LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT <' Laurens, haud ultima Phoebi Gloria, jactatis Laurens fida anchora Musis." Angelo Poliziano {^usticus) MEDICI PORTRAITS, REPRODUCED FROM LITTA I. COSIMO, BY PONTORMO— UFFIZI GALLERY II. LORENZO, BY (;. VASARI. UFFIZI GALLERY III. CARLO, SON OF COSIMO I APOSTOLIC PROTONOTARY AND PROVOST OF PRATO. UY FRA FILIPFO I.IPl'I — PRATO CATHEDRAL IV. HIPFOLITO, CARDINAL. REPUTED SON OF GIULIANO, D. OF NEMOURS. BY TITIAN — PlTTl GALLERY LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT AND FLORENCE IN HER GOLDEN AGE BY E. L. S. HORSBURGH, B.A. LATE EXHIBITIONER OF QUEKN's COLLEGE, OXFORD AUTHOR OF " SAVONAROLA," " WATERLOO " WITH TWENTY-FOUR ILLUSTRATIONS AND TWO MAPS New York : G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS London: METHUEN & CO. 1908 First Published in igo8 THE GETTY RESEARGH INSTITUTE LIBWVroC PREFACE THIS book has been written for those who will read it whoever they may be, though the writer is not without hope that serious students of the Italian Renaissance will find it — or parts of it — not wholly unworthy of their attention. I am well aware that there are works of great excellence upon Lorenzo dei Medici already open to the English reader. None the less I will venture to make an effort to justify the appearance of another. Of existing works in English there are three which may claim to be classics — Mr. Roscoe's life of Lorenzo dei Medici ; the English translation of Baron von Reumont's elaborate study ; and Mr. Armstrong's monograph. Roscoe's book, written nearly a century ago, can never be entirely superseded. It retains, moreover, among its many excellences, the prestige attaching to the work of a pioneer. But in the course of a century much fresh light has been thrown on Lorenzo's work and character. Baron von Reumont, therefore, supplied a pressing need by the publication of his volumes, based on most minute, careful and conscientious researches. Almost every available document and source was ransacked by Von Reumont to provide material for his book, and, since his researches were completed, comparatively little that is fresh has come to light. But it must be confessed that the English translation of Von Reumont's Lorenzo is — to put it frankly — unreadable. However much it may be a treasure to the student, to the general reader it is a terror. It is full of inaccuracies and almost wholly lacking in style. It can only be regarded as a misfortune that a book which is so keen and fine a study vi LORENZO DEI MEDICI of Humanism should, in its English dress, be wanting in those humanistic quahties, which, had they been present, could scarcely have failed to bring Lorenzo home to every student of character and to every lover of Florence. To re-translate Von Reumont in an interesting way would be in itself no small literary service. Mr. Armstrong's monograph is a book differing in scope and kind from the productions of Roscoe and Von Reumont. In it we have, from the hand of an acknowledged master, a briUiant impressionist sketch of Lorenzo's character and career. The hero is thrown up in strong relief against a background of deep, though unobtrusive erudition, painted from the fullest knowledge of all the varied aspects- political, constitutional, literary, philosophic, artistic— of the period which he dominated. Mr. Armstrong's book has been in a sense my despair, for he may seem to have done for Lorenzo all that needed to be done— all that could be done— in a supremely able way. Yet Mr. Armstrong himself was one of the first to spur me on to accomplish this work which is now presented to the public. The thirty years of continuous friendship which has existed between us, and the grateful memories of a pupil for his tutor, afford sufficient assurance that it is only in a spirit of admiring humihty that I venture upon ground already trodden by him. There are, however, reasons which lead me to hope that this book will to some extent supplement not only Mr. Armstrong's monograph, but also the works of Roscoe and Von Reumont. For the more I studied Lorenzo the more I became impressed with the quality of his work as a poet. Roscoe told us much of this, and Armstrong knows all, but, as far as I am aware, no writer in English has yet attempted an analysis and critical estimate of Lorenzo's poetic achieve- ment on a scale adequate to his merit. Vernon Lee in her Euphorion, Symonds in his "Renaissance in Italy", have done much to stimulate an appetite, but the scope of their work scarcely afforded them the opportunity to satisfy it. In successive chapters I have reviewed Lorenzo's poetry. PREFACE Vll in the hope that Nencia, Ambra, Corinto aiid the CafitoU, by becoming better known, may inspire the sense of appreciation, occasionally rising to enthusiasm, which they have aroused in me. It was necessary for my purpose to extract, somewhat generously, illustrative passages, and these passages I have given in the original. Each passage is accompanied by a translation, for which, except in one or two specified cases, I am responsible. As I can make no pretensions to be a poet, I cannot hope that my efforts have truly caught the spirit and brio of Lorenzo's muse. The only merit that I can claim for them is that, in so far as I could make them so, the translations are faithful and literal. Though a full harvest has already been reaped from the documents and authorities which supply the material for our knowledge of Lorenzo as a statesman, yet I have perhaps been able to glean here and there some trifles which may serve to enhance the interest of Lorenzo's story. My narrative is based throughout upon original texts and original authorities which I have been able to study at leisure in the quiet atmosphere of the noble library founded by Mrs. John Rylands at Manchester. In that temple of peace which receives the student, dizzy with the roar of Deansgate, into a Gothic shrine dedicated to the service of scholarship and reflection, I have spent many of the happiest hours of my life. There are to be found not only inestimable treasures which quicken the pulses of virtuosi and collectors, but all the apparatus of sound learning, and all the comfort in acquiring it which the heart of a scholar can desire. Manchester has long been known, to those who know her, as a city pre-eminent for her enthusiasm for the things of the spirit. Permeated as she may be with the passion of commercialism, yet she has . never lacked those who have been able to impress upon her corporate life a sense of the dignity of Art, the glory of literature, and the nobility of the service of man. Her galleries, her public libraries, the social effort of her worthiest sons and daughters, have been for years her speaking testimony to the truth that viii LORENZO DEI MEDICI man, even in Manchester, does not live by bread alone. Now, in her Rylands Library, she challenges the attention of scholars, wherever they may be throughout the world. Now she may dare to aspire to a scholastic reputation akin to that enjoyed by an Oxford or a Cambridge. I have been permitted to lay a few of the rarities of the library under contribution for the purpose of illustrating this book. My warmest thanks are due to The Provost of Queen's College, Oxford, for his kindly encouragement ; — to Mr. Henry Guppy, Librarian of the Rylands Library, who has seemed to take a positive pleasure in satisfying my every want, at whatever cost of trouble to himself ; — to Mr. Frederick B. Miles of New York, President of the American Society for the extension of University Teaching, whose special skill in verse translation has given peculiar value to his criticisms on my verses ; — to the proprietors of the rights in Botticelli's illustrations of Dante for permission to reproduce the illustration of Canto X of the " Inferno " ; — and to my publishers, who, without a murmur, have permitted me to extend the scope of this book far beyond the limits which they originally assigned to it. Even so I fear that I can make no claim to completeness. There will be found only a few brief and casual references to the Art of Florence in Lorenzo's day, though I have lived for long under its spell. My original intentions have been modified by exigencies of space, and even more so by the contemplation of the many recent works on Florentine Art which, for the time, have exhausted the subject. Want of space again has combined with a sense of my own in- competence as a philosopher to debar me from giving that prominence to the Neo Platonic revival which its interest and importance merit. E. L. S. H. St. Helens, Isle of Wight, 1908. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION THE STATE OF ITALY IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY A. Venice — Milan — Naples Venice— Milan— Naples— Claims of the Papacy on Naples— The House of Suabia in Naples— Frederick II.— Naples and Henry III. of England —Charles of Anjou— Conflicting claims of Anjou and Aragon to Naples— Reign of the Angevin queen Giovanna I. in Naples— Charles of Durazzo secures the crown of Naples— Renewed rivalry between Houses of Aragon and Anjou— Alphonso of Aragon gains the crown of Naples — Ferrante succeeds to the crown of Naples — Claims of the French kings to Naples P- ^ B. The Papacy The Papacy in the fifteenth century— The Papacy in relation to its tem- poral power— The great Schism of the West, 1 378-141 7— The Papacy after the Schism— Eugenius IV.— The Conciliar spirit— Nicolas V. —Extinction of the Conciliar spirit— Policy of Nicolas V.— Papal policy in regard to the States of the Church— Advantages attachmg to the Papacy from its dual position— Disadvantages— Papal nepotism —The Papacy and the Italian Powers— Florence— Venice— Milan— The Italian Powers and the Turks— The Popes and Prince Djem p. 16 C. Florence Geographical and political position of Florence— Her attitude towards Italian questions— Conditions governing the development of Florence —Tendencies towards despotism in Florence before the Medici— Rise of Florence— Beginnings of a Constitution— Florence and the Guelph and Ghibelline contest— Florence divided by internal factions —Florence commends herself to Charles of Anjou— Reorganisation of the Constitution, 1 267— Gradation of class in Florence— Attempts to exclude the nobility from power— The Signoria established— Giano della Bella's " Ordinances "—Neri and Bianchi factions- Reorganisation of the Constitution, 1328— Tyranny of the Duke of Athens— His expulsion— Defeat of the nobles— Revision of the Constitution— Rise of a burgher aristocracy— The Albizzi— Fresh divisions consequent on war with Pope Gregory XI.— Opposition of the Signoria and Parte Guelfa— Revolt of the Ciompi— Michele di Lando— The Albizzi recover control of the State, 1 381— The Medici and the Albizzi— Character of the Albizzi government— Impending crisis between Albizzi and Medici . . • • • P- 3° ix X LORENZO DEI MEDICI CHAPTER I RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY TO THE DEATH OF COSIMO Giovanni dei Medici, great-grandfather of Lorenzo the Magnificent- Giovanni's relations with the Albizzi— Cosimo dei Medici— Rivalries between Cosimo and the Albizzi— Banishment of Cosimo— His recall ; fall of the Albizzi — Supremacy of Cosimo— Character of his ascen- dency — His methods of government — His foreign policy— The Milanese alliance — Abortive opposition to Cosimo, 1455 — Luca Pitii— Coup d'etat oi 14^,8 — Death of Cosimo, 1464 . . . . p. 57 CHAPTER II COSIMO DEI MEDICI AND THE HUMANISTIC REVIVAL Incongruities of Cosimo's character— Character of the Florentines— Sympathy of Florence with Humanism— Effects of commerce on national character— Spiritual life and aspirations of Cosimo— Cosimo and the cult of Plato— Florence and the Revival of Learning- Francesco Petrarch— Revival of Greek— Meanings and implications of Humanism— Recovery of ancient MSS.— Professors of Greek in Florence — Foundation of academies — Humanism in relation to Christianity — Harmony between Cosimo and Florentine ideals — Cosimo as a collector of books — Efforts to reconcile Platonism and Christianity — Gemisthos Plethon — Ambrogio Traversari . p. 75 CHAPTER III RULE OF PIERO DEI MEDICI— EARLY YEARS OF LORENZO Lorenzo's birth and parentage— Lucrezia Tornabuoni— Lorenzo's educa- tion—Educational system of Vittorino da Feltre — Lorenzo's character and appearance— Early initiation into public life — The Medici and the Triple Alliance— Crisis caused by the death of Francesco Sforza, 1466— The Pitti conspiracy— Luca Pitti— Diotisalvi Neroni— Niccolo Soderini — Agnolo Acciaiuoli — Lorenzo secures support of Ferrante of Naples — The conspirators secure the aid of foreign Powers Lorenzo and the conspiracy — Collapse of the conspiracy— Its effect on the Medici power . . . . , , . p. 94 CHAPTER IV THE COLLEONIC WAR— LORENZO, POET AND LOVER- - LAST DAYS OF PIERO Despair of the Pitti exiles— The exiles stir up war against Florence— Bartolommeo Colleone— Attitude of Venice— The Colleonic war- Alliances and counter-alliances— Romagna chosen as the seat of war —Dilatory conduct of the war— Combat at Molinella— Dissatisfaction m Florence— Intervention of Louis XI. of France— End of the Col. CONTENTS xi Iconic war— Literary work of Lorenzo, 1 467-1 469— The sonnets and " Commentario " — Biographical interest of the " Commentario " — Lucrezia Donati— Lorenzo's tournament, 1469— Marriage of Lorenzo to Clarice Orsini, December 1468— Lucrezia Tomabuoni on Clarice Orsini— Conclusion of the marriage negotiations— Marriage celebra- tions—Lorenzo's mission to Milan, 1469— Dissatisfaction of Piero Florence intervenes on behalf of Roberto Malatesta of Rimini — Death of Piero dei Medici — His character . . . . p. no CHAPTER V FIRST YEARS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT, 1469-1472 Lorenzo invited to assume the headship of the State— Position of Giuliano in the Government— Nature of Lorenzo's authority— Anomalies in Lorenzo's position— First actions of Lorenzo as Head of the State — Constitutional machinery of Lorenzo's government— The Bardi con- spiracy at Prato— Lorenzo's Foreign policy— Galeazzo Sforza of Milan visits Florence— Attitude of Ferrante of Naples— Death of Pope Paul XL, 147 1— Accession of Pope Sixtus IV.— His character — Relations between Lorenzo and the Pope . . . p. 1 1 3 CHAPTER VI THE INSURRECTION OF VOLTERRA Geographical and political position of Volterra— Discovery of alum mines near Volterra— Lorenzo's alleged partnership in the Alum Company —Dispute between the company and the citizens— Attitude of Florence in regard to the dispute— Disturbances in Volterra— Their effect on Florence— Lorenzo insists on prompt intervention— Conduct of the war against Volterra— Sack of Volterra— Personal action of Lorenzo towards the ruined city P- I49 CHAPTER Vn EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY Lorenzo's relations with Foreign powers— Louis XI. of France— Lorenzo negotiates a Franco-Neapolitan marriage— Pope Sixtus IV. — State of rest in the affairs of Italy— Beginnings of the alienation of the Pope from Lorenzo— Papal policy in Romagna— The Pope and Ferrante of Naples— Florence draws towards Venice— Sixtus IV. and his nephews— The Pope detaches the Duke of Urbino from Florence —Question of Imola— Sixtus IV. transfers his account from the Medici to the Pazzi bank— The Pope, Lorenzo, and Citta di Castello — Salviati appointed Archbishop of Pisa— Opposition of Lorenzo to Salviati— Lorenzo and Carlo Fortebraccio— Resentment of Sixtus IV. against Lorenzo— Venice takes the place of Naples in the Triple Alliance— Assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza— Far-reachmg consequences of Sforza's death— Distractions in the government of Milan— Attitude of Lorenzo towards the situation in Milan— Ludovico Sforza assumes the government of Milan . . • . p. 161 xii LORENZO DEI MEDICI CHAPTER VIII THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY— THE PLOT, AND THE MEN WHO HATCHED IT The Pazzi family — Causes of their animosity against Lorenzo — Political grievances — Private grievances — The Borromeo inheritance — Giro- lamo Riario thinks himself thwarted by Lorenzo — Girolamo ap- proaches Francesco di Pazzi— Salviati, Archbishop of Pisa— Jacopo di Pazzi — His original attitude towards the conspiracy — Services of Battista di Montesecco enlisted — Interview between Girolamo and Montesecco — Montesecco engaged to secure foreign aid — Montesecco's interview with Lorenzo — Interview with Jacopo di Pazzi — Monte- secco relates the story of his interview with the Pope — Jacopo joins the conspiracy — Extent to which the Pope was implicated in the conspiracy — Difficulties of the conspirators as to means to accomplish their ends — The conspirators in Rome — Lorenzo invited to Rome — Ringleaders of the conspiracy in Florence — Accomplices . p. 183 CHAPTER IX THE PLOT IN EXECUTION Cardinal Raffaelle Sansoni made a catspaw for the conspirators — The conspiracy culminates on Sunday. April 26, 1478 — In the Duomo — Montesecco's place as chief assassin taken by two priests — Lorenzo and Giuliano come to the Duomo — Assassination of Giuliano — Lorenzo is wounded and escapes — Salviati attempts to seize the Palazzo Publico— Jacopo dei Pazzi fails to raise the mob and escapes — Summary vengeance executed on the conspirators — Botticelli's frescoes on the Palazzo Publico — Bandini escapes to Constantinople, but is extradited and executed — Punishment of the Pazzi family — Capture and execution of Jacopo — Montesecco writes a confession and is executed— Release of Raffaelle Sansoni — Retirement of the foreign troops from before Florence — General grief for Giuliano — His character — Ferocious decree against the name of Pazzi p. 199 CHAPTER X DIPLOMATIC WAR OF THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY Reception of the news at Foreign Courts— Rage of Girolamo— Riario and the Pope — Insult to the Florentine ambassador at Rome Sixtus IV, issues a Brief of Excommunication against Florence General preparations for hostilities — The " Brief Answer " to a Papal letter— Letter of the Signoria to the Pope — Danger to the Pope from the possible intervention of France — Attitude of Louis XI. towards the Papacy— Louis XI. sends Philip de Commines to Italy — Commines in Florence — Attitude of Lorenzo towards French CONTENTS Xlll intervention— Letter to Sixtus purporting to come from the Floren- tine Synod— Bartolommeo Scala's " Excusatio Fiorentinorum — Sixtus declares that he is at war only with Lorenzo— Weakness of the Triple Alliance at this juncture— Letter of Sixtus to the Duke of Urbino— Urbino's hostility to Lorenzo— Lorenzo submits hi^ cause to the Florentines— Lorenzo's measures of self-defence p» 21 5 CHAPTER XI THE WAR OF THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY Ferrante decides to support the Fope-The Papal forces take the field —followed by those of Florence— Ercole d'Este made generalissimo of the allied forces supporting Florence— Comparison of the rival forces— Operations of the campaign of 1478— Ferrante creates a diversion in Genoa against Milan— Florentine diplomacy and projects -Action of Louis XL— Obduracy of the Pope-The Pope, urged by foreign powers, temporises— Failure of the efEorts for peace— Guerilla operations of the Sforza brothers-The Campaign of 1479-Malatesta and Cortebraccio defeat the Papal force at La Magione-Duke of Calabria surprises the Florentine Camp at Poggio Impenale— Calabria besieges Colle— Situation of Florence and Lorenzo at the end of the campaign-Ludovico Sforza gains control over Milan— Lorenzo negotiates with Ludovico Sforza— Lorenzo's project of visitmg Naples —Lorenzo leaves Florence for Naples— Reception of Lorenzo by Ferrante— Lorenzo's arguments to Ferrante— Hesitation of Ferrante —Conduct of Lorenzo in Naples— Ferrante comes to terms with Lorenzo— Remaining difficulties ended by the descent of the Turks upon Italy— Lorenzo suspected of calling in the Turks— Florentine embassy of apology to Sixtus IV.-Botticelli's "Pallas and the Centaur " P' CHAPTER XII NATURE AND BASIS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT General position of Lorenzo towards the Florentine Constitution-Lorenzo strengthens his personal power-Formation of the Council of Seventy IpSnctions of^the Council of Seventy-Committe^ withm the Council-Machinery for constructing the Council of Seventy-The Consiglio Maggiore-Later modifications of the Council of Seventy -Sorenzo's system of Taxation and Finance-Corruptions of adminis- tration-Lorenzo's private use of public ^^''^-^'Z'''^^ fj^^^ lation of the Monte delle Doti-Lorenzo as a man J^^^^^^^^ Lorenzo's encouragement of trade and commerce-AfEair of the Bartolini Bank-Administration of justice-Private methods of influence and control— Lorenzo's interference m marriages . p. 257 xiv LORENZO DEI MEDICI CHAPTER XIII LORENZO AS AN ITALIAN STATESMAN Lorenzo's Italian policy— His aims— (i.) to recover Sarzana • (ii.) to girdle Florence with small friendly States; (iii.) to maintain the peace of Italy— Difficulties of maintaining a balance of power in Italy— The Turks evacuate Otranto— The Frescobaldi Conspiracy, May 148 1 — The Conspiracy consolidates Lorenzo's position— Venice declares war on Ferrara : alliances and counter-alliances of the Italian States— Archbishop of Carniola threatens a General Council — Sixtus IV. abandons Venice — Congress of Cremona, February, 1483 — Venice detaches Ludovico Sforza from the League Peace of Bagnolo, August 1484— Death of Sixtus IV.— Disappointment of Florence at the terms of the Peace— Election of Innocent VIII. as Pope— Character of Innocent VIII.— Embassy of Piero dei Medici to congratulate the Pope— Lorenzo seeks to regain Sarzana— Capture of Pietra Santa — Lucca demands the cession of Pietra Santa- Beginning of the Barons' war in Naples — Innocent and Ferrante — Ferrante seeks the support of Lorenzo— Lorenzo secures the support of Florence for Ferrante— Confusion created by the Barons' war- Lorenzo influences the Pope to abandon the war with Naples— Inno- cent makes peace, but Lorenzo is practically ignored — Vigorous prosecution of the Siege of Sarzana— Lorenzo at the siege of Sarzana —Rejoicings in Florence— Boccalino Guzzoni of Osimo, i486— Lorenzo mediates between the Pope and Boccalino — Marriage of Lorenzo's daughter to the Pope's son, 1487— Assassination of Giro- lamo Riario, April 1488— Heroism of Caterina Sforza— Alleged complicity of Lorenzo in the murder of Riario— Ottaviano Riario established in the government of Forli — Recovery of Piancaldoli Disturbances in Faenza— Murder of Galeotto Manfredi by his wife, Francesca Bentivoglio, May 1488— Lorenzo's apprehensions of the hostility of Bologna— Lorenzo establishes the government of the Baglioni in Perugia— Summary and criticism of Lorenzo's Italian PO^cy p. 280 CHAPTER XIV LORENZO AND HIS FAMILY Lorenzo's care for his family— His mother— His wife Clarice— Love for his children— Piero dei Medici— Giuliano, Duke of Nemours— Mar- riages of his daughters— Giovanni dei Medici (Leo X.)— His eccle- siastical preferments— Giovanni's Cardinalate— Rejoicings in Florence over Giovanni's Cardinalate— Giovanni in Rome— Lorenzo's letter to Giovanni— Lorenzo's difficulties with the Pope and Naples- Strained relations between Innocent and Ferrante— Lorenzo mediates between the Pope and Ferrante— Threatened intervention of France m Naples— Lorenzo's interest in the fortunes of his son-in-law Fran- ceschetto Cibo— Varied interests of Lorenzo— Savonarola and Lorenzo — Fra Mariano— Flourishing state of Florence in Lorenzo's last years —Troubles in Florence— Embassy from the Soldan of Egypt— CONTENTS XV Deceptive appearances of security in Italy and Florence — Demora- lising influences of wealth and luxury in Florence — General aspect of affairs in 1492— If France came into Italy, Spain was not likely to hold aloof P- 3i7 CHAPTER XV LORENZO'S LAST BAYS— VENIT SUM MA DIES ET INELUCTABILE TEMPUS Crisis in Lorenzo's health, 1492 — Poliziano's account of Lorenzo's last illness — Lorenzo's physicians — Savonarola visits Lorenzo on his death-bed— Poliziano's version— Death of Lorenzo, April 8, 1492 — Savonarola and Lorenzo ; another version — Contemporary accounts, other than Poliziano's — Origins and criticisms of the Savonarola story — Portents which signalised Lorenzo's death — Suicide of Piero Leoni — Lorenzo's funeral and last resting-place — Decree of the Signoria, eulogising Lorenzo and conferring the government on Piero P- 347 CHAPTER XVI LORENZO IN RELATION TO THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY Lorenzo the embodiment of Renaissance tendencies — Renaissance and mediaeval ideals contrasted — Impulses which gave force and meaning to the Renaissance — The revival of ancient learning — Lorenzo as a type of some of the best impulses of the Renaissance — Character and quality of his Humanism — Motives of Lorenzo's Humanism — Study of Greek in Florence — Purpose animating Lorenzo as a collector of antiques — Lorenzo as a patron of Literature — The cult of Plato — Landino's " Disputationes Camaldulenses " — Publication of Lan- dino's edition of Dante's " Divine Comedy " — Lorenzo and the University of Pisa— Difficulties with the Pisan Professors — Barto- lommeo Sozzini — Lorenzo and the Platonic Academy — Platonic studies of Marsilio Ficino . . . . • • • P- 359 CHAPTER XVII LORENZO AS PROSE WRITER AND POET— THE " COMMEN- TARIO " SONNETS, AND PASTORALS Decline of vernacular literature — Survival of the vernacular in the songs of the people — Lorenzo's services to Literature — Revival of the vernacular — Leo Battista Alberti — Lorenzo's defence of the ver- nacular — Lorenzo's " Commentario " — Lorenzo as a critic of Italian literature— The Sonnets — Origin of the Sonnets — Lorenzo's defence of the Sonnet form— Qualities of Lorenzo's Sonnets— Muratori on Lorenzo's poetry — Lorenzo's poetic versatility — Lorenzo's dangerous facility in versification — The Selve d'Amore — Love, Beauty, and Mv Ladv — The Selve and Poliziano's La Giostra — Ambra — Corinto ^ p. 378 xvi LORENZO DEI MEDICI CHAPTER XVIII LORENZO AS POET (continued)— NENCI A DA BARBERINO AND THE CANT I Analysis and criticism of Nencia da Barbarino — The Canzone on Nencia's death — The Canti a Ballo — Connection of the Canti with old popular Florentine songs — Moral influences of the Canti — The Canti Carnascialeschi— Selections from the Canti a Ballo — Carnival songs in their relation to carnival celebrations — II Lasca — The revel of Bacchus and Ariadne ....... p. 403 CHAPTER XIX LORENZO AS POET {continued)—S AT IRICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL SACRED AND MISCELLANEOUS POEMS / Beoni or The Drinkers — Impulses of Lorenzo's religious poetry — L'Alter- cazione — The CapitoH— The Lauds — 5S. Giovanni e Paolo — Amori di Venere e Marte — The Caccia col Falcone — Pico della Mirandola on Lorenzo's poetry — Comparison with Dante and Petrarch — General estimate of Lorenzo as Poet — Importance of Lorenzo's poetry in relation to his character . . . . . . .p. 424 CHAPTER XX LIFE AND MANNERS IN LORENZO'S FLORENCE Character of the Florentines as determined by the conditions of life Commercial and industrial activities of the city — Lorenzo as a citizen — Standard of education in Florence — Simplicity of private life Masculine costume in Florence — The condition of women — Woman in the family — Anomalies in the position of the wife — Lorenzo's intrigue with Bartolommea de' Nasi — Female costume — The feminine toilet— Florentine games— Horse-racing— The game of Calcio— Love of country life — Lorenzo at his villas . . . . .p. 445 CHAPTER XXI EPILOGUE— STATE OF FLORENCE AND ITALY AFTER THE DEATH OF LORENZO Calamities of Italy and of the House of Medici following Lorenzo's death —Could he have averted them ?— French claims to Milan and Naples —Charles VIII. of France— Charles VIII. incited to invade Italy — Rule of Piero dei Medici in Florence — Piero reverses Lorenzo's foreign policy— Piero seeks to propitiate Charles VIII.— Florence repudiates Piero's terms : expulsion of the Medici — Charles VIII. at Pisa and at Florence — Treaty between Charles and Florence Charles VIII. occupies Naples— Intervention of Ferdinand of Aragon— Italian League against the French : retreat of Charles from Naples — Louis XII. prosecutes his claim to Milan, and to Naples Partition CONTENTS xvii Treaty of Granada between Louis and Ferdinand — Dual occupation of Naples by Louis and Ferdinand — Disputes between France and Aragon in Naples — The Spaniards expel the French from Naples — Death of Piero dei Medici at the Garigliano — Changes in the Papacy : accession of Julius II., 1503 — Julius II. aims at the expulsion of the French from Milan — Battle of Ravenna : death of Gaston de Foix — The French withdraw from Milan — Florence and her French alliance — Julius II. determines to re-establish the Medici in Florence — The Medici restored by the aid of a Spanish army, 1512 — Giovanni and Giuliano dei Medici — Rapid changes of personality in the Medici Government — Florence ready to rise against her Medici rulers— Italy in relation to the European situation in 1525 — Charles V., the Emperor, defeats Francis I. at Pavia — The Imperial troops march on Rome — Reconciliation between the Emperor and Pope Clement VII. — Siege and fall of Florence — Could Lorenzo have saved Italy ?— Some contemporary judgments — The true causes of Italy's subjection to the foreigner ......... p. 463 Index . i i < . i i ^ i > i p. 479 Genealogical Tables i. The Visconti Family . . . . . . . p. 7 ii. The Medici Family p. 478 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FACING PAGE Medici Portraits Frontispiece Reproduced from Litt^ Botticelli's illustration for Dante's " Inferno," Canto X. 40 Portrait of Cosimo dei Medici 74 Detail from Benozzo Gozzoli's Adoration of the Magi in the Palazzo Riccardi, Florence First page of Boccaccio's " Decameron." published by Valdarfer, 1471 84 Lorenzo the Magnificent 98 From the painting by Giorgio Vasari, Uffizi Gallery, Florence Portrait of Lorenzo dei Medici as a youth 124 Detail from Benozzo Gozzoli's Adoration of the Magi in the Palazzo Riccardi, Florence Pope Sixtus IV. 146 Detail from the painting by Melozzo da Forli in the Pinacoteca Vaticana, Rome PiETRO and GlROLAMO RiARIO 1 68 Detail from the painting by Melozzo da ForU in the Pinacoteca Vaticana, Rome Galeazzo Maria Sforza i8o From the painting by Antonio del PoUaiuolo in the Uffizi Gallery, Florence Torso of the Figure of Mercury 202 Detail from Botticelli's Spring in the Accademia, Florence Medici Medals 212 Reproduced from Litta LuDovico Sforza il Moro 246 From the painting by Leonardo da Vinci in the Ambro- siana at Milan Federigo da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino 286 From the painting by Piero di Francesca in the Uffizi Gallery, Florence Caterina Sforza 310 From the painting by Marco Palmezzani in the Pinacoteca Communale at Forli ILLUSTRATIONS xix FACING PAGE First Page of Christoforo Landing's edition of Dante's " Divine Cgmdey," Florence, 1481 370 The last Page of Marsilio Ficino's Treatise " De Sole," published by Antonio Mischomini, 1483 376 Possible Portrait of Simonetta Cattoneo 384 Detail from Botticelli's Venus rising from the Sea in the Ufiizi Gallery, Florence Ambra 398 Reproduced from Roscoe's " Supplementary Illustrations " Portraits by Lorenzino Lippi of three Members of the YOUNGER branch OF THE MeDICI FaMILY 444 After the painting in the Uffizi Gallery, Florence Caparra's Lantern, Palazzo Strozzi. Florence 448 Giovanna degli Albizzi 452 Panel portrait by Domenico Ghirlandajo. By kind permission of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan A young Florentine Girl 454 Detail from Domenico Ghirlandajo' s fresco of the Birth of St. John the Baptist In Sta. Maria Novella, Florence LuDOVici Tornabuoni 456 Detail from Domenico Ghirlandajo's fresco of the Birth of the Virgin in Sta. Maria Novella, Florence PiERO DEI Medici, eldest son of Lorenzo 458 From the painting by Bronzino in the Uffizi Gallery, Florence MAPS , I. The Territorial Power of the Papacy II. Campaigns of 1478-1480 31 237 LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT INTRODUCTION THE STATE OF ITALY IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY A. VENICE— MILAN— NAPLES Venice — Milan — Naples — Claims of the Papacy on Naples — The House of Suabia in Naples — Frederick II. — Naples and Henry III. of England — Charles of Anjou — Conflicting claims of Anjou and Aragon to Naples — Reign of the Angevin queen Giovanna I. in Naples — Charles of Durazzo secures the crown of Naples — Renewed rivalry between Houses of Aragon and Anjou — Alphonso of Aragon gains the crown of Naples — Ferrante succeeds to the crown of Naples — Claims of the French kings to Naples. HE tortuous policy and diplomatic falsities of Italian statesmen of the Renaissance are not necessarily evidence of an abnormal superfluity of naughtiness in those statesmen. Their poHcy and their diplomacy alike are the reflection of the political conditions at that time existing in Italy. In times that were distracted and out of joint, no State and no statesman could have survived who sought to mould their statecraft on the principles of the Decalogue. An adequate comprehension of the men who directed Italian politics during the last half of the fifteenth century is impossible without a close and connected study of the complicated relations existing between State and State in Italy, and of the almost equally complicated conditions which existed within each State individually. Thus any estimate of the life, character, and policy of Lorenzo the Magnificent must rest largely upon his work as a prince and ruler in Florence, work which was determined not only by the internal conditions prevailing in Florence itself. A 2 LORENZO DEI MEDICI but by her relations to her neighbour States, and by the activities and ambitions of the World-Powers of the time. The latter half of the fifteenth century marks the period when the energies of Western Europe were largely absorbed in the task of formulating and realising the principles of self-contained and consolidated national life. We see the process of nation-making vigorously in action in England, in France, and in Spain. Edward IV. and the Tudors in England, Louis XI. and his successors in France, Ferdinand the Catholic and Isabella in Spain were, each and all, in their respective dominions, engaged in work of the same order. They acted not so much from conscious intention as under the influence of irresistible tendency and the com- pelling spirit of the age. From this movement towards nationahty, however, Italy stood deliberately and con- sciously aloof. Her aspirations turned rather to the development of the individual than to the development of the nation. The preservation of the distinctive features of her Communes seemed to her of more importance than the unification of her geographical area. To be a Florentine, a Venetian, or a Roman was more than to be an Italian. Yet Italy had not surrendered a national ideal without many struggles, nor could she wholly escape from the tendencies of the age. The aspirations of Dante's " De Monarchia " still find an echo, two hundred years later, in Macchiavelli's " Prince." Cesare Borgia was perhaps trying to effect in a practical way what Henry of Luxem- burg only dreamed of as an idealist. The whole policy of Robert the Wise of Naples was directed towards the unifi- cation of Italy under the dominion of his House. The Visconti, operating from Milan and the North, contemplated the realisation of a similar purpose. But circumstances were too strong for such ambitions. The tradition of the Roman Empire had accustomed Italians to regard them- selves as superior to the trammels of a narrow national existence. The World-Power of the Papacy in the domain of spiritual affairs made it difficult, if not impossible, for INTRODUCTION 3 the Papacy to accommodate itself to the idea of a supreme temporal Power in Italy other than itself. No Italian State would have consented to the establishment of a universal temporal sovereignty in Italy vested in the Popes, nor could there have been any guarantee for the perma- nence or effectiveness of such a sovereignty, had it been established. Thus Italians, in their several States and Communes, were thrown back upon themselves. The swelling tide of nationality passed by them to wash other shores. Italy was content to be politically a chaos, if intellectually she might rule the world. Such efforts, however, as in the past Italy had made towards consoHdation had, in the fifteenth century, assumed forms of definite achievement. Five Governments now stood out from the rest, occupying almost the position of Great Powers in Italy, the smaller communities having been absorbed by them, or being in rapid process of absorp- tion. Venice and Milan in the north, Florence and the States of the Church in the centre, the kingdom of Naples in the south, these States now practically partitioned Italy between them. In a measure independent and self-con- tained, yet they were for the most part intimately associated by the ties of common and contrary interests. Naples and Milan, however, though they made so brave a show, were doomed to fatal weakness and instability by claims upon them from outside which might at any time be asserted and might very possibly be enforced. I. Of these five Powers by far the most stable, the wealthiest, and the most considered was Venice. Her geographical position had proved favourable to the extension of her territories and influence in directions where Italian rivalry was scarcely to be feared. She had carried her dominion over the Adriatic, and established it over the eastern coast- line of that sea, over the Morea, Cyprus, Candia, Negro- ponte, and many of the smaller islands of the Grecian 4 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Archipelago. Her fleets patrolled the Dardanelles and the Black Sea. Her argosies with portly sail ventured far, eastward and westward, and Venice became the depot for the trade of the known world. Not content with holding the gorgeous East in fee, Venice prosecuted her conquests beyond the westward limits of her lagoons, and established herself as a territorial Power upon the mainland of Italy. Padua, Verona, Brescia, Bergamo were successively forced to own her sway, and by 1454 the River Adda formed the boundary westward of the Venetian dominions. To the south she had secured Ravenna, and in the War of Ferrara, in 1 48 1, it seemed to be her purpose, by the acquisition of Ferrara, to consoUdate her possessions south of the River Po. The circumstances in which Venice had acquired her maritime and territorial influence had not been entirely of her own choice and making. Nature had prescribed to her her influence in the East, though her own efforts had established it. Self-preservation had compelled her to make good her insular position when it was menaced from Padua, from Verona, or from Milan. But a certain aloofness on the part of Venice from the common concerns of Italian life, her hard, dry, persistent prosecution of her own ends without regard, as it seemed, to any of those prejudices or restraints which were operative elsewhere, created the general impression that in the game of Italian politics she played for her own hand alone : there was an uneasy sus- picion that she would never relax her zeal for dominion until she had secured the sovereignty of the whole of Italy. That this suspicion was less than just to Venice did not mitigate its force, though in a war of recrimination she could raise a powerful voice. She could point to sixteen years of constant warfare against the advancing power of the Turks (1463-1479), to the fact that she had entered upon that war relying on the faith of Papal representations and on the security of European support, but that she had been forced to bear the ruinous burden of it single-handed. If at last she made peace with the victorious Sultan from sheer inability to support her burden any longer, she cannot INTRODUCTION 5 therefore be justly accused of opening the way to Italy for the Turkish forces. Yet when Otranto fell, in 1480, this was the accusation brought against her. Suspicions were deepened when she refused to make common cause with the Italian States against the Turks, and utilised the ad- vantages of her own position to begin a war of aggression against Ferrara. The fatal blow to Venetian supremacy and Venetian pride came, not from Italy, but from an unsuspected and far-off quarter. The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, and the rounding of that cape by Vasco da Gama, opened out the Atlantic as a waterway to the East. The monopoly of the Adriatic and of the Mediterranean was gone, and the decline of Venice, the great monopolist, followed as a natural consequence. But these events belong rather to the sixteenth than to the fifteenth century. In the days when Lorenzo ruled at Florence, Venice, though in straits with the Turks, displayed towards Italy an arrogant and haughty front. She was the great enigma, the incalculable element in Italian politics, except that men were persuaded that, whatever her action, it would be dictated solely by self-interest and the spirit of aggrandisement. IL In close proximity to Venice, and frequently in deadly rivalry with her, was the State of Milan. Originally a lief of the Empire, the Imperial Vicars had at last succeeded in obtaining over Milan a practically independent sovereignty. By letters patent from the Emperor Wenceslaus in 1395 Milan was created a Duchy for Gian Galeazzo of the ancient House of Visconti. This was but the recognition of the fact that the Visconti had now become masters, not of Milan only, but of a vast extent of surrounding territory. Gian Galeazzo had carried his victorious arms eastward as far as Verona. To the south, Pisa, Siena, Perugia, Assisi, Bologna, Spoleto fell before him. Visions of himself as King of Italy rose before his eyes. He even went so far as to demand the title from the existing Pope. By his wife 6 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Isabella of France Gian Galeazzo had an only daughter, Valentina. Her he betrothed to Louis, Duke of Orleans, brother of the French king Charles VI. From this marriage there arose the claim of the House of Orleans to Milan which was ultimately to be the source of so many woes ahke to Italy and to France. By his second wife, Caterina Visconti, Gian Galeazzo had two sons, Giovanni Maria, who succeeded him in 1402, and Filipo Maria, the last of the Visconti, who succeeded his brother in 1412. The reign of this prince is marked by the wars between Milan and Venice which resulted in those accessions to the Venetian territory which have already been referred to. The miHtary adventures of Filipo Maria led him to seek the assistance of Francesco Sforza, the most skilful and powerful of those mercenary captains of the time whose arms were at the disposal of the highest bidder. The services rendered by Sforza to the Visconti were so great as to make him indispensable. The auxihary began to show himself more powerful than his employer. There was the constant danger that if Sforza were not satisfied he would transfer his own brilhant talent and his fighting strength to the side of the enemies of Milan. To avert this contingency Filipo Maria gave to Francesco the hand of his illegitimate daughter Bianca, his only child. Thus, through his wife, Sforza could put forward formidable claims of his own to succeed to the Duchy of Milan, claims which when backed by the practical argument of irresistible miHtary force were not Ukely to be denied. He was, however, a prudent and deep-scheming man, who knew well how to bide his time and catch the favourable moment. When, on the death of Duke FiHpo Maria in 1447, Milan declared herself a republic, Sforza apparently acquiesced in the arrangement. He accepted the position of Captain- General of the Milanese forces, and, while moulding events, seemed only to wait upon them. Three years later the pear was ripe, and Sforza only had to pluck it. In 1450 he possessed himself without a blow of the sovereignty of Milan, and estabUshed the House of a peasant adventurer in the proud seats of the Visconti. Galeazzo I. 1322-1328 I Azzo, 1328-1339 Matteo Visconti 1295-1322 i Lucchino, 1 339-1 349 Giovanni, Cardinal 1 349-1 354 Matteo 1354-1355 Bemabo 1 354-1385 Stefano Galeazzo II. 1 354-1 378 Caterina — m. (ii) Gian Galeazzo- w. (i) Isabella I 1 378-1402 I Philip VI. of Valois 1328-1350 John of Valois Giovanni Maria 1402-1412 Francesco Sforza Filipo Maria t m. — Bianca Valentina = Louis, D. of Orleans Charles Duke of Orleans Charles V. Louis XII. Charies VI. I Charles VII. Louis XI. I Charles VIII. INTRODUCTION 7 This steadfast, silent, implacable advance towards an end long foreseen, remorselessly pursued, and victoriously achieved, has won for Sforza the admiration of Macchiavelli, He is an example held up before the eyes of princes for their edification and imitation. Princes, says Macchiavelli, should lay the foundations of any new power they may seek to acquire long before they strike the blow which will acquire it. " Francesco, by suitable measures, being en- dowed with great qualities, from a private citizen became Duke of Milan. He had spent a thousand toils to gain the position, but once gained, he maintained it with little difficulty." This was true, but Macchiavelli was to live to see the fatal weakness of the Sforza position. It rested ultimately on nothing but force, and superior force would overthrow it. The French claim to Milan, through Valentina Visconti, was in abeyance, but it was not forgotten. It could be held in terrorem over the Sforza dukes by any enemies to whom they were opposed, and it offered to their political opponents the fatal inducement to summon the French into Italy to assert and make good their hereditary rights in Milan. In 1466 Francesco Sforza died, and was succeeded by his son Galeazzo Maria. Galeazzo plays an important part in the diplomacy of Lorenzo dei Medici, and, worthless as was his personal character, yet he stood as a sort of guarantee for the peace of Italy. The dramatic circumstances of his assassination in 1476 mark a crisis in the history of the country. " To-day," said Pope Sixtus, ** the peace of Italy is dead." The Pontiff himself could scarcely have known how true a word he spoke, Galeazzo Maria left a young son, Gian Galeazzo II., and a bevy of ambitious brothers, intent only upon their own aggrandisement, and upon wresting aU authority from the hands of their sister-in- law who was Regent for her youthful son. Of these brothers, Ludovico, popularly known as II Moro, was the most aspiring, the most unscrupulous, and for a time the most successful. Favoured by circumstances, he secured the guardian- ship of his nephew, kept him studiously in retirement. 8 LORENZO DEI MEDICI and usurped the sovereignty of Milan. But the action of Ludovico only made the Sforza tenure in Milan still more precarious and uncertain, Ludovico's whole policy was necessarily directed to maintaining himself, and he could stand only so long as he was supported. Supposing himself to be a master in statecraft, he set in motion all the appa- ratus of falsehood, fraud, and chicanery which passed for statecraft in Italy in those days ; and at last he found himself caught in his own toils. In an incautious moment he had permitted his nephew, the young Duke Gian Galeazzo, to marry Isabella, the daughter of Alphonso, heir to the kingdom of Naples. Ludovico's own sister, Hippolita, was Isabella's mother. Thus he had to fear the intervention of Naples in assertion of the rights of his nephew, and in his diplomatic relations with Naples he found himself constantly hampered by the irregularity of his personal position. It was of course an easy expedient for Ludovico to make counter-play with the claims which France possessed to the Neapolitan kingdom, but the game was dangerous in the extreme. While prosecuting one claim in Italy, France might think it well at the same time to prosecute another. By calling in the French in order to distract the attention of Naples from himself, he ran the risk of attracting very forcibly the attention of France to the desirability of ousting Ludovico and estabhshing her own sovereignty over Milan. III. The question of the French claims upon Naples involves a survey of what Bishop Creighton calls a " dreary and complicated history." Of the complications there can be no doubt, but if only it be possible to find a clue to guide us through a labyrinth of genealogical involutions and inter- national pretensions, the history of Naples from the days of Frederick II. to the coming of Charles VIII. of France (1494) supplies abundant elements of drama and romance. Though the story is somewhat long for an introductory chapter, yet the relations between Naples and Lorenzo dei Medici INTRODUCTION 9 were so intimate and important, and, moreover, without a clear knowledge of the situation in Naples, so difficult to understand, that proportion will not be violated if some considerable space is given to the presentment of the broad outlines of the story. The Neapolitan kingdom was originally established by Norman adventurers out of territories which they had wrested from the Saracens. War against the infidel was holy war, carried on under the aegis and sanction of Holy Church. The victorious Normans regularised their position in Naples by securing Papal recognition for their tenure of it. The Popes accordingly claimed to be the suzerains of Naples, and whoever held it, held it, according to Papal theory, as a vassal of the Holy See. This condition is constant throughout the period with which we are concerned, and is the first perplexing element in the situation which it is necessary to have constantly in mind. Naples passed in due course from the Normans to the House of Suabia, and under its most brilliant representative, the Emperor Frederick II., Naples and Sicily became his chief paradise of delights, that corner of his dominions which he most loved ; on which he lavished all his care. The bitter enmity between Frederick II. and the Papacy affords the chief dramatic interest of his brilliant reign, and it was a natural consequence of that enmity that the Popes, mindful of their sovereign rights over Naples, should look outside the line of Frederick for some suitable ruler for the Papal fief. It is at this point that the crown of Naples and Sicily became mixed up with our English history. The realm was offered by Pope Innocent IV. to Richard of Cornwall, brother of the English king Henry III. ; though refused by Richard, it was accepted by Henry on behalf of his own son Edmund, Earl of Lancaster. Thus Henry was made the cat's-paw of Papal ambition. He permitted the country to be drained by ruinous exactions, extorted to support a wild-cat scheme of adventure in which his subjects could feel no interest ; thus he precipitated the Barons' War, and came within an ace of losing his own kingdom. 10 LORENZO DEI MEDICI A more promising opportunity for Papal action was afforded by events which followed the death of Conrad, the son and successor of Frederick II. Even in Conrad's life- time his authority had been maintained chiefly through the strength, vigour, and brilliant qualities of his illegitimate brother Manfred. When, in 1254, Conrad was succeeded by his son Conradin, a child not three years old, the actual government fell naturally to Manfred, who became the avowed head of the anti-Papal or Ghibelline party in Italy. Successive Popes by this time had realised that nothing more was to be got from England. Nor was the Papacy strong enough to enforce its own assertion that Naples had reverted, as a lapsed fief, to the Holy See. At this juncture recourse was had to France, and the crown of Naples and Sicily was offered by Pope Urban IV. to the brother of St. Louis, Charles of Anjou. It was in 1265 that Charles of Anjou came to Italy to win from Manfred the kingdom with which the Papacy had endowed him. Guelph and Ghibelline stood facing each other, for once the recognised symbols of an intelligible antagonism. On the fatal field of Benevento Manfred fell, (1266). Two years later the chivalrous, gallant young Con- radin became a prisoner in the hands of Charles, and was barbarously executed. The House of Suabia had fallen. The House of Anjou was established upon the throne of Naples. But though the last legitimate scion of the House of Suabia had been cut off, the independent claims of the House of Manfred were not extinguished, Manfred's daughter Constance had married Peter III. of Aragon, and through her the Aragonese sovereigns could stiU assert a claim to the crowns of Naples and Sicily. The Aragonese claim on Naples was strengthened when Sicily revolted against the tyranny of Charles of Anjou. The Sicilian Vespers in 1282 sounded the knell of French domination in the island. An appeal was made to Aragon to assume the sovereignty of Sicily. An Aragonese dynasty ruled there independently for more than a century, when Sicily became incorporated into the kingdom of Aragon. INTRODUCTION II Meanwhile the fortunes of the House of Anjou in Naples had been subjected to many changes and vicissitudes. The ramifications of the family almost defy analysis, and test beyond endurance even the strongest memory. Conflicting claims to the throne of Naples arose among the Angevins themselves, and a crisis ensued upon the death of Robert the Wise when his direct heir proved to be a woman, whose rights, apart from the question of sex, were by no means unimpeachable. For forty years, however, Giovanna I. maintained herself precariously upon the throne, but upon her death, in 1382, she left everything in a welter of confusion. Though four times married, she left no children to succeed her, and during the later years of her reign she had kept Naples agog by her ever-shifting dispositions in regard to the succession. The claims of the two great Houses of Durazzo and Tarento, which sprang from two brothers of Robert the Wise, seemed to be concentrated in the person of Charles of Durazzo, who regarded himself as Giovanna's heir. Indeed, he endeavoured to anticipate his succession by an expedition in quest of the Neapolitan throne during Giovanna's lifetime. The queen retaliated by adopting as her heir and successor Louis of Anjou, Count of Provence and brother of the reigning King of France, Charles V. (1380). By this time the great Schism in the Papacy had begun, and the rival Popes of Rome and Avignon fought one another through the medium of Naples. Each Pope simultaneously claimed to be the suzerain of the kingdom, and to possess the ultimate rights over the disposal of it. The expedition of Charles of Durazzo was under the immediate sanction of the Roman Pope, Urban VI. Clement VII. at Avignon was equally active in support of the queen and of Louis of Anjou. The success of Charles, which was consoHdated by the murder of Giovanna in 1382, was followed by his assumption of the crown under the title of Charles III., and he was able to transmit his kingdom to his two children in succession, Ladislas, who died without issue in 1414, and Giovanna II., who died without issue in 1435. 12 LORENZO DEI MEDICI The situation was now much what it had been in the time of Giovanna I. No one knew who was to succeed, and the queen herself had covered the tracks with astonish- ing and truly feminine ingenuity. She was a woman of infamous character, and on her caprices and gallantries age seemed to have no effect. Foremost and most in- fluential among her various favourites was Giovanni Carra- cioli. By his insolence and self-seeking he succeeded in alienating from Giovanna the support of Sforza Attendolo, foremost among the Condottieri leaders, and one of the most remarkable men at that time in Italy. Sforza's natural course, in opposing Carracioli and the queen, was to attach himself to the cause of Louis of Anjou, who maintained the claims of his grandfather to the throne of Naples. In her straits Giovanna looked around for assistance, and bethought herself of the House of Aragon and its claims to Naples, which were certainly equally valid with those of Anjou. If Alphonso V. of Aragon would now come to her help she would adopt him as her heir, and upon her death he would succeed to the Neapolitan crown. The bait was irresistible : Alphonso threw himself with vigour into the contest. But it was not long before the capricious queen grew frightened by the resolute character of her ally. Dissatisfaction and distrust arose on each side ; when Alphonso attempted to anticipate his fortunes by seizing Carracioli and making himself master of the queen herself Giovanna retorted by disinheriting Alphonso and adopting Louis of Anjou as heir to her crown. Thus it was that on Giovanna's death the Houses of Aragon and Anjou stood facing one another in deadly rivalry for the possession of Naples. Louis of Anjou was now dead, but on his death the queen had recognised his brother Rene as her heir, and, under the terms of her will, Rene promptly asserted his rights. The Pope in the mean- time insisted that, in default of lineal successors, Naples had reverted to the Holy See. Angevin claims, Aragonese claims. Papal claims, all stand out prominently and in opposition at the same time. Alphonso was the claimant who best knew how to take occasion by the hand. He was INTRODUCTION 13 able to turn even his defeats to his advantage. Taken prisoner by the Genoese, and committed to the custody of FiUpo Maria Visconti as overlord of Genoa, he succeeded in persuading Visconti that the interests of Milan required that the French should be kept out of Italy. With the House of Aragon in possession of Naples, in close alliance with Milan, the key to the situation in Italy would be in the hands of the Milanese duke. The personal fascinations of Alphonso were as powerful as his arguments. An alhance was formed between Filipo Maria and his prisoner, and in due course Alphonso V. of Aragon became Alphonso I. of Naples. But the triumph of the House of Aragon in Naples by no means implied any abandonment of their claims on the part of its rivals. Rene of Provence still continued to style himself King of Naples — his son, John of Anjou, was known as the Duke of Calabria, the title usually borne by the heir-apparent to the Neapolitan throne. The Papacy, not strong enough to enforce its own independent claims, could make the situation dangerous and precarious for every one else. Thus Naples became the most important piece upon the political chessboard. If France should prove trouble- some, an immediate and obvious retort was to support the Aragonese dynasty. If Naples should show herself aggressive or refractory, she could be brought to heel by the threat of enforcing French claims. Alphonso found his position difficult notwithstanding [ his eminent capacity and brilliant gifts. Upon his death i it seemed likely that confusion would be worse confounded, for there was no legitimate heir of his body to succeed him. All his political efforts therefore had been directed to securing the succession to Naples for his illegitimate son Ferdinand, known commonly as Ferrante ; but, notwithstanding the laxity of view which prevailed in Italy on the subject of legitimacy, the fact of Ferrante's birth, taken in conjunction with the general weakness of the Aragonese position in Naples, contributed still further to complicate conditions which were already sufficiently tangled, i In 1458 Alphonso died, and his kingdoms of Aragon and 14 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Sicily passed to his brother, John II. There was no question of Ferrante succeeding there, although his father had been able to induce successive Popes to recognise his legitimacy, and this recognition, if it had been anything more than nominal, would have entitled him to succeed to all the possessions of Alphonso. But the action of the Popes in regard to the matter must only be taken as an expression of their weakness at the moment and their need of Alphonso's support. Eugenius IV. had his own troubles with the Council of Basle, and Nicolas V. wanted to compose all enmities in order that Christendom might show a united front to the Turks, now masters of Constantinople (1453), and bent upon extending still further their dominion in Europe. Ferrante was content to put forward his claims to Naples alone, and was strong enough and astute enough to enforce them. An attempt on the part of John of Anjou to secure the kingdom for his father Ren6 only served to show how incompetent the Angevins were to take advantage of their own successes. Ren6 was fitter for poetry and a quiet life than for the conquest of kingdoms. Pope Calixtus III. was violently hostile to Ferrante, but this was only because he saw an opportunity of conferring the crown of Naples upon one of his own nephews, Pedro Borgia. Fortunately for Ferrante, Calixtus died before he could take any action to effect his purpose. Pope Pius II, took a more reasonable view of the situation. He wanted a king at Naples who would be useful to the Church, and Ferrante was more likely to be useful than the feeble Ren^, than any interloper imposed upon Naples by the Papacy whom nobody at all would recognise. Moreover, Pius II. had deeply at heart his own projects for a general crusade against the Turks. In the circumstances it seemed best to recognise Ferrante's position. Accordingly in 1458 the Pope granted to him the investiture of Naples, " without prejudice to the rights of another," on condition that the king should pay to the Holy See an annual tribute, should withdraw his troops from the States of the Church, and should restore to the Church, either immediately or in due course, those INTRODUCTION 15 ecclesiastical fiefs which had been granted personally to Alphonso. The reign of Ferrante, extending from 1458 to 1494, more than covers the whole political career of Lorenzo dei Medici. It is therefore only necessary, at this point, to note the position of the Angevin claims up to the time of the expe- dition against Naples undertaken by Charles VIII. of France in 1494. Ren^ of Provence and Anjou — the father, it may be noted, of Margaret of Anjou, " she- wolf of France," wife of Henry VI. of England — survived his son, the Duke of Calabria, and his grandson. His claims passed to his nephew — Charles, Count of Maine — who died without issue in 1481. By his will he bequeathed his dominions, together with his claims on Naples, to Louis XI. of France. This sagacious monarch was glad to get Provence, for thus he was able to round off his work of consolidating the kingdom, but he was content merely to note, as an interesting and picturesque accompaniment to his substantial titles, the pretensions which the crown of France could now put forward to an Italian kingdom. His son, Charles VIII., was fired by more romantic ambitions. He determined actively to prosecute his Nea- politan claims. He was, indeed, urged to do so by those Italian statesmen who saw their own advantage in the con- fusions of Italy. In 1494 Charles had completed his plans. The Italian expedition was launched which was to prove the ruin of Italy : which was to prove, it may almost be said, the beginning of the modern world. Incidentally, as a consequence of the expedition, the House of Medici was I overthrown in Florence, and the brief theocracy of Savona- rola was established under the patronage of the French king. Lorenzo himself, fortunate in his death, was spared from being a witness of the destruction of his hopes, the ruin of his policy, and the degradation of his country. He had died in 1492. i6 LORENZO DEI MEDICI B. THE PAPACY The Papacy in the fifteenth century — The Papacy in relation to its temporal power — The great Schism of the West, 1 378-1417 — The Papacy after the Schism — Eugenius IV. — The Conciliar spirit — Nicolas V. — Extinction of the Conciliar spirit — Policy of Nicolas V. — Papal policy in regard to the States of the Church — Advantages attaching to the Papacy from its dual position — Disadvantages— Papal nepotism — The Papacy and the Italian Powers — Florence — Venice — Milan — The Italian Powers and the Turks — The Popes and Prince Djem. The position of the Papacy in the fifteenth century is so anomalous, and the conduct of successive Popes is so at variance with the Christ-Hke character, that it is difficult even for unprejudiced critics to reconcile its pretensions with its actions. The Papacy, however, like all other institutions, must be judged in relation to its historical environment ; so judged, it will be found that the corruption of its ideals and the characters of its representatives were the result of the prevailing conditions rather than of the individual wickedness of the Popes themselves. The times indeed were such, that men of scrupulous and saintly character upon the chair of St. Peter could have brought nothing but ruin to that fabric of Papal power which had been transmitted to them from the past. The question whether that fabric should ever have been reared, whether it was worth transmitting, whether the object should have been, not to preserve it, but to destroy it, is another ques- tion which is not under discussion. The Renaissance Popes found their position defined for them. They had not created it, but they felt themselves bound, to the utmost of their power, to maintain it ; had they not sought to maintain it, they would undoubtedly have lost the respect, and probably the allegiance, of all Christendom. The possession of a temporal sovereignty, especially a sovereignty situated in Italy, placed the Papacy in a dilemma. On the one side was its spiritual position, to be enforced by spiritual arms alone. On the other side lay its temporal dominions, exposed to the greedy covetousness of all its neighbours. If these dominions were not to be lost they must be governed by men acting as other men ; by astute INTRODUCTION 17 politicians ready to match their poHtical sagacity against the most unscrupulous statecraft that the world has ever seen ; by resolute Princes whose business it was to put armies in the field, despatch them to service, and if need be encourage them on campaign ; by men of the world in fact, in contact with the world as it was, not by ascetics and pietists who dreamed of a world as it ought to be. , The student of the Papacy is almost compelled to the opinion that the greatest and most fatal of its acquisitions ■ was the acquisition of a temporal sovereignty in Italy. He may agree with Dante that the Church had then made to herself a god of silver and of gold, and that the chief difference between the Pope in Dante's day and the idolater was that "he worships one and ye a hundred." Ahi, Constantin, di quanto mal fu matre, non la tua conversion, ma quella dote che da ti prese il primo ricco padre. Inferno, C. xix. 115.* But the fatal gift had been accepted long ago in the dim recesses of time. Territorial sovereignty had become in- ' extricably bound up with the very existence of the Papacy as a spiritual force. To the best of Popes, as well as to the worst, it may have seemed the first and most sacred I duty at all hazards to maintain it. I At the beginning of the fifteenth century the Papacy ^ found itself at the lowest level of its fortunes. The bright- ; ness of its mediaeval glory had long been dimmed ; the splendid visions of a Gregory VII. or an Innocent III. had vanished into the mists. For nearly a century successive Popes had been content to abandon the ideal of universal spiritual dominion over Christendom, to abandon Rome, the fount and seat of their greatness, in order to live at ease in Avignon and enjoy the protection and contemptuous patronage of the Kings of France. The return of the Papacy to Rome (1378) was immediately followed by the outbreak of the Great Schism of the West, * " Ah, Constantine ! how much evil was born as from a mother, not by reason of thy conversion, but by that gift which the first rich Father took from thee," alluding to the alleged Donation of Constantine the Great of territorial possessions in Italy to the Papacy, i B i8 LORENZO DEI MEDICI when first two Popes, and then three, strove each against the other for the allegiance of Europe. One question, when the fifteenth century dawned, engrossed the minds of all serious men. How was the Schism to be healed ? How was the unity of the Christian Church to be asserted ? A General Council of the Universal Latin Church seemed to offer the best hope of a settlement, and the Council of Con- stance (141 5), summoned by the joint authority of the Emperor and one of the contesting Popes, seemed to be the nearest possible approach to a representative ecclesias- tical Parliament. But the theory of the validity of a Universal Council to make and unmake Popes was at variance with the first principle of the Papal monarchy which the Middle Ages had so laboriously constructed — the principle of its complete and unquestioned absolutism. A Pope deriving his position from a Council must acknow- ledge that, as a creature, he was less than his creator, and yet, if he were to be faithful to his trust, he must acknow- ledge his inferiority to no man and no body of men. But the exigencies of the situation did not admit an absolute and purely logical settlement. By a Council only could the Schism be healed, for no man knew who was in truth the rightful Pope. By the vote of the Council of Constance Martin V., of the great House of Colonna, was elected Pope, and was generally acknowledged. But his position was difficult. He must aim at regaining the lost prestige, the lost privileges of the Papacy, and the lost control of the Papal territories in Italy, at a time when every territorial rival was keen to take advantage of the weak- ness of his position. Naples especially had old scores to settle. Martin might flatter himself that he enjoyed the obedience of Christendom, but it was an obedience which he enjoyed indirectly through a Council rather than directly as absolute Pope. Moreover, the Council of Con- stance had taken care not to dissolve without providing for the frequent convocation of future Councils ; and as long as this Conciliar spirit prevailed, no Pope could call himself master in his own house. Respect and true obe- dience would follow only from the possession of absolute INTRODUCTION 19 power, and that power only would be understood and realised which took the material form of a temporal sovereignty, ready to enter into competition with other temporal sovereigns, and to engage them with their own weapons. The truth of this had been sufficiently demonstrated during the Pontificate of Eugenius IV., who succeeded Martin V. Eugenius suffered to the full under the outburst of Conciliar enthusiasm. It was indeed this enthusiasm which proved the salvation of the Papacy, The Council of Basle, summoned in due course in accordance with the decrees of Constance, showed itself extreme, pragmatical, and contumacious. When it went to the length of renewing the Schism by electing a Pope of its own, and deposing Eugenius, it exceeded its mission and lost the popular support of Christendom on which alone it rested. More- over, Eugenius was astute enough to utilise the Concihar spirit to the advantage of the Papacy. He took the wind I out of the sails of the Council of Basle by caUing a Council 1 on his own account at Ferrara. Its purpose was inter- i national, and in a sense practical, for the aim of Eugenius j was to see if anything could be done to bring about a recon- ( cihation between the Latin and the Greek Churches. The I business of conciliation on which the Pope was engaged i contrasted favourably with the factious and schismatic I endeavours of the disaffected clique at Basle, which persisted I in caUing itself a Council of the Universal Church. I Though the efforts of the Fathers gathered at Florence 1 (the Council was transferred from Ferrara to Florence in 1439) were successful only on paper, the terms of union to which the Greeks had consented being emphaticaUy rejected at home, yet the Pope could claim at any rate a nominal triumph, and the attempt itself counted to him for righteousness. The reign of Nicolas V., the successor of Eugenius, was not troubled by Councils. Concihar enthusiasm had worked itself out, and Pius II. by 1460, had re-established Papal autocracy on a sufficiently strong basis to issue the Bull Execrahilis, in which he declared that it was an 20 LORENZO DEI MEDICI execrable abuse, unheard of in ancient times, to appeal to a Council which the Pope had not authorised. Any such appeals, if made, were declared to be invahd ; any one making them was ipso facto excommunicated, together with those who framed or witnessed any document containing such appeals. The Bull marks an epoch, not so much because it secured immediate and general recognition— Councils still continued to be used as threats held in tenorem over Popes by their pohtical and spiritual opponents — but because it was an evidence that the assertion of the representative principle in the government of the Church was no longer potent ; that the counter-assertion of Papal absolutism was in a fair way to general recognition. " The Bull of Pius II., though not immediately successful, worked its way into the eccle- siastical system, and became one of the pillars on which the Papal authority rested." * There were other ways, besides war against the ConciHar movement, by which the Popes could re-estabUsh their sovereignty and restore the weakened prestige of the Holy See. To secure themselves in Rome, and identify the traditions of Imperial Rome with the splendours of the Papal Court, were projects which would make a strong appeal to the imaginations of men, and at the same time give weight, stability, and consideration to the Papacy itself. Something might also be gained by associating the Papacy with the spirit of Humanism and the passion for classical scholarship and antiquity which were the dominant charac- teristics of the Renaissance in Italy. It is thus that the reign of Nicolas V. (1447-1455) assumes a special importance in the Papal history of the fifteenth century. A scholar and a humanist, raised to the highest seat from a position of obscurity, he gave to the world, in his own person, an example of what the forces then at work could do for a man who gave them full scope to act upon him. Rome was dignified and ennobled by the concourse of scholars and artists who gathered around the court of Nicolas and * Creighton, " History of the Papacy," iii. 240. INTRODUCTION 21 enjoyed the patronage of a Pope who was himself a scholar and a connoisseur. It is not necessary to suppose that the action of Nicolas V. was governed solely by policy and calculation. He loved art, scholarship, and magnificence for their own sake. But he was also conscious of their political value as instruments whereby to recover for the Papacy its prestige, and few of his successors could afford to be entirely indifferent to the special claims of culture upon the Roman Pontiff. In the same manner Nicolas V. devoted himself to the task of making Rome a fitting capital for the Holy See. To make it sanitary, to widen its streets, to adorn it with splendid churches and palaces, became the recognised policy of the Papacy from the time of Nicolas V. If, indeed, the Coliseum became a stone-quarry, and the precious remains of ancient Rome were incorporated into modem structures, this is only one example of many of the strange incongruities and contradictory ideas which characterised even enlightened men in these strange times. The Rome of Leo X. was foreshadowed and prepared by the policy of Nicolas V., of Sixtus IV., of Alexander VI., and Julius II. But aU this, important as it was, was of small account if the Popes were not masters over their own territories. Men might entertain an abstract regard for a Pope who was cultured and magnificent, but, when it came to the point, they would only obey a Pope who was strong and had force at his command. In the circumstances it is difficult to see how the Popes of this time could possibly have avoided the policy of straining every nerve to make their sove- reignty effective over the States of the Church. If the necessity of the policy be granted we must accept it, and with it the consequences which it entailed. On the field of Italian politics the Pope would find himself on every side surrounded by adversaries. The semi- independent feudatories of the Holy See, who had profited by the distractions of the Papacy to secure to themselves an almost uncontrolled supremacy in their respective States, would oppose to the utmost any attempt to reduce them within the legal limits of their tenure. A vigorous 22 LORENZO DEI MEDICI policy of Papal self-assertion in Italy would inevitably rouse the suspicions and distrust of the greater Itahan powers, each as jealous of the aggrandisement of others as intent upon aggrandising itself. It would not be sufficient for the Pope to employ mihtary forces and engineer cam- paigns from the recesses of the Vatican. He must himself descend into the arena, and fight among the other gladiators for his own hand. He must be a match for his opponents at their own game, and oppose Itahan statecraft, which was made up of force, fraud, treachery, and Hes, by a state- craft equally subtle and unscrupulous. It was only so that pohtics at this time could be carried on in Italy. It is indeed deplorable that the Vicars of Christ should have been called upon to take part in such a sordid game. But the Renaissance Popes were not responsible for the conditions ; they were only responsible for confronting the conditions with vigour and address. It is a point capable of argument that had they adopted methods in harmony with the sanctity of their position, the ultimate results would have more than justified them. It is conceivable that a regenerated Italy might have arisen, called into being by the spectacle and example of a firm, prudent, and saintly Pope. It is possible that no Reformation would have been needed. But the hard logic of facts seems to show that Popes of good character were out of place at this time — the experiment with Adrian VI. was a hopeless failure — and when we wonder how it was that a particular period gives us a succession of Popes whose characters harmonise only too faithfully with everything that was most corrupt in the Itahan of the time, we have to remember that such men were deliberately chosen as Popes because their characters gave evidence that they were fitted for the work which had to be done. In the game of pohtics, as carried on in Italy, the Popes possessed both advantages and disadvantages peculiar to themselves. Their advantage lay in the fact that they possessed, and could simultaneously exercise, both temporal and spiritual weapons. Worsted in the field of battle, they could retahate upon their adversaries by excommunication INTRODUCTION 23 atid interdict. Even in Italy Papal thunders were not wholly without effect, and outside Italy their force was considerable. Nothing is more remarkable in this sceptical and unchristian age than the mingled contempt and respect with which the Papacy was regarded. Men whose every action in life had stamped them as careless of God or Devil yet could not die happy without the Papal absolution. Men who had given their lives to opposing the poHtical action of the Pontiff were yet impressed by the deepest sense of reverence for his spiritual office. This double character with which the Pope was invested gave him a distinct advantage in times of emergency, and he knew how to make full use of the superstition and creduHty of the day. Another advantage of somewhat doubtful efficacy was the Pope's power to bind and loose. It came practically to mean that nothing could bind the Pope. A treaty might be a convenient way of getting out of a difficulty, but, the difficulty once overcome, there was no obligation on the Pope to observe the treaty. And the same latitude which he claimed for himself he could extend to others. A Prince, sheltered behind a Papal Brief, could conscien- tiously excuse himself for breach of faith, however flagrant. Macchiavelli, when instructing his Prince as to how he should keep faith, assures him that pretexts need never be wanting which will justify him in breaking faith when it is expedient to do so. Thus — and this is the disadvantage of the situation — an atmosphere was created of general mis- trust. Nobody put any confidence in anybody, and the most dehberate assurances and the most solemn oaths were only binding as long as it was convenient to observe them. The most serious disadvantage in the position of the Papacy is to be found in the tenure by which each Pope held office. He was Pope only for life ; he was elected at an age when it was improbable he would live long : if in the case of Leo X. he was elected when young, this was only because Leo suffered under an incurable disease which, it was thought, must inevitably cut short his life. There 24 LORENZO DEI MEDICI was no guarantee for continuity of policy from one Pope to another, and hence the Papal government was constantly exposed to individual caprices and violent changes. Mac- chiavelli estimated the Pope's tenure of office at ten years on an average. In the Italian States, on the other hand, the government passed by inheritance ; there was some guarantee for continuity of policy, and while Popes were constantly changing, the temporal despot might Hve for a long term of years. Ferrante of Naples ruled for thirty- six years. During this time he saw the election of five Popes, The government of Lorenzo dei Medici in Florence, begun under Paul II., extended over the Pontificates of Sixtus IV. and Innocent VIII. Francesco Sforza governed Milan for sixteen years. Of this disadvantage the Popes had long been fully sensible. The difficulty lay in finding any remedy for it. The conditions of his election, of his celibacy, and of his office necessarily condemned each Pope to a position of isolation. Thus, the temptation to make as much individual profit as possible out of his brief tenure of power was almost irresistibly strong. Leo X. was only a Httle more frank and a little more cynical than others when he hailed his election with the remark, " Let us enjoy the Papacy, since God has given it to us." But if a Pope was precluded from establishing for himself individually a position of territorial power, he might do much during his Pontificate to enrich and aggrandise his family. With many of the Popes of this period it became an object to carve out of the States of the Church princi- palities for scions of their house : the flagrant and unblushing nepotism of Sixtus IV. and Alexander VI. is only an extreme expression of a policy which Popes had followed for centuries. It was, moreover, always possible for Popes to deceive themselves that in acting in the interests of their families they were in truth acting in the interests of the Church. If it was a paramount necessity that the rebelHous and semi- independent States of the Church should be reduced to obedience, the Pope must use for this purpose some secular instrument on which he could absolutely rely. He must INTRODUCTION 25 have some one at his disposal who thoroughly understood and sympathised with his policy, who had some personal interest to gain from it, and who in the field and in the council chamber was a match for the military and political antagonists by whom he was confronted. Where was a Pope to look for such instruments outside his own family ? If he relied upon a Condottieri general there was no guarantee that he would not be betrayed at every turn. He could not rely upon the Italian Great Powers to help him, for their interest lay in keeping the Papacy, as a temporal sovereignty, weak and embarrassed rather than powerful and untrammelled. He could not rely on his own subject Princes, for it was precisely against them that his strokes were aimed. Therefore, if the States of the Church were to be recovered — and that this was a legitimate object of Papal policy is presupposed — the best prospect of success seemed to lie in using all the resources of the Papacy to establish some Papal " nephew " in strong possession over some part of the Papal States. Using what he had gained as a base for further operations, he might end in gain- ing the whole ; owing everything to the Papacy, there was at least a hope that he would respect the source from which he derived aU his power. It is improbable that such Popes as Sixtus and Alexander coldly and formally defined the precise motives which governed their policy. The motives under which men act are mixed, and the temperament which can strike an exact balance between considerations of self-interest and public policy is rare. But when such a phenomenon as Papal nepotism is constantly before us at a certain period of history, when we find it practised, to a greater or less degree, by good Popes and bad aUke, it is not sufficient merely to condemn it with disgust and scorn. We must examine it, analyse it, and, so far as is possible, endeavour philosophically to understand it. In whatever manner the Papacy might attempt to recover or make good its hold upon its temporal possessions, such attempts were certain to bring it into collision with the other Italian Powers. Florence, for example, whose eastern 26 LORENZO DEI MEDICI boundary extended to the Papal territory of Romagna, would view with jealousy and distrust any activity, in the neighbourhood of the frontier, designed to strengthen the influence of the Holy See in that quarter. It was the interest of Florence to keep the Papacy fully occupied with its own affairs. It would thus have the less opportunity of interfering in the affairs of Florence. Moreover, in the times of Papal weakness and disorganisation some of the Lords of Romagna had commended themselves to the protection of Florence, and recognised its suzerainty rather than that of the Pope. In Citta di Castello it was the constant policy of Lorenzo dei Medici to support the Vitelli against the pretensions of the Pope ; it was, indeed, partly as a consequence of this support that Lorenzo was brought into violent and dangerous antagonism to Sixtus IV. Venice, with its eye directed southward and in actual occupation of Ravenna, was bent upon thwarting the efforts of the Popes to reassert their authority in the north of Romagna, and was intent upon extending its own sovereignty in that quarter. Of all the opponents of the Papacy Venice was perhaps the most dangerous, for it was involved, less than any other Italian Power, in internal and external complications. Therefore it was able to pursue its own course with a more detached, frigid, and inevitable precision than was possible in the case of other States, though this very aloofness from any common interest, and from the troubles which affected other States, might prove as much a source of weakness as of strength. The common appre- hensions of all from Venice might result in rousing common action against her. Milan, in her fears of Venice, would be inclined to support the Papacy, while her alliance with Florence, on which the Sforza dynasty depended, would often lead her to oppose it. The Pope could then play against Milan the Orleanist claims to the Duchy, and could neutralise the action of Naples by forwarding the French claim to that kingdom. Everything in Italy was in a state of such delicate balance that the smallest disturbance was liable to create a crisis ; yet at a time when the country was a powder magazine its INTRODUCTION 27 statesmen, in that contempt which is bred of familiarity with the danger, amused themselves, with fatuous audacity, in playing with the fire which was to destroy them. The political career of Lorenzo dei Medici derives much of its interest from the fact that he was the one statesman in Italy who saw something of the trend of things, and who in the main directed his efforts to avert the calamities of Italy which so many of his contemporaries were frivolously and unconsciously precipitating. Before passing to a review of the State of Florence up to the time of the accession of Lorenzo to power, it may be well here to note a further complication in Italian politics which affected not the Papacy only, but all the Italian States in the latter half of the fifteenth century. The advancing power of the Turks threatened Italy with disaster more sinister and calamitous than any that impended from the intervention of France. The French might be to the Italians barbarians, but they were at least fellow Christians. The infidel Turk brought with him not only fire and sword, but the destruction of the faith and Church of Christendom. The fall of the Eastern Empire by the Turkish capture of Constantinople opened the way for fresh efforts to plant the Moslem banners in the West. At such a time we should expect to see all differences composed, and all Italy united to confront the common enemy of the Christian world. We are able to gauge therefore the folly, frivolity, and irresponsibility which characterised Italian statecraft at this epoch by the fact that, far from any com- bination being effected to resist the Turk, many of the Italian Powers were ready to coquette with the menace of Turkish invasion, and use it to suit the purposes of their individual policy. It was a common thing for an Italian statesman, when hard pressed, to threaten to call in the Turks, and " there was scarcely a government of any con- sequence," says Burckhardt, " which did not conspire against other ItaHan states with Mohammed II. and his successors." Venice, it is true, only made a treaty with the Turks in 1479 under the compulsion of sixteen years of continuous and 28 LORENZO DEI MEDICI ruinous war against them. The Papacy, under Nicolas V., Cahxtus III., and Pius II., did seek to reanimate the crusading spirit and organise a great campaign of resistance. Then Pius II. attempted to effect the conversion of the Turks by argument, and his curious letter to the Sultan which propounds to the Mohammedan ruler the superior advantages of Christianity can still be read. Alexander VI. proceeded to make a treaty with them. The King of Naples encouraged the Turks in their operations against Venice, and Lorenzo dei Medici was credited, though without justification, with inciting the Turks to their attack upon Otranto to serve his own ends. Venice probably did actually incite it, while among the Princelings of Italy there was scarcely one who would have hesitated to call the Turks into the country if his own petty interests of the moment could be advanced thereby. Sigismundo Malatesta of Rimini, Bocalino Guzzoni of Osimo, had no scruples in the matter. Bocalino's negotiations with the Turks are extant, and will be referred to in detail in a subsequent chapter, while the people of Osimo frankly declared that if the choice lay between the domination of the Pope or the Turk, they would prefer that of the Turk. But the episode which most completely illustrates the cynicism of the times towards the Turkish danger is the captivity of the Turkish Prince Djem in the hands of suc- cessive Popes, and the utterly shameless proceedings which characterised the transaction. On the death of Mohammed II., the great Sultan, his dominions were contested between his two sons, Bajazet and Djem, with the result that Bajazet defeated his brother, who threw himself upon the protection of the Knights of St. John at Rhodes. The new Sultan was glad to pay a large annual sum to any one who would act as Djem's gaoler and keep him out of the way. Djem there- fore assumed a money value of 45,000 ducats a year, and a general European scramble for the money ensued. Being entrusted by the Knights of Rhodes to the more secure custody of the King of France, Djem was — to use Creighton's phrase — " put up to public auction " among the compe- titors for his maintenance fees. Of the competitors Pope INTRODUCTION 29 Innocent VIII. was the highest bidder. A cardinalate for the Grand Master, a dispensation for Anne of Brittany's marriage, were powerful arguments in the Pope's favour. Djem was transferred to the custody of Innocent, and his entry into Rome was a public spectacle. The Sultan, however, did not yet feel quite at ease. Though lavish with his payments to the extent of giving to the Pope three years' salary in advance, still it would prove more convenient for him if so dangerous a hostage for his own good behaviour should opportunely cease to exist. It was well understood that the price which the Sultan was prepared to pay to any one who would finally dispose of Djem was a princely one, and it was with difficulty that he was kept alive. But 45,000 ducats a year while he Uved was better than a lump sum down for poisoning him. Thus Djem survived for a time : a few years later the Pope received, as a mark of the Sultan's favour and gratitude, the Holy Lance— the head of the spear which pierced the side of Christ upon the Cross. Strange and fantastic were the times when the most sacred rehcs became objects of exchange between the representative of the Prophet and the representative of Christ, in order to mark the infidel's appreciation of an infamous service rendered to him by the successor of St. Peter. Alexander VI., Innocent's successor, was eventually compelled to part with Djem, and reluctantly to hand him over to Charles VIII. of France. To the pubhc opinion of the time it seemed incredible that Alexander would relinquish so valuable an asset without at any rate making it valueless for anybody else. Dj em's death, therefore, shortly after leav- ing Rome, was generally attributed to the slow poison of the Borgias. Alexander, on the evidence, seems to stand ac- quitted of this crime, but the fact that at the time, and ever since, he has been commonly credited with it, is a commentary upon the estimation in which the Pope was held in his day. Thus the Papacy, in the last fifty years of the fifteenth century, shows itself to be the creature of its times. If no worse, it was certainly no better than the secular Italian : governments of the day. The Popes indeed were secula 30 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Princes : they frankly recognised the fact, and acted in accordance with the character. The charge that hes heavy against them is, not that they failed to reach an ideal standard of saintliness and spirituahty, for such a standard would have been entirely out of harmony with the spirit of the age, and could have worked no permanent good, but that, in the prevailing corruption around them, they made no effort to rise superior to it ; that they adapted their own policy to its worst manifestations, and identified the Papacy with all that was most cynical, shameless, and iniquitous in the politics of the time. And so the Papacy of the Renaissance proved itself unfaithful to the mediaeval ideal which dignified the secular policy of a Gregory VII. or an Innocent III. ; so its policy rendered inevitable a Reformation of the Church in its Head and in its members, if the Church as an institution in Christendom was still to survive. C. FLORENCE I, Geographical and political position of Florence — Her attitude towards Italian questions — Conditions governing the development of Florence — ^Tendencies towards despotism in Florence before the Medici — Rise of Florence — Beginnings of a Constitution — Florence and the Guelph and Ghibelline contest — Florence divided by internal factions — Florence com- mends herself to Charles of Anjou— Reorganisation of the Constitution, 1267 — Gradation of class in Florence — Attempts to exclude the nobility from power — The Signoria established — Giano della Bella's " Ordinances " — Neri and Bianchi factions — Reorganisation of the Constitution, 1328 — Tyranny of the Duke of Athens — His expulsion — Defeat of the nobles — Revision of the Constitution — Rise of a burgher aristocracy — The Albizzi — Fresh divisions consequent on war with Pope Gregory XI. — Opposition of the Signoria and Parte Guelfa — Revolt of the Ciompi — Michele di Lando — ^The Albizzi recover control of the State, 1381 — The Medici and the Albizzi— Character of the Albizzi government— Impending crisis between Albizzi and Medici. The poHtical relations of Florence with the other Italian Powers, and her own internal condition from 145c to 1500, necessarily form no small part of the subject-matter of any work upon the career of Lorenzo dei Medici. The purpose of an introductory chapter is not to anticipate the pohcy and events which fall naturally into the general narrative, but to indicate the lines, marked out by circumstances and 32 LORENZO DEI MEDICI her past history, which the policy of Florence would naturally follow, and to trace in broad outline the development of the Florentine State up to the time when it fell binder the control of the Medici family. The geographical position of Florence, situated centrally between the four rival Italian States, predestined her to play a mediating part in the contentions and complications in which they were involved. More fortunate than Milan to the north and Naples to the south, Florence was not embarrassed by the claims of an ultramontane Power to the sovereignty of her State. But ultramontane claims upon her neighbours could not fail profoundly to influence her own political action. If the French succeeded in establishing themselves in Milan, it was not likely that their ambitions would stop short at that point. Florence would live under the constant apprehension of the advance of a great foreign Power upon her own terri- tories. This danger would exist quite apart from the French claims upon Naples, but taking the Milanese and Neapolitan claims in conjunction, the position of Florence was doubly insecure. Any advance of the French towards Naples must be through Florentine territory, or must at least bring the foreigner into tempting proximity to the frontiers of the State. If the effort were successful, and the King of France should rule in Milan and Naples alike, Florence might soon find herself gromid to powder between the upper and the nether millstone. It is true that Florence, as a great Guelphic common- wealth, traditionally based her policy upon friendship with France. But France outside Italy was one thing ; France seated secure at Milan and Naples was quite another. There was small probability, if French ambitions were fully realised, that Florence would be preserved from absorption into the French vortex merely on the strength of old friendship. To keep the French out of Italy was therefore the pohcy naturally marked out for a State situated as was Florence. This could best be done, not by stirring up confusion, and so affording opportunities for foreign intervention, but by maintaining an equilibrium between the existing Italian Powers, by throwing weight now into this scale, now into INTRODUCTION 33 that, so as to maintain as far as possible the ItaHan status quo, and to enhance her own reputation by the influence which on all sides she was able to exercise. Thus when Francesco Sforza succeeded in making himself master of Milan, it was the poHcy of Florence to support him. The Sforza dynasty, as long as it lasted, was a guarantee against the occupation of Milan by the French ; it would act also in restraint of Venice, who had her own ambitions in Lombardy, ambitions which, if she had attained them without the help of Florence, she would undoubtedly have exercised in a spirit of hostility. So too in Naples it was to the general interest of Florence to support the Aragonese occupation of that kingdom against the pretensions of France, though, if the King of Naples should at any time adopt a policy of aggression towards Florence, it would be necessary as a matter of course to oppose him by the means most suitable to the purpose. A policy of balance implies many contradictions and apparent incongruities, but in the main the interests of Florence demanded a condition of peace in Italy, not of war, and under Lorenzo for the most part such a condition was maintained. But Florence could not be limited exclusively by con- siderations of foreign policy. There were matters of great importance to her which lay outside the Italian claims of France and the conflicting ambitions of the Italian Princes. Her own domestic interests must be subserved, and nothing must be allowed to hamper her legitimate expansion, or neutralise the advantages which at great cost she had gained. Florence, from a city, had become a City-State largely under the irresistible compulsion of her commercial interests. At an early stage in her history she had become notable as a centre of commercial activity. Her wool, silk, and leather were not for her own consumption only. They were for the world at large, and it was of paramount importance that she should have free outlets for her products. First of all it was of importance to have control over the mouth of the Amo, and to possess a port upon the open sea. The long struggle for the possession of Pisa becomes, in this aspect, a matter of life and death to Florence. But C 34 LORENZO DEI MEDICI it was also necessary that she should command the Apennine passes through which, to the north and east, all her exports had to go. Enclosed by the mountains on two sides, Florence would have found herself excluded from contact with the outer world unless she gained control over the roads which led to it. The tendency to expand grows by what it feeds upon. Beyond the Apennines to the eastward lay the great high-road which formed one of the main arteries of communication in Italy, and beyond that lay the Adriatic with all the alluring visions of commercial expansion which the possession of an Adriatic port conjured up. Though these visions were never realised, yet they serve to explain the trend of Florentine expansion eastward towards Romagna, where it was brought up short by the Papal suzerainty over that region. On the debatable frontier of Romagna the action of both Florence and the Papacy becomes touchy, irritable, and nervous. Petty disputes and interferences, which seem on their merits to be of no importance, assume serious proportions, and sometimes threaten ruin to the whole fabric of the Florentine State. The student of Italian history at this period constantly finds himself baffled by the tremendous consequences which seem to hang upon the merest trifles. But the geographical and commercial position of Florence gives the clue to the mystery. Those things were not trifles on which, indirectly, the commerce, and therefore the existence, of the State depended. From the moment therefore when Florence first rose from a position of obscurity to become a thriving commercial town, a definite problem was presented to her for solution : to devise a form of government under which the natural activities of her citizens could be securely exercised, and by which she would be guaranteed against pressure and interference from outside. No form of government would satisfy the liberty-loving Florentines which was not demo- cratic, at any rate in appearance ; but a democratic govern- ment was not the one best fitted in mediaeval Italy to conduct a spirited and independent policy in regard to matters of external politics. The municipal government which suited INTRODUCTION 35 the City of Florence was not the kind of government which suited a territorial State. Something of civic liberty must be sacrificed if the sovereignty of the State was to be secured. The people of Florence wanted the sovereignty without the sacrifice, and the result was years of constitution-making and civil strife, until at last, in the government of the House of Medici, a tolerably acceptable compromise seemed to have been secured. The government of the Medici gave to Florence the forms of republican freedom and democratic independence which were so dear to the hearts of the people : at the same time it gave them security for a continuity in public policy which was of vital necessity in the conduct of diplomatic business and foreign affairs. Florence could pretend not to recognise that she was subject to a despot, when the despot himself was nothing more than a leading citizen living the unosten- tatious life of a wealthy and distinguished burgher. In the hands of such a man her commercial interests were safe, for they were his own ; and by his wealth he could frequently gratify the public passion for ceremony and pageant which was so marked a feature of the Florentine character. If it fell to him to receive distinguished guests in the name of the Republic, and entertain them with lavish hospitality, his temporary assumption of the headship of the State was more than compensated for by the fact that a private person largely defrayed expenses which otherwise the people must have borne. Thus the dignity of the State was maintained, the public pocket was spared, and Florence was grateful on both counts. When, in addition, the Medici despot faithfully and genuinely represented the highest aspirations of the national character, when in a city devoted to art, scholarship, and literature he was the best connoisseur, the best friend of scholars and artists, and in the case of Lorenzo almost, if not quite, the best poet, it is not difficult to under- stand how a practical tyranny should have been almost unconsciously set up over a people passionate for their liberties, how they might still continue to delude themselves that they were free, when by subtle arts their freedom had insidiously been filched from them. 36 LORENZO DEI MEDICI It only remains, before dealing with the actual despotism of Lorenzo, briefly to state the various stages through which Florence had passed before she developed that particular and peculiar kind of despotism which found its most com- plete expression in the Medici family. II. Fiorenza mia . . . che fai tanti sottili Provvedimenti, che a mezzo novembre Non giunge quel che tu d'ottobre fili. Quante volte del tempo che rimembre Legge, moneta, officio e costume Ha tu mutato, e rinovato membre ! E se ben ti ricordi e vede lume, Vedrai te simigliamente a quella inferma, Che non puo trovar posa in su le piume, Ma con dar volta suo dolore scherma. Purgtiiorio, vi. 142. Oh my Florence . . . who dost make so many subtle provisions that that which thou spinnest in October reaches not to mid-November. How often in the time that thou rememberest, laws, coinage, offices and customs hast thou changed, and renewed thy members ! And if thou wilt well bethink thee and see clear, thou shalt behold thyself like unto that sick one who can find no rest upon the down, but by turning about shuns her pain. [Wicksteed's Translation.] The opinion that Florence, having built up for herself a constitutional system distinguished for democratic inde- pendence and republican freedom, was at last enslaved by the designing arts of unscrupulous Medicean despots, derives no warrant from the history of the rise and development of that State. It will be found, on the contrary, that Florence, with strong cravings for what she called liberty, had at no time a sound comprehension of the meaning of the word ; that her conception of liberty was scarcely to be distinguished from Ucence ; that the very elaboration of her constitutional safeguards only conduced to the absence of all real freedom, and that from the earhest times Florence was perpetually subjecting herself to the domination of a master. The processes of constitutional evolution eventually resulted in the estabhshment of a form of despotism which was to her mind. It preserved in a measure the externals of freedom ; it was exercised under the semblance of republican institu- INTRODUCTION 37 tions ; it did not jar against her history in the past nor against her ideals for the future, but it was none the less a despotism which imposed upon her the strong hand of a master whose autocracy was the sole safeguard for the preservation and for the peace of the State. Of this form of despotism the Medici were the last, the most complete, and the most effective representatives. The organisation of their government was not a creation of their own, but an embodiment of past experience. In its architecture we can see the traces of successive constitu- tional styles and various political ideals, the completed edifice exhibiting at last a structure in general harmony with centuries of striving and aspiration. The cradle of every people is shrouded by curtains of legend and of fable, and the legendary story of Florence is one of pecuHar fascination. We must, however, pass over the Trojans, Julius Caesar, Rhadagasius, the good Bishop Zenobius, and many others, and come to the time when Florence more definitely emerges into the light of history as a town upon the Arno colonised by settlers from Fiesole, a vigorous centre of commercial activity, owing a general allegiance to the Holy Roman Emperor, and, as a part of Tuscany, under the actual government of the Margraves of Tuscany, who ruled either as Imperial Vicars, or as inde- pendent Princes, according as the power of the individual Emperor was weak or strong over his dominions. Of the Tuscan Margraves who made a deep and lasting impression upon the City of Florence, the most famous was the Margravine Contessa Matilda, exalted by Dante to be the guardian of his earthly Paradise. Her strong government gave protection under which commerce and the arts of peace could flourish, while her system of exer- cising her own authority through the medium of delegates chosen from the citizens themselves seems to have given to the Florentines their first instincts of self-government and poHtical independence. The seed sown by Matilda fell on favourable soil, for the Florentines were soon to prove themselves, of all the Italian peoples, the most fertile in constitutional expedients, the most restless experimenters in the mysteries of political science. 38 LORENZO DEI MEDICI The position of Florence towards the great struggle between Popes and Emperors which followed upon Matilda's death was determined by circumstances which may be called local, as much as by those which were of general apphcation to Italy. Florence was of necessity deeply concerned in the result of the contest between imperial rivals for the possession of Matilda's inheritance, for her own position depended on the issue ; locally, however, she was even more concerned by the question which must be decided at home, whether the citizens within her waUs were to be the dominant power over Florence, or the nobles who lived in their strong castles outside. It was a question not only of class but of race. The citizens were in the main of Latin stock ; the nobles of Teutonic origin : thus the struggle between them may be regarded as a survival of the efforts of barbarian invaders against the Roman Empire. The feudal tendencies of the nobles were in sharp contrast with the municipal tendencies of the citizens. The nobles would be inclined to the side of a German feudal Emperor, the citizens to that of the Popes, who professed themselves the friends of municipal liberties. Thus Guelph and Ghibelline came to have a sort of meaning for Florence. They repre- sented different and antagonistic ideals. For the dwellers within the walls Ghibellinism meant a feudal domination in the hands of an alien caste ; Guelphism meant a measure of municipal independence, the control of the City-State by its own pure-blooded Italian citizens. But if Ghibellinism meant, as perhaps it did, submission to the imperial sway of an Emperor, Florentine Guelphism by no means meant submission to the imperial sway of a Pope. The ambition of Florence was to be independent of both, and to stand out as a free State governing itself. It was very willing to accept what help the Pope would give towards this end, an end which was more Hkely to be at- tained through the assistance of the Papacy than through the adoption of Ghibelline principles. But the identifi- cation of Florentine Guelphism with the recognition of a Papal temporal supremacy over Florence is altogether mistaken. While always regarding herself as a dutiful daughter of the Church, Florence was ever as ready to rebel INTRODUCTION 39 against the Papacy as to support it, if it appeared that Papal ambition was aiming at the assertion of sovereign power over her. No denunciations of a Pope have been more ferociously outspoken than those levelled against the Vicar of Christ by the Guelphic City of Florence in the times of Sixtus IV. and Alexander VI. This disposition, so marked in their day, to discriminate between the Papacy as a temporal power which was to be resisted, and the Papacy as a spiritual force which was to be respected, makes its appearance very early in the history of Florence. At a time when Emperor and Pope were fully occupied by their doubtful and prolonged contest, Florence profited by the distractions of both. She carried on her own struggle against her threatening nobles and forced them to come within the walls. She organised her industrial interests by means of the Guild system, by which the status of the citizen element within the city was strengthened and con- firmed. She enlarged her boundaries by the building of her second walls (1173) ; then, on the basis of this municipal extension, she formulated a constitution, by which the city was to be governed by an executive Council of twelve Consuls (two being chosen from each of the six wards, or sesti, into which the new city was divided) , and a legislative Council of a hundred members, annually elected, and chosen mainly from the industrial Guilds. Outside the walls her territories began to extend under the irresistible impulse of commercial requirements. Though Florentine independence was as yet an infant birth, liable constantly to be strangled by Imperial or Papal hands, as the fortunes of the grand struggle swayed this way and that, yet at the beginning of the thirteenth century Florence stood out declared, containing within herself, in embryonic forms, the forces which were ultimately to mould her destiny. She now enjoyed what Dante calls sua postrema pace — her last time of peace. Scarcely, however, had Florence begun to display the semblance of a homogeneous State when the city broke into factions whose furious animosities were to have conse- quences reaching far into the future. The romantic story of 40 LORENZO DEI MEDICI young Buondelmonte is comparatively so near to the time of Dante that we may accept his references to it as giving some guarantee of its- authenticity. Macchiavelli tells us that Buondelmonte dei Buondelmonti had betrothed himself to a maiden of the Amidei family, but was enticed from his faith by the extraordinary attractions of a daughter of the House of Donati. Whereupon the Amidei determined on revenge : at a council of their partisans it was resolved to assassinate Buondelmonte on the first suitable occasion. As the young gallant came riding into Florence on Easter Day (1215) he was attacked by the conspirators at the foot of the Ponte Vecchio and slain, close to the statue of Mars which had been set up there. Whereupon the whole city took sides in this family feud, one party supporting the Amidei, another the Buondelmonti, " and as these famihes possessed men and means of defence, they contended with each other for many years without the one being able to destroy the other." The contending parties roughly followed the lines of the Guelph and Ghibelline struggle, the partisans of the Buondelmonti sympathising with Guelph principles, those of the Amidei and Uberti with the policy of the Emperor Frederick II. Thus the distractions of Italy found intense and concentrated expression within the narrow circuit of the walls of Florence. A contest which hitherto had been a contest of principles and political ideals was now embittered by the infusion of frantic personal animosities which two centuries were scarcely sufficient to allay. O Buondelmonte, quanto mal fuggisti Le nozze sue per gli altrui conforti ! Molti sarebbon lieti, che son tristi Se Dio t'avesse conceduto ad Ema La prima volta che a citta venisti. Paradiso, xvi. 140.* " Oh Buondelmonte, how ill didst thou flee its nuptials at the prompting of another ! Joyous had been many who now are sad, had God committed thee to the Ema the first time that thou earnest to the City." [Wick- steed's Translation.'] The death of the Emperor Frederick II. marked a crisis in the history of Italy and of Florence. The confusion which followed from the succession of a child to Frederick's * See also Inferno, xxviii. 103-111. INTRODUCTION 41 Italian dominions, from the usurpation of Manfred, Frederick's illegitimate son, and from the envenomed controversy between Manfred and the Papac}/, tended to strengthen the Guelph cause in Florence, The constitution was remodelled in the Guelphic interest, and the Ghibelline nobles were expelled from the city. The Ghibelline exiles seized the opportunity offered by the distractions which everywhere prevailed to regain their position. In 1260 they won a great victory over the Florentine Guelphs on the field of Montaperti, near Siena, when " the Arbia ran red with blood," and the conquerors doomed the city to utter destruction. From this fate it was saved by the fiery protest of the great Ghibelline chieftain, Farinata degli Uberti, whose patriotism, even at the expense of his party, has been nobly celebrated by Dante in the tenth canto of his Inferno. Though Florence was saved, yet within her walls the hand of Ghibelline domination lay heavy upon her. When, in 1265, Pope Clement IV., in virtue of his suzerainty over Naples, called in Charles of Anjou, brother of the French king St. Louis, to contest the crown of Naples with Manfred, the Florentine Guelphs rallied to the standard of Charles, and on the fatal field of Benevento helped him to win that victory which brought ruin and death to Manfred and established the House of Anjou in southern Italy. The Guelph triumph at Benevento was followed in Florence by a fresh reorganisation of the constitution. An attempt was made to effect a reconciliation between the contending factions. The government was entrusted to two knights of the Order of the Virgin Mary — the frati gaudenti, as they were called — of whom one was a Ghibelline and one a Guelph. They were assisted by thirty-six assessors " from the higher ranks of the people," and by this Macchiavelli means that they were chosen from the members of the great commercial Guilds, not from the noble families. The chief exploit of the new administration was the organisa- tion of the Trade Guilds as separate centres of military force. Each Guild was to have its banner, and to the banner every member of the Guild was to rally in arms when summoned. The effect of the measure was that the Florentine burghers began to realise their military strength, and determined to 4\ 42 LORENZO DEI MEDICI use it. The Ghibellines were again expelled or retired into voluntary exile ; while the victorious Guelphs, in order to preserve the authority which they had won, commended Florence to the charge of Charles of Anjou for a hmited term of years. Charles became the first of a succession of foreign rulers to whom Florence submitted herself rather than endure the distractions to which its own civic feuds had given rise. The advent of Charles of Anjou, and his Principate over Florence, marks the beginning of that attachment of Florence to France which was for more than two centuries to be a leading principle of Florentine policy. The belief that a combination of the lilies of France with the lilies of Florence would prove irresistible was as strong an article in the political creed of Savonarola at the end of the fifteenth century as in that of the Parte Guelfa towards the end of the thirteenth. A statesman of the calibre of Lorenzo dei Medici might perceive, while keeping on good terms with France, that the aggrandisement of a foreign Power in Italy must lead eventually to the ruin of Italy and Florence alike. But the Florentine Guelphs hailed Charles of Anjou as a Crusader going forth to fight against the powers of darkness, represented by Manfred and the Ghibelline House of Hohenstaufen, and even so the followers of Savonarola hailed Charles VIII. of France as one sent by God to chastise Italy for its sins, and to establish the State of Florence as a fitting seat for the throne of Christ the King. In his treatment of Florence Charles of Anjou showed unusual moderation. He permitted the city to govern itself upon the lines already laid down. The constitution was again remodelled, and Guelph ascendency was made complete. The constitution* of 1267 shows in the elabora- * Details, especially as to figures, of the constitution of 1267 differ to such an extent in the various authorities that figures must be received with caution. The following outline seems fairly accurately to represent the main facts ; i. Twelve Buoniuomini with a two months' tenure of office. Germ of the " Signoria." Assisted by a Council of 100. ii. Gapitano del Popolo. Assisted by (a) Consiglio del Capitano e Capetudine. Known as the Credenza. INTRODUCTION 43 tion of its machinery of checks and counter-checks the sensi- tive Florentine jealousy of any strong and concentrated autho- rity, a jealousy which was the leading cause of the eventual establishment of such an authority. The executive govern- ment was placed in the hands of four distinct persons, or bodies of persons, each to be assisted by one or more delibera- tive councils. Twelve " " Buoniuomini " — two from each division of the city — were, during their two months' term of office, to be assisted by a council of loo. Legislation initiated by the Buoniuomini, and sanctioned by their Council, was in turn submitted to the Capitano del Popolo and the two advisory Councils attached to his office ; then to the Podesta and two further Councils which were associated with him. Working behind the scenes and pulling all the political wires was the " Parte Guelfa," a secret society operating generally in the Guelph interest — a sort of mediaeval Tammany — which was composed of six " capitani " (though the number was subject to variation) and two Councils. It was not long before the political organisation of the Parte Guelfa, acting under influences so favourable to mystery and sudden coups d'etat, became a despotism, swamping all the flimsy constitutional checks which had been so laboriously estab- lished, and exercising supreme authority in the State. Indeed at all times in Florence, beneath the forms of constitu- tional liberty, there lurked a despotism of some kind ; it Consisted of eighty members. The Capetudine were the consuls of the Guilds. (6) General Council of 300. A purely popular Council, made up of thirty citizens from each sesto = 180 The Credenza = 80 The Buoniuomini = 12 iii. The Podesta. A foreigner, appointed periodically, impartially to administer civil and criminal justice. His functions now become more definitely political. Assisted by (a) The Consiglio del Podesta, ninety members. \b) The Consiglio del Commune, 300 members (Macchiavelli says 120). A mixed Council of nobles and people. iv. The Parte Guelfa. Six Capitani, three nobles, three people's representatives . Two Councils, at one time acting independently as a secret advisory body to the executive of the Parte Guelfa. at another time acting openly and publicly with the Consiglio del Commune, its members being also members of that body. (Von Reumont.) 272 according to Macchia- velli. 44 LORENZO DEI MEDICI was merely a question of the particular shape which that despotism should assume. It will be seen that this constitution endeavoured to strike a fairly even balance between the nobles and the burghers, giving to each party its due share of authority. But a division of classes into nobles and burghers by no means represents the intricate ramifications of class interest which disintegrated the State. The key to future dis- sensions can only be found in an understanding of the various sections into which society in Florence was spHt, and the distinct and antagonistic aims which animated each section. The nobles may be regarded as a tolerably homogeneous body, but the burghers were only united by a common hostility to the nobles. The burghers who were members of the seven great Guilds— or Arti Majori— constituted the Popolo Grosso — the fat people — the prosperous, well-to- do commercial men, from whom the merchant princes were to rise. Below them were the members of the fourteen lesser Guilds— the Arti Minori— whose commercial interests were largely dependent on the expenditure of the nobles, who were bitterly jealous of the airs of superiority which the " Majori " assumed towards them, and who were constantly scheming to secure for themselves a greater share in the control of the government. At the end of the social scale came the working classes — the Ciompi— unorganised, without any share whatever in poHtical power, separated by a sharp line of cleavage from both the Majori and the Minori, quite apart from the rivalries of the nobles and the " Popolani," for they had little to expect from either party. But as their political intelligence advanced, they were deter- mined to secure for themselves such a share in the government as would put them more on an equality with those who indiscriminately oppressed them, those who, whatever their politics, were united in the determination to keep the lower classes down. It was the presence of these conflicting elements in the State which made constitutional government almost an impossibility in Florence. Where there is discord among the INTRODUCTION 45 citizens there cannot be harmony in the State. The con- ditions afforded the opportunity to an ambitious and crafty pohtical schemer to impose his own personahty upon a people wearied by perpetual distractions, to conciliate to himself the goodwill of the masses, while allowing their own rivalries to neutralise the opposition of the classes. The constitution of 1267 marks a stage in that process of evolution which was to result in the Medician despotism. Succeeding stages become visible in the light of that con- stitution. The first step was to get rid of the nobles. To this end the government in 1282 was placed entirely in the hands of the Guilds. The Priors of the Arti were to take the place of the twelve Buoniuomini, and, to add dignity to their office, they were to be known as Signori ; hence arose the Signoria, with its official residence in the Palazzo Publico, and all the requisite paraphemaha of officers and staff. As no noble would think it compatible with his dignity to be engaged in trade, the effect of these measures was to exclude the nobles altogether from the Signoria : a provision was, however, made which permitted the nobles to enrol them- selves upon the Guild registers : as membership did not necessarily imply the active pursuit of the Guild industry, many of the nobility enrolled themselves without hesitation. The contest between nobles and citizens therefore only assumed larger proportions, and the Guild government proved itself insolent and oppressive. The Signoria attached to itself a Gonfalonier of Justice, who was to have at his disposal 1000 armed men, disposed in twenty companies of fifty men each, who must hold themselves in readiness to obey the summons of the Signoria or Capitano del Popolo. Thus the executive had a force at its back which might be used to secure obedience to just authority, or abused by employing it to force arbitrary and oppressive enactments down the throats of the people. The abuse at this time was more conspicuous than the use. The city was in a deplorable condition. Outrages were occurring every day ; life and property were everywhere insecure. These were the circumstances which in 1293 produced the "Ordinances of Justice," with which the name of Giano della Bella is 46 LORENZO DEI MEDICI conspicuously associated. The chief clause in the Ordinances enacted that a noble must be bond fide engaged in the trade of the Guild of which he was a member : in other words, the nobles must cease to be nobles, and become citizens, or else be entirely excluded from the service of the State.* Provision was also made in the Ordinances for the prompt and vigorous punishment of any noble found guilty of the murder or ill-treatment of the common people : the Guild organisation of the city was further strengthened by the definite recognition of the twenty-one Guilds — seven of the greater arts and fourteen of the lesser — and the regulation of their precedence one over the other. The strength which Florence derived from the restoration of order and strong government was not destined to be long maintained. What precise political principles underlay the faction fights between the Neri and Bianchi — the Black and White Guelphs — is a question not easy to determine. " It ofttimes happened," says Macchiavelli, " when one of the parties in the State gained the upper hand, it split in two." This is what happened in 1300, when the Black and White feud was imported, like some malignant disease, into Florentine politics. The chroniclers, Dino Compagni and Giovanni Villani, give in detail the story of its origin and the narrative of events, but are silent as to the deeper issues which gave life and sustenance to the contest. Perhaps the fact that the vanquished Whites eventually identified them- selves with the old Ghibellines is an indication that they had shown themselves mistrustful of the growth of the Floren- tine democracy, while the Blacks were on the whole its supporters. But the adhesion of Dante to the Whites, his refusal to identify himself with his fellow exiles when they coalesced with the Ghibellines, and the fact that Corso Donato, the Black leader, married the daughter of one of the foremost among the Ghibelline chieftains, tend to baffle any attempt scientifically to analyse the inner meaning of this disastrous conflict. * It is notable that among the few recorded acts of Dante's political life in Florence is his protest against the severity of this enactment, a protest made in 1295 by the poet in his capacity of member of the Consiglio del Commune. INTRODUCTION 47 Its significance in the development of the Florentine State lies in the fact that it emphasises the impotence of the people to govern themselves as an independent Republic. Florence, to save herself from herself, was compelled to commit herself to the protection and government of foreign Princes, who, though they might plunder her, yet afforded a guarantee against those incessant internal distractions which paralysed her beneficent activities. For a period of years the constitution was virtually suspended while Robert the Wise, King of Naples, and afterwards his son, Charles of Calabria, ruled as Lords Paramount in Florence. The death of Charles in 1328, and of the great enemy against whom Florence had been long contending, Castruccio Castracane of Lucca, afforded a brief breathing space in which the experiment of self-government could once more be tried. It was determined on this occasion to simplify the con- stitution by abolishing the old elaborate apparatus of Councils attached to each section of the executive. In their place two Councils were established : the Consiglio del Popolo, of 300, under the presidency of the Capitano, and the Consiglio del Commune, of 250, under the presidency of the Podesta. The former retained the characteristic of the old Councils of the Capitano in being confined exclusively to representatives of the people, while nobles and people sat together in the Consiglio del Commune. Changes of great future importance were also made in the manner of choosing the incoming Signoria. It had been the practice for the outgoing Signoria to nominate its successors. For this method was substituted the " Squittino," or scrutiny, which meant that the names of all those who were eligible for office, for the next three, four, or five years, were put into a box, and as occasion required a sufficient number of names were impartially drawn out to fill up the vacant offices. The system, which in theory had much to recom- mend it, in practice opened the door to grave abuses, and became an important instrument for forging a despotism over the State. For it was not difficult so to manipulate the names as to ensure that none should find entrance into 48 LORENZO DEI MEDICI the boxes which were not favourable to the government, and to arrange the drawing of the names out of the bag in such a way that those only would come out who would prove the submissive tools of the party in power. Further developments soon followed which tended in the same direction. The government assumed the power to exclude its opponents from public life for a period, or for ever, by issuing its " admonition " against such persons as it deemed guilty of civil or criminal offences. The non-payment of taxes, for example, was rightly regarded as disqualifying the delinquent for public office ; but when taxation itself was used as an instrument of oppression, when a particular individual might be subjected to any monstrous tax which it might please his political opponents to impose, the system of admonitions might easily develop into an engine of private vengeance and public tyranny by which despotism could first establish itself and then render opposition to it impossible. Associated with these schemes were the " Parlamento," the " Balia," and the " Accopiatori." The Parlamento was a gathering of all citizens who chose to obey the summons of the great bell of Florence to appear in the piazza of the Signoria. To the multitude thus assembled the government could state its proposals, and, if accepted, they at once, by the exercise of the sovereignty of the people, assumed the force of law. The Parlamento was not a new device contrived in the fourteenth century ; it goes back to the beginnings of Florentine history. In theory at any rate the sovereignty of the people had always been an accepted principle in Florence. What was new was the manner in which the Parlamento was engineered to suit the purposes of a party. When a Parlamento was called the piazza was held in force by armed men, and soldiers controlled the avenues which led to it. A government with astute agents and a military force always has the mob at its beck and call. Thus the Florentine Parlamento degenerated into a mere semblance of popular sovereignty. Of all the engines of tyranny, the ugliest and most repulsive are those that masquerade in the garment^ of liberty. INTRODUCTION 49 The proposals of the government to the Parlamento were as a rule hmited to the one suggestion that a Balia should be appointed. The Balia was a select committee, nominated by the government and confirmed by the Par- lamento, which was to act as a commission of reform. Under the sanction of public authority it could carry into effect whatever measures the government had pre- viously agreed upon. The Balia, however, usually dele- gated at any rate a portion of its authority to " Accopiatori," whose special function was to nominate the persons eligible for public office and to control the electoral boxes. As these accopiatori frequently retained power for years, long outlasting the Balia which had appointed them, it followed that the pubhc offices were mortgaged before- hand, for a term of years, to those who would prove the obedient creatures of their masters. It was not the Medici who forged these weapons of despotism for Florence ; they were manufactured long before the Medici rose to considera- tion in the State, but, being forged, they were ready for use, and the Medici understood, perhaps better than any others, how most effectively to use them. Florence now became involved in wars, of which the main object was the possession of Lucca : her want of success compelled her once more to look abroad for the leadership and enterprise which had proved so lacking at home. She appointed Walter of Brienne, Duke of Athens, generahssimo of her forces, and soon accepted him as her sovereign lord. The Duke, who is represented by contemporary chroniclers and by Macchiavelh as an utterly worthless character, relied upon the support of the lower classes in the State, and they acclaimed him as their Prince for hfe. Once invested with sovereign power, he did not fail frightfully to abuse it. His unmeasured violence ahenated in twelve months all classes in the State. A general rising against him, in which the Medici family took a prominent part, was organised for St. Anne's Day (July 26, 1343). The government of the Duke was overthrown and he himself was ignominiously expelled. St. Anne's Day has been ever since a red-letter day in the Florentine calendar. It is from this time that St. Anne D 50 LORENZO DEI MEDICI begins to appear conspicuously in Florentine art as the protecting saint of the Florentine Repubhc. Immediately upon the expulsion of the Duke of Athers the constitution was remodelled, this time in the interests of the nobles. No sooner was this done than " the people begin to regret that for one tyrant put down there had sprung up a hundred." Now was fought a final battle, within the vails, between the Grandi and the Popolo, and it is notable that in the quarter of S. Giovanni it was the Medici who began the attack on behalf of the people. The victory of the p3ople was complete. Whereas after past contests the nobles had succeeded in reasserting themselves, now they were crushed for ever. The long struggle of centuries reaches its cul- mination in the streets of Florence in the autumn of 1343. The pohtical centre of gravity is shifted, and the triumphant people are for the future engaged in furious rivalries between their own contending sections. Yet another revision of the constitution followed from the victory of the popular party. Eight Priors were to consdtute the Signoria, of whom two, if not three, were to be taken from the Lesser Guilds. Twelve Buoniuomini elected for three months acted as counsellors to the Signoria, and sixteen Gonfaloniers of the Companies, holding office for four months, were made responsible mainly for the military organisation of the State. The two Grand Councils of 1328 were retained, together with their presiding officers, the Capitano and the Podesta. The chief power, however, was in the hands of the Parte Guelfa, which once more began to exercise a despotism analogous to that of the Duke of Athens. No efforts were for long capable of suppressing a tyranny in Florence ; and those exertions which had been directed against the govern- ment of the Duke were, in the course of a few years, concen- trated against the autocracy of the Parte Guelfa. Scarcely was the pohtical power of the nobles extinguished when the city was rent by a new feud. The Albizzi family, which had come to Florence from Arezzo, and had risen by trade and business abihty to affluence and position, found political and commercial rivals in the family of the Ricci. Each was identified with the popolo grosso and repre- INTRODUCTION 51 sented the interests of the rich burghers of the Greater Guilds, but each being bent upon its own sovereignty, the Albizzi associated themselves with the Parte Guelfa in order to attain their ends, while the Ricci courted the support of the Lesser Arts. That condition, in fact, was never known in Florence " when none were for a party but all were for the State." In one of the many speeches which Macchia- velli, in his History of Florence, puts into the mouths of some nameless Florentine citizens — speeches which add so much literary adornment to that work, at the expense, it is to be feared, of historical fidelity — he doubtless expresses his own sentiments when the speaker is represented as saying : " Our laws, statutes, and civil ordinances are not, nor have they ever been, estabhshed for the benefit of men in a state of freedom, but according to the wish of the faction which has been uppermost at the time. Hence it follows that when one party is expelled, or one faction extinguished, another immediately arises ; for in a city that is governed by parties rather than by laws, as soon as one becomes dominant, it must of necessity soon divide against itself, for the private methods originally adopted for its defence will now no longer serve to keep it united." The situation became still further complicated by a war against the Pope, Gregory XI. The anti-Itahan French policy of the Avignon Popes had roused against them strong ItaHan antipathies, and Florence, notwithstanding her Guelphic proclivities, was at heart essentially Italian. The Parte Guelfa, however, was naturally indisposed to a war which seemed to involve a contradiction of its own principles. War, however, began, and it was determined by the Signoria to entrust the conduct of it to the " Otto di Guerra," a committee of eight, specially appointed for the purpose. The city therefore now became divided between the sup- porters of the Signory and the Eight upon the one hand, and those of the Parte Guelfa on the other. The latter could command such aid as the nobility were still capable of giving, and the support of the popolo grosso and the Albizzi ; on the side of the Signory were ranged the lower orders, the Eight, and the influence of the Ricci, Alberti, and Medici families. 52 LORENZO DEI MEDICI The most prominent representative of the Medici family at this time was Salvestro, who was Gonfalonier of Justice in 1370, and again held that office, despite the efforts of the Albizzi, in 1378. He set himself to curb the power of the Parte Guelfa, especially the abuse of the system of " ad- monitions " by which in a great measure that power was exercised. Thwarted in his efforts by the " Colleges "— that is, by the twelve Buoniuomini and the sixteen Gon- faloniers of the Companies — Salvestro appealed to the people. " Let no one," says Macchiavelh, " when raising popu- lar commotions, imagine he can afterwards control them at his pleasure, or restrain the people from the commission of acts of violence. Salvestro intended to enact his law and compose the city, but it happened otherwise." The lower orders, seething with discontent, conscious of their wrongs, and mindful of their opportunity, now broke loose from all bonds. The revolt of the Ciompi in 1378 anticipated iWts purposes and in its ferocity the almost contemporary rising of the Peasants in England. There is the same cry against the well-to-do : the same assertion of the natural equality of all men, the same demand for higher wages and better conditions of labour. It mattered little to the masses whether nobles or popolo grosso got the upper hand. Whoever was victorious, they were equally oppressed, and now they turned on their oppressors. Bursting into the palace of the Signory, the Ciompi made themselves masters of it, and appointed one of their own number, Michele di Lando, chief magistrate of the city. Michele— a street in Florence still bears his name — was a man of remarkable character. His appearance upon his first entrance on the stage of public life was unpromising. Barefoot, with scarcely any clothes upon him, and with the rabble at his heels, this unkempt and ferocious woolcomber seemed to afford no prospect of statesmanship or moderation in the conduct of affairs. But opportunity and responsibihty combined to convince his fellow citizens of how much worth may he concealed beneath a rough exterior, how much political capacity may reside in the humblest of the people. He showed himself resolute in quelling disturbance from INTRODUCTION 53 whatever quarter it might arise ; indeed, the resentments' which he aroused were chiefly on the part of those who thought him too moderate in the constitutional changes which he introduced. Under Michele di Lando the citizens were classified in three divisions — the Greater Guilds, the Lesser Guilds, and the working classes, who were now organised in three new Guilds. The Signoria was to be composed of Guild members in the proportions of two from the Greater Arts, two from the Lesser, and four from the newly formed Trade Unions. Having completed these changes, and having pacified the insurrection, Michele himself seems to have almost entirely withdrawn himself from the stage of political affairs. But the settlement which he had effected was destined to be of short duration. Discontent and faction on all sides raised their heads. The excluded nobility were chafing against their exclusion ; the new aristocracy of the Greater Guilds were jealous of the Lesser, which were now in a position of equal political authority. The minor Guilds were jealous alike of those above them and those below, while the masses were intent on maintaining and increasing the share of power which they had won. " Thus sometimes," to quote Macchia- velli again, " the nobles of the people took arms, some- times the major and sometimes the minor trades, and the lowest of the people ; and it often happened that in different parts of the city all were at once in insurrection." The result was the fall of the new government in 138 1, and the resumption of power by the burgher aristocracy of the Greater Guilds. This practically meant an oligarchy in the hands of the Albizzi family. Maso degli Albizzi, its representative, brought about the abolition of the new Trade Unions, reduced the political power of the Lesser Arts, and placed a crushing preponderance of pohtical authority in the hands of the seven great Guilds. Some years later (1393) an attempt was made to induce the Medici to take up the popular cause against the Albizzi. A depu- tation of the Lesser Guilds, and of the lower classes, waited upon Vieri dei Medici, who was now the chief representative of the family, to implore him to assume the direction of the 54 LORENZO DEI MEDICI State. Moved either by prudence or disinclination, Vieri refused their request, and the contest between the two famihes of Albizzi and Medici was postponed for a genera- tion. The action of the Medici in the troubled times of the Ciompi revolt and its sequel is significant. It was Salvestro dei Medici who in 1378 called forth the tempest, but in ap- pealing from the Colleges to the Council of the Commune he seems to have had httle, if any, idea that he was opening the flood-gates to an infuriated populace. Doubtless he wel- comed the overthrow of the party to which he was in pohtical antagonism, and cared httle by whose hands it was over- thrown, but he by no means identified himself with mob violence : it is indeed certain that by a section of the mob he was regarded as far too moderate. If he made no attempt to restrain the people, he equally made no attempt to inflame them, nor to profit personally by their action. Indeed, on leaving office he does not appear again in public life, and in 1388 he died. But there can be no doubt that Salvestro deepened the impression that the lower classes, in the time of need, would find in the House of Medici friends and supporters. The creation of such an impression with- out giving, by definite action, any very tangible grounds for it, is altogether characteristic of Medician methods. It is difficult to see with what justice Salvestro and Vieri are regarded as deep political schemers, planning the ruin of the Republic for their own benefit, only waiting till the pear should be ripe. Vieri seems to have been a prudent, modest, and unassuming man. But in less than sixty years from the Ciompi revolt the Medici were at the head of the State, and the action of Salvestro undoubtedly paved the way for the despotism of the family, and suggested the lines on which its despotism should be conducted. For the present, however, the Albizzi controlled the sources of power. Their government was that of an oligarchy, resting in the main upon the support of the commercial aristocracy. The government of the Medici which super- seded it was also an oligarchy, but it rested in no small degree upon the support of the lower classes. Each government INTRODUCTION 55 displays the tendencies inherent in an oHgarchy, of which the most notable is the tendency to split from within. The oli- garchs begin to quarrel among themselves ; counsel is divided and policy doubtful ; at last they fall before those who have been on the watch to seize their position. The history of Florence during the first thirty years of the fifteenth century is the history of the almost silent, but none the less deadly, rivalry of the two families — the Albizzi distinguished by the dash and daring of their pohcy, by the briUiance of their representatives, the reckless self-confidence which was generated by their success ; the Medici watchful and re- tiring, patient of injuries but never for a moment forgetful, slowly and stealthily undermining, by the arts of wealth and popularity, the structure of pohtical power which their rivals had so elaborately reared. The rule of the Albizzi in many respects marks a golden age in Florence. Territories were acquired — such as Pisa — which the Republic for the sake of its commercial interests could scarcely do without. The city grew in dignity and external splendour : a new epoch in Art and Letters began ; the luxuries and amenities of civic life reached a point never hitherto attained. But old evils had not yet worked them- selves out, and already new ones began to appear. It was the Albizzi who set the example, which the Medici were not slow to follow, of using taxation as an instrument for the suppression of their pohtical opponents : complaints were loud, even during the period of their ascendency, against the unfair incidence of taxation to the detriment of the poorer classes. The Albizzi met opposition by vigorous proscription, resorting to exile and " admonitions " whenever individuals showed themselves too formidable. But it was their foreign policy which prepared the way for the crisis which eventually overthrew them. Florence found herself constantly involved in wars which may have been necessary, but of which the expense was more sensibly felt than the necessity. War with Gian Galeazzo Visconti could scarcely be avoided if the ambition of the Visconti to be master and King of Italy was to be checked, but it was a war not very gloriously conducted by Florence, and the death 56 LORENZO DEI MEDICI of Galeazzo was certainly fortunate for her. War with Ladislas of Naples did little to thwart his schemes of am- bition. Indeed, it seeemed that it was only his timely death which saved Florence from being annexed to his dominions. " Thus," says Macchiavelli rather unkindly, " death has always been more favourable to the Florentines than any other friend, and more powerful to save them than their own valour," War at a later period with Filipo Maria Visconti resulted in a disastrous defeat for Florence at Zagonara in 1424. War with Lucca, a few years later, was violently opposed, and Rinaldo Albizzi had great difficulty in getting his own way. By conducting it in person he brought upon himself personally the odium which follows military failure and incapacity : when a treaty with Lucca on the basis of the status quo ante had to be patched up in 1433 every one felt that a crisis had arisen. Against the Albizzi there stood Cosimo dei Medici ready to assert the claims of his party and family against the ruling House : the Albizzi felt that the time had come when they must destroy or be destroyed. CHAPTER I RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY TO THE DEATH OF COSIMO Giovanni dei Medici, great-grandfather of Lorenzo the Magnificent — Giovanni's relations with the Albizzi — Cosimo dei Medici — Rivalries between Cosimo and the Albizzi — Banishment of Cosimo — His recall ; fall of the Albizzi — Supremacy of Cosimo — Character of his ascendency — His methods of government — His foreign policy — The Milanese alliance — Abortive opposition to Cosimo, 1455— Luca Pitti— CoMp d'etat of 1458 — Death of Cosimo, 1464. TN the later years of the fourteenth century the poHtical influence of the House of Medici had been identified with that branch of it from which Salvestro and Vieri were sprung. They, and theirs, were regarded by the Albizzi as their most dangerous rivals, and in the proscriptions by which, from time to time, the Albizzi sought to strengthen their power, the Medici of Salvestro's and Vieri's line suffered severely. Another branch of the family, which was represented in Salvestro's days by Averardo Bicci dei Medici, seems to have kept itself aloof from the strife of factions. When poHtical honours and employment came in their way they accepted them, but Averardo Bicci himself was a man more occupied in building up a great commercial business, as trader and banker, than in the strife of parties in the political arena. Thus he and his family escaped notice at a time when the hand of the Albizzi was heavy upon other branches of the Medici House, the ruling oligarchy only awaking to the surprised consciousness of the existence of a competitor when Giovanni dei Medici, Averardo's son, was already one of the most influential men in Florence. In Giovanni, as he is represented to us through the chronicles and histories, we are able to detect most of the essential S7 58 LORENZO DEI MEDTCI traits of the Medici character. As a private man his aptitude for commerce was extraordinary. He amassed enormous wealth, and controlled to so large an extent the money market of Italy that he was able to effect a financial crisis in almost any quarter where it suited him to operate. The ramifications of his banking business extended far beyond the hmits of Italy ; to Constantinople and the Levant in the east ; to France and England in the north and west. In Florence almost every citizen of importance was his chent, and of many of them he was a creditor, while his generosity to the lower classes, whether prompted only by his natural munificence or by nicely calculated pohtical design, gave him a popularity and an influence which could be used on occasion for pohtical purposes. While thus laying the foundations for the ascendency of his House, he was himself a man of singular prudence, distinguished by the moderation of his views, by his conservative tendencies, and by his apparent desire to keep himself outside the contentions which distracted the city as the power of the Albizzi began to wane. By the Albizzi he was regarded as harmless ; as a man who, though not perhaps very well disposed to the ruling oligarchy, was yet intent upon his own affairs, willing to serve the State if called upon to represent it, but not setting himself to seek office nor to use office as a means of disturbing the government. He might even be made to serve a purpose useful to the pre- vailing faction itself. There were malcontents within the ranks of the oligarchy, and they might be brought to heel if it could be shown that they could be dispensed with. Thus when Giovanni became Gonfalonier of Justice in 1421 it was with the consent of the party in power, and in spite of the warnings and remonstrances of Niccolo da Uzzano, who was supposed to exercise an influence in the government not inferior to that of Rinaldo degH Albizzi himself. But his protest was of no avail, for his associates were jealous of Uzzano's reputation, and desirous to exalt some person through whom he might be humbled. It was the foreign pohcy of the Albizzi which brought Giovanni prominently forward as a political opponent. He RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY 59 disapproved of the war undertaken against Filipo Maria Visconti, but if there was to be war, he thought it should be defensive, not offensive in character. When the ill success of the war placed the Albizzi in desperate straits, Giovanni showed himself hostile to the oppressive taxation to which the people were subjected. He refused to lend himself to Rinaldo's project of reducing the political influence of the Lesser Arts in order to enhance still further the ascen- dency of the Grandi. After the disastrous defeat of the Florentines at Zagonara the influence of Giovanni increased, for the defeat seemed to be the result of a policy which he had opposed. Moreover, his adhesion to a plan of taxation, by which every one was called upon to contribute to the revenue at a fixed rate per cent., stamped him in the opinion of the masses as their friend, as one who maintained and advanced the reputation of the Medici House as the cham- pions of the people. When it was sought to make the new scheme retrospective — for thus, it was urged, it could be shown that heavy arrears of taxation could be proved against the Grandi — Giovanni gave fresh proofs of his moderation and good sense, declaring, according to Macchia- velli, that it was not well to go into things so long past unless to learn something for present guidance : that if in former times the taxation had been unjust, " we ought to be thankful that now we have discovered a means of making it equitable — for he that is content with a moderate victory is always most successful ; those who would do more than conquer, commonly lose." There is the trite, epigrammatic touch here which reminds us of some of Cosimo's recorded sayings, leading us to believe that the words may actually have been spoken by Giovanni. Notwithstanding the appeals of his sons, Cosimo and Lorenzo, to take a more decided line, and put himself at the head of a movement against the government, Giovanni refused to take the advantages which his position offered. If the speech which he made to his sons upon his deathbed is authentic, he seems to have desired that they too should follow his example. " I die content, for I leave you rich and weU, and so placed that if you follow the course that 6o LORENZO DEI MEDICI I have followed, you will live in Florence respected and in favour with all men. I am cheered by the thought that I have never wilfully offended any, but have sought to do good to all. In State affairs, if you would live in safety, take that share which the laws and your fellow citizens shall think good to bestow upon you ; for what occasions hatred is not that which is given to an individual, but that which an individual has determined to take possession of. Although among so many enemies, and surrounded by so many conflicting interests, I have not only maintained my reputation, but increased it. If you pursue the same course, the same good fortune will attend you." Cosimo dei Medici, Giovanni's eldest surviving son, was forty years old at the time of his father's death in 1429. He was a man well versed in public affairs, and thoroughly understood how to conduct the vast private interests which were now committed to his hands. In character and methods he bears a close resemblance to his father, but his ambitions were wider. Not circumstances only but incli- nation urged him to come forward and contend with the falling oligarchy for the possession of Florence. The Medici were the traditional supporters of the populace against the privileged class, and Cosimo was the recognised head of the Medici, the natural leader of all who were opposed to the government. Opportunity for active opposition was not long wanting. In 1430 Rinaldo degli Albizzi plunged Florence into a new war, this time against Lucca, which for years had been a peculiar object of Florentine ambition. The enterprise, however, was recognised as hazardous ; it would cost immense sums, involving still heavier taxation upon a people already heavily taxed. A strong anti-war party arose, and there were divided counsels even among the leaders of the ruling faction. Niccolo da Uzzano himself was one of the most forcible opponents of an adventure which he regarded as being as unjust as it was impolitic. Cosimo, on the other hand, seems to have favoured the war. MacchiaveUi's statement to this effect is precise, but Rinaldo degli Albizzi has left it on record that Cosimo only advocated war because he foresaw the issue, and looked RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY 6i upon war as the most likely means of trapping his rival into his toils. This, however, is to attribute to Cosimo a sagacity and cunning of which even he was scarcely capable. It is the kind of accusation which it is easy to make after the event, but such nice calculations before the event are scarcely credible. What is certain is that Cosimo altogether disapproved of the administration of the war, and that he and his party used the fact that Rinaldo himself was the Florentine Commissary to bring personal accusations against the conduct of the campaign. How far Rinaldo was himself responsible for the incom- petence and corruption which characterised the war with Lucca is open to doubt. But as Commissary his efforts were unproductive of success, and he found himself charged with peculation, if not with actual treachery. He was aware that the partisans of the Medici were the source from which these charges arose, and in an evil moment of natural indignation he hurried without leave from his camp to Florence, in order to vindicate his reputation and strengthen the tottering fortunes of his government. He proposed that strong measures should be taken against Cosimo and his party, but was unable to induce Niccolo da Uzzano to support these designs. On the death of Uzzano, Rinaldo felt more free to act, and the war being ended by a treaty which reflected in its terms the unsatisfactory conduct of the enterprise, he felt that no time must be lost. Having secured the co-operation of the Gonfalonier, Bernardo Guadagni, whose term of office was to begin on Sep- tember I, 1433, Cosimo was summoned to attend before the Signoria. In spite of warnings he determined to obey the summons, and found himself a prisoner. He owed his Hfe at this crisis to his own judicious use of lavish bribes — though he marvelled that he was able to accomplish so much by what seemed to him a trifling expenditure — and to the dissensions which existed among his enemies. Albizzi and his more resolute supporters were for Cosimo's death ; others were in favour of banishment ; others refused to commit themselves to any opinion. Moderate counsels eventually prevailed : 6^2 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Rinaldo had to be content with a sentence of banishment which condemned Cosimo to ten years' exile at Padua, his brother Lorenzo to five years' exile at Venice, and the chief partisans of the Medici were in varying degrees to share the punishment of their leaders. It was, however, only when Cosimo was gone that Florence realised that she had lost an integral element of herself. Cosimo had struck his roots so broadly throughout the City- State that, on his departure, she seemed to wither and decline. " He took a part of Florence with him." Rinaldo, already disgusted by the half-measures which had been adopted, began to make preparations against the reaction which he saw to be inevitable. He reverted to the old proposals that the political influence of the Lesser Arts and lower classes should be diminished, and that power should be concentrated solely in the hands of the Grandi. This poHcy did not commend itself to all his friends, while it roused against him the bitter enmity of the lower orders, whose hearts turned to Cosimo as their natural defender. An alliance between Florence and Venice against Milan only resulted in further military disasters. In August 1434 the trend of public feeling was made manifest by the election of a Gonfalonier and Signory who were declared and unani- mous supporters of the Medician party. The time had come for Rinaldo either to accept his own total ruin or to seek to retrieve his position by an appeal to force. He summoned his friends to rally round him in arms : he was himself prepared to make a dash upon the Palazzo, but Palla Strozzi and Giovanni Guicciardini, on whom Rinaldo specially relied, proved cold or faint-hearted : the Signoria plucked up courage, and Rinaldo weakly abandoned arms for negotiations. At this time Pope Eugenius IV. was enjoying the hospi- tahty of Florence — that wandering and perturbed spirit for which Rome so seldom afforded a secure resting-place. He offered his services at this juncture as a mediator between the contending parties, and Rinaldo consented to discuss terms with Eugenius in his Papal quarters in Santa Maria Novella. But while they were discussing in Santa Maria, RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY 63 in the Signoria they were acting. A " Parlamento " having been hastily gathered in the Piazza, the Signory received authority to appoint a Balia, which unanimously determined that Cosimo should be recalled and that his place as an exile should be taken by Rinaldo degli Albizzi. The Pope could only condole with Rinaldo upon the harsh- ness of Fortune. He advised him to be patient ; to wait for some favourable turn. Rinaldo's reply shows the bitterness of a man who has been duped. " The distrust of those who should have trusted me, the trust which I have placed in you, these have been my ruin ; but I myself am most to blame in that I supposed that you, who could not maintain yourself in your own city, could maintain me in mine." Thus Rinaldo degli Albizzi vanishes from the Florentine stage. A man of aspiring spirit and daring resolution, the fascination of his character still impresses itself upon us through the mists of centuries and the dusty records of his day ; but he was a man unable to infuse into his own par- tisans his own boldness and an unquestioning loyalty, and so,' when Fortune proved fickle, he could rely only upon himself. Aiming at a despotism, he had been successful only in establishing an oligarchy, which collapsed under the pressure of its own divided counsels. The victorious Signoria took instant measures for the recall of Cosimo and his friends, anticipating their action by a drastic policy directed against the defeated party. When Cosimo returned he found that his enemies had been already dealt with. Seventy of Rinaldo's principal ad- herents shared the fate of their leader ; there was little left in the way of reprisals and proscriptions for the Medici to do. Cosimo was a man not naturally disposed to violence, nor fond of bloodshed for its own sake, but he was not one who ever shrank from violent methods when they seemed necessary. He was now quite determined not to be sent forth once more upon his travels, but to make his ascendency absolute and final. He proceeded therefore against his fallen rivals with relentless vigour. He knew how to act upon a conviction, which Rinaldo had only expressed, when 64 LORENZO DEI MEDICI he said that great offenders ought either to be left untouched or utterly destroyed. The offending Gonfalonier, Guadagni, under whom Cosimo had been banished, was executed. The unfortunate Albizzi were harried from place to place, the conditions of exile being made as bitter for them as possible. These harsh measures can scarcely be urged in judgment against Cosimo, for they were in the spirit of the times, and Florence had been long accustomed to drastic action in a time of political crisis. Compared with the tortures, murders, secret assassina- tions, which were the political weapons in common use at Milan, Naples, or Venice, Cosimo's procedure may be looked upon as mild, but to suppose him incapable of cruelty and ruthlessness is to mistake his character. He did not need a Macchiavelli to teach him that a Prince should know how to use cruelty as well as kindness, but that cruelty, rightly used, is used not for the sake of cruelty, but for the sake of those advantages which cannot be had without it. With the return of Cosimo in 1434 the despotism of the House of Medici over Florence was an accomplished fact. It remained, unimpaired and scarcely seriously challenged, until the expulsion of Piero dei Medici in 1494. Sixty years tenure of the first position in the State through four successive generations is a pohtical phenomenon in Florence of the first significance. Why did the Medici prevail ? On what foundations was their supremacy reared ? Their supremacy was reared upon political method, upon the power of wealth, and most of all upon a community of sympathy, which was not forced or artificial, between the tastes and habits of the Medici and all the strongest instincts and ideals of the Florentine people. These principles apply to the government of Cosimo even more definitely and consistently than to that of Lorenzo. As a pohtical engineer, the grandfather may take precedence over the grandson by right of originahty and first discovery. The originahty of Cosimo, however, does not consist in the invention of pohtical methods hitherto unknown. It was his distinction to employ old methods in a new way, so as RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY 65 to make them effective not only for personal but for public ends. The Medician government, while securing the ascend- ency of a family, at the same time remedied some fatal flaws which had long been conspicuous in the constitutional system of Florence. It provided an executive authority in the State which was independent of the constant changes in personnel which the system involved, and so established a government with which other governments could deal, and afforded a guarantee of permanence and continuity in the domestic and foreign pohcy of the State. Thus, if there was loss to Florence from the despotism of a family, there was also much gain. Her whole history had conclusively shown that to enjoy hberty she needed a master, and in the master hand of the Medici she flourished as never before. The weakness of the situation lay in its want of definition. The Medici had to act as kings while pretending not to be so, a position that required such deHcate handhng that only the most consummate statecraft and tact could maintain it and make it tolerable. As we trace the evolution of Florentine politics we arrive at last through successive stages of development and re- action at the ascendency of the Medici. It follows as an inevitable consequence of the conditions, and it gives to Florence the government which she needed and deserved. But it has special and peculiar characteristics of its own, of such a kind that the more the Medician supremacy is examined and understood the more the difficulty is felt of expressing its precise nature by a word or phrase. It is convenient to call it a despotism, for in a sense it was so, and yet Cosimo's most intimate associates would have been surprised at the assertion that the State was under the control of a one-man government. It was in a sense the government of a party, as was the government of the Albizzi, but had it been so described in Cosimo's presence he would have smiled and been silent. It was not the government of a faction, for all, or almost all, sections of the State could regard it as their own, yet the avenues to power were in the hands of a clique, and none but members of the ring exercised any actual control over affairs. E 66 LORENZO DEI MEDICI If Cosimo was a despot, it was only because he was in- dispensable. Whatever efforts were made after 1434 to loosen his hold and diminish his authority only resulted in making him stronger than before. His opponents were undone by the very success of their opposition. If they chafed under Cosimo, without him they were immediately reduced to impotence and despair. His wealth, and the uses to which he put it, gave to him personally a power of control over individuals and foreign governments against which it was useless to contend. But Cosimo was content with the possession of this irresistible influence. He had no desire to stand forth declared as the single and unquestioned autocrat. He was quite satisfied to work through agents and to allow them a certain latitude which almost deceived them into the behef that they were partners with him on equal terms. The government was in the hands of Cosimo's party, but the man who worked the party machine was Cosimo himself. Neither was it altogether the government of a faction. This had been the curse of all the previous revolutions in the State which had resulted in imposing successive tyrannies upon it. The ascendency of the Parte Guelfa or of the people, or of the Albizzi, had meant the suppression of everybody else. Cosimo's government was a government for all who would consent to live peaceably under it. He himself had roots among the old nobility, and by relaxing the rigour, at any rate in the case of some noble families, of the restrictive laws against them, he could claim credit for moderation while taking care that the opportunity for exercising pohtical power should never come their way. Of all the merchant princes of Florence, Cosimo was the foremost both by virtue of the range of his commercial transactions and the wealth which accrued from them. Thus he was specially fitted to represent the interests of the Greater Guilds. But the Lesser Arts and the lower classes looked to him as their natural and traditional champion. It was from the ranks of these lower classes that he drew some of his most important and influential henchnient RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY 67 Thus all sections, in a greater or less degree, could regard Cosimo as their friend and could look upon his government as exercised on their behalf. It was in a measure "national" • m Its universality we find its distinction, and some measure of its stabihty and success. To a government so nondescript as that of Cosimo three safeguards were essential. First, to exclude absolutely from the Florentme domain all those of any influence who were hkely to oppose it ; then to secure complete control over all appomtments to office ; lastly, to wield all the powers of taxation m such a way as to bring the pressure of the taxes individually to bear upon such persons as might be inclined to be refractory. With these safeguards in his hands Cosimo could afford to live much in the background to pose as the benevolent bourgeois only anxious to place' his poor services, if required, at the disposal of the State • to express unbounded respect for Gonfaloniers, Signoria 'and Councils, seeing that all ahke were his creatures 'who owed their official existence entirely to his consent and goodwill. Towards his vanquished rivals Cosimo showed himself stern and unrelenting. Apologists urge that the wholesale proscription of the Albizzi was not his work, and it is true that the Signoria which recalled him in 1434 at the same time issued its decrees of exHe against the fallen party But It was with Cosimo's consent, if not at his instigation that the conditions of their banishment were made intol- erable for them ; that the sentences were renewed upon their expiration, and that the exiles, and all who belonged to them, were eventually driven to despair. It is quite possible that Cosimo was governed here as much by policy as by the spirit of vindictiveness. Florence did undoubtedly need repose from the strife of parties. To exclude the rival party absolutely from its confines, to leave it without hope was perhaps the best way to secure repose. But from being merely exiles these men were driven into being rebels^ They stirred up war against the State, enlisted the efforts of Visconti on their behalf, and it was good fortune rather than good judgment which brought about 68 LORENZO DEI MEDICI their overthrow at Anghiari (1440). a defeat which finally ruined all their chances of success. The power of Cosimo was regularised by a Balia which, upon his return from exile, proceeded to fill the boxes which contained the names of those who were successively to fill the public offices with the names of those only who were known to be Medici partisans. To prevent the possibility of accidents, the names, when occasion required, were not to be drawn by lot, but to be selected by a com- mittee acting in Cosimo's interest. Every five years, until 1455, a Balia, appointed for the purpose, confirmed Cosimo's powers, and took the necessary measures to render official opposition impossible. Having thus gained the magistracies, it only remained to secure complete control over taxation. Under the Medici a suspect did not find himself confronted by the dagger of an assassin, but by the demand note of the tax- collector. The ordinance of 1427 which was passed after the Floren- tine defeat at Zagonara had for its avowed object the equalisation of the incidence of taxation. It sought to put a stop to the use of the taxes as an instrument of pohtical oppression. To this end it was enacted that every one was to pay a fixed rate per cent, upon his property of whatever kind; that every three years a new valuation should be made and the results accurately tabled in the pubhc registers. Under Cosimo this system fell into abeyance. The triennial valuation was neglected, and the government kept the right of assessment in its own hands. Thus by lightening the taxes for some, by paying them for others out of his private purse, by imposing on doubtful friends or declared enemies a crushing and intolerable burden, Cosimo made himself the master of all. " The Medici," says Guicciardini, " never allowed a fixed method and legal distribution of the taxes, but always reserved to themselves the power of bearing heavily on individuals according to their pleasure . . . they made use of the taxes to win the people over, while they set themselves up as lords of all." RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY 69 Securely entrenched behind the magistracies and the taxes, Cosimo had httle to fear from opposition, and could look on with equanimity as events pursued their course. But his career was not altogether untroubled. He had occasionally to remind his own most prominent partisans that they must accept the situation as he defined it, and that any attempt to follow an independent course could only result in their discomfiture. After Cosimo, the most prominent man in the city was Neri Capponi. Apart from the reputation which descended to him from his father, Gino, the conqueror of Pisa, Neri himself was a distinguished soldier, who supplied the military buttress which was needed for the edifice of the Medici power. He commanded the Florentine forces at Anghiari, and by his victory there over the Condottiere, Nicolo Piccinino, and the Albizzi rebels, he had materially contributed to the consohdatibn of Cosimo's government. His intimate friend and most trusted captain was Baldaccio d'Anghiari, a soldier of fortune who had served with much distinction in the war against Fihpo Maria Visconti. One day Baldaccio was summoned to the Palazzo by the Gonfalonier under pretext of consulting him on matters connected with his command, but on his arrival he was seized, treacherously murdered, and his body was thrown from the Palace windows into the Piazza below. The motives for this crime are obscure; the compHcity of Cosimo in the deed has not been proved. Macchiavelli describes it as a private act of vengeance on the part of Orlandini, the Gonfalonier, but the circumstance was gen- erally regarded as an indication of the long arm of Cosimo, as designed to convey to Neri Capponi a somewhat gruesome hint that he must confine himself rigidly within his own sphere of action. In the domain of foreign poHcy it required aU Cosimo's authority and powers of persuasion to reconcile the people to some failures, such as another unsuccessful war for the acquisition of Lucca, and to a cardinal departure from all Florentine precedent in an alliance with Milan. From 1450 the Milanese alliance became the leading principle 70 LORENZO DEI MEDICI of Medician diplomacy ; it was maintained as strenuously by Piero dei Medici and Lorenzo as by Cosimo, who initiated it. For years past Florence had been continually engaged in armed opposition to the Visconti, and these hostilities involved a tolerably constant aUiance with Venice, whose territories were even more seriously threatened by the Visconti power. In 1447 Filipo Maria Visconti died. Milan declared itself a republic, but it was obvious that without strong external support this infant republic could not sustain itself against the machinations of Francesco Sforza. Milan naturally looked to her sister republic of Florence to provide the support which was needed, and public feeling in the city set strongly in favour of supplying it. Cosimo thought otherwise. He was convinced that Milan was unfit for repubHcan institutions, and far too weak to defend them. Unless Milan was in the hands of a strong and formidable ruler, the State would inevitably become absorbed by Venice, who would thus consohdate all northern Italy under her sway and completely control all the means of communication by land between the rest of Italy and the outside world. The true pohcy of Florence, therefore, Cosimo urged, was to assist Sforza to instal himself as Duke of Milan. Owing his position to Florentine support, his authority would rest upon Florence and he would be in a measure dependent on her. Florence and Milan in conjunction could effectually check that pohcy of selfish aggrandisement which Venice was supposed invariably to pursue, while Naples, notwithstanding some claim to Milan which the Aragonese House could put forward under the terms of Filipo Visconti's will, was far too much concerned with Aragonese and Angevin rivalries to take a prominent part in general Itahan politics. Thus Florence and Milan, in aUiance, would hold the balance of power in Italy, for the Papacy was still distracted, and a combination of Naples, Venice, and the Papacy would scarcely be a match for Florence and Milan if they stood together. These arguments prevailed, and the foundation-stone of RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY 71 Medician foreign policy was firmly laid by Cosimo. But it was a policy which cannot be said at any time to have roused enthusiasm in Florence. A vigorous effort was made in 1466, upon the death of Francesco Sforza, to break an alliance which had never been popular, and a certain restiveness against Cosimo which is observable in 1455 may be in part explained by the dissatisfaction which the Milanese aUiance had created. Cosimo's rule had now extended, uninterruptedly and on the whole smoothly, over a period of twenty-one years. Italy was at last at peace, for the Venetians determined to reconcile themselves, at any rate for a time, to Sforza's possession of Milan : Rene of Anjou had shown himself so incapable in prosecuting his claims on Naples that the Florentines concluded that he was scarcely worth supporting. A peace concluded at Lodi in 1454 between Milan and Venice soon developed into a general peace, and, as a pledge of amity and reconciliation, Francesco Sforza gave his daughter Ippolita in marriage to the Duke of Calabria, the grandson of Alfonso of Naples. It was indeed time that Italy should compose her internal dissensions and unite against a common danger. In 1453 the Turkish Sultan, Mohammed II., had captured Constantinople ; the Turks were at the gate of Western Europe. There was a vague sense throughout Christendom that a time of crisis had arisen, but in Italy, as in Europe, there was no sense of the necessity of united effort. The Italian States were more interested in their own affairs than in the distant prospect of a remote danger. Each pursued its own course, regardless of the advent of the Turks, except in so far as they constituted a new piece which might be played in the complex game of Itahan diplomacy. In Florence in 1455 some of the principal adherents of Cosimo tardily recognised that they were being reduced to impotence. Thinking to establish an oligarchy in which political power would be shared among the ohgarchs, they discovered that they had set up the rule of a single person by whose authority everything was done. They insisted that the necessity no longer existed for government 72 LORENZO DEI MEDICI by Balias periodically appointed. They desired to re- establish the old system by which the magistracies were filled by lot and not by selection ; they demanded that the registers on which the taxes were based should be revised in the spirit of the law of 1427. Cosimo did not think it worth while to oppose them, for, the boxes being filled exclusively with the names of his supporters, it made little difference to him whether they were chosen by lot or selection ; while any revision of the taxation registers was likely, as he knew, to bear with special severity on the very men who advocated a re-assessment. Scarcely were the changes made when the authors of them realised their mistakes. Their share of political power diminished while their assessments considerably increased. There was no one to whom they could look to save them from themselves, except Cosimo. In 1458 he was urged by the very men who had sought to limit his power to reassert it in its original form. They suggested a Parlamento, a Balia, and all the apparatus by which Florence was wont to cloak force under constitutional forms. Cosimo refused. He had gone about, says MacchiaveUi, as if he did not observe that anything had happened, and expressed surprise that he should now be asked to sanction measures which were only justified by special circumstances of crisis. He was, however, very far from blind to the situation. He knew that there was need for action if his ascendency was to be preserved, but he preferred to use a cat's-paw to do what was necessary, while he himself remained in the background. In Luca Pitti he had always had in reserve the man who was required for any emergency such as that which had arisen. The name of Luca Pitti has become almost a household word, even though only a few have any knowledge of the man. He was the originator of the Pitti Palace, that stately building in Oltrarno whose galleries form the delight of every lover of Art. He was a man of great wealth and wide business connections, and thus his interests were similar to those of Cosimo. He loved popularity and the exercise of power, but his sense of his own importance was such that it could scarcely occur to his mind that his position RISE OF THE MEDICI ASCENDENCY 73 in the State was secondary. He would scarcely attempt to be Cosimo's rival, because he failed to recognise that any one could be a rival to him. He was thus a convenient agent for Cosimo, who could employ him to do work which he did not care to do himself. Luca Pitti would find his reward in living broadly in the public eye and concentrating attention upon himself. Cosimo would be satisfied to have the work done, and rather preferred to be behind the scenes so long as he could pull the strings. In 1458 some changes seemed to Cosimo to be certainly desirable. The con- stitutional party which hankered after the system of 1427 had grown too powerful, and must be taught a lesson. The lower classes were presuming upon the indulgence which had been shown to them. Some of the principal adherents of the Medici party were suspected of enriching themselves at the pubUc expense. A coup d'etat might prove useful aU round. On July I, 1458, Luca Pitti entered upon office as Gon- falonier. His first act was to endeavour to persuade the Signoria and the Colleges to go back on the reforms of 1455. He proposed that the boxes which had then been filled with the names of those eligible for office should be dis- regarded, and that the offices should be filled by selection instead of by lot. His efforts at persuasion proving un- successful, he determined to call a Parlamento, in order to secure from the popular voice the authority which he required. The Parlamento of 1458 is a fair example of the methods of procedure usual on such occasions. Foreign mercenaries overawed the city from outside. A httle army of over 6000 men held the Piazza of the Signory. The Medici partisans in arms blocked all the approaches. Under such conditions of choice Luca Pitti submitted his proposals to the assembled citizens. With one accord they shouted assent, and the proceedings were over. The Balia to which the pubhc had delegated its authority had time and a fair field before it. Its tenure of power was for six months, and thus the revolution was secure at any rate for a season. The changes which it effected were considerable, and they profoundly influenced the 74 LORENZO DEI MEDICI whole future regime of the Medici. The boxes were filled with sufficient names to last for five years. Accopiatori were to select the members of the Signoria for seven years. A Committee of Eight, which in the past, Uke the Ten of War, had occasionally been appointed to assist the govern- ment, was now crystallised into a permanent Commission of " the Eight of Watch and Ward," whose functions were to preside at elections, and take cognisance of offences done against the State. In honour of the greatness of the occasions the Priors of the Signory were no longer to be known as Priors of the Arts, but as Priors of Liberty, while the Gonfalonier's position as chief magistrate was emphasised by assigning to him a central place among his colleagues instead of a place to the side of them as heretofore. In addition, a new Council of The Hundred was established which in later days superseded the two Councils of the People and of the Commune. This Council was composed of suitable persons selected by all those who had held the office of Gonfalonier since Cosimo's return in 1434. It was thus entirely in the interest of the ruhng body, and only served to throw a covering of constitutional forms around the naked autocracy which was supreme. The work was clinched by the banishment of a number of persons who were on various counts disagreeable to the government. Some of these were corrupt tax-gatherers who deserved their fate, but in the majority of cases the fault of the delinquents lay only in their objections to autocratic control. During his remaining years the power of Cosimo was not again questioned. He himself retired still further into the background, leaving the active management of affairs in the hands of those whom he could trust. At the time of the coup d'etat he was nearly seventy years of age, and was a martyr to gout. In 1464 he died, and was hailed by his admiring fellow countrymen as " Pater Patriae." CHAPTER II COSIMO DEI MEDICI AND THE HUMANISTIC REVIVAL Incongruities of Cosimo's character — Character of the Florentines — Sympathy of Florence with Humanism — Effects of commerce on national character — Spiritual life and aspirations of Cosimo — Cosimo and the cult of Plato — Florence and the Revival of Learning — Francesco Petrarch — Revival of Greek — Meanings and implications of Humanism — Recovery of ancient MSS. — Professors of Greek in Florence — Foundation of acad- emies — Humanism in relation to Christianity — Harmony between Cosimo and Florentine ideals — Cosimo as a collector of books — Efforts to reconcile Platonism and Christianity — Gemisthos Plethon — Ambrogio Traversari. IF Cosimo's government and political method are the natural sequence of the complexities and incongruities inherent in the constitutional conditions, the man himself, in an even greater degree, represents the complexities and incongruities which are inherent in the nature of man. The world has not yet decided how far the code of morals which should govern private life is applicable to the necessities of politics and diplomacy. In Cosimo's day the distinction between the two spheres of action was clearly defined and taken for granted. The Prince, as a Prince, must not hesitate to do all those things which were necessary to maintain his position. As a private man he might be what he Mked. Cosimo's character as a private man is not undeserving of the encomiums it has received. Mac- chiavelU can by no means be accused of undue partiahty for the Medici, but he says of Cosimo that he not only surpassed all his contemporaries in wealth and authority, but also in prudence and generosity. " He was generous to his friends, kind to the poor, comprehensive in discourse, cautious in advice, grave and witty in his speech. . . . If, in relating Cosimo's actions, I have rather followed the style of princely biographies than that of sober history, it 75 76 LORENZO DEI MEDICI need not furnish occasion for surprise ; for of so extra- ordinary an individual I was compelled to speak with unusual praise." Even as a statesman and politician Cosimo might easily have been far worse than he was. Judged by the spirit of his age and by the standard afforded by contemporary rulers, he was in advance of public opinion rather than behind it. The dagger of taxation was certainly more respectable, for constant use, than the dagger of the assassin. A cold and calculating self-interest, which does what is necessary and no more, is almost a virtue compared with the wild, sullen, soulless excesses which mark the public life of a Ferrante of Naples or a Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Milan. Yet it is hard to reconcile Cosimo's political method with spiritual aspirations and a genuine sense of religion, though not more hard than it is to-day to reconcile some of the canons of commerce with the canons of strict rectitude and private honour. To deny spirituality to Cosimo would be to misunderstand him altogether. It was a part of the versatility of the Medici character — a versatility especially conspicuous in Lorenzo — to be genuinely affected by apparently the most contradictory impulses, and frankly to exhibit all the gradations which in each of us connect together the elements of the savage and the saint. It is this frank exhibition of incongruities which gives to the Medici character its pecuhar fascination. To deny the incongruities, to assert that all that was bad in them represents them as they really were, while all that appears good in them was an effect of artifice and hypocrisy, is a confession that a complex character is beyond the reach of our understanding. The true secret of the Medici influence over Flcrence is not to be discovered in their poHtical method alone. It lies rather in the perfect harmony which in all things existed between them and the aims, ideas, and aspirations of the Florentine people. The evil and the good in then corre- sponded to the mixed elements of the Florentine character. If their political method was unscrupulous and corrupt, yet it was only a more scientific manifestation of methods THE HUMANISTIC REVIVAL 77 which had been long in use, methods which were regarded as inevitable, and which were thoroughly understood. Other and purer methods must have proved ineffectual for the accomplishment of any purpose at all, because they would have been out of touch with experience and practice. Corruption in political institutions does not imply the general corruption of the people who live under them. Modern America, Walpole's England, Medician Florence, are examples that a nation may be sound, though some features of its government, viewed in the abstract, may seem to be rotten. In Florence the currents of national life flowed on undisturbed by the storms and vicissitudes of political rivalries, and that national life was strenuous, commodious, and aspiring. No mistake can be greater than to regard the Florentines of this epoch as a frivolous, fickle people, ready to surrender their dear inheritance of liberty to the man who would give them festivals and entertainments ; thoughtless of life's problems so long as they could enjoy the carnal and material pleasures which life could afford. The city which had produced Dante did not in two hundred years become utterly unworthy of her greatest son. The Florentines were a people in whom human nature manifested itself in all its many and varied aspects ; qualities in them which debased them to the level of the beasts are found in close association with qualities which drew them near to the nature of the gods. On the whole, they were a sober, striving, industrious race of citizens, engaged from day to day in the work of the day, but with interests not wholly concentrated on the struggle for material subsistence. They had a passion for their city, a sense of their citizenship, a love for what was beautiful, and a critical sense which enabled them to distinguish between false beauty and true ; they had virtues, in fact, which cover much that was degrading and redeem much that was imperfect. Nor is it too much to say that they were on the whole a God-fearing people. At a time when ceremonial observances had almost usurped the place of a religious life, it is astonishing to find in the best thought of Florence at this epoch so deep a sense of the mystery of 78 LORENZO DEI MEDICI life, so general a perception of the insufficiency of mere convention to satisfy the inmost cravings of the heart. While careful of observances, they were conscious that these in themselves were not enough, and the susceptibility of the Florentines to fall under the spell of deeply religious natures, such as St. Antoninus and Savonarola, is an in- dication that they reahsed their own shortcomings and had an instinct for loftier standards than those which they had actually attained. No ruler could have been acceptable to Florence who was totally lacking in a sense of the inner and higher life. The pre-eminence of Florence at this time in philosophy and scholarship is not without connection with the deeper side of the Florentine character. Just as the profound erudition of Dante, and the wide range of his philosophical speculations, were applied by him to the noblest purposes of spiritual life, so the Florentines, in the days of the Medici, regarded the philosophical Renaissance, not as an end in itself, but as a means to a more perfect understanding of the relation between God and man. The study of Plato, the revision of mediaeval views on Aristotle in the light of the authentic text, were more enthusiastically pursued at Florence than elsewhere, and, side by side with the abstract passion for antiquity, there is to be found the constant concrete object of effecting a philosophical reconciliation between the teaching and ideals of Paganism and Christianity. It was, however, in the domain of Art that, in the fifteenth century, Florence could claim a supremacy in Italy which was unquestioned. The municipal patriotism of the people had long found expression in beautifying the city by noble public buildings and princely private houses. Architecture called in the services of sculpture tc give finish and decoration to its creations ; the spacious walls of churches and palaces gave scope for the work of the fresco painters. The wealth of Florence brought with it a standard of comfort, a luxury, and a sense of refinement which called into activity the artistic energies of the workers in gold, silver, tapestry, and brocade ; indeed, there was THE HUMANISTIC REVIVAL 79 no department of life in which Art did not have its recognised and appointed place. All the city looked on at the efforts of its artists with the keenest appreciation and with a critical judgment. The inspiration to great work came only indirectly from the encouragement of patrons : their fount and origin were to be found in the national life. Such a city and such a people could not have been wholly given up to corruption. Splendid impulses cannot spring from a soil that is sour and defiled. Only that man or that family could truly represent Florence who shared her enthusiasms and was in perfect sympathy with the intel- lectual and artistic currents of her life. But before all things Florence was essentially a com- mercial city. It was its wealth, and the consequences which follow from wealth, which determined the bent of its intellectual and artistic activities. It was the oil of commerce which kept the lamp of culture burning. Thus a statesman in charge of the interests of Florence must direct his domestic and foreign policy to advancing her commercial welfare. He must be able to preserve order and peace within her territories, and without ; he must be alive to every opportunity of acquiring points of vantage, and extending the facilities for easy communication with the world at large. If, however, great wealth derived from commerce is capable of bringing to a nation great advantages, it will also impart to the people certain characteristics which are neither amiable nor admirable. It is liable to produce a commercial standard of honour which is quite incompatible with an evangelical standard of conduct. The business of life will largely consist in besting a competitor and ousting rivals from the field. The chivalric qualities of honesty, loyalty, and good faith will tend to fall into the background. Ease and leisure breed luxury, which chiefly seeks full scope for its enjoyment, and insidiously undermines the qualities of grit, self-sacrifice, and humility of spirit, which are the foundation-stones of lofty character. The Floren- tines did not wholly escape from the snares which beset the feet of a wealthy commercial people. The gradations 8o LORENZO DEI MEDICI in the social scale revealed from time to time, though unfrequently, an embittered antagonism between capital and labour. The lower classes sought relief from the monotony of their daily toil in sensation and in unwholesome amusement during their hours of leisure. Shows and spectacles devised for their entertainment would not be without effect in extending the popularity and consolidating the influence of an ambitious ruler. Such a ruler indeed, if he was to succeed, must be a man of many parts. He must have assimilated to himself all the elements which made up in combination the Florentine character. The more he was himself the microcosm of the State, the more surely, almost unconsciously, he would direct it to the service of his personal ends. The edifice of personal rule in Florence must therefore rest upon sympathy with the many-sided activities, interests, prejudices, and weaknesses of the Florentine people. This sympathy must not be the spurious product of cal- culated artifice, but a genuine and native instinct of the heart. No ruler could have succeeded had he set him.self to exploit the characteristics of the Florentine people for his own benefit. He would have been instantly detected as an impostor. The man who sought to rule in Florence must be a representative and not a tyrant : his ascendency must be the natural and spontaneous expression of the fact that he embodied, in a fuller degree than any other man, the genius of the people. And, above all, he must possess in ample measure the saving grace of tact. He must know how to conceal from a people jealous of their liberties the fact that they were under a master ; to disguise personal rule under the appearance of free institutions. Any ostentatious exhibition of regal splendours or authority would have been fatal to the exercise of power. To the outward view he must be simply the leading citizen in a free city, and the test of his kingcraft lay in the skiU with which he succeeded in maintaining the illusion of liberty in conjunction with the practical exercise of personal sovereignty. Such being the conditions under which alone a personal THE HUMANISTIC REVIVAL 8i government could be established in Florence, it remains to see how far the character of Ck)simo dei Medici answered to the conditions. The spiritual hfe of Cosimo is not to be gauged merely by the number of churches and religious houses which he built and endowed. The amount which he expended on such external manifestations of his piety was enormous, and in accordance with the spirit of his times he believed that, by such expenditure, he could do something to square his account with God. Lorenzo, in his Ricordi states that between 1434 and 1471, the sum expended in pubHc buildings, works of benevolence, and contributions to the public funds amounted to 663,755 fiorini, or over £330,000. This represents about three and a half millions sterling of money of to-day. " Though many may think it better to have some of this in hand," says Lorenzo artlessly, " I consider such an expense to be a great honour to our posi- tion. The money is well placed, and I am quite content." But Cosimo never deluded himself by the supposition that lavish contributions could satisfy all the requirements of his religious Hfe. He recognised that, however much he might do for God by charity and church building, it was but an insignificant return for what God had done for him. " He had never been able," he said, " to lay out so much in the service of God as to find the balance in his own favour." Though the spiritual Hfe of Cosimo finds external reflection in the Church of S. Lorenzo, the Convent of S. Marco, and his hospital for pilgrims at Jerusalem, its inner depths are revealed in those intervals of retirement, when he withdrew himself from the demands of poHtics and commerce to meditate and be stiU, and to enjoy the conversation of the keenest thinkers of his age. At such times this shrewd, hard, somewhat cynical man of affairs became the humble searcher into the truth of things and into the mystery of the world. It was in the study of Plato that he found the fuUest satisfaction for this side of his nature. Though his own knowledge of Greek did not permit him to read Plato in the original, he engaged Marsilio Ficino to make translations, and it was in the conceptions F 82 LORENZO DEI MEDICI which he derived from Plato rather than from orthodox sources that he found the fullest consolation for the sorrows which he was called upon to endure. Of these sorrows, the most bitter was the death of his son Giovanni at the age of twenty-two. The Pope, Pius II., sent to Cosimo a letter of condolence, to which he repUed in a letter which is extant. " We," he says, " as you so wisely and religiously write, we know nothing. Yet, as to my son Giovanni, I have never thought anything ill done, since he has passed, not from life, but from death to life. For this that we call life is really death. That is true life which is eternal." * Though the sentiment to which Cosimo here gives ex- pression may be derived from his Platonic studies, there is the touch of nature in it which makes it akin to every age : Cosimo dei Medici and Shelley meet on common ground. Dust to the dust ! but the pure spirit shall flow Back to the burning fountain whence it came, A portion of the Eternal, which must glow Through time and change, unquenchably the same. Peace, peace ! he is not dead, he does not sleep — He hath awakened from the dream of life — 'Tis we, who, lost in stormy visions, keep With phantoms an unprofitable strife. Adonais, 38, 59. Though Cosimo was no hypocrite, yet he was not un- conscious of a certain antagonism between his actions as a politician and his aspirations as a private individual. He half recognised that he was trying to lead two lives, one of which was incompatible with the other, but he ex- cused himself on the ground that a statesman is irresistibly compelled by circumstances to many courses which no man in a private station could honestly adopt, and therefore it was necessary that as far as possible these evil deeds should be expiated by works of piety. Thus, as we regard the spiritual aspect of Cosimo's character, we are not presented with a picture of the perfect man. There is in him much inconsistency and contra- diction. For this very reason he was intelligible to his * See the expression of the same sentiment in Lorenzo's " Commaitary " p. 386 of this book. THE HUMANISTIC REVIVAL 83 compatriots, while impressing them as being above, rather than below, the standard of their own spiritual aspirations. The cult of Plato, which had in Cosimo an enthusiastic votary, arose as a consequence of the revival of ancient learning, in which Florence from the first had led the way. The spirit of the ancient world, contained within its litera- ture, its art, and its ruins, had ceased to operate upon the mediaeval mind. The Latin language, though in a debased form, survived the collapse of the Roman Empire, and, in Italy at any rate, some knowledge of the works of the principal poets and historians and orators of classical Rome long continued to linger after Rome had fallen. But the ancient Latin authors were read, not in order to obtain light from the civiHsation and culture of the past, nor with any idea of assimilating that culture to the con- ditions of the present. They were read only in relation to mediasvalism ; as affording illustrations and allegories of mediaeval modes of thought. The spirit of antiquity awoke again in Francesco Petrarca of Arezzo, who only failed to be a Florentine because he was a citizen of the world. He felt instinctively that within the hterature of ancient Rome was to be found the talisman which would lead his own world to the enjoyment of all the arts, re- finements, and graces of life; that in the knowledge of the past lay the hope of the future. He saw that the fame of Virgil or Cicero must be undying, and thought, by modelling himself on them^ to secure his own immortality. To recover the purity of the Latin tongue, to cleanse it of barbarisms, to make the old world live again in the heart and thought of man, became with Petrarch a passion. Not content with greedily absorbing whatever of Latin literature still survived, he explored the dusty recesses of monastic hbraries for long-forgotten manuscripts of Latin writers. Thus he recovered much of the Latin classics of which the world for centuries had been in ignorance. Whatever he found, he copied, sometimes with his own hand, and thus secured it for ever. Medals, inscriptions, ancient ruins, everything, however apparently insignificant,' which could throw a gleam of light upon antiquity seemed 84 LORENZO DEI MEDICI to him of importance. He pursued his self-imposed tasks not in the spirit of an antiquarian, but rather of a prophet, who saw the vision of a nobler, better world resulting from the recovered knowledge of the world which had passed away. The fascination of his personality, the magnetism of his enthusiasm, attracted to him a band of devoted disciples, who carried forward the work in the spirit of the master, knowing no rest until every discover- able scrap of Latin literature which still survived was permanently rescued from oblivion. But Petrarch had not been long engaged in his work for the revival of antiquity before he discovered that behind the Hterature and civilisation of Rome, there was a still more potent influence for culture in the literature and civilisation of Greece. A sure instinct rather than personal knowledge led him to divine all that was contained for the future in the restoration of Greek form and Helleric thought. Under Petrarch's influence the Florentire, Giovanni Boccaccio, set himself to do for the Greeks what his master had done for the Latins. Greek scholars ivcm Byzantium were induced to visit Italy, and before the end of the fourteenth century Manuel Chrysoloras was estab- lished in Florence, where his lectures on the language, literature, and philosophy of Greece attracted an enthu- siastic following. Greek scholarship from this time became the passport to high office, wealth, and consideration. Kings, princes, and rich merchants vied with one another in collecting manuscripts from every quarter. The most acceptable present which Cosimo dei Medici could make to Alfonso of Naples was a copy of Livy's History, while the reputed bones of a classic author began to assume a sanctity almost superior to that possessed by the rehcs of orthodox saints. Of four Florentine Chancellors between 1427 and 1465, three— Leonardo Bruni Aretino, Carlo Marsuppini, and Poggio Bracciolini— stand successively at the head of the scholarship of their day. The appearance of the great Humanist, Gianozzo Manetti, as Florentne representative before King Alfonso, impressed the monaich so profoundly that " he sat motionless, like a brazen static, I fino : VMANA.COSA.E.LHAVER. COM PASSION E. AG LAFFLICTI. [ i ecomc cbca ^ ■ -•' LORENZO, POET AND LOVER 119 that it was written at a time when he was persecuted by fortune and by men. Yet to relate one's own misfortunes is to incur the charge of pride and vainglory, for when tranquillity comes, a man is apt to attribute the change to his own virtue rather than to fortune which has changed towards him. Doctors will always make out the disease to be much worse than it really is, for if death supervenes, they can lay the blame on the course of nature, while if the patient recovers, then their own care and skill are only the more clearly demonstrated, " My persecutors were most powerful men of great authority and genius. I was a youth and a private citizen without counsel or aid, save such as the divine clemency showed me from day to day. I was in such a state that death would have been grate- ful, — then the thought of my lady drew me from the hands of death " Quel viso che col vago suo splendore Ha gik gli spirti e le mie forze estorte Pill volte deir avare man di Morte, Ancora aiuta I'alma che non muore ? " At another time he draws from Homer the conviction that true happiness is only to be found in the intermixture of evil with good. " For we may read in Homer, that most ancient and excellent poet, how Jove, when he wishes to allot to each man his destiny, places before him two large bowls, one of which is full of evil things alone, in the other, things fortunate and unfortunate are indiscriminately mixed up. When he wishes to allot to any one a caitiff's fate {cattiva sorte),]ie chooses from the bowl which contains ill fortunes alone: but for the happy he chooses from that which contains the mixture, to show that a man cannot be happy unless some element of unhappiness be at the same time present." In later chapters I propose to treat at some length Lorenzo's position as poet and thinker. It will then be necessary to refer more fully to the Commentario* At the moment it serves to supply those biographical details for the years now under consideration which, without it, would be wanting, details which are doubtless coloured by the deceptive radiance of a poet's or a lover's fancy, * Vide pp. 382 et seq^ 120 LORENZO DEI MEDICI but which none the less have their kernel of truth, and so serve to shed light on certain sides of Lorenzo's character. As a preface to his narrative he introduces a philosophic disquisition upon the beginnings and the ends of things. The end of anything must be the beginning of something else. He will not go so far as to say that the end and the beginning are one and the same thing, as Aristotle avers, but only that the end of one thing is the immediate beginning of another. The beginning of the amorosa vita, the life of a lover, proceeds from death : Homer, Virgil and Dante make their heroes pass through death to life. " The beginning of the true Hfe " — della vera vita, a phrase which marks the connection of his thoughts with the nuova vita of Dante — " is the death of the life which is not true." So it was with him, " for there died in Florence a lady for whom all the City grieved ; for truly she was adorned with beauty and every natural grace. Among her other excellent gifts she possessed a manner so sweet and attractive that all who were brought into association with her believed themselves to be loved by her ; yet none was jealous of her, nor was one jealous of another. Her death aroused universal compassion for her youth and beauty ; beauty which in death seemed more radiant than ever before. Every one desired to celebrate her in verse, or else to accuse in prose the greed and bitterness of death. I, among the number, wrote four sonnets, beginning thus : the first, O chiara Stella the second, Quando il Sol giil daroriente scende the third, Di vita il dolce lume fuggirei A quella vita ch' altri morte appella the fourth, In qual parte andr5 io, ch' io non ti trovi Trista memoria ? in qual oscuro speco Fuggir5 io che sempre non siL meco Trista memoria, ch' al mio mal sol giovi ? " The sonnets which follow these are very different. A new argument will appear common to them all, but one LORENZO, POET AND LOVER 121 which will only confirm the principle previously asserted that Death is the fitting beginning of the New Life," for after relating how he mourned over the loss of so beautiful a lady, and was looking around him to see if her equal existed anywhere, " in despair," he says, " I gave in our City a public festival, to which everybody went, and I too, against my will, but led as if by destiny, for from such fetes I had long stood aloof. But soon the spirit of the thing, and past memories, made me act like the rest. Among the ladies there was one of extraordinary beauty, so that if her inward graces were equal to the exterior beauties of her form, she would rival and even excel the dead Lady." He tells how he became acquainted with her, the passion which she inspired in him, the perfect correspondence between her person and her mind. " Her beauty was wonderful. She was of suitable height, and her colouring, though pale, in no way sallow. Her complexion was bright without being ruddy, her appearance grave but not proud, sweet and winsome [piacevole] but without levity or any defect. Her eyes were lively but not restless, with no signs of haughti- ness or fickleness ; her whole body so finely proportioned that there was nothing about her which was rough or un- finished, but always dignity in everything which she did. When walking, or dancing, or engaged in those exercises whereby women are wont to train and display their bodily graces, in short, in every movement, she was elegant and bewitching. Her hands were beautiful beyond any that Nature yet had fashioned. Her voice was most sweet, and her conversation was full of keen and excellent judg- ment. Her wit was polished and fine but without offence ; her abilities were marvellous, but she was entirely without pride or presumption. Moreover she had no trace of that defect which is so common in women, and which renders them insupportable, I mean the affectation of understanding everything, the vice, in fact, of the bluestocking. It would be long to tell of all her perfections — a single sentence will suffice, that nothing could be sought for in a beautiful and gentle lady which was not abundantly to be found in her. The dead lady had shone as a star, but she was 122 LORENZO DEI MEDICI the star of Venus which is eclipsed by the Hght of the rising sun." l^^llt is thus that Lorenzo celebrates his passion for Lucrezia Donati. Nowhere in his writings has he mentioned her name, but her name is known to us through the tributes of Lorenzo's friends, and from his biographer, Niccolo Valori. To her the batch of sonnets which form the subject-matter of the remainder of the Commentario was written. From them we may judge that though Lucrezia existed in the flesh, and was doubtless of admirable beauty, she was yet to Lorenzo the ideal of a poet's fancy rather than a mortal woman : she was, to the young and ardent poet, what Beatrice was to Dante, what Laura was to Petrarch. It seems that he was first attracted to Lucrezia Donati at a tournament, held in 1467, to celebrate the marriage of his friend, Braccio Martelli. Then Lorenzo won a smile from her lips and a wreath of violets from her hand, and vowed that he himself one day would celebrate a tournament in her honour. Two years later the promise was somewhat strangely kept, for on February 7, 1469, Lorenzo held a tournament in the Piazza of S. Croce to celebrate his be- trothal to Clarice Orsini which had been arranged in the previous December. This was the tournament which gave to Luca Pulci the occasion for his Giostra di Lorenzo de Medici, a poem which has its own merits, but which is chiefly memorable as having suggested, if not inspired, the Giostra di GiuUano de' Medici by Angelo Poliziano. Lorenzo in his Ricordi, written a few years later, studi- ously suppresses, if he had not forgotten, all the sentimental emotions which were associated in his mind with this tourna- ment. There is not a word about the lady of his heart, or of the lady of his choice, but a bare record which takes special note of the expense incurred. " To follow the fashion, and do as others do, I arranged a Joust on the Piazza of Santa Croce, with great expense and splendour, in which I find we spent about 10,000 fiorini (£5000), and though I was not very valiant in years or blows, the first prize was awarded to me, to wit a helmet, inlaid with silver, with a figure of Mars as a headpiece." LORENZO, POET AND LOVER 123 The poem of Luca Pulci, and a detailed contemporary record of the festivities, enable us vividly to realise the spectacular effects which were produced on the Piazza upon this occasion. The lists were prepared with great mag- nificence. Eighteen gallant Knights entered as competitors for the prize. Among them was Guglielmo dei Pazzi, Lorenzo's brother-in-law, Francesco Pazzi, and Jacopo Bracciolini. Of these, ten years later, two were to suffer death, and one exile, as the punishment for conspiracy against the Medici power. In the lists were to be seen also Braccio dei Medici, a kinsman of the brothers, Piero Ves- pucci, and Carlo Borromeo. The poet exhausts his vocabu- lary in describing the splendour of the dress and accoutre- ments of the combatants, and the approach of Lorenzo's procession was received with frantic acclamations. As the whole affair was got up for amusement, and not for serious business, it was perhaps suitable that matters of the ward- robe and stage millinery should take precedence over the armed encounters. We can picture to ourselves a glorified scene from a Lord Mayor's Show, or a spectacular effect at a pantomime. First in the procession marched nine trumpeters heralding Lorenzo's approach ; then three pages of whom one bore the banner of red and white, Lorenzo's ensign. Behind the banner came two Squires in full armour, attached to Lorenzo for the occasion by Federigo of Urbino, and Roberto Sanseverino : then twelve noble- men on horseback immediately preceded Giuliano dei Medici. The general scheme of Giuliano's attire, which was estimated to have cost eight thousand ducat {£^000), may be described as silver and pearl. His tabard was of silver brocade, his silk doublet was embroidered in pearls and silver. His black velvet cap was adorned with three feathers worked in gold thread, and set in pearls and rubies. Giuliano was at this time a very handsome, well-grown boy of fifteen, and he must have presented a splendid and engaging appearance. Five mounted pages, preceding a line of fifers and drummers, prepared the spectators for the vision of Lorenzo himself. He came, mounted on a horse presented by 124 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Ferrante of Naples, richly caparisoned in red and white velvet adorned with pearls. Lorenzo wore a surcoat with puffings of red and white silk at the shoulders, and over the surcoat a broad silk scarf embroidered with roses, some fresh, some withered, with the motto, " Le temps revient," picked out upon the scarf in pearls. His black velvet cap was studded with pearls, and from it there sprang a feather of gold thread, spangled with rubies and diamonds, arranged artfully — so as to display to advantage a single pearl of great purity and value. His shield had for its centrepiece the great Medici diamond, " II Libro," estimated to be worth two thousand fiorini, and on the shield was the fleur-de-lys, the three golden hhes of France upon an azure field, which advertised the favour of Louis XI. towards the House of Medici. Ten mounted cavaliers and sixty-four footmen completed Lorenzo's retinue. On arrival at the Piazza, Lorenzo dismounted, and changed his silken surcoat for a doublet of Alexandrian velvet, with gold fringes, embroidered with the golden lihes. For his cap he substituted a helmet adorned with three blue feathers, and rode into the lists upon a mag- nificent charger, a token of the friendship of Borso d'Este of Ferrara. First Carlo Borromeo, then in turn Braccio dei Medici, Carlo da Forme, and Benedetto Salutati felt his prowess, and acknowledged him their conqueror. His feats of arms recall to the poet the deeds of Orlando and Achilles. At the end of the day Lorenzo was escorted from the lists, wearing the silver helmet, with the figure of Mars as a headpiece, which was the prize of victory. We are not told from whose hands the victor received his guerdon, but it seems to have been generally understood that if Lorenzo was the Mars of the occasion, Lucrezia Donati was the Venus. But just as Mars had his own matrimonial relations which were quite independent of Venus, so Lorenzo's attention was perforce given at this time to his approaching marriage with Clarice Orsini. The determination to choose a bride for Lorenzo outside the circle of the great Florentine families was a significant PORTRAIT OF LORENZO DEI MEDICI AS A YOUTH DETAIL FROM BENOZZO GOZZOLl's "ADORATION OF THE MAGI " Palazzo Riccardi, Florence LORENZO, POET AND LOVER departure from the traditional policy of the family. Piero seems to have felt that a semi-regal House needed semi- regal connections and external supports ; that the branches of a Medician dynasty must spread out far and wide. If a beginning was to be made in dynastic alliances Piero could hardly have done better. The Orsini were one of the oldest, noblest, and most powerful famihes in Italy. Their influence was almost as great in Naples as in Rome and its neighbourhood. They were a family of soldiers, and could thus do something to supply the Medici with an armed force in case of need. One of them, the Cardinal Latino, was influential in the Papal Curia. As to the disappointment and jealous disgust of the Florentines, that would pass ; more- over if a bride had been chosen from among them, the selection could only have pleased one family while offending many. Piero therefore listened gladly to overtures which reached him from the Orsini quarters. In the spring of 1467 Lucrezia, Lorenzo's mother, was in Rome nego- tiating with the Orsini in conjunction with her brother, Giovanni Tomabuoni, the Medici agent in the Imperial City. Lucrezia wrote frequent letters to her husband while she was at Rome. From them we can form a picture, by no means unpleasing, of Lorenzo's future wife. " She is," says Lucrezia, " fifteen or sixteen years old, and when I first met her she was dressed in the Roman style, with the handker- Genealogy of the Orsini, to illustrate Lorenzo's Marriage Orso Orsini, killed at Zagonara, 1424. Carlo Orsini of Bracciano. Lorenzo of Monterotondo (possessing a half share with his brother Jacopo in Monterotondo). Jacopo of Montero- tondo I Orso Organtini. I I I Maddalena Roberto Napoleone. m. Caterina da Sanseverino, fought for the Florentine league at MolineUa. Latino, Cardinal. Giovanni, Archb. of Irani. I I Rinaldo, Clarice Archb. of m. Florence. Lorenzo dki Medici. Piero dei = Alfonsina. Medici. 126 LORENZO DEI MEDICI chief on her head, and appeared to me very beautiful in this costume, of fair complexion and tall ; but as she was veiled, I could not see her very well." A Uttle later Clarice ap- peared without the handkerchief and without the veil, " and I had an opportunity of looking at her. She is above the middle height, of fair complexion and pleasant manners, and. if less beautiful than our daughters, of great modesty, so that it will be easy to teach her our manners. She is not blonde, for no one is so here, and her thick hair has a reddish tinge. Her face is round in shape, but does not displease me. The neck is beautiful, but rather thin, or, more properly, delicately shaped. She does not bear her head so proudly as our girls do, but inclining a little forward, which I ascribe to the timidity which seems to be a predominant charac- teristic. On the whole the girl seems to be far above the ordinary type, but she is not to be compared to Maria, Lucrezia, and Bianca." The praise here is certainly some- what guarded, and Piero does not seem to have been quite satisfied about the personal qualifications of Clarice. In another letter Lucrezia reassures him. " I believe you will be satisfied, when on my return you hear me state my opinions. You say that I express myself coldly : I do so in order to attain the end more certainly, and I beheve that there is here no marriageable girl more beautiful than she is." The great point was that Lorenzo was satisfied. He had already seen Clarice, probably at the time of his embassy to Ferrante of Naples, and perhaps on other occasions. Lucrezia was at ease, because, as she expressly states, " the girl pleases Lorenzo." On both sides there was assiduity in negotiations and arrangements, the length of the pro- ceedings being evidently due to the bride's tender years rather than to reluctance or hesitation on either side. At last, in November 1468, all preliminaries were satisfactorily arranged. On the 27th the Cardinal Latino Orsini wrote a con- gratulatory family letter to Piero, while Filippo dei Medici, Archbishop of Pisa, the representative of Lorenzo and his father, wrote to announce that the marriage contract was in order and accepted. The dowry was but a small one— six LORENZO, POET AND LOVER 127 thousand Roman scudi, or about £3000, but, as the Arch- bishop remarked, "you do not need the possessions of others, and yours remain to you." The marriage was indeed rather a condescension on the part of the Orsini, who felt that the Medici were sufficiently honoured by the alHance, and could make but small demands in cash. Far otherwise was it, twenty years later, when the son of this marriage, Piero di Lorenzo dei Medici, went to claim another Orsini bride. Then Lorenzo was the first man in Italy. The most exalted families were proud to be connected with one who was only just less than royal, and the dowry which Alfonsina Orsini brought to Piero was at least double that of his mother, and was popularly reported to be five times greater than it was. In December the marriage between Lorenzo and Clarice was celebrated at Rome. In the absence of the bridegroom, Filippo, the Archbishop, acted as proxy. In May the bride began her journey to Florence ; on June 4, 1469, the wedding took place in Florence. The entry in Lorenzo's Ricordi is rather cold, but exactly expresses the facts. "I, Lorenzo, took Donna Clarice, daughter of Signor Jacopo Orsini to wife, or rather, she was given to me, in December 1468, and the marriage was celebrated in our house on the 4th June, 1469." Lorenzo took his wife, as wives, for dynastic purposes, are wont to be taken, but there are evidences that he soon came to regard her with genuine affection : she became, if not quite the dimidia pars— the half of himself,— at least a considerable part of him, and though she had her own opinions, which were not always his, she proved throughout his life to be a faithful and devoted wife. Full details of the marriage festivities were recorded at the time by Piero Parenti, a Florentine. Extensive presents in kind— capons, hens, wax, wine, sweetmeats — were sent from all parts of the Florentine territory, and these good things went to supply a banquet to 800 citizens. In the Medici palace the celebrations, except that they were upon a larger scale, followed the custom of Florentine weddings. There was the strict separation of the sexes, and the classi- fication of the guests according tg age, The bride'? banquet 128 LORENZO DEI MEDICI in the gardens was attended by thirty-six young married women. In the cloisters surrounding the courtyard Lorenzo entertained seventy of the most considerable male guests Within the house, on the ground floor, thirty-six young people feasted, and here perhaps the sexes were not separated, while on the floor above Lucrezia acted as hostess to forty of the elder married women. The dishes were introduced with much parade of trumpets, stewards, carvers and attendants, but the food itself was simple enough^ Soups meats boiled and roast, cakes, sweetmeats and jellies 'constituted the bill of fare, with ample supphes of the native wines of Italy. The sweetmeats must have been popular if five thousand pounds weight of them were, as is stated really consumed. But the banquetings contmued for several days, and any well-affected citizen was sure of a seat, if not in the Medici palace, then at Messer Carlo dei Medici's house, or at the house of one of the family. Among the presents of rings, brocade, and silver dishes, the gift of Gentile of Urbino, Lorenzo's tutor has received special notice It was an exquisitely illuminated office of the Madonna, in letters of gold upon ultramarine, adorned with paintings in miniature, the whole being bound m crystal and silver. The value of it was estimated at 200 fiorini (£100). . , , • a Thus with feastings and with music, with dancing and with song, with sham fights and mimic sieges were cele- brated the nuptials of Lorenzo and Clarice, and all Florence gathered to wish them happiness and do them honour, though doubtless there were some grumblings that a Medici bride should have been fetched from so far away. The marriage festivities were scarcely over before Lorenzo was called upon, on behalf of his father, to undertake a foreign mission. On June 20 the infant son of Galeazzo Sforza and Bona of Savoy was bom, and Piero was invited to stand sponsor to the child. Piero's interest m the Milanese alliance was too personal and keen to permit him to refuse but being too fll to go himself the duty was delegated to Lorenzo. Early in July he left Florence for Milan, attended by his brothers-in-law, by the Chancellor, by Jiii fidus LAST DAYS OF PIERO 129 Achates, Francesco Nori, and his tutor, Gentile d' Urbino. The letters of Gentile to Clarice enable us to follow the embassy from day to day as the Ambassadors travelled to Milan by way of Lucca and the coast route which ran past Pietra Santa and Sarzana. Everywhere Lorenzo was received with acclamation, and was forcibly compelled to yield up the privacy and retirement which he affected or desired to the clamorous demands of hosts who would take no denial. At Lucca he was dragged from his modest lodging without the walls at " The Crown " to a ceremonial Mass, to a pubhc meeting, and to a banquet. At Pietra Santa the news that he was at " The Bell " brought down upon him a pubhc reception, followed by a supper party under the shade of a green arbour overlooking the sea. From Pietra Santa he journeyed to Sarzana which his father had bought for Florence two years before. There he was able to judge for himself of the commercial and strategical value of the new purchase, and he received an impression of its importance which was materially to in- fluence his pohcy at a later day. From Sarzana he rode, by way of PontremoH, to Milan, where on the appointed day he became godfather to the hapless child, Giovanni Galeazzo, on whom Jove bestowed a destiny taken only from the bowl of misfortune. It was then that the magnificence of Lorenzo's gifts inspired Sforza with the hope that Lorenzo " would stand godfather to all his other children." We have no direct information about the political effects of Lorenzo's mission, but indirectly we can gather that he talked about political affairs in a way that seemed to the prudent Piero neither wise nor discreet. Piero, writing to his wife from Careggi on July 13, rather peevishly requests her to remonstrate with Lorenzo. " You know," he says, " that I gave him permission to go very unwiUingly : tell him to depart in no way from his instructions, and not to indulge in so many fictions. I am quite determined that the goshngs shall not lead the geese to the water." As Lorenzo only announced his arrival at Milan in a letter to Clarice on July 22, and could scarcely have arrived 130 LORENZO DEI MEDICI there at the time when Piero wrote, it is probable that his father took exception not to anything he had done or said at Milan but to his proceedings on the road thither. Perhaps he was a little too expansive in that public speech which he was called upon to make at Lucca, or was not quite diplomatic in his behaviour at Pietra Santa. Though Piero had confessed himself to be "a man without his hands " when Lorenzo was absent from him, yet it is almost grati- fying to find that Lorenzo was no paragon who could never make a mistake. The politician who is so cold and clever as to be incapable of occasionally doing a foolish thing lacks one of the elements which makes for political success. At the time of Lorenzo's return from Milan Piero was obviously sinking. More than ever it was necessary for him to commit affairs of State into the hands of his son. A question of great importance for Florence arose in the autumn, which was not settled till some time after Piero's death. It therefore properly belongs to the period of Lorenzo's government. On October 9, 1469, Sigismondo Malatesta, Lord of Rimini, died leaving no legitimate successor. The Mala- testas held Rimini under the suzerainty of the Pope, and Paul II. thought the time was opportune for resuming the sovereignty over Rimini into his own hands. But his plans were forestalled by Roberto Malatesta, illegitimate son of Sigismondo, who seized the government, and prepared himself to defend it against a Papal attack. The Pope looked to Venice for aid, and concluded an alliance with that Republic. Alessandro Sforza of Pesaro was put at the head of the Papal forces, and a campaign for the posses- sion of Rimini began. Roberto looked around him for allies, and found the Triple Alliance well disposed to thwart any attempts which the Pope or Venice might make to aggrandise themselves in Romagna. Federigo of Urbino, too, was so close a neighbour to Rimini that designs directed against it might easily expand into designs against himself. Accordingly, in answer to the Papal- Venice Alliance, Naples, Florence, Milan and Urbino associated themselves together, and, at the Papal Court, Florence and the Medici were LAST DAYS OF PIERO regarded as the real authors of the league, and the chief contributors of the pecuniary cement by which it was held together. Paul was very angry that his schemes should thus be thwarted, and " even in the Consistory itself," says Fabroni, " he vomited forth contumelies against the Medici brothers." These however were ineffectual to counter- balance the practical consequences of their action. Ales- sandro Sforza was defeated. The further efforts of the Pope to revenge himself upon Ferrante for the aid which Naples had given to Roberto had to be abandoned, for the news that the Turks had taken Negroponte forced upon Italy the consciousness that she must be at peace within herself, if the common danger was to be averted. In 1470 a general peace, modelled on the Peace of Lodi of 1454, was negotiated, which offered the illusive hope that not only Italy, but aU Christendom, would lay aside animosities against Christians, and concentrate in opposition to the infidel invaders. Florence had only just committed herself to the cause of Roberto Malatesta when Piero dei Medici died on December 3, 1469. " He was," says Lorenzo, " much mourned by all the City, for he was an upright man, of the most perfect kindness. We were besieged by the Princes of Italy, especially the chief ones, with letters and embassies, and condolences upon his death, and they offered their own State for our defence." Macchiavelli's testimony to Piero's character corresponds with that of Lorenzo, when he states that Piero was a man of genuine goodness and virtue, but that his qualities were not, in his lifetime, sufficiently appreciated by his fellow citizens, because, up to the age of forty-eight, he was entirely sub- ordinate to Cosimo, and the few years that remained to him after Cosimo's death were spent in civic discord and continual illness. There is, however, abundance of con- temporary evidence to show that the worth of Piero's character was recognised and understood in his own city and in his own day. He exercised upon the foreign policy of the State an influence which was direct, personal and paramount, while in domestic affairs the quality in him 132 LORENZO DEI MEDICI which made the most impression was his moderation. Though the head of his party, he was sincerely desirous for the general good. If he was severe to political opponents who plotted against his power and his life, it can scarcely be said that his severity was in excess of what the occasion demanded. He was not implacable, as Cosimo was, and the story, which rests on fair authority, that he was pro- posing to recall the exiles who had conspired against him, reflects the general estimate of his character, even if it does not exactly express the facts. Piero's reputation suffered under two disadvantages, one of them affecting him in his own day, and the other in the eyes of posterity. He was so constantly ill that there was a tendency to despise him as being necessarily weak and incompetent, and he had the misfortune to be sandwiched in between a father who completely overshadowed him, and a son whom the world regards as one of the most remarkable men that Italy has produced. Piero must have been a man of unusual capacity and strength of character, if, with such disadvantages, he has yet managed to impress himself fairly definitely upon the historical imagination. Like Cosimo, he hated ostentation and display, as being alien from his character and contrary to sound policy. His sons respected his wishes in the matter of his funeral, and in the memorial which they erected to his memory. An urn of red porphyry, designed by Andrea Verrocchio, stands in the old sacristy of San Lorenzo. It bears the inscription, " Patri Patruoque," and is the tribute of Lorenzo and Giuliano to the memory of Cosimo's two sons, Piero their father and Giovanni their uncle. " It would not be possible," says Vasari, " to discover a more perfectly executed work, whether cast or chiselled — evincing as it does, great powers of invention, extraordinary judgment and consummate skill." It is indeed a perfect triumph of simplicity and taste. CHAPTER V FIRST YEARS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT, 1469-1472 Lorenzo invited to assume the headship of the State — Position of Giuliano in the Government — Nature of Lorenzo's authority — Anomalies in Lorenzo's position — First actions of Lorenzo as Head of the State — Constitutional machinery of Lorenzo's government — The Bardi con- spiracy at Prato — Lorenzo's foreign policy — Galeazzo Sforza of Milan visits Florence — Attitude of Ferrante of Naples — Death of Pope Paul II., 147 1 — Accession of Pope Sixtus IV. — His character — Relations between Lorenzo and the Pope. LORENZO, in his Ricordi, gives a bald account of the circumstances personal to himself which immediately followed Piero's death. " The second day after, when I, Lorenzo, was very young, to wit twenty-one years of age, there came to our house the principal men of the City, and of the State, to express their grief at what had happened and to comfort me. They requested that I would undertake the care of the City and the State as my father and grand- father had done. To this I unwillingly assented, as not being in accord with my age, and a matter of much care and danger ; but I undertook it solely for the preservation of my friends and supporters, since at Florence it is ill living without governmental authority [a Firenze si pud mal vivere senza lo Stato). This, up to the present time, has succeeded with honour and satisfaction, and to the reputation of all, not as a consequence of my prudence, but by the Grace of God, and through the good dispositions of my ancestors." In brief personal notices committed to a private diary, Lorenzo was only concerned to record facts which came within his own knowledge and directly affected him. We learn from other sources that the deputation which waited upon him was the result of a meeting of over six hundred 133 134 LORENZO DEI MEDICI of the most influential citizens, called by Tommaso Soderini to the Convent of S. Antonio upon the day of Piero's funeral. Soderini, in station, influence and fidelity, was the most prominent member of the Medici party. He was Piero's brother-in-law, having married Dianora Tornabuoni, Lucrezia's sister, and therefore uncle by marriage to Lorenzo and Giuliano. In the days of the Neroni conspiracy he had stood firm by the Medici in opposition to his brother Niccolo, and to him Piero, on his deathbed, had committed the care of his sons. His position as the leading spirit in the Medici ring, his long attachment to it, his ripe ex- perience, marked him out as a man who might himself have assumed the headship of the State upon Piero's death. Various motives, however, led him to the conclusion that the general interest would be best served at this crisis by vesting the government in Lorenzo and his brother. As long as there was a natural head of the Medici family, he must be the political head of the Medici party. Moreover, Lorenzo's youth and inexperience would probably cause him to lean exclusively on Soderini, who would thus enjoy the substance of power, free of the ceremonial and other burdens which its exercise involved. Influenced by these motives, and doubtless by a genuine feeling of loyalty to the r?mily, Soderini strongly urged that Lorenzo and Giu- liano should be invited to assume the position which Cosimo and Piero had enjoyed. There is no record that his pro- position was opposed. It was certainly supported, even by the representatives of Luca Pitti who were present. The absolute necessity that there should be, in the govern- ment of Florence, some one person at its head to ensure continuity in its policy, and stability in its relations with foreign powers, was frankly admitted at the meeting. The Ferrarese ambassador, reporting to his Duke on December 4, states that Messer Gianozzo Pitti and Messer Domenico Martelli expressed the opinion that the State must recognise " one lord and superior," who should be of one mind in directing all the affairs of that illustrious Signoria. The deputation was therefore appointed to wait upon Lorenzo in the manner that he has described. FIRST YEARS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT 135 In this record of events two considerations call for parti- cular remark. First, that in his own note, Lorenzo makes no mention of a divided tenure of power between himself and Giuliano. He says not a word about Giuliano. And yet the report of Soderini's speech, sent off to Ferrara within twenty-four hours of its delivery, makes it clear that some sort of joint tenure was in the mind of the meeting. All the circumstances, however, make it probable that Giuliano's association with his brother was regarded as one of form and courtesy rather than of practical fact, for Giuliano was but sixteen at the time, and for a few years at any rate his active co-operation in the government was not to be looked for. It was the very fact of Giuliano's youth which made a dual control so nominal as not to be dangerous. It was recognised that there was to be one directing mind, and that mind was to be Lorenzo's. Of greater importance is the fact, so constantly ignored, that the power which Lorenzo now assumed was not usurped, or violently snatched by him. It was deliberately vested in him by the act of the ruling class of the Florentine citizens. The view of Lorenzo as a cold and calculating tyrant, who set himself to destroy the liberties of a free republic, is absurdly at variance with the facts of the situation. Lorenzo was invited to occupy a position analogous to that which the head of the Medici family had occupied for thirty-five years, and his situation practically compelled him to accept the invitation. His wealth, influence, and reputation at home and abroad, forbade him to be a private citizen. But if he was to be a public man he must be first or nowhere. For a Medici indeed it must have been ill-living in Florence without the State behind him, for it must be a Medici or another. If another, then Florence could no longer be any place for a Medici. Such a government as that to which Lorenzo was called had no fellow in any other European country out of Italy ; in Italy, only that of Bologna can be compared with it. The forms of government were strictly and jealously Re- publican, the predominance of a single person being only recognised under the rose. It was acknowledged that some- 136 LORENZO DEI MEDICI body must be at the head, but the person tolerated in that position must pretend all the time that he was no more than an influential private citizen. The authority that he exercised, whatever it was, was strictly personal : it could not be transmitted by descent : no civil list was voted for its upkeep : no armed force was ofiicially at its disposal either for purposes of defence or for the conduct of its enter- prises. It rested on nothing but good-will. It had no direct power to initiate legislation, or to veto legislation to which it objected ; yet if the authority of the ruler were repudiated, repudiation meant for him exile certainly, and death possibly. No elaborate etiquette, or system of cere- monial, created around him that atmosphere of divinity that doth hedge a king, and keep him a being apart from the common run of men. A ruler, such as Lorenzo was, had to devise his own sovereignty, and provide his own methods by which it was to be exercised and maintained. Lorenzo is accused of being a skilful manipulator of the political wires, of corrupting the forms of freedom in the interests of despotism, of bhnding the people to their actual dependence by the splendour of his circuses and shows. It could not be otherwise, for government in Florence had to be carried on ; and the kind of government was that which Florence desired and had deliberately chosen for herself. But, while choosing it, she had neglected to provide the necessary constitutional apparatus to give the forms of legaHty and public sanction to its exercise. Therefore those forms had to be surreptitiously and unofficially devised. The manipulation of ballot-boxes, of councils, and committees was indeed a sorry and a sordid business, but it compared favourably with the unabashed methods of tyranny which despots elsewhere were accustomed to practise. It was deplorable that the finances of the State should be mixed up with the ventures of a commercial house, but the line between the private person and the public man was so incapable of exact definition that no one could say precisely what part of Lorenzo's expenditure might justly be debited to the public treasury, and what part of it was private and personal to himself. It would of course be absurd to maintain that FIRST YEARS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT 137 Lorenzo never did wrong, and that every detail of his poHtical action was the inevitable consequence of his cir- cumstances. Lorenzo was far too human to be perfect. But no estimate of his sovereignty can be fair which fails to recognise that, from the first, it was imposed upon him, not snatched by lawless and tyrannical hands, and that the anomalous character of that sovereignty compelled the use of anomalous methods, if it was to be profitably and effec- tively exercised. Having determined to accept the invitation offered to him, it was of the first importance to take occasion by the hand, and consolidate his authority on the instant of its being conferred upon him : Che val signer che obedito non sia Da suoi soggetti, e massime alio inizio ? . Perche un rettor d'una podasteria Ne' primi quattro di fa il suo ofiziOi (What is that Prince worth who is not obeyed by his own subjects, especially at the beginning. For the ruler of a government must make his position secure within the first four days. 5 So wrote Lorenzo, years afterwards, in the morality play — La Rappresentazione di S. Giovanni e S. Paolo * — which he composed for the amusement and edification of his children. In these lines, and in the remarks upon the true ends of government, and the true functions of the governor, which are scattered throughout the piece, Lorenzo draws from his own experience, and expresses in abstract terms the political conceptions or ideals by which, in the exercise of his power, he was himself directed. He at once took steps, under the guidance, and with the assistance of Soderini, to ensure that the whole political business of the State should be referred to him and pass through his hands. If he was to represent the government, and be responsible for its external and internal administra- tion, it was necessary that he should be familiar with every detail, and should have a deciding voice in whatever policy might be proposed. This, however, was not enough. There could be no security as long as it was possible for the executive to be in the hands of men not in sympathy with the * Vids pp. 433 et seq. 138 LORENZO DEI MEDICI views of the chief magistrate. A revision of the Constitution was at once set on foot to ensure that no one should hold any office in the State who was not an obedient instrument of the Medici party. And lastly, Lorenzo took steps to counterbalance the influence of powerful party chiefs, such as Soderini, by surrounding himself with advisers who were personally devoted to him, and owing everything to him, in order to avoid the danger of being too much under the influence of a small clique of men to whom he owed everything. These measures took time, and could not be accomplished all at once, but the tendency of Lorenzo's policy was obvious from the first. " I believe," said the Ferrarese ambassador, " that, if they guide the bark rightly at the beginning, and while they can influence the election of magistrates, they will reach the desired haven, for, as the philosopher says, ' the beginning is more than a half of the whole.' " The constitutional changes which were accomplished in the early years of Lorenzo's reign had but one object in view : to make the executive in all things the mouthpiece of the will of the ruler. To this end a proposal was made by the Signoria which held office in July 1470, that an Electoral College should be formed consisting of those electors who, since the year 1434, had become qualified to elect. Of these, in 1470, forty were still alive. They, together with five other nominated persons, were to consti- tute an electoral body of forty-five. From their number five were to be drawn annually, and this committee of five was to be a board of appointment to all magistracies for the year. The proposal was not well received, for the cloven hoof of despotism was a little too plainly visible to suit the sus- ceptibilities of the people. There was much outcry against " the forty-five tyrants," and the scheme was dropped, but six months later, in January 147 1, the power of appointment to magistracies was taken out of the hands of the Council of the Hundred : that power was to reside in the Signoria which should come into office in July, in conjunction with the electors of the current year : their nominations were then to be submitted to the Council of the Hundred which FIRST YEARS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT 139 could confirm them by a bare majority. When the time came, however, it was found possible to go still further. In September 1471 a Balia was appointed consisting of forty persons, who were empowered to co-opt two hundred more. The operations of this Balia really decided the forms under which Medician despotism was to be exercised. First it undertook a rigorous scrutiny of the ballot-boxes, so that no name might by any possibility be included whose attach- ment to the Medici was doubtful. The power of appoint- ment was withdrawn from the Council of the Hundred and vested in the forty individuals who originally composed the Balia, assisted by fifty others selected by them. But in return, the legislative authority of the Hundred was largely increased, for it was enacted that all public bills which passed the Hundred thereupon became law, irres- pective of the sanction of the old popular Councils del Popolo, and del Commune. These arrangements were to be in force for a period of five years, but they were renewed at the expiration of the first term, and again in 148 1. Thus they constituted the solid foundation on which the ascendency of Lorenzo rested. In Florence itself, Lorenzo's accession to power was received with general satisfaction. Whatever suspicion or resentment were in the hearts of some stout old Repub- licans, they found no outward expression. The great body of the citizens was undoubtedly proud of their young and brilliant representative, who seemed to embody aU the finest traditions of the Florentine race and character. But there were restless souls outside who saw, in the change of government, an opportunity of avenging old wrongs, and effecting a revolution in the State. Among those who had been condemned to exile for sharing in the Neroni Conspiracy, was the family of the Nardi. Salvestro and Bernardo Nardi had joined the ranks of Bartolommeo CoUeone, and had consequently been declared rebels against the State. Bernardo was a man of restless and aspiring temper, who had already suffered the worst, and consequently had nothing to lose. He thought he saw, in the conditions existing at Prato, 140 LORENZO DEI MEDICI an opportunity for a venture which might be desperate, but which, at any rate, afforded a chance of rousing a general conflagration in Tuscany. Prato lies about ten miles to the north-west of Florence, midway between that City and Pistoia. It had been purchased by Florence from Queen Giovanna of Naples, in 1350, and since that time had enjoyed its own municipal institutions under the superintendence and control of a governor appointed by the Florentine Signoria. Nardi had connections with Prato, and believed the people to be suffering under a sense of injuries received at the hands of Florence, through her governors. If Prato could be seized by a coup de main, and foreign assistance were forthcoming, there was a fair prospect that the town could be made a base for a general movement of insurrection in Tuscany against Florentine domination. Having entered into relations with an influential family in Prato, and having secured, through Diotisalvi Neroni, a doubtful promise of support from Bologna and Ferrara, Bernardo was ready to proceed. He had so skilfully concealed his plans that he had no difficulty, by a ruse, in securing the keys of the Pistoia gate, and in a few moments the Citadel, the governor's palace, the town, and the governor himself were in the hands of the conspirators. It was now, however, that their difficulties began, for the people of Prato utterly failed to understand the meaning of what had taken place, nor did they respond to the cries of Liberty, Freedom, by which Bernardo sought to stir them. The Signoria, con- sisting of eight principal citizens, met to consider the situation. Bernardo eloquently harangued them, declaring that he had no other object than to deliver Prato from slavery, calling to mind their ancient liberties which they had long ceased to enjoy, and reminding them how glorious it would be to secure at once independence for the City and everlasting fame for themselves. The Eight, however, were not moved by these exhortations. They drily declared that they were not called upon to express an opinion as to whether Florence was free or not free, but for themselves they desired no other liberty than FIRST YEARS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT 141 that which, under Florence, they already enjoyed. Let Bernardo at once liberate the governor, withdraw his men, and retire as quickly as possible from so mad and wicked an enterprise. At this juncture Bernardo determined that he would create an impression by hanging the governor from the window of his own palace, and was in the act of doing so when he was induced by the artful persuasions of the captive himself to stay his hand. Cesare Petrucci, Florentine Rector of Prato, now proved himself, not for the last time, to be a man of promptitude and resource. He appears again in a wider sphere, and on a more exalted stage, in Florence in 1478, at the time of the conspiracy of the Pazzi. The same courage and resolution which he ex- hibited then, he showed now in defence of his own life. He represented to Bernardo that by this execution he would only bring upon himself speedy and certain vengeance, whereas, if he issued his orders through the governor, they would be respected, and his designs carried into effect. Bernardo, whose mind, says Macchiavelli, was not fertile in expedients, saw reason in these arguments. He enjoined Petrucci to address the assembled populace from the palace window, and to urge the people to obey Bernardo in all things. By this means the governor saved his life, and gained time, which alone was necessary to defeat Bernardo's plans. The citizens, having recovered from their surprise, rallied under the leadership of a Florentine, Giorgio Ginori, a knight of Rhodes, and before assistance could arrive from Florence, the insurrection was at an end. There the Signoria had taken prompt measures. Roberto da San Severino had been placed in command of an adequate force with full instructions for the restoration of order, but he had scarcely moved out beyond the City gates when he was informed that Bernardo was a prisoner, the governor restored, and that order once more prevailed at Prato. Bernardo was executed, and no effort was spared to stamp out in the neighbourhood of Prato whatever seeds of rebellion his enterprise had sown. 142 LORENZO DEI MEDICI The Nardi insurrection of 1470 is the last flicker of the old spirit of disaffection against the Medici which had produced the Neronic conspiracy three years before. It only served to demonstrate the weakness of their antag- onists, and how barren of effective support the irreconcilables were. Lorenzo derived nothing but benefit from an abortive attempt to dislodge him before he was fairly in the saddle, while the fact that the danger might have been a very real one gave colourable excuse for arbitrary measures within the City and outside it. Lorenzo's government enjoyed the advantage of being established and consolidated during one of the rare intervals when general peace prevailed in Italy. This happy state of things cannot be credited to his account, for it was due to the sense of weariness which prolonged and ineffective war produces, and to the necessity for union in the face of Turkish success. But in his first years of power Lorenzo was much occupied in negotiations with the various Italian governments with a view to making permanent the con- ditions of peace which at the moment existed. True to the poHcy of his father and grandfather, he determined in every way to strengthen the triple alliance between Florence, Milan, and Naples. Though willing to be a party to a general Italian league, a scheme on which Paul II. was now much set, yet his adhesion to such a league must be without prejudice to the special ties which bound Florence to Naples and Milan. As long as Venice remained ambitious of further self-aggrandisement, and as long as the Papal policy was subject to constant shifts and variations, no great confidence could be placed in a league to which they were parties. Thus, when Galeazzo Sforza took exception to some of the terms of the proposed general treaty, Lorenzo gave instructions to the Florentine am- bassador not to sign it on behalf of Florence, although the Signoria had already signified its intention to ratify it. To keep on good terms with Sforza was, in Lorenzo's opinion, of far greater importance than to be pledged to a general engagement which depended too much on the notorious caprices of some of the contracting parties. FIRST YEARS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT 143 It was in pursuit of this policy that, in the early spring of 1471, Lorenzo magnificently entertained the Duke of Milan in his own house in the Via Larga. Galeazzo Sforza was accompanied by his wife, Bona of Savoy, and the splendour of their train exceeded anything which had hitherto been seen in Italy. A hundred knights in armour and five hundred foot soldiers formed their personal guard. Grooms and kitchen-boys glittered in cloth of silver, velvet or silk, and the costumes of courtiers, chamberlains, and ladies-in-waiting were in an ascending scale of unparalleled magnificence. The long procession, with its two thousand horses, many of them richly caparisoned in gold brocade and embroidery, with its two hundred sumpter-mules, its huntsmen, with their dogs and falcons, its trumpeters, fifers and merry-andrews, might almost have been designed from Benozzo Gozzoli's fresco in Lorenzo's own chapel. The suite was entertained at the public cost by the Signoria, but the Duke and Duchess were Lorenzo's personal guests, for it had long been a matter of course that the Medici palace should receive the most illustrious visitors to the City. There Galeazzo spent much time in examining the treasures of art and of antiquity which Lorenzo and his ancestors had collected. He marvelled much at their rarity and beauty, and had the good taste to confess that his own splendours were of small account when compared with the richness of Lorenzo's collections. It was the season of Lent, but yet, as Macchiavelli ob- serves, the Milanese, without respect for either God or His Church, ate animal food daily. The City, however, in honour of the occasion, thought it appropriate to present three mystery plays for the entertainment of the Duke in three principal churches. In San FeUce, the Annunciation was dramatically displayed ; in the Carmine, the Ascension ; and in Santo Spirito, the Descent of the Holy Spirit. This last performance was attended by disaster, for some of the woodwork in the church became ignited. The flames spread throughout the interior, and, though Macchiavelli exag- gerates when he says the church was completely destroyed, very serious damage was done. The Duke headed the 144 LORENZO DEI MEDICI list of subscribers to the restoration fund with a contribution of two thousand fiorini d'oro (;^iooo), but the good citizens of Florence thought the occurrence of evil omen. They looked askance upon the barbaric luxury and godless ways of their Milanese guests, and were of opinion that the disaster at Santo Spirito was a token of Divine displeasure. But, in the round of banquets, spectacles, and entertain- ments, Sforza by no means forgot the political purposes of his visit. Apart from conversations with Lorenzo, he had more than one formal interview with the Signoria, and the alliance between the two States was confirmed and established upon the strongest footing. Valori re- marks that a happy combination was now effected between the wealth and ready money of Florence and the superfluous soldiers that Milan was capable of supplying. Men and money together constitute the sinews of war : each could provide what the other wanted : so Milan and Florence in conjunction could not only resist whoever might desire to offend them, but would be able to dictate terms to the whole of Italy. Politically, however, the visit of Galeazzo Sforza was not an unmixed success. It did not tend to make the Milanese alliance more popular with the people of Florence, who remained cold to all the spectacular splendours which he presented to them. StiU more important was the suspicious attitude of Ferrante of Naples. Lorenzo seems a little to have lost sight of the fact that the policy of his family was based upon a triple, not a dual alliance. Not that he ignored Ferrante, or showed himself indifferent to his friendship. His relations with the Duke of Calabria and Federigo of Aragon continued to be intimate, and the correspondence between Lorenzo and the Neapolitan Court was constant, ranging over every variety of pubiic and personal topics. But he created the impression that the influence of Sforza was the political force,, which chiefly swayed him, and Sforza himself was undoubtedly anxious to make Lorenzo as far as possible dependent solely upon himself. He tried for example, to commit Florence to an attack upon the Appiani of FIRST YEARS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT 145 Piombino, well knowing that such an enterprise would be most unpleasing to Ferrante. Piombino was a small independent territory in the possession of the Appiani family. It forms a httle peninsula abutting on the northern coast of the island of Elba. The safe harbourage which it afforded to vessels of war, and its strategical position, had already attracted the attention of Alfonso of Naples, Ferrante's predecessor, who declared that that one of the Italian Powers which obtained Piombino could readily secure the mastery over all the rest. It was likely, therefore, that Ferrante would take amiss any attempt on Lorenzo's part to secure to Florence so desirable an acquisition. Lorenzo himself soon discovered that he had made a mistake and withdrew from the enterprise. The matter, indeed, would scarcely be worth notice except as a straw shows the direction of the wind. The estrange- ment between Ferrante and Lorenzo which brought the latter to the verge of ruin at the time of the conspiracy of the Pazzi, was the result of the cumulative effect of a number of small misunderstandings, not singly of much importance, but each tending to produce the impression on Ferrante that Lorenzo valued his Milanese connection more highly than his alliance with Naples. Lorenzo, in fact, during the first ten years of his ascendency, made not a few political and diplomatic mistakes, but he was one who could profit by experience, and the faults of his early period were fully corrected in the years which followed. The death of Paul II. in July 1471 had important consequences for the Triple Alliance. The relations between that Pontiff and Ferrante had never been cordial, and latterly had been strained almost to the breaking-point. The accession of a new Pope entirely changed the situation. The questions in dispute between the suzerain and his kingly vassal were satisfactorily adjusted, and a close political and family connection soon sprang up between Ferrante and the Pope. If Lorenzo at any time should have troubles with the Papacy, it was not improbable that Ferrante would be found acting against him, a con- dition of things which in a few years actually arose. But K 146 LORENZO DEI MEDICI at the moment the political sky was bright, and the com- munications between Lorenzo and the Neapolitan Court were of the most cordial and intimate character. The Pope who was elected to succeed Paul 11. took the name of Sixtus IV. Francesco of Savona was of obscure origin ; even his family name is not known. At an early age he was committed to the care of the Franciscans, who undertook his education, and he soon displayed considerable aptitude in theology and philosophy. He became attached to the Piedmontese family of Rovere, and from them acquired a name. His reputation for scholarship led to invitations to him from the chief Italian Universities to lecture on the subjects which he had made his own. At Pavia he had among his audience Cardinal Bessarion, greatest among Byzantine Platonists, and the two scholars were soon on terms of intimate familiarity. He rose to the position of General of the Franciscan Order, was made a Cardinal by Paul II., and rose to the Papacy at the age of fifty-seven, largely by virtue of his reputation as a man of character who had proved himself zealous in the cause of learning, theology, and ecclesiastical reform. Such was the career of a Pontiff whose quiet and re- spectable antecedents entirely belied the character of his Pontificate. It is not necessary to believe the scandalous accusations which a prejudiced chronicler has brought against his private life. Nemo repent e turpissimus fit. But the public actions of Sixtus are sufficient to show that his elevation to the highest position in Christendom was productive of extraordinary and deplorable effects upon his temper and character. A certain wild savagery about everything which he did seems to argue that irresponsible power unhinged to some extent the faculties of his mind. It is only charitable, in the case of Sixtus, to hope that he was not quite sane. His nepotism was more profligate and unblushing than any that the world up to that time had seen. The objects of his affection, Piero and Girolamo Riario, 'were Italian bravi, — desperadoes of the very worst type, whose excesses brought scandal upon the Papal Chair. His passion for discord was such that it was FIRST YEARS OF LORENZO'S GOVERNMENT 147 commonly said that his death was due to the restoration of Italian peace, and he set a precedent for the conduct of the Holy See which his successor, Alexander VL, was too ready to adopt. " Sixtus," says MacchiaveHi, " was the first to show how far a Pope might go, and how much those things which hitherto had been regarded as sinful, lost their iniquity when done by a Pontiff." He became in a few years Lorenzo's implacable foe, and his hatred was destined to carry him to lengths which implicated him in atrocious schemes of assassination, and seriously compromised not only the man, but his sacred office. AU this, however, was in the future. The accession of Sixtus gave good hopes to Italy, and to all Christendom, that a man of piety and learning now sat upon the Chair of St. Peter. Florence determined to despatch an embassy to congratulate him, and at the head of it went Lorenzo. He was received with every token of cordiaUty and esteem. The Pope gratified Lorenzo's passion for antiques and works of art by presenting him with the marble busts of Augustus and Agrippa, " and besides I carried off our engraved chalcedony vase, with many other medals and cameos which I bought, the chalcedony vase being among them." Lorenzo was able to turn the visit to account in many ways. Sixtus knew nothing about art, and looked upon the objects of virtu, which Paul II. had got together with so much dis- crimination and connoisseurship, as so many gewgaws to be turned as speedily as possible into cash. Giovanni Tornabuoni was instructed to make a bargain with the Pope, and some of Paul's finest specimens made their way into Lorenzo's cabinets. Sixtus also made the Medici his bankers, and all the vast funds of the Roman See passed through the hands of Giovanni Tornabuoni, Lorenzo's agent and manager in Rome. The alum mines at Tolfa, which had been recently discovered, were leased to the Medici for a heavy annual payment, and thus the practical monopoly of alum passed into their hands. Lorenzo, indeed, was the recipient of so many private and com- mercial favours that he thought the occasion favourable to sound the Pope upon a project which had long been 148 LORENZO DEI MEDICI entertained by Cosimo, the granting of a Cardinalate to a prominent member of the Medici family. It was suggested to Sixtus that the honour might suitably be conferred on Lorenzo's brother, GiuHano. In making this proposal, it is possible that, apart from the social and political ad- vantage which would accrue to the family from the pos- session of a seat in the Sacred College, Lorenzo was influenced by the desire to bring to an end that partnership in the government of Florence which, if it should ever assume a practical form, might some day prove a source of em- barrassment. Sixtus showed himself at any rate not unwilling to listen to the proposal, and Lorenzo left Rome fully satisfied with the advantageous results which had followed from his mission. He was scarcely home again when trouble arose from an unexpected quarter. Early in 1472 an insurrection broke out in Volterra which threatened to develop into a general state of war in Italy. The history of this rebellion, and of the manner in which it was suppressed, opens up a chapter in Lorenzo's career which is ambiguous and per- plexing. The incident, of no great importance in itself, has a bearing upon Lorenzo's character and reputation which magnifies it out of all proportion to its immediate influence upon the course of events. CHAPTER VI THE INSURRECTION OF VOLTERRA * Geographical and political position of Volterra — Discovery of alum mines near Volterra — Lorenzo's alleged partnership in the alum Company — Dispute between the company and the citizens — View of Florence in regard to the dispute — Disturbances in Volterra — Attitude of Florence — Lorenzo insists on prompt intervention — Conduct of the war against Volterra — Sack of Volterra — Personal action of Lorenzo towards the ruined city. IN the well known, but probably fictitious story of the interview between Savonarola and Lorenzo upon his deathbed, it is related that the dying man unburdened himself to the Friar, declaring that in these last hours three * The original and strictly contemporary authorities on the insurrection of Volterra are : " Antonii Hyvani Sarazanensis Commentariolus de bello Volterrano, 1472," in Muratori, vol. xxiii. The anonymous " Cronachetta Volterrana," in Archivio Storico Italiano, vol. iii. (appendix). The " Chronicle " of Raffaelle MafEei of Volterra* "Ricordi" of Zaccharia Zucchi: extracts dealing with the Volterra question in Fabroni (appendices). Allegretto AUegretti, " Diario Sanese " in Muratori, vol. xxiii. Later authorities : Macchiavelli, " History of Florence/' Fr. Guicciardini, ,, ,, Scipio Ammirato, ., Modem or comparatively modern authorities : Fabroni, Roscoe, Von Reumont. Armstrong. The difficulty of arriving at definite conclusions arises from the fact that the authorities which are strictly contemporary are not free from the suspicion of prejudice and party feeling. Antonio Hyvano, for instance, who was Chancellor of Volterra at the time, and an eye-witness, wrote his narrative at Florence, and, according to Muratori, wrote it to order. Raffaelli Maffei, on the other hand, Weis bitterly antagonistic to Florence and to Lorenzo. One of the Maffei was chosen to act as Lorenzo's assassin by the Pazzi conspirators. Zaccharia Zucchi' s casual statement that Lorenzo was a partner in 149 150 LORENZO DEI MEDICI sins oppressed his conscience, of which one was the sack of Volterra. If it be a legend, the legend has its historical value, for it indicates the extent to which the sack of Volterra, twenty years before, had impressed itself upon the public mind. The questions which present themselves are simple ones. Was Lorenzo responsible for the sack of Volterra ? Was the incident in itself of so disgraceful a character as to leave upon his mind a lasting sense of shame and sorrow ? The town of Volterra, situated on a lofty eminence 1900 feet above the sea, lies midway between Piombino and Florence, thirty miles to the south-west of the latter city. Like Prato, Volterra was commended to Florence, being governed by a Florentine prefect who was changed every six months. His duty was to guard the town, to punish delinquents, and to be present at public discussions, but otherwise Volterra enjoyed self-government under her own elected magistrates, the suzerainty of Florence being only recognised through the prefect, and the payment of an annual tribute. The Volterrans had proved themselves from early times to be a turbulent and high-spirited people, torn by internal feuds, and threatened by external foes. Moved, in 1361, by sheer weariness of never-ending discords, they, to defend themselves against themselves, voluntarily commended themselves to Florence. Having done so they constantly chafed at the restraints thus imposed upon them, and as constantly broke out into rebelHon. The rising in 1472 was the fifth attempt, in little more than a hundred years, on the part of the Volterrans to assert their independence of a yoke which they had imposed upon themselves. It was not unnatural therefore that the Florentines should have thought that the time was opportune to put an end, once the alum firm is not supported by any other authority, but in view of the Medici monopoly of alum, the statement is not improbable. Allegretto Allegretti is impartial, but he says little about Lorenzo's share in the matter. Personally, I do not know any good reasons for doubting that Antonio Hy vano's narrative in the main represents the facts, and my account is largely based upon it. The " Cronachetta Volterrana " in the main supports him. THE INSURRECTION OF VOLTERRA 151 and for all, to a long-continued state of turbulence and dis- affection. Volterra had proved herself incapable of inde- pendence. If she must be dependent, Florence, owing to the geographical position of the town, could not afford that any other Power than herself should exercise authority there. A few miles to the south of Volterra lies the hill of Castel- nuovo, in which deposits of alum had long been known to exist. The alum mines had indeed from time to time been worked, though without any great commercial success. The mines lay neglected, and they brought in no profit to any one. In 1471 a certain Benuccio Capaccio of Siena requested from the public authorities of Volterra a faculty to mine alum in their territories. He proposed to form a company, and to pay an annual rental to the town in return for the concession. The Signoria and the Colleges met to consider the proposal, to which only a slight opposi- tion was offered. The company was accordingly floated, some of the members being Florentines, some Sienese, and two were Volterrans, Benedicto Riccobaldi and Paolo Inghirami. Our estimate of the proceedings which follow, and of the case as a whole, must be governed by the initial question — Was Lorenzo one of the Florentine partners in this Com- pany ? If he was, then any personal action that he might take laid him under suspicion of directing public policy in the interest of his private commercial advantage. If he was not, then his policy, even if mistaken, cannot be said to have been prompted by motives of self-interest. Zaccharia Zucchi, who was, however, a Volterran, states that Lorenzo was a partner, and Guicciardini, though not precise in his particulars, states that Lorenzo had a personal interest in the mines. In view of the fact that alum was practically a Medici monopoly, and that Lorenzo had just entered into an expensive agreement with the Pope as to the working of the alum mines at Tolfa, it is certainly not unlikely that he would secure a controlling influence over mines which were close at hand, and which might, if uncon- trolled by him, open up alum to trade competition. But, on the other hand, his name does not appear upon the list of shareholders ; Antonio Hyvano, and the " Cronachetta 152 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Volterrana " are in agreement in exonerating Lorenzo from the charge of self-interest, and the venture itself did not prove commercially sound. The mines soon proved not to be worth the cost of working. Lorenzo may have been shrewd enough to keep out of a concern which he knew would soon cease to be profitable. Where the evidence is thus conflicting it is impossible to feel any certainty, but the weight and quality of the evidence in Lorenzo's favour seems to be at least equal to that of any that can be urged against him. No sooner was the concession granted than the Volterrans began to exclaim against the alienation of valuble public property from the municipality into the hands of private persons. Forgetful of the fact that the public had hitherto got nothing from the mines, whereas now an annual rental was being paid to the State, they cried out that the con- cession was illegal, that it had been obtained under false pretences, and that Inghirami and the rest were bent upon enriching themselves at the expense of the public revenues. The company, in order to avoid disturbance and ill-feeling, offered to pay a higher rent, and a committee was appointed to consider this proposal which eventually reported in a sense adverse to the concessionnaires. Whereupon they determined to refer the matter to Florence. But before anything could be done there the popular leaders in Volterra stirred up the common people to take affairs into their own hands. The alum mines were declared to be the property of the town ; armed peasants descended upon the mines, and the Company's workmen were driven away. The result was a fresh appeal to the suzerain authority of Florence. At this juncture, we are told, the general state of unrest was further intensified by the appearance of a comet, which struck the beholders with horror, for it was the most certain indication of calamities in store. The Volterran astrologers prophesied evil things. In Florence the affair was looked upon seriously as touch- ing the sovereign authority of the Republic over its de- pendency. Her imperial rights must first of all be enforced and recognised, and these rights, it was asserted, included the THE INSURRECTION OF VOLTERRA 153 possession of whatever nature or man had concealed within Volterran soil, such as treasure, statues, mineral deposits, as soon as such might be discovered. The mines therefore were restored to the concessionaires, and a Florentine commissioner was despatched to see that the decision of the Signoria was respected. At Volterra in the meantime successive Florentine prefects were not inactive. One of these prefects despatched four of the principal agitators to Florence as pledges for the good behaviour of the town, and his successor sent several more. Inghirami and Riccobaldi, the Volterran partners in the Company, also made their way to Florence and clamoured loudly for the full recognition of their rights. As long as Inghirami remained in Florence a truculent attitude towards his fellow citizens was safe enough, but upon his return to Volterra he was an object of general hatred. To secure himself he employed a band of armed men as a bodyguard ; whereupon the Volterrans accused him of a plot against their Hberties. The atmosphere in fact was full of suspicions, and eventually a rumour reached Inghirami that there was a plot to assassinate him as he left the Church of the Virgin. He therefore sought protection in the palace of the Prefect, who, seeing that matters were rapidly becoming dangerous, made an appeal to the citizens to rally to the support of his authority. But the opponents of Inghirami and the Company were in no mood for compromise. The old turbulent spirit of Volterra was now aflame. The time seemed to be favourable for repudiating altogether the suzerainty of Florence, and hoisting the banner of inde- pendence. A furious encounter in the streets between the revolters and the adherents of the Company ended in the complete discomfiture of the latter. The victors appealed to the peasants, provided them with arms, and promised them remission of their debts if they would rally to the cause of rebellion. The Prefect was thoroughly intimidated, and eventually offered to give up Inghirami if security were given for the safety of his life. The Volterran Signoria summoned the Prefect to appear before them to discuss the situation, an invitation which he thought it prudent to 154 LORENZO DEI MEDICI accept. During his absence the Palace of the Prefect was rushed by the mob. Inghirami was discovered in hiding, and smoked out "by an admixture of fire, smoke and sulphur." His dead body was thrown from the Palace windows into the square below. Some of his adherents were more fortunate. One, Barto- lommeo Minuccio, effected his escape in disguise. Giovanni Inghirami, Paolo's brother, sought refuge on the tower of the Palace, where he was a mark for the arrows of the rioters below. On securing guarantees that his life would be spared he capitulated, descending from the tower by a rope, only to be immediately handed over to the safe custody of the City marshal. Blasio Liscio hid himself in the recesses of a chimney, where he made a vow that, if he escaped, he would go on pilgrimage to the shrine of Our Lady of Loretto. Fortune favoured him and the vow was duly redeemed. The alum mines were once more resumed into the hands of the municipaHty, and a Committee of Ten, with plenary powers, was appointed to secure the rights of the town from further infringement. These details give an idea of the lengths to which in- surrection had gone in Volterra before Florence took action. The news produced a profound agitation in Florence. Her honour as well as her authority were compromised if cold- blooded murder of citizens under Florentine protection were to go unpunished. Popular indignation was high against Volterra, to be still further intensified by the arrival of a deputation from the Committee of Ten charged to convey to the Signoria the terms which Volterra was prepared to accept. If Florence would excuse the m.urders which had been committed, on the ground that the victims were Volterrans, and not Florentines ; if the hostages were restored, and the alum mines recognised as municipal property, then Volterra would resume her allegiance, and things should be as they were. Such proposals seemed to the Signoria to add insolence to rebellion, but the attitude of Volterra was so formidable, her position was so impreg- nable, and her appeal for foreign aid was so Ukely to be successful, that it was resolved to proceed with caution. THE INSURRECTION OF VOLTERRA 155 Antonio Ridolfi was despatched to the town on a mission of concihation, but the Volterrans would listen to nothing as long as their hostages were retained in Florence, Ridolfi returned to Florence having effected nothing, and Piero Malgonella was appointed Prefect with full powers. In the meantime in Florence grave differences of opinion existed as to the proper course to pursue. The real danger lay not so much in the revolt itself as in the amount of external support which Volterra might succeed in obtaining. Would the Triple AUiance stand the strain of the temptation now offered to Milan, or to Naples, or to the Pope, or to all of them together, to aggrandise themselves at the expense of a neighbour ? Italian alliances, with whatever assevera- tions of eternal friendship they might be cemented, were apt to last so long as was convenient and no longer. Tommasso Soderini was all for caution. " Better," he said, " a lean peace than a fat victory." Was it wise or reasonable to kindle a flame which might bum up their own dwelling ? He recommended that the submission of Volterra should be accepted on whatever terms it was offered. It was at this point that Lorenzo came prominently and personally forward upon the scene. He strongly opposed the opinion of Soderini. Volterra was in open revolt against the authority of Florence and was intriguing with foreign Powers. This therefore was not a time for weakness or hesitation. The merits of the original dispute had sunk into a secondary place. The paramount duty of the moment was to take effective measures to assert the supremacy of the suzerain State over a rebellious dependency, lest, by the example of Volterra, other dependencies should be led to rebel. The Volterrans must first of all give in their un- conditional surrender ; if they refused, it must be extorted from them by force of arms. As to Soderini's fears from the action of foreign Powers, the bold course must be the safe one ; the surest guarantee against their hostility was to show that Florence was strong, and could protect her own just rights. These arguments prevailed and Florence prepared for war. The responsibility for the war unquestionably lies 156 LORENZO DEI MEDICI with Lorenzo. But for him a compromise would have been effected on the terms proposed by Soderini. The occasion therefore is notable, apart from the military consequences which followed, in that it marks the point when Lorenzo definitely stood forth as master, and finally shook himself free from the leading-strings by which Soderini and the older Medician adherents had sought to guide him. * When once war was declared, Florence determined to neglect no means to bring it to a prompt and successful issue. The usual Ten of War became the Twenty of War, and of these Lorenzo was one. An army of about 5500 men was assembled under the command of Federigo of Urbino. From the State dowry fund 100,000 fiorini d'oro (£50,000) * The narrative of Hyvano presents the facts in another light. He brings Lorenzo on the scene earher, and declares that he summoned the Volterran hostages to the Sacristy of Santa Reparata and there addressed them in conciliatory terms, pointing out that Volterra had nothing but servitude to expect from any other foreign Power, but that Florence had always permitted to her the enjoyment of local self-government. On Lorenzo's porposal Jacopo Acconcio, one of the Volterran Ten, came to Florence, where he was informed that the hostages would be released, and that no penalties would be exacted if Volterra would formally appoint ambassadors and despatch them to Florence to acknowledge their faults and openly to ask pardon for them. Two individuals, the names not being specified, would be exempted from this indemnity. Acconcio's report only increased suspicion at Volterra, whereupon four of the hostages offered to go on parole to explain at home exactly what the Florentine proposals were. In the meantime at Volterra things were going from bad to worse. Help was sought from Ferrante, Venice, Piombino and Siena. The town fell much into the hands of a certain Gigantino, a poverty-stricken and impudent tavern keeper of low extraction. One of the exiles of the Neroni conspiracy, Geri, a Florentine, did what he could to fan the flame of sedition. A general assembly of the people was called by the Priors, when Gabrielo Riccobaldi ventured to point out that Florence had won the day against all the power of Filippo Maria Visconti and Alfonso I. of Naples. What chance, therefore, would Volterra have against her ? Riccobaldi was threatened with death if he used such arguments. A hearing was refused to the four hostages from Florence, who threw in their lot with their fellow citizens, broke their parole, and refused to return. Letters were intercepted which showed that the hostages still remaining in Florence were being urged to seek means of escape. Whereupon they were put under close guard in the Palazzo Publico, and war was declared by Florence against Volterra. Hyvano says nothing about the opposition between Soderini and Lorenzo. He represents the declaration of war as the direct consequence of the contumacy of the Volterrans, in spite of Lorenzo's conciliatory assurances. As I cannot find any support for this part of Hyvano's Commentary, and as some of the statements contained in it are at variance with other accounts, I do not incorporate them into my relation. THE INSURRECTION OF VOLTERRA 157 were borrowed for expenses, and two Florentine com- missaries, Buongianni Gianfigliazzi and Jacopo Guicciardini, were appointed to act with Federigo. Galeazzo Sforza, far from assisting the Volterrans, sent 600 men to act against them, and other overtures to foreign Powers only resulted in some slight assistance being sent to them from Piombino and Siena. Deprived of effective external support, the hope of Volterra lay in the strong natural position of the place. But Federigo, acting with promptitude and resolution, brought up his forces to the front and captured a commanding position from which he could bombard the town. Within, every- thing was in a state of panic and confusion. Divided counsels, jealousies among the leaders, distrust on the part of the people, gave rise to shifting measures, and to occasional outbreaks of ferocious savagery on the part of the mob. The troops were without pay ; desertions were constant, and the generals commanded no confidence. It seemed likely that the mob would soon gain the upper hand, when a general massacre of the principal citizens was to be ex- pected. In the circumstances the Signory of Volterra resolved to treat with Federigo, but while negotiations were in progress a certain Volterran Constable, named II Venezio, who was on guard upon the walls, admitted the Milanese troops through a breach in the immediate neighbourhood of the Church of S. Andrea, and in the course of the night of June 17, the whole of Federigo's army made its way into the town. The troops soon showed a disposition to get out of hand. The Milanese auxiliaries, under the guidance of II Venezio, proceeded to sack the town, and Urbino's men could not be restrained from following suit. The Duke himself appears to have done everything possible to save the city and its inhabitants from plunder and outrage. He issued a pro- clamation that every soldier found within the city after nightfall should be put to death. He seized II Venezio the ringleader, and had him hanged there and then. But all his efforts were insufficient to prevent Volterra from falling into the hands of a brutal undisciplined soldiery, who 158 LORENZO DEI MEDICI inflicted unspeakable horrors upon the inhabitants md brought devastation upon the town. An earthquake, or more probably a landslip caused by heavy rains, addec to the miseries of the situation, though Nature could do but little to increase the desolation created by the hand of n.an. Yet the Volterrans must have been a light-hearted people. Even in the midst of such widespread ruin, and so mach personal suffering, they could not refrain, says Hyvano, fiom laughing at an old man, Jacopo Bardino, wise in council, who had kept himself aloof from the contending factions. Bardino, amid the universal wreck, was heard loudly com- plaining that he had lost his hens and his little waterpots. The Florentines were determined to reap the full advan- tages of their victory. A new and commanding fortress was built upon the ruins of the Church of S. Pietro and the bishop's Palace. The privileges of self-government vi'ere taken away from Volterra ; the ringleaders in the dis- turbance were banished ; the mines were restored to the Company, and all mineral rights in the Volterran territory were definitely resumed by Florence. Care was taken that Volterra should not have a chance of revolting again. This done, Lorenzo could afford to exhibit his private feeling in regard to the incidents which had attended the capture of Volterra. Money was at once sent from Florence to the ruined city to meet the immediate necessities of the popula- tion. Two thousand fiorini d'oro were contributed in the name of the Signoria. Lorenzo himself went to Volterra, not to glory in its devastation, but to administer succour and consolation to the distressed. Though he was per- sonally free from the smallest responsibility for the actual sack of Volterra, and for the atrocities which had there been done, yet the war policy was in a very direct way his policy, and indirectly this slur upon the good name of Florence had come as a consequence of it. He may well have felt there- fore that it became him to do what he could to repair the evil which had been done, to mitigate the impression of wanton cruelty which had been created in the public mind, and to clear his own mind of any qualms which the effects of his public policy may have produced in him. If the THE INSURRECTION OF VOLTERRA 159 sack of Volterra continued to Lorenzo's dying day to lie heavy upon his conscience, — a very doubtful assumption, — the fact seems only to indicate a conscientious sensitiveness far more delicate and susceptible than is to be found in any ruler in Europe in that day. Biographers are commonly reputed to be hero- worshippers, and indeed there must be a tendency, under the attraction of the personaUty of the individual whom the biographer has set himself to reconstruct, to adopt the most charitable view of his actions. But in these days, when history has taken her place among the sciences, when nothing is allowed to pass which has not the authority of a creditable document behind it, the cry is all for impartiaUty. But impartiaUty itself may take upon itself the form of partiality, inasmuch as the bare record derived from documents may often give a barren and misleading view of events from the fact that motives have been left out of consideration. The state- ment that all history is psychology is only an epigrammatic exaggeration of a truth which the historian must not ignore — that the actions of men must be judged in the light afforded by their general character. Thus in criticising the action of Lorenzo towards Volterra, a biographer, so sane, sober and fair-minded as is Von Reu- mont, seems to have confused two issues. Because Lorenzo was responsible for the war, therefore he was responsible for the operations of that war. The sack of Volterra lies at his door because he advocated measures of stringency against her. It is the case of Warren Hastings and the Rohillas over again. But from the circumstances of the case there is at least much to be said in favour of the policy for which Lorenzo argued, and for which he was responsible. It is no reflection on his private character that he should have entertained the opinion that the supreme authority of Florence must be vindicated. The position of her other dependencies, the attitude of Foreign powers, the situation of Florence herself, all alike confirmed him in this opinion, and it is as likely to have been right as wrong. But to hold this opinion does not imply that he approved of ruthless and barbarous outrage i6o LORENZO DEI MEDICI done upon a captured city, or that he was in any way a consenting party to such excesses. Psychology suggests the question — Was Lorenzo the kind of man to sanction and take dehght in such deeds as were enacted in Volterra upon the night of its capture ? If it can be shown that his public policy was dictated by private, personal and sordid ends, that he made war upon Volterra because of a question of alum in which he was commercially interested, there may be a doubt about the answer. It is however extremely doubtful if he was con- nected with the alum Company : it is certain that his whole career was conspicuously free from those brutalities which commonly marked the rulers of his day, nor is it denied that he did what he could individually to alleviate the sufferings which his general had been unable to prevent. It is true that the Duke of Urbino was flattered and rewarded, and that Lorenzo, in common with all Florence, rejoiced over his victory. But Urbino was honoured for taking a rebellious town ; not for sacking it, an outrage which occurred in spite of him, and one which was as uncongenial to all we know of him as it was uncongenial to Lorenzo himself. Volterrans themselves were scarcely in a position to dis- criminate. It was enough for them that pitiless ruin had been brought upon them as a consequence of a policy which was peculiarly Lorenzo's. It was in human nature that they should hold him responsible, and that he should have been pursued with unrelenting enmity by individual Vol- terrans. The case is complicated, and authorities speak with an uncertain voice, but on a review of all the circum- stances we are justified in regarding with grave doubts the story that upon his deathbed Lorenzo declared to Savonarola that the Sack of Volterra was one of the three sins which lay most heavily upon his conscience. CHAPTER VII EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY Lorenzo's relations with Foreign powers — Louis XI. of France — Lorenzo negotiates a Franco-Neapolitan marriage — Pope Sixtus IV. — State of rest in the affairs of Italy — Beginnings of the alienation of the Pope from Lorenzo — Papal policy in Romagna — The Pope and Ferrante of Naples — Florence draws towards Venice — Sixtus IV. and his nephews — The Pope detaches the Duke of Urbino from Florence — Question of Imola — Sixtus IV. transfers his account from the Medici to the Pazzi bank — The Pope, Lorenzo, and Citta di Castello — Salviati appointed Archbishop of Pisa — Opposition of Lorenzo to Salviati — Lorenzo and Carlo Fortebraccio — Resentment of Sixtus IV. against Lorenzo — Venice takes the place of Naples in the Triple Alliance — Assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza — Far-reaching consequences of Sforza's death — Distractions in the govern- ment of Milan — Attitude of Lorenzo towards the situation in Milan — Ludovico Sforza assumes the government of Milan. IN Lorenzo's Italy the Volterran episode aroused only a passing interest. It was a rain-cloud in a summer sky, which passed and was forgotten. None, unless he were a Volterran, dreamed that Lorenzo had permanently sullied his reputation by his action in the matter. On the contrary, he was thought to have done well, and his repu- tation and credit seemed to gain enhancement every day. From his extensive correspondence with foreign Princes, and the manifold and strange favours which they asked of him, we are able to gain a clear idea of the extent of the consideration in which he was everywhere held, of the intimacy, on terms of complete equaUty which existed between him and his fellow sovereigns in Italy, and even beyond the mountains. His relations with Galeazzo Maria Sforza have been noted in connection with Sforza's visit to Florence in 147 1, but they were maintained by constant letters which passed between them, written in a strain of close and friendly familiarity. r 161 l62 LORENZO DEI MEDICI With the NeapoHtan Court Lorenzo was in constant communication. The letters which passed between Lorenzo and the Duke of Calabria and his brother, Federigo of Aragon, were the outward tokens of their private friendship, but Ferrante's official despatches were scarcely less warm and intimate. When Lorenzo received, and splendidly entertained, Ferrante's daughter, Leonora, being on her way to Ferrara in 1473 to become the bride of Ercole d'Este, the King writes : " We must express our unbounded gratitude for this, and though the love we bore you seemed as if it could be little if at all increased, we assure you it has been increased in such a manner that we shall ever be under an obligation to you. We shall endeavour in time to prove our gratitude for the pleasure you have given us." The Duchess of Calabria, Lorenzo's old friend, HippoUta Sforza, finds herself in 1474 greatly embarrassed for the want of 2000 ducats, applies to him for the loan of that sum on the security of her jewellery, and vows, on the faith of a loyal lady, that the loan shall be punctually repaid. Federigo of Urbino, the Gonzaghi of Mantua, the Estes of Ferrara, the King of England, Edward IV., the King of Aragon, all address themselves to Lorenzo, for, as Ferrante said in a letter of 1476, "if we wish to obtain any kind of favour from the Illustrious Republic, we desire no other mediator or representative than your Magnificence, for your great authority is known to us, and we have had experience how readily you fulfil our wishes." But the most striking proof of the estimation in which Lorenzo was held abroad is to be found in the letter addressed to him. by Louis XL of France on June 19, 1473, and in the correspondence to which that letter gave rise. After expressing the pleasure with which he has recently heard that everything is going well with Lorenzo, Louis opens out to him a project of the very first political sig- nificance, and begs his good offices in forwarding and negotiating it, Louis has heard that Ferrante is proposing to marry his eldest daughter to the Duke of Savoy. How much better it would be if he were to marry her to the Dauphin. This would put a check upon the Angevin EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 163 claims in Naples, would result in a close offensive and defensive alliance between Naples and France, and would be of service to Louis in his quarrel with the King of Aragon. The King refrains from mentioning that point which prob- ably he had most in mind, that the proposed alliance would detach Ferrante from the Duke of Burgundy, who was Louis's most formidable opponent. In diplomacy it is often wise to be silent on the subject of the particular advantage which it is sought to secure. The purpose of the King of France in writing to Lorenzo was not merely to give him confidential information, but to enlist his good offices in negotiating the matter with Ferrante. He leaves it to Lorenzo to arrange the amount of the dowry, and begs him to send to the French Court a special ambassador commissioned to deal with the King personally, and with the King alone. Such an ambassador must be careful to have no conferences " with the magnates and Princes of the blood." It would be useful to Louis to have such a man about him, not merely in relation to this particular matter, but in order to expedite the numerous other affairs which might from time to time arise between him and Lorenzo. And, lastly, would Lorenzo send him a dog : one would be sufficient if it were a fine big one. He has heard of Lorenzo's dogs, and would be glad of one to keep constantly about him. The familiar terms of this letter, and the importance of its substance, must have been highly flattering to Lorenzo. He lost no time in executing the King's com- mission. Agostino Bihotti was despatched to Naples bearing a copy of Louis's letter, together with letters from Lorenzo in which he urged the King's proposals upon Ferrante. On August 9 the latter despatched his reply from Castel Nuovo. He begins with warm compliments and assurances to Lorenzo. He feels much honoured by the French King's proposals. But it is quite impossible to accept them, for he is already under obligations to the King of Aragon and to the Duke of Burgundy, which he cannot in honour forego. If Louis would hve in peace with Aragon and i64 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Burgundy, things would be different, but till that happy consummation is arrived at, the claims of honour are more to Ferrante than life itself. Perhaps this Pecksniffian strain was as suitable as any other to apply to fantastic propositions which can have had but little meaning or sincerity behind them. But we are only concerned with the policy of Louis and Ferrante in so far as Lorenzo was associated with it. The interest of the correspondence lies for us in the light which it throws upon Lorenzo's standing in the eyes of foreign potentates, and in the fact that it indicates that he had not sought in vain to base his own position upon an intimate understanding with the French King. With the Pope, too, everything was going well for Lorenzo. It was true that Giuliano had not yet got his Cardinal's hat, but when Sixtus IV. made his first creation of Cardinals on December 15, 1471, only two hats were given, and these only to members of the Pope's immediate family, Pietro Riario and Giuliano della Rovere. There was no need, therefore, for Lorenzo to be disquieted. But, as the months went by, he thought it weU to remind the Pope of the hopes which, when in Rome, he had been permitted to cherish. In a letter of November 21, 1472, he addresses the Pope as " most blessed and holy father " and begs him to add this favour, the greatest and most inextinguishable of all, to the many other obligations already received from him — " and at your feet, I commend with all humility myself and my affairs." The Pope addressed his reply to the Signoria in gracious terms. He acknowledged the justice of the claim of Florence to a seat in the College, regretted the inevitable delay, and bade the Signoria to rest assured that at the next creation, when the just demands of others were being satisfied, " we shall have regard to your Republic also, especially if it approves of our choice." It was certainly disturbing that a second creation of Cardinals should have been made on May 7, 1473, without any Medici being included in the number, but there were undoubted difficulties. Giuliano was a layman ; he was EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 165 not yet twenty, and Lorenzo could have no just cause of complaint if he were kept waiting a little longer. Thus at the beginning of 1474 Lorenzo's sky was quite unclouded. His own position was established and re- cognised in Florence and outside. He was on good terms with everybody, and Italy was at peace. " There are no politics here," writes one of his correspondents to Ercole d'Este ; " the only news is that Lorenzo has lost two falcons." In this year he received a visit of ceremony from the grave, long-bearded, and unpretentious King Christian of Denmark. The simpHcity of his retinue and of his manners contrasted with the barbaric profusion which had marked the visit of Galeazzo of Milan. The sight which pleased Christian most in Florence was the collection of Greek manuscripts, including the manuscripts of the Gospels, which had been brought to Florence from Constantinople. " These," said the old King, " are the true treasures of Princes." It was at this time that Lorenzo was much occupied with poetry, philosophy, and schemes of education, nor was he neglectful of the popular demand for amusement. In 1475 Giuliano's tournament rivalled the splendours of that given by his brother some years before, but of all its splendours the greatest was PoHziano's poem of La Giostra, which influenced profoundly the poetry and art of the Renaissance. A few months later Lorenzo was at Pisa» residing there, in his house in the town, for a considerable period, while he supervised the reconstruction of the University of Pisa. These peaceful and intellectual activities wiU be treated in detail in subsequent chapters, which will present Lorenzo as a man of thought. Here, where we are concerned with him as a man of action, they are mentioned with a view to their chronological connec- tion with events in Lorenzo's career, and as indications of the quiet political waters in which his bark was now sailing. But, though he knew it not, the great crisis of Lorenzo's life was approaching with footsteps which, if slow, were certain. The Pazzi conspiracy of 1478 was not a bolt from i66 LORENZO DEI MEDICI the blue. It was the cubnination of a series of circumstances which, operating over several years, resulted in the com- plete estrangement of Lorenzo from the Pope, from Ferrante of Naples, and from some of his own prominent adherents in Florence. A number of particular causes can be shown to have contributed to the alienation of Sixtus IV. from Lorenzo. But all these can be reduced to one general and governing cause — the opposition between the political interests of Florence and the poHtical designs of the Supreme Pontiff. Sixtus had not long been Pope when he discovered that, if the Papacy was to be respected, it must strike out a new line for itself. It must attract attention through the personality of its head, and must know how to inspire fear if it would command obedience. It must have agents personally devoted to its interests, and these were scarcely to be found outside the circle of the Pope's immediate family. To exalt his own family, to carve out principalities for Riarios and Roveres from those territories which nominally at least were under the suzerainty of the Papal See, became the dominating passion of Sixtus's hfe. He may have deluded himself at the outset that he was actuated only by the laudable desire of vindicating the rights of the Church over her own. It was not long, however, before the private interests of his family gained entire possession of him, and the whole public poUcy of the Holy See was frankly directed by the dictates of private and personal ambition. The district of Romagna naturally suggested itself as the most suitable to serve the purposes of the new policy. There the Papal claims to suzerainty were definite and could most easily be enforced. But the territories of Florence extended to the frontiers of Romagna, and even beyond them, for several of the petty lords of the Romagna had commended themselves to Florence, and lived under her protection. It was impossible that Florence could regard without apprehension the extension of the territorial influence of the Pope towards her own borders. The designs of Sixtus, therefore, must inevitably bring him EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 167 into conflict with the leading principles of Florentine statesmanship. Sixtus, moreover, was not slow to realise that his chances of success in Romagna would be increased if he were on good terms with Naples. Previous Popes had constantly found themselves thwarted by the action of the Neapolitan sovereigns. The question of the Papal suzerainty over Naples, of the tribute which was to be paid in recognition of it, had long kept Naples and the Papacy in a state of agitation and warfare. Sixtus determined to put an end to this state of things by getting Ferrante on his side. He agreed that the Papal suzerainty would be adequately recognised by an annual gift from Ferrante of two white horses. In every way Sixtus strove to detach the King from the Triple Alliance and to attach him firmly to himself. It was impossible for Florence to look on unmoved while the delicate balance of power in Italy was thus being thrown out of gear. She must take steps to redress it by sub- stituting Venice for Naples in the Triple Alliance. Thus the ultimate result of the Papal policy was that the three northern powers, Venice, Milan, and Florence stood out in hardly concealed antagonism to the designs of Naples and the Papacy. Wherever he turned Sixtus found opposition, and in every case it was found that this opposition was engineered in Florence. Lorenzo stood out before the world as the representative of Florence, and upon Lorenzo per- sonally the hatred of Sixtus in the end came to be concentrated. It was therefore as the consequence of general principles rather than of particular incidents that the estrangement between Lorenzo and his former friends, Sixtus and Ferrante, came about. But each particular incident, as it arose, would have a cumulative force finally gathering sufficient volume to drive the Pope to violent action. The storm was gathering during the years 1474-1478, and eventually burst upon Lorenzo's head in the form of the Pazzi conspiracy. During the first few years of the Pontificate of Sixtus he was content that the policy of the Papacy should run on the old lines. He busied himself with crusading projects ; i68 LORENZO DEI MEDICI despatched embassies to various European sovereigns in the hope of stimulating their zeal, and soon contemplated a General Council, whereby Christendom might show itself unanimous in prosecuting a Holy War against the Turks. He thus, as Creighton says, showed himself ready " to give a fair trial to the old poHtical traditions of the Papacy before entering upon a new sphere of action. He paused to justify in his own eyes the transition from a Franciscan reformer to an Itahan prince." There was nothing to prevent the Franciscan reformer being on good terms with Lorenzo, but as soon as the Itahan prince, filled to the full with the Italian spirit, and bent upon displaying his prowess upon the arena of Itahan politics, disclosed himself in the person of the Supreme Pontiff, he became a secular rival, hke any other. If his secular projects clashed with those of Lorenzo, friendly relations between Florence and the Papacy became at once impossible. Sixtus soon discovered that nothing in the way of co- operation and support was to^be expected from Christendom. The Papacy could exercise no influence on the old lines. It must therefore try what could be done on new lines. Sixtus determined that he would impress himself on the imagination of Italy in a manner that Italy could under- stand. A Pope with all the sanctities of his office hanging around him, backed by the secure possession of a strong territorial sovereignty, would be in a position to command respect, not in Italy only, but in Christendom at large. The agents of his new pohcy were ready to his hand. Papal nephews abounded, and through them he determined to act. Already in 1471 he had elevated two of them to the Cardinalate, Pietro Riario, son of his sister lolanda, and Giuliano della Rovere, son of his brother Raffaelle. On Pietro Riario he let loose all the passion and extra\^a- gance of his affections. This hitherto obscure young man of five-and-twenty, suddenly found himself in the possession of enormous revenues derived from abbeys, patriarchates, bishoprics, and archbishoprics. Entirely deficient in the strength of character which would have assisted him to support this sudden freak of fortune, Pietro's EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 169 head was turned ; his luxury, profusion and profligacy became a public scandal in Rome and throughout Italy. Pietro's wild excesses were not, however, a matter of political importance until they became associated with the Pope's political schemes. But in the summer of 1473 it fell to him to entertain Leonora of Aragon, Ferrante's daughter, and Pietro's banquet, given in her honour, has become historical. By such means the Pope signified his departure from the NeapoHtan policy of his predecessors, and his resolution to bind Naples and the Papacy together by close ties of poHtical and private friendship. Fresh evidence of this policy was given when the Pope married his nephew, Leonardo della Rovere, to another of Ferrante's illegitimate daughters. Thus early it should have been clear to Lorenzo that the Pope was designing to undermine the Triple Alliance, and that Papal assurances of goodwill must be received with caution. Lorenzo, however, offered no objections when, on the death of Giovanni Neroni, the Archbishopric of Florence was added to the number of Pietro's preferments. The new Archbishop was received in Florence with acclamations and festivities. Thence he made his way to Milan, where he held close conference with Galeazzo Sforza. They seem to have concocted between them magnificent schemes, that Galeazzo should become King of Lombardy and Pietro Pope, but these schemes, and any alarms Lorenzo might have felt in regard to them, were summarily ended by the death of Pietro in 1474. The Pope for a time was inconsolable, but he remembered that Pietro had a brother, Girolamo Riario, and upon him Sixtus now lavished all, and more than all, the affection which he had felt for Pietro. Girolamo was not an eccle- siastic, nor was it possible to launch him upon the seas of ecclesiastical wealth. Through Girolamo it was now possible for the Pope to begin to lay the foundations of a secular sovereignty in Italy, and to establish his family in the position of ItaHan Princes. In 1474 a step in this direction was taken which was destined to have important consequences in the future. 170 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Another Rovere nephew, Giovanni, was married to the daughter of Federigo of Urbino. In course of time the Duchy of Urbino descended to Francesco Maria della Rovere, the son of this marriage. Of more immediate importance was the influence of the marriage upon Federigo of Urbino himself. It has seen seen that he had constantly acted as generalissimo of the armies of Florence. In the Colleonic War, in the afairs of Rimini and Volterra, Urbino had commanded the Florentine troops, and was generally regarded as per- manently attached to the fortunes of the Republic. Sictus determined to detach him from this connection, and .n a little while Urbino is to be found in command of the Pipal armies in opposition to the Florentine troops which had so often served under his banner. For Girolamo in the meantime a beginning was n.ade by the acquisition of Imola. This was the transaction which first brought Sixtus and Lorenzo into direct antag- onism, for Florence had a very strong desire to secure Imola for herself. Its position, beyond the Apeniine Chain, not very far from the Adriatic coast, made it a very desirable station for the conduct of Florentine trade "vith the East, while, in the hands of an unfriendly power, Inola might be used as a formidable obstacle to the commercial interests of Florence. Continuous feuds in the Manfredi family, who had long ruled in Imola, resulted, in 1472, in the territory passing into the hands of the Duke of Milan, and from him the Florentines tried to purchase it. But the Pope was beforehand with them. His objections to the extension of Florentine interests in Romagna were as strong, and as valid, as the objections which Florence entertained against the extension of Papal interests in that quarter. The mission of Pietro Riario to Milan was doubtless connected with the Pope's projects upon Imola, projects for which he had already secured the sanction of Ferrante of Naples. It was eventually arranged, much to the chagrin of Florence, that the Pope should buy Imola for 40,000 ducats, that it should be handed over in sovereignty to Girolamo Riario, and that he should marry EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 171 Caterina Sforza, an illegitimate daughter of Galeazzo Maria. This arrangement hit Florence severely. Imola was lost to her. The Pope had established his secular power in close proximity to her borders, and her friendship for Sforza, which had entailed much sacrifice, had proved in- sufficient to induce Galeazzo to accede to her wishes, or to prevent him from showing favour to the wishes of the Pope. The alliance between Girolamo and Caterina was of bad omen. It is therefore not surprising that Lorenzo should have put forth his utmost endeavours to thwart the arrangement which had been made. It might still be possible to raise such financial obstacles that the Pope would not be able to find the purchase-money for Imola. The Pope's funds were in the hands of the Medici bank at Rome, and thus difficulties could be put in the way when so large a lump sum was required. At this juncture the rival bankers, the Pazzi, came forward, and undertook to negotiate the business. Sixtus transferred his account from the Medici to the Pazzi bank, and began to regard Lorenzo with feelings of violent animosity. Thus the case of Imola has a double bearing on the Pazzi conspiracy. It marks the beginnings of personal rivalry between the Pazzi and the Medici, and also the beginnings of hostiUty between Lorenzo and the Pope. The difficulties with Sixtus were intensified by the sus- picion that Girolamo Riario would not be contented by the acquisition of Imola, but that his eyes were fixed upon the lordship over Forli and Faenza also. If his schemes should be realised, the position of Florence in the Romagna would be seriously compromised ; in any event it was necessary to oppose, whenever possible, the further ex- tension of direct Papal influence in that region and else- where. An opportunity offered when Sixtus determined to intervene in the affairs of Citta di Castello. This town lay on the frontiers of Tuscany and Umbria, in close proximity to the Florentine outpost, Borgo San Sepolcro. The lordship over Cittk di Castello was in the hands of Niccolo Vitelli, but the Vitelli had for some years 172 LORENZO DEI MEDICI been confronted with formidable rivals in the Giustini family. The broils between the two families had led to constant agitation and violence in the town, and when at last Niccolo Vitelli gained the upper hand, Lorenzo Giustini carried his complaints and his claims to the Pope. Sixtus could put forward plausible excuses drawn from the past history of the town to justify his interference. He could represent his intervention as being in the interests of law, order, and good government. But Citta di Castello would also be a useful addition to Girolamo's possessions, and the Pope was suspected of the intention to hand the place over to him. Florence at any rate was seriously alarmed for Borgo San Sepolcro, and as the Pope prosecuted his enterprise against Niccolo Vitelli with vigour, Florence organised a force of 6000 men to safeguard her interests in that neighbourhood. The Pope took this demonstration as directed against himself, and accused the Signoria of levying troops for the purpose of supporting Vitelli against his lawful suzerain. It was a further grievance that when Vitelli was at length compelled to surrender, he was able to secure such terms that it was said that the conquered, not the conquerors, had dictated them. None the less, Niccolo was compelled to leave Citta di Castello, being then hospitably received by Florence and allowed to find a safe retreat within her territories. It was in vain for Lorenzo to protest to Sixtus that all that had been done was in protection of the legitimate interests of Florence ; that he reckoned the goodwill of the Pope among his most precious treasures which he had no desire to lose " for the sake of Messer Niccolo or any one else." Sixtus remained convinced that Florence had done everything in her power to thwart him, and Florence on her part, says Valori, began to look askance on Papal schemes, to withdraw from the Pope the honours which were his due, and to exclude him from all her secrets. An opportunity soon presented itself to Sixtus to mark his displeasure in a manner peculiarly galling to Lorenzo. In 1474 Filippo dei Medici, Archbishop of Pisa, died, and the Pope conferred the vacant see upon Francesco Salviati. EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 173 For reasons not known Lorenzo regarded this man as unsuitable to hold ecclesiastical authority within the territories of Florence. Only a few months earlier he had successfully thwarted Salviati's ambition to become Arch- bishop of Florence, the see being secured on the death of Pietro Riario, by Lorenzo's brother-in-law, Rinaldo Orsini. In the case of the Archbishopric of Pisa, Lorenzo was not so fortunate. Salviati secured the appointment in the face of an assurance that the Pope had previously given, through Cardinal Jacopo Ticino, that no Bishop or Archbishop should be instituted to any see within the territories of the Republic unless he had been nominated and found fit by the supreme magistracy. It was probably on the strength of this assurance that Lorenzo, though unable to prevent Salviati's appointment, nevertheless was able to withhold from him possession of the Archbishopric for a period of three years. Salviati remained in Rome, seething with indignation, and glad, when the time arrived, to embrace any schemes which offered him a prospect of securing vengeance for his wrongs. Yet a further cause of complaint was Lorenzo's action, or reputed action, in the matter of Carlo Fortebraccio. This man was a somewhat eccentric condottiere in the pay of Venice, who conceived that through his father, Braccio the Great, he had claims upon the lordship of Perugia. In 1477 he determined to prosecute these claims, and raised a private expedition for the purpose. The Pope subsequently accused Lorenzo of having aided and abetted Carlo in this freebooting enterprise, but the truth seems to be that Carlo's failure before Perugia was chiefly due to the action of Florence, who urgently counselled him to withdraw. Carlo, however, was determined not to go back empty-handed. He made an aggressive descent upon the territories of Siena, whose inveterate enmity to Florence made her at all times ready to believe that any designs against her were prompted from that quarter. Siena appealed against Fortebraccio's raid to the Pope and to Ferrante, at the same time making strong repre- sentations to Florence that she should call the freebooter 174 LORENZO DEI MEDICI off. Florence retorted that Fortebraccio's enterprises were no affair of hers, and that she was in no way responsible for them, and was most anxious that he should desist from them. The affair now took a very serious turn which threatened to disturb the general peace of Italy. The Pope was thoroughly roused by Fortebraccio's audacity, was con- vinced that Florence was his accomplice, and shrewdly suspected that, behind the scenes, Venice was pulling the strings and seeking to pick up an advantage from any successes which Carlo might gain. An opportunity was offered to Sixtus to try the effect of his own diplomatic arrangements, and to give proof to the northern powers that his alliance with Ferrante and Urbino was a factor with which they must reckon. He put an army into the field against Fortebraccio commanded by Federigo of Urbino, and Ferrante sent Neapolitan troops to support him. Urbino laid siege to the Castle of Montone, near Perugia, which in a month was compelled to surrender. It seemed as if a state of war would soon become general between the chief ItaUan powers. At this juncture, Florence, by urgent representations, induced Fortebraccio to withdraw, and revert to his old position in the service of Venice. He complained loudly against the Florentines, and declared that, by their unwillingness to support him, they had deprived him of glory, and themselves of a most valuable acquisition. The Sienese, on the other hand, were bitterly indignant against Florence, believing that Forte- braccio's unprovoked attack could only have been made on the strength of covert assurances of Florentine co- operation and goodwill. They were not in the least grateful to Florence for having obliged Carlo to retire, for, says Macchiavelli, " they considered themselves under no ob- ligation to those who had delivered them from an evil to which they had first exposed them." The Florentines, then, were in bad odour all round, and Von Reumont thinks that they had only their own duplicity to thank for it. It is difficult to know what were exactly the facts in the case. If we are to believe the Florentines, they were not only totally innocent of con- EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 175 niving at Fortebraccio's raid, but it was entirely through them that he had twice been induced to stay his hand, first from Perugia, and then from Siena. The Pope and the Sienese were equally convinced that Florence was at the bottom of the whole affair ; and in the Brief of Sixtus, issued in June 1478, after the Pazzi Conspiracy — a Brief in which he pronounces an interdict against Florence, and summarises all his many griefs against Lorenzo — the charge that Lorenzo had endangered the peace of Italy by his encouragement of Fortebraccio, comes second on the list. The Sienese are prejudiced witnesses, and their charges against Florence are balanced by the conviction of Carlo that he only failed because Florence would not help him. The passion and fury of the Pope against Lorenzo, after the Pazzi conspiracy, amounted almost to a maniacal obsession, which certainly discounts the value of his assertions. On the other hand, the suspicions against Florence were almost universal, and the fact that Venice was ready to testify to her integrity only tended to deepen them. Falstaff needs a better security than Bardolph. Venice was herself so much an adept at fishing in troubled waters that feUow feeling for an imitator might in this case have made her kind. Leaving the question of the actual guilt or innocence of Florence in doubt, this much at any rate is certain, that, with or without just cause, the antagonism of the Pope to Lorenzo was intensified by the incidents which attended the raids of Carlo Fortebraccio. Concurrently with the course of events in Romagna and in Umbria, the Pope was drawing closer the ties between himself and Ferrante. It was undoubtedly Ferrante's first interest to be on good terms with his suzerain. His own tenure of Naples was precarious. Powerful and discontented barons were ever watchful for an opportunity to rise against him, and abundant opportunities had been offered to them by the constant struggle between the Neapolitan Kings and the Holy See. To end that struggle, and settle the question of tribute on nominal terms, were advantages sq great that Ferrante cannot be blamed for 176 LORENZO DEI MEDICI attaching himself to Sixtus at the expense of his alliance with Lorenzo. Of course it was necessary to find pretexts, and they were not difficult to find. Lorenzo was allowing himself to fall too exclusively under the influence of Galeazzo Sforza. Their dual alliance was tending to crowd Ferrante out of the Triple Alliance. Lorenzo was making overtures to Venice, and friendship for Venice could not exist side by side with loyalty to the interests of Naples. Lorenzo was trying, at Piombino and in Romagna, to upset the balance of power which he professed himself so anxious to preserve. Lorenzo might have retorted that in proportion as Ferrante drew away from him, it was necessary to be prepared with alternative arrangements. It is difficult to decide what was cause and what was effect. But it may be admitted that, in the exuberance of youth and the confidence of power, Lorenzo was trying to do too much. He was not yet by any means the consummate statesman, but was learning by experience, in this stage of his career, those lessons in statecraft which in a later period he practised with so much faciUty and success. At the same time, as he watched the growing friendship between Ferrante and the Pope, it became obvious to him that, if the balance of the Italian States — the cardinal point in Medici policy — was to be maintained, he must look about him to find an alliance which would counter- balance the possible defection of Naples. Venice was ready to fill the vacant place. In September 1474, the Triple Allaince between Florence, Milan, and Venice was proclaimed, for purposes of common defence. In order to show that the new league had no aggressive intentions, but was only anxious for the public peace, room was left for the Pope and Ferrante to join the combination if they cared to do so. Their reply, however, was formally to ratify their own alliance. The foes of the one were to be the foes of the other, and their association was for mutual protection and support. Ferrante, early in 1475, paid a State visit to Rome, where he was splendidly received by the Pope, and lodged in the Vatican. But though the fact that there were two Leagues facing EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 177 one another in Italy was ominous ; though the opportunity of consohdating these Leagues into one had been dedined, yet there was no declaration of hostilities, the relations between Ferrante and Lorenzo still remaining of a most cordial character. So long as no war broke out there was no occasion for any coldness. When in 1477 Ferrante determined to marry again, Lorenzo received, and splendidly entertained, at Pisa, the Duke of Calabria, who was on his way to fetch the bride. Outwardly, the political sky was fair everywhere in Italy : but an event had already occurred, at the end of the year 1476, which led the Pope, when he heard of it to exclaim, " To-day the peace of Italy is dead." On St. Stephen's Day, December 26, Galeazzo Maria Sforza was assassinated in the Church of St. Stephen at Milan. The event made a tremendous appeal to the Italian imagination, and revived the fashion in dramatic assassi- nations. Among the pupils of Cola Montano, the most distinguished Humanist in Milan, were three young Milanese noblemen, Giovanni Andrea Lampugnani, Carlo Visconti, and Girolamo Olgiati. From their tutor they learned much of the virtues of a republican government, and were fortified in hatred of despots and love of liberty by copious examples drawn from the ancient world of Sparta, Athens, and Rome. Montano does not seem to have refrained from pointing his remarks by direct allusions to the existing government in Milan. " He discussed with them," says Macchiavelli, " the faults of their Prince ; the wretched state of his subjects, and so worked upon their minds as to induce them to bind themselves by oath to destroy the Duke as soon as they were old enough to make the attempt." Montano is scathingly dismissed by Armstrong as " one of the cowardly literary agitators who never dare face the deeds to which they drive their scholars." Under the spell of his glowing periods, assassination took the appear- ance of antique virtue. Immortal glory was to be won by following in the steps of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. If it be possible for the conduct of a tyrant to justify tyrannicide, Galeazzo had gone to lengths of public and M 178 LORENZO DEI MEDICI private immorality such as made him worthy of his fate. He is an example of the man of the Renaissance who combined some taste and love of learning with odious vices and eccentric cruelty. Corio, in his " History of Milan," cites examples of his revolting lusts, and of his ferocious and sanguinary nature. Each of Montano's young pupils, according to Macchiavelli, had his own private wrongs to avenge : and, in the case of Carlo Visconti it was the honour of his own sister which he was called upon to vin- dicate. Having decided that the deed should be done, they determined, by careful preparation, to do it success- fully. They met frequently, and rehearsed the murder by assuming in turn different attitudes, and striking each other with sheathed daggers, their blows being regulated by the position of the one who acted the part of victim. Much consideration was given to the question of time and place. To assassinate the Duke privately would be to rob the deed of half its effect, and, moreover, would be difficult, for he was carefully guarded. Some public festival, or ceremonial occasion, when crowds would be gathered together, and when sympathisers would be at hand, seemed to offer the most favourable and dramatic opportunity. It was the custom of the Duke, on St. Stephen's Day, to go in great solemnity to the Church dedicated to the Saint. On that day, therefore, the oppor- tunity should be seized. The three conspirators, having urged upon their friends to be at hand, but without dis- closing their project, betook themselves to the Church. Having heard Mass together, they gathered before a statue of St. Ambrose, and invoked the patron saint of their City and its Uberties to witness the purity of their motives, and to give favourable assistance to their enterprise. They then took up their positions at the entrance to the Church. In the meantime, according to the accounts of con- temporaries who loved to colour events with a touch of the miraculous, Galeazzo was haunted by strange omens of his approaching death. It was, indeed, not unnatural, when the deed was done, that people should have had in mind the death of Caesar. It is related that the Duke, EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 179 having put on a cuirass, in a fatal moment took it off again for some trifling cause : that he proposed not to go to the church but to hear Mass in his private chapel ; that, in the absence of a priest, he changed his mind, but before setting forth, called his little children to him, and embraced them with unusual warmth. As he approached the en- trance Lampugnani and Olgiati advanced towards him as if to clear the way for him, and the former, faUing on his knee before the Duke, under pretence of presenting a petition, struck him two blows in front, quickly followed by similar blows from the dagger of Olgiati. The Duke staggered forward, affording an opportunity to Visconti to stab him from behind in the shoulder and the spine. The Duke fell ejaculating the name of the Virgin. Great confusion immediately arose, but the thing had been done so suddenly and so rapidly that few knew what had actually taken place. No cries of Liberty, Republic, were raised. The assassination fell flat, and the assassins sought their own safety by mingling with the crowd within the church. Lam- pugnani, however, had been recognised by one of the Duke's attendants. Seeking to save himself among the women, he stumbled over their voluminous trains and was cut down. Visconti escaped for the moment, but soon shared the fate of his companion. Girolamo Olgiati passed quietly out of the church, and made his way home, where through the good offices of his mother he lay concealed for two days. Bitterly disappointed that no general rising on behalf of freedom had followed the Duke's assassination, he sought greater safety in flight, was discovered and handed over to justice. He found consolation for his tortures in the recollection of his deed. In the agonies of death he main- tained his fortitude by the reflection that though death is bitter, fame is everlasting, and that the memory of his act would remain for ever. [Mors acerba, fama perpetua, stahit vetus memoria facti.) Throughout Italy the feeling was entertained, and commonly expressed, that the assassins of Galeazzo Maria had done a glorious thing. They had signalised in a striking way their own individuality and this was of more con- i8o LORENZO DEI MEDICI sequence than the death of a despot. Italy lived under despots, and could not do without them, but was none the less glad when any one of them came to a violent end. The political consequences of the murder lay hidden in the future, and there were few who cared to trouble about them. The Pope was shrewd enough to see that " the peace of Italy was dead," but neither he, nor any other, could foresee that from that day dates the decay of Italian independence. Galeazzo's successor was destined to call the French into Italy in order to preserve his own doubtful sovereignty in Milan, and with the advent of the French the days of Italian independence were numbered. But Lorenzo fully realised that for him a serious crisis had arisen. He had lost an ally who was strong and firmly established, while conditions had arisen which would throw the government of Milan for a time at any rate into the melting-pot. Galeazzo Maria left behind him a son seven years old, and a band of turbulent and ambitious brothers. The widowed Duchess, Bona of Savoy, immediately took steps to secure the Regency on behalf of her son Giovanni, but, in face of the intrigues of her brothers-in-law, her task was difficult, for they were determined that the Regency should be in the hands of one of themselves. Whichever party triumphed in the end, Milan must endure for several years the weakness and the risks involved in the government of a minor. Milan, instead of being, as hitherto, the support on which Lorenzo could chiefly rely, was now likely, whatever government ultimately prevailed there, to need from Lorenzo all the support which he could afford her, Lorenzo therefore had carefully to consider his proper line of action. In any event a close friendship with Milan must be maintained, for that was the keystone of Medici foreign policy. The best course was to be prepared for anything which might happen ; to support the government of the Duchess, seeing that it was established, and at the same time to keep as far as possible on good terms with the brothers, in case they might at any time prevail Such a policy exposed Lorenzo to the charge of double-dealing. EVENTS LEADING TO THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY i8i and was certainly liable to be misunderstood. A year or two later the Duke of Urbino roundly accused Lorenzo of neither desiring nor seeking the peace and safety of Milan, and expressed his agreement with the opinion which had been expressed that Lorenzo " had sinned against the Holy Ghost and doubted the mercy of God." These, however, were the exaggerated statements of political prejudice, and they show no comprehension of Lorenzo's difficulties. At a time of confusion, when the foundations of his traditional policy were in danger of being uprooted, he had to do the best he could for himself, and no course seemed to offer better prospects than to be prepared for any event in Milan. Immediately on receipt of the news of the Duke's assassination Lorenzo despatched Luigi Guicciardini to Milan, soon to be followed by Tommasso Soderini, in order to convey his assurances of support to the Duchess, and to maintain the good relations between the two governments. Much was to be hoped from the fact that Cecco Simoneta, the chief minister of the late Duke, had firmly attached himself to the side of the Duchess-Regent. So long as he remained in power, there was a guarantee for the continuity of Milanese policy, and a formidable obstacle opposed to the ambitions of the Sforza brothers. Two of them, Sforza, Duke of Bari, and Ludovico, known as II Moro, had been banished by Galeazzo to France. They now returned and were joined by two other brothers, Ottaviano, and Ascanio, a churchman, subsequently one of the most influential members of the College of Cardinals. Simoneta endeavoured to conciliate them by offices, dignities and wealth, but they soon took advantage of a revolt in Genoa against the authority of Milan to show their hand. Holding high commands in the Milanese army which was operating in Genoa, they stirred up sedition among the soldiers, sought to win the army to their side, and organised a rising in Milan. These intrigues were discovered, and Ottaviano, seeking refuge in flight, was drowned in the waters of the Adda. The other three were sent into exile. l82 LORENZO DEI MEDICI To Ludovico Pisa was allotted as his place of banishment, and he was thus in the territories of Florence. There Lorenzo extended to him every kindness and consideration, treatment which Ludovico did not forget in the days of his power, when Lorenzo needed assistance from him. Sforza, Duke of Bari, found his way to Naples, where he exerted himself to stir up Ferrante against the Duchess- Regent. Ascanio betook himself to Perugia. The state of general war in Italy which followed as a consequence of the Pazzi Conspiracy, provided the brothers with fresh opportunities of prosecuting their ambitions. By the death of the Duke of Bari, however, Ludovico was left the sole secular representative of the pretensions of the brothers. In an evil moment, yielding to the persuasions of the Duke of Ferrara, the Duchess-Regent made overtures of recon- cihation to Ludovico and Ascanio. They were accepted, and the result corresponded with the anticipations of Simoneta, who warned the Duchess that Ludovico's recall could only mean " that from you wiU be taken all influence and reputation, and from me, Hfe." In September 1479 Ludovico Sforza entered Milan, and from this moment, under the pretence of acting for his nephew, he became for all practical purposes, the reigning Duke. Such were the political results which followed directly in Milan from the assassination of Galeazzo Maria. In Florence, little more than a year later, a scheme of assassination on a more extensive and even more dramatic scale was brought to a head. From it Lorenzo barely escaped with his Hfe, and his brother GiuUano fell, murdered even before the horns of the altar. CHAPTER VIII THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY *— THE PLOT. AND THE MAN WHO HATCHED IT The Pazzi family — Causes of their animosity against Lorenzo — Political grievances — Private grievances — The Borromeo inheritance — Girolamo Riario thinks himself thwarted by Lorenzo — Girolamo approaches Fran- cesco di Pazzi — Salviati, Archbishop of Pisa — Jacopo di Pazzi — His original attitude towards the conspiracy — Services of Battista di Monte- secco enlisted — Interview between Girolamo and Montesecco — Montesecco engaged to secure foreign aid — Montesecco's interview with Lorenzo — Interview with Jacopo di Pazzi — Montesecco relates the story of his interview with the Pope — Jacopo joins the conspiracy — Extent to which the Pope was implicated in the conspiracy — Difficulties of the conspirators as to means to accomplish their ends — The conspirators in Rome — Lorenzo invited to Rome — Ringleaders of the conspiracy in Florence — Accomplices. THE family of Pazzi which gave its name to the remark- able conspiracy of 1478 was of great antiquity, of high estimation in Florence, and closely connected by marriage with Lorenzo and Giuliano dei Medici. One of the great solemnities of Florence, the procession of the Carro dei Pazzi, derived its origin from the tradition that Pazzo dei * The chief contemporary authorities for the Pazzi conspiracy are : (i) The Confession of Giovanni Battista di Montesecco, circulated by the Florentine Chancellor, Bartolommeo Scala, in his " Excusatio Fioren- tinorum," August 10, 1478. {2] " Angeli Poliziani conjurationis Pactionae, anni 1478, Commen- tarium." The edition which I have chiefly used " nunc primum inlus- tratum cura et studio Joannis Adimari documentis, figuris, notis Neapoli, 1769," contains, in addition to Poliziano's Commentary, every available reference to the conspiracy drawn from contemporary sources, such as despatches from ambassadors, extracts from historians, &c. (3] The Pope's Brief of Excommunication, dated June i, 1478. (4) Reply of the Signoria to the Papal Brief, July 21, 1478 — given in Roscoe's supplementary illustrations. (5) Letter purporting to speak for the Florentine synod, July 23, 1478. (6] Other letters, by the Pope, Lorenzo, and others, and diplomatic despatches. (7] Works of contemporary, or quasi-contemporary, historians — Macchiavelli, Valori, Guicciardini, Amirato and others, 183 i84 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Pazzi, at the time of Godfrey de Bouillon's Crusade, brought back from Jerusalem the sacred stone — a fragment of the tomb of Christ — from which, on Easter-eve, the sparks were struck which lighted the Colombina. The Colombina was a firework, shaped like a dove which, when ignited, carried the fire from the stone upon the High Altar of the Duomo to the Pazzi car, which stood, stored with fireworks, upon the Piazza del Duomo, between the Cathedral and the Baptistery. At the touch Florence was bathed in the sacred fire. This august ceremony would alone have made the name of Pazzi a household word in Florence, but later descendants had still further ennobled it. Andrea dei Pazzi was a contemporary of Cosimo dei Medici, the friend and agent of King Rene of Provence, from whom he received the dignity of knighthood. Under Cosimo's regime the family repudiated its nobility and became enrolled among the burghers, thus becoming qualified for pohtical office. Piero dei Pazzi, Andrea's son, yielding to the influence of Niccolo Niccoli, devoted himself to humanistic studies, became the glass of fashion, the darling of Florence. To great accomplishments he added business capacity of a high order. His great wealth enabled him to gratify to the full his tastes as a man of culture and his passion for liberality and magnificence. His friendly relations with the Medici are attested by the marriage of his nephew, Guglielmo, to Bianca, daughter of Piero dei Medici, and sister of Lorenzo. The Pazzi, in fact, were within the inner ring of powerful Medici adherents, and seemed, and indeed for some time were, devoted to the interests of the Medici ascendancy. The Pazzi and the Medici were, it is true, commercial rivals. At Rome particularly the Pazzi Bank, under the management of Francesco dei Pazzi, was a hot competitor against the Medici Bank under Giovanni Tornabuoni. This competition assumed the form of personal antagonism in 1474 when the Pazzi advanced to the Pope the purchase- money for Imola in the face of Lorenzo's efforts to thwart the Papal pohcy by raising financial difficulties. The strain doubtless became more acute when vSixtus deprived the THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 185 Medici of the advantage of being the Papal bankers, and conferred it upon the Pazzi. But this state of tension reflected certain private and pubHc grievances under which Francesco Pazzi, and possibly other members of the family, beUeved themselves to be suffering. The anomalous and undefined position which Lorenzo held in the government of Florence rendered him liable at all times to incur the jealousy and discontent of powerful families, which, though attached generally to the Medician system, yet were of opinion that the system itself implied an oligarchy, and not the supremacy of a single individual. Lorenzo's view on the contrary was that the will of one man must ultimately prevail, and thus all his measures were directed to securing the final voice in the dis- position of affairs. Thinking it dangerous to himself and to the State to permit any real authority to remain in the hands of those who were not entirely dependent on himself, it is certainly probable that he sought to depress the pohtical influence of great famihes which might possibly stand out as rivals for power. Acting on this principle, Lorenzo was careful to prevent any of the great offices of State from falling into the hands of the Pazzi, and therefore, says Macchiavelh, the Pazzi were angry, in that their claims to pohtical distinction, however strong, were invariably set aside, and Lorenzo feared the Pazzi in proportion to the anger which his own conduct had aroused. Contemporary authorities, however, differ so much in accordance with their private and political prejudices that it is not easy to be sure of the actual facts of the case. Poliziano, in opposition to Macchiavelli, declares that the Pazzi family were universally unpopular by reason of their insolence and avarice, that Jacopo Pazzi, the head of the house, sweated his workpeople and frequently did not pay them at all, and therefore that he was generally hated, nor had he, nor his ancestors, at any time enjoyed any popularity in Florence. If this be true it would scarcely have been worth Lorenzo's while to take any particular care to ex- clude the family from the exercise of political power. In the case of Francesco Pazzi, Jacopo's nephew, Poh- i86 LORENZO DEI MEDICI ziano admits that " being a man of great arrogance and pretensions," he never could understand why the Medici were preferred to himself, that he lost no opportunity of traducing them, and that he lived chiefly at Rome because there was no room for him in Florence while the Medici were there. There can be no reasonable doubt that political motives played some part in producing the animosity of the Pazzi towards the Medici, but private grievances were probably more powerful incentives. Of these by far the most important was the question of an inheritance of which the Pazzi believed themselves to have been deprived by the direct and interested action of Lorenzo. Macchiavelli has told us that a man is more affected by the loss of his patrimonial estate than by that of his paternal relative. Financial quarrels between people closely related are often the most deadly of all. Giovanni dei Pazzi, Francesco's brother, was married to Beatrice Borromeo. As her father, Giovanni Borromeo, died leaving no will, his property should have passed to her in accordance with the existing law. Her claims, however, were contested by Borromeo's nephews who were close friends of the Medici. By the action of Lorenzo, as it is said, a retrospective law of intestacy was passed in 1476, under which the claims of females to the property of a father who had died intestate were set aside, the estate passing to male collaterals. Nardi, in his ' ' Storia Fiorentina," comments severely upon the circumstances under which this law was passed, being as he says, " a law made for the occasion, and applying to the past, contrary to custom, and to the just tenor of laws, which should apply to the future." Nardi therefore corroborates Macchiavelli's account of the affair. Guicciardini is equally precise. Roscoe, however, maintains that the law was passed more than ten years before, in the time of Piero dei Medici, when Lorenzo was absent from Florence, when, moreover, he was not in a position, had he been at home, to exercise any material influence upon legislation. In support of this assertion, Roscoe brings forward a letter written to THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 187 Lorenzo by Luigi Pulci on April 22, 1465. In this letter, however, though there is an obscure allusion to the Bor- romei, there is nothing which can lead us to suppose that Luigi Pulci is referring to any intestacy law which had been passed in opposition to the interests of any member of the family. This letter being the only proof which Roscoe can bring forward in exoneration of Lorenzo, the defence falls to the ground. It was so much in accordance with Lorenzo's policy to intervene in private matters — questions of in- heritance, marriage and the like — that his interference in a case of this kind is, on the face of it, probable. Macchia- velli's statement is precise that, not only did the Pazzi recognise the hand of Lorenzo in this act of injustice, but that even Giuliano dei Medici thought his brother was going too far, and expressed his fears that by grasping at too much they might lose all. Whatever the causes of their enmity, however, it is un- likely that the Pazzi would have carried animosity to the point of conspiracy and assassination unless they had been goaded by a stimulus applied from without. There can be little doubt that the true villain of the piece was Girolamo Riario, the Pope's nephew. He had already secured the lordship over Imola, and was anxious to extend his sovereignty in the directions of Forli and Faenza. The serious illness of Carlo Manfredi of Faenza seemed to offer favourable opportunities. Manfredi already felt himself to have been grossly injured by Riario in the matter of Imola, of which he had been dispossessed, and his personal interest in keeping Riario out of Faenza harmonised with the public interest of Florence to prevent any further extensions of the Papal Power in Romagna. Riario therefore, identify- ing Florence with Lorenzo, regarded him as a personal enemy and the chief obstacle in the way of his ambitions. To get rid of the Medici altogether, and effect a complete revolution in the government of Florence, seemed to him the best way of accomplishing his own projects. Being, moreover, well aware of the sentiments of Francesco dei Pazzi towards Lorenzo, Riario saw in him a convenient instrument to serve his purposes. i88 LORENZO DEI MEDICI The various grievances which the Pope had against Lorenzo have already been seen. A revolution in Florence, resulting in the overthrow of the Medici, was a prospect which could not fail to be congenial to him. But how far he would approve of extreme measures involving the violent removal, perhaps the death, of Lorenzo and Giuliano, was another question. Riario felt the necessity of proceeding cautiously. His first step was to approach Francesco dei Pazzi, who, burning with resentment against Lorenzo, jumped at the opportunity of associating so powerful a man as Riario with his undefined schemes against the Medici ascendency. While Girolamo was in fact using him, it is quite possible that Francesco imagined he was using Girolamo. They determined to work together, each for his own purposes, while pretending to serve a common cause : they were soon deep in schemes by which they might attain their ends. It was speedily clear that their enterprise, must be two- fold in its character. They must get rid of the Medici, and thus the assassination of the tv/o brothers was one part of the scheme. But this in itself was not enough. To effect a revolution in the State it was necessary that they should be in a position to support assassination by the assistance of an armed force operating against Florence from without, at the moment when the city was thrown into confusion, was least expecting an attack, and was least prepared to meet it. This twofold scheme involved a double set of agents, one to organise the murders, the other to muster the foreign levies. Thus it became necessary to seek numerous accom- plices. One was ready to hand in Rome in the person of Francesco Salviati, the aggrieved Archbishop of Pisa. Poliziano's picture of Salviati is a black one. He describes him as a man, " as Gods and men well know," who was ignorant of and despised all law, human and divine ; a man of infamous character, stained with every crime, sunk in luxury and profligacy, a gambler and a sycophant, but bold, prompt, cunning and insolent. At an earlier period, how- ever, Poliziano had himself covered Salviati with slavish THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY adulation, and the opinion which he subsequently enter- tained of the Archbishop was coloured by the part which Salviati played in the conspiracy. No sooner was the Archbishop approached than he threw himself eagerly into the schemes of Girolamo and Francesco, and his conduct throughout the business rather bears out the estimate of him which Poliziano has given. These three held secret interviews in Rome, where they agreed that nothing could be done in the way of assassination without the co-operation of Jacopo dei Pazzi in Florence, nor could anything be done in the way of a revolution without the consent and co-operation of the Pope. When first the enterprise was broached to Jacopo he gave no encouragement, declaring that nothing but evil to themselves was likely to result. Though by no means friendly to the Medici ascendency, yet he was on good terms with Lorenzo, as is shown by letters, written in 1474, in which Pazzi expresses his indebtedness to Lorenzo for favours received, and his hopes that a good understanding may be maintained between them. There is nothing to show that he was animated by anything Hke the blind resentment which actuated Francesco. He was, moreover, by this time an old man, and though still a desperate gambler who could not keep his temper when he lost, he wanted to live a quiet life, and was shrewd enough to know that public feeling in Florence would be altogether against any project of removing the Medici brothers. The thing in fact, in his opinion, could not be done, and therefore it should not be attempted. He was averse from the plan even if there were any reasonable chances of success, but in his opinion there were no such chances. The principals at Rome, therefore, resolved to hasten those proceedings which aimed at the enlistment of foreign levies, believing that, if they could show to Jacopo the cer- tainty of strong military support from outside, he would be convinced that the plan was feasible, and therefore would personally support it. To this end the conspirators approached Giovanni Battista di Montesecco, a condottiere in the Papal service, who had 190 LORENZO DEI MEDICI had much experience in war ; a plain blunt man, who, though he would not shrink from murder if it came in the way of duty, yet had no love of murder for the sake of it : he was by no means a professional cut-throat, but a man of some family and distinction, possessing the military virtues of prompti- tude, courage, and decision in a marked degree. This at any rate is the impression conveyed by his lengthy and circumstantial " Confession," which is quite an unstudied document, conveying the impression of truth by its simplicity and directness. The task of sounding Montesecco was undertaken by Francesco Pazzi and the Archbishop. Having heard their proposals he declared that he was in the service of the Pope and Count Girolamo, and therefore was not in a position to give his assistance to any private and unofficial enterprise. The reply was that they were acting in the interest of the Pope and the Count, and they explained to him that the Count's projects were constantly thwarted by Lorenzo's hostihty ; that as long as Lorenzo lived, Girolamo's govern- ment " was not worth a bean." At Montesecco's request they detailed the reasons of this hostility, and in the end the soldier agreed that he would act in the matter in accord- ance with Girolamo's instructions. On a later day Montesecco was summoned by the Count into his chamber whither the Archbishop had preceded him. Girolamo asked for his opinion upon the project which the Archbishop had unfolded, but Montesecco refused to give any opinion until he knew the means that they proposed to adopt. Both of them then waxed eloquent upon the male- volence of Lorenzo towards them, upon the many injuries they had received at his hands. Montesecco, however, drew a clear distinction between their grievances and the methods by which they might be redressed. He would say nothing till their plans were definitely laid before him. They then declared that the only means possible were to assassinate Lorenzo and Giuliano, supporting the act of murder by gathering men-at-arms who should secure the city as soon as the deed was done. By these means a successful revolution could be carried out in Florence, and, THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 191 to quiet his scruples, Montesecco was assured that the Medici rule was uncongenial ; that the Pazzi and the Sal- viati had such influence and popularity that they could draw half Florence after them, and that Montesecco therefore had no cause to shrink from assisting an enterprise the success of which would be welcomed by the Florentines themselves. Montesecco knew Httle about politics, but what he now heard by no means tallied with his previous impressions. He had always understood that Lorenzo had a great following in Florence, and that those who would oppose him were putting their hands to what he called " a big affair." " My Lords," he said, "look to what you do, for Florence is a big affair." Upon this, the Count and the Archbishop in turn assured him that he was mistaken. If the Medici were dead, every one in Florence would lift up hands of gratitude to Heaven, for they were held in much ill-will, " We know," said the Archbishop, " the position of affairs in Florence a great deal better than you do : there is no more doubt that the thing will succeed than that we are here. The first essential is to secure Messer Jacopo dei Pazzi who at present is colder than a block of ice : when we have him, the thing is done." Montesecco's next inquiries were as to the attitude of the Pope. He was primarily the servant of the Pope and would do nothing without full assurances of the Pope's sanction. They declared that the Pope desired this more than any one else : that Lorenzo had incurred the full measure of his ill-will, and that Sixtus moreover would certainly be ready to approve of anything which the Count and the Archbishop desired. They had already spoken to the Pope and made sure of him, but they would go further and arrange an interview, when Montesecco should hear from the Pope's own mouth his views and wishes in regard to the project. With these assurances Montesecco expressed himself content, and pending the promised interview, was prepared to go forward with the scheme for securing the necessary military forces. Among the mercenary Captains who were at that time in the service, or at the disposal, of Girolamo Riario were 192 LORENZO DEI MEDICI Gian Francesco Gonzaga of Tolentino, Napoleone Orsini, and Lorenzo Giustini of Citta di Castello, the rival of the Vitelli, and therefore the natural enemy of Lorenzo dei Medici. It was arranged that Napoleone should march his contingent into Todi and Perugia ; Giustini should hold himself in readiness in his own city, and Gian Francesco in the neighbourhood of Imola. Montesecco was commissioned to go into Romagna in order to superintend these dispositions. At the same time he was entrusted by Girolamo with a mission to Lorenzo himself in Florence with the object apparently of putting him completely off his guard by treacherous assurances of the Count's goodwill and affection. Montesecco gives a particular account of his interview with Lorenzo. He appeared dressed in mourning for the loss of an Orsini relative, and Montesecco was surprised at the warm and friendly expressions which he used in speaking of Riario. No father, no brother could have spoken of him with more affection, " so that I began to wonder, after what I had heard from others, at finding him so well disposed." Lorenzo rode back to town v/ith Montesecco— the interview took place in the villa of Caffagiuolo — engaging him in familiar and friendly conversation. The soldier felt that the job he had undertaken would go much against the grain. In Florence Montesecco took up his quarters in the Inn della Campagna, and there he had a private interview with Jacopo dei Pazzi. Having read the letters of credit ad- dressed to him by Riario and the Archbishop, Jacopo im- patiently declared that he wished to hear no more about the matter. ** They are going to break their necks," he said. " I understand our affairs here better than they do. I do not wish to listen to you." At this point Montesecco introduced the name of the Pope, and related what had occurred when he met the Pope in company with Riario and the Archbishop. This part of his relation therefore has a pecuHar interest, for it is the chief source from which we can form an opinion as to the Pope's complicity in the details of the conspiracy, Sixtus assured Montesecco, according to the latter's state- ment to Jacopo, that it would be agreeable to him that THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 193 " this matter of Florence " should be taken speedily in hand, " this matter " having at this point a clear reference to the accomplishment of a revolution in Florence by means of foreign troops. But the Pope would have no assassina- tions. He did not wish the death of any one. " ' But, said Montesecco, ' this matter. Holy Father, may turn out ill without the death of Lorenzo and Giuliano, and perhaps of others.' His Hohness rephed, ' I do not wish the death of any one on any account since it is not in accord with our Office to consent to the death of any one. Though Lorenzo is a villain, and conducts himself ill towards us, yet we do not on any account desire his death, but only a change in the government.' The Count replied, ' All that we can do shall be done that this may not happen : but should it happen. Your Holiness will pardon him who did it ? ' The Pope rephed to the Count, ' You are a beast. I tell you I do not desire the death of any one, but only a change in the government. And I say to you, Gian Battista, that I strongly desire that a change should take place in the govern- ment of Florence, and that it should be removed from the hands of Lorenzo, who is a villain and a caitiff, who does not esteem us. From the moment that he be out of Florence we could do whatever we wish with that State, and that would be very pleasing to us.' The Count and the Arch- bishop then said, ' Your Holiness speaks true. Be content therefore that we shall do everything possible to effect this end.' ' I tell you,' rephed the Pope, ' I will not have it. Go, and do what you wish, provided there be no killing.' With this we rose up from before his presence, and His Holiness ended by saying that he would be content to give every assistance by way of men-at-arms or otherwise as might be necessary.' The Archbishop thereupon brought the interview to an end by saying, ' Holy Father, be content that we should steer this ship, and that we will steer it well.' And our Lord said, ' I am content.' Thereupon the Count, the Archbishop, and Montesecco withdrew into Riario's private room where details were discussed between them, the conclusion ultimately arrived at being that without the death of Lorenzo and Giuliano the thing could by no means N 194 LORENZO DEI MEDICI be done, and " though this would be to do ill, yet great affairs could not be carried out in any other way. " The impression left upon Jacopo dei Pazzi's mind by this narrative was that the enterprise had the Pope's tacit approval, and that by means of foreign troops it might be carried to a successful issue. From an opponent of the scheme Jacopo became an energetic, if tardy supporter. Several authorities agree that this change of view was the consequence of his conviction that the Pope was on the side of the conspiracy. Sixtus was prepared to support it actively with troops, and would turn a blind eye to murder, if murder should be found to be necessary. And this opinion corresponded with the subsequent facts. When assassination had done its work, the Pope, far from repudiat- ing thfe conspirators, only showed himself indignant against Florence which had punished the assassins. Every reader of Montesecco's Confession must draw his own conclusion as to the attitude and conduct of Sixtus. Some wiU find in it convincing proof that the Pope was not only not an accomplice in an assassination, but had ex- pressly forbidden his friends to compromise the good name of the Papacy by an act of murder. Others will find a tacit sanction conveyed under terms of protest and re- pudiation, Sixtus sufficiently knowing the character of his nephew to be aware that Riario was not the man to stick at trifles. That the Pope covered his tracks, and left a way open subsequently to dissociate himself from the violent courses which were adopted, is undoubtedly true. That he really believed the revolution could take place, and the removal of the Medici brothers from the government be accomplished without bloodshed is to credit Sixtus with more innocence and ignorance of the men and of the times than he can justly claim. The Pope may have imagined that he had saved his face but " a jury, it is to be feared would find Sixtus, in spite of his protestations, guilty as an accessory before the fact." From this sane conclusion of Armstrong it is not easy to find a way of escape. Montesecco was quite capable of arranging all matters connected with the raising of foreign troops, but for the THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 195 work of organising the details of the assassination it was felt that the presence of the Archbishop in Florence was imperatively required. The difRculties to be overcome were serious. Both the brothers must be despatched, for it was useless to kill one without the other ; but the opportunities for catching two men unawares are rare, and moreover the double murder required the services of several accomplices. Jacopo dei Pazzi urged that the deed must be done out of doors, and that each must be dealt with separately, though as far as possible simultaneously. There was a scheme afoot for the marriage of GiuHano to a daughter of Appiani of Piombino. One or other of the brothers would be going to Piombino to negotiate the terms, and a favourable chance would thus be offered, but as long as the two young Medici remained together in Florence, in Jacopo's opinion, no success was possible. Francesco on the contrary thought that they might be despatched together if only a time and place were selected when they would be least suspecting danger : in church for instance, or when they were playing cards. All that was needed, he said, was the mind to do the deed. In any event the first thing to do was to get the Arch- bishop to Florence, so that he might give good speed to everything, and assist operations by his advice. Monte- secco therefore went to Rome, where he related to Riario and the Archbishop all that had occurred. Salviati found the necessary excuse for a visit to Florence in the illness of Carlo Manfredi of Faenza. He could plausibly urge as a pretext that he wished to discuss with Lorenzo the affairs of Faenza in the event of Manfredi's death. Montesecco made his way to Imola to organise the military supports, and to give instructions as to the movements of the mercenaries. This done, he returned to Florence and had another interview with Jacopo and Francesco Pazzi in their villa at Montughi where he urged upon them the need for expedition if the movements of the troops were to coincide with the work which had to be done within the walls of Florence. They declared that their zeal required no spur but rather a bridle, but none the less, being unable at the 196 LORENZO DEI MEDICI moment to devise means to execute their purpose, they recommended that for a time the mihtary movements should be suspended until a favourable opportunity should arise. This was done, and for a time the business was dropped. The scene now changes again to Rome where, in the early days of 1478, the heads of the conspiracy were gathered together. The Captains of the mercenaries, Montesecco, Riario, Francesco Pazzi, were all there. Riario hit upon the expedient of inviting Lorenzo to Rome in order that he might have the opportunity of discussing with the Pope the various points at issue between Sixtus and himself. " I do not in the least doubt," says Riario in his letter to Lorenzo of January 15, " that the Holy Father will receive you with joy, while I, from the affection which I owe you from our friendly relations together, would behave so as fully to satisfy your Magnificence, and all grievances which may have arisen will disappear." In the expectation that Lorenzo would accept this friendly invitation, Riario assured Montesecco that the affair was in train. Lorenzo would come at Easter and would not be suffered to return. " Will you kill him ? " asked Montesecco. " Assuredly," replied the Count : "I do not wish that anything unpleasant should happen to any one here, but before he departs things must be so arranged that they shall turn out well." " Does our Lord (the Pope) know of this ? " " Certainly," he replied. " Diavolo," I said ; " it is a great thing that he should have consented." " Do you not know," added the Count, " that he will let us do whatever we wish ? It is sufficient that the thing should turn out well." Lorenzo however did not come to Rome, and it was necessary to fall back upon the original project of bringing the matter to an issue in Florence. Speed was now essential, for so many people had been admitted into the secret that there was danger that the conspiracy would leak out. Montesecco once more made his military arrangements, and the Archbishop in the meantime was active in Florence. The heads of the conspiracy in Florence itself were seven THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY 197 in number, reinforced by a few others who took a more or less active part in it. Of the original seven the three most prominent ringleaders were the Archbishop himself, and Jacopo and Francesco Pazzi. With them were associated two more Salviatis— one a brother of the Archbishop, and the other a kinsman. Each ol them bore the name of Jacopo. The sixth was Jacopo di Poggio Bracciolini, a son of the- famous Humanist who had been so closely attached to the Medici interest, and had received so many obligations from the family. Jacopo Bracciolini himself was a scholar of no mean attainments, remarkable, says Poliziano, for his eloquence and his knowledge of history, but a vain man who had squandered an ample patrimony and was deeply in debt. He had a passion for thinking evil of all men, and the Archbishop found in him a ready tool. The seventh was Bernardo Bandini, a man who, like Poggio, had dissi- pated his fortune, and had become an adventurer ready to seek his profit fronv any desperate enterprise. The savage ferocity which he displayed at the moment of action seems to justify the estimate of his general character which Poliziano has given to the world. In addition to the seven there was Montesecco, who, having completed his arrangements, was now in Florence, and two priests who associated themselves with the enterprise. Of these Antonio Maffei di Volterra acted a part in this brutal business which may ahnost be called respectable in that he was a Volterran, and imagined that he had the wrongs of his country to avenge upon Lorenzo. The other, Stefano da Bagnone, was a retainer of Jacopo Pazzi, occupy- ing in his house the position of tutor to Jacopo's natural daughter. There were two other members of the Pazzi family who shared the punishment which fell upon the house, but whose complicity in the conspiracy was doubtful. Renato dei Pazzi, son of Piero, was a scholar and something of a recluse, who certainly kept himself aloof from any active participation in the plot, though it is possible that he tacitly acquiesced in it. Guglielmo dei Pazzi was Francesco's brother, and LORENZO DEI MEDICI Lorenzo's brother-in-law. For years he had been intimately associated with the tournaments and festivities in which the Medici delighted, and was generally regarded as one of the family. The position was certainly a painful one which compelled him to take sides against his own family or that of his wife. Poliziano speaks of him as trying to sit on two seats at once. Such an endeavour was not unnatural in the circumstances, and PoHziano's intimate knowledge of the man justifies us in accepting his opinion of Guglielmo's attitude. It is true that a friend and hanger-on of Gughelmo, Napoleone Francesi, was reputed to be among the number of the conspirators, but Poliziano declares that he took not the least part in the business. THE PAZZI FAMILY Andrea dei Pazzi m. Caterina Salviati. Piero dei P. * Jacopo dei P. Antonio I m. ^ I I I I I I I Cosa di Alessandri. Antonio. Gio- An- Nic- Gal- Leo- Re- Bhp. of vanni. drea. colo, eotto. nardo. nato.* Mela- tensis. ♦Guglielmo Giovanni Francesco.* m. Bianca m. Beatrice dei Medici. Borromeo. The star marks the four members of the family who were implicated in the conspiracy. CHAPTER IX THE PLOT IN EXECUTION Cardinal Raffaelle Sansoni made a catspaw for the conspirators — The conspiracy culminates on Sunday, April 26, 1478 — In the Duomo — Montesecco's place as chief assassin taken by two priests — Lorenzo and Giuliano come to the Duomo — Assassination of Giuliano — Lorenzo is wounded and escapes — Salviati attempts to seize the Palazzo Publico — Jacopo dei Pazzi fails to raise the mob and escapes— Summary vengeance executed on the conspirators — Botticelli's frescoes on the Palazzo Publico — Bandini escapes to Constantinople, but is extradited and executed — Punishment of the Pazzi family — Capture and execution of Jacopo — Montesecco writes a confession and is executed — Release of Raffaelle Sansoni — Retirement of the Foreign troops from before Florence — General grief for Giuliano — His character — Ferocious decree against the name of Pazzi. EVERYTHING was now ready except a plan of action, but this must speedily be found if the plot was to remain secret. The effort to separate the brothers had failed, so they must be taken together. Francesco Pazzi's suggestion that a banquet, festival, or ecclesiastical solemnity would offer the best opportunity was, for want of a better, the plan which held the field. Such a plan was hkely to be materially assisted by the presence in Florence of some distinguished person in whose honour the Medici would exercise their well-known talent for hospitaUty and splendour. Girolamo Riario determined to make use of his young nephew, Raffaelle Sansoni, for this purpose, a youth of seventeen who had recently been created a Cardinal by his great-uncle, the Pope. The young Cardinal was pursuing his studies at Lorenzo's new Academy at Pisa : from Pisa he was summoned to Florence to be the guest of the Pazzi at their Montughi villa. Everything turned out according to expectations. Not a whisper of the conspiracy had reached Lorenzo. The letters which came to him from the young Cardinal were 199 200 LORENZO DEI MEDICI of a most friendly character, and an invitation that he would visit Lorenzo and Giuliano at their Fiesole villa foUowec in due course. On the appointed day Lorenzo rode from Florence to Fiesole, accompanied by his son Piero, and by Poliziano, but not by Giuliano. Giulano was ill and compelled to remain at home. The conspirators found their calculations upset once more. But they were immediately prepared with another scheme, exactly the same in character, end only involving a change in venue. The Cardinal, either on his own initiative or instructed by his mentors, expressed a strong desire to see the treasures of the Medici Palace in the Via Larga. He proposed Sunday, April 26, as a suitable day, when he would not only visit the Medici but also celebrate High Mass in the Duomo. This arrangement doubled the chances, for should the conspirators fail at the banquet, they might redeem their failure in the Cathedral. It was the Sunday before Ascension Day. High Mass was to be celebrated with great solemnity, and splendid preparations had been made at the Medici Palace to do honour to the Cardinal. Invitations to a banquet had been issued to the ambassadors of Naples, Milan, Ferrara, and to a distinguished company. At the last moment GiuHano sent word that he scarcely felt well enough to appear at a banquet, but would not fail to meet his guests in the Cathe- dral. A hurried conversation among the conspirators resulted in the determination to strike during the Celebra- tion. No moment could be more favourable, for then the brothers, being least likely to suspect danger, could most certainly be taken unawares. The parts were rapidly allotted. Francesco Pazzi andl Bernardo Bandini were to be responsible for GiuHano : the; Archbishop with his relatives and Poggio were to seize the Palazzo Publico, and rouse the city as soon as the deed was done. The murder of Lorenzo was entrusted to the; professional hands of Montesecco, for this was the most im- portant item on the programme. Here however an obstacle quite unforeseen, and out of all calculation, presented itself. Montesecco flatly refused to do murder in a church. At a THE PLOT IN EXECUTION 201 banquet he had no scruples, and though he had no grudge against Lorenzo, yet, as a soldier, Montesecco must obey his superiors : if assassination came within his duties he was prepared to go through with it in the recognised manner. But as a faithful son of the Church he was not prepared to commit sacrilege, nor could any claims of duty impose such a crime upon him. At this juncture the two priests, Maffei of Volterra and Stefano da Bagnone, stepped into the breach. They offered themselves as Lorenzo's assassins, for, being priests, they were accustomed to churches, and famiharity made them less susceptible to these mysterious influences which a lay- man might naturally feel. There was no alternative but to accept their offer, for it solved the difficulty as to the church, but while doing so, it created another ; for, being priests, Maffei and Stefano were possibly unskilled assassins, as indeed the event proved. On the Sunday morning the Cardmal Raffaelle rode into Florence and dismounted before the Medici Palace, where everything was in readiness for his reception. He was conducted upstairs to his apartments that he might change his dress and put on his ecclesiastical vestments. At the ioot of the staircase Lorenzo received him, and, accompanied by the Archbishop, they proceeded to the Duomo. At the door the Archbishop, who had other work to do, excused himself and Lorenzo conducted the Cardinal to the choir, wlhere he took his place before the High Altar. Lorenzo joined his friends in the ambulatory, a wide passage leading ro)und the choir, from which it was separated by Ghiberti's w^ooden screen work. All the conspirators appointed to do the work of assassination were at hand, and there was a very large congregation. Suddenly it was perceived that Giuliano was not present. Francesco Pazzi and Bandini thereupon hastened to the Palace to fetch him, and with some difficulty persuaded him to come with them. He was to all appearances quite unarmed, but the two traitors alffectionately passed their arms around him to make sure that he was not wearing a shirt of mail beneath his clothing, ome of them jocosely remarking that he seemed to have 202 LORENZO DEI MEDICI grown quite fat during his illness. On arrival at the Cathe- dral Giuliano made his way into the ambulatory, attended by a servant, the band of conspirators specially attached to him pressing close upon him. He took up his position on the southern side, close to the chapel of the Santa Croce, being separated from his brother by the full width of the choir. It is not certain what precise signal the assassins had agreed upon for the work to be begun. Some say the bell which rang at the moment when the Host was elevated was the signal. One authority says the Host had already been elevated. Valori and the Florentine Chancellor say that the moment chosen was when the Priest was breaking the Eucharistic wafer, others, when the Priest was himself receiving the elements; Poliziano states that the Priest had already communicated. Whatever may have been the precise moment, when it arrived Bandini drove his dagger with all his force into Giuliano's side with the cry, " Take that, traitor ! " The stricken man reeled full against Fran- cesco Pazzi, recovered himself, and staggered a few paces forward. Then he was set upon by Francesco with such fury that the assassin either wounded himself, or was seriously wounded, in the thigh in the melee which followed. Giuliano fell pierced by nineteen wounds. His servants in horror fled at the first sign of the onset. On the other side of the choir the two priests were neither so expeditious nor so successful. At the given moment Maffei raised his dagger, and, to steady himself, or make more sure of his aim, placed his hand upon Lorenzo's shoulder. Instantly turning round Lorenzo saw the blow just about to fall upon his throat. With extraordinary promptitude, and with a presence of mind which must have been instinctive, he wound his mantle around his left arm as he Hfted it to ward off the stroke, which only inflicted a sHght wound in the neck. Drawing his sword he leaped over the wooden screen into the choir, and rushing across it in front of the High Alt ar, where stood the trembhng Cardinal, he made for the doo»r behind it which led into the new Sacristy. But Bandini and Francesco had seen what had happened!. Leaving the mutilated body of Giuliano they dashed int