A eg 
 
AT VtO1e CRP 2 
 Row. Cry Ai 1816-1896. 
 
 Christian theism 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2022 with funding from 
 Princeton Theological Seminary Library 
 
 https://archive.org/details/christiantheismb00rowc 
 
I CHRISTIAN. THEISM. 
 
 Re 
 
Cipla sdibaen = dlshotowe 
 
 4 BRIEF AND POPULAR SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE UPON 
 WHICH TT RESTS "AND THE-OBJEGLIONS CRGED 
 AGAINST IT CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 
 
 Cc. A” ROW, M.A. Oxon., 
 
 Honorary D.D. of the University of the South United States, Prebendary of 
 St. Paul's Cathedral, and Bampton Lecturer jor 1877. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 lo Ha@ 2 MeArs. -.W Heltle LAs ke ke Re 
 2, BIBLE HOUSE. 
 
% 
 
 se ee ee 
 
(Pant del Denyee@ dope 
 
 Y reason for composing the present work is 
 
 a special one. I have been frequently 
 
 asked to recommend a book, level to the under- 
 standings of that large number of persons, whose 
 engagements in the active duties of life render it 
 impossible for them to devote themselves to special 
 studies, which sets forth in a popular form the 
 chief reasons on which the belief in the Being of a 
 God who possesses the attributes which the Chris- 
 tian revelation attributes to Him, is founded, and 
 points out the fallacy of the current and widespread 
 anti-Theistic theories of the present day. This | 
 have felt myself unable to do. Several admirable 
 works dealing with those evidences, and answering 
 the objections of anti-Theists, exist, which leave little 
 to be desired; but as far as I am aware, they are, 
 without exception, addressed to the higher orders 
 of thought. On the other hand, smaller works, 
 and works of less pretensions, for the most part 
 deal with particular aspects of the question. [| 
 have, therefore, composed the present work with a . 
 view to the requirements of the class of readers 
 above referred to, in the hope and trust that | may 
 succeed in removing some of the difficulties and 
 objections which, if they do not subvert their faith, 
 
vl PREFACE, 
 
 form serious causes of disquietude. The reader, 
 therefore, must not expect to find in it discussions 
 of high points of philosophy or science. I have 
 appealed throughout it to the principles of common 
 sense. When I commenced writing it, it was my 
 intention to have produced a book of the size of 
 my Manual of Christian Evidences, with the design 
 that it should form a companion volume to it; but 
 this, owing to the extent of the matter which at 
 the present day underlies the Theistic controversy, 
 I found to be impossible. Still, for the benefit of 
 those persons for whose special use this work is 
 designed, I have done all I can to shorten it, by 
 excluding from it all matter which is not absolutely 
 necessary for the completeness of the argument. I 
 have, therefore, abstained from all discussions which 
 are purely philosophical or scientific, and I have 
 endeavoured to exhibit the reasons for believing in 
 Christian Theism in a form which will commend 
 them to those to whom God has not given either 
 the time or the talents for entering on the higher 
 class of studies, or those which require a course 
 of special training for their appreciation, under the 
 firm conviction that He has not left these without 
 adequate reasons for believing both that He exists, 
 
 and is a Rewarder of those who diligently seek 
 Him. 
 
CO NSPE ING Teo. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK 
 
 CHART he Lis 
 
 THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE ON WHICH RESTS OUR 
 BELIEF IN THE BEING OF A GOD 
 
 CUAL PERG ITT: 
 
 AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 
 
 CHAP IE RELY: 
 
 THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION 
 
 ECE abs ar ves 
 
 THE VALIDITY OF THE PROOF WHICH THE ADJUSTMENTS, 
 ADAPTATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS OF THE UNIVERSE, 
 AFFORD TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTELLIGENT 
 CREATOR 
 
 CITA PAE Roe Vib 
 
 THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION CONSIDERED 
 _ AND REFUTED 
 
 CHAP TE ReV Le 
 
 THE COURSE OF REASONING ADOPTED IN THE TWO 
 PREVIOUS CHAPTERS ILLUSTRATED BY EXAMPLE 
 
 PAGE 
 
 it 
 
 46 
 
 65 
 
 87 
 
 IZ0 
 
viii CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PAGE 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN PROVES 
 THAT A GOD EXISTS, WHO IS NOT A MERE IMPER- 
 SONAL FORCE, BUT A MORAL BEING, : : . 166 
 CHAPTER VIX: 
 POPULAR OBJECTIONS AGAINST CHRISTIAN THEISM— 
 THEIR VALUE ESTIMATED . ; 5 : ’ aie 
 
 CHAPTER =X. 
 
 THE OBJECTIONS WHICH ARE URGED AGAINST CHRISTIAN 
 THEISM OWING TO THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL EVIL 
 AND THE RESULTS WITH WHICH IT IS ATTENDED . 251 
 
 GHAP LER SAT 
 THE QUESTION WHETHER WE HAVE REASON FOR BE- 
 LIEVING THAT WE SHALL SURVIVE THE DISSOLUTION 
 OF OUR BODIES; AND ITS BEARING ON THE PREVIOUS 
 ARGUMENTS : ; : ! ; . 290 
 
CHAP TERS: 
 
 Pie SCOP NOM aL Her RESEND UZORL 
 
 HE questions, Is there a God who has made 
 this universe and all that it contains ? does 
 
 He exert a moral government over the world which 
 He has created ? will man survive the stroke of 
 death ? will God call him to an account hereafter 
 for his conduct here ? will his conduct here exert 
 an influence on his condition in the world beyond 
 the grave ?—are considerations which cannot help 
 awakening a profound interest in the mind of every 
 thoughtful man; and can be disregarded by those 
 only who are regardless about the future. If an exist- 
 ence awaits us in a future state of being, in which 
 our condition will be affected by our conduct here, 
 then it becomes a matter of unspeakable importance 
 that that conduct should be so ordered as to secure 
 our happiness hereafter. But if there is no God, 
 or if that which is designated God is an impersonal 
 force, destitute of intelligence, will, and a moral 
 nature,—as is now loudly proclaimed by not a few 
 
 I 
 
CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 to 
 
 who justly hold a high rank in special departments: 
 of scientific research,—then there is every reason 
 for believing that our conscious personal existence 
 will terminate at death. In that case, full well may 
 each of us pursue that course of life, be it what 
 it may, which he thinks best calculated to realize 
 his own happiness ; and what that course is he must 
 be the only judge, for an objective rule. of duty 
 binding on us there can be none. Consequently, 
 whether a man lives what men have agreed to call 
 a virtuous or a vicious course of life becomes a 
 matter of personal taste and temperament. One 
 therefore, whose aspirations are naturally noble, 
 will consider a life of corresponding elevation his 
 Supreme good. Another, whose tastes are grovel- 
 ling and sensual, will pursue that course of life 
 which he thinks will afford him the greatest amount 
 of immediate pleasure and enjoyment; for amidst 
 the shortness of life, and the uncertainty of its 
 duration one thing only is certain: that, after its 
 brief day has passed, the elevated and the base, 
 the saint and the sinner, will sleep a sleep of uncon- 
 sciousness, from which there will be no awakening, 
 and in which pleasure and pain, happiness and 
 misery, will cease for evermore. 
 
 The question of the existence of a God, such as 
 Christian Theism affirms to exist, being thus. pro- 
 foundly important, it is my intention to discuss it 
 in the present work in a form level to the under- 
 
THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK. 3 
 
 standings of those whose engagements in the active 
 business of life give them neither time nor oppor- 
 tunity for entering on a course of special study; 
 for such persons it equally concerns as those who 
 have the time and talents necessary for studies of 
 this description. I shall, therefore, avoid everything 
 in our modern Theistic controversies for the appreci- 
 ation of which such studies are necessary before it 
 is possible to form a judgment of the validity of the 
 reasonings involved in them. Numerous works, 
 dealing with the higher forms of this controversy 
 already exist; works of profound interest to those 
 whose intellectual powers, and whose freedom from 
 the engagements of ordinary life, enable them to 
 devote themselves to such investigations. But such 
 is not the lot of the masses of mankind. They have 
 neither the intellectual training, nor the leisure 
 necessary for the investigation of such questions. 
 The ordinary vocations of life, its struggles, its 
 labours, and the intervals of refreshment necessary 
 for enabling those engaged in them to enter afresh 
 on their daily recurring duties, are sufficient to mo- 
 nopolize almost the entire time at their command. 
 For such investigations therefore, even if they pos- 
 sessed the intellectual training necessary for their 
 successful prosecution the requisite leisure is 
 wanting. 
 Are there, then, no reasons level to the capacity 
 of such, which will afford them firm grounds for 
 
4 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 believing in the existence of a God, to whom 
 they are responsible for realizing the purpose for 
 which He has brought them into being? Or is 
 the question of His existence—a question of the 
 profoundest interest to every individual—one which 
 that comparatively small body which constitutes the 
 intellectual aristocracy of mankind is alone compe- 
 tent to adjudicate upon, and determine ; and are the 
 masses left dependent upon them for information 
 and for guidance? That this last alternative is 
 the true one, it is difficult to believe; for inasmuch 
 as those who claim to constitute this intellectual 
 aristocracy, differ widely in the conclusions at which 
 they have arrived, the question at once confronts 
 the inquirer: To which portion of them is he to look 
 for guidance and direction? The determination of 
 such a question would involve a rehearing of the 
 entire case; because it is impossible to determine 
 which of those who hold opposite opinions on this 
 subject can be safely followed as an infallible guide 
 to truth, without having previously formed a judgment 
 on the validity of the reasons on which his opinions 
 profess to be founded. This would constitute each 
 individual the ultimate judge of the validity of the 
 reasonings in question; and thus would leave the 
 difficulty precisely where it found it. But surely 
 if there is a God, who is not a “mere force, but a 
 moral being who holds man responsible for his 
 actions, it is incredible that He should have left 
 
Peo CORK Oli he Kola LOR kK, 5 
 
 the masses of mankind dependent on specialists 
 for a knowledge of His existence, or that He should 
 not have given them reasons for believing in it 
 amply sufficient to command the assent of that 
 reason with which He has endowed them. St. Paul 
 at least was of this opinion, for he affirms that God 
 had not left Himself without witness (Acts xiv. 17), 
 and that the ‘invisible things of Him since the 
 creation of the world are clearly seen, being per- 
 ceived through the things that are made, even His 
 everlasting power and divinity’” (Rom. i. 20) ; and 
 in His address to the philosophers at Athens this 
 is assumed throughout. 
 
 The following truth, obvious as it is, is too often 
 overlooked in the theistic controversy :—It by no 
 means follows, because certain proofs of the existence 
 of a God are level to people of ordinary understand- 
 ing, that they are not in the highest degree conclusive. 
 Among not a few there is a strange tendency to 
 value what is rare, and to esteem things in proportion 
 as they can only be the exclusive possession of a 
 few. But the careful observer of human life will 
 arrive at the conclusion, that the best of our pleasures 
 and enjoyments are those which are most widely 
 diffused. In asimilar manner I shall endeavour to 
 show that the reasons for believing in the existence 
 of a God, which are capable of commending them- 
 selves to the masses of mankind, are the strongest 
 and most conclusive; and that the arguments which 
 
6 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 have been adduced to prove that they are wanting 
 in validity will fail to commend themselves to men 
 of ordinary understanding. 
 
 Such being the object of the present work, I shall 
 confine myself to those arguments which do not 
 require a course of special study for their due 
 appreciation. Ina word, I shall appeal to the prin- 
 ciples of common sense; such for example, as 
 influence our actions in the ordinary affairs of life. 
 With respect to objections I shall only notice those 
 which are likely to exert an influence on those whose 
 engagements in active life render them incapable of 
 forming a judgment on questions of high philosophy, 
 such as the theories adverse to Theism, which are 
 industriously propagated among the masses by a 
 numerous class of philosophers and scientists. <A 
 vast amount of highly abstract reasoning has been 
 introduced into the theistic controversy by persons 
 of this description respecting the validity of our 
 primary intuitions. I shall not ask the reader to 
 enter into such discussions; but I shall assume that 
 our primary intuitions are true, whatever may be 
 the mode in which they may be supposed to have 
 originated; the latter being a question wholly indepen- 
 dent of the former, though the opponents of Theism 
 have done their utmost to confound their truth with 
 the question of their origin. In a word, I shall 
 appeal to such principles, and have recourse to such 
 reasonings, as constitute our practical guides in life ; 
 
THe SCOPE, OF THE PRESEN I: WORK. ‘i 
 
 and on which, even unbelievers, while they dispute 
 their validity when adduced as proofs of the being 
 of a God, or of the existence in man of a conscience, 
 or moral sense, habitually act. I shall, therefore, 
 assume, if they are sufficient guides to conduct us in 
 the ordinary affairs of life, as they undoubtedly are, 
 that reasonings based on similar principles must 
 constitute sufficient evidence of the being of a God. 
 In making these observations, let me guard against 
 the idea that it is my intention to say one word in 
 depreciation of those discoveries of modern science 
 which have so vastly enlarged our views of the uni- 
 verse ; on the contrary, I cordially welcome them as 
 a kind of fresh revelation. They have disclosed 
 to us the fact that it is not limited by the bounds of 
 earth and sky, or of human vision as former ages 
 thought ; but that it is vast beyond human com- 
 prehension, embracing the infinitely great and the 
 infinitely minute, extending from the universe of 
 suns and planets, in numbers numberless, to the 
 minutest particle, which no human eye, even by the 
 aid of the most powerful instrument which man has 
 invented for enlarging his sphere of vision, has seen 
 or can see. All these testify alike of power, order, 
 adaptation, purpose; and give us additional reasons 
 for believing, not only that a God exists, but in the 
 boundlessness of His power, His presence, and His 
 wisdom. Nay, even the objections which unbelievers 
 have urged against His being, or if not against His 
 
8 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 being, against the belief in a God who bears any 
 relation to mankind, have helped to clear away 
 numerous errors of the past, which have caused His 
 infinitude, His character, and the mode of His working 
 to be imperfectly apprehended. Let every one, there- 
 fore, to whom God has given the endowments and 
 the leisure necessary for the study of such subjects, 
 prosecute it to the utmost, and he will be rewarded 
 by ever-increasing disclosures of the Creator’s glory. 
 
 There is one thing before I conclude this portion 
 of the subject to which I must draw special attention, 
 because it is far too frequently overlooked. I allude 
 to the distinction between the facts which have been 
 ascertained, by careful scientific investigation in 
 conformity with accepted scientific methods, as un- 
 questionably true, and the theories which have been 
 propounded as accounting for their origin. The 
 facts thus verified are worthy of all acceptation ; 
 and justly take the rank of accepted truths. The 
 theories which have been propounded as explanations 
 of these facts, stand on a wholly different basis. 
 This is particularly the case when scientists have 
 ventured to dogmatize, as they far too often have, 
 on subjects which lie outside the sphere of their 
 special studies. ‘In such cases their theories, affir- 
 mations, and conjectures, have no more value than 
 those of ordinary men of sound judgment ; and of 
 far less value than those who have devoted themselves 
 to the special studies on which, without any special 
 
THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK, 9 
 
 qualification for doing so, the former have under- 
 taken to dogmatize. This caution is especially 
 necessary at the present day, because there is a 
 widespread practice of attempting to bear down the 
 ordinary believer in Christian Theism by some name 
 deservedly eminent in some particular department of 
 scientific research, who ventures to propound theories 
 and make affirmations on points which have formed 
 no portion of his special studies. Such persons 
 have loudly charged theologians with dogmatizing, 
 and not unjustly; but when they venture to make 
 assertions outside the range of those scientific pur- 
 suits, for their eminence in which they owe their 
 celebrity, they commit the very fault which they 
 condemn in others. Many men of great celebrity in 
 the scientific world have strongly condemned all 
 abstract studies, especially metaphysics ; but when 
 they propound a theory of the origin of the facts 
 which they investigate, ultimately resolving itself 
 into a theory of the origin of the universe, they 
 plunge into a number of metaphysical questions, the 
 study of which they repudiate. Science can tell us 
 much respecting the order and the secondary agencies 
 by which the universe, and especially the world in 
 which we live, has been brought into its present 
 form ; but respecting its cause, it can tell us nothing. 
 Science deals with facts, and facts only; the inquiry 
 into their causes, and the origin of things, lies outside 
 
 its limits, 
 
10 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Before I conclude this chapter, I would offer 
 one additional caution: Be careful not to under- 
 take the defence of positions which are not essential 
 to the issue. This is a danger to which zealous 
 controversialists are particularly liable, and one 
 which I have endeavoured to guard against in the 
 present work. Not a few of the defenders of 
 Theism and Christianity would have done well if 
 they had attended to this necessary caution. Both, - 
 but the latter especially, have received nearly as 
 much damage from the indiscretions of friends as 
 from the attacks of foes. It is obvious that the 
 wider the line of defence is extended the more 
 difficult it will be to defend it. Let me illustrate 
 my meaning by a metaphor derived from warfare. 
 _As long as a firm hold can be kept on the key 
 of a position, an unnecessary extension of the out- 
 works becomes most dangerous, for a force adequate 
 to defend the one may be utterly inadequate to 
 defend the other. Thus, by unduly extending the 
 line of your defence, you incur the danger of giving 
 your opponent the prestige of apparent victory, by 
 affording him the opportunity of capturing some 
 outwork which is immaterial to the defence itself. 
 In the present work it is my intention to occupy 
 in force those positions which form the key of 
 Christian Theism, under the firm persuasion that 
 if I can maintain these, others may be safely left to 
 take care of themselves, 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE ON WHICH RESTS 
 OUR BELIEF IN THE BEING OF A GOD. 
 
 EFORE entering on our immediate subject, it 
 will be necessary to explain to the reader 
 the nature of the evidence on which the being of 
 a God rests, because misconceptions on this subject 
 are very widespread. I observe, therefore, in the / 
 first place, that it is not capable of being proved 
 by that kind of evidence which is called demon- 
 strative. 
 
 Attempts, it is true, have been made to prove 
 His existence by a course of reasoning of this 
 description ; but it is now the all but universal 
 opinion of competent judges, that the attempts to 
 do so have proved failures. At any rate, it Is 
 certain that the reasoning processes by which it 
 has been attempted to give a demonstrative proof 
 of His existence, are far above the comprehension 
 of the overwhelming majority of mankind, and, 
 therefore, as far as our present argument is con- 
 cerned, are valueless. Our inability to prove His 
 
12 CHRISTIAN THEISM, 
 
 existence by evidence of this description has 
 frequently been urged against the validity of 
 the proof; one class of unbelievers affirming that, 
 if a God exists, we ought to be able to give a demon- 
 strative proof of His existence ; and another, that 
 that portion of the evidence on which, up to a very 
 recent period, Theists have most strongly relied, has 
 been proved by the discoveries of modern science 
 to be valueless. To these objections I reply, 
 
 That the kind of’ evidence which is called 
 ‘demonstration ”” is not the only kind of evidence 
 which is calculated to convey to the human mind 
 the conviction of absolute certainty. This convic- 
 tion is equally produced by that kind of evidence 
 which is called moral, or circumstantial. This being 
 a point of the greatest importance, in relation to the 
 Theistic controversy, I must endeavour to set before 
 the reader, as briefly as I am able, the nature of 
 these two kinds of evidence, and to estimate the 
 power of each to produce on our minds the con- 
 viction of absolute certainty. 
 
 Demonstrative evidence consists of two kinds. 
 The first is founded on two of our primary concep- 
 tions, namely, quantity and extension. In connection 
 with these arise a number of propositions, designated 
 axioms, that is, propositions of which our minds, as 
 they are at present constituted, not only affirm their 
 absolute truth, but that their contradictory must be 
 absolutely false. Of this kind of proposition the 
 
THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENGE. ie 
 
 axioms on which the science of geometry is based 
 form the best possible illustration. Thus, as soon 
 as our minds are capable of forming the conception 
 of “whole” and “ part,” they cannot help perceiving 
 that the affirmation that the whole is greater than 
 its part is, and must be, absolutely true; and that 
 the contrary proposition, which affirms that the 
 part is greater than, or equal to, the whole must be 
 absolutely false. The same is equally true of the 
 other axioms of Euclid, except the twelfth, which, 
 although beyond all doubt true, cannot be said to 
 be self-evident. So also with respect to our pri- 
 mary conceptions of number. Thus, as soon as 
 we are capable of understanding what one, two, 
 three, four, and five mean, we know, with a cer- 
 tainty which nothing can exceed, that two and two 
 are equal to four; and that twice ‘two cannot by 
 any possibility be equal to five. Truths of this 
 kind are incapable of having any addition made to 
 their certainty by any process of reasoning. From 
 these as a basis, aided by a few simple definitions 
 and a still smaller number of postulates, of which 
 it is impossible to doubt the possibility—as, for 
 example, “that it is possible to draw a straight 
 line from one point to another’”’”—have been deduced 
 a vast number of additional propositions, which are 
 not in themselves self-evident, but the truth of 
 which is established as indubitable by the most 
 rigid deductions of our logical faculty from the 
 
14 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 axioms, definitions, and postulates above referred 
 to. This is what, in mathematical language, is 
 called ‘ demonstration,” that is, when a number of 
 propositions follow, as a matter of necessity, from 
 the truth of other propositions which our minds 
 cannot help recognizing as true. This kind of 
 evidence, however, is only possible when the con- 
 ceptions on which we reason are simple. and 
 uncompounded, such as our primary conceptions 
 of space, quantity, and number. But when they 
 are of a complicated character, as is the case in 
 every other department of thought, various ele- 
 ments of uncertainty enter into our conclusions, 
 and our deductions from them cease to possess 
 the character of demonstrations. Hence it is that 
 it is impossible to prove the existence of a God by 
 any course of reasoning which is in this sense 
 demonstrative. It is equally impossible to prove 
 the truth of any particular fact by a course of 
 reasoning of this description. The truth of these 
 and similar things can only be established by 
 reasonings of an entirely different character. 
 
 The second kind of evidence to which the term 
 ‘“‘demonstration”” is applied in scientific treatises 
 admits of being described with greater brevity. A 
 truth is said in scientific language to be demon- 
 strated, when it is capable of being verified by its 
 being subjected to certain well-known scientific tests, 
 and thereby to its being brought under the ultimate 
 
LHEANALORE: OFTHE EVIDENCE. 15 
 
 cognizance of the senses. Such verifications are 
 only capable of being applied to material things, 
 which alone constitute the proper subject-matter 
 of the physical sciences, and are inapplicable to 
 things mental, moral, and spiritual, for these latter 
 belong to a wholly different sphere of thought. 
 Consequently, it is impossible by any such process to 
 demonstrate the existence of a God, or of the soul 
 of man. When the existence of the latter is denied, 
 as it has been denied, because its existence cannot 
 be proved by the use of such tests, it proves either 
 ignorance of the entire subject of mind and its 
 phenomena on the part of him who makes such an 
 assertion, or that he covertly assumes that nothing 
 exists in the universe but matter and its forces, 
 which is neither more or less than to beg the question 
 at issue. No believer in the existence of spiritual 
 beings is so foolish as to imagine that their existence 
 is capable of being either proved or disproved by 
 any test which is capable of being verified by the 
 Senses ; for the conception which the human mind 
 forms of spiritual existence precludes the possibility 
 of applying to it tests of this description, because 
 our primary conceptions of matter and mind are 
 directly antithetic to one another. 
 
 We now come to the consideration of that kind of 
 evidence which is denoted by the term moral or 
 circumstantial, cumulative, etc. On it our belief in 
 everything which is not the result of our primary 
 
16 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 intuitions, or on strictly logical deductions from those 
 intuitions, or on things which are not capable of 
 being subjected to the test of our individual senses, 
 rests. I use the word “individual,” because our 
 belief in what other men affirm that they have seen 
 and heard, or tested by their senses, rests on 
 evidence of this description. It has been truly said 
 that probable evidence is the guide of life, for it is 
 an unquestionable fact, that if we refused to act upon 
 it, and demanded that kind of evidence which is 
 called demonstrative, before we engaged in action, 
 all human activity would come to a standstill. Past 
 experience must be set aside as worthless, our 
 hopes for the future quashed, and all testimony as 
 a proof of fact invalidated. As it is on evidence of 
 this kind that our belief in Theism rests, we must 
 give a careful consideration to its nature and value. 
 Probable evidence varies in degree as to its power 
 to produce conviction. Its extreme limits are, 
 absolute certainty on the one hand, and what we 
 call a bare probability on the other. Between these 
 two limits le various degrees of assurance of the 
 truth of a proposition, or of the occurrence of an 
 event. A bare probability that an event may occur, 
 or a proposition be true, conveys to the mind an 
 assurance so weak, that to act upon it would be to 
 trust simply to chance; but when a number of pro- 
 babilities meet together, and concur at the same time 
 and place, they produce a conviction approximating 
 
Pipe ALoRL. OF sfHi EVIDENGE. 17 
 
 to certainty, exactly in proportion to the frequency 
 of their occurrence ; and when this concurrence ex- 
 tends over a large number of instances, a conviction 
 of certainty which is absolute and complete. 
 
 The power of this kind of evidence to produce con- 
 viction will be better illustrated by an example than 
 by any amount of mere abstract statement. Let us 
 suppose four dice to be thrown once into the air. In 
 this case it is within the limits of probability, though 
 the probability is a very low one, that they may all 
 fall with their aces upwards, and it would be unjust 
 to charge the person who threw them with being 
 guilty ofa fraud. But if the operation were performed 
 thrice with the same result, a suspicion of unfairness 
 would be justly aroused. Still even this would not 
 be such conclusive evidence of fraud as would jus- 
 tify a jury in returning a verdict of guilty. But if 
 the same operation were repeated ten times, and each 
 time the dice fell with their aces upward, we should 
 feel absolutely certain that they were loaded; and a 
 few repetitions of this process would produce in any 
 one of ordinary mental endowments as firm a con- 
 viction of certainty, as is produced on the mind of 
 the mathematician of the truth of any proposition 
 proved by the most rigid process of demonstration. 
 
 Let me now take an illustration from ordinary 
 life. It frequently happens that a murder has been 
 committed, but no one has witnessed it. The mur- 
 derer can only be convicted on what is designated 
 
 2 
 
18 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 circumstantial evidence. In that case the posses- 
 sion of some one thing, as, for example, a revolver 
 from which two shots had been fired, the bullets in the 
 remaining chambers exactly corresponding with the 
 bullets extracted from the body of the murdered 
 man, though sufficient to rouse a very strong sus- 
 picion of guilt, would be evidence wholly inadequate 
 to prove that the man in whose possession such 
 a revolver was found, was the murderer. In such a 
 case there would be the counter-probability that 
 inasmuch as numbers of revolvers are manufactured 
 with chambers of exactly the same size and with 
 bullets fitted to them, the revolver in question may 
 have been purchased for a purpose perfectly inno- 
 cent, and that the possessor of it may have loaded 
 it and discharged two of its chambers for his amuse- 
 ment, leaving the remaining ones undischarged. 
 But, if on the other hand, a revolver was found near 
 the place of the murder; if the balls extracted from 
 the murdered man corresponded exactly with balls 
 found in the possession of the supposed murderer 5 
 if it could be proved on reliable testimony that he 
 had only a few days before purchased both the balls 
 and the revolver ; ifin addition he was seen hastening 
 from the place of the murder at the time when it 
 must have been committed ; if stains of blood which 
 the analysts pronounced to be human blood were 
 found on his clothes; if it could be proved that he 
 had pawned a watch which was indisputably the 
 
Mtl tl Ciccolo of dd eT DIINGE. 19 
 
 watch of the murdered man; or, if he had in his 
 possession trinkets or clothing which had been his 
 property, or that he had disposed of them; if the 
 marks of footsteps about the place of the murder 
 corresponded exactly with the impression which 
 would be made by his boots; and if it could be 
 further proved that his circumstances were such as 
 to have induced him to commit the murder,—no one 
 possessed of ordinary acumen could entertain a doubt 
 that the man in whom these circumstances met, 
 though taken one by one they would only justify a 
 strong suspicion of guilt, was the murderer. | 
 
 This feeling of certainty, though produced by a 
 wholly different process, would be quite as great and 
 be as fully justified as that of a mathematician in a 
 truth which he had arrived at by the most rigid 
 process of mathematical demonstration. The reason 
 of this is that the human mind is so constituted as 
 to be incapable of believing that a number of cir- 
 cumstances, such as I have presupposed, can by any 
 possibility meet together by hap-hazard in the same 
 person. So certain is such a concurrence of circum- 
 stances as a guide to our practical judgments, that 
 even an unbeliever, who theoretically rejects evidence 
 of this description as proof of the being of a God, 
 would, | think, not hesitate, if he were sitting on a 
 jury, and a body of evidence of this description were 
 adduced in proof that the man in whom it all met 
 was guilty of murder, to return a verdict of guilty, 
 
20 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 though no eye had seen him commit the crime. 
 This, however, as I shall show hereafter, is a very 
 imperfect representation of the force of the evidence 
 which the adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
 of the universe furnish to the existence of an 
 intelligent Creator. 
 
 It not unfrequently happens, however, when a 
 jury return a verdict on evidence, equally or little 
 less strong than that which I have presupposed, 
 that a number of persons come forward and impugn 
 the justice of the verdict, on the ground that the 
 evidence is only circumstantial and not direct. This, 
 I think, can only arise from prejudice on the part 
 of the objector, or from his surveying the parts of 
 the evidence one by one instead of estimating 
 their conjoint force taken as a whole. I draw 
 attention to this because objections on_ precisely 
 similar grounds have been urged against the evi- 
 dence of Theism. It should be observed that cir- 
 cumstantial evidence, such as above described, is 
 far more reliable than direct testimony. It is an 
 old but true saying, that facts cannot he, whereas 
 testimony not only may, but frequently does; and 
 mistakes as to personal identity are not uncommon, 
 even on the part of those who are sincerely desirous 
 of speaking the truth. All this weakens the force of 
 direct testimony, but leaves that of moral evidence 
 untouched. 
 
 The above observations have an intimate bearing 
 
THES NALURE- OF THE EVIDENCE. 21 
 
 on those evidences of Theism which act with the 
 greatest force on the masses of mankind. I allude 
 to what is commonly, though perhaps somewhat 
 inaccurately, called ‘“‘the argument from design.” 
 I say ‘somewhat inaccurately” because it has been 
 frequently objected that the word “‘ design” involves 
 a petitio principu, though, after all, the objection is little 
 better than a cavil. I shall, therefore, in the course 
 of this argument, substitute for the word “design” 
 some other term against which no exception can be 
 raised, and use in its place the words “ adjustment” 
 and “adaptation,” which merely state a fact which 
 must be conceded alike by Theists and anti-Theists. 
 
 As this argument is one which is more level to 
 persons of ordinary understanding than any other 
 which is adduced in proof of Theism, it need not 
 surprise us that very numerous attempts have been 
 made by anti-Theists during the present century to 
 dispute its validity ; and to show that these adjust- 
 ments and adaptations, the existence of which, let it 
 be observed, is not disputed, do not prove that they 
 must have originated in intelligence, but that they 
 may have been brought about by the interaction 
 and mutual struggle, during the ages of the past, 
 of the unintelligent forces of the universe, acting 
 in conformity with invariable law. I propose, 
 therefore, to give to this portion of the evidence, 
 and to the objections which have been urged 
 against it, a careful consideration in the course 
 
22 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 of the following chapters, under the firm conviction 
 that it is a proof which is calculated to convey to 
 the masses of mankind an assurance that a God 
 exists, who is not a mere force destitute of intelli- 
 gence and volition, but who is an all-powerful, 
 all-wise, and intelligent Creator. 
 
 The nature of the argument founded on the 
 analogy above referred to, which I shall endeavour 
 to set before the reader, may be briefly stated thus. 
 As in the case of the dice the inference would be 
 inevitable that they were loaded, if twelve of them, 
 when thrown at hap-hazard into the air, fell twenty 
 times in succession with their aces upwards, although 
 the observer had no means of ascertaining the fact, 
 either by weighing them, or measuring them; so 
 from the adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
 with which the universe everywhere abounds, the 
 inference is no less certain that it must be loaded 
 likewise ; and that that with which it is loaded is the 
 presence, and the directing hand of a God, to whose 
 power and intelligence it is impossible to assign 
 limitations. This inference is no less certain, though 
 we cannot make His presence visible to our bodily 
 senses, or weigh it in our scales. The evidence 
 is of the same kind as that on which, in the ab- 
 sence of direct testimony, a jury does not hesitate 
 to return a verdict of guilty against a criminal, 
 even when the forfeiture of his life is the result ; 
 and only differs from it by the overwhelming weight _ 
 
THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE. 23 
 
 which is une to it ty the fact that the ad- 
 justments and adaptations of the universe are not 
 limited to some ten or twelve concurring facts, 
 which, when taken in combination, lead to the same 
 inevitable conclusion, but which exist in numbers 
 past human comprehension, all concurring to prove 
 the existence of intelligent volition. Innumerable 
 complicated adjustments and orderly arrangements 
 not only fitted to realize a particular result, but 
 which actually do so, the effect of the hap-hazard 
 meeting together of matter and forces devoid of 
 intelligence and volition is unbelievable. 
 
 Finally. As it is impossible to prove the existence 
 of God by that kind of evidence which is called 
 “ demonstrative,” it is equally impossible to do so by 
 that which is called “direct.” The reason of this 
 is obvious. Our only rational conception of Him 
 is that of a being who is everywhere present at 
 every point of space, and whom, therefore, it is 
 impossible to see with mortal eye. This being so, 
 the belief in His existence must be an inference of 
 some kind. 1 am aware that it has been urged 
 by some that it is an intuition of the human mind 
 prior to all reasoning. I cannot think so, for then 
 the intuition of His existence would be universal, 
 which it certainly is not. I fully admit that the 
 universality—or the all but universality—of religion 
 proves that.there is something in the constitution 
 of human nature which has suggested, even to the 
 
24 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 most uncultured races, the existence of a super- 
 human being, although their conceptions of such 
 a being are for the most part of a degraded 
 character. But this differs widely from a direct 
 intuition of His existence, which, if it were real, 
 would be in all places everywhere alike. I trust, 
 however, that I shall be able to prove from the 
 authoritative declarations of conscience, when it 
 affirms a law of duty binding on man, and makes 
 him feel self-condemned for its violation, not only 
 that a being exists to whom the duty is due; but 
 that he is a being possessed of the attributes 
 which Christian Theism ascribes to God. But even 
 here, the only thing of which we have a direct in- 
 tuitive knowledge, is the affirmation of conscience 
 proclaiming a law of duty. The existence of a 
 being in whom all duty and obligation centre is 
 an inference, though an obvious one. - Similar 
 remarks are applicable to the evidence on which 
 we believe that our conscious existence will survive 
 the dissolution of our bodies. 
 
 It has often been urged, and will doubtless be 
 urged again, if a God exists to whom we are re- 
 sponsible for our conduct here, and if our conduct 
 here will be attended with important consequences 
 to ourselves in an existence beyond the grave, that 
 He ought to have given us evidence of this far 
 more cogent than that which we possess, either by 
 making our belief in His existence, and of our 
 
THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE. 25 
 
 survival one of our primary intuitions; or else 
 that the evidence of it should be such that we can- 
 not help believing in it. In reply to this objection, 
 I observe, first, that we are very inadequate judges 
 of what God ought to have done, as far as providing 
 us with intuitive knowledge, or affording us on these 
 points evidence which cannot be resisted, is con- 
 cerned; and that He will hold men responsible only 
 for the light which He has imparted to them, and not 
 for that which He has withheld: and secondly, that 
 His not having done so, by no means invalidates 
 the proofs which He has given us of His existence, 
 and of the duties due to Him by us as our Creator 
 and Preserver. The only real questions for our con- 
 sideration are: Is the evidence which we possess 
 sufficient to afford us adequate reason for believing 
 that a God exists to whom we are reponsible for our 
 conduct here ; and has He not, as our Creator, a right 
 to our devoted service? Does He care, or is He 
 indifferent whether we realize the purpose for which 
 He has created us? Will the characters which we 
 have formed here follow us into the world beyond 
 the grave? If these questions must be answered 
 in the affirmative, the survival of our conscious 
 existence after death is a certain consequence, 
 although our reasons for believing in it are not 
 demonstrative, but are indefinitely stronger than 
 that moral evidence on which we act with the 
 fullest assurance in the affairs of ordinary life. 
 
CEA PALE Regula 
 
 AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 
 
 Hi Re system known by the name of Agnosticism 
 
 is widely diffused in the upper regions of 
 thought, and is exerting no little influence in promot- 
 ing unbelief in its lower strata. As it lays the axe 
 to the root of all Theistic investigations by assuming 
 that they are nugatory ; that the question whether 
 there is a God suchas Theists presuppose transcends 
 the limits of the human understanding, and that 
 when we ascribe certain attributes to God we are 
 guilty of what is called Anthropomorphism, that is, 
 that we manufacture a God who exists nowhere but 
 in our own imagination; it is necessary before pro- 
 ceeding further that I should offer a few observations 
 on its general principles. 
 
 While it concedes that a belief in the existence 
 of a First Cause of the Universe, which is itself 
 uncaused,—which, if we please, we may call God— 
 is a necessity of thought ; yet because it is infinite 
 and man’s intellect is finite, it affirms that we 
 
AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 27 
 
 neither know, nor can know, anything about its 
 nature or its attributes. We must, therefore, beware 
 of attributing to it either personality, wisdom, will, 
 a moral character, the exercise of any providential 
 care over the universe of which it is the Cause, or 
 even any purpose or design in its formation. From 
 these principles it follows that the existence of such 
 a being need not exercise any influence on human 
 conduct, and that the entire course of our lives may 
 be safely, perhaps I ought to say wisely, regulated 
 without any reference to it (I must not say “ Him,” 
 for that would be to ascribe to it personality) ; 
 and that the proper answer to every question which 
 our curiosity may suggest respecting it, is that we 
 neither know, nor can know, anything about it, and 
 therefore that all inquiry is as much lost labour. 
 From these principles the very portentous con- 
 clusion follows, that the God in whom Christian 
 Theists believe is neither more nor less than the 
 projection of the highest attributes of man, magnified 
 indefinitely, into some unknown substratum, and 
 then designating this figment of our own imagin- 
 ations God; or, as a very popular writer of this 
 school of thought has most profanely put it, that the 
 God of Christian Theists is a kind of magnified Lord 
 Shaftesbury. It need hardly be said that a God 
 of this kind is as much one of our own making as 
 an idol is of him that fashions it. The propounders 
 of these views object to be called Atheists. They 
 
28 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 say, ‘‘ No; we neither know, nor can know, anything 
 about God. All that we affirm is that the entire 
 subject transcends the limits of our understandings 
 to say whether He exists or not ; and consequently 
 that the God in whom you believe is a figment of 
 the imagination.” Such a system, therefore, may be 
 not incorrectly designated ‘“‘ Moral Atheism.” 
 
 This entire system of thought is based on reason- 
 ings of a very abstract character, so abstract that 
 they require special endowments, and a special 
 training, to enable a judgment to be formed as to 
 their validity. Into these mazes, therefore, I shall 
 not ask the reader to enter. But as the objections 
 against Christian Theism which have been founded 
 on their basis have been loudly trumpeted in popular 
 lectures, and in works which are easily accessible, 
 by certain individuals who hold a high reputation as 
 philosophers and scientists; and there is, therefore, 
 no small danger that they may impress those who 
 are incapable of forming any judgment respecting 
 the value of the reasonings adduced by the sheer 
 weight of authority, it will be necessary that I 
 should point out that the principles and reasonings 
 in question lead to results which are repugnant to 
 that common sense which constitutes the only guide 
 in life of the overwhelming majority of mankind. 
 
 In order that I may avoid involving the reader in 
 a labyrinth of metaphysical puzzles, I must en- 
 deavour to set before him the principles on which 
 
AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 29 
 
 this system is based in the simplest form, and free 
 from language which is difficult to translate into 
 vernacular English.* I think that they may be 
 reduced to the two following affirmations :— 
 
 1. That it is impossible for the finite to compre- 
 hend the infinite, or even to frame to itself any 
 image of it which can enable us to constitute it a 
 definite subject of thought. This being so, inas- 
 much as the human intellect is finite, and the very 
 conception of God involves the idea of His infinity ; 
 it is impossible, even if there is a God, for finite 
 man to attain any knowledge of His nature, or of 
 His character, which is real. 
 
 2. Inasmuch as the idea of God involves on His 
 part the possession of the following attributes: 
 namely, that He is Infinite, that He is the Absolute 
 Being, and that He is the First Cause of the 
 Universe ; and that these three conceptions, when 
 viewed as united in the same being, involve a 
 
 * To give the reader an idea of the unintelligible language in 
 which the propounders of this system of philosophy express 
 themselves, I quote the following words from Mr. H. Spencer’s 
 explanation of the mode in which, according to the principles 
 of the agnostic philosophy, the present universe has been evolved, 
 namely, by “a change from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a 
 definite coherent heterogeneity through continuous differentiations and 
 integrations.” These words will enable the reader to understand 
 what I mean when I speak of “language difficult to translate into 
 vernacular English.” Commenting on them, Mr. Goldwin Smith 
 writes: ‘This universe may well have heaved a sigh of relief 
 when, through the cerebration of an eminent thinker, it had been 
 delivered of this account of its origin,” 
 
30 CHRISTIAN THEISM., 
 
 - ———— as — a . SS 
 
 number of contradictions,—this renders all reason- 
 ings on the subject nugatory and invalid, and con- 
 sequently all knowledge of the realities which exist 
 in Him impossible. Perhaps it is necessary that I 
 should inform the reader who is unaccustomed to 
 this kind of speculation, that by the words, ‘the 
 Absolute Being,” is meant a being who - exists 
 devoid of all relations to every other being, a thing 
 which it is alleged must be true of God if He has 
 existed throughout the eternity of the past, prior to 
 that creative act by which He brought the universe 
 into existence. 
 
 Respecting these positions I observe that none 
 are more ready than Christian Theists to admit that 
 our knowledge of God, though real as far as it goes, 
 is not perfect knowledge, and that there are realities 
 in His being, which transcend the powers of our 
 finite intellects to grasp. This, however, is a diffi- 
 culty which is by no means peculiar to Theism, but 
 is one which extends over the entire range of 
 human knowledge, every department of which runs 
 up into some ultimate, the real nature of which 
 man’s finite intellect is unable to fathom. If, there- 
 fore, the objection, that, because our knowledge of 
 God is partial, or because it runs up into problems, 
 the solution of which transcends the powers of our 
 finite understandings, is valid against Christian 
 Theism, it is equally so against every kind of know- 
 ledge which we imagine that we possess, The 
 
 Pa ts 
 
AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 31 
 
 reasonings in question, therefore, if carried out to 
 their legitimate consequences, would involve us in 
 universal scepticism. But between perfect know- 
 ledge, and total inability to know anything which is 
 real, a great gulf lies; and I feel convinced that no 
 amount of abstract reasoning will induce men of 
 ordinary understanding to believe that because there 
 are actualities in the Divine existence which tran- 
 scend the power of our finite minds to penetrate, that 
 therefore we can know nothing about Him which is 
 real. It has been affirmed by a well-known popular 
 writer that to a God who is unknowable we may 
 render worship of a silent kind; but I think that 
 my readers will be of opinion that a God, respecting 
 whom we can know nothing, is incapable of pro- 
 ducing in the human mind the feeling of either 
 adoration, reverence, or love, or of exerting any 
 influence on our conduct. 
 
 The unsoundness of the basis on which this 
 system of philosophy rests may be made clear to 
 the ordinary reader by the aid of a very simple 
 illustration derived from a subject with which he 
 is well acquainted; I allude to our conception of 
 space. It is impossible to conceive of space as 
 limited ; for if in imagination we attempt to assign 
 a boundary to it, the question at once presents it- 
 self, What is the boundary of that boundary ? and 
 so on for evermore. On the other hand, owing to 
 the limitations of the human mind, it is impossible 
 
32 CHRIS TIAN.ITIEIOM, 
 
 for it to picture to itself an image of a space which 
 is destitute of limits. From this the conclusion has 
 been drawn by certain metaphysical philosophers. 
 that our conception of space is no representation of 
 any reality which exists outside the human mind; 
 and that if any reality exists, outside our subjective 
 consciousness, we can know nothing about its nature 
 which is real. Whatever effect such reasoning may 
 have on those who delight in courses of abstract 
 reasoning, I cannot but think that they will fail to 
 commend themselves to people of ordinary under- 
 standing, who, whenever they set themselves in 
 motion find space to be a great reality. If such a 
 person were to travel from London to Calcutta, is it 
 credible that either he or even a metaphysical philo- 
 sopher could be induced to believe that that through 
 which he was persuaded that he had been travelling 
 several thousand miles had no objective existence 
 outside his own brain ? Our inability, therefore, to 
 penetrate into all the secrets of the infinite, or to 
 image it in our own minds in its infinity, does not 
 hinder us from attaining a partial knowledge of it 
 which is real. Such is our conception of space, and 
 such is our knowledge of God, real as far as it goes, 
 but imperfect. 
 
 From the Agnostic position that because God is 
 infinite and man finite all real knowledge of God is 
 impossible, a number of conclusions have been 
 deduced which directly contradict the positions on 
 
AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 33 
 
 which its reasonings are based. Thus, the Agnostic 
 argues because man’s conceptions are finite they 
 cannot represent any reality which exists in the 
 infinite ; and inasmuch as the conceptions of person- 
 ality, will, intelligence, a moral nature, and various 
 other attributes which Christian Theists habitually 
 ascribe to God all involve finiteness, they can denote 
 no realities which exist in the infinite. From this, 
 as I have observed above, he adduces the additional 
 conclusion that a wise man will do well to frame his 
 conduct without any reference to a being who is thus 
 unknown and unknowable. But if these positions are 
 true, it is evident that our knowledge of God is not 
 inconsiderable. The Agnostic will object that all this 
 is merely negative knowledge. Granted; but the 
 knowledge of what a thing is not is frequently a very 
 important kind of knowledge, especially when, as 
 in the case before us, may be deduced from it the 
 positive conclusion that the whole course of human 
 life may be regulated without any reference to that 
 being which this system of philosophy allows us to 
 designate God. 
 
 The position that the phenomena of the universe 
 are manifestations of its First Cause, respecting which 
 we can know nothing but the bare fact of its exist- 
 ence, is one which is in striking contradiction to our 
 ordinary modes of reasoning which we find verified 
 in our daily experience. It is admitted by Agnostics 
 that we know not a little about phenomena; in fact, 
 
 2 
 
34 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 they affirm that all our knowledge, both ordinary and 
 scientific, is either a knowledge of phenomena or a 
 deduction from it. How then, I ask, is it possible 
 that we can know nothing about the Cause of the 
 universe, of which all its phenomena are manifesta- 
 tions ? In every other department of knowledge we 
 invariably draw inferences from the phenomena 
 which come under our observation, and we are of 
 opinion that they enable us to attain some knowledge 
 which is real respecting the Causes which have pro- 
 duced them. We may not be able to know everything 
 about them, but our experience proves, when pheno- 
 mena are accurately observed, and when in drawing 
 our conclusions due weight has been attached to 
 them as a whole, that our knowledge, though it may 
 be only partial, is yet real. Our habits of drawing 
 inferences of this kind are so universal—they form 
 the very guide of our practical life—that everyone 
 can find abundance of instances of having done so in 
 his own experience. To it, therefore, it will be 
 better that I should refer the reader, rather than 
 adduce a few striking instances, which at best can 
 form only an imperfect representation of what is the 
 habitual practice not only of those who are endowed 
 with ordinary common sense, but even of agnostic 
 philosophers themselves. On what principle, then, I 
 ask, is it that the only exception against the validity of 
 reasonings of this kind is, when we draw inferences 
 from the phenomena of the universe respecting the 
 
AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 35 
 
 character of its Cause, ¢.c. of God? The knowledge 
 of Him which we are able to arrive at from this source 
 may, | should rather say must, be imperfect know- 
 ledge, because our knowledge of the phenomena of 
 the universe is confined to that very small portion of 
 it which comes under our observation ; but this does 
 not hinder it, as far as it goes, from being real. 
 
 I must now offer a few remarks on the objection, 
 so constantly urged by Agnostics, that Christian 
 Theism is neither more nor less than anthropo- 
 morphism, or, in other words, that the God whom 
 Christians worship is a man-made God. 
 
 The word ‘“anthropomorphism” is compounded 
 of two Greek words—avOpw7ros, man ; and popdy, 
 which means, form, shape, or figure. The abstract 
 term “anthropomorphism,” has no word which corre- 
 sponds to it in Greek ; but out of these two words is 
 compounded an adjective—dv@pwrouopdos, which 
 means of human form ; and a verb avOpwropophow, 
 the meaning of which is, to form a thing like a man, 
 or to clothe it in human shape. As long, therefore, as 
 this verb is used in its primary meaning, with the 
 intention of denouncing as utterly inadequate and 
 unreal, every term which has been applied to God, 
 except by way of analogy, or metaphor, which repre- 
 sents Him as possessing the form, shape, and figure 
 of a man, it may be cordially adopted by every in- 
 telligent Christian Theist, for none now believe that 
 the Most High possesses body, parts, passions, or a 
 
 4 
 
36 CHRISTIAN ‘THEISM. 
 
 human shape. But the word as it is now employed 
 by unbelievers has acquired a very extended mean- 
 ing, and is used as a denunciation of every form of 
 theistic belief which ascribes to God any attribute of 
 man, even the highest and the noblest, such as per- 
 sonality, volition, free agency, intelligence, holiness, 
 justice, or benevolence ; because, as it is alleged, these 
 conceptions being finite human ones, can denote no 
 corresponding realities in a being who is infinite. 
 For these and similar reasons, a numerous body of 
 unbelievers seem to think that to denounce Christian 
 Theism as anthropomorphism is a sufficient proof 
 that the belief in it is founded on a delusion. . No 
 weapon is more extensively used by its opponents 
 than this kind of denunciation. 
 
 With respect to this objection, I observe, 
 
 First: It proves too much, for the following reason. 
 All our conceptions, whether of things in heaven or of 
 things on earth, cannot be other than human concep- 
 tions, because as human beings, we possess no other. 
 If, therefore, for this reason we can have no assurance 
 that there is any objective reality corresponding to 
 them, the whole of our knowledge of external things 
 would be invalidated. Into the highly abstract dis- 
 cussion of the relation between the perceiving subject 
 and the perceived object I shall not enter, because it 
 is one which is not only highly perplexing, but which 
 can have no practical interest to the readers whom I 
 am addressing. But if, as it is urged by the Agnostic, 
 
 * 
 
AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 37 
 
 that because our conceptions are finite human ones 
 they can denote no corresponding realities as they 
 exist in God, I observe that it by no means follows 
 because our conception of a thing is finite that it is 
 incapable of denoting a reality as it exists in the 
 infinite. Thus, as I have observed above, our finite 
 conception of space does not cease to denote an 
 objective reality corresponding to it, because we 
 cannot conceive of space otherwise than boundless. 
 In a similar manner, when Theists affirm that God’s 
 power, wisdom, and benevolence are devoid of limita- 
 tions, and His holiness and justice perfect, itis absurd 
 to affirm that our human conceptions of these attri- 
 butes can denote no corresponding realities in Him, 
 or, as some theologians have even taught, that be- 
 nevolence, holiness, and justice, as conceived of by 
 man, may denote one thing, and that when these 
 attributes are ascribed to God they may denote some- 
 thing widely different from our human conceptions 
 of them. 
 
 Second: The objection, viewed as one against 
 Christian Theism, js valueless. Christian Theists 
 believe that God has created man in His own image 
 and likeness. If this is true, it follows as a necessary 
 consequence that the highest attributes of man must 
 have something which corresponds to them in the 
 Divine nature. Unless, therefore, the Agnostic can 
 prove (which he cannot) that God cannot have created 
 man in His own image, the objection owes its entire 
 
38 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 plausibility to the fact that, somewhere in the course 
 of the reasoning by which it has been attempted to 
 be established, the point requiring to be proved has 
 been covertly assumed. The question, therefore, 
 resolves itself into the following alternative : Which 
 is the more probable: That there is a God who has 
 created man in His own image and likeness; or that 
 man, with all his mighty powers of intellect, his free 
 agency, and his moral nature, has been evolved out 
 of we know not what by forces destitute of freedom, 
 intelligence, and morality ? 
 
 Let it be observed when Christian Theists affirm 
 that there are realities in God, such as intelligence, 
 freedom, a moral nature, holiness, justice, and 
 benevolence, the same in character as the corre- 
 sponding attributes in man, that they conceive 
 of them as free from all the imperfections as they 
 exist in ourselves. Thus, while intelligence in 
 man is confined within limits which are relatively 
 narrow, intelligence in God extends to all things 
 actual and possible; while man’s free agency is 
 limited by certain boundaries which it cannot 
 transcend, the Divine free agency is free from 
 all limitations; while holiness and benevolence in 
 man are imperfect, holiness and benevolence in God 
 are absolute and complete; while, owing to our 
 inability to penetrate into motives, and to form a 
 correct estimate of the circumstances which have 
 influenced the formation of character, human justice, 
 
PGVNOS HCloM CONSIDERED ANDARERUTED, 2396 
 
 even with the best intentions on the part of the 
 judge, is only too frequently imperfect,—justice in 
 God, being free of any limitation of knowledge, 
 is absolute and perfect. But because this dis- 
 tinction exists between the Divine and. the human, 
 it is absurd to affirm that realities corresponding 
 to our human conceptions cannot exist in God; 
 or that those who believe in a God in whom 
 such attributes exist, are guilty of the folly of 
 worshipping what is neither more nor less than a 
 magnified man freed from the imperfections of 
 humanity. 
 
 We have a striking example of what may be 
 justly designated a man-made God in that system 
 of much-vaunted lofty philosophic thought, known 
 by the name of Positivism. I refer to it here for 
 the purpose of showing the absurdities into which 
 high philosophy can go, when it deserts the regions 
 of common sense. Though closely allied to Agnos- 
 ticism, its principle is essentially atheistic. Its 
 founder, Comte, affirmed that human knowledge 
 is exclusively confined to phenomena, that it is im- 
 possible to penetrate to anything beyond them, and 
 that we can know nothing about causes. Conse- 
 quently it is impossible even to affirm that a First 
 Cause of the Universe must exist. 1 need scarcely 
 observe that a system of this kind differs little from 
 Atheism pure and simple. Yet the instincts of 
 human nature proved too strong for the gifted 
 
40 CHRISTIAN. THEISM. 
 
 author of this system, and he felt himself forced to 
 admit that a religion of some kind was a necessity 
 for man. Having, as he believed, utterly destroyed 
 the belief in Theism as a worn-out figment of 
 the times of ignorance, he proceeded to propound, 
 in place of all religions which rest on it as a basis, 
 what he designated the Religion of Humanity, in 
 which human nature itself—z.e. all the men and 
 women who have existed in the past, who exist in 
 the present, and who will exist in the future—is set 
 forth as the object of worship; and for its due 
 celebration, he instituted a Church provided with 
 an elaborate system of rites, ceremonies, and sacra- 
 ments, and with a body of philosophers as priests, 
 who were to wield a power even more absolute 
 than that which has been ever claimed for its priest- 
 hood by the Roman Catholic Church. This strange 
 deity still continues to be an object of worship to 
 the orthodox portion of his philosophic followers ; 
 while others, who accept the general principles of 
 his system of philosophy reject it. I think that the 
 reader will be of opinion that this system, though 
 elaborated by one who was really a_ profound 
 thinker, and accepted by others whose abilities it 
 is impossible to deny, is simply grotesque. 
 
 Before concluding this part of our subject, it will 
 be desirable that I should offer a few observations 
 on the language which is applied to God in the 
 Scfiptures of the Old Testament, because the mis- 
 
AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REBUTED At 
 
 understanding of its nature and import, gives to the 
 objection we are considering the only appearance 
 of plausibility as an objection against Christian 
 Theism. Not a few of its readers fall into the 
 error of imagining that the terminology which its 
 writers have used respecting Him, instead of being 
 metaphorical, and not unfrequently accommodated 
 to the mental condition of those to whom it is 
 addressed, is intended to denote realities as they 
 exist in God. This error is also widely diffused 
 among uneducated unbelievers, and forms perhaps 
 the most dangerous weapon. which they direct 
 against Christian Theism in the eyes of the igno- 
 rant, and the unwary. This point is one of very 
 considerable importance, as everyone whose duty 
 ‘t has been to deal with this class of unbelievers, 
 is only too painfully aware. What, then, are the 
 facts ? 
 
 1. In numerous places in these Scriptures, the 
 highest conceptions which the human mind is capable 
 of forming are applied to God. Of these, Psalm 
 exxxix. ascribes to God a universal presence in the 
 universe, as far as it was known to the writer, 
 and a perfect acquaintance with every thought of 
 man; Isaiah xl. ascribes to Him greatness and 
 creative power beyond human comprehension, and 
 a constant presence and energy in providence ; 
 Solomon’s dedication prayer affirms the inadequacy 
 of every temple made with hands to contain Him, 
 
42 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain; and 
 the revelation of His self-existence, and of His 
 moral perfections made to Moses as recorded in 
 Exod. iii, and xxxiv., may be referred to as examples 
 out of a vast number of others equally decisive. 
 
 2. On the other hand, He is frequently spoken 
 of under various limitations, and even as possess- 
 ing a human form, a bodily organism, and a local 
 presence. Of this form of speech, Gen. xviii., 
 which contains the account of Abraham’s inter- 
 cession for the cities of the plain, may be referred 
 to as a striking example. I therefore quote it: 
 “Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is 
 great, and because their sin is very grievous; I will 
 go down now, and see whether they have done 
 altogether according to the cry of it, which is 
 come unto Me; and if not, I will know.” In the 
 immediate context one who bears the Divine name 
 is represented as appearing in human form, and 
 even as partaking of a meal, and, after the colloquy, 
 ‘as going His way.” 
 
 3. It not unfrequently happens that while in 
 one set of passages self-existence, unchangeable- 
 ness, universal presence, and the highest attributes 
 of man, are ascribed to God, in numerous others 
 are freely attributed to Him some of the lowest 
 passions of human nature, such as rage, fury, 
 jealousy, etc., and that, too, by the same writer. 
 Not only is this so, but He is even described, 
 
AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 43 
 
 es a EE Se 
 
 when speaking of Himself, as animated by not a 
 few of the passions of our frail humanity. Of this 
 mode of speaking, the student of the prophets, 
 especially of Jeremiah, cannot fail to find numerous 
 examples. 
 
 From these facts I draw the following conclusions: 
 
 ].—That it is incredible that the same writer 
 should have ascribed to God the highest perfec- 
 tions which are conceivable by man, and have 
 attributed to Him many of the lowest passions of 
 human nature, if He had intended to affirm that 
 these latter denoted realities corresponding to them 
 in the Divine Being. The only rational conclusion, 
 therefore, is that He used them either as metaphors, 
 or as part of the poetic imagery in which He 
 wrote, or as accommodations to the low mental 
 condition of those whom He was addressing. 
 
 I].—A large number of the expressions which 
 ascribe to God a bodily form, bodily organs, a local 
 presence, and others of a similar character, are 
 obviously metaphorical. 
 
 IIIl.—Not a few of them are analogies, as for 
 example when it is said that God’s eyes are in 
 every place, that His ears are open to every prayer, 
 that He smells the smell: of a sweet savour, and 
 that, like a warrior, He takes up the spear and 
 stops the way against them that persecute ; or that 
 His sword is bathed in blood. 
 
 1V.—Not unfrequently when human passions of a 
 
44 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 low type and a limited local presence are ascribed 
 to God, they are accommodations to the mental 
 condition of those to whom they are addressed, 
 that condition being such as to render them inca- 
 pable of receiving anything higher or better. The 
 fact that several of the utterances recorded in the 
 Scriptures are accommodations, is admitted even in 
 these Scriptures themselves. 
 
 V.—It is asserted again and again by the writers 
 of the New Testament, that the Old Testament 
 Scriptures were not intended to contain a revelation 
 of absolute truth; but, on the contrary, that its 
 revelations are fragmentary, relative, accommodated 
 to the mental condition of those to whom they 
 were addressed ; and intended, when they had ful- 
 filled their temporary purpose, to be superseded 
 by a higher and a better. They are best described 
 as containing the history of the gradual education 
 of the Jewish people from low to higher conceptions 
 of the Divine nature and character, until they 
 became capable of receiving the revelation of the 
 Divine character and perfections made in the 
 Person, work, and teaching of Jesus Christ. 
 
 Finally: The objection because there are depths 
 in the mode of the Divine subsistence, and in God’s 
 providential government of the universe, which are 
 unfathomable by man’s finite understanding, that 
 therefore we cannot attain to any knowledge of 
 Flim that is real, is utterly futile. How can it be 
 
AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 45 
 
 otherwise than that such depths should exist in Him? 
 If there are such profundities in the existence even 
 of an atom, which philosophers and scientists have 
 failed to sound, much more must there be still pro- 
 founder ones in Him by the energy of whose will 
 all things are upheld in being, and were at first 
 created. Surely a philosophy and science which, 
 while it admits that the ultimate reality about atoms 
 and molecules is shrouded in mysteries which it 
 cannot penetrate, yet affirms that its knowledge of 
 their activities is not inconsiderable, is in flagrant 
 contradiction to our common sense, when it teaches 
 that because we cannot know everything about 
 God, we can know nothing about Him that is real; 
 and that all inquiries respecting His character, His 
 attributes, and His relations to ourselves, must be 
 a mere useless expenditure of labour; and from 
 such premisses boldly to draw the conclusion that 
 it will not only. be safe, but even wise to frame 
 our course of life without any reference to Him. 
 
ChAT LE ReVe 
 THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 
 
 | AM now in a position to address myself to the 
 
 immediate subject of this work, which is to 
 set forth in as brief a space as possible the evi- 
 dence, which ought to be sufficient to convince 
 men of ordinary understanding, that a God exists 
 who is a moral being, and to whom they will be 
 responsible hereafter for their conduct here. [I 
 shall first attempt to deal with the argument from 
 causation; and as this will constitute the most 
 difficult part of my subject, I must ask the reader’s 
 deepest attention to the following reasonings. I 
 observe, therefore, 
 
 That the human mind is so constituted, that 
 whenever it witnesses an event, or what is called 
 in the language of philosophy a phenomenon, it 
 cannot help inferring that its existence is due 
 either to a single cause, or to several causes 
 acting in combination, ze. to a force or a com- 
 bination of forces, adequate to its production. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 47 
 
 This is no theory, but a matter of our daily 
 individual experience. An occurrence happens. 
 We instantly say to ourselves, ‘‘Whence came it ? 
 What caused it ?”? . We discover that the immediate 
 causes are phenomena. The conclusion is inevi- 
 table, that they must have owed their existence to 
 other causes, and so on in an ascending series, 
 until we are forced to arrive at the conception of 
 a Cause, itself uncaused, which possessed in itself 
 sufficient potency to have brought into existence 
 all the phenomena of the past and of the present. 
 
 Against this conclusion, there are only two 
 possible alternatives :— 
 
 First : That these successions of finite causes have 
 gone on operating during the eternity of the past, 
 1.é. that they have never had a beginning. 
 
 Second: That the first of the series having been 
 at some period, however remote, non-existent, 
 sprung into existence spontaneously, ze. was self- 
 caused. 
 
 With respect to the first of these alternatives, 
 it will be sufficient to observe that our minds are 
 so constituted that it is inconceivable that while 
 each set of a succession of finite causes has had 
 a beginning, that the whole succession can have 
 had none. 
 
 To the second a similar remark applies. Our 
 minds are so constituted that we are incapable of 
 believing that an occurrence, or phenomenon, is a 
 
48 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 chance production which, having been once non- 
 existent, has sprung into existence spontaneously, 
 te. without a cause. 
 
 It would be foreign to my purpose to enter on 
 this work with an inquiry respecting the origin of 
 these beliefs, or of the primary intuitions of the 
 human mind, or to attempt to vindicate their va- 
 lidity. To do so would involve my readers in a 
 number of highly abstract metaphysical discussions. 
 I shall only observe that, be their origin what it 
 may, they are either truths to which as we are at 
 present constituted we cannot help giving assent, 
 or they are direct perceptions of our consciousness, 
 which form to us the highest of certitudes. The 
 fact that it is so, is sufficient for my argument, 
 without entering into the question of how it has 
 become so. Volumes have been written on the 
 latter question, without arriving at any conclusion 
 respecting it which commands anything approach- 
 ing general assent. If any of my readers should 
 entertain a doubt that the beliefs above referred 
 to are necessities of thought, let him try if he 
 can conceive of the possibility of the occurrence of 
 an event without a cause adequate to produce it; 
 or of a succession of causes which have been 
 operating without a beginning during the eternity 
 of the past; or of a succession the first of which 
 sprang into existence spontaneously, and then ask 
 himself whether he has not habitually acted on the 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 49 
 
 conviction that such things are impossible, and 
 found this conviction verified by the facts of actual 
 experience. The contrary assumption contradicts the 
 beliefs of everyone, except that very small portion of 
 mankind who have endeavoured to reason themselves 
 out of them, or who, owing to their low intellectual 
 condition, are unable to form a distinct conception of 
 what is meant by such terms as events and causes. 
 
 To make the following reasoning clear, it will be 
 necessary to state distinctly what is the meaning 
 which the common sense of mankind attaches to the 
 word Cause. Unless we are under the bias of some 
 particular theory, we invariably associate the idea 
 of efficiency with that of cause. By efficiency, I 
 mean a power residing in the cause, which is adequate 
 to produce the effect, and which actually produces it. 
 Further, it is an essential part of the conception of 
 a cause, that it exists prior to the event of which it 
 is the cause. 
 
 The following definition, therefore, will be suffi- 
 ciently accurate for all practical purposes. A cause 
 is a thing previously existing, which has not only 
 the power to bring into existence something not pre- 
 viously existing, but which has actually produced it. 
 The first of these is, in philosophic language, called 
 the antecedent ; and the second, the consequent. 
 
 From the above positions, the following important 
 conclusions follow— 
 
 1. Whatever exists in the effect, exists either 
 
 4 
 
50 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 actively or in potency, in the cause. Otherwise it 
 must either have produced itself, which is absurd ; 
 or some other cause must be invoked to account for 
 the existence of such things in the effect which 
 did not exist either actively or potentially in the 
 cause. 
 
 2. The cause of an event may be the result of the 
 action of a number of previously existing causes, 
 and for the most part it is so; and so through a 
 series indefinitely long; and each number of the 
 series must possess in itself a potency to bring into 
 existence the effect, which prior to the action of its 
 cause was non-existent. But the idea that a suc- 
 cession of finite causes can have been operating 
 throughout the eternity of the past without any 
 beginning to their activity involves a contradiction. 
 Hence we are compelled, as a necessity of thought, 
 to assume the existence of a cause, which is itself 
 uncaused, but which possessed in itself a potency 
 adequate to produce the universe and all that it 
 contains. 
 
 3. An event or phenomenon is, perhaps, never the 
 production of a single cause, but of a multitude of 
 causes acting in combination; and these of a long 
 succession of other causes, which become more 
 numerous the higher we ascend in the series of 
 events, and therefore more and more difficult to set 
 before the mind in their completeness. 
 
 4. Care must be taken to discriminate between 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 5 
 
 causes and necessary conditions of the existence of 
 things, otherwise confusion of thought will be the 
 certain result. Let me illustrate my meaning by an 
 example. Space is the necessary condition of the 
 existence of everything material ; but to speak of 
 it as the cause of their existence would be absurd. 
 Necessary conditions limit the action of causes, and 
 are capable of diverting their activity into this or 
 that particular channel; but to speak of them as 
 causes contradicts the idea which is inherent in the 
 term itself, namely, the possession of a power in 
 something previously existing, adequate to bring 
 into existence something which did not previously 
 exist ; or to mould previously existing elements into 
 anew form; or to modify the action of previously 
 existing forces. 
 
 5. It is most important to observe that law is not 
 a cause, though it is frequently spoken ofas if it were 
 one, alike by philosophers, scientists, theologians, 
 and even in common conversation. Attention cannot 
 be too strongly directed to this fact, because it is 
 frequently used by all these classes of persons as if 
 it were equivalent to force; nay, it is frequently 
 personified even by those who deny that the First 
 Cause of the Universe is a personal being. Thus 
 philosophers and scientific men are frequently in the 
 habit of affirming that the laws of Nature effect this 
 or that ; that feeble man is unable to resist their over- 
 whelming power ; and that they remorselessly crush 
 
52 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 him, when he comes across their path; but the truth 
 is, that whereas the forces of Nature effect much, the 
 aws of Nature can effect nothing. 
 
 What, then, are the laws of Nature? They are 
 nothing but generalized expressions, which denote the 
 invariable order of the occurrence of phenomena, and 
 the invariability of the action of its forces. Thus 
 what is called the law of gravitation, is merely an 
 expression, which denotes the order in which material 
 things fall under the influence of the force of 
 gravitation, the force being the efficient agency, 
 while the law neither does nor can effect anything ; 
 the forces of Nature crush ; its laws are powerless ; 
 they can neither do good nor do evil. A_ similar 
 inaccuracy frequently occurs in speaking of the laws 
 of a state. What are they? They are simple rules 
 which command or forbid particular classes of actions, 
 and in which certain penalties are denounced against 
 the disobedient. Metaphorically, we are in the habit 
 of speaking of the laws as doing this or that; and 
 even as pronouncing sentence ona criminal ; but if 
 we use accurate language—and the use of inaccurate 
 language has introduced endless confusion into the 
 theistic controversy, and into that about miracles— 
 its laws effect nothing; it is the forces which are 
 behind them, such as the judge, the jury, the police, 
 the prison warder, and the executioner, which are 
 the only things which operate efficiently. Let it, 
 therefore, be kept steadily in mind that the laws of 
 
3 
 
 THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 53 
 
 Nature merely denote the invariable order in which 
 certain consequents follow certain antecedents, and 
 are therefore devoid of all causal power. 
 
 A very simple illustration will make it evident 
 that the idea of efficient agency is inseparably united 
 with that of cause in the minds of all, except a few 
 speculative philosophers. Let us suppose that an 
 extensive warehouse has been burnt to the ground, 
 with no inconsiderable loss of life and property, and 
 that a jury is impannelled to inquire into the cause 
 of the calamity which after careful investigation 
 returns the following verdict: A man who was em- 
 ployed to perambulate the building at night care- 
 lessly threw an imperfectly extinguished match into 
 amass of combustible matter, which had been im- 
 properly allowed to accumulate in a dangerous place. 
 This took fire, and from thence the conflagration 
 spread over the entire building. 
 
 Who, or what, then, was the cause, and what were 
 the necessary conditions of the fire, and of the 
 mischief that followed ? , 
 
 The primary and direct cause of the fire was the 
 act of the man who threw the match, which had 
 inherent in it a potency sufficient to kindle a flame, 
 in amass of combustible matter. The match, there- 
 fore, with the properties inherent in it, was its 
 secondary cause. The existence of the combustible 
 matter in the place where it was, the character of 
 the building and of its contents, was the necessary 
 
$4 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 condition. Apart from the presence of the combustible 
 matter in the place where it was, the man and the 
 match would have effected nothing. The cause, then, 
 of the destruction of the lives and property was 
 the action of the man and of the match, exerted on a 
 set of conditions suited to produce combustion meet- 
 ing together at the right time and place, their 
 existence and concurrence being the result of an 
 indefinite number of causes and conditions. 
 
 Having settled these preliminary points, I will now 
 set before the reader the evidence which the principle 
 of causation furnishes in proof of the existence of a 
 God. All thatis essential in it admits of being stated 
 in a brief space. 
 
 The universe, and all which we behold in it, con- 
 sists of a mass of very complicated phenomena. 
 Compelled by that belief in the principle of causation 
 which each of us intuitively feels—it matters not, as 
 far as this argument is concerned, what may have 
 been the origin of this belief—we arrive at the 
 conclusion that none of these phenomena are self- 
 caused ; and we are no less absolutely certain that 
 there was a time when they first came into existence. 
 Hence we infer that they must have been produced 
 by a cause, or by a combination of causes, possessing 
 a potency adequate to their production. On further 
 investigation we arrive at the conclusion that these 
 must have owed their existence to successions of 
 previously existing causes. But as our minds are so 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 55 
 
 constituted that we are incapable of believing ina 
 succession of causes, while each member of the series 
 has been brought into existence by something pre- 
 viously existing—that the series itself never had a 
 commencement, we are compelled to assume the ex- 
 istence of a First Cause which, being itself uncaused, 
 i.e. self-existent, is the cause to which the entire suc- 
 cession of causes, to which the existing phenomena of 
 the universe, owe their existence, and of which they 
 are manifestations. 
 
 It matters not, as far as this argument is concerned, 
 how remote this First Cause may be from existing 
 phenomena, or how complicated may be the succes- 
 sion of intervening causes, which interpose between 
 them and it. However long the chain, the consti- 
 tution of our minds compels us to believe that it is 
 finite ; and as a succession of finite causes which never 
 had a beginning is inconceivable, we are driven to 
 the conclusion that a First Cause, itself uncaused, 
 must exist, for it is unbelievable that existing things 
 could have sprung spontaneously into being out of 
 absolute nothingness; or, to put it in the form 
 of the well-known proverb, Lx nthilo nihil fit. I 
 cannot better express this truth than in the words 
 of Mr. H. Spencer, the Coryphzeus of Agnosticism : 
 ‘‘The assumption of the existence of a First Cause of 
 the Universe is a necessity of thought.” This First 
 Cause we Theists designate God. 
 
 I have heard it urged by a certain class of 
 
56 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 unbelievers that it is necessary to give an account of 
 the origin of this First Cause. To this I answer, that 
 if it had an origin it would cease‘to be a First Cause, 
 and so we should be asked to give an account of that 
 which caused it, and so on for evermore. Far 
 more plausible is the objection, that a Cause, which is 
 itself uncaused, presents equal difficulties to formu- 
 late in thought, as a succession of finite causes, which 
 never had a beginning. One of these alternatives, 
 however, must be true, notwithstanding any difficul- 
 ties with which the conception may be attended. | 
 shall only observe that the difficulties are not equal, 
 The conception of a First Cause, itself uncaused, con- 
 tains in it nothing contradictory ; for as Mr. Spencer 
 affirms, it is a necessity of thought ; whereas a succes- 
 sion of finite causes which never had a beginning, 
 each member of which was non-existent prior to its 
 being caused, involves a direct contradiction in terms. 
 
 I will now set this argument before the reader in a 
 less abstract form. Modern science has rendered an 
 eminent service to Theism by showing that the present 
 universe cannot have existed from eternity; and 
 although the time may be indefinitely remote, that it 
 will certainly come to an end. The nebular theory 
 which has found acceptance by an overwhelming 
 majority of scientists teaches us that the present 
 universe was once a fiery vapour cloud, which, under 
 the influence of forces inherent in it, has in the course 
 of ages gradually condensed into suns and planets, 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 57 
 
 one of which, our earth, has become a fit habitation 
 for living beings, while it is highly probable that this 
 is the case with others also. A time, therefore, once 
 was when this earth, and every form of vegetable and 
 animal life, existed not. No less certain is it that the 
 universe in its present form is gradually wearing out. 
 Suns, as sources of heat and motion, are parting with 
 their energies. The time, therefore, will come when 
 the earth will become too cold to be a fit habitation 
 for animal life. It will then become a desolation like 
 the moon. Owing tothe loss of energy, it, and every 
 one of the planetary bodies, will ultimately be ab- 
 sorbed into the sun, The sun, too, notwithstanding 
 the fresh supplies of heat which will be imparted to 
 it by these catastrophes will, in the lapse of ages, 
 get cooler and cooler, thus gradually losing its ener- 
 gies, until it is absorbed by some mightier body. 
 This body is ultimately destined to a similar fate, and 
 so the entire universe of suns and planets, until, all 
 its energies being equalized, it becomes a homo- 
 - geneous~mass, destitute of motion and of life, and 
 destined to be the region of everlasting silence, un- 
 less some mightier power, external to itself, exists, 
 which is capable of again imparting to it motion, 
 and thus of enabling it to enter on a fresh series of 
 evolutions. 3 : 
 
 The earliest state of things, therefore, to which 
 science professes to have penetrated is this fiery va- 
 pour-cloud, which according to anti-theistic theories 
 
58 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 must have contained within itself, either actively or 
 potentially, the germs and possibilities of all future 
 existence. But even this could not have been the 
 primeval state of things; one must have preceded it 
 and caused it, and so on for evermore, unless we 
 assume the existence of a Cause, itself uncaused, 
 which gave it being. The existence of such a power 
 is rendered certain by the consideration that, if this 
 fiery mist was the original state of things, or any- 
 thing composed of similar materials, it would in the 
 course of the eternal ages have completed all its 
 possible developments, and have passed into that 
 state .of homogeneity, silence, and desolation to 
 which, as this philosophy teaches, this present 
 universe is doomed ; and from which, having no 
 power of its own to rescue it, it must continue for 
 evermore, unless there be some power external to it, 
 to intervene, and impart to it fresh motion and life. 
 It follows, therefore, that such a power must exist, 
 because, during the ages of the past, successions of 
 such catastrophes must have occurred, bringing 
 about a state of things motionless and lifeless. From 
 one of these the existence of the present universe, 
 with all its energies and motions, proves that there 
 must have been a resurrection. Further: if this 
 hypothesis be correct, the existence and active energy 
 of such a power is the only thing which can rescue 
 the ages of the future after the energies of the 
 existing universe have passed into quiescence and 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 59 
 
 its materials into a state of motionless homogeneity 
 from everlasting silence and desolation. It follows, 
 therefore, that this universe, with all its numberless 
 adjustments, adaptations, and correlations, must have 
 owed its origin to a Cause, Itself Uncaused, adequate 
 to its production. That Cause is God. 
 
 The course of reasoning from the principle of 
 causation is so conclusive that we need not be sur- 
 prised that a determined attempt has been made to 
 invalidate it. It has been objected, that our knowledge 
 is confined exclusively to phenomena, and that we 
 neither know, nor can know, anything about causes, 
 Thus, it is alleged that what we call causes are no- 
 thing more than invariable sequences of phenomena, 
 and that all that we really know is that one event 
 or occurrence invariably precedes another, and that 
 the latter never occurs without being preceded by 
 the former. From this the inference which has been 
 drawn, that the one is caused or brought into existence 
 by the other, is a mere figment of our ignorance. 
 
 Perhaps the reader will be of opinion that the best 
 refutation of this objection is its simple statement, 
 for it is in flagrant contradiction to the whole 
 of our convictions as they are verified in practical 
 life. The objector himself habitually acts on the 
 assumption that the position in question is practically 
 false. To take an obvious example; if he is 
 suffering from some severe pain and sends for a 
 medical man to afford him relief, his object is to get 
 
60 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 him to remove not what he considers to be a mere 
 antecedent of the pain but its actual cause. Thus, 
 if he is suffering from toothache, he believes that a 
 decayed tooth by its action on the nerve is the cause, 
 and not the mere antecedent, of the pain and actually 
 produces it; and that its removal will afford him 
 relief. The tooth is extracted, and the relief follows. 
 Similarly, if a person carelessly throws a stone and 
 thereby inflicts an injury on another, no one in his 
 senses would consider the person who threw the 
 stone a mere antecedent, but the direct cause of the 
 injury, and would hold him responsible for it. To 
 speak of holding a mere antecedent or a necessary 
 condition responsible is to talk nonsense. ‘There is 
 nothing like bringing theories of this kind to the test 
 of facts. 
 
 But the assertion that we neither know, or can 
 know, anything about causes directly contradicts one 
 of the greatest of our certitudes. If our observations 
 are exclusively concentrated on things external to 
 ourselves, then it is correct enough to affirm that 
 all that we discern with our senses is a succession 
 of phenomena following one another in an invariable 
 order. But things external to ourselves are far from 
 constituting our only sources of knowledge. Besides 
 these there is the information furnished by our self- 
 consciousness. From its testimony we know, with 
 a certainty which nothing can exceed, that we our- 
 selves are causes and that we possess a power to 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 61 
 
 originate action ; that we are not mere forces acting 
 in conformity with an iron law of necessity, but 
 voluntary agents, having it in our power to act or to 
 forbear acting. Thus, when we turn the action of our 
 minds on ourselves, and observe the results which 
 follow from our mental activity, we feel, with the 
 fullest assurance of certainty, that we are capable of 
 acting on the external world; and that apart from man’s 
 resolve to act on it, and this resolve being carried 
 into effect, the course of things would be entirely 
 different from that which it actually is; and that the 
 centre of this power is our will. ‘The act of our wills 
 in exciting to action, whether it be on things internal 
 or external to ourselves, constitutes our primary idea 
 of force or efficient agency. The mode in which 
 this power is exerted is as follows. We first will or 
 form a resolution to do this or that. Our under- 
 standings then plan the means whereby this purpose 
 can be carried into execution. When this has been 
 determined on, the will, through the nervous system, 
 conveys its orders to the hands, the feet, or to some 
 other part of the body. These execute its injunctions ; 
 and various results, some of which are of the highest 
 importance, follow. Of all this we are as certain as 
 we are of our own existence. Thus, I am absolutely 
 certain that I am the cause of the written characters 
 now before me. How came they there? Once 
 there was nothing but a blank sheet of paper. Now 
 it is covered with written characters. Their existence 
 
62 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 is due to my resolve to write on a given subject. 
 Having thus resolved, I made what I have written the 
 subject of careful deliberation, and thereupon formed 
 the plan of the present work. Having done this, my 
 will—that is, I, myself—communicated its orders to 
 the fingers by means of the nervous system, and 
 thus set them in motion. These laid hold on the 
 pen, dipped it in ink, and the paper which was 
 previously a blank, became covered with characters. 
 Of all this and the various other processes connected 
 with the composition of this work, I am as certain as 
 I am of my own existence. In other words, I am 
 not the mere antecedent of the existence of the work, 
 but its cause. 
 
 The only thing, therefore, of which we have direct 
 and immediate knowledge as possessing causal or 
 efficient power is ourselves, the originating force 
 being what we designate ‘an act of volition.” 
 Hence we draw the inference, when we see similar 
 results produced by beings not ourselves, that they 
 must have originated inasimilar manner. But when 
 we speak of things which are necessary agents as 
 causes, we do so by analogy; they produce results 
 only, but are destitute of the power of originating 
 action. The only thing of which we have experience 
 as possessing this power is will. From this we 
 draw the inference that all force originates in will, 
 and is a manifestation of it. 
 
 But inasmuch as the conception of a rational 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 63 
 
 will involves that of a permanently existing con- 
 scious personality, which not only now exists, but 
 which has existed the same conscious personality, 
 say, during forty, fifty, or sixty years of the past; 
 a bold attempt has been made to invalidate the 
 argument from causation by affirming that we have 
 no knowledge that we are persons, in the sense 
 which we ordinarily attach to the word person. 
 The objection assumes, that what we mistake for 
 our personality is neither more nor less than 
 a succession of states of consciousness, which are 
 never for two moments together permanently the 
 same. I fully admit that if this strange position 
 could be proved to be true, it would invalidate 
 the argument from causation. But the paradox 
 involved in it is so absolute, and the contradiction 
 to universal experience so complete, that I may 
 safely leave it to be dealt with by the common 
 sense of my readers. Strange is it that those 
 who have propounded the theory in question did 
 not see that the idea of states of consciousness 
 involves a permanent something which perceives, 
 and a something which it perceives. The argument, 
 therefore, proves the very thing which it is intended 
 to disprove. I shall, therefore, only observe that the 
 consciousness which each of us possesses, that we 
 not only exist, but that we have existed the same 
 persons during considerable intervals of time, during 
 which every particle which has composed our bodies 
 
64 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 has changed several times over, makes short work 
 with philosophic, scientific, and popular material- 
 ism, and proves that there is something within us 
 which is capable of originating action, of which 
 the blind forces of Nature are incapable. The First 
 Cause of the Universe, therefore, must be possessed 
 of intelligent volition. 
 
 In conclusion, I will briefly set before the reader 
 some of the most important conclusions which follow 
 from the position laid down by Mr. H. Spencer, 
 that the phenomena of the universe are manifesta- 
 tions of its First Cause, the existence of which is a 
 necessity of thought. One of its phenomena is 
 intelligence : intelligence, therefore, must exist in its 
 First Cause. Another is the moral nature of man: 
 a God, therefore, must exist who is a moral being. 
 Another is free agency, rational will, personality, 
 and a power of self-determination—for all these exist 
 jin man—these, therefore, must be manifestations 
 of Him from whom man derives his being. Another 
 of its phenomena is that its irrational forces act in 
 conformity with invariable law, from which mode of 
 action its order springs: invariable law, therefore, 
 must be an expression of the Divine will, and the 
 love of order must exist in God. Similar illustra- 
 tions may be adduced to much greater length; but 
 these will be sufficient to illustrate the nature and 
 character of the argument from causation. 
 
CHAPTER, 
 
 THE VALIDITY OF THE PROOF WHICH THE <AD- 
 MEN Sa a DALPTATIONSA SAND © CORRELA: 
 ITONS MOI LHE UNIVERSE, “AFFORD. TO THE 
 EXISTENCE OF AN INTELLIGENT CREATOR. 
 
 alee evidence furnished by the order, adaptations, 
 
 and correlations of the universe has always 
 been considered to be one of the strongest reasons 
 for believing in the existence of a God. This being 
 so, anti-Theists at all times, but especially during 
 the present century, even while they admit their 
 existence in numbers passing human comprehension, 
 have strained their utmost efforts to prove that they 
 have originated in the interaction of a number of 
 unintelligent forces ; and, therefore, that they furnish 
 no proof of the existence of an intelligent Creator. 
 Such being the case, it will be necessary to prove 
 that this argument, which is commonly called “ the 
 argument from design,” is indubitably valid; and that 
 the reasonings which have been adduced, and the 
 theories which have been propounded in Opposition 
 to it, are destitute of any rational foundation. 
 
66 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Before entering on the argument itself, it will be 
 desirable that I should define the meaning which I 
 attach to the words “adaptation” and “ correlation,” 
 in this and in the following chapters. 
 
 By an adaptation | mean an instrumentality 
 composed of a number of parts acting in com- 
 bination, which is fitted to produce a certain result, 
 which actually produces that result, and which, if 
 one or more of the parts were either misplaced or ab- 
 sent, would produce no result at all, or one wholly 
 different. 
 
 I have used the word “adaptation ' 
 “design,” because it has been objected that the 
 
 ) 
 
 rather than 
 
 expression “the argument from design ” involves 
 a petitio principi. TVhis objection, however, cannot 
 be urged against the word ‘adaptation ;” because, 
 whatever diversity of view may be entertained re- 
 specting the origin of an adaptation, it cannot be 
 denied that it exists as a matter of fact. The only 
 question open for discussion is: Does the existence 
 of an instrumentality, consisting of a number of 
 parts fitted to produce a particular result, prove that 
 its originating cause must have been a being pos- 
 sessed of a power and intelligence adequate to 
 produce the adaptation; or is it conceivable that it 
 can have been produced by a number of forces des- 
 titute of intelligence and volition, meeting together 
 at the fitting time and place. Besides this, a further 
 and all-important question arises, which demands 
 
 ih be 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 67 
 
 solution, to which the anti-Theist is bound to 
 return an answer which will be satisfactory to our 
 reason: What do those adaptations, which he 
 himself admits to exist in the universe in numbers 
 past human comprehension, prove when contem- 
 plated in their totality? Is it believable that they 
 have resulted from the interaction of a number of 
 blind forces destitute of intelligence and volition ? 
 
 By a “correlation” I mean a number of mutually 
 related adaptations, so adjusted to one another as 
 to form a complicated whole, which act in mutual 
 harmony, and which, apart from this harmonious 
 action, would either damage or render nugatory the 
 action of the whole. Of this correlation of parts and 
 functions to one another, the bodies of animals may 
 be referred to as a striking illustration. We our- 
 selves are only too sensible of the results which 
 follow from the derangement of one or more of these 
 adaptations, for when one member suffers, the result 
 is that the whole body suffers with it. The question, 
 therefore, for our consideration is:—What do these 
 adaptations, thus adjusted to one another so as to 
 form a complicated whole, prove? Is it conceiv- 
 able that they can have been the result of the inter- 
 action of a number of forces destitute of volition 
 and intelligence. 
 
 Before proceeding further, I must ask the reader’s 
 attention to the actual position of the argument. It 
 cannot be denied that the action of an intelligent 
 
68 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Creator gives an adequate and rational account of the 
 origin of the order, the adaptations, and the corre- 
 lations with which the universe abounds. How, then, 
 stands the case between the Theist and the anti- 
 Theist ? If, for the sake of argument, we assume 
 that the theory which is propounded by the latter, 
 affords an adequate and a rational account of their 
 origin, it by no means disproves the existence of an 
 intelligent Creator. All that it does is to leave us 
 in the presence of an alternative. The question then 
 arises: Which is the more probable; that the order, 
 adaptations, and correlations of the universe have 
 owed their origin to a being possessed of a power 
 and intelligence adequate to produce them ; or that 
 they have originated in an eternal struggle between a 
 multitude of unintelligent forces, acting under an 
 iron law of necessary agency, from which it was 
 impossible that they could deviate? When the 
 position of the controversy is stated thus, there can 
 be no doubt which alternative will command the 
 assent of an overwhelming majority of those who 
 are endowed with ordinary intelligence. 
 
 It is important that the reader’s attention should 
 be drawn to this, because it is far too generally 
 imagined that the anti-theistic theory of the origin 
 of the universe, disproves the existence of an in- 
 telligent Creator, whereas all it does is to propound 
 an alternative theory which is beset with difficulties 
 in every direction, leaving the question open which 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 69 
 
 is most rational to believe, that the order, the 
 adaptations, and correlations with which the uni- 
 verse abounds, have owed their origin to the inter- 
 action of a number of blind forces during the 
 eternity of the past, or to the energy of a being 
 possessed of a power and intelligence adequate to 
 produce them. But it is not my intention to let 
 the argument for the being of a Gcd rest on a choice 
 between these alternatives, however much the evi- 
 dence in favour of the one may outweigh that in 
 favour of the other; but it will be my duty to show 
 that the anti-theistic position is utterly untenable, 
 and that the theistic one alone rests on a rational 
 foundation. 
 
 First, then, let us inquire with respect to orderly 
 arrangements, What do they prove? I answer, this 
 is what universal experience affirms. We have 
 hever seen a complicated orderly arrangement pro- 
 duced by the action of a number of blind forces. I 
 use the word “complicated” because it is possible 
 that an orderly arrangement on a small scale may 
 be the result of that which we designate “chance.” 
 Thus, as I have observed above, it is within the 
 limits of possibility that twelve dice thrown into the 
 air hap-hazard may fall with their aces upwards ; 
 but although such an occurrence is abstractedly 
 possible, it is very doubtful whether it has happened 
 once in ten million times. But if this operation were 
 repeated a hundred times, and each time the dice fell 
 
70 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 with their aces upwards, no rational man, no, not 
 even the greatest sceptic, would entertain a doubt that 
 ‘they were loaded. But these hundred repetitions 
 of the fall of the dice with their aces upwards is but 
 a faint representation of the force of this argument 
 when applied to the structure of the universe, where 
 orderly arrangements, and these very complicated 
 ones, abound in numbers past human comprehen- 
 sion. From this the inference is irresistible to all, 
 except a few speculators who are committed to the 
 maintenance of a particular theory, that the universe 
 must have owed its origin to the action of an 
 intelligent being, who must have directed the forces 
 of the universe so as to have enabled them to pro- 
 duce its innumerable adjustments, adaptations, and 
 correlations. 
 
 Persons of ordinary intelligence will think this 
 view of the case conclusive, but as the principle on 
 which it rests is of the greatest importance in its 
 bearing on the theistic argument, it will be desirable 
 to exhibit its force by a few illustrations. 
 
 Let us suppose that we enter a large library, in 
 which the books are arranged on shelves. On one 
 set of shelves are the theological works, on another 
 the historical, on another the philosophical, on 
 another the scientific, on another the poetical, and 
 on another the novels and works of fiction. On 
 further observation we find that each of these classes 
 of writings is arranged under a number of distinct 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. va 
 
 heads ; and that the different books are placed in 
 order according to the dates of their publication. 
 What, I ask, is the inference which common sense 
 cannot help drawing from the phenomena in ques- 
 tion? I answer that such arrangements afford 
 incontestable proof of the presence of intelligence. 
 If it were suggested, that the books had been thrown 
 together at hap-hazard, and that some one had 
 picked them up just as he found them, and placed 
 them on the shelves in the order in question, the 
 person who made the suggestion would be consi- 
 dered to be attempting to impose on our credulity. 
 One more illustration will suffice. Let us sup- 
 pose that a manuscript of eight hundred pages is 
 lying on a table immediately before a window, that 
 the wind is blowing a gale against it, that the 
 window is inadvertently opened; and that the wind 
 scatters the manuscript in every direction. Let us 
 further assume that after this disaster we leave 
 the room, and that after a considerable interval 
 we enter it again. To our surprise we find every 
 page in its proper place, page I being at the 
 top, and page 800 at the bottom, of the pile of 
 papers. On inquiring who has been meddling with 
 the MS. during our absence, we are informed by 
 a servant that no human being except herself has 
 entered the room; that she has not touched the 
 papers, but that the wind after scattering the pages 
 in every direction finally deposited them in the 
 
42 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 order in which we find them. What, I ask, is the 
 opinion which every sane man would form respecting 
 
 this story ? Doubtless that the servant who gave 
 this account of the matter made an affirmation 
 which she knew to be untrue. 
 
 What, then, is the conclusion which we instinc- 
 tively arrive at? That all complicated orderly 
 arrangements and adjustments must have been 
 the result of the action of an intelligent agent, 
 although we have not seen him at work in their 
 production. Although the grounds on which our 
 conviction is formed are different, we are no less 
 firmly convinced of its truth, than we are that 
 two and two make four and cannot make five. 
 No sceptic doubts the validity of this argument in 
 the affairs of common life. Objection is only made 
 to its adequacy when it is adduced as affording 
 unquestionable evidence that the universe is the 
 work of an intelligent Creator. 
 
 Let us now consider the argument from the 
 innumerable adaptations with which the universe 
 abounds. What do they prove? I answer, that 
 the common sense of mankind, with the exception 
 of a small number of philosophers and _ scientists, 
 and it may be also of those savage races who 
 are in the lowest state of mental degradation, 
 affirms that intelligence must have presided over 
 their production; and that the more complicated 
 is the adaptation the stronger is this conviction. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 73 
 
 The chances against a combination of materials 
 at hap-hazard, such as is necessary to form a 
 very simple adaptation, are very numerous; but 
 when adaptations are complicated, the conviction 
 which they produce that they cannot have origi- 
 nated in the casual meeting of a number of forces 
 destitute of intelligence and volition, is equal in 
 force to that produced by a mathematical demon- 
 stration. But the adaptations with which the 
 universe abounds are not only extremely numerous 
 —so numerous that they meet us at every point, 
 turn where we will—but highly complicated. No 
 array of millions of millions is capable of presenting 
 to our minds even a faint idea of their number. The 
 chances, therefore, against the concurrence of the 
 materials and the forces necessary to form these 
 combinations are practically infinite. We are, there- 
 fore, incapable of believing that they can have 
 originated in the chance meeting together of a 
 number of molecules and forces destitute of purpose, 
 volition, and intelligence, or in any combination of 
 them. 
 
 The importance of this argument as affording 
 proof of the existence of an intelligent Creator, 
 arises from the fact that it not only commends itself 
 in the strongest manner to our reason, but also from 
 its being level to men of ordinary understanding. 
 It requires no exercise of abstract thought for its 
 appreciation, and the evidences on which it rests 
 
"4 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 are all close at hand; and there is no occasion to 
 enter on a minute research to find instances of 
 these adaptations, for they meet us at every turn. 
 Wherever we cast our eyes, whether to the heavens 
 above, or to the earth beneath, or when we direct 
 our attention to the structure of the vegetable and 
 animal kingdoms, we observe they are full of in- 
 numerable instances of them. Nay, we may find 
 them nearer home in the structure of our own 
 bodies, where they exist in numbers numberless, 
 It is true that while we are in health, and the 
 parts of which our bodies are composed act har- 
 moniously, we are too apt to forget how fearfully 
 and wonderfully we are made; but let only some 
 minute portion of their organism get deranged, and 
 we are painfully reminded of the necessity that 
 these wondrous adaptations of part to part should 
 work together in harmonious combination. ‘Their 
 doing so means health; their failure to do so, 
 disease and death. 
 
 A few more very simple illustrations will do 
 more to impress the reader with a sense of the 
 importance of this argument, as affording proof of 
 the existence of an intelligent Creator, than any 
 mere general description of it. Anti-Theists them- 
 selves, when it suits their convenience to do so, 
 readily avail themselves of it. We have all heard 
 of what is called the ‘Stone Age.” Men of 
 science, whether they believe or disbelieve in the 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 75 
 
 existence of a God, are all but unanimously of 
 opinion that its remains prove that man has existed 
 on the globe at a period indefinitely more remote 
 than the 4,004 years which has been placed in the 
 margin of our Bibles as the time of his first 
 creation. What, then, are the media of proof? 
 
 The answer is, a number of flints which have 
 been found in a great variety of places at different 
 depths, and in company with various remains, which 
 prove the high antiquity of the period when they 
 were deposited in the localities where they have 
 been discovered. These flints are alleged, and 
 alleged truly, to bear unmistakable marks of 
 adaptation, so as to have fitted them for certain 
 purposes of savage life. From these facts the 
 inference has been drawn that they were fashioned 
 at a period long prior—it is impossible to say how 
 long—-to the commonly accepted date of the creation 
 of man. 
 
 On the other hand, it has been urged by those 
 who have endeavoured to maintain the commonly 
 accepted system of chronology, that these flints owe 
 their peculiar shape to the action of natural causes ; 
 and, therefore, form no proof of the existence 
 of man in a state of savagery. To this it has 
 been replied, that although it is within the limits 
 of possibility that one or even a few flints may 
 have acquired their peculiar shape from the ac- 
 tion of such causes, yet their numbers render it 
 
76 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 impossible that this can be a true account of their 
 origin. In a word, they are alleged to bear unmis- 
 takable marks of having been manufactured articles, 
 and of having been adapted to certain purposes 
 of savage life; and, further, although the shape 
 of one or even a few may have been given to 
 them by some accident, that there is no known 
 natural force which is capable of imparting to 
 flints in large numbers these peculiar forms. 
 What, then, is the inference which has been 
 deduced from these facts? That they are not 
 natural productions, but that intelligence of some 
 kind must have presided over their manufacture ; 
 and consequently that intelligent beings of a low 
 order must have existed on this globe at a period 
 indefinitely remote. These beings, although they 
 have left behind them no other record of their 
 existence, are assumed to have been men; and 
 because these implements are extremely rude, men 
 in a very low state of intellectual development. 
 The bearing of this course of reasoning, the 
 validity of which is fully admitted by anti-Theists, 
 and which has been urged again and again as 
 invalidating the Biblical account of the origin of 
 nan, on our present argument is obvious. If the 
 existence of these rude flint instruments proves 
 that an intelligence of some kind presided over 
 their formation at a period indefinitely remote, how 
 is it possible to affirm that the same line of reasoning 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 7 
 
 is not equally valid to prove that an intelligence 
 adequate to their production must have presided 
 over the formation of these innumerable adaptations 
 —adaptations not rude like these flint implements, 
 but highly complicated, and exquisitely finished— 
 which meet us at every turn, and with which the 
 universe everywhere abounds? Surely, if rude 
 implements prove that intellect, though in a low 
 stage of development, must have existed at a period 
 long prior to the birth of history, the innumerable 
 adaptations of the universe must prove that a being 
 possessed of power and intelligence adequate to 
 their production must have presided over their 
 formation, and existed prior to it. To affirm that 
 unintelligent forces could not have shaped the 
 flints, but that they have shaped the adaptations, 
 contradicts every principle of sound reasoning. 
 Let us now pursue this course of reasoning as 
 it has been applied to a later period. After an 
 interval of indefinite duration—it is impossible to 
 say how long—comes what is called the Neolithic, 
 or more recent, stone age. Here, again, we have 
 no direct evidence of the existence of man; that 
 he did exist is an inference from its remains. 
 The implements of this age exhibit more perfect 
 adaptations, a higher finish, and a more artistic 
 skill, than those of the previous one. Hence the 
 inference has been drawn—and justly drawn—that 
 it is impossible that they have owed their shape to 
 
78 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 the action of a number of blind forces, but that they 
 must have been the work of a higher order of 
 intelligence than that possessed by the men of the 
 first stone age; and that during the interval between 
 these two ages, mankind had made a considerable 
 advance in civilization. The same inference follows 
 from the inspection of the remains of the lake dwell- 
 ings which exist in different parts of Europe, and so 
 on as we ascend higher and higher, until we arrive 
 at our present advanced state of civilization. Surely 
 if arguments such as these are valid to prove the 
 existence of men possessed of different degrees of 
 intelligence at these early periods, though they have 
 left no other memorials of their existence, the adapt- 
 ations and correlations with which the universe 
 abounds, afford a proof of the existence of an 
 intelligent Creator which is indefinitely stronger. 
 Let us now assume for the purpose of furthel 
 illustrating the strength of this argument, that all 
 historical evidence of the existence of man during 
 the ages of the past has perished at some distant 
 period of the future, while not a few of his works 
 are preserved. These would afford marks of very 
 complicated adaptations, from which the men then 
 existing would justly infer that mankind had existed 
 throughout these earlier periods, and that they had 
 passed through a succession of developments, gradu- 
 ally advancing from lower to higher degrees of 
 civilization. How, I ask, is it possible that the 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 79 
 
 above arguments can be valid to prove the exist- 
 ence of man in a very low stage of intellectual 
 development, but gradually higher and higher at 
 periods indefinitely remote; yet that the innumer- 
 able, complicated, and perfect adjustments of the 
 universe should not be valid to prove the existence 
 of a being possessed of a power and intelligence 
 adequate to their production? If unintelligent forces 
 cannot have produced the one, surely it is incredible 
 that they have produced the other. 
 
 Once more: let us assume that a traveller pene- 
 trates into some uninhabited region of the globe, 
 and there finds in a building a piece of machinery 
 equally complicated as those which exist in our 
 great manufactories. The question will at once 
 present itself to him, How got it there? Let us also 
 suppose that some one suggested to him that its 
 existence had resulted from the action and inter- 
 action of the blind forces of Nature during the ages 
 of the past; and that the idea that a high form of 
 intelligence must have presided over its formation 
 is a delusion. Surely the most determined sceptic 
 would reject such a suggestion wirh scorn. This 
 assumption is not wholly an imaginary one. Certain 
 monuments exist in America, which are known not 
 to have been the work of the races existing there at 
 the time of its discovery by Europeans. ‘These are 
 inferred, and inferred justly, to have been the work 
 of some prior race of men in a certain stage of 
 
80 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 civilization. Yet the only evidence of their existence 
 is the monuments in question, the race itself having 
 utterly perished, without leaving any other trace 
 of its existence behind. Why, then, is the argument 
 from adaptation only invalid, when it is urged by 
 Theists as affording proof of the existence of a 
 God ? 
 
 On the nature of the evidence afforded by the 
 correlations with which the universe abounds, only 
 a few brief remarks will be necessary, for what has 
 been said above respecting the inference which the 
 contemplation of a number of adaptations suggests 
 to people of ordinary intelligence, applies with an 
 intensified force to a number of correlations. The 
 correlations with which the universe abounds consist 
 of two kinds. 
 
 First: Those which arise from the meeting together, 
 at the right time and place, of a number of forces 
 wholly independent of one another, by the concur- 
 rence of which a particular result is produced ; and 
 apart from which concurrence this result would 
 never have come into existence. 
 
 Second: When a number of adaptations are so 
 mutually related to one another, that they form a 
 complicated whole; and, by their combined action, 
 produce a result which could only be effected by 
 their combined acton in harmonious unison each 
 with the other and with the whole. 
 
 Respecting the nature and the force of the proof 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. SI 
 
 which is furnished by these correlations to the 
 existence of an intelligent Creator, I shall have 
 more to say in a subsequent chapter. 
 
 When we consider the importance of this line 
 of reasoning in its bearing on the Theistic con- 
 troversy, especially on that very numerous class 
 who have neither time nor opportunity to devote 
 themselves to special studies, we need not wonder 
 that anti-Theists have done their utmost to prove 
 that it is destitute of validity. I must, therefore, 
 offer a few brief observations on the alternative 
 theories which have been propounded by them- 
 Before doing so, however, let me ask the reader 
 carefully to bear in mind, that one point is incon- 
 testable, namely, either that the order, adapta- 
 tions, and correlations of the universe must have 
 owed their origin to a being possessed of a power 
 and intelligence adequate to have produced them ; 
 or else to a number of forces destitute of volition 
 and intelligence. Other alternative there is none. 
 
 I am aware that for the purpose of avoiding the 
 difficulty of building the universe by forces of this 
 description, it has been suggested that the ultimate 
 particles of matter may possess in themselves some 
 principle of intelligence, say, one side intelligent, and 
 the other not.* But of this there is not only not one 
 atom of proof, but it involves those who propound 
 
 * This theory has been actually propounded. 
 
 6 
 
$2 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 it in a number of hopeless contradictions. It will, 
 therefore, be unnecessary to discuss it. Who, I ask, 
 will believe, that an intelligence is latent in the 
 particles of matter which compose the table on 
 which I am writing, or that intelligence could be pro- 
 duced out of it, by a different arrangement of its 
 particles ? 
 
 An objection has been urged against the validity 
 of the argument from adaptation on the ground 
 that it is founded on a mere analogy derived from 
 the action of human intelligence ; and that however 
 just the reasoning may be when applied to the latter, 
 it is totally inapplicable when applied to a being of 
 infinite power and wisdom, who not only fashions 
 the materials with which he acts, but also creates 
 them. This means that he might have so created 
 them, as to have avoided the necessity of employing 
 adjustments, adaptations, and correlations to effect 
 his purposes ; or in other words that he has created 
 difficulties for the purpose of overcoming them. 
 Into the discussion of subtleties of this kind I shall 
 not enter, but I shall content myself with observing 
 that even if the objection were never so true it by no 
 means disposes of the fact, that these adjustments, 
 adaptations, and correlations actually exist, and that 
 their existence is a proof that a being must have 
 existed who possessed a power and _ intelligence 
 adequate to their formation. 
 
 Another objection is, that the argument from 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 83 
 
 adaptation represents God as acting from without, 
 fashioning a set of materials after the manner of a 
 human artificer. Those who have urged this objec- 
 tion have not scrupled to apply to this argument 
 the coarse term of “The Carpenter Theory of the 
 Universe.” 
 
 To this objection, I reply, that as far as an 
 adaptation is concerned, it is a matter of indif- 
 ference in what manner the Creator has acted in its 
 production. It is no business of the Theist to 
 define the mode of His activity. In fashioning the 
 universe, for anything we know to the contrary, He 
 may have acted as a force imminent in it, directing 
 all its movements from within, or external to it, or 
 both; whichever of these alternatives we adopt—let 
 it never be forgotten that we are totally ignorant of 
 the mode of the Divine activity in creation—the 
 adaptations of the universe in their countless numbers 
 remain as facts, the existence of which is beyond the 
 power of dispute ; and it is upon them as facts, and 
 not on the manner in which they have been produced, 
 that the argument is founded ; and from them, despite 
 of this objection, those who are not bound by the 
 exigences of a particular theory, will continue to 
 infer that they afford unquestionable evidence of the 
 existence of an intelligent Creator; and that the 
 theory which affirms that they have resulted from 
 the interaction of a number of blind forces during 
 the ages of the past is simply incredible. Another 
 
34 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 objection which has been urged, that the employment 
 of adjustments and adaptations to effectuate particular 
 results, instead of bringing them into existence by 
 the energy of His will, implies a limitation of the 
 Creator’s power, may safely be left to the judgment 
 of the reader. 
 
 As I have said above, the only alternative to the 
 theistic argument that these adaptations and correla- 
 tions afford unquestionable proof of the existence of 
 an intelligent Creator, is the theory which affirms 
 that they have resulted from the interaction during 
 the ages of the past of a multitude of forces desti- 
 tute of intelligence and voluntary agency. This 
 theory assumes the eternal existence of particles of 
 matter, which have inherent in them certain poten- 
 tialities, infinite in number, indefinitely minute, self- 
 existent, and which have been in a state of perpetual 
 motion, in obedience to certain necessary forces, 
 during the eternity of the past. It is further assumed 
 that these atoms during this past eternity must have 
 passed through every possible form of combination, 
 the last of which has produced this universe with all 
 its innumerable adaptations and correlations ; or in 
 other words, that it has been built up by the com- 
 bined action of matter, force, and motion, ali alike 
 destitute of intelligence. This is the anti-theistic 
 theory of its origin stated in all its nakedness, for 
 into it every theory, except that which traces its origin 
 to the power and wisdom of an intelligent Creator 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 85 
 must ultimately resolve itself. The simple statement 
 of such a theory is perhaps its best refutation. 
 
 A few questions, however, may be put with 
 advantage to those who think this account of the 
 origin of the universe a possible one. Is the eternal 
 existence of an infinite number of atoms indefinitely 
 minute one whit more conceivable than that of the 
 eternal existence of an intelligent Creator ? Whence 
 came their inherent potentialities ? Whence their 
 motion ? Why were they not always at a standstill ? 
 How do we know that during the past eternity they 
 must have passed through every possible form of 
 combination? May they not have repeated the same 
 combinations over again times without number ? 
 These and a number of similar questions may be 
 asked, to which the anti-Theist can make no rational 
 reply. Whatever difficulties he may consider to 
 exist in the conception of a self-existent Creator, he 
 will find that those which are inherent in his own 
 system are out of all proportion greater. 
 
 In concluding this portion of my subject, I must 
 ask the reader to refer to, and carefully to ponder 
 over, the observations made in a previous chapter 
 respecting what science tells us is the ultimate destiny 
 of the present universe ; and which must have been 
 the destiny during the ages of the past of any 
 previously existing one, unless a being had existed 
 external to the motionless mass of matter into which 
 they had become resolved, who was capable of 
 
86 CHRISTIAN .THEISM. 
 
 imparting to it fresh energy and life ; for unless such 
 a being had existed, instead of our present universe, 
 full of its varied activities, unbroken silence and 
 lifelessness must have been the result for evermore. 
 
 The favourite theory behind which anti-Theism 
 entrenches itself is the theory of evolution. This 
 theory has obtained during recent years an acceptance 
 among no small number of scientists of great repu- 
 tation as affording a rational account of the origin 
 of the universe with all its innumerable adjustments 
 without the intervention of an intelligent Creator. 
 Many of these have loudly proclaimed their belief — 
 that the investigations of modern science have sapped 
 the foundation of what has long been regarded as 
 the stronghold of the belief in Christian Theism ; 
 and no small number of others, who have never 
 troubled themselves to test the validity of the 
 reasonings on which this theory is based, have 
 been induced to accept it by the sheer weight of 
 authority. This being so, its importance renders it 
 necessary that I should consider its claims to our 
 
 acceptance in a separate chapter. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ite aNd Liei STI CeerheOnY Oh EVOLUTION 
 CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 
 
 T is not every theory of evolution which is anti- 
 theistic. Theories of evolution assume three 
 forms— 
 
 1. One which is consistent with a belief in Chris- 
 tian Theism. 
 
 2. One which is consistent with a belief in a 
 philosophic Theism ; but which affords little satisfac- 
 tion to the requirements of our spiritual and moral 
 nature. 
 
 3. One which is incompatible with the belief in the 
 existence of an intelligent Creator; which affirms 
 that the universe with all its innumerable adjustments, 
 adaptations, and correlations has been produced by 
 the action of blind forces, without the intervention 
 of any being who has an existence independent of it: 
 It is the last of these theories to which I wish to 
 direct the reader’s special attention in this chapter. 
 
 The popularly accepted theistic theory of the past 
 laid down that each separate species of vegetables 
 
88 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 and animals was brought into existence by a special 
 and separate act of creative power. The discoveries 
 of modern science have shown that the number of 
 existing species is so inconceivably vast as to render 
 itimprobable that this can have been the mode in 
 which the Creator has acted in His creative work. 
 That it involves a difficulty is certain, which is 
 obviated by the Christian theory of evolution. This 
 theory is fully consistent with the discoveries of 
 modern science; and lays down that the Creator, 
 by His unceasing energy In a manner unknown 
 to us, has evolved all existing species out of pre- 
 viously existing ones in a gradually ascending scale, 
 beginning from lower to higher forms of being. 
 Both theories alike ascribe the creation and the 
 upholding of all things to His energetic working 
 and the operation of His will. They differ from 
 one another as to the mode in which the Creator has 
 acted in His creative work. The one assumes that 
 His energy has been exerted from without and the 
 other from within matter and its forces, guiding 
 and directing them; and at times introducing into 
 the universe some new element of life. 
 
 It is to be regretted that a few eager controver- 
 sialists have denounced the belief in the principle of 
 evolution, in every one of its forms, as inconsistent 
 with a belief in Christian Theism, because, in their 
 opinion, it is inconsistent with certain statements of 
 the Old Testament. In doing so, they have adopted 
 
Poe tN eS ice ToLOn ew Ol EV OLULION, .89 
 
 a course which is pre-eminently unwise, because it is 
 obvious, that it is not the object of the Bible to teach 
 the modus operandi of the Creator; and it is certain 
 that the mode in which men are brought into exist- 
 ence is not by the direct creation of each individual, 
 but by a process of evolution. It is also beyond 
 dispute that science has proved that the order in 
 which things have come into existence has been a 
 gradual advancement from lower to higher forms of 
 being. As it is foreign to the purpose of the present 
 work to enter on this controversy, I shall only observe 
 that one thing is certain: that we have no means 
 of knowing on a priori grounds, what is the mode in 
 which the Creator has acted in His creative work, 
 and in His present action in providence. These are 
 secrets into which it transcends the powers of our 
 finite intellects to penetrate. It is, therefore, quite as 
 probable that He has produced one species out of a pre- 
 existing one, and so on in an ever ascending series, 
 by a constant and gradual exertion of His power 
 acting from within, as by a number of what are called 
 special and separate acts of creation. This being so, 
 and our ignorance of how creation has been effected 
 being profound, it is absurd to dogmatize on the mode 
 in which the Creator must have acted. All that 
 Christian Theism requires us to believe is, that the 
 universe is the work of a Being who is all-powerful, 
 all-wise, holy, just, merciful, and good ; and that He is 
 ever present in His creative work, upholding it in 
 
go CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 existence by His ceaseless energy, and guiding it by 
 His Providence. But the mode in which He energizes 
 can be known only to Himself ; yet our ignorance of 
 it is no disproof of the reality of the fact. 
 
 The second form of this theory assumes the exist- 
 ence of an intelligent Creator, who, at some period of 
 the past, brought into existence one or more cells 
 possessed of life, endowed them with the power of in- 
 corporating various substances into themselves, and 
 then of evolving out of themselves all the varieties 
 of animal life which have existed in the past or 
 which exist in the present, without any further 
 intervention onhis part. ‘This theory, be it observed, 
 makes no attempt to account for the origin of things, 
 or how the world was brought into existence amply 
 provided with everything needful for the support of 
 the innumerable orders of beings which were destined 
 to inhabit it. All these things it is content to leave 
 unsolved. As I have said, it takes up the work of 
 evolution with the first introduction of life, and 
 having provided itself with one or more living cells, 
 endowed with certain properties, the formation of 
 which it ascribes to an all-powerful and all-wise 
 Creator, it proceeds to evolve all the living beings 
 which have existed in the past, or which exist 
 in the present, by a kind of self-acting machinery, 
 which goes on working out his purposes without 
 any further intervention on his part. To effect 
 this marvellous result, it is alleged that he endowed 
 
THE ern felis tiG) LEORY (OF EVOLUTION, oI 
 
 these cells with a power of producing beings simi- 
 lar to themselves; but inasmuch as, if this had been 
 their only power, universal sameness must have 
 been the result, he bestowed on them the additional 
 power of imparting to their progeny a number 
 of variations from their parental form, indefinitely 
 small, and so on in perpetual succession. Having 
 effected thus much he retired from his creative work, 
 and left it to the blind forces of the universe to grind 
 out his ultimate purposes without any further in- 
 tervention or providential guidance. In this way, 
 according to this theory, through the instrumentality 
 of innumerable variations, struggles for existence, 
 survivals of the fittest (that is, the strongest), the 
 power of transmitting improvements to successive 
 generations, etc., have emerged the present vegetable 
 and animal kingdoms, with all their innumerable 
 adjustments, adaptations, and correlations. 
 
 Let it be observed that throughout all these latter 
 stages this theory of evolution adopts the same 
 machinery as the anti-theistic one. I shall, therefore, 
 discuss the difficulties which are involved in it when 
 Weconeider gtuewlatter, sl teiseriohtwnowever, -thatel 
 should observe, that not a few of those who hold this 
 theory in its main outlines, admit that there are 
 certain gaps in this long succession which it is 
 impossible to bridge over; and which involve the 
 necessity of special interventions of the Creator at 
 certain stages of the evolution process. Of these the 
 
92 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 principal are: the introduction of intelligence, free 
 agency, a moral nature, and those various powers 
 which distinguish man from the animal races; and 
 lastly, on the part of those who believe in Christianity 
 as a Divine revelation, that special interposition of 
 God, which introduced it into the world. 
 
 I by no means wish to deny that this theory is 
 consistent with a belief in Theism, and that it satisfies 
 
 demand of our intellects which anti-Theism does 
 not. Thus, it starts with the assumption that the 
 introduction of the original germs of life into a 
 universe previously destitute of life, must have been 
 the work of an all-powerful and intelligent Creator. 
 It affirms, and affirms truly, that the creation of the 
 original cells, endowed with the potency of evolving 
 out of themselves every form of living being which 
 has existed in the past, and which exists in the 
 present, with all their innumerable adjustments, 
 adaptations, and correlations, is a proof that the 
 being who could effect this must have been possessed 
 of inconceivable power and intelligence. This is 
 indubitable ; but, however much a theory of this kind 
 may satisfy some of the requirements of philosophic 
 thought, a God who, after creating these cells and 
 endowing them with their various properties, has 
 retired from all interference with them except on a 
 few special occasions ; and has left them by the aid 
 of the unintelligent forces of the universe to grind 
 out a number of foreseen results, just as a machine 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 9 
 
 when once set in motion, grinds out the results for 
 the production of which it was constructed, and then 
 stands by calmly contemplating its action, unmoved 
 by any consequences with which it may be attended, 
 can satisfy neither the spiritual nor the moral 
 requirements of man. The intellect may be satis- 
 fied with a. God who is very far off; but man’s 
 spiritual and moral nature sighs after one who is 
 also very near at hand, for one with whom he can 
 hold communion, who reveals Himself, and who can 
 hear and answer prayer. It is difficult to com- 
 prehend how the God of this system of philosophy 
 can become the subject of either love, trust, or hope. 
 Epicurus, himself, did not deny the existence of gods ; 
 but he took care to relegate them to a region of 
 peaceful enjoyment, undisturbed by the cares and 
 troubles of the providential government of the world. 
 The god of this system of philosophy bears a far 
 closer resemblance to one of the gods of Epicurus 
 than to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the 
 Father of mercies and the God of all consolation. 
 Its God may satisfy an intellectual need, which anti- 
 Theism cannot, but he is too remote to satisfy the 
 aspirations of the heart. 
 
 Let us now consider that form of the theory of 
 evolution which is inconsistent with a belief in the 
 existence of an intelligent Creator. Although it has 
 been propounded by several men of eminence, with a 
 
 considerable variety in its details, yet inasmuch as 
 
94 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 these details are based on principles which are 
 substantially the same, it will be unnecessary to 
 discuss them separately. I shall, therefore, simply 
 address myself to the consideration of the principles 
 themselves. : 
 
 All anti-theistic theories are obliged to assume an 
 existence of some kind.as a foundation on which it is 
 possible to commence the operation of world-build- 
 ing, because there is one certitude which is accepted 
 alike by Theists and anti-Theists, namely, that 
 out of nothing nothing can originate. From this it 
 follows that if something now exists, something 
 must have existed always; otherwise nothingness 
 must have produced existence—which is absurd. 
 The propounders of these theories are, therefore, 
 compelled to assume the existence of space; of 
 an innumerable multitude of atoms inconceivably 
 minute, possessed of an inherent power of motion, 
 and an existence designated force,* which enabled 
 these atoms to congregate into masses, and gave rise 
 to the principle of gravitation. These assumptions 
 are rendered necessary, because, without atoms it 
 would be impossible to build a universe; without 
 space motion would be inconceivable; without 
 motion the atoms would have been eternally 
 
 * The opinion which is now widely accepted respecting force 
 is that it is unalterable in amount, neither increasing nor diminish- 
 ing; and that the only change which it undergoes is the trans- 
 formation of one kind of force into another, its equivalent in 
 amount, 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 95 
 
 quiescent ; and without some kind of force operat- 
 ing either upon them or within them, they would 
 have been incapable of congregating in masses, and 
 thereby of forming worlds. It is also necessary to 
 assume that these things were self-existent, ze. that 
 they existed without a beginning during the eternity 
 of the past; for otherwise they must have been 
 brought into existence by a self-existent Creator 
 whose existence it is the object of this theory to 
 disprove. All these are very convenient assumptions, 
 for without them the anti-theistic theory could not 
 advance a step; but to attribute to a succession of 
 atoms, to motion, and to force an existence which 
 never had a beginning involves difficulties out of all 
 proportion greater than the assumption of the 
 existence of a self-existing being, who possessed a 
 power and intelligence adequate to create this 
 universe with all its innumerable adjustments, 
 adaptations, and correlations. The assumption that 
 these atoms must have passed through every possi- 
 ble form of combination during the eternity of the 
 past, of which the hap-hazard production of this 
 ordered universe is the last, may be safely left to 
 the judgment of the reader. 
 
 The anti-theistic theory having thus provided 
 itself with the materials necessary for commencing 
 operations, let us now consider the mode in which, 
 according to it, the present universe has been built 
 up out of these atoms without the intervention 
 
96 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 of intelligence. The process briefly stated is as 
 follows— 
 
 After various interactions of matter, force, and 
 motion during ages of indeterminate duration, these 
 atoms got resolved into a fiery vapour-cloud, in- 
 tensely hot, filling the space now occupied by the 
 solar system. I say ‘the solar system” because, 
 with a view to our present argument, it is unneces- 
 sary to go beyond it and inquire how the millions 
 of suns, which astronomers tell us are scattered 
 throughout space, came into existence. It will be 
 sufficient to inquire how this theory gives a rational 
 account of the origin of the world in which we live, 
 and of all which it contains. 
 
 If it be asked : ‘‘ Whence came the heat of this fiery 
 vapour-cloud?” the anti-Theist will reply, ‘‘ Heat and 
 motion are only two forms of the same force; and 
 when motion is arrested heat is generated.” It is 
 only necessary, therefore, to assume that the motion 
 of these atoms should get diminished (how, we are not 
 told), and heat will be generated in sufficient quantities, 
 What, then, is the next step? <A cooling process in 
 course of time is assumed to have set in, and the 
 heat of the vapour-cloud to have been gradually dissi- 
 pated into space. Hereupon it contracted, and when 
 it had sufficiently cooled, a portion of the atoms met 
 together in masses, forming a nucleus; and the prim- 
 eval force inherent in them, which, as we have said, 
 admits of various transformations, assumed the form 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 97 
 
 of what we call the force of gravitation, and the mass 
 of congregated atoms assumed a circular motion. 
 Then the remaining portions of the vapour-cloud 
 got gradually thrown off from the original mass, and 
 by several other processes after the lapse of ages 
 got consolidated into worlds of which our earth is 
 one. All this, and much more, we are asked to 
 believe has taken place during the ages of the past, 
 from the interaction and hap-hazard meeting of 
 forces destitute of intelligence. If it be objected that 
 these processes require intervals of time inconceiv- 
 ably vast for their accomplishment, the anti-Theist 
 will reply, ‘I never need trouble myself about time ; 
 I have eternity to fall back on, which is inex- 
 haustible. What cannot be accomplished in a million 
 years can be accomplished in a hundred million ; 
 and that admits of being multiplied to any conceiv- 
 able extent. So the necessary time will be always 
 forthcoming. Time, therefore, forms no difficulty 
 with me.” 
 
 Still the work is very incomplete, for the world 
 thus formed was a simple desolation; and until it 
 had passed through a further process of cooling, its 
 heat was so intense that no form of vegetable or 
 animal life was capable of existing in it, though it 
 was well stored with everything which enters into 
 the composition of its solid nucleus, necessary for 
 
 their support. 
 Yet these unintelligent forces, unprescient of the 
 
 7 
 
98 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 future, proceeded with their work, and after long 
 intervals of time, succeeded in so framing and fashion- 
 ing the world as to have made it a place fit for the 
 habitation of beings possessed of life, and furnished 
 with all the materials requisite for their development 
 and growth ; nay, even in making it a fit habitation 
 for beings endowed with a high order of intelli- 
 gence; in a word, without the smallest foresight 
 they succeeded in forming a world, which, in the 
 course of distant ages, would be not only a suitable 
 habitation for man, but one capable of supplying 
 his various wants, as he advanced from one stage 
 of civilization to another. If it is asked what is 
 involved in these operations, the answer must be 
 that forces devoid of intelligence are capable of pro- 
 ducing results, which beings possessed of the highest 
 order of intelligence might full well envy. 
 
 But all that has been thus far effected is to have 
 produced a world devoid of life, yet fitted to be 
 the habitation of life and intelligence. Here, then, 
 we have arrived at a gap in the anti-theistic theory 
 of evolution so wide that none of its advocates have 
 been able to throw a bridge over it except by the 
 aid of their imagination. Let it be observed that 
 the only materials, which they have to work with, are 
 lifeless matter, force, and motion. But life exists. 
 Whence, then, came it? No experiment known to 
 science has been able to evolve matter which is 
 living out of matter which is not living. Pressed by 
 
LHE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 99 
 
 this difficulty, some anti-Theists have affirmed that 
 life is a mode of motion, combined with a suitable 
 arrangement of the particles of matter. But the 
 difference between things possessed of life, and 
 things not possessed of life, is one which is palpable 
 to the most ordinary understanding. Nothing will 
 persuade such a person, that a change in the posi- 
 tion of the atoms which compose the table on which 
 Iam writing, or any motion imparted to them, will 
 enable it to present the phenomena of life. Pressed 
 by this difficulty of producing life by such means, 
 most anti-Theists have adopted a theory called 
 “spontaneous generation,” 7c. that life has in 
 some unknown way during the ages of the past, 
 emerged out of non-life. But here they are pressed 
 by the evidence of facts. Once it was supposed 
 that this was a thing of not unfrequent occurrence ; 
 but certain experiments have proved the contrary. 
 Even eminent Scientists, who disbelieve in Christian 
 Theism, are compelled to admit that as far as our 
 present knowledge goes, no instance can be pro- 
 duced of the production of life out of matter which 
 is certainly devoid of life, Here, as far as present 
 facts are concerned, the anti-theistic theory hope- 
 lessly breaks down. What, then, is to be done? 
 Is the theory to be abandoned ? No; recourse is 
 to be had to the principle of faith. They take 
 refuge in the expression of a confident expectation 
 that, although in the present state of our knowledge 
 
100 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 not a tittle of evidence can be adduced in support 
 of this theory of spontaneous generation, yet that 
 this evidence will be forthcoming at some period 
 of the future; or that the state of things might 
 have been different in the distant past from what 
 they are in the present. In other words they 
 abandon reason, and fall back on that faith which 
 they denounce in others as credulity. 
 
 Let us now suppose, for the sake of argument, 
 that a few living cells have been evolved in the 
 manner which this theory pre-supposes. Let us 
 hear Sir John Lubbock’s description of a cell, and 
 then judge whether the theory is believable— 
 
 “Every cell in the animal body is a standing 
 miracle. It must grow, it must assimilate nourish- 
 ment, it must secrete, it must produce other cells 
 like itself, and this after ‘and in addition to its own 
 proper and distinctive function. The lowest animal 
 consists only of a single cell. Yet they feed and 
 digest, they grow and multiply, they move and feel. 
 Their perceptions are no doubt confused, and un- 
 differentiated, and perhaps devoid of consciousness. 
 The soft protoplasm of which they consist is dimly 
 affected by external stimuli, as for instance, by the 
 waves of light and sound. Their forms are all 
 minute, almost invisible to the naked eye” (The 
 Senses of Animals, p. 3). 
 
 The writer might have full well added one more 
 
either have created themselves, or have been evolved 
 out of matter destitute of life and intelligence by a 
 process which differs only in name from self- 
 creation, if they are not the work of an intelligent 
 Creator. 
 
 But let the anti-Theist proceed in his work 
 of world-building ; and to enable him to do so, 
 let us assume that a cell has been produced 
 by an act of spontaneous generation. A _ very 
 serious task awaits him, to fill the world, then a 
 desolation, with these innumerable forms of vege- 
 table and animal life, which have existed during the 
 past, and which exist in the present; for the cell 
 produced by spontaneous generation cannot be 
 assumed to be endowed with the marvellous quali- 
 ties above described, but to be only a simple cell 
 possessed of life. 
 
 Before it is possible to make the smallest progress 
 in the production of additional forms of life, the anti- 
 Theist is compelled to make a very serious demand 
 on our faith. These cells, unless they had been 
 endowed with the power of producing other cells, 
 and that too in considerable numbers, must have 
 utterly failed to people the globe with living forms. 
 Further, if their powers were limited to the pro- 
 duction of cells precisely similar to themselves, 
 universal sameness must have been the result, and 
 the endless varieties of life would have failed to 
 
102 | CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 come into existence. It was, therefore, necessary 
 that these primeval cells should have been en- 
 dowed with the power of generating their like 
 with the addition of a number of small variations 
 from their primitive forms. Unless this had been 
 so, the whole process of anti-theistic evolution would 
 have come to a standstill. Cells endowed with these 
 properties are very convenient for the purposes of 
 this theory; but the questions, how came they into 
 existence, through what process did they become 
 possessed of the power of generating their like, 
 and of doing this with numerous small variations, 
 demand an answer. To these questions the anti- 
 Theist has no answer to give except that they have 
 been worked out through ages of evolution during 
 the eternity of the past. With theorizers of this 
 kind, with eternity at their back, all things are 
 possible, except the existence of a Creator possessed 
 of boundless power and intelligence. 
 
 Let us now assume, for the sake of argument, 
 however incredible it justly seems to men of ordi- 
 nary understanding, that beings such as those above 
 referred to, have been evolved by the action and 
 interaction of a number of forces devoid of life 
 and intelligence, during the ages of the past; that 
 their descendants have evolved a-vast variety of 
 small variations, some suited, and some unsuited 
 to their environment; that the latter have perished, 
 while the former have survived; that the survivors 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 103 
 
 have evolved fresh variations of an improved type, 
 and more capable of adjusting themselves to their 
 surroundings; and that this process has gone on 
 through ages of indefinite duration. These have 
 at last become so numerous, as to have encroached 
 on the means of subsistence. Hence has arisen 
 what, in the language cf this theory, has been called 
 “a struggle for life.” In this the weaker perished, 
 while the stronger survived, and threw out fresh 
 improvements gradually evolving more and more 
 perfect forms. All this gradual advancement, the 
 position taken by the anti-Theist compels him to 
 assume, has been produced through the action (let 
 this never be forgotten) of forces destitute of in- 
 telligence. What, then, must have occurred? One 
 answer only is possible: A countless number of 
 hap-hazard meetings together of these forces af 
 the right time and place, must have produced the 
 adjustments capable of producing the results in 
 question. I have already drawn attention to the 
 number of chances against the fall of twelve dice 
 with their aces upwards, when thrown into the air, 
 and the immense multiplication of the improbability, 
 if the operation were repeated twelve times in suc- 
 cession with the same result, an improbability so 
 great, that we arrive at the full conviction that 
 intelligence must have intervened somewhere. But 
 this is a mere shadow compared with the chance 
 production of the adjustments, adaptations, and 
 
104 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 correlations which exist in numbers past human com- 
 prehension. Their occurrence, therefore, is incredible. 
 
 Let us, however, for the sake of argument, assume 
 that all these difficulties have been surmounted ; that 
 the blind forces of Nature have prepared a world 
 supplied with everything requisite for the support 
 of vegetable life; and that a few of the lowest 
 forms of organization. have been actually evolved. 
 A mighty work yet remains to be accomplished, 
 namely, to fill the world with the various forms of 
 vegetable existence in all their inconceivable variety, 
 and to fit them to the various conditions of soil 
 and climate; for it is an obvious fact that this has 
 been effected somehow. How, then, has this been 
 accomplished? The anti-theistic evolutionist will 
 answer: ‘By a very gradual evolution of lower forms 
 into higher ones by the aid of a number of small 
 variations, through periods of vast duration, which 
 by repeated struggles for existence, adaptations to 
 their environment, and survival of the fittest, have 
 evolved the present vegetable kingdom, with its 
 endless varieties of form, qualities, adaptations, and 
 correlations.” Let the reader glance at it, and ask 
 himself whether it is credible that blind forces, in- 
 capable of purpose or foresight, can have produced 
 results, such as the highest form of intelligence, short 
 of the infinite, might full well envy. No conceivable 
 array of figures can convey an adequate idea of the 
 number of the requisite hap-hazard interactions of 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 105 
 
 forces necessary to produce such results. What, then, 
 must have been the numbers in their totality which 
 were requisite for evolving the present vegetable 
 kingdom, with its innumerable varieties? The 
 anti-Theist will doubtless again reply: ‘I have 
 the bank of eternity at my command; and with 
 sufficient time all the necessary interactions of 
 unintelligent forces at the right time and place are 
 possible.” To this it will be a sufficient reply, that 
 many abstract possibilities, of which this is one, 
 are not credible as actual occurrences. Further, 
 
 astronomy tells us that the time which has elapsed 
 since the world has been capable of sustaining life, 
 is far too short to satisfy the demands of the anti- 
 theistic evolutionist. 
 
 Let us again assume, for his benefit, that these 
 difficulties have been overcome; and ask him to 
 address himself to the evolution of the varieties 
 of the animal kingdom, the different species of 
 which, as modern science teaches us, amount to 
 hundreds of thousands, if not of miilions. Here, 
 however, before he can take one step in advance 
 he is met by a difficulty which is sufficient to make 
 the most determined evolutionist look grave. In 
 the animal kingdom, which includes man, a number 
 of phenomena make their appearance, of which the 
 preceding forms of existence are destitute, namely, 
 sensation, intelligence, free agency, and a moral 
 nature. Unless these can be generated somehow, 
 
to6 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 the theory of anti-theistic evolution inevitably breaks 
 down. Let us briefly consider how the evolution- 
 ist proceeds to evolve them out of materials which 
 contain no trace of them. 
 
 With respect to sensation, he affirms that it is 
 the result of motions in the nervous system, which 
 are conveyed to the brain, and of the arrangement 
 of the particles of matter, of which that organ is 
 composed, which when set in motion by the action 
 of the nerves, produce the phenomenon which we 
 designate “sensation.” But of this no evidence has 
 been adduced. What, then, are the facts? 
 
 Sensations are invariably preceded by motions in 
 the nervous system, produced by either external or 
 internal forces, which are conveyed to the brain, and 
 terminate in it; but between these motions, and the 
 sensations which invariably follow them, a wide 
 gulf lies, which no amount of scientific observation 
 has been able to bridge over. We have eminent 
 authority for affirming that known science can sug- 
 gest no means, by which a motion can be translated 
 into a sensation ; and that in fact the translation of 
 the one into the other is in the present state of 
 our knowledge inconceivable. This being so, the 
 only resource of the anti-theistic evolutionist is to 
 express his belief that what is not possible now 
 may have been possible in the ages of the past. 
 
 But, assuming that this difficulty has been 
 surmounted, he has immediately to encounter a 
 
THIN TI-THEISTICATAHEORY (OF EVOLUTION.“107 
 
 fresh one—the necessity of evolving intelligence 
 out of materials previously destitute of it. I 
 SayveeetlemilecesslLymOlmevOlvingmit, sionwit. 1S.an 
 obvious fact that it exists, and therefore that it 
 must have come into existence somehow. Equally 
 certain is it that intelligence, and the want of it, 
 are not separated from one another by a few small 
 variations, such as this theory presupposes, but by 
 a great gulf; for even sensation and intelligence 
 differ widely. How, then, is this interval to be 
 bridged over, when the only materials at the com- 
 mand of the evolutionist are matter, force, and 
 motion? Must we once more invoke the theory 
 of spontaneous generation ? 
 
 This difficulty has been attempted to be sur- 
 mounted, by the affirmation that thought and in- 
 telligence are neither more nor less than a function 
 of the brain; that where there is no intelligence, 
 there is no brain ; and that wherever there is brain, 
 however small, there is intelligence however low; 
 and consequently that thought and intelligence are 
 a mere question of organization. I have pointed 
 out in a previous chapter the inadequacy of this 
 theory to account for the facts, and therefore I 
 need not repeat what I have said on that subject 
 here. 
 
 Let us now once more assume, for the sake 
 of argument, that these difficulties have been 
 surmounted, and that the lowest form of animal 
 
108 CHRISTIAN, THEISM. 
 
 existence has been brought into being, with all 
 its marvellous endowments as above described. 
 What, then, is the work which the anti-theistic 
 evolutionist has yet to accomplish? This, and 
 nothing less: to prove that all the forms of animal 
 existence now inhabiting the globe, from the 
 smallest animalcule to the whale, the lion, and the 
 elephant, and even to man with his moral nature 
 have been evolved by a succession of small and 
 gradual improvements out of one of the lowest 
 forms of life by the action of forces destitute of 
 intelligence and volition. This is the problem which 
 he has to solve. How, I ask, is it to be effected ? 
 Here again the answer will be returned, “ By the 
 process called ‘natural selection,’ or the ‘survival 
 of the fittest.’ As this theory is a very widespread 
 and popular one, it will be desirable that I should 
 give it a brief consideration. According to it, the 
 small variations above referred to, when of a favour- 
 able character, gave to their possessors an advantage 
 in the struggle for life, when the means of sub- 
 sistence became scarce; whereas those which were 
 destitute of them perished. These advantages became 
 fixed, and were transmitted to their descendants ; 
 and thus they produced an improved breed, while 
 the inferior ones became gradually extinct. This 
 process has gone on from generation to genera- 
 tion, until at last has emerged the present animal 
 kingdom with all its countless varieties, adaptations, 
 
Tie ANE THE oo tl HEORY: OF EVOLUTION. 109 
 
 and adjustments, including man and his moral nature. 
 Such in very brief outline is the anti-theistic form of 
 this theory. A few comments on it will be necessary. 
 
 I observe, first, that the terms used in it are 
 ‘ambiguous, and therefore misleading. The word 
 “ selection” in the ordinary use of language, 
 means ‘‘choice,” and choice implies the presence 
 of intelligence, because without it in the ordinary 
 acceptation of the term, choice is impossible. But 
 in the process designated “natural selection,’ the 
 forces operating in it are destitute of all power of 
 choosing, and the object of the theory is to construct 
 the various forms of animal and vegetable life with- 
 out the intervention of intelligence, or of any being 
 who is capable of exercising choice. Again: accord- 
 ing to this theory, “ the survival of the fittest” 
 really means “ the survival of the strongest,” for the 
 struggle in question is one for the necessary supply 
 of food, and for space in which to exist, of which 
 the strongest are certain to get the largest share. 
 But it by no means follows that the strongest are 
 ‘n all cases the fittest to survive. Which, I ask, is 
 the fittest to survive: the persecutor or the perse- 
 cuted, the strong villain or the weak saint, the 
 man devoured by the shark or the shark which 
 devours him? Fitness to survive involves other 
 considerations than that of mere strength. This 
 theory also takes for granted that, in a struggle for 
 existence, the victor always emerges out of it with 
 
110 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 undiminished powers. On the contrary, it frequently 
 happens that the victor in a contest for a supply of 
 food, instead of emerging out of it in his full strength, 
 issues from it considerably weakened, especially 
 when the struggle has been a severe one. In such 
 a case he would transmit weakened instead of 
 improved powers to his posterity. Further, the 
 term evolution, as intended to be descriptive of the 
 process by which a simple cell gradually produces 
 the present animal kingdom, is misleading ; the fact 
 being that before any of these primeval germs of 
 life, which this theory assumes the existence of, can 
 produce anything out of themselves, no small amount 
 of involution and assimilation must take place, and 
 so throughout the entire process. Exactness of 
 thought requires that the anti-theistic theory of evo- 
 lution should be designated a theory to account for 
 the existence of the various forms of animal and 
 vegetable life through a process of involution and evo- 
 lution, by means of forces destitute of intelligence 
 and volition. 
 
 The reader will have observed that in the course 
 of this argument I have repeatedly referred to the 
 necessity of the meeting together of a number of 
 distinct and independent forces at the right time and 
 place, in order that they may bring about a par- 
 ticular result. The importance of such a con- 
 currence in its bearing on the anti-theistic theory 
 of evolution will be made clear by a very simple 
 
Paes) eis Gal ROR YO EVOLUTION sql tt 
 
 illustration. Let us assume that the Hew 
 forces of Nature, through the principle of natural 
 selection, have succeeded in producing a male animal 
 —for example, a horse. It is evident that if they 
 had stopped here, no race of horses could have come 
 into existence. What, then, was the necessary con- 
 dition of the production of the species? Evidently 
 that the blind forces of Nature, at the time that they 
 produced a male, or shortly afterwards, should have 
 produced a female. But this is not all; for if the 
 male had been evolved in America, and the female 
 in Europe, the species would never have come into 
 existence. To produce a race of horses, it would 
 have been necessary that the male and the female 
 should have been evolved not only at the same 
 time, but in the immediate neighbourhood of one 
 another. Against sucha concurrence of unintelligent 
 forces at the right time and place, the chances are 
 so overwhelming as to render it unbelievable. But 
 according to this theory a similar concurrence of 
 forces must have taken place in the case of every 
 existing species of animals now existing on the globe 
 to have rendered their existence possible. Is such 
 a concurrence, I ask, within the limits of rational 
 belief? Yet this is only a single instance out of 
 innumerable others which must have taken place 
 during the ages of the past, without which the anti- 
 theistic theory of evolution must have come to a 
 standstill in its operations, 
 
112 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Further: Three thousand years have now elapsed 
 since the birth of authentic history, and a vastly 
 longer period since that which may be desig- 
 nated by the term “ monumental” history. What 
 indications are there of even a tendency on the part 
 of a lower order of beings to evolve out of them- 
 selves a higher one during this interval of time? 
 Surely, during a period so long, some signs of 
 movement in a higher direction ought to be visible. 
 But there are none. The bee is just as wise as, and 
 no wiser than, it was three thousand years ago ; nor 
 has it learned to regard the annual slaughter of its 
 parent drones a sin. The dog has been man’s 
 companion for long centuries, yet he has failed to 
 invent, a language, nor is there a trace of his vocal 
 organs undergoing a gradual improvement in the 
 production of articulate speech. The ape, not to 
 speak of numerous other animals, is capable of 
 appreciating the comfort of a fire; but he has 
 never yet learned the art of kindling one, simple 
 as it is. The cat has long been not only the com- 
 panion, but a favourite, of mankind ; yet it has not 
 made the smallest progress in the way of developing 
 even the semblance of a conscience or a moral 
 sense. It is needless to multiply examples, for we 
 all know that the various races of animals, whatever 
 may be their endowments, if left to themselves, 
 are unprogressive ; although a few instances exist 
 where they are capable of making a slight advance- 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 113 
 
 ment under the direct teaching of man. Full well, 
 then, it may be asked, how it has come to pass, 
 if they have been progressive, as according to 
 this theory they must have been to a wonderful 
 extent during the ages of the past, that during 
 the historic period they have come to a stand- 
 still, and have done nothing. But if it be urged, 
 as it has been urged, that the period of time 
 which is covered by authentic and monumental 
 history is too short to produce any visible ad- 
 vancement in a direction upwards, then this 
 period, compared with the vast intervals of time 
 which must have been requisite for effecting the 
 innumerable evolutions which must have taken 
 place in the animal kingdom, not to speak of 
 those in the vegetable kingdom, can be no larger 
 than a single grain of sand compared with the 
 masses which lie on the ocean’s shore. But other 
 sciences teach us that far, very far, within this 
 stupendous interval of time, the globe in which we 
 live must have been in such a state of heat as to 
 have rendered it impossible for any living thing, 
 such as an animal or a vegetable, to have existed 
 iicit. 
 
 In conclusion, I think that it will-put in a 
 striking light the difficulties which the anti-theistic 
 evolutionist has to encounter, if I put before the 
 reader, in a succinct form, those which must be 
 overcome in the production of a being such as 
 
 8 
 
114 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 man, through agents which are alike devoid of 
 life, intelligence, and a moral nature 
 
 First, he has to provide himself with a cell 
 possessed of life; but how one can be produced 
 out of materials devoid of life he fails to explain, 
 except by drafting on his imagination. This cell, 
 when brought into being, as Sir J. Lubbock tells us, 
 must grow, assimilate, and secrete; and, he should 
 have added, be capable of producing other cells 
 similar to itself; for if it did not possess these 
 powers, the entire evolution process would have 
 _been stillborn. But it by no means follows that a 
 living cell, evolved out of the only materials which 
 the evolutionist has at his command, should be 
 either capable of growth, of assimilating nourish- 
 ment, or of generating other cells similar to itself. 
 Here, again, to explain how they became possessed 
 of these powers, the evolutionist has to make a 
 large draft on our imagination—may I not rather 
 say, on our credulity? If a cell must grow, it 
 must be capable of assimilating nourishment from 
 some source external to itself; and if it must assi- 
 milate nourishment, nourishment must have been 
 all ready at its hand suitable for it to assimilate. 
 How, then, by whom, or by what, has this suitable 
 nourishment been provided? Again, it by no 
 means follows that a living cell should be possessed 
 of a power of generating numerous other cells 
 similar to itself. That cells should have been 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 115 
 
 possessed of this power, is very convenient for the 
 evolutionist ; but the only way in which he can 
 account for the production of a thing which Sir 
 J. Lubbock designates “a standing miracle,” is by 
 making a further draft on our imagination. But 
 here a very serious obstacle blocks the way. If these 
 cells only possessed the power of generating others 
 precisely similar to themselves, universal sameness 
 must have been the result. To prevent this, it is 
 necessary to assume that they possessed this power 
 united with that of producing a number of small 
 variations from their primeval type. How they 
 succeeded in acquiring this singular power, we are 
 not informed, but it is absolutely necessary to 
 assume its existence, if the evolution theory we 
 are considering is to get into working order. An 
 eminent professor, however, has attempted to get 
 rid of all difficulties at once by informing us 
 that his power of vision enables him to see in 
 matter the potency of all living things. Still, it is 
 not unreasonable to demand that each difficulty 
 should be met by itself, because it is evident that 
 if this and the other above-mentioned difficulties 
 cannot be overcome, it is impossible to evolve out 
 of one or more living cells, even if you have suc- 
 ceeded in getting life out of non-life, the innumerable 
 varieties of the animal kingdom. 
 
 But we cannot stop here. Assuming that the 
 anti-Theist has provided himself with the necessary 
 
116 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 cells wherewith to commence operations, how is 
 he to produce the endless variety of organized 
 beings which at present fill the earth ? His answer 
 will doubtless be, by, these cells throwing out a 
 number of variations which were improvements on 
 their original forms, which gave them the advantage 
 in their struggle for existence ; that those improve- 
 ments became fixed, and were transmitted to their 
 descendants; and so on, from generation to genera- 
 tion, until at last they succeeded in evolving the 
 lowest form of organized life. Here, however, he 
 has to encounter a serious difficulty. It is very con- 
 venient for his theory that these cells should have 
 been possessed of the power of transmitting such 
 variations as were improvements to their descend~ 
 ants, and so on for ever in perpetual succession ; 
 and that the varieties which were not improvements 
 should have become extinct; but in this long course 
 of improvement, the hap-hazard concurrences of 
 the various things necessary for carrying the entire 
 process into effect at the right time and _ place, 
 without which it would have been impossible that 
 these advances in an upward direction could have 
 been effected, must have been so inconceivably 
 numerous as to make the theory utterly incredible. 
 
 But his difficulties increase in proportion as the 
 evolutionist advances. Out of such materials He 
 has now to fill the world with every form of 
 organized being which now exists in it. His only 
 
lire Vila bee ol Gal Oly Ore VOLG LION. 117 
 
 machinery for doing so is that which | have re- 
 peatedly referred to in the course of this chapter. 
 The numbers of such beings are inconceivably vast, 
 and in them exist a number of adjustments, adapta- 
 tions, and correlations, whereby each organ is fitted 
 to its function; part to part, and each part to the 
 whole. The number of these which exist in animal 
 bodies exceeds the power of human calculation. How, 
 then, have they been formed, according to the anti- 
 theistic theory of evolution ? Here again, the answer 
 must be by the action and the interaction on matter 
 of a number of unintelligent forces meeting together 
 at the right time and place. But against such a 
 concurrence the chances are enormous even in the 
 case of a single organ. But animal bodies contain 
 a multitude of organs, not a few of which are of a 
 highly complicated character. To express the chances 
 against such a concurrence, the number of organisms 
 which exist in the animal kingdom will have to be 
 multiplied by the number of the adjustments, adapta- 
 tions, and correlations which they contain; and the 
 result by the number of the parts of which they are 
 composed. The array of figures thus produced would 
 be incapable of being embraced by the human mind. 
 This would denote the impossibility of the results, 
 which the anti-theistic evolutionist endeavours to per- 
 suade us can be produced by the hap-hazard concur- 
 rence of atoms and forces destitute of intelligence 
 
 and volition, 
 
115 CHRISTIAN THEISM, 
 
 But I must hasten onwards to man. How is He 
 to be evolved in conformity with the anti-theistic 
 theory of evolution? Here the difficulties thicken 
 so as to make not a few of the holders of this theory 
 look grave. I will briefly enumerate the chief of 
 them. Sensation has to be evolved out of materials 
 which were utterly incapable in their original form 
 of experiencing a sensation; intelligence out of that 
 which was destitute of intelligence ; the free agency 
 which each of us is conscious of possessing out of 
 that which is incapable of exercising an act of choice; 
 conscience, the sense of right and wrong, the feeling 
 that it is our duty to choose the one and to avoid 
 the other, and the sense of approbation and dis- 
 approbation, out of things which neither do nor can 
 understand either of these distinctions: and mercy, 
 holiness, compassion, justice, and benevolence, out 
 of blind forces, which remorselessly crush everything 
 which crosses their path. 
 
 It would be easy to adduce numerous other 
 difficulties, but these will suffice. I will not aggravate 
 the position of the anti-theistic evolutionist, or waste 
 the reader’s time by dwelling on them in detail. I 
 shall, therefore, only observe that it is certain that 
 before one thing can be evolved out of another it 
 must first exist in some form or shape in that thing 
 out of which it is evolved; but in blind matter and 
 force, these things exist not. How, then, was it 
 possible that they should have evolved out of them- 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION, 119 
 
 selves that which was never in them? We can 
 persuade a man; we can terrify an animal; but a 
 steam engine we can neither persuade nor terrify. 
 We may entreat it, but it cannot hear; we may 
 command it, but it will not obey. Wide, therefore, 
 is the gulf which separates the world of free agency 
 from the world of necessary agency. A body of 
 alchymists, wholly different from any which has 
 existed during the past, must arise before the one 
 can be transmuted into the other. 
 
 One observation more before I conclude this 
 chapter: The difficulties of Theism sink into com- 
 parative nothingness compared with those with which 
 the theory of anti-theistic evolution is attended. 
 Those who accept this theory in order that they 
 may avoid those with which a belief in Christian 
 Theism is attended, bear a close resemblance to 
 those who of old strained out a gnat, and swallowed 
 
 a camel. 
 
CHAPTER VET: 
 
 THE COURSE OF REASONING ADOPTED IN THE 
 TWO PREVIOUS CHAPTERS ILLUSTRATED BY 
 EXAMPLES. 
 
 i Be do this in a satisfactory manner is a work 
 
 of no little difficulty. This arises not from the 
 paucity, but from the richness, of the materials at our 
 command; for adjustments, adaptations, and correla- 
 tions abound everywhere in the vegetable and animal 
 kingdoms, and meet us at every turn. Of these 
 some are simple, others extremely complicated. The 
 reader's attention cannot be too strongly called to the 
 fact that it is not single instances of such adapta- 
 tions, but their existence in numbers numberless, 
 which imparts to the argument its overwhelming force. 
 To exhibit its full force in a brief work like the 
 present 1s obviously impossible, for it would involve 
 a description of the most important adjustments and 
 adaptations in the animal and vegetable kingdoms— 
 and of the manner in which they are correlated to 
 one another, and to the external universe. On the 
 other hand, by adducing only a few examples, there 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 121 
 
 is no little danger of failing to impress the reader. 
 with a sense of the force of the argument taken as a 
 whole. Happily, however, their existence is not 
 denied even by the most determined unbelievers. 
 The reader will, therefore, only have to multiply the 
 examples which I shall adduce by hundreds of thou- 
 sands of millions to enable him for all practical 
 purposes to estimate the force of the argument 
 which they furnish in proof of the existence of an 
 intelligent Creator. | 
 
 In considering this subject, it cannot be too con- 
 stantly kept in mind that the only question in the 
 present state of the Theistic controversy is, not the 
 existence of these adjustments, adaptations, and cor- 
 relations, but whether they have owed their origin 
 to the interaction during the ages of the past of a 
 number of blind forces destitute of volition and in- 
 telligence ; or do they prove as the Theist contends, 
 with a force equal to that of a demonstration, that 
 their existence must be due to the energy of a being 
 possessed of a power and intelligence adequate to 
 have brought them into existence ? It will be, 
 therefore, desirable that I should not only exhibit 
 the argument in the general form in which it is 
 set forth in the two previous chapters, but also to 
 enable the reader better to appreciate its force, 
 that I should adduce a few illustrations of it, 
 asking him at the same time to keep steadily in 
 mind what, as I have observed above, unbelievers 
 
i122 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 in the being of a God do not deny ; that these adap- 
 tations and correlations exist in the universe in 
 numbers passing human comprehension. In doing 
 this I shall draw my illustrations from things 
 with which most of us are in some degree ac- 
 quainted. Some of them may seem well worn, but 
 they are clear and obvious, and quite as convincing 
 as the most elaborate discoveries of modern science. 
 The truth is, that God has not left Himself without 
 witness, even to those who know no more of the 
 structure of the universe, than the uncultivated men 
 whom St. Paul addressed at Lystra. All that modern 
 discoveries have done is greatly to enlarge our 
 knowledge, and thereby to furnish a vast mass of 
 additional evidence from every quarter, indefinitely 
 strengthening an argument which in its most 
 simple form commends itself to persons of ordinary 
 understanding. 
 
 I shall draw my illustrations from our bodily 
 framework, for not only is it full of adjustments 
 and adaptations, some of which are extremely com- 
 plicated, by means of which the various results 
 which are necessary for our health, and even for 
 our life, are effectuated, but these adaptations are 
 so correlated together, that they form a compli- 
 cated whole, each part being adjusted to every other 
 part, and to the body as a whole. 
 
 The idea which I desire to convey, cannot be 
 better expressed than in the language of St. Paul 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 122 
 
 slightly accommodated to the present argument, in 
 which form even an anti-Theist cannot object to it, 
 as a true statement of facts, whatever theory he may 
 propound respecting their origin. 
 
 The parts of the body are so tempered together, 
 “that there should be no schism in the body; but that 
 the members should have the same care one for 
 another. And whether one member suffers, all the 
 members suffer with it ; or one member is honoured y 
 (that is, adequate to perform its function) all the 
 members rejoice with it. The well-known fable of 
 the envy of the members against the belly, their 
 conspiracy to starve it, and the results which followed 
 the attempt also forms another admirable illustration 
 of this important truth. 
 
 This correlation of the different parts of the 
 body to one another, and to the body as a whole, 
 is a thing which comes under our daily Experience. 
 Let sickness intervene, and we immediately become 
 sensible that if one member suffer, the whole body 
 suffers with it; and as soon as the mischief wrought 
 by the diseased member ceases, and it is enabled to 
 perform its proper function all the other members 
 obtain relief. The following illustrations, will be 
 amply sufficient to prove that the innumerable adap- 
 tations in our bodily framework, and its correlations 
 by which its parts are so adjusted together as to 
 form a complicated whole, cannot have been the 
 result of the interaction of forces destitute of 
 
124 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 intelligence, and nano of ene a purpose; but 
 on the contrary they prove with irresistible force that 
 their existence must be due to the action of a being, 
 to whose power and wisdom it is impossible to assign 
 limitations. I will consider 
 
 The instrumentalities by which sound, articulate, 
 speech, language, and hearing are produced. 
 
 1.—The Ear. 
 
 I will quote Sir J. Lubbock’s description of it in 
 his recently published work, entitled, The Senses 
 of Animals (p.77). Anti-Theists will scarcely object 
 that I am adducing the testimony of a partial 
 witness. 
 
 “We have first the internal ear, which is much 
 less important in man than in many of the other 
 animals, like the horse, where it may be seen 
 moving continually, and almost automatically, as- 
 suming a form most suitable for carrying the waves 
 of sound down the outer passage to the tympanum 
 or drum. This is a membrane stretched between 
 the outer ear on the one hand and the drum on the 
 other, which also contains air transmitted through 
 the mouth by means of the Eustachian tube. The 
 drum is separated from the brain by a hard bony 
 partition, in which are two orifices, the one oval and 
 the other round. Across the drum stretches a chain 
 of little bones—first the hammer, secondly the anvil, 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 125 
 
 and | thirdly the stirrup. The flat plate of the stirrup 
 lies against the orifice (or, as it is technically called, 
 fenestra ovalis) of the drum. Thus the sounds are 
 intensified by being conveyed from the tympanic 
 membrane to one which is twenty times smaller. 
 Behind the fenestra ovalis is the labyrinth, which is 
 filled with fluid, and on which the final filaments of 
 the auditory nerve are distributed. This fluid is 
 thrown into vibrations by those of the stirrup; but 
 as it is enclosed in a bony case the vibrations would 
 be greatly curtailed if it were not for the second mem- 
 brane, or fenestra rotunda. This second membrane, 
 therefore, acts aS a counter-opening, for if the fluid 
 is compressed in one place, it must claim more room 
 in another. The labyrinth also consists of two parts ; 
 the cochlea, and the semicircular canals. The semi- 
 circular canals are three in number, and stand at | 
 right angles to one another. No satisfactory ex- 
 planation of their function has yet been given ; but 
 there ig some evidence that, in addition to and 
 apart from hearing, they are affected by the position 
 of the head, and thus serve as organs for maintain- 
 ing the equilibrium of the body. Each of the canals 
 commences with an oval dilatation, or ampulla. In 
 the ampulla is a projecting ridge, on which are 
 strong, stiff, delicate, hairlike processes, the vibra- 
 tions of which probably gives certain sound sen- 
 sations. In the canals certain parts have shorter 
 hairs, over which are minute ear-stones, or otoliths, 
 
126 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 a $$$ $s 
 
 consisting of carbonate of lime, embedded in a 
 gelatinous substance. The cochlea contains, more- 
 over, a complicated and wonderful organ discovered 
 by Count Corte. This appears to be, in facGed 
 microscopic musical instrument, composed of some 
 four thousand complex arches, increasing regularly 
 in length and diminishing in height, from the base 
 to the summit of the cochlea. The waves of sound 
 have been supposed to play on this instrument 
 almost like the fingers of a performer on the strings 
 of a musical instrument. The fibres of Corte, ac- 
 cording to Helmholtz, may be distributed among the 
 Seven octaves which are in general use, so that 
 there will be thirty-three and a third fibres to every 
 semitone, and four hundred to each octave. Weber 
 has estimated that a skilful ear can perceive a 
 difference even of one sixty-fourth of a tone, or 
 nearly four thousand seconds, and this would agree 
 fairly well with the number of fibres.” 
 
 Thus complicated is this organ. If the reader 
 will count, he will find that it consists of at least 
 thirty different parts besides the four thousand 
 complex arches, so correlated to each other that, by 
 their conjoint action, they produce a definite result, 
 which result would fail of being produced if any 
 one of the parts were wanting. They are even 
 more numerous, but as their numbers are not given 
 by the author, it is impossible to count them. Some 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 127 
 
 of them are very elaborate, as the drum, the ham- 
 mer, anvil, stirrup, the labyrinth, and the Eusta- 
 chian tube, which connects the ear with the mouth, 
 thereby furnishing the drum with the needful air, 
 and above all, the four thousand complex arches, 
 forming a microscopic musical instrument. 
 
 Yet, notwithstanding all this elaborate machinery, 
 every part of which is adjusted and correlated to 
 every other part, no sound has yet been produced, no, 
 not even a motion; only an organ possessed of life, 
 one portion of which is capable of receiving and 
 being affected by a number of motions, which are 
 not only extremely numerous, but of the most 
 varied character ; and the other, endowed with the 
 capacity of transmitting those motions to the auric 
 nerve. 
 
 Here let it be carefully observed, before the 
 organism of the ear can produce a single sound 
 that three other conditions are necessary— 
 
 (i) An instrumentality capable of originating 
 motions. 
 (ii) A medium capable of transmitting the motions 
 
 thus produced to the ear. 
 
 (iii) A power which, when the motions thus 
 produced are transmitted to the brain, is capable of 
 translating them into sensations, and thus producing 
 what we designate sounds; and in the case of man, 
 with whom alone we are at present concerned, 
 articulate speech. 
 
128 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 How, then, is all this accomplished? To effect 
 it, the vocal organs and the ear require not only to 
 be exactly correlated to each other, but both to a 
 substance quite independent of the human body and 
 its organism, namely, the atmosphere. Apart from 
 this correlation, no communication between the vocal 
 organs and the ear would be possible, and the ex- 
 istence of both would be without result. Yet even 
 when this communication has been established, we 
 get nothing but a mass of complicated motions 
 transmitted to the brain. To produce hearing, 
 speech, and language, something capable of trans- 
 lating these motions into sensations and thoughts 
 is necessary. How this last Operation is effected, 
 science is compelled to confess its ignorance. One 
 thing, however, is certain. Motions are neither 
 sounds, sensations, nor thoughts; but only the 
 media through which they are produced. An intel-- 
 ligent mind is the only thing which is capable of 
 affecting this translation; but how it does SO, we 
 know not. 
 
 The adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
 involved in these latter processes, are not only 
 extremely numerous, but of a highly complicated 
 character. To make this clear it will be necessary 
 that I should give to the vocal organs which pro- 
 duce the requisite motions, and to the medium 
 through which they are transmitted to the ear, a 
 brief consideration. 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 129 
 
 2.—The Vocal Organs. 
 
 It will be unnecessary that I should give an 
 equally minute description of the vocal organs as 
 that which has been given in Sir J. Lubbock’s 
 description of the ear. They are, however, of a very 
 complex character. The degree of their complexity 
 may be appreciated from the fact that, for the pro- 
 duction of that endless variety of motions which are 
 necessary for the production of sounds, a corre- 
 sponding change must take place in the action of 
 the innumerable muscles connected with the lungs, 
 where these motions are originated, the vocal 
 chords, the larynx, the tongue, and the mouth, by 
 means of which they are modified in such ‘a manner 
 as to produce the endless variety of sound, rhythm, 
 tune, pitch, and harmony as is produced in a con- 
 cert. Let it be carefully observed, that not a single 
 change takes place in the human voice, not even in 
 the production of a consonant or a vowel sound, 
 without a corresponding motion taking place in some 
 part of the vocal organs—which changes are produced 
 by the action of muscles specially adapted for that 
 purpose; thereby producing corresponding motions 
 in the air, which forms the only medium of commu- 
 nication between the mouth and the ear. Conse- 
 quently it was necessary that the vast number of 
 parts which constitute these two organs should be 
 mutually adjusted to one another, before those 
 
 9 
 
130 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 motions which cause all the variations of the human 
 voice could be produced, conveyed to the brain, and 
 there translated by the mind into sensations and 
 thoughts. We all know from experience how 
 necessary is their healthy action, when we find that 
 some inconsiderable disorder in the throat is capable 
 of producing hoarseness, and a more considerable 
 one, a total loss of voice. From this we learn the 
 complication of the apparatus, its delicacy and 
 minuteness, and the necessity of the correct action of 
 the various parts of which it is composed; yet this 
 complicated action is continued, with slight inter- 
 ruptions, during the entire period of our lives. 
 
 But the vocal organs are so framed that they are 
 not only capable of causing that variety of motions 
 which are necessary for producing the endless varia- 
 tions of the human voice, but portions of them also 
 subserve some of the most important functions of 
 our bodies. Thus, the teeth aided by the tongue, 
 both of which are most important agents in the 
 formation of voice, act as a mill for grinding our 
 food, preparatory to swallowing it. Then the com- 
 bined action of the tongue and throat conveys it to 
 the only place where it is useful, namely, the 
 stomach. While the tongue is performing these 
 functions, its nerves are acting as the medium of 
 taste. Next, the passage between the mouth and the 
 stomach presents us with a most marvellous adapta- 
 tion, Part of the road is common to the breath and 
 
TELUSTRATIONS OF LHE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 131 
 
 the food; but a short distance down, this road divides 
 into two branches, one leads to the lungs for the 
 purpose of supplying them with air, without which 
 supply life would speedily become extinct, and voice 
 impossible ; and the other, to the stomach, which 
 conveys to it the food necessary for our support, to 
 be there digested. If the food happens by accident 
 to take the road leading to the lungs, the conse- 
 quences would be fatal. How then is this prevented? 
 There is a trap-door provided, over which the food 
 passes, which is so constituted that without any 
 thought or care of ours, it shuts every time we 
 swallow, and opens every time we inhale or exhale 
 breath. Nothing is more striking than the fre- 
 quency, and at the same time the safety, with which 
 this operation apparently so dangerous is performed ; 
 for, during a dinner party, where there is much con- 
 versation, this trap-door must open every time the 
 guests breathe, and must shut every time they 
 swallow ; yet the accident, commonly called “ going 
 the wrong way,’ is of the rarest occurrence. Let 
 the reader judge whether it is believable that this 
 mass of complicated adjustments, adaptations, and 
 correlations can have resulted frem the interaction 
 of atoms and forces destitute alike of volition and 
 intelligence. 
 
 The anti-Theist will reply that these adjustments 
 and adaptations bear no analogy to those formed by 
 man, who fashions those which he originates out of 
 
132 GCORISTIAN THIS, 
 
 materials previously existing, and who is compelled 
 to adopt a number of ingenious contrivances for the 
 purpose of overcoming the obstacles which they 
 interpose in the way of his realizing his purposes; 
 whereas the adjustments and adaptations in question 
 are gradual growths, the originating power acting 
 from within in obedience to a law from which it 
 is impossible to deviate, which gradually develops 
 every part in relation to every other part. 
 
 With respect to this objection, I observe that, 
 while it professes to show how these marvellous 
 adjustments and adaptations can have originated 
 without the intervention of intelligence, it leaves his 
 difficulty precisely where he found it. It is no 
 account of their origin to say that they are a 
 growth. What, I ask, has enabled unintelligent 
 atoms and forces destitute of volition and purpose 
 to grow a mass of adjustments and adaptations, 
 suitable for performing functions necessary for their 
 existence, not a few of which are of so highly com- 
 plicated a character, that it has taken ages of careful 
 study and investigation before they have been dis- 
 covered? Surely a cell possessed of the properties 
 which Sir J. Lubbock has attributed to it in 
 the work from which I have quoted above, could 
 only have been produced by an intelligence of the 
 highest order. He himself calls it “a standing 
 miracle.” 
 
 To account for the existence of the innumer- 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 133 
 
 able adjustments, adaptations, and correlations with 
 which the animal and vegetable kingdoms abound, 
 by telling us that “they grew,” is to throw dust into 
 our eyes. Tell us how, why, and by what agency 
 devoid of intelligence they grow? Not only are 
 they, and the parts of which they are composed, 
 adjusted to one another, and to the organized being 
 as a whole, but they are adjusted and correlated 
 to the external universe; and unless they were 
 thus adjusted and correlated it would perish. Can 
 these, I ask, be growths? That they are not 
 growths by means of any power acting from within 
 them is certain. They must, therefore, have been 
 the production of a being possessed of boundless 
 power and intelligence, who was capable of ad- 
 justing the animal and vegetable kingdoms to the 
 previously existing external universe, or of adjust- 
 ing it to them, when as yet they existed only in 
 His creative purpose. Further; as to the objection 
 that the adjustments and adaptations in animal and 
 vegetable bodies are the result of a power ener- 
 cizing within them, I have only to observe that, 
 if this has been the mode of their production, 
 Christian Theism has nothing to say to the con- 
 trary; for, respecting the mode in which the 
 Creator has operated in effecting His creative 
 work, and operates in upholding it in being, and 
 directing and controlling it by His providence, it 
 
 is silent. 
 
134 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 3.—Lhe Adjustments and Adaptations by means of 
 which the vocal organs, and the organism of the 
 ear, are adjusted and correlated to the atmosphere. 
 
 The vocal organs, and the organism of the ear, 
 with all their wonderful adaptations and correlations, 
 would have existed to no purpose but for the 
 existence of another body, the atmosphere, which 
 is not, like them, a growth; but an existence entirely 
 distinct and independent of both. It must have 
 been formed anterior to the birth of either vegetable 
 or animal life on the globe, for without it neither 
 of them could have existed; yet it is in the most 
 intimate manner correlated to each. I ask the reader 
 particularly to observe that, to render hearing pos- 
 sible it is absolutely necessary that the motions of 
 the vocal organs should be conveyed to the organism 
 of the ear, and reproduced in it. How, then, is 
 this effected, for within the body there is no con- 
 necting link, by means of which the motions of the 
 one can be transmitted to the other ? This connecting 
 link is supplied by the air, which, although it must 
 have been brought into existence long prior to, the 
 formation of either organism, is so intimately corre- 
 lated to both, that every motion which is produced 
 by the one is faithfully transmitted by it to the other. 
 The motions of the vocal organs produce atmospheric 
 waves precisely corresponding to them, and these 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 135 
 
 produce motions precisely corresponding in the 
 tympanum of the ear. The vastness of their 
 number may be estimated by the consideration that 
 minute as are the variations of sound, which we are 
 Capable of perceiving, there must be a wave in the 
 atmosphere exactly corresponding to it which faith- 
 fully transmits every motion of the vocal organs to 
 the ear. The whole of these adaptations and cor- 
 relations, therefore, are inconceivably complicated ; 
 yet they work in harmony. Is it possible, I ask, to 
 believe that this complicated machinery has been pro- 
 duced by the interaction of blind forces undirected 
 by intelligence ? 
 
 Here let it be observed that thus far this mass of 
 complicated machinery has produced neither sound 
 nor voice, but motions only. Al] that it has accom- 
 plished is to have transmitted these motions to the 
 auric nerve, and through it to the brain. Still we 
 have nothing but motions. Before either sound or 
 hearing can be produced, another agent must be 
 present, namely, a percipient and conscious mind, 
 which must be capable of first setting the organism 
 in motion; and then, when the motions have been 
 transmitted to the brain, of translating them into 
 sensations and ideas; and when they have been 
 thus translated, to enable them to arouse the affec- 
 tions, and stir the emotions of our moral and 
 spiritual being. 
 
 But while the atmosphere is so constituted, that 
 
136 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 without it the production of sound, voice, and 
 language would have been impossible, it also fulfils 
 functions no less important in other departments of 
 nature. To one of these, I must ask the reader’s 
 attention at the hazard of somewhat deviating from 
 the direct line of my argument. Without it neither 
 vegetable nor animal life could exist. It consists 
 of a mixture of two gases, one of which is necessary 
 for the support of vegetable, and the other of animal, 
 life; and what is most remarkable, the gas which 
 is necessary for the support of the one, is destructive 
 of the other; and if either of them existed in pro- 
 portions in any considerable degree varying from the 
 present one, it would be destructive of both. How 
 then, is this proportion maintained, when animals 
 are constantly abstracting the one from it, and 
 vegetables the other? So intimately are they corre- 
 lated to it, that decay and death return to it those 
 portions which growth has abstracted from it, and 
 thereby its proper equilibrium is preserved. This 
 is a marvellous adjustment; for, vegetable and 
 animal life being yet non-existent, it must have been 
 adjusted and adapted to the requirements of both 
 while they were yet in the distant future. In a word, 
 in this respect, its constitution may be justly said 
 to have been prophetic. Such an adjustment the 
 constitution of our minds compels us to ascribe to 
 intelligent purpose, and forbids us to believe that it 
 can have been the result of the interaction of forces 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 137 
 destitute of intelligence and volition. It would too 
 much encroach on my space if I were to attempt to 
 describe the other most important purposes which 
 ‘t realizes in connection with animal and vegetable 
 life, and above all with the life of man. 
 
 Such are the complications of the instrumentality 
 by which hearing 1s effected in man. How is it 
 with that vast army of the animal kingdom, which 
 possesses in some form or other this faculty of 
 hearing? In their case the organism undergoes an 
 ‘ndefinite number of modifications, each fitted to the 
 condition of things in which the animal exists. How, 
 then, does the anti-Theist attempt to account for 
 these innumerable adjustments, and adaptations ? 
 He endeavours to persuade us that they have ori- 
 ginated-in a struggle for existence, in the course of 
 which, by the throwing out of favourable variations, 
 and the perishing of unfavourable ones, the endless 
 varieties of animal organisms have become accommo- 
 dated to their environment, and have by this means 
 gradually advanced from imperfect to more perfect 
 forms, until they have culminated in man. Such is 
 the theory. What, I ask, is the answer of common 
 sense? That the presence of intelligent purpose, 
 united with boundless power, is a rational account of 
 their origin; but that the anti-theistic mode of their 
 production is both inconceivable and incredible. 
 
 I have given a somewhat minute description of 
 the instrumentality by means of which sound, voice, 
 
138 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 and articulate speech are produced, in order that 
 I may impart to the reader a lively idea of the over- 
 whelming force of the evidence which these adjust- 
 ments, adaptations, and correlations furnish in proof 
 of the existence of an intelligent Creator. But as 
 others in numbers past comprehension exist in the 
 human body, it will be desirable that I should adduce 
 a few additional examples of the most important 
 ones as illustrations of my present argument. Let 
 us, therefore, give a brief consideration to 
 
 4.—TLhe Manner in which Viston ts effected. 
 
 The organism of the eye has always, and most 
 justly, formed with Theists a favourite illustration of 
 the argument from adaptation. Space will not allow 
 me to enter on a minute description of it ; I shall, 
 therefore, only draw attention to some of its most 
 striking adaptations. As an organism, it is no less 
 complicated than those by means of which we are 
 capable of perceiving the innumerable modifications 
 of the human voice. It is in the strictest sense 
 an optical instrument, as much as, nay more so than, 
 a telescope or a microscope, the distinction between 
 them being that the eye is a growth, whereas these 
 instruments are composed of substances previously 
 existing, put together by the ingenuity of man, and 
 so adjusted as to be capable of conveying rays of 
 light in numbers inconceivably vast, and converging 
 
ILLUSTRA TIONS OFTHE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 139 
 
 them on that portion of the eye designated the 
 “retina,” which is an expansion of the optic nerve, 
 which conveys their impressions to the brain, where 
 the percipient mind translates them into that which 
 we designate Vision. 
 
 In various points, however, the eye transcends all the 
 optical instruments which have ever been invented by 
 man for enlarging his sphere of vision. The telescope 
 is constructed so as to enable us to see distant objects 
 only, the microscope only those that are minute and 
 near ; but no instrument of human invention has been 
 able to combine the two. The human eye, on the 
 contrary, contains within itself a machinery of a most 
 elaborate description, whereby it is capable of changing 
 itself from a telescope into a microscope, and from a 
 microscope into a telescope, on the order of the mind 
 conveyed to it through the nervous system ; and this 
 takes place often every minute without our being 
 conscious of the re-adjustments of its machinery. It 
 also contains within itself an instrumentality, by 
 means of which whatever is requisite for keeping it 
 in constant repair is extracted from the blood. Spec- 
 tacles, telescopes, and microscopes require frequent 
 cleaning; the eye is supplied with a self-acting 
 machinery which enables it to clean 1tSclL eso 
 exclude excess of light, and to render objects visible 
 when there is only a small supply of it, the hole in 
 the eye called the pupil, through which the rays of 
 light pass is so formed as to be capable of dilating 
 
140 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 Fie oa er a ee 
 itself, when it requires a larger, and of contracting 
 
 itself when it requires a less number of rays to enter 
 it. This is effected by a number of nerves and 
 strings of extreme minuteness, adjusted, and corre- 
 lated together with such wonderful precision that 
 throughout every change this hole retains its circular 
 form. Thus, the chamber of the eye is a kind of 
 camera obscura, which, when the light is too little, can 
 enlarge its opening, and when it is too great, can 
 contract it by a self-acting machinery. The retina, 
 which is somewhere about half-an-inch in diameter, is 
 a most marvellous structure. On it, whenever we see 
 an extensive view, is painted by means of rays of light 
 the entire landscape in a form inconceivably minute ; 
 yet so complete and perfect that under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances we are capable of distinguishing a minute 
 change in the landscape, when the distance does not 
 exceed two miles. Further, let it be observed that 
 what we see is not the object itself, but a painting of 
 iton the retina. Small, however, as is the retina, its 
 structure is extremely complicated. The following 
 is an abridgement of Sir John Lubbock’s description 
 of it in the work above referred to— 
 
 “Though no thicker than a sheet of thin paper, 
 it consists of no less than nine separate layers, 
 the innermost being the rods and cones which are 
 the immediate recipients of the rays of light. The 
 number of the rods and cones in the human eye is 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 141 
 
 enormous. At a moderate computation, the cones 
 may be estimated at over three millions, and the rods 
 at thirty millions. .. Light is the effect produced 
 on us, when waves of light strike the eye. When 
 four hundred millions of millions of undulations of 
 ether strike the eye in a second, they produce 
 red; and as the number increases, orange, then 
 yellow, blue, green, and violet ; but between forty 
 thousand millions in a second, and four hundred 
 millions of millions, we have no organ of sense 
 capable of receiving the impression. Yet between 
 these limits, any number of sensations may exist. 
 We have five senses, and sometimes fancy that no 
 others are possible. But it is obvious that we cannot 
 measure the infinite by our narrow limitations” 
 
 (The Senses of Animals, pp. 122, 123, 191). 
 
 Further, although we have two eyes, each of which 
 possesses a retina, with an image of external things 
 painted on it, yet they are so adjusted and corre- 
 lated that no confusion of vision results therefrom, 
 and we are only percipient of a single image ; yet if 
 one eye gets damaged, or even destroyed, we are 
 able to see with the other, though we cannot embrace 
 so large a field of vision. 
 
 Such are some of the most remarkable adjustments, 
 adaptations, and correlations in that wonderful organ 
 by which we are rendered capable of seeing. Thus 
 far, however, we have got motions, undulations, and 
 
142 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 vibrations only, not sight. Unless this complicated 
 apparatus had been in the most intimate manner cor- 
 related to two other existences, it would have existed 
 to no purpose. One of these is that element, distinct 
 from, independent of, and external to, the eye which 
 we call light; but which really only becomes light 
 through the agency of the percipient mind. In 
 itself, as above described, it is neither more nor less 
 than an inconceivable number of vibrations of an 
 intangible element, which is assumed to fill space, 
 designated “ether.” To enable sight to be produced 
 it is necessary that the complicated organism of the 
 eye should be so closely correlated to it, or it to the 
 eye, as to enable the eye to collect and concentrate 
 its innumerable vibrations on the retina, and thence 
 to transmit them through the optic nerve to the brain. 
 Still as yet we have got nothing but vibrations and 
 motions. Before sight can be produced, this com- 
 plicated apparatus must be correlated to another 
 existence, namely, to a mind which possesses the 
 power of translating these motions, which in their 
 numbers numberless are concentrated on the retina, 
 into sensations and thoughts, thus enabling us to ac- 
 quire that mass of knowledge which is communicated 
 to us through the faculty of vision. 
 
 Between the organisms through which we see, and 
 those through which we become percipient of articulate 
 speech, there is, however, this remarkable distinction. 
 The first consists of two organisms, and the second 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 143 
 
 of three, adjusted to one another in the manner above 
 described. Between the eyes, the ears, and the 
 brain, there is a direct communication within the 
 body by means of a set of complicated adjustments. 
 This admits of our viewing the two eyes in the one 
 case, and the two ears in the other, as a single com- 
 plicated organism; yet so constituted, that, while 
 each two coneur in producing a common result, if 
 one of each pair be destroyed, the remaining one is 
 able to discharge its function so as to produce vision 
 and the other articulate speech. But between the vocal 
 organs and the ears, as already observed, there is no 
 means of communication within our bodies. Each, 
 therefore, unless the motions originated by the one 
 could be transmitted to the other through a medium ex- 
 ternal to, and existing independently of, both, would 
 be useless for the production of sound. But such 
 a medium exists in the atmosphere, which must have 
 had an existence not only independent of the vocal 
 organs and the ear, but must have existed long ages 
 prior to the formation of either. Surely, therefore, this 
 adjustment of the one to the other—so complicated, 
 yet, at the same time, so independent of one another ; 
 composed of parts so minute, yet by their adjust- 
 ments and adaptations of part to part, so exquisitely 
 fitted to realize a result so important to the well-being 
 of man that without it he would have only possessed 
 the powers of a mute—affords an unmistakable proof 
 of the presence of a designing mind, 
 
144 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Objections have been urged against the argument 
 from the structure of the eye, as affording proof of 
 the existence of a Creator, to whose wisdom it is 
 impossible to assign limitations, on the ground that 
 it has several imperfections as an optical instrument. 
 I quote from Dr. Carpenter's posthumous work, 
 entitled Mature and Man— 
 
 “The perfection of this adaptation, however, has 
 been partially denied by several modern writers, 
 who have based their denial on a statement in a 
 very interesting and instructive lecture on ‘The 
 Eye and Vision,’ given some years ago by my very 
 distinguished friend, Professor Helmholtz: ‘Now it 
 is not too much to say,’ continues the lecturer, 
 ‘that, if an optician wanted to sell me an instrument 
 which had all these defects, I should think myself 
 quite justified in blaming his carelessness in the 
 strongest terms, and in giving him back his instru- 
 
 TEL bere peel ey, 
 
 Here I cannot help remarking, even if this state- 
 ment of the Professor contained the truth, the whole 
 truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is utterly 
 invalid against the preceding reasonings. It is 
 undeniable that the adaptations and correlations 
 above referred to actually exist. The question really 
 at issue between the Theist and the anti-Theist is 
 not whether the eye is a perfect optical instrument, 
 but whether its intricate adjustments, adaptations, 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 145 
 
 and correlations can have resulted from the inter- 
 action of forces destitute of intelligence and volition ; 
 or whether they do not prove the presence of a 
 designing mind. An instrument may not be one 
 abstractedly perfect, but yet it may afford over- 
 whelming proof of the presence of intelligence. 
 
 But, whatever we may think of the prudence of 
 the language of Professor Helmholtz, the citation 
 of it apart from the context in which it stands, is 
 scandalously unfair, for it contains a statement 
 which entirely qualifies the words above cited ; and, 
 as far as the Theistic argument is concerned, renders 
 them absolutely nugatory. Let us~ again hear 
 
 te @arpcnter-—— 
 
 “Everyone who has any, knowledge of theological 
 controversy will recollect how frequently the charge 
 has been justly raised of unfairness of quotation ; a 
 single passage detached from its context may convey 
 a meaning altogether different from that which it 
 bears when taken with its context, so that even the 
 devil can cite Scripture for his purpose. Those who 
 take the anti-theological side are specially bound, 
 as it seems to me, to abstain from doing the very 
 thing for which they severely blame their opponents ; 
 and, yet I have seldom met with a case so unfair 
 as the citation of this statement without any of 
 the qualifications which it subsequently receives. 
 The following are the salient points of Professor 
 
 IO 
 
ae CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Ee 
 
 Helmholtz’s eee ee -—If I am asked why | 
 have spent so much time in explaining the imperfec- 
 tion of the eye, I answer that I have not done so in 
 order to depreciate the performances of this won- 
 derful organ, or to diminish our admiration of its 
 construction. It was my object to make my reader 
 understand that it was not any mechanical perfec- 
 tion of the organs of our senses, which secures for 
 us such wonderfully true and exact impressions 
 of the outer world. The perfection of the eye 
 is practical not absolute—z.e. adaptation to the 
 wants of the organism ; the defects of the eye as an 
 optical instrument being all so counteracted, that 
 the inexactness of the image which results from 
 their presence very little exceeds under ordinary 
 conditions of illumination the limits which are set 
 to the delicacy of sensation by the dimensions of the 
 retinal cones” (p. 423). 
 
 The preceding observations apply exclusively to 
 the human eye. In the animal kingdom the eye 
 undergoes various modifications, by which it is 
 adapted to the condition of things in which the 
 animal is destined to live. Thus, the eyes of birds of 
 prey are so constructed that they are able to discern 
 a minute object, when they are soaring at a consider- 
 able height; those of animals which have to seek 
 their prey during the night, so as to be able to see in 
 a very small quantity of light —e.g. those of the mole 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 147 
 
 to a life of burrowing. Insects which are incapable 
 of moving their eyes, and consequently if they had 
 only two immovable eyes would be able to com- 
 mand only a very limited view, are endowed as a 
 compensation with multitudes of little eyes, each of 
 which is framed on the strictest principles of optics. 
 To describe the endless modifications of this organ 
 in the different orders of animal existence would 
 occupy a space which would far exceed the limits 
 which can be assigned to this entire work. Suffice 
 it to say, they are as numerous as the different 
 species of animal existence, which are now known to 
 be almost past counting. 
 
 How, then, does the anti-theistic evolutionist 
 endeavour to escape the inference that these innu- 
 merable adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
 IUstenaveusbeenediues=to the-eactions of a being 
 possessed of an intelligence and a power to which it 
 is impossible to assign limitations ? Here, again, 
 the old answer will be repeated, that they have been 
 gradually evolved through the endless attempts of 
 some primeval beings to adjust themselves to their 
 environment at some remote period of the past . 
 which at length resulted in the formation of a 
 rudimentary eye, which has_ been _ gradually 
 improved to its present form by the attempts of 
 each succession of animal races, to adapt them- 
 selves to the ever varying conditions of their 
 
 existence. 
 
148 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Whether this ee affords a reasonable account 
 of the origin of the innumerable adjustments, adapt- 
 ations, and correlations through which vision is 
 
 produced, let the reader judge. 
 
 3.—The Processes through which Nutrition ts effected. 
 
 The following facts are indisputable— 
 
 (i) Our bodies grow. To render their growth 
 possible, a supply of food from some external 
 source is necessary.. This supply is provided. 
 
 (ii) Every act of exertion occasions a waste of 
 their substance. The body, therefore, stands in need 
 of constant repair. It contains a very complicated 
 system of organisms, adjustments, and adaptations, 
 mutually correlated to one another and to the ex- 
 ternal universe, which supply it with, and convey to 
 every part of it, the materials necessary for repair- 
 ing this waste, to which it is capable of imparting 
 its own life, and of incorporating them with its 
 own substance. 
 
 (iii) The, wasted matter, if it remained in the 
 body, would produce disease and death. How, 
 then, is this catastrophe avoided? ‘The body con- 
 tains within itself a complicated machinery which 
 relieves it from the presence of this noxious 
 matter. 
 
 Whence, then, are derived the necessary materials 
 to enable it to grow and repair its waste? Man 
 cannot assimilate mineral substances until they 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 149 
 
 have been incorporated into other bodies, nor can 
 he live on air or water. The needful materials 
 must, therefore, be drawn from the animal and 
 vegetable kingdoms. The animal portion of our 
 food is composed of substances of vegetable origin, 
 which other animals have incorporated into their 
 bodies; and these of substances which have been 
 incorporated into them and extracted by a very 
 complicated machinery out of the earth, the atmo- 
 sphere, and water; the power which enables. them 
 to do so being seated in the distant sun, without 
 whose rays not a single vegetable could exist. It 
 follows, therefore, that the supplying the child with 
 the materials necessary for its growth into a man, 
 involves an inconceivable number of adjustments, 
 adaptations, and correlations, some of which unite 
 the infant with the sun, ninety-three millions of 
 miles distant, and with the universe beyond; for, 
 to speak of nothing else, the force of gravitation 
 operates at the remotest distance to which the 
 telescope has enabled the eye of man to penetrate. 
 Is it conceivable, I ask, that these adjustments, 
 adaptations, and correlations can be accounted for 
 by the anti-theistic theory? 
 
 The necessary supply of food having been thus 
 obtained, I will now describe the processes by 
 which it is converted into the various substances 
 which compose our bodies. In doing this, it will 
 be impossible to enter on a minute description of 
 
150 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 them, for they are very complicated ones. The 
 following description must be viewed only as a 
 very brief and imperfect outline of them. 
 
 The food having been conveyed by the hands 
 into the mouth, there finds ready at hand an 
 apparatus, namely, the teeth aided by the tongue 
 necessary for masticating it, its mastication being 
 a necessary preliminary to its digestion. During 
 mastication a distant gland, by a chemical process, 
 secretes a fluid called saliva, which is conveyed by 
 a pipe from the place where it originates into the 
 mouth, where it is needed, and there gets mixed with 
 the masticated matter, the union of the two being 
 necessary to facilitate the future process of digestion. 
 Thence by another set of machinery of no little 
 complication, the food is conveyed to the stomach. 
 In the course of this journey, it passes over the 
 trap-door which I have above described, the failure 
 of which to execute its proper function would be 
 death. 
 
 In the stomach the process of digestion takes 
 place, and the food is reduced into a pulp. This 
 is effected by the aid of a secretion called the gas- 
 tric juice, which is produced through a chemical 
 process by a gland, whence it is conveyed by pipes 
 to the place where it is wanted, namely, the stomach. 
 It is particularly worthy of notice that this sub- 
 stance is only capable of dissolving dead matter ; 
 but while it acts powerfully on it, it leaves the living 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 151 
 
 stomach unharmed. Another remarkable peculiarity 
 of it is that different animals secrete a gastric juice 
 which is fitted to act on their different kinds of 
 food, and which refuses to act, or only acts imper- 
 fectly, on other substances. When the food is 
 sufficiently dissolved, the muscular ring of the 
 pylorus, which guards the entrance of the bowels, 
 and prevents the matter which has passed it from 
 returning into the stomach, is relaxed, and allows 
 its contents to pass into the duodenum. Here, for 
 the purpose of completing the digestion, two other 
 substances are required, namely, the bile and the 
 pancreatic juice. Accordingly, two secreting appa- 
 ratuses are provided; and their secretions are 
 conveyed by pipes to the place where their pre- 
 sence is necessary, namely, into the first of the 
 intestines. Here the whole of the food which has 
 entered the mouth, however numerous may have 
 been the substances of which it was originally 
 composed—those who are addicted to the pleasures 
 of the table know how many they partake of at a 
 single meal—is converted into a pulp nearly uni- 
 form in substance, called chyle. From hence the 
 entire mass is propelled by a suitable apparatus 
 through the bowels. These may not inaptly be 
 described as a pipe, about six times the length of 
 the human body, capable of lying in folds, and 
 endowed with the power of propulsion by con- 
 traction. This last operation is effected by a 
 
152 CHitosiaiv Paki sm, 
 
 minute but very numerous and complicated set of 
 muscles. 
 
 Complicated, however, as is the process, we are 
 still destitute of a substance suitable for incorpo- 
 ration with our bodies. To provide this another 
 process is necessary: the essence of the digested 
 matter has to be strained off. Here, again, a very 
 complicated machinery is provided, namely, a mass 
 of innumerable capillary tubes, as small as hairs, 
 which open their mouths into every part of the 
 intestines, and drain off from the digested matter 
 in its passage through them all in it which is 
 useful for nutrition. These minute pipes expand 
 into larger branches, and convey their contents into 
 a common receptacle ; and from thence by a suitable 
 machinery it is, strange to say, propelled uphill, 
 until it reaches the neck. It is obvious that in 
 this uphill journey there must be a tendency to 
 fall backwards, whenever the propelling muscles re- 
 lax ; but it finds, at suitable intervals, a machinery 
 already provided resembling the valves of an or- 
 dinary pump, which open to allow it to pass 
 upwards, and close to prevent it from falling down- 
 wards. This obviates the difficulty. From this 
 receptacle a propelling power causes it to discharge 
 its contents into a large vein through which the 
 old blood is flowing, which conveys both to the 
 heart. 
 
 Still, after these various processes have been 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 153 
 
 completed, and this long journey has been accom- 
 plished, the work of supplying the body with the 
 materials necessary for repairing its daily waste is 
 very incomplete. Before this could be effected, a fresh 
 agency of a most extremely complicated character 
 had to be brought into existence. The old blood in 
 its passage through the body has had abstracted 
 from it some of the materials most necessary for 
 supporting life, one of which the new matter has 
 never possessed. To supply this deficiency both 
 require to be brought into contact with the air. 
 How is this effected? By what must be admitted 
 to be a wonderful set of adaptations. The bellows- 
 like action of the chest, by the aid of a suitable 
 machinery, forces the atmospheric air into the lungs, 
 and these into millions of little bags, designated air- 
 cells. But it is necessary that the old blood and 
 the new matter should be brought into contact with 
 these air-cells. To effect this an engine, namely, 
 the heart, is found ready at hand, and prepared for 
 working. It may be described as a pumping machine, 
 but differing from ordinary pumps in possessing a 
 self-acting power of contraction and dilation. The 
 reader is probably aware that ordinary pumps depend 
 for their successful action on being provided with 
 valves, to prevent the water when once pumped up 
 from falling back again. Accordingly, the heart is 
 provided with this necessary apparatus, without 
 which its power of propulsion would be useless, It 
 
154 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 may be said to consist of two hearts, united into a 
 single organ. Of these, one forces the old blood and 
 the new matter into the hairlike capillary tubes of 
 the lungs, which lie on the surface of the air-cells ; 
 the structure of which is so delicate as to admit of 
 a free interchange of gases—the carbolic acid being 
 given off, and the oxygen imbibed. From thence, 
 after the old blood and the new matter have been 
 sufficiently exposed to the action of the air, both are 
 forced back into the other section of the heart, in 
 order that it may force it by the aid of another set 
 of highly complicated machinery through every part 
 of the human body. 
 
 By the agencies above described, the old blood 
 and the new material have been mixed together, and 
 brought into a state fit for nourishing the body, en- 
 abling its glands to secrete the secretions necessary 
 to enable its numerous organs to perform their 
 functions, and to supply its waste. Still it is useless 
 until it is conveyed to those parts of the body where 
 it is wanted; but of this more. presently. Here, 
 however, I would ask the reader’s attention to the 
 marvellous fact, that from one and the same substance 
 these glands secrete “about twenty different fluids, 
 in their sensible properties, in taste, smell, colour, 
 and consistency, the most unlike one another that is 
 possible ; thick, thin, salt, bitter, sweet, etc. And if 
 from ourselves we pass to other species of animals, 
 we find among their secretions not only the most 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 155 
 
 various, but the most opposite, properties; the 
 most nutritious aliment and the deadliest poison ; 
 the sweetest perfume and the most fcetid odours.”* 
 Yet we are invited to believe that such a substance, 
 the production of which would baffle the resources 
 of all the chemists in the world, has been produced 
 by forces destitute of intelligence. 
 
 The aliment necessary for nourishment has now 
 arrived at that place from whence it is necessary, if 
 it is to be of the smallest use, that it should be pro- 
 pelled to every part of the body. On its arrival here, 
 it finds the machinery requisite for effecting this all 
 ready at hand. The heart, a self-acting pumping 
 machine is waiting to undertake the work of pro- 
 pulsion. It is capable of discharging two table- 
 spoonfuls of blood at every beat into the arteries ; 
 and as each contraction is followed by a dilation the 
 blood which was propelled by the contraction would 
 fall backwards, unless a machinery was provided 
 ready at hand necessary for preventing it. This 
 consists of ‘a set of valves placed wherever their 
 services are required, which open to let the blood 
 pass onwards, and close to prevent it from returning 
 backwards. Destitute of these the heart could no 
 more perform its functions than a pump can. It is 
 further to be remarked that its dilation gives the 
 heart the necessary rest. 
 
 * Parey: Natural Theology, revised to harmonize with Modern 
 Science, 
 
156 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 The arteries constitute a very complicated system 
 of pipes, resembling those by which a city is supplied 
 with water ; but unlike them, they are endowed with 
 a contractile power to aid the pump—perhaps 
 syringe would be the more expressive term—in its 
 work of propulsion. These pipes gradually contract 
 in size, until they become indefinitely minute. Hére: 
 however, the analogy between those which supply a 
 city with water and those which supply the body 
 with the necessary aliment ceases. There is no 
 necessity that any portion of the water should be 
 carried back to the reservoir from whence it came ; 
 but it is necessary, after the very complicated organism 
 which is provided for that purpose has abstracted 
 from the blood all that is required for the nourish- 
 ment of the body, that the remainder should be 
 returned to its source; and after having had its 
 expended powers recruited by being mixed with 
 new aliment, and by imbibing a fresh supply of 
 oxygen in the lungs, should be returned to the 
 heart, in order that it should be by it once more 
 propelled on a fresh journey through the body. 
 
 Further: “To effect this complete circulation of 
 the blood four cavities in the heart are necessary, 
 and four are accordingly provided—two called 
 ventricles, which send out the blood, one into the 
 lungs, and the other to the mass of the body after it 
 has been returned from the lungs; and two others 
 called auricles, which receive the blood from the 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 157 
 
 veins: one as it comes immediately from the body ; 
 the other, as the same blood comes a second time 
 into the circulation through the lungs . . . So that 
 there are two receiving cavities, and two forcing 
 cavities. The receiving cavities respectively com- 
 municate with the forcing cavities, and by their 
 contraction unload the received blood into them. 
 The forcing cavities, when it is their turn to 
 contract, propel the same blood into the mouths 
 of the arteries.”* 
 
 This complicated system of pipes, the arteries 
 and the veins, convey nourishment to every part 
 of the body, and bring back again the super- 
 fluous matter to the proper place for enabling it to 
 enter on a fresh journey. They are too numerous 
 to be counted. ‘They run along the surface of the 
 membranes, pervade the muscles, and even penetrate 
 the bones. Every tooth is supplied with an artery 
 and a vein; the one to feed the bone, and the other 
 to bring back the spare blood from it. At the point 
 of junction the arteries and veins are inconceivably 
 minute. The fact that one cannot prick oneself 
 with a pin without drawing blood—that is, without 
 rupturing a blood-vessel—will convey to the reader 
 an idea of their number and minuteness. But in 
 addition to this complicated system of pipes for the 
 purpose of supplying nourishment, a system of 
 
 * PaLey: Natural Theology, revised to harmonize with Modern 
 Science. 
 
158 CHRISTIAN THEISM, 
 
 nerves, which acts as a kind of electric telegraph, 
 pervades every part of the body, and establishes a 
 rapid communication between every part of it and 
 the brain. It consists of two sets of nerves, one of 
 which transmits motions, and the other sensations ; 
 but neither of which are capable of performing. the 
 function of the other. The vastness of their numbers 
 is proved by the fact that it is impossible to prick 
 oneself with the finest needle without producing a 
 sensation. By these means a rapid communication 
 is established between every part of the body and 
 the brain, where these motions are translated by 
 the mind into sensations and thoughts. The whole 
 enables information to be received by the mind, 
 and a message returned in a time so short that to 
 us it 1s imperceptible. 
 
 The above is a very imperfect description of the 
 complicated machinery by which nourishment is 
 conveyed to every part of our bodies, their waste 
 repaired, the noxious matter drawn off from them, 
 and the means by which a rapid communication is 
 established between every part of them and the 
 brain. It will, however, enable the reader to form 
 some idea of the innumerable multitude of the ad- 
 justments, adaptations, and correlations which it 
 involves—the absence of any one of which would 
 mar the working of the whole; and its disorder, as 
 we know from experience, causes disease or even 
 death. 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 159 
 
 I must now ask the reader to pause, and calmly 
 weigh the evidence which those numberless adjust- 
 ments and adaptations furnish, that their formation 
 must have been due to a being, to whose power 
 and intelligence it is impossible to assign limita- 
 tions. For my own part, I am almost tempted 
 to accommodate the language of the Psalmist, and 
 say: ‘‘Foolish is the man who says in his heart 
 that they have been produced by the interaction 
 of forces, destitute alike of intelligence, purpose, 
 and voluntary agency, or in other words, ‘ There 
 TomnOa TOC 
 
 Let me take one more illustration from the human 
 body. Look at the hand. It will be unnecessary 
 to enter into a minute description of the parts 
 of which it is composed, or of the mode in which 
 its bones and muscles are adjusted to one another. 
 One thing, however, must strike every observer 
 as a marvellous adjustment. What, I ask, would 
 have been the result, if instead of our having four 
 fingers and a thumb, we had had five fingers and 
 no thumb? We should have been unable to ac- 
 complish with our hands one thousandth part of 
 what we are now able to effect by them. The anti- 
 Theist will doubtless ask us to believe that the 
 thumb is a natural growth, the production of the 
 unintelligent forces of Nature during a long course 
 of evolution, acting through the principle of natural 
 selection and the survival of the fittest; and that 
 
160 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 traces of its gradual growth may be found in the 
 lower animals. But what set these forces in motion 
 to produce a thumb instead of a fifth finger? What 
 period of time would it take to produce this single 
 adaptation? And how, destitute of a thumb, or while 
 one was gradually growing, could defenceless :man 
 have survived in his struggle for existence with 
 animals of vastly superior strength? Let the 
 anti-Theist answer. 
 
 It would have been easy to have continued these 
 illustrations to almost any extent, because the 
 universe is everywhere loaded with them; but I 
 cannot but think, that those who are unconvinced 
 by the adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
 which I have adduced, that intelligence must have 
 presided over their formation, will still continue un- 
 convinced by any additional number of them. At 
 any rate, they will be amply sufficient to enable the 
 reader not only to form a clear idea of the value of 
 the argument in question, as affording proof of the 
 existence of an intelligent Creator, but to use it 
 himself, when he contemplates the other parts of 
 his bodily constitution, or the innumerable adjust- 
 ments and adaptations which exist throughout every 
 part of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. The 
 author of Psalm cxxxix., whose knowledge of 
 anatomy was doubtless extremely limited, who 
 knew nothing of the nervous system, of the circu- 
 lation of the blood, of the means by which it is 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 161 « 
 effected, or of the complicated machinery by which 
 the food which is introduced into the mouth is 
 rendered fit for the nourishment of the body, and 
 conveyed to every part of it, yet, impressed by - 
 what is visible and palpable could justly exclaim, 
 
 ‘“T will give thanks unto Thee ; for I am fearfully 
 and wonderfully made: Wonderful are Thy works: 
 and that my soul knoweth right well. My frame 
 was not hidden from Thee, when I was made in 
 Secret. ... Thine eyes did see mine unperfect 
 substance, and in Thy book were all my members 
 written, which day by day were fashioned, when as 
 yet there there was none of them.” 
 
 This is the language of common SCISC a teias 
 been reserved for a certain class of philosophers and 
 scientists to propound the theory that these innumer- 
 able adjustments, adaptations, and correlations have 
 resulted from the action and interaction of forces 
 incapable of forming a purpose, and destitute of in- 
 telligence and volition. If this has been so, these 
 forces have effected results, compared with which all 
 those effected by the combined intelligence of man 
 are as nothingness. Let the reader judge. 
 
 Before closing this chapter, it will be desirable to 
 take a single glance at the vegetable kingdom. 
 Having taken a cell, let us now take a seed for an 
 example. From it has been produced the mighti- 
 est monarch of the forest, the humblest plant, and 
 
 a 
 
162 CHRISTIAN -THEISM. 
 
 everything intermediate between them. To prepare 
 it for its future destination— 
 
 ‘adjustments had to be completed between it and 
 things in the earth, in the air, in the water, and 
 in the distant worlds whence come light and heat. 
 It has to live with and by the earths. It contains, 
 ready and adjusted, an apparatus for decomposing 
 earths, and turning their compounds into its future 
 substance. It has to depend on water. It has, ready 
 and adjusted, an apparatus for decomposing water, 
 and nourishing its own material with the new liquid. 
 Alongside of this partly retrospective apparatus exists 
 a purely prospective one, ready made and adjusted, for 
 pumping the new liquid elaborated by the last ap- 
 paratus, for making it run uphill, and for spreading 
 it out on this side and on that. The seed has to 
 depend on air. It contains, ready and adjusted, an 
 apparatus for decomposing air, and for incorporating 
 its component parts in various forms with its own 
 tissues. 
 
 ‘“‘ Again, if the other world, that is, the sun, is in- 
 accessible to the seed, it does not follow that the 
 seed is inaccessible to the other world. Other worlds 
 have long arms. Across open spaces, towards bridging 
 over which all the trunks grown in the forests during 
 terrestial ages would not go so far as would a boy’s 
 boat towards bridging over the Atlantic—across these 
 that other world can put fcrth its emanations till 
 they reach the seed, till they enter into it, till they 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 163 
 
 pass through again and again its cone, till they 
 diffuse over every one.of its cells a force from on 
 high, which, in ways we know not, turns its array 
 of possible energies into actual powers, bringing 
 forth noble products—that is, covering the earth 
 with vegetation” (Arthur’s Fernley Lectures, pp. 54, 
 
 55, 50). 
 
 I need hardly draw the reader’s attention to the 
 fact, that every one of the things above enumerated as 
 necessary for the life and growth of the seed involves 
 a countless number of previously existing adjust- 
 ments, adaptations, and correlations ; if those things 
 were otherwise, both animal and vegetable life would 
 perish. Is it conceivable that they can have been the 
 hap-hazard productions of unintelligent forces ? 
 
 I cannot forbear quoting one more passage from 
 the same author, whose work | strongly recommend 
 for the perusal of the reader — 
 
 “Yet what sense detects in the cells the apparatus 
 for decomposing air, that for decomposing water ; 
 that for decomposing sunbeams, that for turning the 
 heat ray to one use, the colour ray to another, the 
 actinic to a third; that for compounding protoplasm, 
 that for turning one element into fibre, another into 
 complexion, another into odour, another into pumping 
 force, what sense detects within the seed of the 
 maple, the special apparatus pre-established to dot 
 with its pretty bird’s eyes generation after generation 
 
164 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 of its offspring. To tell us that we do not know that 
 these exist! It is just the thing that we do know. 
 Apparatus may not be the right name for them. But 
 the invisible power is there, and we know it. These 
 various powers stand to one another in relations pre- 
 established ; and they, in turn, pre-determine long 
 beforehand the relations of things which as yet are 
 not in existence. But although they fill with wonder 
 the minds of men, who are content to let mind work 
 without lacing it up. against free movement in search 
 of cause or design—with wonder at the skill, the 
 design, the adaptation, the power, of which they are 
 full—they do not, any more than relation among 
 inorganic bodies, present to us any moral ties, or 
 virtues, or defects” (p. 56). 
 
 If, then, as Sir J. Lubbock affirms, “every cell in 
 the animal body is a standing miracle,” I think that 
 we are entitled to affirm that every seed in the 
 vegetable kingdom is also a standing miracle. But 
 both these miracles sink into nothingness, if it is 
 true that all the adjustments, adaptations, and correla- 
 tions with which every part of the universe absounds ; 
 and which unite it into a complicated whole, so that 
 what affects one part affects every other part; have 
 been the result of the action and interaction of forces 
 which are destitute of intelligence, incapable of 
 purpose, foresight, or volition; and whose sole and 
 only agency is necessary agency impelling them in 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 165 
 
 a eee oe ee tty 
 
 a course from which it is impossible for them to 
 deviate to the right hand’ or to the left. If,- then, 
 we feel that it is one of the highest of certitudes, 
 if when twelve dice are thrown at hap-hazard into 
 the air, they fall a hundred times in succession with 
 their aces upwards, that they are loaded, infinitely 
 more commanding is the proof which the adjust- 
 ments, adaptations, and correlations of the universe, 
 existing as they do in numbers passing all human 
 comprehension, furnish that it also must be loaded in 
 every part. With what then only can it be loaded ? 
 I answer, With the presence of Deity, energizing 
 in, directing, and upholding all its forces, so that 
 if we ascend up into heaven, He is there; if we go 
 down to hades, He is there ; if we take the wings 
 of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts 
 of the sea, even there shall His hand lead us, and 
 His right hand shall hold us. If we say, Surely the 
 darkness shall overwhelm us, and the light shall be 
 as the night; even the darkness and the light are 
 both alike to Him. Great and marvellous are Thy 
 works, Lord God Almighty. Thou hast created all 
 things, and by Thy will they are, and were created ; 
 and even the minutest creature which exists was 
 brought into being and fashioned by Thy bound- 
 less power and wisdom, and is the subject of Thy 
 providential care, 
 
CHAPTERS RVALLT: 
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN 
 PROVES THAT A GOD EXISTS, WHO Ioeaenr 
 A MERE IMPERSONAL FORCE, BUT A MORAL 
 BEING. 
 
 EFORE I attempt to offer a direct proof of this 
 position it will be necessary to lay down certain 
 fundamental principles on which this argument will 
 be based. These are facts, the truth of which each 
 of us may verify for himself, by an appeal to the 
 affirmations of his consciousness. These form the 
 highest of our certitudes. What, then, does it 
 affirm ? 
 
 I.—It affirms that we are free agents—that is, that 
 we possess a power of choosing between one or 
 more alternatives, of originating action, and of 
 adopting or refusing to adopt a particular line of 
 action. 
 
 This position is controverted by anti-Theists. 
 I must, therefore, endeavour to make the theistic 
 position clear. It is objected, that when we affirm 
 that man is a free agent that it is equivalent to 
 
PHYSICAL, AND’ MORAL. AGENTS 167 
 
 saying that he possesses a freedom which is devoid 
 of limitations. This is a misrepresentation ; for all 
 that we intend is, that he possesses a freedom of 
 choice within certain definite limits ; that is, that he 
 possesses a power to act or to forbear acting sufficient 
 to constitute him a responsible agent. Into the 
 origin of this power I shall not inquire, for it will be 
 sufficient for the purpose of the present argument to 
 prove that it exists as a fact in whatever way it may 
 have originated. 
 
 As the possession of this power is one of the most 
 important characteristics which distinguish man from 
 all other agents in the world, it will be necessary 
 clearly to point out the nature of this distinction. 
 Physical agents, by which I mean beings devoid of 
 volition, act in the manner in which they act, because 
 they are incapable of doing otherwise. They act 
 because they are forced to act; and they invariably 
 act in the same manner under the same conditions. 
 They are destitute of will, intelligence, and purpose. 
 Force is the only thing which can set them in motion, 
 and when they are once set in motion, they are 
 incapable of acting in any other manner than that 
 which the forces acting on or inherent in them 
 compel them to act, notwithstanding any terrible 
 consequences which may result from their activity. 
 They know not what they do; they have no choice; 
 to all persuasion they are deaf; and do what they 
 may, no one ever thinks of holding them responsible 
 
168 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 for the results which follow. Man, on the contrary, 
 is the opposite of all this. He is capable of choosing 
 between two courses of action which of them he 
 will pursue. Though he is incapable of altering the 
 forces which act in or on physical agents, he possesses 
 the power of giving them a different direction from 
 that which they must have taken, apart from his 
 intervention ; and of combining and directing them, 
 So as to compel them to execute the purposes of his 
 will, and thus make them, instead of lording it over 
 him, his servants. | 
 
 As this is a very important point in the Theistic 
 controversy, I will illustrate my meaning by a very 
 familiar exampie. A steam engine can only act in 
 one way, as long as the forces acting on, or inherent 
 in it, continue to energize; but man, although he is 
 incapable of altering those forces, is capable of 
 giving them a direction, within certain limits, accord- 
 ing to his pleasure; or even, of bringing its action 
 to a standstill. Thus, we never think of blaming an 
 engine for any amount of destruction which it may 
 occasion ; but if the engineer has failed in his duty 
 in controlling its motions, we hold him to be guilty 
 of manslaughter or of murder, according to the degree 
 of his culpable negligence. Physical agents we 
 neither praise, blame, persuade, nor hold responsible, 
 Men we praise, blame, attempt to persuade, and 
 hold responsible, because we entertain no doubt that 
 within certain well-known limits, they possess the 
 
PHYSICAL AND MORAL AGENTS. 169 
 
 power of voluntary action. Whence this persuasion ? 
 We know, with an assurance of absolute certainty, 
 that we ourselves possess this power; and we infer 
 with an assurance of equal certainty, that all other 
 human beings possess it likewise. 
 
 Here it is necessary to meet an objection. It has 
 been urged by anti-Theists, as an argument against 
 the theistic position, that various animals possess a 
 freedom of choice, yet no one on this account argues 
 that they are liberated from the laws of necessary 
 agency. I fully admit that they, especially the 
 higher orders of them, possess an intelligence, and a 
 power to choose between two or more alternatives 
 within certain narrow limits; but these limits are so 
 narrow that no one considers them to be responsible 
 for their actions. Noxious animals simply obey the 
 impulses of their nature, and cannot help doing so. 
 We destroy them, not because we hold them respon- 
 sible, but simply because they are noxious. True it 
 is, that on the higher order of animals, we inflict 
 pain when they offend us; but we do this, not as 
 a punishment for wrong-doing, but for the purpose 
 of deterring them, through the influence of fear, from 
 acting in a similar manner in the future. In this 
 case the appeal is not made to any sense of right, or 
 wrong, possessed by the animal, which merely follows 
 the course which its impulses or its instincts suggest, 
 but to the principle of the association of ideas. 
 Thus, when a dog offends us, we whip him as a 
 
170 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 deterrent from acting again in a similar manner ; 
 and our doing so becomes efficacious, because the 
 animal associates the pain with the act in question, 
 and therefore he avoids it for the future. But this is 
 only efficacious when the pain is inflicted immediately 
 after the offence; if it is delayed for any consider- 
 able time, it would fail to act as a deterrent, and 
 would be cruelty pure and simple. But man under- 
 stands what punishment means, however long it may 
 be delayed after the crime; and our moral nature 
 affirms, when retribution at last overtakes the 
 offender, that the punishment is just; and he under- 
 stands it likewise. 
 
 Further: We never charge an animal which has 
 injured us with having committed a sin ora crime, 
 because we consider, and that rightly, that it has 
 only acted in conformity with impulses which it had 
 no power to restrain; all that we demand is, that it 
 should be prevented from doing mischief for the 
 future. But with man it is the contrary. Why is 
 this? It is because we feel assured that he possesses 
 a power which would have enabled him to avoid 
 doing the evil act. It follows, therefore, that what- 
 ever amount of intelligence and power to choose be- 
 tween different alternatives is possessed by animals; 
 or even if the higher orders of them possess some of 
 the rudiments of a moral nature ; that between their 
 endowments, and those of man, the gulf which separ- 
 ates them is so wide as to make us as it were by a 
 
PHYSICALZANDI MORAL AGENTS. 171 
 
 kind of intuition hold them irresponsible for their 
 actions, while we hold men responsible. The 
 possession of that degree of freedom which is 
 necessary for constituting responsibility is an 
 essential ingredient in the conception of a moral 
 being. 
 
 II.—It forms a certitude, than which we have none 
 stronger, that man is not a thing but a person. 
 As this is an important point in the theistic con- 
 troversy, anti-Theists have done their best to 
 confuse this subject, by the aid of a number of 
 metaphysical subtleties, into the discussion of which 
 I shall not enter. I admit that it is difficult to give 
 a logical definition of personality; but we all of 
 us intuitively understand what we mean when we 
 affirm that we are persons, and not things. Among 
 other things, the conception of personality involves 
 the power of volition, of free agency, and a sense 
 of sameness and persistent existence during long 
 intervals of time, notwithstanding any amount of 
 change that we may have passed through during 
 our previous lives. Thus we intuitively feel: that 
 we are the same beings that we were, say, some 
 twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years ago, or from 
 the earliest dawn of our conscious recollection, and 
 no amount of reasoning can persuade us to the 
 contrary. 
 
 The fact that we are persons, is one of the 
 greatest importance in relation to our present 
 
172 CHRISTIAN THEISM., 
 
 argument, because scientific men assure us that 
 during the shortest of these intervals, our bodies 
 have undergone so complete a change that our 
 present bodies do not contain in them a single 
 particle which they possessed at some not very re- 
 mote period of the past. But notwithstanding this 
 complete change in our bodily framework, we feel 
 that it is one of our highest certitudes, that we 
 were at the earliest dawn of our conscious recol- 
 lection the same persons that we are at the present 
 moment. From this the all-important inference is 
 inevitable, that the beings which we designate 
 Ourselves, have an existence distinct from the 
 atoms which compose our bodies. This being so, 
 it follows that other beings exist than those com- 
 posed of matter impelled by blind unintelligent force ; 
 namely, beings which can neither be seen by our 
 eyes, felt by our hands, weighed by our scales, 
 nor become the subject of our senses. 
 
 The universe, therefore, consists of three orders 
 of beings—persons, animals, and things. Stated 
 briefly, a person may be defined for all the pur- 
 poses of our present argument as a being which 
 possesses self-consciousness, and which is capable 
 of affirming of itself, | Myself, which no thing, and 
 no animal, as far as we can judge, can. Animals, 
 therefore, are destitute of those attributes which 
 constitute personality, and are, consequently, irre- 
 sponsible for their actions. On the other hand, 
 
 i atl 
 
J 
 
 PHYSICAL “AND MORAL AGENTS. 173 
 
 everyone who possesses personality, feels himself 
 responsible for them and for the consequences 
 which have resulted from them, however remote 
 they may have been in point of time. This cer- 
 tainty that we exist, and that we possess the 
 attributes above referred to, not only removes all 
 difficulties in believing that other beings exist 
 who possess similar attributes, but renders it in 
 the highest degree probable that they do so. The 
 above considerations, therefore, make short work 
 with what is called materialism. I mention this 
 in the present place for the purpose of pointing 
 out the importance of the position in question. 
 III.—We possess the highest certainty that we 
 are beings who are capable of distinguishing be- 
 tween right and wrong, and this, irrespective of any 
 consequences which may result to ourselves; that 
 there is something within us which tells us that 
 we ought to pursue the conduct which is right, and 
 abstain from that which is wrong, and which visits 
 us with a feeling of self-condemnation if we dis- 
 obey its dictates. This principle we call conscience, 
 or moral sense; but it is immaterial to our argu- 
 ment by what term we designate it, or how it may 
 have originated, provided we recognize its existence 
 asa fact. I make this observation, because nu- 
 merous attempts have been made to disprove its 
 existence by propounding some particular theory 
 about its origin ; or by appealing to the imperfect 
 
174 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 perceptions of savages, or other imperfect specimens 
 of human nature, as affording proof that the belief 
 that we possess any inherent perception of the dif- 
 ference between right and wrong, is a delusion. 
 All that it is necessary to contend for, as far as 
 concerns our present argument, is, that however it 
 may have originated, it exists in fully developed 
 men and women, and that it is a simple fact that 
 each one of us (I may say all civilized men) is 
 conscious that there is something within us which 
 tells us that it is our duty to do this, and to abstain 
 from doing that, and which visits us with various 
 degrees of disapprobation, if we neglect to obey its 
 behests. 
 
 What, then, in brief, are the certitudes which 
 each of us intuitively feel that our conscience or 
 moral sense affirms as indubitably true? I answer, 
 that there is a distinction between right and wrong ; 
 that it is our duty to do what it affirms to be right, 
 and to abstain from doing what it affirms to be 
 wrong; that there is a clear distinction between 
 things, as they ought to be, and things as they 
 actually are; and that it is our duty to aim at 
 realizing the former, and to strive to elevate both 
 ourselves and others above the latter. 
 
 I'V.—Our consciousness affirms that we possess 
 certain affections widely different from the mere 
 instincts of animals, which constitute what we 
 designate character; and that we possess within 
 
PHYSICAL, AND MORALS AGENIS: 175 
 
 certain limits a power of modifying our characters 
 either for good or for evil by means of another 
 principle inherent in us, the principle of habitua- 
 tion. It is true that what we frequently, though 
 inaccurately, designate character in other members 
 of the animal kingdom, is capable of undergoing 
 various modifications ; but these can only be effected 
 by influence exerted on them from without. Man 
 alone is capable of modifying his character dy an 
 act of self-determination originating in himself. This 
 power renders him within certain limits responsible 
 for his character, and for the actions which result 
 from it. That we possess such a power is a direct 
 affirmation of our consciousness, the existence of 
 which anyone may verify for himself by carefully 
 reflecting on his past history. The possession of 
 a power of modifying our characters by an act of 
 self-determination is disputed by anti-Theists. A 
 very palpable instance to the contrary disproves 
 this. It is an unquestionable fact that, by an act 
 of self-determination, we can modify our tempers. 
 The above positions and the following arguments 
 are based on the assumption that the concurrent affir- 
 mations of the consciousness of the overwhelming 
 majority of mankind form the highest of certitudes— 
 certitudes so complete that they cannot be shaken by 
 any amount of adverse reasoning. This has been 
 denied, but the denial pushed to its legitimate con- 
 sequences means intellectual suicide; for, every truth 
 
176 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 which we arrive at by a process of reasoning must 
 rest on the assumption that there are truths which 
 Wwe arrive at independently of any reasoning process 
 whatever, whether inductive or deductive, which, 
 being self-evident in themselves, ultimately rest on 
 one or more of the affirmations of our consciousness 
 as the ground of our convictions. If it be objected 
 that the consciousness of some, such as madmen 
 or visionaries, though real in themselves, point to no 
 reality corresponding to them, I answer that the 
 appeal must be made from minds thus diseased to 
 the consciousness of men and women in considerable 
 numbers, and when the overwhelming majority of 
 their experiences concur, they must be accepted as an 
 ultimate test of truth ; otherwise universal scepticism 
 would be the result. It will be desirable that I 
 should here briefly enumerate these certitudes as far 
 as they bear on our present argument. 
 
 1. That we are persons in the sense above 
 described. 
 
 2. That within certain limits we are possessed of 
 free, as distinct from necessary, agency. 
 
 3. That we possess the power of originating action. 
 
 4. That although we cannot create any force 
 additional to those already existing, we are capable 
 of imparting to’existing forces a direction different 
 from that which they would have taken apart from 
 our intervention, and thus of compelling them within 
 certain limits to work out our pleasure, 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC POSITION. 1747 
 
 5. That we possess a conscience, or moral sense, 
 which utters authoritative judgments as to what it is 
 our duty to do or to forbear doing; and which visits 
 us with a feeling of self-condemnation if we neglect 
 to obey its behests. 
 
 6. That our belief that moral beings exist, which 
 are not ourselves, is no phantom of the imagination, 
 but a great reality. 
 
 If these positions are true, they afford such strong 
 evidence that a God exists such as Christians believe 
 in, that we need not wonder that anti- Theists— 
 whether they are Atheists, Pantheists, Positivists, 
 or Agnostics—have endeavoured to prove that the 
 affirmations of our consciousness are unreliable. A 
 few additional remarks, therefore, will be necessary 
 for the purpose of enabling the reader to judge of 
 the fallacy of their objections. 
 
 Every form of anti-Theism is based on the assump- 
 tion that mind is an evolution out of matter, that it 
 has no existence apart from matter, and that the 
 phenomena which we call mental, be they intellectual 
 or be they moral, have been produced by a slow and 
 gradual evolution out of that which originally pos- 
 sessed no one quality which we designate intellectual 
 or moral. In a word, life has been spontaneously 
 evolved out of non-life, or has been the result of the 
 different arrangements, motions, and combinations of 
 particles of matter during the ages of the past, which 
 in their original state were devoid of life; and that 
 
 12 
 
178 CHRISTIAN THETSM. 
 
 our intellects, with all their mighty powers, and our 
 moral nature, with its noblest aspirations, have either 
 sprung spontaneously into existence, or have been 
 evolved out of things devoid of intelligence, moral 
 agency, and affections. From these principles the 
 inference has been drawn by anti-Theists—-and, I 
 admit, has been justly drawn if these principles 
 are true—that what Christians understand by the 
 words ‘‘spiritual” and “moral” has no objective 
 reality ; that moral agency is neither more nor 
 less than a modification of physical agency; and 
 that when we fancy that we are free to act, or to 
 forbear acting, or are capable of exercising choice, 
 we are really acting under as iron a law of ne- 
 cessity as that which regulates the motions of the 
 planets. 
 
 This, stripped of all disguises, is the position taken 
 by anti-Theists. Perhaps not a few of my readers 
 may think that its best refutation is its simple state- 
 ment; for I feel persuaded that, whatever anti-theistic 
 philosophers and scientists may affirm, or by what- 
 ever amount of complicated arguments these positions 
 may be attempted to be proved, that the common 
 sense of the overwhelming majority of intelligent men 
 and women will refuse to believe that intelligence 
 has been evolved out of non-intelligence; per- 
 sonality out of that which is not only impersonal but 
 unconscious ; the freedom and the power of volition, 
 which each of us is conscious of possessing, out of 
 
THE ANTI-THEISTIC POSITION. 179 
 
 agents devoid of both, which can only act be- 
 cause they are forced to act, which are destitute 
 of all power to regulate or modify their action, and 
 can only act in conformity with an iron law of 
 necessity. In a word, our common sense affirms that 
 it is impossible to evolve out of a thing that which 
 Was never in it. 
 
 But as these positions have been loudly trumpeted 
 by men of unquestionable eminence as philosophers 
 and scientists, as affording proof that our belief that 
 we are free agents is no better than a delusion, and 
 consequently that there can be no God who is a 
 free agent; and as not a few are influenced by the 
 authority of great names, it will be necessary to 
 ofter a few additional observations on them. These 
 positions are, of course, propounded in a form less 
 Tepugnant to common sense than that in which | 
 have stated them above. Thus, it is affirmed that 
 we can only act in conformity with the strongest 
 motive, and that when different motives present 
 themselves to our minds the strongest necessarily 
 prevails, and leaves us no choice as to the course 
 of action which we will pursue; and that all our 
 actions are the necessary result of our characters, 
 over the formation of which we have exerted no 
 control, because they have been partly transmitted 
 from ancestors more or less remote, and partly the 
 creation of our surroundings. This being so it is 
 urged that to speak of man as a free agent is absurd, 
 
180 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 and therefore that the consciousness which we feel | 
 that we are free agents must be a delusion. Further : 
 It is objected that what is commonly called “the 
 freedom of the will involves the affirmation that man 
 can act without motives. 
 
 First, then, it will be necessary to inquire , what 
 is the meaning which anti-Theists attach to the 
 word “motive,” for it is the vagueness with which 
 it is used in this controversy which gives to the 
 objection its entire plausibility. The term ‘‘ motive x 
 is in popular language used to denote incentives 
 to action which differ as widely as an affirmation 
 of our conscience that it is a duty to act or forbear 
 acting in this or that particular manner, differs from 
 an impulse to gratify some of our animal passions. 
 The reader will at once see that incentives which 
 differ thus widely in character are incapable of being 
 measured by any common measure of pleasure or 
 pain with which our yielding to them may be 
 attended. Anti-Theists in this controversy are in 
 the habit of confounding together under the term 
 “motive” things differing as widely as incentives 
 to action arising from certain affections, passions, or 
 impulses of our nature, from the determinations of 
 our reason, and from affirmations of our conscience 
 which tells us that it is our duty to pursue a certain 
 course of action, notwithstanding any amount of 
 self-sacrifice with which it may be attended; and 
 then tell us that freedom of choice between these 
 
MAN CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN “ALTERNATIVES. 181 
 
 is impossible, because the strongest motive must 
 prevail, and that the strength of a motive must be 
 dependent on the degree of pleasure or pain with 
 which its gratification is attended. How, I ask, 
 can we apply any common measure to the pleasure 
 with which an animal gratification is attended, and 
 an act of self-sacrifice in obedience to ‘the demands 
 of duty ? The incentives to action, therefore, 
 which are confounded together under the common 
 term “motives,” not only differ in degree, but 
 in kind. . 
 
 Abandoning all theory, let us consider what are 
 the actual facts. Man is an animal, but he is 
 also something more. His animal nature, unless 
 restrained by some higher principle, would irresis- 
 tibly impel him to seek sensual gratification as his 
 highest good. His nobler affections lead him to 
 pursue various ideals too numerous to mention. 
 But in addition to these, there is another portion 
 of his being, wholly different in character from his 
 animal passions, or even his nobler aspirations, 
 which asserts its right to prescribe to him what 
 he ought to do, and what he ought to forbear 
 doing—namely, his conscience, and his sense of right 
 and wrong. ‘This, despite of all the arguments which 
 anti-heists have adduced to prove that it has no 
 independent existence in man, the testimony of every 
 language spoken by civilized man proves that we 
 are conscious of possessing. So completely have the 
 
182 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 believers in man’s personality, free agency, and power 
 of self-determination, held possession of the ground 
 during the ages of the past, that it is impossible to 
 express oneself for five minutes in the ordinary 
 intercourse of life, without using language which 
 assumes that these things are not phantoms, but 
 realities. Here, then, the intuitions of mankind stand 
 in direct opposition to the theories and reasonings 
 of anti-theistic philosophers and scientists. 
 
 One form of the anti-theistic theory, however, 
 virtually concedes the point at issue, for it admits that 
 we are capable of controlling those impulses which 
 urge us to the pursuit of immediate pleasure so 
 as to pursue future happiness as an end of life, 
 rather than yield to present gratification which 
 may be subversive of it. If this be so—and who, 
 I ask, has not had experience that it is so ?—it is 
 evident that we are capable of exercising a choice 
 between various impulses which of them we will 
 follow; and that we are under no compulsion to 
 yield to that which for the moment may appear to 
 be the most seductive one: for the possibility of 
 regulating our actions on prudential considerations 
 involves a power of self-restraint, and of choosing 
 between different incentives to action. The desire 
 of present gratification is, perhaps, the strongest 
 impulse in human nature, yet we all know for certain 
 that we are capable of controlling and resisting it. 
 No impulse is stronger than that which urges the 
 
MAN CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES. 183 
 
 drunkard to his bottle ; but until he has arrived 
 at that state of een in which by habitual 
 indulgence in his vice he has destroyed his power of 
 self-restraint, to say that he is irresistibly impelled 
 to yield to temptation is contrary to fact. 
 
 The subject which we are now considering is so 
 important in its bearing on the theistic controversy, 
 that it will aid us in its elucidation if I give a brief 
 analysis of what we are conscious of doing, when a 
 number of incentives to different courses of action 
 present themselves to our minds. Let us suppose 
 that one of them is a strong desire to indulge in 
 some particular pleasure ; another is an affirmation 
 of our reason, that its gratification will be attended 
 at some period of the future with results which are 
 highly undesirable ; and that a third is an authori- 
 tative declaration of our conscience that to gratify 
 the appetite in question would be morally wrong, 
 and that it is our duty to abstain from it. What, I 
 ask are we conscious of doing under these circum- 
 stances? This question is capable of receiving a 
 distinct answer, because they are circumstances of 
 which every one of us has had experience. Let us 
 assume that the desire in question is one of the 
 strongest impulses of our animal nature. Do we, I 
 ask, feel irresistibly impelled to gratify it? I admit 
 that its gratification is certain, if we shut out every 
 other consideration, and concentrate our.attention on 
 the pleasure arising from its indulgence. But there 
 
184 CHRISTIAN. THEISM, 
 
 are other alternatives. We know on the testimony 
 of our consciousness that we possess a power of 
 withdrawing our attention from an impulse however 
 strong, the indulgence of which our reason pro- 
 nounces to be undesirable, or which our conscience 
 pronounces that it is our duty to abstain from ; and 
 of concentrating it on some other incentive to action, 
 be it a prudential consideration, or a sense of duty ; 
 and that by this means we are capable of giving the 
 prudential consideration, or the sense of duty, the 
 victory over the temptation. 
 
 What, then, are we each of us conscious of 
 having done when we have been assailed by a 
 powerful temptation to do that which our conscience 
 has affirmed to be morally wrong? Did we feel 
 that we had no power of resistance, or that we 
 were compelled to yield to the temptation? We 
 are certain of the contrary. We were conscious 
 of possessing a force within us which we designate 
 ‘will,’ which enables us by a vigorous exertion to 
 withdraw our attention from the unhallowed grati- 
 fication, and to concentrate it on our sense of duty. 
 The struggle may have been, and often is, a hard 
 one; but who does not know from his own experi- 
 ence that in this way he has exerted a choice over 
 different impulses to action, and that he has thus 
 enabled his sense of duty to obtain the victory over 
 those impulses of his nature, which, if unrestrained, 
 would have impelled him to the pursuit of present 
 
MAN GAN CHOOGSEVEEDIVEEN ALTERNATIVES. 185 
 
 pleasure? Further: Although conscience utters its 
 affirmations in the most authoritative form that it is 
 our duty to do this, and to forbear from doing that, 
 and we cannot help feeling that we ought to yield 
 obedience to its behest, we all know from our own 
 experience that obedience to its commands is not a 
 matter of necessity, but that it is in our power to 
 disobey them if we so choose. 
 
 Let us now briefly analyze the mode in which an 
 evil impulse is yielded to. I here again appeal 
 to our own experience. We feel a strong desire for 
 its gratification. Conscience remonstrates; and a 
 struggle takes place whether we will yield to its 
 remonstrances, or indulge in the unhallowed grati- 
 fication. For a while we hesitate. What takes place 
 when we adopt the downward course? We allow 
 ourselves to concentrate our attention on the sinful 
 gratification. . This imparts additional strength to 
 the evil desire. Still we dare not gratify it, until 
 the remonstrances of conscience have been in some 
 way got rid of. What, then, is the next step? We 
 persuade ourselves that the evil is not so great as 
 conscience has affirmed it to be; at any rate that 
 we will only indulge in the evil. gratification once; 
 and then cease for evermore. Having in some such 
 manner silenced the remonstrances of conscience, 
 the yielding to the temptation becomes possible— 
 nay, inevitable. The next time the temptation 
 
 occurs, its force becomes stronger, and the remon- 
 
186 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 strances of conscience weaker, until indulgence after 
 indulgence gives it. undisputed sway; or to adopt 
 the words of a sacred writer : “Sin, when it is full 
 grown, brings forth death.” 
 
 These various stages of this process whether for 
 good or for evil are matters of our direct experience ; 
 and, therefore, their truth requires no further proof. 
 Within these limits, we are conscious of being free 
 agents; and by habitually pursuing the course of 
 action which conscience approves, and by exerting 
 the whole force of our wills in restraining our im- 
 pulses in a contrary direction, we are capable of 
 modifying our characters for the better, or by pursuing 
 the opposite course of altering them for the worse. 
 So far, then, the formation of our characters are 
 within our own power, and we are responsible for 
 the results which flow from them. 
 
 It has been necessary to dwell on these points 
 somewhat in detail, because a principle called 
 “Determinism” has been widely adopted by certain 
 popular writers, and set forth by them in many 
 seductive aspects. It is desirable that the reader 
 should clearly understand what this term really means, 
 and be made aware of the hollow foundation on 
 which the entire system rests. Determinism is a 
 term recently invented for the purpose of getting rid 
 of the harsher expression “ Fatalism,” which is its 
 real equivalent. When stript of all disguises, it means 
 that our actions are determined by as necessary a 
 
MAN CANSCHOOSTRBELWERNGALTERNATIVES: 187 
 
 law as that which governs the motions of the planets ; 
 that human actions are all calculable; that man is 
 the creature of his birth and his surroundings ; that 
 our belief that we exercise any choice in our mode 
 of acting is a delusion, and that will is a factor 
 which exerts no influence on the course of human 
 actions. In a word, that force, and not a being who 
 possesses the attributes which Christian Theism 
 ascribes to God, rules the universe; and that the 
 God of Christian Theism is a creation of the 
 imagination. 
 
 Let the reader observe, that to the various 
 forms of this theory, as it is propounded by anti- 
 theistic writers, there is one effective reply, namely, 
 that we profess no higher certitudes than the affir- 
 mations of our consciousness; and that one of these 
 is a conscious perception, that within certain limits, 
 in every act which we perform, we are free agents. 
 Of this we are as absolutely certain as that two and 
 two make four. Let it be observed that I am not 
 speaking of abnormal specimens of mankind, that is, 
 of men who are sunk into sucha state of degradation, 
 that they, like animals, act on the first impulse which 
 presents itself,—I fully concede that there are such 
 —but of persons we meet with in ordinary life, who 
 are in the habit of employing their reasoning powers 
 in determining the course of action they will pursue. 
 If you were to tell one of these, who was a stranger 
 to the teachings of the anti-theistic philosophy, that 
 
. 
 
 188 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 he possessed no control over his actions, but that in 
 everything he had done during the day, he had 
 acted in conformity with an iron law of necessity, 
 which rendered it impossible that he could have acted 
 otherwise ; he would reply: “I am certain that this 
 affirmation of yours is untrue, for it is contradicted 
 by every fact of my daily experience.” Nay, more: 
 in practical life even the sturdiest necessitarian acts 
 on the assumption, that it is possible to exercise a 
 choice among the various incentives to action that 
 present themselves to his mind which of them he 
 will follow ; and on the additional assumption, that 
 others possess this power also. The truth is, that 
 necessitarians only affirm that man is not a free 
 agent when they philosophize ; but when they engage 
 in practical life they act like other men. Ifa burglar 
 should plead as an excuse for an act of burglary that 
 he was impelled to it by a set of forces which he 
 had no power to resist, and that by the same forces 
 he was compelled to use a revolver in case he met 
 with resistance, it may be questioned whether a 
 single necessitarian could be found who would 
 accept such a plea as valid. But what is practically 
 untrue must be theoretically false. 
 
 Before closing this portion of our subject, it will 
 be desirable that I should notice one objection more. 
 Nothing can afford stronger proof that there is some- 
 thing in man which is capable of controlling his 
 strongest impulses, than the martyr in obedience to 
 
MAN CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES. 189 
 
 the dictates of conscience freely yielding himself up 
 to a torturing death, notwithstanding every induce- 
 ment held out to him by the persecutor to deny his 
 conviction and live. It will not be denied that the 
 desire to live is instinctive in human nature, and that 
 it contemplates a torturing death with horror. Yet it 
 is a fact beyond dispute that numbers in obedience 
 to a sense of duty have chosen such a death rather 
 than by apostasy to live. It has been objected, how- 
 ever, that this proves nothing in favour of our present 
 argument, for the martyr only obeys his strongest 
 motive, and is incapable of acting otherwise. Ina 
 word,:he has made this sacrifice in the full persuasion 
 that he will receive ample compensation in a world 
 beyond the grave for the torments which he has 
 endured here, and that it is this belief which has 
 enabled him to triumph over them. To this I 
 answer, even if this is a true statement of the case 
 —which it is not—that it proves that the martyr 
 is no mere machine which acts because it cannot act 
 otherwise, but, on the contrary, that he possesses 
 a power of choosing between the alternative of a 
 torturing death, and life with many prospects of 
 enjoyment—in other words, he is a voluntary agent. 
 
 I have no wish to deny that a firm belief in the 
 unspeakable realities of the unseen world has largely 
 contributed to the support of many a martyr in his 
 trying hour. Few, I hope, will venture nakedly to 
 affirm that the noble army of martyrs—and other 
 
190 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 religions besides Christianity have had their martyrs 
 —have yielded themselves to tortures and to death 
 in obedience to an iron law of necessity. Have they, 
 I ask, had no choice? Have they had no power 
 to apostatize ? But there have been those who have 
 yielded up their lives in obedience to a sense of 
 duty whose belief in the future state was extremely 
 uncertain. Such, if the Phedo of Plato be not a fiction, 
 was Socrates. The philosopher had before him the 
 alternative of a fully secured escape from prison, or 
 certain death. Yet he chose to die. What sustained 
 him in this resolution? Not a certain conviction 
 that he would survive the stroke of death, or that he 
 would realize his greatest happiness by dying. He 
 himself expressly affirms, that although he had a hope 
 that death would not be the termination of his being, 
 yet that he had nothing certain to affirm respecting 
 it. The alternative before his mind was a possible 
 survival, in which case he would hold converse 
 with the gods, the heroes of the past, the great and 
 the good; or else that death would be a sleep un- 
 disturbed by care from which there could be no 
 awakening. Yet, uncertain as was his expectation 
 of survival, he chose to die, under the conviction that 
 it was his duty to obey his country’s laws. Was the 
 philosopher, | ask, in adopting this resolution, impelled 
 by forces which rendered it impossible for him to act 
 otherwise ? Or is the man who rushes into the 
 waves to save the life of another at the hazard of his 
 
CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. IgI 
 
 own, impelled to do so by forces which leave him no 
 choice whether he will do so, or continue a spectator 
 of the drowning man being submerged by the angry 
 waves at a safe distance on the shore? All that is 
 best in human nature repels such a_ suggestion. 
 What is the legitimate, I may say the necessary, 
 conclusion which follows from these premises? A 
 moral world exists, in which freedom reigns ; and 
 if a moral world exists, a God must exist who is 
 a moral being. 
 
 Before entering on the direct proof which the moral 
 nature of man affords of the existence of a God, it 
 will be desirable that I should succinctly set before 
 the reader the chief facts respecting it which have 
 been established in the course of the previous 
 reasonings, and on which the following arguments 
 will be based. 
 
 I. That personality, as we commonly understand 
 that term is a thing which actually exists, whatever 
 account may be given of its origin; and that the 
 attempts of anti-Theists to explain away that per- 
 sonality which each of us is conscious of possessing, 
 and substitute something else in the place of it, are 
 failures. 
 
 2. That a power exists which we designate “ will,” 
 which is the only force the existence of which we are 
 directly conscious. 
 
 3. That we are conscious of possessing a power 
 of originating action, which enables us within certain 
 
192 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 limits to give a different direction to the forces which 
 act in the world of necessary agents, from that which 
 they would have taken apart from our interference, 
 and thus of making them effectuate our pleasure. 
 
 4. That within certain well-understood limits, we 
 possess a power which we designate “ Free Agency.” 
 This power enables us to choose, between the different 
 incentives to action which present themselves to our 
 minds, which of them we will follow, and that we 
 possess such a power we are as certain as of our 
 own existence. 
 
 5. That we possess a power which is capable of 
 discriminating between right action and wrong action, 
 virtue and vice, what is morally right and what is 
 morally wrong. This power is commonly known by 
 the name of a “moral sense.” All, however, which is 
 required for the purpose of our argument Is that we 
 should recognize the existence of this power as a fact 
 by whatever name it may be designated. 
 
 6. That we possess a number of aspirations, intel- 
 lectual and moral, of a wholly different character from 
 any quality which is possessed by an animal or a 
 physical agent. 
 
 7. That we possess, aS an essential portion of 
 ourselves, a power which we designate conscience, 
 which tells us with authority that it is our duty 
 to do this and to forbear from doing that, and 
 which visits us with a feeling of self-condemnation 
 if we refuse to obey its behests ; which also affirms 
 
CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 193 
 
 that there are certain things which are right and 
 proper, and which ought to be done; or, in other 
 words, a power which raises us above that which 
 is actual to the contemplation of something which 
 transcends all the experiences of the past or of the 
 present—that is, the ideal, or something in which 
 perfection resides. 
 
 Lastly: that matter, motion, and force, in fact 
 all physical agents, are destitute of every one of 
 these characteristics. 
 
 Assuming these positions to be true, let us now 
 consider what evidence they afford of the existence 
 of a God who is not the mere impersonal force of 
 anti- Theism, but a moral being. 
 
 1. They prove that the universe consists of two 
 orders of existence, which are separated from one 
 another by an interval so wide that they possess 
 no point in common: namely, beings which possess 
 conscious personality, and things which are utterly 
 devoid of it. What conscious personal beings are, we 
 all know from our own experience. Experience, it is 
 true, does not tell us what unconscious impersonal 
 agents are, but our observation renders it certain 
 that they are devoid of intelligence and the power 
 of self-direction. Now, according to anti-theistic 
 theories, in the universe in its primeval form nothing 
 but impersonal unconscious agents existed, that is, 
 matter, force, and motion. How, then, have per- 
 sonal conscious agents been brought into existence ? 
 
 13 
 
i94 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 There are only three alternatives. Either their 
 existence is due to some act of spontaneous gene- 
 ration; or to the hap-hazard action and interaction 
 of matter, force, and motion, neither of which 
 possessed in itself anything remotely resembling 
 consciousness; or to the energetic will of a being, 
 himself a person, who possessed in himself a power 
 adequate to create finite conscious personal agents. 
 Which of these alternatives is the rational one let 
 the reader judge. 
 
 2. That a power of originating action; of giving 
 a different direction to the forces which energize in 
 the world of necessary agents from that which they 
 would have taken apart from man’s intervention ; 
 of choosing between different incentives to action 
 which of them we will follow: in a word, every- 
 thing which is included under the term Ser 
 agency,” in the sense in which it is used by 
 Theists, unquestionably exists. Whence, then, 
 has come free agency? How has it been pro- 
 duced? The anti-theistic theory admits, as I have 
 intimated above, that the universe in its primeval 
 form contained nothing but matter, force, and 
 motion, all of which were alike destitute of con- 
 sciousness, personality, and freedom. Is it credible, 
 I ask, that these by any amount of manipulation 
 should have produced out of them that which was 
 never in them? Can anyone in his senses believe 
 that by any re-arrangement of the atoms which 
 
CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 195 
 
 compose the table on which I am writing, or by 
 any alteration in their motions, any being can be 
 produced out of them which is capable of self- 
 regulation, of exercising choice, or of feeling any of 
 the affections of our moral nature, such as a sense 
 of justice, a feeling of benevolence, or an aspiration 
 after holiness ? Common sense affirms that before 
 such things can be evolved out of them, they must 
 be first involved into them from a source external 
 to themselves. That source must be a being who 
 has, inherent in himself, the power and the will to 
 create a finite moral agent; or, in other words, a 
 God must exist who is a moral being. It will be 
 time for anti-Theists to ask us to accept their 
 theories when they have succeeded in producing 
 a free agent out of matter in which nothing but 
 necessary forces are inherent; or even the lowest 
 form of life out of that which was previously 
 destitute of it. 
 
 3. That it is a fact that we possess a power of dis- 
 criminating between right and wrong, between virtue 
 and vice, between what is noble and what is base, 
 a power which is commonly called a “moral sense.” 
 Whence came this power? Anti-Theists propound 
 a singular theory of its origin. Primeval man was 
 originally selfish ; that self-regard led him to seek 
 his own greatest happiness, and that in the course 
 of ages the discovery has been made that one’s 
 own greatest happiness would be best realized by 
 
196 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 pursuing that line of conduct which we now designate 
 virtuous ; in other words, that a virtuous man is a 
 clever calculator of the results of. actions, and a 
 vicious man a bad one. With respect to this 
 theory, it will be only necessary to observe that I 
 have elsewhere proved that it is no explanation of 
 the facts of our moral nature. But if it were other- 
 wise, we are entitled to demand an explanation of 
 a further fact. The primeval atoms, forces, and 
 motions were neither selfish nor otherwise ; they 
 pursued their course without taking heed of conse- 
 quences. How, then, did they succeed in producing 
 a moral being? The anti-theistic theory, therefore, 
 hopelessly breaks down ; and the only alternative 
 to it is the theory of Christian Theism, that the 
 existence of a moral nature in man proves the 
 existence of a God who is a moral being. 
 
 4. That it is a fact that man possesses lofty aspir- 
 ations, both intellectual and moral. His intellectual 
 ones have enabled him to measure the distance, and 
 to explore the nature, of the remotest globes; his 
 moral nature inspires him with a feeling of awe 
 when he contemplates the starry heavens and 
 the boundlessness of space. He also possesses 
 affections, such as we are certain no necessary agent 
 has. Whence came these? Can an atom, a 
 molecule, or a necessary force, or any combination 
 of the two entertain a lofty aspiration? Can either 
 
 feel awe, gratitude, or love; a feeling of self-appro- 
 
CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 197 
 
 bation, or one of self-condemnation ? Can such 
 things be imparted to them, by any re-arrangement 
 of atoms or of motions inherent in them? Our 
 common sense replies, Incredible. Whence, then, 
 came they? The only rational answer is, that 
 they prove that a being exists, possessed of 
 power and wisdom adequate to their production, 
 who is not an unintelligent force, but a moral 
 agent. 
 
 5. We now come to the most important proof of 
 the existence of a God who is not a mere force, 
 but a moral being: namely, that derived from the 
 testimony of conscience, when it affirms a law of 
 duty. Its importance is so great that we must 
 consider it in considerable detail. 
 
 It has been urged by some writers that our con- 
 science and moral sense furnish us with a direct 
 intuition of a God. This, I think, is to place a 
 weight on the argument which it will not bear. 
 I myself am unable to discern that I possess such 
 an intuition; and I[ infer that others are equally 
 destitute of it. Besides, if such an intuition really 
 existed, it would be universal, which it certainly 
 is not. 
 
 That of which conscience really affirms the exist- 
 ence is an all-commanding law of duty, which free 
 agents are bound to obey, but which it is possible 
 for them to violate. From this the inference follows, 
 that a being must exist to whom that duty is 
 
198 CHRISTIAN -THEISM, 
 
 due, that is, who is the centre of obligation; and 
 from its affirmation that such a thing ought to be 
 in contradistinction to that which actually is, our 
 reason draws the inference that a being must exist 
 in whom the idea of perfection is realized; and that 
 imperfect and finite beings ought to direct their 
 efforts to realize the perfection of the perfect. 
 Further: In visiting the violation of its behests 
 with a sense of self-condemnation; and, in cases 
 of great guilt, with a feeling of remorse; it con- 
 veys to the sinner an intimation that in some 
 way or other he will reap that which he has 
 sown. 
 
 What, then, is the precise idea which is conveyed 
 to our minds by the words “It is our duty,” when 
 conscience authoritatively proclaims it is our duty 
 to do this, or to forbear from doing that, and this 
 without any reference to the consequences that may 
 result to ourselves from obeying its commands? I 
 answer, that we are under an obligation to some 
 being external to ourselves to act in the manner 
 which it directs. 
 
 It is true that it is not uncommon to say that there 
 is a duty which we owe to ourselves. But this is 
 a metaphor. All that we really mean is, that we 
 are so constituted as to prove that it is the function 
 of the higher affections of our nature, our reason, 
 and our conscience, to bear rule over the lower 
 ones; and that when the latter usurp the place 
 
CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 199 
 
 which belongs to the former, the balance of our 
 mental constitution is upset. We cannot in any 
 strict sense of the word “owe” a thing to our- 
 selves, because this would involve being debtor 
 and creditor to the same person at the same time, 
 which is absurd. A duty, therefore, must be due to 
 a being who is external to ourselves; and as we 
 intuitively perceive that we can owe no duties to 
 things, it follows that a duty can only be due to a 
 personal moral agent. A moral agent, therefore, 
 must exist, in whom all obligation centres—that is, 
 one who possesses the attributes which Christian 
 Theism ascribes to God. 
 
 Again: The idea of duty implies that the being 
 to whom the duty is due, stands to us in the relation 
 of a benefactor who, prior to the duty being due, 
 has conferred on us benefits, in return for which 
 conscience affirms that he has a right to the duty 
 in question. It, therefore, authoritatively affirms 
 that we owe duties to all who have benefited us. 
 But there is one benefit which we have received, 
 existence and its accompanying blessings, without 
 which all subordinate ones would be impossible. If, 
 then, we are neither self-created nor evolved out 
 of unconscious matter, nor produced by means of 
 various arrangements of the molecules which com- 
 pose our bodies, a moral being must exist, who 
 has bestowed on us every blessing which we enjoy. 
 To Him, therefore, every duty which man can 
 
200 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 render must be due, and in Him every obligation 
 centre. 
 
 Moreover: Our reason and conscience affirm that 
 we owe duties not only to the Author of our 
 being, but to others, and even to those who have 
 not benefited us. What, I ask, makes us recog- 
 nize these as duties ? What so unites us to others, 
 that it becomes a duty on our part even to practise 
 acts of self-denial in order that we may do them 
 good? I answer, that we are so constituted that 
 we intuitively feel that the moral law is reasonable 
 which requires us to do to others as we would that 
 they should do to us. How, then, have we become 
 so constituted ? Is it credible that such a conviction 
 has been produced by the meeting together of a 
 multitude of unintelligent atoms impelled by blind 
 forces acting under an iron law of necessity ? But 
 if this is unbelievable, what is the only possible 
 alternative ? That this constitution of our being must 
 be due to the will of a Creator, who, being Himself a 
 - moral being, has so framed our conscience and moral 
 sense, as to pronounce this duty to be reasonable, 
 just, and good; and who, therefore, has a right to 
 say to every moral being whom He has created, with 
 an authority which conscience tells us we ought to 
 obey: “You shall do to all men as you would desire 
 that they should do to you.” I fully admit that, 
 apart from this, it may be convenient, and even 
 
 that it may gratify some impulse of our nature, to 
 
CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 201 
 
 act kindly towards others; and even that an im- 
 pulse may be so strong as to prompt us to an act 
 of self-sacrifice on their behalf; but it is impossible 
 to prove that we are under any obligation so to act, 
 except that it is the will of Him that made us that 
 we should do so, and that He has a right to demand 
 obedience on our part. 
 
 Further: A moral law involves the conception 
 of a moral lawgiver. This is a point the bearing 
 of which on our argument is so important that I 
 must endeavour to make it clear. I have already 
 observed that a physical law denotes an order of 
 events, and nothing more; and that physical agents 
 act as they do because they are incapable of acting 
 otherwise. But moral agents act in conformity with 
 a law of a wholly different character. Moral law is 
 not an expression of the order of actions, such as 
 they actually occur in the moral world; but it pro- 
 claims an order of actions such as they ought to be. 
 Moral law, therefore, contemplates an ideal up to 
 which moral beings ought to act; and its conception 
 involves the idea of an authority which has a right 
 to command, and of a power able to enforce its 
 sanctions. But authority can only reside in a moral 
 agent ; and supreme authority only in one to whom 
 we are supremely indebted. But conscience, in 
 affirming the existence of duty, affirms the existence 
 of a moral law which is obligatory on man, and pro- 
 
 nounces its censure on those who disregard ten, Ane 
 
202 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 affirmations, therefore, prove that there is a God; 
 its approbation that He is on the side of well-doing ; 
 its censure that He is opposed to wrong; and the 
 remorse which it occasions, that under His govern- 
 ment evil men will ultimately reap as they have 
 sown. 
 
 Once more: When conscience proclaims, “ You 
 ought to do this;” ‘You ought not to do that;” what 
 is the idea involved in this its authoritative utter- 
 ance? The word “ought” means ‘‘ owe it;” “ you 
 ought,” “you owe it.” The question therefore 
 arises, “Owe it” to what, or to whom? I answer, 
 that it is impossible to feel that we can owe any- 
 thing to blind matter, force, or motion. Their action 
 may be, and frequently is, beneficial to us; but 
 we instinctively feel that we owe them no thanks, 
 because they cannot act otherwise than they do. 
 Thus, the man would be mad who would return 
 thanks to a train for carrying him safely on a long 
 journey. The only being to whom it is possible to 
 feel that we ‘‘ owe it” to do this or that, is one who 
 has benefited us, but who could have withholden the 
 benefit if such had been his pleasure, z.¢. a free agent. 
 The declaration of conscience, therefore, which au- 
 thoritatively affirms, “You owe it—” (that is, ‘ you 
 ought””)—“to do this,” carries with it the concep- 
 tion of a God, who is our Creator, Preserver, and 
 Benefactor, in whom the obligation centres. 
 
 As a substitute for moral obligation as propounded 
 
ALTRUISM. 203 
 
 by Christian Theism, modern anti-Christian unbelief 
 has propounded a system of morality designated 
 
 ) 
 
 “Altruism,” which teaches that it is our duty to 
 labour for the good of others, without regard to any 
 other consideration. It therefore dispenses with the 
 being of a God; denies that. conscience and a sense 
 of moral obligation are original principles in man ; 
 affirms that while each individual man will at death 
 pass into a state of unconsciousness, from which there 
 will be no awakening, yet that it is his duty to 
 labour for the good of future generations, in the 
 elevation of which he will not participate; and that 
 while the combined labours of successive generations 
 will, after the lapse (it may be) of millions of years, 
 at last produce an altruistic millennium, in which 
 human nature will be so improved that it will be 
 as natural to seek the good of others as it is in our 
 present low moral condition to seek the good of 
 self. Yet let it never be forgotten, that the only 
 immortality which each self-sacrificer for the good 
 of others is allowed to contemplate, will be that 
 his noble acts of self-sacrifice will survive in the 
 grateful remembrance of future generations. Such, 
 In brief, are the principles of moral obligation, 
 which the most elevated form of modern anti- 
 Theism propounds, for breaking the force of that 
 proof of the existence of a God which is furnished 
 by the moral nature of man, and which it vaunts to 
 be an adequate substitute for what it is pleased to 
 
204 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 designate the worn-out moral teaching of the New 
 Testament. 
 
 As this system is now loudly proclaimed, by not a 
 few persons who hold a high position in the intel- 
 lectual world, as the Gospel of the future, it will be 
 necessary, before I close this chapter, to offer a few 
 remarks on its leading principles. 
 
 First: With respect to its position that it 1s our 
 duty to labour for the good of others, without any 
 reference to a God, about whose existence we can 
 know nothing; or any expectation of good resulting 
 to ourselves, either in this world or in a world be- 
 yond the grave. How, I ask, do we know that this 
 is our duty? The Altruist will reply that it is the 
 highest conceivable form of virtue to act on the 
 principle of pure disinterestedness ; that this alone is 
 noble, and to be influenced by what we do witha view 
 to any good resulting to ourselves is mean. I reply, 
 Does not virtuous action conduce to self-elevation ? 
 Is not an advancement in purity, holiness, and be- 
 nevolence an object worthy of pursuit? Is the 
 anti-Theist justified in denouncing the desire for self- 
 elevation, or the wish to bring our animal passions 
 into subjection to the higher principles of our nature 
 an unworthy motive? If it be a duty to labour for 
 the good of others, why, I ask, is it not equally a duty 
 to labour for the good of self? Further: If the hope 
 of realizing this helps to raise us to a higher eleva- 
 tion of character, or to subdue the lower impulses of 
 
ALTRUISM. 208 
 
 a * — a 
 
 our nature, why speak of self-regard as degrading ? 
 A reasonable self-regard is one of the essential 
 elements of our nature. This being so, all attempts 
 to exterminate it will be futile. 
 
 Second: With respect to the altruistic position, 
 which affirms that it is our duty to labour for the 
 good of others, even of generations yet unborn, 
 without any reference to a God, and regardless of the 
 results which our exertions may entail on ourselves ; 
 and this, too, while it is certain that in the life of 
 these future generations we shall have no share; 
 again I ask, how do we know that this is our duty ? 
 Conscience only affirms that we owe duties to those 
 to whom we are under obligations. What obliga- 
 tions on Altruistic principles, can we be under to the 
 non-existent ? If, then, duties are due to those who 
 have never benefited us, they must be found in the 
 will of one who is our Supreme Benefactor, and 
 who, as such, has a right to demand every service 
 which we can render, that is, God. But if there is 
 no God, or if we are entitled to frame our conduct 
 without any reference to Him, it is impossible to prove 
 that anyone who has not benefited us has a right to 
 claim duties at our hands. Such a one may appeal 
 to our kindly feelings; our better impulses may 
 prompt us to help him to the utmost of our power ; 
 but neither kindly feelings nor impulses are duties ; 
 and conscience affirms a stern law of duty which 
 has a right to our obedience, not because we possess 
 
206 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 kindly feelings, but because it is our duty so to 
 do. That law of duty, therefore, affirms the being 
 of a God. 
 
 What, then, is Altruism? Viewed at its best, it is 
 Christian morality shorn of every moral and spiritual 
 force which, amid the strong impulses which reside 
 in our animal nature impelling us ina contrary direc- 
 tion, can render the moral law which it announces a 
 dominant principle in man. If, on the other hand, 
 the Altruist appeals to the principle of self-regard 
 which is inherent in human nature, and urges that 
 the effort to realize the highest happiness of others is 
 the most certain means of realizing our own, the 
 question will present itself: How am I to be certain 
 of this? ‘Tastes differ. Even if you are right I may 
 never live to reap the fruit of my labours. It is use- 
 less, therefore, to sacrifice present gratification in the 
 expectation of some future good which I may never 
 live to enjoy. If there is no God, and no hereafter 
 for man, “let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we 
 dies 
 
 The person who adopted this sentiment as his 
 own knew from painful experience what a life 
 spent in struggles and sufferings encountered in pro- 
 moting the good of others meant ; and his opinion on 
 such a point is of far greater value than are the 
 opinions of any number of theorizers who have 
 never encountered either struggles, dangers, or 
 sufferings on their behalf. 
 
ANTI-THEISTIC MORALITY. 207 
 
 Before concluding this chapter, it will be desirable 
 that I should offer a few observations on the results 
 which follow from the anti-theistic position in their 
 bearing on human conduct. ‘These are of so terrible 
 a character, that thoughtful men may full well arrive 
 at the conclusion that there must be some flaw in the 
 reasonings by which it is sought to be proved that 
 there isno God, and no hereafter for man. I abridge 
 the following positions from the work of an eminent 
 positivist and agnostic writer,* entitled, The Service 
 of Man—who has had the courage to carry out the 
 principles on which this system is based to their 
 legitimate consequences. 
 
 1. Necessary law reigns in the moral world, and 
 men are under a delusion in imagining themselves 
 free agents. 
 
 2. That good men and bad men are irresponsible 
 for the goodness and the badness of their actions ; 
 the good and the evil which is in them being the 
 necessary result of the conditions of their birth and 
 their surroundings. 
 
 3. That it is impossible for a man by any act of 
 his own to modify his character, which has been 
 formed for him and not by him. 
 
 4. That what we call a bad man is no more re- 
 sponsible for the evil which he does than an engine is 
 for killing a man who trespasses on the line of rails. 
 5. That all efforts to succour the weak and the 
 
 * Mr. Cotter Morison. 
 
208 ; CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 miserable are’an interference with the laws of evolu- 
 tion, which, if not interfered with, would crush them 
 out of existence, and thus by preventing them from 
 propagating their evil kind, hasten the advent of the 
 anti-theistic millennium. 
 
 6. That all attempts to convert the evil man from 
 the evil of his ways are as much lost labour. 
 
 7, That the sooner we get rid of the idea of re- 
 sponsibility, the better it will be for society, and 
 moral education. 
 
 8. That the punishments which society inflicts 
 on evil-doers have no other justification than the 
 ‘ right of self-defence, their object being not reforma- 
 tion, but deterrent. 
 
 9. That the Christian doctrine of forgiveness of 
 sins is pernicious, and destructive of the best interests 
 of society ; and that Jesus Christ, when he promised 
 paradise to the robber, who on the cross, pro- 
 fessed faith in him, did an act which was highly 
 censurable. 
 
 10. That the service of God is a hindrance to the 
 service of man. 
 
 11. That the principle of evolution, if left to take its 
 course unimpeded by the action of so-called benevo- 
 lence, will gradually extirpate the weak and the 
 wicked, and thus bring about a state of things at 
 some distant period of the future, in which none will 
 survive but the good and the strong. 
 
 12. That, as man’s individual consciousness will 
 
ANTI-THEISTIC MORALITY. 209 
 
 perish at death; all those who have laboured to 
 promote the advent of this anti-theistic millennium 
 will have no share in its glories. 
 
 These positions necessarily result from the prin- 
 ciples on which anti-Theism is founded. It is true 
 that few anti-Theists have had the courage to state 
 them thus boldly ; but it is no less true that they are 
 the logical consequences of those on which this 
 System of philosophy is founded. They speak for 
 themselves. shall, therefore, not occupy the 
 reader’s time in endeavouring to prove that if they 
 were universally adopted as the guide of life, 
 they would subvert the principles on which obliga- 
 tion rests, those which lie at the foundation of 
 society ; and that every effort which js made in the 
 modern world—and, blessed be God, it abounds 
 with such efforts—to remedy the evils which meet 
 us at every turn, mercy, the milder virtues, every 
 hospital, and every institution to aid the weaker 
 members of society, would be injurious to the best 
 Interests of mankind. 
 
 This system, therefore, instead of realizing a mil- 
 lennium, would bring about a condition of things far 
 more terrible than any which has been realized in 
 the history of the past. If anti-Theism is true, the 
 moral world is the creation of three necessary agents, 
 matter, force, and motion ; and they ought to be left 
 for the future to pursue their course unimpeded by 
 man, Here the Theist may justly object: If the 
 
 14 
 
210 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 universe consists of nothing but matter, force, and 
 motion, how can man, who is their creation, impede 
 their resistless force?” Yet the author I have re- 
 ferred to, with no little inconsistency admits that he 
 can, and pronounces that in so doing his action is 
 pernicious ; and he even doubts whether the results 
 of medical science are not so, in enabling the weak 
 to live longer, and thus propagate their evil kind, 
 whom, apart from its interference, the iron forces 
 of Nature would crush out of being. But if such are 
 the results of anti-theistic principles, what con- 
 clusion are we entitled to deduce from them? As 
 in mathematics, when certain premisses lead to absurd 
 conclusions, the mathematician affirms with the 
 fullest conviction of certainty that they are untrue, 
 so in like manner we are justified in inferring 
 that principles whose practical working would result 
 in moral confusion are false also. It follows, there- 
 fore, that our moral nature testifies to the existence of 
 a God, who is not an impersonal force, but a moral 
 being, a person, a free agent, who, having created us, 
 having endowed us with every faculty, and having be- 
 stowed on us every means of happiness we possess, 1S 
 the centre of all obligation ; to whom is, therefore, due 
 worship, reverence, love, and every service of which 
 man is capable, and who is entitled to say to every 
 moral being whom He has created : Be thou holy, for 
 I, the Lord thy God, am holy. Act towards every 
 man as you would that that man should act towards 
 
CONCLUSION. Fe 
 
 you ; for I, who am your Father, am his Father also, 
 Conscience, therefore, when it affirms a law of duty, 
 affirms that a being must exist in whom that duty 
 centres, z¢. that there is a God, who is the Moral 
 Governor of the world, to whom we are responsible 
 for our conduct here ; and who, although clouds and 
 darkness obscure our view of His present government 
 of the world, will ultimately render to every man 
 according to his deeds, 
 
GHAR LER xe 
 
 POPULAR OBJECTIONS AGAINST CHRISTIAN 
 THEISM—THEIR VALUE ESTIMATED. 
 
 HAVE placed the words “Christian Theism” 
 
 at the head of this chapter, because, with 
 the exception of Judaism and Mahometanism, it is the 
 only form of theistic belief which attributes to the 
 Deity a moral character which has a direct bearing 
 on human conduct. It is true that a body of Theists 
 exist, though their numbers are gradually diminishing, 
 who, while they reject the supernatural element in 
 Christianity, ascribe to God a character similar to 
 that which Christian Theism attributes to Him, It 
 will be unnecessary, however, to give to this form 
 of theistic belief a separate consideration, because, 
 as far as it resembles Christian Theism, the same 
 objections, if they possess any value at all, are 
 equally valid against both. In considering this 
 portion of our subject, I shall confine my observa- 
 tions to that class of objections which, owing to their 
 apparent plausibility, are likely to exert an influence 
 over those who have not made either philosophy or 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. ate 
 
 science a subject of special study. These are for 
 the most part based on considerations arising out of 
 the present constitution of Nature and of man. 
 
 But before I attempt to deal with them, I must ask 
 the reader's attention to the following most important 
 consideration, which is far too generally overlooked. 
 The objections in question leave the conclusions ar- 
 rived at in the previous chapters entirely untouched. 
 Those who urge them make no attempt to prove that 
 they are invalid. Thus, the argument from causation 
 —-an argument resting on one of the most certain of 
 our intuitions—proves that the universe in_ its 
 present form is not self-existent ; but, however remote 
 its origin may have been during the ages of the past, 
 that its existence must have been due to the will of a 
 being possessed of power and wisdom adequate to its 
 production. Against this, the allegation that the 
 world contains a vast amount of suffering falls power- 
 less. The argument, from its numberless adjustments, 
 adaptations, and correlations, the existence of which 
 is not even disputed by the anti-Theist, proves that 
 they cannot have been the result of the hap-hazar! 
 interaction of blind atoms and unintelligent forces 
 but that they must have been brought about by the 
 energy of a being, to whose power and intelligence it 
 is impossible to assign limitations. The strength of 
 this argument is so overwhelming, that it is im- 
 possible to set it aside by the allegation that there 
 are a limited number of apparent imperfections 
 
214 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 in the structure of animal bodies, or that the amount 
 of suffering which exists proves that it cannot have 
 been the work of an intelligent, and benevolent 
 Creator. The argument from the moral nature of 
 man proves from facts, the existence of which is 
 undeniable, that it is incredible that it can have 
 originated from the interaction of atoms and forces 
 which are totally devoid of the elements of a moral 
 nature ; but that it must have owed its origin to a 
 being in whom a moral nature is inherent and un- 
 caused, and to whom conscience points as the centre 
 of moral obligation ; in a word that unmoral atoms 
 and forces can never by any possible combination 
 produce out of themselves that which was never in 
 them. These proofs stand by themselves on wholly 
 independent grounds, and it is impossible that they 
 can be invalidated by a limited number of supposed 
 imperfections in the structure of men or animals, or 
 by the existence of physical or moral evil in the 
 world in which we live. Even if they admitted of no 
 explanation, the utmost that they would prove would 
 be that there are limitations to the power, wisdom, 
 or benevolence of the Creator ; not that the universe 
 has been brought into existence by the interaction of 
 blind atoms and unintelligent forces. But when we 
 consider its inconceivable vastness, and that the 
 limitation of our faculties renders us incapable of 
 fully grasping the creative plan, or the ultimate 
 results which it is destined to produce, the inference 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 215 
 
 would be far more in conformity with reason, 
 that, with an enlargement of our knowledge of 
 the creative plan and of the moral government 
 of the world, all things will be ultimately found 
 to be in harmony with the possession of bound- 
 less power and wisdom, and perfect holiness and 
 benevolence on the part of the Creator. In con- 
 sidering this subject, we must never allow ourselves 
 to forget that the world in which we live, compared 
 with the vastness, may I not rather say the 
 infinitude, of the universe is no larger than a 
 grain of sand on the ocean’s shore ; and consequently 
 that itis impossible that our finite powers can form 
 an adequate estimate of the results which things 
 which may seem to us imperfect, are in the course 
 of the ages of the future calculated to produce. 
 
 The popular objections against Christian Theism 
 assume a great variety of forms, which in a work like 
 the present it is impossible to deal with in detail ; 
 but, numerous as they are, they resolve themselves 
 into two great principles: namely, the presence of 
 physical and moral evil in a world which Christian 
 Theism affirms to have been created by a being who 
 is almighty and all-wise and, at the same time, 
 perfect in holiness and benevolence. In endeavour- 
 ing to meet these objections, it would seem the most 
 simple course to adopt to treat them under the two 
 distinct heads of Physical evil and Moral evil, but 
 this is rendered difficult, if not impossible, owing to 
 
216 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 evil originates in moral causes, which, if the latter 
 ceased to act, would speedily disappear. I shall, 
 therefore, be unable to keep the one subject entirely 
 separate from the other; but as the widespread exist- 
 ence of moral evil in the world not only forms the 
 strength of the anti-theistic position, but has formed 
 the severest trial to the faith of good and holy men 
 in every age, I propose to consider the reasons why 
 it is permitted to exist, and the purposes which its 
 existence is designed to subserve, in a chapter by 
 itself. 
 
 The objections against the existence of a God, who 
 possesses the character and attributes which Christian 
 Theism attributes to Him, on account of the vast 
 amount of evil with which this world abounds, may 
 be compressed under the following heads— 
 
 1. That it proves that this world cannot be the 
 work of a being who is possessed of boundless 
 power and wisdom, and whose benevolence is perfect. 
 
 2. That if a creator exists, he must be deficient 
 either in power, wisdom, or goodness. 
 
 3. That an antagonistic principle must exist 
 somewhere, which he was unable to subdue, which 
 has marred the perfection of the Creator’s work. 
 This objection assumes two forms. One which lays 
 down that a tendency to evil is inherent in matter, 
 which has an existence independent of the Creator’s 
 will, and which tendency he was unable to overcome ; 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 217 
 
 another, which postulates the existence of two gods, 
 one good, and another evil, who have ever been at 
 war with one another ; and although the latter is in- 
 ferior in power to the former, and will be ultimately 
 vanquished by him, he has succeeded in introducing 
 into the world all the imperfections, the sins, and the 
 suffering with which it abounds. 
 
 4. That the imperfections in the. structure. of 
 certain animal races, especially of man, and the fact 
 that diseases are transmissible from ancestors to 
 their descendants, prove that they cannot have 
 been the work of a Creator whose intelligence and 
 benevolence are perfect. 
 
 The theory of Dualism has been effectually dis- 
 posed of by modern science as affording a rational 
 account of the existence of evi]. It has proved beyond 
 controversy that the universe is a unity, and that it 
 is impossible that it can have been the production of 
 two opposing wills; for not only does it present a 
 unity of plan, nor does its structure contain a trace 
 of the presence of two opposing forces, but the same 
 instrumentality which produces pleasure under 
 altered conditions produces pain; and its destructive 
 forces are inherent in its constitution, and are regu- 
 lated by the same laws as those which produce the 
 happiness and the comfort of sentient beings. It 
 is, therefore, not too much to affirm that no well- 
 informed person will now take refuge from the 
 difficulties in question in the theory that the physical 
 
218 CHRISTIAN THEISM., 
 
 and moral evil in the world have originated in the 
 action of two opposing wills, as affording a rational 
 account of the origin of evil, however plausible 
 such a theory may have seemed when the great 
 truths brought to light by modern science were 
 unknown. 
 
 But the extent in which evil exists in the world 
 has formed a great stumbling-block in the way of 
 thoughtful men in every age, especially among 
 Orientals, and, to speak generally, among that order 
 of mind which seeks a solution of difficulties in 
 theorizing rather than in a careful study of the facts 
 of Nature. Pressed by the difficulties in question, 
 some of the greatest thinkers of the Oriental world 
 have sought an escape from them by taking refuge 
 in some one of the various forms of Pantheism. 
 As its nominal adherents are more numerous 
 than those of any single religion in the world, it 
 will be necessary to offer a few observations on it, 
 for the purpose of showing that pantheistic sys- 
 tems of thought utterly fail to solve the difficul- 
 ties in question. My observations on them must 
 be brief. 
 
 Pantheism assumes two aspects— 
 
 First : One which identifies the universe with God, 
 and God with the universe. This may be designated 
 Pantheism pure and simple; and is really, except in 
 name, indistinguishable from Atheism. 
 
 Second: One which lays down that this imperfect 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 219 
 
 world is not a direct emanation from the Supreme 
 God, but that it is the work of a being who is a very 
 distant emanation from Him; who, owing to the 
 remoteness of his emanation from the Supreme God 
 had become the subject of numerous imperfections. 
 By this means it has been sought to free the Supreme 
 God from the responsibility of being the author of 
 evil. The utter inadequacy of such a system of 
 thought to grapple with the difficulties in question 
 I have already pointed out, and therefore I need not 
 further discuss it. 
 
 But with respect to Pantheism generally, the being 
 which the Pantheist designates God is impersonal, 
 destitute of volition, free agency, the power of choice, 
 or a single attribute which we designate moral. He 
 is aS much a necessary agent as blind matter, and 
 unintelligent force. He is, therefore, incapable of 
 inspiring a feeling of adoration, love, or duty due to 
 him. In a word, Pantheism, as affording a rational 
 account of the origin of things, is involved in all the 
 difficulties which we have been considering in 
 the previous chapters, and affords not the smallest 
 solution of them. The universe being God, it fails 
 to offer any explanation of how physical and moral 
 evil have got into it, except on the assumption that, 
 in some form or other, it was originally inherent in 
 it, or that it has originated in separate conscious 
 existence; and the only relief which it offers from 
 its burden is ultimate absorption into the all of 
 
220 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 things, in which personal consciousness will cease, 
 and from which it was a calamity that it ever became 
 separated. ‘lo obtain this re-absorption is the great 
 end of human life. Surely, a system which teaches 
 that the only mode of complete escape from the evil 
 with which the world abounds is the cessation of.our 
 separate conscious existence ; and which at the same 
 time teaches that the all of things, of which man 
 forms a portion, is God, wholly fails to give an account 
 of the origin of either physical or moral evil which 
 will satisfy our reason. 
 
 I will now pass on to the consideration of the 
 objection that the mass of evil, with which the world 
 abounds, proves that its Creator, if there be one, 
 is not almighty, but imperfect either in power, 
 wisdom, or goodness; and, therefore, that he was 
 unable to create a better world than that in which 
 we live; and with respect to which a class of 
 unbelievers, known by the name of Pessimists, have 
 gone the length of affirming that a worse one 
 could not have been brought into existence; and 
 that it would have been good for mankind, taken 
 as a whole, if they had never been born. 
 
 It has been urged by an eminent writer whose 
 works have attained a wide circulation in the higher 
 regions of thought, that all that can be inferred from 
 the existence of the universe is, that it is the work 
 of a being who possessed a power adequate to its 
 formation, but that this is far from proving that 
 
HOLOULAW-OBJEGTIONS, 221 
 
 his power is almighty. Into any abstract discus- 
 sion of what infinite power is capable of effecting, 
 I shall not enter, because I think that my readers 
 will be of opinion that the being who could create 
 the systems of suns which astronomers tell us 
 are scattered throughout space in numbers passing 
 human comprehension; our sun with its attendant 
 planets, with everything which they contain, uphold 
 them in being, and carry on their operations, is for 
 all practical purposes justly designated almighty ; 
 and that the power that could effect all these won- 
 ders transcends all our ideas of limitations. Whether 
 
 such a power could have created a better world than | 
 
 that in which we live is, in our ignorance of world- 
 building, an idle speculation. It is related of a 
 
 Spanish king, who knew only the Ptolemaic system | 
 
 of astronomy, that he said if he had been of the 
 Creator’s counsel, he would have advised Him how 
 to have constructed the solar system better ; but sub- 
 sequent discoveries have shown that the objection 
 was due to the objector’s ignorance, and not to 
 imperfections in its actual structure. On similar 
 principles, we are entitled to argue that supposed 
 imperfections in the Creator's work will hereafter 
 be found to be due, not to imperfections in the 
 work itself, but to our ignorance of what that work 
 actually is, and our inability to contemplate it taken 
 as a whole. It ought never to be forgotten in this 
 controversy that all things which are conceivable 
 
222 CHRISTIAN *THEISM, 
 
 are not possible; for we freely concede to the 
 objector that Almighty power cannot work contra- 
 dictions; and that when He has conditioned the 
 limits of His own working, as He must have done 
 when He determined to create finite beings, that 
 He cannot transcend the limits which He Himself 
 has assigned to it without contradicting His own 
 purposes. Moral and physical evil, pain and suf- 
 fering, therefore, exist in the world, not because its 
 Creator is deficient in power, but because their 
 permitted existence formed a portion of His crea- 
 tive plan, which embraced the past, the present, 
 and the future, boundless space, and boundless 
 duration. The inconceivable vastness of the uni- 
 verse may full well make anti-theistic speculators 
 on the best mode of world-building doubtful, 
 whether if their advice had been taken in its 
 construction they would have produced one more 
 perfect. Whether a world would have been a 
 better one in which the existence of suffering and 
 moral evil had been rendered impossible, I shall 
 have more to say in the next chapter. 
 
 The following objections, which are indepen- 
 dent of moral considerations, now require our 
 attention : 
 
 1. That the fact that diseases should be capable 
 of transmission from ancestors to their descendants, 
 and the imperfections which exist in the structure 
 
 of organized beings as, for example, in persons 
 
FORGLAR OBJECTIONS. 223 
 
 born blind, deaf, dumb, lame, destitute of intellect, 
 with tendencies to insanity, and various forms of 
 disease, prove that beings in which such things 
 exist cannot have been the work of one whose 
 power is devoid of limitations, and whose wisdom 
 and benevolence are perfect. 
 
 2. That the action of the forces of Nature, 
 remorselessly crushing, as they do, everything which 
 comes across their path, are inconsistent with the 
 idea that their Author is one who possesses the 
 attributes which Christian Theism attributes to 
 Him. 
 
 3. That the existence in animals of rudimentary 
 organs, and of organs which have no present use, 
 deprives the argument from adaptation of any 
 argumentative value as affording proof of the 
 existence of an intelligent Creator, it being incon- 
 celvable, as it is alleged, that rudimentary or 
 useless organs can have been the work of one 
 whose wisdom is devoid of limitations, whereas 
 their existence is fully accounted for by the anti- 
 theistic theory of evolution. 
 
 4. That if the author of Nature had been all- 
 powerful, wise, and perfectly benevolent, he would 
 have so constituted the world as to have prevented 
 sentient beings from being subject to pain and 
 suffering; or if their existence is in any sense 
 necessary, that he would have greatly diminished 
 their amount. 
 
224 CHRISTIAN THEION. 
 
 5. That the miseries of existence are so great 
 as to render it doubtful whether it would not 
 have been better if sentient beings, above all man, 
 whose high organization renders him especially 
 obnoxious to suffering, had never been brought 
 into being; and afford proof that the Creator 
 is either deficient in power to have made things 
 otherwise than they are, or in benevolence; or 
 that he is indifferent to the happiness of his 
 creatures. 
 
 I fully admit that the first of these objections is 
 founded on difficulties which are real. Why the 
 Creator has made mental and bodily qualities trans- 
 missible from ancestors to their descendants; why 
 men are born with the various defects above enu- 
 merated, and with inherited tendencies for which 
 they are not responsible ; I may add, why the vast 
 inequalities in the condition of things into which 
 men are born exist; why one man is endowed 
 with a lofty intellect, and another with a mean 
 capacity ; why one is born rich, and another poor ; 
 and numerous other questions of a similar cha- 
 racter,—are problems of which our finite intellects 
 are unable to give the solution. Before that will 
 be possible, we must be capable of entering the 
 council chamber of the Most High, and scan from 
 end to end His creative and providential plan, which 
 embraces alike the ages of the past, the present, and 
 the future, and those worlds which, in numbers 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS, 225 
 
 inconceivable by man, are scattered throughout the 
 infinitude of space. Is it not credible, I ask, rather, 
 is it not highly rational, that there should be diffi- 
 culties into, which the intellect of man cannot pene- 
 trate, in the creative plan and in the providential 
 government of a universe, compared with the vast- 
 ness of which the world in which we live, and all 
 that it contains, is less than a grain of sand on 
 the ocean’s shore ; and in which there must be things 
 for the existence of which it is unable to assign 
 the reason, but which may be readily soluble to 
 higher powers of intellect and a larger grasp of the 
 plan of the Creator? One thing is certain, no effort 
 of the intellect of man has succeeded in penetrating 
 the reason why such things exist, nor has it pleased 
 God to tell us by a revelation. All that our Lord 
 did, when He was asked if a beggar was born blind 
 
 on account of a sin committed by his parents or — 
 himself, was to deny that either was the reason, 
 and to add that he was so born “that the works of 
 God should be made manifest in him.” This being 
 so, I shall not attempt to unravel that which He, 
 when questioned on, declined to explain; and I shall 
 only observe that the existence of difficulties, com- 
 paratively few in number, in the creative plan and 
 in the providential government of a universe so 
 inconceivably vast, is unable to nullify the over- 
 whelming evidence which it furnishes of the exist- 
 ence of a God possessed of the attributes which 
 
 t) 
 
226 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Christian Theism attributes to Him, as set forth in 
 the previous chapters. 
 
 2. The second objection, which has been founded 
 on the fact that the forces of Nature remorselessly 
 crush everything which comes across their path, 
 can be disposed of without difficulty. The objection 
 has been strongly put by the late Mr. J. S. Mill. 
 He tells us that Nature (7e. its necessary forces) 
 perpetrates acts every day which, if committed by 
 man, human justice would punish as atrocious 
 crimes; and, therefore, that it affords no proof of 
 the existence of an author whose justice and benevo- 
 lence are perfect. The fact that the forces of the 
 universe act in conformity with a law from which 
 they never vary, and, therefore, that they re- 
 morselessly crush whatever comes in their way, is 
 undoubted. Equally certain is it, according to the 
 principles of Christian Theism, or of any Theism, 
 which does not assume their existence independent 
 of a Creator, that they are expressions of his will. 
 Why, then, has he so constituted them as to produce 
 results like these? The answer is an obvious one. 
 Unless they thus acted, the entire course of human 
 life would become a scene of hopeless confusion. 
 What, then, is the demand which the objection before 
 us makes on the Creator? Either that He should 
 have so constituted them as to have made them 
 capable of exercising discrimination, and thus have 
 rendered their action variable and uncertain ; or that 
 
LOPULAR OBJECTIONS. 227 
 
 He should directly interfere with their activity 
 by interpositions whenever their action is likely to 
 prove injurious. I need hardly observe that such 
 interpositions, in order that they may be effectual 
 for the end proposed, must be of such frequent 
 occurrence as to deprive their action of all certainty, 
 and thereby render the future incapable of calcula- 
 tion ; a condition of things, be it observed, which is 
 one of the chief objections which unbelievers urge 
 against the belief in the miracles which are recorded 
 in the Bible. Whether the rendering the forces of 
 Nature uncertain in the mode of their action, and 
 thereby throwing the whole course of human life into 
 confusion, would be an improvement on the present 
 order of things, let the reader judge. For example; 
 Would it, I ask, be wise to suspend the force of 
 gravitation every tinte when its action is in danger 
 of causing suffering, or the destruction of human 
 life? If the forces of Nature were rendered 
 variable in their action, would human life be 
 possible ? 
 
 3. The next objection which we have to consider 
 is that derived from the existence in animals of 
 rudimentary, worn-out, and what are supposed to be 
 useless, organs. It is urged that their presence is 
 Inconsistent with the belief that they can have 
 originated in the action of a being possessed of a 
 high order of intelligence, because we should un- 
 hesitatingly affirm that one who possessed no higher 
 
228 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 degree of intelligence than an ordinary man, who 
 introduced things into his constructions which are 
 devoid of use, was little better than a blunderer ; 
 whereas, if in accordance with the anti-theistic 
 theory of evolution the progress of things has been 
 from imperfect to more perfect types of being with- 
 out the intervention of intelligence, the presence 
 of rudimentary, aborted, and even useless organs 
 is readily accounted for, for blind matter and 
 law may be readily excused for making a few 
 blunders. 
 
 To this last explanation I reply, Undoubtedly. But 
 I would ask the reader to consider whether it is 
 reasonable to believe that, during the course of their 
 blind activity during the ages of the past, they must 
 not have made infinitely more, or whether it is 
 believable that they have produced a single compli- 
 - cated orderly arrangement, not to speak of the 
 innumerable adjustments, adaptations, and correla- 
 tions, with which the universe everywhere abounds ? 
 Further: It remains yet to be proved that certain 
 supposed useless organs are really devoid of use. 
 Mistakes have been made on this subject in former 
 times. All that can be truly said is that their uses 
 have not yet been discovered. Several eminent 
 scientists have recently expressed strong doubts 
 whether any organ exists which is really destitute 
 of use. 
 
 But with respect to the main point of the 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 229 
 
 objection, the existence in animals of rudimentary 
 and aborted organs, I must once more ask the reader 
 to bear in mind that Christian Theism is not com- 
 mitted to any theory as to the mode in which the 
 Creator has operated in the production of His works. 
 Respecting the mode of His operation, by which 
 He brought into existence the constituents of the 
 universe in their primeval form, we know, or can 
 know, nothing. The determination of the order in 
 which it has been produced is one which pertains, 
 not to theology, but to science; but as to the modus 
 operandi by which He has produced the various 
 orders of beings—or to use language to which 
 anti-Theists can take no’‘just exception, ‘they have 
 been produced ”—neither theology nor science can 
 determine anything for certain. All that science can 
 effect is to render one mode of His action more pro- 
 bable than another; but as to the actual mode in 
 which He has energized in bringing finite beings into 
 existence, both must confess their ignorance. There 
 is nothing inconsistent, therefore, in a theory of evo- 
 lution which affirms that God, acting from within, 
 through the agency of what we designate growth, 
 and from without, by which at the right time and 
 place He provides the materials necessary for growth, 
 with a cordial acceptance of Christian Theism. All 
 that it demands is, that behind the forces (be they 
 what they may) by which the various orders of 
 beings have been brought into existence, there should 
 
230 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 be a God, all-powerful, and all-wise, who, whether 
 He acts within these forces or without, is energizing 
 through them, directing and controlling them, and 
 working out through them the purposes of His 
 creative and providential will. 
 
 As far then as the belief in Christian Theism is 
 concerned, what does the objection which we are 
 considering actually amount to? I answer, Nothing. 
 Every rational Theist is firmly persuaded that 
 the Creator has acted on a definite plan in His 
 creative work. This being so, it follows that He 
 has acted on a definite plan in the formation of 
 animal structures. It has also, I think, been 
 fully proved that He has begun with bringing into 
 existence the lower forms of life; and by the 
 energy of His power, exerted from within or 
 without, or in both ways (it matters not which), 
 He has evolved a succession of higher and higher 
 ones. Assuming, then, that He has acted on a 
 definite plan, is it any proof of lack of wisdom, 
 that He should have created in embryo in the 
 lower animal structures everything which now 
 exists in a completed form in the highest orders 
 of animal life? 
 
 Let me illustrate my position by an example. 
 The fore feet of numerous animals contain in 
 embryo and in type the various bones which in 
 their perfected form constitute those of the human 
 
 hand. In many other respects the structure of the 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 231 
 
 lower forms of animal life may be said to be pro- 
 phetic of the higher, until they receive their fulfil- 
 ment (¢.¢. the complete realization of the idea which 
 underlies them) in the highest. 
 
 What objection, I ask, can be justly urged against 
 either the power or the wisdom of the Creator, if He 
 has begun by forming animal structures on a definite 
 plan, in embryo and in type, and has gradually 
 improved them through a course of working carried 
 on through a succession of ages, until they have 
 realized the idea involved in their original concep- 
 tion ? Why, I ask, may not the Creative Power 
 energize both from within and from without: from 
 within, in the form which we designate growth ; and 
 from without, in providing the materials necessary 
 for growth, and causing them to meet at the time 
 and place where they are required? Is such a 
 mode of action any objection against His power or 
 His wisdom ? The objection would only be valid 
 on the assumption that each order of beings was a 
 separate creative act, perfect from the first in all its 
 parts. On the contrary, the formation of a definite 
 plan embracing within its wide compass every order 
 of beings possessed of life, proves that the being 
 who conceived it, and who has ultimately realized 
 the idea which underlay it in the formation of the 
 human body, must have been possessed of a power 
 and intelligence to which we can assign no limits ; 
 and His continuing to carry it out through long 
 
232 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 ages that He must have possessed not intelligence 
 only, but purpose and volition. With respect to 
 organs, which were useful once, but are no longer 
 useful now, I ask, is it a proof of lack of wisdom, 
 if, instead of removing every trace of their former 
 existence from the higher forms of life by some 
 special intervention,—a course of action especially 
 objectionable to anti-Theists,—He has allowed them 
 to remain in their present condition as memorials 
 of the past? 
 
 4. Let us now consider the next objection, which 
 is founded on the vast amount of pain and suffering. 
 with which the world abounds. From its existence 
 it is urged that if there is a Creator, all-powerful, 
 wise, and perfectly benevolent, He would have pre- 
 vented its existence altogether, or have greatly 
 limited its amount. 
 
 My observations on this point will be brief, 
 because as a large portion of the pain and suffering 
 which exists originates in moral causes, the subject 
 will more suitably come under notice in the next 
 chapter. In this place it will be sufficient to observe 
 that it is in the highest degree probable, if not 
 absolutely certain, that it is a necessary condition of 
 the creation of beings who are capable of receiving 
 pleasure through a bodily organization, such as a 
 nervous system, that it must involve the necessity 
 of their being capable of suffering pain; or, in other 
 words, what the objection affirms, that which the 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 233 
 
 Creator ought to have done involves a contradiction. 
 Further: It is an undoubted fact that pain has its 
 uses—uses so important that its existence is con- 
 sistent with the most benevolent purpose on the 
 part of the Creator—among which I may notice 
 here that it acts as a warning against consequences 
 which might otherwise be attended with the most 
 dangerous results to the well-being of mankind. 
 How far its amount admits of diminution is a 
 question on which our finite intellects are incapable 
 of forming a judgment. 
 
 5. We now come to the objection which is urged 
 against the benevolence of the Creator ; or, at least, 
 that he is indifferent to the happiness of his crea- 
 tures on the ground that the present condition of 
 animal and human life is attended with results 
 which prove that the Creator, if there be one— for it 
 is the effect of these objections as they are urged 
 by anti-theistic writers and lecturers to convey the 
 impression that there is none-—is either deficient in 
 power to have made things otherwise than they are, 
 or of benevolent purpose in his creative acts. The 
 objection really raises the question, whether from 
 the phenomena of animal and human life we are 
 justified in inferring that its author is perfectly, or 
 only partially benevolent, or indifferent to the happi- 
 ness of sentient beings, or whether their author 
 is blind matter and neceSsary force, both destitute 
 of a single element which can be designated moral. 
 
234 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Not a few of those who have embraced the gloomy 
 view of things which the last alternative suggests 
 have adopted the doctrine known by the name of 
 Pessimism, the meaning of which is that, as things 
 are at present constituted, life is not worth having, 
 and that the present order of things ought to be sub- 
 verted as unbearable, cost what its subversion may. 
 I will offer a few remarks on this last position first, 
 but in doing so I shall avoid referring to it in its 
 political aspect. 
 
 There can be little doubt, if the question were 
 put to every hundred thousand of mankind: Do 
 you think that life, taken as a whole, is a scene of 
 enjoyment, and therefore desirable? that ninety- 
 nine thousand out of each hundred thousand would 
 certainly answer the question in the affirmative. 
 This surely is a sufficient reply to those who adopt 
 the theory in question. They arrive at this con- 
 clusion by contemplating one aspect of it, and by 
 shutting their eyes to every other. I fully admit 
 that human existence, especially towards its close, 
 is not unfrequently clouded with no inconsiderable 
 amount of sorrow and suffering; but it is a fact to 
 the truth of which the testimony is overwhelming, 
 that the happiness of life, taken as a whole, stands 
 - in an overwhelming ratio greater than its sufferings. 
 I say taken as a whole, and I would add, irre- 
 spective of the moral causes by which suffering is 
 produced, because we have no right to fix our 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 235 
 
 exclusive attention on some of its darker aspects, 
 and thereon to erect a theory of human life, and 
 affirm that it is inconsistent with the existence 
 of a benevolent author. I by no means wish: to 
 deny that there are individual cases of protracted, 
 I may say lifelong, suffering, in which the sufferer, 
 if he confines his view to this life only, may be 
 justified in invoking death as a release; but such 
 cases are comparatively rare. It will be only 
 necessary to observe that if it is true that human 
 existence is a scene of misery, such as this theory 
 presupposes, and that man perishes with his body, 
 suicide would be its logical conclusion; and the 
 best thing which could happen would be the pain- 
 less passing of the human race into non-existence. 
 But the Pessimist does not act on his theory; he 
 only grumbles, or commits some crime attended 
 with danger, from the consequences of which he 
 does his utmost to escape. It is true that certain 
 philosophers of two widely different schools sought 
 refuge in suicide from the tyranny of the early 
 Roman imperial government; that others in obe- 
 dience to imperial orders, did the same that they 
 might escape from a more terrible fate; and that 
 during this period suicides were frequent in the less 
 cultivated ranks of life, as a means of escape from 
 a state of things which was deemed intolerable ; 
 and that even the luxurious spendthrift, who had 
 
 squandered his means of subsistence, and who, 
 
236 GH S PLAN Atle S iM, 
 
 therefore, could no longer indulge in his former 
 courses, adopted this as his last refuge. But all 
 this arose, not from evils which are inherent in 
 the constitution of things, but from those which 
 are of man’s creating, and within his power to 
 remedy. Suicides at this period, like many other 
 abnormal things in human nature, were a kind of 
 temporary rage, the reasons for which subsequent 
 experience has refused to endorse. It is also true 
 that the fundamental principle of Buddhism (a 
 system—it can hardly be called a religion in the 
 original form in which it was propounded by its 
 author) is, that life is so bad and miserable that 
 the sooner our separate conscious existence is 
 absorbed in the mighty “All,” the better. This, 
 like many other theories that have been propounded, 
 by concentrating attention on one aspect of the 
 question, namely, the suffering with which the 
 theorizer has come in contact, and excluding from 
 his view the other, namely, the far greater amount of 
 the indications of happiness and enjoyment, which 
 is presented by the phenomena of conscious exist- 
 ence; contradicts the general experience of mankind, 
 which, on such a subject as whether life is desirable 
 or the reverse, is the only adequate test of truth. 
 But the practice of the overwhelming majority of its 
 adherents, as well as that of the professed followers 
 of every system founded on similar principles, 
 proves that they are of opinion that conscious 
 
POPULAR®* OBJECTIONS. 237 
 
 existence is a thing to be desired. I shall, there- 
 fore, only observe that theories which are prac- 
 tically false must be theoretically untrue; and 
 therefore that all theories which affirm that the 
 miseries of life are so great that it would have been 
 better if man had never been brought into existence 
 are untenable. 
 
 Let us now consider the question whether the 
 phenomena of sentient life, taken as a whole, and 
 our own individual experience of it, indicate a 
 benevolent purpose in the Creator, or that He is 
 indifferent to the happiness of His creatures. I say 
 “taken as a whole,” because no theory can be true 
 which is based on partial views of it, or if we fix 
 our exclusive attention on particular aspects of it. 
 What, then, is the inference which the phenomena 
 of life suggest ? It is necessary to consider this 
 subject carefully, because so thoughtful a writer as 
 Professor Huxley speaks in a recent article on “ The 
 Struggle for Existence,” of the myriads of genera- 
 tions of herbivorous animals which have been tor- 
 mented and devoured by carnivorous ones; of both 
 alike being subject to all the miseries incidental to 
 old age, disease, and over-multiplication, and of the 
 more or less suffering which is the meed both of the 
 vanquished and victor ; and he concludes that ‘some 
 thousands of times a minute, weve our cars sharp 
 enough” [the italics are mine] ‘‘ we should hear sighs 
 and groans of pain like those heard by Dante at 
 
238 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 the gate of hell, that the world cannot be governed 
 by what we call benevolence.” Few, I think, will 
 consider this a correct statement of the phenomena 
 presented by animal life. The following is my 
 reply to it— 
 
 As all direct knowledge respecting the happiness 
 or the misery of existence must be confined to our- 
 selves, we can only judge whether beings, other 
 than ourselves, are in a state of enjoyment or of 
 suffering by comparing their actions with our own 
 under similar circumstances. But although our 
 judgments are founded on analogy, few will be 
 found who will doubt their correctness. What, then, 
 are we entitled to infer respecting the animal 
 creation? Are their happiness and enjoyment out 
 of all proportion greater than their sufferings; are 
 they equally balanced; or do their sufferings pre- 
 ponderate ? On this point no careful observer can 
 entertain a doubt. Do not the phenomena of insect 
 life, when we see its innumerable hosts on the wing 
 during the summer evenings prove that they are 
 experiencing sensations of pleasure? Is not the 
 same true of the feathered races, and of the innu- 
 merable shoals of fish which gambol in the ocean, 
 and of the different land animals when they are 
 partaking of their food? Who can doubt that the 
 domestic cat, when we hear it purring, or see it 
 stretching itself in the heat; or that the dog, when 
 following its natural instincts, such as hunting, or 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 239 
 
 when he is engaged in the service of his master, 
 is happy? The same is true of every animal in 
 its various gambols, when acting on its instincts, 
 or reclining at its ease. I think that few who 
 have contemplated the innumerable forms of sentient 
 life, will entertain a doubt, that the life of animals 
 is one which, with few excepilons, 1S .aslife: of 
 pleasure. In many cases it may be short, but 
 as long as_ it lasts, every indication by which we 
 are able to form a judgment, proves that it is 
 pleasurable. The chief exceptions are the suffer- 
 ings which man inflicts on those which are subject 
 to his rule. The diseases to which they are ex- 
 posed are few; and for the most part, as far as we 
 can judge, are not attended with acute pain. From 
 two things which intensify human suffering they 
 are certainly exempt. Animals are incapable of 
 reflex action. Man possesses that power, and by 
 concentrating his attention on a pain, intensifies 
 it. The sufferings of man are multiplied by the 
 power which he possesses of anticipating the future. 
 This power animals have not. Whatever pains they 
 feel, even death, come upon them suddenly, without 
 the suffering which arises from anticipation. If they 
 are subject to death, this is the means by which a 
 far greater number than would otherwise be pos- 
 sible, are rendered capable of the enjoyments of 
 life ; for, if there was no death the world would be 
 speedily over-peopled, 
 
240 CHRISTIAN THEITSM, 
 
 It will doubtless be objected that a large majority 
 of animals live by preying on one another, and that 
 it was the intention of the author of Nature that 
 they should do so; for he has provided not a few 
 of them with a highly complicated machinery for the 
 purpose of enabling them to catch their prey, and 
 with an intelligence adequate to contrive the means 
 of alluring it into their power. It is impossible for 
 us to estimate the exact amount of suffering which 
 this may occasion. All that we know for certain is, 
 that it comes suddenly and without fearful anticipa- 
 tion; but of the precise amount of pain with which 
 the extinction of life in this manner is attended we 
 have no means of judging, for scarcely has a human 
 being escaped from the deadly grasp of the more 
 powerful predaceous animals to tell the tale. But 
 if Livingstone’s experience be not a singular one, he 
 tells us that when he was seized by a lion his sense 
 of feeling and of fear was all but paralyzed. If this 
 be true in all similar cases, it is certainly a merciful 
 provision of the Creator. These inferences are 
 further strengthened by the fact that no organism 
 with which we are acquainted has been framed for 
 the infliction of pain as its immediate object. Many 
 members of the animal creation, it is true, are pro- 
 vided with organisms of a destructive character, 
 and frequently with very elaborate ones; but their 
 use, and, if it may be permitted to use the word 
 their intention, is not to inflict pain, but to procure 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 241 
 
 for their possessors the needful supply of food, 
 or with the means of self-defence. 
 
 If, then, we take a general view of animal life, and 
 at the same time take into account that the number 
 of living beings which exist is past all human com- 
 prehension; and that each of them in its respective 
 sphere shows unquestionable signs of enjoyment ; 
 the conclusion is inevitable that the amount of 
 happiness which they experience is not only in- 
 conceivably vast in quantity, but that it indefinitely 
 transcends the pains which they suffer. If Professor 
 Huxley’s ears were sharpened up to the point which 
 he postulates, it is certain that he would find that 
 the sounds emitted by animals which are indica- 
 tive of enjoyment would be so loud as to drown 
 those which are indicative of pain; and that the 
 groans and sighs of pain which are emitted by 
 animals, like those which Dante supposed that he 
 heard at the gate of hell, are as much the creation 
 of his own imagination as the latter were of the 
 imagination of the poet. Such being the indica- 
 tions of almost uninterrupted enjoyment which are 
 afforded by the phenomena of animal life, they prove 
 that the purpose of the Creator in bringing them 
 into existence was benevolent; and, consequently, 
 that those cases which seem to point to the conclu- 
 sion that He is indifferent to the happiness of His 
 creatures must admit of some other explanation. 
 
 Let us now take a brief survey of human life, 
 
 16 
 
242 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 —- 
 
 Does it indicate the presence of benevolent purpose, 
 or would it have been better, as some have ventured 
 to affirm, if man had never been brought into exist- 
 ence? In considering this subject, | must for the 
 present omit a consideration which, if taken into 
 account, would alter the complexion of the entire 
 question, namely: Does a future state of existence 
 await man, the enjoyments of which may fully com- 
 pensate for the sufferings of the present life? On 
 this question—one of great importance in relation to 
 the present controversy—I will offer a few observa- 
 tions in the concluding chapter of this work. . I must 
 also ask the reader to exclude from his view the 
 popular and widespread doctrine of everlasting 
 damnation. This, if it is true, certainly involves the 
 consequence that it would have been good for the 
 overwhelming majority of mankind if they had never 
 been born. In this place I must confine myself to 
 the question whether human life, as we behold it, 
 taken as a whole, does or does not testify to the 
 benevolence of its author. Let it also be remembered 
 that that vast mass of suffering which originates in 
 moral causes is excluded from our present inquiry. 
 When we contemplate human life, its phenomena 
 prove beyond a doubt that, in its earlier stages, its 
 pleasures greatly exceed its pains. This we know, not 
 only from observation, but from our own recollection. 
 This period of life knows little or nothing of care 
 about the future. Its wants are supplied, not by 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 243 
 its own exertions, but by those of others. The 
 restraints which it is necessary to impose on its 
 desires with a view to its future good may be 
 irksome, but are certainly not painful. Its volun- 
 tary activities—and they are many—are attended 
 with pleasurable sensations. The period of child- 
 hood, with a few rare exceptions, is universally 
 acknowledged to be one of enjoyment. This is not 
 only the case with those born in comfortable 
 circumstances ; it is true of the great majority of 
 mankind. Look, for example, at the ill-clad children 
 in our streets. Observe them when at play ; when 
 they dance at the music of the organ-grinder ; even 
 when they struggle with one another, when contest- 
 ing the palm of superior strength, and in other 
 circumstances too numerous to particularize. One 
 often wonders at witnessing the indications of 
 happiness which they display. They doubtless 
 have their discomforts; but who can doubt that 
 their pleasures out of all proportion greatly pre- 
 ponderate over their pains? The same observations 
 are true of early youth. If the question were 
 put to everyone under twenty years of age: “Do 
 you consider life a blessing ?” I feel assured that 
 the all but unanimous answer would Dene dOge 
 the only exceptions being those who from their 
 earliest consciousness have suffered from painful 
 congenital disease ; .and these are comparatively few. 
 What, then, is the inference which these considerations 
 
244 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 suggest ? I answer whatever clouds and darkness 
 may be round about Him, that the purpose of the 
 Creator was a benevolent one, and that the experi- 
 ence of early life, taken as a whole, proves that life, 
 with all its drawbacks, is a blessing. 
 
 Let us now direct our attention to mature life. 
 What does our own experience of it, and that of 
 others, testify as to the purpose of the Creator in His 
 creative work ? The anti-Theist urges us to contem- 
 plate its struggles, its disappointments, and its suffer- 
 ings ; and say whether such things are consistent 
 with benevolent purpose. The Theist, on the other 
 hand, justly calls on us not to fix our attention on one 
 portion of the picture only, but to take into account 
 the pleasures and the joys with which life abounds, 
 and ask ourselves, as a matter of our own experience, 
 whether they do not greatly preponderate over its 
 pains. When, for example, a man has had expe- 
 rience of sixty years of life, does he wish that 
 he had passed painlessly out of existence at an 
 earlier period? or, after contemplating the past, is 
 it his deliberate opinion that it would have been 
 good for him if he had never been born? I fully 
 believe, and know from experience, that life has its 
 many trials and its sufferings; but what I ask the 
 reader's particular attention to is, that the over- 
 whelming majority of these owe their origin to moral 
 causes. Such evils are either self-caused, or are 
 caused by the action of other moral agents, and are 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 245 
 
 therefore remediable. In fact, if the Gospel of Christ 
 were practically obeyed; if the golden rule, ‘‘ Thou 
 shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” were carried out 
 in religion, in politics, and in every department of 
 social and private life; if ambition, love of power, 
 self-love to the injury of others, envy, hatred, malice, 
 and the innumerable petty trifles which disturb the 
 happiness of life, were made to cease, the pain and 
 misery occasioned by them would disappear. 
 
 If, then, we withdraw from our view that vast 
 amount of suffering which originates in moral causes, 
 is there anything in the phenomena of mature life 
 which would lead us to question the general 
 benevolence of the Creator? I say His “general 
 benevolence,” because I fully admit that there are 
 numerous cases of pain and suffering arising from 
 causes over which we can exert no control, of which 
 it is impossible, with our limited knowledge, to assign 
 a reason why they are permitted. The faculties with 
 which we are endowed prove that a life of energetic 
 action was destined to be the lot of man. Accord- 
 ingly the Creator has attached pleasurable enjoyment 
 to the active energy of every faculty which we pos- 
 sess, and that enjoyment only ceases when the 
 energetic action is pressed beyond due limits, a 
 pressure which often takes place, but which origin- 
 ates in causes over which we can exert control. Let 
 each of us examine our experience of the past, and 
 say whether our every exertion of mind and body— 
 
246 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 and active life is full of exertion—when confined 
 within due limits, has not been pleasurable. Does 
 not a life of energy banish a whole array of evils 
 to which a life of idleness is a prey? Will not the 
 overwhelming majority of mankind testify that this 
 has been their experience also? Let anyone who 
 has attained to mature years calmly survey his past 
 life, and ask himself whether, when he excludes from 
 his estimate those sufferings over which he and 
 others can exert control; and the various trifles, not 
 worth a moment’s consideration, which embitter the 
 lives of thousands ; the pleasures which have lain 
 within his reach have not been out of all proportion 
 greater than the pains which he has suffered? If 
 so, this period of human life is desirable, and it 
 is impossible that a limited number of apparent 
 exceptions can outweigh the overwhelming evidence 
 of benevolent purpose which it affords; but they 
 must admit of an explanation which, if we could 
 take a larger view of the Divine government than 
 is at present open to our observation, would be 
 found to be consistent with it. 
 
 We have now arrived at the concluding period of 
 life, which we designate old age, with respect to 
 which the saying of the Psalmist, if not universally, 
 is for the most part, true: “The days of our years 
 are threescore years and ten, or even by reason 
 of strength fourscore years, yet is their pride but 
 labour and sorrow; for it is soon gone, and we fly 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 247 
 
 away.” Far be it from me to say that this period 
 of life is not attended with a considerable amount of 
 happiness, especially when it is supported by bright 
 prospects of a world beyond the grave in which sin 
 and suffering will cease for evermore; but it is an 
 unquestionable fact that those energies, which once 
 were pleasurable, have with few exceptions become 
 laborious. Not only is this so, but our bodies are so 
 framed that, however long they may last under 
 favourable conditions, they are destined ultimately 
 to wear out; and death is the final result. Whether 
 the act of dying, apart from the presence of disease, is 
 painful it is impossible to say—probably it is not ; 
 but the decay of our bodies for the most part 
 weakens our mental powers, and greatly diminishes, 
 if not destroys, the enjoyment which in the days of 
 our strength resulted from their exercise. Peaceful 
 extinction is, I own, under ordinary circumstances, 
 the favourable side of the picture. Death is fre- 
 quently preceded by long, painful, and wasting 
 disease ; and in not a few cases with sufferings so 
 acute that even the holiest of men have offered 
 earnest prayer to God that He would grant them 
 relief from their sufferings by death. Death also, 
 at whatever period of life it may come, is usually 
 preceded by painful disease. Such are the facts. 
 From these the anti-Theist argues that it is incre- 
 dible that such a condition of things can be the work 
 of a God who is all-powerful, wise, and good. Could 
 
248 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 not such a being, if he exists, have so formed the 
 human body, even if death were a necessary condition 
 of his creative work, that it should be brought about 
 with little or no suffering—at any rate, only with — 
 suffering which has been self-caused ? How is it 
 consistent with unlimited power and perfect goodness 
 on the part of the Creator that the declining years 
 of life should be, with such few exceptions, years of 
 labour and sorrow? Is it not far more rational to 
 believe that the state of things which actually exists 
 has been brought about by the action of forces des- 
 titute of any attribute which we designate moral, 
 than that it is the work of an all-powerful, wise, and 
 benevolent Creator ? 
 
 Such objections may appear plausible to those 
 who contemplate only one side of human life, namely, 
 its sorrows and its sufferings; but it is impossible 
 that they can outweigh the overwhelming evidence 
 which every form of sentient life affords, of the 
 existence of a God who is all-powerful, wise, and 
 good. Unless, then, our reasoning powers are un- 
 reliable, there must be some mode in which the 
 existence of those things which appear to us to be 
 evils, must be consistent with these attributes in the 
 Creator. Surely, it is rational to believe that man 
 with his limited faculties is unable to penetrate to 
 the height, depth, and breadth of the plan of the 
 Creator’s working ; but that this inability does not 
 hinder us from forming a correct estimate of those 
 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 249 
 
 parts of it which are evident and clear. That work 
 extends from the eternity of the past to the endless 
 ages of the future; its sphere is boundless space. 
 Who, then, can embrace it in all its bearings ? That 
 the existence of suffering which originates in other 
 than moral causes has a purpose, we cannot doubt, 
 though we cannot penetrate it here. I fully admit 
 that if man perishes in the grave, the purpose which 
 these sufferings subserve is inexplicable. It is only 
 explicable in the light of a future state, when with 
 an enlargement of our faculties and of our sphere of 
 vision, that which is dark now may become clear 
 hereafter. Until that day dawns, all that we can 
 do is to exercise faith in that God who has filled 
 the world with such innumerable proofs of His 
 power, wisdom, and goodness, that He will do 
 all things right; and when we contemplate what 
 to us is inexplicable in the Divine government of 
 the world, say with the Apostle: “O the depth of the 
 riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of 
 God! how unsearchable are His judgements, and 
 His ways past tracing out! For who hath known 
 the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His 
 counsellor ? or who hath first given to Him, and it 
 shall be recompensed unto him again? For of Him, 
 and through Him, and unto Him, are all things. To 
 Him be the glory” unto theages of ages! Yes, truly, 
 He has the ages of ages in which to work; and in 
 them He can bring good out of apparent evil. Surely, 
 
250 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 then, it isin the highest degree rational to have faith 
 in Him who has filled the world with such innumer- 
 able manifestations of His power, His wisdom, and 
 His goodness, that what at present seem to be 
 blemishes in His creative and providential work 
 will ultimately work out the purposes of His holy 
 will 
 
Cla bad rea DIR © De 
 
 THE OBJECTIONS WHICH ARE URGED AGAINST 
 CHRISTIAN THEISM OWING TO THE EXISTENCE 
 OF MORAL EVIL AND THE RESULTS WITH 
 WHICH TeISSATTENDED. 
 
 Bese can be no doubt that one of the greatest 
 
 stumbling-blocks to ordinary people in the 
 way of their accepting the teaching of Christianity 
 respecting the character of God is the vast amount of 
 moral evil which exists in the world, and the terrible 
 consequences which, as far as we can at present 
 discern, have resulted from it. I say “as far as we 
 can at present discern,” because it is obvious that 
 we have no right to assume that these will be the 
 ultimate ones which will be realized by its permitted 
 existence under the moral government of God, 
 which with a view to my present argument I am 
 entitled to take for granted will not be limited to the 
 brief space of man’s continuance here. I fully admit 
 that the difficulties are real, and that they have 
 the appearance of considerable plausibility to those 
 who have not given to this subject a careful 
 
252 CHRISTIAN THEISM., 
 
 consideration. I propose, therefore, in the present 
 chapter to consider the subject of moral evil, and 
 the reasons why its existence is permitted, notwith- 
 standing the results with which it has been attended. 
 In doing so, it will be impossible to keep the subject 
 of physical and moral evil entirely separate from one 
 another, because it is unquestionable that by far the 
 larger proportion of physical suffering owes its origin 
 to moral causes, that is, to causes over which we 
 ourselves can exert control, or which originate in 
 the conduct of others, or in tendencies to evil trans- 
 mitted from ancestors more or less remote. Few 
 will question that the overwhelming mass of the 
 misery from which man suffers is of his own creation, 
 though we, as individuals, may not be responsible for 
 its origination; and that not a little of it is the 
 penalty which follows on the gratification of his evil 
 appetites and passions, and suited to make him 
 sensible of the evil of those unhallowed gratifications 
 —one, therefore, which is deterrent and calculated 
 to be remediable. There can be no doubt, if moral 
 evil could be removed out of the world, the amount 
 of suffering which originates in causes purely 
 physical, would be reduced to dimensions which are 
 comparatively small—at any rate small compared 
 with the vast amount of enjoyment which, as I have 
 proved in the last chapter, the phenomena of 
 sentient life present. 
 
 I will now state succinctly the chief objections, 
 
MORAL EVIEVAND ITS RESULTS. 253 
 
 founded on the existence of moral evil and the 
 amount of suffering which has resulted from it, 
 which are urged by anti-Theists against the belief in 
 the existence of a God who possesses the attributes 
 which Christian Theism attributes to Him. 
 
 It is objected— 
 
 Peeilateitgiomineredipies tial asGodswho.is: all- 
 powerful and all-good can have been the Creator of 
 a world in which such amass of moral evil and 
 suffering contingent on it exists. Could he not, if 
 he is almighty, have prevented it ? and if he could, 
 but has not, does it not prove, if a Creator exists, 
 which is rendered more than doubtful, that he must 
 be indifferent to the happiness of his creatures ? 
 
 2. lhat even if ‘the existence jof ‘moral evil is a 
 necessary condition of the creation of a free agent, 
 might he not have caused that the amount of sin 
 and suffering should have been far less than it is ? 
 Is it not inconsistent with his holiness to allow 
 moral evil to flourish as-it does, without adopting 
 some more effectual means of openly showing His 
 disapprobation of it? 
 
 3. That inasmuch as every existing thing, whether 
 it be the evil, or the good, is maintained in being 
 by the energy of the Creator’s will; his holiness and 
 his goodness require, even if the possible existence 
 of moral evil is a necessity, that he should withdraw 
 from those beings in whom it has taken root that 
 energy by which he upholds in existence all created 
 
254 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 things, and thus cause everything which is evil to 
 cease to be, and by this means prevent its indefinite 
 multiplication. In a word, is not the suffering in 
 the world which results from the existence of 
 moral evil so vast, and its moral government so 
 imperfect, as to prove, if a moral government 
 exist at all, that it cannot be that of a being who 
 is at the same time all-powerful, all-wise, all-holy, 
 and _ all-good. 
 
 Such are the chief objections which are urged by 
 anti-Theists on moral grounds, in a great variety of 
 forms, against the existence of a Creator who 
 possesses the attributes which Christian Theism 
 attributes to Him, and which severely try the faith 
 of not a few sincere believers. Before I proceed to 
 consider them in greater detail, it will be desir- 
 able that I should offer a few general observations 
 on them. 
 
 (i) The creation of a finite being must necessarily 
 lie open to a considerable number of objections, be- 
 cause imperfection is inherent in the conception of 
 the finite. Thus it is always possible that the most 
 exalted finite being may think that it would have 
 been better if it had been created higher and better 
 still, and so on for evermore; for nothing can be 
 perfect until the infinite is reached, which for a finite 
 being is impossible. Consequently, if objections are 
 urged against the existence of a God who possesses 
 the attributes which Christian Theism attributes to 
 
MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 256 
 
 Him on account of supposed imperfections which we 
 think that we can discern in finite beings, it really 
 means that they ought never to have been created. 
 For the same reason, it would have been impossible 
 for the Creator to have created beings of different 
 orders, some of which are possessed of higher and 
 others of lower endowments, because each inferior 
 one might object that His work was imperfect 
 in that He has made it what it is, and not invested 
 it with the attributes of one of a higher order. The 
 only question open for consideration is: Has the 
 Creator provided each order of beings which He has 
 created, with the means of happiness and enjoyment 
 within the sphere of the faculties with which He has 
 been pleased to endow them? To this question | 
 think that I have returned a sufficient answer in the 
 last chapter. 
 
 (ii) It is important, in considering questions like 
 the present, that it should be kept steadily in mind 
 that the work of world-building, and the possibilities 
 involved in it, is one which transcends the powers 
 of human reason to determine what is possible, or 
 Siescontiany aan Lhiseis obvious, for it is one which 
 lies outside the range of human experience; and 
 whatever the theorizer may imagine, it is impossible 
 to apply a priori principles to the work in question: 
 for these uniformly fail in matters which come 
 within our experience to conduct us to the realities 
 of things; and if they are thus unreliable in the 
 
256 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 case of things which come within our experience, 
 how can they be reliable in things which transcend 
 it? The discoveries of astronomy, to speak of no 
 other science, have so disclosed the vastness of the 
 universe as to make it evident that man’s finite 
 intellect is incapable of fathoming the height and 
 depth, the length and breadth, of the Creator’s 
 plan, or to form a judgment, from the small portion 
 of it which we behold, what will be its ultimate 
 results. Surely, in view of its vastness, a less con- 
 fident affirmation on the part of speculators as to 
 how the creative plan might have been improved 
 would not be unreasonable. A plan thus vast may 
 be fully consistent with the temporary presence of 
 evil which will be ultimately curable, or which will 
 pass into non-existence when it has accomplished 
 the work for which it has been permitted to exist, or 
 with suffering which will hereafter be productive of 
 greater good to the sufferer which could not be 
 realized without it. 
 
 (iii) When the Creator formed the purpose of 
 creating the finite, He must have assigned limits 
 to the exertion of His own omnipotence, for it is 
 evident that the exercise of His power must: have 
 been confined within the limits of His creative 
 purpose, that purpose being the bringing into exist- 
 ence of that which, from the conditions of the case, 
 involved the production of beings in whom various 
 degrees of imperfection must have been inherent. 
 
MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESOLLS, 257 
 
 In other words, when He determined to create 
 finite beings He entered into self-imposed con- 
 ditions, and having judged these conditions to 
 be wise and good, it is absurd to demand that 
 He should violate them to meet our a priori 
 speculations, 
 
 (iv) It has often been assumed, as though it were 
 an axiom, that the work of a perfect Creator must be 
 perfect, that is, have no conceivable imperfection in it. 
 Perfect I allow it must be, as far as the creative 
 purpose is concerned, and that that purpose is holy, 
 just, and good ; yet it by no means follows that this 
 must be true of each creative act taken by itself, 
 and without reference to the plan of which it forms 
 a part. But of the nature of the instrumentality 
 by which His purpose is capable of being realized 
 we have no means of judging. But if we mean 
 by perfect that every creative act, taken by itself, 
 must realize our conception of absolute perfec- 
 tion, then it would have been impossible that the 
 creative and providential plan could have been a 
 work extending throughout the ages, gradually 
 advancing from lower to higher forms of being, and 
 that beings, some of which were gifted with higher, 
 and others with lower endowments could have 
 been brought into existence. 
 
 Who then, I ask, will venture to affirm that it 
 would have been better if all rational beings had 
 been made incapable of progress; or that the 
 
 17 
 
258 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 present plan of creation, so vast as to exceed the 
 powers of man to embrace it in its length, breadth, 
 and depth, will not ultimately realize the highest 
 purposes of holiness and benevolence ? We, in our 
 impatience, are apt to forget that the Creator has 
 ages of ages in which to work, and that we may 
 have ages of ages in which to exist, during which 
 He can bring good out of apparent evil. That He 
 can do so is certain, for I shall show presently that 
 the existence of moral evil is a necessary condition 
 of the existence of moral agents, and that their 
 existence is a necessary condition of the production 
 of the highest form of good. If beings possessed of 
 freedom had not been brought into existence because 
 their creation involved the possibility of the intro- 
 duction of moral evil into the world—then, nothing 
 but beings who could only act as they were com- 
 pelled to act; nothing which could choose good 
 because it is good, nothing which could render a 
 voluntary service ; nothing noble, nothing worthy of 
 commendation, nothing pure, nothing lovely, no 
 virtue, no self-sacrifice,—could have been brought 
 into existence; but all agents would have been of 
 the same dead level, incapable of a single elevated 
 aspiration, or of a single affection which is spiritual 
 or moral. 
 
 (v) One further consideration requires notice. If 
 free agency did not exist (and without it the exer- 
 cise of intellectual power would be impossible), man 
 
MORAL EVIL AND ITS Ie Oy ONLY BS: 259 
 would be incapable of exercising any command over 
 the physical laws of Nature. Their action, when 
 undirected by intelligent volition, as we see in the 
 case of volcanoes, earthquakes, and other similar 
 phenomena, is ofa very destructive character, But as 
 the blind forces of Nature can only act in conformity 
 with invariable law, when the law of their activity 
 is discovered, the mode in which most of them act 
 at any particular time and place is capable of being 
 made a subject of certain calculation. This being 
 so, when our intellect informs us that their action 
 will be either dangerous or destructive, our posses- 
 sion of the power of self-determination enables us 
 to avoid crossing their path, or, by playing off one 
 force against another, to avoid the danger which 
 would result if their blind action was not interfered 
 with by human agency. Man therefore, by the 
 possession of this power, is able, within certain 
 limits, to avert no small amount of the evil which 
 would otherwise result from their uncontrolled 
 activity. Further: It is the power of choosing 
 between alternatives, united with the ability of 
 concentrating our intellects on some particular 
 subjects, and of withdrawing them from others, 
 which enables man to compel the blind forces of 
 Nature to execute the purposes of his will, and thus, 
 instead of being his masters, to become his servants, 
 All this would be impossible unless we were free, 
 and not necessary agents; and, as I shall prove 
 
260 CHRISTIAN THEISM, 
 
 presently, the possibility of the existence of moral 
 evil, with all the consequences with which it is 
 attended, is the necessary condition of the creation 
 of a being who is a free, and not a necessary, agent. 
 Will any rational being, I ask, when he considers 
 the consequences which would be the result of 
 filling the world with nothing but necessary agents, 
 affirm that it would have been desirable that the 
 Creator should have abstained from creating free 
 agents, because His doing so involved the possibility 
 of the introduction of moral evil into the world, 
 with the consequences with which it has been 
 attended ? 
 
 The above considerations are amply sufficient to 
 make a thoughtful man pause, before he ventures to 
 affirm that the amount of suffering which exists is 
 sufficient to invalidate the overwhelming mass of 
 evidence, with which the universe is everywhere 
 loaded, that it is the work of an all-powerful, wise, 
 and benevolent Creator. I will now proceed to 
 consider the fundamental principle on which the 
 anti-theistic objections rest, the question of moral 
 evil generally, and inquire whether its permitted 
 existence is not the necessary condition of the 
 existence of everything above the dead level of 
 necessary agency; or, in plain words, whether it is 
 not the necessary condition of everything which 
 is elevated, noble, just, pure, deserving of praise, 
 and of everything which we understand by the 
 
MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 261 
 
 words, virtue, holiness, and benevolence. If this is 
 so, and I think that the proof that it is so is over- 
 whelming, then its permitted existence is a good— 
 and if a good it is a proof of benevolent purpose in 
 the Creator. 
 
 In considering this subject, I shall assume that | 
 have proved, in chapter viii. of this work, that free 
 agency, in the sense in which we commonly use 
 that term, is not a mere disguised form of necessary 
 agency, as anti-Theists would endeavour to per- 
 suade us; but a thing which actually exists, account 
 for its origin as we may ; and that all their attempts 
 to disprove its existence, or to explain it away, con- 
 tradict the most certain intuitions of our conscious- 
 ness. I shall, therefore, enter into no abstract 
 questions about its origin, but I shall base my 
 reasonings on 7s existence as a fact, the existence of 
 which is not only testified to by our consciousness 
 as individuals, but by the universal experience of 
 mankind. The question, therefore, which we have 
 to consider is, whether it is consistent with holiness 
 and benevolent purpose in the Creator, to have 
 created beings who are endowed with the power 
 of choosing among different incentives to action 
 which of them they will follow, subject to the con- 
 dition of rendering the existence of moral evil 
 possible. In investigating this subject let me 
 remind the reader that although the objections of 
 anti-Theists assume a variety of forms, all that is 
 
262 . CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 really salient in them may be expressed in two 
 simple sentences-- 
 
 1. If God is almighty, all-holy, and benevolent, 
 and if sin and moral evil are hateful to Him, why has 
 He not so constructed the world as to have rendered 
 the intrusion of moral evil into it, with all its terrible 
 consequences, impossible ? 
 
 2. Inasmuch as -nothing is too hard for omnipo- 
 tence to effect, it is inconceivable that a God exists, 
 who permits the continued existence of wills which 
 are antagonistic to His own. 
 
 To these objections, at first sight so plausible, I 
 answer, that it is possible for beings, even with our 
 finite intellects, to conceive of things which it is 
 impossible even for omnipotence to effect. As this 
 is a point of the utmost importance in relation to our 
 present argument, I must adduce a few obvious 
 examples of such limitations. Thus, things being 
 conditioned as they are, it is impossible even for 
 omnipotence to make two straight lines which shall 
 enclose a space; or a triangle, whose three angles 
 shall not be equal to two right angles; or one, the 
 two sides of which shall not be greater than its third 
 side; or to cause that things which are equal to the 
 same thing, should not be equal to one another; or 
 that two and two should make five and not four, or 
 that an event which is past should never have 
 existed. 
 
 In a word, it is no limitation to almighty power 
 
MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 263 
 
 to affirm that it cannot work contradictions, and 
 such things, and numerous others, involve contra- 
 dictions. All that we mean when we attribute 
 almighty power to God is, that He can do all things 
 which are possible. Now the suggestion that it is 
 possible to create a being who is free to choose 
 the good, and who is not at the same time free to 
 choose the evil, involves a direct contradiction ; for 
 the conception of free agency involves the possession 
 of a power of choosing between a number of alterna- 
 tives ; but where a being can only act under compul- 
 sion, or because it cannot act otherwise, there can be 
 no choice, and a being who is impelled to choose the 
 good only, and who cannot choose evil, that is, who 
 can only act in conformity with what has been incor- 
 rectly called the strongest motive, is no more a free 
 agent than the force of gravitation. There can be 
 no doubt that it was within the power of the Creator 
 to have rendered the existence of moral evil impos- 
 sible ; but this could only have been effected by His 
 declining to create a moral being, that is, by His 
 being satisfied with the services of beings which 
 could not do otherwise than serve Him; who could 
 not do His will because it is right to do it; who 
 were incapable of feeling an affection towards Him 
 who made them, of progress, or of obedience to a 
 moral law. 
 
 Let us consider, then, what would have been the 
 consequence, if the existence of moral evil had 
 
264 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 been rendered impossible. |The world would have 
 contained nothing but necessary agents, or, at 
 best, of agents possessing no greater amount of 
 intelligence, or freedom, than that of the most 
 intelligent of animals, whose intellect and freedom of 
 choice is evidently confined within limits so narrow 
 that, if left to themselves, and not interfered with by 
 a higher order of being, they would be utterly un- 
 progressive, and continue precisely the same as they 
 were when they were first brought into existence ; 
 and if, as it is said, some of them possess the 
 rudiments of a moral nature, it would continue 
 undeveloped. Everything, therefore, in man which 
 places him at the elevation which he occupies above 
 the most intelligent of animals—an elevation so great 
 that it is impossible to assign its limits—would have 
 been non-existent. To put the distinction briefly: 
 Man is capable of indefinite progress, both intellec- 
 tually and morally; the noblest animals if left to 
 themselves would continue for ever ‘stagnant ; and 
 even that progress which some of them are capable 
 of making, under the hand of man, is confined within 
 limits so narrow, that they still continue, irrespon- 
 sible for their actions ; or, in other words, no amount 
 of education or training will convert the most intel- 
 ligent of animals into a moral being. 
 
 As this is a point of considerable importance in 
 relation to our argument, let me illustrate it by two 
 familiar examples—one which is capable of making 
 
MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 265 
 
 a very limited progress when brought under the 
 teaching of man, of whom he is the constant 
 companion; and the other which is capable of 
 performing operations which, if the result of an 
 intelligence possessed by itself, would involve in- 
 telligence of a high order, but which remains utterly 
 unprogressive, 
 
 The intelligence displayed by the dog within 
 certain limits is great, but within these limits it is 
 strictly confined. He may even be said to possess 
 some rudiments of a moral nature; but these again 
 are confined within such narrow boundaries that we 
 never think of holding him responsible for his actions. 
 He is capable of learning things under man’s teaching 
 which he never could have learned by his own un- 
 aided powers. That he possesses reasoning powers, 
 not of universal application, but confined within 
 certain narrow limits which he is unable to transcend, 
 seems unquestionable. His devotion to his master 
 is striking. Even when he beats him, he fawns 
 submissively at his feet. He is capable of sacrificing 
 himself for him, and even of pining away at his death. 
 But he will serve with equal faithfulness the greatest 
 saint and the greatest monster of iniquity. He is 
 governed by his impulses ; he is unable to discrimi- 
 nate between right and wrong. Notwithstanding all 
 his devotion to his master, he cannot offer himself as 
 a sacrifice either to him or to any other being 
 because it is holy, just, and right that he should do 
 
266 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 so. His acts of this kind are not the result of 
 choice, but of impulse. With all his intelligence he 
 has never given an intelligent glance at the mighty 
 heavens, though he bays at the moon. Surely no 
 rational being would sacrifice the powers with which 
 his free agency invests him at the cost of being 
 reduced to a level of those of the dog, the horse, or 
 the elephant. 
 
 Let us now take another example from the working 
 bee. Wonderful are its operations. In the formation 
 of its cells, it has solved a difficult mathematical 
 problem thousands of years before it was solved by 
 man. In the construction of its combs, it is capable 
 of deviating from their usual form, so as to meet 
 certain emergencies arising from the nature of its 
 abode. By its incessant labours it provides a 
 store of provisions against a season when it can 
 procure none. When by some untimely accident 
 the hive has been deprived of its queen, it is capable 
 of manufacturing a new one out of a grub which in 
 ordinary course would produce a worker. If these 
 and other operations involved on its part intellect 
 or choice similar to that possessed by man, it is 
 certain that its intellect must be of a very high order ; 
 but yet so stupid is the insect that if it enters a 
 room by an open window, and gets into another 
 which is shut, it will continue vainly to buzz against 
 the glass; for its intellect does not enable it to 
 retrace its steps and escape by the one which is open. 
 
MORALZEVIE ANDATS RESULTS. 267 
 
 Its devotion to its queen is admirable, its self- 
 sacrifice for her is great; the hive bears the 
 appearance of a well-ordered commonwealth, but all 
 this involves no element which can be designated 
 moral. Its stupidity on numerous points makes it 
 certain that the intellect which it possesses is not its 
 own, but that of another. Bees are precisely the 
 same morally as they were three thousand years 
 ago. Such, then, is the condition to which the world 
 would have been reduced, if for the purpose of 
 rendering the existence of moral evil impossible, 
 the Creator had declined to create a free agent, or in 
 other words a moral being. 
 
 The demand, therefore, that the Creator should 
 have rendered the existence of moral evil and the 
 consequences which have resulted from it impossible, 
 means that no being should have existed which 
 could bow in lowly reverence before that power 
 which built the universe, who could adore God 
 because He is worthy of adoration, or love Him be- 
 cause He is the embodiment of loveliness ; or who 
 could choose the right in opposition to the strong, 
 because it is right that that which is right should 
 vanquish that which is strong. Where would have 
 been the noble ? Where would have been the morally 
 beautiful? Where would have been the sense of 
 duty ? Where would have been the army of martyrs 
 who, sooner than violate their conscience, have yielded 
 up their lives to a torturing death ? Where would 
 
268 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 have been those who have striven (imperfectly I 
 admit) to form in themselves something of the char- 
 acter of Jesus Christ? Where, with all reverence 
 be it spoken, would have been that glorious character 
 itself, the contemplation of which has acted on the 
 spiritual and moral world with a force similar to that 
 exerted by the sun on the natural world, breathing 
 into it life and energy, recovering the degraded from 
 their degradation, and elevating the holy to higher 
 degrees of holiness? If, for the purpose of rendering 
 moral evil impossible, free agents had never been 
 created, there would have been none to cry, “ Holy, 
 Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty ;” none to exclaim, 
 “Worthy is the Lamb;” none to acquiesce in the 
 great declarations, ‘‘ Blessed are the meek; Blessed 
 are the pure in heart ; Blessed are they who hunger 
 and thirst after righteousness; Blessed are the 
 merciful; Blessed are the peacemakers ; Blessed are 
 they who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for 
 theirs is the kingdom of heaven.” Nay, modern 
 anti-theistic Altruism would have been impossible ; 
 for not one of the qualities which it desiderates 
 could have come into being. Who, I ask, can feel 
 love for that which is not lovely, or for an agent who 
 is incapable of acting otherwise than it does ? Many 
 such agents exist who benefit us; the food which we 
 eat is absolutely necessary for the support of our 
 lives ; but who ever felt a feeling of gratitude, or 
 thought of returning thanks either to it or them? If 
 
MOnAT EMIT NO TT SeRESULTLS, 269 
 
 only necessary agents, or animals had existed, the 
 existence of a moral world would have been im- 
 possible ; and that the latter should exist without 
 rendering the existence of moral evil possible involves 
 a contradiction. 
 
 The question at issue may be briefly stated thus: 
 Was it desirable that free (that is, moral) agents 
 should have been created with all the possibilities of 
 moral evil which their creation involved, or that the 
 world should have contained no higher order of 
 beings than the highest animals? Few, I think, 
 will affirm that this last alternative would have been 
 the preferable one. I fully admit the terrible char- 
 acter of moral evil, and the fearful results which it 
 has wrought ; but the Creator, when He determined 
 to create a finite moral agent, must have foreseen all 
 the consequences which would result from His 
 creating a being endowed with the power of choosing 
 the evil, as well as the good. He must, therefore, 
 have determined that it was right to do so, notwith- 
 standing the consequences which He foreknew would 
 follow. Who will venture to affirm that He was in 
 error ? He must also have foreseen the remotest con- 
 sequences of His creative acts, which we cannot; and 
 known that He could work out from them results 
 consistent with His holiness and benevolence. This 
 Christianity affirms that He has provided the means 
 of doing, and that this formed a part of that purpose 
 which He purposed in Himself before the ages began. 
 
270 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 Into this subject space forbids that I should enter, but 
 this is the proper place to ask the reader’s attention 
 to it. It is true that an attempt has been made to 
 explain these difficulties by throwing the blame of the 
 apparent imperfections, the sin and suffering, with 
 which the world abounds, on the imperfect action of 
 the machinery by which it was brought into existence 
 in its present form. But all that it succeeds in doing 
 is to remove it a little from our view. Who, I ask, 
 was the constructor of this machine? Did He not 
 foresee all the consequences which would result from 
 its working ? Must He not have stood by, without 
 interfering, while these consequences were being 
 ground out? View the subject as we may, the 
 permitted existence of moral evil, and of the con- 
 Sequences which have resulted from it, must have 
 formed a portion of His creative plan, for every 
 being, the holy, and the unholy, is upheld in exist- 
 ence “every moment. by the energy of His’ ‘wills 
 and if He were to withdraw that energy, both the 
 one and the other would immediately pass into 
 non-existence. 
 
 The existence of moral evil, therefore, must be 
 intended to realize some purpose for good which 
 would be incapable of realization apart from its 
 permitted existence. The most important of these, 
 namely, the existence of a free agent, is one which lies 
 clearly within our mental vision to see that it is pro- 
 ductive of the highest good; and I have been careful 
 
MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 271 
 
 to dwell on it in considerable detail, because, to those 
 who have not carefully considered the subject, it forms 
 the most plausible objection which the anti-Theist 
 adduces against the existence of a holy and bene- 
 volent Creator. Other reasons for its permitted 
 existence [ shall point out presently. But I readily 
 admit that the whole can only be fully known and 
 rightly estimated when we can take a larger view of 
 the Creator’s work, 
 
 Here, then, is the legitimate place for faith, for 
 surely it is not only religious, but in the highest 
 degree rational, to trust that He who is doing innu- 
 merable things on which our reason is fully com- 
 petent to sit in judgment, is doing all things right, 
 although there may be not a few things into 
 the purpose of which our finite intellects cannot 
 penetrate. Scientists ask us to have faith in the 
 ultimate discoveries of science on points on which 
 their present knowledge is imperfect. Is it, then, 
 not rational, I ask, that we should have faith 
 in God when some parts of His working, both 
 in creation and providence, are inexplicable by 
 our finite understandings? Let no one, however, 
 draw the conclusion because the permitted exist- 
 ence of moral evil forms a portion of the Creator's 
 plan, that it is destined to exist for evermore in the 
 universe which He has made. It has been, and still 
 is, a popular belief that it will be so; but that belief 
 has no foundation in reason and is nowhere affirmed 
 
272 CHRISTIAN THETSM. 
 
 in revelation. On the contrary, there is much in 
 the latter, unless language is used in a non-natural 
 sense, which affirms the reverse. Moral evil, as I 
 have shown, has a purpose for its permitted exist- 
 ence, which it is fitted to realize. Who, then, will 
 venture to affirm that when the end of its existence 
 has been accomplished it will not cease to be, or 
 that the Creator has not the means of winning 
 back to Himself during the ages of the future 
 the erring children who have revolted from Him 
 heres, | 
 
 _ Let us now consider the objections so often urged, 
 that even if the creation of finite free agents involved 
 the possible existence of moral evil, could not a 
 Creator all-powerful, wise, holy, and benevolent have 
 limited its amount and prevented it from casting such 
 a blight on the world which He has made? Would 
 it not have been better if He had removed out of 
 existence every being which had become infected 
 with evil, and thus prevented it from forming an 
 environment of evil, by which this moral pestilence 
 has been spread wider and wider? To many there 
 can be no doubt that these objections seem plausible 
 ones. 
 
 To these objections I reply, that it is impossible to 
 form a judgment as to the amount of moral evil of 
 which it was consistent with the holiness and the 
 goodness of the Creator to permit the existence, until 
 we can comprehend His entire creative plan, and 
 
MORAL EVIL AND°ITS “RESULTS. o8 
 
 know all the purposes which its permitted existence 
 is intended to subserve. I have already proved that 
 its existence has realized one of the highest purposes 
 for good, namely, the rendering the existence of moral 
 agents possible. But as to its amount, or the future 
 purposes it is intended to subserve, our finite intel- 
 lects are incapable of forming a judgment. With 
 respect to the objection that it would have been 
 better if He had caused it to pass out of existence as 
 soon as it had become rooted in the world, I reply that 
 its continued existence subserves valuable purposes 
 in the formation of character, and that it would have 
 been impossible for these to have been realized if it had 
 been blotted out of existence as soon as it had become 
 so. The, All-Holy will doubtless cause it to cease 
 to exist when it has realized the purposes for which 
 he has permitted it. Here, again, is rational ground 
 for the exercise of faith, that He whose power and 
 wisdom have built the universe, with all its wondrous 
 adaptations, and whose goodness has provided sen- 
 tient beings with such ample means of happiness and 
 enjoyment—a happiness and enjoyment which would 
 be all but complete if men would live in conformity 
 with the principles of the moral law as enunciated 
 by Jesus Christ,—has done, and will ultimately be 
 proved to have done, all things in conformity with 
 perfect holiness and benevolence, when we are 
 capable of taking a more enlarged view of His 
 creative and providential plan. Who i ask, when 
 
 18 
 
274 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 we consider the limitation of our faculties, can justly 
 venture to affirm that such faith is irrational? Surely 
 not the scientist, who asks us to have faith that the 
 discoveries of the future will fill up the gaps in his 
 present knowledge. One thing we can see plainly, 
 that as long as moral evil exists suffering is its just 
 reward, and that the foreknowledge that suffering 
 will be the certain result of sin is its chief deterrent. 
 God, therefore, is holy and benevolent, who has 
 bound the two together in inseparable union. 
 
 I will now consider some of the other purposes 
 which the existence of evil is fitted to subserve. 
 In doing so I intend borrowing from a recently 
 published work of Dr. Martineau, entitled A Study 
 of Religion. The work in question is one of those 
 which are addressed to a high class of thinkers. 
 I shall, therefore, not quote from it verbatim, but 
 endeavour to translate its leading thoughts into 
 language more adapted to that class of readers 
 for whom the present work is intended. Speaking 
 of the additional sufferings which man undergoes, 
 compared with those of the animal creation, the 
 doctor observes— 
 
 ‘The additional dimensions which suffering gains 
 in man beyond the limits of animal sensibility 
 originate in our superior mental endowments. _ It is 
 because we can see fore and aft from the point where 
 we stand, because we have ever with us the possible 
 
MORATVEVIEVAND ITS RESULTS. 275 
 
 as well as the actual, because the visible has no 
 power to blot out the invisible from our thought, that 
 with us no pang can be born or perish in a moment, 
 It sends no notice of its approach, it leaves with us 
 many a vestige of its departure ; far beyond the term 
 of total eclipse it spreads a broad penumbra of 
 mournful twilight. What, then, is the just inference 
 from this? Would you renounce your reason that 
 you might be saved your tears? Would you quit 
 your many-chambered mind, and shut yourself up in 
 a single cell, and draw down its blinds, and see no 
 lightning, and know nothing until you are struck ? 
 Further : Man’s power of self-consciousness enables 
 him to concentrate his attention on a particular sub- 
 ject in a manner which animals cannot. This power 
 is the foundation of nearly all that is noble in him 
 both in intellect and in character. We all know from 
 experience that this power of concentrating our atten- 
 tion on our pains greatly intensifies them. On the 
 other hand, this act of concentration greatly intensi- 
 fies our pleasures. [rom all these mighty endow- 
 ments of man we must part if we would decline our 
 heritage of pain. That heritage is the consequence of 
 intellect, and cannot be resigned without forfeiting 
 all that intellect brings. 
 
 Suffering is the discipline through which our 
 moral nature gains its true elevation. Not that 
 the mere incidence of pain necessarily awakens the 
 torpid conscience, or frees a man from the slavery 
 
276 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 of selfishness. No mere experience of sense can 
 produce a moral result. Even in low types of 
 mind, it is quite possible for it to dry up and 
 harden the character. But although some charac- 
 ters may do without it, and others may do nothing 
 with it, it is true that you must seek for the 
 greatest and best among those who have abounded 
 in hardships, and who have passed through the 
 discipline of struggling. Ease and prosperity may 
 supply a sufficient school for respectable commoners, 
 but without struggling and effort is no man ennobled, 
 Every highest form of excellence rises from this 
 dark ground, and emerges into its nobleness by 
 the conquest of some severe necessity. In what 
 Elysium would you find the patience and silent 
 self-control of which every nurse can testify, or 
 the fortitude in right, which even the rack cannot 
 quench or the dungeon wear out, or the courage 
 of the prophet to fling his Divine word before the 
 wrath of princes or the mocking of the people ? 
 It will doubtless be urged that these are superfluous 
 virtues, their value being only relative against the 
 evils which they lessen. But is this true? Is the 
 man who has never been subdued to patience 
 braced to fortitude, fired with heroic enthusiasm, 
 as strong, as noble, as free, as he who has been 
 schooled in self-sacrifice and self-denial? These 
 qualities do more than conquer the besetting evil: 
 they add a cubit to the moral Stature ; they clear 
 
MORAI MELE ANDAs RESULTS: 27 
 
 “I 
 
 the vision, they refine the thought, they animate 
 the will. So that there is not a duty, however 
 simple, which does not win from them a_ fresh 
 grace; and if to our chastening we must thus 
 acknowledge this personal debt, it is equally certain 
 that the sufferings of others speak with an indis- 
 putable appeal to our affections, and awaken in us 
 a disinterestedness else impossible. Deeply sunken 
 must be that moral nature in which they do not 
 call into active energy something which is good. 
 It is in the presence of sorrow and of suffering 
 that we forget ourselves, and in many a home the 
 crippled child or the disabled father has trained to 
 sobriety and tenderness the habits which would 
 otherwise have been self-seeking and _ frivolous. 
 The noble army of benefactors to mankind consists 
 of men and women whose hearts have been pene- 
 trated by a deep feeling of compassion; and who 
 have offered themselves up in self-sacrifice to relieve 
 others from suffering and to rescue them from sin. 
 Is there not something in this inherently noble? 
 Could we well spare such characters in a world 
 where there is neither physical nor moral evil? 
 Are they mere instruments for getting rid of this 
 or that evil from the world, and have they nothing 
 morally beautiful, nothing glorious in themselves ? 
 It is their depth of character which comes home 
 to us with power. 
 
 “But further still—apart from its sorrow, the 
 
 CEN 
 
278 CHRISTIAN. THEISM., 
 
 heart would seldom find its rest in God. Even 
 the cynic feeds his cynicism in the fact that men 
 betake themselves to religion when they have lost 
 all besides. He sees aright, but he gives the 
 meaning wrong. He thinks it some mean fear 
 which brings forth the sufferer’s prayer, and takes 
 it as a proof that religion is nothing but the lowest 
 dregs of life, when the generous wine is all drained 
 off, And so it would be if the sole reality lay in 
 temporal well-being. But what does the experience 
 of those whose lives have been a course of unbroken 
 prosperity testify, and who have had no experience 
 of struggles, disappointments, or of suffering ? For 
 the most part they fondly imagine that, after having 
 amply provided themselves with the means of en- 
 joyment for many years, that they will have nothing 
 to do during the remainder of their lives but ‘to 
 eat, drink, and be merry,’ or, in other words, enjoy 
 themselves according to their respective tastes. But 
 does it not for the most part happen that such per- 
 sons speedily become sated, unable to kill time, 
 devoured by ewvmnuz, and, like the author of the 
 Book of Ecclesiastes, after having tried the whole 
 range of enjoyment within the reach of man, ex- 
 claim in bitterness of spirit, ‘ Vanity of vanities ; 
 all is vanity’? But when such an one has been 
 awakened from this baseless dream by the advent 
 of suffering, sorrow, and disappointment, the inner 
 and the outer depths of the realities of things become 
 
MORATREVHETAN DD. TISVRESOLTS, 279 
 
 open to his vision; and thus it becomes revealed to 
 him that there is an infinite reality beyond the 
 present and the visible, that is, God, in whom 
 alone can be found rest and peace. ‘Thus, instead 
 of passing away from actualities, the worldly pro- 
 sperous man for the first time discovers them, and the 
 foot which once blindly attempted to support itself 
 on the shifting sandbank, as though it were solid 
 
 ground, at last rests upon the rock.” 
 
 The demand which has been made that the Creator, 
 if He is all-powerful and benevolent, ought to have 
 made sin and suffering impossible, I shall answer 
 by quoting another passage from the profound 
 thinker above referred to, with only a few omis- 
 sions and alterations as are necessary for accom- 
 modating it to my present purpose, which will leave 
 
 the sense intact. 
 
 “The Creator might have certainly effected this, 
 but only by substituting mechanism for free agency: 
 It is only by abstaining from predetermining neces- 
 sity, and allowing room for preferential choice, that 
 He renders the existence of character, and the test- 
 ing of fidelity a possibility. In virtue of this 
 eMnenceme ee isatic  calsc#oOumticaexistencemoOL 
 character; but not the cause of what that character 
 shall be. Thus a universe which no sin could 
 invade, would be one in which no character could 
 
 exist ; and in insisting that every access should be 
 
280 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 shut against moral evil, we ask that the holiness 
 of God should cancel its own conditions. It is 
 because He is holy, and cannot be content with an 
 unmoral world, where all perfection is given and 
 none is earned, that He refuses to render guilt 
 impossible and inward harmony mechanical. If 
 He were only benevolent, it might suffice to fill 
 creation with the pleasures of sentient existence ; 
 but, being holy too, He wills that beings should 
 exist capable of determining themselves by a free 
 preference to the life which He approves; and 
 preference there cannot be unless the path is open 
 to choose the evil as well as the good. To set up, 
 therefore, an absolute barrier against the admission 
 of wrong, would reduce human life to a kind of 
 menagerie, instead of allowing it to culminate in a 
 moral society. 
 
 “Would, then, the objector prefer that vice and 
 wrong should produce happiness, or would he have it, 
 make no difference to the external condition of man- 
 kind, whether greed and licentiousness prevail, or 
 disinterestedness and purity ? Surely the entail of 
 suffering on moral evil is the indispensable expression 
 of a righteous administration of things. Sin being 
 in the world, it would be monstrous that there should 
 be no suffering : and would more than justify the com- 
 plaint which is not unfrequently raised against the in- 
 sufficiency of the punishment which overtakes human 
 transgression, expressed in the words: ‘ Because 
 
MOTALS PVA IEANDAIT SSRES OLLS. 281 
 
 sentence against an evil deed is not executed speedily, 
 therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set 
 in them to do evil.’ The incidence of such suffer- 
 ing may doubtless at times be open to wonder and 
 criticism ; it may fall on the innocent, and seem to miss 
 its proper aim. But its existence and its amount are 
 only what must be expected in a state of being in 
 which the character is to bear its consequences. The 
 question which presses on us is not, How does it 
 consist with the benevolence of God to admit so much 
 morally incurred pain ? but, How does it consist with 
 the holiness of God to admit so much unholiness 
 in human life ?” 
 
 The fundamental principles involved in the answer 
 to this last question have been already virtually met 
 in the course of the previous arguments, I shall, 
 therefore, only offer on them a few brief remarks. As 
 I have already observed, the determination of the 
 Creator to create finite free agents, involved the pos- 
 sibility of the existence of moral evil, and of all the 
 consequences which result from it—it involving a 
 contradiction to create a being capable of freely 
 choosing the right, without at the same time render- 
 ing possible its choosing the wrong; just as it 
 involves a contradiction to affirm that it is possible 
 to form a surface which is convex, without at the 
 same time involving the possible existence of a surface 
 which is concave. When, then, it is asked, with so 
 
282 CHRISTIAN LHLISIiz: 
 
 much apparent plausibilty, why did not the Creator, 
 all-powerful and beneficent, so constitute the world 
 as to have rendered the existence of moral evil 
 impossible, attention cannot be too strongly drawn 
 to the fact that if free agents are to exist, the demand 
 that He should do so involves a demand that He should 
 work contradictions, a thing which even omnipotence 
 cannot effect. Who, then, I ask, will venture to 
 affirm that the Creator has acted contrary to His 
 holiness, or His benevolence in creating free agents ? 
 Is not free agency the source of everything which is 
 holy, of everything which is morally beautiful in 
 the universe? Would any free agent be content to 
 sacrifice his free agency at the price of being con- 
 verted into an animal, or a machine? It has been 
 shown, in the course of the previous reasonings, that 
 the pain, the suffering, and the struggles, which 
 result from the existence of moral evil, tend not only 
 to the formation of character, but to the production 
 of everything which is noble in it; and so far work 
 out results which are in the highest degree desirable. 
 What would each of us be, if we had been born and 
 brought up ina state of things in which no effort 
 was necessary ; in which there was nothing to con- 
 tend against, and no difficulty to be surmounted ? 
 Obviously we should have been beings destitute of 
 character, and of every quality which is noble. 
 
 The only open question, therefore, is: Ought a 
 God who is holy to tolerate the mass of wickedness 
 
MORALSEVALEA NDTIS RESULTS. 283 
 
 with which human life abounds ? or could He not 
 have limited its amount? One limit he has assigned 
 to it. A moral being in whom conscience has become 
 extinct, the impulses supreme, and the will power- 
 less, has really ceased to be a moral agent, and 
 has sunk to the level of an animal. Beyond this 
 he cannot go in his wickedness. But it may be 
 urged, Ought not narrower limits to have been 
 assigned to it? To this I answer that on this 
 point we are incapable of judging, because with 
 our limited faculties we cannot penetrate all the 
 purposes which its permitted existence is intended 
 to subserve, or to grasp with our finite intellects 
 the creative and providential plan. One thing only 
 can be affirmed for certain, that it is inconsistent 
 with the character which Christian Theism attri- 
 butes to God, that He should permit the endless 
 existence of wills standing in direct opposition to 
 His own. 
 
 Similar is the teaching of Christianity respecting 
 the uses, which the struggles, the temptations, and 
 the sufferings to which we are exposed are intended 
 to be subservient. To adopt the words of an Apostle 
 who suffered far more than falls to the lot of ordi- 
 nary Christians, “ Our light affliction, which is for the 
 moment, worketh for us more and more exceedingly 
 an eternal weight of glory.” What glory? Not the 
 glory of a halo of brightness emitted from us, or 
 shining around us; but the glory of a higher and 
 
284 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 higher spiritual and moral elevation, for the only 
 things which are truly glorious are the moral per- 
 fections which are exhibited in the character of 
 Jesus Christ. That such is the end which these 
 ‘things are intended to subserve is the affirmation 
 of every one of the sacred writers; and the only 
 limit which they recognize is, the attainment to the 
 measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. Nay, 
 one of them has even gone further, and affirmed 
 that Jesus Christ Himself, ‘‘ learned obedience by the 
 things which He suffered ;” “that He was made 
 perfect through suffering ;” and “‘in that He Him- 
 self hath suffered being tempted, He is able to 
 succour them that are tempted.” If this is true of 
 Him who was perfect man, how much more true 
 must it be of those who are not only imperfect men, 
 but whose animal appetites tempt to the indulgence 
 of that which is sinful and evil! 
 
 The importance of the subject which we have 
 been considering in this and the previous chapter 
 will render it desirable that before concluding I 
 should set before the reader the chief points 
 which have been established in the course of the 
 argument, which throw light on the difficulties with 
 which the existence of physical and moral evil is 
 alleged to be attended. 
 
 1. When we consider the vastness of the universe, | 
 the small portion of it which is accessible to our 
 observation, and the limited nature of our faculties, 
 
MORALS EVIEVAND ITS*RESULTS. 285 
 
 it is reasonable to expect that portions of the 
 creative plan, and of its providential government, 
 may contain difficulties, and that things may exist 
 the uses of which we are unable to explain. But 
 when we consider their limited number, compared 
 with the numberless indications of power, wisdom, 
 and goodness with which the universe is everywhere 
 loaded, these entirely overbalance the weight of 
 the objections against Christian Theism which are 
 founded on the difficulties in question; and afford 
 rational ground for believing, and even feeling 
 assured, that what is inexplicable now, when we 
 are capable of taking an enlarged view of God's 
 creative and providential plan, which the Christian 
 revelation promises that we shall be hereafter, will 
 be found to be consistent with every attribute which 
 Christian Theism attributes to Him. 
 
 2. That the amount of suffering which originates 
 in moral causes, that is, in causes over which man 
 can exert control, is out of all proportion greater 
 than that which originates in causes which are 
 purely physical. 
 
 3. That the sufferings which originate in causes 
 which are purely physical, arise from the fact that 
 the Creator has seen good to act in His work of 
 creation and providence through the agency of forces, 
 which can only energize'in conformity with a law 
 from which they cannot deviate, and that this purpose 
 is a wise one is evident, for if these forces were 
 
286 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 made to vary in their action so as to avert the 
 consequences which result to man, whenever he 
 happens to cross their path, these interferences would 
 be so numerous as to render the mode of their 
 action at any particular time and place incapable 
 of calculation, and that this condition of things, if it 
 did not render human life impossible, would throw 
 it into a state of hopeless confusion. On the other 
 hand the action of these forces being calculable, no 
 small portion of the evils which arise from the 
 present mode of their activity are capable of being 
 avoided by prudent calculation. 
 
 4. That pleasure and pain are so closely correlated 
 together, that it is extremely doubtful whether the 
 demand that a nervous system could be so con- 
 structed, which was capable of producing pleasure, 
 and not under altered conditions be capable of 
 producing pain, would not involve a contradiction. 
 Further : That pain in very numerous cases acts as a 
 warning against danger; and when it does so, it is 
 undeniable that its existence is attended with results 
 which are highly beneficial, and therefore consistent 
 with benevolent purpose. 
 
 5. That the happiness and enjoyment of which 
 the phenomena of sentient life prove the existence 
 is out of all proportion greater than the amount 
 of suffering which arises from physical and moral 
 causes united ; and that this disposes of the objection 
 which is urged against the benevolence of the 
 
MORAL Hie ANDVLLESURESULTS: 287 
 
 Creator on the ground of the large amount. of 
 suffering which unquestionably exists; and conse- 
 quently that the existence of suffering in individual 
 cases for which with our present knowledge we are 
 incapable of assigning a reason, must be capable 
 of explanation on grounds which are consistent with 
 His benevolence, if.we were capable of taking a 
 more extended view of His creative and providential 
 plan, and of the ultimate results which it is calcu- 
 lated to realize. 
 
 The following points relate to the existence of 
 moral evil, and to them I ask the reader’s careful 
 consideration. 
 
 1. That the idea that it is possible to create 
 a being who is capable of choosing the good, but 
 who is so constituted as to be incapable of choosing 
 evil, is no less a contradiction than that it is 
 possible to form a convex surface, and at the 
 same time to render the formation of a concave one 
 impossible. 
 
 2. That the demand that the Creator should 
 have rendered the existence of moral evil with 
 all the consequences which have resulted from it 
 impossible, and yet that He should have created 
 beings capable of self-determination, free agency, 
 and with an intelligence such as that possessed 
 by man, is a demand that He should work con- 
 tradictions, which, with all reverence be it spoken, is 
 a thing which not even omnipotence can effect. 
 
288 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 3. That if the existence of moral evil had been 
 rendered impossible, the world would have contained 
 no higher order of being than necessary agents 
 and the most intelligent of animals. In a word, no 
 being possessed of a spiritual and moral nature 
 could have been brought into existence. 
 
 4. That this being so, it was calculated to effect 
 the highest purposes of holiness and benevolence 
 to create agents who possessed all those endowments 
 which we include under the terms “ rational,” “ intel- 
 lectual,” “ spiritual,” and “moral,” notwithstanding 
 all the consequences with which the Creator must 
 have foreseen that the creation of such beings might 
 be attended. 
 
 5. That the present constitution of things in 
 which the evil is inexplicably mingled with the good, 
 and the struggles and exertion rendered necessary 
 by it, is one which tends to the development 
 of everything in human nature which we include 
 under the terms great, noble, elevated, to the form- 
 ation of character, and even of those milder virtues 
 which we designate saintly. 
 
 6. That these things being so, the permitted 
 existence of moral evil is consistent with perfect 
 holiness and benevolence in the Creator, and that 
 it by no means follows that its existence will be 
 endless. 
 
 I by no means affirm that these considerations 
 solve all the difficulties of the problem; _ but 
 
MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 289 
 
 those which they do solve—and they are not few— 
 afford ample ground for believing that those which 
 with our limited knowledge we cannot solve are 
 solvable; and that the thing necessary to render 
 them so is an enlarged view of God’s creative and 
 providential plan. 
 
 Yet if it is true, as many not a little eminent in 
 philosophy and science have ventured to affirm, that 
 man is destined to perish with the dissolution of his 
 body, I fully admit that it is impossible to vindicate 
 the present moral government of the world ; for, in 
 that case it is a mass of confusion which hopelessly 
 confounds human reason, holding out no hope of 
 its future rectification; the existence of suffering 
 and sorrow would subserve no purpose which is 
 beneficial, or tending to ultimate good; and the 
 elevation of character, and the moral qualities which 
 the discipline of life is calculated to generate by 
 means of many a hard struggle with temptation, and 
 with many a trial, would come into existence merely 
 after a short interval to cease to be. This opens 
 to us the question of man’s survival, and the 
 possibilities involved in it, a point which I propose 
 to consider in the following chapter. 
 
 19 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE QUESTION WHETHER WE HAVE REASON FOR 
 BELIEVING THAT WE SHALL SURVIVE Gee 
 DISSOLUTION ..OF OUR (BODIES; \AND@Siis 
 BEARING ON THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS, 
 
 NEED hardly remind the reader how important 
 
 is the bearing of this question on the subject 
 we have been discussing in the previous chapters. 
 If man perishes at death, it is impossible to deny 
 that the present state of things, including the moral 
 government of the world, is exceedingly imperfect. 
 But if, on the other hand, this life is only the com- 
 mencement of his existence, infinite possibilities would 
 then lie open during the ages of the future, in the 
 light of which we must form our estimate of his 
 present condition. It will be necessary, therefore, 
 before bringing this work to a conclusion, that I 
 should point out the fallacies which underlie the 
 anti-theistic position that man perishes with the 
 dissolution of his body; and state the reasons on 
 which we believe that our conscious personality will 
 survive the stroke of death. 
 
MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 291 
 
 If, then, the anti-theistic position is true that 
 man perishes with his body, in what state would 
 it place the proof given in the previous chapters 
 of the existence of a God who possesses the 
 attributes which Christian Theism attributes to 
 Him? In them it has been proved from our 
 intuition of causation, that the existence of a First 
 Cause of the Universe is a necessity of thought ; 
 from its adjustments, adaptations, and correlations, 
 that its First Cause must be a being possessed 
 of boundless power and intelligence; and from 
 the moral nature of man, combined with the 
 marks of regard for the happiness of His creatures, 
 which are manifested in His creative works, that 
 He must be a being possessed of the attributes 
 which Christian Theism ascribes to God. These 
 proofs, as I have already observed, stand on 
 wholly independent grounds, and are not touched 
 by the objections urged by anti-Theists on the 
 ground of the existence of physical and moral evil. 
 On the other hand, it is impossible to deny, if 
 man’s existence is limited to the present life, that 
 the difficulties in question are incapable of explana- 
 tion; and the moral government of the world 
 incapable of vindication as holy, just, and good. 
 Our argument, then, would be placed in the following 
 position: Between the reasons for believing in the 
 existence of a God, who possesses the attributes 
 which Christian Theism attributes to Him, and the 
 
292 CHRISTIAN. THEIS™, 
 
 difficulties in question, our reason would be hope- 
 lessly confounded. 
 
 This being so, it will be necessary that I should 
 set before the reader the chief reasons on which 
 the anti-Theist founds his affirmation that man per- 
 ishes at death, and endeavour to test their validity, 
 before I set forth the grounds on which we believe 
 that this life is only the commencement of his 
 personal conscious existence, and that all that death. 
 effects is to translate him into a state of existence 
 under different conditions. 
 
 The anti-theistic position, briefly stated, is as 
 follows— 
 
 The brain thinks—that is, that it is not only the 
 organ of thought, but that it generates thought, to- 
 gether with that which we designate consciousness ; 
 our highest aspirations, our intellectual powers, and 
 our moral nature; in fact, everything which we 
 include under the words “ mind,” ‘‘soul,” and “spirit.” 
 Consequently, all thought is the result of the arrange- 
 ment and of the motions of the particles of matter 
 which compose our brains. What, then, are the 
 facts which are adduced as affording proof of this 
 position ? 
 
 1. That the phenomena which come under our 
 observation prove that the power of thinking is the 
 exclusive possession of beings who possess brains ; 
 or, to put the position tersely, where there is no 
 brain, there is no thought. 
 
MANS SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 293 
 
 2. That the power of thinking varies with the 
 size of the brain and the nature and arrangement 
 of the matter which composes it. 
 
 3. That diseases and malformation of the brain 
 affect our power of thinking, producing at the one 
 extreme mania, and at the other idiotcy ; and that 
 our mental powers are variously affected by certain 
 forms of nervous and bodily disease. 
 
 4. That every act of thinking is attended with a 
 corresponding motion in the brain. 
 
 5. That the loss of certain of its parts renders 
 thought, and that of certain other parts sensation, 
 impossible. 
 
 6. That when the brain is completely at rest, 
 in other words sound asleep, thought ceases. 
 
 7, That a power of thinking, apart from the 
 possession of a brain, and independent of its ac- 
 tivity, has never come within the range of human 
 experience. 
 
 8. That several of the reasons which have been 
 urged as affording proof that man will survive the 
 dissolution of his body are equally valid to prove 
 the survival of animals. 
 
 These are the chief grounds which are adduced as 
 affording proof that mind and brain are identical ; 
 and it is justly urged that, if they are identical, it 
 affords conclusive proof that our personal conscious 
 existence must perish with the dissolution of our 
 bodies. Others have been added, but it will 
 
204 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 be unnecessary to draw the reader’s attention to 
 them ; because, if those mentioned above fail to prove 
 it, it will scarcely be contended that the others are 
 sufficient to support the weight of the argument. 
 The general truth of the facts above enumerated I 
 shall not dispute; but I deny that they justify the 
 inference which is drawn from them, namely, that the 
 brain generates thought, and that when the brain 
 perishes our conscious personality, the existence of 
 which constitutes the highest certitude of which we 
 are capable, perishes likewise. 
 
 I observe, therefore, that it by no means follows, 
 because as far as our present experience goes, 
 thought is the exclusive possession of beings who 
 possess brains, that that within us which thinks, 
 namely, our conscious personality, must cease with 
 their dissolution. To affirm that the only condi- 
 tion under which thinking is possible is that of an 
 organized brain is to assert that which it is im- 
 possible to prove. Before this can be proved, the 
 reasons which I have given, in the course of the 
 previous arguments, for believing that blind matter 
 and force incapable of self-direction cannot by any 
 amount of interaction produce an adaptation or a 
 moral agent must first be answered. It is simply 
 absurd to affirm that life can only exist under the same 
 conditions as those under which it exists in this planet. 
 This being so, there is nothing irrational in assuming 
 that thought and personality may do so likewise. 
 
MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 295 
 
 What, then, do the facts prove which I have enu- 
 merated above ? I answer this, and nothing more, that 
 as we are at present constituted, mind, brain, and 
 the nervous system are most intimately correlated to 
 one another in a manner analogous to the correla- 
 tions which exist between the vocal organs, the ear, 
 the atmosphere, the brain, and the mind; so that 
 the one cannot act in the production of sound, lan- 
 guage, or thought without the other; or as the 
 sun, the ether, the eye, the brain, and the mind 
 are correlated to one another, so that apart from 
 ‘their conjoint action, neither the one nor the other 
 could produce what we designate “ vision.” All, then, 
 that the facts adduced by the anti-Theist prove 1s, 
 that the mind, the brain, and the nervous system are 
 so adjusted to one another that the mind can only 
 act through the instrumentality of the brain ; and 
 that the nervous system cannot be set in action 
 without producing motions in the brain, which mo- 
 tions the mind translates into sensations, thoughts, 
 and ideas. It follows, therefore, that the facts 
 which are adduced by the anti-Theist as affording 
 proof that the personal existence of which we are 
 conscious during life perishes at death, prove 
 nothing one way or the other, but leave the ques- 
 tion whether it will survive- the dissolution of the 
 body, untouched. 
 
 Let us now consider the reasons on which our belief 
 ‘nits survival is founded. In doing so, I shall not 
 
296 CHRISTIANS IIEISE, 
 trouble the reader with a number of metaphysical 
 arguments which, in former times, have been adduced 
 as affording proof of this position. My own opinion 
 is that our knowledge of the ontology of mind is far 
 too limited, even if such knowledge lies within man’s 
 powers to attain, to enable us to found on it an 
 argument which is really reliable ; certainly not one 
 which will bring conviction to those who have never 
 studied such questions. 
 
 Two of the reasons for believing that the con- 
 scious beings which we designate ourselves, will 
 survive the dissolution of our bodies I have had 
 occasion to refer to in the course of the previous 
 arguments. J must, at the risk of repetition, 
 point out their bearing on the subject we are now 
 considering. 
 
 (i) While it forms a certitude, than which we 
 possess none stronger, that we have continued the 
 same beings from the earliest dawn of our conscious 
 existence, yet scientists assure us that it is an un- 
 questionable fact that our entire bodies have not 
 only been in a state of constant change, but that in 
 the case of those who have attained mature life, that 
 they have changed several times over. This being 
 so, it follows that our conscious personality must be 
 something distinct from the matter which composes 
 our brains, for the one is the subject of continual 
 change; the other changes not. If, then, our per- 
 sonality, that is, we ourselves, have survived every 
 
MANS SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 297 
 
 change through which not only our brains but our 
 bodies have passed; if it is true that there is not a 
 single particle in our present bodies which was in 
 those which we possessed, say, thirty years ago; 
 there can be no reason for believing that their dis- 
 solution will cause the dissolution of our conscious 
 personality. On the contrary, its persistence during — 
 this course of years, amidst all the changes through 
 which our bodies (including our brains) have passed, 
 affords the strongest reason for believing that it will 
 continue to persist after their dissolution. It is 
 probably owing to the strength of this argument that 
 those who affirm that man perishes with the dissolu- 
 tion of his body, have propounded the theory that 
 that which we imagine to be our permanent existence, 
 is nothing but a succession of states of conscious- 
 ness. The untenableness of this theory | have 
 already sufficiently exposed. 
 
 (ii) I have observed in a previous chapter that the 
 affirmations of our consciousness respecting the 
 reality of our moral nature, such as it is there 
 described, prove that there is something within us 
 distinct, and wholly different in character, from the 
 particles of matter which compose our bodies. If 
 this distinction is real, there can be no reason why 
 the dissolution of our bodies should involve the dis- 
 solution of our personality. On the other hand, as 
 it is one of our highest certitudes that our moral 
 being has been persistent through the various 
 
298 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 changes of our bodies, there is every reason to 
 believe that it will continue to persist after their 
 dissolution. That our moral being does thus persist 
 is proved not only by the direct testimony of our 
 consciousness, but from the fact that we both feel 
 responsible, and are held responsible by others, for 
 actions done in the distant past. 
 
 (iii) The next argument which I shall adduce is 
 from the greatness of man’s powers, and from the 
 imperfect sphere which this life affords for their 
 exercise and development. It may be briefly stated 
 thus— 
 
 I have proved in the course of the preceding 
 reasonings that the adjustments, adaptations, and 
 correlations with which the universe everywhere 
 abounds, that its Creator must possess an intelligence 
 to which it is impossible to assign limitations ; and 
 that He must have had a definite purpose in creating 
 a being such as man. How, then, stand the facts? 
 Man has been brought into existence, in possession of 
 various faculties, some of which are of a very high 
 order, and all capable of a higher development. But 
 so short and uncertain is the duration of human life, 
 that a large portion of mankind are cut off in infancy ; 
 others in early youth; others when, after a painful 
 training, they have become fitted to enter on the 
 work of life; others in the midst of their highest 
 usefulness ;—and even at best the period of man’s 
 activity, compared with the powers with which he is 
 
MANS SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 299 
 
 endowed, is very brief. Has, then, the all-wise 
 Creator endowed mankind, and especially that portion 
 of them that I have just mentioned, with these various 
 faculties and powers, in order that they may vanish 
 like a dream ? Has He placed others in situations 
 of the highest usefulness, and endowed them with 
 powers fitted for their work, in order that they might 
 vanish from the scene immediately on entering on 
 the work for which they were pre-eminently fitted ? 
 Has He endowed others with the highest aspirations 
 of which our moral nature is capable in order that 
 they might shine forth as a meteor and disappear 
 for evermore? If, then, the Creator must have had a 
 purpose in bringing man into existence ; and if that 
 purpose has been directed by a wisdom to which it 
 is impossible to assign limitations ; that purpose must 
 fail of its accomplishment, if a large portion of man- 
 kind come into existence, and perish before their 
 faculties are matured; and another portion of them 
 before they can effect anything, which the faculties 
 with which they are endowed are pre-eminently 
 fitted to accomplish. It may be urged that we 
 cannot fathom the purposes of the Creator. This 
 is undoubtedly true of the length and breadth of His 
 creative work ; but we are fully competent to judge 
 if man passes out of existence before he can exert 
 those faculties with which he is endowed, that his 
 creation involves a purposeless expenditure of power, 
 or a lack of wisdom on the part of his Creator. But 
 
300 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 this is impossible. Death, therefore, cannot be the 
 termination of man’s existence, but a removal into a 
 sphere of action, where he will find an opportunity 
 for the exercise of those powers, which, for reasons 
 into which we cannot penetrate, have been denied 
 him here. 
 
 (iv) The next argument which I shall adduce is 
 founded on the fact that in no small number of 
 cases man’s intellectual powers and moral affections 
 continue in full vigour up to the time immediately 
 preceding the dissolution of his body. I fully allow 
 that in the great majority of cases the wear of ad-- 
 vancing years, increasing weakness, disease, and 
 suffering, are attended with a gradual decay of 
 our intellectual powers, and with a weakening of 
 the energies of our moral nature; and that it not 
 unfrequently happens that during some interval 
 before death, both fall into a state of stupor. If 
 this were universally the case, I admit that the 
 position that the death of the body involved the 
 dissolution of our conscious existence would not 
 be without plausibility. But the fact is far other- 
 wise. Numerous cases unquestionably occur, in 
 which the intellect has continued as bright, and 
 the affections as strong, immediately before death 
 as they have been at any period during life. 
 Not only does death not unfrequently occur sud- 
 denly in the midst of man’s activities; but even 
 when it has been preceded by wasting disease, 
 
MAN'S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 301 
 
 the intellect has continued as clear, and the affec- 
 tions as strong, up to the moment of death, as they 
 have been at any time during the days of bodily 
 health and vigour. This being so, it follows that 
 the diseases which have worn out the body, have 
 failed to wear out the mental powers. It will doubt- 
 less be objected that such cases are rare. Granted ; 
 but though rare, they unquestionably exist, and the 
 fact of their existence is all that is required for 
 my present argument. Is it credible, I ask, that 
 the powerful intellect, the warm affections, and, I 
 will add, the ardent faith, which were in active 
 energy up to the time of death, have passed into 
 non-existence ? or that those forces which have 
 gradually worn the body out, but in doing this 
 have left the mental powers untouched, should be 
 able to cause them to pass into non-existence in an 
 instant ? 
 
 What, then, do we know, and what do we not know, 
 respecting death? This is a very important ques- 
 tion, because, where knowledge founded on facts is 
 wanting, imagination too frequently attempts to fill 
 up deficiencies. Of the real nature of life we are 
 profoundly ignorant. Many theories respecting it 
 have been propounded, but they are theories only. 
 Equally ignorant are we of the ultimate nature of 
 mind. Both remain at the present day as profound 
 mysteries as they were at the earliest dawnings of 
 philosophic thought. ‘This being so, it is impossible 
 
302 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 to prove, though it is easy to affirm, that death is the 
 destruction of our conscious personality. All that 
 we know about it is its outward phenomena, namely, 
 that it suspends the manifestation of every pre- 
 viously existing power; and that it liberates the 
 chemical forces which were previously held in check 
 by the vital ones, so that they are able without 
 hindrance to effect the dissolution of our bodies. 
 But on our mental powers, the forces which destroy 
 the body are powerless to act. Death, it is true, 
 removes them from the sphere of our cognizance, 
 When it takes place, those powers which a minute 
 before death were in lively exercise have vanished 
 in a moment; but that it has destroyed them there 
 is not a tittle of evidence, except on the assumption 
 that brain and mind are identical; and that the 
 death of the one involves the destruction of the 
 other. But this is the very thing which scientific in- 
 vestigation has failed to prove. Still more, eminent 
 unbelieving scientists have candidly admitted that, 
 as far as scientific investigation has yet penetrated, 
 it affords no means of explaining how motions—the 
 only things of which we have a certain knowledge 
 that the brain is capable—are translated into thoughts. 
 In a word, motion is destitute of a single element of 
 thought. 
 
 (v) We now come to the most important of all the 
 reasons on which our belief in man’s survival after 
 death is founded—the moral argument. While I set 
 
O 
 
 Oo 
 
 MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 
 
 | Y 2 
 
 it before the reader, I must ask him steadily to keep 
 in mind that the belief in the existence of a God, 
 who possesses a power and wisdom to which it is 
 impossible to assign limitations, and who is a Moral 
 Being and the Moral Governor of the Universe, can 
 now no longer be viewed as an open question, 
 but must be assumed to have been proved by the 
 arguments adduced in the previous chapters. I, 
 therefore, take as the foundation of my argument 
 that such a being exists as Christian Theism pre- 
 supposes, and from this I shall argue if a Moral 
 Governor of the world exists, who is holy, just, and 
 righteous, when we take into consideration the 
 evident imperfection of the present moral order of 
 things, that the conclusion is inevitable that it 
 is absolutely necessary for the vindication of a 
 righteous government, that man should survive the 
 dissolution of his body. | 
 
 What, then, are the phenomena which the moral 
 world presents on the assumption that man perishes 
 at death ? 
 
 1. That it is undeniable that virtuous men are not 
 rewarded, nor evil men punished according to their 
 deserts. 
 
 2. That in numerous cases a career of successful 
 villainy would be the more prudent course to pursue 
 than one of self-sacrificing virtue; and that the only 
 thing which a man of evil propensities would have 
 to consider would be whether in gratifying them 
 
304 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 he has sufficient astuteness to avoid detection, and 
 thereby escape the penalties which society inflicts on 
 evildoers for its own protection. 
 
 3. That such is the condition of the moral world 
 as it presents itself to our view, that if man perishes 
 at death, the old saying, “ Let us eat and drink for 
 to-morrow we die,” would be the most rational guide 
 of life. The principle involved in this saying admits 
 of the following general application. It is best, if man 
 perishes in the grave, that during life’s brief day 
 each man should gratify his own particular tastes, 
 be they what they may, and pursue the course of 
 conduct which he thinks will be most conducive to 
 his own happiness ; for life is not only short, but 
 its duration is so uncertain, that it is impossible to 
 say, whether anyone may live to realize a distant 
 good. On the other hand, death is certain at no 
 distant day, when the virtuous and the vicious, the 
 greatest self-sacrificer for the good of others and he 
 who has lived in the gratification of his most selfish 
 appetites, will alike pass into a state of unconscious- 
 ness, from which there will be no awakening; and if 
 from some error in judgment, a course of conduct 
 has been pursued which has made life a burden, it 
 will not be difficult to find an exit from it which will 
 be comparatively painless. It is evident that if this 
 principle were acted upon it would convert the moral 
 world into astate of hopeless confusion ; yet it is the 
 legitimate conclusion from the principle in question. 
 
MAN'S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 305 
 
 This position involves such serious consequences, 
 that the anti-theistic Utilitarian will doubtless reply 
 that a virtuous life will be far more conducive to 
 a man’s own happiness than a vicious one; and 
 that it is wise to sacrifice present pleasure, and to 
 submit to present self-sacrifice, for the purpose of 
 realizing future good. How, I ask, are the over- 
 Whelming majority of mankind to be convinced of 
 the truth of either of these positions? The second 
 is easily disposed of, for so uncertain is life’s dura-- 
 tion, that it is impossible to calculate whether it 
 will be prolonged a sufficient time to enable the 
 self-sacrificer to reap the fruit of his self-denial ; 
 and if it is not thus prolonged, it is evident that 
 the sacrifice of present happiness in pursuit of a 
 future good, has been a folly. But the principle 
 on which this system of morality is founded, affirms 
 that what we call virtue is the pursuit of that line 
 of conduct which will most conduce to the realiza- 
 tion of our own happiness, and that of others, 
 without regard to any other consideration. In 
 other words, it makes virtue to be dependent on 
 the power of rightly calculating the results of ac- 
 tions ; and vice to be the result of the want of this 
 power, or of the careless use of it. But the 
 majority of mankind are not good calculators; and 
 are, therefore, certain to arrive at opposite conclu- 
 sions as to what that course of conduct is which 
 will realize their own happiness, for respecting this, 
 
 20 
 
306 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 tastes differ widely ; and what the line of conduct 
 - which will do so is, each man must be the sole 
 judge. Thus, a man in whom the desire for sensual 
 gratification predominates will never arrive at the 
 conclusion that a life of self-denial, in the hope of 
 attaining some future good which he may. never 
 live to attain, will be the best means of realizing 
 his own greatest happiness. How, I ask, is it 
 possible to prove that crime will not effect this, if 
 the perpetrator can manage to escape detection ? 
 At any rate, one whom unbelievers do not deny 
 to have been one of the greatest self-sacrificers 
 for what he believed to be the good of others, has 
 recorded the following opinion: ‘If in this life 
 only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men 
 most pitiable.’” The actual experiences of those 
 who have spent long years in labours, self-denial, 
 and suffering, in promoting the good of others, in 
 doing what they were persuaded to have been their 
 duty to do, are of more weight than the theories and 
 the speculations of a multitude of philosophers. 
 
 4. The following are the results which a careful 
 survey of the moral world presents to the observer, 
 whether he views it in the light of the history of 
 the past, or of the facts of the present. Moral 
 evil, social evil, and political evil, have been and 
 still continue widespread. The self-sacrificer for 
 the good of others receives no adequate return for 
 his labours and sufferings, if his existence perishes 
 
MAN SISURVIVARSARIER DEATH: 307 
 
 at death. The noble army of martyrs have yielded 
 up their lives in torture, and no avenger has ap-- 
 peared. The wicked have flourished, great crimes 
 have been perpetrated, the righteous have suffered, 
 and the heavens have not thundered. The astute 
 villain frequently escapes human justice, and there is 
 no visible Divine interference to punish him. Suffer- 
 ing, not self-caused, frequently meets with neither 
 alleviation nor compensation here. The history of 
 the past testifies that strength and intellectual power, 
 united with moral unscrupulousness, persistent self- 
 seeking regardless of the consequences to others, 
 ambition which sacrifices the lives of thousands for 
 its gratification, and other similar qualities too 
 numerous to mention, have been those which have 
 obtained the victory in the struggle of life, while 
 those mental qualities on which the Sermon on the 
 Mount pronounces its most emphatic blessing, and 
 which none will venture to pronounce to be mean 
 and despicable, have gone to the wall ; and although 
 this state of things is less prevalent in modern 
 Christendom, it still far too frequently meets the 
 eye. of the observer even-there. Init, it is true 
 that holiness, disinterestedness, self-sacrifice, and 
 even a conscientious adhesion to a sense of duty, 
 not unfrequently forces vice to render a kind of 
 homage to virtue; but the satire of the Roman 
 satirist still continues far too true: “Virtue is 
 praised and allowed to perish in the cold.” 
 
308 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 If, then, man perishes with his body, what, I ask, 
 becomes of a righteous government of God? It is 
 certain that if he does so, it must be confined to this 
 life only; and that after death the righteous have 
 nothing to hope, nor the wicked to fear. What, 
 then, is the inevitable conclusion? I answer, that 
 although some rudiments of a moral government 
 may be discoverable, in the fact that certain penal- 
 ties are attached to certain sins as their inevitable 
 consequences, yet the government of the moral 
 world, if viewed in the light of this life alone, is of 
 a very imperfect character. Are we, then, to deny 
 that a Righteous Moral Governor exists ? As I have 
 already observed, the proof of His existence which 
 has been given in the preceding pages leaves it no 
 longer an open question. Unless, then, our reason 
 is to be hopelessly confounded, there must be another 
 alternative, namely, that this life is only the beginning 
 of human existence, and that man is destined to- 
 survive the stroke of death; or, to adopt the words 
 of an Apostle, God “has appointed a day, in the 
 which He will judge the world in righteousness by 
 the Man whom He hath ordained; whereof He 
 hath given assurance unto all men, in that He hath 
 raised Him from the dead.” 
 
 5. One further argument requires our attention, 
 namely, that founded on the all but universal 
 belief which has been entertained by mankind that 
 there is something in man which survives the 
 
MAIN SS SORIIVALVARLER “DEATH. 309 
 death of the body. I say the “ail but universal 
 belief,” because doubts have been expressed whether 
 some degraded savage races entertain this _ belief, 
 or even whether they have any religious ideas 
 whatever. Whether this be so or not rests on the 
 reports of travellers, many of whose opinions on 
 this subject have been proved on subsequent in- 
 vestigation to have been inaccurate. However this 
 may be, it will be unnecessary to discuss the ques- 
 tion of their accuracy, because it is certain that 
 the belief that there is something in man, which 
 survives the stroke of death, is so widespread both 
 among civilized and savage races, as to amount to 
 a practical universality. Many of these beliefs are 
 doubtless sufficiently grotesque; but making all 
 allowance for this, the fact remains that the belief 
 exists, and that it is all but, if not quite, as univer- 
 salas man. The only point which concerns us in 
 our present inquiry is, What has suggested this 
 belief ? 
 
 I.—It is impossible that it can have originated 
 in a course of reasoning. The intellect of savage 
 races is far too imperfectly developed to render such 
 an account of its origin a possible one. 
 
 II.—A belief in our survival after death is certainly 
 not one of our primary intuitions. 
 
 III.—As its origin cannot have been derived from 
 either of these sources, it follows that there must 
 be something in the primary constitution of man 
 
310 CHRISTIANVIT HEL SM: 
 
 which has suggested it, and which even the state 
 of degradation into which savage man has fallen 
 has not been able to obliterate. This being so, a 
 belief which is suggested by man’s primary con- 
 stitution cannot be a delusion pure and simple, but 
 must have a reality of some kind which corresponds 
 to it. 
 
 Opponents of this belief have thought it necessary 
 to propound theories to account for its origin on 
 anti-theistic principles. It will be sufficient to notice 
 two of them. 
 
 (i) That the intensity of the desire that men have 
 to live, has suggested the idea of a survival after 
 death. 
 
 (ii) That the fact that some men have seen their 
 departed friends in dreams, has suggested the idea 
 that they have not only survived the dissolution of 
 their bodies, but that they had actually appeared. 
 
 With respect to the first of these theories, it will 
 be sufficient to remark that men have numerous and 
 very strong desires, which do not suggest the idea 
 of their future realization. Why, then, should this 
 particular desire suggest the belief that man will 
 survive the stroke of death not only to a few in- 
 dividuals, but produce an all but universal belief 
 that he will do so; and that, too, in the face of the 
 phenomena of death, which, at least in the case of 
 savages, have all the appearance of a termination of 
 existence ? 
 
MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 311 
 
 To discuss the nature of dreams would fall 
 outside the limits of this work. One thing, how- 
 ever, respecting them is certain. The occasions 
 on which we see our departed friends in dreams 
 are comparatively rare. The thing to be accounted 
 for is not what such ideal appearances may have 
 suggested to a few individuals, but how is it 
 possible that they can have suggested the idea 
 of an existence after death to the uncivilized 
 races of mankind in every part of the globe, 
 however little intercourse they may have had with 
 one another. It will scarcely be urged that the 
 idea was likely to have occurred except to a few. 
 Are we, then, to assume that these turned mission- 
 aries, and proclaimed this truth to their brother 
 savages, and that they succeeded in inducing them 
 to embrace it? But other strange appearances 
 present themselves in dreams with the utmost 
 vividness, which, whatever effect they may produce 
 for the moment, not even savages continue to 
 believe in as objective reality. Why, I ask, should 
 this one in particular obtain an all but universal 
 acceptance ? 
 
 I conclude, therefore, that these and_ similar 
 theories are utterly unable to account for the all but 
 universal belief both of civilized and savage men, 
 that there is something in man which survives the 
 dissolution of his body. How, then, can the belief 
 have originated? I answer that inasmuch as it is 
 
312 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 impossible that savage man can have arrived at 
 it by a process of reasoning it must have been 
 suggested by something which is inherent in the 
 constitution of human nature. 
 
 I fully admit that neither of these five reasons, 
 nor all five taken together, amount to what’ is 
 designated a “scientific demonstration.” But, as I 
 have shown in a previous chapter, that form of 
 reasoning is not the only one which is calculated 
 to produce the conviction of absolute certainty 
 on the human mind. I submit that the conjoint 
 force of the arguments as above stated prove 
 that man’s personality will survive the dissolution — 
 of his body. 
 
 But that this belief is no phantom of the imagina- 
 tion, but has a reality corresponding to it, rests 
 not merely on a course of reasoning, but on the 
 evidence of fact. There is no more strongly 
 attested fact in human history—I may say that 
 there is no fact in history which has an equal 
 attestation—than that Jesus Christ rose from the 
 dead. His renewed life not only rests on the 
 testimony of His followers, who believed that they 
 held intercourse with Him after He rose from the 
 dead—a testimony which all the theories which have 
 been propounded by modern unbelief as affording 
 a rational account of its origin, have been unable 
 to shake; but is borne witness to alike by the 
 history of the past and the facts of the present. 
 
MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 313 
 
 Space does not allow me to place the evidence on 
 which this great fact rests before the reader here. 
 For it I must refer him to my Lampton Lectures: 
 “The Jesus of the Evangelists ;” and, on a smaller 
 scale, to my Handbook of Christian Evidences. | 
 shall only observe in this place, that if the great 
 character which is delineated in the Gospels be 
 a creation of the imagination, the history of the 
 past, and the facts of the present, are inexplicable. 
 He Himself has affirmed of His own direct know- 
 ledge, and those who were commissioned by Him 
 have taught, that our personal existence will not 
 cease with the dissolution of our bodies; or in 
 other words, that an existence awaits man after 
 death. 
 
 The survival of our personal conscious existence 
 after the dissolution of our bodies being thus 
 established as a fact, consequences follow from it 
 which have a most important bearing on the diffi- 
 culties connected with Christian Theism. I do not 
 say that it dissipates all of them, but it enables us to 
 see our way to the solution of no inconsiderable 
 number of them. . 
 
 1. The first of the difficulties which have struck men 
 in every age is the obvious inequality of the moral 
 government of the world, if man perishes at death. 
 If, however, this life is only the commencement of 
 man’s existence, the world beyond the grave will 
 afford an ample sphere for the correction of those 
 
apparent inequalities in the Divine government, the 
 solution of which baffles our reason, if our existence 
 is limited to the present life. 
 
 2. The survival of our conscious personality will 
 afford an ample sphere for the vindication of the 
 Divine justice in the government of the world which 
 is obviously imperfect under the present order of 
 things, and for the exercise of the Divine mercy. 
 
 3. It will also remove the difficulty caused by the 
 want of opportunity for the exercise of those powers 
 and faculties with which man is endowed, referred 
 to in the previous argument, if human existence 
 perishes at death. That opportunity which, for 
 reasons into which we cannot penetrate, has been 
 denied him here may be afforded him hereafter. 
 This being so, the objection so often urged: Where- 
 fore hast Thou made so large a portion of the human 
 race in vain, falls to the ground. 
 
 4. It is a certain fact that the characters of a vast 
 majority, even of Christian people, when they die are 
 so imperfect as to render them unfit, without 
 further purification, to enter into the society and the 
 employments and enjoyments of the holy. Many 
 imagine that the necessary change will be effected by 
 a special interposition of the Divine power, but for 
 this belief there is no foundation either in reason or 
 in Revelation. We are assured, however, that in 
 our Father’s house there are many mansions; and 
 there is nothing irrational in believing that some of 
 
MANS SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 315 
 
 them may be adapted for completing the work of 
 purification which was left imperfect here. 
 
 5. It is an obvious fact that an overwhelming 
 majority of mankind pass the period of their proba- 
 tion here under very unfavourable conditions. ‘This 
 is true of vast numbers even in Christian countries. 
 The unhappy condition of those who are born, and 
 pass that portion of their lives in which the founda- 
 tions of character are laid, in an atmosphere replete 
 with vice and crime is such that I need not describe 
 it. But nearly three-quarters of the human race at 
 present in existence, have not only not had the 
 benefit of the Christian revelation, but have perhaps 
 not even heard of it. A future state will afford 
 ample scope for the correction of these apparent 
 inequalities; and the character which Christian 
 Theism ascribes to God affords the strongest reason 
 for believing that He will afford them those oppor- 
 tunities for the formation of a holy character which, 
 for reasons into which we cannot penetrate, have 
 been withheld from them here. 
 
 6. As we are at present constituted our bodies are 
 the instruments through which we perceive, feel, 
 think, and act; and their imperfections produce no 
 small influence on our intellects, our characters, and 
 our conduct. I need not attempt to prove this, for 
 every one of us is only too painfully conscious of it, 
 I will only refer to one example of it, the effect which 
 a disordered nervous system exerts on our tempers. 
 
316 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 But when death takes place our connection with our 
 body will cease, and whatever influence for evil its 
 imperfections exert upon us will cease with it, 
 Our existence after our connection with our bodies 
 ceases must be an existence under wholly different 
 conditions from our present one, but what these 
 conditions will be is known only to Him who knows 
 all things. | 
 
 The reader will observe that, throughout this work, 
 I have avoided entering on the discussion of the 
 question of man’s natural immortality. My reason 
 for adopting this course is that it is needless to do 
 so, for all that my argument requires is, that our 
 conscious personality, z.e. ourselves, should continue 
 to exist for a period sufficiently long to afford oppor- 
 tunity for the vindication of the moral government 
 of God—a vindication which our reason, conscience, 
 and moral sense affirm to be impossible if our con- 
 scious existence is confined to the short term of our 
 continuance here. To have discussed what is called 
 the question of man’s natural immortality would have 
 involved the subject we have been considering in 
 needless difficulties. One thing alone is certain—that 
 the universe and everything in it is upheld in being 
 by the energetic action of the Creator’s will. In the 
 words of the author of the Apocalypse: He has 
 created all things; and through fis wi// they are 
 (that is, they exist) and were created. His energetic 
 action upholds in existence both the evil and the 
 
is the will of the Creator to withdraw that energy, 
 both alike must pass into non-existence. But .into 
 what that purpose is, no faculty of man can pene- 
 trate by any course of reasoning. It can only be 
 known by a revelation. 
 
 I have only to observe, in conclusion, that the 
 difficulties above referred to, and the moral govern- 
 ment of God, assume a wholly different aspect if we 
 contemplate human life as confined to the brief space 
 Olemans existence here or as extended over the 
 indefinite periods of time called in the New Testa- 
 ment “the age,” “the ages,” and “the ages of ages.” 
 Equally different is the aspect which it will assume 
 if we view His government as limited to this incon- 
 siderable globe, and those regions which in the 
 Bible are designated Hades and Heaven; or as 
 embracing the rational inhabitants of the universe 
 of worlds, the existence of which the discoveries of 
 modern astronomy have rendered indubitable. I 
 say ‘rational inhabitants,” because it is incredible, 
 if these worlds exist in numbers which surpass the 
 powers of human comprehension, that this world 
 should be the only place where rational and moral 
 beings exist. The whole universe of rational beings 
 and moral agents, therefore, must form the subject 
 of the government of God. If, then, it embraces 
 all space, and extends to endless periods of time, 
 who shall assign limits to the possibilities of the 
 
318 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
 
 future ? or affirm that boundless power and wisdom, 
 united with perfect holiness, justice, and benevolence, 
 will not ultimately work out the greatest possible 
 good, notwithstanding the clouds and darkness 
 by which some of His present dispensations are 
 surrounded ? 
 
 Printed by Hazell, Watson, & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury. 
 
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