but real truths
grounded upon the laws of God and nature, acknowledged and pra^-
ctifed by mankind. And no nation being juftly fubject to any, but
fuch as they fet up, nor in any other manner than according to fuch
laws as they ordain, the right of chuiing and making thofe that are
to govern them, muft wholly depend upon their will.
SECT. VII.
The laws of every nation are the meafure of magiftra-
tical power.
OUR author lays much weight upon the word hereditary ; but
the queftion is, What is inherited in an hereditary kingdom,
and how it comes to be hereditary ? It is in vain to fay " the king-
" dom j" for we do not know what he means by the kingdom : it is
one thing in one place, and very different in others ; and I think it
not eafy to find two in the world that in power are exactly the fame.
If he underftand all that is comprehended within the precincts over
which it reaches, I deny that any fuch is to be found in the world : if
he refer to what preceding kings enjoyed, no determination can be
made, till the firft: original of that kingdom be examined, that it may
be known what that firft king had, and from whence he had it.
If this variety be denied, I defire to know whether the kings of
Sparta and Perfia had the fame power over their fubjects ; if the
fame, whether both were abfolute, or both limited ; if limited, how
came the decrees of the Perfian kings to pafs for laws ? If abfolute,
how could the Spartan kings be fubject to fines, imprifonment, or
the fentence of death ; and not to have power to fend for their own
fupper out of the common hall ? Why did Xenophon call Agefilaus
a good and faithful king, obedient to the laws of his country, when,
upon the command of the ephori, he left the war that he had with
fo much glory begun in Afia, if he was fubject to none? How came
the ephori to be eftablifhed to reftrain the power of kings, if it
could no way be reftrained, if all owed obedience to them, and they
to none ? Whv did Theonompus's wife reprove him for Suffering
Z his
88 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. his power to be diminifhed by their creation, if it could not be di-
minifhed ? Or why did he fay he had made the power more perma-
i nent in making it lefs odious, if it was perpetual and unalterable ?
We may go farther, and taking Xenophon and Plutarch for our guides,
affert that the kings of Sparta never had the powers of war or peace,
life and death, which our author eftecms infeparable from regality,
and conclude either that no king has them, or that all kings are not
alike in power. If they are not in all places the fame, kings do not
reign by an univerfal law, but by the particular laws of each country ;
which give to every one fo much power, as in the opinion of the givers
conduces to the end of their inftitution, which is the public good.
It may be alio worth our inquiry how this inherited power came to
be hereditary. We know that the fons of Vefpaiian and Conftantine
inherited the Roman empire, tho' their fathers had no fuch title ;
but, gaining the empire by violence, which Hooker fays is mere ty-
ranny that can create no right, they could devolve none to their
children. The kings of France of the three races have inherited
the crown ; but Meroveus, Pepin, and Hugh Capet, could neither pre-
tend title nor conqueft, or any other right than what was conferred
upon them by the clergy, nobility, and people j and confequently
whatfoever is inherited from them can have no other original -, for
that is the gift of the people which is beftowed upon the firft, under
whom the fucceffors claim, as if it had been by a peculiar act given
to every one of them. It will be more hard to fhew how the crown
of England is become hereditary, unlefs it be by the will of the peo-
ple ; for tho' it were granted, that fome of the Saxon kings came in
by inheritance (which I do not, having, as I think, proved them to
have been abfolutely elective) yet William the Norman did not, for he
was a baftard, and could inherit nothing. William Rufus and Henry
did not -j for their elder Brother Robert by right of inheritance ought
to have been preferred before them : Stephen and Henry the fecond
did not ; for Maud the only heirefs of Henry the Firfr. was living
when both were crowned : Richard, and John, who followed,
did not, for they were baftards born in adultery. They mult there-
fore have received their right from the people, or they could have
none at all ; and their fucceflbrs fall under the fame condition.
Moreover, I find great variety in the deduction of this hereditary
right. In Sparta there were two kings of different families, en-
dowed with an equal power. If the Heraclida? did reign as fathers
of the people, the ^Eacida? did not ; if the right was in the iEacidas,
the Heraclida) could have none ; for 'tis equally impoilible to have two
fathers as two thoufand. 'Tis in vain to lay that two families joined,
and agreed to reign jointly : for it is evident the Spartans had kings
before the time of Hercules or Achilles, who were the fathers of the
two races. If it be faid, that the regal power with which they were
invefted did intitle them to the right of fathers, it mull: in like manner
have belonged to the Roman confuls, military tribunes, dictators,
and pretors ; for they had more power than the Spartan kings ; and
that glorious nation might change their fathers every year, and mul-
tiply or diminifh the number of them as they plealed. If this be
molt ridiculous and abfurd, it is certain, that the name and office of
5 king,
Difcouries concerning Government. 89
king, conful, dictator, or the like, does not confer any determined Sect. 7.
right upon the perfon that hath it : every one has a right to that *— — v*-**
which is allotted to him by the laws of the country by which he is
created.
As the Perfians, Spartans, Romans, or Germans, might makefuch
magistrates, and under fuch names, as belt pleaicd themfelves, and
accordingly enlarge or diminifh their power ; the fame right belongs
to all nations ; and the rights due unto, as well as the duties
incumbent upon every one, are to be known only by the laws of that
place. This may feem ftrange to thofe who know neither books
nor things, hiftories nor laws; but is well explained by Grotius;
who, denying the fovereign power to be annexed to any man, fpeaks
of divers magistrates under feveral names that had, and others that
under the fame names had it not ; and diftinguifhes thofe who have
the " fummum imperium fummo modo," from thofe who have it Grot, de jur.
" modo non fummo :" and tho' probably he looked upon the firft fort !*!• & P ac> •
as a thing merely fpeculative, if by that " fummo modo" a right of
doing what one pleafes be underftood ; yet he gives many examples of
the other; and among thofe who had " liberrimum imperium," if any
had it, he names the kings of the Sabeans ; who neverthelefs were
under fuch a condition, that tho' they were, as Agatharchidas reports,
obeyed in all things, whilft they continued within the walls of their
palace, might be ftoned by any that met them without it. He finds
alfo another obftacle to the abfolute power, " cum rex partem habeat
" fummi imperii, partem fenatus, live populus;" which parts are
proportioned according to the laws of each kingdom, whether here-
ditary or elective, both being equally regulated by them.
The law that gives and meafures the power, prefcribes rules
how it mould be tranfmitted. In fome places the fupreme magi-
strates are annually elected, in others their power is for life ; in fome
they are merely elective, in others hereditary, under certain rules or
limitations. The antient kingdoms and lordfhips of Spain were
hereditary; but the fuccemon went ordinarily to the eldeft of the
reigning family, not to the neareft in blood. This was the ground
of the quarrel between Corbis the brother, and Orfua the fon of the T. Liv. I.
laft prince, decided by combat before Scipio. I know not whether XXVUK c * 2tt
the Goths brought that cuftom with them when they conquered
Spain, or whether they learnt it from the inhabitants ; but certain it
is, that, keeping themfelves to the families of the Balthei and Amal- Saavedra co-
thei, they had more regard to age than proximity; and almoft ever ^"^ °~
preferred the brother, or eldeft kinfman of the laft king before his
fon. The like cuftom was in ufe among the Moors in Spain and Marian, hift.
Africa, who, according to the feveral changes that happened among ' pan *
the families of Almohades, Almoranides, and Benemerini, did always
take one of the reigning blood ; but in the choice of him had moft
refpect to age and capacitv. This is ufually called the law of tha-
neftry ; and, as in many other places, prevailed alfo in Ireland, till
that country fell under the Englifh government.
In France and Turky, the male that is neareft in blood, fucceeds ;
and I do not know of any deviation from that rule in France, fince
Henry the fir ft was preferred before Robert his elder brother,
grand-
both
which were inconfiftent with what God had eftablifhed over his
own people.
But waving the opinions of men, it is good to fee what we can
learn from the fcripture, and inquire if there be any precept there
exprefly commanding them to make a king j or any example that
they did fo whilft they continued obedient to the word of God ; or
any thing from whence we may reafonably infer they ought to have
done it : all which, if I miftake not, will be found directly contrary.
The only precept that we find in the law concerning kings, is that
of Deuteronomy xvii. already mentioned ; and that is not a com-
mand to the people to make, but inftructions what manner of king
they fhould make if they denied to have one : there was therefore
none at all.
Examples do as little favour our author's aifertions. Mofes, Jo-
fhua, and the other judges, had not the name or power of kings :
they were not of the tribe to which the fceptre was promifed : they
did not tranfmit the power they had to their children, which in our
adverfary's opinion is a right infeparable from kings : and their
power was not continued by any kind of fucceflion, but created
occafionally, as need required, according to the virtues difcovered in
thofe who were raifed by God to deliver the nation in the time of
their diftrefs j which being done, their children lay hid among the
reft of the people. Thus were Ehud, Gideon, Jephthah, and others,
fet up : " Whofoever will give battle" (fay the princes and people of Judg. x.
Gilead) " to the children of Ammon, fhall be head over the in-
" heritance of Gilead :" and finding Jephthah to be fuch a man as
they fought, they made him their chief, and all Ifrael followed them.
When Othniel had fhewed his valour in taking Kirjath-fepher, and
delivering his brethren from Cufhan-riihathaim, he was made judge :
when Ehud had killed Eglon; when Shamgar and Samfon had
deftroyed great numbers of the Philiftines ; and when Gideon had
defeated the Midianites, they were fit to be advanced above their
brethren. Thefe dignities were not inherent in their perfons, or
families, but conferred upon them ; nor conferred, that they might be
exalted in riches and glory, but that they might be minifters of good
to the people. This may juftify Plato's opinion, that if one man be
found incomparably to excel all others in the virtues that are beneficial
to civil focieties, he ought to be advanced above all : but I think it
will be hard from thence to deduce an argument in favour of fuch a
monarchy as is necenarilv to defcend to the next in blood, whether
man, woman, or child, without any consideration of virtue,
age, fex, or ability - y and that failing, it can be of no ufe to our
author. But whatever the dignity of a Hebrew judge was, and how-
foever he was raifed to that office, it certainly differed from that
of a king. Gideon could not have refufcd to be a king when the
people
violent changes happening thereupon give us reafon to believe the
like were in the times of other kings : and if we examine the hifto-
ries of later ages, and the lives of princes, that are more exactly
known, we fhall find, that kingdoms are more frequently fwayed by
thofe who have power with the prince, than by his own judgment :
fo that whofoever hath to deal with princes concerning foreign or
dome! tic affairs, is obliged more to regard the humour of thoie
perfons, than the moft important interefts of a prince or people.
I might draw too much envy upon myfelf, if I mould take upon
me to cite all the examples of this kind that are found in modern
hiftories, or the memoirs that do more precifely mew the temper
of princes, and the fecret fprings by which they were moved. But
as thofe who have well obferved the management of affairs in
France during the reigns of Francis the Firft, Henry the Second,
Francis the Second, Charles the Ninth, Henry the Third, Henry the
Fourth, and Lewis the Thirteenth, will confefs, that the interests of
the dukes of Montmorency and Guife, Queen Catharine de Medicis,
• the duke of Epernon, la FofTeufe, Madam de Guiche, de Gabriele,
d'Entragues, the Marechal d'Ancre, the conftable de Luines, and
the cardinal de Richelieu, were more to be confidered by thofe who
had any private or public bufinefs to treat at court, than the opinions
of thofe princes, or the moif weighty concernments of the ftate j fo
it cannot be denied, that other kingdoms where princes legally have,
or wrongfully ufurp the like power, are governed in the like manner;
or if it be, there is hardly any -prince's reign that will not furnifh
abundant proof of what I have afferted.
I agree with our author, that " good order and liability produce
" ftrength." If monarchy therefore excel in them, abfolute monar-
chies fhould be of more ftrength than thofe that are limited accord-
ing to the proportion of their riches, extent of territory, and num-
ber of people that they govern ; and thofe limited monarchies in
the like proportion more ftrong than popular governments or com-
monwealths. If this be fo, I wonder how a few of " thofe giddy
which feeming to be of feveral forts of venifon, was all cut out of
one hog, varioufly dreffed j and not long after was as eaiiiy
ikughtered as the hog had been. The greateft danger of the war
with Mithridates was to avoid his poifons and treacheries ; and to
Plut. in vit. follow him through the deferts where he fled. When Lucullus with
* lefs than twenty thoufand men had put Tigranes with two hundred
thoufand to flight, the Roman foldiers, who for a while had pur-
fued the chace, flood ftill on a fudden, and fell into loud laughter at
themfelves for ufing their arms againft fuch wretched cowardly
flaves. If this be not enough to prove the falfhood of our author's
propofition, I defire it may be confidered, whether good order or lia-
bility be wanting in Venice : whether Tufcany be in a better condition
to defend itfelf fince it fell under the power of the Medices, or when
it was full of free cities : whether it were an eafy work to conquer
Switzerland : whether the Hollanders are of greater flxength fince
the recovery of their liberty, or, when they groaned under the yoke
of Spain : and laftly, whether the intire conquefl: of Scotland and
Ireland, the victories obtained againft the Hollanders when they
were in the height of their power, and the reputation to which
England did rife in lefs than five years after 1648. be good marks of
the inftability, diforder, and weaknefs of free nations : and if the
contrary be true, nothing can be more abfurdly falfe than our au-
thor's afTertion.
S E C T. XII.
The glory, virtue, and power, of the Romans began and
ended with their liberty.
AMONG many fine things propofed by our author, I fee none
more to be admired, or that better declares the foundnefs of his
judgment, than that he is only pleafed with the beginning and end of
the Roman empire ; and fays, " that their time of liberty " (between
thofe two extremes) " had nothing of good in it, but that it was of
u fhort continuance :" whereas I dare affirm, that all that was ever
defirable, or worthy of praife and imitation in Rome, did proceed
from its liberty, grow up, and perifh with it : which I think will not
be contradicted by any, but thofe who prefer the moft fordid vices
before the moft eminent virtues ; who believe the people to have been
more worthily employed by the Tarquins in cleanfing jakes and com-
mon fewers, than in acquiring the dominion of the beft part of man-
kind ; and account it better for a people to be oppreffed with hard
labour under a proud mafter in a fteril, unhealthy ten-mile territory,
than to command all the countries that lie between the Euphrates and
Britain. Such opinions will hardly find any better patrons than Fil-
mer and his difciples, nor the matters of facl, as they are reprefented,
be
Difeourfes concerning Government. 113
be denied by any that know the hiftories of thofe times. Many Sect. 12.
Romans may have had feeds of virtue in them, whilft in the infancy
of that city they lived under kings ; but they brought forth little
fruit. Tarquin furnamed the Proud, being a Grecian by extraction,
had perhaps obferved, that the virtue of that nation had rendered
them averfe to the divine government he defired to fet up; and
having by his well-natur'd Tullia poifoned his own brother her huf-
band, and his own wife her fitter, married her, killed her father, and
fpared none that he thought able to oppofe his defigns, to finim the
work, he butchered the fenate, with fuch as feemed moil eminent
among the people, and like a moil pious father endeavoured to render
the city defolate : during that time they who would not be made
inmuments of thofe villainies were obliged for their own fafety to
conceal their virtues ; but, he being removed, they mined in their
glory. Whilft he reigned, Brutus, Valerius, Horatius, Herminius,
Lartius, and Coriolanus, lay hid and unregarded; but when they
came to fight for themfelves, and to employ their valour for the good
of their country, they gave fuch teftimonies of bravery, as have
been admired by all fucceeding ages ; and fettled fuch a difcipline, as
produced others like to them, or more excellent than they, as long as
their liberty lafted. In two hundred and fixty years that they re-
mained under the government of kings, tho' all of them, the lad
only excepted, were chofen by the fenate and people, and did as much
to advance the public fervice as could reafonably be expected from
them, their dominion hardly extended fo far as from London to
Hounflow : but in little more than three hundred years after they
recovered their liberty, they had fubdued all the warlike nations of
Italy, deftroyed vaft armies of the Gauls, Cimbri, and Germans,
overthrown the formidable power of Carthage, conquered the Cif-
alpine and Tranfalpine Gauls, with all the nations of Spain, notwith-
ftanding the ferocity of the one and the more conftant valour of the
other, and the prodigious multitudes of both : they had brought
all Greece into fubje&ion, and by the conqueft of Macedon the-fpoils
of the world to adorn their city; and found fo little difficulty in
all the wars that happened between them and the greatefr. kings
after the death of Alexander of Epirus, and Pyrrhus, that the defeats
of Syphax, Perfeus, Antiochus, Prufias, Tigranes, Ptolemy, and many
others, did hardly deferve to be numbered amongft their victories.
It were ridiculous to impute this to chance, or to think, that for-
tune which of all things is the moft variable, could for fo many
ages continue the fame courfe, unlefs fupported by virtue ; or to fup-
pofe, that all thefe monarchies, which are fo much extolled, could
have been deftroyed by that commonwealth, if it had wanted
flrength, liability, virtue, or good order. The fecret counfels
of God are impenetrable; but the ways by which he accomplices
his deiigns are often evident : when he intends to exalt a people, he
fills both them and their leaders with the virtues fuitable to the ac-
complishment of his end ; and takes away all wifdom and virtue
from thofe he refolves to deftroy. The pride of the Babylonians and
AfTyrians fell thro' the bafenefs of Sardanapalus ; and the great
city was taken while Belfhazzar lay drunk amongil his whores :
the
il4 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. the empire was tranfported to the Perfians and Grecians by the valour
*-' -v*- " 1 ■■* of Cyrus, Alexander, and the brave armies that followed them. Hi-
ftories furnifh us with innumerable examples of this kind : but I think
none can be found of a cowardly, weak, effeminate, foolifh, ill-difci-
plin'd people, that have ever fubdued fuch as were eminent in ftrength,
wifdom, valour, and good difcipline ; or that thefe qualities
have been found or fubfifted any-where, unlefs they were cultivated
and nourifhed by a well ordered, government. If this therefore was
found among the Romans, and not in the kingdoms they overthrew,
they had the order and (lability which the monarchies had not;
and the ftrength and virtue by which they obtained fuch fuccefs was
the product of them. But if this virtue, and the glorious effects of it,
did begin with liberty, it did alfo expire with the fame. The beft
men that had not fallen in battle were gleaned up by the profcriptions,
or circumvented for the mod part by falfe and frivolous accusations.
Mankind is inclined to vice, and the way to virtue is fo hard, that it
wants encouragement j but when all honours, advantages, and pre-
ferments, are given to vice, and defpifed virtue finds no other
reward than hatred, perfecution, and death, there are few who will
C. Tacit, follow it. Tacitus well defcribes the ftate of the empire, when the
hift. 1. i. c.2. p 0wer was abfolutely fallen into the hands of one : " Italia novis cladi-
" bus, vel poll: longam feculorum feriem repetitis, afBicta; urbs incendiis
" vaftata, confumtis antiquifTimis delubris, ipfo capitolio civium mani-
"bus incenfo; pollutas ceremonias j magna adulteria -, plenum exiliis
"marej infecti caedibus fcopulij atrocius in urbe fawitum ; nobilitas,
€t opes, omifli vel gefti honores pro crimine, & ob virtutes certiiTimum
" exitium. 5> His following words ihew, that the rewards of thefe abo-
minations were not lefs odious than the things themfelves : the higheft
dignities were beftowed upon the " delatores," who were a kind of
rogues like to our Irifh witneffes, or thofe that by a new coined
word we call " trepanners." This is not a picture drawn by a vul-
gar hand, but by one of the beft painters in the world j and being
a model that fo much pleafes our author, it is good to fee what it pro-
duced. The firft fruit was fuch an intire degeneracy from all good, that
Rome may be juftly faid never to have produced a brave man fince the
firft age of her llavery. Germanicus and Corbulo were born " expirante
" libertate ; M and the recompence they received did fo little encourage
others to follow their example, that none have been found in any degree
like to them j and thofe of the moft noble families applied themfelves
to fleep, lazinefs, and luxury, that they might not be fufpected to be
better than their mafters. Thrafeas, Soranus, and Helvidius, were
worthy men, who refolved to perfift in their integrity, tho' they mould
die for it : but that was the only thing that made them eminent -,
for they were of unknown families, not Romans by birth, nor ever
employ'd in war: and thofe emperors who did arrive to any degree
of virtue, were Spaniards, Gauls, Africans, Thracians, and of all
nations, except Romans. The patrician and plebeian families,
which for many ages had filled the world with great commanders,
and fuch as excelled in all virtues, being thus extinguifhed or cor-
rupted, the common people fell into the loweft degree of bafenefs :
hift \Ts 4 ' k § fordida circo & theatris fueta," That people which in mag-
nanimity
Difcourfes concerning Government. nc;
nanimity furpafted all that have been known in the world; who Sect. 12.
never found any enterprize above their fpirit to undertake, and power v — *~v^^
to accomplifh, with their liberty loft all their vigour and virtue.
They who by their votes had difpofed of kingdoms and provinces.,
fell to defire nothing but to live and fee plays.
Duas tantum res anxius optat, Juven. Sat.
Panem & Circenfes. x« ver - 80.
Whether their emperors were good or bad, they ufually re-
joiced at their death, in hopes of getting a little money or victuals
from the fucceffor. Tho' the empire was by this means grown weak
and bloodlefs, yet it could not fall on a fudden : fo vail: a body could
not die in a moment : all the neighbouring nations had been fo much
broken by their power, that none was able to take advantage of their
weaknefs ; and life was preferved by the ftrength of hungry barba-
rians, allured by the greatnefs of the pay they received to defend
thofe, who had no power left to defend themfelves. This precari-
ous and accidental help could not be durable. They who for a while
had been contented with their wages, foon began to think it fit for
them rather to fight for themfelves, than for their weak mafters -,
and thereupon fell to fet up emperors depending on themfelves, or
to feize upon the naked provinces, where they found no other diffi-
culty than to contend with other ftrangers, who might have the like
defign upon the fame. Thus did the armies of the eaft and weft
fet up emperors at their pleafure ; and tho' the Goths, Vandals, Huns,
Sueves, Alans, and others, had cruel wars among themfelves, yet
they feared and fuffered little or nothing from the Romans. This
ftate of things was fo foon obferved, that in the beginning of Tibe-
rius's reign they who endeavoured to excite the Gauls to take arms,
ufed no other arguments than fuch as were drawn from the extreme
weaknefs of the Romans, tc Quam inops Italia, plebs urbana imbellis, C. Tacit.
" nihil in exercitibus validum piaster externum." It was evident, an - 1U - C, 4°-
that after the battles of Philippi and Actium, the ftrength of the
Roman armies confifted of ftrangers ; and even the victories that
went under their name were gained by thofe nations which in the
time of their liberty they had fubdued. They had nothing left but
riches gathered out of their vaft dominions ; and they learned by their
ruin, that an empire acquired by virtue could not long be fupported
by money. They who by their valour had arrived at fuch a height
of glory, power, greatnefs, and happinefs, as was never equalled, and
who in all appearance had nothing to fear from any foreign power,
could never have fallen, unlefs their virtue and difcipline had decayed,
and the corruption of their manners had excited them to turn their
victorious fwords into their own bowels. Whilft they were in that
flourifliing condition, they thought they had nothing more to defire
than continuance : but if our author's judgment is to be followed,
there was " nothing of good in it, except the fhortnefs of its con-
" tinuance." They were beholden to thofe who wrought the change ;
they were the better for the battles of Pharfalia, Philippi, Munda, and
Actium ; the deftruclion of two thirds of the people, with the
G g flaughter
il6 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. (laughter of ail the moll eminent men among them was for their ad-
*— ""V — J vantage : the profcriptions were wholfome remedies' : Tacitus did not
underiland the flate of his own country, when he feems to be aihamed
Annal.l. iv. to write the hiflory of it, " Nobis in arcto & inglorius labor ;" when
c - 32. inflead of fuch glorious things as had been atchieved by the Romans,
whilfl either the fenate, or the common people, prevailed, he had
c. 33. nothing left to relate, but " fasva julTa, continuas accufationes, fallaces
" amicitias, perniciem innocentium :*' they enjoyed nothing that was
good from the expulfion of the Tarquins to the re-eilablifhment of
divine abfolute monarchy in the perfons of thole pious fathers of the
people, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius, &c.
There was no virtue in the Junii, Horatii, Cornelii, Quintii, Decii,
Manlii -, but the generous and tender-hearted princes before-mentioned
were perfect examples of it : whilll annual magiflrates governed,
there was no flability j Sejanus, Macro, and Tigellinus, introduced
good order : virtue was not elteemed by the antient fenate and people ;
MelTalina, Agrippina, Poppaca, NarcifTus, Pallas, Vinnius, and Laco,
knew how to put a juft value upon it : the irregularities of popular
afTemblies, and want of prudence in the fenate, were repaired by the
temperate proceedings of the German, Pannonian, and eaflern armies,
or the modefl difcretion of the pretorian bands : the city was delivered
by them from the burden of governing the world, and for its own
good frequently plundered, fired, and at lair, with the reft of de-
folated Italy, and the noblefl provinces of Europe, Alia, and Africa,
brought under the yoke of the moll: barbarous and cruel nations.
By the fame light we may fee, that thofe who endeavoured to per-
petuate the mifery of liberty to Rome, or loll their lives in the de-
fence of it, were the worfl, or the moll fooliih of men j and that
they were the bell who did overthrow it. This rectifies all our errors ;
and if the highefl praifes are due to him that did the work, the next
are well defer ved by thofe who perifhed in attempting it : and if the
fons of Brutus, with their companions the Vitellii and Aquilii,
Claudius Appius the Decemvir, thofe that would have betrayed the
city to Porfenna ; Spurius Melius, Spur. Caflius, Manlius Capitoli-
nus, Saturninus, Catiline, Cethegus, Lentulus, had been as fortunate
as Julius Caefar, they might as well have deferved an apotheofis. But
if all this be falfe, abfurd, beflial, and abominable, the principles
that neceffarily lead us to fuch conclufions are fo alfo ; which is enough
to fhew, that the llrength, virtue, glory, wealth, power, and happi-
nefs of Rome, proceeding from liberty, did rife, grow, and perifh
with it.
SECT.
Difcourfes concerning Government.
SECT. XIII.
There is no diforder or prejudice in changing the name
or number of magiftrates, whilft the root and principle
of their power continues intire.
T N the next place, our author would perfuade us, that the Romans
-*- were inconstant, becaufe of their changes from annual confuls to
military tribunes, decemviri, and dictators j and gives the name of
fedition to the complaints made againSt ufury, or the conteSts concern-
ing marriages or magistracy : but I affirm,
i . That no change of magistracy, as to the name, number, or
form, doth teflify irregularity, or bring any manner of prejudice, as
long as it is done by thofe who have a right of doing it, and he or
they who are created continue within the power of the law to ac-
complish the end of their institution ; many forms being in them-
felves equally good, and may be ufed as well one as another, accord-
ing to times, and other circumstances.
2. In the fecond place, it is a rare thing for a city at the firft
to be rightly constituted : men can hardly at once forefee all that
may happen in many ages, and the changes that accompany them
ought to be provided for. Rome in its foundation was fubject to
thefe defects, and the inconveniences arising from them were by de-
grees difcovered and remedied. They did not think of regulating
ufury, till they faw the mifchiefs proceeding from the cruelty of
ufurers; or fetting limits to the proportion of land that one man
might enjoy, till the avarice of a few had fo far fucceeded, that their
riches were grown formidable, and many by the poverty to which
they were reduced became ufelefs to the city. It was not time to
make a law, that the plebeians might marry with the patricians, till
the distinction had raifed the Patricians to fuch pride, as to look
upon themfelves to have fomething of divine, and the others to be
" inaufpicati " or " profane," and brought the city into danger by that
division ; nor to make the plebeians capable of being elected to the
chief magistracies, till they had men able to perform the duties, of
them. But thefe things being obferved, remedies were feafonably
applied without any bloodshed or mifchief, tho' not without noife
and wrangling.
3. All human constitutions are fubject to corruption, and
muSt periih, unlefs they are timely renewed, and reduced to
their firft principles : this was chiefly done by means of thofe
tumults which our author ignorantly blames : the whole people,
-by whom the magistracy had been at firft created, executed their
power in thofe things which comprehend fovereignty in the higheft
degree, and brought every one to acknowlege it : there was nothing
that they could not do, who SirSt conferred the fupreme honours upon
the patricians, and then made the plebeians equal to them. Yet
their
il8 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. their modefty was not lefs than their power or courage : and
c -> v — -J therefore when by the law they might have made a plebeian
conful, they did not chufe one in forty years ; and when they did
make ufe of their right in advancing men of their own order, they
were fo prudent, that they cannot be faid to have been miftaken in
their elections three times, whilft their votes were free : whereas,
of all the emperors that came in by ufurpation, pretence of blood
from thofe who had ufurped, or that were fet up by the foldiers, or
a few electors, hardly three can be named who deferved that honour,
and mpft of them were fuch as feemed to be born for plagues to
mankind.
4» He manifefts his fraud or ignorance in attributing the legiflative
power fometimes to the fenate, and fometimes to the people ; for the
fenate never had it. The ftile of " Senatus cenfuit, populus juint,"
was never altered ; but the right of adviiing continuing in the fenate,
that of enacting ever continued in the people.
£. An occafion of commending abfolute power, in order to the
eftablimment of hereditary monarchy, is abfurdly drawn from their
cuftom of creating a dictator in time of danger j for no man was
ever created, but fuch as feemed able to bear fo great a burden, which
in hereditary governments is wholly left to chance. Tho' his power
was great, it did arife from the law 3 and being confined to fix
months, it was almoft impofTible for any man to abufe it, or to cor-
rupt fo many of thofe who had enjoyed the fame honour, or might
afpire to it, as to bring them for his pleafure to betray their country :
and as no man was ever chofen who had not given grent teffi monies
of his virtues, fo no one did ever forfeit the good opinion conceived
of him. Virtue was then honoured, and thought fo necerTarily to
comprehend a lincere love and fidelity to the commonwealth, that
without it the moft eminent qualities were reputed vile and odious ;
and the memory of former fervices could no-way expiate the guilt of
confpiring againft it. This ieeming feverity was in truth the greateft
clemency : for tho' our author has the impudence to fay, that during
the " Roman liberty the belt men thrived worft, and the worft heft,"
he cannot alledge one example of any eminent Roman put to death
(except Manlius Capitolinus) from the expulfion of the Tarquins
to the time of the Gracchi, and the civil wars not long after enfuing ;
and of very few who were banifhed. By thefe means crimes were
prevented j and the temptations to evil being removed, treachery
was deftroyed in the root -, and fuch as might be naturally ambitious,
were made to fee there was no other way to honour and power than
by acting virtuoufly.
But left this fhould not be fufficient to reftrain afpiring men,
what power foever was granted to any magiftrate, the fovereignty
ftill remained in the people, and all, without exception, were fubject
to them. This may feem ftrange to thofe who think the dictators
were abfolute, becaufe they are faid to have been " fine provocatione 5"
but that is to be only underftood in relation to other magiftrates, and
not to the people, as is clearly proved in the cafe of Q^Fabius, whom
T.Liv.l.viii.Papirius the dictator would have put to death :
" rufne fis provocationi, cui Tullus Hoftilius cemt." And tho' the peo-
ple did rather intercede for Fabius than command his deliverance, that
modefty did evidently proceed from an opinion that Papirius was in the
right j and tho' they defired to fave Fabius, who feems to have been one
of the greateft and ben: men that ever the city produced, they would not
enervate that military difcipline, to which they owed, not only their
greatnefs, but their fubfiftence; moft efpecially when their fove-
reign authority was acknowledged by all, and the dictator himfelf
had fubmitted. This right of appeals to the people was the foundation T. Liv. 1. i.
of the Roman commonwealth, laid in the days of Romulus, fubmitted c- 2 6>
to by Hoftilius in the cafe of Horatius, and never violated, till the laws
and the liberty which they fupported, were overthrown by the power
of the fword. This is confirmed by the fpeech of Metellus the tri-
bune, who in the time of the fecond Carthaginian war, cauflefly
diiliking the proceedings of (^Fabius Maximus then dictator, in a
public anembly of the people faid, " Quod fi antiquus animus plebi T.Liv.Lxxii.
" Romans effet, fe audacter laturum de abrogando QJFabii imperio ; c * 25 '
" nunc modicam rogationem promulgaturum, de asquando magiftri
" equitum & diclatoris jure:"' which was done ; and that action, which
had no precedent, mews that the people needed none, and that their
power, being eminently above that of all magiftrates, was obliged to no
other r\de than that of their own will. Tho' I do therefore grant, that
a power like to the dictatorian, limited in time, circumfcribed by
law, and kept perpetually under the fupreme authority of the
people, may, by virtuous and well difciplin'd nations, upon fome
occauons, be prudently granted to a virtuous man, it can have no
relation to our author's monarch, whofe power is in himfelf, fub-
jec~t to no law, perpetually exercifed by himfelf, and for his own lake,
whether he have any of the abilities required for the due perform-
ance of fo great a work, or be intirely deftitute of them ; nothing
being more unreafonable than to deduce confequences from cafes,
which in fubftance and circumftances are altogether unlike : but to
the contrary, thefe examples fhewing that the Romans, even in the
time of fuch magiftrates as feemed to be moil abfolute, did retain
and exercife the fovereign power, do moft evidently prove, that the
government was ever the fame remaining in the people, who with-
out prejudice might give the adminiftration to one or more men, as
beft pleafed fchemfelves -, and the fuccefs mews, that they did it pru-
dently.
H h SECT.
no Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II.
SECT. XIV.
No fedition was hurtful to Rome, till through their pro-
fperity fome men gained a power above the laws.
Little pains is required to confute our author, who imputes much
bloodfhed to the popular government of Rome ; for he cannot
prove, that one man was unjuftly put to death, or flain, in any fedi-
tion before Publius Gracchus : the foundations of the common-
wealth were then fo fhaken, that the laws could not be executed ;
and whatfoever did then fall out ought to be attributed to the monar-
chy for which the great men began to contend. Whilft they had
no other wars than with neighbouring nations, they had a ftrict
eye upon their commanders, and could preferve difcipline among
the foldiers : but when by the excellence of their valour and con-
duct the greatefl powers of the world were fubdued, and, for the
better carrying on of foreign wars, armies were fuffered to continue
in the fame hands longer than the law did direct, foldiery came to
be accounted a trade, and thofe who had the worft defigns againft
the commonwealth, began to favour all manner of licentioufnefs
and rapine, that they might gain the favour of the legions, who by
that means became unruly and feditious: it was hard, if not impoffible,
to preferve a civil equality, when the fpoils of the greatefl kingdoms
were brought to adorn the houfes of private men ; and they who had
the greatefl cities and nations to be their dependents and clients,
were apt to fcorn the power of the law. This was a moll dan-
gerous difeafe, like to thofe to which human bodies are fubject, when
they are arrived to that which phyficians call the athletic habit,
proceeding from the highefl perfection of health, activity, and
flrength, that the befl conflitution by diet and exercife can attain.
Whofoever falls into them lhews, that he had attain'd that perfection ;
and he who blames that which brings a flate into the like condition,
condemns that which is moil perfect among men. Whilfl the Romans
were in the way to this, no fedition did them any hurt : they were
compofed without blood $ and thofe that feemed to be the moll dan-
gerous, produced the bell. laws. But when they were arrived .to
that condition, no order could do them good, the fatal period fet to
human things was come j they could go no higher :
. . • " and the like favour c - 2I *
was fhewn to many others.
2. By making leagues with them, as Livy fays, " Populum Roma- Lib. xxvi.
" num deviclos bello populos,malle fide & focietate habere conjUnctos, c * 4 9-
<£ quam trifti fubjectos fervitio :'* of which fort were the Samnites,
who, not liking their condition, joined with Hannibal ; and after-
wards, under the conduct of the brave Telefinus, with other nations
that lived under the condition of "focii," made an unprofperous attempt
to deliver themfelves.
3. Thofe who after many rebellions were " in provinciam redacti,"
as the Capuans, when their city was taken by Appius Claudius, and
C^Fulvius Flaccus.
We often hear of wars made by thofe of the two latter forts j
but of none that can be called civil, till the times of Marius, Sylla,
and Catiline : and as they are to be efteemed the laft flrugglings of
expiring liberty, when the laws, by which it had fubfifted, were
enervated ; fo thofe that happened between Caefar and Pompey, Octa^
vius and Antonius, with the profcriptions, triumvirate, and all the
mifchiefs that accompanied them, are to be imputed wholly to the
monarchy for which they contended, as well as thofe between Nero,
Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vefpafian, that hardly ever ceafed till
the empire was abolifhed j for the name of a commonwealth con-
tinued to the end ; and I know not why Tiberius or Nero might not
ufe it as well as Sylla or Marius.
Yet if our author be refolved to impute to popular government
all that paffed before Caefar made himfelf perpetual dictator, he will
find no more than is feen in all places. We have known few fmall
ftates, and no great one free from revolts of fubjects or allies ; and
the greateft empire of the earl: was overthrown by the rebellion of
the Mamalukes their flaves. If there is any difference to be obferved
between what happened at Rome, it is chiefly, that whilfl: there
was any madow of liberty, the flaves, gladiators, fubjects or allies,
were always beaten and fupprefled ; whereas in the time of the em-
perors the revolt of a province was fufflcient to give a new mafter
to the bell part of mankind j and he having no more power than was
required
1 22 Difcourfes concerning Government
Chap. II. required for a prefent mifchief, was for the moft part, in a lhort
time, deftroyed by another. But to pleafe our author, I will ac-
knowledge a fecond defect, even that wantonnefs to which he afcribes
all their diforders ; tho' I muft withal defire him to confider from
whence wantonnefs doth proceed. If the people of Turky or
France did rebel, I mould think they were driven to it by mifery,
beggary, or defpair ; and could lay wantonnefs only to the charge
of thofe who enjoy much profperity. Nations that are opprerTed
and made miferable, may fall into rage, but can never grow wan-
ton. In the time of the Roman emperors, the pretorian cohorts,
or the armies that had the liberty of ravaging the richeft provinces,
might be proud of their ftrength, or grow wanton through the
abundance of their enjoyments : the janizaries in later ages may,
for the fame reafons, have fallen into the like exceffes j but fuch as
have loft their liberty are in no danger of them. When all the no-
bility of Rome was deftroyed, and thofe who excelled in reputation
or virtue, were fallen in the wars, or by the profcriptions ; when
two thirds of the people were flain, the beft cities and colonies
burnt, the provinces exhaufted, and the fmall remains left in them
opprefted with a moft miferable flavery, they may have revolted,
and fometimes did, as the Britons, Batavians, and others mentioned
in the Roman hiftory : but they were driven to thofe revolts by fury
and necefhty, arifing from the miferies and indignities they fufrered
under an infupportable tyranny j and wantonnefs had no part in
them. The people of Rome, when they were a little freed from
the terror of the foldiers, did fometimes for the fame reafons con-
fpire againft the emperors j and when they could do no more, ex-
prefTed their hatred by breaking their ftatues : but after the battles of
Pharfalia, Philippi, and the profcriptions, they never committed any
folly through wantonnefs. In the like manner Naples and Sicily have
revolted within thefe few years j and fome who are well acquainted
with the ftate of thofe kingdoms, think them ready again to do the
like ; but if it mould fo happen, no man of underftanding would
impute it to wantonnefs. The prerTures under which they groan,
have cured them of all fuch difeafes ; and the Romans fince the lofs
of their liberty could never, fill into them. They may have grown
wanton when their authority was reverenced, their virtue admired,
their powef irrefiftible, and the riches of the world were flowing
in upon them, as it were, to corrupt their manners, by enticing them
to pleafure : but when all that was loft, and they found their perfons
expofed to all manner of violence from the bafeft of men ; their
riches exhaufted by tributes and rapine, whilft the treafures of
the empire were not. fufficient to fupply the luxury of their mafters ;
the mifery they fuffered, and the lhame of fuffering it, with the con-
temptible weaknefs to which they were reduced, did too ftrongly ad-
monifh them, that the vices of wantonnefs belonged only to thofe
who enjoyed a condition far different from theirs ; and the memory
of what they had loft, fharpened the fenfe of what they felt. This
is the ftate of things which pleafes our author ; and, by prailing that
government, which deprived thofe who were under it of all that is
moft defirable in the world., and introduced all that ought to be de-
tefted,
Difcourfes concerning Government. 125
tefted, he fufficiently fhews, that he delights only in that which is Sect, i f.
moft abominable, and would introduce his admired abfolute monar-
chy, only as an inftrument of bringing vice, mifery, devaluation,
and infamy, upon mankind.
SECT. XV.
The empire of Rome perpetually decayed, when it fell
into the hands of one man.
IN purfuance of his defign our author, with as much judgment as
truth, denies that Rome became miftrefs of the world under the
popular government : " It is not fo, fays he, " for Rome began her
" empire under kings, and did perfect it under emperors : it did only
" increafe under that popularity : her greateft exaltation was under
c< Trajan, and longeft peace under Auguftus." For the illuftration
of which, I defire thefe few things may be confidered.
1 . That the fir ft monarchy of Rome was not abfolute : the kings
were made by the people without regard to any man's title, or
other reafon than the common good, chufing him that feemed molt
likely to procure it ; fetting up at the fame time a fenate confifting
of a hundred of the moll: eminent men among them ; and, after the
reception of the Sabines into the city, adding as many more to them,
and committing the principal part of the government to their care,
retaining the power of making thofe laws to which the kings who
reigned by their command were fubject, and refer ving to themfelves
the judgment of all great matters upon appeal. If any of their
kings deferved to be called a monarch, according to Filmer's defini-
tion, it was the laft Tarquin ; for he alone of all their kings reigned T. Liv. 1. II
not " juffu populi," but came in by treachery and murder. If he had
continued, he had cured the people of all vices proceeding from
wantonnefs ; but his farther!: conquer! was of the fmall town of
Gabii ten miles diftant from Rome, which he effected by the fraud
of his deteftable fon ; and that being then the utmoft limit of the
Roman empire, mull deferve to be called the world, or the empire
of it was not gained by their kings.
2. The extent of conquefts is not the only, nor the chief thing
that ought to be confidered in them ; regard is to be had to the means
whereby they are made, and the valour or force that was employed
by the enemy. In thefe refpects not only the overthrow of Car-
thage, and the conquefts of Spain, but the victories gained againft
the Sabines, Latins, Tufcans, Samnites, and other valiant nations of
Italy, who moft obftinately defended their liberty, when the
Romans had no forces but their own, Ihew more virtue, and de-
ferve incomparably more praife, than the defeats of any nations
whatfoever, when they were increafed in number, riches, repu-
tation, and power, and had many other warlike people inftructed
in their difcipline, and fighting under their enfigns. But I deny
that the Romans did ever make any confiderable acquifition after the
I i lofs
124 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. lofs of their liberty. They had already fubdued all Italy, Greece,
Macedon, the iflands of the Mediterranean Sea, Thracia, Ilfyrium,
Alia the lefs, Pontus, Armenia, Syria, Egypt, Africa, Gaul, and
Spain. The forces of Germany were broken j a bridge laid over the
Rhine, and all the countries on this fide fubdued. This was all that
was ever gained by the valour of their own forces, and that could
bring either honour or profit. But I know of no conquefl made
after that time, unlefs the name of conquefl be given to Caligula's
expedition, when he faid he had fubdued the fea, in making an ufe-
lefs bridge from Puteoli to Baia? ; or that of the other fool, who en-
tered Rome in triumph, for having gathered Shells on the fea-fhore.
Trajan's expedition into the eaft was rather a journey than a war :
lie rambled over the provinces that Auguftus had abandoned as not
worth keeping, and others that had nothing to defend them, but ill-
armed and unwarlike barbarians : upon the whole matter, he feems
to have been led only by curiofity ; and the vanity of looking upon
them as conqueits, appears in their being relinquished as foon as
gained. Britain was eafily taken from a naked and unSkilful, tho' a
brave people j hardly kept, and Shamefully loft. But tho' the em-
perors had made greater wars than the commonwealth, vanquished
nations of more valour and Skill than their Italian neighbours, the
Grecians or Carthaginians ; fubdued and Slaughtered thofe that in
numbers and ferocity had exceeded the Cimbri, Gauls, and Teutons,
encountred captains more formidable than Pyrrhus and Hannibal, it
might indeed increafe the glory of him that mould have done it,
but could add nothing of honour or advantage to the Roman
name : the nobility was extirpated long before, the people corrup-
ted and enflaved, Italy lay defolate, fo as a Roman was hardly to be
found in a Roman army, which was generally compofed of fuch, as
fighting for themfelves or their commander, never thought of any
thing lefs than the interefr. of Rome : and as it is impoffible that
what is fo neglected and betrayed, mould be durable, that empire
which was acquired by the valour and conduct: of the bravefl: and
ben: difciplined people of the world, decayed and perifhed in the
hands of thofe abfolute monarchs, who ought to have preferved it.
3. Peace is defirable by a ftate that is constituted for it, who con-
tenting themfelves with their own territories, have no defires of en-
larging them : or perhaps it might fimply deferve praife, if mankind
were fo framed, that a people intending hurt to none could preferve
themfelves : but the world being fo far of another temper, that no
nation can be fafe without valour and Strength, thofe governments
only deferve to be commended, which by discipline and exercife in-
creafe both, and the Roman above all, that excelled in both. Peace
therefore may be good in its feafon, and was fo in Numa's reign :
yet two or three fuch kings would have encouraged fome active
neighbours to put an end to that afpiring city, before its territory
had extended beyond Fidenac. But the difcipline that beft agreed with
the temper and defigns of a warlike people, being renewed by his
brave fucceSTors, the dangers were put on their enemies ; and all of
them, the laSt only excepted, perfifting in the fame way, did reafonably
well
Difcourfes concerning Government. 129
well perform their duty. When they were removed, and the af- Sect. 15*
fairs of the city depended no longer upon the temper or capacity v^*-y— ■■*
of one man, the ends for which the city was conftituted were vigour-
oufly purfued, and fuch magiftrates annually chofen, as would
not long continue in an univerfal peace, till they had gotten the em-
pire to which they afpir'd, or were by ill fortune brought to fuch a
weaknefs, as to be no longer able to make war. Both of thefe hap-
pened in the fo much magnified reign of Auguftus. He found the
empire (o great, that all additions might rationally be rejected as
ufelefs or prejudicial ; and Italy fo exhaufted, that wars could only
be carried on by the ftrength of ftrangers : it was time to lie ftill,
when they had no power to act ; and they might do it fafely, whilft
the reputation gained by former victories preferved them from fo-
reign invafions. When Craflus, Pompey, and Casfar, who had torn
the commonwealth into three monarchies, were killed, and the
flower of the Roman nobility and people deftroyed with them,
or by them ; when Cato's virtue had proved too weak to fupport a
falling ftate, and Brutus with Camus had perifhed in their noble at-
tempt to reftore their liberty j when the belt, part of the fenate had
been expofed for a prey to the vulturs and wolves of Theilaly, and
one hundred and thirty of thofe who deferved the hatred of tyrants,
and had efcaped the fury of war, had been deftroyed by the profcrip-
tions ; when neither captains nor foldiers remained in the defolate
city ; when the tyrant abhorred and feared all thofe who had
either reputation or virtue, and by the moil: fubtile arts endeavoured
fo to corrupt or break the fpirits of the remaining people, that they
might not think of their former greatnefs, or the ways of recover-
ing it 5 we ought not to wonder, that they ceafed from war. But
fuch a peace is no more to be commended, than that which men
have in the grave ; as in the epitaph of the marquis Trivultio fceii
at Milan, " Qui nunquam quievit, quiefcit. Tace.' 'This peace is in
every wildernefs : the Turks have eftablifhed it in the empty provin-
ces of Alia and Greece. Where there are no men, or if thofe men
have no courage, there can be no war. Our anceftors the Britons
obferved, that the peace which in that age the Romans eftablifhed
in the provinces, confifted in the moil wretched flavery and folitude:
" Miferrimam fervitutem pacem appellant." And in another place, "fo- CTacit.hift.
" litudinem faciunt, pacem vocant." This is the peace the Spa-J. IV \ c ' l . 7 ' et
niards fettled in their dominions of the Weft-Indies, by the deftruction o 0#
of * forty millions of fouls : the countries were very quiet, when »B art y 1>( jc las
wild beafts only were left to fight in them, or a few miferable cafas de-
wretches, who had neither ftrength nor courage to refift their vio- ftruyc. and
the creation of them was the in oft confiderable change that happened
till the time of Marius, who brought all into diforder. The crea-
tion or abolition of military tribunes with confular power, ought
to be accounted as nothing ; for it imported little whether that au-
thority were exercifed by two, or by five : that of the decemviri
was as little to be regarded, they were intended only for a year ; and
tho' new ones were created for another, on pretence that the laws
they were to frame could not be brought to perfection in fo fhort a
time, yet they were foon thrown down from the power they ufur-
ped, and endeavoured to retain contrary to law : the creation of
dictators was no novelty, they were made occasionally from the be-
ginning, and never otherwife than occafionally, till Julius Csefar fub-
* Jura omni- verted all order, and, invading that fupreme magistracy by force,
xiT Su \ tra " * uuar P e d the right which belonged to all. This indeed was a mortal
change
Difcourfes concerning Government. 139
change even in root and principle. All other magiftrates had been Sect. 17-
created by the people for the public good, and always were within *-— v— ■>*
the power of thofe that had created them. But Caefar coming in by
force, fought only the fatisfaclion of his own raging ambition, or
that of the foldiers, whom he had corrupted to deftroy their
country j and his fucceffors governing for themfelves by the help of
the like rafcals, perpetually expofed the empire to be ravaged by them.
But whatever opinion any man may have of the other changes, I
dare affirm, there are few or no monarchies (whofe hiftories are fo
well known to us as that of Rome) which have not fuffered changes
incomparably greater, and more mifchievous, than thofe of Rome,
whilft it was free. The Macedonian monarchy fell into pieces im-
mediately after the death of Alexander : it is thought he perifhed by
poifon : his wives, children, and mother, were deftroyed by his
own captains : the beft of thofe who had efcaped his fury, fell by
the fword of each other. When the famous Argyrafpides might have
expected fome reward of their labours, and a little reft in old age,
they were malicioufly fent into the eaft by Antigonus to perifh by
hunger and mifery, after he had corrupted them to betray Eumenes.
No better fate attended the reft ; all was in confufion, every one fol-
lowed whom he pleafed, and all of them feemed to be filled with
fuch a rage, that they never ceafed from mutual Daughters till they
were confumed ; and their kingdoms continued in perpetual wars
againft each other, till they all fell under the Roman power. The
fortune of Rome was the fame after it became a monarchy : trea-
chery, murder, and fury, reigned in every part ; there was no law
but force ; he that could corrupt an army, thought he had a fuffi-
cient title to the empire : by this means there were frequently
three or four, and at one time thirty feveral pretenders, who called
themfelves emperors ; of which number he only reigned that had
the happinefs to deftroy all his competitors ; and he himfelf con-
tinued no longer than till another durft attempt the deftruc~tion of him
and his pofterity. In this ftate they remained, till the wafted and
bloodlefs provinces were pofTerTed by a multitude of barbarous na-
tions. The kingdoms eftabliihed by them enjoyed as little peace or
juftice ; that of France was frequently divided into as many parts
as the kings of Meroveus or Pepin's race had children, under
the names of the kingdoms of Paris, Orleans, Soiflbns, Aries,
Burgundy, Auftrafia, and others : thefe were perpetually vexed by
the unnatural fury of brothers or neareft relations, whilft the mi-
ferable nobility and people were obliged to fight upon their foolrfh
quarrels, till all fell under the power of the ftrongeft. This mif-
chief was in fome meafure cured by a law made in the time of
Hugh Capet, that the kingdom fhould no more be divided : but the
appanages, as they call them, granted to the king's brothers, with
the feveral dukedoms and earldoms erected to pleafe them, and other
great lords, produced frequently aimoft as bad effects. This is
teftiiied by the defperate and mortal factions, that went under the
names of Burgundy and Orleans, Armagnac and Orleans, Montmo*-
rency and Guife : thefe were followed by thofe of the league, and
the wars of the Huguenots : they were no fooner nnifhed by the
M m taking
136 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. taking of Rochel, but new ones began by the intrigues of the duke
of Orleans, brother to Lewis the Thirteenth, and his mother ; and
purfued with that animofity by them, that they put themfelves under
the protection of Spain : to which may be added, that the houfes of
Conde, Soiflbns, Montmorency, Guife, Vendofme, Angouleme,
Bouillon, Rohan, Longueville, Rochfoucault^ Epernon, and I think
I may fay every one that is of great eminency in that kingdom, witli
the cities of Paris, Bourdeaux, and many others, in the fpace of
thefe laft fifty years, have fided with the perpetual enemies of their
own country.
Again, other great alterations have happened within the fame
kingdom : the races of kings four times wholly changed : five kings
depofed in lefs than i£o years after the death of Charles the Great :
the offices of maire du palais, and conftable, erected and laid alide :
the great dukedoms and earldoms, little inferior to fovereign princi-
palities, eftablifhed and fuppreifed : the decifion of all caufes, and
the execution of the laws, placed abfolutely in the hands of the no-
bility, their deputies, fenefchals, or vice-fenefchals, and taken from
them again; parliaments fet up to receive appeals from the other
courts, and to judge fovereignly in all cafes, exprefly to curb them :
the power of thefe parliaments, after they had crumed the nobiiitv,
brought fo low, that within the laft. twenty years they are made to
regifter, and give the power of laws, to edicts, of which the titles
only are read to them ; and the general alTemblies of eftates, that
from the time of Pepin had the power of the nation in their hands,
are now brought to nothing, and almoit forgotten.
Tho' I mention thefe things, it is not with a defign of blaming
them, for fome of them deferve it not ; and it ought to be confidered
that the wifdom of man is imperfect, and unable to forefee the
effects that may proceed from an infinite variety of accidents, which
according to emergencies, necefTarily require new conftitutions, to
prevent or cure the mifchiefs arifing from them, or to advance a good
that at the firft was not thought on : and as the nobleft. work in
which the wit of man can be exercifed, were (if it could be done)
to conftitute a government that mould lafh for ever, the next to that
is to fuit laws to prefent exigencies, and fo much as is in the power
of man to forefee : and he that mould refolve to perfift obftinately
in the way he firft entered upon, or to blame thofe who go out of
that in which their fathers had walked, when they find it necelTary,
does as far as in him lies, render the worft of errors perpetual.
Changes therefore are unavoidable, and the wit of man can go no
farther than to inftitute fuch, as in relation to the forces, manners,
nature, religion, or interefts of a people, and their neighbours, are
fuitable and adequate to what isfeen, or apprehended to be feen : and
he who would oblige all nations at all times to take the fame courfe,
would prove as foolifh as a phyfician who mould apply the fame
medicine to all diftempers, or an architect that would build the
fame kind of houfe for all perfons, without confidering their eftates,
dignities, the number of their children or fervants, the time or
climate in which they live, and many other circumftances ; or,
which is, if poffible, more fottim, a general who mould obftinately
refolve
Difcourfes concerning Government. X 37
refolve always to make war in the fame way, and to draw up his Sect. 17.
army in the fame form, without examining the nature, number,
and ftrength of his own and his enemies forces, or the advantages
and difadvantages of the ground. But as there may be fome uni-
verfal rules in phyfic, architecture, and military difcipline, from
which men ought never to depart ; fo there are fome in politics
alfo which ought always to be obferved : and wife legiflators adhere-
ing to them only, will be ready to change all others as occafion may
require, in order to the public good. This we may learn from
Mofes, who laying the foundation of the law given to the Ifraelites
in that juftice, charity, and truth, which having its root in God is
fubject to no change, left them the liberty of having judges or no
judges, kings or no kings, or to give the fovereign power to high-
priefts or captains, as beft pleafed themfelves ; and the mifchiefs
they afterwards fuffered, proceeded not fimply from changing, but
changing for the worfe. The like judgment may be made of the
alterations that have happened in other places. They who aim at the
public good, and wifely inftitute means proportionable and ade-
quate to the attainment of it, deferve praife - y and thofe only are to be
diiliked, who either foolifhly or malicioufly fet up a corrupt private
intereft in one or a few men. Whofoever therefore would judge of
the Roman changes, may fee, that in expelling the Tarquins, cre-
ating confuls, abating the violence of ufurers, admitting plebeians
to marry with the patricians, rendering them capable of magiftracies,
deducing colonies, dividing lands gained from their enemies, erect-
ing tribunes to defend the rights of the commons, appointing the
decemviri to regulate the law, and abrogating their power when
they abufed it, creating dictators and military tribunes with a con-
fular power, as occafions required j they acted in the face of the fun
for the good of the public j and fuch acts having always produced
effects fuitable to the rectitude of their intentions, they confequently
deferve praife. But when another principle began to govern, all
things were changed in a very different manner : evil defigns, tend-
ing only to the advancement of private interests, were carried on in
the dark by means as wicked as the end. If Tarquin when he had
a mind to be king, poifoned his firft wife and his brother, contracted
an inceftuous marriage with his fecond by the death of her firft
hufband, murdered her father, and the belt men in Rome, yet Ca?far
did worfe : he favoured Catiline, and his villainous affociates ; bribed
and corrupted magistrates ; confpired with Craffus and Pompey ; con-
tinued in the command of an army beyond the time prefcribed by
law, and turned the arms with which he had been entrufted for the
fervice of the commonwealth, to the deftruction of it ; which was
rightly reprefented by his dream, that he had conftuprated his mo-
ther : in the like manner, when Octavius, Antonius, and Lepidus,
divided the empire, and then quarrelled among themfelves ; and when
Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vefpafian, fet up parties in feveral pro-
vinces, all was managed with treachery, fraud, and cruelty ; nothing
was intended but the advancement of one man, and the recom-
pence of the villains that ferved him : and when the empire had
luffered infinite calamities by pulling down or rejecting one, and fet-
ting
1 38 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. ting U P another, it was for the moft part difficult to determine who
was the worft of the two 5 or whether the prevailing fide had gained
or loft by their victory. The queflion therefore upon which a judg-
ment may be made to the praife or difpraife of the Roman govern-
ment, before or after the lofs of their liberty, ought not to be,
whether either were fubjecl: to changes, for neither they nor any thing
under the fun were ever exempted from them j but whether the
changes that happened after the eftablifhmcnt of abfolute power in
the emperors, did not folely proceed from ambition, and tend to the
public ruin : whereas thofe alterations related by our author con-
cerning confuls, dictators, decemviri, tribunes, and laws, were far
more rare, lefs violent, tending to, and procuring the public good,
and therefore deferving praife. The like having been proved by the
examples of other kingdoms, and might be farther confirmed by
many more, which on account of brevity I omit, is in my opinion
fufficient to manifeft, that whilft the foundation and principle of a
government remains good, the fuperftruc~tures may be changed accord-
ing to occafions, without any prejudice to it.
SECT. XVIIf.
Xenophon in blaming the diforders of democracies,
favours arifrocracies, not monarchies.
IN the next place our author introduces Xenophon " difallowing
" popular governments 5" cites Rome and Athens as places £C where
" the beft men thrived worft, and the worft beft 3" and condemns
the Romans for making it capital to pafs fentence " of death, banifli-
" ment, lofs of liberty, or ftripes, upon any citizen of Rome." But
left his fraud in this fhould be detected, lie cites no precife paffage of
any author, alledges few examples, and thofe miftaken 3 never tells
us what that law was, when made, or where to be found ; whereas
I hope to prove, that he has upon the whole matter abominably pre-
varicated, and advanced things that he knows to be either impertinent
or falfe.
1 . To this end we are in the firft place to confider, whether Xeno-
phon fpeaks of popular governments fimply, or comparatively : if
•iimply, it is confefled, that a pure democracy can never be good, un-
lefs for a fmall town ; if comparatively, we muft examine to what
he compares it : we are fure it was not to abfolute monarchy ; there
was no fuch thing amongft the Greeks eftablifhed by law : the little
tyrants who had enflaved their own countries, as Jafon, Phe-
rams, Phalaris, and the like, had no pretence to it, and were ac-
counted as the worft of beafts : none but fuch as in all beftiality were
like to them, did ever fpeak or think well of them : Xenophon's opi-
nion in this point, may be eaiily found out by what parTed between
his mafter Plato and the Sicilian tyrant j and the matter will not
be mended by referring to his own experience : he had feen the vaft
monarchy of Perfia torn in pieces by the fury of two brothers, and
more
Difcourfes concerning Government. 139
more than a million of men brought to fight upon their private quar- Sect. 18.
rel : inftead of that order, ftability, and ftrength which our author
afcribes to abfolute monarchy as the effecl of wifdom and juflice,
he knew, that by filling one man with pride and cruelty, it brought
unfpeakable miferies upon all others, and infedted them with all the
vices that accompany flavery : men lived like rimes ; the great ones
devoured the fmall ; and as appeared by Tiflaphernes, Pharnabazus,
and others with whom he had to deal, the worft and bafeft were
made to be the greateft : the fatrapas infulted over thofe of meaner
rank with an inlblence and cruelty that equaled the depth of their
fervile fubmiffion to their proud mailer. Luxury and avarice reigned
in all : many great nations were made to live for the fervice of
one man, and to foment his vices. This produced weaknefs and
cowardice : no number of thofe flaves were able to ftand againft a
few free Grecians. No man knew this better than Xenophon, who
after the death of Cyrus the younger, and the treacherous murder of
Clearchus, and other officers that commanded the Greeks who had
ferved him, made his retreat from Babylon to the Hellefpont with ten
thoufand foot, and paffed over the bellies of all that dared to op-
pole him. He would never have fpent his life in exciting his coun-
trymen to attempt the conqueft of Afia, nor perfuaded Agefilaus to
put himfelf at the head of the enterprize, if he had thought there
was fuch admirable order, ftability, and ftrength, in that monarchy,
and in the Greeks nothing but " giddinefs of fpirit, and fo much learn-
" ing as made them feditious :" nor could he, being a wife man, and
an excellent captain, have conceived fuch a defign, if he had not by
experience found, that liberty infpired his countrymen with fuch
folid virtue, and produced fuch ftability, good order, and ftrength,
that with fmall numbers of them he might hope to overthrow the
vain pomp of the barbarians, and to poffefs himfelf of their riches
tho' they could bring more than a hundred men to fight againft one ;
which delign being interrupted in his time by domeftic wars, was
foon after his death accomplifhed by Alexander.
But that Xenophon's meaning may be better understood, it is good
to confider, that he fpoke of fuch governments as were then in ufe
among the Greeks ; which, tho' mixed, yet took their denomination
from the prevailing part : fo that the Dorians, who placed the power
chiefly in the hands of a few chofen men, were faid to be governed
ariftocratically ; and the Ionians giving more power to the common
people, democratically : and he, tho' an Ionian, either through friend r
fhip to Agefilaus, converfation with the Spartans, or for other reafons
beft known to himfelf, preferred the government of Sparta, or fome
other which he thought he could frame, and defired to introduce,
before that of Athens ; as Cimon, Thucydides, and many other ex-
cellent men of that city, are faid to have done : and if I acknowledge
they were in the right, and that Athens was more fubject to diforder,
and had lefs ftability than Sparta, I think it will be of little advantage
to abfolute monarchy
2 . The Athenians did banifh fome worthy men, and put others to
death j but our author, like the devil, never fpeaking truth, unlefs
tq turn it into a lye, prevaricates in his report of them. The tempo-
N n rary
140 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. rary banifhment which they called " oftracifm," was without hurt or
*_ 1 ■-;--. J difhonour, never accounted as a punifhment, nor intended for any
other end, than to put a flop to the too eminent greatnefs of a man,
that might prove dangerous to the city 5 and fome excellent perfons
who fell under it, were foon recalled, and brought home with glory.
But I am not folicitous whether that reafon be fufficient to juftify it
or not : we are upon a general thcfis relating to the laws of God
and nature; and if the Athenians, by a fancy of their own, did
make an imprudent ufe of their liberty, it cannot prejudice the pub-
lic caufe. They who make the worff, of it can only fay, that by
fuch means they, for a time, deprived themfeives of the benefits they
might have received from the virtues of fome excellent men, to the
hurt of none but themfeives; and the application of it as an injuftice
flut. in vita done to Themiftocles is abfolutely falfe : he was a man of great wit,
Themift. induftry, and valour, but of uncertain faith, too much addicted
to his own intereft, and held a moft dangerous correfpondence with
the Perfians, who then threatened the destruction of Greece. Througli
envy and fpite to Ariftides, and to increafe his own power, he raifed
dangerous factions in the city : and being fummoned to render an
account of his proceedings, he declined the judgment of his coun-
try, fled to their enemies, and juftly deferved the fentence pro-
nounced againfl: him. Some among them were unjuflly put to death,
and above all Socrates ; but the people, who, deceived by falfe wit-
neffesj (againfl; whom neither the laws of God or man have ever
prefcribed a fufficient defence) had condemned him, did fo much la-
ment their crime, when the truth was difcovered to them, that I doubt
whether a more righteous judgment had given better testimony of
their righteous intentions. But our author's impudence appears in
the higheft excefs in imputing the death of Phocion to the popular
ftate of Athens : their forces had been broken in the Sicilian war ;
and the city taken, and the principal men flain by Lyfander ; the re-
mains of the mofh worthy deftroyed by the thirty tyrants fet up by
him; their ill-recovered liberty overthrown by the Macedonians,
and the death of Phocion compafTed by Polyperchon, who with
foreign foldiers, Haves, vagabonds, and outlaws, overpowered the
people.
The proceedings of Rome may be more completely jufliiied : Co-
riolanus was duly condemned : he fet too great a price upon his own
valour, and arrogated to himfelf a power in Rome, which would
hardly have been endured in Corioli : his violence and pride over-
balanced his fervices; and he that would fubmit to no law, was juflly
driven from the fociety which could fubfift only by law. Quin-
tius was not unlike him, and Manlius Capitolinus far worfe than
either. Their virtues were not to be considered when they departed
from them. Consideration ought to be had of human frailty, and
fome indulgence may be extended to thofe who commit errors, after
having done important fervices ; but a flate cannot fubfift, which,
compenfating evil actions with good, gives impunity to the moft
dangerous crimes, in remembrance of any fervices whatever. He
that does well, performs his duty, and ought always to do fo ; juflice
and prudence concur in this ; and it is no lefs juft than profitable,
that
Difcourfes concerning Government. 141
that every action be confidered by itfelf, and fuch a reward or Sect. iS.
punifhment allotted to it, as in nature and proportion it doth beft v- *v— '-J
deferve.
This, as I fuppofe, is enough for their cafes -, but relates not to
thofe of Mamercus, Camillus, Livius Salinator, and Emilius Paulusj
their virtue was complete, they were wrongfully fentenccd. But the
beft princes, fenate, or people, that ever was in the world, by the
deceit of evil men, may and have been drawn out of the way of
juflice : yet of all the flates that are known to us, none was ever fo
free from crimes of malice and wilful injuftice ; none was ever guilty
of fo few errors as that of Rome ; and none did ever give better
teftimonies of repentance, when they were difcovered, than the
Romans did by the veneration they fhewed to thofe worthy perfons,
and the honours they conferred upon them afterwards. Mamer-T- Liv. 1.
cus was made dictator, to repair the unjuft mark of infamy laid upon lv ' c ' 31 *
him by the cenfors. Camillus being recalled from his baniihment, 1. v . c. 3Z,
often enjoyed the fame honour, and died the moll reverenced man 46. 1. vi.
that had ever been in that city. Livius Salinator was not only made J 8 . • vn ' c '. 1 .*
conful after he had been fined, but the people (as it were to expiate c# ^[ & 1
the guilt of having condemned him) fuffered that afperity of fpeechxxxix. 37.
and manners, which might have perfuaded fuch as had been lefs con-
fident of his virtue, and their own, that he defired to be revenged,
tho' it were with the ruin of the city. They dealt in the like man- 1. xxxix. c.
ner with Paulus Emilius, repairing the injury of a fine unduly im- 5 6,
pofed. Their generofity in leaving the tribunes in the Forum with l. xxxviii. c.
their accufation againft Scipio Africanus, and following him to cele-5 r «
brate an annual facrifice in the capitol, in commemoration of his
victory againft Hannibal, was no lefs admirable than the greatnefs of
his mind, who thought his virtue mould be fo well known, that
no account ought to be expected from him ; which was an error pro-
ceeding from a noble root, but not to be borne in a well-governed
commonwealth. The laws that aim at the public good, make
no diftinction of perfons ; and none can be exempted from the penal-
ties of them, otherwife than by approved innocence, which cannot
appear without a trial : he that will not bend his mind to them,
makes off the equality of a citizen, and ufurps a power above the
law, to which no man fubmits upon any other condition, than that
none mould be exempted from the power of it. And Scipio being
the firfl Roman that thus difdained the power of the law, I do not
know whether the prejudice brought upon the city by fo dangerous
an example, did not outweigh all the fervices he had done ; never-
thelefs the people contented with his retirement to his own houfe, and
afterwards convinced of his innocence, would probably (if he had
not died in a few months) have brought him back with the honours
that fate referved for his afhes.
I do not at prefent remember any other eminent men, who can be
faid in any refpect to have " thrived ill," whilft the people and fenate
of Rome acted freely ; and if this be not fufficient to clear the point,
I defire to know the names of thofe " worft men that thrived beft."
If they may have been judged to thrive, who were frequently advanced
to the fupreme magiftracies, and enjoyed the chief honours -, I find no
men
142 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. men & eminent as Brutus, Publicola, Quintius Cincinnatus, and
im^^-Y^ m ^ j Capitolinus, the two Fabii furnamed Maximi, Corvinus, Torquatus,
Camillus, and the like : and if thefe were the worft men that Rome
produced in thofe ages, valour* wifdom, induftry in the fervice
of their country, and a mofl intire love to it, mufl have been the
worft of qualities •> and I prefume our author may have thought them
fo, lince they were invincible obftacles to the introduction of that
divine monarchy which Appius Claudius the decemvir, Manlius
Capitolinus, Spurius Camus, Sp. Melius, and fome others, may be
thought to have affected.
However, thefe inftances are not to be underftood as they are
fimply in themfelves, but comparatively with what has happened in
other places under abfolute monarchies : for our inquiry is not after
that which is perfect, well knowing that no fuch thing is found
among men ; but we feek that human conftitution which is attended
With the leaf!:, or the moft pardonable inconveniences. And if we
find, that in the fpace of three hundred years, whilft the fenate,
people, and legally created magiftrates, governed Rome, not one
worthy man was put to death, not above five or fix condemned to
fines by the beguiled people, and thofe injuries repaired by the moft
honourable fatisfaction that could be given j fo that virtue continued
ever flourifhing j the beft men that could be found were put into the
chief commands, and the city was filled with more excellent men
than were ever known to be in any other place : and on the other
fide, if the emperors fo foon as the government was changed, made
it their bufinefs to deftroy the beft, and fo far fucceeded in their defign,
that they left none 3 and never failed to advance the worft, unlefs it
fell out as to queen Catharine de Medicis, who is faid never to have
done any good but by miftake, and fome few may have proved better
than was intended 3 it will appear, that our author's aftertions are in
the utmoft degree falfe. Of this we need no better witnefs than
Tacitus. The civil wars, and the profcriptions upon which he
touches, are juftly to be attributed to that monarchy which was then
fetting up, the only queftion being, who mould be the monarch,
when the liberty was already overthrown. And if any eminent men
efcaped, it was much againft the will of thofe who had ufurped the
power : he acknowledges his hiftories to be a continued relation of
the flaughter of the moft illuftrious perfons, and that in the times
of which he writes, virtue was attended with certain deftruction.
After the death of Germanicus, and his eldeft children, Valerius Afi-
aticus, Seneca, Corbulo, and an infinite number more who were
thought moft to refemble them, found this to be true at the expence
of their lives : Nero, in purfuance of the fame tyrannical defign,
Ipfamexfcin- murdered Helvidius and Thrafeas, that he might " tear up virtue by
deie virtu- « the roots :" Domitian fpared none willingly that had either virtue or
grn. acit. re p Utat -j on . anc | mo ' Trajan, with perhaps fome other, might grow
' up under him in the remote provinces, yet no good man could efcape
who came under his eye, and was fo eminent as to be obferved by him.
Whilft thefe, who were thought to be the beft men that appeared in
the Roman empire, did thrive in this manner, Sejanus, Macro, Nar-
cifiiis, Pallas, Tigellinus, Icetus,Yinnius, Laco, and others like to them,
had
Dilcouiies concerning Government. 143
had the power of the empire in their hands. Therefore, unlefs Sect. 18.
mankind has been miftaken to this day, and that thefe, who have *— - -v— '
hitherto been accounted the worft of villains, were indeed the beft
men in the world, and that thofe deftroyed by them, who are thought
to have been the beft, were truly the worft, it cannot be denied, that
the beft men, during the liberty of Rome, thrived beft j that good
men fuffered no indignity, unlefs by fome fraud impofed upon the
well-meaning people j and that fo foon as the liberty was fubverted,
the worfl: men thrived beft. The beft men were expofed to fo many
calamities and fnares, that it was thought a matter of great wonder
to fee a virtuous man die in his bed : and if the account were well
made, I think it might appear, that every one of the emperors be-
fore Titus fhed more noble and innocent blood than Rome and all the
commonwealths in the world have done whilft they had the free
enjoyment of their own liberty. But if any man in favour of our
author feek to diminifh this vaft difproportion between the two dif*
fering forts of government, and impute the diforders that happened
in the time of the Gracchi, and others, whilft Rome was ftruggling
for her liberty, to the government of a commonwealth, he will find
them no more to be compared with thofe that fell out afterwards, than
the railings of a turbulent tribune againft the fenate, to the villainies
and cruelties that corrupted and difpeopled the provinces from
Babylon to Scotland : and whereas the ftate never failed to recover
from any diforders, as long as the root of liberty remained untouched,
and became more powerful and glorious than ever, even after the
wars of Marius and Sylla ; when that was deftroyed, the city fell into
a languifhing condition, and grew weaker and weaker, till that, and
the whole empire, were ruined by the barbarians.
3. Our author, to fhew that his memory is as good as his judgment,
having reprefented Rome in the times of liberty as a public flaughter-
houfe, foon after blames the clemency of their laws - 3i whereas it is
impoflible that the fame city could at the fame time be guilty of
thofe contrary extremities ; and no lefs certain, that it was perfectly
free from them both. His afTertion feems to be grounded upon Casfar's
fpeech (related by Salluft) in favour of Lentulus and Cethegus, com- Salluft. bell,
panions of Catiline : but tho' he there endeavoured to put the beft Catilin.
colour he could upon their caufe, it fignified only thus much, that a
Roman citizen could not be put to death, without being heard in
public ; which law will difpleafe none that in underftanding and
integrity may not be compared to Filmer, and his followers. It is
a folly to extend it farther j for it is eafily proved, that there was
always a power of putting citizens to death, and that it was exercifed
when occaiion required. The laws were the fame in the time of
the kings, and when that office was executed by confuls, except-
ing fuch changes as are already mentioned. The " lex perduellionis,"
cited by Livy in the cafe of Horatius, who had killed his lifter, con-
tinued in force from the foundation to the end of that government :
the condemnation was to death, the words of the fentence thefe,
"Caput obnubito, infelici arbore refte fufpendito ; verberato intra T. Liv. 1. i,
" pomnerium vel extra pomoerium." He was tried by this law upon c - z6 -
an appeal made to the people by his father, and abfolved " admiratione
O o '' magis
144 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. * c magis virtutis quam jure caufa? ;" which could not have been, if
^-^v^— ' by the law no citizen might be put to death. The fons of Brutus
Liv. I. u. c, were Gondenined to death in public, and executed with the Aquilii
1. vi. c 20. an d Vitellii their companions in the fame confpiracy : Manlius Ca-
1. viii. c. 7. pitolinus was put to death by the vote of the people : Titus Manlius
by the command of his father Torquatus, for fighting without order :
l. li. c. 59. tWQ } e gi ons were decimated by Appius Claudius : Spurius Melius re-
1 $ m ' ' fufing to appear before the dictator, was killed by Servilius Ahala
1. viii. c. 30- general of the horfe, and pronounced "jure exfum :" Quintus Fabius
3** Was by Papirius the dictator condemned to die, and could not have
been faved but by the interceffion and authority of the people. If
Tac. ann. !. this be not fo, I defire to be informed what the fenate meant by con-
xiv. c. 48. demning Nero to be put to death
and that wickednefs is madnefs. It is hard to fay more in praife of
popular governments than will refult from what he fays againft them :
his reproaches are praifes, and his praifes reproaches. As govern-
ment is inftituted for the prefervation of the governed, the Romans
were fparing of blood, and are wifely commended by Livy for it ;
" Nulli unquam populo mitiores placuere poena? 5" which gentlenefs
will never be blamed, unlefs by thofe who are pleafed with nothing
fo much as the fury of thofe monfters, who with the ruin of the beft
part of mankind, ufurped the dominion of that glorious city. But if
the Romans were gentle in punifhing offences, they were alfo diligent
in preventing them : the excellence of their difcipline led the youth to
virtue, and the honours they received for recompence confirmed them
in
Difcourfes concerning Government. 149
in it. By this means many of them became laws to themfelves ; Sect. 19,
and they who were not the moft excellent, were yet taught fo much
of good, that they had a veneration for thofe they could not equal,
which not only ferved to incite them to do well according to their
talents, but kept them in fuch awe as to fear incurring their ill opi-
nion by any bad action, as much as by the penalty of the law. This
integrity of manners made the laws as it were ufelefs ; and, whilft
they feemed to fleep, ignorant perfons thought there were none:
but their difcipline being corrupted by profperity, thofe vices came in
which made way for the monarchy ; and wickednefs being placed in
the throne, there was no fafety for any but fuch as would be of the
fame fpirit, and the empire was ruined by it.
SECT. XIX.
That corruption and venality which is natural to courts, is
feldom found in popular governments.
OUR author's next work is, with that modefty and truth which
is natural to him, to impute corruption and venality to com-
monwealths. He knows that monarchies are exempted from thofe
evils, and has difcovered this truth from the integrity obferved in
the modern courts of England, France, and Spain, or the more an-
tient of Rome and Perfia : but after many falfhoods in matter of fact,
and mifreprefentations of that which is true, he mews that the cor-
ruption, venality, and violence, he blames, were neither the effects
of liberty, not confident with it. Cneius Manlius, who with his
Afiatic army brought in the luxury that gave birth to thofe mifchiefs,
did probably follow the loofenefs of his own difpofition : yet the befl
and wifeft men of that time knew from the beginning, that it would
ruin the city, unlefs a flop might be put to the courfe of that evil :
but they who had feen kings under their feet, and could no longer
content themfelves with that equality which is neceffary among citi-
zens, fomented it as the chief means to advance their ambitious de-
figns. Tho' Marius was rigid in his nature, and cared neither for
money, nor fenfual pleafures ; yet he favoured thofe vices in others,
and is faid to be the firfl that made ufe of them to his advantage.
Catiline was one of the lewdefr. men in the world, and had no other
way of compafTing his defigns than by rendering others as bad as him-
felf: and Caefarfet up his tyranny by fpreading that corruption far-
ther than the others had been able to do j and tho' he, Caligula, and
fome others were flain, yet the befl men found it as impoffible to Sen. de Ben.
reftore liberty to the city when it was corrupted, as the worft had !• »• c. 20.
done to fet up a tyranny whilfl the integrity of their manners did
continue. Men have a ftxange propensity to run into all manner of
exceffes, when plenty of means invite, and there is no power
to deter -, of which the fucceeding emperors took advantage, and
knowing that even their fubfiftence depended upon it, they thought
them-
146 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. themfelves obliged by intereSt as well as inclination to make honours
and preferments the rewards of vice : and tho' it be not always true
in the utmoSt extent, that all men follow the example of the king ;
yet it is of very great efficacy : tho' fome are fo good, that they will
not be perverted j and others fo bad, that they will not be corrected ;
yet a great number does always follow the courfe that is favoured and
rewarded by thofe that govern. There were idolaters doubtlefs
among the Jews in the days of David and Hezekiah j but they prof-
pered better under Jeroboam and". Ahab : England was not without
papifts in the time of queen Elizabeth ; but they thrived much bet-
ter during the reign of her furious fiSter. Falfe witnefles and ac-
cufers had a better trade under Tiberius, who called them " cuftodes
" legum," than under Trajan, who abhorred them ; and whores, play-
ers, fidlers, with other fuch vermin, abounded certainly more when
encouraged by Nero, than when defpifed by Antoninus and Mar-
cus Aurelius. But as every one of thefe manifested what he was by
thofe he favoured or punifTied, and that a man can only be judged by
his principles or practices, he that would know whether abiblute mo-
narchies, or mixed governments, do moll: foment or punifh venality
and corruption, ought to examine the principle and practice of both,
and compare them one with the other.
As to the principle, the above-mentioned vices may be profitable
to private men ; but they can never be fo to the government, if it
be popular or mixed : no people was ever the better for that which
renders them weak or bafe ; and a duly created magiftracy, govern-
ing a nation with their confent, can have no intereft diftinct from
that of the public, or defire to diminish the Strength of the people,
which is their own, and by which they fubfift. On the other fide,
the abfolute monarch, who governs for himfelf, and chiefly feeks
his own prefervation, looks upon the Strength and bravery of his
fubjects as the root of his greateft danger, and frequently defires to
render them weak, bafe, corrupt, and unfaithful to each other, that
they may neither dare to attempt the breaking of the yoke he
lays upon them, nor truft one another in any generous defign for the
recovery of their liberty. So that the fame corruption which pre-
serves fuch a prince, if it were introduced by a people, would weak-
en, if not utterly deftroy them.
Again, all things have their continuance from a principle in na-
ture fuitable to their original : all tyrannies have had their begin-
nings from corruption. The hiftories of Greece, Sicily, and Italy,
Shew that all thofe who made themfelves tyrants in feveral places,
did it by the help of the worft, and the Slaughter of the belt : men
could not be made fubfervient to their lufts whiiSt they continued
in their integrity -, fo as their bufinefs was to deftroy thofe who would
not be corrupted. They muSt therefore endeavour to maintain or
increafe the corruption by which they attain their greatnefs : if they
fail in this point, they muSt fall, as Tarquin, PifiStratus, and others,
have done ; but if they Succeed fo far, that the vicious part do much
prevail, the government is fecure, tho' the prince may be in danger.
And the fame thing does in great meafure accidentally conduce to
the fafety of his perfon : for they who for the moSt part are the au-
thors
Difcourfes concerning Government 147
thors of great revolutions, not being fo much led by a particular Sect. 19.
hatred to the man, as by a defire to do good to the public, feldom
fet themfelves to confpire againft the tyrant, unlefs he be altogether
deteftable and intolerable, if they do not hope to overthrow the
tyranny.
The contrary is feen in all popular and well-mixed governments :
they are ever eftablifhed by wife and good men, and can never be up-
held otherwife than by virtue : the worft men always confpiring
againft them, they muft fall, if the beft have not power to preferve
them. Wherefoever therefore a people is fo governed, the magi-
ftrates will obviate afar off the introduction of vices, which tend
as much to the ruin of their perfons and government, as to the pre-
fervation of the prince and his. This is evidenced by experience.
It is not eafy to name a monarch that had fo many good qualities as
Julius Caefar, till they were extingui/hed by his ambition, which
was inconfiftent with them : he knew that his ftrength lay in the
corruption of the people, and that he could not accomplifh his de-
figns without increarlng it. He did not feek good men, but fuch as
would be for him j and thought none fufficiently addicted to his
interefts, but fuch as ftruck at the performance of no wickednefs
that he commanded : he was a foldier according to Casfar's heart, who
faid,
" Pectore fi fratris gladium, juguloque parentis,
" Condere me jubeas, gravidaeve in vifcera partu
" Conjugis, invita peragam tamen omnia dextra."
Lucan 1. i. v. 376.
And left fuch as were devoted to him mould grow faint in villainy,
he induftrioufly inflamed their fury :
" Vult omnia certe
€f A fe faeva peti, vult pramia Martis amari." lb. 1. v. 307.
Having fpread this poifon amongft the foldiers, his next work was,
by corrupting the tribunes to turn that power to the deftruction of the
people, which had been erected for their prefervation j and pouring
the treafures he had gained by rapine in Gaul into the bofom of Curio,
made him an inftrument of mifchief, who had been a moft eminent
fupporter of the laws. Tho' he was thought to have affected the
glory of fparing Cato, and with trouble to have found, that he de-
fpifed life when it was to be accounted his gift j yet in fufpecting
Brutus and Caffius, he mewed he could not believe that virtuous men
who loved their country could be his friends. Such as carry on
the like defigns with lefs valour, wit, and generofity of fpirit,
will always be more bitterly bent to deftroy all that are good, know-
ing, that the deformity of their own vices is rendered moft manifeft,
when they are compared with the good qualities of thofe who are
moft unlike them -, and that they can never defend themfelves
againft the fcorn and hatred they incur by their vices, unlefs fuch a
number can be infected with the fame, and made to delight in the
recompences of iniquity that foment them, as may be able to keep
the reft of the people in fubjection.
Pp The
148 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap.IL The fame thing happens even when the ufurpation is not fo vio-
\ — -Y^-J lent as that of Agathocles, Dionyfius, or the laft king of Denmark
who in one day by the flrength of a mercenary foldiery overthrew all
the laws of his country : and a lawfully created magiftrate is forced
to follow the fame ways as foon as he begins to affect a power which
the laws do not confer upon him. I wifh I could fay there were few
of thefe j but experience fhews, that fuch a proportion of wifdom,
moderation of fpirit, and juftice, is required in a fupreme magiltrate,
to render him content with a limited power, as is feldom found.
Man is of an afpiring nature, and apt to put too high a value upon
himfelf : they who are raifed above their brethren, tho' but a little
defire to go farther j and if they gain the name of king, they think
themfelves wronged and degraded, when they are not fuffered to do
what they pleafe.
Sen. Thyeft. " Sandtitas, pietas, fides
" Privata bona funt : qua juvat, reges eant."
In thefe things they never want matters ; and the nearer they come
to a power that is not eafily reftrained by law, the more pamonately
they defire to abolifh all that oppofes it : and when their hearts are
filled with this fury, they never fail to chufe fuch minifters as will
be fubfervient to their will : and this is fo well known, that thofe
only approach them who refolve to be fo. Their interefts as well as
their inclinations incite them to diffufe their own manners as far as
they can, which is no lefs than to bring thofe who are under their
power to all that wickednefs of which the nature of man is capable ;
and no greater teftimony can be given of the efficacy of thefe means
towards the utter corruption of nations, than the accurfed effects we
fee of them in our own and the neighbouring countries.
It may be faid, that fome princes are fo full of virtue and good-
nefs, as not to defire more power than the laws allow, and are not
obliged to chufe ill men, becaufe they defire nothing but what the
beft are willing to do. This may be, and fometimes is : the nation
is happy that has fuch a king : but he is hard to find, and more than
a human power is required to keep him in fo good a way. The
flrength of his own affections will ever be againft him : wives, chil-
dren, and fervants, will always join with thofe enemies that arife
in his own breaft to pervert him : if he has any weak fide, any luit
unfubdued, they will gain the victory. He has not fearched into
the nature of man, who thinks that any one can refift when he is
thus on all fides affaulted : nothing but the wonderful and immedi-
ate power of God's Spirit can preferve him ; and to alledge it, will be
nothing to the purpofe, unlefs it can be proved, that all princes are
bleffed with fuch an afMance, or that God hath promifed it to them
and their fuccefibrs for ever, by what means foever they came to the
crowns they enjov.
Nothing is farther from my intention than to fpeak irreverently
of kings -, and I prefume no wife man will think I do fo, if I profefs,
that, having obferved, as well as I can, what hiftory, and daily ex-
perience, teach us concerning the virtues and religions that are or
have been from the beginning of the world encouraged and fupported
by
Difcourfes concerning Government. 149
by monarchs, the methods they have followed fince they have gone Sect, ro-
under the name of chriftians, their moral as well as their theologi-
cal graces, together with what the fcriptures tell us of thofe who
in the laft days will principally fupport the throne of antichrift ; I
cannot be confident, that they are generally in an extraordinary man-
ner preferved by the hand of God from the vices and frailties to
which the reft of mankind is fubjecl. If no man can mew that I am
in this miftaken, I may conclude, that as they are more than any
other men in the world expofed to temptations and fnares, they are
more than any in danger of being corrupted, and made inftruments
of corrupting others, if they are no otherwife defended than the reft
of men.
This being the ftate of the matter on both fides, we may eafily
collect, that all governments are fubjecl: to corruption and decay j
but with this difference, that abfolute monarchy is by principle
led unto, or rooted in it ; whereas mixed or popular governments
are only in a poffibility of falling into it : as the firft cannot fubfift,
unlefs the prevailing part of the people be corrupted ; the other muft
certainly perifh, unlefs they be preferved in a great meafure free from
vices : and I doubt whether any better reafon can be given, whv
there have been and are more monarchies than popular governments
in the world, than that nations are more eaiily drawn into corrup-
tion than defended from it ; and I think that monarchy can be faid
to be natural in no other fenfe, than that our depraved nature is moft
inclined to that which is worft.
To avoid unnecefTary difputes, I give the name of popular go-
vernments to thofe of Rome, Athens, Sparta, and the like, though
improperly, unlefs the fame may alfo be given to many that are ufually
called monarchies, fince there is nothing of violence in either - y the
power is conferred upon the chief magiftrates of both by the free
confent of a willing people, and fuch a part as they think fit is ftill
retained and executed in their own affemblies ; and in this fenfe it is
that our author feems to . fpeak againft them. As to popular go-
vernment in the ftri&eft fenfe (that is pure democracy, where the
people in themfelves, and by themfelves, perform all that belongs to
government) I know of no fuch thing j and if it be in the world,
have nothing to fay for it. In afferting the liberty, generally, as
I fuppofe, granted by God to all mankind, I neither deny, that fo
many as think fit to enter into a fociety, may give fo much of their
power as they pleafe to one or more men, for a time, or perpetually,
to them and their heirs, according to fuch rules as they prefcribe ;
nor approve the diforders that muft arife if they keep it intirely in
their own hands : and looking upon the feveral governments, which,
under different forms and names, have been regularly conftituted by
nations, as fo many undeniable teftimonies, that they thought it
good for themfelves, and their pofterity, fo to do, I infer, that as
there is no man who would not rather chufe to be governed by fuch
as are juft, induftrious, valiant, and wife, than by thofe that are
wicked, flothful, cowardly, and foolifti ; and to live in fociety with
fuch as are qualified like thofe of the firft fort, rather than with
thofe who will be ever ready to commit all manner of villainies, or
want
I $o Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. want experience, ftrength or courage, to join in repelling the inju-
ries that are offered by others : fo there are none who do not accord-
ing to the meafure of understanding they have, endeavour to fet up
thofe who feem to be beft qualified, and to prevent the introduction
of thofe vices, which render the faith of the magistrate fufpected,
or make him unable to perform his duty, in providing for the execu-
tion of juftice, and the public defence of the ftate, againft foreign
or domeftic enemies. For as no man who is not absolutely mad,
will commit the care of a flock to a villain, that has neither fkill,
diligence, nor courage, to defend them, or perhaps is malicioufly fet
to deftroy them, rather than to a flout, faithful, and wife fhepherd ;
it is lefs to be imagined, that any would commit the fame error in
relation to that fociety which comprehends himfelf, with his children,
friends, and all that is dear to him.
The fame confiderations are of equal force in relation to the body
of every nation : for fince the magiftrate, tho' the moft perfect in
his kind, cannot perform his duty, if the people be fo bafe, vicious,
effeminate, and cowardly, as not to fecond his good intentions ; thofe
who expect good from him, cannot defire fo to corrupt their com-
panions that are to help him, as to render it impoffible for him to ac-
complilh it. Tho' I believe there have been in all ages bad men in
every nation > yet I doubt whether there was one in Rome, except a
Catiline or a Caefar, who defigned to make themfelves tyrants, that
would not rather have wifhed the whole people as brave and virtu-
ous as in the time of the Carthaginian wars, than vile and bafe, as in
the days of Nero and Domitian. But it is madnefs to think, that the
whole body would not rather wifh to be as it was when virtue
flourifhed, and nothing upon earth was able to refift their power,
than weak, miferable, bafe, flavifh, and trampled under foot by
any that would invade them ; and forced as a chattel to become a
prey to thofe that were ftrongeft. Which is fufficient to (hew, that
a people acting according to the liberty of their own will, never ad-
vance unworthy men, unlefs it be by miftake, nor willingly fuffer
the introduction of vices : whereas the abfolute monarch always
prefers the worft of thofe who are addicted to him, and cannot fubfift
unlefs the prevailing part of the people be bafe and vicious.
If it be faid, that thofe governments in which the democratical
part governs moft, do more frequently err in the choice of men, or
the means of preferving that purity of manners which is required
for the well-being of a people, than thofe wherein ariftocracy pre-
vails 3 I confefs it, and that in Rome and Athens the beft and wifeft
men - did for the moft part incline to ariftocracy. Xenophon, Plato,
Ariftotle, Thucydides, Livy, Tacitus, Cicero, and others, were of
this fort : but if our author there feek patrons for his abfolute mo-
narchy, he will find none but Phalaris, Agathocles, Dionyfius, Cati-
line, Cethegus, Lentulus, with the corrupted crew of mercenary
rafcals, who did, or endeavoured to fet them up. Thefe are they
<( quibus ex honefto nulla eft fpes j" they abhor the dominion of the
law, becaufe it curbs their vices, and make themfelves fubfervient to
the lufts of a man who may nourifh them. Similitude of interefts,
manners,
Difcourfes concerning Government. 1^1
manners, and defigns, is a link of union between them : both are Sect. 20.
enemies to popular and mixed government; and thofe govern-
ments are enemies to them, and by preferving virtue and integrity
oppofe both ; knowing, that if they do not, they and their govern-
ments muft certainly perifh.
SECT. XX.
Man's natural love to liberty is tempered by reafbn,
which originally is his nature.
THAT our author's book may appear to be a heap of incon-
gruities and contradictions, it is not amifs to add to what has
already been obferved, that, having afTerted abfolute monarchy to be
" the only natural government," he now fays, " that the nature of all
" people is to defire liberty without reftraint." But if monarchy be
that power which above all reftrains liberty, and fubjedts all to the will
of one ; this is as much as to fay, that all people naturally defire that
which is againft nature ; and by wonderful excefs of extravagance
and folly to affert contrary propofitions, that on both fides are equal-
ly abfurd and falfe. For, as we have already proved that no govern-
ment is impofed upon men by God or nature, it is no lefs evident,
that, man being a rational creature, nothing can be univerfally natu-
ral to him, that is not rational. But this liberty without reftraint
being inconfiftent with any government, and the good which man
naturally defires for himfelf, children, and friends, we find no place
in the world where the inhabitants do not enter into fome kind of
fociety or government to reftrain it : and to fay that all men defire
liberty without reftraint, and yet that all do reftrain it, is ridiculous.
The truth is, man is hereunto led by reafon, which is his nature.
Every one fees they cannot well live afunder, nor many together,
without fome rule to which all muft fubmit. This fubmiflion is a
reftraint of liberty, but could be of no effect as to the good in-
tended, unlefs it were general ; nor general, unlefs it were natural.
When all are born to the fame freedom, fome will not refign that
which is their own, unlefs others do the like. This general confent
of all to refign fuch a part of their liberty as feems to be for the
good of all, is the voice of nature, and the act of men (accord-
ing to natural reafon) feeking their own good : and if all go not
in the fame way, according to the fame form, it is an evident tefti-
mony that no one is directed by nature ; but as a few or many may
join together, and frame fmaller and greater focieties, fo thofe focie-
ties may inftitute fuch an order or form of government as beft
pleafes themfelvesj and if the ends of government are obtained,
they all equally follow the voice of nature in conftituting them.
Again, if man were by nature fo tenacious of his liberty without
reftraint, he muft be rationally fo. The creation of abfolute mon-
archies, which entirely extinguifhes it, muft necefTarily be moft
contrary to it, tho' the people were willing j for they thereby abjure
Q^Oj their
I £2, Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. their own nature. The ufurpation of them can be no lefs than the
*— -V"-— > moft abominable and outrageous violation of the laws of nature
that can be imagined : the laws of God muft be in the like meafure
broken ; and of all governments, democracy, in which every man's
liberty is leaft reftrained, becaufe every man hath an equal part,
would certainly prove to be the moft juft, rational, and natural f
whereas our author reprefents it as a perpetual fpring of diforder,
confufion, and vice. This confequence would be unavoidable, if he
faid true ; but it being my fate often to differ from him, I hope to be
excufed if I do fo in this alfo, and affirm, that nothing but the plain
and certain dictates of reafon can be generally applicable to all men
as the law of their nature ; and they who, according to the beft of
their underftanding, provide for the good of themfelves and their
pofterity, do all equally obferve it. He that inquires more exactly
into the matter may find, that reafon injoins every man not to
arrogate to himfelf more than he allows to others, nor to retain that
liberty which will prove hurtful to him ; or to expect that others
will fuffer themfelves to be reftrained, whilft he, to their prejudice,
remains in the exercife of that freedom which nature allows. He
who would be exempted from this common rule, muft fhew for
what reafon he mould be raifed above his brethren ; and, if he do it
not, he is an enemy to them. This is not popularity, but tyranny ;
and tyrants are faid M exuiffe hominem," to throw off the nature of
men, becaufe they do unjuftly and unreafonably affume to themfelves
that which agrees not with the frailty of human nature, and fet up
an intereft in themfelves contrary to that of their equals, which they
ought to defend as their own. Such as favour them are like to them ;
and we know of no tyranny that was not f&t up by the worft, nor
of any that have been dcftroyed, unlefs by the beft of men. The
feveral tyrannies of Syracufe were introduced byAgathocles, Dionyfius,
Hieronymus, Hippocrates, Epicydes, and others, by the help of lewd
diffolute mercenary villains; and overthrown by Timojeon, Dion,
TheOdorus, and others, whofe virtues will be remembered in all ages.
Thefe, and others like to them, never fought liberty without re-
ftraint, but fuch as was reftrained by laws tending to the public
good ; that all might concur in promoting it, and the unruly delires
of thofe who affected power and honours, which they did not deferve,
might be repreffed.
The like was feen in Rome : when Brutus, Valerius, and other
virtuous citizens, had thrown out the lewd Tarquins, they trufted to
their own innocence and reputation ; and thinking them fafe under
the protection of the law, contented themfelves with fuch honours
as their countrymen thought they delerved. This would not fatisfy
the diffolute crew that ufed to be companions to the Tarquins.
T. Liv. I. ii. « Sodales adolefcentium Tarquiniorum affueti more regio vivere, earn
u turn aequato jure omnium licentiam quasrentes, libertatem alioruiri in
'* fuam vertiffe fervitutem conquerebantur. Regem hominem effe, a
" quo impetres ubi jus, ubi injuria opus fit. Effe gratia? locum, efte
" beneficio : & irafci & ignofcere poffe. Leges rem furdam effe & in-*
" exorabilem, falubriorem inopi quam potenti : nihil laxamenti nee
" venia? habere, ft modum excefferis: periculofum effe in tothumanis"
" erroribus
Difcourfes concerning Government. 1^3
and this adventitious help failing, all that a prince can reafonabiy ex-
pect from a difaffected and opprerTed people, is, that they mould bear
the yoke patiently in the time of his prolperity ■, but upon the change
of his fortune, they leave him to fhift for himfelf, or join with his
enemies to avenge the injuries they had received. Thus did Alphon-
fo, and Ferdinand, kings of Naples, and Ludovico Sforza duke of
Milan fall, in the times of Charles the Eighth, and Louis the Twelfth,
kings of France. The two nrfl had been falfe, violent, and cruel - y
nothing within their kingdom could oppofe their fury : but when
they were invaded by a foreign power, they loft all, as Guicciardin
fays, without breaking one lance ; and Sforza was by his own mer-
cenary foldiers delivered into the hands of his enemies.
I think it may be hard to find examples of fuch as proceeding in
the fame way have had better fuccefs : but if it mould fo fall out,
that a people living under an abfolute monarchy, mould through
cuftom, or fear of fomething worfe (if that can be) not only fuffer
patiently, but defire to uphold the government ; neither the nobility,
nor commonalty, can do any thing towards it. They are ftrangers
to all public concernments : all things are governed by one or a few
men, and others know nothing either of action or counfeL Filmer
will
Difcourfes concerning Government. 1^7
will tell us it is no matter; the profound wifdom of the prince Sect. 2 1-
provides for all. But what if this prince be a child, a fool, a fuper- v — m v—-'
annuated dotard, or a madman ? Or if he does not fall under any
of thefe extremities, and pofieffes fuch a proportion of wit, induflry,
and courage, as is ordinarily feen in men, how mall he fupply the
office that indeed requires profound wifdom, and an equal meafure
of experience and valour ? It is to no purpofe to fay a good council
may fupply his defects j for it does not appear how he mould come
by this council, nor who mould oblige him to follow their advice :
if he be left to his own will to do what he pleafes, tho' good advice
be given to him , yet his judgment being perverted, he will always
incline to the worfl : if a necerlity be impofed upon him of acting
according to the advice of his council, he is not that abfolute monarch
of whom we fpeak, nor the government monarchical, but ariflocra-
tical. Thefe are imperfect fig-leaf-coverings of nakednefs. It was
in vain to give good counfel to Sardanapalus ; and none could defend
the Affyrian empire, when he lay wallowing amongfl his whores,
without any other thought than of his lufls. None could preferve
Rome, when Domitian's chief bufinefs was to kill flies, and that of
Honorius to take care of his hens. The monarchy of France muft
have perimed under the bafe kings they call " les roys faineants," if
the fcepter had not been wrefled out of their unworthy hands. The
world is full of examples in this kind : and when it pleafes God to
beflow a juft, wife, and valiant king, as a bleffing upon a nation* it
is only a momentary help, his virtues end with him ; and there being
neither any divine promife nor human reafon moving us to believe
that they (hall always be renewed and continued in his fucceflbrs,
men cannot rely upon it ; and to al ledge a pofiibility of fuch a thing
is nothing to the purpofe.
On the other fide, in a popular or mixed government every man is
concerned : every one has a part, according to his quality or merit ;
all changes are prejudicial to all : whatfoever any man conceives to
be for the public good, he may propofe it in the magiflracy, or to
the magiflrate : the body of the people is the public defence, and
every man is armed and difciplined : the advantages of good fuccefs
are communicated to all, and every one bears a part in the lofTes.
This makes men generous and induflrious ; and fills their hearts with
love to their country : * this, and the defire of that praife which is * Amor pa-
the reward of virtue, raifed the Romans above the reft of mankind ; [ m ^ la ^ a ' fq ^
and wherefoever the fame ways are taken, they will in a great p jdo. Virg.
meafure have the fame effects. By this means they had as many iEn.vi. v. 2 3,
foldiers to fight for their country as there were freemen in it. Whilfl
they had to deal with the free nations of Italy, Greece, Africa, or
Spain, they never conquered a country, till the inhabitants were ex-
haufled : but when they came to fight againft kings, the fuccefs of a
battle was enough to bring a kingdom under their power. Antiochus
upon a ruffle received from Acilius at Thermopylae, left all that he
pofTeffed in Greece ; and being defeated by Scipio Nafica, he quitted
all the kingdoms and territories of Afia on this fide Taurus. Paulus
Emilius became mailer of Macedon by one profperous fight againft
Perfeus. Syphax, Gentius, Tigranes, Ptolemy, and others, were
4 more
1 98 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap.IL more eafily fubdued. The mercenary armies on which they relied
w -v— ' W being broken, the cities and countries not caring for their mailers,
fubmitted to thofe who had more virtue, and better fortune. If the
Roman power had not been built upon a more fure foundation, they
could not have fubfifted. Notwithstanding their valour, they were,
often beaten 5 but their lofTes were immediately repaired by the excel-
lence of their difcipline. When Hannibal had gained the battles of
Trebia, Ticinum, Thrafimene, and Cannae -, defeated the Romans in
many other encounters, and llain above two hundred thoufand of
their men, with Paulus Emilius, C. Servilius, Sempronius Gracchus,
Quintius, Marcellus, and many other excellent commanders : when
about the fame time the two brave Scipio's had been cut off with their
armies in Spain, and many great lories had been fuftained in Sicily,
and by fea, one would have thought it impofiible for the city to have
reiifted : but their virtue, love to their country, and good govern-
ment, was a ftrength that increafed under all their calamities, and in
the end overcame all. The nearer Hannibal came to the walls, the
more obftinate was their refiftance. Tho' he had killed more great
captains than any kingdom ever had, others daily stepped up in their
place, who excelled them in all manner of virtue. I know not, if
at any time that conquering city could glory in a greater number of
men fit for the highest enterprizes, than at the end of that cruel war 7
which had confumed fo many of them ; but I think, that the finiih-
ing victories by them obtained, are but ill proofs of our author's
affertion, that they " thought bafely of the common good, and fought
It is told dif- tc on iy jQ f a ye themfelves," We know of none except Cecilius Me-
IVv 1 xxii te ^ us > who, after the battle of Cannae, had fo bafe a thought as to
c , 53' ' defign the withdrawing himfelf from the public ruin; but Scipio
(afterwards furnamed Africanus) threatening death to thofe who would
not fwear never to abandon their country, forced him to leave it.
This may in general be imputed to good government and difcipline,
with which all were fo feafoned from their infancy, that no affection
was fo rooted in them, as an ardent love to their country, and a re-
folution to die for it, or with it -, but the means by which they ac-
compliihed their great ends, fo as after their defeats to have fuch men
as carried on their noblest defigns with more glory than ever, was
their annual elections of magistrates, many being thereby advanced
to the fupreme commands, and every one by the honours they enjoyed,
filled with a defire of rendering himfelf worthy of them.
I mould not much infill upon thefe things, if they had been feen
only in Rome : but tho' their difcipline feems to have been more
perfect, better obferved, and to have produced a virtue that furpaffed
all others j the like has been found, tho' perhaps not in the fame
degree, in all nations that have enjoyed their liberty, and were admit-
ted to fuch a part of the government, as might give them a love to it.
This was evident in all the nations of Italy. The Sabines, Volfci,
iEqui, Tufcans, Samnites, and others, were never conquered till they
had no men left. The Samnites alone inhabiting a fmall and barren
province, fuffered more defeats before they were fubdued, than all
Liv. 1. xxiii. the kingdoms of Numidia, Egypt, Macedon, and Afia ; and, as it is
c- 4 2 - expreft in their embasly to Hannibal, never yielded, till they who had
brought
Difcourfes concerning Government 1 5$
brought vaft numbers of men into the field, and by them defeated Sect. 22.
fome of the Roman armies, were reduced to fuch weaknefs, that <—• -" v— ■ ■*
they could not refill: one legion. We hear of few Spartans who did
not willingly expofe their lives for the fervice of their country :
and the women themfelves were fo far inflamed with the fame af-
fection, that they refufed to mourn for their children and hufbands,
who died in the defence of it. When the brave Brafidas was flain,
fome eminent men went to comfort his mother upon the news of his
death 3 and telling her he was the moil valiant man in the city, fhe
anfwered, that he was indeed a valiant man, and died as he ought to
do ; but that, through the goodnefs of the gods, many others were Thucyd. de
left as valiant as he. *" kl. Pelopon.
When Xerxes invaded Greece, there was not a citizen of Athens
able to bear arms, who did not leave his wife and children to fhift
for themfelves in the neighbouring cities, and their houfes to be
burnt, when they embarked with Themiftocles ; and never thought of
either, till they had defeated the Barbarians at Salamis by fea, and at
Piatea by land. When men are thus fpirited, fome will ever prove
excellent ; and as none did ever furpafs thofe, v/ho were bred under
this difcipline, in all moral, military, and civil virtues j thofe very
countries where they flourifhed moll, have not produced any eminent
men fince they loft that liberty which was the mother and nurfe
of them
Tho' I fhould fill a volume with examples of this kind (as I might
eafily do), fuch as our author will fay, that in popular governments
men look upon mifchiefs as thunder, and only wifh it may not touch
themfelves : but, leaving them to the fcorn and hatred they deferve by
their impudence and folly, I conclude this point with the anfwer,
that Trajano Boccalini puts into the mouth of Apollo, to the princes Ragion. $g.
who complained that their fubjects had not that love to their coun-
tries, as had been, and was daily feen, in thofe who lived under com-
monwealths -j which did amount to no more than to tell them, that
their ill government was the caufe of that defect, and that the pre-
judices incurred by rapine, violence, and fraud, were to be repaired
only by liberality, juftice, and fuch a care of their fubjects, that
they might live happily under them.
SECT. XXII.
Commonwealths feek peace or war, according to the
variety of their conftitutions.
1 F I have hitherto fpoken in general of popular or mixed govern-
-■- mcnts, as if they were all founded on the fame principle, it was
only becaufe our author without diftinction has generally blamed
them all, and generally imputed to every one thofe faults, which
perhaps never were in any ; but moil: certainly are directly oppofite
to the temper and conititution of many among them. Malice and
ignorance reign fo equally in him, that it is not eafy to determine
S * from
i6o Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. from which of the two this falfe reprefentation proceeds. But left
any man mould thereby be impofed upon, it is time to obferve, that
the conftitutions of commonwealths have been fo various, according
to the different temper of nations and times, that if feme of them
feem to have been principally constituted for war, others have as much
delighted in peace : and many, having taken the middle, and (as
fome think) the beft way, have fo moderated their love to peace, as
•not to fuffer the fpirits of the people to fall, but kept them in a per-
petual readinefs to make war when there was cccafion : and every
one of thofe having followed feveral ways and ends, deferve our par-
ticular confideration.
The cities of Rome, Sparta, Thebes, and all the aflbciations of
the Etolians, Achaians, Sabines, Latins, Samnites, and many others
that antiently flourifhed in Greece and Italy, feem to have intended
nothing but the juft prefervation of liberty at home, and making war
abroad. All the nations of Spain, Germany, and Gaul, fought the
fame things. Their principal work was to render their people valiant,
obedient to their commanders, lovers of their country, and al-
ways ready to fight for it : and for this reafon, when the fenators
of Rome had killed Romulus, they perfuaded Julius Proculus to
affirm, that he had feen him in a moft glorious form afcending to hea-
ven, and promifing great things to the city : " Proinde rem militarem
" colant." The Athenians were not lefs inclined to war ; but applied
: themfelves to trade, as fubfervient to that end, by increafing the
number of the people, and furnifhing them with the means of carrying
it on with more vigour and power. The Phenician cities, of wliich
Carthage was the moft eminent, followed the fame method ; but,
knowing that riches do not defend themfelves, or fcorning flothfully
to enjoy what was gained by commerce, they fo far applied them-
felves to war, that they grew to a power, which Rome only was
able to overthrow. Venice, Florence, Genoa, Lucca, and fome
other cities of Italy, feem chiefly to have aimed at trade ; and placing
the hopes of their fafety in the protection of more powerful ftates, un-
willingly entered into wars, efpecially by land j and when they did,
they made them by mercenary foldiers.
Again, fome of thofe that intended war, defired to enlarge their
territories by conqueft; others only to preferve their own, and to
live with freedom and fafety upon them. Rome was of the firft fort >
and knowing that fuch ends cannot be accomplished without great
numbers of men, they freely admitted ftrangers into the city, fe-
nate, and magiftracy. Numa was a Sabine : Tarquinius Prifcus was
the fon of a Grecian : one hundred of thofe Sabines who came with
Tatius were admitted into the fenate : Appius Claudius of the fame
people came to Rome, was made a member of the fenate, and cre-
ated conful. They demolifhed feveral cities, and brought the in-
habitants to their own j gave the right of citizens to many others
(fometimes to whole cities and provinces) and cared not how many
they received, fo they could engraft them upon the fame intereft
with the old ftock, and feafon them with the fame principles, difci-
pline, and manners. On the other fide, the Spartans defiring only to
continue free, virtuous, and fafe in the enjoyment of their own
ter-
Difcourfes concerning Government. 161
territory, and thinking themfelves ftrong enough to defend it, framed Sect. 22.
a moft fevere difcipline, to which few ftrangers would fubmit.
They banifhed all thofe curious arts, that are ufeful to trade - y pro-
hibited the importation of gold and filver 3 appointed the helotes to
cultivate their lands, and to exercife fuch trades as are neceffary to
life j admitted few ftrangers to live amongft them ; made none of
them free of their city, and educated their youth in fuch exercifes
only as prepared them for war. I will not take upon me to judge
whether this proceeded from fuch a moderation of fpirit, as placed
felicity rather in the fulnefs and {lability of liberty, integrity, virtue,
and the enjoyment of their own, than in riches, power, and dominion
over others ; nor which of thefe two different methods deferves moil:
to be commended : but certain it is, that both fucceeded according
to the intention of the founders.
Rome conquered the heft part of the world, and never wanted
men to defend what was gained : Sparta lived in fuch happinefs and
reputation, that till it was invaded by Epaminondas, an enemy's
trumpet had not been heard by thofe within the town for the fpace
of eight hundred years, and' never fuffered any great difafler, till re-
ceding from their own inftitutions, they were brought by profperity
to affect, the principality of Greece, and to undertake fuch wars as
could not be carried on without money, and greater numbers of men
than a fmall city was able to furnifh ; by which means they were
obliged to beg affiftance from the Barbarians, whom they fcorned and
hated, as appears by the ftories of Callicratidas, Lyfander, and
Agefilaus, and fell into fuch ftreights as were never recovered.
The like variety has been obferved in the conftitutions of thofe
northern nations that invaded the Roman empire ; for tho' all of
them intended war, and looked upon thofe only to be members of
their commonwealths, who ufed arms to defend them, yet fome
did immediately incorporate themfelves with thofe of the conquered
countries. Of this number were the Franks, who prefently became
one nation with the Gauls ; others kept themfelves in a diftinct. body,
as the Saxons did from the Britons : and the Goths for more than
three hundred years that they reigned in Spain, never contracted
marriages, or otherwife mixed with the Spaniards, till their kingdom
was overthrown by the Moors.
Thefe things, and others of the like nature, being weighed, many
have doubted whether it were better to conftitute a commonwealth
for war, or for trade ; and of fuch as intend war, whether thofe
are moll to be praifed who prepare for defence only, or thofe who
defign by conqueft to enlarge their dominions : or, if they admit
of trade, whether they mould propofe the acquifition of riches for
their ultimate end, and depend upon foreign or mercenary forces
to defend them j or to be as helps to enable their own people
to carry on thofe wars, in which they may be frequently engaged.
Thefe queftions might perhaps be eafily decided, if mankind were
of a temper to fuffer thofe to live in peace, who offer no injury to
any ; or that men who have money to hire foldiers when they ftand
in need of them, could find fuch as would valiantly and faithfully
defend them, whilfl they apply themfelves to their trades. But
4 expe-
l6z Difcourfes concerning Government
Chap. II. experience teaching us, that thofe only can be fafe who are ftrong ;
and that no people was ever well defended, but thofe who fought
for themfelves j the beft judges of thefe matters have always
given the preference to thofe conftitutions that principally intend
war, and make ufe of trade as amfling to that end : and think it
better to aim at canqueft, rather than fimply to fland upon their own
defence ; fince he that lofes all if he be overcome, fights upon very
unequal terms j and if he obtain the victory, gains no other advan-
tage, than for the prefent to repel the danger that threatened him.
Thefe opinions are confirmed by the examples of the Romans,
who profpered much more than the Spartans : and the Carthaginians,
who made ufe of trade as a help to war, raifed their city to be one
of the moll: potent that ever was in the world : whereas the Vene-
tians having relied on trade, and mercenary foldiers, are always
forced too much to depend upon foreign potentates - f very often to buy
peace with ignominious and prejudicial conditions ; and fometimes
to fear the infidelity of their own commanders, no lefs than the vio-
lence of their enemies. But that which ought to be valued above all
in point of wifdom as well as juftice, is, the government given by
God to the Hebrews, which chiefly fitted them for war, and to make
conquefts. Mofes divided them under feveral captains, into thou-
fands, hundreds, fifties, and tens : this was a perpetual ordinance
amongft them : in numbering them, thofe only were counted, who
were able to bear arms : every man was obliged to go out to war,
except fuch as had married a wife, or upon other fpecial occafions,
were for a time excufed ; and the whoie feries of the lacred hiftory
fhews, that there were always as many foldiers to fight for their
country as there were men able to fight. And if this be taken for a
picture of a many-headed beaft, delighting in blood, begotten by
{edition, and nourished by crimes, God himfelf was the drawer of it.
In this variety of conflitutions and effects proceeding from them,
I can fee nothing more juftly and generally to be attributed to them
all, than that love to their country, which our author impudently
affirms to be wanting in all. In other matters their proceedings are
not only different, but contrary to each other : yet it cannot be faid,
that any nations have enjoyed fo much peace as fome republics.
The Venetians too great inclination to peace is accounted to be a
mortal error in their conftitution, and they have not been lefs free
from domeflic feditions than foreign wars : the confpiracies of the
Falerii and Tiepoli were extinguifhed by their punifhment, and that
of La Cueva crufhed before it was ripe. Genoa has not been alto-
gether fc happy : the fictions of the Guclphs and Ghibelins, that
fpread themfelves over all Italy, infected that city j and the malice of
the Spaniards and French raifed others under the Fregofl and Adorni •>
but they being compofed, they have for more than an hundred and
fifty years refted in quiet.
There is another fort of commonwealth, compofed of many cities
affociated together, and living " aequo jure ;" every one retaining and
exercifing a fovereign power within itfelf, except in fome cafes ex-
preffed in the act of union, or league made between them. Thefe
I confefs are more hardly preferved in peace. Difputes may arife
among
Difcourfes concerning Government. 163
among them concerning limits, jurifdiction, and the like. They Sect. 22.
cannot always be equally concerned in the fame things. The inju-
ries offered to one do not equally affect, all. Their neighbours will
fow divifions among them j and not having a mother-city to decide
their controverfies by her authority, they may be apt to fall into
quarrels, efpecially if they profefs chrifiianity ; which having been
fplit into variety of opinions ever fince it was preached, and the pa-
pifts, by their cruelty to fuch as diffent from them, fhewing to all,
that there is no other way of defending themfelves againft them,
than by ufing the fame, almoft every man is come to think he ought
(as far as in him lies) to impofe his belief on others, and that he can
give no better teftimony or his zeal, than the excefs of his violence
on that account. Netherthelefs the cantons of the Switzers, tho' ac-
companied with all the molt dangerous circumftances that can be
imagined, being thirteen in number, independent on each other,
governed in a high degree popularly, profeifing chrifiianity differing
in mofl important points ; eight of them much influenced by the Je-
fuits, and perpetually excited to w r ar againil their brethren by the
powerful crowns of Spain and France, have ever fince they caff off
the infupportable yoke of the earls of Hapsburg, enjoyed more peace
than any other ftate of Europe, and, from the moft inconfiderable
people, are grown to fuch a power, that the greatefl monarchs do
moft folicitoufly feek their friendship ; and none have dared to in-
vade them, fince Charles duke of Burgundy did it to his ruin : and he
who for a long time had been a terror to the great, dangerous, and
fubtile king of France, gave by the lofs of three armies, and his own
life, a lafting teftimony of his temerity in affaulting a free and valiant,
tho' a poor people, fighting in their own quarrel. Commines well
relates that war ; but a vaft heap of bones remaining to this day at
Murct with this inscription, (c Caroli fortiflimi Burgundiorum ducis
" exercitus Muretum obfidens ab Helvetiis caefus, hoc f ui monumentum
1 ' reliquit," beft (hews the fuccefs of it. Since that time their greatefr. wars
have been for the defence of Milan ; or fuch as they have undertaken for
pay under the enfigns of France or Spain, that by the ufe of arms they
may keep up that courage, reputation, and experience, which is required
for the defence of their own country. No government was ever more
free from popular feditions ; the revolts of their fubjects have been
few, weak, and eafily fuppreffed ; the diffenfion raifed by the Jefuits
between the cantons of Zurich and Lucern was as foon compofed as
the rebellion of the country of Vaux againft the canton of Bern ;
and thofe few of the like nature that have happened among them have
had the like fuccefs : fo that Thuanus, in the hiftory of his time, com-
prehending about fifty years, and relating the horrid domeftic and fo-
reign wars that diffracted Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Flanders, Eng-
land, Scotland, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary, Tranfilvania,
Mufcovy, Turky, Afric, and other places, has no more to fay of them,
than to mew what arts had been in vain ufed to diflurb their fo much
envied quiet. But if the modeft temper of the people, together
with the wifdom, juftice, and ftrength of their government, could
not be difcompofed by the meafures of Spain and France, by the in-
duffry of their embafladors, or the malicious craft of the Jefuits,
T t we
1&4 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. we may fafely conclude, that their ftate is as well fettled as any thing
among men can be, and can hardly comprehend what is like to in-
terrupt it. As much might be faid of the cities of the Hanfeatic
fociety, if they had an intire fovereignty in themfelves : but the cities
of the United Provinces in the Low Countries, being every one
of them fovereign within themfelves, and many in number, flill
continuing in their union in fpite of all the endeavours that have been
ufed to divide them, give us an example of fuch fteadinefs in practice
and principle, as is hardly to be paralleled in the world, and that un-
deniably proves a temper in their constitutions directly oppoiite to
that which our author imputes to all popular governments : and if
the death of Barnevelt and De Wit, or the preferment of fome mofl:
unlike to them, be taken for a teftimony that the beft men thrive
worft, and the worft belt, I hope it may be confidered that thofe vio-
lences proceeded from that which is moil contrary to popularity, tho*
I am not very willing to explain it.
If thefe matters are not clear in themfelves, I defire they may be
compared with what has happened between any princes that from
the beginning of the world have been joined in league to each other,
whether they were of the fame or of different nations. Let an ex-
ample be brought of fix, thirteen, or more princes or kings, who
entered into a league -, and for the fpace of one or more ages, did
neither break it, nor quarrel upon the explication of it. Let the
ftates of the Switzers, Grifons, or Hollanders, be compared with
that of France, when it was fometimes divided between two, three,
or four brothers of Meroveus or PephYs races ; with the heptarchy
of England - y the kingdoms of Leon, Arragon, Navarre, Caftile, and
Portugal, under which the christians in Spain were divided •$ or thofe
of Cordua, Sevil, Malaga, Granada, and others under the power
of the Moors ; and if it be not evident, that the popular flates have
been remarkable for peace among themfelves, conftancy to their
union, and fidelity to the leagues made with their aflbciates^
whereas all the above-mentioned kingdoms, and fuch others as are
known among men to have been joined in the like leagues, were ever
infefted with domestic rebellions and quarrels, rifing from the
ambition of princes, fo as no confederacy could be fo cautioufly
made, but they would find ways to elude it, or fo folemn and facred,
but they would in far lefs time break through it : I will confefs, that
kingdoms have fometimes been as free from civil disturbances ; and
that leagues made between feveral princes have been as constantly
and religioufly obferved, as by commonwealths. But if no fuch
thing do appear in the world, and no man who is not impudent or
ignorant dare pretend it, I may justly conclude, that tho' every com-
monwealth hath its action fuitable to its constitution, and that many
affociated together are not fo free from disturbances, as thofe that
wholly depend upon the authority of a mother-city ; yet we know
of none that have not been, and are more regular and quiet than any
principalities ; and as to foreign wars, they feek or avoid them accord-
ing to their various conftitutions.
SECT.
Difcourfes concerning Government.
SECT. XXIII.
That is the beft government,which beft provides for war.
/^UR author, having huddled up all popular and mixed govern-
^^ ments into one, has, in fome meafure, forced me to explain the
various conftitutions and principles upon which they are grounded :
but as the wifdom of a father is feen, not only in providing bread
for his family, or increafing his patrimonial eftate, but in making
all poffible provifion for the fecurity of it ; fo that government is evi-
dently the beft, which, not relying upon what it does at firft enjoy,
feeks to increafe the number, ftrength, and riches, of the people >
and by the beft difcipline to bring the power fo improved into fuch
order as may be of moft ufe to the public. This comprehends all
things conducing to the adminiftration of juftice, the prefervation of
domeftic peace, and the increafe of commerce, that the people, be-
ing pleafed with their prefent condition, may be filled with love to
their country, encouraged to fight boldly for the public caufe,
which is their own ; and as men do willingly join with that which
profpers, that ftrangers may be invited to fix their habitations in
fuch a city, and to efpoufe the principles that reign in it. This is
neceflaiy for feveral reafons j but I (hall principally infift upon one,
which is, that all things in their beginning are weak : the whelp of
a lion newly born has neither ftrength nor fiercenefs. He that
builds a city, and does not intend it fhould increafe, commits as
great an abfurdity, as if he mould defire his child might ever con-
tinue under the fame weaknefs in which he is born. If it do not
grow, it muft pine and perifh ; for in this world nothing is per-
manent j that which does not grow better will grow worfe.
This increafe alfo is ufelefs, or perhaps hurtful, if it be not in
ftrength, as well as in riches, or number : for every one is apt
to feize upon ill-guarded treafures ; and the terror that the city of
London was pofTefTed with, when a few Dutch mips came to Chat-
ham, (hews, that no numbers of men, tho' naturally valiant, are
able to defend themfelves, unlefs they be well armed, difciplined,
and conducted. Their multitude brings confufion : their wealth,
when it is like to be made a prey, increafes the fears of the owners ;
and they, who if they were brought into good order, might conquer
a great part of the world, being deftitute of it, durft not think of
defending themfelves.
If it be faid, that the wife father, mentioned by me, endeavours to
fecure his patrimony by law, not by force ; I anfwer, that all defence
terminates in . force j and if a private man does not prepare to defend
his eftate with his own force, it is becaufe he lives under the pro-
tection of the law, and expects the force of the magiftrate mould
be a fecurity to him : but kingdoms and commonwealths, acknow-
ledging no fuperior, except God alone, can reafonably hope to be
pro-
1 66 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. protected by him only ; and by him, if with induftry and courage
w~v— ■•# they make ufe of the means he has given them for their own defence.
God helps thofe who help themfelves j and men are by feveral reafons
(fuppofe to prevent the increafe of a fufpected power) induced to
fuccour an induftrious and brave people : biit fuch as neglect the
means of their own prefervation, are ever left to perifh with fhame.
Men cannot rely upon any league : the ftate that is defended by one
potentate againit another becomes a flave to their protector : merce-
nary foldiers always want fidelity or courage, and molt, commonly
both. If they are not corrupted or beaten by the invader, they make
a prey of their mailers* Thefe are the followers of camps, who
* — Ibi fas, have neither faith nor piety *, but prefer gain before right. They
ubi maxima who expofe their blood to fale, look where they can make the Deft,
merces. bargain, and never fail of pretences for following their interefts.
Moreover, private families may by feveral arts increafe their
wealth, as they increafe in number j but when a people multiplies
(as they will always do in a good climate under a good government)
fuch an enlargement of territory as is neceifary for their fubfiftence
can be acquired only by war. This was known to the northern
nations that invaded the Roman empire j but for want of fuch
conftitutions as might bell: improve their ftrength and valour, the
numbers they fent out when they were overburdened, provided well
for themfelves, but were of no ufe to the countries they left -, and
whilft thofe Goths, Vandals, Franks, and Normans, enjoyed the molt
opulent and delicious provinces of the world, their fathers languished
obfcurely in their frozen climates. For the like reafons, or through
the fame defect, the Switzers are obliged to ferve other princes j
and often to employ that valour in advancing the power of their
neighbours, which might be ufed to increafe their own. Genoa,
Lucca, Geneva, and other fmall commonwealths, having no wars,
are not able to nourifh the men they breed ; but fending many of
their children to feek their fortunes abroad, fcarce a third part of
thofe that are born among them die in thofe cities ; and if they did
not take this courfe, they would have no better than the nations in-
habiting near the river Niger, who fell their children as the increafe
of their flocks.
This does not lefs concern monarchies than commonwealths ; nor
the abfolute lefs than the mixed : all of them have been profperous or
miferable, glorious or contemptible, as they were better or worfe
armed, difciplined, or conducted. The AfTyrian valour was irre-
fiflable under Nabuchodonozor ; but was brought to nothing under
his bafe and luxurious grandfon Belfhazzar : the Perfians, who under
Cyrus conquered Afia, were like fwine expofed to flaughter when
their difcipline failed, and they were commanded by his proud,
cruel, and cowardly fucceflbrs. The Macedonian army overthrown
by Paulus Emilius was not lefs in number than that with which
Alexander gained the empire of the eaft j and perhaps had not been
inferior in valour, if it had been as well commanded. Many poor
and almoft unknown nations have been carried to fuch a height of
glory by the bravery of their princes, that I might incline to think
their
Dilcourfes concerning Government. 167
their government as fit as any other for difciplining a people to war, Sect. 23*
if their virtues continued in their families, or could be tranfmitted to
their fuccerTors. The impofiibility of this is a breach never to be re-
paired ; and no account is to be made of the good that is always
certain, and feldom enjoyed. This difeafe is not only in abfolute
monarchies, but in thole alfo where any regard is had to fuccefiion
of blood, tho' under the ftxicteft limitations. The fruit of all the
victories gained by Edward the Firft and Third, or Henry the Fifth
of England, perimed by the bafenefs of their iliccelTors : the glory
of our arms was turned into fhame j and we, by the lofs of treafure,
blood, and territory, fuffered the punifhment of their vices. The
effects of thefe changes are not always equally violent ; but they are
frequent, and muft fall out as often as occafion is prefented. It was
not poffible for Lewis the Thirteenth of France to purfue the great
defigns of Henry the Fourth : ChrifHna of Sweden could not fupply
the place of her brave father •, nor the prefent king in his infancy
accomplish what the great Charles Guftavus had nobly undertaken :
and no remedy can be found for this mortal infirmity, unlefs the
power be put into the hands of thofe who are able to execute it, and
not left to the blindnefs of fortune. When the regal power is com-
mitted to an annual or otherwife chofen magiftracy, the virtues of
excellent men are of ufe, but all does not depend upon their perfons :
one man finishes what another had begun ; and when many are by
practice rendered able to perform the fame things, the lofs of one is
eafiiy fupplied by the election of another. When good principles
are planted, they do not die with the perfon that introduced them ;
and good conflitutions remain, tho' the authors of them perim.
Rome did not fall back into flavery when Brutus was killed, who had
led them to recover their liberty : others like to him purfued the
fame ends ; and notwithstanding the lofs of fo many great command-
ers confumed in their almoft continual wars, they never wanted fuch
as were fit to execute whatever they could defign. A well-governed
flate is as fruitful to all good purpofes, as the feven-headed ferpent is
faid to have been in evil -, when one head is cut off, many rife up in
the place of it. Good order being once eflablimed, makes good
men ; and as long as it lafts, fuch as are fit for the greateft. employ-
ments will never be wanting. By this means the Romans could not
be furprifed : no king or captain ever invaded them, who did not
find many excellent commanders to oppofe him j whereas they them-
feives found it eafy to overthrow kingdoms, tho' they had been
eftablifhed by the braveft princes, through the bafenefs of their
fucceflbrs.
But if our author fay true, it is of no advantage to a popular ftate
to have excellent men ; and therefore he impofes c< a neceflity upon
" every people to chufe the worfl men for being the worft, and moft
" like to themfelves ; left that if virtuous and good men mould come
" into power, they mould be excluded for being vicious and wicked,
" &c. Wife men would feize upon the ftate, and take it from the
" people." For the understanding of thefe words, it is good to con-
fider whether they are to be taken limply, as ufually applied to the
devil, and fome of his instruments, or relatively, as to the thing in
U u question :
168 Difconrfes concerning Government,
Chap. II. queftion : if fimply, it muft be concluded, that Valerius, Brutus,
Cincinnatus, Capitolinus, Mamercus, Paulus Emilius, Nafica, and
others like to them, were not only the worn: men of the city ; but
that they were fo often advanced to the fupreme magiftracies, becaufe
they were fo : if in the other (cn(c relating to magiftracy, and the
command of armies, the worft are the moft ignorant, unfaithful,
flothful, or cowardly j and our author to make good his proportion,
muil: prove, that when the people of Rome, Carthage, Athens, and
other ftates, had the power of chufing whom they pleafed, they did
chufe Camillus, Corvinus, Torquatus, Fabius, Rullus, Scipio,
Amilcar, Hannibal, Afdrubal, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Pericles,
Ariftides, Themiftocles, Phocion, Alcibiades, and others like to
them, for their ignorance, infidelity, floth, and cowardice ; and on
account of thofe vices, moft like to thofe who chofe them. But if
thefe were the worft, I defire to know what wit or eloquence can
defcribe or comprehend the excellency of the beft ; or of the difci-
pline that brings whole nations to fuch perfection, that worfe than
thefe could not be found among them ? And if they were not fo, but
fuch as all fucceeding ages have juftly admired for their wifdom,
virtue, induftry, and valour, the impudence of lb wicked and falfe
an afTertion ought to be rejected with fcorn and hatred.
But if all governments, whether monarchical or popular, abfolute
or limited, deferve praife or blame as they are well or ill conftituted
for making war j and that the attainment of this end do intirely de-
pend upon the qualifications of the commanders, and the ftrength,
courage, number, affection, and temper of the people out of
which the armies are drawn ; thofe governments muft neceftarily
be the beft which take the beft care that thole armies may be well
commanded ; and fo provide for the good of the people, that they
may daily increafe in number, courage, and ftrength, and be fo
iatisfied with the prefent ftate of things, as to fear a change, and fight
for the prefervation or advancement of the public intereft as of their
own. We have already found, that in hereditary monarchies no care
at all is taken of the commander : he is not chofen, but comes by
chance ; and does not only frequently prove defective, but for the
moft part utterly uncapable of performing any part of his duty ;
whereas in popular governments excellent men are generally chofen -,
and there are fo many of them, that if one or more perifh, others
are ready to fupply their places. And this difcourfe having (if I
miftake not) in the whole feries, fhewn, that the advantages of
popular governments, in relation to the increafe of courage, number,
and ftrength in a people, out of which armies are to be formed, and
bringing them to fuch a temper as prepares them bravely to perform
their duty, are as much above thofe of monarchies, as the prudence
of choice furparTes the accidents of birth j it cannot be denied, that
in both refpects the part which relates to war is much better per-
formed in popular governments than in monarchies.
That which we are by reaibn led to believe, is confirmed to us by
experience. We every- where fee the difference between the courage
of men fighting for themfelves, and their pofterity, and thofe that
lerve a mafter who by good fuccefs is often rendered infupportable.
This
Difcourfes concerning Government. i6p
This is of fuch efficacy, that no king could ever boaft to have over- Sect. 23.
thrown any considerable commonwealth, unlefs it were divided
within itfelf, or weakened by wars made with fuch as were alfo free 5
which was the cafe of the Grecian commonwealths, when the Macedo-
nians fell in upon them : whereas the greateft kingdoms have been eafily
deftroyed by commonwealths j and thefe alfo have loft: all ftrength,
valour, and fpirit, after the change of their government. The
power and virtue of the Italians grew up, decayed, and perifhed,
with their liberty. When they were divided into many common-
wealths, every one of them was able to fend out great armies,
and to fuffer many defeats before they were fubdued ; fo that their
cities were delivered up by the old men, women, and children,
when all thofe who were able to bear arms had been ilain : and
when they were all brought under the Romans, either as aflbciates
or fubjects, they made the greateft ftrength that ever was in the
world.
Alexander of Epirus was in valour thought equal, and in power
little inferior, to Alexander of Macedon: but having the fortune to at-
tack thofe who had been brought up in liberty, taught to hazard or
fuffer all things for it, and to think that God has given to men hands
and fwords only to defend it, he perifhed in his attempt j whilfl
the other encountering flavifh nations, under the conduct of proud,
cruel, and for the moil part un warlike tyrants, became mafter of
Afia.
Pyrrhus feems to have been equal to either of them j but the victo-
ries he obtained by an admirable valour and conduct, coft him fo
dear, that he defired peace with thofe enemies who might be defeat-
ed, not fubdued.
Hannibal, wanting the prudence of Pyrrhus, loft the fruits of all
his victories 5 and being torn out of Italy, where he had nefted him-
felf, fell under the fword of thofe whofe fathers he had defeated or
flain; and died a banifhed man from his ruined country.
The Gauls did once bring Rome, when it was fmall, to the brink
of deftruction 5 but they left their carcafes to pay for the mifchiefs
they had done j and in fucceeding times their invalions were men-
tioned as tumults rather than wars.
The Germans did perhaps furpafs them in numbers and ftrength,
and were equal to them in fortune as long as Rome was free. They
often entered Italy ; but they continued not long there, unlefs under
the weight of their chains ; whereas the fame nations, and others
like to them, attainting that country, or other provinces under the
emperors, found no other difficulty than what did arife upon contefts
among themfelves who fhould be mafter of them. No manly vir-
tue or difcipline remained among the Italians : thofe who governed
them, relied upon tricks and fhifts ; they who could not defend them-
felves, hired fome of thofe nations to undertake their quarrels a-
gainft others. Thefe trinklings could not laft : the Goths, fcorning
to depend upon thofe who in valour and ftrength were much infe-
rior to themfelves, feized upon the city that had commanded the
world, whilft Honorius was fo bufy in providing for his hens, that
he could not think of defending it. Arcadius had the luck not to lofe
his
170 Difcouries concerning Government.
Chap. II. his principal city ; but pafling his time among fidlers, players, eu-
nuchs, cooks, dancers, and buffoons, the provinces were fecurely
plundered and ranfacked by nations, that are known only from their
victories againfl him*
It is in vain to fay, that this proceeded from the fatal corruption of
that age ; for that corruption proceeded from the government, and
the enfuing defolation was the effect of it. And as the like diforder
in government has been ever fmce in Greece, and the greatefl part of Ita-
ly, thofe countries which for extent, riches, convenience of fituation,
and numbers of men, are equal to the bert in the world, and for the
wit, courage, and induftry of the natives, perhaps juflly prefer-
able to any, have fince that time been always expofed as a prey to the
firfl invader. Charles the Eighth of France is by Guicciardin, and
other writers, repreiented as a prince equally weak in body, mind,
money, and forces : but as an ill hare is laid to make a good dog,
he conquered the beft. part of Italy without breaking a lance. Ferdi-
nand and Alphonfo of Arragon, kings of Naples, had governed by
trepanners, falfe witneffes, corrupt judges, mercenary foldiers,
and other minifters of iniquity; but theie could afford no help
againfl an invader ; and neither the opprefled nobility, nor people,
concerning themfelves in the quarrel, they who had been proud, fierce,
and cruel, againfl their poor fubjects, never durfl look an enemy in
the face; and the father dying with anguifh and fear, the fon fhame-
fully fled from his ill governed kingdom.
The fame things are no lefs evident in Spain. No people ever de-
fended themfelves with more obflinacy and valour than the Spani-
ards did againfl the Carthaginians and Romans, who furpafTed them
in wealth and fkill. Livy calls them " gentem ad bella gerenda & re-
" paranda natam," and who generally killed themfelves when they were
maflered and difarmed, " nullam fine armis vitam effe rati." But tho*
the mixture of Roman blood could not impair their race, and the
conjunction of the Goths had improved their force ; yet no more
was required for the overthrow of them all, than the weaknefs and
bafenefs of the two lewd tyrants Witza and Rodrigo, who difdain-
ed all laws, and refolved to govern according to their lufl. They
who for more than two hundred years had refilled the Romans, were
intirely fubdued by the vile, half-naked Moors, in one flight fkirmifh ;
and do not to this day know what became of the king who brought
the destruction upon them. That kingdom after many revolutions
is with many others come to the houfe of Auftria, and enjoys all the
wealth of the Indies ; whereupon they are thought to have affected
an univerial monarchy. " Sed ut funt levia aulicorum ingenia," this was
grounded upon nothing except their own vanity : they had money
and craft j but, wanting that folid virtue and flrength, which makes
and preferves conquefls, their kings have nothing but Milan that
did not come to them by marriage : and tho' they have not received
any extraordinary difafters in war, yet they languifh and confume
through the defects of their own government, and are forced to beg
afTiitance from their mortal and formerly defpifed enemies. Thefe
are the beft hopes of defence that they have from abroad ; and the
only enemy an invader ought to fear in their defolate territories, is
that
Difcourfes concerning Government. 171
that want and famine which teftifies the good order, ftrength, and Sect. 23
ftability of our author's divine monarchy ; the profound wifdom v—«»y— »*
of their kings in fubtilly finding out fo fure a way of defending the
country ; their paternal care in providing for the good of their fub-
jects ; and that whatfoever is defective in the prince, is afTuredly fup-
plied by the fedulity of a good council.
We have already faid enough to obviate the objections that may
be drawn from the profperity of the French monarchy. The beauty
of it is falfe and painted. There is a rich and haughty king, who is
blefTed with fuch neighbours as are not likely to difhirb him, and has
nothing to fear from his miferable fubjects ; but the whole body of
that ftate is full of boils, and wounds, and putrid fores : there is
no real ftrength in it. The people are fo unwilling to ferve him,
that he is faid to have put to death above fourfcore thoufand of his
own foldiers within the fpace of fifteen years, for flying from their
colours ; and if he were vigoroufly attacked, little help could be ex-
pected from a difcontented nobility, or a ftarving and defpairing
people. If to diminiih the force of thefe arguments and examples,
it be faid, that in two or three thoufand years all things are changed -,
the antient virtue of mankind is extinguished ; and the love that
every one had to his country is turned into a care of his private
interefts : I anfwer, that time changes nothing, and the changes pro-
duced in this time proceed only from the change of governments.
The nations which have been governed arbitrarily, have always
fuffered the fame plagues, and been infected with the fame vices ;
which is as natural, as for animals ever to generate according to their
kinds, and fruits to be of the fame nature with the roots and feeds
from which they come. The fame order that made men valiant and
induftrious in the fervice of their country during the firft ages, would
have the fame effect, if it were now in being : men would have the
fame love to the public as the Spartans and Romans had, if there
was the fame reafon for it. We need no other proof of this than
what we have feen in our own country, where, in a few years, good
difcipline, and a juft encouragement given to thofe who did well,
produced more examples of pure, complete, incorruptible, and in-
vincible virtue than Rome or Greece could ever boaft ; or if more be
wanting, they may eafily be found among the Switzers, Hollanders,
and others : but it is not neceflary to light a candle to the fun.
X x SECT,
172 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chaf. II.
SECT. XXIV.
Popular governments are lefs fubjecl: to civil diforders than
monarchies ; manage them more ably, and more eafily
recover out of them.
TT is in vain to feek a government in all points free from a poffi-
•*■ bility of civil wars, tumults, and feditions : that is a blefling
denied to this life, and referved to complete the felicity of the
next. But if thefe are to be accounted the greatefl evils that can fall
upon a people, the rectitude or defects of governments will bell ap-
pear, if we examine which fpecies is more or lefs expofed to or ex-
empted from them.
This may be done two ways.
1. By fearching into the caufes from whence they may or ufually
do arife.
2. Which kind has actually been moil frequently and dangeroufly
dillurbed by them.
To the firil : feditions, tumults, and wars, do arife from miflake,
or from malice ; from juft occafions, or unjufl : from miflake, when
a people thinks an evil to be done or intended, which is not done nor
intended j or takes that to be evil which is done, tho' in truth it be
not fo. Well regulated cities may fall into thefe errors. The Romans
being jealous of their newly recovered liberty, thought that Valerius
Publicola deligned to make himfelf king, when he built a houfe in a
place that feemed too ftrong and eminent for a private man. The
Spartans were not lefs fufpicious of Lycurgus ; and a lewd young
fellow in a fedition put out one of his eyes : but no people ever con-
tinued in a more conflant affection to their befl deferving citizens,
than both the Romans and Spartans afterwards manifefled to thofe
virtuous and wrongfully fufpected men.
Sometimes the fact is true, but otherwife underilood than was in-
tended. When the Tarquins were expelled from Rome, the patri-
cians retained to themfelves the principal magillracies 3 but never
thought of bringing back kings, or of fetting up a corrupt oligarchy
among themfelves, as the plebeians imagined : and this miflake
being difcovered, the fury they had conceived, vanifhed 5 and they
who feemed to intend nothing lefs than the extirpation of all the pa-
trician families, grew quiet. Menenius Agrippa appeafed one of the
mofl violent feditions that ever happened amongfl them (till civil
interefls were purfued by armed troops) with a fable of the feveral
parts of the body that murmured againft the belly : and the mofl
dangerous of all was compofed by creating tribunes to protect them.
Some of the patrician young men had favoured the decemviri, and
others being unwilling to appear againft them, the people believed
they had all confpired with thole new tyrants : but Valerius and Ho-
ratius putting themfelves at the head of thofe who fought their de-
llruction,
Difcourfes concerning Government. 173
ftruction, they perceived their error, and looked upon the patricians Sect. 24.
as the beft defenders of their liberties : " et inde," fays Livy, " auram
" libertatis captare, unde fervitutem timuiffent." Democratical go-
vernments are moft liable to thefe miftakes : in ariftocracies they are
feldom feen, and we hear of none in Sparta after the eftablifhment
of the laws by Lycurgus j but abfolute monarchies feem to be totally
exempted from them. The mifchiefs defigned are often diffembled
or denied, till they are pail: all pombility of being cured by any other
way than force : and fuch as are by neccflity driven to ufe that
remedy, know they muft perfect their work, or perim. He that
draws his fword againft the prince, fay the French, ought to throw
away the fcabbard ; for tho' the defign be never fo juft, yet the au-
thors are fure to be ruined if it mifcarry. Peace is feldom made, and
never kept, unlefs the fubject retain fuch a power in his hands, as
may oblige the prince to ftand to what is agreed j and in time fome
trick is found to deprive them of that benefit.
Seditions proceeding from malice are feldom or never feen in popular
governments ; for they are hurtful to the people, and none have ever
willingly and knowingly hurt themfelves. There may be, and often
is malice in thofe who excite them - y but the people is ever deceived,
and whatfoever is thereupon done, ought to be imputed to error, as
I faid before. If this be difcovered in time, it ufually turns to the
deftruction of the contriver ; as in the cafes of Manlius Capitolinus,
Spurius Melius, and Sp. Camus : if not, for the moft part it produces
a tyranny, as in thofe of Agathocles, Dionyfius, Pififtratus, and
Caefar. But in abfolute monarchies, almoft all the troubles that arife,
proceed from malice ; they cannot be reformed, the extinction of
them is exceeding difficult, if they have continued long enough to
corrupt the people ; and thofe who appear againft them, feek only
to fet up themfelves, or their friends. Thus we fee, that in the civil
wars of the eaft, the queftion was, whether Artaxerxes or Cyrus,
Phraartes or Bardanes, ihould reign over the Perlians and Parthians :
the people fuffered equally from both whilft the contefts lafted ;
and the decifion left them under the power of a proud and cruel
mafter. The like is feen in all places. After the death of Brutus
and Caftius, no war was ever undertaken in the Roman empire upon
a better account than one man's private concernments : the provinces
fuffered under all j and he, whom they had affifted to overthrow
one wicked tyrant, very often proved worfe than his predeceflbr.
And the only ground of all the diffenfions with which France was
vexed under the princes of Meroveus and Pepin's races, were,
which of them fhould reign, the people remaining miferable under
them all.
The cafe is not much different in mixed monarchies : fome wars
may be undertaken upon a juft and public account, but the pre-
tences are commonly falfe : a lafting reformation is hardly introduced,
an intire change often difliked. And tho' fuch kingdoms are fre-
quently and terribly diftracted, as appears by the before-mentioned
examples of England, Spain, &c. the quarrels are, for the moft part,
begun upon perfonal titles, as between Henry the Firft and Robert ;
Stephen and Maud j or the houfes of Lan caller and York : and the
people
174 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. people who get nothing by the victory which way fbever it fall,
and might therefore prudently leave the competitors to decide their
own quarrels, like Theoreftes and Polinices, with their own fwords,
become cruelly engaged in them.
It may feem ftrange to fome that I mention feditions, tumults,
and wars, upon juft occarions ; but I can find no reafon to retract
the term. God intending that men mould live juftly with one
another, does certainly intend, that he or they who do no wrong,
mould fufFer none > and the law that forbids injuries, were of no
ufe, if no penalty might be inflicted on thofe that will not obey it.
If injuftice therefore be evil, and injuries forbidden, they are alio to
be punifhed j and the law inftituted for their prevention muft
neceifarily intend the avenging of fuch as cannot be prevented. The
work of the magiftracy is to execute this law j the fword of juftice
is put into their hands to reftrain the fury of thofe within the lbciety
who will not be a law to themfelves ; and the fword of war to pro-
tect the people againft the violence of foreigners. This is without
exception, and would be in vain if it were not. But the magiftrate,
who is to protect the people from injury, may, and is often known
not to have done it : he fometimes renders his office ufelefs by neg-
lecting to do juftice ; fometimes mifchievous by overthrowing it.
This ftrikes at the root of God's general ordinance, that there lhould
be laws ; and the particular ordinances of all focieties that appoint
fuch as feem beft to them. The magiftrate therefore is comprehended
under both, and fubject to both, as well as private men.
The ways of preventing or punifhing injuries are judicial or ex-
trajudicial. Judicial proceedings are of force againft thofe who fub-
mit or may be brought to trial, but are of no effect againft thofe
who refift, and are- of fuch power that they cannot be conftrained.
It were abfurd to cite a man to appear before a tribunal who can awe
the judges, or has armies to defend him ; and impious to think, that
he who has added treachery to his other crimes, and ufurped a power
above the law, mould be protected by the enormity of his wicked-
nefs. Legal proceedings therefore are to be ufed when the delinquent
fubmits to the law ; and all are juft, when he will not be kept in or-
der by the legal.
The word fedition is generally applied to all numerous aflemblies,
without or againft the authority of the magiftrate, or of thofe who
affume that power. Athaliah and Jezebel were more ready to cry
out treafon than David ; and examples of that fort are fo frequent,
that I need not alledge them.
Tumult is from the diforderly manner of thofe affemblies, where
things can feldom be done regularly ; and war is that " decertatio per
" vim," or trial by force, to which men come when other ways are
ineffectual.
If the laws of God and men are therefore of no effect, when the
magiftracy is left at liberty to break them ; and if the lufts of thofe
who are too ftrong for the tribunals of juftice, cannot be otherwife
reftrained than by fedition, tumults, and war, thofe feditions, tu-
mults, and wars, are juftified by the laws of God and man.
I will
Difcourfes concerning Government 179
I will not take upon me to enumerate all the cafes in which this Sect. 24.
may be done, but content myfelf with three, which have mod fre- <-— rv — •»
quently given occaiion for proceedings of this kind.
The htft is, When one or more men take upon them the power
and name of a magistracy, to which they are not juftly called.
The fecond, When one or more, being juftly called, continue
in their magiftracy longer than the laws by which they are called do
prefer ibe.
And the third, When he or they who are rightly called, do af-
fume a power, tho' within the time prefcribed, that the law does not
give 3 or turn that which the law does give, to an end different and
contrary to that which is intended by it.
For the firft ; Filmer forbids us to examine titles : he tells us, we
muft fubmit to the power, whether acquired by usurpation or other-
wife, not obferving the mifchievous abfurdity of rewarding the
moft deteftable villainies with the higher! honours, and tendering the
veneration due to the fupreme magiftrate as father of the people, to
one who has no other advantage above his brethren, than what he
has gained by injuriously difpofTeffing or murdering him that was
fo. Hobbes, fearing the advantages that may be taken from fuch de-
fperate nonfenfe, or not thinking it neceffary to his end to carry the
matter fo far, has no regard at all to him who comes in without
title or confent ; and, denying him to be either king or tyrant, gives
him no other name than " hoftis & latro ;" and allows all things to be
lawful againft him, that may be done to a public enemy or pirate:
which is as much as to fay, any man may deftroy him how he can.
Whatever he may be guilty of in other refpects, he does in this follow
the voice of mankind, and the dictates of common fenfe : for no
man can make himfelf a magiftrate for himfelf ; and no man can
have the right of a magiftrate, who is not a magiftrate. If he be De Civ. I. if;
juftly accounted an enemy to all, who injures all ; he above all
muft be the public enemy of a nation, who, by ufurping a power
over them, does the greateft and moft public injury that a peo-
ple can fuffer ; for which reafon, by an eftablifhed law among the
moft virtuous nations, every man might kill a tyrant 5 and no names
are recorded in hiftory with more honour, than of thofe who did it.
Thefe are by other authors called " tyranni fine titulo :" and that
name is given to all thofe who obtain the fupreme power by illegal
and unjuft means. The laws which they overthrow can give
them no protection j and every man is a foldier againft him who is
a public enemy.
The fame rule holds, tho' they are more in number ; as the magi,
who ufurped the dominion of Perfia after the death of Gambyfes; the
thirty tyrants at Athens overthrown by Thrafybulus ; thofe of Thebes
flain by Pelopidas j the decemviri of Rome, and others : for tho' the
multitude of offenders may fometimes procure impunity, yet that
ad: which is wicked in one, muft be fo in ten or twenty j and what-
foever is lawful againft one ufurper, is fo againft them all.
2. If thofe who were rightly created, continue beyond the time
limited by the law, it is the fame thing. That which is expired, is
as if it had never been. He that was created conful for a year, or
Y y dictator
Difcourfes concerning Government.
dictator for fix months, was after that a private man -, and if he had
continued in the exercife of his magiftracy, had been fubject to the
fame punifhment as if he had ufurped it at the firft. This was
known to Epaminondas, who finding that his enterprize againft
Sparta could not be accomplifhed within the time for which he was
made Bceotarches, rather chofe to truft his countrymen with his life
than to defift j and was faved merely through an admiration of his
virtue, aflurance of his good intentions, and the glory of the action.
The Roman decemviri, tho' duly elected, were preceded againft
as private men ufurping the magiftracy, when they continued be«
yond their time. Other magiftrates had ceafed j there was none that
could regularly call the fenate or people to an afiembly : but when
their ambition was manifeft, and the people exafperated by the death
of Virginia, they laid afide all ceremonies. The fenate and people
met j and, exercifing their authority in the fame manner as if they
had been regularly called by the magiftrate appointed to that end,
they abrogated the power of the decemviri, proceeded againft them
as enemies and tyrants, and by that means preferved themfelves
from utter ruin.
3. The fame courfe is juftly ufed againfl: a legal magiftrate, who
takes upon him (tho' within the time prefcribed by the law) to exer-
cife a power which the law does not give ; for in that refpect he is a pri-
vate man, " quia," as Grotius fays, " eatenus non habet imperium 5"
and may be reftrained as well as any other, becaufe he is not let up
to do what he lifts, hut what the law appoints for the good of the
people j and as he has no other power than what the law allows, fo
the fame law limits and directs the exercife of that which he has.
This right, naturally belonging to nations, is no-way impaired by
the name of fupreme given to their magiftrates j for it iignifies no
more, than that they do act fovereignly in the matters committed to
their charge. Thus are the parliaments of France called " cours fo-
" veraines 5" for they judge of life and death, determine controverfies
concerning eftates j and there is no appeal from their decrees : but
no man ever thought, that it was therefore lawful for them to do
what they pleafed ; or that they might not be oppofed, if they mould
attempt to do that which they ought not. And tho' the Roman
dictators and confuls were fupreme magiftrates, they were fubject
to the people, and might be punifhed, as well as others, if they tranf-
grefted the law. Thuanus carries the word fo far, that when Bar-
lotta, Giuftiniano, and others who were but colonels, were fent as
commanders in chief of three or four thoufand men upon an enter-
prize, he always fays, " Summum imperium ei delatum." Grotius ex-
plains this point, by diftinguiihing thofe who have the " fumraum im-
" perium fummo modo," from thofe who have it " modo non fummo."
I know not where to find an example of this fovereign power, enjoyed
without restriction, under a better title than " occupation}" which re-
lates not to our purpofe, who feek only that which is legal and juft.
?i ro £ de JUr * Therefore, laying afide that point for the prefent, we may follow Gro-
. pac. t - us j n ex-awning tne right of thofe who are certainly limited : " Ubi
" partem imperii habet rex, partem fenatus five populus;" in which cafe
he fays, " Regi in partem non fuam involanti, vis jufta opponi poteft,"
in-
Difcourfes concerning Government. 177
inafmuch as they who have a part, cannot but have a right of de- Sfxt. 24.
fending th-it part; " quia, data facultate, datur jus facultatem tuen- *—""> — — '
" di," without which it could be of no effect.
The particular limks of the rights belonging to each, can only be
judged by the preciie letter, or general intention of the law. The
dukes of Venice have certainly a part in the government, and could
not be called magiflrates, if they had not. They are faid to be fu-
preme; all laws and public acts bear their names. The embaf-
fador of the ftate fpeaking to pope Paul the 5th, denied that he ac- Thuan. 1.
knowledged any other fuperior than God. But they are fo well cxxxviu
known to be under the power of the law, that divers of them have
been put to death for tranfgreffing it ; and a marble gallows is feen at
the foot of the flairs in St. Mark's palace, upon which fome of them,
and no others, have been executed. But if they may be duly op-
pofed, when they commit undue acts, no man of judgement will deny,
that if one of them by an outrageous violence fhould endeavour to over-
throw the law, he might by violence be fuppreffed and chaftifed.
Again, fome magiflrates are entrufted with a power of providing
mips, arms, ammunition, and victuals for "war; railing and dif-
ciplining foldiers, appointing officers to command in forts and
garifons, and making leagues with foreign princes and frates.
But if one of thefe mould imbezel, fell, or give to an enemy thofe
mips, arms, ammunition, or provifions ; betray the forts ; em-
ploy only, or principally, fuch men as will ferve him in thofe wicked
actions ; and, contrary to the trufl repofed in him, make fuch
leagues with foreigners, as tend to the advancement of his perfonal
interefts, and to the detriment of the public j he abrogates his own
magiftracy; and the right he had, perifhes (as the lawyers fay)
" fruftratione finis." He cannot be protected by the law which he has
overthrown, nor obtain impunity for the crimes from his authority
that was conferred upon him, only that he might do good with it.
He was " lingulis major," on account of the excellence of his office ;
but " univerns minor," from the nature and end of the inftitution.
The fureft way of extinguishing his prerogative, was by turning it
to the hurt of thofe who gave it. When matters are brought to
this pofture, the author of the mifchief, or the nation, mufl perifh.
A flock cannot fubfift under a fhepherd that feeks its ruin, nor a
people under an unfaithful magistrate. Honour and riches are
juftly heaped upon the heads of thofe who rightly perform their
duty, becaufe the difficulty as well as the excellency of the work is
great. It requires courage, experience, induftry, fidelity, and
wifdom. The good fhepherd, fays our Saviour, lays down his life
for his fheep : the hireling who flies in time of danger, is repre-
fented under an ill character ; but he that fets himfelf to deftroy his
flock, is a wolf. His authority is incompatible with their fub-
fiftence; and whoever difapproves tumults, feditions, or war, by
which he may be removed from it, if gentler means are ineffectual,
fubverts the foundation of all law ; exalts the fury of one man to
the deflruction, of a nation ; and giving an irrefiftible power to the
moft abominable iniquity, expofes all that are good to be deflroyed,
and virtue to be utterly extinguifhed.
Few
178 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. Few will allow fuch a pre-eminence to the dukes of Venice or
Genoa, the advoyers of Switzerland, or the burgomasters of Am-
iterdam. Many will fay thefe are rafcals if they prove falfe, and
ought rather to be hanged, than fuffered to accomplish the villainies
they defign. But if this be confeSTed in relation to the higheft ma-
gistrates that are among thofe nations, why fhould not the fame be
in all others, by what name foever they are called ? When did God
confer upon thofe nations the extraordinary privilege of providing
better for their own fafety than others ? Or was the gift univerfal,
tho' the benefit accrue only to thofe who have banifhed great titles
from among them ? If this be fo, it is not their felicity, but their
wifdom, that we ought to admire and imitate. But why mould any
think their ancestors had not the fame care ? Have not they, who
retained in themfelves a power over a magistrate of one name, the
like over another ? Is there a charm in words, or any name of fuch
efficacy, that he who receives it fhould immediately become maSter
of thofe that created him, whereas all others do remain for ever Sub-
ject to them ? Would the Venetian government change its nature,
if they fhould give the name of king to their prince ? Are the Po-
landers lefs free fince the title of king is conferred upon their dukes -,
or are the Mofcovites lefs flaves, becaufe their chief magistrate has no
other than that of duke ? If we examine things but a little, it will
appear, that magistrates have enjoyed large powers, who never had
the name of kings ; and none were ever more restrained by laws
than thofe of Sparta, Arragon, the Goths in Spain, Hungary, Bo-
hemia, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and others, who had that title.
There is therefore no fuch thing as a right univerfally belonging to
a name j but every one enjoys that which the laws, by which he is,
confer upon him. The law that gives the power, regulates it ; and
they who give no more than what they pleafe, cannot be obliged to
fuffer him to whom they give it, to take more than they thought fit
to give, or to go unpunifhed if he do. The agreements made are
always confirmed by oath, and the treachery of violating them is
confequently aggravated by perjury. They are good philofophers,
and able divines, who think this can create a right to thofe who had
none ; or that the laws can be a protection to fuch as overthrow
them, and give opportunity of doing the mifchiefs they defign. If
it do not, then he that was a magistrate, by fuch actions returns into
the condition of a private man j and whatever is lawful againft a
thief, who fubmits to no law, is lawful againSt him.
Men who delight in cavils, may afk, Who fhall be the judge of
thefe occafions ? and whether I intend to give to the people the deci-
fion of their own caufe ? To which I anfwer, that when the conteft
is between the magistrate and the people, the party to which the de-
termination is referred, muft be the judge of his own cafe 5 and the
queftion is only, Whether the magistrate fhould depend upon the
judgment of the people, or the people on that of the magistrate ;
and which is moft to be fufpected of injustice : that is, whether the
people of Rome Should judge Tarquin, or Tarquin judge the people.
He that knew all good men abhorred him for the murder of his wife,
brother, father-in-law, and the beSt of the fenate, would certainly
flrikc
Difcourfes concerning Government. 179
ftrike off the heads of the moft eminent remaining poppies ; and hav- Sect. 24.
ing incurred the general hatred of the people by the wickednefs of
his government, he feared revenge j and endeavouring to deftroy thofe
he feared (that is the city) he might eafily have accomplished his
work, if the judgment had been referred to him. If the people judge
Tarquin, it is hard to imagine how they mould be brought to give
an unjufl fentence : they loved their former kings, and hated him
only for his villainies : they did not fanfy, but know his cruelty.
When the bell: were flain, no man that any-way refembled them
could think himfelf fecure. Brutus did not pretend to be a fool,
till, by the murder of his brother, he found how dangerous a thing
it was to be thought wife. If the people, as our author fays, be
always lewd, foolifh, mad, wicked, and defirous to put the power
into the hands of fuch as are moft like to themfelves, he and his fons
were fuch men as they fought, and he was fure to find favourable
judges: if virtuous and good, no injuftice was to be feared from
them, and he could have no other reafon to decline their judgment,
than what was fuggefted by his own wickednefs. Caligula, Nero,
Domitian, and the like, had probably the fame confiderations : but
no man of common fenfe ever thought that the fenate and people of
Rome did not better deferve to judge, whether fuch monfters mould
reign over the bed part of mankind to their deftruction, than they to
determine whether their crimes mould be punifhed or not.
If I mention fome of thefe known cafes, every man's experience
will fugged: others of the like nature j and whofoever condemns all
feditions, tumults, and wars, raifed againft fuch . princes, mufl fay,
that none are wicked, or feek the ruin of their people, which is ab-
furd ; for Caligula wifhed the people had but one neck, that he
might cut it off" at a blow : Nero fet the city on fire 5 and we have
known fuch as have been worfe than either of them : they mufl
either be fuffered to continue in the free exercife of their rage, that
is, to do all the mifchief they defign ; or mud be retrained by a
legal, judicial, or extrajudicial way ; and they who difallow the ex-
trajudicial, do as little like the judicial. They will not hear of bring-
ing a fupreme magiftrate before a tribunal, when it may be done.
<{ They will," fays our author, " depofe their kings." Why fhould
they not be depofed, if they become enemies to their people, and fet
up an intereft in their own perfons inconfiftent with the public good,
for the promoting of which they were erected ? If they were
created by the public confent, for the public good, {hall they not be
removed when they prove to be of public damage ? If they fet up
themfelves, may they not be thrown down ? Shall it be lawful for
them to ufurp a power over the liberty of others, and fhall it not be
lawful for an injured people to refume their own ? If injuftice exalt
itfelf, mufl: it be for ever eftablifhed ? Shall great perfons be rendered
facred by rapine, perjury, and murder ? Shall the crimes for which
private men do juftly fuffer the moft grievous punifhments, exempt
them from all, who commit them in the higheft excefs, with moft
power, and moft to the prejudice of mankind ? Shall the laws that
folely aim at the prevention of crimes be made to patronize them,
and become fnares to the innocent, whom they ought to protect ?
Zz Has
180 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. Has every man given up into the common ftore his right of avenging
" the injuries he may receive, that the public power, which ought to
protect or avenge him, mould be turned to the deftru&ion of him-
felf, his pofterity, and the fociety into which they enter, without any
poffibility of redrefs ? Shall the ordinance of God be rendered of no
effect j or the powers he hath appointed to be fet up for the diftribu-
tion of juftice, be made fubfervient to the lufts of one or a few
men, and by impunity encourage them to commit all manner of
crimes ? Is the corruption of man's nature fo little known, that
fuch as have common fenfe mould expect juftice from thofe, who
fear no punifhment if they do injuftice ; or that the modefty, in-
tegrity, and innocence, which is feldom found in one man, tho' never
fo cautioufly chofen, mould be conftantly found in all thofe who by
any means attain to greatnefs, and continue for ever in their fuccef-
fors j or that there can be any fecurity under their government, if
they have them not ? Surely if this were the condition of men living
under government, forefts would be more fafe than cities , and
it were better for every man to ftand in his own defence, than to
enter into focieties. He that lives alone might encounter fuch as
mould affault him upon equal terms, and ftand or fall according to
the meafure of his courage and ftrength , but no valour can defend
him, if the malice of his enemy be upheld by a public power.
There muft therefore be a right of proceeding judicially or extraju-
dicially againft all perfons who tranfgrefs the laws , or elfe thofe
laws, and the focieties that mould fublift by them, cannot ftand ;
and the ends for which governments are conftituted, together with
the governments themfelves, muft be overthrown. Extrajudicial
proceedings, by fedition, tumult, or war, muft take place, when
the perfons concerned are of fuch power, that they cannot be brought
under the judicial. They who deny this, deny all help againft an
ufurping tyrant, or the perfidioufnefs of a lawfully created magi-
ftrate, who adds the crimes of ingratitude and treachery to ufurpa-
tion. Thefe of all men are the moft dangerous enemies to fupreme
magiftrates : for as no man defires indemnity for fuch crimes as are
never committed, he that would exempt all from punifhment, fup-
pofes they will be guilty of the worft - y and by concluding, that the
people will depofe them if they have the power, acknowledge, that
they purfue an intereft annexed to their perfons, contrary to that of
their people, which they would not bear if they could deliver them-
felves from it. This fhewing all thofe governments to be tyrannical,
lays fuch a burden upon thofe who adminifter them, as muft necef-
farily weigh them down to deftruction.
If it be faid, that the word fedition implies that which is evil , I
anfwer, that it ought not then to be applied to thofe who feek no-
thing but that which is juft j and tho' the ways of delivering an op-
preffed people from the violence of a wicked magiftrate, who has
armed a crew of lewd villains, and fatted them with the blood
and confifcations of fuch as were moft ready to oppofe him, be ex-
traordinary, the inward righteoufnefs of the act doth fully juftify the
authors. " He that has virtue and power to fave a people, can never
" want a right of doing it." Valerius Afiaticus had no hand in the
death
Difcourfes concerning Government. 1 8 1
death of Caligula ; but when the furious guards began tumultuaufly Srcr. 24.
to inquire who had killed him, he appcafed them with wifLing he * v »
had been the man. No wife man ever afked by what authority F n " a Pfe if "
Thrafybulus, Harmodius, Ariftogiton, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Dion, em ^'" ac *
Timoleon, Lucius Brutus, Publicola, Horatius, Valerius, Marcus
Brutus, C. Caflius, and the like, delivered their countries from tyrants.
Their actions carried in themfelves their own j unification, and their
virtues will never be forgotten whilft the names of Greece and Rome
are remembred in the world.
If this be not enough to declare the juftice inherent in, and the
glory that ought to accompany thefe works, the examples of Mofes,
Aaron, Othniel, Ehud, Barak, Gideon, Samuel, Jephthah, David,
Jehu, Jehoiada, the Maccabees, and other holy men raifed up by God
for the deliverance of his people from their oppreffors, decide the
queftion. They are perpetually renowned for having led the people
by extraordinary ways (which fuch as our author exprefs under the
names of fedition, tumult, and war) to recover their liberties,
and avenge the injuries received from foreign or domeftic tyrants.
The work of the apoftles was not in their time to fet up or pull down
any civil ftate ; but they fo behaved themfelves in relation to all the
powers of the earth, that they gained the name of peftiJent, feditious
fellows, difturbers of the peace ; and left it as an inheritance to
thofe, who, in fucceeding ages, by following their fteps, mould de-
ferve to be called their fuccenors ; whereby they were expofed to the
hatred of corrupt magiitrates, and brought under the neceffity of
perifhing by them, or defending themfelves againft them ; and he
that denies them that right, does at once condemn the moft glorious
actions of the wifeft, belt, and holieft men that have been in the
world, together with the laws of God and man, upon which they
were founded.
Neverthelefs, there is a fort of fedition, tumult, and war, pro-
ceeding from malice, which is always dcteftable, aiming only at the
fatisfaction of private luft, without regard to the public good.
This cannot happen in a popular government, unlefs it be amongft
the rabble ; or when the body of the people is fo corrupted, that
it cannot Hand j but is moft frequent in, and natural to, abfolute
monarchies. When Abimelech defired to make himfelf king, he Judg. ix.
raifed a tumult among the bafeft of the people : he hired light and
vain perfons, fome tranflations call them lewd vagabonds, killed
his brethren, but perimed in his defign ; the corrupt party that fa-
voured him not having ftrength enough to fubdue the other, who
were more fincere. * Sp. Melius, -j- Sp. Caflius, and % Manlius, at- * Livy I iv.
tempted the like in Rome : they acted malicioufly, their pretences to ±i^\ 1 ^' c
procure the public good were falfe. It is probable, that fome in the 4I .
city were as bad as they, and knew that mifchief was intended ; but X W. I vi. c.
the body of the people not being corrupted, they were fupprefTed. It II "" 2 °*
appeared,
(a) This is not told any-where I believe in Tacitus. The whole life of Caligula, and
the beginning of Claudius's reign, are loft. The fixth book of his annals finifhes with
the death of Tiberius, and the eleventh opens with an account of this Valerius Afiaticus
in the time of Claudius. The fact is told by Dion CaffiuS, at the end of his 59th bodk.
1 8l Difcourfes concerning Government
Chap. II. appeared, fays Livy, " nihil efTe minus populare quam regnum :"
they who had favoured Manlius, condemned him to death, when it
was proved, that " egregias alioqui virtutes faeda regni cupidine macu-
" larTet." But when the people is generally corrupted, fuch deiigns
feldom mifcarry* and the fuccefs is always the erection of a tyranny.
Nothing elfe can pleafe vain and profligate perfons, and no tyrannny
was ever fet up by fuch as were better qualified. The ways of attain-
ing it have always been by corrupting the manners of the people,
bribing foldiers, entertaining mercenary Grangers, opening prifons,
giving liberty to flaves, alluring indigent perfons with hopes of
abolifhing debts, coming to a new divifion of lands, and the like.
Seditions raifed by fuch men always tend to the ruin of popular go-
vernments ; but when they happen under abfolute monarchies, the
hurt intended is only to the perfon, who being removed, the promoters
of them fet up another ; and he that is fet up, fubfifting only by the
ftrength of thofe who made him, is obliged to foment the vices that
drew them to ferve him ; tho' another may perhaps make ufe of the
fame again ft him.
The confequence of this is, that thofe who uphold popular govern-
ments, look upon vice and indigence as mifchiefs that naturally in-
creafe each other, and equally tend to the ruin of the ftate. When
men are by vice brought into want, they are ready for mifchief :
there is no villainy that men of profligate lives, loft reputation, and
defperate fortunes, will not undertake. Popular equality is an enemy
to thefe j and they who would preferve it muft preferve integrity of
manners, fobriety, and an honeft contentednefs with what the law
allows. On the other fide, the abfolute monarch, who will have no
other law than his own will, defires to increafe the number of thofe
who through lewdnefs and beggary may incline to depend upon him -,
tho* the fame temper of mind, and condition of fortune, prepare
them alfo for fuch feditions as may bring him into danger j and the
fame corruption which led them to fet him up, may invite them to
fell him to another that will give them better wages.
I do not by this conclude, that all monarchs are vitious men ; but
that whoever will fet up an abfolute power, muft do it by thefe
means ; and that if fuch a power be already eftablifhed, and mould
fall into the hands of a perfon, who by his virtue, and the gentlenefs
of his nature, mould endeavour to render the yoke fo eafy, that a
better difciplined people might be contented to bear it j yet this method
could laft no longer than his life, and probably would be a means to
fhorten it ; that which was at flrft eftablifhed by evil arts always re-
turning to the fame : that which was vitious in the principle, can never
be long upheld by virtue ; and we fee, that the worft of the Roman
emperors were not in greater danger from fuch good men as remained
undeftroyed, than the beft from the corrupt party that would not be
corrected, and fought fuch a mafter as would lay no reftriction upon
their vices. Thofe few who efcaped the rage of thefe villains, only
gave a little breathing-time to the afflicted world, which by their
children or fuccefTors was again plunged into that extremity of mifery,
from which they intended to deliver it. An extraordinary virtue
was required to keep a prince in a way contrary to the principles of
his
Difcourfes concerning Government. 185
his own government j which being rarely found, and never continu- Sect. ?4<
ing long in a family or fucceffion of men, the endeavours of the beft
became ineffectual, and either they themfelves periihed in them,
or after their death all things returned into the old polluted
channel.
Tho' the power of the Hebrew kings was not unlimited, yet it
exceeded the rule fet by God, and was fufiicient to increafe the num-
ber of the worft of men, and to give them opportunities of raifing
perpetual difturbances. On the king's fide there were flatterers
and inftruments of mifchief : on the other fide there were indebted and
difcontented perfons. Notwithftanding the juftice of David's caufe,
the wifdom, valour, and piety of his perfon, none would follow
him, except a few of his own kindred (who knew what God had
promifed to him), and fuch as were uneafy in their worldly circum-
ftances. After the death of Saul there was a long and bloody war
between Ifhbometh and David. The former being killed, the flightefl
matters were fufficient to put the whole nation into blood. Abfalom
with a few fair words was able to raife all Ifrael againft his father :
Sheba the fon of Bichri with as much eafe raifed a more dangerous
tumult : David by wifdom, valour, and the bleffing of God, fur-
mounted thefe difficulties, and prepared a peaceable reign for Solomon -,
but after his death they broke out into a flame that was never quench-
ed till the nation was fo difperfed, that no man knew where to
find his enemies. Solomon by his magnificence had reduced Ifrael to
fuch poverty, as inclined them to revolt upon the firft offer of an
opportunity by Jeroboam. From that time forward Ifrael was
perpetually vexed with civil feditions and confpiracies, or wars
with their brethren of Judah. Nine kings with their families were
deftroyed by the firft, and the latter brought fuch flaughters upon
the miferable people as were never fuffered by any who were not agi-
tated with the like fury j and the courfe of thefe mifchiefs was never
interrupted, till they had brought the nation into captivity, and the
country to defolation. Tho' God, according to his promife, did pre-
ferve a light in the houfe of David ; yet the tribe of Judah was not
the more happy. Joafh w r as flain by a private confpiracy, and Ama-
ziah (as is moil probable) by public authority, for having foolifhly
brought a terrible flaughter upon Judah. Athaliah deftroyed the
king's race, and was killed herfelf by Jehoiada, who, not having
learnt from our author to regard the power only, and not the ways by
which it was obtained, caufed her to be dragged out of the temple,
and put to a well defervcd death. The whole ftory is a tragedy :
and if it be pretended this proceeded rather from the wrath of
God againft his people for their idolatry, than from fuch caufes as
are applicable to other nations j I anfwer, that this idolatry was the
production of the government they had fet up, and moft fuitable to
it; and chufing rather to fubjecl: themfelves to the will of a man,
than to the law of God, they defervedly fuffered the evils that
naturally follow the worft counfels. We know of none who,
taking the like courfe, have not fuffered the like miferies. Notwith-
ftanding the admirable virtue and fuccefs of Alexander, his reign
was full of confpiracies, and his knowledge of them prompted him
A a a to
184 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. to deftroy Parmenio, Philotas, Clytus, Callifthenes, Hermolaus, and
v-^r**' many more of his belt friends. If he efcaped the fword, he fell by
poifon. The murder of his wives, mother, and children, by the
rage of his own foldiers ; the fury of his captains employed in mu-
tual flaughters, till they were confumed ; his paternal kingdom
after many revolutions transferred to Callander his moft mortal ene-
my j the utter extinction of his conquering army, and particularly
the famous Argyrafpides, who, being grown faithlefs and feditious,
after the death of Eumenes were fent to perifh in unknown parts of
the eafti abundantly teftify the admirable liability, good order,
peace, and quiet, that is enjoyed under abfolute monarchy. The next
government of the like nature that appeared upon the ftage of the
world was that of Rome, introduced by wars that confumed two
thirds of the people ; confirmed by profcriptions, in which all that
were eminent for nobility, riches, or virtue, perimed. The peace
they had under Auguftus was like that which the devil allowed to the
Mar. ix. 26. child i n the Gofpel, whom he rent forely, and left as dead. The
miferable city was only calf, into a fwoon j after long and violent
vexations by feditions, tumults, and wars, it lay as dead ; and find-
ing no helper like to him who cured the child, it was delivered to
new devils to be tormented, till it was utterly deftroyed. Tiberius
was appointed as a fit inftrument for fuch a purpofe. It was thought,
that thofe who mould feel the effects of his pride, cruelty, and luft,
would look upon the death of Auguftus as a lofs. He performed
the work for which he was chofen ; his reign was an uninterrupted
feries of murders, fubornation, perjuries, and poiibnings, inter-
mixed with the moil deteftable impurities, the revolts of provinces,
and mutinies of armies. The matter was not mended by his fuc-
ceflors: Caligula was killed by his own guards: Claudius poifoned by
his wife : Spain, Gaul, Germany, Pannonia, Msfia, Syria, and
Egypt, revolted at once from Neroj the people and fenate followed the
example of the provinces. This I think was, in our author's fenfe,
fedition with a witnefs. Nero being dead by the hand of a Have,
or his own to prevent that of the hangman, Galba entered the city
with blood and {laughter -, but when his own foldiers found he
would not give the money for which they intended to fell the empire,
they killed him : and, to fhew the liability of abfolute monarchy,
it may be obferved, that this was not done by the advice of the
C.Tacit.hift. fenate, or by a confpiracy of great men; " Sufcepere duo manipulares
J. 1. c. 25. n p p U ii Romani imperium transferendum, & transitulerunt." Two
rafcals gave the empire to Otho, and the whole fenate was like to be
butchered for not being fo ready to follow their venerable authority
as they ought to have been, and hardly efcaped the fury of their mad
and drunken companions. As a farther teftimony that thefe mon-
archies are not fubject to fedition and tumults, he had at once on-
ly two competitors againft whom he was to defend the well acquired
empire : his army was defeated at Brefcia ; he killed himfelf -,
t and his fucceffor Vitellius was foon after thrown into the common
fewer. The fame method ftill continued: Rome was filled with
blood and allies; and to recite all the public mifchiefs would be to
tranferibe the hiftory : for as Pyrrhus, being afked who mould fuc-
ceed
Difcourfes concerning Government. ig£
cc 1 him, anfwered, He who has the fharpeft fword ; that was the Sect. 24*
only law that governed in the following ages. Whoever could cor-
rupt two or three legions, thought he had a good title to the empire 5
and unlefs he happened to be killed by treachery, or another tumult
of his own foldiers, he feldom receded from it without a battle,
wherein he that was moft fuccefsful, had no other fecurity than what
the prefent temper of the foldiers afforded him j and the miferable
provinces, having neither virtue nor force, were obliged flavifhly to
follow the fury or fortune of thofe villains. In this ftate did Rome
dedicate to Conftantine the triumphal arch, that had been prepared
for Maxentius ; and thofe provinces which had fet up Albinus and
Niger fubmitted to Septimius Severus. In the vaft variety of accidents
that in thofe ages difturbed the world, no emperor had a better
title than what he purchafed by money or violence ; and enjoyed it
no longer than thofe helps continued, which of all things were the
moft uncertain. By this means moft of the princes perifhed by the
fword, Italy was made defolate, and Rome was feveral times fackt
and burnt. The miftrefs of the world being made a Have, the
provinces which had been acquired by the blood of her antient vir-
tuous citizens, became part of an ufurper's patrimony, who without
any regard to the public good, diftributed them to his children ac-
cording to their number, or his paffion. Thefe either deftroyed one
another, or fell under the fword of a third, who had the fortune of
their father, the greateft part moft commonly falling to the fhare of
the worft. If at any time the contrary happened, the government
of the beft w r as but a lucid interval. Well-wiiliing men grew more
extremely to abhor the darknefs that followed when they were gone.
The beft of them could do no more than fufpend mifchief for a while,
but could not correct the corrupt principle of their government ;
fome of them were deftroyed as foon as they were thought to intend
it : and others, who finished their days in peace, left the empire to
fueh perfons of their relations as were moft unlike to them. Do-
mitian came in" as brother to Titus. Commodus and Heliogabalus
were recommended by the memory of thofe virtues that had been
found in Antoninus and Aurelius. Honorius and Arcadius, who by
their bafenefs brought utter ruin upon the weftern and eaftern empires,
were the fons of the brave Theodofius. They who could keep their
hands free from blood, and their hearts from malice, covetoufnefs,
and pride, could not tranfmit their virtues to their fucceffors, nor cor-
rect the perverfenefs that lay at the root and foundation of their go-
vernment. The whole mttfs of blood was vitiated : the body was
but one vaft fore, which no hand but that of the Almighty could
heal j and he, who from an abhorrence of iniquity had declared he
would not hear the cries of his own people, when they had chofen
the thing that was not good, would not fhew mercy to ftrangcrs, who
had done the fame thing.
I have infifted upon the Hebrew, Macedonian, and Roman hiftories,
becaufe they are the moft eminent, and beft known to us : we are in
the dark concerning the Babylonian, Aflyrian, Chaldean, Bactrian,
and Egyptian monarchies: we know little more of them than the
fcripture occafionally relates concerning their barbarous cruelty,
beftial
1 86 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. beftial pride, and extravagant folly. Others have been like to them,
and I know* not where to find a peaceable monarchy uniefs it be in
Peru, where the ynca GarcilaiTo de la Vega fays, that a man and a
woman, children of the fun and the moon, appearing amongft a
barbarous people, living without any religion or law, eftablifhed a
government amongft them, which continued in much peace and
juftice for twelve generations : but this feeming to be as fabulous as
their birth, we may pafs it over, and fix upon thofe that are better
known; of which there is not one that has not fuffered more
dangerous and mifchievous feditions, than all the popular governments
that have been in the world : and the condition of thofe kingdoms
which are not abfolute, and yet give a preference to birth, without
confideration of merit or virtue, is not much better.
This is proved by the reafons of thofe feditions and tumults, as
Well as from the fact itfelf.
The reafons do arife from the violence of the paffions that in-
cite men to theirij and the intricacy of the queftions concerning
fuccelTion.
Every man has paffions ; few know how to moderate, and no one
can wholly extinguish them. As they are various in their nature,
fo they are governed by various objects ; and men ufually follow
that which is predominant in them, whether it proceed from anger
or defire, and whether it terminate in ambition, covetoufnefs, luft,
or any other more or lefs blameable appetite. Every manner of life
furnifhes fomething, that, in fome meafure, may foment thefe - y but
a crown comprehends all that can be grateful to the moft violent and
vitious. He who is covetous, has vaft revenues, beiides what he
may get by fraud and rapine, to fatisfy his appetite. If he be given
to fenfuality, the variety of pleafures, and the facility of accom-
plishing whatever he defires, tends farther to inflame that paffion.
Such as are ambitious, are incited by the greatnefs of their power to
attempt great matters ; and the moft fottifh or lazy may difcharge
themfelves of cares, and hope that others will be eafily hired to take
the burden of bufinefs upon them, whilft they lie at eafe. Thev
who naturally incline to pride and cruelty, are more violently tempted
to ufurp dominion ; and the wicked advices of flatterers, always con-
curring with their paffions, incite them to exercife the power they
have gotten with the utmoft rigour, to fatiate their own rage, and to
fecure themfelves againft the effects of the public hatred, which
they know they have deferved. If there be, as our author fays,
no other rule than force and fuccefs, and that he muft be taken for
the father of a people who is in poiTeffion of a power over them ;
whoever has the one, may put the other to a trial. Nay, even thofe
who have regard to juftice, will feldom want reafons to perfuade
them that it is on their fide. Something may be amifs in the ftate ;
injuries may be done to themfelves and their friends. Such honours
may be denied as they think they deferve j or others of lefs merit, as
they fuppofe, may be preferred before them. Men do fo rarely
make a right eftimate of their own merits, that thofe who mean
2 well
Difcourfes concerning Government. 187
well may be often deceived : and if nothing but fuccefs be required Sect. 24.
to make a monarch, they may think it juft to attempt whatever
they can hope to accompliih. This was the cafe of Julius Csfar ;
he thought all things lawful, when the confulate, which he fuppofed
he had deferved, was denied.
" Viribus utendum eft quas fecimus : arma tenenti
no otherwife related to the royal blood than by his mother, which
in France is nothing at all. He being dead, Lewis fon to the de-
pofed Charles was made king; but his reign was as inglorious to him,
as miferable to his fubjects. This is the peace which the French en-
joyed for the fpace of five or fix ages under their monarchy ; and it is
hard to determine whether they fuffered moft by the violence of thofe
who pofTened, or the ambition of others who afpired to the crown ;
and whether the fury of active, or the bafenefs of flothful princes
was moll: pernicious to them : but upon the whole matter, through
the defects of thofe of the latter fort, they loft all that they had
gained by fweat and blood under the conduct of the former. Henry
and Otho of Saxony, by a virtue like that of Charlemagne, deprived
them of the empire, and fettled it in Germany, leaving France only
to Lewis furnamed Outremer, and his fon Lothair. Thefe feemed
to be equally compofed of treachery, cruelty, ambition, and bafe-
nefs : they were always mutinous, and always beaten : their frantic
paffions put them always upon unjuft defigns, and were fuch
plagues to their fubjects and neighbours, that they became equally
detefted and defpifed. Thefe things extinguished the veneration due
to the memory of Pepin and Charles ; and obliged the whole nation
rather to feek relief from a ftranger, than to be ruined by their
worthlefs defcendents. They had tried all ways that were in their
power ; depofed four crowned kings within the fpace of an hundred
and fifty years ; crowned five who had no other title than the people
conferred upon them; and reftored the defcendents of thofe they
bad rejected : but all was in vain ; their vices were incorrigible, the
mifchiefs produced by them intolerable ; they never ceafed from
murdering one another in battle, or by treachery, and bringing the
nation into civil wars upon their wicked or foolifh quarrels, till
the whole race was rejected, and the crown placed upon the head
of Hugh Capet. Thefe mifchiefs raged not in the fame extremity
under him, and his defcendents; but the abatement proceeded from
a caufe no-way advantageous to abfolute monarchy. The French
were by their calamities taught more ftrictly to limit the regal
power ; and by turning the dukedoms and earldoms into patrimo-
nies, which had been offices, gave an authority to the chief of the
nobility, by which that of kings was curbed; and tho' by this means
the commonalty was expofed to fome prefTures, yet they were fmall,
in comparifon of what they had fuffered in former times. When
many great men had eftates of their own, that did not depend upon
the will of kings, they grew to love their country ; and tho' they
chearfully ferved the crown in all cafes of public concernment,
they were not eafily engaged in the perfonal quarrels of thofe who
pofTefTed it, or had a mind to gain it. To preferve themfelves in
this condition, they were obliged to ufe their vaffals gently ; and this
continuing in fome meafure till within the lafl fifty years, the mon-
archy was lefs tumultuous, than when the king's will had been lefs
reftrained. Neverthelefs, they had not much reafon to boaft ; there
was a root ftill remaining, that from time to time produced poifonous
fruit : civil wars were frequent among them, tho' not carried
on
Difcourfes concerning Government.
on with fuch defperate madnefs as formerly ; and many of them up-
on the account of dilputes between competitors for the crown. All
the wars with England, fince Edward the Second married Ifabella
daughter, and, as he pretended, heir of Philip le Bel, were of this
nature. The defeats of Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, with the
ilaughters and devaluations fuffered from Edward the Third, the
Black prince, and Henry the Fifth, were merely upon contends for the
crown, and for want of an interpreter of the law of fucceffion, who
might determine the queftion between the heir male, and the heir
general. The factions of Orleans and Burgundy, Orleans and Armig-
nac, proceeded from the fame fpring ; and the murders that feem to
have been the immediate caufes of thofe quarrels, were only the
effects of the hatred growing from their competition. The more
odious, tho 1 lefs bloody contefts between Lewis the Eleventh, and his
father Charles the Seventh, with the jealoufy of the former againft
his fon Charles the Eighth, arofe from the fame principle. Charles
of Bourbon prepared to fill France with fire and blood upon the like
quarrel, when his defigns were overthrown by his death in the affault
of Rome. If the dukes of Guife had been more fortunate, thev had
foon turned the caufe of religion into a claim to the crown, and re-
paired the injury done, as they pretended, to Pepin's race, by de-
ftroying that of Capet : and Henry the Third, thinking to prevent
this by the {laughter of Henry le Balafre, and his brother the cardinal
de Guife, brought ruin upon himfelf, and caft the kingdom into a
mqll horrid confullon. Our own age furnifhes us with more than one
attempt of the fame kind attended with the like luccefs. The duke
of Orleans was feveral times in arms againfl: Lewis the Thirteenth his
brother j the queen-mother drew the Spaniards to favour him ;
Montmorency perifhed in his quarrel ; Fontrailles revived it by a treaty
with Spain, which {truck at the king's head as well as the cardinal's,
and was fuppreffed by the death of Cinq Mars and de Thou. Thofe
who underftand the affairs of that kingdom, make no doubt that the
count de -4oiffons Would have fet up for himfelf, and been followed
by the beft part of France, if he had not been killed in the purfuit
of his victory at the battle of Sedan. Since that time the kingdom
has fuffered fuch difturbances as (hew, that more was intended than
the removal of Mazarin : and the Marechal de Turenne was often
told, that the check he gave to the prince of Conde at Gien, after
he had defeated Hocquincourt, had preferved the crown upon the
king's head. And to teftify the {tability, good order, and domeftic
peace, that accompanies abfolute monarchy, we have in our own days
feen the houfe of Bourbon often divided within itfelf -, the duke of
Orleans, the count de Soiffons, the princes of Conde and Conti, in
war againft the king ; the dukes of Angoulefme, Vendome, Longue-
ville, the count de Moret, and other baftards of the royal family
following their example j the houfes of Guife, d'Elbeuf, Bouillon,
Nemours, Rochefocault, and almoft all the moil eminent in France,
with the parliaments of Paris, Bourdeaux, and fome others, joining
with them. I might alledge many more examples, to mew, that this
monarchy, as well as all others, has from the nrft eftablifhment been
full of blood and flaughter, through the violence of thofe who pof-
D d d felled
ip6 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. feffed the crown, and the ambition of fuch as afpired to it -, and
w»*-v— ■■; that the end of one civil war has been the beginning of another :
but I prefume, upon the whole, thefe will be thought fufficient to
prove, that it never enjoyed any permanent domeftic quiet.
The kingdoms of Spain have been no lefs difturbed by the fame
means 5 but efpecially that of Caftile, where the kings had more
power than in other places. To cite all the examples, were to
tranfcribe their hiftories j but whoever has leifure to examine them
will find, that after many troubles, Alphonfo the Second, notwith-
ftanding his glorious furname of Wife, was depofed by means of his
ambitious fon : don Alonfo, furnamed el Defheredado, fupplanted
by his uncle don Sancho el Bravo : Peter the Cruel caft from the
throne, and killed by his baftard brother the conde de Traftamara.
From the time of the above-named Alphonfo to that of Ferdinand
and Ifabella, containing about two hundred years, fo few of them
patted without civil wars, that I hardly remember two together that
were free from them : and whofoever pretends, that of late years that
monarchy has been more quiet, muft, if he be ingenuous, confefs
their peace is rather to be imputed to the dexterity of removing fuch
perfons as have been moft likely to raife difturbances (of which
number were don John of Auflria, don Carlos fon to Philip the
Second, another of the fame name fon to Philip the Third, and don
Balthazar, fon to Philip the Fourth) than to the rectitude of their
conftitutions.
He that is not convinced of thefe truths by what has been faid,
may come nearer home, and fee what mifchiefs were brought upon
Buchan. de Scotland by the contefts between Baliol and Bruce, with their confe-
reb. Scot. quences, till the crown came to the Stuart family ; the quiet reigns,
Dmmmond. and happy deaths, of the five James's, together with the admirable
Melvil. liability and peace of the government under queen Mary, and the
perfect union in which fhe lived with her hufband, fon and people,
as well as the happinefs of the nation whilft it lafted.
But the miferies of England, upon the like occafions, furpafs all.
William the Norman was no fooner dead, but the nation was rent in
pieces by his fon Robert, contending with his younger fons William and
Henry for the crown. They being all dead, and their fons, the like
happened between Stephen and Maud : Henry the Second was made
king to terminate all difputes, but it proved a fruitlefs expedient.
Such as were more fcandalous, and not lefs dangerous, did foon arife
between him and his fons ; who, befides the evils brought upon the
nation, vexed him to death by their rebellion. The reigns of
John and Henry the Third were yet more tempeftuous. Edward the
Second's lewd, foolim, infamous, and deteftable government, ended
in his depofition and death, to which he was brought by his wife
and fon. Edward the Third employed his own and his fubjects
valour againft the French and Scots -, but whilft the foundations were
out of order, the nation could never receive any advantage by their
victories : all was calculated for the glory, and turned to the advan-
tage of one man. He being dead, all that the Englifh held in Scot-
land, and in France, was loft through the bafenefs of his fucceftbr,
with
4
Difcourles concerning Government. 1^7
with more blood than it had been gained ; and the civil wars raifed by Sect. 24.
his wickednefs and madnefs ended as thofe of Edward the Second
had done. The peace of Henry the Fourth's reign was interrupted
by dangerous civil wars; and the victory obtained at Shrewsbury
had not perhaps fecured him in the throne, if his death had not pre-
vented new troubles. Henry the Fifth acquired fuch reputation by
his virtue and victories, that none dared to invade the crown during
his life ; but immediately after his death the ftorms prepared
againft his family broke out with the utmoft violence. His fon's
weaknefs encouraged Richard duke of York to fet up a new title,
which produced fuch mifchiefs as hardly any people has fuffered, un-
lefs upon the like occafion : for befides the flaughter of many thou-
fands of the people, and efpecially of thofe who had been accuftomed
to arms, the devastation of the beft parts of the kingdom, and the
lofs of all that our kings had inherited in France, or gained by the
blood of their fubjects, fourfcore princes of the blood, as Philip de
Commines calls them, died in battle, or under the hand of the hang-
man. Many of the moft noble families were extinguifhed -, others
loft their moft eminent men. Three kings, and two prefumptive
heirs of the crown, were murdered, and the nation brought to
that fhameful exigence, to fet up a young man to reign over them,
who had no better cover for his fordid extraction than a Welfh pedi-
gree, that might mew how a tailor was defcended from prince
Arthur, Cadwallader, and Brutus. But the wounds of the nation
were not to be healed with fuch a plaifter. He could not rely upon
a title made up of fuch ftuff, and patched with a marriage to a
princefs of a very queftionable birth. His own meannefs inclined
liim to hate the nobility ; and thinking it to be as eafy for them to
take the crown from him, as to give it to him, he induftrioufly ap-
plied himfelf to glean up the remainders of the houfe of York, from
whence a competitor might arife, and by all means to crufh thofe
who were moft able to oppofe him. This exceedingly weakened
the nobility, who held the balance between him and the commons,
and was the firft ftep towards the diffolution of our antient govern-
ment : but he was fo far from fettling the kingdom in peace, that
fuch rafcals as Perkin Warbeck and Simnel were able to difturb it.
The reign of Henry the Eighth was turbulent and bloody ; that of
Mary furious, and fuch as had brought us into fubjection to the moft
powerful, proud, and cruel nation at that time in the world, if God
had not wonderfully protected us. Nay, Edward the Sixth, and
queen Elizabeth, notwithftanding the natural excellency of their
difpofitions, and their knowledge of the truth in matters of religion,
were forced by that which men call " jealoufy of ftate," to foul their
hands fo often with illuftrious blood, that if their reigns deferve to
be accounted amongft the moft gentle of monarchies, they were
more heavy than the government of any commonwealth in time of
peace ; and yet their lives were never fecure againft fuch as confpired
againft them upon the account of title.
Having in fome meafure fhewed what miferies have been ufually,
if not perpetually brought upon nations fubject to monarchies, by the
violence of fome princes, and the bafenefs, folly, and cowardice, of
others,
198 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Ckap. II. otherSj together with what they have fuffered in contefts for the
feveral crowns, whilft men divided into divers factions ftrive with as
much vehemency to advance the perfon they favour, as if they or
their country were interefted in the quarrel, and fight as fiercely
for a matter as they might reafonably do to have none, I am not
able to determine which of the two evils is the moft mortal. It is
evident the vices of princes refult to the damage of the people ;
but whether pride and cruelty, or flupidity and floth, be the worft,
I cannot tell. All monarchies are fubject to be afflicted with civil
wars 3 but whether the molt frequent and bloody do arife from the
quarrels of divers competitors for crowns, before any one gain the
poffemon of them, or afterwards, through the fears of him that
would keep what he has gained, or the rage of thofe who would
wrefl it from him, is not fo eafily decided. But commonwealths are
lefs troubled with thofe diftempers. Women, children, or fuch as
are notorioufly foolifh or mad, are never advanced to the fupreme
power. Whilft the laws, and that difcipline which nourifhes virtue,
is in force, men of wifdom and valour are never wanting j and every
man defires to give teftimony of his virtue, when he knows it will
be rewarded with honour and power. If unworthy perfons creep
into magiftracies, or are by miftake any way preferred, their vices,
for the mod part, turn to their own hurt j and the ftate cannot eafily
receive any great damage by the incapacity of one who is not to con-
tinue in office above a year j and is ufually encompaffed with thofe
who having borne, or are afpiring to the fame, are by their virtue
able to fupply his defects ; cannot hope for a reward from one unable
to corrupt them, and are fure of the favour of the fenate and people
to fupport them in the defence of the public intereft. As long as this
good order continues, private quarrels are fuppreffed by the authority
of the magiftrate, or prove to be of little effect. Such as arife be-
tween the nobles and commons frequently produce good laws for the
maintenance of liberty, as they did in Rome for above three hundred
years after the expulfion of Tarquin ; and almoft ever terminate
with little or no blood. Sometimes the errors of one or both parties
are difcovered by the difcourfe of a wife and good man j and thofe
who have mofl violently oppofed one another become the beft friends,
every one joining to remove the evil that caufes the divifion. When
the fenate and people of Rome feemed to be moft furioufly incenfed
againft each other, the creation of tribunes, communication of
honours and marriages between the patrician and plebeian families, or
the mitigation of ufury, compofed all ; and thefe were not only harm-
lefs things, but fuch as gave opportunities of correcting the defects
that had been in the firit conftitution of the government, without
which they could never have attained to the greatnefs, glory, and
happinefs, they afterwards enjoyed. Such as had {qqu. that people
meeting in tumult, running through the city, crying out againft the
kings, confuls, fenate, or decemviri, might have thought they would
have filled all with blood and flaughter j but no fuch thing happened.
They defired no more than to take away the kingdom which Tarquin
had wickedly ufurped ; and never went about fo much as to punifh one
minifter of the mifchiefs he had done, or to take away his goods, till
upon
Difcourfes concerning Government ij?p
upon pretence of treating, his embaffadors by a new treachery had cafl Sect. 24.
the city into greater danger than ever. Tho' the decemviri had by the « v - —— '
like villainies equally provoked the people, they were ufed with the
like gentlenefs : Appius Claudius and Oppius having by voluntary T. Liv. 1. ill.
death fubftracted themfelves from public punifhment, their collegues
were only banifhed, and the magistracies of the city reduced to the
former order without the effufion of more blood. They who con-
tended for their juft rights, were fatisfied with the recovery of them ;
whereas fuch as follow the impulfe of an unruly ambition never think
themfelves fafe, till they have deftroyed all that feem able to difturb
them, and fatiated their rage with the blood of their adverfaries.
This makes as well as (hews the difference between the tumults of
Rome, or the feceflion of the common people to mount Aventine,
and the battles of Towton, Teuxbury, Evefhal, Lewes, Hexham,
Barnet, St. Albans, and Bofworth. It is in vain to fay thefe ought
rather to be compared to thofe of Pharfalia, Aclium, or Philippi ;
for when the laws of a commonwealth are abolifhed, the name alfo
ceafes. Whatever is done by force or fraud to fet up the interefts and
luffs of one man in oppofition to the laws of his country, is purely
and abfolutely monarchical. Whatfoever paffed between Marius, Sylla,
Cinna, Catiline, Caefar, Pompey, CrafTus, Auguftus, Antonius, and Le-
pidus, is to be imputed to the contcfts that arife between competitors
for monarchy, as well as thofe that in the next age happened between
Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vefpafian : or, which is worfe, whereas
thofe in commonwealths fight for themfelves when there is occafion,
and, if they fucceed, enjoy the fruits of their victory, fo as even thofe
who remain of the vanquished party, partake of the liberty thereby
eftabiifhed, or the good laws thereupon made ; fuch as followed the
enfigns of thefe men, who fought to fet up themfelves, did, rather
like hearts than men, hazard and fuffer many unfpeakable evils to
purchafe mifery to themfelves and their pofterity, and to make him
their matter, who, increafing in pride, avarice, and cruelty, was to be
thrown down again with as much blood as he had been fet up.
Thefe things, if I miftake not, being in the laft degree evident, I
may leave to our author all the advantages he can gain by his rhetorical
defcription of the tumults of Rome, " when blood was in the market-
" place fuckt up with fponges, and the jakes fluffed with carcafes ;"
to which he may add the crimes of Sylla's life, and the miferies of his
death : but withal I defire to know, what number of fponges were
fufficient to fuck up the blood of five hundred thoufand men flain in
one day, when the houfe of David and Jeroboam contended for the
crown of Ifrael, or of four hundred thoufand who fell in one battle,
between Joafh and Amaziah on the fame occafion; what jakes were
capacious enough to contain the carcafes of thofe that perifhed in
the quarrels between the fucceffors of Alexander ; the feveral com-
petitors for the Roman empire ; or thofe which have happened in
France, Spain, England, and other «places upon the like occafions ? If
Sylla for fome time acted as an abfolute monarch, it is no wonder that
he died like one, or that God punifhed him as Herod, Philip the
Second of Spain, and fome others, becaufe the hand of his fellow-
citizens had unjuflly fpared him. If, when he was become deteftable
E ee to
200 Difcourfes concerning Government.
'hap. 11= to God and man, he became alfo miferable, his example ought to deter
others from the crimes, that are avenged by a power which none can
efcape, and to encourage thofe who defend, or endeavour to recover,
their violated liberties, to act vigoroufly in a caule, that God does
evidently patronize.
SECT. XXV.
Courts are more fubjecl to venality and corruption than
popular governments.
r I "HOUGH court-flatterers impute many evils to popular govern-
■*- ments they no-way deferve, I could not think any fo impu-
dent as to lay corruption and venality to their charge, till I found it
in our author. They might in my opinion have taken thofe faults
upon themfelves, fince they certainly abound moft where bawds,
whores, buffoons, players, Haves, and other bafe people, who are
naturally mercenary, are moft prevalent. And whofoever would
know whether this does more frequently befal commonwealths than
monarchies, efpecially if they are abfolute, need only to inquire,
whether the Cornelii, Junii, Fabii, Valerii, Quintii, Curii, Fabritii,
and others, who moft prevailed in Rome after the expulfion of the
kings, or Sejanus, Macro, Narciflus, Pallas, Icetus, Tigellinus, Vin-
nius, Laco, Agrippina, Meifalina, Loliia, Poppasa, and the like, were
moft fubjecl to thofe bafe vices : whether it were more eafy to cor-
rupt one or two of thofe villains and ftrumpets, or the fenates and
people of Rome, Carthage, Athens, and Sparta ; and whether that
fort of rabble had more power over the princes they ferved, than
fuch as moft refembled them had whilft the popular government con-
tinued. It is in vain to fay thofe princes were wicked and vile j for
many others are fo likewife ; and when the power is in the hands of
one man, there can be no aflurance he will not be like them. Nay,
when the power is fo placed, ill men will always find opportunities
of comparting their defires : " Bonus, cautus, optimus imperator ven-
" ditur," faid Dioclefian ; and tho' he was no unwife man, yet that
which principally induced him to renounce the empire, was the im-
pombility he found of defending himfelf againft thofe that were in
credit with him, who daily betrayed and fold him. They fee with the
eyes of other men, and cannot refift the frauds that are perpetually put
upon them. Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius feem to have been
the beft and wifeft of all the Roman emperors j but the two Fauftinas
had fuch an afcendent over them, as was moft fhameful to their perfons,
and mifchievous to the empire, and the beft men in it. Such as thefe
may gain too much upon the affections of one man in the beft regu-
lated government ; but that could be of no great danger to the pub-
lic, when many others, equal or not much inferior to him in autho-
rity, are ready to oppofe whatever he mould endeavour to promote by
their impulfe : but there is no remedy, when all depends upon the
will
Difcourfes concerning Government. 20 1
will of a fingle pcrfon who is governed by them. There was more Sect. 25.
of acutenefs and jeft, than of truth, in that faying of Themiftocles, "
" That his little boy had more power than any man in Greece ; for
" he governed his mother, (he him, he Athens, and Athens Greece."
For he himfelf was found to have little power, when for private
pamons and concernments he departed from the intereft of the
public -, and the like has been found in all places that have been
governed in the like manner.
Again, corruption will always reign moft, where thofe who have
the power do moll: favour it, where the rewards of fuch crimes are
greater!:, eafleft, and moil valued, and where the punifhment of
them is leaft feared.
1. For the firft, we have already proved, that liberty cannot be
preferved, if the manners of the people are corrupted, nor abfolute
monarchy introduced where they are fincere j which is fufficient to
fhew, that thofe who manage free governments ought always, to the
utmoft of their power, to oppofe corruption, becaufe otherwife both
they and their government muft inevitably perifh ; and that on the
other hand, the abfolute monarch muft endeavour to introduce it,
becaufe he cannot fubfift without it. It is alfo fo natural for all fuch
monarchs to place men in power, who pretend to love their perfons,
and will depend upon their pleafure, that poffibly it would be hard
to find one in the world who has not made it the rule of his go-
vernment : and this is not only the way to corruption, but the moil:
dangerous of all. For tho' a good man may love a good monarch,
he will obey him only when he commands that which is juft -> and
no one can engage himfelf blindly to do whatever he is commanded,
without renouncing all virtue and religion ; becaufe he knows not
whether that which mall be commanded is confiftent with either, or
direcHy contrary to the laws of God and man. But if fuch a mo-
narch be evil, and his actions fuch as they are too often found to be,
whoever bears an affection to him, and feconds his defigns, declares
himfelf an enemy to all that is good ; and the advancement of fuch
men to power does not only introduce, foment, and increafe, cor-
ruption, but fortifies it in fuch a manner, that without an intire re-
novation of that ftate it cannot be removed. Ill men may poffibly
creep into any government ; but when the worft are placed neareft to
the throne, and raifed to honours for being fo, they will with that
force endeavour to draw all men to a conformity of fpirit with them-
felves, that it can no otherwife be prevented, than by deftroying
them, and the principle in which they live.
2 . To the fecond -, man naturally follows that which is good, or
feems to him to be fo. Hence it is, that in well-governed flates,
where a value is put upon virtue, and no one honoured, unlefs for
fuch qualities as are beneficial to the public, men are from the
tenderer!: years brought Up in a belief, that nothing in this world de-
fences to be fought after, but fuch honours as are acquired by virtuous
actions : by this means virtue itfelf becomes popular, as in Sparta,
Rome, and other places, where riches (which, with the vanity that
follows them, and the honours men give to them, are the root of all
evil) were either totally banifhed, or little regarded. When no
other
161 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. II. other advantage attended the greateft riches than the opportunity
of living more fumptuoufly or delicioufly, men of great fpirits
flighted them. When Ariftippus told Cleanthes, that if he would go
to court, and flatter the tyrant, he need not feek his fupper under a
hedge j the philofopher anfwered, that he who could content him-
felf with fuch a fupper, need not go to court, or flatter the tyrant.
Epaminondas, Ariflides, Phocion, and even the Lacedemonian
kings, found no inconvenience in poverty, whilft their virtue was
honoured, and the richefl princes in the world feared their valour
and power. It was not difficult for Curius, Fabricius, Quintius
Cincinnatus, or Paulus Emilius, to content themfelves with the
narroweft fortune, when it was no obflacle to them in the purfuit of
thofe honours which their virtues defer ved. It was in vain to think
of bribing a man who fupped upon the coleworts of his own garden.
He could not be gained by gold, who did not think it neceflary.
He that could rife from the plough to the triumphal chariot, and con-
tentedly return thither again, could not be corrupted ; and he that
left the fenfe of his poverty to his executors, who found not where-
with to bury him, might leave Macedon and Greece to the pillage of
his foldiers, without taking to himfelf any part of the booty. But
when luxury was brought into fafhion, and they came to be honoured
who lived magnificently, tho' they had in themfelves no qualities to
diftinguim them from the bafeft of llaves, the moil virtuous men
were expofed to fcorn if they were poor : and that poverty which
had been the mother and nurfe of their virtue, grew infupportable.
The poet well underflcod what effect this change had upon the
world, who faid,
" Nullum crimen abefl, facinufque libidinis, ex quo
*
the world, to deftroy it ; and that he, who by his cruelty had brought
it to the laft gafp, would have finifhed the work, if his rage had not
been extinguifhed.
Many princes not having in themfelves power to deftroy their
people, have ftirred up foreign nations againft them, and placed
the only hopes of their fafety in the public calamity 5 and law-
ful kings, when they have fallen into the nrft degree of madnefs, fo
as to afiiime a power above that which was allowed by the law, have
in fury proved equal to the worft ufurpers. Cleonymus of Sparta
was of this fort : he became, fays Plutarch, an enemy to the city, Plut. vit.
becaufe they would not allow him the abfolute power he affected ; p y"h.
and brought Pyrrhus, the fierceft of their enemies, with a mighty
and excellently well difciplined army, to deftroy them. Vortigern Math. Weft,
the Briton called in the Saxons with the ruin of his own people, who
were incenfed againft him for his lewdnefs, cruelty, and bafenefs.
King John for the like reafons offered the kingdom of England to the
Moors, and to the pope. Peter the Cruel, and other kings of Caftille,
brought vaft armies of Moors into Spain, to the ruin of their own
people, who detefted their vices, and would not part with their pri-
vileges. Many other examples of the like nature might be alledged ;
and I wifh our own experience did not too well prove that fuch
defigns are common. Let him that doubts this, examine the caufes
of the wars with Scotland in the years 1639, 1640 j the (laughters
of the proteftants in Ireland 164 1 ; the whole courfe of alliances and
treaties for the fpace of fourfcore years ; the friendfhip contracted
with the French ; frequent quarrels with the Dutch, together with
other circumftances that are already made too public : if he be not
convinced by this, he may foon fee a man in the throne, who had
rather be a tributary to France than a lawful king of England, whilft
either parliament or people fhall dare to difpute his commands,
infift upon their own rights, or defend a religion inconfiftent with
that which he has efpoufed j and then the truth will be fo evident as
to require no proof.
Grotius was never accufed of dealing hardly with kings, or laying
too much weight upon imaginary cafes j neverthelefs, amongft other
reafons, that, in his opinion, juftify fubjects in taking arms againft
their princes, he alledges this, " propter immanem fsvitiam," and De jure belli,
" quando rex in populi exitium fertur ;" inafmuch as it is " contrary
" to, and inconfiftent with, the ends for which governments are in-
" ftituted ;" which were moft impertinent, if no fuch thing could
be j for that which is not, can have no effect. There are therefore
princes who feck the deftruction of their people, or none could be
juftly oppofed on that account.
If king James was of another opinion, I could wifh the courfe of
his government had been fluted to it. When he faid, that whilft he
had the power of making judges and bifhops, he would make that to
1 be law and gofpel, which beft pleafed him, and filled thofe places
with fuch as turned both according to his will and interefts, I muft
think, that by overthrowing juftice, which is the rule of civil and
H h h moral
Difcourfes concerning Government.
moral actions, and perverting the gofpel, which is the light of the
fpiritual man, he left nothing unattempted that he durft attempt, hy
which he might bring the moft extenfive and univerfal evils upon our
nation that any can fuffer. This would ftand good, tho' princes
never erred, unlefs they were " tranfported with fome inordinate lulls j"
for it is hard to find one that does not live in the perpetual power of
them. They are naturally fubject to the impulfe of fuch appetites as
well as others, and whatever evil reigns in their nature is fomented by
education. It is the handle by which their flatterers lead them ; and
he that difcovers to what vice a prince is moil: inclined, is fure to
govern him by rendering himfelf fubfervient. In this confifts the chief
art of a courtier, and by this means it comes to pafs, that fuch lufts
as in private men are curbed by fear, do not only rage as in a wild
beaft, but are perpetually inflamed by the malice of their own fer-
vants : their hatred to the laws of God or men, that might remain
them, increafes in proportion with their vices, or their fears of being
punifhed for them. And when they are come to this, they can fet
no limits to their fury, and there is no extravagance into which they
do not frequently fall. But many of them do not expect thefe violent
motives : the perverfity of their own nature carries them to the ex-
tremities of evil. They hate virtue for its own fake, and virtuous
men for being mod unlike to themfelves. Virtue is the dictate
of reafon, or the remains of divine light, by which men are made
beneficent and beneficial to each other. Religion proceeds from the
fame fpring; and tends to the fame end j and the good of mankind
fo intirely depends upon thefe two, that no people ever enjoyed any-
thing worth defiring that was not the product: of them j and whatso-
ever anv have furfered that delerves to be abhorred and feared, has
proceeded either from the defect of thefe, or the wrath of God againft
them. If any prince therefore has been an enemy to virtue and re-
ligion, he muft alfo have been an enemy to mankind, and molt,
efpecially to the people under him. Whatfoever he does againft thofe
that excel in virtue and religion, tends to the deftruction of the people
who fubfift by them. I will not take upon me to define who they
are, or to tell the number of thofe that do this : but it is certain there
have been fuch ; and I wifh I could fay they were few in number, or
that they had lived only in paft ages. Tacitus does not fix this upon
one prince, but upon all that he writes of; and to give his readers a
C.Tacit.hift. tafte of what he was to write, he fays, " that nobility and honours
Li. " were dangerous, but that virtue brought moft certain deftruction •"
Ann. 1. xvi. an( j - m anot } ier place, that " after the llaughter of many excellent
" men, Nero refolved to cut down virtue itfelf, and therefore killed
" Thrafeas Paetus, and Bareas Soranus." And whofoever examines the
chriftian or ecclefiaftical hiftories, will find thofe princes to have been
no lefs enemies to virtue and religion than their predeceflbrs, and con-
fequently enemies to the nations under them, unlefs religion and
virtue be things prejudicial or indifferent to mankind.
But our author may fay, thefe were particular cafes ; and fo was
the llaughter of the prophets and apoftles, the crucifixion of Chrift,
and all the villainies that have ever been committed ; yet they pro-
ceeded from a univerfal principle of hatred to all that is good, exerting
itfelf
Difcourfes concerning Government. 213
itfelf as far as it could, to the ruin of mankind : and nothing but the Sect. 2
over-ruling power of God, who refolved to preferve to himfelf a
people, could fet bounds to their rage, which in other refpects had
as full fuccefs as our author, or the devil, could have wiihed.
Dionyfius (his other example of juftice) defer ves obfervation :
more falfhood, lewdnefs, treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, bafenefs,
avarice, impudence, and hatred to all manner of good, was hardly
ever known in a mortal creature. For this reafon, Diogenes feeing
him at Corinth, tho' in a poor and contemptible condition, faid, he
rather deferved to have continued in the mifery, fears, and villainies,
of his tyranny, than to be fuffered peaceably to converfe with honeft
men. And if fuch as thefe are to be called obfervers of juftice, it
muft be concluded, that the laws of God, and of men, are either of
no value, or contrary to it ; and that the deftruction of nations is a
better work than their prefervation. No faith is to be obierved :
temples may be juftly facked - 3 the beft men flain for daring to be
better than their matters ; and the whole world, if it were in the
power of one man, rightly torn in pieces and deftroyed.
His reafons for this are as good as his doctrine : cc It is,' 1 faith he,
" the multitude of people, and abundance of riches, that are the
{f glory and ftrength of every prince : the bodies of his fubjects do
the prince who makes himfelf head
of the worft, muft favour them to the overthrow of the beftj which
is fo ftreight a way to an univerfal ruin, that no ftate can prevent it,
unlefs that courfe be interrupted.
Thefe things confidered, no general judgment can be made of a
magiftrate's counfels, from his name or duty. He that is juft, and
become grateful to the people by doing good, will find his own
honour and fecurity in increafing their number, riches, virtue, and
power : if on the other fide, by doing evil, he has drawn upon him-
felf the public hatred, he will always endeavour to take from them
the power of doing him any hurt, by bringing them into the utmoft
weaknefs, poverty, and bafenefs. And whoever would know whether
any particular prince defires to increafe or deftroy the bodies and
goods of his fubje&s, muft examine whether his government be fuch
as renders him grateful or odious to them ; and whether he do pur-
fue the public intereft, or for the advancement of his own authority
let up one in himfelf contrary to that of his people ; which can never
befal a popular government, and confequently, no mifchief equal to
it can be produced by any fuch, unlefs fomething can be imagined
worfe than corruption and deftru&ion.
SECT. XXVIII.
Men living under popular or mixed governments are more
careful of the public good, than in abfolute monarchies.
/^\UR author delighting in ftrange things, does in the next place,
^-^ with an admirable fagacity, difcover two faults in popular go-
vernments, that were never found by any man before him ; and
thefe are no lefs than ignorance and negligence. Speaking of the
care of princes to preferve their fubje&s, he adds, " On the contrary,
" in a popular ftate, every man knows the public good doth not
c£ wholly depend upon his care, but the commonwealth maybe well
" enough governed by others, tho' he only tend his private bufinefs.'
And a little below, " Nor are they much to be blamed for their neg-
" ligence, fince it is an even wager their ignorance may be as great.
" The magiftrates amongft the people being for the moft part annual,
" do always lay down their office before they underftand it ; fo as a
& ^P retores legist nee judicabant, nee judicabantur;" proud, in-
folent, and contemners of the law, who would neither judge, nor fubmit
to judgment as the law commanded. The fruits they gathered were
fuitable to the feed they had fown : their crimes were not left un-
punished: they who defpifed the law, were deflroyed without law;
and when no ordinary courfe could be taken againft them for their
exceftes, they were overthrown by force, and the crown within the
fpace of a few years tranfported into nine feveral families, with the
utter extirpation of thofe that had poffeffed it. On the other hand,
there never was any fedition againft the Spartan kings ; and after
the moderate difcipline, according to which they lived, was eftablifhed,
none of them died by the hands of their fubjects, except only
two, who were put to death in a way of juftice : the kingdom con-
tinued in the fame races, till Cleomenes was defeated by Antigonus,
and the government overthrown by the infolence of the Macedonians.
This gave occalion to thofe beftial tyrants Nabis and Machanidas to
fet up fuch a government as our author recommends to the world,
which immediately brought deftruction upon themfelves, and the
whole city. The Germans, who pretended to be defcended from the
Spartans, had the like government. Their princes, according to their
Tacit. demo- merit had the credit of perfuading, not the power of commanding;
rib. Germ, and the queftion was not, what part of the government their kings
would allow to the nobility and people, but what they would give
to their kings ; and it is not much material to our prefent difpute,
whether they learnt this from fome obfeure knowledge of the law
which God gave to his people, or whether, led by the light of rea-
fon, which is alfo from God, they difcovered what was altogether con-
formable to that law. Whoever underftands the affairs of Germany,
knows that the prefent emperors, notwithstanding their haughty
title, have a power limited as in the days of Tacitus. If they are
good and wife, they may perfuade ; but they can command no far-
ther than the law allows. They do not admit the princes, noble-
men, and cities, to the power which they all exercife in their general
diets, and each of them within their own precincts ; but they exer-
cife that which has been by public confent beftowed upon them. All
the kingdoms peopled from the north obferved the fame rules.
In all of them the powers were divided between the kings, the nobi-
lity, clergy, and commons; and by the decrees of councils,
diets, parliaments, cortez, and aftemblies of eftates, authority and
liberty were fo balanced, that fuch princes as aftumed to themfelves
more than the law did permit, were feverely punifhed; and thofe
who
Difcourles concerning Government. 233
who did by force or fraud invade thrones, were by force thrown Sect. 30.
down from them. 1— ~v-— ■*
This was equally beneficial to kings and people. The powers, as
Theopompus king of Sparta faid, were moil fafe, when they were
lead envied and hated. Lewis the Eleventh of France was one of the
firft that broke this golden chain ; and, by more fubtil arts than had
been formerly known, fubverted the laws, by which the fury of thofe
kings had been reftrained, and taught others to do the like ; tho' all
of them have not fo well faved themfelves from puniihment. James
the Third of Scotland was one of his moft apt fcholars; and*
Buchanan, in his life, fays, " that he was precipitated into all manner
" of infamy by men of the moil abject condition ; that the corruption
" of thofe times, and the ill example of neighbouring princes, were
— v ~~»*j ration by which they fubfifl, and teaches fubjects not to keep faith
with thofe, who by the moll malicious deceits mew, that they are
tied by none. Human focieties are maintained by mutual contracts,
which are of no value if they are not obfcrved. Laws are made,
and magiflrates created, to caufe them to be performed in public and
private matters, and to punifh thofe who violate them. But none
will ever be obferved, if he who receives the greateft benefit by
them, and is fet up to overfee others, give the example to thole
who of themfelves are too much inclined to break them. The firfl
Suarum le- flep that Pompey made to his own ruin was, by violating the laws
gum lator & he himfelf had propofed. But it would be much worfe for kin^s to
Tacit^ break thofe that are eflablifhed by the authority of a whole people,
and confirmed by the fucceffion of manv ages.
I am far from laying any fuch blemifhes on them, or thinking that
they deferve them. I muft believe the French king fpeaks fincerely,
when he fays he can do nothing againfl the laws of his country :
and that our king James did the like, when he acknowledged him-
felf to be the fervant of the commonwealth 5 and the rather, be-
caufe it is true, and that he is placed in the throne to that end. No-
thing is more effential and fundamental in the conflitutions of king-
doms, than that diets, parliaments, and affemblies of eftates, mould
fee this performed. It is not the king that gives them a right to judge
of matters of war or peace, to grant fupplies of men and money, or
to deny them ; and to make or abrogate laws at their pleafure : all
the powers rightly belonging to kings, or to them, proceed from the
fame root. The northern nations feeing what mifchiefs were ge-
nerally brought upon the eaflern, by referring too much to the ir-
regular will of a man - y and what thofe who were more generous had
fuffered, when one man by the force of a corrupt mercenary foldiery
had overthrown the laws by which they lived, feared they might
fall into the fame mifery ; and therefore retained the greater part of
the power to be exercifed by their general arTemblies, or by delegates,
when^ they grew fo numerous that they could not meet. Thefe are
Dejur. bel. the kingdoms of which Grotius fpeaks, " where the king has his
& pac. 1. ii. « p art) and t h e f enate or p e0 pl e t ] ie ir part of the fupreme authority ;"
Ibid. and where the law prefcribes fuch limits, " that if the king attempt
he
is pleafed only to affirm it, without giving the leaft fhadow of a reafon
10 perfuade us to believe him. This might juftify me, if I fhould
reject
Difcourfes concerning Government. 2^3
reject his affertion as a thing faid gratis : but I may fafely go a ftep Sect, i
farther, and affirm, that men lived under laws before there were
any kings ; which cannot be denied, if fuch a power neceffarily be-
longs to kings as he afcribes to them. For Nimrod, who eftablifhed
his kingdom in Babel, is the firft who by the fcripture is faid to have
been a mighty one in the earth. He was therefore the nrft king, or
kings were not mighty ; and he being the firft king, mankind muft
have lived till his time without laws, or elfe laws were made before
kings. To fay that there was then no law, is in many refpects moil
abfurd ; for the nature of man cannot be without it, and the violences
committed by ill men before the flood, could not have been blamed
if there had been no law ; for that which is not, cannot be tranfgrefled.
Cain could not have feared, that every man who met him would flay
him, if there had not been a law to (lay him that had flain another.
But in this cafe the fcripture is clear, at leaft from the time that Noah
went out of the ark j for God then gave him a law fufficient for the
ftate of things at that time, if all violence was prohibited under the
name of fhedding blood, tho' not under the fame penalty as mur-
der. But penal laws being in vain, if there be none to execute them,
fuch as know God does nothing in vain, may conclude, that he who
gave this law, did appoint fome way for its execution, tho' unknown
to us. There is therefore a law not given by kings, but laid upon
fuch as mould be kings, as well as on any other perfons, by one who
is above them j and perhaps I may fay, that this law preffeth moft
upon them, becaufe they who have moft power, do moft frequently
break out into acts of violence, and moft of all difdain to have their
will reftrained : and he that will exempt kings from this kw, muft
either find, that they are excepted in the text, or that God who gave
it has not a power over them.
Moreover, it has been proved at the beginning of this treatife, that
the nrft kings were of the accurfed race, and reigned over the accurf-
ed nations, whilft the holy feed had none. If therefore there was
no law where there was no king, the accurfed pofterity of Ham had
laws, when the Hefted defcendents of Shem had none, which is moft
abfurd ; the word ,{ outlaw," or " lawlefs," being often given to the
wicked, but never to the juft and righteous.
The impious folly of fuch aflfertions goes farther than our author
perhaps fufpected : for if there be no law where there is no king,
the Ifraelites had no law till Saul was made king, and then the law
they had was from him. They had no king before, for they afked
one. They could not have afked one of Samuel, if he had been a
king. He had not been offended, and God had not imputed to them
the fin of rejecting him, if they had afked that only which he had
fet over them. If Samuel were not king, Mofes, Jofhua, and the
other judges, were not kings j for they were no more than he. They
had therefore no king, and confequently, if our author fay true, no
law. If they had no law till Saul was king, they never had any -,
for he gave them none ; and the prophets were to blame for denounc-
ing judgments againft them for receding from, or breaking their law ;
if they had none. He cannot fay that Samuel gave them a Jaw ; for « Sam. x,
that which he wrote in a book, and laid up before the Lord, was not a
law
294 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. * aw to tne people, but to the king. If it had been a law to the
i—— y-*— ' people, it muft have been made public ; but as it was only to the king,
he laid it up before God, to teftify againft him if he fhould adventure
to break it. Or if it was a law to the people, the matter is not
mended j for it was given in the time of a king by one who was not
king. But in truth it was the law of the kingdom by which he was
king, and had been wholly impertinent, if it was not to bind him *
for it was given to no other perfon, and to no other end.
Our author's affertion, upon which all his doctrine is grounded,
to ends contrary to thofe for
fuTbeL C which it was given, becaufe he thereby deftroys it, and puts himfelf
into the fame condition as if it had never been. This is proved by the
example of Saul ; tho' the people finned grievoufly in afking a kin^,
yet God affenting to their demand, no prince was ever more fo-
lemnly
Difeourfes concerning Government. 2^5?
lemnly inftituted than he. The people chofe him by lot from Sect. t.
amongft all the tribes, and he was placed in the throne by the ge-
neral confent of the whole nation : but he, turning his lawful power
into tyranny, difobeying the word of the prophet, flaying the
priefts, fparing the Amalekites, and opprefling the innocent, over-
threw his own right; and God declared the kingdom, which had
been given him, under a conditional promife of perpetuity, to be in-
tirely abrogated. This did not only give a right to the whole people
of oppoling him, but to every particular man ; and upon this account
David did not only fly from his fury, but refifted it. He made
himfelf head of all the difcontented perfons that would follow hjm :
he had at firft four, and afterwards fix hundred men ; he kept thefe
in arms againfl: Saul, and lived Upon the country ; and refolved to de-
ftroy Nabal, with all his houfe, only for refilling to fend provifions
for his men. Finding himfelf weak and unfafe, he went to Achifh
the Philiftine, and offered his fervice even againft Ifrael. This was
never reputed a fin in David, or in thofe that followed him, by any
except the wicked court-flatterer Doeg the Edomite, and the drunken
fool Nabal, who is faid to have been a man of Belial.
If it be objected, that this was rather a flight than a war, inaf-
much as he neither killed Saul nor his men, or that he made war as
a king anointed by Samuel ; I anfwer, that he who had fix hundred
men, and entertained as many as came to him, fufBciently fhewed
his intention rather to refill; than to fly : and no other reafon can be
given why he did not farther purfue that intention, than that he had
no greater power : and he who arms fix hundred men againil: his
prince, when he can have no more, can no more be faid to obey pa-
tiently, than if he had fo many hundreds of thoufands. This holds,
tho' he kill no man •, for that is not the war, but the manner of making
it : and it were as abfurd to fay, David made no war, becaufe he
killed no men, as that Charles the Eighth made no war in Italy, be-
caufe Guicciardin fays, he conquered Naples without breaking a
lance. But as David's ftrength increafed, he grew to be lefs fparing
of blood. Thofe who fay, kings never die, but that the right is
immediately transferred to the next heirs, cannot deny that Ifhbofheth
inherited the right of Saul, and that David had no other right of
making war againfl: him, than againfl: Saul, unlefs it were conferred
upon him by the tribe of Judah, that made him king. If this be
true, it muft be confefled, that not only a whole people, but a part of
them, may at their own pleafure abrogate a kingdom, tho' never fo
well eftablifhed by common confent j for none was ever more fo-
lemnly inftituted than that of Saul ; and few fubjects have more
ftrongly obliged themielvcs to be obedient. If it be not true, the
example of Nabal is to be followed ; and David, tho' guided by the
Spirit of God, deferves to be condemned as a fellow that rofe up
againfl: his mafter.
If to elude this it be faid, that God inftituted and abrogated Saul's
kingdom, and that David, to whom the right was tranfmitted, might
therefore proceed againfl him and his heirs as private men ; I anfwer,
that if the obedience due to Saul proceeded from God's inftitution,
it can extend to none, but thofe who are fo peculiarly inftituted and
Uuu anointed
z6o Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. anointed by his command, and the hand of his prophet, which will
\-*-V""— ' be of little advantage to the kings, that can give no teftimony of fuch
an inftitution or unction -, and an indifputable right will remain to
every nation of abrogating the kingdoms which are inftituted by
and for themfelves. But as David did refift the authority of Saul
and Ifhbofheth, without afTuming the power of a king, tho' defigned
by God, and anointed by the prophet, till he was made king of
Judah by that tribe ; or arrogating to himfelf a power over the other
tribes, till he was made king by them, and had entered into a cove-
nant with them ; it is much more certain, that the perfons and autho-
rity of ill kings, who have no title to the privileges due to Saul by
virtue of his inftitution, may be juftly refilled ; which is as much as
is necefTary to my purpofe.
i Sam. xxvi. Object. But David's heart fmote him, when he had cut off the fkirt
of Saul's garment, and he would not fuffer Abifhai to kill him. This
might be of fome force, if it were pretended, that every man was ob-
liged to kill an ill king, whenfoever he could do it, which I think no
man ever did fay -, and no man having ever affirmed it, no more can
be concluded than is confefled by all. But how is it poftible, that a
man of a generous fpirit, like to David, could fee a great and valiant
king, chofen from amongft all the tribes of Ifrael, anointed by
the command of God, and the hand of the prophet, famous for victo-
ries obtained againft the enemies of Ifrael, and a wonderful deliver-
ance thereby purchafed to that people, caft at his feet to receive life
or death from the hand of one whom he had fo furioufly perfecuted,
and from whom he leaft deferved, and could leaft expect mercy,
without extraordinary commotion of mind j moft efpecially when
Abifhai, who faw all that he did, and thereby ought beft to have
known his thoughts, exprefTed fo great a readinefs to kill him ? This
could not but make him reflect upon the inftability of all that feemed
to be moft glorious in men, and ihew him, that if Saul, who had been
named even among the prophets, and affifted in an extraordinary
manner to accomplifh fuch great things, was fo abandoned and given
over" to fury, mifery, and fhame, he that feemed to be moft firmly
eftablifhed ought to take care left he fhould fall.
Surely thefe things are neither to be thought ftrange in relation to
Saul, who was God's anointed, nor communicable to fuch as are not:
fome may fuppofe he was king by virtue of God's unction (tho' if
that were true, he had never been chofen and made king by the
people) ; but it were madnefs to think, he became God's anointed by
being king : for if that were fo, the fame right and title would belong
to every king, even to thofe, who by his command were accurfed and
deftroyed by his fervants Mofes, Jofliua, and Samuel, The fame
.men, at the fame time, and in the fame fenfe, would be both his
anointed and accurfed, loved and detefted by him; and the moft
facred privileges made to extend to the worft of his enemies.
Again ; the war made by David, was not upon the account of be^
ing king, as anointed by Samuel, but upon the common natural right
of defending himfelf againft the violence and fury of a wicked man ;
he trufted to the promife, " that he fhould be king," but knew that
as yet he was not fo : and when Saul found he had fpared his life, he
faid,
Difcourfes concerning Government. 16 1
faid, ct I now know well, that thou {halt furely be king, and that the Sect. i„
ct kingdom of Ifrael mall furely be eftablimed in thy hand j" not that *— — v— » *
it was already. Nay David himfelf was fo far from taking upon him l Sam * XXiV *
to be king, till the tribe of Judah had chofen him, that he often
acknowledged Saul to be his lord. When Baanah and Rechab
brought the head of Imbofheth to him, he commanded them to be
flain j " becaufe they had killed a righteous man upon his bed, in his 2 Sam. iv,
" own houfe $" which he could not have faid, if Iihbofheth had un-
juftly detained from him the ten tribes, and that he had a right to
reign over them before they had chofen him. The word of God did
not make him king, but only foretold, that he mould be king j and
by fuch ways as he pleafed prepared the hearts of the people to fet
him up ; and till the time dengned by God for that work was ac-
complifhed, he pretended to no other authority, than what the fix
hundred men who nrfr. followed him, afterwards the tribe of Judah,
and at laft all the reft of the people, conferred upon him.
I no way defend Abfalom's revolt j he was wicked, and acted
wickedly j but after his death no man was ever blamed or queftioned
for iiding with him : and Amafa, who commanded his army, is re-
prefented in fcripture as a good man, even David faying, that Joab,
by flaying Abner and Amafa, had killed '* two men who were better 2 Sam. xx.
" than himfelf j" which could not have been, unlefs the people had
a right of looking into matters of government, and of redreffing
abufes : tho', being deceived by Abfalom, they fo far erred, as to
prefer him, who was in all refpe&s wicked, before the man, who,
except in the matter of Uriah, is faid to be after God's own heart.
This right was acKnowledged by David himfelf, when he commanded
Hufhai to fay to Abfalom, " I will be thy fervant O king 3" and by 2 Kings.
Hufhai in the following chapter, " Nay, but whom the Lord, and
" his people, and all the men of Ifrael chufe, his will I be, and with
" him will I abide :" which could have no fenfe in it, unlefs the
people had a right of chufing, and that the choice in which they
generally concurred, was efteemed to be from God.
But if Saul, who was made king by the whole people, and anoint-
ed by the command of God, might be lawfully refitted when he de-
parted from the law of his inftitution j it cannot be doubted, that
any other, for the like reafon, may be refifted. If David, tho' de-
signed by God to be king, and anointed by the hand of the prophet,
was not king till the people had chofen him, and he had made a
covenant with them ; it will, if I miftake not, be hard to find a man
who can claim a right which is not originally from them. And if
the people of Ifrael could erect, and pull down, inftitute, abrogate,
or transfer to other perfons or families, kingdoms more firmly
eftablifhed than any we know, the fame right cannot be denied to
other nations.
SECT.
%6i Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III.
SECT. It.
The kings of Ifrael and Judah were under a law not
fafely to be tranfgreffed.
OUR author might be pardoned if he only vented his own follies ;
but he aggravates his own crime, by imputing them to men of
more credit ; and tho' I cannot look upon Sir Walter Raleigh as a
very good interpreter of fcripture, he had too much underftanding
to fay, " That if practice declare the greatnefs of authority, even
" the beft kings of Ifrael and Judah were not tied to any law, but
" they did whatfoever they pleafed in the greateft matters j" for there
is no fenfe in thofe words. " If practice declares the greatnefs of
" authority, even the beft were tied to no law," iignifies nothing, for
practice cannot declare the greatnefs of authority. Peter the Cruel of
Caftile, and Chriftiern the Second of Denmark, killed whom they
pleafed ; but no man ever thought they had therefore a right to do
fo : and if there was a law, all were tied by it, and the beft were
2 1. hift. l e f s likely to break it than the worft. But if Sir Walter Raleigh's
ca P- ! 9» opinion, which he calls a conjecture, be taken, there was fo great a
difference between the kings of Ifrael and Judah, that as to their
general proceedings in point of power, hardly any thing can be faid
which may rightly be applied to both -, and he there endeavours to
fliew, that the reafon why the ten tribes did not return to the houfe
of David, after the deftruction of the houfes of Jeroboam and Baafha,
was, becaufe they would not endure a power fo abfolute as that
which was exercifed by the houfe of David. If he has therefore
any-where faid, that the kings did what they pleafed, it muft be in
the fenfe that Mofes Maimonides fays, the kings of Ifrael committed
many extravagancies, becaufe they were * " infolent, impious, and
" defpifers of the law." But whatfoever Sir Walter Raleigh may
fay (for I do not remember his words, and have not leifure to feek
whether any fuch are found in his books), it is moil: evident, that
they did not what they pleafed. The tribes, that did not fubmit to
David, nor crown him till they thought fit, and then made a covenant
with him, took care it might be obferved, whether he would or not.
Abfalom's rebellion, followed by almoft all Ifrael, was a terrible check
to his will. That of Sheba, the fon of Bichri, was like to have been
worfe, if it had not been fupprefTed by Joab's diligence ; and David
often confefTed the fons of Zeruiah were too hard for him. Solomon
indeed, overthrowing the law given by Mofes, multiplying gold and
iilver, wives and horfes, introducing idolatry, and lifting up his
heart above his brethren, did what he pleafed j but Rehoboam paid
for all : the ten tribes revolted from him, by reafon of the heavy
burdens laid upon them ; ftoned Adoram, who was fent to levy the
tributes, and fet up Jeroboam, who, as Sir Walter Raleigh fays in the
place before cited, had no other title than the courtefy of the people,
and
* Quia fuperbi erant corde, impif, & fpretorfr leg?s, Mor. Nevoch.
Difcourfes concerning Government. 263
and utterly rejected the houfe of David. If practice therefore de- Sect. z.
clares a right, the practice of the people to avenge the injuries they u.-v*» J
fuffered from their kings, as foon as they found a man fit to be their
leader, fhews they had a right of doing it. ^
It is true, the bcft of the kings, with Mofes, Jofhua, and Samuel,
may in one fenfe be faid to have done what they pleafed, becaufe
they defired to do that only which was good. But this will hardly be
brought to confer a right upon all kings : and I deny, that even the
kings of Judah did what they pleafed, or that it were any thing to our
queftion, if they did. Zedekiah profefled to the great men (that is,
to the fanhedrin), " that without them he could do nothing." When Jer. xxxviii.
Amaziah, by his folly, had brought a great flaughter upon the tribe
of Judah, they confpired againft him in public council : whereupon
he fled to Lachifh, and they, purfuinghim thither, killed him, avowed 2 Kings xiv,
the fact, and it was neither queftioned, nor blamed : which examples
agree with the paraphrafe of Jofephus on Deut. xvii. * c He mall do Antiq. Jud.
" nothing without the confent of the fanhedrin ; and if he attempt
" it, they mall hinder him. :> This was the law of God, not to be
abrogated by man ; a law of liberty directly oppofite to the necemty
of fubmitting to the will of a man. This was a gift beftowed by
God upon his children and people -, whereas flavery was a great part
of the curfe denounced againft Ham for his wickednefsj and perpe-
tually incumbent upon his pofterity. The great fanhedrin were con-
ftituted judges, as Grotius fays, moft particularly of fuch matters as
concerned their kings ; and Maimonides affirms, that the kings were
judged by them : the diftribution of the power to the inferior fan-
hedrins, in every tribe and city, with the right of calling the people
together in general afTemblies as often as occafion required, were
the foundations of their liberty ; and, being added to the law of the
kingdom, prefcribed in the xviith of Deuteronomy (if they mould think
fit to have a king), eftablifTied the freedom of that people upon a
folid foundation. And tho' they in their fury did in a great meafure
wave the benefits God had beftowed upon them 5 yet there was
enough left to reftrain the lufts of their kings. Ahab did not treat
with Naboth, as with a fervant, whofe perfon and eftate depended
upon his will ; and does not feem to have been fo tender-hearted to
grieve much for his refufal, if by virtue of his royal authority he
could have taken away his vineyard, and his life : but, that failing, he
had no other way of accomplifhing his defign, than by the fraud of
his accurfed wife, and the perfidious wretches fhe employed. And
no better proof, that it did fail, can reafonably be required, than that
he was obliged to have recourfe to fuch fordid, odious, and dangerous
remedies : but we are furnifhed with one, that is more unqueftionable ;
" Haft thou killed, and alfo taken pofTeffion ? In the place where dogs t Kings xxi.
" licked the blood of Naboth, fhall they lick thy blood, even thine."
This fhews, that the kings were not only under a law, but under a
law of equality with the reft of the people, even that of retaliation.
He had raifed his heart above his brethren: but God brought him
down, and made him to fuffer what he had done j he was in all re-
fpects wicked, but the juftice of this fentence confifted in the law he
had broken, which could not have been, if he had been fubject to none.
X x x But
264 Difcourfes concerning Government
Chap. III. But as this retaliation was the fum of all the judicial law given by
" God to his people, the fentence pronounced againft Ahab, in confor-
mity to it, and the execution committed to Jehu, fhews, that the
kings were no lefs obliged to perform the law, than other men, tho*
they were not fo eafily puniihed for tranfgrefiing it, as others were ;
and, if many of them did efcape, it perfectly agrees with what had
been foretold by Samuel.
SECT. III.
Samuel did not defcribe to the Ifraelites the glory of a free
monarchy ; but the evils the people fhould fuffer, that
he might divert them from deft ring a king.
HO' no reftraint had been put upon the lufts of the Hebrew
kings, it could be no prejudice to any other nation. They
deflected from the law of God : and, rejecting him, that he fhould
reign over them no longer, they fell into that mifery, which could af-
fect none, but thofe who enjoy the fame bleffings, and with the fame
fury defpife them. If their kings had more power than confifted
with their welfare, they gave it, and God renounces the inftitution of
* fuch. He gave them a law of liberty ; and if they fell into the
fhame and mifery, that accompanies flavery, it was their own work.
They were not obliged to have any king ; and could not without a
crime have any but one, who muft not raife his heart above the reft
of them. This was taught by Mofes : and Samuel, who fpoke by
the fame fpirit, could not contradict him ; and in telling the people,
what fuch a king as they defired would do when he fhould be eiia-
blifhed, he did announce to them the mifery they would bring upon
themfelves, by chufing fuch a one, as he had forbidden. This free
monarchy, which our author thinks to be fo majeftically defcribed,
was not only difpleafing to the prophet, but declared by God to be a
rejection of him, and inconfiftent with his reign over them. This
might have been fufficient to divert any other people from their furious
refolution; but the prophet, farther enforcing his diffuafion, told
them, that God (who had in all other cafes been their helper) would
not hear them when they fhould cry to him by reafon of their king.
This is the majeftic defcription of that free monarchy, with which
our author is fo much pleafed : it was difpleafing to the prophet,
hateful to God, an aggravation of all the crimes they had committed
fince they came out of Egypt, and that which would bring (as it did)
moft certain and irreparable deftruction upon themfelves.
But it feems, the regal majefty in that age was in its infancy,
and little in comparifon of that, which we find defcribed by Tacitus,
Suetonius, and others, in later times. " He fhall take your ions/' fays
Samuel, " and fet them over his chariots, and your daughters to
" make
* " Ye have chofen kings, but not by me j and princes, but I know them not." Hof.
Difcourfes concerning Government 26$
or that they who did confer
the crown upon any of them, did alfo give a propriety in the land ;
which I do not find in any of the fifteen or iixteen titles that have
been fince the coming in of the Normans : and if it was not done to
the firft of every one, it cannot accrue to the others, unlefs by fome
new act to the fame pur pole, which will not eafily be produced.
It will be no lefs difficult to prove, that any thing unworthy of
freemen is by any tenures impoied in England, unlefs it be the offer-
ing up of the wives and daughters of tenants to the luff of abbots
and monks ; and they are fo far from being willingly fuffered, that
iince the dens and nurieries of thofe beafts were abolifhed, no man
that fucceeds them has had impudence fufficient to exact the perform-
ance ; and tho' the letter of the law may favour them, the turpi-
tude of the thing has extinguished the ufage.
But even the kings of Ifrael and Judah, who brought upon the
people thofe evils that had been foretold by Samuel, did not think
they had a right to the powers they exercifed. If the law had given
a right to Ahab to take the beft of their vineyards, he might without
ceremony have taken that of Naboth,, and by the majeftic power of
an abfolute monarch, have chaftifed the churliih clown, who re-
fiifed to fell or change it for another : but for want of it, he was
obliged to take a very different courfe. If the lives of fubjects had
in the like manner depended upon the will of kings, David might
without fcruple have killed Uriah, rather than to place him in the
front of the army, that he might fall by his own courage. The
malice and treachery of fuch proceedings argues a defect of power - y
and he that acts in fuch an oblique manner, mews, that his actions
are not warranted by the law, which is boldly executed in the face of
the fun. This mews the interpretation put upon the words, " againft
Pfal. li. " thee only have I finned," by court-flatterers, to be falfe. If he had
not finned againit Bathfheba, whom he corrupted, Uriah whom he
caufed to be killed, the people that he fcandalized, and the law which
he violated, he had never endeavoured to cover his guilt by fo vile a
fraud. And as he did not thereby fly the fight of God, but of men,
it is evident, that he in that action feared men more than God.
If by the examples of Ilrael and Judah we may judge, whether
the inconveniences and miferies brought upon nations by their kings be
tolerable or intolerable, it will be enough to confider the madnefs of
Saul's cruelty towards his fubjects, and the flaughter brought upon them
by the hand of the Philiftines on mount Gilboa, where he fell with the
flower of all Ifrael ; the civil wars that happened in the time of David,
and the plague brought upon the people by his wickednefs ; the heavy
burdens laid upon them by Solomon, and the idolatry favoured by
him ; the wretched folly of Rehoboam, and the defection of the ten
tribes caufed by it ; the idolatry eftablifhed by Jeroboam, and the
kings
Difcourfes concerning Government. 273
kings of Ifrael, and that of many of thofe of Judah alfo ; the fre- Sect. 6.
quent wars, and unheard of flaughters enfuing thereupon between *- - V '- 1
the tribes -, the daily devaluations of the country by all forts of
Grangers ; the murders of the prophets j the abolition of God's
worfhip ; the defolation of towns and provinces j the captivity of
the ten tribes carried away into unknown countries $ and, in the
end, the abolition of both kingdoms, with the captivity of the tribe
of Judah, and the utter deftruction of the city. It cannot be faid,
that thefe things were furTered under kings, and not from or by
them ; for the defolation of the cities, people, and country, is, in
many places of fcripture, imputed to the kings that taught Ifrael to
fin, as appears by what was denounced againfr. Jeroboam, Jehu, Ahaz, l ^ ln gs XIV /
ManaiTeh, Zedekiah, and others. Nay, the captivity of Babylon, \ Kin© xx '
with the evils enfuing, were firft announced to Hezekiah for his vanity;
and Jofiah, by the like, brought a great flaughter upon himfelf and
people. But if mifchiefs fell upon the people by the frailty of thefe,
who, after David, were the beft, nothing furely lefs than the utmofb
of all miferies could be expected from fuch as were fet to do evil,
and to make the nation like to themfelves, in which they met with
too great fuccefs.
If it be pretended, that God's people, living under an extraordinary
difpenfation, can be no example to us, I defire other hiftories may
be examined ; for, I confefs, I know no nation fo great, happy, and
profperous, nor any power, fo well eftablifhed, that two or three ill
kings, immediately fucceeding each other, have not been able to de-
ftroy, and bring to fuch a condition, that it appeared the nations
mult perifh, unlefs the fenates, diets, and other aflemblies of flate,
had put a fbop to the mifchief, by reftraining or depofing them ; and
tho' this might be proved by innumerable teftimonies, I (hall con-
tent myfelf with that of the Roman empire, which periihed by the
vices, corruption, and bafenefs, of their princes : the noble king-
dom of the Goths in Spain overthrown by the tyranny of Witza
and Rodrigo : the prefent ftate of Spain now languishing, and threat-
ning ruin from the fame caufes : France brought to the laft degree
of mifery and weaknefs by the degenerate races of Pharamond and
Charles, preferved and reftored by the virtues of Pepin and Capet 3
to which may be added thofe of our own country, which are fo
well known that I need not mention them.
SECT. VI.
It is not good for fuch nations as will have kings, to
fuffer them to be glorious, powerful, or abounding in
riches.
OUR author having hitherto fpoken of all nations, as born un-
der a neceffity of being fubjecl; to abfolute monarchy, which he
pretends to have been fet up by the univerfal and" indifpenfable law
of God and nature, now feems to leave to their difcretion, whether
they
274 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. Ill- tne y Wl ^ nave a king or not J but ^ a y s > tnat thofe " who will have a
" king, are bound to allow him royal maintenance, by providing re-
" venues for the crown ; fince it is for the honour, profit, and fafety,
{C of the people, to have their king glorious, powerful, and abound-
" ing in riches." If there be any thing of fenfe in this claufe, there
is nothing of truth in the foundation or principle of his whole book.
For as the right and being of a father is natural or inherent, and no-
ways depending upon the will of the child ; that of a king is fo alfo,
if he be, and ought to enjoy the rights belonging to the father of the
people : and it is not lefs ridiculous to fay, " thofe who will have a
" king," than it would be to fay, " he that will have a father j" for
every one mull have one whether he will or not. But if the king be
a father, as our author from thence infers, that all laws are from him,
none can be impofed upon him ; and whatfoever the fubjecT: enjoys is
by his conceffions : it is abfurd to fpeak of an obligation lying upon
the people to allow him royal maintenance, by providing revenues,
fince he has all in himfelf, and they have nothing, that is not from
him, and depending upon his will. For this reafon a worthy gentle-
man of the houfe of commons, in the year ] 640. defired, that the
bufinefs of the judges, who in the ftar-chamber had given for their
opinion concerning fhip-money, " that, in cafes of neceffity, the king
" might provide it by his own authority, and that he was judge of
tc that neceffity," might be firft examined, that they might know
whether they had any thing to give, before they mould fpeak of
giving. And as it is certain, that if the fentence of thofe perjured
wretches had flood, the fubjects of England by confequence would
have been found to have nothing to give ; it is no lefs fure, that if
our author's principle concerning the paternal and abfolute power of
kings be true, it will, by a more compendious way, appear, that it
is not left to the choice of any nation, whether they will have a king
or not ; for they muft have him, and can have nothing to allow him,
but muft receive all from him.
But if thofe only who " will have a king," are bound to have one,
and to allow this " royal maintenance," fuch as will not have a king,
are, by one and the fame act, delivered from the neceffity of having
one, and from providing maintenance for him ; which utterly over-
throws the magnificent fabric of paternal monarchy ; and the
kings, who were lately reprefented by our author, placed on the
throne by God and nature, and endowed with an abfolute power
over all, appear to be purely the creatures of the people, and to
have nothing but what is received from them.
From hence it may be rationally inferred, that * he who makes a
thing to be, makes it to be only what he pleafes. This muft hold in
relation to kings as well as other magiftrates ; and as they who made
confuls, dictators, and military tribunes, gave them only fuch
power, and for fuch a time, as beft pleafed themfelves, it is impof-
fible they fhould not have the fame right in relation to kings, in
making them what they pleafe, as well as not to make them unlefs
they pleafe ; except there be a charm belonging to the name, or the
letters
* Qui dat efle, dat modum efle.
Difcourfes concerning Government. 279
letters that compofe it 3 which cannot belong to all nations ; for they Sect. 6.
are different in every one according to their feveral languages v— -y^— <
But, fays our author, it is iC for the honour, profit, and fafety of the
" people, tha tth eking mould be glorious, powerful, and abounding in
" riches." There is therefore no obligation upon them, and they are to
judge whether it be fo or not. The fcripture fays plainly the contrary:
" He fhall not multiply filver and gold, wives and horfes: he (hall not D -
'* lift up his heart above his brethren." He mall not therefore be glo-
rious, powerful, or abounding in riches. Reafon and experience
teach us the fame thing: if thole nations, that have been proud, luxu-
rious, and vicious, have defired by pomp and riches to foment the
vices of their princes, thereby to cheriih their own; fuch as have ex-
celled in virtue, and good difcipline, have abhorred it - y and, except
the immediate exercite of their office, have kept their fupreme ma-
giftrates to a manner of living little different from that of private
men: and it had been impoffible to maintain that frugality, in which
the integrity of their manners did chiefly confift, if they had fet up
an example directly contrary to it, in him who was to be an example
to others ; or to provide for their own fafety, if they had overthrown
that integrity of manners by which it could only be obtained and
preferved. There is a neceffity incumbent upon every nation that
lives in the like principle, to put a flop to the entrance of thofe vices
that arife from the fuperfluity of riches, by keeping their kings in
that honeft poverty, which is the mother and nurfe of modefty,
fobriety and all manner of virtue: and no man can deny this to
be well done, unlefs he will affirm, that pride, luxury, and vice, is
more profitable to a nation, than the virtues that are upheld by fru-
gality.
There is another reafon of no lefs importance to thofe nations,
who, tho' they think fit to have kings, yet defire to preferve their
liberty, which obliges them to fet limits to the glory, power, and
riches of their kings ; and that is, That they can no otherwife be
kept within the rules of the law. Men are naturally propenfe to
corruption; and if he, whofe will and interest it is to corrupt them,
be furnifhed with the means, he will never fail to do it. Power, ho-
nours, riches, and the pleafures that attend them, are the baits by
which men are drawn to prefer a perfonal interefl before the public
good j and the number of thofe who covet them, is fo great, that he
who abounds in them will be able to gain fo many to his fervice as
fhall be fufficient to fubdue the reft. It is hard to find a tyranny in
the world that has not been introduced this way ; for no man by his
own ftrength could ever fubdue a multitude ; none could ever bring
many to be fubfervient to his ill defigns, but by the rewards they re-
ceived or hoped. By this means Caefar accomplifhed his work, and over-
threw the liberty of his country, and with it all that was then good
in the world. They who were corrupted in their minds, defired to
put all the power and riches into his hands, that he might diftribute
them to fuch as ferved him. And he, who was nothing lefs than co-
vetous in his own nature, defired riches, that he might gain fol-
lowers ; and by the plunder of Gaul he corrupted thofe that betrayed
Rome to him. And tho' I do not delight to fpeak of the affairs of
A a a a our
276 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. our own time, I defire thofe who know the prefent Hate of France
to tell me, whether it were pofhble for the king to keep that nation
under fervitude, if a vail revenue did not enable him to gain fo many
to his particular fervice as are fufficient to keep the reft in fubje&ion :
and if this be not enough, let them confider, whether all the dangers that
now threaten us at home, do not proceed from the madnefs of thofe,
who gave fuch a revenue, as is utterly unproportionable to the
riches of the nation, unfuitable to the modefl behaviour expected
from our kings, and which in time will render parliaments unnecef-
fary to them.
On the other hand, the poverty and limplicity of the Spartan
kings was no lefs fafe and profitable to the people, than truly glorious
to them. Agefilaus denied that Artaxerxes was greater than he, un-
lefs he were more temperate, or more valiant ; and he made good his
words fo well, that, without any other amftance than what his wif- .
dom and valour did afford, he ftruck fuch a terror into that great,
rich, powerful, and abfolute monarch, that he did not think himfelf
fafe in Babylon or Ecbatane, till the poor Spartan was, by a captain of
as great valour, and greater poverty, obliged to return from Afia to
the defence of his own country. This was not peculiar to the
fevere Laconic difcipline. When the Roman kings were expelled, a
few carts were prepared to tranfport their goods : and their lands,
which were conlecrated to Mars, and now go under the name of
Campus Martius, hardly contain ten acres of ground. Nay, the
kings of Ifrael, who led fuch vaft armies into the field (that is,
were followed by all the people who were able to bear arms), feem
to have poffened little. Ahab, one of the moll: powerful^ was fo
fond of Naboth's vineyard (which, being the inheritance of his fa-
thers, according to their equal divifion of lands, could not be above
two acres), that he grew lick when it was refufed.
But, if an allowance be to be made to every king, it mult, be either
according to an univerfal rule or ftandard, or mull depend upon the
judgment of nations. If the firlt, they who have it, may do well
to produce it j if the other, every nation, proceeding according to the
meafure of their own difcretion, is free from blame.
It may alfo be worth obfervation, whether the revenue given to a
king be in fuch manner committed to his care, that he is obliged to
employ it for the public fervice without the power of alienation ;
or whether it be granted as a propriety, to be fpent as he thinks fit.
When fome of the antient Jews and Chriftians fcrupled the payment
of tribute to the emperors, the reafons alledged to perfuade them
to a compliance feem to be grounded upon a fuppofition of the firft :
for, laid they, the defence of the ftate lies upon them, which can-
not be performed without armies and garifonsj thefe cannot be
maintained without pay, nor money raifed to pay them without tri-
butes and cuftoms. This carries a face of reafon with it, efpecially
in thofe countries which are perpetually or frequently fubject to in-
vafions: but this will not content our author. He fpeaks of em-
ploying the revenue in keeping the king's houfe, and looks upon it as a
propriety to be fpent as he thinks convenient ; which is no lefs than
to call it into a pit, of which no man ever knew the bottom. That
which
Difcourfes concerning Government. 277
which is given one day, is fquandered away the next : the people is Sect. 7.
always oppreffed with impofitions, to foment the vices of the court :
thefe daily increafing, they grow infatiable, and the miferable na-
tions are compelled to hard labour, in order to fatiate thofe lufts that
tend to their own ruin.
It may be confidered, that the virtuous * pagans, by the light of
nature, difcovered the truth of this. Poverty grew odious in Rome,
when great men, by defiring riches, pat a value upon them, and in-
troduced that pomp and luxury which could not be borne by men of
fmall fortunes -j-. From thence all furies and mifchiefs feemed to break
loofe : the bafe, flavifh, and fo often fubdued Alia, by the bafeft of
men revenged the defeats they had received from the braveft ; and
by infufing into them a delight in pomp and luxury, in a fhort time
rendered the ftrongeft and braveft of nations the weakeft and bafeft.
I with our own experience did not too plainly manifeft, that thefe
evils were never more prevalent than in our days, when the luxury,
majeftic pomp, and abfolute power, of a neighbouring king, mull
be fupported by an abundance of riches, torn out of the bowels of
his fubjects, which renders them, in the beft country of the world,
and at a time when the crown moft flourifhes, the pooreft and moft
miferable of all the nations under the fun. We too well know who
are moil: apt to learn from them, and by what means and fteps they
endeavour to lead us into the like mifery. But the bird is fafe when
the mare is difcovered ; and if we are not abandoned by God to de-
ftrudtion, we fhall never be brought to confent to the fettling of that
pomp, which is againft the practice of all virtuous people, and has
brought all the nations that have been taken with it into the ruin that
is intended for us.
SECT. VII.
When the Israelites afked for fuch a king as the nations
about them had, they afked for a tyrant, tho' they did
not call him fo.
" fcF^W ^ at ^ au * was no ty^ 11 ^" ^ a y s our autnor > " note > that
a 1^1 the people afked a king as all nations had : God anfwers, and
" bids Samuel to hear the voice of the people in all things which
" they fpake, and appoint them a king. They did not afk a tyrant ;
" and to give them a tyrant when they afked a king, had not been to
" hear their voice in all things, but rather, when they afked an egg,
' ' to have given them a fcorpion j unlefs we will fay, that all nations
" had tyrants." But before he drew fuch a conclufion, he mould
have obferved, that God did not give them a fcorpion when they
Saevior armis
Luxuria incubuit, viclumq; ulcifcitur orbem. Lucan.
f Nullum crimen abeft, facinufq; libidinis, ex quo
Paupertas Romana perit. Juv. Sat. vi. 292.
afked
278 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. afked an egg, but told them, that was a fcorpion which they called
an egg : they would have a king to judge them, to go out before them,
and to fight their battles j but God in effect told them, he would
overthrow all juftice, and turn the power that was given him, to the
ruin of them, and their pofterity. But fince they would have it fo,
he commanded Samuel to hearken to their voice, and for the punifh-
ment of their iin and folly, to give them fuch a king as they afked,
that is, one who would turn to his own profit, and their mifery, the
power with which he mould be entrufted ; and this truly denominates
a tyrant. Ariftotle makes no other distinction between a king and a
tyrant, than that the king governs for the good of the people, the
tyrant for his own pleafure or profit : and they who afked fuch a one,
afked a tyrant, tho' they called him a king. This is all could be done
in their language : for as they who* are fkilled in the oriental tongues
afTure me, there is no name for a tyrant in any of them, or any other
way of expreffing the thing, than by circumlocution, and adding
proud, infolent, luftful, cruel, violent, or the like epithets, to the
word lord, or king. They did in effect afk a tyrant : they would not
have fuch a king as God had ordained, but fuch a one as the nations
had. Not that all nations had tyrants j but thofe who were round
about them, of whom they had knowledge, and which, in their man-
ner of fpeaking, went under the name of all, were blefTed with fuch
mailers. This way of expreflion was ufed by Lot's daughters, who
faid, there was not a man in all the earth to come in to them j be-
caufe there was none in the neighbourhood with whom it was thought
fit they mould accompany. Now, that the eaftern nations -were
then, and are ftill, under the government of thofe which all free
people call tyrants, is evident to all men. God therefore, in giving
them a tyrant, or rather a government, that would turn into tyranny,
gave them what they afked, under another name ; and, without any
blemifh to the mercy promifed to their fathers, fuffered them to bear
the* penalty of their wickednefs and folly in rejecting him, that he
mould not reign over them.
But tho' the name of tyrant was unknown to them, yet in Greece,
from whence the word comes, it fignined no more than one who go-
verned according to his own will, diftinguifhed from kings that go-
verned by law j and was not taken in an ill ferife, till thofe who had
been advanced for their juftice, wifdom, and valour, or their depen-
dents, were found to depart from the ends of their inftitution, and to
turn that power to the oppremon of the people, which had been
given for their protection : but by thefe means it grew odious, and that
kind of government came to be thought only tolerable by the bafeft
of men ; and thofe who deftroyed it, were in all places efteemed to
be the beft.
If monarchy had been univerfally evil, God had not in the xviitji
of Deuteronomy given leave to the Ifraelites to fet up a king - y and if
that kind of king had been afked, he had not been difpleafed : and
they could not have been faid to reject God, if they had not afked
that which was evil ; for nothing that is good is contrary, or incon-
fiftent with a people's obedience to him. The monarchy they afked
was difpleafing to God, it was therefore evih But a tyrant is no more
than
Difcourles concerning Government. 275?
than an evil or corrupted monarch: the king therefore that they £^ct. 7.
demanded was a tyrant: God in granting one who would prove '
a tyrant, gave them what they afked; and that they might know
what they did, and what he would be, he told them they rejected
him, and mould cry by reafon of the king they defired.
This denotes him to be a tyrant : for as the government of a king
ought to be gentle and eafy, tending to the good of the people, re-
fembling the tender care of a father to his family; if he who is
fet up to be a king, and to be like to that father, do lay a heavy
yoke upon the people, and ufe them as Haves, and not as children,
he muft renounce all refemblance of a father, and be accounted an
enemy.
" But", fays our author, t£ whereas the people's crying argues fome ty-
" rannical oppreflion, we may remember, that the people's cries are not
" always an argument of their living under a tyrant. No man will fay
" Solomon was a tyrant: yet all the congregation complained,- that Solo-
" mon made their yoke grievous." It is ftrange, that when children,
nay, when whelps cry, it mould be accounted a mark that they are trou-
bled, and that the cry of the whole people mould be none : or that
the government which is erected for their eafe, ihould not be efteemed
tyrannical, if it prove grievous to thofe it mould relieve. But as I
know no example of a people that did generally complain without
caufe, our adverfaries muft alledge fome other than that of Solomon,
before I believe it of any. We are to fpeak reverently of him : he
was excellent in wifdom ; he built the temple, and God appeared
twice to him : but it muft be confeffed, that during a great part of
his life he acted directly contrary to the law given by God to kings,
and that his ways were evil and oppreflive to the people, if thofe of
God were good. Kings were forbidden to multiply horfes, wives,
filver, and gold : but he brought together more filver and gold,
and provided more horfes, wives, and concubines, than any man
is known to have had : and tho' he did not actually return to Egypt ;
yet he introduced their abominable idolatry, and fo far raifed his
heart above his brethren, that he made them fubfervient to his pomp
and glory. The people might probably be pleafed with a great part
of this j but when the yoke became grievous, and his foolifh fon
would not render it more eafy, they threw it offj and the thing being
from the Lord, it was good, unlefs he be evil.
But as juft governments are eftablifhed for the good of the go-
verned, and the Ifraelites defired a king, that it might be well with
them, not with him, who was not yet known to them; that which
exalts one to the prejudice of thofe that made him, muft always be
evil, and the people that fuffers the prejudice muft needs know it
better than any other. He that denies this, may think the ftate of
France might have been beft known from Bulion the late treafurer,
who, finding Lewis the Thirteenth to be troubled at the people's mi-
fery, told him they were too happy, fince they were not reduced to
eat grafs. But if words are to be underftood as they are ordinarily
ufed, and we have no other than that of " tyranny" to exprefs a monar-
chy that is either evil in the inftitution, or fallen into corruption, we may
juftly call that "tyranny' 'which the Scripture calls a " grievous yoke,"and
B b b b ' which
280 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. HI. which neither the old nor the new counfellors of Rehoboam could
deny to be fo : for tho' the firft advifed him to promife amendment,
and the others to do worfe, yet all agreed, that what the people faid
was true.
This yoke is always odious to fuch as are not by natural ftupidity
and bafenefs fitted for it ; but thofe who are fo, never complain. An
afs will bear a multitude of blows patiently ; but the leaft of them
drives a lion into rage. He that faid, the rod is made for the back
of fools, confeffed that oppremon will make a wife man mad. And
the moft unnatural of all oppreffions is to ufe lions like affes, and
to lay that yoke upon a generous nation, which only the bafeft
can deferve j and, for want of abetter word, we call this tyranny.
Our author is not contented to vindicate Solomon only, but ex-
tends his indulgence to Saul. His cuftom is to patronize all that is
deteftable; and no better teftimony could be given of it. " It is true/'
fays he, " Saul loft his kingdom, but not for being too cruel or tyranni-
laws that go under the name of Lycurgns, were propofed by him to
Plut. vit. Ly- tne general aflefnbly of the people, and from them received their au-
thority: but the difcipline they contained was offuch efficacy for fra-
ming the minds of men to virtue, and by banifhing iilver and gold they
fo far banifhed all manner of crimes, that from the inftitution of thofe
laws to the times of their corruption, which was more than eight
hundred years, we hardly find, that three men were put to death, of
whom two were kings; fo that it feems difficult to determine where
the power of judging did refide, tho' it is moft probable, confidering
the nature of their government, that it was in the fenate, and, in
cafes extraordinary, in the ephori, with a right. of appealing to the peo-
ple. Their kings therefore could have little to do with the fword of
juftice, neither the legiflative nor the judicial power being any-ways
in them.
The military fword was not much more in their power, unlefs the
excellency of their virtues gave them the credit of perfuading, when
the law denied the right of commanding. They were obliged to
make war againfl thofe, and thofe only, who were declared enemies
by the fenate and ephori, and in the manner, place, and time, they
directed: fo that Agefilaus, tho' carrying on a glorious war in
Perfia, no fooner received the parchment-roll, wherein he was com-
manded by the ephori to come home for the defence of his own
country, than he immediately returned, and is on that account called
Dereg. Age-^y no } e f s a man t \ ian Xenophon, a good and faithful king, rendering
1 * obedience to the laws of his country.
By this it appears, that there are kings who may be feared by thofe
that do ill, and not by fuch as do well ; for, having no more power
than what the law gives, and being obliged to execute it as the law
directs, they cannot depart from the precept of the apoftle. My
own actions therefore, or the fenfe of my own guilt arifing from
them, is to be the meafure of my fear of that magifrrate who is the
mimfter of God, and not his power.
The like may be faid of almofl all the nations of the world, that
have had any thing of civil order amongft. them. The fupreme
magiftrate, under what name foever he was known, whether king,
emperor, afymnetes, fuffetes, conful, dictator, or archon, has ufu-
ally a part affigned to him in the adminiftration of juftice, and mak-
ing war ; but that he may know it to be affigned, and not inherent,
and fo affigned as to be employed for the public good, not to his own
profit or pleafure, it is circumfcribed by fuch rules as he cannot fafely
tranfgrefs. This is above all feen in the German nations, from
whom we draw our original and government; and is fo well de-
De monb. f cr ibed by Tacitus in his treatife of their cuftoms and manners, that
I fhall content myfelf to refer to it, and to what I have cited from him
in the former part of this work. The Saxons, coming into our coun-
try, retained to themfelves the fame rights. They had no kings but
fuch as were fct up by themfelves, and they abrogated their power
when they pleafed. * Oifa acknowledged, " that he was chofen for the
"defence
* Ad libcrtatis veftne tultionem non meis meritis, fed fola liberalitate veftra. 7
Difcourfes concerning Government. zpy
" defence of their liberty, not from his own merit, but by their favour j" Sect, io
and in the " conventus pananglicus," at which all the chief men, as
well fecular as ecclefkftical, were prefent, it was decreed by the king,
archbifhops, bifhops, abbots, dukes, and fenators, that the kings
mould be chofen by the priefts, and by the elders of the people. In
purfuance of which, Egbert, who had no right to the fucceffion, was
made king. Ethel werd was chofen in the fame manner (#) by the
confent of all. Ethelwolf a monk, for want of a better, was ad-
vanced to the fame honour. His fon Alfred, tho' crowned by the
pope, and marrying without the confent of the nobility and kingdom,
\b) againfl: their cuftoms and ftatutes, acknowledged, that he had re-
ceived the crown from the bounty of the princes, elders, and people -,
and in his will declared, that he left the people as he had found them,
free as the inward thoughts of man. His fon Edward (c ) was elected
to be his fucceffor. Ethelftan, tho' a baftard, and without all title,
was elected by the confent of the nobility and people. Eadred, by
the fame authority, was elected and preferred before the fons of
Edmund his predeceffor. Edwin, tho' rightly chofen, was depofed
for hi6 ill life, and Edgar (d) elected king, by " the will of God, and
" confent of the people." But he alfo was deprived of the crown for
the rape of a nun, and after feven years reflored by the whole people,
*' coram omni multitudine populi Anglorum." Ethelred, who is faid
to have been (e) cruel in the beginning, wretched in the courfe, and
infamous in the end of his reign, was depofed by the fame power
that had advanced him. Canutus made a (f) contract with the
princes, and the whole people, and thereupon was, by general con-
fent, crowned king, over all England. After him Harold was chofen
in the ufual manner. He being dead, a meffage was fent to Hardi-
Canute, wkh an offer of the crown, which he accepted, and accord-
ingly was received. Edward the ConfefTor was (g) elected king with
the confent of the clergy and people at London j and Harold excufed
himfelf for not performing his oath to William the Norman, becaufe
he faid he had made it unduly and prefumptuoufly, (h) without con-
fulting the nobility and people, and without their authority. William
was received with great joy by the clergy and people, and faluted king
by all, fwearing to obferve the antient good and approved laws of
England : and tho' he did but ill perform his oath, yet before his
death he feemed to repent of the ways he had taken, and only wifh.-
ing his fon might be king of England, he confeffed in his laft will,
made at Caen in Normandy, (/) that he neither found nor left the king-
dom as an inheritance. If he pofTeffed no right except what was con-
ferred upon him, no more was conferred than had been enjoyed by the
(a) Omnium confenfu.
\b) Contra morem & iratuta.
(c) Succeflbr monarchiae eleclus.
fcd) Eteligerunt, Deo didante, Edgarum in Regem, annuente populo.
\e) Saevus in principio, mifer in medio, turpis in exitu.
\f) Canutus foedus cum principibus & omni populo, & illi cum ipfo percufTerunt.
(?) Annuente clero & populo Londini, in regem eligitur.
(b) Abfque general i fenatus & populi conventu &edi£k>. Matth. Parif. Gul. Gemir. So\
.(/) Neminem Anglici regm conftituo haeredem : non enim tantum decus hereditaria
jure pofledi. Ibid.
antient
2
tions of fervant, fubje£r, or creature. And I fear, that as the laft
of thofe words was introduced amongft us by our bifhops, the reft
of them had been alfo invented by fuch Chriftians as were too much
addicted to the Afiatic flavery. However, the name of king was
never folemnly afiumed by, nor conferred upon, thofe emperors ; and
could have conferred no right, if it had. They exercifed as they
pleafed, or as they durft, the power that had been gained by violence
or fraud. The exorbitances they committed, could not have been
juftified by a title, any more than thofe of a pirate, who mould take
the fame. It was no otherwife given to them than by way of affi-
milation, when they were guilty of the greateft crimes : and Tacitus,
defcribing the deteftable luft of Tiberius, fays, " Quibus adeo in- Annal. I. vi.
" domitis exarferat, ut more regio pubem ingenuam ftupris pollueret ; c " x •
died a baniflied maQ : Draco and Solon di(i
Solon no° make, but propofe laws, and they were of no force till they
were eftablifhed by the authority of the people. The Spartans dealt
in the fame manner with Lycurgus; he invented their laws, but the
people made them: and, when the aflembly of all the citizens had
approved and fworn to obferve them till his return from Crete, he
refolved rather to die in a voluntary banifhment, than by his return
to abfolve them from the oath they had taken. The Romans alfo
had laws during the government of their kings; but not finding in
them that perfection they defired, the decemviri were chofen to frame
others, which yet were of no value till they were palled by the people
* Nee meliorem fervum, nee deteriorem dominum. Tac. Ann, 1. 6. c.20 .
Difcourfes concerning Government. 309
in the * ' c comitia centuriata ;" and being fo approved, they were efta- Sect. 14.
blifhed. But this fanction, to which every man, whether magiftrate '
or private citizen, was fubject, did no way bind the whole body of
the people, who ftill retained in themfelves the power of changing
both the matter and the form of their government, as appears by
their inftituting and abrogating kings, confuls, dictators, tribunes,
with confular power, and decemviri, when they thought good for
the commonwealth. And if they had this power, I leave our au-
thor to mew, why the like is not in other nations.
SECT. XIV.
Laws are not made by kings, not becaufe they are bufied
in greater matters than doing juftice, but becaufe na-
tions will be governed by rule, and not arbitrarily.
OUR author purfuing the miftakes to which he feems perpetually
condemned, fays, that " when kings were either bufied in war,
" or diffracted with public cares, fo that every private man could not
" have accefs unto their perfons, to learn their wills and pleafures,
" then of neceffity were laws invented, that fo every particular fubject
" might find his prince s pleafure." I have often heard, that govern-
ments were eftablifhed for the obtaining of juftice ; and if that be
true, it is hard to imagine what bufinefs a fupreme magiftrate can have
to divert him from arcomplifhing the principal end of his inftitution.
And it is as commonly faid, that this diftribution of juftice to a people,
is a work furpafling the ftrength of any one man. Jethro feems to Exod. xviii.
have been a wife man, and it is probable he thought Mofes to be fo
alfo ; but he found the work of judging the people to be too heavy
for him, and therefore advifed him to leave the judgment of caufes
to others, who mould be chofen for that purpofe -, which advice
Mofes accepted, and God approved. The governing power was as
infupportable to him as the judicial. He dented rather to die than to
bear fo great a burden ; and God, neither accufing him of floth or
impatience, gave him feventy afliftants. But if we may believe our
author, the powers judicial and legiflative, that of judging, as well as
that of governing, are not too much for any man, woman, or child,
whatfoever : and that he ftands in no need, either of God's ftatutes
to direct him, or man's counfel to affift him, unlefs it be when he is
otherwife employed ; and his will alone is furlicient for all. But what
if he be not bufied in greater matters, or diftracted with public cares ?
Is every prince capable of this work ? Tho' Mofes had not found it
too great for him, or it mould be granted, that a man of excellent
natural endowments, great wifdom, learning, experience, induftry, and
integrity, nwht perform it, is it certain, that all thofe who happen to be
* Ingenti hominum expefratione propofitis decern tabulis populum ad eoncionem con-
vocatunt ; & quod bonum, feuftum felixque fit republics, ipfis, liberifque eorum efTet, ire
&legere leges propofitas juffcre. T. Liv. 1. iii. c. 34.
born
5 10 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. born in reigning families are fo ? If Mofes had the law of God be-
*— — y*— »> fore his eyes, and could repair to God himfelf for the application or
explanation of it j have all princes the fame afliftance ? Do they all
fpeak with God face to face, or can they do what he did, without the
afiiftance he had ? If all kings of mature years are of that perfe-
ction, are we allured, that none fhall die before his heir arrive to the
fame ? Or fhall he have the fame ripenefs of judgment in his infan-
cy ? If a child come to a crown, does that immediately infufe the
moft admirable endowments and graces ? Have we any promife
from heaven, that women fhall enjoy the fame prerogatives in thofe
countries where they are made capable of the fuccefhon ? Or does
that law which renders them capable, defend them, not only againft
the frailty of their own nature, but confer the moft fublime virtues
upon them ? But who knows not, that no families do more frequently
produce weak or ill men, than the greateft ? and that which is worfe,
their greatnefs is a fnare to them ; fo that they who in a low condition
might have paffed unregarded, being advanced to the higher!:, have
often appeared to be, or became the worft of all beads •> and they who
advance them are like to them : for if the power be in the multitude,
as our author is forced to confefs (otherwife the Athenians and Romans
could not have given all, as he fays, nor a part, as I fay, to Draco,
Solon, or the decemviri) they muft be beafts alfo, who fhould have
given away their right and liberty, in hopes of receiving juftice from
fuch as probably will neither underftand nor regard it, or protection
from thofe who will not be able to help themfelves, and expect fuch
virtue, wifdom, and integrity, fhould be, and for ever remain, in the
family they fet up, as was never known to continue in any. If the
power be not conferred upon them, they havi* it not ; and if they
have it not, their want of leifure to do juftice, cannot have been the
caufe for which laws are made j and they cannot be the fignification
of their will, but are that to which the prince owes obedience, as well
as the meaneft fubject. This is that which Bracton calls, " effe fub
judgments that were made. One tyrant deftroyed another ; the fame
paffions and vices for the moft part reigned in both : the laft was
often as bad as his predecefior whom he had overthrown ; and one
was fometimes approved by the people for no other reafon, than that
it was thought impoffible for him to be worfe than he who was in
poffeffion of the power. But if one inftance can be of force amon^f!
an infinite number of various accidents, the words of Valerius Afia-
ticus, who, by wifhing he had been the man that had killed Caligula,
did, in a moment, pacify the fury of the foldiers, who were lookino-
for thofe that had done it, mew, that as long as men retain anything
of that reafon which is truly their nature, they never fail of judging
rightly of virtue and vice ; whereas violent and ill princes have al-
ways done the contrary, and even the heft do often deflect from the
rules of juftice, as appears not only by the examples of Edward the
Firft and Third, who were brought to confefs it, but even thofe of
David and Solomon.
Moreover, to mew that the decifion of thefe controversies cannot
belong to any king, but to the people, we are only to confider, that
as kings, and all other magistrates, whether fupreme or fubordinate,
arc conflituted only for the good of the people, the people only can
be fit to judge whether the end be accomplifhed. A phyfician does
not exercife his art for himfelf, but for his patients j and when I am,
or think I fhall be fick, I fend for him of whom I have the beft
opinion, that he may help me to recover, or preferve my health j but
I lay him afide if I find him to be negligent, ignorant, or unfaithful ;
and it would be ridiculous for him to fay, I make myfelf judge in my
own cafe, for I only, or fuch as I fhall confult, am fit to be the judge
of it. He may be treacherous, and through corruption or malice
endeavour to poifon me, or have other defects, that render him unfit
to be trufted : but I cannot, by any corrupt pafiion, be led wilfully
to do him injufticc, and if I miftake, it is only to my own hurt. The
like may be faid of lawyers, Stewards, pilots, and generally of all that
do not act for thcmfelves, but for thofe who employ them. And if a
company going to the Indies fhould find, that their pilot was mad,
drunk, or treacherous, they whofe lives and goods are concerned, can
only be fit to judge, whether he ought to be trufted or not, fince he
cannot liave a right to deftroy thofe he was chofen to preferve ; and they
cannot be thought to judge perveruy, becaufc they have nothing to lead
them but an opinion of truth, and cannot err but to their own pre-
judice. In the like manner, not only Solon and Draco, but Romulus,
Numa, Hoftilius, the confuls, dictators, and decemviri, were not
diftinguifhcd from others, that it might be well with them, " fed ut
" bonum, felix, fauftumque fit populo Romano," but that the
profperity and happinefs of the people might be procured 3 which
being the thing always intended, it were abfurd to refer the judgment
of the performance to him who is fufpected of a defign to overthrow it,
and whofe paffions, interefts, and vices, if he has any, lead him that
way. If king James faid any thing contrary to this, he might be^ . .
anfwered with fome of his own words : " I was," fays he, " fworn toftar-chambc
Cf maintain 161 6.
314 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. " maintain the laws of the land, and therefore had been perjured if I had
u^-^r— - » " broken them." It may alfo be prefumed, he had not forgotten what
Hift. Scot, his matter Buchanan had taught in the books he wrote chiefly for his
inftruclion, that the violation of the laws of Scotland could not have
De jure reg. been fo fatal to moft of his predeceflbrs, kings of that country (nor
apud Scot. as k e hi m f e if had made them to his mother) if kings as kings were
above them.
SECT. XV.
A general prefumption, that kings will govern well, is
not a fufficient fecurity to the people.
" DUT," fays our author, " yet will they rule their fubjects by the
" ■*-* law 5 and a king, governing in a fettled kingdom, leaves to be
" a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, fo foon as he ceafes to rule
" according unto his laws : yet where he fees them rigorous or doubt-
" ful, he may mitigate or interpret." This is therefore an effecT: of
their goodnefs ; they are above laws, but will rule by law, we have
Filmer's word for it. But I know not how nations can be allured
their princes will always be fo good : goodnefs is always accompanied
with wifdom, and I do not find thofe admirable qualities to be generally
inherent or entailed upon fupreme magiftrates. They do not feem to
be all alike, and we have not hitherto found them all to live in the
fame fpirit and principle. I can fee no refemblance between Mofes
and Caligula, Jofhua and Claudius, Gideon and Nero, Samfon and
Vitellius, Samuel and Otho, David and Domitian ; nor indeed between
the bell: of thefe and their own children. If the fons of Mofes and
Jofhua had been like to them in wifdom, valour, and integrity, it is
probable they had been chofen to fucceed them ; if they were not,
the like is lefs to be prefumed of others. No man has yet obferved
the moderation of Gideon to have been in Abimelech ; the piety of
Eli in Hophni and Phinehas 5 the purity and integrity of Samuel in
Joel and Abiah, nor the wifdom of Solomon in Rehoboam. And if
there was fo vaft a difference between them, and their children, who
doubtlefs were inftructed by thofe excellent men in the ways of wifdom
and juftice, as well by precept as example, were it not madnefs to be
confident, that they who have neither precept nor good example to
guide them, but, on the contrary, are educated in an utter ignorance
or abhorrence of all virtue, will always be juft and good -, or to put
the whole power into the hands of every man, woman, or child, that
fhall be born in governing families, upon a fuppofition, that a thing
will happen, which never did -, or that the weakeft and worft will per-
form all that can be hoped, and was feldom accomplifhed by the wifefl
and bell:, expofing whole nations to be deftroyed without remedy, if they
do it not ? And if this be madnefs in all extremity, it is to be prefumed,
that nations never intended any fuch thing, unlefs our author prove,
that all nations have been mad from the beginning, and mull always
continue
Difcourfes concerning Government. 31^
continue to be fo. To cure this, he fays, " they degenerate into tyrants;" Sect. 15.
and if he meant as he fpeaks, it would be enough. For a king can-
not degenerate into a tyrant by departing from that law, which is only
the product of his own will. But if he do degenerate, it muft be by
departing from that, which does not depend upon his will, and is a
rule prcfcribed by a power that is above him. This indeed is the
doctrine of Bracton, who, having faid, that the power of the king is
the power of the law, becaufe the law makes him king, adds, " ¥ that
" if he do injuftice, he ceafes to be king, degenerates into a tyrant,
" and becomes the vicegerent of the devil." But I hope this muft
be understood with temperament, and a due consideration of human
frailty, fo as to mean only thofe injuries that are extreme ; for other-
wife he would terribly make all the crowns of the world.
But left our author mould be thought once in his life to have dealt
fincerely, and fpoken truth, the next lines mew the fraud of his laft
aflertion, by giving to the prince a power of " mitigating or interpret-
i( ing the laws, that he fees to be rigorous or doubtful." But as he
cannot degenerate into a tyrant by departing from the law, which pro-
ceeds from his own will, fo he cannot mitigate or interpret that which
proceeds from a fuperior power, unlefs the right of mitigating or in-
terpreting be conferred upon him by the fame. For as all wife men
confefs, that " -f- none can abrogate, but thofe who may inftitute/*
and that all mitigation and interpretation varying from the true fenfe
is an alteration) that alteration is an abrogation -, for % whatfoever is
changed, is diftblved: and therefore the power of mitigating is infepa-
rable from that of inftituting. This is fufficiently evidenced by Henry
the Eighth's anfwer to the fpeech made to him by the fpeaker of the
houfe of commons 1545", in which he, tho' one of the moft violent
princes we ever had, confeffes the parliament to be the law-makers,
and that an obligation lay upon him rightly to ufe the power with
which he was entrufted. The right therefore of altering being infe-
parable from that of making laws, the one being in the parliament,
the other muft be fo alfo. Fortefcue fays plainly, the king cannot
change any law : magna charta cafts all upon || the laws of the
land, and cuftoms of England : but to fay, that the king can by
his will make that to be a cuftom, or an antient law, which is not,
or that not to be fo, which is, is moft abfurd. He muft therefore
take the laws and cuftoms as he finds them, and can neither de-
tract from, nor add any thing to them. The ways are prefcribed as
well as the end. Judgments are given by equals, " per pares." The
judges, who may be aftifting to thofe, are fworn to proceed accord-
ing to law, and not to regard the kings letters or commands. The
doubtful cafes are referved, and to be referred to the parliament, as
in the ftatute of 35 Edw. III. concerning treafons, but never to
the king. The law intending that thefe parliaments fhould be an-
nual, and leaving to the king a power of calling them more often,
* Quia fi faciat injuriam, definit efle rex, & degenerat in tyrannum, & fit vicarius dia-
boli. Bratf.
t Cuius eft inflituere, ejus eft abrogare.
;!; Quicquid mutatur, diflblvitur: interit ergo.
jj Leges terras?, & confuetudines Angliae.
L 1 1 1 if
316 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. Ill.if occalion require, takes away all pretence of a neceffity, that there
fliould be any other power to interpret or mitigate laws. For it is not
to be imagined, that there fliould be fuch a peflilent evil in any anticnt
law, cuftom, or later act of parliament, which, being on the fudden
difcovered, may not without any great prejudice continue for forty
days, till a parliament may be called ; whereas the force and eflence
of all laws would be fubverted, if, under colour of mitigating and in-
terpreting, the power of altering were allowed to kings, who often
want the inclination, and for the molt, part the capacity, of doing it
rightly. It is not therefore upon the uncertain will or underftanding
of a prince, that the fafety of a nation ought to depend. He is fome-
times a child, and fometimes overburdened with years. Some are
weak, negligent, flothful, foolifli, or vicious : others, who may have
fomething of rectitude in their intentions, and naturally are not un-
capable of doing well, are drawn out of the right way by the fub-
tilty of ill men, who gain credit with them. That rule mult always
be uncertain, and fubject to be diftorted, which depends upon the
fancy of fuch a man. He always fluctuates, and every paffion that
arifes in his mind, or is infufed by others, diforders him. The good
of a people ought to be eftablilhed upon a more folid foundation. For
this reafon, the law is eftablilhed, which no paffion can difturb.
It is void of defire and fear, lull: and anger. It is " mens fine afTectu,"
written reafon, retaining fome meafure of the divine perfection.
It does not injoin that which pleafes a weak, frail man ; but, without
any regard to perfons, commands that which is good, and punilhes
evil in all, whether rich or poor, high or low. It is deaf, inexorable,
inflexible.
By this means, every 1 man knows when he is fafe, or in danger,
becaufe he knows, whether he has done good or evil. But if all de-
pended upon the will of a man, the worft would be often the moll
fafe, and the belt in the greateft hazard ; flaves would be often ad-
vanced, the good and the brave fcorned and neglected. The moll
generous nations have above all things fought to avoid this evil : and
the virtue, wifdom, and generality of each, may be difcerned by the
right fixing of the rule, that mull: be the guide of every man's life, and
fo conllituting their magiftracy, that it may be duly obferved. Such
as have attained to this perfection, have always flourilhed in virtue
and happinefs : they are, as Ariltotle fays, governed by God, rather
than by men, whilft thofe who fubjected themfelves to the will of a
man, were governed by a bealt.
This being fo, our authors next claufe, that tc tho' a king do frame
" all his actions to be according unto law, yet he is not bound there-
" unto, but as his good will, and for good example, or fo far forth
Cl as the general law for the fafety of the commonwealth, doth na-
y, j may not be pretended : which would be the fame, if fuch as Filmer
had the direction of their confciences who take the oaths, and of thofe
who are to exact the performance. This would foon destroy all con-
fidence between king and people, and not only unhinge the belt,
eftablifhed governments, but by a deteftable practice of annihilating
the force of oaths, and moil folemn contracts, that can be made by
men, overthrow all focieties that fubfift by them. I leave it to all
reafonable men to judge how fit a work this would be for the fupreme
magistrate, who is advanced to the higher!: degree of human glory
and happinefs, that he may preferve them ; and how that justice, for
the obtaining of which governments are constituted, can be adminiftred,
if he who is to exact it from others, do in his own perfon utterly fub-
vert it ; and what they deferve, who by fuch bafe prevarications
would teach them to pervert and abolifh the most, facred of all con-
tracts. A worthy perfon of our age was accustomed to fay, that
contracts in writing were invented only to bind villains, who having
no law, juftice, or truth, within themfelves, would not keep their
words, unlefs fuch testimonies were given as might compel them.
But if our author's doctrine were received, no contract would be
of more value than a cobweb *. Such as are not abfolutely of a pro-
fligate confcience, fo far reverence the religion of an oath, as to think,
that even thofe which are most unjustly and violently impofed ought
to be obferved j and Julius Casfar, who I think was not over-fcrupu-
lous, when he was taken by pirates, and fet at liberty upon his word,
caufed the ranfom he had promifed to be paid to them. We fee
the like is practifed every day by prifoners taken in unjust as well as
just wars : and there is no honest man that would not abhor a perfon,
who, being taken by the pirates of Algier, mould not pay what he
had promifed for his liberty. It were in vain to fay they had no
right of exacting, or that the performance was grievous -, he must re-
turn to the chains, or pay. And tho' the people of Artois, Alfatia,
or Flanders, do perhaps, with reafon, think the king of France has no
right to impose oaths of allegiance upon them, no man doubts, that
if they chufe rather to take thofe oaths, than to fuffer what might
enfue upon their refufal, they are as much bound to be faithful to him
as his antient fubjects.
Grotius 1. ii. The like may be faid of promifes extorted by fraud ; and no other
c i3.4« example is necesTary to prove they are to be performed than that of
Jofhua made to the Gibeonites. They were an accurfed nation, which
he was commanded to deftroy : they came to him with lyes, and by
deceit induced him to make a league with them, which he ought not
to have done ; but being made, it was to be performed ; and on that
account he did not only fpare but defend them, and the action was
.approved by God. When Saul by a preposterous zeal violated that
* Ql 1 ' juravit Deo, obligetur ftare jurejurando — non enim perfona fola refpicitur cm
juratur, fed is qui juratur, Deus — repiidiandus ergo Cicero, cum ait perjurium nullum efle,
fi praedonibus paclum, &c. Grotius de jure B. & P. 1. ii. c. 13. p. 14, 15. Ipfe, qui
juratus aliquid promifit nocenti, qua talis eft, puta piratse, non poteft jus promifib quxfitum
poenas nomine ob id ipfum ei auferre : quia tunc verba nullum haberent effe<5tum, quod
bmnino vitandum eft. p. 20, 3. The arguments Pufendorf brings againft Grotius fee de
jure nat. 1. iv, c. 2
league..
Diicourfes concerning Government. 327
league, the anger of God for that breach of faith could no other- Sect. 17.
wife be appeafed than by the death of feven of his children. This <~~~v — ~>
cafe is fo full, fo precife, and of fuch undoubted authority, that I
fhall not trouble myfelf with any other. But if we believe our man
of good morals, voluntary oaths and promifes are of no more value
than thofe gained by force or deceit, that is to fay, none are of any.
For voluntary fignifying nothing but free, all human acts are either
free or not free, that is, from the will of the perfon, or fome impulfe
from without. If therefore there be no force in thofe that are free,
nor in thofe that are not free, there is none in any.
No better ufe can be made of any " pretention of error," or that
the " performance was grievous j" for no man ought to be grieved at
the performance of his contract. David allures us, that a good man
performs his agreement, tho' he lofe by it j and the lord chancellor
Egerton told a gentleman, who defired relief againft his own deed,
upon an allegation that he knew not what he did when he iigned it,
that he did not fit to relieve fools.
But tho' voluntary promifes or oaths, when, to ufe the lawyers
language, there is not a valuable confederation, were of no obliga-
tion ; or that men brought by force, fear, or error, into fuch contracts
as are grievous in the performance, might be relieved j this would not
at all reach the cafes of princes, in the contracts made between them
and their fubjects, and confirmed by their oaths, there being no colour
of force or fraud, fear or error, for them to alledge j nor any thing to
be pretended that can be grievous to perform, other wife than as it may
be grievous to an ill man not to do the mifchiefs he had conceived.
Nations, according to their own will, frame the laws by which
they refolve to be governed j and if they do it not wifely, the da-
mage is only to themfelves : but it is hard to find an example of any
people that did by force oblige a man to take upon him the govern-
ment of them. Gideon was indeed much preffed by the Ifraelites to
be their king ; and the army of Germanicus, in a mutiny, more
fiercely urged him to be emperor j but both derided when their offers
were refufed. If our kings have been more modeit, and our anceitors
more pertinacious in compelling them to accept the crowns they
offered, I fhall, upon proof of the matter, change my opinion. But
till that do appear, I may be pardoned if I think there was no fuch
thing. William the Norman was not by force brought into England,
but came voluntarily, and defired to be king : the nobility, clergy,
and commons, propofcd tiie conditions upon which they would re-
ceive him. Thefe conditions were to govern according to their antient
laws, efpecially thofe that had been granted, or rather collected in the
time of the famous king Edward. Here was neither force nor fraud -,
if he had difliked the terms, he might have retired as freely as he
came. But he did like them ; and tho' he was not perhaps fo modeft,
to fay with the brave Saxon king OfFa, " Ad libertatis veftrae tuitionem, £- ddlt - Mat -
" non meis mentis, fed Tola liberalitate veitra, unanimiter me convo-
st caftis," lie accepted the crown upon the conditions offered and fwore
upon the evangelifts to oblerve them. Not much valuing this, he
pretended to govern according to his own will ; but rinding the people
would not endure it, he renewed his oath upon the fame evangelift9,
O o o o and
328 Diioourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. and the reliques of S. Alban. which he needed not to have done, but
might have departed to his duchy of Normandy if he had not liked
the conditions, or thought not fit to obferve them. It is probable he
examined the contents of Edward's laws before he * fwore to them,
and could not imagine, that a free nation, which never had any other
kings than fuch as had been chofen by themfelves for the prefervation
of their liberty, and from whofe liberality the bell of their kings ac-
knowledged the crowns they wore, did intend to give up their per-
fons, liberties, and eftates, to him, who was a ftranger, moil efpecially
when they would not receive him till he had fworn to the fame laws
by which the others had reigned, of which one was (as appears by
the act of the Conventus Pananglicus) that " reges a facerdotibus &
" fenioribus populi eligantur, the kings mould be elected by the clergy
" and elders of the people." By thefe means he was advanced to
the crown, to which he could have no title, unlefs they had the right
of conferring it upon him. Here was therefore no force, deceit, or
error j and whatfoever equity there might be to relieve one that had
been forced, frighted, or circumvented, it was nothing to this cafe.
We do not find, that William II. or Henry, were forced to be
kings j no fword was put to their throats ; and for any thing we
know, the Englifh nation was not then fo contemptible but men
might have been found in the world, who would willingly have ac-
cepted the crown, and even their elder brother Robert would not have
refufed : but the nobility and commons, trufting to their oaths and
promifes, thought fit to prefer them before him ; and when he en-
deavoured to impofe himfelf upon the nation by force, they fo feverely
punifhed him, that no better proof can be required to mew, that they
were accuftomed to have no other kings than fuch as they approved.
And this was one of the cuftoms that all their kings fwore to main-
tain, it being as antient, juft, and well-approved, as any other.
Having already proved, that all the kings we have had fince that
time, have come in upon the fame title ; that the Saxon laws to
which all have fworn, continue to be of force amongft us, and that
the words pronounced four times, on the four fides of the fcaffold,
by the archbifhop, " Will ye have this man to reign ? ' do teftify it ;
I may fpare the pains of a repetition, and juftly conclude, that if
there was neither force nor fraud, fear nor error, to be pretended by
the firil:, there could be none in thofe that followed.
But the " obfervation of this oath may be grievous." If I received
money the laft year upon bond, promife, or fale of a manor or farm,
can it be thought grievous to me to be compelled to repay, or to
make over the land according to my agreement ? Or if I did not
feal the bond till I had the money, muft not I perform the condition,
or at the leaft reftore what I had received ? If it be grievous to any
king to preferve the liberties, lives, and eftates, of his fubjects,
and to govern according to their laws, let him refign the crown, and
the people to whom the oath was made, will probably releafe him.
Others may pofiibly be found who will not think it grievous : or if
none will accept a crown unlefs they may do what they pleafe, the
* Bonas & approbatas antiquas regni leges, quas fandti & pii reges ejus anteceflbres, &
maxime Edvardus ftatuit, inviolabiliter obfervare,
S people
Difcourfes concerning Government. 325?
people muft bear the misfortune of being obliged to govern them- Sect. 17.
felves, or to inftitute fome other fort of magiftracy, that will be fa-
tisfied with a lefs exorbitant power. Perhaps they may fucceed as
well as fome others have done, who, without being brought to that
neceffity, have voluntarily caft themfelves into the mifery of living
without the majeftic fplendor of a monarch : or, if that fail, they
may, as their laft refuge, furrender up themfelves to flavery. When
that is done, we will acknowledge, that whatfoever we have is derived
from the favour of our mailer. But no fuch thing yet appearing
amongft us, we may be pardoned, if we think we are free-men go-
verned by our own laws, and that no man has a power over us,
which is not given and regulated by them j nor that any thing, but a
new law made by ourfelves, can exempt our kings from the obliga-
tion of performing their oaths taken, to govern according to the old,
in the true fenfe of the words, as they are underftood in our lan-
guage by thofe who give them, and conducing to the ends for which
they are given, which can be no other, than to defend us from all
manner of arbitrary power, and to fix a rule to which we are to
conform our actions, and from which, according to our deferts, we
may expect reward or punifhment. And thofe who by prevarica-
tions, cavils, or equivocations, endeavour to diflblve thefe obligations,
do either malicioufly betray the caufe of kings, by reprefenting them
to the world as men, who prefer the fatisfaction of their irregular
appetites before the performance of their duty, and trample under- foot
the moft facred bonds of human fociety ; or from the groffeft igno-
rance do not fee, that by teaching nations how little they can rely
upon the oaths of their princes, they inftruct them as little to obferve
their own ; and that not only, becaufe men are generally inclined to
follow the examples of thofe in power, but from a moft certain con-
clufion, that he, who breaks his part of a contract, cannot without
the utmoft impudence and folly expect the performance of the other 5
nothing being more known amongft men, than, that all contracts are
of fuch mutual obligation, that he who fails of his part, difcharges
the other. If this be fo between man and man, it muft needs be fo
between one and many millions of men : if he were free, becaufe he
fays he is, every man muft be free alfo when he pleafes: if a private
man, who receives no benefit, or perhaps prejudice, from a contract,
be obliged to perform the conditions, much more are kings, who re-
ceive the greateft advantages the world can give. As they are not by
themfelves, nor for themfelves, fo they are not different in fpecie
from other men : they are born, live, and die, as we all do. The fame
law of truth and juftice is given to all by God and nature; and per-
haps I may fay, the performance of it is moft rigoroufly exacted from
the greateft of men. The liberty of perjury cannot be a privilege an-
nexed to crowns ; and it is abfurd to think, that the moft venerable
authority, that can be conferred upon a man, is increafed by a liberty
to commit, or impunity in committing, fuch crimes, as are the greateft
aggravations of infamy to the bafeft villains in the world.
SECT.
Difcourfes concerning Government.
SECT, xviii. .
The next in blood to deceafed kings cannot generally be
faid to be kings till they are crowned.
TT is hereupon ufually objected, that kings do not come in by
-*■ contract* nor by oath ; but are kings by, or according to proxi-
mity of blood, before they are crowned. Tho' this be a bold propo-
rtion, I will not fay, it is univerfally falfe. It is poffible, that in fome
places the rule of fucceffion may be fet down fo precifely, that, in
fome cafes, every man may be able to fee and know the fenfe, as
well as the perfon defigned to be the fuccelfor : but before I acknow-
ledge it to be univerfally true, I muft defire to know what this rule
of fucceffion is, and from whence it draws its original.
I think I may be excufed, if I make thefe fcruples, becaufe I find
the thing in difpute to be varioufly adjudged in feveral places; and
have obferved five different manners of difpofing crowns efteemed
hereditary, befides an infinite number of collateral controverfies
arifing from them, of which we have divers examples ; and if there
be one univerfal rule appointed, one of thefe only can be right, and
all the others muft be vicious. The firft gives the inheritance to the
eldeft male of the eldeft legitimate line, as in France, according to
that which they call the falique law. The fecond, to the eldeft legi-
timate male of the reigning family, as antiently in Spain, according
to whicrTthe brother of the deceafed king has been often, if not al-
ways, preferred before the fon, if he were elder, as may appear by
the difpute between Corbis and Orfua, cited before from Titus Livius ;
and in the fame country, during the reign of the Goths, the eldeft
male fucceeded, whether legitimate or illegitimate. The fourth
receives females, or their defcendents, without any other condition
diftinguifhing them from males, except that the younger brother is
preferred before the elder lifter, but the daughter of the elder brother
is preferred before the fon of the younger. The fifth gives the in-
heritance to females under a condition, as in Sweden, where they
inherit, unlefs they marry out of the country without the confent of
the eftates ; according to which rule, Charles Guftavus was chofen, as
any ftranger might have been, tho' fon to a fifter of Guftavus Adolphus,
who by marrying a German prince had forfeited her right. And by
the fame a£t of eftates, by which her eldeft fon was chofen, and the
crown entailed upon the heirs of his body, her fecond fon, the prince
Adolphus, was wholly excluded.
Till thefe queftions are decided by a judge of fuch an undoubted
authority, that all men may fafely fubmit, it is hard for any man,
who really feeks the fatisfa&ion of his confciencc, to know whether
the law of God and nature (tho' he mould believe, there is one ge-
neral
Difcourfes concerning Government. 331
neral law) do juftify the cuftom of the antient * Medes and Sabe- Sect. 18.
ans, mentioned by the poet, who admitted females, or thofe of'
France, which totally exclude them as unfit to reign over men, and
utterly unable to perform the duty of a fupreme magiftrate, as we
fee they are every where excluded from the exercife of all other of-
fices in the commonwealth* If it be faid, that we ought to follow
the cuftoms of our own country, I anfwer, that thofe of our own
country deferve to be observed, becaufe they are of our own coun-
try : but they are no more to be called the laws of God and nature
than thofe of France or Germany ; and tho' I do not believe, that any
general law is appointed, I wifh I were fure, that our cuftoms in
this point were not more repugnant to the light of nature, and pre-
judicial to ourfelves, than thofe of fome other nations. But if I
fhould be fo much an Englishman, to think the will of God to have
been more particularly revealed to our anceftors, than to any other
nation, and that all of them ought to learn from us ; yet it would
be difficult to decide many queftions that may arife. For tho' the
parliament, in the 36th of Henry the Sixth, made an act in favour of
Richard duke of York, defcended from a daughter of Mortimer,
who married the daughter of the duke of Clarence, elder brother to
John of Gaunt, they rather aflerted their own power of giving the
crown to whom they pleafed, than determined the queftion. For if"
they had believed, that the crown had belonged to him by a general and
eternal law,, they muft immediately have rejected Henry as a ufur-
per, and put Richard into the porTefiion of his right, which they
did not. And tho' they did fomething like to this in the cafes of
Maud the emprefs, in relation to king Stephen, and her fon Henry the
Second j and of Henry the Seventh in relation to the houfe of York,
both before he had married a daughter of it, and after her death - f
they did the contrary in the cafes of William the Firft and Second,
Henry the Firft, Stephen, John, Richard the Third, Henry the Seventh,
Mary, Elizabeth, and others. So that, for any thing I can yet find,
it is equally difficult to difcover the true fenfe of the law of nature,
that fhould be a guide to my confcience, whether I fo far fubmit to
the laws of my country, to think, that England alone has produced
men that rightly underftand it, or examine the laws and practices of
other nations.
Whilft this remains undecided, it is impoftlble for me to know to
whom I owe the obedience that is exacted from me. If I were a
Frenchman, I could not tell whether I owed allegiance to the king
of Spain, duke of Lorrain, duke of Savoy, or many others defcend-
ed from daughters of the houfe of Valois, one of whom ought to
inherit, if the inheritance belongs to females j or to the houfe of
Bourbon, whofe only title is founded upon the exclufion of them.
The like controverfies will be in all places ; and he that would put
mankind upon fuch inquiries, goes about to fubvert all the go*
vernments of the world, and arms every man to the deftruction of
his neighbour.
-Med is levibufque Sabaeis
Tmpetat hie fexus, reginarumque Cub armis
Barbaries pars magna jacet. Lucan,
P p p p We
332 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. We ought to be informed when this right began : if we had the
genealogy of every man' from Noah, and the crowns of every na-
tion had fince his time continued in one line, we were only to in-
quire into how many kingdoms he appointed the world to be di-
vided, and how well the divifion we fee at this day agrees with the
allotment made by him. But mankind having for many ages lain
under fuch a vaft confufion, that no man pretends to know his own
original, except fome Jews, and the princes of the houfe of Auftria,
we cannot fo eafily arrive at the end of our work j and the Scriptures
making no other mention of this part of the world, than what may
induce us to think it was given to the fons of Japhet, we have no-
thing that can lead us to guefs how it was to be fubdivided, nor to
whom the feveral parcels were given : fo that the difficulties are ab-
folutely inextricable j and tho' it were true, that fome one man had a
right to every parcel that is known to us, it could be of no ufe ; for
that right muft neceffarily perifh, which no man can prove, nor in-
deed claim. But as all natural rights by inheritance muft be by
defcent, this defcent not being proved, there can be no natural
right j and all rights being either natural, created, or acquired, this
right to crowns not being natural, muft be created or acquired, or'
none at all.
There being no general law common to all nations, creating a
right to crowns (as has been proved by the feveral methods ufed by
feveral nations in the difpofal of them, according to which all thofe
that we know are enjoyed), we muft feek the right, concerning which
we difpute, from the particular conftitutions of every nation, or we
fhall be able to find none.
Acquired rights are obtained, as men fay, either by fair means or
by foul, that is, by force or by confent : fuch as are gained by force,
may be recovered by force ; and the extent of thofe that are enjoyed
by confent, can only be known by the reafons for which, or the con-
ditions upon which that confent was obtained, that is to fay, by the
laws of every people. According to thefe laws it cannot be faid,
that there is a king in every nation before he is crowned. John So-
bietfki, now reigning in Poland, had no relation in blood to the for-
mer kings, nor any title till he was'chofen. The laft king of Swe-
den acknowledged he had none, but was freely elected ; and the
crown being conferred upon him, and the heirs of his body, if the
prefent king dies without iffue, the right of electing a fuccerTor re-
turns undoubtedly to the eftates of the country. The crown of
Denmark was elective till it was made hereditary by an act of the
general diet, held at Copenhagen in the year 1660 ; and it is impoffi-
ble, that a right fhould otherwife accrue to a younger brother of the
houfe of Holftein, which is derived from a younger brother of the
counts of Oldenburgh. The Roman empire having paifed through
the hands of many perfons of different nations, no way relating to
each other in blood, was by Conftantine transferred to Conftantinople ;
and after many revolutions coming to Theodofius, by birth a Spaniard,
was divided between his two fons Arcadius and Honorius. From
thence paffing to fuch as could gain moft credit with the foldiers, the
weftern empire being brought almoft to nothing, was reftored by
5 Charles
Difcourles concerning Government.
Charles the Great of France j and, continuing for fome time in his
defcendents, came to the Germans ; who, having created feveral empe-
rors of the houfes of Suevia, Saxony, Bavaria, and others, as they
pleafed, about three hundred years paft chofe Rodolphus of Auftria :
and tho', fince that time, they have not had any emperor who was not
of that family ; yet fuch as were chofen had nothing to recommend
them, but the merits of their anceftors, their own perfonal virtues,
or fuch political confiderations as might arife from the power of their
hereditary countries, which, being joined with thofe of the empire,
might enable them to make the better defence againfl the Turks.
But, in this line alfo, they have had little regard to inheritance ac-
cording to blood ; for the elder branch of the family is that which
reigns in Spain ; and the empire continues in the defcendents of Fer-
dinand younger brother to Charles the Fifth, tho' fo unfixed even to
this time, that the prefent emperor Leopold was in great danger of
being rejected.
If it be faid, that thefe are elective kingdoms, and our author
fpeaks of fuch as are hereditary j I anfwer, that if what he fays be
true, there can be no elective kingdom, and every nation has a na-
tural lord, to whom obedience is due. But if fome.are elective, all
might have been fo, if they had pleafed, unlefs it can be proved, that
God created fome under a neceffity of fubjection, and left to others the
enjoyment of their liberty. If this be fo, the nations that are born
under that neceffity may be faid to have a natural lord, who has all the
power in himfelf, before he is crowned, or any part conferred on him
by the confent of the people ; but it cannot extend to others. And
he who pretends a right over any nation upon that account, Hands
obliged to {hew, when and how that nation came to be difcriminated
by God from others, and deprived of that liberty, which he in good-
nefs had granted to the reft of mankind. I confefs, I think there is no
fuch right, and need no better proof, than the various ways of difpo-
fing inheritances in feveral countries, which, not being naturally or
univerfally better or worfe one than another, cannot fpring from any
other root, than the confent of the feveral nations where they are in
force, and their opinions, that fuch methods were beft for them. But
if God have made a difcrimination of people, he that would there-
upon ground a title to the dominion of any one, muft prove that
nation to be under the curfe of flavery ; which, for any thing I know,
was only denounced againfl: Cham ; and it is as hard to determine
whether the fenfe of it be temporal, fpiritual, or both, as to tell pre-
cifely what nations, by being only defcended from him, fall under the
penalties threatened.
If thefe therefore be either intirely falfe, or impoffible to be proved
true, there is no difcrimination, or not known to us j and every people
has a right of difpoling of their government, as well as the Polanders,
Danes, Swedes, Germans, and fuch as are or were under the Roman
empire. And if any nation has a natural lord before he be admitted
by their confent, it muft be by a peculiar act of their own -, as the
crown of France by an act of that nation, which they call the falique
law, is made hereditary to males in a direct line, or the neareft to the
direct j and others in other places are otherwife difpofed.
I
3 34 Difcourfes concerning Government
Chap. III. I might reft here with full affurance, that no difciple of Filmer
u-*v~"— ' can prove this of any people in the world, nor give fo much as the
fhadow of a reafon to perfuade us there is any fuch thing in any na-
tion, or at ieaft in thofe where we are concerned j and prefume little
regard will be had to what he has faid, fince he cannot prove of any
that which he fo boldly affirms of all. But becaufe good men ought
to have no other object than truth, which in matters of this impor-
tance can never be made too evident, I will venture to go farther, and
affert, that as the various ways by which feveral nations difpofe of
the fucceffion to their refpective crowns, mew they were fubject
to no other law than their own, which they might have made dif-
ferent, by the fame right they made it to be what it is, even thofe
who have the greateft veneration for the reigning families, and the
higheft regard for proximity of blood, have always preferred the
fafety of the commonwealth before the concernments of any perfon
or family ; and have not only laid alide the neareft in blood, when
they were found to be notorioufly vicious and wicked, but when
they have thought it more convenient to take others : and to prove
this I intend to make ufe of no other examples, than thofe I find in the
hiftories of Spain, France, and England.
Whilft the Goths governed Spain, not above four perfons in the
fpace of three hundred years were the immediate fucceffors of their
fathers, but the brother, coufin-german, or fome other man of the
families of the Balthei or Amalthei, was preferred before the children
of the deceafed king : and if it be faid, this was according to the
law of that kingdom, I anfwer, that it was therefore in the power
of that nation to make laws for themfelves, and confequently others
Saavedraco- have the fame right. One of their kings called Wamba was depofed,
ron. Goth. an( j mac { e a m0 nk, after he had reigned well many years j but falling
into a fwoon, and his friends thinking him pafl recovery, cut off
his hair, and put a monk's frock upon him, that, according to the
fuperftition of thofe times, he might die in it ; and the cutting off
Mar.hift.l.vi.the hair being a moft difgraceful thing amongft the Goths, they
would not reftore him to his authority. Suintila, another of
their kings, being deprived of the crown for his ill government, his
Saaved. cor. children and brothers were excluded, and Sifinandus crowned in his
Goth. room.
This kingdom being not long after overthrown by the Moors, a
new one arofe from its allies, in the perfon of Don Pelayo firft king
of the Afturia's, which, increafing by degrees, at laft came to com-
prehend all Spain, and fo continues to this day : but, not troubling
myfelf with all the deviations from the common rule in the collateral
lines of Navarre, Arragon* and Portugal, I find that by fifteen feveral
inftances in that one feries of kings in the Afturia's and Leon (who
afterwards came to be kings of Caftile) it is fully proved, that what
refpect foever they fhevved to the next in blood, who by the law
were to fucceed, they preferred fome other perfon, as often as the
fupreme law of " taking care, that the nation might receive no de-
" triment," perfuaded them to it.
Don Pelayo enjoyed for his life the kingdom conferred upon him
by the Spaniards, who with him retired into the mountains to defend
5 themfelves
Difcourfes concerning Government. 335*
themfelves againft the Moors, and was fucceeded by hisfon Favila. Sect. 18*
&ut tho' Favila left many fons when he died, Alphonfo furnamed the w - —v— -*
Chafte was advanced to the crown, and they all laid alide. Fruela,
fon to Alphonfo the Catholic, was for his cruelty depofed, put to
death, and his fons excluded. Aurelio his coulin-german fucceeded Marian. L
him; and at his death Silo, who married his wife's lifter, was pre- X1U *
ferred before the males of the blood royal. Alphonfo, furnamed el
Cafto, was firft violently difpoffefTed of the crown by a baftard of
the royal family j but he being dead, the nobility and people, think-
ing Alphonfo more fit to be a monk than a king, gave the crown to
Bermudo called el Diacono; but Bermudo after feveral years religning
the kingdom, they conceived a better opinion of Alphonfo, and made
him king. Alphonfo dying without ifTue, Don Ramiro fon to Bermu-
do was preferred before the nephews of Alphonfo. Don Ordonno,
fourth from Ramiro, left four legitimate fons ; but they being young,
the eftates laid them afide, and made his brother Fruela king. Fruela
had many children 3 but the fame eftates gave the crown to Al-
phonfo the Fourth, who was his nephew. Alphonfo, turning monk,
recommended his fon Ordonno to the eftates of the kingdom ; but
they refufed him, and made his brother Ramiro king. Ordonno third
fon to Ramiro, dying, left a fon called Bermudo ; but the eftates took
his brother Sancho, and advanced him to the throne. Henry the Firft,
being accidently killed in his youth, left only two lifters, Blanche
married to Lewis, fon to Philip Auguft king of France; and Berenguela
married to Alphonfo king of Leon. The eftates made Ferdinand, fon Marian. L
of Berenguela the youngeft lifter, king, excluding Blanche, with xu * c ' 7 '
her hulband and children, for being ftrangers, and Berenguela her-
felf, becaufe they thought not lit that her hufband Ihould have any
part in the government. Alphonfo el Savio feems to have been a very
good prince j but, applying himfelf more to the ftudy of aftrology
than to affairs of government, his eldeft fon Ferdinand de la Cerda
dying, and leaving his fons Alphonfo and Ferdinand very young, the
nobility, clergy, and people, depofed him, excluded his grand-
children, and gave the crown to Don Sancho his younger fon furnamed
el Bravo, thinking him more lit to command them againft the Moors,
than an old aftrologer, or a child. Alphonfo and Sancho being dead,
Alphonfo el Delheredado laid claim to the crown ; but it was given to
Ferdinand the Fourth, and Alphonfo, with his defcendents the dukes de
Medina Celi, remain excluded to this day. Peter furnamed the Cruel
was twice driven out of the kingdom, and at laft killed by Bertrand
de Guefclin conftable of France, or Henry count of Traftamara his
baftard-brother, who was made king without any regard to the
daughters of Peter, or to the houfe of la Cerda. Henry the Fourth
left a daughter called Joan, whom he declared his heir; but the Marian. I.
eftates gave the kingdom to Ifabel his lifter, and crowned her with
Ferdinand of Arragon her hulband. Joan daughter to this Ferdinand
and Ifabel falling mad, the eftates committed the care of the govern-
ment to her father Ferdinand, and after his death to Charles her fon.
But the French have taught us, that when a king dies, his next
heir is really king before hetake his oath, or be crowned. From them we
learn, that " le mort failit le vif." And yet I know no hiftory that
Q^cj q q proves
336 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. proves more plainly than theirs, that there neither is nor can be in any
*— — v— -— > man, a right to the government of a people, which does not receive
its being, manner, and meafure, from the law of that country -, which
I hope to juftify by four reafons,
1. When a king of Pharamond's race died, the kingdom was di-
vided into as many parcels as he had fons ; which could not have
been, if one certain heir had been afligned by nature ; for he ought to have
had the whole : and if the kingdom might be divided, they who in-
habited the feveral parcels, could not know to whom they owed obe-
dience, till the divifion was made, unlefs he who was to be king of
Paris, Metz, SoifTons, or Orleans, had worn the name of his king-
dom upon his forehead. But, in truth, if there might be a divifion,
the doctrine is falfe, and there was no lord of the whole. This
wound will not be healed by faying, The father appointed the divi-
fion, and that by the law of nature every man may difpofe of his
own as he thinks fit ; for we fhall foon prove, that the kingdom of
France neither was, nor is, difpofeable as a patrimony or chattel.
Befides, if that act of kings had been then grounded upon the law
of nature, they might do the like at this day. But the law, by
which fuch divifion s were made, having been abrogated by the afTem-
Hiff. de Fr. bly of eftates in the time of Hugh Capet, and never practifed fince, it
en la vie de follows that they were grounded upon a temporary law, and not up-
" gue " on the law of nature, which is eternal. If this were not fo, the pre-
tended certainty could not be; for no man could know to whom
the laft king had bequeathed the whole kingdom, or parcels of it, till
the will were opened 3 and that mufl be done before fuch wit-
nefTes as may deferve credit in a matter of this importance, and
are able to judge whether the bequeft be rightly made ; for other-
wife no man could know, whether the kingdom was to have one
lord or many, nor who he or they were to be ; which intermimon
muft neceffarily fubvert their polity, and this doctrine. But the
truth is, the moit monarchical men among them are fo far from ac-
knowledging any fuch right to be in the king, of alienating, be-
queathing, or dividing the kingdom, that they do not allow him the
Mem. du due right of making a will j and that of the laft king Lewis the Thirteenth
de la Roche- touching the regency during the minority of his fon was of no effect,
focault. 2 . This matter was made more clear under the fecond race. If a
lord had been amgned to them by nature, he mufl have been of the
royal family : but Pepin had no other title to the crown except
the merits of his father, and his own, approved by the nobility and
people who made him king. He had three fons, the eldefl was made
king of Italy, and, dying before him, left a fon called Bernard heir of
Paul. /Emyl. that kingdom. The eftatcs of France divided what remained be-
HHK Franc, tween Charles the Great and Carloman. The laft of thefe dying in
few years, left many fons ; but the nobility made Charles king of all
France, and he difpofTeffcd Bernard of the kingdom of Italy inherited
from his father : fo that he alfo was not king of the whole, before
the expulfion of Bernard the fon of his elder brother ; nor of Aqui-
tain, which by inheritance mould have belonged to the children of
his younger brother, any otherwife than by the will of the eftates.
Lewis the Debonair fucceeded upon the fame title, was depoied, and
put
Difcourfes concerning Government. 3 37
put into a monaftery by his three fons Lothair, Pepin, and Lewis, Sect. i8<
Whom he had by his firft wife. But tho' thefe left many fons, the "
kingdom came to Charles the Bald. The nobility and people, dis-
liking the eldeft fon of Charles, gave the kingdom to Lewis le
Begue, who had a legitimate fon called Charles le Simple j and
two baftards, Lewis and Carloman, who were made kings. Car-
loman had a fon called Lewis le Faineant ; he was made king, but
afterwards depofed for his vicious life. Charles le Gros fucceeded
him, but for his ill government was alfo depofed j and Odo, who was
a ftranger to the royal blood, was made king. The fame nobility
that had made five kings fince Lewis le Begue, now made Charles le
Simple king, who, according to his name, was entrapped at Peronne
by Ralph duke of Burgundy, and forced to refign his crown, leaving
only a fon called Lewis, who fled into England. Ralph being dead,
they took Lewis furnamed Outremer, and placed him in the throne :
he had two fons, Lothair and Charles. Lothair fucceeded him, and
died without iflue. Charles had as fair a title as could be by birth,
and the eftates confefTed it j but their ambafTadors told him, that he
having by an ttnworthy life rendered himfelf unworthy of the crown,
they, whofe principal care was to have a good prince at the head of
them, had chofen Hugh Capet ; and the crown continues in his race
to this day, tho' not altogether without interruption. Robert, fon to
Hugh Capet, fucceeded him. He left two fons Robert and Henry ;
but Henry the younger fon appearing to the eftates of the
kingdom to be more fit to reign than his elder brother, they
made him king ; Robert, and his defcendents, continuing dukes of
Burgundy only for about ten generations, at which time his iflue
male failing, that duchy returned to the crown during the life of
king John, who gave it to his fecond fon Philip for an apannage ftill
depending upon the crown. The fame province of Burgundy was
by the treaty of Madrid granted to the emperor Charles the Fifth,
by Francis the Firft : but the people refufed to be alienated, and the
eftates of the kingdom approved their refufal. By the fame authority
Charles the Sixth was removed from the government, when he
appeared to be mad ; and other examples of a like nature may be
alledged. From which we may fafely conclude, that if the death of
one king do really inveft the next heir with the right and power,
or that he who is fo inverted, be fubject to no law but his own will,
all matters relating to that kingdom muft have been horribly confufed
during the reigns of 2 2 kings of Pharamond's race ; they can have
had no rightful king from the death of Chilperic to king John : and
the fucceffion fince that time is very liable to be queftioned, if not
utterly overthrown by the houfe of Auftria and others, who by the
counts of Hapsburg derive their defcent from Pharamond, and by
the houfe of Lorrain claiming from Charles, who was excluded by
Capet j all which is moft abfurd, and they who pretend it, bring as
much confufion into their own laws, and upon the polity of their,
own nation, as fhame and guilt upon the memory of their anceftors,
who, by the moft extreme injuftice, have rejected their natural lord,
or difpofleffed thofe who had been in the moft folemn manner placed
in
3 3 8 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. in the government, and to whom they had generally fworn alle-
*•— -y— -^ giance.
^. If the next heir be actually king, feized of the power by the
'death of his predecefTbr, fo that there is no intermiffion ; then all
the folemnities> and religious ceremonies, ufed at the coronations of
their kings, with the oaths given and taken, are the moft profane
abufes of facred things, in contempt of God and man, that can be
imagined, moft efpecially if the act be (as our author calls it) volun-
tary, and the king, receiving nothing by it, be bound to keep it no
longer than he pleafes. The prince who is to be fworn, might fpare
the pains of Watching all night in the church, failing, praying, con-
ferring, communicating, and fwearing, " that he will, to the utmoft
whilft other emiflaries and inftruments of iniquity,
by corrupting the youth, and feducing fuch as can be brought to
iewdnefs and debauchery, bring the people to fuch a pafs, that they
may neither care nor dare to vindicate their rights, and that thofe
who would do it, may fo far fufpect each other, as not to con-
fer upon, much lefs to join in, any action tending to the public
deliverance.
This diftinguiilies the good from the bad magiftrate, the faithful
from the unfaithful ; and thofe who adhere to either, living in the
fame principle, muft walk in the fame ways. They who uphold the
rightful power of a juft magiftracy, encourage virtue and juftice ;
teach men what they ought to do, fuffer, or expect from others ; fix
them upon principles of honefty j and generally advance every thing
Sfff that
344 Difcourfes concerning Government
Chap. III. tnat tends to the increafe of the valour, ftrength, greatnefs, and hap-
pinefs of the nation, creating a good union among them, and bring-
ing every man to an exact undcrftanding of his own and the public
rights. On the other fide, he that would introduce an ill magiftrate,
make one evil who was good, or preferve him in the exercife of in*
juftice when he is corrupted, muft always open the way for him by
vitiating the people, corrupting their manners, deftroying the vali-
dity of oaths and contracts, teaching fuch evadons, equivocations,
and frauds, as are inconfiftent with the thoughts, that become men of
virtue and courage ; and overthrowing the confidence they ought to
have in each other, make it impoflible for them to unite among them-
felves. The like arts rauft be ufed with the magiftrate : he can-
not be for their turn, till he is perfuaded to believe he has no depend-
ence upon, and owes no duty to the people ; that he is of himfeif,
and not by their inftitution ; that no man ought to inquire into, nor
bc judge of his actions ; that all obedience is due to him, whether he
be good or bad, wife or foolifh, a father or an enemy to his country.
This being calculated for his perfonal intereft, he muft purfue the
fame defigns, or his kingdom is divided within itfelf, and cannot
fubfift. By this means thofe who flatter his humour, come to be ac-
counted his friends, and the only men that are thought worthy of
great trufts, whilft fuch as are of another mind are expofed to all
perfecution. Thefe are always fuch as excel in virtue, wifdom,
and greatnefs of fpirit : they have eyes, and they will always fee the
way they go ; and, leaving fools to be guided by implicit faith, will
diftinguifh between good and evil, and chufe that which is beft ;
they will judge of men by their actions, and by them difcovering
whofe fervant every man is, know whether he is to be obeyed or not.
Thofe who are ignorant of all good, carelefs, or enemies to it, take a
more compendious way ; their flavifh, vitious, and bafe natures, in-
clining them to feek only private and prefent advantages, they eafily
Hide into a blind dependence upon one, who has wealth and power -,
and, defiling only to know his will, care not what injuftice they do, if
they may be rewarded. They worfhip what they find in the temple,
tho' it be the vileft of idols ; and always like that beft which is
worft, becaufe it agrees with their inclinations and principles. When
a party comes to be erected upon fuch a foundation, debauchery,
lewdnefs, and difhonefty, are the true badges of it. Such as wear them
are cherifhedj but the principal marks of favour are referved for
thofe, who are the mofb induftrious in mifchief, either by feducing the
people with the allurements of fenfual pleafures, or corrupting their
understandings by falfe and flavifh doctrines. By this means, a man
who calls himfeif a philofopher, or a divine, is often more ufeful than
a great number of tapfters, cooks, buffoons, players, fidlers,
whores, or bawds. Thefe are the devil's minifters of a lower order -,
they feduce fingle perfons; and fuch as fall into their fnares, are
for the moft part men of the Ampler fort : but the principal fupport-
ers of his kingdom are they, who by falfe doctrines poifon the
fprings of religion and virtue, and by preaching or writing (if their
falfhood and wickednefs were not detected) would extinguifh all
principles of common honefty, and bring whole nations to be beft
fatisfied
Difcourfes concerning Government. 34^
fatisfied with themfelves, when their actions are moft abominable. Sect. 20.
And as the means muft always be fuitable to the end propofed, the
governments tliat are to be eftablifhed or fupported by fuch ways
muft needs be the worft of all, and comprehend all manner of
evil.
SECT. XX.
Unjiifi: commands are not to be obeyed ; and no man is
obliged to fuffef for not obeying fuch as are againft law.
N the next place our author gravely propofes a queftion, " Whether
" it be a fin to difobey the king, if he command any thing con-
" trary to law ?" and as gravely determines, " that not only in human
tc laws, but even in divine, a thing may be commanded contrary to
" law, and yet obedience to fuch a command is neceifary. The
" fanctifying of the fabbath is a divine law, yet if a mafter command
>
and by whom the conftitutions are made -, or their reprefentatives
and delegates, to whom they give the power of doing it.
But nothing can be more abfurd than to fay, that one man has an
abfolute power above law to govern according to his will, " for the
" people's good, and the prefervation of their liberty :" for no liberty
can fubfift where there is fuch a power ; and we have no other way of
diftinguiihing between free nations, and fuch as are not fo, than that
the free are governed by their own laws and magistrates, according
to their own mind, and that the others either have willingly fubjecled
themfelves, or are by force brought under the power of one or more
men, to be ruled according to his or their pleafure. The fame di-
stinction holds in relation to particular perfons. He is a free man
who lives as bell: pleafes himfelf, under laws made by his own con-
fent 5 and the name of Have can belong to no man, unlefs to him
who is either born in the houfe of a mafter, bought, taken, fub-
dued, or willingly gives his ear to be nailed to the poft, and Subjects
himfelf to the will of another. Thus were the Grecians faid to be
free, in oppofition to the Medes and PerSians, as Artabanus acknow- piut. vlt.
ledged in his difcourfe to Themiftocles. In the fame manner theThemiit.
Italians, Germans, and Spaniards, were distinguished from the eaftern
nations, who, for the molt part, were under the power of tyrants.
Rome was faid to have recovered liberty by the expulsion of the Tar-
quins ; or as Tacitus expreffes it, liberty^ life, and eftate, of every private man, as our author him-
felf is forced to acknowledge.
But what is this fovereign majefty, lb infeparable from royalty,
that one cannot fubfift without the other ? Caligula placed it in a
power of * doing what he pleafed to all men : Nimrod, Nabucho-
donoibr, and others, with an impious and barbarous infolence boafted
of the greatnefs of their power. They thought it a glorious privilege
to kill or fpare whom they pleafed. But fuch kings as by God's per-
miffion might have been fet up over his people, were to have nothing
Deut. xvii. of this. They were not to multiply gold, filver, wives, or horfes $
they were not to govern by their own will, but according to the law ;
from which they might not recede, nor raife their hearts above their
.brethren. Here were kings without that unlimited power, which
makes up the fovereign majefty, that Filmer affirms to be fo efTential
to kings, that without it they are only equivocal ; which proving no-
thing but the incurable perverfenefs of his judgment, the malice of
his heart, or malignity of his fate, always to oppofe reafon and truth,
we are to efteem thofe to be kings who are described to be fo by the
Scriptures, and to give another name to thole who endeavour to ad-
vance their own glory, contrary to the precept of God, and the in-
tereft of mankind.
But unlefs the light of reafon had been extinguifhed in him, he
might have feen, that tho' no law could be made without a fupreme
power, that fupremacy may be in a body con lifting of many men,
and feveral orders of men. If it be true, which perhaps may be
doubted, that there have been in the world fiinple monarchies, ari-
ftocracies, or democracies, legally eftablifhed, it is certain, that the
moft part of the governments of the world (and I think all that are
or have been good) were mixed. Part of the power has been con-
ferred upon the king, or the magiftrate that reprefentedhim, and part
upon the fenate and people, as has been proved in relation to the go-
vernments of the Hebrews, Spartans, Romans, Venetians, Germans,
and all thofe who live under that which is ufually called the Gothic
polity. If the fingle perfon participating of this divided power
diflike either the name he bears, or the authority he has, he may re-
nounce it j but no reafon can be from thence drawn to the prejudice
of nations, who give fo much as they think confiftent with their own
good, and referve the reft to themfelves, or to fuch other officers as
they pleafe to eftablifli.
No man will deny, that feveral nations have had a right of giving
power to confuls, dictators, archons, furfetes, dukes, and other
', magiftrates, in fuch proportions as feemed moft conducing to their
.: own good ; and there muft be a right in every nation of allotting to
kings fo.much as they pleafe, as well as to the others, unlefs there be
a charm in:., the word king, or in the letters that compofe it. But
this cannet be ; for there "is no fimilitude between "king," "rex," and
> fi balileus :" they muft therefore have a right of regulating the power
of kings, as well as that of confuls or dictators ; and it had not been
-. more
Omnia mihi in omnea licere. Sueton.
Difcourfes concerning Government. 393
more ridiculous in Fabius, Scipio, Camillus, or Cincinnatus, to afTertSECT. 21.
an abfolute power in himfelf, under pretence of advancing his fovereign
majefty againft the law, than for any king to do the like. But as
all nations give what form they pleafe to their government, they
are alfo judges of the name to be impofed upon each man who is to
have a part in the power : and it is as lawful for us to call him king,
who has a limited authority amongft us, as for the Medes or Arabs
to give the fame name to one who is more abfolute. If this be not
admitted, we are content to fpeak improperly ; but utterly deny, that
when we give the name, we give any thing more than we pleafe ;
and had rather his majefty mould change his name than to renounce
our own rights and liberties, which he is to preferve, and which we
have received from God and nature.
But that the folly and wickednefs of our author may not be ca-
pable of any farther aggravation, he fays, " That itikills not how he
" come by the power." Violence therefore, or fraud, treachery or
murder, are as good as election, donation, or legal fucceffion. It is
in vain to examine the laws of God or man j the rights of nature ;
whether children do inherit the dignities and magiftracies of their
fathers, as patrimonial lands and goods ; whether regard ought to be
had to the fitnefs of the perfon ; whether all mould go to one, or be
divided amongft them ; or by what rule we may know who is the
right heir to the fucceffion, and confequently, what we are in confeience
obliged to do. Our author tells us in fhort, it matters not how he
that has the power comes by it.
It has been hitherto thought, that to kill a king (efpecially a good
king) was a moil abominable action. They who did it, were
thought to be incited by the worft of paffions that can enter into the
hearts of men j and the fevereft punifhments have been invented to
deter them from fuch attempts, or to avenge their death upon thofe
who mould accomplish it : but, if our author may be credited, it
muft be the moft commendable and glorious aft that can be performed
by man : for, beiides the outward advantages that men fo earneftly de-
fire, he that does it, is prefently inverted with the fovereign majefty,
and at the fame time becomes God's vicegerent, and the father of
his country, poilelfed of that government, which, in exclufion to all
other forms, is only favoured by the laws of God and nature. The
only inconvenience is, that all depends upon fuccefs, and he that is
to be the minifter of God, and father of his country, if he fuc-
ceed, is the worft of all villains, if he fail ; and, at the beft, may be
deprived of all by the fame means he employed to gain it. Tho' a
prince mould have the wifdom and virtues of Mofes, the valour of
Joihua, David, and the Maccabees, with the gentlenefs and integrity
of Samuel, the moft foolifh, vitious, bafe, and deteftable man in the
world that kills him, and feizes the power, becomes his heir, and
father of the people that he governed ; it lkills not how he did it,
whether in open battle, or by fecret treachery, in the field, or in the
bed, by poilbn, or by the iword : the vileft flave in Ifrael had become
the Lord's anointed, if he could have killed David or Solomon, and
found villains to place him in the throne. If this be right, the world
has to this day lived in darknefs, and the actions which have been
thought
394 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. thought to be the mod deteftable, are the mofl commendable and
glorious. But not troubling myfelf at prefent to decide this queftion,
I leave it to kings to confider how much they are beholden to Filmer,
and his difciples, who fet fuch a price upon their heads, as would
render it hard to preferve their lives one day, if the doctrines were
received which they endeavour to infufe into the minds of the people ;
and concluding this point, only fay, that we in England know no
other king than he who is fo by law, nor any power in that king
except that which he has by law : and tho' the Roman empire was
held by the power of the fword ; and Ulpian, a corrupt lawyer, un-
dertakes to fay, that " the prince is not obliged by the laws j" yet
Theodolius confefTed, that it was the glory of a good emperor to ac-
knowledge himfelf bound by them.
SECT. XXII.
The rigour of the law is to be tempered by men of known
integrity and judgment, and not by the prince, who
may be ignorant or vicious.
/^VUR author's next fhift is to place the king above the law,
^-^ that he may mitigate the rigour of it, without which, he fays,
" the cafe of the fubject would be defperately miferable." But this
cure would prove worfe than the difeafe. Such pious fathers of the
people as Caligula, Nero, or Domitian, were not like to mitigate the
rigour -, nor fuch as inherit crowns in their infancy (as the prefent
kings of Spain, France, and Sweden) fo well to underftand the mean-
ing of it as to decide extraordinary cafes. The wifdom of nations
has provided more alfured helps ; and none could have been fo brutiili
and negligent of the public concernments, to fuffer the fucceffion to
fall to women, children, &c. if they had not referved a power in
themfelves to prefer others before the neareft in blood, if reafon re-
quire ; and prefer ibed fuch rules as might preferve the public from
ruin, notwithstanding their infirmities and vices. Thefe helps pro-
vided by our laws, are principally by grand and petit juries, who
are not only judges of matters of fad, as whether a man be killed,
but whether he be killed criminally. Thefe men are upon their oaths,
and may be indicted of perjury if they prevaricate : the judges are
prefent, not only to be a check upon them, but to explain fuch points
of the law as may feem difficult. And tho' thefe judges may be
faid in fome fenfe to be chofen by the king, he is not underftood to
do it otherwife than by the advice of his council, who cannot per-
form their duty, unlefs they propofe fuch as in their confeiences they
think moil worthy of the office, and moft capable of performing the
duty rightly j nor he accomplish the oath of his coronation, unlefs
he admit thofe, who upon deliberation feem to be the beft. The
judges being thus chofen, are fo far from depending upon the will of
1 8 Edw. IIT. the king, that they fwear faithfully to ferve the people as well as the
wp» *• king, and to do juftice to every man according to the law of the
land,
Difcouries concerning Government. 3^
land notwithstanding any writs, letters, or commands received Skct. 22
from him ; and in default thereof they are to forfeit their bodies, lands, *■— "■ v-*— '
and goods, as in cafes of treafon. Thefe laws have been fo often,
and fo feverely executed, that it concerns all judges well to confider
them; and the cafes of Trefilian, Empfon, Dudley, and others, fhew,
that neither the king's preceding command, nor fubfequent pardon,
could preferve them from the punifhment they dtflrved. All men
knew, that what they did was agreeable to the king's pleafure j for
Trelilian advanced the prerogative of Edward the lid, and Empfon
brought great treafures into the coffers of Henry the Vllth. Never-
theless they were charged with treafon for fubverting the laws of the
land, and executed as traitors. Tho' England ought never to for-
get the happy reign of (^Elizabeth, yet it mull be acknowledged,
that {he as well as others had her failings. She was full of love to the
people, juft in her nature, fincere in her intentions; but could not fo
perfectly difcover the fnares that were laid for her, or refill: the im-
portunity of the perfons fhe moft trufted, as not fometimes to be
brought to attempt things againfl law. She and her counfellors
preffed the judges very hardly to obey the patent under her great feal,
in the cafeofCavendifh: but they anfwered, " That both fhe and they A . r ,
" had taken an oath to keep the law ; and, if they fhould obey her R ep . p . 155.
" commands, the law would not warrant them, &c." And befides the
offence againfl God, their country, and the commonwealth, theyalledged
the example of Empfon and Dudley," whereby," they faid," they were
" deterred from obeying her illegal commands." They who had fworn
to keep the law notwithstanding the king's writs, knew that the law
depended not upon his will ; and the fame oath that obliged them not
to regard any command they fhould receive from him, fhewed that
they were not to expect indemnity by it, and not only that the king
had neither the power of making, altering, mitigating, or inter-
preting the law, but that he was not at all to be heard, in general or
particular matters, otherwife than as he fpeaks in the common courfe
of juftice, by the courts legally eftablifhed, which fay the fame thing,
whether he be young or old, ignorant or wife, wicked or good : and
nothing does better evidence the wifdom and care of our anceftors,
in framing the laws and government we live under, than that the
people did not fuffer extremities by the vices or infirmities of kings,
till an age more full of malice than thofe in which they lived, had
found tricks to pervert the rule, and fruftrate their honeft intentions.
It was not fafe for the kings to violate their oaths by an undue inter-
pofition of their authority ; but the miniflers who ferved them in
thofe violations, have feldom efcaped punifhment. This is to be un-
derftood when the deviations from juftice are extreme and mif-
chievous, for fomething mufl always, be allowed to human frailty: the
beft have their defects, and none could fland, if a too exact fcrutiny
were made of all their actions. Edward the Third, about the twentieth
year of his reign, acknowledged his own in parliament, and as well
for the eafe of his confeience, as the fatisfaction of his people, promoted
an act, " commanding all judges to do juftice, notwithftanding any
" writs, letters, or commands from himfelf, and forbidding thofe that
" belonged to tl^e king, queen, and prince, to intermeddle in thofe
X x x x " matters,"
3 $6 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. cc matters."' But if the beft and wifeft of our princes, in the ftrength
v^.-,~ . j and maturity of their years, had their failings, and every act pro-
ceeding from them, that tended to the interruption of juftice, was a fail-
ing, how can it be faid, that the king in his perfonal capacity, directly or
indirectly, may enter into a difcuffion of thefe matters, much lefs to
determine them according to his will ?
" But," fays our author, " the law is no better than a tyrant ; ge-
" neral pardons at the coronation, and in parliament, are but the bounty
" of the prerogative, etc. There may be hard cafes;" and, citing fome
perverted pieces from Ariftotle's ethics and politics, adds, " That when
" fomething falls out befides the general rule, then it is fit, that what
" the lawmaker hath omitted, or where he hath erred by fpeaking
" generally, it mould be corrected and fupplied, as if the lawmaker
" were prefent that ordained it. The governor, whether he be one
" man or more, ought to be lord of thefe things, whereof it was im-
" pomble that the law mould fpeak exactly." Thefe things are in part
true; but our author makes ufe of them as the devil does of Scripture,
to fubvert the truth. There may be fomething of rigour in the law,
that in fome cafes may be mitigated; and the law itfelf (in relation to
England) doesfo far acknowledge it, as to refer much to the confciences
of juries, and thofe who are appointed to arTift them; and the moft
difficult cafes are referred to the parliament as the only judges that are
able to determine them. Thus the ftatute of the 35th Edw. III. enu-
merating the crimes then declared to be treafon, leaves to future par-
liaments to judge what other facts equivalent to them may deferve the
fame punifhment: and it is a general rule in the law, which the judges
are fworn to obferve, that difficult cafes Ihould be referved till the par-
liament meet, who are only able to decide them: and if there be any
inconvenience in this, it is becaufe they do not meet fo frequently as
the law requires, or by finifter means are interrupted in their fitting.
But nothing can be more abfurd than to fay, that becaufe the king does
not call parliaments as the law and his oath requires, that power fhould
accrue to him, which the law and the confent of the nation has
placed in them.
There is alfo fuch a thing in the law, as a general or particular
pardon, and the king may in fome degree be entrufted with the
power of giving it, efpecially for fuch crimes as merely relate to him-
felf, as every man may remit the injuries done to himfelf; but the
14 Edw. III. confeffion of Edward the Third, ° That the oath of the crown had not
15. li been kept by reafon of the grant of pardons contrary to ftatutes,"
and a new act made, " that all fuch charters of pardon from hence-
" forth granted againft the oathof the crown, and the faid ftatutes, fhould
" be held for none," demonftrate that this power was not in himfelf,
but granted by the nation, and to be executed according to fuch rules
as the law prefcribed, and the parliament approved.
Moreover, there have been many, and fometimes bloody contefts
for the crown, upon which the nation was almoft equally divided ;
and it being difficult for them to know, or even for us who have all the
parties before us, to judge which was the better fide, it was underftood,
that he who came to be crowned by the confent of the people, was
acceptable to all: and the queftion being determined, it was no way
fit
Difcourfes concerning Government. 3 $7
fit that he fhould have a liberty to make ufe of the public authority Sfct 22
then in his hands, to revenge fuch peribnal injuries as he had, or
might fuppofe to have received, which might raiie new, and perhaps
more dangerous troubles, if the authors of them were flill kept in
fear of being profecuted ; and nothing could be more unreasonable,
than that he fhould employ his power to the deftruction of thofe who
had confented to make him king. This made it a matter of courfe
for a king, as foon as he was crowned, to ifTue out a general pardon ;
which was no more than to declare, that being now what he was not
before, he had no enemy upon any former account. For this reafon
Lewis the Twelfth of France, when he was incited to revenge him-
felf againft thofe, who, in the reign of his predeceffor Charles the
Eighth, had caufed him to be imprifoned, with great danger of his
life, made this anfwer, " That the king of France did not care to
" revenge the injuries done to the duke of Orleans :" and the laft king
of Sweden feemed no otherwife to remember who had oppofed the
queen's abdication, and his election, than by conferring honours up-
on them ; becaufe he knew they were the beft men of the nation,
and fuch as would be his friends, when they fhould fee how he would
govern, in which he was not deceived. But, left all thofe who might
come to the crown of England, fhould not have the fame prudence
and generoiity, the kings were obliged by a cuftom of no lefs force
than a law, immediately to put an end to all difputcs, and the incon-
veniences that might arife from them. This did not proceed from the
bounty of the prerogative (which I think is nonfenfe, for tho' he that
enjoys the prerogative may have bounty, the prerogative can have
none), but from common fenfe, from his obligation, and the care of
his own fafe ty ; and could have no other effect in law, than what re-
lated to his perfon, as appears by the forementioned ftatute.
Pardons granted by act of parliament are of another nature : for
as the king, who has no other power than by law, can no otherwife
difpenfe with the crimes committed againft the laws, than the law
does enable him j the parliament, that has the power of making laws,
may intirely abolifh the crimes, and unqueftionably remit the puniih-
ment as they pleafe.
Tho' fome words of Ariftotle's ethics are without any coherence
fhufrled together by our author, with others taken out of his poli-
tics, I do not much except againft them. No law made by man
can be perfect, and there muft be in every nation a power of cor-
recting fuch defects as in time may arife or be difcovered. This power
can never be fo rightly placed as " in the fame hand that has the right
" of making laws, whether in one perfon or in many." If Filmer
therefore can tell us of a place, where one man, woman, or child,
however he or flie be qualified, has the power of making laws, I will
acknowledge, that not only the " hard cafes," but as many others as
he pleafes, are referred to his or her judgment, and that they may
give it, whether they have any underftanding of what they do or not,
whether they be drunk or fober, in their fenfes, or ftark-mad. But as
I know no fuch place, and fhould not be much concerned for the
furferings of a people that fhould bring fuch mifery upon themfelves,
as muft accompany an abfolute dependence upon the unruly will of
fuch
?c8 Difcourfes concerning Government.
C HAP jn.fuch a creature, I may leave him to feek it, and reft in a perfect
aiTurance, that he does not fpeak of England, which acknowledges
no other law than its own ; and inftead of receiving any from kings,
does, to this day, obey none, but fuch as have been made by our
anceftors, or ourfelves, and never admitted any king that did not fwear
to obferve them. And if Ariftotle deferve credit, the power of
altering, mitigating, explaining, or correcting, the laws of England,
is only in the parliament, becaufe none but the parliament can make
them.
SECT. XXIII.
Ariftotle proves, that no man is to be entruftcd with an
abfolute power, by mewing, that no one knows how to
execute it, but fuch a man as is not to be found.
/^\UR author having falily cited and perverted the fenfe of Ari-
^* ftotle, now brings him in faying, " That a perfect kingdom is
" that wherein the king rules all according to his own will." But
tho' I have read his books of government with fome attention, I can
find no fuch thing in them, unlefs the word which iignifies " mere "
or " abfolute " may be juftly tranflated into " perfect 5" which is fo far
from Ariftotle's meaning, that he diftinguimes the abfolute or defpotical
kingdoms from the legitimate ; and commending the latter, gives no
better name than that of " barbarous " to the iirft, which he lays can
agree only with the nature of fuch nations as are bafe and ftupid,
little differing from beafts ; and having no fkill to govern, or courage
to defend themfelves, muft reiign all to the will of one that will take
care of them. Yet even this cannot be done, unlefs he that mould
take that care be wholly exempted from the vices which oblige the
others to ftand in need of it ; for otherwife it is no better than if a
fheep mould undertake to govern fheep, or a hog to command fwine ;
Arift. pol. Ariftotle plainly faying, " That as men are by nature equal, if it
1. ii. c 1. « W ere pomble, all mould be magifl rates." But that being repugnant
to the nature of government, he finds no other way of folving the
difficulty, than by " obeying and commanding alternately ;" that they
may do by turns that which they cannot do all together, and to
which no one man has more right than an other, becaufe they are all
by nature equal. This might be compofed by a more compendious
way, if, according to our author's doctrine, pofTeflion could give a
right. But Ariftotle, fpeaking like a philofopher, and not like a
public enemy of mankind, examines what is juft, reafonable, and
beneficial to men, that is, what ought to be done, and which being
done, is to be accounted juft, and therefore to be fupported by good
men. But as * " that which is unjuft in the beginning, can never
* Quod ab initio injuftum eft, nullum poteft habere juris effe&um. Grot, de jur. bel.
& pac. 1. iii.
" have
t)ifcourfes concerning Government. 3 ^p
" have the effect of juftice ;" and it being manifeftly unjuft for one, Sect. 23.
or a few men, to aftume a power over thofe who by nature are equal * v—— '.
to them, no fuch power can be juft or beneficial to mankind j nor fit
to be upheld by good men, if it be unjuft and prejudicial. In the
opinion of Ariftotle, this natural equality continues till virtue makes
the diftinction, which muft be either fimply complete and perfect in
itfelf, fo that he who is endued with it, is a God among men, or re-
latively, as far as concerns civil fociety, and the ends for which it is
constituted, th it is, defence, and the obtaining of juftice. This re-
quires a mind unbiaffed by pafiion, full of goodnefs and wifdom,
firm againft all the temptations to ill, that may arife from defire or
fear ; tending to all manner of good, through a perfect knowledge
and affection to it ; and this to fuch a degree, that he or they have
more of thefe virtues and excellencies than all the reft of the fociety,
tho' computed together : where fuch a man is found* he is by nature Arift.pol.1. ii.
a king, and it is beft for the nation where he is that he govern. If
a few men, tho' equal and alike among themfelves, have the fame
advantages above the reft of the people, nature, for the fame reafon,
feems to eftabiifh an ariftocracy in that place j and the power is more
fafely committed to them, than left in the hands of the multitude.
Eut if this excellency of virtue do not appear in one, nor in a few
men, the right and power is by nature equally lodged in all ; and -to
aftlime or appropriate that power to one, or a few men, is unnatural
and tyrannical, which, in Ariftotle's language, comprehends all that
is deteftable and abominable.
If any man fliould think Ariftotle a trifler, for fpeaking of fuch a
man as can never be found, I anfwer, that he went as far as his way
could be warranted by reafon or nature, and was obliged to ftop
there by the defect of his fubject, He could not fay, that the go-
vernment of one was fimply good, when he knew fo many qua- Barbeyrac
lifications were required in the perfon to make it fo j nor, that it is trad> c | e P"*"-
good for a nation to be under the power of a fool, a coward, or a IV ' vu * J *
villain, becaufe it is good to be under a man of admirable wifdom,
valour, induftry, and goodnefs ; or that the government of one fhould
be continued in fuch as by chance fucceed in a family, becaufe it was
given to the firft who had all the virtues required, tho' all the reafons
for which the power was given fail in the fucceflbr j much lefs could
he fay, that any government was good, which was not good for thofe
whofe good only it was conftituted to promote.
Moreover, by (hewing who only is fit to be a monarch, or may
be made fuch, without violating the laws of nature and juftice,
he fhews who cannot be one : and he who fays, that no fuch man is
to be found, as, according to the opinion of Ariftotle, can be a
monarch, does moft ridiculoufly alledge his authority in favour of
monarchs, or the power which fome amongft us would attribute to
them. If any thing therefore may be concluded from his words, it
is this ; that lince no power ought to be admitted which is not juft -,
that none can be juft which is not good, profitable to the people, and
conducing to the ends for which it is conftitutecj ; that no man can
know how to direct the power to thofe ends, can defer ve, or adminifter
it, unlefs he do fo far excel all thofe that are under him in wifdom,
Y y y y juftice,
360 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. Ill.juftice, valour, and goodnefs, as to poflefs more of thofe virtues thari
all of them 3 I fay, if no fuch man, or fucceflion of men, be found,
ho fuch power is to be granted to any man, or fucceflion of men.
But if fuch power be granted^ the laws of nature and reafon are over-
throw^ and the ends for which focieties are constituted, utterly per-
verted, which neceffarily implies an annihilation of the grant. And
if a grant, fo made by thofe who have a right of fetting up a go-
vernment among themfelves, do perifh through its own natural ini-
quity and perverfity, I leave it to any man, whofe underftanding and
manners are not fo intirely corrupted as thofe of our author, to de-
termine what name ought to be given to that perfon; who, not ex-
celling all others in civil and moral virtues, in the proportion re-
quired by Ariftotle, does ufurp a power over a nation, and what obe-
dience the people owe to fuch a one. But if his opinion deferve our
regard, the king, by having thofe virtues, is " omnium optimus,"
and the beft guide to the people, " * to lead them to happinefs by
" the ways of virtue." And he who aflumes the fame power, with-
out the qualifications required, is c * tyrannus omnium peflimus,"
leading the people to all manner of ill, and, in confequence, to de-
finition*
SECT. XXIV.
The power of Auguftus Caefar was not given, but
ufurped.
/^\UR author's next inftance is ingenioufly taken from the Romans,
^Jr u who," he fays, " tho' they were a people greedy of liberty,
" freed Auguftus from the neceffity of laws." If it be true, as he
affirms, that fuch a prerogative is inftituted only for the prefervation
of liberty, they who are moft greedy of it, ought to be moft forward
in eftablifhing that which defends it beft. But if the weight laid upon
the words " greedy of liberty, &c." render his memory and judgment
liable to cenfure, the unpardonable prevarication of citing any act
done by the Romans in the time of Auguftus, as done freely, lhews
him to be a man of no faith. " Omnium jura in fe traxerat," fays
Annal. 1. i. Tacitus of Auguftus ; nothing was conferred upon him, he took all
to himfelf % there could be nothing of right in that which was wholly
ufurped. And neither the people or the fenate could do any thing
freely, whilft they were under the power of a mad corrupted
foldiery, who firft betrayed, and then fubdued them. The greateft
part of the fenate had fallen at the battle of Pharfalia, others had been
gleaned up in feveral places, the reft deftroyed by the profcriptions -,
and that which then retained the name of a fenate, was made up
chiefly of thofe who had been his minifters, in bringing the moft
miferable flavery upon their own country. The Roman liberty, and
that bravery of fpirit by which it had been maintained, was not only
aboliihed, but almoft forgotten. All confideration of law and right
was
* Ad fummum bonum fecundum virtutem. Arid. pol.
Difcourfes concerning Government. 361
was trampled under foot ; and none could difpute with him, who by Sect. 2$.
the power of the fword had feized the authority both of the fenate
and people. Nothing was fo extravagant, that might not be ex-
torted by the infolent violence of a conqueror, who had thirty mer-
cenary legions to execute his commands. The uncorrupted part of
the people, that had efcaped the fword of Julius, had either perifhed
with Hirtius and Panfa> Brutus and Caflius, or been deftroyed by the
deteftable triumvirate. Thofe that remained could lofe nothing by
a verbal refignation of their liberty, which they had neither ftrength
nor courage to defend. The magistracies were poffefled by the crea-
tures of the tyrant ; and the people Was compofed of fuch as were
either born under flavery, and accuftomed to obey, or remained under
the terror of thofe arms that had confumed the afTertors of their
liberty. Our author, ftanding in need of fome Roman example,
was obliged to feek it in an age, when the laws were fubverted,
virtue extinguifhed, injuftice placed in the throne, and fuch as
would not be of the fame fpirit, expofed to the utmoft cruelty. This
was the time when the fovereign majefty mined in glory ; and they
who had raifed it above the law, made it alfo the object of their re-
ligion, by adoring the ftatues of their oppreflbr. The corruption
or this court fpread itfelf over the beft part of the world ; and re-
duced the empire to that irrecoverable weaknefs in which it languim-
ed and periftied. This is the ftate of things that pleafes Filmer, and
thofe that are like him, who, for the introduction of the fame among
us, recommend fuch an elevation of the fovereign majefty, as is
moil contrary to the laws of God and men, abhorred by all gene-
rous nations, and moil efpecially by our anceftors, who thought
nothing too dear to be hazarded in the defence of themfelves and us
from it.
SECT. XXV.
The regal power was not the firfl: in this nation ; nor
neceffarily to be continued^ tho' it had been the firfr.
TRUTH being uniform in itfelf, thofe who defire to propagate
it for the good of mankind, lay the foundations of their reafon-
ings in fuch principles, as are either evident to common fenfe, or eafily
proved: but cheats and impoftors, delighting in obfeurity, fuppofe
things that are dubious or falfe, and think to build one falfhood upon
another ; and our author can find no better way to perfuade us, that
all our privileges and laws are from the king, than by faying, e< that
" the firft power was the kingly power, which was both in this and
n all other nations in the world, long before any laws, or any other
" kind of government, were thought of ; from whence we muft
" neceffarily infer, that the common law, or common cuftoms of
" this land, were originally the laws and commands of the king."
But denying both thefe points, I affirm,
i. Firft,
362, Difcourfes concerning Government.
ChapTIL I. Firft, that there was a power to make kings before there was
any king.
2. Tho' kings had been the firft created magiftrates in all places
(as perhaps they were in fome), it does not follow, that they mud
continue for ever, or that laws are from them.
To the firft j I think no man will deny, that there was a people at
Babylon, before Nimrod was king of that place. This people had a
power ; for no number of men can be without it : nay this people
had a power of making Nimrod king, or he could never have been
king. He could not be king by fucceflion, for the Scripture fhews
him to have been the firft. He was not king by the right of father,
for he was not their father, Chufh, Cham, with his elder brothers,
and father Noah, being ftill living j and, which is worft of all, were
not kings : for if they who lived in Nimrod 's time, or before him^
neither were kings, nor had kings, he that ought to have been king
over all by the right of nature (if there had been any fuch thing in
nature), was not king. Thofe who immediately fucceeded him, and
muft have inherited his right, if he had any, did not inherit, or pre-
tend to it : and therefore he that {hall now claim a right from nature^
as father of a people, muft ground it upon fomething more certain
than Noah's right of reigning over his children, or it can have no
ftrength in it.
Moreover, the nations who in and before the time of Nimrod had
no kings, had power, or elfe they could have performed no act, nor
conftituted any other magiftrate, to this day, which is abfurd. There
was therefore a power in nations before there were kings, or there
could never have been any ; and Nimrod could never have been king,
if the people of Babylon had not made him king, which they could
not have done if they had not a power of making him fo. It is ri-
diculous to fay he made himfelf king, for tho' he might be ftrong and
valiant, he could not be ftronger than a multitude of men. That
which forces muft be ftronger than that which is forced ; and if it be
true, according to the antient faying, that Hercules himfelf is not fuf-
ficient to encounter two, it is fure more impoflible for one man to force
a multitude, for that muft be ftronger than he. If he came in by
perfuafion, they who were perfuaded, were perfuaded to confent, that
he fhould be king. That confent therefore made him king. But,
" qui dat efle, dat modum effe :" they who made him king, made him
fuch a king as beft pleafed themfelves. He had therefore nothing
but what was given : his greatnefs and power muft be from the
multitude who gave it : and their laws and liberties could not be from
him j but their liberties were naturally inherent in themfelves, and
their laws were the product of them.
There was a people that made Romulus king. He did not make
or beget that people, nor, for any thing we know, one man of them.
He could not come in by inheritance, for he was a baftard, the fon of
an unknown man ; and when he died, the right that had been confer-
red upon him reverted to the people, who, according to that right, chofe
Numa, Hoftilius, Martius, Tarquinius Prifcus, and Servius, all ftran-
gers, and without any other right than what was beftowed upon
them ;
Difcourfes concerning Government. 363
them : and Tarquinius Superbus, who invaded the throne cf * without Sect. 23.
" the command of the people, 1 ' was ejected, and the government of *— * ■V s '-'
kings abolifht, by the fame power that had created it.
We know not certainly by what law Mofes, and the judges, cre-
ated by the advice of Jethro, governed the Ifraelites ; but may pro-
bably conjecture it to have been by that law which God had written
in the hearts of mankind ; and the people fubmitted to the judgment
of good and wife men, tho' they were under no coercive power :
but it is certain they had a law, and a regular magiftracy, under which
they lived, four hundred years before they had a king, for Saul was
the firft. This law was not therefore from the king, nor by the
king ; but the king was chofen and made by the people, according
to the liberty they had by the law, tho' they did not rightly follow
the rules therein prefcribedj and by that means brought deftruclion
upon themfelves.
The country in which we live lay long concealed under obfeure
barbarity, and we know nothing of the firft inhabitants, but what is
involved in fables, that leave us ftill in the dark. Julius Cacfar is the
firft who fpeaks diit.inc~t.ly of our affairs, and gives us no reafon to
believe there was any monarchy then eftablifhed amongft us. Caffi-
vellaunus was occanonally chofen by the nations that were moil ex- j u ]. Csef.
pofed to the violence of the Romans, for the management of thofe Comment,
wars againft them. By others we hear of Boadicia, Arviragus, Gal- '• v>
gacus, and many more fet up afterwards, when need required ; but
we find no footfteps of a regular fucceffion either by inheritance or
eleclion. And as they had then no kings, or any other general magi-
strate, that can be faid to be equivalent to a king, they might have
had none at all unlefs they had thought fit. Tacitus mentions a fort
of kings, ufed by the Romans to keep -f- nations in fervitude to
them j and tho' it were true, that there had been fuch a man as Lucius,
and he one of this fort, he is to be accounted only as a Roman ma-
gistrate, and fignifies no more to our difpute, than if he had been
called proconful, prastor, or by any other name. However there was
no feries of them : that which was temporary and occasional, de-
pended upon the will of thofe, who, thinking there was occafion,
created fuch a magiftrate, and omitted to do fo, when the occafion
ceafed, or was thought to ceafe ; and might have had none at all, if
they had fo pleafed. The magiftracy therefore was from them, and
depended upon their will.
We have already mentioned the hiftories of the Saxons, Danes,
and Normans, from which nations, together with the Britains, we are
defcended, and, finding that they were fevere affertors of their liberties,
acknowledged no human laws but their own, received no kings, but
fuch as fwore to obferve them, and depofed thofe who did not well
perform their oaths and duty, it is evident, that their kings were
made by the people according to the law j and that the law, by
which they became what they were, could not be from themfelves.
* Sine jufili populi. T. Liv. 1. i.
f Inter inftrumenta fervitutis reges habuere. C. Tacit,
Z z z z Our
364 Difcourfes concerning Government
Chap. III. Our anceftors were fo fully convinced, that in the creation of kings
they exercifed their own right, and were only to confider what was
good for themfelves, that without regard to the memory of thofe
who had gone before, they were accuftomed to take fuch as teemed
moft like, wifely, juftly and gently to perform their office 5 refuted
thofe that were fufpected of pride, cruelty, or any other vice that
might bring prejudice upon the public, what title foever they pretended}
and removed fuch as had been placed in the throne, if they did not
anfwer the opinion conceived of their virtue ; which I take to be a
manner of proceeding that agrees better with the quality of mailers,
making laws and magistrates for themfelves, than of Haves receiving
fuch as were impofed upon them.
2. To the fecond. Tho' it mould be granted, that all nations had
at the firft been governed by kings, it were nothing to the queftion ;
for no man, or number of men, was ever obliged to continue in the
errors of his predeceflbrs. The authority of cuftom, as well as of
law (I mean in relation to the power that made it to be), confifts only
in its rectitude : and the fame reafon which may have induced one or^.
more nations to create kings, when they knew no other form of
government, may not only induce them to fet up another, if that
be found inconvenient to them, but proves, that they may as juftly
do fo, as remove a man who performs not what was expected from
him. Jf there had been a rule given by God, and written in the
minds of men by nature, it muft have been from the beginning,
univerfal and perpetual ; or at leaft muft have been obterved by the
wifeft and beft inftructed nations : which not being in any meafure
(as I have proved already), there can be no reafon, why a polite
people fhould not relinquish the errors committed by their anceftors in
the time of their barbarifm and ignorance, and why they mould not
do it in matters of government, as well as in any other thing relating
to life. Men are fubject to errors, and it is the work of the beft and
wifeft to difcover and amend fuch as their anceftors may have com-
mitted, or to add perfection to thofe things which by them have been
well invented. This is fo certain, that whatfoever we enjoy beyond
the mifery in which our barbarous anceftors lived, is due only to the
liberty of correcting what was amifs in their practice, or inventing
that which they did not know : and I doubt whether it be more brutifli
to fay, we are obliged to continue in the idolatry of the druids, with
all the miferies and follies that accompany the moft favage barbarity,
or to confefs, that tho' we have a right to depart from thefe, yet we
are for ever bound to continue the government they had eftablifhed,
whatever inconveniences might attend it. Tertullian, difputing with
the pagans, who objected the novelty of the chriftian religion,
troubled not himfelf with refuting that error ; * but proving chri-
ftianity to be good and true, he thought he had fufficiently proved it
to be antient. A wife architect may fhew his fkill, and deferve com-
mendation for building a poor houfe of vile materials, when he can
procure no better, but he no way ought to hinder others from erecting
* Nullum tempus, nulla praefcriptio, occurrit veritati. Tertul. Id antiquius quod verius.
Ibid.
more
Difcourfes concerning Government. 3 6tj
more glorious fabrics if they are furnimed with the means required. Sect, 23,
Befides, fuch is the imperfection of all human conftitutions, that they
are Subject to perpetual fluctuation, which never permits them to con-
tinue long in the fame condition : corruptions Hide in infenfibly j and
the beft orders are fometimes fubverted by malice and violence ; fo
that he who only regards what was done in fuch an age, often takes
the corruption of the State for the institution, follows the worn: ex-
ample, thinks that to be the firft, that is the moil antient he knows ;
and if a brave people, feeing the original defects of their government,
or the corruption into which it may be fallen, do either correct and
reform what may be amended, or aboliSh that which was evil in the
institution, or fo perverted, that it cannot be reftored to integrity,
thefe men impute it to fedition, and blame thofe actions, which, of all
that can be performed by men, are the moft glorious. We are not
therefore fo much to inquire after that which is moft antient, as that
which is beft, and moft conducing to the good ends to which it was
directed. As governments were inftituted for the obtaining of juftice,
and (as our author fays) the prefervation of liberty, we are not
to feek what government was the firft, but what beft provides for
the obtaining of juftice, and prefervation of liberty. For whatfo-
ever the inftitution be, and how long foever it may have lafted, it is
void, if it thwarts, or do not provide for the ends of its eftablifhment.
If fuch a law or cuftom therefore as is not good in itfelf, had in
the beginning prevailed in all parts of the world (which in relation
to abfolute, or any kind of monarchy, is not true), it ought to be
abolifhed ; and if any man fhould fhew himfelf wifer than others by
propofing a law or government, more beneficial to mankind than
any that had been formerly known, providing better for juftice and
liberty than all others had done, he would merit the higheft vene-
ration. If any man afk, who (hall be judge of that rectitude or
pravity which either authorizes or deftroys a law ? I anfwer, that
as this confifts not in formalities and niceties, but in evident and fub-
ftantial truths, there is no need of any other tribunal than that of
common fenfe, and the light of nature, to determine the matter : and
he that travels through France, Italy, Turky, Germany, and Switzer-
land, without confulting Bartolus or Baldus, will eafily underftand
whether the countries that are under the kings of France and Spain,
the pope and the great Turk, or fuch as are under the care of a well-
regulated magiftracy, do beft enjoy the benefits of juftice and liberty.
It is as eafily determined, whether the Grecians, when Athens and
Thebes flourished, were more free than the Medes ; whether juftice
was better adminiftred by Agathocles, Dionyfius, and Phalaris, than
by the legal kings and regular magiftrates of Sparta ; or whether more
care was taken, that juftice and liberty might be preferved by Tiberius^
Caligula, Claudius, Nero, and Vitellius, than by the fenate and people
of Rome, whilft the laws were more powerful than the commands
of men. The like may be faid of particular laws, as thofe of Nabu-
chodonofor and Caligula, for worshiping their ftatues ; our acts of
parliament againft heretics and Lollards, with the Statutes and orders
of the inquiiition, which is called the holy office. And if that only
be a law which is " fanctio recta, jubens honefta, prohibens contraria,"
the
3^6 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. tne meaneft understanding, if free from paSTion, may certainly know,
t^— y*"—- ' that fuch as thefe cannot be laws, by what authority foever they
were enacted, and that the ufe of them, and others like to them,
ought to be abolished for their turpitude and iniquity. Infinite ex-
amples of the like nature might be alledged, as well concerning divine
as human things. And if there be any laws which are evil, there
cannot be an incontestable rectitude in all, and if not in all, it con-
cerns us to examine where it is to be found. Laws and constitutions
ought to be weighed, and whilft all due reverence is paid to fuch as
are good, every nation may not only retain in itfelf a power of chang-
ing or abolifhing all fuch as are not fo, but ought to exercife that
power according to the beSt of their understanding, and in the place
of what was either at firSt mistaken or afterwards corrupted, to con-
stitute that which is moSt conducing to the establishment of juStice
and liberty.
But fuch is the condition of mankind, that nothing can be fo per-
fectly framed as not to give fome testimony of human imbecillity, and
frequently to Stand in need of reparations and amendments. Many
things are unknown to the wifeSt, and the beSt men can never wholly
deveSt themfelves of paSfions and affections. By this means the beft
and wifeSt are fometimes led into error, and Stand in need of fuccef-
fors like to themfelves, who may find remedies for the faults they
have committed, and nothing can or ought to be permanent but
that which is perfect. No natural body was ever fo well tempered
and organized, as not to be fubject. to difeafes, wounds, or Other ac-
cidents, and to need medicines, and other occasional helps, as well as
nourifhment and exercife, and he who, under the name of innova-
tion, would deprive nations of the like, does, as much as lies in him,
condemn them all to periSh by the defects of their own foundations.
Difcorf. di Some men obferving this, have propofed a neceSfrty of reducing every
Macchiav. State, once in an age or two, to the integrity of its firSt principle :
lib. 11. Dut t ^ e y 0U ght to have examined, whether that principle be good or
evilj or fo good, that nothing can be added to it, which none ever
was ; and this being fo, thofe who will admit of no change would
render errors perpetual, and depriving mankind of the benefits of
wifdom, induStry, experience, and the right ufe of reafon, oblige all
to continue in the rriiferable barbarity of their ancestors, which fuits
better with the name of a wolf than that of a man.
Thofe who are of better understanding, weigh all things, and
often find reafon to abrogate that which their fathers, according to the
meafure of the knowledge they had, or the State of things among
them, had rightly instituted, or to reStore that which they had abro-
gated ; and there can be no greater mark of a moSt brutiSh Stupidity,
than for men to continue in an evil way, becaufe their fathers had
brought them into it. But if we ought not too Strictly to adhere to
our own constitutions, thofe of other nations are lefs to be regarded
by us 5 for the laws that may be good for one people are not for
all, and that which agrees with the manners of one age, is utterly
abhorrent from thofe of another. It were abfurd to think of restoring
the laws of Lycurgus to the prefent inhabitants of Peloponnefus,
who are accuStomed to the moSt abject Slavery. It may eaSily be
- ' imagined,
Difcourfes concerning Government 367
imagined, how the Romans, Sabines, and Latins, now under the tyran- Sect, if*
ny of the pope, would relifh fuch a difcipline as flouriilied among w - \~^
them after the expullion of the Tarquins ; and it had been no lefs
prepofterous to give a liberty to the Parthians of governing them-
felves, or for them to aiTume it, than to impofe an abfolute monarch
upon the German nation. Titus Livius, having obferved this, fays, o-a i ••
that if a popular government had been fet up in Rome immediately
upon the building of the city ; and if that fierce people, which was
compofed of unruly fhepherds, herdfmen, fugitive flaves, and out-
lawed perlbns, who could not fuffer the governments under which
they were born, had come to be incited by * turbulent orators, they * tribunicils
would have brought all into confulion: whereas that boifterous hu- procellis.
mour being gradually tempered by difcipline under Romulus, or taught
to vent its fury againft. foreign enemies, and foftened by the peaceable
reign of Numa, a new race grew up, which, being all of one blood,
contracted a love to their country, and became capable of liberty,
which the madnefs of their lad: king, and the lewdnefs of his fon, gave
them occafion to refume. If this was commendable in them, it muft
be fo in other nations. If the Germans might preferve their liberty,
as well as the Parthians fubmit themfelves to abfolute monarchy,
it is as lawful for the defcendents of thofe Germans to continue in it,
as for the ealtern nations to be ilavesi If one nation may juftly
chufe the government that feems bell: to them, and continue or alter
it according to the changes of times and things, the fame right mull:
belong to others. The great variety of laws that are or have been in
the world, proceeds from this ; and nothing can better mew the wif-
dom and virtue, or the vices and folly of nations, than the ufe they
make of this right: they have been glorious or infamous, powerful
or defpicable, happy or miferable, as they have well or ill executed
it.
If it be faid, that the law given by God to the Hebrews, proceed-
ing from his wifdom and goodnefs, mull: needs be perfect and obliga-
tory to all nations ; I anfwer, that there is a fimple and a relative
perfection : the firft is only in God, the other in the things he has created : Gen. i.
" He law that they were good ;" which can lignify no more than that
they were good in their kind, and fuited to the end for which he de-
ligned them. For if the perfection were abfolute, there could be no
difference between an angel and a worm, and nothing could be
fubject to change or death ; for that is imperfection. This relative
perfection is feen alfo by his law given to mankind in the perfons of
Adam and Noah. It was good in the kind, fit for thofe times ; but
could never have been enlarged or altered, if the perfection had been
fimple ; and no better evidence can be given to fhew, that it was not
fo, than that God did afterwards give one much more full and expli-
cit to his people. This law alfo was peculiarly applicable to that
people and feafon ; for, if it had been otherwife, the apoftles would
have obliged chriftians to the intire obfervation of it, as well as to
abfbain from idolatry, fornication, and blood. But if all this be not
fo, then their judicial law, and the form of their commonwealth,
mult be received by all ; no human law can be of any value ; we are
all brethren ; no man has a prerogative above another ; lands mult
S A be
368 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. ^ e equally divided amongft all; inheritances cannot be alienated for
above fifty years ; no man can be raifed above the reft, unlefs he be
called by God, and enabled by his Spirit to conduct, the people ; when
this man dies, he that has the fame Spirit muft fucceed, as Jofhua did
to Mofes, and his children can have no title to his office : when fuch
a man appears, a fanhedrin of feventy men, chofen out of the whole
people, are to judge fuch caufes as relate to themfelves, whilft thofe
of greater extent and importance are referred to the general arTem-
blies. Here is no mention of a king; and confequently, if we muft
take this law for our pattern, we cannot have one : if the point be
driven to the utmoft, and the precept of Deuteronomy, where God
permitted them- to have a king, if they thought fit, when they came
into the promifed land, be underftood to extend to all nations, every
one of them muft have the fame liberty of taking their own time,
chufing him in their own way, dividing the kingdom, having no
king, and fetting up other governors when they pleafe, as before the
election of Saul, and after the return from the captivity : and even
when they have a king, he muft be fuch a one as is defcribed in the
fame chapter, who no more refembles the fovereign majefty that
our author adores, and agrees as little with his maxims, as a tribune
of the Roman people.
We may therefore conclude, that if we are to follow the law of
Mofes, we muft take it with all the appendages ; a king can be no
more, and no otherwife, than he makes him : for whatever we read
of the kings they had, were extreme deviations from it. No nation
can make any law ; and our lawyers, burning their books, may
betake themfelves to the ftudy of the pentateuch ; in which tho' fome
of them may be well verfed, yet probably the profit arifing from thence
will not be very great.
But, if we are not obliged to live in a conformity to the law of
Mofes, every people may frame laws for themfelves, and we cannot
be denied the right that is common to all. Our laws were not fent
from heaven, but made by our anceftors according to the light they
had, and their prefent occafions. We inherit the fame right from
them, and, as we may without vanity fay, that we know a little
more than they did, if we find ourfelves prejudiced by any law that
they made, we may repeal it. The fafety of the people was their
fupreme law, and is fo to us : neither can we be thought lefs fit to
judge what conduces to that end, than they were. If they in any
age had been perfuaded to put themfelves under the power, or, in Our
author's phrafe, under the fovereign majefty, of a child, a fool, a
mad or defperately wicked perfon, and had annexed the right confer-
red upon him, to fuch as mould fucceed, it had not been a " juft and
" right fanction;" and, having none of the qualities effentially belong-
ing to a law, could not have the effect of a law. It cannot be for the
good of a people to be governed by one, who by nature ought to be
governed, or by age or accident is rendered unable to govern himfelf.
The public interefts, and the concernments of private men in their
lands, goods, liberties, and lives (for the prefervation of which, our
author fays, that regal prerogative is only conftituted), cannot be
preferved by one who is transported by his own paflions or follies, a
flave
£)ifcouries concerning Government. 369
Have to his lufts and vices ; or, which is fometimes worfe, governed Sfct. 26
by the vilefl of men and women, who flatter him in them, and pufh
him on to do fuch things as even they would abhor, if they were in
his place. The turpitude and impious madnefs of fuch an act mult
neceffarily make it void, by overthrowing the ends for which it was
made, fince that juftice which was fought cannot be obtained, nor the
evils that were feared, prevented ; and they for whofe good it was
intended muft neceffarily have a right of abolishing it. This might
be Sufficient for us, tho' our anceftors had enflaved themfelves. But,
God be thanked, we are not put to that trouble : we have no reafon
to believe we are defcended from fuch fools and beafts, as would will-
ingly cart themfelves, and us, into fuch an excefs of miiery and fhame,
or that they were fo tame and cowardly to be fubjecred by force or
fear. We know the value they fet upon their liberties, and the
courage with which they defended them : and we can have no better
example to encourage us never to fuffer them to be violated or
diminifhed.
SECT. XXVI.
Tho' the king may be entrufted with the power of chufing
judges, yet that by which they act is from the law.
T Confefs, that no law can be fo perfect, " to provide exactly for
* " every cafe that may fall out, fo as to leave nothing to the dif-
" cretion of the judges," who in fome meafure are to interpret them :
but " that laws or cuftoms are ever few, or that the paucity is the
" reafon that they cannot give fpecial rules, or that judges do refort
" to thofe principles, or common-law axioms, whereupon former
" judgments, in cafes fomething alike, have been given by former
,e judges, who all receive their authority from the king in his right to
" give fentence," I utterly deny j and affirm,
1 . That in many places, and particularly in England, the laws are
fo many, that the number of them has introduced an uncertainty and
confufion, which is both dangerous and troublefome ; and the infinite
variety of adjudged cafes, thwarting and contradicting each other, has
rendered theie difficulties inextricable. Tacitus imputes a great part
of the miferies fuffered by the Romans in his time to this abufe, and
tells us, that " * the laws grew to be innumerable in the worft. and
d burgeftes of their own chufing j" and would make this to be an
act of grace and favour from that king : but adds, that " it had been
" more for the honour of parliaments, if a king whofe title to the
ifcourfes concerning Government. 387
fended and enlarged their dominions by war; and for a reward of Sect. ,8.
their fervices, in the diviiion of lands gained by conqueft, they dis-
tributed to them freeholds, under the obligation of continuing
the fame fervice to their country. This appears by the name of
knights fervice, a knight being no more than a foldier, and a
knight's fee no more than was lufficient to maintain one. It is plain,
that knighthood was always efteemed nobility ; fo that no man,
of what quality foever, thought a knight inferior to him, and thofe
of the higheft birth could not act: as noblemen till they were knighted.
Among the Goths in Spain, the cutting off the hair (which being
long, was the mark of knighthood) was accounted a degrading, and
looked upon to be fo great a mark of infamy, that he who had Suf-
fered it, could never bear any honour or office in the commonwealth ;
and there was no dignity fo high, but every knight was capable of
it. There was no diftin&ion of men above it, and even to this day
" baron," or " varon," in their language, fignifies no more than " vir ' in
Latin, which is not properly given to any man, unlefs he be free. The
like was in France, till the coming in of the third race of kings, in
which time the 12 peers (of whom 6 only were laymen ) were raifed
to a higher dignity, and the commands annexed made hereditary ;
but the honour of knighthood was thereby no-way diminimed. Tho'
there were dukes, earls, marquifes, and barons, in the time of
Froiffart, yet he ufually calls them knights : and Philip de Comm n s,
fpeaking of the moll: eminent men of his time, calls them good, wife,
or valiant knights. Even to this day the name of gentleman com-
prehends all that is raifed above the common people; Henry the fourth
ufually called himfelf the firft gentleman in France, and it is an ordi-
nary phrafe among them, when they fpeak of a gentleman of good
birth, to fay, " II eft noble comme le roy ; he is as noble as the king."
In their general affembly of eftates, " the chamber of the nobleffe,"
which is one of three, is compofed of the deputies fent by the gen-
try of every province ; and in the inquiry, made about the year 1668.
concerning nobility, no notice was taken of fuch as had affumed the
titles of earl, marquis, vifcount, or baron, but only of thofe who
called themfelves gentlemen ; and if they could prove that name to
belong to them, they were left to ufe the other titles as they pleafed.
When duels were in fafhion (as all know they were lately) no man,
except the princes of the blood, and marefchals of France, could with
honour refufe a challenge from any gentleman : the firft, becaufe it
was thought unfit, that he who might be king, mould fight with a
fubjed to the danger of the commonwealth, which might, by that
means, be deprived of its head : the others being by their office
commanders of the nobility, and judges of all the controverfies
relating to honour, that happen amongft them, cannot reafonably be
brought into private contefts with any. In Denmark, nobleman
and gentleman is the fame thing; and till the year 1660. they had
the principal part of the government in their hands. When Charles
Guftavus, king of Sweden, invaded Poland in the year 1655. it is
faid, that there were above three hundred thoufand gentlemen in
arms to refift him. This is the nobility of that country, kings are
chofen by them : every one of them will fay, as in France', " he is
5 F " noble
588 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. c< noble as the king." The laft king was a private man among them,
Vi ^ - v "** ^ not thought to have had more than four hundred pounds a year. He
Who now reigns was not at all above him in birth or eft ate, till he
had raifed himfelf by great fervices done for his country in many
wars; and there was not one gentleman in the nation who might
not have been chofen as well as he, if it had pleafed the affembly
that did it.
This being the nobility of the northern nations, and the true
baronage of England, it is no wonder that they were called " nobiles ;"
the mod: eminent among them " magnates, principes, proceres '" and
fo numerous, that they were efteemed to be " multitudo infmita."
One place was hardly able to contain them ; and the inconveniences
of calling them all together appeared to be fo great, that they in time
chofe rather to meet by reprefentatives, than every one in his own
perfon. The power therefore remaining in them, it matters not what
method they obferved in the execution. They who had the fubftance
in their hands, might give it what form they pleafed. Our author
fufficiently manifefts his ignorance, in faying, there could be no knights
of the mires in the time of the Saxons, becaufe there were no fhires ;
for the very word is Saxon, and we find the names of Berkshire,
Wiltfhire, Devonshire, Dorfetfhire, and others, moft frequently in
the writings of thofe times ; and dukes, earls, thanes, or aldermen,
Sclden's tit. appointed to command the forces, and look to the diftribution of
of hon. p. 2i juftice in them. Selden cites Ingulphus for faying, that " Alfred was
c * 5* ** the firft that changed the provinces, &c. into counties :" but refutes
him, and proves, that the diftinction of the land into fhires or counties
(for fhire Signified no more than the fhare or part committed to the
care of the earl or comes) was far more antient. Whether the firfl
divifions by the Saxons were greater or leffer than the fhires or coun-
ties now are, is nothing to the queftion : they who made them to be as
they were, could have made them greater or leffer, as they pleafed. And
whether they did immediately, or fome ages after that diftinclion, ceafe
to come to their great arTemblies, and rather chufe to fend their depu-
ties ; or whether fuch deputies were chofen by counties, cities, and
boroughs, as in our days, or in any other manner ; can be of no ad-
vantage or prejudice to the caufe that I maintain. If the power of the
nation, when it was divided into feven kingdoms, or united under one,
did refide in the micklegemots or wittenagemots ; if thefe confifted of
the nobility and people, who were fometimes fo numerous, that no
one place could well contain them ; and if the preference given to the
chief among them was on account of the offices they executed, either
in relation to war or juftice, which no man can deny; I have as much
as ferves for my purpofe. It is indifferent to me, whether they were
called earls, dukes, aldermen, herotoghs, or thanes ; for it is certain,
that the titular nobility, now in mode amongft us, has no refemblance
to this antient nobility of England. The novelty therefore is on the
other fide, and that of the worft fort ; becaufe, by giving the name
of noblemen (which antiently belonged to fuch as had the greater!:
interefts in nations, and were the fupporters of their liberty) to
court-creatures, who often have none, and either acquire their
honours by money, or are preferred for fervile, and fometimes impure
fervices
Difcourfes concerning Government. ^8p
fervices rendered to the perfon that reigns, or elfe for mifchiefs done Six r. 28.
to their country, the conftitution has been wholly inverted, and the vl^ v—^
truft repofed in the kings, (who in fome meafure had the difpofal of
offices and honours) miiemployed. This is farther aggravated by
appropriating the name of noblemen folely to them j whereas the
nation having been antiently divided only into freemen or noblemen
(who were the fame) and villains j the firft were, as Tacitus fays of
their ancestors the Germans, " * exempted from burdens and contri-
'« butions, and referved like arms for the ufes of war, ' whilft the
others were little better than Haves, appointed to cultivate the lands
or to other fervile offices. And I leave any reafonable man to judge'
whether the latter condition be that of thofe we now call commoners!
Neverthelefs, he that will believe the title of noblemen frill to belong
to thofe only who are fo by patent, may guefs how well o'ir wars
would be managed, if they were left folely to fuch as are fo by that
title. If this be approved, his majefty may do well with his hundred
and fifty noblemen, eminent in valour and military experience as
they are known to be, to make fuch wars as may fail upon him, and
leave the defpifed commons, under the name of villains, to provide
for themfelves, if the fuccefs do not anfwer his expectations. But if
the commons are as free as the nobles, many of them in birth equal
to the patentees, in eltate fuperior to moll of them ; and that it is
not only expected they mould affiit. him in wars with their perfons
and purfes, but acknowledged by all, that the Iteng h and virtue of
the nation is in them ; it mult be conreiTcd, that they are true noble-
men of England, and that all the privileges, antiently enjoyed by fuch,
mult necerfarily belong to them, fince they perform the offices to
which they were annexed. This mews how the nobility were juftly
faid to be almolt infinite in number, fo that no one place was able
to contain them. The Saxon armies, that came over into this coun-
try to a wholfome and generative climate, might well increafe in four
or five ages to thofe valt numbers, as the Franks, Goths, and others,
had done in Spain, France, Italy, and other parts j and when they
were grown fo numerous, they found themfelves neceiTarily obliged
to put the power into the hands of reprefentatives chofen by them-
felves, which they had before exercifed in their own perfons. But
thefe two ways differing rather in form than elTentially, the one
tending to democracy, the other to ariftocracy, they are equally op-
pofite to the abfolute dominion of one man reigning for himfelf, and
governing the nation as his patrimony ; and equally afTert the rights
of the people to put the government into fuch a form as belt pleafes
themfelves. This was fuitable to what they had practifed in their own
country : " De minoribus confultant principes, de majoribus omnes." Tacit, de
Nay, even thefe " fmaller matters" cannot be faid properly to relate tomor. Germ,
the king; for he is but one, and the word ■■ principes" is in the plural
number, and can only fignify fuch principal men, as the fame author
fays were chofen by the general alTemblies to do jultice, 6cc. and to
* Exempti oneribus & collationibus, & tantum in ufum prseliorum repofiti, veluti tela
& arma bellis refervantur. Com. Tacit, de morib. Germ.
each
5po Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. eac ^ °f them one hundred comites joined, not only to give advice,
but authority to their actions.
The word l ' omnes," fpoken by a Roman, mud likewife be underftood
as it was ufed by them, and imports all the citizens, or fuch as made up
the body of the commonwealth. If he had fpoken of Rome or Athens
whilfl they remained free, he muft have ufed the fame word (be-
caufe all thofe, of whom the city confifted, had votes), how great fo-
ever the number of flaves or ftrangers might have been. The Spartans
are rightly faid to have gained, loft, and recovered, the lordfhiD or
principality of Greece. They were all lords in relation to their helots,
and fo were the Dorians in relation to that fort of men, which under
feveral names they kept, as the Saxons did their villains, for the per-
formance of the offices which they thought too mean for thofe, who
were ennobled by liberty, and the ufe of arms, by which the com-
monwealth was defended and enlarged. Tho' the Romans fcorned to
give the title of lord to thofe, who had ufurped a power over their lives
and fortunes ; yet every one of them was a lord in relation to his own
fervants, and all together are often called " * lords of the world :" the
like is feen almoft every-whcre. The government of Venice, having
continued for many ages in the fame families, has ennobled them all.
No phrafe is more common in Switzerland, than " the lords of Bern,"
or " the lords of Zurich," and other places, tho' perhaps there is not
a man amongft them, who pretends to be a gentleman, according to
the modern fenfe put upon that word. The ftates of the United Pro-
vinces are called high and mighty lords, and the fame title is given
to each of them in particular. Nay, the word heer, which fignifies
lord both in high and low Dutch, is as common as monfieur in France,
lignor in Italy, or fennor in Spain ; and is given to every one, who is
not of a fordid condition, but efpecially to foldiers : and tho' a com-
mon foldier be now a much meaner thing than it was antiently, no
man fpeaking to a company of foldiers in Italian, ufes any other ftyle
than " fignori foldati;" and the like is done in other languages.
It is not therefore to be thought ftrange, if the Saxons, who in their
own country had fcorned any other employment than that of the
fword, mould think themfelves farther ennobled, when by their arms
they had acquired a great and rich country, and driven out or fubdued
the former inhabitants. They might well diftinguifh themfelves from
the villains they brought with them, or the Britons they had enflaved.
They might well be called " magnates, proceres regni, nobiles,
" Anglias nobilitas, barones j" and the affemblies of them juftly called
" concilium regni generale, univerfitas totius Angliae nobilium, uni-
" verfitas baronagii," according to the variety of times, and other oc-
currences. We have fuch footfteps remaining of the name of baron,
as plainly mew the fignification of it. The barons of London and
the Cinque Ports are known to be only the freemen of thofe places.
In the petty court-barons, every man who may be of a jury is a
baron. Thefe are noblemen ; for there are noble nations as well as
noble men in nations. The Mammalukes accounted themfelves to be
all noble, tho' born flaves j and when they had ennobled themfelves
by
* Romanos rerum dominos. Virg.
Difcourfes concerning Government. 391
by the ufe of arms, they looked upon the nobleft of the Egyptians, Sect. 29.
as their flaves. Tertullian writing, not to force eminent men, but to
the whole people of Carthage, calls them, " antiquitate nobiles, nobi-
" litate felices." Such were the Saxons, ennobled by a perpetual ap-
plication to thofe exercifes that belong to noblemen, and an abhorrence
to any thing that is vile and fordid.
Left this mould feem far fetched, to thofe who pleafe themfelves
with cavilling, they are to know, that the fame general councils are
exprefled, by other authors, in other words. They are called " * The
and, chufing rather to ferve Vortigern, than to
Flor. hift. depend upon what they could get by rapine at fea, lived upon a fmall
proportion of land, by him allotted to them. Tho' this ieems to be
but allender encouragement, yet it was enough to invite many others
to follow their example and fortune ; fo that their number increafing,
the county of Kent was given to them, under the obligation of
ferving the Britons in their wars. Not long after, lands in Northum-
berland were beftowed upon another company of them, with the
fame condition. This was all the title they had to what they enjoyed,
ibkL till they treacheroufly killed four hundred and fixty, or, as William
of Malmfbury fays, three hundred principal men of the Britifli
nobility, and made Vortigern prifoner, who had been fo much their
benefactor, that he feems never to have deferved well, but from them,
and to have incenfed the Britons by the favour he (hewed them,
as much as by the worftof his vices. And, certainly, actions of this
kind, compofed of falfhood and cruelty, can never create a right,
in the opinion of any better men, than Filmer and his difciples, who
think
Difcourfes concerning Government. 3^3
think that the power only is to be regarded, and not the means by Sect. 29,
which it is obtained. Bat, tho' it mould be granted, that a right had
been thus acquired, it mult accrue to the nation, not to Hengiil and
Horfa. If fuch an acquifuion be called a conqueft, the benefit muft
belong to thole that conquered. This was not the work of two
men j and thofe who had been free at home, can never be thought to
have left their own country, to fight as Haves, for the glory and
profit of two men in another. It cannot be faid, that their wants
compelled them; for their leaders fufTered the fame, and could not be
relieved, but by their atiiftance ; and whether their enterprize was
good or bad, juft or unjuft, it was the fame to all : no one man could
have any right, peculiar to himielf, unlefs they who gained ir, did
confer it upon him: and it is no way probable, that they, who in their
own country had kept their princes within very narrow limits, as has
been proved, mould refign themfelves, and all they had, as loon as
they came hither. But we have already fhewn, that they always
continued mofl obftinate defenders of their liberty, and the govern-
ment to which they had been accuftomed ; that they managed it by
themfelves, and acknowledged no other laws than their own. Nay,
if they had made fuch a reiignation of their right, as was necefTary
to create one in their le ders, it would be enough to overthrow the
propoiition ; for it is not then the leader that gives to the people, but
the people to the leader. If the people had not a right to give
what they did give, none was conferred upon the receiver ; if
they had a right, he that mould pretend to derive a benefit from
thence, mull: prove the grant, that the nature and intention of it may
appear.
To the fecond: if it be faid, that records tefiify all grants to have
been originally from the king; I anfwer, that tho' it were con-
ferred (which I abfolutely deny, and affirm that our rights and
liberties are innate, inherent, and enjoyed time out of mind, before
we had kings), it could be nothing to the queftion, which is, con-
cerning reafon and juftice; and, if they are wanting, the defect can
never be fupplied by any matter of fact, tho' never fo clearly proved.
Or, if a right be pretended to be grounded upon a matter of fad:, the
thing to be proved is, that the people did really confer fuch a right
upon the firfl, or fome other kings : and, if no fuch thing do appear,
the proceedings of one or more kings, as if they had it, can be of no
value. But, in the prefent cafe, no fuch grant is pretended to have
been made, either to the firft, or to any of the following kings : the
right they had not, their fuccefTors could not inherit, and confe-
quently cannot have it, or, at mod, no better title to it, than that of
ufurpation.
But, as they who inquire for truth, ought not to deny or conceal any
thing, I may grant that manors, &c. were enjoyed by tenure from
kings; but that will no- way prejudice the caufe I defend, nor fignify
more, than that the countries which the Saxons had acquired, were
to be divided among them ; and, to avoid the quarrels that might
arife, if every man took upon him to feize what he could, a certain
method of making the diftribution was necefTarily to be fixed ; and
it was fit, that every man mould have fomething in his own hands, to
juftify
3P4 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap.III. juftify his title to what he pofTefTed, according to which contro-
* — **¥** •* verfies (hould be determined. This mull be teftiiied by fomebody,
and no man could be fo fit, or of fo much credit, as he who w r as chief
among them ; and this is no more than is ufual in all the focieties of
the world. The mayor of every corporation, the fpeaker or clerk
of the houfe of peers, or houfe of commons, the firft prefident cf
every parliament, or pre fidial in France ; the conful, burget mailer,
advOyer, or bailiff, in every free town of Holland, Germany, or
Switzerland ; (ign the public acts, that pafs in thofe places. The
dukes of Venice and Genoa do the like, tho' they have no other
power, than what is conferred upon them, and, of themfelves, can
do little or nothing. The grants of our kings are of the fame nature,
tho' the words " mero motu noftro" feem to imply the contrary -, for
kings fpeak always in the plural number, to mew that they do not
act for themfelves, but for the focieties over which they are placed ;
and all the veneration that is, or can be, given to their acts, does not
exalt them, but thofe from whom their authority is derived, and
for whom they are to execute. The tyrants of the Eaft, and other
barbarians, whofe power is raoft abfolute, fpeak in the fingle number,
as appears by the decrees of Nabuchodonofor, Cyrus, Darius, and
Ahafuerus, recited in Scripture, with others that we hear of daily from
thofe parts: but, wherefoever there is any-thing of civility or regu-
larity in government, the prince ufes the plural, to (hew that he acts
Dc jur. bell, in a public capacity. From hence, fays Grotius, the rights of kings
to fend ambaiTadors, make leagues, &c. do arife : the confederacies
made by them do not terminate with their lives, becaufe they are
not for themfelves; they fpeak not in their own perfons, but as
reprefenting their people : and " * a king who is deprived of his king-
" dom, lofes the right of fending ambaffadors," becaufe he can no
longer fpeak for thofe, who, by their own conient, or by a foreign
force, are cut off from him. The queftion is, not whether fuch a one
be juftly or unjuftly deprived (for that concerns only thofe who did it,
or fuffer it), but whether he can oblige the people ; and it is ridi-
culous for any nation to treat with a man, that cannot perform what
mall be agreed, or for him to ftipulate that which can oblige, and,
will be made good, only by himfelf.
But, tho' much may be left to the difcretion of kings, in the diftri-
bution of lands, and the like, yet it no-way diminifhes the right of
the people, nor confers any upon them, otherwife to difpofe of what
belongs to the public, than may tend to the common good, and, the
accomplifhment of thofe ends, for which they are enlrufted. Nay,
if it were true, that a conquered country did belong to the crown,
the king could not difpofe of it, becaufe it is annexed to the office,
and not alienable by the perfon. This is not only found in
regular mixed monarchies (as in Sweden, where the grants made by
the lafl kings have been lately refcinded by the general affembly of
eftates, as contrary to law), but even in the moit abfolute, as in France,
where the prefent king, who has ftretched his power to the utmofl, has
lately acknowledged, that he cannot do it ; and, according to the known
maxim
Rex regno ewtus, jus legandi amittit, Grot.
Difcourfes concerning Government 3^9
maxim of the ftate, that the demeafnes of the crown, which are Sect. 30-
defigned for the defraying of public charges, cannot be alienated,
all the grants made within the laft fifteen years have been annulled ;
even thofe who had bought lands of the crown have been called to
account, and the fums given being compared with the profits received,
and a moderate intereft allowed to the purchafers, lb much of the
principal as remained due to them has been repaid, and the lands
renamed.
SECT. XXX.
Henry the Firft was king of England by as good a title
as any of his predeceflbrs or fuccefTors.
HAVING made it appear, as I fuppofe, that the antient nobility
of England was compofed of fuch men as had been ennobled
by bearing arms in the defence or enlargement of the common-
wealth j that the dukes, earls, &c. were thofe who commanded
them ; that they and their dependents received lands for fuch fer-
vices, under an obligation of continuing to render the like, and accord-
ing to their feveral degrees and proportions, to provide and maintain
horfes, arms, and men, for the fame ufes ; it cannot be denied, that
they were fuch gentlemen, and lords of manors, as we now call
commoners, together with the freeholders, and fuch as in war
were found moft able to be their leaders. Of thefe the micklege-
mots, wittenagemots, and other public affemblies, did confift j and
nothing can be more abfurd than to aflign the names and rights of
duke, earl, and vifcount, which were names of offices, to thofe who
have not the offices, and are no- way fit for them. If our author
therefore had faid, that fuch as thefe, who had always compofed the
great councils of our nation, had, in favour of Henry the Firft, be-
llowed the crown upon him, as they had done upon his father and
brother, I mould agree with him : but it is the utmoft extravagance
to fay, that he who had neither title nor pofTeffion, mould give the
power to thofe who had always been in the pofTeffion of it, and exer-
cifed it in giving to him whatfoever he had. But I moft wonder he
mould fo far forget himfelf, to call this Henry a ufurper, and detract
from the validity of his acts, becaufe he had no title 5 whereas there
neither is, was, or can be, a ufurper, if there be any truth in his
doctrine : for he plainly tells us, we are only to look to the power,
and not at all to the means and ways by which it is obtained -, and
making no difference between a king and a tyrant, injoins an equal
fubmiffion to the commands of both. If this were only a flip of his
pen, and he did really take this Henry to be a ufurper, becaufe he had
hot a good title, I fhould defire to know the marks by which a law-
ful king is diftinguifhed from a ufurper, and in what a juft title
does con lift. If lie place it in an hereditary fucceflion, we ought to
be informed, whether this right muft be deduced from one univerfal
5 H lord
55)6 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. HI. lord of mankind, or from a particular lord of every people: if
from the univerfal lord, the fame defcent that gives him a rigt to
the dominion of any one country, enilaves the whole world to him:
if from the particular lord of one place, proof muft be given how
he came to be fo : for if there was a defect in the firft, it can how
be repaired, and the porTemon is no more than a continued u never
tion. But having already proved the abfurdity of any pretefurps-
cither, I (hall forbear the repetition, and only fay, that if the courfe
of fuccemon may never be juftly interrupted, the family of Meroveus
could not have had any right to the crown of France ; Pepin was a
ufurper, if it muft for ever have continued in the defcendents of
Meroveus ; and Hugh Capet could have no title, if the race of Pepin
might not be difpoffeiTed. I leave our author to difpute this point
with the king of France ; and when he has fo far convinced him that
he is a ufurper, as to perfuade him to reiign his crown to the
houfe of Auftria, claiming from Pharamond, or to that of Lorrain,
as defcended from Pepin, I can give him half a dozen more knots,
which will not be with lefs difficulty untied, and which, inftead of
eftablifhing the titles of fuch kings as are known to us, will overthrow
them all, unlefs a right be given to ufurpation, or the confent of a
people do confer it.
But if tl ere be fuch a thing as a ufurper, and a rule by which
men may judge of ufurpation, it is not only lawful, but neceffary, for
us to examine the titles of fuch as go under the name of kings, that
we may know whether they are truly fo or not, left through igno-
rance we chance to give the veneration and obedience that is due to a
king, to one who is not a king, and deny it to him, who by an un-
interruptible line of defcent is our natural lord, and thereby prefer
the worft of men, and our mnft bitter enemy, before the perfon we
ought to look upon as our father : and if this prove dangerous to one
or more kings, it is our author's fault, not mine.
If there be no ufurper, nor rule of diftinguifhing him from a law-
ful prince, Filmer is the worft of all triflers and impoftors, who
grounds his arguments in the moft ferious matters upon what he
efteems to be falfe : but the truth is, he feems to have fet himfelf
againft humanity and common fenfe, as much as againft law and
virtue : and if he who (o frequently contradicts himfelf, can be faid
to mean any thing, he would authorize rapine and murder, and per-
fuade us to account thofe to be rightful kings, who, by treachery,
and other unjuft means, overthrow the right of defcent, which he
pretends to efteem facred, as well as the liberties of nations, which
by better judges are thought to be fo, and gives the odious name of
ufurpation to the advancement of one who is made king by the con-
fent of a willing people.
But if Henry the Firft were a ufurper, I defire to know whether
the fame name belongs to all our kings, or which of them deferves
a better, that we may understand whofe acts ought to be reputed
legal, and to whofe defcent we owe veneration, or whether we are
wholly exempted from all : for I cannot fee a pombility of fixing the
guilt of ufurpation upon Henry the Firft, without involving many, if
not all our kings, in the fame.
If
Difcouries concerning Government. 35)7
If his title was not good, becaufe his brother Robert was ftill living, Sect. 30.
that of Rufus is by the fame reafon overthrown ; and William their *— - *v— - »
father, being a baftard, could have none. This fundamental defeat
could never be repaired j for the fucceffors could inherit no more than
the right of the firft,. which was nothing. Stephen could deduce no
title either from Norman or Saxon ; whatfoever Henry the Second
pretended muft be from his mother Maud, and any other might
have been preferred before her as well as he. If her title was from the
Normans, it mult be void, fince they had none, and the ftory of
Edgar Atheling is too impertinent to deferve mention. But, however,
it could be of no advantage to her j for David king of Scotland, bro-
ther to her mother, from whom only her title could be derived, was
then alive with his ion Henry, who, dying not long after, left three
fons, and three daughters, whofe pofterity, being diftributed into
many families of Scotland, remains to this day 3 and, if proximity of
blood is to be confidered, ought always to have been preferred before
her, and her defcendents, unlefs there be a law, that gives the prefer-
ence to daughters before fons. What right foever Henry the Second
had, it muft neceilarily have perifhed with him, all his children
having been begotten in manifeft adultery, on Eleanor of Gafcony,
during the life of Lewis king of France her firft hufband: and nothing
could be alledged to colour the bufinefs, but a difpenfation from the
pope directly againft the law of God, and the words of our Saviour,
who fays, " That a wife cannot be put away unlefs for adultery ; and
'* he that marrieth her that is put away, committeth adultery." The
pollution of this fpring is not to be cured; but, tho' it mould pafs un-
regarded, no one part of the fuccemon fince that time has remained
intire. John was preferred before Arthur his elder brother's fon :
Edward the Third was made king by the depofition of his father :
Henry the Fourth by that of Richard the lid. If the houfe of Mortimer
or York had the right, Henry the IV th, Vth, and Vlth, were not
kings, and all who claim under them have no title. However, Ri-
chard the Third could have none ; for the children of his elder brother
the duke of Clarence were then living. The children of Edward the
Fourth may be fufpected of baftardy ; and tho' it may have been other-
wife, yet that matter is not fo clear as things of fuch importance
ought to be, and the confequence may reach very far. But, tho' that
fcruple were removed, it is certain, that Henry the Vllth was not king
in the right of his wife Elizabeth ; for he reigned before and after
her; and for his other titles we may believe Philip de Commines, who Mem. de
fays, " He had neither crofs nor pile.*" If Henry the Eighth had a Commin.
right in himfelf, or from his mother, he fhould have reigned imme-
diately after her death, which he never pretended, nor to fucceed till
his father was dead, thereby acknowledging he had no right but from
him, unlefs the parliament and people can give it. The like may be
faid of his children. Mary could have no title, if fhe was a baftard,
begotten in inceft ; but if her mother's marriage was good, and fhe le-
gitimate, Elizabeth could have none.
Yet all thefe were lawful kings and queens ; their acts continue
* Qui n'avoit ni croix, ni pille, ni nul droiftj commeje croi, a la couronne d'Angle-
terre. Memoires livre vi. c. 9.
in
3^8 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. HI. in force to this day to all intents and purpofes : the parliament and
people made them to be fo, when they had no other title. The par-
liament and people therefore have the power of making kings :
thofe who are fo made are not ufurpers : we have had none but
fuch for more than feven hundred years. They were therefore law-
ful kings, or this nation has had none in all that time ; and if our
author like this conclufion, the account from whence it is drawn
may without difficulty be carried as high as our Englifh hiftories do
reach.
This being built upon the fteady foundation of law, hiftory, and
reafon, is not to be removed by any man's opinion j efpecially by
one, accompanied with fuch circumftances as Sir Walter Raleigh was
in, during the laft years of his life : and there is fomething of bafe-
nefs, as well as prevarication, in turning the words of an eminent
perfon, reduced to great difficulties, to a fenfe no-way agreeing with
bis former actions or writings, and no lefs tending to impair his repu-
tation than to deceive others. Our author is highly guilty of both,
in citing Sir Walter Raleigh to invalidate the great charter of our
liberties, as " begun by ufurpation, and mewed to the world by rebellion j"
whereas no fuch thing, nor any thing like it in word or principle, can
be found in the works that deierve to go under his name. The dia-
logue in queftion, with fome other fmall pieces publimed after his
death, deferve to be efteemed fpurious : or if, from a defire of life,
when he knew his head lay under the ax, he was brought to fay
things no- way agreeing with what he had formerly profefled, they
ought rather to be buried in oblivion, than produced to blemifh his
memory. But, that the public caufe may not fuffer by his fault, it is
convenient the world mould be informed, that tho' he was a well
qualified gentleman, yet his morals were no-way exact, as appears by
his dealings with the brave earl of ErTex. And he was fo well af-
fifted in his " hiftory of the world," that an ordinary man, with the
fame helps, might have performed the fame things. Neither ought it
to be accounted ftrange, if that which he writ by himfelf had the tincture
of another fpirit, when he was deprived of that affiftance, tho' his
life had not depended upon the will of the prince, and he had never
laid, That " * the bonds of fubjects to their kings fhould always be
«' wrought out of iron, and thofe of kings to their fubjects out of
<{ cobwebs."
* See Sir W. Raleigh's epiftleto king James.
SECT.
Difcourfes concerning Government. jpp
Sect. 31
SECT. XXXI.
Free nations have a right of meeting, when and where
they pleafe, unlefs they deprive themfelves of it.
A Perverted judgment always leads men into a wrong way, and per-
fuades them to believe, that thofe things favour their caufe, that
utterly overthrow it. For a proof of this, I defire our author's words
may be confidered. " In the former parliaments, 1 ' fays he, " instituted
" and continued fince Henry the Firft's time, is not to be found the
" ufage of any natural liberty of the people : for all thofe liberties
" that are claimed in parliament, are liberties of grace from the king,
" and not the liberties of nature to the people : for if the liberty were
" natural, it would give power unto the multitude to affemble them-
" felves, when and where they pleafed, to beftow the fovereignty, and
" by pactions to limit and direct the exercife of it." And I fay, that
nations, being naturally free, may meet, when and where they pleafe ;
may difpofe of the fovereignty, and may direct or limit the exercife of
it, unlefs by their own act they have deprived themfelves of that right :
and there could never have been a lawful affembly of any people in
the world, if they had not had that power in themfelves. It was
proved in the preceding fection, that all our kings, having no title,
were no more than what the nobility and people made them to be ;
that they could have no power but what was given to them, and
could confer none except what they had received. If they can there-
fore call parliaments, the power of calling them mufl have been given
to them, and could not be given by any who had it not in themfelves.
The Ifraelites met together, and chofe Ehud, Gideon, Samfon, Jeph-
tha, and others, to be their leaders, whom they judged fit to deliver
them from their enemies. By the fame right they arTembled at Mif-
peth to make war againft the tribe of Benjamin, when juftice was
denied to be done againft thofe who had villainoufly abufed the Levite's
concubine. In the like manner, they would have made Gideon king,
but he refufed. In the fame place they met, and chofe Saul to be
their king. He being dead, the men of Judah arTembled themfelves,
and anointed David : not long after, all the tribes met at Hebron,
made a contract with him, and received him as their king. In the
fame manner, tho' by worfe counfel, they made Abfalom king. And
the like was attempted in favour of Sheba the fon of Bichri, tho'
they then had a king chofen by themfelves. When they found them-
felves opprerTed by the tributes that had been laid upon them by
Solomon, they met at Shechem j and being difpleafed with Reho-
boamTs anfwer to their complaints, ten of the tribes made Jeroboam
king. Jehu, and all the other kings of Ifrael, whether good or bad,
had no other title than was conferred upon them by the prevailing
part of the people j which could not have given them any, unlefs
they had met together j nor meet together without the content, and
5 1 againft
400 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. againft the will of thofe that reigned, unlefs the power had been in
themfelves.
Where governments are more exactly regulated, the power of
judging when it is fit to call the fenate or people together, is referred
to one or more magiftrates j as in Rome to the confuls or tribunes,
in Athens to the archons, and in Thebes to the Bceotarches : but none
of them could have thefe powers, unlefs they had been given by thofe
who advanced them to the magiflracies to which they were annexed j
nor could they have been fo annexed, if thofe who created them had
not had the right in themfelves. If thefe officers neglected their
duty of calling fuch affemblies when the public affairs required, the
people met by their own authority, and puniihed the perfon, or ab-
rogated the magifhacy, as appears in the cafe of the decemviri,
and many others that might be alledged, if the thing were not fo
plain as to need no further proof. The reafon of this is, that they
who infritute a magiftracy, beft know whether the end of the infli-
tution be rightly purfued or not : and all juft magiftracies being the
fame in effence, tho' differing in form, the fame right muft perpe-
tually belong to thofe who put the fovereign power into the hands
of one, a few, or many men, which is what our author calls the
difpofal of the fovereignty. Thus the Romans did when they
created kings, confuls, military tribunes, dictators, or decemviri :
and it had been moft ridiculous to fay, that thofe officers gave autho-
rity to the people to meet and chufe them j for they who are chofen
are the creatures of thofe who chufe, and are nothing more than
others till they are chofen. The laft king of Sweden, Charles Gulta-
vus, told a gentleman who was ambaffador there, that the Swedes
having made him king, when he was poor, and had nothing in the
world, he had but one work to do, which was fo to reign, that they
might never repent the good opinion they had conceived of him.
They might therefore meet, and did meet to confer the fovereignty
upon him, or he could never have had it : for tho' the kingdom be
hereditary to males or females, and his mother was filler to the great
Guflavus j yet having married a ftranger without the confent of the
eftates, me performed not the condition upon which women are ad-
mitted to the fucceffion j and thereby falling from her right, he pre-
tended not to any. The act of his election declares he had none, and
gives the crown to him, and the heirs of his body, with this farther
declaration, that the benefit of his election mould no- way extend to
his brother prince Adolphus ; and it is confeffed by all the Swedifh
nation, that if the king now reigning mould die without children,
the eftates would proceed to a new election.
It is rightly obferved by our author, that if the people might meet,
and give the fovereign power, they might alfo direct and limit it j
for they did meet in this and other countries, they did confer the
fovereign power, they did limit and direct the exercife j and the laws
of each people ft\e\v in what manner and meafure it is every- where
done. This is as certain in relation to kings, as any other magiftrates.
The commiflion of the Roman dictators was, to take care " * that the
" common-
* Ne quid detriment refpublica accipiat. T. Liv.
Difcourfes concerning Government 401
" commonwealth might receive no detriment." The fame was fome* Sect. 3 1.
times given to the confuls : king Offa's confeffion, that he was made
king " * to preferve the public liberty," expreffes the fame thing : and
Charles Guftavus, who faid he had no other work, than to govern in
fuch a manner, that they who had made him king might not repent,
mewed there was a rule which he flood obliged to follow, and an
end which he was to procure, that he might merit and preferve their
good opinion. This power of conferring the fovereignty was exer-
cifed in France by thofe who made Meroveus king, in the prejudice
of the two grandchildren of Pharamond fons to Clodion ; by thofe
who excluded his race, and gave the crown to Pepin ; by thofe
who depofed Lewis le Debonair, and Charles le Gros j by thofe who
brought in five kings, that were either baftards or ftrangers, between
him and Charles le Simple ; by thofe who rejected his race, and ad-
vanced Hugh Capet ; by thofe who made Henry the Firft king, to
the prejudice of Robert his elder brother, and continued the crown
in the race of Henry for ten generations, whilft the defcendents of
Robert were only dukes of Burgundy. The like was done in Caftile
and Arragon, by frequently preferring the younger before the elder
brother ; the defcendents of females before thofe of the male line in
the fame degree ; the more remote in blood before the neareft - 3 and
fometimes baftards before the legitimate iffue. The fame was done
in England in relation to every king, fince the coming in of the Nor-
mans, as I fhewed in the laft fection, and other places of this work.
That they who gave the fovereignty, might alfo circumfcribe and
direct it, is manifeft by the feveral ways of providing for the fuccef-
fion inftituted by feveral nations. Some are merely elective, as the
empire of Germany, and the kingdom of Poland, to this day ; the
kingdom of Denmark till the year 1660 j that of Sweden till the
time of Guftavus Ericfon, who delivered that nation from the op-
preflion of Chriftiern the Second, the cruel king of the Danes. In
others the election was confined to one or more families, as the king-
dom of the Goths in Spain to the Balthei and Amalthei. In fome,
the eldeft man of the reigning family was preferred before the neareft,
as in Scotland before the time of Kennethus. In other places the
neareft in blood is preferred before the elder, if more remote. In
fome, no regard is had to females, or their defcendents, as in France
and Turky. In others, they or their defcendents are admitted, either
fimply, as well as males ; or under a condition of marrying in the
country, or with the confent of the eftates, as in Sweden. And no
other reafon can be given for this almoft infinite variety of conftitu-
tions, than that they who made them would have it fo j which could
not be, if God and nature had appointed one general rule for all
nations. For in that cafe, the kingdom of France muft be elective,
as well as that of Poland and the empire ; or the empire and Poland
hereditary, as that of France : daughters muft fucceed in France, as
well as in England, or be excluded in England, as in France j and he
that would eftablifh one as the ordinance of God and nature, muft
neceflarily overthrow all the reft.
A
* In veftrae libertatis tuhionem. Mat. Par.
402 Difcouffes concerning Government.
Chap. III. A farther excrcife of the natural liberty of nations is difcovered
^— - v — -^ in the feveral limitations put upon the fovereign power. Some
De jur. beli* kings, fays Grotius, have the " fiimmum imperium fummo modo;"
* r ac - others, " modo non fummo:" and amongft thofe that are under limi-
tations, the degrees, as to more or lefs, are almoft infinite, as I have
proved already by the example of Arragon, antient Germany, the Saxon
kings, the Normans, the kings of Caftile, the prefent empire, with
divers others. And I may fafely fay, that the antient government
of France was much of the fame nature to the time of Charles the
Vllth, and Lewis the Xlth ; but the work of emancipating them-
felves, as they call it, begun by them, is now brought to perfection in
a boundlefs elevation of the king's greatnefs and riches, to the un
fpeakable mifery of the people.
It were a folly to think this variety proceeds from the concefiions
of kings, who naturally delight in power, and hate that which
crofles their will. It might with more reafon be imagined, that the
Roman confuls, who were brought up in liberty, who had contracted
a love to their country, and were contented to live upon an equal foot
with their fellow-citizens, mould confine the power of their magi-
stracy to a year ; or that the dukes of Venice mould be gracioufly
plcafed to give power to the " council of ten" to punifh them capitally,
if they tranfgreffed the laws, than that kings mould put fuch fet-
ters upon their power, which they fo much abhor ; or that they
would fuffer them, if they could be eafily broken. If any one of
them mould prove fo moderate, like Trajan, to command the prefect
of the Praetorian guard to ufc the fword for him, if he governed well ;
and againft him, if he did not j it would foon be refcinded by his fuc-
ceflbr : the law which has no other ftrength than the act of one
man, may be annulled by another. So that nothing does more cer-
tainly prove, that the laws made in feveral countries to reftrain the
power of kings, and varioufly to difpofe of the fucceffion, are not
from them, than the frequent examples of their fury, who have ex-
poled themfelves to the greateft dangers, and brought infinite miferies
upon the people, through the defire of breaking them. It mufr.
therefore be concluded, that nations have power of meeting together,
and of conferring, limiting, and directing the fovereignty j or
all muft be grounded upon molt manifeft injuftice and ufur-
pation.
No man can have a power over a nation otherwife than " de jure,"
or " de facto.' He who pretends to have a power " de jure,"mufr. prove
that it is originally inherent in him, or his predeceflbr, from whom he
inherits; or that it was iuftly acquired by him. The vanity of any
pretence to an original right appears fufficiently, I hope, from the
proofs already given, that the firft. fathers of mankind had it not ;
or if they had, no man could now inherit the fame, there being no man
able to make good the genealogy that mould give him a right to the
fucctiiion. Befides, the facility we have of proving the beginnings of
all the families that reign among us, makes it as abfurd for any of
them to pretend a perpetual right to dominion, as for any citizen of
London, whofe parents and birth we know, to fay he is the very man
Noah, who lived in the time of the flood, and is now four or five
thouiand years old. If
Difcourfes concerning Government. 403
If the power were conferred on him or his predeceffors, it is what Sect. 26
we afk j for the collation can be of no value, unlefs it be made by
thofe who had a right to do it ; and the original right by defcent fail-
ing, no one can have any over a free people but themfelves, or thofe
to whom they have given it.
If acquifition be pretended, it is the fame thing ; for there can be
no right to that which is acquired, unlefs the right of invading be
proved ; and that being done, nothing can be acquired except what
belonged to the perfon that was invaded, and that only by him who
had the right of invading. No man ever did or could conquer a na-
tion by his own ftrength j no man therefore could ever acquire a per-
ibnal right over any ; and if it was conferred upon him by thofe who
made the conquer! with him, they were the people that did it. He can
1-10 more be faid to have the right originally in and from himfelf, than
a magiftrate of Rome or Athens immediately after his creation ; and
having no other at the beginning, he can have none to eternity j for the
nature of it muft refer to the original, and cannot be changed by time.
Whatfoever therefore proceeds not from the confent of the people,
muft be " de facto " only, that is, void of all right ; and it is im-
poffible there mould not be a right of deftroying that which is grounded
upon none j and by the fame rule that one man enjoys what he gained
by violence, another may take it from him. Cyrus overthrew the
ArTyrians and Babylonians, Alexander the Medes and Periians j and
if they had no right of making war upon thofe nations, the nations
could not but have a right of recovering all that had been unjuftly
taken from them, and avenging the evils they had fuffered. If the
caufe of the war was originally juft, and not corrupted by an intem-
perate ufe of the victory, the conquered people was perhaps obliged
to be quiet ; but the conquering armies, that had conferred upon their
generals what they had taken from their enemies, might as juftly ex-
pect: an account of what they had given, and that it mould be employed
according to the intention of the givers, as the people of any city
might do from their regularly created magi fixates ; becaufe it was as
impomble for Cyrus, Alexander, or Caefar, to gain a power over the
armies they led, without their confent, as for Pericles, Valerius, or
any other difarmed citizen, to gain more power in their refpective cities
than was voluntarily conferred upon them. And I know no other
difference between kingdoms fo conftituted by conquering armies, and
fuch as are eftablifhed in the moil: orderly manner, than that the firft
ufually incline more to war and violence, the latter to juftice and
peace. But there have not been wanting many of the firft fort (efpe-
cially the nations coming from the north) who were no lefs exact-
in ordaining that which tended to the prefervation of liberty, nor
lefs fevere in feeing it punctually performed, than the moft regular
commonwealths that ever were in the world. And it can with no
more reafon be pretended, that the Goths received their privileges
from Alan or Theodoric, the Francs from Pharamond or Meroveus,
and the Englifli from Ina or Ethelred, than that the liberty of Athens
was the gift of Themiftocles or Pericles, that the empire of Rome
proceeded from the liberality of Brutus or Valerius, and that the
5 K commonwealth
404 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. commonwealth of Venice, at this day, fubfifts by the favour of the
Contarini or Morefini : which muft reduce us to matter of right, iince
that of fad, void of right, can fignify nothing. •
SECT. XXXII.
The powers of kings are fo various, according to the
conftitutions of feveral ftates, that no confequence can
be drawn to the prejudice or advantage of any one,
merely from the name.
IN oppofition to what is above faid, fome alledge the name of king,
as if there were a charm in the word ; and our author feems to
put more weight upon it, than in the reafons he brings to fupport his
caufe. But that we may fee there is no efficacy in it, and that it con-
veys no other right than what particular nations may annex to it, we
are to confider,
t. That the moil abfolute princes that are or have been in the
world, never had the name of king ; whereas it has been frequently
given to thofe whole powers have been very much retrained . The
Cadars were never called kings, till the Sixth age of Christianity :
the califs and foldan of Egypt and Babylon, the Great Turk, the
cham of Tartary, or the Great Mogol, never took that name, or any
other of the fame fignification. The czar of Mofcovy has it not,
tho' he is as abfolute a monarch, and his people as miferable Haves, as
any in the world. On the other fide, the chief magistrates of Rome
and Athens for fome time, thofe of Sparta, Arragon, Sweden, Den-
mark, and England, " who could do nothing but by law," have been
called kings. This may be enough to fhew, that a name being no
way eSTential, what title ibever is given to the chief magistrate, he can
have no other power than the laws and cuftoms of his country do
give, or the people confer upon him.
2. The names of magistrates are often changed, tho' the power
continue to be the fame ; and the powers are fometimes altered tho' the
name remain. When Octavius Casfar, by the force of a mad corrupted
foldiery, had overthrown all law and right, he took no other title
in relation to military affairs than that of " imperator," which in the
time of liberty was by the armies often given to prastors and confuls :
in civil matters he was, as he pretended, * content with the power of
tribune ; and the like was obServed in his fucceffor, who to new-in-
C. Tacit, vented ufurpations " gave old and approved names." On the other fide,
thofe titles which have been rendered odious and execrable by the vio-
lent exercife of an abfolute power, are fometimes made popular by
moderate limitations ; as in Germany, where, tho* the monarchy feem
to be as well tempered as any, the princes retain the fame names of
" imperator,Caefar," and a Auguftus,"asthofehad done ; whoby theexcefs
of
* Tribunitia poteflate contentus. C. Tacit.
Difcourfes concerning Government. 40^
of their rage and fury had defolated and corrupted the bell: part of Sect. 32.
the world. *— — ■\r-«— '
Sometimes the name is changed, tho' the power in all refpects con-
tinue to be the fame. The lords of Caftile had for many ages no Saavedra,
other title than that of count j and when the nobility and people J^ anana »
thought good, they changed it to that of king, without any addition unta *
to the power.
The fovereign magiftrate in Poland was called duke till within
the laft two hundred years, when they gave the title of king to one
of the Jagellan family j which title has continued to this day, tho'
without any change in the nature of the magiftracy. And I pre-
fume, no wife man will think, that if the Venetians fhould give the
name of king to their duke, it could confer any other power upon
him, than he has already, unlefs more fhould be conferred by the au-
thority of the great council.
3 . The fame names which in fome places denote the fupreme ma-
giftracy, in others are fubordinate, or merely titular. In England, ^
France, and Spain, dukes and earls are fubjects : in Germany, the
electors and princes who are called by thofe names are little lefs than
fovereigns ; and the dukes of Savoy, Tufcany, Mufcovy, and others,
acknowledge no fuperior, as well as thofe of Poland and Caftile had
none, when they went under thofe titles. The fame may be faid of
kings. Some are fubject to a foreign power, as divers of them were
fubject to the Perfian and Babylonian monarchs, who for that reafon
were called the kings of kings. Some alfo are tributaries ; and when
the Spaniards nrft landed in America, the great kings of Mexico and
Peru had many others under them. Threefcore and ten kings gathered
up meat under the table of Adonibezek. The Romans had many
kings depending upon them. Herod and thofe of his race were of
this number ; and the difpute between him and his fons Ariftobulus
and Alexander, was to be determined by them ; neither durft he decide
the matter till it was referred to him. But a right of appeal did ftill
remain, as appears by the cafe of St. Paul, when Agrippa was king.
The kings of Mauritania from the time of MafinirTa, were under the
like dependence : Jugurtha went to Rome to juftify himfelf for the
death of Micipfa : Juba was commanded by the Roman magiftrates
Scipio, Petreius, and Afranius : another Juba was made king of the
fame country by Auguftus, and Tiridates of Armenia by Nero ; and in-
finite examples of this nature may be alledged. Moreover, their powers
are varioufly regulated, according to the variety of tempers in na-
tions and ages. Some have reftrained the powers that by experience
were found to be exorbitant ; others have dirlolved the bonds that
were laid upon them : and laws relating to the inftitution, abrogation,
enlargement, or reftriclion of the regal power, would be utterly iniig-
nificant, if this could not be done. But fuch laws are of no effect in
any other country than where they are made. The lives of the Spar-
tans did not depend upon the will of Agefilaus or Leonidas, becaufe Na-
buchodonofor could kill or fave whom he pleafed : and tho' the king
of Morocco may ftab his fubjects, throw them to the lions, or hang
them upon tenterhooks ; yet a king of Poland would probably be called
to a fevere account, if he fhould unjuilly kill a fingle man.
SECT.
406
Chap. III.
Difcourfes concerning Government.
SECT. XXXIII.
The liberty of a people is the gift of God and nature.
I" F any man afk, how nations come to have the power of doing
•*- thefe things, I anfwer, that liberty being only an exemption from
the dominion of another, the queftion ought not to be, how a nation
can come to be free, but how a man comes to have a dominion over
it; for till the right of dominion be proved and juftificd, liberty
fubfifts, as arifing from the nature and being of a man. Tertullian,
fpeakingof the emperors, fays, ct ab eo impcrium, a quo fpiritus ;" and
we, taking man in his firft condition, may juftly fay, " ab eo libertas, a
" quo fpiritus j" for no man can owe more than he has received. The
creature having nothing, and being nothing but what the Creator
makes him, muft owe all to him, and nothing to any one from whom
he has received nothing. Man therefore muft be naturally free, un-
lefs he be created by another power than we have yet heard of. The
obedience due to parents arifes from hence, in that they are the inftru-
ments of our generation ; and we are inftructed by the light of rea-
fon, that we ought to make great returns to thofe from whom under
God we have received all. When they die, we are their heirs, we
enjoy the fame rights, and devolve the fame to our pofterity. God
only, who confers this right upon us, can deprive us of it : and we
can no-way underftand that he does fo, unlefs he had fo declared by
exprefs revelation, or had fet fome diftinguifhing marks of dominion
and fubjection upon men ; and, as an ingenious perfon not long
iince faid, caufed fome to be born with crowns upon their heads,
and all others with faddles upon their backs. This liberty therefore
muft continue, till it be either forfeited, or willingly refigned. The
forfeiture is hardly compreheniible in a multitude, that is not entered
into any fociety ; for as they are all equal, and " * equals can have
" no right over each other," no man can forfeit any thing to one, who
can juftly demand nothing, unlefs it may be by a perfonal injury,
which is nothing to this cafe ; becaufe where there is no fociety, one
man is not bound by the actions of another. All cannot join in the
fame act, becaufe they are joined in none ; or if they mould, no
man could recover, much lefs tranfmit the forfeiture ; and not being
tranfmitted, itperifhes, as if it had never been, and no man can claim
any thing from it.
It will be no lefs difficult to bring refignation to be fubfervient to
our author's purpofe ; for men could not reiign their liberty, unlefs
they naturally had it in themfelves. Refignation is a public decla-
ration of their affent to be governed by the perfon to whom they re-
fign j that is, they do by that act conftitute him to be their governor.
This neceflarily puts us upon the inquiry, why they do refign, how
they
* Par in parem non habet imperium.
Difcourfes concerning Government- 407
they will be governed, and proves the governor to be their creature; Sect. 33.
and the right of difpofing the government muft be in them, or they
who receive it can have none. This is fo evident to common fenfe,
that it were impertinent to alk who made Carthage, Athens, Rome,
or Venice, to be free cities. Their charters were not from men, but
from God and nature. When a number of Phenicians had found a
port on the coaft of Africa, they might perhaps agree with the inha-
bitants for a parcel of ground ; but they brought their liberty with
them. When a company of Latins, Sabines, and Tufcans, met together
upon the banks of the Tiber, and chofe rather to build a city for
themfelves, than to live in fuch as were adjacent, they carried their
liberty in their own breafls, and had hands and fwords to defend
it. This was their charter ; and Romulus could confer no more
upon them, than Dido upon the Carthaginians. When a multitude
of barbarous nations infefted Italy, and no protection could be expected
from the corrupted and perifhing empire, fuch as agreed to feek a
place of refuge in the Scattered iQands of the Adriatic gulf, had no
need of any man's authority, to ratify the inftitution of their govern-
ment. They who were the formal part of the city, and had built
the material, could not but have a right of governing it as they
pleafed, fince, if they did amifs, the hurt was only to themfelves. it
is probable enough, that fome of the Roman emperors, as lords of the
foil, might have pretended to a dominion over them, if there had
been any colour for it : but nothing of that kind appearing in thirteen
hundred years, we are not like to hear of any fuch cavils. It is
agreed by mankind, that fubjection and protection are relative ; and
that he who cannot protect: thofe that are under him, in vain pretends
to a dominion over them. The only ends for which governments
are conftituted, and obedience rendered to them, are the obtaining of
juftice and protection ; and they who cannot provide for both, give
the people a right of taking fuch ways as beft pleafe themfelves, in
order to their own fafety.
The matter is yet more clear in relation to thofe who never were
in any fociety, as at the beginning, or renovation of the world after
the flood j or who, upon the diflolution of the focieties to which they
did once belong, or by fome other accident, have been obliged to feek
new habitations. Such were thofe who went from Babylon upon the
confufion of tongues j thofe who efcaped from Troy when it was burnt
by the Grecians ; almoft all the nations of Europe, with many of
Afia and Africa, upon the diffolution of the Roman empire. To which
may be added, a multitude of Northern nations, who, when they
had increafed to fuch numbers, that their countries could no longer
nourifh them, or becaufe they wanted fkill to improve their lands,
were lent out to provide for themfelves; and having done fo, did
erect many kingdoms and ftates, either by themfelves, or in union
and coalition with the antient inhabitants.
It is in vain to fay, that wherefoever they came, the land did belong
to fomebody ; and that they who came to dwell there, mult be
fubject to the laws of thofe who were lords of the foil ; for that is
not always true in fact. Some come into defart countries that have
no lord, others into fuch as are thinly peopled, by men who, know-
5 L in S
4c8 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. ing not how to improve their land, do either grant part of it upon
eafy terms to the new comers, or grow into a union with them in the
enjoyment of the whole ; and hiftories furniih us with infinite examples
of this nature.
If we will look into our own original, without troubling ourfelves
with the fenfelefs ftories of Samothes the ion of Japhet, and his
magicians, or the giants begotten by fpirits upon the thirty daughters
of Danaus fent from Phenicia in a boat without fail, oars, or rudder,
we (hall find, that when the Romans abandoned this ifland, the in-
habitants were left to a full liberty of providing for themfelves : and
whether we deduce our original from them, or the Saxons, or from
both, our anceftors were perfectly free ; and the Normans having
inherited the fame right when they came to be one nation with
the former, we cannot but continue fo (till, unlefs we have enflaved
ourfelves.
Nothing is more contrary to reafon, than to imagine this. When
the fierce barbarity of the Saxons came to be foftencd by a more gentle
climate, the arts and religion they learnt, taught them to reform
their manners, and better enabled them to frame laws for the prefer-
vation of their liberty, but no-way diminifhed their love to it : and
tho' the Normans might defire to get the lands of thofe who had
joined with Harold, and of others, into their hands j yet when they
were fettled in the country, and by marriages united to the antient
inhabitants, they became true Englifhmen, and no lefs lovers of
liberty, and refolute defenders of it, than the Saxons had been. There
was then neither conquering Norman, nor conquered Saxon, but a
great and brave people compofed of both, united in blood and intereft
in the defence of their common rights, which they fo well main-
tained, that no prince fince that time has too violently encroached
upon them, who, as the reward of his folly, has not lived miferably,
and died fhamefully.
Such actions of our anceftors do not, as I fuppofe, favour much of
the fubmiflion which patrimonial Haves do ufually render to the will
of their lord. On the contrary, whatfoever they did was by a power
inherent in themfelves to defend that liberty in which they were
born. All their kings were created upon the fame condition, and
for the fame ends. Alfred acknowledged he found and left them
perfectly free j and the confeiTion of Offa, that they had not made
him king for his own merits, but for the defence of their liberty,
comprehends all that were before* and after him. They well knew
how great the honour was, to be made head of a great people - s and
rigoroufly exacted the performance of the ends for which fuch a one
was elevated, feverely punifhing thofe who bafely and wickedly
betrayed the truft repofed in them, and violated all that is moll: facred
among men ; which could not have been, unlefs they were naturally
free j for the liberty that has no being, cajinot be defended.
SECT.
Difcourfes concerning Government. 409
Sect. 34.
SECT. XXXIV.
No veneration paid, or honour conferred upon a juft and
lawful magiftrate, can diminish the liberty of a nation.
SOME have fuppofed, that tho' the people be naturally free, and
magiftrates created by them, they do by fuch creations deprive
themfelves of that natural liberty} and that the names of u king, fo-
" vereign lord," and if dread fovereign," being no way confident with
liberty, they who give fuch titles do renounce it. Our author carries
this very far, and lays great weight upon the fubmiffive language ufed
by the people, when they tc humbly crave, that his majefty would be
" pleafed to grant their accuftomed freedom of fpeech, and accefs to
" his perfon ;" and " give the name of ^applications and petitions to
" the addrefles made to him :" whereas he anfwers in the haughty lan-
guage of " Le roy le veut, Le roy s'avifera," and the like* But they
who talk at this rate, fhew, that they neither underftand the nature
of magiftracy, nor the practice of nations. Thofe who have lived in
the higheft exercife of their liberty, and have been moft tenacious of it,
have thought no honour too great for fuch magiftrates as were eminent
in the defence of their rights, and were fet up for that end. The
name of dread fovereign might juftly have been given to a Roman
dictator, or conful ; for they had the fovereign authority in their
hands, and power fufficient for its execution. Whilft their magi-
stracy continued, they were a terror to the fame men, whofe axes
and rods had been a terror to them the year or month before, and
might be fo again the next. The Romans thought they could not be
guilty of excefs in carrying the power and veneration due to their
dictator to the higheft: and Livy tells us, that his " * edicts were
,c efteemed facred. u I have already (hewn, that this haughty people,
who might have commanded, condefcended to join with their tribunes
in a petition to the dictator Papirius for the life of Quintus Fabius,
who had fought a battle in his abfence, and without his order, tho'
he had gained a great and memorable victory. The fame Fabius,
when conful, was commended by his father Q^Fabius Maximus,
for obliging him, by his lictors, to difmount from his horfe, and
to pay him the fame refpect that was due from others. The tribunes
of the people, who were inftituted for the prefervation of liberty,
were alfo efteemed facred and inviolable, as appears by that phrafe,
" facrofancta tribunorum poteftas," fo common in their antient
writers. No man, I prefume, thinks any monarchy more limited,
or more clearly derived from a delegated power, than that of the
German emperors; and yet " facra Qefarea majeftas" is the public
ftile. Nay, the Hollanders at this day call their burgermafters, tho*
they
* Ediflum dictatoris pro numine obfervatum. Hift. 1. 8,
410 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap.III. they fee them felling herring or tar, " high and mighty lords," as
foon as they are advanced to be of the 36, 42, or 48 magistrates of a
fmall town. It is no wonder therefore, if a great nation mould
think it conducing to their own glory, to give magnificent titles,
and ufe fubmiffive language, to that one man, whom they fet up
to be their head ; molt efpecially, if we confider, that they came
from a country where fuch titles and language were principally
invented.
Among the Romans and Grecians we hear nothing of majefty,
highnefs, ferenity, and excellence, appropriated to a tingle perfon -, but
receive them from Germany, and other Northern countries. We
find than to cover their mifchievous de-
figns with figurative phrafes. It would be too ridiculous to fay in
plain terms, that all kings without diftinction are better able to judge
of all matters than any or all their people $ they mull therefore be
called " the head," that thereby they may be inverted with all the
pre-eminences which in a natural body belong to that part j and men
muft be made to believe the analogy between the natural and politi-
cal body to be perfect. But the matter muft be better examined be-
fore this mortal poifon feem fit to be fwallowed.
The word " head" is figuratively ufed both in Scripture and profane
authors in feveral fenfes, in relation to places or perfons, and always
implies fomething of real or feeming pre-eminence in point of honour
or jurisdiction. Thus Damafcus is faid to be the head of Syria ; Sama-
ria of Ephraim, and Ephraim of the ten tribes j that is, Ephraim was
the chief tribe : Samaria was the chief city of Ephraim, and Da-
mafcus of Syria j tho' it be certain, that Ephraim had no jurifdiction
over the other tribes, nor Samaria over the other cities of Ephraim,
but every one according to the law had an equal power within it-
felf, or the territories belonging to it ; and no privileges were granted
to one above another, except to Jerufalern, in the matter of religion,
becaufe the temple was placed there.
The words alfo head, prince, principal man, or captain, feem to
be equivocal ; and in this fenfe, the fame men are called heads of the
tribes, princes in the houfes of their fathers : and it is faid, that two z Chron. v.
hundred heads of the tribe of Reuben were carried away captive by
Tiglath-Pilezer, and proportionably in the other tribes ; which were
a ftrange thing, if the word did imply that fupreme, abfolute, and
infinite power that our author attributes to it : and no man of lefs
understanding than he, can comprehend how there fhould be two
hundred or more fovereign unlimited powers in one tribe, mod efpe-
cially when it is certain, that one feries of kings had for many ages
reigned over that tribe and nine more j and that every one of thole
tribes, as well as the particular cities, even from their firft entrance
into the promifed land, had a full jurifdiction within itfelf. When
the Gileadites came to Jephtha, he fufpected them, and aiked whe- j u dg. xii.
ther indeed they intended to make him their head ? They anfwered,
if he would lead them againft the Ammonites, he fhould be their
head. In the like fenfe, when Julius Caefar in defpair would have
killed himfelf, one of his foldiers dilTuaded him from that defign,
by telling him, " * That the fafety of fo many nations, that had
" made him their head, depending upon his life, it would be cruelty
* Cum tot ab hac anima populorum vita falufque
Pendeat, & tantus caput hoc fibi fccerit orbis,
Srevitia eft voluiflc mori. — Lucan.
5 0_ '»
428 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Ch^p.III." m ^ m to ta ^ e fuch a refolution.*' But for all that, when this
head was taken off, the body did ftill fubfift : upon which I obferve
many fundamental differences, between the relation of this figurative
head (even when the word is rightly applied) and that of the natural
head to their refpective bodies.
The figurative heads may be many, the natural but one.
The people make or create the figurative head ; the natural is from
itfelf, or connate with the body.
The natural body cannot change or fubfift without the natural
head ; but a people may change and fubfift very well without the
artificial. Nay, if it had been true, that the world had chofen Caefar,
as it was not (for he was chofen only by a factious mercenary army,
and the foundeft part fo far oppofed that election, that they brought
him to think of killing himfelf) there could have been no truth
in this flattering affertion, " That the fafety of the whole depended
lc upon his life :"'' for the world could not only fubfift without him,
but without any fuch head, as it had done, before he by the help of
his corrupted foldiery had ufurped the power ; which alfo fhews, that
a civil head may be a matter of convenience, but not of necefTity.
Many nations have had none; and if the expreflion be fo far
ftretched, as to make it extend to the annual or temporary magiftrates
fet up by the Athenians, Carthaginians, Romans, and other antient
commonwealths, or to thofe at this day in Venice, Holland, Switfer-
land, and other places, it muft be confeffed, that the people who
made, depofed, abrogated, or aboliihed, both the magiftrates and
magiftracies, had the power of framing, directing, and removing
their heads, which, our author will fay, is moft abfurd. Yet they
did it without any prejudice to themfelves, and very often much to
their advantage.
In mentioning thefe vaft and effential differences between the na-
tural and political head, I no-way intend to exclude others, that may
be of equal weight; but as all figurative expreflions have their
ftrength only from fimilitude, there can be little or none in this,
which differs in fo many important points, and can therefore be of no
effect.
However, right proceeds from identity, and not from fimilitude.
The right of a man over me is by being my father, and not by be-
ing like my father. If I had a brother fo perfectly refembling me,
as to deceive our parents, which has fometimes happened to twins,
it could give him no right to any thing that is mine. If the power
therefore of correcting the parties peccant, which our author attri-
butes to kings, be grounded upon the name of head, and a refem-
blance between the heads of the body politic and body natural ;
if this refemblance be found to be exceedingly imperfect, uncertain,
or perhaps no- way relating to the matter in queftion ; or tho' it did,
and were abfolutely perfect, could confer no right ; the allegation of
it is impertinent and abfurd.
This being cleared, it is time to examine, what the office of the
head is in a natural body, that we may learn from thence, why
that name is fometimes given to thofe, who are eminent in political
bodies, and to whom it does belong.
Some
Difcourfes concerning Government. 42,5)
Some men account the head to be fo abfolutely the feat of all the Sect. 39'
fenfes, as to derive even that of feeling, which is exercifed in every *—" "V — -»
part, from the brain : but I think it is not doubted, that all the reft
have both their feat and function in the head -, and whatfoever is
ufeful or hurtful to a man, is by them reprefented to the underftanding;
as Ariftotle fays, £C Nihil eft intellectu, qnod non lit prius in fenfu."
This is properly the part of every magiftrate : he is the CI ntinel of
the public, and is to reprefent what he difcovers beneficial or hurt-
ful to the fociety ; which office belongs not only to the fupreme, but
proportionably to the fubordinate. In this fenfe were the chief men
among the Ifraelites called, " heads of their fathers houfe, choice and 1 Chrcn,
" mighty men of valour, chief of the princes." And in the following viL 40.
chapter mention is made of " nine hundred and fifty Benjamites, chief
" men in the houfe of their fathers." Thefe men exercifed a chari-
table care over fuch as were inferior to them in power and valour, with-
out any fhadow of fovereignty, or pombility that there could be fo
many fovereigns : and fuch as were under their care are faid to be
their brethren - 3 which is not a word ofmajefty and domination, but
of dearnefs and equality. The name therefore of head may be
given to a fovereign, but it implies nothing of foveregn ty 5 and
muft be exercifed with charity, which always terminates in the good
of others. The head cannot correct or chaftife ; the proper work
of that part is only to indicate ; and he who takes upon him to do
more is not the head. A natural body is homogeneous, and cannot
fubfift, if it be not fo. We cannot take one part of a horfe, an-
other of a bear, and put upon them the head of a lion ; for it would
be a monfter, that would have neither action nor life. The head
muft be of the fame nature with the other members, or it cannot fubfift.
But the lord or mafter differs " in fpecie" from his fervants arid ilaves :
he is not therefore properly their head.
Befides, the head cannot have a fubliftence without the body, nor
any intereft contrary to that of the body j and it is impofflble for any
thing to be good for the head, that is hurtful to the body. A prince
therefore or magiftrate, who fets up an intereft in himfelf diftincl:
from, or repugnant to, that of the people, renounces the title or qua-
lity of their head. Indeed, Mofes was the head of the Ifraelites :
for when God threatened to deftroy that people, and promifed to
make him a great nation, he waved the particular advantages of-
fered to himfelf, interceded for them, and procured their pardon.
Yet he was not able to bear the weight of the government alonej but
defired that fome might be appointed to affift him. Gideon was the
head of the fame people j but he would not reign himfelf, nor fuffer
his fons to reign over them. Samuel was alfo their head ; he took
nothing from any man, defrauded none, took bribes from no man,
oppreiled none ; God and the people were his witnefles : he blamed
them for their rebellion againft God in afking a king, but was no-
way concerned for himfelf, or his family. David likewife had a
right to that title ; for he defired, that God would fpare the people,
and turn the effect, of his anger againft himfelf, and the houfe of his
father. But Rehoboam was not their head ; for tho' he acknow-
ledged, that his father had laid a heavy yoke upon them, vet he
told
430 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. Ill* t0 ^ them he would add to the weight ; and that if his father had
chaftifed them with whips, he would chaftife them with fcorpions.
The head is no hurden to the body, and can lay none upon it j the
head cannot chaftife any member ; and he who does fo, be it more or
lefs, cannot be the head. Jeroboam was not the head of the revolt-
ing tribes; for the head takes care of the members, and to pro-
vide for the fafety of the whole : but he, through fear that the people
going to Jerufalem to worfhip fhould return to the houfe of David,
by letting up idols to fecure his own interefts, drew guilt and de-
ftruction upon them. Tho' it mould be granted, that Auguftus, by a
gentle ufe of his power, had in a manner expiated the deteftable vil-
lainies committed in the acquifition, and had truly deferved to be call-
ed the head of the Romans ; yet that title could no-way belong to
Caligula, Claudius, Nero, or Vitellius, who neither had the qualities
required in the head, nor the underftanding or will to perform the
office. Nay, if I fhould carry the matter farther, and acknowledge
that Brutus, Cincinnatus, Fabius, Camillus, and others, who, in the
time of their annual or fhorter magiftracies, had by their vigilance,
virtue, and care to preferve the city in fafety, and to provide for the
public good, performed the office of the head, and might deferve
the name ; I might juftly deny it to the greateft princes that have been
in the world, who, having their power for life, and leaving it to de-
fcend to their children, have wanted the virtues required for the
performance of their duty : and I fhould lefs fear to be guilty of an
abfurdity in faying, that a nation might every year change its head,
than that he can be the head, who cares not for the members, nor
undeiilands the things that conduce to their good, moll; efpecially if
he fet up an intereft in himfelf againft them. It cannot be faid, that
thefe are imaginary cafes, and that no prince does thefe things ; for
the proof is too ealy, and the examples too numerous. Caligula could
not have wiilied the Romans but one head, that he might cut it off
at once, if he had been that head, and had advanced no intereft. con-
trary to that of the members. Nero had not burned the city of
Rome, if his concernments had been infeparably united to thofe of the
people. He who caufed above three hundred thoufand of his inno-
cent unarmed fubjects to be murdered, and filled his whole kingdom
with fire and blood, did fet up a perfonal intereft repugnant to that
of the nation ; and no better teftimony can be required to {hew, that
he did fo, than a letter written by his fon, to take off the penalty
due to one of the chief minifters of thofe cruelties, for this reafon, that
what he had done, was " by the command, and for the fervice, of his
*' royal father." King John did not purfue the advantage of his people,
when he endeavoured to fubjecl: them to the pope, or the Moors. And
whatever prince feeks affiftance from foreign powers, or makes
leagues with any ftranger or enemy for his own advantage againft
his people, however fecret the treaty may be, declares himfelf
not to be the head, but an enemy to them. The head cannot ftand
in need of an exterior help againft the body, nor fubfift when di-
vided from it. He therefore that courts fuch an affiftance, divides
himfelf from the body ; and if he do fubfift, it muft be by a life he
has in himfelf, diftinc~t from that of the body, which the head can-
not have. But
Difcourfes concerning Government. 431
But befides thefe enormities, that teftify the moil: wicked rage and Sect. 30.'
fury, in the higheft degree, there is another practice, which no man
that knows the world, can deny to be common with princes, and
incompatible with the nature of a head. The head cannot defire to
draw all the nourifhment of the body to itfelf, nor more than a due
proportion. If the reft of the parts are fick, weak, or cold, the head
fufters equally with them ; and, if they perifh, mull: perifh alfo. Let
this be compared with the actions of many princes we know, and
we (hall foon fee which of them are heads of their people. If the
gold brought from the Indies, has been equally diflributed by the kings
of Spain to the body of that nation, I confent they may be called the
heads. If the kings of France afTume no more of the riches of that
great kingdom, than their due proportion, let them alfo wear that
honourable name. But if the naked backs, and empty bellies, of their
miferable fubjects evince the contrary, it can by no means belong to
them. If thofe great nations wafte and languifh ; if nothing be fo
common in the beft provinces belonging to them, as mifery, famine,
and all the effects of the mod outrageous oppreffion, whilft their
princes and favourites pofTefs fuch treafures, as the moft wanton pro-
digality cannot exhauft ; if that which is gained by the fweat of fo
many millions of men, be torn out of the mouths of their ftarving
wives and children, to foment the vices of thofe luxurious courts,
or reward the minifters of their lufts ; the nourifhment is not diftri-
buted equally to all the parts of the body; the ceconomy of the
whole is overthrown ; and they who do thefe things, cannot be the
heads, nor parts of the body, but fomething diitindt from, and
repugnant to it. It is not therefore he who is found in, or advanced
to the place of the head, who is truly the head : it is not he who
ought, but he who does perform the office of the head, that deferves
the name and privileges belonging to the head. If our author there-
fore will perfuade us, that any king is head of his people, he muft
do it by arguments peculiarly relating to him, fince thofe in general
are found to be falfe. If he fay, that the king, as king, may direct
or correct the people, and that the power of determining all contro-
verfies muft be referred to him, becaufe they may be miftaken, he
muft fhew that the king is infallible ; for unlefs he do fo, the wound
is not cured. This alfo muft be by fome other way, than by faying
he is their head ; for fuch powers belong not to the office of the head,
and we fee, that all kings do not deferve that name : many of them
want both underftanding and will, to perform the functions of the
head • and many act directly contrary, in the whole courfe of their
government. If any therefore among them have merited the glo-
rious name of heads of nations, it muft have been by their perfonal
virtues, by a vigilant care of the good of their people, by an infepa-
rable conjunction of interefts with them, by an ardent love to every
member of the fociety, by a moderation of fpirit affecting no
undue fuperiority, or affuming any fingular advantage, which they
are not willing to communicate to every part of the political body.
He who finds this merit in himfelf, will fcorn all the advantages
that can be drawn from mifapplied names: he that knows fuch
honour to be peculiarly due to him for being the beft of kings, will
5 R never
431 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap.III. never glory in that which may be common to him with the worft.
Nay, whoever pretends, by fuch general difcourfes as thefe of our
author, to advance the particular interefts of any one king, does either
know he is of no merit, and that nothing can be faid for him, which
will not as well agree with the worft of men > or cares not what he
fays, fo he may do mifchief ; and is well enough contented, that he
who is fet up by fuch maxims as a public plague, may fall in the ruin
he brings upon the people.
SECT. XL.
Good laws prefcribe eafy and fafe remedies againft the evils
proceeding from the vices or infirmities of the ma-
giftrate ; and when they fail, they muft be fupplied.
THOSE who defire to advance the power of the magiftrate
above the law, would perfuade us, that the difficulties and
dangers of inquiring into his actions, or oppofing his will, when
employed in violence and injuftice, are fo great, that the remedy is
always worfe than the difeafe j and that it is better to fufTer all the
evils that may proceed from his infirmities and vices, than to hazard
the confequences of difpleafing him. But, on the contrary, I think,
and hope to prove,
i. That in well- conftitu ted governments, the remedies againft ill
magiftrates are eafy and fafe.
2. That it is good, as well for the magiftrate as the people, fo to
conftitu te the government, that the remedies may be eafy and fafe.
2. That how dangerous and difficult fcever they may be through
the defects of the firft conftitution, they mufl be tried.
To the firft 3 it is moil evident, that in well regulated governments
thefe remedies have been found to be eafy and fafe. The kings of
Sparta were not fuffered in the leaft to deviate from the rule of the
law : and Theopompus one of thofe kings, in whofe time the
ephori were created, and the regal power much reft rained, doubted
not to affirm, that it was by that means become more lading, and
Plutarch. more fecure. Paufanias had not the name of king, but commanded
in the war againft Xerxes with more than regal power : neverthelefs,
being grown infolent, he was, without any trouble to that ftate,
banifhed, and afterwards put to death. Leontidas father of Cleomenes,
was in the like manner banifhed. The fecond Agis was moft
unjuftly put to death by the ephori j for he was a brave and a good
prince ; but there was neither danger nor difficulty in the action.
Many of the Roman magiftrates, after the expulfion of the kings,
feem to have been defnous to extend their power beyond the bounds
of the law ; and perhaps fome others, as well as the decemviri, may
have defigned an abiblute tyranny; but the firft were reftrained,
and the others without much difficulty fupprefled. Nay, even the
kings were fo well kept in order, that no man ever pretended to the
crown,
Difcourfes concerning Government. 435
crown, unlefs he were chofen, nor made any other ufe of his power Sect. 40.
than the law permitted, except the laft Tarquin, who by his info-
lence, avarice, and cruelty, brought ruin upon himfelf and his fa-
mily. I have already mentioned one or two dukes of Venice, who
were not lefs ambitious ; but their crimes returned upon their own
heads, and they perifhed without any other danger to the flate, than
what had parted before their treafons were difcovered. Infinite
examples of the like nature may be alledged j and if matters have not
at all times, and in all places, fucceeded in the fame manner, it has
been becaufe the fame courfes were not every-where taken ; for all
things do fo far follow their caufes, that, being ordered in the fame
manner, they will always produce the fame effects.
2. To the fecond; fuch a regulation of the magiftratical power
is not at all grievous to a good magiftrate. He who never defires to
do any thing but what he ought, cannot delire a power of doing
what he ought not, nor be troubled to find he cannot do that which
he would not do if he could. This inability is alfo advantageous to
thofe who are evil or unwife j that fince they cannot govern them-
felves, a law may be impofed upon them, left, by following their own
irregular will, they bring deftru&ion upon themfelves, their families,
and people, as many have done. If Apollo in the fable had not been
too indulgent to Phaeton, in granting his ill-conceived requeft, the
furious youth had not brought a neceffity upon Jupiter, either of
deftroying him, or furTering the world to be deftroyed by him.
Befides, good and wife men know the weight of fovereign power,
and mifdoubt their own ftrength. Sacred and human hiftories
furnifh us with many examples of thofe who have feared the luftre
of a crown. Men that find in themfelves no delight in doing mifchief,
know not what thoughts may infinuate into their minds, when they
are raifed too much above their fphere. They who were able to bear
adverfity, have been precipitated into ruin by profperity. When
the prophet told Hazael the villainies he would commit, he anfwered,
" Is thy Servant • a dog, that I mould do thefe things?" but yet he
did them. I know not where to find an example of a man more
excellently qualified, than Alexander of Macedon; but he fell under
the weight of his own fortune, and grew to exceed thofe in vice, whom
he had conquered by his virtue. The nature of man can hardly fuffer
fuch violent changes, without being difordered by them -, and every
one ought to enter into a juft diffidence of himfelf, and fear the tempta-
tions that have deftroyed fo many. If any man be fo happily born,
fo carefully educated, fo eftablifhed in virtue, that no ftorm can
fhake him, nor any poifon corrupt him, yet he will confider he is
mortal ; and, knowing no more than Solomon, whether his fon fhall
be a wife man or a fool, he will always fear to take upon him a
power, which muft prove a moft peftilent evil both to the perfon that
has it, and to thofe that are under it, as foon as it fhall fall into the
hands of one, who either knows not how to ufe it, or may be eafily
drawn to abufe it. Supreme magiftrates always walk in obfcure
and flippery places : but when they are advanced fo high, that no one
is near enough to fupport, direct, or reftrain them, their fall is inevi-
table and mortal. And thofe nations that have wanted the prudence
rightly
434 Difcourfes concerning Government
Chap. IILrightly to balance the powers of their magiftrates, have been fre-
quently obliged to have recourfe to the moft violent remedies, and
with much difficulty, danger, and blood, to punifh the crimes which
they might have prevented. On the other fide, fuch as have been
more wife in the conftitution of their governments, have always had
regard to the frailty of human nature, and the corruption reigning
in the hearts of men ; and, being lefs liberal of the power over their
lives and liberties, have referved to themfelves fo much, as might
keep their magiftrates within the limits of the law, and oblige them
to perform the ends of their inftitution. And as the law which
denounces fevere penalties for crimes, is indeed merciful both to ill
men, who are by that means deterred from committing them -, and
to the good, who otherwife would be deftroyed; fo thofe nations
that have kept the reins in their hands, have by the fame act provided
as well for the fafety of their princes, as for their own. They who
know the law is well defended, feldom attempt to fubvert it : they
are not eafily tempted to run into exceffes, when fuch bounds are fet,
as may not fafeJy be tranfgrened ; and whilft they are by this means
rendered more moderate in the exercife of their power, the people
is exempted from the odious neceffity of fufFering all manner of
indignities and miferies, or by their deftruction to prevent or avenge
them.
3. To the third j if thefe rules have not been well observed in the
nrft conftitution, or from the changes of times, corruption of man-
ners, infeniible encroachments, or violent ufurpations of princes,
have been rendered ineffectual, and the people expofedto all the cala-
mities that may be brought upon them by the weaknefs, vices, and
malice of the prince, or thofe who govern him, I confefs the remedies
are more difficult and dangerous ; but even in thofe cafes they muft
be tried. Nothing can be feared that is worfe than what is fuffered,
or muft in a fhort time fall upon thofe who are in this condition.
They who are already fallen into all that is odious, fhameful, and
miferable, cannot juftly fear. When things are brought to fuch a pafs,
the boldeft counfels are the moft fafej and if they muft * perifh
who lie ftill, and they can but perifh who are moft active, the choice
is eafily made. Let the danger be never fo great, there is a poffibi-
lity of fafety, whilft men have life, hands, arms, and courage to ufe
them ; but that people muft certainly perifh, who tamely fuffer
themfelves to be oppreffed, either by the injuftice, cruelty, and malice
of an ill magiftrate, or by thofe who prevail upon the vices and
infirmities of weak princes. It is in vain to fay, that this may give
occafion to men of railing tumults, or civil war ; for tho' thefe are
evils, yet they are not the greateft of evils. Civil war, in Macchiavel's
account, is a difeafe j but tyranny is the death of a ftate. Gentle
ways are firft to be ufed, and it is beft if the work can be done by
them ; but it muft not be left undone, if they fail. It is good to ufe
fupplications, advices, and remonftrances -, but thofe who have no
* Moriendum victis, moriendum deditis ; id folum intereft, an inter cruciatus &,ludi-
bria, an per virtutem expire mus. C. Tacir.
Quod fi nocentes Lnnccentefq; idem exitus maneat, acrioris viri eft meritoperire. Ibid.
7 regard
Difcourfes concerning Government. 43^
regard to juftice, and will not hearken to counfel, mint be conftrain- Sect. 40.
ed. It is folly to deal otherwife with a man who will not be guided
by reafon, and a magiftrate who defpifes the law; or rather, to
think him a man, who rejects the eflential principle of a man ; or to
account him a magiftrate, who overthrows the law by w r hich he is a
magiftrate. This is the laft refult ; but thofe nations muft come to
it, which cannot otherwife be preferved. Nero's madnefs was not to
be cured, nor the mifchievous effects of it any otherwife to be fup-
preffed than by his death. He who had fpared fuch a monfter when
it was in his power to remove him, had brought deftruction upon
the whole empire ; and by a foolifh clemency made himfelf the au-
thor of his future villainies. This would have been yet more clear, if
the world had then been in fuch a temper as to be capable of an intire
liberty. But the antient foundations had been overthrown, and nothing
better could be built upon the new, than fomething that might in part
refill: that torrent of iniquity which had overflowed the belt, part of
the world, and give mankind a little time to breathe under a lefs bar-
barous mailer. Yet all the beft men did join in the work that was then
to be done, tho' they knew it would prove but imperfect. The facred
hiftory is not without examples of this kind : when Ahab had fub-
verted the law, fet up falfe witnefTes, and corrupt judges, to deftroy
the innocent, killed the prophets, and eftablifhed idolatry, his houfe
mull then be cut off, and his blood be lickt up by dogs. When mat-
ters are brought to this pafs, the decifion is eafy. The queflion is
only whether the punifhment of crimes fhall fall upon one or a few
perfons who are guilty of them, or upon a whole nation that is in-
nocent. If the father may not die for the fon, nor the fon for the
father, but every one muft bear the penalty of his own crimes, it
would be moil abfurd to punifh the people for the guilt of princes.
When the earl of Morton was fent ambaffador to queen Elizabeth
by the eftates of Scotland, to juftify their proceedings againft Mary
their queen, whom they had obliged to renounce the government,
he alledged amongft other things the murder of her hufband plainly
proved againft her ; afTerted the antient right and cuftom of that
kingdom, of * examining the actions of their kings ; by which
means, he faid, many had been -j- punifhed with death, imprifonment,
and exile ; confirmed their actions by the examples of other nations ;
and upon the whole matter concluded, that if (he was ftill permitted
to live, it was not on account of her innocence, or any exemption
from the penalties of the law, but from the mercy and clemency of
the people, who, contenting themfelves with a refignation of her
right and power to her fon, had fpared her. This difcourfe, which
is fet down at large by the hiftorian cited on the margin, being of
* Animadvertendi in reges.
f Morte, vinculis, & exilio puniti. Buchan. hift. Scot. 1. xx. Qui tot reges regno exu-
erunt, exilio damnarunt, carceribus coercuerunt, fupplicio deniq; affecerunt, nee unquam
tamen de acerbitate legis minuenda mentio eft facia, &c. Ibid. Facile apparet regnum nihil
aliud efle, quam mutuam inter regem & populum ftipultaionem. Non de illarum fan£tio-
onum genere, quae mutatonibus temporum funt obnoxiae, fed inprimo generis humani ex-
ortu, et mutuo prope omnium gentium confenfu cemprobatae, & una cum rerum natura
infragiles &: fempiternaeperennent. Ibid.
f S fuch
43 6 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. Ill- fuch ftrength in itfelf as never to have been any otherwife anfwered
than by railing, and no- way difaproved by queen Elizabeth, or her
council, to whom it was made, either upon a general account of the
pretentions of princes to be exempted from the penalties of the law,
or any pretext that they had particularly mifapplied them in relation
to their queen, I may juftly fay, that when nations fall under fuch
princes as are either utterly uncapable of making a right ufe of their
power, or do malicioufly abufe that authority with which they are
entrufted, thofe natious ftand obliged, by the duty they owes to
thcmielvcs and their posterity, to ufe the beft of their ende avour to
remove the evil, whatever danger or difficulties they may meet with
in the performance. Pontius the Samnite faid as truly as bravely
to his countrymen, That " * thofe arms were juft and pious, that were
" neceilary ; and necefiary, when there was no hope of fafety by any
cc other way." This is the voice of mankind, and is difliked only by
thofe princes, who fear the deferved punifhments that may fall upon
them ; or by their fervants and flatterers, who, being for the
moil; part the authors of their crimes, think they fhall be involved in
their ruin.
SECT. XLI.
The people, for whom and by whom the magiftrate is cre-
ated, can only judge whether he rightly perform his office
or not.
IT is commonly faid, that no man ought to be the judge of
his own cafe; and our author lays much weight upon it as
a fundamental maxim, tho', according to his ordinary inconftancy, he
overthrows it in the cafe of kings, where it ought to take place, if in
any ; for it often falls out, that no men are lefs capable of forming a
right judgment than they. Their paffions and interefts are moft
powerful to difturb or pervert them. No men are fo liable to be di-
verted from juftice by the flatteries of corrupt fervants. They never
act as kings, except for thofe by whom and for whom they are cre-
ated ; and acting for others, the account of their actions cannot de-
pend upon their own will. Neverthelefs I am not afraid to fay, that
naturally and properly a man is the judge of his own concernments.
No one is or can be deprived of this privilege, unlefs by his own
confent, and for the good of that fociety into which he enters. This
right therefore muft necefiarily belong to every man in all cafes, ex-
cept only fuch as relate to the good of the community, for whofe
fake he has diverted himfelf of it. If I find myfelf afflicted with
hunger, thirft, wearinefs, cold, heat, or ficknefs, it is a folly to tell
me, I ou<*ht not to feek meat, drink, reft, fhelter, refrefhment, or
phytic, becaufe I muft not be the judge of my own cafe. The like
* Jufta piaq; funt arma ; quibus neceflaria, & neceflaria, quibus nulla nifi in armisfpes
eft falutis. T. Liv. lib. ix. c. 1 .
may
Difcouries concerning Government. 437
may be faid in relation to my houfe, land, or eftate; I may do what Sect. 41
I pleafe with them, if I bring no damage upon others. But I mud
not let fire to my houfe, by which my neighbour's houfe may be
burnt. I may not erect forts upon my own lands, or deliver them to
a foreign enemy, who may by that means infeft my country. I may
not cut the banks of the fea, or thofe of a river, left my neighbour's
ground be overflown, becaufe the fociety into which I am incorpo-
rated, would by fuch means receive prejudice. My land is not
fimply my own, but upon condition that I mall not thereby bring
damage upon the public, by which I am protected in the peace-
able enjoyment and innocent ufe of what I pofTefs. But this fociety
leaves me a liberty to take fervants, and put them away, at my plea-
fure. No man is to direct me, of what quality or number they (hall
be, or can tell me whether I am well or ill ferved by them. Nay, the
ftate takes no other cognizance of what paries between me and them,
than to oblige me to perform the contracts I make, and not to do that
to them which the law forbids : that is to fay, the power to which
I have fubmitted myfelf, exercifes that jurifdiction over me, which
was eftablifhed by my confent, and under which I enjoy all the bene-
fits of life, which are of more advantage to me than my liberty
could have been, if I had retained it wholly in myfelf. The nature
alfo and meafure of this fubmiflion muft be determined by the reafons
that induced me to it. The fociety in which I live cannot fubfift,
unlefs by rule ; the equality in which men are born is fo perfect,
that no man will fuflfer his natural liberty to be abridged, except
others do the like : I cannot reafonably expect to be defended from
wrong, unlefs I oblige myfelf to do none j or to fuffer the punifh-
ment prefcribed by the law, if I perform not my engagement. But,
without prejudice to the fociety into which I enter, I may and do re-
tain to myfelf the liberty of doing what I pleafe in all things re-
lating peculiarly to myfelf, or in which I am to feek my own conve-
nience.
Now if a private man is not fubject to the judgment of any other,
than thofe to whom he fubmits himfelf for his own fafety and
convenience ; and, notwithftanding that fubmiffion, ftill retains to
himfelf the right of ordering according to his own will all things
merely relating to himfelf, and of doing what he pleafes in that
which he does for his own fake ; the fame right muft more certainly
belong to whole nations. When a controverfy happens between
Caius and Seius in a matter of right, neither of them may determine
the caufe, but it muft be referred to a judge fuperior to both -> not be-
caufe it is not fit that a man fhould be judge of his own cafe, but be-
caufe they have both an equal right, and neither of them owes any
fubjection to the other. But if there be a conteft between me and
my fervant concerning my fervice, I only am to decide it: he muft
ferve me in my own way, or begone, if I think fit, tho' he ferve me
never fo well ; and I do him no wrong in putting him away, if either
I intend to keep no fervant, or find that another will pleafe me bet-
ter. I cannot therefore ftand in need of a judge, unlefs the conteft:
be with one who lives upon an equal foot with me. No man can be
my judge, unlefs he be my fuperior j and he cannot be my fuperior,
who
438 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. HI- wno * s not f° by m Y confent, nor to any other purpofe than I confent
to. This cannot be the cafe of a nation, which can have no equal
within itfelf. Controverfies may arife with other nations, the de-
ciiion of which may be left to judges chofen by mutual agreement $
but this relates not to our queftion. A nation, and moft efpecially
one that is powerful, cannot recede from its own right, as a private
man, from the knowledge of his own weaknefs, and inability to defend
himfelf, muft come under the protection of a greater power than
his own. The ftrength of a nation is not in the magiftrate, but the
ftrength of the magiftrate is in the nation. The wifdom, induftry,
and valour of a prince may add to the glory and greatnefs of a na-
tion, but the foundation and fubftance will always be in itfelf. If
the magiftrate and people were upon equal terms, as Caius and Seius,
receiving equal and mutual advantages from each other, no man could
be judge of their differences, but fuch as they mould fet up for that
end. This has been done by many nations. The antient Germans
referred the decifion of the moft difficult matters to their priefts :
the Gauls and Britons to the Druids : the Mahometans for fome ages
to the califs of Babylon : the Saxons in England, when they had em-
braced the chriftian religion, to their clergy. Whilft all Europe
lay under the popifh fuperftition, the decifion of fuch matters was
frequently affumed by the pope j men often fubmitted to his judg-
ment, and the princes that refilled were for the moft part excommu-
nicated, depofed, and deftroyed. All this was done for the fame
reafons. Thefe men were accounted holy and infpired, and the fen-
tence pronounced by them was ufually reverenced as the judgment of
God, who was thought to direct them ; and all thofe who refufed to
iubmit, were efteemed execrable. But no man or number of men,
as I think, at the inftitution of a magiftrate, did ever fay, If any dif-
ference happen between you or your fucceflbrs and us, it (hall be de-
termined by yourfelf, or by them, whether they be men, women,
children, mad, fooliih, or vicious. Nay, if any fuch thing had been,
the folly, turpitude, and madnefs of fuch a fanction or ftipulation
muft necerTarily have deftroyed it. But if no fuch thing was ever
known, or could have no effect, if it had been in any place, it is moft
abfurd to impofe it upon all. The people therefore cannot be de-
prived of their natural rights upon a frivolous pretence to that which
never was, and never can be. They who create magiftracies, and
give to them fuch name, form, and power, as they think fit, do only
know, whether the end for which they were created, be performed
or not. They who give a being to the power which had none, can
only judge whether it be employed to their welfare, or turned to their
ruin They do not fet up one or a few men, that they and their po-
fterity may live in fplendor and greatnefs, but that juftice may be
adminiftred, virtue eftablifhed, and provifion made for the public
fafety. No wife man will think this can be done, if thofe who fet
themfelves to overthrow the law, are to be their own judges. If
Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, Domitian, or Heliogabalus, had been fubject
to no other judgment, they would have completed the deftruction
of the empire. If the difputes between Durftus, Evenus the Third,
Dardanus, and other kings of Scotland, with the nobility and
people,
Difcourfes concerning Government. 439
people, might have been determined by themselves, they had efcaped Sect. 41*
the punifhments they differed, and ruined the nation as they de- *-— —v— • '
figned. Other methods were taken ; they perifhed by their mad-
nefs ; better princes were brought into their places, and their fuc-
ceflbrs were by their example admonifhed to avoid the ways that had
proved fatal to them. If Edward the Second of England, with Gavef-
ton and the Spencers, Richard the Second with Trefilian and Vere,
had been permitted to be the judges of their own cafes, they who had
murdered the beft of the nobility, would have purfued their defigns
to the deftruction of fuch as remained, the enflaving of the nation,
the fubverfion of the conftitution, and the eftablifhment of a mere
tyranny in the place of a mixed monarchy. But our anceftors
took better meafures : they who had felt the fmart of the vices and
follies of their princes, knew what remedies were moft fit to be ap-
plied, as well as the beft time of applying them. They found the
effects of extreme corruption in government to be fo defperately per-
nicious, that nations muft neceffarily perifh, unlefs it be corrected,
and the ftate reduced to its firft principle, or altered. Which being
the cafe, it was eafy for them to judge, whether the governor, who
hadintroduced that corruption, mould be brought to order, andremoved
if he would not be reclaimed -, or whether he fhould^be fuffered to ruin
them and their pofterity, as it is for me to judge, whether I mould
put away my fervant, if I knew he intended to poifon or mur-
der me, and had a certain facility of accomplishing his defign ; or
whether I mould continue him in my fervice till he had performed it.
Nay, the matter is fo much the more plain on the fide of the nation,
as the difproportion of merit between a whole people, and one or a
few men entrufted with the power of governing them, is greater
than between a private man and his fervant. This is fo fully con-
firmed by the general confent of mankind, that we know no go-
vernment that has not frequently either been altered in form, or re-
duced to its original purity, by changing the families or perfons who
abufed the power with which they had been entrufted. Thofe who
have wanted wifdom and virtue, rightly and feafonably to perform
this, have been foon deflroyed; like the Goths in Spain, who, by omit-
ting to curb the fury of Witza and Rodrigo in time, became a prey Mariana,
to the Moors. Their kingdom by this means deftroyed was never
reftored, and the remainder of that nation, joining with the Spaniards,
whom they had kept in Subjection for three or four ages, could not
in lefs than eight hundred years, expel thofe enemies they might have
kept out only by removing two bafe and vitious kings. Such nations
as have been fo corrupted, that when they have applied themfelves to feek
remedies to the evils they fuffered by wicked magistrates, could not
fall upon fuch as were proportionable to the difeafe, have only vented
their paflions in deftroying the immediate inftruments of their op-
preftion, or for a while delayed their utter ruin. But the root ftill
remaining, it foon produced the fame poifonous fruit, and either quite
deftroyed, or made them languifh in perpetual mifery. The Roman
empire was the moft eminent example of the firft ; many of the
monfters that had tyrannized over them were killed ; but the greateft
advantage gained by their death, was a refpit from ruin j and the
$ T govern-
44^ Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. government, which ought to have been eftablifhed by good laws, de-
pending only upon the virtue of one man, his life proved to be no
more than a lucid interval, and at his death they relapfed into the
depth of infamy and mifery ; and in this condition they continued
till the empire was totally fubverted.
All the kingdoms of the Arabians, Medes, Perfians, Moors, and
ethers of the eaft, are of the other fort. Common fenfe inftructs
them, that barbarous pride, cruelty, and madnefs grown to ex-
tremity, cannot be borne : but they have no other way than to kill
the tyrant, and to do the like to his fucceflbr, if he fall into the fame
crimes. Wanting that wifdom and valour which is required for the
inftitution of a good government, they languifh in perpetual flavery,
and propofe to themfelves nothing better than to live under a gentle
mafter, which is but a precarious life, and little to be valued by men
of bravery and fpirit. But thofe nations that are more generous,
who fet a higher value upon liberty, and better underftand the ways
of preferving it, think it a fmall matter to deftroy a tyrant, unlefs
they can alfo deftroy the tyranny. They endeavour to do the work
throughly, either by changing the government intirely, or reform-
ing it according to the firft inftitution, and making fuch good laws
as may preferve its integrity when reformed. This has been fo fre-
quent in all the nations (both antient and modern) with whofe
actions we are beft acquainted, as appears by the foregoing examples,
and many others that might be alledged, if the cafe were not clear,
that there is not one of them which will not furnifh us with many in-
ftances j and no one magiftracy now in being which does not owe its
original to fome judgment of this nature. So that they muft either
derive their right from fuch actions, or confefs they have none at all,
and leave the nations to their original liberty of fetting up thofe ma-
giftracies which beft pleafe themfelves, without any reftriction or
obligation to regard one perfon or family more than another.
SECT. XLII.
The perfon that wears the crown cannot determine the af-
fairs which the law refers to the king.
/^\UR author, with the reft of the vulgar, feems to have been
^^ led into grofs errors by the form of writs fummoning perfons
to appear before the king. The common ftyle ufed in the trial of
delinquents -, the name of the king's witnefles given to thofe who
accufe them^ the verdicts brought in by juries, " coram domino rege;"
and the profecution made in the king's name ; feem to have caufed
this. And they who underftand not thefe phrafes, render the law
a heap of the moft grofs abfurdities, and the king an enemy to
every one of his fubjects, when he ought to be a father to them
all j lince without any particular confideration or examination of
what any witnefs depofes in a court of juftice, tending to the
death,
Difcourfes concerning Government. 441
death, confutation, or other punifhment of any man, he is called Sect. 42
the king's witnefs, whether he fpeak the truth, or a lye, and on
that account favoured. It is not neceflary to alledge many instances
in a cafe that is fo plain ; but it may not be amifs to infert two or three
of the mod: important reafons to prove my affertion.
1 . If the law did intend, that he or me who wears the crown,
mould in his or her perfon judge all caufes, and determine the mofl
difficult queftions, it muft, like our author, prefiime that they will
always be of profound wifdom to comprehend all of them, and of
perfect integrity always to acl: according to their underftanding.
Which is no lefs than to lay the foundation of the government upon
a thing merely contingent, that either never was, or very often fails,
as is too much verified by experience, and the hiftories of all na-
tions ; or elfe to refer the decifion of all to thofe who through the in-
firmities of age, fex, or perfon, are often uncapable of judging the
leaft, or fubje& to fuch paflions and vices as would divert them from
juftice, tho' they did underftand it j both which feem to be almoft
equally prepofterous.
2. The law muft alfo prefume, that the prince is always prefent
in all the places where his name is ufed. The king of France is (as
I have faid already) efteemed to be prefent " * on the feat of juftice" in
all the parliaments and fovereign courts of the kingdom : and if his
corporeal prefence were by that phrafe to be underftood, he muft be
in all thofe diftinct and far diftant places at the fame time ; which ab-
furdity can hardly be paralleled, unlefs by the popifh opinion of " tran-
" fubftantiation." But indeed they are fo far from being guilty of fuch
monftrous abfurdity, that he cannot in perfon be prefent at any tryal ;
and no man can be judged, if he be. This was plainly afferted to
Lewis the XHIth (who would have been at the tryal of the Duke of
Candale) by the prefident de Bellievre, who told him, that as he could
judge no man himfelf, fo they could not judge any, if he were prefent:
upon which he retired.
3. The laws of moft kingdoms giving to kings the confifca-
tion of delinquents eftates, if they in their own perfons might give
judgment upon them, they would be conftituted both judges and
parties i which, befides the forementioned incapacities, to which princes
are as much fubjecl: as other men, would tempt them by their own
perfonal intereft to fubvert all manner of juftice.
This therefore not being the meaning of the law, we are to in-
quire what it is j and the thing is fo plain, that we cannot miftake, un-
lefs we do it wilfully. Some name muft be ufed in all manner of
tranfa&ions, and in matters of public concernment none can be
fo fit as that of the principal magiftrate. Thus are leagues made,
not only with kings and emperors, but with the dukes of Venice
and Genoa, the avoyer and fenate of a canton in Switzerland, the
burgermafter of an imperial town in Germany, and the ftates-
general of the United Provinces. But no man thinking, I prefume,
thefe leagues would be of any value, if they could only oblige the
perfons whofe names are ufed, it is plain, that they do not ftipulate only
for
* Sur fon lit de juftice.
44^ Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. f° r themfelves ; and that their ftipulations would he of no value, it
they were merely perfonal. And nothing can more certainly prove,
they are not fo, than that we certainly know, thefe dukes, avoyers,
and burgermafters, can do nothing of themfelves. The power of the
itates-general of the United Provinces is limited to the points men-
tioned in the act of union made at Utrecht. The empire is not
obliged by any ftipulation made by the emperor without their con-
fent. Nothing is more common than for one king, making a league
with another, to exact a confirmation of their agreement, by the
parliaments, diets, or general eftates ; becaufe, fays Grotius, " a
" prince does not ftipulate for himfelf, but for the people under his
" government j and a king deprived of his kingdom lofes the right of
" fending an ambaffador." The powers of Europe (hewed themfelves
to be of this opinion in the cafe of Portugal. When Philip the Se-
cond had gained the porTeffion, they treated with him concerning
the affairs relating to that kingdom : few regarded Don Antonio ;
and no man confidered the dukes of Savoy, Parma, or Braganza, who
perhaps had the moll: plaufible titles : but, when his grandfon Phi-
lip the Fourth had*ioft that kingdom, and the people had fet up the
duke of Braganza, they all treated with him as king. And the
Englifh court, tho' then in amity with Spain, and not a little influen-
ced by a Spanifh faction, gave example to others by treating with
him, and not with Spain, touching matters relating to that ftate. Nay,
I have been informed by thofe who well underftood the affairs of that
time, that the lord Cottington advifing the late king not to receive
any perfons fent from the duke of Braganza, rebel to his ally the
king of Spain, in the quality of ambaffadors ; the king anfwered,
that he muft look upon thatperfon to be king of Portugal, who was
acknowledged by the nation. And I am miftaken, if his majefty
now reigning did not find all the princes and ftates of the world to
be of the fame mind, when he was out of his kingdom, and could
oblige no man but himfelf, and a few followers, by any treaty he could
make.
For the fame reafon the names of kings are ufed in treaties,
when they are either children, or otherwife uncapable of knowing
what alliances are fit to be made or rejected ; and yet fuch treaties
do equally oblige them, their fuccerTors and people, as if they were
of mature age, and fit for government. No man therefore ought to
think it ftrange, if the kings name be ufed in domeflic affairs, of
which he neither ought nor can take any cognizance. In thefe cafes
he is perpetually a minor : he muft fuffer the law to take its due
courfe ; and the judges, tho' nominated by him, are obliged by oath
not to have any regard to his letters, or perfonal commands. If a
man be fued, he muft appear; and a delinquent is to be tried " coram
" rege," but no otherwife than " fecundum legem terras, according to the
lc law of the land," not his perfonal will or opinion. And the judg-
ments given muft be executed, whether they pleafe him or not, it being
always underftood, that he canfpeak no otherwife than the law fpeaks,
and is always prefent as far as the law requires. For this reafon a
noble lord, who was irregularly detained in prifon in 1681, being by
habeas corpus brought to the bar of the king's bench, where he
fued
Difcourfes concerning Government. 443
{ued to be releafed upon bail; and an ignorant judge telling him he muft Sect. 42
apply himfelf to the king, he replied, that he came thither for that
end j that the king might eat, drink, or fleep, where he pleafed ; but
when he rendered juftice, he was always in that place. The king
that renders juftice is indeed always there : he never fleeps ; he is
fubject to no infirmity; he never dies, unlefsthe nation be extinguifh-
ed, or fo diflipated as to have no government. No nation that
has a fovereign power within itfelf, does ever want this king. He
was in Athens and Rome, as well as at Babylon and Sufa ; and is as
properly faid to be now in Venice, Switzerland, or Holland, as in France,
Morocco, or Turky. This is he to whom we all owe a fimple and
unconditional obedience. This is he " who never does any wrong:"
it is before him we appear, when we demand juftice, or render an ac-
count of our actions. All juries give their verdict in his fight: they
are his commands that the judges are bound and fworn to obey, when
they are not at all to confider fuch as they receive from the perfon
that wears the crown. It was for treafon againft him, that Trefi-
lian, and others like to him in feveral ages, were hanged. They gra-
tified the lufts of the vifible powers ; but the invifible king would
not be mocked. He caufed juftice to be executed upon Empfon and
Dudley. He was injured, when the perjured wretches, who gave that
accurfed judgment in the cafe of fhip-money, Were fuffered to efcape
the like punifhment by means of the enfuing troubles, which they
had chiefly raifed. And I leave it to thofe who are concerned,
to confider how many in our days may expect vengeance for the like
crimes.
I fhould here conclude this point, it the power of granting a "noli
profequi, ceffet proceflus," and pardons, which are faid to be annexed
to the perfon of the king, were not taken for a proof, that all pro-
ceedings at law depend upon his will. But whoever would from
hence draw a general conclufion, muft firft prove his proportion to
be univerfally true. If it be wholly falfe, no true deduction can be
made; and if it be true only in fome cafes, it is abfurd to draw from
thence a general conclufion ; and to erect a vaft fabric upon a nar-
row foundation is impoffible. As to the general proportion, I ut-
terly deny it. The king cannot ftop any fuit that I begin in my
own name, or invalidate any judgment I obtain upon it : he can-
not releafe a debt of ten millings due to me, nor a fentence for the
like fum given upon an action of battery, affault, trefpafs, pub-
lic nuifance, or the like. He cannot pardon a man condemned up-
on an appeal, nor hinder the perfon injured from appealing. His
power therefore is not univerfal : if it be not univerfal, it cannot
be inherent, but conferred upon him, or entrufted by a fuperior power,
that limits it.
Thefe limits are fixed by the law: the law therefore is above
him. His proceedings muft be regulated by the law, and not the
law by his will. Befides, the extent of thofe limits can only be
known by the intention of the law that fets them ; and are fo vifi-
ble, that none but fuch as are wilfully blind can miftake. It cannot
be imagined, that the law, which does not give a power to the king
of pardoning a man that breaks my hedge, can intend he fhould have
5 U power
1
444 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. power to pardon one who kills my father, breaks my houfe, robs me
of my goods, abufes my children and fervants, wounds me, and
brings me in danger of my life. Whatever power he has in fuch
cafes, is founded upon a prefumption, that he who has iworn not to
deny or delay juftice to any man, will not break his oath to interrupt
it. And farther, as he does nothing but what he may rightly do, and it is not doubt-
ed they would have been faved, if the king's power had extended
fo far. I might add the cafes of the earls of Strafford and Dan-
by i for, tho' the king figned a warrant for the execution of the nrft,
no man doubts he would have faved him, if it had been in his power.
The other continues in prifon, notwithftanding his pardon ; and, for
any thing I know, he may continue where he is, or come out in a way
that will not be more to his fatisfaction, unlefs he be found innocent, or
fomething fall out more to his advantage than his majefty's approba-
tion of what he has done. If therefore the king cannot interpofe
his authority to hinder the courfe of the law in contefts between pri-
vate men, nor remit the debts adjudged to be due, or the damages
given to the perfons aggrieved, he can in his own perfon have no other
power in things of this nature, than in fome degree to mitigate the
vindictive power of the law j and this alfo is to be exercifed no other
way than as he is entrufted. But if he acts, even in this capacity, by a
delegated power, and in few cafes, he muft act according to the ends
for which he is fo entrufted, as the fame law fays, " cum magnatum
" & fapientum confilio;" and is not therein to purfue his own will and
interefts : if his oath farther oblige him not to do it ; and his mini-
sters are liable to punifhment, if they advife him otherwife; if in
matters of appeal he have no power; and if his pardons have been of
no value, when, contrary to his oath, he has abufed that with which he
is entrufted, to the patronizing of crimes, and exempting fuch delin-
quents from punifhment, as could not be pardoned without prejudice
to
Difcourfes concerning Government. 44^
to the public ; I may juftly conclude, that the king, before whom Sect. 43
every man is bound to appear, who does perpetually and impartially
diftribute juftice to the nation, is not the man or woman that wears
the crown; and that he or fhe cannot determine thofe matters,
which, by the law, are referred to the king. Whether therefore fuch
matters are ordinary or extraordinary, the decifion is and ought to be
placed where there is moft wifdom and {lability, and where paffion
and private intereft does leaft prevail to the obftruction of juftice.
This is the only way to obviate that confufion and mifchief, which
our author thinks it would introduce. In cafes of the firft: fort, this
is done in England by judges and juries : in the other by the parlia-
ment, which, being the reprefentative body of the people, and the
collected wifdom of the nation, is leaft iubject to error, moft ex-
empted from paflion, and moft free from corruption, their own good,
both public and private, depending upon the rectitude of their
fanctions. They cannot do any thing that is ill without damage to
themfelves, and their pofterity ; which being all that can be done by
human underftanding, our lives, liberties, and properties, are by our
laws directed to depend upon them.
SECT. XLIII.
Proclamations are not laws.
jT~\UR author, according to his ufual method and integrity, lays
^** great weight upon proclamations, as the fignifications of the
king's pleafure, which in his opinion is our only law. But neither
law nor reafon openly directing, nor by confequences infinuating,
that fuch a power mould be put into an uncertain or fufpected hand,
we may fafely deny them to be laws, or in any fenfe to have the
effect of laws. Nay, they cannot be fo much as fignifications of
his will ; for, as he is king, he can have no will but as the law di-
rects. If he depart from the law, he is no longer king, and his
will is nothing to us. Proclamations, at moft, are but temporary,
by the advice of council, in purfuance of the law. If they be not
fo, the fubject is no-way obliged to obey them, and the counfellors are
to be punifhed for them. Thefe laws are either immemorial cuftoms,
or ftatutes. The firft have their beginning and continuance from
the univerfal confent of the nation. The latter receive their autho-
rity and force of laws from parliaments, as is frequently expreffed
in the preambles. Thefe are, under God, the beft defence of our lives,
liberties, and eftates : they proceed not from the blind, corrupt, and
fluctuating humour of a man, but from the mature deliberation of the
choiceft perfons of the nation, and fuch as have the greateft intereft
in it. Our anceftors have always relied upon thefe laws ; and it is to
be hoped we fhall not be fo abandoned by God, fo deprived of cou-
rage and common fenfe, to fuffer ourfelves to be cheated of the inhe-
ritance which they have fo frequently, fo bravely, and fo conftantly
defended.
446 Difcourfes concerning Government
Chap. III. defended. Tho' experience has too well taught us, that parliaments
may have their failings, and that the vices, which are induftrioufly
fpread amongft them, may be too prevalent ; yet they are the beft
helps we have, and we may much more reafonably depend upon
them, than upon thofe who propagate that corruption among them,
for which only they can deferve to be fufpected. We hope they will
take care of our concernments, fince they are as other men fo foon as
a feflion is ended, and can do nothing to our prejudice that will not
equally affect them, and their pofterity; befides the guilt of betraying
their country, which can never be wafhed off. If fome fhould
prove falfe to their truft, it is probable that others would continue in
their integrity : or if the bafe arts, which are ufually practifed by
thofe who endeavour to delude, corrupt, enflave, and ruin nations,
mould happen to prevail upon the youngeft and weakeft, it may be
reafonably hoped, that the wifeft will fee the fnares, and inftruct
their companions to avoid them. But if all things were fo put into the
hands of one man, that his proclamations were to be efteemed laws,
the nation would be expofed to ruin, as foon as it mould chance to
fall into an ill hand. It is in vain to fay we have a good king, who
will not make an ill ufe of his power; for even the beft arefubject
to be deceived by flatterers, and crowned heads are almoft ever en-
compaffed by them. The principal art of a courtier is to obferve
his mafter's parlions, and to attack him on that fide where he feems
to be moft weak. It would be a ftrange thing to find a man impreg-
nable in every part; and, if he be not, it is impofljble he mould refill:
all the attempts that are made upon him. If his judgment come to
be prepoffeffed, he and all that depend on him are loft. Contra-
dictions tho' never fo juft, are then unfafe; and no man will venture
upon them, but he who dares facrifice himfelf for the public good.
The nature of man is frail, and ftands in need of affiftance. Vir-
tuous actions, that are profitable to a commonwealth, ought to be
made, as far as it is pofhble, fafe, eafy, and advantageous; and it is
the utmoft imprudence, to tempt men to be enemies to the public,
by making the moft pernicious actions to be the means of obtaining
honour and favour, whilft no man can ferve his country, but with
the ruin of himfelf, and his family.
However, in this cafe, the queftion is not concerning a pcrfon : the
Tame counfels are to be followed, when Mofes or Samuel is in the
throne, as if Caligula had invaded it. Laws ought to aim at per-
petuity ; but the virtues of a man die with him, and very often be-
fore him. Thofe who have deferved the higheft praifes for wifdom
and integrity, have frequently left the honours they enjoyed to foolifh
and vicious children. If virtue may in any refpect be faid to outlive
the perfon, it can only be when good men frame fuch laws and con-
ftitutions as by favouring it preferve themfelves. This has never been
done otherwife, than by balancing the powers in fuch a manner,
that the corruption which one or a few men might fall into, fhould
not be fuffered to fpread the contagion to the ruin of the whole. The
long continuance of Lycurgus's laws is to be attributed to this:
they reftrained the lufts of kings, and reduced thofe to order who
adventured to tranfgrefs them; whereas the whole fabric muft have
4 fallen
Difcourfes concerning Government. 447
fallen to the ground in a fhort time, if the firft that had a fancy to Sect. 47.
be abfolute, had been able to effect his defign. This has been the fate of <— -v
all governments that were made to depend upon the virtue of a man
which never continues long in any family ; and, when that fails, all is
loft. The nations therefore that are fo happy to have good kings,
ought to make a right ufe of them, by eftablifhing the good that may
outlaft their lives. Thofe of them that are good, will readily join in
this work, and take care, that their fucceffors may be obliged, in do-
ing the like, to be equally beneficial to their own families, and the
people they govern. If the rulers of nations be reftrained, not only
the people is by that means fecured from the mifchiefs of their vices
and follies, but they themfelves are preierved from the greateft temp-
tations to ill, and the terrible effects of the vengeance that frequently
enfues upon it. An unlimited prince might be juftly compared to a
weak fhip expofed to a violent ftorm, with a vaft fail, and no rud-
der. We have an eminent example of this in the book of Either. Cap. 3.
A wicked villain having filled the ears of a foolifh king with falfe
ftories of the Jews, he iffues out a proclamation for their utter extir-
pation ; and not long after, being informed of the truth, he gave them
leave by another proclamation to kill whom they pleafed, which they
executed upon feventy thoufand men. The books of Ezra, Nehe-
miah, and Daniel, manifeftly difcover the like fluctuation in all the
councilsofNabuchodonofor, Cyrus, Darius, andArtaxerxes. When
good men had credit with them, they favoured the Ifraelites 3 fent
them back to their own country} reftored the facred veffels, that had
been taken away ; gave thern all things neceffary for the rebuilding of
the city ; and advanced the chief of them to the higheft employments.
But if they fell into ill hands, three jufl men muft be thrown into
the burning furnace for refufing to worfhip an idol j Daniel muft be
caft to the lions ; the holy city efteemed rebellious, and thofe who
endeavoured to rebuild it, enemies to kings. Such was the ftate of
things, when their proclamations pafTed for laws ; and numbers of
flattering flaves were ready to execute their commands, without ex-
amining whether they were juft or unjuft, good or bad. The life
and death of the beft men, together with the very being of nations,
was expofed to chance ; and they were either preserved or deftroyed
according to the humour of that man who fpoke laft to the king, or
happened to have credit with him. If a frantic fancy come into the
head of a drunken whore, Perfepolis muft be burnt, and the hand of
Alexander is ready to execute her will. If a dancing wench pleafe
Herod, the mod venerable of all human heads muft be offered in a
dim for a facrifice to the rage of her impure mother. The nature of
man is fo frail, that wherefoever the word of a fingle perfon has had
the force of a law, the innumerable extravagances and mifchiefs it
has produced, have been fo notorious, that all nations who are not ftu-
pid, flavifh, and brutifh, have always abominated it, and made it
their principal care to find out remedies againft it, by fo dividing and
balancing the powers of their government, that one or a few men
might not be able to opprefs and deftroy thofe they ought to preferve
and protect. This has always been as grateful to the beft and wifeft
5 X prices,
448 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. princes, as necefTary to the weaker!: and worft, as I have proved al-
ready by the examples of Theopompus, Mofes, and many others. Thefe
confiderations have given beginning, growth, and continuance, to all
the mixed governments that have been in the worlds and I may juftly
fay, there never was a good one that was not mixed. If other proofs
of their rectitude were wanting, our author's hatred would be enough
to juftify them. He is fo bitter an enemy to mankind, as to be dif-
pleafed with nothing but that which tends to their good, and fo per-
verfe in his judgment, that we have reafon to believe that to be good,
which he moft abhors. One would think he had taken the model of
the government he propofes, from the monftrous tyranny of Ceylon
an ifland in the Eaft-Indies, where the king knows no other law
than his own will. He kills, tears in pieces, impales, or throws to
his elephants, whomfoever he pleafes : no. man has any thing that he
can call his own : he feldom fails to deftroy thofe who have been em-
ployed in his domeftic fervice, or public offices ; and few obtain
the favour of being put to death, and thrown to the dogs, without
torments. His fubjects approach him no otherwife, than on their
knees, licking the dufr, and dare affume to themfelves no other
name than that of dogs, or limbs of dogs. This is a true pattern of
Filmer's Patriarchical monarch. His majefty, as I fuppofe, is fuffi-
ciently exalted j for he does whatever he pleafes. The exercife of his
power is as gentle as can'reafonably be expected from one who has
all by the unqueflionable right of ufurpation ; and knows the people
will no longer fuffer him, and the villains he hires to be the inftru-
ments of his cruelty, than they can be kept in fuch ignorance, weak-
ncfs, and bafenefs, as neither to know how to providVfor themfelves,
or dare to reiifk him. We ought to efteem ourfelves happy, if the
like could be eftablifhed among us j and are much obliged to our au-
thor for fo kindly propoiing an expedient that might terminate all our
difputes. Let proclamations obtain the power of laws, and the bu-
finefs is done. They may be fo ingenioufly contrived, that the an-
tient laws, which we and our fathers have highly valued, mail be
abolifhed, or made a fnare to all thofe that dare remember they are
Englifhmen, and are guilty of the unpardonable crime of loving
their country, or have the courage, conduct, and reputation required
to defend it. This is the fum of Filmer's philofophy, and this is the
legacy he has left to teflify his affection to the nation j which having
for a long time lain unregarded, has been lately brought into the light
again, as an introduction of a popifh fuccefTor, who is to be efta-
blifhed, as we ought to believe, for the fecurity of the proteftant re-
ligion, and our Englifh liberties. Both will undoubtedly flourifh un-
der a prince, who is made to believe the kingdom is his patrimony ;
that his will is a law; and that he has a power, which none may re-
fill. If any man doubt whether he will make a good ufe of it, he
may only examine the hiftories of what others in the fame circum-
itances have done in all places where they have had power. The prin-
ciples of that religion are fo full of meeknefs and charity j the popes
have always fhewed themfelves fo gentle towards thofe who would
not fubmit to their authority; the Jefuits, who may be accounted the
foul
Difcourfes concerning Government. 449
foul that gives life to the whole body of the faction, are fo well na- Sect. 43,
tured, faithful, and exact in their morals j fo full of innocence, juftice, *■
and truth • that no violence is to be feared from fuch as are governed
by them. The fatherly care fhewed to the proteftants of France, by
the five laft kings of the houfe of Valois ; the mercy of Philip the
Second of Spain to his pagan fubjects in the Weft-Indies, and the more
hated proteftants in the Netherlands j the moderation of the dukes of
Savoy towards the Vaudois in the marquifate of Saluzzo and the vallies
of Piedmont ; the gentlenefs and faith of the two Maries queens of
E no-land and Scotland j the kindnefs of the papifts to the proteftants
of Ireland in the year 1641. with what we have reafon to believe
they did and do ftill intend, if they can accomplifh the ends of their
confpiracyj in a word, the fweetnefs and apoftolical meeknefs of
theinquifition; may fufficiently convince us that nothing is to be feared
where that principle reigns. We may fuffer the word of fuch a prince
to be a law, and the people to be made to believe it ought to be fo,
when he is expected. Tho' we mould wave the bill of exclufion,
and not only admit him to reign as other kings have done, but refign
the whole power into his hands, it would neither bring inconvenience
or danger on the prefent king. He can with patience expect, that
nature fhould take her courfe, and would neither anticipate nor fecure
his entrance into the porTeflion of the power, by taking one day from
the life of his brother. Tho' the' papifts know, that, like a true fon of
their church, he would prefer the advancement of their religion
before all other confiderations ; and that one ftab with a dagger, or a
dofe of poifon, would put all under his feet ; not one man would be
found among them to give it. The afTafiins were Mahometans, not
pupils of the honeft Jefuits, nor ever employed by them. Thefe things
being certain, all our concernments would be fecure, if, inftead of the
foolifh ftatutes, and antiquated cuftoms, on which our anceftors and
we have hitherto doted, we may be troubled with no law but the
kings will, and a proclamation may be taken for a fufricient decla-
ration of it. We fhall by this means be delivered from that " li-
" berty with a mifchief," in which our miftaken nation feems fo much
to delight. This phrafe is fo new, and fo peculiar to our author,
that it defervcs to be written upon his tomb. We have heard of " ty-
" ranny with a mifchief, flavery and bondage with a mifchief;" and
they have been denounced by God againft wicked and perverfe na-
tions, as mifchiefs comprehending all that is moft to be abhorred
and dreaded in the world. But Filmer informs us, that liberty, which
all wife and good men have in all ages efteemed to be the moft va-
luable and glorious privilege of mankind, is " a mifchief." If he de-
ferve credit, Mofes, Jofhua, Gideon, Samfon, and Samuel, with
others like them, were enemies to their country, in depriving the
people of the advantages they enjoyed under the paternal care of
Pharaoh, Adonibezek, Eglon, Jabin, and other kings of the neigh-
bouring nations, and reftoring them to that " liberty with a mif-
" chieiy' which he had promifed to them. The Ifraelites were happy
under the power of tyrants, whofe proclamations were laws; and
they ought to have been thankful to God for that condition, and not
for
4^0 Difcourfes concerning Government.
r ttj for the deliverances he wrought by the hands of his fervants.
^-1, _y Subjeaion to the will of a man is happinefs, liberty is a " mifchief."
But this is fo abominably wicked and deteftable, that it can deferve
no anfwer.
SECT. XLIV.
No people, that is not free, can fubftitute delegates.
HOW full foever the power of any perfon or people may be, he
or they are obliged to give only fo much to their delegates, as
feems convenient to themfelves, or conducing to the ends they defire
to attain j but the delegate can have none, except what is conferred
upon him by his principal. If therefore the knights, citizens, and
burgefles, fent by the people of England to ferve in parliament, have a
power, it muft be more perfectly and fully in thofe that fend them.
But (as was proved in the laft fe&ion) proclamations, and other
fignifications of the king's pleafure, are not laws to us. They are
to be regulated by the law, not the law by them. They are
to be confidered only fo far as they are conformable to the law, from
which they receive all the ftrength that is in them, and can confer
none upon it. We know no laws but our own ftatutes, and thofe
immemorial cuftoms eftablifhed by the confent of the nation j
which may be, and often are, changed by us. The legifiative power
therefore, that is exercifed by the parliament, cannot be conferred by
the writ of fummons, but muft be erTentially and radically in the
people, from whom their delegates and representatives have all that
they have. But, fays our author, " They muft only chufe, andtruft
" thofe whom they chufe, to do what they lift ; and that is as much liberty
" as many of us deferve for our irregular elections of burgeffes.' ' This
is ino-enioufly concluded : I take what fervant I pleafe, and, when I
have taken him, I muft fuffer him to do what he pleafes. But from
whence mould this neceffity arife? Why may not I take one to be my
groom, another to be my cook, and keep them both to the offices
for which I took them? What law does herein reftrain my right?
And if I am free in my private capacity to regulate my particular af-
fairs according to my own difcretion, and to allot to each fervant his
proper work, why have not I, with my affociates, the freemen of
England, the like liberty of directing and limiting the powers of the
fervants we employ in our public affairs? Our author gives us rea-
fons proportionable to his judgment: " This were liberty with a mif-
" chief; and that of chufing only is as much as many of us deferve." I
have already proved, that, as far as our hiftories reach, we have had no
princes or magiftrates, but fuch as we have made, and they have
had no other power than what we have conferred upon them. They
cannot be the judges of our merit, who have no power but what
we gave them, thro' an opinion they did or might deferve it. They may
diftribute in parcels to particulars that with which they are entrufted
Difcourfes concerning Government. 4^1
in the grofs, But it is impoflible, that the public mould depend ab- Sect. 4,4.
folutely upon thofe who are nothing above other men, except what
they are made to be, for and by the public. The reftrictions
therefore of the people's liberty muft be from themfelves, or there
can be none.
Neverthelefs I believe, that the powers of every county, city,
and borough of England, are regulated by the general law to which
they have all confented, and by which they are all made members
of one political body. This obliges them to proceed with their de-
legates in a manner different from that which is ufed in the United
Netherlands, or in Switzerland. Amongft thefe, every province,
city, or canton, making a diftinct body independent from any other,
and exercifing the fovereign power within itfelf, looks upon the reft as
allies, to whom they are bound only by fuch acts as they themfelves
have made ; and when any new thing, not comprehended in them
happens to arife, they oblige their delegates to give them an account
of it, and retain the power of determining thofe matters in them-
felves. It is not fo amongft us : every county does not make a di-
ftinct body, having in itfelf a fovereign power, but is a member of
that great body which comprehends the whole nation. It is not
therefore for Kent or SulTex, Lewis or Maidftone, but for the whole
nation, that the members chofen in thofe places are fent to ferve in
parliament : and tho' it be fit for them as friends and neighbours
(fo far as may be) to hearken to the opinions of the electors for the
information of their judgements, and to the end that what they fhall
fay, may be of more weight, when every one is known not to fpeak
his own thoughts only, but thofe of a great number of men ; yet they
are not ftrictly and properly obliged to give account of their actions
to any, uniefs the whole body of the nation for which they ferve,
and who are equally concerned in their refolutions, could be aflem-
bled. This being impracticable, the only punifhment to which
they are fubject, if they betray their truft, is fcorn, infamy, hatred,
and an afTurance of being rejected, when they fhall again feek the
fame honour. And tho' this may feem a fmall matter to thofe who
fear to do ill only from a fenfe of the pains inflicted ; yet it is very
terrible to men of ingenuous fpirits, as they are fuppofed to be, who
are accounted fit to be intrufted with fo great powers. But why
mould this be " liberty with a mifchief," if it were otherwife? Or how
the liberty of particular focieties would be greater, if they might do
what they pleafed, than whilft they fend others to act for them,
fdeh wife men only as Filmer can tell us. For as no man, or num-
ber of men, can give a power which he or they have not, the
Achaians, Etolians, Latins, Samnites, and Tufcans, who tranfacted
all things relating to their aflbciations by delegates $ and the Athe-
nians, Carthaginians, and Romans, who kept the power of the ftate
in themfelves j were all equally free. And in our days, the United
Provinces of the Netherlands, the Switfers, and Grifons, who are of
the firft fort, and the Venetians, Genoefes, and Lucchefes, who are
of the other, are fo alfo. All men that have any degree of com-
mon fenfe, plainly fee, that the liberty of thofe who a& in their
f Y own
4^2 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. HI. own perfons, and for thofe who fend delegates, is perfectly the:
c*~~v — •> fame, and the exercife is, and can only be, changed by their con-
fent.
But whatever the law or cuftom of England be in this point, it
cannot concern our queStion. The general propofition concerning a?
patriarchical power cannot be proved by a fingle example. If there
be a general power every-where, forbidding nations to give in-
fractions to their delegates, they can do it no-where. If there be
no fuch thing, every people may do it, unlefs they have deprived
themfelves of their right, all being born under the fame condition.
It is to no purpofe to fay, that the nations before-mentioned had not
kings, and therefore might act as they did. For, if the general the-
fts be true, they mult have kings ; and, if it be not, none are ob-
liged to have them, unlefs they think fit, and the kings they make
are their creatures. But many of thefe nations had either kings,
or other magistrates in power like to them. The provinces of the
Netherlands, had dukes, earls, or marquifes : Genoa and Venice
have dukes. If any, on account of the narrownefs of their ter-
ritories, have abstained from the name, it does not alter the cafe j for
our difpute is not concerning the name, but the right. If that one
man, who is in the principal magistracy of every nation, muft be
reputed the father of that people, and has a power which may
not be limited by any law, it imports not what he is called. But
if in fmall territories he may be limited by laws, he may be fo alfo
in the greateSt. The leaSt of men, is a man as v/ell as a giant : and
thofe in the Weft- Indies who have not above twenty or thirty fubjects
' able to bear arms, are kings, as well as Xerxes. Every nation may
| divide itfelf into fmall parcels, as fome have done, by the fame law
i they have restrained or abolished their kings, joined to one another,
or taken their hazard of fubfifting by themfelves ; acted by delega-
tion, or retaining the power in their own perfons ; given finite or in-
definite powers ; referved to themfelves a power of punifhing thofe
who Should depart from their duty, or referred it to their general
affemblies. And that liberty, for which we contend as thf gift of
God and nature, remains equally to them all.
i If men who delight in cavilling mould fay, that great king-
doms are not to be regulated by the examples of fmall States,
I defire to know, when it was, that God ordained great nations
Should be Slaves, and deprived of all right to difpofe matters re-
lating to their government ; whilSt he left to fuch as had, or Should
divide themfelves into fmall parcels, a right of making fuch constitu-
tions as were moft convenient for them. When this is refolved, we
ought to be informed, what extent of territory is required to deferve
the name of a great kingdom. Spain and France are eSteemed great,
and yet the deputies or procuradores of the feveral parts of Caftile did
Vida de Car- m the cortez held at Madrid, in the beginning of Charles the Fifth's
los 5 de i)an " re ig Ilj excufe themfelves from giving the fupplies he deSired, becaufe
they had received no orders in that particular from the towns that
fent them ; and afterwards receiving exprefs order not to do it, they
gave his majeSty a flat denial. The like was frequently done during
the
Difcourfes concerning Government. 4^3
the reigns of that great prince, and of his fon Philip the Second. Sect. 4.4..
And generally thofe procuradores never granted any thing of import- l-^-y— *^
ance to either of them, without particular orders from their princi-
pals. The fame way was taken in France, as long as there were any
general afiemblies of eftates j and, if it do not ftill continue, it is be-
caufe there are none. For, no man who underftood the affairs of that
kingdom, did ever deny, that the deputies were obliged to follow
the orders of thofe w r ho fent them. And perhaps, if men would
examine by what means they came to be abolifhed, they might find,
that the cardinals de Richelieu and Mazarin, with other minifters
who have accomplifhed that work, were acted by fome other princi-
ple than that of juftice, or the eftablifhment of the laws of God
and nature. In the general affembly of eftates held at Blois in the
time of Henry the Third, Bodin then deputy for the third eftate of r^ Thuan
Vermandois, by their particular order, propofed fo many things as
took up a great part of their time. Other deputies alledged no other
reafon for many things faid and done by them, highly contrary to the
king's will, than that they were commanded to do fo by their fuperi-
ors. Thefe general alTemblies being laid aiide, the fame cuftom is
ftill ufed in the leffer alTemblies of eftates in Languedoc and Britany.
The deputies cannot, without the infamy of betraying their truft,
and fear of punifbment, recede from the orders given by their prin-
cipals; and yet we do not find, that " liberty with a mifchief ' is much
more predominant in France than amongfl us. The fame method is
every day praclifed in the diets of Germany. The princes and great
lords, who have their places in their own right, may do what they
pleafe : but the deputies of the cities mull: follow fuch orders as they
receive. The hiftories of Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and Bohemia,
teflify the fame thing : and if this " liberty with a mifchief" do not ftill
continue intire in all thofe places, it has been diminished by fuch means
as fuit better with the manners of pirates, than the laws of God
and nature. If England therefore do not ftill enjoy the fame, we
muft have been deprived of it either by fuch unjuftifiable means, or
by our own confent. But thanks be to God, we know no people
who have a better right to liberty, or have better defended it, than
our own nation. And if we do not degenerate from the virtue of
our anceftors, we may hope to tranfmit it intire to our pofterity.
Wc always may, and often do, give inftructions to our delegates ;
but the lefs we fetter them, the more we manifeft our own rights ;
for thofe who have only a limited power, muft limit that which they
give ; but he that can give an unlimited power, muft necefTarily have
it in himfelf. The great treafurer Burleigh faid, the parliament could
do any thing but "turn a man into a woman. Sir Thomas More,
when Rich folicitor to K. Henry the Vlllth afked him, if the parlia-
ment might not makeR. Rich king, faid, thatwas"cafuslevis," taking
it for granted that they might make or unmake whom they pleafed.
The firft part of this, which includes the other, is afferted by the fla-
tute of the 13th of Q. Elizabeth, denouncing the moft grievous
punifhments againft all fuch as mould dare to contradict it. But if
it be in the parliament, it muft be in thofe who give to parliament-
men
4^4- Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. Ill- men tne p owers hy which they act ; for before they are chofen, they
have none, and can never have any, if thofe that fend them had it
not in themfelves. They cannot receive it from the magiftrate ; for
that power which he has, is derived from the fame fpring. The power
of making and unmaking him cannot be from himfelf; for he that
is not, can do nothing ; and when he is made, can have no other power
than is conferred upon him by thofe that make him. He who de-
parts from his duty, defires to avoid the punifhment; the power there-
fore of punifhing him is not from hjmfelf. It cannot be from the
houfe of peers, as it is conftituted ; for they act for themfelves, and
are chofen by kings : and it is abfurd to think, that kings, who ge-
nerally abhor all reftriction of their power, mould give that to others
by which they might be unmade. If one, or more princes, relying
upon their own virtue and refolutions to do good, had given fuch a
power againft themfelves, as Trajan did, when he commanded the
prefect to ufe the fword for him, if he governed well ; and againft
him, if he governed ill ; it would foon have been refcinded by their
fucceflbrs. If our Edward the Firft had made fuch a law, his lewd
fon would have abolifhed it, before he would have fuffered himfelf
to be imprifoned and depofed by it. He would never have acknow-
ledged his unworthinefs to reign, if he had been tied to no other law
than his own will ; for he could not tranfgrefs that j nor have owned
the mercy of the parliament, in fparing his life, if they had acted
only by a power, which he had conferred upon them. This power
mull therefore be in thofe, who act by a delegated power ; and none
can give it to their delegates, but they who have it in themfelves.
The mod certain teftimony that can be given, of their unlimited
power, is, that they rely upon the wifdom and fidelity of their de-
puties, fo as to lay no reftrictions upon them : they may do what
they pleafe, if they take care, " ne quid detrimenti refpublica accipiat,
" that the commonwealth receive no detriment.'* This is a commiflion,
fit to be granted by wife and good men, to thofe they chufe through an
opinion, that they are fo alfo, and that they cannot bring any preju-
dice upon the nation, that will not fall upon themfelves, and their
pofterity. This is alfo fit to be received by thofe, who, feeking no-
thing, but that which is juft in itfelf, and profitable to their coun-
try, cannot forefee what will be propofed when they are all together ;
much lefs, refolve how to vote, till they hear the reafons on both fides.
The electors muft neceflarily be in the fame ignorance j and the law
which mould oblige them to give particular orders to their knights
and burgefles, in relation to every vote, would make the decifion of
the moft important affairs to depend upon the judgment of thofe,
who know nothing of the matters in queflion, and by that means
caft the nation into the utmoft danger of the moft inextricable con-
fufion. This can never be the intention of that law, which is " fanctio
" recta," and feeks only the good of thofe that live under it. The fore-
fight therefore of fuch a mifchief can never impair the liberties of
the nation, but eftablifh them,
SECT.
Difcourfes concerning Government. 4^5*
Sect. 45.
SECT. XLV.
The legiflative power is always arbitrary, and not to be
trufted in the hands of any who are not bound to obey
the laws they make.
IF it be objected, that I am a defender of arbitrary powers, I con-
fefs I cannot comprehend how any fociety can be eftablifhed or
fiibfift without them j for the eftablifhment of government is an ar-
bitrary act, wholly depending upon the will of men. The particu-
lar forms and confutations, the whole feries of the magiftracy, to-
gether with the meafure of power given to every one, and the rules
by which they are to exercife their charge, are fo alfo. Magna Char-
ta, which comprehends our antient laws, and all the fubfequent
ftatutes, were not fent from heaven, but made according to the will
of men. If no men could have a power of making laws, none
could ever have been maidej for all that are or have been in the world,
except thofe given by Cod to the Ifraelites, were made by them;
that "is, they have exercifed an arbitrary power in making that to be
law which was not, or annulling that which was. The various
laws and governments, that are or have been in feveral ages and pla-
ces, are the produd of various opinions in thofe who had the power
of making them. This muft neceflarily be, unlefs a general rule be
fet to all ; for the judgments of men will vary, if they are left to their
liberty ; and the variety that is found among them, mews they are
fubjecl: to no rule but that of their own reafon, by which they fee
what is fit to be embraced or avoided, according to the feveral cir-
cumftances under which they live. The authority that judges of
thefe circumftances is arbitrary, and the legillators {hew themfelves
to be more or lefs wife and. good, as they do rightly, or not rightly,
exercife this power. The difference therefore between good and ill
governments is not, that thofe of one fort have an arbitrary power
which the others have mot j for they all have it ; but that thofe which
are well conftituted, place this power fo as it may be beneficial to
the people, and fet fuch rules as are hardly to be tranfgrefTed ; whilft
thofe of the other fort fail in one or both thefe points. Some alfo
through want of courage, fortune, or ftrength, may have been op-
preffed by the violence of Grangers, or fuffer'd a corrupt party to
rife up within themfelve:s, and by force or fraud to ufurp a power
of impofing what they pleafed. Others, being fottifh, cowardly, and
bafe, have fo far erred in the foundations, as to give up themfelves
to the will of one or few men, who, turning all to their own profit Qf
pleafure, have been juft in nothing but in ufing fuch a people like
beafts. Some have placed weak defences againft the lufts of thofe
they have advanced to tlhe highelt places, and given them opportuni-
ties of arrogating more power to themfelves than the law allows.
5 Z Where
4<>6 Difcourfes concerning Government.
Chap. III. Where any of thefe errors are committed, the government may be
eafy for a while, or at leaft tolerable, whilft it continues uncorrupt-
ed ; but it cannot be lafting. When the law may be eafily or
fafely overthrown, it will be attempted. Whatever virtue may be
in the firfl magiftrates, many years will not pafs before they come to
be corrupted ; and their fucceffors, deflecting from their integrity, will
feize upon the ill-guarded prey. They will then not only govern by
will, but by that irregular will, which turns the jaw, that was
made for the public good, to the private advantage of one or few
men. 'Tis not my intention to enumerate the feveral ways that have
been taken to effect this ; or to fhew what governments have de-
flected from the right, and how far. But I think I may juftly fay,
that an arbitrary power was never well placed in any men, and their
fucceffors, who were not obliged to obey the laws they ihould make.
This was well underftood by our Saxon anceftors : they made
laws in their affemblies and councils of the nation ; but all thofe
who propofed or aifented to thofe laws, as foon as the aiTembly
was diffolved, were comprehended under the power of them, as well
as other men. They could do nothing to the prejudice of the na-
tion, that would not be as hurtful to thofe who were prefent, and
their pofterity, as to thofe who by many accidents might be abfent.
The Normans entered into, and continued in the fame path. Our par-
liaments at this day are in the fame condition. They may make
prejudicial wars, ignominious treaties, and unjuft laws : yet when
the feflion is ended, they muft bear the burden as much as others ;
and, when they die, the teeth of their children will be fet on edge with
the four grapes they have eaten. But 'tis hard to delude or corrupt
fo many : men do not in matters of the higheft importance yield
to flight temptations. No man ferves the devil for nothing : fmall
wages will not content thofe who expofe themfelves to perpetual in-
famy, and the hatred of a nation for betraying their country. Our
kings had not wherewithal to corrupt many till thefe laft twenty
years, and the treachery of a few was not enough to pafs a law.
The union of many was not eafily wrought, and there was nothing
to tempt them to endeavour it ; for they could make little advan-
tage during the feflion, and were to be loft in the mafs of the peo-
ple, and prejudiced by their own laws, as foon as it was ended.
They could not in a fhort time reconcile their various interefts or
paflions, fo as to combine together againft the public j and the
former kings never went about it. We are beholden to Hyde,
Clifford and Danby, for all that has been done of that kind. They
found a parliament full of lewd young men chofen by a furious peo-
ple in fpite to the puritans, whole feverity had diftafted them. The
weakeft of all minifters had wit enough to underftand, that fuch as
thefe might be eafily deluded, corrupted, or bribed. Some were fond
of their feats in parliament, and delighted to domineer over their
neighbours by continuing in them : others preferred the cajoleries of
the court before the honour of performing their duty to the coun-
try that employ 'd them. Some fought to relieve their ruined for-
tunes, and were moft forward to give the king a vaft revenue,
that
Difcourfes concerning Government. 497
that from thence they might receive pensions : others were glad of a Sect. 46,
temporary protection again!! their creditors. Many knew not what
they did when they annulled the triennial act ; voted the militia to
be in the king -, gave him the excife, cuftoms, and chimney-money ;
made the act for corporations, by which the greater!; part of the
nation was brought under the power of the worft men in it ; drunk
or fober pafs'd the five-mile act, and that for uniformity in the
church. This embolden'd the court to think of making parlia-
ments to be the inftruments of our flavery, which had in all ages
pail been the firmefl pillars of our liberty. There might have been
perhaps a pombility of preventing this pernicious mifchief in the
conftitution of our government. But our brave anceftors could
never think their pofterity would degenerate into fuch bafenefs to fell
themfelves, and their country : but how great foever the danger may
be, 'tis lefs than to put all into the hands of one man, and his mi-
niflers : the hazard of being ruined by thofe who mufl perifh with
us, is not fo much to be feared, as by one who may enrich and
ftrengthen himfelf by our deflruction. 'Tis better to depend upon
thofe who are under a pombility of being again corrupted, than up-
on one who applies himfelf to corrupt them, becaufe he cannot other-
wife accomplish his defigns. It were to be wifhed, that our fecuritv
were more certain ; but this being, under God, the befl anchor we
have, it deferves to be preferved with all care, till one of a more un-
questionable flrength be framed by the confent of the nation.
SECT. XLVL
The coercive power of the law proceeds from the autho-
rity of parliament.
"LJTAVING proved that proclamations are not laws, and that
* * the legiflative power, which is arbitrary, is trufted only in
the hands of thofe who are bound to obey the laws that are made,
'tis not hard to difcover what it is that gives the power of law to the
fanctions under which we live. Our author tells us, " that all ftatutes
'■ or laws are made properly by the king alone, at the rogation of the
<£ people, as his majefty king James of happy memory affirms in his true
53
S 2
What may be called fo improperly
Jacob adopted Ephraim and Manaffeh 72
Advancements, ought ever to be for the fake
of the publick, not of the man 64
Have oftentimes made people worfe 309,
310
Adverfary,whcm a vicious prince reckons fuch
213, 214
Adultery, brcame as common in Sparta, as in
any part of the w rid, and why 25 1
Cannot be dlfpenfed withal, even by the
pope himfclf 397
Affection- of the people, the prince's moft im-
portant trcafure 242
Agefilaus, his great archievements no, 111
His denial of Alexander to be greater than
he 276
Xenophon'i great character of him, and lor
what 296
Agreement?, the treachery of violating them,
aggravated bv perjury, vid. Contrails i~H
6 B Mad.'
The INDEX.
Made by king John of France, when pri-
foner at London, and Francis under the
fame circumftances at Madrid, reputed
null 234
A good man performs thero s though he is a
lofer by the bargain 327
The neceffity of ftanding to them from re-
ligion, and the law of nature 341
Between princes confirmed afterwards by
parliaments, iffc. 442
Agrippa (Menenius) appeafed one of the moil
violent feditions at Rome, and how 172
Ahab's growing hck on Naboth's refufing him
his vineyard 276
When his houfe was to be cut off 435
Alexander of Macedon, thought to be meant
by Ariftotle, for the man framed by nature
for a king 62. 64
His extravagant frolicks 108
His fortune overthrew his virtue 108. 1 1 1
His reign full of confpiracies 183
After his death the kingdom fell all to
pieces. 135
It is thought he died by poifon 13,-
Alexander of Epirus, in valour thought equal,
in power little inferior to him 169
Alfred, magna charta grounded upon his laws
12
Acknowledged he found and left this king-
dom perfectly free 408
Alienation, vide Dominion.
Allegiance, is fuch an obedience as the law
requires 414
Cannot relate to a whole nation 4 1 5
Alliances %\. 121
All things in their beginning are weak 165
Change by length of time 171
Altar, the horns of it no protection to wilful
murderers 295
AmbafTadors, from whence kings have their
right of fending them 394
Charles Guftavus, his excellent faying to one
400
From the Privernates, their brave and re-
folute anfwer to Plautius the conful, when
they were fuing for a peace 414, 415
From the eftates of Scotland, to queen Eli-
zabeth 435
Ambition, honeft and wife men expofe the
folly of it 52. 70
Can never give a right to any over the li-
berties of a whole nation 82
Tends to public ruin 137
Is the overthrow of Hates and empires 1 47,
148
Man naturally prone to it 148
What it prompts to 186
Has produc'd more mifchiefs than any other
defires and paflions 189
St. Ambrofe, feems to have na knowledge of
the Gothick polity 286
Anceftors, what we ought to do, if we will
be juft to them 420
Never thought their pofterity would fo de-
generate, as to fell themfelve.*, and their
country 457
By exerting their vigour we ftiall maintain
our laws 459
Angli, or Saxons; Tacitus's defcription of
their coming hither, and that they had the
root of power and liberty in themfelves 380,
381
Antiochus, his vain Loaft to ceftroy Greece
and Italy j 1 1
How foon he loft all he poiTuffed in Greece,
&c. 1 57
Apoftles, what their wo*k was in relation to
the civil ftate i8t
Appanages, in France to the king's brothers,
produced very bad effe&s 135. 23c
Or to their fons ; but they remain ltnl iub-
j eel; to the crown 235. 336
Appeals, the right of them to the people, 1 1 8,
li 9- H4- »79- 2 49
None from parliamentary decrees 1 76
To whom they were made,when there was in
Rome no fuperior magiftratein being 31 1
No pardoning a man condemned upon one
444
Arcana imperii, how to be meddled with 8,
9> 'o-
Arians, as cruel as the Pagans 109
Ariftocracy, what 23
For whom beft 61, 62
How fet up 67
Was the Jewilh government 96
Who patrons for it 154
The Lacedemonians for it 238
Whether it feems eftablifhed by nature 358
Ariftotle, flighted by Filmer 1 3
Commendation of him 59. 102
His notion of civil fecieties fo, 61. 65.
95. 230
Who he thought was framed by nature for
a king 62. 65
Wherein he highly applauds monarchy
102, 103
Thinks the firft monarchs were but little
reftrained, becaufe they were chefen
for their virtue 231
His diftindion between a king and a tyrant
278. 358
Who, he fays, are governed by God, ra-
ther than by men 316
Proves that no man is entrufted with an ab-
solute power 358
Armies, of the Eaft and Weft, fet up empe-
rors for theuifelves 114,115
Out of what fort of men, they are to be
formed 168
Vid. Mercenary and Soldiery
Arminius, killed for aiming at a crown, which
blemiflied all his other virtues 303. 381
Arms, thofe juft and pious that are ncceflary,
and thofe ncceflary when there was no hope
of fafety by any other way 436
Artaxerxes, and his army, overthrown by the
valour of 1 0000 Grecians no
Artificer, what fort of one he is, to whom
implicit faith is due g
Aflemblies, that took their authority from the
law of nature, confideied 80
General of the people 98, 99
The ufe of them 381, 382
Of the eftates in France, brought now to
nothing 136
Settled the crown on Pepin 193
What they ought to fee performed 236
Had the power always of the whole people
in them 289
In them none judge for theuifelves 3 1 2
The greatefl truft that can be, was ever re-
poled in the in 378
Jr.coH-
The INDEX.
463
Inconfiflent with the abfolute Sovereignty of
kings t 3^5
Refufed giving fupplies to their kings in
Spain and France, without orders from
their principals 453
Affyrians, vide Eaftern natiions.
That empire wholly abollifhed on the death
of BeKhazzar 107
Their valour irrefiflible under Nebuchad-
nezzar 1 66
Little more known of them than from
Scripture 185
Athaliah more ready to cry out treafon than
David j 74. Deftroyed the king's race,
and by whom herfelf vva.s killed 183. vide
Queen
Athens, its government not fo much approved,
as that of Sparta 139
Banifhed fome worthy men, and put others
to death 14°
The cruelty of the thirty/ tyrants there 141
As much inclin'd to war izs Rome 160
The thirty tyrants deftroyed by Thrafybu-
lus 175
Their ouracifm proceeded folely from fear
228
Was not without laws when fhe had kings
308
Athletic habit, what 1 20
Attila, called the fcourge of God, and gloried
in the name 321
Avarice, the evil efFecls of it 52
Auguftus, Rome's longeft peace under his
reign 123
What happened in it 125
Was worfe in the beginning than latter end
of his reign 126
Had thirty mercenary legiions to execute hi;
commands 360
Whether he truly deferved to be called the
head of the Romans 430
The name of Auguftus is a title belonging
to the German emper. r at this day 404
Auftria, Spain after many revolutions came to
this houfe 170
Princes of this houfe pretend to know their
original 332
The German empire caime to Rodolphus
of this name about 300 years ago 333
What claim this houfe hais to the crown of
France _ 337
Authors of great revolutions, their aims 146
Axioms in law are evident to common fenfe,
and nothing to be taken for one that is
not fo 370
B.
BAbel, vide Nation?.
Babylonian kings, wha t right is pretended
to be in them 32, 33
Monarchy ruled by force, the ftronger turn-
ing out the weaker 106, 107
How its pride fell 113,114
Little more known of its monarchy, than
from Scripture 185
Babylon and Sufa trembled at the motion of
the Grecian arms 206
There were a people there before Nimrod
was king 362
Balance of power, where and how it is broken
419, 420
Nations have fuffered extremely through
want of this prudence in rightly balan-
cing, cifr. 434
In what manner power fhould be balanced,
for the advantage and fervice of the itate
446
Banilhment, not above five or fix men fuffered
unjuftly in the Roman government, in the
fpace of about 300 years 120
The temporary of the Athenians, never ac-
counted as a punifhment 139, 140
Camillus recalled from it, and afterward?
honoured 141
Barbarorum regna 230
Baron, the extent of the name 386. 390
Baronagium, what 79. 387
Bartholomew de las Cafas (a Spanifh bifhop)
his admirable faying concerning the office
of a king 40
Baffompierre, his faying about Rochel 219
Baftards, thofe children can inherit nothing 88
Declared with relation to crowns 90. 340
Advanced before legitimate brethren 132.
335
In fome places wholly excluded 188
Beggars of a king to Samuel, fuch as would
not be denied ioi
Parliaments no beggars 325
Belial, who his fons 103
Bellarmine's tenents 7. 15, 16, 17. 23
Eenjamite?, how they proceeded in preparing
for their defence 100, ioi
Beft men, content with a due liberty under the
protection of a juft law 152. 34.3, 344
Have ever been againft abfolute monarchy
'54
Defpifcd, hated, and marked out for deftruc-
tion 218. 344.
Have their affections and paffions, and are
fubject to be milled by them 230. 356
Were fo efteemed, who deftroyed tyranny
278
Whom they had need to fear 293, 294
Can never wholly divert themfelves of paf-
fions and affections 366
Birthright gives a right to fovcrcign dominion
86
Some have been accufed of fuppofititious
births 340
Bifhops, the king's power in making them 2 1 1
What words of fervitude are faid to be in-
troduced by them among us 303
Blake, the terror his fleet ftruck every-where
222
Blood, by God's law, that man's is to be fhed,
who fheds another's 290
The neareft in blood fet afide, when it was
thought more convenient to advance
others 334, 335
Boccalini, the princes of Europe angry with
him, for his definition of a tyrant, vid. 1
cent. Advertifement 76. 230
Bought and fold, how places come to be fo
203. 20;
Senates and people cannct fo eafily be 204,
205
Bourbon, Henry of that name, not admitted to
the crown till he abjured his religion, and
promifed to rule by law 234
Bracton,
464
The INDEX.
Braflbn, his words, " Omnes fub eo, & ipfe
" fub nullo, &c." how to be underftood
289, 290
What he calls " Efie fub lege" 310. 315
What, he fays, the king is obliged to do by
his oath 373, 374
His laying 'about evil or unskilful judges
374
Brethren, all fo by nature 26
Nature abhors a difference in fpecie between
them 72
Where a fraternal equality continued 76
Are equals 84
What advanced fome above the reft 97
The governed fo called, by their magi-
ftrates 429
Bribery, natural to courts 145, 146. 200, 201
Seeks the largeft bidder 166
Cannot corrupt, where virtue is preferred
201, 202
The way to prevent it 204, 205
A noble perfon turned out of a confiderable
office, as a fcandal to to the court, for
being an enemy to this vice 204
Parliaments not fo eafily to be prevailed upon
456
Britain, fhamefully loft 124
Kings impofed upon the Britons by the Ro-
man?, and to what end 254. 374
Severe afiertors of their liberties 363. 380
Though they chofe commanders in their
wars, yet they kept the government in
themfelves 380
Ever had their great councils to determine
their moft important affairs 381, 382
Brutus found it dangerous to be thought wife,
and why 179. 190
Eftablifhed liberty, and the confulate, toge-
ther 349
Buchanan, joined to Doleman 6
His character of king James III. 233
Concerning the violation of the laws of
Scotland 314
Burgundy, continued in Hugh Capet's eldeft
fon Robert, and his defendants for ten
generations 337
C^Efar, of giving him his due 11.283
Julius fubverted all order, by invading
the fupreme magiftracy by force 1 1 4. 1 34.
283, 284. 428
Worfe thanTarquin 137
By what means he fet up his tyranny 145.
. 2 75
Scarce any prince had fo many good qualities,
till they were extinguished by ambition
147
Defigned to make himfelf a tyrant 150
Thought all things lawful, when the con-
fulate was denied him 187
When the power of the Romans was ex-
preffed by this name 283
Had a diadem offered him by Mark An-
tony 302
How obfervant he was of his word, when
taken by pirates 326
The flate of the Roman empire after his
ufurpation 351
Auguftus's power not given, but ufurped
360, 361
Julius, what account he gives of our affairs
here 363, 380
When, if ever, fear entered into his heart
381
Cafar?, never called kings till the 6th age of
chriftianity 404
Julius, in defpair would have killed himfelf
427
Cain, had no dominion over his brethren after
Adam's death 68, 69
From whence his fear (that every man would
flay him) proceeded 253
Caligula, his wifh that the people had but one
neck 13. 58. 179. 210. 430
A monfter of mankind 31. 32. 312
His making love to the moon 50
His expedition, when he faid, he had fub
dued the fea 1 24
Valerius Afiaticus appeafed the guards, by
faying, he wiftied he had been the man
had killed him 181. 313
Murdered by his own guards 184
Affected the title of being called god, which
Claudius Cssfar, calls " turpem caii in-
" faniam" Z27. viJ. 302
Whofe minifter he might be faid to be 299
Said of him, that no man ever knew a bet-
ter fervant, nor a worfe mailer 308
Wherein he placed his fovereign majefty 352
Calvin, his opinion of the government infti-
tued by God 96. 99
Camden, his credit forfeited by a great num-
ber of untruths 386
Campus Martius, was the land that belonged
to the kings of Rome (not above ten acre<=)
afterwards conlecrated to Mars 276
Cardinals, the refpeft paid them, who have
the power of chuiing popes 7 3
Carthage, how (lie grew to that excefs of
power, that only Rome was able to over-
throw 128
One of the moft potent cities in the world
162
Caftile, the lords thereof, had no other title
for many ages than that of count, which
was afterwards changed to that ot king,
without any addition to the power 405
Concerning the ltates thereof erring 425
Catiline, his temper 1 29
One of the lewdeft men in the world 145
" Ceffet proceffus," faid to be annexed to the
perfon of the king 443
Ceylon, an ifland in the Eaft-Indies, where
the king knows no law but his own will 448
Change, of government, no proof of irregu-
larity or prejudice to it, by thofe that have
right " II7-I37
Nothing found more orderly 132
A mortal one in root and principle 1 34, 1 35
In government unavoidable 1 36
What changes deferve praife 137
Where the wifdom of it is fhewn 137
Where they are requiiite lometimes 366
What are for the worfe 419
Charter of liberty, not from men, but from
God
407
Parliaments interpofed their authority in
thefe matters 423
Chatham,
The I N.D-E X.
4 6 5
Chatham, the city of London's cdread, at the
Dutch fleet's burning our fhips s there 1 65
Cheat of Mario Chigi, brotheer of Alexan-
der VII. upon the Tale of corn 1 208
Child or children, a wife one, lEccl. iv. 13.
29. 50. (93. 224. 287
Their duty is perpetua^. 68. . 250,251.255
Of God and of the devil 55. 58
If children, then heirs 7 1
Wo to thee, O land, when tfchy king is a
child 7 2 -9 2
On what account children ares admitted to
rale 92
What underftood by the word < child 93
They do not always prove like 1 their parents
2205. 314,315
Children, the danger of havingg them to be
kings 224
The law gives them relief agaiiinft the feve-
rities of their parents 254
Were punifhed with death, and i for what 254
Chriftianity has been fplit into vaariety of opi-
nions ever fmce it was preachecd 163
The firft profeflbrs were of thee meaneft of
the people 298
St. Paul's work wasto preferve • the profeflbrs
of it from errors concerning ; the flate 298
Sufficiently proved to be antiennt, if proved
to be good and true 364
Cities confift of equals 60, 61. 65
What makes them free 407
Cives, vide Incola?.
Civil war, vide War.
Cleanthe.% his philosophical repHy to Afiftip-
pus, about flattery 202
Clergy, the veneration our anceeftors had for
them 385
Collector?, their extertions 207
Commanders, after the captivity,, who thought
moft fit 28
Of armies, who belt tobemaade fo 61
The beft among the Greeks anad Romans in
their times, would not knovw how to ma-
nage an army now 418,419
Where they have been put to c death for mil-
behaviour, &c. 424
Commands of a mafter, how far f the fervam is
bound to obey them, &c. 346, 347
Com million, from God, what 56
They who hereby grant authoority, do al-
ways retain more than they - give 422.454
Comitia centunata, what 309
Commons, whether they had a ppart in the go-
vernment 383, 384
Always had a place in the counncils that ma-
naged it 385
Many of them, in antiquity aand eminency,
little inferior to the chief cof the titular
nobility 385. 389
The rations ftrength and virtuee in them 389
How all things have been brouught into the
king's and their hands 420
Yet never can be united to the ( court 420
Haverefufed to give their opinnions in many
cafe% till they had confultecd with thole
that fent them 424
Commonwealths, for what end innflituted 3
All the regular kingdoms in time world are lo
23. 62
Of Italy, not without valour annd virtue 127
How they feek peace and war 1 ; 9, 160
Commonwealths, whether better to conftitute
one for war or trade 161
Another fort compofed of many cities aflbci-
ated together, and living " aequo jnre"
162
Seldom advance women, children, or fuch-
like, to the fupreme power 198
In them all men fight for themfelves 199
When the laws are abolifhed, the name alfo
ceafes 1 99
Lefs flaughter in thefe, than in abfolute
kingdoms 206
Of Greece and Italy, why called nurferies
of virtue 209
Juftice very well adminiflred in them 292
How they may be faved from ruin 42 1
Competitors, Sovereigns do impatiently bear
them 21
Where their own fwords have decided their
difputes 174. 189
Contefts between them relating to the
crown, are often very bloody 191. 193.
195, 196, 197, 199
Compulfion ; he that will fuffer himfelf to be
compelled, knows not how to die 301
Conqueft, what is fo called 24, 25
William I. had the name of conqueror odi-
oufly given to him 82
The extent thereof not the only thing to be
confidered 123, 124
Some commonwealths hereby defigned to en-
large their territories 160
Some conquerors never deferved the name
of ufurpers 291
The king cannot difpofe of a conquered
conntry, becaufe it is annexed to the
office 394
It is the people that conquer, not any one
man by his own ftrength 4O3
Confcience, how it ought to be regulated 300
Confent general, to refign part of their liberty
for the good of all, is the voice of na-
ture 13. 24. 151
Firft conferred power 20, 21. 23. 37. 76.
91, 92
Government arifes from it 38, 39. 75. 83.
245, 246
The right of magiftrates eflentially depend*
upon it 83, 84. 230. 332. 356. 362
None to tyrannies 83, 84
No complete lawful power without it 85,
91. 155. 175
Of the three eitates in many places required,
to pafs a law 239
Whatfoever proceeds not from it, muft be
de fac~to only 403
Conftantine the Great, with what blood he
was polluted 190, 241
His power kept up hereditary, but with ex-
treme confufion and diforder 246
Constitutions of every government to whom
referred 27
Human fubject to corruption, and therefore
to be reduced to their firft principles 1 17
Where new ones are neceflarily required
136
That the bed, which is attended with the
leait inconveniences 142
Who endeavours the fubverflon ot* them
153. 420
Of commonwealths various 159, r6o. 401
6 C Cor,-
466
Tlie INDEX.
Confutations, of the Northern nations that
invaded the Roman empire 1 6 1
The temper of that of the United Pro-
vinces . 1 64
Good ones remain, though the authors of
themperilh 167
The falutary ones made by men, God ap-
proves and ratifies 294
Of a (late aims at perpetuity 307
Are made for and by the people 349
What the imperfections of all human con-
ftijutions 365
Our antient has been wholly inverted 389
"What are moft to be commended 41 7. 434
Of no value, if there be not a power to fup-
port them 417,418
Confuls, made of plebeians, how feldom cho-
fen, and with what prudence 117, 118
Reprefented kings, and were veiled with
equal power 131. 133. 249. 304.409
Were created after the expullion of Tarquin
137.241
Strangers raifed to that honour 1 60
Though fupreme in power, yet fubjett to
the people 176. 249. 274
Marius continued five years in the office 241
Only for a year 249
Title of dread fovereign, might juflly have
been given to them 409
If they grew infolent, how they might be
reduced 418
Contrails, how framed between nations and
theirkings 256.267,268.414,415
Vid. Judges, Nations, Original.
Entered into by princes before their invefti-
ture 297
The breaking them, overthrow* all focieties
326
In writing, faid to be invented only to bind
villains, and why 326
All are mutual, and whoever fails of his
part difcharges the other 329
Contrariorum contraria eft ratio 299
Controversies with other nations, the decifion
of them left to judges chofen by mutual
agreement 238
Coriolanus duly condemned by the Romans
140
Corcnation-oath 85, 86. 91, 92
Norman kings obliged to take it 288
How far our kings are obliged to obferve it
322, 323. 325. 327, 328, 329. 372. 410
Corporations, or bodies politic, what 'places
were thought fit by the king and council
to be made fo 423
Corruption, natural to courts, inftances given,
lie. 145. 149. 200, 201
Of miniflers in foreign courts 156
The effeft of that which proceeds from the
government in particular inftances 170.
439
Of a people tends to tyranny 1 82
Makes princes titles good, and how 185
Where it certainly moft abounds 200, 201.
203
Muft always be oppofed by free govern-
ments, and why 201, 202
The bafeft, but moft lucrative traffick 202
In the head, muft neceflarily diffufe into
moft of the members of the common-
wealth. 204. 221
Corruption, ajuft prince.tr.nt will hear his peo-
ple's complaints himfelf, prevents it 204
Rooted in the very principle of abfolute mo*
narchy, which cannot fubfift without it
205
Mankind naturally propenfe to it 27$
Of j udgment proceeds from private paffions
312
Of members of parliament 456
Counfellors, made choice of according to the
temper of the prince 10. 215. 319, 320
Signify little to an abfolute monarch 157.
170
In the multitude of them, generally is
fafety 424
Whether thofe of the king are expofed to
punifhments, and for what 444.459
Council of feventy chofen men 98
God's counfels are impenetrable '113
A wife and good one cannot always fupply
the defects, or correct the vices, of a
young or ill-difpofed prince 319
Where it is of no uiie, unlefs princes are
obliged to follow it 320
Of Toledo, what it made the prince to
fwear before he was placed in the royal
feat 338
Of what perfons it anciently confided 386.
• . , , 4 Z 3
General, how exprefted antiently by authors
391
When the boldeft are mod fafe 434
The king is obliged to aft, " cum mag-
*' natum & fapientum confilio" 444
He can fpeak only by their advice, and eve-
ry man of them is with his head to an-
fvver for the advice he gives 459
Council-table, the proceedings and jurifdic-
tion of it regulated by 1 7 Car. I. cap. x.
37*
Courtiers, what things are infeparable from
their lives 202
Their phrafe is, to make as much profit of"
their places as they can 203
A wife prince's faying to fome about him
of fuch 204
Wherein their art confifts 212.446
The modern ones, by their names and titles,
what they are apt to put us in mind of 385
When they fpeak moft truth 410
Of Philip III. and IV. of Spain, their fot-
tifhnefs 421,422
Cowards, the cruelleft of men 227
Crown, how the Englifh became hereditary
&8. 90
Changed from one family to another by the
eftatesof the realm 132. 250. 335,
, 3 36.378,379
Comprehends all that can be grateful to the
moft violent and vicious 186
Hereditary or elective, it has its defects 205
The S:artan tranfported into nine feveral
families 232
Of France, is from the people 235. 336,
337
Where none would accept it, but fuch as
did not deferve it 241
Arminius flain for aiming at one 303
Of England, upon what conditions accepted
327, 328
Crown
The INDEX,
467
Crown, five different manners of difpofing
crowns, efteem'd hereditary 330
Of Spam not fixed in a line, but difpofed of
as the nobility and people thought fit
334» 355
Many and bloody contefts for one 356.411,
412
The demefnes of it cannot be alienated 394
Tr.e parliament's power of giving and taking
it away 4*3
Some have feared the luftre of it 433
He that wears it cannot determine the af-
fairs which the law refers to the king
441- 443
Curio, by corruption made an inftrument of
m (chief, who had been an eminent fup-
porter of the laws 147
Caftom. the authority of it, as well as of law,
confifts only in its rectitude 364
The various ones ufed in elections 423
Hao its beginning and continuance from the
oniverfal confent of the nation 445
The reafon why we pay cuftoms 458
D.
DAvid, the mod reverend king, had his
polterity deprived, and his kingdom at
!aft came to the Afmonean race 28
Chofen and anointed king by the tribe of
judah 92. 261
Slew the fons of Rimmon, and why 92
Not without his infirmities and punifh-
ments 107
Who were his followers, notwithstanding
thejuiticeof his caufe 183. 261
His affe&ion towards his people 254
His refilling of Saul, without afluming the
power of a king 259, 260
How his heart fmote him when he had cut
off Saul's fkirt 260
His war with Saul, how grounded 260
There were many rebellions againft him 262
How he feared men more than God 272
Why he commanded Solomon, not to fufter
Joab to go the grave in peace 295
Wife as an angel of God 425
Death of no eminent Roman, except one, for
a long time 1 1 8
Citizens to be condemned in public, by the
Roman law 144
OfBarnevelt, and de Wit 164
Often the reward of fuch ferviccs, as can-
not be fufficiently valued 190
Of the neareft relations, " regnandi caufa "
190
The bitternefs of it, how z 11 waged 24 3
Very few fufFered in Sparta for above 800
years 296
Decemviri, only for a year 134
For two years 3 1 1
To regulate the law 137. 308
Patricians favoured them 172
Proceeded againft as private men, when
they continued beyond their time 176
Ufed with great gentlenefs 199
The Romans eafily beaten under them 220
The power given to them, " iir.e provoca-
'* done," was only in private cafes 311
Decermviri, why the people defiroyed both their
powder and them 3 1 f
Decificon of the mod difficult matters, antient-
ly leeft to the priefts in all countries 438
In England, where made by judges and ju-
riies, and where by parliaments 444,445
Defenice, all terminates in force 168,169
Whiether better .for every man tp ftand in his
own defence, than to enter into focieties
179, 180
Of one's felf, natural 267. 281,282
Delatores. See Roman empire 115
Delegrated perfons, their powers to whom re-
ferred 78, 79, 80
In general aflemblies 8 1
Honv binding the afts of fuch are to the
vwhole nation 83
Whiere the king afts by this power 444
Cam have no power but what is conferred on
tihem by their principals 450
Honv thofe in the United Piovinces, and in
Switzerland, are ufed 45 1
Dejputies of Caftile refufed. in the cortez,
tco gives Charles V. the fupplies he defi-
ned, and why 452
Deliverers of their countries from oppreffions,
hovw they have been efteemed in all ages 1 1
Whiat gifts God bellowed on them 29. 97.
105. 113
Oftcen rewarded with inheritances 78
Th 4 2 4
Elective kingdoms 335
Elizabeth, queen, her government, not with-
out fome mixture of blood 197
What power made her capable of the fuc-
ceffion 34 j. 397
Her character and failings 355
The earl of Morton fern ambaflador to her
by the eftates of Scotland, to juitify their
proceeding? agair.lt queen Mary 43^
F.:i..a.
The INDEX.
469
Eliz. none fo much imitated Henry V. as fhe 462
Eminent, the moft, ought only to be advanced
to places of public truft and dignity 38.
66,67
Moft obnoxious to betaken off 119. 143.
212, 213
Are moft feared 189. 192
When thefe are moft impatient 192, 193
The pillars of every ftate 192
Emperors, Roman, three or four, and at one
time thirty, who called themfelves by this
name l 3S
Endeavoured to make their power hereditary
246
The height of their regal majefty 264, 265
St. Auftin's and Ulpian's faying, that they
were fubject to no law, and why 287.
354
Some foully polluted themfelves with inno-
cent blood 299
The title never folemnly affumed by, nor
conferred on them 302, 303
Theodofius confeft, it was the glory of a
good one to own himfelf bound by laws
354
The prefent one in Germany, an account of
him 4 2 6
Empire, grounded on the pope's donation 40
Gained by violence is mere tyranny 86. 88
Acquired by virtue, cannot long be fupport-
ed by money 1 1 5
The calamities which the Roman fuffered
137
Settled in Germany 194
What made Dioclefian to renounce the em-
pire 200
Under what fort of governors it was ruin-
ed 217, 218. 246
Of the world divided between God and
Caefar 346
Not obliged by any ftipulation of the empe-
ror without their confent 442
Enafting laws, continued in the people of
Rome 118. 123
Enemy of a nation, who 39. 175. 209. 213
Every man is a foldier againft him 17;
Who the moft dangerous to fupreme ma-
gistrates 180. 341
Who is fo to all that is good 201
Who is fo to virtue and religion, is an ene-
my to mankiud 210. 212
Thofe that know they have fuch abroad, en-
deavour to get friends at home 280
Sycophants the vvoiit enemies 322. 462
How a king declares he has none when he
comes to the crown 357
A prince that feeks affirtance from foreign
powers, is fo 43°
England, how the crown became hereditary 88
The ftate of it fince the year 1660. 130
How, and when the glory of our arms was
turned into fhame 167
How the fucceffion of her kings has been
189.379
Her wars with France merely upon contefts
for the crown 1 95
Hermiferies by our civil contefts 196, 197
When her reputation and power was at a
great height 222
Whether our kings were ever proprietor, of
all the kinds 272
England, the naked condition of our anceftors
1 upon Ca?far's invafion 281
Hais no diclatorian power over her 283
Ever a free nation, and chofe her own kings
327, 328. 391
Maide her own laws 380, 381. 391
Wte know little of the firft inhabitants, but
wvhat is involved in fables and obfeurity
3 6 3
Tine great number of our laws make them
iinconvenient 339
Wfherein fhe ought to be compared with
Rome 374
Bratve in William I's time, when fhe faw
rher laws and liberties were in danger 375
Whiat has coft her much blood, and has been
t:he caufe of our late difficulties 379
Ouir fecurity, the belt anchor we have, ought
tco be preferved with all care 457
Thte general impairing of her, may be dated
frrom the death of Henry V. 460
Epamiinondas, forfeiture of his life (though
favesd) for ferving his country longer than
the time limited 1 yS
Ephor.-i, eftablifhed to reftrain the power of
kings 87. 232. 378
Whien they were created 432
Equaliity, in all by nature 5. 7. 15. 36. 60.
358.436,437
Juftc among equals 62
Civril fociety compofed of equals 68
Leaigues do not imply abfolute equality be-
tween parties 92
Whiere it is hard to preferve a civil equa-
liity 121
Popular, to what it is an enemy 182
Of right, what is called liberty 244
Kinigs under this law with the reft of the
pjeople 263
Equials cannot have a right over each other
. 4o6. 437
No nation can have an equal within itfelf
438
Error, all fubjeel to it 120. 141. 173. 214
Discovered by the difcourfe of a wife and
gcood man 198
By iit popular governments may fometimes
lnurt private perfons 210
A poilite people may relinquifh thofe of their
amceftors, which they have been guilty of
im the times of their ignorance 364
Woiuld be perpetual, if no change were ad-
mitted 366
Wrwere they are in government, though it
rmay be eafy for a while, yet it cannot be
laifting 456
Efcheattof the crown for want of an heir 41,
42
Eftates of the realm divided the kingdom of
France _ 235.336,337
The:ir power in voting 239
Have difpofed of crowns as they pleafed
306, 307. 336, 337. 378. vide
Parliarments, Affemblies general. 400, 401
Evil, \what is fo of itfelf, by continuance is
madie worfe, and on the firft opportunity is
jufthy to be abolifhed 380
Eucropnus, when a flave, picked pockets, &c.
but, when a miniller, he fold cities, Sec. 203
Excomtmunication denounced on the violators
off magna c liar ta 324
6 D F.
47°
The INDEX.
F.
FAbius Maximus one of the greateft and bed
of men that ever Rome produced 1 19
Fabius Quintus, in danger of his life for fight-
ing without order, though he gained a fig-
nal vittory 4° 9
Factions about regal power and fucceflion, how
to be prevented 1 89
The convulfions they make 191 . 195*. 420
Of the Guelphs and Ghibelins 208
Virtue and vice were made the badges of
them 214, 215
Faith, implicit, to whom it belongs 8, 9. 344
Families, none antienter than other, and why
49
What required to make a complete one 68
When our anceftors fent to feek a king in
one of the meaneft of them in Wales 190
None that does not often produce weak, ig-
norant, or cruel children 305, 306
Famous men for wifdom, virtue , and good go-
vernment H5- l S*> x 53- l68
Have eyes, and will always fee the way they
go ' 344
Fathers, the power of fatherhood belongs only
to a father 22, 23. 48, 49. 54
Cruel princes no fathers of their country
38,39. 278,279. 320,321
Their characters indelible 48. 54. 60
Adoption of them abfurd 50, 51, 52, 53,54
Who deferve the obedience due to natural
parents 5 1
By ufurpation 56. 78
The fifth commandment how explained 57
Who has the light of fathers 67, 68
Whenitceafes 68.74
Embrace all their children alike 7 2
There is a fort of tyrant that has no father
3 21
Favourites, not always the belt of men 51,52
Their influence over princes 109, 1 10
Whom the monarch commonly makes fdch
201
How their exorbitant defiresare gratified 246
Fauftina, two of them, who by their afcen-
dency tarnifhed the glory of Antoninus
Pius, and Marcus Aurelius 200
Fear, what it tranfports a wicked man to do
227
Renders communities gentle and cautious 208
Puts people on defperate courfes 241
What is the meafure of it to that magiflrate
who is the minifter of God 296
When, if ever, faid to enter Caefar's heart
381
Felicity, man's, where placed 5, 6
Females, vide Women.
Excluded from all ofiices in the common-
wealth 331
Figurative expreffions, all have their ftiength
only from fimilhude 408
Filmer, his right of all kings 3, &c 96, 97,
98
Takes the world to be the patrimouy of one
man 3, 4. 226
Ufes not one argument but what is falfe,
nor cites one author but whom he has
perverted or abufed 5.317
And his partifane, why referved to this age
8, 376
Filmer, his bufuiefs i- to overthrew liberty
and truth 8. 460
His bitter malice againft England 1 1
Makes God the author of democracy 14
His lord paramount over ciiildrens children
to all generations 17, 18, 19
His opinion, to whom all kings are reputed
next heirs 30
Where his kingly power efcheats on inde-
pendent heads of families 4 1 . 49
His adoption of fathers of provinces for
what 52
His notion, that we muft regard the power,
not the means by which it is gained 53.
77,78 .174.258, 259. 353
His diftinclion between " eligere" and " in-
" flituere" 84,8?
His vile abufing of the reverend Hooker 86.
His notion of begging a king 92
Abfolute monarchy to be the nurfery of
virtue 104
Attributing order and {lability to it 104.139
Imputing much bloodfhed to Rome's popu-
lar government 120
His backdoor, fedition and faftion 132, 133
His opinion, that the worft men in Rome
thrived belt 138. 141
That the nature of all people is to defire
liberty without reftraint 151,
His cypher of the form of mixed govern-
ments 154, 155
That there is a neceflity upon every people
to chufe the worlt men, for being moll
like themfelves 167
His defcription of the tumults of P.cmc 1 99
Affirms that more men are {lain in popular
than abfolute governments 206
The extent of his cruelties of a tyrant 210
His attributing ignorance and negligence to
popular governments 215
His notion, that the vijtues and wifdom of
a prince fupply all diitempers of a ftate
223
That there is no fuch tyranny as that of a
multitude 226
That kings muft be abfolute 229, 230
His notion of a king's ceafing to be fo 229.
237
His whimfy about democracies 23^
That all the people's liberties flow from the
gracious conceflion of princes 242. 271
That there is no coming at a king, if he
break his contract with his people 247
That a father of a family, governs it by no
other law than his own will 251
That patient obedience is due both to kings
and tyrants 251
That there were kings, before any laws were
made 252
That Abraham, Ifaac, Jacob, and Mofes,
were kings 265
That Samuel, by telling what a king would
do, inftructtd the people what they were
to fufFer 266. 268
That inconveniencies and mifchiefs are
fome of the eflentials of kingly govern-
ment 270
That all laws are the mandates of kings 271
His ridiculous faying, thofe that will have
a king 274
Filmer.
The INDEX.
47i
Fihner, that the Jews did not a{k a tyrant of
Samuel 277
That the people's cries are not always an
argument of their living under a tyrant
.2/9
That our Saviour limits and diftinguifhes
royal power 283
That the tribute Cacfar impofed was all their
coin 284
Cites Braclon, as a patron of the abfolute
power of kings 290
That St. Paul's higher powers meant only a
monarch that carries the fword, &c. 292
That kings are not bound by the pofitive
laws of any nation 300. 317
That the original of laws was to keep the
multitude in order 305
That laws were invented for every particular
fubjeft to find his prince's pleaiure 309
That kings are above the laws 3 1 2
His opinion when princes degenerate into
tyrants 314
That tyrants and conquerors are kings and
fathers 3 1 7
That the king fwears to obferve no laws, but
fuchasin his judgment are upright, &c.
322
That kings are not obliged by voluntary
oaths, &c. 325
His principles animadverted on 330, 331
That obedience is due to a command, though
contrary to law 345
That the king's prerogative to be above the
law, is only for the good of them that are
under it 348
His equivocal king 35 '
His opinion, that the law is no better than
a tyrant 356
That a perfeft kingdom, wherein the king
rules by his own will 358
That the firfl power was the kingly in this
nation 361
That all judges receive their authority from
the king 369
That the power of kings cannot be retrained
by aft of parliament 376
That the king is the author, corrector, and
moderator of both llatute and common
law 379
His trivial conceits about parliaments, the
time when they began, &c. 379. 383,384
His notion about ufurpers, and lawful kings
39 6
Th.it the liberties claimed in parliament are
liberties of grace from the king, and not
of nature to the people 399
That the people's language is fubmiflive to
the king, but his is haughty to them 409
That kings may call anddillblve parliaments
at pleafure 421
Admires the profound wifdom of all kings
424
A bitter enemy to all mankind 447, 448
His book here lately reprinted, as an intro-
duction to a popilh iuccelTor 448
His meaning of" le roy le veut"458,459,46o
Flatterers, what the vileil of them dare not
deny 10
What called by Tacitus 127
The Hebrew kings not without them 1 S3
Flatterers, their pernicious advices to what end
given 186
Weak princes moll fubjett to them 192.
200. 203. 219
Cleanthes's faying to Ariftippus 202
By what handle they lead their princes 212
Have made valour ridiculous 221
By whom thought the beft friends, and moft
worthy of great trulls 344
The author's wifh, that princes would ab-
hor thefe wretches 374
Almoft ever encompafs crowned heads 446
Fleets, when ours were very famous 222
Florence, the feditions there, and in Tufcany
208
More depopulated now than any part of that
province, though formerly, in a few hours,
it could bring together 135000 well arm-
ed men 208. 349
Folly ; mankind does not univerfally commit,
and perpetually perfifl in any 42
Some are fools at 40 years of age 224
Lord chancellor Egerton faid he did not fit
to relieve fools 327
Force, where it is the only law that prevails
107
What the Romans gained by the valour of
their forces 1 24
All defence terminates therein 165. 237
Thofe that ufe it, mull perfedl their wor k,or
perifh 173
Or fraud, in oppofition to the laws of one's
country, is abfolutely monarchical 199
When the Spartan kings were overthrown
by it 232
Is generally mortal to thofe that provoke it
237
To be ufed, when there is no help in the
law ^ 241.306.435
Can never create a right 245. 256. 403
The French under a force they are not able
to refill 271, 272
What is gained by it may be recovered the
fame way 332. 403
When all difputes about right naturally end
in lorce 417
Forfeiture of liberty, how it can be 406
Fortune, of all things the moft variable 113
How right is made a fiave to it 189, 190
Of a prince, fupplies all natural defedts 223
France, the falic law there 47. 89. 330,331
Her antient kings right how conferre d on
them, and what was her antient govern-
ment 88. 396
Her revenge on England, for all the over-
throws fhe received from our anceflors
130
Frequently divided into feveral parties 135
Her races of kings four times wholly changed
136. 191, 192. 224. 234
The miferable condition of her people 155.
192, 193. 221, 222. 416. 458, 459
Her greatell advantages have been by the
miftaken counfels of England 156
Her bloody conteft and (laughters for the
crown 191, 192, 193, 194, 195
Had ten bafe and flothful kings, called, "les
" roys faineans" 192. 224
The regal power limited 194. 233
Had four king? depofed within 150 years 194
France,
47 l
The INDEX.
France, civil wars frequent there, though not
fo cruel as formerly 195
Compared with Venice 2 1 9
Her foldiers running from their colours 221 ,
222
Her general afiemblies continued the exer-
cife of the fovereign power, long after
Lewis Xlth's death 233, 234
Had never any kings but of her own chufing
2 33
Henry V. of England moll terrible to her
234
Their laws made by themfelves, and not
impofed on them 234
The people have underftood their rights 235
Thereafon of the people's miferies 271,272.
276, 277
The right to the crown is in a great mea-
sure from the law of that country. In-
ftances hereof 33^, 337
She does not allow her kings the right of
making a will 337
By whom the power of conferring the fo-
vereignty was exercifed 40 1
By the people's increafing the power of their
mafter, they add weight to their own
chains 416
Her king cannot be called the head of his
people, and why 431
** Le roy Ie veut,"and " tel eft notre plaifir, '
are French rants ; but no edidl there has
the power of a law, till it be regiftred in
parliament 458
The conqueft of her only to be effected by
the bravery of a free and well fatisfied
people 46 1
Franks foon incorporated themfelves with the
Gauls 161
Fraud, accounted a crime fo deteftable, as not
to be imputed to any but flaves 375
All wicked defigns have been thereby car-
ried on 426, 427
Who delight in it, and will have no other
minifters but fuch as will be the inftru-
mentsof it 461
Free, what nations fo efteemed 12,349
Vid. Popular governments.
Men, how to know ourfelves fuch 23 .75.
102. 329. 348
People, fcarce ever conquered by an abfo-
folute monarch 104. m
Philip of Macedon confeft his people to be
freemen 1 1 1
The Britons were fo, becaufe governed by
their own laws 380
Men, or noblemen, exempt from burdens,
and referved, like arms, for the ufes of
war 389
Free cities, what and who made them 407
Frugality, the virtues that are upheld by it 275
Fruits of our corrupt nature 95
Own labour 98
Recovered liberty 132
Vidtory, how gained and loft 167
Always of the fame nature with the feeds
from whence they come 2 1 8
G.
Enealogies, the Hebrews exad in obferv-
ing them 27. 246
Genealogies of prince?, nicely to be fearched
into, would be dangerous to fome crowns
42, 43. 46. 402
Of mankind very confufed 41, 42. 246. 332
Of being theeldeil fon of the eldeft line of
Noah
244
Geneva and Rome, wherein they only can
concur 6
Genoa, how it is governed 131. 162
By whom that city was infected 162
Gentlemen, at this day, comprehends all that
are raifed above the common people 387
Germanicus's modeity in refufing the empire,
was the occafion of his death 1 90. 327
Germany, how governed
131. 381
Equal to the Gauls in fortune, fo long as
Rome was free 1 69
The power of the German kings 232
The power of this emperor 232
From thence our original and government is
drawn 296
When fhe had no king 303
The emperors thereof reftrained by laws 306
The Weftern empire, how it came hither
_ . 33 2 » 333
Tacitus's account of the people's valour 381
Not imaginable, that thefe people, jealous
of liberty, mould conquer this country to
enflave themfelves 385
No monarchy more limited 409
Gibeonites, by deceit, got Jofhua to make a
league with them 326
Gladiators were flaves 121. 126
Their fury extinguifhed with their blood 126
God, with an equal hand, gave to all the be-
nefit of liberty 14
What fort of kings he approves in fcripture
16
Can fave by few as well as by many 1 8
Always conftant to himfelf 29. 257
Never prefcribed any rule about dividing
the world 44
The fountain of juftice, mercy, and truth
54-, 63
By a univerfal law gave no rule for the ma-
king of kings 84
Is our Lord by right of creation 101
How he endowed the rulers of his people
10 5
His fecret counfels impenetrable r 1 3
What the ufual courfe of his providence 128
Helps thofe who juftly defend themfelves
166
His general ordinance 1 74
Gave Jaws to the Jews only" 187, 188
When he refufed to hear the cries of his
people 257. 264. 268
His anointed and accurfed 260
A law in Rome, that no god fhould be wor-
ihipped without the confent of the fenate
299
Good ; every one feeks their own, according
to the various motions of their mind 38. 76-
226
The public, the end of all government 90.
252. 281. 312,313
Is more obferved in mixed than abfolute ones
2I 5
Of mankind depends on religion and virtue
212
Called evil, and evil good 293
Gcoi
The INDEX.
473
Good aftions always carry a reward with them
And evil, but three ways of diftinguifhing
between them 29
Men, who defer ve to be called fo 4
How they obey their princes 201
Know the weight of fovereign power, and
doubt their own ftrength 433
Goodnefs is always accompanied with wifdom
3»4
Gofpel, the light of the fpintual man 2 1 2
Goths, their polity 131. 352
For above 300 years never contracted mar-
riages, nor mixed with the Spaniards 161
Seized Rome, whiift Honorius was. looking
after his hens 169
Subdued by the Saracens in one day 221
Grew famous by the overthrow of the Ro-
man tyranny 286
Concerning fucceffion to the crown during
their reign 330
Not above four in 300 years time were the
immediate fucceffors of their fathers 334
In Spain overthrown by the Moors 334.439
Their kings in Spain never ventured to dif-
pute with the nobility 379
Their kingdom never reftored 439
Government, the original principles of it to be
examined, and our own in particular 9. 103
An ordinance of God 14. 16
The feveral forms thereof left to man's
choice u- 16. 24. 37. 43, 44. 48. 67.
70. 7;, 76. 94. 117. 130. 150. 152. 238
Of the lawfulnefs of changing it, confider-
ed 15- "7- x 3 2 - z8t
Defpotical differs from the regal 17, 1 8. 59
The ground of all juft governments 28. 144.
I55-372
No man has it either for or from himfelf
29. 92. 175. 229, 230. 318
None ever began with the paternal power
32
To whom the conftitution of every govern-
ment is referred 3 7
All for the good of the people, and their po-
fterity 55. 70, 71. 77. 92. 67. 303. 123.
147. 165, 166. 168. 320. 365. 416. 417
Is a collation of every man's private right
into a public ftock 60. 74
Where juft, it has ever been the nurfe of
virtue 60. 65, 66
Popular for whom beft 61
For whom inftituted 70. 72. 144
What fort was ordained by God 98
The effedls of one well ordered 1 14
What only deferves praife 1 23. 1 26
How the beft has been compofed 1 30. 161
Regal had a mixture of ariftocratical and
democratical in them 1 3 }
Whence the denomination of all is taken
«33- '39- 2 38
The foundation remaining good, the fuper-
fUu&uresmay be altered 134, 137, 138.
171. 281
When it cannot fubfift 140
The effects of a difordered one 1 42
All fubject to corruption and decay 149
None impofcd on men by God or nature
151. 155
Mixed compared with abfolute 153. 448
Government, what the only juft one, by corr
fent of nations 155
What may be imputed to it 158
None ever freer from popnlar feditions than
Switzerland 1 63
That the beft, which beft provides for war
165, 166. 168
None without civil wars, tumults and fedi-
tions 172. 206, 207
The end for which it is conftituted 1 79, 1 80.
228. 407
The Roman, how introduced 184
Expofed to the moft infamous traffick 202
Of what parts it may confift 238
Is a great burden to the wife and good 240,
241. 306. 309. 320. 350
To reform it, is to bring it to its firft prin-
ciples 241. 439
Queiti ms arifing concerning our own, mult
be decided by our laws, and not by the
writings of the fathers 284,285
St. Paul's obedience to higher powers, muft
be underftood to all forts of government
292
What would make all in the world " magna
" latrocinia" 300
When the ends of it are accomplifhed 351
Moft of them have been mixed, at leaft
good ones 352. 448
What only is reckoned good 359
Our own the fame with the Roman in prin-
ciple, though not in form 375
From whence the great variety of them pro-
ceeds 417
The Englifh, not ill conftituted 418
By what means the foundations may be re-
moved, and the fuperftrutture over-
thrown 419
In a well conftituted one, the remedies
againft ill magi Urates are fafe and eafy
43 2
Wifdom and valour required for the inftitu-
tion of a good one 440
Where it is either intirely to be changed, or
reformed according to its firft inftitu-
tion 440
The bleffings of an abfolute one 449
Its eftabliftiment is an arbitrary a£t, wholly
depending upon the will of man 455
Governors appointed to execute the laws for
the good of the people 60.63 7 2 - x l^'
438,439
The law appoints helps for their infirmities,
and reftrains their vices 240
The people's creature 265. 274. 406. 436
Where they are removable, if they will not
be reclaimed 439
The good and bad make the people happy
and miferable in their turns 447
Grants of king John to the pope, declared by
parliament to be unjuft, illegal, &c. 325
What implies an annihilation of fome grants
360
Where they ought well to be proved, that
the nature and intention of them may ap-
pear 393
Of what nature thofe of our kings are 394
Of land?, where they have been refumed
395
6 E
Grecians
474
The INDEX.
Grecians knew no other original title to go
vernment, than that wifdom, &c. which
was beneficial to the people 36
Wherein they excelled other nations 104
Overthrew the vaft armies of the Perfians
no, III
Were reduced to yield to a virtue greater
than their own 129
No abfolute monarch among them eftablifh-
ed by law 138
Have been, by diforder in government, ex-
pofed as a prey to the firft invader 170
When they were happy and glorious 206
Their virtue expired with their liberty 218
The word tyrant came from Greece, and
what it fignified 278
Flourished in liberty in the time of Saul 281
Grotius, his explanation of fovereign and li-
mited power 177. 236. 402
Wherein he juflifies fubjects in taking up
" arms" 21 1
His making St. Peter and St. Paul perfectly
agree, about their different phrafes of or-
dinances of God, and ordinance of man
294
His faying, " qui dat finem, dat media ad
finem neceflaria 422
About kings ilipulations, and right offend-
ing ambaffadors 442
Guelphs and Ghibelins, their factions in Tuf-
cany 127.208
Genoa infected with their factions 162
Guftavus (Charles) his confeffing to an ambaf-
fador how he ought to reign over the people
that had chofe him 400, 401
He and his uncle (Adolphus) were content
with the power that the laws of their
country gave them 425,426
H.
HAnnibal killed more great Roman cap-
tains than any kingdom ever had 158
The Samnites embafiy to him 158
How he loll the fruit of all his victories 169
When he invaded Italy, no country feemed
to have been of greater ffrength 207
What to be done, if he be at the gates 421
Hanfeatic towns 164
Hatred univerfal incurred by prince?, who al-
ways fear thofe that hate them 210. 214
To all that is good 255
Head, why kings are called by this name, and
the import of the word, both in fcripture
and profane authors 427, 428
The differences between the natural and po-
litical 428
What the office of a head is in a natural
body 429,430,431
Hebrew judge different from a king 97
Kings not inftituted by God, but given as a
puniftiment 97
How their government confifted 130. 162
Kings, their power exceeded the rules fet by
God 182. 237
What their difcipline 232
In their creation of judges, kings, &c. had
no regard to paternity 243, 244
Like to their neighbours in folly and vice,
and would be like them too in govern-
ment 257
Hebrew judges, their power greater than what
the law allows to our kings 287
Whether the law given them by God be {o
perfect as to be obligatory to all nations
367
Heir reputed, the abfurdity of the notion
31,32,33,34.37.41.49
Next in blood 46, 47. 68, 69. $59, 90. 105.
401
Annexed to one fingle perfon 7 1
All the children of Noah were his heirs 72
Next to the crown fet afide 89. 334, 335,
33 6
Bellay's extravagant doctrine of an heir ap-
parent 339
Enjoys the fame right as the parent, and de-
volves the fame to his pofterity 406
Hengift and Horfa, on what terms the county
of Kent was given them 392
Henry IV. of France, how he defired to re-
commend himfelf to his people 339
I. of England, whether he was an ufurper
or not 396
V. His care was to pleafc his people, and
to raife their fpirits 459, 460
"Was terrible to France 234
His character 459, 460, 461, 462
VI. became a prey to a furious French-
woman 460
VII. Had neither crofs nor pile for his title
397
VIII. acknowledged the power of the par-
liament, in making, changing, and re-
pealing laws 315'. 375
Heptarchy, when this was divided into feven
kingdoms, each kept flili the fame ufage
within itfelf 382
Could as eafily unite the feven councils as
the feven kingdoms into one 383
Hercules, an account of him 129
Hereditary right cannot naturally be in any
45. 69
Prerogative of dominion, how understood
60
Right, as a reward of virtue 78
How a kingdom comes to be lb 87, 88
Crowns fo as to their ordinary courfe, but
the power retrained 131
Monarchies, in them no care is taken of him
that is to command 168
According to proximity of blood, notpre-
fcribed by any laws of God 187
Children feldom prove like their parents 205
Crowns, five different ways of difpofing
them 330
" Heroum regna" 36. 6y. 252
The government of whom 244
Hiftory Roman, Tacitus fays it wanted men
to write theirs 2 1 6
Hobbes, fcurriloufly derides Plato, Ariftotle,
and Cicero 38
His " bellum omnium contra omnes" 43.
48. 342
His " hoftis fclatro" 175
The firft that contrived a compendious way
of juflifying kings in the moil abomina-
ble perjuries 323
Holland, of great ftrength fince the recovery
of their liberty from the Spanifh yoke 1 1 2
The war with them in 1665. ' 222, 223
Holland,
The INDEX.
•Holland, how they have defended themfelves
from the greateil monarchies 292
The States are called high and mighty lords ;
and the word heer, which figniftes lord,
is as common as monfieur in France, &c.
390. 409,410
The condition of the feventeen provinces
of the Netherlands, when they fell to the
houfe of Auftria 415
The power of the States- General how li-
mited 442
Honours, the higheft, falfly attributed to ill
men 52
Given to ill gotten wealth 64. 114,115.
129. 203, 204
To fuffering virtue fometimes 141
Where they have been rewards of vice 146
To thofe who differved the commonwealth
Juflly bellowed on thofe that rightly perform
their duty 177
From whom purchafed 202
Given for fervices done to the public 246
Princes could not, with nut breach of truft,
confer them upon thofe that did not de-
ferve them 384
Hooker, his miftake in the fundamentals of
natural liberty 1 3
His admirable faying about lawful powers
Slighted by Filmer 91. vid. 13
Hottoman, his character and account of the
French kings 2 3 3> 2 34
Human nature, the miferable Mate of it, if not
improved by art and difcipline 281
Frailty, allowances muft be made for it 355
Hurt, they do none who do nothing j where
this rule is falfe 192
1
J Ames I. (king) his faying about his ma-
king of judges and bifhops 21 1
Acknowledges himfelf the fervant of the
commonwealth 236
Said he was fworn to maintain the laws,
and mould be perjured if he broke them
313, 314. 460
James II. what we might expect from him
44 8 > 449
Japhet, this part of the world feems by the
fcriptures to be given to his fons 332
Jcaloufy of flare 190.197
Jefuits joined to Geneva 6
To be believed with caution 67
The prefent emperor of Germany too much
governed by them 426
The foul that gives life to the whole body
of the Popifh faction 448, 449
The order banifhed out of the kingdom by
an arreft of the parliament of Paris, but
fefufed by thofe of Tholoufe and Bour-
deaux 458
Jews had a great veneration for the houfe of
David, and why 92
Grown weary of God's government 102.
3°9
Had leave to deflroy their enemies 107
Idolaters among them in David and Heze-
kiah's days 146
Jews, idolatry the production of the govern -
raient they had fet up 183. 230, 231
Submit to the Roman power 283
Thought Chrift's firlf. work would be to
throw off the Roman yoke 234
Being converted, thought themfelves freed
from the obligation of human laws 298
Some pretend to know their original 332
A proclamation to extirpate them 447
" I m pernor," a name given by the Roman
a.rmies to pretors and confuls 404
" Imperium fummum fummo modo, 1 88
" Modo non fummo, L 176
" Liberrimum" , J a 0Z
" Ab eo a quo fpiritus" 406
Impoiing on peoples eafy confeiences 163
On fome princci how it is 203
" Incolae," who they are at Venice 1 3 1
Difl.inclion betweenjthem here and " cives"423
Indemnity, the affurance of it wonld turn
miens other vices into madnefs 248
Induftry, what is a fpur to it 215
Infancy, vid. Child.
Inheritance, the common divifion of it among
birothers "2, 73
Where it gave no right to crowns 88.91
To one family 89. 91. 105
Of the fword left to families 108
What the apoflles left to their fucceflbrs in
relation to the fupreme power on earth
iSt
Private, many controverfies arife upon them
187
What right is equally inherited by all chil-
dren on the death of their parents 243
William I. did not leave the kingdom as
fuch at his death 297
What belongs to females 331
Little regard to it in the Auftrian houfe ac-
cording to blood 320
In fome places the liw gives private inherit-
ance to the next heir, in others makes
proportions and allotments 339
Injuries, the ways to prevent or punifh them,
either judicial or extrajudicial 174. 180
Gre.it ones, will one time or other fall on
thofe that do them 237
The Italians fay, he that does an injury
never pardons 255
Thofe that are extreme, when {o to be un-
'derftood -i \ r
Injulr.ice, what is fo in the beginning, can
newer be the effect of juftice 358, 359
Inquifidon of Spain, and other places 449
Inihncl, what 100
Inftitiution, he that inftitutes may alfo abro-
f te 1A . '5. 55- 3-' 5
Js an election 84
Of a kingdom is the aft of a free nation
2 53- 275
No> prince had a more folemn one than Saul
35 8 > 359
Some kings have by it but little power 287
The magiRrates prerogative; depend upon
1 1 302
Of power is coercive 304
• When princes defied! from the end of theirs
312
Wherein the end of it chiefly confifts
341
Inftitu-
475
47 6
The INDEX.
Inftitutioti) often the corruption of the flate is
taken for it 365
They who inftitute a magiftracy, beft know
whether the end of the inftitution be right-
ly purfued or not 400. 434
Integrity of manners makes laws, as it were,
ufelefs 145
Never fubfervient to the luft of princes
146
Makes men contented with a due liberty 1 5 2
Preferves popular equality 182
Cannot be found in abfolute governments
205
Preferves the people's fafety 275
Intereft, what advantages are reaped from uni-
ting the nation's to that of the government
220
Perfonal, preferred to the public good 275
Interregnum, that there can be none, a fun-
damental maxim of great monarchies 1 87
John's (king) grants to the pope declared by
the parliament unjuft, illegal 325
Tofephus of the Jewifh government 96
On what account he calls it a theocracy and
an ariftocracy 99.238
Savs, their princes were to do nothing with-
out the advice of the fanhedrin ; or to be
oppofed, if they did 230
Jofhua had neither the name nor power of a
king 97- 2 53
Ifaac, his character 18
Ifraelites had no kings in the firft inftitutlon
of their government 36
Nor till 400 years after 363
Strangers only excluded from being kings
8 4
Their government ariftocratical 96
What the efteft of their having kings 107.
237
After Solomon perpetually vexed with civil
fedition6 and confpiracies, &c. 183
Afked for a tyrant (though not by that
name) when they affced for a king after
the manner of other nations 277
Not known certainly by what law they were
governed . 363
Lived under the power of tyrants, whofe
proclamations were laws 449
Italy, when fhe lay delblate H4. 185
How her commonwealths have flourilhed
and decayed 126,127.169, 170.185.
207, 208
Charles VIII. of France, conquered the beft
part of it without breaking a lance 156.
170. 259
Judge, where every man is to be his own 75.
313.425. 436
Who fhall be between prince and people
178, 179. $12,313. 340. 365
No prince fit to be judge of his own facts
3-2. 313. 348.436,438,439
The power of judging when it is fit to call
the fenate or people together, to whom
and by whom referred 400. 421
The parliament the beft judge in dubious
cafes 424, 425. 438, 439
Where it is not fit to be a judge in his own
cafe 437
Judges (fuch as Joflma, Gideon, &c.) whe-
ther their power was regal and juft, or not
27, 28. 249
Judges, whether there be any concerning kings
titles 187
The power of making them 211
Sometimes the courts are filled with ill ones
214.371
Appointed to decide the contefts arifing from
the breach of contrails 248
Their opinion concerning fhip-money 274.
443
The religion of their oath 309. 315. 354.
37°. 37*> 37 2
Parliament owned by kings to be judges of
their ftipulations 325
What they ought to be, and in what fenfe
chofen by the king 354
Who were executed as traitors for fubvert-
ing the laws of the land 355. 371. 443
What aft Edw. III. promoted for his judges
to do juftice 355
The general rule they are fworn to obferve
356. 370. 443
The power by which they aft is from the
law 3 6 9»37°»37 I
When they become the minifters of the de-
vil 374
The fad confequence of having all kings
conftituted judges over the body of the
people 424, 425. 436. 438
To determine controverfies in a matter of
right 437
Whofe commands they are bound to obey
443
Judgment perverted, the ill efFefts cf it to
Future, not fuffkient to reflrain men from
being vitious 290
Here they are paffed by equals 371
Thofe the kings of Judah gave, were in and
with the fanhedrin 371
None that is right can be given of hi man
things, without a particular regard to the
time wherein they paffed 418
Kings can give none upon any of their fub-
jefts, and why 440,441
Human is fubjeft to error 442, 443. 459
Juries, grand and petit, their power 354. 371
How the judges are affiftants to them 371
In whofe fight they give their verdift \ 44 3
Juftice has always truth for its rule 34. 68
What the proper aft of it 63
Of every government depends on an origi-
nal grant 77
Has fometimes been perverted by the deceit
of ill men 140. 35$-
The fword of it for what ufe and end 1 74
Where it will be expofed to fale 203
The rule of civil and moral aftions 2 1 r
How well adminiftred in republics 292
What is meant by it 299. 01
The diftributicn of it juftly, is a work above
the flrength of one man 309
When the courfe of it is certainly interrupt-
ed 342
Deviations from it 355
Where it is beft adminiftred 365
Overthrown by the number of laws 369
In receiving it the king is equal to another
man 371
Magiftrates made to fee it well executed 438
K
The INDEX.
477
K.
KAtharine de Medicis faid never to have
done any good but by miftake 142
Kingcraft, what 225.235,236
Was wholly exerted in the fubverrfion of
the laws of France, and the nobility that
fupported them 460
Kingdom, the patriarchs had a fpiritual one
17,18
No paternal one among the Hebrews 27,28
Thought never to be bought at too dear a
rate 35
How the firft kingdoms were fet up 42
What are lawful ones 60
What it imports 87
One poflefled by nine feveral families within
200 years 108
All have their various fluctuations, through
ill difcipline or conduct 109. 166
The greateft have been deftroyed by com-
monwealths 169
Difputes about them moft difficult a:nd dan-
gerous, and very bloody in feveral in-
ftances 187. 1 90, 191
Of France divided by the eftates of tlhe realm
235
Not eftablimed but for the good of the peo-
ple 240
Of Granada, their ufagc of their primces 241
All eredled at firft by the confent of nations
244
Frequently reduced to their firft principles
245
Some elettive, fome hereditary, a.nd how
dire&ed 401,402
Conftituted by conquering armies, aind thofe
eftablifhed in the moft orderly mainner403
And ftates, how they came to be ereitted 407
Kings, the prerogative or royal charter grant-
ed to them 4.. 65, 66
The end of their inftitution 7, 8 . 15. 38.
40. 55. 63, 64. 7 y. 88. 213. 3 73. 438.
439
Whether they may be reftrained or cenfured
7. 15.41.58. 131. 176, 178, 179. 230.
237. 263. 304, 305. 402. 405.422. 435
In what fenfe they are like other mien 9, 10.
49. 101
Evil ones will have evil minifters 10. 148
The relation between them and thie people
J 3
The only fort mentioned in Scripture with
approbation 17. 97. 275. 352
The firft a cruel tyrant 19, 20
Who taken from out of the Ieaft ffamily of
the youngeft tribe 28
All not the natural fathers of their people 3 1
Whom the antients chofc for theirs 36,37.
69. 97
Not all of them wife 50.224. 424,425
A king by nature, who 62.64. 67. 103.
108. 294. 359
No defign to fpeak irreverently of them 82.
148
Set up by the nobles, antients, and p>eople 82.
85. 87, 88. 123. 212 234,235. 237. 335
All not alike in power, nor fpirit .and prin-
ciple 88.314
Some good, and fome bad 314. 447
Kings, whether any are immediately fo on the
death of the predeceffor, and before they
are proclaimed 91. 92. 187
Given in wrath 96, 97, 98- 132. 338
416700 kings ioo
Many great ones overthrown by fmall re-
publics l0 ^
Few poflefs the qualities requifite 106. 205.
230. 240
The name thereof abolifhed 131. 302, 303
" Regis ad exemplum," r.ot always fo in
all 146
A virtuous one, but a momentary help
fometimes, when his virtues die with him
l S7- *93- 205
Whether thofe may be thrown down that
fet up themfelves 179
The flothful and negligent accounted great
evils 192, 193, 194. 197, 198. 214. 217
The belt liable to be corrupted, and fubjeel:
to miftakes and paffions 200. 348. 436
Who faid to be like a phoenix 204
None fo vitious but will fometimes favour
juflice 210
Apt to live under the power of their lufts
212
Wherein juft ones will find their honour and
fecurity 215
Where lawful ones have proved equal to the
worft ufurpers 21 1
Whofe condition moft miferable, and why
224, 225
Some have experience as men, but not other-
wife 22 c
The name cannot make a king, unlefs he be
one 226. 41 1
Have a power of granting honours, immu-
nities, &c. out of the public flock 229.
242.384.423
None to have more power or abilities to per-
form his office than Mofes 230
Advanced by abjuring their religion 234
Under the happy inability to do any thing
againft the laws of their country 235,236.
240. 249. 307. 339. 353. 433
Where they have their fhare (and the fenate
theirs) of the fupreme authority, the go-
vernment is belt fupported 236
Have found out now eafler ways of doing
what they pleafe 241
How there would be as many kings in the
world as men 243
If they have no title, they muft be made io
either by force or confent 244. 256
The confequence of being unaccountable248
Have no other juft power than what the laws
give 250. 275
The fafety of their kingdoms, their chiefeit
law 25 1
The firft were of the accurfed race, while
the holy feed had none 253
By what wicked means many of them have
come in 254
Of Ifrael and Judah under a law, not fafely
to be tranfgrefled 262
Why thofe of Ifrael committed many extra-
vagances 262
Judged by the great fanhedrin 263
This fort of government the people's crea-
ture 265.274.406.412.438.451,452
6 F Kings,
47
8
The INDEX.
Kings, not to claim the liberty of doing in-
juftice in virtue of their prerogative 267,
268
Bound up to the laws as to matters of pro-
perty 271
Not 10 be too powerful, nor too rich 275
Oflfrael, though they led vaft armies into
the field, feem to have poffeffed but little
276
What their government ought to be 278
Of England reign by law, and are under it,
and why 284, 287. 290. 443
What will endear them to their people 288
The fovereign power often meant by this
name 289
What meant by lawful ones 291. 310. 318
Why thofe of Judah could make no laws 295
May be feared by thofe that do ill 296, 297
How made in the Saxon times 296
What thofe of the greateft nations have fuf-
fered 3 01
What is that king which never dies 310,31 1.
443
Cannot mitigate or interpret laws 315, &c.
When faid to become perjured 3 1 4
Not mailers but fervants of the common-
wealth 318. vid. 236
Cannot be interpreters of their own oaths
322
Compelled to perform the conditions of
magna charta 325,326
May refign, if they will not obferve their
oaths 328, 329
Next in blood, generally cannot be faid to
be kings till they are crowned 330^ 332
How he is not to be heard 355
The regal power, not the firft in this nation
361
Where the fame power that had created this
government, abolifhed it 363
What our anceftors did with relation to them
3 6 3
Judges rightly qualified are to inftruct them
in matters of law 370
Wherein they are equal to other men 371
None as fuch have the power of judging any
37 1 - 373>374> 37S
Where they ceafc to be fo, and become ty-
rants 37 2
Their power not reftrained, but created by
magna charta, and other laws 376
What is natural for the worft of them to do
377
The Norman had no more power than the
Saxon, and why 283
Tacitus fays, they were taken out of the no-
bility ^ 3 8 4
Said to be chofen, 01 made, and fometimes
depofed, by their great councils 391. 422
Never mailers of the foil of England 391,
392. 406, 407
Why they fpeak always in the plural num-
ber 394
The titles of ours examined into 397
Whom the parliament have made are law-
ful, or we have had none for thefe 700
years 398
Their power of calling parliaments was
given to them 3.99- 421
Naturally delight in power, and hate what
croffes their wiHs 402, 454
Kings, the moft abfolute princes in the world
never had this name 404
Some fubject to a foreign power, fome tri-
butary ; and the Romans had many de-
pending upon them 405
The acts of one '* de facto" confidered 410,
4 u
Wherein the effence of a king confifts 41 1
Deterred from endeavouring to feduce any
01 their great men from their duty 41 9
Who are a great calamity to a nation 401.
461
Who only are the heads of the people 426.
429,430,431
If their adtions are to be examined, and
their perfons punifhed 435
None lefs capable oftentimes of forming a
right judgment than they, and why 436
Nor can be prefent in all their courts 441
Do not ftipulate for themfelves, but their
people 442
In what cafes they are perpetually minors
442
Their power not univerfal ; for many things
they cannot do 443
May in fome degree mitigate the vindiclive
power of the law 444
The advantage of their being reftrained 447
Not created to make laws, but to govern
by them ; and what is fignified by " le
" roy le veut" 459, 460
Are fworn to pafs fuch laws as the people
chufe 458.461
King's-bench, for what end eftabliihed 373
The king that renders juftice is always there,
&c. 443
Knight's fervice, what 587
Knighthood, the dignity of it, and what was
accounted a degrading 387, 388
Knights of (hires in the Saxon times 388
L.
LAWS, the prevalency of them over fo-
vereign commands 4- iz
Who belt obeys them 6
The end of them is to enjoy our liberties 12,
13.288. 330
Inveft magiftrates with power for the public
good 39-7°
Of England acknowledge one only heir 44.
72
Said to be written reafon 63, 64
Have in them a conftraining force 85
To whom the power of making them be-
longs 85, 86. 308
Are the meafure of power 87. 89. 103.
230. 241. 443,444
Of each country create a right to the perfon
that governs it 88
Prefcribe rules how power fhould be tranf-
mitted 89
Where good ones do no good 105. 254
To be fuited to prefent exigencies 117. 13b
Make no diftinction of perfons 141
" Lex perduellionis" 14;
Made in a fort ufelefs by integrity of man-
ners '46
Abhorrers of the dominion of it 1 50
InlHtuted for the preyenting of evil 1 74.
179. 236. 329
Laws,
The INDEX.
479
Laws, thofe that go beyond them, aft therein
as private perfons 1 77
Who moll reftrained by them 178
Subfill by executing juftiice 180. 253
Concerning the fucceffiom 187. 308
Tricks at law to put men to death 190. 214
When in force, men of wifdom and valour
are never wanting 198
When they were overthrown 209
The defpifers deftroyed without law 232.236
Do not always go by plurality of voices 239
Of every place, fhew the power of each ma-
gistrate 248
Were before kings 252
Proofs hereof 253.305
Of God, not to be abrogated by man 263
Our kings can make none of themfelves
215. 287. 402
We know none but thofe of God and our-
felves 288
Are not made in vain 290
Some neither juft nor commendable ; in-
itances thereof 268, 269. 299, 300
The directive power, which is certain, has
a power over the confidence 300
The fanftion that deferve:s the name of a law
301. 309 351. 3^5. 368
To what end made as to rmagillrates 305,306
Princes and nations both gainers by the due
obfervance of tnem 308. 310. 328, 329.
433> 434
That is not a (late or government, which has
them not 308
Athenians not without thtem when they had
kings ibid.
Haw faid to be above the king 310
Can only be altered in parliament 31 5, 3 16.
368.378
For what reafon ellablifhed ; an encomium
316
Who violate thofe of nat ure in the higheft
degree 320
Of one's country to be fulbmitted to 331
Of nature, eternal 331. 336
By whom the rigour of it is to be tempered
354
None made by man can be perfect 358. 369,
370. 376
By them, kings became fijrft what they were
362. 376
Thofe good for one people, that are not fo
for all 366, 367
The ftatute of Henry VII. concerning a
king " de facto," for what end made
41 1,412. 420
Plain ones, hive been induiltrioufly rendered
perplexed 420
Good ones prefcribe fafe remedies againft the
mifchiefs of ill magiltraccs 432, 4.33
Where they are merciful both to ill and good
men 434
Should aim at perpetuity 446
The mifchiefs effected by a perfon's word
having the force of a law ibid.
When they may be eafily overthrown, it
will be attempted 456
What gives the power of law to the fanftions
under which we live 457
Leagues do not imply abfolute equality be-
tween parties 92
With conquered nations 121
League- faction?, and wars of the Hugonots
135, 136
How faithfully they have been obferved 1 64
Men cannot too much rely upon them 164,
165, 166
Thofe that make fuch as are detrimental to
the public, are punifhable 177
Leagues, made againll the Hollanders 292
Of Jofhua with the Gibeonites gained by
deceit 326
Made on a national, not perfonal account 441
Learning makes men excel in virtue 1 10
Said to make men feditious, but difproved
io 3- x 39
Legiflative power of Rome and Sparta, con-
tinued in the people 118. 123. 296
When it came to be fcorned 1 20
The magiflratical power receives its being
and meafure from hence 304, 305
Cannot be conferred by the writ of fum-
mons, but muft be effentially and radically
in the people 450
Is always arbitrary 455
Only trufted in the hands of thofe, who are
bound to obey the laws that are made 457
The king cannot have it in himfelf, nor any
other part of it than what is formal 459.
462
Legislators fhould always be of the wifeft men
85,86
Wherein their wifdom confifts 137
Wherein they fhew themfelves wife and good
Legitimacy contracted 90, 91
Vide Baftardy.
Some children, though born in wedlock,
utterly rejected as being begotten in adul-
tery 340
Lewis XL his fubverting the laws of his coun-
try 233
XIV. accounted his not being able to aft
contrary to law, a happy impotence 339
Liberty, the notions thereof, and from whence
5. 7. 14
Natural, the confequence, if removed 7
Wherein it folely confifts 12. 317
Filmer's notion of the greateft liberty in the
world 1 2
Oppugners of public liberty 1 3
Univerfal afferted, and what that is 18. 25.
44- 75
The affejtors thereof have God for their
patron 60. 149
Produces virtue, order, liability 104. 139
Thelofsofit in the Roman empire 108,
109. in, 112. 115, 116. 126. 143. 361
The mother and nurfe of virtues 108. in.
126. 159. 201. 209. 217
Made the mod virtuous people in the world
127
When fubverted, the worft men thrive belt
142, 143
How our natural love to it is tempered 151
None fought it but withfome reftraint 153
What the love of it infpires 158. vid. pag.
139
At home, and war abroad 160
When this is loft, kingdoms and ftates come
to nothing 1 69. vid. pag. 1 1 1 . 1 26, 1 27
Patricians the beft defenders of it 173
The way to recover it 181
Liberty,
480
The INDEX.
Liberty, cannot be preferved, if the manners
o; the deople be corrupted 201
None remained in Rome, when Sylla refign-
ed his power 209
When loft, excellent fpirits failed 216, 217
A people can defire nothing befides it 228
Cannot fubfift, if vice and corruption pre-
vail 241, 242
Is a right common to all 242, 243
God gave the Ifraelites this law 264
Who have no true fenfe of it 269
Our anceftors left us the beft laws they could
devife to defend it 288
All by the law of nature have a right to
their liberties, lands, goods, &c. 320.
393
What principles make men lovers of it 341
None can fubfift where there is an abfolute
power above the law 349
Where it is deftroyed by the prerogative 350
Of a people, naturally inherent in themfelves
362. 393. 406
The value our anceftors fet upon theirs 368.
408.453
None has better defended them than this na-
tion 375- 453
To it Tacitus attributes the German bra-
very 3 8 1
What is the utmoft act of it 383
The exercife of the natural liberty of na-
tions, in the feveral limitations of the fo-
vereign power 402
Of a people, the gift of God and nature
406
Forfeited or refigned 406, 407
No veneration paid to magiftrates canleffen
the liberty of a nation 409
Nothing valuable to it in the opinion of the
Romans 414
Eafy to get partizans to make good by force
the greateft violations of it 418
How to ufe one's own with relation to the
public 437
With a mifchief 449, 450. 453
Of thofe who aft in their own perfons, and
of thofe who fend delegates, is perfectly
the fame 45 1 , 45 2
That for which we contend as the gift of
God and nature, remains equally in all
45 2
Lineal fubjeftion never learned from Mofes 66
Succeflion, where not followed 89, 90
London, the privilege of the common-hall 423
Lord paramount, over whom 17, 18, 19, 20
From whence he mult come 25
None by nature over his brethren 72
The mifchiefs they both do and fuffer are
very great 241
Lords, how they have loft the authority which
they had formerly 420
Lord's day, not to be fpent in fports and revel-
lings 346
Love to ones country, commonwealths have
itmoft 157. 159, 160
The happy efFefts of it 158
A refolution to die for, or live with it 158.
162. 165
The way to make people in love with it
165. 194. 218
This now turned into a care of private inte-
reft 171
Love, the behaviour of thofe that are lover?,
&c. 194. 217
Occafions fometimes wars and tumults 207
Loyalty, thofe that boaft loudeft of it moli ap-
ply it in the wrong way 242
Lucullus, his little army put Tigranes with
200000 men to flight 1 1 2
Luxury of the Roman? , the occafion of their
ruin 129
Brought into Rome by C. Manilas 145
Expofes the virtuous to fcom 202
When in fafhion, the defire of riches mull
increafe 203
The braveft nations moft enflaved by it 277
Lycurgus, his laws received their authority
from the general aflembly 296. 508
Abfurd to think of reftoringhis laws 366
To what the long continuance of them is
attributed 446
M.
MAcedonian kings, their power was but
fmall m
1 heir army overthrown by Paulus Emiiius
166
Vide Monarchy.
Machiavel, his admirable faying 105.226
Magi, who ufurped the dominion of Periia
after the death of Cambyfes 175
Magiftracy can have no intereft diftinft from
the public 55. 146
Its office is to execute the law 55. 174. 351,
35 2
If the people be bafe, 6cc. it cannot be iup-
ported,be the ruler never fo perfect 1 5 o. 1 85
Whether it be that power which above all
reftrains liberty 151
Strangers admitted into that of Rome 160
The effect of regal power committed to an
annual or otherwife chofen magiftracy
167. 216
None can have the right of it, that is cot a
magiftrate 175
Where it had nothing to do ia fpiritual things
285, 286
The ordinance both of God and man 294.
302, 303, 304
Circumfcribed by fuch rules as cannot be
fafely tranfgreffed 296. 433
Where obedience is due 300, 301, 30Z
On what the right and power of it depends
302
The nature of it 409, 4 o
None now in being, which owes not its ori-
ginal to fome judgment of the people 440
Magiftrates, by whom conftituted 9. 62. 71.
247. 348
To what end fet up 38. 55
Minifters of God 55. 283
How they they are helpful to cations 63.97.
421.429
Under feveral names and limitations 89. 245'
Jewifh, wherein like the dictators of Rome
98
Punifhable with death by the Roman law
144. 176, 177
Annual election of them 1 5 8
Have enjoyed large power?, that never bad
the name of kings 178
Magiftrate. 5 ,
The INDEX.
Magistrates, how to be reftrained 178. 305,
3°6, 433
A particular character of good! and evil ones
343» 344
When they were temporary and occafional
3 6 3
Walk in obfcure and flippery places 433
What to be done to thofe w ho defpife the
! aw , 434» 435
Wherein their ftrength is 438
The firft may be virtuous, but their fuccef-
fors may foon be corrupted 456
Magna charta grounded on king Alfred's laws
iz
The Jews had none fuch 284
What it obliges the king to fwear to 311
Puts every thing on the law s of the land,
and cuftoms of England 2 1 r
Is only an abridgment of them 324. 300
Not the original, but a declaration of the
Englifli liberties 376. 455
The rights the nation have refolved to main-
tain 3 go
Male-line examined 46,47.188
Malice is blind 1 44
Seditions, &c. arife from thence 172, 173
Mamalukes, their great defeat near Tripoli, by
Selim 1^6
Accounted themfelves all noble, though born
flaves ^oo
Man naturally free 5.23.407,408
Every one chief in his own family 16. 22
Cannot overthrow what God and nature have
inftituted 21.288, 289
Creates governments and magiltrates 24
None knows originally from -whom he is de-
rived 27. 29. 42. 332
Whence his mifery proceeds 63, 64
Wants help in all things 63. 446
What makes a natural differemce among men
66
All fubjeft to error 120.186.308
Enters into fome kind of government by
reafon 1 c 1
Follow what feems advantageous to them-
felves 2 1 8
What every one ought to be 254
None can ferve two contrary interefts 281
Are all by nature equal 3^8
Where every one is a magiftrate 421
Manors, &c. enjoyed by tenuire from kings
393
Marriages, often declared null 90
Of plebeians with patricians 117. 134. 127
Where proved of no force to legitimate
children 340
A power muft be lodged fomewhere to decide
them 34.0
Mailers, how far their commands are binding
345> 346
Only to decide contefts between them and
their fervants 437
Maxims, nothing to be received as a general
one, which is not general ly true 320
Mazarine, the ways of his adva.ncement 205
Medices, of the tide of that family to Tuf-
cany ^ l$
Members of parliament fent to ferve for the
wholenation, not for a particular borough,
&c.
Members of parliament, have no power before
they are chofen, nor ever could, .if thofe
that fend them had it not in themfelves 454
Muft take care that the commonwealth re-
ceives no detriment by their votes ibid.
A few poflibly may be corrupted AtG
Mercenary army, vid. Soldiery.
Their bufinefs is to keep on their employ-
ment , ^r
Soldiers always want fidelity or courage
166. 221
Courtiers will expofe not only honours, but
even juftice to fale 202, 202
Wretches, their power at court 20-
Auguftus Csefar had thirty legions of them
to execute his commands ^ x
Merit, men rarely make a right eftimate of
their own jg^
The way of advancement to honour 2 1 6
What preferves, and what abolifhes it 2i£,
... , , 219
Micklegemots were general aflemblies of the
noble and freemen 382. 388. 42"
They fet up feven magiftrates over the hep-
tarchy g
Of what they were in the beginning of the
Saxons reign 42 »
Miltiades, his defire to wear an olive-garland
for his victory at Marathon, and the an-
fwer given to him 2 . -
Minifters, according to the temper and genius
of the prince IO
Of the devil, who 44. 56. 59. 294. 300,301
Of God, who 56, 5?. 133. 213. 293. 300,
301
Muft receive their dignity from a title not
common to all 2 q6
Every man by his works will declare whofe
he is . 299
The devils of a lower order 344
Of God, how they may become the worft of
men -~
What fort have feldom efcaped punifhment
35?
Of the devil, have always carried on their
defigns by fraud 427
Miftakes in punifhments carefully repaired by
honours 120
Seditions, tumults,and wars,arife from thence
. 172
None in Sparta, after Lycurgus's laws were
eftablilhed ,--,
That fome have fallen into by the form of
writs, fummoning perfons to appear be-
fore the king, redihed 440
Mithridates, what reckoned the greateft dan-
ger of war with him 1 1 2
Monarchs, who have their right from God and
nature x 2
Ought to confult the public good 40
How moft came to their dgnit.es 133
Are not above the law 319
Monarchy, paternal, over whom exercifed 20
Whence fo called 2 3
For whom belt (, 2
No natural propenfity in men and hearts to
,C . 94» 95
How Ariftctle commends it 102, 103
Mixed, regulated by law 106. 109. 146 153
481
Inftruftions are often given to them 453
45 1 Of Rome, at firit not flrftabfblute • izs
6 G
Monarch v,
482
The INDEX.
Monarchy, moft have fuffered far greater
changes than Rome 125
Macedonian, fell all to pieces after the death
of Alexander 135. 184
In what fenfe faid to be natural 1 49
A peaceable one in Peru for twelve genera-
tions 1 86
The French has been full of blood and
flaughter 194, 195. vid. 155
The gentlefl more heavy than any common-
wealth 197
All fubjecT: to civil wars 198
Well regulated, when its powers are limited
by law 229
The jufticeof them eftabliftied by common
confent 229. vid. 82, 83. 92. 155. 175
Why fo called 238. vid. 133. 139
Nothing in the nature and inftitution of it,
that obliges nations to bear with its exor-
bitances 255
What fort was difpleafing to Samuel, and a
rejection of God 264
Paternal, overthrown by Filmer 274
Not nniverfally evil 278
Where it is regular, kings can neither make
nor change laws 310
Not eftabliftied among us in Julius Casfar's
time 363
Mixed, what the beft way to fupport it 419
What has given beginning, growth, and con-
tinuance, to all the mixed ones in the
world 448
That not free, which is regulated by a law,
not to be broken without the guilt of per-
jury 458
"When the mixed monarchies began to be
terribly fhaken 460
Money, Charles VII. of France raifed it by
his own authority 460
Mofes and Aaron, the firft rulers of the people,
neither of the eldeft tribe, nor eldeft line 27
His admirable gifts 25.105.309
Had not the name, or power of a king 70.
m 97- 253
Gave the people leave to chufe their own
magiftrates 137
Divided the Hebrews under feveral captains
162
Power infupportable to him 309
His character 230. 311. 429
Whether we ought to conform to his law
367, 368
Multitude, what a right it has to change a ty-
rannical government 16
Compofed of freemen ; the power that is
placed in them 75
None can be feditious till a commonwealth
be eftabliftied 8 1
Thofe that enter into contracts, aft accord-
ing to their own will ibid.
Where it brings confufion 165
Is the glory and ftrength of every prince 213
May have its fears as well as tyrants 228
Confers on the prince all the power he has
2 43
What is natural thereto in relation to go-
vernment 247
Murderers wilful, the horns of the altar gave
no protection to fuch 295
Myfterie§ of ftate 9
N.
NAMES are not eflential to magiftrates
404
Oi fovereign lord, &c. confiftent with liberty
409, 410
Nothing of majefty among the Romans and
Grecians to a ftngle perfon 410
There muft be fome ufed in all public tranf-
a&ions 441
Not to be regarded fo mnch as the power
45 2
Nations, what their rights are 9.327. 352. 357.
374. 376. 402. 417. 452. 462
That went from Babylon, how many 20.
22. 24, 25, 26, 27. 33. 43. 75, 76. 243
Natural for them to chufe governors 59. 67.
71. 155. 304. 352
Northern, their governments how inftituted
79, 80.236. 386
Free, never conquered but with difficulty
HE
Oppreffed, can never grow wanton 122
None fafe without valour and ft sngth 124;
378
Foreign, called in by fome princes to deftroy
their own people 2 1 o
Some fell their children 1 66
Slight matters fometimes bring them into
confufion. Inftances thereof 183
When they aremoft unquiet 192, 193. 206
The wifeft have fet bounds to their princes
power, &c. 240. 248. 275
Their liberties are from God and nature 242.
256, 257
Where they have taken the extremeft courfes
248
Owe nothing to kings till they are kings
268. 375
What fet limits to their patience 270, 271
What inclines them to fet up governments
270
When all were governed by tyrants 281
Their fafety ought not to depend on the will
of their princes 3 1 6
What are free, and what not 349
Thofe that had no kings had power 362
What fhews beft their wifdom and virtue, or
their vices and folly 368
Wherein their failure has been too frequent
370
This divided into feven kingdoms 383
None can have a power over any, otherwife
than " dejure," or" de fafto" 402
Obedience due from the whole body, what
4i3
Their liberties do not rife from the grants of
princes 4 1 6
Delight in the peace and juflice of a good
government 417
What the moft ready way to effect their ruin
420.438,439. 446
When obliged to remove the evils they lie
under 436
None can have an equal within itfelf 438
One that is powerful cannot recede from its
own right 438
What king none ever wants, that has a fove-
reign power 443
Nations,
The INDEX.
Nations, what thofe ought to do that are fo
happy as to have good kings 447
Great ones t never ordained by God to be
flaves 45 2
Naturalization, Rome was for a general one 160
Negative voice, how far it is faid to extend
*•-* 377> 378
*' Le roy s'avifera," what meant by it 410
Nero, the power of the ftate over him 15.
287
His endeavour to make a woman of a man
5°- 57
To tear up virtue by the roots 58. 142.212
Condemned to be put to death 144. 301
What fort of vermin he encouraged 144
Set the city on fire 179. 210. 299
Died by the hand of a flave 1 84. 287
His character 3 1 2
His madnefs not to be cured but by his death
435
Nimrod the firft king 19, 20. 24, 25. 33. 253
Ufurped the power over his father, &c. 20.
256
Heir to no man as king 32
Slain by Ninus ibid.
No right can be derived from him 42. 49
Eretted his kingdom contrary to paternal
right 220. 362
Noah, bore no image of a king 19. 362
His dividing of Afia, Europe, and Africa,
among his fons 2 1
When he went out of the ark, God gave
him a law fufficient for the ftate of things
at that time 253
None but his right heir can have a title to
an univerfal patriarchal right 291. 332
Nobility of Rome extirpated 1 24
The Roman power chiefly in them, after
the expulfion of the kings 134
Hold the balance between the king and the
commons; when and how weakened 194.
, . 197
Of Arragon's faying to their new-made
king 238
What our anceftors meant by them 384.
395. 390
The ftrength of the government when placed
in them 384. 420
Sometimes called " infinita multitudo" 386.
388. 390
Knighthood always efteemed noble 387
In France, &c. of what efteem 387, 388
The prefent titular has no affinity to the an-
tient nobility of England 388
Of Venice and Switzerland, what makes
them fo 390
Their virtue and power formerly kept the
kings within the limits of the law 419
Many have loft their eftates and intereft
now 420
" Noli profequi," faid to be annexed to the
perfon of the king 443
Norman kings fwore to govern by the lame
laws as the Saxons had 383. 456
Notions, common, what are agreed to by all
mankind 40
Oath, agreements between prince and people,
always confirmed by them 178
How kings may be abfolved from them 322,
3 2 3
Its force confifts in the declared fenfe of
thofe who give it 324.415
Scarce any prince broke it but to his ruin 325
All either voluntary or unvoluntary ibid.
Ought to be performed in reverence to the
religion of it 326. 329
What to be done, where the obfervation of
it would be grievous 328
How the judges are bound by theirs 354,
355
Wherein that of the crown had not been
kept 35 6
What kings are obliged to do by them 340.
373- 45?
How far thofe of allegiance bind private
perfons 416
Obedience, active and paffive 10, 11. 347
Where due, and not due 16. 57. 77. 251.
255.268.303,304.413
How far a good man will pay it to his prince
20 r
The effects of its difcipline among the Ro-
mans 217
To higher powers, St. Paul's words favour
all forts of governments, as well as mon-
archy 292, 293, 294. 303. 304
Why it fhould be paid 298
Is not due to that which is not law 301,
„ . . 3° 2 > 3°3> 345
The prince owes it to the laws, as well as
the meaneft fubjedt 3 1 o
Due to parents, from whence it arifes 406
Simple and unconditional, to what king we
all owe it 443
Objeft, the only worthy one of nven's defire 39
Obligation arifing from benefits, can only be
to thofe who confer them 44
Of gratitude, to whom due 256
How far the extent of ij can be known 267
Henry VIII. owned it lay on him, rightly
to ufe the power with which he was en-
483
trufted
3*5
O
o.
ATH of allegiance ufed in the kingdom
of Arragon 77, 78
Occupation, the meaning of the word 176
Offa, vid. Saxons.
Officers, great ones in armies think only of
enriching themfelves 221
How their authority and power is to be re-
gulated 304
Ought to have their places for the people's
good 374
Frequently put to death by the Athenians,
&c. 424
Offices, what fits men for the execution of
them 65
Thofe that buy will make the molt of them
203
Or muft be turned out as a fcandal to the
court 204
By what means they have been often ob-
tained 205
Oppreffion fometimes m^kes nations outrage-
ous 122
Does people fuch injury, as can never be
pardoned 255
Order, when inverted, introduces extieme
confufion, ' 64
Order
484-
Tlie INDEX.
Order, wherein it principally confifls 105. vid.
64. 76. 81
TheeffecT: of it 105,106.110
Good, not wanting in Venice 1 1 2
Nor among the Romans 1 14
Being eftablifhed, makes good men 167
The befl: fometimes fubverted by malice and
violence 365
Ordinance, what is blafphemy to impute to
God 42
Civil and human 8i
God's general, ami the particular ordinance
of all focieties] 1 74
Of God, appointed for the diftribution of
juftice 180
Several tending to the fame end 294
Original, no man knows his own 30. 36.38.
246. 332
Contract 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 6j. 76, 77.
79. 82, 83. 249. 269
Right muft be regulated according to it 245
Where it would be of no value 247, 248
Of nations almoft wholly unknown to us
252
Ours is deduced both from the Romans and
Saxons 381.408
Oftracifm of the Athenians, no difhonour, nor
accounted as a punifhment 140
Nothing favoured fo much of injuflice 140
Otho had the empire given him, by whom
184
Was a felf-murderer ibid.
Why he was advanced 187
Outlaw, or lawlefs, often applied to the wick-
ed, but never to the juft 25 3
P.
PAPAL power, the foundation of it 8
The civil difienfions in Germany pro-
ceeded from thence 306, 307
Pretends to the power of abfolution 323
Her excommunications, u bruta fulmina "
325
Papifts, their kindnefs to the pretellants in-
ftanccd in 449
Paradoxes, many of them true $9
Pardons, faid to be only the bounty of the
prerogative 356. 443
The meaning of a general one at a corona-
tion 443
Where granted againft the oath of the
crown ibid.
Granted by a& of parliament 357
None for a man condemned upon an appeal
443» 444
The king cannot always pardon in cafes of
treafon 444
Parents, how obliged by nature to feek their
childrens good 251.254
Parliaments, the inftitution of them, and for
what 79
The fettling and transferring of crowns lodg-
ed in them 83. 132. 246
In France, fet up to receive appeals from
other courts, and to judge lovereignly,
now of little ufe 136. 235
A free and well regulated one tochufe mi-
niftersof ftate 153, 154
Their great power in all the kingdoms that
icame from the North 233
Parliaments, declared Henry III. of France
from the crown 234
How they may be made ufclefs 276
England never wanted them 289
The word parliament came from the French,
but the power was always in ourfelves 289
Henry VIII. confeffes them to be the law-
makers 315. 375
Doubtful cafes referred to them 315. 356,
357
By writs compel the king to perform the
conditions of the great charter 325, 326
Have given the crown to whom they pleaf-
cd 33 1 - 335» 336. 37 8 - 3 s6 - 39 1 - 397»
398, 399, 400
Judge of difputes arifing from the children
of royal marriages 340. 375
Have the fole power to explain and correct
laws 357, 358. 377, 378. 386.412
Ought of righ: to be annually 377. 424
From whence they derive their authority
38c. 399, 400.421. 423
Have refufed to be diflblved till their work
was finifhed 423
Not impeccable or infallible, but lefs fub-
jcdr. to error than fome princes 424,425.445
Our lives and liberties depend upon this
court 446
What the great Burleigh, and Sir Thomas
More, faid of their power 453
If they make unjuft laws, their pofterity
will fuffer 456
How difficult they are to be bribed ibid.
To have their rolls in their offices, not a
mere ceremony 458
What kings have had continual difputes
with them 461
Parties, what certainly divides the nation into
them 342
Threaten a national ruin 420
Paffions, every one has them ; few know how
to moderate them 186
Put princes upon the moft unjuft defigns 194.
The law is without paffion 316
Patents, began long after the coming of the
Normans 385
" Pater patriae," the title thereof confidered
3J-57
By killing a tyrant how faid to become fo
3+» 3?- 39- 54
Paternal right, Abraham arrogated none to
himfelf 20, 21
Impoffible to be known 25. 30. 33, 34. 69
All [the kingdoms of the earth ellablifhed
upon it 33
Government of Rome not paternal 38
Cannot be conferred on princes 49. 5 3 ,54.85
To whom it belongs 31. 71, 72. 274
In what the Hebrews had no regard to it
244. 256
Is a mere fiction 346
Is frcm nature, and incommunicable 250
Patriarchal right, women and children have it,
according to Filmer 4
Theabfurdity of it 16, 17. 43. 291. 452
All pretence to it deftroyed 20. 24. 26.
33. 380
Muft accrue to every father 22
Either divifible or indivifible 25.33
Power different from the regal 17, 18. 59
Peace,
The INDEX.
485
Peace, there can be none without juftice 115.
126
Defirable by a ftate conflituted for it 124
Slavifli 1 25
What men have in their graves ibid.
What the Spaniards fettled in the Weft-In-
dies ibid.
The name of it given to defolation 125.
207, 208, 209
The fad one which France enjoyed for five
or fix ages 193, 194
In Spain to what imputed 196
The terms offered, if good, like to be ob-
ferved ; if bad, will foon be broken 414
Peers aft for themfelves in their own houfe
454
Pembroke, a late earl of that noble family, his
faying 189
People, not originally created for kings to reign
over them 7
Whether they chufe governors 14. 59. 62.
78. 87. 90
fcripture-inftances for the proof of it 97. 237
The choice of the conilitution is from them
86. 130, 131. 248. 334. 362
Kings receive their right from them 88. 246
How God deals with a people, when he in-
tends to exalt them 1 1 3
Of Rome, their fad degeneracy 1 15.118,1 19
Their right to appeals 122. 131. 144
Acting according to their own will, never
fet up unworthy men, unlefs through
miuake 150
The body of them the public defence 157.
161, 162
None ever well defended, but thofe who
fight for themfelves 162
In civil contefts they equally fuffer 173
Whether to be judges in their own cafes
178, 179
When generally corrupted, the event is al-
ways the erection of a tyrant 182. 199
Their condition where tolerable under very
cruel emperors 192
Their hating of cruel princes, and they them
214
Mull necefiarily have all the power original-
ly in themfelves 229. 237, 238. 253
Their right of looking into matters of go-
verment, &c. 260. 311 — 313. 349.423.
43 6 > 437
Can never fall into nonage or dotage 3 1 8
Did never part with all their power to kings
3 2 3
May govern by themfelves 328
Their whole body not fubjeft to the com-
mands of the magiftrate 413
In their collective body, always continue as
free as the inward thoughts of a man 416
They certainly perifti, who fuffer themfelves
to be opprefled 434
That are not free, cannot fubfiitute dele-
gates 450
Vide Nations and Multitude.
Perfection, fimple and relative 367
Perfecution among the firft Chriftian emperors
109
Perfia, their kings reigned from the Indies to
the Hellefpont 31
The dercees of thefe kings paffed for laws
87
Perfia, thejuft fentence of the princes about
Daniel 107
Torn to pieces by the fury of two brothers
Under what ill conduct and difcipline their
army was 166
Petition, the haughty Romans condefcended
to join in one with their tribunes to their
dictator 409
Pharamond, his race in France, an account of
■J' , ,- 3 * 6
Pharaoh, his monarchy an aft of tyranny 27
Pharifees, their fuperftition 345
Philo, to what he imputes the inftitution of
kingly government in Ifrael 96
Philofophy true, perfeftly conformable with
what is taught by men divinely infpired 64
Phocion, of his death 140
Phoenicians fettling in Africa, brought their
liberty with them 407
Plato, a commendation of him 59
His principles of government 62. 65, 66. 70
His opinion, who ought to be advanced
above all 65. 97. 230
Plays, the confequence of them 115. 126.
146. 155
Plebeians elefted to the chief magistracies 1 1 7.
134.137.198
Their jealoufy of the patricians 17Z
Polity, its fignification 67
Political fcience abftrufe 94
Pompey, his caufe more plaufible, but his de-
figns as bad as Caefar's 209
The firft ftep to his ruin was by violating
the laws 236
Popular government for what people beft 6t
No-where difpraifed by Ariftotle 104
The extent of its conquefts 105. 109. 128
Of Rome, how fupported 128, 129
Something of monarchical in them 133
Can never be upheld but by virtue 147. 202
Poflible, but not eafily to fall into corrup-
tion, &c. 149. 200,201. 205
Improperly what, and what in the ftrifteft:
fenfe 149
Preferves peace, and manages war beft 1 54,
Every man concerned in them 157.210. 215
States remarkable for peace 163
Excellent men are generally chofen in them
168
What feditions are feldom feen in them 172,
»73
How ruined 1 82
Encourage induflry 209
Never hurt private perfons but through er-
rors 210. 229
When they began to appear in the world 285
Obedience due to them as well as to monar-
chies 292
Portugal, who accounted king thereof by the
Englifh court 442
Poverty, no inconvenience in it, if virtue be
honoured 201
The miferable condition of Greece, Italy,
&c. 206, 207, 208
When it grew odious in Rome 277
Power (all juft fovereign) from the people 54.
78. 80, 81. 89. 194. 237, 238. 247
How he that has it is the minifter of God
5S>S6.338. 353- 377- 4*7
6 H Power,
4.86
The IN D E X.
Power, not ar. advantage, but a burden 70, 7 1
Delegated, to whom referred 70. 79, 80
The root and foundation of it 8 1
Civil, an human ordinance ibid.
Of the people fubject, to no rule but their
own will 1 1 9
Of the Romans, after the expulfion of the
kings, chiefly in the nobility 1 34
Naturally of a fierce and afplring temper
147, 148
Ssvereign and limited 176,177.194
What, in all the kingdoms peopled from the
North 232
Moft fafe when lead envied and hated 233
If it has been divided, it may be fo " in
" infinitum" 244
The Roman emperors endeavoured to make
their power hereditary 246
The ill effects of unlimited power might
caufe it to be moderated 252
What may be lawfully refilled 258
What prince ought to have it, and what
not 287
Wilt thou not be afraid of the power ? what
meant by it 290
Directive and coercive 300, 361. 304
Why it ought to be limited 307
Of the king is the power of the law 315.
371-377
What requilite in every flare 320
None can be juft but what is good 359
Over nations muft either be " de jure," or
** de fafto" 402
Of the king various, according to the con-
ftitutions of every ftate 403
Nothing can make thai inherent, which is
only delegated 423
Reftrained, when it began to grow infolent.
Inftanccs 43a, 433
Where it is not univerfal, it is not inherent
443
How that of every county, city,and borough
of England is regulated 45 1
What muft be in thofe that aft by a delegated
power 454
Where it is placed by well conftituted go-
vernments 455
Practice cannot declare the greatnefs of au-
thority 262
The confequence of fuch a doctrine 263
Of nations to their fovereigns 409
Prayers and tears the only arms of the firft
Chriftians 282
Preferments, by what means men now rife to
them 205
Given to thofe that were moft propenfe to
flavery 2 1 6
Where obtained only by virtne 2 1 8
Prerogative of kings, what 5. 65, 66
Of birth 29
Hereditary of dominion 60
All granted by confent of the whole fociety
76
What the moft glorious 268. 373
The utmoft extent of it, what 3 8. 373
Only inftituted to preferve liberty 350. 368
What is not the gracious bounty of it 357.
461
Who thought whatever could be detracted
from the liberty of the nation, would ferve
to advance the prerogative 461
PrYinccs, ordained for the- good cf the propk
39. 58. 6(3, 6l»6
Ought to be rich in virtue and wiidora 64,
6c
All things vary according to thef humocr cn
thofe that govern 107, 108, 109
Very few of an inflexible virtue 148, 149
Killing one to obtain the crown 193. w
Hafily impofed on by pretenders sot
By fetting up their own intereft, feecoca^
enemies to the public 210, 21 1, 2J2. 2t<^
God's vicegerents, doing their duty 25s
The beft, by what means drawn out of tiitr
way of juflice 141. 2©6
For they have their failings 5^6
Virtuous ones will have virtuous court?; 203,,
Evil ones juft the contrary 146. 148. 2©t»
202, 203. 216, 217, 218, 31$
How they foon lofe their dominions 16*9,
170. 192
Seek the deftrnclion of their beft fubjecls
193. 214. 293
Some confider nations, as graders do their
herds and flocks 213
May commit many errors in the beginning
of their reigns, to the ruin of themfelvcs
and people. Inftanccs 223* 224
The treachery aud perjury cf fome 242
What thofe that govern them inftigate then
to 252
How far their legal power extends 25S
Such as are barbarous to their own peor!e,
are ufually gentle to the enemies of their
country 280
A dangerous thing to arm them with too
much force 306
Bound by their oaths and promifes 325,326,
327
From whence their power is derived 377
Not fafe to contradict fome, though never
fojuftly 416
An unlimited one, what compared to, and
an inftance of fuch an one in fcripture 447
* : Principe?, " the extent of the word 16. 51.
72. 302. 388,389
The fanhedrin meant hereby 230
Prrinciples of all generous nations before Chrift's
time, what 6
And practices the beft way to judge men by
146
Prrifoners, ought to pay their promifed ran-
fom 326
Prrivate perfon, what actions denote a magi-
ftratefo 176. 178
Prrivernate?, their city taken by Plautius the
conful 414
Prrncefs, judicial and legal, what 174
Or extrajudicial 179,180
Pr reclamations are at moft but temporary 445.
45°
The danger of their being accounted laws
446, 447, 448
Prromifes ought juflly to beperformed 326
Even thofe extorted by fraud. A fcripture
inftance 326, 327
Prroperty is an appendage to liberty 317,318
Of our kings, if they be the fountain of it
39 2
Prropofitions ought to be univerfally true 13. 20
Filmer's general one, found falle 32. 214
4 Profcrip-
The I N D EX.
4*7
Proscriptions 114. 116. 122. 142. 11S84
Profperity runs naturally into all manner of cxx-
ccfies »2 2 - "445
Men have been precipitated into ruin by it
44333
Proxies the way of ufingthem 881
Proximity of blood, only regarded in fo>rrme
place?, whether legitimate or not 188. 4x01
How right defcends this way 3997
Vid. S*uccefiion.
PaniuSment of fupreme magiftrates in three: r.in-
ftances *7 6 » x 77> u 77 8
To exempt all perfons from it, fuppofes tihoey
would be guilty of the worft n £80
Where there is no fear of ic 202, :2C03
Future, many do not believe, or not regaard
it 2 54- :2 99°
Of thofe the prince corrupted to defert tithe
public caufe '4 U 9
Of thofe that give princes ill advice 41223.
444, 4445
Whether it ought to fall upon one or a feew
guilty perfons, or a whole nation thatt is
innocent *f-33?
To what members of parliament are fubtjeeft
455 1
In whom the power of it is lodged 45-54
Pyrrhus fecms equal to either of the Alex-
anders )ic68
Hisanfwer to him that ajked who fhouuld
iucceed him '84, 1*85
Qualities, no more extraordinary in
princes than in others of lefs degree- 1 10
vvliat are requifite for chief magiftnatites
38.41. (61
Few kings poiTefs all that are requifite iico6
What fubfift in a well-ordered governmieent
1 ( 14
The mod eminent without virtue, repiuttted
vile and odious :i 1 18
Quarrels among princes for the moft part bbe-
gun upon perfonal titles 173.193, 1 94, "995
Of princes, where they have been deciidded
with their own fwords 173 1 1 89
What would make a perpetual fpring off i ir-
reconcileable and mortal quarrels 1 & 88
Such as arife between the nobles and cconm-
mons, frequently produce good laws K98
Ours with the Dutch Btil
R.
RAwleigh, Sir Walter, reflected on by FFil-
mer 3998
His morals no way exaft to a well qualiifified
gentleman iibbid.
Reafon is man's nature 151.265. 308. 3313
Univerfal is that to which all nations oowe
an equal veneration 3301
Rebellion, the greateft empire of the EEaft
overthrown by that of the Mamalukes 1 1 2 1
People driven to it by mifery or defpair 1 2 22.
262, 2263
There can be no fuch as that of a naatition
againft its own magiftrates 441 3
What it implies ibbid.
Is nothing but a renewed war ibid. 4416
What is compared to witchcraft ibbid.
Regal power, never exercifed by Abraham zts
The firft fathers after the flood had not the
exercife of it 243
Regicides, their abominable fin 353
" Regnum," the fignification of the word 252
Rehoboam, a fad account of him 108. 224
His power far from being abfolute 287
Had good counfel, but would not hearken to
it 319
Was not the head of his people, and why 429
Religion, always dangerous in the the times of
the belt Roman emperors 109
Of the fame nature with virtue 2 1 2
The principles of the Popifh 448
Remedies to government applied according to
the necefllty of circumftances 117.1 36. 432,
4f3
What children have, againft their too fevere
parents 254
None to the Hebrews cries and prayers un-
der their mifcries 257
Muft be tried, how difficult foever 434
Which moft fit to applied, the beft time to
apply them, and who the propereft judges
439
Reprefentatives, how, and by whom, they came
to be deputed 382. 387. 389. 423
Whether the people fhould judge of their
behaviour 424
Republics, vid. Commonwealths.
Resignation of one's liberty, what 406
Of the crown 435 319. vid. 328.
Refinance, in what cafes juftified 211. 258,
259, 260. 269
Every one has a right to refill what ought
not to be done to him 266
Scripture inftances of refilling princes 290, 291
Refumption of lands, vid. Grants.
Retaliation, where nothing was more juft 107
Kings under this law as well as people 263,
264
Revenue, how granted to and fettled on kings
276
Revolts of conquered nations 121
Of fubjecls or allies 122. 184
Of Ifrael in Solomon's time 183. 262
Of Abfalom 261, 262
Of the ten tribes ibid.
General of a nation cannot be called a re-
bellion 4 ! 3
Revolutions, vid. Authors.
Rewards and punifhments how to be propor-
tioned 14 *
Make men fubfervient to ill defigns 275, 276
What called the rewards of the vileft fervi-
tude 381
Riches, the root of all evil 52,53. 202, 203
When they become formidable 117
Exhaufted by tribute and rapine 122
Defired, to gain follower* 275
From thence all mifchiefs enfue 277
Right of thofe fovereigns that are limited 177,
178
Proceeds from identity, not from fimihtudc
428
What belongs to every man in all cafes 436
Acquired, how to be obtained 332
How the refignation of it to another operates
393
Hereditary to the dominion of the world,
no fuch thing 45 • 69
Right,
4 88
The INDEX.
Rtght, g^eat variety in the deduction of it 88
Univerfal, conferred by God and nature 37
Where it muft have been 41.43.49.77
"Mull be in one, or divided 42, 45
Where it devolves on particular nations 77
Ofchufing, infers a right of making a king
Created by an explicit aft of approbation 84. i\
Naturally belonging to nations, not im-
paired by the name of fupreme given to
magiftrates 1 76
Of proceeding judicially, or extrajudicially,
againftall that tranfgrefs the laws 180.258
Of occupancy 38, 39. 55
None can come by conqueft 24
None to be deduced from him that had none
2 4-43-54
Where to be acknowledged 39
Of Jack Straw, Wat. Tyler, Perkin War-
beck 1 89
The continuance of an unjuft ufurpation
can never create a right 247
Of particular nations, how it may fubfift
ii, 12
Proceeds from the laws of nature 380
To crowns, what faid to be infeparable from
kings 97
Muft be either natural, created, or acquired
332
Rochel, how it came to be taken 219
Rods and axes, before whom, and why, carried
144. 175, 176
Roman emperors, who the belt and wifeft of
them 200
How they were fet up 285
Empire, deftroyed by the lofs of her liberty
loo. til, 112, 113, 114. 124, 125.
128. 137
lis extent, after the recovery of liberty 113.
124
Tacitus's defcription of it in its declenfion
114. 116
It did not fall on a fudden, and why 1 15
Her" delatores," what fort of people 114
Subdued by the moft barbarous nations 116.
125. 143
Perpetually decayed, when it fell into the
hands of one man 123, 124, 125. 230.237
Its own prudence prefcrved it 1 28. 1 73
Romans had three ways of dealing with con-
quered nations 121
What raifed them above the reft of man-
kind 158
They only fit to be fo, who thought no-
thing valuable but liberty 414
Rome, whether thaf government was paternal
38
Overthrew all the monarchies within their
reach 38. 113. 128
Its extent at firft 73. 123
Wherein (he excelled other nations 104. 123
When me met with defeats and ruin 105.
216, 217
All that ever was defirable in her, pro-
ceeded from liberty 1 1 2
Never produced a brave man fince the firft
age of her flavery 1 14
How it was compofed 1 30
Sought her grandeur by war 134. 160
Her fortune when (he became a monarchy
Rome, none fo free from 'crimes of wilful in-
juiftke, nor guilty of fo few errors, as fhe
141
Her generofity ibid.
The rmildnefs of her government for 300
years 14Z, 143, 144
Struggling for liberty, at laft was ruined by
the Barbarians 143
Not cmflaved when Brutus wab killed 167
Was je:alous of Valerius Publkola, and why
172
The j»e:ace Hie had under Auguftus 1 84
Whem jfilled with blood and afhes ibid. 185
Her condition now 207
Suffe re:d more by one villain, than by all
the defeats received from Hannibal 208
A pe:rpietual fpring of brave and valiant men
fo long as liberty lafted 218
Remaimed in flavery notwithstanding the
flaiughter of Casfar- 269
Her Mings lands, after their expulfion, con-
fec:ra.ted to Mars 276
Romulus, flain for aiming at too great an au-
thority 37
How ncot made king by the people, but by
God 54. vid. 362
Laidithie right of appeals to the people, as
the foundation of his commonwealth 119
How hie tempered the fierce humour of the
peopile 366
Rule, tlhe:re muft be cne relating to the acqui-
fition amd exercife of power 227. 400
The law of nature, is that which God has
givem to things 265
If any/ ihad been given by God and nature,
it imuift have been from the beginning uni-
verfa.l and perpetual 364
There i:s one which kings are obliged to fol-
low 40 1
None can be fo exafl as to make provision
aga_in:lt all difputes 417
Without it, fociety cannot fubfift 437
Men liulbjett to none but that of their cwn
reaifon 45 ^
Rules, Kett to diftinguilh between right aid
wrong i:n princes 39
By whiich men are governed, are named
laws 60
Not gemerally true, if there be any juft ex-
ceptions againft them 80
In politiicsj fome which ought always to be
obfenved 136, 137. 150
Obfervecd in England as to point of fuccef-
fion 188
S.
SAbeams., their kings, though obeyed in all
things within their palace, yet might be
Honed! without it 89
Sacred,not to be accounted fo by crimes 1 79, 1 80
The ft:ily the houfe of Auftria
337- 39 6
Contefts will arife conicerning it, how exact-
ly foever it be difpofed of by law 339
No footfleps of any regular one, either by
inheritance or eledliion 363
Of the crown fettled by parliament 378
Several queftions ariifing from that which
is hereditary 395, 396
Superiority, given to Mofes, who was the
younger brother 27
Not in nature, but im virtue 60, 61. 65
Supplications and remoinftrances, where to be
ufed 434
Supreme, the extent of the word 176,177,
178. 248, 249. 352. 378
Power has been enjoyed in the fulleft extent
by fuch as never h;ad the name of king
304
Where there was a reservation of this power
in the people 311
Sweden, the blood-royail not to marry out of
the country, or wmhout the confent of
the ftates 188
How the inheritance tto the crown is fettled
there 331.400
Eledlion the beft title to it 332. 387
Their laws but few 370
Who the nobility of t:hat country 387
What Charles Guftawus told an ambafla-
dor there 400
Switzers, the thirteen ciantons, how long they
have enjoyed more perace than any other ftate
of Europe 163, 164
None more free from popular (editions 163
The laws of their couintry read over in a few
hours 37°
How they ufe their dielegates 45 x
Sword, where left as am inheritaance to fami-
lies 108
The right of appeals overthrown by it H9
He that draws it ngaiinft his prince, ought
to throw away the fcabbard 173
Of juftice, and of wair 174. 285, 286
When the only law tlhat governs 185. 209
A way of killing, w *75
What to be accounted making of war 259,
260
Differs much from what it was formerly 281
There is fuch a thing among men as a juit
war, and why 291, 292
Kings of Judah could not make any with-
out the confent of the fanhedrin 295
Whether a fubject may examine, if it be jult
or unjuft ?47, 348
Where the caufe of it is originally juit, ai d
it proves fucceftful ; what right the gene-
rals have over their enemies 403
The events of it various 41 1
V/ars, civil, only made by members of the
civil fociety 1 2 1
None till the times of Mnrius, Sylla, and
Catiline ibid,
Efteemed the laft ftrugglings of expiring li-
berty ibid.
The root of the Romans, what 129
In Erance 135. 195
Erom whence they arife 172. 196
Pretences for them commonly falfe 173
When they will always be frequent 192
What reigns moft accompanied with them
ibid.
In Spain 196
More in kingdoms than in commonwealths
198. 206. 208
Not the greateft evil that befals nations 206
The Romans and Grecians glory in freeing
their countries from a civil war 221
In Machiavel's account are a difeafe 434
Wards, that court, how the inftitution of it
was perverted 5 1
Weftminfter, what its privileges in point of
elcclions 423
Wickednefs, makes men cowards 226
Will is ever drawn by fome real good, or the
appearance of it 38
The dividing of the world, left to the will of
man 43, 44
Paffing for law, the effects of it 109. 226,
227. 246. 455, 456
Where this is the rule, the prince fets up an
int'ereft feparate from that of his people 242
William
I N D EX.
William I. ele&ed " a clero Sc populo" 82.
2 97
Could inherit nothing 88
On what conditions fworn to be received 327
In his time, our anceftors were in a low
condition 375
Wifdom , not always annexed to the character
of kings 50
When men give teftimony of it ib:d.
Whole we ought to admire and imitate 65.
177
The wifeft men moft fit for government 105
Of man imperfect 136
A kind of ability to difpatch fome fort of
affairs, is fo called 225
Of the collected body of the people fur-
paffes that of a fmgle man 318
Witneffes falfe encouraged, and called " cuilo-
" des legum " 1 1 4. 146
No fufficient defence againft them, either by
the laws of God or man 140
Miniileis of iniquity 170. 214
Countenanced at Rome 207
Thebeft tribunals in the world may be milled
by them 228
Irifh 114
Wittena-gemote,its power as declared by Cam-
dem 383
The power of the nation refided in them
388. 422
Women, on what account they are excluded
in France and Turky 47. 89. 188. 331. 401
And were by other nations 47
Some do admit them 90.188
"What have governed kings, but feldom fe-
nates, or popular aftemblics 191. 200,201
What mifchiefs kings have been guilty of to
gratify them 447
Work, that of all magiftrates and governors
55.61
Word men advanced, and moft ambitious to be
fo 51. 58, 64, 65. 70
And by whom preferred 148, 149, 150. 154
Stiled fathers of their people 54, 55
Have their tools to execute their deteitable
defigns 1 26
Tyranny fet up by them 152, 153, 154.214
Engaged in all tumults 183
Moft frequently have obtained the empire
by the worft means 1 87
Word men, their principles ought to be de*
flroyed 201
Eafily fwallow bribes 202. 204
Have moft power in fome courts 204,205
How princes become Co, as alio the molt
miferable 241, 243
Delight in the worft things 265
Whom they had no need to fear 293
What bafecourfes they take to gain the fa-
vour of weak and vicious princes 306
What encourages them to murder the belt
princes 377
Worthy men, in ill times, fufp e&ed for their
virtue 114,
Ought to be had in higheft veneration 365
Wrong is a breach of the laws, which deter-
mine what is right. 227
If there be none done, there can be no re-
venge ibid.
Where kings can do none 443
X.
XEnophon, why he called Agefilaus a good
and faithful king 87
Conducted the Grecians retreat in defpite of
above 400000 men, who endeavoured to
eppofe them 1 1 1
His opinion concerning tyranny 138
For ariftocracy 138, 139. 154
Xerxes, his folly in inflicting ftripes on the fea
5°
His invafion of Greece 159
Y.
YNCA Garcilaffo of Peru, the fabulous
ftory of him 186
Younger brothers preferred to the elder 27, 28J
ZEAL, excefs of violence is but an ill
teftimony of it 163
When it can never be capable of excefs 259
Zimri, his title to the fupreme honour, how
acquired 35
Zoroafter, fuppofed to be Ham 32
495
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