early, simple 
 proofs which have served to communicate, or to call 
 up to consciousness the idea and the knowledge of 
 God. The slightest phenomenon has started the 
 soul upon the induction which ultimately leads to 
 God. That phenomenal effect, by a necessity of 
 experience, as well as by a necessity of thought, has 
 a cause which has a higher, and this onward to the 
 highest. For, the soul by its own necessity of 
 thinking, affirms not only that every phenomenal 
 effect must have a cause, but that there must be a 
 primal, a highest cause. A rational necessity, no 
 less imperative than that which bears the soul along 
 the pathway of causality, impels to the highest unity 
 as ultimate. This is clear to the Reason, however 
 it may be to the Sense or the Understanding. 
 
 This is clear to the reason, else there is nothing- 
 stable, all things flow, and sense by its very confu- 
 sion becomes nonsense. Hence the effort of positive 
 scientists to find a clue which will lead to unity, and 
 
FAITH AMD POSITIVISM. 1 29 
 
 thus make science possible and permanent : seeking 
 for protoplasm, as a first form of life ; or evolution 
 according to " First Principles " (physical units 
 evolving by an inner law) ; or generative gemmules 
 as first developing by " Natural or Sexual Selec- 
 tion, "or by both ; or force as the rudimental origin- 
 ator, unfolding into a universe by conservation and 
 correlation ; or motion as the primal source of all 
 phenomena. 
 
 But it is vain to multiply expedients in the field 
 of the sense. There must be a first. This is clear 
 to the reason, else the understanding must ever plod 
 along its weary, and still more weary way of endless 
 regression, and the soul with hope forever deferred, 
 sink at length in utter exhaustion. But no mind, 
 either the simplest or the sagest, can persistently 
 believe this. Hence the logical systems which have 
 clamored for demonstration, and labored to prove a 
 first. For the sense and the understanding, reason, 
 higher than either, affirms not only that every effect 
 must have a cause, but that there must be a first, a 
 cause which is not an effect. Thus reason settles 
 the vexed question for the human soul, and announ- 
 ces its decision to satisfy the sense, and unbind the 
 burden from the understanding and bid it rest in 
 the great First Cause. 
 
 If the sense-philosopher ignore reason, or rebel, 
 6* 
 
130 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 or appeal to the lower faculty, and clamor for phys- 
 ical sight, he shall remain forever unsatisfied, for the 
 source of all phenomena no physical sense shall ever 
 perceive. 
 
 If the speculative logician ignore reason, or rebel, 
 or appeal to the lower faculty of the understanding, 
 and clamor for demonstration of the first cause, he 
 may plod on with increasing weariness to his dying 
 day, for no human logic can demonstrate a first 
 cause. Without the aid of reason, its premises are 
 insufficient. Its major premise evermore is only 
 that every effect has a cause. No acuteness of logic 
 can thence infer a first cause without being guilty of 
 an illicit process. But, reason recognized and 
 obeyed furnishes the premises which may bear logic 
 safely forward to the desired conclusion : {a) that 
 every effect must have a cause, {U) that there must be 
 a first cause, a cause which is not an effect. 
 
 And since by the very constitution of the human 
 soul, neither the sense nor the understanding is 
 abandoned by the reason, is ever wholly hlo/ov^ so the 
 obedient soul may be guided by the reason even 
 along the phenomenal, or by the way of the logical, 
 to the first cause, the source of all phenomena ; and 
 the sense-philosopher and the speculative logician 
 may, by this help for the soul, be led to rest in the 
 Supreme Cause. But this rest, though speculative, 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. I31 
 
 would scarcely be spiritual ; though sure, it would 
 not be quite satisfactory ; and reason offers some- 
 thing higher than this. Sense has observed higher 
 phenomena than the material; for example, the 
 internal Sense — self-consciousness — has observed 
 thought and feeling and volition, and demands a 
 source for these. The understanding has traced 
 design in the mental, moral, and material world. 
 Nature, it has discovered, is formed into an harmo- 
 nious universe, where invariable as well as universal 
 order exists. Man, also, it has observed, is fitted to 
 such a universe. The universe, so diverse in phe- 
 nomena, seems one to the observant soul; and this 
 universe of endless and endlessly varying phenomena, 
 seems the same to the myriad minds which observe 
 it : the logical understanding declares it one and 
 real, and demands the adequate cause of the order 
 and adaptation and wisdom that pervade the mental, 
 moral, and material universe. Strictest induction 
 demands this — will be satisfied with nothing less. 
 The first cause, already discovered as the source of 
 phenomena and the origin of causes, appears in the 
 light of Reason as intelligent and moral, as wise and 
 free and holy ; and we attain to the personality we 
 seek. Reason affirms for faith a Divine Personality, 
 with no less directness and authority than it affirms 
 for Sense and for the Understanding a great First 
 
132 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Cause. Henceforth, for faith there exists, by the 
 highest finite authority, a personal Jehovah. The 
 human soul may evermore trust and worship *' The 
 king immortal, eternal, invisible, the only wise 
 God ; " may worship with stronger vision and deeper 
 joyousness as the light of Reason is clarified and 
 strengthened. 
 
 Henceforth, in this light it sees, with growing 
 vision, the finite, however extended in space or time, 
 comprehended by the infinite, who is the Author, 
 Upholder, Governor, Finisher, who doeth all things 
 according to the good pleasure of his will ; who, in 
 the possession of supreme wisdom, and in the exer- 
 cise of supreme freedom, doth order all things at the 
 behest and in the interest of supreme holiness. 
 Henceforth, faith in God, (for I do not yet speak of 
 faith in Christ the Saviour,) henceforth, faith in God 
 is strong and secure while it follows the guidance of 
 reason and occupies this high vantage ground, be- 
 coming weak and vulnerable only when it deserts its 
 true guide and treads the lower ground of the 
 understanding, or the still lower grounds of sense. 
 
 Does the Universe stretch beyond the reach of 
 the mightiest telescope? Whatever be its utmost 
 verge, reason no less clearly sees that it is God's 
 universe ; and faith rejoices evermore. Does the 
 microscope reveal minute and still more minute 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 33 
 
 infusoria, multiplied indefinitely till they swarm 
 innumerable in the dust of summer, or in autumn's 
 haze ? Still these are but the small dust in the bal- 
 ance of him who weigheth the mountains in scales 
 and the hills in a balance, who taketh up the isles 
 as a very little thing ; and faith exclaims : '' If I take 
 the wings of the morning, and dwell in the utter- 
 most parts of the sea ; even there shall thy hand 
 lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me." 
 
 Do earth's ages run backward by geologic 
 progression into the dim distance of the past, till 
 man and moving things disappear, and the light 
 vanishes, and darkness settles down upon the 
 formless deep? Reason no less clearly discerns 
 God the Creator, having the powers of the world 
 to come, glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, 
 doing wonders ; and faith exclaims : '' Lord, thou 
 hast been our dwelling place in all generations. 
 Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever 
 thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even 
 from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." Do 
 special creations mark the progress of the Universe ? 
 They are the acts of God. Do '' physical units " 
 appear, and, '' with remarkable powers of producing 
 and reproducing organisms," slowly or swiftly 
 evolve a universe ? They are the creations of God 
 who hath ordained and doth direct the order of 
 
134 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 their evolution. Do *' protoplastic cells " appear, 
 filled with life and pervaded by motion ? The 
 mighty maker, God, hath formed these *' proto- 
 plastic cells," and imparted this breath of life, 
 and intermingled life and motion. And now, if 
 the process of development is modified by *' Nat- 
 ural " or '' Sexual Selections," or by both, it is 
 in accordance with the divine provision. Were even 
 " Spontaneous Generation " possible, it could not 
 take place without the pre-requisite conditions 
 which the Creator supplied. In a word, whatever 
 may be the latent or visible powers in the universe, 
 they have their source in the infinite power of the 
 Creator, and are evermore subject to the divine 
 control ; and faith, walking serenely in the light 
 of reason, doth rejoice in God. Thus we secure 
 at once the retention and validity of the proofs ; 
 the logical argument or the argument from design 
 and order, in the realm of matter and of mind — 
 the moral argument, or the argument from con- 
 science — the volitional argument, or the argument 
 from free-will — the rational argument, or the argu- 
 ment from the affirmation of reason ; and, as will 
 hereafter appear, the scriptural argument, or argu- 
 ment from revelation. 
 
 We secure all this, not at the disparagement, 
 but by the help and authority of reason. It is 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 135 
 
 competent for any man, at his discretion, to employ- 
 either or all of these, not with equal force and 
 conclusiveness, but as he may choose, and as he 
 best can handle them. 
 
 It were easy to elaborate and fully illustrate 
 each proof; but this may not be, and need not. 
 Having shown the valid ground for each, and thus 
 rescued some, at least, from neglect and abuse, 
 it remains for us only to state each succinctly, 
 and arrange all in order to bear successfully upon 
 the conclusion. 
 
 Now, the argument from design takes Its proper 
 place, and has valid force. God seen by the reason 
 and authoritatively affirmed to be as author and 
 finisher, a first is found, and there is room for 
 the revealing of design ; and now, every depart- 
 ment of nature brings voluntary contributions to 
 this accessory argument. Every science reveals 
 fresh evidence ; every power of the mind gives 
 intelligent witness of high design. Mind and 
 body uniting, give their combined, personal testi- 
 mony. The eye, the ear, the touch — every sense 
 furnishes accumulating proofs, in its own wonderful 
 structure, in the perfect adaptation to sight and 
 sound and resistance, and all the countless forms 
 and phenomena, in things great and small, near 
 and remote, in the material universe endlessly 
 
136 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 varying, until the senses can not master the multi- 
 pHcity, and the strongest human mind can not 
 number them ; yet so admirably adapted that they 
 make up individual things complete, and worlds 
 and systems, and a universe ; so admirably adapted 
 throughout, as to constitute in itself one universe ; 
 so admirably adapted to the human senses, and 
 to the countless observant minds, as to constitute 
 for each and for all, one universe. Such a mutual 
 adaptation of the mind and the senses and phe- 
 nomenal nature, bespeaks design which, as every 
 wise man will admit, immeasurably transcends 
 all earthly wisdom. Volumes might furnish some 
 adequate room for satisfactory illustration, but our 
 limits forbid anything beyond a brief outline of 
 the argument. 
 
 Volumes of illustration have been written since 
 the successful example of Paley ; yet these are only 
 the index to illustrations already exhaustless but 
 ever increasing as science and experience are inter- 
 preting the universe. However complete, at once, 
 the rational argument may be — the logical argument 
 (the argument from design) is — shall forever be, 
 cumulative. 
 
 In firm connection with the affirmations of the 
 Reason, and the universal and immemorial fact of 
 religious faith, and the countless evidences of wise 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 37 
 
 design in the universe far surpassing all earthly 
 wisdom, there is the unanswerable argument from 
 the order pervading the universe. This order is not 
 only everywhere manifest, so that innumerable proofs 
 of the argument press upon us ; but this universal 
 order is admitted by even the most determined 
 atheist, who, with the desperation of an assailant, 
 would seize this weapon of religious faith and turn 
 it against theism. Order, universal order, he not only 
 admits as existing, but he asserts it to be invariable 
 and hence the basis of all induction and science. 
 Law governs, law immutable, and thus order is 
 secured, and thus it will forever pervade the universe, 
 law so controlling that it can not be controlled, so 
 enduring that it is eternal, so that it neither needs 
 nor admits a God. 
 
 But, as we have already shown. Reason from a 
 higher position commands this accessory argument, 
 and covers it so completely that it can not be thus 
 stormed and captured by the atheist, even if it had 
 no strength for self-defence. The common consent 
 of humanity and the argument from divine design, 
 already established, also cover it and are ready and 
 competent to defend it, if such defence were needed. 
 But it is more than equal to self-defence. The 
 assumption of the atheist is powerless against it. 
 The atheist himself must admit the weakness of his 
 
138 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 assumption, and after a little reflection withdraw 
 from this point of attack. This order points to God 
 as its author ; the atheist points to chance or fate — 
 he can point to nothing eke. But who is chance, or 
 who is fate to command the subjection and allegiance 
 of order — of universal and invariable order ? Chance 
 is a capricious fiction without any power or wisdom 
 or wish to produce order. Chance is nothing ; and 
 fate is blind — blind by a trick of words, but really a 
 bhnd fiction, nothing more, without any power or 
 wisdom or wish to produce order. Fate is nothing. 
 Induction, which, for its validity and success, de- 
 pends upon order in the universe, would spurn the 
 claim of chance or fate. Induction and science repel 
 the assumption of the atheist, and unite their testi- 
 mony to intelligent design and the common consent 
 of mankind to confirm the affirmation of Reason, 
 that God is over all, blessed forever ; that he is the 
 same yesterday, to-day, and forever, and therefore 
 that order is, and is all-pervading. 
 
 And now, in our Hne of direct proof, another 
 accessory argument takes its proper and valid place 
 — the argument from freedom, freedom of the will. 
 That freedom of the will exists is proved by individ- 
 ual consciousness, and attested by the common con- 
 sent of mankind as expressed in the language, 
 literature, laws, and history of the world. This can 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. ' 1 39 
 
 be accounted for, only on the ground that a supreme 
 free-will presides over the universe. 
 
 Liberty, the freedom of the will, is impossible 
 and absurd in a universe subject to fate. In the 
 nature of the case, by the very terms of the state- 
 ment, necessity must everywhere prevail in that 
 which is chief and, a fortiori, in that which is subor- 
 dinate. The sovereign is necessity, and the subject 
 must be necessitated. Freedom, then, would be 
 utterly and forever excluded from a universe subject 
 to fate ; and no less decisively would it be excluded 
 by chance. Chance is only a name for the total 
 absence of wisdom supreme and free, presiding over 
 the universe. Chance is, in fact, fate only by another 
 name. In a world where all things are subject to 
 irrational caprice or necessity, freedom — freedom of 
 will — is utterly impossible and absurd. Yet, such 
 freedom exists. If anything is known, this is known 
 — known everywhere and by every one, and by every 
 one possessed and exercised as a birthright inalien- 
 able. Freedom exists, therefore neither fate nor 
 chance controls the universe. Freedom exists, there- 
 fore there must be a God who, in the exercise of 
 supreme freedom, hath created a world in which 
 freedom is possible and beings whom he hath en- 
 dowed with this exalted prerogative ; and more, in 
 the exercise of supreme freedom he doth forever 
 
140 • FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 preside over the universe, so that no law or order, 
 however long or invariably it may have operated, 
 shall ever obtain control over the law-giver. The 
 argument is complete in itself, and although arranged 
 as accessory, yet, if all the other arguments were 
 withdrawn, this alone would remain a decisive proof 
 of a God and Governor of the universe, supreme, 
 and supremely free. 
 
 Another important accessory argument, the last 
 which we have room to mention — an argument 
 closely allied to those from reason and free-will, is 
 the argument from conscience — the moral argu- 
 ment. Everywhere and by every one moral obliga- 
 tion is recognized, and its consequent moral desert. 
 Even the atheist applauds and condemns, rewards 
 and blames. In every language and in every 
 land we find this recognition, and find it always 
 expressed in laws and religions, in approbation 
 and disapprobation, in rewards and penalties. The 
 law and order of society proceed on this very prin- 
 ciple ; public and private worship everywhere pro- 
 ceeds on this principle. The individual conscience 
 everywhere repeats it. As sure and universal as 
 the fact of moral freedom, is the fact of moral 
 responsibility and desert. And were it possible for 
 a man, anywhere or at any time, to annihilate his 
 moral freedom, and by his own free act forever to 
 
 I 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. I41 
 
 enslave his soul to lust and sin and Satan, conscience 
 would forever condemn him as guilty of immeas- 
 urable folly and ill-desert ; and attendant penalty 
 would forever chastise the criminal. The individual 
 and universal recognition of moral obligation and its 
 consequent moral desert, is proof, universal and 
 unvarying proof, of a Moral Governor who presides 
 over the universe, who, with the moral freedom he 
 hath bestowed, hath, in the interests of supreme 
 holiness, inseparably connected moral obligation 
 and moral desert. 
 
 The argument, then, is this: Morahty (moral 
 merit and demerit) is impossible where necessity 
 pervades all things. Did fate or chance control the 
 universe, moral praise and blame, reward and punish- 
 ment, would necessarily be excluded as out of place. 
 Morality would be impossible and absurd. But 
 moral obligation and desert everywhere exist ; there- 
 fore there must be a moral governor who presides 
 over the universe, who, in the exercise of supreme 
 wisdom and supreme freedom, doth reign in supreme 
 holiness; who hath ordained the moral law, and, 
 with the gift of moral freedom to all his rational 
 creatures, hath inseparably connected moral obliga- 
 tion and moral desert ; and faith may forever rejoice 
 in the security of liberty and morality ; more than 
 this, faith may forever rejoice in God as Almighty, 
 
142 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 supremely wise, and free, and holy ; the author and 
 finisher, the Alpha and Omega. 
 
 This argument, also, is complete in itself, and 
 although arranged as accessory, yet, if all the other 
 arguments were withdrawn, this alone would remain 
 the decisive proof of a moral governor who presides 
 over the universe, who is the source of the moral 
 law, and the security, as well as the source, of mo- 
 rality. 
 
 Thus, both by the distinct affirmations of reason, 
 and by strict induction guided by reason, we are 
 led to Deity, and by their united authority we rest 
 in God. As our line of direct argumentation began, 
 so it ends, with the full recognition of God as a 
 Divine Personality, supremely wise, supremely free, 
 and holy — with whom, as the Supreme Reason, 
 human reason may hold increasing communion — 
 from whom we receive the exalted endowment of 
 moral freedom — and whom, as holy, we are to wor- 
 ship and imitate, that we may be holy as He is 
 holy ; whose transcendent wisdom is manifest in 
 ourselves, who are fearfully and wonderfully made, 
 and in the earth and heavens which are full of his 
 praises. 
 
 By these varied arguments of morality and of 
 moral freedom, of order and of design, of universal 
 belief and of the affirmations of reason, faith in 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 43 
 
 God is not only authorized but pronounced most 
 rational. 
 
 Thus a place for religious faith is not only vindi- 
 cated by the admissions, expressed or implied, of 
 objectors ; but a place for faith in God is estab- 
 lished upon positive and reliable grounds. 
 
 It remains to present the scriptural argument for 
 faith in Christ and the Gospel, together with some 
 of the prerogatives of faith. 
 
144 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Faith and Positivism. 
 
 The Written and the Living Word, 
 
 "ii 
 
 /^UR course of discussion has led us, first, into 
 ^^ " The Field of the Philosophic and Finite ; " * 
 secondly, into '' The Field of the Religious and 
 Infinite." \ 
 
 In the former we have shown, both by indirect 
 and direct arguments, that philosophic faith (intel- 
 lectual belief) in things unseen, for example, in sub- 
 stance and the relation between substance and qual- 
 ity, in cause and the relation between cause and 
 effect, etc., has valid ground. 
 
 In the latter we have shown, by cumulative and 
 conclusive reasons, the validity of faith in God. 
 
 This ground already gained and securely held, 
 we are prepared finally to consider the Revelation of 
 God in the written and in the living- Word — in the 
 Scriptures and in Christ. Is Christian faith valid ? 
 
 We have an indefeasible right, henceforth, to 
 * See Ch. ii. f See Ch. iii. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 45 
 
 assume the premise that God is. Will he reveal 
 himself? An antecedent probability is sufficient for 
 our argument here. But more than this has been 
 shown in the preceding discussion. God has re- 
 vealed himself in Creation and in Providence. 
 
 Thus we have found him, not as a logical necessity 
 elaborated by a dialectical process, but as a divine 
 reality. God the Father, Almighty, maker of heaven 
 and earth — giving infallible proofs of his presence 
 and power in making, upholding, and governing the 
 universe. A book of high antiquity and one which 
 will challenge our special attention in this closing 
 discussion precisely expresses our thought : " For 
 the invisible things of him from the creation of the 
 world are clearly seen, being understood by the 
 things that are made, even his eternal power and 
 Godhead." Rom. i. 20. 
 
 '' He left not himself without witness, in that he 
 did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruit- 
 ful seasons, filling our hearts with food and glad- 
 ness." Acts xiv. 17. 
 
 Now in the sobriety of prose it speaks, and now 
 in the rapture of poetry. " The heavens declare the 
 glory of God ; and the firmament sheweth his handy 
 work. Day unto day uttereth speech and night 
 unto night sheweth knowledge." Ps. xix. i, 2. 
 
 God has thus revealed himself; he may, then. 
 
146 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 reveal himself more fully. What shall decide? His 
 own infinite wisdom and will. The revelation hith- 
 erto made has occurred in the ongoings of Creation 
 and Providence, and would have been made had 
 only material things been created and upheld, with 
 no finite minds to recognize God's handiwork, and 
 wonder and adore. But, now that finite minds 
 appear, will not God reveal himself in these higher 
 creations, and to these spiritual creatures, and 
 through them to others ? There is abundant a priori 
 ground for expecting this. Indeed, we can scarcely 
 conceive of Divine action without Divine revelation. 
 If God has, by the very process of his action, re- 
 vealed himself in the lower, the physical creation, 
 will he not, by a nobler process of divine action, 
 reveal himself in the higher, the spiritual creation ? 
 Mind alone can originate mind. Will not God 
 appear more manifest, and be better understood, by 
 the living soul which he hath made ? 
 
 This book of singular wisdom, as well as antiqui- 
 ty, precisely states, perhaps suggests, my thought : 
 " Let us make man in our image, after our hke- 
 ness. ... In the image of God created he him." 
 Gen. i. 26, 27. Man stands forth in this lower world 
 as the representative of intelhgence and volition and 
 morality, holding dominion subordinate, but repre- 
 sentative of God's supreme dominion. Gen. i. 28. 
 
FAITH AiVD POSITIVISM, I47 
 
 Thus, in brief, does God reveal himself in the 
 human soul ; will he not also reveal himself to the 
 human soul ? For this the soul would long intensely, 
 even hunger and thirst for it. Without this there 
 would be the ceaseless cry of the human to the 
 divine. 
 
 Until the creation of man, neither could this 
 revelation be, nor could there be the demand for 
 it. Will the divine Father turn away in disregard 
 of his own spiritual children ? Will not God avenge 
 (satisfy) his own elect, his chosen ones among all the 
 creatures on earth, that with filial yearning day and 
 night cry unto him ? He will ; our better Reason 
 replies. He will ; saith the Saviour. Luke xviii. 8. 
 
 Such revelation, if it occur at all, would seem to 
 be especially desirable and fitting in the earlier his- 
 tory of man until not only the eternal power and 
 Godhead should be known, but until God be known 
 in his moral character, — his holiness, his justice, his 
 benevolence, his spiritual care and kindness towards 
 his spiritual creatures ; in a word, in his divine 
 Fatherhood, holy, just, kind, yearning toward his 
 spiritual children. 
 
 Has such a revelation been made, — a revelation 
 corresponding to these very wants of the human 
 soul ? There is a book claiming to be a record of 
 such revealings. The book is not a modern fabrica- 
 
148 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 tion as an after-thought to satisfy a logical necessity, 
 or to embody a cunningly devised theory. The 
 book is genuine ; this can not be successfully dis- 
 puted. It is of the highest antiquity ; this all admit. 
 The theory is in the book itself, else it had not been 
 thought of. The book has been wondrously pre- 
 served amid the shock and change of ages. A 
 people, specially selected for this purpose, marvel- 
 lously protected from extermination, though often 
 conquered — from absorption, though everywhere 
 scattered, have carried with them everywhere, and 
 everywhere guarded this book as a sacred treasure. 
 Early in this record, be it observed, the Divine Unity 
 is revealed — the Divine Unity, as the basis of all 
 true religion, as contradistinguished from polytheism, 
 which is the parent of idolatry with its endless brood 
 of follies and sins. 
 
 This doctrine of the Divine Unity which Socrates 
 hailed as a great light shining from the page of An- 
 axagoras, (cf. Georg. 2, 490) this doctrine had been 
 divinely revealed a thousand years before the time of 
 Anaxagoras. 
 
 Beyond this fundamental doctrine, thus, and 
 thus early revealed, the most progressive theology 
 of modern times has realized its inability to make 
 the least advance. This fundamental doctrine to- 
 gether with the rehgious and moral principles it 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 149 
 
 involves was not only revealed as divine truth, but 
 promulgated as a divine law, enforced by divine 
 sanctions, and enjoined upon men as the universal 
 and perpetual law, thus indicating its importance in 
 the divine estimate. Has any proficiency in morals 
 or in theology superseded these commands of Jeho- 
 vah or improved upon God's moral law ? This book 
 has been multiplied and circulated as has no other 
 in time's whole history; translated into unnumbered 
 tongues ; made accessible to the multitude, the 
 companion and guide both of the illiterate and the 
 learned. Upon the best and wisest men the world 
 has ever known, it has made the impression of a rev- 
 elation from God — upon the best and wisest nations 
 of all time it has made this impression. 
 
 If God's power and wisdom could be seen in the 
 order and harmony of the universe, could not his 
 moral character be expressed in the Scriptures ? 
 According to the written record, God now manifests 
 himself to men in fuller revelations, in spiritual com- 
 munings with patriarchs and priests ; he speaks unto 
 the fathers by the prophets ; he proclaims a moral 
 law for his moral subjects to guide and guard them 
 — as he has already ordained physical laws for mate- 
 rial things ; he establishes a theocracy over a nation 
 showing, at once and to all men, what shall be the 
 theocracy for mind and how it shall differ from the 
 
ISO FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 theocracy for matter. Sin is prohibited by the moral 
 law, and doomed to penalty. Sacrificial propitiation 
 is introduced. Redemption is typified and prophe- 
 sied. The Church is organized ; its future foretold ; 
 a Messiah predicted by whom in the last days God 
 should more fully reveal himself unto men. 
 
 Such, in brief, is an outline of revelation in the 
 earlier Scriptures of the Old Testam.ent. It is ad- 
 dressed to man as a rational spirit. Is it Divine ? 
 Is it a revelation of God and from God ? How shall 
 we as rational, spiritual beings decide ? The conclu- 
 sive answer must be given by the revelation itself, 
 involved in the very revealing. Are these evidences 
 of the supernatural in the record ? To the law and 
 the testimony the candid inquirer will turn first, and 
 most earnestly, and without prejudice. In nature 
 we decided in the same way. We met with eviden- 
 ces of the supernatura,! — order, harmony, adaptation 
 — which matter could neither originate nor regulate ; 
 and thus we found God as appearing in the things 
 he had made. 
 
 So, here are the evidences of God's appearing in 
 the things revealed. We have already referred to 
 the revelation of moral attributes and a moral law 
 supreme in authority, supreme in excellence. We 
 now specify some attendant characteristics befitting 
 these moral attributes and this moral law : 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 151 
 
 There is majesty unrivalled ; majesty more ex- 
 alted even than the material universe reveals; majesty 
 that subjects all nature to the omnipotence of God, 
 — and this with no labor of expression, but with a re- 
 pose and ease which become, and become only, the 
 grandeur of a God and the original right of eternal 
 possession. " He spake and it was done. He com- 
 manded and it stood fast. He said, Let there be light, 
 and there was light. By the Word of the Lord were 
 the heavens made. He gave to the sea his decree. 
 He weigheththe mountains in scales, and the hills in 
 a balance. He taketh up the isles as a very little 
 thing. He bringeth out the (heavenly) host by 
 number ; because he is strong in power ; not one 
 faileth." The same supreme majesty pervades the 
 attendant miracles recorded. There is also purity 
 that is perfect ; so that highest angels veil their faces 
 in its ineffable light, and the elect prophet declares 
 himself undone, because, a man of unclean lips, his 
 eyes had seen the King, the Lord of Hosts. Isa. vi. 5. 
 
 There is a marvellous consistency in the spiritual 
 purpose and prophecy and precept and providence 
 revealed, all of which centre in one great Messianic 
 fact — a purpose and prophecy and precept and 
 providence which no human ingenuity could have 
 devised or regulated — a fact which no human 
 wisdom could have furnished or foreseen, toward 
 
152 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 which history was made steadily to advance, which 
 in the fullness of time became complete, appearing 
 then, at onoe, as the key to all history — the in- 
 terpretation of all time, the past and the future ; 
 a consistency marvellous not alone in theory, but no 
 less marvellous practically, providing salvation for 
 sinners, one Saviour for all mankind ; announcing 
 the brotherhood of man, whose nature a divine 
 being should take upon himself that he might reach 
 and rescue the lost. Attending the divine redemp- 
 tion is a promised ideal of perfect excellence, rising 
 up amid but above all humanity, inviting and 
 helping to a higher even a holy life, reminding the 
 soul of its infinite value, promising a better future 
 even the heavenly, and pointing to a progress illimit- 
 able, even " the measure of the stature of the 
 fullness of Christ." 
 
 In all this revealing of purpose, and prophecy, 
 and precept, and providence, and propitiation, the 
 supernatural everywhere appears. The promised 
 Messiah is supernatural, God incarnate, man divine ; 
 to be made sin for us, yet holy, harmless, undefiled; 
 dying for sin, yet separate from sinners. The 
 predicted redemption is supernatural, saving the 
 people not in but from their sins, thus redeeming 
 humanity. The agency foretold is supernatural. 
 It is the Holy Ghost which should reason of sin and 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. I53 
 
 righteousness and judgment, and regenerate the 
 
 soul. 
 
 The Kingdom to be estabh'shed is supernatural, 
 — the Kingdom of God diffusing righteousness and 
 peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. The promises 
 are exceeding great and precious, such as no human 
 thought could conceive; but what is especially 
 significant is, that they involve a condition unheard 
 and unthought-of till announced in the revelation, — 
 purity of character in the recipients, wherein they 
 become partakers of the divine nature. And the 
 future revealed is supernatural, in which the purity, 
 the promise, the kingdom, shall culminate in a new 
 heaven and a new earth, in which dwelleth right- 
 eousness. Even after the revelation it requires the 
 most careful discrimination to repeat the statement 
 without confusing or humanizing the divine ideal, 
 e. g., in regard to God's spiritual perfections, or 
 Christ's complex nature, or the ministration of 
 the Spirit, or the purity of the divine promises, 
 or the perfection of the kingdom of God. This 
 characteristic of revelation grows upon the human 
 soul as it becomes more intelligent and more 
 studious of the Scriptures. 
 
 All this divine presence is revealed as pervading 
 and interfusing human history, continuous and con- 
 trolling, yet consistent, producing no discord nor 
 
154 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 disorder; but, on the contrary, reconciling the world 
 unto God, and so not only involving harmony in the 
 plan, but, in its onvvorking, diffusing spiritual har- 
 mony. The wonder grows with our increasing knowl- 
 edge ; and unlike acquaintance with the uninspired, 
 the human, here familiarity leads to adoration. 
 
 The study of revelation culminates in worship ; 
 '' Blessed art thou, O Lord ; teach me thy statutes. 
 Thy word have I hid in mine heart, that I might not 
 sin against thee." 
 
 The human reason bows before this divine re- 
 vealing with profounder reverence than any marvel 
 or miracle addressed to the physical sense could 
 possibly produce. It is God appearing in the pene- 
 trating power of his Word, as to Elijah, not in 
 the tempest nor the earthquake nor the fire, but in 
 the still small voice, when the prophet wrapped his 
 face in his mantle. 
 
 If mere reasoning attempt an explanation of this 
 revelation as uninspired, the wonder becomes inex- 
 plicable. But human reason discerns a revealing of 
 the divine reason, and thus the mystery becomes a 
 revelation. 
 
 To recapitulate : this revelation claims to be 
 divine. Can we conceive of nobler attributes? Jus- 
 tice, truth, holiness, benevolence. Do we, elsewhere, 
 find anything surpassing this revelation ? In all 
 
FAITH- AND POSITIVISM. 1 55 
 
 succeeding ages has highest human wit or wisdom 
 originated or demanded anything worthier of divin- 
 ity ? Men of most exalted genius, in their loftiest, 
 boldest statements of the divine character, have 
 resorted to the Scripture vocabulary. If divinity 
 is not revealed here, how could it be revealed in any 
 written word ? What shall decide? Does it satisfy 
 the highest demand of reason ? Then reason de- 
 cides that there is a revelation of God in the written 
 Word. What if some have not believed ? Shall 
 the unbelief of some make the truth of God of none 
 effect ? This unbelief of written revelation has its 
 parallel in the unbelief of natural revelation. 
 Though, according to our preceding argument, in 
 the language of Paul: ''The invisible things of God 
 from the creation of the world are clearly seen, 
 being understood by the things that are made, even 
 his eternal power and Godhead ; so that they are 
 without excuse," yet there have been those who 
 have not believed — determined atheists, notwith- 
 standing the cumulative testimony of nature and 
 the general belief of mankind. 
 
 By this line of internal evidence, then, we are 
 led to the inevitable conclusion, that the written 
 record has inherent, infallible proofs of a divine 
 revelation. 
 
 But there may be external evidence also. In- 
 
156 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT, 
 
 ternal there must be, for this is essential to satisfy 
 the reason. The external can only be corroborative ; 
 for no amount of external evidence can vindicate as 
 divine, a revelation of folly, absurdity, and sin. At 
 the same time, it seems most fitting that such a 
 revelation come with attendant external evidences, 
 corresponding to the supernatural character of the 
 revelation. Precisely this is the recorded statement. 
 The revelation is not primarily of power, ubiquity, in- 
 telligence, as in the physical world ; but, as we have 
 just seen, of holiness, justice, truth, benevolence, 
 presenting a divine personality, revealing to the 
 human spirit a divine spirit infinite in wisdom and in 
 goodness, *' proclaiming the Lord God, merciful and 
 gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness 
 and truth." Exod. xxxiv. 6. With this internal 
 evidence there are corresponding external evidences 
 of supernatural revealing: (Exod. xix. 16-19, ^^ ^^^ 
 miraculous control over the forces of nature as at 
 Sinai and Horeb, the Red Sea and the Wilderness, 
 Jordan and Canaan, showing that the forces of nature 
 are subject to the divine control and subservient to 
 the divine purpose in the higher, spiritual revealings 
 of God. 
 
 Such a revelation, if desirable for man, must, for 
 the same reason, be continuously repeated, or be 
 written for preservation and transmission, that the 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 57 
 
 human race may know the mind and motive and 
 will of God. 
 
 Shall the revelation be continuous, or written ? 
 It is both — continuous, till the time of its comple- 
 tion ; and written, for the ages to come. 
 
 But up to this point, the revelation of God and 
 of the .divine plan is by no means complete. If it 
 be made complete, this must be in the fullness of 
 time. Until then, mankind must desire and wait 
 for it. Completeness will supplement the Old with 
 the New — the Written with the Living Word. 
 
 Deferring the consideration of this for a little, 
 we pause to notice an objection, the objection of 
 the rationalist, that we have human reason to decide 
 what the divine revelation shall be, and thus annul 
 the value and the necessity of a written revelation. 
 
 We reply that we have reason to decide, not 
 what the revelation shall be, but, as Coleridge puts 
 it, " what it shall not be ; " that it shall not be a 
 revelation of folly, absurdity, and sin. 
 
 Hume, pressing an objection from an opposite 
 direction, concludes his essay on miracles with this 
 disingenuous sneer : " Our most holy religion is 
 founded on faith, not on reason ; mere reason is 
 insufficient to convince us of its veracity." 
 
 To this skeptical objection we reply, that our 
 initial work has been in the light of reason to find 
 
158 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 God as he has revealed himself in the material and 
 mental universe. 
 
 With Theism thus securely established, faith in 
 God reposes upon rational and valid ground. Thus, 
 at the very outset, the objection of Hume is more 
 than answered, it is denied and ruled out of the 
 discussion. 
 
 After this initial work we proceed, in the light 
 of Reason, seriously to examine the evidences of 
 Divine Revelation in the written word to which we 
 are earnestly invited by the Scriptures themselves. 
 As Reason has already found in Theism a valid 
 basis for Revealed Religion, so Revelation makes its 
 appeal to Reason and commends itself to the ra- 
 tional soul. This is the uniform tenor of Scripture, 
 as well as the explicit invitation of its Divine Author. 
 The Holy Ghost reasons with men ; and the apos- 
 tolic injunction is : "■ Be ready always to give an 
 answer to every man that asketh you a reason of 
 the hope that is in you." I Pet. iii. 15. Not only 
 at the outset, then, is Hume's objection ruled out of 
 the discussion ; it is all along and forever excluded. 
 Revelation instead of doing violence or discredit to 
 Reason is addressed directly to the rational nature 
 of man. Revelation everywhere assumes the exist- 
 ence of a moral sense — a Reason and Conscience — 
 in man, and thus it ever addresses him. Did Chris- 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 59 
 
 tianity vindicate itself by the false process of Hume, 
 then would faith deserve the supercilious sneer of 
 this arch skeptic. For, as it has been justly said : 
 '* If there be no truth set before the faith it may 
 become the weakest credulity." (McCosh). 
 
 There is then a proper limit to be observed in 
 either direction, toward the atheistic objection, and 
 toward the rationalistic ; on the one hand, preserv- 
 ing Christian faith from sinking into senseless super- 
 stition ; on the other hand, from vaulting into 
 arrogant censorship. Sin is in the world. The 
 consciousness of it is confessed by the individual 
 soul. Its prevalence oppresses humanity. History 
 bears witness to its universal presence. How shall 
 sin be treated ? In the method of justice or of grace? 
 Of penalty or of pardon ? If of penalty, to what 
 extent ? If of pardon, upon what ground and con- 
 dition? If an administration of grace be adopted, 
 how shall it be made to harmonize with justice? 
 If there be propitiation, what shall be the sacrifice? 
 If there be mediation, who shall be the mediator? 
 
 To whose hands shall the administration of grace 
 be committed ? Shall this gracious administration 
 continue forever? If not, when shall it end and 
 how? If there has been temptation shall grace 
 reach the tempted only, or the tempter also? 
 
 These, and the like, are unavoidable questions 
 
l6o FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 which human reason must ask in the interests of the 
 human soul and of the divine government, but is 
 incompetent to answer. These questions more than 
 refute the objection of the rationaHst. They demon- 
 strate the urgent necessity of a completed revelation 
 to a world of sinners. They indicate, also, the pos- 
 sible, if not the necessary revelation of a Saviour and 
 by a Saviour ; and they suggest the necessity of satis- 
 factory evidences attending such a revelation ; eviden- 
 ces the more requisite and satisfactory because of 
 the important issues involved, even salvation for 
 sinners and the integrity of the divine government. 
 
 By this very statement three representative ob- 
 jections are at once met and refuted ; the rational- 
 istic objection of Parker and others, refuted by the 
 need of a revelation ; the atheistic objection of Hume 
 and others, refuted by the evidences to be can- 
 vassed ; the mythical objection of Strauss and 
 others, refuted by the reality required, — a salvation 
 and a Saviour, a real Redeemer and a real redemp- 
 tion. A brief unfolding of this statement must 
 conclude this chapter. 
 
 What is the revelation ? It is of grace rather 
 than of justice ; by propitiation rather than by pen- 
 alty ; through a Saviour for sinners rather than 
 by a sentence of execution ; for the tempted but 
 not for the tempter; on one condition, repentance 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. l6l 
 
 toward God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. 
 The Saviour is the son of God and son of man, 
 divinely begotten but humanly born, thus wonder- 
 fully qualified for the work of mediation. Into 
 the hands of this one Mediator all things are now 
 ordained. He must reign till he hath put all things 
 under his feet, destroying sin and death the last 
 enemy, and him that hath the power of death, thus 
 bringing in everlasting righteousness, when the ad- 
 ministration of grace shall be complete and the king- 
 dom be given up unto God, even the Father, that 
 God may be all in all. (Cor. xv, 25, ^^ seq^ 
 
 Thus the new revelation is of and by a Person 
 combining in himself all typical and verbal reveal- 
 ings ; in whom dwelleth all the fullness of the God- 
 head bodily. (Col. ii. 9.) 
 
 The new revelation is of a person and a life that 
 is at once divine and human, actualizing before men 
 the doctrines of theology — God manifest in the flesh, 
 so that Jesus replied to Philip : *' He that hath seen 
 me, hath seen the Father ; " and John declared : '' The 
 life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear 
 witness, and shew unto you that eternal life which 
 was with the Father, and was manifested unto us." 
 I John i. 2. This is a revelation of the substance 
 hitherto foreshadowed, of types realized, of prophe- 
 cies fulfilled, of sacrifices ended by a propitiation 
 
1 62 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 offered once for all, attended by evidences both 
 human and divine, internal and external, character 
 and conduct, life and teaching, works and words, in 
 trial and triumph from the lowly, lonely birth at 
 Bethlehem to the ascension from Olivet in the 
 presence of all the disciples when, as he blessed 
 them, he was taken up and a cloud received him out 
 of their sight. 
 
 This person, this character, this life and teaching 
 and work, revealing God, redeeming the sinner, 
 reconciling God and man — this stands forth before 
 the world as unique and divine, challenging and 
 securing faith and devotion. 
 
 The revelation, then, is by no means complete 
 without the coming of a Redeemer consummating 
 in himself the mystery and the manifestation of 
 godliness, (i Tim. iii. i6.) 
 
 Until this revelation came, no questions could be 
 so m.omentous to the human soul as those involved 
 in his appearing, no knowledge could be so import- 
 ant to gain ; and now that the revelation is made, no 
 knowledge is so important to retain and apply. 
 
 It might have been justly expected that the 
 divine Law-giver would maintain the law. But 
 how? By penalty? If thus, what would be the 
 doom of the transgressor? And what would be the 
 future relation and conduct of God toward the 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 163 
 
 sinner? No finite reason could tell what God 
 should do, although it could be readily and safely 
 affirmed that the Divine Reason would do nothing 
 irrational ; and highest human reason in this uni- 
 versal emergency of condemnation, could only wait 
 for the divine revelation. And is not the announce- 
 ment full of the supernatural ? The revelation self- 
 evidenced as divine ? *' Thou hast destroyed thyself, 
 but in me there is hope." *' I have found a ransom." 
 ** His arm brought salvation." God reveals himself 
 as just, and yet '* the justifier of the ungodly." 
 Rom. iv. 5. 
 
 This is a new and wondrous revelation of God, 
 no less merciful than just. The wonder grows with 
 every new revealing. Who is this Ransom, human 
 reason reverently inquires. The answer is from the 
 highest heaven : *' Lo, I come," saith the Saviour. 
 " In the volume of the book it is written of me. 
 Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not, but a body 
 hast thou prepared me." Heb. x. 5, 7. In the 
 revelation as it rises to completeness, Christ and 
 redemption are central. Around these, prophecies 
 and promises circle ; and to them, unerringly point. 
 The character and coming of Immanuel, his incarna- 
 tion, his work, his human sympathy and suffering, 
 the death which he should accomplish at Jerusalem 
 that he might deliver man and destroy the works of 
 
164 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 the devil — these revelations fill the vision of seers ; 
 make up the burden of prophecy ; give heavenly 
 rapture to the Songs of David ; inspire Isaiah to 
 prophesy, "■ Prepare ye the way of the Lord : " and 
 Malachi to give the nearer prediction, *' Behold, I 
 will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the 
 way before me ; and the Lord whom ye seek shall 
 suddenly come to his temple ; " and him that was 
 more than a prophet, even John the harbinger, 
 to repeat the prophecy as fulfilled, '* Behold the 
 Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the 
 world.' Inspired apostles take up the heavenly 
 theme, repeating evermore the name that is above 
 every name, until in the apocalyptic vision Jesus 
 again appears as the alpha and omega, the begin- 
 ning and the ending, the first and the last ; and with 
 the revelation completed is heard the echo of the 
 new song in heaven : " Unto him that loved us, and 
 washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath 
 made us kings and priests unto God and his 
 Father ; to him be glory and dominion forever and 
 ever." Rev. i. 5, 6. 
 
 Along this line of divine revealing it were ration- 
 al to expect that attendant miracles would gather. 
 That they multiply in number and in significance 
 would not surprise us, but would rather comport 
 with the greatness of the revealing and thus the 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 65 
 
 better satisfy our rational expectation. And this 
 accords precisely with the record. These are the 
 external credentials of the revelation, corroborat- 
 ing the internal evidences. They are the works of 
 Christ. He maketh the dumb to speak, the deaf to 
 hear, the blind to see, the lame to walk ; he heals 
 the leprous ; restores the paralytic ; walks upon the 
 sea; ca ms the winds and the waves; multiplies the 
 five loaves to feed the hungry thousands ; casts out 
 devils ; raises the dead ; and, higher still, forgives 
 sin ; transforms moral character ; binds sinners to 
 himself in bonds of everlasting love, making them 
 his disciples and apostles; breathes upon them the 
 Holy Ghost ; inspires them for a divine mission preach- 
 ing Chiist and him crucified with signs following. 
 
 This general survey, which involves so many 
 convincing particulars, might easily be made specific. 
 And now, to a candid scrutiny of this Revelation 
 concerning Christ from the first intimations in Eden, 
 the promises to Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, the 
 speaking in times past unto the fathers by the 
 prophets, the Old Testament of sacrifice and atone- 
 ment sealed with blood as typical until the types are 
 realized and the prophecies fulfilled in Christ — 
 to the candid mind is there not manifest a com- 
 prehensive, consistent, wonderful plan more and 
 more fully revealing God to man until it culminates 
 
1 66 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 according to prophecy and promise in the Incarna- 
 tion — "■ God manifest in the flesh, justified in the 
 spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, 
 believed on in the world, received up into glory?" 
 1 Tim. iii. i6. 
 
 Such is the written Word of Revelation, and such, 
 the living Word. Is this living Word a revealing of 
 God ? In what way could God reveal himself to 
 men more fully? How otherwise could the Divine 
 be brought into such near communion with men? 
 What divine trait can human reason conceive which 
 is not revealed in Christ ? When has divine excel- 
 lence been so exalted ? How could holiness receive 
 a higher exemplification ? Christ was without sin. 
 How could divine justice receive superior vindica- 
 tion? Christ came not to destroy, but to fulfill the 
 law— every jot and tittle. How else could the 
 mercy of God be made so conspicuous? " Grace and 
 truth came by Jesus Christ." " He was full of grace 
 and truth." ''Where sin abounded, grace did much 
 more abound." In him is revealed '' the exceeding 
 riches " of divine grace. And the love of God is 
 commended unto us in that '' While we were yet 
 sinners, Christ died for us." This thought is capa- 
 ble of indefinite expansion, but I may not pursue 
 it here. 
 
 In this Revelation, '' Mercy and truth are met 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 6/ 
 
 together ; righteousness and peace have kissed each 
 
 other " 
 
 " Nor dare a creature guess 
 
 Which of the glories brighter shines 
 The justice or the grace." 
 
 The two-fold method of argument, — the direct 
 and the indirect — is applicable in this as in the pre- 
 ceding chapters. The indirect argument is cumula- 
 tive with the admissions of objectors, such as Rous- 
 seau and Renan and Strauss and Parker, both to the 
 supreme excellence of Scripture and the matchless 
 merit of Jesus ; and the reply of Lessing to the 
 neologists is more than an admission — it is a refuta- 
 tion, as well as an argument. 
 
 But these we need not stop to particularize. 
 Nor need we extend the direct argument by dwell- 
 ing upon the doctrines of the Gospel. These doc- 
 trines are but the outgrowth of the Christian 
 principle, the systematizing of the revelations of 
 Christ, to be preserved in the divine record for 
 universal reference. So that henceforth, as both 
 fact and precept it may be said : Search the Script- 
 ures : they are they which testify of Christ. So 
 that henceforth in the ministration of the Spirit, He 
 shall take of the things of Christ and shew them unto 
 men. And in the highest office which he performs, 
 he doth fulfill the Saviour's prayer : " Sanctify thern 
 through thy truth ; thy word is truth.'* 
 
1 68 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 The Scriptures are their own best interpreter. 
 He is the wisest expounder who best compares 
 things spiritual with spiritual. 
 
 The doctrines of the gospel, then, constitute the 
 doctrine of Christ. The holy Scriptures are the re- 
 pository divinely appointed. To perpetuate the 
 Gospel of Christ and teach it to all nations, the 
 Scriptures are necessary. De Quincy has well said : 
 ** No book, no doctrine. No doctrine, no book." 
 
 Words of intense significance conclude the reve- 
 lation from God : " If any man shall add unto these 
 things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are 
 written in this book ; and if any man shall take 
 away from the words of the book of this prophecy, 
 God shall take away his part out of the book of life, 
 and out of the holy city, and from the things which 
 are written in this book." Rev. xxii- i8, 19. 
 
 The revelation in the written and the living 
 Word has an historic reality on which faith may 
 securely rest ; a divine personality with which faith 
 may commune ; a spiritual life which faith may 
 share ; a divine doctrine which faith may practice 
 and proclaim ; a gospel of salvation which faith may 
 preach to every creature with the abiding pledge of 
 Christ's presence and power. 
 
 We have now reached a valid ground for faith in 
 its highest exercise, — saving trust in the Redeemer. 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 69 
 
 There is not only faith in God, as he is seen in 
 nature, in providence, in scripture, and by which he 
 is known so far forth ; but faith in Christ as the 
 revealer of God and the reconciler of men, the ex- 
 press image of the one, the Saviour of the other, 
 the mediator between God and man. And '' This " 
 saith the Saviour, *' is life eternal, that they might know 
 thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou 
 hast sent." Every step of our advance has been upon 
 valid ground, until we have legitimately and securely 
 reached this climax of faith — which bringeth salvation 
 In securing this result as a personal experience, 
 it is to be especially remembered that the Holy 
 Spirit effectually contributes : taking of the things of 
 Christ and showing them unto men. Reasoning of 
 sin and righteousness and judgment, quickening the 
 moral powers to a new Hfe, — a Hfe of faith upon the 
 Son of God. 
 
 A new experience is the steady spiritual out- 
 growth of this new Hfe of faith. This experience is 
 to the soul an earnest of eternal fruition, and a 
 spiritual support and defence, invincible by any form 
 of skeptical or vain philosophy — more than this, a 
 defence and support unassailable by any foe. To the 
 doubting, the hostile, the curious, the candid in- 
 quirer, the reply of Christian experience is : We have 
 found the Messiah. Come and see, 
 8 
 
I/O FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 This individual (inner) witness is corroborated 
 and confirmed by the ministration of the Spirit in 
 perpetuating the reign of Christ and extending it, 
 not through force, but through faith working by love. 
 Christianity vindicates itself by its power over the 
 individual soul and over society, purifying and 
 redeeming the one, civilizing and exalting the other. 
 
 Prophecy, too, is a standing external witness, as 
 in the case of the dispersion of the Jews for 1800 
 years, and onward to their final ingathering, when 
 the fullness of the Gentiles be come in, Rom. xi., 
 whose dispersion shall be the reconciling of the 
 world, and whose receiving shall be life from the 
 dead. 
 
 So, universal human history shall contribute 
 with myriad voices to verify the divine revelation. 
 Then shall it appear to every creature that the Lion 
 of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, hath pre- 
 vailed to unseal and open the book of the Divine plan 
 and Providence ; and, by his redemptive work as the 
 Lamb that was slain, ^' is worthy to receive power 
 and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, 
 and glory, and blessing," Rev. v. 12. 
 
 If now it be demanded. Can human Reason fully 
 comprehend Christianity ? Faith replies : No, it 
 is a life, not a philosophy of life. Can it be proved ? 
 Faith as readily replies : Yes, by divine testimony 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 171 
 
 and by Christian experience. How shall we know it 
 as a reality? The answer is : By trying it. No test 
 can be more simple, or can more readily commend 
 itself to human reason. The answer evermore is 
 and can be no otherwise : " If ye do his will ye shall 
 know of the doctrine." No one has applied this 
 test according to the direction of faith and given tes- 
 timony against the Gospel. 
 
 The soul fully satisfied that God has given a 
 Revelation in the written and the living Word — in 
 the Scriptures and in Christ — Faith, henceforth, 
 assumes its legitimate prerogative. With the con- 
 sent of reason it looks beyond human reason to a 
 higher, even a divine guide. It believes in God, and 
 believes also in Christ. Having rationally received 
 Christ as divine, we believe that he is competent to 
 instruct our ignorance ; and believing in his complete 
 veracity, we accept all that he may reveal although 
 we are unable to comprehend all that he may say. 
 He may speak in grace as freely or unexpectedly or 
 marvellously as in nature. Who shall dictate to 
 God in the creation and control of worlds or of atoms? 
 Who shall dictate the revelation or the riches of 
 divine grace ? 
 
 The Scientist, with philosophic faith, acts as the 
 interpreter of nature ; the Christian, with Evangel- 
 ical faith, acts as the minister of grace. 
 
172 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Now, it is easy by faith to understand that the 
 worlds were framed by the Word of God. 
 
 Now, in the superior h"ght of Revelation, it is 
 rational and easy to look not at the things which are 
 seen and temporal, but at the things unseen and 
 eternal. Now, in this superior light Vv^hich reason 
 recognizes as divine, it seems not only desirable, but 
 clear to faith that God should establish his kingdom 
 among men ; — a kingdom that is not meat and 
 drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the 
 Holy Ghost — a spiritual kingdom. 
 
 In order to this, it seems to faith consistent that 
 material interests be made subordinate and subserv- 
 ient to the spiritual ; and so, that all be ordained in 
 the hands of the Mediator, and that this gracious 
 work of renovation and purification and exaltation 
 be effected by the ministration of the Spirit, the only 
 competent agency. Henceforth, faith becomes to 
 the human soul the substance of things hoped for, 
 the evidence of things not seen. The soul is justified 
 by faith in Christ who is made unto us wisdom and 
 righteousness and sanctification and redemption. 
 Thus we rise to a new spiritual life of communion 
 with God through our Lord Jesus Christ ; so that 
 henceforth we live — in the truest, highest, best sense 
 — we live by faith. This is not abstract or mythical, 
 but rational and simple, commended to human rea- 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM. 1 73 
 
 son in the light of infinite reason. Henceforth, we 
 walk by faith as seeing God who is invisible, and 
 have the testimony that we please God — for, at this 
 stage of our advance, even finite reason is competent 
 to affirm, (what revelation declares) that without 
 faith it is impossible to please God. At every pro- 
 gressive step we rise higher and higher into spiritual 
 life and spiritual communion with him who is the 
 fountain of life and of light. Henceforth, faith works 
 by love, combining graces in one spiritual charac- 
 ter which becomes more excellent as the combina- 
 tion of graces becomes more comprehensive : 
 " Until we all come in the unity of the faith and of 
 the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect 
 man." Eph. iv. 13. 
 
 Now. whether faith be set forth prominently by 
 Paul, or love by John, or hope by Peter, or works 
 by James, it is to the believer only the clearer un- 
 folding of graces which are really inseparable. To 
 the view of faith, variety in revelation harmonizes 
 in a higher unity hke the separate colors of the rain- 
 bow blending in the clear light of day. It is then 
 the prerogative of faith to illumine, to guide, to 
 stimulate the soul. *' Paganism," as De Quincy has 
 justly said, " Paganism aimed at no distant prize 
 ahead ; it fled from a danger immediately behind." 
 
174 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 This is equally true of rationalistic infidelity and 
 atheistic materialism. 
 
 In the darkness which surrounds them, they are 
 confronted evermore by despair, by which, though 
 resisted again and again, they must at length be 
 overborne. The spirit of the times, so far forth as 
 divorced from Christ, is one of spiritual unrest and 
 despair. 
 
 This appears in literature and science, as well as 
 in morals and religion. But faith, saving faith in 
 Christ, gives rest — the rest of a liberated soul — a 
 rest at once intellectual (for they that do his will 
 know of the doctrine) and spiritual — repose in God 
 as a Father, in Christ as a Saviour, in the Holy 
 Ghost as a purifier, in the Scriptures as the word of 
 truth making wise unto salvation. They which 
 have believed do enter into rest. 
 
 In its complete exercise, then, as saving trust in 
 the Redeemer faith assumes exalted prerogative. It 
 commends to the human reason the highest guide, 
 even the divine ; the loftiest motives, even those 
 that are infinite and eternal ; an infallible rule for 
 belief and life, even the inspired Scriptures ; an Al- 
 mighty Saviour, even Jesus ; an unfailing witness, 
 companion and comforter, even the Holy Ghost. 
 By rightful prerogative higher than the human it 
 secures for man all the blessings of salvation, and 
 
FAITH AND POSITIVISM, 1/5 
 
 from man humble and hearty obedience. It prompts 
 to this obedience by presenting a faultless model, 
 even the perfect Christ, tempted in all points like 
 as we are, yet without sin, leaving us an example 
 that we should follow his steps; a divine friend 
 whom it behooved to be made like unto his brethren 
 that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest ; 
 stooping to our low estate that he might redeem us 
 from the curse of the law and lift us with himself to 
 the throne of his divine majesty ; encouraging us to 
 overcome and sit with him in his throne, as he also 
 overcame and is set down with the Father in his 
 throne. Rev. iii. 21. 
 
 In the light of revelation, faith evermore cheers 
 the soul with divine promise, begetting patience in 
 sorrow, waiting for God — strength in weakness, 
 resting on God — courage in danger, trusting in God 
 — diligence in business, serving the Lord — peace, vic- 
 tory even in death, through our Lord Jesus Christ. 
 
1/6 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ADMISSIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL SCEPTICISM. 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL scepticism, not content with 
 -■" occupying the neutral ground of doubt, prefers 
 to be polemic. Studiously avoiding the defensive, 
 it adopts an aggressive policy. Affecting the hau- 
 teur of positivism, it boasts that along its march lie 
 tattered creeds and theologians slain. By this dia- 
 lectic legerdemain it has been wont to divert critical 
 attention from itself, and impose the burden of proof 
 upon Christian theism. 
 
 Christianity has never shirked the burden of 
 proof. The Master assumed it, as a divine Teacher 
 pointing to divine credentials, saying : " Go and 
 show John again those things which ye do hear and 
 see : The blind receive their sight, and the lame 
 walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the 
 dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel 
 preached to them " (Matt. xi. 4, 5). " The works 
 that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness 
 of me " (John x. 25). " If I do not the works 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 1 7/ 
 
 of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though 
 ye believe not me, believe the works " (John 
 
 X. 37, 38). 
 
 The apostles, as they proclaimed the gospel of 
 Christ, accepted the burden of proof. Peter declares : 
 '' We have not followed cunningly devised fables, 
 
 but were eye-witnesses of his majesty. . . . 
 
 The voice which came from heaven we heard when 
 we were with him in the holy mount " (2 Pet. i. 16, 
 17, 18). *' We speak that we do know, and testify 
 that we have seen " (John iii. 1 1). And they charged 
 the disciples, *' Be ready always to give an answer 
 to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope 
 that is in you " (i Pet. iii. 15). 
 
 But while Christianity, in the spirit of the Mas- 
 ter, is always ready to take the burden of proof, 
 and frankly answer the inquiries of every candid 
 mind, it has a logical and a moral right, after eigh- 
 teen hundred years of recognition by the best and 
 the most intelligent individuals and nations — it has 
 a right to claim the presumption in its favor, to 
 challenge the strength of its modern adversary, and 
 put philosophic scepticism upon the defensive. The 
 inevitable reply to this challenge is the acknowl- 
 edged inability to prove that there is no God. 
 This acknowledgment, however reluctant, is uni- 
 versal. The attempt, persistent and repeated, has 
 
178 FAITH AMD MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 issued not in demonstration, but in denial, supported 
 evermore by negative premises, like the assertion of 
 La Place, that no God could be seen within the 
 range of his telescope. But, as every logician knows, 
 negative premises prove nothing. The telescope of 
 La Place could not survey the universe ; and if it 
 could, yet would it discern only material bodies, 
 which appear in space. God is not such a being. 
 The telescope of La Place could not detect the mind 
 even of its maker, much less of Him who created 
 the heavens and the earth. Neither the telescope 
 nor the microscope can detect mind and thought. 
 Such denials are only argiunenta ad ignorantiam. 
 This first admission of philosophical scepticism is 
 fundamental, and reveals its essential weakness, and 
 yields to theism a matchless advantage both for 
 attack and for defence. 
 
 But the admission is not exhausted with this 
 statement. The very attempt to prove that there is 
 no God has been rebuked by the school of sceptics 
 as unauthorized and rash. The latest attempt of 
 this kind, that of the intrepid Dr. Biichner, is re- 
 ferred to by the Westminster Review (Oct. 1872) in 
 the following words of friendly, but significant warn- 
 ing : *' Dr. Biichner seems to overstep the limits of 
 scientific argument, in that he endeavors to prove 
 the Unknowable [Herbert Spencer's nomenclature] 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 1 79 
 
 to be untrue — a position which seems, on the face 
 of it, to be self-contradictory." 
 
 Here, not for the sake of the argument, but to 
 reHeve the mind of some unfledged sceptic who may 
 deem this warning gratuitous, it may be mentioned 
 that Mr. Spencer affirms the existence of the infi- 
 nite, the unknowable, as source of all that is. " The 
 ultimate religious truth of the highest possible cer- 
 tainty " is '' that the power which the universe man- 
 ifests to us is utterly inscrutable." * And again : 
 ** Appearance [manifestation] without reality is 
 unthinkable." t Therefore "the inscrutable power" 
 is *' a reality " ; and still again, according to Mr. 
 Spencer, " to say that we*can not know the absolute 
 [or inscrutable power] is, by implication, to affirm that 
 there is an absolute," % and more to the same effect. 
 
 Mr. Darwin declares : " The question whether 
 there exists a Creator and Ruler of the universe has 
 been answered in the affirmative by the highest 
 intellects that have ever lived." Again he says : 
 " An omniscient Creator must have foreseen every 
 consequence which results from the law imposed 
 by him " ; and again, referring to natural laws : 
 " An omnipotent and omniscient Creator ordains 
 everything and foresees everything." § 
 
 * First Principles, p. 46. t p. 88. % p. 91. 
 
 § Animals and Plants under Domestication, Vol. ii. p. 431. 
 
l8o FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT, 
 
 Sir John Lubbock, speaking of ^' The Origin of 
 Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man," 
 says : *' The whole exhibits one grand scheme of 
 progression, . . . having for its object the con- 
 tinual manifestation of the design, the power, the 
 wisdom, the goodness of Almighty God." Thomas 
 Paine inserts in his creed: ** I believe in one God, 
 and no more, and I hope for happiness beyond this 
 life." * " The Journal of Speculative Philosophy " 
 (William Harris of St. Louis, editor), the modern 
 representative of the Hegelian school in America, 
 vindicates Hegel against the charge of irreligion, 
 " Not only in not denying God, freedom, and immor- 
 tality — the three cardinal points of religious faith — 
 but in affirming them as the highest consequences 
 of his speculations, rejecting atheism and pantheism 
 in the clearest words." And, not to extend this 
 line of admission, '' the new philosophy," in its 
 newest drift,t admits — asserts — '' an almighty will, 
 whose very life is idea, whose action produces time 
 and all its facts and phenomena ... an uncon- 
 scious will and idea which called all creatures into 
 being." His system, like that of his master, Scho- 
 penhauer, ** starts from a positive idea of the spirit- 
 uality, and also impersonality, of an overruling 
 
 * See Frothingham's " Beliefs of Unbelievers." 
 f Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. l8l 
 
 power — a will ruling over all nature and life," and 
 rejects with contempt the gross hypothesis which 
 would make matter originant, and reduce all things 
 to materialism. 
 
 This primary admission of philosophical scep- 
 ticism, we repeat, is fundamental, and at once casts 
 suspicion upon the whole sceptical superstructure. 
 
 Closely related to this is another admission, viz., 
 the inherent weakness of philosophical scepticism. 
 Speaking of physical science, Professor Tyndall 
 says : " The logical feebleness of science is not 
 sufficiently borne in mind." "^ And again : " We 
 know not the connection between the body and 
 mind." f As Mivart has forcibly said, " Physical 
 science, as such, has nothing to do with the soul of 
 man, which is hyperphysical," :j: a fortiori, we say, it 
 has nothing to do, as such, with God who is a 
 Spirit, who is before all things, and by whom all 
 things consist. It can not reach to the question of 
 the supernatural, the question at issue. ** The su- 
 pernatural is not to be expected or looked for in 
 the sphere of mere nature." § " No investigation of 
 natural laws can show the conception of the divine 
 action to be false." *' Physical science can have 
 
 * Pall Mall Gazette, June 15, 1868. 
 f Eclectic Magazine, p. 380, 1869. 
 X p. 303. § P- 284. 
 
1 82 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 nothing whatever to do with absolute or primary 
 creation." This point is well stated by Baden Pow- 
 ell : *' Science demonstrates incessant past changes, 
 and dimly points to yet earlier links in a more vast 
 series of developments of material existence ; but 
 the idea of a bes^innin^ or of creation in the sense 
 of original operation of divine volition to constitute 
 nature and matter, is beyond the province of physi- 
 cal philosophy.'' "^ Mr. Darwin says : " Our ignorance 
 of the laws of variation is profound." f 
 
 Comte proclaimed that philosophy must be posi- 
 tive, that is, leave no unknowable behind it, thus 
 directly contradicting Herbert Spencer. But if phi- 
 losophy ought to be so, it can not be so on Comte's 
 plan — the plan of mere experience ; for no experi- 
 ence can affirm with certainty that behind the 
 phenomenal there is, or is not, an unknown reality. 
 For philosophical scepticism to deny or ridicule, on 
 physical grounds, the doctrine of divine existence 
 were as illogical as for the blind man to deny 
 the existence of the sun. Had this admission not 
 been made by Tyndall and others, it were no less 
 obvious ; for positive science in its very nature 
 involves it. Positive science instructs us to advance 
 only so far as we know. Mr. Mill, its most precise 
 
 * Philosophy of Creation, Essay iii. Sec. 4, p. 480. 
 f Origin of Species, Summary of chap. v. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 1 83 
 
 and profound exponent, declares that we know only 
 phenomena ; that these have no real bond of con- 
 nection ; that they are only associated by the know- 
 ing soul as antecedent and sequent ; that the soul 
 itself is only a series of feelings with no more real 
 bond of connection than belongs to the external phe- 
 nomena — mere antecedence and sequence ; that by 
 such an unreliable association, which such an unrelia- 
 ble soul has exalted into an unreliable law of 
 unreliable induction, we know for all things phenom- 
 enal their phenomenal law may change on this 
 phenomenal planet. Even the phenomenal soul 
 may undergo a like complete change in its phenom- 
 enal law of knowing, so that even here what seems 
 to be, and to be a law, may not be, or may be 
 reversed ; so that two and two shall make five 
 in mathematics, two straight lines may inclose a 
 figure in space, intelligence become folly in mind, 
 and right become wrong in morals, and why not, 
 with the utmost precision of Mr. Mill's logic, a God 
 not appearing be at the next moment a God appear- 
 ing? Or, to put it on the negative side more 
 strongly than Mr. Mill could by his phenomenal 
 system, a God impossible be a God possible ! And 
 if for this world this is the logical and inevitable 
 resultant of positivism, in the prudent and precise 
 interpretation of its ablest exponent, a fortiori 
 
1 84 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 it may be for other worlds. By the very constitu- 
 tion of its system positivism deprives itself of the 
 possibility of making any, the least, positive denial 
 of the question at issue ; and, further still, its princi- 
 ples (if they deserve the name) are subversive even 
 of positive science. Its fundamental premise — 
 while it is all that mere sensation can furnish, is, 
 in the light of reason, positively unstable and self- 
 destructive. '' All things flow," said the old Ionic 
 positivists ; but these modern positivists assert that 
 there is nothing but the flow, and that is only 
 a "possibility for sensation," and therefore may not 
 be what it seems ; the very consciousness in which 
 the seeming *' flow " appears is only a flow, and may 
 not be what it seems; and the soul itself is a flow 
 of flowing feelings. So that, things are only phe- 
 nomenal; consciousness is only phenomenal; the 
 soul is only phenomenal. There is nothing but the 
 flow, and that may not be what it seem.s; indeed, it 
 may not be at all. 
 
 Can such a fundamental premise be other than 
 self-destructive ? Can such principles be other than 
 subversive of " positive science " ? Is not such a sys- 
 tem (we repeat) by its very constitution forever de- 
 prived of the possibility of making any, the least, 
 positive denial of the issue involved in this discussion ? 
 Besides, how reliable can be an induction based upon 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 1 85 
 
 such a shifting ground ? We wonder not that when 
 the possible sensation reached Mr. Mill's " series of 
 feelings " (for soul) that his fundamental premise 
 was silently stealing away, the despairing admission 
 escaped his lips : " Faith in induction is of slow 
 growth." Alas ! the utter imbecility and nescience 
 of positivism ! Weaker than a broken reed to lean 
 upon, it is at best, and only, a seeming reed — " Only 
 this, and nothing more." Its appropriate description 
 would be a philosophic parody on Poe's " Song of 
 the Raven." Is such a system a thing to be proud 
 of? Does it offer a fitting Hcense for dogmatism? 
 Above all, does it authorize its votaries to indulge 
 in defiance and insult toward faith in God, the faith 
 of our age, the faith of all the ages ? If mere ante- 
 cedence and sequence make up all there is in caus- 
 ality, then science is a mere seeming, the absurd 
 assertion that Tenterden steeple is the cause of Sud- 
 bury downs should satisfy the author of Mill's Logic, 
 and the reasoning of the peasant should take rank 
 with that of the philosopher.* 
 
 But the admission does not exhaust itself with 
 this statement. Still more is implied in the failure 
 to array science against Christian theism. In 
 almost every case — astronomy, geology, comparative 
 philology, etc. — the attempt has been made, and 
 
 * Mill's Logic, i. 
 
l86 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 the pre-judged opposition trumpeted. But uniformly 
 has time compelled the admission that true science is 
 not hostile to true religion. Indeed, since the time 
 of Bacon, science has been the strong and sure ally 
 of religious faith ; stronger and surer as it has 
 grown mature. x\stronomy has enlarged and 
 established the illustrations of eternal power and 
 wisdom, until, as never before, the heavens have 
 declared to man the glory of God, and the firmament 
 has showed his handiwork. *' Elegantissima haecce 
 compages solis, planetarum, et cometarum (et stel- 
 larum), non nisi consilio et dominio. Entis cujusdam 
 potentis et intelligentis oriri potuit. " ^ Although 
 celestial bodies moving through the depths of illim- 
 itable space have not all regarded the scientific dictate 
 of La Place, f that all generated motion must lie 
 in the same direction, yet they have implicitly re- 
 garded a higher law and Lawgiver ; so that the 
 satellite of Neptune, or of Uranus, however opposite 
 its direction, has not disturbed the harmony of 
 celestial motion. Suns and satellites now, as when 
 Newton wrote or David sung or Isaiah prophesied 
 declare the glory of him " who bringeth out their 
 host by number ; who calleth them all by names by 
 the greatness of his might, for that he is strong in 
 
 * Newton's Principia. 
 
 f Systerae du Monde, Livre iv. chap. 2, p. 226. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 1 8/ 
 
 power ; not one faileth ' (Isa. xl. 26). The preva- 
 lence and fitness of one simple but efficient law, — the 
 law of gravitation — has been inductively traced, 
 until, not by demonstration, but by progressive 
 approach, it has been declared and believed to be 
 universal ; as if the universe were in fact one — 
 bound to one centre by one law ordained by one 
 supreme Creator. 
 
 Geology has not only illustrated, but well-nigh 
 demonstrated, tenets of religious faith held for ages 
 as most exalted and far-reaching. In all this array 
 of scientific witness for religious faith there has been 
 no speech, no language. No voice has been heard ; 
 but the words (the expression) have gone forth 
 through all the earth and to the end of the world. 
 
 But another scientific witness has recently offered 
 its testimony for religious faith through speech, in 
 language and with a voice coming up from all the 
 earth, — the science of comparative philology. All 
 through the Aryan family, as it has spread over Eu- 
 rope and over India from its Asiatic centre more than 
 five thousand years ago, religious faith has been 
 invariably and universally entertained and expressed, 
 repeated and recorded in living words. In the She- 
 mitic language, Jehovah God has been the sacred 
 name supreme, borne everywhere most piously by 
 every member of the whole Shemitic family whether 
 
1 88 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Chaldean, Mohammedan, or Jew, whether in Asia or 
 Africa, or the Moor-lands in Spain, or the Islands of 
 the Sea. While the remnants of the human race, 
 however concentrated or dispersed, wherever wan- 
 dering, whether Basque or Finn or Tartar or Ameri- 
 can savage, have carried with them the idea of the 
 Great Spirit, have believed in him reverently and 
 worshiped, and have piously transmitted this faith 
 to their children and their children's children forever. 
 
 The science of comparative philology, in all the 
 speech of earth, with myriad living voices and count- 
 less winged words, not only testifies for the past, but 
 tells to the present and to all coming time — tells of 
 faith in God. Mr. Spencer has asserted a postulate, 
 which is fundamental with him, that invariable behef 
 is the highest possible test of certainty in human 
 knowledge. In his own words, '-The invariable ex- 
 istence of a belief is our sole warrant for every truth 
 of immediate consciousness, for every primary gener- 
 alization of the truths of immediate consciousness, for 
 every axiom, and for every demonstration." ^ The 
 youngest neophyte can easily apply Mr. Spencer's 
 postulate to the case in hand. One thing, at least, 
 is evident, that there is no conflict between true 
 science and true faith. 
 
 In reaching the conclusions to which I have just 
 
 * Psychology, p. 28. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 1 89 
 
 alluded, science has in each direction pursued the 
 hne of induction, assuming for an invariable law, as 
 Bacon did, the principle that every effect must have 
 a cause, an adequate cause, and therefore the course 
 of nature is uniform and constant, and the method 
 of induction is valid. This is in direct contrast to 
 the bastard induction of Mill, which, as he complains, 
 is " slow of acceptance," and should be ; because it 
 can never be reliable, based as it is upon a baseless 
 ''possibility of sensation," which is itself based upon 
 the baseless *' series of feelings " of a baseless men- 
 tal being, which, if it exist, according to this use- 
 less and spurious induction, " never can be truly 
 known." 
 
 True science, following not the false but the true 
 Baconian method of induction, has, in its different 
 directions, reached these conclusions confirming re- 
 ligious faith ; while the great representatives of 
 science, Bacon, Locke, Newton, Whitney — not to 
 mention a host of no less worthy names which 
 throng the vast temple of science — really and rever- 
 ently believe in God. We recall Mr. Darwin's 
 testimony, which will be admitted as " calm and 
 impartial," at least in this direction : '' The question 
 whether there exists a Creator and Ruler of the 
 universe has been answered in the affirmative by the 
 hicrhest intellects that have ever lived." To the 
 
190 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 sceptical scientist we commend the most thorough 
 appHcation of the Baconian method, " for," in the 
 words of its author, " while the mind of man looketh 
 upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest 
 in them, and go no farther ; but when it beholdeth 
 the chain of them, confederate and linked together, 
 it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." 
 
 We do not notice materialism for the reason that 
 it is not a settled science, nor can it be, by its very 
 nature. Scientific knowledge is based upon con- 
 sciousness, — the consciousness of the knower. But 
 consciousness testifies to the self and the not-self — 
 to mind as knowing, and matter as known but not 
 knowing — to both as existing, and existing in con- 
 trast. To impugn consciousness is to undermine 
 science; to discard the testimony of consciousness is 
 to destroy the possibility of science. I might in- 
 clude another reason, which may have greater weight 
 with those who are curious for anything in this 
 direction, — the admission of Professor Huxley: ** I 
 am no materialist, but, on the contrary, believe 
 materialism to involve grave philosophic error." * 
 And yet another reason, which may have still greater 
 weight : According to Professor Fiske, who will be 
 readily accepted as good authority by the class just 
 referred to : " Those who wish to see materialism, 
 
 * Physical Basis of Life. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. IQI 
 
 refuted by philosophic reasoning, and not by appeals 
 to vulgar prejudice, may be referred to the latter 
 portion of Mr. Spencer's lately-published volume on 
 Psychology." ^ 
 
 In the light of these preliminary admissions we 
 discern more clearly the appropriateness of Pro- 
 fessor Tyndall's *' Lecture on the Scientific Use of 
 the Inaagination," before the Liverpool Association, 
 and the peculiar force of his statement : *' The imag- 
 ination has become the mightiest instrument of the 
 ph)'sical discoverer " ; and that " by this power we 
 can lighten the darkness which surrounds the world 
 of the senses " ; that, *' in much which has been 
 recently said about protoplasm and life, there was 
 only the outgoings of the same power." But, not 
 to multiply quotations : after such statements by a 
 master of exact science we cease to wonder that 
 experts in positive philosophy and sympathetic 
 reporters, who nurse their scepticism at the neglect 
 not only of duty, but of philosophy, who proclaim 
 the great discoveries of physical science which they 
 do not even comprehend, and the explosion of the- 
 ology which they do not, and will not understand, 
 would thus conceal the weakness of their position, 
 or comfort themselves by imaginary victories. 
 
 * Letter of March i, 1871, to the New York World, from Mr. 
 John Fiske, of Harvard University. 
 
192 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 But we turn to another admission, — that man is 
 a reHgious being. 
 
 Of rationalism this is not only the admission, 
 but the assertion. Assuming as an axiom the prin- 
 ciple of an absolute religion, which belongs to man's 
 nature, and as such is common to humanity, ration- 
 alism arrays its objection against a written revelation 
 as philosophically and practically irrational ; that no 
 external revelation can extend the religious con- 
 viction already universal, or improve the internal 
 revelation of God to the soul. The Radical Club 
 recently listened with manifest approbation to this 
 statement from one of its lecturers, that " the relig- 
 ious element is one of the strongest in the hum.an 
 soul " — an admission offered as at once an explana- 
 tion and a confirmation of the fact that ** religious 
 controversies and wars have been the most bitter 
 and deadly which the world has ever known." 
 
 Spinoza, whom Dr. Hedge styles the typical 
 exponent of pantheism, — Spinoza taught the im- 
 manence and prevalence and interfusion of God, 
 flowing throughout the universe ; so that, in the 
 language of one of his interpreters, '* All religions 
 ha\'e windows that open to those all-governing 
 skies." Satan is expelled from the universe as an 
 impossibility, and all are religious, since, according 
 to pantheism, each beHeves in nothing but God. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 1 93 
 
 On the other hand, Comte, at first, magisterially 
 excluded religion from his positive system as a 
 delusion characterizing the childhood of the human 
 race ; but, finding the sentiment still prevalent and 
 persistent, upon maturer reflection he supplemented 
 positive science by an elaborate system of religion, 
 demanding for each day two hours of religious serv- 
 ice, with a '* Catechism of Positive Religion " and a 
 '' Positivist Calendar." * 
 
 While Mr. Mill rejects Comte's " Politique Posi- 
 tive " as a system of politics and morals, he applauds 
 his religious systems, but suggests as an improve- 
 ment that the " grand etre," the divinity Comte 
 would adore as collective humanity, we should wor- 
 ship in private adoration to woman as the sexeaimant, 
 the proper representative of the " grand etre," and, 
 whether dead or alive, " les vrais anges gardiens." 
 
 Mr. Spencer would rear his altar not to collective 
 humanity, but to the unknown God ; where Mr. 
 Huxley would unite with him in worship, not per- 
 chance with the expressiveness of Mr. Mill in his 
 private adoration of woman, or of Comte with the 
 public assembly of the French positivists in the two 
 hours daily devotion to the '' grand etre," or with 
 the English positivists in the presence of " coUec- 
 
 * See Publications of the English Branch of the Positive School 
 or, Publications of the American Branch. 
 9 
 
194 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 tive humanity " ; but Mr. Spencer and Mr. Huxley, 
 apart from the positivist assembly, would unite in 
 higher worship, ''for the most part of the silent 
 sort." 
 
 Mr. Froude tells us that " God gave us religion, 
 although the devil gave us theology." 
 
 Mr. Huxley speaks of the religious sentiments as 
 " the noblest and most human of man's emotions." * 
 Mr. Higginson declares : " The religion of the heart 
 can never perish, because it is a human instinct ; " 
 and he predicts that at some time in the future 
 ** there will meet in some one of the world's great 
 centres an oecumenical council of the human race, 
 drawn together by the natural religion of the human 
 race — the religion of the heart." \ 
 
 I have dwelt the longer upon this admission of. 
 philosophical scepticism, — that man is a religious 
 being, because it is fundamental toward theism and 
 significant of its inherent strength, in contrast with the 
 preliminary admissions already noted as significant 
 of the inherent weakness of scepticism. All religions 
 lead to the great question of God. Indeed, religion 
 is, strictly, a recognized relation toward God and 
 dependence upon him. Without this the term itself 
 is deprived of significance. The alternative is una- 
 
 * Lay Sermons, etc., p. i6. 
 f See Lectures at Horticultural Hall, Boston, January, 1871. 
 
I 
 
 ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. I95 
 
 voidable : Religious worship and dependence have a 
 correlative object, or this '* strongest element in the 
 human soul," this " noblest and most human of man's 
 emotions," is most false and deceptive — a conclusion 
 which would not only endanger religion, but with it 
 also endanger " positive philosophy." 
 
 But, while philosophical scepticism, by its own 
 admission, can not disprove the prevalence of the 
 religious sentiment among mankind, it is especially 
 powerless to disprove the facts of Christian expe- 
 rience. 
 
 This experience is attested by the best and the 
 wisest of each sex in every clime and in every age. 
 With the progress of civilization and the growth of 
 intelligence, the testimony accumulates. Challenged 
 to reply, philosophical scepticism remains in self- 
 adjudged silence. By its own admission it has not 
 applied the very test required by its own philosophy. 
 In the very nature of the case, it does not, can not 
 claim to have entered upon the ground of Christian 
 experience, much less to apply this test to the sys- 
 tem of faith, and still less to disprove the experimen- 
 tal argument which every Christian affirms for him- 
 self, and which the whole Christian world reaffirms 
 with combined consciousness and sincerity. This con- 
 cession, it should be observed, is by no means gracious, 
 but unavoidable, and is, it should be remembered, 
 
ig6 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 fundamental toward Christianity as experimental. 
 This is not, indeed, the field of sense, where men walk 
 only by sight, and live by bread alone. The phe- 
 nomena are not material ; " The kingdom of God is 
 not meat and drink " ; yet the experience is no less 
 real, no less intense. It is a life which transcends the 
 life of the animal as far as " righteousness and peace 
 and joy in the Holy Ghost " is more exalted than 
 mere sensual gratification. Nor is it, indeed, the field 
 of the understanding, when it judges merely accord- 
 ing to sense, depending for its premises solely upon 
 observation, and thence deducing conclusions by 
 dialectical processes, which the apostle Paul, in the 
 light of his Christian experience, has significantly 
 styled "■ vain philosophy." Yet the knowledge is no 
 less satisfying, no less certain. We speak what we 
 do know. We have not followed cunningly devised 
 fables. Whether there be tongues they shall cease, 
 or knowledge [phenomenal knowledge], it shall van- 
 ish away ; but " this is life eternal, to know the only 
 true God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent." 
 Within this field of " noblest and most human ex- 
 perience," thronged by multitudes of the best and 
 wisest witnesses — within this field physical science, 
 by the very nature of the case, can not enter ; and 
 here philosophical scepticism can only in silence 
 doubt ; it can not deny ; and here most forcibly is it 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 1 9/ 
 
 reminded of Tyndall's confession : " The logical 
 feebleness of physical science is not sufficiently 
 borne in mind." Yet this is only the negative 
 statement of a fact self-evident, that for philo- 
 sophical scepticism on physical grounds to deny or 
 ridicule religious experience is not only feeble, but 
 illogical. 
 
 But not to linger within the field of religion and 
 religious experience : in this extremity, philosophical 
 scepticism puts forth the plea of reason, instead of 
 experience, — that *' Reason is the only arbiter be- 
 tween truth and falsehood which we are sure we 
 possess." Such is the re-statement of the admission 
 by an authority no less unquestionable than the 
 Westminster Review, and as recent as October, 
 1872 ; an admission, be it however remembered, 
 though so recent, yet by no means novel — an ad- 
 mission, which it would seem might win the very 
 elect, but whose context warns of a foe in the garb 
 of friendship, while it discourses thus upon " The 
 -Esthetics of Physicism " : " As reason must ever be 
 the only medium by which the truth can be demon- 
 strated between man and man, it may be taken for 
 granted that pure materialism is the only creed 
 which a rational creature can adopt." However we 
 may regard the admission, it is utterly impossible to 
 accept the logic. Indeed, we can conceive of no 
 
igS FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 principle of reason or process of reasoning- which 
 authorizes the conclusion ; not even with " the 
 possibiHty for sensation " and " the series of feel- 
 ings " (for soul) manipulated by the adroit induction 
 of Mr. Mill's logic that two and two may make five 
 and that two straight lines may inclose a triangle ; 
 for, in the enthymeme of the Westminster Review, 
 not only is a premise wanting and the process vitia- 
 ted by an illicit major, but the very terms assumed 
 are lost from the conclusion. However we may regard 
 this admission, it proves quite too much for the pur- 
 pose of " physicism." This appeal to reason as ar- 
 biter we not only accept as timely, but commend 
 as highly rational, if we may be pardoned the 
 apparent, but unreal pun. It is timely that expe- 
 rience itself be tested, which is possible only by the 
 proper standard ; it is essential that induction have 
 some reliable guide, which can only be by the 
 application of some authoritative rule. We thank 
 our modern sceptic '' for that word," — reason as ar- 
 biter. True, it does not harmonize precisely with 
 the claim of Spencer, that " Experience is the sole 
 origin of knowledge" ; * or of Comte, that " Phys- 
 ics is the mother of all science." f Still, reason shall 
 be the arbiter. It may not confirm the declaration 
 of Schelling and Hegel that ''Nature is petrified 
 * Recent Discussions, pp. 119, 167. f p. 117. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 1 99 
 
 intelligence " ; '^ nor the opinion of the materialist 
 that mind is rarefied matter. Still reason shall be 
 the arbiter. It may find something to condemn m 
 Spencer's definition of science, as *' an extension of 
 perceptions by means of reasoning " ; f or the state- 
 ment of Oken and Hegel, that " to philosophize on 
 nature is to re-think the great thought of creation. ";]: 
 Yet, according to the philosophical, and at the same 
 time sceptical, Westminster Review, " Reason is the 
 only arbiter." Indeed, to our surprise, Herbert 
 Spencer, in a careful review of Oken and Hegel, 
 seems to recognize the same authority, and make the 
 same appeal. Condemning Oken for applying *' a 
 bastard a priori method," Spencer proposes " the le- 
 gitimate a priori method, which sets out with proposi- 
 tions of which the negative is inconceivable." There 
 is, then, an a priori method, which is legitimate ; 
 and, by the admission and example of Mr. Spencer, 
 in the highest appeal, '' reason shall be arbiter." 
 
 We are thus, by this combined admission, 
 referred to an authority which may decide whether 
 experience itself can in any department of phenom- 
 ena be trusted — whether the senses themselves in 
 the reports they bring us are reliable ; or whether 
 the internal and the external worlds which are thus 
 reported are unreal and illusory, " like an insubstan- 
 * Recent Discussions, p. 169. \ p. 160. % p. 167. 
 
200 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 tial pageant." It is evident that some unquestion- 
 able authority must rule this testimony as valid, or 
 philosophical scepticism will invade the field of the 
 senses, and wrest even from positive philosophy all 
 assurance, and drive us into the formless void of 
 nihilism. 
 
 And beyond this, if bare facts and phenomena 
 are true, as the senses report, is there nothing else 
 — no bond of connection to unite these effects to 
 causes, and relate these phenomena to things, and 
 thus combine facts and forms and things into worlds, 
 and worlds into a real universe, existing in space 
 and time ? What shall decide whether this work of 
 the understanding is valid or vain? 
 
 No experience has reached and settled this 
 great question ; and if there be no other appeal, 
 then philosophical scepticism may successfully in- 
 vade the field of the understanding, and vitiate with 
 doubt the very process of induction. Without some 
 first principles, induction itself is impossible, and 
 neither experience nor understanding can avail. 
 But these first principles reason alone can supply. 
 Thus reason, and reason only, can guarantee the 
 validity of induction and deduction, and regulate 
 experience; in a word, save us from credulity on 
 the one hand, and doubt on the other — the Scylla 
 and Charybdis which threaten every course of 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 201 
 
 thought. Reason, then, shall be the arbiter. While 
 we promptly pledge submission to its rulings, we 
 shall insist that philosophical scepticism, according 
 to its own arrangement, be subject to the same au- 
 thority. If reason verify for the sense, we will accept 
 it, even to the utmost limit of physical science. If 
 it verify for the understanding, not only ourselves, 
 but positive philosophy must accept the verifications 
 with the authorized deductions. And if it verify 
 for itself, revealing to us in its own light fundamental 
 truths, reached by *' a legitimate a priori method "; 
 if in morals it rule the testimony of conscience to be 
 valid, and in religion assert the validity of revela- 
 tion ; if it discriminate between material and men- 
 tal phenomena, and refer the one to a physical, 
 the other to a metaphysical origin ; if it relate effect 
 to cause and qualities to substance ; if it affirm spir- 
 itual identity and free personality and moral obliga- 
 tion and the duties of religion, and thus condemn 
 philosophical scepticism as not only illogical, but 
 also irrational, we are still to abide by its superior 
 rulings. There is no appeal ; '' Reason," says the 
 Westminster Review, *' is the only arbiter." Cer- 
 tainly, we respond, if reason can and must verify for 
 the sense ; if it can and must verify for the under- 
 standing—certainly, it can verify for itself, in its own 
 light and by its own authority. And were we called 
 9* 
 
202 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 upon to establish an affirmative, instead of consid- 
 ering the admissions of philosophic scepticism, we 
 would show that thus reason does verify in the pre- 
 cise particulars indicated, and, having done this, 
 rest our cause. For, however man becomes man, 
 — whether by " natural selection," " evolution," or 
 " special creation," it is but a truism to assert that 
 man is what he is, and as such he must be regarded, 
 by common consent of selectionist, evolutionist, and 
 creationist, as the highest being on the earth ; as 
 such, his testimony must be admitted as the high- 
 est within the same sphere. And further, since he 
 can investigate and measure all things around him, 
 but can not be measured by them, so he is philo- 
 sophically the measure of all things. And further 
 still, he alone takes testimony from all the rest, 
 which he examines and pronounces upon in the 
 light of his own reason, thus guiding his own testi- 
 mony, and confirming it as the highest of all, and 
 decisive in the field, of science and philosophy. 
 This, his own reason declares legitimate, and from 
 this decision of human reason there can be no 
 appeal to an inferior tribunal. 
 
 But since the Westminster Review, notwith- 
 standing its admission, volunteers its support to Dr. 
 Buchner's theory of " matter and force " as *' all 
 that is," and to " materiahsm as the only creed 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM, 203 
 
 which a rational creature can adopt," it is fitting 
 that we call attention to other admissions of philo- 
 sophic scepticism, which have an important bearing 
 on this discussion. 
 
 Philosophic scepticism, be it physical or meta- 
 physical, admits that, at least, something is. Doubt 
 is. This is known by consciousness. And Mr. Mill 
 admits that "what is known by consciousness is 
 known beyond the possibility of question," "^ and 
 that thus " we know our feelings." But doubt is not 
 an abstraction, independent and unrelated. Doubt 
 is the mind doubting. It is the mind which doubts, 
 not mere matter. Already, by this admission, the 
 sceptic is borne beyond the control of his own scep- 
 ticism. The effect and the cause, that is, the actor 
 and the act, both are at once known and affirmed 
 by the consciousness. Even Herbert Spencer, with 
 singular precision, pointing out the divergence be- 
 tween some of his own views and those of Comte, 
 admits our consciousness of cause — "a consciousness 
 which remains dominant to the last as it was at the 
 first," f and declares: " The consciousness of cause 
 can be abolished only by abolishing consciousness 
 itself." X The doubt, then, is accounted for by re- 
 ferring it to the doubter. Thought and feeling and 
 
 * Logic, Introduction, p. 191. + Recent Discussions, p. 124. 
 
 X First Principles, Sec. 26. 
 
204 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 volition, — these appear in the Hght of consciousness. 
 Reason and conscience, too, are known with the 
 same conscious certainty; and these are accounted 
 for by referring them to the same conscious mind. 
 Mr. Spencer admits " the personality of which each 
 is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a 
 fact beyond all others the most certain." * 
 
 But the phenomena around him which bear no 
 resemblance to doubt or belief, to thought or feeling 
 or volition ; in a word, which bear no resemblance 
 to the phenomena of mind — how shall these be ac- 
 counted for? Evidently by referring them to some- 
 thing material, in which they inhere, and which 
 produces them. These phenomena do not exist as 
 abstractions, independent and unrelated. In the 
 irrefutable assertion of Mr. Spencer, which amounts 
 to more than an admission, " It is rigorously impos- 
 sible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge 
 of appearances only, without at the same time con- 
 ceiving a reality of which they are appearances ; for 
 appearances without reality is unthinkable." f The 
 admission, then, is inevitable that matter is, and 
 that mind is ; or distinguishing them by whatever 
 names, that something is which has material quali- 
 ties, — extension, figure, solidity, weight, and measure ; 
 and that something is which has mental qualities, — 
 
 * First Principles, p. 66. f p. 88. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 20$ 
 
 thought, feeling, volition, reason, and conscience. 
 By this admission the sceptic is borne beyond the 
 control of his own scepticism. But these material 
 things — how are they accounted for ? By a reason 
 in or out of themselves ? And the doubting mind — 
 how shall this be accounted for ? By a reason within 
 or without itself? For even Mr. Darwin admits not 
 only that mind — finite mind — is, but also that it has 
 not always been ; an admission which history ap- 
 proves and geology confirms. Must there have been 
 a super-cosmical mind, as the cause or origin ? Why 
 the demand that qualities be related to some sub- 
 stance as inherent — a demand which common sense 
 makes, and forever speaks ? Nothing but a thinking 
 soul would raise such a question, or could answer it. 
 The mind for itself sees what reason affirms and 
 consciousness reveals, that mental qualities, e. g., 
 thought, feeling, volition, inhere in mental substance. 
 A like demand is made that material quahties be 
 related to some substance as inherent. These 
 special questions concerning quality and substance, 
 effect and cause, and the all-embracing questions. 
 Whence? and How? and Why? are not peculiar to 
 the metaphysician and theologian. They are no less 
 common and urgent among the scientists and phi- 
 losophers, even the most positive of the positivists. 
 
206 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 The intrepid Buchner * not only raises these ques- 
 tions ; but in Part I. claims to answer the question 
 Whence do we come ? in Part II., Who are we? in 
 Part III., Whither do we go? In the first and 
 second Parts he modestly claims to " solve the great 
 mystery of existence " ! 
 
 Theoretically, indeed, as we are reassured, these 
 inquiries are magisterially forbidden. But the 
 irrepressible questions will not down at the bidding. 
 Theory is powerless here. Practically these ques- 
 tions are indulged ; in fact, they are continuously 
 repeated. What are the phenomena? is the clamor- 
 ous demand of positive science ; and whence ? from 
 force or volition ? from matter, or from mind ? and 
 how ? in correlation and conservation, or in persist- 
 ence and distinction ? by the law of evolution, — the 
 heterogeneous evolving from the homogeneous ? or 
 by the contrary process, — the heterogeneous appear- 
 ing according to intelligent prevision and superin- 
 tendence ? Are all phenomena the manifestation 
 of forces? And if so, are these forces correlative 
 and convertible? And if so, is matter force, or is it 
 motion ? And which is first, force or motion ? And 
 if matter is either, what is force ? or what is motion ? 
 and whence is it ? And if matter is neither, what is 
 it ? And which is first, matter or force or motion ? 
 
 * Place of Man in Nature. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 20/ 
 
 While such questions of positive science are 
 ceaselessly recurring, until they burden the press 
 and the public, it will not do for philosophical scep- 
 ticism to pretend disapprobation or contempt of 
 such inquiries, as if they were unauthorized or unim- 
 portant. The admission is as full as if it were for- 
 mal. This admission is, at the same time, confirmed 
 and extended by the varied, but unsatisfactory, 
 attempts of philosophy to answer these profound 
 questions. What? and Whence? and How? and 
 Why ? questions which are at once fundamental to 
 all science and native to all minds. Philosophical 
 theories have been elaborated and multiplied and 
 modified, until imitation has seemed unconscious, 
 and the old faintly or fully reappears in the new, 
 and originality, if longer possible, seems no longer 
 certain. As we may have occasion to refer to some 
 of these theories shrewdly labeled " modern," and 
 presented by the " new philosophy " as original, and 
 industriously paraded as triumphs of recent discov- 
 ery, it may be well to mention some of the earlier 
 theories. Even a brief mention will prepare us 
 somewhat the better to recognize old forms in new 
 faces. There is the theory that all things came by 
 chance, and then that all things are by fate ; that 
 even God can not be God since he must be con- 
 trolled by fate. 
 
208 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 The atomic theory of Democritus. or Moschus, 
 that atoms by fortuitous concurrence form this intri- 
 cate and orderly mechanism of man, and the no less 
 intricate and orderly universe of worlds. 
 
 The hylopathian theory of Anaximander, that 
 there are phenomena or qualities, but there is no sub- 
 stance ; that these qualities are real, yet originating 
 from nothing ; and that this dead matter, this chaos 
 of insubstantial yet real qualities, issued in an orderly 
 arrangement of organic and inorganic beings and 
 worlds and systems, and a universe evolving life and 
 mind and spirit. 
 
 The hylozoic theory, differing from the former 
 not in making matter the source of all things, but in 
 " ascribing latent life and understanding to the dead 
 matter." 
 
 I might omit the mention of the homoeomery of 
 Anaxagoras, who sought to avoid the absurdity of 
 producing phenomena from nothing, or qualities 
 without substance, and therefore supposed that the 
 atoms of Democritus '* were originally endued with 
 all those forms and qualities that are vulgarly con- 
 ceived to be in bodies, some bony, some fleshy 
 some fiery, some watery, some white, some black, 
 some bitter, some sweet, and the like." I might 
 omit the mention of homoeomery, since Anaxagoras 
 himself was a theist, at least not an atheist, and 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 209 
 
 taught that an eternal mind fashioned the eternal 
 matter. But this theory has been perverted to the 
 service of atheism, and, contrary to the intention of 
 its author, has been made to deny the existence 
 of God. 
 
 The theory of Parmenides (whom some theis- 
 tic apologists have vindicated from the charge of 
 atheism), the theory partly true and partly false, 
 that, *' as something could not come from nothing, 
 therefore creation, [absolute origination] was im- 
 possible " — a theory which has been suborned to 
 deny the existence of God ; though, if unbribed by 
 atheism, and uninfluenced by a false theory of crea- 
 tion, it would testify for God as Creator, and most 
 consistently with the true view of creation. 
 
 The theory of Empedocles, that hyle or rudiment- 
 ary matter was increate and indestructible. How- 
 ever this theory has been perverted, yet Empedocles 
 repudiated atheism. 
 
 Another theory, like the Ionic, taught that all 
 things flow without a guide or governor to regulate 
 the ceaseless movement ; yet, unlike the Ionic, 
 that not natural forces, resulting in motion, but fire 
 penetrated and subdued all things unto restless 
 commotion. 
 
 The theory of Protagoras, that whether there is a 
 real world which all in common may know as existing 
 
210 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 is wholly uncertain, since there is nothing in the 
 consciousness but sensations which are ever chang-. 
 ing and transitory. Man is the measure of all things, 
 but only for himself, and not for another. In this, 
 the self-styled modern theory of Mr. Mill may see 
 itself reflected. Such a theory would be too narrow 
 and fluctuating for establishing even a physical 
 science, much less a science of the human mind or 
 of God — a psychology or theology. While the 
 one theory referred all things to fire, another as- 
 cribed all things to water, and still another attrib- 
 uted all things to air as first mover in producing a 
 universe. 
 
 Thus has the atheistic (or non-theistic) adven- 
 turer in his chaotic realm of speculation been relent- 
 lessly tossed, fleeing now from the tempest of wind, 
 and now from the fiercer tempest of w^ater, and anon 
 from the still fiercer tempest of fire, only to plunge 
 into the fortuitous whirl of the restless atoms of a 
 universe — the sport of capricious chance, or the vic- 
 tim of blind and pitiless fate. 
 
 Such labored, confused, and unsatisfactory the- 
 ories — of which I have presented only a specimen — 
 imply the admission of a demand, which even the 
 atheist can not resist, to account for the existence 
 and order and design of himself and the universe ; 
 to seek, unintentionally, for the Author and Disposer 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 211 
 
 of all things ; in the simple but significant language 
 of Scripture, to '' seek the Lord, if haply they 
 might feel after him, and find him, though he be not 
 far from every one of us ; for in him we live and 
 move and have our being." 
 
 Lucretius, with logical dexterity equaled only by 
 the Westminster Review in its defence of Dr. Buch- 
 ner, denied that anything could have been made for 
 intended use, for the thing must exist before the use. 
 Hence he says there is no such thing as antecedent 
 knowledge doing anything by intention. Such logi- 
 cal adroitness could as well dispense with principle 
 or premise, and at once assume the desired conclu- 
 sion. It would not only abbreviate, but improve the 
 process. 
 
 Hobbes and the French atheists assert that 
 there is no higher power than the forces of nature, 
 and assume that the ideal element of thought, of 
 being, of power, of cause, and of nature is identical, 
 and therefore attribute to the material forces of 
 the material universe what the theist attributes to 
 the supreme intelligence. 
 
 Others, as Bruno, Hegel, and Schelling, maintain 
 that God is only the principles and laws of the uni- 
 verse ; that the universe is thus a sort of self-existing 
 and self-developing organism. 
 
 Others, as Spinoza, hold that, " prior to the crea- 
 
212 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 tion of the world God was not God : he was what he 
 was ; that God and all things are one and the same ; 
 that beside God no substance can be or be consid- 
 ered ; that God in the evolution of the material and 
 spiritual is the absolute Spirit ; that this Spirit be- 
 comes objective to itself in nature, and returns to 
 itself through the human spirit; that God becomes 
 self-conscious in man." 
 
 Lucretius denied the possibility of final cause. 
 These deny the possibility of miracle. 
 
 Antiquated sceptical theories have been repro- 
 duced, sometimes with, sometimes without, modern 
 modification. 
 
 " Gemmules infinitely numerous and infinitely 
 minute," which no human vision or skill of science 
 has ever detected — '' gemmules " have been sug- 
 gested, and *' pangenesis, " and ''natural selection 
 and sexual," to account for the origin of species and 
 the descent of man. This theory, embalmed and for 
 twenty centuries enjoying undisturbed repose, 
 scarcely introduced to the modern world, and by no 
 means established — this theory has been seized upon 
 by the eager sceptic, apparently longing for some 
 demonstration of his near kinship with the ape, and 
 of his more distant, but unbroken relation to the 
 Ascidian, and with undisguised satisfaction has been 
 pressed into the service of philosophical scepticism, 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 213 
 
 with persistent obliviousness of Mr. Darwin's admis- 
 sion that " animals have descended from at most 
 four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or 
 lesser number ; life with its several powers, having 
 been originally breathed by the Creator into a few 
 forms or into one." "^ 
 
 The hypothesis of " natural and sexual selection," 
 even if established, could not be decisive of the great 
 issue involved in this discussion. There would re- 
 main the question of origin to settle. For the sake 
 of argument, if we admit Darwin's theory that man 
 descends (is developed) from the monkey, differing 
 only in degree, that the ape descends from something 
 lower, and lower, and lower still, until we reach blank 
 matter, like the stock or the stone ; yet, since man 
 has the highest authority of anything in the domain 
 of nature as he is the highest development, and 
 since man is by this theory as strictly nature as the 
 stock or the stone, the testimony of man's inner 
 voice or reason must be paramount. What is this 
 testimony? Is it for or against the supernatural? 
 Evidently for it. All history, religions, literatures, 
 languages prove this. All these have recognized the 
 supernatural. We have the thoughts and the words 
 and the worship, the systems and the practice of all 
 the past in evidence on this point. We know not 
 
 * Origin of Species, p. 569, quoted by Mivart, p. 292. 
 
214 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 but other things, could they speak, would give the 
 same testimony. We know that man — rational 
 man — everywhere and in all the ages, gives this 
 testimony. This is one horn of the dilemma. If, 
 on the other hand, Mr. Darwin admits that man dif- 
 fers from animals and things not only in degree, but 
 in kind (as we affirm, for man is person, not thing), 
 then man is supernatural — then he is miraculous in 
 his origin and supernatural in his testimony. This 
 is the other horn of the dilemma. According to the 
 one, nature (if man and all is nature) turns state's 
 evidence against Darwin as soon as it can speak (e.g. 
 as a man), and by its own united voice declares a 
 Supernatural, to be worshiped, feared, and obeyed. 
 According to the other, the testimony itself is ra- 
 tional — supernatural, as well as witness for the 
 supernatural. 
 
 But the theory of '' gemmules infinitely numerous 
 and infinitely minute." What are these, and whence, 
 and how? Does the ''exact science" positively 
 know that they are '' infinitely minute ? " How can 
 we know them, if they are infinitely minute ? How, 
 especially when the *' positive science " declares as a 
 "■ first principle " that we can not know the infinite ? 
 And if, according to such a '' first principle," we can 
 not know a single "gemmule," because it is " infi- 
 nitely minute," how can we know that one exists ; 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM 21 5 
 
 and how especially, that they are '* infinitely numer- 
 ous ? " This obvious criticism concerns at least the 
 sceptic who would avail himself of this theory to 
 dispense with a Creator. I know it is said that 
 '* gemmules multiply by fission " ''^ and to confirm 
 this it is asserted that " Thuret has seen the zoospore 
 of an alga divide itself, and both halves germinate." 
 But how does this reach the difficulty unless the 
 zoospore be a gemmule ? And if it be, then the dif- 
 ficulty increases, since we are required not only to 
 know a " gemmule," which is " infinitely minute," 
 but also to know " both halves " of the infinitely 
 minute gemmule ! To make the point clearer for 
 the scepticism which would adopt this theory, Pro- 
 fessor Delpino has arranged this convenient formula : 
 ** The existence of the gemmules is a first unknown 
 element ; the propagative affinity of the gemmules 
 is a second ; their germinative affinity is a third ; 
 their multiplication by fission is a fourth, — and what 
 an unknown element ! " 
 
 '* Physical units " have been proposed, " with 
 mysterious powers of producing and reproducing 
 organisms." Atomism, hylozoism, and hylopathian- 
 ism of the pagan period, with the increate and inde- 
 structible forces of Empedocles, have been severally 
 recalled in our day, and merged into '' evolution 
 
 * Scientific Opinion, Oct. 13, 1869, p. 408, quoted by Mivart, p. 231. 
 
2l6 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 and correlated forces," and, bearing this new name 
 upon their modern frontlet, have been hailed as the 
 climax of modern scientific discovery — the veriest 
 wonder of the nineteenth century. This admiration 
 of the " younger naturalists," as Professor Youmans 
 patronizingly puts it, may be deserved. To ques- 
 tion its propriety is not our province nor our purpose. 
 Of the valid advances in this direction we would not 
 withhold our own admiration, nor refuse our hearty 
 assent to authorized conclusions ; but we protest 
 against the crude haste displayed in the effort to 
 array the doctrine of the *' conservation of forces " 
 against theism, and to thrust evolution into the 
 false attitude of atheism. 
 
 Suppose matter itself in its final analysis is force, 
 as some of our most profound and philosophic the- 
 ists have held and taught. Then, certainly, upon 
 any well-defined and consistent view of creation, 
 there is, in the very nature of the case, a conserva- 
 tion of forces. 
 
 Suppose all the primary forces which constitute 
 elemental matter are ultimately reducible to '' grav- 
 ity and heat," or ''the antagonistic and diremptive," 
 or " the centripetal and the centrifugal," or " the 
 potential and the actual." Does this thorough anal- 
 ysis array the doctrine of forces against theism ? 
 Certainly not. Some of our ablest theologians have 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 21/ 
 
 insisted upon this very analysis, anticipating Mr. 
 Spencer and his disciples both in the classification 
 and the conservation of forces. 
 
 But "the correlation of forces," it is sometimes 
 defiantly demanded — does not this disprove theism ? 
 It may, according to the logical rules of the objec- 
 tor ; but not according to the logical rules of Aris- 
 totle and Bacon, of Hamilton and Mill, not according 
 to the ordinary process of induction or deduction. 
 If the forces, when they are gravity and heat, do 
 not disprove theism, it is difficult to understand 
 how, by any known logic, they can disprove theism 
 when they become correlated or converted into heat 
 and gravity. Thus far we have referred to material 
 forces only. Whether all the forces which are im- 
 plied in a living body may. be correlated or converted 
 into gravity and heat in a lifeless body — whether all 
 the forces which are implied in an organic, living, 
 thinking man may be correlated or converted into 
 gravity and heat of an unthinking, lifeless, inorganic 
 stock or stone may, at least a httle longer, remain 
 an open question. It should be borne in mind 
 that mature and earnest champions of the doctrine 
 of " conservation and correlation of forces " admit 
 that entire correlation is an open question. Even 
 Professor Barker, incidentally, and so the more 
 strongly, admits this very state of the question : 
 
 lO 
 
2l8 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 *' Can we longer refuse to believe that even thought 
 is in some mysterious way correlated to the other 
 natural forces ? And this even in face of the fact 
 that it [thought] has never been measured?" Sci- 
 entists, then, know of no way in which thought and 
 material force can be correlated ; they can not weigh 
 nor measure thought? Is not this, then, an open 
 question? We commend the question to ''positive 
 science," as one which deserves and demands addi- 
 tional (scientific) research. And we suggest to the 
 eager philosophic sceptic impatient to publish the 
 decisive oracle to the long-desired confusion of the- 
 ism, that he cultivate patience, lest he run upon a 
 fool's errand. 
 
 At the scientific reunion in Inspriick, M. Mayer, 
 a prominent physicist of Germany, who has directed 
 especial investigation to the correlation of forces, 
 made an address. Repudiating the hypothesis that 
 thought is only a form of chemical force, and cog- 
 nition the result of free phosphorus in the brain, he 
 declared it " a great error to identify molecular 
 activity and intellectual action, which may be paral- 
 lel, but are not identical. As what the telegraph 
 says — the contents of the dispatch — could never be 
 regarded as a function of the electro-chemical action, 
 . . . so the brain is only the machine. It is 
 not thought ; intelligence, which is not a part of 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 219 
 
 sensible things, can not be submitted to the investi- 
 gations of the physicist and anatomist." In the 
 mean time, let the eager philosophic sceptic care- 
 fully consider his logic, lest, if the oracle announce 
 correlation of forces as demonstrable, the atheistic 
 herald even then should run upon a fool's errand. 
 The question of forces, their conservation and corre- 
 lation and analysis, falls far within the comprehensive 
 question involved in this discussion, — the question 
 of a God and of faith in God. 
 
 These are but a itw of the many theories pro- 
 posed to account for and explain the system of 
 things. In these manifold and diverse theories, old 
 and new, and old renewed, there is involved not only 
 an admission of the importance and difficulty of 
 answering these great questions of the soul, but also 
 the admission of inherent weakness in the theories 
 themselves. They are mere hypotheses. Even the 
 very positive Westminster Review (Oct., 1872) says 
 of Darwin's theory: "The case of man's descent 
 does not yet admit of proof. The same may be said 
 of the origin of any other species, of Darwin's hy- 
 pothesis in general, and of the hypothesis of special 
 creations which it denies." 
 
 La Place, while he would dispense with the theism 
 of Newton — La Place, bold among the boldest 
 scientific investigators, offers his " Exposition du 
 
220 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Systeme du Monde " as an hypothesis, and as such 
 presents it with becoming diffidence : '' Je presente 
 avec la defiance que doit inspirer tout ce qui n'est 
 point un resultat de Tobservation, ou du calcul." 
 But not only are these theories of " exact" science 
 mere hypotheses concerning the questions at issue ; 
 they are made, it should be remembered, with the 
 provisional admission that '* science can not find a 
 first cause." "^ Whatever science may answer to the 
 soul's irrepressible and comprehensive challenge, it 
 refers to method only, not to origin. Transcending, 
 as well as comprehending, the field of its investi- 
 gations are evermore the questions, Whence ? and 
 Why? The positive philosophy affirms truly, and 
 must perpetually affirm : ** Science can not find 
 a first cause." Science evermore traces, and can 
 only trace, the manifestations of the first cause. 
 Whatever it be — material or spiritual — science stu- 
 diously traces the manifestations of the first cause 
 in the order or law which it discovers, and which it 
 seeks to generalize. Retracing specific to more 
 general laws, it classifies evermore in higher and 
 still higher generalizations, steadily extending its 
 knowledge as it reaches a larger unit. This it makes 
 the point of a new departure, forever asking, What 
 
 * Comte. 
 
ADMISSIONS OF SCEPTICISM. 221 
 
 is? and the higher question, How ? or in what order, 
 or by what law it is. 
 
 And here, at length, we reach the comprehensive 
 admission that science seeks to trace all effects to 
 unity — that philosophy would unify its knowledge by 
 retracing all phenomena to one common origin. 
 Each particular science seeks this unity for itself, 
 and " universal science seeks after absolute unity." 
 To this ultimate result all its processes tend. To 
 seek this unification it is authorized ; nay, it is com- 
 pelled. It is claimed, on the one hand, that this 
 final unification may consist in matter, and not in 
 mind; that matter exists by a reason in itself; and 
 that matter is the beginning, the originator. But 
 how do we get a notion of any beginning ? Is it not 
 by the power (the energy) of our own minds putting 
 forth new activities, producing effects, originating 
 phenomena? What, we ask, is matter, that it should 
 be the originator, the beginning? Does scepticism 
 reply, " It is force " ? Again we ask. Is force an ab- 
 straction, independent and unrelated ? Does not 
 force itself originate in mind ? 
 
 These and similar questions confront the theory 
 of materialistic unity. 
 
 On the other hand, it is claimed that multiplicity 
 in the universe may be reduced to pantheistic unity ; 
 that there is not only theism, but pantheism. God 
 
222 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 is all, and all is God. But, as no one else will believe 
 that the pantheist is God, and as each knows for 
 himself that he is not God, the excess of pantheistic 
 admission is apparent. 
 
 The fault is not in the attempt at unification ; for 
 this is unavoidable. Atheist, pantheist, and theist, 
 materialist and spiritualist, are alike compelled to it 
 by the very law of thought. The admission is inevi- 
 table. The fault lies in the principle and the process 
 of unifying. Is the principle right ? Is the process 
 broad enough ? Here is the point of divergence. 
 Which is the true course? Which is the false? 
 These questions remain to be considered. 
 
MODERN THOUGHT, 223 
 
 I 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 IN the strife of theories, both science and faith 
 should be saved from confusion. Carefully, at 
 least, if not repeatedly, should we take our bearings, 
 that we may better detect the drift of modern 
 thought, and distinguish the course of false thinking 
 from that of the true. 
 
 At the outset, it is obvious to remark, but it is 
 important to remember, that thought has its laws as 
 fixed as those of material nature — perhaps compre- 
 hending the laws of nature and confirming the laws 
 of faith. 
 
 The primary law of thought is the recognition of 
 existence ; the existence of the thinker, and then of 
 the act of thinking as involving content. This is 
 illustrated by the proposition cogito, expressing the 
 simplest judgment. Whatever may be thought of 
 Descartes' familiar enthymeme, cogito ergo sum, to 
 which we do not refer, the proposition cogito (I 
 think), illustrates this primary law which thought im- 
 plicitly follows in the simplest judgment, /^;;2 think- 
 
224 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 ing. In the simplest and earliest thought, then, 
 there is by inevitable law the consciousness of ex- 
 istence and action — of the thinker thinking. 
 
 But more than this, there can not be thought 
 without content, and the primary law involves this, 
 that in every thought there shall be the thinker, the 
 thinking, and the theme ; the agent and the content, 
 the subject and the object, to both of which the 
 thinking relates. This primary law is so compre- 
 hensive that if the mere phenomena seem to furnish 
 the content, the law is not satisfied. It claims more 
 than this, viz. some substance underlying the phe- 
 nomena, as well as some person originating the act 
 of thinking. So scrupulous is this fundamental law 
 of thought, in each direction requiring reality, imply- 
 ing that there can not be an appearing or manifesting 
 without some thing which furnishes the appearance 
 or manifestation. Even Herbert Spencer admits, 
 asserts this, to the confusion of Comte and Mill and 
 Lewes and all mere phenomenalists. There must be 
 a seeing self or mind as well as an object seen. For 
 example, a sensation or impression can not be, unless 
 there be something to produce the sensation or im- 
 pression ; and more, something to cognize the im- 
 pression or sensation. Without a mind to receive, 
 there could be no appearing in the universe, no 
 manifestation. So that at the outset, we find a 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 225 
 
 certain modern system, in both directions violatin^^ 
 this primary law, and therefore doomed to self-re- 
 nunciation or to self-destruction. 
 
 Let valiant knight-errants of science who would 
 fiercely slay theologians and metaphysicians, on the 
 right hand and on the left, sheathe their swords. 
 Their own safety and the higher interests of science 
 will be promoted by peace rather than by Quixotic 
 warfare. Mr. Spencer's advice to scientists is timely 
 and significant : " He who contemplates the universe 
 from the scientific point of view, must learn to see 
 . . . that religion must be treated, as a subject 
 of science, with no more prejudice than any other 
 reality." '^ 
 
 Even Mr. Mill admits that '' there are laws of 
 thought and of feeling which rest on experimental 
 evidence which are a clue to the interpretation of 
 ourselves and others. Such laws, so far forth, make 
 psychology a positive science, as certain as chemis- 
 try." f According to the involuntary confession of 
 the '* straitest of the sect " of inductionists, then, 
 we shall, as we advance, meet with other laws of 
 thought. 
 
 Knowledge begins in consciousness. Without 
 consciousness knowledge were impossible. Whether 
 
 * First Principles, p. 21. 
 
 f See his Inaugural Address at the University of St. Andrew. 
 
226 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 or not suggested by Socrates, at least since the time 
 of Descartes this principle has been admitted. In 
 regard to knowledge, then, the subjective factor is 
 primary and chief, and is to be studied first and 
 chiefly, if we would ascertain what can be known 
 and how it can be known. What then is the scope 
 of our knowledge ? Evidently, the scope of our 
 consciousness. Whatever ma}^ be presented to con- 
 sciousness may become matter of knowledge. 
 
 We have already seen that the primary law of 
 thought is that there must be both content of 
 thought, and agent — something which thinks and 
 something about which it thinks. Now what and 
 whence and how is the content furnished ? Whether 
 these essential questions can be answered a priori we 
 do not stop to inquire. We, at least, will make the 
 approach to the answer a posteriori ; and by the 
 process of observation, which the most fastidious 
 Comtean must approve, detect the law w^hich regu- 
 lates thinking in relation both to the agent and to 
 the content. 
 
 Starting with simple apprehension, we pass, by a 
 process of the judgment, from premise to premise, 
 and thus to conclusion. This, which is completed 
 reasoning, may be in the line of analysis or synthesis 
 from the general to the particular, or from the par- 
 ticular to the general, and so be legitimate reasoning, 
 
MODERN- THOUGHT. 22/ 
 
 either deductive or inductive. These laws devel- 
 oped into a science constitute logic. To ascertain 
 these logical laws, and properly to apply them, is the 
 appropriate work of thinkers in any and in every 
 age. To invent a new, another logic, and call it a 
 science, is quite incompetent for any thought in 
 any age. The simple apprehension of terms — the 
 first elements of knowledge — belongs to the mind 
 alone ; but it is dependent upon the presentation. 
 The senses are to do at least a part of this important 
 service ; and the apprehension, without which the 
 presentation can be of no avail, the mental appre- 
 hension, must be intuitive. The senses, in this pre- 
 sentation, must be supervised by some higher faculty 
 which must evermore verify for the sense, so as to 
 correct for the mind the faulty presentation of a 
 sense, and confirm the true — as in the opposite cases 
 of healthy condition and of nervous derangement, or 
 when the medium for the action of sense is at fault, 
 as in beholding a distant star whose light has been 
 millions of years coming through space, coming to 
 report to us the position of the star in the heavens, — 
 not its present position, but the position it held ten 
 thousand centuries ago. 
 
 Sense is not only unable to verify for itself, its 
 report may be actually false ; e.g., sight reports as 
 the present place of Sirius that which it occupied 
 
228 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 five millions (?) of years ago, and from which place 
 during this immense period it has been steadily 
 hastening away. Ratiocination, having from the 
 higher laws of astronomy deduced the distance, 
 orbit, and motion of this planet, and the velocity of 
 light, corrects and adjusts the report of sense and 
 tells us the real position which the planet now occu- 
 pies. Our eyes hail the morning and report the sun- 
 rise. But eight minutes have actually elapsed since 
 the sun rose above our horizon ; and, again ratioci- 
 nation must correct and adjust the report of sense 
 and verify for the mind the knowledge thus imper- 
 fectly presented. Sense says the sun rises, the sun 
 sets, daily performing its revolution round the earth. 
 But this report of sense must be corrected by some 
 higher mental faculty before it is accepted by precise 
 science and properly announced as the diurnal revo- 
 lution of the earth upon its axis. The sailing ship is 
 not where the sense reports it, nor is the floating 
 cloud, nor the flying bird. Our friend receding or ad- 
 vancing is not where we see him, nor is our foe. The 
 lightning flash deceives the eye ; the thunder's roar 
 deceives the ear. Did the soldier or the sailor trust 
 to sight or sound, disaster would prevail on land and 
 sea ; defeat would take the place of victory. 
 
 Instead, then, of sense being competent to verify 
 to the mind all our knowledge, it can not always 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 229 
 
 verify even for itself Its very reports can not be 
 relied upon. In the instances just cited — and these 
 are but samples of unnumbered instances — we must 
 needs call in our reasoning faculty, the understand- 
 ing, to rectify and adjust and verify for sense. Rea- 
 son supervises both, and as between the two decides 
 that the conclusion attested by the higher faculty is 
 to be accepted as valid. And, whatever the preten- 
 sion of some '^ advanced thinker" or scientific coterie^ 
 the world confirms the decision as rational. And 
 now if this be clear and trustworthy, that while sense 
 (sight, hearing, etc.) reports mere phenomena, mere 
 qualities and attributes, but not any subject to which 
 the attributes belong, not any substance in which 
 qualities inhere, nor any cause which produces the 
 phenomena, the reasoning faculty — the understand- 
 ing — has the competency and the right to supply this 
 deficiency, — to correct again and adjust this report 
 of sense, and affirm to the mind with an authority 
 which gives higher knowledge than mere sense can 
 give, — knowledge of attributes and subject, of qual- 
 ities and substance, effect and cause ; i.e. that think- 
 ing is done by a thinker ; that extension belongs to 
 a body ; that effect is related to its cause. Here, 
 again, reason supervises the work of both, and as 
 between the two decides that the conclusion attested 
 by the higher faculty is to be accepted as valid. 
 
230 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 And, whatever the pretension of some " advanced 
 thinker " or scientific coterie^ the world confirms the 
 decision as rational. 
 
 While, then, we admit and affirm what every ex- 
 periential or sense-philosopher will assert, that the 
 senses present to the mind elements of knowledge ; 
 we deny what some of these philosophers assert, 
 that the senses alone can give, and can verify our 
 knowledge. 
 
 In tracing the laws of thought we are now pre- 
 pared to take another step forward. 
 
 The reasoning faculty, the understanding, may 
 also present to the mind elements of knowledge de- 
 duced from observation and experience. For 
 example, by the argument from progressive approach, 
 the law of motion, or the law of attraction, may be 
 thus presented : that a body can not stop nor put itself 
 in motion, and that all bodies gravitate toward each 
 other. No sense has discovered these conclusions 
 or can verify them. Nevertheless they are laid down 
 as established principles in science. These are 
 among a thousand illustrations which might be 
 given. This second mode of presentation as super- 
 vised by the reason is pronounced rational. The 
 elements of knowledge as thus presented and thus 
 supervised are accepted by the mind as verified 
 knowledge. This, we see at once, is a larger field of 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 23 1 
 
 knowledge than the former, while it is certainly none 
 the less trustworthy, perhaps less liable to suspicion 
 and vacillation. 
 
 But does not reason, also, present elements of 
 knowledge for the intuitive apprehension of the mind 
 — as intuitive as in the case of sense-presentation? 
 An effect which the sight presents for intuitive 
 beholding by the mind, is no less directly presented 
 by the reason as necessarily produced by a cause, 
 and this whether it be the first or the last effect ever 
 presented by the sense. 
 
 The wind blows, as the sense affirms to the mind ; 
 but sense can not go beyond the effect. Reason, 
 however, as quickly affirms that this effect must 
 have a cause ; and the mind as intuitively sees the 
 latter truth through reason as the former truth 
 through sense, and holds the latter truth, to say the 
 least, as certainly and as firmly as the former. 
 Again, the sense can not see or feel or taste or smell 
 space, yet it affirms extension — material extension, 
 as of some body great or small — which the mind 
 intuitively perceives through the sense. But reason 
 as quickly affirms space in which such body may be 
 extended — a space in which all bodies may be ex- 
 tended — even universal limitless space, which no 
 sense can verify, but which the mind sees as intui- 
 tively through the reason as it saw, through the sense. 
 
232 FAITH AN-D MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 a body extended. Indeed, the latter may have been 
 a fancy, the fancy of a disordered sense ; the former 
 is a fact beyond all possible doubt or uncertainty. 
 Events illustrate the same truth. The event is re- 
 ported to the mind, reported by the sense, for in- 
 tuitive perceiving ; but no sense can affirm the time 
 in which the event occurred. Time transcends the 
 cognizance of any sense. Neither sight nor touch 
 nor taste can detect it. But reason as quickly, as 
 certainly, affirms a time for the occurrence of this 
 event — time for the occurrence of every event — time 
 universal, limitless; and the mind as intuitively be- 
 holds this through the reason as the other through 
 the sense. Indeed the sense may be at fault in 
 respect to the specific event ; but the reason is at no 
 fault in regard to time. The mind holds the latter 
 knowledge at least as certain as the former. If it be 
 said that the sense verifies for itself in regard to 
 the things of sense and the mind accepts this intui- 
 tively (a statement which we might question, but 
 which we do not now stop to challenge) ; may we not 
 say with higher certainty that the reason verifies for 
 itself in regard to the things of reason, a verification 
 which the mind accepts as the clearest intuition and 
 as of supreme authority? We may apply the same 
 principle to quality and substance, phenomena and 
 subject, effect and cause, axiom and corollarv. 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 233 
 
 The inevitable conclusion, then, is that sense is 
 not the only agency which presents to the mind 
 elements of knowledge. Reason is a surer, if not a 
 more fertile, source of knowledge. Again, sense is 
 not the only means of verification. Reason is as 
 prompt to verify, and no less competent. Sense, 
 perchance, may verify for the things of sense. It 
 may compare sensation with sensation, as touch 
 with sight, or sight with sound ; but, at best, how 
 do these gross sensations differ, while, often, they 
 can not avail to help each other, as in the instance of 
 sight and smell, or taste and touch — in the universe 
 of color, or in the vast realm of astronomy. So the 
 verification of sense is ever exposed to error and 
 attended with more or less of mental misgiving, until 
 a higher faculty has been called in to decide the 
 case. Indeed, the very ground for any confidence 
 in induction and generalization, viz. the uniformity 
 of the course of nature, is a ground which no sense 
 can furnish and no sense can verify. Withdraw this 
 ground and all the superstructure of induction be- 
 comes insubstantial and '' like the baseless fabric of 
 a vision." 
 
 On the other hand, reason verifies for the things 
 of reason with an authority which does not require 
 the attestation of a lower faculty to confirm ; nor 
 does it allow the intermeddling of subordinates. 
 
234 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Reason may, does, accept the sympathetic attesta- 
 tion of conscience, and the responsive assurance of 
 faith, and the concurrent testimonials of analogy 
 and order and design from ten thousand thousand 
 voices which fill the universe. Now thinkers, an- 
 cient or modern, who, in obedience to mental laws, 
 have employed these modes of presenting knowledge 
 to the mind, and these modes of verification, and 
 these processes of thought, inductive or deductive, 
 analytic or synthetic, are justified in their work. No 
 arbitrary method in the interests of a particular 
 theory or school can be foisted into scientific service 
 to displace or exclude the method which the com- 
 mon consciousness approves, and which the ages of 
 serious and sincere thinking have employed and 
 established. Such a change, if violently precipi- 
 tated, would be not a revolution, but a rebeUion, 
 against the laws of mind — a rebellion to be sup- 
 pressed by the united force of loyal thought. We 
 would be, we are, no less alert to note the testimony 
 of sense and to encourage scientific observation and 
 experiment than are the positivists. We use the re- 
 sults differently, perhaps, while we claim a criterion 
 at once higher and surer. Within the scope of our 
 theory we embrace all the positive knowledge, all 
 the positive science, which they can get ; and by 
 our theory we are authorized to get more. 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 235 
 
 The advances of modern science in every direc- 
 tion are to be hailed with sincere gratification by 
 every true thinker. Its real successes can not be 
 appropriated and monopolized by any clique or 
 class or country ; they belong alike to the world. 
 Everywhere they help the better to interpret the laws 
 which pervade material nature, and to satisfy the phil- 
 osophic longing of the human soul to know things in 
 their causes, contributing to extend and unify that 
 knowledge in the realm of thought and the realm of 
 force, everywhere revealing more fully the reign of 
 law and the prevalence of order. As true science is 
 evermore consistent with itself (since it is the knowl- 
 edge of a higher and all-surrounding harmony), its 
 present successes do not annul those of the past, 
 nor demand that we relinquish what has been gained 
 in order to receive what is being secured. Its real 
 office is not to destroy, but to conserve ; reverently 
 to guard, reverently to gain. Entertaining ever- 
 more this twofold purpose, and cherishing this gen- 
 uine spirit of science, he is the best modern thinker 
 who is grateful for the past and hopeful for the 
 future, with mind alert, actively awaiting every pres- 
 entation of knowledge by the lower intuitions of 
 sense, by the higher intuitions of reason, and by the 
 logical deductions from both. It is evident from 
 this threefold presentation of knowledge that science 
 
236 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 is by no means restricted to the narrow circle of 
 sense. To change the figure, the great superstruct- 
 ure of knowledge which the individual and the 
 universal mind are uniting to rear is based not upon 
 sense alone, but upon the triple foundation of sense, 
 understanding, and reason ; reason being the corner- 
 stone. 
 
 In the process of knowledge, especially in the 
 scientific process, ratiocination, or understanding, 
 supports sense, gives it significance, and makes it 
 serviceable to science by arranging in order the inco- 
 herent reports of each sense, and of all the senses, 
 reducing them to results, connecting them to con- 
 clusions. With sense alone there could be no sci- 
 ence. However strong were the sight, though it 
 could penetrate like the glance of the eagle, undaz- 
 zled by the noontide blaze of the sun ; however 
 acute were the hearing, though it could detect the 
 harmony of the spheres, as in concentric circles they 
 glide through outlying realms of space ; though 
 touch and taste and smell were intensified a thou- 
 sand and a thousandfold ; yet, with mere sense and 
 without understanding there would be, there could 
 be, no classification, no judgment, no generalizations, 
 no advance towards science. Reason, in the mean 
 time, supervises the whole process that it be rational 
 not fanciful ; that science itself be not the slave of 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 237 
 
 tyranny nor the dupe of superstition ; and that sense 
 become not false through fear, nor imbecile through 
 inaction, nor blunted by age, nor drowned in dis- 
 sipation and maddened with delirium. If reason be 
 enthroned in the soul, its light and guidance pene- 
 trate the understanding and pervade the sense ; both 
 become rational ; and man is exalted to his proper 
 place, a different and a higher sphere than that of 
 the animal, and in the right of his own excellence 
 holds dominion. But, if reason be dethroned, hu- 
 man knowledge can be no longer verified ; sense and 
 understanding both wander, lost, without the light 
 and without a guide ; and man is inferior to the 
 meanest brute. In the exercise of these threefold 
 powers, man is conscious of their possession. He 
 needs no argument to make that possession more 
 apparent, while no argument can lessen his assur- 
 ance. But more than this, he clearly sees the pro- 
 priety of this threefold possession. He needs the 
 senses to commune with the outer world, to know 
 its varied phenomena, and to satisfy his physical 
 wants. He needs the understanding to prepare him 
 for scientific knowledge and intellectual advance- 
 ment. He needs reason to satisfy the demands of 
 conscience and the longings of faith ; and, as he 
 holds himself and others morally, responsible, to fit 
 him for moral responsibility. This is the more ap- 
 
238 FAITH AND MODERN" THOUGHT. 
 
 parent, since, by universal consent, when reason fails 
 man ceases to be held responsible. He may be 
 confined, commiserated, or cast out; but he is not 
 held responsible. 
 
 There need, then, be no conflict between true 
 science and true religion. The conflict has been be- 
 tween scientists and religionists. The best thinkers 
 have often been the most devout. Trite as the 
 saying has become, it is no less true, and Baconians 
 at least should not object to its repetition, " Depth 
 in philosophy bringcth men's minds back to relig- 
 ion." Science and religion heartily bid each other 
 good-speed. Religion has served science, and cer- 
 tainly science, especially modern science, with and 
 without intent, is doing much-needed and lasting 
 service to religion in the increasing demonstration it 
 affords of order, '' Heaven's first law," and in the 
 steady advance toward higher and still higher unifi- 
 cation of knowledge, unmistakably indicating what 
 religion has uniformly maintained : that there is a 
 uni-verse, giving new and still newer significance to 
 that term held in common both by science and re- 
 ligion — the universe. 
 
 It is, then, the more remarkable with what refine- 
 ment of self-conceit a certain set of thinkers now-a- 
 days monopolize the merit of modern thought, and 
 gratuitously assume that all other thinking in these 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 239 
 
 times is archaic and obsolete; who talk boastingly of 
 philosophical radicalism that shall reverse the world's 
 estimate of more than twenty centuries, proclaim a 
 new definition of truth, ostracize the old leaders, re- 
 pudiate and banish the established method of 
 thought, and reconstruct the whole empire of knowl- 
 edge ; '^ \\\vo ostentatiously parade a " New Philoso- 
 phy "; and consistently with such pretension, sneer 
 at conservative thought as superstitious veneration 
 for the past, arrogating to themselves the purpose 
 and the spirit of progress ; who would confine science 
 to the field of experience — the field of sense — and 
 then patronize this bantling as the sum of all knowl- 
 edge and as their own private possession. Lest their 
 bantling be not sufficiently dwarfed, they talk ever- 
 more of material science, as if science were only ma- 
 terial, f Sometimes, in more liberal mood, they 
 mention both mind and matter, but both attenuated 
 to the slightest phenomenal consistency (Mill) ; while, 
 in severer moods, they declare feeling and even 
 thought to be material secretions of the brain, as the 
 liver secretes bile (Vogt, etc.). 
 
 From such premises, self-styled modern thought 
 would proceed to divorce science and Christianity as 
 incompatible, framing its bill of indictment, and 
 
 * See Comte, and Lewes, and positivists everywhere. 
 f See Buchner, Moleschott, Maudsley, Virchow, etc. 
 
240 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 trumping up its testimony in irrelevant and inconse- 
 quential conflicts between science and religion. With 
 inflamed zeal it would banish theology as a hoary in- 
 truder upon the domain of scientific thought, slay 
 theologians as enemies of scientific progress, and 
 brand metaphysics as an outlaw doomed to fetters 
 and perpetual imprisonment. Having thus cleared 
 the field, it would consummate the new regime by 
 enthroning "" The New Philosophy." 
 
 The effrontery of such pretension becomes more 
 manifest when we remember that the greatest phi- 
 losophers of modern times, like Newton and Bacon 
 and Locke and Leibnitz and Descartes and Kepler 
 and Galileo, have been sincere Christians, and that 
 the greatest thinkers of all times have been most 
 earnest believers in the supernatural ; and still more 
 manifest, when we remember that the greatest the- 
 ologians, like Augustine and Calvin and Edwards 
 and Bishop Butler and Chalmers, have been valiant 
 champions of progress ; while Christianity has been 
 the very parent of modern civilization, more indus- 
 trious in its promotion than any other agent, and more 
 successful than all other agencies, and most success- 
 ful when most thoroughly imbued with the spirit of 
 Christ, the Master ; seeking to-day with sublime 
 zeal and courage and self-denial to extend Christian 
 civilization and Christian progress over all the earth ; 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 24 1 
 
 desiring at once to plant the school and the church 
 everywhere, at home and abroad ; and still more 
 remarkable, when we remember that Christianity, 
 not satisfied with even the present degree of progress, 
 points to the better time coming, when the knowl- 
 edge of the Lord shall fill the whole earth ; bids us 
 as sons of God, " Be strong and of a good courage," 
 " leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ, 
 go on unto perfection," when, as fuU inheritors 
 of the truth of God, men shall grow up ^' unto the 
 measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ," 
 speaking to us evermore of the supreme value of the 
 soul, and stimulating us and the world evermore 
 with the significant words of Jesus : " What shall it 
 profit a man if he shall gain the whole world, and 
 lose his own soul? " 
 
 On the other hand, self-styled modern thought 
 with shameful contradiction of its pretensions to 
 progress, goes back to heathen scepticism for its 
 philosophy, revives the defunct notions of Democ- 
 ritus and Leucippus, exalts nature above God, and 
 matter above mind, asserts the descent of man from 
 the monkey ; and, as if not satisfied with such 
 debasement, declares that the monkey was once a 
 slimy ascidian, and that the ascidian — the low% but 
 living ascidian — had a spontaneous generation, tak- 
 ing its life from that vv^hich was positively and utterly 
 n 
 
242 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 lifeless ; so that the human soul and body equally 
 are material and alike subject to death and decay ; 
 while '* modern thought " completes the vicious 
 circle of contradictions by declaring that the future 
 shall be not a progress, but a regress along the re- 
 ceding curve in the cycle of evolution and revolution. 
 Such is the pretension and such is the mockery of 
 self-styled modern thought. If this be '* advanced 
 thinking," what, we ask, is the direction ? What a 
 system, we submit, is this to be proud of! How well 
 it is authorized to despise Christ and Christians, the- 
 ology and theologians, civilization such as Christianity 
 has produced and perfected, progress such as Chris- 
 tianity promises — illimitable in the opening field of 
 the future, in a purer moral life and a better moral 
 atmosphere and ^' a better country, even an heav- 
 enly," saying to each and to all evermore : " Be ye 
 perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect ! " 
 
 These general criticisms are more than verified 
 by a reference to specific results reached by modern 
 thought in regard to science, philosophy, morals, and 
 religion. This reference must, of course, be re- 
 stricted ; and, it need be the less extended, by reason 
 of the notoriety industriously given to their conclu- 
 sions by these new schoolmen. 
 
 In science, which is their especial boast, they tell 
 us that we can know nothing but phenomena, their 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 243 
 
 antecedents and sequents. Indeed, this is all we can 
 know of the laws of nature. In fact, this is the law 
 of nature, according to their formal definition,— the 
 invariable succession and resemblance of phenomena 
 (Comte and Lewes and Mill). After all the vaunted 
 talk of laws, their sum. is this, and nothing more. 
 
 According to " modern thought," so extremely 
 tenuous and insubstantial a thing is law. And yet 
 we are told by these ^' advanced thinkers " not only 
 to study the laws of nature, but to study only the 
 laws of nature, since this is all we can know. At the 
 same time we are oracularly informed that we our- 
 selves are only a series of feelings and sensations, 
 and that material nature — the universe of worlds — 
 is but the possibility of sensations (See Mr. Mill). 
 
 But if " modern thought " makes the realm of 
 knowledge thus phenomenal and fleeting, still more 
 unstable does it make science itself. Even so simple 
 a fact as that 2 + 2=4 they tell us is not fixed, but 
 that at some other time or place 2 + 2 may make 5, 
 that two lines which are parallel may meet some- 
 where and at some time, and that effects may hap- 
 pen without any cause. Like the old sceptics, they 
 can not affirm ; they can not deny. In this uncer- 
 tainty of knowledge, which is more tantahzing than 
 ignorance, " modern thought " is driven like a 
 shuttle, between phantasms without and phantasms 
 
244 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 within, weaving its own winding-sheet of nescience ; 
 so that Mr. Mill, coolest and steadiest of modern 
 thinkers, as he looks in another direction resolves it 
 all into self-knowledge, and then, as he pauses to 
 look at his theory, denies the knowledge of self and 
 the knowledge of things. Driven by his theory of 
 nescience, he concludes, with the notorious sophists 
 of twenty centuries ago, that nothing is truly known ; 
 and now, driven by the necessity of thought, or as 
 he styles it, ''irresistible association," he refers every 
 sensation to mind and matter — the subject and 
 object ; affirming, " I can not be conscious of the 
 sensation, without being conscious of it as related to 
 these two things." ^ 
 
 In his posthumous essay on '* Nature," he says : 
 " The nature of a thing means its entire capacity of 
 exhibiting phenomena. Nature means the sum of 
 all phenomena, together with the causes which pro- 
 duce them." Thus, in common with all phenome- 
 nalists, he fully recognizes both the principle and the 
 terminology of causation. Yet, driven by his theory 
 in common with all phenomenalists, he repudiates 
 the principle, and emasculates the term " cause '' of 
 its meaning t " I do not mean a cause which is not 
 itself a phenomenon." f His logic should have 
 
 * Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 214, 215. 
 \ Logic, i. p. 358. 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 245 
 
 saved him fi'om contradictions. It should, at least, 
 have prevented his false play between the general 
 and the special use of such a term as " cause," and 
 from the convenient fallacy of shifting premises. 
 The teacher of logic should not allow his own prac- 
 tice to iUustrate the ignoratio ckncJii. More than 
 this, if he disregards the claim of consistency, he 
 should respect the claim of honesty ; and, in a ques- 
 tion so manifestly essential, be careful neither to 
 deceive himself nor to mislead others. 
 
 Herbert Spencer, driven by the necessity of 
 thought, asserts that " there can not be appearing 
 without an underlying reality or ground of the ap- 
 pearance, that is unthinkable " ; ^ — striving thus to 
 give validity to science ; and now, driven by his 
 theory of nescience, asserts that the ultimate ground 
 is unknowable, and thus concludes, with the sophists, 
 that nothing is truly known. His whole scientific 
 superstructure, which seemed so fair and firm, only 
 deceives us by concealing from our view the fathom- 
 less abyss of nescience ; and as we enter it, seeking 
 scientific repose and security, the false foundation 
 suddenly sinks, precipitating us and all into the 
 frightful vortex of the unknown. 
 
 Lewes, who, with his modern definition of truth 
 as the order of ideas corresponding to the order of 
 
 * First Principles. 
 
246 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 phenomena,^ asserts that we know only phenomena, 
 and should therefore study their laws, and would 
 make science at least legitimate,-informs us that 
 law is only invariable succession, having no vital 
 connection nor real power. When asked whether 
 there is an external world or an internal conscious 
 being, he replies that we know only phenomena — 
 that whether there is really anything within or any- 
 thing without, we know not. Driven by his theory 
 of verification, Lewes would make science legitimate. 
 Driven by his theory of nescience, he would make 
 the internal and the external worlds merely phe- 
 nomenal, and science itself — however legitimate by 
 hypothesis — invalid in fact ; concluding, with the 
 sophists, that nothing is truly known, and even 
 pausing to applaud the sophists in their remark- 
 able conclusion. 
 
 A single quotation from Mr. Bain must conclude 
 our illustration of science as presented by these " ad- 
 vanced thinkers." As if to outdo the old sophists 
 in this direction, and thus establish some apparent 
 claim to originality for " modern thought," Mr. Bain 
 asserts : " Both as to the reality of matter and as to 
 the reality of spirit, I am incapable of direct knowl- 
 edge, therefore make no distinction between the. 
 knowable and the unknowable." f Such is the 
 
 * History of Philosophy, i. p. 31 fThe Senses and the Intellect. 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 247 
 
 scope, and such the security of science, according to 
 self-styled " modern thought." What can science 
 such as this avail, even if perfected ? Is this the 
 boasted progress of our century ? Stripped of its 
 disguises, such thought is not even modern. It is 
 not only ancient, but antiquated. 
 
 Again, we are reminded of Tyndall's truthful 
 confession : " The logical feebleness of science is not 
 sufficiently understood " ; and the more forcibly, 
 when we compare the assertions and admissions of 
 the automatic system so pompously presented by 
 modern materialists, like Maudsley : " The formation 
 of an idea is an organic process. Exquisitely deli- 
 cate is the mental development which takes place in 
 the minute cells of the cortical layers ; yet the mys- 
 teries of their secret operations can not be unravelled. 
 Physiology hitherto has been unable to construct a 
 mental science " ; * and Carl Vogt : " Thought stands 
 in the same relation to the brain as bile to the liver " 
 and Moleschott : '' Thought is a motion of matter " ; 
 and the irrrepressible Buchner : " Mental activity is 
 a function of the cerebral substance " ; in contrast 
 with Tyndall's acknowledgment that " the mole- 
 cular groupings and molecular motion of the materi- 
 alists explain nothing. The problem of the connec- 
 
 * Physiology and Pathology of Mind. 
 
248 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 tion of soul and body is as insoluble in its modern 
 form as it was in the pre-scientific ages." 
 
 Mr. Huxley, who significantly points to materi- 
 alism as threatening the extinction of spirit, and 
 sneeringly refers to the public solicitude in regard 
 to the question as no more dignified or reasonable 
 than the vulgar lamentation at the death of Pan, feels 
 compelled to vindicate his own reputation by saying : 
 " I am no materialist. On the contrary, I believe 
 materialism to involve grave philosophical error.'' 
 
 ''Modern thought," in its phase of materialism, 
 makes mind, like heat, a mode of motion, and 
 thought the result of molecular changes ; and in the 
 phase of nescience, finally reduces science to the 
 knowledge not of things, but of relations, and these 
 not even the relations of things, but the relations of 
 fleeting appearances, — of mere phenomena — scien- 
 tifically and seriously this, and nothing more. 
 
 But if *' modern thought " is so faulty and false 
 toward true science, it is, as we should expect, fatal 
 to true philosophy, — philosophy as knowledge of 
 things in their causes. Indeed, Comte magisterially 
 ruled out philosophy from his system, as irrelevant to 
 knowledge and impossible. Lewes, in his elegiac 
 history of its repeated, but fruitless struggles, reports 
 philosophy a failure — the study of causes vain and 
 illusory. 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 249 
 
 Mill, who '' positively " condescends to examine 
 the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, repudiates 
 all consciousness of being, or knowledge of causes, 
 and, with endless iteration, repeats: ** All our knowl- 
 edge is only of phenomena ; of things and causes we 
 can know nothing." 
 
 Mr. Spencer, not content with mere phenomena, 
 seeks forever for something real ; but, having extin- 
 guished from his system the light of reason, in his 
 blindness postulates despairingly in the unknown 
 what he longs to find, but forever fails, and leaves 
 philosophy confounded in the limitless chaos of the 
 unknowable. If positive science is merely of the 
 phenomenal, not of the real, positive philosophy, at 
 the most, can be no more than this, — the science 
 ultimately of the unknown and unknowable. Thus 
 does the nescience of '' modern thought " summon 
 the scientific crusade against theology and metaphys- 
 ics and philosophy, against the being of God and of 
 mind and of matter. In this war of extermination it 
 would at last slay knowledge itself. The great de- 
 fect in the experiential philosophy is the chasm be- 
 tween mind and matter. Whatever the persistency 
 of the analysis, mind remains conscious, matter 
 remains unconscious. 
 
 It is especially noticeable to what contradictions 
 these philosophical repudiators are driven. Now, in 
 
250 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 their theory, they repudiate a priori principles and 
 processes. And now, driven by the necessity of 
 thought, Spencer rests on a '' fundamental verity," 
 and postulates a force unknowable, as persistent, and 
 as a ground of all phenomena. Mill, driven by 
 ** irresistible association," refers all phenomena to 
 matter and mind — to the " me " and the " not-me " 
 — the subject and the object. And Lewes is driven 
 to admit that " the fundamental ideas of modern 
 science are as transcendental as any of the axioms in 
 ancient philosophy." * These principles, this science 
 (their science of the phenomenal) will not, can not 
 give. No generalization of phenomena can give the 
 knowledge of being, especially to those who scientific- 
 ally deny the possibility of all knowledge of things 
 as existing ; no generalization of effects can give the 
 knowledge of cause, especially to those who scien- 
 tifically deny all possible knowledge of things and 
 causes, and who thus ignore and rule out philosophy 
 as illicit and illusory. 
 
 How do these " advanced thinkers " treat 
 morality } 
 
 Mr. Buckle says : '' Every new fact is the neces- 
 sary product of antecedent fact, and both providence 
 and free-w^ill are a delusion. Physical laws take the 
 place of personal agency. Historic actors, therefore, 
 
 * Philosophy of Aristotle, p. 66, 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 2$ I 
 
 are automatons." In this personal statement, Mr. 
 Buckle indicates the general drift of " modern 
 thought " in regard to morals. 
 
 Mr. Mill, in reviewing Comte's theory approvingly, 
 saj^s : " The transition is steadily proceeding from 
 the theological mode of thought to the positive, which 
 is destined finally to prevail by the universal 
 recognition that all phenomena, without exception, 
 are governed by invariable laws, with which no voli- 
 tions, either natural or supernatural, interfere." Mill 
 would subject even the Creator and Governor to 
 necessity, and restrict him to arbitrary arrangements, 
 permitting no belief even to recognize his existence, 
 unless he obey fixed laws, which are never to be 
 modified or counteracted by the personal preference 
 of the Creator."^ Thus does " modern thought " 
 repudiate responsibility, and reject moral freedom, 
 and inculcate the pernicious theory of automatic 
 action on earth and in heaven. 
 
 Mr. Mill introduces his view of punishment by 
 this startling preamble : " Though a man can not 
 help acting as he does, his character being what it 
 is," and much more to the same effect. '' His own 
 good, either physical or moral, is no warrant for 
 compeUing him " to do otherwise. " The most we 
 
 * Mill's Philosophy of Comte, p. i6. 
 
252 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 should think ourselves justified in doing is leaving 
 him to himself" * 
 
 And yet, whether influenced by force of thought 
 or by force of feeling we need not conjecture, Mr. 
 Mill, with strange forgetfulness, falls into gross in- 
 consistency : He has made up his mind, if the First 
 Cause be an immoral God, he will defy him to do his 
 worst, and will not worship him. f 
 
 But we reply, how can the First Cause, according 
 to Mr. Mill's theory, possibly be immoral or moral ? 
 As a necessary and necessitated cause he can have 
 no moral character ; or, if you please, he must be 
 un-moral (i. e. not moral). But suppose Mr. Mill will 
 not worship such a God ? The carping philosopher 
 must obey, as the effect (according to his system of 
 necessity) must obey its cause. What if the defiant 
 philosopher must, even if he will not, worship the 
 tyrant? Such talk, from a philosophic necessitarian 
 is mere bravado. In spite of his theory excluding 
 all possible morality, Mr. Mill freely employed the 
 terms '' moralit}^ " and " morals," " moral results " and 
 '' moral causes ; " admitted the prevalent conviction 
 of choice or moral freedom both before and after 
 voluntary action ; and asserted that this conviction 
 
 * See Mill's Essay on Liberty ; although this is rather a vindica- 
 tion of necessity or denial of any possible morality or accountability. 
 
 \ See Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, 
 p. 103. 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 253 
 
 could only be acquired by experience. The admis- 
 sion proves too much for the necessitarian — proves 
 the undoing of his theory. The conviction is 
 acquired. The freedom has been exercised. Moral 
 freedom is vindicated by experience, as well as by 
 universal conviction. Therefore Mr. Mill is held to 
 the logical consequence of moral responsibility and 
 moral government. Hence we argue to the moral 
 character and moral government of God. 
 
 Comte, at first, excluded religion from his system, 
 or referred to it not as moral or spiritual, but merely 
 as intellectual — the product of the understanding 
 striving to explain the phenomena of nature, rather 
 than of reason and conscience recognizing moral ob- 
 ligation and seeking communion with a living, 
 personal God. The two conceptions differ utterly 
 in regard to the source, the character, and the sphere 
 of religion. Both can not be true. One must be 
 right to the exclusion of the other. According to 
 Comte's conception, natural history, as intellectual,— 
 the product of the understanding seeking to explain 
 the phenomena of nature — would be the height of 
 relieion ; though it involved not the least moral 
 choice, nor the slightest moral feeling, nor any re- 
 cognition of God. 
 
 But at length intense reaction completely reversed 
 the religious attitude of Comte, and from his earlier 
 
2 54 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 exclusion of religion he proceeded to elaborate the 
 "religion of humanity," which the Catechism Posi- 
 tivist since 1852, has made more familiar to the 
 public, perhaps more repugnant. 
 
 In his review of Comte's system, Mr. Mill ex- 
 pressly declares : " Comte's religion is without a 
 God " ; * and lest the reviewer be suspected of con- 
 demning it as such, he remarks approvingly : '' We 
 venture to think that a religion may exist without 
 belief in a God," and be at once '' instructive and 
 profitable." Mr. Mill will, indeed, allow one to be- 
 lieve or disbelieve in a God, and yet have religion. 
 Nothing could more clearly indicate his complete in- 
 difference to religion, and the utter emptiness of his 
 religious conception. And yet for this careless 
 permission to believe in a God he is severely criti- 
 cised and condemned by Littre, a disciple and 
 successor of Comte. The religious theory of Mr. 
 Spencer is at least as liberal as that of Mr. Mill. 
 From his system he rules out the possible recognition 
 of a personal God, and allows nothing but an inscru- 
 table power, while he makes this startling statement : 
 " The atheistic, the pantheistic, and the theistic 
 hypotheses contain the same element — an absolute 
 mystery." f Thus modern positivism presents a 
 religion without a God, but proposes *' a new 
 
 * Mill's "Examination," etc. p. 120. f First Principles, p. 36^ 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 255 
 
 Supreme Being," the '' Grand Etre," that is, Collect- 
 ive Humanity—" a God not yet formed," but *' to 
 be forming of new component parts " ; " the dead to 
 occupy the first place, then those who are yet to be 
 born." Madame Clotilde de Vaux — like Comte 
 himself released by divorce from the marriage bond — 
 becomes his " angelic interlocutrix " in elaborating 
 the new religion. With the establishment of this 
 religion the Christian calendar is to be superseded 
 by a scientific calendar. The temples are to be 
 turned toward Paris — the Mecca of "modern 
 thought." Jehovah is to give place to a new god- 
 dess, the goddess of Collective Humanity. Thrice, 
 daily, shall men pray, everywhere, to deified woman. 
 Worship, dogmas, discipline, architecture, altars, 
 priesthood, symbolism, gestures, sacraments, — all 
 the details are minutely given in the ritual of posi- 
 tive religion, even to directions for closing and 
 opening the eyes, in this worship of woman. Mad- 
 ame Clotilde — or whatever woman — is to be exalted 
 over him whose name is above every name ; and 
 *' soon the knee of man will never bend, except to 
 woman." The deification of mortals according to 
 Comte, or the worship of the unknowable according 
 to Spencer, or blank materialism excluding all wor- 
 ship and all religion, is offered to us by modern 
 
256 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 thought to supersede the Christian religion and the 
 worship of the ever-Hving and true God. 
 
 Mr. Spencer feels the-need of conciliation, not of 
 conflict, between science and religion, and points to 
 a common ground, which both may harmoniously 
 occupy. Comte, the Corypheus of positivism, whom 
 Lewes devoutly hails -as a scientific apostle, and 
 proclaims as a leader not only for himself, but for 
 such impatient followers as Mill and Huxley and 
 Spencer — Comte, suffering the horrors of divorce 
 between science and religion, penitently besought 
 a reconciliation, and strove to effect a union between 
 his emasculated system and a religion if not wholly 
 earth-born, at least not divine. Even Strauss, after 
 forty 3^ears of Titanic struggle to scale the heavens 
 and dethrone the old faith, repented of his folly, and 
 turned beseechingly toward a new faith, to which 
 he sought to win his vacillating disciples. Mill, left 
 alone with his philosophy, became a devotee at the 
 grave of departed love. The school of nescients 
 worship an unknown God ; while the more advanced 
 of the advanced thinkers, who have pushed their 
 analysis to its scientific limit, and have found the 
 primal being — the source of all phenomena — return 
 with synthetic fervor, crying " Aha ! we have found 
 a God ! " and reverently place a fetich upon the 
 altar of science ; and, with worship *' for the most 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 2$/ 
 
 part of the silent sort," bow the knee to force, — 
 bHnd, unconscious, unintelligent, unknowable force. 
 Mr. Spencer, we repeat, feels the need not of conflict 
 but of conciliation, between science and religion, as 
 did Bacon and Locke, and Newton and Descartes, 
 and Galileo and Copernicus, and Tully and Plato and 
 Socrates, and, as we believe, most men who have been 
 capable of profound thought, earnestly feel. How 
 can this be made not only possible, but permanent? 
 
 We have already described the threefold presen- 
 tation of knowledge to the mind by the sense, by 
 the understanding, by the reason. Now science, 
 however restricted, need not, can not, legitimately 
 conflict with religion. If science be theoretically 
 confined within the narrow limit of sense, as it is by 
 many, it can not oppose, it can at most only stand 
 self-silenced in the presence of religion. Its strong- 
 est assertion can only be, it does not know. Its 
 comprehensive objection must be its own ignorance. 
 In the pathway of religion experimental science has 
 come thus far ; because of self-imposed limits it can 
 go no farther. By no means, however, can it legiti- 
 mately forbid religion to advance. 
 
 If science be enlarged to the field of the under- 
 standing, as is its right and its duty, logical deduc- 
 tions from ten thousand thousand indications confirm 
 the claim of religion, and follow far in the pathway 
 
258 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 of her advance ; and if pausing at any time, it is not 
 with disbeHef but with prompt admission that the 
 course however long, is right, and with an earnest 
 good-speed to reHgion along the brightening way in 
 which it would fain accompany her. 
 
 But if science advance to the province of the 
 reason, which is its chief right and duty, it beholds 
 not only things seen and temporal through the 
 intuitions of sense, but the things unseen and eter- 
 nal through the intuitions of reason. Reason looks 
 out upon space, and reports it limitless ; upon time, 
 and reports it endless ; surveys the realm of phe- 
 nomena, and reports of every effect — as does the 
 sense, so far as it can feel or hear or see, — reports 
 that every effect has a cause, and more, that every 
 effect must have a cause ; and applies this rule 
 with unqualified assurance to every positive effect 
 in space, and to every positive effect in time ; and, 
 as certainly, that every effect must have an adequate 
 cause, e. g. that while the weight of fifty pounds 
 requires a power sufficient to raise it, a weight of one 
 hundred pounds requires twice that power to raise 
 it ; and that variation of cause is required for varia- 
 tion of effect, not only in degree, but also in kind. 
 Moral effects require moral causes ; for there can be 
 no morality without mental choice, and no responsi- 
 bility without rational freedom. By the same intui- 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 259 
 
 tion of reason, it is a positive knowledge that 
 an intelligent effect must have an intelligent cause. 
 Every design put forth into effect must have a 
 designer. The author oi all things must be adequate 
 to what is. Who shall dare deny that these intui- 
 tions of reason reported to the human mind and 
 carefully arrayed in classified knowledge — who shall 
 deny that this is science ? Shall he, especially, who 
 in the same breath asserts that intuitions of sense 
 reported to the mind and then classified constitute 
 science ? 
 
 Intuitively to the individual mind, and with au- 
 thority, reason presents this as most rational. Not 
 only has the common consciousness of the world 
 confirmed this affirmation of reason, but natural re- 
 ligion rests in confidence upon this rational support. 
 In this higher and surer realm of science, religion may 
 best expatiate and feel most at home. With no 
 fanatical frenzy and no superstitious devotion, but in 
 the calm and cheerful light of rational beholding, 
 religion and reason have thus accompanied each 
 other sympathetically and harmoniously. On the 
 way have the physical senses failed ? Has the 
 eye grown dim? the ear dull and heavy? Religion 
 has pressed forward ; for she walks not by physical 
 sight. Have tongues ceased ? Has the understand- 
 ing completed its deductions from what has been 
 
26o FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 seen and heard and felt of sensible things, and 
 paused in its prophecies ? Religion has pressed 
 forward ; for something there is in the human soul 
 that has never failed it, -the presence and the sup- 
 port of reason. 
 
 But is there no end ? no beginning? Are reason 
 and religion doomed forever to tread the unsatisfy- 
 ing pathway of development, never to find what is, 
 only to meet what is becoming — the phenomenal, 
 the transitory? Is there no comprehension to the 
 field of rational science ? While the field of sense is 
 comprehended, and the field of the understanding is 
 comprehended, is there no comprehension to the 
 field of rational science ? Reason itself comprehends 
 this field by a right as complete, at least, as does 
 the sense or the understanding comprehend its 
 field. And reason evermore affirms not only that 
 phenomena come and go in endless succession and 
 variety, but that something is — eternal. Though 
 phenomena pass by and vanish, this remaineth ; 
 although all else should wax old and be changed, 
 yet this shall remain the same, and never fail. This 
 ultimate ground not only has Spencer reached in 
 the pathway of rational science, which he would 
 harmonize with rehgion ; but the same ultimate 
 ground Paul has reached in the pathway of religion, 
 which he promptly harmonizes with reason. So far 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 26 1 
 
 forth, there has been no conflict between science 
 and rehgion. 
 
 ReHgion would find in this eternal source of all 
 things adequate cause for every effect, in one word, 
 eternal power and Godhead, in which it may confide, 
 on which it may rely, with which it may commune. 
 Does reason reject as irrational the declaration of an 
 old and familiar, but by no means dishonored writer, 
 whom we have just mentioned, who, in a remarkable 
 letter to the Romans, says : '' The invisible things of 
 him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, 
 being understood by the things that are made "; and 
 in another letter, no less remarkable, addressed to 
 the Hebrews, says : " Thoii remainest, and tJwii art 
 forever the same ! " Does it not, rather, devoutly 
 accept and confirm this statement? 
 
 If an issue is raised, it is at this point: Shall 
 mind be secondary and subordinate to matter ? 
 This is the real issue. One or the other is original 
 and dominant. We shall be pardoned for adverting 
 to it, for it is the real issue presented and pressed by 
 " modern thought." Mr. Spencer postulates an 
 ultimate force, persistent, unconscious, unintelligent, 
 physical force. This, then, he assumes is original 
 and dominant — the source of all that is. Mind, 
 therefore, according to Spencer, is secondary and 
 subordinate to matter. 
 
262- FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Tyndall looks " across the boundary of experimen- 
 tal evidence," beyond which, according to the experi- 
 mental system of '' modern thought," he has no 
 right to look, '' and discerns in matter the promise 
 and the potency of every form and quality of life." 
 Mind, then, according to Tyndall, is secondary and 
 subordinate to matter. And yet Tyndall is com- 
 pelled to say that all true men of science " will 
 frankly admit their inability to point to any satis- 
 factory, experimental proof that life can be devel- 
 oped save from demonstrable antecedent life." 
 
 Avowed materialists, with whom Spencer and 
 Tyndall are unwilling to be classed — avowed mate- 
 rialists assume that matter is primary -and all-prev- 
 alent. Hence mind, if there is any, is secondary and 
 subordinate to matter ; in its final analysis, is indeed 
 material. 
 
 Now, we do not for a moment stop to speak of 
 blank materialism, which precludes the existence of 
 mind by reducing it and all things to matter, and 
 thus contradicts our fundamental belief, the univer- 
 sal distinctions of language, and the common con- 
 sciousness of mankind. To avowed materialists, who 
 assume that mind itself is material, this issue must 
 be- utterly irrelevant and impossible. The issue with 
 them is upon entirely another ground. Science 
 itself is impossible, where mind is ruled out 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 263 
 
 as material ; for matter can know nothing, a fortiori 
 it can not construct science. 
 
 But to advance to the narrowest field of science, 
 — that of sense, the experiential — we affirm that 
 those who confine themselves within this narrow field 
 are by self-limitation excluded from this discussion. 
 The problem does not, at least, lie within that field. 
 The issue is not a phenomenon, for the eye or ear or 
 touch to decide. If there is no science but this pos- 
 sible, as some scientists pretend, then the problem is 
 ruled out forever, and the issue must be pronounced 
 nugatory. But the issue does not await the permis- 
 sion of positivism. It spurns such scientific imperti- 
 nence. Ruled out forever as nugatory and 
 impossible, it returns with ten thousand thousand 
 voices to assert its real presence, and confront and 
 contradict the partial ruling. If this restricted tri- 
 bunal is incompetent to do it justice and secure its 
 rights, it is but a confession of the incompetency of 
 positivism. There is an appeal to a court of larger 
 jurisdiction and higher competency. We make no 
 special plea against the modern school of science. 
 We point to its confession as conclusive proof of 
 weakness. Within its own field it is doing industri- 
 ous and legitimate service to religion and progress. 
 But it is not comprehensive, therefore it must not be 
 exclusive. It may be positive in regard to its 
 
264 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 knowledge ; it should be positive, also in regard to 
 its ignorance. On other and essential grounds we 
 have already shown its fatal defect. Its confession 
 here confirms our criticism. The issue is not only 
 between religion and partial science, but also between 
 partial science and true philosophy. 
 
 We repeat, the real issue remains. It will not 
 down at the bidding of positive science. It has the 
 life of humanity, and the vigor of faith reappearing 
 in every form of religion since the world began. 
 Shall mind be secondary and subordinate to matter? 
 Or is mind itself superior and primary — the source 
 of all that is, and the sovereign ? We say to positiv- 
 ism, as we say to every sense-theory, it is incompe- 
 tent to assert ; it is incompetent to deny. All it can 
 say is, that there are antecedents and sequents, 
 phenomena succeeding phenomena ; but it can not 
 affirm, it certainly can not deny, that there is any- 
 thing abiding. Hence we dismiss objections from any 
 such quarter, as unauthorized and groundless. But 
 there is a larger field of science, — the field of the un- 
 derstanding, where true logic has its legitimate sphere, 
 and conclusions may be valid, e.g., that there can not 
 be phenomena without something to appear, nor 
 effects without something to produce them. And so 
 Mr. Tyndall admits that all phenomena have a causa- 
 tive source in the potency of matter ; although he does 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 26$ 
 
 not tell US what matter is, nor whence or what is its 
 potency. Till these questions be answered, he has 
 thrown but a dim and unsatisfactory light upon the 
 problem. Yet Tyndall disclaims atheism — a dis- 
 claimer certainly significant in regard to the real 
 question at issue. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, with greater boldness, tells us that 
 force is the ground of all phenomena, and that force 
 is unknowable. This is the farthest analysis of 
 " modern thought." 
 
 And this is proposed as the common ground 
 of reconciliation between science and reHgion. Is 
 science, w^hose very office is to know — is science 
 satisfied' with this proposed reconciliation in the 
 unknowable ? Can it consent to a postulate which 
 is suicidal — an ultimate which would swallow up 
 every scientific labor and success in fathomless 
 nescience? 
 
 Can religion accept this theory as sufficient to 
 satisfy the longing of the human soul— a longing 
 not only to rely upon, but to trust in and commune 
 with, the Eternal Being— not only to fear, but to 
 w^orship and love, the Eternal ? In this final ques- 
 tion, important above all others, does ratiocination 
 repudiate or confirm faith ? Does reason still accom- 
 pany and support religion? Can science give us 
 any knowledge of force which will help decide the 
 
266 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 case? In our own consciousness does force appear 
 as the offspring of mind, the result of will-power 
 and not vice versa ? Is not Mr. Spencer's notion of 
 force derived from mind ? '' Force, as known to us, 
 is an affection of consciousness." * ** The force by 
 which we ourselves produce changes serves to sym- 
 bolize the cause of changes in general, and is the 
 final disclosure of analysis." f Is, then, his final 
 analysis final, when he postulates force as ultimate? 
 Or does it look directly beyond, to the will-power 
 or personality which exerts that force ? Is not his 
 final analysis, then, really an indication and admis- 
 sion oi 2. personal First Cause as Author of force, and 
 thus Creator of the universe ? Religion does not 
 discard the reconciliation proposed by Mr. Spencer 
 because it is too scientific, but because it is too little 
 scientific. Religion admits the right of science to 
 go thus far, whether Mr. Spencer's system would 
 authorize it to do so or not. But religion denies the 
 right to go thus far, and then stop at this point. 
 
 Faith raises the same question in behalf of relig- 
 ion which reason asks in behalf of science : Why 
 stop with force as the ground of all phenomena, 
 when force itself is phenomenal as meeting and re- 
 sisting the senses, e. g., in hearing, touch, etc. ? Why 
 stop with force, when force itself, according to our 
 
 * First Principles, p. 58. f Ibid. p. 235. 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 26 J 
 
 consciousness, testifies of will as its source ? Why 
 call it unknown, when in the sanrie breath it is de- 
 clared known, as having persistence and power and 
 causality, etc. — attributes which belong to person- 
 ality ? Why call it unintelligent, when confessedly 
 its doings are the most intelligent (according to 
 '* modern thought ") in the universe ; comprehending, 
 indeed, by the theory, all the intelligence in the uni- 
 verse ? Why call it unconscious, when it manifests 
 not only the highest intelligence, but the highest wis- 
 dom in the adaptation of means to ends, in relating 
 causes to effects, in harmonizing forces and phenom- 
 ena throughout the universe ? so that science itself 
 asserts the universal order ; and science and reliorion 
 agree in tracing all phenomena and all effects to one 
 ultimate cause. Why call this ultimate and eternal 
 cause force, — blind, unconscious, unintelligent force, 
 — and thus exclude God from the universe, and deny 
 his existence, when *' modern thought " itself invol- 
 untarily admits that such effects as have been pro- 
 duced demand the highest type of causation?"^ 
 Why call it unknown, when in the same breath it 
 is declared persistent, and so known as enduring ? 
 when it is declared " the ultimate of ultimates," and 
 so known as the ground of all appearances, " the 
 cause of all phenornena," the ultimate or first cause? 
 * See Tyndall's Address. 
 
268 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 If science can know so much about this ■* unknow- 
 able " as to clothe it with attributes of personality, 
 why not frankly admit, as some of the most candid 
 and able scientific thinkers affirm, and as faith will 
 admit and our consciousness asserts, that force is 
 the product of will-power, and so the primal or ulti- 
 mate force is the product of an eternal, almighty, 
 intelligent, and wise will,— the infinite and holy will 
 of a personal God ? 
 
 This may be common ground for science and 
 religion. Thus is the First Cause not only ultimate, 
 but adequate to the production of mental, as well 
 as material, phenomena — adequate, which according 
 to Mr. Spencer's theory it confessedly is not. Thus 
 all things centre harmoniously in God. Mind as a 
 free, personal activity is his offspring ; and force, 
 though unseen, is his material creation — the product 
 of his will — the ground of all material phenomena. 
 So that, in the higher light of rational science, as 
 well as in the clear vision of faith, God appears as 
 the Author of all things, and reason confirms the 
 affirmation of faith, that " The worlds were framed 
 by the word of God ; so that things which are seen 
 were not made of things which do appear." 
 
 Thus both by the authority of reason and of 
 faith is the universe wrested from the false and 
 fearful dominion of fate, and the capricious and still 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 269 
 
 more fearful dominion of chance. Moral govern- 
 ment is restored to the world. Not only power, but 
 wisdom and goodness, belong unto God. Hence- 
 forth, forever, science, as well as religion, may rest 
 by faith in God. He is our dwelling-place in all 
 generations ; the universe is secure under his al- 
 mighty and everlasting and holy government. Nei- 
 ther necessity nor chance shall wreck or crush it. 
 The field of science securely opens into the alluring 
 and widening future. Newton was, indeed, as a 
 child gathering pebbles on the shore of the bound- 
 less ocean of knowledge. Bacon was but the trum- 
 peter to sound the inspiring call in the triumphant 
 march of thought ; while faith surveys the expanding 
 fields of science and the bright and interminable 
 field of religion, and with rapture recalls the promise 
 of God : " All are yours." 
 
 Here we find the clue to a true theory of evolu- 
 tion, which runs throughout all material nature, and 
 inductively and securely leads us back to force, and 
 up to God as the Creator of force and the Author of 
 nature — an evolution originated by a divine mind, 
 controlled by divine power, guided by divine wisdom, 
 and consummated by divine benevolence. 
 
 On the other hand, this clue saves us from wan- 
 dering in the endless mazes of the false theory of 
 evolution presented by '' modern thought," based 
 
270 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 Upon the false theory of force as ultimate. Besides 
 this fundamental defect, this theory of evolution 
 declares force to be absolute, yet becoming condi- 
 tioned ; to be homogeneous, yet becoming heteroge- 
 neous — the one evolving into the many, not only, 
 and the multifarious, but into the contradictory and 
 superior, in endless succession. How, we ask, can 
 evolution start with the homogeneous, — force, and 
 force only, — without spontaneity or will? How, 
 then, can the homogeneous become unstable and 
 heterogeneous, and force become forces? It is im- 
 possible, according to the system ; and evolution 
 can not begin. It is only by an illicit process that 
 Spencer's system can change the homogeneous into 
 the heterogeneous, — by surreptitiously introducing 
 motion. If force is first, and at first is ah, how is it 
 that it evolves so as to produce consciousness and 
 self-consciousness ; so as to produce knowledge, — 
 knowledge of itself, and knowledge of all things, 
 amounting even to omniscience ? 
 
 By Spencer's *' positive " legerdemain not only 
 does his unknown and unknowable make itself 
 familiar to mortals in these new and curious forms, 
 as blind force playing fantastic tricks that rival the 
 capricious antics of the Grecian Pan ; but more than 
 this, the unknown and the unknowable, grown famil- 
 iar in the skillful hands of Mr. Spencer, outrivals 
 
MODERN THOUGHT. 2/1 
 
 Pan, who indeed became all things, but by hypoth- 
 esis was himself all things. Mr. Spencer's blind 
 force evolves into more than it was, and what it 
 was not. This ultimate force in itself unconscious, 
 makes itself conscious by whirling ; in itself unintel- 
 ligent, makes itself inteUigent, by whirling and 
 whirling ; without wisdom or purpose in itself, it 
 makes itself the centre of all wisdom and the perfec- 
 tion of all purpose by fortuitous whirling and whirl- 
 ing ; in itself merely physical, at a single bound it 
 leaps into the metaphysical. Material, blind, and 
 unseeing, at a bound it evolves into the mental ; at 
 another bound it evolves into the rational ; by con- 
 tinued evolution the blind, unconscious, physical force 
 evolves into mind, — rational, moral, spiritual — until 
 in a maze of wonder, the multitude cry out : " It is a 
 God "; and the high-priests of positivism, with 
 reverential recognition, standing aloof from the 
 wondering crowd, bow down, " for the most part in 
 worship of the silent sort." Such is the wonder- 
 working of " modern thought." In phenomenal 
 theorizing, verily, nothing serves so well as a skillful 
 prestidigitator. 
 
 If force be declared ultimate, — force persistent, 
 unconscious, unintelligent — then matter must be 
 primary and superior, and evolution must be unorig- 
 inated and uncontrolled by a divine mind, subject 
 
2/2 FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT. 
 
 to blind fate or capricious chance. Either horn of 
 the dilemma would prove fatal. With chance su- 
 preme, science were impossible ; with fate supreme, 
 moral freedom and moral government were im- 
 possible. 
 
 If mind is declared ultimate, — mind infinite, 
 eternal, — then mind is primary and superior ; then 
 evolution is originated and controlled by divine wis- 
 dom and power, and nature's laws are at the same 
 time efficient and uniform ; efficient, because sus- 
 tained by divine authority ; and, although variable 
 according to the divine behest, yet uniform because 
 of the divine faithfulness, which " is unto all 
 generations." 
 
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