oa Te a a eed eis sealed) Sea ‘> in a — Hoa Bie Siva es Hinting Maal ofthat nea een, Oe aera Si Pata : naps ath a teal N Bical ee teattmtnl eM wnat de Witt React PVA SP Wal Sinn Hiei Realla Reet wih eit, Then Soni end death ill SA : " Gm Dt wt ald wa 8 sain wh BERS Fin Pinata EP aA oA) ae Pretty et nt ha Meibin Re es thar Rice ae Po a = Me Degg DAT Zs See = Tato Fs ne SIE Scotts, re Fag Lan eR aig er ; eee. PEN en on Tae TS cotenta tein MeN sted finn St ited, Se Pelle meres mrenba setimnied ied é a SE No wisn Heit ; 4 : Mis ". VosRcah Matas atest iui eS 7 i 3 * ts : 3 . Saath ce eH inten tes te aa ee eae fpr Nae grinet codiinsaciag a eae Fae a ee wn ann a mate tear Mh pty Tai Pali Pieurtiaaeheseire > aieieane rfc a RePo 32 - Sena Pieatentn Deion an ate Bact a ta teh Fiat Bec tim neahc wn RE Sim neg! eminem anise nS aim Ballast aati Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https://archive.org/details/knowledgeofdivinOOelli_ 0 eee can = pe, A “d f Li $* as 1) \ i , i a Ty, j j Bel or ie , an dN eae \ Cees ni teal cei ae hi hae is : ie AD'S bay aaa ane butt an THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM REY bel ASE OEN; ss NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE; WITH AN INQUIRY WHENCE COMETH WISDOM AND UNDERSTANDING TO MAN?" BY THE LATE JOHN ELLIS, D.D. VICAR OF ST. CATHERINE’S, DUBLIN. Adyov 5& Kal moAby Kal Kaddy EXES TOTE Bey ore ae Ocay Hy uvOpw- mos Siavdnmata mpeTa, ws 7 nae duo 7” eyryvovTo, Kal dias perexepiCovTo mpaters, my KaT& vody Tots cwppdar A€yer Oa, uot piAws.—PLATO. A NEW’ EDITION. LONDON: PRINTED FOR THOMAS TEGG AND SON, 73, CHEAPSIDE ; R. GRIFFIN AND CO., GLASGOW; tT. T. AND H. TEGG, DUBLIN ; AND J. WHETHAM, PHILADELPHIA. 1837. LONDON: G. BALNE, PRINTER, GRACECHURCH STREET. & % CON TEN Ts. CHAPTER lI. . The Inquiry stated, and Objections answered. is Page Divine Things what, and the different methods of knowing them : é ; : ; ; : .) Apia Only to be known from revelation : : : «2's _.’ |. That this may disturb the peace of religion 3 * That this account of things has been approved by most emi- nent persons . : : : wien eds . : © That to seek for truth with meekness, will never prejudice , religion . : : : : : : . : ~ That this procedure is consonant to the ideas of God That it best agrees with the intent and end of all religion, ) as giving a better system of the Divine Nature and of | duty, than mere reason ever did, for the manifold de- | » fects of which the maintainers of natural religion are forced to make large apologies : : : : That it weakens the arguments which have been success- fully urged against infidelity : ; : : (These very arguments were drawn from revelation . : To make reason the measure of truth is to pervert the order of things . : : ; : Sip i st af, | Moderns have most unreasonably exalted reason : Ws | / Infidelity hath joined issue with, and triumphed over them 9 Philosophy mixed with religion always debasesit . - 9 We may admire reason, but must adore revelation 6) 10 _’ Man perfect in his kind, but not omniscient ; AO ‘© Ancients always baffled in the discovery of truth - aa _ Which ought to make us distrust reason Sag \ { ' (7 Plutarch and Cicero confess the impossibility of reason to : pol find out truth. 5 : ¥ : A way 8 Wad /4.°>That it is an assault upon the character of those excellent te persons who have defended religion, by arguments x drawn from nature and reason > . ‘ ; : é | ( All their works are owing to the light of revelation : why xe’ * Their ignorance confessed by all, even of Plato, by Serranus 23 _ The testimony of philosophers must be admitted in favour of iv CONTENTS. else do they write more clearly and consistently than the ancients? , : ; Bee ys Among the philosophers no knowledge, every thing opinion 13 ' This appears from the infinite dissensions and contradictions among them ; : : 5 : , ; er: 5) If divine truths are knowable by reason, why did they not attain them with certainty ? ; A ; : pees § Mistakes in natural things do no harm, in divine things are fatal : ; 4 : ; : ; Ee 3 They all lamented their ignorance in divine things SRS & Philosophy always wavering, never agreed on first prin- ciples 4 : ; 5 ae : =}, ah VG Pythagoras on this account changed the name of wise to that of philosopher. : 4 ; ; ; Sai 7) ‘6 The greatest difference between reason in a state of nature, _ and under revelation : . : j : Batre That this throws an imputation on the wiser heathens “ip ho ' Their highest praise is, to have done all that was possible - from the light they had , : ; : meen | We must examine them, to reject error, and subscribe to truth : j , 3 : ; : ce 19, 20 Plato, Aristotle, &c. had great perfections, but as great faults ‘ ; : . : , ; 4 . 20 > In religious matters the heathens did not consult men but the gods, 2 3 21 When Thales, &c. imported sublimer truths, the Greeks comprehended them not : : - j 5 Plato, though so divine, recommends idolatry and false gods 4 : : eevaiii A 5 , suo Which must be owing to his ignorance of the true nature of things 5 : ; 4 : ; : “ cae: The fear of Socrates’ prison, an unworthy apology, and a false one . . : : : : : : es) The same ignorance and uncertainty in Cicero as in others 25, 26 They speak well as learned men, but not as divines . -. 26 The weakness of reason so described by Mons. Perrot, Mr. Locke, and Dr. Clarke, as effectually to destroy the very supposition of natural light . 4 27 this hypothesis, as fully as in the behalf of others . 380 No philosophers who lived after Christ, can with justice be appealed to, because of the amazing progress of Christian- ity, and inquisitiveness of philosophers, who did study the Scriptures. Examples of it in Justyn Martyr, &c. 30,31 Convert heathens charged the pagans with borrowing from the gospels : 5 , ; : : 32 This madefhim set about the reformation of philosophy .. 38 Especially Ammonius at Alexandria . : : : 33 CONTENTS. Vv Page The advantages of Alexandria from the Jews, the Septua- gint version, and the recourse of the learned sae phers in the sacred succession . . 35 Their views in blending Platonism with Christianity . o> 36 They write sublimer than their predecessors, from having oy studied in Christian schools ? a: ( ’, Modern infidelity, like the ancients, labitn’s font Scripture, but disowns it . . 39 ’ The great fallacy in supposing ‘that all the arguments we now perceive the certainty of, might have been urged with equal strength by a mere philosopher : 39 This mistake observ ed in the author of “ the Religion of Na- ture Delineated” . ‘ : i . 89, 40 CHAPTER II. Of the Inlets to Knowledge. To consider man as rational, and how he came to be so... 42 Reason even in this at a loss, and knows not how to define man, nor itself ; what the different operations of the in- tellect are . : . 42 Men never agreed in any certain rules to guide their assent, or form their judgment : . 42, 48 To consider man as a moral creature ; “this from his freedom and choice of acting . . 44 From the intellect being conscious of its actions arises con- science. . 40 Inlets of knowledge, reason divided concerning them, how many, and what they are. : ; ; . 45 First, innate ideas, their absurdity, ee 46 Some accounts given why the ancients believed and taught such ideas . : . 46,47 Texts of Scripture on which some would’ ground such ideas explained . 47 The kowds évvoim of the Heat no more , than traditional notices of things. . Girne So Socrates and Plato seem to detern mine ; ‘and what is ; their law of fame ; ; oe Epicurus taught innate ideas to deceive the world. <- O2 They are denied by all learned men, Pearson, Puffendorf, : Locke, &c. y 53 Secondly, instincts, Ore no jalets of real ‘knowledge ; ee the reasons why . . 63 Thirdly, sensation, the mee of all aa ledge either aamedit ately by the impression of the object, or meas by the use of language and instruction. . 65, 66 vi CONTENTS. . e No materials in the mind, but through the senses ; therefore : no ideas from self-reflection : : ‘ : The mind a large storehouse, but no furniture till brought into ito, : ; ; : ; ; ; 69 No ideas but of sensation . ; : : : - 70 The difference between ideas and notions . : «oho perl No ideas of willing, thinking, or the internal operations of _ themind . : “ : ; b : : a No ideas of God, or spiritual objects, but by analogy, from sensible ideas ; ‘ ql ; : ; 0. 74 Instruction, the only inlet of knowledge concerning God and » immaterial beings : : : . ; 3 of eee This no degradation of reason . : : : - ee No chain of natural causes to know God by his works 75, 76 They who maintain it, forced to admit innate ideas. .. 19 The mind has an innate activity, but no innate furniture . 79 That instruction is the only inlet of divine knowledge, proved from several arguments : ; 5 . 80 First, this method alone is agreeable to the proceedings of God . : i : : : : é : Sa Language taught us*by God, and words necessary to make us rational, and to think 3 : ‘ : -- 8] God gave man language to instruct him in truths not cogni-~ zable by the senses. : 5 : : : » 82 Knowledge of God only from God ; so all antiquity agrees 84 Man could not give names to unknown, invisible beings . “85 Heathens held divine names to be of divine institution ee! Secondly, this method is most agreeable to the condition of man . ; : é : ‘ é : : . 88 Heathens and Christians confess divine knowledge to be from instruction. ; F : : : - ot uae Education so necessary, that without it man would not be ra- tional : : : d : , : : 92, 93 Thirdly, this alone is consistent with history, and the ac- _ count of things .° k : ‘ : : oo All learning from the east, and from masters, which is easily traced up to God : ‘ : ‘ ; < ~ 4Os ~ Fourthly, this accounts for all the great and monstrous de- fects in philosophy. : : : 5 3 Sue They had the names of things related to them, but not the meaning of them : ‘ : : : : . 98 The ancients did not think knowledge to be spun out of the brain, but travelled in search of it ; and these under- stood the nature of things best 99 Fourthly, self-reflection, the impossibility of this being an inlet of knowledge, shown through the preceding’ dis- sertation . . ; : : : : - 101 CONTENTS. Vil Page CHAPTER III. Some brief considerations upon Mr. Locke's hypothesis, that the knowledge of God is attainable by ideas of: reflection ; wherein is demonstrated, upon his own principles, that such knowledge is not to be so attained . 103 CHAPTER IV. Of the law of Nature. Law of nature, what to be understood by it, with the defi- nitions of it . . : : ; : ; f . 142 Most of our learned divines speak of it as if its principles were innate : ; ; 2 2 : * . 150° Marks or characters of it ; it must be, Ist, universal, 2dly, clear, 3dly, perfect 5 ; : , : . 151 What nature can do, must be judged from what it has al- ready done : , é : : : : . 153 Maintainers of this law make such concessions as effectually destroy it . ; : . , z ; sieht gue ne Author of ¢ The Religion of Nature Delineated,’ considered 155 Many objections lie against the religion or law of nature, as now taught ; Ist, the law of reason cannot be more ex-~- tensive than the faculty of reason A ; , . 156 No principles can be omitted in religion but what are evi- . dent . ; : ° . f : : ! . 157 Where principles are clear, so will the doctrines inferred from them be. : A - ; : ; . 158 No principles can be allowed to be universal, but what ex- perience proves to be so. : . : : . 158 There can be no law where there are no motives to obedi- ence’. : : - ; : ; : : . 159 That natural religion is liable to all these objections, proved from Tillotson and Clarke . : : , : . 159 Law what, and the different kinds of it. ; 164 Human laws not of themselves obligatory : . 165 Natural law, the world not agreed in the derivation of it 166 i. Some derive, and would infer the necessity of it from the rights of other animals : 3 : : : . 166 2. From the customs of nations, but the mutability of these ‘prevent their having the force of law . é é . 166 3. Others derive it from the right use of natural reason; this stated at large . : . : ; : ; . 167 Reason because of its uncertainty, cannot be law . 170 But if ever so consonant, could not be obligatory his Neither on individuals, who are equal, nor on such collected into society 3 : tas ; ; : map he) viii CONTENTS. | Page Nor lastly, if formed into a regular government : Res Ws 4, Others derive it from the authority of God ; all obligation from the will of a superior : : 7 : . 174 No law, but the will of one who has a just right to demand subjection . i : ; : : : : . 174 All sanctions of law must be from such authority |. ETO Actions being good or evil, depends on the ordinance of the supreme lawmaker . . : ‘ ; , - 175 This choice of duty and obedience constitutes moral good- ness . : , : : : : : ; . 186 Heathens thought all obligations of law to be from the gods 18} Jews held the precepts of Noah to be the natural, universal law. . 5 f : : s ‘ : : £162 Plato derives all laws from tradition ; hence their common _ notions, &e A : : ; ‘ ‘ ; . All heathens complained of wanting a betterlight . . 186 Reason receives no degradation hereby : : eat eit Reason is the faculty to receive, not discover divine know- ledge : : : 188 Its use in human learning ; : . ; ; 188 Its use in religion, which is a reasonable service . . 189 It cannot add to the original stock of invisible objects Beas But may judge whether doctrines be good, and from God . 192 It can perceive truth when proposed, but not find it out . 193 God, his existence and being a rewarder of them that seek him, the foundation of all religion : : : -4 196 Of faith, and what the ancients thought metaphysical or su- pernatural A : SS Wha : : : . 198 What marks to ground our faith or belief of revelation on . 199 Where those are, to refuse our assent is unreasonable . 199 Nor is it any objection, that we know not the whole of what God reveals ; : : : é : : . 200 Of the trinity, resurrection, &e . : 201 To disbelieve what we cannot comprehend, the ground of all infidelity : ; UN aah : : : . 201 The law of nature supported by three kinds of arguments, Ist, from Scripture ; 2dly, from the works of creation ; 3dly, from the reasons of things. These to be sepa- rately examined : , ; 4 4 CHAPTER V. Texts of Scripture relating to the natural law. Of natural religion being learned from the works of Creation. The knowledge of God not to be had from the contemplation of our own frame. The Deity not discoverable from the fitness of things. What Scripture affirms cannot be disbelieved . : . 205 CONTENTS. Rom. i. 20, &c. Acts xiv, Acts sbi at large commented on a . 206, Rom. ii. 14, ae neared in che sense ot the J ews, and of the hesehen being a law to themselves But we learn ene Seripture several. particulars ‘relating t0 the heathens, Ist, That they did not know God Qndly, That they could not know him by the light af. nature 3 3dly, That the loss of divine knowledge was owing to their own vain reasonings Reason which is the sehen to be considersd as ay as the means®. The standard of it to re Peni fou the balk of Gaakind What conclusions will thence necessarily follow The weakness of it, the common abilities of men, and ae the vulgar . Difficulty of attaining ‘knowledge, even to the wise The condition of man in a state of nature considered Means of natural knowledge are said to be, Ist, The con- templating the works of God in general Qndly, The frame of man in particular. First, heathens knew not God by his works, 1] Cot: be 2h No one can fix the age when bay came at such natural knowledge . 4 If we know aia second acest the works ait Toad to the workman . The greatness of the works made them conclude ‘every thing the effect of visible causes . No transition from nothing to something, put by Omnipo- tence . . Creation no natural proof of the divine “existence, none knew it Nor used in Seripture to prove the being , but only the great- ness of God : Several texts of Scripture relating ‘to. this subject con- sidered .. No one ever thought iaiaihoy coeds pilisvofore? no séake of beings to ascend to God ; Psalm xix, and Rom. i. 20, explained Visible works of God led the world to idolatry : Especially the sun and moon ; pete the Jews also were seduced. Plato did not allow that they led men to the knowledge of God . . ; What the sun is to thé dissertinient Be aeibiee: that God is to invisibles But tell men pinsie 3 is a God, ‘and the works Plcctare his . greatness ‘ a Q - 291 . 292 . 293 x CONTENTS Page So Zaleucus, Aristotle, and Cicero, apply them . ‘ . 294 No proportion between God and his works whereby he can be known . : . 296 Second Means. Man knew not God from contemplating hisown frame . . 297 Could not know himself to be a compound being. Possido- nius’s sphere 4 F . 298 Could never discover what immateriality WAS i. *. { . 800 - orthe soul ; nor account how it thinks or acts on the body . 301 Nor the soul’s immortality . j : . 802 Nor the difference between the souls of men and beasts . 804 Ancients thought beasts rational e . . 305 Different sentiments of the moderns . : . 805 Third General Argument. That man sould disotyer God from the aides: &e. of things . : $307 The system of things great, but what none ever penetrated 308 The study full of embarrassments, what Saletan all the ancients. . 3809 Variety of physical systems at present, therefore no cer- tainty ° ; . . 310 Ancients greatly erred in the plainest matters. : ea lO Grandeur of the universe made them worship it . é . 3ll Matter thought eternal. Long before a mind was intro- duced to order it 3 : . 312 Socrates and Cicero confess the impossibility of knowing nature 2 . 312 Job xxviii. We cannot find out God by the knowledge of nature : . dls But when God is declared, the fitness, &e. of things prove his wisdom, &c. . . 314 Law or moral duties not to be inferred from the fitness of thiags . . 315 Doctrine of Morality arising from the fitness of things stated 815 The reason of things, nothing but the nature and order which God gave them : : : é ; . 316 No eternal goodness but in God : * . . 316 The relations of created beings not eternal . pe ae SES No explanation of the decrees, dependence, or relations of things ‘ . 318 Many expressions used in this controversy profane and blas- phemous . » 320 Attributes of God essentially the same, will and powe er not different . . 320 The force of law not from the nature of things, but from that will which gave the nature . : 3 . 321 If God made things by necessity, he cannot be a x ifrele agent 321 Moral dependence founded on natural, and natural on “the will of God : ; ‘ : j . i . 82) CONTENTS. x1 Page If there be an eternal fitness of things, it must be antece- dent to or coeval with the will of God ; ~ : But this is impossible and false, for the will of God is the cause of allthings : : : : : : The truth of things is their reason, and_ the only reason of them is their being so willed of God . : ; . 323 If these reasons existed in God, they were nothing but the essence of the divine nature : : : i . 324 If different from God, something besides him was eternal . 324 Of ideas, exemplars, archetypes, &e. which are no more than metaphysical enthusiasm : : : . 825 First objection against this doctrine is, that God affirms the 322 322 contrary . . . . . . : . 326 That the immutability of relations is inconsistent with the divine proceedings. : - : : : . 327 Relations have altered both in angels and men. State of fallen angels considered ., - aw, 44H ; . 327 Between men and men, men and beasts, beasts with beasts ? “ : 7 : : : : . 381 Whence new duties, such as prayer, repentance, &c. . 332 This doctrine does not give us a true account of morality . 332 The law of moral goodness must be perfect, but reason is not. : . ; : . . Mate 333 Not reason, but the will of God the measure of good and evil . é : : : : : ; ‘ . 334 Moral goodness consists in choosing an action, because we know it is our duty : : : : a Le nA Fitness, &c. not a means to arrive at the knowledge of divine things. : : : : : : . 336 Because reason could neither judge of such fitness, nor of Beitroodtorvelvaly, Mipla itis) GRRE Palys N 337 Relations of things were never supposed to induce an obli- gation ; : - : : 3 : . . 540 All law and obligation must be from a superior being . 342 Law, whether natural, moral, or positive, has its goodness from the will of God . . 342 This acknowledged by the Jews and heathens, Cicero, &c. 342 Of common notions, said to be congruous to nature, &e. all given by God . Sie : : . : . 345 CHAPTER VI. God not to be defined nor demonstrated ; therefore not disco- verable by reason. Knowledge is a suitable idea or notion in the mind of the Phish MMC gts ae Pe aa ena xii _ CONTENTS. , Page First, therefore God not to be known, because not to be de- fined : ; 5 5 : ‘ : : . 348 He is best known by negative descriptions : ; . 350 Secondly, there was no name to inquire after God by: . 350 Therefore man must set about comprehending he knows not what . : : : : : ; 3 » 351 Or what he knows to be incomprehensible : ; . 353 This made the philosophers ascribe such inconsistent pro- perties to God . ; : ; ‘ ; : . B54 Thales, Plato, &c. confess divine things to be unintelligible 354 Thirdly, there is no ascending from effects to the first cause ; 5 : , : : : . . 356 Heathens never could, nor did conceive an incorporiety . 356 Fourthly, there is no likeness or analogy to pass from visi- bles to invisibles i : : : ‘ ; . 357 The pretended intellectual scale for the mind to ascend by, ~ unnatural and visionary _. f é ; : . 358 The atheistical objection answered, if all knowledge be from sensation, every thing is subject to sense . ‘ . 360 To a man in a state of nature, no rule but that of contra- ries. : ; ‘ ‘ ; ; : ; . 360 He must believe every thing contradictory to his senses . 360 All heathens acknowledged the want of an instructor s O62 Plato every where diffident. His resemblance of the world to men in a cave : : : ; . 363 So were Simonides, Cicero, and all the philosophers . 366 They knew not the Creator, beginning, intent, or end of man . . Pe : : ; ; ; A . 367 No demonstration of God ; the reasons for it, except moral ° demonstration . ‘ 5 : . ; ; . 370 The disadvantages in pretending to any other certainty . 373 The embarrassments even of moral certainty. : . 374 Of those who say, revelation is only a thing by the by, to save labour and trouble i F 7 ; a5) Reliance upon reason has in all ages produced error and atheism. ; : On : : : eae Because reason and all its systems have ever been fallible and false. ; ‘ d : : 5 . 378 The immortality of the soul not to be demonstrated ; there- fore neither is God. . : 5 : ; : . 379 Conclusion ‘ : ; : . ; , : . 381 BPN TRODUC TION. In these latter ages, two religions, that of the heathens, and that of nature, have been the subject of contemplation, in an equal, if not greater degree than the Christian. Concerning the former, “ Natalis Comes,” lord Herbert, and others endeavoured to explain, and dress it up in a mo- dern fashion, and exhibit it to the world as a consistent and rational scheme of worship: and the reason why this happy discovery had not been made sooner, was, it seems, because no one before them “had ever considered more than the shell of the fable ;”* mankind had taken it in the gross for an absurd irrational system, without being able to discern or unfold the sublime and mysterious doctrines contained in it: for paganism is like a diamond out of the quarry, where in- estimable beauties and riches are concealed from the igno- rant eye, under a rough and useless, exterior coat. This they undertook to polish, to pare away the superfluities, and then show the internal worth and excellency of the Gentile religion, or at least make it appear to be not altogether so absurd and stupid, as had hithertobeen generally imagined. * Nat. Com. 2 xiv INTRODUCTION. The first thing to be done, in order to remove the com- mon prejudices conceived against it, and to clear away the vast heap of rubbish and confusion, was to provide a num- ber of classes, into which the different materials might be sorted, that whatever could not be justly accounted for under one head, might bear a tolerable construction in ano- ther ; and be called either mystical, symbolical, allegorical, _ historical, poetical, fabulous, natural, civil, moral, esoterical, exoterical, or the peculiar placit of the legislator, theologist, poet, or philosopher, as was most agreeable to the opinion, humour or prejudice, or best suited to the turn of the in- terpreter and mythologist; in which they had a right to use the most unbounded liberty: because without such latitude it would be impossible to remove the crowd of monstrous and ridiculous fictions, with which truth was perplexed ; to account for those cruel and horrid, those shameful and im- pure rites, that made up so great a part of their religion ; or to reconcile those contradictions which so manifestly ap- pear in the theology of the ancients. But after all this labour in separating and distinguishing, the most notorious articles intheir faith and practice were so villanous, extravagant, and superstitious, as not to be re- duced under any of the former heads, and yet, without being properly disposed of, must have ruined the whole design: therefore for all these, that is, for the bulk of religion, they provided a common storehouse, and called it priesteraft : for it seems whoever were initiated into that order, had but one common view, “to impose upon the stupid credulity of mankind, who always gave the characters of most profound theologists, to such as had most perverted them from the rules of right reason ; and the poor wretched populace had neither courage nor, will to suspect all this superstition and INTRODUCTION. XV juggling doings of the priests as adulterate, or to reject them as such.”* Nor ought it to seem strange, that the priests had such an ascendancy over the minds of others: for in Egypt, the most ancient school of learning and reli- gion, they were always chosen out of the nobility employed in studying the liberal arts and sciences, and advanced to the highest offices and places of preferment in the state. The foolish Athenians established the same custom, for the better government (as they thought) of religion and the commonwealth; and Numa imprudently fell into the like error, by making a law, that none should be elected priests, but who were above fifty years of age, and excelled others in birth and virtue. These were the men, the greatest, the wisest, and the best, who debauched the minds, and intro- | duced so many profanations into the pure religion of the heathens. To such shifts will the defence of a bad cause carry men; priestcraft is made an answer to every thing, a charm to untie all those knotty difficulties, that history had avowed facts would otherwise perplex them with. And however coarse a compliment it may be to the rest of mankind, yet it has been found necessary to maintain, that for 2000 years together, the priests imposed on all the inhabitants of the earth that they could make the whole world dance constant attendance to their temples and oracles, at the expense of numerous, costly, and impertinent ceremonies; could per- suade nations to leave their country, and kings and princes, .as well as people, in spite of all the reluctancies of nature, - to sacrifice their sons and their daughters unto devils, and think it meritorious to do so; and that all the priests suc- * Lord Herbert. _ t Diod. Sic. xvi INTRODUCTION. cessively were so much the same, so stanch in blood and se- crecy, that in this vast tract of time, none could find in their hearts to relent or betray the imposture; this superlative craft was above the reach of emperors, statesmen, or the ~ wisest philosophers, that is, the whole world (except the priests) was all this time perfectly besotted. Another great prejudice against the orthodoxy of hea- | thenism, was the writings of the primitive Christians, men eminent for learning and piety, most of them pagans by birth as well as profession, educated in all their wisdom, and - thoroughly acquainted with their faith and practice: and .so it happened, these fathers represented paganism as an ir- rational and detestable heap of iniquity, what had more of frenzy than of piety in it: they charge the world with the utmost stupidity and idolatry, that they neither knew nor worshipped the true God, but such as were no gods at all, the wickedest and the worst of men; that they transferred divine honours from the only Supreme Being, to the images of dead carcasses, to natural things, and the works of their own hands; that the gods of the nations were devils, and that there could be no religion among them, since their very gods were the patrons of all impurity and impiety ; and so intolerably bold were these old gentlemen, as to challenge their enemies to public disputes on these --yery points; to enter their appeals to the emperors, senate, and people; to disperse their apologies, and triumph in their victories; yet were never upbraided with representing heathenism in a false light, or opposing such doctrines as the world did not believe and practise. To remove this objection, “the fathers of the church are said to be inveterate enemies to the heathens, and to have represented the matter quite otherwise than it is; for INTRODUCTION, Xvi they pass by the more certain and orthodox part of their religion, (their piety, faith, hope, and love) in silence, and from their superstitions and rites, take an occasion to utter severe invectives against them, and represent them after a most ridiculous manner, by ingeniously exposing their mad, sacred rites ; for what the priests did as if they were in a rapture and inspired with a divine spirit, they represented as the effects of lunacy and distraction: as also, when they bitterly inveighed against them for worshipping deified men, they imposed on their readers, and mistook the sense of the heathens about the word of God, for that a deified man signifies no more among the heathens, than a glorified saint does among the Christians.”* That notwithstanding the constant imputation of their worshipping false gods, by the prophets under the Old Testament, or the apostles and martyrs under the New, yet this is the unjustest accusation in the world: for the ancient religion was symbolical, and whatever veneration they offered to the heaven, sun, moon, or stars, it terminated in the worship of the Supreme God, and directly tended to the advancement of his glory : and in all their holy rites there was a religious and mystical sense couched under them, which whoever will accurately examine, and dive into the scope and design of them, wiil easily discover, and without this interpretation the heathens would be the most ridiculous and absurd’ of mortals: yet Dionysius Halicarnass, says, “this is a wisdom and judg- ment which few are masters of.” And how does this last account agree with what the same authors teach of the im- — posture and villany of priesteraft, if there be nothing in paganism but what is wonderful, mysterious, and divine ?. We are also told, that the falsity of the accusation pro- * Lord Herbert. eh INTRODUCTION. ceeded from an original mistake, in believing that the hea- thens maintained a plurality of gods, which they did not do, (as being repugnant to the laws of nature) but ac- knowledged one only God. In the contemplation however of this one infinite Being, as they observed his virtue and power to be diffused through every thing, so, according to the variety of effects, providential dispensations, and known attributes, they gave different names at several times and places to these virtues; whence it is inferred as an un- doubted truth, that all the powers of the other gods, how- ever dispersed through every element, proceed as so many streams from the same fountain, and terminate in one Ju- piter, which Jupiter is no other than the true God ; accord- ingly if they worshipped a statue, the act of religion was not directed to the statue, but the hero it represented ; if a hero, not him, but the star which bore the same name, or into which he was translated ; if the stars, not them, but the God which presided over them, for otherwise the ido- latry would be inexcusable. Having thus prepared the minds of men for a candid re- ception of paganism, the mask is taken off, and the sum of the inquiry drawn up in a few conclusions. The first is, that the heathens agreed with Christians, not only in wore shipping the same Supreme God, and common Father, but with the same piety and virtue, the same most principal and essential kind of worship: and the challenge of Celsus is produced, to show what was in the Christian religion that tended to the establishing of virtue, more than what the heathens had before acknowledged. The second is, that since the heathens had by right reason discovered an uni- versal religion, with all the proper means to attain eternal happiness, it will necessarily follow, that mankind did not INTRODUCTION, xix stand in need of any particular revelation, or instruction from God, to that great end; for this is the whole drift of painting heathenism in those amiable colours, to show that no other assistance is wanting, than what nature by the use of reason has afforded us, to form a pure and perfect reli- gion, sufficient to all the ends of virtue and happiness. It is true indeed, that guilt sometimes flies in the face of these gentlemen, and they ackowledge it to be impossible “ for the heathens to acquit themselves of the suspicion of idolatry, or even the practice of it ;’ .but even in this are they justi- fiable: “for why might they not embrace the faith, and those rites they received from their ancestors, as well as we have done? And they are not to be blamed for approving those things, which had through so long a tract of time been delivered down to them.”* To omit the blasphemy of such comparisons and assertions; how came it to pass that reason or nature did not prevent the ancients from mis- taking rank idolatry for religion: or through so many ages could not show their posterity the folly and impiety of it ? Or is it a law of nature, that the worship of false gods is a proper and acceptable service to the true One? But in the middle of the last century appeared a far nobler school, which carried on a freer inquiry into the law of nature, than had ever yet been done, and urged it with great strength against the scepticism and infidelity of the times, by proving the agreeableness of revealed religion to the unquestionable dictates of right reason; and thereby recommended Christianity with great advantage, as being a - most reasonable service, and best adapted to all the inclina- tions, hopes, and wishes of a rational creature. Had the inquiry stopped here, it would have been of the utiost service to the cause.of truth and virtue; but it was * Lord Herbert. xX INTRODUCTION. gradually carried on to unwarrantable lengths; the religion and the law of nature were set up as independent of, and even in opposition to, revelation : the importance of morality was extolled as superior to the doctrines and duties of Christianity : moral duties were said to have a natural or eternal obligation, but positive ones to be mere arbitrary commands, void of all internal excellency ; the light of rea- son was cried up as sufficient to the discovery of the will of God, and the whole duty of man, to a distinct knowledge of good and evil, i. e. every thing that was necessary for him to do, or not to do, without any supernatural assistance. These studies happened to suit with the genius, and took up the attention of the age, and since then have been the prin- cipal subjects of contemplation to our universities, philoso- phers, and divines. The press abounded with treatises of natural divinity, light of nature, law of nature, natural religion, rational theology, Christian theology, compared with Platonism: so also of moral theology, moral philosophy, Christian moral philosophy, Christian ethics, and of all the duties which men might know, and should be obliged to practise, were there no such thing as ex- ternal revelation. From the pulpit, morality has been earnestly recommended, aud Christianity but coolly re- garded : much said of the light of reason, the eternal fit- ness, and immutable obligation of things; but little of the gospel means of salvation, of wisdom and righteousness, of sanctification and redemption; as if Christianity could not be supported but by the law of nature; or the text of the apostle not become a rule of duty, till proved to agree with the opinion of the philosopher. So that the pious and ju- dicious laity have long complained, that revelation and di- vinity are almost forgot amongst us. And the consequences: of these doctrines have at last nn - INTRODUCTION. XXi appeared in a very fatal manner. First, by throwing so much weight into the scale of reason, so little into that of revelation, as if every one had a right to model a religion for himself; the libertines of the age have taken occasion to despise the authority of Scripture, to look upon its pre- cepts as superstitious or unnecessary, to remove all those terrors which brought any restraint upon their corrupt, sensual gratifications, and by lessening the expectation of that glory which shall be revealed, indulge with greater security their beloved vices in the present enjoyment of sense ; by which means the great motives of religion (which are not to be demonstrated from mere reason) have lost their due and proper influence on the minds of men. And notwithstanding the loud pretences to morality, the end of their arguments and practice is to teach us, that there is no necessity “to live soberly, righteously, or godly in this present world.” Secondly, we have lived to see infidelity join issue in these very doctrines, and from the avowed tenets of modern divines, raise such objections against the necessity or expediency of revelation, as neither have been, nor upon those principles can be answered. A thorough conviction however, that this is the true state of things amongst us, that heathenism and the law of nature have been carried much farther than truth will bear, and that by this means the canon of faith hath been per- verted, and many errors and corruptions entered into the church of God, was the sole reason of putting the following sheets together, and is now the best apology for offering _ them to the public; and if by the hypothesis herein main- tained, religion may-be restored to its original authority, without any debasement of reason ; if the cavils of liber- tines are hereby totally enervated, and the objections of Xxii INTRODUCTION. infidelity meet with a full and easy solution: if throughout, it be consistent with itself, with all the known laws of na- ture and reason, and above all with the proceedings of Almighty God with man, it will deserve a serious conside- ration before it be superciliously condemned, or magis- terially rejected. It is very certain that the importance of the subject loses much of its dignity from the manner of treating it; but truth will bear examination in the plainest dress, and if by this attempt occasion be given to excite some abler hand to bring it to due perfection, it will be of service to religion, which is all I aim at or can hope for. That there are many defects in the ensuing treatise, the publisher is very sensibly convinced, which he would not have imputed to the subject, but to the disadvantages he personally labours under. Such as, Ist.. A long disuse to those studies which accustom the mind to a solid method of reasoning and concluding ; and which a country retirement, embarrassed with the cares of life, almost necessarily disable it from exercising ; and there- fore is persuaded that many of the arguments are capable of being put in a stronger light, than that in which they are here offered. Qdly. They being furnished with a moderate number of books (and too many of them translations) without oppor- tunity of consulting public libraries or originals: if there- fore some small mistakes may have happened, he begs pro- per allowances from the critics for them; but persuades himself that there are none that can any way affect the subject matter in question. But, 3dly. A sense of these disadvantages, and the want of guides to follow in this inquiry (none who pro- INTRODUCTION. XXiil fessedly treat of it having fallen into his hands) determined him to make use of all the helps he could meet with from the best authors; not only to borrow hints from them, but to transcribe their arguments and words, when suitable to his purpose. He is not therefore afraid of being thought a plagiary, but desires that if any thing valuable occurs, it may be ascribed to them; if any thing weak or imperfect, to himself. Lastly. As he has nothing in view but truth, his sincere wishes are, that whatever is built upon false principles, may soon come to nothing, and be forgot. Above all, as there is no instruction or knowledge in divine truths, but from the only sure rule of faith, the word of God; if any thing herein contained be in the least contrary thereto, he re- vokes it, disannuls it, and unsays it. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM REVELATION, NOT FROM- REASON OR NATURE, “ OLA P BiG i The Inqury stated, and Objections answered. THE perfection of our rational nature is true wisdom, and the perfection of wisdom is religion, which consists in the knowledge of God and of ourselves; in virtue and obe- dience, in a well-grounded peace of mind, and the comfort- able hopes of a blessed immortality: and that such wisdom can only proceed from the Author of our beings, is a fun- damental both in divinity and philosophy. But as God has in divers manners spoken to us, an inquiry arises, by what method he has vouchsafed to com- municate to mankind the knowledge of divine things, or those which concern his existence, nature, perfections, and will, and direct us to the attainment of our final end, and ultimate happiness. Therefore, by divine things, I under- stand the great principles of all religion, which may be com- prised under the following heads: the existence of a Deity, and his essential attributes : that worship which is becoming, _ and due to such an infinite being: the immortality of the soul; and a state of rewards and punishments after this life. And allowing that some men, especially the most wise and judicious in all nations and ages, have entertained a B 2 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM belief of these great truths; yet the method by which they received the first notices of them, cannot, by any direct or necessary consequence, be thence inferred. So that pious and learned men are not agreed by what inlet or means of conveyance such notions and apprehensions of remote, invisible, and spiritual objects, entered the minds of men. Most of the opinions on this subject may be reduced to these three : First, That we come at this knowledge by innate ideas ; or, having the law and rule of life written and engraven on our hearts, in such plain visible characters, that whoever looks into himself will clearly discern the great principles and duties of religion, and the several obligations he thereby lies under to obedience: this lord Herbert and others have maintained. Secondly, That man, by a due use of reason, and con- templating the visible works of creation and providence, may come at the knowledge of God, his duty, &c., without any external aid or instruction: which opinion is defended, not only by deists, but all those who teach a religion and law of nature, independent on, and attainable without reve- lation. Thirdly, That the knowledge of these supernatural truths had no other conveyance but that of revelation, or those discoveries which God has made of his nature and will to mankind, without which they must for ever have re- mained ignorant of them. And that those communications which God made to Adam, Noah, and the patriarchs, were, by traditional conveyance, from one generation to another, the sole ground of divine knowledge to the heathen world ; and the precepts thereof, styled by them right reason, the natural, common, and universal law. And this last opinion seems to me most agreeable to serip- ture, reason, history, and truth ; and what therefore I intend to explain and support in the following treatise. But as I am sensible it is a task of great difficulty, and not hitherto professedly treated of; as also liable to many prejudices from the favourers of the second hypothesis, at present al- most universally established ;- I shall first endeavour to remove some objections, which seem most naturally to lie against it. : REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 3 I. It may be said, that it is introducing novelties into re- ligion, and thereby disturbing the peace of it. II. That it is invalidating those arguments drawn from reason and nature, which have been urged with such suc- cess against the attacks of scepticism and infidelity. III. That it is an assault upon the characters of those many excellent persons, who have defended religion by ar- —- guments deduced from the religion of nature. IV. That it is depriving the ancients of that praise, which through so many ages has been justly attributed to them, for those sublime sentiments of virtue, and refined systems of morality, they taught the world. From imputations of the first kind it is natural to seek for shelter under the cover of some great authorities; the fathers, councils, or the judgments of some learned men. 1 shall content myself at present with producing three or four names only, but in weight equal to many: those are Gro- tius and Puffendorf abroad, Barrow and Tillotson at home. The first proving the being of God from the consent of all nations, says, ‘this can be from no other cause, pg yer. than either a declaration of God himself, or a tradi- tat. &c. tion derived from the first parents of mankind. If aciates we admit the former, the thing in question is granted; and if we affirm the latter, there can no good reason be given why we should believe these first parents did deliver a false- hood to their posterity, in a matter of the greatest moment.’ Puffendorf says, “it is very probable that the chief 1.4. yar. heads of natural law were expressly delivered by 1. 2.«. 3. God Almighty to the first mortals, and were from an them communicated to others by custom and institution.” Dr. Barrow, among the several proofs for the being y,) 4. of a God, urges this, “that it might, from some com- Fol. p. mon fountain of instruction, (from one ancient master . or one primitive tradition) be conveyed as from one common head or source, into many particular conduits.’ And the last, speaking of the unity of the divine nature, says, “ it is a notion wherein the greatest and the wisest part y,) ; of mankind did always agree; and therefore may Fol. p. reasonably be presumed to be either natural, or to ig have sprung from some original tradition delivered down to us from the first parents of mankind.” So that, in the opinion of persons eminent for judgment 4 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM and learning, these important truths might be conveyed by tradition through successive ages of the world; and that, according to the several degrees of light mankind received, they would reason concerning them with greater or less ad- vantage ; and consequently, such hypothesis may be not only rational, but probable, becoming the Divine attributes to have acted by, consistent with all the known laws of rea- son and religion, and the cause of virtue be so far from suf- fering, that it may receive many corroborative proofs and illustrations from it. As to Christian peace, the only bond thereof is the unity — of faith; and as truth can be but one, it is what all ought to search and pray for: when that is our sincere aim, and carried on in aspirit of meekness, the endeavour, though un- successful, will not be eondemned by the sober and judi- cious part of mankind; especially in an inquiry, where there is uo breaking down the sacred enclosures, nor rooting up ancient foundations ; but only a different method of in- vestigating the same thing, and intended to lead us up’to the same divine original. The laws of revelation and na- ture, all knowledge both in heaven and earth, is from the same fountain of wisdom, the Father of angels and men, who always shines with a strong unchangeable light; and to ascribe the informations we have of the attributes and will to his own immediate manifestations, cannot detract from, but must rather add to the characters of infinite mercy, as well as glory. All his creatures are intended for happiness, and must have sufficient means granted to attain it, which, if the Au- thor of our being has not done by any clear impression on our intellectual faculty, nor given us constant and ordinary natural abilities unerringly to do it; then an immediate re- velation of the means and end must be consonant to those ideas we necessarily form of infinite goodness, highly agree- able to the expectations and reasonable desires of his crea- tures, and consequently suitable, fit, and proper, to divine righteousness and wisdom, as well as to the imperfections and the wants of men. They who maintain the contrary must say, the impres- sions on our mind are so strong, that no one, without some natural impediment, can be ignorant or mistaken in his duty ; whence this absurdity will follow, that man by nature i eS gen ————o ooo rt es t—~S— ee REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 5 is more able to know than he is to perform ; can make a law, but not fulfil it; or that the book of creation is so plain and legible, as to direct an ordinary capacity, with due applica- tion, to truth and happiness ; and unassisted reason can in- struct us in a worship suitable and well-pleasing to the Deity ; because, otherwise, man would have an end, but not the means; which is contrary to all the ideas we can con-— ceive of God. Both these positions shall be considered ; and if it appear that reason never did furnish men with just apprehensions of divine things, nor exhibit a tolerable body of laws, as a rule of life, what mankind ought, or ought not to do; we must have recourse to some supernatural means, for the obtaining what nature or reason could not afford them. Another argument in favour of this hypothesis may be drawn from the nature of religion in general, which consists in just apprehensions of the true God, and the performance of such worship as will procure his favour and acceptance. For the being of God is the only foundation of morali- Bp. wi- ty, as well as divinity; and, according to the appre- Be hensions we have of his excellencies and perfections, such will our notions even of moral duties be. For the obligation of all religion, call it natural, moral, or revealed, must be deduced from the existence of God; and the admirableness of its precepts, from the divine nature and perfections. Whence it will undeniably follow, that whatever system best instructs us in the being and nature of God, his essential attributes and perfections, his providence, works, and will, and estab- lishes them on the most solid foundations, that is the surest pillar of morality, as well as faith ; because all their duties, with the eternity, necessity, fitness, and relations of them, must be thence derived with a greater truth and certainty. But where has reason given us any rational coherent system of the Divine nature, his self-existence, attributes, and will, able to make men good here, or happy hereafter ? a system in which there is nothing inconsistent with truth or with itself, no inextricable difficulties and absurdities that shock a well-informed mind, and overthrow that being and providence it would establish? If reason has not done this, it could never teach a complete steady rule of moral righteousness ; and because it has not done it, the ablest de- fenders of natural religion are forced to make large apologies 6 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM for its many defects and narrow extent; acknowledging, that reason is too glimmering a light to make a full discovery of sacred matters; that it is a guide, of itself not able to direct or lead its followers right; but often plunges them so deep in error and corruption that they find an insuperable difficulty to extricate themselves; that it not only renders every step they take full of danger, but if they are not very wary in so thick a darkness, most certainly proves destruc- tive to them. Yet the same authors allow, that whatever sense the heathens had of God, his will, or their duty, they had it from the light of nature only, and to this are owing the manifold defects of ancient theology. But is not this confessing reason to be a blind guide, unable to direct us to happiness, and therefore it is prudence to look out for another? Is it not to measure the moral law of eternal rectitude by a broken, crooked, and unequal rule, whilst we have in our hand a plain unerring one, whereby all the doubts that confounded the philosophers vanish and disappear, their mistakes are corrected, and the abstruse notions which they could never reconcile, plainly accounted for? and this done in that strong convictive manner as to satisfy the mind and engage our belief to rest an eternal interest thereon. The difficulty also still remains, it being impossible to prove the heathens had the little they knew of Divine things from reason only: it is what they absolutely disavowed, nor ever admitted an article of religion, but from a persuasion that it was communicated to them by the gods, or the sons of the gods, who were best able to give an account of what related to themselves, and it was impious to dispute or deny what they declared. This is more than some Christians will allow; but whether they will or not, revelation has these two advantages, that it is as capable of proof as any other subject, that is, as much as the nature of the thing will admit, and reason cannot demand more; and that when any thing is proved to be the will of the Supreme Being, reason is silenced, and argu- ments are at an end. It is the awe of the latter that makes infidelity cavil so much at the former. The second objection is, that this hypothesis invalidates those arguments drawn from reason and nature, which have been urged with such success against scepticism and in- fidelity. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 7 To which I answer, that this is the very subject of debate, whether such arguments were drawn from reason, or are not entirely owing to revelation ; therefore, I shall only observe here, that the attributing them to revelation does by no means exclude all those benefits of reason which God and nature intended, or judge the advantages thereof un- necessary ; as to ascribe more to it is neither necessary nor rational. They are both the gifts of the Father of lights, rays of that all-glorious sun, who communicates his beams of brightness to every creature according to its respective condition and the nature of its being: both intended to excellent, but different purposes. The one lays the foun- dation of obedience to the Deity, the other enforces and defends it. Revelation exhibits the principles and duties of religion, and binds the obligation on our souls, from the consideration of God’s greatness, our own immortality, and the certainty of a future state, motives which reason could not suggest. ‘Then reason, by its own strictest rules and laws, can prove that all these are highly agreeable to the dictates of nature, fit and becoming all the apprehensions we can form of an eternal, infinite Being; adapted to all the ends of providence and wisdom, best calculated to our truest expectations and wishes of happiness, whether present or future, and that every thing in religion is amiable and perfective. This is the proper employment of reason, and when used to these purposes is of the greatest service and advantage to mankind. But when it is made the author and foundation of religion, appealed to as an infallible director and evidence, the mea- sure and judge of truth, both human and divine, and nothing to be admitted but what she notifies and explains: this is perverting the order of things, and transgressing those bounds which God and nature have appointed to.it. For as the Supreme Being preserves and directs all his works to the end for which he created them, so he does it by the wisest counsels and unalterable laws. There is a line which no created understanding can pass, and whatever faculties are given to a being, must necessarily be confined within certain limits, and-their operations proportioned to their essential state, according to the maxim in philosophy, that what is received is proportioned to the capacity of the sub- ject that receives it. The angels’ nature is vastly more in- 8 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM tellectual than ours, and yet they veil their faces, can neither know nor comprehend the glories of the Un- created One. Yet men will not, in the things of God, trust to God’s authority ; they must examine them by reason, and try them by the laws of philosophy, as the only, criterion to Judge of truth by: if they do not answer this scrutiny, if we cannot grasp the nature of them, (though such as no human sight can pierce) or want arguments to establish them, we must suspend our belief, or reject them. Whereas, for creatures of such confessed ignorance, to pretend them- selves able to discover these truths, is arrogance ; to deter- mine them by their own reason, is profaneness. In all such cases we advance beyond what is natural or lawful, and wantonly encroach upon the bounds of immortality. Reason is in man what the subordinate ministerial power is in well-regulated governments; not to enact laws, but see the due observance of them, to prove their excellency, explain the uses, and enforce obedience from the rewards and punishments inseparably annexed to them. But to resist the authority of the supreme power, dispute the ex- cellency- of laws, or refuse obedience to them; because he was not the enacter, or may not be able to discover the deep counsels and reasons on which they are founded; and put in an appeal to an inferior court of his own erect- ing to try the utility or obligation of such laws, is both folly and rebellion: yet this crime are they guilty of, who would determine divine things by reason, philosophy, or natural light. They appeal to an inferior, uncommissioned, and incompetent judge, and can never show their right to such claim till they have proved these two things: that the knowledge of God can be limited, or the mind of man com- prehend every thing. Yet how far such appeals have been carried of late, let. every one judge; what pains and labour taken to reform religion by philosophy, (even to make mathematical calcu- lations of the degrees of probability in the principles of religion) that if one cannot be raised to the sublimity of the other, we must reduce faith to the standard of reason. In the modern language, divinity and natural theology pass for equivalent terms: the light of reason stands for faith and revelation: antiquity is represented, as in possession of REVELATION, NOT FROM NATURE OR REASON. = 9 all religious truths, and Christianity little more than a re- publication of the law of nature. Morality, eternal fit- nesses, and relations of things are inculeated with great vehemence, whilst we seldom hear of wisdom, or righteous- ness, or sanctification, or redemption. And the consequence has been, that infidelity at last joined issue with them upon their own principles; and from the concessions they had made, undertook to show that Christianity was not necessary, and by this advantage ob- tained a triumph over them. For if nature and reason can so easily discover the most important truths, it will follow, that the chief purposes of revelation are ina great measure ‘useless, if not altogether unnecessary, and their own argu- ments turned upon them, to root up the foundations of all religion. The enemies of the faith then asserted boldly, that the law of nature, or what the light of reason dictates, — is the only law of man. That it takes in every thing, and is founded in the reason and nature of things, and therefore | revelation cannot be necessary : that God’s will is so clearly and fully manifested in the book of nature, that he who runs may read. And that he revealed his will any oyristian- way besides the light of nature, can only come un- ity asold, der the. head of probability: the consequence of op Here which they well know must be, that in proportion as 1° reason is exalted, and the comprehension of human minds enlarged beyond their proper limits, just so far will revela- tion be depreciated and rendered useless, till at last, reason becomes absolutely independent and self-sufficient. Thus a zeal for natural theology had well nigh destroyed all re- ligion, and Dr. Clarke fell a sacrifice to Tindal by the very weapons he had put into his hands. Yet there is no observation capable of fuller proof, than that religion, through all ages of the Jewish and Christian state, was more or less pure according to the alloy of phi- losophy or human reason mixed up with it. There was not an error or heresy in the primitive church that was not imbibed from Plate’s academy, Zeno’s portico, or some vain reasonings of the Pagan wise men. In latter ages, the schoolmen rejected Plato, and exalted Aristotle into the chair of Christ, says Tilenus : esteemed him the qjenus — god of wisdom who could not err. And the con- Syntagm. troversy long subsisted to which of them an appeal Disp. 16. lay for the determination of truth; so that there TPhes. 31. B2 10 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM was great necessity for the Apostle’s caution, Col. ii. 8, ‘Beware lest any man spoil you, through philosophy and vain deceit, after the traditions of men ;’’ which have always proved highly injurious to the purity of religion, and the great objects of faith which are supernaturally revealed. Many fatal instances might be given of this in Origen and others. It was the affected title of a philosopher, and the superstitious adoration of Pythagoras and Plato, that made Julian an apostate. This drove George Trapezuntius to the extravagant attempt of proving the conformity between the doctrine of Aristotle and Scripture ; and hurried Her- molaus Barbarus, patriarch of Aquileia, to the detestable impiety of consulting the devil for the true meaning of Aristotle’s évreAexera. And Ramus, for his animadversions on that philosopher, was assassinated in Paris, his corpse dragged through the streets, and whipped with cords. So overheated have some men’s heads been, that they looked upon all as infidels and heretics, who had not the same veneration for the philosophers as the apostles. In one Christian country they have taught that our articles of faith had been imperfect without philosophy; and, in another, read Aristotle’s ethics on Sundays to the people, instead of the Gospels. Such is the vain arrogance of human reason, as to have puffed up some, in every age, to promise they would show us the truth by the mere light of it, and main- tain it as the only rule of faith. On the contrary, we may safely affirm, that no one ever looked for God and divine truths by reason only, but missed both one and the other. And surely we may in these searches admire reason, though we adore revelation; and where we cannot fix their exact bounds, rather stop too soon in our determinations than too late; not thinking of ourselves more highly than we ought to think. For it is no abasement of human nature to say it is not infallible, nor has all truth under its view. Man is furnished with every thing proper or necessary to his condition, and his glory must be to act according to the order and perfection of his being ; but as he cannot exceed the powers bestowed on him, it is not justice, but presumption and error, to ascribe operations to him which he never could attain or fulfil: man has a law (as all other creatures of God have) which he is capable of obeying, and it is highly unphilosophical, an arbitrary assertion, to affirm he has performed actions which REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 1) no principle, no essential power, no experience, has or can prove him capable of. The ancient times, in whatever light we view them, are a convincing proof of this: the most exalted capacities that soared as far as reason could lead them without any supe- rior assistance, always found themselves entangled in inex- tricable difficulties, which not being able to solve, they pro- nounced incomprehensible; and finding it impossible to arrive at clear certainty or knowledge, fell into the other extreme; and because the intellect could not comprehend all truth, concluded there was no rule or measure of it; that because all things are not evident, nothing is. They so far discovered the weakness and confusion of reason, that many affirmed there was no such thing as science or certainty, and that all our wisdom never went beyond opi- nion and probability. This at least may hint to us the unmeasurable distance betwixt man, confined to the lowest story of the world, and that light which dazzles the angels ; and that it is not so easy a matter to pierce those veils and clouds which God has placed between him and us, and discover his existence, nature, or essence. It may teach us to distrust so wavering a light asthat of nature, and adhere more closely to the revealed one, which will supply its defects, and lead us to truths which no philosopy ever did. “ To find out tactant. error, and know a thing to be false, is wisdom, but P 73. 127° only human wisdom; beyond which no mortal mind can reach.” Democritus was so sensible of this, that he affirmed “he had rather discover one true cause of things, pysep, than be master of the Persian empire.” But to Erepey know the truth is divine wisdom, which man never rit can, nor was intended to attain, except he is taught of God. Hence so many false religions of old, and they who con- demned them could not find out a better. This was the utmost stretch of human philosophy, to discover what was not true, but could not find out or tell what was so. The stoics, above all others, were boasters of wisdom, - pretended to know all things, and be deceived in nothing. Yet Plutarch says of them, “ that there neither had Repug. been, nor was a wise man on the face of the earth.” St Cicero derides their pretence, and says, “‘ No mortal ever attained what they call wisdom.” Stoic: eam sapten- In Laelio. 12. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM tram interpretantur, quam adhuc nemo mortalis est con- secutus. He denies not, as some did, the truth of every thing; but affirms that falsehood is so closely joined with truth, and so like it, that there can be no sure rule of judg- ing or discerning betwixt them. He saw the vanity of the public religions, but stood in suspense, not knowing what Lactant, Path to take: and in this distress of mind uttered Id. that passionate wish : “* O that I could discover truth with the same ease that I can detect falsehood.” But this exceeded his strength, and that of every other mortal. The third objection is, that this hypothesis is an assault upon those many excellent persons who have defended reli- gion by arguments drawn from natural theology. As to the many admirable treatises wrote to demonstrate the existence and attributes of the Deity, with the great duties of religion thence to be inferred, according to the different relations we stand in to God, our neighbour, or our ourselves ; they are worthy of all possible reverence and esteem, have been managed with the utmost strength of judgment and perspicuity of reason, strong and conclusive ar- guments, in a method strict and demonstrative, beyond what other ages have produced. ‘They are the honour of the pre- sent, and will serve for the instruction and imitation of future times. But notwithstanding this, I can dare to affirm, that these inquiries were carried on, these principles so firmly established, these consequences so incontestably demon- strated, not by the strength of reason or light of nature, but by an assistance far superior, the light and evidence of reve- lation. It was under the direction of that unerring and eternal truth, that clear and more infallible knowledge, than geometrical or metaphysical demonstration, that the exalted reason of these excellent persons hath carried their labours so far in the service of religion: and if they had not had the Gospel in their hands, they would have wrote as loosely and incorrectly as the philosophers before them. Let them have honour, but the glory of it be ascribed only to God. If this be not the cause let some other be assigned, why they write on divine subjects so much clearer and fuller, and more consistently, than the ancients did; or show, which of the wise men did it: for nature and reason are still the same; the intellectual faculties were as strong then as they are now. But the truth is, unassisted reason was REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 13 not sufficient for the task, and the primeval revelations were become so obliterated and dark, that they had little advantage from it, except retaining the names of things. And mankind looking on it as a natural right to argue for themselves, every one inquired after God in the same manner as they did after natural things, ¢. e. they sought for him in their own minds, and endeavoured, by the force of their own wisdom, to find him out; but not being Athenag. able to do it, contented themselves with what seemed ?: 7° most probable. And though every one’s sentiment differed essentially from another, yet the prejudice in favour of his own understanding made him zealous to maintain it; so there were as many opinions, or different gods, taught and defended, as there had been philosophers in the world. Most of them retained or picked up some truth; but not being able to trace out the causes or consequences of things, or comprehend the true end of man, for which he Lactant. was created (which not one of them ever did) could ¥: §?*: not produce proper arguments to support the very truths they were in possession of. And the spirit of contradiction so far prevailed, that when they were in the right, they disputed themselves out of it, and brought every thing into confusion. So that in divine things, it is difficult, Lactant. if not impossible, to know what their real thoughts *?-3°° were, or what it was they had a mind to establish. If men surmise, or guess right, yet have no certainty, it is opinion, not knowledge; they stumble upon truth, but do not find it; nor is it truth to them, as not knowing, or being —Amob. capable of proving it to be so. Pages So that if truth was in philosophy, yet, when divided into so many sects, not one point (except names) agreed on, there was opinion, but no knowledge among them; for knowledge consists in certainty, opinion in Lactant. what is doubtful. And the only conclusion to be ? 1! drawn from such a variety of teachers, contradictions, and uncertainties, is, that none of them understood the system — of virtue or religion scientifically. In such a diversity, then, whom must we follow, or what believe ? Where shall truth be placed? If in one sect, you destroy the rest; if in all, you destroy truth. For truth is‘but one, and always con- sistent ; the philosopher never consistent with truth, or with himself. Therefore such a party-coloured scheme as they 14. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM offered must be false, no sure law or rule of life to be ex- tracted from it. For they had some excellent notions in the general, such as to pursue good, and avoid evil: yet the difficulty lay in applying them to particular actions. They were sensible of this, and complained of it, as the cause of all evil to mankind. Todro yap éorl rd atrioy rots avOpdmros TdYT@V TOY KAKGY, TO TAS TpOAHWELs. Tas Kowds mh divacbat Tae SpapudCew rats emt uépovs. They knew not what was ek good or evil, so could not apply the rule to prac- tice; the principle was good, but the conclusion generally falsehood. And what was divine in theory, became useless in life. If it be otherwise, and supernatural truths are so evident to the light of reason, why did they not, with ease and cer- tainty, arrive at the knowledge and uses of them? Why not all agree in necessary, fit, congruous, eternal, and un- alterable principles, so as to draw sure and steady conse- quences from them, without approving and condemning the same thing, in points of highest importance, or confess- ing themselves so divided in thought as not to know what to determine ? Which of the philosophers, Plato, or Aristotle, or Cicero, did this ? Let him be named, that we may know where to find this body of ethics, and complete system of moral righteousness: one whose doctrines are so consistent, as all of them to be justifiable ; for if any be allowed, so must the whole, or the man can be of no authority. For whoever is guilty of contradictions, or utters as much false- hood as truth (which is their case) deserves credit on neither side of the question. Because there must be an eternal dispute in separating things, what to admit, or reject, since the balance is equal, and both have the same grounds for assent ; and consequently neither scale has power to deter- mine the judgment. For if there had been any sure rule of coming at truth in one case, it must also have directed in the other. If there was not, a proposition though true, was only a surmise, a lesson learned by rote, not certainty in him that delivered it. What dependence then can there be on the ancients ? If we disagree, or are mistaken in natural things, there is no harm: to know them is little profit, to be ignorant of them little disadvantage. But in divine and moral ones, which are to direct us to our final good, there is no room for dis-_ Bae noe REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 15 agreement or error: philosophy must have but one voice, must think and speak the same thing, for here mistakes are fatal, and the end of life destroyed. To rest it therefore on the consent or practice of the heathens, is to place it on the winds and waves, which are not more uncertain than their faith or morals were. Name any one doctrine relating to spiritual subjects, and I will show an hundred contra- rieties, an hundred incompatible notions concerning it, among these so much boasted ancients; and amidst so much confusion, what can be determined? our idolatry exceeds theirs: heroes were once deified for real virtues, philosophers at present for imaginary ones, for what they absolutely disclaimed; and we must not believe them, lest we hurt an hypothesis that cannot be supported without giving the lie to what they affirm concerning themselves. Which of them does not constantly lament the igno- rance, weakness, and inability of human nature for these speculations? I shall have occasion to produce them else- where, so need mention but one or two at present. So- crates, who stands in the foremost rank, is full to this purpose; the vanity of others in pretending to wisdom, and the little truth or solidity he found in the learning of the world, fully convinced him of what he so often repeated ? That he knew but one thing with certainty, and that was his ignorance of all things. Plato over and over again reminds his hearers, that in these subjects they were not to expect proof, but only probability for them. Aristotle condemns his predecessors as the most foolish and vain-glorious persons in the world, from a conviction of their (72s. ignorance, and the vanity of imagining that he had n. 28. carried philosophy to the utmost perfection it was capable of. Though no one said or believed less of divine matters than he did. Tully, though such an admirer of philosophy, frequently complains, that among the multitude of its pro- fessors there never had been one wise one—that we are blind in the discernment of wisdom—that some unaccount- able, we know not what error, and miserable ignorance of ~ the truth, has got possession of us—which he accounts for in this manner: “ that all things are surrounded and Acaa. a. and concealed with so thick a darkness, that no !:* »- 9? strength of mind can penetrate them—that knowledge is 16 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM Ia.1.4, hindered by so many obstructions’’—that the wisest n.3. of the ancients did not without reason distrust their ever being able to find out what they desired :—“ that 14.1.1, this induced Socrates, and all of them, to confess n.12. their ignorance, and believe that nothing could be known, comprehended, or understood :’”’ not out of obsti- nacy or dogmaticalness, but from the narrowness of their senses, the weakness of their minds, the shortness of life, and truth being hid as it were in a deep well. Hence all things were maintained from opinion or precept, not from any sure rule of truth; for all things were involved in im- penetrable darkness. Who therefore would not distrust such a guide, as reason or nature, which the heathens found so miserably blind and defective, and could receive no comfort or satisfaction from? yet this was always the case. In things remote from observation, and less cognisable by the senses, philo- sophy could never go far, but being perpetually at a loss, was forced to give over the pursuit; like one that knows not the right way, when he comes to a place where the road divides into different paths, stands in suspense, not daring to choose any, and not able to follow all. Such is the condition of him who has ‘no certain knowledge of the truth; he wavers in his mind, changes his opinion as often as any suspicious objections come in his way; is in a rest- less condition, and floating on uncertainties. This could proceed from nothing, but their ignorance of supernatural things, which surpassed the efforts of human understanding, and what unassisted reason could give them no satisfaction in. They understood not the general propositions, there- fore could not possibly see the consequences which neces- sarily flowed from them, and this made their arguments commonly to err so wide from the truth, and be altogether inconclusive. Of abstracted invisible things they knew little, and agreed less; when they reasoned on the creation, and first principles out of which all things were formed, they were teacaa, SO divided, 7° that a mind of a divine understanding Q 14. would be at a loss which philosopher’s opinion to a. 8 Ghoose,” yet more than one he could not, such were the dissensions among those great men :—“ what seemed REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 17 certain to one, had scarcely the appearance of pro- Id.n. 40. bability to another; so equal are the reasons, even for contrary opinions, that we can neither imagine or know, whether this world was framed by divine counsel or not.” When they argued on Providence, Zeno and the stoics tell them, ‘‘that the ether informed with a mind, is the Id. n. 41. greatest God, and governs all things ;’ Cleanthes, his dis- ciple, ‘that the sun ruled, and had the direction.” Thus, by the differences of wise men, we know not what god to serve, the ether or the sun,—‘ One will have us all soul, and another all body—some placed moral good and ae ee evil in the nature of actions, and of things: others Diog. maintained, that all actions were in their nature 14 indifferent, and become good or evil from institution only, as law or custom had determined.” Every thing but truth had its patron and defender. Ask them the reason of this, and they will tell you, “that each supported his tus. a. own opinion, because nothing better was offered.” | +”. Or, allowing that some few (two or three, says Dr. Clarke) by travel, and collections from foreign schools, together with observing the works of nature, (the principal subject of philosophy,) did raise their minds to juster contempla- tions of the Deity ; yet their notions of his attributes and will were so imperfect, that they could never frame such a connexion of divine truths and their obligations, as to in- fluence the heart, reform the manners, or direct the prac- tice of themselves or others. Pythagoras on this account changed the name of wise men into lovers of wisdom, as believing it not to be attained by human means. For, if the study of philosophy, or application, had been a certain path to it, it-must have been discovered by some of those exalted spirits. But when through successive ages so many great and accurate minds were broke, and worn out in search of it, yet all in vain ; it shows the widest difference between philosophy and true wisdom, and that its professors neither knew what or where the truth was, they so ardently sought for. Cicero observing this, it made him lay down the ‘ys, q. following rule for his philosophical inquiries: «that } 4 2. 4. as judgment was free, and every one at liberty to support his own opinion, he would not tie himself down to any sect or school, but always adhere to that which was most pro- 18 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM bable.” And yet what is the conclusion of all his labours consecrated to the search of disinterested knowledge, beyond what any other uninspired person ever made. “ We 1a.1.1. only follow probabilities, and are not able to go a m2) istep further.” And whatever extraordinary things the maintainers of the law of nature, in support of their arguments, have said of the ancients; yet finding them so often at a loss, per- plexed, and entangled; in their cooler hours they speak of the weakness of reason (and of them) as the philosophers did ; and make such concessions, as utterly invalidate its testimony. I have a right to appeal to them, which I shall frequently do, and think the cause might be left to their determination. But from what has been said, an observation arises, which, being allowed on all hands, ought to be carried through this dispute, and that is, the great difference be- tween reason in a state of nature, or assisted with very small degrees of external light; and reason guided by re- velation, or directed by grace: both which have removed the doubts and obscurities of former ages, plainly un- folded the sublimest truths, the existence and essence of a Deity, the means of reconciliation, the immortality of the. soul, a future state of rewards and punishments, and de- elared in the plainest manner, the will of the Supreme Being, as a law and rule of life to men: what was to one opinion, to the other is evidence; what the eye of reason could not discover, that of faith distinctly sees. One argues from doubts and probabilities, the other on firm established principles, between which there can be no proportion. And the former can only come under this consideration : not what reason is able to apprehend when proposed, nor how far enlarge its knowledge from the advantage of ampler discoveries, in discerning the evidence of many truths de- ducible from them, or arguments for their confirmation : but only what naked unassisted reason could attain without any other light or direction. On this footing only the pre- sent hypothesis is, or can be grounded ; and will (I doubt not) appear equally redounding to the honour of God, more consistent with scripture, history, reason, the nature of things, common observation, and liable to fewer diffi- culties than any other. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 19 As to the fourth objection: this cannot throw the least imputation on the wiser heathens, who by all parties are allowed to have had a more defective light, than what Jews did, or Christians do enjoy. To cast any blemish upon them would be degrading human nature, of which they were astonishing and illustrious ornaments. They seem to have a dignity of soul peculiar to themselves, a mind large and imperious, thoughts manly and noble, searches after truth quick and indefatigable, sentiments of virtue in particular instances very sublime, and carried human wit and reason to the utmost pitch it was capable of under their circumstances. They now live in their writings more than in their marbles; must be reverenced and esteemed whilst learning flourishes in the world, and will be examples to all succeeding generations. Their making such vast efforts is truly admirable; and by what they have done, we may judge what greater things they would have performed, had their assistances been equal to those of later ages; and to the want of them must be ascribed the many errors and imperfections they inevitably fell into, which to me seems the highest encomium that can be given of them. It is an amiable and noble character to say, they did whatever was in their power to benefit and instruct man- kind. As, on the other hand, to suppose them able to have given the world a complete system of religious virtue, yet did not, or would not do it, is staining them with the blackest infamy and reproach. Or to say, a perfect rule of life is discoverable by reason, yet no such rule is to be found in the collective writings ofall, much less in any one of those uncommon spirits (who, if ever men did, made a proper use of their intellectuals, by pursuing all the means of knowledge and instruction) is to affirm and deny the same thing, that nature can, and cannot do it; for these propositions, « No man has been wise, and no man, v4 can be wise, are equivalent.” And if it were a Deorum, a task above their capacities (as will be hereafter fully manifested) it must be so to every mortal, who has no other teacher; and there could be no such thing as natural religion. It is therefore an act of justice we owe to virtue, to them, and to ourselves, to examine their opinions, embrace what Lu SuMe ole a 20 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM is good, reject the bad, separate the ore from the dross, truth from falsehood, admire their merit without idolizing their authority, and praise their virtues without subscribing to their errors or failings. Not to pay them an implicit Aa. Attie, faith, and worship them as gods, with Cicero : Plato, - 4. Epist. Deus tlle noster. Nor choose to err with a master, Puse.Q. Yatherthan be in the right with others: Lrrare malo 1.1.n.17- eym Platone, quam cum istis vera sentire. Such was the prejudice to party rather than to truth; or per- haps it is a strength which few men can arrive at, to pre- serve the entire prerogative of judgment, so as never to be over-ruled by false reason or incompetent authority. Nay, Plato, according to Ammonius, has given us a rule to Peasant judge by, inall such cases. “ Socrates is dear, but > 4 truth much dearer to us.” And he puts into his master’s mouth the same advice to Cimias and Cebes: Phed. p. “ Believe me only thus far, as to have a great esteem ph for truth, but very little for Socrates.” We must _ and ought to differ from every one, so far (and no further) as he differs from truth. ‘This is the privilege of reason, not to be fettered down by the opinions or understanding of others: and it is a real greatness of soul to preserve our liberty entire, so as to be able to assert the one, and dis- eard the other, according to our best light, and the justest apprehensions we have; and in all philosophical inquiries, to proportion our assent to the different degrees of certi- tude in the subject of debate. Plato indeed spoke in a nobler strain of the Deity than any who went before him; yet delivers numberless things inconsistent with such a Being, and talks, as the poets and others did, of the origin, nature, and vices of the gods. He has some inimitable sentiments of virtue, but at the same time defends many principles productive of the foulest Vid Serra- errors. ‘‘ No one had grander ideas or rose higher ni Pref.in - . : : : Philes, in sublime notions, nor did any fall into more grievous and abominable mistakes.” His scholar Aristotle is another instance of this; a man of most profound judgment and accuracy, called the finish- ing stroke of nature, the measure of human understanding, as knowing all that any mortal is capable of knowing: so that Averroes thought nature was not perfect till he was born. Yet, in the articles of greatest importance, even REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 21 concerning God, he speaks contradictory and inconsistent things: and so perplexedly of the soul’s immortality, that, instead of clearing up doubts, he raised the utmost difficul- ties in the minds of men. The same may be said of all the rest. If their perfec- tions were many, so were their faults; their virtues were great, but so were their vices; if rays of light shine forth in their writings, it is from the midst of a thick darkness ; and the veins of gold which lie in them are hid under a mass of fable and error. When, therefore, we meet with some glittering expressions, and shining sentences, we need not be transported, and lay so great a stress upon them, as if the whole of their religion was equally pure and ortho- dox. They are blended with principles unworthy of a Deity, and destructive of virtue; and when examined, will be found to be loose independent periods, without any co- herence to the subject or one another. How dazzling soever they may be, their being mixed with so many false defective notions, must convince us, that their opinions are but the shadows of truth; and that no rule of duty can with safety be extracted from them; that reason was insuf- ficient to divine knowledge, and therefore great caution should be used in forming our judgments from them. If the heathens, from perceiving this imperfection of nature’s light, with freedom examined and condemned each other's sentiments ; to deny the same liberty to Christians, would be an unreasonable imposition. Men of parts and leisure may read the philosophers as an useful entertainment of the mind, and find many things truly great and worthy their admiration: but as a rule of life, they are infinitely defec- tive, and therefore of no use to the generality of mankind. Nor was this the opinion of private persons only, but of their wisest and best-regulated states. When they wanted di- rection in religious matters, they did not imagine their own or the philosopher’s reason able to instruct them, but that they were under a necessity of applying to the gods, for a rule of devotion. Cicero instances this of the Athenians, _ who, sending to inquire of Apollo what religion they should profess and hold? the oracle answered, “that of their fore- fathers.” They again demanded, since the religions of their ancestors were various, which of them they should pitch upon? the oracle replied, ‘ the best.” This shows the 92 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM opinion of the heathens, that a light superior to that of nature was wanted in divine affairs ; the only recourse was to the gods; and at the same time gives a view of the lamentable ignorance they were in concerning them, who had such gods for their counsellors, that could give no description or characters whereby true religion was to be known, but those of tradition and antiquity. The intent of the Athenians was to embrace the best, but neither they nor the Pythian could tell what it was. And it is amazing that Christians should refer the determination of any thing sacred to a nation, where both gods and men so avowedly confess their ignorance. I would from hence infer two things ; first, that we ought not to rest implicitly on the authority of philosophers ; it being their peculiar error to be slaves to an hypothesis, and never sacrifice to truth, nor judge of the light of nature by sententious scraps picked out of them, but from comparing the whole of what they taught with truth. And, secondly, that if no better light than that of reason had been vouch- safed to mankind, they had ever been to seek in these points of the highest moment, what was the end of man, and what the sure means of attaining it, as the most zea- lous defenders of natural religion allow. To which I shall add, that from the beginning of the world they would have remained in utter ignorance of God, andall manner of religion. For reason cannot reach what is above it, without some assistance besides its own. The philosophers knew more than others, but fell infinitely short of truth. And their soaring so high in some things, then immediately dropping into an abyss of error and impiety, ought to humble human reason, and teach us this at least, that the philosophical light in its utmost strength stands in need of a revealed one to supply its defects; which was the great want and de- sideratum of the wiser heathens; and at the same time makes us suspect, that in their loftiest flights they raised themselves on borrowed pinions. For in all ages they racked their brains to the utmost about important points in divinity, yet were forced to leave them undecided: the attempt was at impossibilities, and reason ever found them out of its depth, and beyond its limits. So that duty, hap- piness, and the true end of man, were never fixed or de- monstrated by any one of them. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 23 Nor let it be said the accusation is carried too far. In- quire of their professed admirers and advocates, and they will tell us the same thing; that, with the good principles they had received, they mixed the most ridiculous trifles and follies. Even Serranus can confess it of his preg, in beloved Plato, who, from his almost incredible Pt: Op. knowledge of sublime truths, God, the soul, and a future life, was called, by antiquity, the Homer and the God of philosophers; by Christians, the wisest, the best, the most useful and holy, the most venerable and divine of all among them ; yet taught the most prodigious errors, and abomin- able vices. That he wandered about the wide sea of knowledge, impatient after truth; but having no certain port to steer to, nor pilot to direct. him, nor sufficient light from heaven to make observations by; the consciousness of his own ignorance made him complain that he was (rAvdwviCduevos) tossed about like the waves, and acknow- ledge the want of a divine guide, and earnestly desire such assistance to arrive at certain truth. He was sensible of the depravity of human nature; that the utmost force of reason was weak and dull, oppressed by a gross earthly ignorance ; that the true and primitive form of the mind, now polluted with innumerable vices, could not possibly be discerned ; that great disorders were introduced into the soul of man, and that we cannot judge thereof, by what we now perceive of it, enclosed within the body, and defiled with many evils. Like the statue of the sea-god Glaucus, Repup.1o. we are ignorant of its former beauty ; some parts of ?: 1: it broken, others worn with the violence of the waves; al- most covered with shells and weeds, and stones growing over it, that it retains but little of its ancient form—*“ That the mind at present has but little solid knowledge, Politicus, knows things but as in a dream, and in reality is ig- P- 277. norant of every thing. And he was so far from yeno. ascribing perfection to human nature, that he af- P- 71. firms he had never met with a man who knew what virtue was.” But though the pure light of original wisdom was, by sin, and the withdrawing of the divine presence, exceedingly darkened in the minds of men, yet was it not quite extin- guished; but by conveyance of original revelations, the direction of providence, and the constant practice of reli- 24 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM gious acts in some parts of the world; the xouval evo, common notices of God, and his worship, of justice and so- ciety, were kept alive in the hearts and consciences of men; by which means some apprehensions of a Deity and wor- ship, however unbecoming, were retained in most nations of the earth. Thus, in the midst of a night of ignorance, some rays of light shone forth, but the darkness comprehended them not. And when Thales, Plato, and others, some 4ges after, imported into Greece more noble maxims and gene- ral propositions concerning God, virtue, happiness, and a future state; all that philosophy could extract from them was but mere conjecture, the interferences of little real use, and the conclusions often intolerable. Instead of im- proving faith, they disguised it by their reasoning upon it, and mixing it up with their own fancies and superstitions. Though the principles were good, yet the arguments proved bad, from their being entirely ignorant of the manner and reasons of them. They had the names, but not the sense or explanation; so that their words often expressed and signified more, than they did or could conceive in their minds: this was the occasion of their inconsistency; nei- ther the terms, or connection of them, being understood, made the deductions irregular or monstrous ; and from the corruption of truth, did so much error abound in the world. This made Plato, who at some times discourses most fitly of the divine nature, so constantly lose the path he had entered on, and wander back to his former state of dark- ness. Truths to them, were like lightning in a tempestuous night to a lost traveller, which dazzles for a_moment, but proves of no real service to direct him. Even Plato, I say, who was vastly superior to all that went before him in the knowledge of divine things, and had learned enough to discern the vanity of many prevailing superstitions, could by the help of nature or philosophy go no further. But nTimza. amidst the perfections he had conceived of the Deity, re- commends the worship of false gods, and the same sacri- fices as the people offered to their idols. When one would think him on the very brink of truth, he on a sudden turns back to all the madness and folly of his country. Now, if we try all methods of accounting for this, we shall find none rational, or consistent with the character and — = ee ae ~ ™ m2 omy ee ee -=—-—— REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 25 dignity of this great man, so impatient after knowledge, who had treasured up such noble principles, and yet was able to make so little use of them; but that theology was not a science ; they understood not the nature or impor- tance of it; neither what its terms signified, nor what con- sequences ought naturally to have been made from them; | which they must necessarily have done, if what they de- livered of sacred matters had been of their own invention. I am aware of what is always said in answer to this; that the fear of Socrates’s prison was the cause of Plato and others concealing their real sentiments. But this isa refuge so base and abject, as to render philosophy and its teachers contemptible both to God and man. For if this apology be true, it will follow, First, that we can never tell what their real sentiments were, and therefore they cannot be appealed to upon any occasion. Secondly, that they did not suppose there were any obligations in religion, since it was not attended with hopes or fear, reverence or obedience: for if it had, among the thousands who every day rushed upon death, for the sake of their country, more than one must have been found who dared to have sacrificed them- selves for the sake of truth. This evidently appears on the preaching the gospel, when the convert heathens no sooner saw the dependence of religion on the will of the true God, but every one was a Socrates, ready to undergo martyrdom for it. This method, therefore, of accounting for the de- fects in philosophy, is false or unworthy. But it is an apology becoming the dignity of Plato; it is a true one, to say, “that Grecian wisdom was the spoil of Egyptian and oriental schools, where ancient truths had been miser- ably mangled and defaced, and the light of natural reason was too weak to restore them to their original holiness and purity.” , The same observation will hold universally true, even of Cicero, the greatest of them; who, in so many places, es- pecially his justly-admired dream of Scipio, wherein he soars with that majesty, teaches us to despise the world, proposes such glorious rewards to virtue, touches the pas- sions with that delicacy, that they accompany him to the stars with a ravishing pleasure, seem to hear the harmony he describes above, and the mind almost believes he is showing the way to a real immortality. Yet reason is lost C 26 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM in the clouds, his wings fail him, and he drops faster than he rose before; his mighty genius could add nothing to what every pagan knew, talks of the deification of Romulus, the eternity of the soul, from the old but false argument of its bemg the principle of motion, and a self-mover ; and, instead of the certainty of a future state, concludes with the stale Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration. Thus Plato, in his ‘“Timeeus,” wanders into all the errors that the philosophers or poets had done. We say not, there are no divine truths among their writing, but none scientifically understood or proved. The philosophers spake well as learned men, were improvers of - every art and science, except divinity; in human studies carried the mind to its utmost pitch, and, in their observa- tions and inferences from natural things, even seemed to sur- Lactant, Pass it; but in sacred ones were ever ata loss: “they 1.3.p. could not exceed the powers of nature, nor speak truth on those subjects, having never learned it of him who could alone instruct them ; nor ever came so near it, as when they confessed their ignorance of it.” Which may teach us, that our only sure retreat is to a super- natural light, and to have no confidence in vain philosophy, lestit deceive us to the prejudice of religion: a caution which a the early Christians always used. St. Jerom does pist. ad : 5 Heliodo- not stick to say, e¢ cum suis stultus Plato dis- mm ewulis; Aristoteli sua argumenta non proderunt. And he imputes the rise of all heresy to Plato and the Pla- Cont, tonists. And Origen, that if one may dare to speak Cels.1.6. the truth, the reading of Plato’s elegant works »- 275. profited but very few, if it profited at all. And what poison lurks, how many snares lie under the specious words of science, falsely so called, appears from this con- fession of Ficinus: that, had it not been for the care of a learned friend, these his beloved studies had led him into the most pernicious fundamental errors. We must beware, then, that an admiration of their opinions beget not a slavery to them. No ards a, no authority, but that which is divine, can be the measure or standard of truth. The best of philosophers, though he indulged himself in it, con- Cic. Nat, demned it in others: apud quos tantum prejudi- D. cata opinio poterat, ut sine vratione valeret auto- vitas. This may also show us the vain pretensions of modern REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 27 philosophy, that from the clearness and connexion of ideas, man may learn his duty. Whereas, the greatest heathens, notwithstanding their sagacity and attention, had not clear ideas of first principles, nor saw the connexion of one duty upon them. As also of such other modern doctrines: “that they who never heard of any external reve- cnristia- lation, yet if they knew from the nature of things 3 ¢° what is fit for them to do, they know all that God p. 233. will, or can require of them.’ Since it appears that all these things were above the strength of human minds; they neither understood the nature of things, nor could assign one reason for them, nor saw what was fit to be done, nor that it was the will of God, nor their obligation to practise it; and if they did not, it is religion, not reason, which teaches these truths. What I say is confirmed by the judgment of most illus- trious men, at home and abroad. Among the latter, one of vast erudition (the famous Monsieur Perrot) has these words: “no one, but a novice in philosophy, will think that all manner of questions may be resolved by it; they who go further in the knowledge of things, meet with greater difficulties ; two contrary opinions are often equally probable; and if they embrace one of them, it is rather out of inclination than reason. Man cannot judge certainly of any thing whatsoever, his reason deceives him as well as his senses; we live among errors and doubts, and have no certain truths here below, but those which God has re- vealed. Take a sight of all the schools of philosophy, con- sider what they do and teach there: you will find pre- sumption in some, obstinacy in others, ignorance, error, and weakness in them all. Since, then, reason is so weak, that the least difficulties puzzle it, is deceived and mistaken at every turn, let us be sure not to trust so blind a guide, nor ground our belief on so weak a foundation. Not rely upon our arguments, but upon Him who made heaven and earth. -Let us always remember, that we must believe in God, and not ourselves ; and if we use our reason in what concerns divine things, we only imitate the cynic, who, not contented with the light of the sun, took a candle at noon- day to search for a good man.” * To which his commen- tator adds, “ that a persuasion grounded upon the light of nature, ought to be considered in a Christian, as eloquence 28 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM in a philosopher, or agreeableness in history; they are no essential parts; the want of them can be no prejudice, though to enjoy them be no disadvantage. But the un- certainty of reason, and the certainty of divine faith, must dispose us to be always ready to lose sight of philosophy, when it cannot be extended to the doctrines that are above its reach, and beyond the capacity of our reason.” Mr. Locke, who so thoroughly saw the limits of human understanding, and, far from being prejudiced in favour of this hypothesis, could not help remarking: ‘‘ whatever was the cause, it is plain in fact, human reason unassisted, failed men in its great and proper business of morality. It never, from unquestionable principles by their deductions, made out an entire body of the law of nature. And he that shall collect all the moral rules of the philosophers, and compare them with those contained in the New Testament, will find them come short of the morality delivered by our Saviour, and taught by his apostles; a college made up, for the most part, of ignorant, but inspired fishermen.” To which I shall add the testimony of that most learned Hie philosopher and able defender of natural religion, sem Dr. Clarke: ‘that notwithstanding the original fit- vol.2. “ness of men’s natural faculties and capacities, to search after and apprehend God; yet, in fact, men, with- out the assistance of revelation, did not attain to a right knowledge of him in any considerable degree. Of the philosophers themselves, who should have corrected the errors of the vulgar, some argued themselves out of the be- lief of the very being of God: some, by ascribing all things to chance, others to absolute fatality, equally subverted all true notions of religion, and made the doctrine of the resur- rection of the dead, and of a future judgment, needless and impossible. Most of them allowed and encouraged the worship of such false gods, as the poets had first feigned, like the most wicked men. Some professed open immorality ; others, by subtile distinctions, patronized particular vices to which themselves were most addicted. The better sort of them, who were the most celebrated, and with the greatest reason discoursed, yet with much uncertainty and doubt- fulness, concerning things of the highest importance,—the providence of God in governing the world, the immortality of the soul, and a future judgment. And, excepting two REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 25 or three very eminent persons, who appeared singly in so many different ages of the world, as lights raised up, by Providence, to shine in a dark place; excepting these, I say, the generality of the philosophers’ disputes, even upon these most important subjects, were managed in a way of pride and vain glory, subtilty and strife, ending in nothing but words and empty contention; and having little or no influence and authority, to amend and reform the manners of a degenerate and corrupt world.” Is it possible to give a more desponding account of the light of nature than this? That, notwithstanding the fitness of men’s capacities to search after and apprehend God; yet, in fact, without revelation, they did attain no compe- ‘tent knowledge of him? That all the teachers of mankind, who had no other light to follow, were immoral idolaters or atheists, except two or three, and they raised up by the special appointment of Providence? Must not nature be a miserable instructor, that, in so many ages, such distant parts of the world, so many schools of learning, with such indefatigable pains as were taken, could produce but two or three, out of millions of rational creatures, to have any tolerable apprehensions of the divine nature, their first cause, and last end? And yet these two or three were so far from having any clear ideas of a Supreme Being, or a worship due to him, that many of their notions were in- compatible and contradictory to all the perfections we can conceive of him. How then can reason be the origin of religion, since it has neither consent, nor practice, nor a direct knowledge of any one truth? Yet all these difficulties are removed, by allowing that divine things were originally taught by reve- lation, the notices whereof passing by oral tradition only, in process of time became so altered and obscured, that mankind had lost the true apprehensions of things, and could not recover the clear knowledge of them without a su- pernatural assistance. And that this occasioned those lame imperfect accounts of God and Providence, the soul’s im- - mortality, and a future state ; and was the reason that the world, for two thousand years, could not exhibit a tolerable system of religion, draw up any regular table of commands and prohibitions, or adjust the limits of moral good and evil. : ) 30 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM To what has been already said concerning the philoso- phers, I shall add two observations, as relative to the pre- sent inquiry. First, that their testimony may be allowed as amply in favour of this hypothesis as of any other. Secondly, that none can with justice be appealed to, who lived after the revelation of the gospel. And for the fol- lowing reasons : Because Christianity made such an amazing progress in the world; that, as Pliny in a letter to Trajan, says, it had reached not only the cities, but the villages and the coun- try, and that great numbers of all ages, sexes, and condi- tions, had embraced it. As Tertullian afterwards boasted : Apol.ec. we have filled with our company all places, except 2: your temples.” And because the learned heathens, having an inquisitive curiosity after all new things, Acts xvii. 21, could not fail to inform themselves exactly of its doctrines ; from whence they received many and great ad- vantages, in adding a large stock of new truths to their former attainments, in removing difficulties which till then had been insurmountable, spiritualizing gross and carnal opi- nions, reconciling seeming contrarieties till then never un- derstood, clearing up obscure fables and traditions, and above all, by engrafting sublimer notions into their ancient theology. All this they did very industriously, at the same time endeavouring by all possible means to disguise and conceal whence they borrowed them, that such acquisitions might pass upon the world for their own. And as the later Platonists, above all others, were engaged in this un- dertaking, they can never be appealed to as proper wit- nesses in behalf of natural religion, having so much altered what their fathers professed, and made a thorough refor- mation in philosophy, by mixing so much of Christianity with it. That they did study the Scriptures with great diligence, is evident from the many instances in ecclesiastical history, of those who, in spite of their beloved philosophy, and against all the prejudices men generally conceive for the opinions they have been educated in, after long and mature deliberation, being convinced of the superior wisdom and divinity of the gospel, became its sincere disciples and able defenders. For not the multitude only, but persons eminent | REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 51 in station, distinguished for genius and learning, orators, grammarians, lawyers, physicians, philosophers, such as were skilled in all the literature and wisdom of the world, the most judicious and inquisitive of mankind, men of no easy faith, (as Trypho derided Justin,) but convinced by the evidence of truth, were added daily to the church: nor did they, till after a long and diligent inquiry, give up their former persuasions, and renounce a catholic religion, estab- lished so many ages, and in whose favour they were strongly prejudiced. In the earliest days, the proconsul Sergius and Dio- nysius the Areopagite were of this number. But to many instances, I shall only just mention Justin Martyr, whose account of himself (in the Dialogue with Trypho ) is very remarkable, and a most lively representation of the thirst the heathens had for knowledge, together with the little satisfaction they received from it. And his relation may deserve credit, since antiquity mentions him as one little behind the apostles, either in time or virtue. In him we see the true philosopher, impatient after wisdom, labo- riously collecting all the learning of the Gentile world, yet unsatisfied in his most serious inquiries after truth. He first betook himself to the stoics, where, finding no solution to his doubts, he went to a peripatetic, but soon concluded that truth did not dwell with him. Then toa Pythago- rean, who requiring the preparatory knowledge of music, astronomy, geometry, &c. he deserted him, and gave him- self up to the institution of an eminent Platonist, with whose intellectual faculties he was greatly taken, and resolved for some time to abandon himself to solitude and contemplation. He ransacked all the wisdom of the world, in search of God and happiness, was tired out, yet found no peace or com- fort; every step added to his anxiety and despair, but brought no relief to his mind, till, in his solitude he met a venerable old man, who fell into discourse with him on the excellency of philosophy in general, and Platonism in parti- cular,-and soon convinced him of the error of those, whom. he depended upon as the bulwarks of learning, and thought nothing could escape their penetration. It concerns me not, says the blessed guide, what Plato, Pythagoras, or others maintained ; he passes them by, and instructs him in the nature of God, the soul, and its certain way to attain 32. .THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM everlasting felicity. He then directs him to the prophets and the Scriptures, where true wisdom only can be learned, and here the disciple found rest to his soul. I found this at last, says he, to be the only sure and profitable philoso- phy. He immediately divests himself of all the human learning he had collected from the different schools, and even from his beloved Plato; adores his infallible master and his doctrine, and, from the force of heavenly truth, learned what no philosophy could teach any of its profes- sors, to despise the sentence and the fate of Socrates, and become a martyr for it. They both fell by poison, but with vastly different circumstances, one in doubts, uncer- tainty, and ignorance; the other with full hopes and assur- ance of a blessed immortality. Such were also Tertullian, Minucius, Cyprian, Arnobius, &c. all professors of science among the heathens; but by examining the principles of the gospel, became its proselytes and advocates; and we may safely judge, the other learned heathens, from being well acquainted with the Scriptures, though they did not be- come converts, could not fail of making great advantage by it. This plagiarism the convert heathens expressly charge Just. Mart. them with,—* that, as the ancients had borrowed poh 1. from the prophets, so did the moderns from the Apol.c.47. gospels.’ And Tertullian,—< which of your poets, which of your sophisters have not drank from the fountains of the prophets? It is from these sacred sources likewise, that your philosophers have refreshed their thirsty spirits ; and if they found any thing in the holy scriptures, which might hit their fancies, or serve their hypothesis, they took and turned it to a compliance with their own curiosity ; not considering these writings to be sacred and unalterable, nor understanding their sense. Every one in- ferring and reforming as his fancy led him. Nor do I wonder the philosophic wits play such foul pranks with the Old Testament, when I find some of the same generation among ourselves, who have made as bold with the New, and composed a deadly mixture of gospel and opinion, as De Ani- philosophising vanity led them.” So again he taxes ma,¢.2. them with mixing their own corruptions with the truths they borrowed from the Scriptures, turning them quite another way, and making that little truth a plea for the rest of their errors. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 33 It was from a converse with Christians, that Epictetus learned to reform the doctrine and abase the pride of the ‘Stoical school. Philostratus wrote of Apolonius to equal his miracles with those of our Saviour; as Eunapius did those of the Sophists in opposition to the primitive Chris- tians. So Celsus and Porphyry studied the Scriptures on purpose to contradict them. But hence proceeded another great alteration in’ the schools of philosophy. The world had been overrun with disputes, contradictions, and finding faults with each other. There was no such thing as a catholic philosophy or reli- gion, but every one having a natural right to reason for themselves, pertinaciously adhered to, and defended their own opinion. The generality of mankind, however, were divided between the schools of Plato and Aristotle, and the Christians never failed to reproach them with the dis- agreement and contrariety betwixt them: that both could not be in possession of truth, and probably neither: that in philosophy every thing was obscure, dark, and incon- sistent; in Christianity every thing clear, rational, and satisfactory :- to which may be added another argument, that its professors lived above the most exalted notions the world ever had conceived of virtue. They seeing this objection, in the present circumstances of philosophy, to be unanswerable, immediately endea- voured to make it more uniform, enrich it with the additions of more excellent truths, and reconcile the principles of their founders. It was the attempt, and indefatigable pains of many, Porphyry, Boethius, &c. and among the rest of Hierocles, to show how their opinions might Ex Pho- be demonstrated to have a perfect harmony and “® P- * agreement with each other. He indeed would have the world believe, that whoever imagined there was any differ- ence between them, widely misunderstood the sense of both these great men. He however confesses, that such irregularities continued till the learning of Ammonius— shone forth upon the world; who when he had purged the opinions of the anciént philosophers, proved that Plato and Aristotle, in most material points, were vastly uniform and agreeable. Therefore he calls him écod3{daxrov, One P. 39 and instructed of God, who, by despising the various **- opinions which brought such disgrace to philosophy, and c2 34 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM thoroughly understanding both sects, had brought them to a reconciliation, and was enabled to give his hearers an hypothesis free from all contention and dispute. p. 27. Hierocles also attempted to reconcile the ancient oracles and priestly laws of Orpheus, Homer, and all the pre- decessors of Plato in the same manner; which was a task of infinite difficulty, and what therefore he laid out all his strength of understanding on, to make their doctrines tally, and (as he describes those of Socrates) to stand upright like a die whichever way they fall. His greatest difficulty, after having read the scripture-doctrine of the creation, was how to varnish over that monstrous doctrine of two eternal independent principles, God and matter, and re- concile those distant ideas of a Creator and uncreated creature. But Photius, from whom we have this, says, all his mighty contrivance ended in mere trifles. It is scarce then to be imagined, that the philosophers of the second century, Marcus Antoninus, Maximus Ty- rius, and others, were ignorant of the Christian doctrine, though the reformation of philosophy received the finishing hand from Ammonius, who lived about the beginning of the third century, and presided with great honour over the Platonic school at Alexandria; a man of such exquisite learning, that they thought him inspired, being thoroughly instructed in all the subtilities of the Pagan, and mysteries of the Christian religion. When such an one undertook to reform the ancient philosophy, to reconcile inveterate feuds which subsisted till that time between the schools of Plato and Aristotle; it is no wonder, that, with these qua- lifications, he was able to do it in an extraordinary mamner ; by paring off superfluities, rejecting falsehoods, abolishing those niceties and cavils which were a disgrace to the pro- fession, and especially by adding many noble sentiments to it, and thereby propounding a more generous and regular system than the world had yet known. Porphyry, for the credit of his religion, affirms him to have become an heathen as soon as he studied philosophy, and Hierocles seems to have accounted him so; but Euse- bius and Jerom deny it, and testify that he died a Christian. And though his scholars were of both religions, as his chair was particularly devoted to philosophical lectures, yet it is certain that he taught divinity also, and had, among REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 35 others, the great Origen for his disciple. Nor is it easy to conceive, that in an age when the power of godliness pre- vailed in the minds of men, and an holy zeal to instruct the world made them prefer martyrdom to silence, that so great and good a man should not take all opportunities of making proselytes to the faith, and instruct his hearers in the mysteries of the gospel, as well as the speculations of philosophy. If we trace this matter up a little higher, we shall find that the thirst after knowledge had for several ages carried men to the most distant persons and places, that made a profession of learning. Hence Athens, and afterwards Rome, became so crowded with the literati. But no city enjoyed this honour with greater advantages than Alexan- _ dria. Many of the Jews who escaped the Babylonish captivity, fled to Egypt; and multitudes of them, by Alex- ander’s favour, settled in this new metropolis. And as the Egyptians were naturally inquisitive after their mysteries, so undoubtedly the Jews communicated some proper parts of their knowledge to them, which afterward became fully opened in that inestimable treasure, the translation of the Scriptures by the Seventy. It grew famous also for the noble library founded there by Philadelphus, under the care of Demetrius Phalareus, (to which Mare Antony added that of Pergamus,) and the encouragement its princes gave to learned men. The Ptolemies invited all the philosophers of eminence to settle there, so that it might be said, there were only remains of learning in other parts of the world. At the first planting of Christianity, St. Mark founded here not only a church, glorious in its patriarchs, but also a school, which in time became the greatest nursery of philosophy and the sciences. They who presided over it were the most renowned persons, admirably versed in all learning human and divine, in the depths both of Pagan and Christian wisdom, so that it has been called the uni- versal school of the church. Among its rectors, was Pan- teenus, an excellent stoic, before he became Christian, and, as Eusebius says, well skilled in human as well as divine ae learning. He was succeeded by Clemens Alexan- Becl. 1.5. drinus, whose writings sufficiently prove his exten- © ’° sive knowledge in all parts of wisdom. In this number 36 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM was the great Ammonius, the head of philosophers in his age, from whom all those Platonists styled, é« ris iepas -yeveas, of the sacred succession, derived their notions. Such were Origen, Herennius, and Plotinus, the preceptor of Porphyry, as he again was of Jamblichus. Origen was in such reputation, that not only Christians, but philosophers flocked to his lectures; wherein, says Eusebius, he read the mathematics, and other parts of philosophy, as well as the Scriptures ; and where the most important truths were constantly preached, and familiarly expounded, in their catechetical exercises: it is impossible but the subject of them must be universally known. After Origen, were Heraclas, Dionysius, Athenodorus, Malchion, and Didy- mus, who reached to the year 300. It was in this school that Ammonius undertook the reformation of philosophy, by blending Platonism and Christianity together, which was afterwards the principal study of the heathen professors, such as Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyry, Hierocles, Syrianus, Proclus, Marinus, Damas- cius, and others of the sacred succession. And they had several views therein: first, that whilst they professed an inveterate opposition to the Scriptures, they were at liberty to select out whatever would sublimate and refine their own doctrines. Secondly, thereby to raise the value of Plato’s philosophy. Thirdly, to depreciate Christianity ; and, fourthly, especially to reform their natural theology, and demon-worship, by paring off gross absurdities (at which the reason of mankind was then generally shocked) giving new interpretations to things which their forefathers never thought of: and, above all, in asserting one supreme Deity, though they could not agree in their notions of him, either who, or what he was. This tampering however with philosophy gave a mortal wound to religion, its beauty was sullied by such impure mixtures; and from that bitter and poisonous root, all the errors and apostacies sprang up, which have since befallen the church of Christ. The advantage however that re- dounded to philosophy, at the expence of Christianity, which they plundered and adulterated, is evident from their writing in so much a sublimer strain than any of their predecessors had done upon important truths; such as the degeneracy of souls, and their return to God; the origin REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE 37 of evil, which had so miserably perplexed the ancients; of Providence, and especially of the eternity of matter, so inconsistent with a Maker of the universe. For, by advantage of the Scriptures, being come to a certain knowledge of sacred truths, which none before had a possibility of doing, they borrow from them whatever could improve, or be reconciled with their own systems, which they alter, disguise, and blend in such a manner, as they hoped no one could know whence they had them. Upon this stock they grow arrogant, and blame their pre- decessors in the school of Plato for delivering some doc- trines, and interpreting others contrary to the sentiments of their master ; though no such arguments or consequences are to be found in any of his writings. These new acqui-. sitions they set up, and boast of as their own; and after altering, corrupting, and debasing the truths of Christianity, pretend there is nothing worth taking from it, at the same time they triumph in its spoils. But the Christians plainly saw the theft, indict them as plagiaries, and call such pro- ceedings an adulterous mixture of Divine truths with human inventions. Veritatis dogmata ad philoso- Tertul. phicas sententias adulterare. That if Plato was ae charged with purloining his choicest doctrines from the prophets, they did the same from the apostles ; and this made them speak in a strain as much above Plato, as the apostles did above the prophets. _All their admirable con- _templations and discourses were not from Plato, but from Christian masters, and their noblest flights took wing from the gospel. From the notoriety of this it is that learned men have opposed some errors, frequently urged by those who are en- gaged in advancing philosophy against divinity, which has of late been renewed amongst us, by overvaluing Platonism, as if it equalled, or in some of its notions even outwent that revelation, from whence all its admirable discourses were borrowed. As also others, who would insinuate, that the fathers of the church corrupted the primitive purity of the gospel with philosophy, and obtruded Platonic enthu- slasm upon the world, for faith, mystery, and revelation: both which opposite opinions are equally false and ground- less, and only advanced by those who would degrade the - gospel, by putting a philosophic livery upon it, or by con- founding them together, destroy all positive religion. Ee - 38 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM The application I would make is this: if reason be so sharp-sighted, as to discover all things essential to natural religion and morality (as so called,) how comes it to pass, that these later philosophers reached a much higher ele- vation, and wrote in so much diviner a strain than their masters did, and excel Plato (who for so many ages was the deity of reason and virtue) as far as he did the most fabulous theologists who went before him in their discourses on the Supreme Being, his attributes, creation, providence, nature, and the immortality of the soul, &c.? They could not have it from Pythagoras or Plato, who had made no such clear discoveries; nor had any rational or tolerable account till this time been given of them; they were secrets to the heathens, till they began to study in the schools of Chris- tians. From whence one of these consequences will neces- sarily follow: either that reason, in its most improved state, as supposed in the ancients (who are allowed to have reached the very extremity and utmost limits of human un- derstanding) was not able to attain a competent knowledge of divine things, for they were ignorant of them. It was a point beyond Aristotle’s logic, wherein syllogism and de- monstration always failed him. And though they added new light to what they received from others, yet infelix operts summa, nothing clear, rational, or consistent, was delivered of God, the soul, or immortality : nothing regularly deter- mined on these subjects; nor was it possible there should, having no distinct ideas of them, nor any one that could instruct them; and philosophy without evidence, is know- ledge without science, a sound without a meaning. The Tertul. professor was glorie@ animal, et popularis aure Epo 5 vile mancipium, a seeker of renown, and a slave to Anim.c.l. popular applause. And his profession was pha- Ambros. lerata magis, quam vera saprentia, que aliena querit cum sua nesciat : celi plagas scrutatur, Deum wg- norat quem solum nosse deberet: a gilt bubble, without solidity or use, busy in prying into the heavens, yet igno- rant of God, whom alone it ought to have been acquainted with. And the character Tresmegistus gave of the Greek philosophy, was ‘EAAqver pirogogla, Adyov podos, nothing but a jargon, and rattle of words. Or else they must have been the worst and wickedest of men, that, knowing better, would still maintain so many errors and impieties, and not rescue the world from the REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 39 miserable bondage of ignorance, to religious truth and moral righteousness. Or, lastly, their successors must have had some better guide than nature or reason to direct them, which was the gospel, and therefore cannot be admitted as witnesses in a cause where natural religion is to be judged of. I may add, that this is the very case of modern infidelity. How comes it to pass, that their systems are more regular, and their deductions-of virtue clearer ? whence are those sublimer duties and notions, and principles more solid, and better established, than appear among the ancients? Are they wiser than Socrates or Cicero? is their capacity of mind greater, their study severer, or their knowledge more universal and extensive? Certainly the very reverse: their art is inferior, but the materials they had to work upon were better, and therefore their sacrilege the more notorious. They learned these things in the word of God, and then disown their benefactor: they take a great deal of pains to prove what no one denies; that the existence and idea of God, with the other great truths of religion, are most agreeable to the faculties of the mind, to reason, and the light of nature ; and thence draw an inconsequent con- clusions, that they originally were, and still may be, dis- covered by the mere strength of human nature, and thus become the oracles of their own unassisted reason. And this fallacy (from a supposition that it exalts the dignity of human nature) has been too easily admitted, and deceived many ; or, rather, is the whole support of natural religion, as opposed to revelation: that all those truths and arguments we now perceive the certainty and force of, must appear in the same light to, and therefore might proceed from, a mere philosopher, or person in a state of nature. And (with great submission to the most learned author's judgment) this mistake runs through the whole delineation of the religion of nature; though in the terms (or even doubts) that he proposes it, no advantages ean accrue there- from to the enemies of revelation. Speaking of the soul’s being a principle of life, he uses the following words : “Here I begin to be very sensible how much I want P. 211. a guide ; but as the religion of nature is my theme, I must, at present, content myself with that light which nature af- fords: my business being, as it seems, only to show, what 40. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM a heathen philosopher, without any other help, and almost avrodacros, May be supposed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing else contained in this de- lineation, can be the least prejudice to any other true religion. Whatever is immediately revealed from God, must, as well as any thing else, be treated of as being what it is; which cannot be, if it is not treated with the highest regard, believed and obeyed. ‘That, therefore, which has been so much insisted on by me, and is as it were the bur- den of my song, is so far from undermining true revealed religion, that it rather paves the way for its reception.” I shall only observe from this passage, that if no other arguments were intended to be offered, but what an unas- sisted philosopher may be supposed to think, yet his book ‘san entire confutation of any such supposition: we can only know what they could do by what they did do, except any will be so ungenerous to say, they did not do their best. And no philosopher (notwithstanding their many external advantages) was able to discern the nature or meaning of these truths, or did, with any degree of clearness, show the dependence of them on the first cause, their connexion with each other, or the consequences deducible from them, in any or all of their writings: and this very author did not put truth in the light he has done, by the light of nature, without any other help, but (whether or no he saw or ac- knowledged it) was entirely beholden.to revelation. On the whole, nothing is here said, that can be a reflec- tion on the ancients, except their not being able to perform impossibilities be one; they were men of insatiable thirst after knowledge, and their attainments in it prodigious. Their learning and improvement of whatever was Lactant. ite . : : . ° 3p. Within their reach is admirable, it was every thing 210. except divine. They discovered many truths, but not such as were above the attainment of mere mortals. Their desires and endeavours were laudable, but could not have the wished-for effect, to discern what truth was, nor where, or by what means to be found. For, whatever they knew, they remained ignorant of the true God, to know whom is the only wisdom. We may, therefore, and ought to conclude them fallible, and reject their errors, without pivin. being apprehensive that any damage will thereby 1.2.n.72. ensue to religion ; for that cannot be the conse- REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 41 quence by Cicero’s own rule: nec vero (id enim diligenter ¢ntelligt volo) superstitione tollenda, religio tollitur. I shall at present add but one argument more in favour of this hypothesis. That, as the only sure rule to judge what reason or nature can do is by what they have done, so this must be determined by known facts ; which is a safer method to guide our inquiries, than any unwarrantable presumptions or suppositions possibly can be. And since it is constantly affirmed, that the heathens had no other light to guide them but naked, unassisted reason, which is mere supposition and presumption, because they might re- ceive their knowledge another way; therefore the asser- tion has a possibility of being false, or, in other words, is a real uncertainty. I shall therefore appeal to unquestioned facts, to history, and the writings of the earliest philoso- phers; all which unanimously confess, they had their know- ledge of divine things by tradition, not invention, delivered from their fathers, or borrowed from others ; and, to set aside the best, the only evidence to be had (undoubted facts, with the confession of the parties concerned, ) by sup- positions and surmises, calculated to support any favourite system, is against all the rules of argumentation. To clear up this point is the principal intent of the fol- lowing treatise ; for, if the ancients had but a very weak, imperfect knowledge, of divine things, and the utmost cer- tainty they could attain to in them was extremely doubtful and precarious ; the consequence (I shall not fear) will be, that reason and nature are very insufficient guides to reli- gion, to duty, and to God. And if it afterwards shall ap- pear that they received all their knowledge by instruction, it will be easily traced up, and by necessary deduction fol- low, that the first and only instructor of mankind was God; and that all the sense the world ever had of religion, whe- ther positive, natural, or moral, must be referred to, and entirely depend on revelation. 42 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM CHA PE Ri. Of the Inlets to Knowledge. Now, the first point to give us any satisfaction in this in- quiry, must be, to consider the true condition of man, as he is a reasonable creature or intelligent being, and how he comes to be so. What the several inlets of knowledge are, whereby the mind is furnished with materials to think, judge, and exercise its several operations on; that we may thereby see the extent of its views and powers, and be the better able to judge of the question before us, viz. whe- ther the sole light of nature and reason were sufficient to discover, and instruct the world in divine truths. Though, methinks it may be some abashment to reason, and that vast perfection to which some would extol it, that *t scarce knows what man or itself is: for, were these points evident and certain, there could not have been such a va- riety of opinions among wise men concerning the true definition of man, his end, and means of knowledge. Some, from observing the wonderful sagacity in brutes, something in them so like reason, have been induced to make religion the distinguishing character of man, there being a kind of natural propensity to it, quo omnes duce natura vehimur, says Tully. But this is contradicted by other philosophers, who make brutes, especially elephants, capable of religion. Some define man to be a moral agent, or a free intelli- gent being, as having a power to act, or not to act, and thereby able to give an account of his actions, and be sub- ject to rewards and punishments, which are the final end of man. And lord Herbert was of this opinion, that we are more distinguished from brutes by free-will, than by reason. Anaxagoras, according to Aristotle and Plutarch, thought man to be the- wisest creature, because he had hands. The peripatetics and stoics defined man to be a com- pound of body and soul. The Platonists, a divine mind chained down in an earthly prison: one made the mind a part, the others the whole of man. But the generally prevailing definition is, that man is a REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 43 creature endued with reason; that being the faculty which distinguishes him from others, or constitutes him what he is, an intelligent being. But here again, to prove how re- mote we are from perfection, it need only be observed, that though man evidently has this faculty, and it is the peculiar excellence and glory of his nature, yet we know not what it is, nor can reason, that aspires to define every thing, define itself; we can only explain it by effects and operations; but how, orin what manner they are produced, are not able to conceive; nor wherein the inward operations of the mind consist; what its freedom, power, and choice are; how we apprehend or think; or how this thinking being within us, by its free action, can cause and determine such volun- tary motions, as we are convinced that thought alone pro- duces in us. The principal operations of this faculty seem to be, First, To perceive and apprehend what is offered to it, Secondly, To consider such object according to the dif- ferent views or circumstances it may appear in, uniting, separating, or comparing it with others already known, re- flecting on its nature and cause, its tendency and effects, till the mind attain a clear and distinct knowledge of it. Thirdly, To examine the connexion of one truth with others, and by deduction from those which are known and evident, discover the certainty or probability of other _ truths or propositions it did not so clearly perceive before. And thence, Fourthly, To fix its judgment, or degrees of assent that ought to be given, which must, in all cases, vary according to the evidence that appears. Where the connexion is clear, the mind will approve and acquiesce in it, as knowledge or science, whereof it can have no distrust. Where the con- nexion is but probable, the assent will be suspended, oie. aca. because the inference js doubtful, and the conclu- @. 1. 4. sion on either side no more than opinion. If there ap-"" "7 pears disagreement in this connexion, then the illation mani- fests it to be a falsehood, and the mind cannot but reject it. And the perfection of our intellectual faculties consists in rightly using the intermediate steps, that may enable it to distinguish between evidence and opinion, probability and certainty. And the most exalted reason is no more Acad. Q. than the discernment of truth and falsehood. Ce ial Yet if we come to examine the rules by which mankind 44. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM give their assent to many propositions, differing from and contradictory to each other, we cannot think the procedure of the mind to be a very easy, or sure performance. The pounds of truth and falsehood have never yet been settled : one is assured of what another is diffident ; evidence in - Egypt is but probability at Athens: and, by all experience and history we find there has been so little exactness or cer- tainty in the conclusions of mankind, that they seem to be the result of inattention, passion, or interest; rather than proceeding on any sound principles, or in any rational me- thod of argumentation for the discovery of truth. From whence such perplexities and errors, such mistakes and falsehoods have been propagated in the minds of men, Nat.D. so much mischief done in the world by reason that 1. 3.2.37. it was a doubt to Cicero whether it were a blessing to mankind or not: for the great misfortune has been, that men took that for light which was real darkness; yet fol- lowed it, as bewildered travellers do the ignis fatwus, which leads them to precipices and ruin. It has been reason only that rendered mankind in all ages so shamefully unreason- able ; and philosophy was the guide to all errors under the sun; and what right reason, the so much boasted of ap0ds Aoyos is, remained a question undetermined. II. Man was created to practise, as well as to know. He has a law given him, the fulfilling of which is the perfec- tion and end of his being ; and as he isa free creature, has a power to weigh, reject, or choose the means conducing thereto; for, in being at perfect liberty to act or not to act, consists the freedom of human will, and such election ‘makes an action his own, because he wills and chooses it, is able to give reasons for his determinations, to declare the cause or motive which influenced him to prefer one counsel or action before another, and thereby becomes ac- countable to the lawgiver, and liable to the sanctions of the law, rewards or punishments. This freedom of will makes him a moral agent: to choose means fit and proper to attain his end, is moral goodness ; to choose such as are contrary to the law and perfective end of his being, is moral evil: and these two faculties, the reason and will, constitute man what he is, a free intelligent being, vertus y tota nostra est, quia posita est in voluntate factendt actant. : d ° ¢.p. dona. Sicut virtus non est, bonum ac malum secure ; ate. ita virtus est, bonum facere, malum non facere. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 45 And as the intellect is conscious of its own operations, and, from comparing the action with the law, perceives its agreement or disagreement therewith; from hence arises another power called conscience, or the internal judgment of a man’s own mind, of the moral rectitude or pravity of what he has done: and this so essential to, and inseparable from the mind, that it can never cease to be self-conscious, until it ceases to think. The sanctions of this internal law and judgment are, either a secret pleasure from having acted according to the perfective principle of our beings; or having done what, as moral agents and rational creatures, was fittest for us to do: or a shame and reproach, for having abused the freedom of will, in doing what as men, we ought not to have done, and approving that which our own mind condemns and forbids. For when men have used the utmost means in their power to inform themselves in the nature of duty and of sin, they are a law, a rule of living to themselves. Their consciences also (by judging of the moral tendency of their actions) bearing witness, and their thoughts (or inward reasonings) meanwhile accusing or else excusing one ano- ther; acquitting or condemning them, according as they have acted conformably to the greatest light of their mind, and the law of their being. Nor have the thoughts and opinions of men been less divided, concerning the means whereby the intellect is sup- plied with its stores of knowledge; what are the several inlets of the mind, whereby it is furnished with such variety of materials to think, reflect, or judge upon, and what its different kinds of notices are. One would imagine that no point could be more obvious to reason, than to look into it- self, and once declare all its real ways of coming at know- ledge ; yet nothing has embarrassed it more, than to find out the doors by which its own furniture was brought in, as appears from the different hypotheses, and many volumes - which have been wrote upon this subject. And yet a right determination of it, or a certain account of the avenues and ways whereby our understandings come to attain those de- grees of knowledge we have, would be of the highest ser- vice to truth, and show us the part which man bears in the intellectual world, more clearly than any other considera- tions or arguments whatsoever. Se _ ae el aise RO ——————— 46 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM - Of these different inlets I shall mention four, as being the most principal, and to which the other may be reduced. 1. Innate ideas, or principles, stamped and engraven on the soul immediately by God. 2. The instincts, or natural propensions. 3. Sensation, or ideas of external objects conveyed by the senses; under which, in a larger meaning, instruction _may be included, as comprehending all those parts of knowledge which the mind receives from the information of others by the help of the senses, in which consists the dif- ference between instruction and illumination. 4. Reflection, or the inward operations of the mind. I should scarce have mentioned these ideas, they are so - unphilosophical, and void of all foundation in reason or na- ture, did we not find them perpetually lurking under this debate, in the expressions of knowledge connatural and coeval, common notions, clear impressions of God on the conscience, &c.; that the ideas of wisdom, virtue, vice, &c. cuaworth must needs spring up from the active power and Morality, fecundity of the mind itself, because the corporeal p.149. objects of sense can imprint no such things upon it. Others are afraid that learned men have gone too far in their disputes against these ideas, for that nothing is meant by them, but such a sense or knowledge as men may have without any other monitor but their own naked unassisted reason, from a consideration of the works of creation, &c. which is a different means of knowledge, and the argument an equivocation, in tacitly affirming and denying the same thing. The strict maintainers of these ideas say, that there are some primary notions and general principles of the law of nature, so indelibly stamped and impressed on the soul of man, that it receives them in its very first being, and brings them into the world with it: so that the mind can- not but necessarily perceive, know, and assent to them, as distinct and actual propositions; and readily expresses and utters them as soon as it arrives at the use of speech and reason, without further instruction or meditation. But this opinion is perplexed with such difficulties, so contrary to observation and experience, and utterly inca- pable of proof, that it is almost universally given up by learned men, both divines and philosophers, as an unwar rantable fiction, a kind of magic to solve all doubts, and REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 47 throw down all objections, we know not why, nor how, and introduced only to support doctrines which men could not scientifically account for. Before any principle is admitted, it ought to have all the demonstration the mind can require, and carry such marks of truth and certainty, that no rea- sonable objections lie against it. Yet inbred notions, oc- cult qualities, and the like, are to stand instead of evidence, must admit no doubts or objections, however liable to them; must stop every inquiry about them, as, whether all men receive them with an universal and full consent ? whether they are equally known and attainable by all? upon what arguments they are founded? or, whether they may not be come at by some other operations of the un- derstanding, or means of knowledge? For any proposition, call it innate, undoubted, universally acknowledged, or _ self-evident, if liable to any of these objections, is no prin- ciple, but the mere effect of ignorance, and intended to suppress the use of reason. The original, however, of this opinion, was probably owing to some expressions of the ancients, and texts of Scripture, neither of which will bear such sense or inter- _ pretation. I. Phrases of this kind are common among the Greeks : thus Plato, xar& dicw roy vduov, the law of nature ; Repub. 5. and [amblichus in latter ages, wept Oeay EupuTos years, 4 es m an inbred knowledge of the gods, and otuoutos duty de Mys- xaravénots, a perception of them born with us; and oe Chrysostom, euputToyv &raciw avOperots érivoiay, as also, arAjy, tpecBuTdrny mept Ocdv tvyyerns and Clemens Alexandrinus, Oc Eupacw gpvowhv. And among the Latins, to mention only Cicero, insitas eorwm, vel potius imnatas x4 p, cogitationes habemus ; and, omnibus enim innatum 1. 1. est, $c. im animo quasi insculptum, esse Deos: Mh that the belief of the existence of the gods was born with every one, and as it were engraven on the mind. The antiquity of this persuasion, and its being coeval with our souls, proceeded from several causes or mistakes. 1. The observing that we did not come by this know- ledge, as we do by other parts of learning ; that it is some- thing superior to the mind of man, ancienter than our Judgment or our will, prevents reason and demonstration, what we cannot prove or disprove at our pleasure: and 48 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM therefore not being able to find out its true source, they concluded it essential to, and coeval with our beings. Or, Procea. 2» Men finding themselves at a loss to solve the of Human manner of our conceiving immaterial and heavenly v.1.p.. things, would not give way to such a thought, as ee that we should conceive them by the help and in- tervention of any thing in this world, there appearing no congruity or proportion between them ; and therefore had recourse to innate ideas for that purpose, which should be the objects of the pure intellect, independent of all sensa- tion, discovering some early notices in the mind, which Plato says they sucked in with their mother’s milk, and not knowing by what inlet they were received, concluded them connate and coeval. 3, They could not discover it was ever originally delivered by any one man to the rest of mankind, or who those were who first invented this notion, that there is a God; therefore concluded it natural and innate. 4. This was a consequence of what they believed concerning the soul's original: that they were portions of God, according to Pythagoras, of ‘their very ae dal divinity and mind, says Cicero; or, with the stoics, ¢. 8. Diog. Of the mind universal and soul of the world, which Lea Vin was with them the supreme deity ; and pre-existing from eternity, enjoyed a spiritual intellectual life, in conversing with the gods and one another: whence their knowledge grasped whatever is in the nature of things, and what they could not lose during their several transmigrations. And this is the eround of Plato’s famous Meno, doctrine of reminiscence : “for, says he, as the P81. soy] is immortal, and frequently returns to life, and sees whatever passes in this world and the other, there is nothing which she has not learned. Whence it should not seem strange, that she is able to call to mind what she has formerly seen of virtue and other things: and there being a relation throughout nature, and the soul having learned every thing, nothing can hinder a man who recalls but one thing to his memory, which we call learning, to find out every thing else, if he apply his mind to it; for to investi- Phedrus, gate and learn, is nothing else put reminiscence.” p. 249. And again, knowledge 1s the reminiscence of those things the soul saw when it was with God. On these considerations, the heathens might conclude there were REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 49 original principles, or an innate knowledge, which the soul brings into the world with it. II. There are also some texts of Scripture, whereon, it is said, these innate ideas may be grounded, as Romans ii. 15, where St. Paul mentions the law written in the hearts of men, even heathens. To which it is answered, that a principal distinction be- tween the Jews and Gentiles was, that one had a written law, the other not: that before the age of Moses, the whole world was subject to the same general law, as it had been given to Adam, Noah, &c., from God, and by them delivered to their posterity, who were subject to the sanc- tions of it, in rewards and punishments; which in justice they could not have been, except it had the force of a law, and received sufficient promulgation. ‘Thus the patriarchs were justified in obeying, the Sodomites and others con- demned for disobeying the law delivered to them; and after-ages had these general notions of duty and sin pro- videntially continued down to them, to keep conscience and the inward senses of the soul awake, and thereby ren- der them excusable or inexcusable. And all the ancient commentators understood these words, dray yao vn, Whitby for when the Gentiles, &c., Romans ii. 14, of those ™ 1° who lived before the law, as Melchisedec, Job, &c., or who repented as the Ninevites, or who had learned the worship _ of the true God, as Cornelius. This was their vdéuos &ypados, unwritten law, for the heathen world had no other: Draco’s were the first (and those chiefly political ones) committed to writing in Greece, about 624 years before Christ; and amoral system was not attempted, till Socrates taught it, and Xenophon and Plato recorded his sentiments. But, secondly, the wisest -writers on the law of nature interpret. these texts as a figurative expres- Tuy ur sion, and implying no more than a clear and certain N¢. 1. 2. knowledge treasured up in the memory, of which “""" ” the persons spoken of are convicted in their own consciences, by what means soever these notions entered into their thoughts. And to write in the mind, év 74 Wx ypdoew, et scribere in animo, was a phrase in common use with the Greeks and Latins as well as the holy penmen both of the Old and New Testament. Solomon frequently uses the expression, Proy. iii. 3, ‘ Myson, write them upon the dD \ 50 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM table of thy heart.” So again, vii. 1, and Jer. xviisdv The sin of Judah is written with a pen of iron, and with the point of a diamond; it is graven upon the table of their heart.” Not that sins were thus originally engraven, but were so heinous, that the memory of them could never be obliterated. So Ezek. xiv.3. ‘They have set up their idols in their heart,” to denote their inward affection for . idolatry. Thus St. Paul, “ Ye are our epistle written in our hearts, known and read of all men.” And again, “ Ye are the epistle of Christ, written, not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God.” And Heb. viii. 10. «I will write them in their hearts.” All which can import no more, than any truth’s being made clearly known to them, and the law so plainly taught, as to be easily perceived by them all, that whenever they transgressed it, their consciences se- cretly condemned them for it. Thirdly, if we consider the perspicuity and evidence wherewith the Almighty framer of our beings could have impressed and manifested his perfect law to the minds of men, and this had been the only method of discovering his nature and will to us; then the frequent revelations he afterwards made, would have been useless, or contrary to his own purpose of acting; and the knowledge of divine affairs would have been much more distinct and clear among the Gentiles, than it appears to have been, or is represented in the holy Scriptures, where their defective knowledge in these truths is described, and in that very chapter, Rom. ii. 19, “as blind as those who sit in darkness, as children and babes.” To remedy which, to restore and fulfil the law, then become utterly depraved and corrupted, was one great intent of the gospel. Innate ideas, therefore, have no foundation in these texts, are repugnant to innumerable passages in Scripture, contrary to fact and experience, and the proceedings of God with men. Had their light been clear and perfect, such would be the obedience demanded of them; but these were times of ignorance, and God re- quired it not ; and it would be inconsistent with the divine equity to condemn his creatures for not observing impossi- ble conditions; but it was the not doing what they might have done, the “ holding truth in unrighteousness,” the not choosing virtue and avoiding vice, according to the suffi- ciency of aid they had received ; but committing those ac- REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 51 tions which their consciences condemned them for, that rendered them totally inexcusable. Fourthly: therefore the xowa %vow, those common no- tions or principles they had, were only traditional notices of the universal (and consequently moral) law, scattered _ up and down among the Gentiles, but were to them the measure of good and evil; for by reason of these being fixed in their consciences, they are said to be a law unto themselves, as having this inward rule to direct their ac- tions by. These Zeno called xaraahpes, comprehensions, and Epicurus xpoafwes, which Cicero renders anticipations, but may be called also opinion, or persuasion. These were evToAal at kaT& véuov Te Kal mpo Tov vduou, precepts Cl. Alex. of law, and before the law, for otre robs mpo vduou Strom. 7. avduous eau, even those before the law, were not with- ? 7+ P- out a law. And in this sense the wisest heathens seem to have un- derstood it. Thus Xenophon represents the opinion of Socrates: that as to unwritten laws, received Mem. loc. over the whole earth, which it was impossible that eae all mankind (as being of different languages, and could not be assembled in one place) should make, that these were given us by the gods; and that no man impunibly violates a law established by the gods: that the laws of morality are the work of a more excellent legislator than men; and whatever force the laws have, they receive it from the gods. And this was a maxim which Socrates always maintained, that virtue was a science; i.e. not inbred, but to be learned like any other, So Plato defines the unwritten law to be 6 card 26 Diog. La- ywouevos, that which proceeded from custom, i. e. =e Nk actions conformable to the common notions of man- 288. kind; and this seems to be the true meaning of his 7) ris onuns, the law of fame, or report ; which, though by Ser- ranus and others interpreted of the power of con- Via. Galo science, with him a kind of demon in men, plainly + _ refers to those traditional truths oral fame had handed down to them, which he so often appeals to, and grounds all his doctrines of theology on, and not on any inward sig- nature or impressions. And he was one of those great minds, whom God, in different ages, raised up, by travel and searches, to collect the scattered fragments of truth, 52 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM and become the teachers and instructors of mankind. So that, amidst a general corruption there was a light that shone in darkness, by a due attention to which they might have made a stronger discernment, and passed a truer judgment upon things. And their crime was, the not obeying truth, according to the aids of knowledge afforded them, nor the degrees of conviction they were under. These active internal principles were the law of man- kind, not that which is written in books, or engraven on Plutarch, WOO, but Zupuxos dy éavtg Adyos, the huing reason in ad Prin- eyery man’s heart, always alive and watchful to- doct. gether with it, and never suffering the mind to be without a director. And from a sense of these (which were universally extended to some more, to others less) and the self-reflective acts of the mind, which are called conscience, proceeded those stings and remorses, on com- oe mitting what they themselves condemned. ‘This Strom. 2, Laius, in the tragedy confesses : p. 388. “a drnder otdtv TaVSE p, GY ob. vouderets, KE. All these things which you advise me, I already know, but notwithstanding this knowledge and conviction, nature Euripid. hurries me away. And Medea, Kad parbdve, &e. Act. 4. : ».206. Which Buchanan thus translates : “Videoque quantum perpetrabitur nefas, Sed pessimorum facinorum genitor furor, Ratione major, me retrorsum distrahit.”’ And Ovid in Metamorph. * aliudque cupido, Mens aliud suadet: video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.” All which are a full comment and explanation of Rom. ii. 14, 15, &e. Fifthly, innate ideas cannot prove the truth of any pro- position, because every man has as good a right to deny, as others to affirm them. And this probably was the reason why Epicurus appealed to them, in order to deceive the world with a popular argument, and leave the exist- ence of the gods on a footing which he knew could never — be maintained. Cicero states it at large in the sense Nat.Deor. that Epicurus understood it ; that without the idea sont of a thing, we can neither conceive, speak of, nor dispute REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 53 about it. That all men and nations have an idea and no- tion of the gods, independent of learning, is an opinion not derived from education, custom, or human law, but it is the firm, unanimous persuasion, of all mankind. It is there- fore from notions implanted in our souls, or rather innate, that we conceive there are gods; for that in which the na- ture of all men agrees, must necessarily be true. Some have © unwarrantably urged this argument under the name and authority of Cicero; though he only introduces it as the opinion of a particular philosopher or sect, and immediately denies the principle on which it is grounded, that of wni- versal consent: egquidem arbitror multas esse gentes sic im- manitate efferatas, ut apud eos nulla Deorum suspicio sit. He verily believed there were many nations so savage as not to have the least notion of a God. And when he uses it in any part of his works, it is not as a proof, but to take the existence of the gods as granted, which must otherwise be perpetually proved. Si hoc non probas, a Deo causa or- dienda est. For these, and many other reasons, “ The wise creea. p. and sober men of all parties (says our excellent 1% Biyuop Pearson) are agreed, that the soul of man has no con- natural knowledge at a!J, not even of a Deity: no particular notion of any thing in it from the beginning. But that as we can have no assurance of its pre-existence, we may more rationally judge it to receive the first apprehensions of things by sense, and by them to make all rational collections.” If then the soul of man be at first like a fair smooth table, without any actual characters of knowledge imprinted on it; if all the knowledge we have comes successively by sen- sation, instruction, or rational collection; then must we not refer the apprehension of a Deity to any connate no- tion or inbred opinion; at least we are assured that God never charges us with the knowledge of him upon that ac- count. The same judgment is passed on these ideas by the wisest philosophers and greatest masters of reason, Puffendorf, 1. 2. c. 3. s. 13, affirms such original characters to be no more than unwarrantable fictions: that the readiness which we see in children, and in the ignorant multitude, to distinguish right from wrong is owing, ina great measure, to exercise and use ; whilst from their early years, and the first opening of rea- 54 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM son, they observe good things to be approved of, and evil things to be exploded. As for the lowest degree of mortals, who are acquainted with the law of nature, chiefly by popular information and by common use, they ought to require no further proofs of its certainty, than that, 1. The exercise of it is maintained by their superiors, by whose authority they are to be guided: and, then, 2. That they themselves can- not find any probable reasons, by which they might either confute or weaken its force. And, 3. Because they are every day sensible of its usefulness, and the benefits which it confers upon mankind. And, upon this account, the law of nature appears to be sufficiently promulgated, so that no person, of competent years, and of sound understanding, can by any means plead invincible ignorance of it. Which is not only giving up these original impressions, but at the same time affirming the far greatest part of mankind to be incapable of making a due use of their rea- son: that they must depend upon others, to know what is right or wrong; and in the matter of duty and sin, be de- termined, by another's judgment, not their own ; for, though they have reason, yet not being able, through the exercise _ of it, to arrive at certainty, the safest method of preserv- ing themselves from error and mistake, is to submit to au- thority, and rely on information. But he who has inquired with the greatest accuracy into this subject, and given such reasons against admitting these ideas, as yet remain (and I believe ever will) unanswered, is the great Mr. Locke, in the beginning of his Essay on Human Understanding, which every one may consult that _ is desirous of a thorough satisfaction in this point. I shall only mention the heads of some of his arguments. The falseness of such supposition, he says, sufficiently appears, by showing how men may arrive at certainty with- out any such original notions or principles; it being un- reasonable to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature and innate characters, when we may observe in our- selves faculties fit to attain as certain and easy knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind. fe observes, that the argument drawn from universal con- sent, on which it principally is founded, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them k | REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 55 innate, if any other way can be shown how men may come to that universal agreement in the things they do consent in, which he presumes may be done. But the worst is, this argument seems a demonstration, that there are no such innate speculative principles, because there are none to which mankind give an universal consent ; for, if children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them, it destroys that universal consent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths ; it being a contradiction to say, there are truths imprinted on the soul which it perceives or understands not: for, if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate ? — and if they are imprinted, how can they be unknown? and if known, they must be conscious of them ; otherwise truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know, which is to make this impression nothing. Or, if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, then all the truths a man ever comes to know will be innate, and it is only an improper way of affirming what no one denies, that the mind is capable of knowing several things; the capacity innate, the knowledge acquired. But if truths can be imprinted on the mind without being perceived, or in the understanding, and not be understood, it is all one as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the mind or understanding. Nor will answering, that men know and assent to them when they come to the use of reason, prove them innate ; because then whatever reason certainly discovered, would equally be so: and what- ever general truths require the use of reason for the disco- very of them, cannot be innate ; for reason is the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions already known, and can amount to no more than this, that they are never known or taken notice of before the use of reason ; but whether they may be assented to after, or when, is uncertain: and so may all other knowable truths, and con- sequently by this note none can be proved innate. Nor is the time of coming to the use of reason the precise time when they are first taken notice of; but to assent to them is the exercise of reason, and therefore the supposition false. Nor ~ will their being assented to, as soon as proposed, prove them to be such; if may be a mark of self-evidence, when men, upon first hearing and understanding the terms, as- 56 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM sent unto them, as that one and two are equal to three, &c., which nevertheless are not innate; or if such assent be a mark of it, we must allow millions of propositions in the sciences to be so, as many as men have distinct ideas of, or can make propositions wherein different ideas are denied of one another. The most universal maxims not being known till they are proposed, proves them not to be innate. Nor is there a proposition whose terms or ideas were either of them innate, and consequently nothing in any proposition that is so. When children are capable of thought, know- ledge, and assent, yet are they ignorant of the most ge- neral truths, which they could not be, if nature had imprinted any such; it being not imaginable that they should perceive the impression from things without, and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to stamp within. Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principle of their beings, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings? This would make nature take pains to no purpose, or at least to write very ill, since its characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things very well. It being impossible that any truth, which is innate, should be unknown to one who knows any thing else: since, if they are innate truths, they must be inward thoughts, there being nothing a truth in the mind which it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths, they must be necessarily the first that appear there, the first of any thought on. Nor can such general maxims be allowed innate, because if these cha- racters were native and original impressions, they should appear fairest and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them: for children and illiterate people being of all others the least corrupted by custom or bor- rowed opinions, and nothing superinduced to confound those characters nature had written, one might reasonably imagine that in their minds those innate notions should lie open fairly to every one’s view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that these principles should be known to naturals; for being (as is supposed) stamped immediately on the soul, they can , REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 57 have no dependence on the constitution, or organs of the body, the only confessed difference between them and others. And all these native beams of light should, in those who have no arts of concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure and abhorrence of pain. And yet there are no general maxims, no uni- versal principles of knowledge, to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. And if speculative principles have not an actual universal consent from all mankind, it is much more visible concérn- ing practical principles, there being no instance of any one moral rule which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as the former. The reasoning and exercise of the mind to discover the certainty of moral principles, the igno- rance wherein many are of them, and the slowness of as- sent wherewith others receive them, are manifest proofs of their not being native impressions, or such as offer them- selves to view without searching. Nor are there any moral principles wherein all agree ; no practical truth universally received without doubt, or being questioned, not even the most extensive principle of justice and keeping contracts. And if it be said, that the tacit assent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts, it is answered, that ac- tions are the best interpreters of thoughts: and if some men have questioned and denied these principles, it is im- possible to establish an universal consent; and if practical principles terminate not in operation, and produce confor- mity of action, they are in vain distinguished from specula- tive maxims: for if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding to regulate our practice, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, as we do those others on the will and appetite, which never cease to be the constant springs and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impel- ling us. Another argument is, that all moral rules want a proof: - nor can one be proposed, whereof a man may not justly demand a reason; for their truth plainly depends upon some antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduced; which could not be, if ‘either they were innate, D2 58 ‘THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM or so much as self-evident, which every innate principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain its approbation. And if a reason be asked of any, the most undeniable rule in morality, men will give it according to the different sorts of happiness’ they have a prospect of, or propose to them- selves: an ancient philosopher would give one reason, a Christian another, an atheist a third: and hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules ; which could not be, if they were imprinted on our minds immediately by the hand of God. And if we judge of mens’ thoughts by their actions, we shall find they have no such full persuasion of the certainty or obligation of these rules. Even the great principle of morality, to do as one would be done to, is more com- mended than practised. If conscience be urged as check- ing us for such breaches, and so the internal obligation and establishment of the rule preserved: it is answered, that men may, by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to assent to several moral rules, and be convinced of their obligation, without being written on their hearts; from education, company, and customs of their country; which persuasion, howsoever got, will serve to set conscience on work, which is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral recti- “tude or pravity of our own actions. How then can men © I transgress these moral rules with confidence and serenity, were they innate and stamped upon their minds? View but a Christian army at the sacking of a town, and see what observation, or sense of moral principles, or what _ touch of conscience for all the outrages they do: robberies, murders, rapes, are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure. The greatest enormities and inhumanities have been practised by many nations without remorse, without being scrupled or condemned: where then are these innate principles of chastity, justice, and piety, or where that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules? And if conscience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate; since some men with the same bent of conscience prosecute what others avoid, and have remorse for doing or omitting what others think they merit by: that there is searce a principle REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 59 of morality to be named, or rule of virtue thought on, which is not slighted and condemned by whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions, quite opposite to others. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one, to be just and good, because naturally imprinted on their minds. It is therefore little less than a contradiction, it is impossible, that whole nations of men should publicly renounce, what every one of them certainly and infallibly knew to be a law; to be just, and right, and good; and what all men they had to do with, must con- temn and abhor them for: so that whatever practical rule is, in any place, generally and with allowance broken, can- not be supposed innate, because it is not a rule or principle, that does upon all occasions excite and direct the actions of men; nor is it a truth naturally imprinted as a duty, without supposing the ideas of God, obligation, punish- ment, and a life after this, to be innate; which they must all be, if any thing as a duty be so, which they certainly are not; it being impossible that whole nations should serenely, without shame or fear, break a rule, which they could not but evidently know that God had set up, and would certainly punish the breach of. But the difference among men, in their practical principles, utterly takes away this mark of general assent, to find out any moral rule by : they who maintain them, tell us not which they are; and» , were there any such, there would be no need to teach them: such proposition stamped on the mind would be easily distinguished from other truths, and nothing could be more easy to know, what, and how many they were; for were there any difference, it would plainly evidence there are none. Lord Herbert has ventured to give a catalogue of them ; but there are numberless propositions, that even by his own rules have as just a pretence to such an original as the five he mentions; nor in each of them are all his marks of common notions to be found. In some the words are uncertain in their signification, and the things they stand _ for difficult to be known, and therefore an uncertain rule - for the conduct of life, and unfit to be assigned as an innate practical principle. Nor indeed can any be imagined, or be of use, unless the particular measures and bounds of all aA “ie 60 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM virtues and vices were engraven on mens’ minds also, which no one pretends to; and that God should engrave prin- ciples in words of uncertain signification, does not seem possible. Nor will it be of any moment to say, that by education, custom, and general opinion, they may be darkened, and at last quite worn out of the minds of men. For this assertion quite takes away the argument of uni- versal assent. Nor is it to be reconciled, that there should be some principles, which all men do acknowledge and agree in: yet none of those principles, which are not, by depraved custom and an ill education, blotted out: which is to say, that all men admit, yet many deny and dissent from them. And if they are capable of being altered or lost, we shall be as much in the dark and uncertainty as if there were no such thing at all; it being all one to have no rule, and one that will warp every way; and amongst various and contrary rules, not to know which is right. Yet there are many opinions received by different men, as unquestionable principles, whose truth is never doubted, which, from their absurdity and opposition to each other, it is impossible should be true. Nor is it wonderful, if we consider with what veneration men generally submit to notions, however false or superstitious, which they first entertained, and have always been educated in; and: being what they can find in themselves no original of, conclude them innate, the impress of God and nature. And as most men have some reverenced principles, on which they found their reasonings, so there are few, who are not ex- posed by their ignorance, laziness, education, or preci- pitancy, to take them upon trust. Many have neither -jeisure, parts, nor will, to examine seriously their own tenets, much less dare they venture to dissent from the received opinions of their country or party; and above all, will be afraid to question those principles, which they think are standards set up by God in their minds, to be the rule and touchstone of all other opinions. By these means it comes to pass that men worship the idols they have set up in their minds, grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with; stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors, and think no gods but their own are to be worshipped. Want- ing time or true helps to penetrate into the principles of REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 61 knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original, they take up with borrowed principles, which never ven- turing to examine, they may take any absurdity for an innate principle, and (by long poring on the same objects) the monsters lodged in their brain for the images of the Deity. \ Nor can there be any principles innate, except the ideas which make up those truths be innate also; for where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge or assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them. And it is certain these are not born with children, therefore there was a time, when the mind was without them, and the knowledge of such propositions could not be born with us. One may perceive how ideas come gradually into their minds, and they get no: more, nor any other, than what experience, and the observation of things that come in their way, furnish them with. If there be any innate principle, this is certainly one, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be: yet the ideas of impos- sibility and identity are so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that many grown persons will, upon examination, be found to want them. And if such ideas be a native impression, they will be so clear and distinct, as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on, or they cannot be the subject of universal and undoubted _ truths, but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty. That God is to be worshipped, is, without doubt, as great a truth as can enter into the mind of man, and de- serves the first place among all practical principles; yet it can by no means be thought innate, unless the ideas of God and worship be innate. That the idea, the term worship stands for, is not, in the understanding of children, a character stamped on the mind in its first original, will be easily granted by any one that considers how few grown men have a clear and distinct notion of it. And there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to say, that children have this practical principle innate, and yet know not what that worship is which is their duty. But if any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of God may, of all others, for many reasons, be thought so, since it is hard to conceive, how there should be innate moral 62 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM principles without an innate idea of a Deity. Without a notion of a law-maker, it is impossible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it: yet there always have been, and still are, persons and nations who have no notion of a God, no religion. Or, had all mankind every where the notion of a God, it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate: for though no nation were to be found, without a name and some few dark notions of him, yet that would not prove them to be natural impres- sions on the mind, no more than the names of fire or the sun do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate, because _ the names of these things and the ideas of them are so uni- versally received and known amongst mankind: since the notion of a God might be other ways discovered, and the suitableness thereof to the principles of common reason, and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide, and continue it down to all generations. But if the general acknowledgment of it be sufficient to prove the idea innate, it will also prove the idea of fire to be so, since there is not a person in the world, who has a notion of God, who has not also the idea of fire. If it be urged that it is suitable to the goodness of God that all men should have an idea of him, and therefore it is naturally imprinted, the argument will prove too much. For, if we may conclude that God hath done for men, all that men shall judge best for them, it will follow, that he has not only imprinted an idea of himself, but all that men ought to know or believe of him; all that they ought to do in obedience to his will, and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. This is better for men, than that they should in the dark grope after know- ledge; as St. Paul tells us, all nations did after God, Acts xvii. 27, than that their wills should clash with their un- derstanding, and their appetites cross their duty. But the goodness of God hath not been wanting to man, since he hath furnished him with other means to attain the know- ledge of him, and the things that concern him. And can it be thought that the ideas men have of God are the cha- racters and marks of himself, engraven in their minds by his own finger; when we see that, in the same country, un- der one and the same name, men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 63 him? Their agreeing in a name or sound, will prove no more, than that-God imprinted on the minds of all men, speaking the same language, a name for himself, but not any idea; since those people who agreed in the name had, at the same time, far different apprehensions about the thing signified, which is an infallible evidence of their igno- rance, and that they had no true notion of him. If, on the whole, the idea of God be not innate, there can scarce any other be found that can pretend to it. And our minds being at first void of that idea which we are most concerned to have, isastrong presumption that it must be so ofall others. II. Some, and those very wise men, to whose judgment I pay the greatest deference, make the instincts another inlet of knowledge to the mind of man, which I must con- fess myself unable to apprehend; and beg leave to dissent from them, for the following reasons: First, because the instincts, or those inward motions and propensions we find within us, are so engrafted in the nature ofman, that whatever notion oridea they convey of themselves, it must be innate, and reduce us to acknowledge what is on all hands confessed to be unphilosophical and absurd. Secondly, the appetites, such as hunger or thirst, desire or aversion, are only certain modifications, motions, or im- pulse of matter and spirit, which impulse we feel, but do not conceive, nor can form any idea of it. And whatever uneasiness they create, it seems confined to the ideas of those objects which excite it, as hunger is a sense of the want of meat, and thirst of drink, &c. And all propen- sions to alleviate them are confined to the ideas of those things which the imagination supposes would give the most immediate relief. So of aversions, or natural antipathies, I cannot conceive any idea of them, till some one will deli- neate the picture he has in his mind, at starting or fainting on the sight ofa cat, or a piece of cheese, and show it to be different from the ideas of those very objects. Besides, the instincts are altogether involuntarily, no way depending on the will, nor have any relation to the rational faculties, but wholly to the animal ones. No reflection can excite or abate them; it is impossible for a full stomach to imagine itself fasting; and whether full or fasting, there is no addi- tion, diminution, or alteration, made to the pure intellect. Thirdly, if we join the passions with instinets, they are 64 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM no more than the effect of a corrupted nature; commotions raised in the mind froma violent agitation.of the blood and animal spirits, what the philosophers called an irrational and preternatural motion of the soul, 760s, %Adyos Yuxijs Kivnots kal rapa otow: and by Cicero, perturbatio, commotio ant- mi, appetitus vehementior, §c. And so far from being an inlet to reason, that they blind and shut it up; pervert and disturb its operations, but never regulate them; and in the same degrees that any person is subject to them, so far is he deprived of reason. | Fourthly, passions and instincts, though they are the great law of the brute creation, for preserving their exist- ence, and continuing their species, which at all times and without varying they observe and pursue, as the greatest direction to the end of their beings; and whatever rationa- lity they have, it never resists or perverts them: yet, in man, it is far otherwise, they disturb his freedom, bias his will, distract his reason, mislead his affections; and are the cause of all moral evil; either choosing means which have no relation to his end, or are destructive of it. And though to correct and keep them within proper bounds and regula- tion affords an ample field for reason to exert itself, and is the proper notion of ethics or morality; and in societies has occasioned so many laws, to restrain their licentious- ness, and prevent the disorders which proceed from them; yet they are no constituent parts of knowledge, any more than robbers or pirates, against whom we take proper cau- tion to defend ourselves: and, so far from being an inlet to wisdom, that they are the conveyors of ignorance and error to the mind, as they are the greatest cause of all that sin and misery which overspreads the earth. Fifthly, an idea must be conformable to some real ex- istence; but we are entirely ignorant of the essence, modes, powers, or subsistence of instincts or passions; and can no more describe the instincts to man, than we can that of the needle to the loadstone; therefore no idea can have any conformity to them. A tree has a natural power or in- stinct to grow upwards, and a stone to fall downwards: we Bs know it is their nature, the will of Him that formed them: but what that nature is, we cannot in the least declare. And if no object is conveyed by them to the intellect; no materials, ideas, or notions, added to the imagination, they REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 65 cannot be a duct or inlet to the mind; but a man would be as wise without, as with them. That they are not a canal for any clear immediate ideas, appears from the numberless definitions or rather deserip- tions of them, no two persons agreeing in their manner, causes, appearances, or effects; which could not happen, if any certain determinate ideas were affixed to them. No one is able to inform another, what modifications produce, or what sensations accompany them. He knows and feels there is an inward commotion (perhaps of the blood and animal spirits) but he cannot, by any notes or marks, frame a distinct conception of their appearance or existence in the mind, any further than as they are compounded of ideas from such sensible things as excite them, in desire or aver- sion, in love, hatred, fear, &c. The soul operates upon the body, and so do certain ob- jects on the imagination, but they are too remote and subtile for apprehension. We cannot form a thought or notion of them, nor how such force, impulse, or motion, acts upon the mind. They are amongst those hidden causes, to ‘which, as being indiscernible, we cannot affix any ideas; nor are they to be collected from the effects, which vary according to the temperament and constitution of bo- dies. As for instance, a guilty fear produces in some tremblings, in others faintings; in one a redness, and in: another a paleness; and consequently there cannot be any immediate original standing pattern or idea of them. Upon the whele, instincts are natural; but what man, as a rational or moral agent, has no clear discernment of, nor dominion over. He may correct, but can neither destroy nor prevent them: they rise up without giving us notice, and subside not when, or how we please, as depending on neither of our superior faculties, the reason or the will; but are merely animal appetites or inclinations, as distinct from the intellect as the body is from the soul. The less'a man has of them, the better and wiser is he; nor can they in any explicit sense be a conduit to truth, or inlet of real knowledge to the understanding; so the more he has of them, the nearer is he to the beast, and the further removed from all the intellectual parts of nature. III. The great inlet of knowledge to the mind is by the senses; either by the direct impression of external objects, 66 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM when the ideas conveyed are immediate and adequate, so that the mind knows the whole of them: or mediately, by the intervention of some other agent, who instructs it in the knowledge of those beings and things, which are invisible, immaterial, and not cognisable by the senses. Even this information the mind receives by the help of the senses, yet cannot form any idea of them (for, because of their remote- ness, subtilty, and undiscernibleness, it cannot know them adequately, or in the whole) but only some thought, notion, or conception of them. And these are the only natural means of coming at knowledge; for illumination is superna- tural, when the mind is taught by an immediate act or com- munication of God himself, without any inlet or use of the senses. But by instruction she learns the knowledge of di- vine abstracted subjects, with the help of language, whereby the thoughts of one mind already informed of them, are communicated, through the canal or inlet of the senses, to another mind. For if the mind has no innate knowledge, or original im- pressions stamped upon it, but is as white paper without — any characters wrote thereon; when all the objects it be- comes acquainted with must be adventitious and extrinsi- cal, and there can be no natural inlet for them but through the senses; so that all its notions or ideas, whatever it per- ceives, thinks of, or is employed about, that is, all its mate- rials of reason and understanding, are conveyed to the intellect through or by their mediation: nor can it possibly be furnished with them any other way (except by inspira- tion, which is supernatural and miraculous) but would al- ways remain a perfect blank, as the soul in a body originally deprived of all its senses must necessarily be. Nor is this a modern supposition, but the common doc- trine of the ancients. Aristotle, that prince among phi- — DeAnima, losophers, says, the mind without the senses 1s Somep _ 1.3.6.4. spopuuareiov & undty imdpxer Evdedexela yeypaupevor, like a tablet on which nothing is yet wrote, but capable of hav- ing all things written ; which receptive power is declared by — the addition of the word, évdcdexeia: and he elsewhere as- serts, that he who is deprived of any sense, must necessarily _ want the knowledge of some things. So Epicurus, — prune mas yap Abyos dmrd Tav aibhoewy Horna, all reason has its © beginning, or is taken from the senses. And Strabo, _ Laert. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 67 H Sidvoww ex tay aldhray ouvtTibnor Td vonra, the under- te Pe vy standing forms all its notions from what the senses De fin.1. offer. Cicero is full of this doctrine, qguicguid ¥,%' }%., animo cernimus, td omne oritur a sensibus: that Q.1. 4. whatever we discern in the mind took its rise from Balt is the senses. And speaking of reason, with its different opera- tions, which alone render us more excellent than y, Tee brutes, nam et sensibus eadem omnia comprehen- 1.1. n. 10. duntur, all these things are comprehended from the senses. So again, at the end of his “ Timzus,” he ascribes the know- ledge of the most excellent things in wisdom and philosophy, of nature and the gods, to be owing to our senses. Rerum enim optimarum cognitiones nobis oculi attulerunt. And among the elder Christians, to mention no more, Lactan- tius has many expressions to this purpose: scventia T are. non est intus in nobis, sed ad nos extrinsecusventt. 514. Knowledge is not from within ourselves, but derived to us from without: which can be only through the senses. For (as a learned author argues) our senses, though common to us with brutes, are the only source and inlet of those ideas, which are the entire groundwork of all our knowledge, both human and divine. Without ideas of some sort or other, we could have no knowledge at all ; for, to know a thing is to have some representation of it in the mind; but we cannot think, nor be conscious of thinking, till we have some idea or semblance of an object to think upon; and without our senses we could not have one internal idea or semblance of any thing without us. So that we must lay down that maxim of the schools as uni- versally true, without any restriction or limitation: nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius Suit in sensu. The imagination is a common storehouse and receptacle of all those images, which are transmitted through the senses ; and till this is furnished in some degree, the soul, while it is in the body, isa still, inactive principle; and then only begins to operate, and first exert itself, when it is sup- plied by sensation with materials to work upon. These are the sole foundation on which we raise all our whole super- structure of knowledge; and all the discoveries we can make in things temporal or spiritual, together with the most refined notions of them in the mind of man, take their rise originally from sensation. At our birth the imagination is ‘entirely a tabula vasa, 68 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM or perfect blank, without any materials, either for a simple view, or any other operation of the intellect. We are not furnished with any innate ideas of things material, or im- material; nor are we endued with a faculty or disposition of forming purely intellectual ideas or conceptions inde- pendent of all sensation: much less has the human soul a power of raising up to itself ideas out of nothing, which is a kind of creation; or of attaining any first principles ex- clusive of all illation, or consequential deduction from ideas of material objects ; without which the mind of man, during its union with the body, could not have arrived even to a consciousness of its own operations or existence. Daily experience shows us, that, as far as persons are from their first infancy deprived of any of their senses, they are so far imperfect in their intellectuals. What a vast de- gree of knowledge de we find cut off together with that one sense of hearing? Take away the sight likewise, and con- sider how limited and confined the operations of the intel- lect must be. If after this you remove from a man all taste and smelling, and if he hath no ideas left for the mind to work upon but those of his feeling, how far would he differ from a sensitive plant ? The mind in such case wourd not be able to infer the bare existence of any thing external to it, but what was felt; and if it were possible for the man to have animal life without feeling, he would be as utterly void of knowledge as one in a swoon or apoplectic fit. For there can be no ideas in the mind, before sensation, or the senses, have conveyed them into it, there being no other intercourse or communication betwixt the object and the faculty: and thought and reason gradually improve, or the mind thinks more, as it has matter to think on. But whilst the spirit is in conjunction with the body, if we remove from it all ideas of sensation, the whole superstructure of knowledge falls to the ground. For it is absurd to say, either that the pure intellect can supply itself with ideas, or that it can think, when it has nothing to think of. gti This is also what Mr. Locke affirms on the par.2. same subject: that the mind of man has all its end- less and various materials of reason and knowledge from ex- perience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it originally derives itself ; which is certainly true, as our observation is employed about external, sensible objects. But what he adds to these of ideas of reflection, as if any FN gee ge Nis Tr Rare i Rl a pi ae Ew REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 69 new stock of materials or ideas were produced in the imag- ination by its own actings or operations, is contrary to ex- perience, to reason, and nature ; it beingimpossible that the mind should come at the knowledge, perception, notion, or idea of any being that has a real existence, but through the mediation of the senses. . The mind has indeed a native power of self-reflection and internal operation: like the stomach, it can receive food, and digest it; but it must be given to it, it cannot feed itself. No more can the mind, by any power it has, raise or create new objects; it can remember, compare, divide, and compound what it has received, but not make the least addition thereto. It can work upon, transpose, and view them in different lights, the better to form its judgment ; but their nature is not altered, they are still the same. View, review, and divide ideas of sensation a thousand times over, and they will after all be no more than mere ideas of sensation. No magic of reflection or abstraction can make invisibles out of visibles, or form immaterial sub- stances out of material ones ; any more than a chymist can extract gold from mud, or a statuary cut a marble image out of wood. The statues of Phidas might be the most beautiful in the world, but he made them of the same in- gredients as others did, and which his art could not alter. And if their form was divine, though he had not Jupiter or Minerva to carve them by; yet was it no creature of his own making, nor would his imagination have directed _ his hands, if it had not received those impressions from the different objects he had before been conversant with. The acts of the mind are as regular and plain as of any other agent; and if we would but attend to them, there could be no need of having recourse to miracles for any article of knowledge we find it in the possession of; it is easy to know how we came by it. But to say it makes ideas, or contains what it never received, is Just as preternatural and as true, as that the artificer makes the materials he builds a house with; first produces, and then puts them together. The imagination is only a capacious storeroom, capable to receive a vast quantity and variety of goods of every kind, and from every place, but is quite empty till they are brought into it; the merchant then ranges them in their several classes and orders, as is most convenient for 70 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM use; but cannot, by any alteration, change, or mixture, increase his stock, or produce a substance that was never conveyed thither. The intellect does the same, it ranges its ideas in their several cells, so as to remember where to have recourse to them, but by no operation of its own can add a fresh stock or supply ; this the senses, and no other vehicle, can bring. For to say the mind can furnish itself with ideas, is the same absurdity, as for merchandise to grow up in the store, or furniture in a house without coming in at the doors or windows. Nothing can be taken out of the imagination, that was not first extrinsically lodged there; all that the intellect can do, is to sort its materials, and work some of them (as a carver may the same block) into a great variety of forms, according to the perfection of its skill. But the materials are just the same, no way essentially altered, though the form is; nor by any alembic or art can it distil spirit from body, or extract incorporeity from what is corporeal. For the truth of this we need only appeal to every one’s experience: let him examine his thoughts, and try whether he has any original ideas, that are not the objects of his senses. Notwithstanding all he has heard of immateriality, let him, if he is able, abstract from all sensation or impres- sion of material objects, look inward, and see if he can find one simple idea independent of it, for the mind to exercise any of its operations upon. It is impossible; or if any such instance is pretended to be offered, it will be easy to show the necessary connexion it hath with sensa- tion, and the dependence it has upon it. This, I say, will plainly appear to any one that will try the utmost extent of his thought, whether the most lively imagination can form an idea of any thing, but upon the pre-existent ones of sensation ; in the most fictitious ideas, the entia rationis, which have no existence but in the understanding, though the mind can compound many ideas together, and so frame a being which really never was in nature; yet there are no new ideas here, though the com- position be so; for if they had not been all separately re- presented before, it could not have joined them together in its apprehension. The series is very natural and easy; we cannot know a thing without perceiving it, nor perceive it but by some 4 REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 71 idea or resemblance of it; nor can the mind have any representation of objects without it, but through the senses : not of human ones, but by impressions made on them; nor of divine ones, but by some similitude or correspond- ence with them, which representations are conveyed to it by instruction through the senses: but in no sense can the in- tellect set up a mint of its own, for the coining of new ideas. It has been presumed, and with great justice, that the power of raising up to itself ideas, without the presence or impression of any object whatsoever, is perhaps a privilege of the divine intellect alone; answerable to the almighty power of creation, or producing a thing out of nothing. But the power of the mind, in our little world, is much the same with that of man in the greater world. It is as im- possible for it to raise up to itself any simple idea entirely new and independent of all sensation, as it is for a man to add one particle to the common mass of matter : though it must be confessed to have a wonderful sagacity in working upon what it finds already stored up in the imagination. As the imagination then is the storehouse, so are the senses the only window, door, or inlet, whereby any light or furniture is admitted into it; and if these were from the first stopped up and closed, it would for ever remain a dark and empty void: yet when we come to examine what is coutained in it, we shall find a most essential difference between the notices which are lodged there. If we survey the whole system of beings, we may divide them into two kinds, material and immaterial, for there is no middle spe- cies. Of the first of these, which are the direct objects of sensation, we may behold full and exact representations in the mind, like a finished picture, boldly and strongly drawn, and lively representing the thing intended to be described. Because we have a direct, immediate perception of them, the figure in the mind is adequate and consentaneous to the object without, and the mind has an idea of it. But of immaterial things we have only a faint, languid conception, a few outlines in a picture, but no full or pro- per representation of them. And the reason is, because they are too big for our mind, it could not contain them ; and therefore in proportion to our capacities, such informa- tion of their essence, nature, and properties, is conveyed to us, as our nature cun bear, or as is sufficient for our 72 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM present state; not so as to yield us any clear perception of them, but describing them by metaphor, analogy, and some similitude to objects better known to us. Whence it is not possible for us to raise an idea, but only an-inadequate thought or notion of them; and in the most refined, exalted parts of knowledge, we are forced to make up these ab- stracted notions from sensible things (having no other. materials to compose them of) and whoever will resolve his most complex thoughts of spiritual things into simple ideas, will find them to terminate in those, and no other, which at first took their rise from sensible objects. By which rule we may easily know of what kind the notices in the intellect are, and then how we came by them, whe- ther from sensation or instruction. And the not sufficiently attending to this distinction has, I am persuaded, been the chief ground of all confusion and error in our reasonings upon this subject; and proved a fatal mistake to Mr. Locke in founding the sublimest parts of knowledge upon ideas of reflection, or the operations of the mind, which can neither give ideas of themselves, nor of any other objects. For there can be no ideas but of — sensible things: nothing is properly an idea, but what stands in the mind for an adequate image or representation of something which is not in it; the thing must be without — us; and because it cannot itself enter, the likeness of it only is conveyed through the senses to the imagination. The term idea, therefore, can never be applied to the ee aT - operations of the mind, as we cannot, properly speaking, — have any idea of them; we cannot define what thinking or _ willing are, we know not their power or nature, nor can we form any distinct idea of them, but only know that | they are the actings or workings of the intellect upon ideas; — first lodged in the imagination for that purpose, and neces- sarily to be considered as antecedent to any such opera- — tions; and without them the mind could not have operated _ at all, nor have exerted one act of thinking, without being provided with some of these to think upon; nor even have had a consciousness of itself, or of its own being. For — though we are certain that the mind does exert its opera- — tions upon sensible objects, yet we cannot frame to our- — selves the least idea or resemblance of them, abstractedly from those objects on which they operate. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 73 And this I observe, to show there can be no weight in the objection from the logic of Port-Royal, and others, | against this general proposition, that all our ideas and knowledge are derived from and by the senses. Their argument runs thus: there is nothing that we conceive more distinctly than our thought itself, nor any proposition more clear than this; I think, therefore I am. Now we could have no certainty of this proposition, if we did not conceive distinctly what it is to be, and what it is to think. Therefore we have in us the ideas of being and thinking, which neither entered into our minds by, nor do in any manner derive their origin from, the senses. But these gentlemen are forced to add, “that we must not be asked to explain these terms, because they are of } the number of those which are so well understood by all \ the world, that endeavouring to explain them would render them obscure.” But this is a mere fallacy, for, if it re- presents nothing, it is no idea. If it has the semblance of any thing, it may be explained. We know that we do think, ¢. e. are conscious of such operation in the mind, but are so far from having any distinct conception, any direct or original idea of this or any other operation in the mind, that all the ideas or notions we can form of its man- ner of acting, and the expressions we use for it, are bor- rowed from sensation. It is no more than a natural power in the soul, and what no waking man can prevent, any more than he can the beating of the heart, or circulation of the blood, which depend not on ideas, but are necessary involuntary motions; and the idea of thinking adds to a man’s knowledge just as much as the idea of walking does to a journey. But we have already seen, that without ideas of sensation we could not think at all; and therefore have no conception of existence, either of ourselves, or any other being. Upon the whole, we cannot with the least propriety say we have an idea of any thing but what is sensible or ma- terial, because nothing else can be wholly or adequately Enown. For want ofsactra distinct and clear view of iiimaterial or spiritual objects, we can have no ideas of them ; but our whole knowledge is confined to notions and conceptions, it being impossible for us to apprehend what their nature, powers, properties, or figure are. Nor can E 74 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM we frame these very notions, but by the help and repre- sentations of sensible things. As for instance, when we would think of the divine nature, the perfectest notion we perhaps can frame, is by ideas of excessive light and daz- zling splendour, though the most extensive imagination cannot conceive any thing beyond the brightness of the sun. And when we would define or describe God, it is by negative expressions, such as infinite, immaterial, immortal, &c., of which we have no positive conception or idea, but analogy to sensible things, that he is not finite, not mate- rial, not mortal, not comprehensible, &c. And this may convince us, that they could not take their rise from the mind, or any internal operations or reflections, because then the mind would know them as they are. But it is not possible for it, by any abstractions, to frame ideas of im- material beings, without applying those of sensation to them, which nevertheless haveno relation to or dependence onthem, but are as different as spirit and matter, 7. e. as two objects in the system of things possibly can be. It implies a con- tradiction, to say our reason can discover a being, and yet have no idea or semblance of it, for that is to discover no- thing; or, that we could naturally come at the knowledge of something whose perfection, essence, or glory, our na- tural faculties are not able to bear the most distant glimpse of. If it be asked, then, how we come by the knowledge of God, if it is not by internal reflections of the mind on the ideas of sensation? the answer is easy, that it is by instruc- tion. What was not obvious to the senses, and therefore could not have entered into the mind to conceive, that the Author of our being has revealed and communicated to us, viz. a full assurance of the existence of invisible objects, with so much of their nature, attributes, and properties as is sufficient for our present state. So that being never mani- fested to our sense or apprehension, “ but in part, as ina glass darkly,” the loftiest conceptions we can form of them fall infinitely short of their real natures; nor can we raise any conception of them beyond those metaphors and similitudes by which they have been pictured out and re- sembled to us. When the eye of the mind would, by the purest abstraction, view the divine glory, it is forced to substitute, by way of resemblance, the strongest light that is known to the eye of the body. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 75 This then is the foundation whereon we are to build all our abstracted knowledge of invisible, immaterial things. It is from instruction alone that the mind takes this flight, advances to remote and sublime truths, which sense cannot discern; soars as high as heaven, and tours in those lofty speculations, wherein it takes a nearer view of all the won- ders of eternity: those objects of faith which, being not seen, are yet believed; though we have no direct ideas or clear perceptions, yet we have sufficient notices to confirm our mind in their existence, our knowledge in their beauty and goodness, our affections to love and pursue, our will and passions to cleave inseparably to them: till, in another world, the veil shall be taken away, and we be admitted to that perfect knowledge which at present is neither needful nor possible. Nor is this any degradation of man, that he was not placed at the head of intellectual beings, able perhaps to contem- plate spiritual truths with a kind of intuition: yet was he created perfect in his order, and endued with all the facul- ties suitable to his condition; as a mortal creature, placed among things which are seen and temporal: as intended for immortality, instructed in things not seen and eternal, in order to fix his hopes on that blessed reward of being ad- mitted into the city of Ged, to see clearly and enjoy fully the glories of the heavenly kingdom, which is reserved for his final and eternal state. The ideas of sense, or the ope- rations of reason, were insufficient to teach him the Author or end of his being, or the objects of divine wisdom. A full view of them was not necessary; therefore God exhi- bited them in such degrees, as would best answer the designs of his providence, and all the purposes and ends of man: so that in the most excellent gifts and graces he has nothing which he did not receive. “ Now, if thou didst re- ceive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?” But knowledge is apt to puff a man up, and make him conceit himself wise above that which is written. These things no way fall within the cognizance of sense or reason; their most exalted faculties give us not the least notion of subjects above the orb of matter, nor could have the remotest view or discernment of an uncreated nature; there being no proportion between the faculty and the ob- ject, between finite and infinite, no similitude or likeness 76 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM whereunto we could compare it; and, consequently, no in- tellectual chain, or certain deductions and conclusions, whereby we could have inferred it, or raised our minds up to the throne above. Therefore God let himself down in condescension to our infirmities, and manifested those real natures which were hid from us, those invisible glories which we could not see and live, by such gradual revela- tions as the wants of men required, and he in his eternal wisdom and justice saw fitting for us; otherwise they had remained for ever unknown and incomprehensible to us; for man could no more be self-instructed in these points, than he could be self-created. The author of The Religion of Nature Delineated, says, =. 3. prop. ‘* that an intelligent being must have some imme- 1.p.41. diate objects of his understanding, or at least a ca- pacity of having such; for if there be no object of his intellect, he is intelligent of nothing. He can neither think nor understand. Therefore man, according to the growth of his reason, would have the objects of sense for the objects of his understanding; but by no abstracted contemplation of their ideas could he discover the essence, nature, or idea of objects not evident to sense;” because, as he adds, “ those Prop. 3. ideas or objects will be adequately and truly known to the mind, whose ideas they are.’’ But we can have no adequate knowledge of supernatural objects; therefore we can have no true idea of them, because we do not perceive them as they are. Yet has he a capacity of receiving such, or forming no- tions or conceptions of them, according to the degrees of perspicuity whereby they are notified to ‘him; and as such notices are more or less distinct and clear, will his images or representations of those originals be. But if they were naturally, or by any demonstrable inferences or conclusions could be, the immediate objects of the intellect, their ideas would be truly and adequately known. But we neither have, nor can have, such ideas of them; therefore the ori~ ginals, neither by nature nor illation, are the immediate ob- jects of human understanding: and consequently can be so only mediately, through the senses, by language and in- struction, which must be by the intervention of another agent, who ultimately, in this case, must be God. Andthis rule will hold universally true in all the parts of divine REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 77 knowledge, whereof we can have no direct conception or adequate idea. / That we have no natural capacities to form an idea of \ God, is evident, because we cannot define him, (for what | we know, we may define) or put bounds in our mind to his essence; but for a finite to.contain an infinite, is contra- _ diction and absurdity. And that we can by no rational consequences or illations discover him, is equally certain, because the intermediate relations between a created effect and a creative cause, are no way apparent or discernible by us, as I shall hereafter more largely show. But in this kind of proof, the arguments always looked upon us as most clear and demonstrative, are those taken from the works of _ God, the frame, constitution, variety, and order of the uni- verse. To which I shall only observe at present, that there is no one chain of causes and effects that can lead the mind from the contemplation of the creature to the knowledge of the Creator. They are terms infinitely distant, what no created understanding could unite and bring together ; it is an act of Omnipotence; and he that could prove it, could also perform it. Let us only hear what the last mentioned excellent au- thor says on this subject: “that both the begin- Reig. nings and the ends of things, the least and the Aaah greatest, all conspire to bafile us; and which way p. 81. ever we prosecute our inquiries, we still fall in with fresh subjects of amazement, and fresh reasons to believe that there are indefinitely still more and more behind, that will for ever escape our eagerest pursuits and deepest penetra- tion. This mighty building is not only thus grand, and the appearances stupendous in it, but the manner in which things are effected, is commonly unintelligible, and their causes too profound for us. There are indeed many things in nature which we know, and some of which we seem to know the causes: but, alas! how few are these with res- pect tothe whole sum? And the causes which we assign, what are they? commonly such as can only be expressed in _ general terms, whilst the bottoms of things remain unfa- _thomable. Such as have been collected from experience, but could scarcely be known before-hand by any arguments a priori, to be capable of such effects; and yet, till causes are known after that manner, they are not thoroughly un- 78 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM derstood. It is impossible for us to come at the true prin- ciples of things. The causes that appear to us are but effects of other causes: and as for the substances themselves of all these things and their internal constitution, they are hid from our eyes. Our philosophy dwells in the surface of nature.” To argue, then, upon this author’s principles: those ideas or objects which are immediate, will be adequately and truly known to the mind whose ideas they are; for ideas can be no further the ideas of any mind, than the mind has a perception of them. But the least and the greatest of created things baffle us, their reasons escape our eagerest pur- suits and deepest penetration. The very substances of things, and much more their internal constitution, are hid from our eyes; therefore we can have no idea or perception of them (except their outward bulk, figure, and some few properties.) All the images we frame of them, their laws, destination, power, contrivance, and wisdom, are but at best false and imperfect representations, incapable of trans* mitting ideas of things as they are, and consequently no more than misrepresentations and misconceptions of things. And if these first relations or respect of things, the near- est to our view, be so unapparent, it will not be possible, by the intuition of any intermediate or more distant rela- tions, to discover other things with greater certainty. There is no certainty, and can be no demonstration ; for if the first proposition be imperfect, or doubtful, or false, it will be always so, in all the instances and uses to which it is applicable; and therefore impossible, from an imperfect idea of the work, to form a perfect idea of the workman. Neither can the mind, by any series of dependency, as- _cend by effects to the first independent cause. We indeed know by revelation, what Aristotle and others could not by reason, that there is a first efficient cause of all things ; and are thence able to form arguments, which may evince the absurdity of those who maintain an eternity of matter, a multiplicity of first movers, or an infinite series and pro- gression of causes; by reducing them to admit either a pro- gress to infinity, which is absurd; or grant some first pure act or being, which needs no other for its actuation. But we cannot ascend seriatim, by this chain of causes and effects, to the first infinite; because out of the num; berless links there are so few that we can discern, or trace REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 79 out their dependence on that above it; because the man- ner in which things are effected is commonly unintelligible, and their causes too profound for us. We cannot know a cause by any arguments a priori, to be capable of rendering * such or such effects; and yet till causes are known after that manner, they are not thoroughly understood ; Relig. Nat. “but it is impossible for us to come at the true Delin-p.s1. principles of things, or to see into the economy of the finest part of nature. And those which appear causes to us, are but effects of other causes which we discern not; these remain unfathomable, hid from our eyes, and our deepest penetration reaches not beyond the surface; i.e. we are ignorant of all the causes and dependencies in nature, and therefore cannot from them ascend through the vast space and series of causes, to the first incomprehensible causality.” Nor am I any way apprehensive of the terrifying objec- tion which some make, that if we ean have no idea or no- tion, conception or thought, not some way subject to, or conveyed by sense; then we cannot have the least evidence of any thing, but from the same: therefore there being no corporeal sense of a Deity, there can be no evidence at all of his existence. But this argument is utterly inconclusive ; for no immaterial beings can be objects of corporeal sense ; therefore without assistance we could not have known them: and for this very reason did the infinite mind communicate them to our minds through the senses, by the artificial in- stitution and vehicle of language; which is so far from in- ferring, as atheists and others, from a wrong stating of the question, would, that therefore knowledge is sense, or sense the criterion of truth ; that it concludes directly con- trary, that neither sense nor reason are the measure of truth, but God alone is; and that reason could not any way dis- cover them, as they are not objects of the very intellect, till they are proposed, and it becomes instructed in them. And this method of accounting for our coming at Divine truths, is free from those embarrassments which so far per- plex the maintainers of a contrary opinion, that we find the greatest authors constantly forced to take shelter under what they themselves condemn, the absurdity of innate tdeas. ‘Thus Dr. Cudworth expresses himself: « if Wetalicy. the soul be a mere tabula rasa, a naked and pas- &e. . x 3 . ‘ ° p. 288. sive thing, which has no innate furniture of its own, nor any thing at all in it, but what was impressed upon it a oad 8) THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM from without, then there could be no such thing as morality in the world. Very far otherwise: there is an innate po- tential faculty and activity, but no innate furniture. And as the being and attributes of God are the first original and source of all things, the ground and foundation of all mo- rality, yet not immediately discoverable by reason: there- fore the infinite mind made such derivative participations of knowledge, or revelations of himself, to the mind of man, as might suffice for direction in all its moral conduct, and to its final end.” Malice, So, to say, “ that these things must needs spring 1.4.p.149. up from the active power and fecundity of the Sei mind itself, because the corporeal objects of sense can imprint no such things upon it, is an evasive begging of the question; and there is no more need for these things springing up in the mind, than there is water springing up in a vessel, because we find it there: it had a capacity to receive it, and it was conveyed by a proper canal, or poured into it. Divine things are not the corporeal or incorporeal objects of sense, yet may be, and are conveyed into the mind by the inlet of the senses ; neither are they ideas of sensation, because sense could imprint no such things: but they are vohuwara, intellectual, intelligible truths, when the mind is taught and instructed in them, and then become objects of its apprehension, contemplation, and thought. But they must be sown before they will spring up in the mind: and if the mind had such a natural power and fe- cundity to produce them, it would necessarily have an im- mediate idea and direct knowledge of them: which is so far from being true, that the shallowness and frailty of its capacities is not able to receive or bear the least glimpse of their real natures or essence, nor conceive them, but darkly, as they are represented to us by analogy to ideas of sensa- tion, which are the only immediate objects of the senses, and consequently of the intellect ; therefore all others must be so immediately, by the intercourse of some other power and means.” And this method of coming at supernatural knowledge, is not only agreeable to experience, or the way our own minds will tell us they became acquainted with it; but it is congruous to God’s proceedings with man; to the true condition of man in this state, and what alone can account for the ignorance of the philosophers, in these points most REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 81 important to be known; and for that blindness and stupidity which have covered so many millions of rational creatures in all nations and ages of the world. First, it is entirely congruous with the Almighty’s pro- ceedings. God made man an intelligent being, or endowed him with a capacity to receive and know truth ; and there- fore gave him also the faculty of speech, or organs fit to frame articulate sounds, and furnished him with language to enable him both to receive and give instruction; that, words being the signs of internal conceptions, or marks for ideas in the mind, he might be capable, first, of being taught by God, and then to teach others, or to convey the thoughts of his own mind to another. I think it would not be difficult to prove (and If shall in -| other parts of this work endeavour to do it) that the first language was taught by God; or, that man could not of himself have discovered the knowledge of fixing sounds to signify objects, ideas, or conceptions, so as to be signs of, and stand for the reality of things; for the subject of in- ternal operations in his own mind, or make others so ex- actly understand his thoughts, that the correspondence or least disagreement of these invisible representations of things should be immediately known. Or, if this were possible, that it must have been the work of many ages, during which time man had been neither an intelligent nor sociable crea- _ ture, and so sent into the world to no purpose; for though he had the faculty of receiving knowledge, and organs adapted to form articulate sounds, yet without language he could not have received it; he could not have thought, and his several noises had been sounds without signification. For he that could not think, could never substitute sounds for things, or affix sense and meaning to words, any more than parrots can; though they frame articulate sounds, because there is no natural connexion between sounds and ideas. And consequently language, the instrument of ra- tionality (since without it our rational faculties had been useless) must be ascribed, not to man, but to God. Words are necessary for two of the most im- Vide portant purposes of life, thought and conversa- ars tion: first, for the recording of our own thoughts D. as they stand for nothing but the ideas or concep- ~ tions in the mind of him that uses them, they are marks n® 82 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM with certain and proper significations, by which he is able to recollect and remember ; and without them could neither call things to his view, nor exercise his thought, nor speak intelligibly. For where there is no object, or mark of it, in the mind, a man is intelligent of nothing, has nothing to exercise any internal operation in compounding, separa- ting, dividing, judging, or reflecting; is only potentially rational, the use of reason being locked up, and of no benefit to him. And if children were not to hear others, they would not learn the use of speech ; as men without language would rather be a species of apes, than rational creatures. So essential are words to reason, that we cannot think but by the help of language. For thought is nothing but the speech of the mind, which it uses to itself in all its re- Plato. flections and contemplations : 7d diavocicbar Adror, bv abth mpos éavthy H Wuxy dietepyeru. So a great author argues, Relic. Nat, tata mental act can scarce be performed without g.Nat. ; 5 5 Delin.p. Words, or something equivalent (I believe, says he, oe that even the deaf and dumb form to themselves some kind of language: I mean something which supplies the room of language.) For thoughts in their naked state, divested of all words, and taken merely by themselves, are such-subtile fleeting things, as are scarcely capable of making any appearance in the mind; at least of being detained, compared together, and ranged into sentences. If a sen- tence be so made up of sensible ideas, as to subsist in the mind by the help of those images which remain in the phan- tasy, after the manner of a sentence expressed in pictures, or by hieroglyphics: yet such a sentence must be very im- perfect, through the want of grammatical inflexions, parti- cles, and other additions, necessary to modify and correct the ideas, of which (particles, &c.) there can be no images; and indeed little more than a set of disjointed conceptions, scarce exhibiting any sense without the assistance of lan- guage to fill up the blanks. It is by the help of words, at least in great measure, that we even reason and discourse within ourselves, as well as communicate our thoughts and discourse with others; and if any one observes himself well, he will find that he thinks as well as he speaks in some language, and that in thinking he supposes and runs’ over silently and habitually those sounds which in speak- ing he actually makes. In short, words seem to be as it REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 83 were bodies, or vehicles, to the sense or meaning; and which, without the other, can hardly be fixed in the mind. Let any man try ingenuously whether he can think over but Alcib. 2. that short prayer in Plato, Ta wiv 26a, &c., abstract- ed quite from those and all other words, &c. So that thinking is no other than a mental speaking ; as no proposition can be understood or considered by the mind without words. ‘They are signs by which it was at at first acquainted with things and all abstracted truths, and by which alone it is able to recall them for its use. Andon this account I doubt not but the Greeks expressed reason and words by the same term Adyos. The single ideas of sensation may be viewed by the mind without thinking: yet we cannot unite several together, so far as to form a pro- position upon them, without words and language. The second use of speech I need but mention, no one denying its necessity for communication, that one man might convey his thoughts to another, without which he could not have been.a sociable creature; it is the interpreter of the mind, whereby we can unfold the clear meaning of our most secret thoughts and discourse, so as to be understood, which is the end of speech. God therefore created man with intellectual faculties ; and, to render them subservient to the great ends of his being, he furnishes him with language; for God immediately conversed with him, as the woman also, as soon as formed, did with man. And as language consists of words or names of things, God ordered him to give names of every creature, which we may justly suppose to be of divine appointment, since their names were according to their natures, it not /being conceivable that any human mind (for the reasons j before given) should at the first view do this, without a supernatural assistance and communication. Whence it seems to appear, that. language, or the signifi- cation of words, and connexion of them with the first ideas of sensation, without which man could not have received any part of knowledge, neither thought himself of sensible objects, or the pictures of them in his mind, nor communi- - cated them to others, was entirely owing to divine in- struction. So large a stock of materials might have perhaps been sufficient for all the purposes of man, as an inhabitant of 84 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM this world only; but God intended him for another invisible and inconceivable state; therefore revealed to him so much of the things belonging thereto, as was necessary to pre- pare and direct him thither. Man had a capacity to receive spiritual and intellectual truths, and God made such dis- coveries of them as plentifully to furnish the mind with all “the means of divine knowledge. But these truths were the secrets of the most high God, what man by his wit, senses, or endeavours, could not have apprehended: there would be but little difference between the created and uncreated nature, if the imagination of one could find out the infinite perfections, purposes, and counsels, of the other. It is equalling a finite to an infinite; and man could with as little absurdity and as much ease create himself, as discover the natures, give definitions, names, and ideas of immaterial, incomprehensible objects: beings of whose real essence, at- tributes, or operations, he could not raise any images in his mind, and therefore could not possibly so much as think of. All the several ranks of beings and relations, which the senses cannot discover, actions we never heard, and notions we cannot see, are out of the reach of their testimony, and must be let into the mind or come to be known some other way; which could be only from a proper instructor, and in the case before us, there was none but God. Plato. The whole voice of antiquity agrees in this, that ne the knowledge of the 1d dv is @cdyv eis &vOpdrous déats, ' agift ofthe gods to men. And Plato says, émorhun, science is nothing but o%éyois, sensation, or that inward judgment which the mind passes upon things conveyed to it through the senses. Even Celsus concluded, “thata divine Or. Cont, Spirit descended to acquaint the ancient sages with Cels. 1.7. those divine truths they taught the world.” And p- 356. Tamblichus asserts, “that our weak and frail nature possesses nothing of this knowledge as natural to it, obuutoy 5é ovdev KeKTNTOL,” It will never be said, that man at his first creation had a natural view of the immaterial world, or an immediate idea of God, because such objects or ideas are adequately known to the mind whose ideas they are; but this God is not sub- ject to, therefore no immediate object of the mind, and can be so only mediately by the help of language and informa- tion. Of material things we form exact pictures, impres- S.. ds C0182 Seifig > De mang th SEF ES SS oa te Spe ae ang ee Se Te sein ss uae tRipesies : aka ahs REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 8% sions, or ideas; of divine things, only thoughts, notions or conceptions, and those by analogy to ideas of sensation, which are no just representations of their real nature, but reflections ev aiviyuort, dark and obscure resemblances, therefore ; gor. cannot be a creature of the intellect, or any original xiii. 12. production of the mind, for then it would have been con- - sentaneous to nature, areal likeness and similitude of it. Again, the objects of sense to one man are so to every man that has his senses, and the impression is the same where the organs are not vitiated; so that all agree in the propor- tions and descriptions of them. It would be the same in spiritual objects, if the natural fecundity of the mind pro- duced them; there would be no difference or confusion in the apprehensions of men concerning God and spiritual things; but the faculty, which is alike in all, would naturally afford the like conceptions to all. Yet the thoughts of men vary infi- nitely; some have true, some have false, some have weak, _ and others no conceptions at all of these subjects. Whence comes this, but from the different manner of instruction ? ° Where the mind is justly informed, its thoughts and rea- sonings will (or ought to) be just and true; but when all the solid notices wherein mankind had been instructed be- came weak or obliterated, such were their apprehensions : the names of things continued, and men reasoned on them; but they reasoned falsely, their instruction poisoned others, and spread the most detestable opinions of the divine na- ture through the world; which could not have happened if the mind had a natural power to raise any direct imme- diate conceptions, or attain a clear discernment of it. Whereas men differed in nothing more than their opinions and sentiments of God, in which every thing was so con- fused and perplexed, dubious and uncertain, that it was the subject of dispute, not of knowledge, and filled the world with debate, contention, and strife: there is no accounting for this, but by saying, that natural wisdom is not the pro- perty of man, but of God; it grows not in the faculty or imagination, that whatever science a man has he receives it from without, it is conveyed to the mind through the ducts and channel of the senses. To put this argument in a yet stronger light: as without language man could not have thought, or discoursed, or given names to sensible things, it is beyond all stretch of 86 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM power and imagination, that even with language he should be able to give names to invisible, incomprehensible beings, i. e. to express what is inexpressible, what he could not think of, whose essence was utterly unknown to him; and therefore he could never invent words to stand for ideas, conceptions, or real natures, that he knew nothing of, and an idea of nothing is a contradiction. And what increases | the difficulty here is, that these names are expressive of their natures, and yet taken from sensible things: now if man had any clear adequate knowledge of them, he would have imposed names proper and peculiar to them, so as to be distinguished from all others, and not borrowed: them from inferior natures; which is a full evidence that they were not of human invention; for as we conceive, so should we speak; but given by one who had a full comprehensive view of them, yet represented those glorious objects so far transcending our capacities, in a manner suitable to our ap- prehension of them, which is not directly or immediately, but by semblance to human things, in order to help the understanding towards conceiving what would otherwise be for ever hidden from us. And for this reason we can nei- ther think, conceive, nor express ourselves concerning them, i butin the manner wherein they have been represented to us. Thus the divine nature, though in itself, by reason of its — absolute simplicity and infinitude, it can neither be defined — nor apprehended by us under any one adequate conception — or notion; yet God has revealed himself by various names which lead us to the contemplation of his nature and attri- a butes, and yet suited to our capacities, or manner of appre- — | hending divine objects. Thus Jehovah is the name of essence, — or substance; El, of force, fortitude, and power; Shaddai,is all-sufficiency ; Adonai, the Lord of the universe; Elohim, — the most high; Sabaoth, the Lord of Hosts, &c.; hereby — denoting eternity, omnipotence, independence, self-existence, the Creator of the world, the giver and preserver of being to all his creatures, &c., which no created understanding | could have known’or explicated, without a communication — from him who is the Author of essence, existence, and all | perfection. | So aspirit, in the primary signification, is breath, there- — by alluding to its invisible subtile nature. Angel is a mes- — senger, denoting the office of those illustrious ministers who REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 87 attend round the throne. These, and other names of spi- ritual objects, could not have been given but by one well acquainted with the secrets of heaven, which neither Adam _ hor any of his posterity possibly could be, without a revela- tion from heaven. The heathens, it is certain, did not hold divine names to _ be of human institution, but from the gods; and via. 1am. what therefore could not be altered, as not retain- Mee oo ing the same peculiar force when translated into c. 5. any other language, and (which is worth observing ) that the barbarous (7. e. the Jewish or oriental) names were more emphatical and brief, and had the least ambiguity and variety of diction. So Plato, though he derives them ori- ginally from the gods, yet confesses the Greeks had them from the barbarians. And these revelations to man had a double use. 1. To enable him to fulfil the ends of his being; and, 2. to communicate and transmit them to others, that there might be no necessity of maintaining a perpetual intercourse be- tween heaven and earth; to exercise the duty of faith, both as a rational and moral agent. Nor is there any danger of mistake, for these subjects of divine communication are as easily separated, distinguished, and known from all other notices of the mind, as the different ideas conveyed by the several senses are. If a man takes a survey of his own mind, and inquires how he came by ideas, or those perfect representations of material beings he sees pictured there, as of a house, a man, &e., he will easily perceive, that it was by the organ of sight; if of sounds, by hearing; and soon. His senses, understanding, and experience, are infallible witnesses of it. But if we come to ask such an one, whether he has a clear perception of objects above the fixed stars? he will answer in the negative. If we demand a reason why ? It is because he never had a near distinct view of them. By what notes or characters does he represent them in his mind? by the most glorious semblances of material things. Did he discover these invisible immaterial beings by any internal operations or reflections of his own? no man that ever lived could answer in the affirmative. By what means then did he come to have a notion of what he never saw nor heard, of the mansions in heaven, the blessed an- 88 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM gels, the infinite Creator of all things, &c.? The reply, without hesitation, will be, that he was taught them, in- structed in their nature and perfections from analogy or representation to sensible things. Whether he could pos- sibly frame any other conception of them, or by any stretch of the mind raise new ideas of immaterial objects, whereim he had never been instructed? It is impossible he should. From whom did he learn them? From his parents or masters? From whom did they receive their knowledge? From their ancestors. Which will lead us on till we come at the first parents of mankind, who were instructed by God himself. Hence comes that universal acceptation of the word learning: all spiritual knowledge is such, we learned it from our fathers, and they from God. In the whole of this procedure, there is nothing but what is plain and natural, agreeable to the experience and testimony of every man’s conscience and understanding, that will but consult them, and satisfy himself how he came by the possession of any truth. We indeed are told by others of ideas of sensation, ideas of reflection, ideas of self-consciousness, ideas of thinking, willing, and all the internal operations of the mind ; simple ideas and complex ideas; ideas of simple modes, and ideas of mixed modes; ideas of primary and secondary qualities ; ideas of power; collective ideas of substances; ideas of — causes and effects: ideas of relations, and numberless others. By a due combination, abstraction, and reflection of which, we may by illation infer the necessity, existence, ta a he iy Oey yen! : ‘ nature, and properties of immaterial beings, and those re- lations we stand in to them. But miserable would be the case of man, were he doomed to learn his duty, his happiness, and his God, from g such unnatural insignificant jumbles of words; for who then could be saved? How few ever understand them 7 How much fewer would be able to go through the laby- — ) rinth of these several operations? and when they had, it — would help them but little in the search of truth, that real — and substantial knowledge, which renders them better, as _ well as wiser, to obey God here, and enjoy him hereafter. Besides, in all our knowledge and experience there is | not the least ground for this omnipotence in the mind. It cannot think or operate without some precedent ideas to REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 89 work upon. With the combination of all its powers, it cannot produce one new idea without the help of the senses ; or notions of invisibilities, but by borrowing them from sensation. Let a person of the greatest natural saga- city, acquired improvements, and exercised in metaphysical abstracted reasonings, try it, and he will not find one idea in his imagination, not a single picture in his intellect, that exhibits things quite removed from all degrees of sense: nor can he affix any precise determined idea, that he shall steadily annex to them, as often as he shall happen to re- volve them in his mind. But what alone may convince every impartial inquirer, that these truths could come from no other source than that of revelation, is the impossibility of altering, enlarging, or diminishing them. We know them so far as God has taught us, and no further; we can neither discover new objects, nor conceive those that have been revealed to us, otherwise than as they were communicated, nor can know them better by any similitudes, relations, or oppositions we can frame: nor have all the self-reflections, or abstractions - of the most exalted minds, from any combinations, or alte- rations of ideas, been able, amidst their other prodigious discoveries, to add a single zota to one of these; which could not have been, if these subjects had been the product of reason, thinking, or human inquiry. All other arts and sciences have been gradual, and most of them yet short of perfection. But where God is the teacher, reason is at a nonplus: it can go no further, nor add to his determina- tions; they are all of that kind of first principles, which give all evidence to, but receive no evidence from our conclusions. Secondly, this method of accounting for our attaining knowledge by instruction, is most agreeable to experience, and the condition of mankind, through all ages; as in a good measure appears from what has been already said: and it will, upon examination, be found, that all our real and solid knowledge is entirely owing to it; not from any private mternal growth, but the pains and culture of others. For without any indignity to the imperial faculty of reason, (which is common to all, and the capacity of learning much the same) the apparent difference among men proceeds from instruction or attention. Ratio est COMNUNIS, Cic. Leg. doctrina differens, discendi quidem facultate par. | ™ \ 90 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM And this explains the old distinction, that ‘virtue is our own, but wisdom is not,’ because we are obliged to the instruction of others for it. Virtus est intus in Lactant. hy g 2 1.6.p.514, 2000S, scientia ad nos extrinsecus vent. Scientia igitur alent beneficti est, quia posita est in au- diendo. No one denies that men are, what Plato justly calls Repub. 7. them, vce: Aoyiorleot, by nature capable of reason, p- 256. and reason of vast attainments in knowledge; but neither one nor the other could be without language, nor language without instruction, nor instruction (in the lan- guage of divine things at least) but from God. This is the order of nature, the appointment of its Author, which there is no deviating from. As it alone solves those other- wise unaccountable difficulties, in the savageness of nations, the ignorance of ages, the horrid errors of philosophy, the gradual advancement, perfection, or decay of religion, arts, and sciences: the only difference was according to the opportunity of receiving instruction. Greece was a thou- sand years without the least tincture of philosophy, or knowledge of nature; and when it appeared among them, it was not of their own manufacture, but the spoils of Egypt and the East. Their fathers were as well fitted for improvement as their descendants, but had no instructors, nor knew where to look for them: and Socrates, in his Apology, tells the Athenians, “that they will fall into an irrecoverable state, unless God shall take care of them, and send them another instructor.’ So the Romans, and every distant nation, were barbarous for want of intercourse; and on the same account the New Guinea-men are savages to this day. For the mind of every one being at first a perfect blank, if nothing were wrote upon it but the observations of naked unassisted reason, it would be little better than a sheet of blotted paper, filled perhaps with characters, but those de- formed and useless, without one note or thought relating to God, eternity, or a future state. And notwithstanding the censures some moderns have passed upon Lactantius and others for asserting that nothing could be known of God but by revelation; as if they hereby attempted to discredit human reason, and we therefore ought to beware of them and their doctrine; because whoever depreciate reason, we may be assured they have some very unwar- oe ae gm I ln es REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 91 rantable paradoxes to advance, &c. It may on the other hand be affirmed with equal justice, that no one exalts rea- son above its proper limits, as the light of heaven, and the oracle of God; but with an intent to depreciate revelation, and make man the measure of truth. But truth will sus- tain itself; and no article in it has a surer foundation than this, that nothing can be known of God but immediately from God; nothing has a more concurrent testimony of all antiquity and learned men in the world: to which also may be added, that man is not born wise, but becomes so by teaching and instruction. It must be confessed, that, in the first ages of philosophy, when every thing was under litigation, much ado was made about virtue in man, whether it were by acquisition or natural infusion; some held the latter, some the former; Plato is variable. But though he and Socrates at some times made virtue produced by @¢fa uolpa, a divine Meno. fate, without a concurrence of the mind; yet ? °*: Timeeus Locrus, from whom Plato borrowed so many no- tions, though he taught the principles of virtue to be from nature, yet affirmed the middle and end (or the completion) of them, to be from diligence, by the means of institution and philosophy, 5:4 raldeias Kat pidocogias, which P. 103. strengthen virtue, as exercise does the body. And So- crates, who studied virtue, we know found instruction so necessary, that he was not ashamed to be taught by women ; he called Diotima his mistress, and for a long time fre- quented Aspasia. Aristotle divided virtue into ra- Ethic. 1.2. tional and moral: the first he makes chiefly to °' proceed from, and be perfected by instruction ; the other, which are ethics, to depend entirely on custom or manners, from which they take their name, and differ very little. Several of the stoics held the seeds of virtue to be in na- ture; as Cleanthes, thata good man was such ducer kal uh bce, by nature, not by institution; yet others of them taught aperhy didaxrHv, that virtue was teachable; and even Zeno, in an epistle to Antigonus, that an ingenuous mind, with the assistance of a master and competent exercise, might easily attain to perfect virtue. But the prevailing opinion of the ancients was, that four things (ovcis, Adyos, maiSela, "kal dcxnois) nature, reason, instruction, and application, were as necessary to the attaining virtue, and every art, as gia 92 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM a rich soil, proper culture, a painful husbandman, and good seed, are to a fruitful harvest ; (and Plutarch wrote a little work to prove virtue to be from industry) that good edu- cation and instruction make good natures; and good na- tures, from such discipline, are made better than they were ~ before; for men become good and wise, not from nature, but instruction and care: that they who are least disposed to them by nature, will by these means be brought to prac- tise every branch of them; as they who by nature are the fittest, will become bad through sloth and negligence; and they looked upon the forming the minds of youths to be as much owing to the master, as the fashion of the clay is to the hands of the potter: therefore when Diogenes saw a lad behave indecently, he gave the master a blow, and Plutarch. asked why he instructed his scholar no better? In Peiaaa} shorts a good education was esteemed mn7i Kat pita p. 4. kadonayadias, the fountain and root of all well-doing. And for the same reasons the Christians called it gwticpds, Cl. Alex, because it illuminates; the master takes off the Strom. 5. cover, opens the store of learning and wisdom, and POR thereby manifests what before was hid. But when they speak of divine learning, it is in another strain, and the gods are allowed to be the only masters. Philed. Plato, treating of the divine nature, says, ‘this Rodd doctrine, though strange, the gods (as they say) have thus delivered to us, to learn and teach it to others.” And over and over again, “that we could not learn these truths but from the gods, or the sons of the gods; and that we cannot know their will without a prophet to reveal it to 9 us.” Iamblichus saw the force of this truth, and was posi- tive, “ that human nature can neither speak of God, nor do any divine works without God.’ Cicero would go fur- ther than his master Plato, in saying “that philosophy (under which he includes the whole of religion) was not only the Tuse.Q. gift, but the invention of the gods.” Philosophia so Omnium mater artium, ut Plato ait donum, ut ego Theodo- inventum Deorum. And Christians, till later ages, lp. 7, affirmed 6edcdor0v coptay, that divine wisdom, or the Lactant. knowledge of divine things, was from God; and that learning and knowledge are to be received from what we hear, and not from what we see. For these reasons, the world has always laid so great a REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 93 stress upon education, as if without it man would scarce become a rational creature; or whatever faculties he has, they would have remained useless to all the purposes of knowledge, society, and life. Thisis a subject I may here- after more largely treat of; and therefore at presént shall only speak the sentiments of Plutarch, as they will both show the necessity of it for the reclaiming of nature, and what was the opinion of the wisest ancients upon this head. He observes, that no creature comes into the We AuS _yworld under so many disadvantages as man; that Prolis. his education is laborious, his increase slow, and virtue ’ seated at so great a distance, that few parents live till their sons can reach it. Hence Neocles did not see Themisto- } cles a conqueror at Salamis; nor Miltiades the triumphs of ' Cimon; Xantippus never heard an oration of Pericles, nor Aristo the philosophy of Plato. That life indeed we have from parents, but to WA live well, from learning and education, which are Colot. vol. as necessary to the mind as the nurse’s milk is to the body; and he that wants it, will prove, like a whelp brought up in an old woman’s lap, useless, and good for no- thing: for if nature produce any good affections, yet, like trees unpruned, they run into false shoots and unprofitable wood. Men take pains to learn all other arts, virtutem reading, riding, music, dancing, nay even what is on ce necessary for meat and drink, and raiment; not. 2. 203. one of which, without learning, could they in any instance do tolerably. And can any thing be more ridiculous, than to see the common acts of life want direction, and yet con- clude that prudence and wisdom, and the art of living well, for the sake of all which other things are provided, and the right use of our intellectual faculties, to which every branch of knowledge is subservient, can be attained without art and care, and be owing entirely to chance? Whoever de- nies that virtue is owing to instruction, denies there is any such thing as virtue; for it proceeds from being taught, and he that hinders the teaching of it, does what he can to root it out of the world. Of all the senses, therefore, hearing is of the pala ie greatest service to virtue and reason; for nature, 1. 155. without teaching and instruction, is blind, 4 péy yap Ceo: pbois tvev pabhoews Tuprddy; and he lays such stress p. 2. ene apis 94 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM thereon, that whereas nature, reason, and application are necessary concurrents to wisdom, yet he will have reason to be nothing but instruction, Kaaé de Adyov piv, Thy madOnow. For the mind of children is like soft wax, capable of impression, but afterwards grows hard, and will not receive it. They stand in need therefore of instruction and care, as much as beasts; which Lycurgus intended to show, by bringing up a couple of whelps, one to sports in Lacon, the field, the other fondled at home: that proved Apothg. sagacious and useful in its kind, this good for no- Lycurgus. thing but to lick a trencher. He afterwards pro- duced them ina full assembly of Spartans, to enforce the necessity of education; for the difference did not proceed from nature, both having the same sire and dam, but from education; and that this formed us to virtue more than na- ture. The application was, that learning, institution, and accustoming themselves to do as Hercules did, would tend more to their glory, than the boasting of being descended from him. batik It is intercourse and commerce that improve the Ignis mind: and without them man would have been the compara- : tio, most savage and shameless creature in the world, — p. 957. rdvrov wypwwraroy Chov Kar avadearatos 6 avOpwros hy. And that to this alone did even Greece owe her literature ~ and politeness, the use of wine, and corn, and letters. De Solert, And the whole may be summed up in this: Animal. that man by nature has reason; but reason, per- — p. 962. pline and industry. This is sufficient to show how degraded the condition of. j fected and endowed with virtue, is owing to disci- — man, and his potential reason, would be without instruc- — tion; a wild savage, under no restraint or law, without — sense to provide the common necessaries or comforts of | life, without the knowledge of manners, letters, or religion. So many always have been, and still are, with a language scarce articulate, without shelter or raiment, without food, but what nature equally provides for them and beasts, — without any apprehensions of God or another world: and, — in all respects, approaching nearer to the brutal than the — Prem.1. rational intellectual state. And if we believe Pliny, . H ic e . . . : 7. Homi- nan without instruction would neither speak, nor — nem scire nihil fine walk, nor eat; and even at this day, without in- REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 95 struction, the very apprehension of religion would doctrina, soon be lost in the world. spe on Thirdly, this account of coming at knowledge non vesci. agrees withall the annals of. antiquity and histories in the world. Moses has recorded the settlements of the first parents of mankind, where God in a more frequent and immediate manner gave revelations of his will, and commanded them to teach it to their children, and their children’s children. Hence, those first colonies of the east, Phoenicia, Persia, and Egypt, continued the oracles of learning to the world through all succeeding ages. The further men dispersed from them, the more they became sunk in barbarity, and di- vested of humanity. Reason was like the echo, where nearest to the voice it was strong, but as it removed, gra- dually sunk and died away. And what not a little contri- buted to this preservation of knowledge in the East, was God’s continuing to reveal himself to the J ews, so that in process of time the little spot of Jewry was the only place where the true God was known and taught. And some beams of this Divine wisdom could not but shine forth from time to time upon the neighbouring people who conversed with them. Accordingly, whenever we find a people begin to revive in literature,’ was owing to one of these causes: either to some transmigrators from those parts coming and settling among them, or else to their going thither for instruction. From these fountains they always had it, and at this fire the nations of the world lighted their own. There is no instance. to be given to the contrary. Hither Athens, and after- wards Rome, came in quest of knowledge and instruction. These were the schools and masters to the world. And though our accounts of Asia are but short and defective, yet what remains there are, as also their traditions, even in China, trace their origin and oracles westward ; which is the fullest confirmation of the Mosaic history, and of the propagation of knowledge by instruction only. Adam, no doubt, had infused science with a large im- perious understanding. He saw all his eldest descendants before the flood, except Noah; and unquestionably did in- struct them, both by example and precept, in the know- ledge and worship of the true God, and what tremendous crimes apostacy and disobedience were. This Noah (who 9 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM had conversed with many of the antediluvian patriarchs, ) and Shem, that preacher of righteousness, did, after the flood, instructing their descendants in that true theology, and most excellent philosophy, they had received from their fathers. From whence the Eastern schools, especially the Jewish and Babylonian, became the most famous in the world, the inventors of all useful arts and sciences, and the Vid. Eu- fountains from which all other nations received . seb. Prep. Pia RGR REY are 9c. 3. their religion and learning; as the very oracles of Apollo confess. Abraham being thoroughly instructed in ‘ geometry, astronomy, and all the literature of the east, is ' supposed by many to be the first who transplanted them i into Egypt, and to have founded the school at Memphis, | where they so assiduously applied themselves to the culture and increase of knowledge, that they were looked upon by other parts of the world to be the inventors of all the arts they found practised there ; and Joseph might instruct them in other parts of wisdom, so that many look upon him as the Apis, or great God of Egypt. Among the Jews the houses of the patriarchs were the schools of religion and learning ; afterwards, in the cities of the Levites the youths were instructed in knowledge and the law of God. Samuel presided over the Naioth, or college of Ramah; and inthe © schools of Jericho and Ramoth-Gilead, the disciples were called the sons of the prophets. And from these seminaries — of learning did Thales, Plato, and others, in after ages, take all the seeds of knowledge, which they cultivated at home with such success and applause. With this account the ancient authors agree. — Vid. Eu- Eypolemus, speaking of the Babylonish traditions, | seb. Prep. |. 9.¢.17. says, the Egyptian priests of Heliopolis learned Id. ¢.26. astrology from Abraham: and that Moses first taught the use of letters to the Jews, from whom the Pheenicians received them, as the Greeks did from the — Pheenicians. Artapanus relates much the same thing, that _ 1a. ¢.18, Abraham first taught astronomy to the Pheenicians 19, 20. and Egyptians, and sodo Melo and Philo. The truth is, that wherever there is science there must have been discipline; and where there is discipline there via. ci, must have been a master ; and this master we may aie sanda, find if we inquire for him, wherever the registers rom. 6, p. 643. of time have been preserved. As for imstance, © i | | ' REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 97 Theophrastus learned of Aristotle, Aristotle of Plato, Plato of Socrates, Socrates of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, and so on. If we go to Thales and the first wise men, we must again stop and inquire who were their masters: if it be said the Egyptians, or Indians, Babylonians and Magi; they again, we see, had their teachers, tillat length we come to the origin of mankind, and if we then ask who was the teacher and in- structor itcertainly could not be any mortal. If it be said, the - angels were, this cannot be; for whatever communications they might make as angels, or spiritual beings, without the organs of voice, man could neither hear nor understand them ; or, if they assumed a human voice and language, this must _ have been by special permission and appointment. But even angels were but learners of truth, for they had a be- ginning. We must therefore ascend above all principalities and powers among them, till we come to one eternal un- created being, by whom all things were made, the only God, who is the fountain of truth; and who, at sundry times, and in divers manners, made communications of his will to his rational creatures, and to whom all knowledge and wisdom is ultimately to be referred. And if truth did not remain in its original purity, it was not owing to the in- struction or the teacher, but to the ungrateful soil into which it fell; to the sloth and remissness of men, to the wicked- ness of their heart, which continually added inventions of their own to the worship of God; to the wiles of the great deceiver, who sowed tares among it to choke and to cor- rupt it; so that at last it became totally defaced, and gra- dually wasted into ignorance and impiety: and the world could never rectify things without beginning again, inquiring for masters, and searching for instruction. And this, I think, every one must be convinced of, who examines how he came by any parts of knowledge, or ob- serves the progress of children in learning. What have they that they did not receive ? either from teachers, who again had their masters, or, what is the same, by reading which is only an artificial language and method of in- struction. Fourthly, this accounts for the many defects and strange ignorance which philosophy laboured under, with respect to these important points, in which every thing was full of error and confusion. Men affirmed, denied, or explained z : 98 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM them as their fancy led, without any rule to judge by. This was owing to the depravation of original truths, and the inability of reason, either to discover them, or rectify mis- takes which crept into them; which made their religion such an heap of absurdities, their notions of God so im- pious and their acts of worship so idolatrous and utterly unbecoming the divine nature. For their endless and ir- reconcileable differences were not confined to the specula- tive points, but equllay prevailed in the most important rules of duty ; what was lawful or unlawful, right or wrong; what was the chief end or good of man, and what were the proper means for the attainment of happiness. Nothing of which could have happened, if divine subjects were either immediate objects of the understanding, or had at first pro- ceeded from any acts of reflection or abstraction ; for then men would either have retained just ideas, or at least such worthy apprehensions, as Noah, Abraham, &c., confessedly ‘taught ;» or else, in the course of so many ages and severe application, would certainly have retrieved them by the same operations of the mind which at first discovered them. But nothing of this appears, nor do we hear of any means of knowledge, but their fathers relating what they had re- ceived from their ancestors. A relation of bare names and facts, without the reasons of them; for the true: notions and reasons of things became soon corrupted or lost after — the dispersion. They had some general terms and propo- sitions transmitted to them, but that they understood them not, is evident, because they never could give any tolerable account of them; for whenever they attempted to give rea- sons for their opinions, they perverted and depraved them, — and the more they commented upon truth, the more did they corrupt it. It was by their own vain speculations that they reasoned out of the world the invisible things of God, which had been some way or other related to them, and changed these, with the plain narrations of fact and history, into fable, superstitions, extravagancies, and a lie. . Even Serranus can allow that Plato spake many things which he understood not, drawn out of the Phcenician or Syrian theology. These Plato frequently mentions, and — calls them ééfs4ro1, ineffable and unintelligible. For, as their traditions were of Hebrew extraction, and such as re- ferred to the Jewish mysteries and divine worship, it is no REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 99 wonder they were unintelligible to the wisest heathens. Therefore Plato calls them nie, fables, which in their phi- losophical notion signify some mysteries handed down from the ancients, the reasons whereof were hidden and unknown. The learned Julius Scaliger affirms the same; that Plato took many things out of the Pheenician theology gyercite. which he understood not; and meeting with many 61. Jewish records or traditions concerning divine mysteries, without understanding the sense or import of them, he called them fables ; and truly made such of them, notwithstand- ing the assistance of allegory or mythology. These traditions, however, furnished Plato’s philosophy with all the divine truths in it: and, because he could not clear or explain them, Aristotle rejected them, and this whole mode of philosophy, because his reason could not comprehend them. He would trust to no other guide, but, as Simplicius observes, confining himself to the sphere of his own reason, would needs examine divine matters by nature, and admit nothing but what he thought was grounded on the light of nature, or his own corrupt reason. Now, if Plato understood them, surely he could have ex- plained the reasons to the capacity of his scholar; or if these truths were at first discovered by the operations of reason, it is altogether inconceivable that so profound and discursive a mind as that of Aristotle should not discern the meaning and reasons of them ; but also fall into so many erroneous contrary opinions; that the world was eternal, governed by nature or chance, the soul an act of the body, &c. He rejected truth, because he could not prove it; and undertook to prove what was totally distant from truth, and therefore not capable of proof; and so becomes a most pregnant argument, that no reason, however elevated, could discover divine objects; since it cannot rightly judge of them when proposed to its contemplation, except it be in- structed in the reason and nature of them, and that by a master more skilful than Plato was. To which may be added, that the wisest men of old, never thought that divine objects were to be spun out of the bowels of the mind by ideas of reflection and abstraction. They stayed not at home to consult their own reasonings, but traversed the world, and spent great part of their lives in searching for masters and instruction. And itis evident, 100 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM that they who conversed most abroad, did speak far more agreeably to the true account of things, than such who only endeavoured by their own wits to improve or correct those principles which were delivered by others ; which must be, because they did not depend upon reason, and that the uni- versal tradition of the first ages was preserved far better in the East, than in Greece or other nations. But it was great vanity or ignorance in Plato, after such frequent confessions of the Greeks receiving their knowledge from the barba- rians, to say in his “ Epinomis,” that they put it in a better fashion; whereas, the most ancient of them, especially the poets, so disfigured traditions by conceits of their own, that they never recovered their pristine form, And afterwards, a Greek dress always served to disguise and conceal from whence they had them. f And the reason why these indefatigable pursuers of wisdom succeeded no better in their laudable attempts, was, that though they sought for instruction, yet they could not find masters, but such who were at the greatest loss themselves in these important points. The ancient mys- teries of God, creation, providence, &c., were become broken, incoherent fragments, their sublimity and great- ness not apprehended in any due measure ; they had under- gone strange alterations, according to the vanity or opinion of different ages, so that they scarce bore any resemblance of their original truth and beauty ; and it was a task too hard for human minds to rectify them, pare off the errors, separate truth from falsehood, restore the true meaning, or see the reasons, so as to give any tolerable account of them. But nothing of this could have happened, if the mind ~ was naturally capable of discerning them, or producing ideas of them by any internal operation, abstraction, or re- flection. For to discern.a thing, must imply some resemb- lance of its nature, truth, and being, as it is; and an ability to explain, or give some account of it to others. But this they could not do; they had neither sufficient knowledge to satisfy themselves, nor the reasons of them to convince er others. Therefore, every scholar took the liberty to dis- — sent from his master; nothing was agreed or concluded on; but the sublimest truths continued the subjects of debate, dissension, and contradiction, in all the, schools of philo- sophy, as long as they subsisted in the world. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 101 From whence also another great argument might be in- ferred, to show how entirely divine knowledge depends upon instruction; and that is, the difference between a Christian and a philosopher: how inferior the light of an Augustan age, in these subjects, was to that of a child trained up in the school of Christ; a topic which the pri- mitive doctors never failed to boast of: that their farmers, ditchers, and herdsmen, knew more of the nature Theodo- of God, his dealings with men, his acts of creation, ae providence, &c., than ever Plato or Aristotle did. But this, and several other points, I only touch upon at present, reserving a fuller discussion of them for a more proper place in some following part of this work. The sum is, that divine truths are not immediate objects of the understanding ; for then we should be able to have a full idea, knowledge, or comprehension ‘of them. But they are mediately so by communication, and what therefore we can have no apprehension, or notions of, but as they are communicated or represented to us. It is this gives act. to that capacity of the mind, which was only potential before : for as objects are visible to the natural eye, but not without the interposition of light; so neither are heavenly objects to the intellect, but by the intervention of some agent, which can be only God. This the greatest of philosophers (would we but attend to him) plainly asterts, “that faith (the belief and know- ledge of heavenly subjects, the only evidence of things not seen) cometh by hearing (through the senses) and hearing by the word of God,” which is the revelation of his will. If then sensation and instruction, by the help of language, (which is the instrument of thought, and conveyer of notices from one mind to another,) be the only inlets of knowledge whereby the mind can receive information of any object external to itself, whether visible or invisible : which I think every impartial inquirer into the method of his coming at knowledge must allow ; and no ideas of sen- sation can of themselves create or raise conceptions of in- sensible things, which they cannot possibly take cognizance ~ of: then it must follow, that all our stock of spiritual know- ledge, whereby we are enabled to contemplate, or in any measure apprehend the natures, attributes, or relations of invisible immaterial objects, must proceed wholly from lan- 102 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM guage and instruction. Nothing, therefore, need be added concerning the fourth inlet of knowledge, or the ideas of reflection : they having, throughout the precedent discourse, been proved absurd and impossible; as the mind has no power, by its own operations, to add the least idea, or fsesh materials, to its store of knowledge. It can divide or com- pound them, and thereby raise monsters in the imagination, the several parts of which, when duly separated, will be found no other than several ideas of sensation unnaturally jumbled together. And consequently, an end might be here put to any further inquiry concerning the religion or law of nature. For, if all religion, morality, and law, are founded on the divine perfections; and unassisted reason could never attain a knowledge of spiritual objects and truths, such as the divine nature and will, the immortality of the soul, and a future state ; it is utterly impossible that it should find out a suffi- cient rule of life, to direct man to his final happiness and B.1.c.3. end. ‘For, as Mr. Locke argues, ‘“ what duty is, par.12. gannot be understood without a law; nor a law be known, or supposed, without a law-maker, or without reward and punishment. So that it is impossible that any practical principle should be innate, 2. e. be imprinted on the mind as a duty, without supposing the ideas of God, of law, of obligation, of punishment, of a life after this, innate.” But none of these, not even the idea of God, is innate, nor to be attained by reflection on ideas of sensation: therefore, what- ever way we come at the knowledge of things themselves, by that only can we know the relations necessarily flowing from, and depending on them ;_ if, by instruction only, we - are acquainted with the lawgiver, by the same means alone must we be acquainted with his law, or the rule of our duty. For our greater satisfaction, however, I shall proceed to examine what this law or religion of nature is; and what those arguments are which have so universally persuaded mankind, that reason, or the light of nature, is capable of such a discovery, as to form to itself a perfect law, or rule of acting. But here I cannot omit taking notice of a learned and ingeniousessay upon the “Inlets of Human Knowledge,’ pub- lished since the writing of the above sheets, and between which there seems to be little difference, except in the x REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 103 terms used of language and instruction, which certainly import the same thing. Therefore, I made no alteration in this chapter ; since I apprehend my sentiments to be agree- able to, if not perfectly the same with, those of that excel- lent author. C PVA RB Ere ue Some brief Considerations upon Mr. Locxe’s Hypothe- sis, that the Knowledge of God is attainable by Ideas of Reflection ; wherein 1s demonstrated, upon his own Principles, that such Knowledge is not to be so attained. {See Locke on HuMAN UNDERSTANDING, 27th Edition, 1836.] PREFACE TO THIS CHAPTER, ON ITS FIRST PUBLICA- TION AS A PAMPHLET. Tue motive for putting these few sheets together, and offering them to the public, arose from a conversation with some friends, who, after perusmg my book, were of opinion, that what was there said on ideas of reflection, had not been particularly enough applied to Mr. Locke’s hypothesis, with the infallibility of which the present age was univer- sally prepossessed. Whence I concluded, that as those gentlemen wanted some farther satisfaction in this point, so might others: and for that purpose I drew up the follow- ing notes with a regard had only to Mr. Locke’s Essay. ‘I am fully sensible of the danger to which any attack on that celebrated work must be exposed: but hope a real love for truth will be a sufficient apology to all learned and impartial men, who prepare their minds seriously to search after and receive it, from whatever hand it comes: my inward satisfaction is, to have inquired after it impartially, and offered nothing but from a thorough conviction, ‘that man can have uo knowledge of God, but what comes di- rectly from God:’ a truth which I think dearer than So- * This Chapter was originally intended by the Author as supple- mentary to the preceding one, on the Inlets to Knowledge; it has therefore been thought proper to incorporate it in that situation. 104. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM crates, stronger than Mr. Locke; and that to support it, is to plead the cause of that God whom we serve, and of his revelation which we ought to believe. They who shall judge me mistaken, may have charity enough to allow me a sincerity of intention. “‘ The first sections I chiefly consider as preparatory to the two last arguments, which are of the greatest import- ~ ance to religion and truth ; and if they appear to others as directly conclusive as they do to me, (from Mr. Locke’s own principles and positions, ‘that man cannot come at the knowledge of God, nor consequently of his own great concernments, from contemplating the operations of his soul, or the works of creation,’) my inference will be just, that ideas of reflection are vain and useless to all the pur- poses of divine knowledge, and that there is no other me- thod left of coming thereat, but by instruction.” —_—_— WuHeEREAS ideas of reflection have not, in the opinion of some, long contented with an implicit submission to Mr. Locke’s philosophy, received a sufficient answer in my book of “ The Knowledge of Divine Things,” p. 131. I shall, for the sake of truth, (an impartial inquiry into which is my only view, ) First, briefly state the hypothesis in his own words. Secondly, offer some reasons why I think the mind can- not, by such ideas, come at the knowledge of any unknown object, which has a real existence in nature. Thirdly, I shall endeavour to show, that we cannot, from any such reflective or other operation of the mind, attain the knowledge of God, that great and fundamental article whereon all other spiritual truths depend. To trace this subject from the fountain-head, it must be observed, that “the mind, in all its thoughts, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, so that all our know- _ ledge is conversant about them.” B. 4.c. 1. par. 1. p. 385. And that “ideas are whatever the mind can be employed about in thinking.” B.1.c¢. 1. par. 8. p.4. There are _ but two kinds of ideas, of sensation ‘and reflection. “The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet — empty cabinet.” B. 1. c. 2. par. 15.—« And ideas of sen- REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 105 sation are those of sensible qualities, which come from without, by the senses.” B. 2. c. 12. par. 2. p. 96.—“ And are derived by them to the understanding.” B. 2..¢. 1. par. 3. p. 51.—* Ideas of reflection are such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself; reflection being that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them.” B. 2. c. 1. par. 4. p. 01.—“ Beyond these ideas received from their proper sources of sensation and reflection, our faculties will not reach: these are the boundaries of our thoughts, beyond which, the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot, nor can it make any discoveries into the nature and hidden causes of these ideas.” B. ps c. 22. par. 29. See also par. 2. “The ideas of reflection (@. e. the perception of the ope- rations of our own minds) are perception, thinking, doubt- ing, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing ; and all the different actings of our own minds, which we being consci- ous of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings, as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses.” B. 2.¢. 1. par. 4. p. 5],—“ Per- ception is when the mind receives an impression, as when fire burns, and the motion is continued to the brain.” B. 2. e. 9. par. 2, 3. p. 81.— This is the inlet of all the mate- rials of knowledge.” Id. par. 15. p. 95, “and furnishes the Mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation, which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the un- derstanding.” B. 2.¢. 19. par. 1. p. 144.—« Thinking is a consciousness that one thinks, and consciousness is a per- ception of what passes ina man’s own mind.” B. 2. ¢. 1. par. 19. p. 59.—« Doubting is when the mind, for want of evidence, is at liberty to believe or disbelieve.” Vid. B. 4. ce. 16. par. 9. p. 507._« Believing is the admitting or re- ceiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so.” B. 4. c. 16. par. 4. p. 505. oo Reasoning is ordering intermediate ideas so as to discover the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas or terms in a proposition.” B. 4. e. 17. par. 2. p- o11.—* And reason is the discovery of that certainty or probability, which the mind arrives at by deductions made from such ideas.” Id. c. 18. par. 2. p. 926.—* Knowing is the per- Fr 2 106 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM ception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement \ and repugnancy of any of our ideas. Where this percep- tipon is, there is knowledge ; where it is not, we always come short of knowledge.” B. 4. c. 1. par. 2. p. 389.— “Willing is exercising a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest.) By. 2.-¢. 21, par. 29. p. 159.—* The freedom of will is the power aman has to do or forbear an action.” Id. par. 15, p. 154.—* Un- derstanding is the power of thinking.” B. 2. c. 6. par. 2. 'p- 69, «and wholly passive in the reception of simple ideas.” Id. c. 1. par. 25. p. 61. Under the different actings of the mind, mentioned as before, are retention, the keeping or preserving ideas al- ready received, by which means the memory can recall them when they have disappeared, or have been as it were out of sight.” _B. 2. c. 10. par. 1, 2. p. 86.—* Discerning or dis- tinguishing the several ideas from each other.” B..2:0; 1a par. 1. p. 90.—* Comparing them with one another in res- pect to extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circum- stances.” Id. par. 4. p. 91.— Compounding, whereby the mind puts together several simple ideas, and combines them into complex ones.” Id. par. 6. p. 92.—“ Abstracting, or making ideas taken from particular beings, to become ge- neral representations of all of the same kind.” Id. par. 9. p. 92,“«'These are the first faculties and operations of the mind, which it makes use of in understanding.” Id. par. 14. _ p. 94. existence and operations of things, such as sensation or re- flection offers them, without being able to make any one — idea; but being once furnished with these, can put them together in several compositions, and so make a variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so in nature.” B. 2. c. 22. par. 1, 2. p. 186.—“ Complex ideas are made up of several simple ones put together.” B.2.¢. — 12. par. 1. p. 96.—* Many complex ideas arise from the explication of their names, which consist of a comparing of simple ideas combined together, as in sacrilege, murder, printing, and thelike.” Id.par.97. “ Complexideas of substan- «‘ Mixed modes are a combination of ideas, not as the characteristical marks of any beings that have a steady ex-_ istence, but are scattered independent ideas, put together — by the mind, which receives all its simple ideas from the — REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 107 ces are a collection of simple ideas considered as united in one thing ; as the complex ‘idea of a swan, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, power of swimming, and other properties, united in the common subject.” Id. ¢. 28. par. 14. p. 202.—* But all our complex ideas, however com- pounded, or decompounded, may be resolved at last into simple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge or thought, we have or can have.” Id. c. 22. par. 9. p: 189. Let us, in the second place, see whether these definitions of the first faculties and operations of the intellect, suppose or include any power of raising in the mind new ideas, that is, of unknown objects which have a real existence in nature. First, we may observe, that “reflection is the notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the man- ner of them;” if, therefore, we shall hereafter find, that thé mind knows not the manner of its operations, half its business is at an end; and the notice of an operation will not produce the idea of an operation, where the manner is unknown, nor of any thing else. Secondly, “the mind cannot make any discoveries into the nature and hidden causes of these ideas.” And the most abstracted reason- ings will never be able to prove, that the fleeting shadows of ideas, whose nature and causes are to us not discover- able, should discover to us the hidden causes and nature _ of intrinsic real beings. _ But to consider the ideas of reflection separately. Per- ception is not an idea, but the entrance of one; or a per- ception that we perceive, which teaches nothing. Think- ing is a consciousness that one thinks, and consciousness is a perception of what passes in a man’s own mind, 7. e. a man perceives he has a natural power to think, which is no idea of reflection, the operation being altogether invo- luntary: a man can no more help thinking whilst awake, than he can breathing. Doubting can furnish no idea, being only conversant about those already lodged in the “tind, between which it discerns not the agreement or disagreement. Believing is not raising but assenting to propositions, from a persuasion of their truth. Reasoning is not the discovering of new terms, but the connection or Tepugnancy of those which are offered in any proposition ; as knowledge is perceiving the indubitable agreement or disagreement between them. Willing can recall ideas 108 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM which the mind had before, not raise or create what it never had; so unable is it to produce new objects, that if the memory chance to forget old ones, it can never retrieve them but by fresh impressions, from the senses. Under- standing is wholly passive, the receiver, not the former of simple ideas. As for the other workings of the mind, retention, discerning, comparing, compounding, abstracting, — their exercise is confined to ideas ready at hand in the mind, not in exciting new ones, as is evident from the definitions. The several modes of thinking are conversant about ideas already received, B. 2. c. 19. Remembrance is the occurrence of an idea, without the operation of the object. Recollection, to bring forth with pain and endeavour the idea sought for. Contemplation, to consider it attentively. Attention, the taking notice of ideas, and registering them in the memory. Intention, the fixing a view of one idea, considering it on all sides, marking its relations and circum- stances, without regard to any other. So the simple modes we’ thence collect, as space. Id. c. 19. Duration, exten- sion, numbers, power, identity, diversity, and the like; they are only the combination or modification of the same simple idea, or of simple ideas of several kinds put toge- ther. Vid. B. 2. c. 12. par. 5.p. 97, and c. 13. par. 1, by obser- vations collected from the qualities and affections of bodies. — But simple ideas of body and matter, however combined Sere SS ee —— 4 or modified, can never produce the remote originals of _ spiritual immaterial beings. . Other simple modes, of mo- tion, as sliding, walking, dancing, running, &c., present me only different attitudes of the same persons, not another. The modes of taste, colour, sound, and such like, are mere — sensations. And they who speak of ideas of passions, love, ‘il joy, hatred, &c., speak very improperly, till they explain how matter acts upon spirit, or how such commotions are raised in the mind by agitations of the blood and animal spirits; which are to us inconceivable, what we have no knowledge or idea of. Complex ideas are a company of simple ones combined. 4 Vid. B. 2. ¢. 22. par. 3, without the addition of any new ori- — ginals: as is evident from those acts of the mind wherein it exercises a power over its simple ideas, which are, Ist, — combining several together into a complex one: 2dly, REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 109 bringing two ideas together, simple or complex, to take a view of them, at once, without uniting them, by which it gets all the ideas of relations: 3dly, separating them from all other ideas which accompany them in their real existence, which is called abstraction. Vid. B. 2. c. 12. par. 1. p. 96. Mr. Locke again tells us, b. 2. c. 21. par. 73. p. 185, that all the ideas of reflection are derived from, made up of, and reduced to, these following, extension, solidity, mobi- lity, or the power of being moved, which ideas we receive by our senses from the body. Perceptivity, or the power of thinking. Motivity, or the power of moving; which, by reflection, we receive from our minds: and if we add to these, existence, duration, and number, which belong both to one and the other, we have all the original ideas on which the rest depend. So that out of eight primary ideas, only two are produced by the reflection of our minds; thinking, whereof we have no idea, neither of what it is, or wherein it consists, (as we shall presently see) and moving, whereof likewise we are equally in the dark: we are conscious that nature has such a power, but discern not the most distant glimpse of the action, manner, or pro- duction of it; for how spirit can operate upon matter, “or thought excite motion, is not within our comprehension.” B. 2. c. 23. par. 28. p. 207. And no one will affirm we can _ have ideas of what is incomprehensible to us, whatever light we view it in: as where there is no idea, there is nothing for the mind to employ itself about, or reflect on. We know things by experience, and there our knowledge ends, having no discernment of their cause or nature: “while we write, the will, a thought of the mind, causes motion in one hand, and rest in the other: this is fact, but no one can explain it, nor render it intelligible; so of all the voluntary motions produced in us only by the free ac- tion or thought of our minds, the determination of them is altogether unintelligible to us. Experience proves it, but reason cannot account for, or comprehend it. And if we do not understand the operation of our own finite mind, that thinking thing within us, it should not seem strange that we cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal, infinite mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.” B. 4. c. 10. par. 19. p- 481.—*‘ How any thought should produce motion in 110 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM the body, is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce thought in the mind. That it is so, if experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like, though they have con- stant and regular connection in the ordinary course of things, yet the connection not being discoverable in the ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependence one upon another, we can attribute their con- nection to nothing else, but the arbitrary determination of that all-wise agent, who has made them to be, and to ope- rate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak under- standing to conceive.” B. 4. c. 3. par. 28. p. 428. If the mind, then, can have no idea of what the understanding is not able to conceive, no more than it can of the arbitrary determination of God; if ideas between which there is no discernible connection, nor necessary dependence one upon another, cannot produce truth, certainty, or knowledge in us; we have no ideas of reflection, not even of thinking or willing, or to no manner of purpose. We know it is in fact so, and that is all; as where the fact is unintelligible, not to be explained by us, nothing is to be inferred. “ For it is only by perceiving the connection and dependence of deas, that we arrive at knowledge.” B. 4. ¢. 17. par. 2. p- 011. Where these are not discernible, there can be no demonstration or regular conclusion. As ‘wherever we have no ideas, our reasoning fails, aud we are at an end of our reckoning ; the obscurity, confusion, or imperfection of ideas involving us in difficulties and contradictions.” Id. par. 9. p. 521.—*“ Reason being only the discovery of the certainty or probability which the mind arrives at, by de- ductions made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties. by sensation or reflection.” Id. c. 18. par. 2. p. 526. But there can be no deduction, no conclusion inferred or drawn in, ““where the mind does not perceive the indubitable connection of all the ideas one with another.” Id.c. 17. par. 2. p. 511. Ideas of reflection, therefore, are so far from raising new objects in the mind, that they are only the perceptions of natural powers, unintelligible to it; or notices of what the senses convey thither concerning the appearances, qualities, accidents, relations, and other circumstances of bodies; _ REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 111 which are ideas of sensation, much more perfect than any internal operations, by modifying of them, can produce: nor will they infer any remote truths, because their nature, causes, and dependence are hidden from us. We stop at the superfices of things, and can go no farther, because of the obscurity, imperfection, and want of agreement in ideas. And whatever combinations the mind can make from the visible appearances and constitution of things; its reflections, when applied to invisibilities (of which in a state of nature it is not supposed to have any notice) would be as far from truth or knowledge as the blind man’s find- ing out the colour of scarlet to be like the sound of a trumpet: there is no proportion, analogy, or other ingre- dient of knowledge, to infer the one from the other. The few discoveries made inthe nature of things, are from poring and dwelling on sensible experiments; which shows the long acquaintance the mind wants to gain a com- petent knowledge of what is most familiar to us; and, till we understand what is nearest to us, it is irrational as well as impossible from them to discover the nature of other beings infinitely removed in dignity and distance from us. For simple ideas being confined to the observation of our senses, and the operation of our minds, we may be imme- diately convinced, “that all such ideas are very dispropor- tionate to things themselves, when a positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us.” B. 4. c.3. par. 23. p.225.—“ Our senses fail us in the discovery of bulk, texture, and figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which their real constitu- tions and differences depend.” B. 2. c. 23. par. 8. p. 199.— ‘We are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the effects we daily see are pro- duced, which are hid from us in some things, by being too remote; in others, by being too minute.” B. 4. c. 3. par. 24. p- 425.—* We want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies, which are nearest to us, and most under our command, being ignorant of their essence, constitutions, powers, and operations.” B. 4. c.3. par. 26. p. 427.—“ We know not what real constitution of substance it is, whereon our simple ideas depend, and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them, one with another, and the exclusion of others; there are very ‘few of them we can be 112. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM sure are, or are not inconsistent in nature, any farther than experience and sensible observation reaches; yet all our com- plex ideas of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones.” Id. c. 4. par. 12. p. 485.— * Or how the primary qualities of any body produce cer- tain sensations or ideas in us; or what are the effects of matter, under its diverse modifications of bulk, figure, co- hesion of parts, motion, and rest, is utterly impossible to be known by us without revelation.” Id. c. 6. par. 14. p. 353.— “ So little do we know of bodies or their properties, that — i natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science; our faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal fa- bric and real essences of bodies; but yet plainly discover to us the being of a God.” Id. c. 12. par. 11. p. 493. Let us observe the manner and force of Mr. Locke’s conclu- sion: it is utterly impossible for us to know any of the effects of matter without revelation, our faculties are not fitted to penetrate into bodies; but they can plainly disco- ver the cause of all effects, a cause hidden from the eye of sense and comprehension of the mind, though they cannot possibly find out the cause proximate to the most inconsi- derable effect produced in nature. “ In the knowledge of bodies, we must be content to glean what we can from par- ticular experiments.” Id. par. 12. But of God, and duty, and our great concernment, ‘‘ we have enough to lead us to a full and clear discovery.” Id. par. 11. These are — some of the extremes in Mr. Locke’s philosophy, which no ideas of reflection can reconcile or bring together; yet easy as the discovery of the divine nature is, so difficult was the finding out of iron, that, as it follows in the same section, _he who first made known the use of that contemptible mi- neral, may be truly Btyted the father of arts, and author of plenty. To add a little more on this subject, ‘we have only some superficial ideas of things discovered to us by the senses from without, or the mind reflecting on what it ex- periments on itself within; but have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal constitution, and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to attain it. And when we would proceed further, we fall presently into dark- ness and obscurity, perplexedness and difficulties, and can discover nothing farther than our own blindness and igno- REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 113 rance.” B, 2. c. 23. par. 82. p.209. Yes, God is farther, much farther, yet blind ignorant mortals can, it seems, from superficial ideas, know him, but nothing else! The great cause of our ignorance is a want of a discoverable connection between those ideas which we have ; for where- ver we want that, we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge. The mechanical affections of bodies which produce in us several sensations, have no affinity with the ideas they produce in us; we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience, and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects pro- duced by the appointment of an infinitely wise agent, which perfectly surpass our comprehensions.” B. 4. ¢. 3. par. 28. p. 428. Want of connection between ideas, and ideas with- out affinity with the affections that produce them, render us incapable of knowing the works; but such unconnected links, such a broken chain, can lead us to the workman, who so infinitely farther surpasses our comprehensions. This is to make camels pass through the eye of a needle, which will scarce contain a single thread. « Yet as our know- ledge cannot exceed our ideas; as far as they are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have ¢ rtain, perfect, or clear knowledge.” Id. c. 12. par. 14. p. 495.—« Our knowledge being real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.” Id. c. 4. par. 3. p. 452. From which principles, and method of coming at know- ledge ; (that it cannot exceed our ideas ; that in proportion as these are imperfect, confused, or obscure, such will be our knowledge ; that all our ideas are merely superficial and unconnected, as must be the knowledge grounded on them :) no impartial inquirer after truth will conclude, that a mind discerning nothing beyond the superfices of things but its own blindness and ignorance, can discover the plenitude of being, with such ease, plainness, and certainty, as Mr. Locke insinuates. We cannot but observe that simple ideas are the only ground-work of all our thoughts, and since Mr. Locke so con- stantly appeals to experience, in order to fix the boundaries of our understanding, (because every man must certainly perceive what passes in his own mind, and how he came at knowledge, better than any other can inform him, ) it were 114. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM tu be wished that every sincere lover of truth would make the experiment, and try whether he can discover any real existent being, of which he has had no notices by sensation or instruction, thereby to determine his judgment on the point before us. ‘For he that would not deceive himself, ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience ; and not presume on matter of fact, because of his hypothesis, that is, because he supposes _ it to be so.” B. 2.c. 1. par. 1. p. 53. If we only strip this phantom of its metaphysical dis- guise, and place it in a familiar light, it may, perhaps, help — to convince us of this truth, that the knowledge of unknown beings cannot enter the imagination, by any other inlets, than those of sensation and instruction. ‘‘ The mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them.” B. 4. c. 4. par. 3. p. 452. Therefore “the whole extent of our knowledge reaches not beyond our own ideas limited to our ways of perception.” B. 3. ¢. — 11. par. 23. p. 381. Foras things themselves cannot enter | the cabinet of the mind, the representations or ideas of © them stand in their stead; which Mr. Locke rightly calls prints, inscriptions, pictures, imagery, images, characters. — B. 2. c. 10. par. 5. p. 87. . Let us then suppose a number of pictures, images, or — a medals of different colours, shapes, sizes, inscriptions, and — characters, shown to one whose mind is unfurnished, or hi- _ therto unacquainted with such exemplars. The instant one Q is produced, he observes the resemblance or impression of it enter his mind, which is perception; the preserving it — there is retention, he recollects it, contemplates it, atten-— tively views and fixes the idea, by marking its relations and circumstances. If a number (for instance an hundred) of them are placed before him, he will again perceive their | : several ideas, and by attention fix the most remarkable ones — in his memory; he will then discern them, so as to distin- } i guish them from each other; compare them with respect to — size, beauty, ornament, or other circumstances ; combine many of them together into a complex figure, as (if images) of an army ; and can afterwards so abstract, as to make one | stand for a general representation of all of the same kind. Here he will exercise all the original ideas of reflection, extension in their magnitude, solidity in the marble or | | REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE 115 metal, mobility, or the power of being moved, existence as they stand before him, duration according to the firmness of their materials, number as he finds and counts them. This will make him conscious of perceptivity, or power to think about them, and motivity, or the power of moving, as thought or will shall direct his hand. The mind may here exert its faculties over the simple ideas; Ist, by com- bining several together ; 2dly, by bringing two simple ones, or two complex little companies together, to view them at once, and get the several ideas of relations ; and, 3dly, to separate them again from all other ideas. Here is an ample field for his reasoning to discover their agreement or disa- greement, and knowing wherein it consists; for believing on sufficient proofs, that this is of marble, that of brass : and doubting what a third composition may be; or sus- pending his assent, which excels in delicacy of art or feature. Let him put them in a thousand groups, or attitudes, compound and decompound them ever so often; view and review their bulk, figure, texture, colours, and other pro- perties; make them perform all the evolutions of the mi- litary art, and carry his imagination (if he has heard of such things) to campaigns, battles, and triumphs, wherein his ideas of reflection may be almost infinite ; yet, when he has run through this pleasing reverie, let him sit down, separate his complex ideas, reduce them to the simple ori- ginal ones, and count the exemplars or archetypes of his ideas ; he will find there is not one more than was at first brought in at the door, or placed in his view ; nor the in- crease of a single object, no alteration in bulk, weight, beauty, or other circumstance. The operation of the human mind is no more than this, it cannot take in the image of one real existing object, but through the door of the senses, nor, with all its secret. me- chanism, or powers, give picture or existence to what it has not received from without. «For it is not in the power of the most exalted sagacity, or quickness of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea.” B.2. ¢. 2. par. 2. p. 62, and combine together ever so many ideas of material visible things, they will never produce an idea, either simple or complex, of what is invisible or immaterial. “We know nothing beyond our ideas, and of an immaterial substance 116 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM we have naturally no ideas.” B. 4. c. 3. par. 17. p. 421.— « The existence of spirits is not knowable but by revela- tion.” Id. c. 12. par. 12. p. 494. It is evident that ideas of reflection are here considered in no other light than as unproductive of new objects to the contemplation of the intellect, and that we can have no ideas but from sensation. Mr. Locke acknowledges, that, e by the mind’s reflection on what passes within it, we can— i have ideas but of two sorts of action, motion, and thinking. — B. 2. c. 21. par. 72. p. 84. Yet it appears that we know not what the one or the other is, wherein they consist, nor a how they are produced ; therefore can have no proper ideas _ of them, or their operations. To know that something a passes within us, we know not what, affords not an idea, f though it may a consciousness, “ which is inseparable from thinking, and essential to it, it being impossible for one to u perceive, without perceiving he does perceive.” And ag perception that we perceive we know not what, nor how, — nor why, will make no advancements towards real know- ledge. ‘Thinking is the employment of the mind about the ideas which are in it.” B. 2. ¢. 1. par. 1. p. 50, but is” no idea of itself: “but the things which the mind con- templates, not being present to the understanding, it is ne- cesssary that signs or representations of the things it con- siders should be present to it, which signs are ideas. As the signs of ideas are articulate sounds or words, which are- necessary to record them for our own use, and to commu- — nicate our thoughts one to another.” B. 4. c. 21. par. 45 p. 550. | E If an apology were wanting for what is here offered it is this: that whoever has a serious love for truth, and prepares” his mind to search impartially after it, will give no degrees — of assent to any thing proposed, beyond the degrees of evi- - dence which accompany it; nor is it any way injurious to — Mr. Locke, that others cannot implicitly submit to an hy- — pothesis, “ wholly new and unborrowed,” as he confesses his — tobe. B. 4. c. 17. par. 7. p. 520. It is a duty we owe to — God and truth, “to cast about for new discoveries, and to.) seek in our own thoughts for those right helps of art, which — will scarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine | | themselves to the rules and dictates of others.” Id. In all — these cases the appeal must be to “ unprejudiced experience — ae ‘ REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 117 : and observation.” 'B. 1. ¢. 4. par. 25. p. 50, as by them we _ can only judge of the methods whereby we arrive at know- ledge: “for it is something beyond philosophy, and it / cannot be less than revelation, that discovers to another _ thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there myself.” 2B. 2. ¢. 1. par. 19. p. 59; or that we come at the know- ledge of spiritual, unknown beings, by ideas of reflection, _ when we can trace no such procedure, neither believe nor _ think it possible. I shall therefore venture to examine this hypothesis a little deeper. We are assured, “that simple ideas, which _ the mind can by no means make to itself, must necessa- _rily be the product of things operating on the mind in a ' natural way; and are not the fictions of our fancy, but the _Tegular production of things without us.” B. 4..c. 4. par. 4. p- 492.—“ And that all our complex ideas whatsoever, may at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the _ materials of knowledge or thought we have, or can have.” |B. 2. ¢. 22. par. 9. p. 189. And as without ideas of sensa- tion it would be impossible to have any idea of reflection (for _ without sense the mind would be always a mere blank) so _ they may be ultimately resolved into it. And though the | imagination take ever so lofty flights, by combining ideas, and laying mountain upon mountain to invade heaven, it will never reach it; but, when it separates its ideas, will find no addition or increase to the ancient store of originals by any such operations. It is very true, that the mind can | put together a combination of scattered, independent ideas, and thereby perceive things which do not, nor ever did ex- ist in nature, as in the given instances of a golden moun- tain, or dreadful animal; but though they do not exist in _ the compounded manner wherein they are pictured to the Imagination, yet all the parts whereof they consist, as a mountain and gold, had a separate existence, and were known | to the mind before it thus arbitrarily joined them together, which is no more than Horace’s painter did, | i e,e . . e ** Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam Jungere si velit, et varias inducere plumas :” _ He ranged and disposed things in a different manner, | but produced nothing out of a new store, nor added any _ thing to an ancient one. 118 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM But such a power in the mind to raise ideas of new and unknown objects, is in my apprehension both useless and impossible. First, they are useless, or of no real service to the mind, whatever attention it pays them. If they give us complex views of things really existing, as of a flock of sheep, or an army of men, no deeper insight into nature will be attained than by abstractedly considering an individual of each spe- cies; as in numbers, an hundred consists in repeating an unit an hundred times; so it is in all other things of the like denomination, which equally and exactly partake of the same specific essence. If they are an assemblage of scat- tered ideas, to represent what has no real existence, it may be an agreeable vision to the fancy, but cannot afford any real knowledge, which is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things; where there is no existing pattern or archetype to refer them to, they are merely fantastical, “< or such a collection of ideas as no substance ever showed us united together.” B. 2. c. 30. par. 1. p. 266. He who apprehends something useful to be thence extracted, must separate and decompound them, before he can distinguish what is truth or falsehood; which is treading in a circle without advancing a step in knowledge. If we could raise ideas entirely new, they must be of ob- | jects unknown to us (for of all known ones we already have — ideas) in which the mind could receive no satisfaction, — being unable to declare whether they represent the things — it intends they should stand for, or discern whether they more belong to the name given, than to any other of aquite different signification. Words are but empty sounds any farther than they are signs of our ideas; and ideas are but — empty dreams, when they have no steady correspondence — with the constitution of real beings. Knowledge is a per- ception of the agreement or disagreement of our thoughts and ideas with the things for which they are substituted. Ideas or names, inconsistent with, or repugnant to the ex- istence of things, are no more than chimeras in the mind that uses them, and want all the materials of true or real knowledge. The very supposition of objects unknown, — must always exclude a certainty of any exact conformity between our ideas and the truth or thing sought for. Tell a thousand knowing persons, that you have seen — | REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 119 a manucodiata, they may raise a confused idea of it, but could not judge it had any agreement with nature, as being ignorant what it is, whether bird, or beast, or man; the only increase of knowledge is a name or sound without a meaning. If you go on and describe it, as Cardan, Her- nandes, Scaliger, and others have done, that it is a bird that lives in the air, without ever coming near the earth till it falls down dead upon it, that its food is the dew of heaven, and the incubiture of the female on the back of the male, their ideas will be enlarged according to the degrees of in- formation ; but no fecundity of the mind can make them perceive one single property, farther than they are in- structed. So it is of every object that was never present to us ; we cannot so much as discover their existence, nor by any operation, or thought, or ideas of reflection, penetrate into their nature, essence, or properties, till we are in- _ structed in them, whether they are material ones, or imma- terial, as spirit, angel, or God. Ideas are by no means at our own election or will ; we _ cannot define colours without sight, nor see a man by _ hearsay ; nor can a painter, though ever so excellent in his art, draw the picture of an unknown person, so as to be sure he had hit it right, or that it bore the least likeness or resemblance. It may therefore as well stand for any other, from whom it ought to be different; and where the differ- ence of. things is not distinguished, the mind perceives nothing but confusion and uncertainty. So a man cannot form the idea of an object, unless he knew it before, and had the pattern in his mind, ¢. e. unless he had already the idea of it, which has no dependence on his will. If he has the idea of it already, he knows the object, and cannot form a new one of it; as where there is one already, a second would be vain. In all cases, we either do, or do not know the object; if the former, the idea is already present ; if the latter, any idea we should raise would be useless, having no rule to judge | whether it be an adequate representation of the thing in- tended, nor to distinguish between truth and falsehood : as wherever the correspondence between object and idea is inadequate or confused, no knowledge or certainty can be Inferred. When an idea does not answer the particular ‘Signification of a word, nor the real essence of the thing 120 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM signified, it is imperfect, affords nothing the mind can rest upon, or be satisfied with, in its search after truth, “ the perceiving their exact difference, is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thought at all.” B. 4. ¢. 1. par. 4. Truth is the conformity of: signs or words, whereby things are expressed, to the things themselves : falsehood is, when they do not express things as they are, or they con- sist ‘in joining or separating of signs, 7. e. ideas or words, as the things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another.” B. 4. ¢. 5. par. 2. But in the inquiry before us, it would be sufficient to say, that upon the principles of natural religion, no ideas are useful but as they are conformable to the reality and nature of things. If they represent what has no existence, or otherwise than they do exist, no object or truth can be con- cluded or drawn in from the “ eternal fitness, congruity, or relations of things ;” as these must have their foundation in nature, not in the dreams of a fever, or the sallies of an heated imagination. | Secondly, I think a power in the mind to raise ideas of — unknown objects to be impossible. | Not to appeal again to observation and experience, which ~ will always convince a man, who will make the trial, that 7 the mind cannot form any ideas which do not originally q arise from, and must ultimately be resolved into sensation; — it is evident that ideas are signs or exhibitions of some- — thing ; for if there be no signs or resemblances of any thing — in the intellect, the mind (as Mr. Woollaston words it) is non intelligent, or intelligent of nothing; it must therefore get this something, before it can have an idea of it ; and to” produce something without an antecedent idea of it, is, in the most relaxed signification, to create. Augustus con- a fessed he could not make a new Latin word: every existing Ba object having a name to express it, without creating some- — thing he could not have imposod a name ; without a new — object and idea there can be no use of a new word. “For language is proportioned to the notions of men, and it isno wonder men should have framed no names for those things — they found no occasion to discourse of.” B. 2. e. 28. param 2. p. 249. KY Without going so far as some have done (who maintain REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 121 that ideas are real things, as they haye real properties, vary one from another, represent opposite things, and are of a spiritual nature, very different from the bodies re- presented by them) it may be affirmed, that they who say the mind has a power of producing the ideas of things for the subject of its contemplations, must attribute to it a _ power of creating, or producing something out of nothing. For the production of ideas in the manner explained by them, who maintain such a power in the mind, is (as Mr. Malbranch argues) a proper and true creation. And men, not having the power of creating, have not consequently the power of producing ideas in such a manner as is pre- tended: for they who would soften the harshness or presump- tion of their opinion, in saying, that the production of ideas supposes something antecedent, whereas creation supposes nothing, bring no reasons to solve the apparent difficulties. It is an observation carefully to be remarked, that there isno greater difficulty in producing something out of nothing, than out of some antecedent supposed thing whereof it could not possibly be made, or what in the nature of things could contribute nothing to its production. For instance, there is no greater difficulty in the absolute creation of an angel, than in producing an angel out of a stone ; because a stone being of a material, dead, senseless, opposite kind, could be no way serviceable to the production of a living, ‘spiritual, immaterial being ; nay perhaps it may include a greater difficulty, as requiring a double act of omnipotence, first to annihilate the stone, and then create the angel. ‘The same will hold true of all the complex ideas of reflection : the mind has originally no ideas but of sensation; if it can from them produce the idea of an angel, it does the same, or as difficult work, as if it created one; since be- tween material images, or their known properties, and | spiritual beings, there is no semblance or proportion; no _ seeds in essence or nature to produce a being of so opposite a kind, and different constitution; nor any analogy, where- _ by the mind could perceive a relation, or the bare possi- _ bility for one to arise from the other. In this sense only are Mr. Locke’s words true, B. 2. c. 2. par. 2. p. 62. That “it is not in the power of the most ex- alted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea G 122 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned, (sensation and instruction.) The dominion of man, in this little world, of his own understanding, being much the same as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power, however managed by art or skill, reaches no farther, than to compound and divide materials, that are made to his hands; but can do nothing towards making the least particle of new matter.” If we consider ideas as (what they properly are) images or pictures of things, by contemplating of which the mind is enabled to think, in the absence of real objects, they must be according to some real exemplar or archetype, or they are the sign and consequently the perception of no- thing: something must be the object of thought, we can- not think on nothing, as it has neither existence, substance, rior properties to be considered. What is more than no- thing must have essence and existence, i. e. be produced into being, which is the very act of creation; so that ex- cept the mind can give existence to positive entities, which were not in being before, ideas of reflection are barren, un- productive notions. If it can give existence, it must create, i. e. be omnipotent, or God. Lastly, they who affirm the mind of man, by its own re- flections, can perceive all things external to it, must allow these two propositions: Ist, that by an act of the will it can produce such ideas of unknown objects at pleasure of all things, and at all times, to have them present for its use; otherwise they would be of no use or purpose, if not ready at hand, when need and occasion call for them. If it has such power, existence must depend on the will of man as its cause: “for a cause is that which makes any — other thing, either simple idea, substance, or mode, begin to be: and the effect is, that which had its beginning from some other thing.” B. 2. c. 26. par. 2. p. 217. 2ndly, if the mind contain in it ideas necessary to the perception of all things, it must also contain the existence and essence of all things; ideas being useless or false, where the agree- ment betwixt them and the real constitution of things is not exactly discerned. And if the mind contain these, it can know the limits of their nature, define and comprehend them, i. e. has an unlimited capacity, and on these accounts has no dependence on an all-comprehending Being. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 123 Which is the sole aim of vain, ungrateful reason, in these pretensions ; to be self-sufficient to its own productions, per- fections, and acts, without standing in need of superior assistance, utterly independent of the Father of lights, who alone teacheth man knowledge ; proposing spiritual and immortal objects to its view, in such measure as its facul- ties can bear, and (not being able to comprehend the whole) in such degrees, as are sufficient to its final end and happiness. I shall, in the third place, endeavour to show, from Mr. Locke’s own principles and argumentation, that the human mind cannot, by any ideas of reflection, or other internal operations, come at the knowledge of God, the great and fundamental article whereon all other spiritual truths de- pend. How we can ascend to the knowledge of a Creator, is without controversy one of the most important subjects the mind of man can exercise its strongest faculties upon. The present age roundly affirms that the connection between the works and the workman are so plainly and clearly per- ceived by the natural sagacity of reason, that there is not amore obvious or demonstrable truth. To prevent any dispute about the extent of reason, we ought to pitch on some sublimer genius, as a common measure to regulate our judgments by; for if it be not allowed, that the argu- ments of the most reasonable men are the proofs of reason, we argue on ad infinitum, without knowing whether a pro- position be capable of proof or not, what is within or with- ‘out the sphere of our knowledge and comprehension. The names of Aristotle and Newton may be here omit- ted; one knew nothing, the other has recorded nothing on the subject before us. And where shall we find a third to succeed them but in Mr. Locke, the most accurate searcher into the extent and powers of reason that the latter ages can — boast of, and who has been long appealed to as sole umpire and judge in philosophical controversies ? Here I shall _ readily join issue, and if the same arguments (to use his _ words ) may be allowed as demonstrations to me, which have been hitherto implicitly granted to him, I make no doubt of demonstrating, “ that the being of a Deity, the only fun- _ damental truth, on which all religion and genuine morality _ depend,” b. 4. c. 8. par. 7. p- 470, is not to be known by 124. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM any ideas of reflection, or other internal operations the mind may exercise in the contemplation of those two noblest to- pics, the soul of man or the works of creation. Some things preparatory thereto may be deservedly con- sidered. First, that wherever Mr. Locke introduces the know- | ledge we come at of spiritual or invisible beings, his argu- ments are intended no farther than to show the probability of them, that there is as much reason to believe as to dis- believe them: without laying down any direct proofs, or in- termediate ideas, whereby reason might infer the undoubted certainty of them: though, where these are wanting, the. mind sees not the connection of truths, can make no deduc- tions, nor arrive at the least degree of what is called know- ledge or demonstration. It is very certain, no such inter- mediate ideas can be found out; but then the consequence will be, that no such immaterial beings can be perceived, or inferred, by our rational faculties. Of spiritual objects in general, he says over and over, that we have no idea of substance, nor know any thing of it, but the outward figure and appearance, as an unknown substratum to many sensible qualities, powers, or relations it has to other bodies: whence he argues, ‘that the idea of corporeal substance in matter being as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions as that of spiritual substance or spirit; it is as rational to affirm there is no body, as to say there is no spirit; because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of spirit.” B. 2. c. 23. par. 5. p. 197. i.e. one unknown thing may possibly exist as well as ano- ther; but here is no step, or middle term, whereby the mind can proceed to knowledge ; which he would not have omitted, could ideas of reflection have furnished him with any. But the truth is, there is no resemblance, analogy, or agreement, between matter and spirit, whereby the terms could be connected, or the illation made. A sure indica- tion that Mr. Locke did not find out, but was taught, what he says upon the subject. Again, “having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity, i.e. immaterial, to exist, as a solid thing without thinking, i. e. matter, to exist: especially since it is no harder to conceive how REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 125 thinking should exist without matter, than how matter should think.” Id. par. 32. p. 209. That is, we know nothing of either, one may possibly be as well as the other. It were to be wished this great master of reason had placed his intermediate ideas in such method and order, that every one might have perceived the agreement of these distant terms, and had laid down that chain of knowledge, in which (as he says) if but one link be loose, the strength of the whole is lost, and nothing to be inferred. To have done this, to have convinced mankind, that there was such a scale of divine wisdom, by easy steps and juxta-position of proofs, whereby the human mind could have ascended to such knowledge, would have been a task worthy of so great a genius, and exhibited a body of philosophy more valuable than all the books in the world, except the inspired ones. But where has he attempted it, or even made an entrance upon it? The declining it proves it impracticable, to be more than his scheme of ideas of reflection would bear. He saw the defect of his hypothesis, but too late, in not admitting language and instruction among the great inlets of knowledge: he confesses the arguments to be inferred from the use of words were new to him, what he thought not of when he began to write, b. 3. ¢. 5. par. 16. p. 319; as to have new-modelled so spacious a system, and made language an instrument of knowledge, b. 3. c. 9. par. 21. p- 357, was too laborious a task to enter on in his advanced years, would have overthrown ideas of reflection, and a character he had been so long establishing in the learned -world: a trial which few minds, however exalted, are so disinterested as to submit to. Secondly, to this defect I impute the inferences he fre- quently makes, in a very unphilosophical manner, without assigning the least shadow of proof or reason, especially on the subject of our attaining the knowledge of God. For instance: “the knowledge of our own being we have by intuition, the existence of God reason clearly makes known to us.” B. 4. c. 11. par. 1. p. 482.—“ The knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation,” Id. par. 13 ; of ‘spirits, only by reve- lation.” Id. par. 12. But why, if God be a spirit, should he be known by other means than spirits are knowable by, revelation only ? | 126 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM Again, though we are not able to attain a clear, ade- quate, or even competent knowledge of one single thing about us; ‘we know not the essence of a pebble or a fly, or of our own selves, yet we are furnished with faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover enough in the crea- tures, to lead us to the knowledge of the Creator, and the knowledge of our duty: and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the convenience of living: these are our business in this world.” B. 2. c. 23. par. 12. p. 201. How gently is this slided in, and how void of proof? dull, weak faculties—but well enough to discover a Creator, and the support of life; as if any thing would serve for the purpose, and it were as easy to discern invisible omnipo- tence, as to quench our thirst, or hide our nakedness ! though, were the abilities of reason to be measured by this rule, we shall find, that men, after the dispersion, lived for many ages like beasts, on fruits and berries, without rai- ment, without shelter, but what dens and caves afforded equally to both. The person who first taught the sowing of corn was ever after worshipped as a god. Mr. Locke says, b. 4. c. 12. par. 11. p. 493, “were the use of iron lost among us, we should in a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions come no way short of the most flourishing and polite nations.” How miserable then is the condition of reason, that the perfect- ing of it should in so high a degree depend on a bit of iron: From this account we may venture to affirm, that the wretch who found out this metal, eontributed more towards dis- covering the Deity, than Aristotle by his logic, or Mr. Locke by his ideas of reflection. So, again, though we cannot by our faculties attain a perfect knowledge of things which surround us,’ not the iron we handle, nor the ground we tread on, “ yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above-mentioned, viz. the knowledge of the Creator, and our duty.” B. 2. ¢. 23. par. 13. p. 202. Though we are blind, and dwell on the superfices of the most trifling things, those faculties which every worm that crawls confounds, will serve us well enough to discover an essence which is hidden, a glory which is inaccessible: every thing in God is of his essence ; that it seems is easily found out and declared, though no man can tell wherein the essence of a fly consists. Or if this he so REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 127 obvious, how comes it to pass, “that some men have no ideas of God, some worse than none, most very different 7” B. 4. c. 8. par. 7. p. 470. That they are various in dif- ferent men, and much “more resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than the true God?” B.1. c¢. 4. par. 13. p. 42. . Nor does Mr. Locke ever tell us, by what method of procedure ideas of reflection are to connect our minds with the divine nature ; without which they are perfectly useless to all the purposes of real knowledge. “ We know nothing ‘beyond our simple ideas: whenever we would proceed be- yond them, and dive farther into the nature of things, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, and can discover nothing but our own blindness and ignorance. But which ever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up, are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection; and so is it of all our other ideas of substance, even of God himself.” B.2. ¢. 23. par. 32. p. 209. How does this carry us through the dark nature of things, to apply the simple ideas of sensation to make up complex ideas of substances, invisible, unknown, what we are supposed never to have heard of? Finite is a sim- ple idea of body, this we must stretch to infinite, though nothing but infinity can do it: so of other properties, exist- ence, wisdom, and power, add infinity to them (though you never heard of the term, or a being to whom it is applicable) and you have the idea of an infinite being. But how this transition from finite to infinite is to be made, neither he “nor any other mortal has declared; here it is they fall pre- sently into darkness and obscurity, and can discover nothing but their own blindness and ignorance. His arguments may be of use to persons. already in- structed in divine subjects, who, by enlarging “the simple ideas in their mind, frame the best idea they can of that all-boundless and infinite Being, which we call God.” Id. par. 34; but can be of no service to those who have no ideas of God, or worse than none, to those who believed _. the universe, or dead men, to be gods, i. e. to every man upon the face of the earth for a thousand years together. To show the impossibility of framing such an idea of infi- nite perfection, no philosopher, the best or wisest that ever 128 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM lived, can be named, whose notion of God did not include an idea of imperfections The mistake of modern philoso- phy is to begin at the wrong end, and ascend upwards from finite to infinite: so did the ancients, who called the world, and many things infinite, without knowing what in- finity was ; whereas, it isa wisdom that descends, and comes down from above, it is only from an infinitely perfect cause, that we frame the best notion we can of infinity. Of eternity, a Christian, perhaps, may, by his rule, b. 2. c. 17. par 3. p. 182, find a help the better to form his conceptions, but not to discover the divine nature. “ For it is another question, quite different from our having an idea of eternity, to know whether there were any real being whose’ duration has been eternal,” id. par. 5; so that a man may have an idea of eternity, yet none (according to Mr. Locke’s principles) of God; which plainly shows, that there is no necessary connection or agreement between the terms, nor any real knowledge to be inferred from them. Experience in these cases is the surest demonstration ; there never was a single ancient sage, who held the eternity of God, but at the same time maintained another coeternal principle, viz. matter, or evil. Though, if there be two eternals, there may be two thousand, or none; which shows that what Mr. Locke builds on ideas of reflection, he did not get from reason but another channel, and that they are of no service to the cause for which they are produced. Of immensity; by the addition of one foot to another, and so on, we enlarge our ideas to boundless space. 3B. 2. c. 13. par. 4, and c. 17. par. 3. But suppose we have learned, that so many inches make a foot, so many feet a yard, so many yards a mile, so many miles a degree, and so many degrees reach round the earth, or up to the stars ; there our horizon is bounded, and immensity as far as ever from our view: the idea would be inapplicable by one in a state of nature. And they who know God, perceive, that the first foot may be as justly applied, as any progres- sion the imagination can conceive, to him of whose essence it is, not to be measured. All these simple ideas proceed from finite, and no combination of numbers can express an infinite. The same will hold of power ; add finite or infinite as long as we please, the mind will never conceive omnipo- a PE, OE i EE tS WS REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 129 tence. No Plato or wiser heathen could, or did, believe it in the power of God to create matter: consequently no simple ideas of existence, space, duration, knowledge, power, or pleasure, could in the most advanced mind dis- cover an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise and happy being. Nor does Mr. Locke, where he professedly treats of the existence of God, as b. 4. c. 10, offer any arguments which had weight with the heathen theologists; a sure proof that no pretended ideas of reflection can lead us to it: they enjoyed the faculties of nature in as perfect a manner as Christians do, yet saw not the evidence, truth, or consist- ency of them. For instance, a man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that nothing cannot produce a real being, nor incogitative a cogitative one, id. par. 10. An intuitive knowledge is vastly clearer than a reflexive one, but both equally useless in the present case ; not a philosopher since the world began, ever imagining that matter was the effect of a wise powerful cause; and most concluded the in- cogitative elements were the sole principles of gods as well as men. Thirdly, the condition of man’s nature and faculties, as represented by Mr. Locke, must disable him from coming at the knowledge of God by any operation of the mind. ‘God has, no doubt, made us as is best for us in our present condition.” B. 2. e. 23. par. 13. p. 202. And hath fitted our senses, faculties, and organs, to the business we - have to do here.” Id. par. 12. Yet we know things only by experience, that is the limit of our understanding. “There is not a substance that exists, but has something in it which baffles our understanding.” BB. 4. c. 3. par. 6, p. 399. Therefore one would imagine that God, who is a spiritual substance, should bafile us also: but these things *want no remarks. “ We are ignorant of all the powers, efficacies, and operations, whereby the effects we daily see are produced.” Id. par. 6.—‘* We may conclude that the things which we constantly find to proceed regularly, do act by a law set them, but yet by a law that we know not.” Id. par. 29.—“ When we come to examine the most con- temptible plant, or animal, we presently find that we know not their make, can give no reason of the different qualities G 2 130 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM we find in them. The internal constitution whereon their properties depend is unknown to us. So that the work- manship of the all-wise and powerful God, in the great fabric of the universe, and every part thereof, farther ex- ceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most inquisi- tive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man doth the conception of the most igno- rant of rational creatures.” 5B. 3. c. 6. par. 9. p. 324. If, then, the causes of the most familiar things are un- known, it must be impossible to ascend by any gradation or links of causes and effects, which have a necessary de- pendence on each other, to the supreme first cause of all things, because we discern not how any one is connected to another. ‘He that will only count twenty, or have any idea of that number, must know that nineteen went before, with the distinct name or sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order; and must retain in his memory the names or marks of the several combinations from an unit to that number; and that not confusedly and at random, but in exact order. For wherever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progress can go no farther.” B. 2. c. 16. par. 130. Yet he tells us, ‘‘ that there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material below us, is pro- bable from hence, that in all the visible corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps; all quite down from us, the des- cent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that in each remove they differ very little the one from the other. There are some brutes which seem to have as much know- Jedge and reason as some that are called men. And so on, through the animal and vegetable kingdoms, till we come to the lowest and most inorganical parts of matter; we shall find every where, that the several species are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think, that the species of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upwards towards his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us down- wards; we being, in degrees of perfection, much more re- mote from the infinite being of God, than we are from the lowest state of being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing.” B. 3. ¢. 6. par. 12. p. 326.—“ So, again, finding in REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 131 all parts of the creation that fall under human observation, there is a gradual connection of one with another, without any great or discernible gaps between, in all that great va- riety of things we see in the world, which are so closely linked together, that in the several ranks of beings it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt them, we have reason to be persuaded, that by such gentle steps, things ascend upwards in degrees of perfection. Itis a hard matter to say where sensible and rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end. If we compare the understanding and abilities of some men and some brutes, we shall find so little difference, that it will be hard to say that that of man is either clearer or larger. Observing such gradual and gen- tle descents downwards, the rule of analogy may make it probable that it is so also in things above us; and that there are several ranks of intelligent beings, excelling us in se- veral degrees of perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite perfection of the Creator, by gentle steps and dif- ferences, that are every one at no great distance from the next to it.” B. 4. c. 16. par. 13. p. 510. It is evident that Mr. Locke believed there was a climax up to heaven, but confesses the first link of the chain broke, the existence of spirits not being knowable but by revela- tion; a chasm was made, and reason at the end of its tether. The inferences he draws from the superficial knowledge we have of body and its qualities, are, that we must of neces- sity have much less of spirits: ‘whoever considers how hardly sensation is in our thoughts reconcileable to extend- ed matter; or existence to any thing that hath no extension at all, will confess, that he is very far from certainly know- ing what his soul is; it is a point which seems to be put out of the reach of our knowledge. Itis past controversy, we have something within us, which thinks, but must con- tent ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is.” B. 4. c. 3. par. 6. p. 399. As “we have no certain information, not even of the ex- istence of other spirits, but by revelation, they being natu- rally beyond our discovery,” id. par. 27. p.427, it will — follow, that whatever Mr. Locke has said of spiritual beings, or any ranks of intelligences above us, was from revelation ; consequently, that to reason there must be a great gap which will prevent its ascending upwards, to the remote and 132. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM infinite being of God, who in the excellency of his nature farther surpasses the purest seraphim, than the soul of man does the most contemptible insect. Fourthly, let us take notice of the method Mr. Locke lays down, as absolutely necessary to come at knowledge. “The mind in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, so that all our knowledge is conversant about them.” B. 4. ¢. 1. par. 1. p. 385.—< And we can have no knowledge farther than we — can have perception of the agreement, or disagreement of our ideas.” Id. ¢.3. par 1. p. 398.—“ So that a man is only said to know a proposition, when he evidently perceives the agreement or disagreement of the terms whereof it consists.” Id. c. 1. par. 8. p. 390. To connect these terms together is the office of reason, which ‘principally consists in saga- city and illation: by the one it finds out, and by the other it so orders intermediate ideas, as to discover what connec- tion there isin each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is called illation or infer- ence; and consists of nothing but the perception of the con- nection there is between the ideas in each step of the deduction, whereby the mind comes to see, either the cer- tain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration, in which it arrives at knowledge; for reason perceives the necessary and indubitable connection of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in each step of demon- stration that produces knowledge.” BB. 4. c. 17. par. 2. p. 311.—2dly, “inference is nothing but by virtue of one pro- position laid down as true, to draw in another as true; that is, to see the connection of the two ideas: it being by virtue of the perceived agreement of the intermediate idea, or medius terminus, with the extremes, that the extremes are concluded to agree. Therefore every intermediate idea must be such, as in the whole chain hath-a visible _ | connection with those two it is placed between; or else thereby the conclusion cannot be inferred, or drawn in ; for wherever any link of the chain is loose, and without connection, there the whole strength of it is lost, it hath no force to infer, or draw in any thing.” Id. par. 4. p. 512. We may therefore look upon those two points as the ground-work of knowledge, Ist, “that wherever we want - REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 133 ideas, our reasoning stops, we are at an end of our reckon- ing.” B. 4. ¢. 17. par. 9. p. 521.—2dly, “that in demon- _ ‘stration, the connection of intermediate proofs must be ob- _ served, and seen in each step of that whole train, and retained in the memory, just at it is; and the mind must be sure, that no part of what is necessary be omitted or over- looked.” Id. par. 15. p. 522.—*« For where the mind dis- covers not this, it remains in ignorance, or at most can go no farther than a probable conjecture.” Id. ¢. 2. par. 3. p- 393.— . as long as we carry ourselves about us. Nor can 474 we justly complain of our ignorance, since he has so plen- tifully provided us with the means to discover and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of happiness; for he hath fur- , ere nished man with those faculties which will serve to par. 12.p. discover all things requisite; and the knowledge SW nig _ of God is the most natural discovery of human rea- pits b- Be son. It is within our reach, and we cannot miss B. 4c. 10, par. 6. it, if we will but apply our minds to that as we do ry to several other inquiries.” . Dr. Clarke : “that the mind or rational faculty ae 148 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM can no otherwise avoid perceiving the natural dictates of reason with regard to things present, or its Judgment con- cerning what is past, or its apprehensions of what is to come, but by forcibly withdrawing its attention from this its proper object, and fixing it entirely and habitually upon Vol. 1, Matters of sense; for, by the light of nature, the | pies being and attributes of God were certain and de- monstrable: the probability of a future state was great and undeniable; the expectation of God’s dealing mercifully : 4 ( < ae la with sinners was reasonable and hopeful; that the — Contents. law of nature is eternal, universal, and absolutely — unchangeable ; for that certain moral obligations, particu- é 4 t larly of piety towards God, righteousness towards one ano- ther, and sobriety to ourselves, naturally and necessarily arise from the eternal and necessary differences of things ; and that all rational creatures are obliged to govern them- selves in all their actions by the eternal reason of things ; forasmuch as such eternal moral obligations are antecedent in some respect to the consideration of their being the will or command of God himself.” agony Others teach, “that the law of reason is that in- aes, vol, ward and true light, whereby alone the proper — 2. pees ascertained ; and thatit is highly agreeable to the goodness _ P, 25. and wisdom of God, that he should afford us such a measure of light, as may be sufficient to direct us both in- our judgment and our practice: but if we will not attend to the light, or follow it, the fault is not to be charged upon any defect in it, but on an inexcusable abuse of our own liberty and the divine goodness ; for antecedently to any positive law or declaration of God’s will, man had this rule given him, whereby he was to conduct himself.” Intellect, The reasons for this are assigned by several, and System, thus by Dr. Cudworth: “that the divine will, p.7is. and Omnipotence itself, hath no wnperiwm over the divine understanding ; for if God understood only by will, he Morality, Would not understand at all: and laws depend not 2. p. 18. onthe will of the commander, but on natural justice” and equity, which give to one the right and authority of commanding, and beget in another duty and obligation to” td. 21. obedience. Nor is it the mere will and pleasure of him that commandeth, that obligeth to do positive things | bounds and measures of good and’ evil are to be REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 149 commanded, but the intellectual nature of him that is com- manded : for if even this were not morally good and just in it own nature, before any positive command of God, that God should be obeyed by his creatures, the bare will of God himself could not beget an obligation upon any to do what he willed and commanded, because the nature of things doth not depend upon will, being not things that are arbitrarily made, but things that are—and every thing is what it is by nature, and not by will: for when qq 5. 14, things exist, they are what they are, this or that, 17, 16. , absolutely or relatively ; not by will or arbitrary command, but by the necessity of their own natures. There is no such thing as an arbitrarious essence, mode, or relation ; for an arbitrarious essence is a being without a nature, a contradiction, and therefore a non-entity : the modes of all subsistent beings, and the relations of things to one another, are immutably and necessarily what they are, and not ar- bitrary ; being not by will, but by nature; omnip- pirenect. otence, or infinite power itself, being determined Syst. la. ois pate: hereby ; for power has no dominion over under- standing, truth, and knowledge ; and even the will of God, without wisdom, is a plumbean, flexible rule; and though it be the efficient cause of all things, yet it is not yyoraity, the formal cause of any thing besides itself; and ¢.3.p..3. 5. it is impossible that any command of God should oblige, otherwise than by virtue of that which is naturally just,” &e. | _ The authorities here cited are very great, and perhaps which no one ought to dissent from without a distrust of his own opinion ; yet every one’s judgment, after having care- fully and impartially endeavoured to inform it, must be his own director: it is as impossible to submit to the dictates of others, or embrace for truth what the mind does not ap- prehend to be such, as it is to see with their eyes, or hear with their ears: and, at the same time, I may be convinced of the error of one hypothesis, without being able to sug- gest a better; or give such arguments for the certainty of | what I would substitute in its place, as the principles _ whereon it is founded may 5e capable of, and if justly stated might fully establish it. But to propose our doubts with caution and modesty, in order to have them cleared up to the satisfaction of ourselves and others, can never prejudice 150 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM the cause of truth, if the method we inquire for it in, equally tends to the establishment of religion, and leads our thoughts upwards to the adoration of that Infinite Majesty, whose glory is the ultimate aim of all human actions. No one will say that the divine wisdom could not have directed mankind by different ways to the same end; and as obedi- ence to the divine will is the whole duty and end of man, whether he discovered his will by reason or revelation, the knowing it to be such makes it a law to us, and his com- mands will have the same force and obligation: but by which of these methods he has been pleased to communicate it, is the subject of the present inquiry. And here one cannot but observe, that most of our great divines express themselves on this subject, as if the princi- ples of natural religion were really innate, though they were convinced of the absurdity of such notion, and the inconsistency of establishing rules which must not be ques- tioned, and cannot be proved, but admitted as the uner- ring deciders of truth and falsehood. What could this pro- ceed from but the difficulties they met with, in lifting up the dim taper of reason to discover invisible glories beyond the stars? This made them so often recoil, relinquish reason, and be willing the controversy should be determined by an oracle, or judge, without any authority but what they invest — him with. To all which there is one unanswerable objec- — tion, that, were the notion of God stamped by himself on — the minds of men, the impression would be a fair transcript of his nature; and it would be common to all nations and — languages, as universal as our senses and passions, what no distance of time, or difference of education, could alter or deface. But their original supposition of these inward im- © pressions, ideas, furniture, &c., being absolutely false, there- fore such must be all their inferences from it. I shall however understand them in another sense, that the duties of natural religion are so clear and evident to reason, that whoever duly exercises those rational faculties _ wherewith every man is endowed, cannot be ignorant of | them; but may find out some principles from which they are to be clearly and solidly deduced, and thereby come at — the knowledge of the whole religion or law of nature. And from the above description of it, we may collect both what it is, and whence attainable. First, that all moral ob-_ ee EE REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 151 ligations depend on the excellences and perfections of the divine nature, consequently, that before any man can com- prehend what they are, or can be obliged by them, he must discover and establish a firm belief of the divine existence and attributes: and from this knowledge of God, which is the most natural discovery of human reason, we cannot miss finding out (if we will but apply our minds to it) whatever is requisite to the end of our being, and the great concern- ment of happiness, 2. e. whatever is seemly or unseemly, virtuous or vicious, good or evil, fit or unfit for us to do, in all the instances of duty we owe to God or man; and so it becomes a sufficient declaration of the divine will, or what God requires of all mankind. Natural religion is nothing else but obedience to the natural law, and it is called the law of nature, because there is nothing in it but what man may find out, and be obliged unto, by the mere principles of reason, without the help of revelation. Secondly, that these things are obvious to be known by the light of nature, may be proved from these three argu- ments. 1. The express testimony of Scripture. 2. The works of creation. 3. The eternal difference and reasons of things; from all which these obligations naturally and ne- cessarily arise. These seem to be the great foundations and supporters of natural religion, and shall therefore be sepa- rately examined. But, first, we must consider whether the law of nature be in fact what it is represented to us; and in doing this, there cannot be a more unexceptionable method, than to | fix on some certain marks and characters, by which it is _ known and distinguished from others, or which constitute it what it is; and then examine, whether they can truly be affirmed of it. Now we find that all the great maintainers of it agree in these three principal characters, 1. That it is universal, or attainable by all men. 2. That it is clear ; and, 3. That it is perfect. If it hasan unexceptionable right to these properties, we may rely upon it, as a safe guide to _ God and happiness; if it fails in any, or all of these, we may, _ and in justice ought to look out for another. 1. It must be universal or attainable by all; for the end of the law being obedience to what it requires, it must be discoverable by all those who are to be directed by it; and 152 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM neither law, nor any thing else, can be called natural, that may not be equally affirmed of every individual, not de- fective in its kind. If therefore man be the workmanship of God, and intended for happiness ; it must necessarily follow, that every man in every age has had sufficient abi- lities, and proper means granted him, for the knowledge of it. Because nothing can be a law, or have an obligatory power, further than it is capable of being apprehended, or known to him who is to obey it. For, if the sanctions of an unknown law were to take place, punishment would be ne- cessary and unavoidable, which is not to be reconciled with infinite justice and mercy. 2. It must be clear; so that whoever seriously endea- vours to find out truth, may not miss of, or avoid knowing it: for as nothing but a full conviction of its being true can make us receive it as the law of our beings; so no precept can be clear, which, after due consideration and attention, a man does not discern the truth of. If it be only probable, we must suspend our assent, because where probabilities are equal, the judgment cannot fix its choice. If it be doubtful, we must refuse our assent; for we cannot believe what we do not know, nor know what we cannot tell whe- ther it be true or false: and from that of which we have ne clear or comprehensive notion, we can make no clear or — certain inferences, and so can have no certain evidence that we are under obligation to obedience. Insuch momentous eases, therefore, as relate to the final end of man, if the law be not perspicuous, a man may fall into error, and yet not be chargeable with a fault ; the rule was not sufficient, and his conscience will not accuse him for doing what he was not able to avoid. For if any thing we cannot know, or knowing cannot do, be .a condition of happiness, we must be under a necessity of being unhappy ; that being necessary which cannot be otherwise. 3. It must be perfect, or contain whatever is requisite to knowledge or practice: and if all men are not by nature able to know the whole of their duty, or whatever is neces-~ sary to regulate their actions towards God, themselves, and one another, the law would be imperfect, or not sufficient to the end for which it was instituted: a man cannot be ob- liged but by some law; if that be deficient, and yet he under obligation, he must be unavoidably ignorant of his duty, or REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 153 compelled to know, what he had neither means nor power to come at the knowledge of: and an imperfect law is a rule, and no rule; or, in other words, a manifest contradic- tion. Besides, if the neglect of duty subjects offenders to punishment, and the particulars of duty are not discovera- ble, then punishment would be inflicted where no fault has been committed, which is injustice. Butas where there is no law there is no transgression, so there can be no trans- » gression where the law is not sufficient for our guidance and direction. That these properties must belong to this universal law, is evident from the fundamental principle of nature, a desire _ of happiness. Every being in heaven and earth aspires to its utmost perfection and good; and the perfection of man, as a moral agent, must consist in the practice of virtue and _ shunning of evil, and conforming himself as far as he is able to the divine excellences, on which all religion and _law depend. If reason be not sufficient for this, if it is not _ able at all times to instruct all the sons of men in what is - commanded or forbidden; if it cannot explicitly prove the divine existence, declare his attributes, manifest his will, | and show how all moral duties derive their obligation from | them; then reason is not of itself able to direct us to that hap- piness whereof we are capable, what we naturally desire, and which constitutes the perfection of our beings; nor can any law of its own discovery be perfect, clear, or uni- versal. _ And let the arguments to prove it so be ever so specious, _ yet if the conclusions be contrary to known fact, experience, and the observation of nature, they cannot be admitted; if impossibilities, they must be rejected: and to say a thing is possible for a rational agent to do, which no such agent with the utmost perfection and exercise of his faculties ever did do, is scarce to be distinguished from an impossibility. Nature is regular in her actings, and suffers not her powers to lie useless; never to do a thing, or not to have power to do it, are with her equivalent terms; and such are facul- 'ties never exercised, or means that never proved effectual. And no instance can be given of any person, nation, or age, wherein the above characters can be affirmed of the Jaw of nature, that it was perfect, clear, and universal. _ Another fallacy that lurks under all the arguments pro- | H 2 : 154. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM duced in favour of natural religion, is, that taking it for granted that the heathen world was utterly destitute of all the benefits accruing from revelation, which is absolutely groundless and false; or, in concluding that what know- — ledge the wiser pagans had of divine matters they got it by — the light of reason only, without any other assistance or in- | struction; which is contrary to fact, history, and their own — confession: and if they deserve credit in any case, it must — be in this; wherein truth so far triumphed over that com- | mon passion of men, to have the discoveries of important — things pass for their own, that they ingenuously tell us where and from whom they got the information of them. — And the whole issue of this controversy must rest upon these single points, whether they had a competent or toler- able knowledge of supernatural truths, and whether the - knowledge they had of them was from their own discovery — or experience ; for it is impossible to do more by the light — of reason than they did. . ; The appeal therefore must be to them, as the only judges — capable of determining it. And as the maintainers of the natural law constantly refer the decision to them, I réadily submit thereto, not doubting to make it appear, that in those ages, when there was as much .reason and profound judgment as in any other period since the crea- tion, their knowledge in these matters was strangely dark and defective, and the little light they had was a bor-| rowed one, not their own: and that for a long number of centuries a barbarous ignorance covered the face of the earth, scarce a man (out of the Jewish church) had so much asa notion of God, (except the idea of an idol be such) the soul’s immortality, or a future state: and if so, reason must be a very blind and insufficient guide, where, out of so many millions of rational creatures, in distant ages and countries, it could not direct above three or four to truth and happiness. It will also appear, that wherever the traditionary notices of revealed things were almost ex- tinguished, reason could never restore, oY give any account of them; even where the names remained, the explanation of them was abominable and ridiculous. Whereas, had rea- con once discovered these things, the same procedure of the mind would have been universally plain and obvious, at all times and jn all nations, which never was the case. This REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 155 shall be at large made out in the ensuing parts of this dis- course. And whoever will take a serious view of the law of na- ture in its true light, the most important duties, quite obli- terated in many places of the world, strangely mangled and deformed in others, unable to influence or reform mankind in any, cannot but suspect, that far more glorious things have been said of it, than in justice can be granted to it. And such doubts must be increased, on observing the many exceptions its ablest defenders are obliged to make from their own general rules, and give up such points as utterly _ destroy the perfection and universality of it. I might instance in one for all, from the celebrated au- thor of The Religion of Nature Delineated, whose very first words are these: “the foundation of religion lies in that ‘difference between the acts of men, which distinguishes them into good, evil, and indifferent; for if there be such a dif- ference, there must be religion, ef contra. Upon this ac- count it is that such a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after some general idea, or some rule, by comparing the foresaid acts with which, it might appear to which kind they respectively belong. And though men have not yet agreed upon any one, yet one there certainly must. be. That which I am going to propose,” &c. Now, may we not from hence justly argue, that if the foundation of reli- _ gion lies in the difference between human actions, and that difference can only appear by comparing them with some rule; and yet, from the beginning of the world to this day, ~ no such rule of moral good and evil has been agreed upon, whereby men might know to which kind their actions res- pectively belong, it is impossible there should be any such thing as natural religion or law, because their very essence consists in enabling men to distinguish their actions (and thereby their choice of acting) whether they are virtues or crimes, morally good or evil: if they had no rule for this, they had no law; and if no law, they could not have any religion, which is nothing but obedience to law: or if they _ never agreed upon one, and without agreement there can- | not be a rule, then there is nothing in this subject obvious, clear, universal, or true; but all the definitions of it must be opinion or falsehood, because they had no rule or method to frame them by. Or (since a rule there certainly must 156 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM be) if Mr. Wollaston found it out, then all the preceding ages wanted it; there was no such thing existing, and it must be Mr. Wollaston’s religion, not nature’s. And ifhe first made the discovery, how could it be owing to reason, since the light of that was as strong three thousand years ago as it isnow? If it was not from reason that he argued so well, and traced out the lineaments of law with such or- der and perspicuity, then it must be from revelation as a Christian, not as a philosopher; which is the whole truth of the matter: and that single passage tears up the foundation — of his whole work, and is a demonstration that whatever he says after that, is not from nature, reason, eternal fitnesses, or universal consent, but from the gospel; and that he only transferred to the support of one school what he learned in another. And however specious a long train of propositions may appear to be, yet not one is applicable to the intent of his work, that reason could delineate the law of nature; since, by his own confession, it appears that reason never could find out that rule which is the foundation of all reli- gion; and, consequently, if revelation had not discovered it, neither would Mr. Wollaston, nor any greater genius yet to come. But besides, there are, in my opinion, several reasons why the above marks and characters cannot belong’ to the law of nature; why we ought not to subscribe to it as the Abp. Ti most sacred of laws, “the very groundwork that lotson. revelation supposes, and is built upon; the very bottom of all the duties which God requires of us: so that whatever God should reveal, would signify nothing to us, unless they be first known and believed.” Were this sup- position true, I must confess I do not see what it would signify for God to reveal any thing that was already well known and firmly believed ; revelation would certainly then be useless, and it is the avowed intent of natural religion to make it so: but besides the falsehood of this supposition, there are many (and in my opinion) strong and undeniable objections against it. As, first, it must be an unquestionable truth, that the law of reason cannot be ampler than reason, nor any thing be allowed in its religion, but what is discoverable by the natural and ordinary use of it: the bounds thereof must be fixed to those principles, which it can by its own power REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 157 clearly investigate, and to such knowledge as may with certainty be deduced from them, because no effect €an be ' more extensive than its cause: therefore this definition of\ it must be false, that it contains every thing founded in the; _ reason and nature of things; since the largest understand- _ ings are ignorant of the essence, cause, qualities, and ope- \ _ rations even of sensible things, and much more of imma-( terial ones, besides the infinite relations that are in the system of the universe: therefore truth, or the law founded . on such relations, is more extensive than reason, and what | none but the Author of nature can comprehend, or make known to others; and especially the excellences of his own being, which must otherwise have been for ever hid from us: for, can we know God but by his attributes? and is there one attribute we do, or can know? God is self-existent, but it is not possible for man to form a notion of being from itself, ens a se; nor of eternity in com- mencement, duration, or suecession ; nor of omnipresence, whether by multiplication or extension of himself to every ubi, or how a spirit can be extended: we are ignorant what this omnipresence is, or how God is or can be so. How then could we know it, if he had not declared it? that reason should discover a nature, not one attribute of which it is able to comprehend, is truly incomprehensible : it is finding out something without knowing any thing of it; and without a clear knowledge of the being we are to » worship, all attempts will be in vain to find out the duties he requires of us. Secondly, nothing can be admitted as principles in any science, much less in religion, but what carry the highest marks of self-evidence with them, what the mind imme- diately apprehends and understands, or by seeing their connection with other undoubted truths, assents to, as. soon as duly proposed: for, where there is doubt or obscurity in principles, the inferences drawn from them must be un- certain, and man be in a perpetual hesitancy which way he ought to act; and if moral actions ought to be uniform and consistent, the rule of them must, of necessity, be so; for otherwise it will prove a snare, instead of a law. That the heathens had no such clear principles or fixed rules _ Mr. Wollaston confesses, and that sentiments of the most important points were wavering and doubtful the whole 158 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM world acknowledges: and if they were furnished with means Clearly to discern and understand the principles of — natural religion, and reason was that means, how could it — happen that all mankind should be so unreasonable as — never to make a due use of it, to know so little, and per- — form much less? and the wisest of them to be so divided — in opinion, and unable to determine in the most obvious cases of sin and duty, and so constantly to mistake the one for the other ? | Thirdly, if there be any such clear and universal prin- ciples, the doctrines deducible from them will be equally — perspicuous and clear: for when reason finds out truth, its procedure is by establishing the evidence of one propo- | sition, and then another which depends upon it, and so by © proper gradations, and the use of intermediate proofs, it — arrives at others: and, let the train of arguments be ever — so long, yet, if the mind perceive a clear connection be-— tween them, the inference or conclusion, which is the — truth sought for, must be as certain as any of the inter- — mediate ones: whoever, therefore, discovers truth in this _ manner, are able to prove it, and assign reasons for it, — because they can trace it backwards, and show its depend-_ ence upon some first clear and universal principles. But — if men speak truth, and yet can give no reasons, nor ac- — count for it, they may have heard or stumbled on it, but eee a nip NG = eS Fema Sa ora EE a ee oe did not discover it, as not perceiving how the evidence of it arises: for, if they come at it by clear and intermediate © steps, the certainty of the conclusion might be proved to i others, and rendered as perspicuous as the truth and con- — nection of the several mediums. But there was not one spiritual subject that the heathens could prove, or give any tolerable account of; therefore, whatever knowledge they — had of such truths, they did not discover, or come at it, by — any operations of their own reason. 4 Fourthly, no principles can be allowed as universal, but | what are proved so by fact and experience; causes must _ be known by their effects, and natural powers by thei productions : and, to affirm that a man, or star, or spirit, — or angel, is capable of acts which the most piercing judg- | ment never discovered, is highly unwarrantable; it is a_ falsehood, because we are ignorant of it. If there were — then any such universal principles, they must be showed © SE ae a ee ee 2D Lee REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 159 from the effects: the same tree will not produce grapes _ this year, and figs the next. The religion of distant ages and nations would have been correspondent, because its principles were natural and universal. If it was various and contradictory, there could be no universal rule or prin- ciples to go by: yet the religions of the world were differ- ent and opposite, the most sacred with one was abominable to another. Nor isa tolerable system of natural religion to be collected out of any or all their writings and prac- tice: therefore no universal principles could subsist in the minds of men. And to say that reason could, but did not, _ or would not do it, is only begging, not proving the ques- tion. Lastly, both law and religion must suppose not only abilities in them who are required to obey, but must offer proper motives to induce them to it: for where there is no - motive for doing or not doing a thing, there can be no just ground either to perform it or neglect; it is quite indiffer- ent. Now the great motives to the observation of moral duties, confessedly are the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards or punishments: but not one in a million believed any of these things; and the few wise men were too doubtful and uncertain about them, to let them have any due influence upon their actions; and therefore the law of nature was highly deficient in this most essential point, if it can be called a law, that has not this sanction, or lays us not under an obligation to rewards or punishments. To prove that these objections, and the inferences drawn from them, are strictly applicable to the law of na- ture, I need only appeal to the ablest defenders of it. Thus Tillotson: ‘as the corruption and degeneracy of y,) » mankind grew worse, so the light of nature waxed Serm. 51. dimmer and dimmer, and the rule of good and Die evil was more doubtful and uncertain, and that in very considerable instances of our duty. The law of Moses was peculiar to the Jews; and even to them it did not _ _ give clear and perfect light and direction as to moral duties, and those things which are of an eternal and immutable reason and goodness. That the Jews under the law had such apprehensions of their own immortality, and of a future state of happiness and misery after this life, as natural light 160 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM suggested to them; which was in most but a wavering and uncertain persuasion, and consequently of small efficacy to engage men to their duty.” Thus Bishop Wilkins, 1. 2. c. 9, “ notwithstanding all that can be said of natural religion, it cannot be denied, but in this dark and degenerate state into which mankind is sunk, there is great want of a clearer _ light to discover our duty to us with greater certainty, and to put it beyond all doubt and dispute, what is the good and acceptable will of God: and all these defects are clearly supplied by that clear and perfect revelation which God hath made to the world by our blessed Saviour.” Can there be a stronger affirmation, that nature and reason are not able to instruct us in our duty ? . Where then could be the law or religion of nature, where there were no plain or certain rules and directions for a good life, no rule of good and evil; but men were doubtful and uncertain in the most considerable instances of duty, and wanted light to direct them even in moral duties, though of eternal reason and goodness? or where was the authority or force of law, which could offer no motives to ebedience but such as were faint and languid, wavering and uncertain persuasions, of small efficacy to engage men to their duty? Certainly there is nothing here that de- serves the name of religion or law, not an article that was clear, or a motive that could influence. Disc. 2. p. And Dr. Clarke, in his celebrated discourses 196, &e. at Mr. Boyle’s Lectures, acknowledges, “there are whole nations, that seem to have very little notion of God, and a very small sense of the obligations of morality : that, in all ages, men had false and unworthy notions of God, or superstitious apprehensions concerning him, and fell into the most absurd idolatry: that few men are able to discover the principal truths of morality clearly and plainly for themselves; therefore want to be particularly taught and instructed in their duty: that in the heathen world there were but few (two or three) who studied and practised the duties of natural religion: yet without any. great success, because the doctrine of most philosophers consisted in empty words and contention, but did not amend the manners, nor was fitted to reform the world; and those few had no knowledge of the whole scheme of things, the method of God’s governing the world, his design. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 161 in creating mankind, &e. Having no knowledge of this, their whole attempt to discover the truth of things, and to Instruct others therein, was like wandering in the wide sea, not knowing whither they were going, or which way to take, or having any guide to conduct them; for their na- tural understanding was as unqualified to find out and ap- prehend these things, as the eyes of bats to behold the light of the sun, not even the first and most necessary thing of all, the nature and attributes of God himself; these were very difficult to learn, and more difficult to explain. So, of the manner in which God might be acceptably wor- _ shipped, they were entirely and unavoidably ignorant ; for, in what particular manner, or with what kind of service he _ will be worshipped, cannot be certainly discovered by bare - reason ; even Socrates fell lamentably into the practice of _ the most foolish idolatry ; nor did they know how to recon- _cile and appease the Deity: here nature stops, and expects | with impatience the aid of some particular revelation. They are also most doubtful, uncertain, and unsteady about the most necessary truths, the immortality of the soul, the un- certainty of a future state, and the rewards and punishments to be distributed in a life to come. Socrates at his death, _ and Cicero, knew not whether the soul was mortal or im- ' mortal; which is most probable was a great question, but | which opinion true, God only knows; and what they were | certain of, such as obligations of virtue, and the will of God in matters of morality, they were never able to prove and _ explain clearly and distinctly: they rather made them mat- _ter of entertainment, than proving the plain, necessary, and indispensable obligation of them: for, as they were not able to frame any regular consistent scheme of things, the | truths they taught were single and scattered, accidental as ‘it were, and hit upon by chance, rather than by any know- |ledge of the true state of things; therefore could never ‘make out upon what principle virtue was to be chosen, and perpetually disagreed, and contradicted one another, upon that great-question, what was the chief good, or final hap- ‘piness, of man? And those things they were able to prove, such as the most obvious and necessary duties of life, they had not authority to enforce ; because they seemed to want weight, and to be but the precepts of men; and it has by | experience appeared to be altogether impossible for philo- | | \ | | 162 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM sophy and bare reason to reform mankind effectually, with- out the assistance of some higher principle. That extra- ordinary and supernatural assistance, without which the philosophers themselves were sensible there could never be any truly great man; and therefore a divine revelation was plainly wanting, and absolutely necessary to recover man- kind out of their universal corruption and degeneracy ; and. their chief lawgivers thought it not a sufficient reeommen- dation of their laws, that they were agreeable to the light of nature, unless they pretended also that they received them from God. ! ‘The modern deists therefore have much departed from the sense of the ancient and wise philosophers, in con- tending that there was no want, no need of revelation; that philosophy and right reason was of itself sufficiently able to instruct and preserve men in the practice of their duty ; and that nothing was to be expected from revelation: for there are several truths not possible to be discovered with any certainty by the light of nature: and it is certain in fact, that the wisest philosophers of old were never able to do it to any effectual purpose. And as to the great pre- tence of the modern deists, it is to be observed, that the clearest of moral reasonings was much improved even in the heathen writers, after the coming of Christ. And al- most all things which are said wisely and truly by modern deists, are plainly borrowed from that revelation, whic they refuse to embrace, and without which they never could have been able to have said the same things. What ground have they to imagine, had they lived without the light off the gospel, that they should have been wiser than Socrates Plato, and Cicero; or made such right use of their reas as to have discovered the truth exactly, and not been in- volved in that idolatry which overspread the whole world It is one thing to see, that those rules of life which are be- forehand plainly and particularly laid before us, are per- fectly agreeable to reason ; and another thing to find out these rules merely by the light of reason, without their hay- ing first been any otherwise made known: and, after all, the truth at the bottom is plainly this, all the great things the modern deists affect to say of right reason, as to its suf- ficiency in discovering the obligations and motives of mo- rality, is only a pretence to be made use of when they are REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 163 | Opposing Christianity. Atother times, and in reality, they _have no hearty regard for morality; and however their _ereed may pretend to be the creed of deists, yet almost always their practice is the practice of atheists; and their _ arguments against revelation and Christianity, in their being | not universally owned and embraced, and consequently no | real want of them, or ground to think any farther assistance necessary to enable men to answer all the ends of their _ creation, than the bare light of nature, will hold equally good against natural religion, that neither was that necessary to enable men to answer the ends of their creation; because it is evident all men are not endued with the same faculties and capacities, nor have they all equally afforded to them the same means of making that discovery: many nations being now ignorant and barbarous, and consequently the knowledge of natural religion being, in fact, by no means | universal ; it will follow, that there is no great necessity | even of that: but that men may do very well without it, | in performing the functions of animal life, and directing | themselves wholly by the inclinations of sense; and thus | these gentlemen must at last be forced to let go all moral obligations, and to recur unavoidably to absolute atheism.”’ Can a more languid and desponding character be given | than this of the law of nature? and are not all the objec- | tions I offered allowed by the ablest defenders of it? Is it not an abuse of words and common sense, to call such a | disjointed heap of fragments and fable either a religion or _alaw? Here we see a whole world involved in barbarity | and idolatry, the wisest therein ignorant of their own final happiness, or God’s dealings with them; their whole at- | tempts to discover the truth of things vain and fruitless, | their natural understanding unqualified to find out or ap- prehend even the being of a God, the immortality of the | soul, &c., not able to prove the obligations of morality, nor | show upon what principles virtue was to be chosen. The | truths they taught were scattered and disjointed fragments, hit upon by chance, not acquired by knowledge; for they understood them not, neither saw their connection, nor ould assign the reasons of them; they had not authority to enforce the most familiar or necessary duties of life; for _ they taught them as the precepts of men, but discerned not _ their derivation nor dependence on the will of God: and on 164. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM these accounts they could not, without the assistance of an a higher principle, either reform themselves or instruct others. — The whole of religion consists in teaching the end of man, @ with the means to attain it; but nature never taught man | wherein his final good consisted: and it is an observation a of Cicero, Acad. Q. 1. 1. de Fin. 1. 5. “that they who do — not agree in stating what is the chief end, or good, must of ) course differ in the whole system of precepts for the con- 4 duct of life.” 4 How could nature and reason then (unable to conclude | one principle or infer one duty) be sufficient guides to hap- — piness and God? How could the author of nature intend — them for such purposes? or what can we believe of a— subject which the greatest of men pull down with one hand — as fast as they build up with the other? but that it is dim, ~ wavering, and uncertain, and something else plainly want- i ing, and absolutely necessary, to direct mankind, and in- © fluence them in the practice of duty? This is the sum of ~ all the arguments in favour of natural religion: God gave — | man reason to discover a rule and law, but reason never did © it, or to no purpose. What is the consequence, but that — an ineffective cause was the appointment of infinite power — and wisdom; and that reason had a divine commission to 4 discharge, which it never did, nor could faithfully execute oi both which are impious and absurd. q But if reason ever did, or possibly could perform the — miracles ascribed to it, there is another difficulty occurs, — ; without a full solution to which the whole superstructure — vanishes into nothing; and that is, how the dictates of | mere reason can obtain the force of a law, or have such an — obligatory power, as to subject us to rewards or punish- | ments? And this can only be inferred from the authority — whence law arises; for the effect cannot have more power or dominion than the cause. t And I would thus define law: that itis a rule of life | baile (Néuos os 6800) directing us by proper means to. Alex the best ends, and armed with punishments for the Susie 1. disobedient, and rewards for the obedient. For that cannot be law which does not direct what is_ best, nor a rule that does not point out proper means to. attain the end, nor obligatory without a power to enforce — it. And law may be divided into human, natural, and divine. | REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 165 As to institutions purely human, they may more pro- _ perly be called agreements than laws, as being deficient in | the end, means, and sanction. They were the invention of latter ages, after men formed themselves into societies, and _ began to traffic, and were calculated purely to be subser- vient to these ends. All commerce at first was by exchange of goods, cattle, and other necessaries, one with another ; there was neither law nor money to regulate the price of things, but every one made the best bargain he could. When coin was introduced as a kind of common measure to adjust the inequality of value, it was from compact or | law, not from nature, and therefore called nuwmmus (from _ véuos) law, and stamped with the impression of cattle; and ' the mulct prescribed by the ancient laws was a forfeiture | of cattle among the Romans, and, according to Strabo, among the Lusitanians and Albanians. Such were the | beginnings of law, and it has been remarked that Homer | does not once use the words véuos. When single persons pre- seribed rules to communities, they were called lawgivers. Some made Ceres the inventor of laws, whence #neid. 4. Virgil styles her Legifera, yet most were of a far later date. But the question is, how laws, purely human, can carry with them an obligation, which is as it were the soul of all | law ? by nature all men are equal, nor has any one a right to put restraint upon the body or mind of another: servi- | tude has always been looked upon as preternatural. Ser- | vitus est constitutio juris gentium, qua quis domino alieno contra naturam subsicitur, a subjection to a strange master contrary to the order of nature. So Aristotle, that Polit. 1. to exercise such a power, is apd ptow 74 deomdCew, to domi- neer contrary to nature. And St. Ambrose will have it, that drunkenness introduced slavery, before which liberty was inviolable ; it never entered into the thought of any mortal to condemn to slavery one partaker of the same nature with himself, nor was any man so unreasonable and mad as to give up himself to obey the arbitrary will of another. By nature there is no difference or inequality, _-and he that is his own master cannot be ruled or controlled | by another; slavery is no more than a subjection to laws which we neither make nor consent to ; and such a state, whether entered on by ‘consent or violence, being unnatural, carries no natural obligation with it. } 166 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM Secondly, as to natural law, there have been as various opinions in deriving, as in defining or describing it. 1. Some have attempted to prove that certain rights are natural to men, because practised by other animals; as self-preservation, and that of their species, by beasts; so- ciety, and an orderly commonwealth, by bees; marriage, and conjugal amity, by doves, &c. And therefore they de- fine the natural law to be in common to beasts, birds, and L.1.D, fish, as well as men. Jus naturale esse quod ge Just et natura omnia animalia docuit, atque jus istud non ae Res humant generis esse proprium, sed omnium ant- ——" malhum que in terra, que in mari nascuntur, avium quoque commune esse. But these acts of brutes, In Avibus. though sometimes called laws, as of birds by Aris- tophanes, dpvi@wy véuous, yet very improperly, as the subject of law must be good and evil, and instincts are not capable | of guidance or direction, as passions are: those natural propensions of brutes are their rights, because from nature ; but are no more law than the actions or motions of vegeta- bles, trees, or other natural bodies. ‘ Even in men these involuntary propensions or sallies are not the effect of reason, but a kind of natural sensibility born with us, for which we are not able to account. If we see a child falling into the fire, our heart is that moment touched, and we fly to help him; it is no reflection that determines us to this, or thoughts of receiving thanks from his parents, but we act by a motion purely natural. Here is no time to deliberate, no concurrence of the judgment or will, and an action incapable of reason and choice cannot be subject to law. i 2ndly. Some derive natural law from the customs of na- tions; but none of these were universal, therefore could not be the law of nature: for what is truly such, must have an unalterable force and obligation in all places and ages, as fire has to burn, or water to flow: the 6 xowds vduos, com- mon law of nature, is an universal judgment, therefore un-_ changeable: customs are particular opinions, and what per-_ petually varies, Proteus-like cannot be alaw. Besides, law K must be truth; for falsehood cannot oblige, and truth is” always the same. Good and evil alter not with law and custom, nor have any dependence on them. Incest with sisters was customary in Greece, and allowed by the laws of Solon and Lycurgus; in after ages, it was disused and f REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE 167 condemned. So Simplicius says, it is now forbid- yy gpict. den both by law and custom ; neither the permis- ¢ 47. sion nor restraint therefore were from nature. And as the customs or manners of a country, 7. e. the consent of those who conform themselves to them, cannot make what is evil good; so neither can they superinduce an obligation, because what is wicked would then sometimes oblige; and the same thing be of force in one age, not in another; oblige at Athens, not at Rome, &c., which is unnatural. We should have been better able to judge of the religion of nature from this head, if several works of the ancients had been preserved ; as the Néuima BapBapicda of Aristotle, or the manners and institutes of barbarians, 7. e. of the na- tions who lived out of Greece; his books of the different politics, civil rites, and morals of people ; their laws by The- ophrastus, &c. But by what remains we have, we may safely judge, that never any thing was more truly spoke than that proverbial expression among them, nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum. __ If it be said, that notwithstanding a difference of man- mers among nations, yet nevertheless they agreed in the fundamental points of all religion, such as the belief of the true God, a proper acknowledgement and worship of him, &c. I would only at present ask, where was this religion or law of nature in Greece before Cecrops? for he was the first who told them there was such a person as Jupiter, invoked him, offered sacrifices, built altars, or made images among them. Before him no one knew, or had so much as heard of these things. Plato acknowledges the same thing, that they had no gods, but the sun, moon, and stars, t. e. the visible system. So that the religion of Greece was without a God; without worship; their law of nature without end, means, motives, or obligation. And this -was not peculiar to Greece; the catholic religion of the world was atheistical idolatry ; their manners turpitude and bar- barity ; and these only were entitled to the appellations of natural and universal. | 3dly. Some derive it from natural reason, and the right ‘use of it among men. And it is no wonder that the hea- then, being ignorant of God, and the method of coming at divine truths, attributed many of them to reason, as finding itin the possession of them, and not knowing what other Py 1 168 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM original to ascribe them to. Yet notwithstanding the many great things they say of nature, or philosophy’s being a suf. ficient guide to virtue, yet the wisest of them meant it not exclusively of the divine assistance: so Cicero, multos et wat. p. nostra civitas et Grecia tulit singulares vires, quo-~ Ee rum neminem, nist juvante Deo, talem fuisse cre- 124, 129. dend t. Nemo igitur vir nus sine aliquo endum es emo ro magnus quo” Diss.2, Oflatu divino unquam fut: and Max. Tyr p. 265. ddovrau EvvarywvioTod O€od Kat EvAAHTopos, &C. : that per- sons of the best dispositions stand in need of the assistance and help of God to lead and impel them, &c.: and there- Cic.leg, fore in this sense we must understand many of their ‘Lu.3 expressions, nec est quisquam gentis ullius qur du- cem naturam nactus ad virtutem pervenire non potest, &ce. But as to the use and rule of natural or right reason among men, it is commonly asserted, that there are such” ‘common notions and apprehensions implanted in them, whereby every one finds an inward fixed conviction and de- | termination, that good is desirable, evil to be avoided, and that we ought to live in a becoming manner, &c. From which notions or principles, a mind not depraved, by its” own rational faculties forms propositions and conclusions as_ certain as the principles themselves. Therefore natural” law is often defined with Aristotle, ravtaxod riy abthy exer Ethic. 1, Oddvamw, rat od TO doxeiy HN, quod ubique eandem vim 5.c.10. gbtinet, et non quia tta videtur vel minime ; t. e what does not depend upon the various and uncertain use of opinions among men or nations, or on positive laws con trived for the public good of society ; but on the constant and ivariable determination of those who act by right and Lez. 1. sound reason. So Cicero, lea est recta ratio im- perandi, &c. The law isright reason, commanding or for- bidding ; and whoever is ignorant of it, whether it be any where written or not, is an unjust person: and a little after, nos legem bonam a mala nulla alia nisi natural norma dividere possumus, &c. We cannot distinguish a good law from a bad one by any other than a natural rule. For not only right and wrong are discerned by nature, but all vir- tuous and vicious things: for common reason, that which is” coeval with our minds, makes these things known to us; that what is honest and laudable should be accounted vir- tuous, what is base, vicious. And it is madness to think . REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 169 they are owing to opinion, not to nature. Many passages are to be met with in Cicero, Plato, Plutarch, Seneca, and other philosophers, as also among civilians and theologists, which will have the laws of nature to be placed in, or | pointed out by, the right use of reason: that there are cer- tain first principles, from which many corollaries or deduc- tions may necessarily be inferred, and the law of nature ex- plicitly drawn and established. As in the mathematics, there are some axioms which every attentive mind must at first sight acknowledge to be true, and from them other pro- positions equally true may be concluded. So in moral in- quiries, after allowing some principles, which must be uni- versally and unavoidably true, such as self-preservation, the use of things necessary for life, the conjunction of sexes, propagation of our species, and other things usually called good and honest; there will arise from right reason certain commands and prohibitions universally binding, by which that good may be preserved, and the contrary hindered : and conclude, that as nature has abundantly provided for all other cases and wants, so especially must it in this, by suggesting whatever can instruct or enable us to lead our lives becoming, justly, and religiously. That some things are by nature indifferent, neither required nor forbidden, in which men are left at liberty to determine for themselves, as they shall judge most convenient, according to the va- riety of circumstances that may attend them. But there are other things so expressly commanded or prohibited by _ hature, that no dispensation therein can at any time be al- _ lowable ; and that man may thus, by the use of right reason, learn the exact boundaries of vice and virtue, by the same _ tule that he knows what is good and honest. To judge rightly in this case, we must consider, that rea- son and its use are taken in two senses; either simply, or _ without regard to the authority and declaration of any su- | perior being; or as it acknowledges such a power, marking | out the bounds of duty to us, declaring what is good, and , what is evil. The first only is at present to be considered, _ and these two remarks will, I think, follow from it: that the | use of reason in men is neither so certain nor consistent in the discernment of these things, that what is best and most desirable can always appear from it ; Or, were it ever so re- gular and constant, yet no legal cause of obligation could be _ thence inferred. 3 | B ‘ 170 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM As to the uncertainty which the free use of reason al- ways laboured under in these inquiries (to omit the vulgar, who may be always strangers to it) it will appear both in the origin and subject of natural law ; their wisest men dis- 4 agreeing in nothing more than whence proceeded the es- sential difference of good and evil. Archelaus, the master of Socrates, taught, that things were just and unjust, not 4 Die, by nature, but by law. Plato tells us, “‘ that in his o0,Ea days the commonly received opinion concerning seb. Prep. Jaws was, that they were positive, not from nature, — 1. 12. ¢. 30. p. 622. but appointment: that the gods themselves existed in their present order, not by nature, but from determi- nations and agreements of their own: that of good things some were such by nature, others by law. But as for just things, there are none such by nature, for that men perpe- tually differed in opinion about them, and were substituting new ones: but whenever they were appointed to be such, i they became just from law, and artificial compact, not from Xenophon Dature.” When Alcibiades asked Pericles what tes Soc. was law? he answered, “what the people ordain Laert. 4. or base, by nature, but only from custom and law; and that a wise man might steal, or commit adultery, or sacri- lege, when it was opportune; for none of these things were _ naturally vile, and he need not restrain himself because _ of the opinion of a foolish unskilful multitude.” The doc- trine of Diogenes was to the same purpose; and Pyrrho denied, “that any thing was in itself base or commendable, just or unjust; but that men did all things by law and cus- Id. p. 411. tom, for one thing was not better than another.” Id. p. 669. This determination of good and evil entered also — into the most sacred parts of their religion. It was the | Xenoph. great rule of Socrates, “to adhere strictly to the Id. p.25. eustoms of his country, and that to deviate from — them was a token of superstition and vanity.” As to their ethics, no one can be ignorant that the dis- putes concerning good and evil were numberless among the in a general assembly, declaring what ought, and © what ought not to be done.” When he inquired again, — ‘whether they ordained what was good or evil?” he re- — plied, “most certainly what is good:” and positively de- i clared, that whatever is the ordinance of a legal govern- — Diog. ment, is law, and consequently right.” Aristip- pus taught, “that nothing was just, or honest, — Sa > erties 'g REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 171 professors of right reason, the lawgivers, priests, and philo- sophers; nor was there any to compose or reconcile these dissensions; so many sects were there, and such a fruitful harvest of opinions, that in philosophy, and that grounded on the strictest reason, according to the utmost abilities and wit of those who searched into it, there were no less, as Varro observed, than two hundred and eighty-eight different sentiments about the swmmuwm bonum, or the final happi- ness and end of man; and consequently so many religions, laws, means, and motives, among them. They also who most professedly inquired into the uni- versal principles of living well, fell into separate opinions and schemes, each judging his own best, and condemning every other. Nay, so singular was reason among philoso- | phers of the highest class, that many things, generally _ deemed to be contrary to the law of nature, they dared to _ assert were absolutely permitted and allowed by it. Zeno, _ Chrysippus, and the Persian Magi held it lawful to lie with | their mothers, their daughters, or with men. Theft, sacri- | lege, and adultery, were held lawful by Theodorus. All _ manner of beastly lust, by Diogenes; and Plato, the divinest | of them all, allowed an almost promiscuous copulation, and _ would have wives and all other things in common, as if the law required it. Archelaus, Aristippus, and Carneades, would not have any thing to be naturally just, but that | whatever was esteemed so, depended wholly on the will and _ appointment of men. Numberless other instances to this | purpose are to be every where met with in the writings of the ancients. Every one loudly affirms 6 vdyos éori Adyos 5 opdds, _ right reason is the law, yet so vastly differ in what right _ reason is. Even when they seem to agree in the funda- - mentals on which laws were founded; when they come to _ interpret or apply them, they divide into many and contra- Yy-opinions. “When any one, says Socrates, men- ,, Phe- tions silver or iron, we all understand the same dro. _ thing by it; but when they speak of what is just or good, _ they think in a different manner, and disagree with them- _ selves as well as others.” _ Some, as the Pyrrhonists, sceptics, and others, thought _ every thing so doubtful; and the reasons on both sides the _ question so equal, that they suspended their assent, and _ concluded that truth was no where to be found; so rivetted 15) ‘THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM) « — were they to this persuasion, that they would not believe common notiéns any more than others. teat On the whole, it appears that great caution must be used, _ that we do not too freely rely on the disquisitions of reason, which are so. various and uncertain, that what one takes for a self-evident principle, or incontestable conclusion, fre- quently appears to another, equally sagacious, as doubtful — or false, and to be absolutely rejected. That this often happened to those masterly understandings of old, who ar- — gued with a. free and unrestrained use of reason, concern- _ . ing the nature of good and evil, honest and dishonest, every — one is convinced of who has but. looked into their writings. — And the infinite variety of sects and schools, with the bit- ter animosities that always subsisted among them, may suf- ficiently convince us, that their laws sprang from opinion, Ml not from nature. aia N54 . e | ~ But if reason had been ever so consonant in her deci- sions, the difficulty still occurs, how they would obtain the — force of a law, or carry an obligation with them. a Men may be here considered as separate individuals, or bi as formed into societies; under the first, which was the | state of mankind for many ages after the dispersion, they were in every respect by nature and condition equal, with- piipne: out settlement, society, polity, or law. The fact | pub.2. could not be otherwise than as represented by the — cic. ce ;, ancients: that there was a time when men wan- oe dered about the fields like beasts, sustained life in ¥ oe’ a wild savage manner, and in their actions never — consulted reason or judgment, but only violence and | strength of body: religion and common notions were then | every where much the same as they now are at the Cape © of Good Hope, or in New Guinea. But let it be supposed . that, from a more diligent use of mere reason, without any regard to the authority of a superior, they were gradually brought to lay aside this wild kind of life, and agreed (but still preserving their equality) to regulate themselves for the future by certain articles and laws, which they called na- tural; yet what has this to do with what in any propriety _ can be called either duty or obligation? or if a few among © them, by a peculiar strength of mind, and long observation, — had hit upon some universal truths, yet they could not in- — fluence others, who were at perfect liberty to receive and ‘REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 173. believe them or not. Because no one has a right to impose — his sentiments or scheme upon another; or if they all be- | came philosophers, the case would have been still worse, it being plain they never could or did agree in any system of truth or law. And no one had more authority than ano- ther to determine who was in the right, and who in the wrong: or, what is. the utmost that can be supposed, had they all concurred in the same way of thinking, in the de-— finitions of right and wrong, and particularly specifying what was reducible under those heads, so as they absolutely judged it to be natural, without any doubt or controversy remaining concerning it, yet the case had been still the same; for no collections or inferences by the bare exercise of reason, without any manifest authority to guide it, could carry a legal obligation with them. Mere naked reason, as such, can only declare and persuade, but not command to the discharge of any duty, except armed with the authority of some superior to him who is commanded, which is so es- sential a property to every given law, that it cannot subsist without it. And that any, or even one of these men, per- fectly equal, can be so obliged or commanded by the rea- son of others, or their own (though none can command or prohibit themselves) or of all the rest, that he cannot alter his opinion, or change it into the contrary,‘can be no more | granted, than that all the rest should stand obliged by his single opinion: for whence can proceed this disparity in the cause of obligation, where all, as has been said, are equal, and not yet formed into a regular society? The only pre- tence for receiving a doctrine is, that it is true, and agree- able to reason; and on the same account another may oppose or reject it, because it does not appear so in his | judgment; and neither one or the other has a right to sub- | mission, because, in this case, their power is equal, nei- ther of them having the sanction of a superior authority. © But let us suppose these very persons, by mutual con- sent, to have united into a body, and agreed not only on a common rule of life, but of government also; so that now amongst them princes are superior to subjects, laws formed _ by mere reason, and punishments enacted for offenders; _ yet if some higher right and authority be not added, a _ power superior to any reason of the particular members, by _ which promises thus entered on can be preserved, by which 174. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM princes are to be obeyed, compacts to be observed, and by which all collectively can be bound with stronger fetters than the opinion of individuals, or vague reason: how can it happen that any obligation consented to by a private per- son may not, on the altering of his judgment, be naturally and at will dissolved? or what can, or ought to prevent his withdrawing at pleasure from such promise, government, com- pact, or appointment of punishments, in which they had con- sented? He commits no sin in this, therefore cannot be obliged to the contrary: for, as an equal can have no rule over an equal, so neither can they who were once equals, from any law mutually agreed on, or the name of duty grounded on such agreement, be rendered so unequal, that every one cannot have the liberty to renounce the society into which he entered, or the law to which he consented, unless some extrinsical obligation, different from themselves, confirm those concessions and duties they have entered into. Without this men can never be restrained or kept within bounds, it being evident, that whatever obligation, or on whatever account, men lay themselves under, they can le- gally dissolve the same, except some authority superior to man require them to continue so obliged. And it is as im- possible to be otherwise, as that equal numbers, without an external addition or substraction, should become unequal. And hence, in the doctrine of the ancient heathens, the gods themselves were not obliged to the observance of a voluntary promise, without swearing to it by the river Styx, ' and the name of a superior deity. “ Dii cujus jurare timent et fallere numen’”—ViR6. 4thly. Others derive the law of nature, or the universal ie law, from the authority and appointment only of the Au- thor of nature. The law is that which, from the creation of nature and things, has been common to, and required of all men: and what from the beginning has been shown and commanded to all human kind, could neither take its rise, ; nor have any authority from any other than the great and holy Author of their beings; his power alone could re- strain their liberty, induce an obligation, or rightfully punish the violators of it. : Cic. de Without law man must be in a state of liberty; e¢ Of.1.1. Libertati proprium est, sic vivere ut velis, * the REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 175 very notion of liberty is, to live as we list.” Nor can any thing restrain us, but violence or law: with the former we have nothing to do; and law is a just rule of acting, where- by our freedom is withheld to do nothing but what that di- rects, and avoid every thing which that forbids, in obe- dience and duty to the will of Him who has a just right and authority to command it. From hence proceeds the obli- gation, or that bond of law whereby we are necessarily engaged to the observance or omission of any thing; so | that as by the law itself there is occasioned a difference of good and evil, in things or actions, from the commands or | prohibitions of the law; so hence arises an obligation or duty to perform some office, which is the first relation be- _ tween us and law: and to such obligation necessarily adheres a subjection to punishment on the violation of it; for law is a restraining the power of doing what we list; but law, without a power to punish, cannot induce such restraint ; therefore all offenders must be under an obligation to pu- nishment, by the same necessity that they are subject tu law; as the undergoing punishment, whether satisfactory, purgative, or expiatory, is nothing but the retribution, re- lease, or discharge, appointed or required by the law. None of which things could possibly be, were not law an injunc- tion of a superior power. Thus, in all well-regulated politics, the wisdom of the le- gislature appears, in forming laws suitable to the exigences of time and place, so as they may best tend to the happi- _ ness and security of the people: yet the obligation. to obey _ such laws arises, not from their intrinsic goodness or expe- | diency, but from the rightful power of the enactors. Conformably to this, in the great commonwealth of the | world, where all things are directed to their best ends, by _ the counsel of an eternal mind; his decrees must be such _ as his will is, and his will as his nature, that is, infinitely perfect. By unerring justice they are fitted to the capaci- ties of those who are to observe them, and by unconfined _ goodness framed for their advantage and happiness: and _ whichever way the laws of God are communicated to us, we | obey them not, for their own sakes, but because they are his will, whose right to obedience is prior to any other con- sideration. And notwithstanding the many prejudices con- | ceived against it, it always has been, and will be the soundest 176 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM rule in divinity, that the wickedness of an action consists in its being forbidden by God, without regard had to the dis- tinction of natural or positive laws. For nothing can possibly be a law, but the will of one who has a just right and authority to demand subjection, with power to enforce it: another may give his advice, but cannot direct, nor without violence compel: and wherever there is subjection, it must be to a superior, for nothing can be subject to itself; and as nothing is superior to man but God, therefore the end of all law, obligatory to man, is to bring him into subjection to the will of God: this will alone can determine his reason, bind his judgment, and direct him, by proper means, to his final end; which end also being su- pernatural, is not from nature, but from God. Again, man, as a creature, is dependent; for indepen- dence is the prerogative of the Creator; and if dependent, subordinate; if subordinate, in a rank below one or more causes, the supreme of which must be superior in dignity, a and have jurisdiction and authority over all: for every se- cond cause owes its being to, and is absolutely dependent in nature and operations on the precedent one, as all are on the supreme; it being essential to a first cause to be inde- pendent, self-being, and self-sufficient, in which all exist- — ence and power are originally lodged, and from which alk others derive, and depend upon, for both being and suffi- Hh ciency: therefore, to be subject and dependent, is essential to a created being, the virtue of an inferior agent being only al an emanation of virtue from a superior one: and all sub- jection requires obedience, it being the law of subordinate natures to obey, according to the sphere of their activity, ~ the will of the first; which having absolute dominion, found- ed on omnipotence and supremacy, has a right to absolute obedience; and consequently, all second limited causesand beings must be obnoxious to his sovereign pleasure: such is ae their nature, and therefore the law and perfection of it. This is the great relation betwixt Creator and creature, < absolute dominion and absolute subjection ; and as no crea- ture can be made exempt from the former, so it never can ~ be exempted from the latter: and this is the foundation of — all law and obedience, to be subject to the pleasure of ano- | ‘4 ther, who has an absolute disposal of those under his domi- nion. Dominion on one hand, and subjection on the other, _ REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 177 are included in the very notion and essence of law: there- fore, among individuals, where there is a perfect equality, there can be neither dependence, subjection, nor law: no created being can give law to itself, any more than it can be the cause of itself, but must receive it from that cause which gave it being and operation: dependence is essential to a creature, and law is the rule of that dependence or obedience: and there is no authority in law, but what proceeds from the declaration of such sovereign will and pleasure. The same argument will equally hold good as to the other most essential part of law, the sanctions of rewards and punishments, which are the support of all government both in heaven and earth. Hence Macrobius says of the InSomn, heathens, “ that because all laws are imperfect Scip. 1. 2. which have not punishments annexed, this made ee them condemn all violators of them to Tartarus, where they should undergo torments for many ages, before they sufficiently expiated their crimes, and finished the due purgation.” And Grotius, in legibus sanctio dicitur ea pars, que sanguinem delinquentis legi consecrat: “ m laws, that part is called sanction, which consecrates the blood of the delinquent to the law:” so that a lawgiver must be one who, when he wills and commands, wills pu- nishments also; without which law would be no more than | apetition or entreaty, and obedience a voluntary compliance, which every one might offer or refuse at ‘pleasure, being finally accountable to none but themselves: because there is no enforcing principle, except reason could oblige or compel itself, i. e. at the same time be cause and effect, be dependent and independent, superior and inferior, which are manifest contradictions. Such principle, therefore, _- must be extrinsic to the mind, because nothing can restrain a natural liberty but a superior authority, nor judicially pu- nish offenders but a legal uncontrollable power; and over man there is no such power, but of God. For, to punish without a right to do it, is injustice, tyranny, and cruelty; and where there is no superior, there is no difference or au- thority, neither law, subjection, nor bond of obligation, _ (every one is a rule to himself) and consequently neither rewards nor punishments. _ And yet we have seen, that in the Gentile world (not- 1 2 178 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM withstanding the name of a Tartarus) the truth of final re- wards and punishments was so far called in question, that some wholly exploded them as a dream of the poets. They were rendered to all doubtful and uncertain by the disputa- tions of the wisest philosophers that ever lived; and they who did believe them, had such obscure notions of their nature, mixed with such fabulous fictions and stories, that they had no force to influence the actions or the lives of men: and consequently the religion of nature wanted the — most essential part, the strongest tie and. bond it could have: on the minds of rational creatures; for not only the foun- dation of all religion, but the most weighty motives to obe- dience, are the existence of God, that he is a rewarder and punisher of men, and that the soul is immortal. All obli- gation to obedience necessarily supposing the existence of such a being as hath power to command us; and the mo- tives engaging men to the practice of religion, must suppose the certainty of a future state, and our subsisting in it; as where men have no motives to induce them either todo _ or avoid a thing, they can have no just ground or reason either for doing or avoiding it, it is perfectly indifferent, nor ought guilt to be charged, or punishment inflicted on them. Mr. Locke acknowledges the truth of this argument. “Those just measures (says he) of right and wrong, Reasonab- which necessity had any where introduced, the anity, p. civil laws prescribed, or philosophy recommended, Pee stood. not on: their true foundations. They were looked. upon as the bonds of society and conveniences of common life, and laudable practices. But where was it that their obligation was thoroughly known and allowed, — and they received as precepts of a law, of the highest law, the law of nature ? that could not be without a clear know- ledge and acknowledgement of the law-maker, and the great rewards and punishments.for those that would or would not — obey them.” Thus, in every branch of religion or law, we must ascend, to a first mover; they are neither of them innate or self- originated, therefore subordinate; and all dependencies must be traced up, and ultimately referred to some neces- sary being, who has universal empire and dominion. All the distinctions of good and evil, as to man, refer to» REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 179 some principle above himself; for were there no supreme governor and judge to reward good and punish evil, the very notions of good and evil would vanish away: they could not exist in the minds of men, if there were nota supreme director to give laws for the measure thereof; for it is from having the will of a supreme law-maker for our rule, ‘that we call an action good or evil, sin or duty, as it is commanded or forbidden by him. This even Aristotle could determine, “that the will of a lawgiver is punic. 1. such, that they who act not according to it, sin.” 2-¢1. And a greater than he says, “ but for the law I had not known sin.” Though by natural reason, or the customs of the world, he had disliked many actions; yet, till the law declared it, he could not call any thing asin: and if St. Paul could not, neither could the Gentiles: nature could not instruct him in the differences of good and evil; for it is only by comparing actions with the law, that men can pronounce them to be duties orsins. So again Mr. Locke : “if I have the will of asupreme invisible lawmaker Essay H. for my rule, then, as I suppose the action com- Underst. manded or forbidden by God, I< call it good or 99. par-14, evil, sin or duty; it being their conformity to, or }- disagreement with some rule, that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad. Thus duelling, when con- sidered in relation to the law of God, will deserve the name of sin; to the law of fashion in some countries, valour and virtue ; and to the municipal laws of some governments a capital crime.” Nor would rewards or punishments be effectual sanc- tions of law, if they were not distributed by a righteous and omnipotent judge. No one trembles or fears but from the apprehensions of a Deity: for the law of man cannot reach the inward mind and soul, as having no dominion over them; nor is armed with authority to take a final vengeance. The punishment of human laws may be undergone without shame or terror: it must be something greater than man, that can arrest the conscience, and fill it with convulsions at the dread of never ceasing misery, and falling into the hands of the living God, who shall pass judgment upon all men according to their works. For this reason, says Lac- tantius, b. 3. c. 27, “the precepts of the philosophers, 80 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM though many of them were right, had no weight, because they were human, and wanted a divine sanction.” Nor could there be any such thing as a moral action, . without supposing a law from the supreme being ; “ morally good or evil being only the conformity or disagree- ment of our voluntary actions to some law where- 2.c.28. by good or evil is drawn upon us from the will and power of the law-maker.” Moral good is when, notwithstanding the liberty of our will, yet having a free principle within us of determining our actions upon proper motives, we choose to govern ourselves, and act by the rule given us, when we were at liberty to have done otherwise: for the only end of liberty is to make us capable of laws, (which they are. not, who are under compulsion or natural necessity) and in consequence of them, of re- wards and punishments. Without these, liberty and choice were good for nothing, and without regard to a law, have q neither use nor purpose. ‘This different manner of ap- — proach to God distinguishes us from beasts, who being de- — termined by mere instinct, are not capable of choice, and — therefore not of having a rule given them. The wisest heathens also, notwithstanding the many great things said of nature and reason, derive the origin, obliga- 4 tion, and efficacy of all law, from the gods alone ; and es- | pecially religion, or those services and acts of worship — wherewith the gods would be honoured, which was the — highest of laws, they perpetually acknowledged to be wholly — of divine authority. Xenophon always presents Socrates under this character: — “that he was so pious as to do nothing without the — 1. 4. advice of the gods: and if any doubts arose what the will of the gods was, or which way men ought to act, i his constant advice (in which Cicero afterwards copied him) was to go to the oracle for instruction :” and he gives this x description of religion and piety: “a pious man is one who — serves the gods, not in what manner he pleases, but as the — laws made for that purpose direct ; and he who keeps these — Mem. loc. laws will know how he ought to serve the gods ; and he — who knows the laws which ought to be observed in the — service of the gods, will serve them according to the laws; and he who serves the gods as the laws direct, serves t X REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON. OR NATURE. 181 them as he ought; and he who serves the gods as he ought, is pious: and thus have we the true definition of a pious man.” Such were the sentiments of the most virtuous person in the heathen world; that no one can of himself find out the proper worship of the gods: he must know the laws which contain their will, and what services would be acceptable to them; and these laws were given by the gods, which is all I contend for. In the modern language it would stand thus: the religion of Socrates was the religion of nature ; but the religion of Socrates depended on the positive laws and communication of the gods, therefore so does the reli- gion of nature. Plato, though he knew not the true God, saw the neces- sity of this doctrine, and is full of it; assuring us, ‘ that no mortal can make laws to purpose ; and that the first Hevee institution of them belongs not to us, but the 427. greatest, best, and first legal ones belonged to Apollo at Delphos.” And he commends Minos for having yyinos a secret communication, for the space of nine 319. years, with Jupiter, as with a sophist, to be instructed in the right framing of laws ; and adds, that Sparta enjoyed constant prosperity after she began to use them & re elors odo, as being divine; for the sceptre (or laws,) of Minos, was nothing else but the instruction of Jupiter, odd&y sAdo civa 4 thy wadeiay tod Aws, which agrees with the common opinion of the legislators having their decrees from God, 6 mapa Aids Nowoderns. Kpicharmus affirmed, that the divine pycep, reason had invented all arts, and taught the use to yeaa be made of them; that men never had invented (1 dex. any, it was the gods that did it, and the reason of ret 5. - men proceeds from that which is divine. Even Hesiod would have the law of man to be from the gods. be aes Tévd_ yap avOpdmoiw. viuov diérake Kpoviwy. Demosthenes gives this reason why all men ought to obey law, because it is évpyua kat Sépov Ocod, the invention Orat. 1. and the gift of God. And the Athenians, though ante a they looked upon Ceres as the inventor of all laws, to. yet they distinguished her mysteries by the higher title of Gecpopdpia, quasi divine legis latio ; for becuds, says Hesy- 182 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM Lee.9, Chius, is yuos dctos, a divine law. Cicero is frequent Rep. 3. to this purpose, that the chief and ultimate law was, até. mens omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei. c. 8. And again, lex vera, ratio est recta summi Jovis. Et Deus legis hujus inventor disceptator, lator, as 1 shall else- Aa Prin. Where more largely show. So after him Plutarch: cinta “that if we may conjecture at these things, Justice oct. : : : ; cannot be so properly said to sit by Jupiter, as that he is the most ancient and perfect rule and right of all laws.” _ And he relates, that Lycurgus being about to frame his laws, consulted with the oracle of Apollo, in order to estab- q lish good ones in his country ; and they were so re- L.6. verenced in after ages, that the judicious Polybius says, they were in his opinion rather the invention of a god than a man. These testimonies may suffice to show the opinion of the wisest heathens on this head: and why all their legislators pretended to deliver nothing but what they had from heaven, viz. to arm their laws with that divine authority which alone could, carry obligation with it, as it was what no human reason or power had a claim to. Hence Zoroaster among the Persians and Bactrians attributed his laws to Oromazes; Trismegistus of the Egyptians to Mercury ; Zamolxis of the Seythians to Vesta; Charondas of the Carthaginians to Saturn; Minos of the Cretans to Jupiter ; Draco and Solon of the Athenians to Minerva; Lycurgus of the Spartans to Apollo; Numa of the Romans to Egeria, and Mahomet of the Arabians to Gabriel. If we inquire of the Jews (and they for many ages were the only school of true theology and learning in the world) we shall find them unanimous in opinion, that the law of nature could not possibly be grounded on the determinations : of reason, because of its inconstancy and uncertainty ; and that it eould not induce an obligation, without some superior authority, to which it must be subject ; but was showed and commanded to human kind by the great Author of their beings, and which they called the precepts of the sons of Noah. This they affirmed to be universal, natural law ; the true and living sacrifices of the mind, not peculiar to any nation, sect, or family; which none, however holy or dis- tinguished, could challenge as their own, but given as a ~ rule in common to the whole race of men (which by being: _ by God’s command, transmitted to posterity ; but REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 183 universally dispersed and approved, was said by the hea- thens to be engraven by their Jup. Opt. Max. on the minds of men) that hence it became obligatory on human nature, and through all ages; from this proceeded all those universal _ duties, together with that moral and civil philosophy, by _ which the whole race of men from their entrance into the world are bound, both towards the Supreme Being, and towards one another; as containing a perfect rule of duty, _ worship, and whatever God required of them. That these , were before the written law, and every where binding, appears from the book of Job, wherein most of the pre- cepts of the sons of Noah or the natural law are to be found, as against idolatry, c. xxxi. 26; against blas- _ phemy, i. 5; against murder, xxxi. 29, and xxiv. 14; against adultery, xxxi. 9, and xxiv. 15; against theft, xxiv. and xxxi. 7; and of judgment, in the passages of idolatry and adultery, besides the reverential acknowledgment of God, his providence, &c., and a pious worship of him by prayer and sacrifice: that the written law was only a repe- tition of them, with an addition of some things peculiar to themselves. So Grotius says, that Moses did not De Jure enlarge on the precepts of Noah, because they Pola were known to all mankind. These precepts were, : ; 2s after the dispersion they became much impaired and ob- secured ; anda dark night of ignorance and barbarity cover- ed the earth: even where the names of God, creation, duty, ' and sin remained, the nature and true reasons of them were absolutely forgot ; so thatit was justly said, este T’ul- augustin. lius rem vidit, eausam nescivit. And this not only agrees with the Mosaic account, but with that of the heathens. Nothing can be more express than Plato, “that after a certain flood, which but few es- caped, on the increase of mankind, they had nei- Leg. . ther letters, writing, nor laws, but obeyed the » °° manners and institutions of their fathers as laws; that when _ eolonies separated from them, they took an elder for their leader, and in their new settlements retained the customs of their ancestors, those especially which related to their gods, and thus transmitted them to posterity; they imprinted them | on the minds of their sons, and they did the same to their ehildren ; by which means, when colonies were greatly mul-- 184. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM tiplied, each preserved its peculiar laws, approving their — own, and disliking others. And this, says he, was the al origin of right laws, and the different forms of govern- — ment.” a Nothing can be more explicit; yet was it no device of — his own, but the truest account of things he could meet with in the different seminaries to which he applied in the — search of wisdom. And such he acknowledges was the — Timeus, method of his coming at all divine truths. Ifhe — p: 29. speaks of the origin of the creation, he has only — received roy eixdra wtdov, some probable tradition or fable — concerning it. If of the immortality of the soul, it is Phado.g5. Adyou Gelov rds, from some divine word. If of the | Phileb. 17. the gods, it is, they delivered it to us; or else — Leg.2. domep kal 6 madauds Adyos, as Old tradition certifies ; ae this, and not nature and reason, was the ground of all his knowledge. And when he attempted to assign causes _ or reasons for these supernatural subjects, some he ob- — scures instead of illustrating ; and in the manner of handl- _ ing them all, shows that he was a stranger to the bottom — and the truth of things. aq Hence we plainly see from what fountain those active | principles, contained in the inward law of conscience, were — derived, and properly called cowa vom, common notions, as passing from the same root, through all the branches of ' mankind ; and how the notices of good and evil were trans- — mitted from generation to generation. These, and nothing else, were the karaAjves comprehensions of Zeno, as con- taining the first principlesof knowledge: the mpoampes, antici- pations, presumptions, or pre-suppositions (as concluding a previous formation of them in the soul) of Epicurus; and — the pbs Adyos, right reason, or law of nature, as containing several traditions of the universal moral law, which were — scattered through the world; and not knowing how their — minds, became possessed of them, vainly attributed them — to an internal growth and culture. As also what the mean- — ing of those expressions is, 2orw & adpeTa Kata Tov opOby Adyor Stobeus obvratis, kal &uapria mapa Tov dpbdy Adyov mapdBacis, &C. de Virtu. « That virtue is a conformity to right reason, and p. 9. sin a transgression against right reason,” &c. That they cannot be intended of any natural light, but of the principles of the universal moral law, taught and treasured REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 185 up in the mind and conscience: and the very outlines of these great truths were so consonant to the dictates of reason, the apprehensions of nature, and of such vast im- portance, that they easily obtained reverence and awe with all that were instructed in them, and to be looked upon (as Plutarch writes) the rules of all both mortal and immortal : not that which is written in books, or engravenon 4q pyin- ’ wood, but the living reason in a man’s heart, atp. Hin, always alive and watchful together with it, never ~~ suffering the mind to be without a director. And as these were less or more preserved or collected, was the law in proportion perfect or imperfect ; as accord- ing to the degrees of knowledge and intention must the moral evil of their actions be aggravated or alleviated. And on this account were the Gentiles a law to themselves, having some of these common notions, or principles,. in their minds; they judged some things to be lawful, and fit. to be done; others unlawful, and what ought not to be done: which inward judgment and persuasion of con- science, superinduced upon them the utmost legal obliga- tion they were capable of, in the circumstances they were under. For their minds being dark, and their hearts hardened, had horridly depraved the law of their being, and so far departed from the purity and perfection of their nature, as to be “subject to the law of sin and death. Be- cause the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be.” Rom. viii. 7. Yet, as “ without the law sin is dead.’ Rom. vii. 8, therefore God winked at those times of ignorance, when the means of coming at true knowledge was not afforded them; which could not have been, if reason were a suffi- cient director, or intended by God to discover at all times a full, perfect, and adequate rule of duty: and that it could not do so, is evident from their not knowing how to apply the very common notions they had, to the several actions of life, so as to make them a rule to walk by. Such was Arrian’s complaint, Todrd éor: 1d atrioy Epictet. Tots avOpdrois mdvTwy Tay KaKay Td Tas mpodhWes |: % ¢. 26. Tas Kowdas uy SdvarOat epapud(ew mats em uépovs: that the cause of all evil to man, was the not knowing how to apply com- mon notions to particular cases; which for ever subjected. them to doubt and error, and rendered the many excellent 186 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM precepts among them of little service or use to the conduct of their moral actions. : And that the many great things spoken by them of rea- son and nature was owing to an inability of deducing things from their first and true principles, may, I think, fairly be collected from the deep sense they had through all the ages of philosophy, of the weakness and irregularity of nature, the dimness and insufficiengy of reason, the re- moteness and obscurity of truth, the defectiveness of natu- ral conscience, the extreme difficulty of knowing what was virtuous, or doing what was good; and therefore Eused. _ stood in need of some better guide and instructor. p. I. . . 13. ¢. 18. It was an aphorism of Solon, “that the mind of P- 088. the gods is entirely hid from men; of others, that truth lies concealed as it were in a deep pit.” Plato fre- quently laments the painfulness and trouble to perform any — morally good or virtuous action: “that to explain wisdom is not indeed very difficult, but to reduce it to use and Philep. | Practice is most difficult :” and that, according to BJ5, the old proverb, good things are very difficult, 385. xadrerd add. Cicero often expresses himself to this Tusc.Q. purpose, st tales nos natura genuisset, &c. If 1. 3.0.1. wehad comeinto the worldin such circumstances, as that we could clearly and distinctly have discerned nature herself, and have been able, in the course of our lives, to follow her true and uncorrupted directions; this alone — might have been sufficient, and there would have been little need of teaching and instruction: but now nature has | given us only some small sparks of right reason, which — we so quickly extinguish with corrupt opinions and evil fe _ practices, that the true light of nature no where appears: — as soon as we are brought into the world, immediately we dwell in the midst of all wickedness; and are surrounded with a number of most perverse and foolish opinions; so that we seem to suck in error with our nurses’ milk: after- wards, when we return to our parents, and are committed to tutors, then we are further stocked with such variety of — errors, that truth becomes perfectly overwhelmed with falsehood ; and the most natural sentiments of our minds are entirely stifled with confirmed follies: but when, after all this, we enter upon business in the world, and make the multitude, conspiring every where in wickedness, our great REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 187 guide and example, then our very nature itself is wholly transformed, as it were, into corrupt opinions. Lucretius expresses this very justly : **O miseras hominum mentes, O pectora ceeca,, Qualibus in tenebris vite, quantisque periclis Degitur hoc evi, quodcunque est.” ~ So that if reason be sufficient to all the great purposes which relate to God, religion, and eternal happiness, it _slumbered and slept during the long state of paganism ; during which it was always wandering, never found the paths of truth and duty; was drawn away into endless fooleries instead of religion, and paid its adorations to every being in heaven and earth, except the true God. pg yrys¢. Iamblichus, though a heathen, saw this, and ac- s. 3. ¢. 18. knowledged there was but one remedy for all its errors, doubts, and disturbances, and that is, to obtain (if possibly “it can) some particles of divine light. What is the sum of this, in the confession of the very heathens, but that the world was in a state of utter dark- ness and perplexity ? they were not able to determine for themselves, nor knew where to find an instructor that they could with safety rely upon. But though the several articles hitherto advanced be ever so Consonant to universal history and experience ; yet strong prejudices are conceived against this hypothesis in general, as derogating from the dignity of human nature _and reason. Were this indeed true, it ought to be scorned and rejected; but whilst we contend to give man his due, let us be careful to give God his due also. It is unde- niable that there are certain limits given to every created power, an appointed sphere for its activity and bounds which it cannot pass; and from these we must regulate and form our judgments concerning them. If, then, reason be not the measure of truth; if infinite productions and counsels of the eternal mind escape it; if it cannot, with the ordinary use of its faculties, discover the whole system of spiritual truths and things; if it cannot universally, clearly, and perfectly, distinguish good and evil in all the various instances of duty and sin; if it cannot form a rule of life to direct man to the ends of his being, and point out the several motives to oblige and influence his practice ; 188 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM its dignity cannot be diminished by receiving instruction from the fountain of all knowledge: so far from being in- jurious, that it is the highest advancement of reason, to — enrich and improve it with new discoveries of the most important truths, to open fresh scenes of wonder for its contemplation, and show an unerring way to its final hap- piness. For, as natural light cannot contain all that may be known of God or his will; and where that ends, faith — begins; revelation therefore seems highly becoming the divine goodness, and most consonant to the rational facul- — ties and the true interest of man. Whenever man attains the knowledge of supernatural objects and truths, it is always by instruction; reason is — never the discoverer, but only the faculty that perceives the — certainty and meaning of them. | Wnen an idea is consen- — taneous to the object, it is true; yet the mind which re- ceives it, is neither the idea nor object, but the discerner of — the agreement between them. When we deduce proposi- — tions from evident principles, reason is neither the principle — nor conclusion, but the discursive operation of the intellect, © which, by viewing the connection and necessary depend- — ence they have on each other, perceives the certainty of — ae the inference; so when divine truths are propounded, the office of reason is to satisfy the understanding that they are ri good, and from God, therefore perfective of our natures, — and most fit to be believed and obeyed; yet is neither the — propounder nor obeyer of them: the first is from the will | of God, the other a determination of the will of man. So that reason, though not omnipotent, is to the most ex-— cellent purposes, i. e. to all the ends whereby man is con-— stituted what he is, a rational creature. To examine the truth of things, separate it from falsehood, and pass judg-— ment upon them, whether they be reasonable or not, and — give degrees of assent according to the apparent evidence or probability that attends them: to know truth, and to o obey it, is the whole of man; the one is the act of the un- | derstanding, the other of the will. The end of reason is, ~ to direct us in the search of it, so that, when found, we may — know it and enjoy it. co In human sciences, the mind either descends from well- known principles, to trace and search out necessarily de- pendent or collateral truths; or, it ascends from given — '- - REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 189 ~ effects to investigate the origin or cause of them. In both, the business of reason is to find out proper intermediate ‘ideas, and range them in such order as to perceive their ‘coherence, that the conclusion may be right; and know ‘what assent is to be given to the proposition sought for. The conclusion of an argument, which the Greeks called érddeckis, Cicero defined to be “ the reason which 4.44 gu. ~ leads us from things apprehended and understood, 1. 4. n. 8. to those things which were not apprehended:” this pares inference, or deducing of one truth from another, is justly esteemed the highest act of the rational faculty, and is no more than judging of the agreement between them: for, though it be foreed to use many intermediate truths, to “unite extremes together when they lie remote, yet, when these exactly agree with the precedent and subsequent ‘ones, as links in a chain, they show the connection between the extremes, however distant, and the mind, by viewing this, perceives the certainty of the illation, that the proce- dure is regular, and the conclusion manifestly true. For, where the connection is evident, so will the inference be; where that is fallacious, obscure, or incoherent, this will be weak, doubtful, and inconclusive. And from such view ‘the mind discovers what kind of assent it ought to give: where there can be no exception to the evidence, the result is knowledge: where the agreement is not clear, and yet the testimonies of one side outweigh the other, it is pro- _bability; where there is an apparent disagreement, it is falsehood. | This is the great use of that faculty which God has given -us for our direction and advancement in knowledge, be- cause, without this, the mind could never distinguish be- tween certainty, probability, or error: and rational know- ledge is what a man comes at by such procedure, not by chance or accident; he receives or believes nothing for truth, but as reason directs him, 1. e. he believes as a ra- tional creature; and all who judge and act upon such grounds, who believe or do nothing but what they are con- vinced by the use of their faculties, according to the best of their power, they ought to do, may be justly said to live according to reason, and do their duty as rational crea- tures. On the same account, reason can never be excluded from, 199 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM Rom. xii, but must go hand in hand with religion, which is Aoyixh i Aarpela, a reasonable service, such a worship as ara- tional man, on considering it, must conclude to be the most fitting for him to offer, and the Supreme Being to accept: for God never commands, but he convinces also; we cannot obey without believing, or believe we know not what, nor know but by discerning the nature and obligation of the duty; and obe- dience being the act of understanding and free-will, is what alone entitles it to reward. In this God deals with us as men; not to compel irresistibly, but to give sufficient evi- dence for the truth and necessity of whatever he requires, — i. e. all that the nature of the thing to be proved is capable of, and it cannot be reasonable for men to expect more; after which he leaves them to themselves, to their own free — determination ; that if they choose obedience, they may be entitled to reward: if disobedience, be subject to punish- ment. : If men, therefore, are not careless to neglect, or, blinded by prejudice, not to see the evidence which is offered, but will impartially use their faculties of examining, reasoning, — and judging, they cannot fail being persuaded by many — certain proofs of the truths in religion, and clearly perceive © that there is the highest reason in the world to believe and obey them. For if men will not be convinced by the evi- _ dence they have, which is the most credible and rational — that can be offered, neither would they by any other ; and their disbelief is apparently owing, not to want of proof, but to a careless inattention, or some wicked unruly pas- sions, which have a greater interest in their hearts than — reason has in their minds, and hurries them away to act so” directly contrary to all evidence and truth. The great difference between the objects of human — knowledge and divine, is, that in the former there is a spa- cious field for new acquisitions and improvements: expe- rience, observation, and industry, makes fresh discoveries — in the arts, sciences, and natural philosophy: penetration into one effect or cause helps to explain another: the pro- gress of one age in real learning is of great benefit to suc- | ceeding ages: and whilst the mind busies itself in inquiries after useful wisdom, it will, by reflection, demonstration, — experiments, and historical observations, add to its former store; and by having larger views, more objects and ideas, — ; ° REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 191 and consequently more truths to speculate and reason upon, _ greatly extends its comprehension and knowledge. But in divine invisible objects it is far otherwise; the boundary is fixed, our inquiries limited to what is revealed, and all further search vain and unlawful. These things are above the discovery of reason; it had no principles from which it could regularly deduce them, by any-natural use of its faculties; and, without supernatural instruction, could never have attained the least knowledge or proba- . bility concerning them. It was not possible for any idea, notion, or apprehension of them, to enter the mind, but by the mediation of some external agency: so that all we do, or can hope to know of them in this world, is from revela- tion. Reason, indeed, or the workings of an inquisitive, | Sagacious mind, may improve itself, but not the subject: _ it may discover variety of arguments to explain the beau- ties, and show the necessity of supernatural truths, but it cannot add one to the originul stock: nor speak a word of their essence or nature beyond what revelation teaches. So that revelation (in Mr. Locke’s words) is nothing but reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries, not laid within the reach of its natural faculties, but communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proof it gives, that they come from God. | __ And here we must observe, that as divine truths are such _ which mere reason could not discover, (for the natural man, _ or natural reason, perceives them not, but they are spirit- ually discerned by the same faculty indeed, but not till assisted and taught by God,) therefore God made such manifestations as were necessary to the end of our being, in a manner suitable to our capacities, and a degree fitting our condition. Whence it will follow, ‘first, that though a _ proposition revealed by God cannot be made out by natural _ principles, so as to frame any distinct or clear reasonings _ concerning it, it ought not, on that account, to be rejected: _ because, if our natural faculties, by their usual procedure, could have come at them, there had been no need of reve- lation: or how there can be a revelation (if there be any _ propriety in the term) to one, of what he certainly knows already, is very hard to be conceived, and at best is a very _unwarrantable explanation of a divine interposition ; and if 192°C. LHE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM revelation was necessary, then the degree of it must depend upon the divine will and pleasure; and we need not know | more than he thinks sufficient for us. Nor, secondly, on the other hand, because the necessity of a revealed truth may seem capable of being proved by reason, does it fol- — low, that therefore we should conclude it was originally a natural dictate of it; for all divine emanations are highly agreeable to the most perfect reason: but if the object had — not been manifested, the mind had never seen it, or looked out for proofs to establish the clearness and validity of it.@ And the only consequence of this is, that truths not dis- coverable by natural light, when made known by revela- tion, are apparently most agreeable to sound unprejudiced — reason: that in these cases, though reason be the eye, or faculty, that sees, yet in things pertaining to God, revela- tion only is the light whereby it is enabled to do it; for natural reason, if not taught by God, would have for ever — remained ignorant of them. Whenever supernatural objects are propounded to the mind for its contemplation, knowledge, or assent, it has no other office (yet this is a most important one) but to in- quire, whether they be of divine original or not: and it has two sure rules for its direction herein, first, the intrinsic — goodness and excellency of the revelation ; and, secondly, - all the external proofs, the nature of the subject will admit, - of its being immediately and directly from God. From whence the conclusion will naturally follow, that whatever has these testimonies ought to be received as a rule of faith and action: because there cannot be a plainer dictate of reason than this, that whatever is from God must be cer-_ tainly true, and whatever he commands ought to be ob- served and obeyed. And in this God deals with us as with rational creatures, requires nothing that does not carry such conviction with it, that we must acknowledge to be most reasonable, and therefore what by our own principles ought to determine our judgment, and regulate our practice. God himself ap- peals to this decision, and submits the equity of his com- Isa. v.3. mands and proceedings to this very rule: “Judge, I pray you, between me and my vineyard, what could have Ezek. been done more, that I have not done. Hear xviii 25. now,—is not my way equal? are not your ways REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 193 unequal?” The justice of his dealings is so evident, that he willingly refers the determination of it to our own _ reason. The only just light, then, that we can take a view of na- ture and antiquity in, is such an one as shows natural reason to be clear enough to perceive the truth and the necessity of its deductions, when proposed and shown; but not strong enough to discover it, or draw right deductions from it. The evidence of this appears from comparing the ages of philosophy and Christianity ; for why were divine truths so clearly known, so readily embraced, and so universally obeyed in one and not in the other; yet reason was as strong in the philosopher as the Christian ? the only answer it can receive is obvious, natural reason could not discern them, because it had not been instructed in them. But it was no sooner taught by revelation, but it saw and acknow- ledged the truth and beauty of them. And this view of antiquity (says a learned modern ) is true with regard to natural religion in general: where we find human reason could penetrate very far into the essen- tial difference of things; but wanting the true principles of religion, the ancients neither knew the true origin of obliga- _ tion nor the consequence of obedience. Revelation has dis- covered these principles, and we now wonder that such prodigies of parts and knowledge could commit the gross absurdities that are to be found in their best treatises of morality. Which yet does not hinder us from falling into greater and worse delusions. For, seeing of late several excellent systems of morals under the title of “the Princi- ples of Natural Religion,” that disclaim the aid of revela- tion; we are apt to think them indeed the discoveries of natural religion, and so regard their excellences as an ob- jection to the necessity of any farther light. The pretence is plausible; but surely there must be some mistake at the bottom; and the immense difference in point of perfection between these imaginary productions of reason, and those real ones of the most learned ancients, will increase our suspicion. The truth is, these modern system writers had an aid, which, as they do not acknowledge, so I persuade myself they did not perceive. This aid were the true prin- ciples of religion, delivered by revelation ; principles so clear K 194 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM aud evident, that they are now mistaken to be amongst the first and simplest ideas. But those who understand anti- quity, know the matter to be far otherwise. Mr. Locke was not prejudiced in this cause, yet says, Reasonab, ‘how short their several systems (viz. of the phi- of Christ. losophers) came of the perfection of a true and ~ p. 266 2 5 ne ° complete morality, is very visible. And if, since that the Christian philosophers have much outdone them, — yet we may observe, the first knowledge of the truths they have added, are owing to revelation; though, as soon as ® they are heard and considered, they are found to be agree- — able to reason, and such as can by no means be con- . tradicted. Every one may observe a great many truths, which he receives at first from others, and readily assents to as consonant to reason, which he would have found it hard, and perhaps beyond his strength, to have discovered — himself, Native and original truth is not so easily wrought — out of the mine, as we who have it delivered, ready dug — and fashioned, into our hands, are apt to imagine. What- Id. p. 267. ever was the cause, it is plain in fact, human rea- — son unassisted, failed men in its great and proper business a of morality: it never from unquestionable principles, by _ their deductions, made out an entire body of the law of — p.27s. nature.” And afterwards, “many are beholden to revelation, who do not acknowledge it.” _ This is the plain, undeniable fact, and cannot be ac- — counted for on any other principles; and therefore what in- fidelity advances, that reason is master of all the truths which revelation has discovered, is absolutely false, and a id contradiction to all that is known of antiquity; and they — who have unwarily made concessions of the like nature, have seen the atheist retort upon them, and show, from _ _ their own principles, that if reason can do every thing, — Christianity cannot be necessary. They who deny any use _ of reason, to satisfy the mind in matters of revealed truths, 2 destroy the means that God has afforded to convince us of the reasonableness and obligation of duty; and, by unjus- tifiable pretences to the Spirit, have advanced the most ex- travagant fancies, an over-heated brain could suggest; — and, instead of a rational worship, have fallen into all the delusions of madness and enthusiasm. The middle way, therefore, between the two extremes REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 195 admits of no objection; that there is a use of reason with- out prejudice to religion. God proposes something to the understanding, which by natural reason it could not have found out; the rational faculty perceives the truth and agreeableness thereof, with the certainty of its being from God, therefore yields up its assent, and believes upon good reasons ; for he cannot be said to believe who has no rea- son for so doing, because a rational mind cannot determine its assent but upon rational grounds and evidence. The understanding, however, cannot exercise its faculties about any of the truths of God, till it is instructed, and has the proper notices communicated to it; but these are not dis- coverable a priort, from any light of nature, but all taken from the divine act of revelation: yet in this, God no way ceases to deal with us as men; he only presents fresh ob- jects, and gives new notices of things ; thereby indeed ex- tending and enlarging our prospect, but does not alter the faculties we had before. Our reason has still the same use, only a wider compass to employ and exert itself in, with different lights and assistances to judge and determine by. This surely is not to degrade, but to exalt reason, and that to the noblest and ifiost excellent purposes. To adore the divine wisdom and goodness; to satisfy ourselves in the most important point, that the religion we profess is from God ; to distinguish truth from falsehood, and reject all im- postures or pretences to revelation, either from the impiety or contradiction of the doctrine, or from insufficiency of proof that it is from God. _ Hence we are sure, that whatever implies a contradiction, or is repugnant to any of the divine attributes, cannot be a revelation from God; and if an angel from heaven should teach such doctrines, we must reject them; because what is inconsistent with certain truth, must certainly be false: and if reason, where it is clearest, be false, we can have no assurance it is ever true, and consequently have no cer- tainty either in science or faith. Nor can two truths be contrary to each other, because nothing can be true and false at the same time. So impossibilities cannot be matter of faith, because they are no acts of power, no effects of omnipotence ; and what is not to be produced, is not to be believed. Nor can we believe incredibilities, for that would be to believe and disbelieve the same thing; or for reason 196 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM to assent to an unreasonable thing, which are contradic- tions. But I need not insist on this ; as infidelity has not been able to show that religion recommends any thing impious, absurd, impossible, or contradictory ; any thing that is not perfective of our beings, suitable to our inclinations, and tending to our final good ; all which are most consistent with truth, and reconcilable to reason, what it cannot but approve, so as to believe what is true, and embrace what will render it happy: on this account religion must be a ra- tional service, as proposing nothing to be done but what is most agreeable to the desires and expectations of nature : nothing to be believed, but what an honest informed mind, by the common ways of knowledge, may satisfy itself of its truth, and coming from God. Our intellectual faculty, therefore, is never so well employed, as in satisfying itself and others, that the truths of God are most exactly con- formable to its own principles, that the good of his crea- tures seems to be the rule and reason of all he enjoins; and therefore deserve from us the fullest credit, the strongest love, and the most prevailing influence. The greathinge on which all religion turns, is, that there is — a God, and that he will reward and punish. God, therefore, © manifested himself and his attributes, and added two espe- — cial proofs thereof for our conviction ; necessary existence, — and the works of creation: both which are so obvious when — proposed to our natural faculties, that the world has mis- taken them for self-evident innate principles; as also_ the necessary consequences from them : that necessary ex- istence is eternal; that omnipotence can do every thing which does not imply a contradiction; that infinite truth — can neither deceive uor be deceived ; that unerring right- eousness can will nothing but what is just and good ; that the Supreme must have absolute authority over all beings dependent upon it, &c. ; The second proposition is clearly deducible from the other, by the strictest principles of reason : that God is | just in all his dealings: that justice will punish guilt; that guilt is offending where there is a power of doing otherwise, that man might have done otherwise, because he is a free” agent; that he is a free agent, as having with him a power of self-determination. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 197 So that if we search this matter to the bottom, we shall find that the reason of faith is the foundation of all religion ; both the articles of this universal creed, that God is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him, being mani- fested from revelation only. For man, as rational, must propose and desire some end: the end of all beings is the perfection of their nature; the perfection of any nature is enjoying all the happiness it is capable of. So, again, to desire the end, is to desire the means also: the means to attain happiness, is to procure his favour on whom the be- stowing of itsolely depends. To procure his favour, is the doing what he commands. His commands are his will ; and his will he has revealed to usin the Scriptures. So that the revealed will of God is the only rule and law of action. Because he enjoins it, the obligation is perpetual ; and obe- dience being the only means of happiness, the reasons for it are immutable: therefore absolute compliance with the divine revealed will, is the whole of religion, or the end of man; and on that account most fit and reasonable for him to be faithful and diligent in the practice of it. To which may be added, that as God has several ways revealed him- self, yet the excellences of the gospel-revelation are appa- rently above all others. But further, if we would consider the agreement of reason, with faith, in the strictest acceptation of the word ; as whatever we come at the knowledge of by the use of our faculties is properly matter of reason ; so what is above their discovery is above reason; and, consequently, when revealed to us, are matters of faith. Certainly there can be nothing unreasonable in this procedure; because, though God has given us reason, he has neither debarred himself of, nor is it contrary to any known attributes, to afford us the light of revelation; for there is always room for infinite wisdom to make fresh discoveries to his crea- tures, as infinite power can always give sufficient testimony of their being from God. To deprive him of these, is to deny his very being; and to find fault with what tends to our perfection, must be very ungrateful and unreasonable. Again, whatever God reveals is certainly true, therefore no doubt can be made of it; it must overrule all opinions, prejudices, and interests: it has a just right to be received with a full assent, 7. ¢. faith. And such a submission as 198 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM Human this of reason to faith (even in Mr. Locke's opi- aie nion ) takes not away the land-marks of knowledge, par.1o. Shakes not the foundations of reason, but leaves p- 931. us that use of our faculties for which they were given us; and, consequently, nothing in faith can be con- trary to reason. The same learned writer thus sums it up: Reasonab. “there is nothing more required of a Christian, e ae but that he receive all the parts of divine revela- tion with a docility and disposition prepared to embrace and assent to all truths coming from God; and submit his mind to whatsoever shall appear to him to bear that cha- racter.” The things supposed to be the objects of this knowledge, or above reason, in the opinion of the ancients, were in- cluded under that part of theology termed metaphysical, above or beyond nature. In this class, Plato ranges the - contemplation of all divine things; such as, the first being or cause, the origin of things, the wonders of providence, the worship of God, the mysteries of religion, the immor- tality of the soul, and a future state. He never pretended one of these to be discoverable by reason, but always in- genuously confesses them to be learned by traditions brought from the barbarians, viz. the Jews, &c. They were frequently termed 72 Gavuaord, wonderful things; as being neither discoverable nor demonstrable by reason. On which very account Aristotle esteemed them éxpyora, useless things, because beyond the sphere of his, and all natural reason and understanding ; and styled those philo- sophers, who dwelt much in the contemplation of such sub- jects, @Acutéous, lovers of fable or tradition. 4 Now faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind (which is an act of reason) to some proposition or truth, upon the — credit and infallible testimony of the proposer, which is God. To believe on the testimony of God, is faith: to know it is divine testimony, is a matter of reason, in per- ceiving it has all the clear evidences the nature of the thing will admit of to conclude its assent. For as, on the one ~ hand, reason cannot assent to what it does not know or believe; so, on the other, it is highly unreasonable not to believe a thing that has all the marks of certainty it pos- Ethic.1, Sibly can have, for its credibility. This is Aris- — }.¢ 7 totle’s own rule, ‘not to expect in all things the REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 199 same exactness, but in every thing to content ourselves with such a method as the subject-matter will bear.” Ma- thematics require a different demonstration from morals, and morals from physics; yet each of these kinds of evi- dence satisfies the mind, so as to leave no room to doubt of their unquestionable truth: for we can know things only as they are to be known, which must be according to the nature of things; and to expect a proof which nature is incapable of, can neither be reasonable nor just. But the question in matters purely of faith, is not, whe- ther what God says be true, (for that is already supposed ) but whether he hath spoken it or not? To satisfy us in this, we can only inquire of unprejudiced reason, what are the utmost proofs the subject will bear, which must be as ‘convincing as any other kind of demonstration; because where reason has all it can require, it will and must be satisfied. Now some things are capable of direct argu- ments, others only of indirect ones; in either case, if we have the proper and natural proofs, it is sufficient; we fol- low our reason, it being reasonable to believe any thing which is as true as in the nature of things it possibly can be. As to matters of revelation, therefore, we can- __ not require more than the testimony of competent Afr sa and undoubied witnesses, prophecy, miracles, his- Past. Lett. tory, universal tradition, the acknowledgment of rat all ages, the nature of things delivered, and unprejudiced reason assisting the mind in these disquisitions ; because these are the highest attestations that can be brought for the support of such truths. Where, then, these testimonies concur, and are unexceptionable, to deny assent would be unreasonable ; because it is all the nature of the thing will admit, and, on that account, a proper object for the under- standing. Todemand more is contrary to nature, therefore contrary to reason, because what it knows to be false it cannot believe. Andas God never requires faith as a duty, but he gives sufficient arguments to induce it, infidelity must be in- excusable. He that will not inquire into these motives, takes his belief upon trust, and has no reason for what he does: he that, upon inquiry, finds them as competent as the nature of © things will admit, yet believes not, is irrational as the other, having no reason for refusing so to do. And they who are resolved not to believe a sufficient evidence, neither “would 200 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.” Thus reason has its proper and due authority, though, in subjects of pure divine revelation, the authority of God will always be found the highest reason, therefore have they the strongest demand to our belief. And he who denies these to be proper evidences of a revelation, must at the same time deny, that it is possible for God to make any revela- tion that can be rationally believed. Nor is all this saying any more, than that God made us rational creatures, and deals with us as such, ¢. e. what we are; and to do otherwise would cast an imputation on his Justice or wisdom. Nor can faith and reason be opposite, though several things; but only different notices and me- thods of coming at knowledge, and proving truths by such principles as they are capable of, and is most reasonable to do. So that faith is no more than the highest instructed reason, no principle in one contradicts the other. Revela- tion discovers some glorious truths, and reason bears wit- ness that they are credible, from God, and ought to be believed and obeyed; and, therefore, the most exalted doc- trines of revelation offer no injury or violence to reason, but are aids and enlargements to it in this dark imperfect state ; and therefore may demand the most serious atten- tion of every rational creature. It is therefore a vain and false insinuation of infidelity, that we must give up our reason, if we would embrace re- velation: for we only believe, because it is most reasonable so to do. When, upon an impartial examination, reason finds the evidences to be full and sufficient, it pronounces that the revelation ought to be received, and, as a neces- sary consequence thereof, directs us to give up ourselves to the guidance of it. But here reason stops; not as set aside by revelation, but as taking revelation for its guide, 2 ,, and not thinking itself at liberty to call in ques- p. Lond. , 3 4 2d. Past. tion the wisdom and experience of any part, after het. P- 4 it is satisfied that the whole comes from God. Neither is it any objection to the reasonableness of reve- lation, that we are not able to comprehend the whole of those subjects it exhibits to us. To manifest them in any degree is matter of divine pleasure, and God cannot be under the least necessity to unfold all the reasons that be- long to them. There are “secret things which be- REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 2061 long unto the Lord our God, and things that are peut. revealed.” To attempt knowing what is secret *** 79: and withheld from us, is arrogance: our knowledge is con- fined to revealed things, and only so far as they are re- vealed. That is the prescribed bounds, beyond which no created understanding can pass. For where God is silent, neither heaven nor earth can give us further light. When, therefore, revelation affirms a thing vastly beyond our comprehension, but no way contrary to our reason, we have nothing to do but submit to believe, though our rea- son cannot tell us why or how such things are; because we cannot measure the wisdom or the works of God, it there- fore may be true, though we are ignorant of it; nay, it in- fallibly must be so, because God has said it, and no reason ean make us doubt of his veracity: and there is an evi- dence of eternal truth, which the mind of man, with its most refined speculations, could neither discover nor com- prehend, and therefore must have some other foundation, which can be none else, but those discoveries which infinite wisdom makes of itself; and, consequently, the noblest mark of true and solid reason is, to be determined by that autho- rity which is unerring, and has a right to demand an impli- cit subjection: “ for the Holy Scripture (says Mr. ,, _ Locke, in the last year of his life) has God for its Works, © author, salvation for its end, and truth, without any ? *4* mixture of error, for its matter.” «Therefore (says the same author) I gratefully receive, and rejoice in the light of revelation, which sets me at rest in many things, the manner whereof my poor reason can by no means make out to me.” But to reject or disbelieve things, because we understand not the whole of their nature, modes of existence, or fitness, is not reason, but stupidity. It is either to make our minds the rule of truth, or to affirm, that because God has not given us all the reasons of things, it is not possible there should be any; both which are equally irrational: for it is of the nature of these things to be above reason, i. e. what of itself it could not have discovered: but it is not above reason, when instructed, to discern the truth and certainty of them, so far as is revealed. To do this, is sufficient ; to do more is impossible; this is the only measure and rule of faith. : K 2 202 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM “To reject a revelation (says an excellent prelate) because we cannot clearly see the fitness and expedience of every part, is to make ourselves as knowing as God; whose wis- dom is infinite, and the depth of whose dispensations, with the reasons and ends of them, are not to be fathomed by our short and narrow comprehensions: it is the greatest folly, as well as presumption, to conclude that this or that revelation cannot come from God, because we cannot see in every respect the fitness and reasonableness of it. The true inference is, that the revelation is therefore wise, good, | and just, and fit to be received, and submitted to by us, be- cause we have sufficient reason to believe that it came from God. For so far he has made us competent judges, in as much as natural reason informs us what are the proper evidences of a divine revelation. But for us to attempt to make a judgment of the fitness of the means to attain the end, is to put’ ourselves in the place of God, and to forget that we are frail men; that is, short-sighted and ignorant Bp. Lona. Creatures, who know very little of divine matters, aes farther than it has pleased God to reveal them Ricks wetO Als. The resurrection of the body is what no force of human wisdom could have discovered: yet reason tells us it is pos- sible, and within the power of God to effect it; therefore the understanding may fully assent to it, without knowing © the bounds of omnipotence, or in what manner he will ac- _ complish and bring it to pass. The doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity surpasses the comprehension of men and angels, yet is no way contrary to reason, nor ever the less true, because we are short-sighted, ignorant creatures: for — God is infinite, but we are finite, and therefore cannot ap- prehend or contain the vast immensity of his counsels or nature. And this conclusion we may safely draw; that since all we see or know appears so wonderful and true, it is reasonable to believe, what yet lies under the veil, is either unfit for us to know, or too big for our understand- ing, and reserved for our adorations in a state of glory. | We should therefore regulate our thirst of knowledge here, Kecles.ii, Dy the advice of the wise Hebrew, “ search not rin the things that are above thy strength; but what is commanded thee, think thereon with reverence.” The sum is: God created man rational, with faculties to REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 203 receive and apprehend truth, which way soever communi- cated: matters of pure revelation are immediately from the instruction of God, therefore most reasonable to be believ- ed, because most certainly true; but cannot be believed otherwise than he has proposed them, either in manner or degree. From the insufficiency of reason to guide us in all matters relating to our final good, appears the necessity of revelation, against the cavils of those who would so exalt nature as to render it altogether needless. And the evi- dence of its coming from God, manifests the obligation we are under to receive and obey it, against the atheistical ob- jections of those who would represent it as a superstitious contrivance or invention of men. When, therefore, reason refuses to submit to this guidance, or assent to what has all the inward and external marks of truth and infallible testimony ; when it will deny, only be- cause it cannot comprehend and fathom the depths of God with its own short line; or attempts to give reasons, and account for things which God has not thought fitting to explain ; then it transgresses the bound of duty, and, instead of a guide, becomes a deceiver and destroyer of those who follow its directions. Confidence is always dangerous; it has been ever found, that the best natural sense is not suf- ficient in human affairs without experience; nor in divine ones, without revelation. It is this arrogance, self-sufficiency, and exalting rea- son to an independency upon God, that has been the source of all fatal error and impiety, and tempted men to revolt from religion and from God. Such oracles of vain reason have all the doubters and disputers against religion been since the world began. The more men have depended upon reason for the measure of divine things, the further always have they erred from the truth. And what this is owing to, we may learn from the confession of a noble au- thor, in the first class among the despisers of revelation. “ There is (says he) a certain perverse humanity characte- in us, which inwardly resists the divine commission, ™S*- vol. 1. though ever so plainly revealed.” The words are spoke on a particular instance, but hold true in him with regard to the whole revelation: there is no want of evidence in di- vine philosophy : but there is in man a pride and over-con- ceited opinion of reason, an affectation of superiority in judgment, a love of novelty and singularity, a pleasure in 204 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM opposing generally received and established truths, toge- ther with a petulant inflated libertine spirit of unbelief in man, which, though it discerns the light, will not acknow- ledge or admit it. I shall add only one caution more, viz. that however perfect reason may be; the use of it, the ratiocinations of men, are vastly imperfect. Do we not every day see wise men falling into dangerous errors and mistakes? and when their arguments come to be examined, are found to proceed on loose uncertain principles, to use fallacious incoherent ideas, or draw weak or false conclusions? If this be not so, whence comes so much controversy, opposition, and li- — tigation, in all parts of knowledge, among the learned of — the world? Sothat care must be taken not to admit every thing for strict reasoning that pretends to be so; but rather to suspect what is subject to so much abuse, especially when we find it striving against God. For such are the prejudices of some minds through the workings of Satan, the strong power of delusion, or the deceit of unrighteous- ness, that they will not believe the truth, but instead thereof a lie, and have pleasure in unrighteousness, because sas! received not the love of the truth. . But I willingly omit many topics on this subject, chera - being such variety of excellent treatises in the world, that firmly demonstrate the exact agreement of Christianity with all the principles of reason ; its evidences to be so plain and direct to the common apprehensions of men, that the more an impartial mind inquires into its grounds and doctrines, — the clearer and fuller satisfaction will he receive: the cer- — tainty of its revelations, and how fitly we may believe and adore those incomprehensible mysteries which we cannot — fully understand, and reverence the exhibition of those — glorious truths which the blessed angels “desire to look into.” a I pass on, to consider the arguments which are offered in support of natural religion ; or that man, by a due sense of his faculties, without the aid of revelation, may attain a sufficient knowledge of whatever is necessary to direct him to the final end of his being. The principal of which I think are these following, First, the testimony of Scripture. Secondly, the contemplation of the works of God. Thirdly, the eternal reason and fitness of things. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 205 CHAPTER V. Creation. The Knowledge of G'od not to be had from the Contemplation of our own Frame. The Deity not discoverable from the Fitness of Things. i } i | i | | Tue first argument, and of the greatest weight to prove di- vine things (those to which this inquiry is limited) may be discovered by the light of nature, is founded on some texts of Scripture ; from which it is said we may fairly and with pressions of a Deity stamped upon his mind, yet he is en- dowed with such faculties as, by a natural use of them, he cannot fail to discern and know him: for God has not left himself without a witness, but provided such abundant means for this purpose, that no one can remain ignorant of him, who carefully attends to them, and especially the works of creation. The magnificence, order, and variety of which, the progression of causes, the necessary series, connection, and dependence of natural things, must raise the mind to the contemplation and acknowledgment of some first self-originated cause, the Fountain and Author of every other being: and from this principle once established, such conclusions may be regularly drawn, as will demonstrate the necessity of those essential properties and attributes which are inseparable from his nature: and that by consi- dering the several relations we stand in to him of creation, preservation, &c., we may irrefragably infer the various duties of worship and adoration we owe to him, and the sundry obligations we are under to ourselves, and one ano- ther, which make up the substance of the moral law, or re- ligion of nature. Were this supposition true, the law of nature would stand in need of no other testimonies, and I must here stop the inquiry. For what the Spirit of God declares, must be al- lowed as full evidence; there is no room for doubt, it ean Texts of Scripture relating to the Natural Law. Of Natural Religion being learned from the Works of certainty conclude, that though man has no original im- SS eae 206 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM receive no higher demonstration. But I maintain the pre- sent hypothesis from a full conviction, that it is best, con- sistent with the. attributes of God, the passages of provi- — dence, and the faculties of the mind; to be fully sup- ported from the authority of Scripture, and most agreeable to the phenomena of nature, to reason, and experience. _ The first text I shall mention, because constantly appeal- ed to on this occasion, is that of St. Paul to the Romans, 1. 20. But the apostle is here so far from asserting the suf- _ ficiency of nature to discover the existence of a Deity, that _ his very argument is founded on the heathens being already convinced of this truth: and from thence shows the unrea- — sonableness and impiety of their idolatry: which was the — first point necessary to convince the heathens of, in order to bring them to a knowledge of the true God, and justify the - Almighty’s proceedings, “in giving them up to a reprobate — mind, receiving in themselves the recompence of their er-— Leek, oor whieh js meet,” ver. 27. “ For the first step 1.1.p. 109. in wisdom is to see what is false; and the second to know the truth; since whoever discerns the one, will be disposed to receive the other.” q Now, it is never denied, that the world once knew the true God, and no other; him the righteous Noah preached to his sons, and they to their posterity; but these great truths were, after the dispersion, soon defaced and oblite- rated. The nations, as David says, Psal. ix. 17, “ forgat God;” forgat him whom they had once known, and his” true nature and essence, as if they had never been declared to them. So that there remained only eSnots ris éuavpd rod Cl. Alex, ©n00, a certain dusky, obscure knowledge of God, Strom. the name of such a being, and a faint application — p. 646. oof some attributes, which they also transferred to creatures in a manner absolutely inconsistent with the di- vine nature, which was utterly forgot, and became little more than a name or empty sound in the world, being — mixed up with so many falsehoods, and applied to such sa- crilegious purposes. Gods they had innumerable ; and therefore the existence of a deity is here taken for granted, being a truth con- | fessed by both parties. Had it been otherwise, he would - have charged them with atheism, or denying such existence, - not with superstition or the worship of many gods: for REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 267 the question which divided the world, was not, whether _ there were gods, but what they were, and how to be wor- shipped ? and this was their folly, that professing themselves wise, admitting the existence of the gods, and some kind of worship to be due to them, they should nevertheless entertain such false conceptions of both these important points. And the apostle might here allude to the many excellent things Socrates and others had spoken of the divine nature, of the ineffable first good, wndauas eivar pyrov 1d Vid. Orig. mparov &yaddy. Yet notwithstanding this, they erred cont, Cele ont. Cels. so greatly in the worship due to the being they },,° P- _ described, and continued in the belief and adora- 276. tion of their country-gods, and so became fools: for the wisest of this world, inflated with the notions of a deity, taken from their poets and philosophers, hastened with the ignorant, and hurried away others to temples, and idols, and the celebration of execrable mysteries. Had they known the true God, they would have perceived the ab- ‘surdity of such practice; as they did not, they were fools in his sight: and what man in his senses would not deride him who discourses of the gods in a philosophical exalted manner, yet immediately betakes himself’ to dumb statues, converses with, reverences, and prays to them as gods, or representations of them, ws decors, # Oeav eixdor3 OF by Oli. TD beholding them as a symbol, pretends to raise his 1.7. p. mind to a conception of an intellectual deity: all °° these things are falsehoods, and herein “ they changed the truth of God into a lie.” _ For, to acknowledge an infinitely Supreme Being, and yet admit more infinities, or a crowd of little inferior gods, te. no gods at all, into partnership with supremacy, is to common sense the greatest absurdity : or to believe a most perfect being, governing all things with justice and wisdom, and on that account the proper object of adoration ; yet | | j | pay divine worship to an army of demons and idols, is such a contradiction, that the natural use of their reason should have made them detest it as irrational. But the fact was quite otherwise ; the harvest of deities which sprang up in Egypt was cultivated in Greece, and thence borrowed by the Romans, was so far from being thought unreasonable by the latter, that, as Cotta says, instead of confuting, they 908 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM confirmed all the fables, by endeavouring to give a proper _ meaning and explanation to them. Vestri autem Dd. 1.3. non modo hec non refellunt, verum etiam confir- mant, interpretando quorsum quidque pertineat. And had they retained, besides the name, some just appre- hensions of a deity, and his incommunicable attributes, it had been impossible they should have thus denied them, and change his glory, the invisible divine perfections, into an image made like to corruptible man, or beast. That the whole should be sunk into such madness and departure from all understanding, as to prostaate themselves before a des- picable, senseless piece of matter, to believe that a god which they themselves had formed: to tremble and fear, and implore blessings from a bit of wood, or stone, or ivory; rete and fall down before idols, made (as the ancient i.6.p Christians ridiculed them) out of unclean vessels, Usa pots, candlesticks, or close-stools; and imagine such base things, by passing into another shape, should have life, and majesty, and divinity conferred on them. ‘This was a reproach to reason, and the most besotted darkness we can conceive the minds of men to be involved in. “‘ Nevertheless, the times of this darkness God winked at,” | Acts xvii. 30, which he would not have done, if every man _ by nature could have attained this wisdom, the knowledge of God, and his duty to him. But now, that a clear mani- festation of these things is made by the gospel, “he com- mandeth all men every where to repent, to turn from their idols, and to serve the living God:” for in the day of knowledge there will be no allowance made for impenitence _ or idolatry. ‘| Ver. 18. “For the wrath of God,” against these sins is now fully declared, not by nature or reason, but “is re- | vealed from Heaven against all ungodliness,” especially the violations of the first table, giving divine honour to what by _ nature is not God, “and unrighteousness of men,” their | impious and immoral practices, “who hold the truth in un- | righteousness,” by acting maliciously against those common 4 notions they had of it. It is also righteousness and justice to give every one their due, but they gave to the creature what belonged to the Creator only; and so committed a double sin; not only robbed him of his honour, but, as it were in reproach to him, transferred it to another. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 209 Ver. 19. “ Because that which may be known of God,” as much as was necessary and sufficient for their present _ circumstances, concerning his essence, attributes, or will, is manifest in them, or (as the margin and others read it) to them, or among them, not indeed from nature and reason, for God hath showed it unto them, égavépwoe: the vid.orig. _word expressly denotes a positive act of God, who Hite brought to light, made manifest and evident that 140.” which was dark, obscure, and unknown before, by the sun- dry ways he thought proper to reveal and make himself known to us. Ver. 20. For (yep, nam, siguidem, forasmuch as) the invisible things of him, his eternal power and Godhead, as afterwards explained, from not é, but amd, ever since, the | creation of the world, when they were fully communicated, are clearly seen, because after a declaration of his nature and existence, the divine attributes are plainly evinced, be- Ing understood, voodueva, explained to the understanding, by the things that are made, moinuact, the works of God, or things which he had done; not only of creation but of providence, in the deluge, in the wonderful preservation of his church, and destruction of his enemies, in his many _ appearances, miracles, and interpositions with mankind, which through all ages had been related to them, and were a sensible demonstration of omniscience, omnipotence, in- visibility, and immateriality : even his eternal power and Godhead, which alone could effect such wonderful things. So that they, who had such aids and notices, might, through _ those mediums, have made that discernible to the mind, which was not visible to the eye, and known they were the works, not of visible causes, but an invisible agent; which they did not, and therefore are without excuse: and the more so, because those very works, which, from their stu- _ pendousness, should have taught them the greatness of the former, were the occasion of their paying that homage to the thing made, which could be due to the worker only. They stopped here, adored the universe as the one great God, and the sun and moon, as its principal parts, and the authors of life: but never considered nor thought of that invisible power and Godhead, which was necessary to pro- duce such astonishing beings; therefore they did not ad- mire or adore the Creator, nor ever lifted their minds beyond 210 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM what was material and visible. This is so true, that even musep. Porphyry owned, the heathens never once dreamed eo of any incorporeal nature, or invisible power, to be “& “the former of the world; and that the early v. Theo- Egyptians, Phoenicians, and Greeks had no other sana gods but heaven, and the heavenly bodies, Plato, Yid. c... In this consisted the great original difference be- Admonit. tween the true and false religion, that though the ~ heathens owned man to be formed for the contem- — p. 42. plation of heaven, yet they adored only what was visible in heaven, worshipped the universe without inquiring for its Creator, and held the sun as God, without considering or | knowing the framer of it. Ver. 21. “ Because that when they knew God,” who had | sufficiently manifested himself, “they glorified him not as | God,” either in the suitableness of their notions or purity of | their worship. Neither were they thankful for the many blessings received, especially their attainments in knowledge, | which they attributed to their own sagacity and wisdom, | and by not attending to what had been revealed, “‘ became | vain in their imaginations,” diaroyicpots philosophical dis- | courses and reasonings, which constantly led them into error, } and could never find out or explain one truth; but in trust-_ ing to their reason, they disputed themselves out of the knowledge of divine things, and their foolish heart was darkened, had so far extinguished the light which God had given them, as not to be able to comprehend those dis- tinguishing perfections by which he had revealed himself; _ but placed nature, or a monstrous plurality, in his stead; that, like the eyes of the blind, they could not see the sun shining in its full strength, but the very light which enables us to discern objects, dazzled them the more. ¢i Ver. 22. “ Thus professing themselves to be wise,” in un- derstanding the abstrusest mysteries, whether of the nature of God, or the causes of things, ‘they became fools,” by giving so absurd and false an explication of them. For the pro- ficiency they had made in human sciences, made them daring to explain divine ones; and by depending on reason for their guide, fell into horrid corruptions of truth, and the most detestable idolatries. The wisdom of the world was_ entirely confined to sensible things, attributed all excellen-— Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, abundantly testify. _ REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 21] ces to body or matter, and affirmed, that besides anise that there was nothing, whether it be called in- Neer eo visible or incorporeal. All their fictitious deities 1: 3. p. were parts of the creation; and there cannot be greater ignorance or madness, than to adore such Id. 1. 6. instead of God, the creator and cause of all things * ap _ visible and invisible. This is the charge the apostle has been drawing up against them, that notwithstanding the means of knowledge God had afforded, they were 1a.1.5. conversant only wep: 7a GydAuara, Kal Td {Spbuara, xa) P- 225. Tept Td Snusoupyhuara Tod Ocod, about images and statues, and the works of God, but did not lift up their mind to God. Ver. 23. “ For they changed the glory of the incorrupti- ble God into an.image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.” Now to change is to put one thing for another, and so they did with God; they excluded him from his place, and attributed his glory, his supereminence and power, to material beings, the universe as the first god, and to all its parts, even the vilest reptiles, as portions of that god. This was their guilt; and thus to err from the truth was the highest unreason- ableness and folly; not only in supposing such despicable things to be proper representatives of the unsullied splendours of the Deity ; but also in blaspheming 7hect- that holy name, which they still retained, and had ap a once been taught to reverence; by applying it to, contra’ and calling stupid idols of their own making, their Si gods and saviours. Todrwy ras eixdvas Gcods Xai owr7. saat pas wyduacay, __ Ver. 25. “Who changed the truth of God into a lie:” in the stead of his eternal, unchangeable nature, they _ placed an idol, a falsehood, avanity,a nothing. It is true, there is a God ; it is a lie, that nature which they worship- ped is God. It is true that God is to be worshipped; it is a lie to give this divine honour to a creature. It was im- en that a creature should be God; but this truth they - converted into a lie, by giving adoration to it, and making that God which was not so: for they worshipped and | Served the creature, 74 «rive, which may be also rendered the creation or universe, to which, in the earliest ages, di- vine adorations were paid, more than the Creator, who is _ blessed for ever: and every creature is temporary, and has a 212 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM no blessings but from him. Hereby they changed the truth of the divine nature into a falsehood, by invoking Orig. con, Statues and creatures as gods, « rois dapixos ds Cels.1. 3. @e@ mpocAadovyTes ;—kal ws Beis Tos ayadpaow h Tos ei, (dois mpooxuvooyres, and thereby violated and altered all the peculiarities of the Godhead. Ver. 28. The apostle then shows them. the moral guilt of their apostacy, ver. 28. ‘That they did not like to re- tain God in their knowledge.’ ‘They had known him, and . might have retained him, but they liked it not, nor would — attend to what was revealed: but they chose rather to de- pend on their own corrupted reason and imaginations, to guide them in and to these supernatural truths; and by that means quickly lost sight, and all right understanding of the divine perfections, and that practical obedience which was congruous to them. This was an act of their judg- ment and will, they rejected God in their minds; and for this cause he judicially rejected them, left them to them- selves, gave them over to a reprobate mind, and the guid- ance of their own vain wisdom, which they had placed in the throne of God. But it was add«uoy, perverse, and con- trary to right reason, and soon hurried them into idolatry and brutality, to do those things which are not convenient ; and, notwithstanding all their boasted morality, to commit and approve the most prodigious immoralities, and filthy impurities, many of which the apostle enumerates, espe- cially those of uncleanness, vile affections, and dishonour- ing their own bodies between themselves, to which the phi- Orig. cont, losophers were incredibly addicted. Quit se sapt-_ Cels. 1.7. entes nominant, volutando se cum pueris in modum — ein nefarium, mascult in masculos patrantes turpitu- — dinem: which Chrysostome on this place observes, was — not only permitted by the wisest nation in the world, the — Athenians, but by Solon, the greatest among them ; nor | practised by the vulgar only, but by the most divine So- — erates, Plato, Xenophon, Cebes, and others, as shall be showed in its proper place. “| From the whole, it is observable that the apostle charges ~ them with ingratitude, or not making a suitable return for — aids received, in not glorifying God according to the know- — ledge they had of him, and which might have carried them — to juster apprehensions. That they did not so was no fault — | REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE 213 in God, who had revealed his existence, and manifested his perfections to them; nor of nature, which exhibited so _ many wonders, in power, wisdom, beauty, and order, which vastly transcend the mind of man, the highest work of God in this world, and should therefore have directed them to its most omnipotent architect the Creator of man, and ruler of the universe; yet they either wilfully shut their eyes, and stopped their ears, against these loud and clear decla- rations, or, if they did attend to them, it was only to debase and disguise the truth, by mixing so many falsehoods and wicked delusions with it; that they were carried about with their own superstition, as with the raging waves of the sea, perpetually fluctuating in doubt, ignorance, and error, giv- ing the divine worship of the only God to dead men, or the several parts of nature ; which stubbornness and ingrati- _ tude rendered them totally inexcusable, in being thus igno- ta tee rant of God, whom they had sufficient means of knowing, and prostituting his honour to the vilest and most senseless idolatries. And then the apostle justifies the dealings of God with men: they rejected the knowledge of God, his manifesta- tions, and all the means he offered; and therefore, as pu- nishment ought to bear proportion with guilt, he, in judg- ment, relinquished them; after which judicial dereliction they became slaves to their own lusts and vile affections ; all their reason, their wisdom and philosophy, when desti- tute of divine aid, proved blind, reprobate, and cursed. Nor was there a single heathen, who confessed a deity, exempt from this crimination of holding the truth in un- righteousness. Sins against knowledge are of the deepest dye: and if Socrates or Plato knew (as some conceit) the true God, it was an aggravation of their crime; they were the guiltiest of men, to join in the superstition of the age, hold communion with demons and devils, or extend the same honours, equally to them and the Supreme Being. Surely they were ignorant of the first thing which ought to be known, that piety, worship, and sacrifice, are due to him only; that no blessed or immortal being besides him is ca- pable of adoration; yet no man adores what he does not esteem as God, and to adore a false god, is blasphemously to violate the nature of the true one. Had they known God, they would have glorified him as such, and not joined 214 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM in a communion so irrational, its mysteries so abominable, its rites and ceremonies so unbecoming and impious, that they could only proceed from the suggestions of the devil: the whole of their religion was from him: none but so bad a master being capable of teaching, or being pleased with it: had they known God, they would not have been the authors of sin to others, by their instruction, or example to the multitude, nor basely out of fear connived at established impieties ; but have boldly confessed, that the blessed im- mortals above, and we wretched mortals upon earth, ‘are bound to the adoration of one only, the God of gods. The same method of argumentation appears in all St. Paul’s discourses with the Gentiles. He does not go about to prove the existence of a Deity, because that was a point confessed; and consequently does not tell them, they might come to the knowledge of it, by considering the greatness of God’s works, or by any other method; but he constantly infers, that by these means, they who acknowledged his existence, might have learned to worship him as God, and be thankful: that the heavens and the earth, the variety of . seasons, and the numberless blessings we enjoy, are clear testimonies of his majesty, wisdom, power, and goodness: that no other can be the object of religious adoration, and that to place it elsewhere is ingratitude and idolatry. This was the end of his reasoning with the people of Lystra, who were so far from atheism, that they believed the apostles to be gods come down to them in the likeness of men, and would have sacrificed to them as such; and consequently wanted no information to believe their exist- ence, or that worship was due to them: but of the true God, and that service which would be acceptable to him, they were totally ignorant. The substance, therefore, of his preaching was, that they should turn from these vanities, the giving divine honours to mere creatures, unto the living God; not to dumb idols, or to dead men, whom they had consecrated, and imagined to be of the same corporeal shape with themselves; but to — that eternal first cause, which made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are therein, the wonderful glories of which declare the wisdom and omnipotence of him that formed them: and though his nature be invisible, “ never- theless he left not himself without witness, in that he did REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 215 good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness :’” which instances of his bounty should dispose us to give thanks to him alone, who is the author and giver of every blessing. So that, in St. Paul’s sense, the book of nature did not reveal God; but was a noble testimony to the revelation when made ; and proved the necessity of those divine per- fections mankind had been instructed in, though they re- mained invisible. But as rain falling on the desert does not render it fruitful, no more did the means of knowledge, reached out to the world, serve to improve them in that true wisdom for which they were intended. They knew there was a Deity, and the beholding the power, wisdom, and goodness of an infinite invisible being, shining from the whole universe, should have dispelled the darkness of their minds, and led them to a confession and knowledge of him: but, instead of raising their conceptions from the visible wonders of nature, to an acknowledgment of the invisible glory and perfection of the great Author of them, they stopped short, and could not distinguish be- tween the power and virtue which was from God, and that which is in God: but, from observing the order and har- mony of nature, they concluded that nature was God, and thence began to pay divine worship to its several parts, though insensible, as gods. This was the error he would turn them from: “and though in times past God suffered all nations to walk in their own ways,” ver. 16, yet if, for the future, they did not serve the living God, and him only, they would be without excuse. There is another famous passage of St. Paul, so con- stantly appealed to, in the question before us, that it must be particularly examined, I mean his sermon at Athens, in Acts xvii. And the better to know the force of the -apostle’s arguments, we must observe against whom he particularly opposes them, viz. the epicureans and stoics, two of the most prevailing sects of philosophers in the world, and their’ doctrines most opposite to truth, the nature of God, and the intent of the gospel. Antipater, in Plutarch, gives a summary, but just cha- racter of them, 6 pty yap 7d evmommrixdy, 6 5E Td dpOaprov Stoic. Re- apaipetror tov Océv, “the one took away the good- PNg P. ness, the other the eternity of the gods :” the first 2 » 216 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM denied a providence, that the world was made by God, or that there was any government of it, but by chance, and fortune, and taught that the gods were of human shape: the other held all things subject to fate, that the world was a god, that matter was eternal, and the gods corporeal and Vid. Orig, COrruptible, géaprol; that their bodies were a sub- cone Cols, stance mutable, alterable, and changeable into Pe’ every thing: and that these bodies were in the likeness of men, was the constant opinion of Egypt and — Greece, through all the ages of idolatry: and Cicero, in- Nat. D.], Quiring into the form of the gods, makes Velleius oe assign this as a reason for it, because they never appeared otherwise. Nature, says he, teaches us, that they are of human shape, seeing all nations represent them in that form, nor do they occur to any man sleeping or waking in any other shape: and therefore the apostle enforces this truth, ver. 29. That we ought not to think that the God- head “is like to gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man’s device.” But another great and fundamental error of paganism, which the apostle here opposes, and what had proved the strongest foundation to idolatry, was, that God neither did nor could create the world; which at once stripped the Deity of his most glorious perfections, and at the same time shows the vanity of that argument, that reason can disco- — ver God in and by his works: whereas not a person in the world ever so much as dreamed of a Creator, and therefore Vid. creation could never lead us to him. Diodorus Pred: ;, Siculus, when he sums up the opinions concerning c. 8. the origin of the world, never gives a hint of such an artificer, neither mentions, nor thought of the name of id.1.3. God. Porphyry, who may be allowed as an im- | ce partial witness in this case, affirms the same, that _ it had never entered into the mind of any man, that an in- corporeal nature should be the former of the world. And ia.1.7._ Eusebius appeals to the heathens, when he declares, _ eo ‘that no nation of the world, the Jews excepted, : did look upon God as the Creator of the universe.” There — was not one philosopher who believed that God made it, — but either that it was eternal, or its matter coeval with — God; or that the universe, the +) ray, was the supreme — God, before which nothing existed. The stoics especially REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 217 maintained the 7d 8aoy to be the first zpéroy and principal God; which indeed was the catholic faith of paganism. This is the reason why the Scriptures distinguish the true God from false ones, by the power of creation, more than any other attribute, as containing such various proofs of the divine existence and perfections. To this Moses and the prophets every where appeal, and David thus cha- racterises him, Psal. xcevi. 5, “ All the gods of the na- tions are idols, but the Lord made the heavens.” This St. Paul every where insists upon as the fullest evidence he could bring against the heathens, who so _sacrilegiously robbed God of his very essence, his power and Godhead, Rom. i. 20. To the men of Lystra he gives this descrip- tion of the living God, Acts xiv. 15, that ‘‘ he made heaven and earth,” &c.; and here to the Athenians, ver. 23, the unknown God whom he preached and declared to them, was no other than this same God “that made the world and all things therein.” So both Jews and Christians, in opposition to heathen- ism, always defined God by this prerogative, in such like forms 7dv daw @cdv, the God of all things. And. ovdev &AAo céeBovow, H Tv emt waot Ocdy, bs ovpavdy, a nies érdinoe Thy ovpavdy, Kal TAX Aoiwa wavTa, the Christians 14.1. 5. worshipped no other than the God over all; who ? made heaven and all other things. And when they would speak so as not to leave room for any exception, it was sufficient to say, O«dv civai roy Kipioy maytwy, that Clem God is the Lord of allthings. This wasakind Alex. of test in religion; the heathens disavowed it, ais ‘ - and whoever held momrhy roy trav ddAwv @edv, that Id. Strom. God was the maker of all things, was guilty of ae heresy, and stood under the correction of Aristotle and the philosophers. As therefore the apostle’s intent was to turn his hearers to the knowledge and service of the living God; in order to this it was necessary to convince them of his superemi- nence above others: and no argument could carry a fuller conviction of this truth than what he offers. The applica- tion to them was, observe the difference between these deities ; you confess your gods unable to create the world, and you hold either that, or the matter whereof it is com- posed, to be eternal, and worship the heavenly bodies, or corporeal deities, or dead idols, the work of men’s hands, 7 218 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM We teach and believe in one living God, spiritual in his nature, supreme in his dignity, who, by his power, made the heavens and the earth, and all things therein; who go- verns the whole by a wise, steady providence, gives life to every being, and is the author of every blessing. The greatness and order of these works which you behold, are the noblest attestations of those infinite perfections we as- cribe to him, in power, wisdom, invisibility, &c. He that made all things, must be himself unmade, self-existing; he that created the world, must be omnipotent; he that con- trived and governs it, infinite in wisdom and goodness, &c. These render him the only proper object of adoration ; and it is reasonable for us to give it, that we may thereby ob- tain his grace and favour, under whose protection and dis- posal we are. But the apostle had just reason to oppose these prevail- ing sects on many other accounts; for they were of all others the greatest enemies to Christianity, which taught men to attain true beatitude through the assistance of di- vine grace, and the mediation of an all-sufficient Redeemer: whereas the stoics presumptuously boasted, that man by his own virtue (though they destroyed all virtue in denying the freedom of will and liberty of ehoice,) could attain happi- ness; that their wise men came no way short of Jupiter; that they owed nothing to God for their wisdom; nor could Gale. pt, Jupiter do more than a good man. Such were - pt. ; ; 2.433. their proud swelling words; they made their own 40:3. virtue their god, which was the most cursed piece of carnal-mindedness and idolatry; and from this poison- Id. p.2. ous root of spiritual pride, Pelagianism sprang up ae in after ages. So of the Epicureans: they took from the immortal gods Nat.D. both assistance and grace. Dhits immortalibus et ' Fe 3: onem et gratiam sustulit, says Cicero; and whilst they affirmed the nature of God to be most excellent, de- nied to him what must be essential to the best and most excellent nature. They denied a providence; affirmed the world was not made by God; that in this life there was no good but what was sensible; that the soul was not immor- tal; and that after death there were neither rewards nor punishments. Such a blasphemy of God, such a destruc- tion of all religion, so debauched and vain were these sects of philosophy, as if they endeavoured to eradicate all fear Oe i i inte ee ee Ie ee REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 219 and reverence, nay the very notion of a Supreme Gale. 1p. Being ott of the world, that it is no wonder the 445 447. apostle encounters them in an especial manner. And so superstitiously mad was the whole world, that there were more gods than men in it. Though they wor- shipped all kinds of creatures as gods, the beasts in the field, the fishes in the sea, the birds in the air, and the plants in the garden; yet, lest they should miss some one or other, they erected altars to the unknown God, and Gods. From this particular superstition, St. Paul takes an opportunity to instruct the Athenians in the nature of the true God, who seemed the only one unknown to them. Ver. 22. “T perceive,” says he, “that in all things ye are too superstitious,” more addicted to the worship of gods, or demons, than other cities: “ for as I passed by, and be- held your devotions,” your worship, or deities, your idols or demons, which they called gods, for so the word céBacua signifies ; not the worship itself, but that which is wor- shipped, and is so used by the author of the book of Wis- dom, xiv. 20, who mentioning the carving of idols, says, they took him now for céBacua, a God. St. Paul, 2 Thess. li, 4, Oedv 4 o¢Bacua, God, or any thing that is worshipped, not the worship. Among which false deities “I found an altar with this inscription, to the unknown God,” a God not yet come to their knowledge: “ whom therefore ye ig- norantly worship,” dyvoowres, not knowing what Lin eee he is, “him declare I unto you,” and restore ©” vy ay- the venerable name to God, that made the world eae Y and all things therein, hitherto unknown amongst "you, ‘seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, and dwelleth not in temples made with hands;’ for he that is infinite in power, and immense in his nature, can- not be confined in temples, or statues, or shrines, as the heathens thought their gods were, like birds in a cage, by a kind of magical consecration; “neither is worshipped with men’s hands,” by images, or other representations of human make, “ as though he needed any thing, seeing he giveth to all life and breath, and all things,” and there- fore can want nothing from them who receive all things from him. Ver. 26. ‘“ And hath made of one blood,” from Adam and Noah, “all nations of men to dwell on all the face of 220 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation :” by the counsel of his own wisdom he hath disposed and upheld the race of men in times and seasons, in their several bounds and posses- sions ; not by any rigid fate, as the stoics held, but by an unerring, just, and bountiful providence: and thence per- suades them. Ver. 27. “That they should seek the Lord,” this God that made the world, if haply, by chance, as men blind, or in the dark, grope after things, “they might feel after him, and find him ;” which, therefore, after all their pain- ful searches after wisdom, they had not hitherto done; though the manifestations of him, in the effects of his pre- sence and power, are not remote from our observations; “ though” (xatro, quamquam, quia, because) “he be not far from every one of us; for in him we live, and move, and have our being;” it being essential to a creature as such, to have its whole dependence upon God. ‘« As certain also of your own poets have said, for we also are his offspring,” of Jehovah the unknown God; not Jove, to whom Aratus the poet ignorantly attributed the government of the world. And if man, the principal work of the lower creation, be of God’s forming, the apostle’s conclusion must necessarily follow, “that we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold or silver, or stone ‘graven by man’s art or device;” it bemg unreasonable to think the artificer is not more excellent than what he forms : and for the same reason, that the gods are in the shape of men, who are so far removed from, and inferior to divinity ; and above all, it is most irrational for man, the offspring of God, to worship an idol of his own making, for, and instead of God. From the whole we may infer, that the wiser of these blind Grecians knew there was a God, but what or who he was they never knew, nor where to find, nor what to make of him; but thought him either Saturn, or J upiter, or the Sun, or any thing but what he really was: uor, with all their natural or acquired wisdom, could they attain any right idea or notion of God, what he was, or where to be found. And if at Athens, the eye of the world, the mistress of learning, the school of wisdom and of nature, they were to- REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 221 tally ignorant of the true God, it cannot be expected that other nations should be acquainted with him; or that the light of nature, philosophy, or the disquisitions of the most elevated minds, should be sufficient for these things; if God was unknown to them, who were most capable (with- out a divine aid) of knowing him, yet they continued blind, and groping in the dark to no purpose. This has brought such difficulties on some mo- Herbert dern schemes, that they who undertake the defence Relig, | of paganism, and must not allow them to be igno- 13. p. 267. rant of the true God; because, if they did, their whole system, calculated to oppose revelation, would fall to the ground, cannot help stumbling at this objection, and grant that the heathens had but very lame and imperfect notions of the supreme God ; that the rays of the divinity were in- tercepted by a dark cloud, and the minds of men Ia. 269. involved in a profound ignorance ; yet, being instructed by the book of nature, they arrived to the knowledge of the supreme God, but not the God of the Jews, because he was unknown to them, and it would be a little strained to sup- pose this unknown deity to be the God of Israel. Such lame and imperfect notions of a God very well indeed cor- respond with an unknown God; and the true God was always Deus incertus. But why should we suppose St. Paul preached two supreme beings, one to the Gentiles, another to the Jews? He had been taught to believe one only, the Creator of heaven and earth; and by this charac- ter he distinguishes him to the Athenians. He is teaching them to receive the God of the Jews, but as manifested under the gospel through Jesus Christ: “ because he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world with righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained: whereof he hath given assurance to all men,” Gentiles as well as Jews, “in that he hath raised him from the dead.” They had not a deity but what was a daluer, and from this derSauovia, Superstition towards demons, he endeavours to convert them; and for their encouragement adds, ver. 30, “the times of this ignorance” (of him and his worship) ~ “God winked at.” There are indeed men of great learning, who y,.. yao). conclude that the apostle here plainly confesses 1.1.c.2. their worshipping of the true God. But how does the ar- 222 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM gument stand? he was unknown to them, therefore they knew him. They worshipped him ignorantly, without knowing whom or how to do it; therefore they worshipped the true God: and thus by the light of nature discovered, _ they knew not what, that is, nothing at all, an ignorant wor- ship for an unknown God; they found in the dark what they never saw or felt: and thus knowledge and ignorance are the self-same thing. But the apostle’s intention is evident: the altar confessed their worship of an unknown God, which was the excess of ignorance and superstition ; but whence they might be con- vinced, that a God unknown to them or their fathers, might yet be a God to be worshipped. He lays hold on this oc- casion, to declare what, God was unknown to them, and persuade them to worship him only, viz. the God that made the world and all things therein, which was a deity that neither Egypt nor Athens before that time had ever heard of; and this was no more than what St. Paul every where repeats and affirms, that od« @yvw 6 xocuos, “he was a God whom the world did not know,” 1 Cor. i. 21. And to the Galatians iv. 8, ot cidéres @edv, * that they knew not God,” &e. which are a plain comment on the unknown waar God of the Athenians, and the truth is, they knew Supersti- not the true God of heaven. rae Though, if ever the Greeks came near the true knowledge and name of the supreme God, it was under that of the Zeus Sabazius, the most rational deriva- tion of which is from the Hebrew Isebaoth, or Sabaoth, the Lord of Hosts: which, however, Aristophanes took notice of as a strange and foreign God, lately crept in amongst them, and who ought to be banished out of Greece. But what may properly be inferred from this passage, in behalf of natural religion, we may safely take from one who was willing and (if ever any were) able, to establish it on a sure and solid foundation, the great Dr. Clarke, in a dis- Vol. 2, course on these very words: “ Athens,” says he, Serm. 33. “ was at that time the seat of learning in Greece, p/2M tethe great resort of philosophers of all sects, and of the ablest and most accomplished men in every part of literature. Whatever the light of nature or reason, assisted with all the helps of acquired learning, could possibly dis- cover concerning the nature of God, and of true religion, REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 223 might naturally have been expected to be met with here. Here, if in any part of the world, it was reasonable to imagine, might have been found numbers of men free from the contagion of those gross superstitions and absurd idola- tries, which had overspread the ignorant and unlearned world. But, on the contrary, in fact, it appears from this history of St. Paul, and from the agreeing account, which all other ancient writers give us of this matter; that this school of reason and philosophy, this eminent seat of learn- ing, was itself as deeply overwhelmed, and buried in super- stition and idolatry, as any other part of the less learned world. The obvious inference from which observation, is, the usefulness and necessity of revelation: for how true soever it be (as most true and certain it is) that the princi- ples of true religion are perfectly agreeable to nature and reason, and may even demonstrably be deduced from thence by irresistible arguments ; yet so it was, that few or none of these most learned philosophers, either themselves saw and traced this light of reason and truth, or dared to dis- cover and recommend it to others. From whence it evi- dently appears, that those right notions concerning God and the natural obligations of religion, which are now so plain and obvious in reason, that they are urged by many as an argument against the needfulness of any revela- tion at all, are themselves generally borrowed from the light of revelation, even by those who use them as an argument against it.” _Can any thing more abundantly prove the insufficiency of reason, notwithstanding all the external aids of the book of nature, and the fitness of things? And when we find these great defenders and ornaments of reason making such retreats as are utterly inconsistent with the boasted powers of it, will it not justify others in endeavouring to satisfy their minds, and account for these truths by different means of knowledge, wherein there may be no darkness or per- plexity, but something obvious, rational, and certain ? But. there are several passages in this sermon that deserve a more particular consideration, as being constantly used © to show ‘how far human learning can teach any place or people the divine truths of God. Athens had been long the seat of wisdom, where it had been carried to its highest elevation, and was for many ages looked upon as the school 224 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM of learning and religion for the rest of world. Whence Xtzen, Such pompous epithets were given to it by Euri- p.178. pides, “EAAd8os ‘EAdas, the Greece of Greece; by Justin. Diodorus, Kowdy rdytov év0pomwy maidevThpiov, by Thu- 15.8. eydides, maiSevais EAASSOS; by Strabo, copéy duxnthpioy, and by the Spartans, one of the eyes of Greece. But as demon-worship was the offspring of vain philos- ophy and reasoning, Rom. i. 21, so wherever these flourished most, there did idolatry also; human sciences, and spiritual blindness growing up equally together, which was the state of Athens, and what raised the apostle’s indignation, ver, 16, when he saw the city wholly given to idolatry, kareiSwAoy full of idols and altars. The idol was an object of adora- tion; and the altar a witness that what it was erected to was a god, and that they took the idol or statue for a god. Ara est, que testatur pro numine id haberi cui Tey erigitur. Nam illi (scilicet Ethnict) quod numen a Cas habeant, et pro numine acciptant illam statuam, biad.Diod. ara testatur. Quid illic faciat ara, si illud non ao habeatur pro numine, &c. And at Athens there were numberless statues of the same god as of Mer- cury. They were in every street and lane, says Plutarch. Eused. pr. _ The first altar at Athens was built by Cecrops STA Re Egyptian, where they so prodigiously multiplied Attic. that Pausanias, who took an accurate survey of the country, says, there were more of these «i5wAa, images and altars there, than in all Greece beside ; they were fond of strange gods, yet worshipped no one without an image to Dissert. Yepresent him. It was the custom of the Greeks, 38. says Maximus Tyrius, to worship the gods in the purest matter, of human shape, and with the most exqui- site art. These increased to so excessive a number, that Athens was called the country and shop of the gods: and Xenophon complained that they had made the whole city De. Rep, DUt one altar. Cicero calls it urbs fanorum re- . Rep. ; A ; Athen. pleta, a city crammed with temples: and one in Rene Petronius observed, our country is so filled with Pausan, deities, that you may easier find a god than a man ; and it was truly the pantheon of the world, having one temple in common to all the gods. Rlian. Hence the oracle might well call Athens rhy 14.0.6. kowhy éoriay ris “EAAddos, the common altar of Greece; REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 225 Sophocles styles, it the sacred building of the gods ; Strabo. 1. as Hegesias did Attica, the work of the gods and *?:*°° the ancient heroes. These werethe gods of Athens ; and its religion the worship of them, being wholly given to idolatry. Ver. 18. “A setter forth of strange gods,” &€vwy damorvlar, foreign demons, to which their itching ears gave immediate attention, being above all others superstitiously disposed to admit foreign gods and worship into their own. As Strabo notes, that their hospitality extended to the gods, L.10 TOAAG TaY kevindy iepay mapedétavTo In recelving many strange gods or worships. Their superstition had not only adopted all the monstrous fictions of antiquity, but they themselves continually added new ones. The Romans, on the contrary, were unkind to pj. ya. strange gods, and did not receive them but with licarnass. difficulty, that they might be said, picoteveiy it) piroteveiv, to be haters, rather than lovers of them: and Dion Cassius says, one of the blackest crimes of Sardanapalus , , , was introducing into Rome the worship of Helio- 351. — gabalus ; and though he was a foreign god, he revered him more religiously than any other, so far as to set him above Jupiter. But by the law of Athens noforeign godorworship 5, ayicto. was to be admitted, till approved and licensed by the crat. Areopagus, which had the sole power in religious matters ; and according to Demosthenes, no one had ever complained of any unjust sentence given by that court ; yet the severest laws were enacted at Athens, and every citizen commanded, on pain of death, to worship the gods and heroes as the laws of the city required: and they who observed not the appointed ceremonies, were immediately dragged to the court of Areopagus. The cutting a twig out of a sacred grove was a capital offence: even a fool has been condemned for killing one of A¢sculapius’s sparrows: and a child acci- dentally taking up a plate of gold, fallen from Diana’s crown, was put to death for sacrilege. From these admissions arose the different titles of the gods ; Patrii, those of the country, and Peregrini, foreigners - or strange gods: there were also older gods, radaidrepo:, and newer ones, vedrepx.: the Dii Patrii were commended for the ancientness of their worship; but the Peregrini— were new gods; in regard they were lately procured or L 2 2 ba ‘y 226 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM chosen: and at Athens there was a vast multitude of these new strange gods, whom they termed éévous, or Eevimovs Oeods. Apollophanes the poet had put together their names and series in his Cretensibus, as Hesychius testifies in 3eoi tevmdss and those are what Cicero says were disquieted by Aristo- phanes; so that Sabazius, and some others of them, were by him judged strange, and had been ejected out of the city. This court assembled on the hill of Mars, because that god was indicted and tried for murder by a jury of twelve gods, but acquitted; and here were Socrates and others tried for invading religion, and undervaluing the gods. Ver. 19. Hither was St. Paul brought, as a publisher of foreign gods and doctrines, Jesus, and the resurrection, to be examined concerning them; though, perhaps, (as the proceedings of the court had been much altered since the days. of Socrates) not as a criminal, but as a benefactor, in Warur. 2aving a new worship to propose to a people zeal- ton divine Ous above all others in what they call religion, as yesat- —_ some have ingeniously conjectured: but the other opinion seems preferable, that he was carried thi- ther, as a babbler, and a sower of sedition, and by putting new notions into men’s heads, before they had been legally authorised, was a disturber of the peace, and had offended the laws of the state. Dr. Bentley, sermon 2. p. 9, (and with him agrees Dr. Annot. Whitby, ) says, “‘they too well understood the no- tion of a resurrection, to worship it as a goddess :” but those learned persons should first have shown how they came not to understand the notion of a fever, or a jakes, too well to worship them for goddesses : they knew it, just as Epimenides did the true God, in erecting an altar to the unknown one, and at the same time building temples to the most shameful vices. Ver. 22. He addresses himself in these remarkable. words, “‘ ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious,” deo daioverrépouvs, More addicted to the worship of demons, or to the worship of more demons than cant others. Both which acceptations are true: for 2eont. Pausanias says, that they did worship the gods Appion. more than others: and J osephus, that all men say Pp. ° . they are the most pious of all the Grecians: and a>. ae REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 227 Sophocles, that this city goes beyond all in worshipping and honouring the gods. The word has sometimes been used for religion in ge- neral, but is here put in opposition to true piety. Religzo vert det cultus est, superstitio falsi; << their gods ee were false, and the worship an idolatrous supersti- 1. 4. p. tion.” Virgil makes it consist in being ignorant nie of the ancient gods: Vana superstitio, veterumque ignara deorum: Athens, however, adored all the gods that mad- ness or folly had ever invented. But decfdamovia signifies more than demonum cultus, viz. a slavish fear of demons, or dead heroes, and was so understood by the most learned Christians, poBos Sandvev duced. And again, &éeos is one that does not think thereis |. a God, dercidainwy d& 5 dedids Th Sadia, 6 wdyra Bed (wv, Alex. xat EvAov, Kal AlOov, kal mvedua, avOpwrdv Te, &C.; one Bie Ta. that fears demons, and makes gods of every thing, Stom. 7. wood, stone, spirit, man, &c.: the word is deriv- rae ed from S \ ° on. |. 6. demons, é&yvdorwv Sarudvev Bouol, and Pausanias men- ., 7, 228 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM tions them in the plural number, @cwy a&yvdswy Bayo, al~ In Attic. tars of the unknown gods; by which also Gro- tius thinks might be denoted many altars @c@ dyvdoT@: Cri- Philopa- tias in Lucian swears v} roy deryvworor év "AOhvas, by tris, vol. 2. the god unknown to the Athenians. Yet Triepho, p. 769. - 6 at the close of the dialogue says, ‘we having found out the God unknown at Athens, and worshipped him with hands stretched up to heaven, will give thanks to him, as having been thought worthy to be made subject to his power.” But as it is plain, the former knew not that God ; so the latter, through the whole dialogue, appears to have been instructed in Christianity; or the author, who- ever he be, was one, and put these words into the mouth of his interlocutor. Or, if the whole inscription ran, according to Oecu- In Acta. menus, ®EOIS ASIAS KAI EYPOMHS KAI AIBYHS @EQ ATNQSTA KAI BENQ. “To the gods of Asia, Europe, and Africa, to the un- known and strange god;” the crowding him among all the demons in the world proves them to be totally ignorant of his nature: as the placing him among the strange ones does, that they had received him from others, and were not au- thors of the discovery. There are several reasons given for the erecting such al- tars. But the most probable is, their superstitious fear of omitting any god, which, amidst the uncertainty of so many | _ different religions, might easily have been done ; or it might proceed from their not knowing what god to ascribe some remarkable benefit or deliverance to, and therefore in gra- titude erected an altar to the unknown one. Diogenes In Epime- Laertius gives this account of their rise: “ that nid. Epimenides staid a plague among the Athenians in this manner: he took a black and white sheep to Areopa- gus, whence he let them go which way they would; com- q manding those that followed them, that wheresoever they - lay down, they should sacrifice them T@ mpoohkovts O€G, to some fit and proper god. The calamity ceased, and to this REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 229 very day, says Laertius, there are altars to be found with- out name, which were then made in memory of this expia- tion.” The pestilence was undoubtedly stopped by the true and living God; but does it not obviously occur, that neither Epimenides, nor they, knew the author of this event, whether Saturn, Jupiter, or which among the host of gods, and therefore ascribed it to a meet god, but they could not tell who. Epimenides was a Cretan, and they were reli- gious worshippers of that Jupiter they had given the world; ‘and if Solon, the wisest man in Greece, who lived in the same age, Olympiad 46, was ignorant of the true God, it is hard to conceive otherwise of Epimenides, by whose advice the Athenians built temples to contumely and im- ¢;, a. pudence: “YBpews Kal “Avaidelas. Leg, }. 2. Let us see whether his character will afford any ground for such supposition. Laertius indeed says, that he was ywortKdratos, divinandt perttissimus, most skilful In cod. in divining, and Oeop:Aioraros, most dear to the gods; and that the Cretans sacrificed to him as to a god, ds 6e@. Aristotle says, he did not prophesy or divine of pyetor. futurities, but of what was past and obscure. Ci- 1.3. ¢. 17. cero, that as there were two methods of divining, » in one by art, and the other without it, by an enthusiastic ‘motion of the mind, or madness, that Epimenides was of the latter sort: quod et somniantibus sepe contin- pivinat git, et nonnunquam vaticinantibus per furorem; Be ut Bacis Beotius, ut Epimenides Cres, ut Sibylla Evy- threa; and Plutarch, that he was skilful in reli- Vit. Solon. gious matters, both fanatical and mystical, rept 7a da, rhv evOovolaoTiKhy Kar TeAcoTiKHY Godiay: and that after lustrating the city, he would ask no presents in money, but only asked a bough of the holy olive. The sum of which is, that he was an excellent priest, augur, and soothsayer, skilful in all the superstitions and mysteries of idolatry; from whence I think it cannot be inferred that he was an evangelist of the true God: or if so, it is evident that he left him unknown to the Athenians. Another original of these altars is said to be on this oc- casion: the Athenians sending to ask aid from the geoumen. Lacedemonians, the form of Pan met the ambassa-_ in Acta. dors, and complained that they worshipped other gods, but — neglected him; however, he promised his assistance, if they 230 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM amended for the future: wherefore after their victory, not being certain to whom they owed it, they erected an altar to the unknown god. What is this but a legend suited to the darkness of the times? If Pan were the true God, they did not worship him, nor come at him by reason or nature, but from hobgoblins and apparitions, and Jehovah was preached by messengers from Pluto. Nor was this custom peculiar to Greece, but observed by the Romans also, in the immediate erection of altars on any sudden benefit received ; as that to adoption mentioned by a.Geu, Lacitus, 1. 1, and another to revenge, 1. 3. So the 1. 2.¢. 28. ancient Romans, when they felt an earthquake, be- took themselves by public command to religious observances, but did not, as on other occasions was usual, name the god to whom they dedicated such solemnities, lest, by mistak- ing one for another, they might oblige the people to a false worship; and as it was uncertain by what power, or god, earthquakes happened, they offered sacrifice to an uncer- tain deity, in the ancient form, si Deo, si Dew, which was by the decree of the priests, says Varro. The Latins had also many altars, Diis deabusque omni- bus ; et Dibus deabusque omnibus; et Herculi invicto, et ceteris Dis: and the most learned among them, Tully, was under the same ignorance and diffidence, when he ad- vised his Terentia to return thanks to some god or other, that had given her relief in her disorder, but could not tell Epist.7. Who, whether Apollo or Aisculapius. But, cud guc- 1. 14. dem tu Deo, quemadmodum soles, pie et caste sa- tisfacias velim. So among the Carthaginians, it was customary, if they did not prosper by worshipping the gods they did know, to Diod. Sic, Sacrifice to them they did not know. After the 1.14. ¢.7. defeat of Imilco in Sicily, and their being invaded, p. 391. : : 5 : they immediately set about atoning Ceres and Pro- serpine, whom they had never adored before ; and having exposed all the statues of the gods, ordered them to be worshipped after the Grecian manner. The ignorance of the divine nature made this uncertainty Senee, run through the whole of their religion : many were Nat. Qu. Det involuti, they knew not whom they should ‘Aman’ adore, therefore to their prayers added swe tu 1. 3. Deus es, sive Dea; and in their public devotions ) oy REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 231 _when they doubted the name, the form was, Dis. Mace Pater.ve Jovis. Manes. sive. vos. Quo. alio. nomine. ‘4 Jas. est. nominare. As also when the sex of their 1.2. c.3s. gods was dubious, many of them being hermaphrodites, they mentioned both, as Onomacritus in his hymn to Mi- nerva thus bespeaks her, “Apony piv kad Onaus eove evs. Sive Deo. Sive Dee And we meet with this inscription * _ Boxhorn. CMPMOMSS O. Ter. Deeter. Ex voto. In the same manner Ovid, “ Quisquis fuit ille Deorum.”’ Metam. 72 _ And Virgil, “‘Sequimur te, sancte Deorum, sa V. 0/6. Quisquis es.” Innumerable passages of the same kind every where occur ; and A. Gellius justly tells us who these unknown gods were, viz. they whose names were uncertain, or it was Noct. At. : . 2 28 not lawful to declare them: nay, he whose sex was '?° 7°: doubtful was called an unknown god. From which it seems very evident, that the Athenians, by their unknown god, intended some deity, who they sup- posed had been propitious to them, yet not being certain of his name, and that no offence might be given, they called ~ him unknown. ¥et it is perpetually hinted, as if this altar were peculiar to Athens, and something might be inferred from its being only in a place where the sciences were carried to their highest elevation: but this is a great mistake, such altars and gods being common all over the world; and were so “many, that Varro wrote a book of the unknown iy. p. ods, and another of the uncertain ones. In the !.°:¢ 3 S Not. Id. Attic Pagi there were many altars without 1.7.c. 17. Pausan. names. Near the great altar of J upiter, at Olym- fine, pus, there was one to the unknown gods ; and the 14. Arcad. -Arcadians worshipped a statue without a name. And both Pausanias in 1 Eliac. and Theagenes in Lib. de Diis, mention two cities among the Lydians, in which 232 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM was a large temple with altars in them, and ashes thereon quite different from the common sort, &c.; and here the priest invoked the unknown God, reciting out of a book some barbarous form, in a language utterly unknown to the Greeks; and that as soon as he prayed, a bright flame shone round, and consumed the wood he had laid upon the altar, without any fire being put to it. p. 164. Strabo mentions this custom of the Celtiberians, that upon the full moon they worshipped an unknown or nameless god, dvwvtu@ tv) Gee, by dancing all night before their doors in unseemly postures: the Persians, Arabians, Wolf. and other easterns, had their unknown god. The Cent. 1. people of Marseilles, in Gaul, openly professed their worship of unknown gods, and found that this in- spired them with a greater fear of their deities. They worshipped them at a distance, and did not come near the place where their statues stood. The priest did not ap- proach them without trembling, and dreaded their appear- ing to him, that is, dreaded the knowing of them. And at Bourdeaux, amongst other demon altars, there was one to an unknown god, which stood with the rest till they | were all demolished by the command of Martial, Bishop of Limosin. And if we pass into America, we shall find — Garcilas. the people of Peru and others to have also an un-— known god, as well as politer nations. So that the arguments will prove too much: if the Athe- — nians knew the true God, because they had an altar toan | unknown one, it will follow, that all others, even the most — barbarous and savage, were for the same reason acquainted — with him: though, if we would speak strictly of. these de- — vout idolaters, they knew no more of either, known or un- ~ known gods, than the statue and the name, all their thoughts — and ideas of a divine nature being so infinitely distant from it: and Sophocles, at the beginning of his Menalippa, made — a confession which extended to all men, Barnes “ Jove, of whom we here below pes et Nothing besides the name do know.” Philopat. : ha hd 4 v.2 Zevs Boris early, ov yap oida TAHY Add. p. 768. So Triepho in Lucian was quite ignorant of every thing 4 relating to Minerva, but her name. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 233 Ver. 28. “ As certain also of your own poets have said, for we also are his offspring ;”’ not of Jove, but Jehovah, the unknown true God, whom he preached unto them ; which _ is only carrying on the allusion, and showing how, on their own principles, they might acknowledge him: and _ Via. cl. the apostle might justly approve what had been ¢i°x2™: truly but ignorantly written by any of their authors; P- 315. as many sublime and most exalted sentences there are in Plato and others, notwithstanding their idolatry: so St. Paul teacheth Titus to convince the Cretans out of their own poets, Tit. i. 12. | Yet however visionary it may be, to imagine that Aratus, the poet, knew the true God, and referred his Zeus to him who made the world and all things therein, great yiq geia. pains have been taken by learned men to apply it Uae in that sense. But does it follow, that because the ¢76.p. words @eds, Deus, or God, are applicable to the 2° true one, that they were so intended by the heathens? Are not many things spoken of idols, or Jupiter, as Optimus, Maximus, &c., which cannot without blasphemy be attri- buted to them? The same appellations which are given to one properly and piously, may be transferred to another improperly and impiously; but are they therefore the same ? Even the illustrious Selden confesses, that the 4a, syntag. inscription to the unknown God was brought to } P. 2%. pass by the delusion of demons, or devils; and yet the apostle takes an opportunity to cite it: can we then other- wise imagine but that these words of the poet were spoken according to the apprehension of mankind; and that the apostle only restores what was improperly said of demons, and gives to God the things which belong to God, what idolatry had sacrilegiously bestowed on idols ? Aratus was of Cilicia, the same province with St. Paul, who therefore was not unacquainted with his writings. He flourished in the time of Philadelphus, and wrote his Phe- nomena, and Diosemia, both in such esteem with learned men, that Cicero, Claudius, and Germanicus, translated them into Latin. He begins his Phenomena with the usual invocation of the poets, ée Aids épxducba, a Jove principium ; and shortly after, rod yap yévos écutr, for we are his offsping. If he had not been instructed from the Jewish schools, 234 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM he must speak these words, either as they were generally understood, or else as an inspired person ; the latter no one supposes, and on the former there cannot be a better com- ment than what the inquisitive and learned Diodorus Si- culus says, that it is generally believed, that all men were 1.5.c.4. OYViginally his offspring: of Jehovah? No; but of @ Jupiter the Cretan, that infamous adulterer and idol of the poets. a But whoever carefully reads the whole passage of Aratus, vid, cl. will, I think, be of opinion, that by Jupiter he giexand- means the universe, the greatest God of the anci- p. 597. ents; for immediately before he says, “ the villages and ways, the markets, harbours, and seas, are full of Ju- piter ; and mdyrn dt Avos Kexphucda mavres, ** we all of us make use of every part of Jupiter.” And Theon, in his Scholia, interprets that hemistich even in a secondary meaning, as spoken of the air, which he calls tv Aia, or rv Ziva tov ovouwdy, the natural Jupiter, in whom, in an inferior sense, we may be said to live, and move, and have our being ; for without air no creature can subsist, it administering the — most immediate matter of life unto them, by feeding and refreshing their animal spirits. And Theon must be al- | lowed as competent a judge of the poet’s meaning as any modern. Nor is that expression any more than the old Iambic, Zauey 8 ey du7G, cad xivodueda: or that of Lucan, Ju- puter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris ; the same as Virg. Eel. 3, Jovis omnia plena; which I imagine no one was ever so void of reason, as to interpret of God that | made heaven and earth. 4 Thus the apostle, Ist, shows the Athenians wherein their ~ _ guilt of superstition and idolatry consisted. 2dly, he teaches — them a new and proper object of their adorations; a God, ~ but confessedly unknown to them, as distinguished by a — more august character than any of their deities had assum- | ed, the Maker of all things. And, 3dly, that some expres- sions of theirown writers could be applicable to him only; for, as the Creator of men, we are his offspring ; as their — Preserver, in him we live, and move, and have our being. I shall add to what has been already said (concerning e innate ideas) on Rom. ii. 14, that “the heathens not hav- ing a law, are a law unto themselves ;” and other texts of the Vid. Sela. Same import, that we must understand and explain REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 235 them in a sense agreeable to the Hebrew accep- rth as tation, in which they were written. Now it is cer- Gent. jux- tain, that the Jews absolutely denied any natural #08? law discoverable by the mere light of reason: and « 8. that in general (especially the Pharisees, who were the doctors and expounders of religion, and of whom St. Paul was one) never intended by universal, common, unwritten, or natural law, any more than the commands given by God to the first parents of mankind, and by them transmitted to _ their posterity, who were all equally under an obligation to observe it, from the authority of him that ordained them. These they supposed to be contained in the precepts of the sons of Noah, propagated through the several dispersions of _ mankind, and for ever continued a law, or rule of life, to the heathen world ; and that they were no farther bound by the written law of Moses, than as those unwritten ones were afterwards incorporated with it. It was from the observance of this law, that Noah was found just, and Abraham became the friend of God: of whom God says, Gen. xviii. 19, that “he shall command his children and his household after him; and they shall keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment.” This way, the doctrine, and the law, which God had showed tomen. And no other interpretation can be given of those remarkable words in Job xxiii. 11, 12, « my foot hath held his steps, his way have I kept, and not declined; neither have I gone back from the commandment of his lip, and I have esteemed (or hid in my breast) the words of his mouth.” But these were not immediately delivered by any relation, and therefore must refer to a former declara- tion of the divine will, viz. to our first parents, which was of perpetual and unalterable obligation to the sons of men; and is what Isaiah applies to the heathen, and alls, Xxiv. 5, “the law, the obedience, the everlasting cove- nant.” The Jews, in short, rejected any natural law, but what the God of nature had declared and ordained for the direc- tion of men: and with them, universal or natural law was the same as the way, the footsteps, the words, the dictates, and commands of the Supreme Being. But as the considering every particular text would run into too great a prolixity, I shall only show in general, 236 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM I. That the Scriptures do not attribute the knowledge of the true God to the heathens. I. That they suppose them incapable of attaining or discovering such knowledge. UI. That men lost the knowledge of God by their own vain reasoning and philosophizing. First, That the Scriptures, &c. It must always be re- — membered, that, through the whole Scripture, the peculiar 4 and distinguishing character of the true God, is Creation — and Omnipotence, which was never given to any other. Gen.il. The first words of the divine historian are, “inthe _ beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” What — Ps. xevi. 5. the heathens adore are but his creatures. “For — all the gods of the nations are idols, but the Lord made the , Ps. Ixxxvi. heavens.” And again, “among the gods there — is none like unto thee, O Lord; there isnone can do as thou — Isa. xii. 5. dost.” And, “thus saith the Lord God, he that — created the heavens, and stretched them out, he that spread — Id. 8. forth the earth,” &¢., and then adds, “I am the : Lord, that is my name, and my glory will I not give to — another, neither my praise to graven images.” And, “I — Is. xliv, am the Lord that maketh all things, that stretch- — 24, eth forth the heavens alone, that spreadeth abroad : the heavens by myself.” And Jeremiah, “he that made the Jerem.x. earth by his power, he hath established the world — by his wisdom, and hath stretched out the heavens by his | discretion.” On which is grounded the prophetic denun- | ciation against every undue object of divine worship: “ the — gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, even — they shall perish from the earth, and from under these — heavens.” And the Wisdom of Solomon, xii. 27, “ they acknowledged him to be the true God, whom before they — denied to know.” -_— And the first Christians, to discriminate their faith from ~ the Gentiles, professed to believe in God the Father Al- — mighty, Maker of heaven and earth. Nor is there one line that I know of through the Old — Testament, whence it may be inferred that the heathens had a knowledge of the true God, who is always put ini di- — rect opposition to the beings they worshipped, which were _ devils, demons, deified men, &c. Thus it is said: “ they 4 Deuteron. have sacrificed to devils, not to God; to gods — REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 237 whom they knew not. They have served gods *xxti. 17. whom they knew not, neither they nor their fa- 3,9 thers.” David is full to this purpose, that “in Judah is God known, his name is great in Israel.” But as Ps. Ixxvi. 1. for the heathen, “they are such as have not ps, ixxix.6. known him; the kingdoms that have not called P- ix. 10. upon his name.” ‘To know the name of God, was the mark of a true Israelite: to forget God, of the rest of the world. So the prophets: ‘pour out thy fury upon the Jer. x. 25. _ heathen that know thee not, and upon the families that call not upon thy name:” where the calling upon God is sub- stituted for the whole worship of him: but they acknow- ledged him not to be their God; and consequently never worshipped or prayed to him: “for they knew not wisa xy. their Maker, but counted all the idols of the hea- 11. 17. 19. then to be gods; worshipped the things they made, and the most hateful beasts; so went without the praise of God and his blessing.” Isaiah gives a full attestation to this, in a pro- Ch. xix. phecy against Egypt, (the great school of wisdom and ido- latry) and the calling of it to the church: “ their princes were become fools, and their wise counsellors Ver. 11. foolish.” They who pretended to be wise, and the sons of ancient kings, and prove their descent from the gods, many thousand years before the creation: even these grossest of idolaters, shall then speak the language of Canaan, and swear not to false gods, but to the Lord of Hosts. “In that day shall there be an altar to the Lord in the 1b. 19. 21. midst of the land of Egypt;” or they shall worship the true God, of which his altar was the monument and wit- ness; and “the Lord shall be known to Egypt, and the Egyptians shall know the Lord.” Can words more clearly express their ignorance of him; and how unprophetical would it be, to say they should some time know what. they already knew ? In the New Testament, our Saviour says to the Matt. xv. woman of Canaan, whom St. Mark calls a Gentile 2”: of Syrophenicia, i. e. a Phenician of Tyre or Sidon, “ it is not meet to take the children’s bread, and to cast it to dogs:” a note of reproach and distinction betwixt them, and such as knew and acknowledged God to be their Father, which the heathens did not. = ° 238 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM Through all the writings of the apostles, idolatry is the 1 Cor. xii. Very character of Gentilism. “ Ye know that ye 5 were Gentiles, carried away to dumb idols, even as ye were led.” Which he thus explains: “in times past Eph. ii. 2. ye walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit — that now worketh in the children of disobedience, 7. e. the — devil, or ‘the power of darkness.” And as they “ were Col. i. 13. servants to him whom they obeyed,” they held com- munion and fellowship only with him. “ Therefore the 1Cor.x. things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice e to devils, not to God.’ They drank of the cup of devils, partook of their table, and had fellowship with them. And for this reason St. Paul so often asserts, “ that Eph. they were without God in the world, in a&edrqri 12 a state of atheism,” in being ignorant of the true ore God. And 2dly, thinking even such things as had Alexandr, €Xistence to be gods; and on these accounts were Seat &Geor, atheists, (the very term which the heathens p. 14. ee: Sie reproached the Christians with, for not allowing — those to be gods whom they esteemed as such,) and hadno — hope of spiritual or future blessings. Galat. iv. So to the Galatians: “when ye knew not P God, ye did service unto them which by nature — are not gods: but now after ye have known God,” &e. | what is more manifest than that they knew him not be- — fore ? : 1 Thess. So he warns the Thessalonians, “not to walk in 7 Iv. 5. _ unnatural crimes as the Gentiles did who know not — God,” nor his will, as looking upon those sins as innocent or — indifferent. So that through the whole Scripture there is scarce one — truth more plainly or frequently asserted, than that the — heathens were utterly ignorant of the true God. II. That the Scriptures did not suppose the Gentiles 1 capable of attaining or discovering such knowledge, is evi- — dently to be inferred,— First, from the characters under which they are con- stantly represented, which are purposely given to show their inability and insufficiency for it. By the prophets in the — Is.1x.2, Qld Testament, “that darkness shall cover the REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 239 earth, and a gross darkness the people.” Again, “ the peo- ple that walked in darkness, and they that dwell in Is. ix. 2. the land of the shadow of death,” which Job styles the grave, “the land of darkness and the shadow of death ;” Job. x.21. which implies their being as dead souls in the dark grave of sin, under a total deprivation of spiritual knowledge, light, and life. In the book of Wisdom, that “they wisa. xv. are the most foolish, more miserable than the !* very babes.” All which terms are directly applied to them in the New Testament. The inhabitants of Zabulon and Nephthali are by our Saviour styled ‘a people which sat in dark- 4,4 sy. ness, in the region and shadow of death.” This 16. was Galilee of the Gentiles, being inhabited, says 39 Strabo, by amixedswarm, Egyptians, Arabians, and ee Phenicians. Josephus observes, that they are en- Ham. and compassed by many strange, 7. e. heathen nations; “by. and had continued in the darkest ignorance of duty and of _ God. _ St. Paul abounds with these expressions: “to Acts xvii. seek after the Lord, if haply they might feel after 7” him and find him.” A task of the utmost difficulty, as men, blind or in the dark, put forth their hands and feel lest they should fall into danger, and try to find the way; groping they know not where, and with the last hazard and uncer- tainty of success, as the phrase Wyraphoeay clearly intimates. He enumerates many of them together: “the Rom. ii blind, and those that are in darkness ;” not able to }% see, as foolish, void of all true wisdom, and babes, like chil- dren before the use of reason, unable to distinguish truth from falsehood. He ealls them, «“ by nature the children of wrath Eph. ii and disobedience, dead in trespasses and sins; who 3. bent walked in the vanity of their mind, having the un- 1? '¥- 1% derstanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blind- ness of their hearts, and being past feeling did give them- selves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness.”’ By these, and many other like expressions, is the dismal state of the heathens every where declared in Scripture : that in their minds they were blinded with the grossest ig- 240 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM norance, and deluded with the foulest errors; in their wills and affections corrupted with the grossest disorder and sen- suality; in their conversation they practised all sorts of impiety, iniquity, and impurity ;_ their conceptions of God were false and unworthy, and their worship answerable to their belief, full of sottish, savage, beastly superstitions ; their principles vain, and their lives conformably dissolute. Even the few wise among them were full of ignorance and doubt with regard to the main points of religion, the exist- ence of God, a providence, the spiritual nature and future subsistence of souls. Gal. iii. So that the world was shut up and concluded Rom, vii, UNder sin, darkness, weakness, and death; and the 22, whole creation, all mankind, groaned together and travailed until now. And in the Scripture phrase and lan- guage it was as easy for the blind to discern and find things, for the deaf to hear, for infants to argue and reason, or for the dead to arise and walk, as for the heathen, in the dark, corrupt, impotent state they were in, and which the un- searchable providence of God permitted to dive into, discern, and know the spiritual things which belong to God. Secondly. The inability of the heathens to attain the ~ knowledge of God, notwithstantling all the aids of reason _ and- nature, may, I think, be safely concluded from consi- dering the dealings of God with them: he is jealous of his . honour, he hates the sins of presumption, and is of purer — eyes than than to behold or approve the least iniquity. Yet how often are they assured, that all their past crimes and abominations should never be laid to their charge, if ; they would be converted to God by the preaching of the — Acts xiv, gospel? ‘ That God in time past suffered all na- — 16. tions to walk in their own ways, to live after — their own opinions; having sent neither priest nor — prophet amongst them to reveal his will, nor had 4q atforded any extraordinary means or supernatural assist- Rom. x. ance, to bring them toa saving knowledge of him: 14, “and how shall they call on him, in whom they — have not believed? and how shall they believe in him, of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher ?” bi . . - ° bd . > y j ‘Therefore the times of this ignorance God winked at,” brepiddv, overlooks, takes no notice of, passes them over in — REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 241 silence: but now, as having given those means of know- ledge which were denied before, “commandeth all men every where to repent ;” which certainly implies a new sub- ject of duty and obedience. And if the heathen either had a full knowledge of God, as some affirm ; or with others, that they might, with the greatest ease and perspicuity, have learned him from the book of nature; the characters of which are so plain and legible, that he who runs, even the way-faring man, those of the lowest understanding, may read, and be perfectly instructed ; and yet no notice is taken of their wilful presumptuous apostacy ; of such loud and crying sins, as called for vengeance from heaven: how is this reconcileable with infinite, unerring justice, that has no respect of persons, but giveth to every man according to his works? Would not the state of paganism be much happier than that of the gospel ? under which, “if yo, . we sin wilfully, after that we have received the 26. knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries.’’ Here apostacy is unpardonable, because done with despite, wilful, obstinate, and malicious. And yet are not the ways of God, and the decrees of divine justice equal? If so, why did not that clear knowledge the heathens had, or might with such ease have obtained, render their idolatry the object of inevitable punishment? But if God will never ‘wink at impenitent sins in the day of knowledge, must we not conclude, that those horrid impieties, which so pure a God would take no notice of, were committed in a night of darkest igncrance ? What other reason can be given for so merciful an allowance of impiety and im- purity ? When we consider these and many other passages, it seems very difficult to imagine the Gentiles had, or could so easily come at the knowledge of God, their duty to him, or to one another, as many of the present age are willing to grant them; if that were the case, if they had a standing and invariable rule of acting, by which they were account- -able, and in equity might be judged ; and if under such circumstances the Judge of the world (and shall not he do right?) winked at, and forgave them; surely their condi- ‘tion was vastly preferable to the Jews, that chosen seed, i 242 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM whose disobedience was so constantly and ie os) punish- ed, beyond the example of other nations. But from these proceedings of the Almighty we may infer some not unuseful observations. First, that the severe and uncharitable censures which many have passed upon the Gentile world, of their being unavoidably condemned to everlasting punishment, was founded on the opinion of their enjoying, or, what is the same thing, of having capacities with the greatest ease to attain an exact knowledge of God and their duty ; and upon this supposition it would be unreasonable to determine otherwise. Such was the vain opinion of the Jews, “ that PirkeEli/ all Israel shall have a portion in the world to ever. ¢-9- come; but the heathens are to be fuel for hell- fire.” Secondly, that as God is the author of men’s beings, who created and intended all for happiness, being of infinite mercy as well as justice, he surely will require no stricter account than according to the talents he himself intrusts, and has committed to their charge: so that impossibilities can never be the terms of duty, nor shall a man be con- demned for what was not in his power to avoid. But who- ever justly uses those helps and abilities he has, in a careful search and obedience of truth, though he miss of truth, may be charitably hoped not to miss the reward of it. For this reason, Socrates, though an idolater, and super- stitious in the article of death, yet, if he was humble, sought for truth with diligence, and impartially chose what to him appeared best ; I shall not doubt but his soul, and that of every honest heathen, is happy, and will be blessed with the vision of God: for if it were a misery to be born in the times of paganism, it was not a fault; and though the light to direct them was ever so dim, if they followed it with hu- mility and sincerity, embraced nothing without a due and calm examination, nor acted contrary to the conviction of | their judgment, it would certainly direct them to light eternal. Wherever there is a law, there must be an obligation to punishment ; and when a man does what he is persuaded he ought not todo, he is as obnoxious to punishment as if the law had been written in tables of brass. If he does what after the most serious inquiry appears to him best, he acts agreeably to the law of his nature, “his thoughts will REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 243 excuse him, and his conscience bear him witness, that he is innocent even in the day when God shall Judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ.” One cannot indeed but be astonished, that the viditee majesty of the great God should be so utterly for- tant. p. got, and man fall into that stupidity, as to prefer '* dead creatures to the Preserver of all things: and yet we see pardon and allowance may be made to it, if proceeding from invincible ignorance. ; Thirdly, we hence learn the rules of God’s proceeding in judgment, that it is the willing a thing that makes it our own: the choosing and preferring one thing before another, knowing it to be in instances of duty or sin: this constitutes the formal good or evil of an action to us, and renders us _ accountable for it: and consequently, as the degrees of re- velation, and means of knowledge, are more or less, so is a person’s ignorance more or less excusable before God. The case of the heathens seems to be stated in those words of our Saviour: “he that knew his Master’s will, Luke xii. and did it not, shall be beaten with many stripes; 47, 48. but he that knew it not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes:” and this is grounded on the strictest equity, “ unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required,” &c. Where therefore the error is involuntary, and the ignorance mo- rally invincible: that after the most diligent search after truth, men are not able to find it, we cannot but hope that a merciful God will weigh these circumstances, and make allowances for the infirmities of his creatures; and that the heathens, if serious in finding out truth, and impartial in choosing what appeared to be the best, will not, we trust, find that gracious Being they have to deal with, severe to mark all that is done amiss, nor eternally condemn them, for not doing what they could not know to be their duty : but the honest Gentiles shall receive a reward, when their sun shall set, and night put an end to their labours Hie ‘for many shall come from the East and from the 11. West, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven: but the children of the kingdom shall be cast out into outer darkness.” | We need not here dispute about their degrees of happi- ness, if it be allowed that they shall not be utterly deprived Rom. ii. 6. _ 944 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM of reward for want of an impossible condition. There may be different mansions, and the blessed differ from one ano- ther, as the stars in glory; yet in the everlasting Sabbath of rest and felicity, every one will be happy to their utmost capacities and wishes. The sum is, that according to the degrees of knowledge which God has afforded, so shall men’s crimes receive ag- eravation of guilt and increase of punishment; and the more light and grace he bestows on any, the more and better performances will he require of them. . Thirdly, the Scriptures, attribute the depravation and loss of divine knowledge to men’s own reasonings and phi- losophizings upon it. This is laid down as a sure, unerring rule to guide our thoughts by, that the things of God are not known but by icor.ii. the Spirit of God: “because the natural man re- 11,12. ceiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they 14. are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.” The apostle af- firms he cannot know them; and the reason must be, that all parts of divine wisdom are too transcendant for natural light, even in those of the most elevated endowments, per- fectly to contemplate or apprehend; there being a spiritual darkness, both in the things to be known and the faculty that is to receive them, which cannot be taken away but by God, in manifesting the thing to be known, and taking off the veil from the mind, thereby enabling it to apprehend supernatural objects: both which are included in revelation, which is an immediate act and communication of God: and | for nature to find out supernatural things, is to act above nature, or an impossibility. The same is true of the angelic world; their glory and excellence is only owing to a nearer contemplation of the infinite beauties of the divine essence. But this is owing to the will of God, whose ministers they are, and not to any necessity of his nature or theirs, being absolutely dependent on his omnipotent will. . 2Pet.i.9. This St. Peter illustrates: “he that wanteth these things (those graces of God mentioned in the preced- ing verses) is blind, and cannot see afar off.’ The moment the divine assistance is withdrawn, we are unable to seek for, consider, or understand them, the whole procedure of REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 245 divine knowledge being under his guidance, influence, and direction ; and when once that forsakes us, or we that, we become blind in the discernment of things, and our reason- ings about them. This was the case of the world; God manifested himself to them, and they might, through a due contemplation of his works, have been fully convinced of his invisible per- fections. But they no sooner began to speculate about na- ture, and account for things by their own reason; but they departed from true wisdom, grew vain in their imaginations, wholly attended to visible objects, and gradually forgot the Maker of them; till, at last, though professing themselves wise, they became fools, so stupid and brutal as to worship the creature more than the Creator. They spoiled the noblest truths through philos- Col. ii. s. ophy and vain deceit, after the traditions of men; debased themselves with their own inventions, converted what they did not thoroughly understand, into fable and mythology, and so turned the truth of God into a lie, which all the labour and study of their wise men could never rectify ; but became the ground of perpetual and inexplicable dissensions among them. This was after the rudiments of the world, kara ra croxéa, according to the elements and principles of natural reason and philosophy, both which were false and imperfect. Whierefore, ver. 18, he would have them dead to the ru- diments of the world, those human institutions which had depraved revelation, and were wholly vain and useless to the great end of man, the knowledge and enjoyment of God. For, ver. 22, they are only the commandments and doctrines of men, a broken and corrupt system, and abused to pride, vanity and idolatry. For even this outside know- ledge, ver. 18, vainly puffed up their fleshly mind, (the same expression is repeated, 1 Cor. iv. 6. 18, 19,) all their specu- lative knowledge was inflated and empty, filled with arrogance and presumption, and was no more than a conceited igno- rance, as void of all that only useful knowledge which tends to the salvation of ourselves and others ; a contemplation of - trifling and unprofitable things, thin and aerial speculations, without any mixture of true and solid science; but was a science falsely so called, 1 Tim. vi. 20, consisting chiefly in foolish and unlearned questions, which served only to gender 246 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM strife, 2 Tim. ii. 23, and no way conducive to the improve- ment or end of man. | To show the vanity of all which artificial learning the apostle, 1 Cor. i. 20, asks, where is the disputer of this world? the contentious litigator, or striver about words; or ov(nrijs, the searcher or inquirer into the nature of things? their philosophy becoming the subject of infinite questions, cavils, and controversies: when it follows, “ hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?” tudpayer, so as to appear frantic and mad, in that they could not find out the truth, which ought to be the end of all philosophical stu- dies and inquiries: as if he had said, hath not God made all those pompous contemplations of the proud philosophers (who with such labour have pried into the bowels of nature for hidden philosophy) appear to be foolish and vain? in that they have not yet, by all their acute researches and in- quisitions, attained to any true notion and discovery of the first principle, the God of nature, which is the chief end of all philosophy : for, after that in the wisdom of God, in the works of creation and providence, the world by wisdom knew not God: those blind studiers of nature could not read those legible characters, nor attain any true notion, nor bring themselves to any serious reverential acknowledgment of him, which was an evident demonstration of the madness and folly of all their wisdom, as not being able to reach its first principle or last end: notwithstanding the various manifestations of a God, they only groped about nature (as Seneca’s blind fool did about his house, complaining the rooms were dark) without being able to find the author of it. The apostle, therefore, to convince the world of the ex- treme vanity of all their boasted wisdom, and its inability from all their contemplations to attain the knowledge of God, adds, ‘that it hath pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, viz. the gospel, which unto the Greeks was foolishness,” ver. 23, “and by this foolish things of the world, the uneducated and illiterate preachers, to confound the wise,’ all the labours and contemplations of philosophy, to _expose its weakness and wickedness, confound their argu- ments and demonstrations, answer all gainsayers, and in an instant, fully to describe and explain the greatest of all sub- Jects; the existence, nature, and providence of a Supreme REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 247 Being; which all the force of nature, the internal endow- ments of the mind, the strength of reason, improved with the utmost acquisitions of wisdom, from the laborious study of nature and advancements in philosophy, through the course of so many ages, could not attain the least certainty or knowledge of, viz. a true notion of God, what he was, or where to be found. . On these accounts the apostle so vehemently and fre- quently repeats that warning to his disciples: “to beware lest any man should beguile them through enticing Colos.ii.2.8- words, and spoil them through philosophy and vain deceit, after the traditions of men;’ which in times past had cor- rupted, instead of repaired their common notions of the- ology, was the means of more effectually entangling them in superstition and idolatry, and what he prophetically fore- saw would be the source of all the monstrous corruptions that should infect the pure doctrine of the gospel. He especially guards them against (ver. 18. 23,) “that show of wisdom, in will-worship and humility,” viz. of de- mons, which was in an especial manner the religion of phi- losophers (as distinguished from the fabulous and political) who, from their misunderstanding or stupidity, had per- verted this great doctrine, and established an order of be- ings, the Phenician Baalim, the Greek demons, but Scrip- ture devils, to be mediators betwixt them and the heavenly gods, and became direct objects of their worship. He gives to Timothy a just summary of human 1 Tim. vi. and heathen learning, “that it is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions, and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, 9 qin. ji. perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, and 14% destitute of the truth ;’ and therefore bids him put them in remembrance, with a note of most solemn adjuration, “charging them before the Lord, not to strive about words (as was the custom of vain philosophers) to no profit, but to the perverting of the hearers. To shun profane and vain babblings,” ¢. e. says Grotius, “ the inventions and com- ments of men on divine matters, without any revelation,” for they will increase into more ungodliness, to the intro- ducing of error, heresy, and every abomination; ‘and their words will eat as doth a canker ;” the venomous in- fluence of philosophy will spread like a gangrene over the 248 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM sound parts of Christianity. Therefore again he urges, ver. 23, “foolish and unlearned questions avoid, knowing that they do gender strifes ;” they had proved the ruin of phi- losophy, and the corruption of religion. All these cautions the spirit of God foresaw were neces+ sary, to prohibit the least mixture of worldly wisdom with the doctrines of faith ;' nevertheless, the fatal effects thereof soon appeared in the gnostics, or men pretending to ex- traordinary knowledge, ‘who, says Dr. Hammond, abounded with an empty, frothy wisdom, taken out of the Pythagorean philosophy: and made Christianity a mythologic, fabulous system ; filling it, in imitation of the heathens, with the generation of the gods, an infinite number of eons, images, ideas, emanations, angelic powers, middle and mediator gods, answerable to the pagan demons, and to which Gro- tius applies these S:dackadias daipovioy, the doctrines of devils, in | Tim. iv. 1. And in this principally followed the Py- thagoreans, who gave heed to seducing spirits, had com- merce with them, were magicians, as Apollonius Tyaneus, and taught their doctrines; being thoroughly superstitious, in fixing the order and worship of demons, external wash- ings and purifications for the expiation of sin, &c. And to mention no more, from the vanity of philosophy, which asserted a power in man to perform all virtuous ac- tions, sprang up Pelagianism, which confidently advanced the possibility of attaining a state of perfection and impec- cability: and thus made corrupt nature independent of God, his assistance or grace; and I wish it be not the same pride, which in this age exalts nature and reason to such excessive height, as to teach, that it is in the power of man, through a due exercise of his faculties, to discover what. is necessary to his perfection both in this world and the other; and consequently that he stands in no need of revelation. This unnatural exaltation of reason has always proved the bane and curse of it; and whoever pretends to derive, or account for religion on those principles, will soon lose the Christian in the vain philosopher. But I hope it fully appears, that in Scripture there is no foundation for such pretences, on which, nevertheless, the whole system of natural religion is built : but by what means this law, or religion of nature, they say, may be attained, shall be the subject of the next inquiry. REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 249 The second argument offered in support of natural reli- gion, is from the contemplation of the works of God. The maintainers of the law of nature affirm, that man by the due use of his reason, and without the help of reve- lation, may discover what is necessary to be known or done, t. e. the knowledge of God, of their duty to him, themselves, and one another; from a due observation of, and proper in- ferences from, the grandeur, beauty, and order of the universe. To guide our judgment in a point of such importance, it will be necessary to consider whether both the instrument and means be sufficient for the purposes assigned to them, since, from a failure in either of these, the whole super- structure must fall to the ground. | The instrument is the faculty of reason, and the means are those collections and inferences it may make from a serious contemplation of created beings, man’s own frame, and that relation and fitness, which so evidently appear in the series, order, and dependence of things. Now, to make a just estimate of reason, we cannot take the standard of it from the state of innocence, when the Judgment was clear, and there were no inordinate passions to bias it; nor in this corrupt state of nature, from any two or three persons who may have appeared in the space of so many thousand years; nor, as has been before observed, from any treatises of morality since the revelation of the gospel ; but from the bulk of mankind, from more millions, than there have been single philosophers in the world; be- cause this is nature which is regular in its actings; and if the same causes sometimes produce surprising, extraordi- nary, or different effects, we say there is something preter- natural in it, or that nature had acted beyond and above its usual course. It is thus in vegetable and animal productions, and the same rule will hold also in the rational: what the present age is in its intellectual powers, such was the last, and such will the succeeding be. There is no inconstancy, varia- tion, or change therein ; times, seasons, and men, are still the same, without any tendency to further imperfection or decay. Whatever difference there has been in several ages, it was owing to some external circumstances, not to nature. When application to knowledge prevailed, the abilities of the M 2 250 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM mind proportionably rose: when discontinued, ignorance, and barbarity spread themselves over the world; yet the faculties were the same, and the difference owing to culture, not to nature. And since infinite power, and the most benign wisdom, were the contrivers of nature, we must suppose they made a suitable provision of all things necessary to the respective condition of their creatures: therefore in man, if there be a duty required of him, he must have the means of knowing and apprehending it, or there can be no law to him; nor he be an accountable creature, but under a natural incapa- city of answering the end and purposes of his being ; under obligation to obedience, yet the power and means of obey- ing withheld by the decree of his Maker, which surely is an imputation not to be cast on divine justice and mercy. Therefore, if every person of a mature age (without any natural imperfection) in all times and places have not sufh- cient abilities clearly to know his duty, and attain the per- fective end of his being, it must follow, that the Author of nature, in not granting such abilities, does not require that man should come at the knowledge of duty by this means ; because he cannot demand impossibilities of his creatures, nor will suffer them to perish eternally without any default of their own. On the other hand, if this be the appointed means of knowledge, and divine truths are so obvious, that every person has a natural sagacity, from sensible observations and eternal reflections, plainly to discover them, these con- clusions must necessarily be granted. First, that every humble, attentive mind, may infallibly do it; because otherwise he would have powers and appre- hensions to no purpose; the not having a thing, and not knowing that we have it, or abilities to use it, being much the same. Secondly, all these truths would be equally plain and evident to every understanding: for where nature is alike, so will be its operations ; and as the same object, from one point of sight, and through a proper medium, appears to the natural eye of different persons in the same magnitude, colour, form, &c., and sounds make a like impression on the ear : so will truths naturally investigable, be discerned with the same evidence and certainty by the mind; for where REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE 251 the thing is apprehended, and the manner of apprehending through similar organs or faculties is the same, there will be no difference in opinion, no uncertainty, or contradiction about it. Thirdly, if the same duties oblige the whole nature, they must be equally discoverable by. every individual which partakes of that nature; the illiterate, as well as the philo- sopher; in the sheep-fold or wilderness, as well as in the college ; among the savage Indians, as in Rome, or Athens; or mercy would be unequal, and millions would be desti- tute of means to attain the end for which all were purposely created. But all souls are equal, and every creature of God perfect in its kind; and no mortal dare to say, that infinite wisdom could not, or essential goodness would not furnish them with powers sufficient to attain their end : and as the knowing and serving God is the end of man; if reason be the means intended to work out the end, every man must have sufficient abilities to do it, or the work of God will be imperfect. . Now, if there had been but a few from whom these truths were hid, it might be imputed to particular sloth or imbecility. But when there are but a few (two or three, says Dr. Clarke) to whom they were known, what can be inferred ? but that this knowledge was not from nature, but some other means. And if laws are attended with rewards and punishments, in which their force consists, since that from which we have neither hopes nor fears is absolutely indifferent to us, and a few only can know or obey those laws, but the multitude be incapable of it; then, by virtue of such laws, one or two may be rewarded, but millions of otherwise innocent, but unhappy souls, be finally condemned, having neither means nor opportunity of doing otherwise : surely this is not a law, but a rigid, inexorable decree: and if man is to be eternally doomed by these rules ; if Omnipotence made creatures on purpose to be miserable, whither is mercy flown, or where do righteousness or justice dwell ? Or if the law be only such as it is discovered or appre- hended, and the obligation extend no further, then the dis- covery will make the law, and that be infinitely various as _ the capacities of mankind are; in common to all, yet not common or alike with any; to some a whole law, to others 252 | “FHE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM in part; universal, but not including particulars ; have force to-day, and none to-morrow ; compel here, and be abrogat- ed there; in one place shine, in another be extinguished— a chameleon that changes its colour, and is contradictory to itself, as circumstances happen, in a thousand shapes and instances (which is the true picture of natural religion through the whole pagan world) and for these reasons can be no law, but a vague unintelligible thing, without force or obligation. Again, if the discovery or apprehension make the law, every man must have a right to judge for himself, accord- ing to such discovery or apprehension, and consequently to act, or not to act, so far as he has formed his judgment, without being controlled by any other. For where one by nature is a judge, he may determine for himself, without submitting to any external authority or instruction. He is to be guided by his own reasons, and those only so far as they are perceived and evident to his mind, for which he neither is, nor can be accountable, but exists in a mere state of nature and liberty, free and independent of every other being. As then nature, and its common way of acting, is the same, what is affirmed of it must hold universally; and let Cie. Leg. the definition of a man be what it will, it must be 7. equally true of all, guecunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. So if natural theology is rightly defined to be that which is attainable by the light of nature only, then all who have the light of nature, and the use of reason, are capable of attaining it; otherwise the definition will be false and imperfect. Let us then only look abroad, and judge whether any of these things be applicable to nature; we shall find the world ~ as full of savages now as in the early ages: and that could — nine parts in ten of the inhabitants of the earth be brought together, not one, perhaps, would have a tolerable notion of — a Divine Being, the soul’s immortality, or a future state. it is possible they may have the name of some things, but | be absolutely ignorant of the nature of them; for to knowa | thing, is to understand its essential properties, that which constitutes it, what it is, and distinguishes it from all others: to call a thing a clock, and yet not know it has wheels, | weights, springs, or motion, or that it divides the time, is — REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 255 the skill of a parrot, not the reason of a man. Yet no better account can the Africans or Americans give of divine truths. They have no apprehensions of them, of the per- fections necessary to a self-existing being: what duty is agreeable to him, or what rewards or punishments await us in a future state. Nay, we may venture to take the standard of human rea- son, even from Christians who enjoy so many greater advan- tages than others do. Go into the woods or mines, and you will find cannibals and hottentots there. Examine and try the commonalty in almost every place, and you must ob- serve how hebete and dull they are, how strangely unac- quainted with what they profess to believe, can give no ra- tional account of those very articles of faith which perhaps they can repeat ; have such uncouth ideas, as are not only the reproach, but the subverting of religion, and literally fulfil the apostle’s words, “ that they have need that yy. y. one teach them again which be the first principles 12. of the oracles of God, have need of milk and not strong meat: are babes and children, so far from being acquaint- ed with the elements of religion, that they are ignorant of the most common truths. “ Talk but with the Lock. Ess. country people, almost of any age, or young people Per ne us almost of any condition, and you shall find, that, 44. though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to, are so odd, low, and pitiful, that nobody can imagine they were taught by a ra- ‘tional man.” Many have natural wit and aptne.s to discharge their own mean employments, yet take them out of that beaten tract, and you will find them ignorant of most truths, doubtful of all, and able to account for none: so far from discovering truth, that they cannot apprehend the arguments whereby alone it could be discovered or proved. Put into their hands any one demonstration of the existence of God, his nature, or providence; will they understand the procedure, or discern the connection of the premises? The proposition they so far know, as to repeat it, because they have been - taught it, but are incapable of perceiving its evidence, or drawing conclusions from it: and to affirm that the law of nature may be demonstrated by the strictest rules of rea- soning, yet, that the world neither can doit, nor understand 254 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM it when done, is saying little to the purpose. But this ge- neral character of man will hold true, that he is without knowledge till he receive instruction ; without conscience, till informed what the will of God is. Nor is this any degradation of man, it is his nature ; what Crito,p. all ages of the world bear witness to and confirm. Xénoph. Socrates said of the commonalty, “they do every Mem. 1.3. thing by chance, without counsel ordesign:” and. to Charmidas, he calls even “ the assemblies at Athens fools, 7 Politic. p. ignorant, and stupid.” Plato calls it, “a thing 300. agreed upon, that the multitude are no way able to receive art or instruction.” And again, “ that the vulgar Repub. 6. are not capable of philosophy, 7. e. of religion, in Best cy) the knowledge or means of it.” And Aristotle, 1.c.5. “that they prefer the life of beasts to any other.” Cicero abounds with these complaints, “that every place Epist, fa. 18 full of fools, stwltorum omnia plena. That mil.1.9. amongst the common people there is neither in- wh dustry, nor discernment, nor reason, ner wisdom ; Froplanco. they judge of most things by opinion, of very few by truth. Non est consilium in vulgo, non ratio, non dis- Pro Roscio. C7UMEN, non diligentia. Ex opinione plurima, ex Comodo. veritate pauca judicat. Sic est vulgus, ex veritate pauca, ex opinione multa estimat.” “ That vir- Tuse. Q. ‘ Pir Ci ete. tuelor knowledge is seldom to be met with in dull a , heavy minds: tardis enim mentibus virtus non 12.0.2. facile comitatur. That philosophy must be con- | tent with a few judges, industriously avoiding the multitude, being mistrusted and hated by them.” And in his Offices, when he treats of wisdom, or the science of things divine and human, and their causes, he says, “his countrymen were little acquainted with such things, though so highly deserving of their knowledge; nec satis erant nota nostris, et erant cognitione dignissima. _ But wisdom shuns the crowd; abhorrere a multitudine philosophiam. And with Nat. D.1. justice he observes, that if the world was made for Divini, the wise, it was made fora very few ; if a prodigy is 2.n. 28. what seldom happens, a wise man is one, and mules have oftener foaled than there have been wise men in the world.” Epist. 29. Seneca says, “nunguam volui populo pla- cere; nam que ego scio, non probat: gue probat popu- REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 255 lus, ego nescio. I never desire to please the people, for they do not approve what I know, and I do not know what they approve.” So of many it became proverbial, “ Beotum crasso jurares aére natum.” The elder Christians said the same, and called : : : St. Aug. them “ turbas imperitorum, a rude, ignorant mob, de Morib. who are superstitious even in the true religion.” Edes. | They have scarce the freedom of reason, having no criterion or rule to judge of truth, or falsehood by ; are therefore slaves to the opinions, and their creed hangs upon the lips of others; are carried with the stream, and can give no account of their persuasion, but that others em- brace it, without considering whether it be dream or de- monstration. Call them rational, yet they are the tools of another’s reason, not their own: for though reason be an instrument in the hands of nature and of God, yet without long forming, without principles, method, and order to work by, it is a most fluctuating giddy thing, and seldom produces any thing that is great or praise-worthy; it is in- struction only that gives it an edge, and fits it for the pro- per use of an intelligent creature. On these accounts Lactantius and others very yactant. justly argued, “that if what they call philosophy 1. ‘sa cannot be attained but by learned men; if it shuns Par the common society of mankind, it cannot be wisdom, nor the way to it; if true wisdom be essentially necessary to the well-doing and end of man, it cannot be confined to a beard, a cloak, or the schools, but must indiscriminately be divided among all. Every rational creature, of whatever nation, language or sex, they be, will be capable of it: and if they cannot attain it by their own mother-wit, the Au- thor of nature never could intend they should do it, or they have natural capacities to no purpose.” There is no other rule to judge of the powers of nature, but general experience and observation: for every creature is perfect in its kind; the tree grows to its allotted propor- tion, the reptile, and inhabitants of every element, have all the requisite means to fulfil the ends of their being, as well as bounds set them beyond which they cannot pass. Let the same observation regulate our thoughts with regard to 256 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM. man, and we shall soon be convinced that these things are out of his reach, what nature has denied him the powers or faculties to attain. And whatever stress the learned maintainers of natural religion lay upon the common abilities and reason of man- Mooker Kind, yet, when they take a serious view of them, a Ee. Pol. they are forced to speak as I do, and complain how _ pe 241. dull, how heavy, how almost without sense the com- i’y8,/° mon multitude every where is: that they who are l.1.s, sunk with beggary, or dejection, or baseness, do not easily give ear to reason; and that of those things which are needful for the direction of all parts of our life, and not impossible to be discerned by the light of nature, are there not many which few men’s natural capa- city, and some which no man’s hath been able to find out 2 Tillotson, That grown persons of a very lowand mean ca- vol. 2. ‘ G i ; eee Serm.4, pacity of understanding ; and who, either by rea- p. 32. son of the weakness of their faculties, or other disadvantages which they lie under, are in little or no pro- bability of improving themselves, are always to be consi- dered in the condition of children and Jearners; and there- fore must, of necessity, in things which are not plain and obvious to the meanest capacities, trust to and rely upon the judgment of others. Dr. Clarke That the necessity and indispensableness of the — Disc, vol. oe : AVE 2.p.155. great and moral obligations of natural religion, as _ also the certainty of a futurestate of rewards and punishments, very few are able in reality and effect to discover clearly — and plainly for themselves: but men have great need of — particular teaching and much instruction, to convince them — of the truth, certainty, and importance of these things. if There are some brutes which seem to have as ock Ess. v. 3.c.6. much knowledge and reason as some that are — par. 12-p- 26? called men; and the animal and vegetable king- doms are so nearly joined, that if you will take the lowest of the one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce- — ly be perceived any great difference between them. — Sabbala, p. 62. And that great philosopher Dr. Moore: that the : i.2.n.17. vulgar cannot have any tolerable conceit of an — omnipotent, invisible, immaterial being; and only under a human shape; which is the same that Cicero affirms. Here is an impartial declaration from the wisest among q REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 257 is: let us then grant it, and only consider what steps such men could take to investigate heavenly wisdom: to pursue it through paths utterly unknown, to ransack the vast abyss of nature, and unfold the causes, relations, and dependen- cies of things; to unveil her secrets, and behold the won- derful harmony and unshaken steadiness whereby she acts, and discover truths in the dark shades wherein she conceals herself, and by a piercing discernment separate it from falsehood ; in short, by a clear and solid understanding, to follow the powers of nature through all her mazes, up to the first spring and original cause, and remove the thick clouds betwixt them and eternity: this surely is a task (by their own confession) utterly inconceivable, altogether im- possible. How can they, who by a kind of necessity, from the constant labour of the body, have the mind bowed raw down and chained to the earth; have neither ca- ». 321. pacity nor attention; know not how to expend labour in searching after truth, nor care in weighing arguments, nor diligence in observing things? Thucydides makes L.1. p. 9. it a general observation on human nature: that in the search of truth most men are impatient of labour, and soonest em- brace the things that are next at hand. How can such, who have no skill or art to account for the least thing they see or hear, so easily find out the most sublime and glo- rious ones that can enter into the heart of man to conceive, and what no wisdom upon earth has been able to explain further than they were revealed to us? But the most ignorant, when once instructed in these points, will immediately see so much truth and reasonable- ness in them, that they cannot withhold their assent; as, on the other hand, without such information, they would live and die without any notion even of the being of a ee Deity: and if such, with an honest heart, an hum- Hee. ee ble and teachable mind, receive instruction, be- pee ees lieve, and obey, they will never want speculative knowledge enough to save their souls. If we take a survey of the elder times, it will illustrate -and confirm this; we shall find it was the work of ages to bring any science to a tolerable perfection; that the most extraordinary geniuses spent their whole lives in unwearied diligence and travels, yet never attained true wisdom. Py- 258 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM thagoras, till the fiftieth year of his age, was a scholar under the greatest masters in the world. Democritus spent no less than fourscore years in hard study. Plato attended the lectures of Socrates, Archytas, and Eurytas, for forty years ; and Aristotle laboured more than twenty under Plato. Here were persons of the most solid judgment, and vast ca- pacity, with invincible study and application, and assisted with the labours of all preceding ages, yet fell infinitely short of truth. What then can others of a weaker mind and slighter practice, without any assistance or guide, do, from the ut- most efforts of their natural speculations? It is an obser- ae 7. vation almost as old as learning, that in the com- 15. mon labours of life, a man stands in need of strength and patience, but in philosophy of much leisure: and Ci- De Orat. Cero notes it as a remark he always made, that 1. 2-in fin. no one ever became eminent in eloquence or wis- dom, without the utmost study and application: semper statui neminem sapientia laudem et eloquentie sine summo studio et labore et doctrina consequi posse. And whoever — tries, will find the labours of the mind to be greater and Cic.de more fatiguing than those of the body. Multo Offic. 1.2. majora sunt opera animi quam corporis. Are not the schools and universities constant witnesses of this? How unintelligible things at first are! what time and pains are consumed to enforce a language or two; to teach the art of reasoning; to open a few paths or inlets to real and substantial wisdom ; yet notwithstanding all this appa- ratus, how few attain it the world will judge. But we must observe the widest difference between the _ procedure in natural and divine subjects. In human stu- dies every advancement pleases: and though we are not able to trace out all the relations and dependencies of — things, or at once perceive the full evidence of what we are contemplating; yet the mind is easy, under no anxiety or despair. It may grasp at more, yet is under no real dejec- tion for what it continues ignorant of, as being no way es- sential to its final end and good. But in matters of duty, and of great concernment, it is — | far otherwise: if the mind have not a plain and direct as- 1 ‘surance of what law obliges it, it must labour under doubts and fears of eternally miscarrying: for whatever we do not | REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 259 know with certainty, can be no more than a probable opi- nion, which carries neither evidence nor obligation with it, nor can afford any acquiescence or satisfaction to the mind. Here is no room for unadvised rashness, or ill-grounded opinion. To be deceived is to be undone; and there can- not be greater folly or arrogance, than for man Tatras to refuse an omniscient guide, and assume to him- 1. 3. s. 13. self what by the law of his nature he is incapa- ?-74°: ble of. Here we must reduce things to their first principles, and by the strictest forms of argumentation, show how they are connected together, what the truth of each proposition con- cludes, and by what means a moral evidence and obligation arises from them. If this be not the case, why are all sys- tems of natural religion forced to submit to these proofs, as the only means to explain and establish them? If the can be otherwise illustrated, why is it not done? If they cannot, I do not see how such religion can be called natu- ral, that wants proofs of that nature, which none but they who are conversant in the depths of philosophy can com- prehend. And if such be the miserable lot of man, that he can only know his duty by metaphysics, mathematics, abstrac- tions, and illations, better he had never been born: if the way to life be so narrow, how few indeed would find it? or, if duty be only discoverable by the knowing, and with- out knowledge there be no obligation, the more unhappy must the wise be, in bringing greater restraints upon them- selves, for which the ignorant are not accountable. There is not an author of note that ever mentions this subject, to whose words I might not leave the decision of it. A late polite writer agrees, that though the pr. mia- natural law, in the perfection to which it was car- i, ried by Cicero, might serve for a sufficient guide Cic.v. 3. p. to the few, such as himself, of enlarged minds and *” happy dispositions; yet, had it been so long depraved and adulterated by the prevailing errors and vices of mankind, that it was not discoverable even to those few, without great pains and study; and could not produce in them at last any thing more than a hope, never a full persuasion ; whilst the greatest part of mankind, even of the virtuous and inquisitive, lived without the knowledge of a God, or 260 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM the expectation of a futurity; and the multitude in every country was left to the gross idolatry of the popular worship. The conclusion, therefore, will be just; that if the law of nature be what is discoverable by the light of reason only, and the infinitely greater part of reasonable creatures be unable to discern it; nay, even the virtuous and inqui- _ sitive, to discover the very foundation of it, the knowledge ~ of a God; this cannot be the means appointed by the author of nature to come at the law of our beings; there necessarily must be some other: nor is it solving the diffi- culty, to say, that some individuals may be able to do it, and communicate it to others; for it is contrary to the de- finition as well as to truth; there being whole nations, and continents, without any such teacher or master ever among them ; therefore God never intended it, nor requires it of them: nor, if they were, could they have any right to de- mand their assent or obedience, nor others under obligation to give it, without the evidence of a superior authority. But let us allow, that though the common herd be un- equal to this task, yet the wise of the world, some few en- larged minds, possibly might discover these. truths, and be — evangelists to the rest of mankind: this will not mend the | matter, because they never could (in such case) impose them as a law to others; and that the question will still re- turn, whether even they were able to do it. Ask the wisest of men, and they will confess the weak- ness of reason; that, after all its attainments, it falls infi- nitely short of perfection, and is far from being commen- | surate to truth or the nature of things: that the greater insight they have, the more clearly they perceive a want of © further light to discover all their hidden beauties. The © deeper their penetration is into what they already know, the — more are they at a loss to account for what they do not — know; and what the most discerning know more than others, — is this, that a thousand things are above their reach, which © they are, and must be content to remain ignorant of. 1 Men indeed desire truth. and knowledge, but they are— not to be had at a cheap rate, not without labour, and watching, and painful study. As they who do not pene- | trate things to the bottom, only raise doubts, and fill them-_ selves with inquietudes: whence it has been made a question, — considering the presumption and yet weakness of the mind, - REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 26} whether the learned are not more subject to dangerous error and mistake, than the simple and ignorant? So near a re- lation is there betwixt science and pride, the relying on our own judgment, and being deceived. But, however, such is the obscurity of things, and the inability of our faculties, that the truly wise of every age have despaired of finding it out. Even Cicero Acad. a. never hoped to declare the fulness of truth, but '*?:* only to express somewhat that resembled, and might ap- proach near unto it. Notwithstanding therefore the pre- tence of divine and moral truths being so obvious, they are not of such easy access in other parts of knowledge: the search is tedious and embarrassing; close attention and unwearied application must be used; yet the farther we penetrate into nature, the thicker does that darkness appear, wherein all things are involved. The more excellent the knowledge is, the more remote doth it lie from the common level and observation of men; and the greater the difficul- ties to be removed, before a clear and solid judgment can be fixed. For the truth of this I need only appeal to the learned, whether their inquiries are not often fruitless, in search of things beyond their reach: too great for us to comprehend, or not fitting for us to know. And shall the knowledge of God, and of ourselves, the most arduous task, be accomplished with the least pains and difficulty ? I speak the sentiments of heathens as well as poouy 5, Christians. “ Are there not very few, says Plato, p. 476. if any, who are able to contemplate, aird 7d Kardy, Kal? abré, beauty in itself, according to itself; nay, that the In. p. 8. power of discovering what was best, was not common, but peculiar to the judgment of Jupiter, (which is a full asser- tion, that reason is not the measure, rule, or canon of itz”) And again, I say, “it is not possible for men to paon be blessed, and happy here, except some few only.” p. 973. I shall add the sentiments of alearned divine of our own. ‘If we reflect upon the common nature of man, or 5, 3... upon our own constitution, we cannot but find our row, vol. conceits of wisdom very absurd, if we observe the * ? *!* blindness of our mind, and the fickleness of human reason. If we mark how painful the search, and how difficult the comprehension is, of any truth; how hardly the most saga- cious descry any thing; how easily thé most judicious mistake ; 262 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM how the most learned everlastingly dispute ; and the wisest irreconcileably clash about matters seeming most: familiar : how the wiser a manis, and the more experience he gaineth, the less confident he is in his own judgment, and the more sensible he groweth of his own weakness: how dim the sight is of the most perspicacious, and how shallow the con- ceptions of the most profound; how narrow is the hori- zon of our knowledge, and how immensely the region of our ignorance is distended; how imperfectly and uncer- tainly we know those few things, to which our knowledge reacheth; how answerably to such experience we are told in holy writ, ‘ that every man is brutish in his knowledge ; that wisdom is hid from the eyes of all men, and is not found in the land of the living. ” Such authorities ought to make us at least hesitate, be- fore we admit so boldly advanced a proposition: that rea- son can discover and know the deep things of God, declare his existence and attributes, discern his will, distinguish exactly in matters of duty and of sin; when it thus falters and stumbles in every other part of knowledge, and is so liable to mistake truth for falsehood, and falsehood for truth. Or, how comes it to pass, that they who are masters of the dialectic sciences, so able to guide our reason, assist in the discovery of truth, and fix the understanding in posses- Cic. Nat, Sion of it, can find no sure criterion for judgment D.1.1. or assent, but the result of all their tedious study, PEs is no more than probability ? Quint. 12, Such was Quintilian’s complaint: non tempus 10. nobis deesse, verum industriam, ordinem, rationem, et modum sciendi. Men of learning find many requisites are wanting, besides genius, leisure, and inclination, to the discernment of truth and increase of knowledge: and that just principles, exact method, and correct reasoning, are not without difficulty made familiar to the studies and the minds of men. Among the few wise, to excel in one science is a character of distinguishing merit ; to excel in more, of a rare, uncommon genius ; to excel inall, is yet to come. But the limits of human reason cannot be very exten- sive, when it is nonplused with every common production Vid. Diod. of nature. The overflowing of the Nile, fora long ee tal course of ages, wearied and baffled the wisdom of the ancients ; and happy was he that could assign a reason REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 263 for it, that could not easily be disproved. Aristotle threw himself into the Euripus, for not being able to ac- Vid. Lact. count for its fluxes. To believe the antipodes, p. 287. was a specimen of madness or delirium ; the world laughed at so prodigious a conceit, that men’s heels should be higher than their heads, fruits and trees grow downward, hail and snow fall upwards to the earth. Even some very learned Christians durst not admit so bold a proposition, lest man- kind should be forced to look out for another parent be- sides Adam. So long-lived is ignorance, that, in the eighth century, Virgil, Bishop of Saltzburgh, was publicly accused of heresy and impiety, for believing this monstrous doctrine, that the earth was round, and every part of it inhabited: pope Zachary ordered a process against him, and that if the articles were proved, that he shouldbe excommunicated and degraded. I will not say this is a reproach to nature, but that it is prodigious, if men, with all their philosophy, could not ac- count for the floods in the Nile, or the form of the globe they lived on ; nay, that it was never done, till a Newton gave a guess at it, and the French mathematicians went to Torneo to try the experiment, and confirmed it; yet could with ease discover the regions of heaven, and Him who sat upon the throne in them. To omit a thousand particulars: how was that Via. Ens. fruitless inquiry, whether there be a vacuum, and Prap. |. what it is, exercised the wits of all ages? The ** “* Pythagoreans would establish it as the means whereby the world breathed. The stoics made it an infinite space in which the world should be consumed by fire. Possidonius, not an infinite space, but just as much as would serve for the disso- lution of the world. Plato and Aristotle denied it; every one preferring the opinion that least shocked them, with- out being able to answer the difficulties objected against it. In the last ages, some defined a vacuum to be a privation of body, that is, a nothing. Gassendus, to avoid that, plunges into an equal absurdity, by imagining some beings which are neither corporeal nor spiritual, neither substance nor accidents. The Cartesians deny the possibility of a vacuum ; as Leibnitz and others do from the great per- plexities found in the supposition. Locke could not an- swer the questions of the Cartesians; but by proposing 264 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM others equally obscure, freely acknowledges, that he knows not even what space, or extension, or substance are. And if we are ignorant of the nature of substance, what can we comprehend truly? Then Newton arises, and entirely de- stroys the physics of Descartes, asserts a vacuum to be so absolutely necessary, that without it the motion of the planets and the consequences thereof, are things inexplic-' able and impossible. Even among the mathematicians, who pretend not to move a step without demonstration, we find some affirm, and others deny, and disputes prevail in that as well as other sciences; which shows that truth is sometimes lost among them: that their demonstrations do not always carry evidence, and that they themselves cannot always see through the mist of infinite diminutions, where a finite atom is divisible to infinities of infinities. To which of these great idols then shall we bend our knee, or live in a perpetual state of scepticism? or, may we not learn, that there are bounds to the most exalted understandings, and room to doubt whether they can find out what is comprehensible; when it is so hard to compre- hend motion, extension, or the least dust of matter. Another question of no small importance, and not fully cleared to this day, is 1édev 7a kaxd, Whence, or what is the origin of evil? Every fool is able to make the question, but. few men so wise, as to be either able to give or fit to receive sufficient answer to it, according to the depth of the matter itself, says a very learned man: for what philo- — sopher or divine has treated this subject so accurately as — to remove all objections, and give thorough satisfaction to — the minds of those who search for it ? _ Metaphysicians have here a noble field for their ab- stracted flights, whether, according to Durandus, there be any divine concourse in sin? Whether, with others, moral evil has any real essence, or real efficient cause, or only deficient? Whether there be any pure evil? Whether it be a privation of being, or a real positive being? Whether it has not some natural good for its subject, and so the entitative material act of sin be physically or morally good ? By what degrees of permission an all-wise and merciful God suffered sin to enter into the world, since he abhors the least appearance of evil? &c. 7 REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 265 The elder heathens, when they observed the wickedness and misery of man, had no other way to solve it, but by admitting two principles, the one good, and the other bad, as the causes of these different appearances in the world. This, Plutarch tells us, was the best account, the most ancient and universal he could meet with. Among the latter pagans, Celsus says, “it is difficult for those who are not philosophers, to know the nature of oa evil.” But his own account is, “ that matter is the p. 206. subject of all evil, to which it adheres; that the evil in things, neither formerly, nor at present, nor for the future, can be more or less; for the nature of all things is alike, and the generation of evil always the same.” Jam- -blichus freely confesses that he knew not the ori- DerMys: gin or cause of it. In other places, he produces it s.4.c. 4. from those demons, who were by nature wicked: 14%” though, in the sense of the Greeks, they were not wicked by choice, but by creation and necessity. So that whilst he would free the gods from being the cause of evil, he directly makes them the authors of it: or else he Ide. 7. imagines, that evil proceeds from the different parts, powers, and influences of the universe; yet of these God is the former. So among Christians, Origen complains, that if there be some points more difficult than others, we may justly reckon among them this of the origin of evil. Reason has never yet answered, but rather entangled itself in the scruples and difficulties that spring up here: we have no- thing to do but to acquiesce in revelation: that “God made man upright, but he sought out many inventions :”’ and though we are not able to comprehend the rule of divine proceedings, yet we are assured, that he cannot act but with the most perfect justice and goodness, without running into those cautions and niceties which learned men are forced to use in the explanation of these points: that sin cannot be said absolutely and simply to be from God, but only with this addition or limitation, that the act, as it is a real entity, is from God; therefore, God is not the cause of sin, but is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative act of sin. What miserable jargon is philosophy, wading out of its depths? ik Is not the world still divided about the doctrine of pres N 266 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM destination, free-will, &c. each sect accusing the other of making God the author of sin, or of denying his providence, and a thousand other reproaches, which they think inevit- ably attend every hypothesis but their own? And if nature, from the contemplations of it, must be our guide to supernatural truths, yet what truth in nature is the most sagacious inquirer able to comprehend? the least occurrence gravels us; all our reasons and experience but slowly discover the contrivance and intrigues of Pro- vidence. Nor can we thoroughly find out one thing in the frame of beings; they being made by a knowledge so far superior and transcendent to that of ours. In the beloved study of the ancients, that of the heavenly bodies, those surest guides to their Creator, their discove- ries were slow and inaccurate, and of their amazing velo- city, distance, magnitude, the order, laws, and regularity of their motion, more discoveries have been made in the space of two centuries than had been since the world be- gan: and how many unknown worlds, and species of in- visible creatures, have the telescope or microscope opened to the moderns, that have enriched and extended their knowledge of nature so vastly beyond that of former ages. Nay, the clearer view of the wisdom of God in our own frame, the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatic vessels, the motion of the heart, the contexture of the brain, on which our very being and life depends, and other things (without which the mechanic structure of the bodies cannot be understood) are but lately brought to light, the discoveries of yesterday. Will not the raillery of the woman to Thales, who fell into a ditch, whilst contemplating the stars, suit all the boasters of reason? “how should you know what passes in the heavens, when you see not what is just at your feet?” If nature be impenetrable, and its springs only known to the maker and director of them; if we know so little of the least of things, how much less, and with what more difficulty must we know any thing of the God of & nature? Is it reasonable to believe that spiritual and im- — mortal subjects are the only ones to be found out with ease and certainty by the wiser sort, but not so by the © commons of the world, who nevertheless are as much inte- rested therein as he that sits in the chair or in the senate? REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE, 267 The whole is against fact, against the experience and ob- servation of every age; it is what man never did; what he is under a necessity of not doing. To apply this (in the words of a most learned prelate ) “it is very unfair in those who deny the need and Ryo expedience of a divine revelation, to argue in fa= 2d Pastor. ; ° . ets py Oe vour of reason, as if all mankind were philosophers, and every one had sufficient capacity, leisure, and inclina- tion, to form a scheme of duties for the direction of his own life. For it is not enough to say, that there are learned men in the world, who are able to form such schemes; since, whatever their own ability may be, they have no right to command assent and obedience from others; nor can any one rationally receive and embrace their schemes, without following them through the chain of reasonings upon which they are built, and judging whe- ther the reasonings will support the schemes. And further (in case those learned men differ) without judging which of them is in the right, and which in the wrong; a task that the generality of mankind are as unequal to, as they are to the framing the schemes themselves. And the dif- ficulty is still greater, when we find the same philosopher differing from himself, now advancing one opinion, and then again leaning to another; at one time clear and posi- tive, at another time doubtful and wavering, upon the very same point; in which case his opinion on either side can amount to no more in the result, than to prove him a guide -very unfit for the people to follow.” To this consideration of human reason, as the instrument of natural religion, and which, from the authorities of the wisest men, seems insufficient for so great a task, some par- ticular circumstances must be added, as necessarily sup- Posed to attend the person who has the use or exercise of it. Lord Herbert would have him one of very extraordinary abilities, but who has received no external informations, by tradition, revelation, or otherwise. His lordship saw the necessity of making such a demand, from the extraordinary part that was to be acted; but could see none for the granting it to him in the present controversy. But let us suppose some person appearing in the world, in full proportion of body and mind, %. e. with all his parts and faculties complete, as much accomplished as we can 268 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM imagine any one to be, not improved by consideration and experience, having no one to instruct him, nor any other light whereby to discover any thing, but his own unassisted reason. The question is, whether this person, by the sole strength and evidence of his own mind, from contemplating himself, and what he sees about him, could arrive to any competent apprehension of a first cause of all these things ? Whether he could, in any tolerable measure or degree, by consideration of, and reflection upon himself; or, by col- lection and inference from sensible objects, find out that Being, who was the Author of all others, together with that worship wherewith he ought to be honoured? If he could not, then it will follow, that the existence of a God could never be discovered by the light of nature only ; and that man either has not reason, or has it to no purpose. _ This is stated in their own words; and we must make a few observations upon them. 1. That it is always made a postulatum, and taken for granted, that the heathens did attain this knowledge by the help of nature only. Which is begging the question, and false, in fact; it being evident from all history, and their own confession, that they had other means of instruc- tion, much shorter than the road of nature, and much more explicit. 2. That if man cannot make these discoveries by reason, he has it to no purpose, is an unjustifiable expression: for man may have reason to all the purposes of his being, though not to all the counsels and purposes of God: man is essentially a dependent creature in mind and body: his — mind is suitable to his nature; and for a natural dependent — reason to discover supernaturals, is not according to the — nature received, and therefore unnatural. 4 3. Nor is it a just insinuation to say (as Puffendorf does) ~ that though it is very probable that the chief heads of na-_ tural law were expressly delivered by God Almighty to — the first mortals, and were from them communicated to — others by custom and institution; yet the knowledge of — that law may nevertheless be styled natural, inasmuch as — the necessary truth and certainty of it may be drawn from the use of natural reason. § It is certain that all the heads of it are in the highest — REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 269 manner agreeable to reason, and what it will assent to as soon as proved: but as natural reason stands distinguished — from revelation, it could not discern or prove the truth of one of them, before it was otherwise manifested to it. And _so his argument suggests. God expressly delivered them, which he need not have done, could reason so certainly have known them without it; and that knowledge did not come this way, is accounted for, by their being communi- cated to others by custom and institution. | 4. Another distinction not sufficiently attended to, is betwixt the light of reason and the law of it; for though truth be the object of the mind, and all law be truth, yet all truth is not law, 7. e. does not oblige. We assent to a thing as true, from sensible evidence, or by discerning the certainty of its terms and meaning. But to believe such truths to be a law, we must go a great deal further, and know them to be the will of some higher power who has a right to exact obedience: for law necessarily induces an obligation; and nothing can oblige but power, which is only from the will of a rightful superior. Reason is to inquire and determine concerning the truth or falsehood of things, which is a vast province; therefore ‘by no means useless or given in vain: for we cannot believe what is contrary to reason, or what we do not perceive the evidence of, nor any further than as we understand it. So neither can obedience be necessary, till we discover (or have sufficient grounds so to do) the connection of such with the divine will. But then, to know a thing to be true, and that it is the command of God, superinduces an obli- gation not to be dispensed with. And here begin the actings of men’s consciences: what before was only dis- cursive, now commences a judicial faculty. But reason, by seeing the evidence of the law, is no more a law to the mind than the sun is to the eye, or to its own being or motion, though by the help of it we see one, and are con- vinced of the other. Let us now suppose this person (or, if it be any advan- tage, a college of such) in a solitude or state of nature, making use of the several means afforded him to discover the end of his being, and consider whether they are suffi- cient to such purpose. . The means generally assigned, are, 270 THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS FROM First, the works of creation. Secondly, his own frame. Thirdly, the congruity and fitness of things. First, then, let him carefully observe the outward frame of things, the course of the rivers, the flowing of the sea, the productions of the vegetable world, the number and variety of the creatures, the different qualities of the ele- ments, the vicissitude of times, the motions of the heavenly bodies, the regular succession of light and darkness, the rising of the stars, and the return of seasons, the renewing of the bloom and verdure of the earth. That there is a constant round of things; a death, and reviviscence in na- ture, without any alteration or real decay, either in the earth on which he dwells, or in the roof of heaven which he beholds, but all move in a regular course and order. Such observations would undoubtedly raise astonishment and admiration in his mind: but if he could from thence learn a deity, it would be a kind piece of instruction in those who are masters of the subject, to show us where the mind would set out, what mediums it would take, and how advance, step by step, without danger or error ; gradually overcoming the imperfections of nature, and the many dif ficulties which constantly occur in such inquiries; until it broke through all that darkness with which it is naturally surrounded, and opened a way to the throne of God. The fallacy which deceives so many, is, not attending to the difference between an assisted and unassisted mind ; and makes them ready to conclude, that because we are able to do this by the guidance of revelation, that therefore an uninformed mind would have taken the same steps; which is boasting of the use of a dark lanthorn at noon- day; they are as different as light and darkness. It is an argument that concludes nothing, because impossible to be proved, therefore is not to be admitted or relied on. But to return: many years must pass in observing the qualities of the elements out of which all things are com- pounded; the nature of things, their manner of existence, powers, and operations; what are their intents and pur- poses, what their productions and effects, their appointment and end; by what steady rules they act, in the long chain and subordination of causes, how one is guided and over- ruled in the next, that by a superior, and so on, till he comes REVELATION, NOT FROM REASON OR NATURE. 271 to the highest visible cause; for without this, he cannot have any knowledge of visible objects, so as to enable his understanding to proceed into further inquiries. And since nature is so dark and obscure, he must raise his speculations from confused and inevident notions to those that are clear and evident: .as also descend in this science from generals to particulars. He must know the cause and original of the dispositions, qualities, and opera- tions of beings, and wherein their perfection consists: he must have a clear and accurate discernment of the origin and generation of things; the construction, temperaments and affections of natural bodies, their gravity and levity, heat and cold, dryness and moisture; he must with the closest view penetrate and unfold the hidden springs of na- ture, to what are owing motion and life, and from what privation, and dissolution come; he must be exactly ac- quainted with the rules and measures of time and motion, with the situation, figure, order, revolutions, and influence of the heavenly bodies; the nature of time, place, and quantity; with ten thousand other disquisitions, necessary to take in the vast compass of the universe, and search them to the bottom, so as to remove all objection and arrive at certainty, otherwise his whole scheme would be but ima- gination, and he could never trace out that wisdom and de- sign which must lead him to the Creator: for if there be error in his procedure, in his reasonings and reflections, they will bewilder him in that mighty labyrinth, but never direct him to truth. Secondly, he must carefully observe the operations of his mind, how it apprehends, collects, compares, and infers, what are the measures and degrees of credibility, and fix some certain rules to distinguish truth from falsehood ; to determine concerning any proposition that offers itself, by discerning how far he is to give his assent to it: for with-, out some such clear infalliblerule, he can never know what to believe or disbelieve, but must remain in perpetual doubt and suspense, or, by admitting false principles, wander in error and delusion. Thirdly, after an accurate view of nature, he must ap- prehend the harmony and connection of the whole, the reasons, fitnesses, and congruity of things, and thence col- lect such rules as are most agreeable to right reason, and 272)