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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 In 2022 with funding from 
 Princeton Theological Seminary Library 
 
 https://archive.org/details/yogaasphilosophyO0dasg 
 
YOGA AS PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 
 

 
 
 
 
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 4 a, pA Ay 
 Tg Ae oth 
 
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 Sane 
 
YOGA 
 
 AS PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 
 
 BY 
 
 i 
 SURENDRANATH ‘DASGUPTA 
 M.A., Pu.D.(CAt.), Pa.D.(CAnTAB.) 
 AUTHOR OF ‘‘A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY’’, ETO. 
 Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, Calcutta 
 Late Professor of Sanskrit, Chittagong College 
 Late Lecturer in the University of Cambridge 
 
 LONDON: 
 KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD 
 NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO. 
 1924 
 
 Printed in Great Britain) 
 
Printed in Great Britain at 
 The Mayflower Press, Piymouth, William Brendon & Son, Ltd 
 
AS A HUMBLE TOKEN 
 OF DEEPEST REGARD AND GRATEFULNESS 
 TO THE 
 MAHARAJA SIR MANINDRACHANDRA NUNDY 
 kK; C1. 8: 
 
 WHOSE NOBLE CHARACTER AND SELF-DENYING CHARITIES 
 BAVE ENDEARED HIM TO THE PEOPLE OF BENGAL 
 AND 
 WHO SO KINDLY OFFERED ME HIS WHOLE-HEARTED 
 PATRONAGE IN 
 ENCOURAGING MY ZEAL FOR LEARNING AT A TIME 
 WHEN I WAS IN SO GREAT A NEED OF IT 
 
PREFACE 
 
 Tuts litle volume is an attempt at a brief exposition of the 
 philosophical and religious doctrines found in Patafijali’s 
 Yoga-stitra as explained by its successive commentaries of 
 Vyasa, Vacaspati, Vijiana Bhikshu, and others. The exact 
 date of Patafijali cannot be definitely ascertained, but if his 
 identity with the other Patafijali, the author of the Great 
 Commentary (Mahabhashya) on Panini’s grammar, could be 
 conclusively established, there would be some evidence in 
 our hands that he lived in 150 B.c. I have already discussed 
 this subject in the first volume of my A History of Indian 
 Philosophy, where the conclusion to which I arrived was that, 
 while there was some evidence in favour of their identity, 
 there was nothing which could be considered as being conclu- 
 sively against it. The term Yoga, according to Patafijali’s 
 definition, means the final annihilation (nirodha) of all the 
 mental states (cittavritc) involving the preparatory stages in 
 which the mind has to be habituated to being steadied into 
 particular types of graduated mental states. This was actually 
 practised in India for a long time before Patafijali lived ; and 
 it is very probable that certain philosophical, psychological, 
 and practical doctrines associated with it were also current 
 long before Patafijali. Patafijali’s work is, however, the 
 earliest systematic compilation on the subject that is known 
 tous. It is impossible, at this distance of time, to determine 
 
 vii 
 
vill PREFACE 
 
 the extent to which Patafijali may claim originality. Had it 
 not been for the labours of the later commentators, much of 
 what is found in Patafijali’s aphorisms would have remained 
 extremely obscure and doubtful, at least to all those who were 
 not associated with such ascetics as practised them, and who 
 derived the theoretical and practical knowledge of the subject 
 from their preceptors in an upward succession of generations 
 leading up to the age of Patafijali, or even before him. It is 
 well to bear in mind that Yoga is even now practised in India, 
 and the continuity of traditional instruction handed down 
 from teacher to pupil is not yet completely broken. 
 
 If anyone wishes methodically to pursue a course which 
 may lead him ultimately to the goal aimed at by Yoga, he 
 must devote his entire life to it under the strict practical 
 guidance of an advanced teacher. The present work can m 
 no sense be considered as a practical guide for such purposes. 
 But it is also erroneous to think—as many uninformed people 
 do—that the only interest of Yoga lies in its practical side, 
 The philosophical, psychological, cosmological, ethical, and 
 religious doctrines, as well as its doctrines regarding matter 
 and change, are extremely interesting in themselves, and have 
 a definitely assured place in the history of the progress of 
 human thought; and, for a right understanding of the 
 essential features of the higher thoughts of India, as well 
 as of the practical side of Yoga, their knowledge is indispens- 
 able. 
 
 The Yoga doctrines taught by Patafijali are regarded as 
 the highest of all Yogas (Rdjayoga), as distinguished from 
 other types of Yoga practices, such as Hathayoga or Man- 
 
PREFACE 1X 
 
 trayoga. Of these Hathayoga consists largely of a system of 
 bodily exercises for warding off diseases, and making the body 
 fit for calmly bearing all sorts of physical privations and phy- 
 sical strains. Mantrayoga is a course of meditation on certain 
 mystical syllables which leads to the audition of certain 
 mystical sounds. This book does not deal with any of these 
 mystical practices nor does it lay any stress on the performance 
 of any of those miracles described by Patafijali. The scope of 
 this work is limited to a brief exposition of the intellectual 
 foundation—or the theoretical side—of the Yoga practices, 
 consisting of the philosophical, psychological, cosmological, 
 ethical, religious, and other doctrines which underlie these 
 practices. The affinity of the system of Samkhya thought, 
 generally ascribed to a mythical sage, Kapila, to that of 
 Yoga of Patafijali is so great on most important points of 
 theoretical interest that they may both be regarded as two 
 different modifications of one common system of ideas. I 
 have, therefore, often taken the liberty of explaining Yoga 
 ideas by a reference to kindred ideas in Samkhya. But the 
 doctrines of Yoga could very well have been compared or 
 contrasted with great profit with the doctrines of other 
 systems of Indian thought. This has purposely been omitted 
 here as it has already been done by me in my Yoga Philosophy 
 on relation to other Systems of Indian Thought, the publication 
 of which has for long been unavoidably delayed. All that may 
 be expected from the present volume is that it will convey to 
 the reader the essential features of the Yoga system of 
 thought. How far this expectation will be realized from this 
 book it will be for my readers to judge. It is hoped that the 
 
x PREFACE 
 
 chapter on “‘ Kapila and Patafijala School of Samkhya ” in my 
 A History of Indian Philosophy (Vol. I. Cambridge University 
 Press, 1922) will also prove helpful for the purpose. 
 
 I am deeply indebted to my friend Mr. Douglas Ainslie 
 for the numerous corrections and suggestions regarding the 
 English style that he was pleased to make throughout the 
 body of the manuscript and the very warm encouragement 
 that he gave me for the publication of this work. In this 
 connection I also beg to offer my best thanks for the valuable 
 suggestions which I received from the reviser of the press. 
 Had it not been for these, the imperfections of the book would 
 have been still greater. The quaintness and inelegance of 
 some of my expressions would, however, be explained if it 
 were borne in mind that here, as well as in my A History of 
 Indian Philosophy, I have tried to resist the temptation of 
 making the English happy at the risk of sacrificing the 
 approach to exactness of the philosophical sense ; and many 
 ideas of Indian philosophy are such that an exact English 
 rendering of them often becomes hopelessly difficult. 
 
 Iam grateful to my friend and colleague, Mr. D. K. Sen, m.a., 
 for the kind assistance that he rendered in helping me to 
 prepare the index. 
 
 Last of all, I must express my deep sense of gratefulness 
 to Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., etc. etc., and the 
 University of Calcutta, for kindly permitting me to utilize 
 my A Study of Patafijalt, which is a Calcutta University 
 publication, for the present work. 
 
 S. N. DASGUPTA. 
 
 PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA, 
 April, 1924. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 BOOK I. YOGA METAPHYSICS: 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 IJ. PRAkRTI ; : ; 1 
 II. PurusHa $ ; ; : Sn Fs: 
 
 Ill. Tae Reawity or THE ExTeERNAL WorRLD . Read 
 IV. Tue Process or Evo.ution i ; 540 
 
 VY. Tue EvouuTion oF THE CATEGORIES : yaa Se! 
 VI. EvoLuTion AND CHANGE OF QUALITIES. ey. O8 
 VII <EvouutTion anp Gop. : ae eee! 
 
 BOOK II. YOGA ETHICS AND PRACTICE: 
 
 VIII. Mrinp anp Mora States ; ay 
 IX. Tuer Turory or Karma : ae) 
 X. Tse Eruicat PROBLEM . ’ : . 114 
 XI. Yoga Practicz A ' : . 124 
 XII. Tuer Yocanaas : : Fv das 3" 
 XIII. Sraczes or SaAMADHI. 2 here ou 
 XIV. Gop in Yoca : ' ae LDY 
 XV. Marter anp MInp retL66 
 APPENDIX : ye Oa) 
 
 INDEX : : ; : LESS 
 

 
YOGA AS PHILOSOPHY 
 AND RELIGION 
 
 BOOK I. YOGA METAPHYSICS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 PRAKRITI 
 
 HowEver dogmatic a system of philosophical enquiry may 
 appear to us, it must have been preceded by a criticism of 
 the observed facts of experience. The details of the criticism 
 and the processes of self-argumentation by which the thinker 
 arrived at his theory of the Universe might indeed be sup- 
 pressed, as being relatively unimportant, but a thoughtful 
 reader would detect them as lying in the background behind 
 the shadow of the general speculations, but at the same time 
 setting them off before our view. An Aristotle or a Patafjali 
 may not make any direct mention of the arguments which led 
 him to a dogmatic assertion of his theories, but for a reader 
 who intends to understand them thoroughly it is absolutely 
 necessary that he should read them in the light as far as pos- 
 sible of the inferred presuppositions and inner arguments of 
 their minds ; it is in this way alone that he can put himself 
 in the same line of thinking with the thinker whom he is 
 willing to follow, and can grasp him to the fullest extent. 
 In offering this short study of the Patafijala metaphysics; 
 I shall therefore try to supplement it with such of my ins 
 
 B 
 
2 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 ferences of the presuppositions of Patafijali’s mind, which 
 I think will add to the clearness of the exposition of his views, 
 though I am fully alive to the difficulties of making such 
 inferences about a philosopher whose psychological, social, 
 religious and moral environments differed so widely from ours. 
 
 An enquiry into the relations of the mental phenomena 
 to the physical has sometimes given the first start to philos- 
 ophy. The relation of mind to matter is such an important 
 problem of philosophy that the existing philosophical systems 
 may roughly be classified according to the relative importance 
 that has been attached to mind or to matter. There have 
 been chemical, mechanical and biological conceptions which 
 have ignored mind as a separate entity and have dogmatically 
 affirmed it to be the product of matter only.* There have 
 been theories of the other extreme, which have dispensed 
 with matter altogether and have boldly affirmed that matter 
 as such has no reality at all, and that thought is the only 
 thing which can be called Real in the highest sense. All 
 matter as such is non-Being or Maya or Avidya. There have 
 been Nihilists like the Siinyavadi Buddhists who have gone 
 so far as to assert that neither matter nor mind exists. Some 
 have asserted that matter is only thought externalized, some 
 have regarded the principle of matter as the unknowable 
 Thing-in-itself, some have regarded them as separate in- 
 dependent entities held within a higher reality called God, 
 or as two of his attributes only, and some have regarded 
 their difference as being only one of grades of intelligence, 
 one merging slowly and imperceptibly into the other and 
 held together in concord with each other by pre-established 
 harmony. 
 
 Underlying the metaphysics of the Yoga system of thought 
 as taught by Patafijali and as elaborated by his commentators 
 we find an acute analysis of matter and thought. Matter 
 
 * See Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 3 
 
 on the one hand, mind, the senses, and the ego on the other 
 are regarded as nothing more than two different kinds of 
 modifications of one primal cause, the Prakrti. But the self- 
 intelligent principle called Purusha (spirit) is distinguished 
 from them. Matter consists only of three primal qualities 
 or rather substantive entities, which he calls the Sattva or 
 intelligence-stuff, Rajas or energy, and Tamas—the factor of 
 obstruction or mass or inertia. It is extremely difficult 
 truly to conceive of the nature of these three kinds of entities 
 or Gunas, as he calls them, when we consider that these 
 three elements alone are regarded as composing all phenomena, 
 mental and physical. In order to comprehend them rightly 
 it will be necessary to grasp thoroughly the exact relation 
 between the mental and the physical. What are the real 
 points of agreement between the two? How can the same 
 elements be said to behave in one case as the conceiver and 
 in the other case as the conceived ? Thus Vacaspati says :— 
 
 ‘The reals (gunas) have two forms, viz. the determiner or 
 the perceiver, and the perceived or the determined. In the 
 aspect of the determined or the perceived, the gunas evolve 
 themselves as the five infra-atomic potentials, the five gross 
 elements and their compounds. In the aspect of perceiver or 
 determiner, they form the modifications of the ego together 
 with the senses.* 
 
 It is interesting to notice here the two words used by 
 Vacaspati in characterising the twofold aspect of the guna 
 viz. vyavasayaimakaiva, their nature as the determiner or 
 perceiver, and vyavaseyatmakatva, their nature as determined 
 or perceived. The elements which compose the phenomena 
 of the objects of perception are the same as those which form 
 the phenomena of the perceiving; their only distinction is 
 that one is the determined and the other is the determiner. 
 What we call the psychosis involving intellection, sensing and 
 
 * Vacaspati’s Tattvavaisaradt on the Vydsa-bhashya, III. 47. 
 
4 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 the ego, and what may be called the infra-atoms, atoms and 
 their combinations, are but two different types of modifica- 
 tions of the same stuff of reals. There is no intrinsic difference 
 in nature between the mental and the physical. 
 
 The mode of causal transformation is explained by Vijfiana 
 Bhikshu in his commentary on the system of Samkhya as if 
 its functions consisted only in making manifest what was 
 already there in an unmanifested form. Thus he says, 
 ‘just as the image already existing in the stone is only 
 manifested by the activity of the statuary, so the causal 
 activity also generates only that activity by which an effect 
 is manifested as if it happened or came into being at the 
 present moment.’* The effects are all always existent, but 
 some of them are sometimes in an unmanifested state. What 
 the causal operation, viz. the energy of the agent and the 
 suitable collocating instruments and conditions, does is to set 
 up an activity by which the effect may be manifested at 
 the present moment. 
 
 With Samkhya-Yoga, sattva, rajas and tamas are substan- 
 tive entities which compose the reality of the mental and the 
 physical.t The mental and the physical represent two 
 different orders of modifications, and one is not in any way 
 superior to the other. As the gunas conjointly form the mani- 
 
 * Samkhyapravacanabhashya, I. 120. 
 
 + It is indeed difficult to say what was the earliest conception of the 
 gunas. But there is reason to believe, as I have said elsewhere, that guna 
 in its earliest acceptance meant qualities. It is very probable that as the 
 Samkhya philosophy became more and more systematised it was realised 
 that there was no ultimate distinction between substance and qualities. 
 In consequence of such a view the gunas which were originally regarded 
 as qualities began to be regarded as substantive entities and no contra- 
 diction was felt. Bhikshu in many places describes the gunas as substantive 
 entities (dravya) and their division into three classes as being due to the 
 presence of three kinds of class-characteristics. This would naturally mean 
 that within the same class there were many other differences which have not 
 been taken into account (Yoga-varttika, II. 18). But it cannot be said that 
 the view that the gunas are substantive entities and that there is no difference 
 between qualities and substances is regarded as a genuine Samkhya view 
 even as early as Sankara. See Gitabhashya, XIV. 5. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 5 
 
 fold without, by their varying combinations, as well as all the 
 diverse internal functions, faculties and phenomena, they are 
 in themselves the absolute potentiality of all things, mental 
 and physical. Thus Vyasa in describing the nature of the 
 knowable, writes: ‘‘ The nature of the knowable is now 
 described :—The knowable, consisting of the objects of en- 
 joyment and liberation, as the gross elements and the per- 
 ceptive senses, is characterised by three essential traits— 
 illumination, energy and inertia. The sattva is of the nature 
 of illumination. Rajas is of the nature of energy. Inertia 
 (tamas) is of the nature of inactivity. The guna entities 
 with the above characteristics are capable of being modified 
 by mutual influence on one another, by their proximity. 
 They are evolving. They have the characteristics of con- 
 junction and separation. They manifest forms by one lending 
 support to the others by proximity. None of these loses its 
 distinct power into those of the others, even though any one 
 of them may exist as the principal factor of a phenomenon with 
 the others as subsidiary thereto. The gunas forming the 
 three classes of substantive entities manifest . themselves 
 as such by their similar kinds of power. When any one of 
 them plays the réle of the principal factor of any phenomenon, 
 the others also show their presence in close contact. Their 
 existence as subsidiary energies of the principal factor is 
 inferred by their distinct and independent functioning, even 
 though it be as subsidiary qualities.’ * The Yoga theory does 
 not acknowledge qualities as being different from substances. 
 The ultimate substantive entities are called gunas, which 
 as we have seen are of three kinds. The guna entities are 
 infinite in number; each has an individual existence, but 
 is always acting in co-operation with others. They may be 
 divided into three classes in accordance with their similarities 
 
 * See Vydsa-bhashya on Patafijali’s Yoga-sitras, II. 18, and Vacaspati’s 
 Tattvavarsiradi on it. 
 
6 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 of behaviour (sila). Those which behave in the way of 
 intellection are called sativa, those which behave in the way 
 of producing effort of movement are called rajas, and those 
 which behave differently from these and obstruct their 
 process are called tamas. We have spoken above of a primal 
 cause prakrti. But that is not a separate category independent 
 of the gunas. Prakrti is but a name for the guna entities 
 when they exist in a state of equilibrium. All that exists 
 excepting the purushas are but the guna entities in different 
 kinds of combination amongst themselves. The effects they 
 produce are not different from them but it is they themselves 
 which are regarded as causes in one state and effects in another. 
 The difference of combination consists in this, that in some 
 combinations there are more of sativa entities than rajas or 
 tamas, and in others more of rajas or more of tamas. These 
 entities are continually uniting and separating. But though 
 they are thus continually dividing and uniting in new com- 
 binations the special behaviour or feature of each class of 
 entities remains ever the same. Whatever may be the nature 
 of any particular combination the sattva entities participating 
 in it will retain their intellective functions, rajas their energy 
 functions, and tamas the obstructing ones. But though 
 they retain their special features in spite of their mutual 
 difference they hold fast to one another in any particular 
 combination (tulyajatiyatulyajatiyasaktibhedanupatinah which 
 Bhikshu explains as aviseshenopashtambhakasvabhavah). In 
 any particular combination it is the special features of those 
 entities which predominate that manifest themselves, while 
 the other two classes lend their force in drawing the minds of 
 perceivers to it as an object as a magnet draws a piece of iron, 
 Their functionings at this time are undoubtedly feeble 
 (sikshmavyttimantah) but still they do exist. * 
 
 In the three gunas, none of them can be held as the goal 
 
 * See Bhikshu’s Yoga-vartiika, IL. 18. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 7 
 
 of the others. All of them are equally important, and the very 
 varied nature of the manifold represents only the different 
 combinations of these gunas as substantive entities. In any 
 combination one of the gunas may be more predominant 
 than the others, but the other gunas are also present there 
 and perform their functions in their own way. No one of 
 them is more important than the other, but they serve con- 
 jointly one common purpose, viz. the experiences and the 
 liberation of the purusha, or spirit. They are always uniting, 
 separating and re-uniting again and there is neither beginning 
 nor end of this (anyonyanmithunah sarvve naishimadisam- 
 prayogo viprayogo va upalabhyate). 
 
 They have no purpose of their own to serve, but they all are 
 always evolving, as Dr. Seal says, “ ever from a relatively less 
 differentiated, less determinate, less coherent whole, to a 
 relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more co- 
 herent whole ”’ * for the experiences and liberation of purusha, 
 or spirit. When in a state of equilibrium they cannot serve 
 the purpose of the purusha, so that state of the gunas is not 
 for the sake of the purusha ; it is its own independent eternal 
 state. All the other three stages of evolution, viz. the lmga 
 (sign), avisesha (unspecialised) and visesha (specialised) have 
 been caused for the sake of the purusha.t Thus Vyasa 
 writes:— { <“ The objects of the purusha are no cause of the 
 original state (alinga). That is to say, the fulfilment of the 
 objects of the purusha is not the cause which brings about the 
 manifestation of the original state of prakrti in the beginning. 
 The fulfilment of the objects of the purusha is not therefore the 
 reason of the existence of that ultimate state. Since it is not 
 brought into existence by the need of the fulfilment of the 
 purusha’s objects it is said to be eternal. As to the three 
 
 * History of Hindu Chemistry, Vol. II, by P. C. Ray, p. 66. 
 
 + The usual Samkhya terms as found in Iévarakrshna’s Karika, having 
 the same denotation as avisesha and visesha, are prakrtivikrit and vikrit. 
 
 t Vydasa-bhashya, II. 19. 
 
8 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 specialised states, the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha 
 becomes the cause of their manifestation in the beginning. 
 The fulfilment of the objects of the purusha is not therefore 
 the reason for the existence of the cause. Since it is not 
 brought into existence by the purusha’s objects it is said to be 
 eternal. As to the three specialised states, the fulfilment of 
 the objects of the purusha being the cause of their manifesta- 
 tion in the beginning, they are said to be non-eternal.” 
 Vacaspati again says :—“ The fulfilment of the objects 
 of the purusha could be said to be the cause of the original 
 state, if that state could bring about the fulfilment of the 
 objects of the purusha, such as the enjoyment of sound, etc., 
 or manifest the discrimination of the distinction between 
 true self and other phenomena. If however it did that, it 
 could not be a state of equilibrium,” (yadyalongavastha 
 Sabdadyupabhogam va sattvapurushanyatakhyatum va pur- 
 ushartham mrvartiayet tannrvarttane hi na simydvastha syat). 
 This state is called the prakrti. It is the beginning, in- 
 determinate, unmediated and undetermined. It neither exists 
 nor does it not exist, but is the principium of almost all 
 existence. Thus Vyasa describes it as “‘ the state which neither 
 is nor is not; that which exists and yet does not; that in 
 which there is no non-existence; the unmanifested, the 
 noumenon (lit. without any manifested indication), the 
 background of all” (nihsattdsattam mhsadasat nirasat 
 avyaktam alingam pradhanam).* Vacaspati explains it as 
 follows :—‘‘ Existence consists in possessing the capacity 
 of effecting the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha. 
 Non-existence means a mere imaginary trifle (e.g. the horn of 
 a hare).” It is described as being beyond both these states 
 of existence and non-existence. The state of the equipoise 
 of the three gunas of intelligence-stuff, inertia and energy, is 
 nowhere of use in fulfilling the objects of the purusha. It 
 * Vydsa-bhashya, II. 19. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 9 
 
 therefore does not exist as such. On the other hand, it does 
 not admit of being rejected as non-existent like an imaginary 
 lotus of the sky. It is therefore not non-existent. But even 
 allowing the force of the above arguments about the want 
 of phenomenal existence of prakrti on the ground that it 
 cannot serve the objects of the purusha, the difficulty arises 
 that the principles of Mahat, etc., exist in the state of the 
 unmanifested also, because nothing that exists can be de- 
 stroyed; and if it is destroyed, it cannot be born again, 
 because nothing that does not exist can be born ; it follows 
 therefore that since the principles of mahat, etc., exist in the 
 state of the unmanifested, that state can also affect the ful- 
 filment of the objects of the purusha. How then can it be 
 paid that the unmanifested is not possessed of existence ? For 
 this reason, he describes it as that in which it exists and does 
 not exist. This means that the cause exists in that state in a 
 potential form but not in the form of the effect. Although 
 the effect exists in the cause as mere potential power, yet it is 
 incapable of performing the function of fulfilling the objects 
 of the purusha ; it is therefore said to be non-existent as such. 
 Further he says that this cause is not such, that its effect is of 
 the nature of hare’s horn. It is beyond the state of non- 
 existence, that is, of the existence of the effect as mere nothing. 
 If it were like that, then it would be like the lotus of the sky 
 and no effect would follow.* 
 
 But as Bhikshu points out (Yoga-varttika, IT. 18) this 
 prakrti is not simple substance, for it is but the guna reals. 
 It is simple only in the sense that no complex qualities are 
 manifested in it. It is the name of the totality of the guna 
 reals existing in a state of equilibrium through their mutual 
 counter opposition. It is a hypothetical state of the gunas 
 preceding the states in which they work in mutual co-operation 
 for the creation of the cosmos for giving the purushas 
 
 * Tattvavaisaradi, II. 19. 
 
10 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 a chance for ultimate release attained through a full en- 
 joyment of experiences. Some European scholars have 
 often asked me whether the prakrti were real or whether the 
 gunas were real. This question, in my opinion, can only arise 
 as a result of confusion and misapprehension, for it is the 
 gunas in a state of equilibrium that are called prakrti. Apart 
 from gunas there is no prakrti (guna eva prakrtrsabdavacya 
 na tu tadatirikta prakrtwrasti. Yoga-varttika, 11. 18). In this 
 state, the different gunas only annul themselves and no 
 change takes place, though it must be acknowledged that the 
 state of equipoise is also one of tension and action, which, 
 however, being perfectly balanced does not produce any 
 change. This is what is meant by evolution of similars 
 (adrsaparipama). Prakrti as the equilibrium of the three 
 gunas is the absolute ground of all the mental and phenomenal 
 modifications—pure potentiality. 
 
 Venkata, a later Vaishnava writer, describes prakrti as one 
 ubiquitous, homogeneous matter which evolves itself into all 
 material productions by condensation and rarefaction. In 
 this view the gunas would have to be translated as three 
 different classes of qualities or characters, which are found 
 in the evolutionary products of the prakrti. This will of 
 course be an altogether different view of the prakrti from that 
 which is described in the Vydsa-bhashya, and the gunas could 
 not be considered as reals or as substantive entities in such an 
 interpretation. A question arises, then, as to which of these 
 two prakrtis is the earlier conception. I confess that it is 
 difficult to answer it. For though the Vaishnava view is 
 elaborated in later times, it can by no means be asserted that 
 it had not quite as early a beginning as 2nd or 3rd century B.C. 
 If Ahirbudhnyasamhita is to be trusted then the Shashtitantra- 
 Sastra which is regarded as an authoritative Samkhya work 
 is really a Vaishnava work. Nothing can be definitely 
 stated about the nature of prakrti in Samkhya from the 
 
INTRODUCTORY 11 
 
 meagre statement of the Karika. The statement in the Vydsa- 
 bhashya is, however, definitely in favour of the interpretation 
 that we have adopted, and so also the Sdmkhya-stitra, which 
 is most probably a later work. Caraka’s account of prakrti 
 does not seem to be the prakrti of Vydsa-bhdashya for here the 
 gunas are not regarded as reals or substantive entities, but 
 as characters, and prakrtiis regarded as containing its evolutes, 
 mahat, etc., as its elements (dhaiu). If Caraka’s treatment 
 is the earliest view of Samkhya that is available to us, then 
 it has to be admitted that the earliest Samkhya view did not 
 accept prakrti as a state of the gunas, or gunas as substantive 
 entities. But the Yoga-sttra, II. 19, and the Vydsa-bhashya 
 support the interpretation that I have adopted here, and it 
 is very curious that if the Samkhya view was known at the 
 time to be so different from it, no reference to it should have 
 been made. But whatever may be the original Samkhya view, 
 both the Yoga view and the later Samkhya view are quite 
 in consonance with my interpretation. 
 
 In later Indian thinkers there had been a tendency to make 
 a compromise between the Vedanta and Samkhya doctrines 
 and to identify prakrti with the avidya of the Vedantists. 
 Thus Lokacaryya writes :—“ It is called prakrti since it is the 
 source of all change, it is called avidya since it is opposed to 
 knowledge, it is called maya since it is the cause of diversion 
 creation (prakrtirityucyate vikdrotpadakatvat avidya gndna- 
 virodhituat maya vicitrasrshtikaratvat).”* But this is distinctly 
 opposed to the Vydsa-bhashya which defines avidya as 
 vidyaviparitam jnananiaram avidyd, 1.e. avidya is that other 
 knowledge which is opposed to right knowledge. In some of 
 the Upanishads, Svetasvatara for example, we find that maya 
 and prakrti are identified and the great god is said to preside 
 over them (mayam tu prakrtum vidyat mayinam tumahesvaram). 
 There is a description also in the Rgveda, X. 92, where it is 
 
 * Tativairaya, p. 48 (Chowkhamba edition), Benares. 
 
12 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 said that (ndsaddsit na saddasit tadanim), in the beginning 
 there was neither the ‘‘ Is’ nor the “ Is not,” which reminds 
 one of the description of prakrti (nthsatidsattam as that in 
 which there is no existence or non-existence). In this way 
 it may be shown from Gita and other Sanskrit texts that an 
 undifferentiated, unindividuated cosmic matter as the first 
 principle, was often thought of and discussed from the earliest 
 times. Later on this idea was utilised with modifications by 
 the different schools of Vedantists, the Samkhyists and those 
 who sought to make a reconciliation between them under the 
 different names of prakrti, avidya and maya. What avidya 
 really means according to the Patafijala system we shall see 
 later on; but here we see that whatever it might mean it 
 does not mean prakrti according to the Patafijala system. 
 Vydsa-bhashya, IV. 18, makes mention of maya also in a 
 couplet from Shashtitantrasastra ; 
 gunanam paramam ripam na drshtipathamrcchate 
 yatiu drshtipatham praptam tanmayeva sutucch akam. 
 
 The real appearance of the gunas does not come within 
 the line of our vision. That, however, which comes within the 
 line of vision is but paltry delusion and Vacaspati Misra 
 explains it as follows :—Prakrti is like the maya but it is not 
 maya. It is trifling (sutucchaka) in the sense that it is chang- 
 ing. Just as maya constantly changes, so the transformations 
 of prakrti are every moment appearing and vanishing and 
 thus suffering momentary changes. Prakrti being eternal is 
 real and thus different from maya. 
 
 This explanation of Vacaspati’s makes it clear that the 
 word maya is used here only in the sense of illusion, and 
 without reference to the celebrated maya of the Vedantists ; 
 and Vacaspati clearly says that prakrti can in no sense be 
 called maya, since it is real.* 
 
 * Bhikshu in his Yoga-varttika explains “ mayeva”’ as “ laukikamdyeva 
 kshanabhanguram”’ evanescent like the illusions of worldly experience. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 PURUSHA 
 
 WE shall get a more definite notion of prakrti as we advance 
 further into the details of the later transformations of the 
 prakrti in connection with the purushas. The most difficult 
 point is to understand the nature of its connection with the 
 purushas. Prakrti is a material, non-intelligent, independent 
 principle, and the souls or spirits are isolated, neutral, intelli- 
 gent andinactive. Then how can the one come into connection 
 with the other ? 
 
 In most systems of philosophy the same trouble has arisen 
 and has caused the same difficulty in comprehending it rightly. 
 Plato fights the difficulty of solving the unification of the idea 
 and the non-being and offers his participation theory ; even in 
 Aristotle’s attempt to avoid the difficulty by his theory of 
 form and matter, we are not fully satisfied, though he has 
 shown much ingenuity and subtlety of thought in devising 
 the “‘ expedient in the single conception of development.”’ 
 
 The universe is but a gradation between the two extremes 
 of potentiality and actuality, matter and form. But all 
 students of Aristotle know that it is very difficult to under- 
 stand the true relation between form and matter, and the 
 particular nature of their interaction with each other, and 
 this has created a great divergence of opinion among his 
 commentators. It was probably to avoid this difficulty that 
 the dualistic appearance of the philosophy of Descartes had 
 to be reconstructed in the pantheism of Spinoza. Again we 
 
 13 
 
me 
 
 14 CONNECTION WITH PURUSHA 
 
 find also how Kant failed to bring about the relation between 
 noumenon and phenomenon,and created two worlds absolutely 
 unrelated to each other. He tried to reconcile the schism 
 that he effected in his Criteque of Pure Reason by his 
 Critique of Practical Reason, and again supplemented it 
 with his Critique of Judgment, but met only with dubious 
 SUCCESS. 
 
 In India also this question has always been a little puzzling, 
 and before trying to explain the Yoga point of view, I shall 
 first give some of the other expedients devised for the purpose, 
 by the different schools of Advaita (monistic) Vedantism. 
 
 I. The reflection theory of the Vedanta holds that the 
 maya is without beginning, unspeakable, mother of gross 
 matter, which comes in connection with intelligence, so that 
 by its reflection in the former we have Iévara. Theillustrations 
 that are given to explain it both in Siddhdntalesa* and in 
 Advaita-Brahmasiddhi are only cases of physical reflection, 
 viz. the reflection of the sun in water, or of the sky in water. 
 
 II. The limitation theory of the Vedanta holds that the 
 all-pervading intelligence must necessarily be limited by mind, 
 etc., so of necessity it follows that “ the soul ”’ is its limitation. 
 This theory is illustrated by giving those common examples 
 in which the Akaga (space) though unbounded in itself is 
 often spoken of as belonging to a jug or limited by the jug 
 and as such appears to fit itself to the shape and form of the 
 jug and is thus called ghatavacchinna akdsa, i.e. space as 
 within the jug. 
 
 Then we have a third school of Vedantists, which seeks to 
 explain it in another way:—The soul is neither a reflection nor 
 a limitation, but just as the son of Kunti was known as the 
 son of Radha, so the pure Brahman by his nescience is known 
 as the jiva, and like the prince who was brought up in the 
 family of a low caste, it is the pure Brahman who by his own 
 
 * Siddhantallega (JiveSvara nirtipana). 
 
CONNECTION WITH PURUSHA 15 
 
 nescience undergoes birth and death, and by his own nescience 
 is again released.* 
 
 The Samkhya-sttra algo avails itself of the same story in 
 IV. 1, “rajaputtravattativopadesat,’ which Vijiana Bhikshu 
 explains as follows :—A certain king’s son in consequence of 
 his being born under the star Ganda having been expelled 
 from his city and reared by a certain forester remains under 
 the idea: “‘I ama forester.” Having learnt that he is alive, 
 a certain minister informs him. ‘‘ Thou art not a forester, 
 thou art a king’s son.” As he, immediately having abandoned 
 the idea of being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal 
 state, saying, ‘‘ I ama king,” so too the soul realises its purity 
 in consequence of instruction by some good tutor, to the effect 
 —‘‘Thou, who didst originate from the first soul, which 
 manifests itself merely as pure thought, art a portion thereof.” 
 
 In another place there are two sititras :—(1) nmhsange’pr 
 uparago vivekat. (2) japdsphatikayorwa noparagah kintva- 
 bhimanah. (1) Though it be associated still there is a tingeing 
 through non-discrimination. (2) Asin the case of the hibiscus 
 and the crystal, there is not a tinge, but afancy. Now it will 
 be seen that all these theories only show that the transcendent 
 nature of the union of the principle of pure intelligence is very 
 difficult to comprehend. Neither the reflection nor the 
 limitation theory can clear the situation from vagueness and 
 incomprehensibility, which is rather increased by their 
 physical illustrations, for the cit or pure intelligence cannot 
 undergo reflection like a physical thing, nor can it be obstructed 
 or limited byit. The reflection theory adduced by the Sam- 
 khya-sttra, “japasphitikayoriva noparagah kintvabhimanah,” 
 
 * Princess Kunti of the Mahabharata had a son born to her by means of 
 a charm when she was still a virgin. Being afraid of a public scandal she 
 floated the child in a stream; the child was picked up by the wife of a 
 carpenter (Radha). The boy grew up to be the great hero Karna and he 
 thought that he was the son of a carpenter until the fact of his royal lineage 
 was disclosed to him later in life, 
 
16 SAMKHYA EXPLICATION 
 
 is not an adequate explanation. For here the reflection 
 produces only a seeming redness of the colourless crystal, 
 which was not what was meant by the Vedantists of the 
 reflection school. But here, though the metaphor is more 
 suitable to express the relation of purusha with the prakrti, 
 the exact nature of the relation is more lost sight of than com- 
 prehended. Let us now see how Patafijali and Vyasa seek to 
 explain it. 
 Let me quote a few siitras of Patafijali and some of the 
 most important extracts from the Bhdashya and try, as far as 
 possible, to get the correct view :— 
 (1) drgdarsanasaktyorekatmateva asmita IT. 6. 
 (2) drashta drsimatrah suddho’pi pratyayanupasyah II. 20. 
 (3) tadartha eva dréyasya atma II. 21. 
 (4) krtartham prati nashtamapyanashtam tadanyasadharanat- 
 vat IT. 22. 
 
 (5) Svasvamisaktyoh svartipopalabdhthetuh samyogah I. 22. 
 
 (6) tadabhavat samyogabhavo hanam taddrseh kawalyam 
 IT. 25. 
 
 (7) sattvapurushayoh suddhisimye kaivalyam III. 25. 
 
 (8) citerapratisamkramayastadakarapattau svabuddhisamve- 
 danam IY, 22. 
 
 (9) sattvapurushayoratyantasamkirnayoh pratyaydvisesho 
 bhogah pararthatvat svarthasamyamat purushajyhanam 
 IIT. 35. 
 
 (1) The Ego-sense is the illusory appearance of the identity 
 of the power as perceiver and the power as perceived. 
 
 (2) The seer though pure as mere “‘seeing”’ yet perceives 
 the forms assumed by the psychosis (buddhz). 
 
 (3) It is for the sake of the purusha that the being of the 
 knowable exists. 
 
 (4) For the emancipated person the world-phenomena 
 cease to exist, yet they are not annihilated since they form 
 a common field of experience for other individuals. 
 
SAMKHYA EXPLICATION 17 
 
 (5) The cause of the realisation of the natures of the know- 
 able and purusha in consciousness is their mutual contact. 
 
 (6) Cessation is the want of mutual contact arising from the 
 destruction of ignorance and this is called the state of oneness. 
 
 (7) This state of oneness arises out of the equality in purity 
 of the purusha and buddhi or sattva. 
 
 (8) Personal consciousness arises when the purusha, 
 though in its nature unchangeable, is cast into the mould of 
 the psychosis. 
 
 (9) Since the mind-objecis exist only for the purusha, ex- 
 perience consists in the non-differentiation of these two which 
 in their natures are absolutely distinct; the knowledge of 
 self arises out of concentration on its nature. 
 
 Thus in Yoga-sttra, II. 6, drik or purusha the seer is spoken 
 of as gakti or power as much as the prakrti itself, and we 
 see that their identity is only apparent. Vyasa in his Bhashya 
 explains ekatmatd (unity of nature or identity) as avibhaga- 
 praptaviva, “as if there is no difference.” And Paficasikha, 
 as quoted in Vydsa-bhashya, writes: “not knowing the 
 purusha beyond the mind to be different therefrom, in nature, 
 character and knowledge, etc., a man has the notion of self, 
 in the mind through delusion.” 
 
 Thus we see that when the mind and purusha are known to 
 be separated, the real nature of purusha is realised. This 
 seeming identity is again described as that which perceives 
 the particular form of the mind and thereby appears, as 
 identical with it though it is not so (pratyayanupasya— 
 pratyayani bauddhamanupasyati tamanupasyannatadatmapr 
 tadatmaka wa pratibhati, Vaysa-bhashya, II. 20). 
 
 The purusha thus we see, cognises the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness after they have been formed, and though its nature 
 is different from conscious states yet it appears to be the same. 
 Vyasa in explaining this stitra says that purusha is neither 
 quite similar to the mind nor altogether different from it. 
 
 C 
 
18 SAMKHYA EXPLICATION 
 
 For the mind (buddhi) is always changeful, according to the 
 change of the objects that are offered to it ; so that it may be 
 paid to be changeful according as it knows or does not know 
 objects ; but the purusha is not such, for it always appears 
 as the self, being reflected through the mind by which it is 
 thus connected with the phenomenal form of knowledge. The 
 notion of self that appears connected with all our mental 
 phenomena and which always illumines them is only due to 
 this reflection of purusha in the mind. All phenomenal 
 knowledge which has the form of the object can only be 
 transformed into conscious knowledge as “I know this,” 
 when it becomes connected with the self or purusha. So the 
 purusha may in a way be said to see again what was perceived 
 by the mind and thus to impart consciousness by transferring 
 its illumination into the mind. The mind suffers changes 
 according to the form of the object of cognition, and thus 
 results a state of conscious cognition in the shape of “ I know 
 it,” when the mind, having assumed the shape of an object, 
 becomes connected with the constant factor purusha, through 
 the transcendent reflection or identification of purusha in the 
 mind, This is what is meant by pratyaydnupasya repercep- 
 tion of the mind-transformations by purusha, whereby the 
 mind which has assumed the shape of any object of con- 
 sciousness becomes intelligent. Even when the mind is with- 
 out any objective form, it is always being seen by purusha. 
 The exact nature of this reflection is indeed very hard to com- 
 prehend ; no physical illustrations can really serve to make it 
 clear. And we see that neither the Vydsa-bhashya nor the 
 siitras offer any such illustrations as Samkhya did. But the 
 Bhishya proceeds to show the points in which the mind may 
 be said to differ from purusha, as well as those in which it 
 agrees withit. So that though we cannot express it anyhow, 
 we may at least make some advance towards conceiving the 
 situation. 
 
NATURE OF PURUSHA AND PRAKRTI 19 
 
 Thus the Bhashya says that the main difference between 
 the mind and purusha is that the mind is constantly under- 
 going modifications, as it grasps its objects one by one; for 
 the grasping of an object, the act of having a percept, is 
 nothing but its own undergoing of different modifications, 
 and thus, since an object sometimes comes within the grasp 
 of the mind and again disappears in the subconscious as a 
 samskara (potency) and again comes into the field of the 
 understanding as smrti (memory), we see that it is parinami 
 or changing. But purusha is the constant seer of the mind 
 when it has an object, as in ordinary forms of phenomenal 
 knowledge, or when it has no object as in the state of nirodha 
 or cessation. Purusha is unchanging. It is the light which 
 remains unchanged amidst all the changing modifications of 
 the mind, so that we cannot distinguish purusha separately 
 from the mind. This is what is meant by saying buddheh 
 pratisamvedt purushah, i.e. purusha reflects or turns into its 
 own light the concepts of mind and thus is said to know it. 
 Its knowing is manifested in our consciousness as the ever- 
 persistent notion of the self, which is always a constant 
 factor in all the phenomena of consciousness. Thus purusha 
 always appears in our consciousness as the knowing agent. 
 Truly speaking, however, purusha only sees himself; he is 
 not in any way in touch withthe mind. Heis absolutely free 
 from all bondage, absolutely unconnected with prakrti. 
 From the side of appearance he seems only to be the intelli- 
 gent seer imparting consciousness to our conscious-like con- 
 ception, though in reality he remains the seer of himself all 
 the while. The difference between purusha and prakrti will 
 be clear when we see that purusha is altogether independent, 
 existing in and for himself, free from any bondage whatso- 
 ever ; but buddhi exists on the other hand for the enjoyment 
 and release of purusha. That which exists in and for itself, 
 must ever be the self-same, unchangeable entity, suffering 
 
20 NATURE OF PURUSHA AND PRAKRTI 
 
 no transformations or modifications, for it has no other end 
 owing to which it will be liable to change. It is the self- 
 centred, self-satisfied light, which never seeks any other end 
 and never leaves itself. But prakrtiis not such ; it is always 
 undergoing endless, complex modifications and as such does 
 not exist for itself but for purusha, and is dependent upon 
 him. The mind is unconscious, while purusha is the pure 
 light of intelligence, for the three gunas are all non-intelligent, 
 and the mind is nothing but a modification of these three 
 gunas which are all non-intelligent. 
 
 But looked at from another point of view, prakrti is not 
 altogether different from purusha; for had it been so how 
 could purusha, which is absolutely pure, reperceive the mind- 
 modifications ? Thus the Bhashya (II. 20) writes :— 
 
 ‘Well then let him be dissimilar. To meet this he says: 
 He is not quite dissimilar. Why? Although pure, he sees 
 the ideas after they have come into the mind. Inasmuch as 
 purusha cognises the ideas in the form of mind-modification, 
 he appears to be, by the act of cognition, the very self of the 
 mind although in reality he is not.” As has been said, the 
 power of the enjoyer, purusha (drksakt), is certainly un- 
 changeable and it does not run after every object. In con- 
 nection with a changeful object it appears forever as if it 
 were being transferred to every object and as if it were 
 assimilating its modifications. And when the modifications 
 of the mind assume the form of the consciousness by which 
 it is coloured, they imitate it and look as if they were mani- 
 festations of purusha’s consciousness unqualified by the 
 modifications of the non-intelligent mind. 
 
 All our states of consciousness are analysed into two parts 
 —a permanent and a changing part. The changing part is 
 the form of our consciousness, which is constantly varying 
 according to the constant change of its contents, The perma- 
 nent part is that pure light of intelligence, by virtue of which 
 
ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 21 
 
 we have the notion of self reflected in our consciousness. 
 Now, as this self persists through all the varying changes of 
 the objects of consciousness, it is inferred that the light 
 which thus shines in our consciousness is unchangeable. 
 Our mind is constantly suffering a thousand modifications, 
 but the notion of self is the only thing permanent amidst all 
 this change. It is this self that imports consciousness to the 
 material parts of our knowledge. All our concepts originated 
 from our perception of external material objects. Therefore 
 the forms of our concepts which could exactly and clearly 
 represent these material objects in their own terms, must 
 be made of a stuff which in essence is not different from them. 
 But with the reflection of purusha, the soul, the notion of 
 self comes within the content of our consciousness, spiritual- 
 ising, as it were, all our concepts and making them conscious 
 and intelligent. Thus this seeming identity of purusha and 
 the mind, by which purusha may be spoken of as the seer of 
 the concept, appears to the self, which is manifested in con- 
 sciousness by virtue of the seeming reflection. For this is 
 that self, or personality, which remains unchanged all through 
 our consciousness. Thus our phenomenal intelligent self 
 is partially a material reality arismg out of the seeming 
 interaction of the spirit and the mind. This interaction is 
 the only way by which matter releases spirit from its seeming 
 bondage. \ 
 
 But the question arises, how is it that there can even be 
 a seeming reflection of purusha in the mind which is altogether 
 non-intelligent ? How is it possible for the mind to catch a 
 glimpse of purusha, which illuminates all the concepts of 
 consciousness, the expression “ anupasya’’ meaning that he 
 perceives by imitation (anukdrena pasyati)? How can 
 purusha, which is altogether formless, allow any reflection 
 of itself to imitate the form of buddhi, by virtue of which it 
 appears as the seli—the supreme possessor and knower of 
 
22 THE SEEMING REFLECTION 
 
 all our mental conceptions? There must be at least some 
 resemblance between the mind and the purusha, to justify 
 in some sense this seeming reflection. And we find that the 
 last siitra of the Vibhiitipada says: sattvapurushayoh sudd- 
 hisémye kawalyam—which means that when the sattva or 
 the preponderating mind-stuff becomes as pure as purusha, 
 kaivalya or oneness is attained. This shows that the pure 
 nature of sattva has a great resemblance to the pure nature 
 of purusha. So muchso, that the last stage preceding the state 
 of kaivalya, is almost the same as kaivalya itself, when purusha 
 is in himself and there are no thoughts to reflect. In this 
 state, we see that the mind can be so pure as to reflect exactly 
 the nature of purusha, as he is in himself. This state in which 
 the mind becomes as pure as purusha and reflects him in his 
 purity, does not materially differ from the state of kaivalya, 
 in which purusha is in himself—the only difference being that 
 the mind, when it becomes so pure as this, becomes gradually 
 lost in prakrti and cannot again serve to bind purusha. 
 
 I cannot refrain here from the temptation of referring to 
 a beautiful illustration from Vyasa, to explain the way in 
 which the mind serves the purposes of purusha. Cuittamayas- 
 kantamantkalpam sannidhimatropakari drsyatvena svam bha- 
 vali purushasya svaminah (I. 4), which is explained in 
 Yoga-varituka as follows: Tathayaskantamanth svasminneva 
 ayahsanmdhikaranamatrat salyarishkarshanakhyam upakaram 
 kurvat purushasya svaminah svam bhavats bhogasadhanatvdt, 1.€. 
 just as a magnet draws iron towards it, though it remains un- 
 moved itself, so the mind-modifications become drawn 
 towards purusha, and thereby become visible to purusha and 
 serve his purpose. 
 
 To summarise : We have seen that something like a union 
 takes place between the mind and purusha, i.e. there is a 
 seeming reflection of purusha in the mind, simultaneously 
 with its being determined conceptually, as a result whereof 
 
EXPLANATION BY ANALOGY 23 
 
 this reflection of purusha in the mind, which is known as the 
 self, becomes united with these conceptual determinations 
 of the mind and the former is said to be the perceiver of all 
 these determinations. Our conscious personality or self 
 is thus the seeming unity of the knowable as the mind in the 
 shape of conceptual or judgmental representations with the 
 reflections of purusha in the mind. Thus, in the single act 
 of cognition, we have the notion of our own personality and 
 the particular conceptual or perceptual representation with 
 which this ego identifies itself. The true seer, the pure 
 intelligence, the free, the eternal, remains all the while beyond 
 any touch of impurity from the mind, though it must be 
 remembered that it is its own seeming reflection in the mind 
 that appears as the ego, the cogniser of all our states, pleasures 
 and sorrows of the mind and one who is the apperceiver of 
 this unity of the seeming reflection—of purusha and the 
 determinations of the mind. In all our conscious states, there 
 is such a synthetic unity between the determinations of our 
 mind and the self, that they cannot be distinguished one from 
 the other—a fact which is exemplified in all our cognitions, 
 which are the union of the knower and the known. The 
 nature of this reflection is a transcendent one and can never 
 be explained by any physical illustration. Purusha is alto- 
 gether different from the mind, inasmuch as he is the pure 
 intelligence and is absolutely free, while the latter is non- 
 intelligent and dependent on purusha’s enjoyment and 
 release, which are the sole causes of its movement. But there 
 is some similarity between the two, for how could the mind 
 otherwise catch a seeming glimpse of him? It is also said 
 that the pure mind can adapt itself to the pure form of 
 purusha ; this is followed by the state of kaivalya. 
 
 We have discussed the nature of purusha and its general 
 relations with the mind. We must now give a few more 
 Ulustrations. The chief point in which purusha of the Sam- 
 
24 ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PURUSHAS 
 
 khya-Patafijala differs from the similar spiritual principle of 
 Vedanta is, that it regards its soul, not as one, but as many. 
 Let us try to discuss this point, in connection with the argu- 
 ments of the Samkhya-Patafijala doctrine in favour of a 
 separate principle of purusha. Thus the Karka says: 
 samghatapararthatvat triqunddwiparyyayadadhishthanadt puru- 
 sho sti bhoktrbhavat kawalyartham pravrttesca,* “‘ Because an 
 assemblage of things is for the sake of another ; because there 
 must be an entity different from the three gunas and the rest 
 (their modifications) ; because there must be a superintending 
 power; because there must be someone who enjoys; and 
 because of (the existence of) active exertion for the sake of 
 abstraction or isolation (from the contact with prakrti) 
 therefore the soul exists.” The first argument is from design 
 or teleology by which it is inferred that there must be some 
 other simple entity for which these complex collocations of 
 things are intended. Thus Gaudapada says: “In such 
 manner as a bed, which is an assemblage of bedding, props, 
 cotton, coverlet and pillows, is for another’s use, not for its 
 own, and its several component parts render no mutual 
 service, and it is concluded that there is a man who sleeps 
 upon the bed and for whose sake it was made ; so this world, 
 which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for 
 use and there is a soul, for whose enjoyment this body, 
 another’s consisting of intellect and the rest, has been 
 produced.’’F 
 
 The second argument is that all the knowable is composed 
 of just three elements: first, the element of sattva, or in- 
 telligence-stufl, causing all manifestations; second, the 
 element of rajas or energy, which is ever causing transforma- 
 tions ; and third, tamas, or the mass, which enables rajas 
 to actualise. Now such a prakrti, composed of these three 
 elements, cannot itself be a seer. For the seer must be always 
 
 * Karika 17. + Gaudapada’s commentary on Karika 17. 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PURUSHAS 25 
 
 the same unchangeable, actionless entity, the ever present, 
 ever constant factor in all stages of our consciousness. 
 
 Third argument: There must be a supreme background 
 of pure consciousness, all our co-ordinated basis of experience. 
 This background is the pure actionless purusha, reflected 
 in which all our mental states become conscious. Davies 
 explains this a little differently, in accordance with a simile 
 in the Tattva-Kaumudi, yathaé rathadi yantradibhih, thus : 
 “This idea of Kapila seems to be that the power of self- 
 control cannot be predicted of matter, which must be directed 
 or controlled for the accomplishment of any purpose, and 
 this controlling power must be something external to matter 
 and diverse from it. The soul, however, never acts. It only 
 seems to act; and it is difficult to reconcile this part of the 
 system with that which gives to the soul a controlling force. 
 If the soul is a charioteer, 1t must be an active force.’ But 
 Davies here commits the mistake of carrying the simile too 
 far. The comparison of the charioteer and the chariot holds 
 good, to the extent that the chariot can take a particular 
 course only when there is a particular purpose for the chario- 
 teer to perform. The motion of the chariot is fulfilled only 
 when it is connected with the living person of the charioteer, 
 whose purpose it must fulfil. 
 
 Fourth argument: Since prakrti is non-intelligent, there 
 must be one who enjoys its pains and pleasures. The emo- 
 tional and conceptual determinations of such feelings are 
 aroused in consciousness by the seeming reflection of the light 
 of purusha. 
 
 Fifth arqumeni: There is a tendency in all persons to move 
 towards the oneness of purusha, to be achieved by liberation ; 
 there must be one for whose sake the modifications of buddhi 
 are gradually withheld, and a reverse process set up, by which 
 they return to their original cause prakrti and thus liberate 
 purusha. It is on account of this reverse tendency of prakrti 
 
26 ‘THE PLURALITY OF PURUSHAS 
 
 to release purusha that a man feels prompted to achieve his 
 liberation as the highest consummation of his moral ideal. 
 
 Thus having proved the existence of purusha, the Karvka 
 proceeds to prove his plurality: “jyanmamaranakarananam 
 pratimyamadayugapat pravrttesca purushabahutvam siddham 
 traigunyaviparyyayacca.” ‘From the individual allotment . 
 of birth, death and the organs ; from diversity of occupations 
 and from the different conditions of the three gunas, it is 
 proved that there is a plurality of souls.” In other words, 
 since with the birth of one individual, all are not born; since 
 with the death of one, all do not die ; and since each individual 
 has separate sense organs for himself; and since all beings 
 do not work at the same time in the same manner ; and since 
 the qualities of the different gunas are possessed. differently 
 by different individuals, purushas are many. Patafjali, 
 though he does not infer the plurality of purushas in this way, 
 
 -yet holds the view of the siitra, krtartham prati nashtamap- 
 yanashtam tadanyasadharanatvat. ‘‘ Although destroyed in 
 relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it is not 
 destroyed, being common to others.” 
 
 Davies, in explaining the former Karika, says: “‘ There is, 
 however, the difficulty that the soul is not affected by the 
 three gunas. How can their various modifications prove the 
 individuality of souls in opposition to the Vedantist doctrine, 
 that all souls are only portions of the one, an infinitely ex- 
 tended monad 3.” 
 
 This question is the most puzzling in the Samkhya doctrine. 
 But careful penetration of the principles of Samkhya-Yoga 
 would make clear to us that this is a necessary and consistent 
 outcome of the Samkhya view of a dualistic universe. 
 
 For if it is said that purusha is one and we have the notion 
 of different selves by his reflection into different minds, it 
 follows that such notions as self, or personality, are false. 
 For the only true being is the one, purusha. So the knower 
 
THE PLURALITY OF PURUSHAS 27 
 
 being false, the known also becomes false ; the knower and 
 the known having vanished, everything is reduced to that 
 which we can in no way conceive. It may be argued that 
 according to the Samkhya philosophy also, the knower is 
 false, for the pure purusha as such is not in any way connected 
 with prakrti. But even then it must be observed that the 
 Samkhya-Yoga view does not hold that the knower is false 
 but analyses the nature of the ego and says that it is due to 
 the seeming unity of the mind and purusha, both of which 
 are reals in the strictest sense of the term. Purusha is there 
 justly called the knower. He sees and simultaneously with 
 this, there is a modification of buddhi (mind); this seeing 
 becomes joined with this modification of buddhi and thus 
 arises the ego, who perceives that particular form of the 
 modification of buddhi. Purusha always remains the knower. 
 Buddhi suffers modifications and at the same time catches 
 a glimpse of the light of purusha, so that contact (samyoga) of 
 purusha and prakrti occurs at one and the same point 
 of time, in which there is unity of the reflection of purusha 
 and the particular transformation of buddhi. 
 
 The knower, the ego and the knowable, are none of them 
 false in the Samkhya-Yoga system at the stage preceding 
 kaivalya, when buddhi becomes as pure as purusha; its 
 modification resembles the exact form of purusha and then 
 purusha knows himself in his true nature in buddhi; after 
 which buddhi vanishes. The Vedanta has to admit the 
 modifications of maya, but must at the same time hold it 
 to be unreal. The Vedanta says that maya is as beginningless 
 as prakrti yet has an ending with reference to the released 
 person as the buddhi of the Samkhyists. 
 
 But according to the Vedanta philosophy, knowledge of 
 ego is only false knowledge—an illusion as many imposed 
 upon the formless Brahman. Maya, according to the 
 Vedantist, can neither be said to exist nor to non-exist. It 
 
28 THE PLURALITY OF PURUSHAS 
 
 is anirvadcya, i.e. can never be described or defined. Such an 
 unknown and unknowable maya causes the Many of the 
 world by reflection upon the Brahman. But according to the 
 Samkhya doctrine, prakrti is as real as purusha himself. 
 Prakrti and purusha are two irreducible metaphysical re- 
 mainders whose connection is beginningless (anddisamyoga). 
 But this connection is not unreal in the Vedanta sense of the 
 term. We see that according to the Vedanta system, all 
 notions of ego or personality are false and are originated by the 
 illusive action of the maya, so that when they ultimately 
 vanish there are no other remainders. But this is not the 
 case with Samkhya, for as purusha is the real seer, his cogni- 
 tions cannot be dismissed as unreal, and so purushas or 
 knowers as they appear to us to be, must be held real. As 
 prakrti is not the maya of the Vedantist (the nature of whose 
 influence over the spiritual principle cannot be determined) 
 we cannot account for the plurality of purushas by supposing 
 that one purusha is being reflected into many minds and 
 generating the many egos. For in that case it will be difficult 
 to explain the plurality of their appearances in the minds 
 (buddhis). For if there be one spiritual principle, how should 
 we account for the supposed plurality of the buddhis? For 
 we should rather expect to find one buddhi and not many 
 to serve the supposed one purusha, and this will only mean 
 that there can be only one ego, his enjoyment and release. 
 Supposing for argument’s sake that there are many buddhis 
 and one purusha, which reflected in them, is the cause of the 
 plurality of selves, then we cannot see how prakrti is moving 
 for the enjoyment and release of one purusha; it would 
 rather appear to be moved for the sake of the enjoyment 
 and release of the reflected or unreal self. For purusha is 
 not finally released with the release of any number of particu- 
 lar individual selves. For it may be released with reference 
 to one individual but remain bound to others. So prakrti 
 
THE PLURALITY OF PURUSHAS 29 
 
 would not really be moved in this hypothetical case for the 
 sake of purusha, but for the sake of the reflected selves only. 
 If we wish to avoid the said.difficulties, then with the release 
 of one purusha, all purushas will have to be released. For 
 in the supposed theory there would not really be many 
 different purushas, but the one purusha appearing as many, 
 so that with his release all the other so-called purushas must 
 be released. We see that if it is the enjoyment (bhoga) and 
 salvation (apavarga) of one purusha which appear as so many 
 different series of enjoyments and emancipations, then with 
 his experiences all should have the same experiences. With 
 his birth and death, all should be born or all should die at 
 once. For, indeed, it is the experiences of one purusha which 
 appear in all the seeming different purushas. And in the 
 other suppositions there is neither emancipation nor enjoy- 
 ment by purusha at all. For there, it is only the illusory self 
 that enjoys or releases himself. By his release no purusha 
 is really released at all. So the fundamental conception of 
 prakrti as moving for the sake of the enjoyment and release 
 of purusha has to be abandoned. 
 
 So we see that from the position in which Samkhya and 
 Yoga stood, this plurality of the purushas was the most 
 consistent thing that they could think of. Any compromise 
 with the Vedanta doctrine here would have greatly changed 
 the philosophical aspect and value of the Samkhya philosophy. 
 As the purushas are nothing but pure intelligences they can 
 as well be all pervading though many. But there is another 
 objection that,since number is a conception of the phenomenal 
 mind, how then can it be applied to the purushas which are 
 said to be many ?* But that difficulty remains unaltered 
 
 * Purusha is a substance (dravya) because it has independent existence 
 (anasrita) and has a measure (vibhu parimana) of its own. So it always 
 possesses the common characteristics (samanya guna) of substances, contact 
 (samyoga), separation (viyoga) and number (samkhyd). Purusha cannot be 
 considered to be suffering change or impure on account of the possession of 
 the above common characteristics of all substances. Yoga-varitika, II. 17. 
 
30 THE PLURALITY OF PURUSHAS 
 
 even if we regard the purusha as one. When we go into the 
 domain of metaphysics and try to represent Reality with the 
 symbols of our phenomenal conceptions we have really to 
 commit almost a violence towards it. But we must perforce 
 do this in all our attempts to express in our own terms that 
 pure, inexpressible, free illumination which exists in and for 
 itself beyond the range of any mediation by the concepts 
 or images of our mind. So we see that Samkhya was not 
 inconsistent in holding the doctrine of the plurality of the 
 purushas. Patafijali does not say anything about it, since 
 he is more anxious to discuss other things connected with 
 the presupposition of the plurality of purusha. Thus he 
 speaks of it only in one place as quoted above and says that 
 though for a released person this world disappears altogether, 
 still it remains unchanged in respect to all the other purushas. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 
 
 WE may now come to the attempt of Yoga to prove the 
 reality of an external world as against the idealistic Buddhists. 
 In stitra 12 of the chapter on kaivalya we find: “ The past 
 and the future exist in reality, since all qualities of things 
 manifest themselves in these three different ways. The 
 future is the manifestation which is to be. The past is the 
 appearance which has been experienced. The present is 
 that which is in active operation. It is this threefold sub- 
 stance which is the object of knowledge. If it did not exist 
 in reality, there would not exist a knowledge thereof. How 
 could there be knowledge in the absence of anything know- 
 able? For this reason the past and present in reality exist.’’* 
 
 So we see that the present holding within itself the past 
 and the future exists in reality. For the past though it has 
 been negated has really been preserved and kept in the 
 present, and the future also though it has not made its appear- 
 ance yet exists potentially in the present. So, as we know 
 the past and the future worlds in the present, they both exist 
 and subsist in the present. That which once existed cannot 
 die, and that which never existed cannot come to be (nastyasa- 
 tah sambhavah na casti sato vindsah, Vydsa-bhashya V. 12). 
 So the past has not been destroyed but has rather shifted its 
 
 * Thus the Bhashya says: bhavishyadvyaktikamandgatamanudbhitavy- 
 aktikamatitam  svavyaparoparidham varttamanam trayam  caitadvastu 
 jnanasya jreyam yadi caitat svaripato nabhavishyannedam nirvishayam 
 jranamudapatsyata tasmadatitamandgatam svartipato stiti. 
 
 31 
 
32 PRESENT, PAST, AND FUTURE 
 
 position and hidden itself in the body of the present, and the 
 future that has not made its appearance exists in the present 
 only in a potential form. It cannot be argued, as Vacaspati 
 says, that because the past and the future are not present 
 therefore they do not exist, for if the past and future do not 
 exist how can there be a present also, since its existence 
 also is only relative? So all the three exist as truly as any 
 one of them, and the only difference among them is the 
 different way or mode of their existence. 
 
 He next proceeds to refute the arguments of those idealists 
 who hold that since the external knowables never exist 
 independently of our knowledge of them, their separate 
 external existence as such may be denied. Since it is by 
 knowledge alone that the external knowables can present 
 themselves to us we may infer that there is really no knowable 
 external reality apart from knowledge of it, just as we see 
 that in dream-states knowledge can exist apart from the. 
 reality of any external world. 
 
 So it may be argued that there is, indeed, no external 
 reality as it appears to us. The Buddhists, for example, hold 
 that a blue thing and knowledge of it as blue are identical 
 owing to the maxim that things which are invariably per- 
 ceived together are one (sahopalambhaniyamadabhedo nilatad- 
 dhiyoh). So they say that external reality is not different 
 from our idea of it. To this it may be replied that if, as you 
 say, external reality is identical with my ideas and there is 
 no other external reality existing as such outside my ideas, 
 why then does it appear as existing apart, outside and inde- 
 pendent of my ideas? The idealists have no basis for the 
 denial of external reality, and for their assertion that it is 
 only the creation of our imagination like experiences in dreams. 
 Kven our ideas carry with them the notion that reality exists 
 outside our mental experiences. If all our percepts and 
 notions as this and that arise only by virtue of the influence 
 
 - 
 
REALITY OF EXTERNAL WORLD 33 
 
 of the external world, how can they deny the existence of the 
 external world as such? The objective world is present by 
 its own power. How then can this objective world be given 
 up on the strength of mere logical or speculative abstraction ? 
 
 Thus the Vydsa-bhashya, IV. 14, says: “There is no 
 object without the knowledge of it, but there is knowledge 
 as imagined in dreams without any corresponding object ; 
 thus the reality of external things is like that of dream- 
 objects, mere imagination of the subject and unreal. How 
 can they who say so be believed ? Since they first suppose 
 that the things which present themselves to us by their own 
 force do so only on account of the invalid and delusive imagina- 
 tion of the intellect, and then deny the reality of the external 
 world on the strength of such an imaginary supposition of 
 their own.” 
 
 The external world has generated knowledge of itself 
 by its own presentative power (arthena svakiyayagrahyas- 
 aktya vyjidnamajant), and has thus caused itself to be repre- 
 sented in our ideas, and we have no right to deny it.* Com- 
 menting on the Bhashya lV. 14, Vacaspati says that the method 
 of agreement applied by the Buddhists by their sahopalamb- 
 haniyama (maxim of simultaneous revelation) may possibly 
 be confuted by an application of the method of difference. 
 The method of agreement applied by the idealists when put 
 in proper form reads thus: ‘‘ Wherever there is knowledge 
 there is external reality, or, rather every case of knowledge 
 agrees with or is the same as every case of the presence of 
 external reality, so knowledge is the cause of the presence of 
 the external reality, i.e. the external world depends for its 
 reality on our knowledge or ideas and owes its origin or 
 appearance as such to them.” But Vacaspati says that this 
 application of the method of agreement is not certain, for it 
 cannot be corroborated by the method of difference. For 
 
 * Tattravaisaradi, IV, 14, 
 D 
 
34 REALITY OF EXTERNAL WORLD 
 
 the statement that every case of absence of knowledge is also 
 a case of absence of external reality cannot be proved, Le. 
 we cannot prove that the external reality does not exist 
 when we have no knowledge of it (sahopalambhaniyamasca 
 vedyatvatica hetti sandigdhavyatirekatayanaikantikau) LV. 14. 
 
 Describing the nature of grossness and externality, the 
 attributes of the external world, he says that grossness means 
 the pervading of more portions of space than one, i.e. grossness 
 means extension, and externality means being related to 
 separate space, i.e. co-existence in space. Thus we see that 
 extension and co-existence in space are the two fundamental 
 qualities of the gross external world. Now an idea can never 
 be said to possess them, for it cannot be said that an idea has 
 extended into more spaces than one and yet co-existed 
 separately in separate places. An idea cannot be said to 
 exist with other ideas in space and to extend in many points 
 of space at one and the same time. To avoid this it cannot 
 be said that there may be plurality of ideas so that some may 
 co-exist and others may extend in space. For co-existence 
 and extension can never be asserted of our ideas, since they 
 are very fine and subtle, and can be known only at the time of 
 their individual operation, at which time, however, other ideas 
 may be quite latent and unknown. Imagination has no power 
 to negate their reality, for the sphere of imagination is quite 
 distinct from the sphere of external reality, and it can never 
 be applied to an external reality to negate it. Imagination is 
 a mental function, and as such has no touch with the reality 
 outside, which it can by no means negate. 
 
 Further it cannot be said that, because grossness and 
 externality can abide neither in the external world nor in 
 our ideas, they are therefore false. For this falsity cannot be 
 thought as separable from our ideas, for in that case our ideas 
 would be as false as the false itself. The notion of externality 
 and grossness pervades all our ideas, and if they are held to 
 
REALITY OF EXTERNAL WORLD 35 
 
 be false, no true thing can be known by our ideas and they 
 therefore become equally false. 
 
 Again, knowledge and the external world can never be said. 
 to be identical because they happen to be presented together. 
 For the method of agreement cannot by itself prove identity. 
 Knowledge and the knowable external world may be inde- 
 pendently co-existing things like the notions of existence and 
 non-existence. Both co-exist independently of one another. 
 It is therefore clear enough, says Vacaspati, that the certainty 
 arrived at by perception, which gives us a direct knowledge 
 of things, can never be rejected on the strength of mere 
 logical abstraction or hair-splitting discussion. 
 
 We further see, says Patafijali, that the thing remains 
 the same though the ideas and feelings of different men may 
 change differently about it.* Thus A, B, C may perceive 
 the same identical woman and may feel pleasure, pain or 
 hatred. We see that the same common thing generates 
 different feelings and ideas in different persons; external 
 reality cannot be said to owe its origin to the idea or imagina- 
 tion of any one man, but exists independently of any person’s 
 imagination in and for itself. For if it be due to the imagina- 
 tion of any particular man, it is his own idea which as such 
 cannot generate the same ideas in another man. So it must be 
 said that the external reality is what we perceive it outside. 
 
 There are, again, others who say that just as pleasure 
 and pain arise along with our ideas and must be said to be due 
 to them so the objective world also must be said to have come 
 into existence along with our ideas. The objective world 
 therefore according to these philosophers has no external 
 existence either in the past or in the future, but has only 
 a momentary existence in the present due to our ideas about 
 it. That much existence only are they ready to attribute 
 to external objects which can be measured by the idea of the 
 
 * Vastusamye cittabhedat tayor vibhaktah panthih. Yoga-sitra, IV. 15. 
 
36 DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT SUBSTRATUM 
 
 moment. The moment I have an idea of a thing, the thing 
 rises into existence and may be said to exist only for that 
 moment and as soon as the idea disappears the object also 
 vanishes, for when it cannot be presented to me in the form 
 of ideas it can be said to exist in no sense. But this argument 
 cannot hold good, for if the objective reality should really 
 depend upon the idea of any individual man, then the objective 
 reality corresponding to an idea of his ought to cease to exist 
 either with the change of his idea, or when he directs attention 
 to some other thing, or when he restrains his mind from all 
 objects of thought. Now, then, if it thus ceases to exist, how 
 can it again spring into existence when the attention of the 
 individual is again directed towards it ? Again, all parts of 
 an object can never be seen all at once. Thus supposing that 
 the front side of a thing is visible, then the back side which 
 cannot be seen at the time must not be said to exist at all. 
 So if the back side does not exist, the front side also can as 
 well be said not to exist (ye casyanupasthita bhagaste caisya 
 na syurevam nasti prshthamiti udaramapi na grhyeta. Vydsa- 
 bhashya, TV. 16). Therefore it must be said that there is an 
 independent external reality which is the common field of 
 observation for all souls in general; and there are also 
 separate “Cittas’’ for separate individual souls (tasmat 
 svatantro’rthah sarvapurushasadharanah svatantrani ca cittam 
 pratipurusham, pravarttanie, ibid.). And all the experiences 
 of the purusha result from the connection of this “ Citta” 
 (mind) with the external world. 
 
 Now from this view of the reality of the external world we 
 are confronted with another question—what is the ground 
 which underlies the manifold appearance of this external 
 world which has been proved to be real 2? What is that some- 
 thing which is thought as the vehicle of such qualities as pro- 
 duce in us the ideas ? What is that self-subsistent substratum 
 which is the basis of so many changes, actions and reactions 
 
VIEW OF THE BHASHYAKARA 37 
 
 that we always meet in the external world? Locke: called 
 this substratum substance and regarded it as unknown, but 
 said that though it did not follow that it was a product of 
 our own subjective thought yet 1t did not at the same time 
 exist without us. Hume, however, tried to explain everything 
 from the standpoint of association of ideas and denied all 
 notions of substantiality. We know that Kant, who was much 
 influenced by Hume, agreed to the existence of some such 
 unknown reality which he called the Thing-in-itself, the nature 
 of which, however, was absolutely unknowable, but whose 
 influence was a great factor in all our experiences. 
 
 But the Bhashya tries to penetrate deeper into the nature 
 of this substratum or substance and says : dharmisvaripamatro 
 hi dharmah, dharmwikriya eva esha dharmadvara prapaticyate, 
 Vydsa-bhashya, III. 13. The characteristic qualities form the 
 very being itself of the characterised, and it is the change of 
 the characterised alone that is detailed by means of the 
 characteristic. To understand thoroughly the exact signifi- 
 cance of this statement it will be necessary to take a more 
 detailed review of what has already been said about the gunas. 
 We know that all things mental or physical are formed by the 
 different collocations of sattva of the nature of illumination 
 (prakdsa), rajas—the energy or mutative principle of the 
 nature of action (kriya)-—and tamas—the obstructive principle 
 of the nature of inertia (sthitc) which in their original and 
 primordial state are too fine to be apprehended (gundnampar- 
 amam ripam na drshtupathamycchati, Vyadsa-bhashya, IV. 13). 
 These different gunas combine in various proportions to form 
 the manifold universe of the knowable, and thus are made the 
 objects of our cognition. Through combining in different 
 proportions they become, in the words of Dr. B. N. Seal,‘ more 
 and more differentiated, determinate and coherent,” and thus 
 make themselves cognisable, yet they never forsake their own 
 true nature as the gunas. So we see that they have thus got 
 
38 THE GUNAS AND DERIVATIVES 
 
 two natures, one in which they remain quite unchanged as 
 gunas, and another in which they collocate and combine 
 themselves in various ways and thus appear under the veil 
 of a multitude of qualities and states of the manifold knowable 
 (te vyaktasikshma gunatmanah [IV. 13]. . . sarvamidam 
 gunandm sannivesavseshamatramite paramarthato gunatmanah, 
 Bhashya, ibid.). 
 
 Now these gunas take three different courses of development 
 from the ego or ahamkara according to which the ego or 
 ahamkara may be said to be sattvika, rajasa and tamasa. 
 Thus from the sattvika side of the ego by a preponderance of 
 sattva the five knowledge-giving senses, e.g. hearing, sight, 
 touch, taste and smell are derived. From the rajas side of 
 ego by a preponderance of rajas the five active senses of speech, 
 etc., are derived. From the tamas side of ego or ahamkara 
 by a preponderance of tamas are derived the five tanmatras. 
 From which again by a preponderance of tamas the atoms of 
 the five gross elements—earth, water, fire, air and ether are 
 derived. 
 
 In the derivation of these it must be remembered that 
 all the three gunas are conjointly responsible. In the deriva- 
 tion of a particular product one of the gunas may indeed be 
 predominant, and thus may bestow the prominent characteristic 
 of that product, but the other’ two gunas are also present 
 there and perform their functions equally well. Their 
 opposition does not withhold the progress of evolution but 
 rather helps it. All the three combine together in varying 
 degrees of mutual preponderance and thus together help the 
 process of evolution to produce a single product. Thus we 
 see that though the gunas are three, they combine to produce 
 on the side of perception, the senses, such as those of hearing, 
 sight, etc.; and on the side of the knowable, the individual 
 tanmatras of gandha, rasa, riipa, sparga and gabda. The 
 gunas composing each tanmatra again harmoniously combine 
 
THE GUNAS AND DERIVATIVES 39 
 
 with each other with a preponderance of tamas to produce 
 the atoms of each gross element. Thus in each combination 
 one class of gunas remains prominent, while the others 
 remain dependent upon it but help it indirectly in the evolution 
 of that particular product. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION 
 
 THE evolution which we have spoken of above may be 
 characterised in two ways: (1) That arising from modi- 
 fications or products of some other cause which are themselves 
 capable of originating other products like themselves; (2) 
 That arising from causes which, though themselves derived, 
 yet cannot themselves be the cause of the origination of other 
 existences like themselves. The former may be said to be 
 slightly specialised (avisesha) and the latter thoroughly 
 specialised (visesha). 
 
 Thus we see that from prakrti comes mahat, from mahat 
 comes ahamkara, and from ahamkara, as we have seen above, 
 the evolution takes three different courses according to the 
 preponderance of sattva, rajas and tamas originating the 
 cognitive and conative senses and manas, the superintendent 
 of them both on one side and the tanmatras on the other. 
 These tanmatras again produce the five gross elements. 
 Now when ahamkara produces the tanmatras or the senses, 
 or when the tanmatras produce the five gross elements, or 
 when ahamkara itself is produced from buddhi or mahat, 
 it is called tativantara-parmama, i.e. the production of a 
 different tattva or substance. 
 
 Thus in the case of tattvantara-parmama (as for example 
 when the tanmatras are produced from ahamkara), it must 
 be carefully noticed that the state of being involved in the 
 tanmatras is altogether different from the state of being of 
 
 40 
 
TATTVANTARA-PARINAMA 4} 
 
 ahamkara ; it is not a mere change of quality but a change 
 of existence or state of being.* Thus though the tanmatras 
 are derived from ahamkara the traces of ahamkara cannot 
 be easily followed in them. This derivation is not such that 
 the ahamkara remains principally unchanged and there 1s 
 only a change of quality in it, but it is a different existence 
 altogether, having properties which differ widely from those 
 of ahamkara. So it is called tattvantara-parinama, 1.e. 
 evolution of different categories of existence. 
 
 Now the evolution that the senses and the five gross elements 
 can undergo can never be of this nature, for they are viseshas, 
 or substances which have been too much specialised to allow 
 the evolution of any other substance of a different grade of 
 existence from themselves. With them there is an end of all 
 emanation. So we see that the avigeshas or slightly specialised 
 emanations are those which being themselves but emanations 
 can yet yield other emanations from themselves. Thus we 
 see that mahat, ahamkara and the five tanmatras are them- 
 selves emanations, as well as the source of other emanations. 
 Mahat, however, though it is undoubtedly an avigesha or 
 slightly specialised emanation, is called by another technical 
 name linga or sign, for from the state of mahat, the prakrti 
 from which it must have emanated may be inferred. Prakrti, 
 however, from which no other primal state is inferable, is called 
 the alinga or that which is not a sign for the existence of any 
 other primal and more unspecialised state. In one sense all 
 the emanations can be with justice called the lingas or states 
 of existence standing as the sign by which the causes from 
 
 * “ Tattvantara-parinama ”’ means the evolution of a wholly new category 
 of existence. Thus the tanmatras are wholly different from the ego from 
 which they are produced. So the atoms are wholly different from the tan- 
 matras from which they are produced, for the latter, unlike the former, have 
 no sense-properties. In all combinations of atoms, there would arise thou- 
 sands of new qualities, but none of the products of the combination of atoms 
 can be called a tattvantara, or a new category of existence since all these 
 qualities are the direct manifestations of the specific properties of the atoms. 
 
42 TATTVANTARA-PARINAMA 
 
 which they have emanated can be directly inferred. Thus in 
 this sense the five gross elements may be called the linga of the 
 tanmatras, and they again of the ego, and that again of the 
 mahat, for the unspecialised ones are inferred from their 
 specialised modifications or emanations. But this technical 
 name linga is reserved for the mahat from which the alinga 
 or prakrti can be inferred. This prakrti, however, is the 
 eternal state which is not an emanation itself but the basis 
 and source of all other emanations. 
 
 The linga and the alinga have thus been compared in the 
 Kareka : 
 
 “hetumadantyamavyapi sakriyamanekasritam lingam 
 
 sdvayavam paratantram vyaktam viparitamavyaktam.” 
 
 The linga has a cause, it is neither eternal nor universal, 
 but mobile, multiform, dependent, determinate, and possesses 
 parts, whereas the alinga is the reverse. The alinga or 
 prakrti, however, being the cause has some characteristics in 
 common with its lingas as distinguished from the purushas, 
 which are altogether different from it. 
 
 Thus the Karvka says : 
 
 “ trigunamavweki vishayah samanyamacetanam prasavadharma 
 vyaktam tatha pradhanam tadviparitastatha puman.” 
 
 The manifested and the unmanifested pradhdna or prakyti 
 are both composed of the three gunas, non-intelligent, objec- 
 tive, universal, unconscious and productive. Soul in these 
 respects 1s the reverse. We have seen above that prakrti 
 is the state of equilibrium of the gunas, which can in no way 
 be of any use to the purushas, and is thus held to be eternal, 
 though all other states are held to be non-eternal as they 
 are produced for the sake of the purushas. 
 
 The state of prakrti is that in which the gunas completely 
 overpower each other and the characteristics (dharma) 
 and the characterised (dharmi) are one and the same. 
 
EVOLUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS 43 
 
 Evolution is thus nothing but the manifestation of change, 
 mutation, by the energy of rajas. The rajas is the one 
 mediating activity that breaks up all compounds, builds up 
 new ones and initiates original modifications. Whenever in 
 any particular combination the proportion of sattva, rajas 
 or tamas alters, as a condition of this alteration, there is the 
 dominating activity of rajas by which the old equilibrium is 
 destroyed and another equilibrium established ; this in its 
 turn is again disturbed and again another equilibrium is 
 restored. Now the manifestation of this latent activity of 
 rajas is what is called change or evolution. In the external 
 world the time that is taken by a paramanu or atom to move 
 from its place is identical with a unit of change.* Now an 
 atom will be that quantum which is smaller or finer than 
 that point or limit at which it can in any way be perceived 
 by the senses. Atoms are therefore mere points without 
 magnitude or dimension, and the unit of time or moment 
 (kshana) that is taken up in changing the position of these 
 
 * Vydsa-bhashya, III. 52, says that the smallest indivisible part of a 
 thing is called a paramanu. Vijfiana Bhikshu in explaining it says that 
 paramanu here means guna, for if a thing say a stone is divided, then the 
 furthest limit of division is reached when we come to the indivisible gunas. 
 But if the prakrti is all-pervading (vibhu) how can the gunas be atomic ? 
 Bhikshu says (Yoga-varitcka, III. 52) in reply that there are some classes 
 of gunas (e.g. those which produce mind antahkarana and akasa) which 
 are all-pervading, while the others are all atomic. In Bhikshu’s interpreta- 
 tion a moment is to be defined as the time which a guna entity takes to 
 change its own unit of space. Gunas are thus equivalent to the Vaiseshika, 
 paramanus. Bhikshu, however, does not deny that there are no atoms of 
 earth, water, etc., but he says that where reference is not made to these atoms 
 but to guna atoms for the partless units of time can only be compared with 
 the partless gunas. But Vacaspati does not make any comment here to 
 indicate that the smallest indivisible unit of matter should mean gunas. 
 Moreover, Yoga-sttra, I. 40, and Vydsa-bhashya, I. 45, speak of paramanu 
 and anu in the sense of earth-atoms, etc. Hven Bhikshu does not maintain 
 that paramanu is used there in the sense of atomic guna entities. I 
 could not therefore accept Bhikshu’s interpretation that paramanu here 
 refers to guna. Paramanu may here be taken in the sense of material 
 atoms of earth, water, etc. The atoms (paramanu) here cannot be 
 absolutely partless, for it has two sides, prior (purvadeSa) and posterior 
 (uttaradesa). 
 
f4 BUDDHI-NIRMANA 
 
 atoms is identical with one unit of change or evolution. 
 The change or evolution in the external world must therefore 
 be measured by these units of spatial motion of the atoms ; 
 i.e. an atom changing its own unit of space is the measure of 
 all physical change or evolution. 
 
 Each unit of time (kshana) corresponding to this change of 
 an atom of its own unit of space is the unit-measure of change. 
 This instantaneous succession of time as discrete moments one 
 following the other is the notion of the series of moments or 
 pure and simple succession. Now the notion of these discrete 
 moments is the notion of time. Even the notion of succession 
 is one that does not really exist but is imagined, for a moment 
 comes into being just when the moment just before had passed 
 so that they have never taken place together. Thus Vyasa 
 in IIT. 52, says: “kshanatatkramayornasti vastusamaharah wi 
 buddhisamaharah muhirttahoratratradayah.” Sa tvayam kalah 
 vastusinyo pr buddhinirmanah. The moments and their 
 succession do not belong to the category of actual things ; 
 the hour, the day and night, are all aggregates of mental 
 conceptions. This time which is not a substantive reality in 
 itself, but is only a mental concept, represented to us through 
 linguistic usage, appears to ordinary minds as if it were an 
 objective reality. 
 
 So the conception of time as discrete moments is the real 
 one, whereas the conception of time as successive or as con- 
 tinuous is unreal, being only due to the imagination of our 
 empirical and relative consciousness. Thus Vacaspati further 
 explainsit. A moment is real (vastupatitah) and is the essential 
 element of the notion of succession. Succession involves the 
 notion of change of moments, and the moment is called time 
 by those sages who know what time is. Two moments cannot 
 happen together. There cannot be any succession of two 
 simultaneous things. Succession means the notion of change 
 involving a preceding and a succeeding moment. Thus there 
 
UNIT OF CHANGE AND UNIT OF TIME 45 
 
 is only the present moment and there are no preceding and 
 later moments. Therefore there cannot be any union of these 
 moments. The past and the future moments may be said to 
 exist only if we speak of past and future as identical with 
 the changes that. have’ become latent and others that exist 
 potentially but are not manifested. Thus in one moment, 
 the whole world suffers changes. All these characteristics 
 are associated with the thing as connected with one particular 
 moment.* 
 
 So we find here that time is essentially discrete, being only 
 the moments of our cognitive life. As two moments never 
 co-exist, there is no succession or continuous time. They 
 exist therefore only in our empirical consciousness which 
 cannot take the real moments in their discrete nature but 
 connects the one with the other and thereby imagines either 
 succession or continuous time. 
 
 Now we have said before, that each unit of change or 
 evolution is measured by this unit of time kshana or moment ; 
 or rather the units of change are expressed in terms of these 
 moments or kshanas. Of course in our ordinary conscious- 
 ness these moments of change cannot be grasped, but they 
 can be reasonably inferred. For at the end of a certain period 
 we observe a change in a thing; now this change, though 
 it becomes appreciable to us after a long while, was still going 
 on every moment, so, in this way, the succession of evolution 
 or change cannot be distinguished from the moments coming 
 one after another. Thus the Yoga-sttra says in IV. 33: 
 ‘* Succession involving a course of changes is associated with 
 the moments.” Succession as change of moments is grasped 
 
 * Bhikshu regards the movement of a guna of its own unit of space as 
 the ultimate unit of time (kshana). The whole world is nothing else but a 
 series of kshanas. This view differs from the Buddhist view that everything 
 is momentary in this that it does not admit of any other thing but the 
 kshanas (na tu kshandtiriktah kshanikah padarthah kascidishyate taistu 
 kshanamétrasthayyeva padarthah ishyate. Yoga-varttika, III. 62). 
 
46 PRESENT, PAST, AND FUTURE 
 
 only by a course of changes. A cloth which has not passed 
 through a course of changes through a series of moments 
 cannot be found old all at once at any time. Even a new 
 cloth kept with good care becomes old after a time. This 
 is what is called the termination of a course of changes and 
 by it the succession of a course of changes can be grasped. 
 Even before a thing is old there can be inferred a sequence ~ 
 of the subtlest, subtler, subtle, grossest, grosser and gross 
 changes (Tattvavarsdradi, IV. 33).* 
 
 Now as we have seen that the unit of time is indistinguish- 
 able from the unit of change or evolution, and as these moments 
 are not co-existing but one follows the other, we see that there 
 is no past or future existing as a continuous before or past, 
 and after or future. It is the present that really exists as 
 the manifested moment; the past has been conserved as 
 sublatent and the future as the latent. So the past and 
 future exist in the present, the former as one which has already 
 had its manifestation and is thus conserved in the fact of the 
 manifestation of the present. For the manifestation of the 
 present as such could not have taken place until the past 
 had already been manifested; so the manifestation of the 
 present is a concrete product involving within itself the mani- 
 festation of the past; in a similar way it may be said that 
 the manifestation of the present contains within itself the seed 
 or the unmanifested state of the future, for if this had not 
 been the case, the future never could have happened. So we 
 see that the whole world undergoes a change at one unit 
 
 * There is a difference of opinion as regards the meaning of the word 
 *“ kshanapratiyogt”” in IV. 33. Vacaspati says that it means the growth 
 associated with a particular kshana or moment (kshanapracaydésraya). 
 The word pratiyogi is interpreted by Vacaspati as related (pratisambandhi). 
 Bhikshu, however, gives a quite different meaning. He interprets kshana as 
 “interval” and pratiyogi as “‘ opposite of” (virodhi). So “ kshanaprati- 
 yogt ” means with him “ without any interval” or “‘ continuous.”’ He holds 
 that the sitra means that all change is continuous and not in succession. 
 There is according to his interpretation no interval between the cessation 
 of a previous character and the rise of a new one. 
 
COSMIC EVOLUTION 47 
 
 point of time, and not only that but it conserves within itself 
 all the past and future history of cosmic evolution. 
 
 We have pointed out before that the manifestation of the 
 rajas or energy as action is what is called change. Now this 
 manifestation of action can only take place when equilibrium 
 of a particular collocation of gunas is disturbed and the rajas 
 arranges or collocates with itself the sattva and tamas, the 
 whole group being made intelligible by the inherent sattva. 
 So the cosmic history is only the history of the different 
 collocations of the gunas. Now, therefore, if it is possible 
 for a seer to see in one vision the possible number of combina- 
 tions that the rajas will have with sattva and tamas, he can 
 in one moment perceive the past, present or future of this 
 cosmic evolutionary process; for with such minds all past 
 and future are concentrated at one point of vision which to 
 a person of ordinary empirical consciousness appears only 
 in the series. For the empirical consciousness, impure as it is, 
 it is impossible that all the powers and potencies of sattva 
 and rajas should become manifested at one point of time ; 
 it has to take things only through its senses and can thus 
 take the changes only as the senses are affected by them ; 
 whereas, on the other hand, if its power of knowing was not 
 restricted to the limited scope of the senses, it could have 
 grasped all the possible collocations or changes all at once. 
 Such a perceiving mind whose power of knowing is not 
 narrowed by the senses can perceive all the finest modifica- 
 tions or changes that are going on in the body of a substance 
 (see Yoga-stitra, III. 53). 
 
CHAPTER V 
 THE EVOLUTION OF THE CATEGORIES 
 
 Tue Yoga analysis points to the fact that all our cognitive 
 states are distinguished from their objects by the fact of their 
 being intelligent. This intelligence is the constant factor 
 which persists amidst all changes of our cognitive states. 
 We are passing continually from one state to another without 
 any rest, but in this varying change of these states we are 
 never divested of intelligence. This fact of intelligence is 
 therefore neither the particular possession of any one of these 
 states nor that of the sum of these states ; for if it is not the 
 possession of any one of these states it cannot be the possession 
 of the sum of these states. In the case of the released person 
 again there is no mental state, but the self-shining intelli- 
 gence. So Yoga regarded this intelligence as quite distinct 
 from the so-called mental states which became intelligent 
 by coming in connection with this intelligence. The action- 
 less, absolutely pure and simple intelligence it called the 
 purusha. 
 
 Yoga tacitly assumed a certain kind of analysis of the 
 nature of these mental states which sought to find out, if 
 possible, the nature of their constituent elements or moments 
 of existence. Now in analysing the different states of our 
 mind we find that a particular content of thought is illumin- 
 ated and then passed over. The ideas rise, are illuminated 
 and pass away. Thus they found that “movement” was 
 one of the principal elements that constituted the substance 
 
 48 
 
THE TAMAS SIDE OF THOUGHT 49 
 
 of our thoughts. Thought as such is always moving. This 
 principle of movement, mutation or change, this energy, they 
 called rajas. 
 
 Now apart from this rajas, thought when seen as divested 
 of its sensuous contents seems to exhibit one universal mould 
 or form of knowledge which assumes the form of all the 
 sensuous contents that are presented to it. It is the one 
 universal of all our particular concepts or ideas—the basis 
 or substratum of all the different shapes imposed upon itself, 
 the pure and simple. Sattva in which there is no particularity 
 is that element of our thought which, resembling purusha 
 most, can attain its reflection within itself and thus makes 
 the unconscious mental states intelligible. All the contents 
 of our thought are but modes and limitations of this universal 
 form and are thus made intelligible. It is the one principle 
 of intelligibility of all our conscious states. 
 
 Now our intellectual life consists in a series of shining 
 ideas or concepts ; concepts after concepts shine forth in the 
 light of the pure intelligence and pass away. But each 
 concept is but a limitation of the pure shining universal of 
 our knowledge which underlies all its changing modes or 
 modifications of concepts or judgments. This is what is called 
 pure knowledge in which there is neither the knower nor the 
 known. This pure object—subjectless knowledge differs 
 from the pure intelligence or purusha only in this that later 
 on it is liable to suffer various modifications, as the ego, 
 the senses, and the infinite percepts and concepts, etc., con- 
 nected therewith, whereas the pure intelligence remains ever 
 pure and changeless and is never the substratum of any 
 change. At this stage sattva, the intelligence-stuff, is 
 prominent and rajas and tamas are altogether suppressed. 
 It is for this reason that the buddhi or mind is often spoken 
 of as the sattva. Being an absolute preponderance of sattva 
 it has nothing else to manifest, but it is its pure shining self. 
 
 E 
 
50 THE PURE SATTVA 
 
 Both tamas and rajas being mostly suppressed they cannot 
 in any way affect the effulgent nature of this pure shining 
 of contentless knowledge in which there is neither the knower 
 nor the known. 
 
 But it must be remembered that it is holding suspended 
 as it were within itself the elements of rajas and tamas which 
 cannot manifest themselves owing to the preponderance of 
 the sattva. 
 
 This notion of pure contentless consciousness is immediate 
 and abstract and as such is at once mediated by other neces- 
 sary phases. Thus we see that this pure contentless universal 
 consciousness is the same as the ego-universal (asmitamdtra). 
 For this contentless universal consciousness is only another 
 name for the contentless unlimited, infinite of the ego-univer- 
 sal. A quotation from Fichte may here be useful as a com- 
 parison. Thus he says in the introduction to his Science 
 of Ethics: “‘ How an object can ever become a subject, or 
 how a being can ever become an object of representation : 
 this curious change will never be explained by anyone who 
 does not find a point where the objective and subjective 
 are not distinguished at all, but are altogether one. Now 
 such a point is established by, and made the starting point ~ 
 of our system. This point is the Egohood, the Intelligence, 
 Reason, or whatever it may be named.’”* The Vydsa-bhashya, 
 IT. 19, describes it as lingamatram mahattatvam sattimatre 
 mahatc dtmani, and again in I. 36 we find it described as the 
 waveless ocean, peaceful infinite pure egohood. This obscure 
 egohood is known merely as being. This mahat has also 
 been spoken of by Vijiana Bhikshu as the manas, or mind, 
 as it has the function of assimilation (niscaya), Now what 
 we have already said about mahat will, we hope, make it 
 
 * Nothing more than a superficial comparison with Fichte is here in- 
 tended. A large majority of the texts and the commentary literature would 
 oppose the attempts of all those who would like to interpret Samkhya-yoga 
 on Fichtean lines, 
 
MAHAT, MANAS, ASMITAMATRA AND BUDDHI 51 
 
 clear that this mahat is the last limit at which the subject 
 and the object can be considered as one indistinguishable 
 point which is neither the one nor the other, but the source 
 of both. 
 
 This buddhi is thus variously called mahat, asmitamatra, 
 manas, sativa, buddhi and linga, according to the aspects 
 from which this state is observed. 
 
 This state is called mahat as it is the most universal thing 
 conceivable and the one common source from which all other 
 things originate. 
 
 Now this phase of sattva or pure shining naturally passes 
 into the other phase, that of the Ego as knower or Ego as 
 subject. The first phase as mahat or asmitamatra was the 
 state in which the sattva was predominant and the rajas and 
 tamas were in a suppressed condition. The next moment 
 is that in which the rajas comes uppermost, and thus the 
 ego as the subject of all cognition—the subject I—the 
 knower of all the mental states—is derived. The con- 
 tentless subject-objectless “I” is the passive sattva aspect 
 of the buddhi catching the reflection of the spirit of 
 purusha. 
 
 In its active aspect, however, it feels itself one with the 
 spirit and appears as the ego or subject which knows, feels 
 and wills. Thus Patafijali says, in Il. 6: drgdarsanasak- 
 tyorekatmateva asmitd, i.e. the seeming identity of the seer 
 and the perceiving capacity is called asmita-ego. Again in 
 Bhashya, 1.17, we have ekatmmka samvidasmita (knowledge as 
 one identical is asmita) which Vacaspati explains as sa ca 
 dtmanad grahitra saha buddhirekatrmka samvid, i.e. it is the 
 feeling of identity of the buddhi (mind) with the self, the 
 perceiver. Thus we find that the mind is affected by its own 
 rajas or activity and posits itself as the ego or subject as 
 activity. By reason of this position of the “I” as active 
 it perceives itself in the objective, in all its conative and 
 
52 THE EVOLUTION OF THE “IT” 
 
 cognitive senses in its thoughts and feelings and also in the 
 external world of extension and co-existence ; in the words 
 of Paficasikha (II. 5) thinking the animate and inanimate 
 beings to be the self, man regards their prosperity as his own 
 and becomes glad, and regards their adversity as his own 
 and is sorry. Here the “I” is posited as the active entity 
 which becomes conscious of itself, or in other words the 
 “TI” becomes self-conscious. In analysing this notion of 
 self-consciousness we find that here the rajas or element of 
 activity or mobility has become predominant and this pre- 
 dominance of rajas has been manifested by the inherent 
 sattva. Thus we find that the rajas side or “I as active ” 
 has become manifested or known as such, i.e. “I’’ becomes 
 conscious of itself as active. And this is just what is meant 
 by self-consciousness. 
 
 This ego or self-consciousness then appears as the modifica- 
 tion of the contentless pure consciousness of the mind (buddha) ; 
 it is for this reasonthat we see that this self-consciousness is but 
 a modification of the universal mind. The absolute identity 
 of subject and object as the egohood is not a part of our 
 natural consciousness, for in all stages of our actual conscious- 
 ness, even in that of self-consciousness, there is an element 
 of the preponderance of rajas or activity which directs this 
 unity as the knower and the known and then unites them as 
 it were. Only so far as I distinguish myself as the conscious, 
 from myself as the object of consciousness, am I at all conscious 
 of myself. 
 
 When we see that the buddhi transforms itself into the ego, 
 the subject, or the knower, at this its first phase there is no 
 other content which it can know, it therefore knows itself 
 in a very abstract way as the “I,” or in other words, the ego 
 becomes self-conscious ; but at this moment the ego has no 
 content; the tamas being quite under suppression, it is 
 evolved by a preponderance of the rajas ; and thus its nature 
 
EGO A MODIFICATION OF BUDDHI 53 
 
 as rajas is manifested by the sattva and thus the ego now 
 essentially knows itself to be active, and holds itself as the 
 permanent energising activity which connects with itself all 
 the phenomena of our life. 
 
 But now when the ego first directs itself towards itself and 
 becomes conscious of itself, one question which naturally 
 comes to our mind is, “Can the ego direct itself towards 
 itself and thus divide itself into a part that sees and one that 
 is seen?” To meet this question it is assumed that the 
 gunas contain within themselves the germs of both sub- 
 jectivity and objectivity (gundnam hi dvairtipyam vyavasa- 
 yatmkatvam vyavaseyatmakatvam ca. Tativavaisadradi, IIT. 47); 
 the gunas have two forms, the perceiver and the perceived. 
 Thus we find that in the ego the quality of the gunas as the 
 perceiver comes to be first manifested and the ego turns 
 back upon itself and makes itself its own object. It is at this 
 stage that we are reminded of the twofold nature of the 
 gunas. 
 
 It is by virtue of this twofold nature that the subject can | 
 make itself its own object; but as these two sides have not 
 yet developed they are still only abstract and exist but in an 
 implicit way in this state of the ego (ahamkara). 
 
 Enquiring further into the nature of the relation of this ego 
 and the buddhi, we find that the ego is only another phase 
 or modification of the buddhi; however different it might 
 appear from buddhi it 1s only an appearance or phase of it ; 
 its reality is the reality of the buddhi. Thus we see that when 
 the knower is affected in his different modes of concepts and 
 judgments, this too is to be ascribed to the buddhi. Thus 
 Vyasa writes (II, 18) that perception, memory, differentiation, 
 reasoning, right knowledge, decision belong properly to mind 
 (buddhi) and are only illusorily imposed on the purusha 
 (grahanadharanohapohatativajnanabhinwesa buddhau  vartta- 
 mana purushe adhyaropitasadbhavah). 
 
54 THE THREE PHASES 
 
 Now from this ego we find that three developments take _ 
 place in three distinct directions according to the preponder- 
 ance of sattva, rajas or tamas. 
 
 By the preponderance of rajas, the ego develops itself 
 into the five conative senses, vak (speech), pani (hands), 
 pada (feet), payu (organ of passing the excreta) and upastha 
 (generative organ). By the preponderance of sattva, the 
 ego develops itself into the five cognitive senses—hearing, 
 touch, sight, taste and smell; and by a preponderance of 
 tamas it stands as the bhiitadi and produces the five tan- 
 matras, and these again by further preponderance of tamas 
 develops into the particles of the five gross elements of earth, 
 water, light, heat, air and ether. 
 
 Now it is clear that when the self becomes conscious of 
 itself as object we see that there are three phases in it: (i) 
 that in which the self becomes an object to itself; (11) when 
 it directs itself or turns as the subject upon itself as the object, 
 this moment of activity which can effect an aspect of change 
 in itself; (iii) the aspect of the consciousness of the self, 
 the moment in which it perceives itself in its object, the 
 moment of the union of itself as the subject and itself as the 
 object in one luminosity of self-consciousness. Now that 
 phase of self in which it is merely an object to itself is the phase 
 of its union with prakrti which further develops the prakrti in 
 moments of materiality by a preponderance of the inert 
 tamas of the bhiitadi into tanmatras and these again into the 
 five grosser elements which are then called the graéhya or 
 perceptible. 
 
 The sattva side of this ego or self-consciousness which was 
 hitherto undifferentiated becomes further differentiated, 
 specialised and modified into the five cognitive senses with their 
 respective functions of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell, 
 synchronising with the evolution of the prakrti on the tan- 
 matric side of evolution. These again individually suffer 
 
THE MANAS 55 
 
 infinite modifications themselves and thus cause an infinite 
 variety of sensations in their respective spheres in our conscious 
 life. The rajas side of the ego becomes specialised as the active 
 faculties of the five different conative organs. 
 
 There is another specialisation of the ego as the manas 
 which is its direct instrument for connecting itself with the five 
 cognitive and conative senses. What is perceived as mere 
 sensations by the senses is connected and generalised and 
 formed into concepts by the manas; it is therefore spoken 
 of as partaking of both the conative and the cognitive aspects 
 in the Samkhya-karika, 27. 
 
 Now though the modifications of the ego are formed 
 successively by the preponderance of sattva, rajas and tamas, 
 yet the rajas is always the accessory cause (sahakarz) of all 
 these varied collocations of the gunas; it is the supreme 
 principle of energy and supplies even intelligence with the 
 energy which it requires for its own conscious activity. Thus 
 Lokacaryya says in his Tativatraya: ‘“‘the tamasa ego 
 developing into the material world and the sattvika ego 
 developing into the eleven senses, both require the help of the 
 rajasa ego for the production of this development ” (anyabhyam 
 ahamkarabhyam svakaryyopajanane rajasahamkarah sahakari 
 bhavati); and Barabara in his Bhashya writes: “just as a 
 seed-sprout requires for its growth the help of water as 
 instrumental cause, so the rajasa ahamkara (ego) works as the 
 accessory cause (sahakarz) for the transformations of sattvika 
 and tamasa ahamkara into their evolutionary products.” 
 The mode of working of this instrumental cause is described as 
 “‘vajas is the mover.” The rajasa ego thus moves the sattva 
 part to generate the senses; the tamas part generating the 
 gross and subtle matter is also moved by the rajas, agent of 
 movement. The rajasa ego is thus called the common cause 
 of the movement of the sattvika and the tamasa ego. Vac- 
 aspati also says : “though rajas has no separate work by itself 
 
56 THE MANAS 
 
 yet since sattva and tamas (which though capable of under- 
 going modification, do not do their work) are actionless in 
 themselves, the agency of rajas lies in this that it moves them 
 both for the production of the effect.”* And according as the 
 modifications are sattvika, tamasa or rajasika, the ego which 
 is the cause of these different modifications is also called 
 vaikarika, bhiitadi and taijasa. The mahat also as the source 
 of the vaikarika, taijasa and bhiitadi ego may be said to have 
 three aspects. 
 
 Now speaking of the relation of the sense faculties with 
 the sense organs, we see that the latter, which are made up of 
 the grosser elements are the vehicle of the former, for if the 
 latter are injured in any way, the former are also necessarily 
 affected. t 
 
 To take for example the specific case of the faculty of hearing 
 and its organ, we see that the faculty of hearing is seated in 
 the ether (akasa) within our ear-hole. Itis here that the power 
 of hearing is located. When soundness or defect is noticed 
 therein, soundness or defect is noticed in the power of hearing 
 also. When the sounds of solids, etc., are heard, then the 
 power of hearing located in the hollow of the ear stands in need 
 of the resonance.produced in the akaga of the ear. 
 
 This sense of hearing, then, having its origin in the principle 
 of ahamkara, behaves like iron, and is drawn by the sounds 
 originated and located in the mouth of the speaker acting 
 as loadstone, and transforms them into its own successive 
 modifications (viz) and thus senses the sounds of the 
 speaker. And it is for this reason that for every living 
 creature, the perception of sound in external space 
 in the absence of defects is never void of authority, 
 Thus Pancasikha also says, as quoted in Vydsa-bhashya, 
 II]. 41: 
 
 * Tattvakaumudi on Simkhya-karika, 25. 
 Tt Tattvavaisaradi, III. 41. 
 
DIVERGENT VIEWS CONSIDERED 57 
 
 “To all those whose organs of hearing are situated in the 
 same place (at different times) the akasga sustaining the sense 
 of hearing is the same.” The akasa, again, in which the power 
 of hearing is seated, is born out of the soniferous tanmatra, and 
 has therefore the quality of sound inherent in itself. It is by 
 this sound acting in unison that it takes the sounds of external 
 solids, etc. This then proves that the akaéa is the substratum 
 of the power of hearing, and also possesses the quality of 
 sound. And this sameness of the situation of sound is an 
 indication of the existence of akaga as that which is the sub- 
 stratum of the auditory power (srutz) which manifests the 
 sounds of the same class in akasa. Such a manifestation of 
 sound cannot be without such an auditory sense-power. 
 Nor is such an auditory power a quality of prthivi (earth), 
 etc., because it cannot be in its own self both the manifestor 
 and the manifested (vyahngya and vyanjaka), Tattvavarsaradt, 
 III. 41. It is the auditory power which manifests all sounds 
 with the help of the akaga of the sense organ. 
 
 The theory of the gunas was accepted by many others 
 outside the Samkhya-Yoga circle and they also offered their 
 opinions on the nature of the categories. 
 
 There are thus other views prevalent about the genesis of 
 the senses, to which it may be worth our while to pay some 
 attention as we pass by. 
 
 The sattvika ego in generating the cognitive senses with 
 limited powers for certain specified objects of sense only ac- 
 counted for their developments from itself in accompaniment 
 with the specific tanmatras. Thus 
 
 sattvika ego-+sound potential (Sabda-tanmatra)=sense 
 of hearing. 
 
 sattvika ego+touch potential (Spars-tanmatra)=sense of 
 touch. 
 
 sattvika ego-+sight potential (éripa-tanmatra)=sense of 
 vision, 
 
58 THE NAITYAYIKAS’ VIEW 
 
 sittvika ego+taste potential (vasa-tanmatra)=sense of 
 taste. 
 
 sattvika ego-+smell potential (gandha-tanmatra)=sense of 
 smell. 
 
 The conative sense of speech is developed in association 
 with the sense of hearing ; that of hand in association with the 
 sense of touch; that of feet in association with the sense of 
 vision ; that of upastha in association with the sense of taste ; 
 that of payu in association with the sense of smell. 
 
 Last of all, the manas is developed from the ego without 
 any co-operating or accompanying cause. 
 
 The Naiyayikas, however, think that the senses are generated 
 by the gross elements, the ear for example by akasa, the touch 
 by air and so forth. But Lokacaryya in his Tattvatraya holds 
 that the senses are not generated by gross matter but are 
 rather sustained and strengthened by it. 
 
 There are others who think that the ego is the instrumental 
 and that the gross elements are the material causes in the 
 production of the senses. 
 
 The view of the Vydsa-bhashya is, I believe, now quite clear 
 since we see that the mahat through the asmita generates from 
 the latter (as differentiations from it, though it itself exists 
 as integrated in the mahat), the senses, and their correspond- 
 ing gross elements. 
 
 Before proceeding further to trace the development of 
 the bhiitadi on the tanmatric side, I think it is best to refer 
 to the views about the supposed difference between the Yoga 
 and the views of the Samkhya works about the evolution of 
 the categories. Now according to the Yoga view two parallel 
 lines of evolution start from mahat, one of which develops 
 into the ego, manas, the five cognitive and the five conative 
 senses, While on the other side it develops into the five grosser 
 elements through the five tanmatras which are directly 
 produced from mahat through the medium ahamkara. 
 
SAMKHYA AND YOGA VIEWS 59 
 
 Thus the view as found in the Yoga works may be tabulated 
 thus :— 
 Prakrti 
 
 Mahat or Asmitamatra 
 
 | 
 
 rn 
 
 | 
 
 Asmita Tanmatras—d 
 | | | 
 11 senses 5 gross elements 
 The view of the Samkhya works may be tabulated thus -— 
 Prakrti 
 Mahat 
 Ego 
 | 
 11 senses 5 Tanmatras 
 
 5 gross elements 
 
 The place in the Vydsa-bhashya which refers to this genesis 
 is that under viseshdviseshalingamatralingan gunaparvani, II. 
 19. There it says that the four bhtitas are ether, air, fire, 
 water and earth. These are the viseshas (specialised modi- 
 fications) of the unspecialised modifications the tanmatras of 
 sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. So also are the cognitive 
 senses of hearing, touch, eye, tongue, and nose and the conative 
 senses of speech, hand, feet, anus and the generative organ. 
 ' The eleventh one manas (the co-ordinating organ) has for its 
 object the objects of all the above ten senses. So these are 
 the specialised modifications (viseshas) of the unspecialised 
 (avigesha) asmita. The gunas have these sixteen kinds of 
 
60 BHIKSHU’S STATEMENT 
 
 specialised modifications (vseshaparinama). The six un- 
 specialised modifications are the sound tanmatra, touch 
 tanmatra, colour tanmatra, taste tanmatra and smell tan- 
 matra. These tanmatras respectively contain one, two, 
 three, four, and five special characteristics. The sixth 
 unspecialised modification is asmitamatra. These are the 
 81x avisesha evolutions of the pure being, the mahat.. The 
 category of mahat is merely a sign beyond the aviseshas and 
 it is there that these exist and develop. 
 
 In this Vydsa-bhashya the fully specialised ones, viseshas, 
 the grosser elements are said to have been derived from the 
 tanmatras and the senses and manas, the faculty of re- 
 flection are said to have been specialised from the ego or 
 asmita. The tanmatras, however, have not been derived from 
 the ego or asmita here. But they together with asmita are 
 spoken of as the six slightly specialised ones, the five being the 
 five tanmatras and the sixth one being the ego. These six 
 avigseshas are the specialisations of the mahat, the great 
 egohood of pure Be-ness. It therefore appears that the six 
 aviseshas are directly derived from the mahat, after which the ~ 
 ego develops into the eleven senses and the tanmatras into the 
 five gross elements in three different lines. 
 
 But let us see how Yoga-varticka explains the point here :— 
 
 “But like the senses the tanmatras are also special 
 modifications of the ahamkara having specially modified 
 characteristics such as sound, touch, etc., why, therefore, are 
 they not mentioned as special modifications (wseshas)? The 
 answer is that those only are mentioned as special modification 
 which are ultimate special modifications. The tanmatras are 
 indeed the special modifications of theego, but they themselves 
 produce further special modifications, the bhiitas. The 
 aviseshas are explained as the six aviseshas. The tanmatras 
 are generated from the tamasa ahamkara gradually through 
 sound, etc. The category of mahat which is the ground of 
 
VIEW OF NAGESA 61 
 
 all modifications, called also the buddhi, has six evolutionary 
 products called the avigeshas. Though the mahat and the 
 prakrti may also be regarded as the root-causes out of which 
 the tanmatras have evolved, yet the word avisesha is used 
 as a technical term having a special application to the six 
 avigeshas only.” The modifications of these are from the 
 buddhi through the intermediate stage of the ahamkara, as 
 has been explained in the Bhashya, I. 45. 
 
 Thus we see that the Yoga-varitika says that the Bhashya 
 is here describing the modifications of buddhi in two distinct 
 classes, the aviseshas and the viseshas; and that the mahat 
 has been spoken of as the source of all the aviseshas, the five 
 tanmatras and the ego; strictly speaking, however, the 
 genesis of the tanmatras from mahat takes place through the 
 ego and in association with the ego, for it has been so described 
 in the Bhashya, I. 45. 
 
 Nagega in explaining this Bhashya only repeats the view 
 of Yoga-varttika. 
 
 Now let us refer to the Bhashya of I. 45, alluded to by 
 the Yoga-varttika: ‘The gradual series of subtler causes 
 proceeds up to the alinga or the prakrti. The earth atom 
 has the smell tanmatra as its subtle cause; the water atom 
 has the taste tanmatra; the air atom the touch tanmatra ; 
 the akasa atom the sound tanmatra; and of these ahamkara 
 is the subtle cause; and of this the mahat is the subtle 
 cause.” Here by subtle cause (stikshma) it is upadanakarana 
 or material cause which is meant; so the Bhashya further 
 says: “It is true that purusha is the subtlest of all. But 
 yet as prakrti is subtler than the mahat, it is not in that sense 
 that purusha is subtler than prakrti for purusha is only an 
 instrumental cause of the evolution of mahat, but not its 
 material cause.’ I believe it is quite clear that ahamkara 
 is spoken of here as the stikshma anvayikarana of the tan- 
 matras. This anvayikarana is the same as upadana (material 
 
62 DIFFERENTIATION AS INTEGRATED 
 
 cause) as Vacaspati calls it. Now again in the Bhashya of 
 the same sira II. 19 later on we see the linga or the mahat is 
 the stage next to prakrti, it is differentiated from it though 
 still remaining integrated in the regular order of evolution. 
 The six aviseshas are again differentiated while still remaining 
 integrated in the mahat in the order of evolution (parimama- 
 kramaniyama). 
 
 The mahat tattva (linga) is associated with the prakrti 
 (alinga). Its development is thus to be considered as the 
 production of a differentiation as integrated within the 
 prakrti. The six aviseshas are also to be considered as the 
 production of successive differentiations as integrated within 
 the mahat. 
 
 The words samsyshta vivicyante are the most important 
 here for they show us the real nature of the transformations. 
 ““Samsrshta”’ means integrated and “ viicyante” means 
 differentiated. This shows that the order of evolution as 
 found in the Samkhya works (viz. mahat from prakrti, aham- 
 kara from mahat and the eleven senses and the tanmatras 
 from ahamkara) is true only in this sense that these modifica- 
 tions of ahamkara take place directly as differentiations of 
 characters in the body of mahat. As these differentiations 
 take place through ahamkara as the first moment in the 
 series of transformations it is said that the transformations 
 take place directly from ahamkara; whereas when stress 
 is laid on the other aspect it appears that the transformations 
 are but differentiations as integrated in the body of the 
 mahat, and thus it is also said that from mahat the six avises- 
 has—namely, ahamkara and the five tanmatras—come out. 
 This conception of evolution as differentiation within inte- 
 gration bridges the gulf between the views of Yoga and the 
 Samkhya works. We know that the tanmatras are produced 
 from the tamasa ahamkara. This ahamkara is nothing but the 
 tamasa side of mahat roused into creative activity by rajas. 
 
VIEW OF NAGESA 63 
 
 The sattvika ahamkara is given as a separate category pro- 
 ducing the senses, whereas the tamas as bhitadi produces the 
 tanmatras from its disturbance while held up within the 
 mahat.* 
 
 Nagega in the Chayd-vyakhya of II. 19, however, follows 
 the Samkhya explanation. He says: “ The five tanmatras 
 having in order one, two, three, four and five characteristics 
 are such that the preceding ones are the causes of the succeed- 
 ing ones. The sabdatanmatra has only the characteristic of 
 sound, the sparsatanmatra of sound and touch and so on.... 
 All these tanmatras are produced from the tamasa ahamkara 
 in the order of gabda, sparga, etc.”’ This ignores the interpre- 
 tation of the Vydsa-bhashya that the tanmatras are differentia- 
 tions within the integrated whole of mahat through the 
 intermediary stage of the tamasa ahamkara. 
 
 * This was first pointed out by Dr. B. N. Seal in his Physical, Chemical 
 
 and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus in Dr. P. C. Ray’s Hindu 
 Chemistry, Vol. IT. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 EVOLUTION AND CHANGE OF QUALITIES 
 
 Tue order of the evolution of the tanmatras as here referred 
 to 1s as follows :— 
 
 Bhtitadi (tamasa ahamkara) 
 Sabdatanmatra 
 Sparéatanmatra 
 Ripatanmatra 
 Rasatanmatra 
 
 Gandhatanmatra 
 
 The evolution of the tanmatras has been variously described 
 in the Puranas and the Smrti literature. These divergent 
 views can briefly be brought under two headings: those which 
 derive the tanmatras from the bhitas and those which derive 
 them from the ahamkara and the bhttas from them. Some 
 of these schools have been spoken of in the Barabara Muni’s 
 commentary on the Tattvatraya—a treatise on the Ramanuja 
 Philosophy—and have been already explained in a systematic 
 way by Dr. B. N. Seal. I therefore refrain from repeating 
 them needlessly. About the derivation of the tanmaitras all 
 the other Samkhya treatises, the Karika, the Kauwmudi, the 
 Lativavarsdradt, the Sitra and Pravacana-bhashya, the 
 
 64 
 
GENESIS OF THE GROSSER ATOMS 65 
 
 Siddhantacandrikd, Sitrarthabodhini, the Rajamdartanda and 
 the Maniprabha seem to be silent. Further speaking of the 
 tanmatras, Vijfiana Bhikshu says that the tanmatras exist 
 only in unspecialised forms; they therefore can be neither 
 felt nor perceived in any way by the senses of ordinary men. 
 This is that indeterminate state of matter in which they can 
 never be distinguished one from the other, and they cannot 
 be perceived to be possessed of different qualities or specialised. 
 in any way. It is for this that they are called tanmatras, 1.e. 
 their only specialization is a mere thatness. The Yogins 
 alone perceive them. 
 
 Now turning towards the further evolution of the grosser 
 elements from the tanmatras, we see that there are great 
 divergences of view here also, some of which are shown 
 below. Thus Vacaspati says: ‘‘ The earth atom 1s produced 
 from the five tanmatras with a predominance of the smell 
 tanmatra, the water atom from the four tanmAatras excepting 
 the smell tanmatra with a preponderance of the taste tan- 
 matra, and so on”’ (I. 44). 
 
 Thus here we find that the akaga atom (anu) has been 
 generated simply by the akasa tanmatra ; the vayu atom 
 has been generated by two tanmatras, sabda and sparsa, 
 of which the sparga appears there as the chief. The tejas 
 atom has been developed from the gabda, sparga and riipa 
 tanmatras, though the ripa is predominant in the group. 
 The ap atom has been developed from the four tanmatras, 
 Sabda, sparsa, ripa and rasa, though rasa is predominant 
 in the group, and the earth or kshiti atom has been developed 
 from the five tanmatras, though the gandha tanmatra is 
 predominant in the group. 
 
 Now the Yoga-varttika agrees with Vacaspati in all irene 
 details, but differs from him only in maintaining that the 
 akaga atom has been generated from the sgabda tanmatra 
 with an accretion from bhiitadi, whereas Vacaspati says 
 
 F 
 
66 THE GROSS ATOMS 
 
 that the akaga atom is generated simply by the akasa 
 tanmatra.* 
 
 Nagega, however, takes a slihgtly different view and says 
 that to produce the gross atoms from the tanmatras, an 
 accretion of bhiitadi as an accompanying agent is necessary 
 at every step; so that we see that the vayu atom is produced 
 from these three: éabda-+sparsa-accretion from bhitadi. 
 Tejas atom =sabda -+Sparga --riipa +accretion from bhitadi. 
 Ap atom = gabda + sparéa + riipa + rasa + accretion from 
 bhitadi. Kshiti atom = gabda + sparga -++ rtipa. + rasa ++ 
 gandha -+ accretion from bhitadi. 
 
 I refrain from giving the Vishnu Purdna view which has 
 also been quoted in the Yoga-varttika, and the view of a certain 
 school of Vedantists mentioned in the Tativa-mripana and 
 referred to and described in the Tattvatraya, as Dr. B. N. 
 Seal has already described them in his article. 
 
 We see thus that from bhtitadi come the five tanmatras 
 which can be compared to the Vaiseshika atoms as they 
 have no parts and neither grossness nor visible differentiation. T 
 Some differentiation has of course already begun in the 
 tanmatras, as they are called Sabda, Sparga, riipa, rasa and 
 gandha, which therefore may be said to belong to a class akin 
 to the grosser elements of akasa, vayu, tejas, ap and 
 kshiti.t 
 
 The next one, the paramanu (atom), which is gross in its 
 nature and is generated from the tanmatras which exist in 
 it as parts (lanmatravayava) may be compared with the 
 trasarenu of the Vaiseshikas. Thus the Yoga-varttika says : 
 “this is called paramanu by the Vaiseshikas. We however 
 call the subtlest part of the visible earth, earth atoms ” 
 
 * Yoga-varttika, I. 465. 
 
 { I have already said before that Bhikshu thinks that the gunas (except 
 the all-pervading ones) may be compared to the Vaiseshika atoms. See 
 
 Yoga-vartiika, ITI. 52. 
 { Cl. Vyasa-bhashya— sabdadinam mirttisamanajdtiyanam,”’ IV. 14. 
 
 
 
THE GROSS ATOMS 67 
 
 (IV. 14). The doctrine of atoms is recognised ‘both in the 
 Yoga-stitras (I. 46) and the Bhashya (III. 52, IV. 14, etc.). 
 
 Whether Samkhya admitted the paramanus (atoms) or not 
 cannot be definitely settled. The Samkhya-karikad does not 
 mention the paramanus, but Vijfiana Bhikshu thinks that 
 the word “sikshma”’ in K@rikaé, 39, means paramanus 
 (Yoga-varttika IV. 14). Though the word paramanu is not 
 mentioned in the Karika, I can hardly suppose that Samkhya 
 did not admit it in the sense in which Yoga did. For it does 
 not seem probable that Samkhya should think that by the 
 combination of the subtle tanmatras we could all at once 
 have the bigger lumps of bhiita without there being any 
 particles. Moreover, since the Yoga paramanus are the | 
 finest visible particles of matter it could not have been 
 denied by Samkhya. The supposition of some German 
 scholars that Samkhya did not admit the paramanus does 
 not seem very plausible. Bhikshu in Yoga-vdarttika, III. 52, 
 says that the gunas are in reality Vaiseshika atoms. 
 
 The third form is gross air, fire, water, etc., which is said 
 to belong to the mahat (gross) class. I cannot express it 
 better than by quoting a passage from Yoga-varttika, IV. 4: 
 “The Bhashya holds that in the tanmatras there exists the 
 specific differentiation that constitutes the five tanmatras, 
 the kshiti atom is generated and by the conglomeration of 
 these gross atoms gross earth is formed. So again by the com- 
 bination of the four tanmatras the water atom is formed and 
 the conglomeration of these water atoms makes gross water.” 
 
 ‘¢ Tt should be noted here: since the Bhdshya holds that the 
 tanmatras of sound, etc., are of the same class as the corre- 
 sponding gross elements it may be assumed that the combining 
 tanmatras possess the class characteristics which are made 
 manifest in gross elements by hardness, smoothness, etc.” 
 Bhikshu holds that since Samkhya and Yoga are similar (sama- 
 natantra) this is to be regarded as being also the Samkhya view, 
 
68 TANMATRAS AND PARAMANUS 
 
 There is, however, another measure which is called the 
 measure of parama mahat, which belongs to akaga for ex- 
 ample. 
 
 Now these paramanus or atoms are not merely atoms of 
 matter but they contain within themselves those particular 
 qualities by virtue of which they appear, as pleasant, un- 
 pleasant or passive to us. If we have expressed ourselves 
 clearly, I believe it has been shown that when the inner and 
 the outer proceed from one source, the ego and the external 
 world do not altogether differ in nature from the inner ; both 
 have been formed by the collocation of the gunas (sarvamidam 
 gunanamn sannwesaviseshamatram). The same book which in 
 the inner microcosm is written in the language of ideas has 
 been in the external world written in the language of matter. 
 So in the external world we have all the grounds of our inner 
 experience, cognitive as well as emotional, pleasurable as well 
 as painful. The modifications of the external world are only 
 translated into ideas and feelings; therefore these para- 
 manus are spoken of as endowed with feelings. 
 
 There is another difference between the tanmatras and the 
 paramanus. The former cannot be perceived to be endowed 
 with the feeling elements as the latter. Some say, however, 
 that rt is not true that the tanmatras are not endowed with 
 the feeling elements, but they cannot be perceived by any save 
 the Yogins ; thusitissaid: tanmdatrandmapi parasparavyavyt- 
 tasvabhavatvamastyeva tacca yogimatragamyam. Thetanmatras 
 also possess differentiated characters, but they can be per- 
 ceived only by the Yogins; but this is not universallyadmitted. 
 
 Now these paramanus cannot further be evolved into any 
 other different kind of existence or tattvantara.* We see 
 that the paramanus though they have been formed from 
 the tanmatras resemble them only in a very remote way and 
 are therefore placed in a separate stage of evolution. 
 
 * Vyasa-bhashya, II. 19. 
 
EVOLUTION WITH THE ATOMS 69 
 
 With the bhiitas we have the last stage of evolution of the 
 gunas. The course of evolution, however, does not cease here, 
 but continues ceaselessly, though by its process no new stage 
 of existence is generated, but the product of the evolution 
 is such that in it the properties of the gross elements which 
 compose its constitution can be found directly. This is what 
 * is called dharmaparinama, as distinguished from the tatt- 
 vintara-parmama spoken above. The evolution of the 
 viseshas from the avigeshas 1s always styled tattvantara- 
 parinama, as opposed to the evolution that takes place among 
 the viseshas themselves, which is called dharmaparindma or 
 evolution by change of qualities. Now these atoms or 
 paramanus of kshiti, ap, tejas, marut or akasa conglomerate 
 together and form all sentient or non-sentient bodies in the 
 world. The different atoms of earth, air, fire, water, etc., 
 conglomerate together and form the different animate bodies 
 such as cow, etc., or inanimate bodies such as jug, etc., and 
 vegetables like the tree, etc. These bodies are built up by 
 the conglomerated units of the atoms in such a way that they 
 are almost in a state of combination which has been styled 
 ayutasiddhavayava. In such a combination the parts do not 
 stand independently, but only hide themselves as it were in 
 order to manifest the whole body, so that by the conglomera- 
 tion of the particles we have what may be called a body, 
 which is regarded as quite a different thing from the atoms 
 of which it is composed. These bodies change with the dif- 
 ferent sorts of change or arrangement of the particles, accord- 
 ing to which the body may be spoken of as “ one,” “ large,”’ 
 “small,” “tangible ’’ or “ possessing ’’ the quality of action. 
 Some philosophers hold the view that a body is really nothing 
 but the conglomeration of the atoms; but they must be 
 altogether wrong here since they have no right to ignore the 
 “body,” which appears before them with all its specific 
 qualities and attributes; moreover, if they ignore the body 
 
70 EVOLUTION WITH THE ATOMS 
 
 they have to ignore almost everything, for the atoms them- 
 selves are not visible. 
 
 Again, these atoms, though so much unlike the Vaiseshika 
 atoms since they contain tanmatras of a different nature as 
 their constituents and thus differ from the simpler atoms of 
 the Vaiseshikas, compose the constituents of all inorganic, 
 organic or animal bodies in such a way that there is no break 
 of harmony—no opposition between them ;—but, on the 
 contrary, when any one of the gunas existing in the atoms 
 and their conglomerations becomes prominent, the other 
 gunas though their functions are different from it, yet do not 
 run counter to the prominent gunas, but conjointly with them, 
 help to form the specific modification for the experiences of 
 the purusha. In the production of a thing, the different 
 gunas do not choose different independent courses for their 
 evolution, but join together and efiectuate themselves in the 
 evolution of a single product. Thus we see also that when 
 the atoms of different gross elements possessing different 
 properties and attributes coalesce, their difference of attri- 
 butes does not produce confusion, but they unite in the 
 production of the particular substances by a common 
 teleological purpose (see Vydsa-bhashya, IV. 14). 
 
 We thus see that the bodies or things composed by the 
 collocation of the atoms in one sense differ from the atoms 
 themselves and in another are identical with the atoms 
 themselves. We see therefore that the appearance of the 
 atoms as bodies or things differs with the change of position 
 of the atoms amongst themselves. So we can say that the 
 change of the appearance of things and bodies only shows 
 the change of the collocation of the atoms, there being always 
 a change of appearance in the bodies consequent on every 
 change in the position of the atoms. The former therefore 
 is only an explicit appearance of the change that takes place 
 in the substance itself; for the appearance of a thing is only 
 
DHARMA-PARINAMA 71 
 
 an explicit aspect of the very selfsame thing—the atoms ; 
 thus the Bhdshya says: dharmisvartiipamatro hi dharmah, 
 dharmurikriya eva eshi dharmadvaré prapaticyate, i.e. a 
 dharma (quality) is merely the nature of the dharmin 
 (substance), and it is the changes of the dharmin that are 
 made explicit by the dharmas.* Often it happens that 
 the change of appearance of a thing or a body, a tree or a 
 piece of cloth, for example, can be marked only after a long 
 interval. This, however, only shows that the atoms of the 
 body had been continually changing and consequently the 
 appearance of the body or the thing also had been continually 
 changing ; for otherwise we can in no way account for the 
 sudden change of appearance. All bodies are continually 
 changing the constituent collocation of atoms and their 
 appearances. In the smallest particle of time or kshana the 
 whole universe undergoes a change. Hach moment or the 
 smallest particle of time is only the manifestation of that 
 particular change. Time therefore has not a separate exist- 
 ence in this philosophy as in the Vaigeshika, but it is only 
 identical with the smallest amount of change—viz. that of 
 an atom of its own amount of space. Now here the appearance 
 is called the dharma, and that particular arrangement of 
 atoms or gunas which is the basis of the particular appearance 
 is called the dharmin. The change of appearance is therefore 
 called the dharma-parinama.t 
 
 Again this change of appearance can be looked at from 
 two other aspects which though not intrinsically different 
 from the change of appearance have their own special points 
 of view which make them remarkable. These are lakshana- 
 parimnamaandavastha-parmama. Taking the particular colloca- 
 tion of atoms in a body for review, we see that all the subse- 
 quent changes that take place in it exist in it only in a latent 
 way in it which will be manifested in future. All the previous 
 
 * Vyasa-bhashya, II. 13. t Ibid. 
 
72 LAKSHANA AND AVASTHA-PARINAMA 
 
 changes of the collocating atoms are not also lost but exist 
 only in a sublatent way in the particular collocation of atoms 
 present before us. For the past changes are by no means 
 destroyed but are preserved in the peculiar and particular 
 collocation of atoms of the present moment. For had not the 
 past changes taken place, the present could not appear. The 
 present had held itself hidden in the past just as the future 
 is hidden within the present. It therefore only comes into 
 being with the unfolding of the past, which therefore exists 
 only in a sublatent form in it. 
 
 It is on account of this that we see that a body comes into 
 being and dies away. Though this birth or death is really 
 subsumed the change of appearance yet it has its own special 
 aspect, on account of which it has been given a separate name 
 as lakshana-parinama. It considers the three stages of an 
 appearance—the unmanifested when it exists in the future, 
 the manifested moment of the present, and the past when it 
 has been manifested—lost to view but preserved and retained 
 in all the onward stages of the evolution. Thus when we say 
 that a thing has not yet come into being, that it has just come 
 into being, and that it is no longer, we refer to this lakshana- 
 parinama which records the history of the thing in future, 
 present and past, which are only the three different mements 
 of the same thing according to its different characters, as 
 unmanifested, manifested and manifested in the past but 
 conserved. 
 
 Now it often happens that though the appearance of a 
 thing is constantly changing owing to the continual change 
 of the atoms that compose it, yet the changes are so fine and 
 infinitesimal that they cannot be marked by anyone except 
 the Yogins ; for though structural changes may be going on 
 tending towards the final passing away of that structure and 
 body into another structure and body, which greatly differs 
 from it, yet they may not be noticed by us, who can take note 
 
DHARMIN AND DHARMA 73 
 
 of the bigger changes alone. Taking therefore two remark- 
 able stages of things, the difference between which may 
 be so notable as to justify us in calling the later the dissolution 
 or destruction of the former, we assert that the thing has 
 suffered growth and decay in the interval, during which the 
 actual was passing into the sublatent and the potential was 
 tending towards actualization. This is what is called the 
 avastha-parinama, or change of condition, which, however, 
 does not materially differ from the lakshana-parinama and can 
 thus be held to be a mode of it. It is on account of this that 
 a substance is called new or old, grown or decayed. Thus 
 in explaining the illustration given in the Bhdshya, III. 13: 
 “there is avastha-parinama. At the moments of cessation 
 the potencies of cessation become stronger and those of 
 ordinary experience weaker.” The Yoga-vdrttika says: 
 “The strength and weakness of the two potencies is like the 
 newness or oldness of a jug; growth and decay being the 
 same as origination and decease, there is no difference here 
 from lakshana-parinama.” 
 
 It is now time for us to examine once more the relation of 
 dharmin, substance, and dharma, its quality or appearance. 
 
 Dharmin, or substance, is that which remains common 
 to the latent (as having passed over or santa), the rising 
 (the present or wdita) and the unpredicable (future or avya- 
 padesya) characteristic qualities of the substance. 
 
 Substance (take for example, earth) has the power of 
 existing in the form of particles of dust, a lump or a jug by 
 which water may be earried. Now taking the stage of lump 
 for examination we may think of its previous stage, that of 
 particles of dust, as being latent, and its future stage as jug 
 as the unpredicable. The earth we see here to be common 
 to all these three stages which have come into being by its 
 own activity and consequent changes. LHarth here is the 
 common quality which remains unchanged in all these stages, 
 
74 DHARMIN AND DHARMA 
 
 and so relatively constant among its changes as particles, 
 lump and jug. This earth therefore is regarded as the 
 dharmin, characterised one, the substance; and its stages 
 as its dharma or qualities. When this dharmin, or sub- 
 stance, undergoes a change from a stage of lump to a stage 
 of jug, it undergoes what is called dharma-parimnama or change 
 of quality. 
 
 But its dharma, as the shape of the jug may be thought 
 to have itself undergone a change—inasmuch as it has now 
 come into being, from a state of relative non-being, latency 
 or unpredicability. This is called the lakshana-parinama of 
 the dharma or qualities as constituting a jug. This jug is 
 again suffering another change as new or old according as 
 it is just produced or is gradually running towards its dissolu- 
 tion, and this is called the avastha-parinama or change of 
 condition. These three, however, are not separate from the 
 dharma-parinama, but are only aspects of it; so it may 
 be said that the dharmin or substance directly suffers the 
 dharma-parinama and indirectly the lakshana and theavastha- 
 parinama. The dharma, however, changes and the lak- 
 shana-parinama can be looked at from another point of view, 
 that of change of state, viz. growth and decay. Thus we see 
 that though the atoms of kshiti, ap, etc., remain unchanged, 
 they are constantly suffering changes from the inorganic to 
 plants and animals, and from thence again back to the in- 
 organic. There is thus a constant circulation of changes in 
 which the different atoms of kshiti, ap, tejas, vayu and 
 akasa remaining themselves unchanged are suffermg dharma- 
 parinama as they are changed from the inorganic to plants 
 and animals and back again to the inorganic. These different 
 states or dharmas (as inorganic, etc.), again, according as they 
 are not yet, now, or no longer or passed over, are suffering 
 the lakshana-parinadma. There is also the avastha-parinama 
 of these states according as any one of them (the plant state 
 
DHARMIN AND DHARMA 75 
 
 for example) is growing or suffering decay towards its dis- 
 solution. 
 
 This circulation of cosmic matter in general applies also to 
 all particular things, such as the jug, the cloth, etc. ; the order 
 of evolution here will be that of powdered particles of earth, 
 lump of earth, the earthen jug, the broken halves of the jug, 
 and again the powdered earth. As the whole substance has 
 only one identical evolution, these different states only happen 
 in order of succession, the occurrence of one characteristic 
 being displaced by another characteristic which comes after it 
 immediately. We thus see that one substance may undergo 
 endless changes of characteristic in order of succession ; and 
 along with the change of characteristic or dharma we have the 
 lakshana-parinama and the avastha-parinama as old or new, 
 which is evidently one of infinitesimal changes of growth and 
 decay. Thus Vacaspati gives the following beautiful example : 
 ‘Even the most carefully preserved rice in the granary 
 becomes after long years so brittle that 1t crumbles into atoms. 
 This change cannot happen to newrice allonasudden. There- 
 fore we have to admit an order of successive changes”’ (Tativa- 
 vavusaradt, IIT. 15). 
 
 We now see that substance has neither past nor future ; 
 appearances or qualities only are manifested in time, by virtue 
 of which substance is also spoken of as varying and changing 
 temporally, just as a line remains unchanged in itself but 
 acquires different significances according as one or two zeros 
 are placed on its right side. Substance—the atoms of kshiti, 
 ap, tejas, marut, vyoman, etc., by various changes of quality 
 appear as the manifold varieties of cosmical existence. There 
 is no intrinsic difference between one thing and another, but 
 only changes of character of one and the same thing ; thus the 
 gross elemental atoms like water and earth particles acquire 
 various qualities and appear as the various juices of all fruits 
 and herbs. Now in analogy with the arguments stated above, 
 
76 COMPARISON WITH DARWIN THEORIES 
 
 it will seem that even a qualified thing or appearance may be 
 relatively regarded as substance, when it is seen to remain 
 common to various other modifications of that appearance 
 itself. Thus a jug, which may remain common in all its 
 modifications of colour, may be regarded relatively as the 
 dharmin or substance of all these special appearances or 
 modifications of the same appearance. 
 
 We remember that the gunas, which are the final sub- 
 stratum of all the grosser particles, are always in a state of 
 commotion and always evolving in the manner previously 
 stated, for the sake of the experience and final realisation of 
 the parusha, the only object or end of the prakrti. Thus the 
 Bhashya, ITI. 13, says: “So it is the nature of the gunas that 
 there cannot remain even a moment without the evolutionary 
 changes of dharma, lakshana and avastha ; movement is the 
 characteristic of the gunas. The nature of the gunas is the 
 cause of their constant movement.” 
 
 Although the pioneers of modern scientific evolution have 
 tried to observe scientifically some of the stages of the growth 
 of the inorganic and of the animal worlds into the man, yet 
 they do not give any reason for it. Theirs is more an experi- 
 mental assertion of facts than a metaphysical account of 
 evolution. According to Darwin the general form of the 
 evolutionary process is that which is accomplished by “ very 
 slight variations which are accumulated by the effect of natural 
 selection.” And according to a later theory, we see that a new 
 species 1s constituted all at once by the simultaneous appear- 
 ance of several new characteristics very different from the old. 
 But why this accidental variation, this seeming departure from 
 the causal chain, comes into being, the evolutionists cannot 
 explain. But the Samkhya-Patafijala doctrine explains it 
 from the standpoint of teleology or the final goal inherent in all 
 matter, so that 1t may be serviceable to the purusha. To be 
 serviceable to the purusha is the one moral purpose in all 
 
TELEOLOGY OF PRAKRTI fii) 
 
 prakrti and its manifestations in the whole material world, 
 which guide the course and direction of the smallest particle 
 of matter. From the scientific point of view, the Samkhya- 
 Patafhijala doctrine is very much in the same position as 
 modern science, for it does not explain the cause of the 
 accidental variation noticed in all the stages of evolutionary 
 process from any physical point of view based on the observa- 
 tion of facts. 
 
 But it does much credit to the Patafijala doctrines that they 
 explain this accidental variation, this avyapadesyatva or 
 unpredicability of the onward course of evolution from a 
 moral point of view, that of teleology, the serviceability of the 
 purusha. They found, however, that this teleology should not 
 be used to usurp the whole nature and function of matter. 
 We find that the atoms are always moving by virtue of the 
 rajas or energy, and it is to this movement of the atoms in space 
 that all the products of evolution are due. We have found 
 that the difference between the juices of Coco-nut, Palm, Bel, 
 Tinduka (Diospyros Embryopteries), Amalaka (Emblic Myro- 
 balan) can be accounted for by the particular and peculiar 
 arrangement of the atoms of earth and water alone, by their 
 stress and strain; and we see also that the evolution of the 
 organic from the inorganic is due to this change of position of 
 the atoms themselves; for the unit of change is the change 
 in an atom of its own dimension of spatial position. There is 
 always the transformation of energy from the inorganic to the 
 organic and back again from the organic. Thus the differences 
 among things are solely due to the different stages which they 
 occupy in the scale of evolution, as different expressions of the 
 transformation of energy ; but virtually there is no intrinsic 
 difference among things sarvam sarvatmakam ; the change of 
 the collocation of atoms only changes potentiality into 
 actuality, for there is potentiality of everything for 
 every thing everywhere throughout this changing world. 
 
78 TELEOLOGY OF PRAKRTI — 
 
 Thus Vacaspati writes: ‘‘The water possessing taste, 
 colour, touch and sound and the earth possessing smell, 
 taste, colour, touch, and sound suffer an infinite variety 
 of changes as roots, flowers, fruits, leaves and their 
 specific tastes and other qualities. The water and the 
 earth which do not possess these qualities cannot have 
 them, for we have proved that what is non-existent cannot 
 come into being. The trees and plants produce the varied 
 tastes and colours in animals, for it is by eating these that they 
 acquire such richness of colour, ete. Animal products can again 
 produce changes in plant bodies. By sprinkling blood on it a 
 pomegranate may be made as big as a palm ” (Tattvavarsaradi, 
 IIT. 14). 
 
 Looked at from the point of view of the gunas, there is no 
 intrinsic difference between things, though there are a thousand 
 manifestations of differences, according to time, place, form 
 and causality. The expressions of the gunas, and the mani- 
 festations of the transformations of energy differ according to 
 time, place, shape, or causality—these are the determining 
 circumstances and environments which determine the modes 
 of the evolutionary process ; surrounding environments are 
 also involved in determining this change, and it is said that 
 two Amalaka fruits placed in two different places undergo two 
 different sorts of changes in connection with the particular 
 spots in which they are placed, and that if anybody inter- 
 changes them a Yogin can recognise and distinguish the one 
 from the other by seeing the changes that the fruits have 
 undergone in connection with their particular points of space. 
 Thus the Bhashya says: “Two Amalaka fruits having the 
 same characteristic genus and species, their situation in two 
 different points of space contributes to their specific distinc- 
 tion of development, so that they may be identified as this and 
 that. When an Amalaka is brought from a distance to a man 
 previously inattentive to it, he naturally cannot distinguish 
 
LIMITATIONS BY TIME AND SPACE (G. 
 
 this Amalaka as being the distant one which has been 
 brought before him without his knowledge. But right know- 
 ledge should be competent to discern the distinction ; 
 and the siitra says that the place associated with one 
 Amalaka fruit is different from the place associated with 
 another Amalaka at another point of space; and the Yogin 
 can. perceive the difference of their specific evolution in 
 association with their points of space ; similarly the atoms also 
 suffer different modifications at different points of space which 
 can be perceived by Igvara and the Yogins”’ (Vydsa-bhashya, 
 IIT. 53). 
 
 Vacaspati again says: “ Though all cause is essentially all 
 effects yet a particular cause takes effect in a particular place, 
 thus though the cause is the same, yet saffron grows in 
 Kasgmira and not in Paficala. So, the rains do not come in 
 summer, the vicious do not enjoy happiness. Thus in accord- 
 ance with the obstructions of place, time, animal form, and 
 instrumental accessories, the same cause does not produce the 
 same effect. Though as cause everything is essentially every- 
 thing else, yet there is a particular country for a particular 
 effect, such as Kasmira is for safiron. Even though the 
 causes may be in other countries such as Paficala, yet the effect 
 will not happen there, and for this reason safiron does not 
 manifest itself in Paficala, Soin summer there are no rains and 
 so no paddy grows then ” (Tattvavarsaradi, III. 14). 
 
 We see therefore that time, space, etc., are the limitations 
 which regulate, modify and determine to a certain extent the 
 varying transformations and changes and the seeming differ- 
 ences of things, though in reality they are all ultimately 
 reducible to the three gunas; thus Kasmira being the 
 country of saffron, it will not grow in the Paficala country, 
 even though the other causes of its growth should all be 
 present there ;—here the operation of cause is limited by 
 space. 
 
80 PLANT LIFE AND ANIMAL LIFE 
 
 After considering the inorganic, vegetable and animal 
 kingdoms as three stages in the evolutionary process, our 
 attention is at once drawn to their conception of the nature of 
 relation of plant life to animal life. Though I do not find any 
 special reference in the Bhdashya to this point, yet I am 
 reminded of a few passages in the Mahabharata, which I think 
 may be added as a supplement to the general doctrine of 
 evolution according to the Samkhya-Patafijala philosophy as 
 stated here. Thus the Mahabharata says: ‘‘ Even the solid 
 trees have ether (akaga) in them which justifies the regular 
 appearance of flowers and fruits. By heat the leaves, the 
 bark, flowers and fruits become withered, and since there is 
 withering and decay in them, there is in them the sensation of 
 touch. Since by the sound of air, fire and thunder the fruits 
 and flowers fall away, there must be the sense of hearing in 
 them. The creepers encircle the trees and they go in all direc- 
 tions, and since without sight there could not be any choice 
 of direction, the trees have the power of vision. By various 
 holy and unholy smells and incenses of various kinds the trees 
 are cured of their diseases and blossom forth, therefore the 
 trees cansmell. Since they drink by their roots, and since they 
 get diseases, and since their diseases can be cured, there is the 
 sense of taste in the trees. Since they enjoy pleasure and 
 suffer pain, and since their parts which are cut grow, I see life 
 everywhere in trees and not want of life’? (Sdnteparva, 184). 
 
 Nilakantha in his commentary goes still further and says 
 that a hard substance called vajramani also may be called 
 living. Here we see that the ancients had to a certain extent 
 forestalled the discovery of Sir J. C. Bose that the life fune- 
 tions differed only in degree between the three classes, the 
 inorganic, plants and animals. 
 
 These are all, however, only illustrations of dharma- 
 parinama, for here there is no radical change in the elements 
 themselves, the appearance of qualities being due only to the 
 
DHARMA-PARINAMA 81 
 
 different arrangement of the atoms of the five gross elements. 
 This change applies to the viseshas only—the five gross 
 elements externally and the eleven senses internally. How 
 the inner microcosm, the manas and the senses are aflected by 
 dharma-parinama we shall see hereafter, when we deal with 
 the psychology of the Samkhya-Patafijala doctrine. For the 
 present it will suffice to say that the citta or mind also suffers 
 this change and is modified in a twofold mode ; the patent in 
 the form of the ideas and the latent, as the substance itself, in 
 the form of samskaras of subconscious impressions. Thus the 
 Bhashya says: ‘The mind has two kinds of characteristics, 
 perceived and unperceived. Those of the nature of ideas are 
 perceived and those inherent in the integral nature of it are 
 unperceived. The latter are of seven kinds and may be 
 ascertained by inference. These are cessation of mental states 
 by samadhi, virtue and vice, subconscious impressions, 
 change, life-functioning, power of movement, and energy ” 
 (IIT. 15). 
 
 This dharma-parinama as we have shown it, is essentially 
 different from the satkaranavada of the aviseshas described. 
 above. We cannot close this discussion about evolution 
 without noticing the Samkhya view of causation. 
 
 We have seen that the Samkhya-Patafijala view holds that 
 the effect is already existent in the cause, but only in a 
 potential form. “The grouping or collocation alone changes, 
 and this brings out the manifestation of the latent powers of 
 the gunas, but without creation of anything absolutely new or 
 non-existent.’ This is the true satkaryyavada theory as 
 distinguished from the so-called satkaryyavada theory of the 
 Vedantists, which ought more properly to be called the 
 satkaranavada theory, for with them the cause alone is true, 
 and all effects are illusory, being only impositions on the cause. 
 For with them the material cause alone is true, whilst all its 
 forms and shapes are merely illusory, whereas according to 
 
 q 
 
82 SAKTI AND SAKTIMAN 
 
 the Samkhya-Patafijala doctrine all the appearances or eflects 
 are true and are due to the power which the substance has of 
 transforming itself into those various appearances and eflects 
 yogyatavacchinna dharminah saktireva dharmah (III. 14). 
 The operation of the concomitant condition or efficient cause 
 serves only to effect the passage of a thing from potency to 
 actualisation. 
 
 Everything in the phenomenal world is but a special 
 collocation of the gunas; so that the change of collocation 
 explains the diversity of things. Considered from the point of 
 view of the gunas, things are all the same, so excluding that, 
 the cause of the diversity in things is the power which the 
 gunas have of changing their particular collocations and thus 
 assuming various shapes. We have seen that the prakrti 
 unfolds itself through various stages—the mahat called the 
 great being—the ahamkara, the tanmatras called the 
 aviseshas. Now the linga at once resolves itself into the 
 ahamkara and through it again into the tanmatras. The 
 abamkara and the tanmatras again resolve themselves into the 
 senses and the gross elements, and these again are constantly 
 suffering thousands of modifications called the dharma, 
 lakshana, and avastha-parinama according to the definite law 
 of evolution (parinamakramaniyama). 
 
 Now according to the Samkhya-Patafijala doctrine, the 
 sakti—power, force—and the éaktiman—the possessor of 
 power or force—are not different but identical. So the prakrti 
 and all its emanations and modifications are of the nature of 
 substantive entities as well as power or force. Their appear- 
 ances as substantive entities and as power or force are but 
 two aspects, and so it will be erroneous to make any such 
 distinction as the substantive entity and its power or force. 
 That which is the substantive entity is the force, and that 
 which is the force is the substantive entity. Of course for all 
 practical purposes we can indeed make some distinction, but 
 
SAKTI AND SAKTIMAN - 83 
 
 that distinction is only relatively true. Thus when we say 
 that earth is the substantive entity and the power which it has 
 of transforming itself into the produced form, lump, or jug 
 as its attribute, we see on the one hand that no distinction is 
 really made between the appearance of the earth as jug and 
 its power of transforming itself into the jug. As this power of 
 transforming itself into lump or jug, etc., always abides in the 
 earth we say that the jug, etc., are also abiding in the earth ; 
 when the power is in the potential state, we say that the jug 
 is in the potential state, and when it is actualised, we say that 
 the jug has been actualised. Looked at from the tanmatric 
 side, the earth and all the other gross elements must be said 
 to be mere modifications, and as such identical with the 
 power which the tanmatras have of changing themselves into 
 them. The potentiality or actuality of any state is the mere 
 potentiality or actuality of the power which its antecedent 
 cause has of transforming itself into it. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 EVOLUTION AND CHANGE OF QUALITIES 
 
 PRAKRTI, though a substantive entity is yet a potential power, 
 being actualised as its various modifications, the aviseshas and 
 the vigeshas. Being of the nature of power, the movement by 
 which it actualises itself is immanent within itself and not 
 caused from without. The operation of the concomitant 
 conditions is only manifested in the removal of the negative 
 barriers by which the power was stopped or prevented from 
 actualising itself. Being of the nature of power, its potentiality 
 means that it is kept in equilibrium by virtue of the opposing 
 tendencies inherent within it, which serve to obstruct one 
 another and are therefore called the avarana Sakti. Of course 
 it is evident that there is no real or absolute distinction be- 
 tween the opposing force (avarana sakti)and the energising force 
 (karyyakart saktc) ; they may be called so only relatively, for 
 the same tendency which may appear as the dvarana sakti of 
 some tendencies may appear as the karyyakari sakts elsewhere. 
 The example chosen to explain the nature of prakrti and its 
 modifications conceived as power tending towards actuality 
 from potentiality in the Vydsa-bhashya is that of a sheet of 
 water enclosed by temporary walls within a field, but always 
 tending to run out of it. As soon as the temporary wall is 
 broken in some direction, the water rushes out of itself, and 
 what one has to do is to break the wall at a particular place. 
 Prakrti is also the potential for all the infinite diversity of 
 things in the phenomenal world, but the potential tendency of 
 all these mutually opposed and diverse things cannot be 
 84 
 
CONCOMITANT CAUSES 85 
 
 actualised together. Owing to the concomitant conditions 
 when the barrier of a certain tendency is removed, it at once 
 actualises itself in its effect and so on. 
 
 We can only expect to get any effect from any cause if the 
 necessary barriers can be removed, for everything is everything 
 potentially and it is only necessary to remove the particular 
 barrier which is obstructing the power from actualising itself 
 in that particular effect towards which it is always potentially 
 tending. Thus Nandi who was a man is at once turned into a 
 god for his particular merit, which served to break all the 
 barriers of the potential tendency of his body towards becom- 
 ing divine, so that the barriers being removed the potential 
 power of the prakrti of his body at once actualises itself in the 
 divine body. 
 
 The Vydsa-bhashya (III. 14) mentions four sorts of con- 
 comitant conditions which can serve to break the barrier in a 
 particular way and thus determine the mode or form of the 
 actualisations of the potential. These are (1) akara, form 
 and constitution of a thing; dega, place, (3) kala, time; thus 
 from a piece of stone, the shoot of a plant cannot proceed, for 
 the arrangement of the particles in stone is such that it will 
 oppose and stand as a bar to its potential tendencies to 
 develop into the shoot of a plant; of course if these barriers 
 could be removed, say by the will of God, as Vijfiana Bhikshu 
 says, then it is not impossible that the shoot of a plant might 
 grow from a stone. By the will of God poison may be turned 
 into nectar and nectar into poison, and there is no absolute 
 certainty of the course of the evolutionary process, for God’s 
 will can make any change in the direction of its Dee 
 (avyavasthitakhilaparinamo bhavatyeva, III. 14). 
 
 According to the Samkhya-Patafijala theory dharma, merit, 
 can only be said to accrue from those actions which lead to a 
 man’s salvation, and adharma from just the opposite course 
 of conduct. When it is said that these can remove the barriers 
 
86 MERIT OR DEMERIT 
 
 of the prakrti and thus determine its modifications, it amounts 
 almost to saying that the modifications of the prakrti are 
 being regulated by the moral conditions of man. According 
 to the different stages of man’s moral evolution, different kinds 
 of merit, dharma or adharma, accrue, and these again 
 regulate the various physical and mental phenomena accord- 
 ing to which a man may be affected either pleasurably or 
 painfully. It must, however, be always remembered that the 
 dharma and adharma are also the productions of prakrti, 
 and as such cannot affect 1t except by behaving as the cause for 
 the removal of the opposite obstructions—the dharma for 
 removing the obstructions of adharma and adharma for those 
 of dharma. Vijfiana Bhikshu and Nagega agree here in 
 saying that the modifications due to dharma and adharma 
 are those which affect the bodies and senses. What they mean 
 is possibly this, that it is dharma or adharma alone which 
 guides the transformations of the bodies and senses of all 
 living beings in general and the Yogins. 
 
 The body of a person and his senses are continually decaying 
 and being reconstructed by refilling from the gross elements 
 and from ahamkara respectively. These refillings proceed 
 automatically and naturally ; but they follow the teleological 
 purpose as chalked out by the law of karma in accordance with 
 the virtues or vices of a man. Thus the gross insult to which 
 the sages were subjected by Nahusha* was so effective a 
 sin that by its influence the refilling of Nahusha’s body and 
 the senses was stopped and the body and senses of a snake 
 were directly produced by a process of refilling from the gross 
 elements and ahamkara, for providing him with a body in 
 which he could undergo the sufferings which were his due 
 owing to the enormity of his vice. Thus by his vicious action 
 
 * Nahusha an earthly king became Indra the king of the gods by the 
 fruition of his virtues, but on account of gross misdeeds fell from Heaven 
 and was turned into a snake. 
 
ISVARA 87 
 
 the whole machinery of prakrti was set in operation so that he 
 at once died and was immediately reborn as a snake. In 
 another place Vacaspati “the virtuous enjoys happiness” as 
 an illustration of the cause of dharma and adharma as 
 controlling the course of the development of prakrti. We 
 therefore see that the sphere of merit and demerit lies in the 
 helping of the formation of the particular bodies and senses 
 (from the gross elements and ahamkara respectively) suited to 
 all living beings according to their stages of evolution and 
 their growth, decay, or other sorts of their modifications as 
 pleasure, pain, and also as illness or health. Thus it is by his 
 particular merit that the Yogin can get his special body or men 
 or animals can get their new bodies after leaving the old ones 
 at death. Thus Yoga-varttika says: “ Merit by removing the 
 obstructions of demerit causes the development of the body 
 and the senses.”’ 
 
 As for Iévara I do not remember that the Bhdshya or the 
 stitras ever mention Him as having anything to do with the 
 controlling of the modifications of the prakrti by removing the 
 barriers, but all the later commentators agree in holding him 
 responsible for the removal of all barriers in the way of prakrtis 
 development. So that Iévara is the root cause of all the 
 removal of barriers, including those that are affected by merit 
 and demerit. Thus Vacaspati says (IV. 3): Isvarasyapi 
 dharmadhishthanartham pratibandhapanaya eva vyadparo, i.e. 
 God stands as the cause of the removal of such obstacles in the 
 prakrti as may lead to the fruition of merit or demerit. 
 
 Yoga-varttika and Nagega agree in holding [évara responsible 
 for the removal of all obstacles in the way of the evolution of 
 prakrti. Thus Bhikshu says that God rouses prakrti by 
 breaking the opposing forces of the state of equilibrium and 
 also of the course of evolution (IV. 3). 3 
 
 It is on account of God that we can do good or bad actions 
 and thus acquire merit or demerit. Of course God is not 
 
88 ISVARA 
 
 active and cannot cause any motion in prakrti. But He by His 
 very presence causes the obstacles, as the barriers in the way of 
 prakrti’s development, to be removed, in such a way that He 
 stands ultimately responsible for the removal of all obstacles 
 in the way of prakrti’s development and thus also of all 
 obstacles in the way of men’s performance of good or bad 
 deeds. Man’s good or bad deeds ‘“‘ punyakarma,” apunya- 
 arma, dharma or adharma serve to remove the obstacles 
 of prakrti in such a way as to result in pleasurable or painful 
 effects ; but it is by God’s help that the barriers of prakrti are 
 removed and it yields itself in such a way that a man may 
 perform good or bad deeds according to his desire. Nilakantha, 
 however, by his quotations in explanation of 300/2, Santvparva, 
 leads us to suppose that he regards God’s will as wholly 
 responsible for the performance of our good or bad actions. 
 For if we lay stress on his quotation “‘ He makes him do good 
 deeds whom He wants to raise, and He makes him commit bad 
 deeds whom He wants to throw down,” it appears that he 
 whom God wants to raise is made to perform good actions and 
 he whom God wants to throw downwards is made to commit 
 bad actions. But this seems to be a very bold idea, as it 
 will altogether nullify the least vestige of freedom in and 
 responsibility for our actions and is unsupported by the 
 evidence of other commentators. Vijfiiana Bhikshu also says 
 with reference to this grutiin his Vaynanamrta-bhashya, IIT. 33 : 
 “* As there is an infinite regressus between the causal connection 
 of seed and shoot, so one karma is being determined by the 
 . previous karma andso on; there is no beginning to this chain.” 
 So we take the superintendence of merits and demerits (dharm- 
 ddhispthanata) by Iévara to mean only in a general way the 
 help that is offered by Him in removing the obstructions of the 
 external world in such a manner that it may be possible for a 
 man to perform practically meritorious acts in the external 
 world. 
 
POSITION OF ISVARA — 89 
 
 Nilakantha commenting on the Yoga view says that “like 
 a piece of magnet, God though inactive, may by His very 
 presence stir up prakrti and help His devotees. So the Yoga 
 holds that for the granting of emancipation God has to be 
 admitted ” (Sdntiparva, 300/2). 
 
 In support of our view we also find that it is by God’s 
 influence that the unalterable nature of the external world 
 is held fast and a limit imposed on the powers of man in 
 producing changes in the external world. Thus Vacaspati in 
 explaining the Bhashya (III. 45) says: “Though capable of 
 doing it, yet he does not change the order of things, because 
 another earlier omnipotent being had wished the things to be 
 such as they were. They would not disobey the orders of the 
 omnipotent God.” 
 
 Men may indeed acquire unlimited powers of producing 
 any changes they like, for the powers of objects as they 
 change according to the difference of class, space, time and 
 condition, are not permanent, and so it is proper that they 
 should act in accordance with the desire of the Yogin; but 
 there is a limit to men’s will by the command of God—thus 
 far and no further. 
 
 Another point in our favour is that the Yoga philosophy 
 differs from the Samkhya mainly in this that the purushartha 
 or serviceability to the purusha is only the aim or end of the 
 evolution of prakrti and not actually the agent which removes 
 the obstacles of the prakrti in such a way as to determine its 
 course as this cosmical process of evolution. Purushartha, is 
 indeed the aim for which the process of evolution exists ; for 
 this manifold evolution in its entirety affects the interests of 
 the purusha alone ; but that does not prove that its teleology 
 can really guide the evolution on its particular lines so as to 
 ensure the best possible mode of serving all the interests of the 
 purusha, for this teleology being immanent in the prakrti is 
 essentially non-intelligent. Thus Vacaspati says: ‘The 
 
90 RECAPITULATION 
 
 fulfilment of the purpose of the purusha is not also the prime 
 mover. God has the fulfilment of the purpose of the purusha as 
 His own purpose, for which He behaves as the prime mover. 
 The fulfilment of the purpose of the purusha may be regarded 
 as cause only in the sense that it is the object in view of God, 
 the prime mover.”’* 
 
 The Samkhya, however, hopes that this immanent purpose 
 in prakrti acts like a blind instinct and is able to guide the 
 course of its evolution in all its manifold lines in accordance 
 with the best possible service of the purusha. 
 
 The Patafjala view, as we have seen, maintains that 
 Ivara removes all obstacles of prakrti in such a way that this 
 purpose may find scope for its realisation. Thus Sutrartha- 
 bodhini, IV. 3, of Narayana Tirtha says: “According to 
 atheistic Samkhya the future serviceability of purusha alone 
 is the mover of prakrti. But with us theists the serviceability 
 of purusha is the object for which prakrti moves. It is merely 
 as an object that the serviceability of the purusha may be said 
 to be the mover of the prakrti.”’ 
 
 As regards the connection of prakrti and purusha, however, 
 both Samkhya and Patafijala agree according to Vijfiana 
 Bhikshu in denying the interference of Isvara; it is the 
 movement of prakrti by virtue of immanent purpose that 
 connects itself naturally with the purusha. Vijiana Bhikshu’s 
 own view, however, is that this union is brought about by God 
 (Vijnanamyta-bhashya, p. 34). 
 
 To recapitulate, we see that there is an immanent purpose 
 in prakrti which connects it with the purushas. This purpose 
 is, however, blind and cannot choose the suitable lines of 
 development and cause the movement of Prakrti along them 
 for its fullest realisation. Prakrti itself, though a substantial 
 entity, is also essentially of the nature of conserved energy 
 existing in the potential form but always ready to flow out 
 
 * Tattravaisaradi, IV, 3. 
 
RECAPITULATION 91 
 
 and actualise itself, if only its own immanent obstructions are 
 removed. Its teleological purpose is powerless to remove its 
 own obstruction. God by His very presence removes the 
 obstacles, by which, prakrti of itself moves in the evolutionary 
 process, and thus the purpose is realised ; for the removal of 
 obstacles by the influence of God takes place in such a way 
 that the purpose may realise its fullest scope. Realisation of 
 the teleology means that the interests of purusha are seemingly 
 affected and purusha appears to see and feel in a manifold way, 
 and after a long series of such experiences it comes to under- 
 stand itself in its own nature, and this being the last and final 
 realisation of the purpose of prakrti with reference to that 
 purusha all connections of prakrti with such a purusha at once 
 cease ; the purusha is then said to be liberated and the world 
 ceases for him to exist, though it exists for the other unliber- 
 ated purushas, the purpose of the prakrti with reference to 
 whom has not been realised. So the world is both eternal and 
 non-eternal, i.e. its eternality is only relative and not absolute. 
 Thus the Bhadshya says the question “ whether the world will 
 have an end or not cannot be directly answered. The world- 
 process gradually ceases for the wise and not for others, so no 
 one-sided decision can be true” (IV. 33). 
 
BOOK IJ. ETHICS AND PRACTICE 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 MIND AND MORAL STATES 
 
 Tue Yoga philosophy has essentially a practical tone and its 
 object consists mainly in demonstrating the means of attain- 
 ing salvation, oneness, the liberation of the purusha. The 
 metaphysical theory which we have discussed at some length, 
 though it is the basis which justifies its ethical goal, is not 
 itself the principal subject of Yoga discussion, and is only 
 dealt with to the extent that it can aid in demonstrating 
 the ethical view. We must now direct our attention to these 
 ethical theories. Citta or mind always exists in the form of 
 its states which are called vrttis.* These comprehend all the 
 manifold states of consciousness of our phenomenal existence. 
 We cannot distinguish states of consciousness from conscious- 
 ness itself, for the consciousness is not something separate 
 from its states; it exists in them, passes away with their 
 passing and submerges when they are submerged. It differs 
 from the senses in this, that they represent the functions and 
 faculties, whereas citta stands as the entity containing the 
 conscious states with which we are directly concerned. But 
 the citta which we have thus described as existing only in its 
 states is called the karyyacitta or citta as effect as distin- 
 
 * T have translated both citta and buddhi as mind, The word buddhi 
 is used when emphasis is laid on the intellective and cosmical functions of 
 the mind. The word citta is used when emphasis is laid on the conservative 
 side of mind as the repository of all experiences, memory, etc. 
 
 92 
 
RELATION OF THE KARANACITTA 93 
 
 guished from the karanacitta or citta as cause. These 
 karanacittas or cittas as cause are all-pervading like the 
 akaga and are infinite in number, each being connected with 
 each of the numberless purushas or souls (Chayavyakhyd, 
 IV. 10). The reason assigned for acknowledging such a 
 karanacitta which must be all pervading, as is evident from 
 the quotation, is that the Yogin may have knowledge of all 
 things at once. 
 
 Vacaspati says that this citta being essentially of the 
 nature of ahamkara is as all-pervading as the ego itself 
 (IV. 10). 
 
 This karanacitta contracts or expands and appears as our 
 individual cittas in our various bodies at successive rebirths. 
 The karanacitta is always connected with the purusha and 
 appears contracted when the purusha presides over animal 
 bodies, and as relatively expanded when he presides over 
 human bodies, and more expanded when he presides over the 
 bodies of gods, etc. This contracted or expanded citta appears 
 as our karyyacitta which always manifests itself as our states 
 of consciousness. After death the karanacitta, which is always 
 connected with the purusha, manifests itself in the new body 
 which is formed by the apira (filling in of prakrti on account 
 of effective merit or demerit that the purusha had apparently 
 acquired). The formation of the body as well as the contrac- 
 tion or expansion of the karanacitta as the corresponding 
 karyyacitta to suit it is due to this apira. The Yoga does 
 not hold that the citta has got a separate fine astral body 
 within which it may remain encased and be transferred along 
 with it to another body on rebirth. The citta being all- 
 pervading, it appears both to contract or expand to suit 
 the particular body destined for it owing to its merit or de- 
 merit, but there is no separate astral body (Tativavaisaradt, 
 IV. 10). In reality the karanacitta as such always remains 
 vibhu or all pervading; it is only its karyyacitta or vrtti 
 
94 THE NATURE OF CITTA 
 
 that appears in a contracted or expanded form, according 
 to the particular body which it may be said to occupy. 
 
 The Samkhya view, however, does not regard the citta 
 to be essentially all-pervading, but small or great according 
 as the body it has to occupy. Thus Bhikshu and Nagega in 
 explaining the Bhashya, “ others think that the citta expands 
 or contracts according as it is in a bigger or smaller body, 
 just as light rays do according as they are placed in the jug 
 or in a room,” attributes this view to the Samkhya (Vydsa- 
 bhashya, TV. 10, and the commentaries by Bhikshu and Nagega 
 on it).* 
 
 It is this citta which appears as the particular states of 
 consciousness in which both the knower and the known are 
 reflected, and it comprehends them both in one state of con- 
 sciousness. It must, however, be remembered that this citta 
 is essentially a modification of prakrti, and as such is non- 
 intelligent ; but by the seeming reflection of the purusha it | 
 appears as the knower knowing a certain object, and we 
 therefore see that in the states themselves are comprehended 
 both the knower and the known. This citta is not, however, 
 a separate tattva, but is the sum or unity of the eleven senses 
 and the ego and also of the five pranas or biomotor forces 
 (Nagesa, IV. 10). It thus stands for all that is psychical in 
 man: his states of consciousness including the living principle 
 in man represented by the activity of the five pranas. 
 
 It is the object of Yoga gradually to restrain the citta 
 from its various states and thus cause it to turn back to its 
 original cause, the karanacitta, which is all-pervading. The 
 modifications of the karanacitta into such states as the kary- 
 yacitta is due to its being overcome by its inherent tamas 
 and rajas ; so when the transformations of the citta into the 
 passing states are arrested by concentration, there takes 
 
 * Tf this is a Simkhya doctrine, it seems clearly to be a case of Jaina 
 influence, 
 
WHO ARE FIT FOR YOGA 95 
 
 place a backward movement and the all-pervading state of 
 the citta being restored to itself and all tamas being overcome, 
 the Yogin acquires omniscience, and finally when this citta 
 becomes as pure as the form of purusha itself, the purusha 
 becomes conscious of himself and is liberated from the bonds 
 of prakrti. | 
 
 The Yoga philosophy in the first chapter describes the Yoga 
 for him whose mind is inclined towards trance-cognition. In 
 the second chapter is described the means by which one with 
 an ordinary worldly mind (vyutthana citia) may also acquire 
 Yoga. In the third chapter are described those phenomena 
 which strengthen the faith of the Yogin on the means of 
 attaining Yoga described in thesecond chapter. In the fourth 
 chapter is described kaivalya, absolute independence or 
 oneness, which is the end of all the Yoga practices. 
 
 The Bhashya describes the five classes of cittas and com- 
 ments upon their fitness for the Yoga leading to kaivalya. 
 Those are I. kshipia (wandering), II. madha (forgetful), II. 
 vikshipta (occasionally steady), IV. ekagra (one-pointed), 
 niruddha (restrained). 
 
 I. The kshiptacitta is characterised as wandering, because 
 it is being always moved by the rajas. This is that citta 
 which is always moved to and fro by the rise of passions, 
 the excess of which may indeed for the time overpower the 
 mind and thus generate a temporary concentration, but 1t 
 has nothing to do with the contemplative concentration 
 required for attaining absolute independence. The man 
 moved by rajas, far from attaining any mastery of himself, 
 is rather a slave to his own passions and is always being 
 moved to and fro and shaken by them (see Siddhanta-candrika, 
 I, 2, Bhojavrtti, I. 2). 
 
 II. The miidhacitta is that which is overpowered by 
 tamas, or passions, like that of anger, etc., by which it loses 
 its senses and always chooses the wrong course. Svamin 
 
96 WHEN SAMADHI COMES 
 
 Harihararanya suggests a beautiful example of such concen- 
 tration as similar to that of certain snakes which become 
 completely absorbed in the prey upon which they are about 
 to pounce. 
 
 IiI. The vikshiptacitta, or distracted or occasionally 
 steady citta, is that mind which rationally avoids the painful 
 actions and chooses the pleasurable ones. Now none of these 
 three kinds of mind can hope to attain that contemplative 
 concentration called Yoga. This last type of mind represents 
 ordinary people, who sometimes tend towards good but 
 relapse back to evil. 
 
 IV. The one-pointed (ekagra) is that kind of mind in which 
 true knowledge of the nature of reality is present and the 
 afflictions due to nescience or false knowledge are thus at- 
 tenuated and the mind better adapted to attain the nirodha 
 or restrained state. All these come under the samprajfiata 
 (concentration on an object of knowledge) type. 
 
 V. The nirodha or restrained mind is that in which all 
 mental states are arrested. This leads to kaivalya. 
 
 Ordinarily our minds are engaged only in perception, 
 inference, etc.—those mental states which we all naturally 
 possess. These ordinary mental states are full of rajas and 
 tamas. When these are arrested, the mind flows with an 
 abundance of sattva in the samprajiiata samadhi; lastly 
 when even the samprajiata state is arrested, all possible 
 states become arrested. 
 
 Another important fact which must be noted is the relation 
 of the actual states of mind called the vrttis with the latent 
 states called the samskaras—the potency. When a particular 
 mental state passes away into another, it is not altogether 
 lost, but is preserved in the mind in a latent form as a sam- 
 skara, which is always trying to manifest itself in actuality. 
 The vrttis or actual states are thus both generating the 
 samskaras and are also always tending to manifest them- 
 
AVIDYA 97 
 
 selves and actually generating similar vrttis or actual states. 
 There is a circulation from vrttis to samskaras and from them 
 again to vrttis (samskarah vrttibhih kriyante, samskaraisea 
 vrttayah evam vyttisamskdracakramanigamavartiate). So the 
 formation of samskaras and their conservation are gradually 
 being strengthened by the habit of similar vrttis or actual 
 states, and their continuity is again guaranteed by the strength 
 and continuity of these samskaras. The samskaras are like 
 roots striking deep into the soil and growing with the growth 
 of the plant above, but even when the plant above the soil 
 is destroyed, the roots remain undisturbed and may again 
 shoot forth as plants whenever they obtain a favourable 
 season. Thus it is not enough for a Yogin to arrest any 
 particular class of mental states ; he must attain such a habit 
 of restraint that the samskara thus generated is able to over- 
 come, weaken and destroy the samskara of those actual states 
 which he has arrested by his contemplation. Unless restrained 
 by such a habit, the samskara of cessation (nirodhaja sam- 
 skara) which is opposed to the previously acquired mental 
 states become powerful and destroy the latter, these are 
 sure to shoot forth again in favourable season into their 
 corresponding actual states. 
 
 The conception of avidya or nescience is here not negative 
 but has a definite positive aspect. It means that kind of 
 knowledge which is opposed to true knowledge (vidyavipari- 
 tam jnanantaramavidya). This is of four kinds: (1) The thinking 
 of the non-eternal world, which is merely an effect, as eternal. 
 (2) The thinking of the impure as the pure, as for example 
 the attraction that a woman’s body may have for a man 
 leading him to think the impure body pure. (3) The thinking 
 of vice as virtue, of the undesirable as the desirable, of pain 
 as pleasure. We know that for a Yogin every phenomenal 
 state of existence is painful (II. 15). A Yogin knows that 
 attachment (raga) to sensual and other objects can only give 
 
 BH 
 
98 PAINFULNESS BY SAMSKARAS 
 
 temporary pleasure, for it is sure to be soon turned into pain. 
 Enjoyment can never bring satisfaction, but only involves a 
 man further and further in sorrows. (4) Considering the non- 
 self, e.g. the body as the self. This causes a feeling of being 
 injured on the injury of the body. 
 
 At the moment of enjoyment there is always present 
 suffering from pain in the form of aversion to pain; for the 
 tendency to aversion from pain can only result from the 
 incipient memory of previous sufferings. Of course this is 
 also a case of pleasure turned into pain (parinamaduhkhata), 
 but it differs from it in this that in the case of parinamaduhkha 
 pleasure is turned into pain as a result of change or parinama 
 in the future, whereas in this case the anxiety as to pain is 
 a thing of the present, happening at one and the same time 
 that a man is enjoying pleasure. 
 
 Enjoyment of pleasure or suffering from pain causes those 
 impressions called samskara or potencies, and these again 
 when aided by association naturally create their memory and 
 thence comes attachment or aversion, then again action, and 
 again pleasure and pain and hence impressions, memory, 
 attachment or aversion, and again action and so forth. 
 
 All states are modifications of the three gunas ; in each one 
 of them the functions of all the three gunas are seen, contrary 
 to one another. These contraries are observable in their 
 developed forms, for the gunas are seen to abide in various 
 proportions and compose all our mental states. Thus a Yogin 
 who wishes to be released from pain once for all is very sensi- 
 tive and anxious to avoid even our so-called pleasures. The 
 wise are like the eye-ball. As a thread of wool thrown into 
 the eye pains by merely touching it, but not when it comes 
 into contact with any other organ, so the Yogin is as 
 tender as the eye-ball, when others are insensible of pain. 
 Ordinary persons, however, who have again and again suffered 
 pains as the consequence of their own karma, and who again 
 
AVIDYA—OF HOW MANY KINDS 99 
 
 seek them after having given them up, are all round 
 pierced through as it were by nescience, their minds become 
 full of afflictions, variegated by the eternal residua of the 
 passions. They follow in the wake of the “I” and the 
 “Mine” in relation to things that should be left apart, 
 pursuing threefold pain in repeated births, due to ex- 
 ternal and internal causes. The Yogin seeing himself and 
 the world of living beings surrounded by the eternal flow 
 of pain, turns for refuge to right knowledge, cause of the 
 destruction of all pains (Vydsa-bhashya, I. 15). 
 
 Thinking of the mind and body and the objects of the 
 external world as the true self and feeling affected by their 
 change is avidya (false knowledge). 
 
 The modifications that this avidya suffers may be sum- 
 marised under four heads. 
 
 I, The ego, which, as described above, springs from the 
 identification of the buddhi with the purusha. 
 
 II. From this ego springs attachment (rdéga) which 1s 
 the inclination towards pleasure and consequently towards 
 the means necessary for attaining it in a person who has 
 previously experienced pleasures and remembers them. 
 
 II. Repulsion from pain also springs from the ego and is 
 of the nature of anxiety for its removal; anger at pain and 
 the means which produces pain, remains in the mind in conse- 
 quence of the feeling of pain, in the case of him who has felt 
 and remembers pain. 
 
 IV. Love of life also springs from the ego. This feeling 
 exists in all persons and appears in a positive aspect in the 
 form “‘ would that I were never to cease.”’ This is due to the 
 painful experience of death in some previous existence, which 
 abides in us as a residual potency (vdsand) and causes the 
 instincts of self-preservation, fear of death and love of life. 
 These modifications including avidya are called the five 
 klegas or afflictions. 
 
100 AVIDYA AND ITS EFFECTS 
 
 We are now in a position to see the far-reaching effects of 
 the identification of the purusha with the buddhi. We have 
 already seen how it has generated the macrocosm or external 
 world on the one hand, and manas and the senses on the other. 
 Now we see that from it also spring attachment to pleasure, 
 aversion from pain and love of life, motives observable in 
 most of our states of consciousness, which are therefore called 
 the klishta vrtta or afflicted states. The five afflictions (false 
 knowledge and its four modifications spoken above) just 
 mentioned are all comprehended in avidya, since avidya or 
 false knowledge is at the root of all worldly experiences. The 
 sphere of avidya is all false knowledge generally, and that of 
 asmita is also inseparably connected with all our experiences 
 which consist in the identification of the intelligent self with 
 the sensual objects of the world, the attainment of which seems 
 to please us and the loss of which is so painful to us. It must, 
 however, be remembered that these five afflictions are only 
 different aspects of avidya and cannot be conceived separately 
 from avidya. These always lead us into the meshes of the 
 world, far from our final goal—the realisation of our own 
 self—emancipation of the purusha. 
 
 Opposed to it are the vrttis or states which are called 
 unafilicted, aklishta, the habit of steadiness (abhydsa) and 
 non-attachment to pleasures (vairagya) which being antagonis- 
 tic to the afflicted states, are helpful towards achieving true 
 knowledge. These represent such thoughts as tend towards 
 emancipation and are produced from our attempts to conceive 
 rationally our final state of emancipation, or to adopt suit- 
 able means for this. They must not, however, be confused with 
 punyakarma (virtuous action), for both punya and papa 
 karma are said to have sprung from the klegas. There is no 
 hard and fast rule with regard to the appearance of these 
 klishta and aklishta states, so that in the stream of the klishta 
 states or in the intervals thereof, aklishta states may also 
 
THE FIVE VRTTIS 101 
 
 appear—as practice and desirelessness born from the study 
 of the Veda-reasoning and precepts—and remain quite distinct 
 in itself, unmixed with the klishta states. A Brahman being 
 in a village which is full of the Kiratas, does not himself 
 become a Kirata (a forest tribe) for that reason. 
 
 Hach aklishta state produces its own potency or samskara, 
 and with the frequency of the states their samskara is 
 strengthened which in due course suppresses the aklishta 
 States. 
 
 These klishta and aklishta modifications are of five descrip- 
 tions: pramana (real cognition), viparyyaya (unreal cogni- 
 tion), vikalpa (logical abstraction and imagination), nidra 
 (sleep), smrti(memory). These vrttis or states, however, must 
 be distinguished from the six kinds of mental activity men- 
 tioned in Vydsa-bhashya, II. 18: grahana (reception or 
 presentative ideation), dharana (retention), tiha (assimilation), 
 apoha (differentiation), tattvajfiana (right knowledge), ab- 
 hinivega (decision and determination), of which these states 
 are the products. 
 
 We have seen that from avidya spring all the klesas or 
 afflictions, which are therefore seen to be the source of the 
 klishta vrttis as well. Abhyasa and vairagya—the aklishta 
 vrttis, which spring from precepts, etc., lead to right know- 
 ledge, and as such are antagonistic to the modification of the 
 gunas on the avidya side. 
 
 We know also that both these sets of vrttis—the klishta 
 and the aklishta—produce their own kinds of samskaras, the 
 klishta samskara and the aklishta or prajfia samskara. All 
 these modifications of citta as vrtti and samskara are the 
 dharmas of citta, considered as the dharmin or substance. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE THEORY OF KARMA 
 
 THE vrttis are called the manasa karmas (mental work) as 
 different from the bahya karmas (external work) achieved in 
 the exterior world by the five motor or active senses. These 
 may be divided into four classes: (1) krshna (black), (2) 
 Sukla (white), (3) Suklakrshna (white and black), (4) asukla- 
 krshna (neither white nor black). (1) The krshna karmas 
 are those committed by the wicked and, as such, are wicked 
 actions called also adharma (demerit), These are of two 
 kinds, viz. bahya and manasa, the former being of the nature 
 of speaking ill of others, stealing others’ property, etc., and the 
 latter of the nature of such states as are opposed to sraddha, 
 virya, etc., which are called the Sukla karma. (2) The gukla 
 karmas are virtuous or meritorious deeds. These can only 
 occur in the form of mental states, and as such can take place 
 only in the manasa karma. These are graddha (faith), virya 
 (strength), smrti (meditation), samadhi (absorption), and 
 prajfiia (wisdom), which are infinitely superior to actions 
 achieved in the external world by the motor or active senses. 
 The gukla karma belongs to those who resort to study and 
 meditation. (3) The suklakrshna karma are the actions 
 achieved in the external world by the motor or active senses. 
 These are called white and black, because actions achieved in 
 the external world, however good (Sukla) they might be, 
 cannot be altogether devoid of wickedness (krshna), since 
 all external actions entail some harm to other living beings. 
 102 
 
KARMAS 103 
 
 Even the Vedic duties, though meritorious, are associated 
 with sins, for they entail the sacrificing of animals.* 
 
 The white side of these actions, viz.: that of helping others 
 and doing good is therefore called dharma, as it is the cause 
 of the enjoyment of pleasure and happiness for the doer. The 
 krshna or black side of these actions, viz. that of doing 
 injury to others is called adharma, as it is the cause of the 
 suffering of pain to the doer. In all our ordinary states 
 of existence we are always under the influence of dharma 
 and adharma, which are therefore called vehicles of actions 
 (aserate samsarika purusha asmin mti Gsayah). That in which 
 some thing lives is its vehicle. Here the purushas in evolution 
 are to be understood as living in the sheath of actions (which 
 is for that reason called a vehicle or gaya). Merit or virtue, and 
 sin or demerit are the vehicles of actions. All sukla karma, 
 therefore, either mental or external, is called merit or virtue 
 and is productive of happiness; all krshna karma, either 
 mental or external, is called demerit, sin or vice and is 
 productive of pain. 
 
 (4) The karma called aguklakrshna (neither black nor 
 white) is of those who have renounced everything, whose 
 afflictions have been destroyed and whose present body is the 
 last one they will have. Those who have renounced actions, 
 the karma-sannyasis (and not those who belong to the 
 sannyasasrama merely), are nowhere found performing 
 actions which depend upon external means. They have 
 not got the black vehicle of actions, because they do not 
 perform such actions. Nor do they possess the white 
 vehicle of actions, because they dedicate to Igvara the fruits 
 of all vehicles of action, brought about by the practice of 
 Yoga. 
 
 Returning to the question of karmagaya again for review, 
 
 * Compare Paficasikha, svalpasankarah sapariharah sapratyavam- 
 arshah, Tattvakaumudi, 2. 
 
104 KARMASAYA THE KLESAS 
 
 we see that being produced from desire (kama), avarice (lobha), 
 ignorance (moha), and anger (krodha) it has really got at its root 
 the klegas (afflictions) such as avidya (ignorance), asmita 
 (egoisin), raga (attachment), dvesha (antipathy), abhinivesa 
 (love of life). It will be easily seen that the passions named 
 above, desire, lust, etc., are notin any way different from the 
 kleSas or afflictions previously mentioned ; and as all actions, 
 virtuous or sinful, have their springs in the said sentiments of 
 desire, anger, covetousness, and infatuation, it is quite enough 
 that all these virtuous or sinful actions spring from the 
 the klegas. 
 
 _ Now this karmagaya ripens into life-state, life-experience 
 and life-time, if the roots—the afflictions—exist. Not only is 
 it true that when the afflictions are rooted out, no karmasaya 
 can accumulate, but even when many karmasgayas of many 
 lives are accumulated, they are rooted out when the afflictions 
 are destroyed. Otherwise, it is difficult to conceive that the 
 karmagaya accumulated for an infinite number of years, 
 whose time of ripeness is uncertain, will be rooted out! So 
 even if there be no fresh karmagaya after the rise of true 
 knowledge, the purusha cannot be liberated but will be 
 required to suffer an endless cycle of births and rebirths to 
 exhaust the already accumulated karmasgayas of endless lives. 
 For this reason, the mental plane becomes a field for the 
 production of the fruits of action only, when it is watered by 
 the stream of afflictions. Hence the afflictions help the 
 vehicle of actions (karmasaya) in the production of their 
 fruits also. It is for this reason that when the afflictions are 
 destroyed the power which helps to bring about the manifesta- 
 tion also disappears; and on that account the vehicles of 
 actions although existing in innumerable quantities have no 
 time for their fruition and do not possess the power of produc- 
 ing fruit, because their seed-powers are destroyed by intellec- 
 tion. 
 
THE EFFECT OF KARMASAYA 105 
 
 Karmagaya is of two kinds (1) Ripening in the same life 
 drshtajanmavedaniya. (2) Ripening in another unknown 
 life. That punya karmagaya, which is generated by intense 
 purificatory action, trance and repetition of mantras, and 
 that papa karmasgaya, which is generated by repeated evil done 
 either to men who are suffering the extreme misery of fear, 
 disease and helplessness, or to those who place confidence in 
 them or to those who are high-minded and perform tapas, 
 ripen into fruit in the very same life, whereas other kinds of 
 karmasayas ripen in some unknown life. 
 
 Living beings in hell have no drshtajanma karmasaya, for 
 this life is intended for suffering only and their bodies are 
 called the bhoga-sariras intended for suffering alone and not 
 for the accumulation of any karmagaya which could take effect 
 in that very life. 
 
 There are others whose afflictions have been spent and 
 exhausted and thus they have no such karmagaya, the effect of 
 which they will have to reap in some other life. They are thus 
 said to have no adrshta-janmavedaniya karma. 
 
 The karmagaya of both kinds described above ripens into 
 life-state, life-time and life-experience. These are called the 
 three ripenings or vipakas of the karmagaya; and they are 
 conducive to pleasure or pain, according as they are products of 
 punyakarmaégaya (virtue) or papa karmasaya (vice or demerit). 
 Many karmasayas combine to produce one life-state; for 
 it is not possible that each karma should produce one or 
 many life-states, for then there would be no possibility of 
 experiencing the effects of the karmas, because if for each one 
 of the karmas we had one or more lives, karmas, being endless, 
 space for obtaining lives in which to experience effects would 
 not be available, for it would take endless time to exhaust the 
 karmas already accumulated. It is therefore held that many 
 karmas unite to produce one life-state or birth (jati) and to 
 determine also its particular duration (ayush) and experience 
 
106 THE EKABHAVIKA KARMASAYA 
 
 (bhoga). The virtuous and sinful karmagayas accumulated in 
 one life, in order to produce their effects, cause the death of the 
 individual and manifest themselves in producing his rebirth, 
 his duration of life and particular experiences, pleasurable or 
 painful. The order of undergoing the experiences is the order 
 in which the karmas manifest themselves as effects, the 
 principal ones being manifested earlier in life. The principal 
 karmas here refer to those which are quite ready to generate 
 their effects. Thus it is said that those karmas which produce 
 their effects immediately are called primary, whereas those 
 which produce effects after some delay are called secondary. 
 Thus we see that there is continuity of existence throughout ; 
 when the karmas of this life ripen jointly they tend to fructify 
 by causing another birth as a means to which death is caused, 
 and along with it life is manifested in another body (according 
 to the dharma and adharma of the karmagaya) formed by 
 the prakrtyapira (cf. the citta theory described above) ; and 
 the same karmasaya regulates the life-period and experiences 
 of that life, the karmasgayas of which again take a similar course 
 and manifest themselves in the production of another life and 
 s0 on. 
 
 We have seen that the karmagaya has three fructifications, 
 viz. jati, ayush and bhoga. Now generally the karmasgaya 
 is regarded as ekabhavika or unigenital, i.e. it accumulates in 
 one life. Hkabhava means one life and ekabhavika means the 
 product of one life, or accumulated in one life. Regarded 
 from this point of view, it may be contrasted with the vasanas 
 which remain accumulated from thousands of previous lives 
 since eternity, the mind, being pervaded all over with them, 
 as a fishing-net is covered all over with knots. This vasana 
 results from memory of the experiences of a life generated by 
 the fructification of the karmagaya and kept in the citta in the 
 form of potency or impressions (samskara). Now we have 
 previously seen that the citta remains constant in all the 
 
THE VASANA THEORY EXPLAINED 107 
 
 births and rebirths that an individual has undergone from 
 eternity ; it therefore keeps the memory of those various 
 experiences of thousands of lives in the form of samskara or 
 potency and is therefore compared with a fishing-net pervaded 
 all over with knots. The vasanas therefore are not the results 
 of the accumulation of experiences or their memory in one life 
 but in many lives, and are therefore called anekabhavika as 
 contrasted with the karmasgaya representing virtuous and 
 vicious actions which are accumulated in one life and which 
 produce another life, its experiences and its life-duration as a 
 result of fructification (vipaka). This vasana is the cause of 
 the instinctive tendencies, or habits of deriving pleasures and 
 pains peculiar to different animal lives. 
 
 Thus the habits of a dog-life and its peculiar modes of 
 taking its experiences and of deriving pleasures and pains are 
 very different in nature from those of a man-life ; they must 
 therefore be explained on the basis of an incipient memory in 
 the form of potency, or impressions (samskara) of the experi- 
 ences that an individual must have undergone in a previous 
 dog-life. 
 
 Now when by the fructification of the karmagaya a dog- 
 life is settled for a person, his corresponding vasanas of a 
 previous dog-life are at once revived and he begins to take 
 interest in his dog-life in the manner of a dog; the same 
 principle applies to the virtue of individuals as men or as 
 gods (LV. 8). 
 
 If there was not this law of vasanas, then any vasana would 
 be revived in any life, and with the manifestation of the 
 vasana of animal life a man would take interest in eating 
 grass and derive pleasure from it. Thus Nagega says: ‘“‘ Now 
 if those karmas which produce a man-life should manifest the 
 vasanas of animal lives, then one might be inclined to eat 
 grass as a man, and it is therefore said that only the vasanas 
 corresponding to the karmas are revived.” 
 
108 MANIFESTATION OF THE VASANAS 
 
 Now as the vasanas are of the nature of samskaras or 
 impressions, they lie ingrained in the citta and nothing can 
 prevent their being revived. The intervention of other births 
 has no effect. For this reason, the vasanas of a dog-life are at 
 once revived in another dog-life, though between the first dog- 
 life and the second dog-life, the individual may have passed 
 through many other lives, as a man, a bull, etc., though 
 the second dog-life may take place many hundreds of years 
 after the first dog-life and in quite different countries. The 
 difference between samskaras, impressions, and smrti or 
 memory is simply this that the former is the latent state 
 whereas the latter is the manifested state ; so we see that the 
 memory and the impressions are identical in nature, so that 
 whenever a samskara is revived, it means nothing but the 
 manifestation of the memory of the same experiences con- 
 served in the samskara in a latent state. Experiences, when 
 they take place, keep their impressions in the mind, though 
 thousands of other experiences, lapse of time, etc., may 
 intervene. They are revived in one moment with the proper 
 cause of their revival, and the other intervening experiences can 
 in no way hinder this revival. So it is with the vasanas, 
 which are revived at once according to the particular fructifica- 
 tion of the karmagaya, in the form of a particular life, as a man, 
 a dog, or anything else. 
 
 It is now clear that the karmagaya tending towards fructi- 
 fication is the cause of the manifestation of the vasanas already 
 existing in the mind ina latent form. Thus the Stitra says :— 
 “When two similar lives are separated by many births, long 
 lapses of time and remoteness of space, even then for the 
 purpose of the revival of the vasanas, they may be regarded as 
 immediately following each other, for the memories and 
 impressions are the same”’ (Yoga-sitra, IV. 9). The Bhashya 
 says: “‘the vasana is like the memory (smrti), and so there 
 can be memory from the impressions of past lives separated by 
 
DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS 109 
 
 many lives and by remote tracts of country. From these 
 memories the impressions (samskaras) are derived, and the 
 memories are revived by manifestation of the karmagayas, and 
 though memories from past impressions may have many lives 
 intervening, these interventions do not destroy the causal 
 antecedence of those past lives ”’ (IV. 9). 
 
 These vasanas are, however, beginningless, for a baby just 
 after birth is seen to feel the fear of death instinctively, and 
 it could not have derived it from its experience in this 
 life. Again, if a small baby is thrown upwards, it is seen 
 to shake and cry like a grown-up man, and from this it may 
 be inferred that it is afraid of falling down on the ground and 
 is therefore shaking through fear. Now this baby has never 
 learnt in this life from experience that a fall on the ground will 
 cause pain, for it has never fallen on the ground and suffered 
 pain therefrom ; so the cause of this fear cannot be sought 
 in the experiences of this life, but in the memory of past 
 experiences of fall and pain arising therefrom, which is 
 innate in this life as vasana and causes this instinctive 
 fear. So this innate memory which causes instinctive fear 
 of death from the very time of birth, has not its origin in 
 this life but is the memory of the experience of some 
 previous life, and in that life, too, it existed as innate 
 memory of some other previous life, and in that again as 
 the innate memory of some other life and so on to beginning- 
 less time. This goes to show that the vasanas are without 
 beginning. 
 
 We come now to the question of unigenitality—ekabhavi- 
 katva—of the karmasaya and its exceptions. We find that 
 great confusion has occurred among the commentators about 
 the following passage in the Bhdshya which refers to this 
 subject : The Bhdshya according to Vacaspati in IT. 13 reads: 
 tatra drshtajanmavedaniyasya niyatavipdkasya, etc. Here 
 Bhikshu and Nagega read _ tatradyshtajanmavedaniyasya 
 
110 BHIKSHU NAGESA AND VACASPATI 
 
 niyatavipakasya, etc. There is thus a divergence of meaning 
 on this point between Yoga-varttika and his follower Nageéa, 
 on one side, and Vacaspati on the other. 
 
 Vacaspati says that the drshtajanmavedaniya (to be 
 fructified in the same visible life) karma is the only true karma 
 where the karmasaya is ekabhavika, unigenital, for here these 
 effects are positively not due to the karma of any other 
 previous lives, but to the karma of that very life. Thus these 
 are the only true causes of ekabhavika karmagaya. 
 
 Thus according to Vacaspati we see that the adrshtajanma- 
 vedaniya karma (to be fructified in another life) of unappointed 
 fruition is never an ideal of ekabhavikatva or unigenital 
 character ; for it may have three different courses : (1) It may 
 be destroyed without fruition. (2) It may become merged in 
 the ruling action. (3) It may exist for a long time over- 
 powered by the ruling action whose fruition has been 
 appointed. 
 
 Vijiiana Bhikshu and his follower Nagega, however, say that 
 the drshtajanmavedaniya karma (to be fructified in the same 
 visible life) can never be ekabhavika or unigenital for there 
 is no bhava, or previous birth there, whose product is being 
 fructified in that life, for this karma is of that same visible life 
 and not of some other previous bhava or life ; and they agree 
 in holding that it is for that reason that the Bhashya makes no 
 mention of this drshtajanmavedaniya karma ; it is clear that 
 the karmagaya in no other bhava is being fructified here. 
 Thus we see that about drshtajanmavedaniya karma, 
 Vacaspati holds that it is the typical case of ekabhavika karma 
 (karma of the same birth), whereas Vijfiiana Bhikshu holds 
 just the opposite view, viz. that the drhtajanmavedaniya 
 karma should by no means be considered as ekabhavika since 
 there is here no bhava or birth, it being fructified in the same 
 life. 
 
 The adrshtajanmavedaniya karma (works to be fructified 
 
ADRSHTAJANMAVEDANIYA KARMA 11] 
 
 in another life) of unfixed fruition has three different courses: 
 (I) As we have observed before, by the rise of asuklakrshna 
 (neither black nor white) karma, the other karmas—sukla 
 (black), kArshna (white) and suklakrshna (both black and 
 white)—are rooted out. The sukla karmasaya again arising 
 from study and asceticism destroys the krshna karmas without 
 their being able to generate their effects. These therefore can 
 never be styled ekabhavika, since they are destroyed without 
 producing any effect. (II) When the effects of minor actions 
 are merged in the effects of the major and ruling action. The 
 sins originating from the sacrifice of animals at a holy sacrifice 
 are sure to produce bad effects, though they may be minor and 
 small in comparison with the good effects arising from the 
 performance of the sacrifice in which they are merged. Thus 
 it is said that the experts being immersed in floods of happiness 
 brought about by their sacrifices bear gladly particles of the 
 fire of sorrow brought about by the sin of killing animals at 
 sacrifice. So we see that here also the minor actions having 
 been performed with the major do not produce their effects 
 independently, and so all their effects are not fully manifested, 
 and hence these secondary karmasayas cannot be regarded as 
 ekabhavika. (IIT) Again the adrshtajanmavedaniya karma (to 
 be fructified in another life) of unfixed fruition (aniyata vipaka) 
 remains overcome for a long time by another adrshtajanma- 
 vedaniya karma of fixed fruition. A man may for example 
 do some good actions and some extremely vicious ones, so that 
 at the time of death, the karmagaya of those vicious actions 
 becoming ripe and fit for appointed fruition, generates an 
 animal life. His good action, whose benefits are such as may 
 be reaped only in a man-life, will remain overcome until the 
 man is born again as a man: s0 this also cannot be said to be 
 ekabhavika (to be reaped in one life). We may summarise the 
 classification of karmas according to Vacaspati in a table as 
 follows :— 
 
112 ADRSHTAJANMAVEDANIYA KARMA 
 
 Karmasaya 
 | a 
 Ekabhayika Anekabhavika 
 | | 
 Niyata Vipaka Aniyatavipaka 
 (of fixed fruition). | 
 | Adrshtajanmavedaniya 
 
 Drshtajanma- Adrshtajanma- 
 vedaniya vedaniya 
 
 | | | 
 (Destruction) (Mergedinthe (To remain 
 
 effect of the overcome by 
 
 major action.) the influence 
 of some other 
 action.) 
 
 Thus the karmagaya may be viewed from two sides, one 
 being that of fixed fruition and the other unfixed fruition, and 
 the other that of drshtajanmavedaniya and adrshtajanma- 
 vedaniya. Now the theory is that the niyatavipaka (of fixed 
 fruition) karmasaya is always ekabhavika, i.e. it does not 
 remain separated by other lives, but directly produces its 
 effects in the succeeding life. 
 
 Ekabhavika means that which is produced from the 
 accumulation of karmas in one life in the life which succeeds 
 it. Vacaspati, however, takes it also to mean that action 
 which attains fruition in the same life in which it is performed, 
 whereas what Vijfiana Bhikshu understands by ekabhavika 
 is that action alone which is produced in the life immediately 
 succeeding the life in which it was accumulated. So according 
 to Vijiana Bhikshu, the niyata vipaka (of fixed fruition) 
 drshtajanmavedaniya (to be fructified in the same life) action 
 is not ekabhavika, since it has no bhava, i.e. it is not the 
 
ADRSHTAJANMAVEDANIYA KARMA 113 
 
 production of a preceding life. Neither can it be anekabhavika ; 
 thus this niyatavipakadrshtajanmavedaniya action is neither 
 ekabhavika nor anekbhavika. Whereas Vacaspati is inclined 
 to call this also ekabhavika. About the niyatavipaka-adrshta- 
 janmavedaniya action being called ekabhavika (unigenital) 
 there seems to be no dispute. The aniyatavipaka- 
 adrshtajanmavedaniya action cannot be called ekabhavika 
 as it undergoes three different courses described above. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM 
 
 WE have described avidya and its special forms as the klegas, 
 from which also proceed the actions virtuous and vicious, 
 which in their turn again produce as a result of their fruition, 
 birth, life and experiences of pleasure and pain and the 
 vasanas or residues of the memory of these experiences. 
 Again every new life or birth is produced from the fructifica- 
 tion of actions of a previous life; a man is made to perform 
 actions good or bad by the klesas which are rooted in him, 
 and these actions, as a result of their fructification, produce 
 another life and its experiences, in which life again new 
 actions are earned by virtue of the klesas, and thus the cycle 
 is continued. When there is pralaya or involution of the 
 cosmical world-process the individual cittas of the separate 
 purushas return back to the prakrti and lie within it, together 
 with their own avidyas, and at the time of each new creation 
 or evolution these are created anew with such changes as are 
 due according to their individual avidyas, with which they 
 had to return back to their original cause, the prakrti, and 
 spend an indivisible inseparable existence with it. The 
 avidyas of some other creation, being merged in the prakrti 
 along with the cittas, remain in the prakrti as vasanas, and 
 prakrti being under the influence of these avidyas as vasanas 
 creates as modifications of itself the corresponding minds for 
 the individual purushas, connected with them before the last 
 pralaya dissolution. So we see that though the cittas had 
 114 
 
CRITICISM OF AVIDYA 115 
 
 returned to their original causes with their individual nesci- 
 ence (avidyd), the avidya was not lost but was revived at the 
 time of the new creation and created such minds as should 
 be suitable receptacles for it. These minds (buddhi) are 
 found to be modified further into their specific cittas or mental 
 planes by the same avidya which is manifested in them as 
 the klegas, and these again in the karmasgaya, jati, ayush and 
 bhoga, and so on; the individual, however, is just in the same 
 position as he was or would have been before the involution 
 of pralaya. The avidyas of the cittas which had returned to 
 the prakrti at the time of the creation being revived, create 
 their own buddhis of the previous creation, and by their 
 connection with the individual purushas are the causes of the 
 samsara or cosmic evolution—the evolution of the microcosm, 
 the cittas, and the macrocosm or the exterior world. 
 
 In this new creation, the creative agencies of God and 
 avidya are thus distinguished in that the latter represents 
 the end or purpose of the prakrti—the ever-evolving energy 
 transforming itself into its modifications as the mental and 
 the material world; whereas the former represents that 
 intelligent power which abides outside the pale of prakrti, 
 but removes obstructions offered by the prakrti. Though 
 unintelligent and not knowing how and where to yield so 
 as to form the actual modifications necessary for the realisa- 
 tion of the particular and specific objects of the numberless 
 purushas, these avidyas hold within themselves the service- 
 ‘ability of the purushas, and are the cause of the connection 
 of the purusha and the prakrti, so that when these avidyas are 
 rooted out it is said that the purusharthata or serviceability 
 of the purusha is at an end and the purusha becomes liberated 
 from the bonds of prakrti, and this is called the final goal of 
 the purusha. 
 
 The ethical problem of the Patafijala philosophy is the 
 uprooting of this avidya by the attainment of true knowledge 
 
116 PRAINA 
 
 of the nature of the purusha, which will be succeeded by the 
 liberation of the purusha and his absolute freedom or indepen- 
 dence—kaivalya—the last realisation of the purusha—the 
 ultimate goal of all the movements of the prakrti. 
 
 This final uprooting of the avidya with its vasanas directly 
 follows the attainment of true knowledge called prajna, in 
 which state the seed of false knowledge is altogether burnt 
 and cannot be revived again. Before this state, the discrimina- 
 tive knowledge which arises as the recognition of the distinct 
 natures of purusha and buddhi remains shaky ; but when by 
 continual practice this discriminative knowledge becomes 
 strengthened in the mind, its potency gradually grows stronger 
 and stronger, and roots out the potency of the ordinary states 
 of mental activity, and thus the seed of false knowledge 
 becomes burnt up and incapable of fruition, and the impurity 
 of the energy of rajas being removed, the sattva as the mani- 
 festing entity becomes of the highest purity, and in that state 
 flows on the stream of the notion of discrimination—the 
 recognition of the distinct natures of purusha and buddhi— 
 free from impurity. Thus when the state of buddhi becomes 
 almost as pure as the purusha itself, all self-enquiry subsides, 
 the vision of the real form of the purusha arises, and false 
 knowledge, together with the klesas and the consequent 
 fruition of actions, ceases once for all. This is that state of 
 citta which, far from tending towards the objective world, 
 tends towards the kaivalya of the purusha. 
 
 In the first stages, when the mind attains discriminative 
 knowledge, the prajiia is not deeply seated, and occasionally 
 phenomenal states of consciousness are seen to intervene in 
 the form of ‘I am,” “‘ Mine,” “I know,” “I do not know,” 
 because the old potencies, though becoming weaker and 
 weaker are not finally destroyed, and consequently occasion- 
 ally produce their corresponding conscious manifestation 
 as states which impede the flow of discriminative knowledge. 
 
JIVANMUKTA STATE 117 
 
 But constant practice in rooting out the potency of 
 this state destroys the potencies of the outgoing activity, 
 and finally no intervention occurs in the flow of the 
 stream of prajfiia through the destructive influence of 
 phenomenal states of consciousness. In this higher state 
 when the mind is in its natural, passive, and objectless 
 stream of flowing prajfia, it is called the dharmamegha-sa- 
 madhi. When nothing is desired even from dhyana arises 
 the true knowledge which distinguishes prakrti from purusha 
 and is called the dharmamegha-samadhi (Yoga-sttra, 
 IV, 29). The potency, however, of this state of consciousness 
 lasts until the purusha is finally liberated from the bonds 
 of prakrti and is absolutely free (kevali), Now this is the 
 state when the citta becomes infinite, and all its tamas being 
 finally overcome, it shines forth like the sun, which can reflect 
 all, and in comparison to which the crippled insignificant light 
 of objective knowledge shrinks altogether, and thus an 
 infinitude is acquired, which has absorbed within itself all 
 finitude, which cannot have any separate existence or mani- 
 festation through this infinite knowledge. All finite states 
 of knowledge are only a limitation of true infinite knowledge, 
 in which there is no limitation of this and that. It absorbs 
 within itself all these limitations. 
 
 The purusha in this state may be called the emancipated 
 being, jivanmukta. Nagega in explaining Vydsa-bhashya, 
 IV. 31, describing the emancipated life says: “In this 
 jivanmukta stage, being freed from all impure afflictions and 
 karmas, the consciousness shines in its infirmity. The 
 infiniteness of consciousness is different from the infiniteness 
 of materiality veiled by tamas. In those stages there could 
 be consciousness only with reference to certain things with 
 reference to which the veil of tamas was raised by rajas. 
 When all veils and impurities are removed, then little is left 
 which is not known. If there were other categories besides 
 
118 MAHAPRALAYA AND KAIVALYA 
 
 the 25 categories, these also would then have been known” 
 (Chayavyakhya, IV. 31). 
 
 Now with the rise of such dharmamegha the succession 
 of the changes of the qualities is over, inasmuch as they have 
 fulfilled their object by having achieved experience and 
 emancipation, and their succession having ended, they cannot 
 stay even for a moment. And now comes absolute freedom, 
 when the gunas return back to the pradhana their primal 
 cause, after performing their service for the purusha by 
 providing his experience and his salvation, so that they 
 lose all their hold on purusha and purusha remains as he is 
 in himself, and never again has any connection with the 
 buddhi. The purusha remains always in himself in absolute 
 freedom. 
 
 The order of the return of the gunas for a kevali purusha is 
 described belcew in the words of Vacaspati: The gunas as 
 cause and vuect involving ordinary experiences samadhi and 
 nirodha, become submerged in the manas; the manas 
 becomes submerged in the asmita, the asmita in the linga, 
 and the linga in the alinga. 
 
 This state of kaivalya must be distinguished from the state 
 of mahapralaya in which also the gunas return back to 
 prakrti, for that state is again succeeded by later connections 
 of prakrti with purushas through the buddhis, but the state 
 of kaivalya is an eternal state which is never again disturbed 
 by any connection with prakrti, for now the separation of 
 prakrti from purusha is eternal, whereas that in the maha- 
 pralaya state was only temporary. 
 
 We shall conclude this section by noting two kinds of eternity 
 of purusha and of prakrti, and by offering a criticism of the 
 prajna state. The former is said to be perfectly and un- 
 changeably eternal (kitastha nitya), and the latter is only 
 eternal in an evolutionary form. The permanent or eternal 
 reality is that which remains unchanged amid its changing 
 
SEVEN STAGES OF PRAJNA 119 
 
 appearances; and from this point of view both purusha 
 and prakrti are eternal. It is indeed true, as we have seen 
 just now, that the succession of changes of qualities with 
 regard to buddhi, etc., comes to an end when kaivalya is 
 attained, but this is with reference to purusha, for the changes 
 of qualities in the gunas themselves never come to an end. 
 So the gunas in themselves are eternal in their changing or 
 evolutionary character, and are therefore said to possess 
 evolutionary eternity (parinadminityatad), Our phenomenal 
 conception cannot be free from change, and therefore it is 
 that in our conception of the released purushas we affirm 
 their existence, as for example when we say that the released 
 purushas exist eternally. But it must be carefully noted 
 that this is due to the limited character of our thoughts and 
 expressions, not to the real nature of the released purushas, 
 which remain for ever unqualified by any changes or modifica- 
 tions, pure and colourless as the very self of shining intelligence 
 (see Vydasa-bhashya, IV. 33). 
 
 We shall conclude this section by giving a short analysis 
 of the prajfia state from its first appearance to the final release 
 of purusha from the bondage of prakrti. Patafijali says that 
 this prajfia state being final in each stage is sevenfold. Of 
 these the first four stages are due to our conscious endeavour, 
 and when these conscious states of prajia (supernatural 
 wisdom) flow in a stream and are not hindered or interfered 
 with in any way by other phenomenal coscinous states of 
 pratyayas the purusha becomes finally liberated through the 
 natural backward movement of the citta to its own primal 
 cause, and this backward movement is represented by the 
 other three stages. 
 
 The seven prajiia stages may be thus enumerated :— 
 
 I. The pain to be removed is known, Nothing further 
 remains to be known of it. 
 
 This is the first aspect of the prajiia, in which the person 
 
120 SEVEN STAGES OF PRAJNA 
 
 willing to be released knows that he has exhausted all that 
 is knowable of the pains. 
 
 II. The cause of the pains has been removed and nothing 
 further remains to be removed of it. This is the second stage 
 or aspect of the rise of prajfia. 
 
 III. The nature of the extinction of pain has already 
 been perceived by me in the state of samadhi, so that I have 
 come to learn that the final extinction of my pain will be 
 something like it. 
 
 IV. The final discrimination of prakrti and purusha, the 
 true and immediate means of the extinction of pain, has been 
 realised. 
 
 After this stage, nothing remains to be done by the purusha 
 himself. For this is the attainment of final true knowledge. 
 It is also called the para vairagya. It is the highest con- 
 summation, in which the purusha has no further duties to 
 perform. This is therefore called the karya vimukti (or 
 salvation depending on the endeavour of the purusha) or 
 jivanmukti. 
 
 After this follows the citta vimukti or the process of release 
 of the purusha from the citta, in three stages. 
 
 V. The aspect of the buddhi, which has finally finished its 
 services to purusha by providing scope for purusha’s ex- 
 periences and release ; so that it has nothing else to perform 
 for purusha. This is the first stage of the retirement of the 
 citta. 
 
 VI. As soon as this state is attained, like the falling of 
 stones thrown from the summit of a hill, the gunas cannot 
 remain even for a moment to bind the purusha, but at once 
 return back to their primal cause, the prakrti; for the 
 avidya being rooted out, there is no tie or bond which can 
 keep it connected with purusha and make it suffer changes 
 for the service of purusha. All the purusharthata being 
 ended, the gunas disappear of themselves. 
 
FOUR DIVISIONS 121 
 
 VII. The seventh and last aspect of the gunas is that they 
 never return back to bind purusha again, their teleological 
 purpose being fulfilled or realised. It is of course easy to 
 see that, in these last three stages, purusha has nothing to 
 do; but the gunas of their own nature suffer these backward 
 modifications and return back to their own primal cause and 
 leave the purusha kevali (for ever solitary). Vydsa-bhashya, 
 Lies, 
 
 Vyasa says that as the science of medicine has four divisions : 
 (1) disease, (2) the cause of disease, (3) recovery, (4) medicines ; 
 s0 this Yoga philosophy has also four divisions, viz.: (I) 
 Samsara (the evolution of the prakrti in connection with the 
 purusha), (II) The cause of samsara. (III) Release. (IV) 
 The means of release. 
 
 Of these the first three have been described at some length 
 above. We now direct our attention to the fourth. We have 
 shown above that the ethical goal, the ideal to be realised, 
 is absolute freedom or kaivalya, and we shall now consider 
 the line of action that must be adopted to attain this goal— 
 the summum bonum. All actions which tend towards the 
 approximate realisation of this goal for man are called kugala, 
 and the man who achieves this goal is called kugali. It is 
 in the inherent purpose of prakrti that man should undergo 
 pains which include all phenomenal experiences of pleasures 
 as well, and ultimately adopt such a course of conduct as to 
 avoid them altogether and finally achieve the true goal, the 
 realisation of which will extinguish all pains for him for 
 ever. The motive therefore which prompts a person towards 
 this ethico-metaphysical goal is the avoidance of pain. An 
 ordinary man feels pain only in actual pain, but a Yogin who 
 is as highly sensitive as the eye-ball, feels pain in pleasure 
 as well, and therefore is determined to avoid all experiences, 
 painful or so-called pleasurable. The extinguishing of all 
 experiences, however, is not the true ethical goal, being only 
 
122 MEANS OF RELEASE 
 
 a means to the realisation of kaivalya or the true self and 
 nature of the purusha. But this means represents the highest 
 end of a person, the goal beyond which all his duties cease ; 
 for after this comes kaivalya which naturally manifests itself 
 on the necessary retirement of the prakrti. Purusha has 
 nothing to do in effectuating this state, which comes of itself. 
 The duties of the purusha cease with the thorough extinguish- 
 ing of all his experiences. This therefore is the means of 
 extinguishing all his pains, which are the highest end of all 
 his duties; but the complete extinguishing of all pains is 
 identical with the extinguishing of all experiences, the states 
 or vrttis of consciousness, and this again is identical with the 
 tise of prajfia or true discriminative knowledge of the difference 
 in nature of prakrti and its effects from the purusha—the 
 unchangeable. These three sides are only the three aspects 
 of the same state which immediately precede kaivalya. The 
 prajiia aspect is the aspect of the highest knowledge, the 
 suppression of the states of consciousness or experiences, 
 and it is the aspect of the cessation of all conscious activity 
 and of painlessness or the extinguishing of all pains as the 
 feeling aspect of the same nirvija—samadhi state. But when 
 the student directs his attention to this goal in his ordinary 
 states of experience, he looks at it from the side of the feeling 
 aspect, viz. that of acquiring a state of painlessness, and as 
 a means thereto he tries to purify the mind and be moral 
 in all his actions, and begins to restrain and suppress his 
 mental states, in order to acquire this nirvija or seedless state. 
 This is the sphere of conduct which is called Yoganga. 
 
 Of course there is a division of duties according to the 
 advancement of the individual, as we shall have occasion to 
 show hereafter. This suppression of mental states which 
 has been described as the means of attaining final release, 
 the ultimate ethical goal of life, is called Yoga. We have 
 said before that of the five kinds of mind—kshipta, mitidha, 
 
 
 
DIFFERENT ADHIKARINS 123 
 
 vikshipta, ekagra, niruddha—only the last two are fit for the 
 process of Yoga and ultimately acquire absolute freedom. 
 In the other three, though concentration may occasionally 
 happen, yet there is no extrication of the mind from the 
 afflictions of avidya and consequently there is no final release. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 YOGA PRACTICE 
 
 THE Yoga which, after weakening the hold of the afflictions 
 and causing the real truth to dawn upon our mental vision, 
 gradually leads us towards the attainment of our final goal, 
 is only possible for the last two kinds of minds and is of two 
 kinds: (1) samprajfiata (cognitive) and (2) asamprajfata 
 (ultra-cognitive). The samprajfiata Yoga is that in which 
 the mind is concentrated upon some object, external or in- 
 ternal, in such a way that it does not oscillate or move from 
 one object to another, but remains fixed and settled in the 
 object that it holds before itself. At first, the Yogin holds 
 a gross material object before his view, but when he can make 
 himself steady in doing this, he tries with the subtle tanmatras, 
 the five causes of the grosser elements, and when he is success- 
 ful in this he takes his internal senses as his object and last 
 of all, when he has fully succeeded in these attempts, he 
 takes the great egohood as his object, in which stage his object 
 gradually loses all its determinate character and he is said 
 to be in a state of suppression in himself, although devoid of 
 any object. This state, like the other previous states of the 
 samprajhata type, is a positive state of the mind and not a 
 mere state of vacuity of objects or negativity. In this state, 
 all determinate character of the states disappears and their 
 potencies only remain alive. In the first stages of a Yogin 
 practising samadhi conscious states of the lower stages often 
 intervene, but gradually, as the mind becomes fixed, the 
 124 
 
YOGA PRACTICE 125 
 
 potencies of the lower stages are overcome by the potencies of 
 this stage, so that the mind flows in a calm current and at 
 last the higher prajiia dawns, whereupon the potencies of 
 this state also are burnt and extinguished, the citta returns 
 back to its own primal cause, prakrti, and purusha attains 
 absolute freedom. 
 
 The first four stages of the samprajfiata state are called 
 madhumati, madhupratika, visoka and the samskdrasesha 
 and also vidarkdnugata, vicdrinugata, anandanugata and 
 asmiutanugata. True knowledge begins to dawn from the first 
 stage of this samprajiata state, and when the Yogin reaches 
 the last stage the knowledge reaches its culminating point, 
 but still so long as the potencies of the lower stages of relative 
 knowledge remain, the knowledge cannot obtain absolute 
 certainty and permanency, as it will always be threatened 
 with a possible encroachment by the other states of the past 
 phenomenal activity now existing as the subconscious. 
 But the last stage of asamprajfiata samadhi represents the 
 stage in which the ordinary consciousness has been altogether 
 surpassed and the mind is in its own true infinite aspect, 
 and the potencies of the stages in which the mind was full of 
 finite knowledge are also burnt, so that with the return of 
 the citta to its primal cause, final emancipation is effected. 
 The last state of samprajhata samadhi is called samskarasesha, 
 only because here the residua of the potencies of subconscious 
 thought only remain and the actual states of consciousness 
 become all extinct. It is now easy to sce that no mind which 
 is not in the ekagra or one-pointed state can be fit for the 
 asamprajiata samadhi in which it has to settle itself on one 
 object and that alone. So also no mind which has not risen 
 to the state of highest suppression is fit for the asam- 
 prajiata or nirvija state. 
 
 It is now necessary to come down to a lower level and 
 examine the obstructions, on account of which a mind cannot 
 
126 DISTRACTIONS 
 
 easily become one-pointed or ekagra. These, nine in number, 
 are the following :— 
 
 Disease, languor, indecision, want of the mental require- 
 ments necessary for samadhi, idleness of body and mind, 
 attachment to objects of sense, false and illusory knowledge, 
 non-attainment of the state of concentrated contemplation, 
 unsteadiness and unstability of the mind in a samadhi state 
 even if it can somehow attain it. These are again seen to be 
 accompanied with pain and despair owing to the non-fulfilment 
 of desire, physical shakiness or unsteadiness of the limbs, 
 taking in of breath and giving out of it, which are seen to 
 follow the nine distractions of a distracted mind described 
 above. 
 
 To prevent these distractions and their accompaniments it 
 is necessary that we should practise concentration on one 
 truth. Vacaspati says that this one truth on which the mind 
 should be settled and fixed is ISvara, and Ramananda 
 Sarasvati and Narayana Tirtha agree with him. Vijhana 
 Bhikshu, however, says that one truth means any object, 
 gross or fine, and Bhoja supports Vijiana Bhikshu, saying 
 that here “ one truth’ might mean any desirable object. 
 
 Abhyasa means the steadiness of the mind in one state 
 and not complete absence of any state; for the Bhashya- 
 kara himself has said in the samapattisiitra, that sampra- 
 jfata trance comes after this steadiness. As we shall see 
 later, 1t means nothing but the application of the five means, 
 sraddha, virya, smrti, samadhi and prajiia ; it is an endeavour 
 to settle the mind on one state, and as such does not differ 
 from the application of the five means of Yoga with a view to 
 settle and steady the mind (Yoga-varttika, I. 13). This effort 
 becomes firmly rooted, being well attended to for a long time 
 without interruption and with devotion. 
 
 Now it does not matter very much whether this one truth is 
 I$vara or any other object; for the true principle of Yoga is 
 
VAIRAGYA 127 
 
 the setting of the mind on one truth, principle or object. But 
 for an ordinary man this is no easy matter ; for in order to be 
 successful the mind must be equipped with graddha or faith— 
 the firm conviction of the Yogin in the course that he adopts. 
 This keeps the mind steady, pleased, calm and free from 
 doubts of any kind, so that the Yogin may proceed to the 
 realisation of his object without any vacillation. Unless a 
 man has a firm hold on the course that he pursues, all the 
 steadiness that he may acquire will constantly be threatened 
 with the danger of a sudden collapse. It will be seen that 
 vairagya or desirelessness is only the negative aspect of this 
 Sraddha. For by it the mind is restrained from the objects of 
 sense, with an aversion or dislike towards the objects of sensual 
 pleasure and worldly desires; this aversion towards worldly 
 joys is only the other aspect of the faith of the mind and the 
 calmness of its currents (cittaprasdda) towards right know- 
 ledge and absolute freedom. So it is said that the vairagya 
 is the effect of Sraddha and its product (Yoga-varttika, I. 20). 
 In order to make a person suitable for Yoga, vairagya 
 represents the cessation of the mind from the objects of sense 
 and their so-called pleasures, and graddha means the positive 
 faith of the mind in the path of Yoga that one adopts, and the 
 right aspiration towards attaining the highest goal of absolute 
 freedom. 
 
 In its negative aspect, vairagya is of two kinds, apara and 
 para. The apara is that of a mind free from attachment to 
 worldly enjoyments, such as women, food, drinks and power, 
 as also from thirst for heavenly pleasures attainable by 
 practising the vedic rituals and sacrifices. Those who are 
 actuated by apara vairagya do not desire to remain in a 
 bodiless state (videha) merged in the senses or merged in the 
 prakrti (prakrtilina). It is a state in which the mind is in- 
 different to all kinds of pleasures and pains. This vairagya 
 may be said to have four stages: (1) Yatamana—in which 
 
128 VAIRAGYA AND SRADDHA 
 
 sensual objects are discovered to be defective and the mind 
 recoils from them. (2) Vyatireka—in which the senses to be 
 conquered are noted. (3) Ekendriya—in which attachment 
 towards internal pleasures and aversion towards external 
 pains, being removed, the mind sets before it the task of 
 removing attachment and aversion towards mental passions 
 for obtaining honour or avoiding dishonour, etc. (4) The 
 fourth and last stage of vairagya called vasikara is that in 
 which the mind has perceived the futility of all attractions 
 towards external objects of sense and towards the pleasures 
 of heaven, and having suppressed them altogether feels no 
 attachment, even should it come into connection with them. 
 
 With the consummation of this last stage of apara vairagya, 
 comes the para vairagya which is identical with the rise of 
 the final prajfia leading to absolute independence. This 
 vairagya, Sraddha and the abhyasa represent the unafilicted 
 states (aklishtavrtti) which suppress gradually the klishta or 
 afflicted mental states. These lead the Yogin from one stage 
 to another, and thus he proceeds higher and higher until the 
 final state is attained. 
 
 As vairagya advances, sraddha also advances; from 
 sraddha comes virya, energy, or power of concentration 
 (dharand) ; and from it again springs smrti—or continuity of 
 one object of thought ; and from it comes samadhi or cog- 
 nitive and ultra-cognitive trance ; after which follows prajfia, 
 cognitive and ultra-cognitive trance; after which follows 
 prajfia and final release. Thus by the inclusion of graddha 
 within vairagya, its effect, and the other products of graddha 
 with abhyasa, we see that the abhyasa and vairagya are the 
 two internal means for achieving the final goal of the Yogin, 
 the supreme suppression and extinction of all states of 
 consciousness, of all afflictions and the avidya—the last state 
 of supreme knowledge or prajna. 
 
 As Sraddha, virya, smrti, samadhi which are not different 
 
PARIKARMAS AND KRIYA-YOGAS 129 
 
 from vairagya and abhyasa (they being only their other 
 aspects or simultaneous products), are the means of attaining 
 Yoga, it is possible to make a classification of the Yogins 
 according to the strength of these with each, and the strength 
 of the quickness (samvega) with which they may be applied 
 towards attaining the goal of the Yogin. Thus Yogins are of 
 nine kinds :— 
 
 (1) mildly energetic, (2) of medium energy, (3) of intense 
 energy. 
 
 Hach of these may vary in a threefold way according to the 
 mildness, medium state, or intensity of quickness or readiness 
 with which the Yogin may apply the means of attaining Yoga. 
 There are nine kinds of Yogins. Of these the best is he whose 
 mind is most intensely engaged and whose practice is also the 
 strongest. 
 
 There is a difference of opinion here about the meaning of 
 the word samvega, between Vacaspati and Vijnana Bhikshu. 
 The former says that samvega means vairagya here, but the 
 latter holds that samvega cannot mean vairagya, and 
 vairagya being the effect of graddha cannot be taken separately 
 from it. “Samvega’’ means quickness in the performance 
 of the means of attaining Yoga; some say that it means 
 “ vairagya.” But that is not true, for if vairagya is an effect 
 of the due performance of the means of Yoga, there cannot be 
 the separate ninefold classification of Yoga apart from the 
 various degrees of intensity of the means of Yoga practice. 
 Further, the word “‘samvega”’ does not mean “ vairagya ”’ 
 etymologically (Yoga-variteka, I. 20). 
 
 We have just seen that sraddha, etc., are the means of 
 attaining Yoga, but we have not discussed what purificatory 
 actions an ordinary man must perform in order to attain srad- 
 dha, from which the other requisites are derived. Of course 
 these purificatory actions are not the same for all, since they 
 must necessarily depend upon the conditions of purity or 
 
 K 
 
130 PARIKARMAS AND KRIYA-YOGAS 
 
 impurity of each mind ; thus a person already in an advanced 
 state, may not need to perform those purificatory actions nec- 
 essary fora maninalowerstate. We have justsaid that Yogins 
 are of nine kinds, according to the strength of their mental 
 acquirements—sraddha, etc.—the requisite means of Yoga 
 and the degree of rapidity with which they may be applied. 
 Neglecting division by strength or quickness of application 
 along with these mental requirements, we may again divide 
 Yogins again into three kinds: (1) Those who have the best 
 mental equipment. (2) Those who are mediocres. (3) Those 
 who have low mental equipment. 
 
 In the first chapter of Yoga aphorisms, it has been stated 
 that abhyasa, the application of the mental acquirements of 
 sraddha, etc., and vairagya, the consequent cessation of the 
 mind from objects of distraction, lead to the extinction of all 
 our mental states and to final release. When a man is well 
 developed, he may rest content with his mental actions alone, 
 in his abhyasa and vairagya, in his dharana (concentration), 
 dhyana (meditation), and samadhi (trance), which may be 
 called the jfianayoga. But it is easy to see that this jianayoga 
 requires very high mental powers and thus is not within easy 
 reach of ordinary persons. Ordinary persons whose minds are 
 full of impurities, must pass through a certain course of 
 purificatory actions before they can hope to obtain those 
 mental acquirements by which they can hope to follow the 
 course of jfianayoga with facility. 
 
 These actions, which remove the impurities of the mind, 
 and thus gradually increase the lustre of knowledge, until the 
 final state of supreme knowledge is acquired, are called 
 kriyayoga. They are also called yogangas, as they help the 
 maturity of the Yoga process by gradually increasing the 
 lustre of knowledge. They represent the means by which 
 even an ordinary mind (vikshiptacitta) may gradually purity 
 itself and become fit for the highest ideals of Yoga. Thus the 
 
PARIKARMAS AND KRIYA-YOGAS 131 
 
 Bhashya says : ‘“‘ By the sustained practice of these yogangas 
 or accessories of Yoga is destroyed the fivefold unreal 
 cognition (avidya), which is of the nature of impurity. Destruc- 
 tion means here disappearance ; thus when that is destroyed, 
 real knowledge is manifested. As the means of achievement 
 are practised more and more, so is the impurity more and more 
 attenuated. And as more and more of it is destroyed, so does 
 the light of wisdom go on increasing more and more. This 
 process reaches its culmination in discriminative knowledge, 
 which is knowledge of the nature of purusha and the gunas. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE YOGANGAS 
 
 Now the assertion that these actions are the causes of the 
 attainment of salvation brings up the question of the exact 
 natures of their operation with regard to this supreme attain- 
 ment. Bhashyakara says with respect to this that they are the 
 causes of the separation of the impurities of the mind just as an 
 axe is the cause of the splitting of a piece of wood ; and again 
 they are the causes of the attainment of the supreme know- 
 ledge just as dharma is the cause of happiness. It must be 
 remembered that according to the Yoga theory causation is 
 viewed as mere transformation of energy; the operation of 
 concomitant causes only removes obstacles impeding the 
 progress of these transformations in a particular direction ; no 
 cause can of itself produce any effect, and the only way in 
 which it can help the production of an effect into which the 
 causal state passes out of its own immanent energy by the 
 principles of conservation and transformation of energy, is by 
 removing the intervening obstacles. Thus just as the passage 
 of citta into a happy state is helped by dharma removing 
 the intervening obstacles, so also the passage of the citta into 
 the state of attainment of true knowledge is helped by the 
 removal of obstructions due to the performance of the 
 yogangas; the necessary obstructions being removed, the 
 citta passes naturally of itself into this infinite state of 
 attainment of true knowledge, in which all finitude is 
 merged. 
 
 132 
 
OPERATION OF THE YOGANGAS 133 
 
 In connection with this, Vyasa mentions nine kinds of 
 operation of causes: (1) cause of birth ; (2) of preservation ; 
 (3) of manifestation ; (4) of modification ; (5) knowledge of a 
 premise leading to a deduction; (6) of otherness; (7) of 
 separation; (8) of attainment; (9) of upholding (Vydsa- 
 bhashya, II. 28.) 
 
 The principle of conservation of energy and transforma- 
 tion of energy being the root idea of causation in this system, 
 these different aspects represent the different points of view 
 in which the word causation is generally used. 
 
 Thus, the first aspect as the cause of birth or production 
 is seen when knowledge springs from manas which renders 
 indefinite cognition definite so that mind is called the cause of 
 the birth of knowledge. Here mind is the material cause 
 (upadana karana) of the production of knowledge, for know- 
 ledge is nothing but manas with its particular modifications as 
 states (Yoga-vartitka, 11.18). The difference of these positive 
 cause from dptikarana, which operates only in a negative way 
 and helps production, in an indirect way by the removal of 
 obstacles, is quite manifest. The sthitikarana or cause 
 through which things are preserved as they are, is the end 
 they serve ; thus the serviceability of purusha is the cause of 
 the existence and preservation of the mind as it is, and not 
 only of mind but of all our phenomenal experiences. 
 
 The third cause of the abhiwyakitkarana or manifestation 
 which is compared to a lamp which manifests things before 
 our view is an epistemological cause, and as such includes all 
 sense activity in connection with material objects which 
 produce cognition. 
 
 Then come the fourth and the fifth causes, vikara (change) 
 and pratyaya (inseparable connection); thus the cause of 
 change (vikdra) is exemplified as that which causes a change ; 
 thus the manas suffers a change by the objects presented to it, 
 just as bile changes and digests the food that is eaten; the 
 
134 OPERATION OF THE YOGANGAS 
 
 cause of pratyaya* is that in which from inseparable connection, 
 with the knowledge of the premise (e.g. there 1s smoke in the 
 hill) we can also have inferential knowledge of the other (e.g. 
 there is fire in the hill). The sixth cause as otherness (anyatua) 
 is that which effects changes of form as that brought about by 
 a goldsmith in gold when he makes a bangle from it, and then 
 again a necklace, is regarded as differing from the change 
 spoken of as vikara. Now the difference between the gold 
 being turned into bangles or necklaces and the raw rice being 
 turned into soft rice is this, that in the former case when 
 bangles are made out of gold, the gold remains the same in 
 each case, whereas in the case of the production of cooked 
 rice from raw by fire, the case is different, for heat changes 
 paddy in a far more definite way; goldsmith and heat 
 are both indeed efficient causes, but the former only effects 
 mechanical changes of shape and form, whereas the latter 
 is the cause of structural and chemical changes. Of course 
 these are only examples from the physical world, their causal 
 operations in the mental sphere varying in a corresponding 
 manner; thus the change produced in the mind by the 
 presentation of different objects, follows a law which is the 
 same as is found in the physical world, when the same object 
 causes different kinds of feelings in different persons; when 
 ignorance causes forgetfulness in a thing, anger makes it 
 painful and desire makes it pleasurable, but knowledge of its 
 true reality produces indifference ; there 1s thus the same kind 
 of causal change as is found in the external world. Next 
 for consideration 1s the cause of separation (viyoga) which is 
 only a negative aspect of the positive side of the causes of 
 transformations, as in the gradual extinction of impurities, 
 consequent upon the transformation of the citta towards the 
 attainment of the supreme state of absolute independence 
 
 * Pratyaya is explained in Yoga-virttika, II. 28, as sampratyaya or 
 pramanyaniscaya. 
 
YOGANGAS 135 
 
 through discriminative knowledge. The last cause for con- 
 sideration is that of upholding (dhrtz) ; thus the body upholds 
 the senses and supports them for the actualisation of their 
 activities in the body, just as the five gross elements are the 
 upholding causes of organic bodies; the bodies of animals, 
 men, etc., also employ one another for mutual support. Thus 
 the human body lives by eating the bodies of many animals ; 
 the bodies of tigers, etc., live on the bodies of men and other 
 animals; many animals live on the bodies of plants, ete. 
 (Tattvavarsaradi, II. 28). The four kinds of causes mentioned 
 in Sankara’s works and grammatical commentaries like that 
 of Sushena, viz.: utpadya, vikaryya, apya and samskaryya, 
 are all included within the nine causes contained mentioned by 
 Vyasa. 
 
 The yogangas not only remove the impurities of the mind 
 but help it further by removing obstacles in the way of attain- 
 ing the highest perfection of discriminative knowledge. Thus 
 they are the causes in a double sense (1) of the dissociation of 
 impurities (viyogakarana); (2) of removing obstacles which 
 impede the course of the mind in attaining the highest develop- 
 ment (aptekarana). 
 
 Coming now to the yogangas, we enumerate them thus :— 
 restraint, observance, posture, regulation of breath, abstrac- 
 tion, concentration, meditation and trance: these are the 
 eight accessories of Yoga. 
 
 It must be remembered that abhyasa and vairagya and 
 also the five means of attaining Yoga, viz. : graddha, viryya, 
 etc., which are not different from abhyasa and vairagya, are 
 by their very nature included within the yogangas mentioned 
 above, and are not to be considered as independent means 
 different from them. The parikarmas or embellishments of 
 the mind spoken of in the first chapter, with which we shall 
 deal later on, are also included under the three yogangas 
 dharana, dhyana and samadhi. The five means éraddha, 
 
136 THEIR DEFINITIONS 
 
 viryya, smrti, samadhi and prajfia are said to be included 
 under asceticism (tapah) studies (svuddhydya) and devotion to 
 God of the niyamas and vairagya in contentment. 
 
 In order to understand these better, we will first give the 
 definitions of the yogaéngas and then discuss them and 
 ascertain their relative values for a man striving to attain the 
 highest perfection of Yoga. 
 
 I. Yama (restraint). These yama restraints are: abstin- 
 ence from injury (ahimsa) ; veracity ; abstinence from theft ; 
 continence ; abstinence from avarice. 
 
 II. Niyama (observances). These observances are cleanli- 
 ness, contentment, purificatory action, study and the making 
 of God the motive of all action. 
 
 III. Asanas (posture). Steady posture and easy position 
 are regarded as an aid to breath control. 
 
 IV. Regulation of breath (pranayama) is the stoppage of 
 the inspiratory and expiratory movements (of breath) which 
 may be practised when steadiness of posture has been secured. 
 
 V. Pratyahara (abstraction). With the control of the mind 
 all the senses become controlled and the senses imitate as it 
 were the vacant state of the mind. Abstraction is that by 
 which the senses do not come in contact with their objects 
 and follow as it were the nature of the mind. 
 
 VI. Dharana (concentration). Concentration is the stead- 
 fastness of the mind applied to a particular object. 
 
 VII. Dhyana (mediation). The continuation there of the 
 mental effort by continually repeating the object is meditation 
 (dhyana). 
 
 VIII. Samadhi (trance contemplation). The same as above 
 when shining with the light of the object alone, and devoid as 
 it were of itself, is trance. In this state the mind becomes one 
 with its object and there is no difference between the knower 
 and the known. 
 
 These are the eight yogangas which a Yogin must adopt for 
 
MAITRI KARUNA MUDITA AND UPEKSHA 187 
 
 his higher realisation. Of these again we see that some have 
 the mental side more predominant, while others are mostly 
 to be actualised in exterior action. Dharana, dhyana and 
 samadhi, which are purely of the samprajfiata type, and also 
 the pranayama and pratyahara, which are accessories to them, 
 serve to cleanse the mind of impurities and make it steady, and 
 can therefore be assimilated with the parikarmas mentioned 
 in Book I. Stitras 34-39. These samadhis of the samprajfiata 
 type, of course, only serve to steady the mind and to assist 
 attaining discriminative knowledge. 
 
 In this connection, it will be well to mention the remaining 
 aids for cleansing the mind as mentioned in Yoga-siira L., 
 viz. the cultivation of the habits of friendliness, compassion, 
 complacency and indifference towards happiness, misery, 
 virtue and vice. 
 
 This means that we are to cultivate the habit of friendliness 
 towards those who are happy, which will remove all jealous 
 feelings and purify the mind. We must cultivate the habit 
 of compassion towards those who are suffering pain; when 
 the mind shows compassion (which means that it wishes to 
 remove the miseries of others as if they were his own) it 
 becomes cleansed of the stain of desire to do injury to 
 others, for compassion is only another name for sympathy 
 which naturally identifies the compassionate one with the 
 objects of his sympathy. Next comes the habit of com- 
 placency, which one should diligently cultivate, for it leads 
 to pleasure in virtuous deeds. This removes the stain of envy 
 from the mind. Next comes the habit of indifference, which 
 we should acquire towards vice in vicious persons. We should 
 acquire the habit of remaining indifferent where we cannot 
 sympathise ; we should not on any account get angry with 
 the wicked or with those with whom sympathy is not possible. 
 This will remove the stain of anger. It will be clearly seen 
 here that maitri, karuna, mudita and upeksha are only 
 
138 THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS 
 
 different aspects of universal sympathy, which should remove 
 all perversities in our nature and unite us with our fellow- 
 beings. This is the positive aspect of the mind with reference 
 to abstinence from injuring ahimsa (mentioned under yamas), 
 which will cleanse the mind and make it fit for the applica- 
 tion of means of graddha, etc. For unless the mind is pure, 
 there is no scope for the application of the means of making 
 it steady. These are the mental endeavours to cleanse the 
 mind and to make it fit for the proper manifestation of 
 Sraddha, etc., and for steadying it with a view to attaining 
 true discriminative knowledge. 
 
 Again of the parikarmas by dharana, dhyana, and sam- 
 prajfiata samadhi and the habit of sympathy as mani- 
 fested in maitri, karuna, etc., the former is a more advanced 
 state of the extinction of impurities than the latter. 
 
 But it is easy to see that ordinary minds can never com- 
 mence with these practices. They are naturally so im- 
 pure that the positive universal sympathy as manifested 
 in maitri, etc., by which turbidity of mind is removed, 
 is too difficult. It is also difficult for them to keep the 
 mind steady on an object as in dharana, dhyana, and 
 samadhi, for only those in advanced stages can succeed 
 in this. For ordinary people, therefore, some course of 
 conduct must be discovered by which they can purify their 
 minds and elevate them to such an extent that they may be 
 in a position to avail themselves of the mental parikarmas or 
 purifications just mentioned. Our minds become steady in 
 proportion as their impurities are cleansed. The cleansing 
 of impurities only represents the negative aspect of the 
 positive side of making the mind steady. The grosser impuri- 
 ties being removed, finer ones remain, and these are removed 
 by the mental parikarmas, supplemented by abhyasa or by 
 graddha, etc. As the impurities are gradually more and more 
 attenuated, the last germs of impurity aré destroyed by the 
 
YAMAS 139 
 
 force of dhyana or the habit of nirodha samadhi, and kaivalya 
 is attained. 
 
 We now deal with yamas, by which the gross impurities 
 of ordinary minds are removed. They are, as we have said 
 before, non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, and 
 non-covetousness ; of these non-injury is given such a high 
 place that it is regarded as the root of the other yamas ; 
 truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, non-covetousness and 
 the other niyamas mentioned previously only serve to make 
 the non-injury perfect. We have seen before that maitri, 
 karuna, muditaé and upeksha serve to strengthen the non- 
 injury since they are only its positive aspects, but we see now 
 that not only they but other yamas and also the other niyamas, 
 purity, contentment, asceticism, studies and devotion to 
 God, only serve to make non-injury more and more perfect. 
 This non-injury when it is performed without being limited 
 or restricted in any way by caste, country, time and circum- 
 stances, and is always adhered to, is called mahavrata or 
 the great duty of abstinence from injury. It is sometimes 
 limited to castes, as for example injury inflicted by a fisher- 
 man, and in this case it is called anuvrata or restricted ahimsa 
 of ordinary men as opposed to universal ahimsa of the Yogins 
 called mahavrata ; the same non-injury is limited by locality, 
 as in the case of a man who says to himself, “I shall not 
 cause injury at a sacred place’’; or by time, when a person 
 says to himself, ‘I shall not cause injury on the sacred day of 
 Caturdasi’’?; or by circumstances, as when a man says to 
 himself, “‘T shall cause injury for the sake of gods and Brah- 
 mans only”; or when injury is caused by warriors in the 
 battle-field alone and nowhere else. This restricted ahimsa 
 is only for ordinary men who cannot follow the Yogin’s 
 universal law of ahimsa. 
 
 Ahimsa is a great universal duty which a man should 
 impose on himself in all conditions of life, everywhere, and 
 
140 VERACITY 
 
 at all times without restricting or qualifying it with any 
 limitation whatsoever. In Mahabharata Mokshadharmad- 
 hyaya it is said that the Samkhya lays stress upon non- 
 injury, whereas the Yoga lays stress upon samadhi; but 
 here we see that Yoga also holds that ahimsa should be the 
 greatest ethical motive for all our conduct. It is by ahimsa 
 alone that we can make ourselves fit for the higher type of 
 samadhi. All other virtues of truthfulness, non-stealing only 
 serve to make non-injury more and more perfect. It is not, 
 however, easy to say whether the Samkhyists attached so 
 much importance to non-injury that they believed it to lead 
 to samadhi directly without the intermediate stages of 
 samadhi. We see, however, that the Yoga also attaches great 
 importance to it and holds that a man should refrain from all 
 external acts; for however good they may be they can- 
 not be such as not to lead to some kind of injury or 
 himsa towards beings, for external actions can never be 
 performed without doing some harm to others. We have seen 
 that from this point of view Yoga holds that the only pure 
 works (Suklakarma) are those mental works of good thoughts 
 in which perfection of ahimsa is attained. With the growth 
 of good works (suklakarma) and the perfect realisation of 
 non-injury the mind naturally passes into the state in which 
 its actions are neither good (sukla) nor bad (asukla); and 
 this state is immediately followed by that of kaivalya. 
 Veracity consists in word and thought being in accordance 
 with facts. Speech and mind correspond to what has been 
 seen, heard and inferred. Speech is for the purpose of trans- 
 ferring knowledge to another. It is always to be employed 
 for the good of others and not for their injury ; for it should 
 not be defective as in the case of Yudhishthira, where his 
 motive was bad.* If it prove to be injurious to living beings, 
 
 * Yudhishthira led falsely Drona to believe that the latter’s son was 
 dead by inaudibly muttering that it was only an elephant having the 
 same name as that of his son that had died. 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF HIMSA 141 
 
 even though uttered as truth, it is not truth; 1¢ is sin only. 
 Though outwardly such a truthful course may be considered 
 virtuous, yet since by his truth he has caused injury to another 
 person, he has in reality violated the true standard of non- 
 injury (ahimsa). Therefore let everyone first examine well and 
 then utter truth for the benefit of all living beings. All truths 
 should be tested by the canon of non-injury (ahimsd). 
 
 Asteya is the virtue of abstaming from stealing. Theft is 
 making one’s own unlawfully things that belong to others. 
 Abstinence from theft consists in the absence of the desire 
 thereof. 
 
 Brahmacaryya (continence) is the restraint of the generative 
 organ and the thorough control of sexual tendencies. 
 
 Aparigraha is want of avariciousness, the non-appropriation 
 of things not one’s own ; this is attained on seeing the defects 
 of attachment and of the mjury caused by the obtaining, 
 preservation and destruction of objects of sense. 
 
 If, in performing the great duty of non-injury and the other 
 virtues auxiliary to it, a man be troubled by thoughts of sin, 
 he should try to remove sinful ideas by habituating himself to 
 those which are contrary to them. Thus if the old habit of 
 sins opposed to virtues tend to drive him along the wrong 
 path, he should in order to banish them entertain ideas such as 
 the following :—“‘ Being burnt up as I am in the fires of the 
 world, I have taken refuge in the practice of Yoga which gives 
 protection to all living beings. Were I to resume the sins 
 which I have abandoned, I should certainly be behaving like 
 a dog, which eats its own vomit. As the dog takes up his own 
 vomit, so should I be acting if I were to take up again what I 
 have once givenup.” This is called the practice of pratipaksha 
 bhavan, meditating on the opposites of the temptations. 
 
 A classification of sins of non-injury, etc., may be made 
 according as they are actually done, or caused to be done, or 
 permitted to be. done ; and these again may be further divided 
 
142 BEGINNINGS WITH THE NIYAMAS 
 
 according as they are preceded by desire, anger or ignorance ; 
 these are again mild, middling or intense. Thus we see that 
 there may be twenty-seven kinds of such sins. Mild, middling 
 and intense are each again threefold, mild-mild, mild-middling 
 and mild-intense; middling-mild, middling-middling and 
 middling-intense ; also intense-mild, intense-middling and 
 intense-intense. Thus there are eighty-one kinds of sins. But 
 they become infinite on account of rules of restriction, option 
 and conjunction. 
 
 The contrary tendency consists in the notion that these 
 immora! tendencies cause an infinity of pains and untrue 
 knowledge. Pain and unwisdom are the unending fruits of 
 these immoral tendencies, and in this idea lies the power which 
 produces the habit of giving a contrary trend to our thoughts. 
 
 These yamas, together with the niyamas about to be 
 described, are called kriyayoga, by the performance of which 
 men become fit to rise gradually to the state of jianayoga by 
 samadhi and to attain kaivalya. This course thus represents 
 the first stage with which ordinary people should begin their 
 Yoga work. 
 
 Those more advanced, who naturally possess the virtues 
 mentioned in Yama, have no need of beginning here. 
 
 Thus it is said that some may begin with the niyamas, 
 asceticism, svadhyaya and devotion to God; it is for this 
 reason that, though mentioned under the niyamas, they are 
 also specially selected and spoken of as the kriyayoga in the 
 very first rule of the second Book. Asceticism means the 
 strength of remaining unchanged in changes like that of heat 
 and cold, hunger and thirst, standing and sitting, absence of 
 speech and absence of all indications by gesture, etc. 
 
 Svadhyaya means the study of philosophy and repetition of 
 the syllable “‘ Aum.” 
 
 This [$varapranidhana (devotion to God) is different from 
 the Iévarapranidhana mentioned in Yoga-stitra, I. 23, where it 
 
BEGINNINGS WITH THE NIYAMAS 143 
 
 meant love, homage and adoration of God, by virtue of which 
 God by His grace makes samadhi easy for the Yogin. 
 
 Here it is a kind of kriyayoga, and hence it means the 
 bestowal of all our actions upon the Great Teacher, God, ie. 
 to work, not for one’s own self but for God, so that a man 
 desists from all desires for fruit therefrom. 
 
 When these are duly performed, the afflictions become 
 gradually attenuated and trance is brought about. The 
 afflictions thus attenuated become characterised by unpro- 
 ductiveness, and when their seed-power has, as it were, been 
 burnt up by the fire of high intellection and the mind 
 untouched by afflictions realises the distinct natures of 
 purusha and sattva, it naturally returns to its own primal 
 cause prakrti and kaivalya is attained. 
 
 Those who are already iar advanced do not require even 
 this kriyayoga, as their afflictions are already in an attenuated 
 state and their minds in a fit condition to adapt themselves 
 to samadhi; they can therefore begin at once with jfianayoga. 
 So in the first chapter it is with respect to these advanced men 
 that it is said that kaivalya can be attained by abhyasa and 
 vairagya, without adopting the kriyayoga ( Yoga-varttzka, IT. 2) 
 kriyayogas. Only sauca and santosha now remain to be 
 spoken of. Sauca means cleanliness of body and mind. 
 Cleanliness of body is brought about by water, cleanliness of 
 mind by removal of the mental impurities of pride, jealousy 
 and vanity. 
 
 Santosha (contentment) is the absence of desire to possess 
 more than is necessary for the preservation of one’s life. It 
 should be added that this is the natural result of ceasing to 
 desire to appropriate the property of others. 
 
 At the close of this section on the yamas and niyamas, it 
 is best to note their difference, which lies principally in this 
 that the former are the negative virtues, whereas the latter are 
 positive. The former can, and therefore must, be practised at 
 
144 OTHER YOGANGAS 
 
 all stages of Yoga, whereas the latter being positive are attain- 
 able only by distinct growth of mind through Yoga. The 
 virtues of non-injury, truthfulness, sex-restraint, etc., should 
 be adhered to at all stages of the Yoga practice. They are 
 indispensable for steadying the mind. 
 
 It is said that in the presence of a person who has acquired 
 steadiness in ahimsa all animals give up their habits of enmity ; 
 when a person becomes steady in truthfulness, whatever hesays 
 becomes fulfilled. When a person becomes steady in asteya 
 (absence of theft) all jewels from all quarters approach him, 
 
 Continence being confirmed, vigour is obtained. Non- 
 covetousness being confirmed, knowledge of the causes of 
 births is attained. By steadiness of cleanliness, disinclination 
 to this body and cessation of desire for other bodies is 
 obtained. 
 
 When the mind attains internal sauca, or cleanliness of 
 mind, his sattva becomes pure, and he acquires highminded- 
 ness, one-pointedness, control of the senses and fitness for the 
 knowledge of self. By the steadiness of contentment comes 
 the acquisition of extreme happiness. By steadiness of 
 asceticism the impurities of this body are removed, and 
 from that come miraculous powers of endurance of the body 
 and also miraculous powers of the sense, viz. clairaudience 
 and thought-reading from a distance. By steadiness of 
 studies the gods, the rshis and the siddhas become visible. 
 When Iévara is made the motive of all actions, trance is 
 attained. By this the Yogin knows all that he wants to know, 
 just as it is in reality, whether in another place, another body 
 or another time. His intellect knows everything as it is. 
 
 It should not, however, be said, says Vacaspati, that 
 inasmuch as the samprajfidta is attained by making Iévara 
 the motive of all actions, the remaining seven yogangas are 
 useless. For the yogangas are useful in the attainment of that 
 mental mood which devotes all actions to the purposes of 
 
ASANAS 145 
 
 Igvara. They are also useful in the attainment'of samprajiiaita 
 samadhi by separate kinds of collocations, and samadhi 
 also leads to the fruition of samprajfidta, but though this 
 meditation on Igvara is itself a species of [¢varapranidhana, 
 samprajfiata Yoga is a yet more direct means. As to the 
 relation of Iévarapranidhana with the other angas of Yoga, 
 Bhikshu writes :—It cannot be asked what is the use of the 
 other disciplinary practices of the Yoga since Yoga can be 
 attained by meditation on Iévara, for meditation on Isvara 
 only removes ignorance. The other accessories bring about 
 samadhi by their own specific modes of operation. Moreover, 
 it is by help of meditation on Ivara that one succeeds in 
 bringing about samadhi, through the performance of all the 
 accessories of Yoga; so the accessories of Yoga cannot be 
 regarded as unnecessary; for it is the accessories which 
 produce dharana, dhyana and samadhi, through meditation 
 on God, and thereby salvation ; devotion to God brings in His 
 grace and through it the yogangas can be duly performed. So 
 though devotion to God may be considered as the direct cause, 
 it cannot be denied that the due performance of the yogangas 
 is to be considered as the indirect cause. 
 
 Asanas are secured when the natural involuntary move- 
 ments cease, and this may be efiected by concentrating 
 the mind on the mythological snake which quictly bears the 
 burden of the earth on its head. Thus posture becomes 
 perfect and effort to that end ceases, so that there is no move- 
 ment of the body ; or the mind is transformed into the infinite, 
 which makes the idea of infinity its own and then brings about 
 the perfection of posture. When posture has once been 
 mastered there is no disturbance through the contraries of 
 heat and cold, etc. 
 
 After having secured stability in the Asanas the pranayamas 
 should be attempted. The pause that comes after a deep 
 inhalation and that after a deep exhalation are each called a 
 
 L 
 
146 PRANAYAMA 
 
 pranayama ; the first is external, the second internal. There 
 is, however, a third mode, by means of which, since the lungs 
 are neither too much dilated nor too much contracted, total 
 restraint is obtained; cessation of both these motions takes 
 place by a single effort, just as water thrown on a heated stone 
 shrivels up on all sides. | 
 
 These can be regulated by calculating the strength of 
 inhalation and exhalation through space, time or number. 
 Thus as the breathing becomes slower, the space that it 
 occupies also becomes smaller and smaller. Space again is of 
 two kinds, internal and external. At the time of inhalation, 
 the breath occupies internal space, which can be felt even in the 
 soles of hand and feet, like the slight touch of an ant. To try 
 to feel this touch along with deep inhalation serves to lengthen 
 the period of cessation of breathing. External space is the 
 distance from the tip of the nose to the remotest point at 
 which breath when inhaled can be felt, by the palm of the 
 hand, or by the movement of any light substance like cotton, 
 etc., placed there. Just as the breathing becomes slower and 
 slower, the distances traversed by it also becomes smaller 
 and smaller. Regulations by time is seen when the 
 attention is fixed upon the time taken up in breathing by 
 moments, a moment (kshana) is the fourth part of the 
 twinkling of the eye. Regulation by time thus means the fact 
 of our calculating the strength of the pranayama the moments 
 or kshanas spent in the acts of inspiration, pause and respira- 
 tion. These pranayamas can also be measured by the number 
 of moments in the normal duration of breaths. The time 
 taken by the respiration and expiration of a healthy man is the 
 same as that measured by snapping the fingers after turning 
 the hand thrice over the knee and is the measure of duration of 
 normal breath; the first attempt or udghata called mild is 
 measured by thirty-six such matras or measures ; when doubled 
 it is the second udghata called middling ; when trebled it is the 
 
DHYANA 147 
 
 third udghata called intense. Gradually the Yogin acquires 
 the practice of pranayama of long duration, by daily practice 
 increasing in succession from a day, a fortnight, a month, etc. 
 Of course he proceeds first by mastering the first udghata, then 
 the second, and so on until the duration increases up to a day, 
 a fortnight, a month as stated. There is also a fourth kind of 
 pranayama transcending all these stages of unsteady practice, 
 when the Yogin is steady in his cessation of breath. It must 
 be remembered, however, that while the pranayamas are being 
 practised, the mind must be fixed by dhyana and dharana to 
 some object external or internal, without which these will be of 
 no avail for the true object of Yoga. By the practice of prana- 
 yama, mind becomes fit for concentration as described in the 
 sutra I. 34, where it is said that steadiness is acquired by 
 pranayama in the same way as concentration, as we also find 
 in the stra II. 53. 
 
 When the senses are restrained from their external objects 
 by pratyahara we have what is called pratyahara, by which 
 the mind remains as if in its own nature, being altogether 
 identified with the object of inner concentration or contempla- 
 tion ; and thus when the citta is again suppressed, the senses, 
 which have already ceased coming into contact with other 
 objects and become submerged in the citta, also cease along 
 with it. Dharana is the concentration of citta on a particular 
 place, which is so very necessary at the time of pranayamas 
 mentioned before. The mind may thus be held steadfast in 
 such places as the sphere of the navel, the lotus of the heart, 
 the light in the brain, the forepart of the nose, the forepart of 
 the tongue, and such like parts of the body. 
 
 Dhyana is the continuance or changing flow of the mental 
 effort in the object of dharana unmediated by any other break 
 of conscious states. 
 
 Samadhi, or trance-contemplation, results when by deep 
 concentration mind becomes transformed into the shape of the 
 
148 SAMADHI 
 
 object of contemplation. By pratyahara or power of abstrac- 
 tion, mind desists from all other objects, except the one on 
 which it is intended that it should be centred ; the Yogin, as 
 he thus abstracts his mind, should also try to fix it upon some 
 internal or external object, which is called dharana ; it must 
 also be noticed that to acquire the habit of dharana and in 
 order to inhibit the abstraction arising from shakiness and 
 unsteadiness of the body, it is necessary to practise steadfast 
 posture and to cultivate the pranayama. So too for the 
 purpose of inhibiting distractions arising from breathing. 
 Again, before a man can hope to attain steadfastness in these, 
 he must desist from any conduct opposed to the yamas, and 
 also acquire the mental virtues stated in the niyamas, and 
 thus secure himself against any intrusion of distractions arising 
 from his mental passions. These are the indirect and remote 
 . conditions which qualify a person for attaining dharana, 
 dhyana, and samadhi. A man who through his good deeds or 
 by the grace of God is already so much advanced that he is 
 naturally above all such distractions, for the removal of which 
 it is necessary to practise the yamas, the niyamas, the asanas, 
 the pranayama and pratyahara, may at once begin with 
 dharana; dharana we have seen means concentration, with 
 the advancement of which the mind becomes steady in 
 repeating the object of its concentration, i.e. thinking of that 
 thing alone and no other thing; thus we see that with the 
 practice of this state called dhyana, or meditation, in which 
 the mind flows steadily in that one state without any inter- 
 ruption, gradually even the conscious flow of this activity 
 ceases and the mind, transformed into the shape of the object 
 under concentration, becomes steady therein. We see there- 
 fore that samadhi is the consummation of that process which 
 begins in dharana or concentration. These three, dharana, 
 dhyana and samadhi, represent the three stages of the same 
 process of which the last one is the perfection ; and these three 
 
SAMADHI 149 
 
 are together technically called samyama, which directly leads 
 to and is immediately followed by the samprajfiata state, 
 whereas the other five yogangas are only its indirect or remote 
 causes. These three are, however, not essential for the asam- 
 prajfiata state, for a person who is very far advanced, or one 
 who is the special object of God’s grace, may pass at once by 
 intense vairagya and abhyasa into the nirodha state or state of 
 suppression. 
 
 As the knowledge of samadhi gradually dawns through 
 the possession of samyama, so is the samyama gradually 
 strengthened. For this samyama also rises higher and higher 
 with the dawning of prajfialoka or light of samadhi knowledge. 
 This is the beginning, for here the mind can hold samyama or 
 concentrate and become one with a gross object together with 
 its name, etc., which is called the savitarka state; the next 
 plane or stage of samyama is that where the mind becomes one 
 with the object of its meditation, without any consciousness 
 of its name, etc. Next come the other two stages called 
 savicara and nirvicara when the mind is fixed on subtle 
 substances, a8 we shall see later on. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 STAGES OF SAMADHI 
 
 SAMPRAJNATA samadhi (absorptive concentration in an object) 
 may be divided into four classes, savitarka, nirvitarka, savicara 
 and nirvicara. 
 
 To comprehend its scope we must first of all understand the 
 relation between a thing, its concept, and the particular name 
 with which the concept or thing is associated. It is easy to 
 see that the thing (artha), the concept (jnadna), and the name 
 (sabda) are quite distinct. But still, by force of association, 
 the word or name stands both for the thing and its concept ; 
 the function of mind, by virtue of which despite this unreality 
 or want of their having any real identity of connection they 
 seem to be so much associated that the name cannot be 
 differentiated from the thing or its idea, is called vikalpa.. 
 
 Now that state of samadhi in which the mind seems to 
 become one with the thing, together with its name and 
 concept, is the lowest stage of samadhi called savitarka ; it is 
 the lowest stage, because here the gross object does not appear 
 to the mind in its true reality, but only in the false illusory way 
 in which it appears associated with the concept and the name 
 in ordinary life. This state does not differ from ordinary 
 conceptual states, in which the particular thing is not only 
 associated with the concepts and their names, but also with 
 other concepts and their various relations ; thus a cow will 
 not only appear before the mind with its concept and name, 
 but also along with other relations and thoughts associated 
 
 150 
 
SAVITARKA 151 
 
 with cows, as for example—“ This is a cow, it belongs to so 
 and so, it has so many hairs on its body, and so forth.” This 
 state 1s therefore the first stage of samadhi, in which the mind 
 has not become steady and is not as yet beyond the range of 
 our ordinary consciousness. 
 
 The nirvitarka stage arises from this when the mind by its 
 steadiness can become one with its object, divested of all other 
 associations of name and concept, so that it is in direct touch 
 with the reality of the thing, uncontaminated by associations. 
 The thing in this state does not appear to be an object of my 
 consciousness, but my consciousness becoming divested of all 
 “TI” or ‘‘mine,’’ becomes one with the object itself; so that 
 there is no such notion here as ‘‘ I know this,” but the mind 
 becomes one with the thing, so that the notion of subject and 
 object drops off and the result is the one steady transformation 
 of the mind into the object of its contemplation. This state 
 brings home to us real knowledge of the thing, divested from 
 other false and illusory associations, which far from explaining 
 the real nature of the object, serves only to hide it. This 
 samadhi knowledge or prajfia is called nirvitarka. The objects 
 of this state may be the gross material objects and the 
 senses. 
 
 Now this state is followed by the state of savicara prajiia, 
 which dawns when the mind neglecting the grossness of the 
 object sinks deeper and deeper into its finer constituents ; 
 the appearance of the thing in its grosser aspects drops off 
 and the mind having sunk deep, centres in and identifies itself 
 with the subtle tanmatras, which are the constituents of the 
 atoms, as a conglomeration of which the object appeared before 
 our eyes in the nirvitarka state. Thus when the mind, after 
 identifying itself with the sun in its true aspect as pure light, 
 tends to settle on a still finer state of it, erther by making the 
 senses so steady that the outward appearance vanishes, or by 
 seeking finer and finer stages than the grosser manifestation of 
 
152 SAVITARKA 
 
 light as such, it apprehends the tanmatric state of the light 
 and knows it as such, and we have what is called the savicara 
 stage. It has great similarities with the savitarka stage, while 
 its differences from that stage spring from the fact that here 
 the object is the tanmatra and not the gross bhttta. The mind 
 in this stage holding communion with the riipa tanmatra, for — 
 example, is not coloured variously as red, blue, etc., as in the 
 savitarka communion with gross light, for the tanmatric light 
 or light potential has no such varieties as different kinds of 
 colour, etc., so that there are also no such different kinds of 
 feeling of pleasure or pain as arise from the manifold varieties 
 of ordinary light. This is a state of feelingless representa- 
 tion of one uniform tanmatric state, when the object appears 
 as a conglomeration of tanmatras of rtipa, rasa or gandha, as 
 the case might be. This state, however, is not indeterminate, as 
 the nirvitarka stage, for this tanmatric conception is associated 
 with the notions of time, space and causality, for the mind 
 here feels that it sees those tanmatras which are in such a 
 subtle state that they are not associated with pleasures and 
 pains. They are also endowed with causality in such a way 
 that from them and their particular collocations originate the 
 atoms. 
 
 It must be noted here that the subtle objects of concentra- 
 tion in this stage are not the tanmatras alone, but also other 
 subtle substances including the ego, the buddhi and the 
 prakrti. 
 
 But when the mind acquires the complete habit of this 
 state in which it becomes identified with these fine objects— 
 the tanmatras—etc., then all conceptual notions of the 
 associations of time, space, casuality, etc., spoken of in the 
 savicara and the savitarka state vanish away and it becomes 
 one with the fine object of its communion. These two kinds 
 of prajfia, savicara and nirvicara, arising from communion with 
 the fine tanmatras, have been collocated under one name as 
 
SAVITARKA 153 
 
 vicdranugata. But when the object of communion is the 
 senses, the samadhi is called anandanugata, and when the 
 object of communion is the subtle cause the ego (asmita), the 
 samadhi is known as asmitanugata. 
 
 There is a difference of opinion regarding the object of the 
 last two varieties of samadhi, viz. anandanugata and asmi- 
 tanugata, and also about the general scheme of division of the 
 samadhis. Vacaspatithinks that Yoga-sttra I. 41 suggests the 
 interpretation that the samprajfiata samadhis may be divided 
 into three different classes according as their objects of 
 concentration belong to one or other of the three different 
 planes of grahya (external objects), grahana (the senses) and 
 erahitr (the ego). So he refers vitarka and vicara to the plane 
 of grahya (physical objects and tanmatras), anandanugata to 
 the plane of grahana (the senses) and asmitanugata to the plane 
 of grahitr. Bhikshu, however, disapproves of such an inter- 
 pretation. He holds that in anandanugata the object of 
 concentration is bliss (ananda) and not the senses. When the 
 Yogin rises to the vicaranugata stage there is a great flow of 
 sattva which produces bliss, and at this the mind becomes one 
 with this ananda or bliss, and this samadhi is therefore called 
 anandanugata. Bhikshu does not think that in asmitanugata 
 samadhi the object of concentration is the ego. He thinks 
 that in this stage the object of concentration is the concept of 
 self (kevalapurushakara samvit) which has only the form of ego 
 or “‘ 1” (asmityetavanmatrakaratvadasmuta). 
 
 Again according to Vacaspati in addition to the four varieties 
 of savitarka, nirvitarka, savicara and nirvicara there are two 
 varieties of Anandanugata as sananda and nirananda and two 
 varieties of asmitanugata as sasmita and nirasmita. This 
 gives us eight different kinds of samadhi. With Bhikshu there 
 are only six kinds of samadhi, for he admits only one variety 
 as anandanugata and one variety as asmitanugata. Bhikshu’s 
 classification of samadhis is given below in a tabular form (see 
 
154 SAVITARKA 
 Vacaspati’s Tattvavarsdradi and Yoga-varitika, I. 17, 41, 42, 
 43, 44). 
 
 samprajhata samadhi 
 | 
 
 | 
 sthilavishayaka stikshma vishayaka 
 
 (vitarkanugata) 
 samadhi 
 ananda asmita 
 1. savitarka 2. nirvitarka or purusha 
 
 (with associations (without associ- 
 of name and con- tion of name) 5. (Anandanugata) 6, (asmitanugata) 
 cept of the object) 
 
 tanmatra 
 
 vicaranugata 
 samadhi 
 3. savicara 4. nirvicara 
 
 (with association of (without associa- 
 name and concept tion of name, etc.) 
 of the tanmatras) 
 
 Through the nirvicara state our minds become altogether 
 purified and there springs the prajfia or knowledge called 
 rtambhara or true ; this true knowledge is altogether different 
 from the knowledge which is derived from the Vedas or from 
 inferences or from ordinary perceptions ; for the knowledge 
 that 16 can give of Reality can never be had by any other 
 means, by perception, inference or testimony, for their com- 
 munication is only by the conceptual process of generalisa- 
 tions and abstractions and these can never help us to affirm 
 anything about things as they are in themselves, which are 
 altogether different from their illusory demonstrations in 
 conceptual terms which only prevent us from knowing the true 
 reality. The potency of this prajfia arrests the potency of 
 ordinary states of consciousness and thus attains stability. 
 When, however, this prajiia is also suppressed, we have what is 
 called the state of nirvija samadhi, at the end of which comes 
 final prajfia leading to the dissolution of the citta and the 
 absolute freedom of the purusha. 
 
SAVITARKA 155 
 
 Samadhi we have seen is the mind’s becoming one with an 
 object by a process of acute concentration upon it and a con- 
 tinuous repetition of it with the exclusion of all other thoughts 
 of all kinds. We have indeed described the principal stages 
 of the advancement of samprajfiata Yoga, but it is impossible 
 to give an exact picture of it with the symbolical expressions of 
 our concepts ; for the stages only become clear to the mental 
 vision of the Yogin as he gradually acquires firmness in his 
 practice. The Yogin who is practising at once comes to know 
 them as the higher stages gradually dawn in his mind and 
 he distinguishes them from each other; it is thus a matter 
 of personal experience, so that no teacher can tell him 
 whether a certain stage which follows is higher or lower, for 
 Yoga itself is its own teacher. 
 
 HKiven when the mind is in the samprajfiata state it is said 
 to be in vyutthana (phenomenal) in comparison with the 
 nirodha state, just as the ordinary conscious states are called 
 vyutthana in comparison with the samprajfiata state; the 
 potencies of the samprajhata state become weaker and weaker, 
 while the potencies of the nirodha state become stronger and 
 stronger until finally the mind comes to the nirodha state and 
 becomes stable therein ; of course this contains within itself a 
 long mental history, for the potency of the nirodha state can 
 become stronger only when the mind practises it and remains 
 in this suppressed condition for long intervals of time. This 
 shows that the mind, being made up of the three gunas, is 
 always suffering transformations and changes. Thus from the 
 ordinary state of phenomenal consciousness it gradually 
 becomes one-pointed and then gradually becomes transformed 
 into the state of an object (internal or external), when it is 
 said to be undergoing the samadhi parinama or samadhi 
 change of the samprajfiata type; next comes the change, 
 when the mind passes from the samprajfata stage to the state 
 of suppression (nirodha). Here also, therefore, we see that the 
 
156 SAVITARKA 
 
 same dharma, lakshna, avasthaparinama which we have 
 already described at some length with regard to sensible objects 
 apply also to the mental states. Thus the change from the 
 vyutthana (ordinary experience) to the nirodha state is the 
 dharmaparinama, the change as manifested in time, 80 that 
 we can say that the change of vyutthana into nirodha has not 
 yet come, or has just come, or that the vyutthana state 
 (ordinary experience) exists no longer, the mind having trans- 
 formed itself into the nirodha state. There is also here the 
 third change of condition, when we see that the potencies of 
 the samprajfiata state become weaker and weaker, while that 
 of the nirodha state becomes stronger and stronger. These are 
 the three kinds of change which the mind undergoes called the 
 dharma, lakshana and avastha change. But there is one 
 difference between this change thus described from the 
 changes observed in sensible objects that here the changes are 
 not visible but are only to be inferred by the passage of the 
 mind from one state to another. 
 
 It has been said that there are two different kinds of qualities 
 of the mind, visible and invisible. The visible qualities whose 
 changes can be noticed are conscious states, or thought- 
 products, or percepts, etc. The invisible ones are seven in 
 number and cannot be directly seen, but their existence and 
 changes or modifications may be established by inference. 
 These are suppression, characterisation, subconscious main- 
 tenance of experience, constant change, life, movement and 
 power or energy. 
 
 In connection with samprajfiata samadhi some miraculous 
 attainments are described, which are said to strengthen the 
 faith or belief of the Yogin in the processes of Yoga as the 
 path of salvation. These are like the products or the mental 
 experiments in the Yoga method, by which people may 
 become convinced of the method of Yoga as being the true one. 
 No reasons are offered as to the reason for these attainments, 
 
SAVITARKA 
 
 157 
 
 ‘ but they are said to happen as a result of mental union 
 
 with different objects. 
 tabular form. 
 
 Object of Samyama. 
 
 
 
 (1) Threefold change of 
 things as dharma, lak- 
 shana and avasthapari- 
 nama. 
 
 (2) The distinctions _ of 
 name, external object 
 and the concept which 
 ordinarily appears uni- 
 ted as one. 
 
 (3) Residual potencies sam- 
 skara of the nature 
 of dharma and ad- 
 harma. 
 
 (4) Concepts alone (separ- 
 ated from the objects). 
 
 (5) Over the form of body. 
 (6) Karma of fast or slow 
 fruition. 
 
 (7) Friendliness, sympathy, 
 and compassion. 
 
 (8) Powers of elephant. 
 (9) Sun. 
 
 (10) Heavens. 
 (11) Pole star. 
 
 (12) Plenus of the navel. 
 
 (13) Base of the throat 
 
 Samyama, 
 
 Samyama, 
 
 39 
 
 3? 
 
 It is best to note them here in a 
 
 Attainment. 
 
 Knowledge of the sounds of 
 all living beings, 
 
 Knowledge of previous life. 
 
 Knowledge of other minds. 
 
 Disappearance (by virtue of 
 perceptibility being checked). 
 
 Knowledge of death. 
 
 Power. 
 
 Power of elephant. 
 
 Knowledge of the world 
 (the geographical position of 
 countries, etc.). 
 
 Knowledge of the heavenly 
 systems, 
 
 Knowledge of its 
 ments, 
 
 move- 
 
 Knowledge of the system of 
 the body. 
 
 Subdual of hunger and thirst. 
 
158 VIBHUTI 
 
 Object or Samyama. Samyama. Attainment. 
 (14) Tortoise tube. Samyama. | Steadiness. 
 (15) Coronal light. + Vision of the perfected ones— 
 
 the knowledge of the seer, or 
 all knowledge by prescience. 
 | 
 
 (16) Heat, r Knowledge of the mind. 
 
 (17) Purusha. >? Knowledge of purusha. 
 
 (18) Gross nature subtle per- is 
 vasiveness and purpose- Control over the element 
 
 tite | from which follows atten- 
 uation, perfection of the 
 body and _non-resistance 
 by their characteristics. 
 
 
 
 (19) Act, substantive ap- ms Mastery over the _ senses; 
 pearance, egoism, per- thence quickness of mind, 
 vasiveness and _ pur- unaided mental percep- 
 posefulness of sensa- tion and mastery over the 
 tion. | pradhana. 
 
 These vibhtitis, as they rise with the performance of the 
 processes of Yoga, gradually deepen the faith sraddha of the 
 Yogin in the performance of his deeds and thus help towards 
 his main goal or ideal by always pushing or drawing him 
 forward towards it by the greater and greater strengthening 
 of his faith. Divested from the ideal, they have no value. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 GOD IN YOGA 
 i 
 
 AFTER describing the nature of karmayoga, and the way in 
 which it leads to jfianayoga, we must now describe the third 
 and easiest means of attaining salvation, the bhaktiyoga and 
 the position of [svara in the Yoga system, with reference to a 
 person who seeks deliverance from the bonds and shackles of 
 avidya. 
 
 Iévarain the Yoga systemisthat purusha whois distinguished 
 from all others by the fact of his being untouched by the 
 afflictions or the fruits of karma. Other purushas are also in 
 reality untouched by the afflictions, but they, seemingly at 
 least, have to undergo the afflictions and consequently birth 
 and rebirth, etc., until they are again finally released; but 
 Iévara, though he is a purusha, yet does not suffer in any way 
 any sort of bondage. He is always free and ever the Lord. 
 He never had nor will have any relation to these bonds. He is 
 also the teacher of the ancient teachers beyond the range of 
 conditioning time. 
 
 This nature of Igvara has been affirmed in the scriptures 
 and is therefore taken as true on their authority. The 
 authority of the scriptures is again acknowledged only because 
 they have proceeded from God or Igvara. The objection that 
 this is an argument in a circle has no place here, since the 
 connection of the scriptures with Igvara is beginningless. 
 
 There is no other divinity equal to Igvara, because in the 
 case of such equality there might be opposition between riva 
 
 159 
 
160 SCRIPTURES AND ISVARA 
 
 Iévaras, which might result in the lowering in degree of any 
 of them. He is omniscient in the highest degree, for in him is 
 the furthest limit of omniscience, beyond which there is nothing. 
 
 This Iévara is all-merciful, and though he has no desires to 
 satisfy, yet for the sake of his devotees he dictates the Vedas 
 at each evolution of the world after dissolution. But he does — 
 not release all persons, because he helps only so far as each 
 deserves ; he does not nullify the law of karma, just as a king, 
 though quite free to act in any way he likes, punishes or 
 rewards people as they deserve. 
 
 At the end of each kalpa, he adopts pure body from his 
 sattva, which is devoid of any karmasaya, and thus com- 
 municates through it to all his devotees and dictates 
 the Vedas. Again at the time of dissolution this body 
 of pure sattva becomes submerged in prakrti; and at the 
 time of its submersion, Iévara wishes that it might come forth 
 again at the beginning of the new creation; thus for ever at 
 each new creation the pure sattva body springs forth and is 
 submerged again into prakrti at the time of the dissolution 
 of the universe. 
 
 In accepting this body he has no personal desires to satisfy, 
 as we have said before. He adopts it only for the purpose of 
 saving mankind by instructing them as to knowledge and 
 piety, which is not possible without a pure sattvamaya body ; 
 so he adopts it, but is not affected in any way by it. One who 
 is under the control of nescience cannot distinguish his real 
 nature from nescience, and thus is always led by it, but such is 
 not the case with Iévara, for he is not in any way under its 
 control, but only adopts it as a means of communicating 
 knowledge to mankind. 
 
 A Yogin also who has attained absolute independence may 
 similarly accept one or more pure sattvamaya nirmana cittas 
 from asmitamatra and may produce one citta as the superin- 
 tendent of all these. Such a citta adopted by a true Yogin by 
 
RELEASE THROUGH ISVARA 161 
 
 the force of his meditation is not under the control of the 
 vehicles of action as is the case with the other four kinds of 
 citta from birth, oshadhi, mantra and tapas. 
 
 The pranava or omkara is his name ; though at the time of 
 dissolution, the word of pranava together with its denotative 
 power becomes submerged in the prakrti, to reappear with 
 the new creation, just as roots shoot forth from the ground in 
 the rainy season. This pranava is also called svadhyaya. By 
 concentration of this svadhyaya or pranava, the mind becomes 
 one-pointed and fit for Yoga. 
 
 Now one of the means of attaining Yoga is [Svarapranid- 
 hana, or worship of God. This word, according to the com- 
 mentators, is used in two senses in the first and the second 
 books of the Patafijala Yoga aphorisms. In the first book it 
 means love or devotion to God as the one centre of meditation, 
 in the second it is used to mean the abnegation of all desires 
 of the fruits of action to [gvara, and thus Iévarapranidhana 
 in this sense is included under kriyayoga. This dedication of 
 all fruits of action to Ivara, purifies the mind and makes it 
 fit for Yoga and is distinguished from the Isvarapranidhana 
 of the first book as the bhavana of pranava and Iévara in this 
 that it is connected with actions and the abnegation of their 
 fruits, whereas the latter consists only in keeping the mind in 
 a worshipful state towards Ivara and his word or name 
 pranava. 
 
 By devotion (bhakti) Igvara is drawn towards the devotee 
 through his nirmana citta of pure sattva and by his grace he 
 removes all obstructions of illness, etc., described in I. 30, 31, 
 and at once prepares his mind for the highest realisation of his 
 own absolute independence. So for a person who can love and 
 adore Iévara, this is the easiest course of attaining samadhi. 
 We can make our minds pure most easily by abandoning 
 all our actions to Igvara and attaining salvation by firm and 
 steady devotion to Him. This is the sphere of bhaktiyoga by 
 
 M 
 
162 ADVAITA VEDANTIC {[SVARA 
 
 which the tedious complexity of the Yoga process may be 
 avoided and salvation speedily acquired by the supreme grace 
 of Iévara. 
 
 This means is not, however, distinct from the general means 
 of Yoga, viz. abhyasa and vairagya, which applies to all stages. 
 For here also abhyasa applies to the devotion of Igvara as one 
 supreme truth and vairagya is necessarily associated with all 
 true devotion and adoration of Iévara. 
 
 This conception of Ivara differs from the conception of 
 Iévara in the Ramanuja system in this that there prakrti and 
 purusha, acit and cit, form the body of Igvara, whereas here 
 Iévara is considered as being only a special purusha with the 
 aforesaid powers. } 
 
 In this system Ivara is not the superintendent of 
 prakrti in the sense of the latter’s remaining in him in an 
 undifferentiated way, but is regarded as the superintendent 
 of dharma and adharma, and his agency is active only in the 
 removal of obstacles, thereby helping the evolutionary 
 process of prakrti. 
 
 Thus [vara is distinguished from the Igvara of Sankara 
 Vedanta in this that there true existence is ascribed only to 
 Iévara, whereas all other forms and modes of Being are only 
 regarded as illusory. 
 
 From what we have seen above it is clear that the main 
 stress of the Yoga philosophy is on the method of samadhi. 
 The knowledge that can be acquired by it differs from all 
 other kinds of knowledge, ordinary perception, inference, 
 etc., in this that it alone can bring objects before our 
 mental eye with the clearest and most unerring light of 
 comprehensibility in which the true nature of the thing is at 
 once observed. Inferences and the words of scriptures are 
 based on concepts or general notions of things. For the 
 teaching of the Vedas is manifested in words ; and words are 
 but names, terms or concepts formed by noting the general 
 
YOGA AND SAMKHYA 163 
 
 similarities of certain things and binding them down by a 
 symbol. All deductive inferences are also based upon major 
 propositions arrived at by inductive generalisations ; so it is 
 easy to see that all knowledge that can be acquired by them is 
 only generalised conceptions. Their process only represents 
 the method by which the mind can pass from one generalised 
 conception to another ; so the mind can in no way attain the 
 knowledge of real things, absolute species, which are not the 
 genus of any other thing; so inference and scripture can only 
 communicate to us the nature of the agreement or similarity 
 of things and not the real things as they are. Ordinary 
 perception also is not of much avail here, since it cannot bring 
 within its scope subtle and fine things and things that are 
 obstructed from the view of the senses. But samadhi has 
 no such limitations and the knowledge that can be attained 
 by it is absolutely unobstructed, true and real in the strictest 
 sense of the terms. 
 
 Of all the points of difference between Yoga and Samkhya 
 the admission of [gvara by the former and the emphasis given 
 by it to the Yoga practice are the most important in 
 distinguishing it from the latter. It seems probable that 
 Iévara was traditionally believed in the Yoga school to be a 
 protector of the Yogins proceeding in their arduous course of 
 complete self-control and absorptive concentration. The 
 chances of a person adopting the course of Yoga practice for 
 the attainment of success in this field does not depend only on 
 the exertions of the Yogin, but upon the concurrence of many 
 convenient circumstances such as physical fitness, freedom from 
 illnesses and other obstacles. Faith in the patronage of God in 
 favour of honest workers and believers served to pacify their 
 minds and fill them with the cheerful hope and confidence 
 which were so necessary for the success of Yoga practice. 
 The metaphysical functions which are ascribed to Isvara 
 seem to be later additions for the sake of rendering his position 
 
164 YOGA AND SMKHYA 
 
 more in harmony with the system. Mere faith in Isvara 
 for the practical benefit of the Yogins is thus interpreted by a 
 reference to his superintendence of the development of 
 cosmic evolution. Samkhya relied largely on philosophical 
 thinking leading to proper discrimination as to the difference 
 between prakrti and purusha which is the stage immediately 
 antecedent to emancipation. There being thus no practical 
 need for the admission of [évara, the theoretical need was also 
 ignored and it was held that the inherent teleological purpose 
 (purusharthata) of prakrti was sufficient to explain all the 
 stages of cosmic evolution as well as its final separation from 
 the purushas. 
 
 We have just seen that Samkhya does not admit the exist- 
 ence of God, and considers that salvation can be obtained only 
 by a steady perseverance in philosophical thinking, and does 
 not put emphasis on the practical exercises which are 
 regarded as essential by the Yoga. One other point of 
 difference ought to be noted with regard to the conception of 
 avidya. According to Yoga, avidya, as we have already 
 explained it, means positive untrue beliefs such as believing the 
 impure, uneternal, sorrow, and non-selfto be the pure eternal, 
 pleasure and the self respectively. With Samkhya, however, 
 avidya is only the non-distinction of the difference between 
 prakrti and purusha. Both Samkhya and Yoga admit that 
 our bondage to prakrti is due to an illusion or ignorance 
 (avidya), but Samkhya holds the akhyati theory which 
 regards non-distinction of the difference as the cause of 
 illusion whereas the Yoga holds the anyathakhyati theory 
 which regards positive misapprehension of the one as the 
 other to be the cause of illusion. We have already referred to 
 the difference in the course of the evolution of the categories 
 as held by Samkhya and Yoga. This also accounts for the 
 difference between the technical térms of prakrti, vikrti and 
 prakrti-vikrti of Samkhya and the visesha and avisesha of 
 
YOGA AND SAMKHYA 165 
 
 the Yoga. The doctrine of dharma, lakshana and avastha- 
 parinama, though not in any way antagonistic to Samkhya, is 
 not so definitely described as in the Yoga. Some scholars 
 think that Samkhya did not believe in atoms as Yoga did. 
 But though the word paramanu has not been mentioned in the 
 Karika, it does not seem that Samkhya did not believe in 
 atoms; and we have already noticed that Bhikshu considers 
 the word siikshma in Karika 39 as referring to the atoms. 
 There are also slight differences with regard to the process 
 involved in perception and this has been dealt with in my 
 Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of 
 thought.* On almost all other fundamental points Samkhya 
 and Yoga are in complete agreement. 
 
 * This book has, however, not yet been published. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 MATTER AND MIND 
 
 In conclusion it may be worth while saying a few words as to 
 theories of the physical world supplementary to the views 
 that have already been stated above. 
 
 Gross matter, as the possibility of sensation, has been 
 divided into five classes, according to their relative grossness, 
 corresponding to the relative grossness of the senses. Some 
 modern investigators have tried to understand the five bhiitas, 
 viz. akaga, marut, tejas,ap and kshitias ether, gaseous heat and 
 light, liquids and solids. But I cannot venture to agree when 
 I reflect that solidity, liquidity and gaseousness represent only 
 an impermanent aspect of matter. The division of matter 
 from the standpoint of the possibility of our sensations, has a 
 firm root in our nature as cognising beings and has therefore a 
 better rational footing than the modern chemical division 
 into elements and compounds, which are being daily threatened 
 by the gradual advance of scientific culture. This carries with 
 it no fixed and consistent rational conception as do the 
 definitions of the ancients, but is a mere makeshift for under- 
 standing or representing certain chemical changes of matter and 
 and has therefore a merely relative value. 
 
 There are five aspects from which gross matter can be 
 viewed. These are (1) sthtila (gross), (2) svariipa (substantive), 
 (3) stikshma, (subtle), (4) anvaya (conjunction), (5) arthavattva 
 (purpose for use). The sthila or gross physical characteristics 
 of the bhtitas are described as follows :— 
 
 166 
 
SUKSHMA, ANVAYA AND ARTHAVATTVA 167 
 
 Qualities of Harth—Form, heaviness, roughness, obstruc- 
 tion, stability, manifestation (vrtti), difference, support, 
 turbidity, hardness and enjoyability. 
 
 Ap—Smoothness, subtlety, clearness, whiteness, softness, 
 heaviness, coolness, conservation, purity, cementation. 
 
 Tejas—Going upwards, cooking, burning, light, shining, 
 dissipating, energising. 
 
 Vayu—tTransverse motion, purity, throwing, pushing, 
 strength, movability, want of shadow. 
 
 Akagéa—Motion in all directions, non-agglomeration, non- 
 obstruction. 
 
 These physical characteristics are distinguished from the 
 aspects by which they appeal to the senses, which are called 
 their svartipas. Harth is characterised by gandha or smell, 
 ap by rasa or taste, tejas by riipa, etc. Looked at from this 
 point of view, we see that smell arises by the contact of the 
 nasal organ with the hard particles of matter ; so this hardness 
 or solidity which can so generate the sensibility of gandha, is 
 said to be the svartipa of kshiti. Taste can originate only in 
 connection with liquidity, so this liquidity or sneha is the 
 svariipa or nature of ap. Light—the quality of visibility— 
 manifests itself in connection with heat, so heat is the svariipa 
 of fire. The sensibility of touch is generated in connection 
 with the vibration of air on the epidermal surface; so this 
 vibratory nature is the svariipa of air. 
 
 The sensibility to sound proceeds from the nature of 
 obstructionlessness, which belongs to akaga, so this obstruc- 
 tionlessness is the svartipa of akaga. 
 
 The third aspect is the aspect of tanmatras, which are the 
 causes of the atoms or paramanus. Their fourth aspect is 
 their aspect of gunas or qualities of illumination, action, 
 inertia. Their fifth aspect is that by which they are service- 
 able to purusha, by causing his pleasurable or painful experi- 
 ences and finally his liberation, 
 
168 SUBSTANCE 
 
 Speaking of aggregation with regard to the structure of 
 matter, we see that this is of two kinds (1) when the parts are 
 in intimate union and fusion, e.g. any vegetable or animal 
 body, the parts of which can never be considered separately. 
 (2) When there are such mechanical aggregates or collocations 
 of distinct and independent parts yutasiddhavayava as the 
 trees in a forest. 
 
 A dravya or substance is an aggregate of the former type, 
 and is the grouping of generic or specific qualities and is not a 
 separate entity—the abode of generic and specific qualities 
 like the dravya of the Vaiseshika conception. The aspect of an 
 unification of generic and specific qualities seen in parts united 
 in intimate union and fusion is called the dravya aspect. The 
 ageregation of parts is the structural aspect of which the side 
 of appearance is the unification of generic and specific qualities 
 called the dravya. 
 
 The other aggregation of yutasiddhavayava, i.e. the 
 collocation of the distinct and independent parts, is again of 
 two kinds, (1) in which stress may be laid on the distinction of 
 parts, and (2) that in which stress is laid on their unity rather 
 than on their distinctness. Thus in the expression mango- 
 grove, we see that many mangoes make a grove, but the 
 mangoes are not different from the grove. Here stress is laid 
 on the aspect that mangoes are the same as the grove, which, 
 however, is not the case when we say that here is a grove of 
 mangoes, for the expression “grove of mangoes” clearly 
 brings home to our minds the side of the distinct mango-trees 
 which form a grove. 
 
 Of the gross elements, akasa seems especially to require a 
 word of explanation. There are according to Vijfiana 
 Bhikshu and Nagega two kinds of akasa—karana (or primal) 
 and karya (atomic). The first or original is the undifferentiated 
 formless tamas, for in that stage it has not the quality of 
 manifesting itself in sounds. This karana later on develops 
 
SUBSTANCE 169 
 
 into the atomic akaga, which has the property of sound. 
 According to the conception of the puranas, this karyakasa 
 evolves from the ego as the first envelope of vayu or air. The 
 karanakaga or non-atomic akaga should not be considered 
 as & mere vacuum, but must be conceived as a positive, 
 all-pervasive entity, something like the ether of modern 
 physicists. 
 
 From this akaga springs the atomic akaga or karyakasa, 
 which is the cause of the manifestation of sound. All powers 
 of hearing, even though they have their origin in the principle 
 of egoism, reside in the akaga placed in the hollow of the ear. 
 When soundness or defect is noticed therein, soundness or 
 defect: is also noticed in the power of hearing. Further, when 
 of the sounds working in unison with the power of hearing, the 
 sounds of solids, etc., are to be apprehended, then the power of 
 hearing located in the hollow of the ear requires the capacity of 
 resonance residing in the substratum of the akasga of the ear. 
 This sense of hearing, then, operates when it is attracted by 
 the sound originated and located in the mouth of the speaker, 
 which acts as a loadstone. It is this akaga which gives penetra- 
 bility to all bodies ; in the absence of this, all bodies would be 
 so compact that it would be difficult to pierce them even with 
 aneedle. Inthe Samkhya sutra II. 12, it is said that eternal 
 time and space are of the nature of akaga. So this so-called 
 eternal time and space do not differ from the one undiffer- 
 entiated formless tamas of which we have just spoken. 
 Relative and infinite time arise from the motion of atoms in 
 space—the cause of all change and transformation ; and space 
 as relative position cannot be better expressed than in the 
 words of Dr. B. N. Seal, as “ totality of positions as an order of 
 co-existent points, and as such it is wholly relative to the 
 understanding like order in time, being constructed on the 
 basis of relations of position intuited by our empirical or 
 relative consciousness. But there is this difference between 
 
170 STATES OF CITTA 
 
 space order and time order :—there is no unit of space as 
 position (dik) though we may conceive time, as the moment 
 (kshana) regarded as the unit of change in the causal series. 
 Spatial position (dik) results only from the different relations 
 in which the all-pervasive akaéa stands to the various finite 
 objects. On the other hand, space as extension or locus of a 
 finite body, or dega, has an ultimate unit, being analysable 
 into the infinitesimal extension quality inherent in the gunas 
 of prakrti.’”’* 
 
 Citta or mind has two degrees: (1) the form of states such 
 as real cognition, including perception, inference, competent 
 evidence, unreal cognition, imagination, sleep and memory. 
 (2) In the form in which all those states are suppressed. 
 Between the stage of complete outgoing activity of ordinary 
 experience (vyutthana) and complete suppression of all states, 
 there are thousands of states of infinite variety, through which 
 a man’s experiences have to pass, from the vyutthana state to 
 the nirodha. In addition to the five states spoken of above, 
 there is another kind of real knowledge and intuition, called 
 prajia, which dawns when by concentration the citta is 
 fixed upon any one state and that alone. This prajiia is 
 superior to all other means of knowledge, whether perception, 
 inference or competent evidence of the Vedas, in this, that 
 it is altogether unerring, unrestricted and° unlimited in its 
 scope. 
 
 Pramana, we have seen, includes perception, inference and 
 competent evidence. Perception originates when the mind or 
 citta, through the senses (ear, skin, eye, taste and nose) is 
 modified by external objects and passes to them, generating a 
 kind of knowledge about them in which their specific characters 
 become more predominant. 
 
 Mind is all-pervasive and can come in touch with the 
 external world, by which we have the perception of the thing. 
 
 * Dr Ray’s Hindu Chemistry, Vol. II, p. 81. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STATES 171 
 
 Like light, which emits rays and pervades all, though it remains 
 in one place, the citta by its vrttis comes in contact with the 
 external world, is changed into the form of the object of 
 perception and thus becomes the cause of perception ; as the 
 citta has to pass through the senses, it becomes coloured by 
 them, which explains the fact that perception is impossible 
 without the help of the senses. As it has to pass through the 
 senses, it undergoes the limitations of the senses, which it 
 can avoid, if it can directly concentrate itself upon any object 
 without the help of the senses; from this originates the 
 prajfa, through which dawns absolute real knowledge of the 
 thing, unhampered by the limitations of the senses which 
 can act only within a certain area or distance and cannot 
 cognize subtler objects. 
 
 We see that in ordinary perception our minds are drawn 
 towards the object, as iron is attracted by magnets. Thus 
 Bhikshu says in explaining Vydsa-bhashya IV. 17 :— 
 
 “The objects of knowledge, though inactive in themselves, 
 may yet draw the everchanging cittas towards them like a 
 magnet and change them in accordance with their own forms, 
 just as a piece of cloth is turned red by coming into contact 
 with red lac.” So it is that the cittas attain the form of any- 
 thing with which they come in touch and there is then the 
 perception that that thing is known. Perception (pratyaksha) 
 is distinguished from inference, etc., in this, that here the 
 knowledge arrived at is predominantly of the specific and 
 special characters (visesha) of the thing and not of its generic 
 qualities as in inference, etc. 
 
 Inference proceeds from inference, and depends upon the 
 fact that certain common qualities are found in all the members 
 of a class, as distinguished from the members of a different 
 class. Thus the qualities affirmed of a class will be found to 
 exist in all the individual members of that class; this 
 attribution of the generic characters of a class to the 
 
172 ERROR AND DOUBT 
 
 individual members that come under it is the essence of 
 inference. 
 
 An object perceived or inferred by a competent man is 
 described by him in words with the intention of transferring 
 his knowledge to another ; and the mental modification, which 
 has for its sphere the meaning of such words, is the verbal 
 cognition of the hearer. When the speaker has neither 
 perceived nor inferred the object, and speaks of things which 
 cannot be believed, the authority of verbal cognition fails. But 
 it does not fail in the original speaker, God or Iévara, and his 
 dictates the Sastras with reference either to the object of 
 perception or of inference. 
 
 Viparyyaya or unreal cognition is the knowledge of the unreal 
 as in doubt—a knowledge which possesses a form that does 
 not tally with the real nature of the thing either as doubt or as 
 false knowledge. Doubt may be illustrated by taking the case 
 of a man who sees something in dim light and doubts its nature. 
 “Ts it a wooden post or a man?” In nature there is either 
 the wooden post or the man, but there is no such fact or entity 
 which corresponds with doubt: ‘Is it a wooden post or a 
 man?” Knowledge as doubt is not cognition of a fact or 
 entity. The illusion of seeing all things yellow through a 
 defect of the eye (as in jaundice) can only be corrected when 
 the objects are seen in their true colours. In doubt, however, 
 their defective nature is at once manifest, Thus when we 
 cannot be sure whether a certain thing is a post or a man, we 
 know that our knowledge is not definite. So we have not to 
 wait till the illusoriness of the previous knowledge is demon- 
 strated by the advent of right knowledge. The evil nature of 
 viparyyaya is exemplified in avidya nescience, asmita, 
 raga, etc.* 
 
 * Avidya manifests itself in different forms: (1) as the afflictions 
 (kleSa) of esmit&é (agoism) raga (attachment), dvesha (antipathy) and 
 abhinivesa (self-love) ; (2) as doubt and intellectual error; (3) as error of 
 sense. All these manifestations of avidyaé are also the different forms of 
 
VIKALPA 173 
 
 Viparyyaya is distinguished from vikalpa—imagination—in 
 this, that though the latter is also unreal knowledge its nature 
 as such is not demonstrated by any knowledge that follows, 
 but is on the contrary admitted on all sides by the common 
 consent of mankind. But it is only the learned who can 
 demonstrate by arguments the illusoriness of vikalpa or 
 imagination. 
 
 All class notions and concepts are formed by taking note 
 only of the general characters of things and associating them 
 with a symbol called “name.” Things themselves, however, 
 do not exist in the nature of these symbols or names or 
 concepts ; it is only an aspect of them that is diagram- 
 matically represented by the intellect in the form of concepts. 
 When concepts are united or separated in our thought and 
 language, they consequently represent only an imaginary plane 
 of knowledge, for the things are not as the concepts represent 
 them. Thus when we say “ Caitra’s cow,” it is only an 
 imaginary relation for, strictly speaking, no such thing exists 
 as the cow of Caitra. Caitra has no connection in reality with 
 the cow. When we say purusha is of the nature of conscious- 
 ness, there is the same illusory relation. Now what is here 
 predicated of what? Purusha is consciousness itself, but in 
 predication there must always be a statement of the relation of 
 one to another. Thus it sometimes breaks a concept into two 
 parts and predicates the one of the other, and sometimes 
 predicates the unity of two concepts which are different. Thus 
 
 viparyyaya or bhrama (error, illusion, mistake). This bhrama in Yoga is 
 the thinking of something as that which it is not (anyathakhyatt). Thus we 
 think the miserable worldly existence as pleasurable and attribute the 
 characteristics of prakrti to purusha and vice versa. All afflictions are due 
 to this confusion and misjudgment, the roots of which stay in the buddhis 
 in all their transmigrations from one life to another. Samkhya, however, 
 differs from Yoga and thinks that all error (avidya or bhrama) is due only to 
 non-distinction between the true and the untrue. Thus non-distinction 
 (aviveka) between prakrti and purusha is the cause of all our miserable 
 mundane existence. Avidya and aviveka are thus synonymous with 
 Samkhya. 
 
174 SLEEP AND MEMORY 
 
 its sphere has a wide latitude in all thought-process conducted 
 through language and involves an element of abstraction and 
 construction which is called vikalpa. This represents the 
 faculty by which our concepts are arranged in an analytical or 
 synthetical proposition. It is said to be sabdajnananupats 
 vastusinyo vikalpah, i.e. the knowledge that springs from 
 relating concepts or names, which relating does not actually 
 exist in the objective world as it is represented in propositional 
 forms. 
 
 Sleep is that mental state which has for its objective 
 substratum the feeling of emptiness. It is called a state or 
 notion of mind, for it is called back on awakening; when 
 we feel that we have slept well our minds are clear, when we 
 have slept badly our minds are listless, wandermg and 
 unsteady. For a person who seeks to attain communion or 
 samadhi, these desires of sleep are to be suppressed, like all 
 other desires. Memory is the retaining in the mind of objects 
 perceived when perception occurs by the union of the cittas 
 with external objects, according to the forms of which the 
 cittas are transformed; it retains these perceptions, as 
 impressions or samskaras by means of its inherent tamas. 
 These samskaras generate memory, when such events occur as 
 can manifest them by virtue of associations. 
 
 Thus memory comes when the percepts already known and 
 acquired are kept in the mind in the form of impressions and 
 are manifested by the udbodhakas or associative manifestors. 
 It differs from perceptions in this that the latter are of the 
 nature of perceiving the unknown and unperceived, whereas 
 the former serves to bring before the mind percepts that have 
 already been acquired. Memory is therefore of percepts 
 already acquired by real cognition, unreal cognition, 
 imagination, sleep and memory. It manifests itself in dreams 
 as well as in waking states. 
 
 The relation between these states of mind and the samskaras 
 
THE SENSES AND MANAS 175 
 
 is this that their frequency and repetition strengthens the 
 samskaras and thus ensures the revival of these states. 
 
 They are all endowed with sukha (pleasure), duhkha (pain) 
 and moha (ignorance). These feelings cannot be treated 
 separately from the states themselves, for their manifestations 
 are not different from the manifestation of the states them- 
 selves. Knowledge and feeling are but two different aspects 
 of the modifications of cittas derived from prakrti; hence 
 neither can be thought separately from the other. The fusion 
 of feeling with knowledge is therefore here more fundamental 
 than in the modern tripartite division of mind. 
 
 In connection with this we are to consider the senses whose 
 action on the external world is known as “ perceiving,” 
 “ srahana,’’ which is distinguished from “* pratyaksha,’’ which 
 means the effect of “ perceiving,” viz. perception. Hach sense 
 has got its special sphere of work, e.g. sight is of the eye, and 
 this is called their second aspect, viz. svaripa. Their third 
 aspect is of “asmita”’ or ego, which manifests itself through 
 thesenses. Their fourth aspect is their characteristic of gunas, 
 viz. that of manifestation (prakasa), action (kriya) and reten- 
 tion (sthiti). Their fifth aspect is that they are set in motion 
 for purusha, his experiences and liberation. 
 
 It is indeed difficult to find the relation of manas with the 
 senses and the cittas. In more than one place manas is 
 identified with cittas, and, on the other hand, it is described 
 as a sense organ. There is another aspect in which manas is 
 said to be the king of the cognitive and motor senses. Looked 
 at in this aspect, manas is possibly the directive side of the ego 
 by which it guides the cognitive and conative senses in the 
 external world and is the cause of their harmonious activity for 
 the experience of purusha. As a necessary attribute of this 
 directive character of manas, the power of concentration, 
 which is developed by pranayama, is said to belong to manas. 
 This is the rajas side of manas. 
 
176 THE SENSES AND MANAS 
 
 There is another aspect of manas which is called the anuvy- 
 avasaya or reflection, by which the sensations (alocana) are 
 associated, differentiated, integrated, assimilated into percepts 
 and concepts. This is possibly the sattvika side of manas. 
 
 There is another aspect by which the percepts and concepts 
 are retained (dharana) in the mind as samskaras, to be 
 repeated or revealed again in the mind as actual states. This 
 is the tamas side of manas. 
 
 In connection with this we may mention tha (positive 
 argumentation), apoha (negative argumentation) and tattva- 
 jana (logical conclusion) which are the modes of different 
 anuvyavasayas of the manas. Will, etc., are to be included 
 with these (Yoga-varttukad, II. 18). Looked at from the 
 point of view of cittas, these may equally be regarded as the 
 modifications of cittas. 
 
 The motives which sustain this process of outgoing activity 
 are false knowledge, and such other emotional elements as 
 egoism, attachment, aversion, and love of life. These 
 emotional elements remain in the mind in the germinal state 
 as power alone ; or they exist in a fully operative state when a 
 man is under the influence of any one of them; or they 
 alternate with others, such as attachment or aversion ; or they 
 may become attenuated by meditation upon opposites. 
 Accordingly they are called respectively prasupta, udara, 
 vicchinna or tanu. Man’s minds or cittas may follow these 
 outgoing states or experiences, or gradually remove those 
 emotions which are commonly called afflictions, thus narrowing 
 their sphere and proceeding towards final release. 
 
 All the psychic states described above, viz. pramana, 
 viparyyaya, etc., are called either afflicted or unafflicted 
 according as they are moved towards outgoing activity or 
 are actuated by the higher motive of emancipation by 
 narrowing the field of experiences gradually to a smaller and 
 smaller sphere and afterwards to suppress them altogether. 
 
FREEDOM OF WILL 177 
 
 These two kinds of motives, one of afflictions that lead towards 
 external objects of attachment and aversion or love of life, and 
 the other which leads to striving for kaivalya, are the sole 
 motives which guide all human actions and psychic states. 
 
 They influence us whenever suitable opportunities occur, 
 60 that by the study of the Vedas, self-criticism or right argu- 
 mentation, or from the instruction of good men, abhyasa and. 
 vairagya may be roused by vidya. Right knowledge and a 
 tendency towards kaivalya may appear in the mind even 
 when a man is immersed in the afflicted states of outgoing 
 activity. So also afflicted states may appear when a man is 
 bent upon or far advanced in those actions which are roused 
 by vidya or the tendency towards kaivalya. 
 
 It seems that the Yoga view of actions, or karma, does not 
 deprive man of his freedom of will. The habit of performing 
 particular types of action only strengthens the corresponding 
 subconscious impressions or samskaras of those actual states, 
 and thus makes it more and more difficult to overcome their 
 propensity to generate their corresponding actual states, and 
 thus obstructs the adoption of an unhampered and free course 
 of action. The other limitation to the scope of the activity of 
 his free will is the vasana aspect of the samskaras by which he 
 naturally feels himself attached by pleasurable ties to certain 
 experiences and by painful ones to others. But these only 
 represent the difficulties and impediments which come to 
 a, man, when he has to adopt the Yoga course of life, the con- 
 trary of which he might have been practising for a very long 
 period, extending over many life-states. 
 
 The free will is not curbed in any way, for it follows directly 
 from the teleological purpose of prakrti, which moves for the 
 experience and liberation of purusha. So this motive of 
 liberation, which is the basis of all good conduct, can never be 
 subordinated to the other impulse, which goads man towards 
 outgoing experiences. But, on the other hand, this original 
 
 N 
 
178 THE SENSES 
 
 impulse which attracts man towards these ordinary experi- 
 ences, as it is due to the false knowledge which identifies 
 prakrti with purusha, becomes itself subordinate and loses its 
 influence and power, when such events occur, which nullify 
 false knowledge by tending to produce a vision of the true 
 knowledge of the relation of prakrti with purusha. Thus, 
 for example, if by the grace of God false knowledge (avidya) 
 is removed, true knowledge at once dawns upon the mind and 
 all the afflictions lose their power. 
 
 Free-will and responsibility for action cease in those life- 
 states which are intended for suffering from actions only, 
 e.g. life-states of insects, ete. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 SPHOTAVADA 
 
 ANOTHER point to be noted in connection with the main 
 metaphysical theories of Patafijali is the Sphota theory which 
 considers the relation of words with their ideas and the things 
 which they signify. Generally these three are not differ- 
 entiated one from the other, and we are not accustomed to 
 distinguish them from one another. Though distinct yet they 
 are often identified or taken in one act of thought, by a sort of 
 illusion. The nature of this illusory process comes to our view 
 when we consider the process of auditory perception of words. 
 Thus if we follow the Bhashya as explained by Vijfiana 
 Bhikshu we find that by an effect of our organs of speech, the 
 letters are pronounced, This vocal sound is produced in the 
 mouth of the speaker from which place the sound moves in 
 aerial waves until it reaches the ear drum of the hearer, by 
 coming in contact with which it produces the audible sound 
 called dhvani ( Yoga-vartitka, 111.17). The special modifications 
 of this dhvani are seen to be generated in the form of letters 
 (varna) and the general name for these modifications is nada. 
 This sound as it exists in the stage of varnas or letters is also 
 called varna. If we apply the word sgabda or sound in the 
 most general sense, then we can say that this is the second 
 stage of sound moving towards word-cognition, the first stage 
 being that of its utterance in the mouth of the speaker. 
 The third stage of Sabda is that in which the letters, for 
 example, g, au, and h, of the word “ gauh ”’ are taken together 
 ; 179 
 
180 APPENDIX 
 
 and the complete word-form “ gauh ”’ comes before our view. 
 The comprehension of this complete word-form is an attribute 
 of the mind and not of the sense of hearing. For the sense 
 of hearing senses the letter-forms of the sound one by one as. 
 the particular letters are pronounced by the speaker and as 
 they approach the ear one by one in air-waves. But each 
 letter-form sound vanishes as it is generated, for the sense — 
 of hearing has no power to hold them together and compre- 
 hend the letter-forms as forming a complete word-form. The 
 ideation of this complete word-form in the mind is called 
 sphota. It differs from the letter-form in this that it is a 
 complete, inseparable, and unified whole, devoid of any past, 
 and thus is quite unlike the letter-forms which die the next 
 moment after they originate. According to the system of 
 Patafijali as explained by the commentators, all significance 
 belongs to this sphota-form and never to the letters pro- 
 nounced or heard. Letters when they are pronounced and 
 heard in a particular order serve to give rise to such complete 
 ideational word-images which possess some denotation and 
 connotation of meaning and are thus called “ sphotas,”’ or that 
 which illuminates. These are essentially different in nature 
 from the sounds in letter-forms generated in the senses of 
 hearing which are momentary and evanescent and can never 
 be brought together to form one whole, have no meaning, and 
 have the sense of hearing as their seat. 
 
 The Vaiseshika view.—Sankara Misra, however, holds that 
 this “‘ sphota ” theory is absolutely unnecessary, for even the 
 supporters of sphota agree that the sphota stands con- 
 ventionally for the thing that it signifies ; now if that be the 
 case what is the good of admitting sphota at all? It is better 
 to say that the conventionality of names belongs to the letters 
 themselves, which by virtue of that can conjointly signify a 
 thing ; and it is when you look at the letters from this aspect— 
 their unity with reference to their denotation of one thing 
 
APPENDIX 181 
 
 —that you call them a pada or name (Upaskara, II. 2,21). So 
 according to this view we find that there is no existence of a 
 different entity called “name” or “‘sphota” which can be 
 distinguished from the letters coming in a definite order within 
 the range of the sense of hearing. The letters pronounced and 
 heard in a definite order are jointly called a name when they 
 denote a particular meaning or object. 
 
 Kumarila’s view :—Kumiarila, the celebrated scholar of the 
 Mimamsa school, also denies the sphota theory and asserts 
 like the Vaiseshika that the significance belongs to the letters 
 themselves and not to any special sphota or name. To prove 
 this he first proves that the letter-forms are stable and eternal 
 and suffer no change on account of the differences in their modes 
 of accent and pronunciation. He then goes on to show that the 
 sphota view only serves to increase the complexity without 
 any attendant advantage. Thus the objection that applies to 
 the so-called defect of the letter-denotation theory that the 
 letters cannot together denote a thing since they do not do it 
 individually, applies to the name-denotation of the sphota 
 theory, since there also it is said that though there is no sphota 
 or name corresponding to each letter yet the letters conjointly 
 give rise to a sphota or complete name (Slokavarttika, Sphota- 
 vada, sl. 91-93). 
 
 The letters, however, are helped by their potencies (sam- 
 skaras) in denoting the object, or the meaning. The sphota 
 theory has, according to Kumarila and Parthasarathi, also to 
 admit this samskara of the letters in the manifestation of the 
 name or the gabda-sphota, whereas they only admit it as the 
 operating power of the letters in denoting the object or the 
 thing signified. Samskaras according to Kumarila are thus 
 admitted both by the sphota theorists and the Kumarila 
 school of Mimamsa, only with this difference that the 
 latter with its help can directly denote the object of the 
 signified, whereas the former have only to go a step 
 
182 APPENDIX 
 
 backwards in thinking their samskara to give rise to the 
 name or the gabda-sphota alone (Nydyaratnakara,Sphotavada, 
 gl. 104). 
 
 Kumarila says that he takes great pains to prove the nullity 
 of the sphota theory only because if the sphota view be 
 accepted then it comes to the same thing as saying that words 
 and letters have no validity, so that all actions depending on 
 them also come to lose their validity (Slokavarttika, Sphota- 
 vada, sl. 137). 
 
 eanh anand beabhelire also holds the same view; for 
 according to him also the letters are pronounced in a definite 
 order; though when individually considered they are 
 momentary and evanescent, yet they maintain themselves 
 by their potency in the form of a pada or name, and thus 
 signify an object. Thus Saliknatha Migra says in his Praka- 
 rana Pancika, p. 89: “ It is reasonable to suppose that since 
 the later letters in a word are dependent upon the perception 
 of a preceding one some special change is wrought in the letters 
 themselves which leads to the comprehension of the meaning 
 ofaword. . .. Itcannot be proved either by perception or by 
 inference that there is any word apart from the letters ; the 
 word has thus for its constituents the letters.” 
 
 Sabara.—The views of Kamarila and Prahhakara thus 
 explicated are but elaborate explanations of the view of Sabara 
 who states the whole theory in a single line—purvavarna- 
 jamtasamskarasahito ntyo varnah pratyayakah. 
 
 “The last letter together with the potency generated by 
 the preceding letters is the cause of significance.” 
 
 Mahabhashya and Kaiyata.—Atter describing the view of 
 those who are antagonistic to the sphota theory it is necessary 
 to mention the Vaidkarana school which is in favour of it ; 
 thus we find that in explaining the following passage of 
 Mahabhashya, 
 
 ‘What is then a word ? It is that which being pronounced 
 
APPENDIX 183 
 
 one can understand specific objects such as those (cows) which 
 have tail, hoofs, horns, etc.” 
 
 Kaiyata says: ‘The grammarians think that denotation 
 belongs to words, as distinct from letters which are pronounced, 
 for if each of the letters should denote the object, there 
 would be no need of pronouncing the succeeding letters. . . .” 
 
 The vaiyakaranas admit the significant force of names as 
 distinguished from letters. For if the significant force be at- 
 tributed to letters individually, then the first letter being quite 
 sufficient to signify the object, the utterance of other letters 
 becomes unnecessary ; and according to this view if it is held 
 that each letter has the generating power, then also they 
 cannot do it simultaneously, since they are uttered one after 
 another. On the view of manifestation, also, since the letters 
 are manifested one after another, they cannot be collected 
 together in due order ; if their existence in memory is sufficient, 
 then we should expect no difference of signification or meaning 
 by the change of order in the utterance of the letters ; that is 
 “sara’”’ ought to have the same meaning as “‘rasa.”’ So it 
 must be admitted that the power of signification belongs to 
 the sphota as manifested by the nadas as has been described 
 in detail in Vakyapadiya. 
 
 As the relation between the perceiving capacity and the 
 object of perception is a constant one so also is the relation 
 between the sphota and the nada as the manifested and the 
 manifestor (Vakyapadiya 98). Just as the image varies 
 corresponding to the variation of the reflector, as oil, water, 
 etc., so also the reflected or manifested image differs accord- 
 ing to the difference of the manifestor (Vak. 100). Though 
 the manifestation of letters, propositions and names occurs at 
 one and the same time yet there seems to be a “ before and 
 after’ according to the “before and after” of the nada 
 utterances (Vak. 102). That which is produced through the 
 union and disunion (of nadas or dhvanis) is called sphota, 
 
184 APPENDIX 
 
 whereas other sound-perceptions arising from sounds are 
 called dhvanis (Vak. 103). As by the movement of water 
 the image of a thing situated elsewhere also appears to adopt 
 the movement of the water and thus seems to move, s0 also 
 the sphota, though unchanging in itself, yet appears to suffer 
 change in accordance with the change of nada which manifests 
 it (Vak. 49). As there are no parts of the letters themselves so 
 the letters also do not exist as parts of the name. There is 
 again no ultimate or real difference between names and 
 propositions (Vak. 73). It is only in popular usage that they 
 are regarded as different. That which others regard as the 
 most important thing is regarded as false here, for propositions 
 only are here regarded as valid (Vak. 74). Though the letters 
 which manifest names and propositions are altogether different 
 from them, yet their powers often appear as quite undiffer- 
 entiated from them (Vak. 89). Thus when propositions are 
 manifested by the cause of the manifestation of propositions 
 they appear to consist of parts when they first appear before 
 the mind. Thus, though the pada-sphota or the vakya-sphota 
 does not really consist of parts, yet, as the powers of letters 
 cannot often be differentiated from them, they also appear 
 frequently to be made up of parts (Vak. 91). 
 
 The Yoga View.—As to the relation of the letters to the 
 sphota, Vacaspati says, in explaining the Bhdshya, that each 
 of the letters has the potentiality of manifesting endless 
 meanings, but none of them can do so individually ; it is only 
 when the letter-form sounds are pronounced in succession by 
 one effort of speech that the individual letters by their own 
 particular contiguity or distance from one another can 
 manifest a complete word called the sphota. Thus owing to 
 the variation of contiguity of distance by intervention from 
 other letter-form sounds any letter-form sound may manifest 
 any meaning or word; for the particular order and the 
 association of letter-form sounds depend upon the particular 
 
APPENDIX 185 
 
 output of energy required in uttering them. The sphota is 
 thus a particular modification of buddhi, whereas the letter- 
 form sounds have their origin in the organ of speech when they 
 are uttered, and the sense of hearing when they are heard. It 
 is well to note here that the theory that the letters themselves 
 have endless potentiality and can manifest any word- 
 sphotas, according to their particular combinations and re- 
 combinations, is quite in keeping with the main metaphysical 
 doctrine of the Patafijala theory. | 
 
 Vakya-sphota. —What is said here of the letter-form sounds 
 -and the gabda-sphotas also applies to the relation that the 
 Sabda-sphotas bear to propositions or sentences. A word or 
 name does not stand alone; it always exists as combined with 
 other words in the form of a proposition. Thus the word 
 “tree ’’ whenever it is pronounced carries with it the notion 
 of a verb “‘asti”’ or “ exists,” and thereby demonstrates its 
 meaning. The single word “tree”? without any reference to 
 any other word which can give it a propositional form has no 
 meaning. Knowledge of words always comes in propositional 
 forms ; just as different letter-form sounds demonstrate by 
 their mutual collocation a single word or gabda-sphota, so the 
 words also by their mutual combination or collocation demon- 
 strate judgmental or propositional significance or meaning. 
 As the letters themselves have no meaning so the words them- 
 selves have also no meaning; it is only by placing them 
 side by side in a particular order that a meaning dawns in 
 the mind. When single words are pronounced they associate 
 other words with themselves and thus appear to signify a 
 meaning. But though a single word is sufficient by associa- 
 tion with other words to carry a meaning, yet sentences or 
 propositions should not be deemed unnecessary for they serve 
 to specialise that meaning (niyamarthe anuvadah). Thus 
 ‘cooks ”’ means that any subject makes something the object 
 of his cooking. The mention of the subject “ Devadatta ” and 
 
186 APPENDIX 
 
 the object “rice ’”’ only specialises the subject and the object. 
 Though the analysis of a sentence into the words of which it is 
 constituted is as imaginary as the analysis of a word into the 
 letter-form sounds, it is generally done in order to get an 
 analytical view of the meaning of a sentence—an imaginary 
 division of it as into cases, verbs, ete. 
 
 Abhihitanvayavada and Anwtabhidhanavada, —This _ re- 
 minds us of the two very famous theories about the relation 
 of sentences to words, viz. the ‘‘ Abhihitanvayavada ” and the 
 “ Anvitabhidhanavada.” The former means that words 
 themselves can express their separate meanings by the function 
 abhidha or denotation ; these are subsequently combined into 
 a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter means 
 that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence, and 
 as grammatically connected with each other; they only 
 express an action or something connected with action; in 
 “samanaya’’ “bring the cow’’—“‘ gam ”’ does not properly 
 mean “ gotva’”’ but ‘‘ dnayananvitagotva,”’ that is, the bovine 
 genus as connected with bringing. We cannot have a case of a 
 noun without some governing verb and vice versa—(Sarvadar- 
 Sana-samgraha, Cowell). 
 
 The Yoga point of view. —It will be seen that strictly 
 speaking the Yoga view does not agree with any one of these 
 views though it approaches nearer to the Anvitabhidhana 
 view than to the Abhihitanvaya view. For according to the 
 Yoga view the idea of the sentence is the only true thing ; 
 words only serve to manifest this idea but have themselves no 
 meaning, The division of a sentence into the component word- 
 conceptions is only an imaginary analysis—an afterthought. 
 
 Confusion the cause of verbal cognition. —According to 
 Patafijali’s view verbal cognition proceeds only from a 
 confusion of the letter-form sounds (which are perceived in 
 the sense of hearing), the sabda-sphota which is manifested 
 in the buddhi, and the object which exists in the external 
 
APPENDIX 187 
 
 world. These three though altogether distinct from one another 
 yet appear to be unified on account of the sanketa, or sign, so 
 that the letter-form sounds, the gsabda-sphota, and the thing, 
 can never be distinguished from one another. Of course 
 knowledge can arise even in those cases where there is no 
 actual external object, simply by virtue of the manifesting 
 power of the letter-form sounds. This sanketa is again defined 
 as the confusion of words and their meanings through memory, 
 so that it appears that what a word is, so is its denoted 
 object, and what a denoted word is, so is its object. 
 Convention is a manifestation of memory of the nature of 
 mutual confusion of words and their meanings. This object 
 is the same as this word, and this word is the same as this 
 object. Thus there is no actual unity of words and their 
 objects: such unity is imaginary and due to beginningless 
 tradition. This view may well be contrasted with Nyaya, 
 according to which the convention of works as signifying 
 objects is due to the will of God. 
 
INDEX 
 
 abhihitanvayavada, 186 
 
 abhinivesa, 101, 104 
 
 abhivyaktikarana, 133 
 
 abhyasa, 100, 101, 126, 128, 129, 
 130, 138, 143, 149, 162, 177 
 
 Absorption, 102 
 
 Abstraction, 135, 136, 148, 
 174. 
 
 Accessories, 135, 137, 145 
 
 Accidental variation, 77 
 
 acit, 162 
 
 Actual, 73 
 
 Actuality, 83 
 
 adharma, 85, 86, 88, 102, 106, 162 
 
 adhikarin, 123 
 
 adrshtajanmavedaniya, 112 
 
 adrshta-janmavedaniya karma, 105, 
 110, 111 
 
 advaita, 14 
 
 Advaita-brahmasiddhi, 14 
 
 Afflictions, 100, 103, 104, 105, 123, 
 124, 128, 143, 173 n., 176, 177, 
 178 
 
 Agent, 4 
 
 Aggregation, 168 
 
 Agreement, 33 
 
 ahamkara, 38, 40, 41, 53, 56, 58, 61, 
 82, 86, 87, 93 
 
 ahamkara-sattvika, rajasa, tamasa, 
 
 154, 
 
 55 
 ahimsa, 136, 138, 139, 144 
 Ahirbudhnyasamhita, 10 
 akhyati, 164 
 aklishta, 101 
 aklishtavrtti, 128 
 alinga, 7, 41, 42, 62,118 
 anaddisamyoga, 28 
 andgsrita, 29 n. 
 anekabhavika, 107, 112, 113 
 Anger, 141 
 anirvacyd, 28 
 
 aniyatavipaika, 112 
 
 aniyatavipaka - adrshtajanmaveda - 
 niya, 113 
 
 antahkarana, 43 n. 
 
 anukdrena pagsyati, 21 
 
 anupagsya, 21 
 
 anuvrata, 139 
 
 anuvyavasaya, 176 
 
 anvaya, 166, 167 
 
 anvayikarana, 61 
 
 anvitabhidhanavada, 186 
 
 anvitabhidhanavada, Yoga view, 
 near to, 186 
 
 anyabhyam ahamkarabhyam  svaka- 
 ryyopajanane rajasadhamkarah sa- 
 hakaribhavati, 55 
 
 anyathakhyati, 164, 173 n. 
 
 anyatvakarana, 134 
 
 anyonyamithunadh sarvve naishdma- 
 disamprayogo viprayogo va upala- 
 bhyate, 7 
 
 anga, 145 
 
 anu, 43 n., 65 
 
 ap, 74, 75, 166, 167 
 
 ap atom, 65, 66 
 
 apara vairagya, 127, 128 
 
 aparigraha, 141 
 
 apavarga, 29 
 
 apoha, 101, 176 
 
 Appearance, 36 
 
 apunya karma, 88 
 
 Aristotle, 1, 13 
 
 artha, 150 
 
 arthavattva, 166, 167 
 
 arthena svakiyaya grahyasaktya vij- 
 Ranamajani, 33 
 
 asamprajnata, 124, 149 
 
 asamprajfiata samadhi, 125 
 
 Asceticism, 136, 139, 142, 144 
 
 asmita, 51, 59, 100, 104, 118, 153, 
 154, 172, 175 
 
 188 
 
INDEX 
 
 asmita-ego, 51 
 
 asmitdmdtra, 50, 51, 59, 160 
 
 asmitanugata, 125, 153, 154 
 
 asmityetavanmatrakaratvadasmita, 
 153 
 
 Assimilation, 101 
 
 Association of ideas, 37 
 
 asteya, 141, 144 
 
 Astral body, 93 
 
 agukla, 140 
 
 asuklakrshna, 102, 103, 111 
 
 Atheistic, 90 
 
 Atomic change as unit of time, 43 
 
 Atoms, 4, 38, 39, 43, 65, 72, 74, 77, 
 81, 152, 167; continual change, 
 71 
 
 Attachment, 99. 100, 176, 177 
 
 Avariciousness, 136, 141 
 
 avastha, 76 
 
 avasthaparinama, 71, 73, 82, 156, 
 165 
 
 Aversion, 98, 176, 177 
 
 avibhagapraptaviva, 17 
 
 avidya, 2, 11, 12, 97, 99, 100, 101, 
 104, 114, 115, 116, 120, 123, 128, 
 bah olbo, 172s LIS, 17837, 1ts 
 definition, 11; uprooting of, 115, 
 116 
 
 avidya of yoga and Samkhya, 164 
 
 avisesha, 7, 7n., 40, 41, 60, 61, 62, 
 81, 82, 84, 165 
 
 aviseshenopashtambhakasvabhavah, 6 
 
 aviveka, 173 n. 
 
 avyapadesyatva, 77 
 
 avyavasthitakhilaparinamo bhavaty- 
 eva, 85 
 
 ayutasiddhavayava, 69 
 
 adisamprayoga, 7 
 
 akara, 85 
 
 akasa, 14, 43 n., 56, 57, 58, 68, 80, 
 93, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170 
 
 akasa, two kinds of, 168 
 
 akasa atom, 65, 66; Bhikshu and 
 Vacaspati on, 65 
 
 akasa tanmatra, 66 
 
 adlocana, 176 
 
 amalaka, 77, 78, 79 
 
 ananda, 153, 154 
 
 anandanugata, 125, 153, 154 
 
 aptikarana, 133, 135 
 
 apura, 93 
 
 189 
 
 apyakarana, 135 . 
 
 asana, 136, 145 
 
 asaya, 103 
 
 Gserate samsarikaé purushdé asminnits 
 asayah, 103 
 
 avarana égakti, 84 
 
 ayush, 105, 106, 115 
 
 Barabara muni, 64 
 
 bahya karma, 102 
 
 Beginningless, 28 
 
 Behaviour, 6 
 
 Bel, 77 
 
 Benares, 11 n. 
 
 bhakti, 161 
 
 bhaktiyoga, 159, 161 
 
 bhava, 110 
 
 bhavishyadvyaktukamandgatamanud- 
 bhitavyaktikamatilam svavyaparo- 
 paridham varitamanam trayam 
 caitadvastu jndnasya jreyam yadr 
 caitat svartipato ndbhavishyan- 
 nedam nirvishayam jndnamuda- 
 patsyata  tasmddatiiamanagatam 
 svaripato stiti, 31 n. 
 
 Bhashya, 16, 17, 18, 19, 33, 61, 62, 
 67, 71, 76, 78, 80, 91, 95, 99, 109, 
 110, 131 
 
 bhavana, 161] 
 
 Bhikshu, 6, 9, 12n., 43n., 45n., 
 46n., 50, 65, 67, 85, 86, 88, 90, 
 94, 109, 110, 112, 126, 129, 1465, 
 153, 168 
 
 bhoga, 29, 105, 106, 115 
 
 bhoga-Sarira, 105 
 
 Bhoja, 126 
 
 Bhojavrtti, 95 
 
 bhrama, 173 n. 
 
 bhita, 60, 69, 166 
 
 bhitadi, 54, 56, 58, 63, 64; accre- 
 tion from, 65, 66 
 
 Biological, 2 
 
 Birth, 133, 161 
 
 Body, sattvamaya, 160 
 
 Bondage, 19 
 
 Brahmacaryya, 141 
 
 Brahman, 27, 28, 139 
 
 Breath, 146, 147 
 
 Breath regulation, 135, 136 
 
 buddheh pratisamvedi purushah, 19 
 
190 
 
 buddhi, 16, 18, 21, 27, 28, 40, 51, 52, 
 61, 115, 116, 118, 152, 173 n. 
 
 Buddhist, 33, 45 n. 
 
 Buddhists, their theory of sahopala- 
 mbhaniyama refuted, 33 
 
 Caitra, 173 
 
 Caraka, 11 
 
 Caste, 139 
 
 Categories of existence, 41 
 
 Category, 6, 117 
 
 OCaturdasi, 139 
 
 Causal activity, 4 
 
 Causal operation, 4 
 
 Causal transformation, 4 
 
 Causality, 152 
 
 Causation, 132,133; Samkhya view 
 of, 81 
 
 Cause, 79, 81, 85, 133, 134; nine 
 kinds of, 133 
 
 Cessation, 19 
 
 Change, 43,44; Buddhist and Yoga 
 idea contrasted, 45n.; units of, 
 45, 46 
 
 Changeful, 18 
 
 Characterised, 37 
 
 Characteristic, 37 
 
 Chaya-vyakhya, 63, 93 
 
 Chemical, 2 
 
 Chowkhamba, 11 n. 
 
 Circumstance, 139 
 
 cit, 15, 162 
 
 citta, 36, 81, 92, 93, 94, 96, 101, 114, 
 115, 116; 117, 119, 126, 132, 147, 
 154, 161, 175; different forms of, 
 92, 93; different states of, 170; 
 its nature, 94 
 
 cittamayaskantamanikalpam sanni- 
 dhimdtropakart dréyatvena svam 
 bhavati purushasya svaminah, 22 
 
 cittaprasadda, 127 
 
 Clairaudience, 144 
 
 Class-characteristics, 4 n. 
 
 Cleanliness, 136, 143, 144 
 
 Coco-nut, 77 
 
 Co-existence, 34 
 
 Cognitive states, 48 
 
 Coherent, 7, 37 
 
 Collocation, 37 
 
 Commentary, 4 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Compassion, 137 
 
 Complacency, 137 
 
 Compounds, 3, 166 
 
 Conceived, 3 
 
 Conceiver, 3 
 
 Concentration, 17, 94, 95, 96, 123, 
 126, 128, 135, 136, 147, 148, 150, 
 152, 153, 155, 163, 170 
 
 Concept, 150, 162, 173 
 
 Conceptual, 23, 25 
 
 Concomitant causes, 85 
 
 Condensation, 10 
 
 Conscious-like, 19 
 
 Consciousness, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 45, 
 92, 93, 122, 149, 151, 154, 173 
 
 Consciousness contentless, 50 
 
 Conscious states, 17 
 
 Conservation, 132, 133 
 
 Contact, 27, 29 n. 
 
 Contemplation, 97 
 
 Contentment, 136, 139, 144 
 
 Continence, 136, 139, 141, 144 
 
 Contrary, 141 
 
 Co-operation, 5 
 
 Cosmic evolution, 47 
 
 Cosmic matter, 74 
 
 Country, 139 
 
 Creation, 114, 115, 160, 161 
 
 Critique of Judgment, 14 
 
 Critique of Practical Reason, 14 
 
 Critique of Pure Reason, 14 
 
 Davies, 25 
 
 Decision, 53 
 
 Demerit, 86, 87, 88, 93, 102, 103 
 
 Denotation, 7 n. 
 
 dega, 85, 170 
 
 Descartes, 13 
 
 Desire, 141 
 
 Determinate, 7 
 
 Determined, 3, 37 
 
 Determiner, 3 
 
 Devotion, 139, 142, 145, 161 
 
 dharana, 101, 128, 130, 135, 136, 
 137, 138, 145, 147, 148, 176 
 
 dharma, 42, 71, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
 101, 103, 106, 162 
 
 dharmamegha-samadhi, 117 
 
 dharmaparindma, 69, 71, 74, 80, 
 81, 156, 165 
 
 dharmin, 71, 73, 74, 76 
 
INDEX 
 
 dharmisvaripamdtro hi dharmah, 
 dharmivikriya eva esha dharma- 
 dvara propancyate, 37, 71 
 
 dharmi, 42 
 
 dhatu, 11 
 
 dhrtikdrana, 135 
 
 dhyana, 117, 130, 135, 136, 138, 139, 
 145, 147, 148 
 
 Difference, 33 
 
 Differentiated, 7, 37, 62 
 
 Differentiation, 53, 66, 101 
 
 dik, 170 
 
 Discrimination, 8, 116, 120, 164 
 
 Distractions, 126, 148 
 
 Doubt, 172 
 
 drashta drsimdairah Suddho pi pratya- 
 yanupasyah, 16 
 
 dravya, 4n., 29n., 168 
 
 Drona, 140 a. 
 
 drgdarganasaktyorekdimateva asmitda, 
 16, 51 
 
 drk, 17 
 
 drksakti, 20 
 
 drshtajanma karmasaya, 105 
 
 drshtajanmavedaniya, 105, 110, 112 
 
 duhkha, 175 
 
 dvesha, 104. 
 
 Earth, 167 
 
 Effect, 81, 82, 85, 132 
 
 Efficient cause, 82 
 
 Ego, 3, 4, 27, 28, 38, 42, 51, 52, 53, 
 BU bit 00. 1B2s- 1b3  V7bs a 
 modification of buddhi, 53; evo- 
 lution in three lines from, 54; 
 three kinds of, 85 
 
 Egohood, 50, 124 
 
 Ego-universal, 50 
 
 ekabhavika, 105, 110, 111, 112 
 
 ekabhavikatva, 109 
 
 ekagra, 95, 96, 123, 126 
 
 ekatmata, 17 
 
 ekatmika samvidasmita, 51 
 
 ekendriya, 128 
 
 Elements, 3, 166 
 
 Emancipation, 164 
 
 Energy, 3, 5, 8, 132 
 
 Enjoyment, 28, 29 
 
 Equilibrium, 6, 7, 8, 9, 42, 43, 
 87 
 
 Error, 173 n. 
 
 191 
 
 Eternal, 8, 91 
 
 Eternity, two kinds of, 118 
 
 Ethics, 92 
 
 European, 10 
 
 Evolutes, 11 
 
 Evolution, 7, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 
 47, 62, 65, 69, 72, 76, 81, 84, 87, 
 89, 114; as change, 43; as 
 change of qualities and as deriva- 
 tion of categories, 69; definite 
 law of, 82; its limitations by 
 time and space, 79; measured by 
 units of spatial motion, 44; of 
 manas, 55; of the senses, 54; 
 of categories, difference between 
 Samkhya and Yoga view, 58-62; 
 of similars, 10 
 
 Evolutionary process, 77, 85, 91 
 
 Exhalation, 146 
 
 Existence as capacity of effecting, 8 
 
 Expiratory, 136 
 
 Extension, 34 
 
 Externality, 34- 
 
 External reality, 34; Buddhist ob- 
 jection to, 32; has more than a 
 momentary existence, 36; its 
 ground, 36; not due to imagina- 
 tion, 35; not identical with our 
 ideas, 35 
 
 External world, 31; refutation of 
 Buddhist objections, 33 
 
 Faith, 102 
 
 Fichte, 50 
 
 Fisherman, 139 
 
 Force, 82 
 
 Freedom, 123, 125,127; of will, 177 
 Friendliness, 137 
 
 Future, 31, 32, 46, 72 
 
 Ganda, 15 
 
 gandha, 38, 152, 167 
 gandha-tanmatra, 58, 64 
 Gaudapada, 24 
 Generalisation, 154 
 Generic, 168 
 ghatavacchinna akasa, 14 
 Gita, 12 
 
 Gitabhashya, 4 n. 
 
 Goal, 115, 121, 124, 127, 129 
 
192 
 
 God, 2, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 115, 136, 
 139, 142, 148, 145, 148, 149, 161, 
 163, 164, 172, 178, 187 
 
 Gold, 134 
 
 grahana, 101, 153, 175 
 
 grahanadharanohapohatativajnana- 
 bhinivesa buddhau varttamana pur- 
 ushe adhyaropitasadbhavah, 53 
 
 grahitr, 153 
 
 grahya, 54, 153 
 
 Gross elements, derivation of, 65 et 
 seq. 
 
 Grossness, 34 
 
 guna eva prakriisabdavacya na tu 
 tadatirikta prakrtirasti, 10 
 
 gunanam hi dvairipyam vyavasiy- 
 atmkatvam vyavaseyatmakatvamea, 
 53 
 
 gunanam paramam ripam na drshti- 
 pathamrcchati, yattu drshtipatham 
 praptam tanmayeva sutucchakam, 
 ib 
 
 gunas, 3, 4n., 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 24, 
 26, 37, 38, 39; 42, 53, 76, 78, 81, 
 82, 98, 101, 118, 120, 121, 13], 
 155, 167, 170 '- 
 
 gunas, three classes, 5; as causal 
 effect, 6; evolution of the cog- 
 nitive and conative senses and 
 tanmatras, 38; identity of quali- 
 ties and substances, 5; relative 
 preponderance of, 7; special 
 affinity of each class, 6; special 
 behaviour of each class of, 6; 
 their atomic qualities consistent 
 with their all-pervasiveness, 43 n.; 
 their common purpose, 7; their 
 co-operation, 38; their mode of 
 combination, 6; their mode of 
 mutual operation, 5; their mode 
 of evolution, 7; their nature as 
 feelings, 68; their twofold nature, 
 53; their threefold course of de- 
 velopment, 38; their want of 
 purpose in the state of equi- 
 librium, 7; two classes of their 
 evolution, avisesha and visesha, 
 40 
 
 Harihararanya, 96 
 Heaven, 86 n, 
 
 INDEX 
 
 hetumadanityamavyapt sakriyaman- 
 ekaésritam lingam savayavampara- 
 tantram vyaktam viparitamavyak- 
 tam, 42 
 
 Hibiscus, 15 n. 
 
 himsa, 140, 141 
 
 History of Hindu Chemistry, 7n., 
 63 n., 170 n. 
 
 Horn of a hare, 8 
 
 Hume, 37 
 
 Idealistic Buddhists, 31 
 
 Ignorance, 141, 145 
 
 Illumination, 5 
 
 Illusion, 173 n.; of Yoga and Sam- 
 khya, 164 
 
 Illusive, 28 
 
 Imagination, 34 
 
 Immanent purpose, 90 
 
 Independence, 95, 128, 134 
 
 Indeterminate, 8 
 
 India, 14 
 
 Indra, 86 n. 
 
 Inertia, 3, 5, 8, 37, 167 
 
 Inference, 1, 2, 81, 96, 154, 156, 162, 
 163, 170, 171 
 
 Infra-atomic, 3 
 
 Infra-atoms, 4 
 
 Inhalation, 146 
 
 Injury, 139 
 
 Inorganic, 74 
 
 Inspiratory, 136 
 
 Intellection, 6 
 
 Intelligence, 2, 48 
 
 Intelligence-stuff, 3, 8, 49 
 
 Iron, 6 
 
 Jévara, 14, 79, 87, 88, 90, 103, 126, 
 144, 145, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 
 172; removal of barriers, 87 
 
 Isvarakrshna, 7 n. 
 
 Igvarapranidhana, 142, 145, 161 
 
 Isvarasyapi dharmadhisthanartham 
 pratibandhapanaya eva vyaparo, 
 87 
 
 janmamaranakarananam pratiniya- 
 madayugapat pravyttesca purusha- 
 bahuivam siddham traigunyavi- 
 paryyayacca, 26 
 
INDEX 
 
 japasphatikayoriva noparagah kint- 
 vabhimanah, 15 
 
 jatt, 105, 106, 115 
 
 Jealousy, 143 
 
 jiva, 14 
 
 jivanmukta, 117 
 
 jivanmukti, 120 
 
 jhana, 150 
 
 jhanayoga, 130, 142, 143, 159 
 
 Judgmental, 23 
 
 kaivalya, 22, 23, 27, 31, 95, 96, 116, 
 118, 121, 122, 139, 140, 142, 143, 
 177 
 
 kalpa, 160 
 
 Kant, 14, 37 
 
 Kapila, 25 
 
 karma, 86, 98, 117, 159, 160, 177; 
 its classification and divergence 
 of views, 109-113 
 
 karma-sannyasin, 103 
 
 karmasaya, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 
 110, 111, 112, 115, 160 
 
 karmayoga, 159 
 
 karuna, 137, 138, 139 
 
 Kaumudi, 64 
 
 kala, 85 
 
 kama, 104 
 
 karana, 168 
 
 karanacitta, 93 
 
 harika, 7 n., 11, 24, 26, 42, 64, 165 
 
 Karya, 168 
 
 karya vimukti, 120 
 
 karyya citta, 92 
 
 karyyakari gakti, 84 
 
 Kasmira, 79 
 
 kevalapurushakéra samvit, 153 
 
 kevali, 117, 118 
 
 kirata, 101 
 
 klega, 99, 100, 104, 114 
 
 klishta, 128 
 
 klishtavrtti, 100 
 
 Knowable, 5, 27, 32, 38 
 
 Knower, 27, 50 
 
 Knowledge, different kinds of, differ- 
 entiated, 163 
 
 Known, 27 
 
 kriya, 37, 175 
 
 kriyayoga, 129, 130, 142, 143, 161 
 
 krodha, 104 
 
 krshna, 102, 103, 111 
 
 18) 
 
 193 
 
 krshna karma, 103, 111 
 
 krtartham pratt nashtamapyanash- 
 tam tadanyasadharanatvat, 26 
 
 kshana, 43, 44, 45, 46 n., 146, 170 
 
 kshanabhanguram, 12 n. 
 
 kshanapracayasraya, 46 n, 
 
 kshanapratiyogi, 46 n. 
 
 kshanatatkramayornastt vastusama- 
 harah itt buddhisaméharah muhir- 
 ttahoratratradayah. sa tvayam 
 kilah vastustinyo pt buddhinir- 
 manah, 44. 
 
 kshipta, 95, 122 
 
 kshiti, 74, 75, 166 
 
 kshiti atom, 66 
 
 kunti, 14, 15 n. 
 
 kugala, 121 
 
 kuSali, 121 
 
 kttastha nitya, 118 
 
 lakshana, 76, 82 
 
 lakshana-parinama, 71, 72, 73, 74, 
 156, 165 
 
 Latent, 46, 73, 81, 96, 108 
 
 laukikamayeva, 12 n. 
 
 liberation, 7, 25, 167, 175, 177 
 
 Light, 167 
 
 Limitation theory, 14, 15 
 
 linga, 7, 41, 42, 51, 62, 118 
 
 lingamatram mahattatvam satiémiatre 
 mahats dtmani, 50 
 
 lobha, 104 
 
 Locke, 37 
 
 Lokacaryya, 11, 55, 58 
 
 Lotus, 9 
 
 madhumati, 125 
 
 madhupratika, 125 
 
 Magnet, 6, 89, 171 
 
 mahat, 9, 11, 40, 41, 42, 51, 56, 38, 
 59, 61, 82; its potential existence 
 in prakrti, 9 
 
 Mahabharata, 15 n., 80, 140 
 
 mahapralaya, 118 
 
 mahavrata, 139 
 
 maitri, 137, 138, 139 
 
 manas, 40, 51, 55, 60, 81, 100, 118, 
 133, 175, 176 
 
 Manifested, 72 
 
 mantra, 161 
 
 Many, 27, 28 
 
194 
 
 Mani prabha, 65 
 
 marut, 75, 166 
 
 Mass, 3 
 
 Material cause, 61, 81 
 
 Matter, 2, 3, 166 
 
 manasa karma, 102 
 
 matra, 146 
 
 maya, 2, 11, 12, 14, 27, 28 
 
 mayam tu prakytim vidyat mayinam 
 tu mahesvaram, 11 
 
 mayeva, 12 n. 
 
 Mechanical, 2 
 
 Meditation, 102, 135, 136, 145, 148, 
 149, 161, 176 
 
 Memory, 53, 98 
 
 Mental, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 37, 48 
 
 Mental states, analysis of, 48 
 
 Merit, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93, 103 
 
 Metaphysics, 30 
 
 Method of agreement, 33, 35; of 
 difference, 33 
 
 Mind, 2, 3, 18, 19, 81; 
 qualities, 156 
 
 Mind-modification, 20, 22; 
 formations, 18 
 
 moha, 104, 175 
 
 Mokshadharmadhyaiya, 140 
 
 Moment, 44, 45 
 
 Momentary, 12, 35 
 
 Moral, 2 
 
 Moral ideal, 26 
 
 Movement, 48 
 
 mudita, 137, 139 
 
 midha, 95, 122 
 
 its seven 
 
 -trans- 
 
 Nahusha, 86 
 
 Naiyayika, 58 
 
 Name, 150,173; and thing, 173 
 
 Nandi, 85 
 
 na tu kshanatiriktah kshanikah pad- 
 arthah kascidishyate taistu kshana- 
 matrasthayyeva padarthah ishyate, 
 45 n. 
 
 Naturalism and agnosticism, 2 n. 
 
 Natural selection, 76 
 
 Nagega, 61, 63, 66, 86, 87, 94, 107, 
 109, 117, 168 
 
 Narayana Tirtha, 90, 126 
 
 nasadasit na sadasit tadanim, 12 
 
 nastyasatah sambhavah na casti sato 
 vinadsah, 31 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Nectar, 85 
 
 Nescience, 14, 15, 97, 99; its dif- 
 ferent forms, 172 n. 
 
 nidra, 101 
 
 Nihilists, 2 
 
 nihsahge pi uparago vivekat, 15 
 
 nihsattasattam nihsadasat nirasat 
 avyaktam alingam pradhanam, 8 
 
 nihsattasattam, 12 
 
 nirasmita, 153 
 
 nirmana citta, 160, 161 
 
 nirananda, 153 
 
 nirodha, 19, 96, 118, 
 170 
 
 nirodhaja samskara, 97 
 
 nirodha samadhi, 139 
 
 niruddha, 95, 123 
 
 nirvicara, 149, 153, 154 
 
 nirvija, 122, 125 
 
 nirvija samadhi, 154 
 
 nirvitarka, 150, 151, 153, 154 
 
 niscaya, 50 
 
 niyama, 136, 139, 142, 143, 148 
 
 niyata vipaka, 112 
 
 niyatavipakadrshtajanmavedaniya, 
 113 
 
 Nilakantha, 80, 88, 89 
 
 Non-being, 2 
 
 Non-covetousness, 139, 144 
 
 Non-discrimination, 15 
 
 Non-distinction, 173 n. 
 
 Non-existence, 8, 12 
 
 Non-injury, 139, 140, 
 classification, 141 
 
 Non-stealing, 139 
 
 Noumenon, 8, 14 
 
 149, 155, 156, 
 
 144; its 
 
 Observance, 135, 136 
 omkara, 161 
 Omniscience, 95 
 oshadhi, 161 
 
 Pain, 98, 121, 122, 126, 137, 142 
 
 Palm, 77 
 
 Pantheism, 13 
 
 Paficasikha, 17, 52, 103 n. 
 
 parama mahat, 68 
 
 paramanu in Samkhya and Yoga, 
 43 n., 66, 67, 165, 167 
 
INDEX 
 
 para vairagya, 120, 127, 128 
 
 parikarma, 129, 130, 135, 137 
 
 parinama, 98 
 
 parinamaduhkhata, 98 
 
 parinamakramaniyama, 62, 82 
 
 parinami, 19 
 
 parinaminityata, 119 
 
 Past, 31, 32, 46, 72 
 
 Pataiijali, 1, 2, 5n., 16, 26, 30, 35, 
 51, 119 
 
 Patent, 81 
 
 pada, 54 
 
 Paficala, 79 
 
 pani, 54 
 
 papa karma, 100 
 
 papakarmasaya, 105 
 
 Patafijala, 1, 12, 90, 115 
 
 payu, 54, 58 
 
 Perceived, 3 
 
 Perceiver, 3 
 
 Percept, 19 
 
 Perception, 3, 53, 96, 154, 162, 170, 
 171, 175 
 
 Permanent, 21 
 
 Phenomena, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 14, 17, 
 18, 19, 95 
 
 Phenomenal, 29, 84, 125, 155 
 
 Philosopher, 2 
 
 Philosophical, 2 
 
 Physical, 2, 3, 4, 5, 37, 166 
 
 Physical, Chemical and Mechanical 
 Theories of the Ancient Hindus, 
 63 n. 
 
 Plant: its possession of life and 
 senses, 80 
 
 Plato, 13 
 
 Pleasure, 98 
 
 Plurality, 26-29, 30 
 
 Poison, 85 
 
 Posture, 135, 136, 145 
 
 Potency, 19, 82, 96, 98, 101, 106, 
 116, 124, 125, 154, 155; destroy- 
 ing other potencies, 117 
 
 Potential, 9, 32, 73, 77, 83, 84, 85 
 
 Potentiality, 5, 83, 84 
 
 Potentials, 3 
 
 Power, 82 
 
 pradhana, 118 
 
 prajia, 102, 116, 117, 120, 122, 125, 
 126, 128, 136, 151, 154, 170, 171; 
 its seven stages, 119-120 
 
 195 
 
 prajiasamskara, 101 
 
 prajialoka, 149 
 
 prakasa, 37, 175 
 
 prakrti, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,13, 16, 17, 
 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 40, 41, 42, 54, 
 59, 62, 77, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
 89. 91, 93, 94, 95, 114, 115, 117, 
 118, 120, 122, 125, 143, 152, 160, 
 161, 162, 164, 165, 170, 173 n., 
 175,177,178; as undifferentiated 
 cosmic matter, 12; as equilibrium 
 of dharma and dharmi, 42; avidya 
 and vasana lie merged in it, 114; 
 different views of, 10, 11; different 
 from avidya, 12; evolution of 
 the second category of asmita, 
 51; its difference from maya, 
 12; its difference from purusha, 
 20; its first evolutionary product, 
 mahat, 50, 51; its goal, 116; its 
 identity with guna reals, 9; its 
 relation with gunas, 6; its simi- 
 larity with purusha, 20; Loka- 
 caryya’s view of, 11; naturein the 
 state of equilibrium, 8; refilling 
 from, 86; roused by God, 87; 
 Venkata’s view of, 10 
 
 prakrtilina, 127 
 
 prakrtivikrtt, Tn. 
 
 prakrtirityucyate vikarotpadakatvat 
 avidya jranavirodhitvat maya vi- 
 citrasrshtikaratvat, 11 
 
 prakrtyapura, 106 
 
 pralaya, 114 
 
 pramana, 101, 170, 176 
 
 pranava, 161 
 
 ‘pranayama, 136, 137, 145, 146, 147, 
 
 148, 175 
 prasupta, 176 
 pratipaksha bhavana, 141 
 pratisambandhi, 46 n. 
 pratiyogi, 46 n. 
 pratyahara, 136, 137, 147, 148 
 pratyaksha, 171, 175 
 pratyaya, 119, 134 
 pratyayakarana, 133 
 pratyayam bauddhamanupasyati ta- 
 manupasyannatadaima pt tadaima- 
 ka wva pratibhati, 17 
 pratyayanupasya, 17, 18 
 Pravacana-bhashya, 64 
 
196 
 
 pramanyaniscaya, 134 n. 
 
 Pre-established harmony, 2 
 
 Present, 31, 32, 46, 72 
 
 Presentative ideation, 101 
 
 Presentative power, 33 
 
 Pride, 143 
 
 Primal, 3 
 
 Primal cause, 3, 6 
 
 prthivi, 57 
 
 Psychological, 2 
 
 Psychology, 81 
 
 Psychosis, 3, 16 
 
 punya, 100 
 
 punya karma, 88, 100 
 
 punya karmasaya, 105 
 
 Purana, 64 
 
 Purification, 138 
 
 Purificatory, 129, 130, 136 
 
 Purity, 139 
 
 purusha, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 
 23, 28, 29, 42, 48, 53, 61, 76, 89, 
 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 100, 104, 116, 
 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 126, 131, 
 133, 143, 154, 159, 162, 164, 173, 
 173 n., 175, 177, 178; arguments 
 in favour of its separate exist- 
 ence, 24; contrast with vedantic 
 Brahman, 26; different from the 
 mental states, 17; fulfilment of 
 its objects, 7, 8; its connection 
 with prakrti real, 28; its final 
 separation from prakrti, 118; its 
 permanence, 21; its plurality, 
 26-30; its reflection in the mind, 
 18; its relation with concepts 
 and ideas, 49; its similarity with 
 sattva, 49; meaning determined 
 from the sitras, 16, 17; nature 
 of its reflection in buddhi, 21, 
 22 
 
 purushartha, 89 
 
 purusharthata, 120, 164; its rela- 
 tion with avidya, 115 
 
 purvadesa, 43 n. 
 
 rajas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 24, 37, 40, 43, 47, 49, 
 50, 51, 54, 55, 62, 95, 96, 116, 175 
 
 Rarefaction, 10 
 
 rasa, 38, 152 
 
 rasa-tanmatra, 58, 64 
 
 Ray, P. C., 7n., 63 n., 170 n. 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Radha, 14, 15 n. 
 
 raga, 97, 99, 104, 172 
 Rajamartanda, 65 
 rajaputiravattativopadesat, 15 
 rajasa, 38 
 
 Ramanuja, 64, 162 
 Realisation, 137 
 
 Reality, 2, 4, 30, 118, 154 
 Reals, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 28 
 Reason, 50 
 
 Reasoning, 53 
 
 Rebirth, 93, 107 
 Reflection, 18, 28 
 Reflection theory, 14, 15 
 Release, 28, 29, 123, 128 
 Religious, 2 
 Reperception, 18 
 Restraint, 135, 136 
 Retention, 101 
 
 Right knowledge, 53 
 ripa, 38, 65, 152, 167 
 rupa-tanmatra, 57, 64 
 Reveda, 11 
 
 rshi, 144 
 
 rtambhara, 154 
 
 sadrsaparinama, 10 
 
 sahakari, 55 
 
 sahopalambhaniyama, 33 
 
 sahopalambhaniyamaé ca vedyatvanea 
 het sandigdhavyatirekatayanatka- 
 ntikau, 34 
 
 sahopalambhaniyamadabhedo 
 taddhiyoh, 32 
 
 Salvation, 145, 159, 162 
 
 samadhi, 81, 96, 102, 118, 122, 124, 
 126, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 140, 
 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 
 153, 155, 161, 162; classification 
 of, 153, 154 
 
 samadhiparindma, 155 
 
 samana tantra, 67 
 
 samprajfiata, 96, 124, 125, 126, 137, 
 144, 149, 153, 155, 156 
 
 nilae 
 
 samprajfidata samadhi, 138, 145, 
 150, 154 
 
 sampratyaya, 134 n. 
 
 samghatapararthatvat  trigunadivi- 
 
 paryyayadadhishthanadt purusho stt 
 bhoktrbhavat kaivalyartham pravyt- 
 tesca, 24 
 
INDEX 
 
 samsara, 115, 121 
 
 samskara, 19, 81, 96, 98, 101, 108, 
 109, 125, 174, 176, 177 
 
 samskarah vrttibhih kriyante sams- 
 karaisca vritayah evam vrttisam- 
 skaracakram anigamavartiate, 97 
 
 samskaraSesha, 125 
 
 samskaryyakarana, 135 
 
 samsrshta vivicyante, 62 
 
 samvega, 129 
 
 samyama, 149, 157 
 
 samyoga, 27, 29 n. 
 
 sannyasasrama, 103 
 
 santosha, 143 
 
 sanketa, 187 
 
 Sarasvati Ramananda, 126 
 
 sarvam sarvatmakam, 77 
 
 satkaranavada, 81 
 
 satkaryyavada, 81 
 
 sattva, 3, 4, 5, 6, 22, 24, 37, 38, 40, 
 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 565, 
 56, 96, 116, 143, 144, 153, 160, 
 161 
 
 sattvapurushayoh suddhisimye kar- 
 valyam, 16, 22 
 
 sattvapurushayoratyantasankirnayoh 
 pratyayavisesho bhogah pararthat- 
 vat svarthasamyamat purushajna, 
 nam, 16 
 
 savicara, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154; 
 prajfia, 151 
 
 savitarka, 149, 140, 152, 153, 154 
 
 sa ca Gimand grahitra saha buddhi- 
 rekatmika samvid, 51 
 
 samanya guna, 29 n. 
 
 Samkhya, 4, 7n., 10, 11, 18, 26, 27, 
 28, 29, 29n., 30, 58, 62, 67, 89, 
 90, 94, 140, 164, 165; Jaina in- 
 fluence on, 94 n. 
 
 Samkhya-karika, 65, 56 n., 67 
 
 Samkhya-Patafijala, 24, 76, 77, 80, 
 81, 82, 85 
 
 Samkhya philosophy, 4 n. 
 
 Samkhyapravacanabhashya, 4n. 
 
 Samkhya-sitra, 11, 15, 169 
 
 Samkhya- Yoga, 4, 26, 27, 50 n., 57 
 
 Samkhyists, 12 
 
 sananda, 153 
 
 sattvika, 38, 56 
 
 sattvikaahamkara, 63 
 
 Science of Ethics, 50 
 
 197 
 
 Seal, Dr. B. N., 7, 37, 63 n., 66- 
 169 
 
 Seeming reflection, 22, 23 
 
 Seer, 17, 19, 23, 24, 28, 47, 51 
 
 Self, 8, 18, 21, 26, 49, 51, 54 
 
 Self-consciousness, 52, 54 
 
 Self-control, 24 
 
 Self-intelligent, 3 
 
 Self-subsistent, 36 
 
 Sensation, 166 
 
 Sense, 141 
 
 Sense faculties, 56 
 
 Sense organs, 56 
 
 Senses, 3, 40, 41, 47, 54, 60, 86, 87, 
 100, 102, 135, 147, .167,:°171; 
 divergent views about their evolu- 
 tion, 57 
 
 Separation, 29 n. 
 
 Sex restraint, 144 
 
 Shashtitantrasastra, 10, 12 
 
 siddha, 144 
 
 Siddhanta-candrika, 65, 95 
 
 Siddhaintalesa, 14 
 
 Sign, 7, 41 
 
 Simultaneous revelation, 33 
 
 Sins, 103 
 
 Sleep, 174 
 
 smrti, 19, 64, 101, 102, 108, 126, 
 128, 136 
 
 Social, 2 
 
 Soul, 13, 14, 24, 25 
 
 Sound, 169 
 
 Space, 79, 146, 152; as relative 
 position, 169 
 
 Space order, 170 
 
 sparsa, 38, 65 
 
 sparsatanmatra, 57, 64 
 
 Specialised, 7, 8 
 
 Specific, 168 
 
 sphotavada, 178-187; Kumaril’s 
 view, 181; Mahabhashya and 
 Kaiyata, 182; Prabhakara, 182; 
 
 abara’s view, 182; Vairseshika 
 
 view, 180; Vakya-sphota, 185; 
 Yoga view, 184 
 
 Spinoza, 13 
 
 Spirits, 7, 13 
 
 Spiritual principle, 24, 28 
 
 sthiti, 37, 175 
 
 sthitikarana, 133 
 
 sthila, 166 
 
198 
 
 sthilavishayaka, 154. 
 
 Strength, 102 
 
 Studies, 136, 139 
 
 Subconscious, 81 
 
 Sub-latent, 46, 73 
 
 Substance, 4n., 29n., 40, 47, 73, 
 74, 76, 81, 168; its nature, 37 
 
 Substantive entities, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 
 82, 84 
 
 Substratum, 36, 37, 49 
 
 Succession, 44, 45 
 
 summum bonum, 121 
 
 Sushena, 135 
 
 sutucchaka, 12 
 
 sikshma, 61, 67, 166, 167 
 
 sukshmavishayaka, 154 
 
 stikshmavrttimantah, 6 
 
 Sitra, 15, 17, 22, 26, 31, 62, 64, 108, 
 137, 147 
 
 Sutrarthabodhini, 65, 90 
 
 svarupa, 166, 167, 175 
 
 svadhyaya, 136, 142, 161 
 
 Svetasvatara, 11 
 
 Sympathy, 137, 138 
 
 Sabda, 38, 65, 150 
 
 Sabdajnandnupatt vastusinyo vikal- 
 pah, 174 
 
 Sabda-tanmatra, 57, 64 
 
 sabdadinim mirttisamanajatiyanam, 
 66n. 
 
 gakti, 17, 82, 83 
 
 Saktiman, 82, 83 
 
 Sankara, 4n., 135, 162 
 
 santa, 73 
 
 Santi-parva, 80, 88, 89 
 
 Sastra, 172 
 
 Sauca, 143, 144 
 
 Sila, 6 
 
 Sraddha, 102, 126, 127, 128, 129, 
 130, 135, 138, 158 
 
 Sruti, 57 
 
 Sukla, 102, 111, 140, 175 
 
 Sukla karma, 103, 140 
 
 Sukla karmasaya, 111 
 
 Suklakrshna, 102, 111 
 
 Siinyavadi Buddhists, 2 
 
 svalpasahkarah sapariharah sapraty- 
 avamarshah, 103 n. 
 
 svasvamisaktyoh svariipopalabdhi- 
 hetuh samyogah, 16 
 
 INDEX 
 
 tadartha eva dréyasya Gitma, 16 
 
 tadabhavat samyogabhavo hanam tad- 
 drseh kaivalyam, 16 
 
 taijasa, 56 
 
 tamas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 37, 39, 40, 43, 47, 
 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 94, 95, 117, 
 169, 176 
 
 tanmatra, 38, 40, 42, 54, 59, 61, 
 65, 66, 67, 70, 82, 83, 124, 151, 
 167 
 
 tanmatras, evolution of grosser ele- 
 ments from, 65; their difference 
 from paramanus, 68; their evolu- 
 tion, ef seg. 64; their relation to 
 ahamkara, 40, 41 
 
 tanmatravayava, 66 
 
 tanmitranamapr parasparavyareytia- 
 svabhavatvamastyeva tacca yogimas 
 tragamyam, 68 
 
 tanu, 176 
 
 tapah, 136 
 
 tapas, 161 
 
 tasmat svatantro’rthah sarvapurusha- 
 sadharanah svatantrani ca cittant 
 pratipurusham, pravarttante, 36 
 
 Taste, 167 
 
 tatradrshtajanmavedaniyasya niyata- 
 vipakasya, 109 
 
 tattva, 40, 94 
 
 tattvajfiana, 101, 176 
 
 Tattva-kaumudi, 25, 56n., 103 n. 
 
 Tattva-niripana, 66 
 
 Tattvatraya, 11 n., 55, 58, 64, 66 
 
 Tattvavartsaradi?, 3n., Sn, On, 
 33 n., 46, 53, 56 n., 64, 75, 78, 79, 
 93, 135, 154 
 
 tattvantara, 68 
 
 tattvantara-parinama, 40, 41, 69 
 
 timasa, 38, 56 
 
 timasa ahamkara, 60, 62 
 
 te vyaktasiikshma gunatmanah.. .« 
 sarvamidam gunanam Sannives- 
 avigeshamatramiti  paramdarthato 
 gunatmanah, 38 
 
 tejas, 65, 75, 166, 167 
 
 tejas atom, 66 
 
 Teleological, 86, 121 
 
 Teleology, 24, 76, 77, 89 
 
 Temptation, 141 
 
 Theft, 136, 141 
 
 Theists, 90 <4 
 
INDEX 
 
 Theories, 2 
 Thing, 150 
 Thing-in-itself, 2, 37 
 Thought, 2 
 
 Time, 79, 139, 152, 169; as discrete 
 
 moments, 44; as unit of change, 
 43; element of imagination in, 
 44, unit of, 46; order, 170 
 
 Tinduka, 77 
 
 Trance, 135, 136, 143; Trance-cog- 
 nition, 95 
 
 Transcendent, 18 
 
 Transformations, 20, 24 
 
 trasarenu, 66 
 
 trigunamaviveki vishayah samanya- 
 macetanam prasavadharmi vyak- 
 tam tatha pradhanam tadvipari- 
 tastatha puman, 42 
 
 Truth, 141 
 
 Truthfulness, 139, 140, 144 
 
 Tulyajatiyatulyajatiyasaktibhedanu - 
 patinah, 6 
 
 udara, 176 
 udbodhaka, 174 
 udghata, 146, 147 
 udita, 73 
 Ultimate state, 7 
 Unafflicted, 176 
 Understanding, 19 
 Undetermined, 8 
 Undifferentiated, 12, 162 
 Unindividuated, 12 
 Universe, 1,13; a product of guna 
 combinations, 37 
 Unknowable, 2, 37 
 Unmanifested, 4, 8, 72 
 Unmediated, 8 
 Unpredicable, 73 
 Unreal, 28 
 Unspecialised, 7 
 Unwisdom, 142 
 Upanishads, 11 
 upastha, 54, 58 
 upadana, 61 
 upidana karana, 61, 133 
 upeksha, 137, 139 
 utpadyakarana, 135 
 uttaradesga, 43 n. 
 tiha, 101, 176 
 
 199 
 
 vaikarika, 56 
 
 vairagya, 100, 101, 127, 129, 130, 
 135, 136, 143, 149, 162, 177 
 
 Vaiseshika, 43 n., 71, 168 
 
 Vaiseshika atoms, 70 
 
 vaishnava, 10 
 
 Vanity, 143 
 
 vasikara, 128 
 
 vastupatitah, 44 
 
 vastusamye cittabhedat tayor vibhak- 
 tah panthéh, 35 n. 
 
 Vacaspati, 3, 5n., 8, 12, 32, 33, 35, 
 44, 46n., 51, 55, 62, 65, 66, 67, 
 75, 78, 87, 89, 93, 109, 110, 112, 
 118, 126, 129, 144, 153, 154 
 
 vak, 54 
 
 Vakyapadiya, 183 
 
 vasana, 99, 106, 108, 114, 116, 
 177; contrasted with karmagaya, 
 107 
 
 Vayu, 167 
 
 Vayu atom, 65 
 
 Vedas, 154, 160, 162, 170, 177 
 
 Vedanta, 11, 14, 24, 27, 28, 29, 
 162 
 
 Vedantism, 14 
 
 Vedantists, 12, 26, 66, 81 
 
 Vedic, 103 
 
 Vehicles of actions, 103 
 
 Venkata, 10 
 
 Veracity, 136, 140 
 
 Verbal cognition, cause of, 186 
 view of Nydya, 187 
 
 vibhu, 43 n. 
 
 vibhu parimana, 29 n. 
 
 vibhiti, 158 
 
 Vibhitipaida, 22 
 
 vicara, 153 
 
 vicaranugata, 125, 153 
 
 vicchinna, 176 
 
 Vice, 86, 87 
 
 videha, 127 
 
 vidya, 177 
 
 vidyavipartiam jnanantaram avidya, 
 11, 97 
 
 Vijnanamrta-bhashya, 88, 90 
 
 Vijfiana Bhikshu, 4, 15 
 
 vikalpa, 101, 150, 173, 174 
 
 vikarakarapa, 133 
 
 vikaryyakarana, 135 
 
 vikyti, 7 n., 165 
 
200 
 
 vikshipta, 95, 123 
 
 vikshiptacitta, 96, 130 
 
 vipaka, 105, 107 
 
 viparyyaya, 101, 172, 173, 176 
 
 viprayoga, 7 
 
 Virtue, 86 
 
 Vishnu Purana, 66 
 
 Sei 7, 7n., 40, 59, 81, 84, 165, 
 
 1 
 
 viseshaparinama, 60 
 
 viseshaviseshalingamatralinganiguna- 
 parvant, 59 
 
 visoka, 125 
 
 vitarka, 153 
 
 vitarkanugata, 125, 154 
 
 viyoga, 29 n. 
 
 viyogakarana, 134, 135 
 
 viryya, 102, 126, 128, 135, 136 
 
 Vomit, 141 
 
 Vrttc, 56, 92, 96, 97, 101, 102, 122, 
 iy gil 
 
 vyangya, 57 
 
 vyanjaka, 57 
 
 vyatireka, 128 
 
 vyavasdyaimakatva, 3 
 
 vyavaseyaimakatva, 3 
 
 Vyasa, 5, 7, 8, 8n., 22, 53, 121, 133, 
 135 
 
 Vyasa-bhashya, 3n., 5n., 7n., 10, 
 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 33, 36, 37, 43 n., 
 50, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66 n., 68 n., 70, 
 71 n., 79, 84, 85, 94, 99, 101, 117, 
 119, 121, 133, 171 
 
 vyoman, 75 
 
 vyutthana, 155, 156, 170 
 
 vyuithana citta, 95 
 
 Ward, 2 n. 
 
 Wicked, 102 
 World-phenomena, 16 
 World process, 91 
 
 INDEX 
 
 yadyalihgavastha sabdidyupabhogam 
 va sativapurushanyatakhyatim va 
 purushartham nirvarttayet tannr- 
 varttane hi na samyavastha syat, 8 
 
 Yama, 136, 138, 189, 142, 143, 148 
 
 Yatamana, 127 
 
 yatha rathadi yantradibhih, 25 
 
 yathayaskantamaywih  svasminneva 
 ayahsannidhikaranamatrat salya- 
 nishkarshanakhyam upakaram 
 kurvat purushasya svaminah svam 
 bhavati bhogasadhanatvat, 22 
 
 ye casyanupasthita bhagaste casya na 
 syurevam nasti prshthamitt udara- 
 mapi na grhyeta, 36 
 
 Yoga, 14, 29, 48, 62, 89, 96, 122, 123, 
 124, 129, 130, 131, 140, 144, 147, 
 155, 162,177; its points of differ- 
 ence with Samkhya, 163-165 
 
 Yoga metaphysics, 1 
 
 Yoga philosophy in relation to other 
 Indian systems of thought, 165 
 
 Yoga system, 2 
 
 Yoga theory, 5 
 
 yoganga, 122, 130, 131, 132, 135, 
 136, 144, 145, 149 
 
 Yoga-sitra, 5n., 11, 17, 35n., 43 n., 
 45, 47, 108, 117, 142, 153 
 
 Yoga-varttika, 4n.,, 6n., 9, 10, 
 12n., 22, 29n., 43n., 45n., 60, 
 61, 65, 66, 67, 87, 110, 126, 127, 
 129, 134 n., 143, 154, 176 
 
 Yogins, 79, 87, 95, 97, 98, 121, 125, 
 127, 128, 129, 136, 139, 143, 147, 
 153, 155, 156, 158, 160; nine 
 kinds of, 129 
 
 yogyatavacchinna dharminah ésakir- 
 reva dharmah, 82 
 
 Yudhishthira, 140 
 
 yutastddhavayaba, 168 
 

 
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