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 THE AUTHOR OF NATURE 
 AND THE SUPERNATURAL 
 
 (De Deo Creante et Elevante) 
 A DOGMATIC TREATISE 
 
 BY 
 
 ¥ 
 
 THE REVEREND JOSEPH POHLE, PH.D., D.D. 
 
 FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY IN THE 
 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA, NOW PROFESSOR 
 OF DOGMA IN THE UNIVERSITY OF BRESLAU 
 
 AUTHORIZED ENGLISH VERSION, BASED ON THE FIFTH 
 GERMAN EDITION, WITH SOME ABRIDGEMENT 
 AND MANY ADDITIONAL REFERENCES 
 
 BY 
 
 ARTHUR PREUSS 
 
 ST. LOUIS, MO., 1912 
 PuBLISHED BY B. HERDER © 
 17 SOUTH BROADWAY 
 
 FREIBURG (BADEN) LONDON W.C. 
 GERMANY 68, GREAT RUSSELL STR. 
 
NIHIL OBSTAT. 
 
 Sti. Ludovici, die 10. Junii, 1912 
 JOSEPHUS WENTKER, 
 
 Censor Librorum. 
 
 IMPRIMATUR. 
 Sti. Ludovici, die 12. Junii, 1912 
 } JOANNES J. GLENNON, 
 Archiepiscopus Sti. Ludovici. 
 
 Copyright, 1912, 
 by 
 JOSEPH GUMMERSBACH. 
 
 — BECKTOLD— 
 PRINTING AND BOOK MFG. CO, 
 ST. LOUIS, MO. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 INTRODUCTION I 
 Part I. CREATION CONSIDERED AS A Divine Act 3 
 Cu. I. The Beginning of the World, or Creation as a Pro- 
 duction out of Nothing 4 
 § 1. The Dogma é 4 
 Art. 1. Demonstration (as ichered Sere : 4 
 Art. 2. The Heresies of Dualism and Pantheism . 20 
 § 2. Explanation of the Dogma . 82 
 Art, 1. The Divine Idea of the Chines as he at 
 emplary Cause of Creation , 32 
 ArT. 2. Creation in its Relation to ine! ieee 35 
 Art. 3. Creation as a Free Divine Act 40 
 ArT. 4. Creation in Time . r 49 
 Art. 5. The Incommunicability on God’s Greate 
 Power 54 
 Cu. II. The Continued Existence of the Created Universe, 
 or Divine Preservation and Concurrence 61 
 § 1. Divine Preservation . ‘ 62 
 § 2. Divine Co-operation or Consitrenes i Se OF, 
 Cu. III. The Final Cause or End of Creation, and Divine 
 Providence : 79 
 § 1. The Final Cause or Obiect Me Creation : 80 
 § 2. Divine Providence OI 
 Part II. CREATION PASSIVELY CONSIDERED, OR THE CREATED 
 UNIVERSE 97 
 Cu. I. Dogmatic Cosmology . 98 
 § 1. First and Second Creation . 98 
 . § 2. The Hexaémeron in its Relation 18) Guienee and 
 PEER ESTO CULE iar bie coma are enn oN ai tatin YUTO3 
 
 ill 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Art. 1. The Mosaic Account of the Creation and 
 Physical Science .:. on lies tO 
 Art. 2. The Hexaémeron and foe MR Ay Seer ti 
 CH. U1. Dogmatio: Anthropology 7.) ae ce ee 124 
 § 1. The Nature of Man. . 2° 2 te6 
 
 Art. 1. The Origin of Man one a Waite ras the 
 TiimatyRacercue - 126 
 
 Art. 2. The Essential Comscimenes i Man an 
 Their Mutual Relationship . . - ae O 
 Art. 3. The Immortality of the ees Soul 2 OES 
 Arr, 4, Origin of. the Setl-).. 9. *.0 au. eee 
 § 2. The Supernatural in Man. . . EM an Ta Soule 60) 
 Art. I. Nature and the Sanernatiratl 3) te Le 
 A. Definition of the Supernatural . . . 180 
 
 B. The Prerogatives That Constitute the Super 
 natural Order.) ohne - I90 
 
 Art. 2. Man’s Srey Hai Eracweey, in Caen 
 ine) coh, SRE . 196 
 
 ArT. 3. Various Hercstoeh VS. the Domai Ronen 
 ing of the Church in Regard to the State of Orig- 
 
 inal’ Justice >. -.0)4 . 218 
 
 Art. 4. The Different Sate Bs Maw id ane State 
 of Pure Nature in Particular. . . Rea) 
 
 § 3. Man’s Defection from the Supernatural ‘Ofled or 
 the Doctrine of Original Sin . . “232 
 
 Art. 1. The Sin of Adam Considered as ane ee 
 Sin, and its Effects on Our Proto-Parents . . 233 
 
 Art. 2. The Sin of Adam Considered as Original 
 Sin in the Technical Sense of the Term . . 2235 
 
 Art. 3. The Nature of Original Sin. . . . 259 
 
 Art. 4. How Original Sin is Transmitted. 8 ZAO 
 
 Art. 5. The Penalties of Original Sin . . . . 26 
 
 Cu. III. Christian Angelology . . . . 308 
 § 1. Existence, Nature, Number, and Hicecche af the 
 
 Bavels a: feels oMeea rd 
 
 ArT. I. Existence and Nene Bi the Mapels Meh 
 Art. 2, Number and Hierarchy of the Angels 75.32% 
 § 2. The Angels and the Supernatural Order . . , 325 
 AR? T; “The Supernatural Endowment of the Angels 325 
 
 iv 
 
TABLE; OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 Art. 2. The Angels in Their Relation to Men, or 
 the Guardian Angels . . Jed B30 
 § 3. The Apostasy of a Number af he Wipelan ine AO 
 Art. 1. The Fallen Angels or Demons. . Le a40 
 Art. 2. The Demons in Their Relation to ‘ie tie 
 Matis RaGCeni saat ace heey alam ual Man nen aitLM eI onl RAL 
 
 ENDER, rata Vicente tis strc elt lees Yorn «cai nin b taut Womhaettite. tren Waly ell SEB 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2022 with funding from 
 Princeton Theological Seminary Library 
 
 https://archive.org/details/godauthorofnatur00pohl 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In two previous volumes * we considered God 
 as He is in Himself. The remaining treatises 
 of what is commonly called Special Dogmatic 
 Theology treat of Him in relation to His various 
 works, both of the natural and the supernatural 
 order. 
 
 God’s first and primal work is the Creation of 
 the universe. Creation constitutes the funda- 
 mental and essential postulate of all being and 
 operation in the natural order as well as of all 
 supernatural institutions, such as the Incarnation, 
 Grace, the Sacraments, etc. Hence, the dog- 
 matic treatise De Deo Creante et Elevante, which 
 forms the subject matter of this volume, views 
 God as the Author of Nature and the Super- 
 natural. A true idea of Creation is indispensable 
 to deepen and perfect the conception of God 
 gained from the two preceding treatises. 
 
 1God: His Knowability, Essence, Herder 1911.—The Divine Trin- 
 and Attributes. A Dogmatic Trea- ity. A Dogmatic Treatise. By the 
 tise. Prefaced by a Brief General Rev. Joseph Pohle, Ph.D., D.D. 
 Introduction to the Study of Dog- -. . Authorized English Version, 
 matic Theology. By the Rev. Jos. with Some Abridgement and Nu- 
 Pohle, Ph.D., D.D. Authorized Eng- merous Additional References, by 
 lish Version, with Some Abridge- Arthur Preuss. St. Louis, Mo.: B. 
 ment and Added References, by Herder 1g11. i 
 Arthur Preuss. St. Louis, Mo.: B. 
 
 I 
 
2 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Creation may be regarded from two distinct 
 points of vantage: either (1) subjectively, as 
 the creative act of God (actus creationis); or 
 (2) objectively, as the result of this act, namely, 
 the work of Creation (opus creationis). Hence 
 the present volume embraces two main divisions: 
 (I) Creation considered as a divine act, and ( TT} 
 Creation considered as the result of that dct aor 
 the created universe. 
 
PART I 
 
 CREATION CONSIDERED AS A 
 DIVINE ACT 
 
 As the innermost Essence of God is self-existence,? 
 so the cosmos (by which we mean everything not-God) 
 is essentially dependent on God as its first and sole cause. 
 The universe is no ens a se; it is entirely ab alio. This 
 dependency is co-existent with the universe in all its 
 phases. From the moment of its creation down to the 
 hour of its consummation the universe is and remains 
 essentially ens ab alio. It depends on God for its being 
 and operation, and would sink back into nothingness 
 without Him. Consequently God’s absolute causality 
 must be our guiding principle in studying the doctrine 
 of Creation. It is in the light of this principle that we 
 must envisage the created universe, all things visible and 
 invisible, the whole of nature and the supernatural order. 
 
 Considered in His causal relation to the universe, God 
 is its Creator; considered in relation to the continued 
 existence of the universe, He is its Preserver and the 
 Principle of all creatural action; considered in His rela- 
 tion to the end of the universe (taking end in the sense 
 of causa finals), He is the ultimate goal of Creation 
 and its Governor by virtue of Divine Providence. We 
 shall treat these three aspects of Creation in as many 
 separate Chapters. 
 
 2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Aitributes, pp. 
 133 Sdq. 
 
 3 
 
CHARTER 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD, OR CREATION AS 
 A PRODUCTION OUT OF NOTHING 
 
 SE GTILOIN er 
 
 THE DOGMA 
 
 That the universe was created out of nothing 
 is one of the fundamental articles of the Catholic 
 faith. Dogmatic theology demonstrates it from 
 Holy Scripture, defends it against the opposing 
 heresies of Dualism and Pantheism, clears up 
 certain supplementary and explanatory notions 
 that centre about the dogma, e. g., the liberty of 
 the divine act of Creation, the simultaneous be- 
 ginning of the world and of time, the incommuni- 
 cability of creative power, etc. 
 
 ARV IGICE Tt 
 
 DEMONSTRATION FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE 
 
 1. THE Concept or Creation ExPLAINED.— 
 Catholic Philosophy, in accord with ecclesiastical 
 Tradition, defines Creation as “the production of 
 
 oS 
 
CREATION DEFINED 5 
 
 a thing from, or out of, nothing.” * In this defi- 
 nition, ‘‘production” expresses the proximate 
 genus, while “out of nothing” * gives the specific 
 difference by which Creation is marked off from 
 all other modes of production as a singular oper- 
 ation peculiar to God. 
 
 a) There are two other well-known modes of pro- 
 duction, which, however, have nothing in common with 
 Creation except the genus. We mean generation and 
 formation.° 
 
 Generation differs from Creation in that Creation is 
 a production out of nothing, while generation signifies 
 the origin of one living being from another. This defi- 
 nition applies to the divine Generation of the Son from 
 the Father as well as to organic generation in the physical 
 universe. In the Blessed Trinity, Generation is the 
 Procession of the Logos “from the substance of the 
 Father.”® The immanent production of the Holy 
 Ghost by Spiration cannot be called Creation.’ 
 
 As regards the so-called formative processes, both of 
 nature and art, whether divine or creatural in their 
 origin, all postulate a substratum, or raw material,’ from 
 which the artificer evolves his product. Even second 
 
 3“ Creatio simpliciter est pro- 
 
 ductio ret ex nihilo.’ Cfr. J. T. 
 Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, 
 
 the nothingness of itself, as dis- 
 tinguished from the nothingness of 
 tts subject.” (W. Humphrey, S. J., 
 
 pp. 202 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 
 1904. 
 
 4 Ex nihilo, in the sense of e*# 
 nililo sui et subjectt. ‘‘ Since that 
 which already is, is not being made, 
 but that is being made which was 
 not; so the nothingness, or the not 
 being, of the thing which is being 
 made, is presupposed to the effect- 
 ing of it. This is what is called 
 
 * His Divine Majesty,’ or The Liv- 
 ing God, p. 206, London 1897.) 
 5 Generatio — plasmatio s. forma- 
 tio. f ; 
 
 8éxk THs ovcias Tov marTpés, 
 (Nicene Creed). Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, 
 The Divine Trinity, pp. 162 sqq. 
 
 7 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
 Trinity, pp. 209 sqq. i 
 
 8 Materia praeiacens Ss. ex qua. 
 
6 THE DOGMA 
 
 creation, 7. ¢., the formation of the universe by God, was 
 not creation in the strict sense, except in so far as in 
 
 process thereof God actual] 
 
 of nothing.® 
 
 y produced new essences out 
 
 b) The phrase er nihilo was misunderstood by Abbot 
 
 Fredegis of Tours, 
 real being, 
 
 erroneous notion. 
 
 who took nihilum in the sense of 
 as some sort of invisible 
 which the universe was formed.1! 
 
 “protyle,” from 
 This is an altogether 
 
 The nothingness that preceded the 
 
 Creation of the universe was no hyle, as conceived by 
 
 Plato and Philo under the name of yi dv. 
 
 The term 
 
 ex nithilo is designed merely to negative the existence of 
 
 any substratum or materia praeiacens, 
 
 aliquo (é ovx dvTwy ) 1? 
 
 It means non ex 
 
 It would be equally erroneous to take Creation as 
 
 signifying a conversion 
 something, 
 
 quo, 1. @., some sort of bein 
 
 another kind.13 
 
 (conversio) of nothing into 
 Every conversion must have a terminus a 
 § convertible into being of 
 Those of the Greek Fathers who de- 
 
 fined Creation as & Tov py eivar eis TO evar Tapaywyn — 
 (adductio ex non esse ad esse), merely wished to em- 
 phasize that a thing which previously was merely possible 
 
 had become rea] or actual. 
 
 to actuality is no conversion, 
 of the term, a mutation, b 
 
 9 Hence the current distinction 
 between creatio prima (ex nthilo) 
 and creatio Secunda (ex materia 
 praetacente), 
 
 10 De Nihilo et Tenebris. Frede- 
 gis flourished about the beginning 
 of the ninth century, Cfr, Hurter, 
 Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae 
 Catholicae, Vol. I, col. 714 sro 
 ed., Oeniponte 1903. 
 
 11 Cfr. A.-M. Clerke, Modern 
 
 A transition from potentiality 
 nor even, in the proper sense 
 ut merely succession, 4. e., 
 
 Cosmogonies, Pp. 150 sqq., London 
 1905. 
 
 12 Cfr. St, Thom., 5S, Theol., 1a, 
 qu. 45, art. 1, ad 3: “ Haec prae- 
 bositio ‘ex? non designat causam 
 materialem, sed ordinem tantum, 
 Sicut cum dicitur: Ex mane fit 
 meridies, i, e., post mane fit meri- 
 dies.” 
 
 13 We shall treat of this subject 
 more in detail in a later volume, 
 on the Blessed Eucharist, 
 
CREATION DEFINED 7 
 
 there suddenly appears a thing which did not previously 
 exist. 
 
 Consequently, Creation is an act whereby God pro- 
 duces a substance which ex parte termini was preceded 
 by pure nothingness (76 oi« gv). Hence the periphrastic 
 definition given by St. Thomas: “ Creatio est productio 
 alicuius ret secundum totam suam substantiam, nullo 
 praesupposito — Creation is the production of the whole 
 substance of a thing, with nothing presupposed.” 14 
 To mark off the concept of Creation still more clearly 
 from all those other kinds of purely formative pro- 
 duction, which merely effect accidental changes in an 
 already existing substance,* the Angelic Doctor de- 
 fines it as “the production of being, as being.” 28 
 Being, as such, is opposed not only to this or that con- 
 crete being, but to pure nothingness. Accident, on the 
 other hand, is not properly being (ens), but ens entis, 
 or ens in alio,—that is to say, it has its being only by 
 inherence in a subject.17 Hence creation invariably re- 
 sults in substances, while accidents, as such, are not, 
 strictly speaking, created, but simply inhere in created 
 substances (“accidentia non tam creantur, quam con- 
 creantur ).”’ 18 
 
 14S. Theol., 1a, qu. 65, art. 3.— 
 *‘ The last three words [of this defi- 
 nition] are merely declarative. The 
 sense of them is contained in the 
 words which precede’ them.... 
 The formal object of creation is 
 being. . . . Creation makes that to 
 be, which was not. Hence, another 
 definition — Creation is the produc- 
 tion of being, as being.”’—(Hum- 
 phrey, “ His Divine Majesty,’ p, 
 207.) 
 
 15 Such as a sculptor, e. g.,,. works 
 in marble. 
 
 16 “ Creatio est productio entis in 
 
 quanium est ens.’ S. Theol., 12, 
 qu. 44, art. 2. 
 
 17 Cfr. John Rickaby, S. J., Gen- 
 eral Metaphysics, p. 253 (Stony- 
 hurst Series). 
 
 18“ To be created is proper to 
 substance. This is so, both be- 
 cause, if substance is to be made, 
 it can be made only by creation; 
 and because other things, even if 
 they are made at the same time, 
 and along with substance, are 
 nevertheless made of that substance, 
 because it is through the reality of 
 the substance that they consist.’”— 
 
8 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOGMA 
 
 c) Though the Scriptural and ecclesiastical concept 
 of Creation was more or less unknown to the most 
 enlightened pagan philosophers of antiquity, as Plato and 
 Aristotle, it is not one at which it was impossible for 
 human reason to arrive without supernatural aid. With 
 the possible exception of the teleological, all the argu- 
 ments by which we are able to demonstrate the exist- 
 ence of God show that He is the absolute Creator 
 of the universe, and they would be incomplete without 
 this final conclusion. De facto, however, human rea- 
 son is indebted to Divine Revelation for the true con- 
 cept of Creation, which philosophy might have found, 
 but in matter of fact did not find. This service which 
 Revelation has rendered to reason is the more important 
 because the concept of Creation clarifies our idea of 
 God. For unless we know God as the Creator of all 
 things, we do not know the true God.” 
 
 d) The objections raised against the dogma of Cre- 
 ation by infidel philosophers are futile. The axiom 
 “Ex nihilo nihil fit” cannot be applied to Creation, be- 
 cause Creation does not suppose a nihilum causae, but 
 merely a nihilum sui et subiecti. God is the exemplary, 
 the efficient, and the final cause of the universe, though, 
 of course, the cosmos was not educed out of a divine sub- 
 stratum, as the Pantheists allege. Consequently it cannot 
 be asserted that the dogma of Creation involves “an 
 overt and direct contradiction of right reason.” *° On 
 the contrary, since the universe has its raison d’étre not 
 in itself, but in a supra-mundane and intelligent Creator, 
 
 Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,’ 
 pp. 207 sq. 
 
 19 Cfr. Kleutgen, Philosophie der 
 Vorzeit, Vol. II, p. 839, 2nd ed. 
 Innsbruck 1878; Suarez, Metaph., 
 disp. 20, sect. 1, n. 24; K. Elser, 
 
 Die Lehre des Aristoteles uber das 
 Wirken Gottes, Minster 1890. 
 
 20 A, Lange, Geschichte des Ma- 
 terialismus, 4th ed., p. 131, Iser- 
 lohn 1882. 
 
THE DOGMA, PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE 9 
 
 Creation is not only a possible but a necessary conception. 
 Herbert Spencer objects that to conceive a relation be- 
 tween nothing and something, is as impossible as to con- 
 ceive of a thing hovering midway betwixt nothingness 
 and existence. But the author of the Synthetic Phi- 
 losophy has overlooked the fact that in defining Creation 
 we employ the term “nothing” to denote logical, not 
 real opposition. The terminus of active Creation (which 
 takes place in instanti), is Being not in fieri, but in facto 
 esse. Hence it is ludicrous to compare the world to 
 “metamorphosed nothingness ” and to treat it as a “ de- 
 lusion.” 
 
 Another, somewhat more serious objection is that the 
 dogma of Creation postulates the pre-existence of an 
 immeasurable void, and the creation of space by an ex- 
 ternal agency,— which are impossible assumptions, since 
 “the non-existence of space cannot by any mental effort 
 be imagined.” 2+ But a man who allows his imagination 
 to picture empty space as a creatable reality, has no 
 right to hurl stones into the garden of Christian philos- 
 ophy. If only actual or real space can be concreated 
 with the corporeal universe, we have no more reason to 
 speak of the “ existence” or “ non-existence ” of empty 
 or imaginary space than of the “ existence” of a possible 
 triangle or man. | 
 
 ‘ 66 
 
 2. ProoF oF THE Docma.—All things are 
 created out of nothing. This truth is clearly 
 contained both in Scripture and Tradition. The 
 Socinian and Arminian claim that it cannot be 
 demonstrated from the Bible, is manifestly false. 
 
 a) seb. 11S \-consider,,. i the, first. place, the 
 
 21 Herbert Spencer, First Principles (Burt’s Library, p. 29). 
 
10 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 
 
 deeper meaning of certain names applied to God 
 by Sacred Scripture. 
 
 a) God’s incommunicable proper name is 711, 6 oy, 
 primus et novissimus. Inasmuch as this name denotes 
 His proper Essence, it applies to God really and truly ; in 
 fact, as a proper name, it applies to Him alone,” or, to put 
 it otherwise, nothing outside of God is or can be called 
 Yahweh. Now, if the things existing outside of God 
 were, like Himself, necessary, increate, and self-existing 
 (even though only after the manner of an eternal self- 
 existing hyle), God could no longer claim as exclusively 
 His own that self-existence which is denoted by the 
 name Yahweh. For the things existing outside Him 
 would then likewise be of the nature of ens a Se, 
 and therefore mn’. But if God alone is Yahweh, or 
 
 ens a se, then whatever else exists must be ab alio, that 
 is, created. On this supposition alone is there any sense 
 in calling, as Sacred Scripture does, the things of this 
 world “nothing” in comparison with God. Only an 
 uncreated, self-existent Being can be called Being in the 
 full and perfect sense of the term. Is. XL, 17: “ Om- 
 nes gentes, quasi non sint, sic sunt coram eo, et quasi 
 nihilum et inane reputatae sunt et— All nations are 
 before him as if they had no being at all, and are counted 
 to him as nothing and vanity.” Wisd. XI, 23: “ Tam- 
 quam momentum staterae, sic est ante te orbis terrarum, 
 et tamquam gutta roris antelucani, quae descendit in 
 terram — For the whole world before thee is as the 
 least grain of the balance, and as a drop of the morning 
 dew, that falleth down upon the earth.” Tertullian de- 
 velops this idea briefly and beautifully as follows: 
 
 22 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 
 163 sqq. 
 
THE DOGMA PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE 11 
 
 “Deus unicus est, nec aliter unicus, nisi quia solus; nec 
 aliter solus, nist quia mhil cum illo. Sic et primus, quia 
 omnia post illum; sic omnia post illum, quia omnia ab 
 ilo; sic ab illo, quia ex mhilo— God is unique, and He 
 is unique because He is sole, and He is sole for the 
 reason that nothing co-exists with Him. Thus He is 
 also the first, because all other beings come after Him; 
 and the reason they come after Him is that they are of 
 Him, and they are of Him, because they are created out 
 St netnine er 
 
 There is another divine name, viz.: FINA, 6 KUpLos, 
 Dominus coeli et terrae, which describes God as the pro- 
 prietor and ruler of the universe, precisely because He 
 is its Creator. Cfr. John I, 3: “ All things were made 
 by him: and without him was made nothing that was 
 made.” Rom. X1) 26: For oft him and:by him, and in 
 him are all things.’ ?* Accordingly, God is the absolute 
 owner and master of “ heaven and earth,” that is, of the 
 whole created universe.2> This could not be if He had 
 not created but merely fashioned the world. For an 
 increate, absolutely independent Being necessarily en- 
 joys unlimited autonomy and the right to repel all ex- 
 traneous interference and to resist attempts made to 
 modify or shape it. As St. Justin Martyr profoundly 
 observes: “ He who has not created, has no power over 
 that which is increate and cannot force anything upon 
 it.’ °* It follows as a necessary corollary that God could 
 not even assume the role of a Demiurge ** if He were 
 
 23 Contr. Hermog. thenticity of this work is, however, 
 
 24 Cir. also Heb. I, 3; Deut. X, doubtful. Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, 
 Dis Vlog CONV sill TENOONOV Talal Patrology, p, 54, Freiburg and St. 
 
 12; 1 Paral. XXIX, 11 sqq. Louis 1908. 
 
 25 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 27 Cfr. J. P. Arendzen in the 
 Knowability, Essence and Aittri- Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 
 butes, pp. 286 sqq. 707 Sq. e 
 
 26 Cohort. ad Gentiles. The au- 
 
12 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 
 
 not the Creator of the universe. Nor would He be 
 omnipotent, for, as Tertullian rightly says: “Jam non 
 omnipotens, si non et hoc potens ex mihilo ommia proferre 
 — He would not be almighty, had He not the power to 
 create all things out of nothing.” 7° 
 
 According to Holy Scripture, God is the Creator not 
 only of the visible but also of the invisible world, 7. e., 
 the Angels. Col. I, 16: “In ipso condita sunt universa 
 in coelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia, sive throni sive 
 dominationes sive principatus sive potestates— For in 
 him were all things created in heaven and on earth, 
 visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or 
 principalities, or powers.” ‘The Angels were created 
 either from some pre-existent substratum, or out of 
 nothing. They can not have been created from a pre- 
 existent substratum, because they are pure spirits. Con- 
 sequently the Angels were created out of nothing. 
 And since Scripture tells us that the visible things 
 originated in precisely the same fashion as the Angels, 
 “ Heaven and earth,” too, must have been created out of 
 nothing. 
 
 8B) Our thesis can also be demonstrated di- 
 rectly from Scripture. Thus the formula “ex 
 milo facere’ occurs literally in the exhortation 
 which the mother of the Machabees addressed to 
 her son: “Peto, nate, ut adspicias ad coelum et 
 terram et ad omnia, quae in ets sunt, et intelligas, 
 quia ex nililo*® fecit illa Deus —I beseech thee, 
 my son, look upon heaven and earth, and all that 
 is in them: and consider that God made them out 
 
 28 Contr. Hermog., c 8 29 €& odk byTwD, 
 
THE DOGMA PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE © 13 
 
 of nothing.” *° Estimating this passage at its 
 lowest value, it is certainly a convincing testt- 
 monial to the belief of the Jews that God created 
 all things out of nothing. But we are justified 
 in attaching to it the authority of an inspired 
 dogmatic text, because the Sacred Writer ex- 
 pressly says that the mother of the Machabees, 
 when uttering the above quoted words, was “‘filled 
 with wisdom.” ** 
 
 The Jews no doubt derived their belief in 
 Creation from Gen. I, 1: “In principio creavit 
 Deus coelum et terram — In the beginning God 
 created heaven and earth.” Jews and Christians 
 alike regard this text asa direct enunciation 
 ol ithe dogma’ of) Creationh| Aside tron )all 
 other considerations, the circumstance that this 
 account, which is clearly meant to be an ex 
 professo explanation of the origin of the uni- 
 verse, gives no hint of any pre-existing sub- 
 stratum or materia ex qua, permits us to con- 
 clude with a very high degree of probability that 
 no such substratum existed, and that, therefore, 
 the universe was literally created out of nothing. 
 We are confirmed in this inference by compar- 
 ing the sublimely simple Mosaic account with the 
 various cosmogonies of pagan philosophers and 
 poets, such as Plato’s in the Timeus and Ovid's 
 in. the Metamorphoses. A careful analysis of 
 
 302 Mach. VII, 28. 812 Mach. VII, 21. 
 
14 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 
 
 Gen. I, 1 will render our conclusion absolutely 
 certain, MYNI2 is employed without qualification 
 and therefore can have no other meaning than: 
 “In the beginning of all things,” that is, at a 
 time when nothing yet existed, and from whence 
 all things date their existence. By “heaven and 
 earth” we may understand either the complete 
 heaven and the complete earth,** or the as yet 
 unformed, shapeless, and chaotic raw material 
 from which God in the course of six days suc- 
 cessively formed and fashioned the complete be- 
 ings that constitute the universe. In view of 
 Gent I; 2s) The: earth owas void and vempry. 
 the last-mentioned assumption is decidedly the 
 more probable. After the act of Creation proper, 
 therefore, things were still in a chaotic state, 
 waiting to be fashioned. “Jnformis illa mate- 
 ria,’ says St. Augustine, “quam de nihilo Deus 
 fecit, appellata est primo coelum et terra, non 
 quia tam hoc erat, sed quia hoc esse poterat; nam 
 et coelum scribitur postea factum— This un- 
 formed matter, which God made out of nothing, 
 was first called heaven and earth; not because 
 it was already heaven and earth, but because it 
 had the capacity of becoming heaven and earth; 
 for we read of heaven that it was made later.” * 
 
 It must also be remembered that Holy Scrip- 
 
 32 Cfr. Petavius, De Mundi Opif., 83 De Gen. contr. Manich., I, 7, 
 Ts 2s7r0, Lis 
 
THE DOGMA PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE 15 
 
 ture often employs the terms “coelum et terra’ 
 in a more general sense, as denoting the entire 
 cosmos, or all things which exist outside of God. 
 Had the original terminus of God’s creative act 
 merely been matter in a chaotic, unformed state, 
 it could not possibly have been produced from 
 some other materia mformis. For to fashion 
 unformed matter from unformed matter 1n- 
 volves a contradiction in terms. Consequently, 
 the original production was strictly a creation out 
 of nothing. 
 
 This interpretation is confirmed by the use of 
 the verb creavit, éroiyce, 892, Unlike the verbs 
 n’y (fecit) and "! (formavit), the Hebrew 833. 
 in the forms Kal and Niphal (in which it oc- 
 curs no less than forty-seven times), exclusively 
 signifies a divine and supernatural activity. 
 It is, moreover, never construed with a materia 
 ey. qua. We cannot.) /therefores\ reasonably 
 doubt that Moses, by employing the term ¥%73,*° 
 intended to teach the Creation of the universe out 
 of nothing.*® 
 
 In further proof of this thesis we quote Rom. IV, 
 17: “Vocat ea, quae non sunt, tamquam ea, quae sunt 
 — God... calleth those things that are not, as those 
 that are.” Or, as the Greek text puts it more pointedly: 
 
 84 Cfr. Hummelauer, Comment. Genes., Malines 1883; V. Zapletal, 
 in Gen., pp. 86 sq., Paris 1895. O.P., Der Schopfungsbericht der 
 
 35 Gen. I, 1. Genesis, Freiburg 1902. _ 
 36 Cir. Lamy, Comment. in Libr. 
 
16 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 
 
 KaAdovytos (@eov) ra py bvta os dvta.— TS pn ovra here 
 cannot mean an eternal /yle. It can only mean absolute 
 nothingness, since the divine “ call” signifies an omnipo- 
 tent fiat, in virtue of which Being (évra) emerges from 
 the abyss of non-being. Cfr. Ps. CXLVIII, 5: “Ipse 
 dixit et. facta sunt, ipse mandavit et creata sunt — 
 He spoke, and they were made: he commanded, and 
 they were created.” In the light of this passage St. 
 Paul’s xadciv ra ph dvta ds dvra is merely a paraphrase 
 of the expression employed by the mother of the Macha- 
 bees: oueiv €€ otk 8vrwv — creare ex nihilo. 
 
 y) No serious Scriptural difficulties can be urged 
 against this interpretation. The seemingly contradictory 
 text, Wisd. XI, 18: “Creavit orbem terrarum ex ma- 
 teria mvisa —[Thy almighty hand] . . . made the world 
 of matter without form,” *? is explained by Estius *° as 
 referring to the creatio secunda, because the Sacred 
 Writer points out that God had the power to send upon 
 the Egyptians “a multitude of bears, or fierce lions,” in- 
 stead of a swarm of comparatively harmless frogs. 
 
 Heb. XI, 3, which some writers likewise urge against 
 the construction we have adopted, is susceptible of vari- 
 ous interpretations. The passage reads thus: “ A ptata 
 esse saecula*® verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia . 
 herent —[By faith we understand that].the world was 
 framed by the word of God; that from invisible things 
 visible things might be made.” Did St. Paul by “ in- 
 visible things” perhaps mean a substratum from which 
 the visible things were made?. If he did, we should 
 have to understand the “ framing of the world(s)” to 
 
 37 The English rendering of this und die Schépfung, p. 63, Ratisbon 
 
 passage is more accurate than that 1910. j 
 of the Latin Vulgate — éé auopou 38 Comment. in Heb., XI, 135 
 irAns means ex materia informi. 39 aqi@ves = worlds. 
 
 Cfr. on this text C. Gutberlet, Gott 
 
THE DOGMA PROVED FROM TRADITION 17 
 
 ‘ 
 
 refer to the creatio secunda and the “ invisible things ” 
 to mean the formless raw material from which the uni- 
 verse was moulded, and which according to Gen. I, I 
 was called into being by the “creatio prima.’ *° Other 
 exegetes take this aptatio to mean creatio prima, and 
 hold that Heb. XI, 3 formally enunciates the dogma 
 of Creation. They translate 76 py é« dawopevov ta Bre- 
 mopeva yeyovevat by: “ The visible things were made from 
 what was not apparent.” A third, somewhat factitious 
 interpretation of the text is that adopted by St. Thomas 
 Aquinas,** who holds that by “invisible things” the 
 Apostle meant creative archetypes in the Divine Intellect. 
 
 b) The argument from Tradition is based 
 partly on the polemical discussions and partly on 
 the positive teaching of the Fathers. 
 
 a) Beginning with the Ionians and Eleatians, up to 
 Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoa, the pagan philosophers 
 of antiquity, and in their train the heretics of the first 
 centuries of the Christian era — especially the Gnostics 
 —either ignored or declined to accept the Christian con- 
 cept of Creation. In defending the faith against both 
 these schools, the Fathers found themselves compelled to 
 employ very strong arguments. In an apologetical trea- 
 tise formerly attributed to St. Justin Martyr, but which 
 is probably spurious, Plato is charged with ignoring the 
 fact that the universe had a zourys as well as a Symoupyds. 
 The writer thus explains the vast difference between the 
 two notions: “ Without requiring anything else, the 
 Creator creates by his own might and power that which 
 comes into being. The Demiurge, on the other hand, 
 needs some pre-existing raw material from which to 
 
 40 Gen, I, 1. 41S. Th., 1a,-qu. 65, art. \4,.ad 1. 
 
18 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 
 
 fashion his works.” ** Similar arguments are advanced 
 
 by Theophilus of Antioch ** and Athanasius.** Irenzeus 
 rightly insists against the Gnostics, that a so-called 
 Demiurge would have been unable to do anything with 
 an uncreated, and therefore immutable, hyle.*® Tertul- 
 lian sharply criticizes Hermogenes in these words: 
 “Totum, quod est Deus, aufert, nolens illum ex mhilo 
 universa fecisse. A Christianis enim conversus ad phi- 
 losophos, de ecclesia in Acadenuam et Porticum, inde 
 sumpsit a Stoicis materiam cum Domino ponere, quae 
 ipsa semper fuerit, neque nata, neque facta, nec mtium 
 habens omnino nec finem, ex qua Dominus omnia postea 
 fecit — He [Hermogenes] denies that God is God when 
 he denies that He made all things out of nothing. Havy- 
 ing left the Church for the sects of the philosophers, he 
 has adopted the Stoic view, that matter co-exists with 
 God, that it is eternal, neither generated nor made, having 
 neither beginning nor end, and that from it God made 
 all things that subsequently came into being.” *° 
 
 8B) In their positive teaching, the Fathers declared the 
 doctrine that the world was created out of nothing to 
 be an article of faith, just as it has since been held by 
 the Christians of all ages, and as it is laid down in the 
 Apostles’ Creed. “ Above all things believe,’ says the 
 Pastor Hermae,*" “that there is but one God, who 
 created and perfected all things, by drawing them out 
 
 42 Cohort ad Gent., 22. “ Very 
 probably it [the Cohortatio ad 
 Gentes] was composed at the end 
 
 of the second or the beginning of 
 the third century, though at present 
 
 [increata], mundus ex eo non con- 
 ditur, siquidem materia omnem mu- 
 tationem respuit, eo quod est in- 
 genita.” (Migne, P.G., VII, 1248.) 
 
 46 Tertull., Contra Hermog., c. 1. 
 
 opinions differ very widely as to 
 its origin.” (Bardenhewer-Shahan, 
 Patrology, p. 53.) 
 
 43 Ad Autol., II, 4. 
 
 44 Serm. de Incarn. Verbi, 2. 
 
 45“ St immutabilis est 
 
 materia 
 
 How the Arians confounded the 
 concept of Creation with that of 
 Generation in regard to the Logos, 
 is explained in Pohle-Preuss, The 
 Divine Trinity, pp. 123, sqq. 
 
 47 Mandat. I, 1. 
 
THE DOGMA PROVED FROM: TRADITION’ |. i9 
 
 of non-being into being.” *® Tertullian 4° denounces the 
 “materiaru,’ who advocated the theory of an uncreated 
 hyle, as heretics and observes: “ Regula est autem fidei, 
 qua creditur, unum omnino Deum esse, nec alium praeter 
 mundi conditorem, qui universa de nihilo produxerit — 
 It is a rule of faith, by which we believe that there is 
 but one God, nor any other beside the Creator of the 
 world, who produced all things out of nothing.” °° For 
 the sources of their teaching the Fathers point to Apos- 
 tolic Tradition and the Mosaic narrative. Thus St. 
 Athanasius teaches: “God created all things, which 
 previously did not exist, through the Logos out of noth- 
 ing, so that they received being, as He speaks through 
 the mouth of Moses: In the beginning God created 
 heaven and earth.” °' The Scriptural text just quoted, 
 according to St. Chrysostom, is a powerful bulwark 
 against all heresies: “This man Moses eradicated all 
 heresies which were later to grow up in the Church, 
 when he laid down the proposition: In the beginning 
 God created heaven and earth. If, therefore, some 
 Manichzan approach thee saying that matter pre-existed, 
 or some other heretic like Marcion or Valentius or any 
 pagan,— reply to him: In the beginning God created 
 heaven and earth.” *? 
 
 48 roinoas éx Tov wn svTos els solution of certain Patristic difficul- 
 
 7o elvat Ta TavTa, ties into which we cannot enter 
 49 Contr. Hermog., c. 25. here, the student is referred to 
 50 Praescript., c. 13. Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Ele- 
 51 Serm. de Incarnat. Verbi, 2. vante, pp. 53 sqq., Rome 1878. 
 
 52 Hom. in Genes., 2, 3. For the 
 
20 DUALISM AND PANTHEISM 
 
 AX DICE 2 
 
 THE HERESIES OF DUALISM AND PANTHEISM AND THEIR 
 CONDEMNATION 
 
 I, [THE ANTI-CREATIONIST HERESIES.—The 
 dogma that God created the universe out of 
 nothing has two heretical antitheses, to either 
 one of which all unorthodox systems can be log- 
 ically reduced: Dualism which holds that the 
 universe (matter in particular) is uncreated and 
 on the same plane with God, and Pantheism, 
 which identifies the universe with God as an 
 emanation from His essence. 
 
 Materialism (which in our day prefers to call itself 
 “mechanical Monism” or “ Positivism),”* though it 
 really denies the existence of God, may nevertheless be 
 regarded as a species of Dualism, because it adopts the 
 chief tenet of that heresy, namely, the existence of an 
 eternal uncreated hyle. Similarly the theory of Emana- 
 tion and Theosophy may be treated as varieties of Pan- 
 theism, because both claim that God is identical with the 
 cosmos. Hylozoism, so-called, is a cross between Dual- 
 ism and Pantheism, though for our present purpose we 
 may regard it merely as an imperfect form of cosmo- 
 logical Pantheism. 
 
 We should have to write a complete history of dogmas 
 and heresies, or rather of philosophy, were we to under- 
 take to describe the various Dualistic and Pantheistic 
 systems that have flourished in the course of centuries. 
 
 1On the various Monistic sys- mus und seine  philosophischen 
 
 tems cfr. the recent admirable work Grundlagen, Freiburg IQII. 
 of Fr. Klimke, S. J., Der Monis- 
 
DUALISM 21 
 
 Both errors in very deed deserve to be called protean. 
 For our present purpose it will be sufficient to sketch 
 the more important varieties of Dualism and Pantheism, 
 against which the Church as been compelled to proceed 
 in order to keep the dogma of Creation from being be- 
 clouded and traduced, and to preserve the Christian (1. e., 
 theistic) concept of God in its pristine purity. For 
 every heresy that impugns the dogma of Creation neces- 
 sarily entails grave errors against the Church’s teaching 
 on the essence and attributes of God. 
 
 a) Many of the ancient pagan philosophers, 
 including Plato, held that God and the world 
 co-existed eternally, though in opposition to 
 each other and incapable of conciliation by mere 
 Snmovpyia, which formed a peculiar feature of this 
 system.” 
 
 Dualism became more and more variegated, and closely 
 approached Pantheism, in the complex and fantastic 
 systems of the Gnostics, who held matter to be the seat 
 of evil and separated the increate hyle from the centre of 
 divinity by a long series of intermediate beings, which 
 they called aeons. Marcion distinguished between the 
 God of the New Testament and the God of the Jewish 
 Covenant as between two essentially different principles. 
 The God of the Old Testament he held responsible for 
 the existence of the material world, which, however, 
 according to him, was not created out of nothing, but 
 fashioned from eternal and uncreated matter. Marcion 
 was a forerunner of Mani,® who carried the system to 
 
 2 See the article ‘‘ Demiurge ” in Arendzen’s article ‘‘ Manichaeism ”’ 
 the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV. in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 
 8QOn Mani (the Greek form is IX, pp. 591 sqq 
 Mdyns) and Manichzism, consult 
 
22 ANTI-CREATIONIST HERESIES 
 
 its ultimate conclusions by distinguishing between the 
 “good God” and His “evil Anti-God.” *  Priscillian- 
 ism represents a mitigated revival of the Manichean 
 heresy.° It had thousands of adherents as early as the 
 fourth century, especially in Spain, and was not entirely 
 extinct at the time of the so-called Protestant Reforma- 
 tion. Since the publication: by G. Schepss, in 1889, of 
 Priscillian’s genuine writings, theologians are inclined to 
 judge his teaching less harshly than that of his later 
 followers, though it is impossible to absolve him from 
 the charge of propagating “ Gnostic-Dualistic specula- 
 tions vividly reminiscent of Manicheism, and propped 
 up, apparently, by a system or framework of mytholog- 
 ical and astrological ideas.” ® 
 
 4“ The preponderance of good or 
 evil is explained by the temporary 
 advantage gained by the one over 
 the other. This teaching profoundly 
 influenced early Christianity. St. 
 Augustine fell under its sway for 
 some years (Confess.). We find it 
 coming out afresh in the doctrines 
 of the Albigensians of the XII 
 century. In our day it has been 
 advanced by John Stuart Mill (Es- 
 say on Rel. and Nature, p. 41).” 
 — Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: 
 God, p. 201. 
 
 5 On the theological side of Dual- 
 ism cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
 Knowability, Essence and  Attri- 
 butes, pp. 213, 221 sqq. For a 
 brief general account see Michael 
 Maher, S. J., in the Catholic En- 
 cyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 169. To 
 avoid misunderstandings the student 
 should note that in modern phi- 
 losophy the term Dualism is em- 
 ployed in a different sense, signify- 
 ing, in opposition to Monism, the 
 ordinary common-sense view that 
 
 the existing universe contains two 
 radically distinct kinds of being or 
 substance — matter and spirit, body 
 and mind. 
 
 6 Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Pa- 
 trology, pp. 427 sqq.— Bardenhewer 
 points out that while Priscillian’s 
 writings, as edited by Schepss, 
 “contradict in various ways the 
 received accounts of the heresy, 
 particularly those of Sulpicius Se- 
 verus (Chron. ii, 46-51; Dial., ii 
 [iii], 311 sq.), at the same time, 
 by reason of their imperfect manu- 
 script tradition and the obscurity 
 of their diction, these newly found 
 writings contain what are at pres- 
 ent insurmountable difficulties.” 
 Cfr. Schepss, Priscillian, ein neuauf- 
 gefundener lateinischer Schriftstel- 
 ler des gten Jahrhunderts, Wirzburg 
 1886; also E. Michael, S. J., in the 
 Innsbruck Zeitschrift fiir kath. The- 
 ologie, 1892, pp. 692 sqq., and P, J. 
 Healy in the Catholic Encyclopedia, 
 article “ Priscillianism,’” Vol. XII, 
 PP. 429 sq., with bibliography. 
 
PANTHEISM 23 
 
 b) Pantheism at bottom is little less than 
 veiled Atheism.’ Its teaching is tersely con- 
 densed in the phrase: ‘God and the universe are 
 one essence.’ * Pantheism is either cosmological 
 or ontological. Cosmological Pantheism puts 
 God first—‘“God is all,’”—while ontological Pan- 
 theism assigns first place to the universe—‘“All 
 things are God.” 
 
 a) These two forms of Pantheism are related to each 
 other as the two sides of a medal, or as relative and 
 correlative. Cosmological Pantheism sinks God in the 
 universe; ontological Pantheism merges the universe in 
 God. This logical distinction forms the basis of impor- 
 tant real differences. Ontological Pantheism, in devel- 
 oping its axiom wav Oeds, finds itself constrained to as- 
 cribe to the universe the reality and substantiality 
 proper to God, together with all His quiescent attributes. 
 Cosmological Pantheism, conversely, immerses the God- 
 head in the restless process of cosmic motion and sub- 
 jects it to all the various mutations characteristic of 
 created being. It has rightly been observed that, while 
 cosmological Pantheism gravitates toward Pancosmism, 
 ontological Pantheism rather tends towards Acosmism. 
 
 8B) Ontological Pantheism is characterized by its en- 
 deavor to deify the cosmos. It was held by the Eleatic 
 school of Greece,? and, in more recent times, by Baruch 
 
 7On Atheism see Pohle-Preuss, 
 God: His Knowability, Essence and 
 Attributes, pp. 49 sqa. 
 
 8éyp Kal may, That existing 
 things are to be explained by an 
 emanation out of the original one 
 divine substance, is a doctrine 
 found in all ancient mythologies. 
 For a succinct historical sketch of 
 
 the various systems see J. T. Dris- 
 coll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 
 180 sqq., New’ York 1904; W. 
 Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 
 17 sqdq., 168 sqq., 306 sqq., 470 sq., 
 Boston 1903. 
 
 9 Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, 
 Melissus, ; 
 
24 ANTI-CREATIONIST HERESIES 
 
 Spinoza,*® a brilliant sophist, who sought by geometrical 
 arguments to establish the proposition that there is but 
 one infinite, indivisible substance, endowed with two at- 
 tributes, thought and extension, which, as mere modi or 
 “affections ” of the one Divine Substance, have no more 
 a distinct reality and substantiality of their own than 
 have the surging waves of the ocean in the great body 
 of water which sustains them.14 
 
 Cosmological Pantheism, as we have noted, aims 
 rather at merging God in the universe. It may be di- 
 vided into three species: Emanatism, Hylozoism, and 
 Evolutionism. The most ancient and the crudest of 
 these systems is Emanatism, which holds that the indi- 
 vidual: creatures are particles detached from the Di- 
 vine Substance, though not identical with it. One va- 
 riety of Emanatism is called realistic, because it holds 
 the world emanating from God to be material. There 
 is another variety which may be described as idealistic, 
 since it dissolves the whole cosmos into a series of in- 
 telligible momenta, corresponding to the spirituality of 
 God. Realistic Emanatism is held by the Brahmans, by 
 many Gnostics, and by the Jewish Cabalists. The Ema- 
 natism championed by the Neo-Platonists and John 
 Scotus Eriugena is distinctly idealistic.12 
 
 10 Born at Amsterdam, of Jewish 
 parents, in 1632. Cfr. Turner, His- 
 tory of Philosophy, pp. 466° sqq. 
 
 11 Cfr. B. Boedder, S. J., Natural 
 Theology, pp. 200 sqq., 2nd ed., 
 London 1890. 
 
 12 Cfr. Turner, History of Phi- 
 losophy, pp. 246 sqq.; Driscoll, 
 Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 183 
 sqq. M. de Wulf calls attention to 
 the curious fact that the philosophy 
 of Eriugena “ contains the germ of 
 subjectivism, since he endows the 
 
 human mind with the power of at- 
 taining, by the unaided effort of 
 consciousness alone (gnosticus in- 
 tuitus) to a knowledge of the di- 
 vine evolution-process as an object 
 of representation.” Of course, 
 Eriugena himself did not go so far; 
 nor did any medieval philosopher 
 or theologian push the logic of his 
 system to its legitimate conclusions. 
 (Cfr. M. de Wulf, History of Me- 
 dieval Philosophy, translated by P. 
 Coffey, p. 173, London 1909.) 
 
PANTHEISM 25 
 
 Hylozoism was taught by the Ionian philosophers of 
 Asia Minor, who believed that God is the world-soul, 
 controlling and vivifying matter as the human soul con- 
 trols and animates the body, and thus completely iden- 
 tified the life of the world with the Divine Life. 
 
 Cosmological Pantheism achieved its highest form in 
 Evolutionism, so-called, which holds that the Absolute 
 was from the beginning immanent, and undergoes a 
 constant process of development, in the universe.** 
 According to this theory we cannot say God is, because 
 He is constantly in fieri. Goethe refers to the God 
 of the Pantheists as “ein ewig verschlingendes, ewig 
 wiederkduendes Ungeheuer—an eternally devouring, 
 eternally ruminating monster.” This evolutionary Pan- 
 theism was first cast into the shape of a philosophical 
 system by Heraclitus of Ephesus.** It was developed by 
 Fichte #® and Schelling,’® and perfected by Hegel,’? who, 
 like all other Pantheists before him, declared the visible 
 universe to be a mere manifestation of the Absolute, 
 whence it would follow that the Divine Substance is a 
 purely abstract, vacuous, substance-less mental phenome- 
 non. In Hegel’s hands this idealistic Pantheism became 
 
 doctrine of determinism. Both Spi- 
 noza and Spencer teach a pure 
 Naturalism, with this difference 
 only that the God of the former 
 becomes to the latter the Unknown 
 and Unknowable behind the phe- 
 nomena.”— Driscoll, Christian Pli- 
 
 13 The influence of Pantheism on 
 modern thought has been, and con- 
 tinues to be, very great. The Eng- 
 lish Agnostic school teaches that 
 God is unknowable and as_ such 
 does not come within the purview 
 of human thought and _ action; 
 
 nevertheless, in all other points it 
 is fashioned in the mould of 
 Spinoza. ‘‘ Hence comes the charge 
 —so strange at first sight — that 
 Mr. Spencer is a Pantheist. In the 
 criticism of his system we meet 
 with the same difficulties that we 
 find in Spinoza, i. e., the nature 
 of mind and of matter, the char- 
 acter of their interaction, and the 
 
 3 
 
 losophy: God, 189 sq. 
 
 14 His was the famous dictum: 
 Tldvra pel, “All things are flow- 
 ing.” Cfr. Turner, History of Phi- 
 losophy, pp. 53 sad. 
 
 15 Cfr. Driscoll, Christian Philos- 
 ophy: God, pp. 199 sq. 
 
 16 Cfr. Turner, History of Phi- 
 losophy, pp. 555 Sdd. { 
 
 17 Turner, op. cit., pp. 560 sqq. 
 
26 ANTI-CREATIONIST HERESIES 
 
 Panlogism, since he asserts the complete identity of our 
 thought with being."® 
 
 2. THEIR CONDEMNATION BY THE CHURCH. 
 —Against these various forms of Dualistic and 
 Pantheistic error the Church has rigorously up- 
 held the dogma of Creation as essential to the 
 
 purity and perfection of the Christian concept of 
 God. 
 
 a) In the early days she did not deem it necessary 
 to utter a formal dogmatic definition against the Dualis- 
 tic vagaries of the pagans and the Pantheistic heresies 
 of the Gnostics and Neo-Platonists, but merely enforced 
 the true doctrine through the Creed and in her ordinary 
 catechetical instruction. The Nicene definition of the 
 uncreatedness of the Logos ?® may be said to imply the 
 dogma that all other things are created. In the sixth 
 century the Council of Braga condemned Manicheism 
 in the peculiar form in which it had been revamped by 
 the Priscillianists.2° 
 
 Bin the Middle Ages the Church found it 
 necessary to condemn the resuscitated Manichz- 
 ism of the Albigenses and the Pantheistic errors 
 
 ee Se ee ——_*- ee 
 
 : 
 Se ee ee 
 
 18 For a general refutation of 
 Pantheism see B. Boedder, S. LY 
 Natural Theology, pp. 112 sqq., 200 
 sqq., and Driscoll, Christian Phi- 
 losophy: God, pp. 204 sqq. Cfr. 
 also P. Hake, Handbuch der allge- 
 meinen Religionswissenschaft, Vol. 
 I, pp. 71 sqq., Freiburg 187s, and 
 Jos. Hontheim, S. J., Institutiones 
 Theodicaeae, pp. 465 sqq., Friburgi 
 1893. 
 
 19 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
 Trinity, pp. 125 sq. 
 
 20 Cir. Denzinger-Bannwart, En- 
 chiridion, nn, 231 sqq. In former 
 editions of the LEnchiridion, this 
 condemnation was attributed to St. 
 Leo the Great. Karl Kiinstle has 
 shown (Antipriscilliana, Freiburg 
 1905, pp. 117 .sqq.) that it is a 
 Spanish fabrication, made after the 
 year 563. 
 
 OT ah nn ca en ee a 
 
ANTI-CREATIONISM CONDEMNED 27 
 
 of Amalric of Béne and David of Dinant.2* The 
 Fourth Council of the Lateran, A.D. t21 5; 
 defined: “Creator omnium visibilium et invisi- 
 bilium, spiritualium et corporalium, . . . sua om- 
 mpotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utram- 
 que de nthilo condidit naturam, spiritualem et 
 corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac 
 deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et 
 corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii de- 
 mones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, 
 sed ipst per se facti sunt mali; homo vero diaboli 
 sug gestione peccavit — The Creator of all things 
 visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, by 
 His omnipotent power, simultaneously with the 
 beginning of time, created a twofold nature, 
 spiritual and corporeal, viz.: the nature of the 
 angels and that of material things, and then 
 human nature, which partakes of both, in that it 
 consists of soul and body. For the Devil and 
 other demons were indeed good in their nature 
 as created by God, but they made themselves 
 bad by their own conduct; man sinned at the 
 suggestion of the Devil.” 2 This definition em- 
 braces four distinct heads of doctrine: (1) God 
 created all things without exception, spiritual 
 
 21 On the teaching of the school 220 sqq. See also Funk-Cappa- 
 of Chartres, of which Amalric (or delta, A Manual of Church History, 
 Amaur) and David were the lead- Vol. I, pp. 355 sq., London IQIO. 
 ing exponents, cfr. De Wulf-Coffey, 22 Caput “ Firmiter.’ Denzinger- 
 History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 428, 
 
28 THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH 
 
 and corporeal, including man, who is a synthesis 
 of both. (2) God created all things out of 
 nothing. (3) As originally created by God, all 
 things were good. (4) Sin, both in angels and 
 men, is not chargeable to God, but to an abuse 
 of creatural liberty. 
 
 The same truths were again defined by the Ecumenical 
 Council of Florence,?? which formulated the teaching of 
 the Church against Manichzan errors as follows: “| Ec- 
 clesia] firmissime credit, ... unum verum Deum, Pa- 
 trem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, esse omnium 
 visibilium et invisibilium creatorem: qui, quando voluit, 
 bonitate sua universas tam spirituales quam corporales 
 condidit creaturas: bonas quidem, quia a summo bono 
 factae sunt, sed mutabiles, quia de nihilo factae sunt, 
 nullamque mali asserit esse naturam, quia omnis na- 
 tura, im quantum natura est, bona est... . Praeterca 
 Manicheorum anathematizat insaniam, qui duo prima 
 principia posuerunt, unum visibilium, aliud invisibilium; 
 et alium Novi Testamenti Deum, alium Veteris esse 
 Deum dixerunt —The Church believes most firmly that 
 the one true God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the 
 Creator of all things visible and invisible, who, when 
 it pleased Him, out of His goodness created all creatures, 
 spiritual and corporeal. These creatures are indeed 
 good, because made by Him who is the Supreme Good, 
 but they are mutable, because made out of nothing. 
 [The Church further] asserts that nothing is evil by na- 
 ture, because every nature, as such, is good. ... And 
 she anathematizes the folly of the Manichzeans who posit 
 two first principles, one the principle of visible, the other 
 
 23 A.D. 1439. 
 
THE VATICAN DECREE 29 
 
 of invisible things; and who say that the God of the 
 New Testament is different from the God of the Old 
 Testament.” 24 From this time on Manichzism with its 
 offshoots gradually disappears from history, and its 
 place is taken by Materialism and Pantheism. 
 
 c) Materialism and Pantheism may be called 
 the prevailing heresies of modern times. Both 
 were clearly and resolutely condemned as atheis- 
 tic by the Council of the Vatican.” Caput I of 
 the decrees of this Council, under the heading 
 “De Deo Rerum Omnium Creatore,’ treats at 
 some length of God’s relation to His creatures. 
 The Vatican decree is substantially a restatement 
 of the Caput “Firmiter”’ of the Fourth Lateran 
 Council, from which it differs merely by laying 
 special emphasis on the doctrine that, in creating 
 the universe out of nothing, God acted “with abso- 
 lute freedom of counsel.” 
 
 Because of their great importance, the five canons 
 which accompany Caput I of the Constitutions of the 
 Vatican Council deserve to be reprinted here. 
 
 The first is directed against Atheism and reads thus: 
 “St quis unum verum Deum visibilium et invisibilium 
 Creatorem et Dominum negaverit: anathema sit — lf any 
 one shall deny the one true God, Creator and Lord of all 
 things visible and invisible; let him be anathema.” 
 
 The second specifically condemns Materialism: “Si 
 quis practer materiam nihil esse affirmare non erubuerit: 
 
 24 Decret. pro Iacobitis, cited in 25 A. D. 1870. 
 
 Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
 nn. 706 sq. 
 
30 THE TEACHING OF «DHE CHURCEH 
 
 anathema sit—If any one shall not be ashamed to 
 affirm that nothing exists except matter; let him be 
 anathema.” 
 
 Canon 3 anathematizes the fundamental principle of 
 Pantheism: “Si quis dixerit, unam eandemque esse 
 Dei et rerum omnium substantiam vel essentiam: ana- 
 thema sit—If any one shall say that the substance or 
 essence of God and of all things is one and the same; 
 let him be anathema.” 
 
 Canon 4 is aimed at certain particular forms or varie- 
 ties of Pantheism: “Si quis diverit, res finitas tum 
 corporeas tum spirituales aut saltem spirituales e divina 
 substantia emanasse, aut divinam essentiam sui mani- 
 festatione vel evolutione fieri omnia, aut denique Deum 
 esse ens universale seu indefinitum, quod sese deter- 
 minando constituat rerum universitatem in genera, 
 Species et individua distinctam: anathema sit—If any 
 one shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spir- 
 itual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the di- 
 vine substance; or that the divine essence by the 
 manifestation and evolution of itself becomes all things; 
 or, lastly, that God. is universal or indefinite being, 
 which by determining itself constitutes the universality 
 of things, distinct according to genera, species, and in- 
 dividuals; let him be anathema.” 
 
 Canon 5 defines the dogma of Creation in its more 
 important aspects: “ Si quis non confiteatur, mundum 
 resque ones, quae in eo continentur, et spirituales et 
 materiales secundum totam suam substantiam a Deo ex 
 nihilo esse productas; aut Deum dixerit non voluntate 
 ab omni necessitate libera, sed tam necessario creasse, 
 quam necessario amat seipsum; aut mundum ad Dei 
 gloriam conditum esse negaverit: anathema sit — If any 
 one confess not that the world, and all things which 
 
DEE VET ICAN  DECR bE 31 
 
 are contained in it, both spiritual and material, have 
 been, in their whole substance, produced by God out of 
 nothing; or shall say that God created, not by His will, 
 free from all necessity, but by a necessity equal to the 
 necessity whereby He loves Himself; or shall deny that 
 the world was made for the glory of God; let him be 
 
 anathema.” 26 
 
 26 These canons can be found in 
 Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
 nn. 1801 sqq. Also, with an Eng- 
 lish translation, in the Appendix to 
 Cardinal Manning’s work, The Vat- 
 ican Council, 4th ed., New York 
 
 reprint, 1902, pp. 192 sqq. For ¢é 
 detailed analysis of them see 
 Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, pp. 496 
 sqq. Cfr. also Granderath-Kirch, 
 Geschichte des vatikanischen Kon- 
 Zils, 3 vols., Freiburg 1903-06. 
 
SECTION 2 
 
 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 The dogma of Creation presents two different 
 aspects, according as we contemplate either the 
 divine act or its creatural terminus. Viewing 
 it in the first-mentioned or active sense, we 
 shall enquire into (1) God’s conception of the 
 universe as the exemplary cause of all things; 
 (2) the relation of Creation to the Blessed 
 Trinity; and (3) God’s freedom of will in 
 creating the world. These points will be sever- 
 ally treated in the first three Articles of the 
 present section. Weshall adda fourth Article on 
 creation as co-existent with time, and a fifth on 
 the question whether or not God can communicate 
 His creative power to creatures. 
 
 ARTIC. Bit 
 
 THE DIVINE IDEA OF THE COSMOS AS THE EXEMPLARY 
 CAUSE OF CREATION 
 
 I. THE Divine IDEA oF THE Cosmos.—Rea- 
 son tells us that the Creator must have designed 
 the created universe in accordance with some 
 
 32 | 
 
THE DIVINE IDEA OF THE COSMOS 33 
 
 pattern or archetype. As an artist cannot pro- 
 duce a work of art unless he has previously 
 formed some idea of it in his mind, so God must 
 have had a definite conception of the cosmos be- 
 fore He proceeded to mould it. 
 
 Metaphysicians are agreed that the idea, or causa ex- 
 emplaris, is a necessary condition for setting to work 
 all those efficient causes which are endowed with under- 
 standing and free will. No intelligent cause proceeds 
 blindly or at random. 
 
 God’s idea of the cosmos may be regarded either sub- 
 jectively or objectively. Subjectively it is God’s creative 
 Wisdom or practical Knowledge, and as such identical 
 with the Divine Essence itself, Objectively, or with re- 
 gard to content, it is the ideal representation of whatever 
 is to become actual, or, in the words of St. Thomas, the 
 outward imitability of the Divine Essence considered as 
 purely conceptual.2 
 
 This definition makes it quite clear that God’s idea of 
 the cosmos is neither a creature, nor a metaphysical en- 
 tity existing outside of, or side by side with God,? nor 
 yet the Divine Essence itself. God’s idea of the cosmos 
 must consequently be the possible essence of the created 
 universe, in so far as that essence is rooted in the Di- 
 vine Substance and conceived by the Divine Intellect 
 from all eternity. If we are careful to guard against 
 the Platonic mistake of conceiving the archetypes of 
 things as individual existences extraneous to God, we 
 may safely adopt Clement of Alexandria’s distinction 4 
 
 1St. Thom., S. th, 1a, qu. 1s, Knowability, Essence and Attri- 
 art. 2. butes, p. 117. 
 
 2 Such was the opinion of Plato. 4 Cfr. Eusebius, Praeparatio Evan- 
 3Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His gelica, XI, 2s, 
 
34 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 between an ideal world (xécpos vonrés) and the really ex- 
 isting world (xécpos aicOyrés). The former is necessary 
 and eternal, the latter contingent and temporal. 
 
 May we speak of divine ideas of created things in 
 the plural number? We may, but only in regard to 
 the multitude of created things. In the Divine Intellect 
 itself there is but one absolutely simple idea,—as sim- 
 ple and indivisible as the Divine Essence with which 
 it coincides. This distinction furnishes the key for the 
 correct interpretation of the plural phrase rationes 
 rerum, Or Adyou ovovdrov1, Which occurs in the writings 
 of the Fathers and theologians. 
 
 2. THE TEACHING OF REVELATION.—While 
 the Church has never formally defined her teach- 
 ing with regard to the divine idea of the cosmos, 
 Holy Scripture does not permit us to doubt the 
 actual existence of such an idea. 
 
 a) Of the various Scriptural texts which may be cited 
 in this connection,® the most luminous perhaps is Gen. 
 I, 26: “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” 
 Here God appears in the role of a thoughtful artificer, 
 who works out the concept of man in his own mind 
 before he proceeds to create him. He is an intelligent 
 Creator who follows a well-digested plan. 
 
 This view is utterly incompatible with the theory of 
 atheistic Darwinism, which attributes the creation of 
 things to “chance.” It is developed in the Sapiential 
 Books of the Old Testament and forms the necessary 
 substratum of St. John’s Logos-doctrine. According to 
 the punctuation of some manuscript codices of the Fourth 
 
 5 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, pp. 
 225 sqq. 
 
CREATION AND THE TRINITY 35 
 
 Gospel, John I, 3 sq. reads as follows: “Et sine ipso 
 factum est mhil. Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat,” 
 1. €., that which was created sprang from a vital idea 
 in the Godhead, namely, the Logos. St. Augustine 
 beautifully develops this thought in his Homilies on the 
 Gospel of St. John,® but the punctuation on which it is 
 based has not stood the test of modern criticism. 
 
 b) The Fathers developed the teaching thus adum- 
 brated in Sacred Scripture, some of them explaining it 
 in consonance with, others in opposition to, the Platonic 
 philosophy.? It remained for the medieval Schoolmen 
 to give it its final polish. The most brilliant exponent 
 of the doctrine of the Divine Idea is St. Augustine.® 
 From him the Schoolmen received it and unfolded it 
 dialectically.® 
 
 AR LCR rn2 
 CREATION IN ITS RELATION TO THE TRINITY 
 Though the Blessed Trinity creates per modum 
 
 naturae, that is to say, qua Godhead, Creation 
 is specially appropriated to the Father as the 
 
 6 Tract. in Ioa., I, 17. 
 
 7 Among those who opposed the 
 Platonic view were Justin Martyr, 
 Tertullian, and Gregory of Nazian- 
 Zus. 
 
 8 He writes: ‘“‘ Quis audeat dicere 
 Deum irrationabiliter omnia condi- 
 disse? Quodsi recte dici et credi 
 non potest, restat, ut omnia ratione 
 sint condita, nec eadem ratione 
 homo qua equus; hoc enim ab- 
 surdum est existimare. Singula igi- 
 tur propriis sunt creata rationibus. 
 Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum 
 est esse nist in mente Creatoris? 
 Non enim quidquam extra se posi- 
 
 tum intuetur, ut secundum id con- 
 stitueret, quod constituebat; nam 
 hoc opinari sacrilegum est. Quodsi 
 hae rerum creandarum creatarumve 
 rationes in divina mente continentur, 
 neque in divina mente quidquam 
 nist aeternum atque incommutabile 
 potest ess@..., non solum sunt 
 ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt et eius- 
 modt atque incommutabiles manent, 
 quarum participatione fit, ut sit, 
 quidquid est, quoquo modo est.” 
 In Libr. 83 Quaest., qu. 46, 2. 
 9Cfr. Ruiz, De Scientia Dei, 
 disp. 82. ¥ 
 
36 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 First of the Three Divine Persons. The fact 
 that the Trinity cannot be demonstrated by phil- 
 osophical arguments, does not, rightly considered, 
 disprove the teaching of Catholic theologians that 
 all creatures contain some vestige of the Trinity, 
 and that, in addition thereto, the pure spirits, and 
 man who is endowed with reason, “represent the 
 Trinity by way of image.” ? 
 
 Thesis I: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost created the 
 universe not as separate Persons, but per modum 
 naturae, i. e., in virtue of the essential Knowledge 
 and Volition common to the whole Trinity. 
 
 Proof. This thesis, which embodies an article of 
 faith, has been repeatedly defined by the Church.” 
 The “Decretum pro Iacobitis,” adopted by the Council 
 of Florence, in 1439, says: “ Firmissime credit, profite- 
 tur et praedicat [Ecclesia], unum verum Deum, Patrem 
 et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, esse omnium visibilium 
 et invisibilium creatorem— The Church most firmly be- 
 lieves, professes, and teaches that the one true God, 
 Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the Creator of all things 
 visible and invisible”? And a few lines further up: 
 “Sed Pater et Filius non duo principia Spiritus Sancti, 
 sed unum principium, sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus 
 Sanctus non tria principia creaturae, sed unum princi- 
 pum — But the Father and the Son [are] not two prin- 
 ciples of the Holy Ghost, but one principle; just as the 
 
 1 Bonjoannes, Compendium of the 2 Cfr. Conc. Lat. IV, Cap. “ Fir- 
 Summa Theologica of St. Thomas miter.” 
 Aquinas. ... Translated into Eng- 3 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridi- 
 
 lish. Revised by Fr. Wilfrid Les- on, n. 706. 
 cher, O. P., p. 116, London 1906. 
 
CREATION AND THE TRINITY 37 
 
 Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost [constitute] not 
 three principles of the creature, but one principle.” * 
 
 We will merely outline the Biblical argument for our 
 thesis. Holy Scripture attributes the Creation of the 
 universe sometimes to the Father,> sometimes to the 
 Son,® and sometimes to the Holy Ghost.?- The diacritical 
 particles ex, per, and in (ék, dia, eis) in Rom. XI, 36: 
 “Ex Patre per Filium in Spiritu Sancto— Of the 
 Father, by the Son, in the Holy Ghost (are all things),” 
 do not signify a difference of power, but simply the 
 Trinitarian relation of origin. The meaning is that the 
 Father has the creative power of Himself, the Son by 
 Generation from the Father, and the Holy Ghost by 
 Spiration from the Father and the Son.’ 
 
 Certain Patristic writers say that if it were not for 
 the Son, the Father could not create for lack of a cre- 
 ative word. This remark must not be misunderstood. 
 The Fathers who make it merely wish to intimate that, 
 if God were not Tri-une, He would not be God at all, 
 and therefore unable to exercise creative power.® St. 
 Thomas explains this point as follows: “ Processiones 
 personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, in- 
 quantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia 
 et voluntas— The divine Processions are the cause of 
 the production of creatures, inasmuch as they include 
 the essential attributes of Understanding and Will.” 1° 
 
 4 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridt- 
 on, n. 704. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The 
 Divine Trinity, pp. 231 sq. 
 
 5 Luke X, 21. 
 
 Gr Ohta ts anol. cls 15 .Saq. 
 
 TP Ss NON) 6s 
 
 8 Cfr. St. Basil, De Spirttu Sanc- 
 to, cap. 5; Humphrey, “ His Divine 
 Majesty,” pp. 224 sq. 
 
 9 “ The three Divine Persons are, 
 
 all of them, required in order to 
 the causality of creation; inasmuch 
 as that God is required, to whom 
 a trinity of persons is essential, so 
 that without this trinity He would 
 not be God.”—(Humphrey, “ His 
 Divine Majesty,” p. 226.) — 
 
 LON Tora du As art, OuusOn 
 some very subtle problems involved 
 iu this theory see Ruiz, De Trinit., 
 
38 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 Thesis II: Creation is properly appropriated to 
 God the Father. | ) 
 
 This thesis may be technically qualified as “ doctrina 
 catholica.” 
 
 Proof. A glance at the so-called Apostles’ Creed #4 
 shows that the Creation of the universe has always been 
 appropriated to the Father. “Credo in unum Deum, 
 Patrem omnipotentem, factorem coeli et terrae —I be- 
 lieve in one God, the Father almighty, Creator of heaven 
 and earth.” The intrinsic reason for this appropriation 
 is the similarity existing between the creative act and the 
 hypostatic character of the First Person of the Trinity. 
 Creation is the beginning of divine operation, and as 
 such related to the Father in His character of principium 
 sine principio (épxy dvapyos). Asa sign of divine power, 
 which culminates in the fiat “Ipse dixit et facta sunt,” 1? 
 Creation is related to the notional Understanding by 
 which the begetting Father utters His Word. “ Pater 
 dicendo gignit Verbum.’ ‘Therefore Creation is rightly 
 appropriated to the Father.?2 
 
 Thesis III: Though the Divine Trinity is the 
 Creator of the universe only per..modum naturae, 
 nevertheless all creatures bear within themselves ves- 
 tiges of the Trinity; the spiritual creatures, moreover, 
 are real images of the same. 
 
 disp. 3, sect. 1. On the whole sub- Apostles’ Creed has always been 
 
 ject cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
 Trinity, pp. 275 sqq. 
 
 11 Though “ we cannot safely af- 
 firm the Apostolic composition of 
 [this] Creed, there is no doubt that 
 in substance it goes back to Apos- 
 tolic times. As a result of [its] 
 intimate association with the liturgy 
 and teaching of the Church, the 
 
 held to have the authority of an 
 ex cathedra utterance.”—Cfr. H. 
 Thurston’s admirable article * Apos- 
 tles’ Creed,’ with bibliography, in 
 the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, 
 
 12 Ps. CXLYITI,. 5: 
 
 13 On the divine Appropriations 
 in general see Pohle-Preuss, The 
 Divine Trinity, pp. 244 sqq. 
 
CREATION AND THE TRINITY 39 
 
 This thesis forms part of the theological teaching com- 
 mon to all schools. 
 
 Proof. We do not assert that the created universe 
 reflects the Trinity as such. If this were so, the 
 mystery of the Trinity would be demonstrable from 
 the cosmos. As a matter of fact the three Divine Per- 
 sons do not create qua Triad, but gua Monad, and this 
 is the fundamental reason why the mystery of the Most 
 Holy Trinity is incapable of demonstration.1* The 
 meaning of our thesis is that, as productions of the 
 Triune God, creatures reflect the same essential attri- 
 butes by virtue of which there are two Processions in 
 the Godhead, viz.: understanding and will, knowledge and 
 love. Thus interpreted the thesis offers no difficulties. 
 For it stands to reason, and is further confirmed by the 
 philosophical arguments by which we can prove the ex- 
 istence of God, that the created universe postulates a 
 wise Intellect and a creative Will, and these are precisely 
 the attributes on which the two inner-divine Processions 
 are based. Consequently all creatures contain within 
 themselves certain vestiges *® of the Trinity. These ves- 
 tiges are, however, blurred and obscure, so that, if it 
 were not for Revelation, the human intellect could not 
 
 14 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, op. cit., pp. 
 196 sqq. 
 
 15 “In every effect there is some- 
 thing corresponding to the cause; 
 something which may be said to 
 represent that cause. This repres- 
 entation may be such that the ex- 
 istence of the effect merely indi- 
 cates the existence of the cause, 
 and such an effect is said to show 
 a vestige of the cause; the proper 
 meaning of the word ‘vestige’ is 
 ‘footprint’; and a footprint which 
 shows that a man has passed, but 
 
 does not tell what manner of man 
 he is, affords an instance of a ves- 
 tige. When the representation af- 
 fords some distinct knowledge of 
 the nature of the cause, even if 
 this knowledge be imperfect, the 
 representation is called an image, 
 such is the work of a sculptor or 
 painter.”— Sylvester Hunter, S. J., 
 Outhnes of Dogmatic Theology, 
 Vol. II, pp. 233 sq., London 1895. 
 Cir. also Humphrey, “ His Divine 
 Majesty,” pp. 227 sqq. 
 
40 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 arrive at a knowledge of the mystery. It is only after 
 the mystery was supernaturally revealed that the mind 
 of man was able to discover the relation existing between 
 the Trinity and Creation.1¢ 
 
 The second part of our thesis, viz.: that every rational 
 creature bears within itself an image of the Trinity, is 
 to be understood with the same limitations. The created 
 intellect being endowed with understanding and free-will, 
 its “internal word” (verbum mentis) reflects the Logos, 
 while the immanent love which it entertains for itself 
 emblems the Holy Ghost. Cfr. Gen. I, 26: “ Faciamus 
 hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram — Let 
 us make man to our image and likeness.” A still more 
 perfect image of the Trinity is produced in the human 
 soul by sanctifying grace 1” and the beatific vision." 
 
 AR TIGER 2 
 
 CREATION AS A FREE DIVINE ACT 
 
 It belongs to the treatise on the Essence and Attri- 
 butes of God to prove that the Divine Will is essentially 
 free. Here we have merely to show that, in creating 
 the universe, God acted as a free agent, and, more spe- 
 cifically, that He acted libertate contradictionis sive ex- 
 ercitu and libertate specificationis, not, however, libertate 
 contrarietatis, which latter term means freedom of choice 
 between good and evil. 
 
 16 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine II, pp. 232 sqq., London 1895. We 
 
 Trinity, pp. 261 sqq. shall recur to certain aspects of this 
 17 Filiatio adoptiva, inhabitatio subject in our treatise on Grace. 
 Spiritus Sancti. 1Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
 
 18 Cfr. Hurter, Compend., Vol. Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 
 ll, thes.-127; S. J. Hunter, Oug- butes, pp. 430 sqq. 
 lines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. 
 
CREATION AvVPREEV DIVINE ACT 41 
 
 Thesis I: Creation was a free act, libertate con- 
 tradictionis, i. e., God was free either to create or not 
 to create, as He pleased. 
 
 This proposition is de fide. 
 
 Proof. The Council of Florence (A. D. 1439) 
 defined: “Deus, quando voluit, bonitate sua 
 universas . . . condidit creaturas — God in His 
 goodness created all things, when He willed.” 
 The Vatican Council (A. D. 1870), with an eye 
 to the heretical teachings of Hermes and Giin- 
 ther, further developed this definition as follows: 
 “[Deus] liberrimo consilio . . . utramque de ni- 
 hilo condidit naturam, spiritualem et corporalem, 
 angelicam videlicet et mundanam — God, with ab- 
 solute freedom of counsel, created out of nothing 
 . . . both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, 
 to wit, the angelical and the mundane.” ? And 
 in Canon 5 the Council adds: “Si quis . 
 Deum dixerit non voluntate ab omni necessitate 
 libera, sed tam necessario creasse, quam neces- 
 Sario amat se ipsum, . . . anathema sit —If any 
 one... shall say that God created, not by His 
 will, free from all necessity, but by a necessity 
 equal to the necessity whereby He loves Him- 
 self, ... let him be anathema.” 3 
 
 Holy Scripture teaches this truth in numerous 
 passages, especially in those which accentuate 
 
 2 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridi- 3 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridi- 
 On, D. 1783. on, n. 1805. y 
 
 4 
 
42 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 the fact that God “hath done all things what- 
 soever he would.’’* The dogma is enforced as 
 it were by contrast in 2 Mach. VIII, 18: “Nos 
 in omnipotente Domino, qui potest... uni- 
 versum mundum uno nutu delere, confidimus 
 —We trust in the Almighty Lord, who at a 
 beck can utterly destroy . . . the whole world.” 
 God cannot destroy at a beck except what He 
 has freely created. We have a still more definite 
 statement of this truth in Apoc. IV, 11: “Tu 
 creastt omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam erant 
 et creata sunt — Thou hast created all things; 
 and for thy will they were, and have been 
 created.” St. Paul writes: “Operatur omnia 
 secundum consilium voluntatis suae — [He] 
 worketh all things according to the counsel of 
 his will.” ° Where there is “counsel” there must 
 be liberty. 
 
 The teaching of the Fathers on this point is 
 in perfect consonance with Holy Scripture. St. 
 Irenzus says: “Ipse omnia libere fecit et quem- 
 admodum voluit— He made all things freely 
 and according to His will,’*® and Hippolytus: 
 “He created even as He would, for He was 
 God.” * St. Ambrose exclaims: “Quid difficile 
 est et, cut velle fecisse est?—What is difficult for 
 
 45. gs, Pe. CAI, 33) “Deus 5 Eph. I, 11. 
 autem noster in coelo; omnia quae- 6 Adv. Haer.,| Iil,:8, 3. 
 cunque voluit, fecit.’’ 7 Contr. Noét., 10. 
 
 A eo, = 
 
 So a a nee 
 
CREATION A FREE DIVINE ACT 43 
 
 Him to whom to will means to do?”’® We 
 close the Patristic argument with a brief quota- 
 tion from the works of St. Augustine: “He 
 made [the universe] with an absolutely free 
 wall.’ ® 
 
 Reason argues thus: If God had not been free in 
 creating the universe, He must have acted under com- 
 pulsion either from without (coactio), or from within 
 (necessitas ab intrinseco). God cannot have acted under 
 external compulsion, because no higher Being existed 
 which could have exercised such compulsion. Nor can 
 He have been actuated by immanent necessity, because 
 in this hypothesis He would not be infinitely perfect, 
 nor self-sufficient, nor absolutely independent (ens a 
 se). Consequently, God was free either to create or 
 not, according to His good pleasure. 
 
 Thesis II: The divine act of Creation was free, 
 libertate specificationis ; that is, God was free to create 
 either this present universe or any other. 
 
 This thesis may be technically qualified as doc- 
 trina catholica. ? 
 
 Proof. The Provincial Council of Cologne 
 (A. D. 1860)" defines: “Quemadmodum penes 
 Deum erat, mundum creare aut non creare, ita 
 penes ipsum etiam erat, hunc creare mundum aut 
 alium — As it lay in the power of God to create 
 or not to create a world, so it also lay in His 
 
 8 In Hexaém., II, 2. 10 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
 9 De Civ. Dei, II, 24. Trinity, p. 262. 3 
 
A4 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 power either to create he particular world, or 
 a diferent one.’)** 
 
 a) The Scriptural argument for this thesis is 
 based upon the sovereignty whereby God ordains 
 all things according to His good pleasure. Ps. 
 CXXXIV, 6: “Ommia, quaecunque  voluit, 
 Dominus fecit in coelo, in terra, in mari et in 
 omnibus abyssis — Whatsoever the Lord pleased 
 he hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, 
 and in all the deeps.” Theodoret comments 
 upon this text as follows: “The Lord created 
 all things whatsoever He pleased, as Holy Scrip- 
 ture testifies. He did not, however, will all that 
 it lay in His power to do, but only what seemed 
 to Him to be sufficient. For it would have been 
 easy for Him to create ten or twenty thousand 
 worlds.” ™* 
 
 For the rest, it is easy to see, even without the 
 aid of Revelation, that, had God had no other 
 choice than to create or not to create the present 
 cosmos, there would be but one possible world— 
 a view repugnant to the attribute of divine 
 omnipotence, which halts only at contradiction; 
 incompatible also with divine wisdom and per- 
 fection, for it is peculiar to wisdom to select and 
 
 11 Synod. Colon., 1860, tit. 3, cap. 360 sqq., Oeniponte 1903. Cfr. also 
 D2. Fortescue, The Orthodox Eastern 
 12 De Curand. Graecor. Affect., Church, pp. 56, 58, 70, London 
 4. On Theodoret of Cyrus cfr. 1907; Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrol- 
 Hurter, Nomenclator  Literarius 09, Pp. 370 sqq. 
 Theologiae Catholicae, Vol. I, coll. 
 
CREATION A FREE: DIVINE AGT © 45 
 
 vary creatable forms with the utmost freedom; 
 while God would not be infinitely perfect if His 
 Essence could be the exemplar of but one cre- 
 atable world. 
 
 b) Absolute Optimism is incompatible with Catholic 
 teaching. This philosophical system, excogitated by 
 Leibniz,** holds that the Divine Intellect, in contemplating 
 an infinite number of possible worlds, was constrained 
 by the divine wisdom and goodness to select, and that 
 the divine power was forced to create, that which was 
 absolutely the best, 7. e., the world in which the greatest 
 number of realities harmoniously co-exist.14 The idea 
 of an “absolutely best world ” involves an intrinsic con- 
 tradiction, because in the domain of finite objects there 
 can be no summum bonum or absolute optimum. The 
 Leibnizian conceit is also disproved by experience, which 
 shows that the universe is seriously disfigured by evil. 
 No sane person will deny that a world in which there 
 was no sin, and no misery caused by sin (such as pain 
 and death, sickness and poverty), would be a far “ bet- 
 ter” world than the one in which we now live. But 
 even if such a thing as an absolutely “ best’ world were 
 conceivable, the Creator would be under no compulsion 
 to produce it. For no matter whether He makes 
 things great or small, perfect or imperfect, God is suffi- 
 cient unto Himself, and nowise depends on His creatures. 
 In the words of St. Augustine: ‘“ Deus nulla necessi- 
 
 13 Theodic., part. 11. Bayle, who had-tried to show that 
 
 14 Cfr. Tennemann’s Manual of 
 the History of Philosophy, ed. John- 
 son-Morell (Bohn’s Philological Li- 
 brary), pp. 340 sqq., London 1878. 
 “ Leibniz’s . . . Théodicée was com- 
 posed for the purpose of refuting 
 
 reason and faith are incompatible. 
 The work is devoted, in a large 
 measure, to the discussion of the 
 problem of evil and to the defence 
 of optimism.”— Turner, History of 
 Philosophy, p. 511. 
 
46 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 tate, nulla suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentid, sed sola 
 bonitate fecit, quod factum est— God made the world 
 not because He was compelled to make it, or because 
 He needed it for any advantage of His own, but out 
 of sheer goodness.” 4 
 
 It is to be remarked, however, that not all forms of 
 Optimism are irrational and repugnant. The relative 
 Optimism advocated by Ruiz and Palmieri, and even by 
 some of the Fathers of the Church,’* is supported by 
 solid arguments and carefully safeguards the liberty of 
 the Creator. The present universe may be regarded as 
 the best in a relative sense, 7. e., in so far as it is per- 
 fectly consonant to the divine idea, adequately serves the 
 purpose for which it was created, and embraces all pos- 
 sible species of natural?” and supernatural perfection.1® 
 
 Thesis III: The divine act of Creation was not, 
 however, a free act libertate contrarietatis; that is to 
 say, God was not free to create a bad world; He could 
 create none but a good world. 
 
 Proof. By a bad world we understand, not 
 one in which there is physical evil (disease, pain, 
 
 15 De Civit. Det, XI, 24. Among 18 Grace, glory, hypostatic union. 
 
 OS a a 
 
 a 
 af 
 ; 
 i 
 b, 
 4 
 ' 
 
 those who have effectively refuted For further information on the 
 
 absolute Optimism we may mention: 
 Jos. Hontheim, Instit. Theodic., pp. 
 622 sqq.; -Hugh of St. \Victor, De 
 Sacram., I, qu. 2, cap. 22, cited by 
 Kilgenstein, Die Gotteslehre des 
 Hugo von St. Viktor, pp. 212 sqq., 
 Wurzburg 1897. 
 
 16 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Lib. 
 Arbit., III, 5; St. Chrysost., Hom. 
 in I Cor., 12; St. John Damasc., De 
 Fide Orth., ‘Il, 29. 
 
 17 Matter, plants, brute animals, 
 men, and angels. 
 
 whole subject the student is re- 
 ferred to Palmieri, De Deo Creante, 
 thes. 12, Romae 1878; Stentrup, 
 De Deo Uno, pp. 650 sqq., Oeni- 
 ponte 1878; Humphrey, “ His Di- 
 vine Majesty,’ pp. 247 sqq., London 
 1897. Prominent among the more 
 recent defenders of absolute Opti- 
 mism is G. W. Allen, The Mission 
 of Evil. Being a Suggestion to- 
 wards a Philosophy of Absolute Op- 
 timism, London 1900. 
 
CREATION A FREE DIVINE ACT 47 
 
 death), but one replete with sin. Evil in its 
 primary and proper sense is sin. But God, who 
 is absolutely holy, cannot be the author of sin. 
 In this sense our thesis is an article of faith, 
 defined as such by the Fourth Lateran Council, 
 and also by the Councils of Florence ?® and Trent. 
 The Tridentine canon says: “Si quis dixerit, 
 non esse in potestate hominis, vias suas malas 
 facere, sed mala ita ut bona Deum operari, non 
 pernussive tantum, sed etiam proprie et per se, 
 anathema sit —If any one say that it is not in 
 the power of man to make his ways evil, but that 
 God worketh evil in the same manner that He 
 worketh good, not by permitting it, but properly 
 speaking and per se, let him be anathema.” 2° 
 
 Of the Fathers we will only cite Augustine, who 
 says: “Naturas igitur Deus omnes fecit, non 
 solum in virtute et iustitia mansuras, sed etiam 
 peccaturas, non ut peccarent, sed ut essent orna- 
 turae universum, sive peccare sive non peccare 
 voluissent — God therefore created all beings, 
 not only those which were to persevere in virtue 
 and justice, but those also which were to sin; 
 and He created them not in order that they 
 should sin, but that they should be an ornament 
 to the universe, regardless of whether they would 
 will to sin or not.” #4 
 
 19 Supra, p. 28. ability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 
 20 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 6. 253 sqq. and 449 sqq. 
 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Know- 21) De EAb. Aros tilors, 
 
48 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 This dogma is denied by Pessimism, which has justly 
 been called “an error that is contemporaneous with 
 philosophic thought.” Its traces appear in every stage 
 of history.*? Arthur Schopenhauer may be regarded 
 as its chief and most consistent exponent. He holds 
 that the existing universe is the worst imaginable; that 
 it is, in fact, a veritable hell in which “man is the 
 devil of his fellows,” and that its only natural end and 
 object apparently is, to be whelmed in utter destruc- 
 tion.** Such a theory is plainly repugnant to faith and 
 reason. We will not deny that the problem of evil, which 
 has baffled so many thinkers since the days of the Gnos- 
 tics and Manichzans, is one of the most difficult in phi- 
 losophy.** But the Pessimism of Schopenhauer is op- 
 posed to common sense, which tells us that evil does not 
 preponderate in the world; that side by side with physical 
 and moral evil there exists an immense amount of 
 good; that even where it takes the form of sin, evil is 
 oftentimes the source of good which would otherwise re- 
 main undone; and, lastly, that a fair equalization and the 
 restoration of the right order, which is partially disturbed 
 here on earth, can only be expected in the world beyond. 
 If we duly consider all these things we shall be persuaded 
 that relative Optimism will ultimately prevail. The most 
 satisfactory solution of “ the riddle of the painful earth” 
 
 22 Cfr. Driscoll, Christian Philos- such questions as these really lie at 
 ophy: God, pp. 275 sqq. the root of all philosophizing, 
 
 23 Cfr. Turner, History of Ph- 
 losophy, p. 589 sq. For a good 
 critical exposition of Schopenhauer’s 
 system see Driscoll, Christian Phi- 
 losophy: God, pp. 283 saqq. 
 
 24“ What place the principle of 
 evil occupies in the constitution of 
 things: how it came to exist: and 
 how it may best be treated and its 
 consequences avoided in practice — 
 
 whether speculative or didactic, an- 
 cient or modern; and it is mostly 
 as a practical way of possible es- 
 cape from some of the most painful 
 and distressing of actual or possible 
 experiences that religion in general 
 has commended itself to the mind of 
 man.”— A, B. Sharpe, Evil: Its 
 Nature and Cause, p. 7, London 
 1907. 
 
CREATION IN TIME 49 
 
 is that offered by Christianity; in fact, “the existence of 
 evil is a serious difficulty in the way of accepting any non- 
 theistic interpretation of the universe.” 25 
 
 According to Catholic teaching man was originally 
 destined for a life of innocence and bliss. He fell 
 from his high estate through his own fault. The Son of 
 God descended from Heaven to redeem the sinful human 
 tace, and through His merits this present life of pain 
 and sorrow will be followed by one of unending happi- 
 ness for those who faithfully obey the divine will. Our 
 Redeemer, who has justly been styled the “Man of 
 Sorrows,” furnishes a splendid pattern for the heroic 
 endurance of this terrestrial exile, which lasts but a 
 short while and affords us an opportunity to accumulate 
 tich merits for the life beyond. In the cross of Christ 
 lies our salvation and reconciliation ; its glory dispels the 
 terrors to which evil has given birth.2¢ 
 
 ARTICLE 4 
 
 CREATION IN TIME 
 
 It is an article of faith that the world was 
 created in time, 7. e., that “a certain finite num- 
 ber of days has elapsed since the instant when 
 the angels and the material world were brought 
 into being.” * But theologians differ with tre- 
 
 25 Sharpe, of. cit., p. 4. Jis Cause, London 1907; IpEM, in 
 
 26 Cfr. J. Dippel, Der neuere Pes- the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, 
 simismus, Wirzburg TOSAM MH sun Lue article ‘* Evil”; Driscoll, Christian 
 Fischer, Das Problem des Ubels und Philosophy: God, Chapter XV, pp. 
 die Theodicee, Mainz 1883; v. Kep- 297 sqq.; Boedder, Natural The- 
 pler, Das Problem des Leidens in ology, pp. 393 sqaq. 5 
 der Moral, new ed., Freiburg 1911; 1 Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic 
 A. B. Sharpe, Evil: lis Nature and Theology, Vol. II, p. 249. 
 
50 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 gard to the question whether God, had He so 
 willed, could have created an eternal world. 
 
 Thesis I: God created the existing universe not 
 from everlasting, but in time. 
 
 This is de fide. 
 
 Proof. In its famous Caput “Firmiter,’ the 
 Fourth Lateran Council solemnly defined against 
 the Albigenses, that God “simul ab initio temporis 
 utramque de nililo condidit naturam,’ and the 
 Council of the Vatican repeated this definition 
 word for word: “God created out of nothing, 
 from the very first beginning of time, both the 
 spiritual and the corporeal creature.’’? This 
 dogmatic definition is based on solid Scriptural 
 grounds. 
 
 a) The very first verse of Genesis declares 
 that the world began in time: “Jn principio 
 (YORIZ) creavit Deus coelum et terram—In 
 the beginning God created heaven and earth.” 
 Some theologians doubt whether these words 
 refer to the beginning of time;* but it is easy 
 to show that they do. YS), in Biblical usage, 
 signifies either the beginning of time, or a pri- 
 macy due to dignity, or the cause that produces 
 an effect, or headship in a local sense. In Gen. 
 I, 1 the context clearly excludes the three last 
 
 2 Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 1. 
 3 Cfr. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II. p. 250. 
 
 ming sal 
 
 Se ee 
 
CREATION IN TIME 51 
 
 mentioned meanings. Consequently, the term 
 -must here denote the beginning of time. 
 
 Some of the Fathers* apply “beginning” to 
 the Divine Logos, as principium de principio. 
 But it is highly improbable that Moses had in 
 mind the Logos. Moreover, the Fathers in 
 question did not propound their construction as 
 the primary and only correct one; they merely - 
 suggested it as a possible secondary interpreta- 
 tion resulting from a deeper study of the text.® 
 
 There are numerous other Scriptural passages 
 which could be adduced in confirmation of our 
 faosis.\) Cir. e.g) Psi aba nia palo. 
 mine, terram fundasti—In the beginning, O 
 Lord, thou foundedst the earth.” Ps. LXX XIX, 
 2: “Priusquam montes fierent aut formaretur 
 terra et orbis, a saeculo et usque ad saeculum tu 
 es, Deus — Before the mountains were made, or 
 the earth and the world was formed, from eter- 
 nity and to eternity thou art God.” ® 
 
 With the possible exception of Origen, the Fathers 
 unanimously teach that the world is not eternal. Tatian, 
 the Apologist, says: ‘“‘ O88 yap dvapyos 9 Urn, Kabarep 6 
 @cds — Matter is not beginningless, as God is.”7 St. 
 Basil, the ablest among the Patristic commentators of 
 the Hexaémeron, declares: “Because many believed 
 
 4Cfr. Theophil., Ad Autol., II, 6 Cfr. also Prov. VIII, 22 sqq.; 
 10; Clem. Alex., Strom., VI, 7; John XVII, 5; Eph. I, 4. 
 Basil., Hom. in Hexaém., 1. 7 Contr. Graec., 5. 
 
 5Cfr. Tertull., Contr. Hermog., 
 C,759. 
 
52 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 that the world was eternal, like God, Moses purposely 
 chose these words: In the beginning God created heaven 
 and earth.” * St. Ambrose insists that the world began 
 simultaneously with time. “In principio temporis,’ he 
 says, “ Deus coelum et terram fecit; tempus enim ab hoc 
 mundo, non ante mundum— In the beginning of time 
 God made heaven and earth; for time began simulta- 
 neously with, not prior to, the world.”® In other words, 
 time began with Creation. Before the Creation of the 
 world there was no real, but ‘only imaginary time. 
 Quite appositely, therefore, does St. Augustine observe: 
 “ Procul dubio non est factus mundus in tempore, sed 
 cum tempore — The world was doubtless not made in 
 time, but with time.” 44 And he brushes aside the ludi- 
 crous question: “ What did God do during the time 
 that preceded the Creation?” with the remark: “ Non 
 enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus — There was no 
 then, because there was no time.” ?? 
 
 Thesis II: Creation from all eternity seems to in- 
 volve a contradiction, and hence was probably impos- 
 sible. 
 
 Proof. As against the revealed truth that the world 
 had its beginning in time, it is a purely speculative ques- 
 
 8 Hom. in Hexaém., 1. 
 
 9 Praef. in Hexaém. contr. Peri- 
 pat. 
 
 10 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
 Knowabihty, Essence, and Attri- 
 butes, pp. 306 sqq.—* The now of 
 time is the boundary line between 
 the past and the future. As soon, 
 therefore, as the world was created, 
 there existed a boundary line be- 
 tween an imaginary or possible past, 
 and a real future. This was the 
 beginning of real time.”— Hum- 
 
 phrey, “His Divine Majesty,” p. 
 2576 
 
 11 De Civ., Dei, V; 6.— Creation 
 is said to have taken place in 
 time, in the sense that real time 
 began with creation. Before real 
 time, there was only possible time, 
 This was indefinite, in the possibil- 
 ity of it. Hence we may, with St. 
 Augustine, say that the world was 
 made with time, rather than made 
 in time. Cfr. Humphrey, “ His Di- 
 vine Majesty,” p. 257. 
 
 12 Confess., XI, 13. 
 
CREATION IN TIME 53 
 
 tion of decidedly minor importance, whether or not an 
 eternal world is intrinsically possible. Granted that it is 
 possible, we must carefully distinguish between “ be- 
 ginning in time” and “being a creature.” From the 
 fact that a thing began in time we can rightly conclude 
 to its being a creature, but we could not argue conversely 
 that it must have begun in time because it is a creature; 
 an eternal creature would be as truly a creature as one 
 produced in time. 
 
 Still some of the Fathers, believing that an eternal 
 world would involve an intrinsic contradiction, boldly 
 concluded from the dependence of the world to its cre- 
 ation in time. It should however, be noted that not a 
 few of the Patristic texts usually cited in this connec- 
 tion do not really bear on the question at issue. They 
 merely affirm that the dualistic assumption of an un- 
 created eternal hyle involves a contradiction, whereas 
 the question we are now considering is whether or not 
 creation from eternity would entail a contradiction. But 
 there is another group of Patristic dicta which are ger- 
 mane to our topic. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria says: 
 “That which has been brought into being by creation, 
 cannot possibly have existed from all eternity.” 1% This 
 view was adopted by a number of eminent Scholastics, 
 e. g., Albertus Magnus and Richard of St. Victor. St. 
 Bonaventure went so far as to declare: ‘To assume 
 that the world is eternal . . . and [at the same time] to 
 hold that all things were created out of nothing, is so 
 contrary to right reason that I cannot persuade myself 
 that any philosopher, no matter how small his intel- 
 lectual capacity, ever took this ground.” 14 
 
 But St. Bonaventure’s opinion was not shared by all 
 
 13 Thes. Assert., 32. 
 14 Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 1, p. 2. 
 
54. EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 Catholic theologians and philosophers. Those two great 
 antagonists, St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, 
 agreed that the proposition that the world necessarily 
 began in time, cannot be cogently established by philo- 
 sophic arguments. “ Mundum non semper fuisse, sola 
 fide tenetur et demonstrative probari non potest,” says 
 St. Thomas; “That the world is not eternal we hold 
 solely as a matter of faith; reason cannot demonstrate 
 it by stringent arguments.” 1° The Angelic Doctor care- 
 fully reviews the objections raised against this thesis in 
 his work De Aeternitate Mundi.* 
 
 Still less is it demonstrable that an eternal creation is 
 necessary.’ Such being the status of the vexed con- 
 troversy, there is plainly no need for us to embrace 
 either of the contradictory opinions current among 
 Catholic philosophers and theologians. We merely note, 
 in passing, that the authority of the Fathers seems rather 
 to favor the intrinsic impossibility of an eternal creation.2® 
 
 ARTICLE 5 
 
 THE INCOMMUNICABILITY OF GOD’S CREATIVE POWER 
 
 Revelation tells us that no creature ever exercised the 
 creative power. Still the purely speculative question may 
 be asked: Could God, if He would, communicate His 
 creative power to a creature, e. g., an angel of the 
 highest rank? Of course no angel could wield the cre- 
 
 16S. Th.,) 1a,qu. a6; art. 2, 18 Cfr. Hontheim, Instit. Theo- 
 
 16 Cfr. the learned monograph of — dicaeae, pp. 710 sqq., Friburgi 1893; 
 Dr. P. Thomas Esser, O. P., Die Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic The- 
 Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquino ology, Vol. II, pp. 249 sqq.; Sten- 
 tiber die Méglichkeit einer anfangs- trup, Das Dogma von der geitlichen 
 losen Schépfung, Miinster 1895. Weltschépfung, Innsbruck 1870. 
 
 17 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Pot., qu. 
 3, art. 17. 
 
 7 
 ad 
 
 ee me Ey ee ee 
 
 —*. 
 
 ay a ae 
 
CREATIVE POWER INCOMMUNICABLE 55 
 
 ative power to the full extent of its infinite perfection, 
 or independently of the preservative and concurring in- 
 fluence of the Divine First Cause. The meaning of our 
 question is: Could any creature, as principal, or at 
 least as an instrumental cause, produce anything (e. g., 
 a blade of grass) out of nothing? A categorical denial 
 of this possibility, it is easy to see, will redound to the 
 glory of the Creator. 
 
 Thesis I: No mere creature ever created anything 
 out of nothing. 
 
 This proposition embodies an article of faith. 
 
 Proof. The Fourth Lateran Council dogmatic- 
 ally declared the Blessed Trinity to be “unwm uni- 
 versorum principium, creator omnium visibilium et 
 mvisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium — The 
 one principle of all things, the Creator of all 
 things visible and invisible, spiritual and cor- 
 poreal.” * This truth can be proved from Sacred 
 Scripture by a twofold method: (1) by show- 
 ing that Creation is never attributed to any 
 one but God; and (2) by demonstrating that 
 the Bible positively denies that any creature ever 
 exercised creative power. Heb. III, a: “Out 
 autem omnia creavit, Deus est — He that created 
 pithines,is God.” Apoc TiVo 1: 22a ereasti 
 omnia et propter voluntatem tuam erant et creata 
 sunt — Thou hast created all things; and for 
 thy will they were, and have been created.” This 
 
 1 Cfr, Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 428, 
 
50 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 truth is enunciated even more solemnly in Is. 
 XLIV, 24: “Ego sum Dominus, faciens omnia, 
 extendens coelos solus, stabiliens terram, et nullus 
 mecum —I am the Lord, that make all things, 
 that alone stretch out the heavens, that estab- 
 lish the earth, and there is none with me.” And 
 in John I, 3: “Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et 
 sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est — All 
 things were made by him: and without him was 
 made nothing that was made.” In the light of 
 these and similar texts the Fathers of the Church 
 did not hesitate to brand as heretical the proposi- 
 tion that the world was made by beings of an 
 inferior order. “Those who allege,” says St. 
 John of Damascus, “that the Angels are the 
 creators of any substance whatever, are mouth- 
 pieces of the Devil, who is their councillor; for 
 being themselves creatures, the Angels cannot be 
 creators.”.* This view is shared by all theolog- 
 ical schools. 
 
 Thesis II: God cannot, even by way of grace, 
 communicate His creative power to any creature. 
 
 This thesis merely represents a theological conclusion. 
 Proof. The Scholastics generally hold* that no crea- 
 ture, how high soever its rank, is able, even with 
 divine assistance, to create anything out of nothing.* 
 Holy Scripture, Tradition, and ecclesiastical teaching 
 
 2De Fide Orth., II, 3. Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist., 1, 
 3 Against Durandus and Gabriel qu. 4. 
 Biel. Cfr. the latter’s Comment. in 4 Durandus was ill-advised when 
 
CREATIVE POWER INCOMMUNICABLE 57 
 
 alike regard the power to create as the true criterion 
 of omnipotence, and consequently as an exclusive and 
 incommunicable divine attribute, which as essentially 
 differentiates God from His creatures as His eter- 
 nity or immensity. Theologically, therefore, it is quite 
 consistent to conclude from God’s creative power to 
 His omnipotence and, ultimately, to His self-exist- 
 ence.) Lhe notion) of a)‘ creating’ creatire,’ on the 
 other hand, is as much a contradiction as would be that 
 ofa “created God.’ Whenever, in fact, Holy Scrip- 
 ture wishes to exalt God’s omnipotence and to impress 
 His creatures with their own impotence, it usually accen- 
 tuates His creative power.’ Hence we may properly 
 conclude that creative power is a mode of operation 
 peculiar to God, qua God, distinguishing Him from the 
 creature, gua creature. This is most certainly the opinion 
 of the Fathers, who hold that a “creatura creatrix” 
 would involve an intrinsic contradiction. Thus St. 
 Athanasius says: “All things were made through the 
 Word, who would not have wrought all things, were 
 He Himself a creature. Hence even the angels are un- 
 able to create, since they are themselves creatures.” ° 
 Similarly St. Augustine: “ An angel can no more create 
 a substance than he can create himself.” 7 | 
 
 The Scholastics tried to demonstrate the incommuni- 
 
 possess the power to produce some- 
 thing out of nothing.” L.c., 1. 23. 
 
 he wrote: “ Quamvis nulli_crea- 
 turae sit communicatum, quod creet, 
 in con- 
 
 tamen non apparet aliqua ratio con- 
 vincens necessario, quod Deus non 
 posset facere aliquam creaturam, 
 quae possit aliquid producere nullo 
 supposito in quo agat — Though it 
 has not been given to any creature 
 to create, yet there appears to be 
 no stringent and necessary reason 
 why God should not be able to 
 make some creature which would 
 
 5 
 
 5 See the texts quoted 
 firmation of Thesis 1, supra, p. 55. 
 
 6 Serm. contr. Arian., ii, n. 21. 
 Newman’s translation; cfr. Select 
 Treatises of St. Athanasius in Con- 
 troversy with the Arians, Vol. I, p. 
 277, 9th impression, London 1903. 
 
 @ De? Gentiad Eats, MIX? 25, 128% 
 For other Patris‘ic texts bearing 
 on this topic cfr. Tepe, Instit. 
 
58 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 cability of God’s creative power by various philosophical 
 arguments. St. Thomas bases his demonstration on the 
 fact that pure being (ens in quantum est ens), which is 
 the terminus of creation, can be produced solely by the 
 causa universalissima.® Suarez starts from an analysis 
 of the creative act, which of its very nature, he says, 
 cannot be limited to this or that being (e. g., a grain 
 of sand), but embraces all creatable things. A power 
 that is able to create by a mere act of the will—so 
 runs his argument — can meet with no material obstacle, 
 and must therefore extend to all possibles. Now, such 
 a power cannot be conceived except as actually infinite, 
 and therefore cannot belong to any finite creature. 
 Hence God alone can create. 
 
 Thesis III: The Creator cannot employ a creature 
 as an instrumental cause in creating. 
 
 This thesis may be qualified as highly probable (pro- 
 babilissima). 
 
 Proof. An instrumental cause is far inferior to a 
 principal cause, because it is moved rather than moving 
 (as, for instance, a saw in the hands of a carpenter). 
 The absolute impossibility of God’s employing creatures 
 as instrumental causes in the act of creation is, there- 
 fore, not quite so evident as the truth embodied in the 
 preceding thesis. In fact, not a few Scholastics, follow- 
 ing the lead of Peter Lombard,’ opposed the thesis we 
 are here upholding. St. Thomas at first followed the 
 “ Master of the Sentences,” but later in life changed 
 Theol., Vol. II, pp. 436 saqq., Paris 9 Suarez, Metaph., disp. 20, sect. 
 1895, and Chr. Pesch, Praelect. 24a). alt tow Cir... Palmierty De Deo 
 Dogmat., t. III, 3rd ed. pp. -12 Creante, thes. 6. 
 
 sqq., Friburgi 1908. 10 Lib. Sent., 5, dist. 4. 
 OSs They ra, quj48, arte<; 
 
CREATIVE POWER INCOMMUNICABLE  ¢9 
 
 his opinion and admitted that it is impossible for any crea- 
 ture to create, even though it were only as an instrument 
 in the hands of God: “ Sic igitur impossibile est, quod 
 alicut creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria 
 neque imstrumentaliter, sive per ministerium.’? A 
 transfer of the creative power to an instrumental cause, 
 akin to the transfer of divine power to man in the 
 working of miracles, the forgiving of sins, and at Con- 
 secration during Holy Mass, is inconceivable because of 
 the absence of a materia circa quam; for, in the act of 
 creating something out of nothing there is no subject to 
 which the instrumental cause could be applied and on 
 which it could exercise its causality. This consideration 
 removes a difficulty raised by Oswald, viz.: that “a con- 
 version of one substance into another (transubstantia- 
 tion) would seem to postulate as great a power as the 
 production of a substance out of sheer nothing.7) 725) A¢ 
 the Consecration the priest takes bread and wine as a 
 substratum upon which to exercise his ministerial powers; 
 but Creation is the production of something out of noth- 
 ing without a pre-existing substratum." 
 
 READINGS : — *Palmieri, S. J., De Creatione et Praecipuis Crea- 
 turis, 2nd ed., Rome 1910.— Mazzella, De Deo Creante, 4th ed., 
 Rome 1908.— Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. EV SS) 259— 
 263, Mainz 1885.— Oswald, Schopfungslehre, Paderborn 1893.— 
 Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, Vol. I, §§ 62-90, F reiburg 
 
 11S. Th., 1a, qu. 45, art. Sy 
 
 12 Schépfungslehre, p. 53, Pader- 
 born 1893. 
 
 13 Cfr. St. Thom., Contr. Gent., 
 II, 21 (Rickaby, God and His Crea- 
 tures, pp. 88 sq., London 1905); 
 Ipem, De Pot., qu. Satta, 4valso 
 Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 
 451 sq. 
 
 *The asterisk before an author’s 
 
 name indicates that his treatment of 
 the question is especially clear and 
 thorough. As St. Thomas is inva- 
 riably the best guide, the omission 
 of the asterisk before his name 
 never means that we consider his 
 work in any way inferior to that of 
 others. There are vast stretches of 
 theology which he scarcely touched. 
 
60 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 
 
 1899.— *G. B. Tepe, Jnstit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 417 sqq., Paris 
 1895.— Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, ed. 3, Friburgi 
 1908.— Pesnell, Le Dogme de la Création et la Science Contem- 
 boraine, 2nd ed., Arras 1894.—L. Janssens, De Deo Creatore et 
 de Angelis, Friburgi 1905.— *St. Thom., S. Theol., ta, qu. 44 sqq. 
 — Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum.— Sane Dogmengeschichte, 
 Vols. I and II, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1892-1895.— Vigener, De Ideis 
 Divinis, Monast. 1869.— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, § 134, Frei- 
 burg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 356 sqq., 2nd 
 ed., London 1899).— *Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. I, 
 2nd ed., Minster 1867 Stentrup, Das Dogma von der gzeit- 
 lichen Weltschopfung, Innsbruck 1870—Kleutgen, Vom zeit- 
 lichen Anfang der Welt (Beilagen to the Theologie der Vorzeit, 
 Heft 2), Miimster 1870—Th. Esser, O. P., Die Lehre des hi. 
 Thomas iiber die Méglichkeit einer anfangslosen Schépfung, 
 Minster 1895.— St. Thom., Opusc. De Aeternitate Mundi.— Bil- 
 luart, De Opere Sex Dierum, diss. I, art. 6.—J. T. Driscoll, 
 Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 179 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 
 1904.— K. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schépfung, Ratisbon t910— 
 W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 205 sqq., London 1897. 
 
CHAPTER TE 
 
 THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE CREATED UNI- 
 VERSE, OR DIVINE PRESERVATION 
 AND CONCURRENCE 
 
 God, having produced out of nothing the va- 
 rious substances that constitute the created uni- 
 verse, with all their properties and powers, con- 
 tinues to influence them, (1) by preserving them 
 in their being,’ and (2) by concurring in their 
 operations.” We shall consider the divine Pres- 
 ervation of the universe and God’s Concurrence 
 with His creatures in two separate Sections. 
 
 1 Conservatio in esse. 2 Concursus in operando. 
 
 61 
 
SECTION |x 
 
 DIVINE PRESERVATION 
 
 1. THe Nature oF Divine PRESERVATION.— 
 All created beings are contingent and absolutely 
 dependent on the creative First Cause. It fol- 
 lows that, once created, they cannot continue in 
 substantial existence without the co-operation of 
 the Creator. A created being never for a mo- 
 ment ceases to be an ens ab alio,* and therefore 
 forever depends upon the preservative influence 
 of God. A sudden withdrawal of that influence 
 would result in the inevitable annihilation of the 
 creature. Consequently divine Preservation is 
 as indispensable for the continued existence of 
 the cosmos as Creation was for its beginning.‘ 
 In this sense the preservation of the universe is 
 sometimes called “continued creation.” 
 
 3“* The fact that a creature actu- between the creative and the pre- 
 ally exists, does not exist neces- Servative action of God, has been 
 sarily, but depends on an external justly rejected by all theological 
 cause as much for its continuous schools. Cfr. St. Thom., S. Theol., 
 
 as for its initial existence.” (Wil- ta. qu. 104, art. 2, ad 4.—QOn 
 helm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Henry of Ghent (Doctor Solemnis) 
 Theology, Vol. I, p. 364.) see Turner, History of Philosophy, 
 
 4The peculiar theory advanced pp. 384 sqq.; on Peter d’Auriol 
 by Henry of Ghent and Aureolus, (Aureolus), ibid., pp. 403 sq. 
 that there is a specific difference 
 
 62 
 
THE TEACHING OF REVELATION 63 
 
 This does not mean that all created beings sink back 
 into nothingness at every moment of their existence, to 
 be each time promptly recreated by God, as Bayle scof- 
 fingly insinuated.® Divine preservation must not be con- 
 ceived as intermittent, but as the continued action of God. 
 The power which sustains the universe is an incommuni- 
 cable attribute of God in the same sense as the creative 
 power which called it into being. 
 
 What we have so far said is sufficient to show the 
 falsity of the systems that have been at various times 
 devised in respect of divine Preservation. First and 
 above all we must note that the divine Preservation of 
 the cosmos is not merely negative. “It is not enough 
 for God not to destroy His creatures, He must exercise 
 some positive influence on them.”® Preservation must 
 be conceived as a positive divine influence directed to 
 the very substance of a creature, and by which the crea- 
 ture is enabled to continue its existence.? 
 
 Like Creation, Preservation, entitatively considered, is 
 an eternal and necessary act; terminatively, however, it 
 is temporal and free. 
 
 2. THE TEACHING OF REVELATION.—Though 
 never formally defined as an article of faith, the 
 doctrine of the divine Preservation of the uni- 
 verse is undoubtedly contained in the sources of 
 
 5If Bayle’s opinion were true, 
 justly observes B. Boedder, S. J. 
 (Natural Theology, p. 354, 2nd ed., 
 London 1899), “‘there would be 
 properly no preservation at all, but 
 only renewal by divine creation of 
 interrupted existences.’’ 
 
 6 Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of 
 Catholic Theology, Vol. I, p. 363. 
 
 7 This last-mentioned point must 
 
 be strongly emphasized against cer- 
 tain modern theologians (e. g., Ber- 
 lage and Klee), who postulate the 
 Divine Preservation only for dis- 
 soluble compound substances (or- 
 ganisms), but hold that the so- 
 called incorruptible and simple sub- 
 stances (the elements, pure Spirits) 
 preserve themselves, 
 
64 DIVINE PRESERVATION 
 
 Revelation. ‘The Roman Catechism declares that, 
 unless preserved by God’s Providence, the uni- 
 verse would instantly return to its original noth- 
 ingness.® 
 
 a) Holy Scripture clearly enforces the neces- 
 sity of divine Preservation, as distinct from 
 Creation. Wisd. XI, 26: “Quomodo posset 
 aliquid permanere (vévev), nisi tu voluisses, aut 
 quod a te vocatum non esset, conservaretur? 
 How could any thing endure, if thou wouldst 
 not? or be preserved, if not called by thee?” If 
 this preservative influence were withdrawn, all 
 living beings would perish. Ps. CIII,29: “Au- 
 feres spiritum eorum, et deficient et in pulverem 
 suum revertentur—Thou shalt take away their 
 breath, and they shall fail, and shall return to 
 their dust.’ Holy Scripture describes divine 
 Preservation either actively as an “upholding” 
 or keeping together, or passively as the indwell- 
 ing of all things in God. Heb. I, 2 sq.: “Per 
 quem fecit et saecula,... portansque® omnia 
 verbo virtutts suae — By whom also he made the 
 
 world . . . upholding all things by the word of 
 
 his power.” Col. 1, 16 sq.: “Omnia per ipsum et 
 
 im ipso creata sunt ... et omnia in ipso con- 
 8 Cat. Rom., P. I, cap. ii, qu. stitutae sunt, illas conservaret, 
 
 19. “‘ Nisi conditis rebus perpetua statim ad nihilum reciderent.” 
 
 ems [Dei] providentia adesset, at- 9 hépwr, 
 
 que eadem vi, qua ab initio con- 
 
THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS 65 
 
 stant “—All things were created by him and in 
 him . . . and by him all things consist.” 1! 
 
 b) The teaching of the Fathers on the whole conforms 
 to the Scripture texts just quoted. Origen commen- 
 tates on Acts XVII, 28 as follows: “In what manner 
 then shall we live and move and be in God, unless with 
 His power He grasps and holds together the uni- 
 werse?.”.? St. Chrysostom observes: “To hold the 
 universe together is no smaller matter than to have 
 created it. Nay, if we be allowed to marvel, it is some- 
 thing even greater. For while the act of Creation pro- 
 duced beings, the act of Preservation sustains them, lest 
 they return to nothingness.” ** St, Augustine remarks :. 
 * The world would scarcely endure even for one single 
 moment, if God were to withdraw His governance from 
 af52,74 
 
 We will close the Patristic argument with a passage 
 from the writings of St. Gregory the Great: “Cuncta 
 ex mhilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursum ad ni- 
 Iulum tenderet, nisi eam auctor omnium regiminis manu 
 teneret — All things were made out of nothing, and their 
 essence would tend to return to nothing, did not the 
 author of all sustain them by his governance.” 18 
 in bringing any theist to avow that 
 things could not be at all, if they 
 dropped out of the thought of the 
 
 Supreme Mind. But God’s mere 
 thinking of them is not enough to 
 
 10 ra wavra évy aire ovvésrnker, 
 11 Cfr. also Acts XVII, 28. 
 
 12 De Princip., II, 1. 
 
 13 Hom. in Hebr., II, 1, 3. 
 
 14In Gen. ad Lit., IV, 14.  “* Be- 
 
 ing is not the nature or essence 
 of anything created, but of God 
 alone,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, 
 “Nothing then can remain in be- 
 ing when the divine activity ceases.” 
 (Contr. Gent., III, 65.) “This is 
 a truly magnificent argument,’’ com- 
 ments Fr. Rickaby. “In these 
 idealist days, there is no difficulty 
 
 raise them out of the order of pure 
 possibilities, and transfer them into 
 the region of actual being. To give 
 them actuality, God must will them; 
 and to keep them in existence He 
 must will them continually.” (Of 
 
 God and His C reatures, p. 236, 
 note.) i 
 15 Moral.. XVI, 37, 45. Other 
 
66 DIVINE PRESERVATION 
 
 c) It may be set down as a certain theological con- 
 clusion that in point of fact God will never actually 
 withdraw His preserving influence either from the uni- 
 verse as a whole, or from any of its constituent parts. 
 He will forever sustain the substance of His Creation. 
 With regard to spiritual substances, their eternal dura- 
 tion (immortality) is an ethical postulate based upon 
 God’s wisdom, sanctity, and fidelity. As to material 
 substances (not, however, their combinations) we have 
 positive assurance that they will also endure forever, 
 Cfr. Wisd. I, 14: “ Creavit Deus, ut essent [t. €., per- 
 manerent| omma—He created all things that they 
 might be,’ 16 
 
 Transubstantiation proves nothing against this; for 
 though bread and wine disappear in the conversion, they 
 are not properly annihilated. The same quantity of nat- 
 ural substance is restored when the species becomes cor- 
 rupted.” 
 
 READINGS : —*Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 130, 131, Frei- 
 
 burg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. r, ppi gor sqq.cu 
 
 Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 272-273, 2nd ed., Mainz 
 1888; Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Div., 1. to-11: St. Thom., 
 Contr. Gent., III, 65 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 
 236 sqq.) ; Inbem, De Potent., qu. 5; Petav., De Deo: NUIT 2s 7B) 
 Boedder, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 348 sqq., 2nd ed., London 
 1899; L. J. Walker, S. J., art. “ Providence,” in the Catholic Ency- 
 clopedia, Vol. XII. 
 
 Patristic texts will be found in 17 For a detailed treatment of 
 Stentrup, De Deo Uno, pp. 658 this point we must refer the stu- 
 sqq., Oenip. 1878. dent to the treatise on the Blessed 
 
 16 Cir. also’-Ps, CIE,) es CXLV; Eucharist, 
 6. 
 
 ‘ 
 ’ 
 4 
 i 
 & 
 i) 
 My 
 t 
 3 
 
SECTION 2 
 
 DIVINE CO-OPERATION OR CONCURRENCE 
 
 I. DEFINITION OF THE TERM.—The causality 
 of God extends to the operations (operari) of 
 His creatures as well as to their being (esse). 
 He co-operates in their operation by preserving 
 their substance and energy. But His co-opera- 
 tion is more than mediate. We hold with Cath- 
 olic theologians generally, against Durandus,! 
 that God lends His immediate physical co-opera- 
 tion or Concursus to each and every creatural 
 act. This particular function of divine Provi- 
 dence is called concursus divinus generalis, in 
 contradistinction to the special assistance granted 
 _ in the order of supernatural grace. 
 
 Two extremes must be avoided in defining the divine 
 Concursus. First, all creatural operations are not at- 
 tributable solely to God. This is the error of the so- 
 called Occasionalists, who assert that the causae secundae 
 are not true causes.2, Secondly, we must not exclude 
 the divine causality altogether by ascribing all causal in- 
 fluence to the creature. The First Cause actually co- 
 
 1Comment. in Quatuor Libros Occasionalism, see J. L. Perrier, 
 Sent., II, dist. 1, qu. 5. The Revival of Scholastic Philos- 
 
 2For a brief summary of the ophy, pp. 70 sq., New York rgog. 
 considerations usually urged against 
 
 67 
 
68 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 
 
 operates with the secondary causes,’ though this co-oper- 
 ation is not a cooperatio in the strict sense of the 
 term; that is, God does not posit one part of the effect, 
 and the creature the other, but the same effect is fully 
 and completely wrought by the First Cause, and just as 
 fully and completely by the second causes. “When 
 one and the same effect is attributed to a natural cause 
 and to the divine power,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, 
 “this does not mean that the effect is produced partly 
 by God and partly by the natural agent. The whole 
 effect is produced by both, though in different ways, 
 just as the same effect is produced wholly by the in- 
 strument and wholly also by the principal cause.” * The 
 right relation between Causa prima and causa secunda 
 demands that the creatural be subordinated to the divine 
 principle in such wise that the effect produced by both 
 derives its physical entity from God more than the 
 creature.® 
 
 As regards sin, we must distinguish between its ma- 
 terial and its formal cause, that is, between the physical 
 entity of the sinful act (entitas peccati), and its in- 
 herent malice (malitia peccati). God lends His co- 
 operation solely to the act as such; the malice inherent 
 in it, or, in other words, the sinning creature’s inclination 
 
 3“ To signify that all capabilities quod non sic idem effectus causae 
 
 of creatures for action must be 
 reduced to divine creation and 
 preservation, and that the exercise 
 of these capabilities can never take 
 place but with dependence upon di- 
 vine volition, Scholastics say that 
 God concurs with His creatures in 
 action as the first cause, whilst the 
 creatures are second causes.” 
 (Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 395 
 sq.) 
 
 4 Contr. Gent., III, 70: “ Patet 
 
 -instrumento et 
 
 naturali et divinae virtuti attribui- 
 tur, quast partim a Deo et partim 
 a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab 
 utroque secundum alium modum, 
 sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur 
 principalt agent 
 etiam totus.” (Cfr. Rickaby, Of 
 God and His Creatures, p. 242, 
 London 1905.) 
 
 5 Cir. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 
 qu. 105, art. 5. 
 
PROVED FROM REVELATION 69 
 
 towards evil, is due entirely to the exercise of its free- 
 will.® 
 
 2. THE DivinE Concursus DEMONSTRATED 
 FROM REVELATION.—The doctrine of the divine 
 Concursus is not strictly a revealed dogma. But 
 it is a certain theological conclusion, as appears 
 from the fact that it is held by all theological 
 _schools.* We quote the Roman Catechism as of 
 special weight in this matter: “Non solum autem 
 Deus universa, quae sunt, providentiad sud tuetur 
 atque administrat: verum etiam, quae moventur 
 et agunt aliquid, intima virtute ad motum atque 
 actionem ita impellit, ut, quamvis secundarum 
 causarum efficientiam non impediat, praeveniat 
 tamen, quum eius occultissima vis ad singula 
 pertineat, et quemadmodum Sapiens testatur, 
 ‘attingat a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit 
 omnia suaviter. Quare ab Apostolo dictum est, 
 quum apud Athenienses annuntiaret Deum, quem 
 agnorantes colebant: ‘Non longe est ab unoquo- 
 que nostrum; im ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, 
 et sumus'— Not only does God by His Provi- 
 dence protect and govern all things that exist, 
 but by His intimate power He also impels to 
 motion and action whatever things move and act, 
 and this in such manner that, although He ex- 
 
 6 God’s predetermination, in the ural Theology, Diisz2emcOtre Ste 
 words of Fr. Boedder, “‘ causes the Thomas, De Malo, qu. 3, art.. 2. 
 free choice which is sinful, but He 7 The isolated opposition of Du- 
 does not cause it as sinful.” (Nat- randus must be styled foolhardy. 
 
70 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 
 
 cludes not, He yet prevents, the agency of sec- 
 ondary causes; for His most secret influence 
 extends to all things, and as the Wise Man tes- 
 tifes, ‘reacheth from end to end mightily, and 
 ordereth all things sweetly.’ Wherefore the 
 Apostle, when announcing to the Athenians the 
 God, whom not knowing they adored, said: 
 ‘He is not far from every one of us, for in Him 
 we live, and move, and be.’ ” ® 
 
 a) The Scriptural argument offers some difficulties. | 
 
 In selecting probatory texts we must be careful to 
 choose only such as do not, on the face of them, refer 
 to the supernatural aid of grace or to the purely mediate 
 co-operation of God. For this reason, e. g., 1 Cor. XII, 
 6 is unavailable. This text runs as follows: “ Divi- 
 stones operationum sunt, idem vero Deus, qui operatur 
 omnia [opera] in ommibus [operantibus]|— And there 
 are diversities of operations, but the same God, who 
 worketh all in all.” St. Paul here speaks of supernatural 
 co-operation on the part of God.® 
 
 Equally unavailing for our present argument is Job 
 X, 8 sqq.: “Manus fecerunt tuae [Domini] me et 
 plasmaverunt me totum in circuitu, ... pelle et carni- 
 bus vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me — Thy 
 hands have made me, and fashioned me wholly round 
 about. . . . Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: 
 thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.” 
 As the plastic power of the womb is undoubtedly due 
 
 8 Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. I, cap. 2, omdvra ép mao, because of the 
 qu. 22. general terms in which it is 
 
 9It should be noted, however, couched, is most probably meant to 
 that the phrase 6 évepymy rd include man’s natural acts. 
 
PROVED FROM REVELATION 71 
 
 to the creative and preservative causality of God, this 
 text would not lose its force even if it did not refer to 
 His immediate co-operation. 
 
 There is another series of Scriptural texts so worded 
 as to be equally applicable to the Preservation of the 
 universe and to the divine Concursus with which we 
 are here concerned. For instance, John V, Wye Later 
 meus usque modo operatur et ego operor —My Father 
 worketh until now, and I work.” 
 
 Bell more) ta) the ( point’ isi) Is). XV 2+)  Do- 
 mine, dabis pacem nobis; omnia enim opera nostra 
 operatus es nobis — Lord, thou wilt give us peace, for 
 thou hast wrought all our works for us.” Here “our 
 works” are attributed to God. Cfr. also Acts XVII, 
 25: “Quum ipse det omnibus vitam? et ims pira- 
 tionem et omnia *— Seeing it is he who giveth to all 
 life, and breath, and all things.” Probably the most 
 conclusive text is Acts XVII, 28, cited by the Triden- 
 tine Catechism: “Jn ipso enim vivimus, movemur et 
 sumus — For in him we live, and move, and are.” The 
 Apostle here emphasizes the fact that we are dependent 
 upon the divine co-operation for our existence as well as 
 our life and operation. 
 
 b) The Fathers of the Church regarded this as a truth 
 both natural and revealed. Their teaching clearly ap- 
 pears from their polemical writings against the Pelagians. 
 St. Augustine censures those “ qui arbitrentur, tantum- 
 modo mundum ipsum factum a Deo, cetera iam fiert ab 
 ipso mundo, Deum autem nihil operari. Contra quos 
 profertur illa sententia Domini: Pater. meus usquemodo 
 operatur.”™* The doctrinal position of the Pelagians is 
 aptly hit off in St. Jerome’s dialogue between Crito- 
 
 10 fwqy, 12 7a wavTa, 
 11 rvony = breath, 13 In Gen. ad Lit., V, 20. 
 
92 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 
 
 bulus and Atticus. Critobulus, who speaks for the Pe- 
 lagian heretics, objects that, “If we need God’s aid in 
 everything we do, we cannot put a pen to paper, or keep 
 silence, or speak, or sit, or stand, or walk about, or 
 run, or eat, or fast, or weep, or laugh, etc., unless God 
 lends us His assistance.” Atticus, who defends the 
 Catholic view, replies that it is quite evident that we 
 can do none of these things except by the aid of God.” 
 Gregory the Great clearly teaches both the Preservation 
 and the divine Concursus: “ Omnia, quae creata sunt, 
 per se nec subsistere valent nec moveri, sed intantum 
 subsistunt, inquantum ut esse debeant acceperunt, in- 
 tantum moventur, inquantum occulto instinctu disponun- 
 tur — Created things, of themselves, can neither con- 
 tinue to exist nor move; they subsist only in so far as 
 they have received the power of subsistence, and they 
 move only in so far as they are disposed thereunto by 
 a hidden instinct.” *° 
 
 3. THE ConTROvERSY BETWEEN MOLINISM 
 AND THomismM.—The famous controversy be- 
 tween the Molinists and the Thomists, which we 
 have already sketched in our volume on God: 
 His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes," 
 sharply reasserts itself in discussing the relation 
 of the concurring First Cause to the operation of 
 the secondary causes, especially in regard to the 
 free acts of rational creatures. While both 
 
 14 Dial. contr. Pelag., I, n. 2. Schoolmen on this point see Sten- 
 15‘ Juxta meum sensum non trup, De Deo Uno, thes. 82. 
 posse perspicuum est.” Cfr. St. 17 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
 Jerome’s Ep. ad Ctesiph. Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 
 
 16 Regarding the consensus of the butes, pp. 383 sqq., St. Louis 1911. 
 
PHE MOLINIST CON PROVERSY 73 
 
 schools agree in upholding the necessity of the 
 divine Concurrence in all human acts, including 
 those which are free, and even those which are 
 sinful, they differ widely in regard to its measure 
 and mode. 
 
 a) The Molinistic theory may be outlined thus. The 
 divine Concurrence postulates two efficient causes 
 (namely, the First Cause and a secondary cause), which 
 by their harmonious co-operation produce the whole 
 effect. The question arises: How is the free act of 
 the will produced by this double cause? Liberty of 
 choice is essentially conditioned by an absolutely free 
 self-determination on the part of the will, and hence it 
 is evident that God, while remaining the First Cause, 
 must so shape His concurrence that the liberty of the 
 creature remains intact. “‘ Albeit the First Cause exerts 
 the strongest influence upon the effect,” says St. Thomas, 
 “that influence is nevertheless determined and specified 
 by the proximate cause.’ ?® Hence the divine Concur- 
 sus must comprise a twofold act: an offer of co-oper- 
 ation, and actual co-operation. The former is called 
 concursus oblatus, the latter, concursus collatus. 
 
 The concursus oblatus does not as yet produce a de- 
 termined act of the free will, but is of its nature in- 
 different, equivocal, and hypothetical, though at the same 
 time necessary, because free volition cannot operate of 
 itself and independently of the First Cause. By seizing, 
 as it were, and leaning on the proffered arm of God, the 
 human will is enabled to get its bearing according to the 
 - full extent of the active indifference which constitutes 
 its freedom, and to act according to its good pleasure. 
 
 18 De Potent., qu. 1, art. 4, ad 3. 
 
74. DIVINE CONCURRENCE 
 
 Did God proffer only a particular concursus along certain 
 definite lines, the choice of the will would by that very 
 fact be determined and its freedom destroyed. 
 
 By Concursus collatus or exhibitus we understand the 
 actual bestowal of divine help for the performance of a 
 specific act which the will freely posits, and which God 
 by virtue of the scientia media foresees with absolute 
 certainty from everlasting. This particular concursus is 
 by its very nature precisely as definite, univocal, and 
 absolute as the free determination of the will. It consists 
 in God’s physically positing the selfsame act to which the 
 free will has determined itself. The will’s self-deter- 
 mination precedes the divine causality as a condition 
 precedes that which it conditions, not, however, as a 
 cause precedes its effect. It follows that the concursus 
 collatus, taken in the sense explained, is and must be 
 strictly simultaneous.” 
 
 b) Thomism ”° postulates what is technically known as 
 the concursus praevius, that is, a co-operation on the 
 part of God which not only co-produces the free act of 
 the creature, but as a praemotio physica causally pre- 
 determines it, and formally applies the will, which is 
 of itself indifferent, to the free act. According to this 
 much-debated theory the free-will of the creature is pre- 
 determined by God physically and ad unum before it 
 determines itself. Concursus praevius and praemotio 
 physica, therefore, are merely different names for one 
 and the same thing. 
 
 19 For further information on pp. 355 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899. 
 
 this question see Suarez, Opusc. de 
 Concursu, I, 14 saqq.; Hontheim, 
 Instit. Theodicaeae, pp. 621 sqq., 
 770 sqq., Friburgi 1893; Schiffini, 
 Disput. Metaph. Specialis, Vol. Il, 
 pp. 331 sqq. August. Taurinor. 
 1888; B. Boedder, Natural Theology, 
 
 20 So called on the plea that it 
 is the doctrine of St. Thomas; the 
 Molinists claim that the Saint is 
 not rightly interpreted by those 
 who impute to him this teaching. 
 Cfr. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 
 371 sdq., 439 sad. 
 
THE MOLINIST CONTROVERSY 75 
 
 Gonet defines physical premotion as follows: “ Actio 
 Dei, qua voluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, 
 ita ad actum movet insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas 
 nequeat omissionem sui actus cum illa praemotione con- 
 jungere.’** Let us analyze this definition. Physical 
 premotion is a determination, not merely an: indif- 
 ferent, manifold, and hypothetical offer of co-operation 
 like the concursus oblatus of the Molinists. It imme- 
 diately and irresistibly (insuperabili virtute) determines 
 the free will ad unum, after the fashion of some 
 transient quality, designed, in the words of Alvarez, 
 to communicate to the will and to all secondary 
 causes the ultimate complement of the actus primus.2? 
 Physical premotion is, more specifically, a predeter- 
 mination, for the reason that both with regard to 
 causality and nature it precedes the exercise of free 
 will on the part of the creature. It is called physical, 
 in order to distinguish it from every species of moral 
 determination (such as, e. g., a counsel, command, pe- 
 tition), and also to emphasize the absolute effectiveness 
 and irresistibility of the divine impulse. For, as it is 
 metaphysically impossible for the human will to act at 
 all without being predetermined, so, too, it is metaphys- 
 ically impossible for the will not to act when it is pre- 
 determined, or to perform an act other than that to 
 which it is predetermined. This predetermination does 
 not, however, destroy freedom of choice, because God 
 predetermines the will not only with regard to the sub- 
 stance of the act to be performed, but also in respect 
 of its mode, that is, He predetermines the will to act 
 
 21 Gonet, Clyp. Thomist., disp. 9, voluntatt et omnibus causis secun- 
 Lbs Si. dis ultimum complementum  actis 
 
 22°Alvarez, De Aux., III, disp. primi.” i 
 18, n. 18, ad 1: ‘.. . ut conferat 
 
76 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 
 
 freely. Needless to say, none but an omnipotent First 
 Cause can so predetermine free-will as to cause it to co- 
 predetermine itself, and, consequently, to act with full 
 liberty. Therefore, say the Thomists, physical premo- 
 tion does not destroy free-will, but postulates and con- 
 firms it.” 
 
 c) This is not the place to enter into a minute criticism 
 of the two systems. To conform fully to the demands 
 of right reason, Molinism must meet the objection that 
 “ free-will, by predetermining itself, forces the divine 
 First Cause into inadmissible co-ordination.” It is more 
 important to guard the majesty and primacy of the di- 
 vine First Cause, than to preserve the freedom of the 
 human will. Molinism overcomes this objection by ex- 
 plaining that God depends on free-will merely as on a 
 condition, and that the divine causality is far and away 
 superior to that of the creature.** ‘That the First Cause 
 should accommodate and conditionally subordinate itself 
 to the nature and properties of the individual free crea- 
 ture, is not derogatory to the infinite dignity and sover- 
 eignty of God, any more than that God should make 
 the execution of His holy Will dependent on a condition 
 which the creature is free either to posit or not. Having 
 bound Himself by a solemn promise to reward His 
 creatures for the good they do, God cannot violate 
 their free-will, but owes it to His own wisdom, sanctity, 
 
 23 Cfr. Zigliara, Theologia Natu- 
 ralis, Lyon 1876, pp. 380 sqq. 
 
 24 “ Primo,’ says Suarez, ‘ causa 
 prima altior est et nobilior magisque 
 independenti modo influit in effec- 
 tum. Secundo causa prima respicit 
 per se primo actionem illam sub 
 quadam universaliori ratione; nam 
 causa prima influit in quemlibet ef- 
 fectum vel actionem ex eo praecise, 
 quod aliquid entitatis participat, 
 
 causa autem secunda semper influit 
 sub aliqua posteriori magisque de- 
 terminata ratione entis. Unde fit 
 tertio, ut influxus causae primae ex 
 se et ex suo genere dicatur etiam 
 prior subsistendi consequentia; nam 
 influxus causae primae absolute non 
 pendet a causa secunda, sed quan- 
 tum est ex suo genere, potest esse 
 sine illa, non vero e converso.” 
 Metaphys., disp. 22, sect. 3, M. 10. 
 
THE MOLINIST CONTROVERSY 79 
 
 and justice to preserve it, to foster it, and to give it 
 full sway. This is not derogatory to His dignity, nor 
 does it imply self-abasement; it is simply a mystery of 
 the divine omnipotence.”® 
 
 The Molinistic charge that Thomism destroys free- 
 will and makes God the author of sin, will be duly con- 
 sidered in the treatise on Grace. Another objection 
 against Thomism is that the concursus praevius, being 
 neither wmmediatus nor simultaneus, cannot properly be 
 called a concursus ad actum. Nature and Revelation 
 agree that a free act of the creatural will requires an 
 immediate and simultaneous concurrence on the part of 
 God. The Thomistic concursus to all appearances pos- 
 sesses neither the one nor the other of these qualifications. 
 It is not per se simultaneus, because it is praevius, and 
 it is not immediatus, because it is primarily directed to 
 the efficient cause, 1. e., the actus primus, and not to 
 the effect as such, 7. e., the actus secundus. Cardinal 
 Zigliara tries to evade this difficulty by pointing out 
 that the concursus simultaneus may be a continuation 
 of the influxus praevius.® It is indeed quite true that 
 the concursus simultaneus may be a continuation of 
 the imfluxus praevius,—but does not the theory of 
 which the learned Cardinal is an advocate, demand 
 that it must always be so? Duly considered, the con- 
 cursus praevius, as such, is not really a concursus at all, 
 it is merely a praecursus. As Liberatore convincingly 
 argues: “Si divinus concursus in re aliqua consisteret 
 actiont creaturarum praevia, huius vi Deus in actionem 
 non immediate influeret, sed mediate, nimirum media 
 re illa praevid, ad quam eius operatio proxime termina- 
 
 25Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 26 Theol. Naturalis, p. 384, Lyon 
 
 Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 1876. 
 butes, pp. 440, 455 saq. 
 
78 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 
 
 tur. Ut igitur salvetur Det concursus tmmediatus, ne- 
 cesse est ut in ipsa actione creaturarum concipiatur.” ™ 
 
 READINGS : — *Suarez, Opusc. de Concursu; *Stentrup, S. J., 
 De Deo Uno, cap. 10, Oeniponte 1878; IpEM, (more briefly), 
 Synopsis De Deo Uno, pp. 286 sqq., Oeniponte 1895; Dummer- 
 muth, O. P., S. Thomas de Doctrina Praemotioms Physicae, 
 Paris 1886; J. Pecci, Lehre des hl, Thomas tiber den Einfluss 
 Gottes auf die Handlungen der verniinftigen Geschdpfe und iiber 
 die Scientia Media, Paderborn 1888; F. G. Feldner, O. P., Die 
 Lehre des hl. Thomas iiber die Willensfreiheit der verniinfitigen 
 Wesen, Graz 1890; Frins, S. J., De Cooperatione Dei cum Omni 
 Natura Creata, presertim Libera, Paris 1892; *L. de San, S. J., 
 De Deo Uno, t. 1: De Mente S. Thomae circa Praedeterminationes 
 Physicas, Louvain 1894; I. Jeiler, O. F. M., S$. Bonaventurae Prin- 
 cipia de Concursu Dei Generali ad Actiones Causarum Secunda- 
 rum Collecta et S. Thomae Doctrind Confirmata, Quaracchi 1897. 
 
 27 Instit. Philos., Vol. II, n. 66, student is also referred to the 
 Naples 1881. For a more com- works cited under * Readings ’’ and 
 plete treatment of these subtleties to the treatise on Grace, which is 
 see Stentrup, S. J., De Deo Uno, to appear later as a separate volume 
 pp. 676 sqq., Oeniponte 1878. The of this series. 
 
OCEDAE TR Lit 
 
 THE FINAL CAUSE OR END OF CREATION, AND 
 ; DIVINE PROVIDENCE 
 
 Having treated of the efficient and the exem- 
 plary cause of the created universe, we now pro- 
 ceed to inquire into its final cause or end. 
 
 What is the final cause or ultimate object of 
 
 Creation? And by what means is that object 
 attained? 
 
 St 
 \O 
 
SEC PION 
 THE FINAL CAUSE OR OBJECT OF CREATION 
 
 I, PRELIMINARY REMARKs.—An end, object, 
 or purpose (fms, TéAos) is that for the sake of 
 which the effect or result of an action is pro- 
 duced.* Aristotle calls it simply 76 od évexa. Since 
 infinite progression is impossible, there must 
 somewhere exist a “last cause’ (fins ultiuus), 
 in respect of which all other causes are but means 
 (fines intermedu). Thus man has a last end, 
 an ultimate goal, beyond which there can be no 
 other, and to the attainment of which he must 
 subordinate all other ends for which he may be 
 striving. The created universe, too, must have 
 such a final cause, or last end, and this we now 
 proceed to examine. 
 
 It is important for the purpose of our present inquiry 
 to draw a clean-cut distinction between fimis operis and 
 finis operantis. A finis operis is an end immanent in 
 the act or work itself, such as the alleviation of poverty 
 in giving alms, or the indication of time on the part of 
 a clock. <A finis operantis, on the other hand, is that 
 particular end or purpose which guides or impels an 
 agent in acting and which constitutes the motive or 
 
 1 Finis est id, cuius gratia aliquid fit. 
 
 SO 
 
TEE OV RINES OPERANTIS” 81 
 
 cause of his action. The finis operantis may or may not 
 coincide with, though it can never frustrate, the finis 
 operis. Thus some men give alms out of vanity, or to 
 be reputed charitable, while clock-makers in construct- 
 ing horologes are usually impelled by motives of gain 
 or love of art. Similarly, in inquiring into the ultimate 
 end of the created universe, we must carefully distin- 
 guish between these two questions: (1) What induced 
 God (finis operantis) to create the universe ? (2) What 
 is the ultimate end or object (finis operis) for which 
 the universe was created? Divine Revelation returns a 
 clear and distinct answer to both these questions. 
 
 2. THE TEACHING OF REVELATION.—The 
 teaching of Revelation on this head can be stated 
 in two propositions: (1) God in creating the 
 universe was impelled by His benevolence; (2) 
 The final object of Creation is, primarily, the 
 glorification of the Creator, and secondarily, the 
 beatitude of His rational creatures, 
 
 Thesis I: God’s sole motive in creating the uni- 
 verse (finis operantis) was His benevolence. 
 
 This is de fide. 
 
 Proof. God is the Sovereign Lord and. in- 
 finitely perfect, and therefore the motive of His 
 external operations must be within Himself. 
 For, being eternally self-sufficient and enjoying 
 absolute beatitude in and for Himself,? He re- 
 quires for His being or happiness nothing that 
 
 2“... im se et ex se beatissimus.’’— Conc. Vaitc., Sess. TI; cap. 1. 
 
82 THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 
 
 exists outside Himself. Furthermore, being sub- 
 stantial goodness or love,? He must have been 
 impelled by His own goodness or love in creating 
 the universe, and, since creation is free, by a free 
 act of His Love. This is in fact the express teach- 
 ing of Holy Church. “Deus bonitate sua .. . 
 non ad augendam suam beatitudinem nec ad ac- 
 quirendam, sed ad mamfestandam perfectionem 
 suam per bona, quae creaturis wunpertitur, liber- 
 rumo consilio ... utramque de nilulo condidit 
 creaturam — God, of His own goodness, ... 
 not for the increase or acquirement of His own 
 happiness, but to manifest His perfections by the 
 blessings which He bestows on creatures, and 
 with absolute freedom of counsel, created out of 
 nothing . ... both [the spiritual and the corpo- 
 teal’ creatures Os ACCOT Cine ALO vie oly 
 Scripture, God is Alpha and Omega, the begin- 
 ning and the end,° 7. e., the final and the first 
 Cause, who derives the motives of His operation 
 solely from’, Hanseltiviisarms| OCU Cider: 
 “Propter me, propter me faciam, ut non blas- 
 phemer, et gloriam meam alteri non dabo — 
 For my own sake, for my own sake will I do 
 it, that I may not be blasphemed: and I will 
 not give my glory to another.’’ Origen couches 
 
 3 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 5**T am Alpha and Omega, the 
 Knowability, Essence, and Attri- beginning and the end, saith the 
 butes, pp. 423 sqq. Lord God.” (Apoc. I, 8.) 
 
 4 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 1. 
 
 ‘ 
 vi 
 : 
 
 % 
 
PEE RINIS OPRERIS? 83 
 
 this fundamental theological verity in the words: 
 “When in the beginning He created the things 
 He willed to create, He had no other motive for 
 His action than His own self, that'is, His good- 
 Mess.) ot, Augustine says (iit sy suficient 
 for a Christian to assume that the goodness of 
 the Creator was the sole cause of creation.” * 
 
 Thesis II: The ultimate purpose of Creation (finis 
 operis) is, primarily, the glorification of God, sec- 
 ondarily, the beatification of His rational creatures. 
 
 Proof of the First Part of the Thesis (which 
 is de fide). The proposition that the glory of 
 God is the ultimate end of Creation, was denied 
 by Descartes, who insisted that we cannot con- 
 ceive God as influenced by egoism and vain- 
 glory.* Against this error the Vatican Council 
 defines: “St quis... mundum ad Dei gloriam 
 conditum esse negaverit; anathema sit — lf any 
 one... shall deny that the world was made 
 for the glory of God, let him be anathema.” ® 
 
 a) The same truth is implicitly taught in all those 
 Scriptural texts which describe God as the absolutely 
 final as well as the highest end and object of all created 
 things. The universe serves its ultimate end by revealing 
 and proclaiming the divine perfections, and thereby 
 
 6 De Princip., II, 9, 6. St. Thomas in the Summa Theolo- 
 7 Enchirid., c. 9. Cfr. also St. gicad, 1a; qu.\ 19, ants !2=3. 
 
 John Damascene, De Fide Orth., 8 Medit., 4. 
 
 II, 2. The philosophical argument 9 Concilium Vaticanum, Sess. III, 
 
 is developed somewhat at length by can. 5. 
 
84 THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 
 
 glorifying God as the last end of all things. It is in this 
 sense that Sacred Scripture again and again says that 
 God created the universe for Himself. Prov. XVI, 4: 
 “Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus 
 — The Lord hath made all things for himself.” That 
 propter Deum here means ud gloriam Dei is patent from 
 Rom. XI, 36: “Ex ipso et per ipsum et im 1pso* sunt 
 omnia: ipsi gloria in saecula— For of him, and by him, 
 and in him, are all things: to him be glory for ever.” 
 
 In his letter to the Hebrews (II, 10) St. Paul, by an ~ 
 
 inimitable play upon words, identifies the causa finals 
 of the world with its causa efficiens: “ Propter quem 
 omnia et per quem omnia — 80 bv ra mévta Kat 8’ ob Téa, 
 advra.” For this reason Yahweh Himself says: “ Om- 
 nem, qui invocat nomen meum, in gloriam meam creavt 
 eum, formavi eum et feci ewm— And every one that 
 calleth upon my name, I have created him for my glory, 
 I have formed him and made him.’** The material 
 universe glorifies God by objectively reflecting His maj- 
 esty. Ps. XVIII, 2: “Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei et 
 opera manuum eius annuntiat firmamentum — The 
 heavens shew forth the glory of God, and the firmament 
 declareth the work of his hands.” Rational creatures 
 have the additional and higher mission of converting 
 the objective glory of the Creator (gloria obiectiva) 
 into a subjective glorification (gloria formalis) by 
 means of knowledge, love, and praise.** This obliga- 
 tion is solemnly enjoined upon them by divine command. 
 Deut. X, 20 sq.: “Dominum Deum tuum timebis et 
 ei soli servies; ipsi adhaerebis iurabisque in nomine allius. 
 Ipse est laus tua, et Deus tuus —Thou shalt fear the 
 Lord thy God, and serve him only: to him thou shalt 
 
 10 eis atdrév = finis ultimus. 12)'@fr. Rom: 1, 19 sqq. 
 Ais A7. 
 
 <4 
 wes 
 
 ES NT ee eR Ee erg a oT ee RN 
 
rE RINT S Oe BR ESE 85 
 
 adhere, and shalt swear by his name. He is thy praise 
 and thy God.” Hence the Christmas hymn of the an- 
 gelic hosts, “Gloria in excelsis Deo;” hence also the 
 incessant exhortation of the Psalmist, “ Laudate Do- 
 minum,” and of Daniel, “ All ye works of the Lord, 
 bless the Lord,” + 
 
 b) The teaching of the Fathers on this point agrees 
 so perfectly with that of Sacred Scripture that we 
 need not rehearse it at length. “ What we adore,” says 
 St. Clement of Rome, “is the one God, who has made 
 this whole mass out of nothing and fashioned it as an 
 ornament to His majesty.” '* Tertullian copies this 
 passage word for word in the seventeenth chapter of 
 his A pologeticum.™ 
 
 c) The Schoolmen draw an important distinction, 
 which is based on the teaching of Scripture, between 
 gloria obiectiva and gloria formalis:® By gloria obiec- 
 tiva they understand the objective grandeur of the cre- 
 ated universe as a mute manifestation of divine wis- 
 dom, benevolence, beauty, etc. Gloria formalis is the 
 subjective glorification of the Creator by His rational 
 creatures, in so far as they are moved by the beauty and 
 grandeur of the physical universe to know, love, and 
 praise Him.’” It is in this manner, and in this manner 
 only, that the ultimate object of Creation (which con- 
 sists in the glorification rather than in the simple glory 
 of God) can be truly, completely, and perfectly at- 
 
 13 Dan. III, 57.—Why God’s 
 
 zeal for His own glory does not 
 imply egoism and vainglory, we 
 
 Doctrina Christiana, I, 32. The 
 philosophical argument is forcibly 
 stated by St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., 
 
 have explained in God: His Know- 
 ability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 
 432 sqq. 
 
 14 Ep. ad Corinth., I, n. 33. 
 
 15 For the teaching of St. Augus- 
 tine, see that holy Doctor’s work, 
 
 III, 16 sq. (Rickaby, Of God and 
 His Creatures, pp. 196 sqq.). Cfr. 
 also Lessius, De Perfect. Moribus- 
 que Div., 1, XIV. 
 16 Cfr, Lessius, J. ¢., c. 10, nm. 7. 
 17) Cir. Rom], ‘19 saa. 
 
86 THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 
 
 tained. We conclude that, in creating the universe, God 
 aimed principally at being glorified by those of His crea- 
 tures whom He has endowed with reason. Had He 
 omitted to kindle the light of reason, at least in some 
 of His creatures, the universe would be “a book with- 
 out a reader, a voice with no one to listen, an altar 
 without a priest, a dwelling without inmates.”*® In 
 view of these considerations it has justly been argued 
 that a purely material world without rational denizens 
 would be repugnant.’® 
 
 Proot of the Second Part of the Thesis) That 
 the happiness of rational creatures is one of the 
 ultimate objects of Creation, is denied by two 
 classes of opponents. Descartes, King, Stattler, 
 and Kant regard the happiness of the rational 
 creature as the sole object of Creation, irrespec- 
 tive of the glory of God. Others, like Hermes 
 and Gtinther, hold that the chief end of Creation 
 is the beatification of rational creatures, and that 
 the glory of the Creator must be subordinated 
 to this end. The opinion of the former has 
 already been refuted. It remains to show that 
 the happiness of rational creatures, though one of 
 the chief purposes of Creation, is not its highest 
 end, but essentially subordinate to the glorifica- 
 tion of God. In other words, beatitude is merely 
 the secondary object of Creation.” 
 
 18 Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, «und ihre Bewohner, 6th ed., pp. 
 n. 461. 467 sqq., 495 sqq., Cologne 1910. 
 
 19 Cfr. Pohle, Die Sternenwelten 20 Cfr. Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, 
 cap. 2. 
 
EE OREN I STORRS 87 
 
 a) Holy Scripture teaches, (1) that the material uni- 
 verse is subject to man and exists for his benefit and 
 use; (2) that man’s well-being is not an end in itself, 
 but a means to the glorification of God. The former 
 purpose being subordinate to the latter, it follows that 
 the happiness of man (and of the Angels) is the sec- 
 ondary, not the primary end of Creation. Many Scrip- 
 tural texts could be quoted to show that all irrational 
 creatures are subject to, and destined to serve man, 
 and that his eternal happiness is one of the ends of 
 Creation. It is on this truth that theologians base what 
 is known as the voluntas Dei salvifica, that is, the ear- 
 nest and sincere will of God to free all men from sin 
 and lead them to supernatural happiness. But as He is 
 the Sovereign Good, the Creator must ultimately refer 
 the eternal happiness of His rational creatures to Him- 
 self, 7. e., He must seek in it His own glorification. 
 Eph. I, 5 sq.: “Qui praedestinavit nos in adoptionem 
 filiorum per Iesum Christum... in laudem gloriae 
 gratiae suae .. . ut simus in laudem gloriae eius — Who 
 hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children 
 through Jesus Christ unto himself . . . unto the praise 
 and glory of his grace ... that we may be unto the 
 praise of his glory.” Only in this way can those who 
 despise the divine glory be confounded. 1 Kings II, B01; 
 “ Quicunque glorificaverit me, glorificabo eum; qui autem 
 contemnunt me, erunt ignobiles — Whosoever — shall 
 glorify me, him will I glorify: but they that despise 
 me, shall be despised.” There is no exception to this 
 fundamental rule. Even Christ, the Godman, glorified 
 
 21a. oe Gen iD 283 \f And. God rule over the fishes of the sea, and 
 blessed them [our first parents], the fowls of the air, and all living 
 
 Saying: Increase and multiply, and creatures that move upon the 
 fill the earth, and subdue it, and earth.”’ 
 
88 THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 
 
 His Heavenly Father in all things. John XVII, 4: 
 “Ego te clarificavt super terram, opus consummavi — 
 I have glorified thee on the earth, I have finished the 
 work.” Hence the life of the Elect in Heaven is nothing 
 but an unceasing hymn of praise in honor of the Cre- 
 ator. Apoc. IV, 11: “ Dignus es, Domine Deus noster, 
 accipere gloriam et honorem et virtutem, quia tu creasti 
 omnia — Thou art worthy, O Lord our God, to receive 
 glory, and honor, and power: because thou hast created 
 all things.” Cfr. 1 Cor. III, 22: “Omnia vestra sunt, 
 
 _ vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei— For all 
 things are yours, .. . and you are Christ's, and Christ 
 is God's." 
 
 b) There is no need of elaborating the argument 
 from Tradition. The Fathers all teach in perfect con- 
 formity with Sacred Scripture that the material uni- 
 verse was made for man. “Non quasi indigens Deus 
 hominis plasmavit Adam,’ says St. Irenzeus,2? . “ sed 
 ut haberet, in quem collocaret sua beneficia— God 
 formed Adam, not as if He had need of him, but as 
 a subject upon which to confer His benefits.” On the 
 other hand, however, the Fathers insist that man should 
 be constantly mindful of the honor and glory he owes to 
 God, according to the exhortation of St. Paul: “ Sive 
 ergo manducatis sive bibitis sive aliud quid facitis, omnia 
 in gloriam Dei facite — Therefore, whether you eat or 
 drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of 
 God.” 22. In his commentary on the Psalms ** St. Augus- 
 tine says: “ Quo fine facias, vide. Si eo id facis, ut tu 
 glorificeris, hoc prohibuit Deus; si autem ideo, ut Deus 
 glorificetur, hoc iussit — Look to the end thou hast in 
 
 22 Adv. Haer., IV, 14. consult St. Augustine’s treatise De 
 
 231 Cor. X, 31.° On this text Doctrina Christiana, ch. 22. 
 YEG I leo a. USA 
 
 Se 
 
THE OPINISJOPERTS 89 
 
 view. If thou dost it in order to glorify thyself, thou 
 dost something which God has forbidden; but if thou 
 dost it in order that God be glorified, thou compliest with 
 His command.” 
 
 c) The glory of God and the happiness of His crea- 
 tures are two ends which can never clash, because the 
 one is subordinate to the other, and the two are so inti- 
 mately bound up that the attainment of either promotes 
 that of the other. In the last analysis, therefore, Cre- 
 ation has but one adequate end, wez., the glory of God, 
 and this is accomplished by the beatification of His ra- 
 tional creatures, which consists in knowing, loving, and 
 praising the Creator. In fact, the higher purpose is at- 
 tained in direct proportion to the attainment of the 
 lower —the greater the happiness of the creature, the 
 more ardent will be its love, the more intense its glorifi- 
 cation of God. And conversely, the more intense the 
 love and praise which the creature renders to God, the 
 greater will be its own beatitude. 
 
 It has been objected that, as some of God’s rational 
 creatures are eternally damned, Creation does not attain 
 its last end and purpose. God inevitably obtains that 
 measure of external glory which He wills; and Hell 
 itself is ultimately a revelation and glorification of the 
 divine justice, though, of course, God does not, voluntate 
 antecedente, seek His glory in the tortures of the repro- 
 bate sinners, but in the jubilant hymns of-the Elect.” 
 
 25 Lessius explains the intrinsic 
 relation existing between the glory 
 of God and the beatitude of His 
 creatures as follows: “ Iiaque in 
 summa Det gloria extrinseca for- 
 maliter et intrinsece includitur sum- 
 mum bonum nostrum, ita ut sine 
 illo concipi nequeat; et hoc ipso 
 
 7 
 
 quod Deus illam gloriam intendit 
 et quaerit, intendit et quaerit sum- 
 mum bonum et commodum nostrum. 
 Unde non minus Deo gratias agere 
 debemus, quod quaerit gloriam 
 suam, quam quod quaerat salutem 
 nostram, quia gloria eius est salus 
 nostra.’ De Perfect. Moribusque 
 
go THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 
 
 READINGS: — Kleutgen, Theologie der V orzeit, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 
 Sec. 5, Minster 1867.— Palmieri, De Creatione et de Praecipuis 
 Creaturis, thes, 10-11, Romae 1910.— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. 
 II, §§ 132-133, Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, 2nd 
 ed., Vol. I, pp. 369 sqq.).— Stentrup, De Deo Uno, thes. 68-73, 
 Oeniponte 1878.— Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, 2nd ed., Vol. 
 V, §§ 265-276, Mainz 1888.— Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. Il, pp. 
 453 sqq., Paris 1895. 
 
 Divin., XIV, 3, n. 36. For a ref- gen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. I, 
 
 utation of the false theories of Sect. 5. 
 Hermes and Giinther consult Kleut- 
 
SECTION 
 
 DIVINE PROVIDENCE 
 
 I. DEFINITION OF THE TERM.—St. Thomas 
 defines Divine Providence as the all-regulating 
 and stable plan by which God, as the Supreme 
 Ruler of the universe, ordains all things.1 
 
 This definition postulates the existence of two divine 
 operations, one of which is proper to the divine In- 
 tellect, viz.: foreknowledge of all, especially the con- 
 ditioned events of the future,? whereas the second, viz.: 
 a preordainment of whatever is to happen or not to 
 happen, with due regard to the free will of rational 
 creatures, belongs to the divine Will. In a wider sense 
 Providence is called the divine government of the world 
 (gubernatio mundi), in as far as it is the successive 
 execution of the divine plan in time. 
 
 Providence, therefore, is related to the divine gov- 
 ernment of the world as a design is related to its execu- 
 tion. Providence is eternal, while the divine government 
 of the world is exercised in time. 
 
 Nor are “Providence” and “divine disposition ” 
 Synonymous terms. What is usually called a divine dis- 
 position (dispositio) has reference to the ordering of 
 things to one another, while Providence ordains things 
 
 WS d Heol, 1a) \aus | 22. afte Wi. Knowability, Essence and Attri- 
 2See Pohle-Preuss, God: His  butes, pp. 361 saq. 
 
 gli 
 
92 DIVINE PROVIDENCE 
 
 to their final end. Because of their intrinsic relation 
 to the final object of the universe, the various divine dis- 
 positions must be conceived as necessary functions of 
 Providence. The same is true of the divine Preserva- 
 tion of the universe and also of divine Concurrence, with 
 both of which we have dealt in a preceding chapter. 
 
 2. THE DocmMa.—The existence of an all-gov- 
 erning Providence was formally defined as an 
 article of faith by the Council of the Vatican: 
 “Universa vero, quae condidit Deus, providentia 
 sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque 
 ad finem fortiter et disponens omma suaviter ; 
 omnia enim nuda et aperta sunt oculis ems, ea 
 etiam, quae liberaé creaturarum actione futura 
 sunt — God protects and governs by His Provi- 
 dence all things which He hath made, ‘reaching 
 from end to end mightily, and ordering all things 
 sweetly.’ For ‘all things are bare and open to 
 His eyes,’ even those which are yet to be by the 
 free action of creatures.” * This definition ex- 
 cludes the pagan notion of “fate” (<#apuem), 
 which had already been rejected by the Council of 
 Braga (A.D. 561), and also modern Deism, 
 which either denies Providence point-blank, or 
 represents God as an idle, uninterested spectator 
 of mundane affairs. 
 
 For the Scriptural argument we must refer 
 the reader to our work entitled God: His 
 
 3 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, c. I. (Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
 n, 1784.) 
 
 akan sh ~ a . 
 SR aie lies ste Oa ie 
 
 a 
 ; — 
 
DEISM 93 
 
 Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 260 
 
 sqq. 
 Among Patristic texts we would call special 
 
 attention to Theodoret’s ten beautiful discourses 
 on God’s Providence in the government of the 
 world,* and to the last of St. Chrysostom’s three 
 books to Stagirius, a treatise of consolation 
 
 written for the benefit of a sorely tried and 
 nearly despairing friend.° 
 
 3. Dre1sm.— By Deism we understand a conception of 
 the universe which acknowledges the existence of a 
 personal Creator, distinct from the world, but holds that 
 He does not care for the universe which He has created, 
 simply letting it shift for itself. Deism differs not only 
 from Christian Theism, but likewise from Pantheism and 
 Materialism, and consequently also from Atheism. It 
 may be fitly described as an incomplete, defective, and 
 halting Theism.°® 
 
 Deism originated in the seventeenth century, in Eng- 
 land, by way of reaction against the Episcopal Church. 
 Under the leadership of Toland (1696), Collins 
 (+ 1724), Tindal (1730), who is called “the great 
 apostle of Deism,” Thomas Morgan (1737), and other 
 notorious Freethinkers, it began by attacking the super- 
 
 4Tlept mpovoias déyou f. 
 
 5 IIpos Zrayeipiov aoxynryny dac- 
 LovevTa, Cfr. Bardenhewer-Sha- 
 han, Patrology, p. 334. There is a 
 difficult passage in the writings of 
 St. Jerome, which the reader will 
 find quoted, with a brief expla- 
 nation, in Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
 Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 
 butes, pp. 358 sq. Ruiz has brought 
 together quite a number of Patris- 
 
 tic texts in his work De Providen- 
 tia, disp. 3, sect. 3. The philosoph- 
 ical argument is well developed by 
 J. Hontheim, S. J., in his Institu- 
 tiones Theodicaeae, pp.- 805 saqq., 
 Friburgi 1893. Cfr. also Pohle- 
 Preuss, op. cit., pp. 445 sqq. 
 
 6 For a good account of Deism 
 see Fr. Aveling in the Catholic En- 
 cyclopedia, Vol. IV, s. wv. 
 
94 DIVINE PROVIDENCE 
 
 natural truths of Christianity and, under Dodwell 
 (1742) and David Hume (+ 1776), sank deep into the 
 quagmire of religious scepticism. German Rationalism 
 (die Aufklirung)—whose leading champions were 
 G. E. Lessing and Im. Kant —like the Freethought of 
 the French Encyclopedists, was merely an offshoot of 
 English Deism. In Germany Deism ultimately devel- 
 oped into Pantheism. In France it engendered Athe- 
 ism, which celebrated its terrible triumphs in the Revo- 
 lution. At present Deism is leading a shadowy exist- 
 ence in certain Freemasonic lodges which have not yet 
 adopted rank Pantheism. It is a comfortable creed, 
 for, while freely acknowledging the existence of a 
 “ Grand Architect of the Universe,” it cares not how He 
 is worshipped or whether He be worshipped at all. The 
 God of the Deists allows the mighty engine of the uni- 
 verse to run at rovers and permits the droll little crea- 
 tures called men to disport themselves as they please. 
 Of course, if the universe is ruled by immutable laws 
 and left to itself by its Creator, there can be no room for 
 miracles; supernatural Revelation is impossible and the 
 Christian world-view must be set down as a chimera. 
 In its last analysis, therefore, Deism is pure Naturalism, 
 or Rationalism, and utterly incompatible with revealed 
 religion. It cannot even keep up the appearance of a 
 “religion of pure reason” upon which it loves to plume 
 itself. Having cut loose from God it has lost all sem- 
 blance of religion and must lead to rank Atheism. Thus 
 the most effective refutation of Deism is its own his- 
 tory.” 
 
 7 On God’s relation to evil, espe- ity, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 
 cially moral evil or sin,—a relation 442 sqq. See also our remarks on 
 
 which Deism blandly ignores,— cfr. Pessimism, supra, pp. 48 sq. St. 
 Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowabil- Thomas deals with this aspect of 
 
DEISM 95 
 
 READINGS: — St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., III, 64-97 (Rickaby, 
 Of God and His Creatures, pp. 235 sqq.).— Ruiz, De Providentia 
 Dei, disp. 1-4.— Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Div., 1. XI.— 
 IpEM, De Providentia Numinis, etc— Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- 
 mat., t. II, 3rd ed., pp. 173 sqq., Friburgi 1906.— Wilhelm-Scan- 
 nell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 372 saq., 
 London 1899.— B. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 381 sqq., 2nd 
 ed., London 1899.— A. Lehmkuhl, Die géttliche Vorsehung, sth 
 ed., Koln 1906.—K. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schépfung, pp. 
 106 sqq., Ratisbon 1910.— F. Aveling, art. “ Deism ” in the Catholic 
 Encyclopedia, Vol. IV. 
 
 the subject in his Summa Theo- Natural Theology, Appendix VI, 
 logica, 1a, qu. 49. On the Opti- PP. 467 sqq. 
 mism of St. Thomas, cfr. Boedder, 
 
Py 7 
 sue taney 
 ZA te 
 
 Re ty ; 
 SD arith i 
 Vee ey 
 % a oF : 
 i e 
 
 at 
 i 
 
PART II 
 
 CREATION PASSIVELY CONSID- 
 ERED, OR THE CREATED 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 By Creation in the passive sense (creari s. 
 creatum ess€) we understand the created uni- 
 verse or world (mundus). This, as its Greek 
 Name (*éopvos) indicates, is not a chaos, but a 
 well-ordered, graduated, and articulated whole, 
 consisting of three kingdoms, which rise one 
 above the other: (1) The material universe, 
 which embraces animals and plants, (2) the 
 human race, and (3) the Angels.+ 
 
 Accordingly we shall treat of Creation pas- 
 sively considered, 7. ¢., the created universe, in 
 three Chapters, entitled respectively: (1) Cos- 
 mology, (2) Anthropology, and (3) Angel- 
 ology. 
 
 1 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 1 (quoted supra, PP. 29 saqq). 
 
 97 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 + DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 SHO ULON a 
 
 FIRST AND SECOND CREATION 
 
 1, DEFINITION oF TERMS.—In respect of 
 matter, both inorganic and organic, God’s cre- 
 ative operation is divided into two logically 
 and really distinct functions, viz.: (1) The cre- 
 ation of primordial matter out of nothing, and 
 (2) the formation of chaotic matter, 1. e., the a 
 fashioning of earth and heaven, oceans and con- ft 
 tinents, plants and animals out of the primitive | x 
 world-stuff. 
 
 The former of these two functions is called first cre- 
 ation (creatio prima). It is creation in the proper sense ~ 
 of the term. The second (creatio secunda) can be called i 
 creation only in a figurative or metaphorical sense. 
 Creatio secunda may be said to partake of the nature © 
 of creation proper, inasmuch as no one but God in His — 
 omnipotence was able to fashion and form the cos-. — 
 mos. Active formation? has for its term or object pas- 
 
 2‘*Formation is an operation their own proper forces, and or — 
 
 which, from already created matter, dains them towards an end.” 
 
 moulds different natures, . fittingly (Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” a 
 compounds them, collects them into p. 262.) ‘ 
 one synthesis, furnishes them with 
 
 98 
 
FIRST AND SECOND CREATION 99 
 
 sive formation, 7. e., the things formed or fashioned. In 
 this passive formation St. Thomas discriminates between 
 distinctio and ornatus. The work of distinction or dif- 
 ferentiation which God performed on the first three 
 days of the Hexaémeron consisted in the separation of 
 light from darkness, of the firmament from the waters 
 below, and of the solid land from the sea. The work 
 of ornamentation, which took place on the last three days, 
 consisted in the allocation of the various celestial and 
 terrestrial bodies, supplying the water with fishes, the air 
 with birds, and the continents with plants and animals. 
 
 2. THE TEACHING OF DIVINE REVELATION.— 
 Revelation furnishes a sufficient basis for the 
 _ distinction between first and second creation. 
 
 a) The book of Genesis begins by describing how 
 God created all things out of nothing. Before He un- 
 dertook the work of formation, which took six “ days,” 
 
 the earth was “void and empty,” and the light as yet 
 _ undivided from the darkness; in other words, the uni- 
 verse was still in a chaotic state. To this twofold 
 _ condition there corresponded a twofold operation on the 
 part of the Almighty, viz.: creare and formare, which 
 we call first and second creation. It is characteristic 
 of the conception existing in the mind of the Sacred 
 _ Writer that He does not describe the act of mere for- 
 _ Mation or ordering by the verb 812, which he em- 
 ployed in the first verse, but by stich verbs as n¥Y and 
 
 Wi, which are capable of being construed with a materia 
 ex qua.* The only exceptions to this rule are Gen. JI, 
 
 21: “Creavit (833) Deus cete grandia — God created 
 the great whales;” and Gen. I, 27: “Et creavit Deus 
 
 2 Supra, p. 15. 
 
100 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 hominem ... masculum et feminam creavit (83) eos 
 
 —And God created man,...male and female he 
 created them.’ With regard to these two passages it 
 should be noted that in the one there is question of a 
 true creation, viz.: the creation of the human soul; while 
 the other is specially designed to show forth God’s 
 omnipotence, which manifests itself with special gran- 
 deur in the creation of the huge ocean monsters. The 
 playful ease with which the Creator produced these gi- 
 gantic beings, proves that He is absolutely independent 
 of matter and, therefore, at least indirectly demonstrates 
 His creative power. 
 
 For a further confirmation of the distinction between 
 first and second creation we may quote from Wisd. XI, 
 18 the phrase “ex materia invisa (scil. informi, é@& 
 dudppov trys).”* It is no argument against our thesis 
 that a distinction is made in Gen. I, 1 between “ heaven” 
 and “earth,” for heaven and earth were present at the 
 Creation of the universe only with regard to their sub- 
 stance ; they were not as yet divided off and moulded into 
 shape,— this took place later (Gen. I, 7-8). 
 
 b) The distinction between first and second creation 
 
 is quite common in the writings of the Fathers. Thus 
 Severian of Gabala (++ after 408) says: “On the 
 first day God created out of nothing (é pH dvrov) 
 
 whatever He has made; but on the following days He — 
 
 did not create out of nothing (oi é py évtwv), but ac- 
 cording to His good pleasure fashioned (peréBadev) that 
 which He had made on the first day.”*> The three Cap- 
 padocians expressed themselves in a similar manner.® 
 
 4 Our English version correctly 5 De Mundi Creatione, Or. 1, n. 3 
 cenders this passage thus: ‘‘ Thy al- (Migne, P.G., LVI, 433). 
 mighty hand, which made _ the 6 Basil., Hom. in Hexaém., 2; 
 world of matter without form.” Greg. Naz., Orat.,.44, mn. 4;. Greg. 
 
 (Cfr. supra, p. 15). Nyss., Hom. in Hexaém., 2. 
 
 a es 
 or 
 
FIRST AND SECOND CREATION Io 
 
 St. Augustine very distinctly insists on the concept of 
 creatio secunda. 
 
 In determining the nature of the materia informis 
 out of which God gradually fashioned the cosmos in 
 the course of six days, the Fathers were entirely de- 
 pendent on the scientific theories prevalent in their day. 
 In expounding these theories, needless to say, they 
 do not represent Tradition, but merely the inade- 
 quate notions of an unscientific age, and we are not 
 bound by their speculations. St. Chrysostom’s*® or St. 
 Ephrem’s® explanations of the process of Creation in 
 the light of the peripatetic theory of the four elements 
 (earth, water, air, and fire), have no more authority 
 than the Patristic or Scholastic defense of the geocentric 
 system of the universe, and we Catholics of the twentieth 
 century are free to substitute for the crude hypotheses 
 of the Patristic period the more solidly established con- 
 clusions of modern science, e. g., to regard the molecules 
 as the proper object of the creatio prima and the various 
 chemical compositions as the objects of the creatio se- 
 cunda. 
 
 While, as we have shown, Revelation offers a solid 
 basis for a real distinction between first and second 
 creation and their products, it remains an open question 
 whether or not the two processes were separated by a 
 _ temporal interval. The great majority of the Fathers not 
 - only admit but positively assert an intermission be- 
 tween creatio prima and creatio secunda. It was only 
 the great authority of St. Augustine that preserved later 
 
 _ theologians from unduly limiting freedom of interpreta- 
 
 tion in regard to a question which, because of its rela- 
 _ tions to natural science, must be handled with the greatest 
 
 7 Supra, p. 14. 8 Hom. in Gen., 3. 9In Gen., I. 
 
102 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 reserve. St. Augustine’s own interpretation *° has, it is 
 true, been generally rejected as forced and artificial; 
 but St. Thomas,’! though himself a defender of the 
 theory of temporal succession, invariably speaks of the 
 Augustinian theory with great respect, and many later 
 theologians, especially those who in some form or other 
 prefer the so-called ideal interpretation, base their right 
 to espouse a less slavishly literal view upon the example 
 of the learned and pious Bishop of Hippo.” 
 
 Reapincs:— Palmieri, De Creatione et Praecipuis Creaturis, 
 
 thes. 14-15, Romae 1910.— Stentrup, De Deo Uno, thes. 78-79, 
 Oeniponte 1875.— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. Il, § 144, Freiburg 
 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 383 sqq.).— Os- 
 wald, Schépfungslehre, pp. 42 sqq., Paderborn 1885.— G. B. Tepe, 
 Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 461 sqq., Paris 1805.— Chr. Pesch, 
 Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 32 sqq., Friburgi 1908.— 
 Among the commentaries on Genesis we recommend especially 
 those by Lamy, Hummelauer, and Hoberg. 
 
 10 Basing on Ecclus. XVIII, 1: 
 “ Creavit omnia simul (xowwy)— He 
 created all things together,” Au- 
 gustine contracts the six days of 
 Creation into one day, nay, into one 
 single moment of time, and inter- 
 prets “evening” as referring to 
 
 the cognitio vespertina of the An- 
 gels. 
 11 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 74, art. 2. 
 12 Cfr. Petavius, De Opere Sex 
 Dierum, I, 5; Grassmann, Die 
 Schépfungslehre des hl. Augustinus 
 und Darwins, Ratisbon 1889. 
 
 Pe ga ml J 
 a a aaa te 
 
SECTION 2 
 
 THE HEXAEMERON IN ITS RELATION TO SCIENCE 
 AND EXEGESIS 
 
 ARDICI Hat 
 
 THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE CREATION AND PHYSICAL 
 SCIENCE 
 
 This subject properly belongs to higher apolo- 
 getics or fundamental theology. In the present 
 (purely dogmatic) treatise it will suffice to lay 
 down certain leading principles which theolo- 
 gians and scientists must constantly keep before 
 them in order to safeguard the sacred rights of 
 revealed religion without trenching on the just 
 claims of science. 
 
 Thesis I: Nature and the Bible both tell the his- 
 tory of Creation, and consequently the assured results 
 of scientific investigation can never contradict Holy 
 
 Writ. 
 
 Explanation. The Word of God, rightly interpreted, 
 cannot clash with the firmly established conclusions 
 of science, because both Sacred Scripture and science 
 have God for their author. Any apparent contradiction 
 _ 1Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, p. 
 
 7 sq. 
 103 
 
104. DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 between the two must be traceable either to some false 
 and unproved claim on the part of science, or to an in- 
 correct interpretation of Holy Writ. A thorough in- 
 vestigation of all the data involved usually lays bare the 
 source of error. The Galilei controversy is a case in 
 point.2 There can be no doubt that the various natural 
 sciences — astronomy, geology, paleontology, etc.— fur- 
 nish, or at least are able to furnish, valuable aids to the 
 exegete who undertakes to interpret the Mosaic cos- 
 mogony. The prudent theologian will not spurn these 
 aids. On the contrary, the respect he owes to the Al- 
 mighty Creator, whose vestiges these sciences seek to 
 trace, will prompt him to welcome their co-operation and 
 to pay due regard to whatever evidence they may have to 
 offer. God has, as it were, set down an objective com- 
 mentary on the Bible in the “ Book of Nature,” to which 
 the theologian can and should devote most careful atten- 
 tion. All true scientists are after a fashion exegetes,” and 
 therefore friends, not enemies, of the theologians. Those 
 among them who antagonize revealed religion,’ have de- 
 serted the solid ground of science for moors and fens 
 in which they gleefully chase deceptive will-o’-the-wisps. 
 Of course, Science has a perfect right to follow her 
 own methods, and the fact that her representatives con- 
 duct their researches without constantly trying to square 
 themselves with the Bible does not argue that they mis- 
 trust religion or despise Christianity. The history of 
 the inductive sciences shows that in many cases an undue 
 
 2 The most recent and the best 
 account of the Galilei case is that 
 by Adolf Miller, S. J., in his two 
 excellent volumes: Galileo Galilet 
 and Der Galileiprozess (Freiburg 
 1909), which deserve to be trans- 
 lated into English. Cfr. also G. V. 
 Leahy, Astronomical Essays, Ppp. 
 
 181 sqq., Boston 1910; J. Gerard, 
 S. J., The Church vs. ‘Science, pp. 
 22 sqq., London 1907. 
 
 3Some of them, like Cuvier, 
 Linné, Newton, Secchi, consciously; 
 others, like Lyell, Kélliker, Vir- 
 chow, unconsciously. 
 
 4E. g. Vogt, Biichner, Hackel. 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 105 
 
 regard for certain favorite interpretations of Scripture 
 has misled science and bred false theories which it 
 took ages to get rid of. We may instance the Coper- 
 nican system,° the debate between Neptunists and Plu- 
 tonists,® the problem of the geological deluge,’ etc. Un- 
 fortunately, too, there have always been over-zealous 
 though perfectly well-intentioned theologians who were 
 ready to add to the confusion by supplying “ theological 
 arguments’ for unproved and unprovable hypotheses. 
 This explains the existence and animus of such works 
 as J. W. Draper’s History of the Conflict between Re- 
 ligion and Science.® 
 
 Thesis II: The proper purpose of the Mosaic nar- 
 rative is not scientific, but strictly religious; hence 
 we must not seek astronomy, physics, geology, etc., 
 in the Hexaémeron, but chiefly religious instruction. 
 
 Explanation. The grounds for this proposition are 
 quite evident. The Bible is not a text-book of science. 
 Had it been written to teach a supernaturally revealed 
 system of physics, chemistry, astronomy, or geology, it 
 would be a sealed and unintelligible book, nay, it would 
 have proved positively dangerous to the faith of the 
 masses, becatise scientific views and terms are subject 
 to constant change. Consequently, in order to accom- 
 plish its purpose, it was necessary that the Bible in 
 matters of natural science should adopt the language of 
 the common people, who derive their views of nature 
 from external appearances. This popular idiom is ever 
 
 5 Cfr. G. V. Leahy, Astronomical Last Geological Period, New York 
 
 Essays, pp. 45 saq. 1895. 
 6 Cfr. A. M. Clerke, Modern Cos- 8 New York 1889. A splendid an- 
 mogonies, London 1905. tidote to this venomous book is Fr. 
 
 7 Prestwich, On Certain Phenom- Lorinser’s Das Buch der Natur, 7 
 ena Belonging to the Close of the vols., Ratisbon 1876-80. 
 8 
 
106 ~DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 true, because it employs relative standards in the con- 
 templation of nature, and remains forever intelligible 
 to the masses, because it makes no claim to describe abso- 
 lute facts. Even at the present day, despite the universal 
 adoption of the Copernican system, certain popular modes 
 of expression, based upon ocular observation of the ap- 
 parent movements of the heavenly bodies, retain the geo- 
 centric color which they had in the days of Ptolemy. 
 Even learned astronomers still speak of the summer and 
 winter solstices, still refer to the sun as rising and set- 
 ting, and so forth. “ We must remember,” says St. 
 Thomas, ‘‘ that Moses addressed himself to an unculti- 
 vated people, and, condescending to their ignorance, pro- 
 posed to them only what was obvious to the senses.” ® 
 Moses’ chief purpose was to impress the Jews and 
 the nations that were to come after them, with four fun- 
 damental truths, vig.: (1) The existence of one true 
 God, Lord of heaven and earth; (2) the creation of 
 all things out of nothing, which implied the falsity of 
 the Egyptian animal and star worship no less than of 
 Dualism and Pantheism; (3) the duty of keeping holy 
 the Sabbath day, after the example of the divine Arti- 
 ficer, who created the universe in six days, and rested 
 on the seventh;?® (4) that all the things which God 
 made were originally good.1* We do not mean to say, 
 of course, that the purely scientific portions of the Bible 
 have no claim to divine authority, or to deny that they 
 are absolutely infallible. As part of the Inspired Word 
 they embody divine revelation. However, since the 
 Hexaemeron is susceptible of many different explana- 
 tions, and the infallible Church has never given an 
 authentic interpretation of it, but, on the contrary, has 
 
 OSs lL heolsyvrasqu, 68, ‘artrigs 11‘* And God saw that it was 
 10 Cfr:) Exod; XX, ‘8 sa. good.” Gen. I, 25. 
 
 z 7 as, 
 ~ 60 =i cael See | 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 107 
 
 granted full liberty to exegetes, Science is nowise 
 hampered in her peculiar field of enquiry. St. Augustine 
 went so far as to contend that the creation of the uni- 
 verse was simultaneous with its formation and that what 
 Sacred Scripture calls six days was in reality but a 
 single moment of time.?? 
 
 Thesis III: The relationship between the Mosaic 
 narrative and natural science may, in principle, be 
 defined thus: The Hexaémeron constitutes a nega- 
 tive, but not a positive guiding principle for scientists. 
 
 Explanation. By a positive guiding principle (norma 
 positiva) we mean a rule, the conscientious observance 
 of which guarantees the immediate possession of truth, 
 while its non-observance entails error. Thus the mul- 
 tiplication table is a positive guiding principle in all 
 mathematical calculations and in the affairs of everyday 
 life. A negative guiding principle merely requires that, 
 while enjoying the greatest possible latitude in a certain 
 sphere, we avoid forming any conclusion which directly 
 contradicts said principle. Thus the axiom of parallel 
 lines is a negative guiding principle in geometry, because 
 any proposition that runs counter to it must inevitably 
 prove false. That the Mosaic Hexaémeron does not pre- 
 scribe what route science must travel is plain from the 
 fact that the true sense of Genesis I, 1 has never been 
 defined either by the infallible teaching office of the 
 Church or by scientific exegesis. Hence the Mosaic 
 narrative is not a positive norm for the guidance of the 
 
 12 De Gen. ad Lit., 
 
 IV, 22; De Spiration der hl. Schrift in der An- 
 Civ. Dei, XI, 9. Supra, pp. 101 sq. schauung des Mittelalters von Karl 
 Cfr. Fr. Schmid, De Inspirationis dem Grossen bis zum Konzil von 
 
 Bibliorum Vi et Ratione, Brix. 1895; 
 P. Dausch, Die Schriftinspiration, 
 Freiburg 1891; K. Holzhey, Die In- 
 
 Trient, Miinchen 1895; Chr. Pesch, 
 De Inspiratione S. Scripturae, Fri- 
 burgi 1906. 
 
108 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 naturalist. The very multiplicity of attempted interpre- 
 tations which the Church has countenanced at various 
 times, confirms this proposition. All that can justly be 
 demanded, therefore, is that the scientist refrain from 
 positively contradicting the Word of God, e. g., by de- 
 fending such propositions as: “ Matter is eternal;” 
 “Matter and energy are the sole principles of the uni- 
 verse;’”’ “ The world originated by mere chance,” and so 
 forth. In all other matters, such as the nebular hy- 
 pothesis,** the evolution of species, etc., he may hold 
 any conclusions that seem warranted. 
 
 The exegete, on his part, is free to interpret the sacred 
 text in accordance with the rules of hermeneutics and 
 in harmony with each particular author’s peculiar style 
 and with the context. Grammar, syntax, and the dic- 
 tionary are quite as valuable scientific aids as the tele- 
 scope, the microscope, and the testing tube. It will not 
 do to impose the conclusions of physical science as a 
 positive norm upon exegesis and to demand that the 
 Hexaémeron be interpreted in accordance with constantly 
 changing hypotheses. Modern exegetes, especially of 
 the last half-century, have been justly charged with pay- 
 ing too much attention to science and too little to the 
 Mosaic text. Though the scientists have an undeniable 
 right to be heard,'* they have no authority to dictate 
 how the Hexaeémeron must be interpreted. All they can 
 reasonably demand is that exegetes accept the established 
 conclusions of science as a negative guiding principle and 
 refrain from advocating as certain, or even probable, 
 any theory that contradicts clearly ascertained facts.*® 
 
 13 Cfr. Leahy, Astronomical Es- infra, p. 112). On this question of 
 
 says, pp. 231 sqq.; Clerke, Modern 
 Cosmogonies, pp. 21 sqq. 
 14 Supra, Thesis I, 
 
 15 Such are, for instance, the Res- 
 titution and the Deluge theories (v. 
 
 principle cfr. Kaulen, “ Grundsitz- 
 liches zur kath. Schriftauslegung ” 
 in the Lit. Handweiser, 1895, Nos. 
 4 and 5; and A, Schépfer, Bibel 
 und Wissenschaft, Brixen 1896. 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE _ 109 
 
 Thesis IV: Those theologians and scientists who 
 deny that the so-called fossils or petrifactions are real 
 remains of plants and animals, representing them as 
 mere freaks of nature (lusus naturae), needlessly ex- 
 pose the Word of God to ridicule. 
 
 Explanation. There have been and still are theo- 
 logians who, in order to save the literal interpretation 
 of the Mosaic narrative, regard the paleontological 
 finds in the lower strata of the earth as specially created 
 products of divine omnipotence, rather than as real tre- 
 mains of primordial organisms. Nothing is so apt to 
 excite ridicule on the part of infidels and indignation 
 in the camp of educated Catholic laymen, as recourse 
 to such pitiable hypotheses, which are altogether un- 
 worthy of a true theologian. To assume that the Cre- 
 ator leads truth-seeking man into invincible error, is to 
 stamp Him a cruel deceiver, who makes it His business 
 to lay annual rings around carbonized trees found 
 standing erect in coal-mines, and to fashion in perfect 
 detail large and small trilobites in siluric deposits — 
 some of them even contain well-developed embryos — 
 all mere lusus naturae! St. Augustine and St. Thomas 
 Aquinas vigorously protested against this curious way of 
 “reconciling ” faith and science. 
 
 Noteworthy for all time is the principle which St. 
 Augustine lays down in his famous treatise De Genesi 
 ad Literam: “In rebus obscuris atque a nostris ocults 
 remotissimis, si qua inde scripta etiam divina legerimus, 
 quae possint salva fide, qua imbuimur, alias atque alias 
 parere sententias, in nullam earum nos praecipiti af- 
 firmatione ita proticiamus, ut, si forte diligentius dis- 
 cussa veritas eam recte labefactaverit, corruamus; non 
 pro sententia divinarum Scripturarum, sed pro nostra 
 
110 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 ita dimicantes, ut eam velimus Scripturarum esse, quae 
 nostra est, cum potius eam, quae Scripturarum est, no- 
 stram esse velle debeamus.”1® With equal earnestness 
 the Saint censures the stupidity of those who, in the 
 mistaken interest of faith, provoke the sarcastic ridicule 
 of learned infidels: “ Turpe est autem nimis et pernicio- 
 sum ac maxime cavendum, ut Christianum de his rebus 
 quasi secundum christianas litteras loquentem ita delirare 
 quilibet infidelis audiat, ut... risum tenere vix possit. 
 Et non tam molestum est, quod errans homo deridetur, 
 sed quod auctores nostri ab tis, qui foris sunt, talia sen- 
 sisse creduntur et cum magno eorum exitio, de quorum 
 salute satagimus, tamquam indocti reprehenduntur atque 
 respuuntur.’ 17 These sentiments of the greatest among 
 the Fathers were shared and re-echoed by the most 
 eminent of the Church’s theologians. “ Dicendum est,” 
 says St. Thomas Aquinas, “ quod sicut Augustinus docet, 
 in huiusmodi quaestionibus duo sunt observanda: primo 
 quidem, ut veritas Scripturae imconcusse teneatur; se- 
 cundo, cum Scriptura divina multipliciter expont possit, 
 quod nulli expositioni aliquis ita praecise inhaereat, ut, 
 si certa ratione constiterit hoc esse falsum, 1d nihilomi- 
 nus asserere praesumat, ne Scriptura ex hoc ab infideli- 
 bus derideatur et ne eis via credendi praecludatur.” ** 
 St. Thomas rightly distinguishes between such Scrip- 
 tural truths as appertain to the substance of faith, 
 and such as are altogether secondary. “Si ergo circa 
 mundi principium aliquid est, quod ad substantiam fidet 
 pertinet, scil. mundum incepisse creatum, et hoc omnes 
 Sancti concorditer dicunt. Quo autem modo et ordine 
 factus sit, non pertinet ad fidem nisi per accidens, in- 
 quantum in Scriptura traditur, cuius veritatem diversa 
 
 16 De Genesi ad Literam, I, 18, LTO Pcit vis yO, 30> 
 37- 18S. Theol., 1a, qu. 68, art. 1. 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 111 
 
 expositione Sancti salvantes diversa  tradiderunt.’ 
 The Creator, when He established nature, also laid 
 down the laws by which it is governed, hence we must not 
 have recourse to miracles except where no natural ex- 
 planation suffices: “Scriptura in principio Genesis com- 
 memorat institutionem naturae, quae postmodum per- 
 severat. Unde non debet dici, quod aliquid tunc factum 
 fuerit, quod postmodum desierit.” 2° And again: “In 
 prima institutione naturae non quaeritur miraculum, sed 
 quid natura rerum habeat, ut Augustinus dicit.? 1 
 
 Thesis V: Since the true interpretation of the Hex- 
 aémeron with regard to the origin of the universe is 
 uncertain, theologians and scientists are free to adopt 
 whatever theory they prefer, provided only it be rea- 
 sonable and moderate, and not evidently opposed to 
 Scripture. 
 
 Explanation. This is merely a corollary from the pre- 
 ceding theses. It is scarcely necessary to point out that 
 scientists have vied with theologians in making liberal 
 use of the privilege named. During the last half of 
 the nineteenth century innumerable theories designed to 
 harmonize science and the Bible have sprung up, and 
 the end is not yet in sight. Most of these theories are 
 
 19 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Archbishop Messmer’s translation 
 
 Sent., II, dist. 12, art. 2. 
 
 20 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 68, art. 4. 
 
 21 Ibid. ad 3. Cfr. Aug., De Gen. 
 ad Lit., II, 1. On the whole sub- 
 ject see Leo XIII’s admirable En- 
 cyclical “ Providentissimus Deus,” 
 of Nov. 18, 1893, of which an Eng- 
 lish translation can be found in 
 Seisenberger’s Practical Handbook 
 for the Study of the Bible, pp. 159 
 sqq., New York 1911, and also in 
 
 of Brithl’s Bibelkunde (Outlines of 
 Bible Knowledge, pp. 257 sqq., Frei- 
 burg and St. Louis 1910). Cfr. also 
 Zanecchia, Divina Inspiratio SS. 
 Scripturarum ad Mentem Divi 
 Thomae, Rome 1898; C. Chauvain, 
 L’Inspiration des Divines Ecritures, 
 Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, De In- 
 spiratione Sacrae Scripturae, Fri- 
 burgi 1906, 
 
Liz DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 tissues of more or less airy conjectures, and not a few 
 evince a woeful lack of consistency. The Hexaémeron 
 has become a playground where imagination runs amuck. 
 The Church evidently apprehends no real contradiction 
 between the Mosaic narrative and the established con- 
 clusions of science. Among the forty or fifty theories 
 which have been thus far contrived, it is reasonable to 
 assume that one or two can be used for exegetical pur- 
 poses without straining the sacred text. 
 
 The number and variety of these theories is so great 
 that they cannot easily be grouped in logical categories. 
 For the following rough classification we are indebted 
 to Msgr. Gutberlet.?? 
 
 1. The Verbal theory interprets “day” literally as a 
 period of twenty-four hours. “ This,’ says Suarez, “is 
 the more common opinion of the Fathers; .. . it is also 
 favored by the Scholastics, though, on account of the 
 authority of St. Augustine, they treat his divergent 
 interpretation very modestly and with great reserve.” 
 To-day this theory is generally called the Deluge theory, 
 for the reason that most of its modern defenders as- 
 cribe the origin of the geological strata and their or- 
 ganic deposits to a catastrophe caused by the Deluge.** 
 In this hypothesis the Hexaemeron would antedate the 
 so-called geological epochs. It is now quite generally 
 held that the creation and formation of the cosmos must 
 have required millions of years, and the Verbal theory 
 no longer has any eminent defenders. 
 
 2. The Restitution theory (held by Buckland, Wise- 
 man, A. Wagner, Hengstenberg, Vosen, and others), 
 
 22C. Gutberlet, Das Sechstage- 24 Thus Keil, Bosizio, Veith, So- 
 werk, Frankfurt 1882. rignet, Laurent, Trissl. 
 
 23 Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, 
 Nese Rr 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 113 
 
 assumes that the ante-diluvian flora and fauna ante- 
 dates the chaos described in Genesis (tohu-vabohu) 
 and was destroyed by a great catastrophe, following which 
 God recreated the world, forming the present cosmos 
 in the course of six natural days. According to this 
 theory the Hexaémeron postdates the geological epochs. 
 A. Westermayer** represents the chaos as the work 
 of the fallen angels. Restitutionism was revamped by 
 A. Stenzel, but it has now been quite generally aban- 
 doned in view of the fact that the undisturbed position of 
 the fossils found in the lower strata of the earth makes it 
 improbable that all living organisms were buried by a 
 sudden catastrophe. To attribute such a catastrophe to 
 the fallen angels almost verges on superstition, Stenzel, 
 moreover, confused the tohu-vabohu with the Deluge. 
 3. The numerous Concordance theories seek to syn- 
 chronize the successive geological periods with the 
 “days” of the Hexaémeron. They place the Hexaé- 
 meron either between the different geological periods, or 
 within them. Hence the names of “ Interperiodism ” and 
 “ Periodism.” ?° “ Interperiodism,” which is a rather 
 obscure system, divides the Hexaémeron into six ordinary 
 days of twenty-four hours each, separated by long in- 
 tervening periods, which contain the millions of years 
 demanded by geology. According to “ Periodism” the 
 six days of Genesis coincide with the geological periods, 
 and the word “ day ” means. an epoch or period of time. 
 There is an older and a more recent Periodism. The 
 former * construes a strict parallelism between the six 
 
 25 Erschaffung der Welt und der periodism.’’ Cfr. y. Hummelauer, 
 
 Menschen und deren Geschichte bis 
 nach der Siindflut, Schaffhausen 
 1861. 
 
 26 The Deluge theory might anal- 
 ogously be called “ Anteperiodism,” 
 and the Restitution theory ‘“ Post-— 
 
 Nochmals der biblische Schépfungs- 
 bericht, p. 54, Freiburg 1898. 
 
 27 It was held by Cuvier, Fraas, 
 Pfaff, Hugh Miller, Guyot, Dana, 
 Pianciani, Dawson, etc. 
 
114 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 days of Creation on the one hand and six “ geological 
 epochs ” on the other. Modern Periodism, seeing the 
 impossibility of such a close parallelism, has adopted a 
 more or less idealistic Concordism.** Among recent 
 champions of Periodism the following deserve to be 
 mentioned: J. Brucker,?® F. Vigouroux,®® M. Seisen- 
 berger,*! and Bourdais.*?. From this idealistic Con- 
 cordism to pure Idealism is but one step.** 
 
 4. The Idealist theories disregard the chronological se- 
 quence of the different stages of Creation and interpret 
 the first chapter of Genesis in a purely religious sense. 
 This puts the Bible and science on different planes; 
 there are no points of contact between them, and a 
 conflict is therefore impossible. The Hexaémeron 
 transcends the geological periods and has absolutely 
 nothing to do with them. Let the exegete and the 
 scientist each pursue his own way in peace! “ Idealism,” 
 says Hummelauer,** “does not interpret the six days 
 as necessarily meaning six consecutive periods of 
 time, but as six logically distinct, outstanding momenta 
 of God’s creative activity, or as six divine ideas real- 
 ized in Creation. Cannot the historian truly assert that 
 the Romans subjugated Europe, Asia, and Africa? Or 
 that Goethe wrote prose and poetry? Similarly the in- 
 spired writer describes for us how God created light 
 and the firmament, land and sea, plants, stars, and ani- 
 mals.”’ 
 
 28 C. Giittler; cfr., however, this 
 writer’s article “ Hexaémeron” in 
 Herder’s Kirchenlexikon, Vol. V; 
 col. 1980 sqq., Freiburg 1888. 
 
 29 Questions Actuelles @’Ecriture 
 Sainte, Paris 1895. 
 
 30 Dictionnaire de la Bible, Paris 
 1895 sdq. 
 
 31 Der bdiblische Schépfungsbe- 
 richt, 2nd ed., Freising 1882. 
 
 32 Le Jour Génésiaque,” in La 
 Science Catholique, 1889, pp. 550 
 sqq. 
 
 33 Compare, e. g., the first with 
 the fourth edition of Reusch’s work 
 Bibel und Natur (4th ed., Bonn 
 1876). 
 
 34 Nochmals der biblische Schop- 
 fungsbericht, p. 73- 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 115 
 
 The simplest and most acceptable form of Idealism re- 
 gards the Hexaémeron as a treatise arranged according 
 to purely logical points of view, with its main emphasis 
 upon the “ week,” and the seventh day as the Sabbath. 
 Cfr. Exod. XXIII, 12: “Sex diebus operaberis, sep- 
 timo die cessabis — Six days thou shalt work: the sev- 
 enth day thou shalt cease.” The divine week of creation 
 is the model upon which man should pattern his week 
 of labor, the divine Sabbath is the exemplar of his 
 day of rest, which he is to consecrate to God. The in- 
 troduction of the figure six is not arbitrary ; nor is it due 
 to chronological considerations; it is based upon the 
 pragmatism of God’s creative activity, in which the num- 
 ber three of the work of distinction corresponds to a 
 like number in the ornamentation of the universe. This 
 hypothesis has the twofold advantage of safeguarding 
 the historic character of the Hexaémeron and of avoid- 
 ing a slavish Concordism. Science can find nothing 
 objectionable in an account of the Creation which is 
 arranged pragmatically rather than chronologically.*° 
 . Allegorism, Poetism, and Liturgism virtually destroy 
 the historic character of the Hexaémeron, and it is not 
 _ surprising, therefore, that they have met with small 
 favor.° 
 
 5. The most widely discussed among the so-called Ideal- 
 istic theories just now is the Vision theory advocated by 
 Kurtz, Hummelauer, Hoberg, and others. It regards 
 
 _ the six days of Creation as so many visions of Adam. 
 
 In six living pictures or tableaux, symbolizing six nat- 
 _ ural days, there passed before the mental vision of-our 
 _ ecstatic progenitor the history of creation, which could 
 
 35 Thus Michelis, Baltzer, Reusch, theories may be mentioned: Stop- 
 
 Niland others, - pani, Hauser, Clifford, and De 
 
 86 Among the advocates of these Gryse, 
 
116 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 be known to no one but God. The facts thus revealed 
 to Adam were handed down by Primitive Tradition 
 to Moses, who faithfully recorded them in the Book 
 of Genesis. “It can truly be said,’ remarks Hummel- 
 auer, “ that the universe was created in six days, that is 
 in a vision, like as the heroes of a drama engage in com- 
 bat on the stage.” °7 This theory claims to eliminate 
 even the possibility of a clash between Revelation and 
 science. ‘The Vision theory,’ to quote Hummelauer 
 again, “meets all objections by pointing to the differ- 
 ence which must naturally exist between a vision of 
 the creative act and that act itself. Science and the 
 Bible do not deal with precisely the same object; a dif- 
 ference between them, therefore, does not necessarily 
 argue contradiction.” ** 
 
 But what becomes of the historic character of the 
 Mosaic narrative? ‘“ What is there to correspond to the 
 six days of Adam’s vision? Six ordinary days? or six pe- 
 riods of time? or six logical momenta? — or nothing?” * 
 Here is the weak spot of the Vision theory. Hummel- 
 auer frankly advocates ‘“‘a theory of Vision sans phrase,” 
 and refuses to accept Periodism in any shape or form.*° 
 But if there is no reality corresponding to the consecutive 
 days of Adam’s vision, the division of time into six 
 days of labor and one day of rest is based on a mere 
 dream, and the Sabbath has no foundation in fact, © 
 despite the solemn declaration in Exodus XX, II: 
 “Sex enim diebus fecit Dominus coelum et terram et 
 mare et omnia, quae in tis sunt, et requievit in die sep- 
 timo; idcirco benedixit Dominus diet Sabbati et sanc- 
 
 87 Nochmals der biblische Schop- schrift fiir katholische Theologie, 
 fungsbericht, p. 112. Innsbruck 1895, p. 730. 
 
 38 Ibidem, pp. 113 Sq. 40 Nochmals der biblische Scho- 
 30 J. Kern, S. J., in the Zeté- pfungsbericht, p. 123. 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 117 
 
 tificavit eum — For in six days the Lord made heaven 
 and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them, 
 and rested on the seventh day: therefore the Lord 
 blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it.’ We must 
 not forget that this revealed truth has been formally 
 proclaimed a rule of human conduct: “Ser diebus 
 operaberis, septimo die cessabis— Six days thou shalt 
 work, the seventh day thou shalt cease” (Exod. XXIII, 
 12). Obviously the Creator instituted this particular 
 order not because Adam had six visions, but because 
 the universe was actually created in the course of six 
 days. To deny the objective truth of this fact is to do 
 violence to the sacred text. One might as consistently 
 adopt the extreme Idealistic theories. Hence we cannot 
 admit that moderate Concordism and moderate Idealism 
 have lost their raison d’étre. The Vision theory, in our 
 humble opinion, can be successfully defended only on 
 the assumption that the six days of Adam’s vision are 
 based on some kind of objective reality.‘ 
 
 ARTICLE: 2 
 
 THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 
 
 Exegetically those interpretations that devi- 
 ate from the literal sense of the Mosaic narrative 
 _—we have in mind chiefly moderate Concordism 
 and Idealism—can be justified only on the as- 
 sumption that the Hebrew word > does not 
 
 41 On this controversy the student 
 may profitably consult K. Holzhey, 
 Schépfung, Bibel und Inspiration, 
 Stuttgart 1902; N. Peters, 
 ben und Wissen im ersten bibli- 
 
 Glau- 
 
 schen Schopfungsbericht, Paderborn 
 1907; F. E. Gigot, Special Intro- 
 duction to the Study of the Old 
 Testament, 2nd ed., Vol. I, pp. 142 
 sqq., New York 1903. 
 
118 DOGMATIC: COSMOLOGY 
 
 necessarily mean an ordinary day of twenty-four 
 hours, but may signify a longer period of time. 
 
 1. Concordism and Idealism can claim the 
 high authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, 
 which every Catholic exegete has a perfect right 
 to follow. We have already adverted to the 
 fact that the eminent Bishop of Hippo regarded 
 the whole week of the Hexaémeron as one sin- 
 gle moment, and that St. Thomas approved of 
 this interpretation. As the Church has never dis- 
 owned the teaching of St. Augustine, it cannot 
 fairly be claimed that ecclesiastical Tradition 
 compels us to take the Hebrew >” in the sense 
 of an ordinary day of twenty-four hours. Ori- 
 gen and Athanasius anticipated the teaching of 
 Augustine. While the Fathers and Scholastics 
 generally preferred to adhere to the literal sense, 
 they never condemned the Augustinian inter- 
 pretation. St. Thomas says: “Moyses rudem 
 populum de creatione mundi instruens per partes 
 divisit, quae simul facta sunt. Gregoris vero 
 
 _ et alii Sancti ponunt ordinem temporis m 
 distinctione rerum servatum; et haec quidem po- 
 sitio est communior, et magis consonare videtur 
 litterae quantum ad superficiem; sed prior est 
 rationabilior, et magis ab irrisione imfhdelium — 
 sacram Scripturam defendens, quod valde ob-— 
 servandum docet Augustinus,’ ut sic Scripturae — 
 
 1De Gen. ad Lit., I, 19, 39- 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 119 
 
 exponantur, quod ab infidelibus non wrrideantur ; 
 et haec opinio plus mihi placet.”2 Under these 
 circumstances the all but universal consensus of 
 the Fathers and Scholastics in favor of the literal 
 interpretation of the Mosaic narrative has no 
 binding: force. 
 
 2. There are also intrinsic reasons for reject- 
 ing the literal interpretation of the word “day.” 
 In the first place geology, palzontology, and as- 
 tronomy all maintain that the formation of the 
 universe, including our own planet, cannot have 
 taken place within the limits of one natural week. 
 Paleozoic coal, for example, mesozoic chalk, and 
 the so-called tertiary formations postulate im- 
 mense periods of time. It is to be noted, also, 
 that the first three “days” of the Hexaémeron 
 cannot have been solar days in the strict sense 
 of the term, because the sun was not created 
 until the fourth day. St. Augustine observes 
 that it is practically impossible to define the 
 exact nature of these ante-solar days.? In an- 
 other portion of his writings he says that it is 
 highly improbable, not to say incredible, that the 
 earth should have brought forth full-grown trees 
 in fruitage within the short Space of twenty-four 
 hours. | 
 
 2Comment. in Quatuor Libros — dies cuiusmodi sint, aut perdiffictle 
 
 _ Sent., II, dist. r2, Que rvartegs: nobis aut impossibile est cogitare, 
 3De Civit. Dei, ME 655 | Out quanto magis dicere.’ 
 
120 _ DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 A decisive argument for our contention is 
 found in the fact that the word 5” is frequently 
 employed by Sacred Scripture in a wider sense, 
 to denote an indefinite period of time.* In Gen. 
 II, 4 the entire period of six days is referred 
 to as “one day.” “Istae sunt generationes coelt 
 et terrae, quando creata sunt in die (o%2) quo 
 fecit Dominus Deus coelum et terram — These » 
 are the generations of the heaven and the earth, 
 when they were created in the day that the 
 Lord God made the heaven and the earth.” 
 Ezech. VII, 7 we read: “Vemit tempus, prope 
 est dies occisionis — The time is come, the day of 
 slaughter is near.” Here “time” and “day” are 
 evidently synonymous. Amos VIII, 13 has this 
 passage: “In die illa deficient vir gines — In 
 that day [i. e., at that time] the fair virgins 
 
 shall faints 
 
 “Day” as a synonym for “time” is also fre- 
 quent in such Scriptural phrases as dies vanitatts 
 (day of vanity),® dies tribulationis (day of tribu- 
 lation),®° dies peccatoris (the sinner’s day)," dies 
 frigoris (day of frost),° etc. 
 
 99 66 
 
 If Di does not mean an ordinary “ day,” “ evening” 
 
 vespera, 21%) and “ morning,” (mane, 122) must like- 
 NM § 2 
 
 4St. Hilary already took notice 5 Eccles. VII, 16. 
 of this. “ Diem frequenter signifi- 64 Kings XIX, 3. 
 cari pro aetate cognovimus,’ he 7 Ps, XXXVI, 13. 
 says, “ut ubi dies tota est, illic 8 Nah. III, 17. 
 
 omne vitae tempus ostensum sit.” 
 
 (In Ps. LV, n. 2+) 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 121 
 
 wise be capable of a figurative interpretation. Ereb 
 etymologically means “ mixture, confusion.” It is analo- 
 gously applied to matter in a chaotic state, 7. e., awaiting 
 formation. Boker, on the other hand, which originally 
 means “opening” or “ revelation,’ may be interpreted 
 as signifying the work of seven days reduced to per- 
 fect order. This distinction is at least as old as St. 
 Augustine, who says: “Cum dixit: ‘Facta est ves- 
 pera, materiam informem commemorat; cum autem 
 dicit: “ Factum est mane,’ speciem, quae ipsa operatione 
 impressa est materiae.’” ® 
 
 But why did Moses choose the term “ day” to de- 
 scribe the periods of Creation? Why did he not em- 
 ploy some such word as 0% or poiy, to indicate that he 
 
 meant indefinite periods of time? The week of the 
 Creation with its six periods crowned by the Creator’s 
 day of repose — which was surely not an ordinary day, 
 since it still continues —was intended to typify man’s 
 week of labor which terminates with the Sabbath. Be- 
 tween a type and that which it figures there generally 
 obtains a relation of real similarity, which by virtue of 
 the laws of analogy justifies the use of the same con- 
 cept and the same term.!° 
 
 3. Nor does the assumption of the moderate Tdealists, 
 that the Hexaémeron must be regarded as history written 
 from the pragmatic rather than the chronological point of 
 
 view, necessarily run counter to the principles of sound 
 Biblical hermeneutics. Secular historians often refer to 
 something done on a certain day briefly as “ day ” 
  (@. g., the day of Waterloo, or dies Alliensis for pugna 
 | 8 Op. Imperfect. de Gen., c. 15. t. III, ed. 3a, pp. 39 sqq., Friburgi 
 10 Cfr. Corluy, Spicil. Dogmatico- 1908; Duilhé-Brzig, Apologie des 
 
 Bibl., t. I, pp. 163 sqq., Gand. Christentums, pp. 178 sqq., Freiburg 
 1884; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., 1889. 
 
 9 
 
122 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 
 
 Alliensis). In like manner Holy Scripture sometimes 
 employs the word “day” to describe some particular 
 event (as, for instance, dies Madian," dies occisionis,” 
 dies Dominij* dies magnus irae),* irrespective of 
 duration. Similarly, in the Book of Genesis “day” 
 may mean act, work, operation, or performance, regard- 
 less of duration. The analogous terms “ evening” and 
 ~“ morning” probably signify the completion of one and 
 the beginning of another action, just as we sometimes 
 speak of the evening of life or the dawn of a better 
 future. 
 
 Reapincs: — Kurtz, Bibel und Astronomie, Berlin 1847.— J. B. 
 Pianciani, Evliuterungen zur mosaischen Schépfungsgeschichte, 
 Ratisbon 1853—A Bosizio, Das Hexaémeron und die Geologie, 
 Mainz 1865.—*F. H. Reusch, Bibel und Natur, 4th ed., Bonn 1876. 
 — *Hummelauer, Der biblische Schopfungsbericht, Freiburg 1877. 
 —*C, Gittler, Naturforschung und Bibel, Freiburg 1877—*F. E. 
 Gigot, Special Introduction to the Siudy of the Old Testament, 
 I, pp. 142 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1903.—*F. Pfaff, Schopfungs- 
 geschichte mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung des biblischen Scho- 
 pfungsberichtes, 2nd ed., Frankfurt 1877—*B. Schafer, Bibel und 
 Wissenschaft, Minster 1881—J. W. Dawson, The Origin of the 
 World according to Revelation and Science, New York 1880.— 
 F. N. Moigno, Les Splendeurs de la Foi, 3rd ed., 5 vols., Paris 
 1883.— A. Stoppani, Sulla Cosmogonia Mosaica, Milano 1887.— 
 De Gryse, De Hexaémero secundum Caput Primum Geneseos ad 
 
 12 Is-EX,) 4, rum operum, quia plerumque a 
 12 Ezech. VII, 7. _ mane incipiunt et ad vesperam de- 
 18 Joel I, 15. sinunt. Habent enim  consuetudi- 
 14 Apoc. VI, 17. nem divinae Scripturae, de rebus 
 
 15 “‘ Restat ergo,’- says St. Au- humanis ad divinas res verba trans- 
 gustine (De Gen. contr. Manich., ferre.’ Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., 
 I, 14, 20), “ut intelligamus, in Vol. II, pp. 461 sqq., Paris 18953 
 ipsa quidem mora temporis ipsas Reusch, Bibel und Natur, 4th ed., 
 distinctiones operum sic [scil. dies] pp. 250 sqq., Bonn 1876; F. Kau- 
 
 appellatas, vesperam propter trans- len, Der biblische Schopfungsbericht 
 actionem consummati operis, et (Gen. I, 1-2, 3) erklart, Freiburg 
 mane propter inchoationem futuri 1902. 
 
 operis: de simtlitudine scil, humano- 
 
THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 123 
 
 Literam, Bruges 1889.— J. McCosh, The Religious Aspect of Evo- 
 lution, New York 1890.— Mir y Noguera, La Creacion, Madrid 
 1890.— C. Giittler, Wissen und Glauben, 2nd ed., Miinchen 1904.— 
 A. Trissl, Das biblische Sechstagewerk, 2nd ed., Ratisbon 1894.— 
 W. D. Strappini, S. J., “ What Were the Days of Genesis?” in 
 the Month, Jan. 1881.— A. Stenzel, Weltschépfung, Sinthut und 
 Gott, Braunschweig 1804. C.\, Brain, Sips Kosmogonie vom 
 Standpunkte christlicher W. issenschaft, 3rd ed., Miinster 1905.—*A. 
 Schopfer, Geschichte des Alten Testaments mit besonderer Riick- 
 sicht auf das Verhdltnis von Bibel und Wissenschaft, Brixen 
 1907.— Vigouroux, Dictionnaire de la Bible, is) ys Cosmogonie 
 Mosaique,” Paris 1898—*F, y. Hummelauer, Noch einmal der 
 biblische S chopfungsbericht, Freiburg 1898.— Zapletal, Der S chop- 
 fungsbericht der Genesis, Freiburg 1902,— P. Schanz, Apology, 
 Vol. I, 4th ed., New York, s.a.— M. Selsenberger, Practical Hand- 
 book for the Study of the Bible (Engl. tr. by Buchanan), Pp. 260 
 sqq., New York, tort, 
 
 The older theologians, like Suarez, Billuart, Tournely, etc., 
 treat the Hexaémeron, and Dogmatic Cosmology generally, under 
 the title “ De Opere Sex Dierum,” in connection with the Summa 
 Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, Ia, qu. 65-74. 
 
CEUA Pe. AL 
 
 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 Anthropology, as a branch of dogmatic the- 
 ology, partly coincides with the philosophical dis- 
 cipline of the same name, and partly with psy- 
 chology. Its object is to determine the natural 
 basis for the supernatural endowment of man- 
 kind in Adam, which was forfeited by original 
 sin. Hence in this Chapter of our treatise we 
 shall consider: (1) The nature of man, (2) 
 The Supernatural in man, and (3) Man’s de- 
 fection from the Supernatural (Original Sin). 
 
 GENERAL READINGS: — St. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 75 sqq., and 
 in connection therewith the treatises De Anima by Toletus, 
 Suarez, and Ruvius; also Kleutgen, Die Philosophie der V orzeit, 
 Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 453 sqq., Minster 1878.— Card. Gotti, De Deo 
 Creatore, tract. 10— Palmieri, De Creatione et de Praecipuis 
 Creaturis, thes. 25-29, Romae 1910.—*Card. Mazzella, De Deo 
 Creante, ed. 2a, disp. 3 sqq., Romae 1880.— T. Pesch, Instit. Psy- 
 chologice secundum Principia S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3 vols., Fri- 
 burgi 1897-8.—J. Thein, Christian Anthropology, New York 
 1892,— W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,’ pp. 272 sqq., Lon- 
 don 1897,— H. Muckermann, S. J., Attitude of Catholics Towards 
 Darwinism and Evolution, St. Louis 1906; Fr. Aveling, art. 
 “Man” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IX; E. Wasmann, S. J., 
 Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution, London 1gro. 
 
 On the history of the various dogmas involved, cfr. A. Stockl, 
 Die spekulative Lehre vom Menschen und ihre Geschichte, 2 vols., 
 
 124 
 
DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 125 
 
 Wirzburg 1858-9.— *Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vols. 
 T and II, Freiburg 1892-5.— E, Klebba, Die Anthropologie des hi. 
 Irenius, Minster 1895.— *G. Esser, Die Seelenlehre Tertullians, 
 Paderborn 1893.— F. Hilt, Des hl. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre vom 
 Menschen, systematisch dargestellt, Koln 1890. 
 
SECON ir 
 
 THE NATURE OF MAN 
 
 The subject-matter of this Section may be 
 treated under four subdivisions, viz.: (1) The 
 origin of man and the unity of the human race; 
 (2) The essential constitution of human nature 
 and the relation of soul to body; (3) The im- 
 mortality of the human soul; and (4) The origin 
 of individual souls. The first two of the subse- 
 quent Articles regard man as a whole, that is to 
 say, as composed of soul and body; the last two 
 deal with the soul alone (Dogmatic Psychology ). 
 Such incidental questions as the probable age of 
 the human race belong to fundamental theology 
 or apologetics. 
 
 ARTICLE 4 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF MAN AND THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN 
 RACE 
 
 God directly created Adam and Eve, from 
 whom all other human beings are descended by _ 
 way of propagation. Holy Scripture lays par- — 
 ticular stress on the truth that the entire human _ 
 
 126 
 
THE ORIGIN OF MAN 127 
 
 race is descended from a single pair of progeni- 
 tors, and thus forms but one family. 
 
 Thesis I: The body of the first man as well as his 
 soul were created immediately by God. 
 
 This thesis may be technically qualified as 
 “sententia satis certa.” 
 
 Proof. There is no need of entering upon a 
 refutation of the obsolete heretical contention of 
 the Gnostics and the Manichzans, that Adam 
 was created by a subordinate Demiurge, or by 
 the author of evil. The modern antithesis of 
 Christian Anthropology is atheistic Darwinism, 
 which teaches that in soul and body alike man 
 is descended from the brute, the human soul 
 being merely a more highly developed form of 
 the brute soul. This teaching is as heretical as 
 it is absurd. The modified Darwinism defended 
 by St. George Mivart, who holds that the body 
 of Adam developed from the animal kingdom, 
 whereas his spiritual soul was infused imme- 
 diately by the Creator must likewise be rejected; 
 for while not directly heretical, it is repugnant 
 to the letter of Sacred Scripture and to Chris- 
 tian sentiment.” 
 
 a) The creation of man occurred towards the 
 
 1Cfr. H. Muckermann, S. J., Af- cussion of the Problem of Evolu- 
 titude of Catholics Towards Dar- tion, pp. 49 sqq., London 1909. 
 
 winism, pp. 39 sqq., St. Louis 1906; 2Cfr. W. Lescher, O. P., The 
 
 E. Wasmann, S. J., The Berlin Dis- Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd 
 ; ed., pp. 15 sqq., London 1899. 
 
128 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 end of the Hexaemeron, immediately prior to 
 the Creator’s day of rest. The Bible contains 
 two separate accounts of it (Gen. I, 26 sqq., and 
 Gen. II, 7), both of which represent Almighty 
 God as personally creating man. 
 
 a) The Creator proceeds with great solemnity in this 
 act. Gen. I, 26sq.: “And he said: let us make man to 
 our image and likeness . . . and God created man to his 
 own image: to the image of God he created him: male 
 and female he created them.” This text, be it remarked 
 in passing, excludes the Platonic error, which was es- 
 poused by certain ancient rabbis, that Adam was a herm- 
 aphrodite. The distinction of sexes is immediately 
 from God. As God took a direct hand in the creation 
 of material and irrational beings, there can be no doubt 
 that He personally created Adam, “the crown of 
 creation,” whose material body from the moment of its 
 origin was to be animated by a soul endowed with sanc- 
 tifying grace. From the irrational brute to man was 
 indeed a farther cry than from inanimate matter to 
 plant, or from plant to brute, and hence if the imme- 
 diate operation of the Creator was required for the 
 latter, it was even more urgently demanded for the 
 former. That God created the soul of Adam out of 
 nothing and personally fashioned his body, becomes still 
 clearer from Gen. II, 7: “And the Lord God formed 
 man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face 
 the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” These 
 words, taken in their natural and obvious sense, present 
 the creative act of God as one, though divided into two 
 momenta, viz.: formation and breathing. 
 
 Did the Creator employ the services of the Angels 
 
THE ORIGIN OF MAN 129 
 
 in preparing the “ slime of the earth ”? The assumption 
 cannot be positively disproved. But even if He did em- 
 ploy the Angels as His agents, God Himself was the sole 
 causa principalis in the formation of the human body.® 
 
 8) The creation of Eve furnishes a decisive ar- 
 gument against the evolutionist hypothesis. 
 
 It is quite inconceivable, and at the same time re- 
 pugnant to the spirit of divine Revelation, that woman 
 should have had a sublimer origin than man. Eve was 
 fashioned immediately by God from a rib which He 
 had taken from Adam.4 Cardinal Cajetan’s allegorical 
 interpretation of this text has been unanimously re- 
 jected by theologians as fanciful and unwarranted. St, 
 Paul says: “ Non enim vir ex mulicre est, Sed mulier ex 
 viro. Etenim non est creatus vir propter mulierem, sed 
 mulier propter virum—For the man is not of the 
 woman, but the woman of the man. For the man was 
 not created for the woman, but the woman for the 
 man.’”*® If Eve had not sprung bodily from Adam, he 
 could not have exclaimed: “This now is bone of my 
 bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman 
 (virago), because she was taken out of man (quoniam 
 de wiro sumpta est).’*® If the sumptio de viro was an 
 immediate act of God, so, a fortiori, was the formatio 
 de limo terrae; and hence Adam’s body,. like his soul, 
 must have come directly from the hands of the Creator.’ 
 
 3 “Tt was necessary,” says St. dust.” (S. Theol., Ta, qu. g1, art. 
 Thomas, “that the first human 2.) 
 
 body should be fashioned imme- 4 Gen. II, 21 sqq. 
 
 diately by God... though possibly 51 Cor. XI, 8 sq. 
 
 the Angels rendered some assist- 6 Gen. II, 23. 
 
 ance, as they will also do at the 7 Hummelauer, Comment. in Gen., 
 
 resurrection by gathering up the PP. 129 sqq., Paris 1895, 
 
130 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 b) The Patristic teaching on this subject is 
 quite unanimous. Not a single one of the Fath- 
 ers can be quoted in favor of Mivart’s hypothe- 
 sis. We shall confine ourselves to a few speci- 
 men quotations. 
 
 Gregory of Nyssa writes: “If it were simply writ- 
 ten: ‘He created,’ you would be free to think that 
 man was made in the same manner as the brute ani- 
 mals, the monsters, plants and herbs. In order to make 
 you see that you have nothing in common with the 
 beasts of the field, Moses describes God’s artistic pro- 
 cedure in creating man thus: ‘God took dust of the 
 earth. Then he relates what God did; then he tells us 
 how God did it. He took dust of the earth and with His 
 own hands formed man.”,* John of Damascus, who 
 exalted man’s dignity to the extent of calling him 
 a “little god” (pxpdOeos), deems it quite natural and 
 proper that the body of the first man should have been 
 immediately created by God. “Thus God created man 
 with His hands: He formed his body out of earth, 
 but gave him the soul by breathing.”® To show the 
 propriety of such direct intervention on the part of the 
 Almighty, St. John Chrysostom compares man to a king, 
 whom God Himself wished to induct into the created 
 universe as his palace.1? Tertullian hails man as “an- 
 gent divint curam, manuum Dei operam, molitionis suae 
 regem, liberalitatis suae heredem.’** It is one of this 
 author’s favorite sayings that Adam bore a bodily re- 
 semblance to the “second Adam,” i. e., Christ, and that 
 the Creator fashioned the body of the first man after 
 
 8 Orat. 2 (Migne, P.G., XLIV, 10 Hom. in Gen., 8, n. 2. 
 279). 41 De Resurrect. Carnis, % 9- 
 
 9 De Fide Orth., Il, 12. 
 
THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 131 
 the pattern of Jesus.12 The Fathers and Patristic 
 writers generally love to descant on the great dignity 
 of Eve because she had sprung from Adam’s side. Eve, 
 they say, did not spring from the head of Adam, which 
 would have signified that she should rule over him; nor 
 from his feet, that she might be his slave; but from 
 his side, that she might be loved by her husband, thus 
 symbolizing the procession of the Church from the side 
 of Christ.* Such utterances are as incompatible with 
 the views of Mivart,* as they are with crude Darwinism 
 in its application to man.1® 
 
 Thesis II: All mankind is decended from one pair 
 of progenitors, Adam and Eve. 
 
 Proof. The unity of the human race, though not yet 
 formally defined, is a Catholic doctrine. 
 
 The dogmatic commission of the Vatican Council 
 drew up the following canon: “Si quis universum 
 genus humanum ab uno protoparente Adam ortum esse 
 negaverit, anathema sit.’** Heresies opposed to this 
 teaching are Pre-Adamism and Co-Adamism. The Pre- 
 Adamites claim that there were men before Adam; the 
 
 12 Op. cit., c. 6: “ Quodcunque 
 enim limus exprimebatur, Christus 
 cogitabatur homo futurus.”’ 
 
 13“ Dormit Adam, ut fiat Eva; 
 moritur Christus, ut fiat ecclesia. 
 Dormientit Adae fit Eva de latere; 
 mortuo Christo lancea percutitur la- 
 tus, ut profluant sacramenta, quibus 
 formatur ecclesia.’ (Aug., Tract. 
 te LOG. 95) 4.) 10; Cir.) ‘Conc. 
 Viennense, apud Denzinger-Bann- 
 wart, n. 480. 
 
 14 On the Genesis af Species, pp. 
 277. sqq., London 1871; Lessons 
 from Nature, pp. 177 sqq., London 
 1876. 
 
 15 Cfr. A. Jakob, Der Mensch, 
 die Krone der Schépfung, Freiburg 
 1900; O. Mohnike, Affe und Ur- 
 mensch, Minster 1888; J. Diebolder, 
 Darwins Grundprinzip der Abstam- 
 mungslehre kritisch beleuchtet, 2nd 
 ed., Freiburg 1891; E. Dennert, At 
 the Deathbed of Darwinism, Bur- 
 lington, Ia., 1904; W. Lescher, OQ. 
 P., The Evolution of the Human 
 Body, 2nd ed., London 1899; E. 
 Wasmann, S. J., Modern Biology 
 and the Theory of Evolution, Lon- 
 don 1910. 
 
 16In Martin’s Collectio 
 ment., p. 30, Paderb. 1873. 
 
 Docu- 
 
132 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 Co-Adamites, that other human beings co-existed with 
 Adam and Eve. Pre-Adamism was reduced to a the- 
 ological system by the French Calvinist Isaac Peyrére,’’ 
 who later became a Catholic and abjured his error before 
 Pope Alexander VII. It has been revamped in modern 
 times with much scientific acumen by Professor Win- 
 chell.18 The defense of Christian monogenism against 
 the objections of infidel scientists is a task which we 
 must leave to apologetics. The dogmatic argument for 
 our thesis may be formulated as follows: 
 
 a) The Bible does not permit us to doubt that 
 all men without exception—including such widely 
 divergent races as the negroes of Australasia, the 
 Chinese, and the aborigines of the South Sea 
 Islands—are descended from the same progeni- 
 tors. This unity of descent sufficiently guar- 
 antees the unity of the human race, which would 
 remain a fact even if the so-called Neandertal 
 race constituted a new zoological species, as is 
 asserted by such eminent authorities as Schwalbe 
 and Klaatsch.*® Dogmatic theology is not con- 
 cerned with zodlogical distinctions. The pur- 
 pose of the Mosaic narrative is simply to de- 
 scribe the origin of the universe, including man. 
 We have in Gen. I, 26 sqq. and II, 4 sqq., as 
 
 17 Systema Theologicum ex Prae- erroneous guesswork,” cfr. P. De 
 adamitarum Hypothesi, 1655. Roo, History of America Before 
 18 Preadamites, or A Demonstra- Columbus, Vol. I, pp. 14 sqq., Phil- 
 tion of the Existence of Men Be- adelphia 1900. 
 fore Adam, Chicago 1890. On the 19 Cfr. E. Wasmann, The Berlin 
 main theses of this work, which is Discussion of the Problem of Evo- 
 “almost as replete with facts and lution, pp. 71 sqd. 
 science as with suppositions and 
 
THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 133 
 
 it were, the original charter of the human race. 
 The very fact that God, when He was about 
 to create man, debated with Himself—“Let us 
 make man,”—shows that a new and very im- 
 portant link still remained to be inserted in the 
 chain of created beings. Moreover, Gen. II, 5- 
 7 expressly tells us: “There was not a man to 
 till the earth ...and the Lord God formed 
 man,” O38", 7. e., man as a species and as the 
 first individual of that species. 
 
 With equal certainty we know from Revelation that 
 Eve was the first woman. Gen. II, 20: “Adae vero 
 non inveniebatur adiutor similis eius —But for Adam 
 there was not found a helper like himself.” Had any 
 other human beings existed at that time (Pre-Adamites 
 or Co-Adamites), Eve would not have been the first 
 woman. Her very name “Eve” is intelligible only on 
 the assumption that she is the proto-mother of man- 
 kind: “Vocavit Adam nomen uxoris suae Eva, eo 
 quod mater esset cunctorum viventium— Adam called 
 the name of his wife Eve, because she was the mother 
 of all the living.” °° This is confirmed by various other 
 Scriptural texts. Wisd. X, 1: “[Adamus] primus 
 formatus est a Deo pater orbis terrarum, cum solus 
 esset creatus— Adam was first formed by God the 
 father of the world, when he was created alone.” 
 Christ Himself says, Matth. XIX, 4: “Qui fecit 
 hominem ab initio, masculum et foeminam fecit eos — 
 He who made man from the beginning, made them male 
 and female.” St. Paul repeats the same truth, Acts 
 
 20Gen, III, 20, 
 
134 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 XVII, 26: “Fecitque [Deus] ex uno omne genus 
 honunum ** inhabitare super universam faciem terrae — 
 He hath made of one all mankind, to dwell upon the 
 whole face of the earth.” ?? 
 
 b) Peyrére himself admitted that his theory 
 was opposed to the unanimous teaching of the 
 Fathers and to the many conciliar definitions 
 which assert the universality of original sin and 
 of the Redemption. 
 
 “T confess,” he says in a letter to Philotimus, “ that 
 I was not unaware of the fact that my hypothesis [as- 
 serting the existence of Pre-Adamites] was entirely for- 
 eign to the opinion of the holy Fathers and to the teach- 
 ing of orthodox councils; and that the whole fabric of 
 doctrine concerning the fall and redemption of man was 
 based by the Fathers and councils on the hypothesis 
 [sic!] that Adam was the first man.” 7° 
 
 The Fathers often make the common descent of all 
 men from one pair of progenitors the text of inspiring 
 reflections. Lactantius, e. g., dwells on the utter wick- 
 edness of hatred, which, he says, is repugnant to the 
 blood relationship that binds all human beings together 
 as members of one family.2* St. Ambrose and others 
 demonstrate the unity of humankind from the manner 
 in which our first parents were created.?® Lastly, the 
 
 21é& évds wav vos avOpwrwyr, mum scelus putandum est, odisse 
 22For a _ refutation of certain hominem vel nocentem.’ (Instit., 
 specious objections drawn from Sa- 1068) 
 cred Scripture consult Palmieri, 25 “ Non de eadem terra, de qua 
 
 De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 
 
 251 sq. 
 23 Epist. ad Philotimum. 
 24° Si ab uno homine, quem 
 Deus finxit, omnes orimur, ergo 
 
 consanguinet sumus, et ideo maxi- 
 
 plasmatus est Adam, sed de ipsius 
 costa facta est mulier, ut sciremus, 
 unam in viro et muliere esse natu- 
 ram, unum fontem generis humant.” 
 (De Paradiso, c. 10,.n. 48.) 
 
THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 135 
 
 dogma of the universality of original sin, and the con- 
 sequent duty for all men of whatever race to receive 
 Baptism, as well as the dogma of the Redemption of all 
 through Jesus Christ, eats common descent from 
 Adam. 
 
 c) Pre-Adamism is heretical only when it 
 culminates in Co-Adamism, because the assertion 
 that certain post-Adamic races had a pre-Adamic 
 origin involves a direct denial of the universality 
 of original sin and of the Redemption. 
 
 Fabre d’Envieu*® held that human beings existed 
 upon this earth long before the Biblical Adam, but that 
 they were totally extinct when God created our first 
 parents. While this airy hypothesis is not directly re- 
 pugnant to the dogma of the universality of original sin 
 and the Redemption of all men through Jesus Christ, 
 it is difficult to reconcile with the Mosaic narrative. 
 Nor is there need of any such gratuitous assumption, 
 so long as science has not discovered the “ tertiary man” 
 —the “missing link” which alone could give us the 
 certainty that hundreds of thousands of years ago 
 there lived upon this earth human beings whose traces 
 became entirely obliterated in the later geological strata, 
 only to re-appear in the glacial epoch. Modern man is 
 no doubt genetically related to the diluvial man of the 
 so-called interglacial period. His descent from Adam 
 is Catholic teaching, and it naturally implies that all 
 the different races of men, including the North American 
 Indians and the Esquimos, are members of the Adamitic 
 family.*7. The early Christians regarded the assumption 
 
 26 Les Origines de la Terre et de 27 On the “tertiary man,” cfr. 
 VHomme, 1878, - J. Ranke, Der Mensch, Vol. II, 
 
136 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 of antipodes, 7. e., men who live diametrically opposite 
 each other, as repugnant to revealed religion. This hy- 
 pothesis was in consequence proscribed until it became 
 scientifically established. We know now that the unity 
 of the human race is sufficiently safeguarded by the 
 assumption that the remotest corners of the earth were 
 peopled from one common centre of migration. St. 
 Augustine found this problem a very thorny one. Lac- 
 tantius brushed it aside with misdirected sarcasm.?8 
 
 Reapincs: —H. Liiken, Die Stiftungsurkunde des Menschen- 
 geschlechtes oder die mosaische Schépfungsgeschichte, Freiburg 
 1876.— St. George Mivart, On the Genesis of Species, London 
 1871.— Rauch, Einheit des Menschengeschlechtes, Augsburg 1873. 
 —J. Ranke, Der Mensch, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Leipzig 1900.—*C. 
 Gutberlet, Der Mensch, sein Ursprung u. seine Entwicklung, 2nd 
 ed., Paderborn 1903.— Lépicier, De Prima Hominis Formatione, 
 Romae 1910.— Hettinger, Apologie des Christentums, oth ed., II, 
 I, 5ter Vortrag, Freiburg 1906.— Fr. Kaulen, Die Sprachverwir- 
 rung zu Babel, Mainz 1861.—*A. Giesswein, Die Hauptprobleme 
 der Sprachwissenschaft, Freiburg 1892— J. Thein, Christian An- 
 thropology, New York 1892.—E. Wasmann, S. J., The Berlin 
 Discussion of the Problem of Evolution, London 1909.— W. 
 Lescher, O: P., The Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd ed., Lon- 
 don 1899. 
 
 ARTICLE 2 
 
 THE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS OF MAN AND THEIR 
 MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
 In proceeding to consider the composite nature of 
 man, we shall have to answer two separate and distinct 
 
 pp. 456 sqq., 2nd ed., Leipzig 1900. 
 On the North American Indians, see 
 De Roo, History of America Before 
 Columbus, Philadelphia 1900. 
 
 28 On the moot decision of Pope 
 Zacharias against Bishop Vigilius of 
 
 Salzburg, who was a contemporary 
 of St. Boniface (cfr. Baronius, An- 
 nales, ad annum 748), see Pohle, 
 Die Sternenwelten und thre Bewoh- 
 ner, 6th ed., pp. 523 sqq., Koln 
 1910. 
 
MAN'S ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS © 137 
 
 questions, zviz.: (1) Of how many essential elements 
 does human nature consist? and (2) How are these 
 elements mutually related? 
 
 To these questions the Church replies: (1) Man 
 is composed of two essential constituents, body and soul. 
 This teaching is called Dichotomy, or Dualism. (2) 
 The rational soul constitutes the essential form of the 
 body, and the two are substantially united in one nature. 
 
 That these philosophical questions have an important 
 dogmatic bearing is evident from the fact that Jesus 
 Christ was true man as well as very God. By finding 
 a correct solution for them we shall obtain accurate theo- 
 logical notions on the substantiality, individuality, and 
 spirituality of the human soul. This will obviate the 
 necessity of entering into a separate discussion of these 
 points. As regards free-will, which is unquestionably a 
 natural endowment of the soul, its existence flows as a 
 corollary from the dogmatic teaching of the Church (to 
 be expounded presently) that original sin did not de- 
 stroy man’s natural freedom of choice. 
 
 Thesis I: Man consists of but two essential con- 
 Stituents, viz.: a body and a spiritual soul. 
 
 This proposition is strictly de fide. 
 
 Proof. All philosophical and theological sys- 
 tems that assumed more than two constituents 
 have been condemned as heretical. 
 
 Aside from the Platonic theory that there are two 
 or even three souls in the human body, the error under 
 
 1 Father Rickaby, by the way, Timaeus, 69c-70Aa, describing how 
 thinks that the traditional idea of ‘the mortal kind of soul,’ with its 
 Plato’s teaching on this head does two divisions, was allocated in the 
 him an injustice. “ The passage, body by inferior deities, after the 
 
 10 
 
138 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 consideration was in ancient times held chiefly by the 
 Gnostics and the Manichzans, and later by Apollinaris. 
 The Gnostics believed that man has a threefold soul : rveipa, 
 yoxn, vAn, while the Manichzans thought that the two 
 eternal principles of good and evil, which are essentially 
 opposed to each other, met in Adam, when his soul, 
 which was an emanation from the good principle, was im- 
 prisoned in the body by the evil one.? Apollinaris, on 
 his part, made the trichotomy of vois, yuxh, odpé the 
 basis of his Christological heresy that the Logos sup- 
 plied reason, which was lacking in the purely sensitive 
 soul of Christ. Passing over the trichotomic errors 
 of the Arabian philosopher Averroés, and of Ockam in 
 the Middle Ages, we will mention only the modern 
 heresy of Anton Gunther. Though formally adhering 
 to the Dualist system (according to which man is a syn- 
 thesis of spirit and nature), Ginther practically taught 
 Trichotomy by endowing matter, gua matter, with a na- 
 ture-psyche of its own and refusing to regard the spirit 
 as the sole vital principle, from which the human body 
 derives its “nature life.” ® 
 
 At the Eighth General Council held in Con- 
 stantinople, A. D. 869, the Church raised Dicho- 
 
 Supreme Deity had produced the in- 
 tellect, misled early commentators, 
 and after them St. Thomas, into 
 the belief that Plato supposed three 
 distinct souls in one human body. 
 Plato never speaks of ‘souls’ ex- 
 cept in reference to distinct bodies. 
 He speaks of ‘the soul’ of man 
 as familiarly as we do. The ypovs 
 in the head, the @uyds (St. Thomas’s 
 pars irascibilis) in the chest, and 
 the émriduuia (pars concupiscibilis) 
 in the belly, are not three souls, but 
 three varieties of one soul. ...In 
 the ultimate analysis of Plato’s 
 
 meaning nothing more will appear, 
 I believe, than the triple division, 
 accepted by Aristotle and St. 
 Thomas, of yots, Ouuds, émibumia, 
 three phases of one soul, the first 
 inorganic and spiritual, the two lat- 
 ter organic and involving connexion 
 with the body.” (Of God and His 
 Creatures, p. 120, n.) 
 
 2Cfr. St. Augustine, De Duabus 
 Animabus, c. 12. 
 
 3 Cfr. Kleutgen, Philosophie der 
 Vorzeitt, 2nd ed., Vol. II, n. 7or 
 sqq., Innsbruck 1878. 
 
MAN'S ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS 139 
 
 tomy to the rank of a dogma and condemned 
 Trichotomy as heretical: “Veteri et Novo Te- 
 stamento unam animam rationalem et intellec- 
 tualem* habere hominem docente . . .in tantum 
 impietatis quidam .. . devenerunt, ut duas eum 
 habere animas impudenter dogmatizare .. . per- 
 tentent. Itaque sancta haec et universalis SYNo- 
 dus ... talis impietatis inventores . . . magna 
 voce anathematizat.... Si autem quis con- 
 traria gerere praesumpserit, ... anathema sit 
 — Both the Old and the New Testament teach 
 that man has one rational and intellectual soul 
 . . . [nevertheless] some have been impious 
 enough to assert, quite impudently, that man has 
 two souls. This sacred and ecumenical Council 
 
 . vehemently anathematizes the inventors of 
 such impiety. . . . If any one shall presume to 
 act contrary to this definition, let him be ana- 
 thema.:’ * 
 
 a) Sacred Scripture is quite positive in its 
 teaching that man is composed of but two ele- 
 ments, a material body and a spiritual soul. 
 Gen. II, 7: “Formavit Dominus Deus hominem 
 de limo terrae [corpus | et inspiravit in faciem eius 
 spiraculum vitae [animam], et factus est homo 
 [synthesis] in animam viventem — And the Lord 
 God formed man [i. ¢., his body] from the slime 
 
 4 wlapy Wuxny AoyiKny TE Kal dion, toth ed. edited by Cl. Bann- 
 voepay, e wart, n. 338. 
 5 Quoted in Denzinger’s Enchiri- | 
 
140 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 of the earth, and breathed into his face the 
 breath of life [1. e., the soul], and man [z. e., the 
 synthesis of body and soul] became a living soul.” 
 “Breath of life’ (spiraculum vitae) in this con- 
 text does not mean an independent animal or 
 plant soul, but the spiritual soul. This is ob- 
 vious from the fact that the sacred writer sets 
 out with the express purpose of describing the 
 origin of the first man (animal rationale). The 
 man thus dichotomically constituted is identical 
 with the one described in Gen. I, 27 sqq., who, 
 created to God’s own image, is commanded to 
 “rule over all living creatures,” which can only 
 mean that he is to hold sway as an intelligent and 
 free being. Hence spiraculum vitae is synony- 
 mous with anima rationalis. In Eccles. XII, 7 
 man is resolved into his constituent elements, and 
 again there are but two: “Et revertatur pulvis 
 [corpus| in terram suam, unde erat, et spiritus 
 [anima spiritualis| redeat ad Deum, qui dedit 
 illum — And let the dust [the body] return to its 
 earth, from whence it was, and the spirit [the 
 spiritual soul] return to God, who gave it.” 
 None but an immortal soul—immortal because 
 spiritual—can “return to God.” ® 
 
 While Sacred Scripture occasionally draws a distinc- 
 tion between “soul” (anima, wy, YD) and “ spirit” 
 
 6Compare Luke XXIII, 46: my spirit” with John XII, 27: 
 “Father, into thy hands I commend ‘“ Now is my soul troubled.” 
 
MAN’S ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS 141 
 
 (spiritus, mvetwa, 7), it nowhere countenances the 
 
 theory that man has two souls. Seemingly discordant 
 passages must be explained either by a poetic parallelism, 
 as in the Psalms, or as a juxtaposition of the higher 
 and lower soul-life, or, lastly, by a desire to differentiate 
 between the pneumatic supernatural life and the merely 
 natural life in man. Under one or other of these aspects 
 it is easy to interpret such texts as Luke I, 40 sq.: 
 “ Magnificat anima mea Dominum, et exultavit Spiritus 
 meus in Deo, salutari meo — My soul doth magnify the 
 Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour; ” 
 Heb. IV, 12: “ Usque ad divisionem animae ac spiritus? 
 — Unto the division of the soul and the spirit; ” 1 Cor. 
 IT, 14 sq.:  “ Animalis homo *® non percipit ea, quae sunt 
 Spiritus Det. . . spiritualis autem ® indicat omnia — But 
 the sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of 
 the Spirit of God; ... but the spiritual man judgeth 
 all things.” The attempt to bolster Giinther’s psychology 
 by Scriptural texts has proved utterly futile. 
 
 b) The Fathers are all strict dichotomists be- 
 cause they consistently refer to the “soul” as the 
 principle of thought. 
 
 It must be observed that the word “soul” (anima, 
 yx) is a relative, whereas “ spirit ” is an absolute term. 
 To identify “spirit” and “soul,” therefore, is tanta- 
 mount to asserting the existence of but one life-princi- 
 ple in human nature, viz.: the spiritual soul. Thus St. 
 Athanasius says: ‘‘ The body of man is called body and 
 not soul, and the soul of man is called soul and not 
 body. The one is a correlative of the other, i. ¢., the 
 
 Tdxpt pepiouod Wuxyns re Kal 8 puxixds d€ &vOpwros, 
 WVEVLATOS, _ 96 bé mvevparikés, 
 
142 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 spirit of the body.” 7° Even before St. Athanasius, St. 
 Justin Martyr, who had been unjustly charged with 
 Trichotomy, taught quite positively: 
 dvOpwros dA’ 7) TO ék Yox7ns Kal odpatos cuvestos LHov AoyiKOv ; 
 — What is man but a rational living being composed of 
 soul and body?” +? 
 
 / 
 Ti yap éotw o 
 
 Thesis II: The spiritual soul is the immediate sub- 
 stantial form of the body. 
 
 This is also de fide. 
 
 Proof. Body and soul do not co-exist side by 
 side in a loose mechanical or dynamic con- 
 nexion, as e. g. a demon might exist in an ener- 
 gumen, but are combined in a substantial unity 
 of nature. Consequently, the spiritual soul, as 
 such, is the immediate substantial form (forma 
 substantialis) of the body, and man’s sensitive 
 and vegetative processes proceed from it as 
 their principle. All philosophical systems that 
 deny this substantial union of nature * directly 
 contravene the teaching of the Church, which 
 the Council of Vienne (A. D. 1311) formulated 
 against Petrus Ioannis Olivi as follows: “Quis- 
 quis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere per- 
 tinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis 
 
 10 De Incarn. contr. Arian., I, n. ma. For the philosophical argu- 
 
 20. 
 11 De Resurrect., fragm. 10. On 
 the orthodoxy of St. Irenzus cfr. 
 
 Klebba, Die Anthropologie des hil. 
 Irenadus, pp. 162 sqq., Miinster 1894. 
 
 St. Augustine’s dichotomic stand- 
 
 point clearly appears in his De Ani- 
 
 ments see, St. Thomas, S. Theol., 
 Ia, qu. 76, art. 3, and Contr. Gent., 
 II, 58 (Rickaby, Of God and His 
 Creatures, pp. 120 sq.). 
 
 12 Plato, Cartesius, Leibniz (har- 
 monia praestabilita), et al. 
 
THE SOUL THE FORM: OF ‘THE (BODY: 143 
 
 seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani 
 per se et essentiahiter, tamquam haereticus sit 
 censendus — Whosoever shall pertinaciously pre- 
 sume to assert, defend or teach, that the rational 
 or intellectual soul is not per se and essentially 
 the form of the human body, shall be considered 
 Eaiereticy** 
 
 This important dogmatic definition, couched in strictly 
 Scholastic terminology, contains the following heads of 
 doctrine: 
 
 (1) Human nature has but two essential constituents, 
 namely, the anima rationalis and the corpus humanum."4 
 
 (2) The rational soul “informs,” 7. e., animates and 
 quickens the human body as its true and real forma; 
 and that (a) per se, not through the instrumentality of 
 a second (sensitive or vegetative) soul, and (b) essen- 
 tially (per essentiam suam), not through some accidental 
 influence (as, for instance, by a mere dynamic com- 
 mingling of spiritual energy with the faculties of the 
 body). 
 
 (3) The spiritual soul is consequently the true form 
 of the body — forma corporis, forma substantialis cor- 
 ports, not a mere forma accidentalis seu assistens. 
 
 (4) It follows as an obvious corollary that man’s 
 vegetative and sensitive life is derived from his spir- 
 itual soul, which is virtually vegetative and sensitive. 
 
 Pope Leo X solemnly approved the Viennese defini- 
 tion at the Fifth Lateran Council, A.D. 1512.% 
 
 13 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiri- 14 Dichotomy, 
 dion, n. 481. On this dogmatic defi- 15 Sess. VIII, Constit. “ Apostolict 
 nition cfr. W. Lescher, The Evolu- regiminis.” 
 
 tion of the Body, 2nd ed., pp. 8 
 sq., London 1899. 
 
144 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 The misrepresentations of Giinther and his school 
 were repeatedly condemned by Pius IX, who, on the 
 one hand, insisted: “ Noscimus, iisdem libris laedi ca- 
 tholicam sententiam ac doctrinam de homine, qui corpore 
 et anima ita absolvatur, ut anima eaque rationalis sit 
 vera per se atque immediata corporis forma,’ and on 
 the other hand declared: “Sententiam quae unum in 
 homine ponit vitae principium: animam scilicet rationalem, 
 a qua corpus quoque et motum et vitam omnem et sen- 
 sum accipiat,...cum Ecclesiae dogmate ita videri 
 coniunctam, ut huius sit legitima solaque vera inter pre- 
 tatio nec proinde sine errore in fide possit negart,”’ 18 
 
 a) According to Holy Scripture, man is con- 
 stituted a “living being” (anima vivens, Mn. WP: 
 —=ens vivum) by the union of the limus terrae 
 (7. @., body) with the spiraculum vitae (i. e., 
 spiritual soul). Consequently, his whole life 
 (vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual), must 
 flow from the spiritual soul, which vivifies the 
 body by a process of “information” in the true 
 and proper sense of the word. Ezechiel’s vision 
 of the resurrection of dry bones (Ezech. 
 XXXVII, 4 sqq.) illustrates this truth. “Ossa 
 arida, audite verbum Domini... . Dabo super 
 vos nervos et succrescere faciam super vos carnes, 
 et. . . dabo vobis spiritum et vivetis et scietis, 
 quia ego sum Dominus — Ye dry bones, hear the 
 
 16 Breve “Eximiam tuam” ad ant refutation of Giinther’s erron- 
 Card. de Geissel, Archiep. Colon., eous teaching see Oswald, Schép- 
 15 Junit 1857; Epist. “ Dolore haud fungslehre, pp. 176 sqq., Paderborn 
 mediocrt”’? ad Episc. Vratisl. (Bres- 1885. 
 lau) d. 30 Apr. 1860. For a trench- 
 
THe SOUL THE FORM OF (THE BODY, 145 
 
 word of the Lord . . . I will lay sinews upon 
 you, and will cause flesh to grow over you, and 
 . . . I will give you spirit, and you shall live, 
 and you shall know that I am the Lord.” To 
 understand this sublime prosopopeia we must 
 observe that the Sacred Writer enumerates only 
 two essential constituents of man, vig.: the body 
 (sinews, bones, flesh) and the spirit (spiritus). 
 The spirit revivifies the body by entering into 
 the bones, consequently all life comes from the 
 spiritual soul. This would be impossible if both 
 factors did not coalesce into an unum per se by 
 a substantial synthesis of nature. 
 
 b) The teaching of the Fathers was brought 
 out most clearly in connection with the Christo- 
 logical heresy of Apollinaris, Bishop of Lao- 
 dicea.** 
 
 It is worth while to recall Augustine’s drastic dictum 
 against the Apollinarists: “ Animam irrationalem eum 
 [scil. Christum] habere voluerunt, rationalem negaverunt ; 
 dederunt ei animam pecoris, subtraxerunt hominis — 
 They attribute to Him [Christ] an irrational, but they 
 deny Him a rational soul; they grant Him the soul of 
 a brute, but they deny Him the soul Of armani) 14.4) Ay 
 gustine himself held that the human body derives its life 
 from the soul: “Ab anima [scil. rationali| corpori 
 sensus et vita.’*® How the Fathers conceived the 
 
 47 Died A.D. 300° Cfr. J. F. 18 Tract. in Ioa., 47, 9. 
 
 Sollier’s article on ** Appollinarian- 19 De Civ. Dei, XXI, 3, 2. 
 
 em. )in-)'Vol. lof | the: Catholic 
 Encyclopedia. - 
 
146 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 mutual relationship of these two constituent elements ap- 
 pears from their favorite comparison of the union of 
 soul and body in man to the Hypostatic Union of the 
 divine with the human nature in Christ. This simile has 
 found its way into the Athanasian Creed: “ Nam sicut 
 anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et 
 homo unus est Christus — For as the reasonable soul 
 and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.” 
 
 There is an important Christological axiom: “Ver- 
 bum assumpsit carnem mediante anima” (the Word as- 
 sumed flesh by means of the soul), of which the 
 Fathers made frequent use against Arianism and Apol- 
 linarianism. Only by assuming a rational soul, they ar- 
 gued, was. the Divine Logos able to take bodily flesh 
 into the Hypostatic Union; for soulless flesh, or flesh 
 animated merely by a brute soul (vy Corin adoyos), 
 would not have been becoming to the Godhead, nor 
 would it have met the requirements of the Redemption. 
 Only flesh animated by a spiritual soul as its essen- 
 tial form constitutes man; similarly the human nature 
 of Christ is constituted only by human flesh animated 
 by a spiritual soul as its essential form.?? After the 
 outbreak of the Arian and Apollinarian controversy the 
 Fathers never wearied of insisting on the “ rationality 
 of the flesh,” 2* not, of course, in the sense of a hylozoistic 
 Panpsychism, as advocated many centuries later by 
 Spinoza, but in consonance with the dogmatic definition 
 of Vienne, which, despite its Scholastic phraseology, may 
 be said to flow from Divine Revelation rather than from 
 philosophy. 
 
 20See the dogmatic treatise on of Alexandria), odpé éupuxos 
 
 Christology, Vol. IV of this Series. Noyixn (Sophronius). 
 2Zloaua Puxwhév voepwos (Cyril 
 
THE SOUL THE FORM OF THE BODY 147 
 
 c) Later theologians have warmly discussed 
 the incidental question, whether the definition of 
 the Council of Vienne can be used as an argu- 
 ment in favor of the Aristotelian doctrine of 
 Hylomorphism as developed by the Scholastics. 
 This philosophic theory holds that all bodies are 
 composed of a substantial form and primordial 
 matter (forma substantialis et materia prima). 
 Is the Vienne definition to be taken as a dog- 
 matic indication that the spiritual soul is imme- 
 diately united with primordial matter (materia 
 prima, *» pom) rather than with an organized 
 body? 
 
 a) St. Thomas distinctly teaches that the spiritual 
 soul is not only the forma corporis, but the unica forma 
 corporis —the sole form of the body.22. He conceives 
 the compositum humanum as consisting not of body 
 and soul, but of primordial matter and soul, because it 
 is the spiritual soul which renders the body materia 
 secunda, 1. e., constitutes it a body, and thereby gives 
 it its esse corporis. 
 
 The Scotists, on the other hand, hold that the body 
 is first constituted by a separate forma corporeitatis, and 
 subsequently receives the intellectual soul as its essential 
 form. In order to obtain an unum per se as the re- 
 sult of this synthesis, the Scotists conceive the forma 
 corporeitatis to be an imperfect, subordinate form, which 
 
 ita virtute continet omnes inferiores 
 formas, et facit ipsa sola, quidquid 
 
 22“ Dicendum est, quod nulla 
 alia forma  substantialis est in 
 
 homine nisi sola anima -intellectiva, 
 _ et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet 
 animam sensitivam et nutritivam, 
 
 imperfectiores formae in aliis fa- 
 ciunt.”’ S. Theel., 1a, qu. 7Owmarts 
 4. 
 
148 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 offers no obstacle to the substantial completion of the 
 whole by the spiritual soul. It is in this sense that 
 Scotus teaches: “ Anima est principium formale, quo 
 vivum est vivum. . . . Est anima immediatum principium 
 formale essendi et immediatum principium operandi,” 7° 
 so that “una forma rationalis dat esse triplex, scil. 
 vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum.’?* But the 
 esse corporis is not immediately communicated by the 
 soul; it 1s derived from the forma corporeitatis, which 
 is distinct from the soul. This explains the Scotist 
 conclusion that the body retains its forma corporeitatis 
 after death, whereas the Thomists are compelled to in- 
 vent a new form for the dead body, which they call 
 forma cadaverica. Neither of the two systems is free 
 from logical difficulties. The whole question properly 
 belongs to the sphere of philosophy. 
 
 8B) It would be absurd to say that the Church has 
 raised Hylomorphism to the rank of a dogma and con- 
 demned in advance the fundamental principles of modern 
 physics and chemistry as heretical. The Council of 
 Vienne did not mean to affirm the existence of pri- 
 mordial matter. Nor did it intend to deny the exist- 
 ence of a forma corporeitatis in man. We know that 
 the Thomistic doctrine was anything but popular 
 among the theologians of that age. Moreover, the 
 Viennese definition was drawn up by Scotist theolo- 
 gians, who cannot have intended to persuade the Council 
 to condemn a pet theory of their own school and order. 
 “That the Council did not harbor any such purpose,” 
 says Schell, “is proved by the unquestioned orthodoxy 
 of the Scotist and allied schools.” 2° The Jesuit Schiffini, 
 
 23 Comment. in Quatuor Libros . 25 Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 287, 
 
 enti Ui,r dist... 26, que x. Paderborn 1890, 
 24 De Rer. Princ., qu. 11, art. 2. 
 
THE SOUL THE FORM OF THE BODY i409 
 
 who defends the Thomistic doctrine with great zeal and 
 acumen, finds himself constrained to counsel mod- 
 eration in this controversy and to warn theologians 
 against drawing hasty conclusions.2® So long, there- 
 fore, as the Church permits modern scientific Atomism 
 and the Scotistic system to be taught without let or 
 hindrance, so long will the definition of Vienne be suffi- 
 ciently safeguarded by saying that the spiritual soul ani- 
 mates the human body (not: primordial matter) as its 
 immediate essential form.27 We are confirmed in this 
 view by the sharp disapproval expressed by Pope Pius 
 IX (June 5, 1876) of any and every extreme inter- 
 pretation of the papal and conciliar definitions against 
 the opponents of the Thomistic system.28 The most 
 that can be said in favor of the latter is that “ by lay- 
 ing a sharper emphasis upon the union of body and soul 
 in one essence, it embodies a deeper and more con- 
 sistent conception of the Church’s teaching, and thereby 
 more emphatically accentuates the direct fusion of the 
 soul with the innermost essence of the body, the utter 
 dependency of the body upon the soul, and the intrinsic 
 perfectioning and unification of the body, as such, by the 
 soul. However, this teaching is hard to understand 
 because of its profundity, and difficult to handle because 
 tiae limites excederet ac temeritatis 
 
 merito argueretur is, qui in rebus 
 eiusmodi propriam sententiam sic 
 
 26“ An vero,’ he writes, “ legi- 
 iima consecutione inde colligatur vel 
 existentia primae materiae, prout 
 
 haec intelligitur in doctrina scholas- 
 tica, praesertim D. Thomae, vel sen- 
 tentia eiusdem Aquinatis de unitate 
 formae substantialis in eodem cor- 
 pore, complures quidem rational 
 discursu id deducunt, sed minime 
 dict potest quasi ab Ecclesia defini- 
 tum, nec oppositum censuram ali- 
 quam theologicam meretur, quamdiu 
 Ecclesiae iudicio res ulterius deter- 
 minata non fuerit. Quare pruden- 
 
 bropugnaret, ut ceteros contra sen- 
 tientes quasi violatae religionis vel 
 sublestae fidei viros traduceret.’’ 
 Disp. Metaphys. Spec., Vol. I, ed. 
 2a, p. 395, Aug. Taurin. 1893. 
 
 27 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- 
 mat., Vol. III, ed. 3a, 66, Friburgi 
 1908. 
 
 28 For the text of this document 
 see Schiffini, 1. c. 
 
150 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 of its delicacy. Hence it must not be insisted upon too 
 strongly, lest the dogma itself be involved in difficulties 
 insoluble to any but the most subtle minds specially 
 trained for this purpose.” ° 
 
 REApvINGS:— Thumann, Bestandteile des Menschen und ihr 
 Verhdlinis zgueinander, Bamberg 1846.—Liberatore, Del Com- 
 posto Umano, 2 vols., Roma 1858.— Morgott, Geist und Natur im 
 Menschen nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas, Eichstatt 1860.— Soff- 
 ner, Dogmat. Begriindung der kirchlichen Lehre von den Be- 
 Standteilen des Menschen, Ratisbon 1861.— Vraetz, Spekulative 
 Begrindung der Lehre der kath. Kirche iiber das Wesen der 
 menschlichen Seele, Koln 1865.— *Katschthaler, Zwei Thesen fiir 
 das allgemeine Konzil, 2, Abteil., Ratisbon 1870—v. Hertling, 
 Materie und Form und Begriff der Seele bei Aristoteles, Bonn 
 1871.— *Zigliara, De Mente Concilii Viennensis in Defniendo 
 Dogmate Unionis Animae Humanae cum Corpore, Romae 1878. 
 — *Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 295-296, Mainz 
 1887.— E. Rolfes, Die substantiale Form und der Begriff der 
 Seele bei Aristoteles, Paderborn 1896.— T. Pesch, S. J., Seele und 
 Leib als zwei Bestandteile der einen Menschensubstanz gemdass 
 der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Fulda 1893.— W. Lescher, 
 O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, London 1899.— M. 
 Maher, S. J., Psychology, pp. 545 sqq., 6th ed., London 1906.— 
 J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: A Treatise on the Human 
 Soul, New York 1808. 
 
 _ 29 Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, and writings of Olivi the student 
 p- 153, Freiburg 1878. On _ the may profitably consult the Archiv 
 whole question cfr. Botalla, La Let- fir Literatur und  Kirchenge- 
 tre de M. Czacki et le Thomisme, schichte des Mittelalters, II, 377 
 Paris 1878; Palmieri, De Deo sqq., III, 409 sqq., Freiburg 1886- 
 Creante, pp. 769 sqq., Romae 1878; 87, and L. Oliger’s article, ‘‘ Olivi, 
 Zigliara, De Mente Concili Vien- Pierre Jean,” in Vol. .XI of the 
 nensis, Romae 1878. On the life Catholic Encyclopedia. 
 
TRE IMMORTALITY: OF THE SOUL! 161 
 
 ARTICLE 3 
 
 THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL 
 
 1. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH AND VarI- 
 ous Heresies.—There is a threefold immor- 
 tality: the essential immortality of God, the nat- 
 ural immortality of the soul, and the supernatural 
 immortality of the body. It is an article of faith 
 that the human soul is immortal. That this im- 
 mortality is natural, 7. e., founded on an exigency 
 of human nature, may be said to be Catholic 
 teaching. 
 
 There are three revealed truths which the Church 
 declares to be demonstrable by philosophical arguments. 
 They are: (1) The existence of God, (2) the spir- 
 ituality of the soul, and (3) free-will The dogma of 
 the soul’s immortality is based on its simplicity and 
 spirituality. Whether this truth is philosophically de- 
 monstrable or not is a question that the Church has left 
 open out of consideration for the Scotists. 
 
 In every age there have been men who denied the 
 immortality of the soul; these the Church has always 
 treated as heretics. 
 
 a) We have it on the authority of Eusebius? and 
 St. Augustine? that, as early as the third century, there 
 existed in Arabia a sect called Hypnopsychites,t who 
 held that the soul slept, i. e. temporarily ceased to exist 
 
 1 Decr. Congr. S. Indicis 1855: Knowability, Essence, and Aitri- 
 
 “ Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam, ani- butes,\ pp. 30 sqq. 
 mae spiritualitatem, hominis liber- 2 Hist. Eccles., VI, 37. 
 tatem cum certitudine probare po- 3 De Haeres., 83. 
 
 test.” Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 4 From tarvos Wux7s = soul-sleep, 
 
152 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 after death, until the resurrection of the flesh. Nicepho- 
 rus Callistus® relates how at an Arabian Council held 
 in 247, Origen combated this heresy with such con- 
 vincing eloquence that all who had espoused it returned 
 to the pale of the Church. 
 
 The theory of a “ soul-sleep ” does not directly contra- 
 vene the dogma of immortality, especially if it con- 
 fines itself to the assertion that the soul survives after 
 a fashion in a dreamy, semi-conscious state. This at- 
 tenuated Hypnopsychism was combated by Tertullian in 
 his treatise De Anima. He raises the question: ‘‘ What 
 will happen during the time that we are in the nether 
 world? Shall we sleep?” and answers it as follows: 
 “The soul never sleeps, not even in this life.” ® 
 
 Another, still more radical sect is mentioned by St. 
 John Damascene. Its adherents were called @vnrow ira, 
 because they believed that the souls of men, like those of 
 brutes, cease to exist at death. 
 
 b) The question of the immortality of the hu- 
 man soul entered upon a new phase when, towards 
 the close of the fifteenth century, paganizing 
 humanists of the stamp of Pietro Pomponazzi 
 alleged that the soul is by nature necessarily 
 mortal. Abul Ibn Roschd, commonly called 
 Averroés, denied that there are individual ra- 
 tional souls. There is, he said, one universal 
 impersonal and objective over-soul (imtellectus 
 universalis), which, by illuminating the inferior 
 souls of individuals, enables mankind to par- 
 
 5 Hist... V, 23. was advocated by Aphraates, A. D. 
 
 6 De Anima, c. 58. Among the 336. 
 Syrians the theory of the soul-sleep 
 
PAR IMMORTALITY, Ob UTHE. SOU. 158 
 
 ticipate perennially in the great eternal truths. 
 “This doctrine involves the extinction of the 
 individual consciousness and the impersonality 
 of life after death: human individuals die, but 
 humanity is immortal in the eternity of the 
 objective, universal intelligence.” * Against this 
 heresy the Fifth Council of the Lateran, under 
 mone Iueo NX (A, D552), dehmedsin7 Cw. 
 diebus nostris . . . (nonnullt aust sint dicere) de 
 natura... animae rationalis, quod mortals sit 
 aut unica im cunctis hominibus, . . . sacro ap- 
 probante Concilio damnamus et reprobamus 
 omnes asserentes, animam intellectivam mortalem 
 esse aut unicam in cunctis honunibus— As... 
 in our days (some have dared to assert) con- 
 cerning the nature of the rational soul, that it is 
 mortal, or that there is but one soul in all men, 
 
 . . with the approval of the sacred Council we 
 condemn and reprobate all who assert that the 
 intellectual soul is mortal or is but one in all 
 get 
 
 The decree proceeds as follows: “Cum illa [scil. 
 anima intellectiva| non solum vere per se et essentialiter 
 humani corporis forma existat, sicut 1m general... . 
 Viennensi Concilio ... continetur;® verum et immor- 
 talis, et pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine 
 
 7De Wulf-Coffey, History of in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiri- 
 Medieval Philosophy, pp. 233 sq4., dion, n. 738. 
 
 London 1909. 9 See supra, pp. 142 sq. 
 8 Constit. ‘‘ Apost. regim.,” quoted 
 
 ome 
 
154 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 singulariter [1. e., individualiter] multiplicabilis et mul- 
 tiplicata et multiplicanda sit.” 
 
 An analysis of this dogmatic definition, and of the rea- 
 soning by which it is supported, gives us.the following 
 points of view: - | 
 
 (1) This definition condemns two distinct heresies: 
 (a) That the spiritual soul is mortal, and (b) that there 
 exists but one universal soul in all men. Consequently, 
 the contradictory proposition, that the spiritual soul is 
 immortal and individual, is an article of faith. 
 
 (2) The individuality of the soul is a necessary pos- 
 tulate of personal immortality, and is therefore specially 
 emphasized, first by reference to the dogmatic defini- 
 tion of Vienne concerning the forma corporis, and 
 again by reference to the individual origin of each 
 human soul in the process of generation. 
 
 (3) By the immortality of the soul Leo X and the 
 Fifth Council of the Lateran understand that physical 
 indestructibility (incorruptibilitas) which flows as a 
 logical corollary from its nature as a spiritual substance. 
 For this reason the dogmatic definition quoted above 
 begins with the statement that the condemned errors 
 concern the “nature of the rational soul” (natura 
 animae rationalis). Unlike the bodily immortality of 
 our first parents in Paradise, the immortality of the soul 
 therefore is not a pure grace. 
 
 The above-quoted definition is the most important and 
 the clearest pronouncement ever made by the Church on 
 the subject of the natural immortality of the soul. 
 
 c) In modern times Materialism and emanatistic Pan- 
 theism deny the natural immortality of the soul as well 
 as its spirituality and individuality. Materialism asserts 
 that nothing is immortal except force and matter,!° 
 
 10 Bichner. 
 
 i 
 4 
 } 
 h 
 ; 
 4 
 
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL  1s5 
 
 while Pantheism ascribes immortality solely to the 
 impersonal Absolute, of which it holds each individual 
 man to be merely a part. The Vatican Council con- 
 tented itself with condemning Materialism and Pan- 
 theism im globo and re-affirming the spirituality of the 
 soul, which forms the philosophical basis of its natural 
 immortality. 
 
 2. PRooF OF THE DOGMA FROM REVELATION. 
 —The demonstration of the immortality of the 
 soul properly belongs to Eschatology. However, 
 as this doctrine forms so important and funda- 
 mental a part of our faith, we cannot pass it over 
 in the present treatise. 
 
 a) Most non-Catholics hold that the Old Tes- 
 tament Jews did not believe in the immortality 
 of the soul, and that this doctrine is the result 
 of a slow and laborious evolution. We admit 
 that the idea of temporal reward and punish- 
 ment in the present life had a far stronger 
 attraction for the Jews than retribution in the 
 life beyond. Yet it is entirely wrong to say, as 
 so many Rationalist critics do, that the Old Tes- 
 tament contains no trace of belief in the immor- 
 tality of the soul. To begin with the Proto- 
 evangelium or prophecy of Paradise,—its promise 
 
 11 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. created] the human [creature], as 
 Tt: “Ac deinde [condidit Deus] partaking, in a sense, of both, con- 
 humanam [creaturam] quasi com- sisting of spirit and body.’ Cfr. 
 
 munem ex spiritu et corpore con- Conc. IV. Lateran. 1215, quoted 
 stitutam— And afterwards [God SUPTA, DP. 27. 
 
156 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 of redemption through the seed of the Woman 
 who was to crush the head of the ancient Serpent, 
 would be utterly meaningless if the souls of men 
 ceased to exist after death. The Patriarchs 
 looked upon this present life as a pilgrimage ” 
 and spoke of death as “going to the fathers.” ! 
 By clearly distinguishing between “going to 
 the fathers,” or “being gathered to their peo- 
 ple,” and burial in a common sepulchre,!* Moses 
 indirectly asserted the survival of the soul in 
 the world beyond. Such phrases as: “I will 
 go down to sheol” * and “You will bring down 
 my gray hairs with sorrow unto sheol,’” '° do not 
 refer to the grave, but to the “nether world” (4s) 
 considered as the abode of departed souls. In 
 confirmation of His teaching on the resurrec- 
 tion of the flesh, Jesus, arguing with the Sad- 
 ducees, quotes Exod. III, 6: “I am the God 
 of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the 
 God of Jacob,” and adds by way of explana- 
 tion: “He is not the God of the dead, but of 
 the living.” “’ Personal immortality could not 
 be more plainly taught than in this exclamation 
 of the pious Job: ** “TI shall see my God, whom I 
 
 12 Gen. XLVII, 9; cfr. Heb. XI, 15 Gen. XXXVII, 35. 
 
 13 sqq. 16 Gen. XLIV, 29; cfr. also Gen. 
 13 Gen. XV; 153 XV 8S? XXXVI MEI 48, 
 
 29; XLIX, 32. 17 Matth. XXII, 32. 
 14Gen. XXV, 8 sq.; XXXV, 29; 18 Job XIX, 26 sq. 
 
 XLIX, 32, etc. 
 
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL) 457 
 
 myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold, and 
 not another.”’ 
 
 The so-called Sapiential Books of the Old 
 Testament are especially rich in proofs for the 
 immortality of the soul. Cfr. Wisd. III, 2 sqq.: 
 “Vist sunt [iusti| oculis insipientium mori, 
 uh autem sunt in pace, ... spes illorum im- 
 mortalitate plena est — In the sight of the unwise 
 they [the souls of the just] seemed to die, 
 but they are in peace. . . . Their hope is full of 
 immortality.” Wisd. IV, 7: “Justus si morte 
 praeoccupatus fuerit, in refrigerio erit — The just 
 man, if he be prevented with death, shall be in 
 mest,” 
 
 The ghost of Samuel said to Saul: “Why 
 hast thou disturbed my rest, that I should be 
 brought up?” '® 
 _ These and similar texts represent immortality 
 as a natural endowment of the soul and not 
 as a gratuitous gift of grace. This follows 
 from the fact, recorded in Gen. I, 26, that the 
 spiritual soul of man was created to the likeness 
 of God. The soul is an image God, not because 
 it is the principle of vegetative and. sensitive life 
 (which is perishable), but because, being an im- 
 perishable, indestructible spirit, it resembles the 
 infinite and immortal spirit of Yahweh. 
 
 191 Kings XXVIII, 15. 
 
158 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 It has been asserted that Ecclesiastes III, 19 is incom- 
 patible with the doctrine of immortality, because it puts 
 the death of man on the same plane with the ex- 
 tinction of the brute beast: ‘‘ Unus interitus est ho- 
 minis et iumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio— 
 The death of man and of beasts is one, and the con- 
 dition of them both is equal.” But the context clearly 
 shows that the Sacred Writer does not mean by this 
 comparison to deny the immortality of the human soul. 
 His purpose is to emphasize the mortality of the body, 
 and to remind man that he who once aspired to equality 
 with God was in punishment for his presumption re- 
 duced to the level of perishable beasts.2° Nor is this 
 train of thought disturbed by the sceptical question: 
 “Quis novit, si spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum, 
 et st spiritus iumentorum descendat deorsum?— Who 
 knoweth if the spirit of the children of Adam ascend 
 upward, and if the spirit of the beasts descend down- 
 ward?” *+ For a little later Ecclesiastes himself in- 
 sists on the immortality of the soul: “ Revertatur 
 pulvis in terram suam, unde erat; et spiritus redeat ad 
 Deum, qui dedit illum — The dust return into its earth, 
 from whence it was, and the spirit return to God, 
 who gave it.’*? Assuredly it will not do to interpret 
 Eccles. III, 21 as implying denial or doubt of a truth 
 so clearly taught in Eccles. XII, 7. How, then, are we 
 to understand this difficult text? Exegetes have sug- 
 gested different interpretations. Some think that the 
 Sacred Writer wished to adapt himself to the mind of the 
 average person, who can perceive no essential difference 
 between the symptoms of agony in man and beast. Giet- 
 mann ** holds that the hagiographer simply desired to 
 
 20 Gen. III, 22. 23 Comment. in Eccles. ct Cant. 
 21 Eccles. III, 21. Canticor., pp. 172 sqq., Paris 1890. 
 22 Eccles, XII, 7. ; 
 
Pee IMMORTALITY ORV PR PSO ULyt bso 
 
 intimate the uncertainty of man’s fate in the world be- 
 yond, because three verses farther up he speaks of the 
 judgment of God, and no man knows, before that judg- 
 ment has been pronounced, whether he will enjoy ever- 
 lasting bliss or be condemned to suffer eternal punish- 
 ment in hell. Thus interpreted the text furnishes a new 
 proof for the doctrine of immortality. Other exegetes, 
 among them Cornely,?* think Eccles. III, 21 is meant 
 to censure the carelessness of men in regard to their 
 future destiny. In this hypothesis the question would 
 mean: “ Who payeth the slightest attention to whether 
 the spirit of man tends upward and the spirit of the 
 beast downward?” It is quite obvious that the Jews 
 before Christ could not have had such well-defined ideas 
 about the other world as we Christians have, who know 
 that we are destined to enjoy the beatific vision in Heaven. 
 This fact sufficiently accounts for their gloomy concep- 
 tion of sheol or the nether world. 
 
 The New Testament teaching on immortality 
 is so explicit that not even the Rationalists ven- 
 ture to dispute it. Hence it will be sufficient 
 for our purpose to cite the Saviour’s famous 
 dictum: “Nolite tumere eos, qui occidunt cor- 
 pus, animam autem non possunt occidere, sed 
 potius timete eum, qui potest et anumam et corpus 
 perdere in gehennam — Fear ye not them that kill 
 the body, and are not able to kill the soul; but 
 rather fear him that can destroy both soul and 
 body in hell.” 
 
 24 Introd. in Utriusque Test. Libr. 25 Matth. X, 28. For the teach- 
 Sacros, Vol. II, pp. 179 sqq., Paris ing of St. Paulsee 1) Cori XV, 1 
 1887. " sqq-; Heb. XI, 13 saqq. A more 
 
160 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 b) Since the immortality of the soul is the 
 very foundation stone of ethics and of the en- 
 tire supernatural order of salvation, it goes with- 
 out saying that this truth was unanimously 
 taught, philosophically investigated, and scienti- 
 fically developed by the Fathers. 
 
 The unknown author of the Epistle to Diognetus 
 professes: “Jmmortalis anima habitat in corpore mor- 
 tal, — The immortal soul dwells in a mortal body.” 2° St. 
 Ireneeus gives this philosophical reason for the immor- 
 tality of the soul: “ Incompositus est enim et simplex 
 spiritus, qui resolvi non potest — For the spirit [soul | 
 is incomposite and simple, and [therefore] cannot be re- 
 solved.” *7 Tertullian,?* Gregory of Nyssa,2? and Am- 
 brose *° express themselves in similar language. St. 
 Augustine, as is well known, wrote a special treatise 
 “On the Immortality of the Soul.” 
 
 Some ancient writers (e. g., the author of the third 
 pseudo-Clementine homily) ,?+ are suspected of having 
 held that God annihilates the souls of the wicked. Their 
 utterances must be read with caution. Some of them 
 are undoubtedly susceptible of an orthodox interpreta- 
 tion. St. Justin Martyr, for instance, in writing: 
 “ Neque immortalis anima dicenda est; nam si immor- 
 talis, etiam profecto ingenita [increata] est,’ plainly 
 did not mean to deny that the soul is endowed with 
 natural immortality,** but had in mind that essential 
 
 detailed treatment of the subject 28 De Testim. An., c. 4 sq. 
 
 in F. Schmid, Der Unsterblichkeits- 29 Or. Catech., c. 8. 
 
 und <Auferstehungsglaube in der 30 De Bono Mortis, c. 9. 
 
 Bibel, Brixen 1902. 81 Cfr. Migne, P.G., Il, 118. 
 26On the Letter to Diognetus 32 Dial. c. Tryph., c. 5. Migne, 
 
 cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, P.G., V1, 486. 
 
 pp. 68 sq. 33 Natural immortality implies 
 
 2% Adv. Haeres., V, 7, 1. that the nature of a being is such 
 
QRIGIN OF THE, SOUL 161 
 
 immortality which belongs to God alone. Of course the 
 creature is immortal in quite a different sense than the 
 Greator,*4 
 
 REApDINGS: — B. Schafer, Neue Untersuchungen tiber das Buch 
 Kohelet, Freiburg 1870.— L. Schiitz, Vernunftbeweis fiir die Un- 
 sterblichkeit der Seele, Paderborn 1874.— J. Knabenbauer, Das 
 Zeugnis des Menschengeschlechtes fiir die Unsterblichkeit der 
 Seele, Freiburg 1878—E. Melzer, Die Unsterblichkeit auf Grund 
 der Schopfungslehre, Neisse 1896.— Fell-Villing, The Inumortality 
 of the Human Soul Philosophically Explained, London 1906.— 
 *W. Schneider, Das andere Leben, 7th ed., Paderborn 1904.— Ph. 
 Kneib, Die Beweise fiir die Unsterblichkeit der Seele aus allge- 
 meinen psychologischen Tatsachen, Freiburg 1903.— F. C. Kemp- 
 son, The Future Life and Modern Difficulties, London 1907.— 
 Piat, Destinée de Homme, Paris 1898—Elbé, Future Life in 
 the Light of Ancient Wisdom and Modern Science, London 1907. 
 —M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 6th ed., pp. 525 sqq., London and 
 New York 1906.— Ipem, art. “Immortality” in the Catholic En- 
 cyclopedia, Vol. VII.— For a comparatively complete bibliography 
 of the subject cfr. Alger, The Destiny of the Soul. A Critical 
 History of the Doctrine of a Future Life, 14th ed., New York 
 1889. 
 
 ARTICLE 4 
 
 ORIGIN OF THE SOUL 
 
 Unlike their progenitor, the children of Adam do 
 not owe their existence to a creative act of God in 
 the strict sense of the term. The race propagates it- 
 self by sexual generation in accordance with the divine 
 
 as to have no inherent tendency only hath immortality.” For the 
 to death, so that it will not die or philosophical arguments see . St. 
 cease to exist, unless God with- Thomas, Contr. Gent., II, 79 sqq. 
 draws. His conservation. Cfr. S. (Rickaby, Of God and His Crea- 
 Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic The- WUres, “Pps | Th20 Saq.)inw) Cfra. Ph: 
 ology, Vol. II, p. 334. Kneib, Die Unsterblichkeit der 
 
 sein.) rt Tims Vi, 262) 8 Quad Seele bewiesen ans dem hoheren 
 Solus habet immortalitatem—Who  Erkennen und Wollen, Wien 1900. 
 
162 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 command “ Increase and multiply.” The question arises 
 — How does the individual human soul come into 
 being? This problem is of interest alike to the phi- 
 losopher and the theologian. Three different attempts 
 have been made to solve it. The theory of Pre-existence 
 holds that all souls exist prior to the creation of their 
 respective bodies, in which they are enclosed as in a 
 prison. Generationism (which in its crude form is 
 called Traducianism) asserts that the souls of children, 
 like their bodies, are produced by the parents. Cre- 
 ationism teaches that each human soul is created by God 
 and immediately united with the material product of 
 parental generation. 
 
 Thesis I: The theory of Pre-existence, which as- 
 serts that the individual soul exists prior to its union 
 with the body, is heretical. : 
 
 This proposition obviously embodies an article 
 of faith. 
 
 Proof. The soul may be conceived as pre- 
 existing either in a state of sin, for the atonement 
 of which it is incarcerated in the body; or as 
 merely slumbering in a state of innocence or in- 
 difference.” Both assumptions, more especially 
 the first, are opposed to the express teaching of 
 Revelation. 
 
 a) A spirit incarcerated in a material body 
 would be in a state of violent and unnatural 
 compulsion. Hence the first of the aforesaid 
 
 1 This notion was derived from 2 This was the belief of the Pris- 
 Plato and held by Origen. cillianists and some other heretics. 
 
PRE-EXISTENTISM 163 
 
 theories implicitly denies the substantial unity of 
 human nature,®? in fact it degrades it by repre- 
 senting the union of body and soul as acci- 
 dental, after the manner of demoniacal possession. 
 Holy Scripture expressly teaches that man as he 
 proceeded from the hand of God, like all other 
 products of the creative act, was “good,” and that 
 he became bad through sin.* Hence it must 
 be received as a revealed truth that the soul of 
 Adam at the moment when his body was formed, 
 was perfectly pure and sinless, and that it was 
 breathed into the material body simultaneously 
 with its creation. Consequently the soul cannot 
 have been affected by some previous catastrophe. 
 
 The same is true of Adam’s progeny. St. Paul, in 
 speaking of Esau and Jacob, says: “Cum nondum natt 
 fuissent aut aliquid bom egissent aut mali, ... non ex 
 operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est et: quia maior. serviet 
 minort — When the children were not yet born, nor had 
 done any good or evil, .. . not of works, but of him 
 that calleth, it was said to her [Rebecca]: The elder 
 shall serve the younger.” ® The Origenistic doctrine of 
 Pre-existence was condemned by the Church at a very 
 early date as incompatible with Revelation. A Council 
 held in Constantinople, A. D. 543,° pronounced anathema 
 against those who “ assert the fabulous pre-existence of 
 
 3 As defined by the: Council of founded with the Fifth General 
 
 Vienne; v. supra, p. 142 Sq. Council of Constantinople, A. D. 
 4\Gfr. Gen. 1/31; Rom. <V; 12 553; cfr. Hefele, Concilienge- 
 
 sqq. schichte, Vol. II, pp. 790 sqq., 
 5 Rom. IX, 11 sq. ~ Freiburg 1875. 
 
 6 This Council must not be con- 
 
164 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 souls, and the doctrine of the Apocatastasis, which logic- 
 ally flows therefrom.” Against the Priscillianists, who 
 shared the error of Origen, the Council of Braga, A. D. 
 561, defined: “Si quis animas humanas dicit prius in 
 coelesti habitatione peccasse et pro hoc in corpora humana 
 in terram deiectas, sicut Priscillianus dicit, anathema sit 
 — If any one shall say, as doth Priscillian, that the souls 
 of men sinned in their celestial habitations, and in punish- 
 ment therefor were cast into human bodies on earth, let 
 him be anathema.” ? 
 
 b) The milder form of this heresy, which 
 asserts that the souls of men pre-existed in a 
 state of moral innocence, is likewise repugnant to 
 Catholic dogma. Nemesius® supported it by 
 the threadbare argument that God rested after the 
 sixth day, and now no longer creates souls out 
 of nothing. But, as St. Augustine pointed out, 
 “these opinions, which attribute to the human 
 soul a meritorious life and condition previous to 
 its union with the flesh, have already been con- 
 demned by the Catholic Church, not only in the 
 case of some ancient heretics, . . . but also more 
 recently in the instance of the Priscillianists.” ® 
 
 7 See Denzinger-Banwart, Enchi- the end of the fourth century, may 
 ridion, n. 236. On the doctrine of be considered as the first complete 
 the amokaraoraois, cfr. P. Batiffol and systematic treatise on anthro- 
 in the Catholic Encyclopedia, S. U.; pology. It was translated into Eng- 
 On Origen’s teaching on this point, lish (The Nature of Man) by 
 see J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas, George Wither, London 1636. Cfr. 
 Engl. tr., Vol. I, pp. 280 sq., St. De Wulf-Coffey, History of Medie- 
 
 Louis rgro. . val Philosophy, p. 98; Turner, His- 
 8 De Nat. Hom., c. 2. This pop- tory of Philosophy, p. 223. 
 ular work of Nemesius, who was 9De Anima et eius Origine, 
 
 Bishop of Emesa in Phoenicia, about I, 7: “‘Haee dogmata, quibus 
 
PRE-EXISTENTISM 165, 
 
 Pope Leo the Great, in his dogmatic Epistle to 
 Turribius, Bishop of Astorga, branded the pre- 
 existence theory in all its forms as heretical. 
 “Decimo autem capitulo referuntur [Priscilian- 
 istae| asserere, animas quae humans corporibus 
 inseruntur, fuisse sine corpore et in coelesti habi- 
 tatione peccasse. . . . Quam wmpietatis fabulam 
 ex multorum sibi erroribus contexuerunt; sed 
 omnes eos catholica fides a corpore suae unitatis 
 abscidit, constanter praedicans atque veraciter, 
 quod animae humanae, priusquam suis inspira- 
 rentur corporibus, non fuere — In the tenth chap- 
 ter the Priscillianists are reported as asserting, 
 that the souls which are planted in human 
 bodies were without a body and sinned in their 
 celestial habitation. . . . This impious fable they 
 have made up from the errors of many; but all 
 of these the Catholic faith has cut off from the 
 body of its unity, constantly and truthfully pro- 
 claiming that the human souls had no existence 
 prior to the time when they were breathed into 
 their respective bodies.” 
 
 This condemnation manifestly includes the modern 
 form of Pre-existentism taught by Kant and Schelling. 
 It is scarcely necessary to add that Metempsychosis, so- 
 called, or the theory of the transmigration of souls, 
 which may be classified as an offshoot of the theory 
 putatur anima ante carnem habuisse haereticis et recentius in Priscillian- 
 
 aliquem statum bonum et meritum istis tam catholica damnavit Eccle- 
 bonum, si forte nescis, in antiquis sia.” 
 
166 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 of Pre-existence,!° is equally repugnant to right reason 
 and Revelation. The same may be said of the so-called 
 Involution theory, according to which the souls of all 
 men were implicitly contained in the soul of Adam, 
 which is successively split up, as it were, and divided 
 among his descendants.*4 
 
 Thesis II: Generationism, both in its crude and 
 in its refined form, must be unconditionally rejected. 
 
 This proposition is theologically certain. 
 
 Proof. a) Generationism in its crude form 
 is called Traducianism (from tradux, cutting, 
 slip). Traducianism holds that the soul is pro- 
 duced immediately from the male sperm (semen 
 corporale), and that children are as it were “cut- 
 tings” or “slips” detached from the souls of their 
 parents. This opinion was defended in the East 
 by Apollinaris, and in the West, apparently, by 
 Uertullians 
 
 Tertullian appears to teach that the germ of a new 
 soul disengages itself from the souls of the begetting 
 
 parents, as a “slip from the stem of Adam.” 18 
 
 10The Transmigration theory 
 seems to be almost co-eval with 
 history. There are traces of it 
 among the early Egyptians, and it 
 was and is almost universal among 
 the Hindus. To a large extent it 
 swayed the philosophies of Greece 
 in the days of Pythagoras, Plato, 
 and Plotinus. Cfr. J. Gibbons, 
 Theories of the Transmigration of 
 Souls, London 1907; SE PAW lO yert 
 coll, Christian Philosophy: God, 2nd 
 ed., pp. 276 sqq., New York 19043 
 
 But as 
 
 Dowd, The Soul, its Powers, Mi- 
 grations, and Transmigrations, San 
 Francisco 1888. 
 
 11 This theory is sometimes called 
 Panspermy. 
 
 12 We say apparently, because the 
 peculiar sense in which Tertullian 
 uses the word ‘“‘ body” makes it 
 dificult to arrive at a just evalu- 
 ation of his teaching, 
 
 13 Cfr. De Anima, c 19: “ Ani- 
 ma velut surculus quidam ex ma-— 
 trice Adam in propaginem deducta 
 
GENERATIONISM 167 
 
 an incorporeal soul cannot possibly proceed from a cor- 
 poreal principle, this theory degrades man to the level 
 of the beast. The brute soul, being entirely merged 
 in matter, can be produced by generation out of the 
 
 ‘potency of matter; but the soul of man, which is a simple 
 
 spiritual substance, does not produce material germs 
 from which a new spiritual soul could sprout. Tertul- 
 lian tries to improve his case by distinguishing between 
 humor and calor seminis, deriving the soul from the 
 former and the body from the latter. But the very 
 suggestion that flesh might possibly beget spirit is 
 essentially materialistic. No wonder Tertullian has 
 been frequently reckoned among the Materialists.‘* Lac- 
 tantius’s refutation of Traducianism still retains its full 
 force: “Jllud quoque venire in quaestionem potest, 
 utrumne anima ex patre, an potwus ex matre, an vero 
 ex utroque generetur. Sed ego in eo iure ab ancipiti 
 vindico: ... corpus enim ex corporibus nasct potest, 
 quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque; de animis animus 
 non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili [1. e. 
 spirituali|] nihil potest descendere. Atque serendarum 
 ammarum ratio unt ac soli Deo subtacet,... ex quo 
 apparet, non a parentibus dart anmas, sed ab uno 
 eodemque omnium Deo Patre— The question may also 
 arise, Is the soul engendered by the father, or by the 
 mother, or by both? I think that it is engendered by 
 neither. ... A body may be produced from a body, 
 since something is contributed from both; but a soul 
 cannot be produced from souls, because nothing can de- 
 part from a thin and intangible [1. e., spiritual] sub- 
 stance. Therefore the manner of the production of 
 et genitalibus foeminae foveis cum 14 Cfr. -Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
 
 omni sua paratura pullulabit tam Knowability, Essence and Attri- 
 intellectu quam sensu.” butes, p. 294. 
 
168 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 souls belongs to God alone. . . . From this it is evident 
 that souls are not given by parents, but by one and the 
 same God, the Father of all.’ | 
 
 The attitude of the Church is sufficiently indicated by 
 a decision of Pope Benedict XII in the matter of reunion 
 (A.D. 1342). When the Armenians were asked to 
 condemn the proposition that “the human soul is prop- 
 agated from father to son, as body is propagated by 
 body, or one angel by another,’ ?® their bishops assured 
 the Pope that “this error, that the soul of man is propa- 
 gated from the soul of the father, as body is propagated 
 from body, . . . was always proscribed in the Armenian 
 Church, and shall be accursed.” 17 
 
 b) Generationism in its refined form is far 
 less repugnant to Catholic teaching than the 
 crude Traducianism of which we have been 
 speaking, though the two systems do not seem to 
 differ much in principle. The chief distinction is 
 that refined Generationism recognizes the spir- 
 ituality of the soul by postulating a kind of spir- 
 itual semen (semen spirituale), which, however, 
 from the purely philosophical point of view, is 
 an impossible chimera. The unequivocal bias 
 of some Patristic writers ** in favor of Gener- 
 ationism has done much to weaken the ecclesi- 
 
 15 De Opif. Det ad Demetr., c. 19. sicut corpus a@ corpore ... semper 
 
 16 “ Quod anima humana filii pro- fuit excommunicatus in ecclesia 
 pagatur ab anima patris sui, sicut Armeniorum, et maledictus sit.” 
 corpus a corpore et angelus etiam (Marténe, Vet. Monum., t. VII, p. 
 unus ab alio.’ Denzinger-Bannwart, 319.) 
 Enchiridion, n. 533; cfr. Raynald., 18 Especially Theodore Abucara 
 Annal. Eccles. ad a. 1341, ". 50. (Opusc. 35), Macarius (Hom. 3o, n. 
 
 17 “‘ Hic error, quod anima homi- 1), and Gregory Nyssen (De Opif. 
 mis propagetur ab anima patris sui, Hom., c. 29). 
 
GENERATIONISM 169 
 
 astical tradition and to retard the complete tri- 
 umph of Creationism, which is after all the only 
 tenable system. 
 
 For eight full centuries (from the time of St. Augus- 
 tine to Peter Lombard) the question of the origin ot 
 the human soul was treated with much hesitation and 
 uncertainty. It remained for St. Thomas Aquinas to 
 pave the way for a general adoption of Creationism. 
 Generationism had obtained currency by the high au- 
 thority of St. Augustine, whose sole reason for hesi- 
 tating to place himself squarely on Creationist ground 
 was that this system had been ostentatiously espoused 
 by the Pelagians in attacking the doctrine of original 
 sin. The Pelagians argued as follows: Nothing un- 
 clean can come from the hand of God; therefore the 
 souls of children, created by Him directly out of noth- 
 ing, cannot be tainted with original sin. Unable to 
 solve this subtle objection, Augustine inclined to the 
 theory that the souls of children are not immediately 
 created by God, but engendered by their parents. He 
 believed in the possibility of a semen incorporeum, from 
 which, he says, the soul in a manner incomprehensible 
 to us, originates in the act of parental generation,— 
 which accounts for the transmission of original sin.’® 
 But Augustine was no decided adherent of the Gener- 
 ationist theory. Indeed he never quite overcame his 
 doubts as. to its correctness. On more than one occa- 
 sion he humbly confessed his ignorance of the true solu- 
 tion of the problem.”® In his epistolary correspondence 
 
 19 Ep. ad Optat., 190: “ Incor- 20“ Libentius disco quam dico, 
 poreum semen animae sua quadam ne audeam docere, quod nescio,” 
 
 occulta et invisibili via seorsum a he says in his work Contr. Iulian., 
 paire currens in matrem.” Vig. 
 
 12 
 
170 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 with St. Jerome, who was a determined Creationist, he 
 frankly declares that he would like to espouse Creation- 
 ism, if he could only make sure that it was compatible 
 with the dogma of original sin.?* 
 
 It follows that St. Augustine cannot be quoted as a 
 traditional witness either for or against Creationism. 
 
 c) The authority of this great Doctor was sufficient 
 to keep his doubts and misgivings alive for many cen- 
 turies.? The Venerable Moneta?* and St. Thomas 
 Aquinas finally broke the spell. St. Thomas did not 
 hesitate to condemn Generationism as “heretical.” *4 
 His immediate predecessors (e. g., Peter Lombard 2 
 and Albert the Great**), though decided champions 
 of Creationism, had not dared to express themselves 
 quite so vigorously. It was no doubt premature on the 
 part of St. Thomas to brand Generationism as a heresy; 
 yet no one can fail to perceive that even in its mildest 
 form this theory is incompatible with the dogma of the 
 simplicity and spirituality of the soul.27 
 
 21“ Unde illa de novarum ani- qu. 118, art. 2: “ Haereticum est 
 
 marum creatione sententia, si hane 
 fidem fundatissimam [peccati ori- 
 ginalis] non oppugnat, sit et mea; 
 st oppugnat, non sit tua... . Ecce 
 volo, ut lla sententia etiam mea 
 sit, sed nondum esse confirmo.” 
 Ep. 166, 25, ad S. Hieron. — 
 
 22 Cfr. the writings of his pupil - 
 
 Fulgentius (De Verit. Praedest. et 
 Grats itl, irs) rand -those ot) St 
 Gregory the Great (Ep. 53 ad Se- 
 cundin.). 
 
 23 In his Summa contra Catharos 
 et Waldenses, II, 4. On Moneta 
 Cremonensis, a Dominican writer of 
 the thirteenth century (-+ 1235), 
 cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator Literarius 
 Theologiae Catholicae, t. II, 2nd. 
 ed., col. 267 sq., Oeniponte 1906. 
 
 24 Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, 
 
 dicere, quod anima intellectiva tra- 
 ducatur cum semine.”’ 
 
 25 Lib. Sent., II, dist. 17, qu. 3. 
 
 26S. Theol., p. 2, qu. 72, memb. 
 3. : 
 27 Cfr. S. Thom., Contr. Gent., 
 II, 86: “ Ridiculum est dicere ali- 
 quam intellectualem substantiam vel 
 per divisionem corporis dividi vel 
 etiam ab aliqua virtute corporis pro- 
 duct. Sed anima humana est quae- 
 dam intellectualis substantia... . 
 Non igitur potest dici, quod divida- 
 tur per divisionem seminis neque 
 quod producatur in esse a virtute 
 activa, quae est in semine; et sic 
 nullo modo per seminis traductio- 
 nem anima humana incipit esse — 
 It is ridiculous to say that any sub- 
 sistent intelligence is either divided 
 
CREATIONISM 171 
 
 d) Creationism held full sway in the theological schools 
 of the Middle Ages, but in modern times timorous at- 
 tempts have been made to revive the apparently defunct 
 system of Generationism. Hermes, Klee, and Oischin- 
 ger endeavored to restore it at least to the rank of a 
 probable opinion. But can a proposition that involves 
 a contradiction in terms be defended as_ probable? 
 Frohschammer, who remodeled the ancient theory by 
 raising the act of parental generation to the dignity of 
 a secondary creation, barely managed to escape one con- 
 tradiction only to fall into another, namely, that God’s 
 creative power is communicable to creatures.” Ros- 
 mini?® held that the Creator transforms the sensitive 
 soul, which the child receives by generation from his 
 parents, into an intellective soul by permitting it to 
 catch a glimpse of the “idea of being.’ This is an 
 utterly fantastic theory. If it were true, all brute souls 
 could by means of this simple expedient be transformed 
 into human souls. Generationism can no longer be up- 
 held; its fate is sealed for good. 
 
 Thesis III: The origin of the human soul can be 
 
 explained only by an immediate act of creation. 
 
 This proposition is “theologically certain.” 
 
 Proof. a) It is difficult to draw a cogent proof for 
 Creationism from Sacred Scripture, because Sacred 
 Scripture does not tell us whether the creation of the soul 
 
 by division of the body or pro- 
 duced by any corporeal power. 
 But the soul is a subsistent intelli- 
 gence. Therefore it can neither be 
 divided by the separation of the 
 semen from the body, nor produced 
 by any active power-in the same, 
 
 And thus the division of the se- 
 men can in no wise be the cause 
 of the soul commencing to be.” 
 (Rickaby, Of God and His Crea- 
 tures, p. 164.) i 
 
 28 Supra, pp. 54 sad. 
 
 29 Prop. a Leone XIII. damn., 20. 
 
172 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 is an immediate (creatio ex nthilo) or only a mediate act 
 (concursus) of God. There are, however, certain Biblical 
 texts which seem to favor the Creationist view. Thus St. 
 Jerome comments on Eccles. XII, 7 as follows: “ Ex quo 
 satis ridendi sunt, qui putant, animas cum corporibus seri 
 et non a Deo, sed a corporum parentibus generari. Cum 
 enim caro revertatur in terram et spiritus redeat ad 
 Deum, qui dedit illum, manifestum est, Deum patrem 
 esse animarum, non homines — Hence those are surely 
 to be laughed at who believe that the souls of men 
 are begotten with their bodies, and are generated not 
 by God but by the parents of their bodies. For since 
 the flesh reverts to dust and the spirit returns to 
 God, who has given it, manifestly the Father of souls 
 is God, not men.” According to 2 Mach. VII, 22 sq. 
 the mother of the seven brethren said to them: “ Neque 
 enim ego spiritum et animam donavi vobis, et vitam 
 et singulorum membra non ego ipsa compegi, sed enim 
 mundt Creator —I neither gave you breath, nor soul, 
 nor life, neither did I frame the limbs of every one 
 of you, but the Creator of the world.” St. Paul calls 
 attention to the sharp antithesis between the “ Father of 
 spirits ” and “the fathers of the flesh.” “Patres quidem 
 carms nostrae,” he says (Heb. XII, 9),“ eruditiores ha- 
 buimus et reverebamur eos; non multo magis obtempera- 
 bimus Patri spirituum et vivemus? —We have had 
 fathers of our flesh for instructors, and we reverenced 
 them: shall we not much more obey the Father of spirits, 
 and live?”’ To judge from this text, the Apostle favored 
 the opinion that the souls of men are created imme- 
 diately by God.*° 
 
 30 Cfr. Estius’ commentary on this text. 
 
CREATIONISM 173 
 
 b) After what has been said above the reader 
 will not be astonished to learn that the argument 
 from Tradition is fraught with peculiar difficul- 
 ties. Not as if Creationism had at any time in 
 the Church’s history lacked numerous and de- 
 termined defenders. St.) Jerome's): statement: 
 “The majority of western Christians hold that 
 soul is born from soul in the same manner 
 as body is born from body,’ ** is no doubt ex- 
 aggerated, for we know that Generationism in 
 its pronounced form really had but one, or at 
 most two champions in the West, we.: Tertul- 
 lian, and later, perhaps, Rufinus. Nor were con--. 
 ditions much different in the East.** But the 
 fact that this important and all but self-evident 
 truth was for eight centuries obscured by doubt 
 and contradiction, is sufficient to show that 
 Creationism cannot be regarded as a dogma in 
 the strict sense of the word. 
 
 c) In view of these facts Cardinal Norisius insisted 
 against Bellarmine,®* that the lack of a true ecclesias- 
 tical Tradition in support of the Creationist system 
 leaves modern theologians free to adopt the doubt- 
 ing attitude of St. Augustine. “ Evanescit,’ he says, 
 “ ecclesiastica traditio, ex qua creatio animarum deduci- 
 tur.’ ** What are we to think of this assertion? 
 
 31 Ep., 126: “ Maximam partem both the East and the West, and 
 
 Occidentalium autumare, ut quo- published them in the Zeitschrift 
 modo corpus ex corpore, sic anima fiir katholische Theologie, Innsbruck 
 nascatur ex anima.” 1883, pp. 196 sqq. 
 
 32 Kleutgen has collected numer- 33 De Amiss. Grat., IV, 11. 
 
 ous Patristic texts from writers of 34 Vindic. August., c. 4, § 3. 
 
174 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 A careful study of the facts shows that Creationism 
 was always implicitly contained in the Church’s belief, 
 and immediately upon its revival assumed all the char- 
 acteristics of a real and true Tradition, which it had in 
 fact already possessed before the time of St. Augus- 
 tine. From A.D. 400 to A.D. 1200 Creationism had 
 as many determined champions throughout the world 
 as Generationism had staunch opponents. These crit- 
 ical centuries were not a period of positive, much less 
 of dogmatic affirmation, but of hesitancy and prob- 
 lematic assumption. If we enquire into the deeper 
 causes of the prevailing doubts, we find that they were 
 based not upon the lack of an Apostolic Tradition, but 
 on the apparent impossibility of reconciling the trans- 
 mission of original sin with the absolute purity of the 
 divine act of Creation. As soon as this difficulty had 
 been cleared away by the Schoolmen, and theologians be- 
 gan to realize the far-reaching implications of the dogma 
 of the spirituality of the soul, the traditional consensus 
 revived with all the marks of a true ecclesiastical Tra- 
 dition. 
 
 d) We may point to certain ecclesiastical de- 
 cisions as so many landmarks in the history of 
 Creationism. 
 
 In his dogmatic Epistle Pope Leo the Great (-+ 461) 
 speaks of the breathing of souls into their bodies: 
 “ Anumae humanae, priusquam suis inspirarentur cor- 
 poribus, non fuerunt.’ > Considering that the Mosaic 
 narrative likewise describes the infusion of Adam’s soul 
 into his body as “inspirare spiraculum witae,’ ** we 
 cannot escape the conclusion that Leo the Great em- 
 
 35 Cfr. supra, p. 165. 36 Gen, II, 7. 
 
CREATIONISM 175 
 
 ployed spirare not as synonymous with generare, but 
 in the sense of a creatio ex nihilo. Strangely enough, 
 the famous dogmatic Epistle of Pope Anastasius II to 
 the Bishops of Gaul, discovered about forty years ago by 
 Fr. Maassen in a seventh-century codex, now preserved 
 at Darmstadt, has hitherto almost entirely escaped the 
 notice of Catholic theologians. Anastasius (496-498) 
 upholds Creationism and condemns Generationism (in 
 its crude form) as a “nova haeresis.’** Basing his 
 judgment on reports received from the Bishop of Arles 
 regarding the propaganda carried on by certain cham- 
 pions of Generationism, who seem to have shared Ter- 
 tullian’s views on the origin of the human soul, the 
 Pope sharply inveighs “contra haeresim,... quod 
 humano generi parentes, ut ex materialt faece tradunt 
 corpora, ita etiam vitalis animae spiritum tribuant.” He 
 exhorts the mistaken champions of this theory to accept 
 the “sound doctrine” of Creationism: “Sanae igitur 
 doctrinae acquiescant, quod ille indat animas, qut vocat 
 ea, quae non sunt, tamquam sint.’ In the course of 
 his instruction Anastasius solemnly defines: “ Ego ab- 
 sens corpore, spiritu vero praesens, vobiscum ita redargut 
 volo, qui im novam haeresim prorupisse dicuntur, ut a 
 parentibus animas tradi genert humano adserant, quem- 
 admodum ex faece materialt corpus imfunditur.” The 
 only thing the parents transmit, besides the body, is 
 original sin: “Quod ab illis [scil. parentibus] nihil 
 aliud potest tradi quam... . culpa poenaque peccatt, 
 quam per traducem secuta progenies evidenter ostendit, 
 ut pravi homines distortique nascantur.’ Recalling Is. 
 LVII, 16: “Nonne omnem flatum ego feci?” the Pope 
 asks with a show of astonishment: “ Quomedo sti 
 
 37 The text of his letter will be Pontif. Genuinae, t. I, pp. 634 saq., 
 found in A. Thiel, Epist. Romanor. Brunsbergae 1868. 
 
176 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 novi haeretici a parentibus dicunt factum et non a Deo, 
 sicut ipse testatur? Aut sibi volunt potius credi quam 
 Deo omnipotenti?” He proceeds to point out other 
 Scriptural texts,®* which the Bishops would find effective 
 against the new heresy, and closes his letter with an 
 ardent appeal for the purity of Catholic doctrine: “ Nos 
 vero inter multas diversasque occupationes haec interim 
 per indicem titulum significasse sufficiat, ut vos velut 
 conministri mei vocem sequentes meam in hoc pugnare 
 debeatis, ne quid catholicae ecclesiae ... foeditas ulla 
 nascatur.” 
 
 The solemn tenor of this epistle might lead one to 
 regard it as an infallible ex cathedra pronouncement. 
 But the concluding phrase plainly idicates that the 
 Pontiff merely wished to give instruction, not to de- 
 cide the controversy. The fact that the letter soon fell 
 into desuetude is sufficient evidence that Creationism 
 was not generally received as an article of faith at the 
 close of the fifth century. It was not even so regarded 
 in the fourteenth century, when Pope Benedict XII 
 (A.D. 1342) required the Armenians to abjure Gen- 
 erationism.*® 
 
 Creationism is also taught, at least by implication, in 
 Leo X’s dogmatic Bull “ Apostolici regiminis,’ issued 
 on the occasion of the Fifth Lateran Council, A. D. 1512. 
 This Pope says among other things: “ Anima intel- 
 lectiva .. . immortalis et pro corporum, quibus infundi- 
 tur, multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis et multiplicata 
 et multyplicanda.” This can only mean that each ra- 
 tional soul is “infused” into, 7. e. created in, its own 
 body. For the soul is either “infused” by God or by 
 
 38 Gen. IV, 25; Ex. IV, 11. and importance of Pope Benedict’s 
 
 39 Fr. Kleutgen, S. J., was the demand. (Zeitschrift fiir kath. The- 
 first in 1883 to point out the scope ologie, 1883). 
 
CREATIONISM 177 
 
 the parents: —if by God, “infusion” is equivalent to 
 creation; if by the parents, “infusion” either means 
 creation out of nothing, or generation. It cannot mean 
 creation out of nothing, because God alone has power 
 to create. Nor can it mean generation, because the 
 Pope does not say: anima infunditur filus, but: infundi- 
 tur corporibus, a phrase which indicates that the act 
 of infusion is not performed by the parents, and there- 
 fore differs from the act of sexual generation. It 
 should be noted that in the Bull under consideration 
 Leo X employs the theological terminology of his time. 
 It was quite usual at that period to say: Animae 
 hominum infundendo creantur et creando infunduntur.*° 
 
 Lastly, the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate 
 Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary rests squarely 
 upon Creationism. Both the Apostolic Constitution of 
 Alexander VII known as “ Sollicitudo” and Pius IX’s 
 dogmatic Bull “Ineffabilem” expressly declare that 
 “The soul of the Blessed Virgin Mary was from the 
 first moment of its creation and infusion into the body 
 Pav stree from all taint of original’ siny, 
 
 Creationism, therefore, is not merely the doctrine of 
 some particular school, but a theologically certain truth, 
 which no Catholic can deny without temerity.*! 
 
 There remains the subordinate question: When is 
 the soul created or infused into the body? The medieval 
 theologians generally followed the physiological teach- 
 ing of Aristotle, who held that the human embryo during 
 
 40 Cfr. Albert. Magnus, Comment. ments for this thesis, and the solu- 
 im Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. tion of various objections raised 
 17; O. Zehetbauer, Animae Hu- against it, we may refer the student 
 manae Infundendo Creantur et to Oswald, Schédpfungslehre, pp. 221 
 Creando Infunduntur, Sopronii sqq., Paderborn 1885; G. B. Tepe, 
 
 1893. Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 486 saq., 
 41 For the philosophical argu- Paris 1895. 
 
178 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 the early history of its existence passes through a series 
 of transitional stages in which it is successively informed 
 by the vegetative, the sentient, and, finally, by the ra- 
 tional soul. To-day the opinion prevails that the ra- 
 
 tional soul is created and infused at the moment of 
 conception.*® 
 
 READINGS : — Oswald, Schépfungslehre, 2nd ed., §§ 12-13, Pa- 
 derborn 1893.—O. Zehetbauer, Animae Humanae Infundendo 
 Creantur et Creando Infunduntur, Sopronii 1893.— Galassi, Sul?’ 
 Origine dell’ Anima Umana, Bologna 1888.— *Scheeben, Dog- 
 matik, Vol. Il, § 151, Freiburg 1878—C. Gutberlet, Der Kampf 
 um die Seele, 2nd ed., 2 vols. Mainz 1903—M. Maher, S. J., 
 Psychology, 6th ed., pp. 572 sqq., London and New York 1905.— 
 J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy, The Soul, New York 1808. 
 — St. George Mivart, Origin of Human Reason, London 1889.— 
 D, Mercier, La Psychologie, Vol. 11, Ch. 2, Louvain 190s. 
 
 42 Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 14, 
 qu. 118, Jart. 2,/ad 2, and in eluci- 
 dation thereof Kleutgen, Philosophie 
 der Vorzeit, Vol. II, p. 657; Maher, 
 Psychology, pp. 575 sq.; Harper, 
 Metaphysics of the Schools, Vol. 
 II, pp. 553 sqq. 
 
 43 Cfr. Jos. Antonelli, Medicina 
 Pastoralis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Rome 
 1906. On the doctrine of Lotze 
 and Ladd cfr. Maher, Psychology, 
 Pp. 576 sqq. 
 
SECTION 2 
 THE SUPERNATURAL IN MAN 
 
 Man’s whole natural endowment was intended 
 merely as the basis and groundwork of a higher 
 and specifically different one, viz.: that of super- 
 natural grace, which renders him capable of 
 participating in prerogatives truly divine." In 
 order rightly to understand this sublime destina- 
 tion, we need a working theory of the Supernat- 
 viral.’ To acquire a correct idea. of ‘the Super- 
 natural, and properly to evaluate the prerogatives 
 enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise, a critical 
 consideration of such heretical antitheses as Pe- 
 lagianism, Protestantism, and Jansenism will 
 prove extremely helpful. Since, however, man’s 
 high estate in Paradise was due solely to Grace, 
 and not to any claim or exigency of pure na- 
 ture, it follows that per se man could have ex- 
 isted in any other state, and in part did so exist. 
 
 We shall, therefore, divide this present Sec- 
 tion into four Articles: (1) Of nature and. the 
 Supernatural in general; (2) Of man’s super- 
 
 12 Pet. I, 4: “* Oelas Kowvwvol piacews — pattakers of the divine nature.” 
 
 179 
 
180 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 natural endowment in Paradise; (3) Of various 
 heresies concerning the Paradisaical state of man 
 and the dogmatic teaching of the Church in 
 regard thereto; and (4) Of the different states 
 of man, particularly the pure state of nature. 
 
 GENERAL READINGS: — Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. 
 V, §§ 277-280; Vol VI, §§ 300-311, Mainz 1884-87.— Palmieri, 
 De Ordine Supernaturali et de Lapsu Angelorum, Romae 1910.— 
 Mazzella, De Deo Creante, disp. 4 sqq., Romae 1880.— Scheeben, 
 Dogmattk, Vol. II, §§ 158-184 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. 
 I, pp. 428 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899).—*Simar, Dogmatik, Vol. 
 I, 3rd ed., §§ 83 sqq., Freiburg 1899.— Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, 
 Mainz 1861.— Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, Paris 1905. 
 
 ANWR) 2 OS) A EP 
 
 NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL 
 
 Neither Revelation nor the dogmatic teaching of the 
 Church supplies us with a ready-made theory of the 
 Supernatural. However, the concrete realization of the 
 Supernatural Order both in humankind and in the an- 
 gels, is so definitely marked, and the pronouncements 
 of the ecclesiastical teaching office furnish so many 
 positive indications, that a theological theory can be 
 easily construed. Let us, in logical order, consider the 
 concept of the Supernatural (a) in its comprehension, 
 and (b) in its extension. 
 
 A. Definition of the Supernatural 
 
 I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.—To obtain a cor- 
 rect notion of the Supernatural, we must begin 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL 181 
 
 by analyzing the concept of Nature, because Na- 
 ture precedes and supposes the Supernatural. 
 
 The term Nature, because of its many mean- 
 ings, may truly be called protean. To escape 
 misunderstanding, which in these matters easily 
 entails heresy, we must study all these various 
 meanings and carefully determine in what sense 
 precisely Nature (¢%os) is the antithesis of the 
 Supernatural. 
 
 a) As a technical term in logic, “ Nature” denotes 
 the essence of a thing (quidditas, 16 ti jv eivac), aS eXx- 
 pressed in its definition. It is in this sense that we 
 speak of the nature of God, or the nature of the uni- 
 verse, nay, even of the nature of the Supernatural. 
 Also sin (which is a privation), and the non-ens (which 
 is a negation), possess each a nature or essence by which 
 they are what they are. This definition of Nature takes 
 in the entire domain of actual and logical beings, of 
 being and not-being, of the real and the imaginary, in 
 a word, whatever can be expressed by a definition. 
 In this logical sense Nature is manifestly not opposed 
 to the Supernatural, since the Supernatural, too, has its 
 own peculiar nature, that is, its quiddity or formal es- 
 sence by which it is what it is. 
 
 b) In the ontological sphere, which embraces all 
 actually existing things, there are beings that have no 
 nature, though, logically considered, they have an es- 
 sence of their own. Such are, e. g., evil, blindness, etc. 
 Ontologically considered, “ Nature” is synonymous with 
 substance (substantia prima, ovcia zpwty). In this sense 
 God is the “ Highest Nature,” 7. ¢., the supernatural sub- 
 
182 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 stance (substantia superessentialis, imepodaws). In this 
 sense, too, an angel is called a “ spiritual nature,’”’ while 
 man’s nature is said to be partly spiritual, partly cor- 
 poreal. According to the particular antithesis in which 
 we choose to place it, the term Nature, in ontology, 
 may have a variety of meanings, each of which requires 
 to be carefully defined. Thus, despite the objective 
 identity of the two terms, “ Nature” differs from “ Es- 
 sence’ in that the latter term denotes simple being, 
 while the former describes that being as a principle of 
 action. “ Nature” must be defined differently according 
 as it is opposed to hypostasis (or person) in the 
 Blessed Trinity,? or to spirit. Other meanings of the 
 term are indicated by such juxtapositions as Nature 
 and Liberty, Nature and Art, Nature and Morality, 
 God and Nature (1. e., the created universe), Nature 
 and Miracle, etc. With the possible exception of “ Na- 
 _ ture and Miracle”* none of these antitheses gives us 
 the exact meaning of the term ‘“ Nature” when used in 
 contradistinction to “ Supernatural.” 
 
 In identifying Supernatural with spiritual, unbelieving 
 modern scientists contradict right reason, which justly 
 regards the human spirit to be as truly a part and parcel 
 of Nature as is matter, inanimate and animate. Knoodt 
 erred when he declared the antithesis “ creatural — 
 super-creatural ” to be equivalent to “ natural — super- 
 natural.” The divine Preservation of the universe, God’s 
 Concurrence with His creatures, and His benign Provi- 
 dence, though supercreatural, emphatically form a part 
 of Nature, because without these operations on the part 
 of God Nature as such could neither exist nor energize. 
 
 2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine supernatural, though it cannot be 
 
 Trinity, pp. 221 sqq. said, conversely, that the supernat- 
 3 A miracle is always something ural is always miraculous. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL 183 
 
 For the same reason we must reject the teaching of 
 Vock,* who defines the Supernatural as that which can 
 be wrought by God alone. 
 
 c) That which is essentially Supernatural is yet, in the- 
 ology, sometimes called Natural, though only in a figura- 
 tive sense. In this connection we must note two mean- 
 ings of the word “ Nature” which occur in the writings 
 of the Fathers, and which Baius and Jansenius have 
 abused in their heretical attempts to counterfeit the true 
 ecclesiastical concept of the Supernatural. Some of the 
 Fathers, notably St. Augustine, refer to the incontestably 
 supernatural state of our first parents in Paradise as 
 “the nature of Adam.” Baius and Jansenius interpret 
 this expression as meaning that the original justice of 
 the first man, with all its preternatural endowments, 
 such as corporeal immortality and freedom from con- 
 cupiscence, was something essentially natural, that is, 
 demanded by human nature. But Augustine uses the 
 word natura in its purely etymological sense, to desig- 
 nate that which Adam had from the very beginning 
 received from God as a supernatural complement of his 
 nature. “ Natural,” therefore, in the usage of the great 
 Bishop of Hippo, means “ original.” Cfr. Ephes. II, 3: 
 “Eramus natura |. e., a nativitate| filu irae—We 
 were by nature [7. e., originally, from our birth] chil- 
 dren of wrath.” The supernatural state of grace which 
 Adam enjoyed in Paradise is also called by St. Augus- 
 tine ® and St. Leo the Great,’ naturalis generis conditio, 
 that is to say, “a state in accordance with nature” (con-— 
 vemens, consentaneum) ; for the supernatural ennoble- 
 
 4 Theol. Dogmat., t. II, tract. 4, una cum origine; naturale = ori- 
 § 202. ginale. 
 
 5 Natura = nascitura, nativitas = 6 Contr. Faust., XXVI, 3. 
 . 7 Serm. de leiunio, 1. 
 
184 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 ment and perfectioning of human nature is neither “ un- 
 natural” nor ‘contrary to nature,” but entirely “ nat- 
 ural,” 7. e., in accordance with nature, befitting nature.® 
 In all these meanings, the terms Nature and Supernatural 
 involve no opposition. By elimination, therefore, we ar- 
 rive at the following conclusions: 
 
 d) “Nature” designates that which (1) intrin- 
 sically constitutes the being of a created sub- 
 stance, either as an essential or as an integral 
 note; or (2) spontaneously flows from its es- 
 sence (é. g., faculties, talents, powers), or at 
 least can flow therefrom through the exertion of 
 one’s own or some one else’s power (technical 
 skill, training); or (3) whatever, though exter- 
 nal to a thing, is necessary or suitable for its 
 existence (e. g., food, air), for its development 
 (e. g., instruction, civil society) or for the at- 
 tainment of its end (e. g., the knowability of 
 God, beatitude). All these factors (7. e., the 
 constitutive elements of a thing’s being, the fac- 
 ulties, powers, and accomplishments flowing 
 from its essence, and lastly such external agen- 
 cies as are necessary or suitable for its subsist- 
 ence, development, or the attainment of its final 
 end), in their totality and severally respond to a 
 proximate or remote claim of the thing under 
 consideration. Its essence demands them. The 
 
 8 Cfr. Coelestini I Epist. 21, ad turalem possibilitatem et tnnocen- 
 Episc. Gall., a. 431: “In praevari- tiam perdidisse.” 
 catione Adae omnes homines na- 
 
THe SUPERNATURAL 185 
 
 Scholastics embrace these momenta under the 
 term “debitum naturae’ and define “Nature” or 
 “Natural” as that whichis duetoathing. (‘“Na- 
 tura sive naturale est omne id, quod alicui ret 
 debetur.”’ ) | 
 
 Every creature has its own specific claims, cor- 
 responding to its peculiar nature, aptitude, and 
 final end. Hence, in determining the full extent 
 of Nature, we must go beyond the individual 
 creature and the various species of being (matter, 
 man, angel), and consider the totality of all be- 
 ings with all their just claims or natural de- 
 mands. “Nature” must consequently be defined 
 as the aggregate of all those perfections to 
 which created beings have a claim, each accord- 
 ing to its specific essence, and which, therefore, 
 the Creator may not deny them. The sum-total 
 of these perfections is commonly called the Nat- 
 ural Order (ordo naturalis). Of course, any 
 superfluity of natural goods which the Creator 
 gives to a creature over and above its strict 
 necessities, is not Supernatural, but part of the 
 natural order. If the soil produces more food 
 than the human race is able to consume, if the 
 atmosphere contains more oxygen than we re- 
 quire to breathe, these gifts are not “graces’’ in 
 the strict sense of the term.° 
 
 9Cfr. T. Pesch, S. J., Institu- tur und Ubernatur,” in Esser-Maus- 
 tiones Philos. Naturalis, pp. 345 bach, Religion, Christentum, Kirche, 
 sqq., Friburgi 1880; J. Pohle, “ Na- Kempten 1911, pp. 315-469. 
 13 
 
186 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 2. DEFINITION OF THE SUPERNATURAL.— The 
 Supernatural, on the other hand, lies beyond or 
 transcends the order of Nature. It is the con- 
 trary of naturae debitum. It is naturae im- 
 debitum, in a positive as well as in a negative 
 sense. It may be defined as a gratuitous gift of 
 God superadded to the nature of a rational be- 
 ing; or, in the terms of the formal definition ab- 
 stracted from the condemned propositions of 
 Baius and Quesnel, “Donum Dei naturae inde- 
 bitum et superadditum.” 
 
 a) In this definition donum Dei, being common to 
 both Nature and the Supernatural, is the proximate 
 genus, while naturae indebitum et superadditum ex- 
 presses the specific difference. The term superadditum 
 indicates that the Supernatural supposes, or postulates, 
 Nature, that it inheres therein as something super-added, 
 and elevates it to a specifically higher order. To em- 
 phasize the last-mentioned element as the most important 
 in the whole definition, the superadded higher perfection 
 is further described as naturae indebitum, 1. e., grace.*° 
 
 b) Now, a gift of God may be an indebitum, 
 i. €., a supernatural grace, either with regard to 
 the manner of its production (supernaturale 
 quoad modum, as, for instance, a miraculous 
 cure), or with respect of its very substance 
 (supernaturale quoad substantiam). ‘There is 
 an essential distinction between these two cate- 
 
 10 Indebitum = gratuitum. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL 187 
 
 gories of the Supernatural. The supernaturale 
 quoad modum has its seat not in nature, 7. e., in 
 the creature itself, but outside of it, wz.: in the 
 divine causality. It is Supernatural only with 
 regard to the manner in which it is communicated 
 to the creature, as when a man is raised from 
 the dead. The gift itself (in the case mentioned, 
 life), is something intrinsically and essentially 
 natural. This species of the Supernatural ap- 
 pertains to the domain of Apologetics. Dog- 
 matic Theology proper is concerned mainly with 
 the supernaturale quoad substantiam, 1. e., that 
 which essentially and intrinsically transcends the 
 bounds of Nature. 
 
 c) The supernaturale quoad substantiam may 
 be subdivided into two well-defined species, ac- 
 cording as the supernatural gift which God com- 
 municates to the creature transcends the sphere 
 and power of Nature absolutely (swmpliciter) 
 or in a relative sense only (secundum quid). 
 The supernaturale simpliciter is the Supernatural 
 in the strict and proper sense of the term (super- 
 naturale stricte dictum). The supernaturale se- 
 cundum quid is also called Preternatural. There 
 is an essential difference between the Preter- 
 natural and the Supernatural. The Supernat- 
 ural involves divine perfections, 7. e., such as 
 by nature belong solely to God. The Preter- 
 natural communicates only such perfections as, 
 
188 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 though belonging to a higher order, do not tran- 
 scend the creatural domain. Thus freedom from 
 concupiscence is natural to an angel, because his 
 nature demands it; but it is not natural to man. 
 If, therefore, God grants freedom from concu- 
 piscence to a man, He gives him a real grace, 
 1. €., something which is not due to his na- 
 ture, and which is consequently Supernatural. 
 However, since such a Supernatural perfection- 
 ing of man does not in principle transcend the 
 creatural order, a grace of the kind just men- 
 tioned is merely a praeternaturale. It is quite 
 otherwise with the supernaturale stricte dictum. 
 The strictly Supernatural absolutely transcends 
 the sphere and power of all real and possible 
 creatures. The possession of such strictly di- 
 vine prerogatives as the beatific vision or sanctify- 
 ing grace, therefore, always entails a sort of 
 deification (deificatio, %iwos) of the rational crea- 
 ture. For the creature to claim such prerogatives 
 as strictly due to its nature, would be tantamount 
 to a demand to be made like unto God. 
 
 3. DEFINITION AND IMPORTANCE OF THE POTENTIA 
 OBEDIENTIALIS.— The best means of distinguishing 
 _ properly between Nature and the Supernatural is fur- 
 nished by the Scholastic concept of the “ potentia obe- 
 dientialis.” No satisfactory theory of the Supernatural 
 can be constructed without a proper appreciation of this 
 term. : 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL 189 
 
 As we have already pointed out, the Supernatural, 
 though it transcends Nature, is designed for and be- 
 comes effective only in Nature. By the inherence of 
 the Supernatural in Nature, Nature is raised to a higher 
 sphere of being and operation, exceeding all natural 
 limitations and possibilities. Such an elevation of a 
 creature beyond the limits and powers of Nature cannot 
 be attained by purely moral means, and therefore the 
 realization of the Supernatural postulates on the part 
 of God a special physical impulse distinct from His 
 preservation of the universe and His general concur- 
 rence. Susceptibility to this specific physical impulse 
 cannot coincide with any of the ordinary active or pas- 
 sive potencies of Nature, else the Supernatural would 
 not really transcend the natural order. On the other 
 hand, since the Supernatural does not hover above or 
 alongside of Nature, but is intended for and becomes 
 effective in Nature, Nature must needs be endowed 
 with some specific passive potency which, while unre- 
 sponsive to any creatural stimulus, willingly obeys the 
 special impulse exercised by the Creator. This is the 
 potentia obedientialis. The Scholastics define it as a 
 passive potency by which a creature is enabled to re- 
 ceive into itself a supernatural impulse from God.** This 
 potency may be compared to a bridge connecting Nature 
 with the Supernatural. Not as if Nature itself could by 
 any creatural agency ever become supernatural; but it 
 must contain some faculty which receives the divine im- 
 
 11‘ In anima himana,” explains 
 St. Thomas, “ sicut in qualibet crea- 
 tura, consideratur duplex potentia 
 passiva: una quidem per compara- 
 tionem ad agens naturale; alia vero 
 per comparationem ad agens pri- 
 mum, quod potest quamlibet crea- 
 
 turam reducere in actum aliquem 
 altiorem actu, in quem reducitur 
 per agens naturale. Et haec con- 
 suevit vocari potentia obedientiae in 
 creaturis.”  S.. TPheol., 3a, qu. 11, 
 art. I. 
 
190 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 pulse and by means of which this impulse effects the su- 
 pernatural elevation of the recipient.!? 
 
 B. The Prerogatives That Constitute the Super- 
 natural Order 
 
 We now proceed to consider the substantially Super- 
 natural (supernaturale quoad substantiam) in its two- 
 fold form, viz.: (1) as the Supernatural in the strict 
 sense of the term, and (2) as the Preternatural.1® 
 
 From the sphere thus marked off must be excluded 
 such supernatural perfections as the Hypostatic Union, 
 the Blessed Eucharist, and the Sacraments, because these 
 exist outside of human nature. They form the subject- 
 matter of separate dogmatic treatises. We are here 
 concerned with those graces only which effect a spe- 
 cifically higher sphere of being and operation in rational 
 creatures, and which can therefore be objectively real- 
 ized only in Angels and men. Of the subjoined two 
 theses the first concerns Angels and men alike, while the 
 second has reference to men alone. 
 
 Thesis I: There are two gifts of God which are 
 Supernatural in the strict sense, and therefore belong 
 to the divine order, namely, beatific vision and the 
 state of grace. 
 
 Proof. Beatific vision is the highest gift 
 which God bestows on a rational creature in 
 
 12 For further information on _ profitably consult v. Tessen-Wesier- 
 
 this point cfr. Glossner, Lehrbuch 
 der Dogmatik nach den Grundsit- 
 zen des hl. Thomas, Vol. II, pp. 
 197 sqq.; G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., 
 bods pp. S12 eddy, Paris 1898" 1 On 
 the whole subject the student may 
 
 ski, Die Grundlagen des Wunder- 
 begriffes nach Thomas von Aquin, 
 pp. 48 sqq., Paderborn 1899. 
 
 13 Miracles and prophecies belong 
 to the supernaturale quoad modum, 
 and hence do not concern us here. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL 191 
 
 the status termini. It is therefore justly re- 
 garded as the standard for gauging all other 
 graces enjoyed by Angels and men. By the 
 state of grace here on earth (im statu viae) we 
 understand the aggregate of those divine gifts 
 which aid man in immediately preparing for, and 
 attaining to, his supernatural end, 7. e., the beatific 
 vision. Besides sanctifying grace with all its 
 prerogatives, the state of grace, therefore, also 
 includes actual grace. The supernatural char- 
 acter of the beatific vision as vouchsafed to ex- 
 isting rational creatures in Heaven is a dogma; 
 with regard to purely possible and creatable be- 
 ings it may be set down as a theological con- 
 clusion.** 
 
 a) From this teaching the supernatural char- 
 acter of the state of grace im statu viae 1s a neces- 
 sary inference. The state of grace on earth is re- 
 lated to the beatific vision in Heaven as a means 
 to an end. Since a means must always be duly 
 proportioned to its end, a supernatural end can- 
 not be attained by purely natural, or even preter- 
 natural, means. 
 
 It is not quite correct, theologically, to distinguish 
 between beatific vision in Heaven and the state of grace on 
 earth as though they were separated by an abyss, and 
 to contemplate them merely in their relation of end and 
 
 14 We have demonstrated this in a God: His Knowability, Essence, and 
 previous volume. fr. Pohle-Preuss, Atiributes, pp. 86 sqq. 
 
192 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 means. Glory and grace are far more intimately re- 
 lated. The character of divine Sonship conferred by 
 both constitutes a common note which puts them 
 on the same essential level and separates the state of 
 grace on earth from the beatific vision in Heaven 
 merely after the manner of what is imperfect from 
 what is perfect.° St. Paul describes the endowment 
 of grace which God grants to man on earth as an 
 heirship of adopted children, while the state of grace 
 which He bestows on man in Heaven resembles an 
 heir’s taking possession of his inheritance.1* Else- 
 where ** the same Apostle refers to the state of grace 
 on earth as “the pledge of our inheritance, unto the 
 redemption of acquisition, unto the praise of his 
 glory.” ** But if the divine Sonship which we are 
 vouchsafed here below is of the same specific nature as 
 that which God grants to the Elect in Heaven, both 
 states must be as strictly supernatural in their essence 
 as the visio beatifica itself. And what is true of di- 
 vine Sonship, must be equally true of sanctifying grace 
 and of the theological virtue of charity, which, like 
 divine Sonship, endures unchanged in Heaven, whereas 
 hope becomes possession and faith gives way to in- 
 tuition through the lumen gloriae.® The necessity of 
 the /umen gloriae as a means of attaining to the beatific 
 vision of God furnishes another proof for the strictly 
 supernatural character of that vision. 
 
 b) We do not know with the certainty of faith 
 
 15 Cfr. 1 Cor. XIII, 9 sqaq. 
 
 16 Rom. VIII, 17 sqq. 
 
 Lf Eph Ty) 14. 
 
 18 dppaBov rhs KkAnpovouias, 
 ““Pignus enim ponitur,’ says St. 
 Augustine, “ quando cum fuerit res 
 ipsa reddita, pignus aufertur; arrha 
 
 autem de ipsa re datur, quae danda 
 promittitur, ut res quando redditur, 
 impleatur quod datum est nec muta- 
 
 tur.” (Serm., 156, 15.) 
 19 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
 Knowability, Essence and Attri- 
 
 butes, pp. 101 sqq. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL 193 
 
 that there could not exist a spiritual being (such as a 
 seraph or cherub) to whom the beatific vision, and con- 
 sequently also the supernatural preparation for it (di- 
 vine Sonship, charity, sanctifying grace), would be due 
 as a postulate of its nature. Ripalda holds that such 
 a being is possible, and that, if it existed, it would be 
 a substantia intrinsece supernaturalis.2° But this theory 
 implies a contradiction in terms.2!_ No creature, no mat- 
 ter how exalted, can claim what by its very nature 
 belongs solely to God.?? Christ alone, the only-begot- 
 ten Son of God, has a strict claim to Divine Sonship 
 and Consubstantiality with the Father because of His 
 eternal generation from the Father. He alone can 
 claim the intuitive vision of God and Trinitarian In- 
 existence ** as a right,— which, of course, mutatis mu- 
 tandis, also belongs to the other two Persons of the 
 Divine Trinity. No mere creature, actual or possible, 
 can rightfully claim prerogatives of a strictly divine 
 order.** To hold with Ripalda that it is possible to 
 conceive at least one creature with a natural claim to 
 the above-mentioned prerogatives of grace, would be to 
 deny the divine character of the eternal yévyous of the 
 Logos from the Father, to put natural sonship on a 
 par with adoptive sonship, and to confound the Con- 
 substantiality and In-existence of the Three Divine Per- 
 sons with the analogical accidents of deification and 
 spiritual indwelling. It would, in a word, be equivalent 
 to reducing the Supernatural to the level of the purely 
 natural.?° 
 
 20De Ente Supernaturali, disp. qu. 12, art. 4; Contr. Gent., III, 52. 
 
 23. 23 Cir. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
 21 Cir. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Trinity, pp. 281 sqq. 
 
 Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 24Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 
 
 butes, pp. 86 sqq. Ta 2ae,) QU 112, arti yt. 
 
 22 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 25 For a more exhaustive treat- 
 
194 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY. 
 
 Thesis II: Exemption from concupiscence, bodily 
 immortality, habitual infused science, and impassibility 
 are prerogatives which are not natural to man; they 
 are preternatural gifts of divine grace. 
 
 Proof. The censures which the Church has pro- 
 nounced against the teachings of Baius compel us to hold 
 as fideit proximum, that the first two of the four prerog- 
 atives mentioned, namely, exemption from concupiscence 
 and bodily immortality, are indebita, 1. e., pure graces. 
 The other two, viz.: infused science and impassibility, 
 are likewise held by all theological schools to be free and 
 unmerited gifts of God. 
 
 These prerogatives are called preternatural rather than 
 supernatural, first, because the Angels have a just claim 
 to them in virtue of their angelic nature; and secondly, 
 because by the possession of them human nature, though 
 it does not receive any strictly divine prerogative, is 
 perfected far beyond anything it can rightfully demand. 
 These characteristics exactly verify the concept of “ Pre- 
 ternatural”’ which we gave above. As a matter of fact 
 concupiscence is per se only a natural and spontaneous 
 effect of man’s composite nature, and the Creator, as 
 such, is not bound to exercise any special intervention 
 to suppress the strife which results from that nature, 
 especially since concupiscence is not in itself a sin nor yet 
 inevitably leads to sin. In the words of St. Thomas: 
 “Poterat Deus a principio, quando hominem condidit, 
 etiam alium hominem ex limo terrae formare, quem in 
 conditione naturae suae relinqueret, ut scil. mortalis et 
 passibilis esset et pugnam concupiscentiae ad rationem 
 sentiens; in quo nihil humanae naturae derogaretur, quia 
 
 ment see Palmieri, De Deo Creante Instit. Theol., t. III, pp. 193 saaq., 
 et Elevante, thes. 37, 39; Tepe, Paris 1896. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL 195 
 
 hoc ex principiis naturae consequitur. Non tamen iste 
 defectus in eo rationem culpae et poenae habuisset, quia 
 non per voluntatem iste defectus causatus assets, 
 
 Death being a necessary resultant of the synthesis of 
 body and soul, corporeal immortality, too, must be a pre- 
 ternatural gift of grace. 
 
 The same is true in an even higher measure of impassi- 
 bility, because incapacity for physical *’ and psychical 
 suffering °° is a lesser evil than death.” 
 
 As regards knowledge, God was not obliged to give 
 man more than the faculty of reasoning, which enables 
 him to attain to a true natural knowledge of his Creator 
 and to acquaint himself with the essential precepts of 
 the moral law. Infused science (scientia imfusa, in 
 contradistinction to scientia acquisita), is a free gift of 
 pracc.?, 
 
 REapincs:— The opus classicum on the subject is *Ripalda, 
 De Ente Supernaturali, 4 vols—*Schrader, S, J., De Triplict Or- 
 dine Naturali, Supernaturali et Praeternaturali, Vindob. 1864.— 
 Dom. Soto, De Natura et Gratia— Tournely, De Gratia, qu. 3.— 
 Du Plessis d’Argentré, De Gratia Primi Hominis et Angelorum. 
 — Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861.—*v. Schazler, Natur 
 und Ubernatur, Mainz 1865.—Ipem, Neue Untersuchungen uber 
 das Dogma von der Gnade, Mainz 1867.— Kleutgen, Theologie 
 der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Minster 1872.— Kirschkamp, Gnade 
 und Glorie in ihrem inneren Zusammenhange, Wirzburg 1878. 
 —A. Kranich, Uber die Empfinglichkeit der menschlichen Na- 
 tur fiir die Giiter der iibernatiirlichen Ordnung nach der Lehre 
 
 26 Comment. in Quatuor Libros suis principiis naturae,... sed ex 
 
 Sent., II, dist. 31, qu. 1, art. 2, ad 
 35 
 
 27 Disease, pain, etc. 
 
 28 Sadness, disgust, etc. 
 
 29Cfr. St. Thom., Comment. in 
 Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 19, 
 qu. 1, art. 4: “Immortalitas illa 
 et impassibilitas, quam homo habuit 
 in primo statu, non inerat sibi ex 
 
 beneficio Conditoris; unde naturals 
 proprie dict non potest, nist forte 
 naturale dicatur omne illud, quod 
 natura incipiens accepit.” 
 
 30 Cfr. on the whole subject of 
 this thesis A. M. Weiss, Apologie 
 des Christentums, Vol. III, 4th ed.: 
 “ Natur und Ubernatur,’ Freiburg 
 1907. 
 
196 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY. 
 
 des hl. Augustin und des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Mainz 1892.— 
 A. M. Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. III, 4th ed., Frei- 
 burg 1907.— *J. B. Terrien, La Grace et la Gloire ou la Filiation 
 Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu, etc., Paris 1897.— A. Rademacher, 
 Die wbernatiirliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und 
 johanneischen Theologie, Freiburg 1903.— W. Humphrey, “ His 
 Divine Majesty,” pp. 283 sqq., London 1897.— Bainvel, Nature et 
 Surnaturel, Paris 1903.—Pohle, “Natur und Ubernatur,” in 
 Esser-Mausbach, Religion, Christentum und Kirche, Vol. I, pp. 
 315-469, Kempten IgI11. 
 
 AR SICLE 2 
 
 MAN’S SUPERNATURAL ENDOWMENT IN PARADISE 
 
 Having theoretically defined the extent and character 
 of the supernatural and preternatural prerogatives of 
 grace, we now proceed to demonstrate that our first 
 parents actually enjoyed these prerogatives in Paradise. 
 Without this fundamental truth it is impossible to under- 
 stand the dogma of original sin. We shall deal with the 
 subject in six connected theses. 
 
 Thesis I: Adam, the progenitor of the human 
 race, was endowed with sanctifying grace before the 
 Fall. 
 
 This proposition embodies a formally defined 
 dogma of the Catholic faith.’ 
 
 Proof. The Biblical argument can best be 
 stated in the form of a syllogism, the major and 
 minor premises of which rest on numerous Scrip- 
 tural texts:—Adam originally possessed that 
 which was restored by Christ; now Christ re- 
 
 1 Concil. Trid., Sess. V, can. 1 ef 2. 
 
MAN IN PARADISE 197 
 
 stored the lost state of justice, 7. e., sanctifying 
 erace;* consequently Adam originally possessed 
 sanctifying grace. 
 
 a) Some theologians have tried to prove this thesis 
 directly from Sacred Scripture; but their demonstra- 
 tions do not produce anything more than probability. 
 The text upon which they chiefly rely is Eph. IV, 24: 
 “Induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus 
 est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis — Put ye on the new 
 man, who according to God is created in justice and 
 holiness of truth.” But it is by no means certain that 
 St. Paul speaks of Adam in this passage. In fact it is 
 far more likely that he did not mean to advert to Adam 
 at all. In the first place, it is entirely foreign to the 
 Apostle’s manner of thinking to set up Adam as an ideal 
 of holiness,? and, secondly, the phrase novus homo ap- 
 plies far more fittingly to the “second Adam,” (1. e. 
 Christ), though this interpretation, too, is not strictly 
 demanded by the context. Probably St. Paul simply 
 wished to say: ‘‘ Be converted, become new creatures 
 through sanctifying grace.” | 
 
 Still less convincing is the argument based on Gen. I, 
 26: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem 
 nostram — Let us make man to our image and likeness.” 
 For though the example of several of the Fathers would 
 justify us in referring this passage to Adam’s super- 
 natural endowment, the literal sense is sufficiently safe- 
 guarded if we take it to mean merely that Adam bore 
 the natural likeness of His Creator.* 
 
 2 Cfr. Roma Ve t2esddss..L.Cor. ing certain other, equally weak ar- 
 XV, 45 saa. guments adduced from Sacred Scrip- 
 Bieter Cor. Vera. Sad. ture, see Chr. Pesch, Praelect. 
 
 4Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante Dogmat., t. III, ed. 3a, pp. 88 sq., 
 et Elevante, pp. 410 sqq. Concern- Friburgi 1908. 
 
198 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 b) The Fathers conceive the possession of 
 sanctifying grace with its attendant prerogatives 
 as a “deification” of the soul, and consequently 
 count it among the strictly supernatural gifts of 
 grace. “Deus hominem creavit accessu. ad 
 Deum detficandum,’ says, e. g., St. John Damas- 
 cene, “deificatum (Geovuevov) vero participatione 
 divinae illuminationis, non vero in essentiam di- 
 vinam mutatum.” ® 
 
 The belief of the Fathers may be gathered 
 partly from their formal doctrinal teaching, 
 partly from the way in which they inter- 
 preted Holy Scripture. Certain of the Greek 
 Fathers (e. g., SS. Basil and Cyril of Alexan- 
 dria), think the supernatural sanctification of 
 Adam is intimated in Gen. II, 7. They take 
 spiraculum vitae to mean the grace of the Holy 
 Ghost as a supernatural vital principle. Others 
 (SS. Irenzeus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine) 
 hold that imago Dei (Gen. I, 26) has reference 
 to Adam’s nature, while similitudo Dei describes 
 him as being in the state of sanctifying grace. 
 This is a rather arbitrary interpretation and open 
 to objections from the purely scientific point of 
 view; but the fact that it was adopted by these 
 Fathers sufficiently proves that, as witnesses to 
 Tradition, they firmly believed in the original 
 sanctity of our first parents.® 
 
 5 De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 12. can be seen from St. Thomas, 
 6 The teaching of the Schoolmen Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 95, art. 13 
 
MAN IN PARADISE 199 
 
 c) The question as to the precise instant when Adam 
 was raised to the state of supernatural grace, has long 
 been in dispute between the Thomists and the Scotists. 
 The Thomists hold that the elevation of man was con- 
 temporaneous with his creation, while the Scotists assert 
 that Adam was created in puris naturalibus, and that 
 an interval of time must consequently have elapsed be- 
 tween his creation and his elevation to the state of 
 grace. They contend that his elevation took place 
 at the moment when he was “put into the paradise 
 of pleasure, to dress it and to keep it.”’* The Scotist 
 view, which was shared by Hugh of St. Victor, Peter 
 Lombard, and St. Bonaventure, is founded chiefly on the 
 supposed necessity, on the part of Adam, of preparing 
 himself for justification, since he was not a child but a 
 full-grown man. In the early period of Scholastic the- 
 ology the Franciscan view was the prevailing one.* St. 
 Thomas demolished its main argument by showing that 
 Adam’s personal preparation for the grace of justifica- 
 tion must have been synchronous with the divine act of 
 Creation. “Cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus,” 
 he says, “nihil prohibet etiam in primo instant suae 
 creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse.”® Al-. 
 though the Tridentine Council purposely evaded this 
 controversy by substituting the phrase im iustitia con- 
 stitutus for in iustitia creatus in the original draft of 
 its canon on justification,’® the Thomistic view has ob- 
 
 St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, part. 
 V, cap. 1; Suarez, De Opere Sex 
 Dierum, III, 17. On the curious 
 attitude of Giles of Rome (Aegidius 
 Romanus; cfr. De Wulf-Coffey, His- 
 tory of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 
 361 sqq.) and Eusebius Amort, see 
 Scheeben, Dogmatik; Vol. II, pp. 
 194 sq., Freiburg 1878. 
 
 7 Gen, II, 15. 
 
 8 St. Thomas himself refers to it 
 as ‘“‘communior.” (Comment. in 
 Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 4, 
 arcing.) i 
 
 9 St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 
 O5;narty | Panads 5. 
 
 10) Sessiz V0) Camanit. yieery) balla- 
 vicini, Hist. Conc. Trid., VII, 9. 
 
200 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 tained all but universal currency since the fifteenth cen- 
 tury. * 
 
 Thesis II: Our first parents in Paradise were by 
 a special grace exempt from concupiscence. 
 
 This thesis may be qualified technically as 
 “doctrina catholica.” 
 
 Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches that 
 St. Paul calls concupiscence “sin,” “because it 
 originates in and inclines to sin.’ From this 
 dogmatic definition it follows that man was 
 free from concupiscence until after the Fall. 
 This special prerogative of our first parents in 
 Paradise is called the gift of integrity (donum 
 imtegritatis), because it effected a harmonious 
 relation between flesh and spirit by completely 
 subordinating man’s animal passions to his rea- 
 son. 
 
 a) That this harmony was a prerogative of 
 our first parents in Paradise is sufficiently indi- 
 cated by Holy Scripture. Gen. II, 25: “rat 
 autem uterque nudus, Adam scil. et uxor eius, et 
 non erubescebant — And they were both naked: 
 to wit, Adam and his wife: and they were not 
 ashamed.” Shame among savages spells want of 
 pride or decency; in children it flows from inno- 
 cence. Adam and Eve were certainly not shame- 
 less, because the Bible tells us that after the Fall 
 
 11 For the teaching of the Fath- Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t 
 ers on this disputed point consult III, ed. 3a, pp. 94 saq. 
 
MAN IN PARADISE 201 
 
 a feeling of disgrace suddenly overwhelmed 
 them. Nor were they wild, uncivilized savages. 
 The Sacred Writer represents them as perfect 
 and highy developed human:beings. Hence the 
 fact of their not being ashamed must have been 
 due to a state of childlike innocence, in which 
 the evil impulses of sensuality were kept under 
 perfect control. There is no other satisfac- 
 tory explanation. It has been suggested that 
 our first parents were blind and could not see 
 each other. But the phrase upon which this 
 interpretation is based, viz.: “And the eyes 
 of them both were opened,” *? plainly refers to 
 their spiritual vision. St. [renzeus’s theory that 
 Adam and Eve were infants,’* is refuted by the 
 fact that God commanded them to “increase and 
 multiply.” ™ 
 
 That our first parents enjoyed complete im- 
 munity from concupiscence follows with still 
 greater cogency from St. Paul’s referring to 
 the carnal law which works in our members as 
 “sin.” *° This carnal law, or concupiscence, is 
 not a sin in itself, but, in the Tridentine phrase, 
 
 12 Gen. -IIl, 7. 
 
 18 Adv. Haer., III, 22, 4: “ Non 
 intellectum habebant filiorum gen- 
 erandorum, oportebat enim  illos 
 primo adolescere, dein sic multipli- 
 cari.” 
 
 14Gen, I, 28. Cfr. also Gen. II, 
 23 sq.: “*And Adam. said: This 
 now is bone of my bones, and flesh 
 
 of my flesh; she shall be called 
 woman, because she was taken out 
 of man. Wherefore a man_ shall 
 leave father and mother, and shall 
 cleave to his wife: and they shall 
 be two in one flesh.’’ ’ 
 
 15 Peccatum, duapria, Rom. VII, 
 16 sqq. 
 
202 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 “originates in and inclines [man] to sin.” %° 
 Concupiscence cannot have existed prior to the 
 sin of Adam, because an effect cannot precede 
 its cause, and consequently our first parents in 
 Paradise were exempt from concupiscence. 
 
 b) The Fathers were so firmly persuaded of the nat- 
 ural integrity of our first parents in Paradise that some 
 of them (e. g., Athanasius,’ Gregory of Nyssa,!® and 
 John Damascene)* derived marriage from original sin. 
 This was, of course, an unjustifiable exaggeration. 
 Sexual propagation does not exclude natural integrity, 
 and there can scarcely be a doubt that matriage would 
 have been instituted even if man had remained in the 
 state of innocence.?° It was such considerations as these, 
 no doubt, that prompted St. Augustine to retract 21 his 
 earlier dictum that, had the human race preserved its 
 primitive innocence and grace, propagation would have 
 been asexual. The primitive Tradition was most clearly 
 brought out in the controversy with the Pelagians, who 
 maintained that concupiscence was a vigor rather than 
 a defectus naturae. This view was energetically com- 
 bated by St. Augustine in his work De Nuptiis et Con- 
 cupiscentia.* In Contra Iulianum, by the same author, 
 freedom from concupiscence is explained to be a gift of 
 grace. The supernatural character of the prerogatives 
 
 16 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 5. cibo prohibito nuditas indicata nisi 
 AT In: Ps. 5a 7. peccato nudatum, quod gratia con- 
 18 De Opif. Hom., c. 17. tegebat? Gratia quippe Dei magna 
 19 De Fide Orth., II, 30. ibi erat, ubi terrenum et animale 
 20 For a detailed discussion of corpus bestialem libidinem non habe- 
 this point consult St. Thomas, S. bat. Qui ergo vestitus gratia non 
 Theol., 1a, qu. 95, 98 sq. habebat in nudo corpore, quod pude- 
 21 Retract., I, 109. ret, spoliatus gratid sensit, quod 
 
 22Cfr. also his Contr. LIulian., operire deberet.’’ 
 IV, 16, 82: “Quid est gustato 
 
MAN IN PARADISE 203 
 
 enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise is emphasized 
 also by some of the other Fathers.** 
 
 c) From the purely theological point of view it will 
 be well to explain that man has a twofold appetite, viz., 
 the sensitive appetite (appetitus sensitivus) and the will 
 (appetitus rationalis). Each of these faculties has its 
 own circle of good by which it is attracted, and its own 
 sphere of evil by which it is repelled. The sensitive 
 appetite can seek only sensitive things, whereas the will 
 is able to strive after intellectual goods as well (e. g., 
 virtue, honor). The sensitive appetite is inordinate 
 when it rebels against reason, and in every such case 
 the will can attain the higher spiritual good only by 
 dint of vigorous resistance. Unfortunately the appetitus 
 rationalis (or will) is also affected by an immanent 
 tendency to reject that which is truly good in favor of 
 what is good only in appearance (sin). Rom. VII, 17 
 sqq.: “ Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod 
 habitat in me peccatum [1. e., concupiscentia]. ... St 
 autem quod nolo, illud facio, iam non ego operor illud, 
 sed quod habitat in me peccatum.... Video autem 
 aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis 
 meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati, quae est m 
 membris mets — Now then it is no more I that do it, 
 but sin that dwelleth in me. Now if I do that which 
 I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that 
 dwelleth in me. . .. I see another law in my members, 
 fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating 
 me in the law of sin, that is in my members.” 
 
 This inordinate leaning of human nature towards evil, 
 which is called concupiscence, exerts itself most violently 
 in the pars concupiscibilis of the lower soul life (libido, 
 
 2a rcs Casini, Quid est Homo? art. 4, ed. Scheeben, Moguntiae 1862. 
 
204 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 gula). But in a wider sense the inordinate affections of 
 the pars irascibilis (as anger, jealousy, pugnacity) like- 
 Wise pertain to concupiscence. In our first parents all 
 these passions were kept in due subjection by virtue of 
 the donum integritatis.*4 
 
 Theologians differ as to how man in Paradise was 
 enabled to keep his passions under the absolute control 
 of reason. Durandus held that God infused a preter- 
 natural habitus into the sensitive element of human na- 
 ture; Scotus, that such an habitus was infused into the 
 will ; Cajetan, that God established the proper equilibrium 
 Beveen man’s higher and lower nature. simply by 
 strengthening his intellect. The problem is not as simple 
 as it appears. The variety of the psychological factors 
 involved, and the wide scope which must be assigned to 
 the will, seem to postulate a rather complicated endow- 
 ment which enriched the various higher and lower fac- 
 ulties of the soul with habits and enabled these habits to 
 co-operate harmoniously.” The problem may be simpli- 
 fied by assuming that divine Providence exercised a 
 special external governance by carefully removing all 
 occasions apt to provoke an outbreak of man’s animal 
 passions, and in case of actual danger simply withholding 
 the necessary concursus. On the other hand we must 
 be careful not to exaggerate the donum integritatis, else 
 the Fall of our first parents would appear inexplicable, 
 nay impossible. The question whether by virtue of the 
 gift of natural integrity Adam and Eve were able to 
 commit venial sin, has been answered affirmatively by 
 
 24 Cfr. (Gal. : V;. 17. art. 4; Mangenot, art. “ Arbres de 
 
 25 Cir. Suarez, De Opere Sex a Vie, etc.” in Vigouroux’s Dic- 
 Dierum, III, 12; St. Augustine, tionnaire de la Bible, Vol. I, cols. 
 
 De Civitate Dei, XX, 20; XIV, 26; 895 sqq., Paris 1895. 
 St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 97, 
 
MAN IN PARADISE 205 
 
 Scotus and Gabriel Biel, against Albert the Great, 
 Aquinas, and Bonaventure, and we are inclined to adopt 
 
 the Scotist view. For, as Schell correctly remarks: 
 “Adam, as he was actually constituted, must have been 
 liable to err in non-essentials, seeing that he was able to 
 go astray in matters of decisive moment.” *° 
 
 Thesis III: Our first parents before the Fall were 
 endowed with bodily immortality. 
 
 This proposition is strictly of faith.?‘ 
 
 Proof. By immortality we here understand 
 neither the natural immortality of the soul,*”* nor 
 the glorious immortality to be enjoyed by the 
 Elect after the resurrection of the flesh, but an 
 intermediate prerogative peculiar to man’s orig- 
 inal state of justice in Paradise.” In that state, 
 according to St. Augustine,*” man was immortal, 
 not because he could not die (non posse mort), 
 but simply because it was not necessary that he 
 should die (posse non mort). This Paradisaical 
 immortality must have been a_preternatural 
 grace, because it constituted no strict postulate 
 of human nature.** 
 
 The Scriptural argument for our thesis rests 
 on the story of the Fall as recorded in Gene- 
 sis. Under penalty of death God had forbidden 
 
 26 Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 303. ai Citi So Phoms Sand heol.y \ta, 
 
 27/Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. I. qu. 97, art. 2: “ Vis illa_praeser- 
 
 28 Supra, pp. I51 sqq. vandi corpus a corruptione non erat 
 
 29 Cir. St) Dhomas,(S: Theol., za, animae humanae naturalis, sed per 
 Qis5O75) artes Ls ; donum gratiae.” 
 
 30De Gen. ad Lit., VI, 25, 36. 
 
200 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 our first parents to eat of the tree of knowl- 
 edge. “For in what day soever thou shalt eat 
 of it, thou shalt die the death.” #2 After the 
 Fall He pronounced sentence as follows: “Dust 
 thou art, and into dust thou shalt return.” 2° 
 From all of which it is quite evident that, had 
 Adam never sinned, he would not have been 
 under the necessity of dying. Cfr. Wisd. II, 23 
 sq.: “Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem *4 
 et ad imaginem similitudinis suae fecit illum. 
 Invidia autem diaboli mors introivit in orbem ter- 
 rarum — God created man incorruptible, and to 
 the image of his own likeness he made him. But 
 by the envy of the devil, death came into the 
 world.” St. Paul represents the death of Adam 
 and all his descendants as a divinely inflicted 
 punishment for sin. Rom. V, 12: “Per unum 
 hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit et 
 per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors 
 pertransut — As by one man sin entered into this 
 world, and by sin death; and so death passed 
 upon all men.” 
 
 The Fathers unanimously echo the teaching of 
 Scripture on this point. 
 
 What part the “tree of knowledge ” (DTyY) played 
 in the preservation of life is not apparent. From the 
 
 32 The Hebrew text has: noon 83 Gen, III, 109. 
 
 , % 34 én’ adbapola 
 MW , literally: “Thou wilt have , isha nih x 
 to die.”” (Gen. II, 17.) 
 
MAN IN PARADISE 207 
 
 words of Jehovah quoted in Gen. III, 22 sq., we know that 
 to eat of its fruit was a necessary condition of 1m- 
 mortality: “Now, therefore, lest perhaps he [Adam] 
 put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, 
 and eat, and live forever, ... the Lord sent him out 
 of the paradise of pleasure.” This passage has led 
 some of the Fathers to regard the tree of life as ddppaxov 
 tis a0avacias. Others explain it allegorically.*° 
 
 Thesis IV: Our first parents were also endowed 
 with an infused knowledge of natural and supernat- 
 ural truth. 
 
 Proof. Sanctifying grace, freedom from con- 
 cupiscence, and immortality of the body were a 
 heritage of Paradise, and as such destined to 
 descend to all of Adam’s children. Besides these 
 our first parents possessed as a fourth strictly 
 personal prerogative, an unusual measure of nat- 
 ural and supernatural knowledge. 
 
 a) While the Bible nowhere explicitly refers to Adam’s 
 natural knowledge as infused (sctentia infusa), we have 
 sufficient Scriptural warrant for holding that it could 
 not have been acquired by ordinary human means. It 
 must have been infused knowledge which enabled Adam 
 immediately after his creation to call all the beasts of 
 the earth and the fowls of the air by their proper 
 names ** and intuitively to understand the nature and 
 mission of Eve.?7 St. Augustine observes that Adam 
 “yniversis generibus animarum vivarum nonina wm- 
 posuit, quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae 
 
 35 Cfr. Suarez, De Op. Sex Dier., 36 Gen. II, 19 sqq. 
 TT rasa. 87 Gen, IT, 23. 
 
208 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 im saecularibus etiam libris legimus. Nam ipse Pytha- 
 goras ... dixisse fertur, illum fuisse omnium sapien- 
 tissimum, qui vocabula primis indidit rebus.? 38 
 
 A further confirmation of our thesis may be found 
 in Helis, OVID, ig usa Fe Disciplina intellectus re- 
 plevit illos, creavit [1. e. infudit] illis scientiam Spiritus, 
 sensu implevit cor illorum, et mala et bona ostendit 
 hs — He filled them with the knowledge of under- 
 standing, he created in [i. e., infused into] them the 
 science of the spirit, he filled their heart with wisdom, 
 and shewed them both good and evil.’ What we can 
 learn only by dint of painstaking application, Adam and 
 Eve knew by virtue of infused knowledge; which is not, 
 of course, equivalent to saying that their knowledge was 
 substantially different from ours.®® 
 
 That the progenitors of the human race should be 
 endowed with infused knowledge was meet and con- 
 gruous for three reasons, to wit: (1) The Creator 
 could not in justice abandon grown-up men to complete 
 ignorance in. matters of religion and morality; (2) 
 Adam and Eve had no parents or teachers to give them 
 the necessary instruction; and (3) As the head of the 
 human race, Adam was destined to be its natural guide 
 and teacher.*° 
 
 b) The knowledge of our first parents must have 
 extended to the domain of the Supernatural. Above all 
 they must have been cognizant of their final destiny. 
 This follows from the fact of their elevation to the 
 
 38 Op. Imperf. contr. Iulian., V, 
 I. 
 
 39 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 
 qu. 94, art. 3, ad 3: “ Primus 
 homo habuit scientiam omnium re- 
 rum per species a Deo infusas, nec 
 tamen scientia illa fuit alterius ra- 
 
 tionis @ scientia nostra, sicut nec 
 ocult, quos caeco nato Christus 
 dedit, fuerunt alterius rationis ab 
 oculis, quos natura produxit.” 
 
 40 Cfr. St. Thomas, SS. Theol., 1a, 
 qu. 94, art. 3. 
 
MAN IN PARADISE | 209 
 
 state of grace,** which can be preserved only by means of 
 external revelation and internal acts of faith, hope, and 
 charity. Our first parents, be it remembered, were 
 adults, not children. 
 
 As regards the precise character of their supernatural 
 knowledge, they must have had supernatural faith, be- 
 cause without faith “it is impossible to please God.” * 
 St. Bonaventure was hardly justified in denying ** that 
 Adam and Eve in Paradise had faith, on the ground that 
 “faith cometh by hearing.” ¢* Until he attains to the 
 beatific vision of God, man must necessarily walk in the 
 twilight of faith, which, in the words of the Apostle,*® 
 “is the substance of things to be hoped for.” 
 
 The extent of Adam’s supernatural knowledge is a 
 problem open to debate. This much, however, is cer- 
 tain: He must have known, as he was bound to believe 
 in, the existence of God and eternal retribution in the 
 life beyond, because Sacred Scripture teaches that an 
 explicit knowledge of these two truths is necessary for 
 salvation (necessitate medii).4® In addition to this 
 knowledge Adam probably had a belief in the Blessed 
 Trinity and the future Incarnation of the Logos.‘ 
 
 c) Any attempt to ascertain the extent of Adam’s 
 natural knowledge would lead us from solid ground into 
 the domain of more or less hazardous speculation. The 
 Schoolmen, as a rule, were inclined to exaggerate the 
 intellectual powers of our progenitor. To reduce specu- 
 lation to reasonable bounds, St. Thomas. Aquinas laid 
 
 41 Cfr. First Thesis, supra, p. 196. 46 Heb. XI, 6: ‘* Without faith 
 
 42 Heb. XI, 6. it is impossible to please God. For 
 
 43 Comment. in Quatuor Libros he that cometh to God, must believe 
 Sent., II, disp. 23, art. 2, qu. 3. that he is, and is a rewarder to 
 
 44 Rom. X, 17. them that seek him.” 
 
 45“ Est fides sperandarum sub- 47 Cfr. Suarez, De Op. Sex Die- 
 
 Stantia rerum.” Heb. XI, 1. rum, III, 18. 
 
210 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 down two hard and fast rules. The first is: Adam 
 depended on phantasms for his intellectual concepts; 
 whence it follows: (a) That, unlike the human soul 
 of Christ, he was not endowed with beatific vision here 
 on earth,*® (8) that he could have no intuitive but only 
 an abstractive knowledge of the nature of the Angels,*® 
 and (y) that he had no intuitive knowledge of his own 
 soul. The second rule laid down by St. Thomas is: 
 In the domain of nature Adam had a perfect infused 
 knowledge only with regard to such things as were in- 
 dispensable to enable himself and his descendants to 
 live in conformity with the laws of reason. This does 
 not mean that he was not compelled to learn and to 
 inquire, or that he was unable to progress in matters 
 of science and culture. There is no reason whatever 
 for assuming that Adam was acquainted with the Coper- 
 nican world-view, the stellar parallaxes, spectrum analy- 
 sis, electricity, X-rays, or the infinitesimal calculus. The 
 progenitor of the human race was well able to dispense 
 with a knowledge of such abstruse scientific matters as 
 these. Besides, had he possessed such knowledge, tra- 
 dition would surely have preserved fragments of it. The 
 typical exemplar of Adam’s natural attainments, there- 
 fore, is not the human knowledge of our Lord and 
 Saviour Jesus Christ, whom Holy Scripture calls ‘“ the 
 second Adam,” but the wisdom of Solomon. It is worthy 
 of note, in this connexion, that the Scholastics were not 
 
 all persuaded that Adam was wiser than Solomon.* 
 Another question has been raised, vig.: Was Adam 
 gifted with infallibility in his capacity as teacher and 
 48 Cir. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 94, art. Dierum, III, 9, 29. On the human 
 knowledge of Christ, we must refer 
 
 49 Ibid., art. 2. the student to the dogmatic treatise 
 50 Cir. Suarez, De Opere Sex on the Incarnation. 
 
 x 
 
“MAN IN PARADISE ey 
 
 guide of the human race? On this point, too, it is im- 
 possible to form a certain conclusion. St. Thomas sets 
 up some strong arguments to show that Adam was in- 
 fallible: “ Sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum 
 est malum eius. ... Unde non poterat esse, quod in- 
 nocentia manente intellectus hominis alicui falso ac- 
 quiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis 
 primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionts alicuius, 
 puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat, 
 ita im intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, 
 nulla tamen poterat 1bi esse existimatio falsi.’*+  Con- 
 sidering that when ordinary mortals go astray, it is usu- 
 ally due to the fact that the will is too weak to resist and 
 control passion and prejudice, it is highly probable, to say 
 the least, that our first parents in Paradise, keen-witted, 
 unprejudiced, and dispassionate as they were, gave their 
 assent only to what was evidently true, and cautiously 
 felt their way whenever the evidence was insufficient or 
 unconvincing. . 
 
 d) We now come to another difficult problem, to wit: 
 How did speech originate? The Bible says: ‘“ Omne 
 enim, quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est 
 nomen eius— For whatsoever Adam called any living 
 creature, the same is its name.”®? This text would 
 seem to indicate the existence of a primitive language. 
 The naming of the different creatures may be explained 
 either naturally or preternaturally. In the last-men- 
 tioned hypothesis Adam must have received language 
 ready made by a miraculous infusion from God. Those 
 who prefer the natural explanation hold that the first 
 human idiom was evolved by virtue of a native im- 
 pulse. Both explanations have found ardent defenders 
 
 51S. Theol., 1a, qu. 94, art. 4. 52 Gen. II, 19. 
 
212 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 among theologians, philosophers, and exegetes. Until 
 quite recently it was pretty generally held that Adam 
 received the Hebrew language directly from God as 
 a ready-made and perfect medium of speech.®* This 
 belief was shared by a nineteenth-century exegete of 
 the unquestioned ability of Fr. Kaulen, who was im- 
 pressed in favor of Hebrew by the following facts: 
 (1) In no other language is there such an intimate rela- 
 tion between nouns and their objects; (2) the peculiar 
 Hebrew use of three consonants is based upon a variation 
 of the third letter and closely resembles logical defini- 
 tion by proximate genus and specific difference. These 
 important phenomena are especially interesting from the 
 viewpoint of the philosophy of language. Yet the theory 
 can hardly be upheld. Comparative Philology shows 
 that ancient Hebrew is the product of a well-defined 
 process of evolution, and therefore cannot be the orig- 
 inal language of the human race. Onomatopoeia is com- 
 mon to all civilized languages.°* The discovery that the 
 inflected languages (Semitic and Aryan) are derived 
 from the agglutinative (Turanian group), and these in 
 turn from the isolating tongues,°> has led philologians 
 to surmise that the primitive idiom of the human race 
 consisted exclusively of simple, uninflected root-words. 
 On philological grounds, not to speak of others, it seems 
 reasonable to assume that the first man possessed a 
 onomatopoeic (and the  interjec- 
 
 tional) principles is extremely lim- 
 ited, many apparent instances of 
 
 53 Cfr. Ben. Pererius, S. J., Com- 
 ment. im Gen., II, 20 (Romae 
 1591): “Lingua vero, quam a 
 
 primo habuit Adam [a Deo] et 
 secundum quam imposuit animali- 
 bus nomina, concessu omnium he- 
 braeca fuit.’’ 
 
 54 This feature has, however, been 
 greatly exaggerated. Max Miller 
 holds that the efficiency of the 
 
 onomatopoeia not being really so. 
 Cfr. M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 
 4th ed., p. 456, London 1900. 
 
 55 An isolating language is one 
 of simple, uninflected root-words. 
 Chinese has never developed beyond 
 this stage. 
 
MAN IN PARADISE 213 
 
 highly developed intellect and created his own language 
 by forming monosyllabic root-words. This theory gains 
 additional probability from the fact that the original 
 Semitic root-formations closely correspond to the process 
 of intellectual conception and bear all the earmarks 
 of human invention. The names which Adam gave 
 to various creatures, and which can still be ascertained 
 from a study of ancient Semitic roots, are in each 
 case based on some characteristic note representing a 
 universal concept abstracted from a phantasm. Thus 
 the word “moon,” mensis, Greek piv, Gothic ména, 
 Sanskrit mds and masa, is derived from MA, 1. e., “to 
 measure,” from which root was formed MAN, 2. e., “to 
 think,” which in its turn furnished the etymon of such 
 words as mens, man, Sanskrit mana.*® 
 
 Strangely enough, in rejecting the antiquated notions 
 of the Hebraists, modern Comparative Philology has un- 
 consciously reverted to the scientific view-point of the 
 Fathers, who regarded primitive speech as a purely hu- 
 man invention. St. Augustine, for example, extols the 
 transcendent genius of Adam as revealed in naming 
 the different creatures passing before his eyes, and 
 lays down the general proposition: “ Jllud quod est in 
 nobis rationale, . . . vidit esse imponenda rebus vocabula, 
 1. €. significantes quosdam sonos. ... Sed audir verba 
 absentium non poterant: ergo illa ratio peperit litteras, 
 notatis omnibus oris ac linguae sonis atque discretis.’” ** 
 St. Gregory of Nyssa, who discusses the probable origin 
 of language at some length,®* vigorously defends the 
 opinion of his teacher, St. Basil, that language is a 
 human invention. Against the objections of Eunomius 
 he lays down the thesis that, endowed as they were by na- 
 
 56 Cir. C. Gutberlet, Psychologie, 57 De Ordine, II, 12, 35. 
 3rd ed., p. 133, Miinster 1896. i) 58 Contr. Eunom., 1. 12. 
 
214 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 ture with both reflexion and the power of making signs, 
 men could not but learn to communicate their ideas to one 
 another.®® This opinion, which is the most ancient, is 
 probably also the correct one, because it conforms to 
 the sane and sound principle that secondary causes must 
 be credited with all the power they are able to exert.®° 
 
 Thesis V: Bound up with the prerogatives already 
 mentioned was the impassibility of our first parents 
 in Paradise. 
 
 This proposition embodies a common teaching 
 of Catholic theologians. 
 
 Proof. The impassibility with which man will 
 be endowed after the resurrection of the flesh 
 must be conceived as non posse pati, 1. €., aS in- 
 capability of suffering. The impassibility of our 
 first parents in Paradise, on the other hand, con- 
 sisted in posse non pati, 1. e., in the non-necessity 
 
 59 Cfr. Maher, Psychology, p. 455- 
 
 60 Cfr. Max Miller, Lectures on 
 the Science of Language, 2 vols., 
 London 1880. “Apart from the 
 question of the original fund of 
 root-sounds,” says Fr. Maher, l. ¢., 
 p. 457, n., “which is equally a 
 difficulty to all purely rational the- 
 ories— Miiller’s general doctrine 
 seems plausible. The fierce conflict, 
 however, which still prevails on 
 most fundamental questions of the 
 science of Comparative Philology, 
 makes one feel that beyond the 
 limited region of common agree- 
 ment even the most attractive hy- 
 potheses are extremely hazardous. 
 . . . Opposed equally to Max Miller 
 and Schleicher is the chief Amer- 
 ican philologist, Professor Whitney. 
 
 With him language, which separates 
 man from the brute, is essentially a 
 voluntary invention, an ‘ institu- 
 tion’ like government, and ‘is in 
 all its parts arbitrary and conven- 
 tional.’ (Life and Growth of Lan- 
 guage, p. 282.) Steinthal’s teaching 
 increases the novelty; and Heyse, 
 who stands to Hegel as Schleicher 
 
 _ to Darwin, evolved a mystical creed 
 
 on the subject, in unison with the 
 spirit of his master’s philosophy.” 
 An account of the various theories 
 is given in Sayce’s Introduction to 
 the Science of Languages, Vol. I, c. 
 1, London 1875. On the dogmatic 
 aspect of the question the reader 
 may profitably consult Chr. Pesch, 
 Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. III, 3rd 
 ed., pp. 112 sqq. 
 
MAN IN PARADISE 215 
 
 of suffering. They irretrievably forfeited this 
 prerogative for themselves and their descendants 
 by sin. The Biblical argument for our thesis 
 is based upon the fact that Paradise was a 
 “garden of pleasure.” °* Whether we interpret 
 this term literally, as most exegetes do, or meta- 
 phorically after the example of Philo, Origen, 
 and others, it is certain that our first parents 
 in the Garden were free from pain and suffer- 
 ing. They led a life of unalloyed pleasure 
 and pure delight. The pains of parturition and 
 hard labor are punishments inflicted for sin. 
 The immortality of the body with which the 
 Creator had endowed Adam and Eve, necessarily 
 excluded all those sufferings and infirmities | 
 which are the harbingers of death, while the 
 gift of integrity (donum integritatis) effectively 
 stopped the principal source of mental sorrow 
 and temptation, which is concupiscence. St. 
 Augustine gives an alluring description of the 
 life of our first parents in his great work De 
 Civitate Dei: “Vivebat homo in paradiso, sicut 
 volebat, quamdiu volebat, quod Deus iusserat. 
 Vivebat sie ulla egestate, ita semper vivere 
 habens in potestate. . .. Nihil corruptionis in 
 corpore vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius 
 61 ys {2 Which the Septuagint in the Canticle of Canticles IV, 13, 
 
 it is called sy55. 
 renders by tmapddewos, the Vul- pI 
 gate by paradisus voluptatis; in later 62 Gen. ITI, 16 sqq. 
 portions of the Old Testament, e. I> 
 
216 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, 
 nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in 
 carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas. ... 
 Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum. 
 . .. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non som- 
 nus premebat invitum.” °° 
 
 The “golden age’ so enthusiastically cele- 
 brated in the folklore of many nations repre- 
 sents but a faint recollection of the state of our 
 first parents in the Garden of Pleasure.** 
 
 Thesis VI: The five prerogatives enjoyed by our 
 first parents in Paradise were organically interrelated 
 so that the preternatural graces served as a comple- 
 ment to the supernatural state of grace, and the pres- 
 ervation of the former was causally dependent on the 
 retention of the latter. Theologians therefore justly 
 characterize.this primitive state as “the state of orig- 
 inal justice and sanctity.” 
 
 This thesis embodies a doctrine common to all 
 theological schools. 
 
 Proof. Sanctifying grace and its preternat- 
 ural concomitants were not necessarily inter- 
 dependent, else they could not exist separately 
 in the present state of repaired nature. Their 
 harmonious combination in Paradise was a free 
 institution oLithe, Uneatory) Sacted, Scripture 
 tells us that the loss of sanctifying grace en- 
 
 63 De Civit. Dei, XIV, 26. 
 64 Cir. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 102. 
 
MAN IN PARADISE 217 
 
 tailed the forfeit of the preternatural gifts en- 
 joyed by our first parents in the Garden. After 
 the Fall, concupiscence, until then properly sub- 
 dued, suddenly became rebellious,°® death as- 
 sumed sway over the human race,** and all man- 
 ner of suffering followed.°’ By the Redemption 
 the race recovered its lost supernatural destiny; 
 but the bond that originally connected sanctify- 
 ing grace with the preternatural gifts enjoyed by 
 our first parents in Paradise was never restored. 
 
 Catholic theologians are not, however, agreed as to 
 the precise meaning of the term original justice (iustitia 
 originalis).°§ The majority take it to signify not the 
 state of integral nature, as such, nor yet mere sanctifying 
 grace, but the aggregate of all those organically corre- 
 lated prerogatives which constituted the state of our 
 first parents in Paradise. With the exception of in- 
 fused science, this state of original justice was not a 
 purely personal privilege, but a natural endowment which 
 Adam was to transmit to all his descendants. This dis- 
 tinction explains why the sin of our first parents is trans- 
 mitted to all men by propagation. 
 
 READINGS: — St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 94-102, and the 
 commentators.— Bellarmine, De Gratia Primi Hominis.— Suarez, 
 De Opere Sex Dierum, 1, III, c. 1 sqq.— *Casini, Quid est Homo? 
 ed. Scheeben, Moguntiae 1862.— Lohan, Das Paradies nach der 
 Lehre der katholischen Kirche, Mainz 1874—— Fr. Delitzsch, Wo 
 lag das Paradies? Leipzig 1881.— Oswald, Religidse Urgeschichte 
 dey Menschheit, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1887.— A. Urbas, Die Geo- 
 
 65 Gen. III, 7. 68 Cfr. Bellarmine, De Gratia 
 66 Gen. III, 19. Primi Elominis, cap. 3. 
 67 Gen. III, 16, e¢ passim. 
 
 15 
 
218 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 logie und das Paradies, Laibach 1889.— W. Engelkemper, Die 
 Paradiesesfliisse, Minster 1901— S. J. Hunter,-S. J., Outlines of 
 Dogmatic Theology, Vol. Il, p. 373 sqq., London 1895.— W. Hum- 
 phrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,’ pp. 338 sqq., London 1897. 
 —F. Vigouroux, art. “Paradis Terrestre” in the Dictionnaire 
 de la Bible, Vol. IV. 
 
 ARTICLE 3 
 
 VARIOUS HERESIES VS. THE DOGMATIC TEACHING OF THE 
 CHURCH IN REGARD TO THE STATE OF ORIG- 
 INAL JUSTICE 
 
 The doctrine set forth in the preceding Article 
 has in process of time been impugned by three 
 great heresies; by Pelagianism in the early days 
 of Christianity, by Protestantism at the begin- 
 ning of the sixteenth century, and in modern 
 times by Jansenism. 
 
 1, PELAGIANISM.—Pelagianism, which flour- 
 ished in the fifth century, held that the state of 
 our first parents in Paradise was not one of 
 supernatural grace, but essentially and purely a 
 natural state: .°” 
 
 a) In consequence of this fundamental fallacy the Pe- 
 lagians denied the necessity and gratuity of actual grace, 
 nay the very existence of original sin. They admitted 
 that Adam possessed sanctifying grace, with its claim 
 to the beatific vision of God, and that he enjoyed 
 freedom from concupiscence, but insisted that man can 
 merit Heaven and attain to absolute sinlessness by his 
 own free volition, unaided and without transcending 
 
PELAGIANISM 219 
 
 his natural faculties. Concupiscence, according to the 
 Pelagians, is not a punishment for sin, nor yet, prop- 
 erly speaking, an inherent defect of human nature, 
 it is simply a vigor naturae, the ordinate or inordinate 
 use of which depends entirely on man’s free will. To 
 bolster the fiction that our first parents in Paradise were 
 in no essential respect superior to their descendants, 
 the Pelagians disparaged Adam’s bodily immortality and 
 impassibility, holding that the only deterioration which 
 mankind suffered in consequence of sin consists in this 
 that Adam’s descendants have his evil example and other 
 incitements to do wrong. Hence the Pelagian maxim: 
 “Peccatum imitatione, non propagatione,” that is, orig- 
 inal sin is not really a sin of nature, but merely a sin 
 of imitation. Aside from it, the condition of Adam’s 
 descendants is identical with that of their progenitor in 
 Paradise. 
 
 b) Against this arbitrary confusion of na- 
 ture with the Supernatural the Church has again 
 and again insisted that the sin of Adam resulted 
 in a real deterioration of human nature by rob- 
 bing it of sanctifying grace with its accompany- 
 ing prerogatives. That these prerogatives were 
 supernatural was not at first expressly empha- 
 sized, but taught rather by implication. 
 
 The second council of Mileve, which was confirmed 
 by a plenary council held at Carthage, A.D. 418, and 
 by Pope Zosimus in his Tractoria, defined: “ Quicum- 
 que dixerit, Adam primum hominem mortalem fac- 
 tum, ita ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moreretur 
 in corpore, hoc est, de corpore exiret, non peccati merito, 
 
220 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 sed necessitate naturae, anathema sit.’1 This definition 
 embraces the following truths: (1) Adam _ enjoyed 
 immortality of the body; (2) he lost this immor- 
 tality through sin; (3) this loss was a punishment of 
 sin. 
 
 In 431, Pope Celestine I wrote to the Bishops of 
 Gaul against the Semi-Pelagians: “Jn praevaricatione 
 Adae omnes homines naturalem? possibilitatem et inno- 
 centiam perdidisse, et neminem de profundo illius ruinae 
 per liberum arbitrium posse consurgere, nisi eum gratia 
 Det miserantis erexerit — By the fall of Adam all men 
 lost their natural power and innocence, and no one can 
 rise from the depth of that ruination by [his own] 
 free-will, except the grace of a merciful God raise him 
 A ES ng | 
 
 Another important dogmatic pronouncement is con- 
 tained in the fifteenth and nineteenth canons of the 
 Second Council of Orange, A.D. 529. Canon 15 says: 
 “Ab eo, quod formavit Deus, mutatus est Adam, sed 
 in peius per iniquitatem suam. Ab eo, quod operata 
 est iniquitas, mutatur fidelis, sed in melius per gratiam 
 Christi — Adam was changed from that state in which 
 God created him, but he was changed for the worse by 
 his own iniquity. The faithful Christian is changed 
 from the state brought about by sin, but he is changed 
 for the better through the grace of Christ.” Canon 19: 
 “ Natura humana, etiamsi in.illa integritate [1. e. sanc- 
 titate|, in qua est condita, permaneret, nullo modo setp- 
 sam, Creatore suo non adiuvante, servaret. Unde cum 
 sine gratia Det salutem non possit custodire, quam ac- 
 cepit, quomodo sine Det gratia poterit reparare, quod 
 
 1Canon 1, quoted in Denzinger- 8 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridi- 
 
 Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 101. on, N, 130. 
 2See supra, pp. 184 sq. 
 
PROTESTANTISM 221 
 
 perdidit? — Human nature, even if it had remained in 
 the state of integrity [7. e. holiness] in which it was 
 created by God, could in no wise have preserved [this 
 prerogative] without the divine assistance. Hence, if it 
 was unable without the grace of God to keep the salva- 
 tion which it had received, how should it have been able 
 without the assistance of that grace to regain that which 
 it had lost?” 4 
 
 That the lost prerogatives were supernatural can be 
 inferred from these definitions by the following process 
 of reasoning: What is due to human nature on account 
 of its creation, its conservation, and the divine con- 
 cursus, er vt notionis can never be lost. Now the 
 Church teaches that by original sin Adam and his prog- 
 eny lost sanctifying grace, together with its concomitant 
 prerogatives. Therefore the lost endowment was not 
 due to human nature, but a gratuitous favor, in other 
 words, it was a pure grace. Sanctifying grace, in par- 
 ticular, was essentially identical with that prerogative 
 which mankind regained through the Redemption. But 
 this latter favor is restored only per gratiam Christi, to 
 employ the Council’s own words, and therefore must be 
 supernatural in character. 
 
 2. PROTESTANTISM.—In the sixteenth century 
 erroneous notions on the subject of the original 
 state of the human race were propagated by the 
 so-called Protestant reformers, who; failing to 
 draw the proper distinction between nature and 
 the Supernatural, heretically affirmed that, besides 
 his preternatural prerogatives man by sin also 
 
 4Syn Arausic. II, can. 15 et 19. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, nn. 
 188, 192. 
 
222 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 lost certain essential properties of human nature 
 itself, such as the moral freedom of the will. 
 
 a) Practically this basic error culminated in the doc- 
 trine of man’s justification by faith alone (sola fide), 
 without co-operation on his part. Though Pelagianism 
 and Protestantism agree in acknowledging that man en- 
 joyed an ideal state in Paradise, they are yet diametri- 
 cally opposed to each other. For while Pelagianism con- 
 ceives original justice as a purely natural state, “ ortho- 
 dox ” Protestantism admits that it contained a divine ele- 
 ment, but falsely asserts that this element formed part 
 and parcel of the very nature of man. This identifica- 
 tion of the divine with the human, of nature with the 
 Supernatural is decidedly Pantheistic, and we need not 
 wonder, therefore, that many later Protestant theologians 
 (e. g., Schleiermacher) became true-blue Pantheists.° 
 
 b) Though the chief purpose of the Council 
 of Trent was to guard the dogmas of original 
 sin and justification, that holy ecumenical synod 
 left no doubt as to what is the orthodox teaching 
 of the Catholic Church concerning the original 
 state of man. 
 
 The Tridentine Fathers implicitly condemned Pelagian- 
 ism when they defined that Adam was created “in holi- 
 ness and justice,” but “immediately lost” this state of 
 grace, and thereby “ suffered deterioration both in body 
 and soul.” “Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem 
 Adam, quum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset trans- 
 gressus, statim sanctitatem et iustitiam, in qua consti- 
 
 5 Cfr. Oswald, Religidse Urgeschichte, p. 45, Paderborn 1887. 
 
 g 
 : 
 : 
 2 
 5 
 ' 
 3 
 e 
 Aik 
 
JANSENISM 223 
 
 tutus® fuerat, amisisse ... totumque Adam per illam 
 praevaricationis offensam secundum corpus et animam 
 in deterius commutatum fuisse, anathema sit’? This 
 deterioration of body and soul involved the loss of holi- 
 ness and justice, and also of the gift of integrity ® and 
 the immortality of the body.2 The two last-mentioned 
 prerogatives were supplanted by “ death and bodily pun- 
 ishments.” *° Since no one can “ lose” what he does not 
 possess, our first parents in Paradise must have actually 
 enjoyed sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, 
 immortality of the body, and impassibility. That these 
 prerogatives were supernatural is not expressly defined 
 by the Tridentine Council. 
 
 3. JANSENISM.—The Jansenists applied Prot- 
 estant principles to the domain of grace, which 
 was their chief field of operation, and tried by 
 various subterfuges to evade the dogmatic de- 
 ; crees of Trent. 
 
 a) Perhaps no other heresy has so deeply wounded the 
 Church as Jansenism, despite its oft-repeated pretence of 
 loyalty. The chief protagonists of this sect were Baius, 
 Jansenius, and Quesnel. One of their palmary teachings 
 was that the state of primitive justice was strictly due 
 to man, something “connatural to him,” a debitum na- 
 turae which the Creator owed in justice to mankind. 
 This assertion clearly involves a denial of the super- 
 natural character of grace, though Baius tried to veil 
 this inevitable conclusion by contending that to grant 
 
 6 Not creatus; see supra, p. 199. 
 
 7 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, c. Ie 
 
 8Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. V, 
 canon, 5: ‘“‘ Concupiscentia ... ex 
 peccato est.” 
 
 9 LE. '¢.3'\ can. 22“ Adam: . 
 incurrisse mortem, quam antea illi 
 comminatus fuerat Deus. 
 
 10L. c., can. 2: “‘ mortem et 
 poenas corporis.” 
 
224 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 grace and glory to a sinner might be called gratia se- 
 cundum quid. Other Jansenists asserted that sanctify- 
 ing grace was due to human nature as such, not to its 
 “works.” But it is quite obvious that what is debitum 
 naturae cannot at the same time be indebitum naturae, 
 1. €., a grace. 
 
 b) The Holy See upheld the true faith against 
 Jansenism in a long series of struggles, which 
 culminated in the explicit condemnation of this 
 dangerous heresy. 
 
 The most important ecclesiastical pronouncements 
 against Jansenism are: (a) The condemnation, by 
 Pius V (A.D. 1567), of seventy-nine propositions ex- 
 tracted from the writings of Baius; (b) the rejection 
 by Innocent X (A.D. 1653) of five theses formulated 
 by Jansenius himself; (c) the censures uttered by 
 Clement XI in the Bull “ Unigenitus” (A.D. 1713), 
 against one hundred and one propositions advocated by 
 Quesnel; and (d) the reprobation of the Jansenistic 
 decrees of the pseudo-synod of Pistoia by Pius VI in 
 his Bull “ Auctorem fidei” (A.D. 1794). In studying 
 the question of man’s original state of justice the errors 
 of Baius and Quesnel prove indirectly helpful, inasmuch 
 as their contradictories, though not formally defined ar- 
 ticles of faith, clearly embody the teaching of the 
 Church.14 
 
 The definition of the Supernatural which we have for- 
 mulated on a previous page is confirmed by the Church’s 
 official condemnation of the twenty-fourth proposition of 
 Baius, to wit: “A vanis et otiosis hominibus secundum 
 insipientiam philosophorum excogitata est sententia, homi- 
 
 11 Supra, p. 194. 
 
JANSENISM. 225 
 
 nem ab initio sic constitutum, ut per dona naturae super- 
 addita fuerit largitate conditoris sublimatus et in Filiwm 
 Det adoptatus.” The supernatural character of sanctify- 
 ing grace may be inferred from the condemnation of 
 the twenty-first proposition championed by Baius, viz.: 
 “Humane naturae sublimatio et exaltatio in consortium 
 divinae naturae debita fuit integritati primae conditionis, 
 et proinde naturalis dicenda est, et non supernaturalis,” 
 and likewise from the rejection of the thirty-fifth of the 
 Propositions extracted from the works of Quesnel, to 
 wit: “Gratia Adami est sequela creationis, et erat 
 debita naturae sanae et integrae.” 
 
 That Adam’s original immunity from concupiscence 
 Was a supernatural grace follows also from the con- 
 demnation of Baius’s twenty-sixth proposition: “ In- 
 tegritas primae creationis non fuit indebita humanae 
 naturae exaltatio, sed naturalis eius conditio.” 
 
 The Church’s teaching on the subject of the bodily 
 immortality of our first parents may be inferred from 
 the reprobation of proposition number seventy-eight, ex- 
 tracted from the writings of Baius: “ Immortalitas 
 primi hominis non erat gratiae beneficium, sed naturalis 
 conditio.” 18 
 
 To sum up the argument: It is a Catholic doctrine, 
 directly deducible from revelation (fidei proximum), that 
 sanctifying grace, exemption from concupiscence, and 
 immortality of the body, all of which Adam and Eve 
 enjoyed in Paradise, were supernatural gifts. That the 
 impassibility and infused knowledge enjoyed by our first 
 parents were also supernatural prerogatives is not di- 
 rectly taught by the Church. The supernatural character 
 
 12Cfr. also proposition XVI of 13 Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1026 
 the Synod of Pistoia, quoted in and 1078. Cfr. also proposition 
 
 Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, XVII of the Pistoian Synod, Den- 
 nN. 1516, zinger-Bannwart, n, T5107, 
 
226 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY, 
 
 of the beatific vision, however, so far as it is granted 
 to existing rational creatures, is an express article of 
 faith."* 
 
 READINGS : — Petavitus, De Pelagiana et Semipelagiana Haeresi. 
 — Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali (Append. adv. Baium et 
 Baianos).—*F. Worter, Der Pelagianismus nach seinem Ur- 
 sprung und seiner Lehre, Freiburg 1874 A. Krampf, Der Ur- 
 sustand des Menschen nach der Lehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa, 
 Wiirzburg 1889.— A. Hoch, Lehre des Johannes Cassianus von 
 der Natur und Gnade, Freiburg 1895—F. Klasen, Die innere 
 Entuncklung des Pelagianismus, Freiburg 1882.— Schwane, Dog- 
 mengeschichte, Vol, II, 2nd ed., §§ 56 sqq., Freiburg 1895.— S. 
 Dechamps, De Haeresi Janseniana ab Apostolica Sede Merito 
 Praescripta, Paris 1654.— A. Paquier, Le Jansénisme, Etude Doc- 
 trinale d’aprés les Sources, Paris 1909— A. Vandenpeerenboom, 
 Cornelius Jansenius, Septieéme Evéque d’Y pres, sa Mort, son Tes- 
 tament, ses Epitaphes, Bruges 1882.— B. Jungmann, S. J., Disser- 
 tationes Selectae in Hist. Eccles., Vol. VII, Diss. XL, Ratisbon 
 1887.— Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, Paris 1909.— 
 J. Pohle in the Catholic Encyclopedia, art. “ Pelagius and Pe- 
 lagianism,” Vol. XI.—J. Forget, ibid., art. “ Jansenius and Jan- 
 senism,” Vol. VIII. 
 
 ARTICLE 4 
 
 THE DIFFERENT STATES OF MAN, AND THE STATE OF PURE 
 NATURE IN PARTICULAR 
 
 I, THE DIFFERENT STATES OF MAN.—A sharp 
 distinction must be drawn between historic and 
 purely possible states. 
 
 a) A historic state is one in which the human 
 race some time or other actually existed, or 
 now exists. Such states are: (1) the state of 
 
 14 See supra, pp. 190 sqq. 
 
THE DIPPEREN DT STATES OF MAN). 227 
 
 original justice in Paradise (status iustitiae ori- 
 ginalis), of which we have already treated; (2) 
 the state of fallen nature (status naturae lapsae), 
 into which the human race was precipitated by 
 the sin of Adam. ‘This state consisted in the loss 
 of all supernatural and preternatural preroga- 
 tives which our first parents enjoyed in the Gar- 
 den, and soon gave way to (3) the state of re- 
 paired nature (status naturae reparatae), in 
 which God, in consideration of the merits of 
 Jesus Christ, restored sanctifying grace, though 
 without the preternatural prerogatives of integ- 
 rity, impassibility, and bodily immortality which 
 had accompanied it in’ Paradise. The state of 
 repaired nature is the historic state par excel- 
 lence, because it has been the condition of man- 
 kind since the promise of Redemption. 
 
 b) Those states in which man might, but in 
 matter of fact never did exist, are called pos- 
 sible. We may, in the first place, conceive of 
 a state of natural integrity (status naturae in- 
 tegrae) in the narrower sense, 7. é., one with 
 a purely natural end,’ yet endowed with such 
 preternatural prerogatives as, e. g., freedom from 
 concupiscence. According as we combine the 
 preternatural prerogatives (freedom from con- 
 cupiscence, bodily immortality, impassibility, 
 and infused knowledge) into one harmonious 
 
 1 This would exclude beatific vision and sanctifying grace. . 
 
228 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 whole, or imagine any one of them separately 
 realized to the exclusion of all others, we may 
 subdivide the state of natural integrity into four 
 different states, all of them devoid of strictly 
 supernatural grace. It would serve no useful 
 purpose to enter into a speculative discussion of 
 these states here. Lastly, by eliminating man’s 
 supernatural destiny together with sanctifying 
 grace and all preternatural prerogatives, we ar- 
 tive at what is termed the state of pure nature 
 (status naturae purae). 
 
 2. POSSIBILITY OF THE STATE OF PuRE Na- 
 TURE.—The concept of the status naturae purae 
 involves only such notes as belong to the es- 
 sence of human nature and are due to it by 
 virtue of creation, preservation, concurrence, 
 and the general providence of God.2 Among 
 the things that are due to man, as man, (aside 
 from his physical endowment which is included 
 in the definition of animal rationale), is the 
 ethical faculty of knowing God as his natural 
 end and of discovering and observing the moral 
 law of nature. That is, man must be able, by 
 leading a naturally good life, to attain to his 
 natural destiny, which would not consist in the 
 beatific vision, but in an abstractive knowledge of 
 God apt to render the creature naturally happy. 
 To these positive notes must be added a nega- 
 
 2 See supra, pp. 181 sqq. 
 
THE STATE. OF PURE NATURE 229 
 
 tive one, viz.: the exclusion of all such preroga- 
 tives as are either strictly supernatural (e. g., 
 grace, actual and habitual), or at least preter- 
 natural.* A recent writer observes that “this 
 state [of pure nature] is conceived as substan- 
 tially identical with the state in which man ac- 
 tually exists, minus the character of guilt and 
 punishment which mark the absence of the higher 
 prerogatives, and minus the grace which is 
 operative in all men unto salvation.” * In this 
 hypothetic state of pure nature, therefore, man 
 would be subject to the same evils from which he 
 suffers at present, viz.: concupiscence, ignorance, 
 and death with its attendant sufferings. 
 
 There is reason to doubt, however, whether the state 
 of pure nature, thus conceived, would in every detail be 
 essentially like the present state of original «sin. Orig- 
 inal sin, with the consequences which it entails, impairs 
 the purity of nature to a considerable extent. It is not 
 likely that in the state of pure nature idolatry and bes- 
 tiality would have wrought such havoc as they actually 
 did and do in consequence of the Fall, especially if we 
 consider that original sin has immensely increased the 
 ravages of these two arch-enemies of humankind. Ab- 
 stracting from the guilt of sin and the punishment due to 
 it, the state of pure nature may consequently be conceived 
 as somewhat more perfect than the state of original sin. 
 It is permissible, too, with Cardinal Franzelin® and 
 other eminent theologians, to postulate certain natural 
 
 3 See supra, pp. 190 sq. 5 De Tradit. et Script., pp. 635 
 4 Schell, Dogmatik, Vol. II, Pp. 293 sqq., Rome 1882, 
 
230 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 aids as substitutes for the missing supernatural assist- 
 ance in the battle against concupiscence. We may con- 
 ceive these adiutoria Dei naturalia as due to man in the 
 pure state of nature, but they would not, of course, par- 
 take of the essence of strictly supernatural grace.° 
 
 Though it would not essentially coincide in 
 every detail with the state of original sin, this 
 hypothetical state of pure nature is per se possi- 
 ble. To say that it is impossible would be tanta- 
 mount to asserting that God was bound to endow 
 man with supernatural graces and prerogatives. 
 This was precisely the false teaching of Baius.? 
 “Deus non potuisset,” reads the fifty-fifth of his 
 condemned propositions, “ab initio talem .creare 
 hominem, qualis nunc nascitur.’ The Catholic 
 doctrine is that, had He so chosen, God could 
 have created man in the state in which he is now 
 born, minus original sin. 
 
 The so-called Augustinians and some Thomists ® 
 thought that the teaching of tte Church would be suffi- 
 ciently safeguarded against the errors of Baius by hold- 
 ing that God could have established the state of pure na- 
 ture de potentia absoluta, though not de potentia ordinata. 
 But this is not a safe position to take. What God 
 may not do by virtue of His wisdom, sanctity, and 
 benevolence (potentia ordinatd), He cannot do by virtue 
 
 6 This theory is defended against 7 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, En- 
 Becanus (Summa Theol. Scholast., chiridion, n. 1055. 
 p. II, tr. 4) by Schiffini, De Gratia 8 Augustinians — Berti, Norisius, 
 Divina, pp. 71 sqq., 85 sqq., Fri- Bellelli; Thomists — Contenson, Ser- 
 burgi 1oor. ry, De Lemos. 
 
THE STATE OF PURE NATURE 231 
 
 of His omnipotence (potentid absoluté), which is in- 
 variably directed in its operations by the other divine at- 
 tributes. If God were constrained by some one or other 
 of His attributes ° to endow man with supernatural gifts, 
 these gifts would forthwith cease to be graces, because 
 they would correspond to a legitimate demand of nature. 
 The theologians with whom we are here dealing declare, 
 in opposition to Baius, that these prerogatives are super- 
 natural graces; but in this they are guilty of incon- 
 sistency, because they confound nature with the Super- 
 natural, and fail to distinguish between the characteristics 
 of both.?° 
 
 READINGS : — Berti, Augustinianum Systema Vindicat., diss. 2. 
 —*Card. Norisius, Vindic. Augustin., c. 3.—Kuhn, Die christ- 
 liche Lehre von der géttlichen Gnade, § 16, Tiibingen 1868.— G. 
 Vandenesch, Doctrina Divi Thomae Aquinatis de Concupiscentia, 
 Bonn. 1870.— Mohler, Symbolism, pp. 23 sqq., Robertson’s trans- 
 lation, 5th ed., London 1906.— Suarez, Proleg. 4 ad Tract. de 
 Gratia.— Goudin, Tract. Theol., t. I, qua.) 2) art rt Ps Xin: 
 senmann, Michael Bajus, Tiibingen 1867—J. F. Sollier, art. 
 “Baius” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II.— Kroll, “The 
 Causes of the Jansenist Heresy” in the Am. Cath. Quarterly Re- 
 view, 1885, pp. 577 sqq.— W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” 
 PP. 338 sqq., London 1897. 
 
 9 Ex decentia Creatoris et lege 10 Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante 
 
 iustissimae providentiae, as the Au- et Elevante, thes. 47, Rome 1878. 
 gustinians put it, 
 
SECTION 3 
 
 MAN’S DEFECTION FROM THE SUPERNATURAL 
 ORDER, OR THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN 
 
 We shall treat the subject-matter of this Sec- 
 tion in five Articles, considering (1) The sin of 
 Adam as the first sin and its effects on our proto- 
 parents; (2) The sin of Adam as original sin in 
 the technical sense of the term, 7. e., in so far as 
 it affects the whole human race; (3) The nature 
 of original sin; (4) Its mode of propagation; and 
 (5) Its effects in Adam’s descendants. 
 
 The doctrine of original sin is a fundamental 
 dogma of Christianity, because on it is based the 
 necessity of the Redemption. 
 
 GENERAL READINGS: —*St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 81 
 sqq.— Billuart, De Peccatis, diss. 6.— Suarez, De Vitiis et Pecca- 
 tis, disp. 9. 
 
 The principal Scholastic treatise on the subject is *De Rubeis, 
 De Peccato Originali, Venetiis 1757, nov. ed. Herbipoli 1857. 
 
 Of later authors the student may profitably consult the follow- 
 ing: Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 197 sqq., Freiburg 1878 
 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. II, pp. 20 sqq., 2nd ed., Lon- 
 don 1901).— Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, thes. 65-81, 
 Rome 1878.—*Oswald, Religidse Urgeschichte der Menschheit, 
 Part II, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1887.— Kleutgen, Theologie der Vor- 
 gett, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 616 sqq., Minster 1872.— Mazzella, De 
 Deo Creante, disp. 5, Rome 1880.— Heinrich, Dogmatische The- 
 
 232 
 
DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN 233 
 
 ologie, Vol. VI, Mainz 1887,— Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. 
 IIT, 3rd ed., pp. 121 sqq., Freiburg 1908— G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., 
 t. II, pp. 551 sqq., Paris 1895.— Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Dog- 
 matik, 4th ed., Vol. I, pp. 393 sqq., Freiburg 1899.— D. Coghlan, 
 De Deo Uno et Trino et de Deo Creatore, pp. 599 sqq., Dublinii 
 1909.— S. J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. 
 IT, pp. 394 sqq., London 1894.— Le Bachelet, Le Péché Originel, 
 Paris 1900. 
 
 ARTICLE z 
 
 THE SIN OF ADAM CONSIDERED AS THE FIRST SIN, AND 
 ITS EFFECTS ON OUR PROTO-PARENTS 
 
 All men are born in the state of original sin. This 
 state necessarily supposes as its cause a sinful act of 
 the free will; for the assumption that original sin is not 
 incurred through actual guilt would logically lead to the 
 Manichzean heresy of the existence of an essentially evil 
 principle. 
 
 The sin of Adam is original sin in a twofold sense: 
 (1) As a sinful personal act (peccatum originale ori- ° 
 ginans), and (2) as a sinful state (peccatum originale 
 originatum). It is the state not the act that is trans- 
 mitted to Adam’s descendants. | 
 
 In the present Article we shall consider the sin of 
 Adam as a personal act, (1) in its historic aspects and 
 (2) in the immediate consequences which it entailed upon 
 our first parents. 
 
 Thesis I: Our first parents, seduced by Satan, 
 committed a grave (mortal) sin by transgressing the 
 precept of probation. 
 
 This thesis embodies an article of faith. 
 
 Proof. The Fall of our first parents, as every 
 
 1 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 1-3. 
 
 16 
 
234. DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 Catholic knows from his catechism, is an im- 
 portant historical fact, not a mere myth, as al- 
 leged by the Rationalists. 
 
 a) The Bible relates that God gave Adam and Eve 
 a probationary precept by forbidding them to eat of the 
 fruit of a certain tree in the Garden, called “the tree 
 of the knowledge of good and evil.” This command 
 bound them under pain of mortal sin — not because of 
 its intrinsic importance, but on account of the at- 
 tendant circumstances. We all know how Satan ap- 
 proached Eve in the form of a serpent and persuaded 
 her to transgress the divine command,— how “ She took 
 of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave to her husband, 
 who did eat.” * This simple account is plainly meant to 
 be historical and is treated as such throughout the Bible. 
 Cfr. Ecclus. XXV, 33: “A muliere initium factum est 
 peccati, et per illam omnes morimur — From the woman 
 came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die.” 1 Tim. 
 II, 14: “Adam non est seductus [a serpente], mulier 
 autem seducta im praevaricatione fuit— Adam was not 
 seduced [by the serpent]; but the woman being se- 
 duced, was in the transgression.” Ecclesiastical Tradi- 
 tion, too, has always maintained the historic character 
 of the Fall. St. Augustine* thus explains the gravity 
 of the first sin: “There is in it pride, because man 
 chose to be under his own dominion rather than under 
 the dominion of God; and sacrilege, because he did not 
 
 2 Gen. III, 6. tina suasione corrupta est; et fur- 
 
 3“ Nam superbia est illic, quia tum, quia cibus prohibitus usurpatus 
 homo in sua potius esse quam in est; et avaritia, quia plus quam illi 
 Dei potestate dilexit; et sacrilegium, sufficere debuit, appetivit, et si quid 
 quia Deo non credidit; et homici- aliud in hoc uno admisso diligenti 
 dium, quia se praecipitavit in mor- consideratione inveniri potest.” 
 
 tem; et fornicatio spiritalis, quia (Enchiridion, c. 45.) 
 integritas mentis humanae_ serpen- 
 
DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN 235 
 
 believe God; and murder, for he brought death upon 
 himself; and spiritual fornication, because the purity of 
 the human mind was corrupted by the seducing blan- 
 dishments of the serpent; and theft, for man turned to 
 his own use the food he had been forbidden to touch ; 
 and avarice, for he had a craving for more than should 
 have been sufficient for him; and whatever other sin 
 can be discovered on careful reflection to be involved in 
 this one admitted sin.” ¢ 
 
 b) Differences of opinion are permissible with regard 
 to certain questions of detail, provided only that original 
 sin be acknowledged as a historical fact. The “tree of 
 knowledge ” is as mysterious as the “tree of life.” Ca- 
 jetan held that the story of the serpent merely symbolizes 
 inward temptation. But this audacious hypothesis never 
 found much support among Catholic theologians. The 
 divine curse ® is intelligible only on the assumption that 
 the serpent was a real animal, employed by Satan for the 
 purpose of seduction. Cfr. Apocalypse DOA Me Mba i 
 provectus est draco ille magnus, serpens antiquus qui 
 vocatur diabolus et satanas— And that great dragon 
 was cast out, that old serpent, who is called the devil 
 ande Satan.) (2 Cor. XT, 3's; “eTimeo ne) sicid serpens 
 Hlevam seduxit astutid sud, ita corrumpantur sensus 
 vestri— I fear lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his 
 subtility, so your minds should be corrupted.” 
 
 The holy Fathers and theologians generally hold 
 that intellectual pride was the motive of the Pall eC rr: 
 Feclus.. X, 15: “Initium omnis peccati superbia — 
 miide.isithe beginning of all,sin.’. Considered in itself, 
 
 4Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 2a, peccatum mortale und veniale. 
 2ae, qu. 163, and H. Gerigk, Wesen Breslau 1903. 
 und Voraussetzungen der Totsiinde, SiGens TLL) 24, 
 
 Untersuchung der Frage nach dem 66 dqus 6 dpxaios 
 Wesexsunterschiede swischen dem 
 
236 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 the sin of our first parents, according to St. Paul’s 
 teaching, was an act of grave disobedience,— which dis- 
 poses of the strange hypothesis that the Fall was due 
 to the natural use of marriage.” 
 
 It is not so easy to decide whether the transgression 
 of the law of probation constituted the first mortal sin 
 committed by Adam and Eve, or whether they had 
 previously been guilty of other grievous offenses. Alex- 
 ander of Hales held that previous mortal sins on the part 
 of our first parents had smoothed the way for their trans- 
 gression of the decisive precept of probation, which in- 
 volved the fate of Adam and all his progeny. Among 
 modern theologians this view has been adopted by 
 Schell. Though not exactly untenable, it lacks prob- 
 ability. The majority of Catholic divines hold that 
 original sin was the first mortal sin committed by our 
 first parents, because every mortal sin entails the loss of 
 sanctifying grace. 
 
 Thesis II: By transgressing the law of probation 
 Adam forfeited sanctifying grace and merited eternal 
 damnation; he became subject to bodily death and 
 the dominion of Satan, and suffered a deterioration in 
 body and soul. 
 
 This is de fide.° 
 
 Proof. Every grievous sin entails the loss 
 of sanctifying grace and provokes the anger of 
 God. The very grievous nature of the sin com- 
 mitted by our first parents may be inferred from 
 
 7Cfr. St. Paul’s Epistle to the dience of one man, many were made 
 
 Romans, V.-19: “ Per inobedien- sinners,” 
 tiam unius hominis peccatores con- 8 Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 308. 
 stitutt sunt multi-——By the disobe- 9 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. Ie 
 
 7 Ae ee es 
 
DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN 237, 
 
 the punishment with which God had threatened 
 them. After the Fall He appears to Adam as 
 the angry judge. The relation of sonship was 
 turned into enmity, which spelled eternal damna- 
 tion. Death, which had been the sanction of the 
 law of probation,’® was actually inflicted on our 
 first parents as a punishment."* “Jnvidid diaboli 
 mors introwit in orbem terrarum—By the envy 
 of the devil, death came into the world.” #2 In- 
 cidental to it was the dominion of Satan, which 
 is intimated in the so-called Protevangelium 
 (Gen. ITI, 15), and explicitly taught in the New 
 Testament.** The deterioration which human 
 nature had suffered through the Fall manifested 
 itself in the sudden awakening of concupiscence, 
 which had till then been duly subject; the flesh 
 rebelled against the spirit, the intellect was dark- 
 ened and the will enfeebled."* 
 
 The corruption of nature caused by original sin must 
 have been far greater in Adam than it is in his 
 descendants, and for two reasons: — first, because of 
 the singularly privileged status of our progenitor, and 
 secondly, because the first or original sin, which St. Au- 
 gustine calls “ peccatum ineffabiliter grande,’ was a free 
 personal transgression, deserving of far severer punish- 
 ment than a merely inherited state. In Adam’s de- 
 scendants original sin exists merely as habitual sin, in 
 
 10 Gen, II, 17. 13 Cfr, John XII, 31; XIV, 30; 
 11 Gen. III, 19. 2 Cor, IV; 43) a Petiiiiigo. 
 12 Wisd. II, 24. 14 Cfr. supra, Section 2, Art, 2 
 
 and 3. 
 
238 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY, 
 
 which the personal will of the individual has no 
 share. 
 
 As for Adam and Eve, the Church piously believes 
 that they repented and were ultimately saved® St. 
 Irenzus ** defends this belief against Tatian. Rupert of 
 Deutz’s assertion that our first parents were damned 
 cannot be made to square with the fact that their names 
 figure in the calendar of Saints (December 24th). Be- 
 sides, the promulgation of the Protoevangelium in Para- 
 dise would seem to indicate that they were saved. 
 
 ReaDINGs: — Reinke, Beitrage zur Erklirung des Alten Tes- 
 taments, Vol. II, pp. 210 sqq., Minster 1855.—*P. Scholz, The- 
 ologie des Alten Bundes, Vol. II, pp. 90 sqq.— Patrizi, De Inter- 
 pret. Scriptur., 1. II, qu. 3, Rome 1876.—Schopfer, Geschichte 
 des Alten Testamentes, 3rd ed., pp. 40 sqq., Brixen 1907. J. F. 
 Driscoll, art. “Adam” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I. 
 
 ARTICLE 2 
 
 THE SIN OF ADAM CONSIDERED AS ORIGINAL SIN IN THE 
 TECHNICAL SENSE OF THE TERM 
 
 I. HERETICAL THEORIES AND THEIR CON- 
 DEMNATION BY THE CHuRCH.—Theologically 
 as well as historically the different heresies that 
 have arisen in regard to original sin may be 
 reduced to three main heads. (1) Manicheism, 
 Priscillianism, and Pre-existentism hold that 
 there is a sin of nature (peccatum naturale),’ 
 
 15 Cir. Wisd. X, 1 sqq. was at once a personal sin, inas- 
 16 Adv. Haeres., III, 23. much as it deprived that first man 
 1“ The sin of the first man, from of his own private good, and also a 
 whom, according to the doctrine of sin of nature (peccatum naturale), 
 faith, all other men are descended, inasmuch as it took away from that 
 
ORIGINAL SIN 239 
 
 but no original sin in the technical sense of 
 the word. (2) Pelagianism teaches that there 
 iS a primeval sin, but no sin of nature and no 
 original sin. (3) Protestantism and Jansenism 
 contend that there is a sin of nature which is 
 at the same time original sin, but that original 
 sin is identical with concupiscence and destroys 
 free-will, thereby seriously impairing human na- 
 Pure. 
 
 a) The earlier heresies concerning original sin all re- 
 volve around the problem of evil. The Manichzans 
 and Priscillianists admitted the existence of a sin of 
 nature, but attributed it to an absolutely evil principle, 
 which they called hyle (flesh), and which, they declared, 
 necessarily contaminates the spirit on coming in contact 
 with it. The Pre-existentists, or Origenists, conceived 
 natural sin as the result of a moral catastrophe in the 
 realm of pure spirits, antedating the existence of matter. 
 All of these writers to a greater or less extent deny the 
 doctrine of original sin.? 
 
 b) A far more radical heresy was that of the 
 Pelagians. They admitted that Adam sinned, but 
 denied that his sin is transmitted to his descend- 
 ants. Pelagius himself and Ccelestius? main- 
 tained the following errors: (1) Man, as now 
 
 man, and consequently from his pos- 20On the Church’s condemnation 
 
 terity, a benefit conferred upon the 
 whole of human  nature.’’ (St. 
 Thomas, Contr. Gent., IV, 52; Rick- 
 aby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 
 381.) 
 
 of these errors cfr. supra, pp. 20 
 sqq.; pp. 161 sqq.; also K. Kiinstle, 
 Antipriscilliana, Freiburg 1905. 
 
 3 After A. D, 411. 
 
240 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 constituted, does not differ essentially in endow- 
 ment from Adam before the Fall. The only dif- 
 ference (an accidental one) is that personal sins 
 are committed in the present order.* (2) New- 
 born infants do not bring original sin with them 
 into the world; they are baptized not “for the for- 
 giveness of sins,” but merely that they may be 
 enabled to attain to the regnum coelorum, which, 
 in the mind of these heretics, is something quite 
 different from eternal life. (3) The sin which 
 Adam committed in Paradise injured him, but not 
 his descendants, except in so far as their will- 
 power is weakened by his bad example. (4) 
 Since Adam’s sin is not transmitted to his de- 
 scendants, they cannot be punished for it. Death 
 is not a punishment for sin, but a necessity of 
 nature (neécessitas naturae), and concupiscence is 
 merely nature’s way of asserting itself (vigor 
 naturae). 
 
 Few heresies were so vigorously combated 
 from their very birth, and condemned by so 
 many councils, as Pelagianism. During the 
 short period from A.D. 412 (or 411) to 431 
 no less than twenty-four councils, in the East and 
 in the West, denounced the new sect. Promi- 
 nent among them is the Second Council of Mileve 
 (416); its canons were taken over by a plenary 
 council held at Carthage in 418, and approved 
 
 4 Supra, pp.-26 sqq. 
 
 apie fetes 5, 
 
 ———— 
 
ORIGINAL SIN 241 
 
 and promulgated by Pope Zosimus in his Epis- 
 tola Tractoria. Pelagianism was cut to the 
 quick by the second canon of this council, 
 which reads as follows: “Quicumque parvulos 
 recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat aut 
 dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos bap- 
 tizart, sed mhil ex Adam trahere originalis pec- 
 cati, quod regenerationis lavacro expietur, unde 
 sit consequens, ut in eis forma baptismatis ‘in 
 remissionem peccatorum’ non vere sed false in- 
 telligatur, anathema sit — Whoever denies that 
 new-born infants should be baptized immediately 
 after birth, or asserts that they are indeed bap- 
 tized for the remission of sins, but do not con- 
 tract from Adam original sin, which must be ex- 
 piated in the waters of regeneration, and that con- 
 sequently the baptismal form ‘for the remission of 
 sins’ applies to them not truly, but falsely; let 
 him be anathema.” The Council bases this defi- 
 nition on Rom. V, 12 sqq., and on ecclesiastical 
 Tradition, and concludes: “Propter hanc enim 
 regulam fidet etiam parvult, qui nihil peccatorum 
 m semetipsis adhuc committere potuerunt, ideo 
 m peccatorum remissionem veraciter baptigan- 
 tur, ut im eis regeneratione mundetur, quod ge- 
 neratione traxerunt — According to this rule of 
 faith little children, who are as yet unable to 
 commit actual sin, are therefore truly baptized 
 for the remission of sins, in order that by regen- 
 
242 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 eration they may be cleansed of that which they 
 have contracted by generation.” ® 
 
 The Council of Ephesus (A. D. 431) imposed 
 this teaching on all clerics under pain of deposi- 
 tion, and the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 
 529) dealt Pelagianism a further blow by de- 
 fining: “Si quis soli Adae praevaricationem 
 suam, non et ews propagini asserit nocuisse, aut 
 certe mortem tantum corporis, quae poena pec- 
 catt est, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est 
 animae, per unum hominem in omne genus hu- 
 manum transusse testatur, iniustitiam Deo dabit 
 contradicens Apostolo dicenti: Per unum homi- 
 nem, etc.— If any one asserts that the prevari- 
 cation of Adam injured himself only and not his 
 progeny, or alleges that bodily death, which is 
 the penalty of sin, but not sin, which is the death 
 of the soul, was brought by one man upon the 
 entire human race, he attributes an injustice to 
 God and contradicts the Apostle, who says: ‘By 
 one man, etc.’ ” 
 
 c) In more modern times we meet with two 
 great heresies which misrepresented the nature 
 of original sin by describing it as an intrinsic 
 and radical corruption of nature. The two here- 
 sies in question are Protestantism and Jansenism. 
 They denied free-will® and asserted that concu- - 
 
 5 Synod. Milevit. II, can. 2, apud vin, Instit., IV, 18; Zwingli. De 
 Denzinger-Bannwart n. to2. Providentia, c. 6. 
 6 Luther, De Servo Arbitrio; Cal- 
 
ORIGINAL SIN 243 
 
 concupiscence is the formal element of original 
 sin. 
 
 Zwingli flatly denied that original sin involves real 
 guilt, and thus reverted to the teaching of Pelagius, 
 from whom, however, he differed by entirely rejecting 
 the doctrine of free-will. Jansenism (Baius, Jansenius, 
 Quesnel) held that original sin formally consists in con- 
 cupiscence, and that every act performed without grace 
 is sinful.” 
 
 The Protestant conception of original sin was 
 solemnly condemned by the Tridentine Council 
 in its supremely important Decretum de Peccato 
 Origimali.® The first of the five canons of this 
 decree describes the sin of Adam and_ the 
 consequences which it entailed upon himself.® 
 Canon II defines how “sin, which is the death 
 of the soul,” *° is transmitted from Adam to his 
 descendants."* Canon III defines original sin as 
 “one in its origin, and being transfused into all 
 by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one 
 as his own.”’ Canon IV substantially repeats the 
 second canon of the Council of Mileve,!? on the 
 effect of infant baptism as the ordinary means 
 
 7 Cfr. Baius’? condemned proposi- 
 tion: “Omnia opera  infidelium 
 sunt peccata et philosophorum vir- 
 tutes sunt vitia.’ For further in- 
 
 9 Cfr. supra, pp. 233 sqq. 
 
 10 “ Peccatum, quod est mors ani- 
 mae.” 
 
 11 This canon employs almost the 
 
 formation on this subject we must 
 refer the reader to our treatise on 
 Grace. 
 
 8 Sess. V. Cfr. Denzinger-Bann- 
 wart, Enchiridion, nn. 787 sqq. 
 
 exact phraseology of the Second 
 Council of Orange, cited above, p. 
 242. 
 
 12 Supra, p. 241. 
 
244 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 of purging the soul from guilt. Canon V de- 
 fines the effect of Baptism to be an actual re- 
 mission of sin, and reduces the influence of con- 
 cupiscence to its true bounds. We reproduce 
 this canon in full because of its dogmatic im- 
 portance: “Sz quis per Iesu Christi gratiam, 
 quae in baptismate confertur, reatum originalis 
 peccatt remitti negat; aut etiam asserit, non tolli 
 totum 1d, quod veram et propriam peccati ra- 
 tionem habet, sed illud dicit tantum radi aut non 
 imputart, anathema sit —If any one denies that, 
 by the grace of Jesus Christ, which is conferred 
 by baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, 
 or even asserts that the whole of that which has 
 the true and proper nature of sin is not taken 
 away, but says that it is only erased or not im- 
 puted, let him be anathema.” 
 
 Consequently it is an article of faith that orig- 
 inal sin is real sin, and that its entire guilt is 
 blotted out by Baptism. “Jn renatis enim nihil 
 odit Deus,’ the Tridentine Fathers add, “quia 
 nihil est damnationts tis, qui vere consepulti sunt 
 cum Christo per baptisma in mortem — In those 
 who are born again, there is nothing that God 
 hates, because there is no condemnation to those 
 who are truly buried together with Christ by 
 Baptism into death.” 
 
 As for the innate predisposition to sin, the 
 fomes peccati or concupiscence which remains 
 
 me el > ob 
 
ORIGINAL SIN 245 
 
 in man after Baptism, the Council solemnly de- 
 clares: “Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquan- 
 do Apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus 
 declarat, Ecclesiam catholicam nunquam intel- 
 lexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie 
 m renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est 
 et ad peccatum inclinat. St quis. autem con- 
 trarium senserit, anathema sit — This concupis- 
 cence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the 
 holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has 
 never understood it to be called sin, as being truly 
 and properly sin in those born again, but because 
 it is of sin and inclines to sin. And if any one 
 is of a contrary sentiment, let him be anathema.” 
 
 Hence it is also an article of faith that concupis- 
 cence as such 1s not really sin, but is merely so 
 called by metonymy, because “‘it is of sin and in- 
 clines to sin.” 
 
 The Jansenist teaching on original sin was 
 condemned as heretical by Popes Pius V, Inno- 
 cent X, Clement XI) and: Pius) VL: 
 
 2. SCRIPTURAL PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF 
 ORIGINAL Sin.—The dogma of original sin im- 
 plies, first, the existence of habitual sin in man 
 from birth, and, secondly, its connexion with the 
 sin’ of Adam. Adam’s ‘sin; in as far as. it was 
 personal, could not fall on his descendants. Like 
 his death, it was by its very nature incommunica- 
 ble. Original sin is consequently not a personal 
 
246 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 sin but a sin of nature, which inheres in all hu- 
 man individuals as guilt, and is a true sin only 
 
 in its logical connexion with Adam’s voluntary 
 
 transgression of the divine command in Paradise. 
 
 a) The nature of original sin is far less sharply de- 
 fined in the Old than in the New Testament. The oft- 
 quoted text Ps. L, 7: “ Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus 
 sum et m peccatis concepit me mater mea— Behold I 
 was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother 
 conceive me,’ seems from the context to refer rather 
 to concupiscence, 7. e., the inclination which draws all 
 men to evil, and which the Psalmist mentions in ex- 
 tenuation of his own unrighteousness. Some of the 
 Fathers of the Church, it is true, quote this passage 
 against the Pelagians,!* but in doing so their main ob- 
 ject is to demonstrate that Adam’s sin injuriously affected 
 his descendants. That the injury which it inflicted is 
 identical with original sin can hardly be proved from this 
 text, unless it be interpreted in the light of the New 
 Testament. 
 
 A somewhat more conclusive text is Job XIV, 1 sqq., 
 which was cited already by the Fathers as an argument 
 for the existence of original sin. The passage runs as 
 follows: ‘Man born of a woman, living for a short 
 time, is filled with many miseries. . . . Who can make 
 him clean that is unclean? Not one.” This is a literal 
 translation of the Hebrew text. The Vulgate brings 
 out the sense of the passage more clearly thus: “ Quis 
 potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine? 
 Nonne tu qui solus es? — Who can make him clean that 
 is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only 
 
 13 Cfr. e. g., St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 50, n. 10. 
 
ORIGINAL SIN 247 
 
 art?” The meaning plainly is: No one but God can 
 sanctify a man conceived in ethical uncleanness, i. é\)) i 
 sin. There is no question here of Levitical unclean- 
 ness. The Sacred Writer plainly means that every man 
 is conceived in original sin, though he does not ex- 
 plicitly mention the relation of man’s guilt to the sin 
 of Adam,—a relation which not even St. Paul himself 
 emphasized on all occasions. Cfr. Eph. II, Be ey 
 
 -- eramus natura (dvoea) filtti irae, sicut et ceteri— 
 We... were by nature children of wrath, even as the 
 rest, ” 
 
 b) The locus classicus for our dogma is Rom. 
 V, 12-21. St. Paul in this passage draws a 
 sublime parallel between “all” (adres, also Toot ) 
 and the “one’’ («s) who, under one aspect, is the 
 first Adam as the author of sin and death, and 
 under another, the second Adam (i. e., Christ) as 
 the Father of grace and salvation. The passage 
 may be divided into three sections, all of which 
 clearly bring out the doctrine of original sin. 
 
 «) Consider in the first place Rom. V, 12: 
 “Sicut per unum hominem peccatum (4 dpapia. ) 
 in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, 
 et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo 
 (<# @) omnes peccaverunt — As by one man sin 
 entered into this world, and by sin death: and 
 so death passed upon all men, in whom all have 
 sinned.” 
 
 According to the context cis cvOpwros here can only 
 mean Adam, who is the author of sin and death. By 
 
248 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 peccatum (i dpaptia) St. Paul evidently means a real 
 sin, in the strict sense of the term, not mere concu- 
 piscence, or death as the penalty of sin. If peccatum 
 spelled death, the text would contain a tautology: “ By 
 one man death entered into this world, and by death, 
 death.” If it meant concupiscence (which, it is true, 
 St. Paul in Rom. VII, 17, also calls peccatum, but only 
 by metonymy), the sense would be: “ By one man con- 
 cupiscence entered into this world, and by concupiscence, 
 death.” But concupiscence is not per se sinful, much less 
 a sin by which “all men sinned.” We must also take 
 into consideration that Adam was not punished with 
 death on account of his concupiscence, but for his dis- 
 obedience, which was a grievous sin. The Apostle ex- 
 pressly says: “‘ Per inobedientiam unius hominis pecca- 
 tores constituti sunt multi — By the disobedience of one 
 man, many were made sinners.” ** It is quite obvious 
 that the “ sin’ which, together with death, was by “one 
 man” transmitted to all others, cannot be identical with 
 the personal transgression of Adam. Like the death of 
 Adam, this sin was not communicable to others, and more- 
 over the Apostle never calls it éuapria, but sometimes zapd- 
 Baows (praevaricatio), occasionally rapérrwpa (delictum), 
 or mapaxoy (inobedientia). Consequently it can only be 
 the habitual sin of Adam (habitus peccati) which “ en- 
 tered into this world” through him, 7. e., was by him 
 transmitted to all his progeny.— The anacoluthic clause, 
 cb’ & rdvres japrov — in whom all have sinned — is taken 
 by the older Latin Fathers and by a number of councils 
 as a relative sentence, and interpreted thus: “Jn quo 
 [scil. uno homine, 1. e., Adam] omnes peccaverunt — 
 And in him [i. e., in this one man, Adam], all have 
 
 14 Rom. V, 19. 
 
ORIGINAL SIN 249 
 
 sinned.” This may be said to embody the traditional 
 view, since it has been the constant belief of Christians 
 that all men sinned in Adam. Nor is there anything in 
 the Greek text of Rom. V, 12 to disprove this construc- 
 tion. In New Testament Greek émi is sometimes used 
 interchangeably with év, e. g., éx’ évouare for év dvopate. 
 Since Erasmus, however, many Catholic exegetes prefer 
 to take 颒 6 causally for dm (émi rovrw 6m, eo quod, quia, 
 which may be a Hebraism from Wed). It must be ad- 
 mitted that this interpretation is more in conformity with 
 the Greek idiom than the phrase duaprévew éxi (for év) 
 miu. Nor does it in any way impair the dogmatic bearing 
 of the text. If 颒 é be construed relatively, the sense 
 of the passage is: ‘All men have sinned in Adam;” 
 if causally, it means: “ All men (and consequently chil- 
 dren too) must die, because all have sinned.” 
 
 The trend of the Pauline argument therefore 
 is: The sin of this one man Adam is exactly 
 co-extensive with the death of the body, which 
 entered this world in consequence of it. Now, 
 infants too must die. This can assuredly not be 
 a punishment for personal sins, as they are in- 
 capable of sinning. Hence they suffer the pen- 
 _alty of death because the habitual sin of Adam 
 has been transmitted to them. It is this habitual 
 sin we call original sin. Consequently all men 
 are born in the state of original sin. 
 
 8) Proceeding with his demonstration the 
 Apostle continues:** “Usque ad legem enim 
 
 15 Rom. V, 13 sq. 
 17 
 
250 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 peccatum erat in mundo; peccatum autem non 
 wunputabatur, quum lex non esset. Sed regnavit 
 mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eos, 
 quit non peccaverunt in similitudinem praevari- 
 cations Adae, qui est forma futuri — For until 
 the law sin was in the world; but sin was not 
 imputed, when the law was not. But death 
 reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them 
 also who have not sinned after the similitude of 
 the transgression of Adam, who is a figure of 
 him who was to come.” 
 
 Though St. Paul in this passage refers to the personal 
 transgressions of men “ from Adam unto Moses” rather 
 than to the habitual sin of our progenitor, the context 
 shows that peccatum here again is used in the sense of 
 moral transgression. The Apostle notes that “ until the 
 law,” that is, up to the time when the Mosaic code took 
 effect, personal crimes were “not imputed,” 7. e., not 
 punished by death, and that nevertheless death reigned 
 “even over them who have not (p#) sinned after the 
 similitude of the transgression of Adam,” 7. e., in the 
 manner in which Adam sinned. The negative particle py 
 (not) is absent from some codices and Patristic citations 
 of the passage; but modern textual criticism has fully es- 
 tablished its authenticity. It occurs in the majority of 
 extant MSS. as well as in the Itala, the Vulgate, and 
 the Peshitta, and the rhetorical figure which the Apostle 
 employs in this passage (auxesis) clearly demands it. 
 
 St. Paul evidently wishes to meet an objection 
 which might arise from his expression “mdvres 
 
ORIGINAL SIN. . 251 
 
 jmaprov—all have sinned.” ‘All men have sinned 
 personally,” it might be argued, “and therefore 
 all men must die.” True, replies the Apostle, 
 the men who lived “from Adam unto Moses’ 
 did commit many personal sins. But it was not 
 on this account they had to die. For there was 
 not then any positive law which punished per- 
 sonal sins by death, as was the case later under 
 the Mosaic code. Yet “death reigned from 
 Adam unto Moses,” even over those who (such as 
 infants) were not guilty of personal sin. Con- 
 sequently, death was not a punishment for per- 
 sonal sin, but for that particular épaptia which 
 “entered into this world” through the fault of 
 Adam, 1. é., original sin. ! 
 
 y) An additional argument for the existence 
 of original sin is contained in Rom. V, 18 sq: 
 “Tgitur sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines 
 m condemnationem, sic et per unius [scil. Christi] 
 wustitiam in omnes homines in iustificationem 
 vitae. Sicut enim per inobedientiam unius homi- 
 mis [scil. Adae] peccatores constituti sunt multi 
 (dpaprwdot Kateotébyoay oi TONAL ) | ata et per unius 
 obeditionem tusti constituentur multi: (Sixaor Karo- 
 oralnoovrar ot rohdoi)—Therefore, as by the offence 
 of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also 
 by the justice of one, unto all men to justifica- 
 tion of life. For as by the disobedience of one 
 man, many were made sinners; so also by the 
 
252 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 obedience of one, many shall be made just.” The 
 Apostle’s reasoning is quite transparent. He 
 develops the parallel between Adam and Christ, 
 which he had begun in verse 12. The reader will 
 note the sharp antithesis between constituti pec- 
 catores by the disobedience of Adam, and con- 
 stitutt tustos by the obedience of Christ. The 
 human race ( wavTes avOpwro., ot modhot ) has by the 
 sin of Adam become a race of sinners, precisely 
 as, by the “justification of life” through Christ, 
 it has recovered justice. Now, justification is 
 effected by the grace of being “born again of 
 water and the Holy Ghost; ** consequently, the 
 sin of Adam inheres in man from birth,—it is 
 really and truly inherited. 
 
 It may be objected that, since “many” but not all 
 were justified by and in Christ, so a pari “many,” but 
 not all men were tainted by the sin of Adam, namely 
 those who imitated Adam’s sinful conduct. But St. 
 Paul expressly rejects this construction. Moreover, 
 there is a perfect parity between “being born” and 
 “being born again;” for as no man contracts original 
 sin except by descent from Adam, so no man is justified 
 except he be born again of the Holy Ghost. That the 
 number of individuals in the two contrasted groups is 
 unequal, is due to the fact that descent from Adam is 
 inevitable, while spiritual regeneration depends upon a 
 voluntary act, 7. e., the reception of the Sacrament of 
 Baptism.** 
 
 16 John III, s. Schafer, Erklarung des Briefes 
 17 On the whole subject cfr. Al. Pauli an die Romer, Minster 1891, 
 
ORIGINAL SIN 283 
 
 3. THE ARGUMENT FROM TRADITION.—Belief 
 in the existence of original sin dates back to 
 Apostolic times. This can be shown: (a) from 
 the constant practice of infant Baptism, and (b) 
 from the verbal teaching of the Fathers. 
 
 a) The necessity of infant Baptism (paedo- 
 baptismus) has always been regarded as a con- 
 clusive argument for the existence of original 
 sin. Baptism of its very nature is a sacrament 
 instituted “for the forgiveness of: -sins. 777) ili, 
 therefore, new-born infants must be baptized 
 “for the forgiveness of sins,’”’ and their sin, un- 
 like that of adults, cannot be personal sin, then 
 it must be original sin. This argument, which 
 St. Augustine effectively employed against Bishop 
 Julian of Eclanum,” was extremely repugnant to 
 the Pelagians.”° 
 
 Origen testifies to the early practice of bap- 
 tizing infants in order that they might obtain 
 forgiveness of their sins.** St. Cyprian says: 
 “St a baptismo atque gratia nemo prohibetur, 
 
 18“ In remissionem peccatorum.” 
 (Symb. Nicaen.-Constantinop.) 
 
 19“ Non est,’ he says on one 
 occasion, ‘‘ cur provoces ad Orientis 
 antistites. . 
 
 tus, aut ipsum [solum] tibi remis- 
 sum aut et ipsum [t. e., siinul cum 
 actualibus]. Sed sit verum est, quod 
 audivimus, te infantulum baptiza- 
 tum, etiam tu, quamvis a tuis pro- 
 pris peccatis innocens, tamen quia 
 
 - . Nam peccatum ori- 
 ginale, quacumque aetate sis baptiza- 
 
 ex Adam carnaliter natus contagium 
 mortis antiquae prima  nativitate 
 traxistt, et in iniquitate conceptus 
 es, profecto exorcizatus et exsuffla- 
 tus es, ut a potestate erutus tene- 
 
 brarum transferreris in regnum 
 Christi.” (De Pecc. Mer. et Rem., 
 Tye.) 
 
 20 Cfr. St. Jerome, Dial., 3, n. 
 
 17s 
 21 Hom. in Lue., 14. 
 
254 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 quanto magis proliberi non debet infans, qui 
 recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum 
 
 Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquae 
 
 prima nativitate contraxit — Since nobody is de- 
 nied baptism and grace, how much more ought 
 an infant not to be denied [these benefits], who 
 being but just born has done no sin, except that, 
 by being descended from Adam in the flesh, he 
 has contracted by birth the contagion of the an- 
 clent death 335 
 
 b) In examining the positive teaching of the 
 Fathers, it will be well to consider («) the West- 
 ern Fathers apart from (f) the Eastern. Pela- 
 gianism was an occidental growth and was al- 
 most entirely extirpated by the Latins, notably 
 St. Augustine. The Eastern Fathers, in view 
 of the errors of the Gnostics and Origenists, 
 which flourished mainly in the Orient, and for 
 fear of encouraging such false beliefs as that in 
 the existence of an absolutely evil principle, were 
 accustomed to speak of original sin with caution 
 and reserve. 
 
 a) As for the pre-Augustinian period, St. Augustine 
 himself calls upon antiquity as bearing witness against 
 
 the Pelagians. 
 
 22 Epist. ad Fidum, 64, n. 5. For 
 a more detailed treatment we must 
 refer the student to the dogmatic 
 treatise on the Sacrament of Bap- 
 tism. 
 
 23 De Nupt. et Concup., II, 12, 25. 
 
 “Non ego finxt originale peccatum, quod 
 
 —In his work Contra Iulianum 
 Pelagianum he marshals a veritable 
 phalanx of Patristic texts and con- 
 cludes as follows: ‘‘ Non est hoc 
 malum nuptiarum, sed primorum 
 hominum peccatum, in  posteros 
 
 =e a ee 
 
 ae On at ee 
 
 if 
 i“ 
 at 
 
ORIGINAL SIN ass 
 
 catholica fides credit antiquitus; sed tu [Iuliane], qui 
 negas, sine dubio es novus haereticus —It was not I 
 who devised the original sin, which the Catholic faith 
 holds from ancient times; but you [he is addressing 
 Julian], who deny it, are undoubtedly an innovating 
 leretic.;; 2+ | 
 
 Vincent of Lerins wonderingly enquires who before the 
 time of Ccelestius ever dreamt of denying the doctrine of 
 original sin.2* Among the most ancient testimonies is 
 that of Tertullian, who in his favorite legal phraseology 
 writes: “Omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, 
 donec in Christo recenseatur; peccatrix autem immunda 
 recipiens ignominiam ex carnis societate.’ 2° 
 
 8) The belief of the Oriental Christians could not be 
 substantially different from that of their western 
 brethren, because the churches of the East and West at 
 that time conjointly constituted the one true Church of 
 Christ. In matter of fact, Irenaeus, who belonged to 
 the East both with regard to birth and training, gives 
 expression to the primitive faith when he writes: 
 “Deum in primo quidem Adam offendimus (pocexdpa- 
 pev), non facientes eius praeceptum; in secundo autem 
 Adam reconciliati sumus. . . . Neque enim alteri cuidam 
 eramus debitores, cuius praeceptum transgressi fueramus 
 ab initio (vmepéBnpev ax’ apyns)—In the first Adam we 
 
 propagatione traiectum. Etenim runt, adversus vos proferunt de om- 
 huius mali reatus baptismatis sanc- nium hominum peccato originali ob- 
 tificatione remittitur. ... Propter no-zia successione sententiam.”” 
 
 quam catholicam veritatem sancti ac (Contra Iulianum Pelag., II, 10, 
 beatt et in divinorum eloquiorum 33). 
 
 pertractatione clarissimt sacerdotes 24De Nupt. et Concup., II, 12, 
 Ireneus, Cyprianus, Reticius, Olym- 25. 
 
 pius, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius 25 Commonit., 38: “Quis ante 
 [Naz.], Innocentius, Ioannes [Chry- Coelestium reatu praevaricationis 
 sost.], Basilius, quibus adde presby- Adae omne genus humanum dene- 
 
 terum, nolis velis, Hieronymum, ut  gavit adstrictum? ” 
 _omittam eos, qui nondum dormie- 26 De Testim. Anim., qo. 
 
256 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 offended God by disobeying His command; but in the 
 second Adam. we were reconciled. ... For to no one 
 else were we indebted for having transgressed His pre- 
 cept in the beginning.” ?* St. Athanasius tersely de- 
 clares: ‘In that Adam sinned, death entered the 
 world.” 28 And St. Basil?®: “ Because we did not ab- 
 stain, we were expelled from Paradise.” *° 
 
 The Pelagians made desperate efforts to claim at least 
 one of the Greek Fathers in favor of their view. 
 Bishop Julian of Eclanum repeatedly appeals to the 
 authority of the “ great John of Constantinople.” ** Did 
 St. Chrysostom ignore, nay even oppose, the doctrine of 
 original sin? *? St. Augustine triumphantly defended him 
 against this charge. In descanting on the effects of 
 Baptism St. Chrysostom says: “In the laver of regen- 
 eration grace touches the soul and eradicates the sin 
 which has taken root in it.” ** But what does he mean 
 when he writes in another of his works: “Ideo etiam 
 infantes (Ta madia) baptizgamus, licet peccata** non 
 habeant (xatro. duaprhara odx éyovtra)”— Therefore do 
 we also baptize little children, although they have no 
 sins.” Augustine rightly explains that Chrysostom meant 
 actual sins: “Intellige propria [scil. peccata] et nulla 
 contentio est. At inquies: Cur non ipse addidit propria? 
 Cur, putamus, nist quia disputans in catholica ecclesia 
 non se aliter intelligt arbitrabatur? Tali quaestione nul- 
 Fall and Original Sin, pp. 273 saq., 
 Cambridge 1903. 
 
 31 Cfr. Jos. Schwane, Dogmenge- 
 schichte, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 457 
 
 27 Adv. Haeres., V, 16, 3. 
 
 28 Contr. Arian., Or. 1, 51. 
 
 29 Or. de Ieiunio, 1. 
 
 30 A large number of other 
 
 equally pertinent Patristic texts is 
 cited by Heinrich, Dogmatische The- 
 ologie, Vol. VI, pp. 736 sqq., Mainz 
 1887. For the development of the 
 dogma up to the time of St. Augus- 
 tine, cfr. F,.. R. Tennant, The 
 Sources of the Doctrines of the 
 
 sqq. 
 
 32 This thesis is defended by two 
 Protestant writers on the history of 
 dogmas, Wigger and Miinscher. 
 
 33 Hom. in rt Cor., 40. 
 
 34 Not peccatum. 
 
ORIGINAL SIN 257 
 
 lus pulsabatur, vobis nondum litigantibus securius lo- 
 quebatur.” *° Elsewhere Chrysostom positively asserts 
 the existence of original sin. Thus he says in his 
 homilies on the Book of Genesis: “ Christ appeared 
 only once; he found our paternal note of indebtedness, 
 which Adam had written (eipev ipdv yeypdypadov TATPOOV, 
 ort e€ypawev 6 ’ASdu); for it was he [Adam] who laid 
 the foundation of the debt (roo xpetous) which we have 
 increased by subsequent [i. e., personal] sins.” °* Julian 
 further insisted that, according to St. Chrysostom, St. 
 Paul in employing the word “sin” merely meant the 
 penalty of bodily death. In his commentary on Rom. 
 V, 19 the Saint says: “What does the term ‘sinner’ 
 mean here? . It seems to me that it means one who has 
 incurred a penalty and is condemned to death.” 37 But 
 the context shows that Chrysostom merely wishes to deny 
 that all men became personal sinners through the sin of 
 Adam. For in the same homily from which we have 
 quoted he clearly admits the existence of habitual sin- 
 “We have received out of that grace not only so much 
 as was needed to take away the sin, but much more. 
 For we were freed from the penalty, cast off all injus- 
 tice, and re-arose as men newly-born, after the old man 
 meds Deen buried, (0. All this Pant terms |/4 super- 
 abundance of grace, intimating that we have not only 
 received a medicine adapted to the hurt, but health and 
 beauty. ... For Christ hath paid so much more than 
 we owed. ... Therefore, O man, doubt not if thou 
 seest the richness of so many graces, and ask not in 
 what manner that spark of death and sin was quenched, 
 since a whole ocean of graces was poured out upon 
 —it.’%8 St. Augustine was therefore perfectly justified 
 
 35 Contr. Iulian. Pelag., I, 6, 22. 37 Hom. in Ep. ad Rom., TOw Tints 
 36 Hom. in Gen., 9. . 38 Ibid, 
 
258 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY. 
 
 in addressing Julian in such harsh words as these: 
 “Ttane ista verba S. Ioannis Episcopi audes tamquam 
 e contrario tot taliumque sententiis collegarum eis op- 
 ponere, eumque ab illorum concordissima societate seiun- 
 gere et eis adversarium constituere? Absit, absit hoc 
 malum de tanto viro credere aut dicere. Absit, inquam, 
 ut Constantinopolitanus Ioannes de baptismate parvulo- 
 rum eorumque a paterno chirographo liberatione per 
 Christum tot ac tantis coepiscopis suis, maximeque 
 Romano Innocentio, Carthaginiensi Cypriano, Cappadoct 
 Basilio, Nazianzeno Gregorio, Gallo Hilario, Mediola- 
 nensi resistat Ambrosio. ... Hoc [dogma] sensit, hoc 
 credidit, hoc docuit et Ioannes.” *° 
 
 It must be admitted, however, that St. Chrysostom’s 
 interpretation “does not coincide exactly with the ideas 
 of Augustine on the nature of original sin. He fre- 
 quently repeats that the consequences or penalties of the 
 first sin affected not only our first parents, but also their 
 descendants, but he does not say that the sin itself was 
 inherited by their posterity and is inherent in their na- 
 ture. In general, to appreciate the homiletic teaching of 
 Chrysostom apropos of sin it is well to remember that 
 he had in mind Manichzean adversaries with their denial 
 of free-will and their doctrine of physically irresistible 
 concupiscence, an error that cut away the foundations 
 of all morality, and one which he opposed with all his 
 mighti)*? 
 
 Reapincs: — Greg. de Valentia, Controv. de Peccato Originals. 
 — *Bellarmine, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, 1. 3 sqq.— 
 Mariano a Novana, O. Cap., De Originaria Lapsi Hominis Con- 
 
 89 Contr. Iulian. Pelag., I, 6, 22. + of the dogma of original sin cfr. St. 
 
 40 Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrol- Thomas, Contr. Gent., IV, 52 (Rick- 
 ogy, Pp. 340, Freiburg and St. Louis aby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 
 1908. On the philosophical aspects 380 sqq.). i, 
 
a giiee 
 
 NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 259 
 
 ditione, Parisi 1882.—Simar, Die Theologie des hil. Paulus, 
 and ed., pp. 30 sqq., Freiburg 1883— A. Scher, De Universali 
 Propagatione Originalis Culpae, Romae 1895.— Bossuet, Défense 
 de la Tradition et des Saints Péres, VIII, 2 sqq.— Baur, Das 
 manichiische Religionssystem, Titbingen 1831— Mandernach, 
 Geschichte des Priscillianismus, Trier 1851.— Klasen, Innere Ent- 
 wicklung des Pelagianismus, Freiburg 1882— The Anti-Pelagian 
 Works of Saint Augustine, Translated by Peter Holmes et al., 
 Vol. I, Preface, Edinburgh 1872. (The documents which relate 
 to the Pelagian controversy will be found in an appendix to St. 
 Augustine’s works edited by the congregation of St. Maur. For 
 a full bibliography of Pelagianism consult Bardenhewer-Shahan, 
 Patrology, pp. 504 sq., Freiburg and St. Louis 1908.) —*Mohler, 
 Symbolism, ch. 2 sqq., 5th English ed., London 1906.— Hefele, 
 Conciliengeschichte, and ed., Vol. Il, Freiburg 1875.— Schwane, 
 Dogmengeschichte, and ed., Vol. II, § 56 sqq., Freiburg 1895.— 
 F. R. Tennant, The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and 
 Original Sin, Cambridge 1903.— S. Harent, art. “ Original Sin,” in 
 the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI— MacEvilly, An Exposition 
 of the Epistles of St. Paul, Vol, 1, 4th ed., New York 1801. 
 
 ARTICLE 3 
 
 THE NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 
 
 We might fitly preface this Article with the well-known 
 dictum of St. Augustine: “Antiguo peccato nihil est 
 ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secre- 
 huss? + 
 _ That the sin of Adam indwells as a real and true guilt 
 (reatus culpae) in all his descendants, is most assuredly 
 an impenetrable mystery. While the Church has never 
 dogmatically defined the nature of original sin, she 
 teaches: (1) that it exists as a real and proper sin in 
 every human being in consequence of his descent from 
 
 ® 1 DesMor. Eccl. I, 22. 
 
260 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 Adam;2 (2) that Baptism removes whatever is of the 
 nature of sin;* and (3) that the concupiscence which 
 remains after Baptism does not partake of the nature 
 of guilt.* 
 
 It is within these clearly defined limits, therefore, that 
 we must seek for the constitutive elements of original 
 sin. The Church tells us in what the essence of orig- 
 inal sin does not consist ; it remains for scientific theology 
 to ascertain its true nature. In the following series of 
 systematic theses we shall endeavor as far as possible 
 to go to the root of the problem. 
 
 Thesis I: Original sin does not descend as a sub- 
 stantial form from Adam to his progeny, constituting 
 man an incarnate image of the Devil. 
 
 This is de fide. 
 
 Proof. The heretical view opposed to this 
 thesis was held by the Lutheran theologian 
 Mathias Flacius Illyricus (+ 1575), head of 
 the so-called “Substantiarians,’” who contended 
 that the sin of Adam intrinsically transformed 
 the soul into a sinful substance and an image of 
 Satan, comparing it to “wine which turns into 
 vinegar.” Illyricus was opposed in his own 
 camp by a school called ‘“‘Accidentarians.” Be- 
 ing little more than a revamped Manicheism, 
 his theory stands and falls with the ancient heresy 
 asserting the absolute nature of evil. “Malum 
 illud,’ says St. Augustine, “quod quaerebam, 
 
 2“ Propagatione inest unicuique 38“ Tollit totum id, quod veram 
 proprium.” et propriam peccati rationem habet,” 
 4 Supra, pp. 243 sqq. 
 
NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 261 
 
 unde esset, non est substantia; quia si substantia 
 esset, bonum esset. Aut enim esset incorrupti- 
 bilis substantia, magnum utique bonum; aut sub- 
 stantia corruptibilis, quae nisi bona esset, cor- 
 rumpi non posset — That evil, the origin of which 
 I have been so long seeking for, is no substance; 
 for if it were a substance, it would be good. For 
 it would either be an incorruptible substance, a 
 great good indeed; or it would be a corruptible 
 substance, which if it were not good could not be 
 corrupted.” ° The theory of the Substantiarians 
 has not even the recommendation of novelty, for 
 it substantially agrees with the teaching of the 
 Euchites or Messalians, which was condemned 
 by the Third General Council of Ephesus, A. D. 
 431.° It is unnecessary to point out the absurd 
 consequences to which this error leads, not only 
 with regard to the doctrine of the Creation, but 
 likewise in Anthropology and Christology.’ 
 
 Thesis II: Concupiscence as such does not con- 
 stitute the essence of original sin. 
 
 Proot. Uhis- thesis isiialso' de) Ade.) liwis 
 5 Confess., VII, 12. olic Encyclopedia, Vol. enn Ctr. 
 6 The Messalians, or Euchites St. John Damascene, De Haer., n, 
 
 (i. e., Praying folk), believed that 80. 
 
 ‘evil was a physical substance and 7 The student will find this mat- 
 
 that the Devil indwelled personally ter exhaustively treated by_ Bellar- 
 
 (évuroordtrws) in every man. mine, De <Amiss.) .Grat.):V, 3-3: 
 
 (Funk, Manual of Church History, 
 Eng. trans. by L. Cappadelta, Vol. 
 I, p. 147, London 1910; J. P. Arend- 
 zen, art. ‘‘ Messalians ” in the Cath- 
 
 Suarez, De Peccato Orig., disp. 9, 
 sect. 2; and De Rubeis, De Pecc. 
 Orig., C. 54. 
 
 8 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5- 
 
262 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 aimed at the so-called Reformers of the sixteenth 
 century (Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon), and 
 against the Jansenists (particularly Baius, Jan- 
 senius, and Quesnel), who depicted concupis- 
 cence in lurid colors and asserted that it is a 
 formal sin and original sin.® This theory was 
 condemned as heretical by the Council of Trent.*° 
 
 The orthodox doctrine on the subject of con- 
 cupiscence is based upon the Epistles of St. Paul 
 and the teaching of the Fathers, notably St. Au- 
 gustine. 
 
 a) St. Paul expressly declares that Baptism 
 obliterates whatever is sinful and deserving of 
 reprobation in man. Rom. VI, 4: “Consepulti 
 sumus cum illo [scil. Christo] per baptismum in 
 mortem — Weare buried together with him [7. e., 
 Christ] by baptism into death.” Rom. VIII, 1: 
 “Nihil ergo nunc damnationis est its, qui sunt 
 im Christo Iesu — There is now therefore no con- 
 demnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.” 
 We know from experience that concupiscence re- 
 mains in man even after baptism; hence con- 
 culpiscence cannot be a sin, and least of all orig- 
 inal sin. 
 
 Jansenism can be triumphantly refuted from 
 the writings of St. Augustine, whom it professes 
 
 9 Supra, pp. 239 sq. 11 ovdéy dpa viv KardKpuua. 
 10 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5, 
 
 ty 
 iS 
 
NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 263 
 
 to follow. It is quite true St. Augustine, like 
 St. Paul,’ calls concupiscence sin; but he mani- 
 festly does not mean that it is a sin in the strict 
 sense of the term, except by the free consent of 
 the will. “Peccati nomen accepit concupiscentia,” 
 he says quite unmistakably, “quod ei consentire 
 peccatum est —Concupiscence has received the 
 name of sin, because it is a sin to consent to it.” 12 
 In fact, St. Augustine anticipated the authentic 
 declaration given by the Tridentine Council, that 
 the reason why St. Paul calls concupiscence sin 
 is because it “is of sin and inclines to sin,’? 14 
 “Sic autem,” he writes, “vocatur peccatum, quia 
 peccato facta est, quum iam in regeneratis non stt 
 ipsa peccatum; sic vocatur lingua locutio, quam 
 facit lingua, et manus vocatur scriptura, quam 
 facit manus — As arising from sin, it is called 
 sin, although in the regenerate it is not actually 
 sin; and it has this designation applied to it, 
 just as speech which the tongue produces is 
 itself called tongue, and just as the word hand 
 
 is used in the sense of writing, which the hand 
 
 produces.” * And again: “Restat ergo [in 
 
 it baptizatis] cum carne conflictus, quia deleta est 
 
 miquitas, sed manet infirmitas — There remains, 
 therefore, a conflict with the flesh [in those who 
 
 12Rom. VII, 17: “It is no 13 De Perfect. Iust., n. 44. 
 
 Ho, more I that ‘do it, but sin that 14 Supra, p. 245. 
 _ dwelleth in me,” ; 15 De Nupt. et Concub., Wo 23336, 
 
264, DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY. 
 
 are baptized], because, while unrighteousness is 
 wiped out, infirmity remains.” * 
 
 We may add the following theological argu- 
 ment. It is possible to conceive a state of pure 
 nature in which concupiscence would be neither a 
 sin nor original sin; consequently, original sin is 
 not identical with concupiscence.** 
 
 b) If original sin is not concupiscence, neither is it 
 identical with the hereditary evils brought upon the 
 human race by the misconduct of Adam.** There can 
 be no original sin without moral guilt. Mere penalties 
 are not sins, they presuppose sin. 
 
 Some of the earlier Schoolmen?® believed that orig- 
 inal sin is a positive quality (morbida qualitas) which is 
 transmitted from the infected body to the soul and as- 
 serts itself in the form of concupiscence. A few Scho- 
 lastic theologians derived this contagious disease from the 
 poisonous juices of the forbidden apple which Adam ate 
 in Paradise, or from the pestilential breath of the serpent 
 which seduced Eve. This untenable theory bears a 
 striking resemblance to that of the Lutheran theologians 
 of the sixteenth century. There is, however, an essen- 
 tial difference between the two. Henry of Ghent, 
 Gregory of Rimini, and the other representatives of 
 this school expressly teach that concupiscence (which 
 they identify with original sin) loses its sinful character 
 in those who are regenerated by Baptism. But this very 
 consideration should have convinced them that con- 
 cupiscence cannot be identical with original sin even 
 
 16 Serm., 6. 19 Henry of Ghent, Gregory of 
 
 17 Supra, pp. 228 sqq. Rimini, Driedo, and others. Cfr. 
 
 18 This heresy was taught by Vasquez, Comment. in S. Theol., 
 Abélard and Zwingli. 1a 2ae, disp, 132, c 4. 
 
NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 265 
 
 before justification, because the morbida qualitas re- 
 mains after Baptism without losing its intrinsic nature.?° 
 
 Hermes * gathered up as into a sheaf the various 
 heresies of Luther, Zwingli, and Baius. He held that 
 “ original sin is a disposition common to all natural de- 
 scendants of Adam and Eve in consequence of their de- 
 scent from these sinful progenitors, and which, in course 
 of time, produces an inevitable dissonance between rea- 
 son and the senses.’ 2? 
 
 Thesis III: It is highly improbable that, as cer- 
 tain eminent theologians hold, original sin consists 
 exclusively in the extrinsic imputability of the actual 
 sin of Adam conceived as morally enduring. 
 
 Proof. The theory ?? rejected in this thesis is 
 based upon a peculiar conception of habitual sin. 
 
 a) Theologians and moral philosophers rightly distin- 
 guish between actual sin (peccatum actuale) and habitual 
 sin (peccatum habituale). Actual sin (sin as an act) 
 is the cause of habitual sin (sin as a state), because a 
 sinful action produces a state of enmity with God. Now, 
 while the majority of Catholic divines define habitual 
 sin as a privation of sanctifying grace,?4 the writers 
 whose particular theory we are here considering re- 
 gard the loss of sanctifying grace merely as a punish- 
 ment for sin, not as a sinful state.2°> In this hypothesis 
 
 20Cfr. Bellarmine, De Pighius (Contr. I de Pece. Orig.), 
 Grat., V; 15. Alphonsus Salmeron (In Ep. ad 
 21 See his Dogmatik, Part 3, Dp. Rom., disp. 46), Toletus (In Ep. 
 172. ad Rom., cap. 5), and De Lugo 
 
 Amiss. 
 
 22 Refuted by Kleutgen, Theologie 
 der Vorzeit, Vol. II, pp. 616 sqq., 
 Miinster 1872. 
 
 23 Among its adherents may be 
 mentioned: Ambrosius.  Catharinus 
 
 (Opusc. de Lapsu Hom.), Albertus 
 
 18 
 
 (De Poenit., disp. 7, sect. 2 and 
 7 
 
 24° Peccatum habituale est ipsa 
 privatio gratiae.”’ 
 
 25 “ Privatio gratiae non est pec- 
 catum, sed poena peccati habitualis.”’ 
 
206 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 the nature of habitual sin cannot consist in the loss of 
 grace. In what, then, does it consist? De Lugo an- 
 swers: “ Peccatum habituale est ipsum peccatum actuale 
 moraliter perseverans, physice autem praeteritum, in or- 
 dine ad reddendum hominem rationabiliter exosum 
 Deo.” *® Since original sin is plainly not an actual sin 
 committed by him in whom it indwells, but merely a sin- 
 ful state traceable to Adam, the same theologian con- 
 sistently defines it as “ipsum peccatum actuale Adae 
 moraliter perseverans, quamdiu parvulis non condonatur, 
 in ordine ad reddendos eos rationabiliter exosos Deo.” ?* 
 This morally enduring fault and its imputability is the 
 reason why God withholds the jewel of sanctifying grace 
 from every child at the moment of its conception. In 
 other words, privation of grace is not the constitutive 
 element of habitual sin, but merely a penalty due to it. 
 This theory has been defended by a number of subtle 
 arguments, which may be summed up as follows: (1) 
 In the state of pure nature there would be habitual 
 sins which would not entail the loss of sanctifying 
 grace; consequently the privatio gratiae cannot consti- 
 tute the essence of sin. (2) Habitual sins may be ve- 
 nial sins, and in that case they do not entail the loss 
 of supernatural grace; consequently, and a pari, habitual 
 mortal sin (and therefore also original sin) does not 
 essentially consist in the loss of supernatural grace. 
 (3) It is far more consistent and more satisfactory to 
 consider the loss of grace as a cessation of divine 
 friendship, and therefore as a punishment for sin, rather 
 than as a sin in itself. (4) If the privation of grace 
 constituted the essence of habitual sin, repeated mortal 
 sins would produce but one habitual sin, because sanc- 
 
 26 De Poenit., disp. 7, sect. 2. 27 Op. cit., sect. 7. 
 
es 
 
 NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 267 
 
 tifying grace can be lost only once. In other words, 
 all habitual mortal sins would be specifically equal to, or 
 would constitute, but one sin,— which is absurd. For 
 the solution of these subtle difficulties we refer the 
 student to Palmieri.?8 
 
 b) The theory which ‘we have just expounded, 
 especially the exaggerated form in which it was 
 championed by Ambrosius Catharinus and Al- 
 bertus Pighius, is inadmissible: (1) On account 
 of the dogmatic consequences which it involves, 
 and (2) because it does not fully square with 
 the Tridentine teaching. 
 
 In its more moderate form, as propounded by Sal- 
 meron, Toletus, and especially De Lugo,”® this theory 
 is less objectionable, because these writers make two 
 admissions which insure the orthodoxy of their system 
 even if the Church should one day define it as an article 
 of faith that the privation of grace enters into the formal 
 essence of original sin.*° These admissions are: (1) 
 That the sin of Adam is morally at least a real sin also 
 in his descendants, and (2) that original sin cannot be 
 conceived without a privatio gratiae. Ambrosius Catha- 
 tinus maintains that original sin consists exclusively in 
 the extrinsic imputability of the sin of Adam, and that 
 his descendants, therefore, are not really sinners (ab 
 imtrinseco) but are merely so called by a sort of di- 
 vine imputation, somewhat after the manner in which, 
 
 28 De Deo Creante, pp. 566 sqq., 30“ Ad rationem peccati originalis 
 Romé 1878. bertinere privationem gratiae sancti- 
 
 29In this form the theory was  ficantis.” Cfr, Schema Propos. 
 also espoused by a number of minor Conc. Vatican. in the Collectio La- 
 
 writers, e. g., Arriaga, Platel, Kil- censis, t. VII, pp. 517, 549. 
 ber, Frassen, and Henno. 
 
268 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 in the Lutheran view of justification, man does not be- 
 come internally justified by Baptism, but merely seizes 
 the extrinsic justice of Christ and with it, as with a 
 cloak of grace, covers the sinful nakedness of his soul. 
 It is true that Catharinus refers to the privation of grace 
 as a penalty of original sin; but he fails to establish any 
 organic and necessary connexion between the two. Un- 
 like De Lugo, he omits to accentuate the fact that the 
 loss of sanctifying grace is er vi notionis an essential 
 consequence of original sin. 
 
 However, De Lugo’s theory, too, is open to 
 objection: It fails to account for the individual 
 guilt of original sin as an intrinsic (privative) 
 quality, and does not get beyond the extrinsic 
 imputation of the sin of Adam. If original 
 sin in its formal essence were but the actual sin 
 of Adam in so far as it morally continues in his 
 descendants until forgiven by Baptism, it could 
 not strike root in the souls of infants and exist 
 in them as individual, physically inhering sin. 
 The only quality of original sin that inheres in 
 the individual, according to this theory, is the 
 privation of grace, and this De Lugo and his 
 school do not conceive. as the substance, but 
 merely as a penalty of original sin. This view 
 can hardly be harmonized with the fundamental 
 conception underlying the Tridentine definition, 
 to wit, that original sin is “transfusum ommi- 
 bus et mest umicuque proprium,’*' and that 
 
 81 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 3. 
 
NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 269 
 
 those affected with it “propriam iniustitiam 
 contrahunt.” °° The Council goes even further 
 than that; it adds that unrighteousness follows 
 natural birth in precisely the same manner in 
 which righteousness follows regeneration. This 
 gives rise to the antithesis between nasci and 
 contrahere propriam iniustitiam on the one 
 hand, and renasci and iustum fieri gratia Christi 
 on the other. Now the essence of justification 
 consists in the infusion of sanctifying grace; and 
 if this be true, then original sin (like habitual 
 sin in general) essentially consists in the priva- 
 tion of sanctifying grace. Thus the theory of 
 De Lugo, and a fortiori that of Catharinus, falls 
 to pieces. 
 
 Thesis IV: Original sin essentially consists in pri- 
 vation of grace, so far as this is voluntary in all men 
 through the will of their progenitor. 
 
 This proposition embodies a common teaching 
 of Catholic theologians. 
 
 Proof. We have to show: (1) that priva- 
 tion of grace (privatio gratiae) constitutes the 
 essence of original sin, and (2) that, through its 
 causal relation to the sin of Adam, it involves guilt 
 on the part of all who are affected by it. These 
 
 two. elements, viz., privation of grace and the 
 
 origin of this privation in voluntary guilt, to- 
 gether constitute original sin. 
 32 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 3. 
 
270 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY, 
 
 1. As regards the first of these elements, it 
 follows from the preceding thesis that the pri- 
 vatio gratiae is not merely a punishment, but 
 original sin itself. Because of the importance 
 of this proposition we shall restate the argument 
 in a somewhat different form. 
 
 a) It is an article of faith that infant Baptism so com- 
 pletely obliterates original sin, qua guilt, that nothing 
 odious or damnable remains in the regenerate infant.** 
 This effect is produced solely by sanctifying grace, 
 which Baptism infuses into the soul of the child. 
 “ Nam sicut revera homines, nisi ex semine Adae pro- 
 pagati nascerentur, non nascerentur iniusti, quum ed 
 propagatione ... propriam imiustitiam contrahunt: ita 
 nisi in Christo renascerentur, nunquam tustificarentur, 
 quum ea renascentiad per meritum passionis eius gratia, 
 gua iustt fiunt, illis tribuatur.8* Consequently original 
 sin, considered as habitual sin, consists essentially in 
 privation of grace, whereby the child becomes an enemy 
 of God, just as he is constituted a friend of God by 
 the sanctifying grace conferred in Baptism. 
 
 b) Following in the footsteps of the Second Council 
 of Orange (A.D. 528) the Tridentine Fathers teach * 
 that original sin is “the death of the soul”? (mors ani- 
 mae). Now, in the present economy of grace, the only 
 way in which the soul can die is by being deprived of 
 its supernatural life-principle, which is sanctifying grace. 
 Let us put the argument into the form of an equation: 
 privatio gratiae== mors animae= peccatum originale ; 
 consequently, peccatum originale est privatio gratiae. 
 
 38 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 34 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 3. 
 5; supra, pp. 243 Sq. 35 Sess. V, can. 2; supra. p. 243. 
 
NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 271 
 
 c) According to the teaching of St. Paul * original 
 sin and justification are opposed to each other as con- 
 traries; to deny the one is to affirm the other, and vice 
 versa. Now, if sanctifying grace constitutes divine son- 
 ship or justice, then the absence of this grace (due to the 
 guilt of Adam) must constitute the state of enmity with 
 God, usually called original sin. 
 
 d) We arrive at the same result by the method of 
 elimination. The state of original justice in Paradise 
 comprised the following factors: (1) Sanctifying grace 
 as the primary element of original justice, (2) integrity 
 of nature (immunitas a concupiscentia) as its secondary 
 element, and (3) bodily immortality and impassibility 
 as its tertiary element.*’ By original sin Adam for- 
 feited all these prerogatives for himself and the whole 
 human race, and they were superseded by their contraries, 
 vig.: privation of grace, concupiscence, mortality, and 
 passibility. Among these evils death and suffering are 
 assuredly not sins, but merely inherited evils, or, to speak 
 more accurately, penalties of sin. Concupiscence cannot 
 constitute the substance of original sin, because the 
 Church teaches that it remains in the soul after Bap- 
 tism.** Consequently privation of grace must be the 
 formal essence of original sin. 
 
 These convincing arguments have led the majority of 
 theologians to adopt the view formulated in our thesis.®9 
 
 2. To render privation of grace.a sin, another 
 factor must co-operate, namely the ratio volun- 
 
 36 Rom. V, 15 sq. 145; Duns Scotus, Comment. in 
 87 Cfr. supra, pp. 196 sqq. Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 20; 
 38 Cfr. supra, pp. 261 saqq. qu. 2; Dominicus Soto, De Nat. 
 
 39 Cfr. St. Anselm, De Concept. 
 Virg., c. 26; St. Thomas Aquinas, 
 S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 82; De Malo, 
 qu. 4, art. 1; Compend. Theol., c. 
 
 et Grat., I, 9; Bellarmine, De Amiss. 
 Grat., V, 9; Suarez, De Vitiis et 
 Peccatis, disp. 9, sect. 2; and most 
 other theologians, 
 
272 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 ‘aru, 1. e., freely incurred guilt. Although sanc- 
 tifying grace, even in baptized infants, is doubt- 
 less more than a mere physical ornament of the 
 soul (viz.: moral righteousness and_ sanctity, 
 gratia sanctificans, iustificans), its loss involves 
 real guilt only when it is due to a sinful act of 
 voluntary renunciation. For every habitual sin 
 postulates an actual sin, every guilt a moral 
 crime, the death of the soul a sinful act of mur- 
 der. To deny this fundamental principle of 
 moral philosophy would be equivalent to Mani- 
 chzism.*° Consequently, original sin, too, be- 
 ing real guilt, must have for its efficient cause 
 a sinful act. Where are we to look for this 
 sinful act? In the case of infants it surely can- 
 not be a personal sin, since an infant is guilty 
 of original sin before he is able to commit a 
 sinful personal act. The sin which causes pri- 
 vation of grace in an infant, therefore, can be 
 none other than the sin of Adam in Paradise, 
 constituting in some way or other a real guilt in 
 the infant as well. This is precisely the teaching 
 of St. Paul. Rom. V,12: “Per unum hominem 
 peccatum in hunc mundum intravit — By one 
 man sin entered into this world.” Rom. V, 10: 
 
 debeat esse voluntarium.”’ Likewise 
 Prop. 47: “‘ Unde peccatum originis 
 
 40 The Church has condemned 
 the proposition (No. 46) of Baius: 
 
 “Ad rationem et definitionem pec- 
 cati non pertinet voluntarium, nec 
 definitionis quaestio est, sed causae 
 et originis, utrum omne peccatum 
 
 vere habet rationem peccati sine ulla 
 ratione ac respectu ad voluntatem, 
 @ qua originem habutt.’’ 
 
NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 4 
 
 “Per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores 
 constitutt sunt multi — By the disobedience of 
 one man many were made sinners.” This is also 
 the unanimous and firm belief of the Fathers of 
 the Church. In the words of St. Augustine: 
 “Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando fuimus 
 ule unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum 
 — For we were all in that one man, when we 
 were all [identical with] that one man who 
 through a woman fell into sin.” 4 
 
 3. To the question, why the sin of Adam inheres 
 as a true sin, 7. ¢. as real guilt (reatus culpae) in all 
 his decendants, we can only reply that this is a mystery 
 which theological speculation is unable to explain. The 
 following considerations are commonly adduced to refute 
 certain philosophical objections. 
 
 It was the will of God that Adam should be phys- 
 ically and juridically the head of the human race, and, 
 as such, should act as its representative. God had 
 given him original justice and its concomitant pre- 
 ternatural prerogatives not only as a personal privilege, 
 but as a heritage which he was to transmit to all his de- 
 scendants. In other words, original justice was essen- 
 tially hereditary justice, original sanctity was essentially 
 hereditary grace, and a privilege given to human nature 
 as such. Consequently, hereditary grace and human 
 nature were from the first causally related. The nexus 
 existing between them was based neither on metaphysical 
 _ hecessity nor on any legal claim, but was instituted 
 by the free will of God. When Adam voluntarily re- 
 
 - 41 De Civ. Dei, XIII, ia. A 42 Supra, pp. 216 sqq. 
 
274 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 nounced original justice, he acted not for himself alone, 
 but as the representative of his race, as the moral and 
 juridical head of the whole human family. Thus the 
 loss of original justice was essentially a privation of 
 hereditary justice, and as such tantamount to a volun- 
 tary renunciation on the part of human nature of its. 
 supernatural heritage. This voluntary renunciation in- 
 volves an hereditary guilt, which is voluntary on the part 
 of each and every individual human being, because Adam, 
 acting as head and progenitor of the race, rejected sanc- 
 tifying grace in the name.of his entire progeny. Con- 
 sequently original sin is not a personal sin, but a sin of 
 nature, conditioned upon our generic relation to Adam, 
 who, contrary to the will of God, despoiled human 
 nature of grace and thereby rendered it hostile to its 
 Creator. 
 
 It will be worth while to support this explanation by 
 theological authorities. St. Anselm of Canterbury, who 
 is called the Father of Scholasticism, writes luminously 
 as follows: “In Adamo omnes peccavimus, quando ille 
 peccavit, non quia tunc peccavimus ipsi qui nondum 
 eramus, sed quia de illo futuri eramus, et tunc facta est 
 necessitas, ut cum essemus peccaremus: quoniam per — 
 unius inobedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi.” 
 St. Thomas Aquinas says with his usual clearness: 
 “ Sicut autem est quoddam bonum, quod respicit naturam, © 
 et quoddam quod respicit personam, ita etiam est quae- 
 dam culpa naturae et quaedam personae. Unde ad cul- 
 pam personae requiritur voluntas personae, sicut patet — 
 in culpa actualt, quae per actum personae committitur. — 
 
 Ad culpam vero naturae non requiritur nisi voluntas in | 
 
 natura illa. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod defectus illius 
 
 43 De Conc. Virg., c. 7. 
 
ahr 
 
 NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 275 
 
 originalis wustitiae, quae homini in sua creatione collata 
 est, ex voluntate hominis accidit. Et sicut illud naturae 
 
 donum fuit et fuisset in totam naturam propagatum 
 
 homine m wstitia permanente, ita etiam privatio illius 
 boni in totam naturam perducitur quasi privatio et vitium 
 naturae; ad idem genus privatio et habitus referuntur. 
 Et in quolibet homine rationem culpae habet ex hoc, 
 quod per voluntatem principii naturae, 1. e. primi hominis, 
 inductus est talis defectus.” ** Blessed Odo of Cambrai 
 (+ 1113) graphically describes the difference between 
 
 personal sin and sin of nature as follows: “ Peccatum, 
 
 quo peccavimus in Adam, mihi quidem naturale est, in 
 Adam vero personale. In Adam gravius, levius in me; 
 nam peccavi in eo non qui sum, sed quod sum. Peccavi 
 in €0 non ego, sed hoc quod sum ego; peccavi homo, non 
 Odo; peccavt substantia, non persona. Et quia substan- 
 tia non est nisi in persona, peccatum substantiae est 
 etiam personae, sed non personale. Peccatum vero per- 
 sonale est, quod facio ego, qui sum, non hoc quod sum; 
 quo pecco Odo, non homo; quo pecco persona, non 
 natura, Sed quia persona non est sine natura, peccatum 
 personae est etiam naturae, sed non naturale.’ * 
 
 The logical and theological possibility of original sin 
 therefore depends upon three separate and distinct con- 
 ditions: (1) The existence of a supernatural grace 
 which was not due to human nature, and the absence of 
 
 which entails enmity with God, 7. e., a state of sin; (2) 
 
 _ The existence of an ontological nexus by which Adam 
 
 and his descendants constitute a moral unity or monad; 
 (3) The existence of a positive divine law conditioning 
 the preservation or loss of hereditary grace upon the 
 
 44 Comment. in Quatuor Libros  Cfr. also S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 81, 
 
  Sent., II, dist. 30, qu. 1, art. 2— art. 1; De Malo, qu. 4, art. 1. 
 
 45 De Peccato Originali, 1. 2. 
 
276 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 personal free-will of our progenitor as the head and 
 representative of the whole human family. 
 
 God cannot be charged with cruelty or injustice on 
 account of original sin, for He denies fallen man nothing 
 to which his nature has a just claim. Adam’s headship 
 was divinely intended for the purpose of transmitting 
 original justice (not original sin) to all his descendants. 
 God did not cause but merely permitted the Fall of 
 man, perhaps with a view of making it the source 
 of still greater blessings, such as the Incarnation, Re- 
 demption, grace, etc. O felix culpa, o certe necessarium 
 Adae peccatum! 
 
 4. THE CONTRACTUAL AND THE ALLIGATION THEORIES. 
 — To facilitate a deeper understanding of the com- 
 munity of nature and will that unites Adam with the 
 members of his family, there have been excogitated two 
 separate and distinct theories, one of which is ‘called 
 the theory of Contract, the other, the theory of Alliga- 
 tion. The contractual theory (sometimes also called 
 “ Federalism”), holds that God made a formal contract 
 with Adam to this effect: If you preserve hereditary 
 justice, it will be transmitted to all your descendants; 
 but if you forfeit it, you will involve yourself and your 
 posterity in misery and sin.** According to the other 
 theory, God by a decretum alligativum so bound up the 
 will of all of Adam’s descendants with that of their 
 progenitor that the will of Adam became the will of his 
 family, just as under the civil law a free-will act of a 
 guardian is considered equivalent to that of his ward. 
 
 It seems to us, however, that neither of these theories 
 contributes anything to a profounder appreciation of 
 the nature of original sin. If the causal nexus existing 
 
 46 Thus Ambrosius Catharinus and others; cfr. De Rubeis, De Pecc. 
 Orig., c. 61. 
 
ae 
 
 at, Ecler 
 se ene 
 
 mre 
 
 NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 277 
 
 between Adam and his descendants was a positive ordi- 
 nance of God, there was no need of a contract or decretum 
 alligativum. If, on the other hand, we deny the existence 
 
 of such a causal nexus, the transmission of Adam’s sin 
 
 by inheritance becomes absolutely unintelligible. A breach 
 of contract might result in an evil of nature, but it 
 could never produce a sin of nature, while the inclusion 
 of the will of Adam’s descendants in that of their pro- 
 genitor per se can constitute only a nexus conditionis, 
 but never a nexus unitatis. Revelation furnishes no 
 basis whatever for such hypotheses, and Dominicus Soto 
 is right in treating them as “ fictions.” 47 
 
 One more important observation and we shall close. 
 We have explained that original sin formally consists 
 in privation of grace and that concupiscence is merely 
 a resulting penalty. St. Thomas and several other emi- 
 nent theologians regard concupiscence as an integral 
 though secondary constituent of original sin, in fact as 
 its materia (its forma being absence of grace).*® The 
 Angelic Doctor explains this as follows: Every ha- 
 bitual sin embraces two essential elements: (tr) A 
 
 ‘ turning away from God (aversio a Deo) and (2) a 
 
 turning to the creature (conversio ad creaturam). The 
 first is the formal, the second the material element. In 
 the case of original sin, this turning to the creature 
 manifests itself most drastically in concupiscence, and 
 therefore concupiscence enters as an integral constituent 
 
 into the essence of original sin and is thereby sharply 
 
 differentiated from other evils such as mortality, suffer- 
 ing, diabolical or external temptation, etc. In matter of 
 
 47 For a more detailed treatment ter quidem est concupiscentia, for- 
 of these theories cfr. Palmieri, De maliter vero est defectus gratiae 
 
 oh Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 584  originalis.’ S. Theol., 1a z2ae, qu. 
 1. sqd. Solaray: 
 
 - 48° Peccatum originale materiali- 
 
278 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 fact concupiscence, though not in itself sinful, lies very 
 near the line that divides the physical from the moral 
 order; so much so that even its unconscious movements 
 (motus primoprimi) are, materialiter, opposed to the 
 moral law, and escape being sins only by the circumstance 
 that the will withholds its formal consent. It is in this 
 sense we must understand St. Augustine, when he speaks 
 of a reatus concupiscentiae, as for instance in the follow- 
 ing passage: “Cuius concupiscentiae reatus in baptis- 
 mate solvitur, sed infirmitas manet, cur donec sanetur, 
 omnis fidelis, quit bene proficit, studiosissime relucta- 
 tur.’ 4° This view, which was adopted by some of the 
 Schoolmen, must not be confounded with the heretical 
 teaching of the Protestant Reformers, or with that of 
 the Jansenists.°° The Tridentine Council originally 
 intended to defend this Scholastic view against its op- 
 ponents by adding to its first draft of the Decretum 
 de Peccato Originali the words: “ Non improbare Syno- 
 dum eorum theologorum assertionem, qui aiunt, manere 
 post baptismum partem materialem peccati originalis 
 [scil. concupiscentiam], non formalem.” This clause 
 was, however, omitted from the final draft of the de- 
 Cree. 
 
 REapDINGS : — Berlage, Dogmatik, Vol. V, pp. 249 sqq., Miinster 
 1860.— *Schliinkes, Wesen der Erbsiinde, Ratisbon 1863.— Hur- 
 ter, Compend. Theol. Dogmat.,-t. II, n. 407 sqq., Oeniponte 1806. 
 
 _(S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 3908 © 
 sqq.).— G. Pell, Das Dogma von der Sitinde und Erlésung im — 
 
 Lichte der Vernunft, Ratisbon 1886—*Scheeben, Mysterien des 
 
 Christentums, §§ 40 sqq., 3rd ed., Freiburg 1912——J. H. Busch, 
 
 Das Wesen der Erbsiinde nach Bellarmin und Suarez, Paderborn if 
 
 49. Retract., I, 315,\2.—Cfr. St. 50 Cfr. Second Thesis, supra, pp. 
 Thomas, S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 82, 261 sqq. 
 
 art. 3. 51Cfr. Pallavicini, Hist. Conc. 
 
 Trident., VII, 9. 
 
TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL SIN 279 
 
 1909.— S. Harent, art. “Original Sin” in the Catholic Ency- 
 clopedia, Vol. XI—C. Cutberlet, Gott und die Schopfung, pp. 360 
 sqq., Ratisbon 1910. 
 
 ARTICLE 4 
 
 HOW ORIGINAL SIN IS TRANSMITTED 
 
 1. THe Specrric Unity or Oricinat Sin— 
 Our guiding principle in this Article must be that 
 original sin is specifically one in all men, and that 
 it comes down to us from the first sin of our proto- 
 parents in Paradise. By its peculiar mode of 
 transmission original sin is numerically multiplied 
 as many times as there are children of Adam born 
 into the world. Yet in each and every one of 
 these there inheres one and the same specific 
 sin, 1. e., the sin of Adam, with no difference 
 either of essence or degree so far as gravity is 
 concerned. Such is the express teaching of the 
 Church. “Hoc Adae peccatum,’ says the Tri- 
 dentine Council, “quod origine unum est, propa- 
 gatione transfusum, omnibus inest unicuique 
 proprium — This sin of Adam, one in its origin, 
 being transfused aay all by eae SAAT is in 
 each one as his own.’ 
 
 It is a controverted question among theologians 
 
 whether original sin derives solely from Adam or from 
 both Adam and Eve as its efficient cause; or, rather, 
 
 whether there would be an original sin if Eve alone 
 
 1 Cone. Trident., Sess. V, can. 3. 
 
280 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 had fallen. Holy Scripture seems to answer this ques- 
 tion in the negative; for whenever it refers to original 
 sin, it speaks of it as the “sin of Adam” (peccatum 
 Adami) or the “sin of one man” (peccatum unius 
 hominis).2 In point of fact Adam alone was qualified 
 to act as the head and representative of the human 
 race. The apparently dissentient text Ecclus. XXV, 33: 
 “A muliere initium factum est peccati et per tlam 
 omnes morimur — From the woman came the beginning 
 of sin, and by her we all die,” is merely a statement of 
 the historic fact that Eve seduced her husband. Hence, 
 in the words of St. Thomas, “ Original sin-is not con- 
 tracted from the mother, but from the father. Accord- 
 ingly, if Adam had not sinned, even though Eve had, 
 their children would not have contracted original sin; 
 the case would be different if Adam had sinned and Eve 
 had not.”*® It remains to be explained how original sin 
 is transmitted from Adam to his descendants. 
 
 2. THE TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL SIN BY 
 NaTURAL GENERATION.—To solve this problem 
 we must first examine in what way the nature 
 of Adam is transmitted to his descendants. 
 
 The answer obviously is—by sexual generation. © 
 By this same act the child also contracts natural 
 or original sin. The Catholic formula for this _ 
 
 truth reads: “Generatione contrahitur pecca- 
 tum,’* or: “Adae peccatum propagatione 
 transfusum,’ © which is diametrically opposed to 
 
 2B. ‘go; Rom: Vy) 12 Vsqq. 5 Cfr. the Council of Trent, Sess. 
 3\S. Theol: ra 2ae; qu, (81, art. 5. V, canon 3. 
 4 Cfr. the Second Council of Mil- 
 
 eve, canon 2. 
 
TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL SIN 281 
 
 the Pelagian heresy that “sin is transmitted by 
 imitation, not by propagation.” ° 
 
 Original sin can be transmitted only by the natural 
 mode of sexual generation, 7. e., the commingling of 
 male with female, because this is the way in which all 
 children of Adam come into being. Hence the frequent 
 occurrence of the phrase “ex semine Adae”’ in the 
 various definitions of our dogma.’ If any man, therefore, 
 though a descendant of Adam, were not born ex semine 
 Adae, he would not be subject to original sin. This is 
 the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, who was “ conceived by 
 the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary.” ® Not so 
 His mother, who was miraculously conceived without 
 original sin in view of the merits of her Divine Son? 
 When, as in the case of St. John the Baptist, the lack of 
 generative power (regardless of whether it is due to fe- 
 male sterility or male impotency) is miraculously sup- 
 plied by God, there is sexual generation, and consequently 
 also original sin. 
 
 3. ORIGINAL SIN AND CREATIONISM.—The 
 Catholic teaching that original sin is transmitted 
 by sexual generation contains the solution of a 
 great difficulty, which caused St. Augustine to 
 
 6 Cir. supra, p. 243. Spiritu Sancto.... Et propter hoc 
 
 “Cir. Conca Trid.,) Sess. V1, cap. 
 4; Supra, p. 270. 
 
 8 Circ. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 3a, 
 Gi. fs, dart. t;/4ad). 20. “Unde 
 Christus non fuit in Adam secun- 
 dum seminalem rationem, sed solum 
 secundum corpulentam substantiam. 
 Et ideo Christus non accepit active 
 ab Adam humanam naturam, sed 
 solum materialiter, active vero a 
 
 19 
 
 Christus non peccavit in Adam, in 
 quo fuit solum secundum materiam.”? 
 For a more detailed treatment of 
 this subject we must refer the 
 reader to the dogmatic treatise on 
 the Incarnation. - 
 
 9The dogme of the Immaculate 
 Conception belongs to Mariology, 
 to which we shall devote volume VI 
 of this series of dogmatic text-books. 
 
282 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 waver between Creationism and Generationism.* 
 The Pelagian argument was substantially this: 
 A spiritual soul cannot originate otherwise than 
 by a creative act of God. But since nothing im- 
 pure can come from the hands of God, it is absurd 
 to say that the human soul is contaminated by 
 original sin. The solution of the difficulty is as 
 follows: The parents engender the whole child, 
 not merely its body. This is not, of course, to 
 be understood in the sense that they create the 
 spiritual soul. What they do is to produce a 
 material substratum which is determined and dis- 
 posed by the laws of nature to receive a spiritual 
 soul. This soul, forming a constitutive element 
 of that human nature for which the parents lay 
 the foundation, incurs original sin, not on account 
 of its creation by God, but in consequence of the 
 genesial connexion of the human nature, of which 
 it forms a part, with Adam. “Sic ergo originale 
 peccatum est in anima,’ says St. Thomas, “in 
 quantum pertinet ad humanam naturam. Hu- 
 mana autem natura traducitur a parente in hlium 
 
 per traductionem carnis, cut postmodum anima in- — 
 
 funditur, et ex hoc infectionem incurrit.” * Bel- 
 larmine gives an equally clear explanation in his 
 
 treatise De Amissione Gratiae: “Siquidem ani- — 
 
 ma ut prius intelligitur creart a Deo, mhil habet 
 cum Adamo ac per hoc non commumicat eius pec- 
 
 10 Supra, pp. 169 sqq. 11 De Potent., qu. 3, art. 9, ad 6. 
 
CONCUPISCENCE 283 
 
 cato, sed quum in corpore generato ex Adamo in- 
 cipit habitare et cum ipso corpore unum SUp posi- 
 tum facere, tunc peccatum originis trahit.’ ” 
 
 It follows that original sin in the soul of a new-born 
 babe is produced neither by Almighty God nor by the 
 child’s parents. It is not produced by God, for He merely 
 creates the soul, just as He would do were man in a state 
 of pure nature, and refrains from endowing it with sancti- 
 fying grace for the sole reason that it is destined to be the 
 substantial form of a body which is derived by genera- 
 tion from Adam. Nor is original sin produced by the 
 child’s parents, because the parents merely beget a human 
 nature, regardless of whether it is to be constituted in 
 righteousness or sin. The efficient cause of original sin 
 is purely and solely Adam. “ Infectio originalis peccatt 
 nullo modo causatur a Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi 
 parentis per carnalem generationem,” says Aquinas.1° 
 This is the reason why even pious and saintly parents 
 beget their children in the state of original sin. For, 
 as St. Augustine observes, “ parents, though themselves 
 regenerated, beget not children inasmuch as they are 
 born of God, but inasmuch as they are still children of 
 the world.” 14 
 
 4. THE Part PLAYED BY CONCUPISCENCE IN 
 THE TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL S1n.—To pre- 
 vent misunderstanding and to acquire a clearer 
 notion of original sin and the manner of its prop- 
 agation, we must carefully distinguish (1) be- 
 
 12 De Amiss. Grat., V, 15. “It qui generant, sit iam regenerati 
 13S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 83, art. sunt, non ex hoc generant, quod 
 ¥, adi. filu Det sunt, sed ex hoc, quod 
 
 14 De Nupt. et Concup., 1, 18, 20: adhuc filii saeculi.” 
 
284 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 tween actual and habitual concupiscence, (2) be- 
 tween concupiscence in the begetting parents and 
 in the begotten child, and (3) between material 
 and formal concupiscence. 
 
 a) Whether concupiscence be conceived actually as an 
 evil commotion, or habitually as an evil disposition, the 
 fact that it exists both in the begetting parents and the 
 begotten child furnishes an inductive proof of the actual 
 transmission of original sin by sexual generation. It is an 
 article of faith that the loss of integrity is a penalty of 
 original sin. Had not human nature, through Adam, vol- 
 untarily renounced sanctifying grace, and with it all the 
 preternatural prerogatives with which it was originally 
 endowed (including the perfect dominion of reason over 
 the lower passions), neither parents nor children would 
 now be subject to concupiscence. The existence of 
 concupiscence, which is the result of sin, may, therefore, 
 from the standpoint of Catholic dogma, be taken as a 
 certain proof for the existence of original sin, which is 
 its underlying cause. We say, from the standpoint of 
 Catholic dogma, for human reason would be unable to 
 draw this conclusion without the aid of Revelation, be- 
 cause in the state of pure nature, which we know to 
 
 be possible, concupiscence might exist without being © 
 
 caused by sin. 
 
 b) Taken in the more limited sense of formal con- 
 cupiscence of the flesh as manifested in the act of sexual 
 generation, concupiscence is not the proper cause of the 
 transmission of original sin, nay it is not even a necessary 
 condition of such transmission. We know from Divine 
 Revelation that the principal cause of original sin is the 
 
 transgression of Adam. Sexual generation, whether ac- — 
 
 a rn. 
 
CONCUPISCENCE 285 
 
 companied by concupiscence or not, is merely instru- 
 mental. 
 
 St. Augustine, instead of regarding concupiscence as a 
 mere mode, or an inevitable concomitant, of sexual gen- 
 eration (in the state of fallen nature), held it to be 
 the instrumental cause of original sin. Such at least 
 seems to be the tenor of a number of passages in his 
 writings; e. g.: “The very embrace which is honorable 
 and permitted, cannot be effected without the ardor of 
 concupiscence. . . . Now from this concupiscence what- 
 ever comes into being by natural birth is tied and bound 
 by original sin.”*® It was due to the influence of this 
 great Doctor (who, as we have pointed out before, found 
 himself unable to form a definite opinion with regard to 
 the comparative merits of Generationism and Creation- 
 ism),*° that Peter Lombard and others of the Schoolmen 
 unduly exaggerated the part played by concupiscence in 
 the transmission of original sin.7 Even if a child were 
 miraculously begotten without concupiscence on the part 
 of its parents, it would yet be tainted by original sin, 
 because born of the seed of Adam. Such a child would 
 come into the world precisely like other children,— not 
 in a state of pure nature, nor yet in the state of sanc- 
 tifying grace, but defiled by original sin: and it would 
 consequently need Baptism just as much as any other 
 child. Consequently the “ ardor of concupiscence ” is not 
 a necessary condition, much less the instrumental cause, 
 of original sin. 
 
 c) In its material sense, however, 7. e., as sexual com- 
 merce, or the conjugal embrace, concupiscence is the 
 
 15 De Nupt. et Concup., I, 24, 27: broles, originali est obligata pec- 
 
 ““Ipse ille licitus honestusque con- cato.” 
 cubitus non potest esse sine ardore 16 Supra, pp. 169 sqq. 
 libidinis. ... Ex hac carnis con- 17 Cfr. Peter Lombard, Lib, Sent., 
 
 cupiscentia quaecumque  nascitur . II, dist. 30, 31. 
 
286 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 instrumental cause of original sin, because original sin is 
 transmitted by sexual generation. It is in this sense that 
 the Fathers of the Church, and especially St. Augustine, 
 say that where there is no concupiscence of the flesh, 
 there is no original sin. They take absentia concupis- 
 centiae as meaning sine opere viri, or sine amplexu mari- 
 tali.* Jesus Christ is the only man who was thus con- 
 ceived,*? 
 
 Reapincs: —*Kilber (Theol. Wirceburg.), De Peccato Ori- 
 ginali, cap. 3— Katschthaler, Theol. Dogmat. Specialis, Vol. I, 
 Ratisbon 1878.— Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, 
 Vol. II, pp. 30 sqq., 2nd ed., London igor. 
 
 ’ 
 
 ARTICLE 5 
 
 THE PENALTIES OF ORIGINAL SIN 
 
 Although the penalties of original sin are practically 
 the same for Adam’s descendants as they were for Adam 
 himself, there is a difference in degree. Our first 
 parents deserved a severer punishment for their actual 
 transgression than their unfortunate descendants, who 
 have committed no personal fault but are merely tainted 
 by inherited guilt. The sin of our first parents was a 
 mortal sin, while that with which their descendants are 
 born is merely a sin of nature, and consequently, in 
 point of co-operation, there is less guilt in original sin 
 than even in the smallest venial sin. This is the express 
 teaching of St. Thomas.? 
 
 18 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Gen. 1 Comment. in Quatuor Libros 
 ad Lit., X, 20; Leo the Great, Sent; Wb, dist.’ 33; give 0a, nae 
 Serm. de Nativitate Domini, 2. 1, ad 2: “Inter omnia peccata 
 
 19 St. Anselm has left us a special minimum est originale, eo quod 
 treatise on this subject under the minimum habet de voluntario. Non 
 title of De Conceptu Virginali et enim est voluntarium voluntate is- 
 Peccaito Oritginali. tins personae, sed voluntate princi- 
 
 a & - > f i 
 A ey ee i i nD Mee 
 
EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN 287 
 
 But why does God, who punishes venial sin only with 
 purgatory, visit original sin -with eternal damnation? 
 For the reason that, in the words of Francis Sylvius, 
 original sin by its very nature imports privation of jus- 
 tice, and he who is infected with it lacks that grace by 
 which alone the punishment can be lifted. 
 
 I. THE PENALTIES OF ORIGINAL SIN IN THE 
 WAYFARING STATE.—In order to gain a clear 
 notion of the effects of original sin, let us consider 
 an unbaptized infant. He is free from personal 
 guilt, mortal or venial, and tainted solely by the 
 stain of original sin. A consideration of his 
 condition here below and his fate in the next 
 world, should he die before receiving Baptism, 
 will give us a good idea of the nature of original 
 sin and the penalties which it entails. 
 
 Divine Revelation enables us to reduce the ef- 
 fects of original sin in the status viae to four dis- 
 tinct groups, all of which are penalties until Bap- 
 tism removes their guilt and together with it their 
 characteristic as a punishment; some of them, 
 
 et subiectum eius, nimirum homo, 
 invenitur sine gratia, per quam 
 
 pi naturae tantum [scil. Adae]. 
 Peccatum enim actuale, etiam ve- 
 
 niale, est voluntarium voluntate eius 
 in quo est, et ideo minor poena 
 debetur originali quam veniali.”’ 
 2Fr. Sylvius, Comment. in S. 
 Hie Ole he TAZA LGU Orel arion: Se 
 “Quod originali peccato debeatur 
 poena aeterna, non est simpliciter 
 ratione suae gravitatis, sed est ex 
 conditione peccati et subjecti, quia 
 peccatum illud importat [natura 
 
 Sua] privationem iustitiae et gratiae, 
 
 solum remissio poenae fieri potest.” 
 (Sylvius was an eminent Scholastic 
 theologian of the seventeenth cen- 
 tury, whose commentary on the 
 Summa of St. Thomas is distin- 
 guished by great clarity and com- 
 pleteness. See P. von Loe in the 
 Kirchenlexikon, Vol. XI, 2nd ed., 
 col. 1042 sq.) Cfr. also St. Thomas, 
 De} Malo) (quien. arti) nad 4.0% Sy 
 Theol 3a) "aa. a vagts 4: 
 
288 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 however, continue as mere consequences of orig- 
 inal sin even after Baptism. 
 
 a) By far the worst effect of original sin in 
 the theological order is the privation of sanctify- 
 ing grace,* which involves the loss of all its super- 
 natural concomitants, such as adoptive sonship, 
 the theological virtues, the seven gifts of the 
 Holy Ghost, ete.* The privation of these strictly 
 supernatural gifts, entailing as it does the loss 
 of all claim to Heaven and of the right to actual 
 graces (these can, however, be regained by Bap- 
 tism), plainly bears the stamp of a just punish- 
 ment. But even in the privatio gratiae there is 
 besides the element of guilt also an element of 
 punishment. 
 
 Privation of grace implies (1) the turning away of 
 man from God (aversio hominis a Deo), which con- 
 stitutes the nature of original sin as such; (2) a turning 
 away of God from man (aversio Dei ab homine), i. e., 
 the anger and indignation of God against the sinner, 
 which constitutes the punishment for sin,—a _ punish- 
 ment that manifests itself in the privation of sanctify- 
 ing grace. It is in this latter sense that St. Thomas 
 teaches: ‘“ Conveniens poena peccati originalis est sub- 
 tractio gratiae et per consequens visioms divinae.’*® And 
 again: ‘“Subtractio originalis iustitiae habet rationem 
 poenae.” ® : 
 
 , 8&8 Supra, pp. 269 saqq. published as Volume VII of this 
 4For a detailed treatment of _ series. 
 these prerogatives consult the dog- 5 De Malo, qu. 5, art. 1. 
 
 matic treatise on Grace, to be 6S. Theol., 1a 2ae, que 8s, arte Ss. 
 
EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL. SIN 289 
 
 b) The most disastrous effect of original sin 
 in the moral order is concupiscence, so touch- 
 ingly described by St. Paul? as “the law of sin 
 that is in my members.” *® Second among the 
 evil effects of original sin, because most. inti- 
 mately related to concupiscence, is the rebellion 
 of the flesh against the spirit. Not only does 
 man’s tendency to evil furnish evident proof of 
 the existence of original sin,® but concupiscence 
 even in its unpremeditated stirrings—including 
 the irascible passions—not only furnishes the 
 occasion for a large number of actual sins, but 
 leads directly to material sins.!° It is for this 
 reason that St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans 
 calls concupiscence sin, and St. Thomas Aqui- 
 nas treats it as an integral constituent—more 
 specifically as the material component—of orig- 
 inal sin. 
 
 c) In the physical order, death, passibility, the 
 suffering caused by disease, unhappiness, etc., 
 are not mere consequences but also penalties of 
 original sin; and this is as true of every man born 
 in the state of original sin as it was of Adam 
 himself. Chief among these evils is the death 
 of the body, which in most of the Scriptural 
 texts dealing with the subject is emphasized as 
 the typical penalty of sin in the physical order.1! 
 
 7 Rom. VII, 14 sqq. 10 Supra, pp. 277 sqq. 
 
 8 Lex peccati, lex in membris. ~ 11 Cfr. Rom. V, r2 sqq. 
 9 Supra, pp. 283 sqq. ; 
 
290 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 The Council of Trent describes this whole cate- 
 gory of evils by the phrase, “mors et poenae cor- 
 poris.® 77 
 
 Special mention must be made of the disturbed rela- — 
 
 tion of fallen man to nature, especially to the animal 
 kingdom. In enumerating the prerogatives enjoyed by 
 Adam in Paradise, the Roman Catechism expressly says 
 that he ruled over the brute creation. This teaching is 
 well supported by Gen. I, 26 sqq. Adam forfeited this 
 prerogative both for himself and his descendants, but 
 through the merits of Jesus Christ it was restored in a 
 limited degree and by way of exception to certain of the 
 Saints (St. Francis of Assisi, among others). 
 
 d) Another, extrinsic, penalty of original sin 
 is the dominion of Satan, under which humanity 
 has groaned ever since the Fall. In casting off 
 the divine law man voluntarily shouldered the 
 
 galling yoke of the Devil and became his slave. _ 
 
 2 Pet. II, 19: “A quo enim quis superatus est, 
 huius et servus est-— For by whom a man 1s 
 overcome, of the same also he is the slave.” The 
 Fall of our first parents inaugurated the diabol- 
 ical regimen which caused Christ to describe 
 Satan as “the prince of this world,” ** while St. 
 Paul went so far as to refer to him as “the god 
 
 of this world.” +4 With the Fall also began the — 
 
 temptation of man by the Devil, the worship of 
 
 12 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 2. 14iSCOL nL Vy od. 
 18 John. XII, 31; XIV, 30. 
 
 ' 
 / * 
 7 i ‘ 
 i ee ee Se ee ee 
 
THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 291 
 
 demons, idolatry, the deception practiced by 
 pagan oracles, diabolical possession, etc.*® 
 
 It is interesting to note that the Tridentine Council 
 refers to the captivitas diaboli as the cause of death, and 
 speaks of the Devil as exercising a “reign of death.” 16 
 What are we to understand by this “reign of death”? 
 Surely something more than bodily decay. It means the 
 power of evil, which is quite as truly a reign of death 
 as the dominion of Jesus Christ is a power unto life. 
 “The opposition of life and death,’ remarks Glossner, 
 “is personified in Christ on the one hand, and in the 
 Devil on the other. Christ is the author and ruler of 
 life, because He is life itself. The Devil is irretrievably 
 doomed to eternal death by his personal conduct, and 
 is consequently ‘the prince of death,’ the ruler of the 
 -empire of death.’ ’’ 17 
 
 2. THE DocMa oF FREE-WILL.—It is an ar- 
 ticle of faith that even in the state of original 
 sin man retains full liberty of choice between 
 good and evil. 
 
 Liberty in general is immunity either (1) from exter- 
 nal compulsion (libertas a coactione), or (2) from 
 inward necessitation (libertas a necessitate). Free- 
 will embraces both and may therefore be explained as 
 active indifference of doing or not doing a thing (libertas 
 
 15 On the Devil’s dominion over 
 the human race as manifested in 
 our own day, cfr. J. Godfrey Rau- 
 pert, The Supreme Problem, Buf- 
 falo 1910, pp. 80 sqq.;- on diabolical 
 possession, infra, pp. 346 sqq. 
 
 16 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, cani-t: 
 
 - et cum morte [incurrit Adam] 
 
 oe 
 . 
 
 captivitatem sub eius potestate, qui 
 mortis deinde habuit imperium, i. e. 
 diabolit.” Cfr. Heb. II, 14. See 
 also Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. t. 
 17 Dogmatik, p. 348 sq. Fora fur- 
 ther treatment of this point see 
 Theoph. Raynaud, De _  Attribut. 
 
 . Christi, sect. 5, c. 15, Lugduni 166s. 
 
292 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 contradictions sive exercitti), of doing it thus or other- 
 wise (libertas spectficationis), of doing what is good or 
 what is evil (libertas contrarietatis). The last-men- 
 tioned kind of liberty is not a prerogative, but a defect 
 of free-will. The libertas contradictionis constitutes the 
 complete essence of free-will; for he who is able freely 
 to will or not to will, is eo ipso also able to will this 
 particular thing or that. Hence the term free-will 
 (liberum arbitrium, libertas indifferentiae). The ne- 
 cessity consequent upon a free act does not destroy, 
 but rather includes free-will, and is therefore called 
 necessitas consequens s. consequentiae, in contradistinc- 
 tion to necessitas antecedens s. consequentis, which de- 
 termines the will.** As soon as the will, by determining 
 itself, has performed a free act, this act becomes a his- 
 torical fact and cannot be undone. This is what is 
 called historical necessity. There is another kind of 
 necessity, termed hypothetical, which does not destroy 
 the liberty of the will; for to will an end one must needs 
 will those means without which the end cannot be at- 
 tained. A traveller who insists on visiting a city which 
 can be reached in no other way than by water, must 
 necessarily choose the water route, though he may en- 
 joy untrammeled liberty of choice with regard to his 
 starting point and different lines of steamers. The dis- 
 tinction between physical and ethical freedom of choice 
 does not affect substance but merely extension. Physical 
 liberty extends to morally indifferent actions, such as 
 walking, reading, writing, and so forth, whereas ethical 
 liberty refers solely to such actions as are morally good 
 or bad. The theologian is concerned with ethical liberty 
 
 18 Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 
 
 365 sqq. 
 
THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 203 
 
 only, and our thesis is that man enjoys freedom of choice 
 between good and bad even in the state of original sin. 
 
 a) Luther asserted that ethical liberty was 
 so completely destroyed by original sin that fallen 
 man is compelled to do good or evil according as 
 Mood’ or the Devil ridés him.” “Uhis) teaching 
 has been expressly condemned as heretical. “S1 
 quis liberum homims arbitrium post Adae pec- 
 catum amissum et extinctum esse dixerit, .. . 
 anathema sit—AIf{ any one assert that the free 
 will of man was lost and became extinct after 
 the sin of Adam, let him be anathema.” It 
 was on the denial of free-will that Calvin based 
 his terrible doctrine of Predestination. | 
 
 a) The dogmatic teaching of the Church is 
 supported by all those numerous texts of Scrip- 
 ture which describe the human will, even in the 
 condition in which it finds itself after the Fall, 
 as exercising a free choice between good and 
 evil, life and death, the worship of the true God 
 and idolatry, and which expressly ascribe to 
 man the power of governing his passions. To 
 quote only a few passages: Deut. XXX, Io: 
 “Testes invoco hodie coelum et terram, quod 
 proposuerim vobis vitam et mortem, benedic- 
 tionem et maledictionem; elige ergo vitam —I 
 
 19 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 5 (in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
 Mm.) S15). 
 
294 ‘DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 call heaven and earth to witness this day, that 
 I have set before you life and death, blessing 
 and cursing. Choose therefore life.” Josue 
 XXIV, 15: “Optio vobis datur; eligite hodie, 
 quod placet, cui servire potissimum debeatis, 
 utrum dus, quibus servierunt patres vestri in 
 Mesopotamia, an diis Amorrhaeorum, in quorum 
 terra habitatis: ego autem et domus mea servie- 
 mus Domino — You have your choice: choose this 
 day that which pleaseth you, whom you would 
 rather serve, whether the gods which your 
 fathers served in Mesopotamia, or the gods of 
 the Amorrhites, in whose land you dwell: but 
 as for me and my house we will serve the Lord.” 
 Gen. IV, 7: “Sub te erit appetitus ews, et tu 
 dominaberis illius — The lust thereof shall be un- 
 der thee, and thou shalt have dominion over iti 
 There are many other passages in which Holy 
 Scripture postulates liberty of choice by com- 
 manding or suggesting something conditioned 
 upon man’s free will. Cfr., e. g., Matth. XIX, 
 17: “ Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata — 
 If thou wilt enter into life, keep the command- 
 ments.” St. Paul freely admits the existence of 
 a moral and religious aptitude even in pagan na- 
 
 tions, thereby indirectly teaching the doctrine of 
 free-will.”° 
 
 20 The references to prove this Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., ae 
 
 proposition will be found in Simar, Pp. 37 sqq., 81 sqq., Freiburg 1883. 
 
THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 295 
 
 B) As regards the Fathers, Calvin himself admits 
 that they unanimously defend free-will. The Greek 
 Fathers *1 speak of the aire€odauov Tis Tov avVOporav dicews 
 quite as often as their Latin colleagues of the liberum 
 arbitrium.”? St. Augustine, on whom the Jansenists 
 pretend to base their heterodox teaching, occasionally 
 alludes to “a decline of free-will in consequence of 
 original sin”;?? but the liberty he has in view is not 
 the natural ethical liberty of the will; it is the freedom 
 from concupiscence which our first parents enjoyed in 
 Paradise and which they forfeited by original sin. Thus 
 he says in his treatise Against Two Letters of the Pe- 
 lagians: “For which of us can say that by the sin of 
 the first man free-will perished from the human race? 
 Through sin liberty indeed perished, but it was that — 
 liberty which was in Paradise. .. . For free-will is so 
 far from having perished in the sinner, that by it all 
 Sins 4s 
 
 b) In addition to its denial of free-will, Jan- 
 senism upheld another grievous heresy, viz.: that 
 in the state of fallen nature mere freedom from. 
 external compulsion (libertas a coactione) is 
 sufficient to produce merit or demerit. The 
 third of the series of condemned propositions ex- 
 
 21. g., Basil (In Is., I, 19) and 
 John of Damascus (De Fide Ortho- 
 doxa, II, 12). 
 
 22 A large number of Patristic 
 texts bearing on this doctrine has 
 been collected by Bellarmine, De 
 Grat. et Lib. Arbit., V, 25 sqq. 
 
 23 Thus, e. g., in the oft-quoted 
 passage: “Libero arbitrio male 
 utens homo et se perdidit et ipsum.” 
 
 (Enchir, 30; Migne, P. L., XL, 
 246.) i 
 
 24 Contra Duas Epist. Pelag., I, 
 2, 5: “Quis nostrum dicat, quod 
 primi hominis peccato perierit li- 
 berum arbitrium de humano genere? 
 Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, 
 sed illa, quae in Paradiso fuit. . . 
 Nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo 
 in peccatore non periit, ut per illud 
 peccent.” 
 
 . 
 
296 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 tracted from the writings of Jansenius reads: 
 “Ad merendum et demerendum in statu naturae 
 lapsae non requiritur in homine libertas a neces- 
 sitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione.” => This 
 proposition was condemned as heretical; hence 
 it is an article of faith that the will, to be en- 
 tirely free in its actions, must not only be exempt 
 from external compulsion, but must intrinsically 
 determine itself; in other words, it must be abso- 
 lutely free also from intrinsic necessity.?° 
 
 a) Sacred Scripture accentuates the sover- 
 eignty of the will over its interior actions quite 
 as strongly as the essential dependence of the 
 ethical merit or demerit of our free-will actions 
 on the absence of all manner of intrinsic necessi- 
 tation. St. Paul says of him who has the choice 
 between the married state and virginity: ‘Hav- 
 ing no necessity, but having power of his own 
 will (Hy €xov avayxyy, ovoiay Sé exer wept rod idiov OeAua- 
 ms). #7 And in Eeclus. XXKI, 8 sqq., the 
 moral value of human actions is described as 
 necessarily conditioned by free determination: 
 “Beatus dives, qui inventus est sine macula, et 
 
 qui post aurum non abut nec speravit im pecunia — 
 
 et thesauris. Quis est lic? et laudabimus eum; 
 fecit enim mirabiliain vita sua. Quit probatus 
 est in illo et perfectus est, erit ili gloria aeterna; 
 
 25 Denzinger-Bannwart,  Enchiri- 26 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Malo, qu. — 
 
 dion, 0. 1094. ; 
 Pagid \Ofoy SIRNA WISE Y, B 
 
THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 297 
 
 gui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus, 
 facere mala et non fecit — Blessed is the rich man 
 that is found without blemish: and that hath not 
 gone after gold, nor put his trust in money nor 
 in treasures. Who is he, and we will praise 
 him, for he hath done wonderful things in his 
 life. Who hath been tried thereby, and made 
 perfect, he shall have glory everlasting. He 
 that could have transgressed, and hath not. 
 transgressed, and could do evil things, and hath 
 not done them.” 
 
 8) This conception, which is based upon the 
 most elementary moral sentiment, dominates 
 the writings of the Fathers to such an extent 
 that it was only by the most violent sophistry 
 that Jansenius was able to base his heretical 
 teaching on the utterly misunderstood dictum 
 of St. Augustine: “Quod amplius nos delec- 
 tat, secundum id operemur necesse est — We 
 must of necessity act according to that which 
 pleases us most.” ** By delectatio St. Augustine 
 does not mean the unfree impulse which in the 
 impulses called motus primo-primi overpowers the 
 will; but that deliberate delectation which mo- 
 tivates the determination of the will. That a 
 man may repel the attraction of grace as freely 
 as he may resist the incitements of the senses, 
 
 28 In Galat., 49. (Migne, P. L., the student is advised to consult the 
 XXXV, 2141). For a more detailed dogmatic treatise on Grace. 
 discussion of this and kindred topics | 
 
 20 
 
298 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 Augustine knew from his own experience, for 
 he says in his Confessions: “Non faciebam, 
 quod et incomparabili affectu amplius mihi place- 
 bat — I did not do that which pleased me incom- 
 parably more.” * At no time in his life did 
 this great and holy Doctor ever deny. free-will 
 or teach that freedom from external compulsion 
 is sufficient to render a moral action meritorious. 
 “God gave free-will to the rational soul which 
 is in man,” he says in his treatise against For- 
 tunatus. “Thus man was enabled to have 
 merits: if we are good by our own will, not of 
 necessity. Since, therefore, it behooved man to 
 be good not of necessity, but by his own will, 
 God had to give to the soul free-will.”’ ®° 
 
 3. How Nature ts “WouNDED” By ORIGINAL 
 Stn.—The Scholastic theory of the vulneratio 
 naturae is based on the ancient teaching of the 
 Church that original sin entailed a serious de- 
 terioration of both body and soul,?* and on the 
 doctrine of various councils that it weakened and 
 warped free-will.*? 
 
 29 Confess., VIII, 8, 20. 
 senius taught that we necessarily 
 follow the greater indeliberate at- 
 traction, whether good or bad.) 
 
 30 Contr. Fortunat., disp. 1, 15 
 (Migne, P. L., XLII, 118): ‘ Ani- 
 mae rationalit, quae est in homine, 
 dedit Deus liberum arbitrium. Sic 
 enim posset habere meritum, si 
 voluntate, non necessitate boni es- 
 semus. Cum ergo oporteat non ne- 
 
 (Jan- 
 
 cessitate, sed voluntate bonum esse, 
 oportebat ut Deus animae daret 
 liberum arbitrium.’ For a_ de- 
 tailed refutation of the heretical 
 teaching of Jansenius see Palmieri, 
 
 De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. © 
 
 615 sqq., Romae 1878; cfr. also 
 Pope Leo XIII’s Encyclical letter 
 “ Libertas’ of June 20, 1888. 
 
 31 Cfr. supra, pp. 218 sqq. 
 
 82 Cfr. <Arausic. II, can. 252 
 
 ~ x = nae KS 
 _—— 7 
 nt Na ll ce asl a dies 5 —=—_S 
 
THE “WOUNDS OF NATURE” 299 
 
 a) In attempting to estimate the extent of the injury 
 which human nature suffered through original sin, and to 
 determine the measure of its influence upon the attenuatio 
 et inclinatio liberi arbitrii, St. Thomas Aquinas proceeds 
 from the principle that fallen man — aside from original 
 sin proper, as guilt— could experience a deterioration 
 of his nature only with regard to those psychic faculties 
 which are apt to be the seat of virtues, to wit: reason, 
 will, pars irascibilis, and pars concupiscibilis. By op- 
 posing to the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, 
 fortitude and temperance) the four contrary vices of 
 ignorance, malice, weakness, and cupidity, the Scholas- 
 tics arrived at what they called the four ‘ wounds of 
 nature” inflicted by original sin. It is quite obvious 
 that free-will, too, was affected by these four vices, es- 
 pecially by evil concupiscence.** Man suffers grievously 
 from these wounds ** even after justification. 
 
 b) Theologians are not agreed as to whether these 
 “wounds of nature ”’ consist in an actual deterioration of 
 
 “Liberum arbitrium atienuatum et 
 inclinatum;’? Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, 
 cap. tT: “ Tametsi in eis [scil. ho- 
 minibus lapsis] liberum arbitrium 
 minime extinctum esset, viribus licet 
 attenuatum et inclinatum.” 
 
 S3iCirn St.) Dhomass9.) Dneol, 1a 
 2ae, qu. 85, art. 3: “ Per iustitiam 
 originalem perfecte ratio continebat 
 inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio 
 a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta. 
 Haec autem originalis iustitia sub- 
 tracia est per peccatum primi paren- 
 tis. Et ideo omnes vires animae 
 remanent quodammodo  destituiae 
 proprio ordine, quo naturaliter or- 
 dinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa desti- 
 tutio vulneratio naturae  dicitur. 
 Sunt autem quatuor potentiae 
 animae, quae possunt esse subiecta 
 virtutum, scil. ratio, 
 
 in qua est 
 
 prudenta; voluntas, in qua est ius- 
 titia; trascibilis, in qua est fortt- 
 tudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est 
 temperantia. Inquantum ergo ratio 
 destituitur suo ordine ad verum, 
 est vulnus ignorantiae; inquantum 
 vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad 
 bonum, est vulnus malitiae; inquan- 
 tum vero irascibilis destituitur suo 
 ordine ad arduum, est vulnus in- 
 firmitatis; inquantum vero concu- 
 piscibilis destituitur ordine ad de- 
 lectabile moderatum ratione, est 
 vulnus concupiscentiae.” 
 
 34 On the philosophical aspect of 
 the Fall and the wounds- inflicted 
 thereby on both the intellectual and 
 the moral nature of man, see J. 
 Godfrey Raupert, The Supreme 
 Problem, 2nd ed., London and New 
 York i911. 
 
300 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 the natural faculties of the soul, or merely in the priva- 
 tion of supernatural justice. Of course, neither of the 
 two contending schools dreams of asserting that original 
 sin formally annihilated any natural faculty of the soul. 
 The more moderate school contents itself with saying that 
 fallen nature is merely the state of pure nature into 
 which man was thrown back, while the extreme school 
 insists that original sin seriously impaired the natural 
 faculties of the soul. This difference of opinion ac- 
 counts for the various interpretations put upon the 
 well-known axiom: “Natura est spoliata gratuitis et 
 vulnerata in naturalibus.” > The rigorists describe the 
 relation of fallen man to man in a state of pure nature 
 as that of a patient to one in the enjoyment of good 
 health (aegroti ad sanum), while their opponents compare 
 it to the relation of a man who has been stripped of 
 his garments to one who has never had any (nudati 
 ad nudum). A reconciliation of the two opinions is 
 impossible except on the basis of a previous understand- 
 ing with regard to the true conception of the so-called 
 state of pure nature.*° 
 
 4. THE EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN IN THE 
 STATUS TERMINI, OR THE Lot oF UNBAPTIZED 
 CHILDREN.—Since original sin is not actual sin, 
 but merely a sin of nature, the punishment in- 
 flicted on those who die while involved in it can- 
 
 35 Cfr. Bellarmine, De Gratia 
 Primi Hominis, c. 6. 
 
 36 Cfr. supra, pp. 228 sqq. The 
 arguments for the rigorist view can 
 be found in Alb. a Bulsano, Theol. 
 Dogmat., ed. Gottefrid. a Graun, t. 
 I, pp. 468 sqq., Oeniponte 1893, and 
 France. Schmid, Quaest. Select. ex 
 Theol. Dogmat., pp. 297 saqq., 
 
 Paderbornae 1891. The case for 
 the milder view, which seems to 
 us to be the more probable one, is 
 well stated by Palmieri, De Deo 
 Creante et Elevante, th. 78 and 
 Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. 
 III, 3rd ed., pp. 152 sqq., Friburgi 
 1908. 
 
THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 301 
 
 not consist in physical suffering (poena sensus), 
 but simply and solely in their exclusion from the 
 beatific vision of God (poena damni). The 
 hypothesis that they will be punished by fire 
 (poena ignis) must be rejected as cruel and un- 
 tenable. 
 
 a) The rigoristic view alluded to in the last sentence 
 had its defenders among the Fathers and early ecclesias- 
 tical writers. We mention only Fulgentius,?? Avitus of 
 Vienne,** and Pope Gregory the Great.2® It was advo- 
 cated also by a few of the Schoolmen, e. G StiiAne 
 selm,*° Gregory of Rimini‘! (who was called by the 
 opprobrious name of “torturer of little children) ,” # 
 and by Driedo,** Petavius,*4 Fr. Sylvius, and the so- 
 called Augustinians, to whom may be added Bossuet 
 and Natalis Alexander. St. Augustine,*® while admitting 
 that the punishment of unbaptized children is “ the 
 mildest punishment of all,” ® yet speaks of it as 1gms 
 aeternus, so that Faure ** and others have charged him 
 with advocating the more rigorous view.*® In matter of 
 fact his attitude was one of uncertain hesitation. To- 
 wards the end of his life he seems to have held that the 
 penalty pronounced in Math. XXV, 41: “ Depart from 
 me, you cursed, into everlasting fire,” would not fall upon 
 
 37 De Fide ad Petr., c. 27. 46 “ Mitissima. omnium poena.” 
 
 38 Carm. ad Fuscin. Soror. 47In S.- Augustini Enchirid., c. 
 
 39 Moral., IX, 21. 93. 
 
 40 De Concept. Virg., c. 23. 48 P. J. Toner goes so far as to 
 
 41 Comment. in Quatuor Libros say that “St. Augustine was an 
 Sent., II, dist. 31, qu. 2. innovator, and... sacrificed tra- 
 
 42“ Tortor infantiwm.’ 
 
 43 De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., tr. 3, 
 Geis 2s 
 
 44 De Deo, IX, to. 
 
 45 Enchirid.,: c. 93; 
 Mer. et Remiss., I, 16. 
 
 De Peccat. 
 
 dition to the logic of an indefensi- 
 ble private system.” Crish The- 
 ological Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 
 rs). 
 
' 
 
 302 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY; 
 
 unbaptized children, but that, “as between reward and 
 punishment there may be a neutral sentence of the 
 qudge;y it" 
 
 b) The teaching of the Church is more clearly 
 apparent from her dogmatic definitions than from 
 either Scripture or Tradition. It is an article 
 of faith that children who die unbaptized must 
 suffer the poena damni, 1. e., are deprived of the 
 beatific vision of God. “Amen, amen, I say 
 to thee, unless a man be born again of water 
 and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the 
 kingdom of God.” The arbitrary assumption, 
 said to have been made by the Pelagians, that 
 unbaptized infants, though deprived of the king- 
 dom of heaven (i. e., communion with Jesus 
 Christ and the Saints), nevertheless enjoy “eter- 
 nal life” (7. e@., the visio beatifica), was never 
 admitted by the Fathers nor by the magis- 
 terium of the Church! “Si quis parvulos re- 
 centes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat,” says 
 the Tridentine Council, “. . . aut dicit in remis- 
 stonem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed 
 nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod 
 
 49 De Lib. Arbit., III, 23. Fora gree of glory» (companionship with 
 
 succinct account of the controversy 
 cfr. P.J. Toneriie 
 
 50 John III, s. 
 
 51 Dr. Toner holds (1. c., p. 316) 
 that “‘the teaching attributed to 
 the Pelagians — viz., that they ad- 
 mitted unbaptized infants to the 
 beatific vision and only excluded 
 them from a certain accidental de- 
 
 Christ and the Saints)—is an his- 
 
 torical fiction. ... Nearly all the 
 great theologians who have made 
 a serious study of the history of 
 the question admit that it was only 
 natural happiness for wunbaptized 
 children that the Pelagians meant 
 to defend.”’ 
 
THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED. CHILDREN 303 
 
 regenerationis lavacro necesse sit expiari ad 
 vitam aeternam consequendam, anathema sit.” °° 
 
 But do wunbaptized infants also suffer the 
 poena sensus? More specifically, are they con- 
 demned to the punishment of fire? The milder 
 and more probable opinion is that they are not. 
 This milder teaching is traceable to the writings 
 of some of the earlier Fathers; °* but the Church 
 did not emphasize it until a much later period. 
 An important, though not ex-cathedra, decision 
 is the dictum of Innocent III, embodied in the 
 Corpus Iuris Canonici, that “Poena originalts 
 peccati est carentia visions Det, actualis vero 
 poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae crucia- 
 tus.’ °* The opposition in this passage between 
 original and actual sin on the one hand, and 
 carentia visionis and cruciatus (1. @., poena ignis ) 
 on the other, justifies the conclusion that pri- 
 vation of the beatific vision (== poena damnt) 
 is the only punishment inflicted on him who has 
 no other guilt than that involved in original sin, 
 while he who is guilty of actual sin has to suffer 
 the eternal torments of hell (= poena sensus). 
 When the Jansenist pseudo-council of Pistoia 
 ventured to ridicule the so-called limbus puerorum 
 as a “Pelagian fiction,” Pope Pius VI solemnly 
 
 52 Conc. ‘Trid., \Sess. V3, cans 4. 54 Cap. “ Maiores” de Bapt. in 
 
 53 Cfr., e. g., Gregory of Nazian- Deore Vapi tite Cass 
 zus, Serm., 40, cap. 30. 
 
304 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 declared in his dogmatic Bull “Auctorem fidei” 
 (A.D. 1794): “Perinde ac si hoc ipso, quod qui 
 poenam ignis removent, inducerent locum illum 
 et statum medium expertem culpae et poenae inter 
 resnum Dei et damnationem aeternam, qualem 
 fabulabantur Pelagiani: falsa, temeraria, in 
 scholas catholicas iniuriosa.” 
 
 But how is this teaching to be reconciled with 
 the definition of the Council of Florence that 
 “the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, 
 or merely in original sin, at once go down to 
 hell, to be punished unequally?” ®> What is the 
 meaning of the phrase in infernum? Does it im- 
 ply that the unbaptized children are condemned 
 to the tortures of hellfire? Impossible. To 
 understand the definition aright we must attend 
 to the expressly defined disparity of punishment 
 quite as carefully as to the descensus in in- 
 fernum. As there is an essential difference be- 
 tween original and actual sin, the disparitas poe- 
 narum held by the Church must be more than a 
 mere difference of degree; it must be specific, 
 which can only mean that unbaptized infants 
 suffer the poena dammni, but not the poena sensus. 
 
 As a matter of fact the pain of hellfire can be in- 
 flicted only in punishment of personal sin, because it 
 
 55 This definition reads as fol- mox in infernum descendere, poenis 
 lows: “ Definimus, illorum animas, tamen disparibus puniendas.” (De- 
 qui in actuali mortali peccato mo- cret. Unionis Conc. Flor., quoted in 
 
 riuntur vel solo originali decedunt, Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 693.) 
 
THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 305 
 
 directly affects human nature in its innate faculties and 
 powers, and subjects not merely the supernatural and 
 preternatural gifts a man may have, but his very nature 
 to the punitive justice of God. “ Peccato original non 
 debetur poena sensus,’ says St. Thomas, “sed solum 
 poena dammni, scil. carentia visionis divinae. Et hoc vide- 
 tur rationabile propter tria. Primo quidem quia... 
 peccatum originale est vitium naturae, peccatum autem 
 actuale est vitium personae. Gratia autem et visio di- 
 vina sunt supra naturam humanam, et ideo privatio 
 gratiae et carentia visionis divinae debentur alicui per- 
 sonae non solum propter actuale peccatum, sed etiam 
 propter originale. Poena autem sensus oppomtur in- 
 tegritati naturae et bonae eius habitudini, et ideo poena 
 sensus non debetur alicui nisi propter peccatum ac- 
 tuale.”” 56 
 
 c) In connection with the subject just discussed the- 
 Ologians are wont to treat the question (of considerable 
 importance in pastoral theology) whether, in view of 
 the dogma that unbaptized children suffer the poena 
 damni, it is possible to entertain the hypothesis that 
 these infants may enjoy a species of natural beatitude 
 in the world beyond. Cardinal Bellarmine somewhat 
 harshly calls the affirmative view heretical and lays it 
 down as an article of faith that those children who die 
 without the grace of Baptism are absolutely damned 
 and will be forever deprived of supernatural as well 
 as natural beatitude.*’ The eminent Cardinal’s thesis 
 
 56 De Malo, qu. s, art. 2. Cfr. logical, Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 
 Bolgeni’s monograph, Stato dei He - 
 Bambini Morti senza Battesimo, 57 De Amiss. Grat., Minin: 
 Rome 1787; J. Didiot, Ungetauft “ Fide catholica tenendum est, par- 
 verstorbene Kinder.’ Dogmatische vulos sine baptismo decedentes ab- 
 Trostbriefe, Kempen 1898; P. ye solute esse damnatos et non solum 
 
 Toner, ‘‘ Lot of Those Dying “in coelesti, sed etiam naturali beati- 
 Original Sin,’ in the Irish Theo- - tudine perpetuo carituros.” 
 
306 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 is true in so far as man in the present economy can- 
 not miss his supernatural without at the same time 
 missing his natural destiny. Now, according to the dog- 
 matic teaching of the Church he who dies in the state 
 of original sin cannot attain to the beatific vision of 
 God, which is his supernatural end, and consequently 
 incurs eternal damnation (poena damni); hence it 
 would be heretical to assume that he could escape dam- 
 nation and attain to his natural end in the form of 
 a purely natural beatitude corresponding to the status 
 naturae purae. But Cardinal Bellarmine overlooked the 
 fact that between these two extremes (damnation in 
 the strict sense and natural beatitude) there is con- 
 ceivable a third state, viz.: a condition of relative 
 beatitude materially though not formally identical with 
 natural beatitude properly so called. He who dies in 
 the state of original sin can never formally attain to 
 natural beatitude, because original sin remains in him and 
 will perpetually exclude him from the kingdom of heaven ; 
 in other words, as there is no status purae naturae, so 
 there can be for him no beatitudo purae naturae. But 
 materially he may enjoy all those prerogatives which in 
 some other economy would have constituted man’s nat- 
 ural end and happiness, viz.: a clear abstractive knowledge 
 of God combined with a natural love of Him above all 
 things,— such a love is in itself a source of natural beati- 
 tude. It may almost be laid down as a theological axiom 
 that original sin, as such, cannot deprive man of those nat- 
 ural prerogatives which in the state of pure nature would 
 constitute his natural end and object; but that it affects 
 only supernatural prerogatives. For this reason St. 
 Thomas does not hesitate to assert that the conscious- 
 ness of being eternally deprived of the beatific vision 
 of God is not even a source of tormenting pain or ex- 
 
 d Z ‘ % 
 i 
 
THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 307 
 
 ceptional sadness to unbaptized children. “ Omnis homo 
 usum liberi arbitri habens proportionatus est ad vitam 
 aeternam consequendam, quia potest se ad gratiam 
 praeparare, per quam vitam aeternam merebitur; et ideo 
 st ab hoc deficiant, maximus erit dolor eis, quia amittunt 
 ulud, quod suum esse possibile fuit. Pueri autem nun- 
 quam fuerunt proportionati ad hoc, quod vitam aeternam 
 haberent: quia nec eis debebatur ex principiis naturae, 
 cum omnem facultatem naturae excedat, nec actus pro- 
 prios habere potuerunt, quibus tantum bonum conse- 
 querentur. Et ideo nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia 
 visionis divinae, imo magis gaudebunt de hoc, quod par- 
 ticipabunt multum de divina bonitate in perfectionibus 
 naturalibus.’ °* This opinion of the Angelic Doctor. is 
 now shared by so many eminent theologians that it may 
 justly be called sententia communior,®® and so far from 
 being un-Catholic or heretical, may be entertained as 
 ktghly probable.®° 
 
 READINGS : — St. Thomas, De Malo, qu. 5.— *Fr. Schmid, Quaes- 
 tiones Selectae ex Theologia Dogmatica, pp. 289 sqq., Pader- 
 born 1891—J, R. Espenberger, Die Elemente der Erbsiinde 
 nach Augustin und der Friihscholastik, Mainz 1905.— Jos. Rick- 
 aby, S. J., Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, 
 Locke, Hume and Mill), London 1906. 
 
 58 Comment. in Quatuor Libros and latterly Franz Schmid, Quaest. 
 
 Sent., II, dist: 33, qu. 2, art. 2. 
 
 59 Among those who share it we 
 may mention: Suarez (De Pecce. 
 et Vitus, disp. 9, sect. 6), and Les- 
 sius (De Perfect. Div., XII,- 22). 
 Prominent among the comparatively 
 few who oppose it is Cardinal Bel- 
 larmine (De Amiss. Grat., VI, 6), 
 
 Selectae ex Theol. Dogmat., pp. 278 
 sqq. 
 
 60 Cir. A. Seitz, Die Heilsnot- 
 wendigkett der Kirche nach der 
 alichristlichen Literatur bis zur 
 Zeit des hl. Augustinus, pp. 301 
 sqq., Freiburg 1903. 
 
CHAPTER Lit 
 
 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 Human reason may conjecture the existence of 
 pure spirits but is unable to demonstrate it by 
 
 cogent arguments.’ 
 
 What knowledge we pos- 
 
 sess of the Angels is based entirely on Divine 
 Revelation,? and for this reason we will treat of 
 
 1Cfr. Palmieri, 
 Romae 1876. 
 
 2 This fact did not prevent Scho- 
 lastic philosophy from assigning to 
 the Angels an important réle in its 
 speculations. “Modern thought,” 
 says Fr. Joseph Rickaby, S. J., in 
 an exquisite passage of his classic 
 essay on Scholasticism (New York 
 1908, pp. 70 sq.), “attends curi- 
 ously to the brute creation, and to 
 the physiology of the human body; 
 it believes in experimental psy- 
 chology; it never attempts to con- 
 template intellect apart from brain 
 and nerves. On grounds of pure 
 
 Pneumatologia, 
 
 reason, it asks, what have we that — 
 
 can be called knowledge even of 
 the very existence of angels? The 
 angels have taken flight from Cath- 
 olic schools of philosophy; the rus- 
 tle of their wings is caught by the 
 theologian’s ear alone. Whether 
 philosophy has lost by their de- 
 parture, it is not for these pages 
 to say. St. Thomas would have 
 counted it a loss, The angels en- 
 tered essentially into his scheme 
 
 of the cosmos, and were indispen- 
 sable transmitters of thought to 
 human kind. ‘Our _ intellectual 
 knowledge,’ he says, ‘must be reg- 
 ulated by the knowledge of the 
 angels.” (Contra Gentiles, III, 9). 
 Modern psychology is serenely ob- 
 livious of the fact. Catholics, no 
 doubt, still believe in angels, dread 
 the evil ones (devils), and pray to 
 the good ones who now see the 
 face of God. Catholics also be- 
 lieve that good angels are often 
 the vehicles through which ‘ actual 
 grace,’ that is, warnings and im- 
 
 pulses in order to salvation, de- | 
 
 scends from God to men. But 
 that man owes his ordinary knowl- 
 edge of mathematics, chemistry, 
 sanitation, railway management, to 
 any action whatever of angelic in- 
 telligence upon his mind —is there 
 any man living who thinks so? 
 If all that St. Thomas meant was 
 that we should try to penetrate be- 
 yond the surface evidence of the 
 senses, that is what every scientific 
 man endeavors to do in his view 
 
 308 
 
THE ANGELS 309 
 
 them under the title of Christian Angelology, in 
 contradistinction to the pagan fictions of gen and 
 demigods. 
 
 As the history of the Angels runs parallel to, 
 and displays many analogies with, that of the 
 human race, we are justified in dealing with it 
 aiter much the same method. Hence we shall 
 divide this Chapter into three Sections. In the 
 first we shall treat of the nature of the Angels; 
 in the second, of the supernatural aspects of the 
 angelic creation; and in the third, of the apos- 
 tasy of the Angels from the supernatural order. 
 Leaving to Scholastic speculation the deeper 
 problems involved in the existence and activity 
 of pure spirits, we shall confine ourselves to a rea- 
 soned exposition of the positive dogmatic teach- 
 ing of the Church. 
 
 GENERAL READINGS: — *St. Thomas, S, Theol., Ia, qu. 50 sqq., 
 106 sqq.— Ipem, Contr. Gent., II, 46 sqq. (Rickaby, Of God and 
 His Creatures, pp. 108 sqq.).—IpEM, Opusc. 15, De Substantiis 
 Separatis— Cfr, also St. Thomas’ commentators, notably Fer- 
 rariensis and the treatises De Angelis composed ‘in his spirit by 
 Billuart, Philippus a SS, Trinitate, Gonet, Gotti, and the Salman- 
 ticenses, 
 
 *Suarez, De Angelis, is the opus classicum on the subject. 
 
 The doctrine of the Fathers is admirably summarized by Peta- 
 vius, De Angelis (Dogm. Theol., t. IIT). 
 
 A complete and profound monograph is Tourneley, De An- 
 gelis. 
 
 of nature—to see e. g. in a bar more than that (cf. Of God and 
 of iron what a pure intelligence His Creatures, p. 252), and some 
 would see there, that is the effort are beginning to suspect that he is 
 of science. But St. Thomas meant - right.” 
 
310 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 Among modern theologians the student will find it profitable 
 to consult Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 135 saq. and §§ 181 
 sqq., Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 
 pp. 376 sqq., London 1899); Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Ele- 
 vante, thes. 17 sqq. 58 sqq. Romae 1878; Heinrich, Dog- 
 matische Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 281-290, Mainz 1884; Oswald, 
 Angelologie, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1889; Simar, Dogmatik, 4th ed., 
 Vol. I, pp. 313 sqq., Freiburg 1899; L. Janssens, De Deo Creatore 
 et de Angelis, Friburgi 1905; D. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino 
 et De Deo Creatore, pp. 493-511, Dublinii 1909; S. J. Hunter, 
 Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 265-311. 
 See also R. O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, London 1887, and 
 Hugh Pope, art. “ Angelus ” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I. 
 
 On the cultus of the Angels, see Bareille, “ Le Culte des Anges 
 a ’Epoque des Péres de lEglise” in the Revue Thomiste, March 
 1900; J. H. Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian 
 Doctrine, 12th impression, pp. 411 sqq., London 1903; Tixeront, 
 Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, pp. 133 sqq., 219, 274 sqq., 372 sqq. 
 
SECTION 1 
 
 EXISTENCE, NATURE, NUMBER, AND HIERARCHY 
 OF THE ANGELS 
 
 A DICE At 
 
 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE ANGELS 
 
 _ I. THE DocmMa.—The existence of Angels is 
 a truth so obviously founded in Scripture, Tra- 
 dition, and the teaching of the Church that it 
 seems superfluous to undertake a formal demon- 
 stration of it. We therefore merely indicate 
 some of the many Scriptural texts in which it 
 fe, expressly taught: ’ Ps.) XC Ti) GEE e Zor 
 Px 2) Matth, TV; 11x Ville: XXII, 
 Bos OV) 30; John I, 61s Heb, £4: 
 
 St. Augustine voices the belief of the Fathers 
 when he says: “Quamvis non videamus appari- 
 tionem angelorum, tamen esse angelos novimus 
 ex fide ... Spiritus autem angeli sunt; et cum 
 spiritus sunt, non sunt angeli; cum mittuntur, 
 tunt angel. ‘Angelus enim officii nomen est, non 
 naturae. Quaeris nomen huius naturae, spiritus 
 est; quaerts oficium, angelus est: ex eo quod est, 
 _ Spiritus est; ex eo quod agit, angelus est — Al- 
 
 though we may not see them, we know by faith 
 311 
 
are CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 that wAngels: €xist.)\.) Phe Aneels are spirits; 
 but it is not as such that they are Angels; they be- 
 come Angels by being sent. For Angel denotes an 
 office, not a nature. You ask the name of this 
 nature? tis; "spirit." You, ask titsomices tis 
 that of an angel [7. e. messenger].’ In as far as 
 he exists, an Angel is a spirit; in’as far as he 
 acts, Nels anvaneel« > 
 
 We know three Archangels by name, viz.: 
 Michael, Raphael, and Gabriel. 
 
 Though it is uncertain whether the Mosaic 
 account of the Creation,* in employing the term 
 coelum, means to include the Angels,’ the cre- 
 ation of the Angels out of nothing is undoubt- 
 
 edly Wan \articlé vot) faith. (St Paul) expressly 
 
 teaches: “Jn ipso [scil. Christo] condita sunt ® 
 umiversa in coelis et in terra, visibiha et invisi- 
 bilia,” sive throni sive dominationes, sive prin- 
 cipatus, sive potestates — In him |1. e., Christ] 
 were all things created in heaven and on earth, 
 visible and invisible, whether thrones, or domt- 
 nations, or principalities, or powers.” * The 
 Church through her infallible teaching office has 
 raised this truth to the rank of a formally de- 
 fined dogma at the Fourth Council of the Lat- 
 eran: “Creator omnium visibilium et imvisi- 
 
 8 Serm. in Ps. 103, I, 15. 6 éxricOn, 
 4 Gen. I, 1 sqq. Tra adpara, 
 5 Theologians have been split into 8 Col. I, 16; cfr. also Rom. VIII, 
 
 two opposing factions on this ques- 38 sq. 
 tion ever since the Patristic era. 
 
EXISTENCE OF THE ANGELS 313 
 
 bilium, spiritualium et corporalium, qui sua. 
 omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis 
 utramque de mihilo condidit naturam, spiritualem 
 et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, 
 ac deinde humanam.”® This definition was sub- 
 stantially reaffirmed by the Vatican Council: 
 “God . . . created out of nothing, from the very 
 first beginning of time, both the spiritual and 
 the corporeal creature, to wit, the angelical and 
 the mundane, and afterwards the human crea- 
 BEC ie /.4) t | 
 
 When the Angels were created is not so clearly defined. 
 The phrase “Simul ab initio temporis,” strictly inter- 
 preted, says no more than that they were created in and 
 with time. Whether the creation of the Angels was si- 
 multaneous with that of the material universe is uncertain. 
 Simul may be interpreted in the sense of aequaliter 
 (xowy), and in the phrase “ac deinde humanam,” deinde 
 is not necessarily temporal, but may be illative in mean- 
 ing. As St. Thomas has pointed out,!! the definition of 
 the Fourth Lateran Council was aimed at a Manichzean 
 heresy which did not bear directly on the time of the 
 creation of the Angels. Nevertheless many theologians 
 tegard the interpretation just suggested as artificial and 
 hold the simultaneous creation of the Angels and the ma- 
 terial universe to be a theologically certain doctrine, 
 which may not be rejected without temerity. We prefer 
 
 9 Cap. “ Firmiter,’”’ quoted by Den- 1783), Manning’s translation (The 
 
 zinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. Vatican Council and its Definitions, 
 428. 4th American ed., p. 209, New York 
 _ 10Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 1902). 
 
 I (apud Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 11 Opusc, XXIII. 
 
 21 
 
314 CHRISTIAN: ANGELOLOGY 
 
 not to read into the Lateran definition something which 
 its authors evidently did not intend to put there, and 
 adopt the affrmative view merely for the reason that 
 it is the common teaching of theologians.’* It would at 
 any rate be unreasonable to assume an immoderately 
 long interval of time to have elapsed between the creation 
 of the angels and that of the physical universe. The only 
 thing we know positively is that the Angels existed at the 
 time of Adam,** whence it follows that they were created 
 no later than the sixth “ day.” 
 
 2. THE NATURE OF THE ANGELS.—It is Cath- 
 olic doctrine, though not yet an article of faith, 
 that the Angels are incorporeal substances, 7. é., 
 pure spirits. 
 
 a) This doctrine can be more effectively dem- 
 onstrated from Holy Scripture than from ancient 
 ecclesiastical Tradition, the latter being far less 
 clear and definite. The Bible constantly refers 
 to the Angels as spirits (spiritus, mvedpara), in 
 express contradistinction to souls.** St. Paul, — 
 moreover, draws a direct contrast between a 
 pure spirit’? and man, who is a compound of 
 spirit and body. Eph. VI, 12: “Non est nobis” 
 colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed 
 adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundt 
 rectores tenebrarum harum— Our wrestling is 
 not against flesh and blood; but against prin- 
 
 12.Gir, Sie Dhoom. oe liaeol., . tas 14 Cfr. Luke XI, 24; Heb. I, 14, 
 du. OF, cart. 3. et passim. 
 ue Cir. Gen.” LIU913 T1,) 24. 15 The Devil, whose nature was — 
 
 not destroyed by sin. 
 
NATURE OF THE ANGELS 315 
 
 cipalities and powers, against the rulers of the 
 world of this darkness.” : 
 
 That the Angels have often visibly appeared to 
 men is no argument against their incorporeity. 
 When they assume a body, that body is merely 
 an outer garment, assumed for a transitory pur- 
 pose, not something which the bearer informs 
 aiter the manner of a substantial form.’® There- 
 fore Raphael said to Tobias: “Videbar quidem 
 vobiscum manducare et bibere, sed ego cibo in- 
 visibili et potu, qui ab hominibus videri non po- 
 test, utor — I seemed indeed to eat and to drink 
 with you: but I use an invisible meat and drink, 
 which cannot be seen by men.” ?7 The much- 
 discussed text,’ Gen, VI.)'2: "Phe sonstotitod 
 seeing the daughters of men, that they were fair, 
 took to themselves wives,” #®—which misled even 
 some of the Fathers,°’—does not refer to the 
 Angels at all, but to the pious Sethites, who mar- 
 ried the evil daughters of Cain.”° 
 
 b) As we have already noted, the Fathers do 
 not teach this doctrine as clearly as the Bible. 
 Several of their number ascribe to the Angels 
 
 a body of ether or fire. 
 
 16 Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of 
 Catholic Theology, Vol. DN Ds03 7.0 
 
 1G Tob. XII;\ 70. 
 
 18“ Videntes filii Det (the Sep- 
 tuagint has of dyyedor Tov Oeov) 
 fitas hominum, quod essent pul- 
 chrae, acceperunt sibi uxores.? — 
 
 This they were led to 
 
 19 E. g., SS. Justin, Ireneus, and 
 Ambrose. i 
 
 20 Cfr. P. Scholz, Die Ehen der 
 Sohne Gottes mit den Téchtern der 
 Menschen, Ratisbon 1865; Robert, 
 Les Fils de Dieu et les Filles de 
 VHomme in La Revue Biblique, 
 1895, PP. 340-373 and 525-552. 
 
316 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 do “by a literal interpretation of Ps. CIII, 4: 
 “Out facis angelos tuos spiritus et ministros tuos 
 ignem urentem — Who makest thy angels spirits, 
 and thy ministers a burning fire.” ?* Some con- 
 ceived Satan as clothed in an aérial body.?? It is 
 evident from all this that belief in the incorporeity 
 of the Angels was the result of a gradual de- 
 velopment. To-day it is held as theologically cer- 
 tain.” 
 
 c) Are the Angels composed of matter and form? 
 This is quite a different question from the one discussed 
 above. Granted that the Angels are pure spirits, it 
 may be asked whether their purely spiritual nature 
 admits of a composition of matter (determinabile) re- 
 quiring for its actuation a form (determinans), or 
 whether, like the Divine Essence, they are metaphysically 
 simple.*4 
 
 Being purely spiritual substances, the Angels are phys- 
 ically simple, and therefore essentially immortal. “ Not, 
 indeed, that their destruction is in itself an impossibility, 
 but because their substance and nature are such that, 
 when once created, perpetual conservation is to them 
 natural.” *° They are indestructible also for this reason 
 
 210On the Angelology of the 23 Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante 
 Jews cfr. Hackspill, “ L’Angelologie et Elevante, pp. 153 sqq. 
 Juive & VEpoque Néotestamentaire ” 24 Alexander of Hales and St. 
 in La Revue Biblique, 1902, pp. Bonaventure held that the nature 
 527-550. of Angels admits of potentiality 
 
 22 Cfr. St. Fulgentius, De Trinit., and actuality. Cfr. on this contro- 
 c. 9. Even St. Bernard (cfr. his versy St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 
 De Considerat., V, 4) entertained 50, art. 2. 
 rather hazy notions on this point, 25 Cfr. Wilhelm-Scannell, 4 Man- 
 as also Abbot Rupert of Deutz (De ual of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. I, 
 Trinit., I, 11), Cardinal Cajetan, pp. 379. 
 and Bafiez. 
 
NATURE OF THE ANGELS 317 
 
 that the Creator is bound by His own wisdom, goodness, 
 sanctity, and justice to conserve these pure Spirits, in 
 whom He has implanted an immanent craving for beati- 
 tude.*° 
 
 3. INTELLECT, WILL, AND PoWER OF THE 
 ANGELS.—Being pure spirits, the Angels must 
 possess intellect and free-will; for no spirit is con- 
 ceivable without these attributes. Hence they 
 are called simply ves or vois by the Fathers, and 
 intelligentiae by the Scholastics. 
 
 a) The comprehension of the angelic intellect 
 and its mode of operation is a subject of specu- 
 lation, concerning which our limited mind is at 
 a decided disadvantage. The Schoolmen have 
 practically exhausted the capacity of the human 
 intellect along these lines. As of faith we need 
 only hold that the Angels are not endowed with 
 cardiognosis nor with a certain knowledge of the 
 free-will acts of the future; these being exclu- 
 sively divine prerogatives.2? It follows that their 
 knowledge of the thoughts and future free ac- 
 tions of men is purely conjectural and can at 
 most engender moral certitude. 
 
 Can the Angels communicate their thoughts to one 
 another? It would be unreasonable to assume that such 
 
 26 Cfr. Matth. XVIII, 10; XXV, 
 ‘41; Luke XX, 36. As regards the 
 relation of the Angels to space, 
 that is a philosophical rather than 
 a theological problem, on which 
 the student may, if he wishes, have 
 recourse to Suarez, De Angelis, 1.: 
 
 IV, and F. Schmid, Quaest. Select. 
 ex Theol. Dogmat., pp. 28 sqq., 
 Paderborn 1801. 
 
 27 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
 Knowability, Essence, and Atiri- 
 butes, pp. 359 sqq., 361 sqq. 
 
318 » CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 a vast number of pure spirits, endowed with intellect 
 and free-will, should lack the means of intercommunica- 
 tion. Besides, we know on the authority of Holy 
 Scripture that the Angels do converse with one an- 
 other.2® But Revelation tells us nothing about the nature 
 of their intercourse. The only thing we know for certain 
 is that they do not converse by word of mouth. Among 
 the six theories that have been excogitated on the subject 
 the most plausible is that of St. Thomas. He holds that 
 the Angels converse by a mere act of the will, which 
 manifests the thought of the speaker to him whom he 
 wishes to address.”° 
 
 b) That the Angels are endowed with free- 
 will follows from the fact, (which is demonstrable 
 on purely philosophic grounds), that free-will 
 belongs to every spiritual nature as such. I[n- 
 deed, if God operates freely ad extra because He 
 is the supreme and infinite Spirit,°° and 1f man, 
 who occupies the lowest rank in the scale of 
 intellectual beings, enjoys freedom of choice be- 
 cause the light of reason burns within him,” 
 surely the Angels, who form the connecting link 
 between God and man, and most certainly far 
 
 festare.”’— On the different theories 
 in question cfr. Becanus, De An- 
 
 28 Cfr, Zach. I, 9 saq.; 1 Cor. 
 DG GLEE 13 
 
 29 Cfr. Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 107, 
 art. 1: ““Ex hoc quod conceptus 
 mentis angelicae ordinatur ad mani- 
 festandum alteri per voluntatem ip- 
 sius angeli, conceptus mentis unius 
 angeli innotescit alteri; et sic lo- 
 quitur unus angelus alteri. Nihil 
 est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, 
 quam conceptum mentis altert mani- 
 
 gelis, c. 1, qu. 14; Gregory of Va- 
 lentia, De Deo Creatore, disp. 8, qu. 
 4, p. 2. On the mode of operation 
 peculiar to the angelic intellect, and 
 on its medium, see St. Thomas, S. 
 Theol., 1a, qu. 54 sqq., and Suarez, 
 De Angelis, 1. II. 
 
 80 Supra, pp. 40 sqq. 
 
 81 Supra, pp. 291 sqq. 
 
NATURE OF THE ANGELS 319 
 
 outrank the latter, must also be endowed with 
 free-will. The logical force of this argument is 
 irresistible. Free-will is either included or it is 
 not included in the concept of spirit. If it were 
 not included therein, then God Himself would not 
 be free; if it is, then the Angels, too, are free, 
 freer in fact than man, who is hampered by his 
 senses. Sacred Scripture, moreover, tells us that 
 the Angels rejoice, that they have desires,?? 
 that some of them sinned and were transformed 
 into demons. The story of the Fall is the most 
 convincing proof that the Angels enjoy freedom 
 Or choice: Ctr 2 Pets TL) Aci ene angelis 
 peccantibus non pepercit —God spared not the 
 Angels that sinned.” | 
 
 In the light of these and similar texts St. John 
 Damascene defines an Angel as “a rational, in- 
 telligent, free nature, with a mutable will,’ and 
 he adds: “Every being that is endowed with 
 reason, is likewise equipped with free-will, Con- 
 sequently an Angel, being a nature endowed with 
 reason and intelligence, is also equipped with 
 freedom of choice. Being a creature, he is mu- 
 table, because free either to persevere and pro- 
 gress in what is good, or to turn to the bad.” *4 
 
 c) The Angels are by nature superior to, and 
 
 32 Luke XV, 7. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu) 59, art. 
 
 331 Pet. I, 12. 1, and Suarez, De Angelis, 1. III. 
 34 De Fide Orth., II, 3. Cfr. St. 
 
320 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 more excellent than man. Cir. 2 Pet: II, 11: 
 ‘gAneels’).) |. sare “)oTeater Vinee strensih .; and 
 power) Gal (Via) 6 Youle received. me 
 asan. angel, of ‘God, ‘as. Jesus ‘Christ.".* The 
 names by which the Angels are called in the Bible 
 (Dominations, Virtues, Powers) also indicate 
 that they enjoy superior prerogatives, though, of 
 course, being themselves mere creatures, they can 
 neither create nor perform miracles.*® 
 
 It is to be remarked, however, that Angels 
 (and demons) by virtue of their natural faculties 
 are able to perform actions which impress man 
 as exceeding the powers of nature (muiracula 
 quoad nos). But such actions are not miracles in 
 the strict and proper sense of the term unless the 
 nature of the case or its attending circumstances 
 make it plainly evident that the effect 1s one which 
 could not be produced by any agency short of the 
 divine omnipotence. We need not add that, with 
 regard to the extent of their power, good and evil 
 spirits alike depend at all times on the Divine 
 Will, without whose command or permission they 
 cannot interfere with the laws of nature. 
 
 35 Cfr. Matth. XXII, 30; Gal. I, 55 sqq.; that every supernatural 
 8. effect (and a miracle in the strict 
 
 36 That the power of creating sense is a supernatural effect) pos- 
 something out of nothing belongs to tulates an infinite causality, 7 @., 
 God alone, and is incommunicable, omnipotence, was shown supra, pp. 
 we have demonstrated supra, pp. 187 sqq. 
 
NUMBER OF THE ANGELS 321 
 
 ARTICLE 2 
 
 NUMBER AND HIERARCHY OF THE ANGELS 
 
 I. NUMBER OF THE ANGELS.—Sacred Scrip- 
 ture and Tradition furnish us no clue by which 
 we could determine the number of the Angels. 
 It is certain that they are very numerous. Cfr. 
 Dan. VII, 10: “Millia millium ministrabant et 
 et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei — 
 Thousands of thousands ministered to him, 
 and ten thousand times a hundred thou- 
 sand stood before him.” Apoc. V, 11: “I 
 heard the voice of many angels . . . and the 
 number of them was thousands of thousands.” 
 Basing their calculations on the parable of the 
 Good Shepherd, some of the Fathers have esti- 
 mated the numerical proportion of Angels to 
 men as 99:1. ‘Thus St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: 
 “Consider all the human beings that have lived 
 from Adam to the present day; their number is 
 very large, and yet it is small, for of Angels 
 there are still more. They are the ninety-nine 
 sheep, we are the one hundredth, since there is 
 but one human race.” 37 
 
 Theologians differ as to whether or not the Angels are 
 all of one species. St. Thomas holds that each consti- 
 37 Catech., 15. For a more com- Suarez, De Angelis, EY re Cfr: 
 
 plete treatment of this topic see also O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, 
 Petavius, De Angelis, Era, cand PDs 78a. 
 
322 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 tutes a distinct species.** Suarez teaches that the mem- 
 bers of each choir bear a specific relation to all the other 
 members of the same choir.*® Cardinal Toletus assumes 
 that, like men, all the Angels belong to one and the same 
 species.*° The problem really defies the limited powers 
 of human reason. Cardinal Toletus and those who hold 
 with him must not, however, be understood as asserting ~ 
 that the specific unity of the Angels results from pro- 
 creation, because the Church has formally condemned the 
 proposition that “the human soul is propagated from 
 parent to child just as body from body or one Angel 
 from another.” *# 
 
 2. THE NINE CHOIRS AND THE THREE HIER- 
 ARCHIES OF THE ANGELS.—The Angels are dis- 
 tributed into various Orders, some _ superior, 
 others inferior. This is not an article of faith, 
 but it may be set down as a certain truth. Sacred 
 Scripture enumerates nine such Orders. Isaias 
 saw the Seraphim,* Moses mentions the Cheru- 
 bim, as ouardians ot Paradise.3 and ot), Pauly, 
 enumerates the Thrones, Dominations, Principal- 
 ities, and Powers, to which, in another place,*® 
 he adds the Virtues. Besides these the Bible 
 frequently mentions Angels and Archangels. 
 The fact that Holy Scripture carefully discrimi- 
 
 S8)Seud Heol.) 1a; .aus 80; att. 4e 
 
 39 De Angelis, I, 14. 
 
 40 Comment. in S. Thom., l. c 
 
 41“ Anima humana fil propaga- 
 tur ab anima patris sui sicut corpus 
 a corpore et angelus etiam unus ab 
 alio.” Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchi- 
 ridion, n. 533. For a fuller discus- 
 
 sion of this subject cfr. Palmieri, 
 De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 
 204 sqd. 
 
 42 Ts. VI, 2. 
 
 43 Gen. III, 24. 
 
 44 Col. I, 16. 
 
 45 Eph: I, 213 cfr. 
 38. 
 
 Rom. VIII, 
 
PIERARCHY Of) THEM ANGELS 323 
 
 nates between these different Orders is sufficient 
 watrant that the names employed by the Bible 
 are not merely synonymous terms.*® The precise 
 number of the angelic choirs is not known to us. 
 In how far they differ, and what are their mutual 
 relations, is a matter of speculation rather than 
 of faith.*” 
 
 Since the time of the Pseudo-Dionysius.** it 
 has been customary in the Schools to group 
 the nine angelic choirs into three divisions, in 
 imitation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, each di- 
 vision comprising three choirs (ordines, 74&«s), as 
 follows: (1) The supreme hierarchy, compris- 
 ing the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; (2) 
 The intermediate hierarchy, comprising the 
 Dominations, Virtues, and Powers; (3) The 
 lowest hierarchy, comprising the Principalities, 
 Archangels, and Angels. 
 
 This difference in rank is believed to be due to 
 the fact that the members of the supreme hier- 
 archy, who are, so to speak, assistants at the di- 
 vine throne, receive their orders directly from 
 God Himself, while those of the intermediate 
 hierarchy hand the divine commands down to the 
 lower Angels, who in turn communicate them to 
 46 Cir. S. Greg. M., Hom. in Ev., Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, 3rd 
 r ed., pp. 214 sq., Friburgi 1908. 
 
 47 “ Dicant qui possunt,” says St. 48 De Coelesti Hierarchia, c. 3. 
 Augustine (Enchir., c. 58), “‘ ego Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Know- 
 
 me ista ignorare confiteor.” Cfr. ability, Essence, and Attributes, p. 
 270. 
 
 34 
 
324 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 men. Revelation is silent on this point. Ac- 
 cording to Pseudo-Dionysius,*® whom the Scho- 
 lastics, thinking him a pupil of the Apostles, 
 blindly followed,” the division of the Angels into 
 hierarchies has still another signification. The 
 higher Angels, he says, are charged with the 
 mission of “illuminating” and “purifying” those 
 of the lower Orders. By illumination (illumi- 
 natio) the Schoolmen mean the communication 
 of knowledge by an Angel of a higher to an 
 Angel of a lower Order. In so far as the in- 
 ferior Angel is thereby cleansed of defects inci- 
 dent to his imperfect mode of cognition, the 
 process is also called “purgation” (purgatio). 
 We need scarcely remind our readers that this 
 teaching does not exceed the value of a more or 
 less well-founded opinion.°* 
 
 49 De Coelestti Hierarchia, c. 4 108; Stiglmayr, S. J., “ Die En- 
 
 and 8. gellehre des sogen. Dionysius Areo- 
 
 50 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His pagita’’ in the Comite Rendu du 
 Knowability, Essence, and Aitri- Congrés Intern. & Fribourg, Vol. I, 
 butes, p. 270. Pp. 403 sqq., 1897; Hugo Koch, 
 
 51 On the interesting problems Pseudo-Dionysius  Areopagita im 
 involved in these speculations the seinen Beziehungen zum Neupla- 
 student may profitably consult St. tonismus und Mysterienwesen, 
 Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 106, Mainz 1goo. 
 
SECON 2 
 THE ANGELS AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 
 
 AN DOTY 
 
 THE SUPERNATURAL ENDOWMENT OF THE ANGELS 
 
 I. THEIR ELEVATION TO THE STATE OF GRACE. 
 —After having created the Angels, God did not 
 leave them in puris naturalibus, but endowed 
 them with sanctifying grace. Thus they became 
 His adopted children and received a claim to the 
 beatific vision. This is the unanimous teaching: 
 of Catholic theologians, and it is based upon Di- 
 vine Revelation. Being “saints,” “angels of 
 Holt cnpelectiancels. \* sons of God, “\andiso 
 forth, the Angels must necessarily be conceived as 
 endowed with sanctifying grace. There is no 
 ground for the assumption’ that the demons 
 never enjoyed such a supernatural endowment. 
 On the contrary, it is quite certain that all the 
 Angels without exception were elevated to the 
 supernatural order.” We read in the Epistle 
 
 1 Dan. VIII, 13. of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, 
 Bis Corse XN Paeaen and St. Bonaventure. 
 
 Siz lim. Vecer. Y 6 ““ Neque tamen haec assertio ex 
 4Job XXXVIII, 7. fide certa est. Nam Magister Sen- 
 
 5 Made by Peter Lombard, Hugh tentiarum in 2 dist. 5 absque nota 
 
 325 
 
326 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 of St. Jude: “Non servaverunt suum principa- 
 tum,’ sed dereliquerunt suum domicilium — And 
 the angels . . . kept not their principality, but 
 forsook their own habitation;” 7. e., they did not 
 preserve their supernatural prerogatives, but re- 
 linquished their place of honor. Consequently 
 the demons too, before the Fall, were endowed 
 with grace.® 
 
 According to the more common opinion of Catholic di- 
 vines, the Angels are endowed with grace each according 
 to the measure of his natural perfection, 7. e., the natural 
 prerogatives with which he was created. This doctrine 
 has nothing in common with Pelagianism; for it is not 
 merit (meritum naturae), but the disposition of each An- 
 gel’s nature which guides God in distributing His graces. 
 In the words of St. Basil, ‘The Powers of Heaven are 
 not holy by nature, but they possess the measure of their 
 sanctification from the Holy Ghost, according to the 
 rank by which one excels the other.” ® Or, as St. John 
 Damascene puts it, “ They partake of light and grace, 
 each according to his dignity and order.” 1° According 
 to this theory the Seraphim *! rank first in the order of 
 grace, because their nature is the most perfect; while 
 the “ Angels,” simply so called, occupy the lowest rung 
 of the ladder. But since this teaching cannot be demon- 
 erroris existimavit, daemones nun- tiam.” Other Patristic texts in 
 
 quam habuisse gratiam. Ceterum Tepe, Instit. Theol., t. II, pp. 628 
 est tta certa nostra assertio, ut iam sqq., Paris 1895. 
 
 eam negare censeatur esse plane 9 De Spiritu Sancto, c. 16, n. 38. 
 temerartum.” (Gregory of Valen- 10:De) Fide Orth. II, 32) 7 Pre 
 cia, disp. 4, qu. 13, p. 1.) sua quisque dignitate et ordine 
 T dpxny. splendoris gratiaeque participes.” 
 8 Cfr. St, Ambrose, Serm. in Ps., 11 From ay to burn, to glow; 
 i Y 
 
 118, 7, n. 8: “TIpse dtabolus per 
 
 superbiam naturae suae amisit gra- hence, literally: Angels of love, 
 
THEIR SUPERNATURAL ENDOWMENT = 327 
 
 strated from Revelation, its value does not exceed that 
 of a probable opinion.” 
 
 2. WHEN WERE THE ANGELS SANCTIFIED ?— 
 A number of medieval theologians * held that 
 all the Angels remained for some time after 
 their creation in the pure state of nature and 
 were elevated to the state of supernatural grace 
 at a later date. St. Thomas demonstrated by 
 weighty arguments that the sanctification of the 
 Angels must have been contemporaneous with 
 their creation.‘* Among the Fathers this view 
 had been championed by St. Augustine: “Deus 
 angelos cum amore casto, quo illi adhaererent, 
 creavit, simul in eis condens naturam et largiens 
 gratiam — God created the Angels with a chaste 
 love, by which they adhered to Him, endowing 
 them with grace at the same time that He created 
 their nature.” * Though not an article of faith, 
 this opinion has become the prevailing one in 
 consequence chiefly of its having been adopted 
 into the Roman Catechism. St. Thomas himself 
 had previously championed the contrary view as 
 the more common and probable one." 
 
 12S. Theol., 1a, qu. 62, art. 6: 
 ** Rationabile est, quod secundum 
 gradum naturalium angelis data sint 
 dona gratiarum, et perfectio beatitu- 
 dinis.”’ 
 
 13 Hugh of St. Victor, Alexander 
 of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Duns 
 Scotus, and others. 4 
 
 14 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 
 wa, qu. 62, art. 3: “... quamvis 
 
 super hoc sint diversae opiniones, 
 hoc tamen [scil. quod angeli in gra- 
 tia creati fuerint] probabilius vide- 
 tur et magis dictis Sanctorum con- 
 sonum est.’ 
 
 15 De Civ. Dei, XII, 9.. For some 
 other Patristic texts of similar tenor 
 see Suarez, De Angelis, V, 4. 
 
 16 Comment. in Quatuor Libros 
 Sentent., II, dist. 4, qu. 4, art. 2. 
 
328 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY. 
 
 3. THE PROBATION OF THE ANGELS.—It is the 
 teaching of the Fathers, unanimously defended by 
 Catholic theologians, that, like men, the Angels 
 had to undergo a probation, during which they 
 found themselves in the status viae and had to 
 merit the beatific vision of the Blessed Trinity. 
 The fact that they were able to merit the beatific 
 vision presupposes that while in the wayfaring 
 state they received an external revelation of the 
 truths necessary for salvation, and, like man, were 
 bound to prepare themselves by a free act of in- 
 ternal faith for the attainment of eternal happi- 
 ness." Gennadius * taught that the Angels 
 were simultaneously raised to the state of grace 
 and glory in the instant of their creation. But 
 this opinion is incompatible with the revealed 
 truth that some of them apostatized. If the 
 fallen Angels had been constituted in the state of 
 glory, it would have been impossible for them to 
 sin, because the beatific vision of God completely 
 abrogates the creature’s freedom of. chosing 
 evil.’® 
 
 Cfr. Catech. Rom., P. 1, c. 2, qu. 
 17: “Cum illud sit in divinis lt- 
 teris, diabolum ‘in veritate non 
 stetisse,’ perspicuum est, eum re- 
 liquosque desertores angelos ab or- 
 tus sui initio gratia praeditos fuisse 
 — Since Holy Scripture says that 
 the Devil ‘stood not in the truth,’ 
 (John VIII, 44), it is clear that 
 he and the rest of the rebel angels 
 
 were gifted with grace from the 
 very moment of their creation.” 
 This sentence does not, of course, 
 decide the question at issue. 
 
 17 Cfr. Suarez, De Angelis, V, 5 
 sq. 
 
 18 De Eccl. Dogm., c. 59. 
 
 19 For a more elaborate treatment 
 of this point we must refer the 
 student to Eschatology. 
 
PROBATION OF THE ANGELS 329 
 
 How long the period of probation lasted, whether but 
 a single instant, or two morulae, or three,”° is a matter 
 of pure conjecture. The only thing that we must hold 
 as an article of faith is that a portion of the Angels 
 came forth unsullied, while the remainder fell and were 
 cast into hell. The good Angels “stand before the 
 ord,” 2+" before bis) throne,’ they, dwelliiino, the 
 heavenly Jerusalem,” 2? 7. e.,'“ in heaven.” ** Christ ex- 
 pressly teaches: “Their [little children’s] angels in 
 heaven always see the face of my Father who is in 
 heaven.” ?° 
 
 That the grace and glory enjoyed by the Angels is a 
 supernatural state follows from what we have said in a 
 previous Chapter of this volume on the essence of the 
 Supernatural,* and also from the rejection by the Church 
 of Baius’s propositions: ‘‘ Nec angeli nec primi hominis 
 adhue integri merita recte vocantur gratia;” “ Et bons 
 angelis et primo homini, si in statu ilo perseverasset 
 usque ad ultimum vitae, felicitas esset merces, et non 
 gratia; ” “ Vita aeterna homini integro et angelo promissa 
 fuit mtuitu bonorum operum, et bona opera ex lege 
 naturae ad illam consequendam per se suticiunt.”*" The 
 condemnation of these propositions proves that the spe- 
 cial endowment of the Angels, like that of man, was 
 essentially supernatural. 
 
 20 This is the opinion of Suarez with this problem in his Dogmatik, 
 and Scheeben. Suarez writes (De Vol. II, n. 1139. 
 
 Angelis, VI, 3, 5): “Prima [mo- 21 Tob. tochbsy ise 
 
 rula| fuit creationis et sanctifica- 22 Apoc, I, 4. 
 
 tionis cum dispositione ad illam et 23 Heb, XII, 22. 
 
 consequenter cum merito de con- 24 Mark XII, 2s. 
 
 digno gloriae; secunda fuit perse- 25 Matth. XVIII, 10. 
 
 verantiae in gratia cum merito de 26 Supra, pp. 190 sqq. 
 
 condigno gratiae et gloriae; tertia 27 Propos. 1, 3, 4 Batt Damn., in 
 
 receptionis gloriae.”’ Scheeben deals Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
 mn. I00I, 1003, 1004. 
 
 22 
 
330 _ CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 ARTICLE es 
 
 THE ANGELS IN THEIR RELATION TO MEN, OR THE GUARD- 
 IAN ANGELS 
 
 The Catholic Church teaches that every man has a 
 Guardian Angel, whom he should venerate and invoke. 
 This teaching is founded on Sacred Scripture.? 
 
 The mission of the Guardian Angels may be Pile 
 described as follows: They ward off dangers from body 
 and soul, they inspire good and salutary thoughts, they 
 convey our prayers to the throne of grace, they assist 
 us in the hour of death and bear the souls of the elect 
 to Heaven.* The Catholic teaching on the subject may 
 be formulated in four theses. 
 
 Thesis I: The Angels exercise a kind of general 
 guardianship over the human race. 
 
 Proof. Though we can adduce no express 
 dogmatic definition in support of this thesis, it 
 must be accepted as an article of faith, because 
 it is taught by the magistertwm ordinarium of 
 the Church, which, in its turn, voices the mani- 
 fest teaching of Scripture and Tradition. St. 
 Paul lays it down as an indisputable axiom 
 that the Angels minister to those who “shall re- 
 ceive the inheritance of salvation.” Heb. I, 14: 
 “Nonne omnes sunt administratorii spiritus* in 
 ministerium missi propter eos, qui haereditatem 
 
 1\Cfr; Gal. I, 8; x. Tim. III, 76: 2 Cfr. Suarez, De Angelis, VI, 19. 
 erbets it, 12. 3 NetTOUpyiKa mvevuaTa, 
 
THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 331 
 
 capient salutis?—Are they not all ministering 
 spirits, sent to minister for them, who shall re- 
 ceive the inheritance of salvation?’ The Psalm- 
 ist touchingly describes the tender care which 
 the Angels bestow upon man. Ps. XC, 11 sq.: 
 “Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in 
 omnibus viis tuis; in manibus portabunt te, ne 
 forte offendas ad lapidem pedem tuum — He 
 hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep 
 thee in all thy ways; in their hands they shall 
 bear thee up, lest thou dash thy foot against a 
 stone.”” The lives of Tobias and of our Lord 
 Jesus Christ Himself prove how faithfully the 
 Guardian Angels perform their duty. 
 
 This doctrine was part of the Apostolic Tra- 
 dition, as is clearly evidenced by the following 
 passage from Origen: “This too is contained in 
 the ecclesiastical teaching, that there are Angels 
 of God and good powers who serve Him for the 
 purpose of consummating the salvation of men.” 4 
 
 Since this angelic guardianship is based upon a di- 
 vine mission,® the question has been broached whether 
 such missions are limited to the lower choirs, or whether 
 members of the higher choirs too are sometimes sent down 
 from Heaven. There are two theological opinions on 
 _this subject. One, based on the writings of the Pseudo- 
 Areopagite, and espoused by SS. Gregory the Great, 
 Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, holds that only the 
 
 4 De Princip., praef. n._10. Other 5 The term ‘ Angel” is derived 
 Patristic passages infra. from ayyenos ; ayyenrewy, to send. 
 
332 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 lowest three, or at the most five of the lower choirs dis- 
 charge the office of messengers, while the Seraphim, the 
 Cherubim, the Thrones, and the Dominations are con- 
 stantly assembled around the throne of the Most High. 
 Since, however, theologians have begun to emancipate 
 themselves from the authority, once all too highly re- 
 garded, of the Pseudo-Areopagite, the opinion of Scotus 
 and his school has become the more common one, to wit, 
 that all Angels without exception are employed as divine 
 messengers. ‘There are two very good reasons for adopt- 
 ing this view. The first is the authority of St. Paul, who 
 emphatically teaches that all spirits are “sent.’® The 
 second is the fact that Angels of the highest rank have 
 been commissioned to execute divine commands, as, e. g., 
 the Seraph in Isaias VI, 6 sqq., and the two Cherubim 
 “ placed before the paradise of pleasure,’ Gen. III, 24.7 
 
 Thesis II: Every Christian from the moment of 
 Baptism has-his particular Guardian Angel. 
 
 Proof. Suarez says of this thesis: “Though 
 not expressly contained in Holy Writ, nor yet 
 formally defined, it is received by universal con- 
 sent in the Church and has such a solid founda- 
 tion in Scripture, as interpreted by the Fathers, 
 that it cannot be denied without very great 
 temerity and even error.” * The Biblical basis 
 
 6 Heb. I, 14. transmitting God’s commands to 
 
 7 Gerson declared the Thomistic the lower Angels. How violently 
 view to be heretical; but this is the simplest Scriptural passages 
 manifestly unjust, because the Tho- were sometimes strained in order 
 mists willingly concede that the to square them with the teaching of 
 higher (or. so-called assisting) Pseudo-Dionysius, can be seen in 
 choirs may act at least mediately Suarez, De Angelis, VI, to. 
 as divine messengers, 7. e., by 8 De Angelis, VI, 17. 
 
THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 333 
 
 of this doctrine is our Saviour’s own declaration: 
 “Videte, ne contemnatis unum ex Ins pusillis; 
 dico enim vobis, quia angeli eorum® in coelis 
 semper vident faciem Patris met — See that you 
 despise not one of these little ones: for I say to 
 you, that their angels in heaven always see the 
 face .of tiy Hather whois tm heaven.’ The 
 expression “their angels” (7. e., the angels of 
 these little children), plainly points to the exist- 
 ence of Guardian Angels (angelt custodes seu 
 tutelares, dyyeho. pidaxes), That each man has a 
 Guardian Angel is also proved by a passage in 
 the Acts of the Apostles. The friends of St. 
 Peter, when he knocks at the door after his de- 
 liverance from prison, joyfully exclaim: “It is 
 his angel.” ‘4 The objection that the Saviour’s 
 words apply exclusively to the children of the 
 Jews, is invalid. For, in the first place, all the 
 supernatural prerogatives of the Synagogue de- 
 scended in an enhanced degree upon the Christian 
 Church; and, secondly, the Fathers in their in- 
 terpretation of this and similar passages no- 
 where make a distinction between Jews and 
 Christians, or between the Old and the New 
 Testament. St. Basil declares: “That each one 
 among the faithful? has an angel, who directs 
 his life as a guide ** and shepherd,** nobody can 
 
 90i ayyedou aUTaOY, =~ 12 €xdoT@ TOY TLOTHY, 
 10 Matth. XVIII, 10. ; 13 madaywyés, 
 11 Acts XII, 15. 14 youeus, 
 
334 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 deny who remembers the words of our Lord: 
 “See that you despise not one of these little 
 ones.” *° Commenting on this same dictum of 
 our Divine Saviour, St. Chrysostom writes: 
 “Each faithful Christian has an Angel; for 
 every righteous man had an Angel from the very 
 beginning, as Jacob says:*® The Angel that 
 nourisheth and delivereth me from youth.” 7 
 Origen undoubtedly voices the belief of the Prim- 
 ittve Church when he says: “Each of us, even 
 the lowliest, has an Angel by his side.” 18 
 
 The faith of the early Christians manifested 
 itself unmistakably in the devotion they paid to 
 the Guardian Angels. As early as the fourth 
 century it was customary to erect altars and sanc- 
 tuaries in their honor. The Feast of the Guard- 
 ian Angels originated in the eleventh century. 
 “Though of comparatively recent introduction, 
 [it] gives the sanction of the Church’s authority 
 to an ancient and cherished belief.” ™ 
 
 Some of the early Fathers and ecclesiastical writers 
 held that besides his Guardian Angel every Christian 
 has also a demon to tempt him.” Bellarmine rightly 
 
 general see K. A. H. Kellner, Heor-« 
 tology, pp. 328 sqq., London 1908. 
 20Thus Origen (Hom. 12 in 
 Luc.), Gregory of Nyssa (De Vita 
 Moysis), Tertullian (De Anim., ec. 
 
 15 Contr. Eunom., 1. 3, n. 1. 
 
 16 Gen. XLVIII, 16. 
 
 17 Hom. in Col., 3 n. 4. 
 
 18 Hom. in Num., 20. 
 
 19 On the history of this feast 
 
 cfr. the article ‘‘ Guardian Angels, 
 Feast of,” by T. P. Gilmartin, in 
 the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII. 
 On the festivals of the Angels in 
 
 30), and Cassian (Collat., VIII, 17). 
 They seem to have followed the 
 Shepherd of Hermas (1. II, mand. 
 6): Ato elaly adyyedor, els Tis 
 dixaoovvns, els THS Tovnpias, 
 
THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 335 
 
 reckoned this belief, which has absolutely no Scriptural 
 foundation whatever, among the errors of Hermas. That 
 every man should be afflicted with an imp to plague him, 
 is a notion which can hardly be reconciled with belief 
 in a benevolent Providence. Perhaps Hermas was led to 
 adopt it in a well-meant endeavor to Christianize the 
 pagan idea of a genius niger as a counterpart to the 
 genius albus. 
 
 Some modern writers on the philosophy of religion 
 maintain that Jewish and Christian angelology was bor- 
 rowed from the pagan religions of the East, and that 
 in the last analysis the Angels are merely personifica- 
 tions of Divine Providence. Not to speak of the ex- 
 treme antiquity of the Jewish belief in Angels,?1 this 
 theory is disproved by the teaching and conduct of 
 Christ Himself, and also by the sharp contrast existing 
 between the Angels of the Bible and the figments of. 
 pagan mythology. 
 
 Thesis III: Not only Christians and those justi- 
 fied, but heathens and sinners also have each a Guard- 
 ian Angel. 
 
 Proof. Suarez refers to this proposition as em- 
 bodying “the common teaching of theologians and 
 Fathers.” 7. Its meaning is that every man has 
 a Guardian Angel in as far as he is a man, not 
 in consequence of Baptism or justification. This 
 angelic guardianship begins at birth. “Magna 
 
 21 See Gen. III, 24; XVI, 7 saq. 
 
 Cofrs Hackspill, ** L’ Angelologie 
 Juive”’? in La Revue Biblique, 1902, 
 PP. 527 sq. 
 
 22° Non solum iustos, sed etiam 
 peccatores, neque solos fideles, sed 
 
 etiam infideles, neque solos bapti- 
 gatos, sed etiam inbaptizatos habere 
 angelos custodes, est communis sen- 
 tentia theologorum et patrum, quos 
 in priore assertione principali alle- 
 gavimus.’ (De Angelis, VI, 17.) 
 
336 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 dignitas animarum,” says St. Jerome, “ut una- 
 quaeque habeat ab ortu nativitatis in custodiam sut 
 angelum delegatum.” ?* Theodoret and Isidore 
 of Sevilla base this belief on Christ’s dictum con- 
 cerning little children, which we have quoted 
 above.** Quite a number of the Fathers, it is 
 true, speak of Guardian Angels only in connec- 
 tion with pious Christians; but their utterances 
 must not be interpreted in an exclusive sense; 
 these Fathers merely wish to emphasize that 
 every good Christian enjoys the special protection 
 of a Guardian Angel, which does not exclude that 
 God bestows the same paternal providence also 
 upon the heathen and the sinner. 
 
 The attitude of the Schoolmen on this ques- 
 tion was Soy nen by the declaration of St. An- 
 selm, that “every soul is committed to an An- 
 gel at the moment when it is united with the 
 body.” *° St. Thomas, proceeding from the prin- 
 ciple that “the guardianship of the Angels over 
 men is as it were the carrying into effect of divine 
 Providence,” ** argues as follows: “Beneficia, 
 quae dantur divinitus, ex eo quod est C hristianus, 
 incipiunt a tempore baptismi, sicut perceptio 
 Eucharistiae, et alia huiusmodi. Sed ea quae 
 
 23 In Matth., 18, 10. 26 “ Angelorum custodia est quae- 
 
 24 Supra, p. 333. dam executio divinae providentiae 
 
 25 Elucid., II, 31: ‘‘ Unaquaeque circa homines,’ (S. Theol., 1a, qu. 
 anima, dum in corpus mittitur, an- LVS mavtare) 
 
 gelo committitur,” 
 
THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 337, 
 
 providentur homini a Deo, in quantum habet 
 naturam rationalem, ex tunc et exhibentur, ex 
 quo nascendo talem naturam accipit; et tale 
 beneficium est custodia angelorum. ... Unde 
 statim a nativitate habet homo angelum ad sui 
 custodiam deputatum.” *" Socrates’s assertion 
 that he enjoyed the guidance of a tutelary spirit 
 (Saonov) expresses a profound truth.2® 
 
 Thesis IV: Every State and every ecclesiastical 
 province has its own divinely appointed tutelary spirit. 
 
 Proof. This thesis, which embodies merely a 
 probable opinion, finds some slight support in the 
 famous vision of Daniel,*® where the Archangel 
 Michael battles side by side with Raphael as prin- 
 ceps Iudaeorum, for the Israelites against two 
 other Angels, who are called princes (5%) of the 
 Persians and the Greeks. Of the four Angels en- 
 gaged in this conflict three are expressly desig- 
 nated as “princes” of certain nations or States. 
 We must refer the reader to St. Thomas for an ex- 
 planation as to how Angels can battle with one 
 another on behalf of their clients.2° St. Basil 
 commenting on the vision of Daniel says: ‘That 
 there are certain Angels who are placed at the 
 
 27h ec. 
 28 Cfr. Manning, The Daemon of 
 Socrates, London 1872. For a 
 
 a proper translation) cfr. M. Louis, 
 Doctrines Religieux des Philosophes 
 Grecs, Paris 1910. 
 
 lehgthy and attractive discussion of 
 the ‘‘ Daimonion of Socrates” (for 
 which he admits his inability to find 
 
 29 Dan. X, 12 sqq. 
 30 Summa Theologica, 1a, qu. 113, 
 art. 8. 
 
338 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 head of entire nations, is a fact which the 
 wise Daniel heard from the Angel [Raphael], 
 who spoke to him thus: The prince of the king- 
 dom of the Persians resisted me, and behold 
 Michael came to help me.” *! Some of the 
 Fathers think that the “man of Macedonia’? who 
 appeared to St. Paul in a vision and besought him 
 to “pass over into Macedonia, and help us,” ®? 
 was the tutelary Angel of the Macedonians.*? 
 St. Michael, who is called “the Prince of Guard- 
 ian Angels,’ was regarded as the tutelary spirit 
 of the Jewish Synagogue; in the New Testament 
 he is venerated as the special protector of the 
 Catholic Church.** 
 
 Certain Scriptural expressions * permit us to 
 infer that churches, cities, and ecclesiastical prov- 
 inces likewise have special tutelary spirits.** 
 
 That we owe a duty of reverence to our 
 Guardian Angel is taught by St. Bernard in 
 these words: “Jn quovis diversorio, in quovis 
 angulo, angelo tuo reverentiam habe.” *" 
 
 READINGS: — Trombelli, Tratiato degli Angeli Custodi, Bo- 
 logna 1747.— Berlage, Dogmatik, Vol. IV, §§ 26 sqq—De la 
 
 31 Contr. Eunom., 1. III, n. 1. 
 82 Acts XVI, 9. 
 83 Cfr. Origen, Hom in Luc., 123 
 
 St. Michael, his personality and his 
 cult see F. G. Holweck in the Pas- 
 toral-Blatt, St. Louis, Mo., 1910, 
 
 St.. Ambrose, In Luc., 1. 12. 
 
 84 Cfr. St. Thomas, Comment. in 
 Quatuor Libros Sent., IV, dist. 43, 
 art. 3, qu. 3: “* Ministertum iWud 
 erit principaliter unius archangelt, 
 scil. Michaelis, qui est princeps Ec- 
 clesiae, sicut fuit Synagogae.” On 
 
 No. 7, pp. 97 sqq. 
 
 ShiCir ne. .5 Lach Lana. 
 
 386 For a more detailed explana- 
 tion see Suarez, De Angelis, VI, 
 17. 
 
 87 Serm. in Ps., 12, 90. 
 
THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 330 
 
 Gerda, De Angelo Custode.— Albert. a Bulsano, Theol. Dogmat., 
 t. I, pp. 321 sqq., Oeniponte 1893.— Chardon, L’Ange et le Prétre, 
 Paris 1899.— S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. 
 II, 2nd ed., pp. 298 sqq—R. O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, 
 pp. 99-119, London 1887.— C. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schopfung, 
 PP. 441 sqq., Ratisbon 1910—H. Pope, art, “ Guardian Angels ” 
 in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII. 
 
SECTION 3 
 
 THE APOSTASY OF A NUMBER OF THE ANGELS 
 
 AR DICTA sr 
 
 THE FALLEN ANGELS OR DEMONS 
 
 1. THE EXISTENCE oF Evit Spirits.—The 
 Fall of the Angels was unlike that of man. The 
 human race apostatized as a whole, because all 
 men were virtually contained in Adam and con- 
 sequently all contracted original sin through him. 
 The fallen Angels sinned as individuals, each of 
 his own accord, and thereby rendered themselves 
 guilty of actual sin. 
 
 The existence of evil spirits is an obvious in- 
 ference from the revealed truth that a portion 
 of the angelic host, who were all originally 
 created in the state of sanctifying grace, rebelled 
 against God and were cast into hell. “Diabolus 
 et alu daemones a Deo quidem natura creatt sunt 
 boni, sed ipst per se factt sunt mali,’ says the 
 Fourth Council of the Lateran.’.. Our : Lord 
 Himself says: “I saw Satan like lightning fall- 
 
 1Caput “ Firmiter,’ quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n, 
 428. 
 
 340 
 
APOSTASY OF THE ANGELS 341 
 
 ing from heaven.’ St. John in the Apocalypse 
 gives a graphic description of his fall: “Cauda 
 ews [scil. draconis| trahebat tertiam partem 
 stellarum coeli et misit eas in terram. . . . Draco 
 ... prowectus est in terram et angeli eius cum 
 illo missi sunt — And his tail drew the third part 
 oft the stars of heaven, and cast them to the earth. 
 vated they dragon) was cast’ mntetne 
 earth, and his angels were thrown down with 
 him.” * On the strength of this text certain 
 mystically inclined theologians estimated the pro- 
 portion of the fallen angels to those that remained 
 faithful as 1:3. Whether this estimate be cor- 
 rect or no, we may safely assume that the number 
 of the faithful Angels exceeded those who fell 
 away. 
 
 The Bible consistently distinguishes between the 
 “ Devil,’ or “Satan,” in the singular, and ‘“ demons,” 
 in the plural number. Satan is described as the seducer, 
 the demons as his victims. While the latter are desig- 
 nated by the indefinite terms “demons” (daemones, 
 Saipoves, Saipdua), or “unclean spirits” (spiritus impuri 
 Ss. nequam, rvedpata axabapta % movnptas), their leader, 
 “the prince of demons,” * is called by the proper name 
 of “Satan” (cardy or catavas, [OW, i. e., an adversary) 
 or “ Devil” (diabolus, 8:aBodos, i. e., slanderer or ac- 
 cuser, from daBdddev, to traduce), and by such quasi- 
 
 2 Luke X, 28.\ .\Cfr.) John -VII1; 4 Matth. IX, 34: “ princeps dae- 
 44. ; moniorum.”’ 
 3 Apoc. XII, 4. 
 
342 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 proper names as Asmodeus,® Azazel, Beelzebub” and 
 Belial. The name Lucifer does not occur in the Bible. 
 Nor is there any Scriptural warrant for speaking of 
 “ devils” in the plural number. There is but one Devil, 
 though there are many demons or evil spirits. It is the 
 teaching of Holy Scripture that the kingdom of Christ 
 is opposed by a kingdom of evil ruled by the prince of 
 this world, who is the father of lies, Leviathan or the 
 “great dragon ... that old serpent, who is called the 
 Devil and Satan, who seduceth the whole world.” 
 
 From the psychological point of view it is a reasonable 
 assumption that the apostasy of the Angels was instigated 
 by one of their own number, most likely by the one who 
 ranked highest both in natural and supernatural endow- 
 ment,'* and that consequently the kingdom of evil orig- 
 inated at the very summit of creation and thence spread 
 over heaven and earth. 
 
 What was the nature of the sin committed by the 
 fallen angels? Fathers and theologians quite generally 
 hold that it was pride; but they are not agreed as to its 
 underlying motive. Some think the pride of the fallen 
 angels was inspired by envy because of the great things 
 which God had in store for the human race (elevation 
 to the state of grace, the Hypostatic Union, Mary the 
 Queen of Angels, and so forth). Others believe the in- 
 ordinate desire of these angels to be like God prompted 
 them to rise in mutiny against their Sovereign.” 
 
 5/ Lob. TLEY 8, 
 
 6 Lev. XVI, to. 
 
 7 Luke XI, 15 ef passim. 
 
 St2sCor. Vile sass 
 
 9 Cfr. Petavius, De Angelis, III, 
 
 Be 
 10 Apoc. XII, 9. 
 11 Among Christians he is pop- 
 ularly known as “ Lucifer.”’ 
 
 12 Hence the name of Michael 
 
 (ON2" Quis est ut Deus?) On 
 the cult and feast of St. Michael, 
 cfr. F. G. Holweck in the Pastoral- 
 blatt, St. Louis, July 1910. For a 
 more detailed account of the doc- 
 trine of the Fall of the Angels the 
 student is referred to Suarez, De 
 Angelis, VII, 10 sqq. 
 
APOSTASY OF THE ANGELS 343 
 
 2. THE PUNISHMENT OF THE FALLEN AN- 
 GELS.—It is an article of faith that the fallen 
 angels in punishment for their crime were forth- 
 with shorn of grace and cast into hell, where 
 they have no hope of redemption. Sacred Scrip- 
 ite, teaches; this expressly Ciny Qebeuiin a 
 “Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercit, sed 
 rudentibus inferni detractos in tartarum tradidit 
 cruciandos — God spared not the angels that 
 sinned, but delivered them, drawn down by in- 
 fernal ropes, to the lower hell, unto torments.” 
 Epistle of St. Jude 6: “Angelos vero, qui non 
 servaverunt suum principatum, sed dereliquerunt 
 suum domicilium, in iudicium magni diei vinculis 
 aeternis sub caligine reservavit — And the angels 
 who kept not their principality, but forsook their 
 own habitation, he hath reserved under dark- 
 ness in everlasting chains, unto the judgment of 
 the great day.” The phrase “reserved unto the 
 judgment of the great day” does not mean that 
 the evil spirits have any chance of redemption, 
 but merely indicates that their punishment will 
 not be complete till after the Last Judgment, 
 when they shall cease to harass men. 
 
 The much-discussed theory that a time will 
 come when all free creatures, demons and lost 
 souls included, shall share in the grace of salva- 
 tion ( dmoxataoracts mavroy) 18 was rejected as he- 
 
 13 Latin, restitutio in integrum. and was taught among others by 
 This doctrine originated with Origen St. Gregory of Nyssa. See the 
 
344 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 retical in the first of the famous anathemas pro- 
 nounced at the Council of Constantinople, A. D. 
 543. Christ Himself implicitly condemned it 
 when He spoke of the final judgment: “Dis- 
 cedite a me, maledicti, in 1gnem aeternum, qui 
 paratus est diabolo et angelis ems — Depart 
 from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire which 
 was prepared for the devil and his angels.” 
 It is the almost unanimous opinion of theolo- 
 gians * that, unlike man, the fallen angels were 
 granted no time for repentance. 
 
 ARTICLE, 2 
 
 THE DEMONS IN THEIR RELATION TO THE HUMAN RACE 
 
 While the good Angels are placed as guardians 
 over men in order to help them to attain their tem- 
 poral and eternal salvation, the Devil, who “was 
 a murderer from the beginning,’ ’ by way of 
 punishment for original sin, exercises a “reign 
 of death” (imperium mortis) over the human 
 race. This “reign of death’ manifests itself in 
 three ways. | 
 
 1. TEMPTATION TO Sin.—There are two 
 species of temptation, known by the Scholastic 
 names of tentatio probatioms and tentatio seduc- 
 
 article ‘‘ Apocatastasis ’’ by P. Batif- 15 Salmeron is one of the very 
 fol in the Catholic Encyclopedia, few exceptions. 
 Vol. I. 1John VIII, 44. 
 
 14 Matth. XXV, 41. 
 
THE FALLEN ANGELS 345 
 
 tionis. The tentatio probationis aims at prov- 
 ing the will, while the tentatio seductionts has 
 for its ultimate object the ruin of the soul. It 
 is quite plain that God cannot seduce men.’ 
 When)He.:\“tempts’’\a’/many) Hey simply)) tries 
 his faith,” as in the case of Adam and Abraham; 
 which is quite compatible with His infinite holi- 
 ness. Satan and his demons, on the contrary, 
 continually strive by lies and false pretences to se- 
 duce men to commit sin and thereby to incur eter- 
 nal damnation. John VIII, 44: “Tile homicida 
 erat ab initio et in veritate non stetit, quia non est 
 veritas m eo; quum loqutur mendacium, ex 
 proprus loqutur, quia mendax est et pater ems 
 — He was a murderer from the beginning, and 
 he stood not in the truth; because truth is not in 
 him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of 
 his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof.” 
 Gaxsiewoaniie lion, ) says; >t Peter, 7[ the Devil 
 goeth about, seeking whom he may devour.” * 
 
 Whether the demons have a hand in all the tempta- 
 tions to which men are subject, is a problem regarding 
 which the Fathers and theologians do not agree. What 
 renders its solution difficult is the circumstance that, 
 as Suarez has rightly pointed out, the underlying ques- 
 tion is not one of power, but of fact. St. Thomas takes 
 middle ground. He attributes all temptations to the in- 
 
 2Cfr. the Epistle of St. James,. I, ter diabolus tamquam leo rugiens 
 circuit, quaerens quem devoret.” 
 
 « 81 Pet. V, 8: ‘“* Adversarius ves- 
 
 23 
 
346 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 direct influence of the Devil. “ Diabolus,” he says, “ est 
 causa omnium peccatorum nostrorum, quia instigavit 
 primum hominem ad peccandum, ex cuius peccato con- 
 secuta est in toto genere humano quaedam pronitas ad 
 omnia peccata. Et per hunc modum intelligenda sunt 
 verba Damascent et Dionysu. Directe autem dicitur esse 
 aliquid causa alicuius, quod operatur directe ad illud; 
 et hoc modo diabolus non est causa omnis peccati. Non 
 enim omnia peccata committuntur diabolo instigante; sed 
 quaedam ex libertate arbitru et carnis corruptione.” * 
 
 2. DEMONIACAL PossEssion.—God in His in- 
 finite wisdom occasionally permits demons to take 
 possession of the human body. Ascetic theology 
 distinguishes three species of demoniacal posses- 
 sion: (1) Circumsession, (2) obsession, and 
 (3) possession in the strict sense of the term. 
 Demoniacal possession, even in its highest stage, 
 must not be conceived as analogous to the Hy- 
 postatic Union, or the indwelling of the Holy 
 Ghost in the souls of the just. It is no more 
 than the relation of one who moves to him 
 who is moved. We know that demoniacal pos- 
 session is possible from Sacred Scripture and 
 Tradition. Both in the Gospels and the Acts 
 Christ and His Apostles are frequently described 
 as expelling evil spirits from persons possessed by 
 them (daemomiact, évepyovpevor), It is a blasphe- 
 mous reflection upon the truthfulness and sanctity 
 
 ANOLE HCOL Tas Cu wihiAartans: und thre Gegenmittel, 3rd ed., Frei- 
 Cfr. Fr. Hense, Die Versuchungen burg 1902. 
 
DEMONIACAL POSSESSION 347 
 
 of the Godman to assume, as some modern Ra- 
 tionalists do,’ that Christ simply played the réle 
 of a physician or magnetic healer to accommo- 
 date Himself to the superstitions of the Jews. 
 The Church placed herself squarely upon the 
 ground taken by her Founder when she adopted 
 various exorcisms into her liturgy and even es- 
 tablished a special ordo of exorcists.? Cases 
 of diabolical possession were frequent in the 
 Apostolic age and for a long time thereafter.’ 
 The Church still recognizes the possibility of 
 demoniacal possession in her Pontifical. The 
 indications of demoniacal possession are: “Ig- 
 nota lingua loqui pluribus verbis vel loquentem 
 intellgere; distantia et occulta patefacere; vires 
 supra aetatis seu conditionis naturam ostendere, 
 et id genus alia.’ Under the present discipline 
 no exorcism may be performed without the ex- 
 press mandate of the Bishop. This rule is in- 
 tended to prevent mistakes and abuses, such as 
 have occurred in the past and are likely to occur 
 again. We know that in the Middle Ages epi- 
 lepsy, impotence, and other diseases were fre- 
 quently ascribed to demoniacal influence, and no 
 
 5 Cfr. Barker Stevens, The The- 
 ology of the New Testament, pp. 
 76 sqq., Edinburgh 1gor1. 
 
 6 Ordination to the office of exor- 
 cist is the second of the four minor 
 orders of the Western Church, 
 Cfr. our dogmatic treatise -on the 
 Sacrament of Holy Orders and the 
 
 article *‘ Exorcist’? by P. J. Toner 
 in Vol. V of the Catholic Ency- 
 clopedia. 
 
 7Ireneus, Adv. Haer., Il, 32, 4; 
 Tertullian, Apol. c. 23. Cfr. Alex- 
 ander, Demonic Possession in the 
 New Testament, London 1902. 
 
348 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 
 
 attention was paid to the fact that people who 
 believe they are possessed by an evil spirit are 
 often merely insane.® 
 
 3. Brack Macic.—By black magic® theolo- 
 gians understand the power of producing super- 
 human effects without the codperation of God or 
 the blessed Angels. If any such power really ex- 
 ists, it must certainly be attributed to the in- 
 fluence of evil spirits..° The possibility of hu- 
 man intercourse with Satan cannot be denied 
 in view of the many instances recorded, or 
 assumed as true, in the New Testament. The 
 medieval witch-baiters sinned grievously by ex- 
 aggerating the power of the Devil, by neglecting 
 the most elementary principles of sound psy- 
 chology, and by proceeding with unpardonable 
 carelessness and inhuman cruelty in the trial of 
 persons accused of witchcraft. No period of 
 the world’s history is characterized by so many 
 insane superstitions and such a radical want of 
 common sense as the terrible time during which 
 thousands of supposed witches were tried, tor- 
 tured, and executed for practicing sorcery.1! Of 
 course, the theological principle that there are 
 
 8 Cfr. Heyne, Uber Besessenheits- 
 wahn bei geistigen Erkrankungs- 
 zustanden, Paderborn 1904; W. H. 
 Kent, art. ‘‘Demoniacs” in the 
 Catholic Encyclepedia, Vol. IV. 
 
 9“ White magic” is a natural 
 art, based on an extraordinary fa- 
 cility of doing things, 
 
 10 On the pagan oracles and the 
 false prophets of whom the Fathers 
 so frequently speak, cfr. Palmieri, 
 De Deo Creante, pp. 483 sqq. 
 
 11 Cfr. J. Janssen, Geschichte des 
 deutschen Volkes, Vol. VIII, Frei- 
 burg 1895 (English ed. by A. M. 
 Christie, Vol. XVI.) 
 
“‘DEMONIACAL POSSESSION 349 
 
 demons and that they have the power. of injuring 
 man in body and soul, is no more disproved by 
 these medieval excesses than by the all too ready 
 credence which in our own time thousands of 
 well-meaning Catholics gave to the bogus rev- 
 elations of Leo Taxil and his fictitious Diana 
 Vaughan.” 
 
 READINGS: — St. Anselm, “De Casu Diaboli—*St. Thomas, 
 Quaest. Disp., De Daemonibus.— M. Psellus, De Daemonum Ope- 
 yatione (reprinted in Migne, P. G., CXXII, 819 sqq.).—J. M. 
 Platina, De Angelis et Daemonibus, Bononiae 1740.— M. Ger- 
 bert, Daemonurgia Theologice Expensa, Friburgi 1776.— W. 
 Schneider, Der neuere Geisterglaube, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1885.— 
 Leistle, Die Besessenheit mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der 
 Lehre der Viéter, Dillingen 1887—-*M. Hagen, Der Teufel im 
 Lichte der Glaubensquellen, Freiburg 1899.—Duhm, Die bdsen 
 Geister im Alten Testament, 1904—S. J. Hunter, Outlines of 
 Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 302 sqq—R. O’Kennedy, The 
 Holy Angels, pp. 39 sqq., 120 sqq., London 1887.— Spirago-Clarke, 
 The Catechism Explained, 8th ed., pp. 147 sqq.— Delaporte-Sad- 
 lier, The Devil: Does He Exist? And What Does He Do? New 
 York 1904—N. Paulus, Hexenwahn und Hexenprogess, vor- 
 nehmlich im 16. Jahrhundert, Freiburg 1910.— W. H. Kent, arti- 
 cles “ Devil” and “ Demon” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 
 IV.— M: Ji O'Donnell, ‘art.’ Possession, > bid... Vol XIEs\ J.-P. 
 Arendzen, art. “ Occult Arts,” ibid., Vol. XI— Habert, La Magie, 
 Paris 1908.— R. Polz, Das Verhiltnis Christi zu den Damonen, 
 Innsbruck 1907.—J. G. Raupert, Modern Spiritism, London 1904. 
 —Ipem, The Supreme Problem, London 1911.—A. V. Miller, 
 The Dangers of Modern Spiritualism, London 1908. 
 
 12 Cfr. H. Gruber, S. J., Leo Tavil’s Palladismus-Roman, 3 vols., 
 ; Berlin 1897-8. zs 
 
, iN SoMa 
 
 4 Haye 
 Hi) nb Le | 
 
INDEX 
 
 A 
 
 ABELARD, 2064. 
 
 Abraham, 345. 
 
 Accident, 7. 
 
 Accidentarians, The Lutheran, 
 260. 
 
 Acosmism, 23. 
 
 Adam, Visions of, 115 sq.; Su- 
 pernatural endowment of, 
 124; The body of, not de- 
 veloped from the animal 
 kingdom, 127; Was not a 
 hermaphrodite, 128; Was per- 
 sonally created by God, 128; 
 The first man, 134; Mani- 
 chaean error concerning, 138; 
 His supernatural state in 
 Paradise, 183; Was endowed 
 with sanctifying grace before 
 the Fall, 196 sqq.; When was 
 he raised to the state of su- 
 pernatural grace? 199 sq.; 
 Exempt by a special grace 
 from concupiscence, 200 sqq.; 
 Was he gifted with infalli- 
 bility? 210 sq.; Was created 
 in holiness, 222 sq.; Original 
 sin contracted from Adam, 
 not Eve, 279 sq. 
 
 Adductio ex non esse ad esse, 
 6 
 
 Adiutoria Dei naturalia, 230. 
 Albertus Magnus, 53, 170, 205. 
 Albertus Pighius, 265, 267. 
 Albigenses, 26, 50. 
 
 Alexander of Hales, 236, 316. 
 Alexander *V II); Popex 132, 177. 
 Allegorism, 115. 
 
 Alligation, The theory of, 276 
 
 sqq. 
 
 Amalric of Béne, 27. 
 
 ‘Auapria, 247 sq. 
 
 Ambrosius Catharinus, 265, 267, 
 269, 276. 
 Ambrose, St., 
 255,250. 
 Anastasius II, Pope, 175 sqq. 
 Angelology, Christian, 308 sqq.; 
 Not borrowed from pagan- 
 
 ism, 335. 
 
 Angels, The, Created out of 
 nothing, 12; God’s creative 
 power not communicable to, 
 54 saqq.; Were they instru- 
 mental in the creation of 
 man? 129; Role of in Scho- 
 lastic philosophy, 308; His- 
 tory of the, 309; Nature of 
 the, 311 sqq.; Three Arch- 
 angels known by name, 312; 
 Created out of nothing, 312 
 sq.; When created, 313 sq.; 
 They are ptire spirits, 314 
 sq.; Have often visibly ap- 
 peared to men, 
 “sons of God” 
 ‘ daughters: of) ten,” . 315° 
 Teaching of the Fathers on, 
 315 sq.; They are physically 
 simple, essentially immortal 
 and indestructible, 316; They 
 possess intellect, 317 sq.; Are 
 not endowed with cardio- 
 gnosis, 317; They can com- 
 municate their thoughts to 
 one another, 317 sq.; Possess 
 freewill, 318 sq. ; Damascene’s 
 
 42, 52, 134, 160, 
 
 351 
 
352 
 
 definition of, 319; The An- 
 
 gels by nature superior to- 
 
 man, 320 sq.: Are able. to 
 perform muiracula quoad nos, 
 320; Number of, 321 sq.; Are 
 they all of one species? 321 
 sq.; Nine choirs of, 322 sqq.; 
 Difference in rank, 323 sq.; 
 The supernatural endowment 
 of, 325 sqq.; Their santifica- 
 
 tion contemporaneous with 
 thetr “creation; 3275) Their 
 probation, 328 sq.; The 
 
 Guardian Angels, 330 sqq.; 
 Apostasy of a number of the 
 Angels, 340 sqq. 
 
 Animals, Man’s disturbed rela- 
 tion towards, in consequence 
 of original sin, 290. 
 
 Animal worship, 106. 
 
 Anselm of Canterbury, St., 274, 
 286, 301, 336. 
 
 Anteperiodism, 113. 
 
 Ante-solar days, 1109. 
 
 Anthropology, Dogmatic, 124 
 sqq. : 
 
 Anticreationist heresies, 20. 
 
 Anti-God, Theory of an evil, 
 
 22. 
 
 Antipodes, 136. 
 
 Apocatastasis, 164, 343. 
 
 Apollinaris, 138, 145, 166. 
 
 Apostles’ Creed, The, 18, 38. 
 
 Appetite, Twofold in man, 
 203. 
 
 Archangels, 312, 322, 323. 
 
 Arguments for the existence of 
 God also show that He is the 
 absolute creator of the uni- 
 verse, 8. 
 
 Arianism, 146. 
 
 Aristotle, 8, 17, 80, 177. 
 
 Armenians, 168, 176. 
 
 Arriaga, 267. 
 
 Asmodeus, 342. 
 
 Astronomy, 104, 105. 
 
 Athanasian Creed, 146. 
 
 Athanasius, St., 18, 19, 57, 141, 
 202,250. 
 
 Atheism, 23, 29, 93. 
 
 Atomism, 149. 
 
 INDEX 
 
 “Auctorem fidei,” Bull, 224, 
 304. 
 
 Aufklirung, 94. 
 
 Augustine, St.— On Gen. i, 1, 
 14; For some time under the 
 sway of dualistic error, 22; 
 On’) John ing, 135. - On) the 
 freedom of God’s creative 
 will, 43, 46; On the creation 
 of sinful creatures, 47; On 
 the creation of the world not 
 in time but with time, 52; 
 Denies that an angel can 
 create, 57; On divine Preser- 
 vation, 65; On the divine 
 Concursus, 71; On the finis 
 operantis of creation, 83, 88; 
 On creatio secunda, 101, 102; 
 Teaches that the six days of 
 creation were but a_ sin- 
 gle moment, 107; Protests 
 against a foolish way of 
 reconciling faith and science, 
 109; As an advocate of Con- 
 cordism and Idealism, 118; 
 On the ante-solar days, 119; 
 On the Hexaémeron, 122; 
 On the unity of the human 
 race, 136; His dichotomic 
 standpoint, 142; Drastic dic- 
 tum against the Apollinarists, 
 145; On the Hypnopsychites, 
 151; On the immortality of 
 the soul, 160; Against the er- 
 rors of the Priscillianists, 
 164; Inclines to Generation- 
 ism, 169 sq.; Admits there is 
 no eccles. tradition in favor 
 of Generationism, 173 sq.; On 
 the supernatural state of our 
 first parents, 183; On the 
 spiraculum vitae, 198; On the 
 propagation of the human 
 race, 202; On freedom from 
 concupiscence, 202; On the 
 bodily immortality of our 
 first parents, 205; On the in- 
 fused knowledge of Adam, 
 207 sq.; On the origin of 
 speech, 213; On the life of 
 our first parents in Paradise, 
 
INDEX 
 
 215 sq.; On the gravity of 
 the first sin, 234 sq., 237; On 
 infant baptism, 253; Against 
 Pelagianism, 254; Defends 
 St. Chrysostom, 256; Against 
 Julian of Eclanum, 257 sq.; 
 His teaching on original sin 
 does not coincide exactly 
 with that of St, Chrysostom, 
 258; On original sin, 259; 
 Teaches that it is not a sub- 
 stance, 260 sq.; Jansenism 
 can be refuted from his 
 writings, 262 sqq.; All men 
 sinned in one man, 273; On 
 concupiscence as a secondary 
 element of original sin, 278; 
 On concupiscence as the in- 
 strumental cause of original 
 sin, 285. sq.; On “ free-will ” 
 gitenm theuohalle 2057 Fis 
 teaching misinterpreted by 
 Jansenius, 297 sq.; On the lot 
 of unbaptized children, 301; 
 On the Angels, 311 sq.; On 
 the sanctification of the An- 
 gels, 327. 
 
 Augustinians, The so-called, 
 230, 301. 
 
 Aureolus, 62, 
 
 Averroés, 138, 152. 
 
 Avitus of Vienne, 301. 
 
 Azazel, 342. 
 
 B 
 
 BAIUS}, 593,223," 224, 225, '290, 
 231, 243, 262, 265, 272, 320. 
 Baptism, 135, 243, 244, 245, 252, 
 253, 260, 264, 270, 335. 
 
 Basil St.,) 51, (108; 213, 255, 250, 
 258, 326, 333, 337. 
 
 Bayle, 63. 
 
 Beatitude merely a secondary 
 
 ‘end of Creation, 86. 
 
 Beatific Vision, The, a super- 
 natural prerogative, 190 sq. 
 
 Beelzebub, 342. 
 
 Being, Creation the production 
 of being as being, 7. 
 
 Belial, 342. 
 
 353 
 
 Bellarmine, Cardinal, 173, 265, 
 282 Sq., 305, 306, 307, 334. 
 
 Benedict XII, Pope, 168, 176, 
 
 Bereschith, 14. 
 
 Berlage, 63. 
 
 Bernard, )St,,))316,, 338. 
 
 Bible, Nature and the, both tell 
 the history of Creation, 103 
 sqq.; Not a text-book of sci- 
 ence, 105; Speaks the lan- 
 guage of the common people, 
 
 105. 
 
 Biel, Gabriel, 56, 205. 
 
 Body, The human, An essential 
 constituent of man, 137 sqq. 
 
 Boker, 120 sq. 
 
 Bonaventure, St., 53, 190, 205, 
 209, 316, 331. 
 
 “Book of Nature,” The, 104. 
 
 Bossuet, 301. 
 
 Bourdais, 114. 
 
 Braga,. Council of, 26, 92, 164. 
 
 Brahmans, 24. 
 
 Brucker, +J.; 114 
 
 Buckland, 112. 
 
 C 
 
 CABALISTS, 24. 
 
 Cajetan, Cardinal, 129, 204, 235. 
 
 Calvin, 262, 295. 
 
 Caput “ Firmiter,’ 27, 20, 50. 
 
 Carthage, Plenary Council of 
 (AL DoS'418), 210," 240. 
 
 Catechism, Roman, 64, 60, 71, 
 327. 
 
 Causae secundae, 67. 
 
 Causality, God’s absolute, 3. 
 
 Causa prima, 68. 
 
 Causa universalissima, 58. 
 
 Celestine I, Pope, 220. 
 
 Chartres, School of, 27. 
 
 Chemistry, 148. 
 
 Cherubim, 322, 323, 332. 
 
 Children, The lot -of unbap- 
 tized, 300 sqq. 
 
 Choirs of the Angels, 322 sqq. 
 
 Christ, The “Second Adam,” 
 130, 210, 247, 252; The Apol- 
 linarists deny Him a rational 
 soul, 145; Alone has a claim 
 
354 
 
 to Divine Sonship, 193; Re- 
 stored the lost state of jus- 
 tice, 196 sq.; Not tainted by 
 original sin, 281; The only 
 man conceived sine opere 
 virt, 286; Drove out demons, 
 
 347. 
 
 Chrysostom, St. John, 19, 65, 
 93, IOI, 130, 255, 256, 257, 258, 
 334- 
 
 Circumsession, Diabolical, 346. 
 
 Clement of Alexandria, 33 sq. 
 
 Clement of Rome, St., 85. 
 
 Clement XI, Pope, 224, 245. 
 
 Co-Adamites, 131 sq. 
 
 Coelestius, 239 sq., 255. 
 
 Coelum et terra, 14, 15. 
 
 Cohortatio ad Gentes, 18. 
 
 Collins, 93. 
 
 Cologne, Provincial Council of, 
 43. 
 
 Comparative Philology and the 
 origin of speech, 212 sq. 
 
 Concordance theories, 113. 
 
 Concordism, 114 sq., 117, 118. 
 
 Concupiscence, Freedom from, 
 @ .gtace,; 188) 194) squs Our 
 first parents: originally ex- 
 empt from, 200 sqq.; Not a 
 vigor naturae, 202; An in- 
 ordinate inclination towards 
 evil, 203; Became rebellious 
 after the Fall, 217; Is not sin 
 but of sin and inclines to sin, 
 245; Not the essence of orig- 
 inal sin, 261 sqq.; The part it 
 plays in the transmission of 
 original sin, 283 sqq.; Formal 
 concupiscence of the flesh 
 not the proper cause of the 
 transmission of original sin, 
 84 sq. 
 
 Concurrence, Divine, 67 sqq.; 
 Definition of, 67; Demon- 
 strated from Revelation, 609; 
 The controversy between 
 Molinism and Thomism, 72. 
 
 Concursus collatus, 74. 
 
 Concursus divinus generalis, 67. 
 
 Concursus oblatus, 73. 
 
 Concursus praevius, 74, 77. 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Constantinople, Council of, 138, 
 103 Sq., 344, 543. 
 
 “Continued creation,” 62, 
 
 Contract, The theory of, 276 
 sq. 
 
 Conversion of 
 something, 6. 
 
 Copernican world-view, The, 
 105, 106, 210. 
 
 Cornely, 150. 
 
 Cosmogonies, The Mosaic and 
 pagan, 13; The Mosaic and 
 science, 104. 
 
 Cosmology, Dogmatic, 98 sqq. 
 
 Cosmos, Pantheism deifies the, 
 23; The divine idea of the, 
 32 Sqq. 
 
 Creare, Meaning of the term in 
 Gens 4,78: 25%) G0: 
 
 Creation, The, God’s first work, 
 1; A true conception of, in- 
 dispensable, 1; Subjective 
 and objective, 2; Considered 
 as a divine act, 3 sqq.; The 
 concept of explained, 4; Def- 
 inition of, 4 sq.; Not a con- 
 version, 6; Periphrastic def- 
 inition of by St. Thomas, 7; 
 Invariably results in  sub- 
 stance, 7; Reason could have 
 arrived at the concept of 
 Creation without supernat- 
 ural aid, 8; But de facto is 
 indebted for it to Revelation, 
 8; Futile objections raised 
 against the dogma by infidel 
 philosophers, 8; Creation a 
 necessary conception, 9; 
 ‘Proof of the dogma, 9 sqq.; 
 From Scripture, 10; The 
 dogma enunciated in certain 
 divine names, 10; In Gen. 1, 
 1, 13; Proved from Tradi- 
 tion, 17; Anti-creationist 
 heresies, 220; Dualism, 21% 
 Pantheism, 23; The dogma 
 defined by the Vatican 
 Council, 30; Explanation of 
 the dogma, 32; The divine 
 idea of, 32; In relation to 
 the Trinity, 35 sqq.; Crea- 
 
 nothing into 
 
INDEX 
 
 tion properly appropriated 
 to the Father, 38; Creation 
 as a free divine act, 40 sqq.; 
 libertate contradictionis, 41 
 sqq.; libertate specifications, 
 43 saqq.; But not Ilbertate 
 contrarietatis, 46 sqq.; Crea- 
 tion in time, 49 sqq.; Cre- 
 ation from all eternity, 52 
 saq.; Can’ creatures) create? 
 54 sqq.; Final cause or end 
 of, 79 sqq.; Finis operantis, 
 SI sq.; Finis operis, 83 sqq.;3 
 Creation passively consid- 
 ered, 97 sqq. 
 
 Creationism, 169 sqq.; Not a 
 dogma in the strict sense, 173 
 sqq.; But a theologically | cer- 
 tain “truth, 177; And original 
 sin, 281 sq. 
 
 Creatio prima, 16, 98, 100 sq. 
 
 Creatio secunda, 6, 16, 98, 100 
 sq. 
 Creative power, The, incom- 
 
 municable, 54. 
 
 Creator, The, 8. 
 
 Creatura creatrix, 57. 
 
 Creatures, All bear vestiges 
 of the Trinity, 395. Spiritual 
 creatures are real images of 
 the Trinity, 40; Can they 
 create? 55; Can be employed 
 as instrumental causes in 
 creating, 58; The happiness 
 of, merely a secondary end 
 of Creation, 86. 
 
 Cross of Christ, The, 49. 
 
 Curse, The divine, 235. 
 
 Cyprian, St., 253 sq., 255, 258. 
 
 Cyril of: Alexandria, St., 53, 
 
 198. 
 Cyril’ of Jerusalem, St.,. 32T. 
 D 
 
 Aaiuoviov, The, of Socrates, 337. 
 
 Damascene, St, John, 56, 130, 
 152, 198, 202, 319, a 
 
 Daniel, 337. 
 
 Darwin, 214. 
 
 355 
 
 Darwinism, 34, 127. 
 
 David of Dinant, 27. 
 
 (i Days; Ol ane shexacmeron, 
 II3 sqq., 117 sqq. 
 
 Death, 195, 237, 240, 245, 247, 
 289 
 
 Debitum naturae, 185. 
 
 Decretum pro Iacobitis, 36. 
 
 Deification, entailed by the pos- 
 session of supernatural pre- 
 rogatives, 188, 198. 
 
 Deism, 92, 93. 
 
 Deluge, The, 105, 113. 
 
 Deluge theory, The, 112, 113. 
 
 De Lugo, 266, 267, 268, 269. 
 
 Demiurge, II, 17, 18, 127. 
 
 Anuovpyia, 21. 
 
 Demons, 340 sqq.; In their re- 
 lation to men, 344 sqq. 
 
 D’Envieu, Fabre, 135. 
 
 Descartes, 83, 86, 142. 
 
 Devil, The, Good by nature, 27; 
 Envy of, the cause of death, 
 206; Seduced our first par- 
 ents, 233 sqq.; Original sin 
 does not constitute man an 
 incarnate image of the, 260 
 sqq.; Humanity under the 
 dominion of the, 290 sq.; 
 There is but one, 341 sq.; 
 Human intercourse with the, 
 348. | 
 
 Diabolical possession, 346 sqq. 
 
 Dichotomy, 137, 138 sq. 
 
 Diognetus, Epistle to, 160. 
 
 Disposition, Divine, 91. 
 
 Dodwell, 94. 
 
 Dominations, 320, 322, 323, 332. 
 
 Dominicus Soto, 277. 
 
 Dominus coeli et terrae, It. 
 
 Donum integritatis, 200, 204, 
 
 215. 
 
 Draper’s History of the Con- 
 flict between Religion and 
 Science, I05. 
 
 Driedo, 301. 
 
 Dualism, 20 sqq., 26, 100. 
 
 Duns Scotus, 54, 204, 205. 
 
 Durandus, 56, 67, 69, 204. 
 
356 
 E 
 
 EccLes. ili, 19, Not incompati- 
 ble with the doctrine of im- 
 mortality, 158 sq. 
 
 Egyptians, 16. 
 
 Eiwapuéevn, 92. 
 
 Eleatians, The, 17, 23. 
 
 Elements, Essential, of human 
 nature, 137 sqq. 
 
 Emanation, Theory of, 20, 24. 
 
 Embryo, The human, 177 sq. 
 
 Encyclopedists, French, 94. 
 
 End, Definition of, 80; Final, 
 of creation, 80 sqq. 
 
 Endowment, Man’s_ supernat- 
 ural in Paradise, 196 sqq. 
 
 Energumenes, 346 sq. 
 
 "Ep kal wav, 23. 
 
 Ens ab alio, 3, 10, 62. 
 
 EUS: G\SE.' 3.00: 
 
 Ephesus, Council of, 242, 261. 
 
 Ephrem, St., 101. 
 
 "Eroupia, 138. 
 
 Erasmus, 249. 
 
 Esquimos, 135. 
 
 Estius, 16, 172. . 
 
 Eternity, Was the world cre- 
 ated from? 52 sqq. 
 
 Eucharist, The Blessed, 190. 
 
 Euchites, 261. 
 
 Eunomius, 213. 
 
 Eusebius, I5I. 
 
 Eve, Creation of, 129; Dignity 
 of, 131; The first woman, 
 133; Original sin not con- 
 tracted from, 279 sq. 
 
 Evil, 47, 181. 
 
 Evil Spirits, Existence of, 340 
 sqq.; Nature of their sin; 
 342; Their punishment, 343; 
 In their relation to the hu- 
 man race, 344 sqq. 
 
 Evolutionism, 24, 25. 
 
 Exegesis and the Hexaémeron, 
 117 sqq. 
 
 Ex nihilo, True sense of the 
 phrase, 6. 
 
 Ex nihilo nihil fit, 8. 
 
 Ex nthilo sui et subiecti, 5. 
 
 INDEX 
 
 "EE obK bpTwr, 6, 
 Ezechiel’s vision, 144 sq. 
 
 F 
 
 Fatt, The, Of our first parents, 
 233 sqq.; Of the Angels, 340 
 sqq. 
 
 Fate, 92. 
 
 Faure, 301. 
 
 Federalism, 276 sqq. 
 
 Fichte, 25. 
 
 Finis, 80. 
 
 Finis operantis of Creation, 81 
 sqq. 
 
 Fims operis of Creation, 83 
 
 Sqq. 
 First and Second Creation, 100 
 
 sq. 
 Flesh, “ Rationality ” of, 146. 
 Florence, Council of, 28, 36, 41, 
 473) 304 
 Fomes peccati, 244 sq. 
 Forma cadaverica, 148. 
 Forma corporeitatis, 147 sq. 
 Formation of the universe, 6, 
 98, 90. 
 Fossils, 100. 
 Francis of Assisi, St., 290. 
 Franzelin, Cardinal, 229. 
 Frassen, 267. 
 Fredegis of Tours, 6. 
 Freemasonry, Deism in, 94. 
 Freethinkers, 93. 
 Freewill, 137, 222, 242; 
 dogma of, 291 sqq. 
 Frohschammer, 171. 
 Fulgentius, 301. 
 
 G 
 
 GALILEI controversy, The, 104. 
 
 Gen, i, I, analysis of, 14 sq., 17, 
 50; Sense of, never defined 
 by the Church, 107. 
 
 Generation, Defined, 5; Sexual, 
 161 sqq.; Asexual, 202; Orig- 
 inal sin transmitted by nat- 
 ural, 280 sq.; Sexual, not the 
 proper cause of the trans- 
 mission of original sin, 284 
 
 sq. 
 
 The 
 
INDEX 
 
 Generationism, 166 
 sqq. 
 
 Genius albus, 335. 
 
 Genius niger, 335. 
 
 Gennadius, 328. 
 
 Geocentric world-view, 101. 
 
 Geology, 104, 105. 
 
 Geometry, 107. 
 
 Gerson, 332. 
 
 Gietmann, 158. 
 
 ae obiectiva and formalis, 
 
 = 
 
 Glorification of God, the ulti- 
 mate object of Creation, 85. 
 
 Glory, 192. 
 
 Glossner, 291. 
 
 Gnostics, The, 17, 18, 21, 24, 20, 
 48, 127, 138. 
 
 Gnosticus intuitus, 24. 
 
 God, Self-existing, 3; The 
 cause of the universe, 8; As 
 Yahweh, 10; As Dominus 
 coeli et terrae, 11; As De- 
 miurge, 11; The Creator of 
 the invisible world, 12; The 
 God of the Old Testament vs. 
 the God of the New, 21, 29; 
 His creative wisdom, 33; 
 Creation properly appropri- 
 ated to the Father, 38; His 
 freedom in creating the 
 world, 45; Incommunicabil- 
 ity of His creative power, 54; 
 Creation never attributed to 
 any one but God, 55; He will 
 never withdraw His preserv- 
 ing influence from the uni- 
 verse, 66; Alpha and Omega, 
 82; His object in creating the 
 universe, 81; His Providence, 
 gl; He is the “highest na- 
 ture,” 181. 
 
 ‘Goethe, 25. 
 
 Golden Age, The, 216. 
 
 Gonet, 75. 
 
 Grace, The state of, as distin- 
 guished from beatific vision, 
 191 sq.; Its concomitants in 
 Paradise, 216 sq.; Voluntary 
 
 sqqd., 173 
 
 357 
 
 privation of, the essence of 
 original sin, 269 sqq. 
 
 Grammar as a scientific aid in 
 exegesis, 108. 
 
 “Grand Architect of the Uni- 
 verse,” 94. 
 
 Gregory Nazianzen, 35, 255, 
 258. 
 
 Gregory of Nyssa, 130, 160, 108, 
 2025213, 
 
 Gregory of Rimini, 264, 301. 
 
 Gregory the Great, 65, 72, 301, 
 
 eu 
 Guardian Angels, 330 sqq. 
 Gubernatio mundi, 91. 
 Gunther, 86, 138, 144. 
 Gutberlet, 112. 
 
 H 
 
 HATRED, 134. 
 
 Hebrew language, 
 Adam receive it 
 from God? 212. 
 
 Hegel, 25, 214. 
 
 Hell, 80, 304 sq., 343. 
 
 Hengstenberg, 112. 
 
 Henno, 267. 
 
 Henry of Ghent, 62, 264. 
 
 Heraclitus of Ephesus, 25. 
 
 Heresies, Anticreationist, 20. 
 
 Hermas, Pastor of, 18, 335. 
 
 Hermes, 86, 171, 265. 
 
 Hermogenes, 18. 
 
 Hexaémeron, Distinctio and 
 ornatus, 99; In its relation to 
 science, 103 sqq.; Its purpose 
 strictly religious, not scien- 
 tific, 105 sqq.; Susceptible of 
 many different interpreta- 
 tions, 106; None adopted by 
 the Church,. 106; The Hex- 
 aémeron is a negative guid- 
 ing principle for scientists, 
 107; Scientists free to inter- 
 pret it in any reasonable and 
 moderate way, 111 sqq.; Dif- 
 ferent theories of, I12 sqq.; 
 And exegesis, 117 sqq.; Cre- 
 ation of man towards the end 
 of the, 128. 
 
 The, Did 
 directly 
 
358 
 
 Heyse, 214. 
 
 Hilary,.,St., 258. 
 
 Hippolytus, St., 42. 
 
 Hoberg, 115. 
 
 Holy Ghost, 346. 
 
 Hugh of St. Victor, 190. 
 
 Hume, David, 94. 
 
 Hummelauer, J. 7:(S) (J... 114, 
 TIS, 116: 
 
 Hyle, An eternal, uncreated, 6, 
 10, 18, 20, 21, 53; An abso- 
 lutely evil principle, 239. 
 
 Hylomorphism, 147, 148. 
 
 Hylozoism, 20, 24, 25. 
 
 Hypnopsychites, 151 sq. 
 
 Hypostatic Union, The, 
 190, 342, 340. 
 
 I 
 
 146, 
 
 IpEA of the Cosmos, The di- 
 vine, 32 sqq. 
 
 Idealism, 114 sq., 118. 
 
 Idealist theories, 114 sq. 
 
 Illyricus, M. Flacius, 260. 
 
 Immaculate Conception, 177. 
 
 Immortality, Of spiritual sub- 
 stances, 66; Of the human 
 soul, 151 sqq.; Proved from 
 Revelation, 155 sqq.; From 
 Tradition, 160 sqq.; Bodily, 
 a supernatural prerogative, 
 194 sq.; Our first parents be- 
 fore the Fall were endowed 
 with bodily, 205 sqq.; The 
 Church’s teaching on the 
 bodily immortality of our 
 first parents, 225; Of the An- 
 gels, 316, 
 
 Impassibility, a supernatural 
 prerogative, 194 sq.; Enjoyed 
 by our first parents in Para- 
 dise, 214 sqq. 
 
 Incarnation, Probable belief of 
 our first parents in the, 200. 
 
 Incommunicability of the cre- 
 ative power, 54. 
 
 Indebitum naturae, 186, 194. 
 
 Indestructibility of the human 
 soul, 154; Of the Angels, 316 
 sq. 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Indians, North American, 135. 
 
 Infallibility, Was Adam gifted 
 with? 210 sq. 
 
 Infant Baptism, 243 sq., 253; 
 270. 
 
 Infusion of the soul into the 
 body, 176 sq. 
 
 Innocent III, Pope, 303. 
 
 Innocent X, Pope, 224. 
 
 Integrity, The gift of, 200; 
 Possessed by our first par- 
 ents, 202, 215; The loss of, 
 a penalty of original sin, 284. 
 
 Intelligentiae, 317. 
 
 Ionian philosophers, 25. 
 
 Interperiodism, 113. 
 
 Ireneus, St, 18, 42, 88, 160, 
 108)/, 201, 1255: 
 
 Isaias, 322. 
 
 Isidore of Sevilla, 336. 
 
 Af 
 JANSENISM, 223 sq., 242 sqq., 
 262, 278, 205. 
 Jansenius, 183, 223, 224, 243, 
 262, 206, 297. 
 Jerome, Sti 71) O8n g0s kya 
 
 339. 
 Jews, The, Their belief in 
 Creation, 13; In immortality, 
 
 155 sqq. : 
 
 Job, His belief in personal im- 
 mortality, 156 sq. 
 
 Jona Tt, kage: 
 
 John, St., Logos-doctrine of, 34. 
 
 John, St., of Damascus. (See 
 Damascene. ) 
 
 John the Baptist, St., 281. 
 
 John Scotus Eriugena, 24. 
 
 Julian of Eclanum, 253, 256, 
 257, 258. 
 
 Justification, 252, 268, 271, 335. 
 
 Justin Martyr, St., 11, 17, 35, 
 142, 160 
 
 K 
 
 KAnrT, 86, 94, 165. 
 Kaulen, Fr., 212. 
 Kilber, 267. 
 
 King, 86. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Klaatsch, 132. 
 
 Klee, 63, 171. 
 
 Kleutgen, Jos. (S.J.), 173, 176. 
 
 Knowledge, Infused, of our 
 first parents, 207 sqq. 
 
 Knoodt, 182. 
 
 Kéoyos, 97. 
 
 Kécopos vontés — kécpos acOnrés, 
 
 34 
 Kunstle, K., 26. 
 Kupwos, 6, 11. 
 Koartz,; (115: 
 
 L 
 
 LACTANTIUS, 134, 136, 167. 
 
 Languages, 212. 
 
 Lateran, Fourth Council of the, 
 27, 47, 50, 55, 312, 313, 3403 
 Fifth Council of the, 143, 153, 
 176. 
 
 Leibniz, 45, 142. 
 
 Leo the Great, 26, 165, 174, 184. 
 
 Leo X, Pope, 143, 153, 176 sq. 
 
 Lessing, 94. 
 
 Lessius, 89. 
 
 Liberatore, 77. 
 
 Liberty, 2091. 
 will.) 
 
 Liturgism, I15. 
 
 Adyot ovovdrrool, 34, 
 
 Logos, The Divine, 5, 26, 35, 37, 
 40, 51, 138, 193, 200. 
 
 Lucifer, 342. 
 
 Lumen gloriae, 192. 
 
 Lusus naturae, 109. 
 
 Luther, 262, 265, 293. 
 
 (See also Free- 
 
 M 
 
 MAASSEN, Fr., 175. 
 
 Macedonia, 338. 
 
 Machabees, The Mother of the, 
 12 sq. 
 
 Magic, 348 sq. 
 
 Maher, M. (S.J.), 214. 
 
 Man, The nature of, 126 sqq.; 
 The origin of, 126 sqq.; The 
 first man immediately created 
 
 359 
 
 by God, 127 sqq.; The Crea- 
 tion: of, 1277) 'saq:;, Called 
 pukpdeos, 130; All men de- 
 scended from Adam and 
 Eve, 131 sqq.; Essential con- 
 stituents of, 136 sqq.; Dichot- 
 omy proved from Scripture, 
 139 sqq.; Has an immortal 
 soul, 151 sqq.; Things due to 
 him as man, 228 sq.; His de- 
 fection from the supernatural 
 order, 232 saqq. 
 
 Mani, 21. 
 
 Manichaeism, 109, 21, 22, 26, 28, 
 20,48, 127, 138,238 Sau, 200, 
 
 313: 
 Mankind, Descended from 
 Adam and Eve, 131. 
 “Man of Sorrows,’ The, 49. 
 Marcion, 19, 21. 
 Marriage not derived from 
 original sin, 202. 
 Mary, Blessed Virgin, 281, 342. 
 Mass, The, 59. 
 Materia informis, tot. 
 Materialism, 20, 29, 93, 154. 
 Materia praeiacens, 5, 6 
 Materiarii, The, Io. 
 Melanchthon, 262. 
 My dy, 6 
 Messalians, 261. - 
 Metamorphoses, Ovid’s, 13. 
 Metempsychosis, 165 sq. 
 Michael, Archangel, 337, 338, 
 
 342. 
 Mileve, Council of, 219, 240, 
 
 243. 
 
 Mill, John Stuart, 22. 
 
 Miracles, 59, I11, 182, 190, 320. 
 
 Mivart,St..G,, 127;)130,\131. 
 
 Molecules, 101. 
 
 Molinism, On the divine Con- 
 cursus, 72 sqq. 
 
 Moneta, Ven., 170. 
 
 Monism,*20;':22.)1 5). 
 
 Monogenism, Christian, 132. 
 
 Morgan, Thomas, 93. 
 
 Mosaic account of the Creation, 
 The, 13; Historic character 
 of, 116 sq. (See also Hex- 
 aémeron. ) 
 
360 
 
 Moses, 10, 52, 116, 130, 250, 251, 
 Rao 
 Muller, Max, 214. 
 N 
 
 NAMES, Deeper meanings of 
 God’s, 10 sqq. 
 
 Naturalism, 94. 
 
 Nature, and the Supernatural, 
 180 sqq.; Explanation of the 
 term: Natures t8rusqa,- 
 Definition of, 185; The state 
 of pure, 228 sqq.; The state 
 of fallen, 227; The state of 
 repaired, 227; How “wound- 
 ed” by original sin, 298 sqq. 
 
 Neanderthal race, 132. 
 
 Necessity, Historical, 292. 
 
 Negroes, 132. 
 
 Nemesius, 164. 
 
 Neo-Platonists, 24, 26. 
 
 Neptunists, 105. 
 
 Nicephorus Callistus, 152. 
 
 Norisius, Cardinal, 173. 
 
 Noes, 317, 
 
 Novs, 138, 317. 
 
 O 
 
 OBSESSION, 346. 
 
 Occasionalism, 67. 
 
 Ockam, 138. 
 
 Odo of Cambrai, 275. 
 
 Oischinger, 171. 
 
 Olivi, Petrus Ioannis, 142, 
 
 Olympius, 255. 
 
 Omnipotence, God’s, 57. 
 
 Onomatopoeia, 212. 
 
 Optimism, Absolute, 45; Rela- 
 tive, 46. 
 
 Orange, Second Council of, 220, 
 242. 
 
 Ordines angelorum, 323. 
 
 Ordo naturalis, 185. 
 
 Original justice, State of, 216 
 80d), 227, 
 
 Origen, 51, 65, 82, 152, 164, 215, 
 230,'253,'331, 334.’ 
 
 Original Sin, Marriage not a 
 result of, 202; Heresy of the 
 
 INDEX | 
 
 Pelagians concerning, 218 
 sqq.; State of, not identical 
 with the state of pure nature, 
 229 sq.; The doctrine of, ex- 
 pounded, 232 sqq.; The sin 
 of Adam as the first sin, 233 
 sqq.; Heretical Theories con- 
 cerning, 238 sqq.; Tridentine 
 decree on, 243 sqq.; Scrip- 
 tural proof for, 245 sqq.; 
 Traditional proof for, 253 
 sqq.; The nature of, 259 sqq.; 
 Does not descend as a sub- 
 stantial form from Adam to 
 his progeny, 260 sqq.; Is not 
 a substance, 260 sq.; Con- 
 cupiscence not the essence of, 
 261 sqq.; Not identical with 
 concupiscence, 264 sq.; No 
 morbida qualitas, 264; Does 
 not consist exclusively in the 
 extrinsic imputability of the 
 actual sin of Adam, 265 sqq.; 
 Consists essentially in priva- 
 tion of grace, 269 sqq.; Why 
 does the sin of Adam in- 
 here as a true sin in all his 
 descendants? 273 sqq.; The 
 contractual and _ alligation 
 theories, 276 sqq.; How it is 
 transmitted, 279 sqq.; Its 
 specific unity, 279; Derives 
 from Adam, 279 sq.; Trans- 
 mitted by natural generation, 
 280 sq.; And Creationism, 
 281 sq.; The part played by 
 concupiscence in the trans- 
 mission of, 283 sqq.; The 
 penalties of, 286 sqq.; Ef- 
 fects of, in the status termimi, 
 300 sqq. 
 
 Oswald, so. 
 
 Ovcia mpwrn, 181. 
 
 Over-soul, The universal, 152. 
 
 Ovid, 13. 
 
 P. 
 
 PAEDO-BAPTISMUS. 
 Baptism. ) 
 Paleontology, 104. 
 
 (See Infant 
 
INDEX 
 
 Palmieri, 46, 267. 
 
 Pancosmism, 23. 
 
 Panlogism, 26. 
 
 Panpsychism, 146. 
 
 Pantheism, Its teaching, 8, 20, 
 23; Cosmological and_onto- 
 logical, 23 sqq.; Its influence 
 on modern thought, 25; Sup- 
 plants Manichaeism, 29; Con- 
 demned by the Vatican Coun- 
 cil, 30; Differs from Deism, 
 93, 94; Incompatible with 
 the dogma of Creation, 106; 
 Denies the immortality of 
 the soul, 154 sq.; The, of 
 later Protestant divines, 222. 
 
 Tlav Oeds, 23. 
 
 Paradise a garden of pleasure, 
 
 216; 
 
 Parents, Our first, Exempt by 
 a special grace from_con- 
 cupiscence, 200 sqq.; Were 
 they blind? 201; Were they 
 infants? 201; Their natural 
 integrity, 202; Were they 
 able (in Paradise) to com- 
 mit venial sin? 204; Fall of, 
 233 sqq.; Were they ulti- 
 mately saved? 238. (See 
 also Adam and Eve.) 
 
 Passibility, A penalty of orig- 
 inal sin, 289. 
 
 Pastor of Hermas, The, 18. 
 
 Pattern, 33. 
 
 Paul, St., 16, 42, 70, 88, 163, 172, 
 192, 197, 201, 206, 209, 247, 
 249, 252, 257, 262, 263, 271, 
 289, 290, 204, 206, 312, 314, 
 322, 330, 332, 338. 
 
 Pelagianism, 218 sqq., 239 Sdq., 
 254, 281, 326. 
 
 Pelagians, 71, 169, 202, 218 sqqd., 
 239, 246, 253, 256, 302. 
 
 Periodism, 113 sq. 
 
 Peripatetic theory of the ele- 
 ments, I0f. 
 
 Pessimism, 48. 
 
 Petavius, 301. 
 
 Peter Lombard, 58, 170, 199, 
 285. 
 
 Peter, St..)'333, 345." 
 
 24 
 
 361 
 
 Petrifactions, 100. 
 
 Peyrére, Isaac, 132, 134. 
 
 Pdpuakov THs dPavacias, 207. 
 
 Philo, 6, 215. 
 
 Physical premotion. (See prae- 
 motio physica.) 
 
 Physics, 105, 148. 
 
 Pistoia, Pseudo-council of, 224, 
 303. 
 
 Pius V, Pope, 224, 245. 
 
 Pius. ‘Vi, (Pope, 245,' 303: 
 
 Pitts LX Pope; 440) 177: 
 
 Platel, 267. 
 
 PISO Geni Nyd Sad 73 2Eu SaaS, 
 137,202. 
 
 Plutonists, 105. 
 
 Poetism, I15. 
 
 Pomponazzi, 152. 
 
 Positivism, 20. 
 
 Possession, Demoniacal, 
 sqq. 
 
 Postperiodism, I13. 
 
 Potentia obedientialis, 188 sqq. 
 
 Powers, 320, 322, 323. 
 
 Praemotio physica, 75. 
 
 Pre-Adamites, 131 sq., 134, 135 
 sq. 
 
 Pre-existence, Theory of, 162 
 sqq., 238. 
 
 Preservation, Divine, 61 sqq.; 
 ‘The nature of, 62; Not mere- 
 ly negative, 63; Proved from 
 
 346 
 
 Scripture, 64; Active and 
 passive, 64. 
 Preternatural, The, 187 sq.; 
 
 Prerogatives, 194. 
 Principalities, 322, 323. 
 Principium sine principio, 38, 
 
 51. 
 Priscillian and Priscillianism, 
 22, 26, 164, 238. 
 Privatio gratiae, 269 sqq., 288. 
 Probation, Precept of, 233 sqq: 
 Processes, Formative, 5, 7. 
 Production, Modes of, 5. 
 
 -Prophecies, 190. 
 
 Protestantism, Heretical teach- 
 ing of, on original sin, 221 
 sqq., 242 sqq. 
 
 Protoevangelium, The, 155. 
 
 Protyle, 6. 
 
362 
 
 Providence, Divine, 91 sqq.; 
 Definition of, 91; How re- 
 lated to the divine govern- 
 ment of the world, 91; The 
 dogma, 92. 
 
 “Providentissimus Deus,” En- 
 cyclical,: 111, 
 
 Pseudo-Clement, 160. 
 
 Pseudo-Dionysius, 323, 324, 331, 
 332. 
 
 Ptolemy, 106, 
 
 Pure Nature, The state of, 
 (See Nature.) 
 Q 
 
 QUESNEL, 223, 224, 225, 243, 262. 
 R 
 
 RAPHAEL, Archangel, 337, 338. 
 
 Rationalism, 94. 
 
 Rationes rerum, 34. 
 
 Reason might have arrived at 
 the concept of Creation, but 
 in matter of fact did not, 8. 
 
 Redeemer, The, 4o. 
 
 Redemption, The, 135, 217, 
 
 227. 
 Reign of death, The, 291, 344. 
 Restitution theory, 112. 
 Reticius, 255. 
 
 Revelation, Reason indebted to, 
 for the true concept of Cre- 
 ation, 8, 
 
 Richard of St. Victor, 53. 
 
 Rickaby, Jos. (S.J.), 308. 
 
 “Riddle of the painful earth,” 
 The, 48. 
 
 Ripalda, 193. 
 
 Rosmini, 171, 
 
 Rufinus, 173. 
 
 Ruiz, 46, 93. 
 
 Rupert of Deutz, 316. 
 
 S 
 
 SABBATH, The, 106, 116, 121. 
 Sacraments, The, 190. 
 ‘Salmeron, 267, 344. 
 Samuel, 157. 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Satan, also 
 
 Wevsdoui sq: 
 Devil.) 
 
 Saul, 157. 
 
 Sayce, 214. 
 
 Schell, 148, 205. 
 
 Schelling, 25, 165. 
 
 Schepss, G., 22. 
 
 Schiffini, 148. 
 
 Schleicher, 214. 
 
 Schleiermacher, 222, 
 
 Schmid, Fr., 307. 
 
 Schopenhauer, 48. 
 
 Schwalbe, 132. 
 
 Science, Habitual infused, A 
 supernatural prerogative, 194 
 sq.; Possessed by our first 
 parents, 207 sqq. 
 
 Scientia media, 74. 
 
 Scientists as exegetes, 104. 
 
 Scotists, The, Their doctrine of 
 the forma corporeitatis, 147 
 sq.; On the immortality of 
 the soul, 151; On the eleva- 
 tion of Adam to the state of 
 
 grace, 199 sq. 
 Scotus, Duns. (See Duns Sco- 
 (See John 
 
 tus.) 
 
 Scotus Eriugena. 
 
 Scotus Eriugena.) 
 Seisenberger, M., 114. 
 Self-existence, God’s, 10, ine 
 Semen spirituale, 168. 
 Semi-Pelagians, 220. 
 Seraphim, 322, 323, 326, 332. 
 Serpent, The, in Paradise, 234. 
 Severian of Gabala, 100. 
 Shame, 200. 
 
 Sheol, 156. 
 
 Sin, 28, 45, 47, 68, 181, 200, 236, 
 245, 344. (See also Original 
 Sin.) 
 
 Socrates, 337. 
 
 Sola fide, Protestant theory of 
 justification, 222, 
 
 Solomon, 210. 
 
 Sonship, Divine, 192, 193. 
 
 Sorcery, 348. 
 
 Soul, The human, Is not merely 
 a more highly developed 
 form of the brute soul, 127; 
 The spiritual soul an essen- 
 
 (See 
 
INDEX 
 
 tial constituent of man, 137 
 sqq.; Man has but one, 140 
 sq.; The principle of thought, 
 141 sq.; The spiritual soul 
 the immediate substantial 
 form of the body, 142 sqq.; 
 Immortality of the, 151 sqq.; 
 Does it sleep after death till 
 the Resurrection? 151 sq.; 
 The soul an image of God, 
 157; Origin of the, 161 sqq.; 
 Generationism unacceptable, 
 166 sqq.; Creationism the 
 only true theory, 169 sqq.; 
 Infused into the body, 176 
 sq.; When infused, 177 sq. 
 
 Soul-sleep, Theory of, 152. 
 
 South Sea Islands, Aborigines 
 OF, (132: 
 
 Space in its relation to Crea- 
 tion, 9. 
 
 Speech, Origin of, 211 sqq. 
 
 Spencer, Herbert, 9, 25. 
 
 Spinoza, Baruch, 24, 146. 
 
 Spiraculum vitae, 140, 198. 
 
 Spiration, 5. 
 
 Stagirius, 93. 
 
 Star worship, 106. 
 
 States of man, The different, 
 226 sqq.; Historic, 226 sq.; 
 Possible, 227 sq. 
 
 Stattler, 86. 
 
 Status termini, IQI. 
 
 Status viae, 191. 
 
 Steinthal, 214. 
 
 Stenzel, A., 112. 
 
 Stoa, The, 17. 
 
 Suarez, 58, 76, 112, 307, 332, 335, 
 
 345. 
 
 Substance, Creation results in 
 7; Creatures are not emana- 
 tions of the divine, 24; When 
 A ahh with Nature, 
 181. 
 
 Substantia intrinsece superna- 
 turalis, Possibility of a, 193. 
 
 Substantiarians, The Lutheran, 
 260, 261. 
 
 Succession, 6 sq. ‘ 
 
 Suffering, A penalty of original 
 sin, 289. 
 
 363 
 
 Supernatural Order, Preroga- 
 tives of the, 190 sqq. 
 
 Supernatural, The, in man, 179 
 sqq.; Definition of, 180 sqq.; 
 Not synonymous with spirit- 
 ual, 182; Definition of the 
 term, 186 sqq.; Two species 
 of, 187 sq.; The Preternat- 
 ural, 187; The strictly super- 
 natural, 188; Prerogatives, 
 190 sqq. 
 
 Sylvius, Francis, 287, 301. 
 
 i 
 
 TATIAN, 51. 
 
 Taxil, Leo) 340. 
 
 Temptation to sin, 344 sqq. 
 
 Tertullian, 10 sq., 12, 18, 19, 35, 
 85, 130, 152, 160, 166 sq., 173, 
 175, 255- 
 
 Gelwots, 188, 108. 
 
 Theodore Abucara, 168. 
 
 Theodoret, 93, 336. 
 
 Theophilus of Antioch, 18. 
 
 Theosophy, 20. 
 
 Thomas, St., Definition of Cre- 
 ation; 73 On Elebs! 11134 17: 
 On the divine idea of the 
 cosmos, 33; On the divine 
 Processions, 37; On the eter- 
 nity of the world, 54; Teach- 
 es that pure being can be 
 created only by the causa 
 universalissima, 58; And that 
 a creature cannot even be an 
 instrumental cause in creat- 
 ing, 59; And that being is the 
 essence of God alone, 65; On 
 co-operation between God 
 and the creature, 68, 73; St. 
 Thomas and Thomism, 74; 
 On the formation of the uni- 
 verse, 99; On St. Augustine’s 
 interpretation of the Hexae- 
 meron, 102; Explains why 
 the Bible is written in un- 
 scientific language, 106; Pro- 
 tests against a foolish way of 
 reconciling faith and science, 
 
304 
 
 IIO sq.; On the Hexaémeron, 
 118 sq.; On the creation of 
 man, 129; On the forma cor- 
 boris, 147; Paves the way for 
 Creationism, 169 squei On 
 the potentia obedientialis, 
 189; On concupiscence, 194 
 sq-; On impassibility, 195; 
 On Adam’s -elevation to the 
 State of grace, 199; Holds 
 that our first parents (in 
 Paradise) could not commit 
 venial sin, 205; On _ the 
 knowledge of our first par- 
 ents before the Fall, 200 
 sq.; On the infallibility of 
 Adam, 211; On the mys- 
 tery of original sin, 274 
 sq.; On concupiscence as 
 a secondary constituent of 
 original sin, 277; On the 
 transmission of original sin, 
 280, 282; On Christ’s im- 
 munity from original sin, 
 281 ; On the penalties of orig- 
 inal sin, 286; On concupis- 
 cence as the material com- 
 ponent of original sin, 289; 
 On the influence of original 
 sin on human nature, 209; 
 On the punishment due to 
 original sin, 305; On the lot 
 of unbaptized children, 306 
 sq.; On the Angels, 308; 
 Holds that they converse by 
 a_mere act of the will, 318; 
 Holds that each Angel con- 
 stitutes a distinct species, 
 321 sq.; On the sanctification 
 of the Angels, 327; On the 
 orders of the Angels, 331 sq.; 
 On the Guardian Angels, 336 
 sq.; On temptation, 345 sq. 
 Thomism, On the divine Con- 
 cursus, 74 sqq.; On the ques- 
 tion: When was Adam 
 raised to the state of super- 
 natural grace? 199 sq.; On 
 the state of pure nature, 230 
 
 sq. 
 Ovpos, 138, 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Thrones, 322, 822; 332. 
 
 Timeus, Plies is 
 
 Time in its relation to Crea- 
 tion, 49 sqq. 
 
 Tindal, 93. sip 
 
 Tobias, 331. 
 
 Tohu-vabohu, ris, 
 
 Toland, 93. 
 
 Toletus, Cardinal, 267, 22) 
 
 Traducianism, 166 sqq. 
 
 Poner tipi. 301, 302, 
 
 Transmigration of souls, 165 
 sq. 
 
 Transmission of original sin, 
 Mode of, 279 sqq. 
 
 Transubstantiation, 66. 
 
 Tree of knowledge, 206 Sq., 
 234, 235. 
 
 Tree of life, 235. 
 
 Trent, Council of, 47, 109, 222 
 Sq., 243 Sqq., 262, 263, 268 sq., 
 270, 278, 279, 290, 201, 293, 
 302. 
 
 Trichotomy, 138, 139, 142. 
 
 Trinity, The dogma of Crea- 
 tion in its relation to the, 35 
 sqq.; The Trinity as Creator, 
 38; Vestiges of the, in all 
 creatures, 38 sqq.; Rational 
 creatures bear the image of 
 the, 40; Nature vs. hyposta- 
 sis in the, 182; Our first 
 parents probably had a be- 
 lief in the, 200. 
 
 Turribius, 165. 
 
 U 
 
 “ UNIGENITUS,” Bull, 224. 
 
 Unity of the human race, 126 
 sqq.; Is a Catholic doctrine, 
 131 sq.; How safeguarded, 
 130. 
 
 Universe, The, Essentially an 
 ens ab alio, 3; Beginning of 
 the, 4; Formation, 6: God 
 the cause of the, 8; The di- 
 vine idea of the, 32: The 
 best in a relative sense, 46; 
 Was it created from all eter- 
 nity? 52, 
 
INDEX 
 
 V 
 
 VALENTIUS, 19. 
 
 Vatican, Council of the, 29, 50, 
 82,/93,792,- 131,155, 313. 
 
 Vaughan, Diana, 340. 
 
 Verbal theory, 112. 
 
 Vestiges of the Trinity in all 
 creatures, 38. 
 
 Vienne, Council of (A.D. 
 7211), 142. 140. Ssqa. 
 
 Vigilius of Salzburg, 136. 
 
 Vigouroux, F., 114. 
 
 Vincent of Lerins, 255. 
 
 Virtues, 320, 322, 323. 
 
 Vision theory, I15 sqq. 
 
 Vock, 183. 
 
 Vosen, I12, 
 
 Vulneratio naturae, 208 saq. 
 
 W 
 
 Wacner, A., I12\ 
 Westermayer, A., 113. 
 Whitney, Prof., 214. 
 
 Will, The human, 203, 204. 
 
 365 
 Winchell, 132. 
 Wiseman, Cardinal, 112. 
 Witchcraft, 348. 
 Woman, Creation of, 129; 
 Promise of redemption 
 
 through the seed of the, 156. 
 
 World, The beginning of the, 
 4; Not “metamorphosed 
 nothingness,” 9; God _ the 
 Creator of the visible as well 
 as the invisible, 12; The 
 theory of an absolutely per- 
 fect, 45; Was it created from 
 all eternity? 52. 
 
 iy 
 YAHWEH, I0. 
 Z 
 
 ZACHARIAS, Pope, 136. 
 ZigiiaraiGard.i77: 
 Zosimus,- Pope, 219, 241. 
 Zwingli, 243, 264, 265. 
 
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