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THE 
 
 ANALOGY 
 
 O F 
 
 RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED, 
 
 TO THE 
 CONSTITUTION and COURSE of NATURE. 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED, 
 
 TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS : 
 I, On Perfonal Identity, II. On the Nature of Virtue. 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 A CHARGE, 
 
 Delivered to the Clergy of the Diocefe oi Durham, at the Primary Vifitation, 
 in the Year mdccli. 
 
 I 
 
 By JOSEPH BUTLER, LL. D. 
 
 LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. 
 
 Fjus (Analogia;) ha:c vis eji, ut id quod dubium ejl, ad aliquid fimile de quo non 
 quariiur, referat ; tit incerta certis frobet. 
 
 QUINT. INST. ORAT. L.I, C. 6. 
 
 A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED, 
 
 WITH A . 
 
 PREFACE, 
 
 Giving fome Account of the Character and Writings of the Authof., 
 
 By SAMUEL, Lord Bishop of GLOUCESTER. 
 
 PRINTED at boston^ 
 By manning and L O R I N G, 
 
 For DAVID WEST, Nb. 36, Marl80Rouch-StR5ET% 
 
 MDCCXCIII, 
 
TO TftE RSVEREND 
 
 THOMAS BALGUY, 
 
 ARCHDEACON AND PREBENDARY OF WINCHESTER, &c. 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 1 TRUST you will excufe the liberty I have 
 itaken of prefixing your name to the following flieets ; 
 the latter part of which, I am confident, will not be 
 thought undeferving of your approbation ; and of the 
 former part you will commend the intention at leafl, 
 jf not the execution, in vindicating the character of 
 Bilhop Butler from the afperfions throvm upon it 
 fince his death, I have but difcharged a common duty 
 of humanity, which furvivors owe to thofe who have 
 deferved well of mankind by their lives or writings, 
 when they are pafl the power of appearing in their 
 own defence. And if what I have added, by way of 
 opening the general defign of the works of this great 
 Prelate, be of ule in exciting the younger clafs of flu- 
 dents in our univerfities to read, and fo to read as to 
 Underftand, the Two Volumes prepared and publifli- 
 ed by the Author himfelf ; I flatter myfelf I fhall 
 have done no inconllderable fervice to morality and 
 religion. Your time and ftudies have been long fuc- 
 cefsfully devoted to the fupport of the fame grea(; 
 caufe ; and in what you have lately given to the 
 world, both as an author and an editor, you have 
 largely contributed to the defence of our common 
 Chrlflianity, and of what was efleemed by one, who 
 v/as perfedly competent to judge, its beft eftabiifh- 
 A 2 ment. 
 
iV 
 
 ment, the Church of Englani^. In the prereiit 
 pubhcation I confider myfelf as a fellow-labourer with 
 you in the fame delign, and tracing the path you 
 Iiave trod before, but at great diilance, and with 
 unequal paces. When, by his Majesty's good- 
 nefs, I was raifed to that flation of eminence in the 
 church, to which you had been firft named, and 
 which, On account of the infirmity of your health, 
 you had defired to decline ; it was honour enough 
 for me on fuch an occafion to have been thought 
 of next to you : And I know of no better rule by 
 which to govern my conduct, fo as not to difcredit 
 the royal hand which conferred on me fo fignal 
 and unmerited a favour, than in cafes of difficulty 
 to put the queflion to myfelf. How you would prob- 
 ably have afted in the fame (ituation. You fee, Sir, 
 I flill look up to you, as I have been wont, both a3 
 my fuperior and my example. That I may long 
 reap the benefit of your advice and friendfhip ; and 
 that fuch a meafure of health and ftrength may be 
 continued to you, as may enable you to pais the 
 evening of your days with comfort, and enjoy the 
 blelTmgs of the life you love, is the cordial wifh of. 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 Your very affedtionate 
 and faithful Servant, 
 
 S. GLOUCESTER. 
 
 Dartmouth-Street, Weftminfterj 
 nth May, 1786. ' 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 "When I confider how light a matter very often fubjcfts the 
 beft eftabliflied charafters to the fufpicions of porterity, 
 pofterity often as malignant to virtue as the age that faw it 
 was envious of its glory ; and how ready a remote age is to 
 catch at a low revived flander. which the times that brought 
 it forth faw defpifed and forgotten almofl: in its biith ; I 
 cannot but think it a matter that deferves attention." — Let~ 
 ter to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotifm, &c. 
 by Bp. Warburton. See his Works, Vol. VII. p. 547. 
 
 X HE Charge to the Clergy of the Dio- 
 cefe of Durham, which is fubjoinecl ,to the prefent 
 volume, was printed and pubhlhed in the year 1751, 
 by the learned Prelate, whofe name it bears ; and, 
 together with the Sermons and Analogy of the 
 fame writer, both too well known to need a more 
 particular dcfcription, completes the collection of his 
 works. It has long been confidered as a matter of 
 curiofity, on account of its fcarcenefs ; and it is equal- 
 ly curious on other accounts, its fubjedt, and the cal- 
 umny to which it gave occalion, of reprefenting the 
 Author as addi£ied to fuperftition, as inclined to popery, 
 and as d]Hiig in the cotnmunion of the church of Rome. 
 The improved edition of the Biographia Britannica., 
 now publifhing under the care of Dr. Kippis, having 
 unavoidably brought this calumny again into notice ^ 
 it may not be unleafonable to offer a few refleilions 
 in this place, by way of obviating any impreffions that 
 may hence arife, to the difadvantage of fo great a 
 charadter as that of the late BifliLop Butler j refer- 
 ring thofe who deiire a more pai:tic;ular account of his 
 life, to the third volume of the : fame entertaining 
 work, printed in 1784. Art. Butler fjo/eph.j 
 
 ^ I. The 
 
vl PREFACE 
 
 I. The principal defign of the Bifhop, in his CIiai"ge, 
 is to exhort his Clergy to *' do their part towards re- 
 viving a practical fenfe of religion amongft the people 
 committed to their care ;" and, as one way of elFedt- 
 ing this, to *' inftrud them in the importance of exter^ 
 nal religion^'' or the ufcfulnefs of outward obfcr\'ances 
 in promoting' inward piety. Now, from the com- 
 pound nature of man, confiding of two parts, the 
 body and the mind, together with the influence which 
 thefe are found to have on one another, it follov/s, 
 that the religious regards of fuch a creature ought to 
 be fo framed, as to be in fome way properly accom- 
 ir^odated to both. A religion which is purely fpirit-. 
 ual, dripped of every thing that may af!e(5t the fenfes, 
 and confidered only as a divine philofophy of the 
 mind, if it do not mount up into enthufiafm, as has 
 frequently been the cafe, often fmks, after a few fiiort 
 fervours, into indifference : An abftracVed invilible 
 obje6t, like that which natural religion offers, ceafes 
 to move or intereft the heart ; and fomcthing further 
 is wanting to bring it nearer, and render it more pref- 
 ent to our viev/,than merely an intellectual contempla-. 
 tion. On the other hand, when, in order to remedy 
 this inconvenience, recourfe is had to inftituted forms 
 and ritual injundions ; there is always danger left men 
 be tempted to reft entirely on thefe, and perfuade 
 themfelves that a painful attention to fuch obfervances 
 will atone for the want of genuine piety and virtue.. 
 Yet furely there is a way of fteering fafely between 
 thefe two extremes ; of lb confulting both the parts 
 of our conftitution, that the body and the mind may 
 concur in rendering our religious fervices acceptable 
 to God, and at the fame time ufefui to ourfelves. 
 And what way can this be, but precifely that which 
 is recommended in the Charge ; fuch a cultivation of 
 outward as well as inward religion, that from both 
 may refult, what is the point chiefly to be laboured 
 
 aftet. 
 
Y THE EDITOR. 
 
 VII 
 
 after, and at all events to be fecured, a correfpondent 
 temper and behaviour ; or, in other words, fuch an 
 application of the forms of godlinefs as may be fub- 
 fervient in promoting the power and fpirit of it ? No 
 man who believes the Scriptures of the Old and New 
 Teftament, and underftands what he believes, but 
 mufh know, that external religion is as much enjoin- 
 ed, and conftitutes as real a part of revelation, as that 
 which is internal. The many ceremonies in ufe 
 among the Jews, in confequence of a divine com- 
 mand ; the baptifm of water, as an emblem of moral 
 purity ; the eating and drinking of bread and wine, 
 as fymbols and reprefentations of the body and blood 
 of Chrift, required of Chriftians, are proofs of this. 
 On comparing thefe two parts of religion together, 
 one, it is immediately feen, is of much greater impor- 
 tance than the other ; and, whenever they happen to 
 interfere, is always to be preferred : But does it follow 
 from hence, that therefore that other is of little or no 
 importance, and, in cafes where there is no compe- 
 tition, may entirely be neglected ? Or rather is not 
 the legitimate conclufion direftly the reverfe, that 
 nothing is to be looked upon as of little importance, 
 which is of any ufe at all in preferving upon our minds 
 a fenie of the Divine Authority, which recals to our 
 remembrance the obligations we are under, and helps 
 to keep us, as the Scripture expreffes it, in the fear of 
 the Lord all the day long ?* If, to adopt the inftance 
 mentioned in the Charge, the fight of a Church 
 fhould remind a man of fome fentiment of piety ; if, 
 from the view of a material building dedicated to the 
 fervice of God, he fhould be led to regard himfelf, his 
 own body, as a living temple of the Holy Ghofi,^- and 
 therefore no more than the other to be profaned or 
 defecrated by any thing that defileth or is im.pure j 
 could it be truly faid of fuch a one that he was fuper- 
 
 ftitious, 
 
 * Prov. xxiii. 17. •)- i Cor. vi. 19. 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 ftitious, or miftook the means of religion for the end ? 
 If, to ufe another, and what has been thought a more 
 obnoxious inftance, taken from the Bilhop's prac- 
 tice, a Cross, erefted in a place of public worlhip,* 
 lliould caufe us to refle<5t on him who died on a crofs 
 for our falvation, and on the necefiity of our oivn dy- 
 ing toftn^\ and of crucifying the fieJJi with its affe^ions 
 nnd liijls ; \ would any worfe confequences follow from 
 fuch fentiments fo excited, than if the iame fentiments 
 had been excited by the view of a pidure, of the cru- 
 cifixion fuppofe, fuch as is commonly placed, and 
 with this very defign, in foreign churches, and indeed 
 in many of our own ? Both the inftances here ad- 
 duced, it is very poiTible, may be far from being ap- 
 proved, even by thofe who are under the moft; fincere 
 convictions of the importance of true religion ; and it 
 is eafy to conceive how open to fcorn and cenfure they 
 muft be from others, who think they have a talent for 
 ridicule, and have accuftomed themfelves to regard all 
 pre tendons to piety as hypocritical or fuperflitious. 
 But zvifdom is juflified of her children.^ Religion is 
 what it is, whether men zvill hear, or whether they will, 
 forbear -jW and whatever in the fmallefl; degree pro- 
 motes its interefbs, and affifts us in performing its 
 commands, whether that affiftance be derived from- 
 the medium of the body or the mind, ought to be 
 efteemed of great weight, and deferving of our mofl 
 ferious attention. 
 
 However, be the danger of fuperflition what it may, 
 no one was more fenfible of that danger, or more ear- 
 neft in maintaining that external afts of themfelves 
 are nothing, and that moral holinefs, as diftinguilhed 
 from bodily obfervances of every kind, is that which 
 conftitutes the elTence of religion, than Bilhop But- 
 ler. Not only the Charge itfelf, the whole inten- 
 tion 
 
 * See note [A], at the end of this Preface. 
 
 ■\ Rom. vi. II. + Gal. v. 24. 
 
 % Match, xi. 1 9. II Ezek. ii. 5, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. k 
 
 tion of which Is plainly nothing more than to enforce 
 the neceffity otl pr apical religion, the reality as well as 
 form, is a demonftration of this ; but many paflages 
 beftdes, to the fame purpofe, feledled from his other 
 writings. Take the two following as fpecimiens. In 
 his Analogy he obfer\'es thus : " Though mankind 
 have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their re- 
 ligion in peculiar pofitive rites, by way of equivalent 
 for obedience to moral precepts ; yet, Vv^ithout mak- 
 ing any comparifon at all between them, the nature 
 of the thing abundantly fhews all notions of that kind 
 to be utterly fubveriive of true religion : As they are, 
 moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scrip- 
 ture ; and likewife to the moft exprefs particular dec- 
 larations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of 
 God, without moral virtue."* And to the fame pur- 
 pofe in his Seyifian^ preached before the Society for the 
 Propagation of the Gofpel, in Febraary, 1738-9. 
 " Indeed amongft creatures naturally formed for re- 
 ligion, yet fo much under the power of imagination as 
 men are, iuperfiiition is an evil, which can never be out 
 of light. But even againft this, true religion is a great 
 fecurity, and the only one. True religion takes up 
 tiiat place in the mind, which fuperftition would ufurp, 
 and fo leaves little room for it ; and likewiie lays iis 
 under the ftrongeft obligations to oppofe it. On the 
 contrar)/-, the danger of fuperftition cannot but be in- 
 creafed by the prevalence of irreligion ; and by its 
 general prevalence, the evil wdll be unavoidable. For 
 the common people, wanting a religion, will of courfe 
 take up with almoft any fuperftition which is thrown 
 in their way j and, in procefs of time, amidft the in- 
 finite viciffitudes of the political world, the leaders of 
 parties will certainly be aible to ferve themfelves of that 
 fuperftition, whatever it be, which is getting ground ; 
 and v/ill not fail to carry it to the utmoft length their 
 
 occafions 
 
 * Analorv, Part II. Chan, i. 
 
X PREFACE 
 
 occafions require. The general nature of the thing 
 fliews this ; and hiftory and facl confirm it. It is 
 therefore wonderful, thofe people who feem to think 
 there is but one evil in life, that of fuperflition, Ihould 
 not fee that atheifiu and profanenefs mufl be the in- 
 troduftion of it." * 
 
 He who can think and write in fuch a manner, can 
 never be faid to mifhake the nature of real religion : 
 And he, who, after fuch proofs to the contrary, can 
 perfift in afTerting of fo difcreet and learned a perfon, 
 that he was addicted to fuperjiition, mud himfelf be 
 much a ftranger both to truth and charity. 
 
 And here it may be worth our while to obferve, 
 that the fame excellent Prelate, who by one fet of men 
 was fufpefted oi fuperjUtion^ on account of his Charge^ 
 has by another been reprefented as leaning to the op- 
 poiite extreme di enthnjiajm^ on account of his two dii- 
 courfes On the Love of God. But both opinions are 
 equally without foundation. He was neither fuper- 
 ftitious nor an enthufiaft. His mind was much too 
 ftrong, and his habits of thinking and reafoning much 
 too ftri(51: and fevere, to fufter him to defcend to the 
 weakneffes of either charafter. His piety was at once 
 fervent and rational. When, imprelfed with a gener- 
 ous concern for the declining caufe of religion, he la- 
 boured to revive its dying interefts, nothing he judged 
 would be more effeftual to that end, among creatures 
 {o much engaged with bodily things, and fo apt to be 
 affefted with whatever flrongiy folicits the fenfes as 
 men are, than a religion of fuch a fram.e as fnould in 
 its exercife require the joint exertions of the body and 
 the mind. On the other hand, when penetrated wiih 
 the dignity and importance of the firjl and great com- 
 mandment.'f Love to God, he fet himleif to inquire, 
 what thofe movements of the heart are, which are due 
 to him, the Author and Caufe of ail things ; he found, 
 
 in 
 
 * Serm. XVI. p. 3:39, 340. Ed. 4tb, 1749. 
 f Matth. x.\ii. 38. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xi 
 
 jn the cooled way of confideratlon, that God is the 
 natural objeft of they^;;?^ aifetftions of gratitude, rev- 
 erence, fear, defire of approbation, triillj and depend- 
 ence ; the fame affedtions in kindy though doubtlefs in. 
 a very difproportionate degree, vj\\\c\\ any one would 
 feel from contemplating a perfed; character in a crea-^ 
 ture, in which goodnefs with v.^fdoni and power are 
 fuppofed to be the predominant qualities, with the 
 further circumftance that this creature was alfo his 
 governor and friend. This fubjetft is manifeitly a 
 real one ; there is nothing in it fanciful or unreafon- 
 able. Tliis way of being affecfted towards God is piety, 
 in the flrideft fenfe : This is religion, conlidered as a 
 habit of mind ; a religion, fuited to the nature and 
 condition of man.* 
 
 II. From fuperflition to popery the tranlition is 
 eafy. No wonder then, that, in the progrefs of de- 
 tradlion, the hmple imputation of the former of thefe, 
 with which the attack on the charader of our Author 
 was opened, fliould be followed by the more aggra- 
 vated imputation of the latter. Nothing, I think, 
 can fairly be gathered in fupport of fuch a fuggeflion 
 from the Charge^ in which popery is barely mentioned, 
 and cccaiionally only, and in a fentence or tvvo ; yet 
 even there, it fnould be remarked, the Billiop takes 
 care to , defcribe the peculiar obfervances required by 
 it, " fome as in themlelves wrong and fuperftitious, 
 and others of them as being; made fubfervient to the 
 purpofes of fuperflition." With refpeft to his other 
 writings, any one at all converfant with them needs 
 not to be told, that the matters treated of both in 
 his Sermons and his Analogy did, none of them, direct- 
 ly lead him to confider, and much lefs to combat, the 
 opinions, whether relating to Faith or Worfliip, which 
 are pecuUar to the Church of Rom.e : It might there- 
 fore have happened, yet without any jufl conclufion 
 
 ariiing 
 
 * See aote [B], at the eadoi this Preface. 
 
xn PREFACE 
 
 arillng; from thence, of beinp; himfelf inclined to favour 
 thofe opinions, that he had never mentioned, fo much 
 as incidentally, the fubject of popery at all. But for- 
 tunately for the reputation of the Billiop, and to the 
 eternal difgrace of his calumniators, even this poor 
 refource is wanting to fupport their m.alevolence. In 
 his Sermon at St, Bride's, before the Lord Mayor, in 
 1740, after having faid that " our laws and whole 
 confbtution go more upon fuppofition of an equality 
 amongil m^ankind, than the conilitution and laws of 
 other countries ;" he goes on to obferve, that '* this 
 plainly requires, that more particular regard fliould he 
 bad to the education of the lower people here, than in 
 places v^^here they are born flaves of power, and to be 
 w.^idt f.aves of fnperftition :'' * Meaning evid>:rntly in 
 this place by the general term fuperftition, the partic- 
 ular errors of the Romanifts. This is fomething ; but 
 we have a ftill plainer indication what his fentiments 
 concerning popery really were, from another of his 
 Additional Sermons, 1 mean that before the Houfe of 
 Lords, on June the nth, 1 747, the anniverfary of his 
 late Majefty's acceilion. The palfage alluded to is as 
 follows, and my readers will not be diipleafed that I 
 give it them at length. " The value of our religious 
 eftablifliment ought to be very much heightened in 
 our efteem, by confidering what it is a fecurity from i 
 1 mean that great corruption of Chrifbianity, popery, 
 which is ever hard at work to bring us again under 
 its yoke. Whoever will coniider the popilli claims 
 to the difpofal of the whole earth, as of divine right, 
 to difpenfe \nt\\ the moft facred engagements, the 
 claims to fupreme abfolute authority in religion ; in 
 Ihort, the general claims which the Canonifts exprefs 
 by the words, plenitude of power— v^A\OQ\'Qr, I fay, will 
 confider popery as it is profelied at Romey may fee, 
 that it i§ manifeft, open ufurj)ari on of all human and 
 
 divine 
 
 * Serm. XVII. p. 36^ 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xiii 
 
 divine authority. But even in thofe Roman-catholic 
 countries where thefe monftrous claims are not ad- 
 mitted, and the civil power does, in many refpeds, 
 rcftrain the papal ; yet perfecution is profefTed, as it 
 is abfolutely enjoined by what is acknowledged to be 
 their higheft authority, a General Council, To called, 
 with the Pope at the head of it ; and is pra^lifed in 
 all of them, I think, without exception, where it can 
 be done fafely. Thus they go on to fubfcitute"" force 
 inflead of argument, and external profeiTion made by 
 force inftead of reafonable conviction. And thus 
 corruptions of the groffeft fort have been in vogue^ 
 for many generations, in many parts of Chriflendom ; 
 and are lb ftill, even where popery obtains in, its leafb 
 abfurd form : And their antiquity and wide extent 
 are infilled upon as proofs of their truth ; a kind of 
 proof which at beft can only be prefumptive, but 
 which' lofes all its little weight, in proportion as the 
 long and large prevalence of fuch corruptions have 
 been obtained by force."* In another part of the, 
 fame fermon, where he is again ipeaking of our ec- 
 cleliaftical conftitutiori, he reminds his audience that 
 it is to be valued, " not becaufe it leaves us at liberty 
 to have as little rehgion as we pleafe, without being 
 accountable to human judicatories ; but bccaule it 
 exhibits to our view, and enforces upon our con- 
 fciences, genuine Chriftianity, free from the iupcrfti- 
 tions with which it is defiled in other countries ;'* 
 which fuperftitions, he obferves, " naturaUy tend to 
 abate its force." -f The date of this Sermon fhould 
 here be attended to. It was preached in June, 1 747 ; 
 that is, four years before the delivery and publication 
 of the Charge, which was in the year 1751 ; and ex- 
 _adly five years before the Author died, which was in 
 June, 1752. We have then, in the palTagcs now 
 .laid before the reader, a clear and unequivocal proof, 
 
 broudit 
 
 ^■' Serni. XX, p. 440 — 44^, -j- P. 449. 
 
stv PREFACE 
 
 brought down to within a few years of Bifhop But^ 
 ler's death, that popery was held by hhn in the ut- 
 moft abhorrence, and that he regarded it in no other 
 h'ght than as the great corruption of Chrijiianlty , and a 
 manifeji^ open ujurpatlon of all human and divine author- 
 ity. The argument is deciiive ; nor will any thing be 
 of force to invalidate it, unlefs from fome after-ki^ 
 during the fhort remainder of the Bidiop's life, befides 
 that of delivering and printing his Charge, (which, 
 after what I have faid here, and in the Notes added 
 to this Preface and to the Charge, I mull have leave 
 to confider as affording: no evidence at all of his in- 
 clination to papiflical doctrines or ceremonies) the 
 contrary (hall incontrovertibly appear. 
 
 III. One fuch after-atl, however, has been alleg-* 
 ed, which v/ould effeftually demolifh all that we have 
 urged in behalf of our Prelate, were it tnle, as is pre- 
 tended, that he died in the communion of the church of 
 Rome. Had a ftory of this fort been invented and 
 propagated by Papifts, the wonder might have been 
 lefs : 
 
 Hoc Ithacus velit, Sc magno mercentur Atridse. 
 
 But to the reproach of proteftantifm, the fabricatloa 
 of this calumny, for fuch we fliall find it, originated 
 from among ourfelves. It is pretty remarkable, that 
 a circumftance fo extraordinary fhould never have been 
 divulged till the year 1767, fifteen years after the Bifli- 
 op's deceafe. At that time DhThomasSecker was 
 Archbifhop of Canterbury ; who of all others was 
 the moft likely to know the truth or falfehood of the 
 fact alTerted, having been educated with our author in 
 his early youth, and having lived in a conftant habit 
 of intimacy with him to the very time of his death. 
 The good Archbilhop was not filent on this occafion : 
 With a virtuous indignation he flood forth to prote<3: 
 the poflhumous character of his friend ; and in a pub- 
 lic newfpaper, under the fignature of MiJoj^feudeSy call- 
 ed 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xv 
 
 ed upon his accufer to fupport Vv'hat he had advanced, 
 by whatever proofs he could. No provof, however, nor 
 any thing like a proof, appeared in reply ; and every 
 nian of fenfe and candour at that time v/as perfedly 
 convinced the alfertion was entirely groundlefs.* As 
 a further confirmation of the rectitude of this judg- 
 ment, it may not be amifs to mention, there is yet in 
 exiftence a ftrong prefumptivc argument at lead in its 
 favour, drawn from the teftimony of thofe v*^ho attend- 
 ed our author in the ficknefs of which he died. The 
 laft days of this excellent Prelate were palTed at Bath ; 
 Dr. N A T H A N A E L F o R s T E R , his chaplain, being con- 
 tinually with him ; and for one day, and at the very 
 end of his illnefs. Dr. Martin Benson aUo, the then 
 Bilhop of Gloucester, who fhortened his own life 
 in his pious hafte to viht his dying friend. Both thele 
 perfons conilantly wrote letters to Dr. Secker, then 
 Bifhop of Oxford, containing accounts of Biihop 
 Butler's declining health, and of the fymptoms and 
 progrefs of his diforder, which, as was conjedlured, foon 
 terminated in his death. Thefe letters, which are fcill 
 preferved in the Lambeth library,-^- I have read ; and 
 not the flendereft argument can be collected from 
 them, in juftification of the ridiculous flander we are 
 here confiderino;. If at that awful feafon tlie Bilhoo 
 was not known to have exprefied any opinion, tending 
 to fhew his dijlike to popery ; neither was he known 
 to have faid any thing, that could at ail be conftrued 
 in approbation of it : And the natural prefumption is, 
 that whatever fentiments he had formerly entertained 
 concerning that corrupt fyflem oi religion, he contin- 
 ued to entertain them to the laft. The truth is, nei- 
 ther the word nor the idea of poper}'" feems once to 
 have occurred either to the Eilhop himfelf, or to thofe 
 who watched his parting moments : Their thoughts 
 were otherwife engaged. His diforder had reduced 
 
 hiui 
 
 * See note [C], at the end of this Preface. 
 f See uwte [p], at the end of tliif Pixfai;?. 
 
svi PREFACE 
 
 him to fuch debility, as to render him incapable of 
 fpeaking much or long on any fubjedt ; the few bright 
 intervals that occurred were paffed in a ftate of the ut- 
 mofl tranquillity and compofure ; and in that compo- 
 fure he expired. Mark the perfe5i man, mid behold the 
 upright ; for the end of that man is peace.* — Let me die 
 the death of the righteous^ and let my lafi end he like his l\ 
 Out of pure lefpeft for the virtues of a man, whom 
 I had never the happinefs of knowing, or even of fee- 
 ing, but from whole writings I have received the great- 
 eft benefit and illumination, and which I have reafon 
 to be thankful to Providence for having early thrown 
 in my way ; 1 have adventured, in what I have now 
 offered to the public, to ftep forth in his defence, and 
 to vindicate his honeft fame from the attacks of thofe, 
 who, Vv/ith the vain hope of bringing down fuperior 
 characters to their own level, are forever at work in de- 
 trafting from their juft praife. For the hterary repu- 
 tation of Bilhop Butler, it ftands too high in the 
 opinion of the world, to incur the danger of any dimi- 
 nution ; but this in truth is the leafh of his excellen- 
 cies. He was more than a good writer, he was a good 
 man ; and, what is an addition even to this eulogy, he. 
 was a fmcere Chriftian. His whole ftudy was diredied 
 to the knowledge and praftice of found morality and 
 true religion : Thefe he adorned by his life, and has 
 recommended to future ages in his v/ritings ; in which, 
 if my judgment be of any avail, he has done effential 
 fervice to both ; as much, perhaps, as any lingle per- 
 fbn, fmce the extraordinary gifts of the zvord of wif- 
 dom and the word of knowledge']^ have been withdrawn. 
 
 IN what follows, I propofe to give a Ihort account 
 of the Bifhop's Moral and Religious Systems, 
 as thefe are colleded from his works. 
 
 I. Hi^ 
 
 * PL xxxvii. 37. f Numb, xxiii. lo, % i Cor. xii. S, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xvii 
 
 I. His way of treating the fubjed of morals is to be 
 gathered from the volume of his Sermons, and par- 
 ticularly from the three firil, and from the preface to 
 that volume. 
 
 " There is," as our Author with fmgular fagacity 
 has obferved, " a much more exa6t correfpondence be- 
 tween the natural and moral world, than we are apt to 
 take notice of." * The inward frame of man anfwers 
 to his outward condition. The feveral propenfities, 
 pallions, and afFeftions, implanted in our hearts by the 
 Author of nature, are in a peculiar manner adapted to 
 the circumftances of life in which he hath placed us. 
 This general obfervation, properly purfued, leads to 
 feveral important conclulions. The original internal 
 conftitution of man, compared with his external con- 
 dition, enables us to difcern what courfe of action and 
 behaviour that conftitution leads to, what is our duty 
 refpeAing that condition, and furniOies us befides with 
 the moft powerful arguments to the pradlice of it. 
 
 What the inward frame and conftitution of man is, 
 is a queftion of fa6l, to be determined, as other facts 
 are, from experience, from our internal feelings and 
 external fenfes, and from the teftimony of others. 
 Whether human nature, and the circumftances in 
 which it is placed, might not have been ordered other- 
 wife, is foreign to our inquiry, and none of our con- 
 cern : Our province is, taking both of thefe as they 
 are, and viewing the connexion between them, from 
 that connexion to difcover, if we can, what courfe of 
 adtion is fitted to that nature and thofe circumftances. 
 From contemplating the bodily fenfes, and the organs 
 or inftmments adapted to them, we learn that the eye 
 was given to fee with, the ear to hear with. In like 
 manner, from confidering our inward perceptions and 
 the final caufes of them, we collect that the feeling of 
 ihame, for inftance, was given to prevent the doin^ of 
 B things 
 
 * Serm, VI, 
 
nvm P R E j^ A C E 
 
 things fliameful ^ compaffion, to carry us to rel!0\'(* 
 others in diftrefs ; anger, to refift fudden violence of-' 
 fered to ourfelves. if, coiitiniMng o\h" inquiries in thi'j 
 way, it fhould at length appear, that the nature, the 
 whole nature of man,- leads him to and is fitted for that 
 particular courfe of behaviour, which we ufually dif-^ 
 tinguifli by the name of virtue ; we are authorized to 
 conclude, that virtue is the law we are born under, that 
 it was fo intended by the Author of out being ; and 
 we are bound by the moft intimate of ail obligations, a<- 
 regard to our own highefc intereft and happinefs, tp- 
 conform to it in all fltuatic/ns and events. 
 
 Human nature is not fuuple and uniform, but made 
 up of feveral parts ; and' we can hate no jufl idea of it 
 as a fyftem or conftitution, unlefs v/e take into our view' 
 the refpedls and relations which thefe parts have to each, 
 other. As the body is not one member, but many, 
 fo our inward ftrufture conhfcs of various inftincls, 
 appetites, and propenfions. Thus far there is no dif- 
 ference between human creatures and brutes. But 
 befides thefe common paffions and affections, there is 
 another principle, peculiar to mankind, that of con-- 
 fcience, moral fenfe, refleftion, call it what you pleafe, 
 by which they are enabled to review their whole con- 
 duft, to a.pprove of fome aftions in themfelves, and t<y 
 dil approve of others. That this principle will of courfe 
 have/owf influence on our behaviour, at leaft at times, 
 will hardly be difputed : But the particular influence 
 which it oug/it to have, the precife degree of power ia 
 the regulating of our internal fra,me that is afhgned it 
 by him who placed it there, is a point of the utmoft 
 confequence in itfelf, and on the determination of 
 which the very hinge of our Author's moral i'yftem 
 turns. If the faculty here fpoken of be, indeed, what 
 it is afTerted to be, in nature and kind fuperior to every 
 other pafhon and affeftion ; if it be given, not merel5!f 
 tha;t it may exert its force occafionally, or as our pref- 
 
 ent 
 
:bY TPtfi EDITOR. xk 
 
 ent humour or fancy may difpofe us, but that it may 
 at all times Jexercife an uncontrollable authority and 
 government over all the reft ; it will then follow, that 
 in order to complete the idea of human nature, as a 
 fyftem, we muft not only take in each particular bias, 
 propenfion, inftinft, which are feen to belong to it, but 
 we muft add,, befides the principle of confcience, to- 
 gether with the fubjection that is due to it from all the 
 other appetites and pafiions ; juft as the idea of a civil 
 conftitution is formed, not barely from enumerating 
 the feveral menibers and ranks of which it is compofed, 
 but from thefe confidered as a6ting in various degrees 
 of fubordination to each other, and all under the di- 
 redlion of the fame fiipreme authority, whether thai: 
 authority be vefted in one perfon or more. 
 
 The view here given of the internal conftitution of 
 man, and of the fupremacy of confcience, agreeably 
 to the conceptions of Biiliop Butler, enables us to 
 comprehend the force of that expreffion, common to 
 him and the ancient moralifts, that virtue confifts in 
 foUozving nature. The meaning cannot be, that it 
 confifts in adling agreeably to that propenfity of our 
 nature which happens to be the ftrongeft ; or which 
 propels us towards certain objefts, without any regard 
 to the methods by which they are to be obtained ; but 
 the meaning muft be, that virtue confifts in the due 
 regulation and fubjedion of all the other appetites and 
 affecftions to the fuperior faculty of confcience ; from 
 a conformity to which alone our actions are properly 
 natural, or correfpondent to the nature, to the whole 
 nature of fuch an agent as man. From hence too it 
 appears, that the Author of our frame is by no means 
 indifferent to virtue and vice, or has left us at liberty 
 to a(5t at random, as humour or appetite may prompn 
 us ; but that every man has the rule of right within 
 him ; a rule attended in the very notion of it with au- 
 thority, and fuch as has the force of a dire(ftion and a 
 B 2 command 
 
XX PREFACE 
 
 command from him, who made us what we are, what 
 courfe of behaviour is fuited to olir nature, and which 
 he expeds that we fhould follow. This moral faculty 
 implies alfo a pre-fentiment and apprehenfion, that the 
 iuclgment which it paffes on our aftions, confidered as 
 of good or ill defert, will hereafter be confirmed by the 
 unerring judgment of God ; when virtue and happi- 
 nefs, vice and mifery, whofe ideas are now fo clofely 
 conne6led, ihall be indiffolubly united, and the divine 
 government be found to correspond in the moft exa(5t 
 propoition to the nature he has given us. Laftly, this 
 juft prerogative or fupremacy of confcience it is, which 
 Mr. Pope has defcribed in his Univerfal Prayer^ though 
 perhaps he may have exprefled it rather too ftrongly, 
 v/here he lays, 
 
 " What confcience diflates to be done,- 
 
 " Or warns me not to do, 
 " This teach me more than Hell to fhun, 
 
 " That more than Heaven purfue." 
 
 The reader will obferve, that this way of treating 
 the fubjecfl of morals by an appeal to fa5is does not at 
 all interfere with that other way, adopted by Dr. 
 Samuel Clarke, and others, which begins with inquir- 
 ing into the relations 2ind filnejfes of things , but rather 
 illuftrates and confirms it. That there afe eflential 
 differences in the qualities of human actions, eflablilh- 
 ed by nature, and that this 77<?/?^m/ difference of things, 
 prior to and independent of all will, creates a natural 
 jitnefs in the agent to adt agreeably to it, feems as little 
 to be denied, as that there is the wor^/ difference before 
 explained, from which we approve and feel a pleafu're in 
 what is right, and conceive a diftafle to what is wrong. 
 Still, however, when we are endeavouring to eftablilli 
 either this moral or that natural difference, it ought 
 never to be forgotten, or rather it will require to be 
 diftindlly iliewn, that both of thefe, when traced up to 
 their fource, fuppofe an intelligent Author of nature 
 
 and 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxi 
 
 and moral Ruler of the world ; who originally ap- 
 pointed thefe differences, and by fuch an appoint- 
 ment has lignified his will that we Iliould conform 
 to them^ as the only effectual method of fecuring our 
 HAPPINESS on the whole under his government.* 
 And of this confideration our Prelate himfelf was not 
 unmindful ; as may be collefted from many expref- 
 iions in different parts of his writings, and particularly 
 from the following palTages in his Xlth Sermon. " It 
 may be allowed, without any prejudice to the caufe of 
 virtue and religion, that our ideas of happinefs and mii- 
 ery are, of all our ideas, the neareft and moft important 
 to us ; that they will, nay, if you pleafe,that they ought 
 to prevail over thofe of order, and beauty, and harmo- 
 ny, and proportion, if there fhould ever be, as it is im- 
 poffible there ever fliould be, any inconfiftence between 
 them." And again, " Though virtue or moral retti- 
 tude does indeed confift in affedion to and purfuit of 
 what is right and good, as fuch ; yet, when we fit down 
 in a cool hour, we can neither jufbify to ourfelves this 
 or any other purfuit, till we are convinced that it will 
 be for our happinefs, or at lead not contrary to it." -f 
 
 Befides the general fyftem of morality opened above, 
 our Author in his Volume of Sermons has ftated with 
 accuracy the difference between felf-love and benevo- 
 lence ; in oppofition to thofe, who on the one hand 
 make the whole of virtue to confifb in benevolence,;!* 
 and to thofe, who on the other affert that every par- 
 ticular affedion and action is refolvable into felf-love. 
 . In combating thefe opinions, he has fhewn, I think un- 
 anfwerably, that there are the fame kind of indications 
 in human nature that we were made to promote the 
 happinefs of others, as that we were made to promote 
 our own : That it is no juft objeftion to this, that we 
 have difpofitions to do m/ to others as well as good ; 
 
 for 
 
 * See note [E], at the end of this Preface. f Serm. XI. p. 229. 
 
 J See the vd Differtation On the Nature of Virtue, at the end of the Anahgv, 
 
xxli PREFACE 
 
 for we have alfo difpofitions to do evil as well as good 
 to ourfehes, to our own moft important interefts even 
 in this life, for the fake of gratifying a prefent pafTion : 
 That the thing to be lamented is, not that men have 
 too great a regard to their own real good, but that 
 they have not enough : That benevolence is not more 
 at variance with or unfriendly to felf-love, than any 
 other particular afFediion is ; and that, by confulting 
 the happinefs of others, a man is fo far from lejfening 
 his own, that the very endeavour to do fo, though he 
 fhould fail in the accompiiiliment, is a fource of the 
 higheft latisfa6tion and peace of mind.* He has alfo, 
 in paffing, animadverted on the philofopher oiMalmf- 
 htiry, who in his book Of Human Nature has advanced, 
 as difcoverles in moral fcience, that benevolence is on- 
 ly the love of power, and compaflion the fear of future 
 calamity to ourfelves. And this our Author has done, 
 not fo much with the delign of expoimg the falfe rea,~ 
 foning of Mr. Hobbes, but becaufe on fo perverfe an 
 account of human nature he has raifed a fyftem, fub- 
 verfive of all juftice and honeity.-j~ 
 
 II. The Religious Sj^ftem of Bifhop Butler is 
 chiefly to be colleded from the treatife, entitled The 
 Analogy of Religion^ Natural and Revealed^ to the Con- 
 Jlitution and Courje of Nature. 
 
 All things are double one againft another, and God hath 
 made nothing imperfeEi.\ On this fingie obfervation of 
 the Son of Sir achy the whole fabric of our Prelate's 
 defence of religion, in his Analogjy is raifed. Inftead 
 of indulging to idle fpcculations, how the world might 
 poffibly have been better than it is ; or, forgetful of 
 the difference between hypothefis and faft, attempting 
 to explain the divine economy with reipe6t to intelli- 
 gent creatures frcun pre-conceived notions of his own ; 
 he firft inquires what the conllitution of nature, as 
 
 made 
 
 * See Sermons I. and XI. and the Preface to the Volume of Sermons. 
 ;- See the Notes to Sermon I. and V. % Ecclus. xlii. 24. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxiii 
 
 jnade known to us in the way of experiment, a6tually 
 IS ; and from this, now feen and acknowledged, he en- 
 deavours to fonu a judgment of that larger conftitu- 
 tion, which religion difcovers to us. If the difpenfa- 
 tion of Providence we are now under, confidered as 
 inhabitants of this world, and having a temporal in- 
 tereft to fecure in it, be found, on examination, to be 
 analogous to, and of a piece with that further difpen- 
 fation, which relates to us as deiigned for another 
 \vorld, in which we have an eternal intereft, depend- 
 ing on our behaviour here ; if both may be traced 
 up to the fame general laws, and appear to be carried 
 on according to the fame plan of adminiftration ; the 
 fair prefumption is, that both proceed from one and 
 the lame Author. And if the principal parts cbjefled 
 to in this latter difpenfation be fimilar to, and of the 
 fame kind with what we certainly experience under 
 the former, the objeftions, being clearly inconclufive 
 in one cafe, becaufe contradided by plain faft, mufl, 
 in all reafon, be allowed to be inconclufive alfo in the 
 other. 
 
 This way of arguing from what is acknowledged to 
 what is difputed, from things known to other things 
 that refemble them, from that part of the divine eflab- 
 iilhment which is expofed to our viev/, to that more 
 important one which lies beyond it, is on all hands 
 confeffed to be juft. By this method Sir Ifaac New- 
 ton has unfolded the Syllem of Nature ; by the fame 
 method Bifhop Butler has explained the Syfleni of 
 Grace, and thus, to ufe the words of a writer, whom I 
 quote with pleafure, *' has formed and concluded a 
 happy alliance between faith and philofophy."-^- 
 
 And althoudi the ar2;ument from analo2;v be al^ 
 lowed to be imperfett, and by no means fufficient to 
 folve all difficulties refpedfing the government of God, 
 and the deligns of his Providence with reoard to man- 
 
 liind, 
 
 * Mr. Mainuaring's Differtatlon, prefixed to his Volume of Scri-.iOiis. 
 
XXIV 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 kind, (a degree of knowledge, which we are not fbr- 
 niflied with faculties for attaining, at leaft in the pvef- 
 ent fbate) yet furely it is of importance to learn from 
 it, that the natural and moral world are intimately 
 connetled, and parts of one ftupendous whole or fyf- 
 tem ; and that the chief objedions, which are brought 
 againft religion, may be urged with equal force againft 
 the conftitution and courfe of nature, where they are 
 certainly falfe in fadt. And this information we may 
 derive from the work before us ; the proper delign of 
 which, it may be of ufe to obferve, is not to prove the 
 truth of religion either natural or revealed, but to con- 
 firm that proof, already known, by conliderations from 
 analogy. 
 
 After this account of the method of reafoning em- 
 ployed by our Author, let us now advert to his man- 
 ner of applying it, firft to the fubjeO; of Natural Re- 
 ligion, and fecondly to that of Revealed. 
 
 I . The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a 
 future life ; and with this the treatife begins. Nei- 
 ther the reafon of the thing, nor the analogy of nature, 
 according to Bifliop Butler, give ground for imagin- 
 ing, that the unknown event, death, will be our de- 
 ftru(ftion. The flates in which we have formerly ex- 
 ifted, in the womb and in infancy, are not more differ- 
 ent from each other than from that of mature age in 
 which we now exifl : Therefore that we fliall continue 
 to exift hereafter, in a ftate as different from the prefent 
 as the prefent is from thofe through which we have 
 paffed already, is a prefumption favoured by the anal- 
 ogy of nature. All that we know from reafon con- 
 cerning death, is the effedls it has upon animal bodies : 
 And the frequent inftances among men of the intel- 
 ledtual powers continuing in high health and vigour, 
 at the very time when a mortal difeafe is on the point 
 of putting an end to all the powers of fenfation, in- 
 duce us to hope that it may have no effed at all on 
 
 the 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxv 
 
 the human foul, not even fo much as to fufpend the 
 exercife of its faculties ; though if it have, the fuf- 
 penfion of a power by no means implies its extinftion, 
 as fleep or a fwoon may convince us.* 
 
 The probability of a future ftate once granted, an 
 important quefliion arifes, How beft to fecure our m- 
 tereft in that ftate. We find from what paffes daily 
 before us, that the conftitution of nature admits of 
 mifery as well as happinefs ; that both of thefe are 
 the confequences of our own aftions ; and thefe con- 
 fequences we are enabled to forefee. Therefore, that 
 our happinefs or mifery in a future world may depend 
 on our own actions alfo, and that rewards or punifli- 
 ments hereafter may follow our good or ill behaviour 
 here, is but an appointment of the fame fort with 
 what we experience under the divine government, ac- 
 cording to the regular courfe of nature.-f- 
 
 This fuppofition is confirmed from another circum- 
 fiance, that the natural government of God, under 
 which we now live, is alfo moral ; in which rewards 
 and punifliments are the confequences of aftions, 
 confidered as virtuous and vicious. Not that every 
 man is rewarded or punillied here in exa6t proportion 
 to his defert ; for the eifential tendencies of virtue 
 and vice to produce happinefs and the contrary are 
 often hindered from taking eifed from accidental 
 caufes. However, there are plainly the rudiments and 
 beginnings of a righteous adminiftration to be dif- 
 cerned in the conftitution of nature ; from whence 
 we are led to expedt, that thefe accidental hindrances 
 will one day be removed, and the rule of diftributive 
 juftice obtain completely in a more perfe6t ftate.;}; 
 
 The moral government of God, thus eftabliihed, 
 implies in the notion of it fome Ibrt of trial, or a 
 mofal pollibility of afting wrong as well as right, in 
 thofe who are the fubjedts of it. And the dodrine 
 
 of 
 
 ♦ Pan I, Chap. r. f Ch. 2. J Ch, 3. 
 
isxyl PREFACE 
 
 of religion, that the prefent life is in fad a flate of 
 probation for a future one, is rendered credible, from 
 its being analogous throughout to the general con- 
 dud: of Providence towards us with refpeft to this 
 world ; in which prudence is neceflary to fecure our 
 temporal intereft, jull as we are taught that virtue is 
 jiecefi'ary to fecure our eternal interefi: ; and both are 
 trufted to ourfelves.* 
 
 But the prefent life is not merely a ftate of probation, 
 implying in it difficulties and danger ; it is alfo a ftate 
 of difcipline and improvement ; and that both in our 
 temporal and religious capacity. Thus childhood is 
 a flate of difcipline for youth ; youth for manhood, 
 and that for old age. Strength of body, and matu- 
 rity of underftanding, are acquired by degrees ; and 
 neither of them without continual exercife and atten- 
 tion on our part, not only in the beginning of life, 
 but through the whole courfe of it. So again with 
 refpedt to our rehgious concerns, the prefent world is 
 fitted to be, and to good men is in event, a ftate of 
 difcipline and improvement for a future one. The 
 feveral pafTions and propenllons, implanted in our 
 hearts, incline us, in a multitude of inftances, to for- 
 bidden pleafures : This inward infirmity is increafed 
 by various fnares and temptations, perpetually occur^ 
 ring from without. Hence ariies the neceffity of rec- 
 olledion and felf-government, of withftanding the 
 calls of appetite, and forming our minds to habits of 
 piety and virtue ; habits, of which we are capable, 
 and which to creatures in a ftate of moral imperfec- 
 tion, and fallen from their original integrity, muft be 
 of the greateft ufe, as an additional fecurity, over and 
 above the principle of confcience, from the dangers 
 to which we are expofed.-f- 
 
 Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of 
 nature, to the general dodrine of religion, deftroyed 
 
 or 
 
 * Ch. 4. -f Ch. 5. . 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxvii 
 
 or weakened by any notions concerning neceflity. 
 -Of itfelf it is a mere word, the fign of an abflradt 
 ,idea ; and as much requires an agent, that is, d necef- 
 fary agent, in order to eflfed: any thing, as freedom re- 
 quires a free agent. Admitting it to be fpeculativeiy 
 true, if confidered as influencing pradice, it is the fame 
 as falfe ; for it is matter of experience, that, with regard 
 to our prefent intereft, and as inhabitants of this world, 
 we are treated as if we were free ; and therefore the anal- 
 ogy of nature leads us to conclude, that, with regard 
 to our future intereft, and as defigned for another 
 world, we fhall be treated as free alfo. Nor does tlie 
 opinion of neceffity, fuppofmg it poffible, at all affect 
 either the general proof of religion, or its external 
 evidence.* 
 
 Still objedions may be made againft the wifdoni 
 and goodnefs of the divine government, to which 
 analogy, which can on.ly fliew the truth or credibility 
 of facts, affords no anfwer. Yet even here analogy is 
 of ufe, if it fuggeft that the divine government is a 
 fcheme or fyftem, and not a number of unconnected 
 acfts, and that this fyftem is alfo above our compre- 
 henfioji. Now the government of tlie natural world 
 appears to be a fyftem of this kind ; with parts, re- 
 lated to each other, and together compofmg a whole ; 
 in which fyftem ends are brought about by tlie ufe 
 of means, many of which means, before experience,, 
 would have been fiifpe<5ted to have had a quite con- 
 trary tendency ; which is carried on by general laws, 
 fimilar caufes uniformly producing fimilar effed;s ; the 
 utility of which general laws, and tlie inconveniences 
 which would probably arife from the occafional or 
 even fecret fufpenHon of them, we are in fome fort 
 enabled to difcern ;-i- but of the whole we are incom- 
 petent judges, becaufe of the linall part which comes 
 
 within 
 
 * Ch. 6. 
 
 f See a Treat: fc on Divine Benev'jkn:c, by Dr. Thonai Balgujy Tai t II. 
 
xxvlii PREFACE 
 
 ivithin our view. Reafoning then from what we 
 know, it is highly credible, that the government of 
 the moral world is a fyftem alfo, carried on by general 
 laws, and in which ends are accompliHied by the in- 
 ten^ention of means ; and that both conftitutions, the 
 natural and the moral, are fo connefted, as to form to- 
 gether but one fcheme. But of this fcheme, as of 
 that of the natural world taken alone, we are not 
 quahhed to judge, on account of the mutual refpect 
 of the feveral parts, to each other and to the whole, 
 and our own incapacity to furvey the v/hole, or, with 
 accuracy, any fingle part. All objections therefore 
 to the wifdom and goodnefs of the divine government 
 may be founded merely on our ignorance ;* and to 
 iiich objections our ignorance is the proper and a fat- 
 isfad:ory anfwer.-i* 
 
 2. The chief difficulties concerning Natural Re- 
 ligion being now removed, our Author proceeds, in 
 the next place, to that which is Revealed ; and as 
 an introdudlion to an inquiry into the credibility of 
 Chriftianity, begins with the confideration of its im- 
 portance. 
 
 The importance of Chriftianity appears in two 
 refpecls. Firft, in its being a republication of Nat- 
 ural Religion, in its native fimplicity, with authority, 
 and with circumftances of advantage ; afcertaining, 
 in many inftances of moment, what before was only 
 probable, and particularly confirming the do<5trine of 
 a future ftate of rewards and punifliments.i Second- 
 ly, as revealing a new difpenfation of Providence, 
 originating from the pure love and mercy of God, and 
 conduced by the mediation of his Son, and the guid- 
 ance of his Spirit, for the recovery and falvation of 
 mankind, reprefented in a ftate of apoftacy and ruin. 
 This account of Chriftianity being admitted to be 
 
 juftj 
 
 * See note [F], at the end of this Preface. .- ' ^ t . 
 
 t Ch. 7. 
 
 % See note [G], at the end of this Preface. • . c 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxlx 
 
 jufl, and the diftinft offices of thefe three Divine Per- 
 ions being once difcovered to us, we are as much 
 obhged in point of duty to acknowledge the relations 
 we ftand in to the Son and Holy Ghoft, as our Me- 
 diator and San^lifier, as we are obhged in point of du- 
 ty to acknowledge the relation we ftand in to God the 
 Father ; although the two former of thefe relations 
 be learnt from revelation only, and in the laft v/e are 
 inftruded by the light of nature ; the obligation in 
 either cafe ariling from the offices themfelves, and not 
 at all depending on the manner in wliich they are 
 made known to us.* 
 
 The prefumptions againft revelation in general are, 
 that it is not difcoverable by reafon, that it is unlike 
 to what is fo difcovered, and that it was introduced 
 and fupported by miracles. But in a fcheme fo large 
 as that of the univerfe, unbounded in extent, and ev- 
 erlafting in duration, there mud of neceffity be num- 
 berlefs circumftances which are beyond the reach of 
 our faculties to difcern, and which can only be known 
 by divine illumination. And both in the natural and 
 moral government of the world, under which we Hve, 
 we find many things unlike one to another, and there- 
 fore ought not to wonder if the fame unlikenefs ob- 
 tain between things vifible and invilible ; although it 
 be far from true, that revealed religion is entirely 
 unlike the conftitution of nature, as analogy may 
 teach us. Nor is there any thing incredible in reve- 
 lation, confidered as miraculous ; whether miracles be 
 fuppofed to have been performed at the beginning of 
 the world, or after a courle of nature has been eftab- 
 liflied. Not at the heginning of the zvorkl -y for then 
 there was either no courfe of nature at all, or a power 
 mull have been exerted totally different from what 
 that courfe is at prefent. All men and animals cannot 
 liave been born, as they are now ; but a pair of each 
 
 fort 
 
 * Part II. Ch. r. 
 
:£xx P R E t" A C E 
 
 fort mull have been produced at firft, in a way alto- 
 gether unlike to that iti which thfey have been fmce pro- 
 duced ; unlefs we affirm, that men and animals have 
 exifted from 'eternity in an endlefs fuccelTion : One 
 miracle therefore at leafb there muft have been, at th^ 
 bcc^innins; of the world, or at the tmie of man's crea- 
 tion. Not after the fettlenient of a cotirfe of nature^ on 
 account of miracles being contrary to that courfe, or, 
 in other words, contrary to experience : For in or- 
 der to know whether miracles, worked in atteftation 
 of a divine religion, be contrary to experience or 
 not, we ought to be acquainted with other cafes, lim- 
 ilar or parallel to thofe, in which miracles are alleged 
 to have been wrought. But where fhatl we find fuch 
 limilar or parallel cafes ? The world which we inhabit 
 affords none. We know of no extraordinary revela- 
 tions from God to man", but thofe recorded in the Old 
 .and Ne\v Teftament ; all of v/hich were eftablilhed by 
 miracles. It cannot therefore be faid that miracles arc 
 incredible, becaufe contrary to experience, when all 
 the experience we have is in favour of miracles, and on 
 the fide of religion.* Befides, in reafoning concerning 
 miracles, they ought not to be compared with com- 
 mon natural events, but with uncommon appearances, 
 flich as comets, magnetifm, electricity ; which to one 
 acquainted only with the ufual phenomena of nature, 
 and the common powers of matter, mufl, before proof 
 of their aftual exiftence, be thought incredible. -f 
 
 The prefumptions againft revelation in general be- 
 ing difpatched, objeftions againfl the Chriftian reve- 
 lation in particular, againft the fcheme of it, as diftin- 
 guifhed from objeclions againft its evidence, are con- 
 fidered next. Now, fuppofing a revelation to be re- 
 ally given, it is highly probable beforehand, that it 
 muft contain many things, appearing to us Jiable to 
 
 objedions. 
 
 * See note [H], at the end of this Trtface. 
 f Ch. 2. 
 
BY TfUJi. EDITOR. xxxf 
 
 ?Tbje(^ions. The acknowledged difpenfation of nature 
 is ver/ different from wliat we Ihould have expected ; 
 reafoning then from analogy, the revealed difpenfation, 
 it is credible, would^ be alio different. Nor are we in 
 any fort judges at what time, or in what degree, or 
 manner, it is fit or expedient for God to infhru6l us, in 
 things confefledly of the greatcft ufe, either by natural. 
 reaibn, or by fupernatural information. Thus, argu- 
 ing on fpeculatidn only, and without experience, it 
 would feem very unlikely that fo important a remedy 
 as that provided by Chrifiianity for the recovery of 
 mankind from a ftate of ruin, fliouid have been for 
 fo many ages withheld ; and, when at laft vouchfafed, 
 fhould be imparted to fo fev/ ; and, after it has been 
 imparted, lliould be attended v/ith obfcurity and 
 doubt. And juft fo we might have argued, before 
 experience, concerning the remedies provided in na- 
 ture for bodily difeafes, to which by nature we are ex- 
 pofed : For many of thefe were unknown to man- 
 kind for a nitmber of ages ; are known but to te-v 
 now i fome important ones probably not difcovered 
 yet ; 2.nd thofe which are, neither certain in their ap- 
 plication, nor univerfal in their ufe. And the fame 
 mode of reafoning that would lead us to exvedi thev 
 ihould have been fo, would lead us to expert that the 
 neceffity of them (hould have been fuperfeded, by 
 there being no difeafes ; as the neceffity of the Chrif- 
 tian fcheme, it m^ay be thought, might alfo have beea 
 fuperfeded, by preventing the fall of m.an, fo that he 
 (liould not have flood in need of a Redeemer at all.* 
 As to objections again ft the wifdom and goodnefs 
 of Chrifiianity, the fame anfwer may be applied to 
 them as was to the like objedlions againil the- conili- 
 tution of nature. For here alfo, Chriftianlty is a 
 fcheme or economy, compofed of various parts, form- 
 ing a whole ; in which fcheirte means are ufed for the 
 
 accomplilhing 
 
sxxii PREPACK 
 
 accomplifliing of ends ; and which is condu6led by 
 general laws ; of all of which we know as little as we 
 do of the conftitution of nature. And the feemlng 
 want of wifdom or goodnefs in this fyflem is to be 
 afcribed to the fame caufe, as the like appearances of 
 defefts in the natural fyflem ; our inability to difcern 
 the whole fcheme, and our ignorance of the relation 
 of thofe parts which are difcernible to others beyond 
 our view. 
 
 The objeftions againfl Chriftianity as a matter of 
 fadt, and againfl the wifdom and goodnefs of it, hav- 
 ing been obviated together, the chief of them are now 
 to be confidered diftindly. One of thefe, which is 
 levelled againfl the entire fyflem itfelf, is of this fort : 
 The reftoration of mankind, reprefented in Scripture 
 as the great defign of the Gofpel, is defcribed as re- 
 quiring a long feries of means, and perfons, and dif- 
 penfations, before it can be brought to its completion ; 
 ■whereas the whole ought to have been efTefted at 
 once. Now every thing we fee in the courfe of na- 
 ture Iliews the folly of this objedlion. For in the nat- 
 ural courfe of Providence, ends are brought about by 
 means, not operating immediately and at once, but 
 dehberately and in a way of progreffion ; one thing 
 being fubfervient to another, this to fomewhat further. 
 The change of feafons, the ripening of fruits, the 
 growth of vegetable and animal bodies, are inftances 
 of this. And therefore that the fame progreflive 
 method fhould be followed in the difpenfation of 
 Chriftianity, as is obferved in the common difjpenfa- 
 tion of Providence, is a reafonable expediation, jufti- 
 fied by the analogy of nature.* 
 
 Another circumftance objeded to in the Chriflian 
 fcheme is, the appointment of a Mediator, and the 
 faving of the workl through him. But the vifible gov- 
 ernment of God being adually adminiflered in this way, 
 
 or 
 
 * Ch. 4. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxxiii 
 
 TjY by the mediation and inftmmentality of others, there 
 can be no general prefumption againft an appoint- 
 ment of this kind, againft his invifible government 
 being exercifed in the fame manner. We have (een 
 aheady that, with regard to ourfelves, this vifible gov- 
 ernment is carried on by rewards and puniOiments ; 
 for happinefs and mifery are the confequences of our 
 own adtions, confidered as virtuous and vicious, and 
 thefe confequences we are enabled to forefee. It might 
 have been imagined, before confulting experience, that 
 after we had rendered ourfelves liable to mifery by our 
 own ill condu6t, forrow for what was paft, and behav- 
 ing well for the future, would, alone and of themfelves, 
 have exempted us from deferved pimifhment, and re- 
 ftored us to the divine favour. But the fad is other- 
 wife ; and real reformation is often found to be of no 
 avail, fo as to fecure the criminal from poverty, fick- 
 nefs, infamy, and death, the never-failing attendants 
 on vice and extravagance, exceeding a certain degree. 
 By the courfe of nature then it appears, God does not 
 always pardon a finner on his repentance. Yet there 
 is provifion made, even in nature, that the miferies, 
 which men bring on themfelves by unlawful indulgen- 
 ces, may in many cafes be mitigated, and in fome re- 
 moved ; partly by extraordinary exertions of the of- 
 fender himfelf, but more efpecially and frequently by 
 the intervention of others, who voluntarily, and from 
 motives of compaflion, fubmit to labour and forrow, 
 fuch as produce long and lafting inconveniences to 
 themfelves, as the means of refcuing another from the 
 wretched effefts of former imprudences. Vicarious 
 puniihment, therefore, or one perfon's fufferings con- 
 tributing to the relief of another, is a providential dif- 
 pofition, in the economy of nature : * And it ought 
 not to be matter of furprife, if by a method analogous 
 to this we be redeemed from fm and mifery, in the 
 
 C economy 
 
 * See note [I], at the end of this Preface, 
 
XXX17 PREFACE 
 
 economy of grace. That mankind at prefent are in at 
 ftate of degradation, different from that in which they 
 were originally created, is the very ground of the 
 Chriftian Revelation, as contained in the Scriptures. 
 Whether we acquiefce in the account, that our being 
 placed in fuch a ftate is owing to the crime of our firS 
 parents, or choofe to afcribe it tO' any other caufe, it 
 makes no difference as to our condition j the vice and 
 iinhappinefs of the world are flill there, notwithftand- 
 ing all our fuppofitions ; nor is it Chriflianity that 
 hath put us into this flate. We learn alio from the 
 fame Scriptures, what experience and the ufe of ex- 
 piatory facrifices from the mofl early times might 
 have taught us, that repentance alone is not fufHcient 
 to prevent the fatal confequences of paft tranfgref- 
 fions J but that flill there is room for mercy, and 
 that repentance fhall be available, though not of it- 
 lelf, yet through tlie mediation of a Divine Perfon, 
 the MelTiah ; who, from the fublimefl principles of 
 compailion, when we were dead in trefpajfcs andfins^^ 
 fuffered and died, the innocent for the guilty, the jiijl 
 for the unjnji^\ that we might have redemption through 
 his bloody even the forgivenefs of fins. % In what 
 way the death of Chrift was of that efficacy it is laid 
 to be, in procuring the reconciliation of finners, the 
 Scriptures have not explained : It is enough that the 
 doftrine is revealed ;: that it is not contrary to any 
 truths wdiich reafon and experience teach us ; and 
 that it accords in perfed harmony with the ufual 
 method of the divine condud: in the government of 
 the world'. § 
 
 Again it hath been faid, that if the Cliriflian reve- 
 lation were true, it muft have been univerfal, and 
 could not have been left upon doubtful evidence- 
 But God, in his natural Providence, difpenfes his gifts 
 
 ii> 
 
 ♦ "Ephef. ii. r. f Pet. iii. iS. 
 
 t Coloff. i. I4w % Ch, 5, 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxxv 
 
 *n great variety, not only among creatures of the fame 
 ipecies, but to the fame individuals alfo at different 
 times. Had the Chriftian revelation been univerfali 
 at firfl, yet from the diverfity of men's abilities, botb 
 of mind and body, their various means of improve- 
 inent, and other external advantages, fome perfons 
 muft foon have been in a fituation, with refped to 
 iehgious knowledge, much faperior to that of others, 
 as much perhaps as they are at prefent : And all men 
 will be equitably dealt with at laft ; and to whom 
 little is given, of him little will be required. Thert 
 as to the evidence for religion being left doubtful, 
 difficulties of this fort, like difficulties in practice, af- 
 ford fcope and opportunity for a virtuous exercife of 
 the underftanding, and difpofe the mind to acquiefce 
 and reft fatisfied with any evidence that is real. la 
 the daily commerce of life, men are obliged to a6t 
 upon great uncertainties, with regard to fuccefs in 
 their temporal purfuits f and the cafe with regard to 
 religion is parallel. However, though religion be not 
 intuitively true, the proofs of it which we have are 
 amply fufficient in reafon to induce us to embrace it ; 
 and diflatisfaftion with thofe proofs may poffibly be 
 men's own fault.* 
 
 Nothing remains but to attend to the poiitive evi- 
 dence there is for the truth of Chriftianity. Now, 
 belides its direct and fundamental proofs, which are 
 miracles and prophecies, there are many collateral cir- 
 cumftances, which may be united into one view, and 
 all together may be confidered as making up one ar- 
 gument. In this way of treating the fubjed, the 
 revelation, whether real or otherwife, may be fuppofed 
 to be wholly hiftorical : The general defign of which 
 appears to be, to give an account of the condition of 
 religion, and its profeffors, with a concife narration of 
 the political ftate of things, as far as religion is affe£t- 
 " Ca ed 
 
 * Ch. 6. 
 
xxxvi PREFACE 
 
 ed by it, during a great length of time, near fix thorr- 
 fand years of which are already pall. More particu- 
 larly it comprehends an account of God's entering 
 into covenant with one nation, the Jews, that he 
 would be their God, and that they fliould be his 
 people ; of his often interpofmg in' their affairs ; giv- 
 ing them the promife, and afterwards the poffeffion, 
 of a flourilliing country j aiTuring.them of the greateft 
 national profperity, in cafe of their obedience, and 
 threatening the fevcrell national punifhment, in cafe 
 they forfook him and joined in the idolatry of their 
 pagan neighbours. It contains alfo a prediftion of a 
 particular perfon, to appear in the fulnefs of time, in 
 whom all the promifes of God to- the Jews were to be 
 fulfilled : And it relates that, at the time expefted, a- 
 perfon did adtually appear, afTuming to be the Saviour 
 foretold ; that he worked various miracles among 
 them, in confirmation of his divine authority ; and/ 
 as was foretold alfo, was rejected and put to death" by 
 the very people who had long defired and waited for 
 his coming ; but that li'is rehgion, in fpite of all op- 
 pofition, was eftablifhed in the world by his difciples, 
 invefled with fupernatural powers for that purpofe ; 
 of the fate and fortunes of which religion there is a 
 prophetical defcription, carried down to the end of 
 time. Let any one now, after reading the above hif- 
 tory, and not knowing whether the whole were not a 
 fidion, be fuppofed to afk. Whether all that is here' 
 related be true ? And inftead of a diredt anfwer, let 
 him be informed of the feveralr acknowledged fafhs', 
 which are found to correfpond to it in real life ; and 
 then let him compare the hiftory and fa<5ts together, 
 and obferve the aftoniihing coincidence of both : 
 Such a joint review mufl appear to him of very great 
 weight, and to amount to evidence fomewhat more 
 than human. And unlefs the whole feries, and 
 every particular circumftance contained in it, can. 
 
 be 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxxvii 
 
 fee thought to have arifen from accident, the truth 
 «f Chriftianity is proved.* 
 
 The view here given of the moral and reHgious 
 fyftems of Bifhop Butler, it will immediately be 
 perceived, is chiefly intended for younger ftudents, 
 cfpecially for ftudents in divinity ; to whom it is hop- 
 ed it may be of ufe, fo as to encourage them to pe-- 
 rufe, with proper diligence, the original works of the 
 Author hirafelf. For it may be necelTary to obferve, 
 that neither of the volumes of this excellent Prelate 
 are addreffed to thofe, who read for amufement, or 
 curiofity, or to get rid of time. All fubjedts are not 
 to be comprehended with the fame eafe ; and moral- 
 ity and religion, when treated as fciences, each ac- 
 companied with difficulties of its own, can neither of 
 them be underftood as they ought, without a very pe- 
 culiar attention. But morality and religion are not 
 merely to be ftudied as fciences, or as being fpecula- 
 tively true j they are to be regarded in another and 
 higher light, as the rule of life and manners, as con- 
 taining authoritative directions by which to regulate 
 our faith and pra6tice. And in this view, the infinite 
 importance of them conlidered, it can never be an 
 indifferent matter whether they be received or rejedl- 
 ed. For both claim to be the voice of God ; and 
 whether they be fo or not, cannot be known, till their 
 
 claims 
 
 * Ch. 7, To the Analogy are fubjoined Two DifTertatlons, both originally 
 inferted in the body of the work. One on Perfonal Identity, in which are 
 contained fonae ftri(5lures on Mr. Lccke, who aflerts that confcioufnefs mak.e:j 
 or conftitutes perfonal identity ; whereas, as our Author obferves, confciouf- 
 nefs makes only perfonality, or is necelTary to the idea of a perfon, i. e. a 
 thinking intelligent being, but prefuppofes, and therefore cannot conftitute 
 perfonal identity ; jufl as knowledge prefuppofes truth, but does not confti- 
 tute it. Confcioufnefs of pafl adlions does indeed fliew us the ider.tity of 
 ourfelves, or gives us a certain aflurance that we are the fame perfons or liv- 
 ing agents now, which we were at the time to which our remembrance can 
 look back ; but flill we Ihould be the fame perfons as we were, though this 
 confcioufnefs of what is pafl were wanting, though all that had been done 
 by us formerly were forgotten ; unlefs it be true, that no perfon has exifteij 
 a fmgle moment beyond what he can remember. The other DilTertation ii 
 On the Nature of Virtue, which properly belongs to tiie moral fyftem cf oui' 
 Author, already explained. 
 
xxxviii EPITAPH. 
 
 claims be impartially examined. If they indeed come 
 from him, we are bound to conform to them at our 
 peril ; nor is it left to our choice, whether we will 
 lubmit to the obligations they' impofe upon us or 
 not ; for fubmit to them we muft in fuch a fenfe, as 
 to incur the punilhments denounced by both againfi^ 
 wilful difobedience to their injunctions. 
 
 The following EPITAPH, faid to be written by Dr. Natkanad Fcrjkft is 
 infcribed on a flat marble flone, in the cathedral church of Brifol, placed 
 over the fpot where the remains of Bifliop Butler are depofited ; and 
 which, as it is now almoil obliterated, it may be worth while here tp 
 preferve. 
 
 H. S. 
 
 Reverendus admodum in Chrifho Pater 
 J O S E P H U S BUTLER, LL. D. 
 
 Hujufce primo Dioecefeos 
 Deinde Dunelmenfis Epifcopus, 
 
 Qualis quantufq; Vir erat 
 
 Sua libentiffime agnovit setas : 
 
 Et fi quid Praifuli aut Scriptori ad famam valent 
 
 Mens altiffima, 
 
 Ingenii perfpicacis et fubadi Vis, 
 
 Animufq; pius, fimplex, candidus, liberahs, 
 
 Mortui haud facile evanefcei memoria. 
 
 Obiit Bathoni^ i6 Kalend. Juiii, 
 
 A. D. 1752. 
 
 Annos natus 60. 
 
 NOTES 
 
NOTES 
 
 TO THE 
 
 PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 D 
 
 Page viii, [A]. 
 
 'R. Butler, when Blfhop of Brijiol^ put up a 
 CFofs, a plain piece of marble inlaid, in the chapel of his 
 epifcopal houfe. This, which was intended by the blame- 
 lefs Prelate merely as a fign or memorial, that true Chriftians 
 are to bear their crofs, and not to be afhamed of folloM'ing 
 a crucified Mailer, was confidered as affording a prefump- 
 tion that he was fecretly inclined to popifh forms and cere- 
 monies, and had no great diflike to popery itfelf. And, on 
 account of the offence it occafioned, both at the time and 
 fince, it were tp be wiflied, in prudence, it had not beea 
 done. 
 
 Page xi. [B]. 
 Many of the fentiments, in thefe two difcourfes of Bifhop 
 JBuTLER, concerning the fovereign good of man ; the impof- 
 fibility of procuring it in the prefent life ; the unfatisfa£lo- 
 rinefs of earthly enjoyments •, together with the fomewhat 
 beyond and above them all, which once attained, there will 
 reft nothing further to be wifhed or hoped ; and which is 
 then only to be expe£led, v/hen we (hall have put off this 
 mortal body, and our union with God fhall be complete j 
 occur in Hooher's Eccleftajlical Polity ^ Book I. § xi. 
 
 Page XV. [C]. 
 When the firfl: edition of this Preface wag publiflied, I 
 had in vain endeavoured to procure a fight of the papers, in 
 which Bifliop Butler was accufed of having died a papift, 
 and Archbifliop Secker's replies to them ; though I well 
 remembered to have read both, when they firft appeared in 
 the public prints. But a learned profeffor in the univerfity 
 of Oxford has furnifhed me with the whole controverfy in 
 its original form ; a brief hifi;ory of which it may not be 
 unacceptable to offer here to the curious reader. 
 
 The 
 
Xl NOTES TO THE PREFACE 
 
 The attack was opened in the year 1767, In an anonymous 
 pamphlet, entiled Tke Root of Protejlant Errors examined; in 
 which the author aflerted, that " by an anecdote lately given 
 him, that * fame Prelate,* (who at the bottom of the page 
 is called B — p of D — m) is faid to, have died in the com- 
 munion of a church, that makes ufe of faints, faint days, 
 and all the trumpery pf faint worfliip." When this remark- 
 able fa£l:, no\y firft divulged, came to be generally known, it 
 occafioned, as might be expelled, no little alarm ; and intel- 
 ligence of it was no fooner conveyed to Archbiihop Secker, 
 than in a fhort letter, figned Mifopfeu;les ^ and printed in the 
 S/. James's Chronicle of May 9, he called upon the writer to 
 produce his authority for publifhing " fo grofs and fcandal- 
 ous a falfehood." To this challenge an immediate anfwet 
 was returned by the author of the pamphlet, who, now af-? 
 fuming the name of Phikleuthcrosy informed Mifopfeudes^ 
 through the channel of the fame paper, that *' fuch anec- 
 dote had been given him ; and that he was yet of opiniou 
 there is not any thing improbable in it, when it is confidered 
 that the fame Prelate put up the popifii injignla of the crop 
 in his chapel, when at Briftol ; and in his laft epifcopal 
 Charge ^as fquinted very much towards that fuperltition.'^ 
 Here we find the accufation not only repeated, but fupported 
 by reafons, fuch as they are ; of which it feemed neceiTary 
 that fome notice fhould be taken : Nor did tke Archbifliop 
 conceive it unbecoming his own dignity to (land up, on thiq 
 occafion, as the vindicator of innocence againft the calumni- 
 ator of the helplefs dead. Accordingly, in a fecond letter 
 in the fame newfpaper of May 23, and fubfcribed Mifop^ 
 feudesy as before, after reciting from Eiftiop Butler's Sermon 
 before the Lords the very paflage here printed in the Pref- 
 ace, and obferving that "there are, in the fame Sermon, 
 declarations, as flrong as can be made, againft temporal 
 punifliments for herefy, fchifm, or even for idolatry," his 
 Grace expreffes himfelf thus : " Now he (Biihop Butx.ER) 
 was univerfaliy cfteemed, throughout !iis life, a man of ftrid^ 
 piety and honefty, as well as uncommon abilities. He gave 
 all the proofs, public and private, which his ftation led him 
 to give, and they were decifive and daily, of his continuinjy 
 to the laft a iincere member of the church of England. Nor 
 had ever any of his acquaintance, or moft intimate friends, 
 nor have they to this day, the ieaft doubt of it." As to. 
 putting up a crofs in his chapel, the Archbifliop frankly owns, 
 
 th"at 
 
B Y T H E E D I T O R. xU 
 
 that for himfelf he wifiies he had not ; and thinks that in fo 
 doing the Biftiop did amifs. But then he afks, "Can that 
 be oppofed, as any proof of popery, to all the evidence on 
 the other fide j or even to the fingle evidence of the above-* 
 snentioned Sermon ? Moll of our churches have crofles upon 
 them : Are they therefore popifh churches ? The Lutherans 
 have more than crofles in theirs : Are the Lutherans there- 
 fore papifts ?" And as to the Chargef no papift, his Grace 
 remarks, would have fpoken as Bifhop Butler there does, 
 of <he obfervances peculiar to Roman catholics, fome of 
 which he exprefsly cenfures as wrong and fuperftitious, and 
 others as made fubfervient to the purpofes of fuperftition, 
 and, on thefe accounts, abolifiied at the reformation. After 
 the publication of this letter, Fhileleutheros replied in a fliort 
 defence of his own conduft, but without producing any 
 thing new in confirmation of what he had advanced. And 
 here the controverfy, fo far as the two principals were con- 
 cerned, feems to have ended. 
 
 But the difpute was not futFered to die away quite fo foon. 
 For in the fame year, and in the fame newfpaper of July 21, 
 another letter appeared ; in which the author not only con- 
 tended that the crofs in the epifcopal chapel at Brifloly and 
 the Charge to the clergy oi Durham in 1751, amount to full 
 proof of a ftrong attachment to the idolatrous communion 
 of the church of Rome, but, with the reader's leave, he 
 would fain account for the Bifhop's " tendency this way.'*" 
 And'this he attempted to do, ** from the natural melancholy 
 and gloominefs of Dr. Butler's difpofition ; from his great 
 fondnefs for the lives of Romilh faints, and their books of 
 xr.yftic piety 5 from his drawing his notions of teaching men 
 religion, not from the New Teftament, but from philofoph- 
 jcal and political opinions of his own ; and above all, from 
 his tranfition from a ftri£l diflenter amongft the prefbyteri- 
 ans to a rigid churchman, and his fudden and unexpedled 
 elevation to great wealth and dignity in the church." The 
 attack thus renewed excited the Archbifhop's attention a 
 fecond time, and drew from him a frefh anfwer, fubfcribed 
 alfo Mifopfeudesy in the St. James's Chronicle of Augult 4. 
 In this letter our excellent Metropolitan, firft of all obliquely 
 hinting at the unfairnefs of fitting in judgment on the char- 
 a6ler of a man who had been dead fifteen years, and then 
 reminding his correfpondent, that " full proof had been al- 
 ready publiflied, that Biftiop Butler abhorred popery as a 
 
 vile 
 
xKl NQTES TO THE PREFACE 
 
 vile corruption of Chriftianity, and that it snight be proved, 
 if needful, that he held the Pope to be Antichriit," (to 
 which decifive teftimonies of undoubted averfion from the 
 Romifli church another is alfo added in the poftfcript, his 
 taking, when promoted to the fee of Durham, for his do- 
 meftic chaplain, Dr. Nath. Forller, who had publifhed, not 
 four years before, a Sermon, entitled. Popery deJiruBive of 
 the Evidence of Chr'ifiaJiity) proceeds to obferve, " That the 
 natural melancholy of the Bifliop's tern. per would rather have 
 fixed him amongft his firil friends, than prompted him to 
 the change he made : That he read books of all forts, as 
 well as books of myftic piety, and knew how to pick the 
 good that was in them out of the bad : That his opinion* 
 were expofed without referve in his Analogy and his Ser- 
 mons, and if the doftrine of either be popifh or unfcriptural, 
 the learned world hath millaken ftrangely in admiring both : 
 That inftead of being a ftri61: diil'enter, he never was a com- 
 municant in any diffenting aflembly ; on the contrary, that 
 he went occafionally, from his early years, to the eftablifhed 
 worihip, and became a conftant conformift to it, when he was 
 barely of age, and entered himfelf, in 1714, of Oriel College : 
 That his elevation to great dignity in the church, far from 
 being fuddeji and unexpecled, was a gradual and natural rife, 
 through a variety of preferments, and a period of thirty two 
 years : That as Bifnop oi Durham he had very little authority 
 beyond his brethren, and in ecclcfiaftical matters had none 
 beyond tlaem •, a larger income than mod of them he had ; 
 but this he employed, not, as was infmuated, in augmenting 
 the pomp of worfhip in his cathedral, where indeed it is no 
 greater than in others, but for the purpofes of charity, and 
 in the repairing of his houfes." After thefe remarks, the 
 letter clofes with the following words : *' Upon the whole, 
 few accufations, fo entirely groundlefs, have been fo perti- 
 nacioufly, I am unwilling to fay malicioufly, carried on, as 
 the prefent ; and furely it is high time for the authors and 
 abettors of it, in mere common prudence, to (hew fome re- 
 gard, if not to truth, at leaft to fhame." 
 
 It only remains to be mentioned, thnt the above letters of 
 Archbifliop Seeker had fuch an effe6l on a writer, wJio 
 iigned himfelf in the St. Jameses Chronkle, of Auguft 25, 
 yl Diffenting Mirtifer, that he declared it as his opinion, 
 that " the author of the pamphlet, called The Root of Protef 
 taut Errors examinedi and his friends, were obliged in can- 
 
 dourj 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xViii 
 
 dour, jn juftice, and In honour, to retra£l their charge, un- 
 lefs they could eflabliili it on much better grounds than had 
 hitherto appeared :" And he exprefled his " hopes that it 
 would be underftood that the diflenters In general had no 
 hand in the accufation, and that it had only been the a6t of 
 two or three miftaken men." Another perfon alfo, "a. 
 foreigner by birth," as he fays of himfelf, who had been 
 long an admirer of Bifhop Butler, and had perufed with 
 great attention all that had been written on both fides in 
 the prefent controverfy, confefles he had been " wonder- 
 fully pleafed with obferving, with what candour and tern** 
 per, as well as clearnefs and folidity, he was vindicated from 
 the afpcrfjons laid againft him." All the adverfaries of our 
 Prelate, however, had not the virtue or fenfe to be thus 
 convinced ; fome of whom ftill continued, under the figna-? 
 tures of OJd Martin, Latimer^ An Impartial Protejlant, Pau- 
 linusy Mifonothos, to repeat their confuted falfehoods in the 
 public prints; as if the curfe of calumniators had fallen 
 upon them, and their memory, by being long a traitor to 
 •truth, had taken at laft a fevere revenge, and compelled 
 them to credit their own lie. The firft of thefe gentlemen. 
 Old. Martin, who dates from N-c-Jl-e, May 29, from the 
 rancour and malignity with which his letter abounds, and 
 from the particular virulence he difcovers towards the char- 
 adlers of Bifliop Butler and his defender, I conje£lure to 
 be no other than the very perfon who had already figured in 
 this difpute, fo early as the year 1752 ; of whofe work, en- 
 titled A fsrioiis Inquiry into the life and Importance of External 
 Religion, the reader will find fome account in the notes fub- 
 joined to the Blfhop's Charge, at the end of this volume. 
 
 Page XV. [D], 
 The letters, with a fight of which I was indulged by the 
 favour of our prefent mo ft worthy Metropolitan, are all, as 
 I remember, wrapped together under one cover ; on the 
 back of which is written, in Archbifliop Secker's own 
 hand, the following words, or words to this effedl, PrC" 
 Jumptive Arguments that BiJIjop Butler did not die a papijl. 
 
 Page xxl. [E]. 
 "Par be it from me," fays the excellent Dr. 7*. Balguy,* 
 ** to difpute the reality of a 7noral principle in the human 
 heart. I feel its exiftence ; I clearly difcern its ufe and im- 
 portance* 
 
 * Difcourfe IX, 
 
liliv NOTES TO THE PREFACE 
 
 portance. But in no refpedl is it }}iore important, than as It 
 fuggefts the idea of a fftaral Governor. Let this idea be once 
 effaced, and the principle of confcience will foon be found 
 weak and inefFeftual. Its influence on men's conduft has, 
 indeed, been too 77iuch undervalued by fome philofophical in- 
 quirers. But be that influence, while i,t lafts, more or lefs, 
 it is not -n Jieady and permanent principle of adlion. XJn.- 
 happily v/e alv/ays have it in our power to lay it ajleep.—' 
 Neg/eff alone v/ill fapprefs and ftifle it, and bring it almofl: 
 into a ftate of ftupefatlion : Nor can any thing lefs than 
 the terrors of religion awaken our minds from this danger- 
 ous and deadly fleep. It can never be matter of indiffer- 
 ence to a thinhing man, whether he i? to be happy or mife?» 
 rable beyond the grave." 
 
 Page xxviii. [F], 
 ^The ignorance of man is a favourite doftrine with Biihop 
 Butler. It occurs in the fecond Part of the Analogy ; it 
 makes the fubjedl of his fifteenth Sermon ; and we meet 
 with it again in his Charge. Whether fometimes it be not 
 carried to a length which is exceflive, may admit of doubt. 
 
 Page xxviii. [G]. 
 Admirable to this purpofe are the words of Dr. 7. 
 Salguy, in the IXth of his Difcourfes, already referred to. 
 *' The dodlrine of a life to comcy fome perfons will fay, is a 
 do£lrine of natural religion ; and pan never therefore be 
 properly alleged to (hew the importance of revelation. 
 They judge perhaps from the frame of the world, that the 
 prefent fyflem is imperfeEl : They fee defigns in it not^yet 
 completed ; and they think they have grounds for expelling 
 another ftate, in which thefe defigns (liall be farther carried 
 on, and brought to a conclufion, worthy of Infinite Wifdom. 
 I am not concerned to difpute xhejiijlnefs of this reafoning ; 
 nor do I wifh to difpute it. But hovv far will it reach ? 
 Will it lead us to the Chrijlian doctrine of a judgment to 
 come ? Will it give us the profpe£l of an eternity of happi- 
 nefs ? Nothing of all this. It fhews us only, that death is 
 not the end of our beings ; that we are likely to pafs here- 
 after into other fyftems, more favourable than the prefent 
 to the great ends of God's Providence, the virtue and the 
 happinefs of his intelligent creatures. But into nvhat fyf- 
 tems we are to be removed ; what new fcenes are to be pre- 
 fented to us, either of pleafure or pain \ what new parts we 
 
 ihall 
 
B Y T H E E D I T O R. xU 
 
 fnallhave to a£l, and to what trials and temptations we may 
 yet be expofed ; on all thefe fubjefts we know juft nothing. 
 That our hzp^'intfs forever depends on our condu£l here, is 
 a moft important propofition, which we learn only from 
 reve/ation." 
 
 Page XXX. [H}. 
 ** In the common affairs of life, common experience is fuf- 
 ficient to direcl us. But will common experience ferve to 
 guide our judgment concerning xht fall and redemption of 
 mankind ? From what we fee every day, can we explaiil 
 the commencement y or foretel the difjolutmi of the world ? 
 To judge of events like thefe, we fhould be converfant in 
 the hiftory of other planets ; fhould be diftrn6lly informed 
 of God's various difpenfations to all the different orders o£ 
 rational beings. Inftead then of grounding our religious 
 opinions on what ive call experience, let us apply to a more 
 certain guide, let us hearken to the iefimony of God himfelf. 
 The credibility of human tcflimony, and the conduft of human 
 agents, are fubje^ls perfe£lly within the reach of our natural 
 faculties ; and we ought to defire no firmer foundation for 
 our belief of religion, than for the judgments we form in 
 the common affairs of life j where we fee a little plain tefti- 
 mony eafily outweighs the moft fpecious conje£lures, and. 
 rot feldom even ftrong probabilities." Dr. Ba/gufs 4th 
 Charge. See alfo an excellent pamphlet, entitled. Remarks' 
 on Mr. Hume's E-[fay on the Natural Hifory of Religion^ § v. 
 And the 6th of Dr. Poivell'^ Difcourfes. 
 
 Page xxxiii. [I]. 
 Dr. Arthur Ashley Sykes, from whofe writings fome 
 good may be colle£l:ed out of a multitude of things of a 
 contrary tendency, in what he is pleafed to call The Scrip' 
 ture Do5lrif^ of Redemption,* oppofes what is here advanced 
 by Bilhop Butler J quoting his words, but without men- 
 tioning his name. If what is faid above be not thought a 
 fufhcient anfwer to the objections of this author, the reader 
 may do well to confult a Charge On the life and Ahife of 
 Philofophy in the Study of Religion, by the late Dr. Powell, 
 who feems to me to have had the obfervations of Dr. Sykes 
 in his view, where he is confuting the reafonings of certaia 
 philofophizing divines againft the do^lrine of the Atone- 
 ment. Powell's Difcourfes, Charge III. p. 342 — 348. 
 
 * See the Obfervations on the texts cited in his firft chapter, and a'fo m 
 chapters the tifth and fixth. 
 
THE 
 ANALOGY 
 
 O F 
 
 RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED,^ 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION and COURSE op NATURE. 
 
TO THE 
 RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 CHARLES Lord TALBOT, 
 
 BARON OF HENSOL, 
 
 LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT 
 BRITAIN, 
 
 THE FOLLOWING 
 
 TREATISE 
 
 IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, 
 
 3[nrcribeti, 
 
 IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE HIGHEST 
 OBLIGATIONS TO THE LATE 
 
 LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM AND 
 TO HIMSELF, 
 
 BY HIS LORDSHIP'S 
 
 MOST DUTIFUL, 
 \ MOST DEVOTED, 
 AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT, 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER, 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 If the reader fliould meet here with any thing 
 •which he had not before attended to, it will not be in the ob- 
 fervations upon the conftitution and courfe of nature, thefe be- 
 ing all obvious, but in the application of them ; in which, 
 though there is nothing but what appears to me of fome real 
 weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will obferve 
 fcveral things which will appear to him of very little, if he can 
 think things to be of little importance, which are of any real 
 v.'eight at all upon fuch a fubjedt as religion. However, the 
 proper force of the following treatife lies in the whole general 
 analogy confidered together. 
 
 It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by 
 many perfons, that Chriftianity is not fo much as a fubjedt of 
 inquiry, but that it is now at length difcovered to be fictitious. 
 And accordingly they treat it as if, in the prefent age, this 
 were an agreed point among all people of difcerflment, and 
 nothing remained but to fet it up as a principal fubjedl of mirth 
 and ridicule, as it were by way of reprifals for its having fo 
 long interrupted the pleafures of the world. On the contrary, 
 thus much, at leaft, will be here found, not taken for granted, 
 but proved, that any reafonable man, who will thoroughly con- 
 fider the matter, may be as much aifured as he is of his own 
 being, that it is not, however, fo clear a cafe that there is noth- 
 ing in it. There is, I think, ftrong evidence of its truth ; but 
 it is certain no one can, upon principles of reafon, be fatisfied 
 of the contrary. And the pradical confequence to be drawn 
 from this is not attended to by every one who Is concerned 
 in it. 
 
 Mav, 1736. 
 
; :.»lj.>V ,»K II.U H'lUlg-tJ., 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Tage 
 
 Introduction 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Of Natural Religion. 
 
 C H A P. I. 
 
 0/a Figure Life -> - - - 67 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the Government of God by Rewards and Pun- 
 i^im^nis ', and particularly of the latter •> 86 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of the Mora/ Government of God - - gT 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as impfying Trial, Diffi- 
 culties and Danger - - - - j 23 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as intended fof Moral 
 
 Difcipline and Improvement - - 131 
 
 CHAP. 
 
lii CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Page 
 
 Of the Opinion of NeceJJityi confidered as inflU' 
 encing Pra£iice - - - - i^6 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the Government ofGod^ confidered as a Scheme 
 or Conjiitutiony imperfeBly comprehended - 1 7,2 
 
 CONCLUSION - - - 184. 
 
 P A R T II. 
 
 Cy Revealed Religion. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Importance of Chrijiia^iity - 191 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the fuppofed Prefumption againfl a Revelation, 
 confidered as miraculous - - - 209 
 
 % CHAP. III. 
 
 Of our Incapacity of judging^ what were to be ex- 
 pe^ed in a Revelation i and the Credibility^ 
 from Analogy, that it muji contain Things ap- 
 pearing liable to Objections - - 216 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of Chriflianity, confidered as a Scheme or Confitu- 
 iion, imperfectly comprehended - - 232 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS. liii 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Page 
 
 Of the particular Syjiem of Chrijiianity ; the Ap- 
 pointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of 
 the World by him - - - - 240 
 
 CHAP, VI. 
 
 Of the Want of Univerfality in Revelation ; and 
 of the fiippofed Deficiency in the Proof of it 260 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the particular Evidence for Chrijiianity - 280 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of the ObjeBions which may he made againji ar- 
 guing from the Analogy of Nature to Religion 318 
 
 CONCLUSION . - . - q^i 
 
 DISSERTATION 
 
 L 
 
 Of Perjonal Identity ^ - - 
 
 
 DISSERTATION 
 
 11. 
 
 Of the Nature of Virtue 
 
 
 6^ 
 
 si 
 
 A Charge to the Clergy of the Diocefe of Dut- 
 hamy 1751- * - . =- ~ ~ Ci^i^^ 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 JrROBABLE evidence is elTentlally dif- 
 tingulfhed from demonftrative by this, that it admits 
 of degrees ; and of all variety of them, from the high- 
 eft moral certainty, to the very lowefh prefumption. 
 We cannot indeed fay a thing is probably true upon 
 one very flight prefumption for it, becaufe, as there 
 may be probabilities on both fides of a queftion, there 
 may be fome againft it ; and though there be not, 
 yet a flight prefumption does not beget that degree of 
 convitftion which is implied in faying a thing is prob- 
 ably true. But that the llighteft poffible prefump- 
 tion is of the nature of a probability, appears from 
 hence, that fuch low prefumption, often repeated, 
 will amount even to moral eertainty. Thus a man's 
 having obferved the ebb and flow of the tide today, 
 affords fome fort of prefumption, though the loweft 
 imaginable, that it may happen again tomorrow ; but 
 the obfervation of this event for fo many days, and 
 months, and ages together, as it has been obferved by 
 mankind, gives us a full aflurance that it will. ^ 
 
 That which chiefly conftitutes probability is ex- 
 prefled in the word likely, i. e. like fome truth,* or 
 true event ; like it, in itfelf, in its evidence, in fome 
 more or fewer of its circumftances. For when we de- 
 termine a thing to be probably true, fuppofe that an 
 event has or will come to pafs, it is from the mind's 
 remarking in it a likenefs to fome other event, which 
 we have obferved has come to pafs. And this obier- 
 vatlon forms, in num.berlefs daily inflances, a prefump- 
 tion, opinion, or full convidion, that fuch event has 
 
 or 
 
 * Verifimile. 
 
56 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 or will come to pafs, according as the obfervation is, 
 tmt the like event has fometimes, moft commonly, or 
 alwr.ys fo far as our obfervation reaches, come to pafs 
 at like difhances of time, or place, or upon like occa- 
 fions. Hence arifes the belief that a child, if it lives 
 twenty years, will grow up to the Itature and ftrength 
 of a man ; that food will contribute to the preferva- 
 tion of its life, and the want of it for fuch a number 
 of days, be its certain deftruftion. So likewife the 
 rule and meafure of our hopes and fears concerning 
 the fuccefs of our purfuits ; our expectations that 
 others will aO: fo and fo in fiich circumftances ; and 
 our judgment that fuch actions proceed from fuch 
 principles ; all thefe rely upon our having obferved 
 the like to what we hope, fear, expert, judge ; I fay 
 upon our having obferved the like, either with re- 
 fpeit to others or ourfelves. And thus, whereas the 
 prince* who had always lived in a warm climate, nat- 
 urally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was 
 no fuch thing as w^atcr's becoming hard, becaufe he 
 had always obferved it to be fluid and yielding, — ^we 
 on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there is 
 no prefumption at all againft this ; that it is fuppofa^- 
 ble there may be froft in England any given day in 
 January next j probable that there will on fome other 
 I day of the month ; and that there is a moral certainr 
 ty, i. e. ground for an expedation without any doubt 
 of it, in fome part or other of the winter. 
 
 Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but 
 an imperfect kind of information, and is to be conlid- 
 ered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. 
 For nothing which is the pofTible objedl of knowledge, 
 whether pail, prefent, or future, can be probable to an 
 infinite Intelligence, fmce it cannot but be difcerned 
 abfoutely as it is in itfelf, certainly true, or certainly 
 falle. But to kj, probability is the very guide of life. 
 
 Froni 
 
 * The ftory in told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 57 
 
 From thefe things it follows, that in queflions of 
 difficulty, or fuch as are thought fo, where more fatis- 
 fadory evidence cannot be had, or is not feen ; if 
 the reiult of examination be, that there appears upon 
 the whole, any the loweft prefumption on one fide, 
 and none on the other, or a greater prefumption on 
 one fide, though in the loweft degree greater ; this de- 
 termines the queftion, even in matters of fpeculation ; 
 and in matters of pradice, will lay us under an abfo- 
 lute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and 
 of intereft, to adt upon that prefumption or low prob- 
 ability, though it be fo low as to leave the mind in 
 very great doubt which is the truth. For furely a 
 man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon 
 the whole appears, according to the beft of his judg- 
 ment, to be for his happinefs, as what he certainly 
 knows to be fo. Nay, further, in queftions of great 
 confequence, a reafonable man will think it concerns 
 him to remark lower probabilities and prefumptions 
 than thele ; fuch as amount to no more than fliowing 
 one fide of a queftion to be as fuppofeable and cred- 
 ible as the other ; nay, fuch as but amount to much 
 lefs even than this. For numberlefs inftances might 
 be mentioned refpefting the common purfults of life, 
 where a man would be thought, in a literal fenfe, dif- 
 traded, who would not adl, and with great applica- 
 tion too, not only upon an even chance, but upon 
 much lefs, and where the probability or chance was 
 greatly againft his fucceeding.* 
 
 It is not my defign to inquire further into the nature, 
 the foundation, and meaftire of probability ; or whence 
 it proceeds that likenefs llioukl beget that prefump- 
 tion, opinion, and full convidion, which the human 
 mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does 
 necelfarily produce in every one ; or to guard againft 
 ihe errors, to which reafoning from analogy is liable. 
 
 E This 
 
 •i" SeA Ch. vi. Part II. 
 
58 INTRO DUCTIO]^. 
 
 This belongs to the fubjed of logic ; and is a part of 
 that iubjeft which has not yet been thoroughly confid- 
 ered. Indeed I fhali not take upon me to fay, how 
 far the extent, compafs, and force of analogical rea- 
 fonirig can be reduced to general heads and rules, 
 and the whole be formed into a fyftem : But though 
 fo little in this way has been attempted by thofe who 
 have treated of our intelledual powers, and the exer- 
 cife of them, this does not hinder but that we may 
 be, as we unqueftionably are allured, that analogy is 
 of weight, in various degrees, towards determining 
 our judgment and our praftice. Nor does it in any 
 wife ceafe to be of weight in thofe cafes, becaufe per- 
 fons, either given to difpute, or who require things 
 to be fbated with greater exadnefs than our facul- 
 ties appear to admit of in pradlical matters, may 
 find other cafes in which it is not eafy to fay, whether 
 it be or be not .of any weight ; or inftances of feem- 
 ing analogies, which are really of none. It is enough 
 to the prefent purpofe to obferve, that this general 
 way of arguing is evidently natural, juli, and conclu- 
 five. For there is no man can make a queftion but 
 that the fun will rife tomorrow ; and be feen, where 
 it is feen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in 
 that of a fquare. 
 
 Hence, namely from analogical reafoning, Origen* 
 has with fmgular fagacity obferved, that /le who be- 
 lieves the Scripture to have proceeded from him who is 
 the Author of nature^ may well exped to find the fame 
 fort of difficulties in it, as are found in the confiitution of 
 nature. And in a hke way of refledion it may be 
 added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been 
 from God upon account of thefe difficulties, may, for 
 
 the 
 
 Apr) jw.£i/ Tot yi Tov (KTiy.^ 'KOL^txoiyoi.u.ivoy m Trricccvro?- tuv 
 •A.o(TfJi,ov imxi Tavrxg rxg ypoc<p(x,<; Tmruc^ai^ on o(ra, wspt rnj 
 
 XTJCTEW? aTTOiVTX TOJ? (^riTii(n TQV TTSpi aVTYig AoyOUy TSillTX aoii 
 
 TTtf/i Tuv ^^^(puv, Philocal. p. 23. Ed. Cant, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 59 
 
 tlie very fame reafon, deny the world to have been 
 formed by him. On the other hand, if there be an 
 analogy or likencfs between that fyftem of things and 
 <iifpenfation of Providence, which revelation informs 
 us of, and that fyftem of things and difpenfation of 
 Providence, which experience, together with reafon, 
 informs us of, i. e. the known courfe of nature ; this is 
 a prefumption, that they have both the fame author 
 and caufe ; at lead fo far as to anfwer objections againft 
 the former's being from God, drawn from any thing 
 which is analogical or fimiiar to what is in the latter, 
 which is acknowledged to be from him j for an Au- 
 thor of nature is here fuppofed. 
 
 Forming our notions of the conftitution and gov- 
 ernment of the world upon reafoning, without foun- 
 dation for the principles which we alTume, whether 
 from the attributes of God or any thing elfe, is build- 
 ing a world upon hypotheiis, like Des Cartes. Form- 
 ing our notions upon reafoning from principles which 
 are certain, but applied to cafes to which we have no 
 ground to apply them, (like thofe who explain the 
 ilrudure of the human body, and the nature of dif- 
 eafes and medicines, from mere mathematics, without 
 fufficient {lata) is an error much a-kin to the former ; 
 iince what is aflumed in order to make the reafoning 
 applicable, is hypothefis. But it muft be allowed juft, 
 to join abftrad reafonings with the obfervation of 
 fafts, and argue from fuch fa6ts as are known, to 
 others that are like them ^ from that part of the divine 
 government over intelligent creatures which comes 
 under our view, to that larger and more general gov- 
 ernment over them, which is beyond it ; and from 
 what is prefent, to colled: what is likely, credible, or 
 not incredible, will be hereafter. 
 
 This method then of concluding and determining 
 being practical, and what, if we will adt at all, we can- 
 not but ad {ipon in the common purfuits of life ; be- 
 E z ing 
 
6o INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ittg evidently conclulive, in various degrees, propor- 
 tionable to the degree and exaftnefs of the whole anal- 
 ogy or likenefs ; and having (o great authority for its 
 introdudion into the fubjed of religion, even reveal- 
 ed religion ; my delign is to apply it to that fiibjeft in 
 general, both natural and revealed ; taking for proved, 
 that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and nat- 
 ural Governor of the world. For as there is no pre- 
 fumption againft this prior to the proof of it, fa it has 
 been often proved with accumulated evidence ; from 
 this argument of analogy and final caufes ; from ab- 
 llract reafonings ; from the mofh ancient tradition 
 and teflimony, and from the general confent of man- 
 kind. Nor does it appear, fo far as I can find, to be' 
 dehied, by the generality of thofe who profefs them- 
 felves difiatisfied with the evidence of religion. 
 
 As there are fome, who, inftead of thus attending to 
 what is. in fad: the conftitution of nature, form their 
 notions of God's government upon hypothefis ; fo 
 there are others, who indulge themfelves in vain and 
 idle fpeculations, how the world might poflibly have 
 been framed otherwife than it is ; and upon fuppofi- 
 tion that things might, in imagining that they fliould, 
 have been difpofed and carried on after a better mod- 
 el than what appears in the prelent difpofition and 
 condud of them. Suppofe now a perfon of fuch a 
 turn of mind, to goon with his reveries, till he had at 
 length fixed upon fome particular plan of nature, as ap- 
 pearing to him the beft ; One fhall fcarce be thought 
 guilty of detradion againft human undcrftanding, if 
 one lliould fay, even beforehand, that the plan which 
 this fpeculative perfon would fix upon, though he were 
 the wifeft of the fons of men, probably would not be 
 the very beft, even according to his own notions of 
 l?e/i ; whether he thought that to be fo, which afford- 
 ed occalions and motives for the exercife of the great- 
 eft virtue, or which was produdive of the greateft hap- 
 
 pineis, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 6i 
 
 pinefs, or that thefe two were necelTarily connedled, 
 and run up into one and the fame plan. However, it 
 may not be amifs once for ail to "fee, what would be 
 the amount of thefe emendations and imaginary im- 
 provements upon the fyftem of nature, or how far they 
 would miflead us. And it feems there could be no 
 flopping, till we came to fome fuch conclufions as 
 thefe : That all creatures fhould at firft be made as 
 perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever be- 
 ing : That nothing, to be fure, of hazard or danger 
 {hould be put upon them to do , fome indolent perfons 
 would perhaps think nothing at all ; or certainly, thai 
 elfeftuai care Ihould be taken, that they (hould, wheth- 
 er neceffarily or not, yet eventually and in fad, always 
 do what was right and moft conducive to happinefs, 
 which would be thought eafy for infinite power to ef- 
 fe6t ; either by not giving them any principles which 
 would endanger their going wrong, or by laying the 
 right motive of a<5tion in every inftance before their 
 minds continually in fo ftrong a manner, as would 
 never fail of inducing them to aft conformably to 
 it ; and that the whole method of government b]/ 
 punifliments fhould be rejeded as abfurd, as an 
 awkward round-about method of carrying things 
 on ■; nay, as contrary to a principal purpofe, for 
 which it would be fuppofed creatures were made, 
 namely happinefs. 
 
 Now, without confidering what is to be faid in par- 
 ticular to the feveral parts of this train of folly and ex- 
 travagance, what has been above intimated, is a full, 
 direft, general anfwer to it, namely, that we may fee 
 beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of 
 fpeculation. For though it be admitted, that from 
 the firft principles of oui' nature, we unavoidably judge 
 or determine fome ends to be abfolutely in themfelves 
 preferable to others, and that the ends now mentioned, 
 or if they run up into one, that this one is abfolutely 
 
 the 
 
62 INTRO D UCTIOK 
 
 the beft ; and confequently that we muft conclude 
 the ultimate end deiigned, in the conftitution of na- 
 ture and conduft of Providence, is the moft virtue and 
 happinefs pofTible : Yet we are far from being able ta 
 judge, what particular difpofition of things would be 
 mofi; friendly and affiltant to virtue ; or what means 
 might be abfolutely necelTary to produce the moit 
 happinefs in a fyftem of fuch extent as our own world 
 may be, taking in all that is paft and to come, though 
 we fhould fuppofe it detached from the whole of 
 things. Indeed we are fo far from being able to judge 
 of this, that we are not judges what may be the necef- 
 fary means of railing and conducing one perfon to the 
 higheft perfection and happinefs of his nature. Nay, 
 even in the little affairs of the prefent life, we find men 
 of different educations and ranks are not competent 
 judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole na- 
 ture leads us to afcribe all moral perfection to God, 
 and to deny all imperfection of him. And this will 
 forever be a practical proof of his moral character, to 
 fuch as will confider what a practical proof is ; becaufe 
 it is the voice of God fpeaking in us. And from hence 
 we conclude, that virtue muft be the happinefs, and 
 vice the mifery of every creature ; and that regularity 
 and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a uni- 
 verfe under his government. But we are in no fort 
 judges, what are the neceffary means of accomplifliing 
 this end. 
 
 Let us then, inftead of that idle and not very inno- 
 cent employment of forming imaginary models of a 
 world, and fchemes of governing it, turn our thoughts 
 to what we experience to be the conduCt of nature 
 with refpeCt to intelligent creatures ; which may be 
 refolved into general laws or rules of adminiflration, 
 in the fame way as many of the laws of nature refpeCt- 
 ing inanimate matter may be collected from experi- 
 ments. And let us compare the known conftitution 
 
 and 
 
INTRODUCTION. 6^ 
 
 and courfe of things, with what is faid to be the moral 
 fyftem of nature ; the acknowledged difiDenfations of 
 Providence, or that government which we find our- 
 felves under, with what religion teaches us to be* 
 lieve and expert ; and fee whether they are not 
 analogous and of a piece. And upon fuch a com- 
 parifon, it will I think be found, that they are very 
 much fo ; that both may be traced up to the fame 
 general laws, and rcfolved into the fame principles of 
 divine condud. 
 
 The analogy here propofed to be confidered is of 
 pretty large extent, and confifhs of feveral parts ; in 
 lome more, in others lefs exadt. In fome few in- 
 itances, perhaps, it may amount to a real practical 
 proof; in others not fo. Yet in thefe it is a con- 
 firmation of wliat is proved other ways. It will un- 
 deniably lliow, what too many want to have fliown 
 them, that the fyftem of religion, both natural and 
 revealed, confidered only as a fyftem, and prior to the 
 proof of it, is not a fubje<ft of ridicule, i^nlefs that of 
 nature be fo too. And it will afford an anfwer to al- 
 moft ail objeftions againfl the fyftem both of natural 
 and revealed religion ; though not perhaps an anfwer 
 in fo great a degree, yet in a very confiderable degree 
 an anfwer, to the objections againft the evidence of it : 
 For objeftions againft a proof, and objeftions again(l 
 what is faid to be proved, the reader wiU obferve are 
 different things. 
 
 Now the divine government of the world, implied 
 in the notion of religion in general and of Chriftianity, 
 contains in it, — That mankind is appointed to live in a 
 future ftate ;* that there, every one Ihall be rewarded or 
 punilhed y-\- rewarded or puniftied refpeftively for all 
 that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the 
 words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil : J 
 That our prefent life is a probation, a ftate of trial, § 
 
 and 
 
 * oil. 1, -f- Ch. ii. J Ch. iii. § Ch. iv. 
 
64 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 and of difcipline,* for that future one ; notwithHand- 
 ing the objeftions, which men may fancy they have, 
 from notions of neceflity, againft there being any fuch 
 moral plan as this at all ^-j- and whatever objedions 
 may appear to lie againft the wifdom and goodnefs of 
 it, as it {lands fo imperfedly made known to us at 
 prefent : % That this world being in a ftate of apof- 
 tacy and wickednefs, and confequently of ruin, and the 
 fenfe both of their condition and duty being greatly 
 corrupted amongft men ; this gave occafion for an ad- 
 ditional difpenfation of Providence ; of the utmoft im- 
 portance ;§ proved by miracles ;|| but containing in 
 it many things appearing to us ftrange and not to 
 have been expefted -** a difpenfation of Providence, 
 which is a fcheme or fyftem of things i-f-f- carried on 
 by the mediation of a divine perfon, the Meffiah, in 
 order to the recovery of the world ; \X yet not revealed 
 to all men, nor proved with the ftrongeft poflible evi- 
 dence to all thofe to whom it is revealed j but only to 
 fuch a part of mankind, and with fuch particular evi- 
 dence as the wifdom of God thought fit.§§ The de- 
 lign then of the following Treatife will be to fhew, 
 that the feveral parts principally objeded againft in 
 this moral and Chriftian difpenfation, including its 
 fcheme, its publication, and the proof which God has 
 afforded us of its truth ; that the particular parts prin- 
 cipally objected againft in this whole difpenfation, are 
 analogous to what is experienced in the conftitutiqn 
 and courfe of nature, or providence ; that the chief 
 objedions themfelves which are alleged againft the 
 former, are no other than what may be alleged with 
 like juftnefs againft the latter, where they are found in 
 fad to be inconclufive ; and that this argument from 
 analogy is in eeneral unanfwerable, and undoubtedly 
 
 / " '^ 
 
 ./ * Ch. V. f Cb. yi. % Ch. viJ. 
 
 > § Part ir. Ch. i. |1 Ch. ii. ** Ch. iii. 
 
 ft Ch. jv. XX Ch. V. §§ Ch. vi,Vii. 
 
INTRODUCTION, 65 
 
 of weight 01:1 the fide of religion,* notwithflanding the 
 objeftions which may feem to lie agalnfl it, and the 
 real ground which there may be for difference of opin- 
 ion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to 
 be laid upon it. This is a general account of what 
 may be looked for in the following Treatife ; and I 
 Ihall begin it with that which is the foundation of 
 all our hopes and of all our fears, all our hopes and 
 fears which are of any confidcration, I mean a fu- 
 ture life. 
 
 * Chap. viii. * 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY 
 
 O F 
 
 RELIGION 
 
 TO THE 
 
 Constitution and Course of Naturis, 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Of Natural Religion, 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of a Future Life, 
 
 OTRANGE difficulties have been raifed 
 by fome concerning perfonal identity, or the lamenels 
 of hving agents, implied in the notion of our exifting 
 now and hereafter, or in any two fucceffive moments ; 
 which, whoever thinks it worth while, may fee con- 
 fidered in the firll Dillertation at the end of this 
 Treatife. But without regard to any of them here, 
 let us confider what the analogy of nature, and the 
 feveral changes which we have undergone, and thofe 
 which we know we may undergo without being de- 
 ilroyed, fuggeft, as to the effect which death may or 
 
 may 
 
63 Of a Future Life, 
 
 may not have upon iis ; and whether It be not from 
 thence probable, that we may furvive this change, and 
 exift in a future ftate of Hfe and perception. 
 
 I. From our being born into the prefent world in 
 the helplefs imperfeft ftate of infancy, and having ar- 
 rived from thence to mature aq;e, we find it to be a 
 general law of nature in our own fpecies, that the fame 
 creatures, the fame individuals, Ihould exift in de- 
 grees of life and perception, Vv^ith capacities of aftion, 
 of enjoyment and fuffering, in one period of their be- 
 ing, greatly different from thofe appointed them in 
 another period of it. And in other creatures the 
 fame law holds. For the difference of their capaci- 
 ties and ftates of life at their birth (to go no higher) 
 and in maturity j the change of worms into flies, and 
 the vaft enlargement of their locomotive powers by 
 fuch change ; and birds and infecls burfting the fliell, 
 ■their habitation, and by -this means entering into a 
 new Vk'orld, furnillied with ne\y accommodations for 
 them, and finding a new fphere of aftion afligned 
 them ; tbeie are inftances of this general law of nature. 
 Thus all the various and wonderful transformations of 
 animals are to be taken into confideration here. But 
 the ftates of life in which we ourfelves exifted formerly 
 in the womb and in our infancy, are almoft as different 
 from our prefent in mature age, as it is poffible to 
 conceive any two ftates or degrees of life can be. 
 Therefore, that we are to exift hei^eafter in a ftate as 
 different (fuppofe) from our prefent, as this is from 
 our former, is but according to the analogy of na- 
 ture ; according to a natural order or appointment 
 of the very fame kind with what we have already 
 experienced. 
 
 II. We know we are endued with capacities of ac- 
 tion, of happinefs and mifery j for we are confcious 
 of acting, of enjoying pleafure, and fuffering pain. 
 Now that we have thefe powers and capacities before 
 
 death, 
 
Of a Future Life, ^9 
 
 death, is a prefumption that we lliall retain them 
 through and after death ; indeed a probability of it 
 abundantly fufficient to aft upon, unlefs there be fome 
 pofitive reafon to think that death is the deftruction 
 of thofe living powers ; becaufe there is in every cafe 
 a probability, that all things will continue as we ex- 
 perience they are, in all refpeds, except thofe in 
 which we have fome reafon to think, they will be al- 
 tered. This is that kind* of prefumption or proba- 
 bility from analogy, exprefled in the very word contin- 
 uance^ which feems our only natural reafon for believ- 
 ing the courfe of the world will continue tomorrow^ 
 as it has done fo far as our experience or knowledge 
 of hiftory can carry us back. Nay, it feems our only 
 reafon for believing that any one fubfcance now ex- 
 iftino; will continue to exift a moment longer, the 
 felf-exiftent fubllance only excepted. Thus if men. 
 were aiiured that the unknown event, death, was not 
 the deftruftion of our faculties of perception and of 
 action, there would be no apprehenfion that any other 
 power or event unconnefted with this of death, would 
 deftroy thefe faculties juft at the inftant of each crea- 
 ture's death, and therefore no doubt but that they 
 would remain after it ; which fliows the high proba- 
 bility that our living powers will continue after death, 
 unlefs there be fome ground to think that death is 
 their deftruftion.-j~ For, if it would be in a manner 
 certain that v/e lliould furvive death, provided it were 
 
 certain 
 
 * I fay liiiJo( prefumption or probability ; for I do not mean to affirm 
 that ther? isthe fame degree of conviftion, that our living powers will con- 
 tinue after death, as there is, that our fubftances will. 
 
 f Defru&ion of living poiuers, is a manner of e.xprefiion unavoidably ambig- 
 uous ; and may fignify either the delirutlion of a living being, fn as that the fame 
 living being Jluill he unca-pablc of ever -perceiving or acting again at all ; or, the de- 
 fir uB ion of thofe means and injiruments by vohich it is capable of its prejhit l:f\', of its 
 prefent fate of perception and of aflio/t. It is lie re ufed in the form.er fenfs. 
 When it is ufed in the latter, the epithet prejent is added. The lofs of a 
 man's eye, is a deftrucftion of hving powers in the latter fenfe. But we have 
 no reafon to think the deftrudlion of living powers in'the former fenfe, to be 
 poffible. We have bo more reafon to tliink a being endued with living nov/- 
 ers ever lofes them duruig its whole exifience, than to believe that a ftoae 
 ever acquires them. 
 
^o Of a Future Life, Part L 
 
 certain that death would not be our deftruction, ifc 
 muft be highly probable we fliall fijrvive it, if there 
 be no ground to think death will be our deflruftion. 
 
 Now, though I think it muft be acknowledged, 
 tliat prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future 
 life commonly inftfted upon, there would arife, a gen- 
 eral confufed fufpicion, that in the great fiiock and 
 alteration which we fliall undergo by death, we, i. e. 
 our living powers, might be wholly deftroyed ; yet, 
 even prior to thofe proofs, there is really no particu- 
 lar diftinft ground or reafon for this apprehenfion at 
 all, fo far as I can find. If there be, it muft arife 
 either from the reafon of the thing, or from the analogy 
 of nature. 
 
 But we cannot argue from the reafon of the thing, that 
 death is the deftru6tIon of living agents, becaufe we 
 know not at all what death is in itfelf ; but only 
 feme of its effefts, fuch as the diflblution of flefh, 
 ikin, and bones. And thefe effects do in no wife ap- 
 pear to imply the deftrudion of a living agent. And 
 befides, as we are greatly in the dark, upon what the 
 exercife of our living powers depejids, fo we are whol- 
 ly ignorant what the powers themfelves depend up- 
 on ; the powers themfelves as diftinguiOied, not only 
 from their adual exercife, but alfo from the prefent 
 capacity of exercifing them ; and as oppofed to their 
 deftruftion : For fleep, or however a fwoon, Ihews us, 
 not only that theffe powers exift when they are not ex- 
 ercifed, as the paflive power of motion does in inani^ 
 mate matter j but fhews alfo that they exift, when 
 there is no prefent capacity of exercifing them ; or 
 that the capacities of exercifing them for the prefent, 
 as well as the a6lual exercife of them, may be luf- 
 pended, and 3^et the powers themfelves remain unde- 
 ftroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what 
 the exiftence of our living powers depends, this fliews 
 further, there can no probability be collected from 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 71 
 
 the reafoh of the thing, that death will be their de- 
 ftrildion ; becaufe their exiftence may depend upon 
 lomewhat in no degree affeded by death, upon fome- 
 vvhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. 
 So that there . is nothing more certain, than that the 
 reafon of the thing' fhews us no connexion between 
 death, and the deftruftion of living agents. Nor can 
 we find any thing throughout the whole analogy of 
 7iature^ to afford us even the flighteft prefumption, 
 that animals ever lofe their living powers ; much lefs, 
 if it were poffible, that they lofe them by death ; for 
 we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or 
 through it, fo as to fee what becomes of them. This 
 event removes them from our view. It defbroys the 
 fenfible proof, which we had before their death, of 
 their being pofTelfed of living powers, but does not 
 appear to aiford the leaft reafon to believe that they 
 are, then, or by that event, deprived of them. 
 
 And our knowing that they were pofTeffed of theie 
 powers, up to the very period to which we have facul- 
 ties capable of tracing them, is itfelf a probability of 
 their retaining them beyond it. And this is confirm- 
 ed, and a fenfible credibiHty is given to it, by obferving 
 the very great and aftoniihing changes which we have 
 experienced j fo great, that our exiftence in another 
 ftate of life, of perception and of adlion, will be but 
 according to a method of providential conduQ:, the 
 like to which has been already exercifed even with re- 
 gard to ourfelves ; according to a courfe of nature, 
 the like to which we have already gone through. 
 
 However, as one cannot but be greatly fenfible 
 how difhcult it is to lilence imagina.tion enough to 
 make the voice of reafon even diftinftly heard in this 
 cafe ; as we are accuftomed, from our youth up, to in- 
 dulge that forward delufive faculty, ever obtruding 
 beyond its fphere ; of fome afTiftance indeed to appre- 
 henfion, but the author of all error j as we plainly lofe 
 
 ourfelvei 
 
7^ ^f ^ Future Life. 
 
 ourfeltes in grofs and crude conceptions of things, 
 taking for granted that we are acquainted with what 
 indeed we are wholly ignorant of ; it may be proper to 
 confider tiie imaginary prefumptions, that death will 
 be our deftruftion, ariling from thefe kinds of early and 
 lading prejudices ; and to fhew how little they can re- 
 ally amount to, even though we cannot wholly diveft 
 ourfelves of them. And, 
 
 I. All prefumption of death's being the deftruc- 
 tion of living beings, muft go upon fuppoiition that 
 they are compounded, and fo difcerptible^ But fince 
 confcioufnefs is a fingle and indivifible power, it Ihould 
 feem that the fubjedl in which it refides mufl be fo 
 too. For were tlic motion of any particle of matter 
 abfolutely one and indivifible, fo as that it fhould im- 
 ply a contradiclion to fuppofe part of this motion to 
 exift, and part not to exill, i. e. part of this matter to 
 move, and part to be at reft, then its power of motion 
 would be indivifible ; and fo alfo would the fubjecft in 
 which the power inheres, namely, the particle of mat- 
 ter ; For if this could be divided into two, one part 
 might be moved and the other at reft, which is con- 
 trary to the fuppofition. In like manner it has been 
 argued,* and, for any thing appearing to the contrary, 
 juftly, that fince the perception or confcioufnefs, which 
 we haVe of our own exiftence, is indivifible, fo as that 
 it is a contradiclion to fuppofe one part of it fliould be 
 here and the other there, the perceptive power, or the 
 power of confcioufnefs, is indivifible too ; and confe- 
 cjuently the fubject in which it refides, i, e. the con- 
 fcious being. Now upon fuppofition that living agent 
 each man calls himfeif, is thus a fingle being, which 
 there is at leaft no more difficulty in conceiving than in 
 conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is 
 the proof now mentioned, it follows, that our organ- 
 ized bodies are no more ourfelves or part of ourfelves, 
 
 than 
 
 * See Dr. Clarie's Letter to Mr. Doliud/, and the defences of it. 
 
Chap. I. 0/ ^ Future Life. 75 
 
 than any other matter around us. And It is as eafy 
 to conceive how matter, which is no part of ourfelves, 
 may be apjjropriated to us in the manner which our 
 prefent bodies are, as how we can receive impreffions 
 from, and have power over any matter. It is as eafy 
 to conceive .that we may_exifl out of bodies, as in 
 them ; that we might have animated bodies of any 
 other organs and fenfcs wholly different frofn thefe 
 now given us, and that we may hereafter animate thefe 
 fame or new bodies varioufly modified and organized, 
 as to conceive how we can animate fuch bodies as our 
 preient. And lafllv, the difTolution of all thefe feveral 
 organized bodies, iuppoling ourfelves to have fuccef- 
 fively animated them, would have no more conceiva- 
 ble tendency to deflroy the living beings ourfelves, or 
 deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of percep- 
 tion and of action, than the diflblution of any foreign 
 matter, which we are capable of receiving impre (lions 
 from, and making ufe of for the common occafions of 
 life. 
 
 II. The iimplicity and abfolute onenefs of a living 
 agent cannot, indeed, from the nature of the thing, be 
 properly proved by experimental obfervations. But 
 as thefe fall in with the fuppofition of its unity, fo 
 they plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our 
 grofs organized bodies, with which we perceive the 
 objects of fenfe, and with which we act, are no part of 
 ourfelves ; and therefore fhow us, that we have no 
 reafon to believe their deftruftion to be ours, even 
 without determinins; whether our living fubflances be 
 material or immaterial. For we fee by experience, 
 that men may lofe their limbs, their organs of fenfe, 
 and even the greateft part of thefe bodies, and yet re- 
 main the farrke living agents. And perfons can trace 
 up the exidence of themielves to a time, when the 
 bulk of their bodies v/as extremely fmall, in compan- 
 ion of what it is in mature age i and we cannot but 
 F think 
 
74 Of a Future Life. Part T. 
 
 tlilnk that they might then have lo(l a confiderable 
 part of tliat fmall body, and yet have remained the 
 iame Hving agents ; as they may now lofe great f)art 
 ot their ])rerent body, and remain ("o. And it is cer- 
 tain that the bodies of all animals arc in a conftant 
 flux, from that never ceafing attrition which there is 
 m every part of them. Now things of this kind un- 
 avoidably teach us to didinguifli between thefe living 
 agents ourlelves, and large cjuantities of matter, in 
 which we are very nearly intereded ; fmcc thefe may 
 be alienated, and actually arc in a daily courfe of iuc- 
 ceffion, and changing their owners ; whilfl we are al- 
 lured, tha<: each living agc'nt remains one and the fame 
 })crmanent being.*' And this general obfervation leads 
 us on to the following ones. 
 
 Firjly That we have no way of determining by ex- 
 }")erience, what is the certain bulk of the living being 
 each man calls himlelf j and yet, till it be determined 
 that it is larger in bulk than the folid elementary par- 
 ticlcs of matter, which there is no ground to think any 
 natural power can diilolve, there h no fort c>f reaibn 
 to think death to be the diliblution of it, of the living 
 being, even though it fliould not be abfoiutely indif- 
 cer])tible. 
 
 Sccond/y^ From our being fo nearly related to and 
 intercRetl in certain fyflems of matter, fuppofc our 
 llclh and bones, and atterwards ceafmi>; to be at all re- 
 lated to them, the living agents ourlelves remaining 
 all this while undcftroyed, notwithftanding Inch alie- 
 nation ; and conlequently thefe fyllems ot matter not 
 being ourfelves, it follows further, that we have no 
 ground to conclude any other, fuppofc internal fvjlems 
 ol matter, to be the living agents ourlelves y bccauic 
 wc can have no ground to conclude this, but troni 
 our relation to and interefl in Inch other fyilems of 
 u'.atler ; and therefore we can have no reafon to con- 
 clude, 
 
 * Sec D'Jfi.rtuiiw I. 
 
CiiAP. I. Of n Future Life, y^ 
 
 elude, what bcfals tliofc fyftems of matter at death, to 
 be the deflruftion of the living agents. We have al- 
 ready fevcral times over loll a great part or perhaps 
 the whole of our body, according to certain common 
 eftablilhed laws of nature, yet we remain the fame 
 living agents ; when we Ihall lofe as great a part, or 
 the whole, by another common eftablilhed law of na- 
 turcj dcatii, wliy may we not alfo reniain the fame ? 
 That the alienation has been gradual in one cafe, and 
 in the other will b« more at once, does not prove any 
 thing to the contrary. We have paflcd undcftroyed 
 through thole many and great revolutions of matter, 
 fo peculiarly appropriated to us ourfelves ; why fliould 
 we imagine death will be fo fatal to us ? Nor can it 
 be objected, that what is thus alienated or loll, is no 
 part of our original Iblid body, but only adventitious 
 matter ; becauie we may lo(e entire limbs, which muft. 
 have contained many folid parts and vellels of the 
 original body ; or if this be not admitted, we have 
 no jjroof, that any of thefe folid parts are diffolved or 
 alienated by death. Though, l)y the way, we arc 
 very nearly related to that extraneous or adventltiou:; 
 matter, whilft it continues united to and diftending 
 the feveral parts of our Iblid body. But after all, the 
 relation a perfon bears to thofe parts of his body to 
 which he is the mod nearly related, what docs it ap- 
 pear to amount to but this, that the living agent and 
 thofe parts of the body mutually affed: each other ? 
 And tlie fame thing, the fame thing in kind, though 
 not in degree, may be faid of ^i// foreign matter, which 
 gives us ideas, and which we have any power over. 
 From thefe obfervations, the whole ground of the 
 imagination is removed, that the diirolutioix of any 
 matter is the cieftruftion of a living agent from the 
 intereft he once had in fuch matter. 
 
 Thirdly^ If v/e confjdcr oiir body fomewhat more 
 
 diftinctly, ar. made up of organs and inilruments of 
 
 F ?. perception 
 
76 Of a Future Life. Part L 
 
 perception and of motion, it will bring us to the fame 
 conclufion. Thus the common optical experiments 
 fhow, and even the obfervation how light is aflifted by 
 glafles fhows, that we fee with our eyes in the famer 
 lenfe as we fee with glalTes. Nor is there any reafon 
 to believe, that we fee with them in any other fenfe ; 
 any other, I mean, whieh would lead us to think the 
 eye itfelf a percipient. The like is to be faid of hear- 
 ing ; and our feehng diftant folid matter by means of 
 fomewhat in our hand, feems an inftance of the like 
 kind as to the fubjedt we are confidering. All thele 
 are inftances of foreign m.atter, or fuch as is no part of 
 our body, being inftrumental in preparing objeds for, 
 and conveying them ta the perceiving power, in a 
 manner fmiilar or like to the manner in which our 
 organs of fenfe prepare and convey them. Both are 
 in a like way inftruments of our receiving fuch ideas 
 from external objects, as the Author of nature ap- 
 pointed thofe external objefts to be the occafions of 
 exciting in us. However, glaiTes are evidently in- 
 ftances of this ; namely of matter which is no part of 
 our body, preparing objefts for and conveying them 
 towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our 
 bodily organs do. And if we fee with our eyes only 
 in the fame manner as we do with glafles, the like 
 may juftly be concluded, from analogy, of all our other 
 fenfes. It is not intended, by any thing here faid, 
 to affirm^ that the whole apparatus of vifion, or of 
 perception by any other of our fenfes, can be traced, 
 through all its fteps, quite up to the living power of 
 feeing, or perceiving •; but that fo far as it can be trac- 
 ed by experimental obfervations, fo far it appears, that 
 our organs of fenfe prepare and convey on objefts, in 
 order to their being perceived, in like manner as for- 
 eign matter does, without affording any fhadow of ap- 
 pearance that they themfelves perceive. And that we 
 have no reafon to think our organs of fenfe percipi- 
 ents, 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. ^^j 
 
 ents, is confirmed by inftances of perfons lofing fome 
 of them, the living beings themfelves, their former 
 occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed 
 alfo by the experience of dreams ; by which we find 
 we are at prefent poflefled of a latent, and, what would 
 otherwife be, an unimagined, unknown power of per- 
 ceiving fenfible objefts, in as ftrong and lively a man- 
 ner without our external organs of fenfe as with them. 
 
 So alfo with regard to our power of moving, or di- 
 recting motion by will and choice : Upon the deftruc- 
 tion of a limb, this aO;ive power remains, as it evi- 
 dently feems, unleflened ; fo as that the living being, 
 who has fuffered this lofs, would be capable of mov- 
 ing as before, if it had another limb to move with. 
 It can walk by the help of an artificial leg j juft as it 
 can make ufe of a pole or a leaver, to reach towards 
 itfelf, and to move things, beyond the length and the 
 power of its natural arm ; and this lafl; it does in the 
 fame manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural 
 arm, things nearer and of lefs weight. Nor is there 
 fo much as any appearance of our limbs being endu- 
 ed with a power of moving or direfting themfelves, 
 though they are adapted, like the feveral parts of a 
 machine, to be the inftruments of motion to each 
 other, and fome parts of the fame limb, to be inftru- 
 nients of motion to other parts of it. 
 
 Thus a man determines, that he will look at fuch 
 an obje£t through a microfcope ; or being lame fup- 
 pofe, that he will walk to fuch a place with a ftaff a 
 week hence. His eyes and his feet no more deter- 
 mine in thefe cafes, than the microfcope and the 
 ftaff. Nor is there any ground to think they any 
 more put the determination in practice ; or that his 
 eyes are the feers or his feet the movers, in any other 
 fenfe than as the microfcope and the fliaff are. Upon 
 the whole then, our organs of fenie and our limbs are 
 certainly inftruments, which the living peribns our- 
 
 felves 
 
 
78 Of a Future Life. Part I. 
 
 felves make ufe of to perceive and move with ; there 
 is not any probability that they are any more, nor con- 
 fequently, that we have any other kind of relation to 
 them, than what we may have to any other foreign 
 matter formed into inftruments of perception and 
 motion, fuppofe into a microfcope or a ftafF; (I fay 
 any other kind of relation, for I am not fpeaking of 
 the degree of it) nor confequently is there any proba- 
 bility, that the alienation or dilTolution of thefe in- 
 ftrmnents is the deftruftion of the perceiving and 
 moving ag-ent. 
 
 And thus our finding, that the dilTolution of mat- 
 ter, in which living beings were moft nearly interefhed, 
 is not their diffolution, and that the deflruftion of 
 feveral of the organs and inftruments of perception and 
 of motion belonging to them, is not their deftruction, 
 fhows demonftratively, that there is no ground to 
 think that the diflblution of any other matter, or dc- 
 ftruftion of any other organs and inftruments, will be 
 the diflblution or deftruction of living agents, from 
 the like kind of relation. And we have no reafon to 
 think we ftand in any other kind of relation to any 
 thing which we find diflblved by death. 
 
 But it is faid thefe obfervations are equally applicable 
 to brutes ; and it is thought an infupcrable difficulty, 
 that they Ihould be immortal, and by confequence ca- 
 pable of everlafting happinefs. Now this manner of 
 expreflion is both invidious and weak ; but the thing 
 intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in the 
 way of natural or moral confiderat ion. Fori/?. Sup- 
 pofe the invidious thing, defigned in fiach a manner of 
 expreffion, were really implied, as it is not in the Icaft 
 in the natural immortality of brutes j namely, that 
 they muft arrive at great attainments, and become ra^ 
 tional and moral agents ; even this would be no diffi- 
 culty, fince we know not what latent powers and ca- 
 pacities they may be endued with. There was o;ice, 
 
 prior 
 
Chap. I. 0/" ^ Future Life. 79 
 
 prior to experience, as great prefiimption againft hu- 
 man creatures, as there is againftthe brute creatures, ar- 
 riving at that degree of underftanding, which we have 
 in mature age. For we can trace up our ov/n exift- 
 -ence to the fame original with theirs. And we find it 
 to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued 
 with capacities of virtue and rehgion, iliould be placed 
 in a condition of being, in which they are altogether 
 without the ufe of them, for a confiderable length of 
 their duration ; as in infancy and childhood. And 
 great part of the human Ipecies go out of the prefent 
 world, before they come to the exercife of thefe ca- 
 pacities in any degree at all. But then, 2^/v, the nat- 
 ural immortality of brutes does not in the lead im- 
 ply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of 
 a rational or moral nature. And the economy of the 
 univerfe might require, that there {hould be living crea- 
 tures without any capacities of this kind. And all dif- 
 ficulties as to the* manner how they are to be difpofed 
 of, are fo apparently and wholly founded in our ig- 
 norance, that it is wonderful they ihould be infifted 
 upon by any, but fuch as are weak enough to think 
 they are acquainted with the whole fyftem of things. 
 There is then abfolutely nothing at all in this objec- 
 tion which is fo rhetorically urged againfh the greatefh. 
 part of the natural proofs or prefumptions of the im- 
 mortality of human minds : I fay the greateft part ; 
 for it is lefs applicable to the following obfervation, 
 which is more peculiar to mankind : 
 
 III. That as it is evident our prefent powers and ca- 
 pacities of reafon, memory and aifedtion, do not de- 
 pend upon our grofs body in the manner in which per- 
 ception by our organs of fenfe does ; fo they do not 
 appear to depend upon it at all in any fuch manner, 
 as to give ground to think, that the diffolution of this 
 body, will be the deftrudlion of thefe our prefent pow- 
 ers of refleclion, as it will of our powers of ienfation-; 
 
 or 
 
So Of a Future Life. Part I. 
 
 or to give ground to conclude even that it will be fo 
 much as a fufpenfion of the former. 
 
 Human creatures exifl at prefent in two ftates of 
 life and perception, greatly different from each other ; 
 each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own 
 peculiar enjoyments and fuiFerings. When any of our 
 lenfes are affedted or appetites gratified with the ob- 
 jects of them, we may be faid to exift or live in a ftate 
 of fenfatio n. When none of our fenfes are afFefted or 
 appetites gratified, and yet we perceive and reafon and 
 act, we may be faid to exift or live in a flate of reflect 
 tion. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing 
 which is diiTolved by death, is any way necelfary to the 
 living being in this its flate of relledion, after ideas are 
 gained. For, though from our prefent conffitution 
 and condition of being, our external organs of fenfe 
 are neceiTary for conveying in ideas to our reilefting 
 powers, as carriages and leavers and fcaffolds are in ar-. 
 chitecture ; yet when thele ideas are brought in, we 
 are capable of reflecting in the moft intenfe degree, and 
 of enjoying the greatefl pleafure, and feeling the great- 
 eft pain by means of that refleftion, without any af- 
 fiilance from our fenfes ; and without any at all, which 
 we know of, from that body which vv^ill be diifolved by 
 death. It does not appear then, that the relation of 
 this grofs body to the reflecting being, is, in any de- 
 gree, neceffary to thinking ; to our intelleclual enjoy- 
 ments or fufferings : Nor, confequently, that the dif- 
 folution or alienation of the former by death, will be 
 the deftruftion of thole prefent powers, which render 
 us capable of this ftate of reflcftion. Further, there 
 are inftances of mortal difeafes, which do not at all af- 
 fedt our prefent intellectual powers \ and this affords 
 a prefumption, that thofe difeafes will not deftroy thefe 
 prefent powers. Indeed, from the obfervations made 
 above,* it appears, that there is no prefumption, from 
 their mutually affeCting each ether, that the diflblu- 
 
 tion 
 
 ■* ^' 74' 75j 7^' 
 
Chap, I. O/* ^ Future Life. Zi 
 
 tlon of the body is the deftrucftion of the living agent. 
 And by the ilime reafoning, it mufb appear too, that 
 there is no prelumption, from their mutually affefting 
 each other, that the diflblution of the body is the de- 
 ftraftion of our prelent reflecting powers j but infta nces 
 of their not affe6ling each other, afford a prefump- 
 tion of the contrarj''. Inftances of mortal difeafes not 
 impairing our prefent refledting powers, evidently turn 
 our thoughts even from imagining fuch difeafes to be 
 the deftruftion of them. Several things indeed great- 
 ly affecfl all our living powers, and at length fufpend 
 the exercife of them ; as for inftiuice drowfinefs, in- 
 creafmg till it ends in found fleep ; and from hence 
 we might have im.agined it would deftroy them, till 
 we found by experience the weaknefs of this way of 
 judging. But in the difeafes now mentioned, there is 
 not fo much as this fliadow of probability, to lead us 
 to any fuch conclulioii, as to the reflecting powers 
 which we have at prefent ; for in thofe difeafes, per- 
 fons the moment before death appear to be in the. 
 higheft vigour of life ; they difcover apprehenfion, 
 memory, reafon, all entire ; with the utmoft force of 
 affection ; fenfe of a character, of iliame and honour ; 
 and the higheft mental enjoy nients and futierings, 
 even to the laft gafp : And thefe furely prove even 
 greater vigour of life than bodily ftrength does. Now 
 what pretence is there for thinking, that a progrefTive 
 clifeafe when arrived to fuch a degree, I mean that de- 
 gree which is mortal, will deftroy thofe powers wliich 
 were not impaired, which were not afleited by it, dur- 
 ing its whole progrefs quite up to that degree ? And 
 if death, by difeafes of this kind, is not the deftruc- 
 tion of our prefent reflefting powers, it will fcarce be 
 thought that death by any other means is. 
 
 It is obvious that this general obfervation may be 
 carried on further ; and there appears fo little con- 
 nexion between our bodily powers of fenfation, and 
 cur Drefent powers cf refledtion, that there is no reafon 
 
 to 
 
Si Of a Future Life. Part I. 
 
 to conclude, that death, which deflroys the former, 
 does fo much as fu{]:)en.d the exercife of the latter, or 
 interrupt our contimmig to exift in the like ilate of re^ 
 fle6tion which we do now. For fufpenfion of reafon, 
 memory, and the affections which they excite, is no 
 part of the idea of death, nor is implied in our notion 
 of it. And our daily experiencing thefe powers to be 
 exercifed, vv'ithout any aiTiftance, that we know of, 
 from thofe bodies, which will be diffolved by death ; 
 and our finding often that the exercife of them is fo 
 lively to the laft ; thefe things afford a fenfible appre- 
 henfion, that death may not perhaps be fo much as a 
 difcontinuance of the exercife of thefe powers, nor of 
 the enjoyments and fufferings which it implies.* So 
 that our poflhuraous life, whatever there may be in it 
 additional to our prefent, )^et may not be entirely be- 
 ginning anew, but going on. Death may, in fome 
 fort, and in ioxno: refpefts, anfwer to our birth ; which 
 is not a fufpenfion of the faculties which we had be- 
 fore it, or a total change of the ftate of life in which 
 we exifted when in the womb ; but a continuation of 
 both, with i'uch and fuch great alterations. 
 
 Nay, for what we know of ourfelves, of our prefent 
 life and of death, death may immediately, in the nat- 
 ural courfe of things, put us into a higher and more 
 enlarged ftate of life, as our birth does y^ a ftate in 
 
 which 
 
 * There are three diflinft queftions, relating to a future life, here confid- 
 ered : Whether death be the deilruftion of living agents ; if not, Whether 
 it be the deflrudtionof their -prefent powers of reflection, as it certainly is 
 tli.e deftruiflion of their prefent powers of fenfation ; and if not, Whether it 
 be the fuf[)enUon, or difcontinuance of the exercife, of thefe prefent refledl- 
 ing powers. Now, if there be no reafon to believe the laft, there will be, if 
 that were poilible, Icl's for the next, and lefs ftill for the firfl. 
 
 t This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, 
 1/ofAiy^iiv fA.iv yocp ^Yi Tov yXv iv^u^s ^401/, cjf o-v dy.[/.7tv avoy.ivuv 
 elvxi' tcjv ^i ^avccTOv, yevEcriv £i? rov ovrug (^'O"* '*^* ''"'"' ^'^oocmovx 
 ro7g ^iXo<TO(pri<Toc<n' Lib. XV. p. 1039. Ed. Amft. 1707. To 
 which opinion perhaps Antotiinu! may allude in thele words, 
 t^g i/uv ZTB^if^svEig, TTOTS sjIaS^uo!/ l>i T^ij yxgr^og rni/ yvvxmog (TH 
 l^ixB'-/}, isrccg iK^ey^ea-^'xi ty\v uipocv h r, ro ^xj-^x^iov <TZ T2J JAuT^a 
 fdTii v.iins-uro'A. Lib. IX. c. 3. 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. Z^ 
 
 which our capacities and fphere of perception and 
 of aftion may be much greater than at prefent. For 
 as our relation to our external organs of fenfe ren- 
 ders us capable of exifting in our prefent ftate of 
 fenfation, fo it may be the only natural hindrance 
 to our exifting, immediately and of courfe, in a 
 higher ftate of reflection. The truth is, reafon does 
 not at all fhew us in what ftate death naturally leaves 
 us. But were we fure that it would fufpend all our 
 perceptive and a6tive powers, yet the fufpenfion of 
 a power and the deftruclion of it are effefts fo to- 
 tally different . in kind, as we experience from fleep 
 and a fwoon, that we cannot in any wife argue from 
 one to the other, or conclude, even to the loweft 
 degree of probability, that the fame kind of force 
 which is fufficient to fufpend our faculties, though 
 it be increafed ever fo much, will be fufficient to 
 deftroy them. 
 
 Thefe obfervations together may be fufficient to 
 lliew, how little nrefumption there is, that death is 
 the deftruftion of human creatures. However, there 
 is the Ihadow of an analogy which may lead us to 
 imagine it is ; the fuppofed likenefs which is obferv- 
 ed between the decay of vegetables, and of living 
 creatures. And this likenefs is indeed fufficient to 
 afford the poets very apt allulions to the flowers of 
 the field, in their piftures of the frailty of our prefent 
 life. But in reafon, the analogy is fo far from hold- 
 ing, that there appears no ground even for the com- 
 parilbn, as to the prefent queftion ; becaufe one of the 
 two fubjeds compared is wholly void of that^ which is 
 the principal and chief thing in the other, the power 
 of perception and of adlion, and which is the only 
 thing we are inquiring about the continuance of; fo 
 that the deftruftion of a vegetable is an event not 
 finiilar or analogous to the deft ru'51: ion of a living 
 aeeut. 
 
 But 
 
84 Of a Future Life. Part I. 
 
 But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the de- 
 luiive cuftom of fubflituting imagination in the room 
 of experience, we would confine ourfelves to what we 
 do know and underfland, if we would argue only from 
 that, and from that form our expectations, it would 
 appear at firfl fight, that as no probability of living 
 beings ever ceafing to be fo, can be concluded from 
 the reafon of the thing, fo none can be collected from 
 the analogy of nature, becaufe we cannot trace any 
 living beings beyond death. But as we are confcicus 
 that we are endued with capacities of perception and 
 of action, and are living perfons, what we are to go 
 upon is, that we Ihall continue fo, until we forelee 
 fome accident or event which will endanger thofe ca- 
 pacities, or be likely to deflroy us ; which death does 
 in no wife appear to be. 
 
 And thus, when we go out of this world, we may 
 pafs into new fcenes, and a new flate of life and ac- 
 tion, juft as naturally as we came into the prefent. 
 And this new ftate may naturally be a focial one. 
 And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind, 
 may naturally be beftowed, according to fome fixed 
 general lavv'S of wifdom, upon every one in proportion 
 to the degrees of his virtue. And though the ad- 
 vantages of that future natural flate, fliould not be 
 beftowed, as thefe of the prefent in fome meafure are, 
 by the will of the fociety, but entirely by his more 
 immediate aftion, upon whom the whole frame of na- 
 ture depends ; yet this diftribution may be juft as 
 natural as their being diftributcd here by the inftru- 
 mentality of men. And indeed, though one were to 
 allow any confufed undetermined icnfe, v/hich people 
 pleafe to put upon the word natural, it would be a 
 Ihortnefs of thought fcarce credible, to imagine that 
 110 fyftem or courfe of things can be fo, but only what 
 we fee at prefent ; efpecially whilft the probability of 
 a future life, or the natural immortality of the foul, is 
 
 admitted 
 
Chap. I. Q/* ^ Future Life. 85 
 
 admitted upon the evidence of reafon ; becaufe this is 
 really both admittirig and denying at once, a ftate of 
 being different from the prelent to be natural. Eul: 
 the only diftindl meaning of that word is Jiated,fixed^ 
 ov fettled ; fince what is natural, as much requires and 
 prefuppofes an intelligent agent to render it fo, i. e. to 
 effect it continually or at ftated times, as what is fu- 
 pernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once- 
 And from hence it muil follow, that perfons' notion of 
 what is natural, will be enlarged in proportion to their 
 greater knowledge of the works of God, and the dif- 
 penfations of his providence. Nor is there any ab- 
 iurdity in fuppofing, that there may be beings in the 
 univerfe, whofe capacities, and knowledge, and views, 
 may be fo extenfive, as that the whole Chriftian dif- 
 penfation may to them appear natural, i. e. analogous 
 or conformable to God's dealings with other parts of 
 his creation ; as natural as the vifible known courfe 
 of things appears to us. For there feems fcarce any 
 other poffible fenfe to be put upon the word, but that 
 only in which it is here ufed ; llmilar, ftated, or 
 Uniform. 
 
 This credibihty of a future life, which has been 
 here infifted upon, how little foever it may fatisfy our 
 curiofity, feems to anfwer all the purpofes of religion, 
 in like manner as a demonftrative proof would. In- 
 deed a proof, even a demoniirative one, of a future 
 life, v/oald not be a proof of religion. For that we 
 are to live hereafter, is juft as reconcileable with the 
 icheme of atheifm, and as well to be accounted for by 
 it, as that we are now alive, is ; and therefore nothing 
 can be more abfurd than to argue from that fcheme, 
 that there can be no future ftate. But as religion im- 
 plies a future ftate, any prefumption a'gainft fuch a 
 ftate is a prefumption againft religion. And the fore- 
 going obfervations remove all prefumptions of that 
 fort, and prove, to a very confiderable degree of prob- 
 
 , ability. 
 
86 Of the Government .of Gcd P a r t L 
 
 ability, one fundamental doctrine of religion ; which, 
 if believed, would greatly open and difpofe the mind 
 feriouily to attend to the general evidence of the 
 whole. 
 
 CHAP. n. 
 
 Of the Covernment of God bv Rezvards and Punifti* 
 ments ; ayid particular h of the latter. 
 
 JL HAT which makes t\\t qucftion con* 
 cerning a future life to be of fo great importance to 
 us, is our capacity of happinefs and mifery. And that 
 which makes the conlideration of it to be of fo great 
 importance to us, is the fuppofition of our happinefs 
 and mifery hereafter depending upon our aftions here. 
 Without this, indeed, curiofity could not but fome- 
 times bring a fubje*^, in which we may be io highly 
 interefted, to our thoughts ; efpecially upon the mor- 
 tality of others, or the near proipeft of our own. But 
 reafonable men would not take any farther thought 
 about hereafter, than what fliould happen thus occa- 
 iionally to rife in their minds, if it were certain that our 
 future intereft no way depended upon our prefent be- 
 haviour ; whereas, on the contrary, if there be ground, 
 either from analogy or any thing elfe, to think it does, 
 then there is reafon alfo for the mofh aclrve thought 
 and folicitude to fecure that intereft, to behave fo as 
 that we may efcape that mifery and obtain that hap- 
 pinefs in another life, which we not only fuppofe our- 
 felves capable of, but which we apprehend alfo is put in 
 our own power. And whether there be ground for this 
 Lift apprehenfion, certainly would deferve to be moft fe- 
 rioufly confidered, were there no other proof of a future 
 life and intereft than that prefumptive one which the 
 foregoing obfervations amount to. Now 
 
Chap. II. by Rewards and PimiJJiments. S7 
 
 Now in the prefent flate, all which we enjo}^, and a 
 great part of what we Tuffcr, is put in our own power. 
 For plealbre and pain are the coiifequences of our ac- 
 tions ; and we are endued by the Author of our na- 
 ture with capacities of forefeeing thefe confequences. 
 We find by experience he does not fo much as pre- 
 ferve our lives, excluiively of our own care and atten- 
 tion to provide ourfelves with, and to make ufe of, 
 that fuftehance, by which he has appointed our lives 
 fliall be preferved, and without which, he has appoint- 
 ed they lliall not be preferved at all. And in general 
 we forefee that the external things, which are the ob- 
 jects of our various palTions, can neither be obtained 
 nor enjoyed without exerting ourfelves in fucli and 
 fuch manners ; but by thus exerting ourfelves, we 
 obtain and enjoy thefe objects in v/hich our natural 
 good confifts ; or, by this means God gives us the 
 pofleffion and enjoyment of them. I know not that 
 we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by 
 the means of our own anions. And by prudence and 
 care we may, for the moft part, pafs our days in tol- 
 erable eafe and quiet ; or, on the contrary, we may by 
 ralhnefs, ungoverned pafTion, wilfulnefs, or even by 
 negrligence, make ourfelves as miferable as ever we 
 pleafe. And many do pieai'e to make themfelves ex- 
 tremely miferable, i. e. to do what they know befoie- 
 hand will render them fo. They follow thofe ways, 
 the fruit of which they know by inftruction, example, 
 experience, will be difgrace, and poverty, and ficknefs, 
 and untimely death. This every one obferves to be 
 the general courfe of things ; though it is to be al- 
 lowed, w^e cannot find by experience, that all our fuf- 
 ferings are owing to our own follies. 
 
 Why the Author of nature does not give his crea- 
 tures promifcuoufly fuch and fiich perceptions, with- 
 out regard to their behaviour ; why he does not make 
 them happy without the inftrumentality of their own 
 
 adions. 
 
88 Of the Government of Go^ PartL 
 
 aft ions, and prevent their bringing any fufferings up- 
 on themfelves, is another matter. Perhaps there may 
 be fome impoflibihties in the nature of things, which 
 we are unacquainted with. Or lefs happinels, it may 
 be, would upon the whole be produced by fuch a 
 method of conduft, than is by the prefent. Or per- 
 haps divine goodnefs, with which, if I miftake not,* 
 we make very free in our fpeculations, may not be a 
 bare fingle difpofition to produce happinefs, but a dif- 
 pofition to make the good, the faithful, the honeft 
 man happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfeft Mind may 
 be pleafed with feeing his creatures behave fuitably 
 to the nature which he has given them, to the rela- 
 tions which he has placed them in to each other, and 
 to that which they ftand in to himfelf ; that relation 
 to himfelf, which, during their exiftence, is even 
 neceflary, and which is the moft important one of all. 
 Perhaps, I fay, an infinitely perfect Mind may be 
 pleafed with this moral piety of m.oral agents, in and 
 for itfelf ; as well as upon account of its being eflen- 
 tially conducive to the happinefs of his creation. Or 
 the whole end, for which God made, and thus governs 
 the world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our 
 faculties ; there may be ibmewhat in it as impoffible 
 for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man 
 to have a conception of colours. But however this be, 
 it is certain matter of univerfal experience, that the 
 general method of divine adminiftration is forewarn- 
 ing us, or giving us capacities to forefee, with more or 
 lefs clearnefs, that if we aft fo and fo, we fliall have 
 fuch enjoyments, if fo and fo, fuch fufferings ; and 
 giving us thofe enjoyments, and making us feel thole 
 fufferings, in conlequence of our aftions. 
 
 " But all this is to be afcribed to the general courfe 
 of nature." True. This is the very thing which I 
 am obferving. It is to be afcribed to the general courfe 
 of nature } i. e. not furelv to the words or ideas, courfe 
 
 "S 
 
Chap. II. ^y Rewards and PuniJIments. 8^ 
 
 cf nature, but to him who appointed it, and put 
 things into it ; or to a courfe of operation, from its 
 uniformity or conftancy, called natural ; * and which 
 neceflarily implies an operating agent. For when 
 men find themfelves neceffitated to confefs an Author 
 of nature, or that God is the natural Governor of the 
 world, they muft not deny this again, becaufe his 
 government is uniform ; they muft not deny that he 
 does things at all, becaufe he does them conftantly ; 
 becaufe the effects of his afting are permanent, wheth- 
 er his acting be fo or not, though there is no reafon to 
 think it is not. In fliort, every man, in every thing 
 he does, naturally afts upon the forethought and ap- 
 prehenfion of avoiding evil or obtaining good ; and if 
 the natural courfe of things be the appointment of 
 God, and our natural faculties of knowledge and ex- 
 perience are given us by him, then the good and bad 
 confequences which follow our actions are his appoint- 
 ment, and our forefight of thofe confequences is a 
 warning given us by him, how we are to a^l. 
 
 " Is the pleafure then naturally accompanying every 
 particular gratification of paflion intended to put us 
 upon gratifying curfelves in every fuch particular in- 
 ftance, and as a reward to us for fo doing V No cer- 
 tainly. Nor is it to be faid, that our eyes were natu- 
 rally intended to give us the fight of each particular 
 objed:, to which they do or can extend ; objeds which 
 are defti\id:ive of them, or which, for any other rea- 
 fon, it may become us to turn our eyes from. Yet 
 there is no doubt but that our eyes were intended for 
 us to fee with. So neither is there any doubt but 
 that the forefecn pleafures and pains belonging to the 
 paffions Vv^ere intended, in general, to induce mankind 
 to a6t in fuch and fuch manners. 
 
 Nov; from this general obiervation, obvious to eve- 
 ry one, that God has given us to underfland he has ap- 
 
 G pointQ4 
 
96 Of the Government of God Part f, 
 
 pointed fatlsfadion and delight to be the confequence 
 of our ading in one manner, and pain and uneafinefs 
 of our ading in another, and of our not ading at all ; 
 and that we find the confequences which we were be- 
 forehand informed of uniformly to fjllow — we may 
 learn, that we are at prefent adually under his govern- 
 ment in the ftrideft and moft proper fenfe ; in fuch ^ 
 fenfe, as that he rewards and puniflies us for our ac- 
 tions. An Author of nature being fuppofed, it is not 
 fb much a dedudion of reafon as a matter of expe- 
 rience, that we are thus under his government ; under 
 his government, in the fame fenfe as we are under the 
 government of civil magiftrates. Becaufe the annex- 
 ing pleafure to fome adions and pain to others, in our 
 power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this ap- 
 pointment beforehand to thofe whom it concerns, is 
 the proper formal notion of government. Whether 
 the pleafure or pain which thus follows upon our be* 
 haviour be owing to the Author of nature's ading up- 
 on us every moment which we feel it, or to his having 
 at once contrived and executed his own part in the 
 plan of the world, makes no alteration as to the mat- 
 ter before us. For if civil magiftrates eould make 
 the fandions of their laws take place, without inter-* 
 pofing at all after they had paffed them, without a tri- 
 al and the formalities of an execution ; if they were 
 able to make their laws execute themfelves, or every 
 offender to execute them upon himfelf j w^e fliould be 
 juft in the fame fenfe under their government then, as 
 v/e are now, but in a much higher degree, and more 
 perfed manner. Vain is the ridicule, with which one 
 fore fees fome perfons will divert themfelves, upon 
 finding lefTer pains confidered as inflances of divine 
 punifhment. There is no pofTibiiity of anfwering or 
 evading the general thing here intended, without de- 
 nying all final caufes. For final cauies being admit- 
 ted,' the pleafures and pains now mentioned muit be 
 
 admitted 
 
Chap. II. hy Rewards and Vunijliments. 91 
 
 admitted too as inftances of them. And If they are, 
 if God annexes delight to fome actions and uneaiinefs 
 to others, with an apparent deii^n to induce us to a6t 
 fo and fo, then he not only difpenfes happinefs and 
 mifery, but alfo rewards and punifhes ad:ions. If, for 
 example, the pain which we feel, upon doing what 
 tends to the deftruAion of our bodies, fuppofe upon 
 too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding our- 
 felvcs, be appointed by the Author of nature to pre- 
 vent our doing what thus tends to our deftrudiion, this 
 is altogether as much an inftance of his punitliing' 
 our actions, and confequently of our being under 
 his government, as declaring by a voice from 
 heaven that if we afted {o^ he would inflict fuch 
 pain upon us, and inflicting it, whether it be greater 
 or lefs. 
 
 Thus we find, that the true notion or conception 
 of the Author of nature is that of a mafter or govern- 
 or, prior to the confideration of his moral attributes. 
 The fa6t of our cafe, which we find by experience, is, 
 that he a£tually exercifes dominion or government 
 over us at prefent, by rewarding and punilhing us for 
 our actions, in as ftridt and proper a fenfe of thefe 
 words, and even in the fame fenfe, as children, fer- 
 vants, fubjedt?, are rewarded and puniflied by thofc 
 who govern them. 
 
 And thus the v/hole analogy of nature, the whole 
 prefent courfe of things, moft fully fhows, that there 
 is nothing incredible in the general do6trine of relig- 
 ion, that God will reward and punifh men for their 
 a£tions hereafter ; nothing incredible, I mean, ariiing 
 out of the notion of rewarding and punifhing. For 
 the whole courfe of nature is a preient inftance of his 
 cxercifmg that government over us, which implies in 
 it rewarding and puniQiing. . 
 
 G2, BUT 
 
g% Of the Government of God Part I. 
 
 BUT as divine punifhment is what men chiefly 
 object againft, and are mofl unwiUing to allow, it 
 may be proper to mention fome cirCumftances in 
 the natural courfe of pimifbments at prefent, which 
 are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning 
 a future ftate of punifhm.ents ; indeed fo analogous, 
 that as they add a farther credibility to it, fo they 
 cannot b^^t raife a mofl ferious apprehenfi-r^n of it in 
 tliofe who will attend to them. 
 
 It has been now obferved,that fuch and fuch miferies 
 naturally follow fuch and inch aftions of imprudence 
 and wilfulnefs, as well as adions more commonly and 
 more diftin6tly confidered as vicious ; and that thefe 
 confequences, when they may be forefeen, are proper- 
 ly natural punifhments annexed to fuch actions. For 
 the general thing here infifted upon is, not that we 
 fee a great deal of mifery in the world, but a great deal 
 which men bring upon themfelves by their own be- 
 haviour, which they might have forefeen and avoided. 
 Nov/ the circumftances of thefe natural pimifhments 
 particularly deferving our attention, are fuch as thefe : 
 That oftentimes they follow or are infli6ted in confe- 
 quence of adlions, which procure many prefent ad- 
 vantages, and are accompanied with much prefent 
 pleafure ; for inftance, ficknefs and untimely death is 
 the confequence of intemperance, though accompa- 
 riied with the highefl mirth and jollity : That thefe 
 punilhments are often much greater than the advan- 
 tages or pleafures obtained by the anions of which they 
 are the punifhments or confequences : That though 
 we may imagine a eonftitution of nature, in which 
 thefe natural punifhments which are in fact to follow 
 would follow, immediately upon iuch aftions being 
 done, or very foon after ; we find on the contrary in 
 our world, that they are often delayed a great while, 
 fometimes even until long after the aftions occafioning 
 them are forgot j lb that the conflitution of nature is 
 
 fuch. 
 
Chap. II. hy Punijliments. 93 
 
 fuch, that delay of punifhment is no fort nor degree 
 of prefumption of final impunity : That after fuch 
 delay, thefe natural punifliments or miferies often 
 come, not by degrees, but fuddenly, with violence, 
 and at once ; however, the chief mifery often does : 
 That as certainty of fuch diftant mife-ry following fuch 
 aftions is never afforded perfgns, fo perhaps during 
 the aftions they have feldom a diftind: full expecta- 
 tion of its following ■, * and many times the cafe is 
 only thus, that they fee in general, or may fee, the 
 credibility that intemperance, fuppofe, will bring after 
 it difeafes, civil crimes civil punifhments, when yet 
 the real probability often is that they ihall efcape ; 
 but things notwithftanding take their deftined courfe, 
 and the mifery inevitably follows at its appointed 
 time, in very many of thefe cafes. Thus alfo, though 
 youth may be alleged as an excufe for raflinefs and 
 folly, as being nati.iraliy thoughtlefs, and not clearly 
 forefeeing all the conlbquences of being untradlable 
 and profligate, this does not hinder, but that thefe 
 confequences follow, and are grievoufly felt throughout 
 the whole courfe of mature life. Habits contrafted 
 even in that age are often utter ruin ; and men's fuc- 
 cefs in the world, not only in the corjimon fenfe of 
 worldly fuccefs, but their real happinefs and mifery 
 depends, in a great degree, and in various ways, upon 
 the manner in which they pafs their youth ; which 
 confequences they for the moft part negleft to con- 
 fider, and perhaps feldom can properly be faid to be- 
 lieve, beforehand. It requires alfo to be mentioned, 
 that in numberlefs cafes the natural courfe of thino;s 
 affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to 
 ourfeives at certain times, which we cannot procure 
 when we will, nor ever recal the opportunities, if we 
 have neglefted them. Indeed the general courfe of 
 nature is an example of this. If, during the oppor- 
 tunity 
 
 * See Part II. Chap. vi. 
 
94 Of the Government of God Paut I, 
 
 tunity of youth, perfons are indocile and felf willed, 
 they inevitably fuffer in their future life for want of 
 thofe ace]uirements which they negle6ted the natural 
 lealbn of attaining. If the hufbandman lets his feed 
 time pafs without fowing, the whole year is loft to him 
 beyond recovery. In like manner, though after men 
 liave been guilty of folly and extravagance up to a cer* 
 tain degresy it is often in their power, for inftance, to 
 retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and char- 
 after, at leaft in good meafure ; yet real reformation 
 is, in many cafes, of no avail at all towards preventing 
 the miferies, poverty, ficknefs, infamy, naturally an- 
 nexed to folly and extravagance exceeding that degree. 
 There is a certain bound to imprudence and mifoe- 
 haviour, which being tranfgrelled, there remains no 
 place for repentance in the natural courfe of things. 
 It is further very much to be remarked, that neglects 
 from inconlideratenefs, want of attention,* not look-s. 
 ing about us to fee v^hat v/e have to do, are often atr 
 tended with confequences altogether as dreadful as 
 any aftive mifbehaviour, from the moft extravagant 
 pallion. And laftly, civil government being natural, 
 the punifhments of it are fo too ; and fome of thefe 
 punilhments are capital, as the effects of a diffolute 
 courfe of pleafure are often mortal. So that many 
 natural punilhments are final -f to him who incurs 
 
 them, 
 
 * Part II. Chap. vi. 
 
 f The general confideration of a future flateof puniihment, nioft e\-ident- 
 ly belongs to the fubjett of natural rehgion. But if any of thefe refledtions 
 Ihould be thought to relate n^ore particularly to this doftrine, ab taught in 
 fcripture, the reader is defired to obferve that gentile writers, both moralills 
 and poets, fpeak of the future punifhment of the wicked, both as to the du- 
 ration and dvgree of it, in a like ma'.ner of exprelFion and of dcfcription as 
 the fcripture does. So that all which can pohtivcly be alfcrted to be mattei- 
 of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, feems to be, that the great 
 diftinclion between the righteous and the wicked Ihall be made at the end of 
 this world; ttiat each Ihall //4f« receive according to his defcits:. P.eafon 
 <'id, as it well might, conclude that it llrould, finally and upon the whole, be 
 vvell with the righteous and ill with the wicked ; but it could not be deter- 
 mined upon any principles of reafon, Vvihether lii'.man creatures might not 
 bave heen-sppomted to pafs through otlker ftate= of life and being, before that 
 
 dillributivii 
 
Chap. II. hy Piinijfimenis, 95 
 
 them, if confidered only in his temporal capacity j and 
 feem inflidied by natural appointment, either to re- 
 move the oifender out of the way of being further mif- 
 chievous ; or as an example, though frequently a dif- 
 regarded one, to thofe who are left behind. 
 
 Thefe things are not what we call accidental, or to 
 be met with only now and then j but they are things 
 of every day's experience : They proceed from gene^ 
 ral laws, very general ones, by which God governs the 
 world, in the natural courfe of his providence. And 
 they are fo analogous to what rehgion teaches us con- 
 cerning the future punifiiment of the wicked, fo much 
 of a piece with it, that both would naturally be ex- 
 prclTed in the very fame words and manner of defcrip- 
 tion. In the book of Proverbs,* for inftance, Wif- 
 dom is introduced as frequenting the moft public 
 places of refort, and as rejedied when ihe offers herfelf 
 as the natural appointed guide of human life. How 
 long, fpeaking to thole who are paiTmg through it, 
 kow long, yefimple ones, will ye love folly, and the [com- 
 ers delight in their [corning, and fools hate knowledge f 
 Turn ye at my reproof. Behold, I will pour out my Spirit 
 upon you, I will make known my words unto you. But 
 upon being neglefted, Becaufe / have called, and ye 
 refufed, I have Jiretched out my hand, and no man re- 
 garded ; but ye have fet at nought all my counfel, and 
 would none of my reproof : I a Jo will laugh at your ca- 
 lamity, I will mock when your fear cometli ; when your 
 fear comet h as defolation . and your definition comet h as a 
 whirlzvind ; when difirefs and anguijh cometh upon yon. 
 Then [hall they call upon me, but I will 7iot anfwer ; they 
 fliall feck me early ^ but they fliall not find me. This paf- 
 
 fage 
 
 diftributive juftlcc fhould finally and efFeftually take place. Revelation 
 teaches us, that the next ftate of things after the prefe it is appointed for the 
 execution of this juflice, that it fliall be no longer delayed ; but the msfiery of 
 Cod, the great niyftery of his fuffering vice and confufioa to prevail, /,i<z// /■/;!« 
 he finiJJicd ; and he will tale ta him his great powrr and wih' rcig'i, by ."cndering 
 tu every one according to iiis works. 
 
 * Chap, i. 
 
^6 Of the Government of God Part I. 
 
 fage every one fees is poetical, and fome parts of it are 
 highly figurative ; but their meaning is obvious. 
 And the thing intended is exprefled more literally in 
 the following words : For that they hated knowledge^ 
 and did not choofe the fear of the Lord — therefore fliall 
 they eat of the fruit of their own way^ and be filled with 
 their own devices. For the fecnrity of the fimple (liatl 
 flav them, and the prcfperity of fools jhall deftroy them. 
 And the whole paflage is lb equally applicable to 
 v/hat we experience in the prefent world concerning 
 the confequences of men's aftions, and to what re-- 
 ligion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it 
 may be queftioned which of the two was principally 
 intended. 
 
 Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper 
 proofs of a future flate of rewards and punifliments, 
 nothing methinks can give one fo fenfible an apprc- 
 henlion of the latter, or reprefentation of it to the 
 mind, as obferving, that after the many difregarded 
 checks, admonitions and warnings, which people meet 
 "with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance j 
 warnings from their very nature ; from the examples 
 of others ; from the lelfer inconveniences which they 
 bring upon themfeives ; from the infhrudlions of wife 
 and virtuous men — after thefe have been long -defpif-^ 
 ed, fcorned, ridiculed ; after the chief bad confe- 
 quences, temporal confequences, of their follies have 
 been delayed for a great while ; at length they break 
 in irrefiftibly, like an armed force ; repentance is too 
 late to relieve, and can ferve only to aggravate, their 
 diftrefs ; the cafe is become defperate, and poverty and 
 iicknefs, remorfe and anguifh, infamy and death, the 
 eifcfts of their own doings, overwhelm them, beyond 
 poffibility of remedy or efcape. This is an account 
 of what is in facft the general conftitution of nature. 
 
 It is not in any fort meant, that according to what 
 appears at prefent of the natural courfe of things, men 
 
 are 
 
Chap. II. 'hy PmiJIiments. 97 
 
 are always uniformly puniihed in proportion to their 
 mifbehaviour ; but tliat tliere are very many inflances 
 of mifbehaviour punifhed in the feveral ways now 
 mentioned, and very dreadful inftances too ; fufficient 
 to (how what the laws of the univerfe may admit, and, 
 if thoroughly confidered, fufficient fully to anfwer all 
 objeftions againft the credibility of a future ftate of 
 puniiliments, from any imaginations that the frailty 
 of our nature and external temptations almou: annihi- 
 late the guilt of human vices, as well as objections of 
 another fort, from necellity, from iuppofitions that 
 the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradict- 
 ed, or that he mud be incapable of offence and 
 provocation.* 
 
 Reflections of this kind are not without their ter- 
 rors to ferious perfuns, the moil free from enthufiafm, 
 and of the greateft ftrength of mind ; but it is fit 
 things be ftated and confidered as they really are. 
 And there is, in the prefent age, a certain fearlefsnefs, 
 with regard to what may be hereafter under the gov- 
 ernment of God, which nothing but 3,n univeriaily 
 acknowledged demonftration on the fide of atheifm 
 can juflify ; and which makes it quite neceifary, that 
 men be reminded, and if pofTible made to feel, that 
 there is no fort of ground for being thus prefumptu- 
 ous, even upon the mofl fceptical principles. For, 
 may it not be faid of any perfon upon his being born 
 into the world, he may behave fo as to be of no feryice 
 to it, but by being made an example of the vvoful ef- 
 fects of vice and folly ? That he may, as any one may, 
 if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands 
 of civil juftice ; or in iome other courle of extrava- 
 gance fliorten his days ; or bring upon himfelf infamy 
 and difeafes worie than death ? So that it had been 
 better for him, even with regard to the prefent world, 
 that he had never been born. And is there any pre- 
 tence 
 
 * See Chap. iv. and vi. 
 
^t Of the Moral Part L 
 
 tence of reafon, for people to think tbemfelves fecure, 
 and talk as if they had certain proof, that let them adt 
 as licentioufly as they will, there can be nothing anal- 
 ogous to this, with regard to a future and more gene- 
 ral intereft, under the providence and government of 
 fche fame God ? 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 Of the Moral Government cf God. 
 
 jc\S the manifold appearances of defiga 
 and of final caufes, in the conftitution of the world, 
 prove it to be the work of an intelligent Mind, fo the 
 particular final caufes cf pleafure and pain diftributed 
 amongft his creatures, prove that they are under his 
 government, j what may be called his natural govern- 
 ment of creatures endued with fenfe and reafon. This, 
 however, implies fom^ewhat more than feems ufually 
 attended to, when we fpeak of God's natui*al govern- 
 ment of the world. It implies government of the 
 very fam.e kind with that, which a mafter exercifes 
 over his fervants, or a civil magiftrate over his fub- 
 jefts. Thefe latter inftances of final caufes as really 
 prove an inteUigent Governor of the world, in the fenlc 
 now mentioned, and before* difhinftly treated of, as 
 any other infbances of final caufes prove an intelligent 
 Maker of it. 
 
 But this alone does not appear at firft fight to de- 
 termine any thing certainly, concerning the moral 
 chara6ter of the Author of nature, confidered in this 
 relation of governor ; does not afcertain his govern- 
 ment to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous 
 
 Judge 
 
 * Ch. ii. 
 
Chap. III. GovcnuJicnt of God. 99 
 
 Judge of the world, Moral government- conlllls, not 
 barely in rewarding and punifhing men tor their ac- 
 tions, which the moft tyrannical peribn may do ; but 
 in rewarding the righteous and punifhiiig the wicked, 
 in rendering to men according to their actions, con- 
 fidered ar, good or evil. And the perfeftion of moral 
 governm.ent confifts in doing this, with regard to all 
 intelligent creatures, in an exa£t proportion to their 
 perfonal merits or demerits. 
 
 Some men feem to think the only chara6:er of the 
 Author of nature to be that of (imple abiolute benev- 
 olence. This, confidered as a principle of adion and 
 infinite in degree, is a difpofition to produce the great-- 
 efl poffible happinefs, without regard to perfons' be- 
 liaviour, othervviie than as fuch regard would produce 
 higher degrees of it. And ilippoling this to be the 
 only character of God, veracity and juflice in him 
 would be nothing but benevolence condudcd by wil- 
 dom. Now furely this ought not be alierted, unlefs 
 it can be proved ; for we Ihould fpcak with cautious 
 reverence upon luch a llibje*5t. And whether it can 
 be proved or not, is not the thing here to be inquired 
 into 5 but wJiether in the conftitution and condud of 
 the world a righteous government be not difcernibly 
 planned out ; which neceffarily implies a rigliteous 
 Governor. There miay poiTibiy be in the creation be- 
 ings, to whom the Author of nature manifefts himfelf 
 under this moft amiable of all characters, this of infi- 
 nite abfolute benevolence ; for it is the moft amiable, 
 fuppofing it not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible 
 with juftice ; but he manifefts himlelf to us under 
 the character of a righteous Governor. He may, con- 
 liftently with this, be fnuply and abfolutely benevo- 
 lent, in the ^t^n^t now explained ; but he is, for he has 
 given us a proof in the conftitution and condud; of 
 the world that he is, a governor over fervants, as he 
 rewards and punifhes us for our actions. And in tlic 
 
 conftitution 
 
loo Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 conftltutlon and condud of it, he may alfo have giv- 
 en, beiides the reafon of the thing, and the natural 
 prefages of confcience, clear and diftin6l intimations 
 that his government is righteoi:;s or moral ; clear to 
 fuch as think the nature of it deferving their atten- 
 tion ; and yet not to every carelefs perfon, who caft§ 
 a tranfient refledion i^pon the fubjeft,^ 
 
 But it is particularly to be obferved, that the divine 
 government, which we experience ourfelves under in 
 the prefent ftate, taken alone, is allowed not to be the 
 perfeclion of moral government. And yet this by ng 
 means hinders but that there may be fomewhat, be it 
 more or lefs, truly moral in it. A righteous govern- 
 ment m.ay plainly appear to be carried on to fome de- 
 gree ; enough to give us the apprehenlion that it lliall 
 be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfec- 
 tion which religion teaches us it fliall ; but which can- 
 not appear, till much more of the divine adminiftra-' 
 tion be feen, than can in the pr-efent life. And the 
 defign of this Ciiapter is to inquire, how far this is the 
 cafe; how far, over and above the moral nature -J- 
 which God has given us, and our natural notion of 
 him as righteous Governor of thofe his creatures, to 
 whom he has given this nature ; I fay how far beiides 
 this, the principles and beginnings of a moral govern- 
 ment over the world may be difcerned, notvvithftand- 
 ins: and amidfl; all the confufion and diforder of it. 
 
 Now one might mention here, what has been often 
 urged with great force, that in general lefs uneaiinefs 
 and more fatisfaclion are the natural confequences % of 
 
 a virtuous 
 
 * The objeftions ajainfl: religion, from the evidence of it not being uni- 
 verfal, nor fo ilrong as might polFibly have been, may be urged agamft nat- 
 ural religion, as well as againft revealed ; and therefore the confideration of 
 tiiem belong, to the firft part of this Treatife, as well as the fecond. But as 
 .thefe objections are chiefly urged againil: revealed religion, I chofe to con- 
 fider them in the fecond part. And the anfu-ei- to tliem there, Ch. vi. as 
 urged againft Chriflianity, being almoft equally applicable to them as urged 
 aga»ift the religion of nature ; to avoid rcpetitiooj the reader isYeferred to 
 that chapter. 
 
 f Dijfcrtation II. 
 
 + See Lord Slwjtjhury'% Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II, 
 
Chap. III. Gcvernment of God. loi 
 
 a virtuous than of a vicious courfe of life, in the pref- 
 ent ftate, as an inftance of a moral government eftab- 
 lifhed in nature ; an inftance of it, collefted from ex- 
 perience and prefent matter of fad:. But it n^uft be 
 owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleaf- 
 ures and unealineffes, each amongft themfelves, and 
 alfo againft each other, fo as to make an eftimate, with 
 any exaftnefs, of the overplus of happinefs on the fide 
 of virtue. And it is not impoflible, that, amidft the 
 infinite diforders of the world, there may be excep- 
 tions to the happinefs of virtue, even with regard to 
 thofe perfons whofe courfe of life, from their youth up, 
 has been blamelefs ; and more with regard to thofe 
 who have gone on for fome time in the ways of vice, 
 and have afterwards reformed. For fuppofe an in- 
 ftance of the latter cafe ; a perfon with his paflions in- 
 flamed, his natural faculty of felf-government impair- 
 ed by habits of indulgence, and with all his vices about 
 him, like fo many harpies, craving for their accuftomed 
 gratifications, who can fay how long it might be, be- 
 fore fuch a perfon would find more fatisfadlion in the 
 reaibnablenefs and prefent good confequences of vir- 
 tue, than difficulties and felf denial in the reftraints of 
 it ? Experience alfo ftiows, that men can, to a great 
 degree, get over their fenfe of ihame, fo as that by 
 profeffing themfelves to be without principle, and 
 avowing even direft villany, they can fupport them- 
 felves againft the infamy of it. But as the ill actions 
 of any one will probably be more talked of, and oftener 
 thrown in his way, upon his reformation, fo the infamy 
 of them will be much more felt, after the natural fenfe 
 of virtue and honour is recovered. UneafinelTes of 
 this kind ought, indeed, to be put to the account of 
 former vices ; yet it will be faid, they are in part the 
 confequences of reformation. Still I am far from al- 
 lowing it doubtful, whether virtue, upon the v/hole, be 
 happier than vice in the prefent world. But if it were, 
 
 vet 
 
102 Of the Mora! Part 1 
 
 yet the beginnings of a righteous adminiftration may, 
 beyond ail queflion, be found in nature, if we will at* 
 tentively inquire after them. And, 
 
 I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral 
 government over the world might be treated, if it did 
 not appear whether he were in a proper fenfe our gov- 
 ernor at all, yet when it is Certain matter of experience, 
 that he does manifefl; himfelf to lis under the charac- 
 ter of a governor, in the ienfe explained,* it muft de- 
 fervc to be confidered, whether there be not reafon to 
 apprehend, that he may be a righteous or moral Govi* 
 ernor. Since it appears to be fad:, that God does gov- 
 ern mankind by the method of rewards and puniili- 
 ments, according to fome fettled rules of diftribution, 
 it is furely a queilion to bd afked, What prefumption 
 is there againfh his finally rewarding and punifhing 
 them, according to this particular rule, namely, as they 
 aft reafonably or unreaibnably,virtuoufly or vicioufly ? 
 fince rendering men happy or miferable by this rule, 
 certainly falls in, much miore falls in, with our natural 
 apprehenfions and fenfe of things, than doing fo by 
 any other rule whatever ; fmce rewarding and punifh- 
 ing anions by any other rule, vvould appear much 
 harder to be accounted for by minds formed as he has 
 formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then more 
 or Icfs clear, the expeftation which it raifes in us, that 
 the righteous fhall, upon the whole, be happy, and the 
 wicked miferable, cannot however poffibly be conlid'- 
 ered as abfurd or chimerical ; becaufe it is no more 
 than an expectation, that a method of government 
 already begun, iliall be carried on, the method of re- 
 warding and punilliing actions ; and iliall be carried 
 on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to 
 us at firft fight more natural than any other, the rule 
 which we call dlftributivc juftice. Nor, 
 
 II. Ought it to be entirely paffed over, that tran- 
 quillity, fatisfa(5tion, and external advantages, being 
 
 the 
 
 * Chap. ii. 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. lo^ 
 
 the natural confequences of prudent management of 
 ourfelves, and our affairs ; and rafhnefs, profligate neg- 
 ligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them many in- 
 conveniences and fufferings ; thefe afford inftances of 
 1 right conflitution of nature ; as the correction of 
 children, for their own fakes, and by way of example, 
 when they rim into danger or hurt themfelves, is a 
 part of right education. And thus, that God governs 
 the world by general fixed laws, that he has endued 
 us with capacities of retieflin2: upon this conftitution 
 of things, and forefeeing the good and bad confe- 
 quences of our behaviour, plainly implies feme fort of 
 moral government ; fince from fuch a conititution of 
 things it cannot but follow, that prudence and impru- 
 dence, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,* 
 mud be, as they are, refpedively rewarded and pun- 
 iihed. 
 
 III. From the natural courfe of things, vicious ac- 
 tions are, to a great degree, aftually punifhed as mif- 
 chievous to fociety °, and befides punifhment ad:ualiy 
 inflicted upon this account, there is alfo the fear and 
 apprehenfion of it in thofe perfons, whofe crimes have 
 rendered them obnoxious to it, in cafe of a difcovery ; 
 this flate of fear being itfelf often a very coniidcrable 
 punifhment. The natural fear and apprehenfion of it 
 too, which reftrains from fuch crimes, is a declaration 
 of nature againft them. It is neceiTary to the very 
 being of focietv, that vices deftruftive of it fhould be 
 punifhed as being fo ; the vices of falfehood, injuftice, 
 cruelty ; which punifhment therefore is as natural as 
 fociety, and fo is an inflance of a kind of moral gov- 
 ernment, naturally eftablifhed and adtually taking 
 place. And, fmce the certain natural courfe of things 
 is the conduct of Providence or the government of 
 God, though carried on by the inilrumentaiity of 
 men, the obfervation here made amounts to this, that 
 
 mankind 
 
104 ^f i^^^ Moral Part I. 
 
 mankind find themfelves placed by him in fuch cir- 
 cumftances, as that they are unavoidably accountable 
 for their behaviour, and are often punifhed, and fome- 
 times rewarded under his government, in the view of 
 tlieir being mifchievous, or eminently beneficial to 
 fociety. 
 
 If it be obje6ted that good aftions, and fuch as 
 are beneficial to fociety, are often puniflied, as in the 
 cafe of perfecution and in other cafes, and that ill and 
 mifchievous adtions are often rewarded, it may be an- 
 fwered diftinftly, firft, that this is in no fort necelfary, 
 and confequently not natural, in the fenfe in which it 
 is neceiiary, and therefore natural, that ill or mif- 
 chievous actions fhould be punillied ; and in the next 
 place, that good adlions are never punifhed, confider- 
 ed as beneficial to fociety, nor ill actions rewarded, un- 
 der the view of their being hurtful to it. So that it 
 ilands good, without any thing on the lide of vice to 
 be fet over againft it, that the Author of nature has 
 as truly diredted, that vicious adions, confidered as 
 mifchievous to fociety, fhould be punifhed, and put 
 mankind ujidei* a neceffity of thus punifhing them, as 
 he has dire^'ted and neceffitated us to preferve our 
 lives by food. 
 
 IV. In the natural courfe of things, virtue as fuck 
 is actually rewarded, and vice as fuch punifhed ; which 
 feems to afford an inftance or example, not only of 
 government, but of moral government, begun and 
 eftablilbed ; moral in the ftricteft fenfe, though not in 
 that perfeftion of degree, which religion teaches us to 
 exped:. In order to fee this more clearly, we mufb 
 diftinguiili betw&m aftions themfelves, and that qual- 
 ity afcribed to them, which we call virtuous or vi- 
 cious. The gratification itfelf of every natural paffion, 
 muft be attended with delight ; and acquifitions of 
 fortune, however made, are acquifitions of the means 
 or materials of enjoyment. An aftion then, by 
 
 whicli 
 
Chap. ill. Government of God. 205 
 
 which any natural paffion Is gratified or fortune ac- 
 quired, procures delight or advantage, abftra£led from 
 all confideration of the morality of fuch action. Con- 
 fequently, the pleafure or advantage in this cafe is 
 gained by the a£tion itfelf, not by the morality, the 
 virtuoufnefs or vicioufnefs of it ; though it be, per- 
 haps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to fay fuch an ac- 
 tion or courfe of behaviour procured fuch pleafure or 
 advantage, or brought on fuch inconvenience and pain, 
 is quite a different thing, from faying, that fuch good or 
 bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of fuch ac- 
 tion or behaviour. In one cafe, an action, ab{tra(5led 
 from all moral confideration, produced its effed ; in 
 the other cafe, for it will appear that there are fuch 
 cafes, the morality of the aftion, the action under a 
 moral confideration, i. e. the virtuoufnefs or viciouf- 
 nefs of it, produced the effeft. Novv^ I fay, virtue, as 
 fuch, naturally procures confidcrable advantages to the 
 virtuous, and vicCjiis fuch, naturally occafions great in- 
 convenience and even mifery to the vicious, in very 
 many inftanceSi The irnmediate effefts of virtue and 
 vice upon the mind and temper are to be mentioned 
 as inftances of it^ Vice, as fuch, is naturally attended 
 with fome fort of uneafinefs, and, not uncommonly, 
 with great difturbance and apprehenfion. That in- 
 ward feeling, which refpeding leiTer matters, and in 
 familiar fpeech, we call being vexed with onefelf, and 
 in matters of importance and in more ferious language, 
 remorfe, is an uneafinefs naturally arifing from an ac- 
 tion of a man's own, reflected upon by himfelf as 
 wrong, unreafonable, faulty, i. e. vicious in greater or 
 lefs degrees , and this manifeftly is a different feeling 
 from that uneafinefs which arifes from a ^tw^o. of mere 
 lofs or harm. What is more common, than to hear 
 a man lamenting an accident or event and adding, — 
 but however he has the fiitisfadion that he cannot 
 blame himfelf for it ; or on the con:rary, that he has 
 H the 
 
iqS Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 the uneafinefs of being fenfible it was his own doing ? 
 Thus alfo the diflurbance and fear, which often follow 
 upon a man's having done an inj ury, arife from a fenfe 
 of his being blameworthy ; otherwife there would, in 
 many cafes, be no ground of difturbance, nor any rea- 
 fon to fear refentment or Ihame. On the other hand, 
 inward fecurity and peace, and a. mind open to the 
 feveral gratifications of life, are the natural attendants 
 of innocence and virtue. To which mufl be added 
 the complacency, fatisfa£tion, and even joy of heart, 
 which accom.pany the exercife, the real exercife, of 
 gratitude, friendfhip, benevolence. 
 v^ And here, I think, ov\ght to be mentioned, th« 
 fears of future puniflmient, and peaceful hopes of a 
 better life, in thofe who fully believe, or have any fe- 
 rious apprehenfion of religion^ becaufe thefe hopes and 
 fears are prefent uneafinefs and fatisfaftion to the 
 mind ; and cannot be got rid of by great part of the 
 world, even by men who have thought mofl thor- 
 oughly upon the fubjed of religion. And no one can 
 fay, how confiderable this uneafinefs and fatisficlion 
 may be, or what upon the whole it may amount to. 
 In the next place comes in the confideration, that 
 all honefl and good men are difpofed to befriend hon- 
 efl good men, as fuch, and to difconntenance the vi- 
 cious, as fuch, and do fo in fome degree, indeed in a 
 confiderable degree ; from which favour and difcour- 
 agement cannot but ariie confiderable advanta2;e and 
 inconvenience. And though the generality of the 
 world have little regard to the morality of their own 
 adtions, and may be fuppofed to have lefs to that of 
 others, when they themfelves are not concerned, yet 
 let any one be known to be a man of virtue, fome 
 how or other he will be favoured, and good offices 
 will be done him, from regard to his chara<fler with- 
 out remote views, occalionally, and in fome low de- 
 gree, I think, by the generality of the world, as it hap- 
 
Gkap. III. Gov eminent of God. toy 
 
 pens to come in their way. Public honours too and 
 advantages are the natural confequences, are fome- 
 times at leaft the confequences in fa6t, of virtuous ac- 
 tions ; of eminent juftice,. fidelity, charity, love to our 
 country, confidered in the vievr of being virtuous. 
 And fometimes even death itfeif, often infamy and 
 external inconveniences, are the public confequences 
 of vice, as vice. For inflance, the (enfe which man- 
 kind have of tyranny, injuflice, opprefTion, additional 
 to the mere feehng or fear of mifery, has doubtlefs 
 been inftrumental in bringing aboilt revolutions, 
 which make a figure even in the hiftory of the worlds 
 For it is plain, men refent injuries as implying faulti- 
 nefs, and retaliate, not merely under the notion of 
 having received harm, but of having received wrong; 
 and they have this refentment in ^behalf of others, as 
 well as of themfelves. So likewife even the generality 
 are, in fome degree, grateful, and difpofed to return 
 good offices, not merely becaufe fuch an one has been, 
 the occafion of good to them, but under the vievv'^, 
 that fuch good offices implied kind attention and 
 good defert in the doer. To all this may be added 
 two or three particular things, which many perfons 
 will think frivolous ; but to me nothing appears fo$ 
 which at all comes in towards determining a queilion 
 of fuch importance, as, whether there be or be not a 
 moral inftitution of government, in the ftrideft fenfe 
 moral, vijibly eftablifhed and begun in nature. The 
 particular things are thefe : That in domeftic govern- 
 ment, which is doubtlefs natural, children and others 
 alfo are very generally punifhed for faliehood and in- 
 juflice and ill behaviour, as fuch, and rewarded for the 
 contrary ; which are inflances where veracity and juf- 
 tice, and right behaviour, as fuch, are naturally en- 
 forced by rewards and punilhments, whether more or 
 lefs confiderable in degree ; That, though civil gov- 
 ernment be fappofed to take cognizance of actions in. 
 H 2 no 
 
loS Of the Moral Part t 
 
 no other view than as prejudicial to fociety, without 
 refpecl to the immoraHty of them ; yet as fuch ac- 
 tions are immoral, fo the fenfe which men have of the 
 immorality of them very greatly contributes, in differ- 
 ent ways, to bring offenders to juftice ; and, that en- 
 tire abfence of all crime and guilt in the moral fenfe, 
 when plainly appearing, will almofh of courfe procure, 
 and circumftances of aggravated guilt prevent, a re- 
 miffion of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in 
 many cafes, though by no means in all. 
 
 Upon the whole then, befides the good and bad ef-^ 
 lefts of virtue and vice upon nien's own minds, the 
 courfe of the world does, in feme meafure, turn upon 
 the approbation and difapprobation of them, as fuch, 
 in others. The fenfe of well and ill doing, the pre- 
 fages of confcience, the love of good charafters and 
 diflike of bad ones, honour, fhame, refentment, grati- 
 tude ; all thefe, confidered in themfelves, and in their 
 effefts, do afford manifeft real inflances of virtue, as 
 fuch, naturally favoured, and of vice, as fuch, difcoun-- 
 tenanced, more or lefs, in the daily courfe of human 
 life ; in every age, in every relation, in every general 
 circumftance of it. That God has given us a moral 
 nature,^ may moft juftly be urged as a proof of our 
 being Under his moral government ; but that he has 
 placed us in a condition, which gives this nature, as 
 one may fpeak, fcope to operate, and in which it does- 
 unavoidably operate, i. q. influence mankind to ad:, 
 fo as thus to favour and reward virtue, and difcoun- 
 tenance and punilh vice^ — this is not the fame, but a 
 further additional proof of his moral government, for 
 it is an inftance of it. The firft is a proof that hef 
 will finally favour and fupport virtue effedually ; the 
 fecond is an example of his favouring and fupporting 
 it at prefent, in fome degree. 
 
 If a more diftind: inquiry be made, whence it arifes 
 that virtue, as fuch, is often rewarded, and vice, as 
 
 fiichy 
 
 * See Dijffrtation II. 
 
Chap. HI. Government of God. 3^9 
 
 fuch, is punifhed, and this rule never inverted — it 
 will be found to proceed, in part, immediately from 
 the moral nature itfelf, which God has given us ; and 
 alfo, in part, from his having given us, together with 
 this nature, fo great a pov/er over each other's happinefs 
 and mifery. For JlrJ}, it is certain that peace and de- 
 light, in fome degree and upon fome occalions, is the 
 neceflary and prefent effeft of virtuous pradiice ; an 
 i^ffecb arifing immediately from that conftitution of 
 our nature. We are fo made, that well doing, as 
 fuch, gives us fatisfaftion at leafl in fome infbances ; 
 ill doing, as fuch, in none. And fecond/y, from our 
 moral nature, joined with God's having put our hap- 
 pinefs and mifery in many refpefts in each other's 
 power, it cannot but be that vice, as fuch, fomi 
 kinds and inftances of it at leaii, will be infamous, 
 and men will be difpofed to punifh it, as in itfelf de- 
 teftable ; and the villain will by no means be able al- 
 ways to avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he 
 will be able to efcape this further punifh ment, which 
 mankind v/ill be difpofed to inflidt upon him, under 
 the notion of his deferving it. But there can be noth- 
 ing on the iide of vice to anfwer this, becaufe there is 
 nothing in the human mind contradidory, as the lo- 
 gicians fpeak, to virtue. For virtue confifts in a re- 
 gard to what is right and reafonable, as being fo ; in 
 a regard to veracity, juftice, charity, in themfelves i 
 and there is furely no fuch thing as a like natural re- 
 gard to falfehood, injuftice, cruelty. If it be thought 
 that there are inftances of an approbation of vice, as 
 iuch, in itfelf, and for its own fake, (though it does 
 not appear to me that there is any fuch thing at all ; 
 but fuppofing there be,) it is evidently monftrous ; as 
 much fo as the moft acknowledged perverfion of any 
 paffion whatever. Such inftances of perverfion then 
 being left out, as merely imaginary, or, however, un- 
 natural, it muft follow from the frame of our nature, 
 
 and 
 
no Of the Moral Part I, 
 
 and from our condition, in the refpeds now defcribed, 
 that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be 
 favoured, as fi^ch, by others, upon fome occafions, and 
 happy in itfelf in fome degree. For what is here in- 
 filled upon, is not the degree in which virtue and vice 
 are thus diftinguifhed, but only the thing itfelf, that 
 they are fo in fome degree, though the vv^hole good 
 and bad efFeQ: of virtue and vice, as fuch, is not in- 
 confiderable in degree. But that they muft be thus 
 diflinguiihed in fome degree, is in a manner necef- 
 fary j it is matter of fad: of daily experience, even in i 
 the greatefl confufion of human affairs. 
 
 It is not pretended but that in the natural courfe 
 of things, happinefs and raifery appear to be diftrib- 
 uted by other rules than only the perfonal merit and 
 demerit of charaders. They may fometimes be dif- 
 tributed by way of mere difcipline. There may be 
 the wifeft and bed reafons, why the world Hiould be 
 governed by general laws, from whence fuch promif- 
 cuous diftribution perhaps mud follow, and alfo why 
 our happinefs and mifery Ihould be put in each other's 
 power in the degree which they are. And thefe 
 things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding 
 virtue and punifliing vice, as fuch, fo they often con- 
 tribute alfo, not to the inverfion of this, which is im- 
 poffible, but to the rendering perfons profperous, 
 though wicked j afflicted, though righteous ; and, 
 which is worfe, to the rewarding fome a^ions^ though 
 vicious, and punijhing other a£fwns, though virtuous. 
 But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the 
 conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itfelf for vir- 
 tue, by way of diftinftion from vice, and preference to ' 
 it. For, our being fo confdtuted, as that virtue and 
 vice are thus naturally favoured and difcountenanced, 
 rewarded and punilhed reipeftively, as fuch, is an in- 
 tuitive proof of the intent of nature that it fhould be 
 fo J otherwife the conflitution of our mind, from 
 
 whicl]^ 
 
Chap. III. Govtrnment of God. iii 
 
 tvhich it thus immediately and diredly proceeds, would 
 be abfurd. But it cannot be faid, becaufe virtuous 
 anions are fometimes puniihed, and vicious adions 
 rewarded, that nature intended it. For, though this 
 great diforder is brought about, as all adtions are 
 done, by means of fome natural pafllon, yet this may 
 he, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perver- 
 fion of fuch paflion, implanted in us for other and 
 thofe very good purpofes. And indeed thele other 
 and good purpofes, even of every paffion, may be 
 clearly feen. 
 
 We have then a declaration in fome degree of pref- 
 ent effed:, from Him. who is fupreme in nature, which 
 fide he is of, or what part he takes ; a declaration for 
 virtue, and againft vice. So far therefore as a man is 
 true to virtue, to veracity and juftiee, to equity and 
 charity, and the right of the cafe, in whatever he is 
 concerned, fo far he is on the fide of the divine ad- 
 miniftration, and cooperates with it ; and from hence, 
 to fuch a man arifes naturally a fecret fatisfadlion and 
 fenfe of fecurity, and implicit hope of fomewhat fur- 
 ther. And, 
 
 V. This hope is confirmed by the neceflary tenden-' 
 cies of virtue, which, though not of prefent efFed, yet 
 are at prefent difcernible in nature, and fo afford an 
 inftance of fomewhat moral in the effential conftitu- 
 tion of it. There is, in the nature of things, a ten- 
 dency in virtue and vice to produce the good and bad 
 efFefts now mentioned in a greater degree than they do 
 in fad: produce them. For inftance ; good and bad 
 men would be much more rewarded and puniihed, as 
 fuch, were it not that juftice is often artificially eluded, 
 that characters are not known, and many, who would 
 thus favour virtue and difcouragc vice, are hindered 
 from doing fo by accidental caufes. Thefe tendencies 
 of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individ' 
 uals. But it may require more particularly to be 
 
 confidered^ 
 
JI2 Of tie Moral Part I, 
 
 confidered, that power is ^ifonety, by being under the 
 direftion of virtue, naturally increafes, and has a nee- 
 eflary tendency to prevail over oppoiite power, not un-^ 
 der the dired.ion of it ; in like manner as power, by 
 being under the diredion of reafon, increafes, and has 
 a tendency to prevail over brute . force. There are 
 feveral brute creatures of equal, and feveral of fuperior 
 flrength, to that of men, and poffibly the fum of the 
 whole flrength of brutes may be greater than that of 
 mankind ; but reafon gives us the advantage and fu- 
 periority over them, and thus man is the acknowledg- 
 ed governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this iu- 
 periority confidered by any as accidental, but as what 
 reafon has a tendency, in the nature of the thing, to 
 obtain. And yet perhaps difficulties may be raifed 
 about the meaning as well as the truth of the affertion, 
 that virtue has the like tendency. 
 
 To obviate thefe difficulties, let us fee more diftind^ 
 ly how the cafe ftands with regard to reafon, which 
 is fo readily acknowledged to have this advantageous 
 tendency. Suppofe then two or three men, of the 
 beft and moft improved underftanding, in a defolate 
 open plain, attacked by ten times the number of beafts 
 of prey — would their reafon fecure them the viftory 
 in this unequal con^bat ? Power then, though join- 
 ed with reafon, and under its direftion, cannot bo 
 expefted to prevail over oppofite power, though mere- 
 ly brutal, unlefs the one bears fome proportion to the 
 other. Again — put the imaginary cafe, that rational 
 and irrational creatures were of like external iliape and 
 manner ; it is certain, before there were opportunities 
 for the firft to diftinguilh each other, to feparate from 
 their adverfaries, and to form an union among them- 
 felves, they miglit be upon a level, or in feveral re-r 
 fpeds upon great difadvantage, though united they 
 might be vaftly fuperior ; fince union is of fuch effi- 
 cacy, that ten men, united, might be able to accom- 
 
 plilh 
 
Chap. III. Government of God, 113 
 
 plifh what ten thoufand of the fame natural flrength 
 ^nd underflanding, wholly ununited, could not. In 
 this cafe then, brute force might more than maintain 
 its ground againtl reafon, for want of union among 
 the rational creatures. Or fuppofe a number of men 
 to land upon an ifland inhabited only by wild beads, 
 a number of men, who, by the regulations of civil 
 government, the inventions of art, and the experience 
 of fome years, could they be preferved fo long, would 
 be really fufficient to fubdue the wild beads, and to 
 preferve themfelves in fecurity from them ; yet a con- 
 jund:ure of accidents might give fuch advantage to 
 the irrational animals, as that they might at once 
 overpower, and even extirpate, the whole fpecies of 
 rational ones, Length of time then, proper fcope and 
 opportunities for reafon to exert itfelf, may be abfo-<' 
 lutely neceffary to its prevailing oyer brute force. 
 Further flill — there are many inftances of brutes fuc- 
 ceeding in attempts which they could not have un-r 
 dertaken had not their irrational nature rendered them 
 incapable of forefeeing the danger of fuch attempts, 
 or the fury of paflion hindered their attending to it ; 
 and there are inftances of reafon and real prudence 
 preventing men's undertaking what, it hath appeared 
 afterwards, they might have fucceeded in by a lucky 
 raiiinefs. And in certain conjunftures, ignorance 
 and folly, weaknefs and difcord, may have their ad-r 
 vantages. So that rational animals have not necef- 
 farily the fuperiority over irrational ones ; but, hov>r 
 improbable ibever it may be, it is evidently poffiblc, 
 that, in fome globes, the latter may be fuperior. 
 And were the former wholly at variance and difunit- 
 ed, by falfe felf interefl and envy, by treachery ■^nd in- 
 juftice, and confequent rage and mahce againii each 
 other, whilil the latter were firmly united among 
 themfelves by inilind, this might greatly contribute 
 to the introducing fuch an inverted order of things. 
 
 For 
 
114 Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 For every one would conrider it as Inverted, finee rea- 
 fon has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over 
 brute force ; notwithftanding the poflibility it may 
 not prevail, and the neceility which there is of many 
 concurring circumftances to render it prevalent. 
 
 Now I fay, virtue in a fociety has a like tendency 
 to procure fuperiority and additional power, whether 
 this power be confidered as the means of fecurity from 
 oppofite power, or of obtaining other advantages. 
 And it has this tendency, by rendering public ^ood 
 an objed and end to every member of the fociety j 
 by putting every one upon coniideration and diligence, 
 recolledtion and felf government, both in order to fee 
 what is the moil effedual method, and alfo in order 
 to perform their proper part for obtaining and pre- 
 ferving it ; by uniting a fociety within itfelf, and fo 
 increafmg its ftrpngth ; and, which is particularly to 
 be mentioned, unitmg it by means of veracity and juf- 
 tice. For as thefe laft are principal bonds of union, 
 fo benevolence or public fpirit, undirected, unreftrain- 
 ed by them, is, nobody knows what. 
 
 And fuppofe the invifible world, and the invifible 
 difpeniations of Providence, to be in any fort analo- 
 gous to what appears, or that both together make up 
 one uniform fcheme, the two parts of which, the part 
 which we fee, and that which is beyond our obferva- 
 tion, are analogous to each other, then there mufh be 
 a like natural tendency in the derived power, through- 
 out the univerfe, under the diredlion of virtue, to pre- 
 vail in general over that which is not under its protec- 
 tion, as there is in reafon, derived reafon in the uni- 
 verfe, to prevail over brute force. But then, in order 
 to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may aftually pro- 
 duce what it has a tendency to produce, the like concur- 
 rences are neceflary as are to the prevalence of reafon. 
 There mufl be fome proportion between the natural 
 power or force which is, and that which is not, under 
 
 the 
 
.Chap. III. Government of God. 115 
 
 the diredion of virtue ; -there mufl be fufficient -length 
 of time ; for the complete fuccefs of virtue, as of rea- 
 fon, cannot, from the nature of the thing, be other- 
 wile than gradual ; there muft be, as one may fpeak, 
 a fair field of trial, a ftage large and extenfive enough, 
 proper occafions and opportunities, for the virtuous to 
 join together to exert themfelves againft lawlefs force, 
 and to reap the fruit of their united labours. Now 
 indeed it is to be hoped, that the difpioportion be- 
 tween the good and bad, even here on earth, is not fo 
 great but that the former have natural power fufficient 
 to their prevailing to a confiderable degree, if circum- 
 ftances would permit this power to be united. For 
 much lefs, very much lefs power under the direftion of 
 virtue, would prevail over much greater not under the 
 diretlion of it. However, good men over the face of 
 the earth cannot unite, as for other rcafons, fo becaufe 
 they cannot be fufficiently afcertained of each other's 
 charafters. And the known courfe of human things, 
 the fcene we are now paffing thrQugh, particularly the 
 (hortnefs of life, denies to virtue its full fcgpe in feve- 
 ral other refpects. The natural tendency, which we 
 have been confidering, though real, is hindered from 
 being carried into eifed; in the prefent ftate ; but thefs 
 hindrances may be removed in a future one. Virtue, 
 to borrow the Chriftian allufion, is militant here, and 
 various untoward accidents contribute to its being oft- 
 en overborne j but it may combat with greater ad- 
 vantage hereafter, and prevail completely, and enjoy 
 its confequent rewards in fonT.e future ftates. Neg- 
 ledted as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps defpifed and 
 oppreffed here, there may be fcenes in eternity lafting 
 enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford it a 
 fufficient fphere of adion, and a fufficient fphere for 
 the natural confequences of it to follow in fad. If the 
 foul be naturally immortal, and this ifate be a progrefs 
 towards a future one, as childhood is towards mature 
 
ii5 Of the Moral Part L 
 
 age, good men may naturally unite, not only amongft 
 themfelves, but alio with other orders of virtuous crea- 
 tures, in that future (late. For virtue, from the very 
 nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in fome 
 degree, amongf: all v/ho are endued with it, and 
 known to each other ; fo as that by it a good man 
 cannot but recommend himfelf to the favour and pro- 
 tedlion of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole 
 univerfe, who can be acquainted with his charader, 
 and can any way interpofe in h'ls behalf in any part of 
 his duration. And one might add, that fuppofe all 
 this advantageous tendency of virtue to become effedl, 
 amongft one or more orders of creatures, in any dif- 
 tant fcenes and periods, and to be feen by any orders 
 of vicious creatures throughout the univerfal kingdom 
 of God, this happy effedt of virtue would have a ten- 
 dency, by way of example, and pofiibly in other ways, 
 to amend thofe of them who are capable of amend- 
 ment, and being recovered to a jvift fenfe of virtue. 
 If our notions of the plan of Providence were enlarged, 
 in any fort proportionably to what late difcoveries have 
 enlarged our views with refpeft to the material world, 
 reprefentations of this kind v/ould not appear abfurd or 
 extravagant. However, they are not to be taken as 
 intended for a literal delineation of what is in fad the 
 particular fcheme of the univerfe^ which cannot be 
 known without revelation ; for fuppofitions are not to 
 be looked on as true, becaufe not incredible, but they 
 are mentioned to Ihew, that our finding virtue to be 
 hindered from procuring to itfelf fuch iuperiority and 
 advantages is no objedion againft its having, in the 
 effential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure 
 them. And the fuppofitions now mentioned do plain- 
 ly ihew this ; for they fhew that thefe hindrances are 
 fo far from being necelfary, that we ourfelves can eafi- 
 ly conceive how they may be removed in future ftates, 
 and full fcope be granted to virtue. And all thefe ad* 
 
 vantageous 
 
Chap. til. Cover nmcnt of God. 117 
 
 tantageous tendencies of it are to be confidered as dec- 
 larations of God in its favour. This, however, is tak- 
 ing a pretty large compafs ; though it is certain that, 
 as the material world appears to be, in a manner, 
 boundlefs and immenfe, there muft ho. fame fcheme of 
 Providence vaft in proportion to it. 
 
 But let us return to the earth our habitation, and 
 we fhall fee this happy tendency of virtue, by imagin- 
 ing an inftance not lb vaft and remote ; by fuppofing 
 a kingdom or fociety of men upon it, perfectly virtu- 
 ous, for a fuccellion of many ages, to which, if you 
 pleafe, may be given a fituation advantageous for uni- 
 verfal monarchy. In fuch a ftate there v/ould be no 
 fuch thing as faction ; but men of the greateft capac- 
 ity would of courfe, all along, have the chief dire(^ion 
 of affairs willingly yielded to them ; and they would 
 fliare it among themfelves without envy. Each of 
 thefe would have the part afiigned him to which his 
 genius was peculiarly adapted ; and others, who had 
 not any difhinguifhed genius, would be fafe, and think 
 them^feives very happy, by being under the protection 
 and guidance of thofe who had. Public determina- 
 tions would really be the refult of the united vv^ifdom 
 of the community ; and they would faithfully be exe- 
 cuted, by the united ftrength of it. Some would in 
 a higher way contribute, but all would in fome way 
 contribute, to the public profperity ; and in it, each 
 would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as in- 
 juftice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown 
 among themfelves, fo they would be fufficiently fe- 
 cured from it in their neighbours ; for cunning and 
 falfe felf intereft, confederacies in injuftice, ever flight, 
 and accompanied with faction and inteftine treachery ; 
 thefe on one hand would be found mere childiili folly 
 and weaknefs, when fet in oppoiidon againft wifdom, 
 public fpirit, union inviolable, and fidelity en the 
 other ; allowing both a fufficient len2:th of vcars to 
 
 try 
 
T> A--n -»> ■» 
 
 liS Of the Moral Part 
 
 try their force. Add the general influence which fuch 
 a kingdom would have over the face of the earth, by 
 way of example particularly, and the reverence which 
 would be paid it. It would plainly be fuperior to all 
 others, and the world muft gradually come under its 
 empire ; not by means of lawlefs violence, but partly 
 by what muft be allowed to be juft conqueft, and part- 
 ly by other kingdoms fubmitting themfelves volun- 
 tarily to it, throughout a €Ourfe of ages, and claiming 
 its proteftion, one after another, in fucceffive exi- 
 gencies. The head of it would be an univerfal mon- 
 arch, in another fenfe than any mortal has yet been ; 
 and the eaftern ftyle would be literally applicable to 
 him, that all -people^ nations and languages Jlwiild few* 
 Aim. And though indeed our knowledge of human 
 nature, and the whole hiftory of mankind, fhew the 
 impoffibility, without fome miraculous interpolition, 
 that a number of men, here on earth, fhould unite iri 
 one fociety or government, in the fear of God and uni- 
 verfal praflice of virtue ; and that fuch a government 
 fhould continue fo united for a fucceflion of ages ; yet 
 admitting or fuppofmg this, the efFe6t would be as 
 now drawn out. And thus, for inftance, the wonder- 
 ful power and profperity promifed to the Jewifli na- 
 tion in the fcripture, would be, in a great meafure, the 
 confequence of what is predifted of them, — that the 
 people fmdd be all righteous and inherit the land for- 
 ever^* were we to underftand the latter phrafe of a 
 long continuance only, fufficient to give things iirrie 
 to work. The predictions of this kind, for there are 
 many of them, cannot come to pafs in the prefent 
 known courfe of nature ; but fuppofe them come to 
 pafs, and then the dominion and preeminence promif- 
 ed muft naturally follow, to a very confiderable degree. 
 Confider now the general fyftem of religion ; that 
 the government of the world is uniform, and one, and 
 
 moral i 
 
 * Ifai. Ix. 21. 
 
Chap. III. Government of God. 119 
 
 moral ; that virtue and right fhall finally have the ad* 
 vantage, and prevail over fraud and lawlefs force, over 
 the deceits as well as the violence of wickednefs, un« 
 der the conduct of one fupreme Governor j and from, 
 the obfervations above made, it will appear, that God 
 has, by our reafon, given us to fee a peculiar connex- 
 ion in the feveral parts of this fcheme, and a tendency 
 towards the completion of it, arifing out of the very 
 nature of virtue ; which tendency is to be conlidered 
 as fomewhat moral in the effential conftitution of 
 things. If any one lliould think all this to be of lit- 
 tle importance, I defire him to conlider what he would 
 think if vice had, ellentially and in its nature, thefe 
 advantageous tendencies > or if virtue had elTentially 
 the dire<5t contrary ones. 
 
 But it may be objected, that, notwithftanding all 
 thefe natural effefts and thefe natural tendencies of 
 virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout 
 the univerfe, and may go on hereafter, in the fame 
 mixed way sts here at prefent upon earth ; virtue fome- 
 times profperous, fometimes deprefied ; vice fome-^ 
 times punilhed, fometimes fuccefsful. The anfwer to 
 which is, that it is not the purpofe of this chapter, nor 
 of this treatife, properly to prove God's perfed; moral 
 government over the world, or the truth of religion, 
 but to obferve what there is in the conftitution and 
 courfe of nature to confirm the proper proof of it^ 
 fuppofed to be known ; and that the v/eight of the 
 foregoing obfervations to this purpofe may be thus 
 diftindly proved. Pleafure and pain are, indeed, to a 
 certain degree, fay to a very high degree, diftributed 
 amongft us without any apparent regard to the merit 
 or demerit of characters. And were there nothing 
 elfe, concerning this matter, difcernible in the confti- 
 tution and courfe of nature, there would be no ground 
 from the conftitution and courfe of nature, to hope or 
 to fear that men would be rewarded or punifhed here- 
 after 
 
IZQ Of the Moral Part t 
 
 after according to their deferts ; which, however, it is 
 to be remarked, imphes that even then there would be 
 no ground from appearances to think, that vice upon 
 the whole would have the advantage, rather than that 
 virtue would. And thus the proof of a future ftate of* 
 retribution would reft upon the ulual known argu- 
 ments for it ; which are, I think, plainly unanfwera- 
 ble, and would be fo, though there were no additional 
 confirmation of them from the things above infifted 
 on r But thefe things are a very ftrong confirmation 
 of them. For, 
 
 Firfi, They Ihew that the Author of nature is not 
 indifierent to virtue and vice. They amount to a 
 declaration from him, determinate and not to be evad- 
 ed, in favour of one, and againft the other; fach a. 
 declaration, as there is nothing to be let over againft 
 or aniwer, on the part of vice. So that were a man, 
 laying afide the proper proof of religion, to determine 
 from the courfe of nature only, whether it were moft 
 probable that the righteous or the wicked would have 
 the advantage in a future life, there can be no doubt 
 but that he would determine the probability to be, 
 that the former would. The courfe of nature then, 
 in the view of it now given, furniflies us with a real 
 practical proof of the obligations of religion. 
 
 Secondly, When, conformably to what religion 
 teaches us, God fliall reward and punifh virtue and 
 vice, as fuch, fo as that every one Ihall, upon the whole, 
 have his deferts, this diftributive juftice will not be a 
 thing different in kind, but only in degree, from what 
 We experience in his prefent government. It will be 
 that in effe^, towards which we now fee a tendency^ 
 It will be no more than the completion of that morai 
 government, the principles and beginning of which have 
 been Hiewn, beyond all difputc, difcernible in the pref- 
 fent conftitution and courfe of nature. And from 
 hence it follows. 
 
 Thirdly^ 
 
CptAP. III. Gevernment of Qod. 12 1 
 
 Thirdly y That as under the natural government of 
 God, our experience of thofe kinds and degrees of 
 happinefs and mifery which we do experience at pref- 
 ent, gives jufl ground to hope for and to fear higher 
 degrees and other kinds of both in a future Hate, fup- 
 pofing a future flate admitted, io under his moral 
 government, our experience, that virtue and vice are, 
 in the manners above mentioned, actually rewarded 
 and punilhed at prefent, in a certain degree, gives jufh 
 ground to hope and to fear that they 7yiay be rewarded 
 and puniilied in an higher degree hereafter. It is ac- 
 knowledged indeed that this alone is not fufficient 
 ground to think that they (i5itially will be rewarded 
 and punifhed in a higher degree, rather than in a low- 
 er ; but then, 
 
 Lafilyy There is fufficient ground to think fo, from 
 ihe good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For 
 thefe tendencies are eifential, and founded in the na- 
 ture of things, whereas the hindrances to their becom- 
 ing effecl, are, in numberlefs cafes, not neceffary, but 
 artificial only. Now it may be much more flrongly 
 argued, that thefe tendencies, as well as the adlual re- 
 wards and punilhments of virt\ie and vice, which arile 
 diredtiy out of the nature of things, will remain here- 
 after, than that the accidental hindrances of them 
 will. And if thefe hindrances do not remain, thofe 
 rewards and punifliments cannot but be carried on 
 much further towards the perfection of moral govern- 
 jnent, i. e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will be- 
 come effed ; but when, or where, or in v^rhat particu- 
 lar way, cannot be known at all, but by revelation. 
 
 Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral govern- 
 ment implied in God's natural government ; * virtue 
 and vice are naturally rewarded and puniihed as ben- 
 eficial and mifchievous to fociety,-!- and rewarded and 
 puniilied directly as virtue and vice. \ The notion 
 
 I then 
 
 '' p. to;. i P. loj. + P, ip4, &c. 
 
122 Of the Moral Government of God. P A Ff t L 
 
 then of a moral fcheme of government is not fi(^itlous 
 but natural, for it is fuggefted to our thoughts b)^ the 
 eonflitution and eourfe of nature ; and the execution 
 of this fcheme is adlually begun, in the inftances here 
 mentioned.' And thefe things are to be confidered as 
 a declaration of the Author of nature for virtue and 
 againft vice ; they give a credibility to the fuppoiition 
 of their being rewarded and puniflied hereafter, and 
 alfo ground to hope and to fear that they may be re- 
 warded and punifhed in higher degrees than they are 
 here. And as all this is confirmed, fo the argument 
 for religion from the eonftitution and eourfe of nature 
 is carried on farther, by obferving, tlmt there are nat* 
 ural tendencies, and, in innumerable cafes, only artifi- 
 cial hindrances, to this moral fcheme^s being carried 
 on much farther towards perfedliion than it is at pref- 
 ent.* The notion then of a moral fcheme of govern-* 
 ment much more perfe^b than wh-a.4: is feen, is not a 
 fiftitious but a natural notion, for it- is fuggefted to 
 our thoughts by the eflential tendencies of virtue and 
 vice. And thefe tendencies are k) be confidered as in- 
 timations, as imphcit promifes and threatenings from 
 the Authod- of nature, of irtuch greater rewards and 
 punifliments to follow virtue and vice than do at pref-* 
 ent. And indeed, every natural tendency which is to 
 continue, but which is hindered from becoming effeft 
 by only accidental caufes, affords a prefumption that 
 fuch tendency will, fome time or other, become effe£t 5 
 a prefumption in degree proportionable to the length 
 of the duration through which fuch tendency will con- 
 tinue. And from thefe things together arifes a real 
 prefumption, that the moral fcheme of government 
 eilabhfhed in nature fiiall be carried on much farther 
 towards perfeftion hereafter, and, I think, a prefump- 
 tion that it will be abfolutely completed. But from 
 thefe things, joined with the moral nature which God 
 
 has 
 
 * Pr III, he. 
 
C S A P . I V. Of a State of Trial 123 
 
 has given us, confidered as given us by him, arifes a 
 praftical proof* that it will be completed ; a proof 
 from fa6t, and therefore a difbin6t one from that which 
 is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, 
 the fitnefs and unfitnefs of adions. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 X)f a State of Probation, as implving Trial, Difficulties 
 and Danger. 
 
 X HE general doftrine of religion, that 
 our prefent life is a fbate of probation for a future one, 
 comprehends under it feveral particular things diflindt 
 from each other. But the firft and moft common 
 meaning of it feems to be, that our future interefb is 
 now depending, and depending upon ourfelves ; that 
 we have fcope and opportunities here for that good 
 and bad behaviour, which God will reward and punilh. 
 hereafter ; together with temptations to one, as well 
 as inducements of reafon to the other. And this is, 
 in great meafure, the fame with faying, that we are un- 
 der the moral government of God, and to give an ac- 
 count of our actions to him.. For the notion of a 
 future account and general righteous judgment im- 
 plies fome fort of temptations to what is wrong, oth- 
 erwife there would be no moral poffibility of doing 
 wrong, nor ground for judgment or difcrimination. 
 But there is this difference, that the word probation is 
 more diilinflly and particularly expreffive of allure- 
 ments to wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly 
 ro what is right, and of the danger of mifcariying by 
 fuch temptations, than the" words moral government. 
 
 I 2 A ftate 
 
 * See this proof drawn out briefly, Ch. vi. 
 
124 <y ^ State of TriaL P a R t I. 
 
 A ftate of probation then, as thus particularly imply- 
 ing in it trial, difficulties and danger, may require to 
 be coniidered diftinftly by itfelf. 
 
 And as the moral: government of God, which re- 
 ligion teaches us, implies that we are in a ftate of tri- 
 al with regard to a future world, fo alfo his natural 
 government over us implies that we are in a ftate of 
 trial in the like fenfe with regard to the prefent world- 
 Natural government by rewards and puniftiments as 
 much implies natural trial as moral government does 
 moral trial. The natural government of God here 
 meant,* confifts in his annexing pleafure to fome ac- 
 tions and pain to others, which arc in our power to 
 do or forbear, and in giving us notice of fuch appoint- 
 ment beforehand. This necefTirily implies, that he 
 has made our happinefs and mifery, or our intereft, to 
 depend in part upon ourfelves. And fo far as men- 
 have temptations to any courfe of ad:ion which wil! 
 probably occalion them greater temporal inconveni- 
 ence and uneafxiiefs than fatisfa£tion, fo far their tem- 
 poral intereft is in danger from themfelves, or they 
 are in a ftate of trial with refpeft to it. Now people 
 often blame others, and even themfelves^ f^r their mif- 
 condud; in their temporal concerns. And we find 
 many are greatly wanting to themfelves, and mifs of 
 that natural happinefs which they might have obtain- 
 ed in the prefent life ; perhaps every one does in fome 
 degree. But many run themfelves into great incon- 
 venience, and into extreme diftrefs and mifery ; not 
 through incapacity of knowing better, and doing bet- 
 ter for themfelves, which would be nothing to the 
 prefent purpofe, but through their own fault. And 
 thefe things neceffarily imply temptation, and danger 
 of mifcarrying, in a greater or lefs degree, with relpe(ft 
 to our worldly intereft or happinefs. Every one too, 
 without having religion in his thoughts, fpeaks of the 
 
 hazards 
 
 * Ch, ii. 
 
Chap. IV. Of a State of Wtah ii^ 
 
 hazards which young people run, upon their fetting 
 out in the world j hazards from other caufes than 
 merely »their ignorance and unavoidable accidents. 
 And fome courfes of vice, at leaft, being contrary to 
 men's worldly intereft or good, temptations to thefe 
 muft at the fame time be temptations to forego our 
 prefent and our future intereft. Thus in our natural 
 or temporal capacity we are in a flate of trial, i. e. of 
 ^difficulty and danger analogous or like to our moral 
 and religious trial. 
 
 This will more diftin^lly appear to any one who 
 thinks it worth while more diftinftly to confider 
 what it is which conftitutes our trial in both capaci- 
 ties, and to obferve how mankind behave under it. 
 
 And that which conftitutes this our trial, in both 
 thefe capacities, muft be fomewhat either in our ex- 
 ternal circumftances, or in our nature. For, on the 
 one hand, perfons may be betrayed into wrong be- 
 haviour upon furprife, or overcome upon any other 
 very fingular and extraordinary external occaiions, who 
 would otiijerwile have preferved their charafter of pru- 
 dence and of virtue ; in which cafes, every one, in 
 (peaking of the wrong behaviour of thefe perfons, 
 would impute it to fuch particular external circum- 
 ftances : And on the other hand, men who have con- 
 tracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have 
 fome particular paffions in excefs, will feek opportu- 
 nities, and, as it were, go out c^ their way to gratify 
 themfelves in thefe refpefts, at the expenfe of their 
 wifdom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one would 
 fay, not by external temptations, but by fuch habits 
 and paflions. And the account of this laft cafe is, 
 that particular paflions are no more coincident with 
 prudence, or that reafonable feif love, the end of which 
 is our worldly intereft, than they are with the princi- 
 ple of virtue and religion, but often draw contrary 
 ■ways to one as well as to the other 5 and fo fuch par- 
 ticular 
 
126 Of a State of Trial. Part I. 
 
 ticular paflions are as much temptations to aft im- 
 prudently with regard to our worldly intereft, as to aft 
 vicioully.* However, as when we fay, men are mif- 
 led by external circumftances of temptation, it cannot 
 but be underflood that there is fomewhat within 
 themfelves to render thofe circumftances temptations, 
 or to render them fufceptible of imprefTions from 
 them ; fo when we fay, they are mifled by paffions, 
 it is always fuppofed that there are occafions, circum- 
 ftances and objefts, exciting thefe paffions, and afford- 
 ing means for gratifying them. And therefore, 
 temptations from within and from without coincide 
 and mutually imply each other. Now the feveral 
 external objefts of the appetites, paffions and affec- 
 tions being prefent to the lenfes, or offering themfelves 
 to the mind, and fo exciting emotions fuitable to 
 their nature, not only in cafes where they can be grat- 
 ified confiftently with innocence and prudence, but 
 alfo in cafes where they cannot, and yet can be grati- 
 fied imprudently and vicioufly ; this as really puts 
 them in danger of voluntarily foregoing their prefent 
 intereft or good as their future, and as really renders 
 felf denial as neceffary to fecure one as the other ; i. e. 
 ■we are in a like ftate of trial with refpeft to both, by 
 the very fame paffions, excited by the very fame 
 means. Thus mankind having a temporal intereft 
 depending upon themfelves, and a prudent courfe of 
 behaviour being neceffary to fecure it, paffions inor- 
 dinately excited, whether by means of example, or by 
 any other external circumftance, towards flich objefts, 
 at liTch times, or in fuch degrees, as that they cannot 
 be gratified confiftently with worldly prudence, are 
 temptations, dangerous and too often fuccefsful temp- 
 tations, to forego a greater temporal good for a lefs ; 
 i. e. to forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal 
 
 intereft, 
 
 * See Sermons preached at the Ro/is, 1716. zd. Ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 
 25, (sfc, Serm. p. 21, ^c 
 
Crr A p . I V . Of a State' of Trial. iij 
 
 intereft, for the fake of a prefent gratification. This 
 is a defcription of our ftate of trial in our temporal ea-> 
 pacity. Subftitute now the \NOxd futitre for temporal, 
 and virtue for prudence^ and it will be juft as proper a 
 defcription of our ftate of trial in our religious capac- 
 ity ; fo analogous are they to each other. 
 
 If, fi'om confideration of this our like ftate of trial' 
 m both capacities, we go on to obferve farther how 
 mankind behave under it, we fliall find there are fome 
 •who have fo little fenfe of it that they fcarce look be- 
 yond the pafiing day ; they are fo taken up with pref- 
 ent gratifications as to have^ in a manner, no feeling 
 of confequences, no regard to their future eafe or for- 
 tune in this life, any more than to their happinefs in 
 another. Some appear to be blinded and deceived by 
 inordinate pafTion in their worldly concerns as much 
 as in religion. Others are not deceived, but as it were 
 forcibly carried away by the like pafTions, againft their 
 better judgment and feeble refolutions too of a^iing 
 better. And there are men, and truly they are not a 
 few, who lliamelefsly avow, not their intereft, but their 
 mere will and pleafure, to be tlieir law of life, and who, 
 in open defiance of every thing that is reafonable, will 
 go on in a courfe of vicious extravagance, forefeeing, 
 with no remorfe and fittle fear, that it will be their 
 temporal ruin, and fome of them under the apprehen- 
 fion of the conlequences of wickednefs in another 
 ftate. And to fpeak in the moft moderate way, hur 
 man creatures are not only continually liable to go 
 wrong voluntarily, but we (ee hkewife that they often 
 adtually do fo, with refped to their temporal interefts 
 as well as with refpeft to religion. 
 
 Thus our difiiculties and dangers, or our trials, in 
 our temporal and our religious capacity, as they pro- 
 ceed from the fame caufes, and have the fame effeft 
 upon men's behaviour, are evidently analogous and' 
 of the fame kind, 
 
 It 
 
128 Of a State of TriaL P ar t I. 
 
 It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers 
 of mifcarrying in our rehgious ftate of trial are greatly 
 increaied, and one is ready to think in a manner wholly 
 made^ by the ill behaviour of others ; by a wrong edu- 
 cation, wrong in a moral fenfe, fometimes pofitively 
 vicious ; by general bad example ; by the difhoneft 
 artifices which are got into bufmefs of all kinds ; and, 
 in very many parts of the world, by religion's being 
 corrupted into fuperftitions, which indulge men in 
 their vices ; fo in like manner, the difficulties of con- 
 ducing ourfelves prudently in refpedt to our prefent 
 intereft, and our danger of being led afide from purfu- 
 ing it, are greatly increafed by a foolifli education ; 
 and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance 
 and careleflhefs of others whom we have intercourfe 
 with, and by miftaken notions, very generally preva- 
 knt, and taken up from common opinion, concerning 
 temporal happinefs, and wherein it confifls. And per- 
 fons, by their own negligence and folly in their tem- 
 poral affairs, no lefs than by a courfe of vice, bring 
 themfelves into new difficulties, and, by habits of in- 
 dulgence, become lefs qualified to go through them ; 
 and one irregularity after another embarralTes things 
 to fuch a degree, that they know not whereabout 
 they are, and often makes the path of condud fo in- 
 tricate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace it 
 out, difficult even to determine what is the prudent 
 or the moral part. Thus, for inftance, wrong beha- 
 viour in one ftage of life, youth ; wrong, I mean, con- 
 fidering ourfelves only in our temporal capacity, with- 
 out taking in religion ; this, in feveral ways, increafes 
 the difficulties of right behaviour in mature age ; i. e. 
 puts us into a more difadvantageous {late of trial in 
 our temporal capacity. 
 
 We are an inferior part of the creation of God. 
 There are natural appearances of our being in a ftate 
 of degradation. And we certainly arc in a condition, 
 
 which 
 
Chap. IV. Of a State of TdaL 12.9 
 
 which does not feem, by any means, the mod advanta- 
 geous we could imagine or deiire, either in our natural 
 or moral capacity, for fecuring either our prefent or 
 future intereft. However, this condition, low and 
 careful and uncertain as it is, does not atford any jufi 
 ground of complaint. For, as men may manage their 
 temporal affairs with prudence, and fo pafs their days 
 here on earth in tolerable eafe and fatisfacftiun, by a 
 moderate degree of care, fo likewife with regard to re- 
 ligion, there is no more required than what they are 
 well able to do, and what they muft be greatly want- 
 ing to themfeives if they negleft. And for perlbns 
 to have that put upon them which they are well able 
 to go through, and no more, we naturally coniidcr as 
 an equitable thing, fuppofmg it done by proper au- 
 thority. Nor have we any more reafon to complain 
 of it, with regard to the Author of nature, than of 
 his not having given us other advantages, belonging 
 to other orders of creatures. 
 
 But the thing here infifled upon is, that the (late of 
 trial, which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered 
 credible by its being throughout uniform and of a 
 piece with the general conduct of Providence towards 
 us, in all other refpevls within the compafs of our 
 knowledge. Indeed if mankind, confidered in their 
 natural capacity, as inhabitants of this world only, 
 found themfeives, from their birth to their death, in a 
 fettled flate of fecurity and happinefs, without any fo^ 
 licitude or thought of their ovv^n ; or if they were in 
 no danger of being brought into inconveniences and 
 difhrefs, by careleffnefs, or the folly of pafTion, through 
 bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful 
 appearances of things j were this our natural condi- 
 tion, then it might feem ftrange, and be fome pre- 
 fumption againfl the truth of religion, that it repre- 
 ients our future and more general interef!:, as not ie- 
 cure -of GovKifej biU as -depending upon our behaviour, 
 
 and 
 
l-jo Of a State of Trial. Part I. 
 
 and requiring recolledion and felf government to ob- 
 tain it. For it might be alleged, " What you fay is 
 our condition in one reipedl is not in any wife of a fort 
 with what we find, by experience, our condition is in 
 another. Our whole preient intereft is fecured to our 
 hands, without any folicitude of ours ; and why fliould 
 not our future intereft, if we have any fuch, be fo 
 too ?" But iince, on the contrary, thought and con- 
 fideration, the voluntary denying ourfelves many 
 things which we defire, and a courfe of behaviour far 
 from being always agreeable to us, are abfolutely nec- 
 elTary to our adling even a common decent and com- 
 mon prudent part, fo as to pafs with any fatisfadiion 
 through the prefent world, and be received upon any 
 tolerable good terms in it ; Iince this is the cafe, all 
 prefumption againft felf denial and attention being 
 neceffary to fecure our higher intereft, is removed. 
 Had we not experience, it might, perhaps fpecioufly, 
 be urged, that it is improbable any kind of hazard 
 and danger fhould be put upon us by an infinite Be- 
 ing, when every thing which is hazard and danger in 
 our manner of conception, and will end in error, con- 
 fufion and mifery, is now already certain in his fore- 
 knovv'ledge. And indeed, why any thing of hazard 
 and danger fliould be put upon fuch frail creatures as 
 we are, may well be thought a difficulty in fpecula- 
 tion, and cannot but be fo till we know the whole, or, 
 however, much more of the cafe. But ftill the con- 
 ftitution of nature is as it is. Our happinefs and mif- 
 ery are trufted to our condu£t, and made to depend 
 upon it. Somewhat, and in many circumftances a 
 great deal too, is put upon us, either to do or to fuf- 
 ter, as we choofe. And all the various miferies of life 
 which people bring upon themfelves by negligence 
 and folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are 
 inftances of this ; which miferies are beforehand juft 
 as contingent and undetermined as their cojiduft, and 
 left to be determined by it. Thefe 
 
 '/ 
 
C H A P . V . Of a State of Moral Difclpline. 1 3 t 
 
 Thefe obfervations are an anfwer to the objections 
 ag;ainft the credibihty of a flate of trial, as implying 
 temptations, and real danger of mifcarrying with re- 
 gard to our general intereft, under the moral govern-: 
 ment of God ; and they fhew that, if we are at all to 
 be confidered in fuch a capacity, and as having fuck 
 an intereft, the general analogy of Providence muft 
 lead us to apprehend ourielves in danger of mifcarry- 
 ing, in different degrees, as to this intereft, by our 
 neglecting to adt the proper part belonging to us in 
 that capacity. F^or we have a prefent intereft, under 
 the government of God which we experience here upon 
 earth. And this intereft, as it is not forced upon us,- 
 fo neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our 
 acquifition, in fuch fort as that we are in danger of 
 miffing it, by means of temptations to negled:, or 
 a6t contrary to it ; and without attention and felf 
 denial muft and do mifs of it. It is then perfectly 
 credible that this may be our cafe, with refpedt to that 
 chief and final good which religion propofes to us. 
 
 C H A P. V. 
 
 Of a State of Probation^ as intended for Moral Dfci- 
 pline and Improvement. 
 
 JCROM the conlideration of our being 
 in a probation ftate, of fo much difficulty and hazard, 
 naturally arifes the queftion, how we came to be placed 
 in it. But fuch a general inquiry as this would be 
 found involved in inluperable difficulties. For though 
 fome of thefe difficulties would be leffened, by obferv- 
 ing that all wickednefs is voluntary, as is implied in 
 its very notion, and that many of the miferies of life 
 
 have 
 
ij? Of a State of Part L 
 
 have apparent good eflTeds, yet when we confider other 
 circumftanc€s belonging to both, and what muft be 
 thfe confequence of the former in a life to come, it 
 cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and prefump- 
 tion to pretend to give an account of the whole realbns 
 of this matter j the whole reafons of our being allot- 
 ted a condition, out of which fo much wickednefs and' 
 mifery, fo circumftanced, would in fad arife. Wheth- 
 er it be not beyond our faculties, not only to find out, 
 but even to underiland, the whole account of this ; or, 
 though we fhould be fuppofed capable of underfland-' 
 ing it, yet, whether it would be of fervice or prejudice 
 to us to be informed of it, is impoffible to fay. But 
 as our prefent condition can in no wife be (hewn in- 
 confiftent with the peifed: moral government of God, 
 fo religion teaches us we were placed in it that we 
 might qualify ourfelves, by the praftice of virtue, for 
 another flate v/hich is to follow it. And this, though 
 but a partial anfwer, a very partial one indeed, to the 
 inquiry now mentioned, yet is a more fatisfaftory an- 
 fwer to another, which is of real, and of the utmofl 
 importance to us to have aniwered, — the inquiry. 
 What is our bufinefs here ? The known end, then, 
 why we are placed in a ftate of fo much affliftion, 
 hazard and difficulty, is, our improvement in virtue 
 and piety, as the requifite qualification for a future 
 llate of fecurity and happinefs. 
 
 Now the beginning of life, confidered as an educa- 
 tion for mature age in the prefent world, appears plain- 
 Jy, at firfl fight, analogous to this our trial for a future 
 one ; the former being in our temporal capacity, what 
 the latter is in our religious capacity. But fome ob- 
 servations common to both of them, and a more dif- 
 tinct confideration of each, v/ili more diftin6tiy lliew 
 the extent and force of the analogy between them, and 
 the credibility which arifes from hence, as well as fr^m 
 
 the 
 
CiiAP. V. Mcrai DifcipKne. 133 
 
 the nature of tlie thing, that the prefent life was in- 
 tended to be a ftate of difcipline for a future one. 
 
 I. Every ipecies of creatures is, we i'ee, deligned for 
 a particular way of life ; to V\rhich the nature, the ca- 
 pacities, temper, and quahfications of each fpecies, are 
 as neceffary as their external circumftjmces. Both 
 come into the notion of fuch ftate, or particular way 
 of hfe, and are conilituent parts of it. Change a 
 man's capacities or charafter, to the degree in which 
 it is conceivable they may be changed, and he would 
 be altogether incapable of a human courfe of life, and 
 human happinefs ; as incapable as if, his nature con- 
 tinuing unchanged, he were placed in a v/orid where 
 he had no fphere of aftion, nor any obje^s to anfwer 
 his appetites, paftions, and aifections of any fort. One 
 thing is fet over againfl another, as an ancient writer 
 expreffes it. Our nature correfponds to our external 
 condition : Without this correfpondence, there would 
 be no poflibility of any fuch thing as human life and 
 human happinefs ; which life and happinefs are, there- 
 fore, ^ refult from our nature and condition jointly; 
 meaning by human life, not living in the literal fenfe, 
 but the whole complex notion commonly underftood 
 by thofe words. So that without determining what 
 will be the employraent and happinefs, the particular 
 hfe of good men hereafter, there muft be fome deter- 
 minate capacities, fome neceffary charafter and qual- 
 ifications, without which perfons cannot but be utterly 
 incapable of it ; in like manner as there muft be fome, 
 without which men would be incapable of their pref- 
 ent ftate of life. Now, 
 
 II. The conftitution .of hum.an creatures, and in- 
 deed of all creatures which come under our notice, is 
 fuch, as that they are capable of naturally becoming- 
 qualified for ftates of life, for which they were once 
 v/holly uhqualified. In imagination we may indeed 
 conceive of creatures as incapable of having any of 
 
 their 
 
134 ■ Q/" ^ ^^"f^ of Part I. 
 
 their faculties naturally enlarged, or as being unable 
 naturally to acquire any new qualifications j but the 
 'faculties of every fpecies known to us are made for 
 enlargement, for acquirements of experience and hab* 
 ■its. We find ourfelves in particular endued with ca- 
 pacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of knowl- 
 edge or perceiving truth, but alfo of floring up our 
 ideas and knowledge by memory* We are capable, 
 not only of afting, and of having different momentary 
 imprelTions made upon us, but of getting a new fa- 
 cihty in any kind of action, and of fettled alterations 
 in our temper or charadler. The power of the two 
 ;laft is the power of habits ; but neither the percep- 
 •tion of ideas, nor knowledge of any fort, are habits, 
 though abfolutely necelTary to the forming of them. 
 However, apprehenfion, reafon, memory, which are 
 the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly im- 
 proved by exercife. Whether the word kabii is ap- 
 plicable to all thefe improvements, and in particular 
 Low far the powers of memory and of habits may be 
 powers of the fame nature, I fliall not inquire. But 
 that perceptions come into our minds readily and of 
 courfe, by means of their having been there before, 
 feems a thing of the fame fort as readinefs in any par- 
 ticular kind of adlion, proceeding from being accuf- 
 tomed to it. And aptnefs to recoiled pradical ob- 
 fervations of fervice in our conduft, is plainly habit in 
 many cafes. There are habits of perception, and hab- 
 its of adion. An inflance of the former is our con- 
 ftant and even involuntarily readinefs, in correfting 
 the imprefTions of our fight concerning magnitudes 
 and diftances, fo as to fubftitute judgment in the room 
 of fenfation imperceptibly to ourfelves. And it feems 
 as if all other alTociations of ideas not naturally con- 
 neded, might be called pafTive habits, as properly as 
 our readinefs in underftanding languages upon fight, 
 or hearing of words. And our readinefs in fpeaking 
 
 and 
 
Chap. V. Moral D if cipline. 135 
 
 and writing tliem is an inftance of the latter, of a6bive 
 habits. For diftindnefs, we may confider habits as 
 belonging to the body or the mind ; and the latter 
 will be explained by the former. Under the former 
 are comprehended all bodily activities or motions, 
 whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to 
 ule ; under the latter, general habits of life and con- 
 duct, fuch as thcrfe of obedience and fubmiffion to au- 
 thority, or to any particular perfon ; thofe of veracit}'^, 
 juftice and charity ; thofe of attention, induftrV, felf 
 government, envy, revenge.^ And habits of this latter 
 kind feem produced by repeated a6^s, as well as the 
 former. And in like manner as habits belonging tc* 
 the body are produced by external a6i:s, fo habits of 
 the mind are produced by the exertion of inward 
 practical principles, i. e. by carrying them into a£l, or 
 acting upon them j the principles of obedience, of ve- 
 racity, juftice and charity. Nor can thofe habits be 
 formed by any external courfe of a6tion, othervvife 
 than as it proceeds from thefe principles ; becaufe it is 
 only thefe inward principles exerted, which are ftridly 
 adls of obedience, of veracity, of juftice, and of charity. 
 So likewife habits of attention, induftry, felf govern- 
 ment, are in the fame manner acquired by exereife ; 
 and habits of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether 
 in outward aft, or in thought and intention, i. e. in- 
 ward aft ; for fuch intention is an aft. Refolutions 
 alio to do well, are properly afts. And endeavouring 
 to enforce upon our own minds a practical fenfe of 
 virtue, or to beget in others that praftical fenfe of it 
 which a man really has himfelf, is a virtuous aft. All 
 thefe, therefore, may and will contribute towards 
 forming good habits. But going over the theory of 
 virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine 
 piftures of it, — this is fo far from neceffarily or cer- 
 tainly conducing to form an habit of it, in him who 
 thus employs himfelf, that it may harden the mind ia 
 
 a contrary 
 
ijo Of a State of T^art L 
 
 a contrary courle, and render it gradually more inlen- 
 fible, i. c. form an habit of infenfibility to all moral 
 confiderations. For, from om: very faculty of habits, 
 pafTive irapreilions, by being repeated, grow weaker^ 
 Thoughts, by often palling through the mind, are felt 
 lefs fenfibly ; being accuftomed to danger begets in- 
 trepidity, i. e. leffens fear ; to diftrefs, leffens the paf- 
 lion of pity ; to inftances of others' mortality, leffen^ 
 the fenfible apprehenfion of our own. And from 
 thefe two obfervations together, — that practical habits 
 are formed and ftrengthened by repeated a6\:s, and that 
 paffive impreffions grow weaker by being repeated up- 
 on us, — it mufl follow, that aftive habits may be 
 gradually forming and ftrengthening, by a courfe of 
 acting upon fuch and fuch motives and excitements, 
 Vvhilil thefe motives and excitements themfelves are, 
 by proportionable degrees, growing kfs fenfible, i. e. 
 are continually lefs and lefs fenfibly felt, even as the 
 adbive habits flrengthen. And experience confirms 
 this ; for a<5tive principles, at the very time that they 
 are lefs lively in perception than they were, are found 
 to be, feme how, wrought more thoroughly into the 
 temper and character, and become more efFedtual in 
 influencing our praftice. The three things juft men- 
 tioned, may afford inftances of it. Perception of dan- 
 ger is a natural excitement of paflive fear, and aSive 
 caution ; and by being inured to danger, habits of the 
 latter are gradually wrought, at the fame time that 
 the former gradually lefiens. Perception of diflrefs in 
 others is a natural excitem.ent, pafiively to pity, and 
 actively to relieve it ; but let a man fet himfelf to at- 
 tend to, inquire out, and relieve diftrelTed perlbns, and 
 he cannot but grow lefs and lefs fenfibly affedted with 
 the various miferies of life with which he muft become 
 acquainted, when yet at the fame time benevolence, 
 confidered not as a pafTion, but as a praftical principle 
 of action, will Ibengthen ; and whiiil he pafTively com- 
 
 pafTionates 
 
ChAP.V. Moral D if cipline. 23 7 
 
 paffionates the diftreffed lefs, he will acquire a greater 
 aptitude adlively to affifl and befriend them. So aUb 
 at the fame time that the daily inflances of men's dy- 
 ing around us give us daily a lefs fenfible paffive feel- 
 ing or apprehenfion of our own mortality, fuch in- 
 ftances greatly contribute to the ftrengthening a prac- 
 tical regard to it in ferious men, i. e. to forming an 
 habit of acting with a conftant view to it. And this 
 feems again farther to Ihew, that paffive impreffions 
 made upon our minds by admonition, experience, ex- 
 ample, though they may have a remote efficacy, and 
 a very great one, towards forming adive habits, yet 
 can have this efficacy no otherwife than by inducing 
 us to fuch a courfe of action ; and that it is, not be- 
 ing affe<5ted fo and fo, but a<5ting, which forms thofe 
 habits ; only it muft be always remembered, that real 
 endeavours to enforce good impreffions upon ourfelves, 
 are a fpecies of virtuous a£tion. Nor do we know 
 how far it is poffiible, in the nature of things, that ef- 
 fe6ts fliould be wrought in us at once, equivalent to 
 habits, i. e. what is wrought by ufe and exercife. 
 However, the thing infifled upon is, not what may be 
 poffible, but what is in fadt the appointment of nature; 
 which is, that aftive habits are to be formed by exer- 
 cife. Their progrefs may be fo gradual as to be im- 
 perceptible in its fteps ; it may be hard to explain the 
 faculty by which we are capable of habits throughout 
 its feveral parts, and "to trace it up to its original, fo 
 as to diftinguifli it from all others in our mind ; and 
 it feems as if contrary effects were to be afcribed to it. 
 But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to 
 yield, in fome fuch manner as this, to ufe andexercife, 
 is matter of certain experience. 
 
 Thus, by accuftoming ourfelves to any courfe of 
 aftion, we get an aptnefs to go on, a facility, readinefs, 
 and often pleafure in it. The incHnations which ren- 
 dered us averfe to it grow weaker ; the difficulties in 
 
 K it. 
 
138 Of a State of ?art fl- 
 
 it, not oiily the imaginary but the real ones, lefTen ; 
 the reafons for it offer themfelves of courfe to our 
 thoughts upon all occafions, and the lead gllmpfe of 
 them is fufficient to make us go on in a courfe of ac- 
 tion to which we have been accuftomed. And prac- 
 tical principles appear to grow ftronger abfolutely in 
 themfelves by exercife, as well as relatively with re- 
 gard to contrary principles, which, by being accuf- 
 tomed to fubmit, do fo habitually and of courfe. And 
 thus a new character in feveral refpects may be form- 
 ed, and many habitudes of life not given by nature, 
 but which nature direds us to acquire. 
 
 Hi. Indeed we may be aflured, that we fhould 
 never have had thefe capacities of improving by expe- 
 rience, acquired knowledge and habits, had they not 
 been neceflary, and intended to be made ufe of. And 
 accordingly we find them fo neceflary, and fo much 
 intended, that without them we fliould be utterly in- 
 tapable of that which was the end for which we were 
 made, confidered in our temporal capacity only, the 
 employments and fatisfaftions of our mature ilate of 
 life. 
 
 Nature does in no wife qualify us wholly, much lefs 
 at once, for this mature ftate of life. Even maturity 
 of underftanding and bodily ftrength are not only ar- 
 rived to gradually, but are alfo very much owing to the 
 continued exercife of our powers of body and mind, 
 from infancy. But if we fuppofe a perfon brought into 
 the world with both thefe in m.aturity, as far as this is 
 conceivable, he would plainly at firft be as unqualified 
 for the human life of mature age as an idiot. He 
 would be in a manner diftrafted with aftonilhment, 
 and apprehenfion, and curiofity, and fufpenfe ; nor can 
 one guefs how long it would be before he would be 
 familiarized to himfelf, and the objeds about him, 
 enough even to fet himfelf to anything. It may be 
 queftioned too, wlicther the natural information of his 
 
 fight 
 
v ■ 
 
 Chap. V. Moral l)tfcipline. 13^ 
 
 fight and hearing ;vduld be of any manner of ufe at all 
 to him in acting, before experience. And it feems, 
 that men would be ftrangely headftrong and felf will- 
 ed, and difpofed to exert themfelves with an impetuofi- 
 ty which would render fociety infupportable, and the 
 living in it impra(3:icable, were it not for fome acquir- 
 ed moderation and felf government, fome aptitude 
 d,nd readinefs in reftraining themfelves, and conceal- 
 ing their fenfe of things. Want of every thing of 
 this kind which is learnt, would render a man as un - 
 capable of fociety as want of language would, or as 
 his natural ignorance of any of the particular employ- 
 ments of life would render him uncapaple of provid- 
 ing himfelf with the common conveniences, or fup- 
 plying the necelTar}'' wants of it. In thefe refpects, 
 and probably in many more, of which we have no par- 
 ticular notion, mankind is left by nature an unform- 
 ed, unfinilljed creature, utterly deficient and unquali- 
 fied, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience 
 and habits, for that mature ftate of life which was the 
 end of his creation, conlidering him as related only to 
 this world. 
 
 But then, as nature has endued us with a power of 
 fupplying thofe deficiencies by acquired knowledge, 
 experience and habits, fo likewife we are placed in a 
 condition, in infancy, childhood and youth, fitted for 
 it ; fitted for our acquiring thofe qualifications of all 
 fortS) which we ftand in need of in mature age. 
 Hence children, from their very birth, are daily grow- 
 ing acquainted with the objefts about them, with the 
 fcene in v/hich they are placed and to have a future 
 part, and learning fomewhat or other neceflary to the 
 performance of it. Th^ fubordinations to which they 
 are accuftomed in domeftic life, teach them felf gov- 
 ernment in common behaviour abroad, and prepare 
 them for fubjeftion and obedience to civil authority. 
 What pafles before their eyes, and daily happens to 
 K 2 them. 
 
i'40 Of a State of Part L 
 
 them, gives them experience, caution agalnil treache- 
 ry and deceit, together with numberlefs Httle rules of 
 aftion and condu6t, which we could not live without, 
 and which are learnt fo infenfibly and fo perfe6tly as to 
 be miftaken perhaps for inftinft, though they are the 
 effed: of long experience and exercife, as much fo as 
 language, or knowledge in particular bufinefs, or the 
 qualifications and behaviour belonging to the feveral 
 ranks and profeffions. Thus the beginning of our 
 days is adapted to be, and is, a flate of education in 
 the theory and pra£lice of mature life. We are much 
 affifted in it by example, inftruAion, and the care of 
 others ; but a great deal is left to ourfelves to do. 
 And of this, as part is done eafily and of courfe, fo- 
 part requires diligence and care, the voluntary forego- 
 /ing many things which we defire, and fet ting ourfelves 
 to what we fliould have no inclination to, but for the 
 necefilty or expedience of it. For, that labour and 
 induflry which the ftation of fo many abfolutely re- 
 quires, they would be greatly unqualified for in ma- 
 turity, as thofg in other flations v/ould be for any oth- 
 er forts of application, if both were not accuflomed ta 
 them in their youth. And according as perfons be- 
 have themfelves, in the general education which all 
 go through, and in the particular ones adapted to par- 
 ticular employments, their character is formed and 
 made appear ; they recommend themfelves more or 
 lefs, and are capable of and placed in different flations 
 in the fociety of mankind. 
 
 The former part of life then is to be confidered a?- 
 an important opportunity which nature puts into our 
 hands, and which, when loft, is not to be recovered. 
 And our being placed in a ftate of difcipline through- 
 out this life for another world, is a providential difpo- 
 fition of things, exadly of the fame kind as our being 
 placed in a ftate of difcipline during childhood, for 
 mature age. Our condition in both refpeds is uni- 
 form 
 
Chap. V. Moral DlJcipUne. 141 
 
 form and of a piece, and comprehended under one 
 and the fame general law of nature. 
 
 And if we were not able at all to difcern how or in 
 what way the prefent life coyld be our preparation for 
 another, this would be no obje,Q:ion againll the credi- 
 bility of its being fo. For we do not difcern how 
 food and fleep contribute to the growth of the bod3% 
 nor could have any thought that they would before we 
 had experience. Nor ido children at "all think, on the 
 -One hand, that the fports and exercifes to which they 
 are fo much addidted contribute to their health and 
 .growth ; nor on the other, ef the neceflity which there 
 is for their being reflrained in them ; nor are they 
 capable of underlianding the ufe of many parts of dlf- 
 cipline, which neverthelefs they muft be made to go 
 througli, in order to qualify them for the bufinefs of 
 mature age. Were we not able then to difcover, in 
 what refpecis the prefent life could form us for a fu- 
 ture one, yet nothing v;ould be more fuppofeable 
 than that it might, in fome refpecis or other, from 
 the genera! analogy of Providence. And this, for 
 ought I fee, might reafonably be faid, even though 
 we fhould not take in the confideration of God^s 
 moral government over the world. But, 
 
 IV. Take in this confideration, and confeqiiently 
 that the character of virtue and piety is a neceflary 
 qualification for the future flate, and then we may 
 diftindly fee how, and in what refpefts, the prefent 
 life may be a preparation for it ; fince we ijcant^ and 
 are capable of^ improvement in that chara^er, by moral 
 and religious habits^ and the prefent life is fit to be aflate 
 cf difcipline for fuck improvement ; in like manner as we 
 have already obferved how, and in what refpects, in- 
 fancy, childhood and youth are a neceflary prepara- 
 tion, and a natural ftate of difcipline, for mature age. 
 
 Nothing which we at prefent fee would lead us to 
 the thought of a folitary unadive ftate hereafter ; but, 
 
 if 
 
142- Of a State of Part I, 
 
 if we judge at all from the analogy of nature, we muft 
 fuppofe, according to the Scripture account of it, that 
 it will be a community. And there is no lliadow of 
 any thing unreafonable in conceiving, though there 
 be no analogy for it, that this community will be, as 
 the Scripture reprefents it, under the more immediate, 
 or, if fuch an exprelTion may be ufed, the more fenfi- 
 ble government of God. Nor is our ignorance what 
 will be the employments of this happy community, nor 
 our confequent ignorance what particular fcope or ocr 
 cafion there will be for the exercife of veracity, juftice 
 and charity amongfl the members of it with regard to 
 each other, any proof that there will be no fphere of 
 exercife for thofe virtues ; much lefs, if that were pof- 
 fible, is our ignorance any proof, that there will be no 
 occafion for that frame of mind, or character, which is 
 formed by the daily practice of thofe particular virtues 
 here, and which is a refult from it. This at lead 
 muft be owned in general, that, as the government 
 eftablifhed in the univerfe is moral, the chara^fter of 
 virtue and piety muft, in fome way or other, be the 
 condition of our happinefs, or the qualification for it. 
 Now from what is above cbferved, concerning our 
 natural power of habits, it is eafy to fee that we are 
 capable of moral improvement by difcipline. And 
 how greatly we want it, need not be proved to any one 
 who is acquainted with the great wickednefs of man- 
 kind, or even with thofe imperfections which the beft 
 are confcious of. But it is not perhaps diftinftly at- 
 tended to by every one, that the occafion which hur 
 man creatures have for difcipline, to improve in them 
 this character of virtue and piety, is to be traced up 
 higher than to excefs in the paffions, by indulgence 
 and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite 
 creatures, from the very conftitution of their nature, 
 before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of 
 deviating from what is right j and therefoi^e ftancj iji 
 
 need 
 
Ckap. V. Moral Bijclpline. 143 
 
 need of virtuous habits, for a fecurity agalnft this dan- 
 ger. For, together with the general principle of moral 
 underflanding, we have in our inward frame various 
 affedions towards particular external objects. Thefe 
 affetflions are naturally and of right fubjed to the 
 -government of the moral principle, as to the occafioqiS 
 upon which they may be gratified, as to the times, de- 
 grees and manner in which the objedls of them may be 
 purfued ; but then the principle of virtue can neither 
 .excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On 
 the contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects 
 of them are prefent to the mind, not only before all 
 conlideration whether they can be obtained by lawful 
 means, but after it is found they cannot. For the 
 ;iatural objeds of a,fFe£lion continue fo j the necefla- 
 ries, conveniences and pleai'ures of life remain naturally 
 defirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently \ 
 nay, though they cannot podibly be obtained at alL 
 And when the objeAs of any aifedlion whatever can- 
 not be obtained without unlawful means, but may be 
 .obtained by them, fuch affedion, though its being ex- 
 cited, and its continuing fome time in the mind, be it 
 as innocent as it is natural and neceflary, yet cannot 
 but be conceived to have a tendency to incline perfons 
 to- venture upon fuch unlawful means, and therefore 
 niuft be conceived as putting them in fome danger of 
 jt. Now what is the general fecurity againll this dan- 
 ger, againfl their adually deviating from right ? As 
 the danger is, fo alio mud the fecurity be from withr- 
 in ; from the pradical principle of virtue.* And the 
 
 ftrcngthening 
 
 * It may be thought, that a fenfe of intereft wcalJ as efi'edlually reftrain 
 creatures from doing wrong. But if by a fuiji of intercjl is meant a fpecu- 
 lative coavidtion or belief, that fuch and fuch indulgence would occafion 
 them greater uneafinefs, upon the whole, than fati->fa(5tion, it is contrary to 
 prefent e.xperience to fay, that this fenfe of intereft is fufficient to reftrain 
 them from thus indulging themfelves. And if by Aj'enje nf intereji is rncaut 
 a pradlical regard to what is, upon the whole, our happinefs, this is not only 
 coincident with the principle of virtue or moral reditude, but is a part of the 
 idea itfelf. And it is evident this reafonable felf love wants to be improved, 
 
J44 ^f ^ ^f^t^ 9f Part I, 
 
 ftrengthening or improving this principle, confidered 
 as praclical, or as a principle of adion, will leffen the 
 danger, or increafe the fecurity againft it. And this 
 moral principle is capable of improvement by proper 
 difcipline and exercife, by recollecting the praftical 
 impreflions which example and experience have made 
 upon us, and, inftead of following humour and mere 
 inclination, by continually attending to the equity and 
 tight of the cafe in whatever we are engaged, be it in 
 greater or lefs matters, and accuftoming ourfelves al- 
 ways to ad upon it, as being itfelf the juft and natural 
 motive of adion ; and as this m.oral courfe of beha- 
 viour muft necefTarily, under divine government, be 
 our final intereft. Thus the principle of virtue, im- 
 proved into an habit, of which improvemerd ive are thus 
 capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the flrength of it, 
 a fecurity againfi the danger zvhich finite creatures are in, 
 from the very nature of propenfion, or particular affeElions^ 
 This way of putting the matter fuppofes particular af- 
 fedions to remain in a future ftate, which it is fcarce 
 poffible to avoid fuppofing. And if they do, we clear- 
 ly fee that acquired habits of virtue and felf govern- 
 ment may be neceflary for the regulation of them. 
 However, though we v/ere not diftindly «ito take in 
 this fuppofition, but to fpeak only in general, the 
 thing really comes to the fame. For habits of virtue, 
 thus acquired by difcipUne, are improvement in vir- 
 tue ; and improvement in virtue muft be advance- 
 ment in happinefs, if the government of the univerfe 
 be moral. 
 
 From thefe things we may obferve, and it will far- 
 ther fhcw this our natural and original need of being 
 
 improved 
 
 as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily fee it overmatched, 
 nnt only by the more boillerous paffions, but by curiofity, fliame, love of imir 
 ration, by any thing, even indolence ; efpecially if the interefl, tl»e temporal 
 interefl, fuppofe, which is the end of fuch felf love, be at a diflance. So 
 greatly are profligate men miflaken, when they affirm they are wholly j^ov- 
 erned by intereftednefs and felf love. And fo little caufe is there for moral-. 
 ills to difclaim this principle. See p. 125, 126. 
 
Chap. V, Mora/ Difcipline. 145 
 
 improved by difcipline, how it comes to pafs, that 
 creatures made upright fall ; and that thofe who pre- 
 ferve their uprightnefs, by fo doing raife themfelves to 
 a more fecure ftate of virtue. To fay that the former 
 is accoijnted for by the nature of liberty, is to fay no 
 more than that an event's ad;ually happening is ac- 
 counted for by a mere poffibility of its happening. 
 But it feems diftinftly conceivable from the very na- 
 ture of particular affettions or propenlions. For, 
 fuppofe creatures intended for fuch a particular ftate 
 of life for which fuch propenfions were neceffary i fup- 
 pofe them endued with fuch propenfions, together 
 with mioral underftanding, as well including a pradii- 
 cal fenfe of virtue as a fpeculative perception of it, 
 and that all thefe feverai principles, both natural and 
 moral, forming an inward conftitution of mind, were 
 in the moil exa£t proportion poffible, i. e. in a pro- 
 portion the m.oft exadly adapted to their intended 
 ftate of life ; fuch creatures would be made upright, 
 or finitely perfect. Now particular propenfions, from 
 their very nature, muft be felt, the objeds of them 
 being prefent, though they cannot be gratified at all, 
 or not with the allowance of the moral principle. But 
 if they can be gratified without its allovv-ance, or by 
 cohtradi6f ing it, then they muft be conceived to have 
 fome tendency, in how low a degree foever, yet fome 
 tendency, to induce perfons to fuch forbidden gratifi- 
 cation. This tendency, in fome one particular pro- 
 penfion, may be increafed by the greater frequency of 
 occaiions naturally exciting it, than of occauons ex- 
 citing others. The leaft voluntary indulgence in for- 
 bidden circumftances, though but in thought, v/ill 
 jncreafe this wrong tendency, and may increafe it fur- 
 ther, until, peculiar conjunctures perhaps confpiring, 
 it becomes eifeft ; and danger of deviating from right, 
 ends in aftual deviation from it ; a danger ncceiilirily 
 arifing from the very nature of propenfion, and which 
 
 thereforo 
 
14^ Of a Sfate of Part I, 
 
 tbereforG could not have b'een prevented, though it 
 might have been elcaped, or got innocently through. 
 The cafe would be as if we were to fuppofe a ftrait 
 path marked out for a perfon, in which fuch a degree 
 of attention would keep him fteady ; but if he would 
 not attend in this degree, any one of a thoufand ob- 
 jects catching his eye might lead him out of it. Now 
 it is impoflible to fay how much, even the firft full 
 overt a6t of irregularity, might diforder the inward 
 conftitution, unfettle the adjuftments, and alter the 
 proportions which formed it, and in which the up^ 
 rightnefs of its make confifted ; but repetition of ir- 
 regularities would produce habits : And thus the con- 
 flitution w^ould be fpoiled, and creatures made upright 
 become corrupt and depraved in their fettled char- 
 acter, proportionably to their repeated irregularities in 
 occafional adls. But on the contrary, thefe creatures 
 might have improved, and railed themfelves to an 
 higher and more fecure ftate of virtue, by the con- 
 trary behaviour ; by fbeadiiy following the moral prin- 
 ciple, fuppofed to be one part of their nature, and 
 thus withftanding that unavoidable danger of defec- 
 tion, which neceflarily arofe from propenfion, the other 
 part of it. For, by thus preferving their integrity for 
 Ibme time, their danger would leffen, fmce propenr 
 fions by being inured to fubmit, would do it more ea- 
 fily and of courfe ; and their fecurity againfl this lef- 
 fening danger would increafe, fince the moral princir 
 pie would gain additional flrength by exercife ; both 
 which things are implied in the notion of virtuous 
 habits. Thus then, vicious indulgence is not only 
 criminal in itfelf, but alfo depraves the inward confti- 
 tution and character. And virtuous felf government 
 is not only right in itfelf, but alfo improves the inward 
 conftitution or character ; and may improve it to fuch 
 a degree, that though we fnould fuppofe it impoffible 
 for particular affedtions to be abfoluteiy coincident 
 
 with 
 
Chap. V, Moral DifcipHne. 147 
 
 with the moral principle, and confequently fhould aU 
 Jow, that fuch creatures as have been above fuppofed 
 would forever remain defe^hit^le, yet their danger of 
 adlualiy deviating from right may be ahnoft infinitely 
 lelfened, and they fully fortified againfl what remains 
 of it, if that may be called danger againft which there 
 is an adequate efFeftual lecurityo JBut ftill this their 
 Jiighe.r perfedtion may continue to confift in habits of 
 virtue, formed in a (late of difciplint;;, and this their 
 more complete fecurity remain to proceed from them. 
 And thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures with- 
 out blemilh, as they came out cf the hands of God, 
 may be in danger of going wrong, and Iq ir^ay ftand in 
 need of the fecurity of virtuous habits, additional to 
 the moral principle wrought into their natures by him. 
 That which is th^ grouiid of their danger, or their 
 want of fecurity, may be confidered as a deficiency in 
 them, to which virtuous habits are the nqitural fcpply^ 
 And as they are naturally capable of being raifed and 
 improved by dilcipline, it may be a thing fit and 
 requifite that they fliould be placed in circumftances 
 with an eye to it ; in circumftances peculiarly fitted 
 to be to them a ftate of difciplinc for their improver 
 ment in virtue. 
 
 But how much more ftrongly muft this hold with 
 refped to thole who have corrupted their natures, are 
 fallen from their original rectitude, and whofe paflions 
 are become exceffive by repeated violations of their 
 inward conftitution ? Upright creatures may want to 
 be improved ; d^pi'^-ved creatures want to be renew- 
 ed. Education and dilcipline, which may be in all 
 degrees and forts of gentlcnefs and of feverity, is ex- 
 pedient for thofe, but muft be abfolutely necelTary for 
 theie. For thefe, difcipline of the feverer fort too, 
 and in the higher degrees of it, muft be neceliary, ir). 
 order to v/ear out vicious habits; to recover t^ .:. 
 primitive ftrength of felf governmentj which : 
 
^4^ Of a State of Part L 
 
 gence muft have weakened ; to repair, as well as raife 
 into an habit, the moral principle, in order to their 
 arriving at a fecure ftate of virtuous happinefs. 
 
 Now whoever will confider the thing, may clearly 
 fee, that the prefent world is peculiarly fit to be a ftate 
 of diicipline for this purpofe, to fuch as will fet them- 
 felves to mend and improve. For, the various temp^ 
 tations v/ith which we are furrounded ; our experience 
 of the deceits of wickednefs ; having been in many 
 inftances led wrong ourielves ; the great vicioufnefs of 
 the world ; the infinite diforders confequent upon it j 
 our being made acquainted with pain and forrow, ei- 
 ther from our owmfeeling of it, or from the fight of 
 it in others ; thefe things, though fome of them may 
 indeed produce wrong effefts upon our minds, yet 
 when duly reflefted upon, have, all of them, a dired 
 tendency to bring us to a fettled moderation and rea- 
 fonablenefs of temper, the contrary both to thought- 
 lels levity, and alio to that unreftrained felf will, and 
 violent bent to follov/ prefent inclination, which may 
 be obferved in undifciplined minds. Such experience 
 as the prefent ftate affords, of the frailty of our nature ; 
 of the boundlefs extravagance of ungoverned pafhon ; 
 of the power which an infinite Being has over us, by 
 the various capacities of mifery which he has given us ; 
 in fliort, that kind and degree of experience which the 
 prefent ftate affords us, that the conftitution of nature 
 is fuch as to admit the polTibility, the danger, and the 
 adlual event of creatures lofina; their innocence and 
 happmeis, and becommg vicious and wretched, hath 
 a tendency to give us a practical fenfe of things very 
 different from a mere fpeculative knowledge, that we 
 are liable to vice, and cajDable of mifery. And who 
 knows, whether the fecurity of creatures in the high- 
 eft and m,oft fettled ftate of perfedion may not in part 
 arife from their having had fuch a fenfe of things as 
 this, formed and habitually fixed within them, in Ibme 
 
 ftate 
 
Chap. V. Moral Difcipline. 149 
 
 ftate of probation. And paffing through the prefent 
 world with that mora), attention which is neceliary to 
 the a£ting a right part in it, may leave everlafling im- 
 preffions of this fort upon o"cr minds. But to be a 
 little more diflinct — allurements to what is wrong ; 
 difficulties in the difcharge of our duty ; our not be- 
 ing able to aft an uniform right part without fome 
 thought and care ; and the opportunities which we 
 have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we diflike, 
 or obtaining what we defire, by unlawful means, when 
 we either cannot do it at all, or at leaft not fo eafily, 
 by lawful ones ; thefe things, i. e. the fnares and 
 temptations of vice, are what render the prefent world 
 peculiarly fit to be a ftate of difcipline to thofe who 
 will preferve their integrity, becaufe they render being 
 upon our guard, refolution, and the denial of our 
 paflions necefl'ary in order to that end. And the 
 exercife of fuch particular recolleftion, intention of 
 mind, and felf government in the praiSlice of virtue 
 has, from the make of our nature, a pecuHar tendency 
 to form habits of virtue, as implying not only a real 
 but alfo a more continued and a more intenfe exercife 
 of the virtuous principle, or a more conftant and a 
 ftronger effort of virtue exerted into acl. Thus fup-, 
 pofe a perfon to know himfelf to be in particular dan- 
 ger for fome time of doing any thing wrong, which 
 yet he fully refolves not to do ; continued recolledion, 
 and keeping upon his guard, in order to make good 
 his refolution, is a continued exerting of that ad of vir- 
 tue in a high degree^ which need have been, and per- 
 haps would have been, only injiantaneous and weak, 
 had the temptation been fo. It is indeed ridiculous 
 to affert, that felf denial is eilential to virtue and piety; 
 but it would have been nearer the truth, though not 
 ftridly the truth itfelf, to have faid, that it is elfential 
 to difcipline and improvement. For though actions 
 materially virtuous, which have no fort of difnculty, 
 
 but 
 
i^5 Of a State of Part L 
 
 but are perfeftly agreeable to our particular Inclina- 
 tions, may polTibly be done only from thele particu- 
 lar inclinations, and fo may not be any exercife of the 
 principle of virtue, i. e. not be virtuous adlions at all , 
 yet on the contrary, they ,may be an exercife of that 
 principle ; and vv^hen they are, they have a tendency 
 to form and fix the habit of virtue. But when the 
 exercife of the virtuous principle is more continued, 
 oftener repeated, and more intenfe, as it muft be in 
 circumftances of danger, temptation, and difficulty 
 of any kind and in any degree, this tendency is in- 
 creafed proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is 
 the confequence. 
 
 This undoubtedly holds to a certain length ; but 
 how far it may hold } know not. Neither our intel- 
 ic6lual powers, nor our bodily ftrength, can be im- 
 proved beyond fuch a degree ; and both may be over- 
 VvTOUght. Poffibly there may be fomewhat analogous 
 to this, with refpeft to the moral character, which is 
 fcarce worth conlidering. And I mention it only, left 
 it lliould com-c into fome perfons' thoughts, not as aa 
 exception to the foregoing obfervations, which perhaps 
 it is, but as a confutation of them, v/hich it is not. 
 And there may be feveral other exceptions. Obfer- 
 vations of this kind cannot be fu]:)pofed to hold mi- 
 nutely and in every cafe. It is enough that they hold 
 in general. And thefe plainly hold fo far, as that 
 from them may be feen diflinilly, which is all that is 
 intended by them, that the prefent world is peadiarly 
 fit to be a fate of dfcipline^ for our improvement in vir- 
 tue and piety, in the fame fenfe as ibme fciences, by 
 requiring and engaging the attention, not to be fure 
 ot iucxi perfons as will not, but of fuch as will, fet 
 themfelves to them, are fit to form the mind to habits 
 of attention. 
 
 Indeed the prefent ftate is fo far from proving, in 
 event, a difcipline of virtue to the generahty of men, 
 
 that. 
 
C H A p . V . Moral hijcipline-. i' 5 1 
 
 that, on the contrar\% they feem to make it a difci-* 
 pline of vice. And the vicioufnefs of the world is, in 
 different ways, the great temptation which renders it 
 a ftate of virtuous difcipiine, in the degree it is, to 
 good men. The whole end and the whole occafion 
 of mankind's being placed in fuch a flate as the pref- 
 ent, is not pretended to be accounted for. That 
 which appears amidft the general corruption, is, that 
 there are ibme perfons, who, having within them the 
 principle of amendment and recovery, attend to and 
 follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more 
 clear or more obfcure, which are afforded them ; and 
 that the prefent world is, not only an exercife of vir- 
 tue in thefe perfons, but an exercife of it in ways and 
 degrees peculiarly apt to improve it j apt to improve 
 it, in fome refpeds, even beyond what would be by 
 the exercife of it required in a perfedly virtuous foci- 
 ety, or in a fociety of equally imperfed: virtue with 
 themfelves. But that the prefent world does not ac- 
 tually become a ftate of moral difcipiine to many, 
 even to the generality, i. e. that they do not improve 
 or grow better in it, cannot be urged as a proof that 
 it was not intended for moral difcipiine, by any who 
 at all obferve the analogy of nature. For, of the nu- 
 merous feeds of vegetables and bodies of animals, 
 which are adapted and put in the way to improve to 
 fuch a point or ftate of natural maturity and perfec- 
 tion, we do not fee perhaps that one in a million ac- 
 tually does. Far the greateft part of them decay be- 
 fore they are improved to it, and appear to be abfo- 
 lutely deftroyed. Yet no one, who does not deny aU 
 final caufes, will deny that thofe feeds and bodies 
 which do attain to that point of maturity and perfec- 
 tion, anfwer the end for which they were really defign- 
 cd by nature, and therefore that nature defigned them 
 for fuch perfection. And I cannot forbear adding, 
 though it is not to the prefent purpoie, that the ay^ 
 
 pearance 
 
t^'z Of a State of Part L 
 
 fearance of fucli an amazing wafie in nature, with re- 
 fpecl to thefe feeds and bodies, by foreign caufes, is to 
 lis as unaccountable, as, what is much more terrible, 
 the prefent and future min of fo many moral agents 
 by themfelves, i. e. by vice; 
 
 Againft this whole notion of moral difcipline it may 
 be objected in another way, that fo far as a courfe of 
 behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope 
 ^ . and fear, fo far it is only a difcipline and ftrengthen- 
 J in<5- of felf love. But doing what God commands, 
 
 becaufe he commands it, is obedience, though it pro-, 
 ceeds from hope or fear. And a courfe of fuch obe- 
 dience will form habits of it. And a conftant regard 
 to veracity, juftice and charity may form diftinft hab- 
 its of thefe particular virtues, and will certainly form 
 habits of felf government, and of denying our inclina- 
 tions, whenever veracity, juftice or charity requires 
 it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, 
 with which fome affeft to diftinguith in this cafe, in 
 order lo depreciate all religion proceeding from hope 
 or fear. For, veracity, juftice and charity, regard to 
 God's authority, and to our own chief intereft, are not 
 only all three coincident, but each of them is, in it- 
 felf, a juft and natural motive or principle of aftion. 
 And he who begins a good life from any one of them., 
 and perfeveres in it, as he is already in fome degree, 
 fo he cannot fail of becoming more and more of that 
 character, which is correfpondent to the conftltution 
 of nature as moral, and to the relation which God 
 ftands in to us as moral governor of it ; nor confe- 
 quently can he fail of obtaining that happinefs which 
 tlfis conft.itution and relation neceflarily fuppofe con- 
 nefted with that charader. 
 
 Thefe feveral obfervations concerning the adive 
 principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands 
 £.re applicable to pafTive fubmiffion or reiignation to 
 his will, which is another eflential part of a right char- 
 
 ader. 
 
Chap. V. Moral Difcipline. 15 
 
 :>:> 
 
 after, connefted with the former, and very much in. 
 our power to form ourfelves to. It may be ima<gined, 
 that nothing but afilidions can give occafion for or 
 require this virtue ; that it can have no refpeft to, nor 
 be any way neceffary to qiiahfy for, a ftate of perfect 
 happinefs ; but it is not experience which can make 
 us think thus. Profperity itfelf, whiift any thing fup- 
 poied defirable is not ours, begets extravagant and un- 
 bounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as 
 much a fource of difcontent as any thing in our exter- 
 nal condition. It is indeed true, that there can be no 
 fcope for patience, when forrow (hall be no more ; but 
 there may be need of a temper of mind which Ihall 
 have been formed by pd,tience. For though felf love, 
 coniidered merely as an aftive principle leading us to 
 purfue our chief intereft, cannot but be uniformly co- 
 incident with the principle of obedience to God's 
 commands, our intereft being rightly underflood ; be- 
 caufe this obedience, and the purfuit of our own chief 
 intereft, muft be in every cafe one and the fame thing ; 
 yet it may be queftioned, wdiether felf love, coniidered 
 merely as the defire of our own intereft or happinefs, 
 can, from its nature, be thus abfolutely and uniformly 
 coincident with the will of God, any more than par- 
 ticular affe6tions can ; coincident in fuch fort, as not 
 to be liable to be excited upon occafions and in de- 
 grees, impoiTible to be gratified confiftently wdth the 
 €onftitution of things, or the divine appointments. 
 So that habits of reiignation may, upon this account, 
 be requifite for all creatures ; habits, I fay, which fig- 
 nify what is formed by ufe. However, in general it 
 is obvious, that both felf love and particular affeftions 
 in human creatures, confidered only as paftive feelings, 
 diftort and rend the mind, and therefore ftand in need 
 of difcipline. Now denial of thofe particular affec- 
 tions, in a v,ourle of active virtue and obedience to 
 God's will, hss a tendency to moderate them, and 
 L feems 
 
1^4 Of a State of ?art L 
 
 feems alfo to have a tendency to habituate the mind 
 to be eafy and fatisfied with that degree of happinefs 
 which is allotted us, i. e. to moderate felf love. But 
 the proper dilbipline for refignation is affliftion. For 
 a right behaviour under that trial ; recolleding our- 
 ielves fo rjs to confider it in the view in which religion 
 tearches us to' confider it, as from the hand of God ; 
 receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to 
 permit, in his world and under his government ; this 
 will habituate the mind to a dutiful lubmifTion. And 
 fuch fubmiffion, together with the adive principle of 
 obedience, make up the temper and character in us 
 which anfwers to his fovereignty, and which abfolute- 
 ly belongs to the condition of our being, as depend- 
 ent creatures. Nor can it be faid that this is onl)r 
 breaking the mind to a fubmiffion to mere power, for 
 mere power may be accidental, arid precarious, and 
 ufurped ; but it is forming within ourfelves the tem- 
 per of refignation to his rightful authority, v»'ho is, by 
 nature, fupreme over all. 
 
 Upon the whole, fuch a character, and fuch qual- 
 ifications, are neceflary for a mature ftate of life in the 
 prefent world, as nature alone does in no wife beftow, 
 but has put it upon us in great part to acquire, in our 
 progrefs from one ftage of life to another, from child- 
 hood to mature age ; put it upon us to accjuire them., 
 by giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, 
 jn the beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And 
 this is a general analogy to our condition in the pref- 
 ent world", as in a ftate of moral difcipline for another. 
 It is in vain then to objed againft the credibility of 
 the prefent life's being intended for this purpofe, that 
 all the trouble and the danger unavoidably accompa- 
 nying fuch difcipline might have been faved us, by our 
 being made at once the creatures and the characters 
 which zve zvere to be. For we experience, that what 
 ive were to he was to be the effcft of wliat we would 
 
 do i 
 
Chap. V. Moral D if cipline. j^i 
 
 :>o 
 
 do ; and that the general conduft of nature is, not to 
 fave us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of 
 going through them, and to put it upon Us to do fo. 
 Acquirements of our own, experience and habits, are 
 the natural fupply to our deficiencies, and fecurity 
 againft our dangers, (ince it is as plainly natural to {tt 
 ourfelves to acquire the qualifications, as the external 
 things, which we ftand in need of. In particular, it 
 is as plainly a general law of nature that we fliould, 
 with regard to our temporal intereft, form and culti- 
 vate practical principles within us, by attention, ufe 
 and difcipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law ; 
 chiefly in the beginning of life, but alio throughout 
 the whole courie of it. And the alternative is left to 
 our choice, either to iniprove ourfelves, and better 
 our condition, or, in default of fjch improvement, to 
 remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore per- 
 fectly credible, from the analogv of nature, that the 
 fame may be our cafe, with reipett to the happincfs of 
 a future ftate, and the qualifications necellary for it. 
 
 There is a third thing, which may feem implied in 
 the prefent world's being a ftate of probation ; that it 
 is a theatre of aftion for the manifeftation of perfons* 
 characters, wqth refpedt to a future one ; not to be 
 fure to an all knowing Being, but to his creation or 
 part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a confequence 
 of our being in a ftate of probation in the other fenfes. 
 However, it is not impofiibie that men's iliewing and 
 making manifcft what is in their heart, what their re- 
 al character is, may have refpeft to a future life, in 
 ways and manners which we are not acquainted with ; 
 particularly it may be a means, for the Author of na- 
 ture does not appear to do any thing without means, 
 of their being difpofed of fuitably to their characters ; 
 .md of its being known to the creation, by way of ex- 
 ample, that they are thus difpofed of. But not to 
 enter upon any conjeCtural account of this, ov£. may 
 L 2, iuf: 
 
i^S Of the Opinion of Nee effity. Part 1 
 
 juft mention, that the manifeftation of perfons' char- 
 afters contributes very much, in various ways, to the 
 carrying on a great part of that general courfe of na- 
 ture, refpeding mankind, which comes under our ob- 
 iervation at prefent. I fhall only add, that probation^ 
 in both thefe fenfes, as well as in that treated of in the 
 foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government, 
 fince by perfons' behaviour under it their charaders 
 cannot but be manifefted, .and, if they behave well, 
 improved. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Opinion of NeceJJity, conjidered as influencing 
 Pradice. 
 
 Throughout the foregoing trea- 
 tife it appears, that the condition of mankind, confid- 
 ered as inhabitants of this world only, and under the 
 government of God which- we experience, is greatly 
 analogous to our condition as defigned for another 
 world, or under that farther government which relig- 
 ion teaches us. If therefore any affert, as a fatalill 
 muft, that the opinion of univerfal neceflity is recon- 
 cileable with the former, there imm.ediately arifes a 
 queflion in the way of analogy, whether he muft not 
 alio own it to be reconcileable with the latter, i. e. 
 with the fyftem of reHgion itfelf, and the proof of it. 
 The reader then will obferve, that the queftion now 
 before us is not abiblute, Whether the opinion of fate 
 be reconcileable with religion ; but hypothetical. 
 Whether, upon fuppofition of its being reconcileable 
 with the conftitution of nature, it be not reconcileable 
 with religion alfo ; or, what pretence a fatalift, not 
 
 other 
 
Ckap. VI. as influencing Pra8ice. 15; 7 
 
 other perfons, but a fotalift, has to conchide from his 
 opinion that there can be no (lich thing as reHgion. 
 And as the puzzle and obfcurity which muft unavoid- 
 ably arife from arguing upon fo abfurd a fuppofitioii 
 as that of univerfal neceffity will, I fear, eafily be feen, 
 it will, I hope, as eafUy be excufed. 
 
 But fmce it has been all along taken for granted, as 
 a thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of 
 nature, or natural Governor of the world ; and fince 
 an objection may be made againft the proof of this, 
 from the opinion of univerfal neceffity, as it may be 
 fuppofed that fuch neceffity will itfelf account for the 
 origin and prefervation of all things, it is requiiite that 
 this objection be difbindly anfv^^ered, or that it be 
 fhewn that a fatality, fuppofed confiftent with what 
 we certainly experience, does not deftroy the proof of 
 an intelligent Author and Governor of nature, before 
 we proceed to confider whether it dellroys the proof 
 of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a (late of 
 religion. 
 
 Now, when it is faid by a fatalift, that the whole 
 conftitution of nature, and the actions of men, that 
 every thing, and every mode and circumftance of ev- 
 ery thing, is neceflary, and could not poffibly have 
 been othenvife, it is to be obferved, that this necef- 
 fity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, 
 and adting from certain principles, and to certain 
 ends ; becaufe all this is matter of undoubted expe- 
 rience, acknowledged by all, and what every man 
 may, every moment, be confcious of. And from 
 hence it follows, that neceflity, alone and of itfelf, is 
 in no fort an account of the conftitution of nature, 
 and how things came to be and to continue as they are ; 
 but only an account of this circumjlance relating to 
 their origin and continuance, that they could not have 
 been otherwife than they are and have been. The 
 aflertion that every thing is by neceffity of nature, is 
 
 not 
 
158 Of the Opinion of Ncceffity, P a r t I. 
 
 not an anfwer to the qucftion, Whether the world 
 came into being as it is, by an intelligent Agent form- 
 ing it thus, or not ; but to quite another queftion. 
 Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and 
 manner which we call necejj'arily ^ or in that way and 
 manner which we call freely. For fuppofe farther, 
 that one who was a falalift, and one who kept to his 
 natural fenfe of things, and believed himfelf a free 
 agent, were difputing together, and vindicating their 
 refpective opinions, and they fliould happen to inftance 
 in a houfe,— they would agree that it was built by an 
 architeft. Their difference concerning neceflity and 
 freedom would occafion no diiference of judgment 
 concerning this, but only concerning another matter, 
 whether the architect built it neceffarily or freely. 
 Suppofe then they fliould proceed to inquire concern- 
 ing the conftitution of nature ; in a lax way of fpeak- 
 ing, one of them might fay it was by necefTity, and 
 the other by freedom ; but if they had any meaning 
 to their words, as the latter muft mean a free agent, 
 lo the former mufb at length be reduced to mean an 
 agent, whether he would fay one or more, aiding by 
 ueceffity ; for abftract notions can do nothing. In- 
 deed we afcribe to God a necellt^ry exiftence, uncaufed 
 by any ageqt. For we find within ourfelves the idea 
 of infinity, i. e. immeniity and eternity, impofhble, 
 even in imagination, to be removed out of being. 
 We feem to difcern intuitively that there muft and 
 cannot but be fomewhat, external to ourfelves, anfwer- 
 ing this idea, or the archetype of it. And from 
 hence (for this abfiraEl^ as much as any other, implies 
 a concrete') we conclude that there is, and cannot but 
 be, an infinite and immenfe eternal Being, exifting 
 prior to all defign contributing to his exiftence and 
 exclufive of it. And from the icantinefs of lano;uap;e, 
 a manner of fpeaking has been introduced, that necef- 
 fity is the foundation, the reafon, the account of the 
 
 exiftencQ 
 
Crap. VI. as influencing Practice. 159 
 
 exiflence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be 
 at all intended, that every thing exiils as it does, by 
 this kind of neceflity, a neceffity antecedent in nature 
 to defign : It cannot, I fay, be noeant th-at every thing 
 exifls as it does, by this ki-nd of neceffity, upon feveral 
 accounts ; and particularly becaufe it is admitted, 
 that defign, in the actions of men, contributes to ma- 
 ny alterations in nature. For if any deny this, I fliall 
 not pretend to reafon with them. 
 
 From thefe things it follows, Firji^ That when a fa- 
 talift alTerts that every thing is by necejjiiy, he muft 
 mean by an agent acting necejfarily ; he muft, I lay, 
 mean this, for I am very fenfible he would not choole 
 to mean jt : And, Secondly, That the neceffity by 
 which fuch an agent is fuppofed ,to aft does not ex- 
 clude intelligence and deli,<n. So that were the lyf- 
 tem of fatality admitted, it would juft as much ac- 
 count for the formation of the world as for the ftruc- 
 ture of an lK)ufe, and. no more. Neceffity as much 
 requires and fuppofes a neceffary agent, as freedom 
 requires and fuppofes a free agent, to be the former of 
 the world. And the appearances of defign and oi final 
 caufes in the conftitution of nature as really prove this 
 .a6ling agent to be an intelligent dejiguer^ or to act from 
 choice, upon the fcheme of neceffity, fuppofed pof- 
 fible, asjupon that of freedom. 
 
 It appearing thus, that the notion of neceffity does 
 not deftroy the proof that there is an intelligent Au- 
 thor of nature and natural Governor of the world, the 
 prefent queftion, which the analogy before mention- 
 ed* fuggefts, and which, I think, it will anfwer, is 
 this, — Whether the opinion of neceffity, fuppofed 
 confiftent with poffibihty, with the conftitution of the 
 world, and the natural government which we expe- 
 rience exercifed over it, deftroys all reafonable ground 
 of belief that we are in a ftate of religion ; or whether 
 
 thiit 
 *?. 156, 
 
T 6 o Of the Opinion of NeceJJity, Part L 
 
 that opinion be reconcileable with religion, with the 
 fyitem and the proof of it. « 
 
 Suppofe then a fatahll to educate an}'' one, from his 
 youth up, in his own principles ; that the child 
 fnould reafon upon them, and conclude that lince he 
 cannot poffibly behave otherwife than he does, he is 
 not a fubjeft of blame or commeridation, nor can de- 
 ferve to be rewarded or punilhed : Imagine him to 
 eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commen- 
 dation out of his mind, by means of this fyftem ; to 
 form his temper, and character, and behaviour to it, 
 and from it to judge of the treatment he was to ex- 
 pert, lay from reafonable men, upon his coming abroad 
 into the world ; as the fatalift judges from this fyftem 
 what he is to expert from the Author of nature and 
 with regard to a future ftate. I cannot forbear flop- 
 ping here to aik, whether any one of common fenfe 
 would think fit that a child (liould be put upon thefe 
 fpeculations, and be left to apply them to pradice, 
 And a man has little pretence to reafon, who is not 
 fenfible that we are all children in fpeculations of this 
 kind. However, the child would doubtlefs be highly 
 delighted to find himfelf freed from the reftraints of 
 fear and fhame, with which his playfellov/s were fet- 
 tered and embarralled, and highly conceited in his fu- 
 pcrior knowledge, fo far beyond his years. But con- 
 ceit and vanity would be the leaft bad part of the in- 
 fluence which thefe principles muft have, when thus 
 reafoned and afted upon, during the courfe of his ed- 
 ucation. He muft either be allowed to go on and be 
 the plague of all about him, and himfelf too, even to 
 his ov^n deftruclion, or elie corredtion muft be con- 
 tinually made ufe of, to fupply the want of thofe nat- 
 ural perceptions of blame and commendation which 
 we have luppofed to be removed, and to give him a 
 practical imprefTion of what he had reafoned himlelf 
 out of the belief of, that he v»^as in fa6l an accountable 
 
 child. 
 
Chap. VI. as influencing VraFike. i6i 
 
 .child, and to be puniflied for doing what he was fofr- 
 bid. It is therefore in realit)/^ impoffible, but that the 
 correction which he muft meet with, in the courfe of 
 his education, mull conviace him that if the fcheme 
 he was inftructed in were not faU'e, yet that he reafon- 
 ed inconclufively upon it, and fome how or other mif- 
 appHed it to practice and common Ufe ; as what the 
 fatahil experiences of the condu6t of Providence at 
 prefent, ought in all reafon to convince him that this 
 fcheme is mifapplied when applied to the fubjeft of 
 religion. But fuppofmg the child's temper could re-r 
 main ftill formed to the fyftem, and his expeftation 
 of the treatment he v/as to have in the world be regu- 
 lated by it, fo a,s to exped that no reafonable man 
 would blame or punilh him for any thing which he 
 fhould do, becaufc he could not help doing it — upon 
 this fuppofition it is manifeft he would, upon his comr- 
 ing abroad into the world, be infupportable to focie- 
 ty, and the treatment which he would receive from it 
 would render it fo to him, and he could not fail of do- 
 ing fomewhat very loon for which he would be deliv- 
 ered over into the hands of civil juftice. And thus, 
 in the end, he would be convinced of the obligations 
 he was under to his wife inilruclor. Or fuppofe this 
 fcheme of fatality in any other way applied to practice, 
 fuch practical application of it will be found equally 
 abfurd, equally fallacious in a practical fenfe. For 
 inltance, that if a man be dellined to live fuch a time, 
 he lliall live to it, though he take no care of his own 
 prefervatlon ; or if he be dellined to die before that 
 time, no care can prevent it ; therefore all care about 
 preferving one's life is to be neglected, which is the 
 fallacy inftanced in by the ancients. But now on the 
 contrary, none of thefe pradical abfurdities can be 
 drawn from reafoning upon the fuppofition that we are 
 free ; but all fuch reafoning with regard to the com- 
 nion affairs of life is juftihed by experience. And 
 
 therefore. 
 
1 62 Of the Opinion of NeceJJity^ Part I. 
 
 therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion 
 of neceflity were fpeculatively true, yet with regard to 
 praftice it is as if it were falle, fo far as our experience 
 reaches ; that is, to the whole of our prefent Hfe. 
 For, the conflitution of the prefent world, and the 
 condition in which we are adually placed, is as if we 
 were free. And it may perhaps juftly be concluded, 
 that fmce the v/hole procefs of afliion, through every 
 ftep of it, fufpenfe, deliberation, inclining one way, 
 determining, and at laft doing as we determine, is as 
 if we were free, therefore we are fo. But the thing 
 here inlifled upon is, that unckr the prefent natural 
 government of the world, we find we are treated and 
 dealt with as if we were free, prior to all conlideration 
 whether we are or not. Were this opinion therefore 
 of neceflity admitted to be ever fo true, yet fuch is in 
 fa6t our condition and the natural courle of things, 
 that whenever we apply it to life and pradice, this ap- 
 plication of it always mifieads us, and cannot but mif- 
 iead us, in a moft dreadful manner, with regard to 
 our prefent intcreft. And how can people think 
 themfelves fo very fecure then, that the fame applica- 
 tion of the fame opinion may not miflead them alfo, 
 .in fome analogous manner, with reipe6t to a future 
 or more general and m.ore important intereft ? For, 
 religion being a pradiical fubje<5t, and the analogy of 
 nature Ihewing us that we have not faculties to apply 
 this opinion, were it a true one, to practical fubjedts, 
 whenever we do apply it to the fubjed; of religion, and 
 thence conclude that we are tree from its obligations, 
 it is plain this conclufion cannot be depended upon. 
 There will ftill remain juft reafon to think, whatever 
 appearances are, that we deceive ourlelves j in fomewhat 
 of a like manner, as when people fancy they can draw 
 contradidory conclufions from the idea of infinity. 
 
 From thefe things together, the attentive reader 
 will fee it follows, that if upon fuppofition of freedom 
 
 the 
 
C II A P . V I . tis influencittg PraElke. 163 
 
 the evidence of religion be conclufive, it remains ib 
 upon fiippofition of neceflit}^ becaufe the notion of 
 neceflity is not appHcable to pra<5lical fiibjccfts, i. e. 
 Vv'ith refped to them, is as if it Vv'ere not true. Nor 
 does this contain any reflexion upon reafon, but only 
 upon what is unreafonable. For to pretend to ad 
 upon reafon, in oppofition to praftical principles, 
 which the Author of our nature gave us to aft upon, 
 and to pretend to apply our reafon to fubjecls, with 
 regard to which our own Ihort views, and even -our 
 experience, will (hew us it cannot be depended upon, 
 and i'ucli at beft the fubject of neceffity muft be, this 
 is vanity, conceit and unreafonablenefs. 
 
 But this is not all ; for we find within ourfelves a 
 will, and are confcious of a charadler. Now if this in 
 us be reconciieable with fate, it is reconcileable with it 
 in the Author of nature. And befides, natural gov- 
 ernment and final caufes imply a character and a will 
 in the Governor and Defigner ;* a will concerning the 
 creatures whom he governs. The Author of nature 
 then being certainly of fome character or other, not- 
 withftanding neceffity, it is evident this neceffity is as 
 reconcileable with the particular charafter of benevo- 
 lence, veracity and juftice in him, which attributes are 
 the foundation of religion, as with any other charac- 
 ter ; fince we find this neceffity no more hinders me/i 
 from being benevolent than cruel, true than faithlefs, 
 juft than unjuft, or if the fataliil pleafes, what we call 
 unjuft. For it is faid indeed, that what, upon fuppo- 
 fition of freedom, would be juft punill"iment,upon fup- 
 pofition of neceffity becomes manifeftly unjuft, becaufe 
 it is punifliment inflided for doing that Vv'hich perfons 
 could not avoid doing ; as if the neceffity which is 
 fuppofed to deftroy the injuftice of murder, for in- 
 
 ftance, 
 
 * By ivill 5nd charaElcr is meant that, which, in fpeaking of men, we 
 ftiould expref'-., not only by thefe words, hut alfo by t!ie words tentper, taj}{, 
 difpofilioKiy praSiical principles ; that wkok frame of mind, from whence "J-'c a£l in 
 QHi manner rather that; another. 
 
J 64 Of the opinion of Nee ejfity. Part I. 
 
 fiance, would not alfo deftroy the injuftice of puniflii- 
 ing it. However, as little to the purpofe as this ob- 
 jedion is in itfelf, it is very much to the purpofe to 
 obferve from it how the notions of juftice and injuftice 
 remain, even whilft we endeavour to fuppofe them re- 
 moved ; how they force themfelves upon the mind, 
 even whilft we are making fuppofitions deftruftive of 
 them ; for there is not, perhaps, a man in the world, 
 but would be ready to make this objection at firft 
 thought. 
 
 But though it is moft evident, that univerfal necef- 
 iity, if it be reconcileable with any thing, is reconcile- 
 abie with that charafter in the Author of nature which 
 is the foundation of rehgion, " Yet, does it not plain- 
 ly deftroy the proof that he is of that charader, and 
 confequently the proof of religion ?" By no means. 
 For we find, that happinefs and mifery are not our fate, 
 in any fuch fenfe as not to be the confequences of our 
 behaviour ; but that they are the confequences of it.* 
 We find God exercifes the fame kind of government 
 over us with that which a father* exercifes over his 
 children, and a civil magiftrate over his fubjefts. 
 Now, whatever becomes of abilrad queftions con- 
 cerning liberty and necefFity, it evidently appears to 
 •us, that veracity and juftice muft be the natural rule 
 and meafure of exercifing this authority or govern- 
 ment, to a Being who can have no competitions, or 
 interfering of interefts, with his creatures and his 
 fubjeds. 
 
 But as the do6trine of liberty, though we experience 
 its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties which run 
 up into the moft abftrufe of all fpeculations, and as 
 the opinion of neceffity feems to be the very bafis up- 
 on which infidelity grounds itfelf, it may be of fome 
 ufe to offer a more particular proof of the obligations 
 t)f religion, which may diftindly be lliewn not to be 
 deftroyed by this opinion. The 
 
 *Chap. ii. 
 
€ H A p . Vf . ds influencing PraHice. 1 6 ^ 
 
 The proof from final caufes of an intelligent Author 
 t£ nature is not affected by the opinion of neceflity, 
 fuppofing neceflity a thing pofTible in itfelf, and recon- 
 cileable with the coniJitution of things.* And it is a 
 matter of fadt, independent on this or any other fpec- 
 iilation, that he governs the world by the method of 
 rewards and punifliments j-f- and alfo that he hath 
 given us a moral faculty, by which wc diftinguifli be- 
 tween adtions, and approve fome as virtuous and of 
 good defert, and difapprove others as vicious and of 
 ill defert. \ Now this moral difcernment implies in- 
 the notion of it a rule of action, and a rule of a very 
 peculiar kind ; for it carries in it authority and a right 
 of diredlion ; authority in fuch a fenfe, as that we can- 
 not depart from it without being feif condemned. § 
 And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are 
 by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, 
 laws in a fenfe including fanftions, may be thus proved. 
 Confcioufnefs of a rule or guide of action, in creatures 
 who are capable of conlidering it as given them by 
 their Maker, not only raifes immediately a fenfe of 
 duty, but alfo a {tn^Q of fecurity in following it, and 
 of danger in deviating from it. A diredlion of the 
 Author of nature, given to creatures capable of look- 
 ing upon it as fuch, is plainly a command from him ; 
 and a command from him necefTarily includes in it, 
 at leaft, an implicit promife in cafe of obedience, or 
 threatening in cafe of difobedience. But then the 
 fenfe or perception of good and ill defert, || which is 
 contained in the moral difcernment, renders the fanc- 
 tion explicit, and makes it appear, as one may fay, ex- 
 prefled. For fince his method of government is to re- 
 ward and punilh adions, his having annexed to fome 
 a6tions an infeparable fenfe of good defert, and to 
 others of ill, this furely amou;its to declaring upon 
 
 whom 
 
 * p. 157, Jcc. f Ch. ii. 1 Bifftrtamn 11. 
 
 § Sermon i. at the RcU:. J| D'Jfertation II. 
 
1 66 Of the Opinion of NeceJJity^ Part I. 
 
 whom his punifliments fhall be inflided, and his re- 
 wards be beftowed. For he muft have given us this 
 difcernment and fenfe of things, as a prefentiment of 
 what is to be hereafter ; that is, by way of informa- 
 tion beforehand what we are finally to expe^l in his 
 world. There is then moft evident groimd to think, 
 that the government of God, upon the whole, will be 
 found to correfpond to the nature which he has given 
 us ; and that in the upihot and iflue of things, happi- 
 nefs and mifery fhall, in fadt and event, be made to 
 follow virtue and vice refpeftively, as he has already, 
 in fo peculiar a manner, afTociated the ideas of them 
 in our minds. And from hence might eafily be de- 
 duced the obligations of rehgious worlliip, were it on- 
 ly to be confidered as a means of preferving upon our 
 minds a fenfe of this moral government of God, and 
 fccuring our obedience to it ; which yet is an ex- 
 tremely imperfeft view of that mofi; important dutv. 
 Now I fay, no objeftion from neccffity can lie 
 againft this general proof of religion. None againft 
 the propofition reafoned upon, that we have fuch a 
 moral faculty and difcernment, becaufe this is a mere 
 matter of fad, a thing of experience, that human kind 
 is thus conftituted ; none againft the concluiion, be- 
 caufe it is immediate and wholly from this fa6t. For 
 the concluiion, that God will finally reward the righ- 
 teous and punifh the wicked, is not here drawn from 
 its appearing to us fit* that he Jliould, but from its ap- 
 pearing 
 
 * However, I am far from intending to deny that the will of God is deter- 
 mined, by what is fit, by the right and reafon of the cafe ; though one chooi'es 
 to decline matters of fuch abftraft fpeculation, and to fpeak with caution 
 when one does fpeak of them. But if it be intelligible to fay, that it isfii and 
 reajonahte for every one to coufutt kU otvn kappi7icfs, then fitnefs of aih'of;, or I'u 
 right and re.ijon of the cafe, is an intelligible manner of fpeaking. And it feeni- 
 2S inconceivable to fuppofe God to approve one courfe of adlion, or one end, 
 preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from dcfigu implies th:.t he- 
 does, without fuppofmg fomewhat prior in that end to be tha ground of thr 
 preference, as to fuppofe him to difcern an abflradl propofition to be true, 
 without fuppofing fomewhat prior in it to be the ground of the difcernment. 
 It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to percep- 
 tion than abflrafl truth is ; or that it is any more improper to fpeak of the 
 fitnefs and rightnefs of adf ions and ends, as founded in the r-ature of thinjSi 
 than to fpeak of abHradt trail), as thus founded. 
 
GilAP. VI. as influencing Pra6iice. 16 j 
 
 pearing that he has told us /le will. And this he hath 
 certainly told us, in the promife and threatening which 
 it hath been obferved the notion of a command im- 
 plies, and the fenfe of good and ill defert which he has 
 given us, more diftinftly expreffes. And this reafon- 
 ing from faft is confirmed, and in fome degree even 
 verified, by other fafts ; by the natural tendencies of 
 virtue and of vice ; * and by this, that God, in the 
 natur-al courfe of his providence, puniflies vicious ac- 
 tions as milchievous to fociety, and alfo vicious ac- 
 tions, as fuch, in the llridtefl. fenfe.-f So that the gen- 
 eral proof of religion is unanfwerably real, even upon 
 the wild fuppofition which we are arguing upon. 
 
 It mud likewife be obierved farther, that natural 
 religion hath, befides this, an external evidence, which 
 the doctrine of neceffity, if it could be true, would 
 not affedt. For fuppofe a perfon, by the obiervations 
 and reafoning above, or by any other, convinced of the 
 truth of religion ; that there is a God, who made the 
 world, who is the moral Governor and Judge of man- 
 kind, and will upon the whole deal with every one ac- 
 cording to his works ; I lay, fuppofe a perfon con- 
 vinced of this by reaion, but to know nothing at all 
 of antiquity, or the prefent (late of mankind ; it would 
 be natural for fuch an one to be inquifitivc what was 
 the hiftory of this fyftem of dodrine ; at what time, 
 and in what manner, it came fi^ril into the world, and 
 whether it were believed by any confiderable part of it. 
 And were he upon inquiry to find, that a particular 
 perfon in a late age firft of all propofed it, as a deduc- 
 tion of reafon, and that mankind were before wholly 
 ignorant of it ; then, though its evidence from reafon 
 would remain, there would be no additional proba- 
 bility of its truth, from the account of its difcovery. 
 But inftead of this being the fa6t of the cafe, on the 
 contrary he would find, what could not but aiTord 
 
 hin'i 
 
 '*• P. iir. f p. 10.^, &:C. 
 
1 68 Of the Opinion of Nee ejfity. Part L 
 
 him a very ftrong confirmation of its truth, Firf, 
 That fomewhat of this fyftem, with more or fewer ad- 
 ditions and alterations, hath been profefied in all ages 
 and countries, of which we have any certain informa- 
 tion relating to this matter. Secondly, That it is cer- 
 tain hiflorical fa£t, fo far as we can trace things up, 
 that this whole fyftem of behef, that there is one God, 
 the Creator and moral Governor of the world, and that 
 mankind is in ?. ftate of religion, was received in the 
 firft ages. And, Thirdly, That as there is no hint or 
 intimation in hiftory, that this fyftem was firft reafon- 
 ed out, lb there is exprefs hiftorical or traditional evi- 
 dence, as ancient as hiftory, that it; was taught firft by 
 revelation. Now thefe things muft be allowed to be 
 of great v/eight. The firft of them, general confent, 
 flievvs this fyftem to be conformable to the common 
 fenfe of mankind. The fecond, namely, that religion 
 was beUeved in the firft ages of the world, efpecially 
 as it does not appear that there were then any fuper- 
 ftitious or falfe additions to it, cannot but be a farther 
 confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of this 
 alternative, either that it came into the world by rev- 
 elation, or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itfelf 
 upon the mind. The former of thefe is the conclu- 
 lion of learned men. And whoever will confider how 
 unapt for fpcculation rude and uncultivated minds 
 are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be ftrongly in- 
 clined to believe it the truth. And as it is fliewn in 
 die fecond part* of this treatife, that there is noth- 
 ing of fuch peculiar prefumption againft a revelation 
 in the beginning of the world, as there is fuppofed to 
 be againft fubfequent ones, a fceptic could not, I 
 think, give any account, which would appear more 
 probable even to himfelf, of the early pretences to rev- 
 elation, than by fuppofing fome real original one, 
 from whence they were copied. And the third thing 
 
 above 
 
 * Ch. ii. 
 
Chap. VI. ds injiiiencing PraSiice. 169 
 
 above mentioned, that there is exprefs hiflorlcal or 
 traditional evidence as aacient as hiftory, of the fyf- 
 tem of rehgion being taught mankind by revelation ; 
 this muft be admitted as fome degree of real proof 
 that it was fo taught. For why fhould not the moft 
 ancient tradition be admitted, as fome additional 
 proof of a faft, againft which there is no prefumption ? 
 And this proof is mentioned here, becaufe it has its 
 weight to fhew, that religion came into the world by 
 revelation, prior to all confideration of the proper au- 
 thority of any book fuppoied to contain it, and even 
 prior to all conlideration whether the revelation itfelf 
 be uncorruptly handed down and related, or mixed 
 and darkened with fables. Thus the hiftorical ac- 
 count which we have of the origin of religion, taking 
 in ail circumftances, is a real confirmation of its truth 
 no way afFefted by the opinion of neceflity. And the 
 external evidence, even of natural religion, is by no 
 means inconfiderable. 
 
 But it is carefully to be obferved, and ought to be 
 recolledled after all proofs of virtue and religion, which 
 are only general, that as fpeculative reafon may be 
 neglected, prejudiced and deceived, — fo alfo may our 
 moral underftanding be impaired and perverted, and 
 the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This 
 indeed proves nothing againft the reality of our fpec- 
 ulative or practical faculties of perception ; againft 
 their being intended by nature to inform us in the 
 theory of things, and inftruft us how we are to be- 
 have, and what we are to exped: in confequence of 
 our behaviour. Yet our liablenefs, in the degree we 
 are liable, to prejudice and perveriion, is a moft ferious 
 admonition to us to be upon our guard with refpedt 
 to what is of ftich confequence as our determinations 
 concerning virtue and religion, and particularly not to 
 take cuftom, and fafhion, and flight notions of hon- 
 our, or imaginations of prefent eafe, ufe and conve- 
 nience to mankind, for the only moral rule.* 
 
 * Dijjiitathn II. M The 
 
1 70 Of the Opinion of Necejfity, Part I, 
 
 The foregoing obfervations, drawn from the nature 
 of the thnig, and the hiflory of rehgion, amount, 
 when taken together, to a real praftical proof of it, 
 not to be confuted ; fuch a proof as, confidering the 
 infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend would 
 be admitted fully fufficient, in reafon, to influence the 
 adions of men who aft upon thought and refleftion, 
 if it were admitted that there is no proof of the con- 
 trary. But it may be faid, " There are many proba- 
 bilities, which cannot indeed be confuted, i. e. (hewn 
 to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced 
 by greater probabiUties on the other fide ; much more 
 by demonflratlon. And there is no oceafion to objedt 
 againfb particular arguments alleged for an opinion, 
 when the opinion itfelf may be clearly fhewn to be 
 falfe, without meddling with fuch arguments at all, 
 but leaving them juil as they are. Now the method 
 of government by rewards and punifhments, and ef- 
 pecially rewarding and puniiliing good and ill defert, 
 as fuch, refpedtively, muft go upon fuppofition that 
 we are free, and not neceffary agents. And it is in- 
 credible that the Author of nature ihould govern us 
 upon a fuppofition as true, which he knows to be falfe ; 
 and therefore abfurd to think he will reward or punilh 
 us for our adions hereafter, efpecially that he will do 
 it under the notion that they are of good or ill defert.'* 
 Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the 
 anlwer to all this is full, and not to be evaded, that 
 the whole conftitution and courfe of things, the whole 
 analogy ot Providence, fhews beyond poflibility of 
 doubt, that the conclufion from this reafoning is falfe, 
 wher ever the fallacy lies. The do6trine of freedom 
 indeed clearly fhows where ; in fuppoiing ourielves 
 neceflary, when in truth we are free, agents. But up- 
 on the iiippclition of neceifity, the fallacy lies in tak- 
 ing for granted, that it is incredible necelfary agents 
 ihould be rewarded and punilhed. But that, fome 
 
 how 
 
Chap. VI. as utfluencing PraBice* 171 
 
 Jiow or other, the conclufion now mentioned is fahe, 
 is moft certain. For it is fad:, that God does govern 
 even brute creatures by the method of rewards and 
 punifhments, in the natural courle of things. And 
 men are rewa'rded and punifhed for their actions, pun- 
 ilhed for aftions mifchievous to fociety as being fo, 
 punilhed for vicious actions, as fuch, by the natural 
 inftrumentahty of each other, under the prefent con- 
 duct of Providence. Nay even tlie affection of grati- 
 tude, and the paffion of refentment, and the rewards 
 and punifliments following from them, which in gen- 
 eral are to be confidered as natural, i. e. from the Au- 
 thor of nature, — thefe rewards and punifhments, be- 
 ing naturally* annexed to aftions confidered as imply- 
 ing good intention and good defert, ill intention and 
 ill defert, — thefe natural rewards and punifhments, I 
 fay, are as much a contradi6tion to the conclufion 
 above, and fhew its falfehood, as a more exad: and 
 complete rewarding and punifliing of good and ill de- 
 fert, as fuch. So that if it be incredible that neceflary 
 agents fliould be thus rewarded and punifhed, then 
 men are not neceliary, but free ; fmce it is matter of 
 fad that they are thus rewarded and punifhed. But 
 if, on the contrary, which is the fuppofition we have 
 been arguing upon, it be infifted that men are necef- 
 fary agents, then- there is nothing incredible in the far- 
 ther fuppolition of necefTary agents being thus reward- 
 ed and punifhed, fince we ourfelves are thus dealt with. 
 From the whole, therefore, it muft follow, that a 
 neceffity fuppofed polTible, and reconcileable with the 
 conftitution of things, does in no fort prove that the 
 Author of nature will not, nor deftroy the proof that 
 he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal gov- 
 ernment, render his creatures happy or miferable, by 
 fome means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, 
 to exprefs this conclufion in words conformable to the 
 M 2 title 
 
 * Sermon 8 th, at the Rolh. 
 
Tt"]! The Government of God, Fart L 
 
 title of the chapter, the analogy of nature Ihews us, 
 that the opinion of neceffity, confidered as practical, 
 is falfe. And if neceffity, upon the fuppofition above 
 mentioned, doth not deftroy the proof of natural re- 
 ligion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof 
 of revealed. 
 
 From thele things likewife we may learn, in what 
 fenfe to underftand that general affertion, that the 
 opinion of neceffity is efTentially deftru6live of all re- 
 ligion. Firfl: in a praftical fenfe ; that by this notion, 
 atheiftical men pretend to fatisfy and encourage them- 
 felves in vice, and juftify to others their difregard to 
 all religion. And fecondly, in the ftrifteft fenle, that 
 it is a contradiction to the whole conftitution of na- 
 ture, and to what we may every moment experience 
 in ourfelves, and fo overturns every thing. But by 
 no means is this affertion to be underftood, as if ne- 
 ceffity, fuppofing it could poffibly be reconciled with 
 the conftitution of things and with what we experi- 
 ence, were not alfo reconcileable with religion ; for 
 upon this fuppofition it demonftrably is fo. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the Government of God, conjtdered as a Scheme or 
 Conflitution, im-perfe£tly comprehended. 
 
 X HOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, 
 acknowledged, that the analogy of nature gives a 
 ftrong credibility to the general doftrine of religion, 
 and to the feveral particular things contained in it, 
 confidered as fo many matters of fa6t, and likewife 
 that it fhews this credibility not to be deilroyed by 
 any notions of neceffity, — ^yet ftill objedions may be 
 
 infifted 
 
Ch A p . V II . a Scheme incomprehenjtble. 173 
 
 infifted upon againft the wifdom, equity and goodnefs 
 of the divine government implied in the notion of re- 
 ligion, and againft the method by which this govern- 
 ment is condtifted ; to which Gbjections analogy can 
 be no direft anfwer. For the credibihty or the cer- 
 tain truth of a matter of fad: does not immediately 
 prove any thing concerning the wifdom or goodnefs 
 of it ; and analogy can do no more, immediately or 
 -diredly, than fliew fuch and fuch things to be true or 
 credible, conlidered only as matters of fadt. But ftill, 
 if, upon fuppofeion of a moral conftitution of nature 
 and a moral government over it, analogy fuggellis and 
 makes it credible that this government muft be a 
 fcheme, fyftem, or conftitution of government, as dif- 
 tinguiftied from a number of fmgle unconnected ads 
 of diftributive juftice and goodnefs, and likewife that 
 it muft be a fcheme fo imperfectly comprehended, and 
 of fuch a fort in other refpefts, as to aftbrd a direct 
 general anfwer to all objedions againft the juftice and 
 goodnefs of it, — then analog}' is, remotely, of great fer- 
 \ict in anfwcring thofe objedions, both by fuggefting 
 the anfwer^ and ihewing it to be a credible one. 
 
 Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the 
 cafe. For, Firji^ Upon fuppofition that God exer- 
 cifes a moral government over the world, the analogy 
 of his natural government fuggefts and makes it cred- 
 ible that his moral government muft be a fcheme quite 
 beyond our compreheniion ; and this affords a general 
 anfwer to all objedions againft the juftice and good- 
 nefs of it. "And, Secondly^ A more diftind obfervation 
 of fome particular things contained in God's fcheme 
 of natural government, the like things being fuppofed 
 by analogy to be contained in his moral government, 
 will farther fliew how little weight is to be laid upon 
 thefe objedions. 
 
 I. Upon fuppofition that God exercifes a moral 
 government over the world, the analogy of his natural 
 
 government 
 
174 T^^^^ Government of God, Part I. 
 
 government fuggefts and makes it credible that his 
 moral government muft be a icheme quite bej'ond our 
 comprehenfion j and this affords a general anfvver to 
 all objections againfl the juftice and goodnefs of it. 
 It is moft obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, 
 that upon fuppolition of a moral government, it muft 
 be a fcheme ; for the world, and the whole natural 
 government of it, appears to be lb, to be a fcheme, fyf- 
 tem, or conftitution, whofe parts correfpond to each 
 other and to a v/hole, as really as any work of art, or 
 as any particular model of a civil conftitution and 
 government. In this great fcheme of the natural 
 world, individuals have various peculiar relations to 
 other individuals of their own fpecles. And whole 
 fpecies are, we find, varioufly related to other fpecies 
 upon this earth. Nor do we know how much farther 
 thefe kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is 
 not any aft ion or natural event, which we are ac- 
 quainted with, fo fingle and unconnected as not to 
 have a refpedl to fome other adions and events, — fo 
 poffibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, 
 may yet have a remote natural relation to other aftions 
 and events, much beyond the compafs oi this prefent 
 world. There feems indeed nothing from whence we 
 can fo much as make a conjefture, whether all crea- 
 tures, actions and events, throughout the whole of 
 nature, have relations to each other. But, as it is ob- 
 vious that all events have future unknown confe- 
 quences, fo if we trace any as far as we can go into 
 what is connected with it, we fhall find, that if fuch 
 event were not connefted with fomewhat farther in na- 
 ture unknown to us, fomevv^hat both pafb and prefent, 
 fuch event could not poffibly have been at all. Nor 
 can we give the whole account of any one thing what- 
 ever ; of all its caufes, ends and ncceffary adjundls ; 
 thofe adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not 
 have been. By this moil aftonilhing connexion, 
 
 thefc 
 
C H A p . VI I . a Scheme incomprehenftble. 175 
 
 t\\t(& reciprocal correfpondencies and mutual relations, 
 every thing which we fee in the courfe of nature is ac- 
 t^Lially brought about. And things feemingly the 
 mofl infignihcant imaginable, are perpetually obferv- 
 ed to be necelTary conditions to other things of the 
 greateft importance ; fo that any one thing whatever 
 may, for ought we know to the contrary, be a necefla- 
 ry condition to any other. The natural world then, 
 and natural government of it, being fuch an incom- 
 prehenfible fcheme, fo incomprehenfible that a man 
 m.uft really in the literal fenle know nothing at all, 
 who is not fenfible of his ignorance in it, this imme- 
 diately fuggefts,and ftrongly (hews the credibility, that 
 the moral world and government of it may be fo too. 
 Indeed the natural and moral conftitution and govern- 
 ment of the world are fo connefted, as to make up to- 
 gether but one fcheme ; and it is highly probable, 
 that the firft is formed and carried on merely in fub- 
 ferviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for 
 the animal, and organized bodies for minds. But 
 the thing intended here is, without inquiring how far 
 the adminiftration of the natural world is fubordinate 
 to that of the moral, only to obferve the credibility 
 that one fhould be analogous or fimilar to the other ; 
 that therefore every aft of divine juftice and goodnefs 
 maybe fuppofed to look much beyond itfelf, and its im- 
 liiediate objecb ; may have fome reference to other parts 
 of God's moral adminiftration, and to a general moral 
 plan ; and that every circumftance of this his moral 
 government may be adjuiled beforehand with a view 
 to the whole of it. Thus for example ; — the deter- 
 mined length of time, and the degrees and ways in 
 which virtue is to remain in a ftate of warfare and dif- 
 cipline, and in which wickednefs is permitted to have 
 its progrefs ; the times appointed for the execution of 
 juftice ; the appointed inftruments of it ; the kinds of 
 rewards and puniiliments, and /llie manners of their 
 
 dillribution ^ - 
 
176 The Government of God, Part I. 
 
 diftributlon. ; all particular inftances of divine juftice 
 and goodnefs, and every circumiLance of them, may 
 have fuch refpefts to each other as to make up all to- 
 gether a whole, connected and related in all its parts ; 
 a fcheme or fyfbem which is as properly one as the 
 natural v^rorld is, and of the like kind. And fuppof- 
 ing this to be the cafe, it is mofh evident that we are 
 not competent judges of this fcheme, from the fmall 
 parts of it which come within our view in the prefent 
 life ; and therefore no objeftions againft any of thele 
 parts can be infifted upon by reafonable men. 
 
 This our ignorance, and the confequence here 
 drawn from it, are univerfally acknowledged upon 
 other occafions ; and, though fcarce denied, yet are 
 univerfally forgot, when perfons come to argue againft 
 religion. And it is not perhaps eafy, even for the 
 moffc reafonable men, always to bear in mind the de- 
 gree of our ignorance, and make due allowances for it. 
 Upon thefe accounts, it may not be ufelefs to go on a 
 little farther, in order to fhew more diftindly how juft 
 an anfwer our ignorance is, to objections againft the 
 fcheme of Providence. Suppofe then a perfon boldly 
 to alTert that the things complained of, the origin and 
 continuance of evil, might eafJy have been prevent- 
 ed by repeated interpofitions ;* interpofitions fo 
 guarded and circumftanced, as would preclude all mif- 
 chief arifing from them ; or, if this were impradica- 
 ble, that 2, fcheme of government is itfelf an imperfec- 
 tion, fince more good might have been produced with- 
 out any fcheme, fyftem, or conftitution at all, by con- 
 tinued fmgle unrelated a6ts of diftributive juftice and 
 goodnefs ; becaufe thefe would have occafioned no ir- 
 regularities. And farther than this, it is prefumed, 
 the objections will not be carried. Yet the anfwer is 
 obvious, that were thefe alTertions true, ftill the obfcr- 
 vations above, concerning our ignorance in the fchem^e 
 
 of 
 
 * p. 179, i8o. 
 
Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehenjible. 177 
 
 of divine government, and the confequence drawn 
 from it, would hold in great meafure, enough to vin- 
 dicate religion againft all objeftions from the diforders 
 of the preient fbate. Were thefe allertions true, yet 
 the government of the world might be juft and good 
 notwithftanding ; for, at the mod, they would infer 
 nothing more than that it might have been better. 
 But indeed they are mere arbitrary affertions, no man 
 being fufficiently acquainted v»^ith the poflibilities of 
 things to bring any proof of them to the loweft de- 
 gree of probability. For however poffible what is af- 
 ferted may feem, yet many infbances may be alleged; 
 in things much lefs out of our reach, of fuppolitions 
 abfolutely impoffible, and reducible to the mofh pal- 
 pable felf contradidions, which not every one by any 
 means would perceive to be fuch, nor perhaps any one 
 at firft fight fufpecl. From thefe things it is eafy to 
 fee difbin61:ly how our ignorance, as it is the common, 
 is really a fatisfaftory anfwer to all objeftions againft 
 thejuftice and goodnefs of Providence. If a man, 
 contemplating any one providential difpenfation, which 
 had no relation to any others, fliould obje£t, that he 
 difcerned in it adifregard to jufhice, or a deficiency of 
 froodnefs, nothinsi; would be lefs an anfwer to fuch ob- 
 jedtion than our ignorance in other parts of Providence, 
 or in the poffibilities of things no way related to what 
 he was contemplating. But when we know not but 
 the parts objected againft may be relative to other 
 parts unknown to us, and when we are unacquainted 
 with what is in the nature of the thing pradiicable in 
 the cafe before us, then our ignorance is a fatisfac- 
 tory anfwer ; becaufe, fome unknown relation, or 
 fom.e unknown impofiibility may render Vsfhat is ob- 
 jected againft juft and good ; nay, good in the higheft 
 practicable degree. 
 
 II. And how little weight is to be laid upon fuch 
 objections will farther appear, by a more diftinct ob- 
 
 fervation 
 
r^8 The Government of God ^ Part I. 
 
 fervation of fome particular things contained in the 
 natural government of God, the like to which may be 
 fuppokd, from analogy, to be contained in his moral 
 government. 
 
 Firjfy As in the fcheme of the natural world no 
 ends appear to be accomplifhed without means, fo we 
 find that means very undefirable often conduce to 
 bring about ends, in fuch a meafure defirable as great- 
 ly to overbalance the difagreeablenefs of the means. 
 And in cafes where fuch means are conducive to fuch 
 ends, it is not reafon, but experience, w^iich fhews us 
 that they are thus conducive. Experience alfo fhews 
 many means to be conducive and neceflary to accom- 
 plilh ends, which means, before experience, we Ihiould 
 have thought would have had even a contrary tenden- 
 cy. Now from thefe obfervations relating to the nat- 
 ural fcheme of the world, the moral being fuppofed 
 analogous to it, arifes a great credibility, that the put- 
 ting our mifery in each other's power to the degree it 
 is, and making men liable to vice to the degree we 
 are, — and in general, that thofe things which are ob- 
 jected againft the moral fcheme of Providence, may 
 be, upon the whole, friendly and affiftant to virtue, 
 and productive of an overbalance of happinefs, i. e, 
 the things objefted againft may be means, by which 
 an overbalance of good will, in the end, be found pro- 
 duced. And from the fame obfervations, it appears 
 to be no prefumption againft this, that we do not, 
 if indeed we do not, fee thofe means to have any fuch 
 tendency, or that they feem to us to have a contrary 
 one. Thus thofe things which we call irregularities, 
 may not be fo at all ; becaufe they may be means of 
 accompliftiing wife and good ends more confiderable. 
 And it may be added, as above, that they may alfo 
 be the only means by which thefe wife and good ends 
 are capable of being accomplifhed. 
 
 After 
 
Chap.VIT. a Scheme hicomprehenf.hk. 179 
 
 After thefe obfervations it may be proper to add, in 
 order to obviate an abfurd and wicked conclufioii from 
 any of them, that though the conftitution of our na- 
 ture from whence we are capable of vice and mifery, 
 may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the per- 
 feftion and happinefs of the world ; and though the 
 aftual permiffion of evil may be beneficial to it, (i. e. it 
 would have been m.ore mifchievous, not that a wicked 
 perfon had himfelf abftained from his own wicked nefs, 
 but that any one had forcibly prevented it, than that 
 it was permitted) yet notwithflanding, it might have 
 been much better for the world it this very evil had 
 never been done. Nay, it is mofh clearly conceivable, 
 that the very commiflion of wickednefs may be bene- 
 ficial to the world, and yet that it would be infinitely 
 more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, ■ 
 in the wife and good conftitution of the natural world, 
 there are diforders which bring their own cures, dif- 
 eafes which are themielves remedies. Many a man 
 would have died, had it not been for the gout or a 
 fever ', yet it would be thought madnefs to aliert, that 
 ficknefs is a better or more perfect ftrte than health, 
 though the like with regard to the moral world has 
 been aflerted. But, 
 
 Secondly, The natural government of the world is 
 carried on by general laws. For this there may be 
 wife and good reafons ; the wifeft and beft, for ought 
 we know to the contrary. And that there are fuch 
 reafons, is fuggelled to our thoughts by the analogy of 
 nature ; by our being made to experience good ends 
 to be accompliihed, as indeed all the good •which we 
 enjoy is accompliihed, by this means, that the laws by 
 which the world is governed are general. For we have 
 Icarce any kind of enjoyments but what we are, in 
 fome way or other, inftrumental in procuring our- 
 felves, by afting in a manner which we foreiee likely to 
 procure them , now this forefight could not be at ail, 
 
 were 
 
X 8 o The Government of Gody Part I . 
 
 were not the government of the world carried on by 
 general laws. And though, for ought we know to the 
 contrary, every fingle cafe may be at length found to 
 have been provided for even by thefe, yet to prevent 
 all irregularities, or remedy them as they arife, by 
 the wifeft and befh general laws, may be impoffible in 
 the nature of things, as we fee it is abfolutely impoffi- 
 ble in civil government. But then we are ready to 
 think, that, the conftitution of nature remaining as it 
 is, and the courfe of things being permitted to go on 
 in other refpe6ts as it does, there might be interpo- 
 fitions to prevent irregularities, though they could not 
 have been prevented or remedied by any general laws. 
 And there would indeed be reafon to wifh, which, by 
 the way, is very different from a right to claim, that all 
 irregularities were prevented or remedied by prefent 
 interpolitions, if thefe interpofitions would have no 
 other efFe6t than this. But it is plain they would have 
 fome vifibie and immediate bad effects ; for inftance, 
 they would encourage idlenefs and negligence, and 
 they would render doubtful the natural rule of life, 
 which is afcertained by this very thing, that the courfe 
 of the world is carried on by general laws. And far- 
 ther, it is certain they would have diftant eftecfts, and 
 very great ones too, by means of the wonderful con- 
 nexions before mentioned.* So that we cannot fo much 
 as guefs what would be the whole refult of the inter- 
 pofitions defired. It may be faid, any bad refult might 
 be prevented by farther interpofitions, whenever there 
 was occafion for them ; but this again is talking quite 
 at random, and in the dark. ^ Upon the whole then, 
 we fee wife reafons, why the courfe of the world fhould 
 be carried on by general laws, and ?ood ends accom- 
 plifhed by this means ; and, for ought we know, there 
 may be the wifeft reafons for it, and the beft ends ac- 
 compliflied by it. We have no ground to believe, that 
 
 all 
 
 *P. 174, &C. fP-I/^; 177- 
 
Chap. VII. a Scheme incomprehenfMe-. i8r 
 
 all irregularities could be remedied as they arile, or 
 could have been precluded, by general laws. We find 
 that interpolitions would produce evil, and prevent 
 good ; and, for ought vv^e know, they would produce 
 greater evil than they would prevent 3 and prevent 
 greater good than they would produce. And if this 
 be the cafe, then the not interpofing is fo far from be- 
 ing a ground of complaint, tiiat it is an inftance of 
 goodnefs. This is intelligible and fufficient, and go- 
 ing farther feems beyond the utmoft reach of our fac- 
 ulties. 
 
 But it may be faid, that " after all, thefe fuppofed 
 impoffibilities and relations are what we are unac- 
 quainted with, and we mufh judge of religion, as of 
 other things, by what we do know, and look upon 
 the reft as nothing ; or however, that the anfwers here 
 given to what is objefted againft religion, may equally 
 be made uie of to invalidate the proof of it, fmce their 
 ilrefs lies fo very much upon out" ignorance." But, 
 
 F/V/r, Though total ignorance in any matter does 
 indeed equally deftroy, or rather preclude all pro(3f 
 concerning it, and objeftions againft it, yet partial ig- 
 norance does not. For we may in any degree be coht 
 vinced, that a perfon is of fuch a character, and con- 
 fequently will purlue fuch ends, though we are greatly 
 ignorant what is the proper way of acting, in order the 
 moft effe(^lually to obtain thofe ends ; and in this cafe, 
 objections againft his manner of afting, as feemingly 
 not conducive to obtain them, might be anfwered by 
 our ignorance, though the proof that fuch ends were 
 intended might not at all be invalidated by it. Thus 
 the proof of religion is a proof of the moral character 
 of God, and confequently that his government is mor- 
 al, and that every one upon the whole fhall receive ac- 
 cording to his deferts ; a proof that this is thedefigned 
 end of his government. But we are not competent 
 judges what is the proper way of afting, in order the 
 
 mod 
 
iBz ' The Government of God, Part L 
 
 mofl effedually to accomplifh this end.* Therefore 
 our ignorance is an anfwer to objedions againft the 
 condu6l of Providence in permitting irregularities, as 
 feeming contradiftory to this end. Now, fmce it is 
 fo obvious that our ignorance may be a fatisfatflory 
 anfwer to objeftions againft a thing, and yet not afre6l 
 the proof of it, till it can be Ihewn, it is frivolous to 
 affert that our ignorance invalidates the proof of relig- 
 ion, as it does the objedtions againft it. 
 
 Secondly^ Suppofe unknow^n impoffibilities and un- 
 known relations might juftly be urged to invalidate 
 the proof of religion, as well as to anfvv^er objections 
 sgainft it, and that in confequence of this the proof 
 of it were doubtful, — yet ftill, let the aflertion be de- 
 ipifed, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true that 
 moral obligations would remain certain, though it 
 were not certain what would, upon the whole, be the 
 confequences of obferving or violating them. For, 
 thefe obligations arife immediately and necelfarily from 
 the judgment of our own mind,un]efs perverted, which 
 *u'e cannot violate without being; felf condemned. And 
 they would be certain too, from confiderations of in- 
 tereft. For though it were doubtful what will be the 
 future confequences of virtue and vice, )'et it is, how- 
 ever, credible, that they may have thofe confequences 
 which religion teaches us they will ; and this credibil- 
 ity is a certain >^- obligation in point of prudence, to 
 abftain from all wickednefs, and to live in the confci- 
 entious praclice of all that is good. But, 
 
 Thirdly^ The anfwers above given to the objedlions 
 againft religion, cannot equally be made ufe of to in- 
 validate the proof of it. For, upon fuppofition that 
 God exercifes a moral government over the world, 
 analogy does moft ftrongly lead us to conclude, that 
 this moral government muft be a ibheme or conftitu- 
 tion beyond our comprehenfion. And a thoufand 
 
 particular 
 
 * p. 6i, 6a. t P- 57- and Part II. Ch. vi. 
 
Chap. VII. a Scheme incomp-ehenfihk. 183 
 
 particular analogies fliew us, that parts of fuch a 
 fcheme, from their relation to other parts, may con- 
 duce to accomphfh ends,vvhich weiliould have thought 
 they had no tendency at all to accompliiln ; nay ends, 
 which before experience we lliould have thought fuch 
 parts were contradidory to, and had a tendency X<::> 
 prevent. And therefore all thefe analogies Ihew, that 
 the way of arguing made ufe of in objedling againir 
 religion, is deluiive ; becaufe they Ihew it is not at ail 
 incredible, that, could we comprehend the whole, we 
 fliould find the permiffion of the diforders objected 
 againft to be confiftent with juflice and goodneis, and 
 even to be inflances of them. Now this is not appli- 
 cable to the proof of religion, as it is to the objections 
 againft it j* and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, 
 as it does thefe objections. 
 
 Lajily, From the obfervation now made, it is eafy 
 to fee, that the anfwers above given to the objeftions 
 againft Providence, though in a general way of fpeak- 
 ing, they may be faid to be taken from our ignorance, 
 yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from 
 fomewhat which analogy fliews us concerning it. For 
 analogy ihews us pofitively, that our ignorance in the 
 poiTibilities of things, and the various relations in na- 
 ture, renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to 
 faife concluiions, in cafes iimilar to this, in which we 
 pretend to judge and to objeft. So that the things 
 above infifted upon, are not mere fuppofitions of un- 
 known impoffibilities and relations, but they are fug- 
 gefted to our thoughts and even forced upon the ob- 
 lervation of ferious men, and rendered credible too, by 
 the analogy of nature. And therefore, to take theie 
 things into the account, is to judge by experience and 
 what we do know ; and it is not judging fo, to take 
 no notice of them. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 * Seimoo at the RoUt, p, 312. 2d EJ, 
 
r 184 ] 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 JL HE obfervations of the laft chapter lead 
 us to confider this httle fcene of human Hfe, in which 
 we are fo bufiiy engaged, as having a reference, o£ 
 lome fort or other, to a much larger plan of things- 
 Whether we are any way related to the more diftant 
 parts of the boundlefs univerfe, into which we are 
 brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident 
 that the courfe of things which comes within our view 
 is connected with fomewhat paft, prefent, and future, 
 beyond it.* So that we are placed, as one may fpeak, 
 in the middle of a fcheme, not as a fixed but a pro^ 
 greffive one, every way incomprehenfible ; incompre- 
 henfible in a manner equally with refpedt to what has 
 been, what now is, and what fhall be hereafter. And 
 this fcheme cannot but contain in it fomewhat as won- 
 derful and as much beyond our thought and concep- 
 tion -f- as any thing in that of religion. For, will any 
 man in his fenfes fay, that it is lefs difficult to conceive 
 how the world came to be and to continue as it is, 
 without, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor 
 of it ? or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, 
 that there is fome other rule of government more nat- 
 ural and of eafier conception than that which we call 
 moral ? Indeed, without an intelligent Author and 
 Governor of nature, no account at all can be given 
 how this univerfe, or the part of it particularly in 
 which we are concerned, came to be, and the courfe 
 of it to be carried on, as it is ; nor any of its general 
 end and defign, without a moral Governor of it. 
 That there is an intellig-ent Author of nature and 
 natural Governor of the world, is a principle gone up- 
 on in the foregoing treatife, as proved, and generally 
 
 known 
 
 * p. 174, &c, f See Part II. Ch. ii. 
 
1?ART I. CONCLUSION. 185 
 
 known and confelTed to be proved. And the very- 
 notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved b}'' 
 particular final caufes, implies a v/iil and a character.* 
 Now as our whole nature, the nature which he has 
 given us, leads us to conclude his will and character to 
 be moral, jufh and good, — fo we can fcarce in imag- 
 ination conceive what it can be othetwife. Hov/ever, 
 in confequence c^ this his will and character, v/hatever 
 it be, he formed the univerfe as it is, and carries on 
 the courfe of it as he does, rather than in any other 
 manner ; and has afTigned to us, and to all living 
 creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures 
 acl this their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleaf- 
 ures and the pains allotted them, without any reflec- 
 tion. But one would think it impolTible, that crea- 
 tures endued with reafon could avoid refleding fome- 
 times upon all this ; reficfting, if not from whence vm 
 came, yet, at leaft, whither we are going ; and what 
 the myflerious fcheme, in the midft of which we find 
 ourfelves, will, at length, come out and produce ; a 
 fcheme in which it is certain we are highly intercfied, 
 and in which we may be interefled even beyond con- 
 ception. For many things prove it palpably abfurd to 
 conclude, that we lliall ceafe to be at death. Partic- 
 ular analogies do moft fenfibiy fnew us, that there ir. 
 nothing to be thought ftrange, in our being to exlft 
 in another (late of life. And that v/e are no| living 
 beings affords a ftrong probability that we fliall con- 
 timie fo, unlefs there be fome politive ground, and 
 there is none 'from reafon or analogy, to think death 
 will deflroy us. Were a perfuafion of this kind ever 
 fo well grounded, there would fureiy be little reafon to 
 take pleafure in it. But indeed it can have no other 
 ground, than ibme fuch imagination as that of our 
 grofs bodies being ourfelves ; which is contrary to ex- 
 perience. Experience too mcfb clearly fiiews us the 
 
 N ' foily 
 
 =^p. 16::. 
 
lS6 CONCLUSIO?r. Part t 
 
 folly of concluding, from the body and the living 
 agent afFefting each other mutually, that the dlflblu- 
 tion of the former is the deftruftion of the latter. 
 And there are remarkable inftances of their not affect- 
 ing each other, which lead us to a contrary conclufion. 
 The fuppofition then, which in all reafon we are to 
 go upon, is, that our living nature will continue after 
 death.' And it is infinitely unreafonable to form an 
 inftitution of life, or to a6l, upon any other fuppofition. 
 Now all exped:ation of immortality, whether more or 
 lefs certain, opens an unbounded profpe(5l to our hopes 
 and our fears ; fince we fee the confbitution of nature 
 15 fuch as to admit of mifery, as well as to be produc- 
 tive of happinefs, and experience ourfelves to partake 
 of both in fome degree ; and fince we cannot but knovsr 
 what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And 
 there is no prefumption againft believing farther, that 
 our future intereil depends upon our prefent beha- 
 viour ; for we fee our prefent intereft doth, and that 
 the happinefs and mifery which are naturally annexed 
 to our aftions, very frequently do not follow till long 
 after the actions are done to which they are refpeftive- 
 ly annexed. So that were fpeculation to leave us un- 
 certain whether it were likely that the Author of na- 
 ture, in giving happinefs and mifery to his creatures^ 
 hath regard to their aftions or not, yet fince we find 
 by experience that he hath fuch regard, the whole 
 fenfe of things which he has given us plainly leads us, 
 at once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think 
 that it may, indeed muft, be to good aftions chiefly 
 that he hath annexed happinefs, and to bad aftions 
 mifery ; or that he will, upon the whole, reward thofe 
 who do well, and puniOi tliofe who do evil. To con- 
 firm this from the confbitution of the world, it has 
 been obferved, that fbme ibrt of moral government 
 is necefianly implied in that natural government of 
 God, which we experience ourfelves under 3 that good 
 
 and 
 
Part I. CONCLUSION. 187 
 
 and bad actions at prefent are naturally rewarded and 
 puniflied, nbt only as beneficial and mifchievous to 
 lociety, but alfo as virtuous and vicious ; and that 
 there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency to 
 their being rewarded and puniflied in a much higher 
 degree than they are at prefent. And though this 
 higher degree of diftributlve juftice, which nature thus 
 points out and leads towafds, is prevented for a time 
 from taking place, it is by obftacles which the ftate of 
 this world unhappily throws in its way, and which 
 therefore are in their nature temporary. Now as thefe 
 things, in the natural conduct of Providence, are ob- 
 fervable on the fide of virtue, ib there is nothing to be 
 fet againft them on the fide of vice. A moral icheme 
 of government then is vitibly eftabliflied, and in ibme 
 degree carried into execution ; and this, together with 
 the elTential tendencies of virtue and vice duly confid- 
 ered, naturally raife in us an apprehenfion, that it will 
 be carried on farther towards perfection in a future 
 ftate, and that every one fhall there receive according 
 to his deferts. And if this be lb, then our future and 
 general intereft, under the moral government of God, 
 is appointed to depend upon our behaviour, notwith- 
 (landing the difficulty which this may occafion of fe- 
 curing it, and the danger of lofing it, jufh in the fame 
 manner as our temporal intereft, under his natural gov- 
 ernment, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour, 
 notwithftanding the like difficulty and danger. For, 
 from our original conftitution, and that of the world 
 which we inhabit, we are naturally trufted with our- 
 felves, with our own condud: and our own intereft". 
 And from the fame conftitution of nature, efpecially 
 joined with that courfe of things which is owing to 
 men, we have temptations to be unfaithful in this 
 truft, to forfeit this intereft, to neglect it, and run 
 ourfelves into mifery and ruin. From thefe tempta- 
 tions arife the difficulties of behaving fo as to fecure 
 N a our 
 
i88 CONCLUSION, Part t 
 
 our temporal intereft, and the hazard of behaving fo 
 as to mifcarry in it. There is therefore nothing in- 
 credible in fuppofing, there may be the Hke difficulty 
 and hazard with regard to that chief and final good 
 which religion lays before us. Indeed the whole ac- 
 count, how it came to pafs that we were placed in 
 fuch a condition as this, muft be beyond our compre- 
 henfion ; but it is in part accounted for by what re- 
 ligion teaches us, that the charafter of virtue and piety 
 muft be a neceflary qualification for a future ftate of 
 fecurity and happinefs under the moral government of 
 God, in like manner as fome certain quahfications or 
 other are neceflary for every particular condition of life 
 under his natural government , and that the prefent 
 ftate was intended to be a fchool of drfcipline for im- 
 proving in ourfelvSs that character. Now this intention 
 of nature is rendered highly credible by obferving, that 
 we are plainly made for improvement of all kinds ; 
 that it is a general appointment of Providence that we 
 cultivate practical principles, and form within ourfelves 
 habits of aftion, in order to become fit for what wc 
 were wholly unfit for before ; that in particular, child- 
 hood and youth is naturally appointed to be a ftate of 
 difcipline for mature age ; and that the prefent world 
 is peculiarly fitted for a ftate of moral difcipline. And 
 whereas objections are urged againft the whole notion 
 of moral government and a probation ftate, from the 
 opinion of neceffity, it has been fliewn, that God has 
 given us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that 
 all objediions againft religion on this head are vain and 
 delulive. He has alfo, in his natural government, fiag- 
 gefted an anfwer to all our Oiort fighted objections 
 againft the equity and goodnefs of his moral govern- 
 ment ; and iii general he has exemplified to us the 
 latter by the former. 
 
 Thefe things, which, it is to be remembered, are 
 matters of fad, ought, in all common fenfe, to awakeii 
 
 mankind ; 
 
Part I. CONCLUSION^. iSg 
 
 mankind ; to induce them to confider in earneft their 
 condition, and what they have to do. It is abfurd, 
 abfurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the fubje6t 
 were not of fo feriotis a kind, for men to think them- 
 felves fecure in a vicious hfe, or even in that immoral 
 thoughtleffnefs which far the greatefl part of them are 
 fallen into. And the credibility of religion,arilmg from 
 -experience and fafts here confidered, is fully fufficient, 
 in reafon, to engage them to live in the general prac- 
 tice of all virtue and piety ; under the ferious appre- 
 henlion, though it fhould be mixed with fome doubt,* 
 of a righteous adminiftration eftablifhed in nature, 
 and a future judgment in confequence of it ; efpec- 
 ially when we confider how very queftionable it is, 
 whether any thing at all can be gained by vice ; -f how 
 unqueftionably little, as well as precarious, the pleaf- 
 ures and profits of it are at the bell ; and how foon 
 they mufl be parted with at the longeft. For, in the 
 deliberations of reafon, concerning what we are to pur- 
 fue, and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing 
 from mere paffion, are fuppofed out of the cafe, — fo in- 
 ducements to vice, from cool expeftations of pleafure 
 and intereft fo fmall and uncertain and fhort, are re- 
 ally fo infignificant, as, in the view of reafon, to be al- 
 moft nothing in themfelves j and in comparifon with 
 the importance of religion, they quite difappear and 
 are lofb. Mere paffion indeed may be alleged, though 
 not as a reafon, yet as an excufe, for a vicious courfe of 
 life. And how forry an excufe it is will be manifeft 
 by obferving, that we are placed in a condition, in 
 which we are unavoidably inured to govern our paf- 
 (ions, by being neceffitated to govern them ; and to 
 lay ourfelves under the fame kind of reftraints, and as 
 great ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue and 
 piety in the ordinary courfe of things require. The 
 plea of ungovernable paffion then, on the fide of vice, 
 
 is 
 
 * Part II. Ch. vi» f P. loo; loi. 
 
I90 CONCLUSION. Part I. 
 
 is the poorefl of all things ; for it is no reafon, and 
 but a poor excufe. But the proper motives to relig- 
 ion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, 
 from the prefages of confcience, and our natural ap- 
 prehenfion of God under the charafter of a righteous 
 governor and judge ; a nature and confcience and ap- 
 prehenfion given us by him ; and from the confirma- 
 tion of the diftates of reafon, by life and immortn/itv 
 brought to light by the Gofpel ; and the wrath of God 
 revealed from heaven^ ciga'wfi all tmgodlinefs, and wir^ 
 righteoufnefs of men. 
 
 Thk end of thf. first PART. 
 
ANALOGY 
 
 O F 
 
 RELIGION 
 
 TO THE 
 
 Constitution and Course of Nature. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Of Revealed Religion. 
 
 C H A P. I. 
 
 Of the Importance of Chriflianity, 
 
 i^OME perfons, upon pretence of the fuf- 
 iiclency of the hght of nature, avowedly reject all rev- 
 elation, as in its very notion incredible, and what muft 
 be fictitious. And indeed it is certain no revelation 
 would have been given, had the light of nature been 
 fufficient in fuch a fenfe as to render one not wanting 
 and ufelefs. But no man, in ferioufnefs and fimplicity 
 of mind, can poffibly think it fo, who confiders the 
 ftate of religion in the heathen world, before revela- 
 tion, and its prefent ftate in thofe places which have 
 borrowed no light from it ; particularly the doubt' 
 fulnefs of fome of the greateft men concerning things 
 of the utmoft importance, as well as the natural inat-^ 
 tention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is 
 impoffible to fay v/ho would have been able to have 
 
 reafoned 
 
igz Of the Importance Part II. 
 
 reafoned out that whole fyfteai, which we call natural 
 rehgion, in its genuine fimpilcity, clear otTuperftition ; 
 but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the 
 generality could. If they could, there is no fort of 
 probability that they would. Admitting there were, 
 they would highly want a {landing admonition, to re- 
 mind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. And 
 farther flill, were they as much difpofed to attend to 
 religion as the better fort of men are, yet even upon 
 this fuppofition there would be various occafions for 
 fupernatural inftruclion and affiftancc, and the greateft 
 advantages might be afforded by them. So that to 
 fay, revelation is a thing fuperfluous, what there was 
 no need of, and what can be of no fervice, is, I think, 
 to talk quite wildly and at random. Nor would it 
 be more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is fo en- 
 tirely at eafe in the prefent ftate, and life fo complete- 
 ly happy, that it is a contradidion to fuppofe our con- 
 dition capable of being in any refpedl better. 
 
 There are other, perfons, not to be ranked with 
 thefe, who feem to be getting Into a way of negledl- 
 ing, and, as it were, overlooking revelation as of fmall 
 importance, provided natural religion be kept to. 
 With little regard either to the evidence of the former, 
 or to the objections againfh it, and even upon fuppo- 
 iition of its truth, *' the only delign of it," fay they, 
 " muft be to eflablilli a belief of the moral fyflcm of 
 nature, and to enforce the practice of natural piety 
 and virtue. The belief and practice of thefe things 
 were, perhaps, much promoted by the firfl publication 
 of Chrifcianity ; but whether they are believed and 
 pradtifed, upon the evidence and motives of nature or 
 of revelation, is no great matter." * This way of con- 
 
 fidering 
 
 * Invsnis multos propterea nolle fieri Chriflianos, quia quafi faffic;- 
 
 unt fibi de bona vita fua. Bene vivere opus eft, ait. Quid mi hi pi juceptur 
 rus eft Chrillus ? Ut bene vivam ? jana bene vivo. Quid mihi uecefTarius 
 eft Chriftus ? Nullum liomicidium, nullum furtura, nuliam rapinam faciu, 
 res alienas iion concupifco, nullo adulterio contaminor. Nam inveniatur 
 in vita msa aliouid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faclat Chrifti- 
 anum. ^'lug. in FfuLxxxx, 
 
Chap. I. of Chrijlianity. 193 
 
 fidering revelation, though it is not the fame with the 
 former, yet borders nearly upon it, and very much, at 
 length, runs up into it, and requires to be particularly 
 conlidered, with regard to the perfons who feem to be 
 getting into this way. The conftderation of it will 
 likewife farther ihew the extravagance of the former 
 opinion, and the truth of the obfervations in anfwer to 
 it, juft mentioned. And an inquiry into the import- 
 ance of Chriftianity, cannot be an improper introduc- 
 tion to a treatife concerning the credibility of it. 
 
 Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and 
 commanded thofe things which are com.manded in 
 Chriftianity, it is evident, at firft fight, that it cannot 
 in any wife be an indifferent matter, whether we obey 
 or difobey thofe commands, unlefs we are certainly af- 
 fured that we know all the reafons for them, and that 
 all thofe reafons are now ceafed, with regard to man- 
 kind in general, or to ourfelves in particular. And it 
 is ablolutely impoifible we can be alTured' of this. For 
 our ignorance of thefe reafons proves nothing in the 
 cafe, lince the whole analogy of nature (hews, what is 
 indeed in itfelf evident, that there may be infinite rea- 
 fons for things, with which we are not acquainted. 
 
 But the importance of Chriftianity will more dif- 
 tinftly appear, by confidering it more diftin6tly. — 
 Firji, as a republication and external inftitution of nat- 
 ural or elTential religion, adapted to the prefent cir- 
 cumftances of mankind, and intended to promote nat- 
 ural piety and 'virtue : And, Secondly, as containing an 
 account of a difpenfation of things, not difcoverable 
 by reafon, in confequence of which feveral diftinct pre- 
 cepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is 
 the foundation and principal part of Chriftianity, it is 
 not in any fenfe the whole of it. 
 
 I. Chriftianity is a republication of natural religion. 
 It inftruccs mankind in the moral fyftem of the world ; 
 that it is the work of an infinitely perfed Being, and 
 
 under 
 
194, ^f ^^^^ Importance Part II, 
 
 under his government ; that virtue is his law ; and 
 that he will finally judge mankind in righteoufnefs, 
 and render to all according to their works, in a future 
 ftate. And, which is very material, it teaches natural 
 religion in its genuine fimplicity, free from thofe fuper- 
 ftitions with which it was totally corrupted, and un- 
 der which it was in a manner loft. 
 
 Revelation is farther an authoritative publication 
 of natural religion, and fo affords the evidence of tefti- 
 mony for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles and 
 prophecies recorded in Scripture were intended to 
 prove a particular difpenfation of Providence, the re- 
 demption of the world by the Mefliah j but this does 
 not hinder but that they may alfo prove God's general 
 providence over the Vv'orld, as our moral governor and 
 judge. And they evidently do prove it, becaufe this 
 charafter of the Author of nature is neceflarily con- 
 neifled with and implied in that particular revealed 
 difpenfation of things ; it is likewife continually taught 
 exprefsly, and infifted upon, by thofe perfons who 
 wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. 
 So that indeed natural religion feems as much proved 
 by the Scripture revelation, as it would have been had 
 the defign of revelation been nothing elfe than to 
 prove it. 
 
 But it may pofTibly be difputed, how far miracles 
 can prove natural religion, and notable objedions may 
 be urged againft this proof of it, confidered as a mat- 
 ter of fpeculation j but confidered as a pradical thing, 
 there can be none. For fuppofe a perfon to teach 
 natural religion to a nation, who had lived in total ig- 
 norance or forgetfulnefs of it, and to declare he was 
 commifTioned by God lb to do, — fuppofe him, in proof 
 of his commiffion, to foretel things future which no 
 human forefight could have guefTed at, to divide the 
 fea with a word, feed great multitudes with bread from 
 heaven, cure all manner of difeaies, and raife the dead, 
 
 even 
 
Chap. I. of Chrijlianity, 195 
 
 even himfelf, to life, — would not this give additional 
 credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what 
 that ot a common man would have, and be an authori- 
 tative publication of the law of nature, i. e. a new proof 
 of it ? It would be a pradical one, of the ftrongeft 
 kind, perhaps, which human creatures are capable of 
 having given them. The Law of Mofes then, and 
 the Gofpel of Chrifl, are authoritative publications of 
 the religion of nature ; they afford a proof of God's 
 general providence, as moral governor of the world, as 
 well as of his particular difpenfations of providence to- 
 wards finful creatures, revealed in the Law and the 
 Gofpel. As they are the only evidence of the latter, 
 fo they are an additional evidence of the former. 
 
 To fhew this further, let us fuppofe a man of the 
 greateft and mofh improved capacity, who had never 
 heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole, not- 
 withftanding the diforders of the world, that it was un- 
 der the direftion and moral government of an infinitely 
 perfedt Being, but ready to queftion whether he were 
 not got beyond the reach of his faculties, — fuppole 
 him brought, by this lui'picion, into great danger of 
 being carried away by the univerfal bad example of al- 
 moft; every one around him, who appeared to have no 
 fenfe, no pradiical fenfe at leaft, of thefe things, — and 
 this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a fituation 
 with regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed 
 any man in. What a confirmation now muft it be to 
 fuch a perfon, all at once to find that this moral fyf- 
 tem of things was revealed to mankind, in the name 
 of that infinite Being, whom he had from principles of 
 reafon believed in ; and that the publKhers of the rev- 
 elation proved their com.raiffion from him, by making 
 it appear, that he had entrufted them with a power of 
 fufpending and changing the general laws of nature. 
 
 Nor muft it by any means be omitted, for it is a 
 thuig of the utmoil importance, that life and immor- 
 tality 
 
196 Of the Importance Part II, 
 
 tality are eminently brought to light by the Gofpel. 
 The great doctrines of a future ftatc, the danger of a 
 courfe of wickednefs, and the efEcacy of repentance, 
 are not only confirmed in the Gofpel, but are taught, 
 efpecially the laft is, with a degree of light to which 
 that of nature is but darknefs. 
 
 Farther : As Chriftianity ferved thefe ends and pur- 
 pofes when it was firft publifhed, by the miraculous 
 publication itfelf, fo it was intended to ferve the fame 
 purpofes in future ages, by means of the fettlement of 
 a vifible church ; of a fociety diftinguiflied from com- 
 mon ones, and from the reft of the world, by pecuiiajr 
 religious inftitutions, by an inftituted method of in^ 
 ilrudlion, and an inftituted form of externa! religion. 
 Miraculous powers were given to the firft preachers of 
 Chriftianity, in order to their introducing it into the 
 world ; a vifible church was eftabliflied in order to 
 continue it, and carry it on fucceffively throughout all 
 ages. Had Mofes and the prophets, Chrift and his 
 apoftles, only taught, and by miracles proved, religion 
 to their cotemporaries, the benefits of their inftru(!tions 
 would have reached but to a fmall part of mankind. 
 Chriftianity muft have been, in a great degree, funk 
 and forgot in a very few ages. To prevent this, ap- 
 pears to have been one reafon why a vifible church was 
 inftituted ; to be like a city upon a hill, a ftanding 
 memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our 
 Maker ; to call men continually, both by example and 
 inftruftion, to attend to it, and by the form of religion 
 ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality j to 
 be the repofitory of the oracles of God ; to hold up 
 the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and 
 propagate it throughout all generations to the end of 
 the world — the light of revelation conlidered here in 
 no other view than as defin-ned to enforce natural re- 
 hgion. And in proportion as Chriftianity is profelfed 
 and taught in the world, religion, natural or effen- 
 
 tial. 
 
Chap. t. of Chrifianity, 197 
 
 tial religion, Is thus difliindly and advantageoully laid 
 before mankind, and brought again and again to 
 their thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance. 
 A vifible church has alfo a farther tendency to pro- 
 mote natural religion, as being an inftituted method 
 of education, originally intended to be of more pecu- 
 liar advantage to thofe who would conform to it. For 
 one end of the inftitution was, that by admonition and 
 reproof, as well as inftruction, by a general regular 
 dlfcipline, and publick exercifes of rehgion, the body of 
 CJiriJI, as the Scripture fpeaks, ihould be edified, i. e, 
 trained up in piety and virtue, for a higher and better 
 itate. This fettlement then appearing thus beneficial, 
 tending in the nature of the thing to anfwer, and in 
 fome degree actually aniwering, thofe ends, it is to be 
 remembered that the very notion of it implies pofitive 
 inflitutions ; for the vifibility of the church confifts in 
 thenii Take away every thing of this kind, and yoxi 
 iofe the very notion itfelf. So that if the things now 
 mentioned are advantages, the reafon and importance 
 of pofitive inflitutions in general is moft obvious, fince 
 without them thefe advantages could not be fecured to 
 the world. And it is mere idle wantonnefs, to infifl: 
 upon knowing the reaions why fuch particular ones 
 were fixed upon, rather than others. 
 
 The benefit arifing from this fupcrnatural afiifgmce 
 which Chriflianity affords to natural religion, is what 
 fome perfons are very flow in apprehending. And yet 
 it is a thing diflinct in itfelf, and a very plain obvious 
 one. For will any in good earrieft really fay, that the 
 bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as ad- 
 vantageous a fituation with regard to natural religion 
 as they are now amongfl us ; that it was laid befort; 
 thani, and enforced upon them, in a manner as dif- 
 tin»5t, and as much tending to influence their pra^fJce ? 
 
 The objedions againfl ail this, from the perverfioji 
 of Chriflianity, and from the fuppoiition of its having 
 
 had 
 
ipS Of the Importance . Part IL 
 
 had but little good influence, however innocently they 
 may be propoled, yet cannot be infifted upon as con- 
 cluiive upon any principles but fuch as lead to down- 
 right atheifm ; becaufe the manifeftation of the law 
 of nature by reafon, which upon all principles of theifni 
 muft have been from God, has been perverted and ren- 
 dered ineffedtual in the fame manner. It may indeed, 
 I tliink, truly be faid, that the good effefts of Chrifti- 
 anity have not been fmall ; nor its fuppofed ill effedts 
 an'y effeds at all of it, properly fpeaking. Perhaps too 
 the things themfelves done have been aggravated ; and 
 if not, Chriftianity hath been often only a pretence • 
 and the fame evils in the main would have been done 
 upon Ibme other pretence. However, great and 
 fhocking as the corruptions and abufes of it have re- 
 ally been, they cannot be infifted upon as arguments 
 againft it upon principles of theifm. For one cannot 
 proceed one ftep in reafoning upon natural religion, 
 any more than upon Chriftianity, without laying it 
 down as a firft principle, that the difpenfations of Prov- 
 idence are not to be judged of by their perverfions, but 
 by their genuine tendencies ; not by what they do ac- 
 tually feem to effe6t, but by what they would effed if 
 mankind did their part, that part which is juftly put 
 and left upon them. It is altogether as much the 
 language of one as of the other. He that is wijuji let 
 him be mijiift Jiill ; and he that is holy let him be holy Ji ill* 
 The light of reafon does not, any more than that of 
 revelation, force men to fubmit to its authority ; both 
 admonifli them of what they ought to do and avoid, 
 together with the confequences of each, and after this 
 leave them at full liberty to aft juft as they pleafe, till 
 the appointed time of judgment. Every moment's 
 experience (hews, that this is God's general rule of 
 government. 
 
 To return then : Chriftianity being a promulgation 
 of the law of nature, being moreover an authoritative 
 
 promulgation 
 
 Rev. xxii. ij> 
 
Chap. I. of Chrijlianity. ip^j 
 
 promulgation of it, with new light, and other circum- 
 ftances of peculiar advantage adapted to the wants of 
 mankind, — thefe things fully ihew its importance. 
 And it is to be obferved farther, that as the nature of 
 the cafe requires, fo all Chriftians are commanded to 
 contribute, by their profeffion of Chriftianity, to pre- 
 ferve it in the world, and render it fuch a promulga- 
 tion and enforcement of religion. For it is the very 
 fcheme of the Gofpel that each Chriftian ihould, in 
 his degree, contribute towards continuing and carry- 
 ing it on ; all by uniting in the publick profeffion and 
 external pradice of Chriftianity ; fome by inftrufting, 
 by having the overiight, and taking care of this religi- 
 ous community, the church of God. Now this far- 
 ther fhews the importance of Chriftianity, and, which 
 is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a pra£lical 
 fenfe ; or the high obligations we are under to take it 
 into our moft ferious conlideration, and the danger 
 there muft neceffarily be, not only in treating it de- 
 fpitefully, which I am not now fpeaking of, but in 
 difregardlng and neglecting it. For this is negled:ing 
 to do what is exprefsly enjoined us, for continuing 
 thole benefits to the world, and tranfmitting them 
 down to future times ; and all this holds, even though 
 the only thing to be coniidered in Chriftianity were 
 its fubferviency to natural religion. But, 
 
 II. Chriftianity is to be confidered in a further view, 
 as containing an account of a difpenfation of things 
 not at all difcoverable by reaion, in confequence of 
 which feverai diftindt precepts are enjoined us. Chrift- 
 ianity is not only an external inftitiition of natural 
 religion, and a new promulgation of God's general 
 providence, as righteous governor and judge of the 
 world, but it contains alfo a revelation of a particular 
 difpenfation of providence, carrying on by his Son 
 and Spirit, for the recovery and falvation of mankind, 
 who are reprefented in Scripture to be in a ftate of ruin. 
 
 And 
 
200 The Importance Part If. 
 
 And in confequence of this revelation being made, we 
 are commanded to he baptized^ not only in the name 
 of the Father^ but alfo of the Son^ and of the Holy Ghoft ; 
 and. other obligations of duty, unknown before, to 
 the Son and the Holy Ghoft, are revealed. Now the 
 importance of thefe duties may be judged of, by ob- 
 ferving that they arife, not from pofitive commstnd 
 merely, but alfo from the offices which appear from 
 Scripture, to belong to thofe divine perfons in the 
 Golpel difpcnfation ; or from the relations which we 
 are there informed they ftand in to us. By reafon is 
 revealed the relation which God the Father ftands in 
 to us. Hence arifes the obligation of duty which we 
 are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the rela- 
 tions which the Son and Holy Spirit ftand in to us. 
 Hence arife the obligations of duty which we are un- 
 der to them. The truth of the cafe, as one may fpeak, 
 in each of thefe three refpedls being admitted ; that 
 God is the governor of the world, upon the evidence 
 of reafon — that Chrift is the mediator between God 
 and man, and the Holy Ghoft our guide and fanclifier, 
 upon the evidence of revelation ; the truth of the cafe, 
 I fay, in each of thefe refpefts being admitted, it is no 
 more a queftion, why it iliould be commanded that 
 we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy 
 Ghoft, than that we be baptized in the name of the 
 Father. This matter feems to require to be more 
 fully ftated.* 
 
 Let it be remembered then that relig-ion comes un- 
 der the twofold confideration of internal and external ; 
 for the latter is as real a part of religion, of true relig- 
 ion, as the former. Now when rehgion is confidered 
 under the firft notion, as an inward principle, to be 
 exerted in fuch and fuch inward a<5ls of the mind and 
 heart, the effence of natural religion may be faid to 
 confift in religious regards to God the Father Almtghty ; 
 
 and 
 
 * See, The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Chrifliati Sacrannients, 
 <£c. and CoUibcr of revealed Religion, as there quoted. 
 
Chap. I. of Chrijiianity. 201 
 
 and the effence of revealed religion, as diftingulfhed 
 from natural, to confift in religious regards to the Son 
 and to the Holy Ghojl. And the obligation we are 
 under, of paying thefe religious regards to each of 
 the{e divine perfons refpeclively, arifes from the refpec- 
 tive relations v/hich they each ftand in to us. How 
 thefe relations are made known, whether by reafou or 
 revelation, makes no alteration in the cafe ; becaufe 
 the duties arife out of the relations themfelves, not 
 out of the manner in which we are informed of them» 
 The Son and Spirit have each his proper office, in that 
 great difpenfation of Providence, the redemption of 
 the world ; the one our mediator, the other our fanc- 
 tifier. Does not then the duty of religious regards 
 to both thefe divine perfons as immediately arife, to 
 the view of reafon, out of the very nature of thefe of- 
 fices and relations, as the inward good will and kind 
 intention, which we owe to our fellow creatures, arifes 
 out of the common relations between us and them ? 
 But it will be afked, *' What are the inward religious 
 regards, appearing thus obvioufly due to the Son and 
 Holy Spirit, as ariiing, not merely from command in 
 Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed 
 relations which they ftand in to us ?" I anfwer — the 
 religious regards of reverence, honour, love, truft, grat- 
 itude, fear, hope. In what external manner this in- 
 ward worfliip is to be exprefied, is a matter of pure 
 revealed command, as perhaps the external manner in 
 which God the Father is to be worfhipped m.ay be 
 more io than we are ready to think 5 but the worfhip, 
 the internal worfhip itfelf, to the Son and Holy Ghofl, 
 is no farther matter of pure revealed command, than 
 us the relations they ftand in to us are matter of pure 
 revelation ; for the relations being known, the obliga- 
 tions to fuch internal worlhip are obligations of reafon, 
 arifmg out of thofe relations themfelves. In Ihort, 
 the hiitcry of the Gofpel as immediately Ihews us the 
 
 O reafon 
 
202 Of the Importance Part IL 
 
 reafon of thefe obligations, as it fliews us the meaning 
 of tlie words, Son and Holy Ghoft. 
 
 If this account of th-e Chriftian religion be juft,' 
 thofe perfons who can fpeak lightly of it, as of little 
 conGsquence, provided natural religion be kept tOy 
 plainly forget that Chriftianity, even what is peculiarly 
 fo called, as diftinguifhed from natural religion, has 
 yet fomewhat very important, even of a moral nature.- 
 For the office of our Lord being made known, and tlie 
 relation he ftands in to us, the obligation of religious 
 regards to him, is plainly moral, as much as charity to 
 mankind is ; fince this obligation arifes, before ex- 
 ternal comm.and, immediately out of that his office 
 and relation itfelf. Thiofe- perfons appear to forget, 
 that revelation is to be confidered as informing us of 
 fomewhat new in the ftate of mankind, and in the 
 government of the world ; as acquainting us with 
 fome relations we ftand in, which could not otherwife 
 have been known. And thefe relations being real, 
 (though before revelation we could be under no obli- 
 gations from them, yet upon their being revealed) 
 there is no reafon to think, but that negle6t of behav- 
 ing fuitably to them will be attended with the fame 
 kind of confequences under God's government, as 
 neglecting to behave fuitably to any other relations 
 made known to us by reafon. And ignorance, wheth- 
 er unavoidable or voluntary, fo far as we can poffibly 
 fee, will, juft as much, and juft as little, excufe in one 
 cafe as in the other ; the ignorance being fuppofed 
 equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both 
 cafes. 
 
 If therefore Chrift be indeed the mediator between 
 God and man, i. e, if Chriftianity be true, if he be in- 
 deed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God, — no one 
 can fay what may follow, not only the obftinate but 
 the carelefs difre2;ard to him in thofe hi^h relations. 
 Nay, no one can fay what may follow fuch difrcgard, 
 
 even 
 
ChAp. L of Chrijimnity. 203 
 
 even in the way of natural confequence. For, as 
 the natural confequences of vice in this life are doubt- 
 lefs to be confidered as judicial punifhments inflidied 
 by God) fo likewife, for ought we know, the judicial 
 puniihments of the future life may be, in a like way or a, 
 like fenfe, the natural confequence of vice -, * of men's 
 violating or difregarding the relations, v.'hich God 
 has placed them in here^ and made known to them. 
 
 Again : If mankind are corrupted and depraved in 
 their moral chara<^ler, and fo are unfit for that ftate 
 which Chrift is gone to jTrepare for his difciples ; and 
 if the aififlance of God's Spirit be necelTary to renew 
 their nature, in the degree requiiite to their being 
 qualified for that flate ; all which is implied in the 
 exprefs though figurative declaration. Except a man 
 be born of the Spirit^ he canvM enter into the kingdom of 
 God -y-f fuppofuig this, is it pcffible any ferious perfon 
 can think it a flight matter, whether or no he makei^ 
 ufe of the means exprefsly commanded by God for 
 obtaining this divine afliflance ? efpccially fince the 
 whole analogy of nature fhews, that we are not to 
 expeft any benefits without m.aking ufe of the appoint- 
 ed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now rea- 
 fon ihev'js us nothing of the particuiar immediate 
 means of obtaining either tempora,! or fpiritual bene- 
 fits. This therefore we mull learn, either from expe- 
 rience or revelation. And experience the prefent cafe 
 does not admit of* 
 
 The conclufion from all this evidently is, thatChrifl:-. 
 ianity being fuppofed either true or credible, it is un- 
 ipeakable irreverence, and really the mofh prefump- 
 tuous rafhnefs, to treat it as a light matter. It can 
 never juftly be efteemed of little confequence, till it 
 be pofitively fuppofed falfe. Nor do I know a higher 
 and more important obligation which we are under, 
 than that of examining mofc ferioufly into the evi- 
 O 2 dence 
 
 * Ch. V. -f John iii. 5, 
 
204 Q/" ^^^ Importance Part IL 
 
 dence of it, fuppofmg its credibilit}^ and of embracing 
 it, upon fuppofition of its truth. 
 
 The two following dcdudions may be proper to be 
 added, in order to illuftrate the foregoing obfervations, 
 aiid to prevent their being miftaken. 
 
 Firjl, Hence we may clearly fee, where lies the dif- 
 tindion between what is pofitive and what is moral in 
 religion. Moral precepts arc precepts the reafon of 
 which we fee ; pofitive precepts are precepts the rea- 
 fons of which we do not fee.* Moral duties arife out 
 of the nature of the cafe itfelf, prior to external com- 
 mand- Podtive duties do not arife out of the nature 
 of the cafe, but from external command ; nor would 
 they be duties at all, were it not for fuch command, 
 received from him whole creatures and fubjecfts we 
 are. But the manner in which the nature of the cafe 
 or the fact of the relation is made known, this doth 
 not denominate any duty either pofitive or moral. 
 That we be baptized in the name of the Father, is as 
 much a pofitive duty, as that we be baptized in the 
 name of the Son, becaufe both arife equally from re- 
 vealed command ; though the relation v^'hich we 
 ftand in to God the Father is made known to us by 
 reafon, the relation we ftand in to Chrift by revelation 
 only. On the other hand, the difpenfation of the 
 Gofpel admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes 
 due to Chrift, from his being the voluntary minifter 
 of this difpenfation, as it is due to God the Father, 
 from his being the fountain of all good ; though the 
 firil is made known to us by revelation only, the (qc- 
 ond by reafon. Hence alfo we may fee, and, for dif- 
 tinclnefs fake, it may be worth mentioning, that pofi- 
 tive inftitutions come under a twofold confideration. 
 
 They 
 
 * Thi"; is the diftinftion between moral and pofitive precepts, confidered 
 refpectively as fuch. But yet, fince the latter have fomewhat ot a moral na- 
 ture, we may fee the realon of them, confidered in tliis view. Moral and 
 pofitive precepts are in fome refpe<fts ahke, in other refpecSts different. So 
 far as they arc aUke, we difcern the reafous of both ; fo far as they ar? dif- 
 terent, ws difcern the reafoas of the former, but not of the latter. 
 
Chap. I. of Chrijiianity. 205 
 
 They are either inftltutions founded on natural relig- 
 ion, as baptifm in the name of the Father, though this 
 has alfo a particular reference to the Gofpel difpenfa- 
 tion, for it is in the name of God, as the Father of 
 our Lord Jefus Chrifb ; or they are external inflitu- 
 tions founded on revealed religion, as baptifm in the 
 name of the Son and of the Holy Ghoft. 
 
 Secondly, From the diftinftion between what is 
 moral and what is pofitive in religion, appears the 
 ground of that peculiar preference which the Scripture 
 teaches us to be due to the former. 
 
 The reafon of pofitive inflitutions in general is very 
 obvious, though we fhould not fee the reafon why fuch 
 particular ones are pitched upon rather than others. 
 Whoever therefore, inftead of cavilling at words, will 
 attend to the thing itfelf, may clearly fee that pofitive 
 inftltutions in general, as diftinguillied from this or 
 that particular one, have the nature of moral com- 
 mands, fince the reafons of them appear. Thus, for 
 inftance, the external v/orfhip of God is a moral duty, 
 though no particular mode of it be fo. Care then is 
 to be taken, when a comparifon is made between pofi- 
 tive and moral duties, that they be compared no far- 
 ther than as they are different ; no farther than as the 
 former are pofitive, or arife out of mere external com- 
 jiiand, the reaibns of which we are not acquainted 
 with ; and as the latter are moral, or arife out of the 
 apparent reafon of the caffe, without fuch external 
 command. Unlefs this caution be obferved, we fhall 
 ran into endlefs confufion. 
 
 Now, this being premifed, fuppofe tvv^o {landing 
 precepts enjoined by the fame authority ; that, in cer- 
 tain conjunftures, it is impofTible to obey both ; that 
 the form.er is moral, i. e. a precept of which we fee 
 the reafons, and that they hold in the particular cafe 
 before us ; but that the latter is pofitive, i. e. a pre- 
 cept of which we do not fee the reafons ; — it is indif- 
 
 putable 
 
20 6 Of the Importance Part II. 
 
 putable that our obligations are to obey the former ; 
 becaufe there is an apparent reafon for this preference, 
 and none againft it. Farther, pofitive inilitutions, I 
 fuppofe all thofe which Chriftianity enjoins, are means 
 to a moral end ; and the end muft be acknowledged 
 more excellent than the means. Nor is obfervance of 
 thefe inftltutions any religious obedience at all, or of 
 any value, otherwife than as it proceeds from a moral 
 principle. This feems to be the ftricl logical way of 
 ilating and determining this matter ; but will, per- 
 haps, be found lefs applicable to practice than may be 
 thought at firfl fight. 
 
 And therefore, in a more pradlical though more lax 
 way of confideration, and taking the words, moral law 
 and pofitive vijiitutions ^ in the popular fenfe, — I add, 
 that the whole moral law is as much matter of reveal- 
 ed command, as pofitive inftltutions are ; for the 
 Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this refpedt 
 then they are both upon a level. But the moral law 
 is, moreover, written upon our hearts — interwoven in- 
 to our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of 
 the Author of it, which is to be preferred, when they 
 interfere. 
 
 But there is not altogether fo much neceffity for the 
 determination of this queftion as fome perfons feem to 
 think. Nor are we left to reafon alone to determine 
 it. For, Firfi^ Though mankind have, in all ages, 
 been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar 
 pofitive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to 
 moral precepts, — yet, without making any compari- 
 fon at all between them, and confequently without de- 
 termining which is to have the preference, the nature 
 of the thmg abundantly ibews all notions of that kind 
 to be utterly fubverfive of true religion ; as they are, 
 moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scrip- 
 ture, and likewife to the moft exprefs particular decla^ 
 rations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of 
 / Go4 
 
Chap. I, of Chriftianity. toy 
 
 God without moral virtue. Secondly , Upon the oc- 
 cafion of mentioning together pofitive and moral du- 
 ties, the Scripture always puts the ftrefs of religion 
 upon the latter, and never upon the former ; which, 
 though GO fort of allowance to negleft the former, 
 when they do not interfere with the ktter, yet is a 
 plain intimation that when they do, the latter are to 
 be preferred. And farther, as mankind are for plac- 
 ing the ftrefs of their religion any where rather than 
 upon virtue — left both the reafon of the thing, and 
 the general fpirit of Chriftianity, appearing in the inti- 
 mation now mentioned, Ihould be inefFedual againft 
 this prevalent folly, — our Lord himielf, from whole 
 command alone ihe obligation of politive inftitutions 
 arifes, has taken occaiion to make the comparifon be- 
 tween them and moral precepts, when the Pharifees 
 cenfured him, for eating with publicans andfinners ; 
 and alfo when they cenfured his difciples for plucking 
 the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. Upon this com- 
 parifon, he has determined exprefsly, and in form, 
 Vvr'hich fliall have the preference when they interfere. 
 And by delivering his authoritative determination in 
 ^. proverbial manner of expreffion, he has made it gen- 
 eral : Ivjill have mercy ^ and not facrifice.*" The pro-? 
 priety of the word proverbial is not the thing infiftcd 
 upon, though I think the manner of fi.eaking is to be 
 called fo. But that the manner of fpeaking very re- 
 markably renders the determination general, is iurely 
 indifputable. For, had it, in the latter cafe, been laid 
 only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid obiervance 
 of the Sabbath, — even then, by parity of reafon, moft 
 juftly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy 
 likewife to the obfervance of other ritual inftitutions, 
 and in general, moral duties to pofitive ones. And 
 thus the determination would have been genera], 
 though its being fo were inferred and not exprelfed. 
 
 But 
 
 * Matth. ix. 13. and xii. 7. 
 
2o8 Of the Importance of Chrifiianity. Part II, 
 
 But as the paffage really ftands in the Gofpel, it is 
 much ftronger. For the fenfe, and the very literal 
 ivords of our Lord's anfwer, are as applicable to any 
 other inftance of a comparifon, between pofitive and 
 moral duties, as to this upon which they were fpoken. 
 
 And if, in cafe of competition, mercy is to be pre- 
 ferred to pofitive inftitutions, it will fcarce be thought 
 that juftice is to give place to them.. It is remarkable 
 too, that, as the words are a quotation from the Old 
 Teflament, they are introduced, on both the foremen- 
 tioned occafions, with a declaration that the Pharifees 
 did not underftand the meaning of them. This, I 
 fay, is very remarkable. For, fmce it is fcarce pofiTi- 
 ble for the moft ignorant perfon not to underftand the 
 literal fenfe of the palTage in the prophet,* and fincc 
 underftanding the literal fenfe would not have pre- 
 vented their condemning the guUtlefs,-\- it can hardly be 
 doubted that the thing which our Lord really intend- 
 ed in that declaration was, that the Pharifees had not 
 learnt from it, as they might, wherein \.\-\^ general fpirit 
 of rehgion conlifts ; that it confifts in moral piety and 
 virtue, as diftinguifhed from forms and ritual obferv- 
 ances. However, it is certain we may learn this from 
 his divine application of the paffage in the Gofpel. 
 
 But, as it is one of the peculiar weakneiies of human 
 nature, when, upon a comparifon of two things, one is 
 found to be of greater importance than the other, to 
 confidcr this other as of fcarce any importance at all, — 
 it is highly necelTary that we remind ourfelves how 
 great prefumption it is, to make light of any inftitu- 
 tions of divine appointment ; that our obligations to 
 obey all God's commands whatever are ablblute and 
 indifpenlible ; and that commands merely pofitive, 
 admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obli- 
 gation to obey them — an obligation m.oral in the 
 Itrifteft and mofh proper fenfe. 
 
 To 
 
 * Hof. vi. f Sec Matth. xii. 7. 
 
Chap. II. OfthefiippofedPrefuinptlon,i^c. 2,09 
 
 To thefe things I cannot forbear adding, that the 
 account now given of Chriftianity mofl: ftrongly fhews 
 and enforces upon us tiie obligation of fearching the 
 Scriptures, in order to fee what the fcheme of reveia" 
 tion really is, inflead of determining beforehand from 
 reafon what the fcheme of it mud be.* Indeed if in 
 revelation there be found any pafiages, the feeming 
 meaning of which is contrary to natural religion, we 
 may moft certainly conclude fuch feeming meaning 
 not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a 
 prefumption againfl an interpretation of Scripture, that 
 fuch interpretation contains a doctrine which the light 
 of nature cannot difcover, -f- or a precept which the Jaw 
 of nature does not oblige to. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the fuppofed Prefumption agahijl a Revelation^ con- 
 fidered as miraculous. 
 
 JlTAVING fliewn the importance of the 
 Chriftian revelation, and the obligations which we are 
 under ferioufly to attend to it, upon fuppofition of its 
 truth, or its credibility, — the next thing in order is, to 
 conlider the fuppofed prefumptions againft revelation 
 in general, which (hall be the fubjedt of this chapter ; 
 and the obje-ftions againft the Chriftian in particular^ 
 which Ihall be the fubiect of fome following ones, t 
 For It feems the moft natural method to remove the 
 prejudices againft Chriftianity, before we proceed to 
 the confideration of the pofitive evidence for it, and 
 the objeftions againft that evidence. § 
 
 It is, I think, commonly fuppofed, that there is fome 
 peculiar prelumption, from the analogy of nature, 
 
 againft 
 
 *Sec Ch. iii. f V. no, 2ir. 
 
 J Ch. iii, IV, y, vi. § Ch. vii. 
 
210 Of tie fuppofed Prefiimption Par t II. 
 
 againfl the Chriftian fcheme of tilings, at leaft againft 
 miracles ; fo as that flrong-er evidence is neceffarv to 
 prove the truth and reahty of them than would be fuf- 
 ficient to convince us of other events, or matters of 
 fa(5t- Indeed the confideration of this fuppofed pre- 
 fumption cannot but be thought very infignificant, by 
 many perfons ; yet, as it belongs to the fubjecl of this 
 treatiie, fo it may tend to open the mind, and remove 
 fome prejudices, however needieis the confideration of 
 it be upon its own account. 
 
 I. I find no appearance of a prefumption, from the 
 analogy of nature, againft the general Icheme of Chrift- 
 ianity, that God created and invifibly governs the 
 world by Jefus Chrift, and by him alfo will hereafter 
 judge it in righteoufnefs, i. e. render to every one ac- 
 cording to his works ; and that good men are under 
 the fe^jret influence of his Spirit. Whether thefe 
 things are or are not to be called miraculous, is |)er- 
 haps only a queftion about words, or however, is of no 
 moment in the cafe. If the analogy of nature raifes 
 any prefumption againft this general fcheme of Chrift- 
 ianity, it muft be either becaufe it is not difcoverable 
 by reafon or experience, or elfe becaufe it is unlike that 
 courie of nature which is. But analogy raifes no pre- 
 fumption againft the truth of this icheme, upon either 
 of thefe accounts. 
 
 Firjl, There is no prefumption, from analogy, againft 
 the truth of it upon account of its not being difcover- 
 able by reafon or experience. For fuppofe one who 
 never heard of revelation, of the moft improved un- 
 derftanding, and acquainted with our whole fyftem of 
 natural philoiophy and natural religion, — fuch an one 
 could not but be fenfible that it was but a very fmali 
 part of the natural and moral fyftem of the univerie, 
 which he was acquainted with. He could not but be 
 fenfible that there muft be innumerable things, in the 
 diipenfations of Providence paft, in the invifible gov- 
 ernment 
 
Chap. II, ^gainjl Miracles. 21 1 
 
 ernment over the world at prefent carrying on, and in 
 what is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant,* 
 and which could not be difcovered without revelation. 
 Whether the rcheme of nature be, in the llridteft fenfe, 
 infinite or not, it is evidently vail, even beyond all pof- 
 iible imagination ; and doubtlefs that part of it which 
 is opened to our view is but as a point, in coniparifon 
 of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout 
 eternity paft and future ; in comparilbn or what is even 
 now going on in the remote parts of the boundiefs uni- 
 verfe ; nay, in comparifon of the whole fcheme of this 
 world. And therefore, that things Ite beyond the nat- 
 ural reach of our faculties, is no fort of prelumption 
 againffc the truth and reality of them ; becaufe it is 
 certain there are innumerable things, in the conftitu- 
 tion and government of the uaiverfe, which are thus 
 beyond the natural reach of our faculties. Secondi-Vy 
 Analogy raifes no prefumption againil any of the 
 things contained in this general do6lrine of Scripture 
 noiv mentioned, upon account of their being unlike 
 the known courfe of nature. For there is no pre- 
 fiimption at all from analogy, that the zvJiole courfe of 
 things, or divine government, naturally unknown to 
 us, and every thing in it, is like to any thing in that 
 which is known, and therefore no peculiar prefump- 
 tion againft any thing in the former, upon account of 
 its being unlike to any thing in the latter. And in 
 the conititution and natural government of the world, 
 as well as in the moral government of it, we fee things 
 in a great degree unlike one another, and therefore 
 ought not to wonder at fuch unlikeneis between things 
 vifible and invifible. However, the fcheme of Chnlt- 
 ianity is by no means entirely unlike the fcheme of na- 
 ture, as will appear in the foiiov/ing parr of this treatifj. 
 The notion ot a miracle, confidered as a proof of a 
 divine miffion, has been ftated with great exadnefs by 
 
 divines, 
 *p. 174, 175, 
 
 '^ 
 
c 1 2 Of ike fiippofed Prefumption P a R t II, 
 
 divines, and is, I think, fufficiently underftood by 
 every cne. There are alfo invifible miracles, the in- 
 carnation of Chrift, for inftance, which being fecret 
 cannot be alleged as a proof of fuch a miflion, but re- 
 quire themfelves to be proved by vifible miracles. 
 Revelation itfelf too is miraculous, and miracles are 
 the proof of it ; and the (uppofed prefumption againft 
 thefe, fhall prefently be confidered. All which I have 
 been obferving here is, that, whether we choofe to caU 
 every thing in the difpenfations of Providence, not 
 difcoverable without revelation, nor like the known 
 courfe of things, miraculous, and whether the o-eneral 
 Chriflian diipenfation now mentioned, is to be called 
 fo or not, the foregoing obfervations feem certainly to 
 ihew, that there is no prefumption againil it, from 
 the analogy of nature. 
 
 II. There is no prefumption from analogy againft 
 fome operations, which we fhould now call mracu- 
 lous, particularly none againft a revelation at the be- 
 ginning of the work! ; nothing of fuch prefuni'tion 
 againft it, as is fuppofed to be implied or expreii-d in 
 the word miraculous. For a miracle, in its very no- 
 tion, is relative to a courfe of nature, and implies 
 fomewhat different from it, confidered as being fo. 
 Now, either there was no courfe of nature at the time 
 which v\^e are fpeaking of, or if there were, we are not 
 acquainted what the courfe of nature is, upon the 
 firft peopling of worlds. And therefore the queftion, 
 whether mankind had a revelation made to them at 
 that time, is to be confidered, not as a queftion con- 
 cerning a miracle, but as a common quefticn of fact. 
 And we have the like reafon, be it more or lefs, to 
 admit the report of tradition concerning this queftion, 
 and concerning common matters offa61: of the fame 
 antiquity ; for inftance, what part of the earth was 
 firft peopled. 
 
 Or 
 
Chap. IL ^g^injl Miracles, 215 
 
 Or thus : When mankind was firft placed In this 
 ftate, there was a power exerted totally different from 
 the prefent courfe of nature. Noxv, whether this pow- 
 er, thus wholly different from the prefent courfe of na- 
 ture, for we cannot properly apply to it the word w/- 
 raciilons^—\v\\ti\\tr this power flopped immediately 
 after it had made man, or went on, and exerted itfelf 
 farther in giving him a revelation, is a queftlon of the 
 fame kind, as whether an ordinary power exerted it- 
 felf in fuch a particular degree and manner or not. 
 
 Or fuppole the power exerted in the formation of 
 the world be confidered as miraculous, or rather be 
 called by that name, the cafe will not be different ; 
 fmce It mufl be acknowledged, that fuch a power was 
 exerted. For fuppofing it acknowledged, that our 
 Saviour fpent fome years in a courfe of working mira- 
 cles, there is no more prefumption, worth mentioning, 
 againfl his having exerted this mxiraculous power in a 
 certain degree greater, than in a certain degree lefs ; 
 in one or two more inftances, than In one or two few- 
 er ; in this, than in another manner. 
 
 It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar 
 prefumption, from the analogy of nature, againfl fup- 
 pofing a revelation when man was firft placed upon 
 the earth. 
 
 Add, that there does not appear the leaft intima- 
 tion in hiftory or tradition, that religion was firfb rea- 
 foned out ; but the whole of hiftory and tradition 
 makes for the other fide, that it came into the world 
 by revelation. Indeed the flate of religion in the firfl 
 ages, cf which we have any account, feems to fuppofe 
 and imply that this was the original of it amongfl 
 mankind. And thefe reflexions together, without 
 taking in the pecuHar authority of Scripture, amount 
 to real and a very material degree of evidence, that 
 there was a revelation at the beginning of the world. 
 Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, 
 
 and 
 
214 Of the fuppofed Prefumptwn P a il t IL 
 
 and therefore mentioned in the former part of this 
 treatiie,* fo likewife it has a tendency to remove any 
 prejudices againft a fubfequent revelation. 
 
 III. But (lill it may be objeded, that there is fome 
 peculiar preuimption, from analogy, againft miracles, 
 particularly againft revelation, after the fettlement and 
 during the continuance of a courfe of nature. 
 
 Now with regard to this fuppofed prefumption it is 
 to be obferved in general, that before we can have 
 ground for railing what can, with any propriety, be 
 called an armment from analoq;v, for or againfl revela- 
 tion, conlidered as fomewhat miraculous, we muft be 
 acquainted with a fimilar or parallel caie. But the 
 hiftory of fome other world, feemingly in like circum- 
 ftances wdth our own, is no more than a parallel cafe, 
 and therefore nothing fhort of this can be fo. Yet, 
 could w^e come at a prefumptive proof for or againft a 
 revelation, from being informed whether fuch world 
 had one or not, fuch a proof, being drawn from one 
 fingle inftance only, muft be infinitely precarious. 
 More particularly ; Firjl of all. There is a very ftrong 
 prefumption againft common fpeculative truths, and 
 againft the moft ordinary fadis, before the proof of 
 them, which yet is overcome by almoft any proof. 
 There is a prefumption of millions to one againft the 
 ftory of Cafar, or of any other man. For fuppofe a 
 number of common fafts fo and fo circumftanced, of 
 which one had no kind of proof, ihouid happen to 
 come into one's thoughts, every one would, without 
 any pofTible doubr, conclude them to be falfe ; and 
 the like may be faid of a fmgle common fadL And 
 from hence it appears, that the queftion of importance 
 as to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of 
 the peculiar prefumption fuppofed againft miracles ; 
 not v.'hether there be anv peculiar prefumption at all 
 againft them. For, if there be the prefumption of 
 
 miUioiis 
 
Chap. II. ~ againji Miracles. 213 
 
 millions to one againft the mod common fads, what 
 can a fmall prefumption additional to this amount to, 
 though it be peculiar ? It cannot be ellimated,and is as 
 nothing. The only material queftion is, whether there 
 be any fuch prefumption againft miracles, as to render 
 them in any fort incredible. Secondly^ If we leave out 
 the confideration of religion, we are in fuch total dark- 
 nefs upon what caufes, occafions, reafons, or circum- 
 {lances,theprefent courfe of nature depends, that there- 
 does not appear any improbability for or againft fuppof- 
 ing,that five or (ix thoufand years may have given fcope 
 for caufes, occafions, reaforis, or circumftances, from 
 whence miraculous interpofitions may have arifen. 
 And from this, joined with the foregoing obfervation, 
 it will follow, that there muft be a prel'umption be- 
 yond all comjDarifon greater, againft the particular 
 common fads juft now inftanced in, than againft mir- 
 acles in general^ before any evidence of either. But, 
 Thirdly^ Take in the confideration of religion, or the 
 moral fyftem of the world, and then we fee diftind: 
 particular reafons for miracles — to afford mankind in- 
 ftrudion additional to that of nature, and to atteft 
 the truth of it. And this gives a real credibility to 
 the fuppofition, that it might be part of the original 
 plan of things, that there Ihould be miraculous inter- 
 pofitions. Then, LaJiJy, Miracles muft not be com- 
 pared to common natural events, or to events which, 
 though uncommon, are fimilar to what we daily expe- 
 rience ; but to the extraordinary phenomena of na- 
 ture- And then the comparifon will be between the 
 prefumption againft miracles, and the prefumption 
 againft luch uncommon appearances, fuppofe, as com- 
 ets, and againft there being any fuch powers in nature 
 as magnetifm and eledricity, fo contrary to the prop- 
 erties of other bodies not endued with thefe powers. 
 And before any one can determine whether there be 
 any peculiar preiumption againft miracles, more than 
 
 againft 
 
£i6 The CrediaiBty cf Rnelation Part H. 
 
 againll other extraordinary things, he muft confider 
 v.har, upon hrft hearing, would be the prefumption 
 againit the iaft mentioned appearances and powers, to 
 a perlon acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and 
 annual coune of nature refpeftir^ this earth, and with 
 thole common powers ot matier which we even- day 
 fee. 
 
 Upon all this I conclude, that there certainly is no 
 fuch Drefumption agamit miracles as to render them in 
 any wife incredible ; that on the contrary, our b^ng 
 able to dilcem reafons for them gives a pofitive credi- 
 bility to the hiftory of them, in cafes where thofe rea- 
 loas hold ; and that it is by no means certain, that 
 there is any particular prefomption at all, from analo- 
 gr, even in the lowell degree, againil miracles, as dif- 
 tinguiiLed from other extraordinar)'^ phenomena — 
 though it is not wonh while to perplex the reader 
 WiXh. inquiries into the abltrad nature of evidence, in 
 order to determine a quefbon, w hich without fuch in- 
 quiries we fee* is of no importance. 
 
 =^>i o? «o» tQ titi )fn ii i^«=^^ 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of our I - ■ '■■: ofj\tdpn% zdieit ivere to he expefted /« 
 
 a Re I. , and the Credibility, from A?m!og^;, that 
 
 it mufi contain. Things appearing iicble to Obje^ions. 
 
 XSeSIDES the objeclions againil: the evi- 
 dence for Chriitianity, many are alleged againil the 
 fcheme of it, againil the whole manner in which it is 
 pjt and left with the world, as well as againfl feveral 
 partic-iiar relations in Scripture ; obieftions drawn 
 firom the deficiencies of revelation ; from things in it 
 appearing to men foollOinefs ; -f from its conraining 
 
 matters 
 
 '?.;:?. -MCor.L;?. 
 
Chap. III. liahJe io Op/cBhns. ±ij 
 
 matters of offence, which have kd, and it muil have 
 
 been toreleen would lead, into ftrange enthuiiai'in and 
 Tuperftition, and be made to ien"e the purpoies of r\-- 
 rannv and wickedneis ; from its not being iiniverial ; 
 and, which is a thing ot the iame kind, u:on\ its evi- 
 dence not being io convincing and fatisfaitory as it 
 might have been ; for this kit is fometimes turned 
 into apoiitive argument againii its trath.* It would 
 be tedious, indeed impollibie, to enumerate the leveral 
 particulars comprehended under the objetftions here 
 referred to ; thev being fo various, according to the 
 diiferent fancies of men. There are perfons who think 
 it a ftrong objection againit the authoRty of Scripture, 
 that it is not comp>oied by rules of art, agreed upon 
 by criticks, for polite and correct wTitings. And the 
 fcom is inexprellible, with which fome of the prophet- 
 ick parts of Scripture are treated ; partly through the 
 raihnefs of interpreters, but very much alfo on account 
 of the hierogiyphical and fiarurative language in which 
 they are left us. Some of the principal tilings of this 
 fort Ihall be particularly conlidered in the foilowing 
 chapters. But my deign at preient is to obierve ia 
 genera], with refpe>ft to this whole way of arguing, 
 that, upon fuppofiticn of a revelation, it is highly cred- 
 &le betorehand, we {hould be incomp)etent judges of 
 it, to a great degree ; and that it would contain ma- 
 ny things app-eanng to us liable to great objecnons, 
 in cafe we judge of it otherwife than by the anaic^y 
 of nature. And therefore though objections againit 
 the evidence of Chriilianity are moil fericinh' to be 
 conlidered, yet obje<5tions agsinil Chrifdanity itfehare, 
 in a great meaiure, frivolous .; almoft all oV - 
 
 againit it, excepting thofe which are allegec _, z 
 
 the particular proofs cf its ctHnin^ from God. I ex- 
 
 prefs myfeh'with caution, lelt I ilioulJ be miitakeii to 
 
 viiifv reafon, which i? indeed the or/iv facnlty we have 
 
 r wberewkk 
 
 ^ SecCh-vi. 
 
1 1 8 The Credibility of Revelation ]P ar t Tf * 
 
 wherewith to jyidge concerning any thing, even reve- 
 lation itfelf ; or be mirundcrflood to affert, that a fiip- 
 pofed revelation cannot be proved falfe from internal 
 charaders. For, it may contain clear immoralities or 
 contradictions, and either of thefe would prove it falfe. 
 Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing elfe 
 can poffibly render any fuppofed revelation incredible* 
 Yet ftill the obfervation above is, I think, true beyond 
 doubt, that objec^Lions againft Chriftianky, as diftin- 
 guillied from objeftions againft its evidence, are friv- 
 olous. To make out this, is the general defign of the 
 prefent chapter. And with regard to the whole of 
 it, I cannot but particularly wifh that the proofs 
 might be attended to, rather than the affertiotis cavil- 
 led at, upon account of any unacceptable confequenc- 
 es, whether real or fuppofed, which may be drawn 
 from them. For, after all, that which is true muft 
 be admitted, though it fhould Ihew us the fhortnefs 
 of our faculties, and that we are in no wife judges of 
 many things, of which we are apt to think ourfelves 
 very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection 
 with reafonable men, at leaft upon fecbnd thought it 
 will not be any objedlion with fuch, againft the juft-» 
 nefs of the following obfervations. 
 
 As God governs the world, and inftruds his crea- 
 tures, according to certain laws or rules, in the known' 
 courfe of nature, known by reafon together with ex- 
 perience, — fo the Scripture informs us of a fcheme of 
 divine Providence additional to this. It relates, that 
 God has, by revelation, inftrudied men in things con- 
 cerning his government which they could not oth- 
 erwife have known, and reminded them of things 
 which they might otherwife know, and attefted the 
 truth of the whole by miracles. Now if the natural 
 and the revealed difpenfation of things are both from 
 God, if they coincide with each other, and together 
 make up one fcheme of Providence, — our being in- 
 competent 
 
Chap. III. liahlc to OhjeBions. 219 
 
 competent judges of one, mufl render it credible that 
 we may be incompetent judges alfo^ of the other. 
 Since, upon experience, the acknowledged conftitution 
 and courfe of nature is found to be greatly different 
 from what, before experience, would have been expeft- 
 ed, and fuch as men fancy there lie great objediions 
 againft, — this renders it beforehand highly credible, 
 that they may find the revealed difpenfation likewife, 
 if they judge of it as they do of the conftitution of na- 
 ture, very different from expedations formed before- 
 hand, and liable, in appearance, to great objections ; 
 objections againft the fcheme itfelf, and againft the de- 
 grees and manners of the miraculous interpofitions by 
 which it was attefted and carried on. Thus, fuppofe 
 a prince to govern his dominions in the wifeft manner 
 poffible, by common known laws, and that upon fome 
 exigencies he fhould fufpend thefe laws, and govern, 
 in feveral inftances, in a different manner ; if one of 
 his fubjedts w^re not a competent judge beforehand, 
 by what common rules the government ftiould or 
 would be carried on, it could not be expefted that 
 the fame perfon would be a competent judge, in what 
 exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, thofe 
 laws commonly obferved would be fufpended or devi- 
 ated from. If he were not a judge of the wifdom of 
 the ordinary adminiftration, there is no reafon to think 
 he would be a judge of the wifdom of the extraordi- 
 nary. If he thought he had objeftions againft the 
 former, doubtlefs it is highly fuppofable he might 
 think alfo that he had objeftions againft the latter. 
 And thus as we fall into infinite follies and miftakes, 
 whenever we pretend, otherwife than from experience 
 and analogy, to judge of the conftitution and courfe 
 of nature, — it is evidently fuppofable beforehand that 
 we fliould fail into as great in pretending to judge, in 
 the like manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there 
 any more ground to exped that this latter ihould ap- 
 P % pear 
 
220 The Credibility of Revelation Part If, 
 
 pear to us clear of objedions, than that the former 
 fliould. 
 
 Thefe obfervations, relating to the whole of Chrift'^ 
 ianitjs are applicable to infpiration m particular. As 
 we are in no, fort judges beforehand, by what laws or 
 rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were to 
 have been expeded, that God would naturally inftruft 
 us, — {o upon fuppofition of his affording us light and 
 inftruftlori by revelation, additional to what he has af- 
 forded us by reafon and experience, we are in no fort 
 judges by what methods, and in what proportion, it 
 were to be expected that this fupernatural light and 
 inflruftion would be afforded us. We know not be- 
 forehand, what degree or kind of natural information 
 it were to be expeded God would afford men, each by 
 his own reafon and experience ; nor how far he would 
 enable and' effe6lually dilpofe them to communicate 
 it, whatever it Ihould be, to eacn other ; nor whether 
 the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable^ 
 or doubtful ; nor whether it would be given with equal 
 clearnefs and convi6lion to all. Nor could we guefs, 
 upon any good ground I mean, whether natural knowl- 
 edge, or even the faculty itfelf by which we are capa- 
 ble of attaining it, reafon, would be given us at once, 
 or gradually. In like manner we are wholly ignorant,, 
 what degree of new knowledge it were to be expedied 
 God would give mankind by revelation, upon fuppo- 
 iition of his afTording one ; or how far, or in what way, 
 he would interpofe miraculoully to qualify them, to- 
 whom he fhould originally make the revelation, for 
 communicating the knowledge given by it, and to fe- 
 cure their doing it' to the age in which they fhould 
 live, and to fecure its being tranfmitted to pofterity. 
 We are equally ignorant whether the evidence of it 
 would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful ;* 
 or whether all who fhould have any degree of inflruc-' 
 
 tioiii 
 
 * See Cb. vi. 
 
Chap. III. liable to ■ObjeSlions. 221 
 
 tion from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, 
 would have the fame ; or whether the fcheme would 
 be revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we 
 are not in any fort able .to judge, whether it were to 
 have been expefted that the revelation fhould have 
 been committed to writing, or left to be handed down, 
 and confequently corrupted by verbal tradition, and at 
 length funk under it, if mankind lb pleafed, and dur- 
 ing fuch time as they are permitted^ in the degree they 
 evidently are, to acl as they will. 
 
 But it may be faid, " that a revelation in fome of 
 the above mentioned circumllances, one, for inftance, 
 which was not committed to writing, and thus fecured 
 againft danger of corruption, would not have aniiwered 
 its purpofe," I afk, what purpofe ? It v/ould not have 
 anfwered all the purpofes which it has now anfwered, 
 and in the fame degree ; but it would have anfwered 
 others, or the fame in different degrees. And which 
 of thefe were the purpofes of God, and befl fell in with 
 his general government, we could not at all have de^ 
 termined beforehand. 
 
 Now fince it has been lliewn, that we have no prin- 
 ciples of reafon, upon which to judge beforehand how 
 it were to be expefted revelation fhould have been left, 
 or what was mofl fuitable to the divine plan of gov- 
 ernment in any of the forementioned refpe<9:s, — it 
 muft be quite frivolous to objeA afterwards as to any 
 of them, againft its being left in one way rather than 
 another ; for this would be to objed: againft things, 
 upon account of their being different from expefta- 
 tions, which have been fhewn to be without reafon. 
 And thus we fee that the only queftion concerning the 
 truth of Chriftianity is, whether it be a real revelation , 
 not whether it be attended with every circumlfance 
 which we fliould have looked for — and concerning the 
 .authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to 
 be J not whether it be a bo'ok of fuch fort, and (o pro- 
 
 ;nulged, 
 
222 The Credibility of Revelation Part II. 
 
 mulged, as weak men are apt to fanc}^ a book con- 
 taining a divine revelation fhouid. And therefore nei- 
 ther obfcurity, nor Teeming inaccuracy of ftyle, nor 
 various readings, nor early difputes about the authors 
 of particular parts, nor any other things of the like 
 !kind, though they had been much more confiderable 
 in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority 
 of the Scripture ; unlefs the prophets, apoftles, or our 
 Lord, had promifed that the book containing the cJi- 
 vine revelation fliould be fecure from thofe things. 
 Nor indeed can any objeftions overthrow fuch a kind 
 of revelation as the Chriftian claims to be, iince there 
 are no objections againfl the morality of it,* but fuch 
 as can fhev/ that there is no proof of miracles wrought 
 originally in atteflation of it, no appearance of any 
 thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world, nor any 
 of prophecy, that is, of events foretold which hu- 
 man fagacity could not forefee. If it can be Ibewn, 
 that the proof alleged for all thefe is abfolutely none 
 at ail, then is revelation overturned. But were it al- 
 lowed that the proof of any one or all of them is lower 
 than is allowed, yet, whilft any proof of them remains, 
 revelation will ftand upon much the fame foot it does 
 at prefent, as to all the purpofes of life and praftice, 
 and ought to have the like influence upon our be- 
 haviour. 
 
 From the foregoing obfervatlons too it will follow, 
 and thofe who will thoroughly examine into revelation 
 will find it worth remarking, that there are feveral 
 wa5^s of arguing, which, though juft with regard to 
 other writings, are not applicable to Scripture ; at leafb 
 not to the prophetic parts of it. We cannot argue, 
 for inftance, that this cannot be the fenfc or intent of 
 fuch a paflage of Scripture, for if it had it would have 
 been exprelTed more plainly, or have been reprefented 
 under a more apt figure or hieroglyphick ; yet we may 
 
 juflly 
 * p. 229, 
 
Chap. III. liable to ObjeElions. 223 
 
 juftly argue thus with refped; to common books. And 
 the realbn of this difference is very evident, that in 
 Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in 
 common books, how plainly it were to have been ex-- 
 peeled, what is the true fenfe fhould have been ex-, 
 prefled, or under how apt an image figured. The 
 only queftion is, what appearance there is that this is 
 the fenfe, and fcarce at all how much more determi- 
 •nately or accurately it might have been exprefled or 
 iigured. 
 
 *' But is ist not felfevident, that internal improba- 
 bilities of all kinds v^^eaken external probable proof ?'* 
 Doubtlefs. But to v/hat praftical purpofe can this be 
 alleged here, when it has been proved before,* that 
 real internal improbabilities, which rife even to moral 
 certainty, are overcome by the moft ordinary teftimo^. 
 jiy, and when it now has been made appear, that we 
 •fcarce know what are improbabilities as to the matter 
 we are here confidering — as it will farther appear from 
 what follows. 
 
 For though from the obfervations above made, it is 
 manifefh that we are not in any fort competent judges 
 what fupernatural inftrudtion were to have been expedt^ 
 ed,and though it is felfevident that the objections of an 
 incompetent judgment muft be frivolous, — yet it may 
 be proper to go one ftep farther, and obferve, that if 
 men will be regardlefs of thefe things, and pretend to 
 judge of the Scripture by preconceived expedlations, 
 the analogy of nature lliews beforehand, not only that 
 it is highly credible they may, but aifo probable that 
 they will, imagine they have ftrong obje(5tions againft 
 it, however really unexceptionable ; for fo, prior to exr 
 perience, they would think they had, againft the cirr 
 cumftances and degrees, and the whole manner of that 
 inftruclion which is afforded by the ordinary courfe of 
 nature. Were the inllrudion which God affords to 
 
 brute 
 *p. 214. 
 
424 The Credibility of Revelation Fart 11, 
 
 brute creatures by inftinds and mere propenfions, and 
 to mankind by thefe together with reafon, matter of 
 probable proof, and not of certain obfervation, — it 
 would be rejected as incredible in many inftances of it, 
 only upon account of the means by which this inftruc- 
 tion is given, the feeming difproportions, the limita- 
 tions, necefTary conditions and circumftances of it. 
 For inftance — would it not have been thought highly 
 improbable, that men (hould have been fo much more 
 capable of difcovering, even to certainty, the general 
 laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths and revo- 
 lutions of the heavenly bodies, than the occafions and 
 cures of diftempers, and many other things in which 
 human life feems fo much more nearly concerned than 
 in aftronomy ? How capricious and irregular a way 
 of information, would it be faid, is that of invention, 
 by means of which nature inftruds us in matters of 
 fcience, and in many things upon which the ajffairs of 
 the world greatly depend ; that a man fliould by this 
 faculty be made acquainted with a thing in an inftant, 
 when perhaps he is thinking of fomewhat elfe which he 
 has in vain been fearching after, it may be, for )'ears. 
 So likewife the imperfedions attending the only meth- 
 od by which nature enables and directs us to communi- 
 cate our thoughts to each other, are innumerable. Lan- 
 guage is in its very nature inadequate, ambiguous, ha- 
 ble to infinite abufe even frorn negligence, and fo liable 
 to it from defign, that every man can deceive and betray 
 by it. And to mention but one inftance more, that 
 brutes without reafon fhould aft, in many refpefts, 
 with a fagacity and forefight vaftly greater than what 
 men have in thofe refpecls, would be thought impof- 
 fibie ; yet it is certain they do acl with fuch fuperior 
 forefight — whether it be their own indeed is another 
 queftion. From thefe things it is highly credible be- 
 forehand, that upon fuppofition God fliould afford men 
 fome additional inftrudion by revelation, it would be 
 
 with 
 
Chap. III. liable to ObjeBions, 225 
 
 with circumllances, in manners, degrees and refpecls, 
 which we fhould be apt to fancy we had great objec- 
 tions againft the credibihty of. Nor are the objedtions 
 againft the Scripture, nor againft Chriftianity in gene- 
 ral, at all more or greater than the analogy of nature 
 would beforehand — not perhaps give ground to ex- 
 pedt, for this analogy may not be fufficient in fome cafe 
 to ground an expedation upon, but no more nor 
 greater than analogy would iliew it, beforehand, to be 
 fuppofable and credible that ther^ might feem to lie 
 againft revelation. 
 
 By applying thefe general obfervations to a particu- 
 lar objedion, it will be more diftinftly ^ztn how they 
 are applicable to others of the like kind, and indeed 
 to almoft all objedions againft Chriftianity, as diftin- 
 guilhed from objediions againft its evidence. It ap- 
 pears from Scripture, that as it was not unufual in the 
 apoftolick age for perfons, upon their converfion to 
 Chriftianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts, fo 
 fome of thofe perfons exercifed thefe gifts in a ftrange- 
 ly irregular and diforderly manner ; and this is made 
 an objection againft their being really miraculous. 
 Now the foregoing obfervations quite remove this ob- 
 jedion, how confiderable foever it may appear at firft 
 fight. For confider a perfon endued with any of 
 thefe gifts, for inftance, that of tongues, it is to be fup- 
 pofed that he had the fame power over this miracu- 
 lous gift, as he would have had over it had it been 
 the etFed of habit, of ftudy and ufe, as it ordinarily is, 
 or the fame power over it as he had over any other 
 natural endowment. Confequently he would ufe it 
 in the fame manner he did any other, either regularly 
 and upon proper occafions only, or irregularly and up- 
 on improper ones, according to his fenfe of decency, 
 and his character of prudence. Where then is the 
 objeftion ? Why, if this miraculous power was indeed 
 given to the world to propagate Chriftianity and atteft 
 
 the 
 
226 The Credibility of Revelation Part TI. 
 
 the truth of it, we might, it feems, have expeded 
 that other fort of perfons fhould have been chofen to 
 be invefted with it ; or that thefe fhould, at the fame 
 time, have been endued with prudence ; or that they 
 fhould have been continually reftrained and direded 
 in the exercife of it ; i. e. that God fhould have mi- 
 raculoully interpofed, if at all, in a different manner or 
 higher degree. But from the obfervations made 
 above, it is undeniably evident that we are not judges 
 in what degrees and manners it were to have been ex- 
 pected he fhould miraculoufly interpofe, upon fuppOf 
 iition of his doing it in fome degree and manner. 
 Nor, in the natural courfe of Providence, are fuperior 
 gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other tair '^ 
 ents of great influence, conferred only on perfons of 
 prudence and decency, or fuch as are difpofed to make 
 the propereft ufe of them. Nor is the inftruftion and 
 admonition naturally afforded us for the conduct of 
 life, particularly in our education, commonly given in 
 a manner the moft fuited to recommend it, but often 
 with circumfbances apt to prejudice us againft fucU 
 inftruftion. 
 
 One might go on to add, that there is a great re- 
 femblance between the light of nature and of revela- 
 tion in feveral other refpefts. Practical Chriftianity, 
 or that faith and behaviour which renders a man a 
 Chriftian, is a plain and obvious thing, like the com- 
 mon rules of conduct with refpedl to our ordinary 
 temporal affairs. The more diftincl and particular 
 knowledge of thofe things, the ftudy of which the 
 Apoftle calls going on unto perfetlion^* and of the pro- 
 phetick parts of revelation, like many parts of natural 
 and even civil knowledge, may require very exadl 
 thought, and careful confideration. The hindrances 
 too, of natural and of fupernatural light and know- 
 ledge, have been of the fame kind. And as, it is owned, 
 
 the 
 
 * Heb. vi. I, 
 
Chap. III. liable to ObjeSiions. " azy 
 
 the whole fcheme of Scripture is not yet underflood, 
 fo, if it ever comes to be underftood, before the rejli- 
 tution of all things^* and without miraculous interpofi- 
 tions, it mufl be in the fame way as natural knowledge 
 is come at, by the continuance and progrefs of learn- 
 ing and of liberty, and by particular perfons attending 
 tOy comparing and purfiiing intimations fcattered up 
 and down it, which are overlooked and difregarded by 
 the generality of the world. For this is the way in 
 which ail improvements are made, by thoughtful men's 
 tracing on obfcure hints, as it were, dropped us by 
 nature accidentally, or which feem to come into our 
 minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a 
 book which has been fo long in the poffeffion of man- 
 kind ihould contain many truths as yet undifcovered. 
 For, all the fame phenomena and the fame faculties 
 of inveftigation, from which fuch great difcoveries in 
 natural knowledge have been made in the prefent and 
 iaft age, were equally in the poffeffion of mankind feve- 
 ral thoufand years before. And poffibly it might be in- 
 tended, that events, as they come to pafs, fhould open 
 and afcertaii'i the meaning of feveral parts of Scripture. 
 It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a mate- 
 rial refpecl ; for that natural knowledge is of little or no 
 confequence. But I have been fpeaking of the gene- 
 ral inftruftion which nature does or does not afford us. 
 And be fides, fome parts of natural knowledge, in the 
 more common reftrained fenfe of the words, are of the 
 greatefh confequence to the eafe and convenience of 
 life. But fuppofe the analogy did, as it does not, fail 
 in this refped, yet it might be abundantly fupplied 
 from the whole conftitution and courfe of nature, 
 which fliews that God does not difpenfe his gifts ac- 
 cording to our notions of the advantage and confe- 
 quence they would be of to us. And this in general, 
 with his method of difpenfing knowledge in particu- 
 lar, 
 
 * Ai5ts iii. 2 r. 
 
428 The Credibility of Revelation Part II, 
 
 lar, would together make out an analogy full to the 
 point before us. 
 
 But it may be objeded ftill farther and more gen- 
 erally, *' The Scripture reprefents the world as in a 
 ftate of ruin, and Chriftianity as an expedient to re- 
 cover it, to help in thefe refpeds v/here nature fails ; 
 in particular, to fupply the deficiencies of natural light. 
 Is it credible then, that fo many ages iliould have 
 been \tt pafs, before a matter of fuch a fort, of fo great 
 and fo general importance, was made known to man- 
 kind ; and then that it fhould be made known to fo 
 fmall a part of them ? Is it conceivable, that this fup- 
 ply fhould be fo very deficient, fhould have the like 
 obfcurity and doubtfulnefs, be liable to the like per- 
 verfions, in fhort, lie open to all the like objeftions, 
 as the light of nature itfelf ?" * Without determin- 
 ing how far this in fa£l is fo, I anfwer, — it is by no 
 means incredible that it might be fo, if the light of na- 
 ture and of revelation be from the fame hand, Men 
 are naturally liable to dileafes, for which God, in his 
 good providence, has provided natural remedies. -f- 
 But remedies exifting in nature have been unknown 
 to mankind for many ages, are known but to few now, 
 probably many valuable ones are not known yet. 
 Great has been and is the obfcurity and difficulty in 
 the nature and application of them. Circumflances 
 feem often to make them very improper, where they 
 are abfolutely neceffary. It is after long labour and 
 fbudy, and many unfuccefsful endeavours, that they are 
 brought to be as ufeful as they are ; after high con- 
 tempt and abfolute rejedion of the mofl ufeful we 
 have ; and after difputes and doubts which have feem- 
 ed to be endlefs. The bell remedies too, when un- 
 ikilfuUy, much more if dlflioneftJy applied, may pro- 
 duce new difeafes ; and with the righteft appHcation, 
 the fuccefs of them is often doubtful. In m*any cafes 
 
 they 
 
 * Ch. vi. f See Ch, v. 
 
Chap. HI. liable to OhjeBims. 229 
 
 they are not at all effeftual ; where they are, it is oft- 
 en very {lowly ; and the appHcation of them, and the 
 necelTary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncom- 
 monly, fo difagreeable, that forne will not fubmit to 
 them, and fatisfy themfelves with the excufe, that if 
 they would, it is not certain whether it would be fuc- 
 cefsful. And many perfons who labour under difeafes 
 for which there are known natural remedies, are not 
 fo happy as to be always, if ever, in the way of them. 
 In a word, the rem.edies which nature has provided for 
 difeafes are neither certain, perfect, nor univerfal. 
 And indeed the fame principles of arguing v/hicli 
 would lead us to conclude that they muft be fo, would 
 lead us likewife to conclude that there could be no 
 occafion for them, i. e. that there could be no difeafes 
 at all. And therefore, our experience that there are 
 difeafes, fhews that it is credible beforehand, upon 
 fuppofition nature has provided remedies for them, 
 that thefe remedies may be, as by experience we find 
 they are, not certain, nor perfeft, nor univerfal ; be- 
 caufe it fhews, that the principles upon which we 
 ihould expeift the contrary are fallacious. 
 
 And now, what is the juft confequence from all 
 thefe things ? Not that reafon is no judge of what is 
 offered to us as being of divine revelation. For this 
 would be to infer that we are unable to judge of any 
 thing, becaufe we are unable to judge of all things. 
 Reafon can and it ought to judge, not only of the 
 meaning, but alfo of the morality and the evidence 
 of revelation. Firji, It is the province of reafon to 
 judge of the morality of the Scripture ; i. e. not 
 whether it contains things different from what we 
 fhould have expetfled from a wife, juft, and good Be- 
 ing, for objedtions from hence have been now obviat- 
 ed ; but whether it contains things plainly contradic- 
 tory to wifdom, juftice or goodnefs ; to what the light 
 of nature teaches us of God. And I knov/ nothing of 
 
 this 
 
230 The Credibility of Revelation Part IL 
 
 this fort objeded againft Scripture, excepting fuch ob- 
 jeftions as are formed upon fuppofitions, which would 
 equally conclude that the conftitution of nature is con- 
 tradiftor}^ to wifdom, juftice, or goodnefs, which moil 
 certainly it is not. Indeed there are fome particular 
 precepts in Scripture, given to particular perfons, re- 
 quiring aftions which would be immoral and vicious 
 were it not for fuch precepts. But it is eafy to fee 
 that all thefe are of fuch a kind, as that the precept 
 changes the whole nature of the cafe and of the ac- 
 tion, and both conftitutes and fhews that not to be 
 unjuft or immoral, which, prior to the precept, m^uft 
 have appeared and really have been fo ; which may- 
 well be, lince none of thefe precepts are contrary to 
 immutable morality. If it were commanded to culti- 
 vate the principles, and aft from the fpirit of treach- 
 ery, ingratitude, cruelty, the command would not al- 
 ter the nature of the cafe or of the action in any of 
 thefe inftances. But it is quite otherwife in precepts, 
 which require only the doing an external a6lion j for 
 inftance, taking away the property or life of any. For 
 men have no right to either life or property, but what 
 arifes folely from the grant of God ; when this grant 
 is revoked, they ceafe to have any right at all in ei- 
 ther ; and when this revocation is made known, as 
 furely it is poflible it may be, it mud ceafe to be un- 
 juft to deprive them of either. And though a courfe 
 of external adts, which without command would be 
 immoral, muft make an immoral habit, yet a few de- 
 tached commands have no fuch natural tendency. I 
 thought proper to fay thus much of the few Scripture 
 precepts, which require, not vicious aftions, but ac- 
 tions which would have been vicious had it not been, 
 for fuch precepts ; becaufe they are fometimes weakly 
 urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon ob- 
 jeclions drawn from them. But to m.e there feems no 
 difficulty at all in thefe precepts, but what ariibs from 
 
 their 
 
Chap. III. liahle to ObjeSiions. 231 
 
 their being offences, i. e. from their being liable to 
 be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked defigning 
 men, to ferve the moft horrid purpoies ; and, perhaps, 
 to miflead the weak and enthufiaflick. And objec- 
 tions from this head are not objeftions againfl revela- 
 tion, but againft the whole notion of religion as a trial, 
 and againft the general conftitution of nature. Second- 
 ly^ Reafon is able to judge, and muft, of the evidence 
 of revelation, and of the objedions urged againft that 
 evidence ; which fliall be the fubjeA of a following 
 chapter.* 
 
 But the conlequence of the foregoing obfervation is, 
 that the queftion upon which the truth of Chriftiani- 
 ty depends is fcarce at all what objections there arc 
 againft its fcheme, (ince there are none againft the 
 morality of it ; but zvhat objeElions there are againfi its 
 evidence, or what proof there remains of it^ after due al- 
 lowances made for the objections againfi that proof -, be- 
 caufe it has been (hewn, that the obje^ions againfl 
 Chriflianity\ as difiingniflied from objeElions againfl its 
 evidence y are frivolous. For iurely very little weight, 
 if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and 
 objefting, which, when applied to the general confti- 
 tution of nature, experience fliews not to be conclu- 
 five ; and fuch, I think, is the whole way of objecting 
 treated of throughout this chapter. It is refolvabic 
 into principles, and goes upon fuppofitions which 
 miflead us to think that the Author of nature would 
 not act as we experience he does, or would aft, in fuch 
 and fuch cafes, as we experience he does not, in like 
 cafes. But the unreafonablenefs of this way of ob- 
 jecting will appear yet more evidently from hence, 
 that the chief things thus objected againft are juftifi- 
 ed, as fliall be farther Ihown,-!- by diftinft, particular 
 and full analogies, in the conftitution and courfe of 
 nature. 
 
 But 
 
 * Ch. vii. f Ch. iv, latter part. And v, vi. 
 
Z^z Cliri/fianity a Scheme^ Part IL 
 
 But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as 
 objections of the foregoing fort againfl revelation are, 
 yet, when a fuppofed revelation is more confiftent with 
 kfelf, and has a more general and uniform tendency 
 to promote virtue, than, all circumftances confidered, 
 could have been expefted from enthuliafm and polit- 
 ical views, — this is a prefumptive proof of its not pro- 
 ceeding from them, and fo of its truth ; becaufe we 
 are competent judges what might have been expedted 
 from enthufiafm and political views. 
 
 — — -^rsr ^)@^(|'i@^>@i^ c— ^- — 
 
 C H A P. IV. 
 
 Of Chrijiianity, conjidered as a Scheme or Conftitutio'fti 
 imperfedly comprehended. 
 
 XT hath been now fhewn* that the anal- 
 ogy of nature renders it highly credible beforehand, 
 that fuppofing a revelation to be made, it muft con- 
 tain many things very different from what we fhould 
 have expefted, and fuch as appear open to great ob- 
 jedions, and that this obfervation, in good meafure, 
 takes oiF the force of thofe objeftions, or rather pre- 
 cludes them. But it may be alleged, that this is a 
 very partial anfwer to fuch objeftions, or a very un- 
 fatisfadtory way of obviating them, becaufe it doth 
 not fliew at all that the things objefted againft can be 
 wife, juft and good, much lefs that it is credible they 
 are fo. It will therefore be proper to fhew this dif- 
 tin6tly, by applying to thefe objeftions againft the 
 wifdom, juftice and goodnefs of Chriftianity, the an- 
 fwer above -f- given to the like objections againft the 
 conftitution of nature, before we coniider the particu- 
 lar analogies in the latter to the particular things ob- 
 
 jefSted 
 
 * In the foregoing chapter. 
 
 f Part I. Ch. vii. to which this all along refers. 
 
Chap. IV. imperfeBly comprehended. 233 
 
 je6i:ed againfh in the former. Now that which affords 
 a fufficient anfwer to objedtions againft the wifdom, 
 juftice and gcodnefs of the conflltucion of nature, is 
 its being a confcitution, a fyftem or fcheme imperfe£lly 
 comprehended ; a fcheme in which means are made 
 ufe of to accomphfh ends, and which is carried on by 
 general laws. For from thefe things it has been prov- 
 ed, not only to be poffible, but aifo to be credible, 
 that thofe things which are obje£led againft may be 
 coniiftent with wifdom, juftice and goodnefs, nay 
 may be inftances of them ; and even that the confti- 
 tution and government of nature may be perfeft in 
 the higheft pofnble degree. If Chriftianity then be a 
 fcheme, and of the like kind, it is evident the like ob- 
 jedlions againft it muft admit of the like anfwer. 
 And, 
 
 I. Chriftianity is a fcheme, quite beyond our com- 
 prehenlion. The moral government of God is exercif- 
 ed, by gradually conducing things fo in the courfe of 
 his providence, that every one, at length and upon the 
 whole, ftiali receive according to his deferts ; and nei- 
 ther fraud nor violence, but truth and right, ftiall finally 
 prevail. Chriftianity is a particular fcheme under this 
 general plan of Providence, and a part of it, conducive 
 to its completion, with regard to mankind ; coniift- 
 ing itfelf alfo of various parts, and a myfterious econ- 
 omy, which has been carrying en from the time the 
 world came into its prefent wretched ftate, and is ftill 
 carrying on for its recovery, by a divine perfon, the 
 Mefiiah, who is to gather together hi one, the children 
 of God that are fcattered abroad,"^ and eftabliih an ever- 
 lafiing kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteoufneJs.\ And 
 in order to it, after various m.anifeftations of things, 
 relating to this great and general fcheme of Providence, 
 through a fucceffion of m^any ages : (For the Spirit of 
 Chrift which was in the prophets, tejUfied beforehand his 
 Q^ fuferingSy 
 
 - Joh. xi. 52. t i. Pet. iii, 13. 
 
234 ChrtjViantty a Scheme^ Part IL 
 
 fufferings, and the glory that Jliould follow ; unto whom it 
 was revealed^ that not unto themfelves^ but unto us the-^ 
 didmimjier the things zvhich are now reported unto us by 
 them that have preached the Gofpel ; which things the an- 
 gels dejire to look into*) — after various difpenfations, 
 looking forward and prq)aratory to this final faivation, 
 in the fullnefs of time^vjhen i-nfinite wifdom thought fit. 
 He, being in the form of God ^ — made himfelf of no repu- 
 tation^ and took upon him the form of a fervant^ and was 
 made in the likenefs of men ; and being found infaJJiion as 
 a man, he humbled himfelf, and became obedient to death, 
 even the death of the crofs ; wherefore God alfo hath high- 
 ly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every 
 name ; that at the name ofjefus every knee fJiould bow, of 
 things in heaven, and. things in the earth, and things un- 
 der the earth ; and that every tongue Jliould confefs, that 
 Jefus Chrifl is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. -\- 
 Parts hkewife of this economy, are the miraculous mif- 
 fion of theHolyGhoft,and his ordinary alTiftance given 
 to good men, the invifible government which Chrift at 
 prefent exercifes over his church ; that which he him- 
 lelf refers to in thefe words, \ In my father s houfe are 
 many manfions — I go to prepare a place for you ; and his 
 future itfturn to judge the world in right eoufnefs, and 
 completely reeftabiifh the kingdom of God. For the 
 Father judgeth no man , but hath committed all judgment 
 wvo the Son, that all men (Imuld honour the Son, even as they 
 honour the Father. § All power is given unto him in heav- 
 en and in earth. \\ And he mufi reign till he hath put 
 all enemies under his feet. Then comet h the aid, when he 
 fliall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Fa- 
 ther ; when he JJiall have put down all rule, and all au- 
 thority and power. And zvhen all things ffiall be fubdued 
 unto him, then fliall the Son alfo himfelf be fubje5l unto him 
 that put all things under him, that God may be all in all. ** 
 Now Httle, furely, need be faid to Ihew that this fyftem. 
 
 or 
 
 * I Pet. i. II, 12. f Phil, ih % Joh. xiv. a. 
 
 § Joh. V. 22, 23. II Mattli. xxviii. 18. ** i C6r. xv. 
 
Chap. IV. imperfeSily comprehended. 235 
 
 or fcheme of things is but imperfeftly comprehended 
 by us. The Scripture exprefsly afferts it to be fo. 
 And indeed one cannot read a paflage relating to this 
 great myjiery of Godlinefsy*" but what immediately runs 
 up into fomething which (hews us our ignorance in it ; 
 as every thing in nature fhews us our ignorance in 
 the conftitution of nature. And whoever will feri- 
 cully confider that part of the Chriftian fcheme which 
 is revealed in Scripture, will find fo much rnore unre- 
 vealed, as wlh convince him, that, to all the purpofes of 
 judging and objecting, we know as little of it as of the 
 conftitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is 
 as much an anfwer to our objeftions agalnfb the per- 
 fection of one as againfl the perfeftion of the other. -j' 
 
 II. It is obvious too, that in the Chrif!:ian difpen- 
 fation, as much as in the natural fcheme of things, 
 means are made ufe of to accomplifli ends. And the 
 obfervation of this furniihes us with the fame anfwer 
 to objeftions againft the perfedion of Chriftianity, as 
 to objections of the like kind againft the conftitution 
 of nature. It fliews the credibility, that the things 
 objected againft, how fooliJJi % foever they appear to 
 men, may be the very beft means of accomplifhing 
 the very beft ends ; and their appearing ybo/r/Zv?^/} is no 
 prefumption againft this, in a fcheme fo greatly beyond 
 our comprehenlion.§ 
 
 III. The credibility that the Chriftian difpenfation 
 may have been, all along, carried on by general laws, |j 
 no lefs than the courfe of nature, may require to be 
 more diftindly made out. Confider then upon what 
 ground it is we fay, that the whole common courfe of 
 nature is carried on according to general foreordained 
 laws. We know indeed feveral of the general laws of 
 matter, and a great part of the natural behaviour of 
 living agents is reducible to general laws. But we 
 know in a manner nothing by what laws, iiorms and 
 
 0^2 tempefts, 
 
 ■^ iTira. iii, i6. f P. 174, &c. + i Cor. i. 
 
 ) P. 177, 17S. ii?. 179, 180. 
 
236 Chrijlianity a Scheme, Part If. 
 
 tempefts, earthquakes, famine, peftilence, become the 
 inftruments of deflrudion to mankind. And the 
 laws by which perfons born into the world at fuch a 
 time and place are of fuch capacities, geniufes, tem- 
 pers ; the laws by which thoughts come into our 
 mind in a multitude of cafes, and by which innume- 
 rable things happen, of the greateft influence upon the 
 affairs and ftate of the world ; thefe laws are fo wholly 
 unknown to us, that we call the events which come to 
 pafs by them accidental, though all reafonable men 
 know certainly that there cannot, in reality, be any 
 fuch thing as chance, and conclude that the things 
 which have this appearance are the refult of general 
 laws, and may be reduced into them. It is then but 
 an exceeding little way, and in but a very few refpefts, 
 that we can trace up the natural courfe of things be- 
 fore us to general laws. And it is only from analogy 
 that we conclude the whole of it to be capable of be- 
 ing reduced into them — only from our feeing that 
 part is fo. It is from our finding that the courfe of 
 nature, in fome refpe6ts and fo far, goes on by general 
 laws, that we conclude this of the reft. And if that 
 be a juft ground for fuch a conclufion, it is a juit 
 ground alfo, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to- 
 render it fuppofable and credible, which is fufficient 
 for anfwering objections, that God's miraculous inter-* 
 pofitions may have been, all along in like manner, by 
 general laws of wifdom. Thus, that miraculous pow- 
 ers lliould be exerted at fuch times, upon fuch occa- 
 fions, in fuch degrees and manners, and with regard to- 
 fuch perfons, rather than others — that the affairs of - 
 the world, being permitted to go on in their natural 
 courfe fo far, (hould, juft at fuch a point, have a new 
 direction given them by miraculous interpofitions — • 
 that thefe interpofitions ftiould be exactly in fuch de- 
 grees and refpeds only, — all this may have been by 
 general laws. Thefe laws are unknown indeed to us, 
 
 but 
 
Chap. IV. imperfeElly comprehended. 237 
 
 but no more unknown than the laws from whence it 
 is, that fome die as foon as they are born, and others 
 live to extreme old age — that one man is fo fuperior 
 to another in underftanding — with innumerable more 
 things, which, as was before obferved, we cannot re- 
 duce to any laws or rules at all, though it is taken for 
 granted they are as much reducible to general ones as 
 gravitation. Now, if the revealed difpenfations of 
 Providence, and miraculous interpofitions, be by gen- 
 eral laws, as well as God's ordinar)^ government in the 
 courfe of nature, made known by reafon and expe- 
 rience, — there is no more reafon to expect that every 
 exigence, as it arifes, fhould be provided for by thefe 
 general laws or miraculous interpofitions, than that 
 every exigence in nature fliould by the general laws of 
 nature ; yet there might be wife and good reafons that 
 miraculous interpofitions fhould be by general laws, 
 and that thefe laws fhould not be broken in upon, or 
 deviated from, by other miracles. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies 
 and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a 
 fcheme but in part made know^n, and of fuch a cer- 
 tain particular kind in other refpedts. Now we fee no 
 more reafon why the frame and courfe of nature fliould 
 be fuch a fcheme, than why Chriftianity fliould. And 
 that the former is fuch a fcheme, renders it credible 
 that the latter, upon fuppofition of its truth, may be 
 fo too. And as it is manifeft that Chriftianity is a 
 fcheme revealed but in part, and a fcheme in which 
 means are made ufe of to accomplifli ends, like to 
 that of nature,— -fo the credibility that it may have 
 been all along carried on by general laws, no leis than 
 the courfe of nature, has been diflindly proved. And 
 from all this it is beforehand credible that there might, 
 I think probable that there would, be the like appear- 
 ance of deficiencies and irregularities in Chriftianity as 
 in nature i i. e. that Chriftianity would be liable to 
 
 the 
 
238 Chriftianity a Scheme, Part II, 
 
 the like obje^ions as the frame of nature. And thefe 
 objefliions are anfwered by thefe obfervations concern- 
 ing Chriftianity, as the Hke objections againft the 
 frame of nature are anfwered by the Uke obfervations 
 concerning the frarr^e of nature. 
 
 THE objedions againft Chriftianity, confidered as 
 a matter of fa6t,* having in general been obviated in 
 the preceding chapter, and the fame, confidered as 
 made againft the wifdom and goodnefs of it, having 
 been obviated in this, the next thing, according to the 
 method propofed, is to fhew that the principal objec- 
 tions, in particular, againft Chriftianity may be an- 
 fwered by particular and full analogies in nature. 
 And as one of them is made againft the whole fcheme 
 of it together, as juft now defcribed, I choofe to con- 
 fider it here, rather than in a diftinft chapter by itfelf. 
 The thing objedted againft this fcheme of the Gofpel 
 is, " that it feems to luppofe God v«'as reduced to the 
 neceffity of a long feries of intricate means, in order to 
 j^ccomplifh his ends, the recovery and falvation of the 
 world ; in like fort as men, for want of underftanding 
 or power, not being able to come at their ends direcl- 
 ly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make ufe 
 of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." 
 Now every thing which we fee fliews the folly of this, 
 confidered as an objeftion againft the truth of Chrift- 
 ianity. For, according to our manner of conception, 
 ■God makes ufe of variety of means, what we often 
 think tedious ones, in the natural courfe of providence, 
 for the accomplifiiment of all his ends. Indeed it is 
 certain there is fomewhat in this matter quite beyond 
 our comprehenlion j but the myftery is as great in na- 
 ture as in Chriftianity. We know what we ourfelves 
 aim at, as final ends, and what courfes we take, mere- 
 ly as means conducing to thofe ends. But we are 
 
 greatly 
 
 *P. I7». 
 
Chap. IV. imperfeBly comprehended, 239 
 
 greatly ignorant how far things are confidered by the 
 Author of nature, under the fingle notion of means 
 and ends ; fo as that it may be faid, this is merely an 
 end, and that merely means, in his regard- And 
 whether there be not fome peculiar abfiirdity in our 
 very manner of conception, concerning this matter, 
 fomewhat contradictory arifing from our extremely 
 imperfect views of things, it is impoiTible to fay. 
 However, thus much is rnanifeft, that the whole nat- 
 ural world and government of it is a fcheme or fyf- 
 tem ; not a fixed, but a progreflive one ; a fcheme, 
 in which the operation of various means takes up a 
 great length of time, before the ends they tend to can 
 be attained. The change of feafons, the ripening of 
 the fruits of the earth, the very hiftory of a flower, is 
 an inftance of this, and fo is human life. Thus vege- 
 table bodies, and thofe of animals, though poflibly 
 formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature 
 (late. And thus rational agents, who animate thefe 
 latter bodies, are naturally dire<fted to form each his 
 own manners and charafter, by the gradual gaining of 
 knowledge and experience, and by a long courfe of 
 action. Our exiflence is not only fucceflive, as it 
 mufl be of neceffity, but one ftate of our life and be- 
 ing is appointed by God to be a preparation for an- 
 other, and that to be the means of attaining to anoth- 
 er fucceeding one ; infancy to childhood, childhood 
 to youth, youth to mature age. Men are impatient, 
 and for precipitating things ; but the Author of na- 
 ture appears dehberate throughout his operations, ac- 
 complilbing his natural ends by flow fuccefiive fteps. 
 And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, 
 which, from the nature of it, requires various fyitems 
 of means, as well as length of time, in order to the 
 carrying on its feveral parts into execution. Thus, in 
 the daily courfe of natural providence, God operates.' 
 \n the very fame manner as in the difpenfation of 
 
 Chriftianity, 
 
Z4-0 The Appointment of Part 11. 
 
 Chriftianity, making one thing fubfervient to another^ 
 this to fomewhat farther, and fo on, through a pro- 
 greflive feries of means, which extend, both backward 
 and forward, beyond our utmoft view. Of this man- 
 ner of operation, every thing we fee in the courfe of 
 nature is as much an inftance, as any part of the 
 Chriftian difpenfation. 
 
 — '-=^»^i'^-&nwMM^iou^^^~^ — 
 
 C H A P. V. ' 
 
 Of the particular Syjiem of Chrijiinnity ; the Appoint- 
 ment of a Mediatory and the Redemption of the World 
 by him. 
 
 JL HERE is not, I think, any thing re- 
 lating to Chriftianity which has been more objected 
 againft than the mediation of Chrift, in fome or other 
 of its parts. Yet, upon thorough confideration, there 
 feems nothing lefs juftly liable to it. For, 
 
 I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imag- 
 ined prefumption againft the general notion of a Me- 
 diator between God and man.^ For we find all living 
 creatures are brought into the world, and their life in 
 infancy is pre-ferved, by the inftrumentality of others ; 
 and every fatisfadtion of it, fome way or other, is be- 
 ftowed by the like means. So that the vifible govern>- 
 ment which God exercifes over the world is by the in- 
 ftrumentality and mediation of others. And how far 
 his invifil:)le governm.ent be or be not fo, it is impofli- 
 ble to determine at all by reafon. And the fuppofition 
 that part of it is fo, appears, to fay the leaft, altogeth- 
 er as credible as the contrary. There is then no fort 
 of objc<flion, from the light of nature, againft the gen- 
 eral notion of a mediator between God and man, con- 
 
 fidered 
 
 * I Tim, ii. 5, 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 241 
 
 fidered as a do6trine of Chriftianity, or as an appoint- 
 ment in this difpenfation ; fince we find by experience 
 that God does appoint mediators to be the inftru- 
 ments of good and evil to us, the inilruments of his 
 juftice and his mercy. And the objedion here re- 
 ferred to is urged, not againft mediation in that high, 
 eminent and peculiar fenfe in which Chrift is our me- 
 diator, but abfolutely againft the whole notion itfelf 
 of a mediator at all. 
 
 II. As we muft fuppofe that the world Is under the 
 proper moral government of God, or in a ftate of re- 
 ligion, before we can enter into coniideration of the 
 revealed doctrine concerning the redemption of it by 
 Chrift, fo that fuppofition is here to be diftinftly tak- 
 en notice of. Now the divine moral government 
 which religion teaches us, implies that the confequence 
 of vice fliali be mifery, in fome future ftate, by the 
 righteous judgment of God. That fuch confequent 
 puniilTiment fliall take effed by his appointment, is 
 neceflarily implied. But, as it is not in any fort to be 
 fuppofed, that we are made acquainted witli all the 
 ends or reafons for which it is fit future punilhments 
 fhould be inflided, or why God has appointed fuch 
 and fuch confequent mifery fhould follow vice, ^nd as 
 we are altogether in the dark how or in what manner 
 it lliould follow, by what immediate occafions, or by 
 the inftrumcntality of what means, there is no abfurd ■■ 
 ity in fuppofing it may follow in a way analogous to 
 that, in which many miferies follow fuch and fuch 
 courfes of adion at prefent • poverty, ficknefs, infamy, 
 untimely death by difeafes, death from the hands of 
 civil juftice. There is no abfurdity in fupponng fu- 
 ture punifliment may follow wickednefs of courfe, as 
 Vv-e fpeak, or in the way of natural confequence from 
 God's original conftitution of the Vv'orld, from the na- 
 ture he has given us, and from the condition in which 
 he places us i or in a like manner, as a perfon radily tri- 
 fling 
 
£4^ ^^^^ Appointme^it of Part IL 
 
 fling upon a precipice, in the way of natural confe- 
 quence, falls down ; in the way of natural conl'equence, 
 breaks his limbs, fuppofe ; in the way of natural con- 
 fequence of this, without help, perifhes. 
 
 Some good men may perhaps be oifended, with 
 hearing it fpoken of as a fuppofable thing, that the 
 future puniihments of wickednefs may be in the way 
 of natural confequence ; as if this were taking the ex- 
 ecution of juflice out of the hands of God, and giv- 
 ing it to nature. But they fhould remember, that 
 when things come to pafs according to the courfe of 
 nature, this does not hinder them from being his do- 
 ing, who is the God of nature ; and that the Scrip- 
 ture afcribes thofe punifbments to divine juflice which 
 are known to be natural, and which muft be called fo, 
 when diftin9"uilhed from fuch as are miraculous. But 
 after all, this fuppofition, or rather this way of fpeak- 
 ing, is here made ufe of only by way of illuflration of 
 the fubjedl before us. For lince it muft be admitted, 
 that the future punifhment of wickednefs is not a mat- 
 ter of arbitrary appointment, but of reafon, equity 
 and juftice, it comes, for aught I fee, to the fame thing, 
 whether it is fuppofcd to be inflicted in a way analo- 
 gous to that in which the temporal puniihments of 
 vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And 
 though there were a difference, it is allowable, in the 
 prefent cafe, to make this fuppofition, plainly not an 
 incredible one, that future puniihment may follow 
 wickednefs in the way of natural confcvquence, or ac- 
 cording to ibme general laws of government already 
 eflabliihed in the univerfe. 
 
 HI. Upon this fuppofition, or even without it, we 
 may obferve fomewhat much to the prefent purpofe 
 in the conftitution of nature or appointments of Prov- 
 idence ; the provilion which is made that all the bad 
 natural confequences of mxcn's adions fiiould not al- 
 ways aftuaily follov/ j or that fuch had confequences 
 
 as, 
 
Ckap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. z^^ 
 
 as, according to the fettled courfe of things, would in- 
 evitably have followed if not prevented, fhould in 
 certain degrees be prevented. We are apt prefump- 
 tuoufly to imagine, that the world might have been fo 
 conftituted, as that there would not have been any fuch 
 thing as mifery or evil. On the contrary we find the 
 Author of nature permits it ; but then he has provid- 
 ed reliefs, and, in many cafes, perfed: remedies for it, 
 after fome pains and difficulties ; rehefs and remedies 
 even for that evil, which is the fruit of our own mif- 
 condu£l ; and which, in the courfe of nature, would 
 have continued and ended in our deilru6tion, but for 
 fuch remedies. And this is an inftance both of fever^ 
 ity and of indulgence, in the conilitution of nature. 
 Thus all the bad confequences now mentioned, of a 
 man's trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. 
 And though all were not, yet fome of them might, by 
 proper interpofition, if not rejeded ; by another's 
 coming to the rafh man's relief, with his own laying 
 hold on that relief, in fuch fort as the cafe required. 
 Perfons may do a great deal themfelves towards pre- 
 venting the bad confequences of their follies ; and 
 more may be done by themfelves, together with the 
 affifbance of others their fellow creatures ; which af- 
 liftaace nature requires and prom.pts us to. This is 
 the general conftitution of the world. Now fuppofe 
 it had been fo conftituted, that after llich aflions were 
 done as were forefeen naturally to draw after them 
 mifery to the doer, it fliould have been no more in 
 human power to have prevented that naturally confe- 
 quent mifery, in any inftance, than it is in all, — no 
 one can fay whether fuch a more fevere conftitution 
 of things might not yet have been really good. But 
 that, on the contrary, provifion is made by nature, that 
 we may and do to Co great degree prevent the bad 
 natural effeds of our follies, — this may be called 
 Hiercy or compaifica in the original conftitution of the 
 
 world i 
 
244 ^^^ Appointment of Part II. 
 
 worH ; compaffion as diftinguiflied from goodnefs in 
 general. And, the whole known conftitution and 
 courfe of things affording us inftances of fuch com- 
 paffion, it would be according to the analogy of na- 
 ture to hope, that, however ruinous the natural con- 
 fequences of vice might be, from the general laws of 
 God's government over the univerfe, — yet provifion 
 might be made, pofiibly might have been originally 
 made, for preventing thofe ruinous confequences from 
 inevitably following j at leaft from following univer- 
 fally, and in all cafes. 
 
 Many, I am fenfible, will wonder at finding this 
 made a queftion, or fpoken of as in any degree doubt' 
 ful. The generality of mankind are fo far from hav- 
 ing that awful fenfe of things, which the prefent ftate 
 of vice and mifery and darknefs feems to make but 
 reafonable, that they have fcarce any apprehenfion or 
 thought at ail about this matter any way ; and fome 
 ferious perfons may have fpoken unadvifedly concern- 
 ing it. But let us obferve what we experience to be, 
 and what from the very conftitution of nature cannot 
 but be, the confequences of irregular and diforderly 
 behaviour ; even of fuch rafhnefs, wilfulnefs, neglefts, 
 as we fcarce call vicious. Now it is natural to appre- 
 hend, that the bad confequences of irregularity wilt be 
 greater, in proportion as the irregularity is fo. And 
 there is no comparifon between thefe irregularities, and 
 the greater inftances of vice, or a diffolute profligate 
 dilregard to all religion, if there be any thing at all in 
 religion. For conlider what it is for creatures, moral 
 agents, prefumptuoufiy to introduce that confufion and 
 mifery into the kingdom of God, which mankind have 
 in fact introduced — to blafpheme the fovereign Lord 
 of all — to contemn his authority — to be injurious to 
 the degree they are, to their fellow creatures, the crea- 
 tures of God. Add that the eifeds of vice in the 
 prefent world are often extreme mifery, irretrievable 
 
 ruin. 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and B.edeemeir. 245 
 
 ruin, and even death ; and upon putting all this to- 
 gether it will appear, that as no one can fay in what 
 degree fatal the unprevented confequences of vice may 
 be, according to the general rule of divine govern- 
 ment, fo it IS by no means intuitively certain how far 
 thefe confequences could po/hbly, in the nature of the 
 thing, be prevented, confidently with the eternal rule 
 of right, or with what is in faft the moral confcitution 
 of nature. However, there would be large ground to 
 hope that the univerfal government was not fo feverely 
 flrid but that there was room for pardon, or for hav- 
 ing thole penal confequences prevented. Yet, 
 
 IV. There feems no probability that any thing we 
 could do would alone and of itfelf prevent them ; pre- 
 vent their following or being infiicled. But one would 
 think, at leaft, it were impoffible that the contrary 
 fhould be thought certain. For v/e are not acquaint- 
 ed with the whole of the cafe. We are not informed 
 of all the reafons which render it lit that future pun- 
 iihments iliould be inflided, and therefore cannot 
 know w^hether any thing we could do would make 
 fuch an alteration as to render it fit that they fhould 
 be remitted. We do not know what the whole nat- 
 ural or appointed confequences of vice are, nor in what 
 way they would follow, if not prevented ; and there- 
 fore can in no fort fay, whether we could do any thing 
 which would be fufficient to prevent them. Our ig- 
 norance being thus manifeft, let us recoiled: the analo- 
 gy of nature or Providence. For, though this may be 
 but a flight ground to raife a pofitive opinion upon in 
 this matter, yet it is fufficient to anfwer a mere arbi- 
 trary ailertion, without any kind of evidence, urged by 
 way of objeftion againft a doctrine, the proof of which 
 is not reafon but revelation. Confider then — Deonle 
 rum their fortunes by extravagance i they bring dif- 
 eafes upon themfelves by excels ; they incur the pen- 
 alties of civil laws, and furely civil government is nat- 
 ural y 
 
246 The Appointment of Part If. 
 
 ura! ; will forrow for thefe follies pad, and behaving 
 well for the future, alone and of itfelf prevent the nat- 
 ural confequences of them ? On the contrary, men's 
 natural abilities of helping themfelves are often im- 
 paired ; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden 
 to the affiftance of others, upon feveral accounts and 
 in different ways ; afliftance which they would have 
 had no occafion for had it not been for their mifcon- 
 duft, but which, in the difadvantageous condition 
 they have reduced themfelves to, is abfolutely necef- 
 fary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. 
 Now fmce this is our cafe, coniidering ourfelves mere- 
 ly as inhaJDitants of this world, and as having a tem- 
 poral intereft here, under the natural government of 
 God, which however has a great deal moral in it, — 
 why is it not fuppofable that this may be our caie alfo 
 in our more important capacity, as under his perfe(ft 
 moral government, and having a more general and fu- 
 ture intereft depending ? If we have mifbehaved in 
 this higher capacity, and rendered ourfelves obnoxious 
 to the future puniflinient which God has annexed to 
 vice, it is plainly credible, that behaving well for the 
 
 time to come, may be — not ufelefs, God forbid 
 
 but wholly infufficient, alone and of itfelf, to prevent 
 that punifhment, or to put us in the condition which 
 v/e fhould have been in had we preferved our inno- 
 cence. 
 
 And though we ought to reafon with all reverence, 
 whenever we reafon concerning the divine conduft, yet 
 it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our 
 notions of government, as well as to what is in fa6t the 
 general conftitution of nature, to fuppofe that doing 
 well for the future (liould, in all cafes, prevent all the 
 judicial bad confequences of having done evil, or all 
 the punifhment annexed to difobedience. And we 
 have manifeftly nothing from whence to determine, in 
 what degree and in what cafes reformation would pre- 
 vent 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and F^edeimer. 247 
 
 vent this punlfhmelit, even fuppoiing that it would in 
 fome. And though the efficacy of repentance itielf 
 alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered them- 
 feives obnoxious to, and recover what they had for- 
 feited, is now iniifled upon in oppofition to Chriftian- . 
 ity, — yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory 
 facrifices over the heathen world, this notion of re- 
 pentance alone being fufficient to expiate guilt, ap- 
 pears to be contrary to the general {^^{^ of mankind. 
 
 Upon the whole then, had the laws, the general 
 laws of God's government been permitted to operate, 
 without any interpofition in our behalf, the future 
 puniihment, for aught we know to the contrary, or 
 have any reafon to think, muft inevitably have follow- 
 ed, notwithftanding ajiy thing we could have done to 
 prevent it. Now, 
 
 V. In this darknefs, or this light of nature, call it 
 which you pleafe, revelation comes in — confirms every 
 doubting fear, which could enter into the heart of 
 man, concerning the future unprevented confequence 
 of wickednefs — fuppofes the world to be in a ftate of 
 ruin — (a fuppofition which feems the Very ground of 
 the Chriftian difpenfation, and which, if not proveable 
 by reafon, yet it is in no wife contrary to it) teaches 
 us too, that the rules of divine government are fuchas 
 not to admit of pardon immediately and direftly upon 
 repentance, or by the fole efficacy of it ; but then 
 teaches at the fame time what nature might juftly have 
 hoped, that the moral government of the univerfe was 
 not lb rigid, but that there was room for an interpo- 
 fition to avert »the fatal confequences of vice, which 
 therefore by this means does admit of pardon. Rev- 
 elation teaches us, that the unknown laws of God's 
 more general government, no lefs than the particular 
 laws by which we experience he governs us at prefent^ 
 are compaffionate,* as well as good in the more gene- 
 ral 
 
 ♦ p. 242, lac. 
 
24S The Appoinfmeni of Part IL 
 
 ral notion of goodnefs ; and that he hath mercifully 
 provided that there Ihould be an interpofition to pre- 
 \'ent the deftruftion of human kind, whatever that 
 deftruftion unprevented would have been. God fa 
 loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that 
 vjhcfcever believeth, not to be fure in a fpeculative, 
 but in a praftical fenfe, that whofoever believeth in him 
 fliould not periJJi ;* gave his Son in the fame way of 
 goodnefs to the world as he affords particular perlbns 
 the friendly affiflance of their fellov/ creatures, when 
 v;ithout it their temporal ruin would be the certain 
 conlequence of their follies ; in the fam-e way of good- 
 nefs, I fay, though in a tranfcendent and infinitely 
 higher degree. And the Son of God loved us and gave 
 himfelf for lis, with a love which he himfelf compares 
 to that of human friendfhip, though in this cafe all 
 comparifons mud fall infinitely Ihort of the thing in- 
 tended to be illuftrated by them. He interpofed in 
 fuch a manner, as was necelfary and effe6tual to pre- 
 vent that execution of juftice upon finners, which 
 God had appointed ihould othervvife have been exe- 
 cuted upon them ; or in fuch a manner as to pre- 
 vent that puniihment from adiually following, which, 
 according to the general laws of divine government, 
 mull have followed the lins of the world, had it not 
 been for fuch interpofition. -j- If 
 
 * Joh. iii. 16. 
 •f It cannot, I fuppofe, be imagined, even by the moft curfory reader, that 
 it is in any fort affirmed or implied in any thing faid in tliis chapter, that 
 none can have the benefit of the general Redemption but fuch as have the 
 advantage of being made acquainted with it iu the prefent life. But it may 
 be needful to mention, that feveral quellions which have been brought into 
 the fubjeii before us, and determined, are not in the leail entered into here ; 
 quellions which have been, I fear, ralhly determined, and perhaps with equal 
 raflmefs contrary ways. For inftance, whether God could have faved the 
 world by other means than the deatii of Chrirt, 9onfiItently with the general 
 lavvs ot his government. And had not Chrirt come into the world, what 
 would have been tlie future condition of the better fort of men, thofe jufl per- 
 ■fons over the face of tiie earth, for ^vhom Manaffei in his prayer alfertb, re- 
 pentance was not appointed. The meaning of the firfl of thsfe quellions is 
 greatly ambiguous ; and neither of them can properly be anfwered, without, 
 going upon that infinitely abfurd I'uppofition, that we know the whole of the 
 cafe. And perhaps the very inquiry, vjhat ivould have fil/oiueJ if Ga! had mt 
 do/iL- as he' has, may have in it foine very great impropriety, and ought not to 
 be carried on any farther than is neceffai'y to help our partial and inade- 
 quate conceptions of tilings. 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 1j\<^ 
 
 If any thing here faid (hould appear, upon firfl 
 thought, inconfiftent with divine goodnefs, a fecond, 
 I am perfuaded, will entirely remove that appearance. 
 For were we to fuppofe the conftitutlon of things to 
 be fuch as that the whole creation muft have perifhed, 
 had it not been for fomewhat, which God had ap- 
 pointed fhould be, in order to prevent that ruin, — 
 even this fuppofition would not be inconfiftent in any 
 degree with the moft abfolutely perfeft goodnefs. But 
 flill it may be thought, that this whole manner of 
 treating the fubjedb before us fuppofes mankind to be 
 naturally in a very ftrange ftate. And truly fo it does. 
 But it is not Chriftianity which has put us into this 
 ftate. Whoever will confider the manifold miferles, 
 and the extreme wickednefs of the world, that the befh 
 have great wrongnefTes within themfelves, which they 
 complain of and endeavour to amend, but that the 
 generality grow more profligate and corrupt with age ; 
 that heathen moralifts thought the prefent ftate to be 
 a ftate of punilhment ; and what might be added, that 
 the earth our habitation has the appearances of being 
 a ruin ; — ^whoever, I fay, will confider all thefe, and 
 fome other obvious things, will tliink he has little rea- 
 fon to object againft the fcripture account, that man- 
 kind is in a ftate of degradation ; againft this being the 
 fa£t, how difficult foever he may think it to account 
 for, or even to form a diftinct conception of the occa- 
 lions and circumftances of it. But that the crime of 
 our firft parents was the occafion of our being placed 
 in a more difadvantageous condition, is a thing 
 throughout and particularly analogous to what we fee 
 in the daily courfe of natural providence ; as the re- 
 covery of the v/orld by the interpofition of Chrift has 
 been fhewn to be fo in general. 
 
 VI . The particular manner in v/hich Chrift inter- 
 pofed in the redemption of the v;orld, or his office as 
 mediatory in the iargeft fenfe, between God and man, is 
 
 R thus 
 
250 The Appointment of Part IL 
 
 thus reprefented to us in the Scripture. He is the 
 light of the world -* the revealer of the will of God in- 
 the moft eminent fenfe. He is a propitiatory facri- 
 fice ; -f The Lamb of God ; % and, as he voluntarily of- 
 fered hi mfelf up, he is ftiled our high prieft.§ And, 
 which feems of peculiar weight, he is defcribed be- 
 forehand in the Old Tefbment, under the fame char- 
 aders of a priefl, and an expiatory vi6lim. |j And 
 whereas it is objecfted, that all this is merely by way of 
 allufion to the facritices of the Mofaick law, the apof- 
 tle on the contrary affirms, that the law was a Jliad- 
 ozv of good things to come^ and not the very image of the 
 things-,** and t\\2Li the priefis that offer gifts according 
 to the law — ferve unto the example andfliadow of heaven- 
 ly things^ as Mojes was admonijlied of God when he was 
 about to make the tabernacle. For fee, faith he, that thou 
 ■make all things according to the pattern (liewed to thee hi 
 the mount j ■f -f- i. e. the Levitical priefthood was a fhad- 
 ow of the priefLhood of Chrifl, in like manner as the 
 tabernacle made by Mofes, was according to that fhew- 
 ed him in the mount. The priefthood of Chrifh, and 
 the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals ; of 
 the former of which the Levitical priefthood was a 
 type, and of the latter the tabernacle made by Mofes 
 was a copy. The doftrine of this epiftle then plainly 
 is, that the legal facritices were allufions to the great 
 and final atonement, to be made by the blood of 
 Chrifl: ; and not that this was an allufion to thofe. 
 Nor can any thing be more exprefs or determinate^ 
 than the following paflage. // is not pojjible that the 
 blood of bulls and of goats fiould take aivavftn. Where- 
 fore when he cometh into the world, he faith. Sacrifice and 
 offering, i, e. of bulls and of goats, thou wouldefi not, but 
 
 a body 
 
 * Joh. i. and viii. 12. f Rom. iii. 25. and v. 11. 1 Cor. v. 7. Eph. 
 
 V. z. I Joh. ii. 2. Matth. x.\vi. 28. + Joh. i. 29, 36. and through- 
 
 out the Book, of Revelation. § Throughout the Epiftle to the He- 
 
 brews. II Ifai, liii. Dan. ix. 24. Ff. ex. 4. ** Heb. x. i. 
 
 ff Heb, viii. 4, 5. 
 
Chap. V. a MeMator and Redeemer. 2^1 
 
 a body hafl thou prepared me — Lo I come to do thy tvill 
 O God — By which will we are JanEtified, through the 
 offering of the body of Jefus Chrijl once for all* And to 
 add one paflage more of the like kind — Chrifi was once 
 offered to bear the Jins of many, and unto them that look 
 for him fliall he appear the Jecond time y without fin ^ i. e. 
 without bearing fin as he did at his firft coming, by 
 being an offering for it, without having our iniquities 
 again laid upon him, without being any more a fm of- 
 fering ; — unto them that look for him fJiall he appear the 
 fecond time, without Jin, unto falvation.-\- Nor do the 
 infpired writers at all confine themfelves to this man- 
 ner of fpeaking concerning the fatisfaftion of Chrift, 
 but declare an efficacy in what he did and fuffered for 
 us, additional to and beyond mere inftruflion, exam- 
 ple and government, in great variety of expreffion : 
 That Jefus Jliould die for that nation the Jews ; and not 
 for that nation only, but that alfo, plainly by the efficacy 
 of his death, he Jlioidd gather together in one, the children, 
 of God that were fcattered abroad ; | that he fuffered for 
 fins, thejufifor the unjufl j § that ^^ gave his life, himfelf 
 a ranfom ; \\ that we are bought, bought with a price ;** 
 that he redeemed us with his blood ; redeemed us from the 
 curfe of the law being made a cUrJe for us ; •f'f that he 
 is our advocate, inter ceffor and propitiation ; j;]; that he 
 was made perfe5i, or confummate, through Jufferings ; 
 and being thus made perfeti, he became the author of fal- 
 vation ; §§ that God was in Chrifi reconciling the world 
 to himfelf, by the death of his Jon, by the crofs, not imputing 
 their trefpaffes unto them;\\\\ and laflly, that through death 
 he dejlroyed him that had the power of death. ^ Chrift; 
 then having thus humbled himfelf, and become obedient 
 to death, even the death of the crofs, God alfo hath highly 
 
 exalted 
 
 * Heb. X. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. f Heb. ix. i8. J Joh. xi. 51, 52. 
 
 § I Pet. hi. 1 3. II Matth. xx. 28. Mark x. 45. i Tim. ii. 6* 
 
 ♦* 2 Pet. ii. I. Rev. xiv. 4. i Cor. vi. 2.0. ff 1 Pet. i. ig. Rev. 
 
 V. 9. Gal. iii. 13. XX Heb. vii. 25. i Joh. ii. i, 2. §§ Heb. 
 
 ii. 10. and v. 9. ||[1 2 Cor. v. 19. Rom. v. 10. Eph. ii. 16. 
 
 ^ Heb. ii. 14. See alfo a remarkable palfage ia the Book of Job, x.\xiii. 24. 
 
1^2 The Appointment of Part II. 
 
 exalted him, and given him a name which is above every 
 name ; hath given all things into his hands ; hath com- 
 mitted all judgment unto him ; that all menJJiould honour 
 the Son even as they honour the Father.^ For, worthy 
 is the lamb that zvas /Iain, to receive power, and richeSy 
 and wifdom, and Jlrength, and honoiir, and glory, and 
 blejjing. And every creature which is in heaven, and at 
 the earth, heard L faying, Blejfrng, and honour, and glory, 
 and power, be unto him thatjitteth upon the throne, andim- 
 to the Lamb for ever and ever, -f- 
 
 Thefe paffages of Scripture feem to comprehend 
 andexprefs the chief parts of Chrift's office, as media- 
 tor between God and man, fo far, I mean, as the na- 
 ture of this his office is revealed ; and it is ufuallv treat- 
 ed of by divines under three heads. 
 
 Firjl, He was, by way of eminence, the prophet ; 
 that prophet that f mild come i?ito the world, % to declare 
 the divine will. He publifhed anew the law of nature 
 which men had corrupted, and the very knowledge of 
 which, to fome degree, was loft among them. He 
 taught mankind, taught us authoritatively, to live fi- 
 ber ly, righteoufly and godly in this prefent world, in ex- 
 pectation of the future judgment of God. He con- 
 firmed the truth of this moral fyftem of nature, and 
 gave us additional evidence of it, the evidence of tef- 
 timony. § He diftindly revealed the manner in which 
 God would be worfliipped, the efficacy of repentance, 
 and the rewards and punifhments of a future life. 
 Thus he was a prophet in a fenfe in which no other 
 ever was. To which is to be added, that he fet us 
 a perfeft example, that we Jliould follow his Jieps. 
 
 Secondly, He has a kingdom, zvliich is not of this worlds 
 He founded a church, to be to mankind a ftanding 
 memorial of religion, and invitation to it, which he 
 promifed to be with always even to the end. He ex- 
 ercifes an invlfible government over it himfelf, and by 
 
 his 
 
 * Phil. ii. 8, 9. Joh. iii. 35, and v. zz, 23. •[- Rev. v. 12, 13. 
 
 X Joh. vi. 14. § P. 1 94, &c. 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer, 255 
 
 fiis Spirit ; over that part of it which is militant here 
 on earth, a government of dircipHne,/or the perfeEiing 
 cf the faints^ for the edifying his body, till we all come^ 
 in the unity of the faith^ and of the knowledge of the Son 
 ofGody unto a perfeB man^ unto the meafiire of the Jiature 
 cf the fulnefs of Chriji* Of this church, all perfons 
 fcattered over the world, who live'in obedience to his 
 laws, are members. For thefe he is gone to prepare a 
 place, and will come again to receive them unto himfelfy 
 that where he is there they may be alfo — and_ reign with 
 him forever and ever ; -{~ and likewife to take vengeance 
 on them that know not God, and obey not his Gofpel. X 
 
 Againil thefe parts of Chrift's office, I find no ob- 
 jections but what are fully obviated in the beginning 
 of this chapter. 
 
 Lajily, Chrifl offered himfelf a propitiatory facrifice, 
 and made atonement for the fins of the world ; which 
 is mentioned lafb in regard to what is objected againft 
 it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews, 
 and obtained amongft mofl other nations from tradi- 
 tion, whofe original probably was revelation. And 
 they were continually repeated, both occafionally, and 
 at the returns of ftated times, and^made up great part 
 of the external religion of mankind. But now once in 
 the end of the zvorld Chriji appeared to put away fin by 
 the facrifice of himfef.^ And this facrifice was, in the 
 higheft degree and with the moft extenfive influence, 
 of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of fm, which the 
 heathens may be fuppofed to have thought their fac- 
 rifices to have been, and which the Jewilh facrifices 
 really were in fome degree, and with regard to fome 
 perfons. 
 
 How and in what particular way it had this efficacy, 
 there are not wanting perfons who have endeavoured 
 t6 explain ; but 1 do not find that the Scripture has 
 explained it. We fcem to be very much in the dark 
 
 concerning 
 
 * Eph. iv. 12, 13. f Joh. xiv. 2, 3. Rev. iii. 21. and xi. i j. 
 
 + 2Thsir. i. 8. §Heb. is, a6. 
 
S54 ^^^ appointment of Part II. 
 
 concerning the manner in which the ancients under- 
 flood atonement to be made, i. e. pardon to be ob- 
 tained by facrifices. And if the Scripture has, as 
 furely it has, left this matter of the fatisfadion of 
 Chrift myfterious, left fomewhat in it unrevealed, all 
 conjedures about it mufl be, if not evidently abiurd, 
 yet at lead uncertain. . Nor has any one reafon to 
 complain for want of farther inforpiatipn, unlefs he 
 can fhew his claim to it, 
 
 ' Some having endeavoured to explain the efficacy of 
 what Chrift has done and fuffered for us, beyond what 
 the Scripture has authorized, others, probably becaufq 
 they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, 
 and confining his office as redeemer of the world to his 
 inftruftion, example and government of the church. 
 Whereas the doftrine of the Gofpel appears to be, not 
 only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but 
 rendered it of the efficacy which it js by what he dic^ 
 and fuffered for us ; that he obtained for us the ben- 
 efit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal 
 life ; not only that he revealed to linners that they 
 were in a capacity of falvation, and how they might 
 obtain it, but moreover that he put them into this 
 capacity of falvation by what he did and fuffered for 
 them ; put us into a capacity of efcaping future pun^. 
 ifhment, and obtaining future happinefs. And it is 
 our wifdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by per- 
 forming the conditions upon which it is offered on our 
 part, without difputing how it was procured on his. 
 For, 
 
 VII. Since we neither know by v;hat means punifhr 
 ment in a future ftate would have followed wickednefs 
 in this ; nor in v;hat manner it would have been in- 
 fiidled had it not been prevented ; nor all the reafon^ 
 yvhy its inflidion would have been needful ; nor the 
 particular nature of that ftate of happinefs which 
 Chrift is gone to prepare for his difciples j and fince 
 
 we 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redsffmer. 25^ 
 
 we are ignorant how far any thing which we could do 
 would, alone and of itfelf, have been effedtual to pre- 
 vent that punifhment to which we were obnoxious, 
 and recover that happinefs which we had forfeited, — 
 it is mod evident we are not judges antecedently to 
 revelation, whether a mediator was or was not necef- 
 fary to obtain thofe ends, to prevent that future pun- 
 iihment, and bring mankind to the final happinefs of 
 their nature. And for the very fame reafons, upon 
 fuppofition of the necefllty of a mediator, we are no 
 more judges, antecedently to revelation, of the whole 
 nature of his office, or the feveral parts of which it con- 
 fifts, of what was fit and requifite to be affigned him, 
 in order to accomplifh the ends of divine Providence 
 in the appointment. And from hence it follows, that 
 to objed: againft the expediency or ufefulnefs of par- 
 ticular things, revealed to have been done or fuffered 
 by him, becaufe we do not fee how they were condu- 
 cive to thofe ends, is highly abfurd. Yet nothing is 
 more common to be met with than this abfurdity. 
 But if it be acknowledged beforehand that we are not 
 judges in the cafe, it is evident that no objeftion can, 
 with any iliadow of reafon, be urged againfl any par- 
 ticular part of Chrift's mediatorial office revealed in 
 Scripture, till it can be (hewn pofitively not to be req- 
 uifite or conducive to the ends propofed to be accom- 
 phfhed, or that it is in itfelf unreafonabie. 
 
 And there is one objeclion made againft the fatis- 
 fadion of Chrift, which looks to be of this pofitive 
 kind, that the dodrine of his being appointed to fuf- 
 fer for the fins of the world, repreients God as being 
 indifferent whether he puniilied the innocent or the 
 guilty. Now from the foregoing obfervations we may 
 lee the extreme flightnefs of all fuch objedlions ; and 
 (though it is mofl certain all who make them do not 
 fee the confequence) that they conclude altogether as 
 much againft God's whole original conftitution of na?- 
 
 ture, 
 
^^6 The Appointment of Part II, 
 
 ture, and the whole daily courfe of divine Providence 
 in the government of the world, i. e. againft the whole 
 fcheme of theifm and the whole notion of religion, as 
 •againft Chriftianity. For the world is a conftitution 
 ■or fyftem, whofe parts have a mutual reference to each 
 other ; and there is a fcheme of things gradually car- 
 rying on, called the courfe of nature, to the carrying 
 on of which God has appointed us, in various ways, 
 to contribute. And when, in the daily courfe of nat- 
 ural providence, it is appointed that innocent people 
 fhould fuffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable 
 to the very fame objedlion as the inftance we are now 
 confidering. The infinitely greater importance of that 
 appointment of Chriftianity which is objected againft, 
 does not hinder but it m.ay be, as it plainly is, an ap- 
 pointment of the very fame kind with what the world 
 affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there were any 
 force at all in the objedlion, it would be ftronger in 
 one refpe£t againft natural providence than againft 
 Chriftianity 5 becaufe under the former we are in 
 many cafes commanded, and even necellitated wheth- 
 er we will or not, to fuffer for the faults of others — • 
 whereas the fufFerings of Chrift were voluntary. The 
 world's being under the righteous government of God 
 does indeed imply that, finally and upon the whole, 
 every one fliall receive according to his perfonal de- 
 ferts ; and the general doftrine of the whole Scripture 
 is, that this fhali be the completion of the divine gov- 
 ernm.ent. But during the progrefs, and for aught we 
 know even in order to the completion of this moral 
 fcheme, vicarious punifiiments may be fit, and abfo- 
 lutely necelTary. Men by their follies run themfelves 
 into extreme diftrefs, into difficulties which would be 
 abfolutely fatal to them, were it not for the interpo- 
 fition and afiiftance of others. God commands by 
 the law of nature, that we afford them this afTiftance, 
 in many cafes where we cannot do it without very 
 
 great 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 25^ 
 
 great pains, and labour, and fufferings to ourfelves. 
 And we fee in what variety of ways one perfon's fuf- 
 ferings contribute to the relief of another ; and how, 
 or by what particular means, this comes to pafs or fol- 
 lows, from the conflitution and laws of nature which 
 come under our notice ; and being familiarized to it 
 men are not fhocked with it. So that the reafon of 
 their infifting upon objeftions of the foregoing kind 
 againft the fatisfadion of Chrift, is, either that they 
 do not confider God's fettled and uniform appoint- 
 ments as his appointments at all, or elfe they forget 
 that vicarious punilliment is a providential appoint- 
 ment of every day's experience ; and then, from their 
 being unacquainted with the more general laws of na- 
 ture or divine government over the world, and not fee- 
 ing how the fufferings of Chrift could contribute to 
 the redemption of it, uniefs by arbitrary and tyranni- 
 cal will, — they conclude his fufferings could not con- 
 tribute to it any other way. And yet, what has been 
 often alleged in juftification of this doftrine, even from 
 the apparent natural tendency of this method of our 
 redemption ; its tendency to vindicate the authority 
 of God's laws, and deter his creatures from fin, — this 
 has never yet been anfwered, and is I think plainly un- 
 anfwerable, though I am far from thinking it an ac- 
 count of the whole of the cafe. But without taking 
 this into confideration, it abundantly appears from the 
 obfervations above made, that this objection is not an 
 objedtion againft Chriftianity, but againft the whole 
 general conftitution of nature. And if it were to be 
 confidered as an objeftion againft Chriftianity, or con- 
 fidering it as it is, an objeftion againft the conftitu- 
 tion of nature, — it amounts to no more in conclufion 
 than this, that a divine appointment cannot be necef- 
 ■fary or expedient., becauie the objeftor does not dif- 
 cern it to be fo, though he muft own that the nature 
 of the cafe is fuch, as renders him uncapable of judging 
 
 whether 
 
258 The Appointment of Part II. 
 
 whether It be fo or not, or of feeing it to be neceflary, 
 though it were fo. 
 
 It is indeed a matter of great patience to reafonable 
 men, to find people arguing in this manner, objeding 
 againfl the credibility of fuch particular things revealed 
 in Scripture, that they do not fee the neceffity or expe^ 
 diency of them. For though it is highly right, and 
 the mofl pious exercife of our underftanding, to ni^ 
 quire with due reverence into the ends and reafons of 
 God's difpenfations, — yet when thofe reafons are con- 
 'cealed, to argue from our ignorance that fuch difpen- 
 fations cannot be from God, is infinitely abfurd, The 
 prefumption of this kind of objeftions feems almoft 
 loft in the folly of them. And the folly of them is 
 yet greater, when they are urged, as ufually they are, 
 againft things in Chriflianity analogous or like to thofe 
 natural difpenfations of Providence which are matter 
 of experience. Let reafon be kept to ; and if any 
 part of the fcripture account of the redemption of the 
 world by Chrift can be fhewn to be really contrary to 
 it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up ; 
 but let not fuch poor creatures as we, go on objecting 
 againft an infinite fcheme, that we do not fee the ner 
 ceffity or ufefulnefs of all its parts, and call this rear 
 Ibning ; and, which ftill farther heightens the abfurd- 
 ity in the prefent cafe, parts which we are not adively 
 concerned in. For it may be worth mentioning, 
 
 Lafily^ That not only the reafon of the thing, but 
 the whole analogy of nature, fliould teach us not to 
 expert to have the like information concerning the 
 divine conduQ: as concerning our own duty. God 
 inftruds us by experience, (for it is not reafon, but 
 experience which inftructs us) what good or bad con^ 
 fequences will follow from our ading in fuch and fuch 
 manners ; and by this he direds us how we are to be- 
 have ourfelves. But, though we are fufficiently in- 
 ftruded for the common purpofes of hfe, yet it is but 
 
 aa 
 
Chap. V. a Mediator and Redeemer. 259 
 
 an almoft infinitely fmall part of natural providence 
 which we are at all let into. The cafe is the fame 
 with regard to revelation. The do<5trine of a mediator 
 between God and man, againft which it is obje6ted 
 that the expediency of fome things in it is not under- 
 flood, relates only to what was done on God's part in 
 the appointment, and on the Mediator's in the exe- 
 cution of it. For what is required of us, in confe- 
 quence of this gracious difpeniation, is another fub- 
 je6t in which none can complain for want of informa- 
 tion. The conftitution of the world, and God's nat- 
 ural government over it, is all myftery, as much as the 
 Chriftian difpenfation. Yet under the firft he has 
 given men all things pertaining to life, and under the 
 other all things pertaining unto godlinefs. And it 
 may be added, that there is nothing hard to be ac- 
 counted for in any of the common precepts of Chrift- 
 ianity ; though if there were, furely a divine command 
 is abundantly fufHcient to lay us under the ftrongeft 
 obligations to obedience. But the faft is, that the 
 reafons of all the Chriftian precepts are evident. Poli- 
 tive inftitutions are manifeftly necelTary to keep up 
 and propagate religion amongft mankind.- And our 
 duty to Chrift, the internal and external worfhip of 
 )iim J this part of the religion of the Gofpel manifeft- 
 ly arifes out of what he has done and fuffered, his au- 
 thority and dominion, and the relation which he is 
 fevealed to ftand in to us.* 
 
 * P, zoo, &c. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ i^o ] 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OfthetVant of UniverfaUty in Re^u elation -, and of the 
 ftippofed Deficiency in the Proof of it. 
 
 .T has been thought by fome perfohs, 
 that if the evidence of revelation appears doubtful, 
 this itfelf turns into a pofitive argument againft it, be- 
 caufe it cannot be fuppofed that if it were true it 
 would be left to fubfifi upon doubtful evidence. And 
 the objedtion againft revelation from its not being 
 univerfai is often infifted upon as of great weight. 
 
 Now the VvTeaknefs of thefe opinions may ht fliewn, 
 by obferving the fuppofitions on which they are found- 
 ed, which are really fuch as thefe, — that it cannot be 
 thought God would have beftowed any favour at all 
 upon us, unlefs in the degree which we think he might, 
 and which we imagine would be moft to our particu^ 
 lar advantage j and alfo that it cannot be thought he 
 would beftow a favour upon any unlefs he beftowed 
 the fame upon all ; fuppofitions which we find contra- 
 dided not by a few inftances in God's natural govern- 
 ment of the world, but by the general analogy of na-t 
 ture together. 
 
 Perfons who fpeak of the evidence of religion as 
 doubtful, and of this fuppofed doubtfulnefs as a pofi- 
 tive argument againft it, fhould be put upon confid- 
 ering what that evidence indeed is, which they aft up- 
 on with regard to their temporal interefts. For, it is 
 not only extremely difHcult, but, in many cafes, abfo- 
 lutely irnpofTible, to balance pleafure and pain, fatif- 
 faftion and uneafmefs, {o as to be able to fay on which 
 fide the overplus is. There are the like difficulties and 
 impoffibilities in making the due allowances for a 
 change of temper and tafte, for fatiety, difgufts, ill 
 health ; any of which render men incapable of enjoy- 
 ing* 
 
Chap. VI. Revelation not tmiverfal, &c. 26% 
 
 ing, after they have obtained, what they moft eagerly 
 defired. Numberlefs too are the accidents, befides 
 that one of untimely death, which may even probably 
 difappoint the beft concerted fchemes ; and ftrong ob- 
 jedlions are often feen to lie againft them, not to be re- 
 moved or anfwered, but which feem overbalanced by 
 reafons on the other fide ; fo as that the certain difr 
 ficulties and dangers of the purfuit are, by every one, 
 thought juflly difregarded, upon account of the ap- 
 pearing greater advantages in cafe of fuccefs, though 
 there be but little probability of it. LafUy, every one 
 obferves our liablenefs, if we be not upon our guard, 
 to be deceived by the falfehood of men, and the falie 
 appearances of things ; and this danger mufl be great- 
 ly increafed, if there be a ftrong bias within, fuppofe 
 from indulged paffion, to favour the deceit. Hence 
 arlfes that great uncertainty and doubtfulnefs of proof, 
 wherein our temporal intereft really confifts, what are 
 the moft probable means of attaining it, and whether 
 thofe means will eventually be fuccefsful. And num- 
 berlefs inftances there are, in the daily courfe of hfe, 
 in which all men think it reafonable to engage in pur- 
 fuits, though the probability is greatly againft fuc- 
 ceeding, and to make fuch provifion for themfelves, 
 as it is fuppofable they may have occafion for, though 
 the plain acknowledged probability is that they never 
 (hall. Then thofe who think the objeftion againft 
 revelation, from its light not being univerfal, to be of 
 weight, ibould obferve, that the Author of nature, in 
 numberlefs inftances, beftows f/iat upon fome which 
 he does not upon others who feem equally to ftand in 
 need of it. Indeed he appears to beftow all his gifts 
 with the moft promifcuous variety among creatures 
 of the fame fpecies ; health and ftrength, capacities 
 of prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, 
 riches, and all external advantages. And as there are 
 not any tv/o men found of exadly like Ihape and fea- 
 tures. 
 
zSz Revelation not univerfai : Part IL 
 
 tures, fo it is probable there are not any two of an ex- 
 aftly like conftitution, temper and fituation, with re- 
 gard to the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithftand- 
 ing thefe uncertainties and varieties, God does exercife 
 a natural government over the world, and there is fuch- 
 a thing as a prudent and imprudent infbitution of life, 
 with regard to our health and our affairs, tinder that 
 his natural government. 
 
 As neither the Jewifli nor Chriftian revelation have 
 been univerfai, and as they have been afforded to a 
 gi'eater or lefs part of the world, at different times, 
 fo likewife at different times both revelations have had 
 different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived 
 during the fuccelRon of prophets, that is, from Mofes 
 till after the captivity, had higher evidence of the 
 truth of their religion, than thofe had, who lived in 
 the interval between the laft mentioned period and 
 the coming of Chrift. And the firft Chriftians had 
 higher evidence of the miracles wrought in atteftation 
 of Chridianity than what we have now. They had 
 alfo a ftrong prefumptive proof of the truth of it, per- 
 haps of much greater force, in way of argument, than 
 many think, of which we have very little remaining ; 
 I mean the prefumptive proof of its truth, from the 
 influence which it had upon the lives of the generality 
 of its profeffors. And we, or future ages, may poffi- 
 bly have a proof of it, which they could not have, 
 from the conformity between the prophet ick hiftory 
 and the ftate of the world and of Chriftianity. And 
 farther, if we were to fiippofe the evidence which fome 
 have of religion to amount to little more than feeing 
 that it may be true, but that they rerhain in great 
 doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and 
 its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule 
 of life ; others to have a full conviction of the truth 
 of religion, with a diftinct knowledge of their duty ; 
 and others feverally to have all the intermediate de- 
 grees 
 
Chap. VI. Suppofed deficiency in its Proof. 263 
 
 grees of religious- light and evidence, which lie be- 
 tween thefe two, — if we put the cafe, that for the pref- 
 ent it was intended revelation Ihould be no more than 
 a fmall light, in the midft of a world greatly over- 
 fpread, notwithftanding it, with ignorance and dark- 
 nefs ; that certain glimmerings of this light iliould ex- 
 tend and be direded to remote diftances, in fuch a 
 manner as that thofe who really partook of it fhould 
 not difcern from whence it originally came j that fome 
 in a nearer fituation to it fhould have its lisiht obfcur- 
 ed, and in different ways and degrees intercepted ; 
 and that others fhould be placed within its clearer in- 
 fluence, and be much more enlivened, cheered and di- 
 rected by it ; but yet that even to thefe it fhould be 
 no more than a light JJiining in a dark place ; — all this 
 would be perfeftly uniform and of a piece with the 
 condud of Providence in the diflribution of its other 
 bleffings. If the fad of the cafe really were, that fome 
 have received no light at all from the Scripture, as 
 many ages and countries in the heathen world -, that 
 others, though they have by means of it had elTentiai 
 or natural religion enforced upon their confciences, 
 yet have never had the genuine fcripture revelation 
 with its real evidence propofed to their confideration, 
 and the ancient Perjians and modern Mahometans may 
 pofTibly be inftances of people in a fituation Ibmewhat 
 like to this ; that others, though they have had the 
 Scripture laid before them as of divine revelation, yet 
 have had it with the fyftem and evidence ofChriftianity 
 fo interpolated, the fyftem fo corrupted, the evidence 
 fo blended with falfe miracles, as to leave the mind in 
 the utmoft doubtfulnefs and uncertainty about the 
 w^hole ; which may be the ftate of fome thoughtful 
 men, in moft of thofe nations who call themlelves 
 Chriftian. And laftly, that others have had Chrifl- 
 ianity offered to them in its genuine fimplicity, and 
 with its proper evidence, as perfons in countries and 
 
 churches 
 
5564 Revelation net unherfal: Part IT* 
 
 churches of civil and of Chriftian liberty ; but how- 
 ever that even thefe perfons are left in great ignorance 
 in many refpefts, and have by no means light afforded 
 them enough to fatisfy their curiofity, but only to 
 regulate their Hfe, to teach them their duty, and en- 
 courage them in the careful difcharge of it : I fay, if 
 we were to fuppoie this fomewhat of a general true 
 account of the degrees of moral and religious light 
 and evidence, which were intended to be afforded 
 mankind, and of what has adually been and is theif 
 £tuation, in their moral and religious capacity, there 
 would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulnefs 
 and uncertainty, in all thefe varieties, and fuppofed 
 difadvantages of fome in comparifon of others, refpeQ:- 
 ing religion, but may be paralleled by manifeft anal- 
 ogies in the natural difpenfations of Providence at 
 prefent, and confidering ourfelves merely in our tem- 
 poral capacity. 
 
 Nor is there any thing (hocking in all this, or which 
 v/ould (eem to bear hard upon the moral adminiftra- 
 tion in nature, if we would really keep in mind that 
 €very one fliall be dealt equitably with, inftead of for- 
 getting this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowl- 
 edged in words. Ail fliadow of injuftice, and indeed 
 all harfh appearances, in this various economy of 
 Providence, would be loft, if we would keep in mind 
 that every merciful allowance fhall be made, and no 
 more be required of any one than what might have been 
 equitably expeded of him, from the circumftances in 
 which he was placed, and not what might have been 
 expected had he been placed in other circumftances ; 
 i. e. in Scripture language, that every man fliall be 
 accepted according to what he had, not according to what 
 he had not* This however doth not by any means 
 imply that all perfons' condition here is equally ad- 
 vantageous with refped to futurity. And Provi- 
 dence's 
 
 * 2 Cor. viii. 12= 
 
Chap. VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Troof. zSjj 
 
 dence*s defigning to place fome in greater darknefs 
 with refpedt to religious knowledge, is no more a rea- 
 fon wh}^ they fliould not endeavour to get out of that 
 darknefs, and others to bring them out of it, than 
 why ignorant and flow people in matters of other 
 knowledge fhould not endeavour to learn, or fliould 
 not be inftructed. 
 
 It is not unreafonable to fuppofe that the fame wife 
 and good principle, whatever it was, which difpofed 
 the Author of nature to make different kinds and or- 
 ders of creatures, difpofed him alfo to place creatures 
 of like kinds in different fituations ; and that the fame 
 principle which difpofed him to make creatures of dif- 
 ferent moral capacities, difpofed him alfo to place 
 creatures of like moral capacities in different religious 
 fituations, and even the fame creatures in different pe- 
 riods of their being. And the account or reafon of 
 this is alfo moll probably the account, Vv^hy the con- 
 flitution of things is fuch, as that creatures of moral 
 natures or capacities, for a confiderable part of that du- 
 ration in which they are living agents, are not at all 
 fubjeds of moraUty and religion, but grow up to be 
 fo, and grow up to be fo more and more, gradually 
 from childhood to mature age. 
 
 What, in particular, is the account or reafon of 
 thefe things, we mull be greatly in the dark, were it 
 only that we know fo very httle even of our own cafe. 
 Our prefent flate may poffibly be the confequence of 
 fomewhat pafl which we are wholly ignorant of, as it 
 has a reference to fomewhat to come, of which we 
 know fcarce any more than is neceffary for pradice. 
 A fyftem or conftitution, in its notion, implies varie- 
 ty ; and fo complicated an one as this world, very 
 great variety. So that were revelation univerfal, yet 
 from men's different capacities of underftanding, from 
 the different lengths of their lives, their different edu- 
 cations and other external circumflances, and from 
 
 S their 
 
i66 Revelation not univerfah Pakt IL 
 
 their difference of temper and bodily conftitution, — 
 their religious fituations would be widely different, 
 and the difadvantage of fome in comparifon of others, 
 perhaps, altogether as much as at prefent. And the 
 true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or fuch a 
 part of mankind, are placed in this condition of igno- 
 rance, muft be fuppofed alfo the true account of our 
 farther ignorance, in not knowing the reafons v/hy or 
 whence it is that they are placed in this condition. 
 But the following praftlcal refleftions may deferve the 
 ferious confideration of thofe perfons who think the 
 circumftances of mankind or their own, in the fore- 
 mentioned refpefts, a ground of complaint. 
 
 Firji^ The evidence of religion not appearing ob- 
 vious, may conftitute one particular part of fome men's 
 trial in the religious fenfe, as it gives fcope for a virtu- 
 ous exercife or vicious negleft of their underftanding, 
 in examining or not examining into that evidence. 
 There feems no poffible reafon to be given, why we 
 may not be in a ftate of moral probation, with regard 
 to the exercife of our underftanding upon the fubjeft' 
 of religion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in 
 common affairs. The former is as much a thing 
 within our power and choice as the latter. And t 
 fuppofe it is to be laid down for certain, that the fame 
 charader, the fame inward principle, which, after a 
 man is convinced of the truth of religion, renders him 
 obedient to the precepts of it, would, were he not thus 
 convinced, fet him about an examination of it, upon 
 its fyftem and evidence being offered to his thoughts ; 
 and that in the latter ftate his examination would be 
 with an impartiality, ferioufneis and foHcitude pro- 
 portionable to what his obedience is in the former. 
 And as inattention, negligence, want of all ferious 
 concern about a matter of fuch a nature and fuch im- 
 portance, when offered to men's confideration, is, be- 
 fore a diftin^t convidion cf its truth, as real immoral 
 
 depravity 
 
C H A P . VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 267 
 
 depravitv and diflblutenefs, as negle£t of religious prac- 
 tice after fuch convidlion,— fo aftive folicitude about 
 it, and fair impartial confideration of its evidence be- 
 fore fijch convidtion, is as really an exercife of a morally 
 right temperas is religious praftice after. Thus, that 
 religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduc- 
 tion and inference ; that a conviction of its truth is 
 not forced upon every one, but left to be, by fome, 
 colle(5ted with heedful attention to premifes ; this as 
 much conllitutes religious probation, as much affords 
 fphere, fcope, opportunity, for right and wrong beha- 
 viour, as any thing whatever does. And their man- 
 ner of treating this fubjed when laid before them, 
 (hews what is in their heart, and is an exertion of it. 
 Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident, though 
 it is not fo much attended to, that if upon confidera- 
 tion of religion the evidence of it (hould feem to any 
 perfons doubtful, in the higheft fuppofable degree, 
 even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them 
 into a general fiate of probation in the moral and relig- 
 ious fenfe. For, fuppoie a man to be really in doubt 
 whether filch a perfon had not done him the greatefb 
 favour, or whether his whole temporal intereft did not 
 depend upon that perfon, — no one, who had any fenfe 
 of gratitude and of prudence, could poffibly confider 
 himfelf in the fame fituation with regard to fuch per- 
 fon, as if he had no fuch doubt. In truth, it is as jufb 
 to fay that certainty and doubt are the fame, as to fay, 
 the iituations now mentioned would leave a man as en- 
 tirely at liberty in point of gratitude or prudence, as 
 he would be were he certain he had received no favour 
 from fuch perfon, or that he no w^y depended upon 
 him. And thus, though the evidence of religion 
 which is afforded to fome men fhould be little more 
 than that they are given to fee the fyltem of Chriftian- 
 ity, or religion in general, to be fuppofable and cred- 
 ible, — this ought in all reafon to beget a ferious prac- 
 S 2 tical 
 
168 Revelation not tmh erf at : J* art IK 
 
 tical apprehenrion that it may be true. And even this 
 will afford matter of exercife for religious fufpenfe and 
 deliberation, for moral refolution and felf government, 
 becaufe the apprehenfion that religion may be true, 
 does as really lay men under obligations as a full con- 
 vidlion that it is true. It gives occafion and motives 
 to confider farther the important fubjeft, to preferve 
 attentively upon their minds a general imphcit fenfe 
 that they may be under divine moral government, an 
 awful folicitude about religion, whether natural or re- 
 vealed. Such apprehenfion ought to turn men's eyes 
 to every degree of new light which may be had, from 
 whatever fide it comes, and induce them to refrain in 
 the mean time from all immoralities, and live in the 
 confcientious praftice of every common virtue. Ef- 
 pecially are they bound to keep at the greateft diftance 
 from all diflblute profanenefs ; for this the very nature 
 of the cafe forbids ; and to treat with higheft rever- 
 ence a matter, upon which their own whole intereft 
 and being, and the fate of nature depends. This be- 
 haviour, and an adive endeavour to maintain withint 
 themfelves this temper, is the bufinefs, the duty, and 
 the wifdom of tlwfe perfons, who complain of th^ 
 doubtfulnefs of religion ; is what they are under th^ 
 mod proper obligations to. And fuch behaviour i§ 
 an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in 
 them that chara6ter, which the practice of all the fev^ 
 eral duties of religion, from a full convidtion of its 
 truth, is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve 
 in others ; others, I fay, to whom God has afforded 
 fuch convidion. Nay, confidering the infinite im- 
 portance of rehgion, revealed as well as natural, I think 
 it may be faid in general, that whoever will weigh the 
 matter thoroughly may fee there is not near fo much 
 difference as is commonly imagined, between what 
 ought in reafon to be the rule of life, to thofe perfons 
 who are fully convinced of its truth, and to thofe 
 
 who 
 
Ghap. VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 269 
 
 who have only a ferlous doubting apprehenfion that 
 it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and obliga- 
 tions will be in various degrees ; but, as the fubjecft 
 matter of their hopes and fears is the fame, fo the 
 fubjecl matter of their obligations, what they are 
 bound to do and to refrain from, is not fo very unlike. 
 
 It is to be obferved farther, that from a character 
 of underftanding, or a lituation of influence in the 
 world, fome perfons have it in their power to do infi- 
 nitely more harm or good, by fetting an example of 
 profanenefs and avowed difregard to all religion, or, 
 on the contrary, of a ferious, though perhaps doubt- 
 ing apprehenfion of its truth, and of a reverend re- 
 gard to it under this dbubtfulnefs, than they can do, 
 by ading well or ill in all the common intercourfes 
 amongft mankind. And eonfequently they are moil 
 highly accountable for a behaviour, which they may 
 eafily forefee is of fuch importance, and in which 
 there is moil plainly a right and a wrong, even ad- 
 mitting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as 
 is pretended. 
 
 The ground of thefe obfervations, and that which 
 renders them juft and true, is, that doubting neceffa- 
 rily implies fome degree of evidence for that of which 
 we doubt. For no perfon would be in doubt con- 
 cerning the truth of a number of fa6ls fo and fo cir- 
 cumftanced, which ihould accidentally come into his 
 thoughts, and of which he had no evidence at all. 
 And though in the cafe of an even chance, and where 
 eonfequently we were in doubt, we fhould in common 
 language fay that we had no evidence at all for either 
 iide, — yet that fituation of things, which renders it 
 an even chance and no more, that fuch an event will 
 happen, renders this cafe equivalent to all others, 
 where there is fuch evidence on both fides of a quef- 
 tion,* as leaves the mind in doubt concerning the 
 
 truth. 
 
 * Introdudlioiu 
 
2, 7 o Revelation not univerjal : P A R t 11. 
 
 truth. Indeed in all thefe cafes, there is no more ev- 
 idence on one fide than on the other ; but there is. 
 (what is equivalent to) much more for either than 
 for the truth of a number of fa£ls which come into 
 one's thoughts at random. And thus in all thefe 
 cafes doubt as much prefuppofes evidence, lower de- 
 grees of evidence, as belief prel'uppofes higher, and 
 certainty higher ftilL Any one who will a little at- 
 tend to the nature of evidence, will eafily carry this 
 obfervation on, and fee that between no evidence at 
 all, and that degree of it which affords ground of 
 doubt, there are as many intermediate degrees, as there 
 are between that degree which is the ground of doubt, 
 and demonflration. And though we have not facul- 
 ties to diftinguifli thefe degrees of evidence with any 
 fort of exadnefs, yet in proportion as they are difcern- 
 ed they ought to influence our practice. For it is as 
 real an imperfection in the moral charader, not to be 
 influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence 
 when difcerned, as it is in the underftanding not to 
 difcern it. And as in all fubjecls which men confider, 
 they difcern the lower as well as higher degrees of evi- 
 dence, proportionably to their capacity of underftand- 
 ing, — fo in pradical fubjeds they are influenced in 
 practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, 
 proportionably to their fairnefs and honefly. And as, 
 in proportion to defeats in the underftanding, men 
 are unapt to fee lower degrees of evidence, ^re in dan- 
 ger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, 
 and are eafily impofed upon in fuch cafes, — fo in pro- 
 portion to the corruption of the heart, they feem ca- 
 pable of fatisfying themfelves v/ith having no regard 
 in practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it be not 
 overbearing. From thefe ihings it muft follow, that 
 doubting concerning religion implies fuch a degree of 
 evidence for it as, joined with the confideration of its 
 importance, unqueftionably la)fs men under the obli- 
 gations 
 
Chap. VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 271 
 
 gations before mentioned to have a dutiful regard to 
 it in all their behaviour. 
 
 Thirdhy The difficulties in which the evidence of 
 religion is involved, which fome complain of, is no 
 more a juft ground of complaint, than the external 
 circumftances of temptation which others are placed 
 in, or than difficulties in the pradice of it after a 
 full convidion of its truth. Temptations render our 
 Hate a more improving ftate of difcipline * than it 
 would be otherwife, as they give occafion for a more 
 attentive exercife of the virtuous principle, which 
 confirms and ftrengthens it more than an eafier or lefs 
 attentive exercife of it could. Now fpeculative diffi- 
 culties are, in this refped, of the very fame nature v/ith 
 thefe external temptations. For the evidence of relig- 
 ion not appearing obvious, is to fome perfons a temp- 
 tation to rejed it, without any confideration at all ; and 
 therefore requires fuch an attentive exercife of the vir- 
 tuous principle, ferioufly to confider that evidence, as 
 there would be no occafion for but for fuch temptation. 
 And the fuppofed doubtfulnefs of its evidence, after 
 it has been in fome fort confidered, affords opportu- 
 nity to an unfair mind of explaining away, and deceit- 
 fully hiding from itfelf, that evidence which it might 
 fee, and alfo ^or men's encouraging themfelves in vice 
 from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly fee 
 thus much at leaft that thefe hopes are uncertain ; in 
 like manner as the common temptation to many in- 
 ftances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and 
 ruin, is the ground for hope of not being deteded, 
 and of efcaping with impunity ; i. e. the doubt- 
 fulnefs of the proof beforehand, that fuch foolilh be- 
 haviour will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the 
 contrary, fuppofed doubtfulnefs in the evidence of re- 
 ligion calls for a more careful and attentive exercife of 
 the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themfelves up 
 
 to 
 
 * Part I. Chap. y. 
 
272 Revelation not unlverfal : Part 11, 
 
 to the proper influence of any real evidence, though 
 doubtful, and in praftifing confcientioufly all virtue, 
 though under fome uncertainty whether the govern- 
 ment in the univerfe may not poffibly be fuch, as 
 that vice may efcape with impunity. And in general, 
 temptation, meaning by this word the leffer allure- 
 ments to wron^; and difficulties in the difcharsje of 
 our duty, as well as the greater ones — temptation, I 
 fay, as fuch, and of every kind and degree, as it calls 
 forth fome virtuous efforts, additional to what would 
 otherwife have been wanting, cannot but be an ad- 
 ditional difcipline and improvement of virtue, as well 
 as probation of it in the other fenfes of that word.* 
 So that the very fame account is to be given why the 
 evidence of religion fhould be left in fuch a manner, 
 as to require in fome an attentive, folicitous, perhaps 
 painful exercife of their underftanding about it, as why 
 others fhould be placed in fuch circumftances as that 
 the praftice of its common duties, after a full convic- 
 tion of the truth of it, fliould require attention, folic- 
 itude and pains ; or, why appearing doubtfulnefs 
 fhould be permitted to afford matter of temptation to 
 fome, as why external difficulties and allurements 
 jQiould be permitted to afford matter of temptation to 
 others. The fame account alfo is to 1-3 given why 
 fome fhould be exercifed with temptations ot both 
 thefe kinds, as why others fhould be exercifed with 
 the latter in fuch very high degrees as fome have been, 
 particularly as the primitive Chriftians were. 
 
 Nor does there appear any abfurdity in fuppofing, 
 that the fpeculative difficulties in which the evidence 
 of religion is involved, rnay make even the principal 
 part of fom.e perfons' trial. For, as the chief tempta- 
 tions of the generality of the world are, the ordinary 
 m.otives to injuftice or unreft rained pleafure, or to live 
 in the negleft of religion, from that frame of mind 
 
 which 
 
 * Part I. Chap, v, and p. 155- 
 
Cha?. VI, Siippofed Deficiency in its Proof . 275 
 
 which renders many perfons almofl; without feeling as 
 to any thing diftant, or which is not the objeft of their 
 fenfes, — fo there are other perfons without this fhal- 
 lownefs of temper, perfons of a deeper fenfe as to what 
 is invifible and future ; who not only fee, but have a 
 general prad:ical feeling, that what is to come will be 
 prefent, and that things are not lefs real for their not 
 being the objedls of fenfe ; and who, from their nat- 
 ural conftitution of body and of temper, and from 
 their external condition, may have fmall temptations 
 to behave ill, fmall difficulty in behaving well in the 
 common courfe of life. Now when theie latter per- 
 fons have a diftind: full conviftion of the truth of re- 
 ligion, without any poflible doubts or difficulties, the 
 praftice of it is to them unavoidable, unlefs they v>'ili 
 do a conftant violence to their ov^m minds ; and re^ 
 ligion is fcarce any more a difcipline to them than it 
 is to creatures in a ftate of perfeftion. Yet thefe per- 
 fons may poffibly Hand in need of moral difcipline and 
 exercife in a higher degree, than they would have by 
 fuch an eafy pradice of religion. Or it may be requi- 
 {ite for reafons unknown to us, that they ihould give 
 fome farther manifeftation* what is their moral char- 
 after, to the creation of God, than luch a praftice of 
 it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious 
 fituations in which men are placed, what conftitutes, 
 what chiefly and peculiarly conftitutes the probation, 
 in all fenfes, of fome perfons, may be the difficulties in 
 which the evidence of religion is involved ; and their 
 principal and diftinguiilied trial may be, how they will 
 behave under and with refpeft to thefe difficulties. 
 Circumftances in men's fituation in their temporal ca- 
 pacity, analogous in good meafure to this refneding 
 religion, are to be obferved. We find fome peribns are 
 placed in fuch a fituation in the world, as that their 
 chief difficulty with regard to condud:, is not the do- 
 ing 
 *p. 155. 
 
12 7 4 Revelation not univerfal : P A R t IL 
 
 ing what is prudent when it is known, for this in num- 
 bcrlefs cafes is as eafy as the contrary, but to fome the 
 principal exercife is, recolledion and being upon their 
 guard againft deceits, the deceits fuppofe of thofe about 
 them, againft falfe appearances of reafon and prudence. 
 To perfons in fome fituations the principal exercife 
 with refped to condud is, attention in order to inform 
 themfeives what is proper, what is really the reafona^ 
 ble and prudent part to ac5l. 
 
 But as I have hitherto gone upon fuppofition, that 
 men's diffatisfadion with the evidence of religion is not 
 owing to their neglefts or prejudices, it muft be added 
 on the other hand, in all common reafon, and as what 
 the truth of the cafe plainly requires fliould be added, 
 that fuch diffatisfadion pofTibly may be owing to thofe, 
 poffibly may be men's own fault. For, 
 
 If there are any perfons who never fet themfeives 
 heartily and in earned to be informed in religion ; if 
 there are any who fecretly wifli it may not prove true, 
 and are lefs attentive to evidence than to difficulties, 
 and more to objedions than to what is faid in anfwer 
 to them, — thefe perfons will fcarce be thought in a 
 likely way of feeing the evidence of religion, though it 
 were moft certainly true, and capable of being ever fo 
 fully proved. If any accuftom themfeives to confider ' 
 this fubjed: ufually in the way of mirth and fport ; if 
 they attend to forms and reprefentations, and inade- 
 quate manners of expreffion, inftead of the real things 
 intended by them ; (for figns often can be no more 
 than inadequately cxpreffive of the things fignified) or 
 if they fubftitute human errors in the room of divine 
 truth, — why may not all, or any of thefe things, hin- 
 der fome men from feeing that evidence which really 
 is feen by others, as a like turn of mind with refped 
 to m.atters of common fpeculation and practice, does, 
 we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that, 
 knowledge and right underftanding, in matters of com- 
 mon 
 
Chap. VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof . 27^ 
 
 nion fpeculation and pradice, which more fair and at« 
 tentive minds attain to ? And the effed will be the 
 fame, whether their negled of ferioully confidering the 
 evidence of religion, and their indiredt behaviour with 
 regard to it, proceed from mere careleflheis, or i . r.i 
 from the groffer vices ; or whether it be owing to this, 
 that forms and figurative manners of expreffion, as 
 well as errors, adminifter occafions of ridicule, when 
 the things intended and the truth itfelf would not. 
 Men may indulge a ludicrous turn fo far as to lofe all 
 fenfe of condud and prudence in worldly affairs, and 
 even as it feems to impair their faculty of reafon. 
 And in general, levity, careleffnefs, paflion and preju^ 
 dice do hinder us from being rightly informed with 
 refpe.£l to common things j and they may in like man- 
 ner, and perhaps in fome farther providential manner, 
 with refpefl to moral and religious fubjeds ; may hin- 
 der evidence from being laid before us, and from be- 
 ing feen when it is. The Scripture* does declare that 
 every ontJJiall not underjiand. And it makes no dif- 
 ference by what providential condud this comes to 
 pafs i whether the evidence of Chriftianity was, orig- 
 inally and with defign, put and left fo as that thole 
 who are defirous of evading moral obligations fliould 
 not fee it, and that honefl minded perfons lliould ; or 
 whether it comes to pafs by any other means. 
 
 Farther, The general proof of natural religion and 
 of Chriftianity, does, I think, lie level to common 
 men ; even thofe, the greateft part of whofe time, 
 from childhood to old age, is taken up with providing 
 for themfelves and their families the com^mon conve- 
 niences, 
 
 * Dan. xii. lo. See alfo Ifai. xxix. 13, 14. Matth. vi. 23. and xi. 25. 
 and xiii. 11, 12. Joh. iii. 19. joh. v. 44. i Cor. ii. 14. and 2 Cor. iv. 4. 
 2 Tim. iii. 13. and that affeftionate, as well as authoritative admonition, fo 
 Veiy many times inculcated, He that katk can to hear, let him hear, Grotius 
 faw fo flrongly the thing intended in thefe and other paffages of Scripture 
 ef the like fenfe, as to fay that the proof given us of Chriftianity was lefs than 
 it might have been, for this very purpofe ; Ut ita Jemio E'vangelii tanquum 
 lapis ejjct Lydius ad (juem ingtrtia Janubilia tx^lorartntur, De Ver, R, C, h. Z, 
 
 towards :he snd. 
 
Z']S Revelation not univerfal : P a r t II. 
 
 niences, perhaps neceffaries of life ; thofe I mean of 
 this rank, who ever think at all of afking after proof or 
 attending to it. Common men, were they as much 
 in earneft about religion as about their temporal af» 
 fairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evi^ 
 dence, that there is a God who governs the world ; 
 and they feel themfelves to be of a moral nature, and 
 accountable creatures. And as Chriftianity entirely 
 falls in with this their natural fenfe of things, fo they 
 are capable, not only of being perfuaded, but of being 
 made to fee, that there is evidence of miracles wrought 
 in atteftation of it, and many appearing completions 
 of prophecy. But though this proof is real and con* 
 clufive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be run 
 up into difficulties ; which, however, perfons who are 
 capable not only of talking of, but of really feeing, are 
 capable alfo of feeing through ; i, e. not of clearing up 
 and anfwering them fo as to fatisfy their curiofity, for 
 of fuch knowledge we are not capable v/ith refpeft to 
 any one thing in nature, but capable of feeing that the 
 proof is not loft in thefe difficulties, or deftroyed by 
 thefe objeftions. But then a thorough examination 
 into religion with regard to thefe objections, which 
 cannot be the bufinefs of every man, is a matter of 
 pretty large compafs, and from the nature of it requires 
 lomxe knowledge, as well as time and attention, to fee 
 how the evidence comes out upon balancing one thing 
 with another, and what upon the whole is the amount 
 of it. Now if perfons who have picked up thefe ob- 
 jections .from others, and take for granted they are 
 of weight, upon the Vv'ord of thofe from whom they 
 received them, or by often retailing of them come to 
 fee or fancy they fee them to be of weight, will not 
 prepare themfelves for fuch an examination with a 
 competent degree of knowledge, or will not give that 
 time and attention to the fubject, which from the na- 
 ture of it is neceflary for attaining fuch information, — 
 
 ia 
 
Chap. VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. I'jj 
 
 in this cafe they muft remain in doubtfulnefs, igno- 
 rance or error, in the fame way as they muft with re- 
 gard to common fciences, and matters of common Hfe, 
 if they negledt the neceffary means of being informed 
 in them. 
 
 But ftill perhaps it will be obje£led, that if a prince 
 or common mafter were to fend directions to a fer- 
 vant, he would take care that they fliould always bear 
 the certain marks who they came from, and that their 
 fenfe (hould be always plain, fo as that there fliould be 
 no poffible doubt, if he could help it, concerning the 
 authority or meaning of them. Now the proper an- 
 fwer to all this kind of objeftions is, that, wher ever 
 the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus 
 with refpeft to Him who is the governor of the world ; 
 and particularly that he does not afford us fuch in- 
 formation with refpe6t to our temporal affairs and in- 
 terefts, as experience abundantly fhews. However, 
 there is a full anfwer to this objedion from the very 
 pature of religion. For, the reafon why a prince 
 would give his direftions in this plain manner, is, 
 that he abfolutely defires fuch an external aftioii 
 fliould be done, without concerning himfelf with the 
 tnotive or principle upon which it is done ; i. e. he 
 regards only the external event, or the thing's being 
 done, and not at all, properly fpeaking, the doing of 
 it, or the a6lion. Whereas the whole of morality and 
 religion confifting merely in action itfelf, there is no 
 fort of parallel between the cafes. But if the prince 
 be fuppofed to regard only the aftion, i. e. only to de- 
 fire to exercife or in any fenfe prove the underftanding 
 or loyalty of a fervant, he would not always give his 
 orders in fuch a plain manner. It may be proper to 
 add, that the will of God refpecling morality and re- 
 ligion may be confidered either as abfolute or as only 
 conditional. If it be abfolute, it can only be thus, 
 that we fliould a6t virtuouily in fuch given circum- 
 
 ftances ; 
 
27S Rev elation mot tmiv erf a! i Part IL 
 
 ftances ; not tliat we fliould be brought to ad fo by 
 his changing of cur circumflances. And if God's 
 will be thus abfolute, then it is in our power, in the 
 highefl and flrifteft fenfe, to do or to contradid his 
 will, which is a moft weighty confideration. Or his 
 will may be confidered only as conditional, that if we 
 adl fo and fo we fhall be rewarded ; if otherwife, pun- 
 idled ; of which conditional will of the Author of na- 
 ture the whole conftitution of it affords moft certain 
 inftances. 
 
 Upon the whole — that we are in a ftate of religion 
 neceflarily implies that we are in a ftate of probation ; 
 and the credibiHty of our being at all in fuch a ftate 
 being admitted, there feems no peculiar difficulty in 
 kippofing our probation to be juft as it is in'thofe re- 
 fpefts which are above objefted againft. There feems 
 no pretence, from the reafan of the thing, to fay, that the 
 trial cannot equitably be any thing, but whether per- 
 fons will ad: fuitably to certain information, or fuch as 
 admits no room for doubt ; fo as that there can be no 
 danger of mifcarriage, but either from their not at- 
 tending to what they certainly know, or from over- 
 bearing paffion hurrying them on to a6t contrary to 
 it. For, fince ignorance and doubt aiford fcope for 
 probation in all fenfes, as really as intuitive conviftion 
 or certainty, and fince the two former are to be put 
 to the fame account as difficulties in praftice, — men's 
 moral probation may alfo be, whether they will take 
 due care to inform themfelves by impartial confidera- 
 tion, and afterwards whether they will a6t as the cafe 
 requires, upon the evidence which they have, however 
 doubtful. And this, we find by experience, is fre- 
 quently our probation,* in our temporal capacity. 
 For, the information which we want with regard to 
 our worldly interefts is by no means always given us 
 of courfe, without any care of our own. And we are 
 
 greatly 
 
 * p. 93:. 271* 273> 274^. 
 
Chap. VI. Suppofed Deficiency in its Proof. 279 
 
 greatly liable to felf deceit from Inward fecret preju- 
 dices, and alio to the deceits of others. So that to be 
 able to judge what is the prudent part, often requires 
 much and difficult confideration. Then after we 
 have judged the very beft we can, the evidence upon 
 which we muft ad, if we will live and ad at all, is per- 
 petually doubtful to a very high degree. And the 
 conftitution and courfe of the world in fad Is fuch, as 
 that want of impartial confideration what we have to 
 do, and venturing upon extravagant courfes becaufe 
 it is doubtfal what will be the confequence, are often 
 naturally, i. e. providentially, altogether as fatal as 
 mifcondud occafioned by heedlefs inattention to 
 what w^e certainly know, or difregarding it from over- 
 bearing paffion. 
 
 Several of the obfervations here made may well 
 feem ftrange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good 
 men. But if the perfons for whofe fake they are made 
 think fo — perfons who objed as above, and throw off 
 all regard to religion under pretence of want of evi- 
 dence, — I defire them to confider again whether their 
 thinking fo be owing to any thing unintelligible in 
 thefc obfervations, or to their own not having fuch a 
 (enfe of religion and ferious folicitude about it as even 
 their ftate of fcepticifm does in all reafon require. It 
 ought to be forced upon the refledion of thefe per- 
 fons, that our nature and condition necelfarily require 
 us, in the daily courfe of life, to ad upon evidence 
 much lower than what is commonly called probable ; 
 to guard not only againft what we fully believe will, 
 but alfo againft what we think it fuppofable may, 
 happen ; and to engage in purfuits when the proba- 
 bility is greatly againft fuccefs, if it be credible that 
 pofiibly we may lucceed in them. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
■^-Ji 
 
 
 
 
 [ ^^o 
 
 3 
 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Of the particular Evidence for Ckrijlianity. 
 
 
 JL HE prefumptlons agalnft revelation, and 
 objections againfl the general fcheme of Chriftianity 
 and particular things relating to it, being removed, 
 there remains to be conlidered what pofitive evidence 
 we have for the truth of it, chiefly in order to fee what 
 the analogy of nature fuggefts with regard to that ev- 
 idence and the objections againfh it, or to fee what is, 
 and is allowed to be, the plain natural rule of judg- 
 ment and of ad.ion, in our temporal concerns, in cafes 
 where we have the fame kind of evidence and the 
 fame kind of objections againft it that we have in the 
 cafe before us. 
 
 Now in the evidence of Chriftianity there feem to 
 be feveral things of great weight, not reducible to the 
 head either of miracles or the completion of prophecy, 
 in the common acceptation of the words. But thefe 
 two are its direft and fundamental proofs, and thofe 
 other things, however confiderable they are, yet ought 
 never to be urged apart from its dired proofs, but al- 
 ways to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of 
 Chriftianity will be a long feries of things, reaching, 
 as it feems, from the beginning of the world to the 
 prefent time, of great variety and compafs, taking in 
 both the dired and alfo the collateral proofs, and 
 making up, all of them together, one argument ; the 
 convidtion arifing from which kind of proof may be 
 compared to what we call the ejfe^ in architecture or 
 other works of art, a refult from a great number of 
 things fo and fo difpofed, and taken into one view. 
 I fliall therefore, First, make fome obfervations re- 
 lating to miracles and the appearing completions of 
 
 prophecy. 
 
Gh A p . VII. Of the particular Evidence^ ^c. 281 
 
 prophecy, and confider what analogy fuggefts in anfwer 
 to the obje£tions brought againft this evidence. And, 
 Secondly, I fhall endeavour to give fome account 
 of the general argument now mentioned, confifting 
 both of the dired and collateral evidence, confidered 
 as making up one argument ; this being the kind of 
 proof upon which we determine moft queftions of dif- 
 ficulty, concerning common fads, alleged to have hap- 
 pened or feeming likely to happen, eipecially queftions 
 relating to condu6t: 
 
 First, I fliall make fome obfervations upon the 
 direft proof of Chriftianity from miracles and prophe- 
 cy, and upon the objections alleged againft it. 
 
 I. Now the following obfervations relating to the 
 hiftorical evidence of riiiracles wrought in atteftatioil 
 of Chriftianity appear to be of great weight. 
 
 I . The Old Teftament affords us the fame hiftoric- 
 al evidence of the miracles pf Mofes and of the proph- 
 ets, as of the common civil hiftory of Mofes and the 
 kings of Ifrael, or as of the affairs of the Jewiih nation. 
 And the Gofpels and the Atls afford us the fame hif- 
 torical evidence of the miracles of Chrift and the apof- 
 tles, as of the common matters related in them. This 
 indeed could not have been affirmed by any reafonable 
 man, if the authors of thefe books, like many other 
 hiftorians, had appeared to make an entertaining man- 
 ner of writing their aim, though they had interfperfed 
 miracles in their works, at proper diftances and upon 
 proper occaiions. Thefe might have animated a dull 
 relation, amufed the reader, and engaged his atten- 
 tion. And the fame account would naturally have 
 been given of them as of the ipeeches and defcriptions 
 of iuch authors ; the fame account, in a manner, as is 
 to be given why the poef s make ufe of wonders and 
 prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and natu-' 
 ral, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned narra- 
 tives, and both of them appear, in all refpeds, to ftand 
 T upon 
 
282 Of the particular Evidence P a R t II. 
 
 upon the fame foot of hifloricd evidence. Farther — 
 fome parts of Scripture, containing an account of mir- 
 acles fully fufficient to prove the truth of Chriflianity, 
 are quoted as genuine, from the age in which they 
 are faid to be written, down to the prefent ; and no 
 other parts of them, material in the prefent queftion, 
 are omitted to be quoted in fuch manner as to afford 
 any fort of proof of their not being genuine. And as 
 common hiftory, when called in queftion in any in- 
 ftance, may often be greatly confirmed by cotempo- 
 rary or fubfequent events more known and acknowl- 
 edged, and as the common fcripture hiftory, like man)^ 
 others, is thus confirmed, — fo likewife is the miracu- 
 lous hiftory of it, not only in particular inftances, but 
 in general. For the eftablilhment of the Jewifh and 
 Chriftian religions, which were events cotemporary 
 with the miracles related to be wrought in attefta- 
 tion of both, or fubfequent to them, thefe events 
 are juft what we fhould have expected, upon fuppofi- 
 tion fuch miracles were really wrought to atteft the 
 truth of thofe religions. Thefe miracles are a fatif- 
 faclory account of thofe events ; of which no other 
 fatisfa6lory account can be given, nor any account at 
 all but what is imaginary merely and invented. It 
 is to be added, that the moft obvious, the moft eafy 
 and dire<fl account of this hiftory, how it came to be 
 written and to be received in the world, as a true hif- 
 tory, is, that it really is fo ; nor can any other account 
 of it be eafy and direct. Now, though an account 
 not at all obvious, but very far fetched and indireft, 
 may indeed be, and often is, the true account of a mat- 
 ter, — 3'et it cannot be admitted on the authority of its 
 being afferted. Mere guefs, fuppofition, and poffibil- 
 ity, when op|)ofed to hiftorical evidence, prove nothing 
 but that hiftorical evidence is not demonftrative. 
 
 Now the juft confequence from all this, I think, is, 
 that the fcripture hiftory in general is to be admitted 
 
 - as 
 
Chap. VII. for Chrijlianity. 283 
 
 as an authentick genuine hiftory, till fomewhat pofi- 
 tive be alleged fufficient to invalidate it. But no 
 man will deny the contequence to be, that it cannot 
 be rejeded, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can 
 be proved to be of none ; even though the evidence 
 now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This 
 evidence may be confronted by hidorical evidence on 
 the other fide, if there be any ^ or general incredibility 
 in the things related, or inconfiftence in the general 
 t\irn of the hiftory, would prove it to be of no author- 
 ity. But lince, upon the face of the matter, upon a 
 firft and genei'al vievvr, the appearance is that it is an 
 authentick hiftory, it cannot be determined to be fic- 
 titious without fome proof that it is fo. And the fol* 
 lowing obiervations, in fupport of thefe and coincident 
 w^ith them, will greatly confirm the hiftorical evidence 
 for the truth of Chrifiianity. 
 
 2. . The epiftles of St. Vatil^ from the nature of. 
 epiftolary writing, and moreover from feveral of them 
 being written, not to particular perfons, but to church- 
 es, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, 
 beyond what can be in a mere hiftorical narrative, left 
 to the world at large. This evidence, joined v/ith that 
 which they have in common with the reft of the New 
 Teftament, feems not to leave fo much as any partic- 
 ular pretence for denying their genuinenefs, conlidered 
 as an ordinary matter of fact, or of criticifm ; I fay 
 ■particular pretence for denying it, becaufe any fmgle 
 fad, of fuch a kind andfuch antiquity, may have^.?;/- 
 eral doubts raifed concerning it, from the very nature- 
 of human aflairs and human teftimony. There is alfo 
 to be mentioned, a diftinct and particular evidence of 
 the genuinenefs of the epiftle chiefly referred to here, 
 the firft to the Corinthians, from the manner in which 
 it is quoted by Clemens Komanv.s, in an epiftle of his 
 own to that church.* Now thefe epiftles afford a 
 
 T 2 proof 
 
 * Clem. Rom. Ep. I. c. a-. 
 
284 Of the partkular Evidence Part II, 
 
 proof of Chriftianity, detached from all others, which 
 is, I think, a thing of weight, and alfo a proof of a 
 nature and kind peculiar to itfelf. For, 
 
 In them the author declares, that he received the 
 Gofpel in general, and the inflitution of the Commu- 
 nion in particular, not from the reft of the apoftles, or 
 jointl)^ together with them, but alone, from Chrift 
 himfelf, whom he declares likewife, conformably to 
 the hiftory in the Atls^ that he faw after his afcen- 
 fion.* So that the teftimony of St. Paul is to be 
 confidered as detached from that of the reft of the 
 apoftles. 
 
 And he declares farther, that he was endued with a 
 power of working miracles, as what was publickly 
 known to thofe very people — fpeaks of frequent and 
 great variety of miraculous gifts, as then fublifting in 
 thofe very churches to which he was writing, which he 
 was reproving for feveral irregularities, and where he 
 had perfonal oppofers ; he mentions thefe gifts inci- 
 dentally, in the moft eafy manner and without effort, 
 by way of reproof to thofe who had them, for their 
 indecent ufe of them, and by way of depreciating 
 Iherri, in comparifon of moral virtues ; in Ihort, he 
 fpeaks to thefe churches, of thefe miraculous powers, 
 in the manner any one would fpeak to another of a 
 thing, which was as familiar and as much known in 
 common to tliem both, as any thing in the world.-j* 
 And this, as hath been obferved by feveral perfons, is 
 furely a very confiderable thing. 
 
 3. It is an acknowledged hiftorical fad, that 
 Chriftianity offered itfelf to the world, and demanded 
 to be received, upon the allegation, i. e. as unbeliev- 
 ers would fpeak, upon the pretence of miracles, pub- 
 lickly wrought to atteft the truth of it in fuch an age, 
 and that it was adually received by great numbers in 
 
 that 
 
 * Gal. i. I Cor. xi. 23, &c. i Cor. xv. 8. 
 
 f Rom. XV. 19. I Cor. xii. 8, 9, lo — i8, &c. ami ch. xiii. i, z, 8, and the 
 ■whole xivth ch, 2 Cor. xii. is, 13. Gal. iii. a, 5. 
 
Chap. VII. for Chrijiianity. 285 
 
 that very age, and upon the profelTed belief of the re- 
 ahty of thefe miracles. And Chrlftianity, including 
 the difpenfation of the Old Teftament, feems difhin- 
 guiflied by this from all other religions. I mean, that 
 this does not appear to be the cafe with regard to any 
 other ; for furely it will not be fuppofed to lie upon 
 any perfon, to prove by pofitive hiftorical evidence that 
 it was not. It does in no fort appear that Mahomet- 
 anifm was firft received in the world upon the foot of 
 fuppofed miracles,* i. e. publick ones ; for, as revela- 
 tion is itfelf miraculous, all pretence to it muft necef- 
 farily imply fome pretence of miracles. And it is a 
 known fa6t that it was iramediatdly, at the very firft, 
 propagated by other means. And as particular infti- 
 tutions, whether in paganifm or popery, faid to be 
 confirmed by miracles after thofe inftitutions had ob- 
 tained, are not to the purpole, — fo were there >\'hat 
 might be called hiftorical proof, that any of them were 
 introduced by a fuppofed divine command, believed 
 to be attefted by miracles, — thefe would not be in any 
 wife parallel. Foi' fingle things of this fort are eafy to 
 be accounted for, after parties are formed and have 
 power in their hands, and the leaders of them are in 
 veneration with the multitude, and political interefts 
 are blended with reHgious claims and religious diftinc- 
 tions. But before any thing of this kind, for a few 
 perfons, and thofe of the loweft rank, all at once to 
 bring oyer fuch great numbers to a new religion, and 
 get it to be received upon the particular evidence of 
 miracles, — this is quite another thing. And I think 
 it will be allowed by anv fair adver/ary, that the fa6t 
 now mentioned, taking in all the circumftances of it, 
 is peculiar to the Chriftian religion. However, the 
 fad itfelf is allowed that Chriftianity obtained, i. e. 
 was profefled to be received in the world, upon the be- 
 lief of miracles, immediately in the age in which it is 
 
 faid 
 
 -* See the Koran, c. xiii, and c. xvii. 
 
286 Of the particular Eiiidence Part II. 
 
 faid thofe miracles were wrought ; or that this is what 
 its firft converts would have alleged, as the reafon for 
 their embracing it. Now certainly it is not to be fup- 
 pofed, that fuch numbers of men, in the moft diftant 
 parts of the world, Ihould forfake the religion of their 
 country in which they had been educated, feparate 
 themfelves from their friends, particularly in their fef- 
 tival fhows and folemni.ties, to which the common 
 people are fo greatly addidled, and which were of a na- 
 ture to engage them much move than any thing of 
 that fort amongft us, and embrace a religion which 
 could not but expofe them to many inconveniences, 
 and indeed muft have been a giving up the world in a 
 great degree, even from the very firft, and before the 
 empire engaged in form againft them, — it cannot be 
 fuppofed that fuch numbers fhould make fo great, 
 and, to fay the leaft, fo inconvenient a change in their 
 •whole inftitution of life, unlefs they were really con- 
 vinced of the truth of thofe miracles, upon the knowlr 
 edge or belief of which they profefTed to make jt. 
 And it will, I fuppofe, readily be acknowledged, that 
 the generality of the firfl converts to Chriftianity muft 
 have believed them ; that as by becoming Chriftians 
 they declared to the world they were fatisf^ed of the 
 truth of thofe miracles, — fo this declaration was to be 
 credited. And this their teftimony is the fame kind 
 of evidence for thofe miracles as if they had put it in 
 writing, and thefe writings had com.e down to us. 
 And it is real evidence, bccaufe it is of fa£ts which 
 they had capacity and full opportunity to inforrn 
 themfelves of. It is alfo diftinft from the dire<it or 
 exprefs hiftorical evidence, though it is of the fame 
 kind i and it would be allowed to be diftincl in all 
 cafes. For were a fad cxprefsly related by one or 
 more ancient hiftorians, and difputed in after ages ; 
 that this faft is acknowledged to have been believed 
 by great numbers of the age in which the hiftorian 
 
 fays 
 
Ghap. VII. for Chrijlianliy. 287 
 
 fays it was done, would be allowed an additional proof 
 of fuch fa6t, quite diftindl from the exprefs teflimony 
 of the hiftorian. The credulity of mankind is ac- 
 knowledged, and the fiifpicions of mankind ought to 
 be acknowledged ioo^ and their backwardnefs even to 
 believe, and greater iiili to pradiife, what makes againll 
 their intereft. And it muft particularly be remember- 
 ed, that education, and prejudice, and authority, were 
 againfb Chriftianity, in the age I am fpeaking of. So 
 that the immediate converfion of fuch numbers, is a 
 real prefumption of fomewhat more than human in 
 this matter ; I fay prefumption, for it is not alleged as 
 a proof alone and by itfelf. Nor need any one of the 
 things mentioned in this chapter be confidered as a 
 proof by itfelf; and yet all of them together may be 
 one of the ftrongeft. 
 
 Upon the whole — as there is large hiftorical evi- 
 dence, both direft and circumftantial, of miracles 
 wrought in atteflation of Chridianity, collefted by 
 thofe who have writ upon the fubjeft, — it lies upon 
 unbelievers to fliew, why this evidence is not to be 
 credited. This way of fpeaking is, I think, juft, and 
 what perfons who write in defence of religion naturally 
 fall into. Yet, in a matter of fuch unfpeakable im- 
 portance, the proper queftion is, not whom it lies up- 
 on, according to the rules of argument, to maintain 
 or confute objedions, but whether there really are anv 
 againft this evidence, fufficient in reafon to deftroy thq 
 credit of it. However, unbelievers fcem to take upon 
 them the part of fliewing that there arc. 
 
 They allege, that numberiefs enthufiaftick people, 
 in different ages and countries, expofe themlelvcs to 
 the fame difficulties wiiich the primitive Chriftians 
 did, and are ready to give up their lives for the moft 
 idle follies imaginable. But it is not very clear to what 
 purpofe this objection is brought. For every one 
 iurely, in every cale, mufl difLinguifn between opinions 
 
 and 
 
288 Of the particular Evidence Part II. 
 
 and fads. And though teftin^ony is no proof of en- 
 thufiaftick opinions, or of any opinions at all, yet it is 
 allowed in all other cafes to be a proof of fafts. And 
 a perfon's laying down his life in atteflation of fads or 
 of opinions, is the ftrongeft proof of his believing them. 
 And if the apoflles and their cotemporaries did believe 
 the fads, in atteftation of wiiich they expofed them- 
 felves to fufferings and death, this their belief, or rather 
 knowledge, muil be a proof of thofe fads ; for they 
 were fuch as came under the obfervation of their fenfes. 
 And though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight 
 that the martyrs of the next age, notwithftanding they 
 Were not eye witnefles of thofe fads, as were the apoi- 
 tles and their cotemporaries, had, however, full op- 
 portunity to inform themfelves whether they were true 
 or not, and gave equal proof of their believing them 
 to be true. 
 
 But enthuiiafm, it is faid, greatly weakens the evi- 
 dence of teftimony eyen for fads, in matters relating 
 to religion ; fome feem to think it totally and abfo- 
 lutely deftroys the evidence of teftimony upon this 
 fubjed. And indeed the powers of enthuiiafm, and 
 of difeafes too which operate in a like manner, are very 
 wonderful in particular inftances. But if great num- 
 bers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, 
 nor under any peculiar fufpicion of negligence, affirm 
 that they faw and heard fuch things plainly with their 
 eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnefl, — 
 fuch teftimony is evidence of the ftrongeft kind we can 
 have for any matter of fad^ Yet poffibly it may be 
 overcome, ftrong as it is, by incredibility in the things 
 thus attefted, or by contrary teftimony. And in an 
 inftance where one thought it was (o overcome, it 
 might be juft to confider, how far fuch evidence could 
 be accounted for by enthuiiafm ; for it feems as if 
 no other imaginable account Vv-ere to be given of it. 
 But until fuch incredibility be fhewn, Or contrary tefti- 
 mony 
 
Ghap.VII. for Chrijiianity. 289 
 
 mony produced, it cannot furely be expected, that To 
 far fetched, fo indireft and wonderful an account of 
 fuch teftimony as that of enthufiafm muft be ; an ac- 
 count fo flrange, that the generality of mankind can 
 fcarce be made to underftand what is meant by it j it 
 cannot, I fay, be expected that fuch account will be 
 adrnitted of fuch evidence, when there is this diredt, 
 eafy and obvious account of i-t, that people really faw 
 and heard a thing not incredible, which they affirm 
 lincerely and with full affurance they did fee and hear. 
 Granting then that enthufiafm is not (ftriftly fpeak- 
 ing) an abfurd but a polii-ble account of fuch tefti- 
 mony, it is manifeft that the very mention of it goes 
 upon the previous fuppofition that the things fo at- 
 tefted are incredible, and therefore need cot be confid- 
 ered until they are fhewn to be fo. Much let's ^need it 
 be confidered after the contrary has been proved. 
 And I think it has been proved to full fatisfadlion, 
 that there is no incredibility in a. revelation in general, 
 or in fuch an one as the Chriftian in particular. 
 However, as religion is fuppofed peculiarly liable to 
 enthufiafm, it may juft be obferved, that prejudices 
 almoft without number and without name, romance, 
 affeftation, humour, a defire to engage attention or 
 to furprize, the party fpirit, cuftom, Httle competi- 
 tions, unaccountable likings and dillikings, — thefe in- 
 fluence men ftrongly in common matters. And as 
 thefe prejudices are often (carce known or reflefted 
 upon by the perfons themfelves who are influenced by 
 them, they are to be confidered as influences of a like 
 kind to enthuliatrn. Yet human teftimony in com- 
 mon matters is naturally and jufcly believed notwith- 
 itanding. 
 
 It is intimated farther, in a more refined way of ob- 
 fervation, that though it fliould be proved that the 
 apoftles and firft Chriftian.s could not, in fomc re- 
 ipedts, be deceived themfelves, and in other refpefts 
 
 cannot 
 
Z()o Of the particular Evidence Part II, 
 
 cannot be thought to liave intended to Impofe upon 
 the world, — j^et it will not follow that their general 
 teftimony is to be believed, though truly handed down 
 to us ; becaufe they might ftill in part, i. e. in other re- 
 fpefts, be deceived themfelves, and in part alio defign- 
 edly impoie upon others ; which, it is added, is a thing 
 yery credible, from that mixture of real enthufiafm 
 and real knavery to be met with in the fame charaders. 
 And I muft confefs I think the matter of faft, con- 
 tained in this obfervation upon m»ankind, is not to be 
 denied ; and that fom.ewhat very much a-kin to it, is 
 often fuppofed in Scripture as a very common cafe, 
 and moft feverely reproved. But it \vere to have been 
 expeded, that perfons capable of applying this obfer^ 
 vation as applied in the objeclion, might alfo fre- 
 quently have met with the hke mixed charafter, in in- 
 ftances where reHgion was quite out of the cafe. The 
 thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued 
 with reafon, or a capacity of diftinguiihing between 
 truth and falfehood > and as naturally they are endued 
 with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they fay ; 
 but from many occafions, they are liable to be preju- 
 diced and biaffed and deceived themfelves, and capa- 
 ble of intending to deceive others, in every different 
 degree — infomuch that as we are all liable to be de- 
 ceived by prejudice, fo likewife it feems to be not an 
 uncommon thing for perfons, who from their regard 
 to truth would not invent a lie entirely without any 
 foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening 
 circumftances, after it is once invented and fet agoing. 
 And others, though they would not propagate a lie, 
 yet, which is a lower degree of falfehood, will let it pafs 
 without contradiftion. But notwithftanding all this, 
 human teftimony remains fiill a natural ground of af- 
 fent, and this aflent a natural principle of adion. 
 
 It is objeded farther, that however it has happened, 
 the/tf^ is, that mankind have, in different ages, been 
 
 ilrangely 
 
Cii^P. VII. . for ChriJlianUy, 291 
 
 ftrangely deluded .with pretences to miracles and woa- 
 ders. But it is by no means to be admitted that they 
 have beejLi oftener, or 4re at all more liable to be de- 
 ceived by thefe pretences than by otl^ers.. 
 
 It is added, that t]iene is a very confiderabje degree 
 of hiftorical evidence for miracles, which are on all 
 hands acknowledged to be fabulous. But fupppie 
 there were even the like hiftoricai evidpjnce for thele, 
 to what there, is for thofe alleged in proof of ChriiU- 
 a,nity, whicli yet is in no wife allowed, but fuppofe 
 this,— the confequence would not be, that the evi- 
 dence of the latter is not ,to be admitted. Nor is 
 there a m.an in the world who, in common cafes, would 
 conclude thus. For what vvould fuch a conclufion 
 really amount to but this, that evidence confuted by 
 contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, deftroys 
 the credibihty of other evidence, neither cqnfuted nor 
 overbalanced ? To argue that becaufe there isj if there 
 were, like evidence frorn teftimony for miracles ac- 
 knowledged falfe, iis for thofe in atteftation of Chrift- 
 ianity, therefore the evidence in the latter cafe is not 
 to be credited, — ^this is the fame as to argue, that if 
 two mqn of equally good reputation had given evi-^ 
 dence in different cafes no way connected, and one of 
 them had been convided of perjury, this confuted the 
 teilimony of the ether. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the general obfervation that 
 hum.an creatvires are fo liable to be dcjceived, from ea- 
 thufiafm in religion, and principles equivalent to en- 
 thufia&i in common matters, and in both from neg- 
 ligence ; and that they are fo capable of diihoneflly 
 endeavouring to dect?ive others,— r-this does indeed 
 weaken the evidence of teflimony in aU cafes, but does 
 not deftroy it in any. And thcie things will appear, 
 to different men, to weaken the evidence of tefliraony 
 in different degrees ; in degrees proportionable to the 
 obfervations they have made, or the notions they have 
 
 any 
 
igz Of the particular Evidence Part IT. 
 
 any way taken up, concerning the weaknefs and neg^ 
 ligence and difhonefty of mankind, or concerning th^ 
 powers of enthufiafm, and prejudices equivalent to it. 
 But it feems to me that people do not know what they 
 fay, who afErm thefe things to deflroy the evidence 
 from teftimony, which we have of the truth of Chrift- 
 ianity. Nothing can deftroy the evidence of teftimony 
 in any cafe, but a proof or probabiHty that perfons 
 are not competent judges of the fafts to which they 
 give teftimony, or that they are actually under fome 
 indire«Sl influence in giving it in fuch particular cafe. 
 Until this be made out, the natural laws of human 
 actions require that teftimony be admitted. It can 
 never be fufficient to overthrow direct hiftorical evi- 
 dence, indolently to fay, that there are fo many princi- 
 ples from v«^hence men are liable to be deceived them- 
 felves, and difpofed to deceive others, efpecially in 
 matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe. 
 And it is furprizing perfons can help reflefting, that 
 this very manner of fpeaking fuppofes they are not 
 fatisfied that there is nothing in the evidence of which 
 they fpeak thus ; or that they can avoid obferving, if 
 they do m.ake this refledion, that it is on fuch a fub- 
 je6t a very material one.* 
 
 And over againft all thefe objections is to be fet the 
 importance of Chriftianity, as what muft have engaged 
 the attention of its firft converts, fo as to have render- 
 ed them lefs liable to be deceived from careleifnefs than 
 they would in common matters ; and likewife the 
 ftrong obligations to veracity which their religion laid 
 them under ; fo that the firft and mod obvious pre- 
 fumption is, that they could not be deceived them- 
 felves, nor would deceive others. And this prefump- 
 tion in this degree is peculiar to the teftimony we have 
 been confidering. 
 
 In 
 
 * See the foregoing chapter. 
 
Ghap. VII. for Chrijlianhy. 293 
 
 In argument, aflertions are nothing in themfelves, 
 and have an air of pofitivenefs which fometimes is 
 not very eafy ; yet they are neceffary, and neceffary 
 to be repeated, in order to conned a difcourfe, and 
 diftinftly to lay before the view of the reader what is 
 propofed to be proved, and what is left as proved. 
 Now the conclufion from the foregoing obfervations 
 is, I think, beyond all doubt, this — that unbelievers 
 mull be forced to admit the external evidence for 
 Chriftianity, i. e. the proof of miracles wrought to at- 
 tefb it, to be- of real weight and very confiderable, 
 though they cannot allow it to be fufficient to con- 
 vince them of the reality of thofe miracles. And as 
 they muft in all reaibn admit this, fo it feems to me, 
 that upon confideration they would in fa£t; admit it y 
 thofe of them, 1 mean, who know any thing at all of 
 the matter ; in like manner as perfons, in many cafes, 
 own they fee ftrong evidence from teftimony for the 
 truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced 
 are true — cafes, fuppofe, where there is contrary tefti- 
 mony, or things which they think, whether with or 
 without reafon, to be incredible. But there is no tef- 
 timony contrary to that which we have been confider- 
 ing ; and it has been fully proved that there is no in- 
 credibility in Chri/tianity in general, or in any part 
 of it. 
 
 II. As to the evidence for Chriftianity from proph- 
 ecy, I (hall only make fome few general obfervations 
 which are fuggefted by the analogy of nature, i. e. by 
 the acknowledged natural rules of judging in com- 
 mon matters, concerning: evidence of a hke kind to 
 this from prophecy. 
 
 I. The obfcurity or unintelllgiblenefs of one part 
 of a prophecy docs not, in any degree, invalidate the 
 proof of forefight, arifmg from the appearing comple- 
 tion of thofe other parts which are underftood. For 
 £he cafe is evidently the fame as if thofe parts, which 
 
 arc 
 
294 Of the farttctifdir Evidence PAH't IL 
 
 are not underftood, were loft or not written at all, or 
 written in an unknown tongue. Whether this obferva- 
 tion be commonly attended to or not, it is fo evident, 
 that one can Icarce bring one's lelf to fet down an in- 
 ftancc in common matters to exemplify it. How- 
 ever, fuppofe a writing, partly in cypher, and partly in- 
 plain words at length, and that in the part one un- 
 derftood there appeared mention of feveral known" 
 fa<fl5, it would never come into any man's thoughts to 
 imagine, that if he underftood the whole, perhaps he 
 might find that thole fafts w^tVQ not in reality known 
 by the writer. Indeed, both in this example andf 
 the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not 
 nnderflanding the whole (the whole fuppofe of a 
 fentence or a paragraph) might fometimes occafion 
 a doubt, whether one underilood the literal meaning 
 of fuch a part j but this comes under another con- 
 lideration. 
 
 For the fame reafon, though a man fhould be in- 
 capable, for want of learning or opportunities of in- 
 quiry, or from not having turned his ftudies this way, 
 even fo much as to judge, whether particular prophe- 
 cies have been throughout completely fulfilled, — yet 
 he may fee in general, that they have been fulfilled to 
 fuch a degree as, upon very good ground, to be con- 
 vinced of forefight more than human in fuch prophe- 
 cies, and of fach events being intended by them. For 
 the fame reafon alfo, though by means of the deficien- 
 cies in civil hifiiory, and the different accounts of hif- 
 torians, the moll learned Ihould not be able to make 
 out to fatisfaction, that fuch parts of the prophetick 
 hifl-ory have been minutely and throughout fulfilled, — 
 yet a very ftrong proof of forefight may arife from that 
 general completion of them which is made out j as 
 much proof of forefight, perhaps, as the Giver of 
 propliecy intended fhould ever be afforded by fuch 
 parts of prophecv. 
 
 2. A 
 
Chap. VII. for Chrijlianity. 29^ 
 
 2. A long ferles of prophecy being applicable to 
 fuch and fuch events, is itielf a proof that it was in- 
 tended of them ; as the rules by which we naturally 
 judge and determine in common cafes parallel to this 
 will fhew. This obfervation I make in anfwer to the 
 common objection againft the application of the 
 prophecies, that confidering each of them diftindly by 
 itfelf, it does not at all appear, that they were intend- 
 ed of thofe particular events to which they are appli- 
 ed by Chrillians ; and therefore it is to be fuppofed 
 that, if they meant any thing, they were intended of 
 other events unknown to us, and not of thefe at all. 
 
 Now there are two kinds of writing which bear a 
 great refemblance to prophecy, with refpe£t to the 
 matter before us ; the mythological, and the fatirical, 
 where the fatire is to a certain degree concealed. And 
 a man might be aflured, that he underflood what an 
 author intended by a fable or parable, related without 
 any application or moral, merely from feeing it to be 
 eafily capable of fuch application, and that fuch a 
 moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he 
 might be fully aflured, that fuch perfons and events 
 were intended in a fatirical writing, merely from its be- 
 ing applicable to them. And, agreeably to the lall 
 obfervation, he might be in a good meafure fatisfied 
 of it, though he were not enough informed in affairs, 
 or in the ftory of fuch perfons, to underfland half the 
 fatire. For, his fatisfliclion that he underftood the 
 meaning, the intended meaning of thefe . writings, 
 would be greater or lefs, in proportion as he faw the 
 general turn of them to be capable of fuch application, 
 and in proportion to the number of particular things 
 capable of it. And thus, if a long feries of prophecy 
 is applicable to the prefent ftate of the church, and to 
 the political fituations of the kingdoms of the world, 
 lome thoufand years after thefe prophecies were deliv- 
 ered, and a long feries of prophecy delivered before 
 
 the 
 
29^ Of the particular Evidence Part If.- 
 
 the coming of Chrift is applicable to him, — thefe 
 things are in themfelves a proof, that the' prophetick 
 hiftory was intended of him, and of thofe events ; in 
 proportion as the general turn of it is capable of fucli 
 application, and to the number and variety of partic- 
 ular prophecies capable of it. And, though in all juffc 
 way of eonfideration, the appearing completion of 
 prophecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of, 
 and to determine their meaning, — yet it is to be re- 
 membered farther, that the ancient Jews applied the 
 prophecies to a Meffiah before his coming, in much 
 the fame manner as Chriftians do now ; and that the 
 primitive Chriftians interpreted the prophecies refpedt- 
 ing the ftate of the church and of the world in the laffc 
 ages, in the fenfe which the event feems to confirm 
 and verify. And from thefe things it may be made 
 appear, 
 
 3. That the (hewing even to a high probability, if 
 that could be, that the prophets thought of fome 
 other events in fuch and fuch predictions, and not 
 thofe at all which Chriftians allege to be completions 
 of thofe predications j or that fuch and fuch prophecies 
 are capable of being applied to other events, than thofe 
 to which Chriftians apply them, — that this would not 
 confute or deftroy the force of the argument from 
 prophecy, even with regard to thofe very inftances. 
 For, obferve how this matter really is. If one knew 
 fuch a perfon to be the fole author of fuch a book,, 
 and was certainly aftured, or fatisfied to any degree, 
 that one knew the whole of what he intended in it, — ■ 
 one fliould be aftured or fatisfied to fuch degree, that 
 one knew the whole meaning of that book ; for the 
 meaning of a book is nothing but the meaning of the 
 author. But if one knew a perfon to have compiled 
 a book out of memoirs, which he received from anoth- 
 er of vaftly fuperior knowledge in the fubject of it, 
 efpecially if it were a book full of great intricacies and 
 
 difficulties,—" 
 
Cii A p . V II . for ChriJIianky. Q.gy 
 
 difficulties, — It would in no wife follow that one knew 
 the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the 
 whole meaning of the compiler ; for the original mem- 
 oirs, i. e. the author ot them, might have, and there 
 would be no degree of prefumpticn in many cafes 
 againft fuppofing him to have, fome farther meaning 
 than the compiler law. To fay then that the Scrip- 
 tures, and the things contained in them, can have no 
 other or farther meaning than thofe perfons thought 
 or had, who firft recited or wrote them, is evidently 
 faying that thofe perfons were the original, proper, and 
 fole authors of thofe books, i. e. that they are not in- 
 fpired ; which is abfurd, whilft the authority of thefe 
 books is under examination, i. e. until you have de- 
 termined they are of no divine authority at all. Un- 
 til this be determined, it m.uft in all reafon be fuppof- 
 ed, not indeed that they have, for this is taking for 
 granted that they are infpired, but that they may 
 have fome farther meaning than what the compilers 
 faw or undcrftood. And upon this fuppoiition it is 
 fuppofable alfo, that this farther meaning may be ful- 
 filled. Now events correfponding to prophecies, in-^ 
 ternreted in a different mAcaniny; from that in which 
 the prophets are iuppofed to have underftood them, 
 -^s- affords in a manner the fame proof, that this dif- 
 ferent fenfe was originally intended, as it would have 
 afforded if the prophets had not underilood their pre- 
 diftions in the fenfe it is fuppofed they did ; becaufe 
 there is no prefumption of their fenfe of them being 
 the whole fenfe of them. And it has been already 
 fhewn, that the apparent completions of prophecy 
 muft be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. 
 So that the queftion is, whether a feries of prophecy 
 has been fuinlled, in a natural or proper, i. e. in any 
 real fenfe of the words of it. For fuch completion is 
 equally a proof of forefight more than human, wheth- 
 er the prophets are or are not fuppofed to have under- 
 
 U flood 
 
2,93 Of the particular EvidencS Part 1 J, 
 
 ftood it in a different fenfe. I fay, fuppofed ; for,' 
 though I think it clear that the prophets did not un- 
 derftand the full meaning of their predi6dons, it is 
 another queftion how far they thought they did, and 
 in what fenfe they underftood them. 
 
 Hence may be feen to how little purpofe thofe per- 
 fons bufy themfelves, who" endeavour to prove that the 
 prophetick hiflory is applicable to events of the age 
 in which it was written, or of ages before it. Indeed 
 to have proved this before there was any appearance 
 of a farther completion of it, might have anfwered 
 fome purpofe ; for it might have prevented the ex- 
 pectation of any fuch farther completion . Thus, could 
 Porphyry have (hewn that fome principal ^parts of the 
 book of Daniel^ for inftance, the feventh verfe of the 
 feventh chapter, which the Chriftians interpreted of 
 the latter ages, was applicable to events which hap- 
 pened before or about the age oi Antiochus Epiphanes, — > 
 this might have prevented them from expeding any 
 farther completion of it. And, unlefs there was then^ 
 as I think there muft have been, external evidence con- 
 cerning that book more than is come down to us, 
 fuch a difcovery might have been a ftumbling block 
 in the way of Chriftianity itfelf ; confidering the au- 
 thority which our Saviour has given to the book of 
 Daniel, and how much the general fcheme of Chrift- 
 ianity prefuppofes the truth of it. But even this 
 difcovery, had there been any fuch,* would be of ve- 
 ry little weight v*'ith reafonable men. Now, this paf- 
 fage, thus applicable to events before the age of Por- 
 phyry, appears to be applicable alfo to events which 
 fucceeded the diffolution of the Roman empire. I 
 mention this, not at all as intending to infmuate, that 
 
 the 
 
 * It appears that Pcr-phvry did nothing worth mentioning in this v/ay. 
 For Jerom on the place fays, Di4as pojleriora lefiiai — in um ISlacedonum regn9 
 fonit. And as to the ten kings, Decent regcs cnumerat, qui fuerunt faviffimi i 
 ipfofnue reges non unius fonit regni, ■verbi gratia, Macedonia:., Syriie, Afia et 
 jEzvptia ; fed dc di-verfu regnis imum cfficit rcgnunt orditum. And in this Way of 
 interpretation any thing may be made of any thing. 
 
G! HA p. -VII. for Clmjlianity. 299 
 
 the divifion of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly 
 was divided into about that number, were, alone and 
 by itfelf, of any moment in verifying the prophetick 
 hiftory ; but only as an example of the thing I am. 
 fpeaking of. And thus upon the whole, the matter 
 of inquiry evidently mud be, as above put. Whether 
 the prophecies . are applicable to Chrift, and to the 
 prefent ftate of the world and of the church, appli- 
 cable in fuch a degree as to imply forefight ; not 
 whether they are capable of any other application, 
 though I know no pretence for faying the general turn 
 of them is capable of any other. 
 •. Thefe obfervations are, I think, juft, and the evi- 
 dence referred to in them real, though there may be 
 people who will not accept of fuch imperfeft informa- 
 tion from Scripture. Soiije too have not integrity and 
 regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence which 
 keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and 
 which is much of a different fort from what they ex- 
 pefted. And it plainly requires a degree of modefty 
 and fairnels, beyond what every one has, for a man to 
 lay, not to the world, but to himfeif, that there is a 
 real appearance of fomewhat of great weight in this 
 matter, though he is not able thoroughly to fatisfy 
 himfeif about it ; but it (hall have its influence upon 
 him, in proportion to its appearing reality and weight. 
 It is much more eafy, and more falls in with the neg- 
 ligence, prefumption and wjlfulnefs of the generality^ 
 to determine at once, with a decifive air. There is 
 nothing in it. The prejudices arifmg from that abfo- 
 lute contempt and fcorn with which this evidence is 
 treated in the world, I do not mention. For what 
 indeed can be faid to perfons, Vv^ho are weak enough 
 in their underftanding to think this any prefumption 
 againft it, or if they do not, are yet weak enough in 
 their temper to be influenced by fuch prejudices, up- 
 on &ch a fubject ? 
 
 U ?. I Hiall 
 
300 Of the particular Evidence Par t 11. 
 
 I (hall now, Secondly, endeavour to give fome 
 account of the general argument for the truth of 
 Chriftianity, confiding both of the direct and circum- 
 ftantial evidence, confidered as making up one argu- 
 ment. Indeed to ftate and examine this argument 
 fully, would be a work much beyond the compafs of 
 this whole treatife ; nor is fo much as a proper abridg- 
 ment of it to be expefted here. Yet the prefent fub- 
 jeft requires to have fome brief account of it given. 
 For it is the kind of evidence, upon which moft quef- 
 tions of difficulty in common practice are determined ; 
 evidence arifing from various coincidences which fup- 
 port and confirm each other, and in this manner prove, 
 with more or lefs certainty, the point under confider- 
 ation.- And I choofe to do it alfo : Firft, becaufe it 
 ieems to be of the greatell importance, and not duly 
 attended to by every one, that the proof of revel9,tion 
 is, not fome dired and exprefs things only, but a great 
 vairiety of circumfhantial things alfo ; and that though 
 each of thefe direfl and circumftantial things is in- 
 deed to be confidered feparately, yet they are after- 
 wards to be joined together ; for that the proper force 
 of the evidence confifts in the refult of thofe feveral 
 things, confidered in their refpe6ls to each other, and 
 united into one view. And in the next place, becaufe 
 it feems to me, that the matters of faft here fet down, 
 which are acknowledged by unbelievers, muft be ac-- 
 knowledged by them alfo to contain together a de- 
 gree of evidence of great weight, if they could be 
 brought to lay thefe feveral things before themfelves 
 difbindly, and then with attention confider them to- 
 gether, inftead of that curfory thought of them to 
 which we are familiarized. For being familiarized 
 to the curfory thought of things, as really hinders 
 the weight of them from being ieen, as from having 
 its due influence upon pradice. 
 
 The 
 
Chap.VIL for Clirijlianity. 301 
 
 The thing afTerted, and the truth of which is to be 
 inquired into, is this, that over and above our reafon 
 and affeftions, which God has given us for the infor- 
 mation of our judgment and the condud of our Hves, 
 he has alfo, by external revelation, given us an ac- 
 count of himfelf and his moral government over the 
 world, implying a future Hate of rewards and punifh- 
 ments ; i. e. hath revealed the fyftem. of natural relig- 
 ion ; for natural religion may be externally* revealed, 
 by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by mankind, 
 their fellow creatures — that God, I fay, has given 
 us the evidence of revelation, as well as the evidence 
 of reafon, to afcertain this moral fyftem , together 
 with an account of a particular difpenfation of Provi- 
 dence, which reafon could no way have difcovercd, and 
 a particular inftitution of religion founded on it, for 
 the recovery of mankind out of their prefent wretch- 
 ed condition, and raifmg them to the perfedion and 
 iinal happinefs of their nature. 
 
 This revelation, whether real or fuppofed, may be 
 confidered as wholly hiftorical. For prophecy is noth- 
 ing but the hiftory of events before they come 'to pafs ; 
 dodrines alfo are matters of faSt ; and precepts come 
 under the fame notion. And the general defign of 
 Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus 
 confidered as hiftorical, may be faid to be to give us 
 an account of the world, in this one iingie view, as 
 God's world ; by which it appears eflentially diftin- 
 guilhed from all other books, fo far as I have found, 
 except fuch as are copied from it. It begins with an 
 account of God's creation of the world, in order to af- 
 certain and diftinguifh from all others who is the ob- 
 jeft of our worfhip, by what he has done j in order to 
 afcertain who he is, concerning whofe providence, 
 commands, promifes and threatenings, this facred book 
 all along treats j the Maker and Proprietor of the 
 
 world, 
 
 * p. 193, &c. 
 
302 Of the particular Evidence " Part IL 
 
 world, he whofe creatures we are, the God of nature ; 
 in order Ukewife to diftinguifli him from the idols of 
 the nations, which are either imaginary beings, i. e. no 
 beings at all, or elfe part of that creation, the hiftor- 
 ical relation of which is here given. And St. Johuy 
 not improbably with an eye to this Mofaick account 
 of the creation, begins his Gofpel with an account of 
 our Saviour's preexiftence, and that all things zverc 
 made by him^ and without him was not any thing made 
 that was made ;* agreeably to the doftrine of St. Vaul^ 
 that God created all things bv Jefus Chrijl.^ This be- 
 ing premifed, the Scripture, taken together, feems to 
 profefs to contain a kind of an abridgment of the hif- 
 tory of the v/orId,in the view juft now mentioned; that 
 is, a general account of the condition of relig;ion and 
 its profeflbrs, during the continuance of that apoftacy 
 from God, and ftate of wickednefs, which it every 
 where fuppofes the world to lie in. And this account 
 of the ftate of religion carries with it fome brief ac- 
 count of the political ftate of things, as religion is af- 
 fected by it. Revelation indeed confiders the com- 
 mon affairs of this world, and what is going on in it, 
 as a mere fcene of diftradtion, and cannot be fuppofed 
 to concern itfelf with foretelling at what time Rome 
 or Babylon or Gre'ece, or any particular place, ihould 
 be the moft confpicuous feat of that tyranny and dif- 
 folutenefs, which all places equally afpire to be ; can- 
 not, I fay, be fuppofed to give any account of this wild 
 fcene for its own fake. But it feems to contain fome 
 very general account of the chief governments of the 
 world, as the general ftate of religion has been, is, or 
 fliall be, affected by them, from the firft tranfgrelTion, 
 and durino" the whole interval of the world's continu-* 
 ing in its prefent ftate, to a certain future period, fpok- 
 en of both in the Old and New Teftament, very dif- 
 tin(5tly and in great variety of expreflion : The times of 
 
 ih^ 
 
 * Job. i. 3. -)• Eph. iii. 9. 
 
Chap. VII. for ChriJIianity. 303 
 
 the reftitution of all things : * when the myjiery of God 
 fliall he finijiiedy as he hath declared to his fervants the 
 prophets .--f- when the God of heaven JJiall fet up a king- 
 dom^ which JJiall never he defrayed : and the kingdom 
 fliall not he left to other people, % as it is reprefented to be 
 during this apoftacy, hut judgment fiall he given to the 
 faint s^^ and they f mil reign : \\ and the kingdom and do- 
 minion, and the greatnejs of the kingdom under the zvhole 
 heaven, fiall he given to the people of the faints of the 
 Moft High.% 
 
 Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would re- 
 mark how great a length of time the whole relation 
 takes up, near lix thoufand years of which are pafl -, 
 and how great a variety of things it treats of; the nat- 
 ural and moral fyflem or hiflory of the world, in- 
 cluding the time when it was formed, all contained 
 in the very firft book, and evidently written in a rude 
 and unlearned age ; and in fubfequent books, the va- 
 rious common and prophetick hiflory, and the partic- 
 ular difpenfation of Chrillianity. Now all this tor 
 gether gives the largeft fcope for criticilm ; and for 
 confutation of what is capable of being confuted, ei- 
 ther from reafon, or from common hiftory, or from 
 any inconiiftence in its feveral parts. And it is a thing 
 which deferves, I think, to be mentioned, that where- 
 as fome imagine the fuppofed doubtfuinefs of the evi- 
 dence for revelation implies a politive argument that 
 it is not true, it appears, on the contrary, to imply a 
 politive argument that it is true. For, could any 
 common relation, of fuch antiquity, extent and variety 
 {for in thefe things the ftrefs of what I am now obferv- 
 ing lies) be propofed to the examination of the world ; 
 that it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, 
 be confuted, or fhewn to have nothing in it, to the fat- 
 isfadion of re^fonable men, this would be thought a 
 fljong preiumptive proof of its truth. And indeed it 
 
 mull 
 
 * A6ts iii. 21. \ Rev. X. 7. 
 
 + Dan. ii, § Dan. vii. 22. 1| Rev. f[ Dan. vii, 
 
304 Of the particular Evidence Part ip 
 
 muft be a proof of it, juft in proportion to the proba- 
 bility, that if it were falfe, it might be Ihewn to be fo ; 
 and this, I think, is fcarce pretended to be lliewn but 
 tipon principles and in ways of arguing, w^hich have 
 been clearly obviated.* Nor does it at all appear, that 
 any fet of men who believe natural religion, are of the 
 opinion that Chriftia,nity has been thus confuted. Byt 
 to proceed : 
 
 Together with the moral fyftem of the world, the 
 Old Tefhament contains a chronolosical account of 
 the beginning of it, and from thence an unbrokei-^ 
 genealogy of mankind for many ages before common 
 hifhory begins ; and carried on as much farther, as to. 
 make up a continued thread of hiftory of the length 
 of between three and four thoufand j^ears. It cont- 
 tains an account of God's making a covenant with a 
 particular nation, that they Ihould be his people, an4 
 he would be their God, in a peculiar fenfe ; of his often 
 interpofmg miraculoufly in their affairs ; giving them 
 the promiie, and long after the polTeilion, of a partic- 
 ular country ; alluring them of the greateft national 
 profperity in it, if they would worfliip him, in oppo- 
 lition to the idols which the reft of the world worlhip- 
 ped, and obey his commands ; and threatening them 
 with unexampled punifhments, if they difobeyed him, 
 and fell into the general idolatry ; inibmuch that this 
 one nation Ihould continue to be the obfervation and 
 the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly, 
 that God would fcatter them among all people, from one end 
 of the earth unto, the other ; but that when they fliould 
 return unto the Lord their God, he would have compaf- 
 Jion upon them, and gather them from all the nations 
 whither he had fcatter ed them ; that Ifraeljhould be faved 
 in the Lord zvith an everlafiing falvation, and not be 
 aftiamed or confounded world without end. And as fome 
 of thefe promifes are conditional, others are as abfo- 
 
 lute 
 
 * Ch. ii, iiij &c. 
 
CtlAP. VII. fo^ Chrijiianity. 305 
 
 lute as any thing can be exprefled 5 that the time 
 Ihould come, when the people JJmdd be all righteous^ 
 cud inherit the lan-d for ever ; that though God would 
 make a full end of all nations xvhither he had fcattered 
 them^ yet would he not make a full end of them ; that he 
 would bring again the captivity of his people Ifrael, and 
 plant them upon their landy and they fhould be no more 
 pidled up out of their land ; that the feed of Ifrael JJioidd 
 not ceafe from being a nation for ever.^ It foretells, 
 that God would raife them up a particular perfon, in 
 whom ail his promifes fhould finally be fulfilled ; the 
 Mefiiah, who fhould be in an high and eminent {o.n'i^i:^ 
 their anointed Prince and Saviour. This was fore- 
 told in fuch a manner, as raifed a general expecftation 
 of fuch a perion in the nation, as appears from the 
 New Tcfiament, and is an acknowledged fact ; an ex- 
 pe6lation of his coming at fuch a particular time, be- 
 fore any one appeared claiming to be that perfon, and 
 when there was no ground for fuch an expeftation, 
 but from the prophecies ; which expectation therefore 
 mud in all reafbn be prefumed to be explanatory of 
 thole prophecies, if there were any doubt about their 
 meaning, It feems moreover to foretell, that this 
 perfon fhould be rejected by that nation, to whom 
 he had been fo long promifed, and though he was fo 
 much defired by them.-j~ And it exprefsly foretells* 
 that he Ihould be the Saviour of the Gentiles ; and 
 even that the completion of the fcheme, contained 
 in this book, and then begun, and in its progrefs, 
 fhould be ioniewhat fo great, that, in comparifon 
 with it, the reftoration of the Jews alone would be but 
 of fmall account. It is a light thing that thou JJioul deft 
 be my fervant to raife up the tribes of Jacobs and to re- 
 Jiore the preferjed of Ifrael : I will alfo give thee for a 
 light to the Gentiles, that thou mayefi be for falvaticn unto 
 
 "^ • " the 
 
 * Deut. xxviii. 64. Ch. xxx. 2, 3. Ifai. xlv. 17. Ch. Ix. 21. Jer. xxx. 
 II. Ch, xlvi. 28. Amos ix. 15. Jer. xxxi. 36. 
 
 f Ifai..viii. 14, 15. Ch. xlix. 5, Ch. liii. Mai. i. 10, ji. and Ch. iii. 
 
2,0 6 0/ tkd particular Evidence Part IT, 
 
 t/ie end of the earth. And, /;/ the I aft days, the moun^ 
 tain of the Lord's houfe Jhall be ejiablijiied in the top of 
 the mountains^ and fJiall be exalted above the hills ; and 
 
 all nations fJiall flow into it for out of Zion fliall go 
 
 forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerufalem. 
 
 And he fJiall judge among the nations and the Lord 
 
 alone fliall he exalted in that day, and the idols he fftall ut- 
 terly abolifh.^ The Scripture farther contains an ac- 
 count, that at the ' ^ time the Meffiah was expected, 
 a perfon rofe up, in this nation, claiming to be that 
 Meffiah, to be the perfon whom all the propktcies re- 
 ferred to, and in whom they fhouia center ; that he 
 fpent fome years in a continued courfe of miraculous 
 works, and endued his immediate dilciples and follow- 
 ers with a power of doing the fame, as a proof of the 
 truth of that relisiion whixrh he commiffioned them to 
 publiili ; that, invefted with this authority and power, 
 thev m.ade numerous converts in the remoteft coun- 
 tries, and fettled and eftablifhed his religion in the 
 world, to the end of which the Scripture profeiles to 
 give a prophetiek account of the ftate of this religion 
 amongft mankind. 
 
 Let us now fuppofe a perfon utterly ignorant of hif- 
 tor}', to have all this related to him out of the Scrip- 
 ture. Or fuppofe fuch an one, having the Scripture 
 put into his hands, to remark thefe things in it, not 
 knowing but that the whole, even its civil hiftory, as 
 well as the other parts of it, might be from beginning 
 to end an entire invention, and to aik. What truth 
 was in it, and whether the revelation here related was 
 real or a fiction ? And inilead of a dired anfwer, fup- 
 pofe him, all at once, to be told the following confeft 
 fads, and then to unite them into one view. 
 
 Let 
 
 * Ifai.xllx. 6. Ch. ii. Ch. xi. Ch. Ivi. -. Mai. in. To which muft 
 be added the other prophecies of the like kind, feveral in the New Tefta- 
 jnent, and very roany in che Old ; which delcribe what Ihali be the comple- 
 tion of the revealed plan of Providence. 
 
Ghap. VII. for Chrijiianity . 507 
 
 Let him firft be told in how great a degree the pro- 
 feffion and eftabuHiment of natural religion, the be- 
 lief that there is one God to be worlhipped, that virtue 
 is his law, and that mankind fliall be rewarded and punr 
 ithed hereafter, as they obey and difobey it here ; in 
 how ver}' great a degree, I fay, the profeffion and eftabr 
 iilhment of this moral fyftem in the world is owing to 
 the revelation, whether real or fuppofed, contained in 
 this book ; the ellablifhment of this moral fyftem, even 
 in thofe countries which do not acknowledge the prop- 
 er authority of the Scripture.* Let him be told alfo 
 what number of nations do acknowledge its proper 
 authority. Let him then take in the confideration of 
 what importance religion is to mankind. And upon 
 thefe things he might, I think, truly obferve, that this 
 fuppofed revelation's obtaining and being received in 
 the world, with all the circumftances and effeds of it, 
 conlidered together as one event, is the moft confpicu- 
 ous and important event in the ftory of mankind ; 
 that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and 
 recommended to our confideration, demands, -as if by a 
 voice from heaven, to have its claims moft; ferioufly ex- 
 amined into ; and that, before fuch examination, to 
 treat it with any kind of Icoffing and ridicule, is an of- 
 fence againft natural piety. But it is to be remember- 
 ed, that how much foever the eftabliftiment of natural 
 religion in the world is owing to the fcripture reveia- 
 tion, this does not deftroy the proof of religion from 
 reafon, any more than the proof of Euclid's Elemeiiis 
 is deftroyed by a man's knowing or thinking that he 
 ftiould never have iesn the truth of the feveral propoli- 
 tions contained in it, nor had thofe propolitions come 
 into his thou2;hts, but for that mathematician. 
 
 Let fuch a perfon as we are fpeaking of be, in the 
 next place^ informed of the acknowledged antiquity 
 of the firft parts cf this book, and that its chror:ology, 
 
 Its 
 *p. 263. 
 
3o8 Of the particular Evidence Part IT, 
 
 its account of the time when the earth and the feveral 
 parts of it were firfl peopled with human creatures is 
 no way contradifted, but is really confirmed, by the 
 natural and civil hiftory of the world, colleded from 
 common hiftorians, from the ftate of the earth, and 
 from the late invention of arts and fciences. And as 
 the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common 
 and civil hiftory, from the creation to the captivity, for 
 between three and four thoufandyears, let the perfonwe 
 are fpeaking of be told in the next place that this gen- 
 eral hiftory, as it is not contradicted but is confirmed 
 by profane hiftory as much as there would be reafon to 
 expe6l,upon fuppofition of its truth, — fo there is noth- 
 ing in the whole hiftory itfelf to give any reafonable 
 ground of fufpicion of its not being, in the general, a 
 faithful and literally true genealogy of men, and fe- 
 ries of things. I fpeak here only of the common 
 fcripture hiftory, or of the courfe of ordinary events 
 related in it, as diftinguifhed from miracles and from 
 the prophetick hiftory. In all the fcripture narrations 
 of this kind, following events arife out of foregoing 
 ones, as in all other hiftories. There appears nothing 
 related as done in any age, not conformable to the 
 manners of that age ; nothing in the account of a fuc- 
 ceeding age which, one would fay, could not be true, 
 or was improbable, from the account of things in the 
 preceding one. There is nothing in the characters 
 which would raife a thought of their being feigned ; 
 but all the internal marks imaginable of their being 
 real. It is to be added alfo, that mere genealogies, 
 Ijare narratives of the number of years which perfons 
 called by fuch and fuch names lived, do not carry the 
 face of fiftion, perhaps do carry fome prefumption of 
 veracity ; and all unadorned narratives, which have 
 nothing to furprize, may be thought to carry fome- 
 what of the like prefumption too. And the domef- 
 tick and the poHtical hiftory is plainly credible. 
 
 There 
 
Chap. VIL for Chijlianhy. 3(59 
 
 There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken 
 alone in the naked way they are told, may appear 
 ftrange, efpecially to perfons of other manners, tern- 
 per, education ; but there are alfo incidents of un- 
 doubted truth, in many or mofl perfons' lives, which, 
 in the fame circumftances, would appear to the full 
 as ftrange. There may be miftakes of tranfcribers, 
 there may be other real or feeming miftakes not ealy 
 to be particularly accounted for ; but there are cer- 
 tainly no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than 
 what were to have been expedted in books of fuch an- 
 tiquity, and nothing in any wife fufficient to difcredit 
 the general narrative. Now, that a hiftory claiming 
 to commence from the creation, and extending in one 
 continued feries through fo great a length of time and 
 variety of events, ftiould have fuch appearances of re- 
 ality and truth in its whole contexture, is furely a ve- 
 ry remarkable circumftance in its favour. And as all 
 this is apphcable to the common hiftory of the New 
 Teftament, fo there is a farther credibility, and a very 
 high one, given to it by profane authors ; many of 
 thefe waiting of the fame times, and confirming the 
 truth of cuftoms and events which are incidentally as 
 well as more purpofely mentioned in it. And this 
 credibility of the common fcripture hiftory, gives fome 
 credibility to its miraculous hiftory; efpecially as this is 
 interwoven with the common, fo as that they imply 
 each other, and both together make up one relation. 
 Let it then be more particularly obferved to this 
 perfon, that it is an acknowledged matter of 'faft, which 
 is indeed implied in the foregoing obfervation, that 
 there was fuch a nation as the Jews^ of the greateft 
 antiquity, whofe government and general polity was 
 founded on the law here related to be given them by 
 Mofes as from heaven ; that natural religion, though 
 with rites additional, yet no w^ay contrary to ic, was 
 their eftabliihed religion, which cannot be faid of the 
 
 Gentile 
 
^lo Of the particular Evidence Part Ih 
 
 Gentile world ; and that their very being as a nation 
 depended upon their acknowledgment of one God, 
 the God of the.univerfe. For, fuppofe In their cap- 
 tivity in Babylon^ they had gone over to the religion 
 of their conquerors, there would have remained no 
 bond of union to keep them a diftinft people. And 
 whilft thev were under their own kin2;s, in their own 
 country, a total apoftacy from God would have been 
 the difiblution of their whole government. They, in 
 fuch a fenfe, nationally acknowledged and worfhipped 
 the Maker of heaven and earth, when the reft of the 
 world were funk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fa6l, 
 the peculiar pec^:)le of God. And this fo remarkable 
 an eftablifhment and prefervation of natural religion 
 amongft them, feems to add fome peculiar credibility 
 to the hiftorical evidence for the miracles of Mofes and 
 the prophets ; becaufe thefe miracles are a full fatisfac- 
 tory account of this event, which plainly wants to be 
 accounted for, and cannot otherwife. 
 
 Let this perfan, fuppofed wholly ignorant of hiftory,- 
 be acquainted farther, that one claiming to be the 
 Meffiah, of JewiOi extradion, rofe up at the time 
 when this nation, from the prophecies above mention- 
 ed, expefted the Meffiah ; that he was rejefted, as it 
 feemed to have been foretold he fhould, by the body 
 of the people, under the direction of their rulers ; 
 that in the courfe of a very few years he was believed 
 on and acknowledged as the promifed Meffiah, by 
 great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the 
 prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon the evidence of 
 prophecy, but of miracles,* of which miracles we have 
 alfo ftrong hiftorical evidence ; (by which I mean here 
 no more than muft be acknowledged by unbelievers, 
 for let pious frauds and foUies be admitted to v»'eaken, 
 it is abfurd to fay they deftroy, our evidence of mira- 
 cles wrought in proof of Cbriftianity-j^) that tliis relig- 
 ion, 
 
 * p. 284, &:c. t p. 291, &c. 
 
Chap. VIL for Chrijiianity: 311 
 
 ion, approving itfelf to the reafon of mankind, and car- 
 rying its own evidence with it. To far as reafon is a 
 judge of its fyftem, and being no way contrary to rea- 
 fon in thofe parts of it which require to be beHeved 
 upon the mere authority of its Author, — that this re- 
 ligion, I fay, gradually fp^ad and fupported itfelf, for 
 fome hundred years, not only without any affiftance 
 from temporal power, but under conftant difcourage- 
 ments, and often the bittereft perfecutions from it, and 
 then became the religion of the world ; that in the 
 mean time the Jewifh nation and government were 
 deftroyed, in a very remarkable manner, and the peo- 
 ple carried away captive and difperfed through the 
 mofh diflant countries, in which ftate of difperfion 
 they have remained fifteen hundred years ; and that 
 they remain a numerous people, united amongft them- 
 felves, and diftinguifhed from the reft of the world, as 
 they were in the days of Mofes, by the profeffion of 
 his law, and every where looked upon in a manner 
 which one fcarce knows how diftin6lly to exprefs, but 
 in the words of the prophetick account of it, given fo 
 many ages before it came to pafs — ThouJJialt become an 
 tiftonifliment^ a proverb^ and a byword, among all nations 
 'whither the Lord Jliall lead thee* 
 
 The appearance of a ftanding miracle, in the Jews 
 remaining a diftin6l people in their difperfion, and the 
 confirmation which this event appears to give to the 
 truth of revelation, may be thought to be anfwered by 
 their rehgion's forbidding them intermarriages with 
 thofe of any other, and prefcribing them a great many 
 peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred 
 from the means of incorporating with the people in 
 whofe countries they live. This is not, I think, a fat- 
 isfadory account of that which it pretends to account 
 for. But what does it pretend to account for } The 
 correfpondence between this event and the prophecies ; 
 
 or 
 
 * Deut. xxviii. 37. 
 
3 1 2 Of the particular Evidence Part It^ 
 
 or the coincidence of both, with a long difpenfation 
 of Providence of a peculiar nature, towards that peo- 
 ple formerly? No. It is only the event itfelf which is 
 offered to be thus accounted for, which {ino;Ie event 
 taken alone, abftra£ted from all fuch correfpondence 
 and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared 
 miraculous ; but that correfpondence and coincidence 
 may be fo, though the event itfelf be fuppofed not. 
 Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's being born at 
 Bethlehem^ with a long foregoing feries of prophecy 
 and other coincidences, is doubtlefs miraculous, the; 
 feries of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the 
 event, being admitted ; though the event itfelf, his 
 birth at that place, appears to have been brought 
 about in a natural way ^ of which, however, no ons 
 can be certain. 
 
 And as feveral of thefe events feenl in fome degree: 
 exprefsly to have verified the prophetick hiftory alrea- 
 dy, fo likewife they may be confidered farther as 
 having a peculiar afpe6l towards the full completion 
 of it, as affording fome prefumption that the whole of 
 it (hall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that 
 the Jevjs have been fo wonderfully preferved in their 
 long and wide difperfion, which is indeed the direft 
 fulfilling of fome prophecies, but is now mentioned 
 only as looking forward to ibmewhat yet to come ; 
 that natural religion came forth from Judea, and 
 fpread in the degree it has done over the world, before 
 loft in idolatry, which together with fome other things 
 have diftinguifhed that very place, in like manner as 
 the people of it are diftinguifhed ; that this great 
 change of religion over the earth, was brought about 
 under the profeflion and acknowledgment that Jefus 
 was the promifed Mefliah j things of this kind natu- 
 rally turn the thoughts of ferious men towards the full 
 completion of the prophetick hiftory, concerning the 
 final reftoration of that people, concerning the eftab- 
 
 lilhment 
 
for Chrijlianity. 31^ 
 
 llfhrnent of the everlafling kingdom among them, the 
 kingdom of the Meffiah, and the future ftate of the 
 world under this facred government. Such circum- 
 ftances and events compared with thefe prophecies, 
 though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, 
 be fpoken of as nothing in the argument, by a perfon 
 upon his firil being informed of them. They fall in 
 with the prophetick hiftory of things ftill further, give 
 it fome additional credibility, have the appearance of 
 being fomewhat in order to the full completion of it. 
 
 Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and 
 great calmnefs and conlideration, to be able to judge 
 thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Chrift- 
 ianity, from that part of the prophetick hiftory which 
 relates to the fituation of the kingdoms of the world, 
 and to the ftate of the church, from the eftablifli- 
 ment of Ghriftianity to the prefent time. But it ap- 
 pears, from a general view of it, to be very material. 
 And thofe perions who have thoroughly exam.ined it, 
 and fome of them were men of the cooleft tempers, 
 greateft capacities, and leaft liable to imputations of 
 prejudice, inlift upon it as determinately conclulive. 
 
 Suppofe now a perfon quite ignorant of hift.ory, firfi; 
 to recoUetSt the paiTages abovementioned out of Scrip- 
 ture, without knowing but that the whole was a late 
 fidtion, then to be informed of the correfpondent facts 
 now mentioned, and to unite them all into one view ; 
 that the profeffion and eftablifliment of natural relig- 
 ion in the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to 
 this book, and the fuppofed revelation which it con- 
 tains i that it is acknowledged to be of the earlieft an- 
 tiquity ; that its chronology and common hiliory are 
 entirely credible ; that this ancient nation, the y^wj-, of 
 whom it chiefiy treats, appear to have been in fact the 
 people of God in a diftinguiihed fenfe j that, as there 
 was a national expeftation amongll them, raifed from 
 the prophecies, of aMeffiah to appear at fuch a time, fo 
 W one 
 
5 14 Of the particular EiJidenci Fart iL 
 
 one at this time appeared claiming to be that Mefliah j 
 that he was rejeded by this nation, but received by the 
 Gentiles, not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of 
 miracles ; that the religion he taught fupported itfelf 
 under the greatefb difficulties, gained ground, and at 
 length became the religion of the world ; that in the 
 mean time the Jewiih polity was utterly deftroyed, and 
 the nation difperfed over the face of the earth ; that 
 notwithftanding this, they have remained a diftind nu- 
 merous people for fo many centuries, even to this day^ 
 which not only appears to be the exprefs completion of 
 leveral prophecies concerning them, but alfo renders 
 it, as one may fpeak, a vifible and eafy poffibility that 
 the promifes made to them as a nation may yet be ful- 
 filled ; and to thefe acknowledged truths, let the per- 
 fon we have been fuppoiing add, as I think he ought, 
 whether every one will allow it or not, the obvious ap- 
 pearances which there are, of the flate of the world, in 
 other refpeds befides what relates to the Jezvs^ and of 
 the Chriftian Church, having fo long anfwered and 
 ftill anfwering to the prophetick hiftory ; — fuppofe, 
 I fay, thefe fadts fet over againft the things before men- 
 tioned out of the Scripture, and ferioufly compared 
 with them, — the joint view of both together muft, 
 I think, appear of very great weight to a confiderate 
 reafonable perfon ; of much greater indeed, upon hav- 
 ing them firfl laid before him, than is eafy for us who 
 are fo familiarized to them to conceive, without fome 
 particular attention for that purpofe. 
 
 All thefe things, and the feveral particulars contain- 
 ed under them, require to be diftinftly and mofl thor- 
 oughly examined into, that the weight of each may be 
 judged of upon fuch examination, and fuch conclufion 
 drawn as reiults from their united force. But this has 
 not been attempted here. I have gone no farther than 
 to fliow, that the general imperfect view of them now 
 given, the confeft hiftorical evidence for miracles, and 
 
 the 
 
Chap. VII. for Chrijlianity. 3i_^ 
 
 the many obvious appearing completions of propliecy, 
 together with the collateral things* here mentioned, 
 and there are feveral others of the like fort ; that all 
 this together, which being facl muft be acknowledged 
 by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of fomewhat 
 more than human in this matter ; evidence much 
 more important than carelefs men, who have been ac- 
 cuftomed only to tranfient and partial views of it, can 
 imagine, and indeed abundantly fufficient to aft upon. 
 And thefe things, I apprehend, nmft be acknowledged 
 by unbelievers. For though they may fay, that the 
 hiftorical evidence of miracles, wrought in atteftation 
 of Chriftianity, is not fufficient to convince them that 
 fuch miracles were really wrought, they cannot deny 
 that there is fuch hidorical evidence, it being a known 
 matter, of fadt that there is. They may fay, the con- 
 formity between the prophecies and events is by acci- 
 dent ; but there are many inftances in which fuch con- 
 formity itfelf cannot be denied. They may fay, with 
 Regard to fuch kind of collateral things as thofe above- 
 mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without 
 meaningjwill have a meaning found in them by fanciful 
 people ; and that fuch as are fanciful in any one cer- 
 tain way, will make out a thoiifand coincidences which 
 feem to favour their peculiar follies. Men, I fay, m.ay 
 talk thus ; but no one who is ferious can poffibly 
 think thefe things to be nothing, if he confiders the 
 importance of Collateral things, and even of lelTer cir- 
 cumftances, in the evidence of probability, as diftin- 
 guiflied in nature from the evidence of demonftration. 
 In many cafes indeed it feems to require the truefl 
 judgment, to determine with exaftnefs the weight of 
 circumftantial evidence ; but it is very often altogeth- 
 er as convincing, as that which is the moft exprefs and 
 
 direft. ,_,, . 
 
 ihis 
 
 * All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible t3 
 the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. 
 Seep. 280, 281. 
 
 Wz 
 
« 1 6 Of the particular "Evidence Part It. 
 
 This general view of the evidence for Chriftianity, 
 confidered as making one argument, may alfo ferve to 
 recommend to ferious perfons, to fet down every thing, 
 which they think may be of any real weight at all in 
 proof of it, and particularly the many feeming com- 
 pletions of prophecy ; and they will find that, judging 
 by the natural rules by which we judge of probable 
 evidence in common matters, they amount to a much 
 higher degree of proof, upon fuch a joint review, than 
 could be fuppofed upon confidering them feparately 
 at different times, how fb-ong foever the proof might 
 before appear to them upon fuch feparate views of it* 
 For probable proofs, by being added, not only in- 
 creafe the evidence, but multiply it. Nor fhould I 
 diffuade any one from letting down what he thought 
 made for the contrary fide. But then it is to be re- 
 membered, not in order to influence his judgment, 
 but his praftice, that a miftake on one fide may be, 
 in its confequences, much more dangerous than a miP 
 take on the other. And what courfe is moll fafe, and 
 what moft dangerous, is a confideration thought very 
 material, when we deliberate, not concerning events, 
 but concerning condud in our temporal affairs. To 
 be influenced by this confideration in our judgment, 
 to believe or difbelieve upon it, is indeed as much prej- 
 udice as any thing whatever. And, like other prej- 
 udices, it operates contrary ways, in different men. 
 For fome are inclined to believe what they hope, and 
 others what they fear. And it is manifeft unreafona- 
 blenefs, to apply to men's paflions in order to gain 
 their aifent. But in deliberations concerning conduft, 
 there is nothing which reafon more requires to be tak- 
 en into the account, than the importance of it. For, 
 fuppofe it doubtful what would be the confequence of 
 afting in this, or in a contrary manner, ftill that tak- 
 ing one fide could be attended with little or no bad 
 confequence, and taking the other might be attended 
 
 with 
 
C H A P . VII. for Chrijlianity , 3 1 7 
 
 with the greatefl, muft appear to unprejudiced reafon 
 of the highell moment towards determining how we 
 are to a£l. But the truth of our rehgion, hke the 
 truth of common matters, is to be judged of by all 
 the evidence taken together. And unlefs the whole 
 feries of things which may be alleged in this argu- 
 ment, and every particular thing in it, can reafonably 
 be fuppofed to have been by accident, (for here the 
 fhrefs of the argument for Chriftianity lies) then is the 
 truth of it proved ; in like manner as if in any cc-nmon 
 cafe, numerous events acknowledged, were to be alleg- 
 ed in proof of any other event difputed, the truth of 
 the difputed event would be proved, not only if any 
 one of the acknowledged ones did of itfelf clearly im- 
 ply it, but, though no one of them fmgly did fo, if the 
 whole of the acknowledged events, taken together, 
 could not in reafon be fuppofed to have happened, un- 
 lefs the difputed one were true. 
 
 It is obvious how much advantage the nature bf 
 this evidence gives to thofe perfons who attack Chrifb- 
 ianity, efpecially in converfation. For it is eafy to 
 fhew, in a lliort and lively manner, that fuch and fuch 
 things are liable to objeftion, that this and another 
 thing is of little weight in itfelf ; but impoffible to 
 {hew, in like manner, the united force of the whole ar- 
 gument in one view. 
 
 However, laftly, as it has been made appear that 
 there is no preiumption againft a revelation as mirac- 
 ulous ; that the general fcheme of Chriftianity, and 
 the principal parts of it, are conformable to the expe- 
 rienced conftitution of things, and the whole perfectly 
 credible, — fo the account now given of the pofitive ev- 
 idence for it, fhews that this evidence is fuch, as from 
 the nature of it cannot be deftroyed, though it fhould 
 be leflened. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 3iS 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of the OhjeSiions which mav be made agahtjl arguing 
 from the Analogy of Nature to Religion. 
 
 .F every one would confider, with fuch 
 attention as they are bound even in point of moraUty 
 to confider, what they judge and give characters of, 
 the occafion of this chapter would be, in fome good 
 meafure at leaft, fuperfeded. But fince this is not to 
 be expected, for fome we find do not concern theni- 
 felves to underftand even what they write againft j 
 lince this treatife, in common with moft others, lies 
 open to objections which may appear very material to 
 thoughtful men at firft fight ; and, befides that, feems 
 peculiarly hable to the objections of fuch as can judge 
 without thinking, and of fuch as can cenfure without 
 judgmg, — it may not be amifs to fet dov/n the chief 
 of thele objections which occur to me, and confider 
 them to their hands. And they are fuch as thefe ; 
 
 " That it is a poor thing to folve difficulties in rev- 
 elation, by faying that there are the fame in natural 
 religion, when what is wanting is to clear both of them 
 of thefe their common, as well as other their refpec- 
 tive, difficulties ; but that it is. a ftrange v/ay indeed 
 of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to 
 ihew them that they have as little reafon for their 
 worldly purfuits ; and a ftrange way of vindicating 
 the juftice and goodnefs of the Author of nature, and 
 of removing the objections againft both, to which the 
 fyftem of religion lies open, to fhew that the hke ob- 
 jections lie againft natural providence ; a way of an-r 
 fwering objections againft religion, without fo much 
 as pretending to make out that the fyftem of it, or the 
 particular things in it objeCted againft, are reafonable ; 
 
 efpecially. 
 
Chap, VIII. ObjeEiions againji the Analogy^ ISc. 319 
 
 efpecialjy, perhaps fome may be inattentive enough to 
 add, Muft this be thought ftrange, when it is confef- 
 fed that analogy is no anfwer to Ilich objedions ; that 
 when this fort of reafoning is carried to the utmoft 
 length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave 
 the mind in a very unfatisfied ftate ; and that it mufl 
 be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine 
 they will be prevailed with to forego their prefent in- 
 terefts and pleafures, from regard to religion, upon 
 doubtful evidence." 
 
 Now, as plaufible as this way of talking may ap- 
 pear, that appearance will be found in a great meafure 
 owing to half views, which fhew but part of an objeft, 
 yet (hew that indiitindily, and to undeterminate lan- 
 guage. By thefe means weak men are often deceived 
 by others, and ludicrous men by themfelves. And 
 even thofe who are ferious and conliderate, cannot al- 
 ways readily difentangle,and at once clearly fee through 
 the perplexities in.which fubjefts themfelves are involv- 
 ed, and which are heightened by the deficiencies and 
 the abufe of words. To this latter fort of perfons, 
 the following reply to each part of this objection fev- 
 erally may be of fome affiftance, as it may alfo tend a 
 little to ftop and filence others. 
 
 Flrji^ The thing wanted, i, e. what men require, is 
 to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, of at leaft 
 for any thing we know to the contrary it may be, the 
 fame as requiring to comprehend the Divine Nature, 
 and the whole plan of Providence, from everlafting to 
 everlafting. But it hath always been allowed to argue 
 from what is acknowledged to what is difputed , and 
 it is in no other fenfe a poor thing to argue from natu- 
 ral religion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, 
 than it is to argue in numberlefs other ways of prob- 
 able dedudion and inference, in matters of conduct, 
 which v/e are continually reduced to the neceffity of 
 doing. Indeed the epithet poor^ may be applied, I fear 
 
 as 
 
320 Objections againjl the Analogy Part II, 
 
 as properly, to great part or the world of human life, 
 as it is to the things mentioned in the objeftion. Is 
 it not a poor thing, for a phyfician to have fo little 
 knowledge in the cure of difeafes as even the mod 
 eminent have ? To adt: upon conjecture and guefs, 
 where the life of man is concerned ? Undoubtedly it 
 is ; but not in comparifon of having no fkill at all in 
 that ufeful art, and being obliged to a6t wholly in the 
 dark. 
 
 Further — fince it is as unreafonable as It is common, 
 to urge obje6lions againft revelation which are of ecpal 
 weight againft natural religion ; and thofe who do 
 this, if they are not confufed themfelves, deal unfairly 
 with others, in making it feem that they are arguing 
 only againft revelation, or particular dodrines of it, 
 when in reality they are arguing againft moral provi- 
 dence, — it is a thing of confequence to iliow that fuch 
 objeftions are as much levelled againft natural reHgion, 
 as againft revealed. And objeftions- which are equal- 
 ly applicable to both, are properly fpeaking anfwered, 
 by its being iTiown that they are fo, provided the form- 
 er be admitted to be true. And without taking in 
 the confideration how diftindly this is admitted, it is 
 plainly very material to obferve, that as the things ob- 
 jedted againft in natural religion, are of the fame kind 
 with what is certain matter of experience in the courfe 
 of Providence, and in the information which God af- 
 fords us concerning our temj:oral intereft under his 
 government, — fo the objections againft the fyftem of 
 Chriftianity and the evidence of it, are of the very fame 
 kind with thofe which are made againft the fyftem and 
 evidence of natural religion. However, the reader 
 upon review may fee, that moft of the analogies inlift- 
 ed upon, even in the latter part of this treatife, do not 
 neceffarily require to have more taken for granted than 
 is in the former ; that there is an Autlior of nature, or 
 natural Governor of the world ; and Chriftianity is 
 
 vindicated, 
 
Chap. VIII. of Nature to Religion. 321 
 
 vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, 
 but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced con- 
 flitution of nature. 
 
 Secondly^ Religion is a praftical thing, and confifts 
 in fuch a determinate courfe of life, as being what 
 there is reafon to think is commanded by the Author 
 of nature, and will upon the whole be our happinefs 
 under his government. Now if men can be convinc- 
 ed that they have the like reafon to believe this, as to 
 believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will 
 be to their advantage, — fuch convidiion cannot but 
 be an argument to them for the praftice of religion. 
 And if there be really any reafon for believing one of 
 thefe, and endeavouring to preferve life, and fecure 
 ourfelves the necefTaries and conveniences of it, — then 
 there is reafon alfo for believing the other, and endeav- 
 ouring to fecure the interefl it propofes to us. And 
 if the interefl which religion propofes to us be infinite- 
 ly greater than our whole temporal intereft, then there 
 muft be proportionably greater reafon for endeavour- 
 ing to fecure one than the other ; fince by the fuppo- 
 iition, the probability of our fecuring one, is equal to 
 the probability of our fecuring the other. This feems 
 plainly unanfwerable, and has a tendency to influence 
 fair minds, who conlider what our condition really is, 
 or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to 
 acl ; and who are difpofed to acquiefce in the terms 
 upon which we live, and attend to and follow that 
 practical inftru6tion, whatever it be, which is afford- 
 ed us. 
 
 But the chief and proper force of the argument re- 
 ferred to in the objeftion lies in another place. For, 
 it is faid that the proof of religion is involved in fuch 
 inextricable difficulties as to render it doubtful, and 
 that it cannot be fappofed that if it were true it would 
 be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and 
 above the force of each particular difficulty or objec- 
 tion. 
 
322 Objeftions againfi the Analogy Part II. 
 
 ■I 
 tion, thefe difEculties and objeftions, taken together, 
 
 are turned into a pofitive argument againft the truth 
 of religion ; which argument would ftand thus. If 
 religion were true it would not be left doubtful, and 
 open to objections to the degree in which it is ; there- 
 fore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence 
 of it weak, and leflens its force in proportion to the 
 v/eight of fuch objedions, but alfo fhews it to be falfe, 
 or is a general prefumption of its being fo. Now the 
 obfervation., that from the natural conftitution and 
 courfe of things, we muft in our temporal concerns, 
 almoft continually, and in matters of great confe- 
 quence, a6t upon evidence of a like kind and degree 
 to the evidence of religion, is an anfwer to this argu- 
 ment i becaufe it fliews that it is according to the con- 
 duft and charafter of the Author of nature to appoint 
 we fhould act upon evidence like to that which this ar- 
 gument prefumes he cannot be fuppofed to appoint we 
 fhould a6t upon ; it is an inftance, a general one made 
 lip of numerous particular ones, of fomewhat in his 
 dealing with us fimilar to what is faid to be incredible. 
 And as the force of this anfwer lies merely in the par- 
 allel which there is between the evidence for religion 
 and for our temporal conduft, the anfwer is equally 
 juft and conclulive, whether the parallel be made out 
 by fhewing the evidence of the former to be higher, 
 or the evidence of the latter to be lower. 
 
 Thirdly, The defign of this treatife is not to vindi- 
 cate the charafter of God, but to (hew the obligations 
 of men ; it is not to juftify his providence, but to fhew 
 what belongs to us to do. Thefe are two fubjeds, 
 and ought not to be confounded. And though they 
 may at length run up into each other, yet obfervations 
 may immediately tend to make out the latter, which 
 do not appear by any immediate connexion to the 
 purpofe of the former j which is lefs our concern than 
 many feem to think. For, ift, It is not neceflary v/e 
 
 fhould 
 
C H A p . VIII . of Nature to Religion. 323 
 
 fliould juflify the difpenfations of Providence againfi; 
 objedions, any farther than to fhew that the things ob- 
 jected againft may, for aught we know, be confiftent 
 with juftice and goodnefs. Suppofe then, that there 
 are things in the fyflem of this world, and plan of Prov- 
 idence relating to it, which taken alone would be un- 
 juft^ — yet it has been fhewn unanfwerably, that if we 
 could take in the reference which thefe things may 
 have to other things prefent, paft and to come, to the 
 whole fcheme which the things objeded againft are 
 parts of, — thefe very things might, for aught we know, 
 be found to be not only confiftent with juftice, but in- 
 ftances of it. Indeed it has been ihewn, by the anal- 
 ogy of what we fee, not only poffible that this may be 
 the cafe, but credible that it 's. And thus objec- 
 tions drawn from fiich things are anfwered, and Prov- 
 idence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindi- 
 cation neceffary. Hence it appears, 2dly, That objec- 
 tions againft the divine juftice and goodnefs are not 
 endeavoured to be removed, by lliewing that the like 
 objedions, allowed to be really conclufive, lie againft 
 natural providence ; but thofe objedions being fup- 
 pofed and fhewn not to be conclufive, the things ob- 
 jeded againft, confidered as matters of fad, are farther 
 fhewn to be credible from their conformity to the con- 
 ftitution of nature ; for inftance, that God will reward 
 and punifti men for their adions hereafter, from the 
 obfervation that he does reward and punifli them for 
 their adions here. And this I apprehend is of weight. 
 And I add, 3dly, It would be of weight, even though 
 thofe objedions were not anfwered. For, there being 
 the proof of religion above fet down, and religion im- 
 plying feveral fads, for inftance again, the fad laft 
 mentioned, that God will reward and punifti men for 
 their adions hereafter, — the obfervation that his pref- 
 ent method of government is by rewards and puniih- 
 jnents, lliews that future fad not to be incredible ; 
 
 whatever 
 
524 Ohjenions againji the Analogy Part II, 
 
 whatever objedions men may think they have againft 
 it, as unjuft or unmerciful, according to their notions 
 of juftice and mercy, or as improbable from their be- 
 lief of neceffity. I fay, as improbable 5 for it is evident 
 no objecftion againft it, as unjiiji, can be urged from 
 neceffity, lince this notion as much deftroys injuftice 
 as it does juftice. Then 4thly, Though objections 
 againft the reafonablenefs of the fyftem of reHgion, can- 
 not indeed be anfwered without entering into coniid- 
 eration of its reafonablenefs, yet objeftions againft the 
 credibility or truth of it may. Becaufe the fyftem of 
 it is reducible into what is properly matter of fad ; and 
 the truth the probable truth of fa6ls, may be fhewn 
 without confideration of their reafonablenefs. Nor is 
 it neceffary, though in fome cafes and refpedls it is 
 highly ufetul and proper, yet it is not neceffary, to give 
 a proof of the reafonablenefs of every precept enjoined 
 us, and of every particular difpenfation of Providence 
 which comes into the fyftem of religion. Indeed the 
 more thoroughly a perfon of a right difpofition is con- 
 vinced of the perfe6:ion of the divine nature and con- 
 duct, the farther he will advance towards that perfec- 
 tion of religion which St. John*' fpeaks of. But the 
 general obligations of religion are fully made out, by 
 proving the reafonablenefs of the praftice of it. And 
 that the pradice of religion is reafonable may be fliewn, 
 though no more could be proved than that the fyftegi 
 of it may befo^ for aught we know to the contrary ; and 
 even without entering into the diftind confideration 
 of this. And from hence, 5thly, It is eafy to fee, that 
 though the analogy of nature is not an immediate an- 
 Iwer to objedions againft the wifdom, the juftice or 
 goodnefs of any doftrine or precept of religion, — yet 
 it may be, as it is, an immediate and dired anfwer to 
 what is really intended by fuch objeftions, v/hich is to 
 fliew that the things objected againft are incredible. 
 
 FouYthlyy 
 
 * I Joh. iv. 18. 
 
Ghap. VIII. of Nature to Religion. 325 
 
 Fourthly, It is moft readily acknowledged that the 
 foregoing treatife is by no means fatisfacflory, very far 
 indeed from it ; btit fo would any natural inftitutioa 
 of life appear, if reduced into a fyftem, together with 
 its evidence. Leaving religion out of the cafe, men 
 are divided in their opinions whether our pleafures 
 overbalance our pains ; and whether it be, or be not, 
 eligible to live in this world. And were all fuch con- 
 troverfies fettled, which perhaps in fpeculation would 
 be found involved in great difficulties, and were it de- 
 termined upon the evidence of reafon, as nature has 
 determined it to our hands, that life is to be preferv- 
 ed, — yet flill the iTiles which God has been pleafed to 
 afford us, for efcaping the miferies of it and obtaining 
 its fa'tisfa6tions, the rules, for iniiance, of preferving 
 health, and recovering it when loft, are not only falli- 
 ble and precarious, but very far from being exa6t. 
 Nor are we informed by nature in future contingencies 
 and accidents, fo as to render it at all certain what is 
 the beft method of managing our affairs. What 
 will be the fuccefs of our temporal purfuits, in the 
 common fenfe of the word fuccefs, is highly doubtful. 
 And what will be the fuccefs of them in the proper 
 fenfe of the word, i. e. what happinefs or enjoyment 
 we fliall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher 
 degree. Indeed the unfatisfadiory nature of the evi- 
 dence with which we are obliged to take up, in the 
 daily courfe of life, is fcarce to be exprelTed. Yet men 
 do not throw away life, ordifregard the interefts of it, 
 upon account of this doubtfulnefs. The evidence of 
 religion then being admitted real, thofe who objed: 
 againft it as not fatisfactory, i. e. as not being what 
 they wifli it, plainly forget the very condition of our 
 being ; for iatisfa£tion in this fenfe does not belong to 
 fuch a creature as man. And, which is more mate- 
 rial, they forget alfo the very nature of religion. For, 
 religion prefuppofes, in all thofe who will embrace it, 
 
 a certain 
 
326 Ohje5li9ns againji the Analogy Part IL 
 
 a certain degree of integrity and honefty, which it was 
 intended to try whether men have or not, and to ex- 
 ercife in fuch as have it, in order to its improvement. 
 ReHgion prefuppofes this as much, and in the fame 
 fenfe, as fpeaking to a man prefuppofes he underflands 
 the language in which you fpeak, or as warning a man 
 of any danger prefuppofes that he hath fuch a regard 
 to himfelf as that he will endeavour to avoid it. Ani 
 therefore the queflion is not at all. Whether the evi- 
 dence of religion be fatisfa6tory, but. Whether it be 
 in reafon fufficient to prove and difcipline that virtue, 
 which it prefuppofes. Now the evidence of it is fully 
 fufficient for all thofe purpofes of probation, how far 
 foever it is from being fatisfaftory as to the purpofes 
 of curiofity, or any other j and indeed it anfwers the 
 purpofes of the former in feveral refpecls, which it 
 would not do if it were as overbearing as is required. 
 One might add farther, that whether the motives or 
 the evidence for any courfe of aftion be fatisfaftory, 
 meaning here by that word, what fatisfies a man, that 
 fuch a courfe of aftion will in event be for his good, — • 
 this need never be, and I think ftridly fpeaking never 
 is, the praftical queftion in common matters. But 
 the practical queftion in all cafes is, Whether the evi- 
 dence for a courfe of adion be fuch as, taking in all 
 circumftances, makes the faculty within us which is 
 the guide and judge of conduct,* determine that 
 courfe of action to be prudent. Indeed fatisfadion 
 that it will be for our intereft or happinefs, abundant- 
 ly determines an aftion to be prudent ; but evidence 
 almoft infinitely lower than this determines actions to 
 be fo too, even in the conduft of every day. 
 
 Fifthly^ As to the obje6tion concerning the influ- 
 ence which this argument, or any part of it, may or 
 may not be expected to have upon men, — I obferve as 
 above, that religion being intended for a trial and ex- 
 
 ercife 
 
 * See Dijfertation II. 
 
Chap. VIII. of Nature to Religion. 327 
 
 ercife of the morality of every perfon's charadler who 
 is a fubjeft of it, and there being, as I have fhevvn, 
 fuch evidence for it as is fufficient in reafon to influ- 
 ence men to embrace itj, — to objeft that it is not to 
 be imagined mankind will be influenced by fuch evi- 
 dence, is nothing to the purpofe of the foregoing trea- 
 tife. For the purpofe of it is not to inquire what fort 
 of creatures mankind are, but what the light and 
 knowledge which is aflbrded them requires they fhouid 
 be ; to Ihew how in reafon they ought to behave, not 
 how in fa6t they will behave. This depends upon 
 themfelves, and is their own concern, the perfonal 
 concern of each man in particular. And how little 
 regard the generality have to it, experience indeed does 
 too fully {hew. But religion, confidered as a proba- 
 tion, has had its end upon all perfons, to whom it has 
 been propofed with evidence fufficient in reafon to in- 
 fluence their practice ; for by this means they have 
 been put into a ftate of probation, let them behave as 
 they will in it. And thus, not only revelation, but 
 reafon alfo, teaches us that by the evidence of religion 
 being laid before men, the defigns of Providence are 
 cariying on, not only with regard to thofe who will, 
 but likevv'ife with regard to thofe who will not, be in- 
 fluenced by it. Hovv'ever, iaflily, the objedion here 
 referred to allows the things infifted upon in this trea- 
 tife to be of fome weight ; and if fo, it may be hoped 
 it will have fome influence. And if there be a proba- 
 bility that it will have any at all, there is the fame rea- 
 fon in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men, 
 as there would be if it were likely to have a greater in- 
 fluence. 
 
 And farther, I defire it may be confidered, with re- 
 fpeA to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in 
 this treatifelhave argued upon the principles of others,* 
 
 not 
 
 * By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will obferve is meant, 
 not proving any ttiing f: ojn tliole principles, but nQtiuithfianding them. Thus 
 religion is proved, not from the opinion of neceiiity, which is abfurJ, but 
 notvjithjlunding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true, 
 
528 OhjeElions againfi the Analogy Part II, 
 
 not my own ; and have omitted what I thhik true, 
 and of the utmofl importance, becaufe by others 
 thought unintelhgible, or not true. Thus I have ar- 
 gued upon the principles of the fatahfts, which I do 
 not beHeve j and have omitted a thing of the utmofl 
 importance which I do beHeve, the moral jfitnefs and 
 unfitnefs of actions, prior to all will whatever ; which 
 I apprehend as certainly to determine the divine con- 
 dud, as Ipeculative truth and falfehood necelTarily de- 
 termine the divine judgment. Indeed the principle 
 of hberty and that of moral fitnefs fo force themfeives 
 upon the mind, that moralifts, the ancients as well as 
 moderns, have formed their language upon it. And 
 probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeav- 
 oured to avoid it, and in order to avoid it, have fome- 
 times been obliged to exprefs myfelf in a manner which 
 will appear ftrange to fuch as do not obierve the reafon 
 for it J but the general argument here purfued does 
 not at all fuppofe or proceed upon thefe principles. 
 Now, thefe two abftrad: principles of liberty and mor- 
 al fitnefs being omitted, religion can be conlidered in 
 no other view than merely as a queftion of fa6t , and 
 in this view it is here conlidered. It is obvious that 
 Chriilianity, and the proof of it, are both hiftorical. 
 And even natural religion is, properly, a matter of fad: ; 
 for, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, 
 is fo J and this proportion contains the general fyftem 
 of natural religion. But then, feveral abflrad truths, 
 and in particular thofe two principles, are ufually taken 
 into confideration in the proof of it, whereas it is here 
 treated of only as a matter of faft. To explain this ; 
 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
 ones, is an abftrad truth , but that they appear fo to 
 our mind, is only a matter of fad. And this laft muft 
 have been admitted, if any thing was, by thofe ancient 
 fcepticks who would not have admitted the former ; 
 but pretended to doubt. Whether there were any fuch 
 
 thing 
 
Ghap. VIIL of Nature to Religion. 329 
 
 thing as truth, or, Whether we could certainly depend 
 upon our faculties of underflanding for the knowledge 
 of it in any cafe. So Hkewife that there is, in the nature 
 of things^ an original ftandard of right and wrong in 
 adions, independent Upon all will, but which unalter- 
 ably determines the will of God to exercife that moral 
 government over the world which religion teaches, 
 i. e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punifli 
 men refpediyely as they aft right or wrong, — this af- 
 fertion contains an abftradl truth, as well as matter of 
 fa6t. But fuppofe in the prefent .(late every man, with- 
 out exception, was rewarded and punifhed in exacl pro- 
 portion as he followed or tranfgreffed that fenfe of right 
 and wrong which God has implanted in the nature of 
 every man, — this would not be at all an abftraO: truth, 
 but only a matter of fadl. And though this fad were 
 acknowledged by every one, yet the very fame difficul- 
 ties might be raifed as are now, concerning the abftrad 
 queflions of liberty and nioral fitnefs 5 and we fliould 
 have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that 
 the government of the world was perfedly moral, with- 
 out taking in the conlideration of thofe queflions j 
 and this proof would remain, in what way foever they* 
 were determined. And thus, God having given man- 
 kind a moral faculty, the objed of which is adions, 
 and which naturally approves fome adions as right and 
 of good defert, and condemns others as wrong and of 
 ill defert ; that he will, finally and upon the whole, 
 reward the former and punifli the latter, is not an af- 
 fertion of an abftrad truth, but of v;hat is as mere a 
 fad as his doing fo at prefent would be. This future 
 fad I have, not indeed proved with the force with 
 which it might be proved, from the principles of lib- 
 erty and moral fitnefs, but without them have given 
 a really conclufive pradical proof of it, which is greatly 
 ilrengthened by the general analogy of nature ; a proof 
 eafily cavilled at, eafily fhewn not to be demonftrative, 
 
 X for 
 
330 OhjeBions againji the Analogy, i^c. Part IT. 
 
 for it Is not offered as fuch ; but impoffible, I think, 
 to be evaded or anfwered. And thus the obligations 
 of religion are made out, exclufively of the queftions 
 concerning liberty and moral fitnefs, which have been 
 perplexed with difficulties and abftrufe reafonings, as 
 every thing may. 
 
 Hence therefore may be obferved diftindly what is 
 the force of this treatife. It will be, to fuch as are con- 
 vinced of religion upon the proof arifing out of the two 
 laft mentioned principles, an additional proof and a 
 confirmation of it; to fuch as do not admit thofe 
 principles, an original proof of it,^ and a confirmation 
 of that proof. Thofe who believe, will here find the 
 fcheme of Chrifcianity cleared of objedions, and the 
 evidence of it in a peculiar manner ftrengthened ; thofe 
 who do not believe, will at leaft be fliewn the abfurd- 
 ity of all attempts to prove Chriftianity falfe, the plain 
 undoubted credibility of it ; and, I hope, a good deal 
 more. 
 
 And thus, though fome perhaps may ferioufly think 
 that analogy, as here urged, has too great fl;refs laid up- 
 on it; and ridicule, unanfwerable ridicule, may be appli- 
 ed, to fhew the argument from it in a difadvantageous 
 light, — yet there can be no queftion but that it is a 
 real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, im- 
 plying in it numerous fads, analogy being a confirma- 
 tion of all fadts to which it can be applied, as it is the 
 only proof of moft, cannot but be admitted by every 
 one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the 
 fide of religion, both natural and revealed ; and it 
 ought to be particularly regarded by fuch as profefs to 
 follow nature, and to be lefs fatisfied with abflraft 
 reafonings. 
 
 * p. 165, &c. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
[ 331 ] 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 W HATEVER account may be given 
 of the ftrange inattention and difregard, in fome 
 ages and countries, to a matter of fuch importance as 
 religion, it would, before experience, be incredible that 
 there fhould be the like difregard in thofe who have 
 had the moral fyftem of the world laid before them, as 
 it is by Chriftianity, and often inculcated upon them ; 
 becaufe this moral fyftem carries in it a good degree 
 of evidence for its truth, upon its being barely propofed 
 to our thoughts. There is no need of abilrufe rea- 
 fonings and diftinftions, to convince an unprejudiced 
 underftanding that there is a God who made and gov- 
 erns the world, and will judge it in righteoufnefs, 
 though they may be neceflary to anfwer abflrufe diffi- 
 culties, when once fuch are raifed ; when the very 
 meaning of thofe words which exprefs moft intelligi- 
 bly the general dodrine of religion, is pretended to be 
 uncertain, and the clear truth of the thing itfelf is ob- 
 fcured by the intricacies of fpeculation. But to tin 
 unprejudiced mind, ten thoufand thoufand inf};a?i<!es 
 of defign cannot but prove a defigner. And it is in- 
 tuitively manifeft, that creatures ought to live under 
 a dutiful fenfe of their Maker, and that juftice and 
 charity muft be his laws, to creatures whom he has 
 made focial and placed in fociety. Indeed the truth 
 of revealed religion, peculiarly fo called, is not feifevi- 
 dent, but requires external proof in order to its be- 
 ing received. Yet inattention among us to revealed 
 religion, will be found to imply the fame difTolute im- 
 moral temper of mind as inattention to natural relig- 
 ion y becaufe, when both are laid before us in the ' 
 manner they are in Chriftian countries of liberty, our 
 X z obligations 
 
332 CONCLUSION, Part It, 
 
 obllgationr, to Inquire into both, and to embrace both 
 upon fuppofition of their truth, are obligations of the 
 fame nature. For, revelation claims to be the voice 
 of God ; and our obligation to attend to his voice Is 
 furely moral in ail cafes. And as it is infifled that its 
 evidence is conclufive, upon thorough confideration 
 of" it, fo it offers itfelf to us with manifeft obvious ap- 
 pearances of having fomething more than human In 
 it, and therefore in all reafon requires to have its claims 
 moft ferioufly examined into. It is to be added, that 
 though light and knowledge, in what manner foever 
 afforded us, is equally from God, yet a miraculous rev- 
 elation has a peculiar tendency, from the firft princi-? 
 pies of our nature, to awaken mankind, and Infpire 
 them with reverence and awe ; and this is a peculiar 
 obhgation to attend to what claims to be fo withfuch 
 appearances of truth. It Is therefore mofl certain that 
 our obligations to inquire ferioufly into the evidence 
 of Chriftianity, and upon fuppofition of its truth to 
 embrace it, are of the ut mofl importance, and moral in 
 the highefl and moil proper fenfe. Let us then fuppofe 
 that the evidence of religion in general, and of ChriilT. 
 ianity, has been ferioufly inquired into by all reafona- 
 ble men among us. Yet we find many profelledly to 
 reje<5l both, upon fpeculative principles of infidelity. 
 And all of them do not content themfelves with a bare 
 negled: of religion, and enjoying their imaginary free- 
 dom from its refbraints. Some go much beyond this. 
 They deride God's moral government over the world. 
 They renounce his protection, and defy his juftice. 
 They ridicule and vilify Chriftianity, and blafphemc 
 the Author of it ; and take all occaiions to manifefl a 
 fcorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts to 
 an aftive fetting themfelves againfb rehgion, to what 
 may be confidered as a pofitive principle of irreligion ; 
 which they cultivate within themfelves, and, whether 
 they intend this efTedt or not, render habitual, as a 
 
 good 
 
I'art II. C O N C L IT S I O N. 
 
 333 
 
 good man does the contrary principle. And others, 
 who are not chargeable with all this profligatenefs, yet 
 are in avowed oppofition to religion, as if difcovered 
 to be groundlefs. Now admitting, which is the fup- 
 pofition we go upon, that thefe perfons aft upon what 
 they think principles of reafon, and otherwife they are 
 not to be argued with, it is really inconceivable that 
 they fhould imagine they clearly fee the whole evidence 
 of it, confidered in itfelf, to be nothing at all ; nor do 
 they pretend this. They are far indeed from having 
 ajuft notion of its evidence ; but they would not fay 
 its evidence was nothing, if they thought the 0/ ftem 
 of it, with all its circumftances,were credible, like other 
 matters of fcience or hiftory. So that their rnanncr 
 of treating it muft proceed, either from fuch kind of 
 obje6lions againft all religion as have been anflvered or 
 obviated in the formicr part of this treatife, or elfe from 
 objeftions and ditiiGulties fuppofed more peculiar to 
 Chriftianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices againft 
 the whole notion of a revelation and miraculous in- 
 terpofitibns. They find things in Scripture, whether 
 in incidental pafTages or in the general fcheme of it, 
 which appear to them unreafonable. They take for 
 granted that if Chriftianity were true, the light of it 
 m.ufl have been more general, and the evidence of it 
 more fatisfadlory, or rather overbearing ; that it mufr 
 and would have been, in fome way, otherwife put and 
 left than it is. Now this is not imagining they fee the 
 ■evidence itfelf to be nothing or inc6nfiderable, but 
 quite another thing. It is being fortified againft the 
 evidence in fome degree acknowleda;ed, bv thinkin?: 
 *i:Rfey fee the fyftem of Chriftianity, or fonie\!vhf^t 'which 
 "Appears to them neceffarily connected with it', to be in- 
 credible orfalfe ; fortified againft that evidence which 
 might dtherwife mai?:e great impreffioh tipdn therti. 
 Or, laftly, if any of thefe perfons are, upon the whole, 
 in doubt -concerning the truth of Chriftian'ty, theh- 
 
 behaviom' 
 
534 CON'CLUSION, Part II. 
 
 behaviour feems owing to their taking for granted, 
 through ftrange inattention, that fuch doubting is, 
 in a manner, the fame thing as being certain againftit. 
 To thefe perfons, and to this ftate of opinion con- 
 cerning religion, the foregoing treatife is adapted. 
 For, all the general objedions againft the moral fyfteni 
 of nature having been obviated, it is fliewn that there 
 is not any peculiar prefumption at all againft Chrift- 
 ianity, either confidered as not difcoverable by reafon, 
 or as unlike to what is fo difcovered j nor any worth 
 mentioning againft it as miraculous, if any at all ; 
 none certainly which can render it in the leaft incred- 
 ible. It is (hewn that upon fuppofition of a divine 
 revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand 
 highly credible, I think probable, that many things 
 in it muft appear liable to great objedlions ; and that 
 we muft be incompetent judges of it to a great de- 
 gree. This obfervation is, I think, unqueftionably 
 true, and of the very utmoft importance ; but it is 
 urged, as I hope it will be underftood, with great cau- 
 tion of not vilifying the faculty of reafon, which is 
 i/ie candle of the Lord within us ; * though it can af- 
 ford no light where it does not Ihine, nor judge where 
 it has no principles to judge upon. The objections 
 here fpoken of, being firft anfwered in the view of ob- 
 jedions againft Chriftianity as a matter of fadt, are in 
 the next place confidered as urged more immediately 
 againft the wifdom, juftice and goodnefs of the Chrift- 
 ian difpenfation. And it is fully made out that they 
 admiit of exadly the like anfwer, in every refpedt, to 
 what the like objedions againft the conftitution of na- 
 ture admit of; that, as partial views give the appearance 
 of wrong to things, which upon farther confideration 
 and knowledge of their relations to other things are 
 found juft and good, fo it is perfectly credible that the 
 things objeded, againft the wifdom and goodnefs of the 
 
 Chriftiaii 
 
 * Prov. XX. 27. 
 
Part 11. CONCLUSION, 
 
 135 
 
 Chriftian difpenfation, may be rendered inftances of 
 wifdom and goodnefs by their reference to other things 
 beyond our view ; becauie Chriftianity is a fcheme as 
 much above our comprehenlion, as that of nature, and 
 like that, a fcheme in which means are made ufe of to 
 accomphfli ends, and which, as is mod credible, may 
 be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be 
 attended to, that this is not an anfwer taken merely 
 or chiefly from our ignorance, but from fomewhat 
 pofitive which our obfervation Ihews us. For, to like 
 objedions the like anfwer is experienced to be juft, 
 in numberlefs parallel cafes. The obje£lions againft 
 the Chrifbian difpenfation, and the method by which 
 it is carried on, having been thus obviated in general 
 and together, the chief of them are confidered diftinft- 
 ly, and the particular things objeded to are iTiewn, 
 credible, by their perfedt analogy, each apart, to the 
 conftitution of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from 
 his primitive ftate, and to be reftored, and infinite 
 wifdom and power engages in accomplifhing our re- 
 covery, it were to have been expedied, it is faid, that 
 this fliould have been effcded at once, and not by 
 fuch a long feries of means, and fuch a various econ- 
 omy of perfons and things ; one difpenfation prepar- 
 atory to another, this to a farther one, and lb on 
 through an indefinite number of ages, before the end 
 of the fcheme propofed can be completely accom- 
 plifhed J a fcheme conducted by infinite wifdom, and 
 executed by almighty power. But now on the con- 
 trary, our finding that every thing in the conftitution 
 and courfe of nature is thus carried on, fliews fuch ex- 
 pectations concerning revelation to be highly unrea-- 
 fonable, and is a fatisfadory anfwer to them, when 
 urged as objections againft the credibility that the 
 great fcheme of Providence in the redemption of the 
 world may be of this kind, and to be accomplifhed in 
 this mann-^^r. As to the particular method of our re- 
 demption. 
 
53^ CONCLUSION. Part IL 
 
 demption, the appointment of a Mediator between 
 God and man, this has been ftiewn to be moft obvi- 
 oufly analogous to the general condud of nature, i. e. 
 the God of nature in appointing others to be the in - 
 ftruments of his mercy, as v/e experience in the daily 
 courfe of Providence. The condition of this world, 
 which the doftrine of our redemption by Chrift pre- 
 fuppofes, fo much falls in with natural appearances, 
 that heathen moralifls inferred it from thole appear- 
 ances ; inferred that human nature was fallen from 
 its original rediitude, and in confequence of this de- 
 graded from its primitive happinefs. Or, however 
 this opinion came into the world, thefe appearances 
 muft have kept up the tradition, and confirmed the 
 belief of it. And as it was the general opinion un- 
 der the light of nature that repentance and reforma- 
 tion, alone and by itfelf, was not fufficient to do away 
 fin, and procure a full remiffion of the penalties an- 
 nexed to it, and as the reafon of the thing does not 
 at all lead to any fuch conclufion, — fo every day's ex- 
 perience fliews us that reformation is not, in any fort, 
 fufficient to prevent the prefent difadvantages and 
 mileries which, in the natural courfe of things, God 
 lias annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there 
 may be ground to think that the punifliments, which 
 by the general lav/s of divine government are annexed 
 to vice, may be prevented ; that provifion may have 
 been even originally made, that they fhould be pre- 
 vented by fome means or other, though they could 
 not by reformation alone. For we have daily inftances 
 oifiich mercy ^ in the general conduft of nature ; com- 
 paffion provided for mifery,* medicines for difeafes, 
 friends againii enemies. There is provifion made, in 
 the oriorinal conftltution of the world, that much of 
 the natural bad confequences of our follies, which 
 perfons themfelves alone cannot prevent, may be pre- 
 vented 
 
 * Serm. at the Rolls, p. io6. 
 
Part II. CONCLUSION. 
 
 337 
 
 vented by the affiftance of others ; affiftance which 
 nature enables, and dtfpofes, and appoints them toaf^ 
 tord. By a method of goodnefs analogous to this, 
 when the world lay in wickednefs and confequently irj 
 ruin, Godfo loved the worlds that he gave his only begot- 
 ten Son to fave it ; and he being made perfeB: bv fuffer- 
 xngy became the author of eternal Jalvation to all them that 
 obey kirn.* Ifideed neither reaibn nor analogy would 
 lead us to think, in particular, that the interpolition 
 of Chrift, in the manner in which he did interpofe, 
 would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world 
 which the Scripture teaches us it was ; but neither 
 \vould reafon nor analogy lead us to think, that other 
 particular means would be of the efficacy which expe- 
 rience lliews they are, in nuniberlefs inftances. And 
 therefore, as the cafe before us does not admit of ex- 
 perience, fo that neither reafon nor analogy can (hew 
 how, or in what particular way, the interpolition of 
 Chrift, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy which 
 it is there reprefented to be, — this is no kind nor de- 
 gree of prefumption againfl: its being really of that 
 efficacy. Farther — the objections againft Chriftianity, 
 from the light of it not being univerfal, nor its evi- 
 dence fo ftrong as might poffibly be given us, have 
 been anfwered by the general analogy of nature. 
 That God has made fuch variety of creatures, is in- 
 deed an anfwer to the former j but that he difpenfes 
 his gifts in fuch variety, both of degrees and kinds, 
 amongft creatures of the fame fpecies, and even to the 
 fame individuals at different times, is a more obvious 
 and full anfwer to it. And it is fo far from being the 
 method of Providence in other cafes, to afford us fuch 
 overbearing evidence as fome require in proof of Chrift- 
 ianity, that on the contrary, the evidence upon v.'h!ch 
 we are naturally appointed to ad: in comm.on mat- 
 ters^ throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful 
 
 ■^ Joh. iii. 1 6. Heb. v. 91 
 
338" CONCLUSION, Part IL 
 
 in a high degree. And admitting the fad:, that God 
 has afforded to fome no more than doubtful evidence 
 of religion, the fame account may be given of it as of 
 difficulties and temptations with regard to pra6tice. 
 But as it is not impoffible,* furely, that this alleged 
 doubtfulnefs may be men s own fault, it deferves their 
 moft ferious confideration whether it be not fo. How- 
 ever, it is certain that doubting implies a degree of 
 evidence for that of which we doubt ; and that this 
 degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations, 
 as demonflrative evidence. 
 
 The whole then of religion Is throughout credible ; 
 nor is there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed 
 difpenfation of things, more different from the expe- 
 rienced confhitution and courfe of nature, than fome 
 parts of the conflitution of nature are from other parts 
 of it. And if fo, the only queftion which remains is, 
 what pofitive evidence can be alleged for the truth of 
 Chriflianity. This too in general has been confidered, 
 and the objedions agalnfl it eflimated, Dedudt there- 
 fore what is to be dedu6ted from that evidence, upon 
 account of any weight which may be thought to re- 
 main in thefe objedlions, after what the analogy of 
 nature has fuggefled in anfwer to them, and then con- 
 fider what are the practical confequences from all this, 
 upon the moft fceptical principles one can argue upon, 
 (for I am writing to perfons who entertain thefe prin- 
 ciples) and upon fuch confideration it will be obvious 
 that immorality, as little excufe as it admits of in it- 
 felf, is greatly aggravated in perfons who have been 
 made acquainted with Chriftianity, whether they be- 
 lieve it or not ; becaufe the moral iyftem of nature, or 
 natural rehgion, which Chriflianity lays before us, ap- 
 proves itfelf, almoft intuitively, to a reafonable mind 
 upon feeing it propofed; In the next place, with re- 
 gard to Chriftianity it will be obferved, that there is a 
 
 middle 
 
 * p. 274, &c. 
 
Part II. CONCLUSION. 339 
 
 middle between a full fatisfadlon of the truth of it, 
 and a fatisfadion of the contrary. The middle ftate 
 of mind between thefe two, confifts in a ferious appre- 
 henfion that it may be true, joined with doubt whether 
 it be fo. And this, upon the beft judgment I am able 
 to make, is as far towards fpeculative infidehty as any 
 fceptick can at all be fuppofed to go, who has had 
 true Chriftianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid 
 before him, and has in any tolerable meafure confid- 
 ered them. For I would not be miftaken to compre- 
 hend all who have ever heard of it ; becaufe it feems 
 evident that in many countries, called Chriftian, nei- 
 ther Chriftianity nor its evidence are fairly laid before 
 men. And in places where both are, there appear to 
 be fome who have very little attended to either, and 
 who rejeft Chriftianity with a fcorn proportionate to 
 their inattention, and yet are by no means without 
 underftanding in other matters. Now it has been 
 fhewn that a ferious apprehenfion that Chriftianity 
 may be true, lays perfons under the ftrifteft obliga- 
 tions of a ferious regard to it throughout the whole of 
 their life ; a regard not the fame exaftly, but in many 
 refpedts nearly the fame, with what a full convi61:ion of 
 its truth would lay them under. Laftly, it will ap- 
 pear that blafphemy and profanenefs, I mean with re- 
 gard to Chriftianity, are abfolutely without excufe. 
 For there is no temptation to it but from the wan- 
 tonnefs of vanity or mirth ; and thefe, confidering the 
 infinite importance of the fubjeft, are no fuch tempta- 
 tions as to aiford any excufe for it. If this be a juft 
 account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or 
 difregard Chriftianity, which is to talk and aft as if 
 they had a demonftration of its falfehood, there is no 
 reafon to think they would alter their behaviour to 
 any purpofe, though there were a demonftration of 
 its truth. 
 
 The end of the SECOND PART. 
 
TWO BRIEF 
 
 DISSERTATION S« 
 
 I. Of Per'jonal Identity. 
 11. Of the Nature of Virtue, 
 
A D V ERTISEM E N T. 
 
 In the fir Ji copy of thefe papers, I had in- 
 fer ted the two following Dijfertations into the chapters^ 
 Of a Future Life, and. Of the Moral Government 
 of God, with which they are clofely conneEled, But 
 as they do not dire£lly fall under the title of the fore- 
 going Treatifey and zmuld have kept the fubjeSl of it 
 too long out of fight y it feemed more proper to place 
 them by themfelves. 
 
DISSERTATION I. 
 
 Of Perfonal Identity, 
 
 VV HETHER we are to live In a future 
 ilate, as it is the moft important queftion which can 
 poflibly be afked, fo it is the moft intelligible one 
 which can be exprefled in language. Yet ftrange per- 
 plexities have been raifed about the meaning of that 
 identity or famenefs of perfon, which is implied in the 
 notion of our living now and hereafter, or in any two 
 rucceflive moments. And the folution of thefe diffi- 
 culties hath been ftronger than the difficulties them- 
 felves. For, perfonal identity has been explained fo 
 by fome, as to render the inquiry concerning a future 
 life of no confequence at all to us, the perfons who are 
 making it. And though few men can be milled by 
 fuch fubtieties, yet it may be proper a little to con- 
 fider them- 
 
 Now, when it is afked wherein perfonal identity 
 coniifts, the anfwer fhould be the fame as if it were 
 a{ked v/herein confifts limilitude or equality ; that ail 
 attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet there 
 is no difficulty at all in afcertaining the idea. For as, 
 upon two triangles being compared or viewed togeth- 
 er, there arifes \o the mind the idea of fimilitude, or 
 upon twice two and four, the idea of equality, — fo 
 iikewife, upon comparing the confciouineHes oi one's 
 
 felf 
 
544 Q/" P^^fi^^^^ Identity. Diss, tr 
 
 felf or one's own exiftence in any two moments, there 
 as immediately arifes to the mind the idea of perfonal 
 identity. And as the two former comparifons not 
 only give us the ideas of fimiHtude and equahty, but 
 aUb iliew us that two triangles are aUke, and twice 
 two and four are equal, — fo the latter comparifon not 
 only gives us the idea of perfonal identity, but alfo 
 fliews us the identity of ourfelves in thofe two mo- 
 ments ; the prefent, fuppofe, and that immediately 
 paft ; or the prefent, and that, a month, a year, or 
 twenty years paft. Or in other words, by refle£ling 
 upon that which is my felf now, and that which w^as 
 my felf twenty years ago, I difcern they are not two, 
 but one and the fame felf- 
 
 But though confcioufnefs of what is pafl does thus 
 afcertain our perfonal identity to ourfelves, yet to fay 
 that it makes perfonal identity, or is necelTary to our 
 being the fame perfons, is to fay that a perfon has not 
 exifted a fmgle moment, nor done one aftion, biit 
 what he can remember ; Indeed none but what he re- 
 flects upon. And one fliould really think it felfevi- 
 dent, that confcioufnefs of perfonal identity prefup- 
 pofes, and therefore cannot confbitute, perfonal iden- 
 tity, any more than knowledge in any other cafe can 
 conftitute truth, which it prefuppofes. 
 
 This wonderful miftake may poffibly have arifen 
 from hence, that to be endued with confcioufnefs is 
 infeparable from the idea of a perfon or intelligent be- 
 ing. For, this might be expreffed inaccurately thus, 
 that confcioufnefs makes perfonality, and from henc^ 
 it might be concluded to make perfonal identity. But 
 though prefent confcioufnefs of what we at prefent do 
 and feel is neceflary to our being the perfons we now 
 are, yet prefent confcioufnefs of paft actions or feelings 
 is not necelFary to our being the fame perfons, who 
 performed thofe adions or had thofe feelings. 
 
 The 
 
t)iss. L Of Perfonal Identity. 34^ 
 
 The inquiry, what makes vegetables the fame in the 
 common acceptation of the word, does not appear to 
 have any relation to this of perfonal identity, becaufe 
 the word fame, when applied to them and to perfon, is 
 not only applied to different fubjeds, but it is alfo 
 ufed in different fenfes. For when a man fvvears to 
 the fame tree as having flood fifty years in the fame 
 place, he means only the fame as to all the purpofes of 
 property and ufes of common life, and not that the 
 tree has been all that time the fame in the ffrift phi- 
 iofophical fenfe of the word. For he does not know, 
 Vv'hether any one particle of the prefent tree be the 
 fame with any one particle of the tree which flood in 
 the fame place fifty years ago. And if they have not 
 one common particle of matter, they cannot be the 
 fame tree in the proper philofophick fenfe of the word 
 fame ; it being evidently a contradidion in terms to 
 fay they are, when no part of their fubflance and no 
 one of their properties is the fame ; no part of their 
 fubflance, by the fuppofition ; no one of their prop- 
 erties, becaufe it is allowed that the fame property can- 
 not be transferred from one fubflance to another. And 
 therefore when we fay the identity or famenefs of g. 
 plant confifls in a continuation of the fame life, com- 
 municated under the fame organization to a number 
 of particles of matter, whether the fame or not, — the 
 word famey when applied to life and to organization, 
 cannot podibly be underflood to fgnifjr what it iigni- 
 fies in this very fentence when applied to matter. In 
 a loofe and popular fenfe then, the life and the organ- 
 ization and the plant are juflly faid to be the fame, 
 notwithflanding the perpetual change of the parts. 
 But in a fcrid and philofophical manner of fpeech, no 
 man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be 
 the fame with that with which it hath indeed nothing 
 the fame. Now famenefs is uied in this latter fenfe 
 when applied to perfons. The identity of thefe, there- 
 fore, cannot liibfifl with dlverfity of fubflance. 
 
 Y • The 
 
546 Of PerJoMl Identify, Diss. \, 
 
 The thing here confidered, and demonftratively, as 
 I think, determined, is propofed by Mr. Locke in thefe 
 words, whether it^ i. e. the fame felf or perlbn, . be the 
 fame identical ftibfiance f And he has fuggefted what is 
 a much better anfwer to the queflion than that which 
 he gives it in form. For he defines perfon, a thinking 
 intelligent beings &c. and perfonal identity, the famrnefs 
 of a rational being.* The qiieftion then is, whether 
 the fame rational being is the fame fubftance ; which 
 needs no anfwer, becaufe being and fubftance in this 
 place ftand for the fame idea. The ground of the 
 doubt, whether the fame perfon be the fame fubftance, 
 is faid to be this, that the confcioufnefs of our own 
 exiftence in youth and in old age, or in any two joint 
 fucceffive moments, is not the fame individual action,^ 
 i. e. not the fame confcioufnefs, but different Ibc- 
 cefiive confciouinelTes. Now it is ftrange that this 
 lliould have occafioned fuch perplexities. For it is 
 furely conceivable that a perfon may have a capacity 
 of knowing fome objeft ox other to be the fame now, 
 which it was when he contemplated it formerly ; yet 
 in this cafe, where by the fuppofition the object is per- 
 ceived to be the fame, the perception of it in any two 
 moments cannot be one and the fame perception. And 
 thus, though the fucceffive confcioufnelfes which we 
 " have of our own exiftence are not the fame, yet are they 
 confcioufnelfes of one and the fame thing or objeft ; 
 of the fame perfon, feif, or living agent. The perfon 
 of whofe exiftence the confcioufnefs is felt now, and 
 was felt an hour or a year ago, is difcerned to be, not 
 two perfons, but one and the fame perfon ; and there- 
 fore is one and the fame. 
 
 Mr. Locke's obfervations upon this fubje£l: appear 
 hafty ; and he feems to profefs himfelf diffatisfied 
 with fuppofitions which he has made relating to it.j; 
 
 But 
 
 * Locke's Works, vol. I. p. 145. 
 f Locke, p. 146, 147. 
 % Locke, p. 15a. 
 
Diss. L Of Perfonal Identify^ ^47 
 
 But fome of thofe haity obfervations have been carried 
 to a (Irange length by others, whofe notion, wlien tra- 
 ced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, 
 to this ,: * "That, perfonahty is not a permanent, but 
 a tranfient thing ; that it hves and dies, begins and 
 ends continually ; that no one can any more remain 
 one and tlie lame perfon two moments together, than 
 two fucceiTive moments can be one and the fame mo- 
 ment ; that our fubftance is indeed continually chang- 
 ing ; but whether this be fo or not, is, it feems, noth- 
 ing to the purpofe, fmce it is not fubftance, but con- 
 fcioufnefs alone, which conftitutes perfonahty, which 
 confeioufnefs being facceffive cannot be the fame in 
 any two momentSj nor confequently the perfonallty 
 conftituted by it." And from hence it muft follow, 
 that it is a fallacy upon ourfelves to charge our prefent 
 felves with any thing we. did, or to imagine our prefent 
 ielves intereiied in any thing which betel us yefierday, 
 or that our prefent felf will be interefted in what will 
 befal us tomorrow ; lince our prefent felf is not, in real- 
 ity, the fame with the felf of yefterday, but another 
 like felf or perfon coming in its room, and miftaken 
 for it ; to which another felf will fucceed tomorrow. 
 This, I fay, muft follow ; for if the felf or perfon of to- 
 day, and that of tomorrow, are not the fame, but on- 
 ly like perfons, the perfon of today is really no more 
 interefted in what will befal the perfon of tomorrow, 
 than in what will befal any other perfon. It may 
 be thought perhaps, that this is not a juft reprefenta- 
 tion of the opinion we are fpeaking of j becaufe thofe 
 who maintain it allow, that a perfon is the lame as far 
 back as his remembrance reaches. And indeed they 
 do ufe the words identity and fame perfon. Nor will 
 language permit thefe words to be laid alide ; fince if 
 they were, there muft be, I know not what ridiculous 
 
 periphrafis 
 
 •'■■ See an anfiver to Dr. Clarks'i third defence of his letter to Mr- i'si- 
 i--'.\ 2'.i «;d!t. p. 44, 56, &c. 
 
 Y 2 
 
34^ Of Verfond fckntiiy. liiss. fv 
 
 periphrafis fubftituted in the room of them. But 
 they cannot, confiftently with themfelves, mean that 
 the perfon is really the fame. For, it is felfevident that 
 the perfonality cannot be really the fame, if, as they 
 exprefsly alTert, that in which it confifts is not the 
 fame. And as, confiftently with themfelves, they can- 
 not, fo I think it appears they do not, mean that the 
 perfon is really the fame, but only that he is fo in a 
 fictitious fenfe ; in fuch a fenfe only as they aflert, for 
 this they do alfert, that any number of perfons what- 
 ever may be the fame perfon. The bare unfolding 
 this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, feems 
 the beft confutation of it. However, fmce great flrefs- 
 is faid to be put upon it, I add the following things. 
 
 Firji^ This notion is abfolutely contradictory to 
 that certain conviftion which neceffarily and every 
 moment rifes within us, when we turn our thoughts 
 upon ourfelves, when we reileft upon what is pad, and 
 look forward upon what is to come. All imagination 
 of a daily change of that living agent v/hich each man 
 calls himfelf, for another, or of any fuch change 
 throughout our v/hole prefent life, is entirely borne 
 down by our natural fenfe of things. Nor is it poflible 
 for a perfon in his wits to alter his conduft, with re- 
 gard to his health or affairs, from a fufpicion that 
 though he fhould live tomorrow, he fhould not, how- 
 ever, be the fame perfon he is today. And yet, if it 
 be reafonable to aft, with refpeO: to a future life, up- 
 on this notion that perfonality is tranfient, it is reafon- 
 able to aft upon it with refpeft to the prefent. Here 
 then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to 
 our temporal concerns, and every one fees and feels the 
 inexprefiibie abfurdity of it in the latter cafe ; if there- 
 fore any can take up with it in the former, this cannot 
 proceed from the reafon of the thing, but mull be ow- 
 ing to an inward unfairnefs and fecret corruption oi 
 heart. 
 
 Secondly^ 
 
Piss. I. Of Pe^fotial Identity. 349 
 
 Secondly, It is not an idea, or abftrad notion, or 
 quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and 
 a<Sion, of happinefs and mifery. Now all beings con- 
 feflediy continue the fame, during the whole time of 
 their exiftence. Confider then a livino- beins; now 
 exiftmg, and which has exifted for any* time alive ; 
 this living being mufh have done and fufFered and 
 enjoyed, what it has done and fufFered and enjoyed 
 formerly, (this living being, I fay, and not .another) as 
 really as it does and fuffers and enjoys, what it does 
 and fuffers and enjoys this inftant. All thefe fucceffive 
 adlions, enjoyments and fufFerings, are actions, enjoy- 
 ments and fufFerings of the fame living being. And 
 they are fo, prior to all confideration of its remember- 
 ing or forgetting ; fmce remembering or forgetting 
 can make no alteration in the truth of pafl matter of 
 faft. And fuppofe this being endued with limited 
 powers of knowledge and memory, there is no more 
 difiiculty in conceiving it to h^ve a power of knowing 
 itfelf to be the fame living being which it was fome 
 time ago, of remembering fome of its adions, fufier- 
 ings and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in 
 conceiving it to know or remember or forget any thing 
 elfe. 
 
 Thirdly y Every perfon is confcious, that he is now 
 the fame perfon or felf he was as far back as his re- 
 membrance reaches ; lince when any one reflects upon 
 a pafl adion of his own, he is juft as certain of the per- 
 fon who did that adion, namely, himfelf, the perlbn 
 who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the ac- 
 tion was at all done. Nay, very often a perfon's alFur- 
 ance of an adlion having been done, of which he is ab- 
 folutely afFured, arifes wholly from the conicioufnefs 
 that he himfelf did it. And this he, perfon, or felf, muft 
 ei,ther be a fubftance, or the property of fome fubftance. 
 If he, if perfon, be a fubftance, then confcioufnefs that 
 he is the fame perfon, is conicioufnefs that he is the 
 
 fame 
 
5.5^ Cy Perfonal Identity. Diss. L 
 
 fame fubftance. If the perfon, or he, be the property 
 of a fubftance, ftill confcioufners that he' is the fame 
 property is as certain a proof that his fubftance remains 
 the fame, as confcioiifnefs that he remains the fame 
 fubftance would be • fince the fame property canndt 
 be transferred from one fubftance to another. 
 
 But though we are thus certain that we are the 
 fame agents, Hving beings, or fubftanccs now, which 
 we were a; far back as our remembrance reaches, yet 
 it is afked whether we may not poflibly be deceived 
 m it ? And this qucftion may be alked at the end of 
 any demonftration whatever ; becaufe it is a queftion 
 concerning the truth of perception by memory. " And 
 he who can "doubt whether perception by memory can 
 in this cafe be depended upon, ma]/- doubt alfo whether 
 perception by dedu^tioh and reafoning, which alfo in- 
 clude memory, or indeed whether intuitive perception 
 can. Here then we can go no farther. For it is ri- 
 diculous to attempt to prove the truth of thofe per- 
 ceptions, ivhofe truth we can no otherwife prove than 
 by other perceptions of exactly the fame kind with 
 them, and which there is juft'the fame ground to fuf- 
 pe<ft 5 or to attempt to prove the truth of our facul- 
 ties, which can no otherwife be proved than by the 
 ufe or means of thofe very fufpedted faculties then:^V 
 ielves, • 
 
DISSERTATION 11. 
 
 Of the Nature of Virtue, 
 
 
 Jl hat which renders beings capable of 
 iiioral government, is their having a moral nature and 
 moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute 
 creatures are impreffed and actuated by various in-r 
 ifincfls and propenfions ; fo alfo ar^ we. But addi- 
 tional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upoi> 
 actions and characters, and making them an object to 
 our thought ; arid on doing this, we naturally and 
 unavoidably approve fome actions, under the peculiar 
 view of their being virtuous and of good delert, and 
 difapprove others, as vicious and of ill defert= That 
 we have this moral approving and difapproving * fac- 
 ulty, is certain from our experiencing it in ourfelves, 
 and recognizing it in each other. It appears from 
 our exercifing it unavoidably, in the approbation and 
 dllapprobation even of feigned characters ; from the 
 words, right and wrong, odious and amiable, bafe 
 and worthy, with many others of like fignification in. 
 all languages, applied to a£lions and characters j from 
 the many written fyltems of morals which fuppofe it, 
 fmce it cannot be imagined that all thefe authors, 
 
 throughout 
 
 * This way of fpeaking is taken frcm Ep/Sfetus, [a] and is made vife of as 
 feeming the moft full, and leaft liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be 
 
 underflood tohavethefe two epithets, (^oxijUaTTtxr) and (X7ro^OKiiJ.iX(TTmY}y 
 upon a double account ; becaufe, upon a furvey of adlious, whether before 
 or after they are done, it di^termines them to be good or evil ; and alfo be- 
 caufe it determines itfeif to be the guide of a<5lion and of life, in contradif- 
 tinftion from all other faculties, or natural principles of aftion ; in the veiy 
 fame manner as fpeculative reafon diicB.'y and naturally judges of fpeculative 
 truth and falfehood, and at the fame time is attended with a confcioufnefs 
 upon rrJieSl'wny that the natiiral right to judge of them beionp tp it. 
 
 [a] Arr. EpiFt. I. I. c. \, 
 
35^ Of the Nature of Virtue. Diss. IT, 
 
 throughout all thefe treatifes, had abfolutel)'' no mean- 
 ing at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimer- 
 ical ; from our natural fenfe of gratitude, which im- 
 plies a difl:in6lion between merely being the infhrumenfc 
 of good and intending it ; from the like diftindion 
 every one makes between injury and mere harm, which, 
 Hobbs fays, is peculiar to mankind ; and between in- 
 jury and jufl: punifliment, a diftinction plainly natural, 
 prior to the confideration of human laws. It is man- 
 ifeft great part of common language, and of common 
 behaviour over the world, is formed upon fuppofition 
 of fuch a moral faculty, whether called confcience, 
 moral reafon, moral fenfe, or divine reafon j whether 
 confidered as a fentiment of the underflanding, or as 
 a perception of the heart, or, which feems the truth, 
 as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the 
 general what courfe of action this faculty or practical 
 difcerning power within us approves, and what it dif- 
 approves. For, as much as it has been difputed 
 wherein virtue confifts, or whatever ground for doubt 
 there may be about particulars,— yet, in general, there 
 is in reality an univerfally acknowledged ilandard of 
 it. It is that which all ages and all countries have 
 made profeffion of in publick j it is that which every 
 man you meet puts on the (hew of ; it is that which 
 the primary and fundamental laws of all civil confti- 
 tutions, over the face of the earth, make it their bufi- 
 nefs and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon 
 mankind ; namely, juftice, veracity, and regard to 
 common good. It being manifeft then, in general, 
 that we have fuch a faculty or difcernment as this, it 
 may be of ufe to remark fome things more diftinctly 
 concern! no; it. 
 
 FirJ}^ It ought to be obferved that the objedt of 
 this faculty is adions,* comprehending under that 
 
 name 
 
 Anton. I. g. i6. Virtutii laus omnis in aftione confiftiu Cic. Off, 1. r. 
 c. €. 
 
Diss. II, Of the Nature of Vtrtuc. 353 
 
 name active or pra<5liGal principles ; thofe principles 
 from which men would ail if occafions and clrcum- 
 llances gave them power, and which, when fixed and 
 habitual in any perfon, we call his charader. It does 
 not appear that brutes have the leaft refiex fenfe of 
 actions as dlftinguiihed from events, or that will and 
 defign, which conftitute the very nature of a(5tions, au 
 fuch, are at ail an objecfl to their perception. But to 
 ours they ^re ; and they are the objedit, and the only 
 one, of the approving and difapproving faculty. A6t- 
 ing, condu<!t, behaviour, abftradied from all regard to 
 what is, in fa6l and event, the confequence ot it, is it- 
 felf the natural obje6l of the moral difcernment, as 
 fpecuiative truth and falfehood is of Ipeculative reafon. 
 Intention of fuch and fuch confequences, indeed, is al- 
 ways included, for it is part of the action itfelf ; but 
 though the intended good or bad confequences do not 
 follow, we have exadly the fame fenfe of the aclion as 
 if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of 
 characters, abftrafted from all conlideration of the 
 good or the evil which perfons of fuch characlers have 
 it aftually in their power to do. We never, in tlie 
 moral way, applaud or blame either ourfelves or others 
 for what we enjoy or v;hat we fufFer, or for having ira- 
 preflions made upon us which v.'e coniider as altogether 
 out of our power ; but only for what we do, or would 
 have done, had it been in our power, or for what we 
 leave undone which we might have done, or would 
 have left undone though we could have done it. 
 
 Secondly y Our fenie or difcernment of adlions as 
 ^morally good or evil, implies in it a fenfe or difcerrr- 
 "ment of them as of good or ill defert. It may bedif- 
 ■jficult to explain this perception, fo as. to anfwerali the 
 queftions which may be 'aiktd concerning it ; but ev- 
 'ery one fpeaks of fiich and fuch.aftions as deferving 
 punifhment, and it is not, I fuppofe, pretended that 
 'they have abfolutei^vao^meaning at -all ta the expref- 
 
 fion. 
 
3 54 ^f ^^^^ Nature of Virtue. Diss. II, 
 
 fion. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we con- 
 ceive it for the good of fociety that the doer of fuch 
 actions iliould be made to fuffer. For if unhappily it 
 were refolved that a man, who by fome innocent ac- 
 tion was infeded with the plague, fliould be left to 
 perifn, left by other people's coming near him the in- 
 fed: ion ftiouid fpread, — no one would fay he deferved 
 this treatment. Innocence and ill defert are inconfift- 
 ent ideas. Ill defert always fuppofes guilt ; and if one 
 be not part of the other, yet they are evidently and 
 naturally connefted in our mind. The fight of a man 
 in mifery raifes our compaffion towards him ; and if 
 this mifery be inflifted on him by another, our indig- 
 nation againit the author of it. But when we are in- 
 form.ed that the fufferer is a villain, and is puniflied 
 only for his treachery or cruelty, our compaffion ex- 
 ceedingly leffens, and in many inflances our indigna- 
 tion wholly fublides. Now what produces this effed:, 
 is the conception of that in the fuiferer which we call 
 ill defert. Upon confidering then, or viewing togeth- 
 er, our notion of vice and that of mifery, there refults 
 a third, that of ill defert. And thus there is in hu- 
 man creatures an affociation of the two ideas, natural 
 and moral evil, wicked nefs and punifhment. If this 
 affociation were merely artificial or accidental, it were 
 nothing ; but being moil unqueilionably natural, it 
 greatly concerns us to attend to it, inftead of endeav- 
 ouring to explain it away. 
 
 It may be oblerved farther, concerning our percep- 
 tion of good and of ill defert, that the former is very 
 weak with refpecl to common inftances of virtue ; 
 or,e reafon of which may be, that it does not a,ppea,r 
 to a fpedator how far fuch inftances of virtue proceed 
 from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this prin- 
 ciple is prevalent, fmce a very weak regard to virtue 
 may be lufficient to make men aft well in many com- 
 mon inftances. And on.the other haiid, our perception 
 
 of 
 
piss. II, Of the Nature of Virtue. 35^ 
 
 of ill defert in vicious actions lefTens, in proportion to 
 the temptations men are thought to have had to luch 
 vices. For, vice in human creatures confifting chiefly 
 in the abfence or want of the virtuous principle, thougn 
 a iTian be overcome, fuppofe, by tortures, it does not 
 from thence appear to what degree the virtuous prin- 
 ciple was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it 
 not in fiich a degree as to prevail over the temptation ; 
 but poffibly he had it in a degree which would have 
 rendered him proof againft common temptations. 
 
 Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill defert arifeii 
 from, and is the refult of, a comparifon of actions witii 
 the nature and capacities of the agent. For, the mere 
 negledl of doing what we ought to do, would in many 
 cafes be determined by all men to be in the higheft 
 degree vicious. And this determination mufh arife 
 from fuch comparifon, and be the refult of it, be- 
 caufe luch neglecft would not be vicious in creatures 
 of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And it 
 is the fame alfo with refpedt to pofitive vices, or 
 fuch as confift in doing what; we ought not. For, 
 every one has a different fenfe of harm done by an 
 idiot, madman, or child, and by one of mature and 
 common underftanding, though the adion of both, 
 including the intention which is part of the a6lion, be 
 the fame j as it "may be, fmce idiots and m.admen, as 
 well as children, are capable not only of doing mil- 
 chief, but alfo of intending it. "^ Now this difference 
 muft arife from fomewhat difcerned in the nature or 
 capacities of one, which renders the aftion vicious, 
 and the want of which iii the other, renders the fanrie 
 action innocent or lefs vicious ; and this plainly fup- 
 pofes a comparifon, whether refle&ed upon or not, 
 between the action and capacities of the agent, previ- 
 ous to our determining an aftion to be viciou::. And 
 hence arifes a proper application of' the epitliets, 
 incongruous, unfuitable, difproportionate, unfit, to 
 
 actions 
 
35^ Of the Nature of Virtue. Diss. II, 
 
 actions which our moral faculty determines to be 
 vicious. 
 
 Fourthly^ It deferves to he confidered whether men 
 are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make them- 
 felves miferable without reafon, than to make other 
 people fo ; or diffolutely to neglecl their own greater 
 good, for the fake of a prcfent lelFer gratification, than 
 they are to negled: the good of others, whom nature 
 has committed to their care. It fliould feem, that a 
 due concern about our own intereft or happinefs, and 
 a reafonable endeavour to fecure and promote it, 
 which is, I think, very much the meaning of the 
 word prudence, in our language, — it fiiould feem, 
 that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty 
 and blameabie ; fince, in the calmed way of re- 
 flection, we approve of the firft, and condem.n the 
 other conduct, both in ourfelves and others. This 
 approbation and difapprobation are altogether differ- 
 ent from, mere defire of our own, or of their happinefs, 
 and fromforrow upon miffing it. For the objeft or 
 occafion of this laft kind of perception is fatisfaclion 
 or uneafinefs ; whereas the obje6t of the firfh is adlive 
 behaviour. In one cafe, what our thoughts fix upon 
 is our condition ; in the other our condud. It is 
 true indeed, that nature has not given us fo fenfible 
 a difapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in 
 ourfelves or other s^z.^ of falfehood, injuflice and cruelty j 
 I fuppofe, becaufe that conftant habitual fenfe of pri- 
 vate intereft and good, which we always carry about 
 with us, renders fuch fenfible difapprobation lefs 
 neceffary, lefs wanting, to keep us from imprudently 
 negleding our own happinefs, and foolifhly injuring 
 ourfelves, than it is necellliry and wanting to keep us 
 from injuring others, to whofe good we cannot have fo 
 ftrong and conftant a regard ; and alfo becaufe im- 
 prudence and folly, appearing to bring its own punifh- 
 ment more immediately and conftantly than injurious 
 
 behaviour. 
 
l)iss. it. Of the Nature of Virtue. 357 
 
 behaviour, it lefs needs the additional punifliment 
 which would be inflicted upon it b}"" others, had they 
 the fame feniible indignation againft it as againft in- 
 juftice and fraud and cruelty. Befides, unhappinefs 
 being in itfeif the natural objeft of compaffion, the 
 unhappinefs which people bring upon themfelves, 
 though it be wilfully, excites in us fome pity for them ; 
 and this of courfe lefTens our difpleafure againft them. 
 But ftill it is matter of experience, that we are form- 
 ed fo as to refxcct very feverely upon the greater in- 
 ftances of imprudent neglects and foolifli rafhnefs, 
 both in ourfelves and others. In inftances of this 
 kind, men often fay of themfelves v/ith remorie, and 
 of others with fome indignation, that they deferved 
 to fuffer fuch calamities, becaufe they brought them 
 upon themfelves, and would not take warning. Par- 
 ticularly when perfons conie to poverty and diftrefs by 
 a long courfe of extravagance, and after frequent ad- 
 monitions, though without falfehood or injuftice ; we 
 plainly do not regard fuch people, as alike objects of 
 compaffion Vvith thofe who are brought into the fame 
 condition by unavoidable accidents. From thefe 
 things it appears, that prudence is a fpecies of virtue, 
 and folly of vice ; meaning by folly fomewhat quite 
 different from mere incapacity ; a thoughtlefs v/ant 
 of that regard and attention to our own happinefs 
 which we had capacity for. And this the word prop- 
 erly includes, and, as it feems, in its ufual accep- 
 tation ; for we fcarce apply it to brute creatures. 
 
 However, if any perfon be difpofed to difpute the 
 matter, I fhall very willingly give him up the words 
 virtue ^indi vice, as tiot applicable to prudence and 
 folly ; but muft beg leave to infift, that the faculty 
 within us, which is the judge of a<Stions, approves of 
 prudent actions, and difapproves imprudent ones ; I 
 fay prudent and imprudent a5iions^ as fuch, and con- 
 fidered diftinftly from the happinefs or mifery which 
 
 thev 
 
55^ ' Of the Kuiure of Vir^uei l)iss. IL- 
 
 they occafion. And by the way, this obfervation 
 may help to cietermhie what jullnefs there is in that 
 objeftion againft rcHgion, that it teaches us to be in- 
 terefted and lelfilh. 
 
 Fifthly, Without inquiring \\ow far and in what 
 fenfe virtue is refolvable into benevolence, and vice 
 into the v/ant of it, it may be proper to obferve, that 
 benevolence and the want of it, fmgly confidered, are 
 in no fort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this 
 were the cafe, in the review of one's ovv'n character or 
 that of others, our m.oral underftandine; and moral 
 fenie would be indifferent to every thing but the de- 
 grees in wliich benevolence prevailed, and the degrees 
 in whicii it was wanting. That is, we iliould neither 
 approve of benevolence to fome perfons rather than to 
 others, nor difapprove injufiice and falfehood upoa 
 any other account than merely as an overbalance of 
 happinefs was forefeen likely to be produced by the 
 iirfl, and of mifery by the fecond. But now on the 
 contrary, fuppofe two men competitors for any thing 
 whatever which would be of equal advantage to each 
 of them, though nothing indeed would be more ira-- 
 pertinent than for a ftranger to bufy himfelf to get one 
 of them preferred to the other, yet fuch endeavour 
 would be virtue in behalf of a friend or benefactor, 
 abilradled from ail confideration of diftant confe- 
 quences ; as that examples of gratitude and the cul- 
 tivatioxn of friendihip would be of general good to the 
 world. Again, fuppofe one man ihould, by fraud or 
 violence, take from another the fruit of his labour, 
 with intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, 
 would have as much pleafure from it as would bal- 
 ance the.pieafure which the firft poffeiTor would have 
 had in the enjoyment and his vexation in the lofs of 
 it ; fuppofe aUo that no bad confequences would fol- 
 low ; yet fuch an aftion would furely be vicious. 
 Nay farther, were treachery, violence and injuftice no 
 
 otherwife 
 
Di3S.il/: Of the Nature cf Virtue: ^-^g 
 
 otherwife vicious than as forefeen likely to produce an 
 overbalance of miiery to fociety, then, if in any cafe 
 a man could procure to himfelf as great advantage by 
 an ad of injuftice as the whole forefeen inconvenience 
 likely to be brought upon others by it would amount 
 to, fuch a piece of injuflice would not be faulty or 
 vicious at all, becaufe it would be no more than, in 
 any other cafe, for a man to prefer his own fatisfac- 
 tion to another's in equal degrees. The fa6t then ap- 
 pears to be, that we are conftituted fo as to condemn 
 falfehood, unprovoked violence, injuflice, and to ap- 
 prove of benevolence to fome preferably to others, ab- 
 ftra£led from all confideration which conduft is like- 
 lieft to produce an overbalance of happinefs or miiery. 
 And therefore, were the Author of nature to propofe 
 nothing to himfelf as an end but the produi^ion of 
 happinefs, were his moral charafter merely tliat of be- 
 nevolence, yet ours is not fo. Upon that fuppofition 
 indeed, the only reafon of his giving us the above- 
 mentioned approbation of benevolence to fome per- 
 fons rather than others, and diiapprobation of falfe- 
 hood, unprovoked violence, and injuftice, muft be, 
 that he forefaw this conftitution of our nature would 
 produce more happinefs than forming us with a tem- 
 per of more general benevolence. But ftill, lince this 
 is our conftitution, falfehood, violence, injuftice, muft 
 be vice in us, and benevolence to fome preferably to 
 others, virtue, abftrafted ftom all confideration of the 
 overbalance of evil or good v/hich they may appear 
 likely to produce. 
 
 Now if human creatures are endued with fuch a 
 moral nature as wc have been explaining, or with a 
 moral faculty the natural object of which isadiions, — ■ 
 moral government muft confift in rendering them hap- 
 py and unhappy, in rewarding and punifhing them, 
 as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule 
 of adion interv/oven in their nature, or fu^oefted and 
 
 enrorced 
 
3 6<9 t)f the Nature of P^irtiie. Diss. IL 
 
 enforced by this moral faculty;* in rewarding and 
 puniOiing them upon account of their fo doing. 
 
 I am not fenfible that I have, in this fifth obferva- 
 tion, contradicted what any author defigned to affert. 
 But fome of great and diftinguilbed merit have, I 
 think, exprelled themfelves in a manner which may 
 occafion Ibme danger to carelefs readers, of imagin- 
 ing the whole of virtue to confift in fmgly aiming, ac- 
 cording to the beft of their judgment, at promoting 
 the happinefs of mankind in the prefent ftate ; and 
 the whole of vice, in doing what they forefee, or 
 might forefee, is likely to produce an overbalance of 
 unhappinefs in it ; than which miilakes, none can be 
 conceived more terrible. For it is certain that feme 
 of the moft Ihocking inftances of injuftice, adulter}-, 
 murder, perjury, and even of perfecution, may, in 
 many fiippofable cafes, not have the appearance of be- 
 ing likely to produce an overbalance of mifery in the 
 prefent ftate ; perhaps fometimes may have the con- 
 trary appearance. For this reflexion might eafily be 
 
 carried on, but I forbear The happinefs of the 
 
 world is the concern of him, who is the lord and the 
 proprietor of it ; nor do "we know what we are about,, 
 when we endeavour to prom.ote the good of man- 
 kind in any ways but thole which he has direfted, 
 that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and 
 juftice. I fpeak thus upon fuppofition of perfons real- 
 ly endeavouring, in fome fort, to do good without re- 
 gard to thefe. But the truth feems to be, that fuch 
 iuppofed endeavours proceed, almoft always, from am- 
 bition, the fpirit of party, or fome indired principle, 
 concealed perhaDS in great meafure from perfons 
 themfelves. And though it is our bufinefs and our 
 duty to endeavour, within the bounds of veracity and 
 juftice, to contribute to the eafe, convenience, and 
 even cheerfulnefs and diverlion. of our fellow crea- 
 tures, — • 
 * r. 169. 
 
Diss. li. Of the Nature of Virtue. 361 
 
 tures, — yet from our fliort views, it is greatly uncertain 
 whether this endeavour will, in particular inftances, 
 produce an overbalance of happinefs upon the whole, 
 ilnce fo many and diftant things muft come into the 
 account. And that which makes it our duty, is, that 
 there is fome appearance that it will, and no pofi- 
 tive appearance fufficient to balance this on the con- 
 trary fide ; and alfo that fuch benevolent endeavour 
 is a cultivation of that moft excellent of all virtuous 
 principles, the active principle of benevolence. 
 
 However, though veracity as well as juftice is to be 
 our rule of life, it muft be added, otherwife a fnare 
 will be laid in the way of fome plain men, that the 
 ufe of common forms of fpeech generally underftood, 
 cannot be falfehood, and, in general, that there can be 
 no defigned falfehood without defigning to deceive. 
 It muft likewife be obferved, that in numberlefs cafes 
 a man may be under the ftri£teft obligations to what 
 he forefees will deceive, without his intending it. 
 For it is impolTible not to forefee that the words and 
 actions of men in different ranks and employments, 
 and of different educations, will perpetually be mif- 
 taken by each other j and it cannot but be fo whilft 
 they will judge with the utmoft careleffnefs, as they 
 daily do, of what they are not, perhaps, enough in- 
 formed to be competent judges of, even though they 
 confidered it with great attention. 
 
A 
 
 CHARGE 
 
 DELIVERED TO THE 
 
 CLERGY 
 
 AT THE 
 
 Primary Visitation of the Diocese of Durham, in the Year 
 
 MDCCLI ; 
 
 BY THE RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN COD 
 
 JOSEPH B U T L E R, LL. D. 
 
 THEN LORD BISHOr OP THAT DIOCESE. 
 
 With NOTES, 
 
 Containing a Defence of the Charge .igainft the Objedlions of an anonymous 
 
 Writer. 
 
 BY THE EDITOR. 
 
A 
 
 H A R G : 
 
 DELIVERED TO THE 
 
 L E R G Y, (s?<".* 
 
 It Is impoffible for me, my brethren, 
 upon our firft meeting of this kind, to forbear lament- 
 ing with you the general decay of religion in this na- 
 tion ; which is now obferved by every one, and has 
 been for forne time the complaint of all ferious perfons. 
 The influence of it is more and more wearing out of 
 the minds of men, even of thofe who do not pretend to 
 enter into fpeculations upon the fubjed: ; but the num- 
 ber of thofe who do, and who profefs themfelves unbe- 
 lievers, incr^afes, and with their numbers their zeal. 
 Zeal, it is natural to aik — for what ? Why truly /or 
 nothing, but agair^ every thing that is good and fa- 
 cred amongft us. 
 
 Indeed, whatever efforts are made agalnft our relig- 
 ion, no Chriilian can poffibly defpair of it. For He, 
 who has a// power i-n heaven and earthy has promifed 
 that he will he with us to the end of the world. Nor 
 can the prefent decline of it be any Humbling block 
 
 to 
 
 * The publication of Bifhop Sutler's Charge, in the year 1751, was 
 followed by a pamphlet, printed in 1752, entitled, A Serious Inquiry into the 
 Ufe and Importance of External Religiony occafioned by fame Fajfaga in the Right 
 Reverend the Lord hiftop of Durham'* Charge to the Clergy of that Dioccfe, Sec. 
 humbly addreffed to his LorJ/Iiip. This pamphlet has been reprinted in a mif- 
 cellaneous work ; fuch parts of it as feemed moft worthy of obfervation, the 
 reader will find in the Notes fubjoined to thofe palTages of the Charge, to 
 %vhich the pamphlet refers. 
 
366 Charge to the 
 
 to fuch as arc confiderate ; fince he himfelf has (o 
 flrongly expreffed what is as remarkably predifted in 
 other paiTages of Scripture, the great defedlion from 
 his rehgion which fhould be in the latter days, by that 
 prophetick queftion, When the Son of Man cometh^ JJiall 
 he find faith upon the earth ? How near this time is, 
 God only knows ; but this kind of fcripture figns of 
 it is too apparent. For as different ages have been 
 diftinguifhed by different forts of particular errors 
 and vices, the deplorable diftindtion of ours is an avow- 
 ed fcorn of religion in fome, and a growing difregard 
 to it in the generality. 
 
 As to the profefled enemies of religion, I know 
 not how often they may come in your way ; but often 
 enough, I fear, in the way of fome at leail amongft; 
 you, to require confideration what is the proper beha- 
 viour towards them. One would, to be fure, avoid 
 great familiarities with thefe perfons ; efpecially if they 
 affed to be licentious and profane in their common 
 talk. Yet if you fall into their company, treat them 
 with the regards which belong to their rank ; for fo 
 we muft people who are vicious in any other refpecl. 
 We fhould ftudy what St. James ^ with wonderful ele- 
 gance and exprefTivenefs, calls meeknejs of wifdorriy in 
 our behaviour towards all men, but more eipecialiy 
 towards thefe men ; not lb much as being what we 
 owe to them, but to ourfelves and our religion, that 
 we may adorn the doSlrine of God our Saviour^ in our 
 carriage towards thofe who labour to vilify it. 
 
 For difcourfe with them, the caution commonly 
 given, not to attempt anfwering objections which we 
 have net confidered, is certainly juli. Nor need any 
 one in a particular cafe be afhamed frankly to ac- 
 knowledge his ignorance, provided it be not general. 
 And though it were, to talk of what he is not ac- 
 quainted with, is a dangerous method of endeavour- 
 ing to conceal it. But a conlidcrate perfbn, however 
 
 qualified 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 367 
 
 qualified he be to defend his religion, and anfwer the 
 objeftions he hears made againft it, may fometimes 
 lee caufe to decline that office. Sceptical and profane 
 men are extremely apt to bring up this fubjed at 
 meetings of entertainment, and fuch as are of the freer 
 fort ; innocent ones, I mean, otherwife I fhould not 
 fuppofe you would be prefent at them. Now religion 
 is by far too ferious a matter to be the hackney iub- 
 je(5t upon thefe occafions. And by preventing its being 
 made fo, you will better fecure the reverence which is 
 due to it, than by entering into its defence. Every one 
 obferves, that men's having examples of vice often be- 
 fore their eyes, familiarizes it to the mind, and has 
 a tendency to take off that juft abhorrence of it which 
 the innocent at firft felt, even though it fhould not 
 alter their judgment of vice, or make them really be- 
 lieve it to be lefs evil or dangerous. In like manner, 
 the hearing religion often difputed about in light fa- 
 miliar converfation, has a tendency to leflen that fa- 
 cred regard to it, which a good man would endeavour 
 always to keep up, both in himfelf and others. But 
 this is not all ; people are too apt inconfiderately to 
 take for granted that things are really queftionable, be- 
 caufe they hear them often difputed. This indeed 
 is fo far from being a confequence, that we know de- 
 monftrated truths have been difputed, and even mat- 
 ters of fad, the objeds of our fenfes. But were it a 
 confequence, were the evidence of religion no more 
 than doubtful, then it ought not to be concluded falfe 
 any more than true, nor denied any more than affirm- 
 ed ; for fufpenfe would be the reafonable ftate of mind 
 with regard to it. And then it ought in all reafon, 
 confidering its infinite importance, to have nearly the 
 fame influence upon pradice, as if it were thoroughly 
 believed. For would it not be madnefs for a man to 
 forfake a fafe road, and prefer to it one in which he 
 acknowledges there is an even chance he fhould lofe 
 
 his 
 
36S Charge to the 
 
 his life, though there were an even chance llkewife of 
 his getting fafe through it ? Yet there are people ab- 
 furd enough to take the fuppofed doybtfulnefs of re- 
 ligion for the fame thing as a proof of its falfehood, 
 artei^they have concluded it doubtful from hearing 
 it often called in queftion. This fhews how infinitely 
 unreafonable fceptical men are, with regard to religion, 
 and that they really lay afide their reafon upon this 
 fubjeft as much as the moft extravagant enthufiafts. 
 But further, cavilling and objecting upon any fubjecl 
 is much ealier than clearing up difficulties ; and this 
 laft part will always be put upon the defenders of re- 
 ligion. Now a man may be fully convinced of the 
 truth of a matter, and upon the ftrongeft reafons, and 
 ytt not be able to anfwer all the difficulties which may 
 be raifed upon it. 
 
 Then again, the general evidence of religion is 
 complex and various. It confifts of a long feries of 
 things, one preparatory to and confirming another, 
 from the very beginning of the world to the prefent 
 time. And it is eafy to fee how impofTible it muft 
 be, in a curfory converfatiqn, to unite all this intq 
 one argument, and reprefent it as it ought j and could 
 it be done, how utterly indifpofed people would be to 
 attend to it — I fay in a curfory converfation ^ where- 
 as unconnected obje£lions are thrown out in a few 
 words, and are eafily apprehended, v/ithout more atten- 
 tion than is ufual in common talk. So that, notwith- 
 flanding we have the beft caufe in the world, and 
 though a man were very capable of defending it, yet 
 I know not why he fhould be forward to undertake it 
 upon {q great a difadvantage, and to fo little good ef- 
 fed, as it muft be done amidft the gaiety and carelefT- 
 nefs of common converfation. 
 
 But then it will be necelfary to be very particularly 
 upon your guard, that you may not feem^ by way of 
 compliance, to join in with any levity of difcourfe 
 
 refpedling 
 
' Clergy of Durham ^ 1 7 5 1 - 2>^() 
 
 refpecllng religion. Nor would one let any pretend- 
 ed argument againft it pafs entirely without notice ; 
 nor any grofs ribaldry upon it, without expreffing our 
 thorough difapprobation. T'lis lafl may fometimes 
 be done by iilence j for lilence fometimes is very ex- 
 preffive ; as was that of our blefled Saviour before 
 the Sanhedrim, and before Pilate. Or it may be done 
 by obferving mildly, that religion deferves another fort 
 of treatment, or a more thorough confideration than 
 fuch a time, or fuch ciifcumftances admit. However, 
 as it is abfolutely necelTary that we take care, by dil- 
 igent reading and fiudy, to be always prepared, to be 
 ready always to give an anfwer to evei'y man that ajketh 
 a reafon of the hope that is in us, — fo there may be oc- 
 cafions when it will highly become us to do it. And 
 then we muft take care to do it in the fpirit which the 
 apoftle requires, with meeknefs and fear :* Meehjiefs to- 
 wards thofe who give occailons for entering into the 
 defence of our religion ; and with fear, not of them, 
 but of God ; with that reverential fear which the na- 
 ture of religion requires, and which is fo far from be- 
 ing inconfiftent with, that it will infpire proper cour- 
 age towards men. Now this reverential fear will 
 lead us to infift ftrongly upon the infinite great nefs of 
 God's fcheme of government, both in extent and du- 
 ration, together with the wife connexion of its parts, 
 and the impoffibility of accounting fully for the feve- 
 ral parts, without feeing the whole plan of Providence 
 to which they relate ; which is beyond the utmoft 
 llretch of our underftanding. And to all this muft be 
 added the neceffary deficiency of human language, 
 when things divine are the fubje(5t of it. Theie ob- 
 fervations are a proper full anfwer to many objections, 
 and very material with regard to all. 
 
 But your Handing bufmefs, and which requires con- 
 ftant attention, is with the body of the people ; to re- 
 vive 
 
 * 1 Pet, iii, 15, 
 
37*3 Charge to the 
 
 vive in them the fpirit of religion which is fo much 
 declining. And it may feem, that whatever reafon 
 there be for caution as to entering into any argu- 
 mentative defence of religion in common converjation, 
 yet that it is neceffary to do this /row the pulpit, in or- 
 der to guard the people againft being corrupted, how- 
 ever in fome places. But then furely it fhould be 
 done in a manner as little controverfial as poffible. 
 For though fuch as are capable of feeing the force of 
 objediions are capable alio of feeing the force of the 
 anfwers which are given to them, yet the truth is, the 
 people will not competently attend to either. But 
 it is eafy to fee which they will attend to moft. And 
 to hear religion treated of, as what many deny, and 
 which has much faid againfl it as well as for it, this 
 cannot but have a tendency to give them ill impref- 
 fions at any time ; and feems particularly improper 
 for all perfons at a time of devotion, even for fuch as 
 are arrived at the moft fettled ftate of piety ; — I fay 
 at a time of devotion, when we are affembled to yield 
 ourfelves up to the full influence of the Divine Pres- 
 ence, and to call forth into adual exercife every pi- 
 ous alfedion of heart. For it is to be repeated, that 
 the heart and courfe of afFedions may be difturbed 
 when there is no alteration of judgment. Novv? the 
 evidence of religion may be laid before men without 
 any air of controverfy. The proof of the being of 
 God, from final caufes,or the defign and wifdom v^^hich 
 appears in every part of nature, together with the law 
 of virtue Vv^rittcu upon our hearts j* the proof of 
 
 Chriflianity 
 
 * f he law or virtue written upon our hearts.] The author of the Inquiry^ 
 nientionpil ^bove, informs us in bis Pou.cript, tiiat " the certain confequcnce 
 'jf retci :ing mankind to a hiv (/ nature ur 'Linui- •luritten ufon th'ir hearts iS their 
 tiavin;.'; r(xoui fe to their own foife ofihing!, (ji) all occafions ; -.vhich being, in a 
 ^i;reat majoDty, no better tnan t"iimily Aiperflition, party preiutlice.or lelf in- 
 iereftc<; ai tifict, (perhaps a compouml of all) will be too apt to overrule the 
 plain precepts of the Gofpcl." And he declarer, he has " no better opinion 
 fjf the clciirneji, certainty, un-formity, univcrj\ilily, &C. of this law, than" he 
 has " of the in:portance of externat rel'^ict." What then muft we fay to St. 
 raul, who not only alferts, -.a the ftiongtll terra?; the reality of luch a law, 
 
 tut 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1751. 371 
 
 Chriftianlty from miracles, and the accomplifhment 
 of prophecies ; and the confirmation which the nat- 
 ural and civil hiftory of the world give to the fcripture 
 account of things j — thefe evidences of religion might 
 properly be infifted on in a way to affefl: and influenee 
 the heart, though there were no profeffed unbelievers 
 in the world ; and therefore may be infifted on with- 
 out taking much notice that there are fuch. And 
 even their particular objeftions may be obviated with- 
 out a formal mention of them. Befides, as to religion 
 
 in 
 
 but fpeaks of its obligation as extending to all mankind ; 'blamiiig foms 
 among the Gentiles as without e.vcMfe, for not adverting to and obeying it ; and 
 commending others for doing by nature (in contradiction to revelation) the 
 things contained in the law, thai J/ie-w:ng the -work of thelaiv luritten in their hearts. 
 If, becaufe " natural religion is liable to he miftaken, it is high Time to have 
 done with it in the puljnt," how comes it that the lame apoftle refers the 
 Philippiansto the ftudy of this religion, to -whalfoever things are true, honfji, juji, 
 ifvely and of good report ? And yet 'W'ithout fuch a fludy our knowledge of the 
 moral law muft always remain imperfect ; for a complete fyftem of morality 
 is certainly no where to be found either in the Old or Nev/ Tcflame t. [al 
 When aChriftian rainifter is enforcing the duties or doctrines of revealed re» 
 ligion, he may perhaps do well to <' tell his people he has «o o.'her proof of the 
 original, truth, obligations, prefent benefits and future rewards of religion to 
 lay before them, than what is contained in the Scriptures," But what if his 
 purpofe be to inculcate fome moral virtue ? Will it not be ufeful here, befidcs 
 obferving that the pra<ftice of that virtue is enjoined by a divine command, to 
 recommend it ftill further to his hearers, by fhewing that it approves itfelf to 
 our inward fenie and perception, and accords with the native fentiments and 
 fuggeflions of our minds ? Metaphyficians may fay what they will of our feei- 
 ings of this fort being all illufive, liable to be perverted hy education and 
 habit, and judged of by men's ownfcnfe cf things ; they whofe underftandings 
 are yet unlf oiled hy pkihfophv and ■vain deceit will be little difpofed to liften to 
 luch affertions. Nor are there wantii^g arguments which prove, and, as 
 lliould feem, to the fatisfaiflion of every real'onable inquirer, that the great 
 and leading principles of mora" duties have in all ages been the fame ; that 
 fuch virtues as benevolence, juftice, compaffion, gratitude, accidental ohlla- 
 cles removed, and when the precife meaning of the words has been once ex- 
 plained, are inftindtively known and approved by all men j and that cur ap- 
 probation of thefe is as much a part of our nature implanted in us by God, and 
 as little liable to caprice and falliioii, as the fcnfe of feeing, given us alfo hy 
 Him, by which all bodies appear to us in an ere£l. and not an inverted pofi. 
 tion. [b] Mr. Locke's authority has been generally looked up to as decifive 
 on fdch Queftions, and his fentiments have been embraced implicitly and 
 v/ithout examination. That great and good man, however, is not to he 
 charged with the pernicious confequences which others havp diavvn from liis 
 opinions ; confequences which have been carried to fuch a length, as to de- 
 ftroy all moral difference of human ailions ; making virtue and vice altc- 
 jether arbitary ; calling ei'i'l good, and good evil ; putting darkncfs Jer Ji^hty and 
 jigh. fof darknefs ; putting bitter for fiueet, and fiueei for liilter^ 
 
 [a] See the Jeeond cf Dr. Balguy's Charges. 
 
 [I*] Sa the third if B f hep Hurd't Sermtni, FuL L 
 
372 Charge to the 
 
 in general, it is a praftical thing, and no otherwife 
 a matter of fpecuiation, than common prudence in 
 the management of our worldly affairs is fo. And 
 if one were endeavouring to bring a plain man to be 
 more careful with regard to this laft, it would be 
 thought a ftrange method of doing it, to perplex him 
 with ftating formally the feveral objections which men 
 of gaiety or fpecuiation have made againft prudence, 
 and the advantages which they pleafantly tell us folly 
 has over it, though one could anfwer thofe objedlions 
 ever lb fully. 
 
 Nor does the want of religion in the generality of 
 the common people, appear owing to a fpeculative 
 difbelief or denial of it, but chiefly to thoughtleflfnefs 
 and the common temptations of life. Your chief 
 bufinefs, therefore, is to endeavour to beget a practi- 
 cal fenfe of it upon their hearts, as what they acknowl- 
 edge their belief of, and profefs they ought to con- 
 form themfelves to. And this is to be done by keep- 
 ing up, as well as we are able, the form and face of re-; 
 ligion with decency and reverence, and in fuch a de- 
 gree as to bring the thoughts of religion often to their 
 minds ; * and then endeavouring to make this form 
 more and more fubfervient to promote the reality and 
 
 power 
 
 * By keeping up the form and face of religion \x\fuch a degree as to brincj 
 the thoughts of religion often to (heir minds.] To this it is faid by our Inquirer^ 
 that " the Clergy of the Qhurch of England have no way of keeping up the 
 farm zndfice of religion any cftener^ or in an\ other degree, than is direcfled by 
 rhe prefcribed order of the Church." As if the whole duty of a parifh prieft 
 confifted in reading prayers and a fermon on Sundays, and performing the 
 occafional ofhces appointed in the liturgy ! One would think the writer who 
 made this obie(5lion had never read more of the Charge than the four pages' ht 
 has particularly felefted for tlie fybjeft of his animadverfions. Had he look- 
 ed farther, he v\ould have found other methods recommended to the Clergy 
 of introducing a fenfe of religion into the minds of their parifhioners, which 
 occur >i!uc/! oftener than the times allotted for the publick fervices of the 
 Church ; fuch as family prayers ; acknowledging the divine bounty at oyr 
 meals ; perfonai applications from minifters of pariflies to individuals under 
 their care, on particular occafions and circumflances, as at the time of con- 
 tirmation, at firft receivmg the holy communion, on recovery from ficknefs, 
 and the like ; none of which are prefcribed in our eftablifhed litual, any 
 more than thofe others fo ludicroufly mentioned by this writer, " bowing to 
 the eaft, turning the face to that quarter in repeating the creeds, dipping tlic 
 finger in water, and therewith croifing the cliild's Jotehead in baptifm." 
 
Clergy of Durham ^ 1 7 5 1 . 3 7 3 
 
 power of it. The form of religion may indeed be 
 where there is Uttle of the thing itfelf ; but the thing 
 itfelf cannot be preferved amongft mankind without 
 the form.* And this form frequently occurring in 
 fome inftance or other of it, will be a frequent admo- 
 nition 4" to bad men to repent, and to good men to 
 grow better ; and alfo be the means of their doing fo. 
 That which men have accounted religion in the 
 feveral countries of the world, generally fpeaking, has 
 had a great and confpicuous part in all publick appear- 
 ances, and the face of it been kept up with great rev- 
 erence throughout all ranks from the higneft to the 
 loweft i not only upon occafional folemnities, but al- 
 fo in the daily courfe of behaviour. In the heathen 
 
 world, 
 
 * The thing itfelf tannot be preferved nmongft mankind without the 
 form.] The Quakers reje<5l all forms, even the two of Chrift's own inftitu- 
 tion ; will it be faid that " thefe men have no religion preferved among 
 them ?" It will neither be faid nor infmuateJ. The Quakers, though they 
 have not the form, ai'e careful to keep up Xhtfticc of religion ; as appears not 
 only from the cuftom of aflembling themfeives for the purpofes of publick 
 worftiip on the Lord's day, but from their filent meetings on other days of 
 the week. And that they arc equally fenfible of the importance of main- 
 taining the influence of religion on their minds, is manifefl from the pradlice of 
 what they call iniuard -prayer, in conformity to the dire<5lion of Scripture to 
 fray continually : " Which," faith Robert Barclay, " cannot be underftood of 
 outivard prayer, becaufe it were inipoilible that men fhould be always upon 
 their knees, exprefling the ivwds of prayer, which would hinder them from 
 the exercife of thole duties no lefs pofitively commanded." j^fology for tht 
 (Quakers. Prop. xi. Of Wotjlii-p. 
 
 \ This form frequently occurring in fome inftance or other of it, will be a 
 ■frequent admonition, ifec] Here it has been objedled, that " the number, -va- 
 riety, -dwdi frequent occurrence of forms in religion are too apt to be confidered 
 by the generality as commutations for their vices, as foniething fuhftituted in lieu 
 of repentance, and as loads and incumbrances upon true Chriftian edifica- 
 tion." This way of arguing againft the ufe of a thing from the abufe of it, 
 inftcad of arguing from the nature of the thing itfelf, is the mafter fophifm 
 that pervades the whole performance we are here examining. What reafon- 
 able man ever denied that the pomp of outward worfhip has been fometimes 
 miftaken for inward piety ? That pofitive inflitutions, when refled in as 
 ends, inftead of being applied as means, are hurtful to the interefts of true 
 religion ? Not Bifhop Butler certainly, who blames the obfervances of the 
 papifts on this account ; fome of them as being " in themfeives wrong and 
 I'uperftitious ;" and others, as being "made fubfervient to the purpofes of 
 fuperftition," and for this reafon " abolifhed by our reformers." In the 
 meanwhile it will itill be true, that bodily worfhip is by no means to be dif- 
 carded. as unufeful in exciting fpiritual devotion ; on the contrary, thAt they 
 mutually affift and ftrengthen each other ; and that a m.ere mental inter- 
 courfe wiih God, and a religious fervice purely intelle(5tual, is altogethf r 
 unfuitable to fuch a creature as man, during his prefent flate o^. earth 
 
;574 Charge to the 
 
 world, their fuperftition was the chief fubje^l: of ftatu- 
 ary, fculpture, painting and poetry. It mixed itfelf 
 with bufinefs, civil forms, diverfions, domeftick enter- 
 tainments, and every part of common Hfe. The Ma- 
 hometans are obliged to fhort devotions five times be- 
 tween morning and evening. In Roman Cathohck 
 countries, people cannot pafs a day without having 
 religion recalled to their thoughts, by fome or other 
 memorial of it, by fome ceremony or publick relig- 
 ious form occurring in their way ;* befides their fre- 
 quent holidays, the fhort prayers they are daily call- 
 ed to, and the occafional devotions enjoined by con- 
 feffors. By thefe means their fuperflition fmks deep 
 into the minds of the people, and their religion 
 
 alfo 
 
 * Tn Roman Catholick countries, people cannot pafs a day without having 
 rdigian recalled to their thoua;hts, by fome ceremony or publick re/igious form 
 occurring in their way.] '* What in the former period" (when fpeaking of 
 the heathen world) was " czWed Juperjiition, becomes in this" (when fpeaking 
 of Roman Catholicks) " religion and religinui farms ; which the papifts pre- 
 tending to connedft with Chriftianity, and the Charge giving no hint that this 
 is no more than a pretence, a plain reader mufl needs take this as fpoken of 
 the means and memorials of TRUE RELIGION, and will accordingly confider 
 thefe as recommended to his praftice and imitation." If a plain reader, at 
 firft view of the pafTage alluded to, fhould inadvertently fall into fuch a mif- 
 take, he would find that miftake immediately corre<5led by the very next fen- 
 tence that follows, where the religion of the Roman Catholicks and their fu- 
 perllition are diftinguifhed from each other in exprefs words. But the 
 terms in queftion are uftd with the flri(5le{l propriety. The defign of the 
 Bifhop, in tiiis part of his Charge, is to confider religion, not under the no- 
 tion of its being true, but as it aftedls the fenfes and im<)ginations of the mul- 
 titude. For fo the paragraph begins. " That which men /mt^^ afcoan/^^ re- 
 ligion in the feveral countries of the world," (whether the religion be true 
 or falfe is befide his prefent argument) " generally fpeaking, has had a great 
 and confpicuous part in all puHlick appearances." This pofjtion he illuf- 
 trates by three examples, tlie Heathen, the Mahometan, and the Roman 
 Catholick religions. The two firft of thefe, having little or nothing of true 
 religion belonging to them, may well enough be chara61erized under the 
 common name of fuperflition; the la ft contains a mixture of both, which 
 therefore the Bifhop, like a good writer as well as a juft reafoner, is careful 
 to diftinguiili. In Roman Catholick countries a man can hardly travel a mile 
 without palFmg a crucifix eredled on the road fide ; he may either ftop to 
 worfhip the imcige reprefented on the crofs, or he may fimply be reminded 
 by it of his own relation to Chrift crucified ; thus by one and the fame out- 
 ward fign " religion may be recalled to his thoughts," or fuperftition may 
 take polfeiTion of his mind. In the celebration of the eucharift, the elements 
 of bread and wine are regarded by a papift as the ve.y body and blood of 
 Chriil — tr> a proteftant they appear only a: fymbols and memorials of that 
 body and blood ; what in one is an aft of rational devotion, becomes in the 
 other an inftance of the groffeft fuperftition, if not idolatry. 
 
Clergy of Durham^ ^ 7 5 ^ • 375 
 
 alfo into the minds of fuch among them as are ferious 
 and well difpofed. Our reformers, confidering that 
 fome of thefe obfervances were in themfelves wrong 
 and fuperftitious, and others of them max:ie fubfervi- 
 ent to the purpofes of fuperftition, abohfhed them, 
 reduced the form of reHgion to great fimpHcity,and en- 
 joined no more particular rules, nor left any thing more 
 of what was external in religion than was, in a man- 
 ner, neceflary to preferve a fenfe of religion itfelf up- 
 on the minds of the people. But a great part cf this 
 is neglefted by the generality amongft us^ for inilance, 
 the fervice of the Church, not only upon common 
 days, but alfo upon faints' days ; and feveral other 
 things might be mentioned. Thus they have no cuf- 
 tomary admonition, no publick call to recollect the 
 thoughts of God and Religion from one Sunday 
 to another. 
 
 It was far otherwife under the Law. Thefe zvords, 
 fays Mofes to the children of Israel, which I com- 
 mand thee^ fJiall be in thine heart ; and thou flialt teach 
 them diligently unto thv children^ and fhalt talk of them 
 when thou fittefi in thine hoife, and when thou walk- 
 eji bv the way^ and when thou Heft downy and when thou 
 rifefi up.^ And as they were cori^manded this, fo it 
 
 is 
 
 * ^nd iv/ien thou rifejl up."] Allowing that " what Mofes in this paflage 
 wanted to have effedled was ohedience to the moral law," nothing fure could 
 be of greater ufe in fecuring that obedience than the pra<5lice here enjoined. 
 Our [n-juirer however is of a different opinion ; and •* very much queftion'j 
 whether his Lordfliip could have fallen upon any palTage in the Old Tefta- 
 ment, which relates at all to his fubjedl, that would have been lefs favoura- 
 
 ble to his argunnent." f^ylio jhall decide ? &c. The Bilhop goes on, " As 
 
 tteey (the Jews) were commanded this, fo it is obvious how much the confti- 
 tution of their law was adapted to effe<5l it, and keep religion ever in view." 
 Upon which the Inquirer remarks, " It was then very ill, or at leaft very 
 unwifely done, to abrogate that law, whofe conftitution was adapted to fo 
 excellent a purpofe." Let us firft fee what may be offered in defence of the 
 Bifhop, and then confider what is to be faid in anfwer to his opponent. The 
 purpofe for which the Mofaick conftitution was eitablilhed was this, to pre- 
 serve, amidfl a world univerfally addi(5ted to polytheifm and idchCry, the 
 great do(5lrine of the Unity of the Divine Nature, //// the feed JlMid come to 
 •whom the promife was made. As a means to this end, the Ifraelites were not 
 only to be kept feparate from every other nation, but, the better to enfure 
 fuch feparation, they were to be conftantly employed in a multifarious ritual, 
 
 which 
 
376 Charge to the 
 
 is obvious how much the conftitution of that lav<r was5 
 adapted to effedb it, and keep reHgion ever in view. 
 And without fomcwhat of this nature, piety will grow 
 languid even among the better fort of men ; and the 
 woril will go on quietly in an abandoned coiirle, with 
 fewer interruptions frorii within than they would have, 
 were religious reflexions forced oftener upon their 
 minds,* and confequently with lefs probability of their 
 amendment. Indeed in moft ages of the church, the 
 care of reafonable men has been, as there has been for 
 the moft part occafion, to draw the people off fronl; 
 laying too great weight upon external things ; upon 
 formal afts of piety. But the ftate of matters is quite, 
 chariged now with us. Thefe things are negleded to 
 a degree which is, and cannot but be, attended with a 
 
 decay 
 
 vs'hich left them neither time nor opportunity for deviating into the fupei- 
 ftitious r.bfervances of their pagan neighbours. And this, I fuppofe, ma/ 
 fuffice for vindicating the Bifhop's alfertion, that " the conftitution of the 
 Tevvifh law was adapted to keep religion ever in view." But the Jewifh 
 law was not only adapted to this end ; we arc next to ohferve that the end 
 itfelf was adlually gained. For though it be too notorious to be denied, that 
 the Jews did not always confine their religious homage to the God of Ifrael; 
 but polluted the fervice, due to Him alone, with foreign worfhip, — yet, even 
 in their worft defeftions, it fhould be remembered, they never totally re- 
 ip(5ted the true Jehovah ; and after their return from captivity, they were fo 
 thoroughly cu ed of all remaining propeufity to the idolatrous rites of hea 
 thenifm, as never again to violate their allegiance to the God of their fathers, 
 it appears then that, in confequence of the Jewi(h feparation, the principle 
 of the Unity was in faft preferved inviolate among that people till the com- 
 ing of Chrifl. When the Mofaick. conflitution had thus attained its end, and 
 mankind were now prepared for the reception of a better covenant, the law 
 expired of courfe ; the partition wall that had divided the Jew from t.he 
 Gentile was taken down, and all dillinaion between them lofl under the 
 common iiame of Chriftians. And this may fuffice to Ihew, in oppofition to 
 our Irf^uirfr, that it was both very well and very nuifely done to abrogate a 
 law, when the purpofe for wJiich the law had been enadled was accompliftied, 
 
 * Were religious refiei5lions/orc/-(/ oftener upon their minds.] '' Accord- 
 ing to the Bifhop's doftrine, then," fays tlie Inquirer, " it fhould be not only 
 rood policy, but wholefome difcipline ro/orcc men in England to come to 
 church, and in France to go to mafs." And again, " If externals have this 
 virtue to enforce religious reflexions, it muft be right to compel thofe who are 
 indifpofed to fuch refleaions to attend thefe memorials." Yes ; granting 
 that the fenfe of the palLige in the Charge is not IhamefuUy perverted, and 
 4hat we are to underfland the Bifhop here to fpeak of external force and com- 
 pulfion. Whereas by " religious refie^t'ions forced," is plainly meant no more 
 than religious refleftions oftener throivn in men's luay, brought more frequently 
 into their thought^, fo as to produce an habitual recolleftion that they are al- 
 ways in the divine prefence. 
 
Clergy of Durham^ ^ 7 5 ^ • 377 
 
 decay of all that is good. It is highh^ feafonablc now 
 to inftruft the people in the importance of external 
 religion.* 
 
 And doubtlefs under this head muft come into 
 confideration a proper regard to the ftrudures which 
 are confecrated to the {ervice of God. In the prefent 
 turn of the age, one may obferve a wonderful frugali- 
 ty in every thing which has refpe(5L to religion, and ex- 
 travagance in every thing elfe. But amidft the ap- 
 pearances of opulence and improvement in all common 
 things, whi&Ji are now fcen in mofl places, it would 
 be hard to fjnd a reafon why thefe monuments of an- 
 cient piety rhould not be preferved in their original 
 beauty and magnificence. But in the leafh opulent 
 places they muft be preferved in becoming repair ; 
 and every thing relating to the divine fervice be, how- 
 ever, decent and clean ; otherwife we (hall vilify the 
 face of religion whilft we keep it up. All this is in- 
 deed principally the duty of others. Yours is to prefs 
 ftrongly upon them what is their duty in this refped, 
 and admonilh them of it often, if they are negligent. 
 
 But then you muft be fure to take care and not 
 negledt that part of the facred fabrick which belongs 
 to you to maintain in repair and decency. Such neg- 
 le<5t would be great impiety in you, and of moft per- 
 nicious 
 
 * To inftriKft the people in the importance of external religion.] " The 
 importance of external religion," the Inquirer remarks, " is the grand engine 
 of the papifts, which they play with the greatefl effcft upon our common 
 people, who are always foonefl taken and enfnared by /«?■'! and yS^io ; and, 
 fo far as we concur with them in the principle, we are doing their work ; 
 fmce if externals, as fuch, are important, the plain natural confequei.ee is, 
 the more of t him I he letter." He had the fame reflection once before — " If true 
 religion cannot be preferved among men w'll'aoMlfiinn^, the coniequence mufl 
 
 be that the R^miJJi religion, having mr.re fre.wnt occurrences of forms, is 
 
 beUer than other religions which have ft^et of theie occurrences." To 
 
 this argument I reply, h'ego confequattiam. There may be too much of form 
 in religion, a5 well as too little' ;" the one leads to enthufiafnv the other de- 
 generates into luperftition ; one is puritaiiihn, the other popery — wherca? 
 the rational worihip of God is equally removed from either extreme. Did 
 the Injuirer never hear of tne pofiibiUty of having too much of a good thing >" 
 Or does he fuppolV, v-ith the late hiftoVian of Great Britain, that all reliff>on 
 is divided into two foecies, tlie fuperilirious and the fanatical ; and tij.it 
 whatever is noi one of thefe nmll of neceiiity be the other r 
 
 A a 
 
j»7^ :: y-iO/iai'^e f& the 
 
 picioiis example to others. Nor could y6u, with any 
 i-ucGefs, or any propriety, urge upon them their duty 
 in a regard in which you yourfeives fhould be openly 
 negledtulof it. 
 
 Bifhop Fleetwood has obferved,* that tmlefs the 
 good piihlick Jpirit of building, repairing, and adorning 
 churches prevails a great deal more among us, and he 
 more encouraged, an hundred years will bring to the 
 ground an huge number of our churches. This excellent 
 prelate made this obfervation forty years ago ; and no 
 one, I believe, will imagine that the good^fpirit he has 
 recommended prevails more at prefent 'than it did 
 then. 
 
 But if thefe appendages of the divine fervice are to 
 be regarded, doubtlefs the divine fervice itfelf is more 
 to be regarded ; and the confcientious attendance up- 
 on it Ought often to be inculcated upon the people, 
 as a plain precept of the Gofpel, as the means of grace, 
 and what has peculiar promifes annexed to it. But 
 external a6:s of piety and devotion, and the frequent 
 returns of them are, moreover, neceffary to keep up a 
 fenfe of religion, which the affairs of the v/orld will 
 otherwife wear out of mien's hearts. And the fre- 
 quent returns, whether of publick devotions, or of 
 any thing elfe, to introduce religion into men's feri- 
 ous thoughts, will have an influence upon them in 
 proportion as they are fufceptible of religion, and not 
 given over to a reprobate mind. For this reafon, be- 
 sides others, the fervice of the church ought to be 
 celebrated as often as you can have a congregation to 
 attend it. .biuh : 
 
 But fince the body of the people, efpecially in 
 country places, cannot be brought to attend it often- 
 er than one day in a week, and lince this is in no fort 
 enough to keep up in them a due fenfe of religion, it 
 were greatly to be wiflied they could be periuaded to 
 
 any 
 
 * Charge to the Clergy of St. Afaph, i its. 
 
Clergy pf Durham^ 1 7 5 1 . 379 
 
 any thing which might, in fome meafxire, ■ fupply the 
 want of more frequent pubHck devotions, or ferve the 
 like purpofes. Family prayers, regularly kept up in 
 every houfe, would have a great good effect. 
 
 Secret prayer, as exprefsly as it is commanded by 
 pur Saviour, and as evidently as it is implied in the 
 notion of piety, will yet, I fear, be grievoufiy forgot- 
 ten by the generality, until they can be brought to fix 
 for theiiifelves certain times of the day for it i lince 
 this is not done to their hands, as it was in the Jew- 
 ifh church by cuftom or authority. Indeed, cuftom, 
 as well as the manifeft propriety of the thing, and ex-^ 
 amples of good men in Scripture, juftify us in infifting, 
 that none omit their prayers morning or evening, who 
 have not thrown off all regards to piety. But fecret 
 prayer comprehends not only devotions before men 
 begin and after they have ended the bufinefs of tlae 
 day, but fuch alfo as may be performed while they are 
 employed in it, or even in company. And. truly, if 
 befides our more fet devotions, -morning and evening, 
 _all of us would fix upon certain times of .the day, lb 
 that the return of the hour Ihould remind us to fay 
 Ihort prayers, or exercife our thoughts in a way equiv- 
 alent to this, perhaps there are few perfons in lo high 
 .and habitual a ftate of piety, as not to find the benefit 
 of it. If it took up no more than a minute or two, 
 .or even lefs time than that, it would ferve the end I 
 am propqfing ; it would be a recolledion that we are 
 in tlie Divine Prefence, and contribute to our ■hingJn 
 t^e fear of the Lqrd all the day Jong, "'-'■' 
 
 A duty of the like kind, and ferving to the fame 
 purpofe, is the particular acknowledgment of God 
 when we are partaking of his bounty at our meals. 
 The negled of this is faid to have been fcandalous to 
 a proverb in the heathen world ;* but it is without 
 
 iliame 
 
 * Cudworth on the Lord's Supper, p. ?. Cafaub. in Atheaasum, L. i. c 
 xi. p. 22. Duport. Prsel. in Theo.phraftum Ed, Needham. C. ix. p. 335, &i;. 
 
380 -^IX^tyiarge-fo tJteT^^' 
 
 fhame laid afide at the tables of the higlieCt and the 
 ioweft rank, among us. s 05 ^^.oi:.::. 
 
 And as'parents fhould be admonifhbdi'^fld it" ^6uld 
 be prefled upon their confciences, to teach their chil- 
 'dren their pra3!^ers and eatechifm, it being what they 
 are obHged to upon all accounts, fo it is proper to be 
 mentioned here, as a mearits by which they will bring 
 the principles of Chriftianity often totheir 6wn minds, 
 inftead of laying afide all thoughts of- it-from week's 
 end to -week's end. . : 'c , : ;i lijw . : 
 
 General exhortations to piety, abftrafted from the 
 particular circumfkances^ of it^ are of great ule to fuch 
 as are already got into- a- religious courfe of life ; but 
 fuch as are not, though they be touched with them, 
 yet when they go -away from cl^urch they fcarceknow 
 whereto begin, or how to' fet about what they are 
 exhorted to. And it is with refpe£t to religion as 
 in the common affairs of life, in which many things of 
 great confequence intended are yet never done at all, 
 becaufe they may be done at any time, and in any 
 manner ; which would not be, were fome determin- 
 ate time and manner voluntarily fixed upon for the 
 doing of them. Particular rules and dire<^ions, then, 
 concerning the times and circumftances of perform- 
 ing acknowledged duties, bring religion nearer to prac- 
 tice ; and fuch as are really proper^ and cannot well 
 be miftaken, and are eafily obferved. Such particu- 
 lar rules in religion, prudently recommended, would 
 have an influence upon the people. "-^ — - - ' 
 
 All this indeed may be called form, as every -fliiftg 
 external in religion may be merely fo. And there- 
 fore whilft we endeavour in thefe, and other like in- 
 ftances, to keep up t\it-'formof godlinefs* amongft 
 thofe who are our care, and over whom we have any 
 influence, we mud endeavour alfo that this form be 
 made more and more fubfervient to promote \\\q power 
 of it. * Admoniib them to take heed that they mean 
 
 . what 
 
 * * a Tim. iii. 5, 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1 7 5 x • 381 
 
 ivvhat they fay in their prayers, that their thoughts and 
 
 intentions go along with thdr words, that they really 
 
 jiin their hearts exert and exercife before God the af- 
 
 -fedions they exprefs with their mouth. Teach them, 
 
 - not that external religion is nothing, for this is not 
 rtrue in any fenfe ; it being fcarce poiTible but that 
 
 it will lay fome fort of reftraint upon a man's morals ; 
 and it is moreover of good eflfed with refpeO: to the 
 world about him. But teach them that regard to 
 one duty will in no fort atone for the negle£l of any 
 •other. Endeavour to raife in their hearts fuch a fenfe 
 ^ of God as (hall be an habitual, ready principle of 
 : reverence, love, gratitude, hope, truft, relignation and 
 obedience. Exhort them to make ufe of every cir- 
 curaflance which brings the fubjecl of religion at ail 
 before them ; to turn their hearts habitually to him -, 
 to recolledt ferioully th^ thoughts of his prefence in 
 • ^'kom they live and move cud have their being, and by 
 a ihort aft of their mind devote themfelves to his fer- 
 •-yice. :If, for inftance, perions would accuftom them- 
 -felves to be thus-adraonilhed by the very fight of a 
 -, -pKiJjR. c ifi could it be called fuperftition ? Enforce up- 
 on therQ the necefiity of making rehgion their principal 
 
 - concern, as what is the exprefs condition of the gofpel 
 , -covenant, and what the very nature of the thing re- 
 quires. Explain to them the terms of that covenant 
 ot mercy, founded in the incarnation, lacritice and in- 
 terceifion ofCnRiST, together with the promifed aihil- 
 ance ot the FIoly Ghost, not to fuperfede our own 
 
 - endeavours, but to render them efledtual. The great- 
 er feflivals of the church being inftituted for com- 
 memorating the feveral parts of the gofpel hiilory, of 
 courfe lead you to explain thefe itsieveral doctrines, 
 and fhew the Chriitian practice which arifpsout of 
 them. And the more occaiional folemnitics , of relig- 
 ion, as well as thefe feftivals, will often afford you the 
 faireft opportunities of enforcing ail thefe things in 
 . . familiar 
 
382 -i'l charge to the 
 
 familiar conTerfaticm. Indeed all offeBation of talk-- 
 ing pioufly is quite naufeous ; and though there be 
 nothing of this, yet men will eafily be difgufted at 
 the too great frequency or length of thefe occafional 
 admonitions. But a word of God and Religion 
 dropped fometimes in converfation gently, and with- 
 out any thing fevere or forbidding in the manner of it, 
 this is not unacceptable. It leaves an imprefTion, is 
 repeated again by the hearers, and often remembered 
 by plain well difpofed perfons longer than one would 
 think. Particular circumftances too which render 
 men more apt to receive inftruftion, l}i,ould be laid 
 hold of to talk ferioufly to their confciences. For in- 
 ftance, after a man's recovery from a dangerous fick- 
 nefs, how proper is it to advife him to recoiiedt and 
 ever bear in mind, w4iat were his, hopes or fears, kis^ 
 wilhes and refolutions when under the apprehenlion of 
 death, in order to bring him to repentance, or confirm 
 him in a courfe of piety, according as his life and char- 
 ader has been. So likewife the terrible accidents which 
 often happen from riot and debauchery, and indeed; 
 almoft every vice, are occafions providentially thrown- 
 in your way to difcourfe againft thefe vices in common 
 converfation, as well as from the pulpit, upon any luch 
 accidents happening in your parifh, or in a neighbour- 
 ing one. Occafions and circumftances of alike kind 
 to fome or other of thefe occur often, and ought, if I 
 may io fpeak, to be catched at, as opportunities of con- ' 
 veying inlfrudion, both publick and private, with 
 ^reat force and advantage. 
 
 - :Publick inftru6tion is alfo abfolutely neceffary, and 
 can in no fort be dify;enled with. But as it is com- 
 mon to ail who are prefent, many perfons ftrangeiy" 
 negiedtto appropriate what they hear to themfelves, 
 to their own heart and hfe. Now the only remedy 
 for this in our power is a particular perfonal applica- 
 tion. A. ad a perfonal application makes a very dif- 
 ferent 
 
Clergy of Durham^ ^ 7 5 1 • 3^3 
 
 ferent impreffion from a common, general one. It 
 were therefore greatly to be wifhed, that every man 
 fhould have the principles of Chriftianity, and his own 
 particular duty enforced upon his confcience, in a 
 manner fuited to his capacity, in private. And be- 
 lides the occafional opportunities of doing this, fome 
 of which have been intimated, there are fbated oppor-. 
 tunities of doing it. Such, for inftance, is confirm^' 
 tion ; and the ulual age for confirmation is that tims 
 of life, from which youth muft become more and 
 more their own maflers, when they are often leaving 
 their father's houfe, going out into the wide world and 
 all its numerous temptations ; againft which they par- 
 ticularly want to be fortified, by having ftrong and 
 lively imprefiions of religion made upon their minds. 
 Now the 6ift canon exprefsly requires, that every 
 minifler that hath care of fouls fnall ufe his beft en- 
 deavour to prepare and make able — as many as he can 
 to be confirmed ; which cannot be done as it ought 
 without fuch pcrfonal application to each candidate in 
 particular as I am recommending. Another opportu- 
 nity fordoing this is, when any one of your pariihioners 
 fignifies his name, as intending for the firfl time to be 
 partaker of the communion. The rubrick requires 
 that all perfons, whenever they intend to receive, fhali 
 fignify their names beforehand to the minifler ; which, 
 if it be not infifted upon in all cafes, ought abfolutely 
 to be infilled upon for the firft time. Now this even, 
 jays it in your way to difcourfe with them in private 
 upon the nature and benefits of this facrament, and en- 
 force upon them the importance and neceffity of re- 
 ligion. However, I do not mean to put this upon 
 the, fame foot with catechifmg youth and preparing 
 them for confirmation ; thefe being indifpenfable ob- 
 ligations, and exprefsly commanded by our canons. 
 This private intercoude with your pariihioners prepar- 
 atory to their firfl communion, let it, if you pleafe, be 
 
 confidered 
 
5^4 'Charge to the 
 
 confidercd as a voluntary fervice to religion on your 
 part, and a voluntary inftance of docility on theirs. 
 I will only add as to this praftice, that it is regularly 
 kept up byfome perfons,and particularly by one, whoie 
 exemplary behaviour in every part of the paftoral of- 
 iice is enforced upon you by his ftation of authority 
 and influence in (this pait* efpecially of) the diocefe. 
 I am very fenfible, my brethren, that ftime of thefe 
 things, in places where they are greatly wanted, are im-. 
 pradlicable from the largenefs of parilhes, fuppofci 
 And where there is no impediment of this fort, yet the 
 performance of them will depend upon others, as well 
 as upon you. People cannot be admoniflied or in- 
 flruded in private, unlefs they will permit it. And 
 little will you be able to do in forming the minds of 
 children to a fenfe of religion, if their parents will not 
 affift you in it ; and yet much lefs, if they will fruftrate 
 your endeavours, by their bad example, and giving 
 encouragement to their children- to be diflbliite. The 
 like is to be faid alfo of 3^our influence in reforming 
 the common people in general, in proportion as their 
 fuperiors aft in like manner to fuch parents ; and 
 whilfl they, the lower people I mean, muft have fuch 
 numerous temptations to drunkennefs and riot every 
 where placed in their way. And it is cruel ufage we 
 often meet with, in being cenfured for not doing what 
 we cannot do, without, what we cannot have, the con- 
 currence of our cenlurers, Doubtlefs very much re- 
 proach which now lights upon the clergy would be 
 tound to flill eUewhere, if due allowances were made 
 for things of this kind. But then we, rny brethren, 
 muft take care and not make more than due allow- 
 ances for them. If others deal uncharitably with u?, 
 we muft deal impartially with purfelves, as in a piatter 
 of confcience, in determining what good is in our 
 power to (^0 j and not let indolence keep us from fct- 
 
 ting 
 
 * T].f Archdeaconrr of JitrthumlerUnd^ 
 
Clergy of Durham, 1 7 5 1 . 385 
 
 ting about what really is in our power, nor any heat 
 of temper create obllades in the profecution of it, or 
 render infuperabie luch as we find, when perhaps gen- 
 tlenefs and patience would prevent or overcome them. 
 
 Indeed all this diligence to which I have been ex- 
 horting you and myfelf, for God forbid I fhouid not 
 confider myfelf as included in all the general admoni- 
 tions you receive fi-om m.e ; all this diligence in thefe 
 things does indeed fuppofe that we give ourfehes zvhol- 
 ly to them. It fuppofes, not only that we ha.ve a real 
 fenfe of religion upon our own minds, but alfo, that 
 to promote the practice of it in others is habitually up- 
 permofl: in our thought and intention, as the bufinefs 
 of o.ur lives. And this, my brethren, is the bufmefs 
 of otir lives, in every fenfe, and upon every account. 
 It is the general bufmefs of ail Chriftians as they have 
 opportunity.; it is our particular bufinefs. It is fo, as 
 we have devoted ourfelves to it by the moft folemn 
 engagements ; as according to our Lord's appointment 
 we live of the Gofpel ;* and as the prefervation and ad- 
 vancement of religion, in fuch and fuch diftrifts, are, in 
 fome refpeds, our appropriated truft. 
 
 By being faithful in the difcharge of this our truft, 
 by thus taking heed to the minijiry we have received in 
 the Lord that we fulfil it^-f we fl:iali do cur part to- 
 vvards reviving a practical fenfe of religion amongft the 
 people committed to our care. And this will be the 
 fecurefk barrier againft the efforts of infidelity ; a great 
 fource of which plainly is, the endeavour to get rid of 
 religious reftraints. But whatever be our fuccefs with 
 regard to others, v»^e fhall have the approbation of our 
 confciences, and may reft aflured that, as to ourfelves 
 s.t leaft, our labour is not in vain in. the Lord."]; 
 
 * I Cor. ix. 14. f Col. iv. 17. + r Cor. xv. 58. 
 
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