pe fk es Se NSP as. a. ve sett RS ‘ent mete ee) ra ex Pie MES POD) Saneses i 7 ee 2 t ao eS Aven Ags o Si Be be i as x Seecties re Sn Rarins : wt © ees, am yini ‘a, eels Sets “ye x4 Yo Shee Be, Se MvOt sy a} Sm ior es Ss ics na! See ae EO sie to ets. pak bendy: rete singe: 0s Soke ae Bes be 2 APOLOGETIC LECTURES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY. EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY MURRAY AND GIBB FOR T. AND T. CLARK. LONDON, Seems. ne HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO. DUBLIN, . - + JOHN ROBERTSON AND CO. APOLOGETIC LECTURES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY. DELIVERED IN LEIPSIC IN THE WINTER OF 1864 BY VA CHR. ERNST LUTHARDT, DOCTOR AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY. Granslated from the Chis Goition by SOPHIA TAYLOR. EDINBURGH: T. & T. CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET. 1865. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https://archive.org/details/apologeticlecturOOluth_1 PREFACH. Ours is an apologetic age. Two views of the world stand opposed one to the other, and contend together | for the sway of the modern mind. It is, then, the task of the advocates of the Christian view to show, in the presence of modern thought, and by the re- sources of modern intellectual culture, that it, and it alone, is the satisfactory solution of the problem of all existence, of human life and its enigmas, of the human heart and its inquiries,—to prove that Chris- tianity is truth, truth ever young and always fresh, universal truth, and therefore equally adapted and equally satisfying to all ages and all degrees of civili- sation. —— LECTURE I. THE ANTAGONISTIC VIEWS OF THE WORLD IN THEIR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. PAGE The subject proposed—Christianity a new View of the World— The Ancient Church—The Middle Ages—The Reformation—The Development of the Negative Spirit —Socinianism — English Deism—Naturalism in France—Illumination in Germany—Ration- alism—Pantheism—Materialism — Prevailing Opinions—Theistic and Cosmical Views contrasted, ; d é : Eis et LECTURE II. THE ANOMALIES OF EXISTENCE. The problem—The Relation of Man to the World—The Anomalies of Knowledge—Of the Sentiments—Of the Will—Of all Existence— Death—Perception of Truth a Moral Act—The Answer of Chris- tianity, . : ; ; : : : ‘ . 24 LECTURE IIL THE PERSONAL GOD. The importance of the question, Is there a God ?—Intuitive Convic- tion of the Existence of God; its Universality—Atheism—Proofs of the Existence of God: from Nature; from its existence; from its adaptation to its purpose; from History; from our idea of God; from Conscience—Result—The Nature of God—Pantheism —Pantheism criticised; its practical consequences; it contradicts Reason, Conscience, the demands of the heart, : : 38 Contents. LECTURE IV. THE CREATION OF THE WORLD. PAGE The Conflict between Natural Science and the Religious View of the World—The Idea of Creation—Pantheism and Materialism—Ma- terialism criticised—Astronomy and its supposed Opposition to Christianity—The Position of the Harth—Geology and its Dis- coveries—Geology and the Bible—The Uncertainties of Geological Science—Point of view for forming a right judgment, and Har- mony in Hssentials, LECTURE V. MAN. The Scriptural View in general—The Transmutation Theory of Dar- win—The Unity of the Human Race necessary both from religious and human reasons—Varieties of Race—Man as a Union of Body and Soul—The Body—The Soul—Psychological Materialism criti- cised—Scriptural View of the Nature and Destiny of Man—Man as a Recapitulation, in a more exalted sense, of the World—Per- > sonality of Man—His conscious Thought—His free will—Man’s Position in the World—The higher Destiny of Man, LECTURE VI. RELIGION. Universality and Necessity of Religion ; it is rooted in the nature of man—lIts abode, man’s inner spiritual life—Religion viewed as Faith, and the Nature of Faith; its manifestation in prayer—The Position of Religion—Connection of Mental Culture with Religion —Religion the Foundation of National Life—Religion and Poli- tical Life—Its importance with respect to the present highly civilised age, 68 - 100 . 130 Contents. xl LECTURE VII. REVELATION. PAGE Necessity of Revelation considered with respect to our Reason, and our Will—Sin—Testimony to its universality—Scriptural account of its origin—Its consequences: moral schism in our whole existence, and ourincapacity to obviate it by our own strength—Possibility of Revelation—Miracles and the Laws of Nature—Certainty of Miracles— Their relation to Revelation—The genuineness and truth of Revelation ; testimony of the Apostles—F act of the Resur- rection; testimony of the whole Church; testimony of our own heart—The Self-witness of Truth—Its popular power—The rela- tion of Revelation to Reason, inasmuch as it surpasses the limits of Reason; is opposed to erring Reason; is in harmony with the inner truth of Reason—Reason the organ for Revelation, . . 156 LECTURE VIII. HISTORY OF REVELATION—HEATHENISM AND JUDAISM. Historical nature of Revelation—Vocations of various Nations—The Nation of Religion, and the Nations of Civilisation—Heathen Reli- gion—Heathen Morality—The Philosophical Morality of Heathen- ism—Its actual morality—The Voices of Prophecy among the Nations—Heathenism searching after God—Judaism and the Reli- gious Vocation of Israel—The great Fundamental Ideas of the Jewish Religion—Prophecy and its History—Jesus in Israel—The judgment of Israel—Christianity, . - 3 ; . 194 LECTURE IX. CHRISTIANITY IN HISTORY. The Historical Situation at the entrance of Christianity into the world—The Universal Empires: the Babylonian, Persian, Grecian, Xl Contents. and Roman—Mental Progress—Jesus Christ the End of Ancieniae and the Beginning and Power of Modern Times—Victorious Pro- gress of Christianity in the World’s History—The Power of the Christian Spirit—The Universal Character of Christianity, and its testimony to Jesus Christ, . : : , . 226 LECTURE X. THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST. The Question of the present— Oppositions in ancient times; in modern times—Strauss and Renan—The Gospels; testimony of the ancient Church—The portrait of J esus, the Self-witness of the Gospels; the trustworthiness of their narrative—Attacks upon the Gospels—The Gospel description of the Person of Jesus, of His youth, of His public ministry—The Saviour’s Life a Revela- tion of Divine Love even to Death—The miraculous Person of Jesus; His holiness and harmony ; His consciousness of fellowship with God; His miracles; His sayings; His self-witness—The Son of Man; His universal position with respect to the world; His testimony to His future—The Son of God, and His absolute fellowship with God—The testimony of Christ’s two institutions, Baptism and the Lord’s Supper—Recapitulation, . : . 249 NOTES. Nores To Lecrours I., ; : : : ; ; 299 Notes to Lecrure Il, . : ; ; : , 304 Nores to Lecture IIL, . : : : : : 309 Norrs ro Lecrurr lV., . ; - ‘ ‘ : 318 Nores ro Lecture V.,_ . 2 : : 7 ' 324 Nores ro Lecrure VL, . : ‘ " 3 ; 331 Nores To Lecrure VIL, . : : ‘ : ; 334 Nores to Lecrurr VO : ‘ : : ‘ 343 Norrs To Lecture IX., . ; ; : : ; 347 | Nores to LecrureX., . 4 , : ° ; 350 APOLOGETICAL LECTURES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY. LECTURE I. THE ANTAGONISTIC VIEWS OF THE WORLD IN THEIR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. aN. HE task which I propose to myself in the lectures | am about to deliver before you, my respected hearers, is to state to you those general truths on which Christianity is founded, and to justify them in the presence of modern thought. The Christian view of the world is in these days opposed by a non-Christian view; and a separation in the whole current of opinion in the modern world, leading to a rupture which could not but have a fatal influence upon the future, is in- creasingly imminent. Under such circumstances it is the duty of every advocate of Christian truth to do his utmost to maintain the connection of intellectual life. Christian intellect has in our days undoubtedly attained a degree of enlightenment and power rarely before witnessed. We need only observe the earnest- A . 2 The Subject Proposed. ness with which theological studies are prosecuted, or compare the sermons of the present day with those of the past, or the great activity manifested in the various provinces of Christian usefulness with that of former times, to be convinced that the Christian intel- lect is indeed a power. But the non-Christian intellect is also such a power as it never was before. We have indeed already seen times in which Christianity met with the most positive denial. Voltaire ruled the educated minds of his age, and was able to indulge the hope that in a few centuries Christianity would be extinct. Such a hope in the present day could be entertained by no reasonable man; and yet the non- Christian mind is a mightier power now than then. And this for two reasons. The force of church cus- toms then still formed a barrier against the gainsayers, and brought Christianity itself intact through the times of scepticism. But this barrier of the form of sound words is ever more and more yielding to the torrent of modern times. Again, former attacks were desultory, modern ones are systematic. The spirit of French infidelity is more stormy and tumultuous, but not so dangerous as the German. When a Renan writes a Life of Jesus, it is clever, piquant, popular; but it is a romance, an interesting novel. Works of fiction are the favourite literary productions of the day; and what could be imagined more interesting than a novel, whose hero is Jesus Christ, an amiable revolutionist, a model enthusiast and fanatic, sur- rounded by women who love His person more than The Subject Proposed. 3 His work, by disciples who force Him to play the part of a worker of miracles, etc.? But what is the result? A few years and the book will be forgotten, while the heavy artillery directed thirty years ago against the faith of the Church by David Strauss, and since then by his intellectual successors, has caused far greater confusion among the ranks of the faithful than this French skirmisher can effect. Since the French attacks in the days of Voltaire, the refutation of Christianity has passed through a school, the philosophical school of the German mind; it has been formed into a systematic view of the world, and earnest attempts have been made to set this up in the place of Christianity. And this view, stripped of its philosophic garb, and uniting itself with the other tendencies of the age, has passed into the general opinions, not only of the educated, but in a coarser and clumsier form into those of the labouring classes also. It is the duty of every one to be rightly informed concerning these antagonistic views, that he may take up a conscious position with respect to them. Nothing is more unworthy than to prejudge a cause of which we are ignorant, and yet there is nothing more common in religious matters. In every other case it is admitted that, in order to arrive at a judg- ment in any suit at law, we must know thefacts upon which such judgment must be based. Christianity is put upon its trial, and judgment is passed ; but how many among those who are so eager to pronounce it, 4 The Subject Proposed. are acquainted with the Bible, and the doctrinal writ- ings of the Church, which are its chief acts? Surely, of all questions which can agitate an age, the reli- gious question must be that which most deeply and most nearly concerns us. In such a question it is not just to decide upon mere authority, and to allow the position we are to occupy to be pointed out to us by others. Nor can it be right to remain indif- ferent. In no question is indifference so inadmissible, or so unworthy the dignity of man, as in the question of the great religious antagonisms. Nor is it any- where more impossible to keep clear of both sides, and to choose the middle course. For these antagonisms are exclusive. In other cases it may often be expe- dient to seek truth in a middle course; in this, we must choose one side or the other. The language of one is, There is a God; of the other, There is no God. Can it then be said, truth lies between the two? There are no greater contrasts than the Chris- tian and non-Christian views. Goethe says in his Westéstlichen Divan, ‘The most special, the unparal- leled, the deepest subject in the history of the world and of mankind, and that to which all others are sub- ordinate, is the conflict between faith and unbelief,’ (1) Two utterly opposite principles determine these views, and every individual is compelled to take up a positive position with respect to one of them. The principle, however, which he adopts will fashion his whole being and colour his whole life. ‘ Everything depends upon what principle a man embraces, for both his theory Christianity a New View of the World. 5 and practice will be formed in accordance therewith.’ (2) Let us then endeavour to bring before our minds the great antagonism in its historical development, that we may clearly understand what the question really is, which is stirring up the vast mental contest now going on around us, and in which every one of us is playing his part. When Christianity came into the world, it came into it as a new view of the world. Its first object, indeed, was the preaching of the cross, the word of reconcilia- tion, the gospel of the grace of God in Christ Jesus, the doctrine of repentance and faith as the way of salvation and eternal life to man. Christianity is primarily the doctrine of salvation. But this doctrine of salvation includes, and is founded on, a certain view of the world, and this view was an entirely new one. Its way, indeed, was prepared, and points of contact furnished by previous knowledge, by philosophy, and still more by man’s conscience and his instinctive sense of truth; but in its essence it was absolutely new. Kiven its very first and fundamental principles, the unity of God and the unity of the human species, could not but produce an entire revolution in the world of mind. For these were entirely new notions. How differently, indeed, must the world be regarded, when looked upon as the work of a Creator, as the free and loving act of a Father, who orders and maintains all things by the power of His wisdom and love, to whom the most remote is not too remote, nor the least too small; who has not merely His individual favourites 6 Christianity a New View of the World. among mankind, but equally cherishes the whole race in His heart; who cares not merely for the most minute interests of their external life, but seeks above all things the salvation of their souls, and desires above all the affection of their hearts. These were utterly new notions, notions of which the old world had known nothing. Moreover, that God had made of one blood all nations of the earth; that all were brethren, and ought to be united by one common bond of love; that the stranger was no stranger, but a neighbour; that we should look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others; that our life should be a life of service and of sacrifice for others; that selfishness is the radical sin of human nature; self-surrender, love, the radical virtue,—whose imagi- nation had such ideas as yet entered? And finally, that one single idea ruled the fate of nations and states as well as of individuals; that there was a single his- tory of the whole human race, commencing from one beginning, proceeding to one end, and that end the kingdom of God; that there was to be a kingdom of God upon earth, into which all were to be gathered, in which all were to be absorbed; and that this kingdom of God was already established in Him who formed the central point of history, the termination of the old, the beginning of a new era; who was not merely its herald, but its founder, the manifestation of God himself, the manifestation of the life, the light, the love of God in history, in and towards man—Jesus Christ; in whom all the lines of former history meet, Christianity a New View of the World. i from whom all the lines of subsequent history proceed, who is also the central point of attraction to individual souls, in whom each individual, as well as the whole agoregate of humanity, attains his destination, and thus becomes a member of that great kingdom of God which is founded upon justice and grace, upon the deepest and firmest moral basis :—what a light has all this cast upon history, upon God’s dealings with nations, upon His dealings with individual souls; and how has it gathered the greatest and the least, the ageregate and the individual, into one marvellous unity! (3) Not the very greatest of philosophers, not the most comprehensive, not the most soaring mind, had as yet formed even a conjecture of these truths, far less had thought out, recognised, and expressed them, and moreover succeeded in making them the universal view, a popular matter, a power over heart and life. Verily, Christianity brought into the world a new view of the world. With us these are now current notions: the things which were then new, surprising, and unheard of, now form the elementary propositions of Christian opinion. Yet these thoughts have lost nothing of their great- ness; they are the same now that they ever were, as true, as sublime, as enlightening, and as enkindling. It is we who have lost the lively impression of their greatness, sublimity, and beauty; we have become accustomed to them, and they have thus become too customary to us. Such is the fate of all great truths. It was but natural that this new view of the world 8 The Ancient Church. should not immediately prevail. It had to overcome an obstinate resistance before it obtained the victory. It is true that this resistance was not offered by any united system of opinions. The world of ancient thought was dissolved. ‘The process of decomposition had begun with the rise of philosophy in the sixth century before Christ. For philosophy had set itself to work upon traditionary religious notions, and had shattered the power of the objective spirit by the motive force of the subjective. Ancient philosophy, indeed, had sought to fill the place of religion itself. It was no merely speculative theory, but was practical both in nature and tendency. Great statesmen passed through its school as a preparation for their practical labours. It dealt in moral and political, as well as in scientific problems. But its power was never a popu- lar one. Always somewhat aristocratic, and confined to a small circle, it was incapable of taking the place of religion, and soon resolved itself into the most opposite tendencies. Hence its chief result was the establishment of a doubt in all truth, the overthrow of all conviction and certainty. And yet man could not dispense with certainty. Hence philosophy was accompanied by all sorts of secret doctrines; and the more mysterious these were, the more desirable. The old religion and its myths were allegorically explained, and transformed into symbols of ethics and wisdom. A whole world of views and notions had accumulated as the result of the previous development. But it was a world of The Middle Ages. 9 ruins. Leading minds collected these fragments of former times, and sought to form them into a new structure. Laborious intellectual efforts were de- voted to this restoration of heathen opinions. The Neo-Platonism of Alexandria was an experiment in which imagination and profundity united to construct an edifice, which, in fulness of thought, should far surpass the Christian, and by its profound philo- sophy should conquer the meagre doctrines of these ‘barbarians. It was indeed a wondrous compound. All religions and all nations had been forced to contribute to it. But it remained only a splendid experiment. It was advocated by men of conspi- cuous and noble minds. General education, with which heathen opinions were most closely interwoven, lent it its support, and yet the experiment failed ; the Christian view prevailed over the heathen, and has since ruled the civilised world. The intellectual powers of Judaism and heathenism, thus conquered by Christianity, took their revenge, indeed, by seeking to make their influence felt within the Church, and upon the very soil of Christianity, in the form of heterodoxy. The special object of their attack was the doctrine of Christ’s person, which they sought to misinterpret in either a J ewish or a heathen sense. But even this antagonism within the Church to the full truth of the Christian view was overcome, and the exclusive supremacy of the latter established. The Middle Ages were the period of this exclusive supremacy. As the outer world of Christendom was 10 The Middle Ages. gathered to the Vicar of Christ and the German emperor, the two supreme powers of the whole earth, the sun and moon which shed their light upon all earthly life, so also did the world of mind form itself into a strict unity. The heathen mind did indeed practically make its influence felt, but it was obliged to bow to the authority of the Church, and to the ecclesiastical mode of receiving and treating all sub- jects. ‘The Middle Ages are the eras when a single view of the world prevailed. It is this which forms their charm, and their greatness. In the great poems, and in the great works of art of this period, we encounter this single view. This never happened again in any subsequent age. Reason was the hand- maid of faith, and philosophy of theology. In the Summa, the great theological work of Thomas Aquinas, the greatest doctor of the Middle Ages, the heathens Aristotle and Plato appear as witnesses to Christian truth; so also in the great cathedrals, those most characteristic representatives of the times, every thing, even the most heterogeneous, the very world of goblins and demons, contributed to the great yet simple edifice. And all this for the glorification of the Church, that supreme power on earth which held in one compacted unity the whole fabric of human society. Such were the Middle Ages, the era of the supreme sway of Christianity over the world and its opinions. Yet the heathen mind was but repressed, not anni- hilated, and soon reappeared the more openly and the more strongly. Italian Humanism. 11 The revival of the ancient world in the Classical Studies pursued with such passionate ardour in Italy at the close of the Middle Ages, revived also the spirit of heathenism, harboured it in Rome itself, and upon the throne of the Romish bishop, and threatened the world with a new heathenism, unless the Reformation had averted this danger. This was one of the greatest, though one of the least known and least acknowledged, of the services rendered by the German Reformation to western Christendom in general. We are apt, in contemplating the revival of learn- ing in Italy, to be dazzled by the splendour of the enlightenment which it introduced. It assumes, how- ever, a different appearance upon closer observation. Assuredly the arts and sciences flourished in Italy, in the Medicean era, as they had never done before, as they have never done since, and adorned life with an unwonted refinement of manners and education. But the foundation of true morality was wanting. Classical studies resulted in a hitherto unheard of licentiousness of life and motive. Count Picus of Mirandola, indeed, was a brilliant exception. His saying, ‘Philosophy seeks truth, theology finds it, religion possesses it,’ is almost the history of his life. But his was an isolated case. The most distinguished advocates of classical learning reproach each other with sins which cannot be spoken of. Poggius wrote jests (facetie) which can scarcely be equalled for vulgarity and immorality, and which yet went through twenty editions in thirty years. The heathen spirit, 12 The German Reformation. under the form of refinement and scientific interest, ruled at the Medicean court. The Platonic academy at Florence put the Platonic philosophy in the place of Christianity, and Savonarola strove with ardent zeal against heathen immorality and heathen belief, as defended by the highest prelates. He introduces ~ one man as saying to another, ‘What do you think of our Christian ‘belief? What do you take it to be?’ And the other replies, ‘ Well, you seem to me a thorough dunce; faith is only a dream, a matter for sentimental women and monks. At the Court of Rome there was great taste for the fine arts, but very little theology or Christianity, when such words as these could be put into the mouth of the supreme head of Christendom: ‘ How much the fable about Christ has profited us, is sufficiently known to all;’ and also that other saying, that a man would be better off in disbelieving the immortality of the soul. Matters had indeed gone so far that it was thought necessary at the Lateran Council of the year 1513, to inculcate afresh the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. (4) It was a blessing for the whole Church that, in contrast with the refined heathenism of Italy, the German Reformation exhibited in Luther, a moral seriousness of conscience and faith, and in Melancthon a union of classical cultivation and Christianity. This had its effect even in Italy, and infused into the opposition to the Church a moral and religious spirit. The Reformation cast far behind it the negative spirit, Socinianism. 13 and forced it back into a more positive position ; and it has needed more than three centuries to arrive again where it then stood,—enriched, indeed, by the fruits of the development of which it was meantime the subject. Let us now consider this movement of the negative spirit from the more positive position into which it was thrown, towards the decided negativism of modern heathenism. The phenomenon which first presents itself, and that with which this movement begins, is Socinianism. A series of uneasy spirits appeared about the time of the Reformation, who opposed the orthodox view of the Trinity. This anti-Trinitarian movement re- ceived its clearest, most comprehensive, and influential expression from the Italian, Faustus Socinus. In 1574, he gave up a respectable and comfortable position in the Medicean court, and betook himself to Germany and Poland, where he became the cen- tral point of the so-called Unitarians, who formed a Socinian Society in Poland and Transylvania, and thence extended their influence over western Europe. Socinianism does not deny either revelation or the supernatural ; it abides by the authority of the Scrip- tures, but makes its own subjective notions the stan- dard of all religious truth. In its view the essence of Christianity consists in the doctrine of immortality, and it was for the sake of this that Christ both lived and died. But it denies the deity of Christ, affirming that this doctrine is not found in the Scriptures. ‘It 14 FEinglish Deism. is more credible, says Wollgazen the Socinian, ‘that a man should be an ass, than that God should be aman. It admits, however, that Christ was no ordi- nary man, that He was the son of the Virgin, perfectly holy, just, and godlike, and therefore exalted to be the ruler of the world, and to receive divine honour. It regards His prophetic and kingly offices as essential, expunges His priestly office, and views His death as undergone for the confirmation of His doctrine, and not as an atonement for sin. Socinianism is a union of the supernatural element with rationalistic opinions. The English Deism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made a still further advance on the path of negation. It was an attempt to set up so-called natural religion in the place of positive Christianity. Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1648), the first of a series of deistical writers, was followed by many others, as Toland, Tindal, Woolston, Bolingbroke, etc. It was not a frivolous, but an earnest and moral spirit which originated this movement, whose object was to reduce Christianity to general moral and religious principles. The existence of God, the duty of worshipping Him, virtue and piety as His true service, the duty of repenting and forsaking sin, and faith in a divine retribution, partly in this life, partly in the next: these five principles are, according to Lord Herbert, ‘the chief pillars of pure religion. ‘ Whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.’ When Lord Herbert had completed his work On Naturalism in France. 15 Truth as distinguished from Revelation,* he was filled with doubt whether its publication would con- tribute to the glory of God, and threw himself upon his knees to entreat His guidance. ‘Give me a sion from heaven, or if not I will suppress my book!’ ‘I had scarcely uttered these words,’ says he, ‘when a distinct, yet gentle sound, unlike any earthly one, came from heaven. This so supported me, and gaye me such peace, that I considered my prayer as heard.’ Marvellous indeed! That God should be said to have given a direct sign, in attestation of a work which denies all direct revelation! So we are not to believe that God manifested himself in Christ, because we are to believe that God manifested himself to Lord Herbert of Cherbury ! But a further advance was soon made: all that is matter of revelation in the Scriptures was attributed to the self-seeking invention of the priesthood, and the moral character of scriptural personages attacked. The great excitement produced by these attacks is evident from the multitude of replies they called ° forth. To Tindal’s work alone, Christianity as Old as the Creation, more than one hundred answers appeared. But other religious movements in Eng- land, and especially the rise of Methodism, soon cast this tendency into the background. We find, then, here a denial of revelation; but God, virtue, and immortality, are permitted to remain. * The full title of this book is De Veritate prout distinguitur a Revela- tione a verisimili, a possibili et a falso. 16 Naturalism in France. The naturalistic tendency assumed an entirely dif- ferent form in /rance. ‘There it was frivolous, immoral, and denied the existence of God. Upon the soil of an Epicureanism, which made sensual prosperity the supreme law of existence, sceptical opinions were formed, which, advocated by a number of influential writers, helped to prepare for the Revolu- tion. Rousseau, indeed, had religious feeling, ad- vocated faith in God, and repeatedly acknowledged the sublimity of Christianity, of the Holy Scriptures, and of Jesus Christ; but he destroyed all sense for what actually existed, by his dream of a state of nature, in which alone he could see a remedy for all the evils of human society, and which, never- theless, has never been realized, nor can ever be possible. Voltaire, whose wit ruled his age, and to whom Frederick the Great wrote, ‘There is but one God, and there is but one Voltaire, satirized and abused both Christianity and the Church, and hated Christ,—his frequently repeated saying was, ecrasez Tinfame,—and he ventured to predict His fall from the throne of His dominion over mind, within the next ten years. The French Encyclopzedia of Diderot and D’Alembert, whose influence was a very extensive one, was founded upon an ordinary and sensualistic theory, and advocated a corresponding disposition. A circle of gowrmands collected around the German Baron Halbach, and produced among other materialistic works the noted Systeme de la Nature (1770), which affirmed the exclusiveness ot Illumination in Germany. 17 matter: ‘Man is but matter; thought and will are affections of the brain; faith in God, as well as the admission of the existence of the soul, rest upon a dualization of nature, upon a false distinction between matter and spirit; the freedom of man can as little be asserted as his immortality; self-love and interest are the only principles of action, and human society depends upon a system of mutual interest.’ The negative tendency could recede no farther. It had started with the denial of Christ’s divinity ; it had arrived at the denial of spirit in general! The motive power, in its later manifestations, was not reason but inclination. Inclination was the founda- tion of opinion. In Germany this movement came more slowly, but more thoroughly, to maturity, and was therefore the more dangerous. Far more moral earnestness existed here than in France, hence the positive spirit offered a far more energetic resistance. Hermann Reimarus, a native of Hamburg, indeed, transplanted English Deism, in all its keenness and bitterness, into German soil in the so-called Wolfenbuttel Fragments published by Lessing. His polemics were directed not only against the Scrip- tures, and the morality of Scripture characters, but even against the person of Jesus himself. The plan of Jesus was only a political one; His cry on the cross, ‘My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me 2’ did but express His despairing lamentation over its failure. But His disciples, even at the twelfth hour, B 18 Illumination in Germany. transformed His political plan into a religious one, and Jesus into a religious Messiah. (5) This was, however, too strong meat for the times, and these attacks called forth a general protest. French infidelity had indeed taken root at the court of Frederick the Second, and communicated itself to the higher classes. But it was limited to these, and too much of their old honourable stedfastness still existed in the mass of the people to allow it to penetrate to them. The spirit of the age was more in accordance with the illumination move- ment than with the direct denial of Christianity. The heavy form of mathematical demonstration with which the school of Wolf had sought at first to support, but afterwards to supplant Christian faith, was exchanged for the lighter drapery of popular philosophical reasoning, while the teaching of the Church was prudently confined to generalities. Re- ligion and morality were wanted, but not mystery. Only what was clear was considered true, and that only was clear which was upon the surface, not that which must be brought from the depths. Such were the ruling principles of the age. Mendelssohn proved the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul; and on these doctrines men built for themselves the edifice of their religious faith. Theology allied itself to the spirit of the age, and proclaimed the agreement of revelation and reason. Kant, indeed, overthrew this dogmatic edifice by proving, in his Criticism of Pure Reason, that all thought is but subjective, that consequently we know Rationalism. 19 nothing of God, and of the supersensuous in general, with objective certainty, and hence cannot philosophi- cally prove the existence of God, etc. He showed, in his Criticism of Practical Reason, that there is only a moral certainty in conscience and its claims. God, immortality, retribution, are claims of conscience, and on this foundation he builds his moral world. It is the absolute duty of every one to obey the moral law. The categorical imperative, thou shalt, must sway the sceptre. This is the morality of man. ‘A morality, truly,’ as Schiller answers him, ‘for slaves, but not for the freeborn children of the family.’ (6) Religion is only so far valuable as it subserves this morality of law. Religion is but a handle for morality,—the Christian religion is certainly the best ; and Christ, as the Church describes Him, the ideal of morality. How far the Jesus of history realized this ideal, we are unable to determine. He could scarcely have been identical with it. But we need not keep to the historical, but to the ideal Christ, 2.e. to the ideal of moral perfection ; and this we should seek to realize in our own lives. Rationalism, which reduces Christianity to the stan- dard of sound human reason, grew out of these ele- ments. In some respects morally admirable, it is in the highest degree bigoted, and, if we might be allowed the expression, somewhat Philistine (Philisterhaftes*). It teaches that there is a God, but a God who leaves the world to itself, with the exception of seeing that it * A cant term applied by students to tradesmen and others not belong- ing to the University. 20 Pantheism. goes on according to the laws He has imposed upon it. There is not, nor can there be, either miracle, prophecy, or direct revelation : God cannot act directly. Chris- tianity is not a revelation, properly so called; Jesus Christ no miracle, but only the wisest and most virtu- ous man that ever lived, and by means of His teaching, which He sealed with His blood, the benefactor of mankind. If Socinianism left somewhat of the super- natural in the person of Jesus, Rationalism entirely strikes it out, and reduces all to morality. It leaves, however, a personal God, moral freedom, and the im- mortality of the soul. Pantheism, however, abolishes these three funda- mental truths of religion and morality. Pantheism 1s the necessary successor of Rationalism. It was impos- sible to remain stationary at a God who has but an external influence upon the world. ‘ What God were He who acts but from without, Just making all in circles twirl about ? A God, creation’s hidden springs should move Himself in all, all in himself should love ; That they who in Him live, and move, and are, Should never miss His power, His aid, His care.’ (7) God is cosmical life itself, or the universal reason in things, not essentially separate from the world. God and the world are only two different expressions for the same thing, two sides of the same world, the inner and outer side of the same object. Thus all religion is abolished ; for there can be no personal relation to such a God, because He is himself impersonal, and has Materialism. 91 no personal relation to us. There may be a certain religious disposition, in which the individual may rise to generalities; but no faith, no love, no hope, no prayer to such a God. And thus morality also is vir- tually abolished. For there is no such thing as free- will. Everything happens from pure necessity. No man can free himself from its power. He only thinks himself free,—‘he thinks he pushes; he himself is pushed.’ The more acute any one is, the more will he perceive how all actions are caused by circumstances. Hence neither is there moral responsibility, retribution, or life after death, but an absorption of individual into general life. Such notions were connectively expressed by Spinoza, and they have been reagitated by philosophy in our days. They received some modification at the hands of Hegel, but are fundamentally what they ever were. They have been followed out to their results in religion and theology by David Strauss. The denial of the super- natural runs consistently throughout his so-called Doc- trine of Faith, which concludes thus: ‘ Another world is indeed, in all its forms, the only enemy, and in its form of a future life the last enemy, which speculative criticism has to attack, and if possible to overcome.’ He has since spoken with even greater asperity. Materialism took the place of Rationalism. Feuer- bach points out the transition: ‘God was my first, reason my second, man my third and last notion.’ In these words he shortly and graphically describes the downward progress of his philosophic reasoning. He oz Prevailing Opinions. means, however, man in his empirical, sensuous reality. His philosophy, the knowledge of this sensuous man, ‘< converted into anthropology. All religion is self- delusion. The idea of God is only that idea of man which man makes objective to himself. He thinks of himself when he thinks of God. ‘Man created God after his own image.’ In man, however, the senses are everything ; they are all reality, all truth. Upon these philosophical maxims Materialism is founded, and be- lieves it can establish them by its facts. There is no spirit, no soul; the agency of matter is everything. Such is its wisdom. The development here attained is complete, and further progress impossible. We have reached the mud of Materialism. The opinions, then, which now prevail are a com- pound of all these various elements, which, appearing in succession, have successively occupied and vacated the mind of the present generation, and left behind them traces of their existence. First one, then another element will be the more prominent. Multi- fold, however, as are the opinions now prevailing, they have nevertheless one general tendency, one general principle. Wherein, then, does this consist ? Guizot describes it as the denial of the supernatural. And certainly the question of the supernatural is the question of the day. We might say that the general feature of present opinions is the making the Cosmos into a principle. The world, however, has two sides,— matter and spirit. Hence at one time greater emphasis Prevailing Opinions. 23 is laid upon spirit, and at another upon matter; the tendency is now more idealistic, now more realistic ; sometimes more sublime, sometimes more ordinary. But the Cosmos is still the principle. It is this which becomes progressively prominent during the joint development. Deism suffered a God to exist, but plunged Him into a state of quiescence; Pantheism confounded Him with the world; Materialism entirely denied Him ; while, on the other hand, the world, the spirit of the world, the life of the world, the matter of the world, were in succession exalted. It is herein that its antagonism to the Christian view consists. With this, God is the principle of all things, —the principle of the world, of man, of his spirit, and of his matter. The Christian view is decidedly theistic. The question then is, whether God or the world is to be the principle and centre of all things, and conse- quently of our reasoning. . It is this which constitutes the eminently practical importance of this contrast. It is decisive of the whole tendency of our thoughts. The prerequisite, however, and determining motive of different opinions is not so much a different philosophy, a different set of notions, as a different state of feeling. It is the inclination and tendency of the heart which finally determines the opinions of the mind. For an opposite course of life must result according as a man finds his satisfying portion in the world, or in the per- sonal and living God. LECTURE IL. THE ANOMALIES OF EXISTENCE. meme ITH RE are two great views of the world $4 diametrically opposed to each other. Each is an attempt to solve the great problem of existence, and to give an answer to the question of questions. The problem is the world, is man himself. The existence which surrounds us, and which we share, is the question. We see a realm of spirit, and a realm of nature. Whence is the world of spirit and of nature? What laws prevail in it? And why and for what purpose does this world exist ? This universal existence is a question which comes before us, and from which we cannot escape. If it be answered, The world which surrounds us is a series of gradations terminating in man, man is made the answer to the question, What is the world? But is not man himself the greatest of all questions? Is he not the most anomalous of beings ? His relation to the world is an anomaly, his relation to himself anomalous, he is a born anomaly. And not only his natural existence, but still more his moral being is full of anomalies. This question will The Enigma of Existence. Des not let us rest. We cannot cease from seeking its answer. In all time it has been sought. All philo- sophy, all religions are attempts at an answer. ‘The interest is not merely an intellectual but an ethical one,—an interest not merely of the mind, but of the conscience. It is the heart’s deepest necessity to obtain light on this matter. Let us then consider the problem with a view to discovering where the answer lies. We are placed in the world. The ewistence of the world is a ques- tion which presses upon the mind. Where is it? No thinking man can escape this question. Pan- theism answers: It is from itself; matter is eternal, it has formed itself into the world; being is the foundation of existence. But whence this beng? Pantheism answers: From itself. In other words, Pantheism can give no answer. Must we then leave off inquiring because Pantheism is obliged to leave off answering ? | ? But not only is the origin of the world a problem, its actual existenee and the course of its history are full of enigmas. Does the law of necessity govern it? or does freedom prevail therein? Is it governed accord- ing to laws, moral laws, or arbitrarily? Appearances point now to the former, now to the latter. Who can behold with indifference this varying machinery of existence? Yet who can furnish the answer ? And finally, why is all this? This inquiry after the why and wherefore is the chief of the questions pressing upon the mind of man, and that of which 26 The Enigma of Existence. it can least of all divest itself; the question most worthy of his attention, and yet that also which he is least capable of answering. Why does anything exist? Why is there not nothing? Has being a purpose, an end, a destiny? Pantheism speaks only of cause and origin, but not of end and purpose. But this question of the why and wherefore will not be silenced. It is the question of the intellectual — interest, the problem of the highest criticism, the peculiar expression of thought. Man must cease to think when he ceases to inquire after the where- fore of existence. The origin, existence, and purpose of the universe, then, is the question placed before the mind of man. It may be answered: Man is the answer. Is man really the answer? Perhaps he is to the question, Wherefore? But to the question, Whence? Strauss, indeed, is of opinion that the mind of man, ‘as the unconscious mind of nature, created’ the world, ‘ordered the relations of the stars, found earths and metals, arranged the organic structure of plants and animals.’ (1) I say that this is folly; and the Scrip- ture says (Job xxxvili. 4—7), ‘ Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner-stone thereof, when the morning-stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?’ The Relation of Man to the World. 27 Again, if man is the answer to the question where- fore, is he not himself the question of questions ? Even the relation of man to the world is a paradox. The eighth Psalm sets this forth: ‘When I consider the heavens, the work of Thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which Thou hast ordained ; what is man that Thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that Thou visitest him?’ The sentiment expressed by the psalmist is the contrast between impotence and great- ness, between the exalted and the abject. Man, in the presence of the universe, is an atom, a vanishing point, a cipher. And yet he has the strongest feeling of independence and elevation in the presence of the world. He cannot but fear every moment being swallowed up by the universe, and sinking in this ereat ocean of heaving forces and masses ; and yet he proudly lifts himself in his own consciousness above the universe. How impotent is man! ‘There 1s no need,’ says Pascal, (2) ‘for the whole universe to arm itself to annihilate him; a breath, a drop of water is enough to kill him. But even if the universe should annihilate him, man would still be the greater ; for he knows that he dies, but the universe knows not that it annihilates him’ ‘It is thought which constitutes the greatness of man. But is this thought also a power in the presence of the world? Man has a feeling of freedom, and yet he everywhere sees himself restrained, dependent, limited by the most insignificant and most material forces. He is made subject to necessity, and yet endowed with a feeling of 28 The Anomalies of Knowledge. freedom. How shall this.contradiction be reconciled ? The relation of man to the world is verily a paradox. But man is himself a paradox. What an ocean of anomalies are united in him!—anomalies of know- ledge, of feeling, of will, of his whole nature. There is in man a hungering after knowledge, after truth, after certainty. And yet there is nothing but uncertainty. What Goethe says in Faust is no rash exaggeration. There is in each of us something of this insatiable hunger after knowledge, this longing to ‘Recognise the hidden ties That bind creation’s inmost energies ; Her vital powers her embryo seeds survey, And fling the trade in empty words away.’* Yet are we also compelled to add: ‘That we in truth can nothing know, This in my heart like fire doth burn.’ ‘We are always groping at problems,’ says Goethe. ‘Man is a dark being, he knows little of the world, and least of all of himself’ (3) And is this to be the lot of man, to be ever obliged to inquire after truth, and never to find it? ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth? Or must’ he content himself with the poor comfort with which Mephistopheles tries to console Faust ?— ‘Oh! credit me, who, still as ages roll, Have chewed this bitter fare from year to year ; No mortal, from the cradle to the bier, Digests the ancient leaven.’ * Gorrur’s Faust, translated by ANNA SWANWICK. The Anomalies of the Sentiments. 29 And yet man cannot cease from chewing it, even if he should break all his teeth over it. But this is not all. | Man has a craving for happiness. He longs for that supreme good which would fully satisfy him, and allay his deepest need. He seeks it, but finds it not, amidst the good things which this world can afford. He strives after happiness, yet ever feels himself miser- able. He soars beyond things temporal and earthly, and carries his craving into infinite space. He seeks God as his supreme good—for we are made for God; and this characteristic of humanity is an ineffaceable one. And yet, where is God to be found? He is lost in obscurity. Then, again, another characteristic opposes the former, and draws us from God. We all bear within us a secret opposition to God, and yet we are made for God! ‘Si Phomme rest fait pour Dieu, pourquoi n’est il heureux qu’en Dieu? Si ’homme est fait pour Dieu, pourquoi est il si contraire 4 Dieu?’ ‘In vain, O man, dost thou seek in thyself a remedy for thy misery. Thy highest wisdom can attain nothing beyond the knowledge that thou canst find neither truth nor the true good in thyself. Philoso- phers have promised it thee, but have been unable to keep the promise.’ (4) And yet we cannot cease from craving after it. ‘My whole heart burns to know where the true good is to be found. Nothing would be too costly to attain it. ‘We long for truth, and find within us nothing but uncertainty. We seek happiness, and find only misery and death. We are 30 The Anomalies of the Will. incapable of ceasing to long for truth and happiness, and are yet incapable of attaining either. The desire is left us only to punish us, and to show us whence we are fallen.’(5) But it is just in the very cireum- stance that man has a feeling of his misery that his greatness consists. ‘La grandeur de homme est grande en ce quil se connait misérable; il est donc misérable parcequwil Test ; mais il est bien grand parcequil le connait.’ ‘No one is unhappy at being a king, except a dethroned king.’ (6) There is, then, an anomaly within us, in the contrast between desire and attainment. It is desire which makes us un- happy; yet this very desire is the sign of our greatness, but a fallen greatness. Wherein lies the solution of this enigma ? (7) But not only our knowledge and sentiments, our will also is at variance with itself. For as there is in man a desire for truth, so is there also a striving after what is truly good, an attraction towards morality, and a longing for moral freedom. And yet man loves immorality. His will rises towards the noble, it soars above the ordinary standard of morality, and yet is continually suffering itself to be drawn down by its power. Goethe, indeed, boasts of Schiller, that he had left behind him that general tendency which restrains us all. And certainly Schiller was full of sublime and noble aspirations. But was he alone free from that common lot of mortals, the necessity of lamenting the weakness of our moral nature? We must all experi- The Anomalies of the Wiil. dl ence the power of passion, how it can deceive and persuade, not only the understanding, but the will. The will is the deepest and highest faculty of man, an incomparable power, mighty enough to set a world on flames; and yet, again, how powerless! How slight often is the temptation before which it falls in a moment of weakness! How impotent is it in opposi- tion to the heart! how restrained by the inclinations, habits, desires, and weaknesses of nature! The most sublime word a man can utter is, I will. But how seldom does he really will! He would like to will, yet does not attain to actual willing. Man is, through his possession of will, a minor god; and yet he is the slave of all things, and of his own nature. Learn, hence, proud man, what a paradox thou art to thyself ! (8) It is the feeling of these anomalies, and the impossi- bility of reconciling them, which has at all times extorted from poets and thinkers so many bitter lamentations over the ills of human life, the sorrows of the human heart. For at one time man reaches, in proud self-consciousness, or in defiant audacity, towards the stars, and would take heaven by storm; at another, he lies in the dust, and how often in de- filement! Even old Homer complained, that of all that breathes and moves, nothing on earth is sadder than man.(9) And the saying of Theognis, that it would have been best for us never to have been born, or at least to have died as soon as possible after our birth, has been again and again repeated in 32 Death an Enigma. various forms. Poets vie with one another in describ- ing the ills of life in all its various stages, from the follies of youth up to sad old age, ‘the meeting-place of all ills;’ a life which no wise man could desire to live over again. And even a Pliny, otherwise so short and terse, becomes eloquent when he describes human misery: man is, in his view, a being full of con- tradictions, the most unhappy of all creatures; for other creatures have no wants beyond their own limits, but man is full of wants and wishes which can never be satisfied. His nature is a lie, the greatest poverty united with the greatest loftiness. Amidst so many and so great evils, the best thing is that he can put an end to his life. (10) Is, then, suicide the highest wisdom? death the solution of every enigma? How can that satisfy our reason which our moral consciousness condemns ? And how can that solve every enigma which is itself the ereatest of all enigmas? Death adds to the enigmas which man bears within him, and which his life in- volves, that which is in fact the greatest. For as death is the most certain, so is it also the most uncer- tain of events. For, to quote the words of Pascal, ‘all that I know is, that I must soon die; but what I know the least of is this very death, from which never- theless I know not how to escape.’ (11) Yet it is at the same time the most solemn event that befalls us. For it is the beginning of an eternity, whether of annihila- tion or of future life. There is an affecting solemnity in the certainty, I must die; shall we live after death Perception of Truth a Moral Act. 33 or not? We must know it. And if we live, what kind of life will it be? Happy or unhappy? We must know it, for our eternity is concerned. This question is of such importance, and touches us so closely, that a man must have lost. all feeling to be indifferent about it. Our thoughts and actions will take an entirely opposite direction, according as we have or have not an eternal life to hope for. So that it is quite impossible to decide, with due deliberation, upon our course of life, unless we decide upon it from this last-named point of view. (12) In short, existence is a problem requiring solution. We cannot withdraw from this question, for it is the question of our life. There must be an answer some- where, and we must be capable of finding it. We must have certainty about this answer if we are to know peace and security. The world cannot be the answer. That view of the world which makes the world a principle, cannot be the correct one. For the world is itself the enigma. Is man the answer to the sphinx’s riddle? But if man himself becomes the sphinx, who is then to solve the riddle? The Chris- tian view of the world affirms that it possesses the solution, by referring us to God and to the will of His eternal love. Shall we find here the truth we are seck- ing? If we would find it, we must seek for it; and to seek it rightly, we must be willing to find it. It is unworthy, and it ought to be impossible, to feel an interest in all possible inquiries and phenomena, and none in this greatest of all inquiries. But just C 34 Perception of Truth a Moral Act. slightly to nibble at the surface of knowledge, without penetrating into its depths, cannot be called feeling an ‘nterest in ite What Bacon says of philosophy, ‘ that a little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to religion, applies to the knowledge of all truth. For truth dwells in the depth, and God dwells in the depth. He is to be found behind things. The ways of inquiry are many, but the end is one,—viz. God, who is The Truth. But we must press forward after the truth. And why should we not do so? Because there are obscurities in the way? When are we free from them? Do we not live in the midst of mysteries? Life itself, the notion of life, what is it but a dark mystery? If reality is full of obscurity, how should our knowledge be without it? What system of truths was ever set up in which no obscurity was to be found? ‘The farther we advance in research, the nearer we approach to the unsearchable, says Goethe. (13) We should pause upon subjects and questions, and let them make their influence felt upon us, not hurry from one thing to another without going deeply into any. We must be willing to find out the truth of a matter, and our own notions must not be allowed to interfere. According to Pythagoras, the knowledge of truth be- gins with silence, ze. with a quiet and hearty submis- sion to it, and not with arguments or an inclination to doubt. There is, indeed, a doubt leading to inquiry, which may appropriate the promise made by God to the sincere; but there is also a love of doubting, which Perception of Truth a Moral Act. oo ‘1s ever learning, yet never able to come to the know- ledge of the truth’ This is a fault not of the under- standing, but of the will. No one doubts mathema- tical propositions. Why not? Because no one has an interest in doubting them. But the existence of God, it is just possible that some may have an interest in doubting this. Our thoughts are far more closely con- nected with our wishes and inclinations, and, in short, with our whole moral condition, than is often supposed. ‘The heart has reasons of which the understanding knows nothing,’ says Pascal; and that famous philo- sopher Fichte says, ‘Our system of thought is often but the history of our heart; conviction arises from inclination, not from reason, and the improvement of the heart leads to true wisdom,’ (14) Our relation to truth is not only an intellectual, it is more especially a moral one. It is the moral position which we occupy with respect to truth which determines our opinions. How often does it happen that a moral fall is followed by intellectual decay! The understanding is venal, and may be induced by various motives to subserve the wishes of the heart. Truth isa great and a solemn matter, It is not easy to endure its glance. When first it penetrates the heart, it chastises and condemns ; its after effects illumine and elevate. We must endure its first operation if we would experience its subsequent benefits. In short, the perception of truth ts a moral act,—an act of the will, and not chiefly of the understanding. For even after every misap- prehension and doubt has been cleared up, it is the 36 The Search for Truth, and the will which finally decides upon its reception or rejection. What we need, then, is willingness to know the truth. Now, since Christianity declares itself to be the truth, every man must take up a position with respect to it. It cannot be avoided. We may oppose it, we may hate it, but we cannot ignore it, for it stands in every man’s path, and forces from him an answer to the question it proposes. We are, indeed, often told: Christianity is a beauti- ful theory; but it is nothing more than a theory. It is too ideal, it does not suit our circumstances. Our public affairs, political life with its problems and changes, the great tasks of mankind, art and science, trade and industry, etc.,—all these are incompatible with Christianity. Christianity cannot really accom- modate itself to these actual circumstances. It 1s too alien to the whole course of our life. It is poetic, our life is prosaic. It comes from another world, while we have to pass our lives in this. It directs our thoughts to another life, but we and all our powers belong to this. It stands in opposition to our natural feelings and thoughts. It is the denial of the human. It does not bring before us a real, whole, and proper man. Christ is at most ‘an angel riding upon an animal? Christianity is not human enough. How are we men to deal with it? We cannot make use of it. It cannot be the truth which we seek and need. And what answers shall we make to all this? We will first appeal to facts, we will invoke the testimony of history. Is it not a fact that Christianity has become Answer furnished by Christianity. 37 the chief and most fruitful of intellectual powers ? Even its opponents are obliged to allow this. They would not so violently oppose its truth if they were not forced to own the reality of its power and influence, and constrained to feel them at every step they take, whether in the province of external or of intellectual life. Christianity, then, is not merely a theory and a poem; it is an actual power, and indeed the greatest of powers. Do not the ages which have succeeded Christianity stand far above those which preceded it ? The age of humanity did not begin till after Chris- tianity. It must then be adapted to human nature. It has opened up new depths of feeling and intel- lect in every province of art and science ; it has brought forth hitherto unparalleled kindliness and tenderness of feeling in every relation of social life. It cannot, then, be a denial of the human, it must be the truth of human life. In fact the testimony of history is that Christianity is truth. But it is our desire to make this truth self-evident. What we are concerned to show is, that the fundamental truths of Christianity are the intuitive truths of the mind, and it is this which will constitute the subject of the fol- lowing lectures. Christianity, however, founds its whole system of truths upon. the existence of God. The first word of Christianity is God. The solution of the problems of existence is to be found in God. The truth which we need and seek is God,—the living, personal God. This is the truth which is the foun- dation of the Christian view of the world. LECTURE III. THE PERSONAL GOD. eee LLERE can be no higher subject of inquiry #/ than God. It determines every other ques- tion which can occupy our minds, and influences the whole course of our life. Everything depends upon the answer to the question, Is there a God, or not? Our view of the world, and the general tendency of our life, will be in accordance therewith. It must consequently be the foremost and uppermost of all questions, and its interest supreme. It 1s utterly incomprehensible how every other possible inquiry should engage the attention of the human mind, while this is passed by with indifference. For even the loftiest inquiries of art or science, the noblest exercises of the mind, the most dignified avocations to which man can devote his life,—what are all or any of these in comparison with this inquiry, this interest? How is it possible to be so engrossed with these that this supreme matter should be forgotten ? And if this is a question of the whole man, its answer must also come from the whole man. It is not only the power of thought and the faculty of Intuitive Conviction of the Existence of God. 39 perception which must decide upon it. These do not constitute the whole man. A deep, a moral decision is involved therein. Not the head alone, but also the heart and conscience must concur in this answer. For God is more sensible to the heart and conscience than to the understanding. If God is the funda- mental principle, certainty of His existence is not, in the first instance, the business of the reflecting powers, but was previously a matter of intuitive feeling. For fundamental principles rest upon intuitive convic- tion. And there is nothing of which man has so intuitive a conviction as he has of the existence of God. The denial of God is the denial of a conviction which we bear within our minds, and hence a mental error which should be impossible. The ingenious and sagacious natural philosopher Lichtenberg depicts this error in his well-known prediction, ‘This world of ours will become so refined that it will be as ridi- culous to believe in God, as it now is to believe in ghosts. And then,’ he continues, ‘the world will become still more refined ; then we shall believe only in ghosts. We shall ourselves become as God.’ (1) The Scripture says (Ps. xiv.), ‘The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God,’ An intuitive conviction of the existence of God dwells within the human mind. We can by no means free ourselves from the notion of a God. We cannot think of ourselves, we cannot think of the world, without involuntarily connecting therewith the idea 40 Intuitive Conviction of the Existence of God. of God. Our thoughts hasten past the visible and the finite towards a supreme, invisible, infinite Being, and cannot rest till they have attained their goal. We are obliged to think of God. Consciousness of God is as essential an element of our mind as con- sciousness of the world, or self-consciousness. The idea of God is a deep necessity of the mind. ‘When the mind rises, it throws the body upon its knees, says Lichtenberg. And Epictetus, the heathen moral philosopher, says, ‘If I were a nightingale, I would, by singing, fulfil the vocation of a nightingale ; if I were a swan, by singing, the vocation of a swan. But since I am a reasonable being, mine is to praise God. This is my calling. I will fulfil it’ (2) The highest thought of which man is capable is God, and this is a necessary thought. Does not, then, its inherent necessity force upon us the conclusion that its subject has an actual existence apart from our-— selves? Such an inference is indeed inevitable. To think of God means to be certain:of His existence. We cannot help thinking of God, and we cannot think of Him otherwise than as existing; it Is a necessity of our reason. Certainly this consciousness of God needs development ; but so also do all the intuitive truths and convictions which we bear within us. Even self-consciousness must needs be developed. But is it therefore acquired, or otherwise received from without? And this is also the case with the consci- ousness of God, which is, @ priori, a necessary com- ponent of our mental life. Its Unwersality. 41 For this reason too it is universal. ‘There is no people so wild and savage as not to have believed in a God, even if they have been unacquainted with his nature,’ says Cicero. (3) And though more than half a world has been discovered since his days, a reverence for God and a religion have everywhere been found. No people is without a conscious- ness of God. Atheists have had an interest in dis- covering a nation of atheists, but their efforts have been in vain. The negroes of Africa, the dark New Hollanders, the wild Indians of America, have all been acquainted with a higher being. Even where it was at first supposed that the opposite was the case, this supposition has been found to be the result of superficial observation. And even investigators more alien from Christianity (such as Waiz in his Anthropologie der Naturvolker, i. 322, etc.) acknow- ledge that, at least a belief in invisible, mysterious, spiritual powers exists where higher notions of Gods, properly so called, are absent. Certainly nations and tribes are capable of sinking to an almost animal savageness and stupidity of intellect. But this is a degenerate, and not a natural condition, and even then the notion of a God is not utterly obliterated. But that which is, as all agree, so general, cannot be false. This was long since Cicero’s well-known argument. (4) All error is at last self-destructive ; for the longer it lasts, the more is its antagonistic spirit to the very nature of things and the constitution of man developed. ‘Truth alone is of an enduring nature, 42 Atheism. because it is ever acquiring fresh strength and vigour from the very matter upon which it is founded. Since, then, we find a belief in the existence of God in all places and at all times, and see it not diminishing but increasing, we are constrained to say that ‘it would be a contradiction if this faith could not only maintain itself, but progressively flourish, unless founded on universally valid and overwhelming reasons.’ (5) This conviction of the existence of God may indeed be denied, even by those who cannot free themselves from it. But in this case a man persuades himself that that which he cannot help knowing, is the only thing he does not know. Atheism is not a necessity of the reason, but an act, and in fact an arbitrary act of the will. The reasons usually advanced in its favour serve only to conceal its real origin. And how seldom do they surpass the argument of the Hindoo, who disputed with a missionary the existence of God on the ground that he could not see Him! Whereupon the latter replied that neither could he, the missionary, see his opponent’s understanding. (6) A conviction of the existence of God dwells, indeed, in each of us, but we must on our part allow this con- viction to have fair play. It is not a knowledge founded on proofs which force the consent of the understanding, but a knowledge of inward persuasion to which the will bows. Belief in God is not a science, but a virtue. It certainly does not grow from, but precedes reflection. It is not the understanding which Proofs of the Existence of God. 43 convinces the heart, but the heart which convinces the understanding ; just as in moral truths, it is not the proofs of the reason which convince the conscience, but the conscience which convinces the reason. The conviction that there is a God dwells first in our heart, and hence also in the thoughts of our reason. ‘It has pleased God,’ says Pascal, ‘that divine verities should not enter the heart through the understanding, but the understanding through the heart. For human things must be known to be loved, but divine things must be loved to be known.’ And Lichtenberg thinks it questionable ‘whether mere reason, without the heart, ever lighted upon God; it is after the heart perceives Him that the reason also seeks Him. It everywhere seeks for Him, and for traces of Him in nature, in history, in the mind itself” (7) It is the most exalted employment of man’s mind, and the chief proof of its dignity, to follow up these traces of divinity, that the understanding may attain that cer- tainty which the heart already intuitively possesses,— a certainty entirely independent of that which the thoughts demand,—a certainty not derived from, but rather communicated to, the mind. Proofs of the existence of God have at all times been brought forward. They abound even in the pre- Christian philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Christian theology and speculation have but adopted and extended them. They are not intended to prove to us that with which we are not yet acquainted, but to justify our intuitive conviction to our reasoning 44 Proofs of the Hwistence of God from Nature. faculties, by directing us to the traces, scattered on all sides, of that God whom we already perceive and know in our hearts. All Nature around us proves the existence of God. ‘The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firma- ment showeth His handy-work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard.’ (Ps. xix.) This thought runs through the whole Bible, and finds an echo in our hearts. The sight of nature involuntarily arouses within us the feeling of the infinite. Claudius, in his Chria, puts into the mouth of one of the illuminati the words, ‘Whether there be a God, and what he may be, philosophy alone can teach, and without philosophy there can be no thought of God’ ‘Good,’ says the master. ‘Yet no man can say of me with a shadow of truth that I am a philosopher; but I never go through the forest without thinking who makes the flowers grow, and then a faint and distant notion of a great unknown One comes over me, and so rever- ently, yet so joyfully, does my heart thrill, that I could wager that I am then thinking of God. (8) Everything around us breathes of God. ‘In Him we live and move and have our being.’ ‘Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from Thy presence?’ As the invisible soul creates a visible expression on the countenance of a man, so does nature—which is, as it were, the countenance of God—betray the hidden spirit which dwells within it. (9) Unless, however, we Proof of God’s Existence. 45 bring with us the notion of God, we shall find nature but dumb. Nature is like a written document con- taining only consonants. It is we who must ourselves furnish the vowels which shall enable us to decipher it. But, on the other hand, the tones within our hearts need also the aid of nature’s kindred tones to become articulate speech. Certainly nature alone cannot re- veal God. He is hidden behind that law of necessity by which nature is governed. (10) Nature conceals as well as manifests God. She is a veil, but a trans- parent one. All things conceal a mystery which they tempt us to uncover, and the ultimate mystery is God. But to be found, He must be sought; to be sought, He must be known; to be known, He must be loved. They who have no wish to know Him, do not find Him in nature, which, on the contrary, rather furnishes them with occasions of scepticism. ‘As all things speak of God to those who know Hin, and discover Him to those who love Him, so do they also conceal Him from those who are ignorant of Him.’ (11) | But chiefly does the very existence of the world pro- claim and prove that there isa God. There is a world. By what cause does it exist? By itself? They who know of nothing higher than, and beyond the world, make it its own creator. But how can it be its own creator? Where is its creative force? Every force we discover is a finite force: no single force, then, is creative. Is it the sum total of forces? No accumu- lation of the finite can produce the Infinite. Each 46 Proof of God’s Haistence force is limited by other forces. No accumulation of limited forces can produce one which is only a limiting and not a limited one. All the causes which we see in action are second causes ; no single one is the ultimate, the supreme, the originating cause. No accumulation of mediate causes can produce the absolute cause. Hence we must seek the one supreme force, the great First Cause, through whom this world of finite things and forces exists, beyond all finite things, forces, and causes. All things which surround us point from and beyond themselves ; each is but a finger-post directing us onward past nature to the supernatural. And this supernatural which we seek beyond the world, to which the world directs us, what is it but God, the personal God, the personal power of the world? (12) ‘I asked the earth, says Augustine, in a splendid passage of his Confessions (x. 6); ‘it said, I am not He; and all that therein is, made the same acknowledgment. I asked the sea and the depths, and all that move and live therein, and they answered, We are not thy God, seek higher. I asked the winds, but the air, with all its inhabitants, answered, I am not thy God. I asked the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars, and they an- swered, Neither are we the God whom thou seekest. And I said to all things that surround me, Ye have told me concerning my God that ye are not He; speak then to me of Him. And they all cried with loud voices, He made us.’ Yes, all things have a language which we can understand, and that language utters their testimony to God the Creator. From the Existence of the World. 47 The proof of the existence of God, derived from the existence of the world, has been expressed by various formulx,—e.g. the world, as the ageregate of things incidental, demands one supreme essence, bearing within itself the cause of its own existence (Leibnitz) ; or that which exists incidentally, demands as its cause that which exists necessarily (Wolf). Again, vital motion requires an immovable One as the ultimate cause of motion, from whom proceeded that impulse which caused all the activity of life; ‘for how should any- thing be moved if no moving force had previously existed?” So argued Aristotle in his Metaphysics, iv. 6, and Newton when treating of the law of gravitation. Life actually existing points backward to an eternal life before itself. Organic life had a beginning upon earth, and hence requires One who produced this be- ginning. Once more, the duality of the world, as consisting of matter and spirit, demands a God. For matter and spirit being essentially unlike, and each the opposite to and limitation of the other, each is con- sequently finite, and neither could have originated the other. Material nature cannot bring forth personal spirit, nor can the spirit of man produce material nature. It is folly to suppose consciousness to have originated from matter; it is madness to suppose the material world to have been formed by the mind of man. (13) In short, the existence of the world demands the existence of God. Again, what kind of a life would that be which should be swallowed up in this flood of finitude ? 48 Proof of God’s Existence There must be an eternal life beyond the changes of time, beyond the current of events,—an eternal Being, the cause and origin of all things. Our heart as well as our reason demands an ultimate, supreme, eternal One,—God. Nor is the world’s adaptation to its purposes a less striking evidence of God, than its existence. Even the ancient world delighted to contemplate and describe God as the designer and arranger of the world, and the artist of the Cosmos. (14) “And certainly the world is a Cosmos, a harmonious whole, a wondrous edifice of truly congruous parts, in which the least is connected with the greatest, the greatest with the least, the most remote is a necessary part of the whole, and each must serve another with admirable reciprocity. No- thing is superfluous, nothing injudicious. It is, in- deed, possible to degrade this argument of purpose by carrying it out to trifles; and this has been done to a degree which provoked the well-known sarcastic reply, that according to this view God caused the cork- tree to grow in Africa, on purpose that we might make our stoppers from it. But neither the abuse of this argument nor the sarcasm it has provoked, can make us mistake the direct evidence of this harmony and mutual relation of the whole and its component parts ; and the more deeply the mind of man penetrates into the design manifest in creation, the more perfectly his ear is attuned to perceive the harmony of the whole, the more grandly will that full majestic chorus of the universe, forme1 by the infinite multitude of yoices From Adaptation of the World to its Purpose. 49 belonging to the things of heaven and earth, burst upon his senses. Whence did this harmony originate? If we say from chance, what is this but an attempt to explain a fact by an unmeaning word? Chance can sport with things, and bring about strange coincidences ; but it is devoid of reason, and cannot produce that mutual de- pendence which is the work of reason, and which shows that an objective reason, an unmistakeable intelligence, governs all things. (15) Nor is it possible to substitute the laws and forces of nature for God. Natural force is a power, which, working blindly, produces an effect; but it is not an intelligence, which, acting freely, arranges a mutual connection. Natural law is the rule which determines the course of things, but not the wisdom which appoints their end and order. It is impossible to suppose an unconscious intelligence, for that is a contradiction in terms; or to speak of unconscious ideas, for ideas require the conscious and reasoning principle which produces them. (16) ° If one shipwrecked upon a desert island were to find a geometrical figure traced upon the sand, would he not thence infer the existence of a human inhabi- tant, and feel his heart filled with joy and thank- fulness to God for the fact?(17) But the world is more than a geometrical figure; and should not our souls be filled with joy and gratitude that we can so plainly see a higher and divine intelligence pre- siding over it? To deny this intelligence is not D 50 Proof of God’s Existence from History. merely an error of the understanding, it is a fault of the heart. Even the pre-Christian world could perceive the presence of design in nature; but it is the privilege of Christian times to recognise the divine government in history, and to follow its traces with increasing admiration and joyful elevation of heart. For it is Christianity, for the most part, which, by means of the notions of the unity of the human race and the unity of God, first attained to the idea of a united, connected, and progressive history of mankind. This idea was an unknown one to the pre-Christian world ; it has become a current one with us, and it is a notion very kindred to the genius of the western mind, and furnishes, moreover, one of the sublimest of subjects of human contemplation. What is more intricate, multiform, and anomalous than the history of the different nations of the earth? At the first glance it seems an inextricable coil of men and actions. At the next it appears a continual repetition, a rising and falling of nations, a flourishing and decaying of states, a constant recurrence of the same events under different forms. But on closer observation history becomes a wondrous tissue of all the variegated threads,—a tissue ever lengthening, and continually advancing according to fixed moral laws. Justice controls it; moral government presides over the whole, as it advances step by step to an appointed end. It is in the writings of the Apostle Paul pre-eminently, that we find the first traces of this universal view Proof of God’s Existence from an Idea of God. 51 of the history of mankind. But it’ does not need a large amount of Christianity to appropriate and carry it out. Even a Lessing could understand and teach that history is to be regarded as the education of the human race; while more than one of our great historians have recognised Jesus of Nazareth as that great turning-point in time, in which all former lines meet, from which all subse- quent lines proceed, as the key to the enigma of the world’s history. In fact, whatever we may think of Jesus Christ, we cannot deny Him this position in history. And even philosophers who have acknow- ledged no personal God, such as Fichte, and that decided non-Christian Strauss, maintain a moral government of the world. (1s) But this is only another word for God. For an unconscious govern- ment, according to moral laws, is simply impossible. We need not, however, plunge into the sea of history, and follow out its enigmas, to find out God; every individual may find His leading, governing, providing hand in the events of his own Kfe, if he does not wilfully close his eyes, if he will but believe what he sees. As we find God in the world, in its existence, its design, its history, so do we find Him m our own soul. We find the idea of God within us, as we also find within us other ultimate truths. We did not produce in our own minds the ideas of the Good, the True, the Beautiful, etc.; we simply think them. They are not our work, but the work of truth itself. 52 Proof of God’s Existence from an Idea of God. Objective reason produces them. It is this that is reflected in our mind, this whose divine light is broken into various colours by passing through the medium of our understanding. But what is objective truth, and where is it? The highest idea we have is the idea of God. In it are comprised all other ideas. It is the truth of truths. It was not ourselves who produced it, but objective reason produced this idea in our reason. We think of God simply because He exists. God himself is the author of our idea of God. The fact of our intuitive idea of God is the proof of His existence. Such was the argument of Cartesius, and we cannot but agree with him. Nor is the nature of the fact less a proof than the fact itself. For our thoughts are occupied, not with a mere idea, but with an actual God. We can think of Him no otherwise. It is a necessity to our reason to think of Him thus. Not to think of Him as a reality, is equivalent to not thinking of Him at all. Hence, from our own thinking of God, we neces- sarily infer His existence. Such is the famous onto- logical proof of Anselm. (19) Kant, indeed, objected that there is no inference from thought to existence, no bridge out of the world of thought into that of reality, and argued that as little as the idea of a hundred crowns could prove their existence, or include their possession, so little could the idea of God prove His existence. But we must distinguish between mere arbitrary notions or imaginations, and such ideas as are a necessity Proof of God’s Existence from that of Conscience. 53 to the reason. Necessary ideas are the expression of a reality. If there were really no bridge between such thought and existence, our thought in general would be utterly unconnected with things existent, and there could be no such thing as objective truth and certainty for the mind. If this necessary thought deceives us, all our thoughts deceive us, and our mind may as well rest from its efforts, for all its thinking is vain. But, God be praised, this is not the fact. There is a connection between necessary ideas, thoughts necessary to the reason, and real existence. For the very thing we think of is existence, and it is reality with which the thoughts of our reason are occupied. Kant decried this inference, but has at least admitted and even proved another,—viz. the inference from the moral consciousness. God is a postulate of the moral sense, a demand of the conscience. There is nothing we feel more certain of than con- science. To deny it, is to overthrow the foundation of all certainty, and to annihilate therewith the whole moral constitution of the world, which rests upon it. T’o explain conscience as the result of the training of the mind, is both a foolish and a vain endeavour. It may err, and has often erred. But does it follow that it is generally an error and a deception? The most sublime truths are just those that are most liable to abuse. It needs development; but does it follow that it is acquired and not original? Does not the mind in general need development? But is it thence to be inferred that it does not exist? If we should attempt 54 Proof of God’s Existence to deny it, the fact of its existence would contradict us. And so if we should attempt to deny conscience, the fact of its existence would contradict us. No man can deny conscience: with a good conscience. Kven while we are trying to deny it, it makes itself felt by its inward reproofs; and we cannot deny it without belying ourselves. Conscience is assuredly a fact. But conscience is also an authority. All bow before its power. We may despise its commands, but we must listen to its reproving voice. We may harden ourselves against its reproofs, but we cannot succeed in annihilating them. Conscience is independent of the will. It is not at our disposal. We do not com- mand it, but it commands us. We do not correct and direct it, but it corrects and chastises us. We are not over but under it. It is not under our power, but has power over us. It follows that it is no descendant of our will or our reason. Jt is no product of our own mind. It is the product of a moral spirit above and beyond ourselves, whose voice speaks to us through the conscience. Conscience is the supreme and ultimate court of appeal, the highest moral criterion in all cases. Hence it is the product of the supreme mind of the Supreme Lawgiver, of the absolute moral will. The fact of its existence proves that of God. The office of conscience is also a testimony to God ; for it is part of its office to testify of the moral law as the will of God, and to bring our will into union with the will of God. Hence even Cicero says, ‘It was always the persuasion of all truly wise men, that the ~ From that of Conscience. 55 moral law was not devised by men or introduced by nations, but an eternal law, according to which the whole world must be ruled. Its ultimate basis is God, who commands and forbids. And this law is as old as the mind of God himself. Hence the law upon which all obligation is founded is truly and pre-eminently the mind of the Supreme Divinity.’ (20) Kant proves the existence of God from the necessity of a reconciliation, and therefore of a supreme recon- ciling power, between virtue and fortune, duty and inclination, which are so often found in opposition to each other. Some find in this argument a low view of morality, and maintain that it is a higher moral stand- point to follow virtue for its own sake, and neither to expect nor wish for any special reward. (21) But the truth upon which Kant’s reasoning is founded, is the idea of justice. ‘There is such a thing as justice, and therefore there is also retribution,—unless, indeed, we consider it a proof of supreme wisdom— ‘Ohne Wahl vertheilt, die Gaben Ohne Billigkeit, das Gluck.’ But this is impossible. Our deepest moral conscious- ness revolts at the thought. The highest state of existence is that in which the inward truth and the outward reality are in harmony with each other. This earthly existence is full of contradictions between truth. and reality. We cannot but require that these contra- dictions, which often so painfully stir our moral con- sciousness, should find a solution in some state of 56 Result. harmonious moral existence. It is a hope and a faith of which we cannot divest ourselves. Hence by all these different paths we arrive at God, and are constrained to own that our whole being de- mands God as the truth and object of our existence. In no earthly circumstances can we find either rest or full satisfaction, for God is our rest. In no set of notions can we bid our minds to repose, for the idea of God can alone satisfy our reasoning mind. We are unable to set before our moral efforts any end which can satisfy our will, for communion with God can alone allay the cravings of our moral nature. (rod is the truth and object of our whole existence, and no less so of all existence external to ourselves. In all exist- ence external to ourselves we see an image of God,—a mirror in which His one essence is parted and divided into various rays, which all direct us to their original. In all the relations of this life we see foundations laid for a relation still higher; and even the very highest forms of human existence point to a Supreme One far above themselves. ‘They would serve us as steps to mount up above themselves towards God. God is the truth and object of universal being. Our earthly life does not attain either its true purpose or highest consecration till we perceive God’s presence, and re- cognise God’s image therein. Whatever may be our worldly possessions, this and this only is, strictly speak- ing, our own. Hence to deny God is not only to act in direct contrariety to our reason,—for our reason de- mands Grod,—but to plunge ourselves into the extremity The Nature of God. 57 of poverty ; for it makes the whole world dead, cold, and empty, and deprives all that is around us of its soul and its truth. In short, God exists because His exist- ence is necessary, because without Him nothing else could exist, and because, even if anything did exist without Him, it would be without value and without reality. Our deepest conviction is, that there is a God. This direct consciousness is implanted in every mind. It is a universal fact—a fact pertaining to the human race as such. It is quite true that it is Christianity which has restored to man the consciousness of this component part of his mind. Consciousness of God was like a choked up well, which Christianity dug out afresh. But it did but dig out what already existed. It did, as it were, call to remembrance a great but forgotten or misunderstood truth of the mind. It was in this sense that Paul preached before the Areopagus (Acts xvii. 23), the unknown God whom the Athenians had ignorantly worshipped; whom, in their inmost hearts, they were unconsciously seeking and intending, and whom the whole heathen world still unconsciously seeks and intends. It was in this sense that the apologists of the first centuries reminded the heathen of their direct consciousness of God, and convicted them of an unconscious faith in Him, breaking out under the influence of inward emotion into invocations and appeals. ‘Oh, human soul,’ exclaims Tertullian, ‘who art by nature a Christian !’ | It is then certain that God exists. But what is God? 58 The Nature of God. Who can describe Him? God is ‘a boundless, fathomless ocean’—who can comprise His infinity in words? God is a mystery—who can express His secret nature? But God manifests himself to man’s consciousness, so that he has at least presentient acquaintance with the hidden Divinity, and has re- vealed His very nature in Christ Jesus, so that in Him we may, as it were, look into His heart, and know what He is to ourselves. God is the power of all being; for He is the eternal lite, self-originating, and self-sufficing. He is His own eternal act; hence, also, the origin and end of all created things, and the Lord of the world ruling in all and over all. God is the Holy One, who is perfectly self-consistent. He is unobscured hight and perfect goodness; hence, also, the origin of all moral order, the Creator of our moral convictions, and the only good which can satisfy our moral being. Finally, God is Love, who has eternally purposed that we should be His own, and should find in Him peace for our souls. Creation teaches us God’s power, our own conscience testifies to His holiness, but His love was first shown in its fulness in Jesus Christ. The heathen world had a prescience of the power of God, the faintest notion of His holiness, but no idea of His love. We owe the knowledge of His love entirely to Christianity. And yet this is the knowledge which we most need; for so long as we are acquainted merely with the power and holiness of God, the abyss which separates Him from us remains. His power shows us Pantheism. 59 our impotence, His holiness our sin. And the self- knowledge we thus obtain, keeps us at a distance from God; it humbles us, indeed, before Him, but still keeps us at a distance. ‘In Christ we have a God whom we approach without pride, and before whom we humble ourselves without despair, says Pascal. And again: ‘The knowledge of God without that of our misery makes us proud; the knowledge of our misery without the knowledge of God leads us to despair; the knowledge of Christ combines both, for in Him we find both God and our own misery,’ (22) because we find the love which has reunited us to God. This is that knowledge which revelation teaches us, and our heart and conscience say, Yea and amen. But Pantheism says, No. Pantheism denies the God of Christianity, and sets up something else in His place. The pantheistic question is, indeed, a philosophic one, and it is not the intention of these lectures to pursue philosophical inquiries. But it is also a ques- tion of supreme practical importance, and cannot as such be entirely passed. I shall therefore discuss it as simply and as briefly as possible. (23) The forms of Pantheism are various, yet it has but a single fundamental notion; and this fundamental notion from which all these forms proceed is, that there is at the root of the infinite variety of this world, and its individual phenomena, a common principle which constitutes its unity, and that this common principle is God. But this is no conscious, personal God ; it is 60 Pantheism. but the common life which animates all that lives, the common existence being which is in all that exists, or the reason in all things. We only call it God. This God has no independent being, he exists only in the world; the world is his reality, and he is its truth. This Pantheism existed in pre-Christian times. It is the foundation on which were raised the religions of heathenism, the religions of a fanatic sensibility for nature ; it produced the dreamy and imaginative views of the Indian philosophy; it founded also a philo- sophic school—that of the Eleates—in Greece, but the great philosophers, Aristotle and Plato, taught a per- sonal God. Spinoza was its most influential advocate in the Christian world. And after it had seemed for a long time buried in oblivion, Lessing recalled attention to it in his since well-known Discourse with Jacobi. (24) It was then revived by Schelling, and carried out by Hegel, since which time it has frequently, and indeed far oftener than is known or suspected, formed a part of and entered into generally entertained opinions. ‘The foundation of all that exists, taught Spinoza, ‘is the one eternal substance which makes its actual appearance in the double world of thought, and of matter existing in space. Individual forms emerge from the womb of this substance, as of ever-fertile nature, to be again swallowed up in the stream of life. As the waves of the sea rise and sink, so does indivi- dual life arise, to sink back again into that common life which is the death of all individual existence.’ Pantheism.. 61 ‘Eternal absolute being,’ said Schelling in his earlier days, ‘is continually separating into the double world of mind and nature. It is one and the same life which runs through all nature, and empties itself into man. It is one and the same life which moves in the tree and the forest, in the sea and the crystal, which works and creates in the mighty forces and powers of natural life, and which, enclosed in a human body, produces the thoughts of the mind.’ (25) ‘The absolute,’ says Hegel, ‘is the universal reason, which, having first plunged into nature, and becoming there lost, as it were, to itself, is then found in man as self-conscious mind, in which the absolute, at the close of its great process, comes again to itself, and comprises itself into unity with itself. This process of mind is God. Man’s thought of God is the existence of God. God has no independent being or existence ; He exists only in us. God does not know of himself ; it is we who know of Him. While man thinks of and knows God, God knows and thinks of himself and exists. God is the truth of man, and man is-the reality of God.’ Consequently man becomes God. It cannot be denied that Pantheism is founded upon a great idea, an exalted sentiment; and that this idea, this senti- ment, 1s moreover a true one,—viz. that there is a unity in existence, a connection between our life and the universal life around us. The life of nature awakens within us sympathetic feelings, and calls forth a cor- responding disposition, which is itself a testimony to the 62 Its Practical Results. relationship existing between the mind and nature. It is its own laws which the mind recognises in the world of nature and of mind, and we find therein an objec- tive reason homogeneous with our subjective reason. But is this collective life which surrounds us, and the province of that objective spirit which is reflected in our spirit, the ultimate, the supreme, the very God ? It is the error of Pantheism that its thought and feel- ing are fixed upon and limited by this middle ground, instead of piercing through it to the great First Cause of all things, to the absolute reason, to God. Lhe refutation of Pantheism is to be found, first of all, in its practical results. Pantheism annihilates religion. For its God is not a personal God with whom I can hold a personal relation, whom I can love, in whom I can trust, to whom I can pray, whom I may approach and address as my Friend, but only the power of necessity beneath which I must bow, the universal life in which I may lose myself. Pantheism abolishes the very postulates of morality ; for all the distinctions of good and evil are but different manifestations of one absolute prin- ciple. Consequently they cease to be actual moral contrasts. What we call evil is fundamentally as necessary as what we call good; how then can we condemn what is necessary ? (26) Pantheism destroys hope. For as the flower fades in autumn never to blossom again, so is man swallowed up in the stream of existence, to be found no more; all is over with him. (27) The flower may be placed in the herbarium, It is opposed to Reason. 63 and aman live in the remembrance of posterity; but all is over with him. (@s) It is but your egotism, re- plies the pantheist, that makes you unwilling to come utterly to an end; yet, since it is God himself who has placed this ‘egotism’ in our hearts, it cannot but be truth. These results are themselves a sufficient refutation of Pantheism. But it may be objected that this is a clumsy refutation; since we should not judge by results, but by the thing itself. ‘Truly it 1s the thing itself which is seen in its results; but let us lose sight of them, and prove that Pantheism is its own refutation. For it is the triple contradiction of reason, of conscience, and the heart. | It contradicts reason, for it speaks of God and yet denies Him. The God of Pantheism is the Infinite One, but this Infinite One has actual existence only in that which is finite, which is equivalent to say- ing that there is actually no Infinite Being. For how can the infinite be identical with the finite? If the finite is its reality, it is not its own essential reality, and hence not infinite. Thus Pantheism, at the same time, both admits and denies the infinite. And again, how should the finite be identical with the infinite? We are told that by dying its finity is annulled, but only to give place to something also finite. Hence, we never get beyond things finite into the world of the infinite. The infinite is nowhere to be met with. The God of Pantheism is the general, continually changing into the particular and the indi- 64 It is opposed to Reason. vidual. By what law? Spinoza answers, ‘By a divine necessity. But what a saying is this! The general substance does not independently produce particular forms. For this general substance acts according to the law of necessity, but individual forms depend at the same time upon the law of freedom; hence these two opposites must be combined to account for what actually exists. (29) The God of Pantheism is either nature producing mind, or mind producing nature. Nature, however, is unconscious, mind con- scious; how, then, can that which is itself uncon- scious produce that which is conscious? It is an old rule of logic that the effect can contain nothing which did not pre-exist in the cause. Now, con- sciousness is absolutely new, and opposed to uncon- sciousness ; how, then, should the latter be the cause of the former? According to Hegel, the God of Pan- theism is absolute conception. Because man knows and thinks of the absolute, 7.e. God, God knows and thinks of himself. But how can my consciousness of God be God’s self-consciousness? And if man’s consciousness of God is not a reality corresponding to the absolute, while the latter is nevertheless, as Hegel requires, subject, it must have a higher reality than is found in the human mind, must be a higher subject than the human subject,—a super- mundane subject, a superhuman consciousness, a self-conscious, personal God, above all mundane ex- istence. A trace of personality runs through the whole world. From the very lowest grades of exist- = ONS ee lt is opposed to Conscience. 65 ence upwards, life struggles to attain personality, and becomes personality in man. Whence, then, this trace of personality in all life, if it is not a universal law 2 and whence this law, if the principle of the world is an impersonal one? The whole human race combines into the single organism of the kingdom of God, which, in its turn, seeks its personality, that thereby it may attain its climax in the absolute personality, in God, the crown and summit of every created object. (80) Reason, then, demands the personality of the absolute, and Pantheism is in opposition to reason. Nor is this system less in opposition to conscience. Our conscience demands the supremacy of moral law, and the supremacy of moral law demands a personal God. For He alone can be the supreme lawgiver, He alone the supreme judge. There is a universal conviction that the moral law must rest upon a more than human, that is, upon the supreme and divine, authority. Civil law, indeed, may be the product of the human will, of a changeable will. But the moral law is eternal, and has an eternal origin, a superhuman Author. It is upon this alone that its inviolable autho- rity depends. God alone can be the supreme law- giver; He alone can be the supreme judge. We re- quire a supreme justice, which, unlike human justice, cannot err, which the guilty cannot elude. There must be an ultimate court of appeal to which the guiltless may resort, from which the guilty cannot escape. Is it said, Conscience is the lawgiver and judge: we adduce, in reply, those cases where con- E 66 Lt is opposed to the Demands of the Heart. science is neither the one nor the other. It may be obscured, weakened, stunted, mutilated; it may be silent, or we may decide in opposition to its dictates. Where, then, is the justice which is the fundamental law of human life? Grant that it is nothing but conscience, it must then be an infallible, inexorable, unavoidable conscience,—that is to say, an absolute conscience—God, the supreme conscience of the world. Our conscience demands a God, but our heart demands Him no less. We are made for devotion, faith, love, hope, happiness. Can the world be the object of our faith and love? The world is ever transitory and changeable; how are we to find peace therein? Faith and love are personal relations; we were made, then, for personal relations. Is man to be the supreme object of our love? The sister of Pascal tells us of a paper which her brother always carried about with him, upon which was written the words, ‘It is wrong that any one should have an attachment to me, however voluntary; I could but disappoint those in whom I should call forth such a feeling, for I am no one’s aim, and am able to satisfy no one. Am I not about to die? And then even the object of attachment would be dead’ And in the Pensées he thus expresses himself: ‘It is false to say that we deserve the love of others, and it is unjust to desire it. (31) Certainly the power of loving each other is the best and highest attribute of human beings, but this best and highest attribute is but prophetic of something still better and higher. And It is opposed to the Demands of the Heart. 67 where love is real, what we love in man is more than man. ‘That which Heloise loved in Abelard, which cultivated and embellished her mind, and taught it to soar aloft, was not Abelard, but something more than Abelard. All earthly love points beyond itself. So exalted a being is man, that the love of God is alone worthy of him, and can alone satisfy his heart. But love to God demands a personal God. If we do away with the personality of God, we do away with all that is best and noblest in human nature, with faith, love, and hope; and we get in exchange resignation,—not meek and patient submission to the will of God, but that mute, cold resignation which submits because it must, which bows not to love but to power, which, with closed eyes, plunges into eternal death, to the extinction of our best attribute, our personal being. Pantheism annihilates human personality, by annihi- lating the personality of God. Its God, being himself no real and essential life, is not the God of the living, but of the dead. (32) In short, Pantheism is in absolute opposition to our inmost nature, our inmost truth, our inmost craving ; it is a contradiction of our reason, our conscience, and our heart. He who admits there is such a being as man, is constrained to admit that there is a God; and he who admits that there is a God, is constrained to acknowledge the personal God. He who says, I am, must also say, O. God, Thou art; and the entire direc- tion of the thoughts will be dictated by this admission. LECTURE IV. THE CREATION OF THE WORLD. fone) LE view we entertain of God will determine B&Q We our view of the world. If God is a living and personal God, then the world was made by Him, and creation was a free act of His power, wisdom, and love. Such is the founda- tion of the Christian view of the world. As soon, how- ever, as we enter upon this subject, we are met by the objections raised by physical science and a naturalistic view of the world, against the religious, and especially against the biblical view. These have given rise to a series of inquiries and doubts, which have occupied, and often inordinately disquieted, the minds of many. The conflict between the physical sciences and the religious view of the world is a product of modern times. It stands connected with the great advances lately made in physics, chemistry, astronomy, and geology. Since the disclosure of hitherto unknown worlds, the resolution of distant nebulze into systems of stars by the telescopes of Herschel and Rosse, and the discoveries made in the world of infusoria by Ehren- berg, who found, for example, that a single cubic inch Conflict between Science and Religion. 69 of tripoli contained as many as forty-one thousand million of the siliceous fossil shells of these creatures, —new notions have been entertained of this visible world, and a consciousness of higher powers has, as may easily be conceived, taken possession of the human mind, which now believes that neither space nor time are any longer closed against it. The knowledge thus obtained has begun to be formed into a naturalistic view of the world, which is imposing in its appeal to facts, and its claim to tangible evidence ; for that which is tangible naturally makes a great impression upon the mind. On the other hand, religious faith is not wont to limit its influence to one province of the intellectual life; it would leaven every thought of the mind, and bring all into harmony with itself. Now, it is contrary to the very nature of the mind to tolerate within itself views diametrically opposed to each other. Hence a schism has frequently arisen in modern intellectual life, and a consequent uncomfort- able feeling of hesitation and uncertainty, whether or what concessions should be made, to restore, if pos- sible, the lost harmony of the world of mind. Even Schleiermacher feared the results of scientific dis- covery, not merely for the sake of theology, but for Christianity in general. ‘I fear, writes he to Liicke in 1829 (Theol. Studien und Kritiken ti. 489), ‘that we shall have to learn to do without much, which many are accustomed to regard as indissolubly united with Christianity. I do not speak of the six days’ work, but of the notion of creation : how long will it be able 70 Conflict between Physical Science and the to hold out against a view of the world founded on scientific conclusions, which no one can escape ?’ ‘And our New Testament miracles, for I speak not in the first instance of those of the Old: how long will it be before they fall again, but this time before far more dignified and well-founded premises than formerly, in the days of the inflated Encyclopzdists ? What is to be done then, my friend? I shall not live to see those days, but may lay myself down to my last sleep in peace. But what do you and your contem- _poraries intend to do? Will you entrench yourselves behind these outworks, and let yourselves be blockaded and shut out from science? The bombardment of derision would do you little harm. But the blockade! The starving out by science, which, because you thus entrench yourselve$, will be forced by you to raise the standard of unbelief!. Is it thus that the knot of history is to be severed, and Christianity to be allied with ignorance, science with unbelief?’ Schleier- macher has gone to his rest, and so has Liicke, to whom he thus wrote; but we are here, and have the work to do which they left undone. What are we then to say? Is the danger really as great as he described it, and as many now seem to think ? When the: Israelites had reached the borders of the promised land, they sent spies before them to obtain information concerning the country and its inhabitants, and to bring them back an account thereof. These returned dispirited, and discouraged the hearts of the rest by their report. Two only, Caleb and Joshua, Religious View of the World. a retained their courage, and exhorted them to advance, trusting in God and their cause. And, in his own time, God acknowledged the courageous, and put the timid to shame. Thus, too, did Schleiermacher make a short excursion into the territory of science, and bring back with him a dispirited heart. Are we therefore to allow ourselves to be discouraged? Things have not, I think, come to such a pass. There has scarcely been a strife in the world, but it has arisen from the removal of boundaries, and many a complication might be arranged merely by a. strict maintenance of boundaries (schiedlich friedlich). The first and most necessary concern then is, strictly to mark out and maintain the boundary line between the two provinces in question. The main thing will then have been gained. Religion and theology deal with truths, concerning which science knows nothing, and which she has therefore no right to deny; while, on the other hand, science deals with a circle of knowledge with which religion has nothing to do, and to which theology has nothing to reply. And even when the two are dealing with the same subject, it is with two entirely different sides of it. Religion tells us that God gives us our daily bread; science teaches us how the corn grows from the earth. Why should any one say that because the one takes place, the other does not? Re- ligion and science have both their rights, but each within its own domain.