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THE 
 
 MEMORABILIA °>= SOCRATES 
 
 LITERALLY TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK 
 
 OF 
 
 XENOPHON 
 
 BY THE 
 
 KEV. J. S. WATSON, M.A., M.K.S.L. 
 
 With an Introduction by 
 EDWARD BROOKS, JR. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA 
 
 DAVID McKAY, Publisher 
 
 1022 Market Street 
 
Copyright, 1899, by David McKay 
 
 PRESS ΟΓ 
 
INTKODUCTIOK 
 
 Xenophon the Athenian historian and philosopher 
 was born about 444 b. c. and is said to have lived 
 to the age of ninety. His father, G-ryllus, was an 
 Athenian knight, a native of the Attic borough 
 Ercheia. It is quite probable that his means and 
 social standing were such that Xenophon was sup- 
 plied with all the advantages of education and cul- 
 ture which could be desired. 
 
 Principal among his instructors was the sage 
 3oci*ates. The meeting between the two has been 
 described as a chance or accident. Xenophon was 
 [walking along a narrow street one day, when sud- 
 denly Socrates appeared, and blocking the way, 
 asked the question where men were made honor- 
 able and good. Xenophon, being at a loss for an 
 ianswer, the latter replied : "Follow me, and find 
 but," and from this time on a sincere and devoted 
 friendship sprang up between them. 
 
 Another story of their meeting is that, when 
 about twenty years of age, Xenophon having de- 
 termined upon a military career for himself, was 
 present at the battle of Delium. In the flight 
 which took place after the battle Xenophon is said 
 bo have fallen from his horse and been carried to a 
 place of safety on the shoulders of Socrates. 
 
 ν 
 
vi. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Little is known of the early life of Xenophon. 
 About the age of forty-three his friend Proxenus, 
 who was then at Sardis, having raised a band of 
 mercenaries and entered the service of Cyrus the 
 Younger, brother of the Persian king, Artaxerxes, 
 begged Xenophon to join him in what was supposed 
 to be an expedition against the Psidians. Xeno- 
 phon, being anxious to go, but hesitating as to the 
 propriety of entering a foreign service, asked advice 
 of Socrates who suggested that he had better consult 
 an oracle. To Delphi Xenophon accordingly betook 
 himself for advice as to the success of the expedition. 
 Being bent on joining his friend, however, he did 
 not ask the question directly, but merely requested 
 to know to what gods he should sacrifice in order 
 to insure a successful outcome. On receiving the 
 reply of the oracle he acted in accordance there- 
 with, performed the sacred rites and then pro- 
 ceeded to Sardis, where he joined Proxenus. 
 
 The real object of this expedition, which was 
 an attack upon Artaxerxes, the Persian king, was; 
 soon revealed, but not before it was too late to turn 
 back. So Xenophon accompanied it in its tedious 
 march toward Babylon until within fifty miles of 
 the Persian capital, where, in the plain of Cunaxa 
 a fierce battle was fought, which resulted in the 
 death of Cyrus. 
 
 The Greeks then held parley with Artaxerxes and 
 decided, upon his promise to give them safe con- 
 duct, to return to their country. Accordingly un- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 vii 
 
 ler the escort of Tissaphernes they set out for home. 
 Dpon reaching the river Zabatus, Tissaphernes, 
 through treachery, put to death their leader Clear- 
 chus and five other generals, among whom was 
 Proxenus, together with a number of captains. 
 In this emergency Xenophon came forward and 
 urged his countrymen to select other generals who 
 might lead them home in safety. This advice was 
 followed, Xenophon himself being chosen to fill the 
 place of Proxenus. Not daring to return by the 
 route they had come, they followed the course of the 
 river Tigris and across the high lands of Armenia 
 to Trebizond, a Greek colony on the southeast coast 
 of the Black Sea, and thence to a place called 
 Chrysopolis, which is opposite to what is now Con- 
 stantinople. Here the Greeks found themselves in 
 sore distress on account of lack of money and pro- 
 visions. They therefore readily accepted a prop- 
 osition offered them by Seuthes, king of Thrace, to 
 assist him in fighting to regain his lost sovereignty. 
 The Greeks performed their part of the agreement, 
 but Seuthes failed to live up to his part, and it was 
 I with the greatest of difficulty that Xenophon finally 
 obtained from him only a portion of the promised 
 reward. Being still in want an expedition was 
 planned into the plain of Caicus, where they seized 
 the house of a wealthy Persian and obtained con- 
 siderable treasure, of which Xenophon obtained a 
 due portion. 
 
 On account of his participation in the expedition 
 
viii 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 against Artaxerxes a decree of banishment was 
 passed by the Athenians against Xenophon. He 
 accordingly remained in Asia Minor, and probably 
 joined Agesilaus, King of Sparta, in his expedition 
 into the former country. Returning with Agesi- 
 laus he took part in the battle of Chaeronea against 
 his own countrymen. Some say it was for this 
 offense that he was banished by the Athenians. At 
 any rate he subsequently took up his residence at 
 Scillus in Elis, not far from Olympia. Here he 
 dwelt in a home given to him by the Spartans along 
 with his wife and children, who joined him there. 
 He spent most of his time in writing the works 
 which have handed down his name to posterity, and 
 for recreation indulged in hunting and entertaining 
 his friends. 
 
 Upon the defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra and 
 the consequent loss of their ascendency, he was 
 driven from Scillus by the Eleans, and is supposed 
 to have taken up his residence in Corinth, where he 
 died sometime after 357 B. c. 
 
 Xenophon's writings may be divided into four 
 classes : 1, Historical ; 2, Didactic ; 3, Political, and 
 4, Philosophical. His historical works are the An- 
 abasis, which describes the expedition against Ar- 
 taxerxes ; the Cyropaedia, a story of the early life of 
 Cyrus ; the Hellenics, a continuation of the history 
 of the Peloponnesian War and the Life of Agesi- 
 laus. His didactic writings consist of a treatise on 
 Horsemanship and one on Hunting. His political 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ix 
 
 compositions are a work on the Constitution of 
 Sparta and Athens, and a work on the Revenues of 
 Attica. Among his philosophical works are the 
 Memorabilia of Socrates, which is translated in the 
 following pages. His other philosophical writings 
 are the Apology of Socrates, which purports to con- 
 tain Socrates' plea to his judges ; the Symposium, 
 an account of a festive meeting which Socrates 
 attended ; the Oeconomicus, a treatise on domestic 
 duties, and the Hiero, a fictitious dialogue between 
 the tyrant of Syracuse and Simonides. 
 
 The Memorabilia of Socrates, as its name indi- 
 cates, consists of a series of personal recollections of 
 Socrates. It has been called an affectionate tribute 
 of an admiring pupil, and contains a full vindica- 
 tion of Socrates' life and teachings, and although it 
 can hardly be considered a masterpiece, it is an 
 honest piece of work, and probably faithfully de- 
 scribes the merits and eccentricities of the philoso- 
 pher's manner of life. 
 
 1* 
 
XENOPHOFS 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCEATES. 
 
 BOOK i. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The two charges on which Socrates was condemned to death by 
 the Athenians, sect. 1. The first charge refuted by several argu- 
 ments ; for Socrates used to sacrifice to the gods. 2 ; he prac- 
 ticed divination, and his dcemon was no new god, 2-5 ; he 
 recommended that the gods should be consulted by man in per- 
 plexing circumstances, 6-9 ; he was guilty of no impiety, he 
 avoided vain speculations respecting the gods, and said that the 
 business of philosophy was the study of virtue, 1C-17 ; his life 
 was in accordance with the precepts of morality, 18-20. 
 
 1. I have often wondered by what arguments the ac- 
 cusers 1 of Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he de- 
 served death from the state ; for the indictment against 
 him was to this effect : Socrates offends against 
 
 THE LAWS IN NOT PAYING RESPECT 2 TO THOSE GODS WHOM 
 
 1 Plato, in his Apology of Socrates, mentions his accusers by 
 name : Meletus. a bad author of tragedies and songs (see Aristoph. 
 Ran. 1302, and the Scholiast) ; Anytus, who was a tanner or currier, 
 as appears from Xen. Apol. sect. 29, illustrated by the industry of 
 Bornemann, p. 72, ed. 1824, and p. 350, ed. 1829; and Lyco. an 
 orator, to whom allusion seems to be made in Aristoph. Vesp. 
 1301. Kiihner. 
 
 2 Ού νομίζων .] Νομίζΐίν deoii? is deos more publico (τω νόμω) receptos 
 colere. . . . Hence oi νενομίσμένεοι #eol are the gods publicly ac- 
 knowledged and worshipped. Kiihner. 
 
 ( " ) 
 
12 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 THE CITY RESPECTS, AND INTRODUCING OTHER NEW 
 DEITIES J HE ALSO OFFENDS AGAINST THE LAWS IN COR- 
 RUPTING THE YOUTH. 
 
 2. In the first place, that he did not respect the gods 
 ιυΐιοηι the city respects, what proof did they bring? For 
 he was seen frequently sacrificing at home, and fre- 
 quently on the public altars of the city ; nor was it 
 unknown that he used divination ; as it was a common 
 subject of talk that "Socrates used to say that the 
 divinity instructed him ; " and it was from this circum- 
 stance, indeed, that they seem chiefly to have derived 
 the charge of introducing new deities. 
 
 3. He however introduced nothing newer than those 
 who, practising divination, consult auguries, voices, 1 
 omens, and sacrifices ; for they do not imagine that 
 birds, or people who meet them, know what is advan- 
 tageous for those seeking presages, but that the gods, 
 by their means, signify what will be so ; and such was 
 the opinion that Socrates entertained. 
 
 4. Most people say that they are diverted from an 
 object, or prompted to it, by birds, or by the people 
 who meet them ; but Socrates spoke as he thought, for 
 he said it was the divinity that was his monitor. He 
 also told many of his friends to do certain things, and 
 not to do others, intimating that the divinity had fore- 
 warned him ; and advantage attended those who obeyed 
 his suggestions, but repentance those who disregarded 
 them. 
 
 5. Yet who would not acknowledge that Socrates 
 wished to appear to his friends neither a fool nor a 
 boaster? But he would have seemed to be both, if, 
 after saying that intimations were given him by a god, 
 he had then been proved guilty of falsehood. It is 
 manifest, therefore, that he would have uttered no 
 predictions, if he had not trusted that they would 
 prove true. But who, in such matters, would trust to 
 
 1 Φημαις.] φτ)μη, an omen taken from the voices of men. See 
 Cicero de Div. i. 45. 102 ; where it is said that the Pythagoreans 
 observed not only the voices of the gods, but also those of men, 
 and called the signs from them omina. See Eustath, ad, II. κ', 
 
 & 790; Xen. Apol. 12; Bornemann ad Apol. 18, p. 51, ed. 1824; 
 erbst on Sympos. iv. 48, and on this passage. Kuhner. 
 
ch. ι., s. 8.] ON CONSULTING THE GODS. 13 
 
 any one but a god ? And how could he, who trusted 
 the gods, think that there were no gods? 1 
 
 6. He also acted toward his friends according to his 
 convictions, for he recommended them to perform 
 affairs of necessary consequence 2 in such a manner as 
 he thought that they would be best managed : but con- 
 cerning those of which it was doubtful how they would 
 terminate, he sent them to take auguries whether they 
 should be done or not. 
 
 7. Those who would govern families or cities well, 
 he said, had need of divination ; for to become skil- 
 ful in architecture, or working in brass, or agri- 
 culture, or in commanding men, or to become a critic 
 in any such arts. 3 or a good reasoner, or a skilful reg- 
 ulator of a household, or a well-qualified general, he 
 considered as wholly matters of learning, and left to 
 the choice of the human understanding. 
 
 8. But he said that the gods reserved to themselves the 
 most important particulars attending such matters, of 
 which nothing was apparent to men ; for neither was 
 it certain to him who had sown his field well, who 
 should reap the fruit of it ; nor certain to him who had 
 built a house well, who should inhabit it ; nor certain 
 to him who was skilled in generalship, whether it 
 would be for his advantage to act as a general ; nor 
 certain to him who was versed in political affairs, 
 whether it would be for his profit to be at the head of 
 the state ; nor certain to him who had married a beau- 
 tiful wife in hopes of happiness, whether he should not 
 
 1 τίως ουκ eivai deois ϊνόμιζίν ;] Xenophon here goes out of his line 
 of argument, and introduces a new point, which is not given in the 
 charge against Socrates as it stands in sect. 1. He there says that 
 Socrates was accused of introducing new gods, not of denying that 
 there were gods. Plato, in his Apology, p. 36, C, has made a far 
 more accurate distinction between these two points of accusation. 
 Kiihner. It is observable, that if eivai were omitted, the question 
 would be in accordance with the accusation : " How could he, who 
 trusted in the gods, not pay respect to the gods ? " 
 
 2 Τά άκογκαΐα.] Things of which the event is certain, because 
 necessary, as Ernesti interprets. Schneider. . 
 
 8 Τών τοιουτωκ epyoiv ef (τασηκόν.] "Εξεταστικός appears to Slgnity 
 one who can point out the merits and defects in works, though he 
 himself could not execute anything better than what he criticises ; 
 a man of theory, not of practice. Weiske. 
 
14 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 incur misery by her means ; nor certain to him who 
 had acquired powerful connections in the state, whether 
 he might not be banished by them. 
 
 9. And those who thought that none of these things 
 depended on the gods, but that all were dependent on the 
 human understanding, he pronounced to be insane ; as 
 he also pronounced those to be insane who had recourse 
 to omens respecting matters which the gods had granted 
 to men to discover by the exercise of their faculties ; as 
 if, for instance, a man should inquire whether it would 
 be better to take for the driver of his chariot one who 
 knows how to drive, or one who does not know ; or 
 whether it would be better to place over his ship one 
 who knows how to steer it, or one who does not know ; 
 or if men should ask respecting matters which they 
 may learn by counting, or measuring, or weighing ; for 
 those who inquired of the gods concerning such matters 
 he thought guilty of impiety, and said that it was the 
 duty of men to learn whatever the gods had enabled 
 them to do by learning, and to try to ascertain from 
 the gods by augury whatever was obscure to men ; as 
 the gods always afford information to those to whom 
 they are rendered propitious. 
 
 10. He was constantly in public, for he went in the 
 morning to the places for walking and the gymnasia ; 
 at the time when the market was full 1 he was to be 
 seen there ; and the rest of the day he was where he 
 was likely to meet the greatest number of people ; he 
 was generally engaged in discourse, and all who pleased 
 were at liberty to hear him. 
 
 11. Yet no one ever either saw Socrates doing, or 
 heard him saying, anything impious or profane ; for 
 he did not dispute about the nature of things as most 
 other philosophers disputed, 2 speculating how that 
 
 1 ΧΙληΟούση^ ά-yopSs.] See note on Anab. i. 8. 1. 
 
 2 That Socrates used at times to discuss physical subjects, appears 
 from Xenophon himself (see c. 4. and Symp. vi. 6), as well as from 
 Plato's Apology and Phsedo, c. 46, and Diog. Laert. ii. 45 ; but he 
 pursued a different method from that of other philosophers in such 
 discussions ; for, abstaining from subtle and useless inquiries as to 
 the origin of things, the courses of the heavenly bodies, and other 
 obscure topics, he directed his inquiries to the consideration of the 
 
C. I., s. 15.] ON THE PHILOSOPHERS. 15 
 
 which is called by sophists the world was produced, and 
 by what necessary laws everything in the heavens 
 is effected, but endeavored to show that those who 
 chose such subjects of contemplation were foolish. 
 
 12. And used in the first place to inquire of them 
 whether they thought that they already knew sufficient 
 of human affairs, and therefore proceeded to such sub- 
 jects of meditation, or whether, when they neglected 
 human affairs entirely, and speculated on celestial 
 matters, they thought that they were doing what be- 
 came them. 
 
 13. He wondered, too, that it was not apparent to 
 them that it is impossible for man to satisfy himself on 
 such points, since even those who pride themselves 
 most on discussing them, do not hold the same opinions 
 one with another, but are compared with each other, 
 like madmen. 
 
 14. For of madmen some have no fear of what is to 
 be feared, and others fear what is not to be feared ; 
 some think it no shame to say or do anything what- 
 ever before men, and others think that they ought not 
 to go among men at all ; some pay no respect to temple, 
 or altar, or anything dedicated to the gods, and others 
 worship stones, and common stocks, and beasts : so of 
 those who speculate on the nature of the universe, 
 some imagine that all that exists is one, others that 
 there are worlds infinite in number ; some that all 
 things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing is 
 ever moved ; some that all things are generated and 
 decay, and others that nothing is either generated or 
 decays. 
 
 15. He would ask, also, concerning such philosophers, 
 whether, as those who have learned arts practiced by 
 men, expect that they will be able to carry into effect 
 what they have learned, either for themselves, or for 
 any one else whom they may wish, so those who in- 
 quire into celestial things, imagine that, when they 
 have discovered by what laws everything is effected, 
 
 divine power, the nature of man, the connection of the human with 
 the divine nature, and the government of the world by divine in- 
 fluence. Kiihner. 
 
l6 MEMORABILIA .OF SOCRATES. [b. | 
 
 they will be able to produce, whenever they please, 
 wind, rain, changes of the seasons, and whatever else 
 of that sort they may desire, or whether they have no 
 such expectation, but are content merely to know how 
 everything of that nature is generated. 
 
 16. Such were the observations which he made about 
 those who busied themselves in such speculations ; but 
 for himself, he would hold discourse, from time to time, 
 on what concerned mankind, considering what was 
 pious, what impious ; what was becoming, what un- 
 becoming ; what was just, what unjust ; what was 
 sanity, what insanity ; what was fortitude, what 
 cowardice ; what a state was, and what the character of 
 a statesman ; what was the nature of government 
 over men, and the qualities of one skilled in governing 
 them ; and touching on other subjects, with which he 
 thought that those who were acquainted were men of 
 worth and estimation, but that those who were ignorant 
 of them might justly be deemed no better than slaves. 
 
 17. As to those matters, then, on which Socrates 
 gave no intimation what his sentiments were, it is not 
 at all wonderful that his judges should have decided 
 erroneously concerning him ; but is it not wonderful 
 that they should have taken no a.ccount of such things 
 as all men knew ? 
 
 18. For when he was a member of the senate, and had 
 taken the senator's oath, in which it was expressed that 
 he would vote in accordance with the laws, he, being 
 president in the assembly of the people when they were 
 eager to put to death Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and all 
 the nine generals, by a single vote contrary to the law, 
 refused, 1 though the multitude were enraged at him, 
 and many of those in power uttered threats against 
 him, to put the question to the vote, but considered it 
 of more importance to observe his oath than to gratify 
 the people contrary to what was right, or to seek safety 
 against those who menaced him. 
 
 19. For he thought that the gods paid regard to men, 
 not in the way in which some people suppose, who 
 imagine that the gods know some things and do not 
 
 1 See Xen. Hell. i. 7, especially sect. 15. 
 
ϊ. ιι., s. 2.] PRINCIPLES OF SOCRATES. 17 
 
 mow others, but he considered that the gods know all 
 ihings, both what is said, what is done, and what is 
 neditated in silence, and are present everywhere, 
 md give admonitions to men concerning everything 
 mman. 
 
 20. I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians were ever 
 persuaded that Socrates had not right sentiments con- 
 cerning the gods ; a man who never said or did any 
 thing impious toward the gods, but spoke and acted in 
 such a manner with respect to them, that any other 
 who had spoken and acted in the same manner, would 
 have been, and have been considered, eminently pious. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Reply to the other charge against Socrates. He did not corrupt 
 the youth, for his whole teaching dissuaded them from vice, and 
 encouraged them to temperance and virtue of every kind, sect. 
 1-8. He exhorted them to obey the laws, 9-11. If Critias and 
 Alcibiades, who listened to his discourses, became corrupt, the 
 fault was not his, 12-28 ; he endeavored to reclaim them, till they 
 deserted him ; and others, who resigned themselves wholly to 
 his instructions, became virtuous and honorable men, 28-48. 
 Other frivolous assertions refuted, 49-60. His benevolence, 
 disinterestedness, and general merits, 61-64. 
 
 1. It also seems wonderful to me, that any should 
 have been persuaded that Socrates corrupted the youth ; 
 I Socrates, who, in addition to what has been said of 
 Jhim, was not only the most rigid of all men in the 
 
 government of his passions and appetites, but also most 
 able to withstand cold, heat, and every kind of labor : 
 and, besides, so inured to frugality, that, though he 
 possessed very little, he very easily made it a sufficiency. 
 
 2. How, then, being of such a character himself, 
 could he have rendered others impious, or lawless, or 
 luxurious, or incontinent, or too effeminate to endure 
 labor? On the contrary, he restrained many of them 
 from such vices, leading them to love virtue, and 
 giving them hopes, that if they would take care of 
 
l8 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 themselves, they would become honorable and worthy- 
 characters. 
 
 3. Not indeed that he ever professed to be an instruc- 
 tor in that way, but, by showing that he was himself 
 such a character, he made those in his society hope 
 that, by imitating him, they would become such as he 
 was. 
 
 4. Of the body he was not neglectful, nor did he com- 
 mend those who were. He did not approve that a 
 person should eat to excess, and then use immoderate 
 exercise, but recommended that he should work off, by 
 a proper degree of exercise, as much as the appetite 
 received with pleasure ; for such a habit, he said, was 
 peculiarly conducive to health, and did not prevent 
 attention to the mind. 
 
 5. He was not, however, fine or ostentatious in his 
 clothes or sandals, or in any of his habits of life : yet he 
 did not make those about him lovers of money, 1 for he 
 checked them in this as well as other passions, and asked 
 no remuneration from those who desired his company. 
 
 6. By refraining from such demand, he thought that 
 he consulted his liberty, and called those who took 
 money for their discourses their own enslavers, since 
 they must of necessity hold discussions with those from 
 whom they received pay. 
 
 7. He expressed wonder, too, that any one who pro- 
 fessed to teach virtue, should demand money, and not 
 think that he gained the greatest profit in securing a 
 good friend, but fear that he whom he had made an 
 honorable and worthy character would not retain the 
 greatest gratitude toward his greatest benefactor. 
 
 8. Socrates, indeed, never expressed so much to any 
 one ; yet he believed that those of his associates who 
 imbibed what he approved, would be always good 
 friends both to himself and to each other. How then 
 could a man of such a character corrupt the young, 
 unless, indeed, the study of virtue be corruption ? 
 
 9. "But assuredly," said the accuser, "he caused 
 those who conversed with him to despise the established 
 
 1 Though he was not extravagant, he was not avaricious ; nor 
 had his conversation a tendency to make others avaricious. 
 
L π., s. 13.] CRTTIAS AND ALCIBIADES. 19 
 
 ■aws, by saying how foolish it was to elect the magis- 
 trate's of a state by beans, 1 when nobody would be wili- 
 ng to take a pilot elected by beans, or an architect, or 
 a flute-player, 2 or a person in any other profession, 
 which, if erroneously exercised, would cause far less 
 harm than errors in the administration of a state ; " and 
 declared that " such remarks excited the young to con- 
 temn the established form of government, and disposed 
 them to acts of violence." . . 
 
 10. But I think that young men who exercise their 
 understanding, and expect to become capable of teach- 
 ing their fellow-citizens what is for their interest, grow 
 by no means addicted to violence, knowing that on 
 violence attend enmity and danger, but. that, by per- 
 suasion, the same results are attained without peril, and 
 with goodwill ; for those who are compelled by us, hate 
 us as if despoiled of something, while those who are 
 persuaded by us, love us as if they had received a favor. 
 It is not the part, therefore, of those who cultivate the 
 intellect to use violence ; for to adopt such a course be- 
 longs to those who possess brute force without intellect. 
 
 11. Besides, he who would venture to use force, had 
 need of no small number of allies, but he who can 
 succeed with persuasion, has need of none, for, though 
 left alone, he would think himself still able to persuade ; 
 and it by no means belongs to such men to shed blood, 
 for who would wish to put another man to death rathei 
 than to have him as a living subject persuaded to 
 obey ? 
 
 12. " But,"' said the accuser, " Critias and Alcibiades, 
 after having been associates of Socrates, inflicted a great 
 number of evils on the state ; for Critias was the most 
 avaricious and violent of all that composed the oligarchy, 
 and Alcibiades was the most intemperate, insolent, and 
 turbulent of all those in the democracy." 
 
 13. For whatever evil they did the state, I shall make 
 
 1 ' Από κυίμου .] Black and white beans were used in voting for 
 the magistrates at Athens. 
 
 2 Μηδ' avy-ητη] These words, which occur in the texts of Weiske 
 Schneider, and all others that I have seen, are omitted by Kuhner ; 
 perhaps inadvertently. 
 
ι 
 
 20 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 no apology ; but as to their intimacy with Socrates, I 
 will state how it took place. 
 
 14. These two men were by nature the most am- 
 bitious of all the Athenians, and wished that every 
 thing should be done by their means, and that they 
 themselves should become the most celebrated of ail 
 men. But they knew that Socrates lived with the ut- 
 most contentment on very small means, that he was 
 most abstinent from every kind of pleasure, and that 
 he swayed those with whom he conversed just as he 
 pleased by his arguments. 
 
 15. " And, seeing such to be the case, and being such 
 characters as they have just been stated to be, whether 
 will any one say that they sought his society from a 
 desire to lead such a life as Socrates led, and to practise 
 such temperance as he practised, or from an expect- 
 ation, that if they associated with him, they would be- 
 come eminently able to speak and act ? 
 
 16. I myself, indeed, am of opinion, that if a god had 
 given them their choice, whether they would live their 
 whole lives as they saw Socrates living, or die, they 
 would have chosen rather to die ; and they showed this 
 disposition by what they did ; for as soon as they con- 
 sidered themselves superior to their associates, they 
 at once started away from Socrates, and engaged in 
 political life, to qualify themselves for which they had 
 sought the society of Socrates. 
 
 17. Perhaps some one may observe on this point, that 
 Socrates should not have taught his followers politics 
 before lie taught them self-control. To this remark I 
 make no reply at present ; 1 but I see that all teachers 
 make themselves examples to their pupils how far they 
 practise what they teach, and stimulate them by 
 precepts. ■ 
 
 18. And I know that Socrates made himself an ex- 
 ample to those who associated with him as a man of 
 honorable and excellent character, and that he dis- 
 coursed admirably concerning virtue and other things 
 that concern mankind. I know, too, that those men 
 
 1 Xenophon leaves this point for the present, intending to reply 
 to it in iv. 3. Kuhner. 
 
C. II., S. 21.] 
 
 MORAL PRECEPTS. 
 
 21 
 
 exercised self-control as long as they conversed with 
 Socrates, not from fear lest they should be fined or 
 beaten by him, but from a persuasion at the time that 
 it was best to observe such conduct. 
 
 19. Perhaps, however, many of those who profess to 
 be philosophers, may say that a man once just, can 
 never become unjust, or once modest, immodest ; and 
 that, with regard to any other qualification (among 
 such as can be taught), he who has once learned it can 
 never become ignorant of it. But regarding such points 
 I am not of that opinion ; for I see that as those who do 
 not exercise the body cannot perform what is proper to 
 the body, so those who cannot exercise the mind, can- 
 not perform what is proper to the mind ; for they can 
 neither do that which they ought to do, nor refrain 
 from that which they ought to refrain. 
 
 • 20. For which reason fathers keep their sons, though 
 they be of a virtuous disposition, from the society of 
 bad men, in the belief that association with the good is 
 an exercise of virtue, but that association with the bad 
 is the destruction of it. One of the poets also bears 
 testimony to this truth, who says, 
 
 'Έσθλων μέι> yap άπ' έσθλά διδάχοι ην δε κακοΐσι 
 Συμμισγί, άπολεϊί και τον ιόντα νόον. 
 From good men you will learn what is good ; but if you associate 
 with the bad, you will lose the understanding which is in you. 1 
 
 And another, who observes, 
 
 Αύτάρ άνηρ αγαθοί τότε μεν κακοί άλλοτε δ έσθλόϊ, 
 
 A good man is at one time good, and at another bad. 
 
 21. I also concur with them ; for I see that as people 
 forget metrical compositions when they do not practise 
 the repetition of them, so forgetfulness of precepts of 
 instructions is produced in those who neglect them. 
 But where a person forgets moral admonitions, he 
 forgets also what the mind felt when it had a desire for 
 
 1 This distich is taken from Theognis, v. 35, 36. That Socrates 
 was fond of quoting it, appears also from Xen. Symp. ii. 4, and 
 Plato, Menon, p. 95, D. Whence the following verse is taken is un- 
 known. Kiihner. 
 
22 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 self-government ; and. when he forgets this, it is not at 
 all wonderful that he forgets self-government also. 
 
 22. I see, too, that those who are given up to a fond- 
 ness for drinking, and those who have fallen in love, are 
 less able to attend to what they ought to do, and to re- 
 frain from what they ought not to do ; for many who 
 can be frugal in their expenses before they fall in love, 
 are, after falling in love, unable to continue so ; and, 
 when they have exhausted their resources, they no 
 longer abstain from means of gain from which they pre- 
 viously shrunk as thinking them dishonorable. 
 
 23. How is it impossible, then, that he who has once 
 had a control over himself, may afterward cease to 
 maintain it, and that he who was once able to observe 
 justice, may subsequently become unable ? To mo 
 everything honorable and good seems to be maintained 
 by exercise, and self-control not the least ; for sensual 
 desires, generated in the same body with the soul, are 
 constantly exciting it to abandon self-control, and to 
 gratify themselves and the body as soon as possible. 
 
 24. Critias and Alcibiades, then, as long as they asso- 
 ciated with Socrates, were able, with the assistance of 
 his example, to maintain a mastery over their immoral 
 inclinations ; but, when they were separated from him, 
 Critias, fleeing to Thessaly, formed connections there 
 with men who practised dishonesty rather than justice ; 
 and Alcibiades also, being sought by many women, 
 even of high rank, for his beauty, and being corrupted 
 by many men, who were well able to seduce him by 
 their flattery, on account of his influence in the city and 
 among the allies, and being also honored by the people, 
 and easily obtaining the pre-eminence among them, be- 
 came like the wrestlers in the gymnastic games, who, 
 when they are fairly superior to others, neglect their 
 exercise ; so he grew neglectful of self-control. 
 
 25. When such was their fortune, and when they were 
 proud of their birth, elated with their wealth, puffed 
 up with their power, corrupted by many associates, de j 
 moralized by all these means, and long absent from 
 Socrates, what wonder is it if they became headstrong? 
 
 26. And then, if they did any thing wrong, does the 
 
c. π., s. 30.] BLAMELESSNESS OF SOCRATES. 23 
 
 accuser blame Socrates for it ? and does Socrates seem 
 to the accuser deserving of no praise, for having, when 
 they were young, and when it is likely that they were 
 most inconsiderate and intractable, rendered them dis- 
 creet ? 
 
 27. Yet other affairs are not judged of in such a way; 
 for what flute-player, or what teacher of the harp, or 
 what other instructor, if he produces competent pupils, 
 and if they, attaching themselves to other masters, be- 
 come less skilful, is blamed for their deterioration ? 
 Or what father, if his son, while he associated with one 
 man, should be virtuous, but afterward, on uniting him- 
 self to some other person, should become vicious, would 
 blame the former of the two ? would he not rather, the 
 more corrupt his son became with the second, bestow 
 the greater praise on the first ? Not even parents them- 
 selves, \yhen they have their sons in their society, are 
 blamed if their sons do anything wrong, provided they 
 themselves are correct in their conduct. 
 
 28. In the same manner it would be right to judge 
 of Socrates ; if he had done anything immoral, he 
 would justly be thought to be a bad man ; but if he con- 
 stantly observed morality, how can he reasonably bear 
 the blame of vice which was not in him ? 
 
 29. Or even if he himself did nothing wrong, but com- 
 mended others when he saw them doing wrong, he 
 would justly be censured. When he perceived, how- 
 ever, that Critias was enamored of Euthydemus, and 
 was seeking to have the enjoyment of his society, like 
 those who abuse the persons of others for licentious pur- 
 poses, he dissuaded him from his intention, by saying 
 that it was illiberal, and unbecoming a man of honor 
 and proper feeling, to offer supplications to the object 
 of his affections, with whom he wished to be held in 
 high esteem, beseeching and entreating him, like a 
 beggar, to grant a favor, especially when such favor 
 was for no good end. 
 
 30. But as Critias paid no regard to such remon- 
 strances, and was not diverted from his pursuit, it is 
 said that Socrates, in the presence of many others as 
 well as of Euthydemus, observed that " Critias seemed 
 
24 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 to him to have some feeling like that of a pig, as he 
 wished to rub against Muthydemus as swine against 
 stones." . 
 
 31. Critias. in consequence, conceived such a hatred 
 to Socrates, that when he was one of the Thirty Tyrants, 
 and was appointed a law-maker 1 with Charicles, he re- 
 membered the circumstance to his disadvantage, and 
 inserted in his laws that " none should teach the art of 
 disputation," intending an insult to Socrates, yet not 
 knowing how to affect him in particular, but laying to 
 his charge what was imputed to the philosophers by 
 the multitude, 2 and calumniating him to the people ; at 
 least such was my opinion ; for I myself never heard 
 this from Socrates, nor do I remember having known 
 any one say that heard it from him. 
 
 32. But Critias showed that such was the case ; for 
 when the Thirty had put to death many of the citizens, 
 and those not of the inferior class, and had encouraged 
 many to acts of injustice, 3 Socrates happened to observe 
 that " it seemed surprising to him if a man, becoming 
 herdsman of a number of cattle, and rendering the cat- 
 tle fewer and in worse condition, should not confess 
 that he was a bad herdsman, and still more surprising 
 if a man. becoming governor of a city, and rendering 
 the people fewer and in worse condition, should not feel 
 ashamed, and be conscious of being a bad governor of 
 the city." . . 
 
 33. This remark being repeated to the Thirty, Critias 
 and Charicles summoned Socrates before them, showed 
 him the law, and forbade him to hold discourse with the 
 youth. Socrates inquired of them if he might be per- 
 mitted to ask a question as to any point in the prohibi- 
 
 1 See Hellen. ii. 3. 2. Of the Thirty, Charicles alone is here named, 
 besides Critias the chief of them, because, by conspiring with 
 Critias and a few of the others, he afterward acquired great autho- 
 rity and power in the state, Kiihner. The law here mentioned 
 was abrogated after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants. See 
 Potter's Antiquities of Greece, vol. i. c. 25. 
 
 2 The common charge brought by the multitude against the 
 philosophers and sophists, was that they endeavored to " make the 
 worse appear the better reason : " τον ηττω λόγοι> κρείττω ποιειν. _ 
 
 s See Plato's Apology of Socrates, c. 20 : Ola 6η κα\ αλλδιϊ dceivot 
 πολλοίς πολλά προσεταττο^, βουΚόμ^νοι ώϊ πλ«ίστον? άναπλήσαι αίτιων. 
 
c. π., s. 37.] ENMITY TOWARD SOCRATES. 25 
 
 tions that might not be understood by him. They 
 gave him permission. 
 
 34. "Then," said he, "I am prepared to obey the 
 laws; but that I may not unconsciously transgress 
 through ignorance, I wish to ascertain exactly from 
 you, ' whether it is because you think that the art of 
 reasoning is an auxiliary to what is rightly spoken, 2 or 
 to what is not rightly spoken, that you give command 
 to abstain from it ; for if it be an adjunct to what is 
 rightly spoken, it is plain that we have to abstain from 
 speaking rightly ; but if to what is not rightly spoken, 
 it is plain that we ought to endeavor to speak rightly.' " 
 
 35. Charicles, falling into a passion with him, said, 
 Since, Socrates, you are ignorant of this particular we 
 
 give you an order more easily to be understood, not to 
 discourse at all with the young." " That it may not be 
 doubtful, then," said Socrates, " whether I do anything 
 contrary to what is enjoined, define for me till what age 
 I must consider men to be young." " As long," replied 
 CI 1 ancles, " as they are not allowed to fill the office of 
 senator, as not being yet come to maturity of under- 
 standing ; and do not discourse with such as are under 
 thirty years of age." 
 
 36. " And if I wish to buy any thing," said Socrates, 
 " and a person under thirty years of age has it for sale, 
 may I not ask him at what price he sells it?" " Yes, 
 such questions as these," replied Charicles, " but you 
 are accustomed to ask most of your questions about 
 things, when you know very well how they stand ; such 
 jquestions, therefore, do not ask." " If then any young 
 pan," said he, "should ask me such a question as 
 t where does Charicles live ? Or ' where is Critias ? ' may 
 I not answer him, if I know ? " " Yes, you may answer 
 such questions," said Charicles. 
 
 37. "But," added Critias, "it will be necessary for 
 
 1 2ϋν tow όρδώς λβγομίχο^ eiVai.l That is, " that the art of speak- 
 ng supports what is rightly said : " for συν τινι signfies alicui 
 wxiho esse. See my Gr. Gr. vol. ii. § 601. Kiihner. Schneider 
 ;ook συν. for ev, giving the passage the meaning of itner ilia puce 
 fectedicuntur, which is, as Weiske says, a forced sense of συν but 
 which, it must be confessed, suits very well with the sequel of the 
 juestion put by Socrates. H 
 
 2 
 
2 6 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. I. 
 
 you to abstain from speaking of those shoemakers. 1 and 
 carpenters, and smiths ; indeed I think that they must 
 now be worn out from being so often m your mouth. 
 "I must therefore," said Socrates, "abstain from the 
 illustrations that I attach to the mention of those people, 
 illustrations on justice, piety and other such subjects. 
 " Yes, by Jupiter," retorted Charicles, " and you must 
 abstain from illustrations taken from herdsmen ; for, 
 if you do not, take care lest you yourself make cattle 
 fewer." ^ 
 
 38. Hence it was evident that they were angry with 
 Socrates on acount of his remark about the cattle having 
 been reported to them. _ 
 
 What sort of intercourse Critias had with Socrates 
 and how they stood toward each other, has now been 
 stated. ... 
 
 39. But I would say that no regular training is 
 derived by any one from a teacher who does not please 
 him ; and Critias and Alcibiades did not associate with 
 Socrates, while their association with him lasted, as 
 being an instructor that pleased them, but they were, 
 from the very first, eager to be at the head of the state, 
 for, while they still attended Socrates, they sought to 
 converse with none more than with those who were 
 most engaged in affairs of government. 
 
 40. Alcibiades, it is said, before he was twenty years 
 of age, held the following discourse with Pericles, who 
 was his guardian, and chief ruler of the state about 
 laws. , . 
 
 41 "Tell me," said he, " Pericles, can you teach me 
 what a law is." " Certainly," replid Pericles. " Teach 
 
 ι ·Αττίχ(σ&αι— των σκντέων, κ. τ. λ.] A brief mode of expression for 
 " to abstain from drawing illustrations, from those shoemakers, 
 etc Socrates, in his conversation, was accustomed to illustrate or 
 support his precepts and opinions by examples taken from fullers, 
 leather-cutters, potters and other artizans ; a mode of lecturing 
 auite the. reverse of that of the sophists, who sought to dazzle or 
 delight the minds of their hearers, by the splendor and magnifi- 
 cence of their illustrations, and the grandiloquence of their 
 speeches, and derided the method of Socrates as common, trite, and 
 mean. See b. iv. 4. 5; Plato, Symp. p. 221, Ε ; Gorg. 491, A. 
 Kiihner. 
 
 2 By losing your own life. 
 
C. II., s. 45.] 
 
 WHAT A LAW IS. 
 
 27 
 
 me then, in the name of the gods," said Alcibiades, 
 " for I, hearing some persons praised as being obedient 
 to the laws, consider that no one can fairly obtain such 
 praise who does not know what a law is." 
 
 42. " You desire no very difficult matter, Alcibiades," 
 said Pericles, " when you wish to know what a law is ; 
 for all those regulations are laws, which the people, on 
 meeting together and approving them, have enacted, 
 directing what we should do and what we should not 
 do." "And whether do they direct that we should do 
 good things, or that we should do bad tilings ? " " Good, 
 by Jupiter, my child," said he, " but bad by no means." 
 
 43. " And if it should not be the whole people, but a 
 few, as where there is an oligarchy, that should meet 
 together, and enact what we are to do, what are such 
 enactments!" Everything," replied Pericles, "which 
 the supreme power in the state, on determining what 
 the people ought to do, has enacted, is called a law." 
 " And if a tyrant, holding rule over the state, prescribes 
 to the citizens what they must do, is such prescription 
 called a law." " Whatever a tyrant in authority pre- 
 scribes," returned Pericles, " is also called a law." 
 
 44. "What then, Pericles," asked Alcibiades, "is 
 force and lawlessness? Is it not when the stronger 
 obliges the weaker, not by persuasion, but by compul- 
 sion, to do what he pleases ?" " So it appears to me," 
 replied Pericles. " Whatever then a tyrant compels 
 the people to do, by enacting it without gaining their 
 consent, is that an act of lawlessness?" "Yes," said 
 Pericles, " it appears to me that it is, for I retract my 
 admission 1 that what a tyrant prescribes to the people 
 without persuading them, is a law." 
 
 45. " But what the few enact, not from gaining the 
 consent of the many, but from having superior power, 
 should we say that that is force or that it is not ? " 
 " Everything," said Pericles, " which one man obliges 
 another to do without gaining his consent, whether he 
 
 1 Άνατίδεμαι.] A metaphorical expression from the game of 
 fifTToi or calculi, in which avadelvaL πεττοϋς, is to replace or re-ar- 
 range the calculi, after discovering that one or more of them are 
 misplaced. Kilhner. See Suidas sub voce afadso-tfai. 
 
s 4 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. II. 
 
 never weary of contriving means by which good fortune 
 may come to your friends ; and that you think it the 
 great virtue of a man to surpass his friends in doing 
 them good and his enemies in doing them harm, I think 
 that I shall be a very useful assistant to you in gaining 
 the affections of worthy friends." 
 
 36. " But why," said Critobulus, " do you say this to 
 me, as if you were not at liberty to say of me any thing 
 you please ? " " No, by Jupiter," replied Socrates ; " I 
 have no such liberty, according to a remark that I once 
 heard from Aspasia ; for she said that skilful match- 
 makers, by reporting with truth good points of char- 
 acter, had great influence in leading people to form 
 unions, but that those who said what was false, did no 
 good by their praises, for that such as were deceived 
 hated each other and the match-maker alike : and as I 
 am persuaded that this opinion is correct, I think that 
 I ought not to say, when I praise you, any thing that I 
 cannot utter with truth." 
 
 37. "You are, therefore," returned Critobulus, "a 
 friend of such a kind to me, Socrates, as to assist me, if 
 I have myself any qualities adapted to gain friends ; 
 but if not, you would not be willing to invent any thing 
 to serve me." " And whether, Critobulus," said Soc- 
 rates, " should I appear to serve you more by extolling 
 you with false praises, or by persuading you to endea- 
 vor to become a truly deserving man ? 
 
 38. If this point is not clear to you, consider it with 
 the following illustrations : If, wishing to make the 
 owner of a ship your friend, I should praise you falsely 
 to him, pronouncing you a skilful pilot, and he, be- 
 lieving me, should intrust his ship to you to steer when 
 you are incapable of steering it, would you have any 
 expectation that you would not destroy both yourself 
 and the ship ? Or if. by false representations, I should 
 persuade the state, publicly, to intrust itself to you as 
 a man skilled in military tactics, in judicial proceed- 
 ings, or in political affairs, what do you think that 
 yourself and the state would suffer at your hands? Or 
 if, in private intercourse, I should induce any )f the 
 citizens, by unfounded statements, to commit their 
 
C. vii., s. 2.] EFFECTS OF JUDICIOUS PRAISE. S5 
 
 property to your care, as being a good and diligent 
 manager, would you not, when you came to give proof 
 of your abilities, be convicted of dishonesty, and make 
 yourself appear ridiculous ? 
 
 39. But the shortest, and safest, and best way, Crito- 
 bulus, is to strive to be really good in that in which 
 you wish to be thought good. Whatever are called 
 virtues among mankind, you will find, on considera- 
 tion, capable of being increased by study and exercise. 
 I am of opinion, that it is in accordance with these 
 sentiments, that we ought to endeavor to acquire 
 friends ; if you know any other way, make me acquainted 
 with it." " I should be indeed ashamed/' replied Crito- 
 bulus, " to say any thing in opposition to such an 
 opinion ; for I should say what was neither honorable 
 nor true." 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Socrates endeavored to alleviate the necessities of his friends by 
 his instructions, and by exhorting them to assist each other. In 
 this chapter it is particularly shown that any person of liberal 
 education may, when oppressed by poverty, honorably use his 
 talents and accomplishments for his support. 
 
 1. Such difficulties of his friends as arose from ignor- 
 ance, he endeavored to remedy by his counsel ; such as 
 sprung from poverty, by admonishing them to assist 
 each other according to their means. With reference 
 to this point, I will relate what I know of him from 
 having been an ear- witness of what he said. 
 
 Observing Aristarchus, 1 on one occasion looking 
 gloomily, "You seem," said he, "Aristarchus, to be 
 taking something to heart ; but you ought to impart 
 the cause of your uneasiness to your friends ; for per- 
 haps we may by some means lighten it." 
 
 2. " I am, indeed, Socrates," replied Aristarchus, " in 
 great perplexity ; for since the city has been disturbed,' 2 
 
 1 Nothing more is known of him than is here mentioned. Kiihner. 
 
 2 When Lysander had taken the city, and established the Thirty 
 Tyrants, those who sought to restore the democracy and regain 
 
2 8 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. I. 
 
 enact it in writing or not, seems to me to be force rather 
 than law." " Whatever, then, the whole people, when 
 they are stronger than the wealthier class, enact with- 
 out their consent, would be an act of force rather than 
 
 E 46% Certainly, Alcibiades," said Pericles: "and I, 
 when I was of your age, was very acute at such dis- 
 quisitions ; for we used to meditate and argue about 
 such subjects as you now appear to meditate. ' ' Vv ould, 
 therefore," said Alcibiades, " that I had conversed with 
 you, Pericles, at the time when you were most acute m 
 discussing such topics!" 
 
 47 When Alcibiades and Cntias, therefore, began to 
 think themselves superior to those who were then gov- 
 erning the state, they no longer attended Socrates (tor 
 he was not agreeable to them in other respects, and 
 they were offended, if they went to him at all, at being 
 reproved for any error that they had committed) but 
 devoted themselves to political employments with a 
 view to which they had at first associated with Socrates. 
 
 48 But Crito was also an attendant on Socrates, as 
 well as Chserephon.Chserecrates, Hermocrates Simmias, 
 Cebes, and Phanlondes, who, with others that attended 
 him, did not seek his society that they might be fitted 
 for popular orators or forensic pleaders, but that, be- 
 coming honorable and good men, they might conduct 
 themselves irreproachably toward their families ^ con- 
 nections, dependents, and friends, as well as towaid 
 their country and their fellow-citizens ; and no one ot 
 all these, whether in youth or at a more advanced age, 
 either was guilty, or was accused, of any crime. 
 
 4r'' But 8 Sociates," said the accuser " taught chil- 
 dren to show contempt fori their parents, persuading 
 his followers that he rendered them wiser than their 
 fathers, and observing that a son was allowed by the 
 
 ι ττ^^ληκ^ιν 1 See Αηοΐοε. sect. 20, and Atistoph. Nub. 1407, 
 wL^idTppidel if ntro P ducfd, as a disciple > ot g S-rates beat η 
 
 aSa^^KSS^ wh \ wer A?Tn^ui e t d See β ad U De- 
 was at length applied to every kind of insult. See tiremi aa i;e 
 
 mosth. de Cor. p. 229. Kuhner. 
 
c. II., s. 60.] HIS PHILANTHROPY. 
 
 31 
 
 or do anything bad and pernicious, he called idle ; and 
 in this view the sentiment of the poet will be un- 
 objectionable. 
 
 Work is no disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace. 
 
 58. That passage of Homer, too, the accuser stated 
 that he often used to quote, in which it is said that 
 Ulysses, 
 
 Whatever king or eminent hero he found, 
 Stood beside him, and detained him with gentle words : 
 " Illustrious chief, it is not fit that you should shrink back as a 
 coward ; 
 
 Sit down yourself, and make the rest of the people sit down." 
 But whatever man of the people he noticed, and found clamor- 
 ing, 
 
 He struck him with his staff, and rebuked him with words : 
 " Worthless fellow, sit down in peace, and hear the exhortations 
 of others. 
 
 Who are much better than you ; for you are unwarlike and 
 powerless, 
 
 Neither to be numbered in the field nor in the council.' 1 
 
 59. And he said that he used to explain it as if the 
 poet recommended that plebeians and poor people should 
 be beaten. Socrates, however, said no such thing (for 
 he would thus have given an opinion that he himself 
 ought to be beaten), but what he did say was, that 
 those who benefited others neither by word nor deed, 
 and who were incapable of serving the army, or the 
 state, or the common people, if they should ever be 
 called upon to serve, should, especially if , in addition 
 to their incapacity, they were of an insolent spirit, be 
 curbed in every way, even though they might be ever 
 so rich. 
 
 60. But, contrary to the charge, of the accuser, Soc- 
 rates was evidently a friend to the common people, 
 
 1 Π. ii. 188, seqq. 
 
 Each prince of name, or chief in arms approv d, 
 He fir'd with praise, or with persuasion mov'd ; 
 Warriors like you, with strength and wisdom blest, 
 By brave examples should confirm the rest, 
 But if a clamorous, vile plebeian rose, 
 Him with reproof He check'd, or tam'd with blows : 
 Be still, thou slave, and to thy betters yield, 
 Unknown alike in council and in field.— Pope. 
 
32 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 and of a liberal disposition ; for though he received 
 numbers of persons desirous to hear him discourse, as 
 well citizens as foreigners, he never required payment 
 for his communications from any one, but imparted to 
 every one in abundance from his stores, of which some 1 
 receiving fragments from him for nothing, sold them 
 at a great price to others, and were not, like him, 
 friends to the common people, for they declined to con- 
 verse with such as had not money to give them. 
 
 61. But Socrates, in the eyes of other men, conferred 
 glory on the city, far more than Lichas, who was cele- 
 brated in this respect, on that of the Lacedaemonians ; 
 for Lichas indeed entertained the strangers that visited 
 Lacedsemon at the Gymnopasdise, 2 but Socrates, through 
 the whole course of his life freely imparted whatever he 
 had to bestow, and thus benefited in the highest degree 
 all who were willing to receive from him, making those 
 who associated with him better before he let them go. 
 
 62. To me, therefore, Socrates, being a man of such 
 a character, appeared to be worthy of honor rather than 
 of death ; and any one, considering his case according 
 to the laws, would find such to be the fact ; for, by the 
 laws, death is the punishment for a man if he be found 
 stealing, or stripping people of their clothes, or cutting 
 purses, or housebreaking, or kidnapping, or sacrilege, 
 of which crimes Socrates was the most innocent of all 
 men. 
 
 63. Nor was he ever the cause of any war ending un- 
 fortunately for the state, or of any sedition or treachery ; 
 nor did he ever, in his private transactions, either de- 
 prive any man of what was for his good, or involve him 
 in evil ; nor did he ever lie under suspicion of any of 
 the crimes which I have mentioned. 
 
 1 Xenophon alludes to other hearers of Socrates, but especially 
 to Aristippus, who was the first of the Socratic philosophers that 
 taught for hire. Ruhnken. See Diog. Laert. ii. 65. 
 
 2 A festival at Sparta, which lasted for several days during the 
 month of Hecatombaeon, and in which dances were performed by 
 youths in honor of Apollo, Diana, and Latona. It was partly in- 
 tended to celebrate the victory of the Spartans over the Argives 
 at Thyrea. See Smith's Dictionary of Gr. and Rom. Ant. art. Τνμνο- 
 
 παιδι'α. 
 
c. πι., s. 8.] EXHORTATIONS TO SELF-CONTROL. 35 
 
 5. He disciplined his mind and body by such a course 
 of life, that lie who should adopt a similar one, would, 
 if no supernatural influence prevented, live in good 
 spirits and uninterrupted health ; nor would he ever be 
 in want of the necessary expenses for it. So frugal 
 was he, that I do not know whether any one could earn 
 so little by the labor of his hands, as not to procure 
 sufficient to have satisfied Socrates. He took only so 
 much food as he could eat with a keen relish ; and, to 
 this end, he came to his meals 1 so disposed that the 
 appetite for his meat was the sauce to it. Every kind 
 of drink was agreeable to him, because he never drank 
 unless he was thirsty. 
 
 6. If he ever complied with an invitation to go to a 
 feast, he very easily guarded, what is extremely diffi- 
 cult to most men, against loading his stomach to excess. 
 Those who were unable to do so, he advised to be cau- 
 tious of taking anything that would stimulate them to 
 eat when they were not hungry, and to drink when 
 they were not thirsty ; for he said that those were 
 the tilings that disordered the stomach, the head, and 
 the mind. 
 
 7. And he used to say, in jest, that he thought Circe 
 transformed men into swine, by entertaining; them 
 with abundance of such luxuries, but that Ulysses, 
 through the admonition of Mercury, and through being 
 himself temperate, and forbearing to partake of such 
 delicacies to excess, was in consequence not changed 
 into a swine. 
 
 8. Such jests he would utter on these subjects, but 
 with an earnest meaning. As to love, his counsel was to 
 abstain rigidly from familiarity with beautiful persons ; 
 for he observed that it was not easy to be in communica- 
 tion with such persons, and observe continence. Hear- 
 ing, on one occasion, that Critobulus, the son of Criton, 
 had kissed the son of Alcibiades, 2 a handsome youth, 
 
 (i 1 ' Έ ϊΙ . τουτω oC ™> τταρ€σκ(νασμ4ι>ος rjei.] Kiihner prefers cn-i τούτω, 
 m on this account, with this view," understanding ίπϊ σΊτον with 
 ijei. Schneider has «Ιτΰ τοϋτον, from a conjecture of Neiske. "En-i 
 το^τω is supported by almost all the manuscripts. 
 
 The various opinions of critics on this passage have been con- 
 
3 6 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. a 
 
 he asked Xenophon, in the presence of Critobulus, say- 
 ing, " Tell me. Xenophon, did you not think that Crito- 
 bulus was one of the modest rather than the forward, 
 one of the thoughtful rather than of the thoughtless 
 and inconsiderate?" 
 
 9. " Certainly," replied Xenophon. " You must now, 
 then, think him extremely headstrong and daring ; one 
 who would even spring upon drawn swords, and leap 
 into the fire." 
 
 10. " And what," said Xenophon, " have you seen him 
 doing, that you form so unfavorable an opinion of 
 him':"' "Why, has he not dared," rejoined Socrates, 
 " to kiss the son of Alcibiades, a youth extremely hand- 
 some, and in the flower of his age ? " "If such a deed," 
 returned Xenophon, " is one of daring and peril, I think 
 that even I could undergo such peril." 
 
 11. "Unhappy man!" exclaimed Socrates, "and 
 what do you think that you incur by kissing a hand- 
 some person ? Do you not expect to become at once a 
 slave instead of a free-man? To spend much money 
 upon hurtful pleasures ? To have too much occupation 
 to attend to anything honorable and profitable ? And 
 to be compelled to pursue what not even a madman 
 would pursue ? " 
 
 12. " By Hercules," said Xenophon, " what extraor- 
 dinary power you represent to be in a kiss ! " "Do you 
 wonder at this?" rejoined Socrates; "are you not 
 aware that the Tarantula, 1 an insect not as large as half 
 
 sidered by Cobet, Prosop. p. 59-69, who conjectures that we should 
 read rb v τοϋ Ά£ ιόχου νίόν " the son of Axiochus," named Chnias. 
 Kilhner. . . , . 
 
 ι Φαλάγγι·! Insects similar in form to scorpions or spiders, or 
 which the most venomous and destructive are found in Italy, ana 
 are called Tarantula, from Tarentum. Concerning the madness 
 said to be caused bv their bite, sensible men entertain doubts in 
 the present day. Weiske. The comparison of it to the half obolus 
 shows at once the shape and smallness of the insect. Schneider. 
 Kircher, in his Mumrgia, Sir Thomas Brown, Vide/. Err. b. in. c. AX, 
 and Boyle, in his treatise On Lanquid and Unheeded Motions, ex- 
 press belief in the effects ascribed to the bite of the Tarantula. 
 Opinions unfavorable to the truth of the accounts respecting it, 
 may be found in the Philosophical Transactions for 10, A and ιπυ, 
 and in Swinburne's Travels in the Two Sicilies. The popular opin- 
 ion regarding it is now generally supposed to have arisen from lm- 
 
c. in., s. 15.] HIS TEMPERANCE. 
 
 37 
 
 an obolus, by just touching a part of the body with his 
 mouth, wears men down with pain, and deprives them 
 of their senses?" "Yes, indeed," said Xenophon, 
 "but the Tarantula infuses something at the bitten 
 part?" 
 
 13. "And do you not think, foolish man," rejoined 
 Socrates, "that beautiful persons infuse something 
 when they kiss, something which you do not see ? Do 
 you not know that the animal, which they call a hand- 
 some and a beautiful object, is so much more formidable 
 than the Tarantula, as those insects instil something 
 when they touch the body, but this creature, without 
 even touching, but if a person only looks at it, though 
 from a very great distance, instils something of such 
 potency, as to drive people mad? Perhaps indeed 
 Cupids are called archers for no other reason but be- 
 cause the beautiful wound from a distance. But I 
 advise you, Xenophon, whenever you see any hand- 
 some person, to flee without looking behind you ; and I 
 recommend to you, Critobulus, to absent yourself from 
 hence for a year, for perhaps you may in that time, 
 though hardly indeed, be cured of your wound." 
 
 14. Thus he thought that those should act with regard 
 to objects of love who were not secure against the at- 
 tractions of such objects ; objects of such a nature, that 
 if the body did not at all desire them, the mind would 
 not contemplate them, and which, if the body did 
 desire them, should cause us no trouble. For himself, 
 he was evidently so disciplined with respect to such 
 matters, that he could more easily keep aloof from the 
 fairest and most blooming objects than others from the 
 most deformed and unattractive. 
 
 15. Such was the state of his feelings in regard to eat- 
 ing, drinking, and amorous gratification ; and he be- 
 lieved that he himself, with self-restraint, would have 
 no less pleasure from them, than those who took great 
 trouble to pursue such gratifications, and that he would 
 suffer far less anxiety. 
 
 postures of the lower class of people : no instance of any respect- 
 able person having died of the bite of the insect, or having been 
 made to dance by it, being known. 
 
1 
 
 3δ 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [Β. ι. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Socrates not only exhorted men to practise virtue, but led them to 
 the practise of it ; his dialogue with Aristodemus, sect. 1, 2. Things 
 formed for a purpose, must be the production, not of chance, but 
 of reason, 3, 4. The human frame is a structure of great excel- 
 lence, and admirably fitted for its purposes ; and we must there- 
 fore suppose that man is the object of divine forethought, 5-7 . 
 The order of things throughout the universe shows that it is 
 under the providence of a superior nature, 8, 9. The superiority 
 of man over the inferior animals proves that he is more imme- 
 diately under the care of the higher powers, 10-14. The gods also 
 give instruction to man as to his conduct, 15. That they care for 
 man both individually and collectively is evident from various 
 considerations, 15, 16. As the mind governs the body, so the 
 providence of the gods governs the world, 17. If men therefore 
 worship the gods rightly, they may feel persuaded that the gods 
 will be ready to aid them, 18, 19. 
 
 1. But if any suppose that Socrates, as some write 
 and speak of him on con jecture, 1 was excellently quali- 
 fied to exhort men to virtue, but incapable of leading 
 them forward in it, let them consider not only what he 
 said in refutation, by questioning, of those who thought 
 that they knew everything (refutations intended to 
 check the progress of those disputants), 2 but what he 
 used to say in his daily intercourse with his associates, 
 and then form an opinion whether he was capable of 
 making those who conversed with him better. 
 
 2. I will first mention what I myself once heard him 
 advance in a dialogue with Aristodemus, surnamed 
 The Little, 3 concerning the gods ; for having heard 
 that Aristodemus neither sacrificed to the gods, nor 
 prayed to them, nor attended to auguries, but ridiculed 
 
 ι Τεκμαιρόμενοι.] Forming conjectures from those men, who, 
 after being under the instruction of Socrates, fell into vice. Weiske. 
 
 2 Κολαστηρίου ένεκα.] I have been obliged to paraphrase this ex- 
 pression. Κολάζω was often used inthe signification of " to restrain, 
 check, or keep within bounds," like the Latin castigate, as Liddell 
 and Scott observe. "Xenophon seems to allude to the διάλογοι 
 ε>στικοί of Plato and the other disciples of Socrates, in which Soc- 
 rates refutes the subtleties of the sophists." Schneider. 
 
 3 An Athenian whom Plato names in his Symposium, a constant 
 auditor of Socrates, and a man of much austerity." Schneider. 
 
c. iv., s. 6.] THE HUMAN FRAME. 
 
 39 
 
 those who regarded such matters, he said to him, " Tell 
 me, Aristodemus, do you admire any men for their 
 genius?" " I do," replied he. "Tell us their names, 
 then," said Socrates. 
 
 3. "In epic poetry I most admire Homer, in dithy- 
 rambic Melanippides, 1 in tragedy Sophocles, in statuary 
 Polycletus, in painting Zeuxis." 
 
 4. " And whether do those who form images without 
 sense and motion, or those who form animals endowed 
 with sense and vital energy, appear to you the more 
 worthy of admiration ? " "Those who form animals, 
 by Jupiter, for they are not produced by chance, but by 
 understanding." "And regarding things of which it 
 is uncertain for what purpose they exist, and those 
 evidently existing for some useful purpose, which of 
 the two would you say were the productions of chance, 
 and which of intelligence?" " Doubtless those which 
 exist for some useful purpose must be the productions 
 of intelligence." 
 
 5. " Does not he, then," proceeded Socrates, "who 
 made men at first, appear to you to have given them, 
 for some useful purpose, those parts by which they per- 
 ceive different objects, the eyes to see what is to be 
 seen, the ears to hear what is to be heard ? What would 
 be the use of smells, if no nostrils had been assigned 
 us ? What perception would there have been of sweet 
 and sour, and of all that is pleasant to the mouth, if a 
 tongue had not been formed in it to have a sense of 
 them." 
 
 6. In addition to these things, does it not seem to 
 you like the work of forethought, to guard the eye, 
 since it is tender, with eyelids, like doors, which, when 
 it is necessary to use the sight, are set open, but in 
 sleep are closed ? To make the eyelashes grow as a 
 screen, that winds may not injure it ? To make a cop- 
 ing on the parts above the eyes with the eyebrows, 
 that the perspiration from the head may not annoy 
 them ? To provide that the ears may receive all kinds 
 
 1 He flourished about b. c. 520. Another Melanippides, his grand- 
 son, lived about sixty years later, at the court of Perdiccas II. of 
 Macedonia. 
 
40 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 of sounds, yet never be obstructed? and tliat the front 
 teeth in all animals may be adapted to cut, and the 
 back teeth to receive food from them and grind it ? To 
 place the mouth, through which animals take in what 
 they desire, near the eyes and the nose ? and since what 
 passes off from the stomach is offensive, to turn the 
 channels of it away, and remove them as far as possible 
 from the senses ? — can you doubt whether such a dispo- 
 sition of things, made thus apparently with attention, 
 is the result of chance or of intelligence ? " 
 
 7. " No, indeed," replied Aristodemus, "but to one 
 who looks at those matters in this light, they appear 
 like the work of some wise maker who studied the 
 welfare of animals?" "And to have engendered in 
 them a love of having offspring, and in mothers a desire 
 to rear their progeny, and to have implanted in the 
 young that are reared a desire of life, and the greatest 
 dread of death ? " " Assuredly these appear to be the 
 contrivances of some one who designed that animals 
 should continue to exist." 
 
 8. ' ' And do you think that you yourself have any 
 portion of intelligence ? " "Question me, at least, and 
 I will answer." 1 " And can you suppose that nothing 
 intelligent exists anywhere else? When you know 
 that you have in your body but a small portion of the 
 earth, which is vast, and a small portion of the water, 
 
 1 Ερώτα yoiv καϊ άποκρινοΰμαι.] These words are wanting in 
 many editions, though found, as Kiihner says, who has replaced them 
 in all the manuscripts. "As modesty prevented Aristodemus 
 from expressly affirming, and a regard for truth kept him from 
 exactly denying, that he had any intelligence, he answers guard- 
 edly and ingeniously, 1 Question me and I will answer ;' and, when 
 1 answer, you will understand that I have in me some portion of 
 intelligence." Lange. " Lange, therefore thinks that Aristodemus 
 did not wish his possession of intelligence to be concluded from the 
 matter of his answer or answers, but from the mere fact of his an- 
 swering ; intimating that he who could give an answer to a ques- 
 tion must necessarily be possessed of intellect." Kiihner. Zeune 
 gives this sense to the passage : " Question me as to other things 
 which necessairly follow from hence, and which you are accus- 
 tomed to infer from premises of this kind, and you will find me 
 prepared to answer you." The true sense, however, seems to be, 
 " Question me, and judge from my answers whether I ought to be 
 considered as possessed of intellect or not." 
 
c. iv., s. 12.] SUPERIORITY OF MAN. 
 
 41 
 
 which is vast, and that your frame is constituted for you 
 to receive only a small portion of each of other things, 
 that are vast, do you think that you have seized for 
 yourself, by some extraordinary good fortune, intelli- 
 gence alone which exists nowhere else, and that this 
 assemblage of vast bodies, countless in number, is main- 
 tained in order by something void of reason ? " 
 
 9. " By Jupiter, I can hardly suppose that there is any 
 ruling intelligence among that assemblage of bodies, 1 for 
 I do not see the directors, as I see the agent of things 
 which are done here." " Nor do you see your own soul, 
 which is the director of your body ; so that, by like reason- 
 ing, you may say that you yourself do nothing with un- 
 derstanding, but everything by chance." 
 
 10. "However, Socrates," said Aristodemus, " I do 
 not de.spise the gods, but consider them as too exalted 
 to need my attention." "But," said Socrates, " the 
 more exalted they are, while they deign to attend to 
 you, the more ought you to honor them." 
 
 11. "Be assured," replied Aristodemus, " that if I be- 
 lieve the gods took any thought for men, I would not neg- 
 lect them." " Do you not, then, believe that the gods 
 take thought for men ? the gods who, in the first place, 
 have made man alone, of all animals, upright (which up- 
 rightness enables him to look forward to a greater dis- 
 tance, and to contemplate better what is above, and ren- 
 ders those parts less liable to injury in which 2 the gods 
 have placed the eyes, and ears and mouth) ; and, in the 
 next place, have given to other animals only feet, which 
 merely gives them the capacity of walking, while to 
 men they have added hands, which execute most of 
 those things through which we are better off than 
 they. 
 
 12. "And though all animals have tongues, they have 
 made that of man alone of such a nature, as by touch- 
 
 1 The words in italics are supplied according to the sense given 
 to the passage by Kiihner, who observes that the expression " By 
 Jupiter, "Μά Δία, has reference to the first part of the question of 
 Socrates, " can you suppose that nothing intelligent exists any 
 where else ? " 
 
 * This passage admitted of no satisfactory interpretation till 
 Kiihner substituted ois for και. 
 
42 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 ing sometimes one part of the mouth, and some- 
 times another, to express articulate sounds, and to sig- 
 nify everything that we wish to communicate one to 
 another. Do you not see too, that to other animals 
 they have so given the pleasures of sexual intercourse 
 as to limit them to a certain season of the year, but that 
 they allow them to us uninterruptedly till extreme old 
 age ? 
 
 13. "Nor did it satisfy the gods to take care of the 
 body merely, but, what is most important of all, 
 they implanted in him the soul, his most excellent 
 part. For what other animal has a soul to understand, 
 first of all, that the gods, who have arranged such a 
 vast and noble order of things, exist? What other 
 species of animal, besides man offers worship to the 
 gods ? What other animal has a mind better fitted than 
 that of man, to guard against hunger or thirst, or cold 
 or heat, or to relieve disease, or to acquire strength by 
 exercise or to labor to obtain knowledge ; or more 
 capable of remembering whatever it has heard, or seen, 
 or learned? 
 
 14. "Is it not clearly evident to you, that in com- 
 parison with other animals, men live like gods, 
 excelling them by nature, both in body and mind ? For 
 an animal, having the body of an ox, and the under- 
 standing of a man, would be unable to execute what it 
 might meditate ; and animals which have hands, 1 but 
 are wit hout reason, have no advantage over others ; and 
 do you, who share both these excellent endowments, 
 think that the gods take no thought for you ? What 
 then must they do. before you will think that they take 
 thought for you ? " 2 
 
 15. " I will think so," observed Aristodemus, " when 
 they send me, as you say that they send to you, moni- 
 tors, to show what I ought, and what I ought not, to 
 do." " But when they send admonitions to the Athe- 
 nians, on consulting them by divination, do you not 
 
 1 Apes have hands resembling those of men, but are not on that 
 account equal to men in ability. Schneider. 
 
 2 Άλλ', όταν τι ποιησωσι, νομιεις αΰτους σον φροντι ζαν;] " But when 
 they have done what, will you think that they care for you ? " 
 
C. IV., s. 18.] AN OVERSEEING PROVIDENCE. 43 
 
 think that they admonish you also? Or when they 
 give warnings to the Greeks by sending portents, or 
 when they give them to the whole human race, do they 
 except you alone from the whole, and utterly neglect 
 you? 
 
 16. " Do you suppose, too, that the gods would have 
 engendered a persuasion in men that they are able to 
 benefit or injure them, unless they were really able to 
 do so, and that men, if they had been thus perpetually 
 deluded, would not have become sensible of the delu- 
 sion? Do you not see that the oldest and wisest of 
 human communities, the oldest and wisest cities and 
 nations, are the most respectful to the gods, and that 
 the wisest age of man is the most observant of their 
 worship ? 
 
 17. " Consider also, my good youth," continued Soc- 
 rates, " that your mind, existing within your body, 
 directs your body as it pleases ; and it becomes you 
 therefore to believe that the intelligence pervading all 
 things directs all things as may be agreeable to it, and 
 not to think that while your eye can extend its sight 
 over many furlongs, that of the divinity 1 is unable to 
 see all things at once, or that while your mind can 
 think of things here, or things in Egypt or Sicily, the 
 mind of the deity is incapable of regarding everything 
 at the same time. 
 
 18. " If, however, as you discover, by paying court to 
 men, those who are willing to pay court to you in 
 return, and, by doing favors to men, those who are 
 willing to return your favors, and as, by asking counsel 
 of men, you discover who are wise, you should, in like 
 manner, make trial of the gods by offering worship to 
 them, whether they will advise you concerning matters 
 hidden from man, you will then find that the divinity 
 is of such power, and of such a nature, as to see all 
 things and hear all things at once, to be present every- 
 
 3 ToC deoO.] Xenophon sometimes makes Socrates use 'the sin- 
 gular, ό deb?, in speaking of the gods, But it is not hence to be 
 inferred that he insinuated that there was only one god : for the 
 Greeks frequently used the singular when they might have been 
 expected to use the plural. Compare iv. 3. 14. 
 
44 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. i 
 
 where, and to have a care for all things at the same 
 time." 
 
 19. By delivering such sentiments, Socrates seems to 
 me to have led his associates to refrain from what was 
 impious, or unjust, or dishonorable, not merely when 
 they were seen by men, but when they were in solitude, 
 since they would conceive that nothing that they did 
 would escape the knowledge of the gods. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Temperance and self-control recommended : he that is destitute of 
 temperance can be profitable or agreeable neither to himself nor 
 others, sect. 1-4. Without temperance nothing can be learned 
 or done with due effect, 5. Socrates not only encouraged to 
 temperance by precept, but by his example, 0. 
 
 1. If temperance, moreover, be an honorable and 
 valuable quality in a man, let us consider whether he 
 at all promoted its observance by reflections of the 
 following kind concerning it. " If, my friends, when 
 a war was coming upon us, we should wish to choose a 
 man by whose exertions we might ourselves be pre- 
 served, and might gain the mastery over our enemies, 
 should we select one whom we knew to be unable to 
 resist gluttony, or wine, or sensuality, or fatigue, or 
 sleep ? How could we think that such a man would 
 either serve us, or conquer our adversaries ? 
 
 2. Or if, being at the close of life, we should wish to 
 commit to any one the guardianship of our sons, or the 
 care of our unmarried daughters, or the preservation 
 of our property, should we think an intemperate man 
 worthy of confidence for such purposes? Should we 
 intrust to an intemperate slave our herds, our granaries, 
 or the superintendence of our agriculture ? Should we 
 be willing to accept such a slave as an agent, or pur- 
 veyor, even for nothing? 
 
 3. But if we would not even accept an intemperate 
 slave, how can it be otherwise than important for every 
 
c. v., s. 6.] VALUE OF TEMPP:RANCE. 
 
 45 
 
 man to take care that he himself does not become such 
 a character ? For the intemperate man is not injurious 
 to his neighbor and profitable to himself (like the 
 avaricious, who, by despoiling others of their property, 
 seem to enrich themselves), but, while he is mischievous 
 to others, is still more mischievous to himself, for it is, 
 indeed, mischievous in the highest degree, to ruin not 
 only his family, but his body and mind. 
 
 4. In society, too, who could find pleasure in the 
 company of such a man, who, he would be aware, felt 
 more delight in eating and drinking than in intercourse 
 with his friends, and preferred the company of harlots 
 to that of his fellows ? Is it not the duty of every man 
 to consider that temperance is the foundation of every 
 virtue, and to establish the observance of it in his mind 
 before all tilings ? 
 
 5. For who, without it, can either learn anything 
 good, or sufficiently practise it? Who, that is a slave 
 to pleasure, is not in an ill condition both as to his body 
 and his mind ? It appears to me, by Juno, 1 that a free- 
 man ought to pray that he may never meet with a slave 
 of such a character, and that he who is a slave to 
 pleasure should pray to the gods that he may find well- 
 disposed masters ; for by such means only can a man 
 of that sort be saved." 
 
 6. While such were the remarks that he made, he 
 proved himself more a friend to temperance by his life 
 than by his words ; for he was not only superior to all 
 corporeal pleasures, but also to those attendant on the 
 acquisition of money ; thinking that he who received 
 money from any one, 2 set up a master over himself, 
 and submitted to a slavery as disgraceful as any that 
 could be. 
 
 1 Νή την Ήραν.] This mode of swearing, which was commonly 
 used by women, was very frequently adopted by Socrates. See 
 below, hi. 10. 9 ; 11. 5 ; iv. 2. 9 ; 4. 8 ; OEcon. χ. 1 ; Plato, Phaidr. 
 p. 230, B. Kuhner. 
 
 ! παρά τοϋ τυχόντος.] From any one that happened to present him- 
 self ; from any one indiscriminately. 
 
46 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Three dialogues of Socrates with Antipho. I. Antipho ridicules 
 the poverty and frugality of Socrates, and his forbearance to 
 receive pay for his instructions, sect. 1-3 ; Socrates replies that, 
 by not receiving remuneration, he is more at liberty to choose his 
 audience, 4, 5 ; that there are various advantages attendant on 
 plainness of diet and dress, 6, 7 ; that the frugal man has the ad- 
 vantage over the man of pleasure in facilities for self -improve- 
 ment, for doing his duty to his country, and for securing general 
 happiness, 8-10. II. Antipho asserts that Socrates might be a 
 just man, but was by no means wise, in accepting no payment, 
 11,12 ; Socrates replies that to sell wisdom is to degrade it, and 
 that more good is gained by the acquisition of friends than of 
 money, 13, 14. III. Antipho asks Socrates why, when he trained 
 others to manage public affairs, he took no part in public affairs 
 himself ; Socrates replies that he was of more service to his 
 country by training many to govern it, than he could have been 
 by giving his single aid in the government of it, 15. 
 
 1. It is due to Socrates, also, not to omit the dialogues 
 which he held with Antipho the sophist. Antipho, on 
 one occasion, wishing to draw away his associates from 
 him, came up to Socrates when they were present, and 
 said, 
 
 2. "I thought, Socrates, that those who studied phi- 
 losophy were to become happier than other men ; but 
 you seem to have reaped from philosophy fruits of an 
 opposite kind ; at least you live in a \vay in which no 
 slave would continue to live with his master ; you eat 
 food, and drink drink, of the worst kind ; you wear a 
 dress, not only bad, but the same both summer and 
 winter, and you continue shoeless and coatless. 1 
 
 3. Money, which cheers men when they receive it, 
 and enables those who possess it to live more generously 
 
 1 'Α.ννπό5ητός re και άχίτων.] On the άνυποίτησία of Socrates, See 
 Forster on Plato Pheedon, p. 64, D. ; and the commentators on 
 Aristoph. Nub. 103, 362, and on Plato Phaedr. p. 220, A. Kuhner. 
 By ίχίτων is not to be understood that Socrates had covered his 
 bare bodv only with his cloak, but that he wore only the inner 
 tunic, νπίνδντης, not having the upper, ίπ^νίντης, which they called 
 the tunic κατ (ξοχ-ήν, terming those who were without it ίχιτωνας, 
 as Salmasius has fully shown, and Tertullian, de Falho, p. 70, seq. 
 and 400, seq. Ernesti. 
 
C. VI., s. 7.] 
 
 ON DIET AND DRESS. 
 
 47 
 
 and pleasantly, you do not take ; and if, therefore, as 
 teachers in other professions make their pupils imitate 
 themselves, you also shall produce a similar effect on 
 your followers, you must consider yourself but a teacher 
 of wretchedness." 
 
 4. Socrates, in reply to these remarks, said, "You 
 seem to me, Antipho, to have conceived a notion that 
 I live so wretchedly, that I feel persuaded you yourself 
 would rather choose to die than pass your life as I pass 
 mine. Let us then consider what it is that you find 
 disagreeable in my mode of life. 
 
 5. " Is it that while others, who receive money, must 
 perform the service for whicli they receive it, while I, 
 who receive none, am under no necessity to discourse 
 with any one that I do not like ? Or do you despise my 
 way of living, on the supposition that I eat less whole- 
 some or less strengthening food than yourself ? Or is 
 it that my diet is more difficult to procure than yours, 
 as being more rare and expensive ? Or is it that what 
 you procure for yourself is more agreeable to you than 
 what I provide for myself is to me ? Do you not know 
 that he who eats with the most pleasure is he who less 
 requires sauce, and that he who drinks with the great- 
 est pleasure is he who least desires other drink than 
 that which he has ? 
 
 6. " You know that those who change their clothes, 
 change them because of cold and heat, and that men 
 put on sandals that they may not be prevented from 
 walking through annoyances to the feet ; but have you 
 ever observed me remaining at home, on account of 
 cold, more than any other man, or fighting with any one 
 for shade because of heat, or not walking wherever I 
 please because my feet suffer ? 
 
 7. "Do you not know that those who are by nature the 
 weakest, become, by exercising their bodies, stronger 
 in those things in which they exercise them, than those 
 who neglect them, and bear the fatigue of exercise with 
 greater ease ? And do you not think that I, who am 
 constantly preparing my body by exercise to endure 
 whatever may happen to it, bear everything more 
 easily than you who take no exercise ? 
 
48 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 8. " And to prevent me from being a slave to gluttony, 
 or sleep, or other animal gratifications, can you imagine 
 any cause more efficient than having other objects of 
 attention more attractive than they, which not only 
 afford pleasure in the moment of enjoying them, but 
 give hopes that they will benefit me perpetually ? You 
 are aware of this also, that those who think themselves 
 successful in nothing, are far from being cheerful, but 
 that those who regard their agriculture, their seaman- 
 ship, or whatever other occupation they pursue as go- 
 ing on favorably for them, are delighted as with pres- 
 ent success? 
 
 9. " But do you think that from all these gratifications 
 so much pleasure can arise as from the consciousness 
 that you are growing better yourself , and are acquiring 
 more valuable friends? Such is the consciousness, 
 then, which I continue to enjoy. 
 
 " But if tli ere should be occasion to assist our friends 
 or our country, which of the two would have most 
 leisure to attend to such objects, he who lives as I live 
 now, or he who lives, as you think, in happiness ? 
 Which of the two would most readily see"k the field of 
 battle, he who cannot exist without expensive dishes, 
 or he who is content with whatever comes before him ? 
 Which of the two would sooner be reduced by a siege, 
 he who requires what is most difficult to be found, or 
 he who is fully content with what is easiest to be met 
 with ? 
 
 10. " You, Antipho, seem to think that happiness con- 
 sists in luxury and extravagance ; but I think that to 
 want nothing is to resemble the gods, and that to want 
 as little as possible is to make the nearest approach to 
 the gods ; that the Divine nature is perfection, and 
 that to be nearest to the Divine nature is to be nearest 
 to perfection." 
 
 11. " On another occasion, Antipho, in a conversation 
 with Socrates, said, " I consider you indeed to be a just 
 man, Socrates, but by no means a wise one ; and you 
 appear to me yourself to be conscious of this ; for you 
 ask money from no one for the privilege of associating 
 with you ; although, if you considered a garment of 
 
c. vr., s. 14.] PREFERS FRIENDSHIP TO MONEY. 49 
 
 yours, or a house, or any other thing that you possess, 
 to be worth money, you would not only not give it to 
 anybody for nothing, but you would not take less than 
 its full value for it. 
 
 12. " It is evident, therefore, that if you thought your 
 conversation to be worth anything, you would demand 
 for it no less remuneration than it is worth. You may, 
 accordingly, be a just man, because you deceive nobody 
 from covetousness, but wise you cannot be, as you 
 have no knowledge that is of any value." 
 
 13. ''Socrates, in reply said, " it is believed among us, 
 Antipho, that it is possible to dispose of beauty, or of 
 wisdom, alike honorably or dishonorably ; 1 for if a 
 person sells his beauty for money to any one that wishes 
 to purchase, men call him a male prostitute ; but if any 
 one makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be 
 an honorable and worthy admirer, we regard him as 
 prudent : and, in like manner, those whosell their wis- 
 dom for money, to any that will buy, men call sophists, 
 or, as it were, prostituters of wisdom ; but whoever 
 makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be de- 
 serving, by teaching him all the good that he knows, 
 we consider him to act the part which becomes an 
 honorable and good citizen. 
 
 14. As any other man, therefore, Antipho, takes de- 
 light in a good horse, or dog, or bird, so I, to a still 
 greater degree, take delight in valuable friends ; and, 
 if I know anything good, I communicate it to them, 
 and recommend them, also, to any other teachers by 
 whom I conceive that they will be at all advanced in 
 virtue. The treasures, too, of the wise men of old, 
 which they have left written in books, I turn over and 
 peruse in company with my friends, and if wefindany- 
 
 1 ΐίομιζίται την ωραν και τψ' σοφίαν ομοίως μίν καΧ'ον, ομοίως Si αίσχρον 
 
 δια.·η'#εσΐ>αι dvai.] The seuse seems to be, that it is alike honorable 
 or dishonorable to dispose of beauty (in a certain way) and to dis- 
 pose of wisdom (in a certain way) : i e, that there is a certain way 
 of disposing of beauty honorably, and a certain way of disposing of 
 it dishonorably, and that the same is the case with regard to wis- 
 dom, or talent. My translation is much the same as the Latin of 
 Schneider. Apud nos existimatur eodem modo posse aliquem et 
 forma et sapientia vel honeste vel turpiteruti. 
 
 3 
 
50 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. i. 
 
 thing good in them, we remark it, and think it a great 
 gain, if we thus become more attached 1 to one another." 
 To me, who heard him utter these sentiments, Socrates 
 appeared to be both happy himself, and to lead those 
 that listened to him to honor and virtue. 
 
 15. Again, when Antipho asked him how he imagined 
 that lie could make men skilful statesmen, when he 
 himself took no part in state affairs, if indeed he knew 
 anything of them. " In which of the two ways," said 
 he, " Antipho, should I better promote the manage- 
 ment of affairs ; if I myself engage in them alone, or if 
 I make it my care that as many as possible may be 
 qualified to engage in them ? " 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Dissuasions from ostentation. He that desires to be distinguished, I 
 should endeavor to be what he would wish to seem. He that I 
 pretends to be what he is not, exposes himself to great incon- I 
 venience and ridicule, and may bring disgrace and detriment on I 
 his country. 
 
 1. Let us consider also, whether, by dissuading his I 
 followers from ostentation he excited them to pursue 
 virtue. He always used to say that there was no better 
 road to honorable distinction, than that by which a 
 person should become excellent in that in which he 
 wished to appear excellent. 
 
 2. That he said what was just, he used to prove by 
 the following arguments. " Let us consider," he would 
 say, " what a person must do, if, not being a good flute- 
 player, he should wish to appear so ? Must he not imi- 
 tate good flute-players in the adjuncts of their art ? In 
 the first place, as flute-players procure fine dresses, and 
 go about with a great number of attendants, he must 
 
 ι Φίλοι γιγυώμε^α.] For φίλοι Ernesti substituted from one manu- 
 script ώφέλιμοι, which Kiihner stigmatizes as ''apertum glossema,'' 
 and restores the old φίνοι, with the comment, " Si nos jam antea 
 amicitia? vinculis constricti, etiam horum studiorum communiqne 
 cari ac dilecti flamus." I have rendered φίλοι by the comparative 
 degree, but think Ernesti's correction far more eligible. 
 
c. vii., s. 5.] AGAINST OSTENTATION. 
 
 act in a similar manner ; and as many people applaud 
 them, he must get many to applaud him ; yet he must 
 never attempt to play, or he will at once be shown to 
 be ridiculous, and not only a bad flute-player, but a 
 vain boaster. Thus, after having been at great expense 
 without the least benefit, and having, in addition, in- 
 curred evil repute, how will he live otherwise than in 
 uneasiness, unprofitableness, and derision ? 
 
 3. "In like manner, if anyone should wish to be 
 thought a good general, or a good steersman of a ship, 
 without being so, let us reflect what would be his suc- 
 cess. If, when he longed to seem capable of perform- 
 ing the duties of those characters, he should be unable 
 to persuade others of his capability, would not this be 
 a trouble to him ? and, if he should persuade them of 
 it, would it not be still more unfortunate for him ? For 
 it is evident that he who is appointed to steer a vessel, 
 or to lead an army, without having the necessary 
 knowledge, would be likely to destroy those 1 whom he 
 would not wish to destroy, and would come off himself 
 with disgrace and suffering." 
 
 4. By similar examples he showed that it was of no 
 profit for a man to appear rich, or valiant, or strong, 
 without being so ; for he said that demands were made 
 upon such persons too great for their ability, and that, 
 not being able to comply with them, when they seemed 
 to be able, they met with no indulgence. 
 
 5. He called him, also, no small impostor, who, ob- 
 taining money or furniture from his neighbor by per- 
 suasion, should defraud him ; but pronounced him the 
 greatest of all impostors, who, possessed of no valuable 
 qualifications, should deceive men by representing 
 himself capable of governing his countrv. To me he 
 appeared, by discoursing in this manner," to deter his 
 associates from vain boasting. 
 
 1 His friends, and such as he would wish to applaud him. 
 
52 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. IB 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Socrates, suspecting that Aristippus, a man of pleasure, was aspir- 
 ing to a place in the government, admonishes him that temper- 
 ance is an essential qualification in a statesman, sect. 1-7. But 
 as Aristippus says that he looked only to a life of leisure and 
 tranquil enjoyment, Socrates introduces the question, whether 
 those who govern, or those who are governed, live the happier 
 life, 8-10. Aristippus signifies that he wished neither to govern 
 nor to be governed, but to enjoy liberty ; and Socrates shows 
 that such liberty as he desired is inconsistent with the nature of 
 human society, 11-13. Aristippus still adhering to his own views, 
 and declaring his intention not to remain in any one country, but 
 to visit and sojourn in many, Socrates shows him the dangers of 
 such a mode of life, 14-16. But as Aristippus proceeds to accuse 
 those of folly who prefer a life of toil in the affairs of govern- 
 ment to a life of ease, Socrates shows the difference between 
 those who labor voluntarily, and those who labor from compul- 
 sion, and observes that nothing good is given to mortals without 
 labor, 17-20 ; in illustration of which remark he relates the fable 
 of Prodicus, The Choice of Hercules, ϋ1-34. 
 
 1. He appeared also to me, by such discourses as the 
 following, to exhort his hearers to practise temperance 
 in their desires for food, drink, sensual gratification, 
 and sleep, and endurance of cold, heat, and labor. But 
 finding that one of his associates was too in temperately 
 disposed with regard to such matters, he said to him, 
 "Tell me, Aristippus, 1 if it were required of you to 
 take two of our youths and educate them, the one in 
 such a manner that he would be qualified to govern, 
 and the other in such a manner that he would never 
 seek to govern, how would you train them respectively ? 
 "Will you allow us to consider the matter by commencing 
 with their food, as with the first principles ? " " Food, 
 indeed," replied Aristippus, "appears to me one of the 
 
 1 Aristippus of Cyrene, the founder of the Cyrenaic sect of phi- 
 losophers, who thought pleasure the greatest good, and pain the 
 greatest evil. See b. iii. ch. 8. 
 
c. I.) s. 4.] DISCOURSE WITH ARISTIPPUS. 
 
 53 
 
 first principles ; for a person could not even live if he 
 were not to take food." 
 
 2. "It will be natural for them both, then," said 
 Socrates, "to desire to partake of food when a certain 
 hour comes." " It will be natural," said Aristippus. 
 " And which of the two, then," said Socrates, " should 
 we accustom to prefer the discharge of any urgent 
 business to the gratification of his appetite?" "The 
 one, undoubtedly," rejoined Aristippus, " who is trained 
 to rule, that the business of the state may not be neg- 
 lected during his administration." " And on the same 
 person," continued Socrates, "wo must, when they de- 
 sire to drink, impose the duty of being able to endure 
 thirst ? " " Assuredly," replied Aristippus. 
 
 3. " And on which of the two should we lay the ne- 
 cessity of being temperate in sleep, so as to be able to 
 go to rest late, to rise early, or to remain awake if it 
 should be necessary?" "Upon the same, doubtless." 
 " And on which of the two should we impose the obli- 
 gation to control his sensual appetites, that he may not 
 be hindered by their influence from discharging what- 
 ever duty may be required of him ? " " Upon the same ." 
 "And on which of the two should we enjoin the duty 
 of not shrinking from labor, but willingly submitting 
 to it?" "This also, is to be enjoined on him who is 
 trained to rule." "And to which of the two would it 
 more properly belong to acquire whatever knowledge 
 would assist him to secure the mastery over his rivals ? " 
 " Far more, doubtless, to him who is trained to govern, 
 for without such sort of acquirements there would be 
 no profit in any of his other qualifications." 
 
 4. "A man, then, who is thus instructed, would ap- 
 pear to you less liable to be surprised by his enemies, 
 than other animals, of which some, we know, are 
 caught by their greediness ; and others, though very 
 shy, are yet attracted to the bait by their desire to 
 swallow it, and consequently taken ; while others also 
 are entrapped bv drink." " Indisputably," replied 
 Aristippus. ' ' Are not others, too, caught through 
 their salaciousness, as quails and partridges, which, 
 being attracted to the call of the female by desire and 
 
54 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 Β. II.] 
 
 hope of enjoyment, and losing all consideration of 
 danger, fall into traps ? " To this Aristippus expressed 
 his assent. 
 
 5. "Does it not then," proceeded Socrates, "appear 
 to you shameful for a man to yield to the same influence 
 as the most senseless of animals ; as adulterers, for in- 
 stance, knowing that the adulterer is in danger of suf- 
 fering what the law threatens, and of being watched, 
 and disgraced if caught, yet enter into closets; and, 
 though there are such dangers and dishonors hanging 
 over the intriguer, and so many occupations that will 
 free him from the desire of sensual gratification, does 
 it not seem to you the part of one tormented with an 
 evil genius, to run, nevertheless, into imminent peril?" 
 " It does not seem so to me," said Aristippus. 
 
 6. " And since the greater part of the most necessary 
 employments of life, such as those of war and agri- 
 culture, and not a few others, are to be carried on in 
 the open air, does it not appear to you to show great 
 negligence, that the majority of mankind should be 
 wholly unexercised to bear cold and heat ? " Aristippus 
 replied in the affirmative. " Does it not then appear to 
 you that we ought to train him who is intended to rule, 
 to bear these inconveniences also without difficulty ? " 
 " Doubtless," answered Aristippus. 
 
 7. "If, therefore, we class those capable of enduring 
 these things among those who are qualified to govern, 
 shall we not class such as are incapable of enduring 
 them among those who will not even aspire to govern ? " 
 Aristippus expressed his assent. " In conclusion, then, 
 since you know the position of each of these classes of 
 men, have you ever considered in which of them you 
 can reasonably place yourself ? " 
 
 8. " I have indeed," said Aristippus, " And I by no 
 means place myself in the class of those desiring to 
 rule ; for it appears to me that, when it is a task of 
 great difficulty to procure necessaries for one's self, it 
 is the mark of a very foolish man not to be satisfied 
 with that occupation, 1 but to add to it the labor of pro- 
 
 1 Μη άρκβίν τοϋτο.] That is, τόΰτο μη ίρκΐϊν αντω', "that that oc- 
 cupation should not be sufficient for him; " should not content him. 
 
c. ι., s. ι a] DISCOURSE WITH ARISTIPPUS. 
 
 curing for his fellow-countrymen whatever they need. 
 And is it not the greatest folly in him, that while many 
 things which he desires are out of his reach, he should, 
 by setting himself at the head of the state, subject him- 
 self, if he does not accomplish all that the people desire, 
 to be punished for his failure? 
 
 9. For the people think it right to use their governors 
 as I use my slaves ; for I require my slaves to supply 
 me with the necessaries of life in abundance, but to 
 take no part of them themselves ; and the people think 
 it the duty of their governors to supply them with as 
 many enjoyments as possible, but themselves to abstain 
 from all of them. Those, therefore, who wish to have 
 much trouble themselves, and to give trouble to others, 1 
 I would train in this manner, and rank among those 
 qualified to govern ; but myself I would number with 
 those who wish to pass their lives in the greatest pos- 
 sible ease and pleasure." 
 
 10. Socrates then said, "Will you allow us to con- 
 sider this point also, whether the governors or the 
 governed live with the greater pleasure?" "By all 
 means," said Aristippus. " In the first place, then, of 
 the nations of which we have any knowledge, the 
 Persians bear rule in Asia, and the Syrians, Phrygians, 
 and Lyclians are under subjection ; the Scythians govern 
 in Europe, and the Maeotians 2 are held in subjection ; 
 the Carthaginians rule in Africa, and the Libyans are 
 under subjection. Which of these do you regard as 
 living with the greater pleasure ? Or among the Greeks, 
 of whom you yourself are, which of the two appear to 
 you to live more happily, those who rule, or those who 
 are in subjection ? " 
 
 1 He that holds the reins of government, must not only undergo 
 much toil and trouble himself, but must also enjoin many tasks and 
 duties on others, and incite them to exertion and industry. . 
 With this passage of Xenophon may aptly be compared what the 
 Corinthians say of the Athenians in Thucydides, i. TO : " If any one 
 should say, in a word, that they are formed by nature neither to 
 enjoy quiet themselves, nor to suffer others to enjoy it, he would 
 speak of them rightly." Kuhner. 
 
 1 The people bordering on the lake Maeotis, which was in Sarmatia 
 Europaaa, and is now called the Sea of Azov. Kuhner. 
 
56 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. if. 
 
 11. " Yet, on the other hand," 1 said Aristippus, " I do 
 not consign myself to slavery ; but there appears to me 
 to be a certain middle path between the two, in which 
 I endeavor to proceed, and which leads, not through 
 slavery, but through liberty, a path that most surely 
 conducts to happiness." 
 
 12. " If this path of yours, indeed," said Socrates, 
 "as it lies neither through sovereignty nor servitude, 
 did not also lie through human society, what you say 
 would perhaps be worth consideration ; but if, while 
 living among mankind, you shall neither think proper 
 to rule nor to be ruled, and shall not willingly pay 
 respect to those in power, I think that you will see that 
 the stronger know how to treat the weaker as slaves, 
 making them to lament both publicly and privately. 
 
 13. Do those escape your knowledge who fell and 
 destroy the corn and trees of others that have sown and 
 planted them, and who assail in every way such as are 
 inferior to them, and are unwilling to natter them, 
 until they prevail on them to prefer slavery to carrying 
 on war against their superiors ? In private life, too, do 
 you not see that the spirited and strong enslave the 
 timorous and weak, and enjoy the fruits of their 
 labors ? " " But for my part," answered Aristippus, ' ' in 
 order that I may not suffer such treatment, I shall not 
 shut myself up in any one state, but shall be a traveller 
 everywhere." 
 
 14. " Doubtless," rejoined Socrates, " this is an ad- 
 mirable plan that you propose ; for since Sinnis, and 
 Sciron, and Procrustes 2 were killed, nobody injures 
 travelers. Yet those who manage the government in 
 their several countries, even now make laws, in order 
 that they may not be injured, and attach to themselves, 
 in addition to such as are called their necessary con- 
 nections, other supporters ; they also surround their 
 
 1 AC] Compare sect. 8, where Aristippus says that he does not 
 rank himself among those who wish to rule ; here he states that, 
 on the other hand, he does not wish to be a slave. 
 
 2 Celebrated robbers, put to death by Theseus. This is a pleasant 
 irony, says Weiske. in the remark of Socrates : though Sinnis, 
 Sciron, and Procrustes no longer rob on the highways, yet there is 
 no lack of successors to them. 
 
c. ι., s. 17.] DISCOURSE WITH ARISTIPPUS. 
 
 cities with ramparts, and procure weapons with which 
 they may repel aggressors, securing, besides all these 
 means of defence, other allies from abroad ; and yet 
 those who have provided themselves with all these bul- 
 warks, nevertheless suffer injury. 
 
 15. And do you, having no protection of the sort, 
 spending a long time on roads on which a very great 
 number are outraged, weaker than all the inhabitants 
 of whatever city you may arrive at, and being such a 
 character 1 as those who are eager to commit violence 
 most readily attack, think, nevertheless, that you will 
 not be wronged because you are a stranger ? Or are you 
 without fear, because these cities proclaim safety to 
 any one arriving or departing? Or because you think 
 that you would prove a slave of sucli a character as 
 would profit no master, for who, you perhaps ask 
 yourself, would wish to keep in his house a man not at 
 all disposed to labor, and delighting in the most expen- 
 sive fare ? 
 
 16. But let us consider how masters treat slaves of 
 such a sort. Do they not tame down their fondness for 
 dainties by hunger? Do they not hinder them from 
 stealing by excluding them from every place from 
 whence they may take anything ? Do they not prevent 
 them from running away by putting fetters on them ? 
 Do they not overcome their laziness with stripes ? Or 
 how do you yourself act, when you find any one of 
 your slaves to be of such a disposition ? " 
 
 17. "I chastise him," said Aristippus, " with every 
 kind of punishment, until I compel him to serve me. 
 But how do those, Socrates, who are trained to the art 
 of ruling, which you seem to me to consider as hap- 
 piness, differ from those who undergo hardships from 
 necessity, since they will have (though it be with their 
 own consent) to endure hunger, and thirst, and cold, 
 and want of sleep, and suffer all other inconveniences 
 of the same kind ? 
 
 18. For I, for my own part, do not know what differ- 
 
 1 A person without any settled abode, without friends or support- 
 ers : not under the protection of any particular state, but wan- 
 dering from one state to another. Kuhner. 
 
 3* 
 
58 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. ri 
 
 ence it makes to a man who is scourged on the same 
 skin, whether it be voluntarily or involuntarily, or, in 
 short, to one who suffers with the same body in all such 
 points, whether he suffer with his consent or against it, 
 except that folly is to be attributed to him who endures 
 troubles voluntarily." "What then, Aristippus," said 
 Socrates, " do not voluntary endurances of this kind 
 seem to you to differ from the involuntary, inasmuch 
 as he who is hungry from choice may eat when he 
 pleases, and he who is thirsty from choice may drink 
 when he pleases, the same being the case with regard 
 to other voluntary sufferings, while he who endures 
 such hardships from necessity has no liberty to relieve 
 himself from them when he wishes? Besides, he who 
 undergoes trouble willingly, is cheered in undergoing 
 it with some expectation "of good, as the hunters of wild 
 animals bear fatigue with pleasure in the hope of cap- 
 turing them. 
 
 19. And such rewards of toil are indeed but of small 
 worth ; but as for those who toil that they may acquire 
 valuable friends, or that they may subdue their enemies, 
 or they may, by becoming vigorous in body and mind, 
 manage their own household judiciously, and be of 
 service to their friends and of advantage to their coun- 
 try, how can you think that they labor for such objects 
 otherwise than cheerfully, or that they do not live in 
 happiness, esteeming themselves, and being praised and 
 envied by others ? 
 
 20. But indolence, moreover, and pleasures enjoyed at 
 the moment of desire, 1 are neither capable of producing 
 a good constitution of body, as the teachers of gymnas- 
 tic exercises say, nor do they bring to the mind any 
 knowledge worthy of consideration ; 2 but exercises pur- 
 
 i Έκ toG παραχρήμα ήδοι/αί.] The interpretation of this phrase gvien 
 in the text is that which is adopted by Kuhner : Voluptates ejus- 
 modi, quas, ubi concupiveris, statim, utpotesine ullo laborapaia- 
 biles, percipere liceat ; an interpretation taken from Ernestl. hiut 
 the expression often seems to signify nothing more than what we 
 mean by "present pleasures; as in Cyrop. i. 5. 9 ; n. Z.'ji; so 
 Schneider understands eas voluptates quae statim pcrctpitintur, et 
 quorum usus breve tempus durat, with Heindorf, and Plat. Protag. 
 p. 353. . . , . 
 
 f Έπιστήμην άξιόλογον ονδεμίαν.] 'Af ιόλογοι/ is very properly added , 
 
C. ι., s. 21.] SEDUCTION OF PLEASURE. 
 
 sued with persevering labor lead men to the attainment 
 of honorable and valuable objects, as worthy men in- 
 form us ; and Hesiod somewhere says, 
 
 Vice it is possible to find in abundance and with ease ; for the 
 way to it is smooth, and lies very near. But before the temple 
 of Virtue, the immortal gods have placed labor, and the way to 
 it is long and steep, and at the commencement rough ; but 
 when the traveller has arrived at the summit, it then becomes 
 easy, however difficult it was at first. 1 
 
 A sentiment to which Epicharmus gives his testimony 
 in this verse, 
 
 The gods for labor sell us all good things ; 
 and in another place he says, 
 
 O wretched mortal, desire not what is soft, lest you find what 
 is hard. 
 
 21. Prodicus the sophist, 2 also, in his narrative con- 
 cerning Hercules, 3 which indeed he declaims to most 
 people as a specimen of his ability, expresses a similar 
 notion respecting virtue, speaking, as far as I remember, 
 to the following effect : For lie says that Hercules, 
 when he was advancing from boyhood to manhood, a 
 period at which the young, becoming their own masters, 
 
 for it cannot be said that αί παραντίκα ηοΌνα.1 convey no knowledge 
 to the mind ; for who can deny that from listening to music con- 
 templating pictures, and other pleasures of that kind, some knowl- 
 edge may be gained ? Kiihner. 
 
 1 Choose Sin, by troops she shall beside thee stand ; 
 Smooth is the track, her mansion is at hand : 
 Where Virtue dwells the gods have placed before 
 The dropping sweat that springs from every pore ; 
 And ere the foot can reach her high abode, 
 Long, rugged, steep th' ascent, and rough the road. 
 The ridge once gain'd, the path so hard of late. 
 Runs easy on, and level to the gate. Elton. 
 2 '° σοφό;.] Sturz and others consider σοφσς, in this passage, 
 to be the same as σοφιστής but there seems no particular reason 
 why it should not be rendered the wise. " On Prodicus, the famous 
 sophist of Ceos, there is an excellent note of Beierus ad Cic. Off 
 i. 32. See Cobet, Prosop. Xen. p. 35. C. Fr. Hermann, in his Disv. 
 de bocr Mngistris, Marb. 1837, p. 49, seq., judiciously shows that 
 those are mistaken who think that Prodicus was a teacher of 
 Socrates." Kiihner 
 8 There is an allusion to this fable in Cic. de Off. i. 32. It has been" 
 versified in English, with much elegance, though rather verbosely, 
 by Bishop Lovvth. 
 
6o 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [Β. Π.Ι 
 
 begin to give intimations whether they will enter on 
 life by the path of virtue or that of vice, went forth in- 
 to a solitary place, and sat down perplexed as to which 
 of these two paths he should pursue. 
 
 22. And that two female figures, of lofty stature, 
 seemed to advance towards him, the one of an engag- 
 ing and graceful mien, gifted by nature with elegance 
 of form, modesty of look, and sobriety of demeanor, 1 
 and clad in a white robe ; the other fed to plumpness 
 and softness, but assisted by art both in her complexion, 
 so as to seem fairer and rosier than she really was, and 
 in her gesture so as to seem taller than her natural 
 height ; she had her eyes wide open, 2 and a robe 
 through which her beauty would readily show itself ; 
 she frequently contemplated her figure, and looked 
 about to see if any one else was observing her ; and she 
 frequently glanced back at her own shadow. 
 
 23. As they approached nearer to Hercules, she, 
 whom I first described, came forward at the same 
 pace, but the other, eager to get before her, ran up to 
 Hercules, and exclaimed, " I see that you are hesitating, 
 Hercules, by what path you shall enter upon life ; if 
 then you make a friend of me, I will conduct you by 
 the most delightful and easy road, and you shall taste 
 of every species of pleasure, and lead a life free from 
 every sort of trouble. 
 
 24. In the first place, you shall take no thought of 
 wars or state affairs, but shall pass your time consider- 
 ing what meat or drink you may find to gratify your 
 appetite, what you may delight yourself by seeing or 
 hearing, what you may be pleased with smelling or 
 touching, with what objects of affection you may have 
 most pleasure in associating, how you may sleep most 
 softly, and how you may secure all these enjoyments 
 with the least degree of trouble. 
 
 1 Κίκοσμημϊνην τομένσώμα καιϊαριότητι, κ. τ. λ.] " Adorned as to her 
 
 person with elegance, as to her eyes with modesty, and as to her 
 gesture with sobriety." The reading κα&αριότήτι is properly pre- 
 ferred by Kiihner.to κα.&αρότητι,ί\\β first meaning elegance or grace- 
 fulness, the second purity. 
 
 ένα..] " Wide open," says Kiihner, is equivalent to 
 " looking or staring boldly," in opposition to " modestly cast down." 
 
C ι., s. 28.] CHOICE OE HERCULES. 
 
 61 
 
 25. If an apprehension of want of means, by which 
 such delights maybe obtained, should ever arise in you, 
 there is no fear that I shall urge you to procure them 
 by toil or suffering, either of body or mind ; but you 
 shall enjoy what others acquire by labor, abstaining 
 from nothing by which it may be possible to profit, for 
 I give my followers liberty to benefit themselves from 
 any source whatever." 
 
 26. Hercules, on hearing this address, said, "And 
 what, O, woman, is your name ?" " My friends," she 
 replied, "call me Happiness, but those who hate me, 
 give me, to my disparagement, the name of Vice." 
 
 27. In the mean time the other female approached, 
 and said, " I also am come to address you, Hercules, 
 because I know your parents, and have observed your 
 disposition in the training of your childhood, from 
 which I entertain hopes, that if you direct your steps 
 along the path that leads to my dwelling, you will be- 
 come an excellent performer of whatever is honorable 
 and noble, and that I shall appear more honorable and 
 attractive through your illustrious deeds. I will not 
 deceive you, however, with promises of pleasure, but 
 will set before you things as they really are, and as the 
 gods have appointed them. 
 
 28. For of what is valuable and excellent, the gods 
 grant nothing to mankind without labor and care ; 
 and if you wish the gods, therefore, to be propitious to 
 you, you must worship the gods ; if you seek to be be- 
 loved by your friends, you must serve your friends ; if 
 you desire to be honored by any city, you must benefit 
 that city ; if you long to be admired by all Greece for 
 your merit, you must endeavor to be of advantage to 
 all Greece ; if you are anxious that the earth should 
 yield you abundance of fruit, you must cultivate the 
 earth ; if you think that you should enrich yourself from 
 herds of cattle, you must bestow care upon herds of 
 cattle ; if you are eager to increase your means by war, 
 and to secure freedom to your friends and subdue your 
 enemies, you must learn the arts of war, and learn 
 them from such as understand them, and practise how 
 to use them with advantage ; or if you wish to be 
 
62 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. II 
 
 vigorous in body, you must accustom your body to 
 obey your mind, and exercise it with toil and exer- 
 tion." 
 
 29. Here Vice, interrupting ber speech said, (as Pro- 
 dicus relates), " Do you see, Hercules, by how difficult 
 and tedious a road this woman conducts you to gratifi- 
 cation, while I shall lead you, by an easy and short 
 path, to perfect happiness? " 
 
 30. "Wretched being," rejoined Virtue, "of what 
 good are you in possession ? Or what real pleasure do 
 you experience, when you are unwilling to do any 
 thing for the attainment of it ? You, who do not even 
 wait for the natural desire of gratification, but fill 
 yourself with all manner of dainties before you have 
 an appetite for them, eating before you are hungry, 
 drinking before you are thirsty, procuring cooks that 
 you may eat with pleasure, buying costly wines that 
 you may drink with pleasure, and running about seeking 
 for snow 1 in summer ; while, in order to sleep with 
 pleasure, you prepare not only soft beds, 2 but couches, 
 and rockers under your couches, for you do not desire 
 sleep in consequence of labor, but in consequence of 
 having nothing to do ; you force the sensual inclina- 
 tions before they require gratification, using every 
 species of contrivance for the purpose, and abusing 
 male and female ; for thus it is that you treat your 
 friends, insulting their modesty at night, and making 
 them sleep away the most useful part of their day. 
 
 1 " To cool wine ; for they deposited snow and ice in pits for such 
 purposes. See notes on Athen. iii. p. 124 ; Plin. Η. N. ix. 4 ; Aul. Gell. 
 xix. 5 ; Maerob. Sat. vii. 12." Schneider. See Wyttenbach ad Plu- 
 tarch. Praecept. Sanit. p. 809. Bornemann. 
 
 2 Στρωμι/as.] Properly, couches or beds spread on the ground. 
 With these the luxurious were not content, but prepared for them- 
 selves κΚίναι, or couches with legs, to which they afterward added 
 ύπόδαΰρα, rockers or rollers. Commentators used to interpret 
 vnodadpa, carpets spread under the feet of couches, referring to 
 Cyrop. viii. 8. 1G ; but the true signification of the word has been 
 very learnedly made clear by Schneider from three passages of 
 Antyllus in Fragm. Medicorum, ed. Oribas. ed. Mattheei, p. 114, 170, 
 172 ; from which it appears that the ύπόόαθρα were fulcra diago- 
 nalia, diagonal props, put under the feet of couches, in order that 
 a σεισμός ov rocking might be produced. The effect, as he observes, 
 would be the same as that of suspended cradles. Kiihner. 
 
c. ι., s. 33.] THE CHOICE OF HERCULES. 
 
 63 
 
 31. Though you are one of the immortal, you are cast 
 out from the society of the gods, and despised by the 
 good among mankind ; the sweetest of all sounds, the 
 praises of yourself, 1 you have never heard, nor have you 
 ever seen the most pleasing of all sights, for you have 
 never beheld one meritorious work of your own hand. 
 Who would believe you when you give your word for 
 anything ? Or who would assist you when in need of 
 anything ? Or who, that has proper feeling, would 
 venture to join your company of revellers ? for while 
 they are young they grow impotent in body, and when 
 they are older they are impotent in mind ; they live 
 without labor, and in fatness, through their youth, and 
 pass laboriously, and in wretchedness, through old age ; 
 ashamed of what they have done, oppressed with what 
 they have to do, having run through their pleasures in 
 early years, and laid up afflictions for the close of life. 
 
 32. But I am the companion of the gods ; I associate 
 with virtuous men ; no honorable deed, divine or human, 
 is done without me ; I am honored, most of all, by the 
 deities, and by those among men to whom it belongs to 
 honor me, being a welcome co-operator with artisans, 
 a faithful household guardian to masters, a benevolent 
 assistant to servants, a benign promoter of the labors of 
 peace, a constant auxiliary to the efforts of war, an ex- 
 cellent sharer in friendship. 
 
 33. My friends have a sweet and untroubled enjoy- 
 ment of meat and drink, for they refrain from them 
 till they feel an appetite. They have also sweeter sleep 
 than the idle ; and. are neither annoyed if they lose a 
 portion of it, nor neglect to do their duties for the sake 
 of it. The young are pleased with praises from the old ; 
 the old are delighted with honors from the young. 
 They remember their former acts with pleasure, and 
 rejoice to perform their present occupations with suc- 
 cess; being, through my influence, dear to the gods, 
 beloved by their friends, and honored by their country. 
 
 1 " It is said that Themistocles, when he was asked what acroama, 
 or whose voice, he would hear with most pleasure, replied, 'The 
 voice of him by whom his merits would be best set forth. 1 " Cicero 
 Pro Archiae, c. 9. 
 
■■■■■■ 
 
 64 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. II. 
 
 And when the destined end of life comes, they do not 
 lie in oblivion and dishonor, but, celebrated with songs 
 of praise, flourish forever in the memory of mankind. 
 By such a course of conduct, Ο Hercules, son of noble 
 parents, you may secure the most exalted happiness." 
 
 34. Nearly thus it was that Prodicus related the in- 
 struction of Hercules by Virtue ; adorning the senti- 
 ments, however, with far more magnificent language 
 than that in which I now give them. It becomes you, 
 therefore, Aristippus, reflecting on these admonitions, 
 to endeavor to think of what concerns the future period 
 of your life. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Δ dialogue between Socrates and his son Lamprocles, who had ex- 
 pressed resentment against his mother, on the duty of children 
 to their parents. The ungrateful are to be deemed unjust, sect. 
 1 a The greater benefits a person has received, the more unjust 
 is he if he is ungrateful ; and there are no greater benefits than 
 those which children experience from their parents, 3-6. Hence 
 it follows that a son ought to reverence his mother, though she 
 be severe, when he knows that her severity proceeds from kind 
 motives, 7-12. How great a crime the neglect of filial duty is, 
 appears from the fact that it is punished by the laws and ex- 
 ecrated by mankind, 13, 14. 
 
 1. Having learned, one day, that Lamprocles, the 
 eldest 1 of his sons, had exhibited anger against his 
 mother, "Tell me, my son," said he, "do you know 
 that certain persons are called ungrateful?" "Cer- 
 tainly," replied the youth. "And do you understand 
 how 'it is they act that men give them this appellation ? " 
 " I do," said Lamprocles, " for it is those that have re- 
 ceived a kindness, and that do not make a return 
 when they are able to make one, whom they call un- 
 grateful." "They then appear to you to class the un- 
 grateful with the unjust ? " "I think so." 
 
 2. " And have you ever considered whether, as it is 
 thought unjust to make slaves of our friends, but just 
 to make slaves of our enemies, so it is unjust to be un- 
 
 1 Socrates had three sons, Lamprocles, Soph roniscus, and Blene- 
 xenus. See Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 57. Kuhner. 
 
C. π., s. 5.] DUTY TOWARDS PARENTS. 
 
 65 
 
 grateful toward our friends, but just to be so toward 
 our enemies?" "I certainly have," answered Lam- 
 procles, " and from whomsoever a man receives a favor, 
 whether friend or enemy, and does not endeavor to 
 make a return for it, he is in my opinion unjust." 
 
 3. "If such, then, be the case," pursued Socrates, 
 " ingratitude must be manifest injustice ? " Lampro- 
 cles expressed his assent. " The greater benefits, 
 therefore, a person has received, and makes no return, 
 the more unjust he must be." He assented to this posi- 
 tion also. "Whom, then," asked Socrates, " can we 
 find receiving greater benefits from any persons than 
 children receive from their parents ? children whom 
 their parents have brought from non-existence into 
 existence, to view so many beautiful objects, and to 
 share in so many blessings, as the gods grant to men ; 
 blessings which appear to us so inestimable, that we 
 shrink, in the highest degree, from relinquishing them ; 
 and governments have made death the penalty for the 
 most heinous crimes, in the supposition that they could 
 not suppress injustice by the terror of any greater evil. 
 
 4. You do not, surely, suppose that men beget chil- 
 dren merely to gratify their passions, since the streets 
 are full, as well as the brothels, of means to allay de- 
 sire ; but what we evidently consider, is, from what 
 sort of women the finest 1 children may be born to us, 
 and, uniting with them, we beget children. 
 
 5. The man maintains her who joins with him to pro- 
 duce offspring, and provides, for the children that are 
 likely to be born to him, whatever lie thinks will con- 
 duce to their support, in as great abundance as he can ; 
 while the woman receives and bears the burden, op- 
 pressed and endangering her life, and imparting a por- 
 tion of the nutriment with which she herself is sup- 
 ported ; and, at length, after bearing it the full time, 
 and bringing it forth with great pain, she suckles and 
 cherishes it, though she has received no previous 
 benefit from it, nor does the infant know by whom it is 
 
 1 Ββ'λτιστα.] Kiihner interprets this word robustissima ; but it is 
 better to understand it as meaning good in every way ; excellent in 
 shape, vigor, health, and understanding. 
 
™ύΐ:; ._M.:'.aiitiaS 
 
 66 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. Π. 
 
 tended, nor is it able to signify what it wants, but she, 
 conjecturing what will nourish and please it, tries to 
 satisfy his calls, and feeds it for a long time, both night 
 and day, submitting to the trouble and not knowing 
 what return she will receive for it. 
 
 6. Nor does it satisfy the parents merely to feed their 
 offspring, but as soon as the children appear capable of 
 learning anything, they teach them whatever they 
 know that may be of use for their conduct in life ; and 
 whatever they consider another more capable of com- 
 municating than themselves, they send their sons to 
 him at their own expense, and take care to adopt every 
 course that their children may be as much improved as 
 possible." 
 
 7. Upon this the young man said, " But, even if she 
 has done all this, and many times more than this, no 
 one, assuredly, could endure her ill-humor." "And 
 which do you think," asked Socrates, " more difficult 
 to be endured, the ill-humor of a wild beast, or that of 
 a mother ? " " I think," replied Lamprocles, " that of 
 a mother, at least of such a mother as mine is." " Has 
 she ever then inflicted any hurt upon you, by biting or 
 kicking you, as many have often suffered from wild 
 beasts ? " 
 
 8. " No ; but, by Jupiter, she says such things as no 
 one would endure to hear for the value of all that he 
 possesses." "And do you reflect," returned Socrates, 
 "how much grievous trouble you have given her by 
 your peevishness, by voice and by action, in the day 
 and in the night, and how much anxiety you have 
 caused her when you were ill?" "But I have never 
 said or done anything to her," replied Lamprocles, "at 
 which she could feel ashamed." 
 
 9. " Do you think it, then," inquired Socrates, " a more 
 i difficult thing for you to listen to what she Rays, than 
 
 for actors to listen when they litter the bitterest re- 
 proaches against one another in tragedies ? " " But ac- 
 tors, I imagine, endure such reproaches easily, because 
 they do not think that, of the speakers, the one who 
 utters reproaches, utters them with intent to do harm, 
 or that the one who utters threats, utters them with 
 
c. π., s. 13.] DUTY TOWARDS PARENTS. 
 
 67 
 
 any evil purpose." " Yet you are displeased at your 
 mother, although you will know that whatever she 
 says, she not only says nothing with intent to do you 
 harm, but that she wishes you more good than any 
 other human being. Or do you suppose that your 
 mother meditates evil toward you?" " No, indeed," 
 said Lamprocles, " that I do not imagine." 
 
 10. " Do you then say that this mother," rejoined So- 
 crates, " who is so benevolent to you, who, when you 
 are ill, takes care of you, to the utmost of her power, 
 that you may recover your health, and that you may 
 want nothing that is necessary for you, and who, be- 
 sides, entreats the gods for many blessings on your 
 head, and pays vows for you, is a harsh mother? For 
 my part, I think that if you can not endure such a 
 mother, you can not endure any thing that is good ? 
 
 11. But tell me," continued he, " whether you think 
 that you ought to pay respect to any other human being, 
 or whether you are resolved to try to please nobody, 
 and to follow or obey neither a general nor any other 
 commander?" "No, indeed," replied Lamprocles, "I 
 have formed no sucli resolutions." 
 
 12. "Are you then willing," inquired Socrates, "to 
 cultivate the good-will of your neighbor, that he may 
 kindle a fire for you when you want it, or aid you in 
 obtaining some good, or, if you happen to meet with 
 any misfortune, may assist you with willing and ready 
 help?" "I am," replied he. "Or would it make no 
 difference," rejoined Socrates, " whether a fellow-trav- 
 eller, or a fellow-voyager, or any other person that you 
 met with, should be your friend or enemy? Or do you 
 think that you ought to cultivate their good-will?" 
 " I think that I ought," replied Lamprocles. 
 
 13. " You are then prepared," returned Socrates, " to 
 pay attention to such persons ; and do you think that 
 you ought to pay no respect to your mother, who loves 
 you more than any one else? Do you not know that 
 the state takes no account of any other species of in- 
 gratitude, nor allows any action at law for it, over- 
 looking such as receive a favor and make no return for 
 it, but that if a person does not pay due regard to his 
 
m ■■■■ 
 
 68 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. II. 
 
 parents, it imposes a punishment on him, 1 rejects his 
 services, and does not allow him to hold the arch- 
 onship, considering that such a person cannot piously 
 perform the sacrifices offered for the country, or dis- 
 charge any other duty with propriety and justice. In- 
 deed, if any one does not keep up the sepulchers of his 
 dead parents, the state inquires into it in the examina- 
 tions of candidates for office. 
 
 14. You therefore, my son, if you are wise, will en- 
 treat the gods to pardon you if you have been wanting 
 in respect toward your mother, lest, regarding you as 
 an ungrateful person, they should be disinclined to do 
 you good ; and you will have regard, also, to the opinion 
 of men, lest, observing you to be neglectful of your 
 parents, they should all condemn you, and you should 
 then be found destitute of friends ; for if men surmise 
 that you are ungrateful toward your parents, no one 
 will believe that if he does you a kindness he will meet 
 with gratitude in return. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Socrates, hearing that two brothers, Chaerephon and Chserecrates, 
 had quarrelled, recommends brotherly love to Chserecrates by 
 the following arguments. A brother ought to be regarded as a 
 friend, and esteemed more than wealth, sect. 1 ; for wealth is an 
 uncertain possession, if the possessor of it is destitute of friends, 
 2, 3. Fraternal love, an appointment of Nature ; and men who 
 have brothers are more respected than those who have none, 4. 
 Even though a brother should conceive ill feelings toward us, we 
 should still endeavor to conciliate him, 5-9. How such concilia- 
 tion may be effected, 10-14. The endeavor to conciliate is still 
 more the duty of a younger than of an elder brother, and the 
 more noble the disposition of a brother is, the more easy will it 
 be to conciliate him, 15-17. Brothers should act in unison with 
 one another, like different members of the same body, 18, 19. 
 
 1. Socrates, having observed that Chaerephon and 
 Chserecrates, two brothers well known to him, were at 
 
 1 Concerning the law against disrespect to parents, or ill treat- 
 ment of them, see Meier and Schoemann, Att Proc. iii. 1, p. 288, 
 and C. F. Hermann, Gr. Staats-alterthiimer, sect. 133, 11, p. 254. 
 Kuhner. 
 
C. III., s. 5.] ON BROTHERLY CONCORD. 
 
 69 
 
 variance with each other, and having met with Chsere- 
 crates, said, " Tell me, Chserecrates, you surely are not 
 one of those men, are you, who think wealth more 
 valuable than brothers, when wealth is but a senseless 
 thing, and a brother endowed with reason, when wealth 
 needs protection , while a brother can afford protection, 
 and when wealth, besides, is plentiful, and a brother 
 but one ? 1 
 
 2. It is wonderful, too, that a man should consider 
 brothers to be a detriment to him, because he does not 
 possess his brothers' fortunes, while he does not con- 
 sider his fellow-citizens to be a detriment, because he 
 does not possess their fortunes ; but, in the latter case, 
 he can reason with himself, that it is better for him, 
 living in society with many, to enjoy a competency in 
 security, than, living alone, to possess all the property 
 of his fellow-citizens in fear of danger, while, with regard 
 to brothers, he knows not how to apply such reasoning. 
 
 3. Those who are able, too, purchase slaves that they 
 may have helpers in their work, and procure friends, 
 as being in need of supporters, while they neglect their 
 brothers, as if friends could be made of fellow-citizens, 
 but could not be made of brothers. 
 
 4. Yet it surely conduces greatly to friendship to have 
 been born of the same parents, and to have been brought 
 up together, since, even among brutes, a certain af- 
 fection springs up between those that are reared to- 
 gether. In addition to these considerations, men pay 
 more respect to those who have brothers than to those 
 who have none, and are less forward to commit aggres- 
 sion on them." 
 
 5. To this Chaerecrates made answer, "If, indeed, 
 Socrates, the dissension between us were not great, it 
 might perhaps be my duty to bear with my brother, 
 and not shun his society for slight causes ; for a brother, 
 as you say, is a valuable possession, if he be such as he 
 ought to be ; but when he is nothing of the sort, and is 
 indeed quite the reverse of what he should be, why 
 should I attempt impossibilities?" 
 
 1 "After all, there is more money than brothers." Bysshe's 
 Translation. 
 
■■■■■■ 
 
 70 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. π. 
 
 6. "Whether, then, Chaerecrates," rejoined Socrates, 
 "is Chserephon unable to please any body, as lie is un- 
 able to please you, or are there some whom he certainly 
 can please?" " Yes," replied Chaerecrates, "for it is 
 for this very reason that 1 justly hate him, that he can 
 please others, while to me lie is on all occasions, when- 
 ever he comes in contact with me, a harm rather than 
 a good, both in word and deed." 
 
 7. "Is the case then thus," said Socrates, " that as a 
 horse is a harm to him .who knows not how to manage 
 him, and yet tries to do so, so a brother is a harm, when 
 a person tries to manage him without knowing how to 
 do it?" 
 
 8. " But how can I be ignorant," replied Chaerecrates, 
 " How to manage my brother, when I know how to 
 speak well of him who speaks well of me, and to do well 
 to him who does well to me ? As to one, however, who 
 seeks to vex me both by word and deed. I should not 
 be able either to speak well of him, or to act well toward 
 him, nor will I try." 
 
 9. " You speak strangely, Chaerecrates," rejoined 
 Socrates, "for if a dog of yours were of service to 
 watch your sheep, and fawned upon your shepherds, 
 but snarled when you approached him, you would for- 
 bear to show any ill feeling toward him, but would en- 
 deavor to tame him by kindness ; but as for your 
 brother, though you admit that he would be a great 
 good to you if he were such as he ought to be, and 
 though you confess that you know how to act and speak 
 well with respect to him, you do not even attempt to 
 make him of such service to you as he might be.*' 1 
 
 10. "I fear, Socrates," replied Chaerecrates, "that I 
 have not wisdom enough to render Chserephon such as 
 he ought to be toward me." " Yet there is no need to 
 contrive anything artful or novel to act upon him," 
 said Socrates, "as it appears to me ; for I think that 
 he may be gained over by means which you already 
 know, and may conceive a high esteem for you." 
 
 1 Kiihner, differing from other editors, puts a note of interro- 
 gation at the end of this sentence. It seems better not to take it 
 interrogatively. 
 
C. πι., s. 1 6.] FRATERNAL CONCILIATION. 
 
 11. "Tell me first," said the other, "whether you 
 have observed that I possess any love-charm, which I 
 was not aware that I knew ? " " Answer me this ques- 
 tion," said Socrates : "If you wished to induce any one 
 of your acquaintance, when he offered sacrifice, to in- 
 vite you to his feast, what would you do ? " "I should 
 doubtless begin by inviting him when I offered sacrifice." 
 
 12. " And if you wished to prevail on any of your 
 friends to take care of your property, when you went 
 from home, what would you do ? " "I should certainly 
 first offer to take care of his property, when he went 
 from home." 
 
 13. " And if you wished to induce an acquaintance 
 in a foreign land to receive you hospitably when you 
 visited his country, what would you do?" "I should 
 unquestionably be the first to receive him hospitably 
 when he came to Athens ; and if I wished him to be 
 desirous to effect for me the objects for which I went 
 thither, it is clear that I must first confer a similar 
 service on him." 
 
 14. "Have you not long been unawares acquainted, 
 then, with all the love-charms that exist among man- 
 kind ? Or are you afraid." continued Socrates, "to 
 make the first advances, lest you should seem to degrade 
 yourself, if you should be the first to propitiate your 
 brother ? Yet he is thought to be a man deserving of 
 great praise, who is the first to do harm to the enemy, 
 and to do good to his friends. If, then, Chserephon had 
 appeared to me more likely to bring you to this frame 
 of mind, I would have endeavored to persuade him first 
 to try to make you his friend ; but, as things stand, you 
 seem more likely, if you take the lead, to effect the 
 desired object." 
 
 15. "You speak unreasonably. Socrates," rejoined 
 Chserecrates, ' ' and not as might be expected from you, 
 when you desire me, who am the younger, to take the 
 lead ; for the established practice among all men is 
 quite the reverse, being that the elder should always be 
 first, both to act and speak." 
 
 16. "How," said Socrates; "is it not the custom 
 every where that the younger should yield the path to 
 
y 2 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. Π. 
 
 the elder when he meets him, rise from his seat before 
 him, honor him with the softest couch, ,and give place 
 to him in conversation ? Do not therefore hesitate, 
 my good young friend, but endeavor to conciliate your 
 brother, and he will very soon listen to you. Do you 
 not see how fond of honor, and how liberal-minded he 
 is? Mean-minded persons you can not attract more 
 effectually than by giving them something ; but honor- 
 able and good men you may best gain by treating them 
 in a friendly spirit." 
 
 17. " But what if he should become no kinder," said 
 Cliaerecrates, "after I have done what you advise?" 
 " It will be of no consequence," replied Socrates, " for 
 what other risk will you run but that of showing that 
 you are kind and full of brotherly affection, and that 
 he is mean-spirited and unworthy of any kindness? 
 But I apprehend no sucli result ; for I conceive that 
 when he finds you challenging him to such a contest, 
 he will be extremely emulous to excel you in doing 
 kindnesses both by word and deed. 
 
 18. At present, you are in the same case as if the two 
 hands, which the gods have made to assist each other, 
 should neglect this duty, and begin to impede each 
 other ; or as if the two feet, formed by divine provi- 
 dence to co-operate with one another, should give up 
 this office, and obstruct one another. 
 
 19. Would it not be a great folly and misfortune to 
 use for our hurt what was formed for our benefit? 
 And indeed, as it appears to me, the gods have de- 
 signed brothers to be of greater mutual service than the 
 hands, or feet, or eyes, or other members which they 
 have made in pairs for men ; for the hands, if required 
 to do things, at the same time, at greater distance than 
 a fathom, would be unable to do them ; the feet can 
 not reach two objects, at the same time, that are dis- 
 tant even a fathom ; and the eyes, which seem to reach 
 to the greatest distance, can not, of objects that are 
 much nearer, see at the same time those that are before 
 and behind them ; but brothers, if they are in friend- 
 ship, can, even at the greatest distance, act in concert 
 and for mutual benefit." 
 
c. iv., s. 4.] VALUE OF FRIENDS. 
 
 73 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 On the value of friendship. Many are more desirous to acquire 
 property than friends, sect. 1-1. But no species of property is 
 more valuable, lasting, and useful than a good friend : his 
 qualities enumerated, 5-7. 
 
 1. I heard him, also, on one occasion, holding a dis- 
 course concerning friends, 1 by which, as it seems to me, 
 a person might be greatly benefited, both as to the 
 acquisition and use of friends ; for he said that he had 
 heard many people observe that a true and honest 
 friend was the most valuable of all possessions, but that 
 he saw the greater part of mankind attending to any 
 thing rather than securing friends. 
 
 2. He observed them, he added, industriously en- 
 deavoring to procure houses and lands, slaves, cattle, 
 and furniture ; but as for a friend, whom they called 
 the greatest of blessings, he saw the majority consid- 
 ering neither how to procure one, nor how those whom 
 they had might be retained. 
 
 3. Even when friends and slaves were sick, he said 
 that he noticed people calling in physicians to their 
 slaA^es, and carefully providing other means for their 
 recovery, but paying no attention to their friends ; 
 and that if both died, they grieved for their slaves, and 
 thought that they had suffered a loss, but considered 
 that they lost nothing in losing friends. Of their other 
 possessions they left nothing untended or unheeded, 
 but when their friends required attention, they utterly 
 neglected them. 
 
 4. In addition to these remarks he observed that he 
 saw the greater part of mankind acquainted with the 
 number of their other possessions, although they might 
 be veiy numerous, but of their friends, though but 
 few, they were not only ignorant of the number, but 
 even when they attempted to reckon it to such as asked 
 
 1 The sentiments of Plato's Socrates concerning friendship are 
 given in his Lysis ; but Stallbaum, in a note on it, p. 89, has justly 
 observed that that subject is much more acutely and copiously 
 discussed in the Symposium and Pheedrus. Kiihner. 
 
 4 
 
74 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. II. 
 
 them, they set aside again 1 some that they had previ- 
 ously counted among their friends ; so little did they 
 allow their friends to occupy their thoughts. 
 
 5. Yet in comparison with what possession, of all 
 others, would not a good friend appear far more valu- 
 able? What sort of horse, or yoke of oxen, is so useful 
 as a truly good friend ? What slave is so well-disposed 
 or so attached, or what other acquisition so beneficial ? 
 
 6. For a good friend is ready to supply whatever is 
 wanting on the part of his friend, whether in his private 
 affairs, or for the public interests ; if he is required to 
 do a service to any one, he assists him with the means ; 
 if any apprehension alarms him, he lends him his aid, 
 sometimes sharing expenditure with him, sometimes 
 co-operating with him, sometimes joining with him to 
 persuade others, sometimes using force toward others ; 
 frequently cheering him when he is successful, and 
 frequently supporting him when he is in danger of 
 falling. 
 
 7. What the hands do, what the eyes foresee, what 
 the ears hear, what the feet accomplish, for each indi- 
 vidual, his friend, of all such services, fails to perform 
 no one ; and oftentimes, what a person has not effected 
 for himself, or has not seen, or has not heard, or has not 
 accomplished, a friend has succeeded in executing for 
 his friend ; and yet, while people try to foster trees for 
 the sake of their fruit, the greater portion of mankind 
 are heedless and neglectful 2 of that most productive 
 possession which is called a friend. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 On the different estimation in which different friends are to be held. 
 We ought to examine ourselves, and ascertain at what value we 
 may expect our friends to hold us. 
 
 1. I heard one day another dissertation of his, which 
 seemed to me to exhort the hearer to examine himself, 
 
 1 See note on i. 2. 44. «.««.λ 
 
 2 Άργώϊ και ανειμίνως έπιμέλονται.] " Idly and negligently attend 
 to—." 
 
c. v., s. 5.] SELF-EXAMINATION. 
 
 75 
 
 and ascertain of how much value he was to his friends. 
 Finding that one of his followers was neglectful of a 
 friend who was oppressed with poverty, he asked An- 
 tisthenes, in the presence of the man that neglected his 
 friend, and of several others, saying, " Are there certain 
 settled values for friends, Antisthenes, as there are for 
 slaves ? 
 
 2. For, of slaves, one, perhaps, is worth two minse, 
 another not even half a mina, another five minas, an- 
 other ten. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, is said to have 
 bought an overseer for his silver mines 1 at the price of 
 a whole talent. I am therefore considering whether, 
 as there are certain values for slaves, there are also cer- 
 tain values for friends." 
 
 3. "There are, undoubtedly," replied Antisthenes; 
 " at least I, for my part, should wish one man to be my 
 friend rather than have two minas ; another I should 
 not value at even half a mina ; another I should prefer 
 to ten minae ; and another I would buy for my friend 
 at the sacrifice of all the money and revenues in the 
 world." 2 
 
 4. "If such be the case, therefore," said Socrates, 
 " it would be well for each of us to examine himself, 
 to consider of what value he is in the estimation of his 
 friends ; and to try to be of as much value to them as 
 possible, in order that his friends may be less likely to 
 desert him : for I often hear one man saying that his 
 friend has abandoned him, and another, that a person 
 whom he thought to be his friend has preferred a mina 
 to him. 
 
 5. I am considering, accordingly, whether, as one 
 
 1 Τάργνρεία.] Kiihner reads τάργυ'ρια. "money," but without giv- 
 ing any reason for his preference of that reading. I havo thought 
 it better to follow the generality of editors. 
 
 2 Προ πάντων χρημάτων καλ πόρων.] Πόρων IS the Conjecture of 
 
 Portus or Leunclavius, which many editors have adopted instead 
 of the old πόνων, which Kiihner retains, supposing that it means 
 what is gained by labor, agreeably to the saying in ii. 1. 20, " the 
 gods sell us all good things for labor ; " and that προ πάντων χρημάνων 
 κάί πότων may be a proverbial expression. But this sense of μόνων 
 is so forced, and so destitute of support, that I have preferred the 
 emendation, especially as it is effected with the change of one 
 letter. 
 
76 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [Β. π. 
 
 sells a bad slave, and parts with him for whatever he 
 will fetch, so it may be advisable to give up a worthless 
 friend, when there is an opportunity of receiving more 
 than he is worth. Good slaves I do not often see sold 
 at all, or good friends abandoned." 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 What sort of persons we should choose for our friends, sect. 1-5. 
 How we may ascertain the characters of men, before we form a 
 friendship with them, 6, 7. How we may attach men to us as 
 friends. 8-13. Friendship can exist only between the good and 
 honorable, 14-19 ; between whom it will continue to subsist in 
 spite of differences of opinion, 19-28. Deductions from the pre- 
 ceding remarks, 29-39. 
 
 1. He appeared to me, also, to make his followers 
 wise in examining what sort of persons it was right to 
 attach to themselves as friends, by such conversations as 
 the following : " Tell me, Critobulus," said he, " if we 
 were in need of a good friend, how should we proceed to 
 look for one ? Should we not, in the first place, seek for 
 a person who can govern his appetite, his inclination to 
 wine or sensuality, and abstain from immoderate sleep 
 and idleness ? for one who is overcome by such propen- 
 sities would be unable to do his duty either to himself 
 or his friend." " Assuredly he would not," said Crito- 
 bulus. "It appears then to you that we must avoid 
 one who is at the mercy of such inclinations? " " Un- 
 doubtedly." replied Critobulus. 
 
 2. " Besides," continued Socrates, "does not a man 
 who is extravagant and yet unable to support himself, 
 but is always in want of assistance from his neighbor, a 
 man who, when he borrows, cannot pay, and when he 
 cannot borrow, hates him who will not lend, appear to 
 you to be a dangerous friend ? " " Assuredly," replied 
 Critobulus. "We must therefore avoid such a char- 
 acter?" " We must indeed." 
 
 3. " Again : what sort of friend would he be who has 
 the means of getting money, and covets great wealth, 
 and who, on this account, is a driver of hard bargains, 
 
C. VI., s. 8.] QUALITIES OF A GOOD FRIEND. 77 
 
 and delights to receive, but is unwilling to pay ? " 
 "Such a person appears to me," said Critobulus, " to 
 be a still worse character than the former." 
 
 4. " What then do you think of him, who, from love 
 of getting money, allows himself no time for thinking 
 of anything else but whence he may obtain it ? " " We 
 must avoid him, as it seems to me ; for he would be 
 useless to any one that should make an associate of 
 him." " And what do you think of him who is quarrel- 
 some, and likely to raise up many enemies against his 
 friends?" "We must avoid him also, by Jupiter." 
 "But if a man have none of these bad qualities, but 
 is content to receive obligations, taking no thought of 
 returning them?" "He also would be useless as a 
 friend. But what sort of person, then, Socrates, should 
 we endeavor to make our friend?" 
 
 5. " A person, I think, who, being the reverse of all 
 this, is proof against the seductions of bodily pleasures, 
 is upright and fair in his dealings, and emulous not to 
 be outdone in serving those who serve him, so that he 
 is of advantage to those who associate with him." 
 
 6. " How then shall we find proof of these qualities 
 in him, Socrates, before we associate with him?" 
 " We make proof of statuaries," rejoined Socrates, 
 " not by forming opinions from their words, but whom- 
 soever we observe to have executed his previous statues 
 skillfully, we trust that he will execute others well." 
 
 7. "You mean, then, that the man who is known to 
 have served his former friends, will doubtless be likely 
 to serve such as may be his friends hereafter ? " " Yes ; 
 for whomsoever I know to have previously managed 
 horses with skill, I expect to manage other horses with 
 skill." 
 
 8. "Be it so," said Critobulus ; " but by what means 
 must we make a friend of him who appears to us worthy 
 of our friendship?" "In the first place," answered 
 Socrates, "We must consult the gods, whether they 
 recommend us to make him our friend." "Can you 
 tell me, then," said Critobulus, " how he, who appears 
 eligible to us, and whom the gods do not disapprove, is 
 to be secured ? " 
 
78 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. II. 
 
 9. " Assuredly," returned Socrates, "he is not to be 
 caught by tracking him like the hare, or by wiles, like 
 birds, or by making him prisoner by force, like enemies ; 
 for it would be an arduous task to make a man your 
 friend against his will, or to hold him fast if you were 
 to bind him like a slave; for those who suffer such 
 treatment are rendered enemies rather than friends." 
 
 10. "How then are men made friends?" inquired 
 Critobulus. "They say that there are certain incan- 
 tations, which those who know them, chant to 
 whomsoever they please, and thus make them their 
 friends ; and that there are also love-potions, which 
 those who know them, administer to whomsoever they 
 will, and are in consequence beloved by them." 
 
 11. "And how can we discover these charms?" 
 ' ' You have heard from Homer the song which the 
 Sirens sung to Ulysses, the commencement of which 
 runs thus : 
 
 'Come hither, much-extolled Ulysses, great glory of the 
 Greeks.' " 
 
 " Did the Sirens then, by singing this same song to 
 other men also, detain them so that they were charmed 
 and could not depart from them?" "No; but they 
 sang thus to those who were desirous of being honored 
 for virtue." 
 
 12. " You seem to mean that we ought to apply as 
 charms to any person, such commendations as, when 
 he hears them, he will not suspect that his eulogist 
 utters to ridicule him ; for, if he conceived such a sus- 
 picion, he would rather be rendered an enemy, and 
 would repel men from him ; as, for instance, ii a person 
 were to praise as beautiful, and tall, and strong, one 
 who is conscious that he is short, and deformed, and 
 weak. 
 
 But," added Critobulus, " do you know any other 
 chai'ms?" 
 
 13. " No," said Socrates, " but I have hoard that 
 Pericles knew many, which he used to chant to the 
 city, and make it love him." " And how die Themis- 
 tocles make the city love him ? " " Not, by Jupiter, by 
 
c. VI., s. ιδ.] HOW FRIENDS ARE GAINED. 
 
 79 
 
 uttering charms to it, but by conferring 1 on it some 
 advantage." 
 
 14. " You appear to me to mean, Socrates, that if 
 we would attach to us any good person as a friend, we 
 ourselves should be good both in speaking and acting." 2 
 " And did you think it possible," said Socrates, " for a 
 bad person to attach to himself good men as his 
 friends?" 
 
 15. "I have seen," rejoined Critobulus, " bad orators 
 become friends to good orators, and men bad at com- 
 manding an army becoming friends to men eminently 
 good in the military art." 
 
 16. " Do you then," said Socrates, " regarding the 
 subject of which we are speaking, 3 know any persons, 
 who, being themselves useless, can make useful persons 
 their friends ? " " No, by Jupiter," replied Critobulus ; 
 " but if it is impossible for a worthless person to attach 
 to himself good and honorable friends, it becomes now 
 an object of consideration with me, whether it is pos- 
 sible for one who is himself honorable and good, to be- 
 come, with ease, a friend to the honorable and good." 
 
 17. "What perplexes you, Critobulus, is, that you 
 often see men who are honorable in their conduct, and 
 who refrain from every thing disgraceful, involved, 
 instead of being friends, in dissensions with one an- 
 other, and showing more severity toward each other 
 than the worthless part of mankind." 
 
 18. "Nor is it only private persons," rejoined Crito- 
 bulus, " that act in this manner, but even whole com- 
 munities, which have the greatest regard for what is 
 honorable, and are least inclined to anything disgrace- 
 ful, are often hostilely disposed toward one another. 
 
 1 neptai/zas.] An expression borrowed from witchcraft or sor- 
 cery, when an amulet, or any thing supposed to have a fascinating 
 power, is applied or attached to the person, and termed, in conse- 
 quence, περίαπτον and περίαμμα, as is justly observed by Er- 
 nesti. Schneider. 
 
 2 Άγα#οΰ; Ae-yeiv re και. πράττεις] Referring, as Coray and Herbst 
 think, to the eloquence of Pericles, and the exploits of Themis- 
 tocles. 
 
 3 Π«ρί οϋ διαλεγόμε^α.] Socrates wishes to recall the attention of 
 Critobulus to the subject immediately under discussion. Kiihnei: 
 
So 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. ir. 
 
 19. When I reflect on these differences," continued 
 Critobulus, "I am quite in despair about the acquisi- 
 tion of friends, for I see that the bad cannot be friends 
 with one another ; for how can the ungrateful/ or 
 careless, or avaricious, or faithless, or intemperate, be 
 friends to each other ? indeed the bad appear to me to 
 be altogether disposed by nature to be mutual enemies 
 rather than friends. 
 
 20. Again, the bad, as you observe, can never harm- 
 onize in friendship with the good ; for how can those 
 who commit bad actions be friends with those who 
 abhor such actions ? And yet, if those also who prac- 
 tice virtue fall into dissensions with one another about 
 pre-eminence in their respective communities, and 
 even hate each other through envy, who will ever be 
 friends, or among what class of mankind shall affection 
 and attachment be found ? " 
 
 21. "But these affections act in various ways," re- 
 joined Socrates, " for men have by nature inclinations 
 to attachment, since they stand in need of each other, 
 and feel compassion for each other, and co operate for 
 mutual benefit, and, being conscious that such is the 
 case, have a sense of gratitude toward one another ; 
 but they have also propensities to enmity, for such as 
 think the same objects honorable and desirable, engage 
 in contention for them, and, divided in feelings, be- 
 come enemies. Disputations and anger lead to war ; 
 the desire of aggrandizement excites ill-will ; and envy 
 is followed by hatred. 
 
 22. But, nevertheless, friendship, insinuating itself 
 through all these hinderances, unites together the 
 honorable and good ; for such characters, through af- 
 fection for virtue, prefer the enjoyment of a moderate 
 competency without strife, to the attainment of un- 
 limited power by means of war ; they can endure 
 hunger and thirst without discontent, and take only a 
 fair share of meat and drink, and, though delighted 
 with the attractions of youthful beauty, they can con- 
 trol themselves, so as to forbear from offending those 
 whom they ought not to offend. 
 
 23. By laying aside all avaricious feelings too, they 
 
c. VI., s. 26.] ON FRIENDSHIP. 
 
 81 
 
 can not only be satisfied with their lawful share of the 
 common property, but can even assist one another. 
 They can settle their differences, not only without 
 mutual offense, but even to their mutual benefit. They 
 can prevent their anger from going so far as to cause 
 them repentance ; and envy they entirely banish, by 
 sharing their own property with their friends, and con- 
 sidering that of their friends as their own. 
 
 24. How, then, can it be otherwise than natural, 
 that the honorable and good should be sharers in poli- 
 tical distinctions, not only without detriment, but even 
 with advantage to each other? Those indeed who 
 covet honor and power in states, merely that they may 
 be able to embezzle money, to do violence to others, 
 and to live a life of luxury, must be regarded as un- 
 principled and abandoned characters, and incapable of 
 harmonious union with other men. 
 
 25. But when a person wishes to attain honors in a 
 community, in order, not merely that he may not suffer 
 wrong himself, but that he may assist his friends, as 
 far as is lawful, and may endeavor, in his term of office, 
 to do some service to his country, why should he not, 
 being of such a character, form a close union with 
 another of similar character ? Will he be less able to 
 benefit his friends if he unite himself with the honor- 
 able and good, or will he be less able to serve his 
 country if he have the honorable and good for his 
 colleagues ? 
 
 26. In the public games, indeed, it is plain, that if the 
 strongest were allowed to unite and attack the weaker, 
 they would conquer in all the contests, and carry off all 
 the prizes; and accordingly people do net permit them, 
 in those competitions, to act in such a manner; but 
 since, in political affairs, 1 in which honorable and good 
 men rule, no one hinders another from serving his 
 country in concert with whomsoever he pleases, how 
 can it be otherwise than profitable for him to conduct 
 affairs with the best men as his friends, having these 
 
 1 'En-el ουν eicei μεν ουκ ίωσι τούτο notdv, ev Si τοϊϊ πολοιτικοΐς, κ. τ. γ.] 
 
 " Since, accordingly, they do not permit to act so there (i. e., in the 
 public games), but in political affairs," etc. 
 
 4* 
 
82 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [Β. π 
 
 as colleagues and co-operators, rather than antagonists, 
 in his proceedings ? 
 
 27. It is evident, too, that if one man commences 
 hostilities against another, he will need allies, and will 
 need a great number of them, if he oppose the honor- 
 able and good ; and those who consent to be his allies 
 must be well treated by him, that they may be zealous 
 in his interest ; and it is much better for him to serve 
 the best characters, who are the fewer, than, the in- 
 ferior, who are more numerous ; for the bad require far 
 more favors than the good. 
 
 28. "But strive with good courage, Critobulus," he 
 continued, "to be good yourself, and, having become 
 so, endeavor to gain the friendship of men of honor and 
 virtue. Perhaps I myself also may be able to assist you 
 in this pursuit of the honorable and virtuous, from be- 
 ing naturally disposed to love, for, for whatever per- 
 sons I conceive a liking, I devote myself with ardor, 
 and with my whole mind, to love them, and be loved 
 in return by them, regretting their absence to have 
 mine regretted by them, and longing for their society 
 while they on the other hand long for mine. 
 
 29. I know that you also must cultivate such feelings, 
 whenever you desire to form a friendship with any per- 
 son. Do not conceal from my knowledge, therefore, 
 the persons to whom you may wish to become a friend ; 
 for, from my carefulness to please those who please 
 me, I do not think that I am unskilled in the art of 
 gaining men's affections." 
 
 30. " Indeed, Socrates," replied Critobulus, "I have 
 long desired to receive such instructions as yours, es- 
 pecially if the same knowledge will have effect at once 
 on those who are amiable in mind, and handsome in 
 person." 
 
 31. "But, Critobulus," replied Socrates, "there is 
 nothing in the knowledge that I communicate to make 
 those who are handsome in person endure him who lays 
 hands upon them ; for I am persuaded that men shrunk 
 from Scylla because she offered to put her hands on 
 them ; while every one, they say, was ready to listen to 
 the Sirens, and were enchanted as they listened, because 
 
C. vi., s. 35.] EFFECTS OF JUDICIOUS PRAISE. 83 
 
 they laid hands on no one, but sang to all men from a 
 distance." 
 
 32. " On the understanding, then, that I shall lay my 
 hands on no one," said Critobulus, " tell me if you know 
 
 , any effectual means for securing friends." "But will 
 you never,"' asked Socrates, " apply your lips to theirs?" 
 " Be of good courage, Socrates," said Critobulus, " for 
 I will never apply my lips to those of any person, un- 
 less that person be beautiful." " You have now said," 
 rejoined Socrates, " the exact contrary to what will pro- 
 mote your object ; for the beautiful 1 will not allow such 
 liberties, though the deformed receive them with pleas- 
 ure, thinking that they are accounted beautiful for 
 their mental qualities." 
 
 33. " As I shall caress the beautiful, then," said Crit- 
 obulus, " and caress the good with the utmost ardor, 
 teach me, with confidence, the art of attaching my 
 friends to me." "When, therefore, Critobulus," said 
 Socrates, " you wish to become a friend to any one, 
 will you permit me to say to him concerning you, that 
 you admire him, and desire to be his friend ? " "You 
 may say so," answered Critobulus, " for I have never 
 known any one dislike those who praised him." 
 
 34. " But if I say of you, in addition, that, because 
 you admire him, you feel kindly disposed toward him, 
 will you not think that false information is given of 
 you by me ? " " No : for a kind feeling springs up in 
 myself also toward those whom I regard as kindly dis- 
 posed toward me." 
 
 35. "Such information, then," continued Socrates, 
 "I may communicate regarding you to such as you 
 may wish to make your friends ; but if you enable me 
 also to say concerning you, that you are attentive to 
 your friends ; that you delight in nothing so inuch as 
 in the possession of good friends ; that you pride your- 
 self on the honorable conduct of your friends not less 
 than on your own ; that you rejoice at the good fortune 
 of your friends not less than at your own ; that you are 
 
 1 Καλοί.] Socrates plays on the word καλοί, which referred, as 
 Bornemann observes, both to beauty of person and beauty of 
 mind. 
 
S4 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. a. 
 
 never weary of contriving means by which good fortune 
 may come to your friends ; and that you think it the 
 great virtue of a man to surpass his friends in doing 
 them good and his enemies in doing them harm, I think 
 that I shall be a very useful assistant to you in gaining 
 the affections of worthy friends." 
 
 36. " But why," said Critobulus, "do you say this to 
 me, as if you were not at liberty to say of me any thing 
 you please ? " " No, by Jupiter," replied Socrates ; " I 
 have no such liberty, according to a remark that I once 
 heard from Aspasia ; for she said that skilful match- 
 makers, by reporting witli truth good points of char- 
 acter, had great influence in leading people to form 
 unions, but that those who said what was false, did no 
 good by their praises, for that such as were deceived 
 hated each other and the match-maker alike ; and as I 
 am persuaded that this opinion is correct, I think that 
 I ought not to say, when I praise you, any thing that I 
 cannot utter with truth." 
 
 37. "You are, therefore," returned Critobulus, "a 
 friend of such a kind to me, Socrates, as to assist me, if 
 I have myself any qualities adapted to gain friends ; 
 but if not, you would not be willing to invent any thing 
 to serve me." " And whether, Critobulus," said Soc- 
 rates, " should I appear to serve you more by extolling 
 you with false praises, or by persuading you to endea- 
 vor to become a truly deserving man ? 
 
 38. If this point is not clear to you, consider it with 
 the following illustrations : If, wishing to make the 
 owner of a ship your friend, I should praise you falsely 
 to him, pronouncing you a skilful pilot, and he. be- 
 lieving me, should intrust his ship to you to steer when 
 you are incapable of steering it, would you have any 
 expectation that you would not destroy both yourself 
 and the ship ? Or if. by false representations, I should 
 persuade the state, publicly, to intrust itself to you as 
 a man skilled in military tactics, in judicial proceed- 
 ings, or in political affairs, what do you think that 
 yourself and the state would suffer at your hands ? Or 
 if. in private intercourse, I should induce any of the 
 citizens, by unfounded statements, to commit their 
 
c. vii., s. 2.] EFFECTS OF JUDICIOUS PRAISE. 85 
 
 property to your care, as being a good and diligent 
 manager, would you not, when you came to give proof 
 of your abilities, be convicted of dishonesty, and make 
 yourself appear ridiculous ? 
 
 39. But the shortest, and safest, and best way, Crito- 
 bulus, is to strive to be really good in that in which 
 you wish to be thought good. Whatever are called 
 virtues among mankind, you will find, on considera- 
 tion, capable of being increased by study and exercise. 
 I am of opinion, that it is in accordance with these 
 sentiments, that we ought to endeavor to acquire 
 friends ; if you know any other way, make me acquainted 
 with it." "I should be indeed ashamed," replied Crito- 
 bulus, "to say any thing in opposition to such an 
 opinion ; for I should say what was neither honorable 
 nor true." 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Socrates endeavored to alleviate the necessities of his friends by 
 his instructions, and by exhorting them to assist each other. In 
 this chapter it is particularly shown that any person of liberal 
 education may, when oppressed by poverty, honorably use his 
 talents and accomplishments for his support. 
 
 1. Such difficulties of his friends as arose from ignor- 
 ance, he endeavored to remedy by his counsel ; such as 
 sprung from poverty, by admonishing them to assist 
 each other according to their means. With reference 
 to this point, I will relate what I know of him from 
 having been an ear-witness of what he said. 
 
 Observing Aristarchus, 1 on one occasion looking 
 gloomily, "You seem," said he, "Aristarchus, to be 
 taking something to heart ; but you ought to impart 
 the cause of your uneasiness to your friends ; for per- 
 haps we may by some means lighten it." 
 
 2. " I am, indeed, Socrates," replied Aristarchus, " in 
 great perplexity ; for since the city has been disturbed,' 2 
 
 1 Nothingmore is known of him than is here mentioned. Kiihner. 
 
 2 When Lysander had taken the city, and established the Thirty 
 Tyrants, those who sought to restore the democracy and regain 
 
86 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. Π. 
 
 and many of our people have fled to the Piraeeus, my 
 surviving sisters, and nieces, and cousins have gath- 
 ered about me in such numbers, that there are now in 
 my house fourteen i'reeborn persons. 1 At the same 
 time we receive no profit from our lands, for the enemy 
 are in possession of them ; nor any rent from our houses, 
 for but few inhabitants are left in the city ; no one 
 will buy our furniture, nor is it possible to borrow 
 money from any quarter ; a person, indeed, as it seems 
 to me, would sooner find money by seeking it on the 
 road, than get it by borrowing it. It is a grievous thing 
 to me, therefore, to leave my relations to perish ; and 
 it is impossible for me to support such a number under 
 such circumstances." 
 
 3. Socrates, on hearing this, replied, " And how is it 
 that Ceramon, 2 yonder, though maintaining a great 
 number of people, is not only able to procure what is 
 necessary for himself and them, but gains so much 
 more, also, as to be positively rich, while you, having 
 many to support, are afraid lest you should all perish 
 for want of necessaries?" "Because, assuredly," re- 
 plied Aristarchus, " he maintains slaves, while I have to 
 support free-born persons." 
 
 4. " And which of the two," inquired Socrates, " do 
 you consider to be the better, the free-born persons that 
 are with you. or the slaves that are with Ceramon ? " 
 " I consider the free persons with me as the better." 
 "Is it not then a disgrace that he should gain abund- 
 ance by means of the inferior sort, and that you should 
 be in difficulties while having with you those of _ the 
 better class?" "Such certainly is the case; but it is 
 not at all wonderful ; for 3 he supports artisans ; but I, 
 persons of liberal education." 
 
 their ancient liberty, occupied the Pirseeus under the leadership 
 of Thrasvbulus, and began to make war on the supporters of 
 the oligarchy. See Xen. Hellen. ii. 4. Schneider. 
 
 1 Τους ίλίνδέρονς.] Observe the force of the article : " Fourteen, 
 and those free persons, to say nothing of slaves." Ernesti. 
 
 2 Ό Κεράμων. 1 He is nowhere else mentioned. The article is here 
 used SeiKTiKoij, Ceramon We. Kiihner. 
 
 3 Νη Δί', ϊχ-η, κ. τ. λ.] I have been obliged to supply some words 
 here, which it is absolutely necessary to understand, if we adhere, 
 with Kiihner, to the reading Nij Δί'. " Profecto ille in abundantia 
 
c. νπ., s. 7.] NECESSITY OF LABOR. 
 
 «7 
 
 5. "Artisans then," asked Socrates, "are persons 
 that know how to make something useful?" "Un- 
 questionably," replied Aristarchus. "Is barley-meal, 
 then, useful ? " "Very." "Isbread?" "Notlessso." 
 " And are men's and women's garments, coats, cloaks, 
 and mantles, useful ? " "They are all extremely use- 
 ful." " And do those who are residing with you then, 
 not know how to make any of these things? " " They 
 know how to make them all, as I believe." 
 
 6. " And are you not aware that from the manufac- 
 ture of one of these articles, that of barley-meal, Nau- 
 sicydes 1 supports not only himself and his household, 
 but a great number of swine and oxen besides, and 
 gains, indeed, so much more than lie wants, that he 
 often even assists the government with his money? 
 Are you not aware that Cyrebus, by making bread, 
 maintains his whole household, and lives luxuriously ; 
 that Demea, of Collytus, 2 supports himself by making 
 cloaks, Menon by making woolen cloaks, and that most 
 of the Megarians live by making mantles ? " " Certainly 
 they do." said Aristarchus ; " for they purchase bar- 
 barian slaves and keep them, in order to force them to 
 do what they please ; but I have with me free-born 
 persons and relatives." 
 
 7. "Then," added Socrates, "because they are free 
 and related to you, do you think that they ought to do 
 nothing else but eat and sleep ? Among other free per- 
 sons, do you see that those who live thus spend their 
 time more pleasantly, and do you consider them hap- 
 pier, than those who practice the arts which they know, 
 and which are useful to support life ? Do you find that 
 idleness and carelessness are serviceable to mankind, 
 either for learning what it becomes them to know, or 
 for remembering what they have learned, or for main- 
 taining the health and strength of their bodies, or for 
 
 vivit, ego in egestate : neque id minim est, nam," etc. Finck apud 
 Kiihner. Zeune and Schneider would read negatively μά Δι'. " No, 
 indeed, it is not at all disgraceful, for," etc. ; a change which I 
 cannot but think would much improve the passage. 
 
 1 By the Scholiast on Aristoph. Eccl. 426, he is called άγφιταμοιλόί. 
 Sturz, Lex. Xen. 
 
 2 One of the boroughs or districts into which Attica was divided. 
 
88 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. ii. 
 
 acquiring and preserving what is useful for the support 
 of life, and that industry and diligence are of no service 
 at all. 
 
 8. And as to the arts which you say they know, 
 whether did they learn them as being useless to main- 
 tain life, and with the intention of never practicing 
 any of them, or, on the contrary, with a view to oc- 
 cupy themselves about them, and to reap profit from 
 them? In which condition will men be more temper- 
 ate, living in idleness, or attending to useful employ- 
 ments ? In which condition will they be more honest, 
 if they work, or if they sit in idleness meditating how 
 to procure necessaries ? 
 
 9. Under present circumstances, as I should suppose, 
 you neither feel attached to your relatives, nor they to 
 you. for you find them burdensome to you, and they 
 see that you are annoyed with their company. For 
 such feelings there is danger that dislike may grow 
 stronger and stronger, and that previous friendly in- 
 clination may be diminished. But if you take them 
 under your direction, so that they may be employed, 
 you will love them, when you see that they are serv- 
 iceable to you, and they will grow attached to you, 
 when they find that you feel satisfaction in their society ; 
 and remembering past services with greater pleasure, 
 you will increase the friendly feeling resulting from 
 them, and consequently grow more attached and better 
 disposed toward each other. 
 
 10. If, indeed, they were going to employ themselves 
 in anv thing dishonorable, death would be preferable 
 to it Γ but the accomplishments which they know, are, 
 as it appears, such as are most honorable and becoming 
 to women; and all people execute what they know 
 with the greatest ease and expedition, and with the 
 utmost credit and pleasure. Do not hesitate, there- 
 fore," concluded Socrates, " to recommend to them 
 this line of conduct, which will benefit both you and 
 them ; and they, as it is probable, will cheerfully com- 
 plv with your wishes." 
 
 11. "By the gods," exclaimed Aristarchus, "you 
 seem to me to give such excellent advice, Socrates, 
 
c. vii., s. 14.] ADVANTAGES OF INDUSTRY. 89 
 
 that though hitherto I did not like to borrow money, 
 knowing that when I had spent what I got, I should 
 have no means of repaying it, I now think that I can 
 endure to do so, in order to gain the necessary means 
 of commencing work." 
 
 12. The necessary means were accordingly provided ; 
 wool was bought ; and the women took their dinners 
 as they continued at work, and supped when they had 
 finished their tasks ; they became cheerful instead of 
 gloomy in countenance, and instead of regarding each 
 other with dislike, met the looks of one another with 
 pleasure ; they loved Aristarchus as their protector, 
 and he loved them as being of use to him. At last he 
 came to Socrates, and told him with delight of the state 
 of things in his house ; adding that "the women com- 
 plained of him as being the only person in the house 
 that ate the bread of idleness." 
 
 13. " And do you not tell them," said Socrates, " the 
 fable of the dog ? For they say that when beasts had 
 the faculty of speech, the sheep said to her master, ' you 
 act. strangely, in granting nothing to us who supply 
 you with wool, and lambs, and cheese, except what we 
 get from the ground ; while to the dog, who brings 
 you no such profits, you give a share of the food which 
 you take yourself.' 
 
 14. The dog, hearing these remarks, said, ' And not 
 indeed without reason ; for I am he that protects even 
 yourselves, so that you are neither stolen by men, or 
 carried off by wolves ; while, if I were not to guard you, 
 you would be unable even to feed, for fear lest you 
 should be destroyed.' In consequence it is said that 
 the sheep agreed that the dog should have the superior 
 honor. You, accordingly, tell your relations that you 
 are, in the place of the dog, their guardian and pro- 
 tector, and that, by your means, they work and live in 
 security and pleasure, without suffering injury from 
 any one." 
 
9° 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. ii. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Socrates persuades Eutherus, who was working for hire, to seek 
 some more eligible employment, as his present occupation was 
 not suited for old age, and recommends to him the post of ste- 
 ward to some rich man. An objection on the part of Eutherus, 
 that he should dislike to have to render an account to a master, 
 Socrates opposes with the remark that there is no office in the 
 world free from responsibility. 
 
 1. Seeing an old friend one day, after a considerable 
 interval of time, he said, "Whence do you come, 
 Eutherus?" "I am returned, Socrates," replied 
 Eutherus, "from my retirement abroad at the con- 
 clusion of the Avar ; 1 and I come now from the immedi- 
 ate neighborhood ; for since we were robbed of all our 
 possessions beyond the borders, and my father left me 
 nothing in Attica, I am obliged to live in the city and 
 work with my own hands to procure the necessaries of 
 life ; but this seems to me better than to ask aid of any 
 body, especially as I have nothing on which I could bor- 
 row." 
 
 2. "And how long," said Socrates, "do you think 
 that your bodily labor will serve to earn what you re- 
 quire ? " " Not very long, by Jupiter," replied Euth- 
 erus. " Then," said Socrates, " when you grow older, 
 you will doubtless be in want of money, and no one will 
 be willing to give you wages for your bodily labor." 
 "What you say is true," rejoined Eutherus. 
 
 3. " It will be better for you, therefore," continued 
 Socrates, " to apply yourself immediately to some em- 
 ployment which will maintain you when you are old, 
 and., attaching yourself to some one of those that have 
 larger fortunes (who requires a person to assist him), 
 and, superintending his works, helping to gather in his 
 fruits, and preserve his property, to benefit him, and to 
 be benefited by him in return." 
 
 1 There is no doubt that the allusion here is to the peace of Thera- 
 menes, by which every thing that the Athenians possessed beyond 
 the limits of Attica was taken from them. See Plutarch Lys. 14. 
 Andoc. de Pace, 12. Kriiger. 
 
c. ix., s. ι.] CONVERSATION WITH EUTHERUS. 91 
 
 4. "I should with great reluctance, Socrates," said 
 he, "submit to slavery." "Yet those who have the 
 superintendence in states, and who take care of the 
 public interests, are not the more like slaves on that 
 account, but are thought to have more of the freeman." 
 
 5. "In a word, however," rejoined Eutherus, " I am 
 not at all willing to make myself liable to any one's cen- 
 sure." " But assuredly, Eutherus," said Socrates, " it is 
 not very easy to find an employment in which a person 
 would not be exposed to censure ; for it is difficult to do 
 any thing so as to commit no error ; and it is difficult, 
 even if you have done it without error, to meet with a 
 considerate judge ; for even in the occupation in which 
 you are now engaged I should wonder if it be easy for 
 you to go through it without blame. 
 
 6. But you must endeavor to avoid such employers as 
 are given to censure, and seek such as are candid ; to 
 undertake such duties as you are able to do, and to de- 
 cline such as you can not fulfill ; and to execute what- 
 ever you take upon you in the best manner and with 
 the utmost zeal ; for I think that, by such conduct, you 
 w ill be least exposed to censure, you will most readily 
 find assistance in time of need, and you will live with 
 the greatest ease and freedom from danger, and with 
 the best provision for old age. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Crito, a rich man, complaining that he is harassed by informers, 
 Socrates recommends him to secure the services of Archedemus, 
 a poor man well skilled in the law, to defend him against them ; 
 a plan by which both are benefited. Archedemus also assists 
 others, and gains both reputation and emolument. 
 
 1. I know that he also heard Crito once observe, how 
 difficult it was for a man who wished to mind his own 
 business to live at Athens. 1 " For at this very time," 
 
 1 To live at Athens is said to have been troublesome on account 
 of the sycophantce, or informers, whom the populace allowed to 
 harass and annoy the richer class, in the belief that such liberty 
 helped to support the democracy. Schneider. 
 
92 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. II. 
 
 added he, " there are people bringing actions against 
 me, not because they have suffered any wrong from me, 
 but because they think that I would rather pay them a 
 sum of money than have the trouble of law proceed- 
 ings." 
 
 2. " Tell me, Crito," said Socrates, " do you not keep 
 dogs, that they may drive away the wolves from your 
 sheep ? " " Certainly," answered Crito, " for it is more 
 profitable to me to keep them than not." " Would you 
 not then be inclined to keep a man also, who would be 
 willing and able to drive away from you those that try 
 to molest you?" "I would with pleasure," returned 
 Crito, "if I were not afraid that he would turn 
 against me." 
 
 3. "But do you not see," said Socrates, "that it 
 would be much more pleasant for him to serve himself 
 by gratifying such a man as you than by incurring your 
 enmity. And be assured that there are such characters 
 here, who would be extremely ambitious to have you 
 for a friend." 
 
 4. In consequence of this conversation, they fixed 
 upon Archedemus, a man of great ability both in 
 speaking and acting, but poor ; for he was not of a 
 character to make money by every means, but was a 
 lover of honesty, and a person of superior mind, so that 
 he could draw money from the informers. 1 Crito, 
 therefore, whenever he gathered in his corn, or oil, or 
 wine, or wool, or anything else that grew on his land, 
 used to select a portion of it. and give it to Archedemus ; 
 and used to invite him whenever he sacrificed, 2 and 
 paid him attention in every similar way. 
 
 5. Archedemus, accordingly, thinking that Crito's 
 house -would be a place of refuge for him, showed him 
 
 1 Φιλόχρηστός re και βύφυεστερος ων, άπο των συκοφαντών λαμβάνειν.] 
 Understand ώστ€, "so that he could get the better of the syco- 
 phants, and draw money from them, instead of allowing them to 
 practice on Crito." This is the reading of Kiihner ; most editions 
 have ίφν ραστον etvou, " he said that it was very easy to get money 
 from the sycophants." 
 
 s When the sacrifice was ended, an entertainment followed, to 
 which it was usual to invite kinsmen and friends, as a mark of 
 respect. See Bachius ad Hieron. viii. 3. Kiihner. 
 
c. χ., s. ι.] ARCHEDEMUS SERVES CRITO. 
 
 93 
 
 much respect, and quickly discovered, on the part of 
 Crito's accusers, many illegal acts, and many persons 
 who were enemies to those accusers, one of whom he 
 summoned to a public trial, in which it would be 
 settled what he should suffer or pay. 1 
 
 6. This person, being conscious of many crimes, tried 
 every means to get out of the hands of Archedemus ; 
 but Archedemus would not let him off, until he ceased 
 to molest Crito, and gave himself a sum of money besides. 
 
 7. When Archedemus had succeeded in this and some 
 other similar proceedings, then, as when any shepherd 
 has a good dog, other shepherds wish to station their 
 flocks near him, in order to have the benefit of his dog, 
 so likewise many of the friends of Crito begged him to 
 lend them the services of Archedemus as a protector. 
 
 8. Archedemus willingly gratified Crito in this re- 
 spect, and thus not only Crito himself was left at 
 peace, but his friends. And if any of those with whom 
 he was at variance taunted him with receiving favors 
 from Crito, and paying court to him, Archedemus 
 would ask, "whether is it disgraceful to be benefited 
 by honest men. and to make them your friends by 
 serving them in return, and to be at variance with the 
 unprincipled, or to make the honorable and good your 
 enemies by trying to wrong them, and to make the bad 
 your friends by co-operating with them, and associate 
 with the vicious instead of the virtuous ? " From this 
 time Archedemus was one of Crito's friends, and was 
 honored by the other friends of Crito. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Socrates exhorts Diodorus, a rich man, to aid his friend Hermo- 
 genes, who is in extreme poverty. A man endeavors to preserve 
 the life of a slave, and ought surely to use greater exertions to 
 save a friend, who will well repay our kindness. 
 
 1. I am aware that he also held a conversation with 
 Diodorus, one of his followers, to the following effect. 
 
 1 '0 η Sel πα&Λν η άττοτΐσαι.] A legal expression, μαΰείν referring 
 to corporal punishment, άποτϊσαι to a pecuniary fine. 
 
94 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. ii. 
 
 "Tell me, Diodorus," said he, "if one of your slaves 
 runs away, do you use any care to recover him ? " 
 
 2. "Yes, indeed," answered he, "and I call others to 
 my aid, by offering rewards for capturing him." " And 
 if any of your slaves falls ill," continued Socrates, " do 
 you pay any attention to him, and call in medical men, 
 that he may not die?" " Certainly," replied the other. 
 " And if any one of your friends, who is far more valu- 
 able to you than all your slaves, is in danger of perish- 
 ing of want, do you not think that it becomes you to 
 take care of him, that his life may be saved ? 
 
 3. But you are not ignorant that Hermogenes is not 
 ungrateful, and would be ashamed, if, after being as- 
 sisted by you, lie were not to serve you in return ; and 
 indeed to secure such a supporter as he, willing, well- 
 disposed, steady, and not only able to do what he is 
 directed, but capable of being useful of himself, and of 
 taking forethought, and forming plans for you, I con- 
 sider equivalent to the value of many slaves. 
 
 4. Good economists say that you ought to buy, when 
 you can purchase for a little what is worth much ; but 
 now, in consequence of the troubled state of affairs, it 
 is possible to obtain good friends at a very easy rate." 
 
 5. " You say well, Socrates," rejoined Diodorus ; 
 "and therefore tell Hermogenes to come to me." 
 "No, hy Jupiter," said Socrates, "I shall not; for I 
 think it not so honorable for you to send for him as to 
 go yourself to him ; nor do I consider it a greater 
 benefit to him than to you that this intercourse should 
 take place." 
 
 6. Diodorus accordingly went to Hermogenes, and 
 secured, at no great expense, a friend who made it his 
 business to consider by what words or deeds he could 
 profit or please Diodorus. 
 
BOOK III. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Socrates used to exhort those who aspired to public offices to 
 learn the duties that would be required in them. The duties of 
 a military commander, and his responsibilities, sect. 1-5. He 
 must know many things besides military tactics, 6-11. 
 
 1. I will now show that Socrates was of great service 
 to those who aspired to posts of honor, 1 by rendering 
 them attentive to the duties of the offices which they 
 sought. 
 
 Having heard that Dionysodorus 2 had arrived at the 
 city, offering to teach the art of a general, he said to 
 one of those who were with him, whom he observed to 
 be desirous of obtaining that honor in the state. 
 
 2. "It is indeed unbecoming, young man, that he 
 who wishes to be commander of an army in his country 
 should neglect to learn the duties of that office when 
 he has an opportunity of learning them ; and such a 
 person would be far more justly punished by his coun- 
 try than one who should contract to make statues for 
 it, when he had not learned to make them. 
 
 3. For as the whole state, in the perils of war, is 
 intrusted to the care of the general, it is likely that 
 great advantages will occur if he act well, and great 
 evils if he fall into error. How, then, would not he, 
 who neglects to learn the duties of the office, while he 
 is eager to be elected to it, be deservedly punished ? " 
 By making such observations, he induced the young 
 man to go and learn. 
 
 1 Των καΚων.] Τα καλά are here munera publico,, honores. See 
 Weiske ad h. 1., and Haas, ad lib. de Rep. Lac. p. 95, seq. Kuhner. 
 
 3 A native of Chios, and brother of Euthydemus. He first taught 
 the military art at Athens, and then devoted himself to the profes- 
 sion of the Sophists. See Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 38. Kuhner. 
 
9 6 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. III. 
 
 4. When, after having learned, he returned to 
 Socrates again, he began to joke upon him, saying, 
 " Since Homer, my friends, has represented Agamem- 
 non as dignified, 1 does not this young man, after learn- 
 ing to be a general, seem to you to look more dignified 
 than before ? For as he who has learned to play the 
 lyre is a lyrist, though he may not use the instrument, 
 and he who has learned the art of healing is a physi- 
 cian, though he may not practice his art, so this youth 
 will from henceforth be a general, though no one may 
 elect him to command ; but he who wants the proper 
 knowledge is neither general nor physician, even 
 though he be chosen to act as such by all the people in 
 the world. 
 
 5. " But," he continued, " in order that we may have 
 a better knowledge of the military art, in case any one 
 of us should have to command a troop or company un- 
 der you, tell us how he began to teach you generalship ? " 
 " He began," replied the youth, " with the same thing 
 with which he ended ; for he taught me tactics, and 
 nothing else." 
 
 6. " But," said Socrates, " how small a part of the 
 qualifications of a general is this ! For a general must 
 be skillful in preparing what is necessary for war, able 2 
 in securing provisions for his troops, a man of great 
 contrivance and activity, careful, persevering, and 
 sagacious ; kind, and yet severe ; open, yet crafty ; 
 careful of his own, yet ready to steal from others ; 
 profuse, yet rapacious ; lavish of presents, yet eager to 
 acquire money ; cautious, yet enterprising ; and many 
 other qualities there are, both natural and acquired, 
 which he, who would fill the office of general with 
 ability, must possess. 
 
 7. It is good, indeed, to be skilled in tactics ; for a 
 well-arranged army is very different from a disorderly 
 one ; as stones and bricks, wood and tiles, if thrown 
 together in confusion, are of no use whatever ; but 
 when the stones and tiles, materials not likely to rot 
 or decay, are placed at the bottom and the top, and the 
 bricks and wood are arranged in the middle (as in 
 
 1 Tepapov. II. iii. 171. 8 Compare Cyrop. i. 6, 12, seqq. 
 
C. I., s. io.] THE DUTIES OF A GENERAL. 97 
 
 building) , a house, which is a valuable piece of property, 
 is formed." 1 
 
 8. "What you have said. Socrates," rejoined the 
 youth, " is an exact illustration of our practice ; for in 
 the field of battle we must place the bravest troops in 
 the front and rear, and the cowardly in the middle, 
 that they may be led on by those before them, and 
 pushed forward by those behind." 2 
 
 9. "If indeed he has taught you to distinguish the 
 brave and cowardly," rejoined Socrates, "that rule 
 may be of use ; but if not, what profit is there in what 
 you have learned ? for if he ordered you, in arranging 
 a number of coins, to lay the best first and last, and the 
 worst in the middle, and gave you no instructions how 
 to distinguish the good and bad, his orders to you 
 would be to no purpose." " But indeed," he replied, 
 " he did not teach me this ; so that we must distinguish 
 the brave from the cowardly ourselves. " 3 
 
 10. " Why should we not consider then," said So- 
 crates, " how we may avoid mistakes as to that 
 matter?" "I am willing," returned the young man. 
 " If then we had to capture a sum of money, and were 
 to place the most covetous men in front, should we not 
 arrange them properly?" "It appears so to me." 
 " And what must generals do when entering on a perilous 
 enterprise ? Must they not place the most ambitious in 
 front?" " They at least," said the young man, "are 
 those who are ready to brave danger for the sake of 
 praise ; and they are by no means difficult to discover, 
 but will be every where conspicuous and easy to be 
 selected." 4 
 
 1 Compare Cyrop. vi. 3, 25. 
 
 2 See Cyrop. vii. 5. 5. As Homer, II. iv. 297, says of Nestor, 
 
 The horse and chariots to the front assign'd, 
 The foot (the strength of war) he rang'd behind ; 
 The middle space suspected troops supply. 
 Inclos'd by both, nor left the power to fly. Pope. 
 
 3 So that if we have to decide which are good, and which bad, we 
 must, make the decision for ourselves. Kiihner. 
 
 4 These remarks on the easiness of discovering the ambitious, are 
 given to the young man by Schneider, Kiihner, and, I believe, all 
 other editors ; but it might be inquired whether they are not more 
 suitable to the character of Socrates, to whom Sarah Fielding has 
 taken the liberty of giving them. 
 
 5 
 
9 δ 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. hi. 
 
 11. "But did your instructor," inquired Socrates, 
 " teach you to arrange an army, merely, or did he tell 
 you for what purpose, and in what manner, you must 
 employ each division of your forces?" "Not at all," 
 replied he. "Yet there are many occasions, on which 
 it is not proper to draw up an army, or to conduct it, 
 in the same way." " But, by Jupiter, he gave me no 
 explanation as to such occasions." "Go, again, then, 
 by all means," said Socrates, "and question him; for 
 if he knows, and is not quite shameless, he will blush, 
 after taking your money, to send you away in ignor- 
 ance." 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 A good general ought to take measures for the safety, maintenance, 
 and success of bis troops ; and not to study his own honor alone, 
 but that of his whole army. 
 
 1. Having met, on some occasion, a person who had 
 been elected general, Socrates said to him, " Why is it, 
 do you think, that Homer has styled Agamemnon 
 ' Shepherd of the people ? ' Is it not for this reason, 
 that as a shepherd must be careful that his sheep be 
 safe, and have food, and the object may be effected for 
 which they are kept, so a general must take care that 
 his soldiers be safe, and have provisions, and that the 
 object be effected for which they serve? and they 
 serve, no doubt, that they may increase their gratifica- 
 tions by conquering the enemy. 
 
 2. Or why has he praised Agamemnon in the follow- 
 ing manner, saying that he was 
 
 Both characters, a good king, and an efficient warrior ? 1 
 
 Does he not mean that he would not have been ' ' an 
 efficient warrior " if he had fought courageously alone 
 against the enemy, and if he had not been the cause 
 of courage to his whole army ; and that he would not 
 have been " a good king," if he had attended to his own 
 1 II. iii. 179. 
 
C. πι., s. i.] DUTIES OF A CAVALRY OFFICER. 99 
 
 subsistence only, and had not been the cause of com- 
 fort to those over whom he ruled ? 
 
 3. For a man is chosen king, not that he may take 
 good care of himself, but that those who have chosen 
 him may prosper by his means ; and all men, when 
 they take the field, take it that their lives may be 
 rendered as happy as possible, and choose generals 
 that they may conduct them to the accomplishment of 
 that object. 
 
 4. It is incumbent on the leader of an army, there- 
 fore, to carry into execution the views of those who 
 have chosen him their leader. Nor is it easy to find 
 anything more honorable than such exertion, or more 
 disgraceful than an opposite course of conduct." 
 
 Thus considering what was the merit of a good 
 leader, he omitted other points in his character, and 
 left only this, that he should render those whom he com- 
 manded happy. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The duty of a commander of cavalry is twofold, to improve the 
 condition both of his men and his horses ; and not to leave the 
 care of the horses to the troops, sect. 1-4. How he should train 
 his men, and how he should be himself qualified to do so, 5-10. 
 He should acquire oratorial power, that he may incite his men 
 to exertion, and fire them with the desire of glory, 11-15. 
 
 1. I remember that he held a dialogue with a person 
 who had been chosen Hipparch, 1 to the following pur- 
 port : " Could you tell me, young man," said he, " with 
 what object you desired to be a Hipparch ? It certainly 
 was not for the sake of riding first among the cavalry ; 
 for the horse-archers are honored with that dignity, 
 as they ride even before the Hipparchs." " You say the 
 truth," said the youth. " Nor was it surely for the 
 sake of being noticed, for even madmen are noticed 
 
 1 There were at Athens two ίππαρχοι, or commanders of the 
 horse, who had supreme authority over the cavalry, but were 
 subject to the orders of the ten στρατηγοί, or commanders of the 
 infantry. The duties of a Hipparch, Xenophon has described in 
 his treatise entitled Ίππαρχικόϊ. Kuhner. 
 
IOO MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. πι. 
 
 by everybody." "You say the truth in that respect 
 also." 
 
 2. "But was it, then, that you expect to render the 
 cavalry better, and present them in that condition to 
 your country, and that, if there should be need for the 
 services of cavalry, you hope, as their leader, to be 
 the author of some advantage to the state?" "I do 
 hope so, certainly." "And it will be truly honorable 
 to you," continued Socrates, " if you are able to effect 
 that object. But the office, to which you have been 
 chosen, takes charge of both the horses and riders?" 
 " It does so," said the young man. 
 
 3. " Come then, tell me this first of all, how you pro- 
 pose to render the horses better?" "That," replied 
 the other, " I do not consider to be my business ; for I 
 think that each man, individually, must take care of 
 his own horse." 
 
 4. "If, then," said Socrates, "some of the men 
 should present their horses before you so diseased in 
 the feet, so weak in the legs, or so feeble in body, and 
 others, theirs so ill-fed, that they could not follow you ; 
 others, theirs so unmanageable, that they would not 
 remain where you posted them ; others, theirs so 
 vicious that it would not be possible to post them at 
 all ; what would be the use of such cavalry to you ? 
 Or how would you be able, at the head of them, to be 
 of any service to your country ? " "You admonish me 
 well," said the youth, "and I will try to look to the 
 horses as far as may be in my power." 
 
 5. " And will you not also endeavor," asked Socrates, 
 "to make the riders better?" "I will." said he. 
 " You will first of all, then, make them more expert in 
 mounting their horses." " I ought to do so ; for if any 
 of them should fall off, they would thus be better pre- 
 pared to recover themselves." 
 
 6. " If, then," said Socrates, " you should be obliged 
 to hazard an engagement, whether will you order your 
 men to bring the enemy down to the level sand 1 on 
 
 1 The cavalry were exercised on level ground streVed with sand ; 
 hence such places were called άμμόδρομοι. See Lexic. apud Ruhnk. 
 ad Timaeum, p. 23, ed. ii. Schneider. See also Hipparch. i. 5, and 
 Schneider ad Hipparch. iii. 10. 
 
c. in., s. ii.] DUTIES OF A CAVALRY OFFICER. 101 
 
 which you have been accustomed to ride, or will you 
 try to exercise them on such ground as that on which 
 the enemy may show themselves?" "The latter 
 method will be the better," said the young man. 
 
 7. "Will you also take any care that the greatest 
 possible number of your men may be able to hurl the 
 dart on horseback?" " That will be better, too," re- 
 plied he. " And have you considered how to whet the 
 courage of your cavalry, since you intend to make 
 them more courageous, and animate them against the 
 enemy ? " " If I have not yet considered," said he, " I 
 will now try to do so." 
 
 8. "And have you at all considered how your cav- 
 alry may be induced to obey you ? For without obedi- 
 ence you will have no profit either from horses or 
 horsemen, spirited and valiant as they may be." 
 " You say the truth, Socrates, said he ; " but by what 
 means can a leader most effectually induce them to 
 obedience ? " 
 
 9. " You are doubtless aware that in all circum- 
 stances men most willingly obey those whom they 
 consider most able to direct ; for in sickness patients 
 obey him whom they think the best physician ; on 
 shipboard, the passengers obey him whom they think 
 the best pilot, and in agriculture, people obey him 
 whom they deem the best husbandman." " Unques- 
 tionably," said the young man. " Is it not then likely," 
 said Socrates, "that in horsemanship also, others will 
 be most willing to obey him who appears to know 
 best what he ought to do? " 
 
 10. " If, therefore, Socrates, I should myself appear 
 the best horseman among them, will that circumstance 
 be sufficient to induce them to obey me?" "If you 
 convince them in addition," said Socrates, "that it is 
 better and safer for them to obey you." "How, then 
 shall I convince them of that ? " "With much more 
 ease," replied Socrates, "than if you had to convince 
 them that bad things are better and more profitable 
 yian good." 
 
 "11. "You mean," said the young man, "that a 
 commander of cavalry, in addition to his other qual- 
 
102 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. in. 
 
 ifications, should study to acquire some ability in 
 speaking." " And did you think," asked Socrates, 
 " that you would command cavalry by silence ? Have 
 you not reflected, that whatever excellent principles 
 we have learned according to law, 1 principles by 
 which we know how to live, we learned all through 
 the medium of speech ; and that whatever other valu- 
 able instruction any person acquires, he acquires it by 
 means of speech likewise ? Do not those who teach 
 best, use speech most ; and those who know the most 
 important truths, discuss them with the greatest elo- 
 quence ? 
 
 12. Or have you not observed, 2 that when a band of 
 dancers and musicians is formed from this city, as 
 that, for instance, which is sent to Delos, 3 no one from 
 any other quarter can compete with it ; and that in no 
 other city is manly grace 4 shown by numbers of peo- 
 ple like that which is seen here?" " What you say is 
 true," said he. 
 
 13. " But it is not so much in sweetness of voice, or 
 in size and strength of body, that the Athenians excel 
 other people, as in ambition, which is the greatest in- 
 citement to whatever is honorable and noble." " This 
 also is true," said he. 
 
 14. " Do you not think, then," said Socrates, " that 
 if any one should study to improve the cavalry here, 
 the Athenians would excel other people in that depart- 
 ment also (as well in the decoration of their arms and 
 horses as in the good order of the men, and in boldly 
 
 1 Νόμΐϊ.] That is, more et institutis civitatis. Ernesti. 
 
 2 The idea is, that though the Athenians excel other people in 
 many respects,they excel them in nothing more than in their love of 
 praise. If, therefore, you wish to improve the cavalry, you must 
 bestow praise and honors upon them as often as they do their 
 duty well. Lange. 
 
 3 The Athenians sent a chorus to Delos every year, and a sacred 
 deputation, in which there was also a chorus, every fifth year, to 
 celebrate games in honor of Apollo. It is of this deputation that 
 the passage in iv. 8. 2 is to be understood. Weiske. 
 
 4 He refers to the custom of selecting the best-looking men, both 
 young and old, to walk as Thullophori at the Panathenasa, or feast 
 of Minerva. See Harpocration sub h. v. ibique Valesius, p. 34. 
 Old men are mentioned as Thallophuri by Xen. Sympos. iv. 17. 
 See Athenseus, lib. xiii. p. 565. Schneider. 
 
c. iv. f s 2.] GOOD QUALITIES FOR COMMAND 103 
 
 defying danger to encounter the enemy,) if they 
 thought that by such means they would acquire praise 
 and honor ? " " It is probable," said the young man. 
 " Do not delay, therefore," added Socrates, " but try 
 to excite your men to those exertions by which you 
 will both be benefited yourself, and your countrymen 
 through your means." " I will assuredly try," re- 
 plied he. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Nicomachides complaining that the Athenians had not chosen him 
 general though he was experienced in war, but Antisthenes, 
 who had seen no military service, Socrates proceeds to show- 
 that Antisthenes, although he had never filled the office of com- 
 mander, might have qualities to indicate that he would fill it 
 with success. 
 
 1. Seeing Nicomachides, 1 one day, coming from the 
 assembly for the election of magistrates, he asked him, 
 "Who have been chosen generals, Nicomachides?" 
 " Are not the Athenians the same as ever, Socrates? " 
 he replied: "for they have not chosen me, who am 
 worn out with serving on the list, 2 both as captain and 
 centurion, 3 and with having received so many wounds 
 from the enemy (he then drew aside his robe, and 
 showed the scars of the wounds), but have elected 
 Antisthenes, who has never served in the heavy-armed 
 infantry, nor done any thing remarkable in the cavalry, 
 and who indeed knows nothing, but how to get 
 money." 
 
 2. "Is it not good, however, to know this, said Socra- 
 tes,' "since he will then be able to get necessaries for 
 the troops ? " " But merchants," replied Nicomachides, 
 " are able to collect money : and yet would not on that 
 account, be capable of leading an army." 
 
 1 Nothing is said of him elsewhere. Kiihner. 
 
 *Έκ καταλόγου.] Ε delectu militans. * * * Significatur ratio qua 
 ad militares expeditiones venit. Kiihner : who also refers to 
 Thucyd. viii. 24 ; Aristot. Polit. v. 2 ; and Suidas, v. κατάλογο?. 
 
 3 Λοχαγών και ταξιαρχών.] Serving as λοχαγοί, captain of tAventy- 
 five, and τα£ιαρχ6ϊ, captain of a hundred. 
 
104 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. hi. 
 
 3. " Anthisthenes, however," continued Socrates, "is 
 given to emulation, a quality necessary in a general. 
 Do you not know that whenever he has been chorus- 
 manager 1 he has gained the superiority in all his 
 choruses ? " " But, by Jupiter," rejoined Nicomachides, 
 "there is nothing similar in managing a chorus and 
 an army." 
 
 4. " Yet Antisthenes," said Socrates, " though neither 
 skilled in music nor in teaching a chorus, 2 was able 
 to find out the best masters in these departments." 
 " In the army, accordingly," exclaimed Nicomachides. 
 "he will find others to range his troops for him and 
 others to fight for him ! " 
 
 5. "Well, then," rejoined Socrates, "if he find out 
 and select the best men in military affairs, as he has 
 done in the conduct of his choruses, he will probably 
 attain superiority in this respect also ; and it is likely 
 that he will be more willing to spend money for a vic- 
 tory in war on behalf of the whole state, than for a 
 a victory with a chorus in behalf of his single tribe." 8 
 
 6. " Do you say, then, Socrates," said he, "that it is 
 in the power of the same man to manage a chorus well, 
 and to manage an army well ? " "I say," said Socrates, 
 " that over whatever a man may preside, he will, if he 
 knows what he needs, and is able to provide it, be a 
 good president, whether he have the direction of a 
 chorus, a family, a city, or an army." 
 
 7. "By Jupiter, Socrates," cried Nicomachides, "I 
 should never have expected to hear from you that good 
 managers of a family would also be good generals." 
 "Come, then," proceeded Socrates, " let us consider 
 what are the duties of each of them, that we may un- 
 derstand whether they are the same, or are in any re- 
 spect different." " By all means," said he. 
 
 1 The χορηγός, or chorus-manager, among the Attic writers, is 
 properly he who raised the chorus, and provided it with instruc- 
 tion and everything necessary, at his own expense. Schneider. 
 See Bockh, Sub.CEcon. of Athens, vol. i. p. 487. 
 
 2 Χορών διδασκαλίας.] He that taught and disciplined the χοροί, 
 
 was Called χοροϋ διδάσκαλοι. 
 
 8 The victory belonged, not to the χορηγοί, but to his tribe, in 
 the name of which the money was expended. Schneider. Attica 
 was divided into ten tribes. 
 
C. iv., s. 12.] GOOD QUALITIES FOR COMMAND. 105 
 
 8. " Is it not, then, the duty of both," asked Socra- 
 tes, "to render those under their command obedient 
 and submissive to them ? " "Unquestionably." "Is 
 it not also the duty of both to intrust various employ- 
 ments to such as are fitted to execute them ? " " That 
 is also unquestionable." "To punish the bad, and to 
 honor the good, too, belongs, I think, to each of them." 
 " Undoubtedly." 
 
 9. " And is it not honorable in both to render those 
 under them well-disposed towards them?" "That 
 also is certain." " And do you think it for the interest 
 of both to gain for themselves allies and auxiliaries or 
 not? " " It assuredly is for their interest." " Is it not 
 proper for both also to be careful of their resources ? " 
 "Assuredly." "And is it not proper for both, there- 
 fore, to be attentive and industrious in their respective 
 duties ? " 
 
 10. " All these particulars," said Nicomachides, " are 
 common alike to both, but it is not common to both to 
 fight." "Yet both have doubtless enemies," rejoined 
 Socrateg. " That is probably the case," said the other. 
 " Is it not for the interest of both to gain the super- 
 iority over those enemies ? " 
 
 11. "Certainly ; but to say nothing on that point, 
 what, I ask, will skill in managing a household avail, 
 if it be necessary to fight ? " "It will doubtless in that 
 case, be of the greatest avail," said Socrates ; " for a 
 good manager of a house, knowing that nothing is so 
 advantageous or profitable as to get the better of your 
 enemies when you contend with them, nothing so un- 
 profitable and prejudicial as to be defeated, will zeal- 
 ously seek and provide everything that may con- 
 duce to victory, will carefully watch and guard against 
 whatever tends to defeat, will vigorously engage if he 
 sees that his force is likely to conquer, and, what is not 
 the least important point, will cautiously avoid engag- 
 ing if he finds himself insufficiently prepared. 
 
 12. Do not, therefore, Nicomachides," he added, " de- 
 spise men skillful in managing a household ; for the 
 conduct of private affairs differs from that of public 
 concerns only in magnitude ; in other respects they are 
 
 5* 
 
io6 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. HI. 
 
 similar ; but what is most to be observed is, that neither 
 of them are managed without men, and that private 
 matters are not managed by one species of men, and 
 public matters by another ; for those who conduct 
 public business make use of men not at all differing in 
 nature from those whom the managers of private 
 affairs employ ; and those who know how to employ 
 them conduct either public or private affairs judiciously, 
 while those who do not know will err in the manage- 
 ment of both." 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Conversation of Socrates with Pericles the younger on the manner 
 in which the Athenians might be made to recover their ancient 
 spirit and ambition. They ought to be reminded of the deeds of 
 their ancestors, sect. 1-12 ; and to be taught that indolence has 
 been the cause of their degeneracy, 13. They ought to revive the 
 institutions of their forefathers, or imitate those of the Lace- 
 daemonians, 14 ; and to pay great attention to military affairs, 
 15-25. How the territory of Attica might be best secured against 
 invasion, 26-28. * 
 
 1. Conversing, on one occasion, with Pericles, 1 the 
 son of the great Pericles, Socrates said, " I have hopes, 
 Pericles, that under your leadership the city will be- 
 come more eminent and famous in military affairs, and 
 will get the better of her enemies." " I wish, Socrates," 
 said Pericles, "that what you say may happen ; but 
 how such effects are to be produced, I cannot under- 
 stand." "Are you willing, then," asked Socrates, 
 "that we should have some conversation on these 
 points, and consider how far there is a possibility of 
 effecting what we desire." "I am quite willing," re- 
 plied Pericles. 
 
 2. " Are you aware, then," said Socrates, " that the 
 Athenians are not at all inferior in number to the Boeo- 
 
 1 This is the Pericles, the illegitimate son of the great Pericles, 
 whom the Athenians, when the legitimate sons of the elder Pericles 
 were dead, naturalized, in order to gratify his father. See Plu- 
 tarch in Pericl. extr. Being made general with Thrasylus and 
 Erasinides, and being involved in the ill-success at Arginusae, he 
 was condemned to death, Olymp. xciii. 2. Ernesti. 
 
c. v.,s. 4·] CONVERSATION WITH PERICLES. 107 
 
 tians ? " "I am," said Pericles. " And whether do you 
 think that a greater number of efficient and well- 
 informed men could be selected from the Boeotians, or 
 from the Athenians ? " " The Athenians do not appear 
 to me to be inferior in this respect." " And which of 
 the two peoples do you consider to be more united 
 among themselves ? " "I think that the Athenians are ; 
 for many of the Boeotians, being oppressed by the The- 
 bans, entertain hostile feelings toward them. But at 
 Athens I see nothing of the kind." 
 
 3. " But the Athenians are, moreover, of all people 
 most eager for honor and most friendly in disposition ; 
 qualities which most effectually impel men to face 
 danger in the cause of glory and of their country." 
 "The Athenians are certainly not to be found fault 
 with in these respects." " And assuredly there is no 
 people that can boast of greater or more numerous 
 exploits of their ancestors than the Athenians ; a cir- 
 cumstance by which many are prompted and stimu- 
 lated to cultivate manly courage and to become brave." 
 
 4. "All that you say is true, Socrates, but you see 
 that since the slaughter of the thousand occurred at 
 Lebadeia, under Tolmides, 1 and that at Delium under 
 Hippocrates, 2 the reputation of the Athenians has suf- 
 fered as far as regards the Boeotians, and the spirit of 
 the Boeotians has been raised as far as regards the Ath- 
 enians, so that the Boeotians, indeed, who formerly did 
 
 1 Lebadeia was a town of central Boeotia, between Haliartus and 
 Chseronea; the whole province is now comprehended under the 
 name of Livadia. From the proximity of these places, it has hap- 
 pened that the battle is sometimes called the battle of Lebadeia, 
 sometimes at Chajronea, sometimes at Coronea. See Thucyd. i. 
 113 ; Plutarch, Pericl. c. 18 ; Agesil. c. 19; Diod. Sic. xn. G; Plat, 
 Alcib I p. 132, E. The battle was fought b. c. 447. The 
 " slaughter " was of a thousand Athenians by the Boeotians. Tol- 
 mides was the Athenian general. Kiihner, „ 
 
 3 Hippocrates was a general of the Athenians killed by the Boeo- 
 tians. See Kruger. de Xen. Vit. Questt. Critt. p. 6 Cobet. pros- 
 opogr. Xen. p. 49. The battle at Delium was fought b. c. 424 ; So- 
 crates, as Schneider observes, was present at it, according to 
 Strabo, ix. p. 618, B., and Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Soc. See Thucyd. 
 iv 93 seqq. * * * Delium was a temple of Apollo in Boeotia, near 
 which a little town seems gradually to have arisen ; for Strabo 
 and others speak of a ποΚιχνίον. Kiihner. 
 
Io8 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. in. 
 
 not dare, even on their own soil, to meet the Athenians 
 in the field without the aid of the Spartans and other 
 Peloponnesians, now threaten to invade Attica single · 
 handed ; while the Athenians, who formerly, when the 
 Boeotians were unsupported, ravaged Bceotia, are 
 afraid lest the Boeotians should lay waste Attica." 
 
 5. "I perceive, indeed," said Socrates, "that such is 
 the case ; but the city seems to me now to be more 
 favorably disposed for any good general ; for confidence 
 produces in men carelessness, indolence, and disobedi- 
 ence, but fear renders them more attentive, obedient, 
 and orderly. 
 
 6. You may form a notion of this from people in a 
 ship ; for as long as they fear nothing, they are all in 
 disorder, but as soon as they begin to dread a storm, or 
 the approach of an enemy, they not only do every thing 
 that they are told to do, but are hushed in silence, 
 waiting for the directions to be given, like a band of 
 dancers." 1 
 
 7. " Well, then," said Pericles, "if they would now, 
 assuredly, obey, it would be time for us to discuss how 
 we might incite them to struggle to regain their ancient 
 spirit, glory, and happiness." 
 
 8. "If then," said Socrates, "we wished them to 
 claim property of which others were in possession, we 
 should most effectively urge them to lay claim to it, if 
 we proved that it belonged to their fathers, and was 
 their rightful inheritance ; and since we wish that they 
 should strive for pre-eminence in valor, we must show 
 them that such pre-eminence was indisputably theirs 
 of old, and that if they now exert themselves to recover 
 it, they will be the most powerful of all people." 
 
 9. "How, then, can we convince them of this?" 
 "I think that we may do so, if we remind them that 
 they have heard that their most ancient forefathers, of 
 whom we have any knowledge, were the bravest of 
 men." 
 
 10. " Do you allude to the dispute between the gods, 
 of which Cecrops 2 and his assessors had the decision 
 
 1 Ώσπερ xopevraC] Who always look to the coryphreus, or chorus 
 leader. Schneider. 
 1 Cecrops is said to have set as judge between Neptune and 
 
C. v., s. 12.] CONDITION OF THE ATHENIANS. 109 
 
 on account of their valor ? " " I do allude to that, and 
 to the education and birth of Erechtheus, 1 and the war 
 which occurred in his time with the people of the whole 
 adjoining continent, 2 as well as that which was waged 
 under the Heracleidae against the Peloponnesians, 3 and 
 all the wars that were carried on under Theseus, 4 in all 
 of which they showed themselves the bravest people of 
 their time. 
 
 11. And also, if you please, to what their descendants 
 have since done, who lived not long before our day, not 
 only contending, with their own unassisted strength, 
 against the lords of all Asia and of Europe, as far as 
 Macedonia (who inherited vast power and wealth from 
 their ancestors, and who had themselves performed 
 great achievements), but also distinguished themselves, 
 in conjunction with the Peloponnesians, both by land 
 and sea. They, doubtless, are celebrated as having far 
 surpassed other men of their time." "They are so," 
 Sciid Pericles. 
 
 12. "In consequence, though many migrations oc- 
 curred in Greece, they remained 5 in their own country ; 
 and many, when contending for their rights, submitted 
 their claims to their arbitration, while many others, 
 
 Minerva when they were contending for the dominion over Attica. 
 The fable is related both by other writers and by Apollodorus, 111. 
 14. See Heyne, Observat. p. 321, seqq., and the commentators on 
 Ovid. Met. vi. 70. Schneider. 
 1 Erectheus was the fourth king of Athens. II. ii. 547 : 
 
 Athens the fair, where great Erectheus sway d, 
 That owed his nurture to the blue-ey'd maid, 
 But from the teeming furrow took his birth, 
 The mighty offspring of the foodful earth. Pope. 
 * The continent meant is the country of Thrace, which, in the 
 earliest times, reached to the boundaries of Attica. See Isocrates, 
 Panegyr c. 19. The war intended is that which was waged by the 
 Athenians against the Tliracians and Eleusinians See Goeller ad 
 Thucyd. ii. 15, and Stallbaum ad Plat. Menex. p. 289, B. Kuhner. 
 
 3 The war carried on by the descendants of Hercules against 
 Eurvstheus and the Peloponnesians. Kuhner. 
 
 1 He alludes to the wars carried on against the Amazons and 
 Thracians. Herodot, ix. 27 ; Isocr. Panegyr. c. 19 ; Plutarch, Thes. 
 c. 27 ; Aristid. Panath. p. 201, seqq. ; Lysia? Epitaph, sect. 4, seqq. , 
 Justin ii. 4. Herbst. , , , 
 
 5 Hence the Athenians wished to be thought α.(.υοχ&ον^ and 
 νηγεκεΣϊ : all their praises, to which Xenophon here alludes, are 
 briefly given by Isocrates, in his Panegyric. Schneider. 
 
9 
 
 no 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. III. 
 
 also, when persecuted by more powerful people, sought 
 refuge with them." 
 
 13. " I wonder, indeed, Socrates," said Pericles, " how 
 our city ever degenerated." " I imagine," said Socrates, 
 "that as some other nations 1 have grown indolent 
 through excessive exaltation and power, so likewise 
 the Athenians, after attaining great pre-eminence, 
 grew neglectful of themselves, and consequently be- 
 came degenerate." 
 
 14. "By what means, then," said Pericles, "could 
 they now recover their pristine dignity ? " "It appears 
 to me," replied Socrates, "not at all difficult to dis- 
 cover ; for I think that if they learn what were the 
 practices of their ancestors, and observe them not less 
 diligently than they, they will become not at all inferior 
 to them ; but if they do not take that course, yet, if 
 they imitate those 2 who are now at the head of Greece, 
 adhere to their institutions, and attend to the same 
 duties with diligence equal to theirs, they will stand 
 not at all below them, and, if they use greater exertion, 
 even above them." 
 
 15. " You intimate," returned Pericles, "that honor 
 and vintue are far away from our city ; for when will 
 the Athenians reverence their elders as the Spartans do, 
 when they begin, even by their own fathers, to show 
 disrespect for older men? Or when will they exercise 
 themselves like them, when they not only are regard- 
 less of bodily vigor, but deride those who cultivate it. 
 
 16. Or when will they obey the magistrates like them, 
 when they make it their pride to set them at naught ? 
 Or when will they be of one mind like them, when, in- 
 stead of acting in concert for their mutual interests, 
 they inflict injuries on one another, and envy one an- 
 
 1 Άγλοι τιν«.] Schneider, from a conjecture of Weiske or Heinz, 
 reads ά&γηταί rives; for, says he, "inepte civitati Atheniensium 
 άλλοι rei-es opponuntur." Άλλοι Tivh is however the reading of all 
 the old copies, and is followed by Kiihner. 
 
 2 That the Lacedaemonians are meant is plain from what follows 
 Schneider. It is justly observed by Herbst, that Xenophon takes 
 every occasion to praise the constitution of Sparta, and to prefer it 
 
 iv. 4. 15 ; Cyrop. i. 6. 19 ; Symp. viii. 39 ; 
 [. Kiihner. 
 
v.,s. 20.] MILITARY IMPROVEMENT. ill 
 
 other more than they envy the rest of mankind ? More 
 than any other people, too, do they dispute in their 
 private and public meetings ; they institute more law- 
 suits against one another, and prefer thus to prey upon 
 one another than to unite for their mutual benefit. 
 They conduct their public affairs as if they were those 
 of a foreign state ; 1 they contend about the manage- 
 ment of them, and rejoice, above all things, in having 
 power to engage in such contests. 
 
 17 From such conduct much ignorance and baseness 
 prevail in the republic, and much envy and mutual 
 hatred are engendered in the breasts of the citizens ; on 
 which accounts I am constantly in the greatest fear 
 lest some evil should happen to the state too great tor 
 it to bear." . , „ Λ 
 
 18. " Do not by any means suppose, Pericles, re- 
 ioined Socrates, "that the Athenians are thus dis- 
 ordered with an incurable depravity. Do you not see 
 how orderly they are in their naval proceedings, How 
 precisely they obey the presidents in the gymnastic 
 games, and how, in the arrangement of the choruses, 
 they submit to the directions of their teachers m a way 
 inferior to none ? " tt +i„+ 
 
 19. " This is indeed surprising," said Pericles, tiiar 
 men of that class 2 should obey those who are set over 
 them, and that the infantry and cavalry, who are 
 thought to excel the ordinary citizens m worth and 
 valoi^ should be the least obedient of all the people. 
 
 20. "The council of the Areopagus, too, said 
 Socrates. " is it not composed of men of approved char- 
 acter ? " 8 " Undoubtedly," replied Pericles. " And do 
 you know of anv judges who decide causes, and con- 
 duct all their business with more exact conformity to 
 
 ι Ωσττ€ρ άγγοτρτρίοΐϊ.] Negligently ; as if they had no concern in 
 
 * * ei Tous τοιούτο^.] Such men as the sailors, rowers, and ίπ^άται, 
 who were either slaves, or of the lower order of the citizens. 
 
 K 3 δοκιμασμένων.] Those who had discharged their duties as ma- 
 gistrates with integrity and honor, and. on giving > n their accounts 
 It the end of their term of office, had been approved by the judg- 
 ment of the people. Schneider. 
 
112 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. hi. 
 
 the laws, or with more honor and justice ?" " I find 
 no fault with them," said Pericles. " We must not, 
 therefore, despair," said Socrates, " as if we thought 
 that the Athenians are not inclined to be lovers of 
 order." 
 
 21. " Yet in military affairs," observed Pericles, " in 
 which it is most requisite to act with prudence, and 
 order, and obedience, they pay no regard to such 
 duties." " It may be so," returned Socrates. " for per- 
 haps in military affairs men who are greatly deficient in 
 knowledge have the command of them. Do you not ob- 
 serve that of harp-players, choristers, dancers, wrestlers, 
 or pancratiasts, no one ventures to assume the direction 
 who has not the requisite knowledge for it, but that all 
 who take the lead in such matters are able to show from 
 whom they learned the arts in which they are masters ; 
 whereas the most of our generals undertake to command 
 without previous study. * 
 
 22. I do not, however, imagine you to be one of that 
 sort ; for I am sensible that you can tell when you 
 began to learn generalship not less certainly than when 
 you began to learn wrestling. I am sure, too, that you 
 have learned, and keep in mind, many of vour father's 
 principles of warfare, and that you have collected many 
 others from every quarter whence it was possible to 
 acquire any thing that would add to your skill as a 
 commander. 
 
 23. I have no doubt that you take great care that you 
 may not unawares be ignorant of any thing conducive 
 to generalship, and that, if you have ever found your- 
 self deficient in any such matters, you have applied to 
 persons experienced in them, sparing neither presents 
 nor civilities, that you might learn from them what 
 you did not know, and might render them efficient 
 helpers to you." 
 
 24. "You make me well aware, Socrates," said 
 Pericles, "that you do not say this from a belief that I 
 have diligently attended to these matters, but from a 
 wish to convince me that he who would be a general 
 
 • \A similar complaint is made by Marius of the Roman generals 
 m Sail. Jug. 85. β 
 
c. v., s. 28.] DEFENCE OF ATTICA. 
 
 113 
 
 must attend to all such studies ; and I indeed agree with 
 you in that opinion." 
 
 25. " Have you considered this also, Pericles," asked 
 Socrates, "that on the frontier of our territories lie 
 great mountains, 1 extending down to Boeotia. through 
 which there lead into our country narrow and precipi- 
 tous defiles ; and that our country is girded by strong 
 mountains, 2 as it lies in the midst of them?" "Cer- 
 tainly," said he. 
 
 26. " Have you heard, too, that the Mysians and 
 Pisidians, who occupy extremely strong positions in 
 the country of the Great King, 3 and who are lightly 
 armed, are able to make descents on the king's terri- 
 tory, and do it great damage, while they themselves 
 preserve their liberty?" "This, too, I have heard," 
 said Pericles. 
 
 27. " And do you not think that the Athenians," said 
 Socrates, "if equipped with light arms while they are 
 of an age for activity, and occupying the mountains 
 that fence our country, might do great mischief to our 
 enemies, and form a strong bulwark for the inhabitants 
 of our country ? " "I think, Socrates," said he, " that 
 all these arrangements would be useful." 
 
 28. " If these plans, then," concluded Socrates, "ap- 
 pear satisfactory to you, endeavor, my excellent friend, 
 to act upon them ; for whatsoever of them you carry 
 into execution, it will be an honor to yourself and an 
 advantage to the state ; and if you fail in the attempt 
 for want of power, you will neither injure the state nor 
 disgrace yourself." 
 
 1 The frontier of Attica was defended by the mountains Cithseron, 
 Cerastes, and others. Schneider. 
 
 2 Parnes, Brilessus, Hymettus, Laurium. Schneider. Also Lyca- 
 bettus, Pentelicum, Corydalus. Herbst. 
 
 8 The king of Persia. See, respecting the Pisidians, Anab. iii. 2. 
 23 ; i. 1. 11. 
 
314 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. in. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Socrates, by his usual process of interrogation, leads Glaucon, a 
 young man who was extravagantly desirous of a post in the 
 government, to confess that he was entirely destitute of the 
 knowledge necessary for the office to which he aspired. He then 
 shows that, unless a ruler has acquired an exact knowledge of 
 state affairs, he can do no good to his country or credit to him- 
 self. 
 
 1. When Glaucon, 1 the son of Ariston, attempted to 
 harangue the people, from a desire, though he was not 
 yet twenty years of age, 2 to have a share in the govern- 
 ment of the state, no one of his relatives, or other 
 friends, could prevent him from getting himself 
 dragged down from the tribunal, and making himself 
 ridiculous ; but Socrates, who had a friendly feeling 
 toward him on account of Charmides 3 the son of 
 Glaucon, as well as on account of Plato, 4 succeeded in 
 prevailing on him, by his sole dissuasion, to relinquish 
 his purpose. 
 
 2. Meeting him by chance, he first stopped him by 
 addressing him as follows, that he might be willing to 
 listen to him: " Glaucon," said he, "have you formed 
 an intention to govern the state for us?" "I have, 
 Socrates," replied Glaucon. " By Jupiter," rejoined 
 Socrates, " it is an honorable office, if any other among 
 men be so ; for it is certain that, if you attain your 
 object, you will be able yourself to secure whatever 
 
 1 This Glaucon was the brother of Plato the philosopher. See 
 Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 66. On the other Glaucon, see iii. 7, 1. 
 Kiihner. 
 
 2 Young men at Athens were allowed to assume the right of citi- 
 zens, and take part in the government, on attaining their twenty- 
 second year. Sauppe. See Schoemann de Comit. Athen. p. 76, 105. 
 
 3 He is mentioned, iii. 7. 1. 
 
 * The philosopher, of whom Gellius (xiv. 13) denies that any men- 
 tion is made in the writings of Xenophon. But Muretus has re- 
 ferred to this passage for a refutation of Gellius, Var. Lect. v. 14. 
 Schneider. This question about the supposed enmity between 
 Plato and Xenophon is learnedly and acutely considered by Boeckh 
 in his treatise on the subject. Cobet, too, in his Prosopogr. Xen. 
 p. 28, thinks that the belief of their rivalry rests on no good founda- 
 tion, and ought to be rejected. Kiihner. 
 
C. vi., s. 7.] DISCOURSE WITH GLAUCON. 115 
 
 you may desire, and will be in a condition to benefit 
 your friends ; you will raise your father's house, and 
 increase the power of your country ; you will be cele- 
 brated, first of all in your own city, and afterward 
 throughout Greece, and perhaps also, like fhemistocles, 
 among the Barbarians, and, wherever you may be, you 
 will be an object of general admiration." 
 
 3. Glaucon, hearing this, was highly elated, and 
 cheerfully staid to listen. Socrates next proceeded to 
 say, "But it is plain, Glaucon, that if you wish to be 
 honored, you must benefit the state." " Certainly,^ 
 answered Glaucon. " Then, in the name of the gods, 
 said Socrates, " do not hide from us how you intend to 
 act, but inform us with what proceeding you will begin 
 to benefit the state ? " . . 
 
 4. But as Glaucon was silent, as if just considering 
 how he should begin, Socrates said, " As, if you wished 
 to aggrandize the family of a friend, you would en- 
 deavor to make it richer, tell me whether you will in 
 like manner also endeavor to make the state richer ? 
 " Assuredly," said he. 
 
 5. "Would it then be richer, if its revenues were 
 increased ? " " That is at least probable," said Glaucon. 
 "Tell me then," proceeded Socrates, "from what the 
 revenues of the state arise, and what is their amount ; 
 for you have doubtless considered, in order that if any 
 of them fall short, you may make up the deficiency, and 
 that if any of them fail, you may procure fresh sup- 
 plies." " These matters, by Jupiter," replied Glaucon, 
 " I have not considered." 
 
 6. " Well then," said Socrates, "if you have omitted 
 to consider this point, tell me at least the annual expen- 
 diture of the state; for you undoubtedly mean to 
 retrench whatever is superfluous in it." "Indeed," 
 replied Glaucon, " I have not yet had time to turn my 
 attention to that subject." " We will therefore," said 
 Socrates, "put off making our state richer for the pres- 
 ent ; for how is it possible for him who is ignorant of 
 its expenditure and its income to manage those mat- 
 ters?" . . ... 
 
 7. " But, Socrates," observed Glaucon, " it is possible 
 
Ii6 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [ B . in. 
 
 to enrich the state at the expense of our enemies." 
 " Extremely possible, indeed," replied Socrates, " if we 
 be stronger than they ; but if we be weaker, we may 
 lose all that we have." " What you say is true," said 
 Glaucon. 
 
 8. " Accordingly, said Socrates, " he who deliberates 
 with whom he shall go to war, ought to know the force 
 both of his own country and of the enemy, so that, if 
 that of his own country be superior to that of the 
 enemy, he may advise it to enter upon the war, but, if 
 inferior, may persuade it to be cautious of doing so." 
 " You say rightly," said Glaucon. 
 
 9. " In the first place, then," proceeded Socrates, 
 " tell us the strength of the country by land and sea, 
 and next that of the enemy." " But, by Jupiter," ex- 
 claimed Glaucon, " I should not be able' to tell you on 
 the moment, and at a word." " "Well, then, if you have 
 it written down," said Socrates, " bring it, for I should 
 be extremely glad to hear what it is." " But to say 
 the truth," replied Glaucon, " I have not yet written it 
 down." 
 
 10. " We will therefore put off considering about war 
 for the present," said Socrates, "for it is very likely 
 that, on account of the magnitude of those subjects, 
 and as you are just commencing your administration, 
 you have not yet examined into them. But to the 
 defense of the country, I am quite sure that you have 
 directed your attention, and that you know how many 
 garrisons are in advantageous positions, and how many 
 not so^ what number of men would be sufficient to 
 maintain them, and what number would be insufficient, 
 and that you will advise your countrymen to make the 
 garrisons in advantageous positions stronger, and to 
 remove the useless ones." 
 
 11. " By Jove," replied Glaucon, " I shall recommend 
 them to remove them all, as they keep guard so negli- 
 gently, that the property is secretly carried off out of 
 the country." " Yet, if we remove the garrisons." said 
 Socrates, " do you not think that liberty will be given 
 to any body that pleases to pillage? But," added he, 
 "have you gone personally, and examined as to this 
 
C. vr., s. 14.] DISCOURSE WITH GLAUCON. 117 
 
 fact, or how do you know that the garrisons conduct 
 themselves with such negligence?" " I form my con- 
 jectures," said he. " Well then," inquired Socrates, 
 " shall we settle about these matters also, when we no 
 longer rest upon conjecture, but have obtained certain 
 knowledge ? " " Perhaps that," said Glaucon, " will be 
 the better course." 
 
 12. "To the silver mines, however," continued Soc- 
 rates,." I know that you have not gone, so as to have 
 the means of telling us why a smaller revenue is derived 
 from them than came in some time ago." " I have not 
 gone thither," said he. " Indeed the place," said Soc- 
 rates, "is said to be unhealthy, so that, when it is 
 necessary to bring it under consideration, this will be a 
 sufficient excuse for you." " You jest with me," 1 said 
 Glaucon. 
 
 13. "I am sure, however," proceeded Socrates, " that 
 you have not neglected to consider, but have calculated, 
 how long the corn, which is produced in the country, 
 will suffice to maintain the city, and how much it re- 
 quires for the year, in order that the city may not suf- 
 fer from scarcity 2 unknown to you, but that, from 
 your own knowledge, you may be able, by giving your 
 advice concerning the necessaries of life, to support 
 the citv, and preserve it." "You propose avast field 
 for me," observed Glaucon, " if it will be necessary for 
 me to attend to such subjects." 
 
 14. " Nevertheless," proceeded Socrates, " a man 
 can not order his house properly, unless he ascertains 
 all that it requires, and takes care to supply it with 
 every thing necessary ; but since the city consists of 
 more than ten thousand houses, and since it is difficult 
 to provide for so many at once, how is it that you have 
 not tried to aid one first of all, suppose that of your 
 
 1 Σκώπτομαι. ] " I am jested with." This is the reading of five 
 manuscripts ; one gives σκίφομαι, which has been adopted by Er- 
 nesti, Schneider, and several other editors. 
 
 **lva μη τούτο ye ka&r) ae ποτε η πόλις ίνδΐής -γενομένη.] That IS κατά. 
 
 toGto. One manuscript exhibits τουτκΰ, which has been adopted by 
 most editors. But Zeune refers to Cyrop. ii. 2. 1, and vi. 3. 1, for 
 the examples of similar accusatives with ενδεής. 
 
Il8 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. hi. 
 
 uncle, 1 for it stands in need of help? If you be able to 
 assist that one, you may proceed to assist more ; but if 
 you be unable to benefit one, how will you be able to 
 benefit many ? Just as it is plain that, if a man can 
 not carry the weight of a talent, he need not attempt 
 to carry a greater weight." 
 
 15. "But I would improve my uncle's house," said 
 Glaucon, " if he would but be persuaded by me." 
 "And then," resumed Socrates, "when you can not 
 persuade your uncle, do you expect to make all the 
 Athenians, together with your uncle, yield to your ar- 
 guments ? 
 
 16. Take care, Glaucon, lest, while you are eager to 
 acquire glory, you meet with the reverse of it. Do you 
 not see how dangerous it is for a person to speak of, 
 or undertake, what he does not understand ? Contem- 
 plate, among other men, such as you know to be char- 
 acters that plainly talk of, and attempt to do, what 
 they do not know, and consider whether they appear 
 to you, by such conduct, to obtain more applause or 
 censure, whether they seem to be more admired or 
 despised ? 
 
 17. Contemplate, again, those who have some under- 
 standing of what they say and do, and you will find, I 
 think, in all transactions, that such as are praised and 
 admired are of the number of those who have most 
 knowledge, and that those who incur censure and neg- 
 lect are among those that have least. 
 
 _ 18. If therefore you desire to gain esteem and reputa- 
 tion in your country, endeavor to succeed in gaining 
 a knowledge of what you wish to do ; for if, when you 
 excel others in this qualification, you proceed to man- 
 age the affairs of the state, I shall not wonder if you 
 very easily obtain what you desire." 
 
 1 Charmides. See iii. 7. 1. Kiihner. 
 
c. νπ., s. 3.] EXHORTATION TO CHARMIDES. 119 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Socrates exhorts Charmides, a man of ability, and acquainted with 
 
 Eublic aff airs, to take part in the government, that he may not 
 e charg&d with indolence, sect. 1-4. As Charmides distrusts his 
 abilities for public speaking, Socrates encourages him by various 
 observations, 5-9. 
 
 1. Observing that Charmides, 1 the son of Glaucon, 
 a man of worth, and of far more ability than those 
 who then ruled the state, hesitated to address the 
 people, or to take part in the government of the city, 
 he said to him, " Tell me, Charmides, if any man, who 
 was able to win the crown in the public games, 2 and, 
 by that means, to gain honor for himself, and make 
 his birth-place more celebrated in Greece, should 
 nevertheless refuse to become a combatant, what sort 
 of person would you consider him to be ? " "I should 
 certainly think him indolent and wanting in spirit,'' 
 replied Charmides. 
 
 2. " And if any one were able," continued Socrates, 
 " by taking part in public affairs, to improve the con- 
 dition of his country, and thus to attain honor for him- 
 self, but should yet shrink from doing so, might not he 
 be justly regarded as wanting in spirit?" "Perhaps 
 so," said Charmides; " but why do you ask me that 
 question?" "Because," replied Socrates, "I think 
 that you yourself, though possessed of sufficient ability, 
 yet shrink from engaging even in those affairs in which 
 it is your duty as a citizen to take a share." 
 
 3. " But in what transaction have you discovered my 
 ability," said Charmides, "that you bring this charge 
 against me?" "In those conferences," answered 
 
 1 On Charmides, the son of Glaucon, a young man of great beauty 
 and modesty, see Stallbaum's Prolegomena to Plato's Dialogue 
 named from him ; and Cobet in Prosop. p. 46. Kiihner. The reader 
 may find more about him in Xenophon's Symposium. " By Plato, 
 in his Theages, t. i. p. 128, D., he is called b καλό?. He was one of 
 the ten leaders at the Pirseeus in the war with Thrasybulus against 
 the Thirty Tyrants, in which he was killed. See Perizon. ad. JElian, 
 V. H. viii. 1." Sturz. 
 
 2 Tobs σταφανίτας ά-γωνας cikSv.] " To conquer in the crowned 
 games," the games in which a crown was given as a prize. 
 
ΐ2θ MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. hi. 
 
 Socrates, "in which you meet those who are engaged 
 in the government of the state ; for when they consult 
 you on any point, I observe that you give them excel- 
 lent advice, and that, when they are in any way in the 
 wrong, you offer judicious objections." 
 
 4. " But it is not the same thing, Socrates," said he, 
 " to converse with people in private, and to try one's 
 powers at a public assembly." " Yet," said Socrates, 
 " he that is able to count, can count with no less ex- 
 actness before a multitude than alone, and those who 
 can play the harp best in solitude are also the best per- 
 formers on it in company." 
 
 5. " But do you not see," said Charmides, " that bash- 
 fulness and timidity are naturally inherent in mankind, 
 and affect us far more before a multitude than in 
 private conversations?" "But I am prompted tore- 
 mind you." answered Socrates, "that while you neither 
 feel bashfulness before the most intelligent, nor timid 
 before the most powerful, it is in the presence of the 
 most foolish and weak that you are ashamed to speak. 
 
 6. And is it the fullers among them, or the cobblers, 
 or the carpenters, or the copper-smiths, or the ship- 
 merchants, 1 or those who barter in the market, and 
 meditate what they may buy for little and sell for 
 more, that you are ashamed to address ? For it is of all 
 such characters that the assembly is composed. 
 
 7. How then do you think that your conduct differs 
 from that of a wrestler, who, being superior to well- 
 practiced opponents, should yet fear the unpracticed ? 
 For is not this the case with you, that though you 
 converse at your ease with those who have attained 
 eminence in state affairs, and of whom some undervalue 
 you, and though you are far superior to many who 
 make it their business to address the people, you yet 
 shiink from uttering your sentiments before men who 
 have never thought of political affairs, and who have 
 shown no disrespect for your talents, from an apprehen- 
 sion that you may be laughed at ? " 
 
 1 Έμπ-όρους.] The Ιμττοροι were merchants who traded by sea, and 
 are opposed to " those who barter in the forum," mentioned im- 
 mediately afterward. See Schneider ad Cyrop. iv. 5, 42. Kiihner. 
 
c. νιιι., s. ι.] ON SPEAKING IN PUBLIC. 
 
 121 
 
 8. " And do not the people in the assembly," asked 
 Charmides, " appear to you often to laugh at those who 
 speak with great judgment?" "Yes," said Socrates, 
 " and so do the other sort of people ; 1 and therefore I 
 wonder at you, that you so easily silence one class of 
 persons when they do so, and yet think that you shall 
 not be able to deal with another ? 
 
 9. Be not ignorant of yourself, 2 my friend, and do not 
 commit the error which the majority of men commit ; 
 for most persons, though they are eager to look into the 
 affairs of others, give no thought to the examination of 
 their own. Do not you, then, neglect this duty, but 
 strive more and more to cultivate your own powers ; 
 and do not be regardless of the affairs of your country, 
 if any department of them can be improved by your 
 means ; for, if they are in a good condition, not only 
 the rest of your countrymen, but your own friends and 
 yourself, will reap tiie greatest benefit." 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Socrates meets the captious question of Aristippus about goodness 
 and beauty in such a manner as to show that nothing is good or 
 bad in itself, but only with reference to some objects, sect. 1-8 ; 
 and that nothing is beautiful or otherwise in itseif, but that the 
 beautiful must be considered with regard to the useful, 4-7. His 
 remarks on buildings, to the same effect, 8-10. 
 
 1. When Aristippus attempted to confute Socrates, 
 as he himself had previously 3 been confuted by him, 
 Socrates, wishing to benefit those who were with him, 
 gave his answers, not like those who are on their guard 
 lest their words be perverted, 4 but like those who are 
 
 1 Οί erepoc] Meaning those, says Kiihner, with whom he is men- 
 tioned as discoursing in sect. 3. 
 
 * Ernesti refers to a passage in Cicero ad Quintum Fratrem, iii. 
 6, in which he seems to have had Xenophon in his mind : Cessator 
 esse noli ; et Mud yviodt. σεαντον noli putare ad arrogantiam minu- 
 endam solum esse dictum, veriim etiam ut bona nostra ndrimus. 
 
 "Book ii. c. 1. 
 
 * Not being at all afraid lest he should give any answer which 
 might, from some ambiguity in it, be wrested to mean, apparently, 
 
 6 
 
122 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. hi. 
 
 persuaded that they ought 1 above all things to do what 
 is right. 
 
 2. What Aristippus had asked him, was, " whether 
 he knew any thing good," in order that if he should say 
 any sueh thing as food, or drink, or money, or health, 
 or strength, or courage, he might prove that it was 
 sometimes an evil. But Socrates, reflecting that if any- 
 thing troubles us, we want something to relieve us 
 from it, replied, as it seemed best to do, 2 " Do you ask 
 me whether I know any thing good for a fever?" 
 
 3. " I do not." " Any thing good for soreness of the 
 eyes?" " No." "For hunger?" "No, nor for hun- 
 ger either." " Well then." concluded Socrates, " if you 
 ask me whether I know any thing good that is good 
 for nothing, I neither know any thing, nor wish to 
 know." 
 
 4. Aristippus again asking him if he knew any thing 
 beautiful, he replied, " Many things." "Are they 
 then," inquired Aristippus, "all like each other? 
 " Some of them," answered Socrates, "are as unlike 
 one another as it is possible for them to be." " How 
 then," said he, " can what is beautiful be unlike what 
 is beautiful ? " " Because, assuredly," replied Socrates, 
 " one man, who is beautifully formed for wrestling, is 
 unlike another who is beautifully formed for running ; 
 and a shield, which is beautifully formed for defense, 
 is as unlike as possible to a dart, which is beautifully 
 formed for being forcibly and swiftly hurled." 
 
 5. "You answer me," said Aristippus, " in the same 
 manner as when I asked you whether you knew any 
 thing good." "And do you imagine," said Socrates, 
 li that the good is one thing, and the beautiful another ? 
 Do you not know that with reference to the same ob- 
 
 • what he did not intend, or of which his adversary might take ad- 
 vantage to entrap him. See Aristot. Pol. i. 2. 17. Schneider and 
 Kuhner acquiesce in this sense of the word ίπαΜαττΐΐν. 
 1 With the word πράττει in the text the word &e t v seems to be 
 
 W f "^πεκρίνατο ωσπίρκα ι ποιεΐν κράτιστο».] It is well known that the 
 word Trotelv, like the Latin facere, and the German thun, is often 
 made to do duty for another verb. See Passow's Gr. Lex. v. noieiv, 
 and my note on Cic. Tusc. Qusest. iv. 14. 31. Kuhner. 
 
■ α νιιι., s. 9 ] ON THE GOOD AND BEAUTIFUL. 123 
 
 jects all things are both beautiful and good ? Virtue, 
 for instance, is not good with regard to some things 
 and beautiful with regard to others ; and persons, in 
 the same way, are called beautiful and good with re- 
 ference to the same objects ; and human bodies, too, 
 with reference to the same objects, appear beautiful 
 and good ; and in like manner all other things, what- 
 ever men use, are considered beautiful and good with 
 reference to the objects for which they are service- 
 able." 
 
 6. " Can a dung-basket, then," said Aristippus, "be 
 a beautiful thing?" "Yes, by Jupiter," returned So- 
 crates, "and a golden shield may be an ugly thing, if 
 the one be beautifully formed for its particular uses, 
 and the other ill formed ? " 
 
 7. "Do you say then, that the same things maybe 
 both beautiful and ugly?" "Yes, undoubtedly, and 
 also that they may be good and bad ; for oftentimes 
 what is good for hunger is bad for fever, and what is 
 good for a fever is bad for hunger ; oftentimes what is 
 beautiful in regard to running is the reverse in regard 
 to wrestling, and what is beautiful in regard to wrestl- 
 ing is the reverse in regard to running ; for whatever 
 is good is also beautiful, in regard to purposes for which 
 it is well adapted, and whatever is bad is the reverse of 
 beautiful, in regard to purposes for which it is ill 
 adapted." 
 
 8. When Socrates said, too, that the same houses 
 that were beautiful were also useful, he appeared to me 
 to instruct us what sort of houses we ought to build. 
 He reasoned on the subject thus, "Should not he, who 
 purposes to have a house such as it ought to be contrive 
 that it may be most pleasant, and at the same time 
 most useful, to live in ? " 
 
 9. This being admitted, he said " Is it not then pleas- 
 ant to have it cool in summer, and warm in winter?" 
 When his hearers had assented to this, he said, " In 
 houses, then, that look to the south, does not the sun, 
 in the winter, shine into the porticoes, while in the 
 summer, it passes over our heads, and above the roof, 
 
124 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. in. 
 
 and casts a shade ? If it is well, therefore, that houses 
 should thus be made, 1 ought we not to build the parts 
 toward the south higher, that the sun in winter may 
 not be shut out, and the parts towards the north lower, 
 that the cold winds may not fall violently on them? 2 
 
 10. To sum up the matter briefly, that would be the 
 most pleasant and the most beautiful residence, in 
 which the owner, at all seasons, would find the most 
 satisfactory retreat, and deposit what belongs to him 
 with the greatest safety." 
 
 Paintings, and colored decorations of the walls, 3 de- 
 prive us, he thought, of more pleasure than they give. 
 
 1 That is, so as to be cool in summer and warm in winter. 
 
 2 Of this passage no satisfactory explanation has yet been given. 
 Kuhner contents himself with adducing, without any remark, the 
 comment of Lange : ' L As far as the summer is concerned, the posi- 
 tion of a house (in Greece) need not be considered, whether it looks 
 to the south or any other quarter of the heaven ; for it must be 
 shady in the hottest season of the year, when, indeed, the sun 
 sends down its rays almost perpendicularly, and makes a shade in 
 whatever position the house may be. (Umbrosa tamen sit fervi- 
 dissimo anni tempore, sole nimirum radios suos rectis lineis deor- 
 sum mittente, et in quovis domus situ umbram efflciente). In 
 building a house (in Greece), therefore, it is necessary to take 
 thought only for the winter, that at that season of the year the j 
 house may be as warm as possible. To effect this object, let one j 
 row of buildings (una domorum series) face the south, and the j 
 other the north, in such a way, that those looking toward the ? 
 south may be higher than those looking in the opposite direction ; j 
 for thus the higher will enjoy the sun in winter, and the lower, i 
 facing the north, will be defended from the winds blowing from 
 that quarter. 11 (The part near umbrosa tamen sit seems to be i 
 defective, or incorrect in someway.) But to me the text seems] 
 capable of explanation only on the supposition that Socrates η 
 speaking with reference to the porticoes or colonnades merely, as : 
 we can easily conceive why he should recommend porticoes toward '. 
 the south to be made high, in order to admit the sun in winter (the 
 summer sun, as Lange remarks, being not at all regarded), and 
 those toward the north to be made low, in order to exclude, inj 
 some degree, the keen north winds. Thus Columella, R. R. i. 6. W 
 says. Ambulationes meridiano ozquinoctiali subjectce sint, ut hiema 
 plurimum solis et (Estate minimum recipiant ; a passage which! 
 Schneider savs is not to be compared with this of Xenophon ; bura 
 it might not be very difficult to prove the contrary. 
 
 a ΠοικιλιΌι.] Ralph Rochet, cited by G. Hermann in Opusc. vol.] 
 v. p. 221, thinks that by ποικιλίαι are to be understood those colored! 
 ornaments on walls which are called ποικίλματο by XenophonJ 
 CEcon. ix. 2, and by Plato, Hipp. Maj. p. 298, A. Kuhner: wh<| 
 gives the following reason for the disapprobation which Socratea 
 
c. ix., s. ι.] ON VIRTUES AND VICES. 
 
 The most suitable ground for temples and altars, 1 he 
 said, was such as was most open to view, and least 
 trodden by the public ; for that it was pleasant for 
 people to pray as they looked on them, and pleasant to 
 approach them in purity. 2 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Various definitions of fortitude, prudence and temperance, mad- 
 ness, envy, idleness, command, happiness, given by Socrates. 
 Fortitude is not equal in all men ; it may be increased by ex- 
 ercise, sect. 1-3. Prudence and temperance not distinct from 
 each other, 4. Justice, as well as other virtues, is wisdom, 5. 
 The opposite to prudence is madness : ignorance distinct from 
 madness, 6, 7. Envy is uneasiness of mind at the contemplation 
 of the happiness of others, 8. Idleness is forbearance from use- 
 ful occupation, 9. Command is exercised, not by those who bear 
 the name, merely, of kings and rulers, but by those who know 
 how to command, 10-13. The best object of human life is to act 
 well ; the difference between acting well and acting fortunately, 
 14, 15. 
 
 1. Being asked, again, whether Fortitude was a 
 quality acquired by education, or bestowed by nature, 
 " I think," said he, " that as one body is by nature 
 stronger for enduring toil than another body, so one 
 
 expresses of them : " That those ornaments might not be injured 
 by the rays of the sun, the parts of the house in which they were, 
 were so constructed as not to face the sun ; and thus the inmates, 
 in winter, were deprived of the heat of the sun (tali modo homines 
 hiberno tempore solis calore privabantur), and exposed to the 
 cold winds from the north." 
 
 1 Altars and temples, and especially temples, were surrounded 
 with a wall, within which was an area, the view across which was 
 intercepted by a thick grove or some considerable number of 
 trees. Of these obstructions to the view, Socrates disapproves, 
 wishing the site of the temple to be ίμφανιιστάτη, fully open to the 
 sight, as if the worshippers would then fancy that they saw as it 
 were the deity before them, and would suppose that their prayers 
 would thus be better received by him. Weiske. Others suppose 
 that Socrates merely wished that temples and altars should be 
 built on high grounds ; an opinion which is equally defensible. 
 Kiihner. 
 
 * That is, as Schutz suggests, that they might not have to go 
 through a crowd, in which they might encounter polluted persons, 
 and be defiled by them. 
 
126 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. hi. 
 
 mind may be by nature more courageous in meeting 
 dangers than another mind ; for I see that men who 
 are brought up under the same laws and institutions 
 differ greatly from each other in courage. 
 
 2. " I am of opinion, however, that every natural dis- 
 position may be improved, as to fortitude, by training 
 and exercise ; for it is evident that the Scythians and 
 Thracians would not dare to take bucklers and spears 
 and fight with the Lacedaemonians ; and it is certain 
 that the Lacedaemonians would not like to fight the 
 Thracians with small shields and javelins, or the Scy- 
 thians with bows. 
 
 3. " In other things, also, I see that men differ equally 
 from one another by nature, and make great improve- 
 ments by practice ; from which it is evident that it 
 concerns all, as well the naturally ingenious as the 
 naturally dull, to learn and study those arts in which 
 they desire to become worthy of commendation." 
 
 4. Prudence and Temperance 1 he did not distinguish, 
 for he deemed that he who knew what was honorable 
 and good, and how to practice it, and who knew what 
 was dishonorable, and how to avoid it, was both pru- 
 dent and temperate. Being also asked whether he 
 thought that those who knew what they ought to do, 
 but did the contrary, were prudent and temperate, he 
 replied, " No more than I think the [openly] impru- 
 dent and intemperate to be so ; 2 for I consider that all 
 [prudent and temperate] persons choose from what is 
 possible what they judge for their interest, and do it ; 
 and I therefore deem those who do not act [thus] ju- 
 diciously to be neither prudent nor temperate." 
 
 5. He said, too, that justice, and every other virtue, 
 
 1 Σοφίαν και σπφροσννην οώ διώρι^ν.] 2οφία, wisdom ΟΓ prudence, IS 
 
 as Kiihner remarks, right judgment about what ought to be done ; 
 σίοφθοσύνη is temperance, self-control, or self-regulation, in acting. 
 The word σοφία, is used in another sense in iv. 6. 7. " This subject, 
 in conformity with the opinion of Socrates, is discussed in Plato's 
 Charmides, ubi pariter temperantia scientiH contineri demon- 
 strate." See Stallbaum on that Dialogue, p. 81, seqq. Kiihner. 
 
 2 Ii, qui sciunt quidem bona, sed contraria faciunt, nihilo magis 
 sapientes et temperantes sunt quam ii qui sunt insipientes et in- 
 temperantes. Kiihner. The words in brackets are supplied as be- 
 ing necessary to the translation. 
 
c. ix., s. 7.] ON VIRTUES AND VICES. 127 
 
 was [a part of] prudence, for that every thing just, and 
 every thing done agreeably to virtue, was honorable 
 and good ; that those who could discern those things, 
 would never prefer any thing else to them ; that those 
 who could not discern them, would never be able to do 
 them, but would even go wrong if they attempted to 
 do them ; and that the prudent, accordingly, did what 
 was honorable and good, but that the imprudent could 
 not do it. but went wrong even if they attempted to do 
 it ; and that since, therefore, all just actions, and all 
 actions that are honorable and good, are done in agree- 
 ment with virtue, it is manifest that justice, and every 
 other virtue, is [comprehended in] prudence. 
 
 6. The opposite to prudence, he said, was Madness ,· 1 
 he did not, however, regard ignorance as madness; 
 though for a man to be ignorant of himself, and to 
 fancy and believe that he knew what did he not know, 
 he considered to be something closely bordering on 
 madness. The multitude, he observed, do not say that 
 those are mad who make mistakes in matters of which 
 most people are ignorant, but call those only mad who 
 make mistakes in affairs with which most people are 
 acquainted. 
 
 7. For if a man should think himself so tall as to 
 stoop when going through the gates in the city wall, or 
 so strong as to try to lift up houses, or attempt any 
 thing else that is plainly impossible to all men, they 
 say that he is mad ; but those who make mistakes in 
 small matters are not thought by the multitude to be 
 
 1 Μανία, madness or insanity, is, according to the definition of 
 Socrates, the contrary to wisdom or prudence, σο&ία. Madness is, 
 therefore, ignorance of the virtues of oustice, temperance, and forti- 
 tude ; for prudence is manifested in the knowledge of these virtues. 
 But the source and foundation, as it were, of prudence, is the knowl- 
 edge of one's self. He, therefore, that is destitute of this knowl- 
 edge of himself is bordering on madness. The multitude, however, 
 do not, like Socrates, consider ignorance of virtue to be madness, 
 but apply that term only to gross ignorance or misconduct with 
 regard to other matters. Kiihner. 
 
 " Aristotle is praised for naming Fortitude first of the cardinal, 
 virtues, as that without which no other virtue can steadily be 
 practiced ; but he might, with equal propriety, have placed Prud- 
 ence and Justice before it, since, without Prudence Fortitude is 
 mad ; without Justice, it is mischievous. Johnson, Life of Pope. 
 
128 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. III. 
 
 mad ; but just as they call " strong desire" " love," so 
 they call " great disorder of intellect " " madness." 
 
 8. Considering what Envy was, he decided it to be a 
 certain uneasiness, not such as arises, however, at the 
 ill success of friends, nor such as is felt at the good suc- 
 cess of enemies, but those only, he said, were envious 
 who were annoyed at the good success of their friends. 
 When some expressed surprise that any one who had 
 a friendly feeling for another should feel uneasy at his 
 good fortune, he reminded them that many are so dis- 
 posed toward others as to be incapable of neglecting 
 them if they are unfortunate, but would relieve them 
 in ill fortune, though they are uneasy at their good for- 
 tune. This feeling, he said, could never arise in the 
 breast of a sensible man, but that the foolish were con- 
 stantly affected with it. 
 
 9. Considering what Idleness was, he said that he 
 found most men did something ; for that dice-players 
 and buffoons did something ; but he said that all such 
 persons were idle, for it was in their power to go and 
 do something better ; he observed that a man was 
 not idle, however, in passing from a better employment 
 to a worse, but that, if he did so, he, as he [previously] 
 had occupation, acted in that respect viciously. 
 
 10. Kings and Commanders, he said, were not those, 
 who held scepters merely, or those elected by the mul- 
 titude, or those who gained authority by lot, or those 
 who attained it by violence or deceit, but those who 
 knew hdw to command. 
 
 11. For when some admitted that it was the part of 
 a commander to enjoin what another should do, and 
 the part of him who was commanded, to obey, he 
 showed that in a ship the skillful man is the com- 
 mander, and that the owner and all the other people in 
 the ship were obedient to the man of knowledge ; that, 
 in agriculture, those who had farms, in sickness, those 
 who were ill, in bodily exercises, those who practiced 
 them, and indeed all other people, who had any busi- 
 ness requiring care, personally took the management 
 of it if they thought that they understood it, but if not, 
 that they were not only ready to obey men of knowl- 
 
c. XX., s. 15.] ON COMMAND AND OBEDIENCE. 129 
 
 edge who were present, but even sent for such as were 
 absent, in order that, by yielding to their directions, 
 they might do what was proper. In spinning, too, he 
 pointed out that women commanded men, as the one 
 knew how to spin, and the other did not know. 
 
 12. But if any one remarked in reply to these obser- 
 vations, that a tyrant is at liberty not to obey judicious 
 advisers, he would say, " And how is he at liberty not 
 to obey, when a penalty hangs over him that does not 
 obey a wise monitor? for in whatever affair a person 
 does not obey a prudent adviser, he will doubtless err, 
 and, by erring, will incur a penalty." 
 
 13. If any one also observed that a tyrant might put 
 to death a wise counselor, " And do you think," he 
 would say, " that he who puts to death the best of his 
 allies will go unpunished, or that he will be exposed 
 only to casual punishment ? Whether do you suppose 
 that a man who acts thus would live in safety, or would 
 be likely, rather, by such conduct, to bring immediate 
 destruction on himself ? " 
 
 14. When some one asked him what object of study 
 he thought best for a man, he replied, " good conduct." 
 When he asked him again whether he thought "good 
 fortune" an object of study, he answered, " ' Fortune' 
 and ' Conduct ' I think entirely opposed ; for, for a per- 
 son to light on any thing that he wants without seek- 
 ing it, I consider to be ' good fortune,' but to achieve 
 any thing successfully by learning and study, I regard 
 as ' good conduct ; ' and those who make this their ob- 
 ject of study appear to me to do well." 
 
 15. The best men, and those most beloved by the 
 gods, he observed, were those who, in agriculture, per- 
 formed their agricultural duties well, those who, in 
 medicine, performed their medical duties w ell, those 
 who, in political offices, performed their public duties 
 well ; but he who did nothing well, he said, was neither 
 useful for any purpose, nor acceptable to the gods. 
 
 6* 
 
130 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. ill. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Socrates was desirous to benefit artisans by discoursing with them 
 on the principles of their several arts. Of painting, sect. 1. Of 
 representing perfect beauty, 2. Of expressing the affections of 
 the mind, 3-5. Of statuary, 6-8. In what the excellence of a 
 corselet consists, 9-15. 
 
 1. Whenever he conversed with any of those who 
 were engaged in arts or trades, and who wrought at 
 them for gain, he proved of service to them. Visiting 
 Parrhasius 1 the painter one day, and entering into con- 
 versation with him, he said, " Pray, Parrhasius, is not 
 painting the representation of visible objects ? At least 
 you represent substances, imitating them by means of 
 color, whether they be concave, or convex, dark or 
 light, hard or soft, rough or smooth, fresh or old." 
 " What you say is true," said Parrhasius. 
 
 3. " And when you would represent beautiful figures, 
 do you, since it is not easy to find one person with every 
 part perfect, select, out of many, the most beautiful 
 parts of each, and thus represent figures beautiful in 
 every part ? " "We do so," said he. 
 
 3. " And do you also," said Socrates, " give imitations 
 of the disposition of the mind, as it may be most per- 
 suasive, most agreeable, most friendly, most full of 
 regret, or most amiable? Or is this inimitable?" 
 " How can that be imitated, Socrates," said he, " which 
 has neither proportion, nor color, nor any of the quali- 
 ties which you just now mentioned, and is not even a 
 visible object ? " 2 
 
 4. "Is it not often observable in a man that he regards 
 others witli a friendly or unfriendly look ? " "I think 
 so," said he. " Is this then possible to be copied in the 
 eyes?" "Assuredly." " And at the good or ill fortune 
 
 1 It is to be remembered that this celebrated painter, when Soc- 
 rates held this conversation with him, was then young, and that it 
 was not till after the death of Socrates, Olymp. xcv. i, that he ac- 
 quired a great name in his art. Kiihner. 
 
 * Ορατόι/.J Not an object which you can represent by its shape, as 
 a tree, or a house. 
 
C X., s. 7·] ON PAINTING AND STATUARY. I31 
 
 of people's friends, do those who are affected at it, and 
 those who are not, appear to you to have the same sort 
 of look ? " " No, indeed ; for they look cheerful at their 
 good, and sad at their evil, fortune." " Is it possible, 
 then, to imitate these looks ? " " Unquestionably." 
 
 5. " Surely, also, nobleness and generosity of dispo- 
 sition, meanness and illiberality, modesty and intel- 
 ligence, insolence and stupidity, show themselves both 
 in the looks, and gesture of men, whether they stand 
 or move." " "What you say is just." " Can these pe- 
 culiarities be imitated '? " "Certainly." "Whether, 
 then," said Socrates, "do you think that people look 
 with more pleasure on paintings in which beautiful, 
 and good, and lovely characters are exhibited, or those 
 in which the deformed, and evil, and detestable are re- 
 presented ? " " There is a very great difference indeed, 
 Socrates," replied Parrhasius. 1 _ 
 
 6. Going once, too, into the workshop of Cleito, 2 the 
 statuary, and beginning to converse with him, he said, 
 " I see and understand, Cleito, that you make figures of 
 various kinds, runners and wrestlers, pugilists and 
 pancratiasts, but how do you put into your statues that 
 which most wins the minds of the beholders through 
 the eye, the life-like appearance ? " 
 
 7. As Cleito hesitated, and did not immediately 
 answer, Socrates proceeded to ask, "Do you make 
 your statues appear more life-like by assimilating your 
 work to the figures of the living ? " " Certainly," said 
 he. " Do you not then make your figures appear more 
 like reality, and more striking, by imitating the parts 
 of the body, that are drawn up or drawn down, com- 
 pressed or spread out, stretched or relaxed, by the ges- 
 ture ? " " Undoubtedly," said Cleito. " And the repre- 
 sentation of the passions of men engaged in any act, 
 does it not excite a certain pleasure in the spectators ? 
 " It is natural, at least, that it should be so," said he. 
 
 1 The admonition which Socrates wished to convey to Parrhasius 
 was, as Schneider thinks, that he should exercise his pencil in re- 
 presenting rather what was fair and lovely than what was deformed 
 and repulsive. 
 
 * He is nowhere else mentioned. Kuhner. 
 
132 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [B. in. 
 
 "Must you not, then, copy the menacing looks of com- 
 batants ? And must you not imitate the countenance of 
 conquerors, as they look joyful ? " " Assuredly," said 
 he. " A statuary, therefore," concluded Socrates, 
 " must express the workings of the mind by the form." 
 
 9. Entering the shop of Pistias, 1 a corselet- maker, and 
 Pistias having shown him some well-made corselets, 
 Socrates observed, " By Juno, Pistias, this is an excel- 
 lent invention, that the corselets should cover 2 those 
 parts of a man's body that need protection, and yet 
 should not hinder him from using his hands. 
 
 10. But tell me, Pistias, " he added, " why do you sell 
 your corselets at a higher price than other makers, 
 though you neither make them stronger nor of more 
 costly materials ? " " Because, Socrates," said he, "I 
 make them better proportioned." " And do you make 
 this proportion appear in the measure or weight of your 
 corselets, that you set a higher price on them ? For I 
 suppose that you do not make them all equal or similar, if 
 3 t ou make them to fit different persons." "Indeed," 
 replied he, " I do make them to fit, for there would 
 be no use in a corselet without that qualit}'." 
 
 11. "Are not then," said Socrates, " the bodies of 
 some men well-proportioned, and those of others ill 
 proportioned?" "Certainly," said Pistias. "How, 
 then," asked Socrates, " do you make a well-propor- 
 tioned corselet fit an ill-proportioned body?" " As I 
 make it fit," answered Pistias; "for one that fits is 
 well proportioned. " 
 
 12. " You seem to me," said Socrates, " to speak of 
 proportion considered not independently, but with re- 
 spect to the wearer, as if you should say of a shield, or 
 a cloak, that it is well proportioned to him whom it 
 suits ; and such appears to be the case with regard to 
 other things, according to what you say. 
 
 13. But, perhaps, there may be some other consider- 
 able advantage attendant on being made to fit." Tell 
 
 1 He seems to be the same that is called Πιστών in Athenseus, iv. 20 
 Sturz. 
 
 1 Τω σκεπάζαν τον θώρακα) " In that the corselet should cover," 
 
 etc. Many editions have to, with which must be understood διά. 
 
c. χι., s. ι.] 
 
 VISIT TO THEODOTA. 
 
 !33 
 
 me, Socrates," said he, "if you know any." "Those 
 corselets which fit," answered Socrates, "are less op- 
 pressive by their weight, than those which do not fit, 
 though they be both of equal weight ; while those 
 which do not fit, are, either from hanging wholly on 
 the shoulders, or from pressing heavily on some other 
 part of the body, inconvenient and uneasy ; but those 
 which fit, as they distribute their w eight partly over 
 the collar-bone 1 and shoulder, partly over the upper 
 part of the arm, and partly over the breast, back, and 
 stomach, appear almost like, not a burden to be borne, 
 but a natural appendage." 
 
 14. " You have hit upon the very quality," said 
 Pistias, " for which I consider my manufacture deserv- 
 ing of the very highest price ; some, however, prefer 
 purchasing ornamented and gilded corselets." " Yet if 
 on this account," said Socrates, " they purchase such as 
 do not fit, they appear to me to purchase an ornamented 
 and gilded annoyance. But," added he, "since the 
 body does not continue always in the same position, 
 but is at one time bent, and at another straight, how 
 can a corselet, which is exactly fitted to it, suit it?" 
 " It cannot by any means," said Pistias. " You mean, 
 therefore," said Socrates, "that it is not those which 
 are exactly fitted to the body that suit, but those that 
 do not gall in the wearing." " You say what is clearly 
 the case, Socrates," replied he, " and exactly compre- 
 hend the matter." 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 The visit of Socrates to Theodota, and his discourse with her, sect. 
 1-9. He tells her that true friends are not acquired without the 
 manifestation of kind and good feelings, 9-12. He reminds her 
 that in gratifying the appetites we must guard against satiety, 
 13, 14. His jests on taking leave of her, 15-18. 
 
 1. There being at one time a beautiful woman in the 
 city, whose name was Theodota, 2 a woman ready to 
 
 i'Yu-o των κλείδων, κ. τ. λ.] The preposition ϋττο is used because the 
 idea of being borne must be kept in the mind. Kilhner. 
 2 This passage is cited by Athenseus, v. p. 200, F. Theodota was 
 
MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. in 
 
 form a connection with any one that made advances to 
 her, and somebody in company with Socrates making 
 mention of her, and saying that her beauty was beyond 
 description, and that painters went to her to take her 
 portrait, to whom she showed as much of her person as 
 she could with propriety, "We ought then to go and 
 see her,'' remarked Socrates, " for it is not possible to 
 comprehend by hearing that which surpasses descrip- 
 tion." "You cannot be too quick in following me, 
 then," said he who had mentioned her. 
 
 2. Going, accordingly, to the house of Theodota, and 
 finding her standing to a painter, they contemplated 
 her figure ; and when the painter had left off, Socrates 
 said, " My friends, whether ought we to feel obliged to 
 Theodota for having shown us her beauty, or she to us 
 for having viewed it with admiration ? If the exhibi- 
 tion be rather of advantage to her ought not she to feel 
 grateful to us, or if the sight has given rather more 
 pleasure to us. ought not we to feel grateful to her ? " 
 
 3. Somebody saying that he spoke reasonably, he 
 added, "She, then, for the present, gains praise from 
 us, and, when we have spoken of her to others, will 
 gain profit in addition ; but as for us, we now desire to 
 embrace what we have seen, and shall go away excited, 
 and long for her after we are away from her ; the 
 natural consequence of which is that we shall be her 
 adorers, and that she will be worshiped as our mistress." 
 " If this be the case, indeed," said Theodota, " I must 
 feel gratitude to you for coming to see me." 
 
 4. Soon after, Socrates, seeing her most expensively 
 attired, and her mother with her in a dress and 
 adornment above the common, with several handsome 
 female attendants, not unbecomingly appareled, and 
 her house richly furnished in other respects, said to her, 
 "Tell me, Theodota, have you an estate?" "Not I, 
 indeed," replied she. "But perhaps you have a house 
 
 afterward the mistress of Alcibiades, and covered his body with 
 her garment when he was killed, and burned it, Athen. xiii. p. 574, 
 F. ; Corn. Nep. Vit. Alcib. Libanius mentions her among the most 
 remarkable courtesans of Greece, torn. i. p. 582. In iElian, V. H., 
 xiii. 32, mention is made of Callisto, a courtesan, with whom So- 
 crates conversed. Schneider. 
 
C. XI., S. 9.] MEANS OF ACQUIRING FRIENDS. 135 
 
 that brings you an income?" "Nor a house either," 
 said she. " Have you then any slaves that practice 
 handicrafts ? "i- " No, nor any slaves." " How then," 
 said Socrates, " do you procure subsistence ? " " If any 
 one becomes my friend," she replied, "and is willing 
 to benefit me. he is my means of subsistence." 
 
 5. " By Juno, Theodota," rejoined Socrates, " and he 
 is an excellent acquisition to you ; and it is much better 
 to have a flock of friends than of sheep, oxen, and goats. 
 But," added he, "do you leave it to chance whether a 
 friend, like a fly, shall wing his way to you, or do you 
 use any contrivance to attract them ? " 
 
 6. " And how," said she, "can I find a contrivance 
 for such a purpose ? " " Much more readily," said he, 
 " than spiders can ; for you know how they try to get 
 subsistence ; they weave fine nets, and feed upon what- 
 ever falls into them." 
 
 7. " And do you advise me, too," said she, " to weave 
 a net ? " " Yes," said he, " for you ought not to think 
 that you will catch friends, the most valuable prey that 
 can be taken, without art. Do you not see how many 
 arts hunters use to catch hares, 2 an animal of but little 
 worth ? 
 
 8. As the hares feed in the night, they procure dogs 
 for hunting by night, with which they chase them ; as 
 they conceal themselves in the day, they provide other 
 dogs, which, perceiving by the smell the way that they 
 have gone from their feeding place to their forms, trace 
 them out ; and as they are swift or foot, so as soon to 
 escape from view by running, they procure also other 
 dogs, of great speed, that they may be caught by pur- 
 suit ; and because some of them escape even from these 
 dogs, they stretch nets across the paths by which they 
 flee, that they may fall into them and be entangled." 
 
 9. " By what art of this kind, then," said she, " can I 
 catch friends ? " " If," said he, " instead of a dog, you 
 got somebody to track and discover the lovers of beauty, 
 
 1 xecporeXeai.] These were slaves trained to mechanical occupa- 
 tions, the owners of whom derived considerable income from their 
 labors. 
 
 2 Cyrop. i. 6. 40. 
 
136 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. in. 
 
 and tlie wealthy, and who, when he has found them, 
 will contrive to drive them into your nets." " And 
 what nets have I ? " said she. 
 
 10. "You have one at least," he replied, " and one 
 that closely embraces its prey, your person ; and in it 
 you have a mind, by which you understand how you 
 may gratify a person by looking at him, and what you 
 may say to cheer him, and learn that you ought to re- 
 ceive with transport him who shows concern for you, 
 and to shut out him who is insolent, to attend carefully 
 on a friend when he is ill, to rejoice greatly with him 
 when he has succeeded in anything honorable, and to 
 cherish affection in your whole soul for the man who 
 sincerely cares for you. To love I am sure that you 
 know, not only tenderly, but with true kindness of j 
 heart ; and your friends* try to please you, I know, be- 
 cause you conciliate them, not with words merely, but 
 by your behavior toward them." "Indeed," replied 
 Theodota, "I use none of these schemes." 
 
 11. " Yet," said Socrates. " it is of great importance 
 to deal with a man according to his disposition, and! 
 with judgment ; for by force you can neither gain nor 
 keep a friend, but by serving and pleasing him the; 
 animal 1 is easily taken and attached to you." " What; 
 you say is true," said she. 
 
 12. " It becomes you, therefore," proceeded Socrates, 
 " in the first place, to request of your lovers only such 
 favors as they will perform with least cost to them- 
 selves ; and you must then make a return by obliging] 
 them in a similar way ; 2 for thus they will become most' 
 sincerely attached to you, and will love you longest,; 
 and benefit you most. 
 
 13. But you will please them most if you grant them 
 favors only when they solicit them ; for you see thati 
 even the most savory meats, if a person offer them td 
 another before he has an appetite for them, appear td 
 him distasteful ; and in the satisfied they excite even 
 
 1 T6 θ-ηριον.] A word suitable to the illustrations which Socratei 
 had previously given. j 
 
 2 That is, as freely as they oblige you ; not at the least possible 
 cost. 
 
c. χι., s. 17.] ON SECURING FRIENDS. 
 
 J 37 
 
 loathing ; but if one offers food to another after having 
 raised an appetite in him, it seems, though it be of a 
 very ordinary kind, extremely agreeable." 
 
 14. " How then can I," said she, " excite such an ap- 
 petite in any one of those that visit me?" " If, when 
 they are satiated," said he, "you, in the first place, 
 neither offer yourself to them, nor remind them of you, 
 until, coming to an end of their satiety, they again feel 
 a desire for you ; and, when they do feel such desire, 
 remind them of your fondness by the most modest ad- 
 dress, and by showing yourself willing to gratify them, 
 holding back at the same time, until they are filled with 
 impatient longing ; for it is far better to grant the tame 
 favors at such a time, than before they had an appetite 
 for them." 
 
 15. " Why do not you, then, Socrates," said she, " be- 
 come my helper in securing friends ? " "I will indeed," 
 said he, " if you can persuade me." " And how then." 
 said she, "can I persuade you?" " You yourself will 
 seek and find means to do so, if you should at all need 
 me." " Come often to see me, then," said she. 
 
 16. Then Socrates, joking upon his own easy life, 
 said, "But, Theodota, it is not easy for me to find 
 leisure; for my own numerous occupations, private and 
 public, 1 allow me no rest; and I have friends 2 also, 
 who will not suffer me to leave them day or night, 
 learning from me love-charms and incantations. 
 
 17. "Do you then know such arts, too, Socrates?" 
 said Theodota. " Through what other influence do you 
 suppose that Apollodorus 3 here, and Antisthenes, 4 
 never leave me ! and through what other influence do 
 you suppose that Cebes 5 and Simmias 6 came to me 
 
 1 This mention of public employments is to be taken as a joke, as 
 Weiske observes ; for Socrates took no part in public employ- 
 ments, as is stated in i. 6. 15. 
 
 * Ψίλαι.] He uses the feminine gender in jest, as if he had his 
 φίλαι as Theodota had her φίλοι. 
 
 3 He was a great admirer of Socrates, and constant attendant on 
 him. Apol. Soc. c. 28. Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 63. 
 
 * Founder of the Cynics ; he passed much of his time with So- 
 crates : Sympos. iv. 44 ; Mem. ii. 5. 1. Both theso men appear to 
 have attended him in his visit to Theodota. 
 
 0 Mentioned i. 2. 48. 
 
138 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [B. ill. 
 
 from Thebes? Be assured, that such effects were not 
 produced without many love-charms, incantations, and 
 magic wheels." 1 
 
 18. "Lend me, then, your magic wheel," said she, 
 " that I may set it a going, 2 first of all, against your- 
 self." "But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Socrates, '· I do 
 not wish that I should be drawn to you, but that you 
 should come to me." "I will come then," said she, 
 "only take care to let me in." " I will let you in," re- 
 plied he, "if another more acceptable than you be 
 not within." 3 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Socrates shows the benefit of gymnastic exercises, as well on the 
 health of the mind as on that of the body, sect. 1-4. The advant- 
 ages of health and vigor, 5-8. 
 
 1. Noticing that Epigenes, one of his followers, was 
 both very young and weak in body, he said to him, 
 " How veiy unlike an athlete 4 you are in frame, Epi- 
 genes ! " "I am not an athlete, Socrates," replied he. 
 "You are not less of an athlete," rejoined Socrates, 
 "than those who are going to contend at the Olympic 
 games. Does the struggle for life with the enemy, 
 
 1 Ίυ'γγων.] The Ίύξ is a small bird that builds in hollow trees, and 
 feeds on insects ; it is called in Latin torquilla, in French torcou, 
 in German wendehals, and in English wry-neck, from the incessant 
 motion of its head. From this peculiarity the ancients believed 
 that it had some magic power, and used it in incantations. They 
 used to tie the bird to a wheel with four spokes, which they 
 whirled round rapidly, chanting, at the same time, certain charms. 
 Hence the wheel itself came to be called ίόγ£ . See Find. Pyth. iv. 
 880 ; ^sch. Pers. 993 ; Theocr. ii. 17. Schneider. 
 
 2 "Ελκω.] The expression ϊλκίιν Ivyya έπϊ τίνα was a common one, 
 says Schneider. " "Ελκεις is used for torquere, in speaking of the 
 magic wheel. So tortus rhombus, Ov. Amor. i. 8. 7 ; and retro solvere 
 turbinem, Hor. Ep. xvii. 7." Sturz. 
 
 8 Aptly and wittily said ; for the excuse of the εταϊραι in shutting 
 out their gallants was ίνδον eTepos. Lucian, Dialog. Meretr. xii. p. 
 810 ; viii. p. 300. Ruhnken. 
 
 4 Ω5 ίδιωςικώϊ — το σώμα όχείϊ.] Quant non athletice corpore con- 
 stitutus es ! Ιδιώτης, one untrained in gymnastic exercises, was op- 
 posed to ασκητής, one trained in them. See iii. 7. 7. 
 
C. XU., s. 5.] ADVANTAGES OF EXERCISE. 
 
 1 39 
 
 which the Athenians will demand of you when cir- 
 cumstances require, seem to you to be a trifling contest ? 
 
 2. Yet, in the dangers of war, not a few, through 
 weakness of body, either lose their lives, or save them 
 with dishonor ; many, from the same cause, are taken 
 alive, and, as prisoners of war, endure for the rest of their 
 lives, if such should be their fate, the bitterest slavery ; 
 or, falling into the most grievous hardships, and paying 
 for their ransom sometimes more than they possess, pass 
 the remainder of their existence in want of necessaries, 
 and in the endurance of affliction ; and many, too, 
 incur infamy, being thought to be cowards merely from 
 the imbecility of their bodily frame. 
 
 3. Do you think lightly of such penalties attached to 
 weakness of body, or do you expect that you will en- 
 dure such calamities with ease ? I believe that what 
 he must bear who attends to the health of his body, is 
 far lighter and more pleasant than such afflictions. Or 
 do you suppose that an ill condition of body is more 
 salutary and advantageous than a good condition ? Or 
 do you despise the benefits secured by a good state of 
 the body ? 
 
 4. Yet the lot which falls to those who have their 
 bodies in good condition is exactly the reverse of that 
 which falls to those who have them in ill condition ; 
 for those who have their bodies in a good state are 
 healthy and strong ; and many, from being possessed 
 of this advantage, save themselves with honor amid 
 the struggles of war, and escape every peril ; many, 
 also, assist their friends and benefit their country, and, 
 for such services, are thought worthy of favor, acquire 
 great glory, and attain the highest dignities ; and, on 
 these accounts, pass the rest of their lives with greater 
 pleasure and honor, and bequeath finer fortunes 1 to 
 their children. 
 
 5. Nor, because the city does not require warlike 
 exercises publicly, 2 ought we, on that account, to neg- 
 
 1 Άφορμάϊ ei? τον βίον.~\ Supplies or incomes for living ; means of 
 life. 
 
 2 Xenophon, in recording this censure on the Athenians, intends 
 tacitly to praise the Lacedaemonians. See iii. 5. 15. Weiske. There 
 
ΐ4θ 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. III. 
 
 lect them privately, but rather to practise them the 
 more ; 1 for be well assured that neither in any other 
 contest, nor in any affair whatever, will you at all come 
 off the worse because your body is better trained than 
 that of other men ; since the body must bear its part in 
 whatever men do ; and in all the services required from 
 the body, it is of the utmost importance to have it in 
 the best possible condition. 
 
 6. For even in that in which you think that there 
 is least exercise for the body, namely, thinking, who 
 does not know that many fail greatly from ill-health? 
 and loss of memory, despondency, irritability, and mad- 
 ness, often, from ill-health of body, attack the mind 
 with such force as to drive out all previous knowledge. 
 
 7. But to those who have their bodies in good condi- 
 tion, there is the utmost freedom from anxiety, and no 
 danger of suffering any such calamity from weakness 
 of constitution ; while it is likely, rather, that a healthy 
 state of body will avail to produce consequences the 
 reverse of those which result from an unhealthy state 
 of it ; and, indeed, to secure consequences the reverse 
 of what we have stated, what would a man in his senses 
 not undergo ? 
 
 8. It is disgraceful, too. for a person to grow old in 
 self-neglect, before he knows what he would become 
 by rendering himself well-formed and vigorous in body ; 
 but this a man who neglects himself cannot know ; for 
 such advantages are not wont to come spontaneously. 
 
 were at Athens, says Schneider, as in other states of Greece, 
 όπλομάχοι, men who trained others in the exercise of arms ; but no 
 such exercise was publicly required by law as at Lacedaemon. 
 
 1 Μηδέν ήττον.] " Not less." 
 
C. χιπ., s. 3.] SAYINGS OF SOCRATES. 
 
 141 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Several brief sayings of Socrates. We should not be offended at 
 rudeness of manner more than at personal defects, sect. 1 . Fast- 
 ing the best remedy for loathing of food, 2. We should not be 
 too nice as to food or drink, 3. He that punishes his slave, should 
 consider whether he himself deserves like punishment, 4. Ad- 
 monitions to travellers, 5. It is disgraceful to him who has been 
 trained in the gymnasium to be outdone by a slave in enduring 
 toil, 6. 
 
 1. A person being angry, because, on saluting an- 
 other, he was not saluted in return, " It is an odd thing," 
 said Socrates to him, "that if you had met a man ill- 
 conditioned in body you would not have been angry, 
 but to have met a man rudely disposed in mind pro- 
 vokes you." 
 
 2. Another person saying that he ate without pleas- 
 ure, " Acumenus," 1 said Socrates, "prescribes an ex- 
 cellent remedy for that disease." The other asking, 
 " What sort of remedy ? " "To abstain from eating," 
 said Socrates ; " for he says that, after abstaining, you 
 will live with more pleasure, less expense, and better 
 health." , . , , 
 
 3. Another saying that the water which he had to 
 drink at his house was warm, " When you wish to 
 bathe in warm water, then," said Socrates, " it will be 
 ready for you." " But it is too cold to bathe in," said 
 the other. "Are your slaves, then," asked Socrates, 
 " inconvenienced by drinking or bathing in it ? " 
 " No, by Jupiter," replied he ; " for I have often won- 
 dered how cheerfully they use it for both those pur- 
 poses." "And is the water in your house." said Soc- 
 rates, " or that in the temple of ^Esculapius, 2 the warmer 
 for drinking ?" "That at the temple of iEsculapius," 
 replied lie. " And which is the colder for bathing in, 
 
 1 A physician of the time of Socrates, and one of his friends. 
 See Plato, Pheedr. p. 227, Α., p. 208, A. B. ; Symp. p. 176; Cobet, 
 Prosopogr. Xen. p. 50. ,j. * 
 
 2 At Athens, Pausanias, Attic, c. 21, mentions that it was situate 
 in the way from the theatre to the Acropolis, and that there was a 
 fountain belonging to it ; but says nothing of the nature of the 
 water. Schneider. 
 
142 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. in. 
 
 that at your house, or that in the temple of Amphia- 
 raus ? ' n "That in the temple of Amphiaraus," said he. 
 " Consider, then," said Socrates, " that you seem to be 
 harder to please than your slaves or the sick." 
 
 4. Another person beating his attendant severely, 
 Socrates asked him why he was so angry at the slave. 
 " Because," said he, "he is very gluttonous and very 
 stupid, very covetous and very idle." " And have you 
 ever reflected," rejoined Socrates, "which of the two 
 deserves the greater number of stripes, you or your 
 slave ? " 
 
 5. A person being afraid of the journey to Olympia, 
 " "Why," said Socrates to him, " do you fear the jour- 
 ney ? Do you not walk about at home almost all day ? 
 And, if you set out thither, you will walk and dine, 
 walk and sup, and go to rest. Do you not know that 
 if you were to extend in a straight line the walks which 
 you take in five or six days, you would easily go from 
 Athens to Olympia ? But it will be better for you to 
 start a day too soon than a day too late ; for to be 
 obliged to extend your days' journeys beyond a moder- 
 ate length is disagreeable ; but to spend one day more 
 on the road gives great ease ; and it is better, therefore, 
 to hasten to start than to hurry on the way." 
 
 6. Another saying that he was utterly wearied with 
 a long journey, Socrates asked him whether he carried 
 any burden. "No, by Jupiter," said he, "I did not, 
 except my cloak." " And did you travel alone," said 
 Socrates, " or did an attendant accompany you ? " " An 
 attendant was with me." " Was he empty-handed, or 
 did he carry anything ? " "He carried, certainly, the 
 bedding 2 and other utensils." "And how did he get 
 over the journey ?" " He appeared to me to come off 
 better than myself? " " If you. then, had been obliged 
 to carry his burden, how do you imagine that you would 
 have fared ? " " Very ill, by Jupiter ; or rather, I should 
 not have been able to carry it at all." " And how can 
 you think that it becomes a man trained to exercise to 
 be so much less able to bear fatigue than a slave? " 
 
 1 Between Potniae and Thebes. 
 
 2 Which slaves used to carry in a bag. See note on Anab. v. 4. 13. 
 
C. XIV., s. 3.] 
 
 TABLE TALK. 
 
 143 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Table-talk of Socrates in praise of frugality. In contributions to 
 feasts, one guest should not strive to surpass another in the 
 quality or quantity of what he contributes, sect. 1. He may be 
 called όψοφάνοϊ, flesh-eater, who eacs flesh alone, or with very little 
 bread, 2-4. He that eats of many dishes at once acts foolishly 
 in various ways, 5, 6. He may be truly said «ΰωχ^σθαι, to banquet, 
 who lives on plain and wholesome food, 7. 
 
 1. When, among a number of persons who had met 
 together to sup, some brought little meat, and others a 
 great quantity, Socrates desired the attendant either to 
 set the smallest dish on the table for common partici- 
 pation, or to distribute a portion of it to each. They, 
 accordingly, who had brought a great deal, were 
 ashamed not to partake of what was put on table for the 
 company in general, and not, at the same time, to put 
 their own on table in return. They therefore offered 
 their own dishes for the participation of the company ; 
 and when they had no greater share than those who 
 brought but little, they ceased to buy meat at great cost. 
 
 2. Observing one of those at table with him taking 
 no bread, but eating meat by itself, and a discussion 
 having arisen at the same time about names, for what 
 cause any particular name was given, " Can we tell, ' 
 said Socrates, " for what cause a man should be called 
 ΌψοωάγοςΊ 1 For everybody eats flesh with his bread 
 when he has it ; but I do not suppose that people are 
 called όψοωάγοι on that account." " I should think not, ' 
 said one of the company. 
 
 3. " But," said Socrates, " if a person should eat meat 
 by itself without bread, not for the purpose of training, 2 
 but of gratifying his appetite, whether would he seem 
 to be an οψοωάγος or not ? " " Scarcely any other would 
 more justly seem so," said he. " And he that eats a 
 great deal of meat with very little bread," said another, 
 of the company, " what should he be called ? " " To me," 
 
 1 Flesh-eater. From οψον, whatever was eaten with bread, and 
 
 φανεί]/, to eat. .... . , . 
 
 * Άσκήσίπς.] A word used to denote the training of the athlete, 
 who ate a great deal of flesh to strengthen them. See 1. 3. 4 ; 111. 7. 
 7. Kiihner. 
 
144 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. III. 
 
 replied Socrates, "it appears that he would justly be 
 called οψοωάγοή, and when other men pray to the gods for 
 abundance of corn, he may pray for abundance of flesh." 
 
 4. When Socrates said this, the young man, thinking 
 that the words were directed at him, did -not indeed 
 leave off eating meat, but took some bread with it. 
 Socrates, observing him do so, said, " Notice this young 
 man, you that sit near him, whether he takes bread to 
 his meat, or meat to his bread." 
 
 5. Seeing another of the company taste of several 
 dishes with the same piece of bread, " Can any cookery 
 be more extravagant," said he, " or more adapted to 
 spoil dishes, than that which he practices who eats of 
 several at the same time, putting all manner of sauces 
 into his mouth at once ? For as he mixes together more 
 ingredients than the cooks, he makes what he eats 
 more expensive ; and as he mixes what they forbear to 
 mix as being incongruous, he, if they do right, is in the 
 wrong, and renders their art ineffectual. 
 
 6. And how can it be otherwise than ridiculous," hdj 
 added, " for a man to provide himself with cooks of the 
 greatest skill, and then, though he pretends to no 
 knowledge of their art, to undo what has been done by 
 them ? But there is another evil attendant on him who 
 is accustomed to eat of several dishes at once ; for, if 
 he has not several sorts of meat before him, he thinks 
 himself stinted, missing the variety to which he has 
 been used. But he who is accustomed to make one 
 
 iece of bread, and one piece of meat, go together, will 
 e able to partake contentedly of one dish when several 
 are just at hand." 
 
 7. He observed also that εύωχεϊσΰαι, " to fare well," 1 
 was in the language of the Athenians called έσ&ίειν, " to 
 eat;" and that the εν, "well," was added to denote 
 that we should eat such food as would disorder neither 
 mind nor body, and such as would not be difficult to be 
 procured ; so that lie applied ώνχείσΰαι, " to fare well," 
 to those who fared temperately. 
 
 1 Εύωχεω, quasi ίύοχβω, from eC and ό Χ η, support, nourishment, 
 from €χω : a derivation for which Kiihner refers to Eustath. ad II. 
 
 11. p. 212. 37 : Αχαιοί την τροφοην όχήν λβ'γτυρι. 
 
c. ι., s. 3.] HIS INTEREST IN YOUNG MEN. 145 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Socrates liked the society of young men ; how he judged of them ; 
 his desire that they should be well educated, sect. 1, 2. The more 
 powerful the mind in youth, the more likely it is, if ill trained, 
 to run into vice, 3, 4. Happiness does not depend on riches, but 
 on knowledge, and on being useful to our fellow-creatures, and 
 gaining their esteem, 5. 
 
 1. So serviceable was Socrates to others, in every 
 kind of transaction, and by every possible means, that 
 to any one who reflects on his usefulness (even though 
 he possess but moderate discernment), it is manifest 
 that nothing was of greater benefit than to associate 
 with Socrates, and to converse with him, on any oc- 
 casion, or on any subject whatever ; since even the re- 
 membrance of him, when he is no longer with us, 
 benefits in no small degree those who are accustomed 
 to enjoy his society, and heard him with approbation ; 
 for he sought to improve his associates not less in his 
 numerous than in Ins serious conversation. 
 
 2. He would often say that he loved some particular 
 person ; but he was evidently enamored, not of those 
 formed by nature to be beautiful, but of those naturally 
 inclined to virtue. He judged of the goodness of 
 people's abilities from their quickness in learning the 
 things to which they gave their attention, from their 
 remembrance of what they learned, and from their 
 desire for all those branches of knowledge by means of 
 which it is possible to manage a family or an estate 
 well, and to govern men and their affairs with success ; 
 for he thought that such characters, when instructed, 
 would not only be happy themselves, and regulate their 
 own families judiciously, but would be able to render 
 other men, and other communities beside their own 
 happy. 
 
 3. He did not however make advances to all in the 
 7 
 
I 4 6 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. IV. 
 
 same manner. Those who thought that they had good 
 natural abilities, but despised instruction, he en- 
 deavored to convince that minds which show most 
 natural power have most need of education, pointing 
 out to them that horses of the best breed, which are 
 high-spirited and obstinate, become, if they are broken 
 in when young, most useful and valuable, but if they 
 are left unbroken, remain quite unmanageable and 
 worthless ; and that hounds of the best blood, able to 
 endure toil, and eager to attack beasts, prove, if they 
 are well trained, most serviceable for the chase, and 
 every way excellent, but, if untrained, are useless, 
 rabid, and disobedient. 
 
 4. In like manner he showed that men of the best 
 natural endowments, possessed of the greatest strength 
 of mind, and most energetic in executing what they 
 undertake, became, if well disciplined and instructed 
 in what they ought to do, most estimable characters, 
 and most beneficent to society (as they then performed 
 most numerous and important services), but that, if 
 uninstructed, and left in ignorance, they proved utterly 
 worthless and mischievous : for that, not knowing what 
 line of conduct they ought to pursue, they often entered 
 upon evil courses, and, being haughty and impetuous, 
 were difficult to be restrained or turned from their pur- 
 pose, and thus occasioned very many and great evils. 
 
 5. But those who prided themselves on their wealth, 
 and thought that they required no education, but im- 
 agined that their riches would suffice to effect whatever 
 they desired, and to gain them honor from mankind, 
 he tried to reduce to reason by saying that the man 
 was a fool who thought that he could distinguish the 
 good and the evil in life without instruction ; and 
 that he also was a fool who, though he could not dis- 
 tinguish them, thought that he would procure what- 
 ever he wished, and effect whatever was for his interest, 
 by means of his wealth. He also said that the man was 
 void of sense who, not being qualified to pursue what 
 was for his good, fancied that he would be prosperous 
 in the world, and that everything necessary for his 
 comfort was fully, or at least sufficiently, provided for 
 
C. π., s. ι.] MORAL OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 *47 
 
 him ; and that he was equally void of sense who, 
 though he knew nothing, thought that he would seem 
 good for something because of his riches, and, though 
 evidently despicable, would gain esteem through their 
 influence. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 No dependence to be placed on natural abilities without educa- 
 tion. Socrates proceeds to show Euthydemus, a self-conceited 
 young man, that in every art it is proper to have recourse to 
 instructors, sect. 1, 2. He shows the folly of a man who should 
 pretend to have learned everything of himself, 3-5. The necessity 
 of instruction in the art of government, 6, 7. By a long series of 
 interrogations Socrates reduces Euthydemus to acknowledge his 
 ignorance and incompetence, 8-23. The value of self-knowledge, 
 24-30. Further instructions given to Euthydemus, 30-40. 
 
 1. 1 1 will now show how Socrates addressed himself 
 to such as thought that they had attained the highest 
 degree of knowledge, and prided themselves on their 
 ability. Hearing that Euthydemus, 2 surnamed the 
 Handsome, had collected many writings 3 of the most 
 celebrated poets and sophists, and imagined that by 
 that means he was outstripping his contemporaries in 
 accomplishments, and had great hopes that he would 
 excel them all in talent for speaking and acting, and 
 finding, by his first inquiries about him, that he had 
 not yet engaged in public affairs on account of his 
 youth, 4 but that, when he wished to do any business, 5 
 he usually sat in a bridle-maker's shop near the Forum, 
 he went himself to it, accompanied by some of his 
 hearers. 
 
 1 Schneider observes that this second chapter is but a continu- 
 ation of the first, and ought not to be separated from it. 
 
 2 The same that is mentioned i. 2. 29. 
 
 3 Γράμμστα.] They Seem to be the same as συγγράμματα, ΟΓ trvyy- 
 
 Γγραμμένα., moral precepts, reflections, and examples, extracted 
 from different writers. See Bekker, Anecd, i. p. 31 ; and Borne- 
 mannad Cyrop. viii. 4. 16. Kiihner. 
 
 * Being under twenty years of age. See iii. 6. 1. 
 
 t> Ti — διαπρά£ασναι..] He seems to have appointed the bridle- 
 maker's shop as a place for meeting his friends, and for waiting 
 for them, if they went away to do any business for him. 
 
148 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [B. IV. 
 
 2. And as somebody asked, first of all " whether it was 
 from his intercourse with some of the wise men, or 
 from his own natural talents, that Themistocles attained 
 such a pre-eminence above his fellow-citizens, that the 
 republic looked to him whenever it wanted the service 
 of a man of ability," Socrates, wishing to excite the 
 attention of Euthydemus, said that " it was absurd to 
 believe that men could not become skilled in the lowest 
 mechanical arts without competent instructors, and to 
 imagine that ability to govern a state, the most impor- 
 tant of all arts, might spring up in men by the unassisted 
 efforts of nature." 
 
 3. On another occasion, when Euthydemus was one 
 of the company, and Socrates saw him leaving it, from 
 apprehension lest he should seem to admire him for his 
 wisdom, he observed, " It is evident, my friends, from 
 the studies that he pursues, that Euthydemus here, 
 when he comes of age, and the government give liberty 
 of discussion 1 on any point, will not i - ef rain from offer- 
 ing his counsel ; and I imagine that he has already 
 framed an exordium for his public oration, taking pre- 
 caution that he may not be thought to have learned 
 anything from anybody ; and it is pretty certain, there- 
 fore, that when he begins to speak, he will make his 
 opening thus : 
 
 4. " I, Ο men of Athens, have never learned anything 
 from any person, nor, though I heard of some that were 
 skilled in speaking and acting, have I sought to con- 
 verse with them ; nor have I been anxious that any 
 one of the learned should become my master ; but I 
 nave done the exact contrary ; for I have constantly 
 avoided not only learning anything from any one, but 
 even the appearance of learning anything ; neverthe- 
 less I will offer you such advice as may occur .to me 
 without premeditation." 
 
 5. "So it might be proper for a person to commence 
 
 1 When the public crier called the people to an assembly, he gave 
 notice that liberty would be granted to those who wished to speak 
 on the subject of discussion: as in Demosth. de Cor. c. 53 : τις 
 άγορευειν βούΚεται ; and Aristoph. Acharn. 45. Schneider. Schoe- 
 man η de Comitiis, ii. p. 104. 
 
C. II., s. 7.] EUTHYDEMUS. 
 
 149 
 
 a speech who desired to obtain a medical appointment 1 
 from the government : Ί, Ο men of Athens, have never 
 learned the medical art from any one, nor have been 
 desirous that any physician should be my instructor ; 
 for I have constantly been on my guard, not only 
 against learning anything of the art from any one, 
 but even against appearing to have learned anything ; 
 nevertheless confer on me this medical appointment ; 
 for I will endeavor to learn by making experiments 
 upon you.' " At this mode of opening a speech all who 
 were present burst out into laughter. 
 
 6. As Euthydemus had now evidently begun to at- 
 tend to what Socrates was saying, but was cautious of 
 speaking himself, as thinking by his silence to clothe 
 himself with reputation for modesty, Socrates, wish- 
 ing to cure him of that fancy, said, " It is indeed 
 strange that those who desire to play on the lyre, or 
 on the flute, or to ride, or to become expert in any 
 such accomplishment, should endeavor to practice, as 
 constantly as possible, that in which they desire to 
 excel, and not by themselves merely, but with the aid 
 of such as are considered eminent in those attainments, 
 attempting and undergoing every thing, so as to do 
 nothing without their sanction, as supposing that they 
 can by no other means attain reputation ; but that of 
 those who wish to become able to speak and act in 
 affairs of government, some think that they will be 
 suddenly qualified to achieve their object without 
 preparation or study, and by their own unassisted 
 efforts. 
 
 7. " Yet these pursuits are manifestly more difficult 
 of attainment than those, inasmuch as of the very 
 many who attempt them a much smaller number suc- 
 ceed in them ; and it is evident, therefore, that those 
 
 1 Ιατρικδύ e P yov.1 Weiske supposes that there were two classes of 
 medical men ; some freemen, and others slaves ; and that the 
 better sort were appointed by the people at their assemblies, re- 
 ceiving a salary from the public treasury. 
 
 2 To learn by making experiments on their patients medical men 
 do not profess, yet it is what they secretly practise. Discunt pen- 
 cults nostris, et experimenta per mortes agunt, as Pliny says, H. JS. 
 xxix. 1. Schneider. 
 
 7* 
 
150 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. iv. 
 
 who pursue the one are required to submit to longer 
 and more diligent study than those who pursue the 
 other." 
 
 8. Socrates used at first to make such remarks, while 
 Euthydemus merely listened ; but when he observed 
 that he stayed, while he conversed, with more willing- 
 ness, and hearkened to him with more attention, he at 
 last came to the bridle-maker's shop unattended. As 
 Eutl^demus sat down beside him, he said, " Tell me, 
 Euthydemus, have you really, as I hear, collected 
 many of the writings 1 of men who are said to have 
 been wise." "I have indeed, Socrates," replied he, 
 "and I am still collecting, intending to persevere till 
 I get as many as I possibly can." 
 
 9. '· By Juno," rejoined Socrates, " I feel admiration 
 for you, because you have not preferred acquiring 
 treasures of silver and gold rather than of wisdom ; 
 for it is plain you consider that silver and gold are 
 unable to make men better, but that the thoughts of 
 wise men enrich their possessors with virtue." Euthy- 
 demus was delighted to hear this commendation, be- 
 lieving that he was thought by Socrates to have sought 
 wisdom in the right course. 
 
 10. Socrates, observing that he was gratified with tho 
 praise, said, " And, in what particular art do you wish 
 to become skillful, that you collect these writings?" 
 As Euthydemus continued silent, considering what 
 reply he should make, Socrates again asked, "Do you 
 wish to become a physician ? for there are many writ- 
 ings of physicians." " Not I, by Jupiter," replied Eu- 
 thydemus. " Do you wish to become an architect, 
 then? for a man of knowledge is needed for that art 
 also." 4 "No, indeed," answered he. "Do you wish 
 to become a good geometrician, like Theodorus?" 3 
 " Nor a geometrician either," said he. " Do you wish 
 
 1 Γράμματα.] See note on sect. 1. 
 
 2 Τνωμονικοΰ yap αν&ρος και τούτο &έΐ.] " There is need of a man of 
 knowledge also for this art." Τούτο for κατά τούτο, for it cannot, as 
 Kuhner observes, be a nominative. 
 
 8 Theodorus of Cyrene, the preceptor of Socrates in geometry, 
 mentioned in the Theeetetus of Plato. Comp. iv. 7, 3. Schneider. 
 See Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 32. 
 
C. π., s. 13.] DISCOURSE WITH EUTHYDEMUS. 151 
 
 then to become an astronomer?" said Socrates. As 
 Euthydemus said, " No," to this, " Do you wish then," 
 added Socrates " to become arhapsodist," 1 for they say 
 that you are in possession of all the poems of Homer? ' 
 "No, indeed," said he, "for I know that the rhapso- 
 dists, though eminently knowing in the poems of 
 Homer, are, as men, extremely foolish." 
 
 It. " You are perhaps desirous, then," proceeded So- 
 crates, " of attaining that talent by which men become 
 skilled in governing states, in managing households, able 
 to command, and qualified to benefit other men as well 
 as themselves." "I indeed greatly desire," said he, 
 " Socrates, to acquire that talent." "By Jupiter," re- 
 turned Socrates, "you aspire to a most honorable 
 accomplishment, and a most exalted art, for it is the 
 art of kings, and is called the royal art. But," added 
 he, "have you ever considered whether it is possible 
 for a man who is not just to be eminent in that art ? " 
 " I have certainly," replied he : " and it is not possible 
 for a man to be even a good citizen without justice." 
 
 12. " Have you, vourself, then, made yourself master 
 of that virtue ? " "I think," said he, " Socrates, that 
 I shall be found not less just than any other man." 
 " Are there then works of just men. as there are works 
 of artisans?" "There are, doubtless," replied he. 
 "Then," said Socrates, "as artisans are able to show 
 their works, would not just men be able also to tell their 
 works?" "And why should not I," asked Euthy- 
 demus, "be able to tell the works of justice; as also 
 indeed those of injustice ; for we may see and hear of 
 no small number of them every day ? " 
 
 13. " Are you willing then," said Socrates, " that we 
 should make a delta on this side, and an alpha 2 on 
 
 1 The rhapsodists, ραψωδοί, were men who publicly recited epic 
 verses, especially those of Homer. " The judgment here passed on 
 the rhapsodists has reference to the period of Socrates only, not 
 to preceding times, in which they were held in great honor, bee 
 Bornemann ad Symp. hi. 6. There is an elegant discussion on the 
 rhapsodists by G. H. Bodius, in a work of much learning, entitled 
 Gesch. der He'llec. Dichtkunst. vol. i. p. 351, seqq. See Stallbaum 
 ad Plato, Ion. ρ 285, F. Α.; Wolf. Prolegom. in Horn. p. 99, seqq.; 
 and Gr. Guil. Nitzsch in Qusest. Horn. P. iv. p. 13." Kuhner. 
 
 2 Delta for δίκαιοι, " just ; " alpha for άδικόϊ, 4> unjust. 
 
MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [Β. IV. 
 
 that, and then that we should put whatever seems to 
 us to be a work of justice under the delta, and what- 
 ever seems to be a work of injustice under the alpha f '* 
 " If you think that we need those letters," said Suthy- 
 demus, " make them." 
 
 14. Socrates, having made the letters as he proposed, 
 asked, "Does falsehood then exist among mankind?" 
 " It does, assuredly," replied he. " Under which head 
 shall we place it?" "Under injustice, oertainly." 
 " Does deceit also exist?" "Unquestionably." "Under 
 which head shall we place that?" " Evidently under 
 injustice." "Does mischievousness exist?" "Un- 
 doubtedly." "And the enslaving of men?" ' That, 
 too, prevails." "And shall neither of these things be 
 placed by us, under justice, Euthydemus ? " "It would 
 be strange if they should be," said he. 
 
 15. " But," said Socrates, " if a man being chosen to 
 lead an army, should reduce to slavery an unjust and 
 hostile people, should we say that lie committed in- 
 justice ? " "No, certainly," replied he. " Should we 
 not rather say that he acted justly ? " " Indisputably." 
 " And if, in the course of the war with them, lie should 
 practice deceit?" " That also would be just," said he. 
 " And if he should steal and carry off their property, 
 would he not do what was just?" "Certainly," said 
 Euthydemus ; but I thought at first that you asked 
 these questions only with reference to our friends." 
 " Then," said Socrates, " all that we have placed under 
 the head of injustice, we must also place under that of 
 justice ? " "It seems so," replied Euthydemus. 
 
 16. " Do you agree, then," continued Socrates, " that, 
 having so placed them, we should make a new distinc- 
 tion, that it is just to do such things with regard to 
 enemies, but unjust to do them with regard to friends, 
 and that toward his friends our general should be as 
 guileless as possible ? " " By all means," replied Euthy- 
 demus. 
 
 17. " Well, then," said Socrates, " if a general, seeing 
 his army dispirited, should tell them, inventing a false- 
 hood, that auxiliaries were coming, and should, by that 
 invention, check the despondency of his troops, under 
 
C. π., s. 20.] ON JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. 153 
 
 which head should we place such an act of deceit ? " 
 " It appears to me," said Euthydemus, " that we must 
 place it under justice." ''And if a father, when his 
 son requires medicine, and refuses to take it, should 
 deceive him, and give him the medicine as ordinary 
 food, and, by adopting such deception, should restore 
 him to health, under which head must we place such an 
 act of deceit ? " " It appears to me that we must put it 
 under the same head." ■" And if a person, when his 
 friend was in despondency, should, through fear that he 
 might kill himself, stealor take away his sword, or any 
 other weapon, under which head must we place that 
 act ? " " That, assuredly, we must place under justice." 
 
 18. "You say, then," said Socrates, "that not even 
 toward our friends must we act on all occasions with- 
 out deceit?" "We must not, indeed," saM he, "for I 
 retract what I said before, if I may be permitted to do 
 so." " It is indeed much better that you should be per- 
 mitted," said Socrates, " than that you should not place 
 actions on the right side. 
 
 19. But of those who deceive their friends in order to 
 in jure them (that we may not leave even this point un- 
 considered), which of the two is the more unjust, he 
 who does so intentionally or he who does so involun- 
 tarily ? " " Indeed, Socrates," said Euthydemus, " I no 
 longer put confidence in the answers which I give ; for 
 all that I said before appears to me now to be quite dif- 
 ferent from what I then thought ; however, let me ven- 
 ture to say 1 that he who deceives intentionally is more 
 unjust than he who deceives involuntarily ? " 
 
 20. " Does it appear to you, then, that there is a way 
 of learning and knowing what is just, as there is of 
 learning and knowing how to read and write?" "I 
 think there is." " And which should you consider the 
 better scholar, him who should purposely write or read 
 incorrectly, or him who should do so unawares ? " 
 " Him who should do so purposely, for, whenever he 
 pleased, he would be able to do both correctly." "He, 
 therefore, that purposely writes incorrectly may be a 
 
 1 Ειρήσθω μοι.] " Let it have been said by me," or "Let me 
 say." 
 
154 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. IV. 
 
 good scholar, but he who does so involuntarily is desti- 
 tute of scholarship?" "How can it be otherwise?" 
 " And whether does he who lies and deceives intention- 
 ally know what is just, or he who does so unawares?" 
 " Doubtless he who does so intentionally." "You, 
 therefore, say that he who knows how to write and 
 read is a better scholar than he who does not know ? " 
 " Yes." " And that he who knows what is just is more 
 just than he who does not know ? " "I seem to say so ; 
 but I appear to myself to say this I know not how." 
 
 21. "But what would you think of the man, who, 
 wishing to tell the truth, should never give the same 
 account of the same thing, but, in speaking of the same 
 road, should say at one time that it led toward the east, 
 and at another toward the west, and, in stating the 
 result of the same calculation, should sometimes assert 
 it to be greater and sometimes less, what, I say, would 
 you think of such a man ? " "It would be quite clear 
 that he knew nothing of what he thought he knew." 1 
 
 22. "Do you know any persons called slave-like." 2 
 " I do." " Whether for their knowledge or their igno- 
 rance?" "For their ignorance, certainly." "Is it 
 then for their ignorance of working in brass that they 
 receive this appellation ? " " Not at all. " Is it for their 
 ignorance of the art of building?" "Nor for that." 
 "Or for their ignorance of shoemaking?" "Not on 
 any one of these accounts ; for the contrary is the case, 
 as most of those who know such trades are servile." 
 " Is this, then, an appellation of those who are ignorant 
 of what is honorable, and good, and just ? " "It appears 
 so to me." 
 
 23. "It therefore becomes us to exert ourselves in 
 everyway to avoid being like slaves." "But, by the 
 gods, Socrates," rejoined Euthydemus, "I firmly be- 
 
 1 This is the conclusion to which Socrates wished to bring Euthy- 
 demus with regard to his own knowledge of justice ; and to exhort 
 him, at the same time, to gain a knowledge of it, " as he who 
 knows what is just is more just than he who does not know," 
 sect. 20. 
 
 2 'ΑυδραττοδώδΕίϊ.] Slave-like, ignorant, low-minded, not pos- 
 sessed of any qualities to raise them above the level of slaves. 
 Compare i. 1. 16 ; and sect. 39 of this chapter. 
 
C π., s. 26.] ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE. 155 
 
 lieved that I was pursuing that course of study, by 
 which I should, as I expected, be made fully acquainted 
 with all that was proper to be known by a man striving 
 after honor and virtue ; but now, how dispirited must 
 you think I feel, when I say that, with all my previous 
 labor, I am not even able to answer a question about 
 what I ought most of all to know, and am acquainted 
 with no other course which I may pursue to become 
 better." 
 
 24. Socrates then said, " Tell me, Euthydemus, have 
 you ever gone to Delphi ? " " Yes, twice," replied he. 
 "And did you observe what is written somewhere on 
 the temple wall. Know thyself?" "I did." "And 
 did you take no thought of that inscription, or did you 
 attend to it. and try to examine yourself, to ascertain 
 what sort of character you are?" " I did not indeed 
 try, for I thought that I knew very well already, since 
 I should hardly know any thing else if I did not know 
 myself." 
 
 25. " But whether does he seem to you to know him- 
 self, who knows his own name merely, or he who (like 
 people buying horses, who do not think that they know 
 the horse that they want to know, until they have as- 
 certained whether he is tractable or unruly, whether 
 he is strong or weak, swift or slow, and how he is as to 
 other points which are serviceable or disadvantageous 
 in the use of a horse, so he,) having ascertained with 
 regard to himself how he is adapted for the service of 
 mankind, knows his own abilities?" " It appears to 
 me, I must confess, that he who does not know his 
 own abilities, does not know himself ." 
 
 26. " But is it not evident." said Socrates, " that men 
 enjoy a great number of blessings in consequence of 
 knowing themselves, and incur a great number of evils, 
 through being deceived in themselves ? For they who 
 know themselves know what is suitable for them, and 
 distinguish between what they can do and what they 
 can not ; and, by doing what they know how to do, 
 procure for themselves what they need, and are pros- 
 perous, and by abstaining from what they do not 
 know, live blamelessly, and avoid being unfortunate. 
 
156 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [Β. IV. 
 
 By this knowledge of themselves, too, they can form 
 an opinion of other men, and, by their experience of 
 the rest of mankind, 1 obtain for themselves what is 
 good, and guard against what is evil. 
 
 27. But they who do not know themselves, but are 
 deceived in their own powers, are in similar case with 
 regard to other men, 2 and other human affairs, and 
 neither understand what they require, nor what they 
 are doing, nor the characters of those with whom they 
 connect themselves, but, being in error as to all these 
 particulars, they fail to obtain what is good, and fall 
 into evil. 
 
 28. They, on the other hand, who understand what 
 they take in hand, succeed in what they attempt, and 
 become esteemed and honored ; those who resemble 
 them in character willingly form connections with 
 them ; those who are* unsuccessful in life desire to be 
 assisted with their advice,. 3 and to prefer them to 
 themselves ; they place in them their hopes of good, 
 and love them, on all these accounts, beyond all other 
 men. 
 
 29. But those, again, who do not know what they are 
 doing, who make an unhappy choice in life, and are 
 unsuccessful in what they attempt, not only incur 
 losses and sufferings in their own affairs, but become, 
 in consequence, disreputable and ridiculous, and drag 
 out their lives in contempt and dishonor. Among 
 states, too, you see that such as, from ignorance of 
 their own strength, go to war with others that are 
 more powerful, are, some of them, utterly overthrown, 
 and others reduced from freedom to slavery." 
 
 30. "Be assured, therefore," replied Euthydemus, 
 " that I feel convinced we must consider self-knowledge 
 of the highest value ; but as to the way in which we 
 
 1 Διά της των ά-γλων χρείας.] Xpsia is here " dealing with," " inter- 
 course," by which knowledge and experience may be obtained. 
 Compare ο'ίς χρώνται. in the following section. 
 
 2 As they have no right knowledge of themselves, they have no 
 right knowledge of other men, or of human affairs. 
 
 3 Έπι^υμΟοσι tootovs inep αυτών βου\ΐϋ€σ&αι.] " Desire that these 
 
 persons should deliberate (or consider about matters) for them." 
 
C. Π., s. 33.] ON GOOD AND EVIL. 
 
 J 57 
 
 must begin 1 to seek self-knowledge, I look to you for 
 information, if you will kindly impart it to me." 
 
 31. " Well, then," said Socrates, " you doubtless fully 
 understand what sort of things are good, and what sort 
 are evil." "Yes, by Jupiter," replied Euthydemus, 
 " for if I did not understand such things, I should be 
 in a worse condition than slaves are." " Come then/' 
 said Socrates, " tell me what they are." " That is not 
 difficult," said he, "for, in the first place, health I 
 consider to be a good, and sickness an evil, and, in the 
 next, looking to the causes of each of them, as drink, 
 food, and employments, I esteem such as conduce to 
 health to be good, and such as lead to sickness to be 
 evil." 
 
 32. " Consequently," said Socrates, " health and sick- 
 ness themselves, when they are the causes of any good, 
 will be good, and when they are the causes of any evil, 
 will be evil." " But when," exclaimed Euthydemus, 
 ' ' can health be the cause of evil, and sickness of good ? " 
 "When, for example," said Socrates, " some portion of 
 a community, from being in good health, take part in 
 a disgraceful expedition by land, or a ruinous voyage by 
 sea, or in any other such matters, which are sufficiently 
 common, and lose their lives, while others, who are left 
 behind from ill-health, are saved." "What you say is 
 true," said Euthydemus, "but you see that some men 
 share in successful enterprises from being in health, 
 while others from being in sickness, are left out of 
 them." "Whether then," said Socrates, are those 
 things which are sometimes beneficial, and sometimes 
 injurious, goods, rather, or evils?" "Nothing, by 
 Jupiter, is to be settled with regard to them 2 by con- 
 sidering thus. 
 
 33. But as to wisdom, Socrates, it is indisputably a 
 good thing ; for what business will not one who is wise 
 
 1 Όπό&εν χρη άρζασΰαι.] " Whence (from what point) we must 
 begin." 
 
 2 OvSev φαίνεται.] " Nothing appears " or is shown : nothing 
 
 can be settled with regard to them ; they can not be called posi- 
 tively good things, or positive evils, as they seem sometimes one 
 and sometimes the other : but as to wisdom, that is indisputably a 
 good, etc. 
 
 8 
 
MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. IV. 
 
 conduct better than one who is untaught?" "Have 
 you not heard, then, of Daedalus," said Socrates, " how- 
 he was made prisoner by Minos and compelled to serve 
 him as a slave ; how he was cut off, at once, from his 
 country and from liberty, and how, when he endeavored 
 to escape with his son, he lost the child, and was unable 
 to save himself, but was carried away among barbarians, 
 and made a second time a slave?" " Such a story is 
 told, indeed," said Euthydemus. " Have you not heard, 
 too, of the sufferings of Palamedes ? for every body 
 says that it w T as for his wisdom he was envied and put 
 to death by Ulysses." "That, too, is said." replied 
 Euthydemus. " And how many other men do you think 
 have been carried off to the king 1 on account of their 
 wisdom, and made slaves there?" 
 
 34. " But as to happiness, Socrates," said Euthyde- 
 mus, " that at least appears to be an indisputable good." 
 " Yes, Euthydemus," replied Socrates, " if we make it 
 consist in things that are themselves indisputably 
 good." 2 "But what." said he, "among things con- 
 stituting happiness can be a doubtful good?" "No- 
 thing," answered Socrates, "unless we join with it 
 beauty, or strength, or wealth, or glory, or any other 
 such tiling." 
 
 35. " But we must assuredly join them with it," said 
 Euthydemus ; " for how can a person be happy without 
 them ? " " We shall then join with it, by Jupiter," said 
 Socrates, " things from which many grievous calami- 
 ties happen to mankind : for many, on account of their 
 beauty, are ruined by those who are maddened with 
 passion 3 for their youthful attractions ; many, through 
 confidence in their strength, have entered upon under- 
 takings too great for it, and involved themselves in no 
 small disasters ; many, in consequence of their wealth, 
 have become enervated, been plotted against, and de- 
 stroyed ; and many, from the glory and power that 
 
 1 The kinp of Persia ; iii, 5. 26. 
 
 2 EI ye μή τις αντό — 1£ άμφιλόγων aya&tav συρτι^είη.] " If ΟΠΟ does 
 
 not make it up of things doubtfully (or disputably) good." 
 
 3 Παρακΐκινηκότων.] VLapanevelv put intransitively signifies mente 
 excuti, to be disturbed in mind, to be distracted or mad. See Plato 
 Rep. vii. p. 517, D., Phaedr. p. 249, and Stallbaum's note. Kiihner. 
 
— 
 
 C. π., s. 39.] DOCILITY OF EUTHYDEMUS. 159 
 
 they have acquired in their country, have suffered the 
 greatest calamities." 
 
 36. " Well, then," said Euthydemus, " if I do not say 
 what is right when I praise happiness, I confess that I 
 do not know what we ought to pray for to the gods." 
 
 " These points, however," proceeded Socrates, "you 
 have perhaps not sufficiently considered, from too con- 
 fident a belief that you were already well acquainted 
 with them ; but since you intend to be at the head of a 
 democratic government, you doubtless know what a 
 democracy is." " Assuredly," said he. 
 
 37. " Do you think it possible for a person to know 
 what a democracy is, without knowing what the Demos 
 is?" "No, indeed." "And what do you conceive the 
 Demos to be?" "I conceive it to be the poorer class 
 of citizens." " Do you know, then, which are the 
 poor?" "How can I help knowing?" "You know 
 then which are the rich?" "Just as well as I know 
 which are the poor." " Which sort of persons then do 
 you call poor, and which sort rich ? " " Those who have 
 not sufficient means to pay for the necessaries of life, 1 1 
 regard as poor ; those who have more than sufficient, I 
 consider rich." " Have you ever observed, then, that 
 to some who have very small means, those means are 
 not only sufficient, but that they even save from them, 
 while, to many, very large fortunes are not sufficient? " 
 "I have indeed," said Euthydemus, "(for you very 
 properly put me in mind of it) , since I have known 
 some princes, who, from poverty, have been driven to 
 commit injustice like the very poorest people." 
 
 39. "Then," said Socrates, "if such be the case, we 
 must rank such princes among the Demos, and those 
 that have but little, we must rank, if they be good 
 managers, among the rich ? " "My own want of knowl- 
 edge, 2 indeed," said Euthydemus, "obliges me to admit 
 even this ; and I am considering whether it would not 
 be best for me to be silent ; for I seem to know abso- 
 lutely nothing." 
 
 1 Μή ικανά e χοντα* eis ά Bel TeXelv.] I take TeXeiv in the sense of 
 paying, as in ii. 9. 1, ii. 10, 6, and i is ad vital necessitatibus 
 satisfaciendum. Kuhner. 2 ΦανΚότψ.] Inscitia. Sturz. 
 
l6o MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. jy. 
 
 He went away, accordingly, in great dejection, hold- 
 ing himself in contempt, and thinking that he was in 
 reality no better than a slave. 
 
 40. Of those who were thus addressed by Socrates, 
 many came to him no more ; and these he regarded as 
 too dull to be improved. But Euthydemus, on the con- 
 trary, conceived that he could by no other means be- 
 come an estimable character than by associating with 
 Socrates as much as possible ; and he in consequence 
 never quitted him, unless some necessary business 
 obliged him to do so. He also imitated many of his 
 habits. 
 
 When Socrates saw that he was thus disposed, he no 
 longer puzzled him with questions, but explained to 
 him, in the simplest and clearest manner, what he 
 thought that he ought to know, and what it would be 
 best for him to study. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The necessity of temperance or self-control, and of right notions 
 concerning the gods, sect. 1, 2. The gods have a providential 
 care for mankind, 3-9. Other animals are formed by the gods 
 for the use of man, 10. In addition to the senses common to 
 man with the inferior animals, the gods have given him reason 
 and speech, 11, 12. Though we do not see the gods, we are con- 
 vinced of their existence from their works, 13, 14. We ought, 
 therefore, to pay them honor according to our means, 15-18. 
 
 1. Socrates was never in haste that his followers 
 should become skillful in speaking, in action, or in in- 
 vention. 1 but, previous to such accomplishments, he 
 thought it proper that a love of self-control should be 
 instilled into them ; for he considered that those who 
 had acquired those qualifications were, if devoid of 
 self-control, only better fitted to commit injustice and. 
 to do mischief. 
 
 1 Ae/criKous και πρακτικούς καί μίχα.νικοΌς.'] How Socrates rendered 
 his hearers λεκτηκούς, is shown in c. 5 ; how διαλεκτικοοϊ, in c. 6 ; 
 how μηχανικούς, in c. 7. Μηχανικοί maybe Englished " fertile in 
 expedients." 
 
c. nr. s. 6.J BENEVOLENCE OF THE GODS. 161 
 
 2. In the first place, therefore, he endeavored to im- 
 press his associates with right feelings toward the gods. 
 Some, who were present with him when he conversed 
 with others on this subject, have given an account of 
 his discourses ; but I myself was with him when he 
 held a conversation with Euthydemus to the following 
 effect. 
 
 3. " Tell me," said he, " Euthydemus, has it ever oc- 
 curred to you to consider how carefully the gods have 
 provided for men every thing that they require ?" " It 
 has indeed never occurred to me," replied he. "You 
 know at least," proceeded Socrates, " that we stand in 
 need, first of all, of light, with which the gods supply 
 us." " Yes, by Jupiter," answered Euthydemus, " for 
 if we had no light, we should be, as to the use of our 
 eyes, like the blind." " But, as we require rest, they 
 afford us night, the most suitable season for repose." 
 " That is assuredly," said Euthydemus, "a subject for 
 thankfulness. " 
 
 4. " Then because the sun, being luminous, shows us 
 the hours of the day, and every thing else, while the 
 night, being dark, prevents us from making such dis- 
 tinctions in it, 1 have they not caused the stars to shine 
 in the night, which show us the night-watches, and 
 under the direction of which we perform many things 
 that we require?" "So it is," said he. " The moon, 
 too, makes plain to us not only the divisions of the 
 night, but also of the month." "Assuredly," said he. 
 
 5. "But that, since we require food, they should 
 raise it for us from the earth, and appoint suitable 
 seasons for the purpose, which prepare for us, in 
 abundance and every variety, not only things which 
 we need, but also things from which we derive 
 
 .pleasure, what do you think of such gifts?" "They 
 certainly indicate love for man." 
 
 6. " And that they should supply us with water, an 
 element of such value to us, that it causes to spring up, 
 
 1 Ασαφεστέρα έστίν. ] Schneider interprets, " nihil patitur oculis 
 distinguere." Kiihner observes that the adjective will not bear 
 this active sense, and interprets, " Nox propter tenebras obscurior 
 est, quam ut ejus singulas partes discerni possint. 1 ' 
 
 8* 
 
l62 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. IV. 
 
 and unites with the earth and the seasons in bringing 
 to maturity, every thing useful for us, and assists also 
 to nourish ourselves, and, being mixed with all our 
 food, renders it easier of digestion, more serviceable, 
 and more pleasant ; and that, as we require water in 
 great quantities, they should supply us with it in such 
 profusion, what do you think of such a gift ? " " That 
 also," said he, " shows thought for us." 
 
 7. "That they should also give us fire, a protection 
 against cold and darkness, an auxiliary in every art 
 and in every thing that men prepare for their use (for, 
 in a word, men produce nothing, among the various 
 things necessary to life, without the aid of fire), what 
 do you think of such a gift ? " " That likewise," said 
 he, gives eminent proof of regard for man. " 
 
 8. 1 [" That they should diffuse the air also around us 
 every where in such abundance, as not only to preserve 
 and support life, but to enable us to cross the seas by 
 means of it, and to get provisions by sailing hither and 
 thither among foreign lands, is not this a boon inex- 
 pressibly valuable ? " " It is indeed inexpressibly so," 
 replied he.] " That the sun, too, when it turns toward 
 us in the winter, should approach to mature some 
 things, and to dry up others 2 whose season for ripen- 
 ing has passed away ; and that, having effected these 
 objects, he should not come nearer to us, but turn back, 
 as if taking care lest he should hurt us by giving us 
 more heat than is necessary ; and that when again, in 
 his departure, he arrives at the point at which it be- 
 comes evident that, if he were to go beyond it, we 
 should be frozen by the cold, he should again turn 
 toward us, and approach us, and revolve in that precise 
 part of the heaven in which he may be of most advan- 
 tage to us, what do you think of things so regulated? " 
 " By Jupiter," replied Euthydemus, " they appear to be 
 appointed solely for the sake of man." 
 
 1 The passage in brackets is found only in one manuscript. 
 "Weiske and Schneider admitted it into their texts. Kiihner con- 
 demns it as spurious, justly observing that the language of it 
 " glossatoris manum aperte prodit." 
 
 2 As hay, and standing corn. 
 
C. πι., s. 12.] CARE OF THE GODS FOR MAN. 163 
 
 9. " Again, that the sun, because it is certain that we 
 could not endure such heat or cold if it should come 
 upon us suddenly, should approach us so gradually, and 
 retire from us so gradually, that we are brought imper- 
 ceptibly to the greatest extremes of both, what do you 
 think of that appointment ? " "I am reflecting, in- 
 deed," said Euthydemus, " whether the gods can have 
 any other business than to take care of man ; only this 
 thought embarrasses me, that other animals partake in 
 these benefits." 
 
 10. "But is not this also evident," said Socrates, 
 " that these animals are produced and nourished for the 
 sake of man ? For what other animal derives so many 
 benefits from goats, sheep, horses, oxen, asses, and other 
 such creatures, as man ? To me it appears that he gains 
 more advantages from them than from the fruits of the 
 earth ; at least he is fed and enriched not less from the 
 one than from the other ; and a great portion of man- 
 kind do not use the productions of the earth for food, 
 but live by herds of cattle, supported by their milk, 
 and cheese, and flesh ; and all men tame and train the 
 useful sort of animals, and use their services for war 
 and other purposes." " I agree with what you say on 
 that point," said Euthydemus, " for I see some animals, 
 much stronger than we, rendered so subservient to men 
 that they use them for whatever they please." 
 
 11. "But that, since there are numberless beautiful 
 and useful objects in the world, greatly differing from 
 one another, the gods should have bestowed on men 
 senses adapted to each of them, by means of which we 
 enjoy every advantage from them : that they should 
 have implanted understanding in us, by means of which 
 we reason about what we perceive by the senses, and, 
 assisted by the memory, learn how far every thing is 
 beneficial, and contrive many plans by which we enjoy 
 good and avoid evil. 
 
 12. And that they should have given us the faculty 
 of speech, by means of which we convey information 
 to one another, and mutually impart whatever is good, 
 and participate in it, enact laws, and enjoy constitu- 
 tional government, what think you of such blessings? " 
 
164 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [Β. IV. 
 
 "The gods certainly appear, Socrates, to exercise the 
 greatest care for man in every way." " And that, since 
 we are unable to foresee what is foi our advantage 
 with regard to the future, they should assist us in that 
 respect, communicating what will happen to those who 
 inquire of them by divination, and instructing them 
 how their actions may be most for their benefit, what 
 thoughts does that produce in you ? " " The gods seem 
 to show you, Socrates," rejoined he, " more favor than 
 other men, since they indicate to you, without being 
 asked, what you ought to do, and what not to do." 
 
 13. " And that I speak the truth, 1 you yourself also 
 well know, if you do not expect to see the bodily forms 
 of the gods, but will be content, as jou behold their 
 works, to worship and honor them. Reflect, too, that 
 the gods themselves give us this intimation ; 2 for the 
 other deities 3 that give us blessings, do not bestow any 
 of them by coming manifestly before our sight ; and 
 he that orders and holds together the whole universe, 
 in which are all things beautiful and good, and who 
 preserves it always unimpaired, undisordered, and un- 
 decaying, obeying his will swifter than thought and 
 without irregularity, is himself manifested only in the 
 performance of his mighty works, but is invisible to us 
 while he regulates them. 
 
 14. Consider also that the sun, which appears mani- 
 fest to all, does not allow men to contemplate him too 
 curiously, but, if any one tries to gaze on him stead- 
 fastly, deprives him of his sight. The instruments of 
 the deities you will likewise find imperceptible ; for 
 the thunder-bolt, for instance, though it is plain that it 
 is sent from above, and works its will with everything 
 with which it comes in contact, is yet never seen either 
 
 1 In saying that the gods assist and admonish us. 
 
 2 That we must not expect, when we consult the gods, to see 
 their shapes. Kuhner. 
 
 s Socrates, and those who followed him, Plato, the Stoics, and 
 Cicero, were advocates of the opinion that, besides the one su- 
 preme God, there were others, far inferior to him, but immortal, 
 and of great power and endowments, whom the supreme God em- 
 ployed, as his ministers, in the government of the world ; a sub- 
 ject which I have discussed at some length in a treatise de Μ. T. 
 Ciceronis in philosophiam meritis, Hamb. 1825. Kuhner. 
 
c. nr. s. 18.] CARE OF THE GODS FOR MAN. 165 
 
 approaching, or striking, or retreating ; the winds, too, 
 are themselves invisible, though their effects are evi- 
 dent to us, and we perceive their course. The soul of 
 man, moreover, which partakes of the divine nature if 
 anything else in man does, rules, it is evident, within 
 us, but is itself unseen. Meditating on these facts, 
 therefoi - e, it behooves you not to despise the unseen 
 gods, but, estimating their power from what is done 
 by them, to reverence what is divine." 
 
 15. "I feel clearly persuaded, Socrates," said Euthy- 
 demus, " that I shall never fail, in the slightest degree, 
 in respect for the divine power, but I am dejected at 
 the thought that no one among mankind, as it seems 
 to me, can ever requite the favors of the gods with due 
 gratitude." 
 
 16. " But be not dejected at that reflection, Euthy- 
 demus," said Socrates, " for you know that the deity 
 at Delphi, whenever any one consults him how he may 
 propitiate the gods, answers, According to the law 
 of YOUR country ; : and it is the law. indeed, every- 
 where, that every man should propitiate the gods with 
 offerings according to his ability ; and how, therefore, 
 can any man honor the gods better or more piously, 
 than by acting as they themselves direct ? 
 
 17. It behooves us, however, not to do less than we 
 are able, for, when any one acts thus, he plainly shows 
 that he does not honor the gods. But it becomes him 
 who fails in no respect, to honor the gods according to 
 his means, to be of good courage, and to hope for the 
 greatest blessings ; for no one can reasonably hope for 
 greater blessings from others than from those who are 
 able to benefit him most ; nor on any other grounds 
 than by propitiating them ; and how can he propitiate 
 them better than by obeying them to the utmost of his 
 power? " 
 
 18. By uttering such sentiments, and by acting ac- 
 cording to them himself, he rendered those who con- 
 versed with him more pious and prudent. 
 
 1 See. i. 8. 2. 
 
ι66 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. iv. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Socrates inculcated a love of justice into his followers. He gave 
 them an example of adherence to justice in his own life, sect. 
 1-4. He commences a conversation with Hippias, a sophist, 4-9. 
 It is better to be just than merely to talk of justice, 10, 11 ; it is 
 a part of justice to obey the laws ; what a law is, 12-14 ; who are 
 the best magistrates in states, 15 ; a general observance of the 
 laws maintains concord, 10-18 ; there are certain unwritten laws, 
 which it is not possible to transgress without incurring punish- 
 ment, 19-24 ; to observe the divine laws is to be just, 25. 
 
 1. Concerning justice, too, he did not conceal what 
 sentiments he entertained, but made them manifest 
 even by his actions, for he conducted himself, in his 
 private capacity, justly and beneficently toward all 
 men, and, as a citizen, he obeyed the magistrates in all 
 that the laws enjoined, both in the city and on military 
 expeditions, so that he was distinguished above other 
 men for his observance of order. 
 
 2. When he was president in the public assembly, he 
 would not permit the people to give a vote contrary to 
 law, but opposed himself, in defence of the laws, to 
 such a storm of rage on the part of the populace as I 
 think that no other man could have withstood. 1 
 
 3. When the Thirty Tyrants commanded him to do 
 anything contrary to the laws, he refused to obey them ; 
 for both when they forbade him to converse with the 
 young, and when they ordered him, and some others of 
 the citizens, to lead a certain 2 person away to death, he 
 alone did not obey, because the order was given con- 
 trary to the laws. 
 
 4. When he was accused by Meletus, 3 and others 
 were accustomed, before the tribunal, to speak so as to 
 gain the favor of the judges, and to flatter them, and 
 
 1 See i. 1. 18. 
 
 2 Leon, a native of Salamis, but an enrolled citizen of Athens, 
 who had gone of his own accord into exile at Salamis that he 
 might not be put to death by the Tyrants, in their greediness for 
 wealth. Stallbaum ad Plat. Apol. p. 32, C. See Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 39 ; 
 Andocid. de Myster. p. 40 ; Diop. Laert. ii. 24. Kuhner. 
 
 s See note on i. 1. 1. He is generally called Melitus. 
 
C. iv, s. 6.] CONVERSATION WITH HIPPIAS. 167 
 
 supplicate them, in violation of the laws, 1 and many- 
 persons, by such practices, had often been acquitted by 
 the judges, he refused, on his trial, to comply with any 
 practices opposed to the laws, and though he might 
 easily have been acquitted by his judges, if he had but 
 in a slight degree adopted any of those customs, lie 
 chose rather to die abiding by the laws than to save his 
 life by transgressing them. 
 
 5. He held conversations to this effect with others on 
 several occasions, and I know that he once had a dia- 
 logue of the following kind, concerning justice, with 
 Hippias of Elis ; 2 for Hippias, on his return to Athens 
 after an absence of some time, happened to come in the 
 way of Socrates as he was observing to some people how 
 surprising it was that, if a man wished to have another 
 taught to be a shoemaker, or a carpenter, or a worker 
 in brass, or a rider, he was at no loss whither he should 
 send him to effect his object ; 8 [nay, that every place, 
 as some say, was full of persons who would make a 
 horse or an ox observant of right for any one that 
 desired ;] while as to justice, if any one wished either 
 to learn it himself, or to have his son or his slave taught 
 it, he did not know, whither he should go to obtain his 
 desire. 
 
 6. Hippias, hearing this remark, said, as if jesting 
 with him, "What! are you still saying the same 
 things, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago ? " 
 " Yes," said Socrates, " and what is more wonderful, I 
 am not only still saying the same things, but am saying 
 them on the same subjects ; but you, perhaps, from 
 being possessed of such variety of knowledge, never 
 
 1 It was forbidden at Athens to attempt to move the feelings of 
 the judges. Quintil. vi. 1. Pollux de Areopagit. viii. 117. 
 
 2 A famous sophist of that time, well known from the Dialogues 
 of Plato ; see Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 36 ; Quintil. xii. 11. 21 ; 
 Borneman ad Sympos. iv. 62. Of the vanity and arrogance of the 
 man. see Stallbaum ad Plat. Hipp. Maj. p. 148. 
 
 3 The works in brackets are condemned by Ruhnken and Valcke- 
 naer as spurious. Bornemann and Kiihner attempt to defend them. 
 They certainly disturb the course of the argument so much and 
 are so useless, that I can not think them Xenophon's. " Observant 
 of right," in the translation answers to δίκαιον*, "just," a word 
 on which the writer plays. 
 
ι68 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. IV. 
 
 say the same things on the same subjects." "Cer- 
 tainly," replied Hippias, " I do always try to say some- 
 thing new." 
 
 7. " About matters of which you have certain knowl- 
 edge, then," said Socrates, " as, for instance, about the 
 letters of the alphabet, if any one were to ask you how 
 many and what letters are in the word ' Socrates,' would 
 you try to say sometimes one thing, and sometimes 
 another ? or to people who might ask you about num- 
 bers, as whether twice five are ten, would you not 
 give the same answer at one time as at another ? " 
 "About such matters, Socrates," replied Hippius, "I, 
 like you, always say the same thing ; but concerning 
 justice I think that I have certainly something to say 
 now which neither you nor any other person can 
 refute." 
 
 8. " By Juno," returned Socrates, " it is a great good 
 that you say you have discovered, since the judges 
 will now cease from giving contradictory sentences, 
 the citizens will cease from disputing about what is 
 just, from going to law, and from quarreling, and com- 
 munities will cease from contending about their rights 
 and going to war ; and I know not how I can part with 
 you till I have learned so important a benefit from its 
 discoverer." 
 
 9. "You shall not hear it, by Jupiter," rejoined 
 Hippias, " until you yourself declare what you think 
 justice to be ; for it is enough that you laugh at others, 1 
 questioning and confuting every body, while you your- 
 self are unwilling to give a reason to any body, or to 
 declare your opinion on any subject." 
 
 10. " What then, Hippias," said Socrates, " have you 
 not perceived that I never cease declaring my opinion 
 as to what I conceive to be just ? " " And what is this 
 opinion of yours V " said Hippias. " If I make it known 
 to you, not by words merely, but by actions, do not 
 deeds seem to you to be a stronger evidence than 
 words? " " Much stronger, by Jupiter," said Hippias, 
 " for many who say what is just do what is unjust, but 
 
 1 " Satis est quod ceteros omnes rides ;— me vero non ridebis." 
 Kiihner. 
 
c. IV., s. 14.] CONVERSATION WITH HIPPIAS. 169 
 
 a man who does what is just can not be himself un- 
 just." 
 
 11. "Have you ever then found me bearing false 
 witness, or giving malicious information, or plunging 
 my friends or the state into quarrels, or doing any thing 
 else that is unjust?" "I have not." "And do you 
 not think it justice to refrain from injustice ? " " You 
 are plainly, now," said Hippias, " endeavoring to avoid 
 expressing an opinion as to what you think just ; for 
 what you say is, not what the just do, but what they 
 do not do." 
 
 12. " But I thought," rejoined Socrates, " that to be 
 unwilling to do injustice was a sufficient proof of jus- 
 tice. If this, however, does not satisfy you, consider 
 whether what I next say will please you better ; for I 
 assert that what is in conformity with the laws is 
 just." " Do you say, Socrates, that to be conformable 
 to the laws, and to be just, is the same thing?" " I 
 do, indeed." 
 
 13. "I am puzzled ; for I do not understand what 
 you call conformable to law, or what you call just." 
 " Do you know the laws of the state? "said Socrates. 
 "I do," said the other. " And what do you consider 
 them to be?" "What the citizens in concert have 
 enacted as to what we ought to do, and what we ought 
 to avoid doing." "Would not he, therefore, asked 
 Socrates, "be an observer of the laws who should 
 conduct himself in the community agreeably to those 
 enactments, and he be a violater of the laws who 
 transgresses them?" "Undoubtedly," said Hippias. 
 " Would not he, then, do what is just who obeys the 
 laws, and he do what is unjust who disobeys them ? " 
 " Certainly." " Is not he, then, just who does what is 
 just, and he unjust who does what is unjust ?" " How 
 can it be otherwise?" " He, therefore, that conforms 
 to the laws is just," added Socrates, " and he who vio- 
 lates the laws, unjust." 
 
 14. "But," objected Hippias, "how can any one 
 imagine the laws, or obedience to them, to be a matter 
 of absolute importance, when the very persons who 
 make them often reject and alter them? " " That ob- 
 
 9 
 
170 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [B. IV. 
 
 jection is of no consequence," said Socrates, "for 
 states, which have commenced war, often make peace 
 again." " Undoubtedly they do," said Hippias. 
 " What difference will there be in your conduct, then, 
 think you,' if you throw contempt on those who obey 
 the laws, because the laws may be changed, and if you 
 blame those who act properly in war, because peace 
 may be made ? Do you condemn those who vigorously 
 support their country in war?" " I do not indeed," re- 
 plied Hippias. 
 
 15. "Have you ever heard it said of Lycurgus the 
 Lacedaemonian, then," said Socrates, "that he would 
 not have made Sparta at all different from other states, 
 if he had not established in it, beyond others, a spirit 
 of obedience to the laws ? Do you not know, too. that 
 of magistrates in states, those are thought the best who 
 are most efficient in producing obedience to the laws, 
 and that the state in which the citizens pay most re- 
 spect to the laws, is in the best condition in peace, and 
 invincible in war ? 
 
 16. The greatest blessing to states, moreover, is con- 
 cord ; and the senates and principal men in them often 
 exhort the citizens to unanimity ; and every where 
 throughout Greece it is a law that the citizens shall 
 take an oath to observe concord, an oath which they 
 every where do take ; but I conceive that this is done, 
 not that the citizens may approve of the same choruses, 
 or that they may praise the same flute-players, or that 
 they may prefer the same poets, 2 or that they may take 
 delight in the same spectacles, but that they may obey 
 the laws ; for while the citizens adhere to these, states 
 will be eminently powerful and happy ; but without 
 such unanimity, no state can be well governed, nor any 
 family well regulated. 
 
 17. As an individual citizen, too, how could any 
 person render himself less liable to penalties from the 
 government, or more likely to have honors bestowed 
 upon him, than by being obedient to the laws? How 
 
 1 Διάφοροι οδν τι oiei iroieic — ί) — .] " Do you think, therefore, that 
 you do any thing different — than — ," 
 
 1 The same scenic poets. 
 
c. IV., s. 20.] THE JUST MAN IS ESTEEMED. 171 
 
 else would he incur fewer defeats in the courts of jus- 
 tice, or how more certainly obtain sentence in his 
 favor ? To whom would any one believe that he could 
 more safely confide his money, or his sons or daughters ? 
 Whom would the whole community deem more trust- 
 worthy than him who respects the laws ? From whom 
 would parents, or relatives, or domestics, or friends, or 
 citizens, or strangers, more certainly obtain their 
 rights? To whom would the enemy sooner trust in 
 cessations of arms, or in making a truce, or articles of 
 peace ? To whom would people more willingly be- 
 come allies than to the observer of the laws, and to 
 whom would the allies more willingly trust the leader- 
 ship, or command of a fortress, or of a city? From 
 whom would any one expect to meet with gratitude, 
 on doing him a kindness, sooner than from the observer 
 of the laws? Or whom would any one rather serve 
 than him from whom he expects to receive a return ? 
 To whom would any one more desire to be a friend, or 
 less desire to be an enemy, than such a man? With 
 whom would any one be less inclined to go to war, than 
 with him to whom he would most wish to be a friend, 
 and least of all an enemy, and to whom the greatest 
 part of mankind would wish to be friends and allies, 
 and but a small number to be antagonists and enemies? 
 
 18. I, therefore, Hippias, pronounce that to obey the 
 laws and to be just is the same ; if you hold an opinion 
 to the contrary, tell me." " Indeed, Socrates," rejoined 
 Hippias, "I do not know that I entertain any senti- 
 ments opposed to what you have said of justice." 
 
 19. " But are you aware, Hippias," continued Socrates, 
 " that there are unwritten laws ? " " You mean those," 
 said Hippias, " that are in force about the same points, 
 every where." " Can you affirm, then, that men made 
 those laws ? " " How could they," said Hippias, when 
 they could not all meet together, and do not all speak 
 the same language?" "Whom, then, do you suppose 
 to have made these laws?" "I believe," said he, 
 "that it was the gods who made these laws for men, 
 for among all men the first law is to venerate the gods." 
 
 20. "Is it not also a law every where to honor parents ? " 
 
172 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. IV. 
 
 " It is so." " Is it not a law, too, that parents shall not 
 intermarry with their children, nor children with their 
 parents?" " This does not, as yet, Socrates, appear to 
 me to be a law of the gods ? " " Why? " " Because I 
 find that some nations transgress it." 
 
 21. " Many others, too, they transgress," said Socrates ; 
 " but those who violates the laws made by the gods 
 incur punishment which it is by no means possible for 
 man to escape, as many transgressors of the laws made 
 by men escape punishment, some by concealment, 
 others by open violence. 
 
 22. " And what sort of punishment, Socrates," said 
 he, " can not parents escape who intermarry with their 
 children, and children who intermarry with their 
 parents?" "The greatest of all punishments, by Ju- 
 piter," replied Socrates, " for what greater penalty can 
 those who beget children incur, than to have bad chil- 
 dren ? " 
 
 23. " How then," said Hippias, "do they necessarily 
 have bad children when nothing hinders but that they 
 may be good themselves, and have children by good 
 partners?" " Because," returned Socrates, "it is not 
 only necessary that those who have children by each 
 other should be good, but that they should be in full 
 bodily vigor. 1 Or do you suppose that the seed of those 
 who are at the height of maturity is similar to that of 
 those who have not yet reached maturity, or to that 
 of those who are far past it ? " " By Jupiter," replied 
 Hippias, " it is not at all likely that it should be simi- 
 lar. " " Which of the two then is the better ? " " Doubt- 
 less that of those at full maturity." ' ' That of those who 
 are not at full maturity, then, is not sufficiently ener- 
 getic." "Probably not." "Accordingly they ought 
 not to have children ?" " No." " Do not those, there- 
 
 1 Mirari libet Socratis commentum, qui in conjugiis talibus nihil 
 culpandum invenit prseter astatis disparitatem. Illud potius dis- 
 quirendum, annon in hominibus nulla prava educatione corruptis 
 sit in ipsis affectibusinsita f uga quaedam commixtionis cum paren- 
 tibus et ex se natis, quippe cum ab ea etiam quaedam aniniantia 
 naturaliter abhorreant. Hugo Grotius de J. B. etP. ii. 5, 12, 4—5, et 
 2, 3, cum annott. Puffendorf. et Osiand. Herbst. Parentum et 
 liberorum offlcia mutua plus ait Weiskius valere ad reprobanda 
 connubia talia quam annorum ineequalitatem. Kiihner. 
 
c. iv., s. 2&] VICE ITS OWN PUNISHMENT. 173 
 
 fore, who have children under such circumstances, 
 have them as they ought not?" "So it appears to 
 me." " What other persons, therefore, will have bad 
 children, if not these?" " Well," said Hippias, "I 
 agree with you on this point also." 
 
 24. " Is it not every where a law, also," said Socrates, 
 "that men should do good to those who do good to 
 them?" "It is a law," answered Hippias, "but it is 
 transgressed." " Do not those therefore who transgress 
 it incur punishment," continued Socrates. " by being de- 
 prived of good friends, and being compelled to have re- 
 course to those who hate them ? Are not such as do 
 service to those who seek it of them good friends to 
 themselves, and are not those who make no return to 
 such as serve them hated by them for their ingratitude ; 
 and yet, because it is for their advantage to have their 
 support, do they not pay the greatest court to them ? " 
 "Indeed, Socrates," replied Hippias, "all these things 
 seem to suit the character of the gods ; for that the laws 
 themselves should carry with them punishments for 
 those who transgress them, appears to me to be the ap- 
 pointment of a lawgiver superior to man." 
 
 25. "Whether, therefore, Hippias," added Socrates, 
 " do you consider that the gods appoint as laws, what 
 is agreeable to justice, or what is at variance with jus- 
 tice?" "Not what is at variance with justice, cer- 
 tainly." said Hippias, " for scarcely would any other 
 make laws in conformity with justice, if a god were 
 not to do so." " It is the pleasure of the gods, therefore, 
 Hippias," concluded Socrates, " that what is in conform- 
 ity with justice should also be in conformity with the 
 laws." 1 
 
 26. By uttering such sentiments, and acting in agree- 
 ment with them, he rendered those who conversed 
 with him more observant of justice. 
 
 1 Lange has given a judicious summary of these arguments. The 
 gods give just laws ; what is in conformity with these laws, is 
 νόμιμοι* : therefore every thing νόμιμοι/ in the divine laws is just. 
 Thus the gods in this definition (το νόμιμον δίκαιον eivai, sect. 12), 
 agree with men, or with me, says Socrates. A sound argument, if 
 human laws be what they ought to be, that is, in conformity with 
 the divine laws, or the laws of nature. 
 
 9* 
 
174 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [B. IV. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Socrates rendered his followers better qualified for public life. 
 The necessity of temperance, sect. 1, 2 ; the evils of intemper- 
 ance, 3-7 ; the benefits arising from temperance, 8-10 ; the con- 
 duct of the temperance man, 11, IS. 
 
 1. I will now relate how he rendered his followers 
 better qualified for the management of public business. 
 Thinking it expedient that temperance should be ob- 
 served 'by him who would succeed in any thing honor- 
 able, he first made it evident to those who conversed 
 with him, that he practiced this virtue beyond all other 
 men, and then, by his discourse, he exhorted his fol- 
 lowers, above everything, to the observance of temper- 
 ance. He continued always, therefore, to make allu- 
 sions to whatever was conducive to virtue ; audi know 
 that he once held a conversation on temperance with 
 Euthydemus to the following effect : 
 
 2. " Tell me," said he, " Euthydemus, do you regard 
 liberty as an excellent and honorable possession for an 
 individual or a community?" "The most excellent 
 and honorable that can be," replied he. 
 
 3. " Do you consider him, then, who is held under 
 control by the pleasures of the body, and is rendered 
 unable, by their influence, to do what is best for him, 
 to be free?" "By no means," replied Euthydemus. 
 "Perhaps, then, to have the power of doing what is 
 best seems to you to be freedom, but to be under in- 
 fluences which will hinder you from doing it, you con- 
 sider to be want of freedom ? " " Assuredly," said he. 
 
 4. "Do not the intemperate appear to you, then, to 
 be absolutely without freedom?" "Yes, by Jupiter, 
 and naturally so." " And whether do the intemperate 
 appear to you to be merely prevented from doing what 
 is best, or to be forced, also, to do what is most dishonor- 
 able ? " "They appear to me," replied Euthydmus, 
 " to be not less forced to do the one than they are hin- 
 dered from doing the other." 
 
 5. " And what sort of masters do you consider those 
 to be, who hinder men from doing what is best, and 
 
c. v., s. 9.] ADVANTAGES OF TEMPERANCE. 175 
 
 force them to do what is worst? "The very worst 
 possible, by Jupiter," replied he. "And what sort of 
 slavery do you consider to be the worst?" "That," 
 said he, " under the worst masters ? " "Do not then 
 the intemperate," said Socrates, " endure the very worst 
 of slavery I " "It appears so to me," answered Euthy- 
 demus. 
 
 6. " And does not intemperance seem to you, by 
 banishing from men prudence, the greatest good, to 
 drive them into the very opposite evil ? Does it not 
 appear to you to hinder them from attending to useful 
 things, and learning them, by drawing them away to 
 pleasure, and frequently, by captivating those who have 
 a perception of good and evil, to make them choose the 
 worse instead of the better?" "Such is. die case," 
 said he. 
 
 7. "And whom can we suppose, Euthydemus, to 
 have less participation in self-control than the intem- 
 perate man ? for assuredly the acts of self-control and 
 of intemperance are the very opposite to each other." 
 " I assent to this also," said he. "And do you think 
 that any thing is a greater hinderance to attention to 
 what is becoming, than intemperance?" "I do nob." 
 " And do you imagine that there is any greater evil to 
 man, than that which makes him prefer the noxious to 
 the beneficial, which prompts him to pursue the one 
 and to neglect the other, and which forces him to pur- 
 sue a contrary course of conduct to that of the wise ? " 
 " There is none," said Euthydemus. 
 
 8. "Is it not natural, then," said Socrates, "that 
 temperance should be the cause of producing in men 
 effects contrary to those which intemperance produces ? " 
 " Undoubtedly," said Euthydemus. " Is it not natural, 
 therefore, also, that what produces those contrary 
 effects should be best for man ? " " It is natural," said 
 he. " Is it not consequently natural, then, Euthyde- 
 mus, that temperance should be best for man?" "It 
 is so, Socrates," said he. 
 
 9. " And have you ever reflected upon this, Euthyde- 
 mus? " " What ? " " That even to those pleasures, to 
 which alone intemperance seems to lead men, it can 
 
176 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. iv. 
 
 not lead them, but that temperance produces greater 
 pleasure than any thing else?" "How?" said he. 
 '■ Because intemperance, by not allowing men to with- 
 stand hunger, thirst, or the desire of sensual gratifica- 
 tion, or want of sleep (through which privations alone 
 is it possible for them to eat, and drink, and gratify 
 other natural appetites, and go to rest and sleep with 
 pleasurp, waiting and restraining themselves until the 
 inclinations may be most happily indulged), hinders 
 them from having any due enjoyment in acts most 
 necessary and most habitual ; but temperance, which 
 alone enables men to endure the privations whichl 
 have mentioned, alone enables them to find delight in 
 the gratifications to which I have alluded." "What 
 you say," observed Euthydemus, " is indisputably true." 
 
 10. " From learning what is honorable and good, 
 moreover, and from the study of those accomplish- 
 ments by which a man may ably govern himself, 
 judiciously regulate his household, become useful to 
 his friends and the state, and gain the mastery over his 
 enemies (from which studies arise not only the greatest 
 advantages, but also the greatest pleasures), the tem- 
 perate have enjoyment while they practice them, but 
 the intemperate have no share in any of them ; for to 
 whom can we say that it less belongs to participate in 
 such advantages, than to him who has the least power 
 to pursue them, being wholly occupied in attention to 
 present pleasures ? " 
 
 11. " You seem to me, Socrates," said Euthydemus, 
 " to say that the man who is under the influence of 
 bodily pleasures, has no participation in any one virtue." 
 '· For what difference is there, Euthydemus," said he, 
 between an intemperate man and the most ignorant 
 brute ? How will he, who lias no regard to what is best, 
 but seeks only to enjoy what is most seductive by any 
 means in his power, differ from the most senseless cattle ? 
 To the temperate alone it belongs to consider what is 
 best in human pursuits, to distinguish those pursuits, 
 according to experience and reason, into their several 
 classes, and then to choose the good and refrain from 
 the evil." 
 
C. vi., s. 2.] DEFINITION OF PIETY. 
 
 177 
 
 12. Thus it was, he said, that men became most vir- 
 tuous and happy, and most skillful in reasoning ; and 
 he observed that the expression όιαλέγεσΰαι, " to reason," 
 had its origin in people's practice of meeting together to 
 reason on matters, and distinguishing them, όςαλεγοτας, 
 according to their several kinds. It was the duty of 
 every one, therefore, he thought, to make himself ready 
 in this art, and to study it with the greatest diligence"; 
 for that men, by the aid of it, became most accom- 
 plished, most able to guide others, and most acute in 
 discussion. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 The value of skill in argument and definition, sect. 1. Definition 
 of piety, 2-4 ; of justice, 5, 6 ; of wisdom, 7 ; of goodness and 
 beauty 8, 9; of courage, 10, 11. Some other definitions, 12. Re- 
 marks on the Socratic method of argument, 13-15. 
 
 1. I will now endeavor to show that Socrates ren- 
 dered those who associated with him more skilful in 
 argument. For he thought that those who knew the 
 nature of things severally, would be able to explain 
 them to others; but as to those who did not know, he 
 said that it was not surprising that they fell into error 
 themselves, and led others into it. He therefore never 
 ceased to reason with his associates about the nature 
 of things. 1 To go through all the terms that he defined, 
 and to show how he definited them, would be a long 
 task ; but I will give as many instances as I think will 
 suffice to show the nature of his reasoning. 
 
 2. In the first place, then, he reasoned of piety, in 
 some such way as this. "Tell me," said he, " Euthy- 
 demus, what sort of feeling do you consider piety to 
 be?" "The most noble of all feelings," replied he. 
 '· Can you tell me, then, who is a pious man ? " " The 
 man, I think, who honors the gods." " Is it allowable 
 to pay honor to the gods in any way that one pleases ? " 
 
 1 Τί ϊκαστον citj των όντων.] Quid res qucelibet esset ; " what each 
 thing was ;" what was the nature of each thing. 
 
I7 8 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. iv. 
 
 " No : there are certain laws in conformity with which 
 we must pay our honors to them." 
 
 3. " He, then, who knows these laws, will know how 
 he must honor the gods ? " "I think so." " He there- 
 fore who knows how to pay honor to the gods, will not 
 think that he ought to pay it otherwise than as he 
 knows? " " Doubtless not." " But does any one pay 
 honors to the gods otherwise than as he thinks that he 
 ought to pay them ? " "I think not." 
 
 4. "He therefore who knows what is agreeable to 
 the laws with regard to the gods, will honor the gods 
 in agreement witli the laws? " " Certainly." " Does 
 not he, then, who honors the gods agreeably to the 
 laws honor them as he ought ? " How can he do other- 
 wise?" "And he who honors them as he ought, is 
 pious?" "Certainly." "He therefore who knows 
 what is agreeable to the laws with regard to the gods, 
 may be justly defined by us as a pious man ? " " So it 
 appears to me," said Euthydemus. 
 
 5. " But is it allowable for a person to conduct him- 
 self toward other men in whatever way he pleases ? " 
 " No : but with respect to men also, he who knows what 
 is in conformity with the laws, and how men ought, 
 according to them, to conduct themselves toward each 
 other, will be an observer of the laws. " "Do not those, 
 then, who conduct themselves toward each other ac- 
 cording to what is in conformity with the laws, con- 
 duct themselves toward each other as they ought?" 
 " How can it be otherwise? " " Do not those, there- 
 fore, who conduct themselves toward each other as 
 they ought, conduct themselves well?" " Certainly." 
 " Do not those, then, that conduct themselves well to- 
 ward each other, act properly in transactions between 
 man and man?" "Surely." "Do not those, then, 
 who obey the laws, do what is just?" "Undoubt- 
 edly." 
 
 6. " And do you know what sort of actions are called 
 just?" " Those which the laws sanction." "Those, 
 therefore, who do what the laws sanction, do what is 
 just and what they ought?" " How can it be other- 
 wise?" "Those who do just things, therefore, are 
 
c. VI., s. 8.] WISDOM AND GOODNESS. 
 
 just?" "I think so." "Do you think that any per- 
 sons yield obedience to the laws who do not know 
 what the laws sanction? " " I do not." " And do you 
 think that any who know what they ought to do, think 
 that they ought not to do it ? " "I do not think so." 
 " And do you know any persons that do other things 
 than those which they think they ought to do?" "I 
 do not." "Those, therefore, who know what is agree- 
 able to the laws in regard to men, do what is just?" 
 " Certainly." " And are not those who do what is 
 just, just men ? " " Who else can be so ? " " Shall we 
 not define rightly, therefore," concluded Socrates, " if 
 we define those to be just who know what is agreeable 
 to the laws in regard to men ? " "It appears so to 
 me," said Euthydemus. 
 
 7. "And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell 
 me, whether do men seem to you to be wise, in things 
 which they know, or in things which they do not 
 know?" "In what they know, certainly; for how 
 can a man be wise in tilings of which he knows noth- 
 ing?" " Those, then, who are wise, are wise by their 
 knowledge?" "By what else can a man be wise, if 
 not by his knowledge?" "Do you think wisdom, 
 then, to be anything else than that by which men are 
 wise ? " "I do not." " Is knowledge, then, wisdom ? " 
 " It appears so to me." " Does it appear to you, how- 
 ever that it is possible for a man to know all things 
 that are?" "No, by Jupiter ; not even as I think, a 
 comparatively small portion of them." " It is not 
 therefore possible for a man to be wise in all things ? " 
 "No, indeed." " Every man is wise, therefore, in that 
 only of which he has a knowledge ? " " So it seems to 
 me." 
 
 8. "Shall we thus, too, Euthydemus," said he, " in- 
 quire what is good?" "How?" said Euthydemus. 
 " Does the same thing appear to you to be beneficial to 
 every body?" "No." "And does not that which is 
 beneficial to one person appear to you to be sometimes 
 hurtful to another ? " " Assuredly." " Would you say, 
 then, that anything is good that is not beneficial?" 
 " I would not." " What is beneficial, therefore, is good, 
 
i8o MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. iv. 
 
 to whomsoever it is beneficial ? " "It appears so to me," 
 said Euthydemus. 
 
 9. " And can we define the beautiful in any other 
 way than if you term whatever is beautiful, whether a 
 person, or a vase, or any thing else whatsoever, beauti- 
 ful for whatever purpose you know that it is beautiful ?" 1 
 " No, indeed," said Euthydemus. " For whatever pur- 
 pose, then, any thing may be useful, for that purpose it 
 is beautiful to use it?" " Cei-tainly." "And is any 
 tiling beautiful for any other purpose than that for 
 which it is beautiful to use it? " " For no other pur- 
 pose, " replied he. " What is useful is beautiful, there- 
 fore, for that purpose for which it is beautiful? " " So 
 I think," said he. 
 
 10. "As to courage, Euthydemus," said Socrates, 
 " do you think it is to be numbered among excellent 
 things?" " I think it one of the most excellent," re- 
 plied Euthydemus. "But you do not think courage a 
 thing of use for small occasions." " No, by Jupiter, 
 but for the very greatest." " Does it appear to you to 
 be useful, with regard to formidable and dangerous 
 things, to be ignorant of their character?" " By no 
 means." "They, therefore, who do not fear such 
 things, because they do not know what they are, are not 
 courageous ? " " Certainly not ; for, in that case, many 
 madmen and even cowards would be courageous." 
 " And what do you say of those who fear things that 
 are not formidable?" "Still less, by Jupiter, should 
 they be called courageous." " Those, then, that are 
 good with reference to formidable and dangerous things, 
 you consider to be courageous, and those that are bad, 
 cowardly ? " " Certainly." 
 
 11. "But do you think that any other persons are 
 good, with reference to terrible and dangerous circum- 
 stances, except those who are able to conduct them- 
 selves well under them?" "No, those only," said he. 
 
 1 I have translated this apparently corrupt passage according to 
 the interpretation of it proposed by Lange, a friend of Kuhner's : 
 Num possumus pulchrum aliter [intellige ac bonum, iii. 8, ubi de- 
 monstration est κανόν, άγαμοι/, et χρησιμν idem esse,] deflnire, an 
 pulchrum vocas, si quid pulchrum est [ei ίστιν] vel corpus, vel vas, 
 velaliudquid,quod ad quamcunque rem (προς πάντα) pulchrum est? 
 
c. vi., s. 13.] JUST REASONING OF SOCRATES. 181 
 
 " And you think those bad with regard to them, who 
 are of such a character to conduct themselves badly 
 under them?" "Whom else can I think so?" "Do 
 not each, then, conduct themselves under them as they 
 think they ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" 
 " Do those, therefore, who do not conduct themselves 
 properly under them, know how they ought to conduct 
 themselves under them?" " Doubtless not." "Those 
 then who know how they ought to conduct themselves 
 under them, can do so?" "And they alone." "Do 
 those, therefore, who do not fail under such circum- 
 stances, conduct themselves badly under them ? " "I 
 think not." " Those then who do conduct themselves 
 badly under them, do fail? " "It seems so." "Those, 
 therefore, who know how to conduct themselves well in 
 terrible and dangerous circumstances are courageous, 
 and those who fail to do so are cowards?" "They at 
 least appear so to me," said Euthydemus. 
 
 12. Monarchy and tyranny he considered to be both 
 forms of government, but conceived that they differed 
 greatly from one another ; for a government over men 
 with their own consent, and in conformity with the 
 laws of free states, he regarded as a monarchy ; but a 
 government over men against their will, and not ac- 
 cording to the law of free states, but just as the ruler 
 pleased, a tyranny ; and wherever magistrates were ap- 
 pointed from among those who complied with the in- 
 junctions of the laws, he considered the government to 
 be an aristocracy ; wherever they were appointed ac- 
 cording to their wealth, a plutocracy ; and wherever 
 they were appointed from among the whole people, a 
 democracy. 
 
 13. Whenever any person contradicted him on any 
 point, who had nothing definite to say, and who perhaps 
 asserted, without proof, that some person, whom he 
 mentioned, was wiser, or better skilled in political af- 
 fairs, or possessed of greater courage, or worthier in 
 some such respect, [than some other whom Socrates 
 had mentioned], he would recall the whole argument, 
 in some such way as the following, to the primary 
 proposition : 
 
 10 
 
182 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. IV. 
 
 14. " Do you say that he whom you commend, is a 
 better citizen than he whom I commend ? " " I do say 
 so." "Why should we then not consider, in the first 
 place, what is the duty of a good citizen ?" " Let us 
 do so." "Would not he then be superior in the man- 
 agement of the public money who should make the 
 state richer ? " " Undoubtedly." " And he in war who 
 should make it victorious over its enemies?" "As- 
 suredly." " And in an embassy he who should make 
 friends of foes ? " " Doubtless." "And he in address- 
 ing the people who should check dissension and inspire 
 them with unanimity?" "I think so." When the 
 discussion was thus brought back to fundamental prin- 
 ciples, the truth was made evident to those who had 
 opposed him. 
 
 15. When he himself went through any subject in 
 argument, he proceeded upon propositions of which the 
 truth was generally acknowledged, thinking that a 
 sure foundation was thus formed for his reasoning. 
 Accordingly, whenever he spoke, he, of all men that I 
 have known, most readily prevailed on his hearers 
 to assent to his arguments ; and he used to say that 
 Homer 1 had attributed to Ulysses the character of a 
 sure orator, as being able to form his reasoning on 
 points acknowledged by all mankind. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 How Socrates rendered his followers μηχανικούς, ingenious and 
 adapted for business; his frankness and sincerity, 1. How far 
 he thought that Geometry should be studied, 2, 3. How far he 
 recommended that Astronomy should be pursued, 4-7. Vain in- 
 vestigations to be avoided, 8. Regard to be paid to health, 9. 
 Counsel to be asked of the gods, 10. 
 
 1. That Socrates expressed his sentiments with sin- 
 cerity to those who conversed with him, is, I think, 
 manifest from what I have said. I will now proceed 
 to show how much it was his care that his followers 
 
 1 Odyss. viii. 171 : Ό Be ασφαλές oyopevei : a passage noticed by 
 Dionys. Hal. de Arte Rhet. xi. 8. 
 
evil., s. 3·] CONCERNING STUDIES. 183 
 
 should be competently qualified for employments suited 
 to their powers. Of all men that I have known, he was 
 the most anxious to discover in what occupation each 
 of those who attended him was likely to prove skillful ; 
 and of all that it becomes a man of honor and virtue to 
 know, he taught them himself, whatever he knew, with 
 the utmost cheerfulness ; and what he had not sufficient 
 knowledge to teach, he took them to those who knew, 
 to learn. 
 
 2. He taught them also how far it was proper that a 
 well-educated man should be versed in any department 
 of knowledge. 1 Geometry, for instance, he said that a 
 man should study until he should be capable, if occa- 
 sion required, to take or give land correctly by measure- 
 ment ; or to divide it or portion it out for cultivation ; 2 
 and this, he observed, it was so easy to learn, that he 
 who gave any attention at all to mensuration, might 
 find how large the whole earth was, and perfectly un- 
 derstand how it was measured. 
 
 3. But of pursuing the study of geometry to diagrams 
 hard to understand, he disapproved ; for lie said that 
 he could not see of what profit they were, 3 though he 
 himself was by no means unskilled in them ; but lie 
 remarked that they were enough to consume a man's 
 whole life, and hinder him from attaining many other 
 valuable branches of knowledge. 
 
 1 Πράγματοϊ.] " Negotii ex doctrina et scientia pendentis." 
 
 Schneider. 
 
 J 'Epyov άη·οδεί£ασ#αι.] "Ad opus faciendum agri portionemas- 
 signare." Ernesti. 
 
 3 Socrates did not altogether condemn the study of geometry and 
 astronomy, but disapproved of the general practice of the philoso- 
 phers of his own age, who devoted themselves wholly to difficult 
 questions concerning the figure of the earth, etc., to the entire 
 neglect of moral philosophy. Plato, Phaed. c. 46, agrees with 
 Xenophon ; and, indeed, an immoderate pursuit of such studies 
 was altogether alien from the affairs of common life and morality, 
 to w hich alone Socrates gave his serious attention. Zeune. In the 
 infancy of the mechanic arts, and amid the foolish practices of the 
 philosophers, who endeavored to apply geometry and astronomy 
 to subjects too high for the human intellect, we cannot wonder at 
 the determination of Socrates, who preferred improving the morals 
 of men. Those who are ignorant of those sciences in the present 
 day repeat the objections of Socrates as to their inutility. 
 Schneider. 
 
ι84 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 
 
 [b. IV. 
 
 4. He recommended his followers to learn astronomy 
 also, but only so far as to be able to know the hour of 
 the night, the month, and the season of the year, with 
 a view to traveling by land or sea, or distinguishing 
 the night-watches ; and to be competent, by knowing 
 the divisions of the above-mentioned times, to profit by 
 the signs for whatever other things are done at a cer- 
 tain period of the night, or month, or year. These 
 particulars, he said, were easily learned from men who 
 hunted by night, from pilots, and from many others 
 whose business it was to know them. 
 
 5. But to continue the study of astronomy so far as 
 to distinguish the bodies which do not move in the same 
 circle with the heavens 1 the planets, and the irregular 
 stars, 2 and to weary ourselves in inquiring into their 
 distances from the earth, the periods of their revo- 
 lutions, and the causes of all these things, was what he 
 greatly discountenanced ; for he saw, he said, no profit 
 in these studies either, 3 though he had himself given 
 attention to them ; since they also, he remarked, were 
 enough to wear out the life of a man, and prevent him 
 from attending to many profitable pursuits. 
 
 6. Concerning celestial matters in general, he dis- 
 suaded every man from becoming a speculator how the 
 divine power contrives to manage them ; for he did not 
 think that such points were discoverable by man. nor 
 did he believe that those acted dutifully toward the 
 gods who inquired into things which they did not wish 
 to make known. He observed, too, that a man who 
 was anxious about such investigations, was in danger 
 of losing his senses, not less than Anaxagoras, who 
 prided himself highly on explaining the plans of the 
 gods, lost his. 
 
 7. For Anaxagoras, when he said that fire and the 
 sun were of the same nature, did not reflect that people 
 
 1 Τά μη ev μη avrfj περιφορά όντα.} Edwards refers to Diog. Laert. 
 vii. 144, where it is'said that some of the heavenly bodies are carried 
 round with the heaven, without changing their place, while others 
 have motions peculiar to themselves. 
 
 2 Άσταβμητουϊ αστέρας. Schneider, Bornemann, and KUhner, agree 
 in understanding comets. 
 
 4 Any more than in difficult geometrical investigations. 
 
C. vir., s. io.] CONCERNING STUDIES. 
 
 can easily look upon fire, but can not turn their gaze to 
 the sun, and that men, if exposed to the rays of the 
 sun, have complexions of a darker shade, but not if 
 exposed to fire ; he omitted to consider, too, that of the 
 productions of the earth, none can come fairly to ma- 
 turity without the rays of the sun, while, if warmed 
 by the heat of fire, they all perish ; and when he said 
 that the sun was a heated stone, he forgot that a stone 
 placed in the fire does not shine, or last long, but that 
 the sun continues perpetually the most luminous of all 
 bodies. 
 
 8. He advised his followers also to learn computa- 
 tions,' but in these, as in other things, he exhorted 
 them to avoid useless labor ; as far as it was of any 
 profit, he investigated everything himself, and went 
 through it with his associates. 
 
 9. He earnestly recommended those who conversed 
 with him to take care of their health, both by learning 
 whatever they could respecting it from men of experi- 
 ence, and by attending to it, each for himself, through- 
 out his whole life, studying what food or drink, or 
 what exercise, was most suitable for him, and how he 
 might act in regard to them so as to enjoy the best 
 health ; for he said it would be difficult for a person 
 who thus attended to himself to find a physician that 
 would tell better than himself what was conducive to 
 his health. 
 
 10. But if any one desired to attain to what was be- 
 yond human wisdom, he advised him to study divi- 
 nation ; for he said that he who knew by what signs 
 the gods give indications to men respecting human 
 affairs, would never fail of obtaining counsel from the 
 gods. . 
 
 1 Δογι'σμονς.] Computations or calculations, " Artem calcula- 
 toriatn." Schneider. How λογιστική differed from αριθμητική is 
 shown by Plato, Gorg. c. 13. 
 
 10* 
 
ι86 
 
 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [β. IV. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Bocrates, though condemned to death, was not convicted of false- 
 hood with regard to his Daemon. His resolution to die. His 
 innocence inspires him with courage. He thinks it good to die, 
 and escape the evils of old age. Summary of the arguments of 
 the Memorabilia. 
 
 1. But if anyone thinks that he was convicted of 
 falsehood with regard to his D^mon, because sentence 
 of death was pronounced on him by the judges although 
 he said that the daemon admonished him what he ought 
 and wbat he ought not to do, let him consider, in the 
 first place, that he was already so advanced in years, 1 
 that he must have ended his life, if not then, at least 
 not long after ; and, in the next, that he relinquished 
 only the most burdensome part of life, in which all feel 
 their powers of intellect diminished, while, instead of 
 enduring this, he acquired great glory by proving the 
 firmness of his mind, pleading his cause above all men, 
 with the greatest regard to truth, ingenuousness, and 
 justice, and bearing his sentence at once with the 
 utmost resignation and the utmost fortitude. 
 
 2. It is indeed acknowledged that no man, of all that 
 are remembered, ever endured death with* greater 
 glory ; for he was obliged to live thirty days after his 
 sentence, because the Delian festival 2 happened in that 
 month, and the law allowed no one to be publicly put 
 to death until the sacred deputation should return from 
 Delos ; and during that time he was seen by all his 
 friends living in no other way than at any preceding pe- 
 riod ; and, let it be observed, throughout all the former 
 part of his life he had been admired beyond all men for 
 the cheerfulness and tranquillity with which he lived. 
 
 3. 3 How could any one have died more nobly than 
 
 1 He was seventy years old, according to Diog. Laert. ii. 44, and 
 Maxim. Tyr. ix. 8. . 
 
 2 Δτίλια.] A procession, instituted by Theseus, which the Athe- 
 nians made annually to Delos, and which is to be distinguished 
 from the greater Delia, or panegyris, in that island. See Smith's 
 Diet, of G. and R. Ant., art. Delia. 
 
 3 Bornemann thinks that portion of this chapter between the be- 
 
c. νιπ., s. .5] DEATH OF SOCRATES. 
 
 187 
 
 thus ? Or what death could be more honorable than that 
 which any man might most honorably undergo ? Or 
 what death could be happier than the most honorable ? 
 Or what death more acceptable to the gods than the 
 most happy ? 
 
 4. I will also relate what I heard 1 respecting him 
 from Hermogenes, 2 the son of Hipponicus, who said that 
 after Meletus had laid the accusation against him, he 
 heard him speaking on any subject rather than that of 
 his trial, and remarked to him that he ought to consider 
 what defense he should make, but that he said at first, 
 "Do I not appear to you to have passed my whole life 
 meditating on that subject ? " 3 and then, when he asked 
 him " How so ? " he said that " he had gone through 
 life doing nothing but considering what was just and 
 what unjust, doing what was just and abstaining from 
 what was unjust, which he conceived to be the best 
 meditation for his defence." 
 
 5. Hermogenes said again, " Do you not see, Socrates, 
 that the judges at Athens have already put to death 
 many innocent persons, from being offended at their 
 language and have allowed many that were guilty to 
 escape?" " But, by Jupiter, Hermogenes," replied he, 
 44 when I was proceeding, a while ago, to study my ad- 
 dress to the judges, the daemon testified disapprobation." 
 44 You say what is strange," rejoined Hermogenes. 
 44 And do you think it strange," inquired Socrates, 
 44 that it should seem better to the divinity that I should 
 now close my life ? Do you not know, that, down to 
 the present time, I would not admit to any man that 
 he has lived either better or with more pleasure than 
 myself ? for I consider that those live best who study 
 best to become as good as possible ; and that those live 
 with most pleasure who feel the most assurance that 
 they are daily growing better and better. 
 
 ginning of sect 3, and ίμοί μϊν δή in sect. 11, spurious and made up 
 from the Apology. Weiske is of a contrary opinion. 
 
 1 Xenophon himself was then with Cyrus in Asia. Schneider. 
 
 2 The same that is mentioned in ii. 10. See Cobet,Prosopogr. Xen. 
 p. 64. 
 
 s Ύοϋτο μελετών διαδεβιωκεναι.] " In hac re (defensione mei) medi- 
 tanda totam vivam transegisse." Kuhner. 
 
l88 MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. [b. iv. 
 
 7. This assurance I have felt, to the present day, to be 
 the case with respect to myself ; and associating with 
 other men, and comparing myself with others, I have 
 always retained this opinion respecting myself ; and 
 not only I, but my friends also, maintain a similar 
 feeling with regard to me, not because they love me 
 (for those who love others may be thus affected toward 
 the objects of their love), but because they think that 
 while they associated with me they became greatly ad- 
 vanced in virtue. 
 
 8. If I shall live a longer period, perhaps I shall be 
 destined to sustain the evils of old age, to find my sight 
 and hearing weakened, to feel my intellect impaired, 
 to become less apt to learn, and more forgetful, and, in 
 fine, to grow inferior to others in all those qualities in 
 which I was once superior to them. If I should be in- 
 sensible to this deterioration, life would not be worth 
 retaining ; and, if I should feel it, how could I live other- 
 wise than with less profit, and with less comfort ? 
 
 9. If I am to die unjustly, my death will be a disgrace 
 to those who unjustly kill me ; for if injustice is a dis- 
 grace, must it not be a disgrace to do anything unjustly ? 
 But what disgrace will it be to me, that others could 
 not decide or act justly with regard to me ? 
 
 10. Of the men who have lived before me, I see that 
 the estimation left among posterity with regard to such 
 as have done wrong, and such as have suffered wrong, 
 is by no means similar ; and I know that I also, if I now 
 die, shall obtain from mankind far different considera- 
 tion from that which they will pay to those who take 
 my life : for I know that they will always bear witness 
 to me that I have never wronged any man, or rendered 
 any man less virtuous, but that I have always en- 
 deavored to make those better who conversed with me." 
 Such discourse he held with Hermogenes, and with 
 others. 
 
 11. Of those who knew what sort of man Socrates 
 was, such as were lovers of virtue, continue to regret 
 him above all other men, even to the present day, as 
 having contributed in the highest degree to their ad- 
 vancement in goodness. To me, being such as I have 
 
C. Vlir., s. ii.] CONCLUSION. 
 
 189 
 
 described him, so pious that he did nothing without the 
 sanction of the gods ; so just, that he wronged no man 
 even in the most trifling affair, but was of service, in 
 the most important matters, to those who enjoyed his 
 society ; so temperate, that he never preferred pleasure 
 to virtue ; so wise, that he never erred in distinguishing 
 better from worse, needing no counsel from others, but 
 being sufficient in himself to discriminate between 
 them ; so able to explain and settle such questions by 
 argument ; and so capable of discerning the character 
 of others, of confuting those who were in error, and of 
 exhorting them to virtue and honor, he seemed to be 
 such as the best and happiest of men would be. But if 
 any one disapproves of my opinion, let him compare the 
 conduct of others with that of Socrates, and determine 
 accordingly. 
 
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